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LixJiviiiv 1
THE NEW RATIONALISM
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTRUCTIVE REALISM
UPON THE BASIS OF MODERN LOGIC AND SCIENCE,
AND THROUGH THE CRITICISM OF OPPOSED
PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS
BY
EDWARD GLEASON SPAULDING
Professor of Philosophy in Princetoo Uciversity
NEW YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
r*. "- (^ (\ O
C^ D V-'' *>•■> ^
COPTKIQHT, 1918,
BY
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
PubliBhed May, 1918
THE QUINN « BODCN 00. Mill
HAHWAY, N. J.
i
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Cop,(
PREFACE
As I send this manuscript to the publishers, I am keenly
aware of how far the results that it presents fall short of
attaining that ideal both of method and of accomplishment
which has been before me during the period of composition, and
which I have explained in Chapters I. and III. Yet coinci-
dentally with the closing of my labors I find that I am con-
vinced more strongly than ever that, although there are many
other ways, of undoubted value, in which to study philosophy,
nevertheless the point of view and the method of treating
problems which this book presents offer one way or mode of
approach that has thus far been of much too infrequent use in
philosophical investigation. For it has been my experience,
especially during a number of years of teaching at Princeton
University, as well as of presenting philosophical problems to
the scientific workers of the Marine Biological Laboratory at
Woods Hole, Mass., that there is, at present at least, a much
deeper interest in a systematic than in a historical treatment of
philosophy. An opportunity to satisfy such an interest would
be presented to a far greater extent than it now is, if only the
effort were made in philosophy, as it is in science, not to em-
phasize history, but to investigate problems of fact, and finally
to obtain such a fairly extensive body of knowledge as will
receive general acceptance and be recognized as meaning a well-
defined advance and progress.
The present tendency in philosophy, at least in our educa-
tional institutions, is, however, directly opposed to such a pro-
cedure, for it is to the almost exclusive study of the history of
philosophy that both student and general reader are urged and
directed. The result is that the average student of philosophy
is left so perplexed through, e.g., the multiplicity of systems
which his study discloses to him, that his dissatisfaction usually
far exceeds his satisfaction with the outcome of his intellectual
efforts. But even if this is not true of the student, it most
vi PREFACE
certainly is the case with the scientist, who is thereby frequently
moved not only to the sharpest criticism of all philosophy what-
soever, but also to the total neglect of philosophical considera-
tions where these cannot well be neglected.
This book, therefore, represents the results of departing
abruptly from the historical method, and of endeavoring to
ascertain both what those postulates are from which each philo-
sophical system is logically derivable, and also, whether there
is, finally, one body of principles that is common to all systems,
and logically presupposed by them.
It is my conviction both that there is such a single "doc-
trine," difficult though it may be to discover what it is, and
also that this doctrine in its fundamentals is logically present in
every effort to philosophize rationally.
It is for these reasons, therefore, that I have chosen the title,
The New Rationalism, for a position which also becomes, as a
developed theory, a Neo-realism of ideals that are discovered by
reason, as well as of those reals that are disclosed to the senses
and that form what we call nature.
A further constant stimulus to my efforts has been the con-
viction, also, that, if it is to be admitted that philosophy is of
direct and far-reaching effect on life — and what more convincing
demonstration of such an effect could there be than the origins
of the present world-crisis? — then that philosophy which the
world needs to accept and to act upon at the present time, is
one that holds to the actuality of ideals, discovered by reason,
rather than one that justifies our living only in accordance with
our biological nature. For it is such a naturalistic philosophy
and ethics that, it seems to me, has not only actuated the present
attack on civilization, but is also persistently used to justify this
attack.
There is need, therefore, not only of combating by physical
force those physical forces to the use of which such a naturalistic
philosophy has led, but also of combating and refuting by
argument and by philosophical investigation that philosophy
which is used to justify such a physical attack — if only such
a refutation can be found. For if such a refutation cannot be
found, then intellectually our attitude should be one of calm
acceptance of the outcome, whatever it may be.
PREFACE vii
It is a most important problem, then, to ascertain whether
or not there is possible a philosophical refutation of this nat-
uralism that is challenging the world to the very foundations
of its civilization, and, if there is such a refutation, to ascertain
vJiat it is, or where its means can be found. »
Such means are, however, surely not those of merely dog-
matically denying the truth of Naturalism, nor of studying its
history or development as a philosophy, nor, seemingly, of
appealing to the opposed system of Idealism, which in the face
of the present horrors that afflict humanity seems to have suf-
fered collapse in its basic doctrine that "all's well with the
A\orld." But, if the refutation of Naturalism is not possible
by such means, then it would seem to me that it is possible only
by a philosophy which can demonstrate that, while some
"things" evolve, not all "things" are subject to the principle
of evolution; that, while a ruthless struggle for existence may
be one condition for progress, cooperation is another and, per-
haps, more important condition ; that, while the best may survive
(and may not), the mere fact of survival is itself not identical
with heing the best; that, while justice may be useful to him
who survives, there are, nevertheless, other reasons for the
practice of justice than its usefulness; and, finally, that, al-
though nature is undeniably fact, not all fact is identical with
ruthlessly combating, slowly evolving, strongest-surviving na-
ture, but that there are some realities which are beyond nature,
and which, though they cannot be seen by the eye of the body,
are nevertheless revealed to reason.
The only philosophy, however, which can demonstrate these
things, — i.e., which can refute and not merely deny Naturalism
— is one that, in fearlessly submitting all "things" to reason's
testings, includes among these "things" the very means either
of defense or of refutation, namely, reason itself. And the
only outcome at which such a rational "criticism" of reason
itself can consistently arrive is one that justifies its own pro-
cedure, and, therefore, any rational procedure whatsoever, as
such. But such an outcome means the frank recognition that
there are not only facts of the senses, but also facts of the
reason, and that not all fact is part of nature or of evolution.
Such a philosophy is, however, Rationalism.
Viii PREFACE
It is, therefore, both for the student and for the general
reader who are interested, first, in problems that concern fact
rather than history, and, secondly, in the more specijfic prob-
lem, What is the correct philosophy, Naturalism, or some other
opposed system? that this book is written. It is, also, for such
readers, in case they are not familiar with psychology and logic,
that I have presented certain questions, such as the Problems
of Method of Part I., Section III., that are not usually offered in
an ' ' Introduction. ' ' These Chapters may be omitted by one who
is conversant with their contents, as may also Chapters II.,
XXII., XXIV., XLIII., vii.-x., if they are found too difficult.
In conclusion I desire to express my appreciation of the sym-
pathy and inspiration that I have received from my friends,
Professors E. B. Holt, W. T. Marvin, W. P. Montague, R. B.
Perry and W. B. Pitkin in the development of a point of view,
a method, and, finally, a positive philosophy. The present
volume is not cooperative, as was The New Realism in which
my five friends and myself collaborated, but it is, nevertheless,
in part an outgrowth of frequent discussions with these friends,
and of definite attempts to cooperate.
My thanks are also due my friend, Mr. Henry Lane Eno,
who, in thorough sympathy with the general character of my
endeavor, has kindly read the greater part of the manuscript.
I also desire to acknowledge my obligation to my friend and
colleague, Professor H. C. Longwell, for his careful reading of
the proofs.
Finally, I should explain, that the bibliographical references
are intended, not to be complete, but only to indicate either the
more important literature on a topic under discussion, or those
places where the correctness of my assignment of certain specific
positions to certain writers may be confirmed.
Princeton,
October 10, 1917.
CONTENTS
PART I
PAQE
Introduction xv
SECTION I
THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
CHAPTER
I Postulates and Assumptions 3
II Realism and Logic 12
III The Old and the New Logic 25
I Introductory 25
II The Origins of the Traditional Logic ... 29
ni The Formulation and the Criticism of the Tradi-
tional Logic 35
SECTION II
THE HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
IV Introductory 44
V The Ontological Problem 51
VI The Cosmological Problem 64
VII The Teleological Problem ....... 57
VIII The Theological Problem 62
IX The Problem of Values 66
X The Epistemological Problem 71
XI The Psychological Problem and the Nature op Con-
sciousness .88
SECTION III
METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
I THINKING
XII Reasoning by Words and the Psychology of Thinking 95
I Introductory 95
n The Thinking Situation 95
m The Psychology of Thinking; Symbols ... 96
IV Grammar 99
X CONTENTS
CHAPTEB PAGE
XIII The Logical Aspects of Thinking: Interpretations
OF the Nature of Logic 99
I The Realistic View of Logic 100
II The " Psychologizing " Tendency .... 105
III The Pragmatic Tendency 109
II the traditional technical methods of reasoning
XIV The Categorical Syllogism Ill
XV The Truth of Premises 119
I The Regress of Premises 119
II Common Sense and the Social Tradition . . . 120
HI Induction 121
rv How Facts Are Given 122
1 Sense Experience 123
2 Intuition, Feeling, and Emotion . . . 124
3 Memory 126
4 Imagination 126
5 Self-Evidence 129
6 The Inconceivability of the Opposite . , 130
7 Presupposition by Denial 132
XVI The Nature of Contradiction 136
XVII The Disjunctive Syllogism 141
XVIII The Hypothetical Syllogism 144
XIX The Dilemma 148
XX Analogy 152
III analysis and the new logic
XXI Further Implicative Situations and New Methods
of Establishing Premises 155
XXII Analysis 158
XXIII Analysis by Incorrect Principles 160
XXIV Misinterpretations of Correct Analysis . . . 170
XXV The Methods of the New Logic: Summary . . . 173
IV theories of relations
XXVI The Theories of External and Internal Relations 176
I The Formulation of the Theories .... 176
II The Proofs or Arguments for the Theories of Re-
lations 178
1 The Theory of External Relations . .178
2 The " Modification " Theory of Relations . 182
3 The Underlying or Transcendent Reality
Theory of Relations: Criticism of the Argu-
ment 185
CONTENTS
XI
CHAPTER
XXVII
PAGE
Types of Relations, of Wholes, and of Unities . . 190
I Types of Relations 190
II Types of Wholes 292
ni Types of Unity 197
IV Theories of Relations and Types of Logic . . 198
V Material Principles of Proof 200
PART II
SECTION I
INTRODUCTORY
XXVIII The Problem about Problems 203
I The Epistemological Problem 203
II The Value-Centric Predicament 206
ni The Solution of the Ego-Centric Predicament , . 208
SECTION II
CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
XXIX Phenomenalism 216
I The Logical Derivation of Phenomenalism . . 216
II Phenomenalism's Solution of Problems . . . 224
in Criticism of Phenomenalism 230
XXX Subjective Idealism 233
I Logical Derivation 233
n Subjectivism's Solution of Problems: Criticism . 237
XXXI Positivism 041
I Derivation 241
II Criticism 251
XXXII Naturalism 257
I Detailed Naturalism 259
II Materialism, Psychism and Dualism: Materialism 262
m Universal Dualism or Parallelism . . . .264
IV Psychism : Criticism of Naturalistic Theories . . 268
XXXIII Pragmatism 273
I Pragmatism's Anti-Substance Doctrine . . . 273
n Pragmatism's Anti-Intellectualism .... 274
m Pragmatism's Evolutionism 283
1 Criticism: Truth and Falsity for Pragmatism 288
2 The Degrees of Pragmatism's Evolutionism . 295
IV General Criticism of Pragmatism .... 299
V Conclusion 3q1
xii
CONTENTS
SECTION III
SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES: OBJECTIVE IDEALISM
CHAPTER PAGE
XXXIV INTEODUCTORT 308
I Objective, Subjective, and Platonic Idealism . . 308
II The Historical Development of Objective Idealism
out of Phenomenalism 311
XXXV The Logical Derivation of Objective Idealism: Criti-
cism 317
XXXVI Developments of Objective Idealism .... 328
I Theism and Pantheism 328
II Panlogism and Ethical Idealism .... 329
XXXVII Further Developments of Objective Idealism . . 335
I Voluntarism 335
II Vitalistic and Romantic Idealism .... 342
XXXVIII Conclusion 345
I Monism's Solution of Philosophical Problems:
Criticism 345
II What can the Absolute One be? . . . . 354
SECTION IV
REALISM: FUNCTION PHILOSOPHIES
I the central doctrine of realism
XXXIX The Solution of the Eqo-Centric and Value-Centric
Predicaments . 364
XL Realism's Hypotheses 372
I Knowing and Known Object may be Qualitatively
Different 373
II Illusory Objects are Objective 374
in 1 Objects may be Genuinely Known . . . 378
2 They may Become Known and Cease to be
Known 378
3 Not All Objects are Known . . . .378
IV Other Instances of External Relations. The Free-
dom of Reason 382
V Philosophical Problems not Generated by their
History 396
VI Truth an External and Non-causal Relation . . 396
VII Analysis does not Alter the " Thing " Analyzed 396
Vin Individualism and Skepticism are Logically False
Positions 402
jx Analysis reveals Facts, and Mysticism is False . 402
CONTENTS l^iij
C5APTEE PAGE
XLI The Principles of Realism 408
I There are Propositions , 409
II There are Terms aud Relations .... 409
ni There is the Relation of Implication . . . 412
IV There is the Relation of Contradiction . . 414
V There is Consistency 418
VI There is a System of Propositions . . .421
VII There are Specific Processes called Knowing,
and There is Knowledge 423
VIII There is Truth 423
IX Truth is Distinct from Certainty .... 424
X The Nature of Truth is not the Same as the
Outcome of Knowledge, i.e., of its Successful
and Satisfactory Working 425
XI Truth is Independent of its Proof and Tests . 426
XII Analysis is Possible 426
xni Reason is Free to Follow the Implicative Struc-
ture of Reality 427
XIV An Analysis of the Knowing Situation is Pos-
sible 427
XV Truth is not a Completely Implicative System of
Truths 427
XVI There is a System of Ideal Truth .... 428
XVII Knowing and Known Object may be Both Quali-
tatively and Numerically Distinct . . . 428
XVIII Particular Existent Entities are not the Only
Objects that can be Known .... 429
XIX There are Two Types of Knowing, namely, (a)
by Specification, (b) by Type .... 429
XX " Unknown " is not the Same as " Unknowable " 429
XXI Error is a Fact that can be Explained . . 429
XXII There are Certain Entities that are Related by
Logical Priority 429
xxin Relations are Themselves not Causally Related 429
n CONSTRUCTIVE AND DETAILED REALISM
XLII The Ontological Problem as Solved by Realism . . 430
I Introductory 430
n Realism's Solution of the Ontological Problem 432
XLIII Realism's Solution of the Cosmological Problem . 437
I Normal Objects, ii Error, and ill The Nature
of Consciousness 437
IV Complex Entities; v Creative Synthesis; vi
Freedom 444
VII and VIII Space and Time as Part of the Cosmos :
Infinity and Continuity 451
XIV
CONTENTS
OHAPTEB PAGE
IX Number 455
X Motion, Qualitative Change, and Evolution . 464
XI Consciousness as a Dimension and a Variable . 470
XLIV Epistemoloqy and Psychology as Pabt of Cosmoloqy 486
XLV The Realistic Doctrine of Values 496
^LVI Realism's Teleology and Theology 607
INTRODUCTION
The reader familiar with philosophical literature will find in
this book a not inconsiderable departure from the usual presenta-
tion and treatment of the problems, methods, and systems of
philosophy. Such a departure, however, has been deliberately
adopted by the author, not out of any mere desire to be ex-
ceptional, but because of a philosophical and scientific point of
view of the correctness of which he is deeply convinced. Some
of the most notable features of this point of view and of the
departure that proceeds from it are, briefly, as follows: —
I. Genuine philosophical problems are regarded as being
independent of their historical origin, setting, and develop-
ment. This, of course, does not imply that these problems and
the systems of philosophy which are sets of solutions of them,
have not had a history. But, if the problems are real, and not
false, it means that, while the consciousness of the problems
has had a history, the problems themselves are not necessarily
historical in character, nor conditioned by the development of
the consciousness of them. Not all problems can be admitted
to be historical or genetic, since, if history itself presents real
problems, there may be other problems of fact that, as such, are
not conditioned by their history and development.
II. Each of the several great systems of philosophy is re-
garded as a set of solutions (of philosophical problems) that are
obtained by the use of certain methods and presuppositions
which are in most cases otily assumed, either tacitly or explicitly,
but not established and proved. These methods and presup-
positions, moreover, have been regarded and employed in the
past as absolute and self-evident, chiefly because of the influence
of tradition on individual philosophers. They now, however,
can be restated in a purely logical and disinterested manner,
and subjected to examination and criticism by a method quite
analogous to that strictlj^ scientific procedure which has recently
xvl INTRODUCTION
been adopted in the examination of the several geometrical sys-
tems, namely, the Euclidean, Lobatchewskian, and Riemannian,
not, of course, in reference to their history, but to their self-
consistency, their basic postulates or so-called axioms, and their
logical structure.
III. The position is taken and developed at length, that most
great philosophical systems have been worked out under the
domination of a logic and of certain philosophical concepts that
have come down in the tradition whicli emanated from Aris-
totle. This tradition is one that uecognizes chiefly only a lim-
ited number of relations between rentities, such as the relations
of similarity and difference, as well as a limited number of
philosophical concepts, such as cause and substance, so that it
is limited as an organon, or method.
IV. Historical study reveals the domination of this Aris-
totelian tradition in its several phases, but does not so readily
disclose its origin. However, this difficulty is to be expected
if the character of the tradition is due to the unconscious influ-
ence of certain entities on its initiators. But that hypothesis
which accounts both for the specific character of the logic and
for the concepts ivhich have dominated most traditional phil-
osophical thinking is, that the physical thing, conceived as
identical ivith a substratum in which qualities inhere, occupied
the attention of the great philosophical pioneers more than did
relations and events. This being the case, one should expect
a logic of a specific kind, namely, a logic that is modeled after
the most patent relations among physical things, and these
are: — (1) independence of order, or mere additiveness, along
with (2) resemblance and (3) difference, by virtue of which
there are classes, and (4) the inclusion of one class in another,
either completely, or partially-, or negatively. Furthermore, one
should expect philosophies that are based either on the view
that all entities are (5) in causal interaction with one another,
or on the view that entitii^ are (6) substances or substrata in
which attributes (7) inhere, or, (8) in some cases, on both
views combined. }
These expectations a e fully confirmed by the character of
the greater part of pft.losophical development, in which there
have appeared a seri28 both of causation-philosophies and of
INTRODUCTION xvii
substance-philosophies, though with neither of these fully ex-
cluding the other in any one instance. We may therefore say,
if a homely, but most expressive term may be coined, that
philosophy has largely been "thingized" throughout its entire
history.
V. At the same time that philosophy has been, throughout
most of its history, under the domination of the Aristotelian
tradition, an independ'^it development has been taking place
in science, especially for the last four hundred years. In this
development a logic has Ix-^n used that is radically different
from the logic of the traditic i, while the concepts of "relation"
and of "event" or "happening" have played the dominant
role as philosophical principles of thinking, rather than the
concepts of substance and cause. This "new" logic and these
principles have only recently come to full consciousness and
received careful and accurate formulation. The logic is not
limited to the logic of classes and, therefore, to such relations
as similarity and inclusion, but is essentially the "science of
order" — a principle which, as identical with the non-additive
relationship of parts to form a whole, allows of the appearance
and subsistence in the whole of qualities that are lacking to the
parts. It fully recognizes also (1) the functional relation-
ship as opposed to the causal, and (2) those asymmetrical and
transitive relations that are present in series, such as the series
of positive integers in order of magnitude. A pivotal point, also,
in this new logic is the discovery (3) of the complete com-
patihility of relatedness and independence, as instanced in a
number of respects in the functional relation.
VI. From the point of view and by the method which this
new and non-Aristotelian logic furnishes, a number of im-
portant philosophical positions ai i found both to be logically-
justified and to receive empirical confirmation.
One of the most important of these positions is, that the
relationship between knowing and T -t which is known, what-
ever that object may be, is but anothe ■ instance of entities that
are related and yet independent, whic^i means, of course, that
knowing does not create nor even affect that which is (to be)
known, in contradistinction from the ri lit which is obtained
if the problem of knowing is "solved" by the Aristotelian logic
xvi'ii INTRODUCTION
and by the principles of cause and substance. This episte-
mological position is both Rationalism and Realism.
Another position or result is, that the entities which can be
known {in this way) are not limited to those of the physical
and mental "worlds," but include, as well, universals and such
ideals as perfect justice, which, though they may never "exist,"
are nevertheless facts.
It is also found that recent attacks on intellectual analysis
are really baseless because arbitrarily and unjustifiably they
limit intellect to the use of a logic and of methods that are
Aristotelian, and so seem to be able to demonstrate its failure;
whereas, if in place of this traditional logic and method, the
principles of the new logic be granted to intellect, it can be
shown as inevitably to succeed.
PART I
PROBLEMS AND METHODS
SECTION I
THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
CHAPTER I
POSTULATES AND ASSUMPTIONS
In presenting an examination and analysis of the several great
philosophical systems, not historically, but according to their
success or failure in the solution of philosophical problems, and
their logical dependence upon one or another set of initial
assumptions, the writer has no intention to minimize the interest
and importance of that study of philosophy which concerns its
development. The literature of philosophy, however, is already
full of both books and articles that are historical. There is
opportunity, then, for a volume which has resulted from the
conviction that, although philosophical problems and their mani-
fold solutions have both had a history, nevertheless these prob-
lems are not in every instance generated by their history, any
more than are the problems of the science of history itself.
This statement requires, perhaps, some elucidation, since the
term history is somewhat ambiguous. It may be used to desig-
nate the actual development, throughout one time period or
another, of human thought, ideas, and institutions, or of the
structure and functions of living organisms, or the evolution
of chemical elements, or planets and suns. For the modem
view is that all these evolve and have a history. The term may
also be used to mean the scientific, or at least the systematic
study of this development and evolution in any specific instance.
Sometimes, however, the term is so employed that it seems to
have both meanings at once, whereupon confusion arises. In
this volume, however, it is the first meaning that concerns us
most. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, the term will be
3
4 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
used to identify history with development and evolution. When
used in the second sense we shall refer specifically to history
as a science.
With these distinctions made, the statement is clear, that
history as a science has itself had a history or development.
When this specific development is studied, as it is, e.g., in
investigating the progress in historical methods and canons, we
have the history of history. We may conclude, then, that history
as development, history as a science, and the history of history
itself are three different "things," and that the distinction
between them is essential.
It is important next to note that history as a science does
not generate its own problems — at least, not all of them. The
most it can do is to focus the attention of historians upon one
kind of problem rather than upon another, as, e.g., upon that
branch of history which concerns itself with the rule of kings
rather than with the aspirations and deeds of the people ruled.
As a science history is selective, not generative of its own prob-
lems, unless these problems be false ones, — which is not beyond
the range of possibilities.
That history as a science must always be rewritten from the
point of view of the present, is a dictum both frequently re-
peated and widely accepted. But the reinvestigation of that
which is past fails of its purpose, unless there are 7iew methods
and points of view which themselves reveal facts and truths
that are not historical. Indeed it may be that it is only by
such truths and facts, and by such methods and points of view,
now to be regarded as correct, that the real character of the
past, oftentimes in its falsity of hypothesis and of problem, can
ever become known.
In other fields, e.g., in biology, the situation is quite similar.
There has been a development of biological science, and there
is a history of this development ; but biology as a science is little
concerned with the study of this specific development, and is
certainly not identical with the history of itself.
A similar condition holds of many other sciences, such as
logic, mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry, and astron-
omy. Indeed one can say of these sciences that they themselves
would not have had a development and a history, had there not
POSTULATES AND ASSUMPTIONS 5
been problems which are themselves not developmental or his-
torical.
Philosophy presents no exception to these principles. It is
admittedly a fact of compelling interest and importance that
there has been a long and extensive development of human
thought and knowledge, especially among European peoples,
which because of its character and influence is called philo-
sophical. For philosophy means love of knowledge. It is to
be admitted, too, that this great ''stream of thought" has
touched, or included in itself, to some degree at least, perhaps
every phase of human activity, more especially religion, science,
art, and politics. But the great vis a tergo in the onward sweep
of its currents has been the conviction that there are problems
of fact which have not been conditioned by their own develop-
ment. Indeed, the consciousness that there are problems of
development has itself been almost entirely absent throughout
the greater part of history, as is witnessed by the comparatively
recent origin of history, and especially evolution as sciences.
It is the writer's intention, therefore, to present in this non-
historical way the several great philosophical systems of the
past in respect to their problems, their methods and their solu-
tions of problems (whether these be true or false), and thus to
review the comparative anatomy and morphology, as it were,
of these systems, not as they have grown up in a maze of
surroundings and of antecedent historical causes, but as each
may be regarded today as a set of possibly genuine solutions
of problems. As systems that have this character, they are
open to examination and analysis as to their logical structure,
their presuppositions, their self-consistency, their implications,
and their agreement with facts, quite as much as they are in
respect to their historical setting. And an investigation of this
character also serves the purpose of presenting to the reader,
whether he has a knowledge of the history of philosophy or
not, the various systems of philosophy as they may solve or fail
to solve problems that concern facts.
Such a program, moreover, is not different from that of the
scientist, e.g., of the student of geometry, who elucidates the
older geometries in the light of present geometrical science, and
who examines and develops in a purely logical manner the
THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
possible geometrical systems, of which it is now well known
there are several.
Indeed, the character and purpose of this volume may be
further made clear by the statement, that the writer has long
been convinced of the close resemblance between the situations
in geometrical science a7id in philosophy. This resemblance,
while it is important, is, however, not complete. The several
geometries, e.g., the Euclidian, the Lobatchewskian, and the
Eiemannian, are each self-consistent and free from internal
contradiction,^ This, however, cannot be said of the several
philosophical systems, some of which are very evidently self-
contradictory and self-refuting at critical points. Of this,
Phenomenalism is a good example in its denial, on the one hand,
of the possibility of knowing "things-in-themselves" {i.e.,
things as they really are), and in its assertion, on the other
hand, that this is the real "state of affairs" concerning know-
ing.^ But geometrical and philosophical systems both seem to
agree in this, that there issues from them that which is put into
them by way of initial postidation or assumption, be this taciti
or explicit. In geometry it is usually explicit or conscious,
while in philosophy it is, more frequently than not, almost
entirely tacit or unconscious. The study of the psychological
influences on the philosopher, both past and present, demon-
strates this quite convincingly.
The procedure of explicit postulation is commonly recognized
to be the correct one in geometrical science today, though the
history of geometry shows that it has not always been so. For
not until Bolyai, in 1832, and Lobatchewsky, in 1835, inde-
pendently found it possible to develop a consistent system of
geometry by denying the Euclidean axiom of parallels, was
there known a non-Euclidean system. This denial was made by
postulating what amounted to the proposition, that through a
given point not on a given line there are an infinite number of
lines parallel to this given line. The non-Euclidean system that
results is self-consistent and quite as applicable to our space as
the traditional Euclidean geometry, as far as empirical measure-
ment can determine.
' See the bibliography at the end of this chapter.
"See Chap. XXIX.
POSTULATES AND ASSUMPTIONS 7
Today, however, still other geometrical systems are known,
of which the same assertion can also be made as regards their
internal consistency and their application to the space in which
we measure angles, distances, and the like. Among these sys-
tems there is the Riemannian, which is based on the postulate,
among others, that through a given point not on a given line
no lines pass that are parallel to this line.
Each of these geometries is a consistent body of propositions
that are implied or generated by the original propositions which,
as not derived from other propositions still "further back,"
are freely postulated or assumed. The process of discovering
or deriving these later propositions chat are implied by these
initial ones is deduction. This process, so far as it is correct,
follows, as it were, the thread-like network of implications that
already subsist or are facts. Each system is said to apply to
a manifold of such entities, whether these be points, lines, sur-
faces, or spheres, or something else, as can be "exhibited" to
be in "consistent standing" with the propositions asserted about
them. Thus a line, or a space of one dimension is found to
be the field of entities, called "points," that are related in a
very definite and specific manner, namely, by an asymmetrical
and transitive relation.^ But emphasis is placed upon the rela-
tions rather than upon the specific character of the entities
that are related. In this way the necessity of making a defini-
tion, e.g., of a point, is avoided, other than to assert that, e.g.,
a point is such an entity as is "consistent with what is said
about it." The test of the consistency of a system of initial
postulates and implied propositions is the "exhibition" of a
class of entities of which the system holds.
It is to be emphasized, however, that the geometer discovers
a certain freedom to postulate * one set of initial propositions
(axioms?) or another, so that, by taking advantage of this
freedom, the several extant systems of geometry are developed.
But it is further discovered that, although the Euclidean geom-
etry historically preceded the other systems, nevertheless all
the geometries are open to an examination and criticism
• See Chap. XXVII.
*Cf. articles by H. C. Brown and Karl Schmidt in the general bibli-
ography at the end of the chapter.
8 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
that is quite independent of the temporal order of their
appearance.
The writer of this book is convinced that a situation very
similar to that which exists among the various geometries is
to be found among the several great philosophical systems, not-
withstanding certain obvious points of difference. In phi-
losophy, as in geometry, there are fundamental divergences
between the respective sets of propositions which constitute the
different systems, and also between the respective manifolds of
entities to which these propositions apply. Also, these differ-
ences result from initial postulates. However, unlike the results
in geometry, in philosophy not all systems are found by em-
pirical tests to apply equally well to the universe. Further,
not all systems are self-consistent and free from self-contradic-
tion, and finally, the right or the freedom to postulate is not
recognized. Rather, in philosophy the making of postulates that
condition the remaining whole structure of a system, is found,
in many instances to have been determined either by the emo-
tional disposition of the individual philosopher, or, very fre-
quently, by tradition, or by both together. Because of either
of these two influences, or of both combined, fundamental philo-
sophical assumptions are made unconsciously, or uncritically,
and quite tacitly, and oftentimes with the support of the con-
viction that they are necessarily true, either because they are
self-evident, or because their opposite is inconceivahle, or both.^
However, tests or evidence of this kind are found, on the one
hand, to be generated by the influence of tradition and author-
ity, and, on the other hand, — which is not surprising — to be
thoroughly unreliable as criteria of that which they are held to
reveal, namely, absolute truth. That which is self-evident or
inconceivable to one person, or to one generation, is not to
another; and it is certainly not self-evident, that that which is
self-evident, or whose opposite is inconceivable, must be true,
and could not be false. That it might be false, is itself not
inconceivable.
But to become thus aware that it has been, not the unbiased
investigation of facts, but rather the influence of tradition and
authority that has led many of the great philosophers to develop
° Cf. the examination of these tests in Chap. XV.
POSTULATES AND ASSUMPTIONS 9
their specific systems, is itself one of the first steps in freeing
oneself from this very influence, and in establishing a firm
foundation for further examination and criticism. On this
basis one not only can discover that there have been great
historical tendencies or postulates in philosophy, but also can
critically restate these postulates, much as this is done in
geometry, i.e., both the postulates themselves and the philo-
sophical systems that result from them can be restated logically
and quite apart from their historical setting, and both postulates
and systems can be examined for their self -consistency and com-
pared with one another.
As a result it is found, not only that not all systems are
self-consistent, but that some of them, and indeed perhaps all
of them, presuppose one system. This system, since it is 0710
among systems, must, then, presuppose itself, and in this respect
be self -consistent.
This self-consistent and basic system, in the form in which it
appears to the writer in respect to both its fundamental princi-
ples and its detailed structure, is philosophical Kealism, the
exposition and defense of which is here conducted by examining
other, opposed systems as to their logical structure of primary
postulates and derivative propositions, and not in their his-
torical setting and development.
The opposed systems, of which this system is critical, and
which are found to presuppose it, and, possibly, also to be self-
contradictory, are classified, contrary to the usual more elaborate
classifications, as fundamentally only two, and even these two
can be shown to arise from a common source and tradition.
These two systems are a causation-philosophy, represented by
Phenomenalism, and a "substance" and monistic philosophy,
which usually takes the form of Objective Idealism. The
common source is the Aristotelian tradition, with its logic of
classes, and its dominant concepts of cause and substance.
Other systems of philosophy, as they are usually classified,
e.g., as Subjective Idealism, Positivism, Naturalism, and Prag-
matism, and as Voluntarism, Pan-logism,® and the like, are but
• See Wm. James, The Problems of Philosophy, for the types of phil-
osophical systems; also L. Stein, Philosophische Stromungen der Gegen-
tcart.
10 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
specific modifications of these two more fundamental phi-
losophies.
These more specific systems thus fall together under two
great heads because each is a product of one or the other of
two great tendencies, which, on the one hand, have produced
a rather definite historical succession of systems, and, on the
other hand, are each identical logically with the tacit presup-
position of a very definite set of metaphysical presuppositions.
Thus, Subjective Idealism, Positivism, Naturalism, and Prag-
matism (Naturalism up-to-date) present an historical sequence
of systems which have resulted from the metaphysical assump-
tion that all things causally affect one another^ On the other
hand, the monistic systems of such philosophers as Spinoza,
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Bradley and others have resulted from
the assumption that a numerically single, suh stance-like, under-
lying entity is necessary in order to mediate the relationships^
which are universal among all "things." ^ In the last analysis,
however, even these two basic logical and metaphysical doctrines
are traceable to a common source, namely, the Aristotelian phi-
losophy and logic, especially as each of these has come down in
the tradition. It is because of the influence of this tradition,
not only that these metaphysical principles have been postulated
unconsciously and uncritically, but that they have been in many
instances accepted as self-evident and their opposite regarded
as inconceivable. The metaphysics of cause and substratum
(substance) and the logic of classes, since these together form
the core of the Aristotelian tradition, constitute, then, that
philosophy from which later systems have diverged as branch-
ing genera and species from an ancestral tree.^
The Realism which is accepted, defended, and explained in
this book is one that is based on logical and metaphysical doc-
trines that are directly opposed to the logic and metaphysics
of the Aristotelian tradition. The logic is one that has long
been used in the development of modern science, but that has
only recently been formulated as the logic of series, or as the
^ See Chap. XXVI. on the modification theory of relations, and Chaps.
XXIX.-XXXIII. on the systems that are developed from this.
" See Chap. XXVI. on the underlying-reality theory of relations, and
Chaps. XXXIV.-XXXVIII. on the systems that are developed from this.
" Bee Chap. III. for the expansion of this hypothesis.
POSTULATES AND ASSUMPTIONS n
science of order, and that can be designated broadly as non-
Aristotelian.^o The metaphysics is one that denies the uni-
versality of causation and of substance, and that emphasizes
relations. On this basis it is found that the knowing situation
is of such a character that the knowing process neither causally
affects, modifies, or creates that which is known, nor demands
an underlying entity to mediate the relationship between know-
ing and its object. For this reason the position is called Realism.
It is that position which results from discovering such empirical
evidence, including non-Aristotelian logical principles, as allows
for a knowledge of all entities in their genuine character. One
of these entities is that very ''state of affairs" which the position
itself asserts to be true concerning the knowing situation. Cer-
tain other systems are not thus self -consistent.
This Realism is, however, not one that limits the realm of
entities that are knowable in their true character to the objects
and relations of the physical universe, and to conscious proc-
esses. Bather, it is a Realism which insists also on the factuality
and knowableness of entities that are neither physical nor
mental, nor "individual" in the usual sense of this term as
meaning spatially and temporally particularized. All such
entities may be called " subsistents" to distinguish them from
the temporally and perhaps also spatially particularized ex-
istents. They include what are frequently called " universals, "
and also "ideals" such as justice, and still other entities, such
as numbers, and the ideal systems of mechanics. This Realism
is one which holds that the realm of such subsistents, as entities
that are both knowaUe and yet independent of being known,
is even more varied and extensive than the realm of existential
entities." Indeed, as an important demonstration in the closing
chapters of this book, it is shown that such worths and values,
typified by justice and beauty, although they are ideals which
are never completely attained, are, nevertheless, realities,
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Concerning the actual development of non-Euclidean svBtems, aa well
aa the use of the method of postulation in other fields, see H. C. Brown in
li^asays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James, 1908.
"Bee Char'xSv'^^^" ^^^^' '' ^°^ "' ^' ^°^ ^^^P' ^^"-
12 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
pp. 425-459, and Karl Schmidt, Studies in the Structure of Systems, 4,
" The Generating I'roblem," Jour, of Phil., Psych, and Scientific Methods,
Vol. X., pp. 64-75, especially p. 73 on the freedom to postulate, etc.; also
" Critique of Cognition and its Principles," Jour, of Phil., Psych, and
Scientific Methods, Vol. VI., p. 281 ff.
Concerning (1) the method of postulation in geometry, or (2) the
actual systems that result, see J. Bolyai, The Science Absolute of Space,
trans, by G. G. Halsted, 1896; original edition in Latin, Editio Nova,
by the Hungarian Academy of Science, Teubner, 1903; K. Bonola, Non-
Euclidean Geometry, trans, by H. S. Carslaw, 1912; B. Erdmann, Die
Axiome der Geometric; D. Hilbert, Foundations of Geometry, trans, by
E. J. Townsend; E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen; E. V. Huntington,
Sets of Independent Postulates for the Algebra of Logic, trans, of the
American Math. Society, 1904, Vol. V.; Wm. James, A Pluralistic Uni-
verse, Lecture I.; Lobatschewsky, Geometrical Researches on the Theory
of Parallels, trans, by G. B. Halsted; R. H. Nunn, Aims and Achievements
of Scientific Method, Chap. V.; H. Poincare, Science and Hypothesis, 1905,
Chap. Ill, on Non-Euclidean Geometries; B. Russell, Foundations^ of
Geometry, 1897, and Principles of Mathematics, 1903; B. Riemann, f/fter
die Uypothesen welche die Geometric zu Grunde liegen, 1868, Abh. Ges.
Gottingen, 1868; also in Gesam. Werke, 1892; F. C. S. Schiller, Axioms
as Postulates, in Personal Idealism; O. Veblen, A System of Axioms for
Geometry, trans. Am. Math. Soc, 1904, Vol. V.; J. W. Withers, Euclid's
Parallel Postulate, 1908; F. S. Woods, Non-Euclidean Geometry, in
Monographs on Topics of Modern Mathematics, ed. by J. W. A. Young,
1911; A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematica, 3 vole..
Vol. I., Introduction; A. N. Whitehead, Axioms of Projective Geometry,
1906, and Axioms of Descriptive Geometry, 1907; J. W. Young, Ftmda-
mental Concepts of Algebra and Geometry, 1911.
CHAPTER II
REALISM AND LOGIC ^
That ultimately a realistic position is taken in philosophy,
even when one attempts the opposite,' and that this Realism is
not limited to the acceptance alone of an existential world of
physical and mental entities, has been, in the author's opinion,
exceedingly well shown by Professor Josiah Royce in his Essay,
"The Principles of Logic," in the volume entitled. The En-
cyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Logic, 1913. Pro-
* This chapter was originally published under the title of " Realistic As-
pects of Royce's Philosophy," in the Philosophical Review, Vol. XXV.,
No. 3, in the number in honor of Professor Royce.
' Uf. the criticism, throughout Fart II., of systems opposed to realism.
REALISM AND LOGIC 13
fessor Royce probably would not have accepted this judgment as
to the outcome of his demonstrations, but that the judgment is
correct I shall endeavor to show by quoting^ and discussing
certain paragraphs of the essay. Professor Royce 's essay will
be examined in this way, both because it is a most timely and
excellent presentation of recent results in the field of modern
logic, and because of what seems to be its bearing on philo-
sophical problems and their solution.
The essay is divided into three sections. The last two, making
up its greater part, are (p. 67) "devoted to indicating, very
summarily, the nature of a doctrine of which the traditional
General or Formal Logic is but a part, and, in fact, a very
subordinate part. To this doctrine the name 'The Science of
Order' may be given. It is a science which is indeed inci-
dentally concerned with the norms of the thinking process.
But its character as a normative doctrine is wholly subordinate
to other features which make it of the mos*t fundamental im-
portance for philosophy. It is today in a very progressive con-
dition. It is in some notable respects new. It offers inex-
haustible opportunities for future progress.'
Defining Applied Logic, or Methodology, as that "special
and very extended" part of "Logic as a Normative Science"
"which deals with the norms of thought in their application to
the methods used in various special sciences," Professor Royce
says (p. 69) : "Methodology, taken in its usual sense as a study
of the norms and methods of thought used in the various arts
and sciences, is the mother of Logic taken in the other sense
hereafter to be expounded. For the undertakings of Methodo-
logy lead to certain special problems, such as Plato and Aristotle
already began to study, and such as recent inquiry makes more
and more manifold and important." "They are problems
regarding, 7iot the methods by which the thinker succeeds, nor
yet the norms of correct thinking viewed as norms, but rather
the Forms, the Categories, the Types of Order, which characterize
any realm of objects which a thinker has actually succeeded in
mastering, or can possibly succeed in mastering, by his methods."
• The meaning of the passages quoted is not altered by removal from
their context.
14 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
Discussing some of the solutions of the problems of method
as they have occurred in the development of philosophy, he
cites (p. 71) the view of Plato, that (1) "The realm of the
Universals or 'Ideas' is essentially a System, whose unity and,
order are of the first importance for the philosopher; (2) /n-
ference is possible because truths have momentous objective Rela-
tions, definable precisely in so far as the process of inference is
definable; (3) The 'Order and Connection' of our rational proc-
esses, when we follow right methods, is a sort of copy of an order
and connectio^i which the individual thinker finds, but does not
make. One thus sets out to formulate the right method. One
discovers, through this very effort, a new realm — a realm of
types, of forms, of relations. All these appear to be at least as
real as the facts of the physical world. And in Plato's indi-
vidual opinion they are far more real than the latter."
Professor Royce then says (p. 72) : "We are not in the least
concerned to estimate in this discussion the correctness or even
the historical significance of the Platonic Metaphysic, — a doc-
trine thus merely suggested. It is enough to note, however, that
even if one sets aside as false or as irrelevant all the principal
metaphysical conclusions of Plato, one sees that in any case the
Methodology of the logician, even in this early stage of the
doctrine, inevitably gives rise to the problem as to the relatively
objective order and system of those objects of thought to which
the methodologist appeals when he formulates his procedure.
The Platonic theory of Ideas, Aristotle's later theory of Forms,
the innumerable variations of the Platonic tradition which the
subsequent history of thought contains — all these may or may
not be of use in formulating a sound metaphysic. But in any
case this comes to light : If a logician can indeed formulate any
sound method at all, in any generally valid way, he can do so
only because certain objects which he considers when he thinks,
— be these objects definitions, classes, types, relations, proposi-
tions, inferences, numbers, or other 'principles,' — form a more
or less orderly system, or group of systems, whose constitution
predetermines the methods that he must use when he thinks.*
This system, or these systems, and their constitution, are in some
sense more or less objective. That is: What constitutes order,
* Italics mine.
REALISM AND LOGIC 15
and what makes orderly method possible, is not the product of
the thinker's personal and private caprice. Nor can he 'by-
taking thought' wilfully alter the most essential facts and rela-
tions upon which his methods depend. If any orderly classifica-
tion of a general class of objects is possible, then, however sub-
jective the choice of one's principles of classification may be,
there is something about the general nature of any such order
and system of genera and of species, — something which is the
same for all thinkers, and which outlasts private caprices and
changing selections of objects and of modes of classification."
And again Professor Royce says to the same point (p. 73),
"Order is order. System is system. Amidst all the variations
of systems and of orders, certain general types and character-
istic relations can be traced. If, then, the methodologist attempts
to conduct thinking processes in an orderly way, he inevitably
depends upon finding in the objects about which he thinks those
features, relations, orderly characters, upon which the very
possibility of definite methods depends. Whatever one's meta-
physic may be, one must therefore recognize that there is some-
thing objective about the order both of our thoughts and of the
things concerning which we think; and one must admit that
every successful methodologist depends upon grasping and fol-
lowing some of the traits of this orderly constitution of a realm
that is certainly a realm of facts."
In all th^se quoted statements Professor Royce seems to
accept very directly and unconditionally the objectivity not only
of entities that are ideal and general and abstract, but also of
those that are logical. Thus he opposes the dominant and tradi-
tional view that logic is "subjective," and is, in this sense, the
"art of thinking," and that the "laws of thought" are laws of
a psychical process.*
From the quotations given it would appear that all logic,
including the traditional, narrow logic of classes and of the
syllogism, is objective, and is only one of the several types of
order.
There follows, in Professor Royce 's essay, an exposition of
some of the most important features of The New Logic, espe-
cially as this includes "Order-types." In these sections such
« Of. Chap. XUI.
16 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW '
subjects as Relations and their "logical properties," Classes,
Series, the Correlation of Series, Functions, and, finally, "The
Logical Genesis of the Types of Order," are presented in con-
siderable detail, and the following interesting statements, bear-
ing upon specific points, are made (p. 97) : "Relations are of
such importance as they are for the theory of order, mainly
because, in certain cases, they are subject to exact laws which
permit of a wide range of deductive inference. To some of
these laws attention must be at once directed. They enable us
to classify relations according to various logical properties.
Upon such properties of relations all deductive science depends.
The doctrine of the Norms of deductive reasoning is simply the
doctrine of these relational properties when they are viewed as
lawful characteristics of relations which can guide us in making
inferences, and thus Logic as the 'Normative Science' of the
deductive inference is merely an incidental part of the Theory
of Order." Thus the implicative relation, the progressive dis-
covery or guidance of which is identical with or accompanies
our correct reasoning processes, is held to be objective. Rea-
soning, as defined in this manner, has its conditions. Did these
conditions not subsist, there might still be a "world," and this
"world" might be knowable, but we could not reason about it.
For, says Professor Royce (p. 107), "Without objects con-
ceived as unique individuals, we can have no Classes. Without
classes we can, as we have seen, define wo Relations, without
relations we can have no Order. But to he reasonable is to con-
ceive of order-systems, real or ideal. Therefore, we have an
absolute logical need to conceive of individual objects as the
elements of our ideal order-systems."
With all this, excepting only a seemingly implied dependence
of the individuality of "individuals" upon their being conceived
as such, one can agree. But at this point, as in other places,
Professor Royce seems to retract his earlier introductory asser-
tions of the objectivity of the logical situation, and to color
these now with an idealistic tinge. He introduces the thin edge
of a wedge for his idealism even more noticeably, but quite as
unnecessarily, in the statement (p. 108), that "Apart from some
classifying will, our world contains no classes." One may very
well ask. then: How about the class of ivilh that classify? Is
REALISM AND LOGIC 17
this, as a class of individual wills or ^vill-ads that are related
and so ordered in a certain way, itself dependent upon a classi-
fying will? And, if not, may not other classes, and the indi-
viduals, the relations, and the order, by virtue of which they
subsist as classes, be equally independent of a classifying will,
although related to it ?
Professor Royee's "proof" or demonstration that Individual,
Relation, and Class are "the Forms," or "Categories" that
"characterize any realm of objects which a thinker has actually
succeeded in mastering, or can possibly succeed in mastering,"
is contained in the Section on "The Logical Genesis of the
Types of Order." His proof is the familiar one of finding cer-
tain propositions that are "presupposed by their own denial." °
But in applying this test or criterion he again seems to pass
from the earlier acknowledged objectivity of logical entities to
a somewhat surreptitious introduction of an idealism that does
away with this. Professor Royce's demonstration and the prin-
ciple on the basis of which he makes it can be granted in the
specific instance chosen. But one cannot allow either the
limitation of the principle to this instance, or the conclusions
which he draws from this specific demonstration. Some of the
main points of his demonstration are as follows (p. 131) : —
"(1) To any 'mode of action,' such as 'to sing' or 'singing'
(expressed in English either by the infinitive or by the present
participle of the verb) there corresponds a mode of action,
which is the contradictory of the first, for example 'not to
sing' or 'not singing.' Thus, in this realm, to every x there
corresponds one, and essentially only one, x."
"(2) Any pair of modes of action, such for instance as
'singing' and 'dancing,' have their 'logical product,' precisely
as classes have a product, and their 'logical sum,' again, pre-
cisely as the classes possess a sum. Thus the 'mode of action'
expressed by the phrase: 'To sing and to dance' is the logical
product of the 'modes of action' 'to sing' and 'to dance.' The
mode of action expressed by the phrase, 'Either to sing or to
dance,* is the logical sum of 'to sing' and 'to dance.' These
logical operations of addition and multiplication depend upon
triadic relations of modes of action, precisely analogous to the
• See Chap. XV., rv,
18 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
triadic relation of classes. So then, to any x and y, in this
realm, there correspond xy and x + y."
"(3) Between any two modes of action a certain dyadic,
transitive and not totally non-symmetrical relation may either
obtain or not obtain. This relation may be expressed by the
verb 'implies.' It has precisely the same relational properties
as the relation — -< of one class or proposition to another.
Thus the mode of action expressed by the phrase, 'to sing and
to dance,' implies the mode of action expressed by the phrase
'to sing.' In other words 'singing and dancing' implies
'singing.' "
" (4) There is a mode of action which may be symbolized by
a 0. This mode of action may be expressed in language by the
phrase, 'to do nothing,' or 'doing nothing.' There is another
mode of action which may be symbolized by 1. This is the mode
of action expressed in language by the phrase 'to do some-
thing,' that is, to act positively in any way whatever which
involves 'not doing nothing.' The modes of action and 1 are
contradictories each of the other."
Professor Royce finds further (p. 134) : —
" (1) That the members, elements, or 'modes of action' which
constitute this logically necessary system 2 exist in sets both
finite and infinite in number, and both in 'dense' series, in 'con-
tinuous' series, and in fact in all possible serial types."
" (2) That such systems as the whole number series, the series
of the rational numbers, the real numbers, etc., consequently
enter into the constitution of this system. The arithmetical
continuum, for instance, is a part of the system ^." "
"(3) That this system also includes in its complexities all
the types of order which appear to be required by the at present
recognized geometrical theories, projective and metrical."
In conclusion. Professor Royce arrives at a position which,
he calls Absolute Pragmatism, and which he holds "differs from
that of the pragmatists now most in vogue." He says (p. 121),
"There are some truths that are known to us not by virtue of
the special successes which this or that hypothesis obtains in
particular instances, but by virtue of the fact that there are
certain modes of activity, certain laws of the rational world,
' Uf. for (1) and (2) Chaps. XXI.-XXV. and XLIII., vu., vni., ix., x.
REALISM AND LOGIC 19
which we reinstate and verify, through the very act of attempt-
ing to presuppose that these modes of activity do not exist, or
that these laivs are not valid. Thus, whoever says that there
are no classes whatever in his world, inevitably classifies. Who-
ever asserts that for him there are no real relations, and that,
in particular, the logical relation between affirmation and denial
does not exist, so that for him yes means the same as no, — on
the one hand himself asserts and denies, and so makes the
difference between yes and no, and, on the other hand, asserts
the existence of a relational sameness even in denying the dif-
ference between yes and no."
"In brief, whatever actions are such, whatever types of
actions are such, whatever residts of activity, whatever con-
ceptual constructions are such, that the very act of getting rid
of them, or of thinking them away, logically implies their pres-
ence, are known to us indeed both empirically and prag-
matically; hut they are also absolute. And any account
which succeeds in telling what they are has absolute truth J
Such truth is a 'construction' or 'creation,' for activity
determines its nature. It is 'found' for ive observe it when we
act."
With the general tenor of Professor Royce's essay I am in
closest sympathy, and it is only to certain restrictions and con-
clusions that exception must be taken. One can accept even
the specific instance which the application of "proof by denial"
furnishes, namely, that the "modes of action," "to assert" and
"to deny," are themselves instances which conform to and pre-
suppose the logic of classes, of relatio7is, of logical products,
and of series. However, this is not proof for the idealistically
tinged conclusion, that this logic is in some way created by
"will," e.g., by the "will to assert" and "to deny," or that
individuals, classes, relations, order, and the like are in some
way dependent on "will." This idealistic tendency is exhibited
in the statement, previously quoted, that "Apart from some
classifying will, our world contains no classes."
Modes of action such as those of willing, of affirming and
denying, — and especially of finding that denial presupposes the
very thing denied, may indeed present a specific existential case
' Cf. the criticisms of systems opposed to realism all through Part II.
20 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
of entities that are individual, are similar, form classes with
sub-classes, have logical products, and form series that are
infinite, and, also, either discontinuous, dense, or continuous.
But this does not imply that any of these generic entities as
such, or that any instance of them, such as, e.g., the real num-
bers, points, and physical objects, is created hy ''will," or
dependent on it.
The ground for this assertion is the generally recognized
principle, accepted by Professor Royce himself, that, if there is
one "instance," it is always a permissible hypothesis that there
are others. Perhaps, indeed, "instance" means or implies just
this possibility. It follows, that, if there is one "instance,"
namely, of acts of ''will" which form classes, series, etc., the
possibilities cannot be denied (1) that there are other instances
of these generic entities, class, series, etc., and (2) that these
generic entities themselves also are, i.e., have being. However,
if there are these possibilities, there are also the further ones,
(3) not only that these other instances of individuals, classes,
and series may be independent of that particular series which
is identical with acts of will, but also (4) that the generic en-
tities, class, series, and the like, may be similarly independent.^
In fact, this independence of "other instances" is itself identical
with that of these generic entities. But in any case, even with
only the possibility implied, that there are other instances of
series than the will-series, it is logically prohibited to infer the
dependence, either of these other instances, or of the generic
entities, on the will-series itself. The opportunity for their inde-
pendence is quite as good as for the opposite. Such an inde-
pendence is quite compatible with a relatedness of both the
specific and the generic entities to will, to reasoning, or to know-
ing, and means the objectivity both of the generic logical
entities, class, individual, series, and of all instances of these
entities.
However not only can one thus find that this hypothesis of
the objectivity of logical entities and principles is permissible,
and that it is confirmed by empirical investigation," but also
one can show that Professor Royce himself really presents no
obstacles to its acceptance as confirmed. For the very logical
» Cf. Cliap. XLIV. ' Cf. Chap. XXVI., ii., 1.
REALISM AND LOGIC 21
principles which our author himself elucidates and accepts, if
they are applied to the specific situation under discussion, them-
selves demand this conclusion. This can be demonstrated as
follows : —
Professor Royce makes a number of statements to the effect
that "rational will," ''modes of action," "reasoning," "the
making of conceptual constructions," and "the getting rid of
them," and the like, each "presupposes" or "logically" implies
that logic which is identical with classes of individuals that
stand in one or another, or in many, of several relationships,
and that form one of the several kinds of series.
Although neither "presuppose" nor "imply" is defined by
Professor Royce, each of these "entities" is by his own logic
(at least) a relation. This is the case, first, because the distinc-
tion is made between the act of "rational activity" (the \n\l
to reason) and that which this activity presupposes or logically
implies, namely, individuals, classes, and series. "Presupposer"
and "presupposed" are, therefore, at least two. But, secondly,
a relation is defined (p. 96) as "a character that an object pos-
sesses as a member of a collection (a pair, a triad, etc.), and
that would not belong to that object, were it not such a mem-
ber." We must conclude that, since "presupposer" and "pre-
supposed" are two, they are related, and that "presuppose,"
or "imply," is the relation present between them.
The next important question is, Can that which is presup-
posed or implied be related to, and yet be independent of the
"presupposer" or "implier"? And again Professor Royce
gives us the materials for an answer. In his presentation of
the several classes of relations as dyadic, triadic, symmetrical
and non-symmetrical, transitive and intransitive,^" he says (p.
99), ''Transitivity and symmetry are mutually independent rela-
tional characters." This independence is then exhibited by
finding instances of the one character without the other. Thus
the relation of "greater than," symbolized by >, is transitive,
since, il A > B and B > C, A > C; but it is totally non-
symmetrical, since, ii A>B, this precludes B > A. Likewise
the relation "father of" {A is "father of* B) is also non-
symmetrical, yet it is non-transitive, since, if A is father of B,
" See Chap. XXVIl.
22 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
and B is father of C, A is precluded from being father of C:
the relation '' father of" does not "go" from A to C. "An-
cestor of" is, however, both non-symmetrical and transitive.
Thus are symmetry and transitivity demonstrated to be, in
Professor Royee's own words, '^ independent relational char-
acters." But, in any case, by the principles previously stated,
since these characters are two, i.e., a pair, they are related.
Therefore it follows, in at least one case, that relatedness and
independence are quite consistent, and 'cosuhsist.' '^^
Here again it must be said, that, if there is one instance of
such compatibility, there may be others, and, further, that in
no case does relatedness merely of itself imply, necessitate, or
carry with it, dependence; nor independence, non-r elatedness.
Just such another instance, however, may be the important
relation, just discussed, of "presupposition" or "implication."
That which is presupposed or implied, namely, the logic of order,
may be related to and yet be independent of that which pre-
supposes (or implies) it, namely, that very rational activity
which Professor Royce emphasizes so much.
With this the case, one certainly cannot justifiably assert
that (p. 109) "our world contains classes" only because
there is the will to classify. One cannot in this manner
logically maintain a "synthetic union" of "creation" and
"discovery."
However, in order to confirm empirically this hypothesis, that
independence and relatedness are quite compatible. Professor
Royce himself need only have found, if possible, another class
and series of individuals that bear the same relation (that of
being "reviewed") to his own investigating mind as do his own
rational modes of action. He discovers among or in these last,
quite as Descartes found that either to deny or to assert con-
sciousness is to presuppose it, a relation that generates a series.
Thus he finds that to review a mode of action is itself a mode of
action that implies its own possible reviewal in another mode
of action, and so on, in an infinite series. Further, this series
is found to be generated by an asymmetrical transitive relation,
and is either discontinuous, dense, or continuous.^- However,
each member of the series is, as Professor Royce himself admits
" See Chap. XXVI., n., 1. ^= Cf. Chap. XLIII., vn.-x.
REALISM AND LOGIC S8
(p. 153), "distinct," and sooner or later there is that member
of the series which discovers, or is identical with ihe discovery
of, the serial character of the whole. It is shown by the subse-
quent study of this series, that, if any specific member drop out,
especially any so-called first or last member, the series is no
less serial or ordered. The series is, therefore, both related to,
and yet independent of any member that can thus "drop out."
Thus that very serial character of the "modes of action,"
which Professor Royce, in order to support his Idealism,
would show is created by and depends upon the "will
to act," is implied by his own logic to be independent of that
individual act or member in which it is discovered. This is
Realism.
But further, that there are other series than the series of the
modes of action called "reviewing," "noting," and the like, is
also admitted, at least tacitly. For our author accepts and
explains at some length the correlation of series and the func-/
tional relationship.^^ Then, at least, there must be series (at
least two) to be correlated, say, by a one-one relation,^* and each
series is distinct from the other. But, though thus related,
they are also in their distinctness, or bare "twoness," inde-
pendent. For. if there must be at least two entities as the con-
dition for a relation, then this relation cannot in turn generate
or condition this minimum of diversity.
We thus reach, finally, an important conclusion of direct
bearing on the problem of the character of the relationship
between "knowing process" and "entity known," whether this
be existential or subsistential, generic or specific, physical or
mental. First, there are other manifolds than that of the series
of rational will-acts. This is implied by the possibility of series
being correlated, for correlation demands at least two series.
But the manifold of will-acts is a series. Then there must be
other series with which this is in correlation. Accordingly we
must include (1) that other manifolds are, or have being;
(2) that these other manifolds involve one, some, or all of the
logical principles that the series of rational will-acts itself
involves; (3) that, as "other than" and numerically distinct
from this series, these other series are both independent of and
" Cf. Chap. XLIII., VU.-X. " See Chap. XXVII.
24 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
yet related to it, just as the series of one's own rational "modes
of action" (e.g., Professor Eoyce's) are both related to and
independent of that specific mode which is the act of discovery; ^^
and (4) that there is at least the possibility that all of
these ordered manifolds should be related to, and yet be
distinct from, not indentieal with, and independent of one
another.
This four-fold conclusion presents one of the most important
parts of that modern logical doctrine which is called Logical
Pluralism. It is the direct opposite of that tendency which
Professor Royce supports, at least towards the close of his
essay, namely. Logical Monism. These two positions together
center on what is perhaps the most important prohlem in philo-
sophical methodology, that, namely, of the compatibility of
independence and r elatedness. ^^ The one answer to this problem,
Logical Monism, has, whether it be true or false, conditioned
logically the majority of the great orthodox philosophical sys-
tems down to the present. It is an answer that is itself con-
ditioned historically and psychologically in the Aristotelian
tradition. The other answer, Logical Pluralism, has also had its
foreshadowings now and then throughout philosophical devel-
opment, but its roots strike deepest into that fertile soil for
logical research which is furnished by the relatively recent de-
velopment of the empirical sciences, including mathematics.
Only of late has this tradition and tendency come, as it were,
to self-consciousness, and its logic been formulated. Professor
Royce 's essay forms a notable contribution to the formulation
and emphasis of the importance of this new logic or "science
of order," as it may be called. Indeed this long discussion of
the essay has been undertaken because of its recognition of "the
inexhaustible opportunities for future progress," both in
philosophy and in science, through investigations in this new
field. Not so much along the line of continuing to use the
traditional logic as in philosophizing in accordance with the
new logic, is there the possibility of philosophical advance in
the future; not so much by studying substance and causation,
mere classes, and the relations of exclusion and inclusion, will
real problems be solved, as by examinmg the various types and
" See Chap. XXVI., ii., 1. " Ihid.
THE OLD AND THE NEW LOGIC 25
the properties of relations and series {as well as mere classes),
the correlations of series {e.g., functions), and the nature of
implication and presupposition. The one procedure would seem
to have exhausted its possibilities : the other is full of promise.
CHAPTER III
THE OLD AND THE NEW LOGIC
I. INTRODUCTORY
A SURVEY of the general situation in modern philosophy dis-
closes three dominant features. One of these features is the
ascendancy of the epistemological problem over all other prob-
lems. Thus from the time of Descartes (1596-1G50), of Locke
(1632-1704), and of Kant (1724-1804) to the present, there has
been sought either an absolutely certain basis for (absolute)
knowledge, or a knowledge of how we know, or both, before
philosophers have gone ahead and known, as, in contrast, the
scientists have gone ahead. Secondly, there has been the almost
exclusive influence both of a method or logic and of a set of
fundamental premises, often called necessary truths, that may
be grouped together under the caption of Aristotelian logic.
The third dominant feature is one of omission, but it is the
correlative of the other two. Philosophers have proceeded
largely in ignorance of the actual practice of, and, in many
cases, of the results obtained by the scientists, who have in-
creased human knowledge without prior investigation of the
problem of knowing. Thus, e.g., philosophy has largely been
ignorant, until rather recently, of a logic that is radically dif-
ferent from the Aristotelian.
Now, as has been suggested in the preceding chapter, the
demonstration that there is one philosophical position tvhich is
presupposed by others, and that this position is Realism, is
obtained by examining the "knowing situation" in the light of
^6 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
the principles of this neiv logic. The general epistemological
problem includes a number of more specific problems, such, e.g.,
as those of the origin of knowing, the nature of truth and its
tests, the limits of knowledge, and the like. But ivhatever posi-
tion is taken in the solution of these problems, and whether this
position be Skepticism, Individualism, Pragmatism, Naturalism,
Positivism, Idealism, or Phenomenalism, it is presupposed that
the knowing process and the ''state of affairs"'^ known and
asserted in the position taken, are both independent and related.
This presupposition, however, is the very essence of Epistemo-
logical Realism. In other words, whoever asserts or advances as
true a position that is opposed to Realism, of necessity takes a
realistic position toward that very ''state of affairs" which this
opposed position describes. For, if one arrive at any conclusion at
all in solution of the epistemological problem, then some position
is asserted, as true in some sense, and this position is descriptive
of that "state of affairs," regarding the knowing situation,
which includes the relation of knowing to the entities known,,
whether these entities be simple or complex. But it is there-
with presupposed, that, although this (true) "state of affairs"
is known by him who asserts it as true, and is therefore related
to this specific knowing, nevertheless it is, as a genuine "state
of affairs," not created, altered, or ynodified by virtue of this
relation. This, however, is a clear case of asserting and of pre-
supposing, at least tacitly, that rclatedness and independence
are, in one instance at least, quite compatible. From this it
follows, in this specific instance, that one, at least, of the two
entities, knowing and entity known, could be without the other.
But that this is the fact, is, again, one of the basic contentions
of Realism.
This discovery of the compatibility of relatedness and inde-
pendence in the instance of the knowing situation, and in other
cases as well, has extremely important consequences. Indeed
this compatibility is a fundamental logical principle that leads
to the development both of more specific logical doctrines and
of a detailed Realism.
One of the most important implications of the principle is,
' E. L. Thorndike, Elements of Psychology, p. 71 et passim, also uses
this phrase.
THE OLD AND THE NEW LOGIC 27
e.g., that it permits of the validity of analysis. For, iy it, the
"thing" analyzed, though related to the act of analysis, can be
independent of this. But, if it is thus independent, then the
analyzed entity is not created, altered, or modified by the
analysis. This principle of the consistency of relatedness and
independence that is itself discovered by analysis, thus logically
supports the validity of the very method of its own discovery.
But, further, the principle implies that those constituent
parts of which analysis discloses certain wholes to be made up,
are to be accepted as entities that are not thereby created, but
that are discovered. For, if entities can be both related and
independent, then such constituent entities do not of necessity
causally affect, modify, alter, or create one another. They can,
therefore, either be removed experimentally without being
changed, or, if an experimental removal is impossible, they, or
at least certain classes of them, can be selected and isolated in
the attention field, while others are ignored. This is analysis
in situ - — a method that has been most productive, all through
the history of modern science, of the discovery of the details of
those complex entities that cannot be experimentally rent
asunder. It is also a method of virtual ^ elimination, since, if
one class of entities is independent, in the sense defined, of
another class, then the one can he studied as if the other were
not present.
In the results and methods of the more exact sciences, espe-
cially mathematics, and the new logic, which is largely the
formulation of such methods, any number of instances of re-
latedness and independence, of analysis in situ, and of virtual
elimination are present. These are found, e.g., among func-
tional relations, which subsist between variables; among abso-
lutely simple entities, such as points and instants, both in the
case of the relations of the individuals of each of these classes
among themselves and to those of the other class; and among
* Analysis situs is the term that is used in mathematics. But the phrase
here used also has recognition; e.g., see Cajori, History of Mathematics,
p. 226. Cf. Russell, Principles of Mathematics, pp 141, 466. It is here
used with a broader meaning than it has in the technical analysis situs.
* Cf . the definition of " virtual " as " existing in effect, but not actually,"
given by Mach, Science of Mechanics, p. 49, in his footnote concerning
The Principle of Virtual Velocities.
28 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
relations, such as 'cosubsisting' asymmetrical and transitive rela-
tions, as we found in the preceding chapter.*
If, now, it were not possible to discover in a direct manner,
that the knowing situation demands the compatibility of re-
latedness and independence and the possibility of an analysis
which always leaves the knowing in situ in any situation where
something is known, this might he discovered by first forming
our hypothesis in accordance with those principles that are
recognized in the new logic. Conversely, if these principles had
not been already obtained from other sources, then the first sug-
gestion of them as well as direct evidence for them could well
come from an analysis of the knowing situation itself. Either
order of procedure is thoroughly empirical, and the outcome in
the two cases is the same. On the one hand it is, that the * ' state
of affairs" in the "knowing situation" is one that demands,
if no other instance does, those principles which are recognized
in the new logic, while, on the other hand, it is, that for these
principles there is one more opportunity for "application" in
the particular instance of the knowing situation.
An analogous statement with reference to the traditional, old
logic, especially those doctrines which concern the concepts of
substance and of cause, meets, however, with a different fate.
First, the result of the empirical study of the knowing situation
directly invalidates at least the universality of these two con-
cepts. For it is found that the knowing situation is one that
makes it impossible for the knowing or the ego to be a sub-
stance, or to have a modifying, causal effect on the entity known,
on pain of the attempt genuinely to know defeating itself. Or,
secondly, if one endeavor, conversely, as it were, to "apply"
these concepts of substance and cause, then they fail to account
for the facts of the knowing situation, namely, that there is
always something that is genuinely known. And yet it is just
these traditional principles and concepts that have been applied,
in one form or another, again and again, in the orthodox en-
deavors to solve the epistemological problem, until, with per-
haps every variation tried and a philosophical impasse reached,
one must seek success by a radically different procedure.
The necessity of thus adopting a new and radical point o^
* Pp. 21-22.
THE OLD AND THE NEW LOGIC 29
vietv may indeed be forced upon us even by the mere manifold-
ness of systems that result from the application of the tradi-
tional doctrines. But, even if this were not so, the discovery
of the self-contradictory character of at least some of these
systems, and of the presupposition by all of them of the prin-
ciples of the new logic, would compel our recognition.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE TRxiDITIONAL LOGIC
The modern view is that logic is an empirical science. One
accepts various types of relations, of classes, of series, and of
functions because one finds that there are these entities. One
proceeds here much as he does in physics, chemistry, and
biology, namely, by induction. In induction one generalizes
from those cases that are regarded as typical and are taken at
random. The inductive procedure, further, may be used either
quite unconsciously and uncritically, as it often is, indeed, in
common sense affairs, or with full knowledge and control of it
as a method, as it is in science.
This modern view, although one not held by all logicians, as
to what logic is, and as to what constitutes logic, results from
the use of the general inductive method as it is used in science,
namely, consciously. But the use of induction in the historical
development of logic has 7iot been of this kind. For, if we
investigate the heginnings of logic among the Greeks, we find
much evidence for the conclusion, that these founders of logic
were unconsciously dominated, in respect to the typical cases
which they selected for inductive examination, by physical
things. However, that this should have been the case, is, per-
haps, not surprising. For psychology shows that, out of all
the variety of the realm of entities with which we are acquainted,
it is physical things that most extensively and intensively attract
the attention of both the individual and the nation that is im-
mature. But both psychology and the history of human thought
show, also, that the physical thing, when this thus becomes the
model for thinking, is itself conceived of as a complex of quali-
ties that inhere in a suhstance-like substratum or core, the thing,
i.e., the qualities and the substratum together, being "particu-
larized" as here or there in space, and as now or then in time.
It is the physical thing, therefore, as defined in this way, that
30 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
was the model after which the Greek philosophers, though uncon-
sciously, perhaps, patterned their thinking and formulated the
"laws of thought," ^ these laws being called logic. Accordingly,
" In the very nature of the case it is difficult to get certain evidence
that Aristotle and his predecessors in Greek thought were predominantly
influenced by the particular physical thing as the model after which they
patterned their thinking, i.e., both their logic and philosophy. For such
an influence would, in the circumstances, be exercised without at least the
full awareness, criticism, and consciousness of those whom it affected.
Therefore we must not expect to find an explicit recognition and formula-
tion of this influence in the philosophical writings of the Greeks, but we
must, rather, look for such an influence " between the lines," and beneath
the surface.
If, e.g., Aristotle's Metaphysics is examined in this way, it will be
found that, by and large, the whole work, and especially Book V., is
couched in terms of the particular thing. That to which Aristotle directs
his thought, and from which he derives the rest of his philosophy is a
concrete somewhat ( rdde ri ) , an individual thing. This concrete somewhat
is a subject {v^roKeifievov) with qualities, quantities, and relations. These
latter are the predicates of the former (vnoKelfievov ) , while the former, the
subject, does not stand in the relation of predicate to the latter or to
anything else.
As examples of statements that confirm this whole view one finds in
the Metaphysics the following definitions: Book V. (A), Chap. I., "'Be-
ginning ' means that from which a thing arises, e.g., as the foundation of
a house." Chap. IV., " ' Nature ' means the genesis of growing things."
Chap, v., "'The necessary' means that without which, as a condition,
o thing cannot live, e.g., breathing and food are necessary for an animal."
Chap. VI., b, " Things are called one — because the substratum does not
difl'er in kind." Chap. VIII., " ' Substance ' means the simple bodies, i.e.,
the earth and fire and water and everything of the sort, and, in general,
bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and divine beings
and the parts of these. All these are called substances because they are
not predicate of a subject, but everything else is a predicate of them."
In agreement with the view of the writer, that the particular physical
thing was the point of departure for Aristotle, we have also the statement
of Grote, Aristotle, 2nd ed., 1880, p. 97, that Aristotle " was, as far as we
can see, original in taking as the point of departure for his theory the
individual man, horse, or other perceivable object; in laying down this
concrete particular with all its outfit of details, as the type of Ens proper,
complete and primary; and in arranging into classes the various secondary
modes of Ens according to their different relations to the primary type
and the mode in which they contribute to make up its completeness."
Also, ibid., pp. 69 and 79.
A. W. Benn in his Greek Philosophers, 1914, and R. Adamson, in hia
Development of Oreek Philosophy, 1008, also agree with my view. See
the latter author, op cit., pp. 153-154 and 180-182. Also E. Cassirer,
Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbe griff, 1910, Chap. IV., v., concurs in my
views, not only as to the origin, but also as to the character of the
Aristotelian tradition.
On the Aristotelian tradition see de Wulf, History of Mediceval Phi-
losophy, 1900, trans, by Coffee, and Scholasticism, Old and Neiv ; H. O.
Taylor, The Classical Heritage of the Middle A (jes, and The Media vol
Mind; and Adams, Civilization during the Middle Ages, Cambridge
Mediaeval History. A good systematic account of the general character
of this development in its divergencies, with names, dates, bibliographies.
THE OLD AND THE NEW LOGIC 31
it is not surprising that not only in the logic and thinking of
these Greek philosophers, but also in the whole long tradition
which has developed from them, one should find philosophy to
be dominated by the * ^ thing-concept,' ^ and by those further con-
cepts that are derivable from this, namely, the concepts of sub-
stance and of cause.^
etc., will be found in F. H. Thilly'a History of Philosophy, 1914, pp. 120-
227. Cf. with this, Boutroux, Historical Studies in Philosophy, trans, by
F. Rothwell, pp. 74-169, especially pp. 156-162. For the continuation of
the tradition in modern philosophy see The Life of Ren6 Descartes, by
E. S Haldane, 1905.
Evidence that the concrete particular thing was the model for earlier
thinkers as well as for Aristotle, is found in Plato in the Cratyhis, the
Vhcexlo, and the Parmenides. Plato's logic is presented in the Cratylus,
the Phcedo, and the Thecetetus.
* As illustrating the character of the tradition, and also as confirmatory
of my main hypothesis, I may quote a modern scholastic, P. Coffee,
Ontology, pp. 216-217.
" First, as regards our knowledge of the existence of substances, and
the manner in which we obtain our concept of substance. We get this
concept from corporeal substances, and afterwards apply it to spiritual
substances; so that our knowledge of the former is 'immediate' only in
the relative sense of being prior to the latter, not in the sense that it is
a direct intuition of the natures of corporeal substances. We have no
such direct insight into their natures. But our concept of them as actually
existing is also immediate in the sense that at first we spontaneously
conceive every object which comes before our consciousness as something
existing in itself. The child apprehends each separate stimulant of its
sense perception — resistance, color, sound, etc., — as a ' this ' or a ' that,'
i.e., as a separate stimulant in itself; in other words, it apprehends all
realities as substances: not, of course, that the child has yet any reflective
knowledge of what a substance is, but unknowingly it applies to all
realities at first the concept which it undoubtedly possesses of ' something
existing in itself.' It likewise apprehends each such reality as ' one '
or ' undivided in itself,' and as ' distinct from other things.' Such is
the child's immediate, direct, and implicit idea of substance. But if we
are to believe Hume, what is true of the child remains true of the man:
for the latter, too, ' every perception is a substance, and every distinct
part of a perception a distinct substance.' Nothing, however, could bo
more manifestly at variance with the facts. For as reason is developed
and reflective analysis proceeds, the child most undoubtedly realizes that
not everything that falls within its experience has the character of ' a
something existing in itself and distinct from other things.' ' Walking,'
' talking,' and ' actions ' generally, it apprehends as realities, — as reali-
ties which, however, do not ' exist in themselves,' but in other beings, in
the beings that ' walk ' and ' talk ' and ' act.' And these latter beings
it still apprehends as ' existing in themselves,' and as thus differing from
the former, which ' exist not in themselves but in other things.' Thus
the child comes into possession of the notion of ' accident,' and of the
further notion of ' substance ' as something which not only exists in
itself (bvaia,] ens in se subsistens) but which is also a support or subject
of accidents {vnoKeifjevov, suhstans, suhstare) . Nor, indeed, need the
child's reason be very highly developed in order to realize that if experi-
ence furniBhes it with 'beings that do not exist in themselves'; that if
32 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
Such is the conclusion to which the study of the history of
philosophy brings us, as is shown by the fact that the dominant
concepts in philosophy throughout the middle ages and, indeed,
in the greater part of modern philosophy, e.g., in the systems of
Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel, have been:
(1) substance, in the sense of a substratum in which (2) quali-
ties seem to inhere'' — as in a physical thing; (3) causation, in
the sense in which one physical thing seems to affect another
physical thing, namely, by producing an effect which is a new
quality that inheres in the substance of the thing affected ; (4)
the relations of similarity and dissimilarity, by virtue of which
"things" form classes; (5) the fact of class and the relation of
inclusion by virtue of which an individual "thing" is included
in a class, or one class is included in another class,^ completely,
partially, or negatively; (6) and finally, the additive relation
by virtue of which, whether it exists alone or together with
similarity, parts form a whole that is not ordered or serial
in character, and that has only the same characteristics that the
parts have.
That philosophy and even science, somewhat, should have been
dominated by these concepts, is, however, readily understood, if
one inquires, What would most probably be the derivative con-
cepts if the particular physical thing were unconsciously made
the model not only for the formulation of logic but for "actual"
thinking and reasoning? "Would it not then have seemed to the
' accidents ' exist at all, it would be unintelligible and self -contradictory
to deny the existence of ' substances.'
" Hence, in tlie order of our experience the first, implicit notion of sub-
stance is that of ' something existing in itself ' ( Svoia ) ; the first explicit
notion of it, however, is that by which it is apprehended as ' a subject
or support of accidents' (vTroKeifjnov, suhstare, substantia) ; then by reflec-
tion we go back to the explicit notion of it as ' something existing in
itself.' In the real or ontological order the perfection of ' existing in
itself ' is manifestly more fundamental than that of ' supporting
accidents.' "
'Aristotle distinguished four causes. Tims he says: "The same thing
may have all the kinds of causes, e.g., the moving cause of a house is the
art or the builder, the final cause is the function it fulfils, the matter is
earth and stones, and the form is the definitory formula." — Metaphysics,
translated by \V. D. Ross, Bk. III., Chap. II., p. 990''. These four causes
are usually called the efficient, the final, the material, and the foi'mal,
respectively. They are in turn " reduced " to two, the material and the
formal.
* Aristotle's doctrine of the syllogism, contained in the Prior Analytics,
the Posterior Analytics, and the Topics.
THE OLD AND THE NEW LOGIC 33
uncritical mind, even as it does today, that a thing is not the
mere aggregate of its qualities, but that it includes a suhstratum
in which these attributes inhere? For, if there are qualities,
are they not qualities of something, and so dependent? And
do they not, therefore, imply something that, ultimately, is not
dependent on anything else, on pain of this again being a quality
and so in turn demanding a substratum? With this the case,
would it be surprising if, further, the concept of a substance-
like unitary ego" had resulted from "thinking" a human being
after the analogy of a physical thing, with only the difference
that the substratum here is regarded as spiritual instead of as
"material"? And would it be a step far removed from this
also to conceive of the manifold parts of the universe as inhering
in one universal substratum, be this spiritual or material or even
"unknowable"? To these inquiries the history of philosophy
gives innumerable affirmative answers in, e.g., the doctrines of
rational psychology and the modern ontological monistic systems
of materialism and spiritualism.
But further, with the physical thing made, unconsci'^asly,
perhaps, the model for thinking, would it not also seem to the
uncritical and naive mind that things woidd affect one another,
so as to produce either modifications in old qualities, or quite
new ones, yet in both cases without prejudice to the self-ideyitity
of the substance-like substratum that is the "core" of each?
And also, if all the entities of the universe were conceived of
as "things" of this kind, and so in causal interaction, would not
each "thing," in respect to its qualities, be infinitely complex
by virtue of being affected by everything else? Indeed, would
not each complex of qualities depend on all other "things'* to
a greater or less degree, so that the universe would be like an
organism? And finally, would not the soul, or the knowing
ego, or whatever it may be called, be in interaction with other
"things," both material and spiritual, so as loth to affect and
* The Platonic doctrine of the unity of the soul, presented in the Phcedo,
the Thewtetus, and the Parmenides is an excellent example of the trans-
ference, to the human personality, of the model of the concrete particular
thing defined as a unitary substratum with a manifold of qualities.
Further references: C. M. Bakewell, Source Book in Ancient PhUosophij,
1909; Burnett, Greek Philosophy, Part I., Thales to Plato; Gomperz,
Greek Thinkers, trans, by G. G. Berry, 1912; Lutoslawski, The Origin and
Growth of Plato's Logic, 1905,
34 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
he affected hy themf Then would not the very act of knowing,
as the act of a thing-like-ego, causally affect the object {to be)
known, with the result that all genuine knowing would h^
rendered impossible? ^'^
Again do our inquiries receive affirmative answer in some of
the great systems of philosophical history. Thus there is phe-
nomenalism, holding that things-in-themselves are unknowable,
and not merely unknown, because the "structure" of the know-
ing ego in its inherent qualities affects the "thing" known, thus
to condition the character of all that filters through. Thus it
conditions the tvorld that we live in as the only world that we
know. Of necessity it follows from this that, ivere knowing
eliminable, it could not be removed without altering "things"
as we know them. But there are also panzoism, maintaining that
the universe is a living being and has a soul, and anti-intellectu-
alism, holding that genuine intellectual analysis is impossible,
both because each thing is infinitely complex and because the
removal of a part alters its causal context."
Finally, we may complete our inquiries by asking: If the
physical thing is the model after which the naive mind strongly
tends both to conceive the entities that it thinks about and also
to formulate its logic, then what kind of a logic will this bef
Will it not be one that rests on the most patent relations among
*' things," in addition to that of causation? And are not these
the relations of similarity and of difference, and of mere "to-
getherness" or additiveness ?
But "things'' in that they are merely additively related form
only a plurality or manifold or collection that is quite inde-
pendent of order, while, as both similar and dissimilar, they form
distinct classes. Patterned on the physical thing as a model,
logic thus becomes essentially a system of classes that are either
included in or excluded from each other, partially or com-
pletely. But, if this is the logic of the naive mind, Greek or
other, then, with a tradition based upon it, would there not
develop philosophies which, because of the lack of the proper
methods of analysis, become involved in unsuccessful struggles
to solve such problems as those of infinity and continuity, calling
•'Kant's phenomenalistic position: Bee Chap. XXIX.
" See Chap. XXXIII.
THE OLD AND THE NEW LOGIC 35
the results of these vain attempts "antinomies,"" as Kant
does? Would there not also be systems which, because they
insist that parts can be only additively related to form a whole,
can conceive of 7iotliing new appearing in this world-process?
Would they not thus be forced to deny all genuine evolution?
And finally, would there not be systems that would be con-
spicuous for their ignorance of those entities and relations which
science discovers, such as (1) limits, (2) relations that generate
series and correlations hetiveen these (some of which are called
functions) , and, lastly, many other wholes that have properties
which are very different from those of their parts f
Historical inquiry shows that nearly all of the great philo-
sophical systems, especially those of the last three hundred years,
have one or more of the characteristics above mentioned. Yet
that this should be the case is not surprising to him who looks
sufficiently beneath the surface to discover the influences that
have determined both problems and methods and solutions. One
may conclude, indeed, that throughout its entire history phi-
losophy has been for the most part "thingized," if the term
is allowable. The one great postulate from which deductions
as to both problems and methods and solutions have been made,
is, that entities are "things" which (1) consist of a suhstance-
like substratum in which qualities inhere, and (2) are related
causally, additively, and by similarity and difference.
in. THE FORMULATION AND THE CRITICISM OP THE TRADITIONAL
LOGIC
At the present time, however, in both philosophical and sci-
entific circles there is a fairly general recognition of the necessity
of some criticism of the Aristotelian traditional logic and of what
it has produced. This criticism, however, is participated in by
two schools. The one, attempting to criticize, is nevertheless,
with the irony of fate, itself caught up in the onward sweep of
the tradition. Even now it can discern no other methods and
concepts for intellect to use than the Aristotelian. And since
it discovers that, with these, intellect fails to solve certain prob-
lems, this school takes refuge in a philosophy of emotionalism,
" See Chaps. XXIII., XXIV., and XXIX.
36 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
of intuition, and of direct experience. A much discussed repre-
sentative of this anti-intellectualism, emotionalism, and prag-
matism, is the French philosopher, Bergson. In criticism of this
school it is perhaps but fair to admit that it is guilty only of
an unconscious ignoring of those other methods and principles
to which intellect may turn if it does not succeed by the use of
the Aristotelian methods and principles.
The other school of criticism frankly recognizes these other
methods and principles, and, in the knowledge and use of them,
not only discovers the reason for the failures of the past, but
also solves problems and gains the promise of future advance.
Those who thus criticize are, many of them, scientists, but,
mostly, philosophers who keep their weather-eye on the methods,
the results, and the logic of modern analysis.
It is in the light of these methods and results that it is possible
to reformulate, in terms of logical theory, the major postulates
of the great historical systems of philosophy. The new logic,
especially through its principle of the consistency of relatedness
and independence, and its denial of universal causation, itself
logically justifies the presentation of the "comparative anat-
omy" of systems independently of their historical environment
and causes. Even the Aristotelian logic in its several aspects
receives reformulation and proper placing in a broader realm.
Thus the Aristotelian doctrine of the syllogism is found to
be but a special instance of the "science of order." An ordered
series is generated by some asymmetrical and transitive relation,
such as "precedes" or "less than" or "ancestor of," and the
relationship of inclusion is only one of a number of such specific
relations. Any asymmetrical transitive relation, e.g., "less
than," supposing it to be symbolized by the sign <, is of such
a character, that, if x <C y, and y <. z, then x <i z. Substituting
for these variables the less general ones of three classes, standing
as subject, or minor term, predicate, or major term, and middle
term, and symbolized by 8, P, and M, respectively, we have, if
S < M, and M < P, then S < P; i.e., the conclusion S < P is
"mediated" by a middle term, and in this conclusion this term
"falls out." This is all illustrated by the syllogism, that (1) if
knowing is an entity, and all entities are causes, then (2) know-
ing is a cause.
THE OLD AND THE NEW LOGIC 87
But more important for our purposes is the restatement and
logical formulation of the traditional Aristotelian doctrine of
suhsiance and of cause. This doctrine is now called the theory
of "internal relations," and, in accordance with what has been
said of the dominant influence of the Aristotelian tradition, it
is evident that it is that theory which conditions logically most
systems of philosophy. The theory may be formulated in two
ways, according as emphasis is placed on one or the other of
the two doctrines that are involved in it.
The one formulation is, that terms, by virtue of being related,
causally affect one another and are complex, indeed infinitely
so; or, merely, that related terms are infinitely complex}^ How-
ever, this second statement is not so satisfactory as the first,
since it leaves the reason for the complexity unassigned. This
reason is, that terms are initially conceived of after the analogy
of interacting physical things. Then it follows that they are
infinitely complex not only because of the causal effect on them
of the infinite number of other "things" to which they are
related, but also because the effects thereby produced in turn
affect or causally modify one another, since they are related.
Phenomenalism, Subjective Idealism, Naturalism, Pragmatism,
and Anti-Intellectualism are systems that are logically derivable
from the postulation of this theory for one situation or another,
but especially in interpretation of the specific relational com-
plex, "knowing" and "object known."
A symbolism that may be used advantageously to express this
theory of internal relations in brief form is : —
xBy or a^y®^^- R 2/^ etc.
<r
The former symbolism is preferable, since it is the sim-
pler. B symbolizes the relation, x and y the related terms,
and the arrow that causal action of each term on the other,
by virtue of ivhich each becomes infinitely complex. This
specific theory of relations may be called the " modification
theory."
''B. Russell, "The Basis of Realism," .Jovr. of Phil., Psych., and
Scientific Methods, 1911, Vol. Vlll., p. 158; also see the references in
Chap. XXVI.
Q ^ P n o
*J t) iJ \j kj
!38 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
The other formulation of the theory of internal relations is
the proposition, that tiie relatedness of two terms demands an-
other, third entity, of a different order of reality, to mediate
the relationship, i.e., to make the relation "really" relate. This
may be called the "underlying," or the "transcendent reality"
theory. This theory is derived, consciously or unconsciously,
from the analogy of the supposed holding together of the several
related attributes of a physical thing hy the substance-like sub-
stratum in which they inhere, and of which they are attributes.
It receives an advantageous, brief formulation in the sym-
X R y
holism > — . — ', the meaning of which is evident. X, y, and R
symbolize respectively the two related terms and the relation,
and U the numerically single, metaphysical reality that medi-
ates this. Objective Idealism is an example of a system that is
logically derivable from the postulation of this theory as applied
to all entities, i.e., to the universe.^^
The logical arguments for both of these aspects of the theory
of internal relations will be given in a later chapter.^'^
In direct opposition to this twofold theory of internal rela-
tions stands the theory of external relations. A convenient sym-
bolism for this is x\R\y, or merely xRy. By this it is in-
tended to express (1) the fact of the mere relatedness of the
terms by virtue of the relation; (2) the absence of any causal
action of either term on the other; (3) the absence of any com-
plexity as produced by causal action; (4) the possible absolute,
numerical simplicity of either term; (5) the absence of any
entity to mediate the relationship, or to relate the relation to
the terms; (6) the independence of the terms side by side with
the fact of their relatedness.
The central question for which each of these theories of rela-
tions is asserted by its advocates to be an answer, is, How does
a relation relate? The answer of one party is, that a relation
relates by carrying with it, or by transmitting, a ca^isal effect
from one entity to another ; of another party it is, that a relation
relates through the agency of another, a third and underlying
entity. Each of these answers is conditioned, at least psycho-
" Chaps. XXXIV.-XXXVIII. " Chap. XXVI.
THE OLD AND THE NEW LOGIC 39
logically, by the influence of the physical thing as the model
for all thinking. The answer of a third party is that a relation
just relates, with no causal effect, no dependence, no "under-
lying entity."
For the third theory, that of external relations, direct and
convincing evidence is found throughout a broad field of scien-
tific, logical, and philosophical investigation.^® A most impor-
tant instance is the functional relationship — between variables,
particularly in the case of "one-valued" functions, in which
there is a one-one correspondence between two series. Each
series is, of course, a manifold and a complex, but it is also
an ordered whole; and, in the case of one-valued functions, each
individual of the one series is related in a one-one manner to,
or is in one-one correspondence with, one and only one specific
individual of the other series. A simple illustration of such
one-valued functions is presented in the case of the uniform
motion of a body. Here the distance traveled is a function of
the time required ; i.e., each point of the path or space-series is
related in a one-one manner to one, and only one, specific instant
of the time-series ; each of these correlatioyis is, therefore, itself
a complex, but its constituent parts, namely, a point and an
instant, are, not complex, hut simple; they are, therefore, hoth
related and independent, since each would be "the same entity,"
if it were out of the relation, that it is in the relation. The
motion itself is the series of these complexes, as these are related
asymmetrically and transitively."
Another instance of one-valued functions is the relation be-
tween the uniform acceleration of a falling body, and the specific
time-period required for this change. Acceleration is not mo-
tion, but it is change of velocity. It is, therefore, a series of
velocities that are correlated with the instants of the specific
time series of which it is the function. Each specific velocity
is a complex that is correlated in a one-one manner with one
and only one instant of this time-series, and this correlation is
in turn another complex. But no individual velocity is complex
" See G. A. Bliss, "The Function Concept and the Fundamental Notions
of the Calculus," in Monographs ov Topics of Modern Mathematics, ed. by
J. W. A. Youno:; also A. N. Whitehead, Introduction to Mathematics,
1911, Chaps. 1., II., v., and VI.
"See Chap. XLIII., x.
40 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
by virtue of this particular one-one correlation, since, were there
no accelerated motion, there could still be (motion of uniform)
velocity. In other words, there could still be that complex,
point-correlated-with-instant, which is the constituent term of
uniform motion, even if there were not that further correlation
of this complex with an instant, which further relational com-
plex is the constituent term of acceleration.
The brief analysis of these two examples shows that at least
certain types of the functional relationship present a number of
instances of entities, both simple and complex, that are related
externally, as this term has been previously defined. Such in-
stances are (1) an ordered series of points, and (2) of instants;
(3) in the case of motion, the correlation of a point with an
instant, and (4) the ordered series of these complexes as "form-
ing" motion. Indeed it may be said, in general, of the func-
tional complexes in their several aspects of simple and complex
individuals that form series through asymmetrical and transitive
relations, and of complexes that are formed by one-one relations,
and the like, that a consistent explanation of them is possible
only on the basis of the theory of external relations.
Further evidence for the theory of external relations from
the fields of both science and logic will be presented in the later
chapters of this volume. At this point, however, we may note
the important fact, that, while philosophy has remained for the
most part under the influence of the Aristotelian tradition,
scientific development has been, from the time of Galileo (1564-
1641), especially in the mathematical sciences, largely identical
with the discovery of functional relationships and of what is
involved in them. The expression of these relationships in brief
formulae is indeed the symbolic form that is taken by the ma-
jority of precise scientific laws. That which these laws express
is, in a large number of instances, the correlation of variables,
and this correlation is the functional relation.^ ^ Science at the
present time distinguishes a number of different kinds of func-
tions, and it is remotely possible that some of these do not allow
of the "cosubsistence" of independence and relatedness. But
the majority of them do, and indeed, in some such manner as
•'Whitehead, op. cit.; Eoyce, Essay on "The Principles of Logic" in
the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.
THE OLD AND THE NEW LOGIC 41
our specific examples show. The functional relation at any rate,
therefore, involves in a number of ways relations that are
external.
For this reason, but also to employ a term which will perhaps
be more familiar to the reader than "external relation," and
which will suggest the sources of the evidence from which this
theory is obtained, I shall frequently use "functional" as inter-
changeable with "external." This can be done advantageously
except in cases where more precise distinctions are necessary.
As concerns the relation between the two, it may be said that
the theory of external relations is the formulation of that con-
sistency of independence and relatedness of which the functional
relationship is, in its several aspects, a most important example.
As other systems result logically from postulating one or the
other aspect of the theory of internal relations for certain situa-
tions, so Realism is that theory ivhich is, in general, consisten
with the theory of external relations, particularly as "holding
for the knowing situation. But there is a radical difference in
the two cases. In the one case there may be said to have been
a genuine application that was forced on philosophers ty his-
torical causes. The systems that result are not only self-refuting,
but lack empirical confirmation. In the other ease, that of
Realism, the specific theory of external relations is found to be
applicable. In other words, the investigation of the conditions
under which genuine knowing is alone possible discloses these
to be of such a character as to demand the "external" or "func-
tional" theory. They are shown to be but another instance of
the generic theory of two entities being both related and inde-
pendent. For example. Phenomenalism, Subjectivism, Natural-
ism and Pragmatism, and Objective Idealism, whatever else
they may be, are asserted to be, if not explanatory, then at least
descriptive of a "state of affairs" that is known, and that is
true. Yet the sole condition on which, in each instance, this
specific knowing can really be what it is at least tacitly assumed
to be, namely, genuine knowing, is that of the cosuhsistent
relatedness and independence of the knowing process and the
state of affairs known. But this condition, as a proposition, is
precisely what these systems explicitly deny. Therein lies one
aspect of their inconsistent and self-contradictory character.
i-
42 THE PROBLEM OF THE POINT OF VIEW
Genuine knowing, and a cosubsistent relatedness and inde-
pendence between the object known and the knowing, are erc-
cluded, if the knowing is in any sense a substance after the
analogy of a physical thing. For, if it is this, then the knowing
process affects the object, and is self-defeating. From this the
conclusion is clear, that, if genuine knowing is to be accounted
for, and if knowing is to be regarded as a typical conscious
process, one hypothesis as to its nature, and that the great his-
torical one, is to be excluded. This hrjpothesis is, that knounng
and consciousness are substances. Whatever else these entities
may be, they cannot be this. They may be specific relations, or
specific events, one or both, or even specific disembodied qualities
that do not inhere in any substance. All of these classes of
entities are shown by modern logical analysis to be quite con-
sistent; for an event is a relational whole, and one specific event
is qualitatively different from others. All of these classes of
entities allow also for a cosubsistent relatedness and inde-
pendence.
But further, if the "substance view" is found impossible of
acceptance in explanation of the nature of knowing and of con-
sciousness in general, the suggestion lies near, that it must also
be given up as a means of explaining the physical thing. This
suggestion is confirmed by physical science. A physical thing
is now regarded in physics, not as a substratum in which quali-
ties inhere, but as a complex of mere qualities that are related in
various specific ways. It is a whole that is the 7ion-additive
result of its constituent parts, these parts seeming to be identical
with different energy-forms. But even energy, although it is
conserved, is not a substratum-like substance. Rather, it is at
once a relational whole, a process, and a specifically distinct
qualitative constituent of the universe.
The "relational view of consciousness" is, then, that one
which the writer finds himself compelled to support. Somewhat
paradoxical though this view is in the light of tradition, and
incomplete though it now is in many details, it is, nevertheless,
that view which seems to be forced upon us by the logic of facts.
It appears, however, as only one part of a much more extensive
position that may be well called the relational view of the uni-
verse, and that stands in strong opposition to the substance and
THE OLD AND THE NEW LOGIC 4>S
the causal views. This position may, however, receive other
names. It may be called Ontological Pluralism from the fact
that there are found any number of instances of entities, both
simple and complex, that are related externally and functionally.
No empirical evidence is discovered either for the universality
of causation, or for one suhstratum, whether this be mind,
matter, or an "unknowable," The position may also be called
Realism, since, among the entities that are related externally
to other entities, are knowing and consciousness. Objects known
are neither modified nor created by the act of knowing, and no
underlying reality is required to mediate the knowing. Finally
the position may be called The New Rationalism to indicate that
there are new methods of rational analysis which make it possible
to solve problems where old methods fail. One is not justified
in betaking himself to an anti-intellectualism and emotionalism
on the ground that intellect fails, unless he has first granted
to intellect the freedom to use all possible methods. Recent
attacks on analysis '^^ have ignored those new logical methods
and principles that come from science, and have assigned to
intellect only those methods that are imbedded in the Aristotelian
tradition. Intellect, if limited to these, does fail to solve many
problems. But such attacks on intellect can have only a seeming
success, for there are other methods, as we have seen. These
new methods lead both to Logical Pluralism and to Realism.
For this reason the name The New Rationalism is perhaps the
most suitable for a volume that is a defense and an exposition of
a position the character of which is well indicated by any of the
three titles suggested.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
For a discussion of the problems of philosophy and the types of
philosophical thinking see J. G. Hibben, The Problems of Philosophy ;
W'm. James, A Pluralistic Universe; H. Hoffding, Problems of Philosophy ;
A. Key, La Philosophie Moderne; R. Eucken, Main Currents of Modern
Thought; VV. Windelband, Philosophische Richtungen der Oegenwart.
^^ E.g. by Bergson in Creative Evolution.
SECTION II
THE HISTORICAL PEOBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER IV
INTRODUCTORY
Having outlined, in some detail, the point of view and also
the departure from the more usual methods tvhich that point of
view represents, we may now undertake the task of examining
in further detail philosophical problems, methods, and solutions
of problems. The problems of philosophy will be considered
first, since so to proceed is to follow a certain natural order of
relationship, whether this be logical, psychological, or historical,
or all of these together. For it is clear, that, if there were no
philosophical problems, there would be no occasion to apply
methods of solution, even if these were ready at hand, and also,
that, if there were no problems to be solved, there would be no
solutions. To present, first, problems, then methods, and finally
solutions, is, therefore, to follow a specific order of relationship
between the three main divisions of all philosophical thought
and development.
However, in carrying out this program, the attempt will not
be made to discover a definition of philosophy that will separate
its problems from those of science, art, and religion. Rather,
without any such definition, reliance will be placed upon the
designation, both in the past and at present, of certain problems
as philosophical. Thus to recognize the historical point of view
is quite in agreement with the position, accepted in Chapter I.,
that, while history is not the only source of facts and of prob-
lems, it is nevertheless one source, and that although many of
the historical problems of philosophy may be genuine, many
also may be false. But problems that are false logically may
44
INTRODUCTORY 45
psychologically be very serious and real, and should, therefore,
in a general list of philosophical problems be included with
those problems that are logically and factually genuine.
Although the problems of philosophy will, then, be presented
in this very general sense, nevertheless they will be limited very
largely to that philosophy which has appeared in European
intellectual development. This limitation is made with the ex-
plicit recognition that very distinctive and interesting phi-
losophies have developed in other civilizations, notably in those
of India, of China, and perhaps of Japan.^ Indeed, for these,
especially for the first, much preeminence in both insight and
liberality is claimed by their occasional occidental adherents.
It may also be found that these philosophies are adapted to their
environment as beliefs to live hy, and that they are poetic in
form and suggestive of realities which are mysterious and
strange to the European mind; but, since it is also the fact
that they have developed in a social environment from which
there is absent much both of the knowledge of science and of the
logic that is involved in science, we are relieved of the necessity
of examining these systems in our present endeavor.
With our program thus limited, it is advantageous to remind
ourselves of that environment in which the problems, the meth-
ods, and the systems of European philosophy have arisen. This
environment consists of the realms of common sense, of conduct,
of religion, of politics, of science, and of creative art and
literature, each in a greater or lesser degree of development.
Each of these realms influences the others and is influenced by
them, and each contains certain elements which come to be
recognized and formulated as philosophical. It is thus that
philosophy arises and develops. Philosophy in turn is re-
absorbed into each of these realms, to influence them, and again
to help form a new environment, out of which, together with
its own tradition, there develop new problems, new methods,
and new solutions. However, of the parts played by these
several realms in containing, in influencing and in being influ-
enced by philosophy, it is the parts of religion and science that
are most important. Each of these realms has furnished prob-
' See, e.g., P. Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, trana. by
Geden, 1906; and lloyce, World aiul Individual, Chiijis. II. and IV.
46 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
lems, methods, and solutions to philosophy, and each has, during
certain periods of history, been the dominant motive and source
for all philosophizing.
Religion played this role, especially from the second and third
centuries A.D., down to the seventeenth century, and has recur-
rently done so ever sinee.^ But for the last four hundred years,
while the problems that come from religion have not been
excluded, it is science or at least the scientific impulse that has
been the most active stimulus for philosophy.^ Also in the
period of the bloom of the Greek civilization it was the scientific
and not the religious impulse that was in most intimate inter-
action with philosophy. Indeed it is important to note that in
their beginnings in that period both science and philosophy arose
from a common source, which was the conviction not only that
there is absolute truth, but also that the attainment of truth is
worth while both for itself and as a means to practical ends.
However, since at the present time it is not religion, nor art,
nor common sense, but science that is most intimately related to
philosophy and that furnishes it with most of its problems and
also with its methods, it is interesting to note hoiv this relation-
ship has been interpreted in certain specific historical instances.
First we may note the historical fact, that many hypotheses,
theories, and laws that now are scientific in the strict sense of
this term, e.g., the atomic theory, have had their origin in the
tendency of men to reflect, to speculate, and to seek for con-
sistent descriptions and explanations of the "things" that sur-
round them. This specific relationship between science and
philosophy, this origin of problems and solutions, is in large
part identical with the development of thought among the
Greeks, from its beginnings in the sixth century B.C. to its
climax in Plato and Aristotle.
A second and more sophisticated view is, that philosophy is
the queen that reigns over the sciences, possibly in all justice
and kindness, yet nevertheless to say them "nay" and to say
them "aye," prohibiting and permitting, and passing judgment
on the validity of their efforts. In this relationship philosophy
" Much philosophy has been and still is apologetics.
" iJ.g., with Descartes, Locke, tSpinoza, Comte, ISpencer, Mill, Mach,
Avenarius, the Neo-Realists, and probably with the Pragmatists.
INTRODUCTORY 47
would assume for herself the role of a science, yet one in which
she would be not only distinct from other sciences in respect
both of subject-matter and of method, hut also supreme over
them. Her oivn distinct method would be that of criticism; her
subject-matter, the methods and the results of the other sciences.
Such an interpretation of the relationship between philosophy
and science is the position of Kant and of the Kantian tradition,
and persists even to the present.
Thirdly, and in distinction from the relationship just pre-
sented, it is also an historical fact, that, while to philosophy
there has been assigned both a method and a subject-matter that
are special, yet to her the right and the possibility of criticizing
has been denied. By this view philosophy is a constructive
science, along with other sciences, with her function neither that
of destructive criticism nor of sitting in judgment over other
sciences. This is a position of ancient lineage, since it is found
among the Greeks. It also precedes Kant in the philosophy of
Spinoza and of Leibniz, and follows Kant in Hegel and in the
Hegelian school.
Fourthly, still another interpretation and development, both
historical and recent, denies to philosophy not only all right to
criticize, both also all specific problems and methods. In this
view philosophy is held to be but the sum total, or, perhaps,
the organized and consistent unity of the whole group of the
special sciences. But the special sciences selected and em-
phasized are the group of so-called "natural sciences." Nothing
is admitted to be fact except what is recognized by these sciences,
and some sciences, such as mathematics, are denied their purity,
and wholly identified with their application to natural "things."
The whole realm of fact is thus held to be included in, and ex-
hausted by Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, Biology, Astronomy,
Psychology, and Sociology. This view has become especially
prominent during the last hundred years, because of the great
expansion of the natural sciences, and especially through the
influence of such great empirical generalizations as Evolution
and the Conservation of Energy. It is identical with Positivism
and Naturalism, and is the position held by such philosophers
as Comte, Spencer, and Ostwald, and by the majority of natural
scientists. Pragmatism is in large part its latest phase.
48 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
Fifthly, — though perhaps this does not exhaust the list of
possibilities — there is the tendency of interpretation which
grants to philosophy a special field of research, but assigns to
her only those methods that have appeared and been tested in
the development of science. But in this case, as concerns results,
much, if not all, depends upon the view that is taken as to what
these scientific methods are. If these are selected as being
limited to the formal principles of the Aristotelian logic and
the concepts of substance and cause, as is more frequently the
case than not, then philosophical systems of a very limited type
result.* On the other hand, if recognition and use are made of
the modern scientific methods of the *' science of order" in its
several branches of analysis in situ, and of discovering func-
tional relations, series and their limits, and the various types of
non-additive relations, and the like, then there result radically
different, new, and satisfactory solutions of those problems that
are left for philosophical investigation only because the special
sciences omit to consider them. Aside from this, these problems
are quite as scientific as they are philosophical, and whether
they are referred to by the one name or the other is a matter
of complete indifference. That philosophy which results from
these liberal scientific methods as applied to the solution of
specific problems, may be called Rationalism, or Intellectualism,
or Neo-Realism.
The general question as to the character of the problems of
philosophy in their relation to science may perhaps be still more
sharply focused by the question : Are the methods and the results
of the individual sciences open to rcinterpr elation and trans-
formation, and, if so, to what extent and in what manner ? This
question is answered positively and definitely by the majority
of philosophical systems, most notably by Phenomenalism, by
Idealism, and by Naturalism.
As an excellent example of the complete reinterpretation and
transformation of the results of science, we may cite that philo-
sophical position — of great influence in recent thought — which
holds that all the entities of the enormous quantitative and.
qualitative midtiplicity and diversity of this universe, are but
* See Part II., Section 1, for the systematic and logical derivation of
BUch systems.
INTRODUCTORY 49
the manifestation of, and are held together in relation and
made a universe by, a numerically single, unitary spiritual
being. Such a being is frequently identified with the Deity,
while the philosophy which holds to its existence, assign-
ing to it such "manifesting" and "uniting" functions,
is variously called Pantheism, and Transcendental or Objective
Idealism.
Another example of reinterpretation is the position which
holds that all the entities of our immense and yet minutely de-
tailed universe are, not the manifestations of a single universal
entity, but the partial creations of finite knowing minds. This
position is Phenomenalism.
Still another position maintains, that this creation is not par-
tial, hid complete, so that the whole universe (of time) and of
space, and of all other entities, is reinterpreted to be only the
sensations and ideas of finite knowing minds. This position is
Subjective Idealism. If this view be developed consistently,
then clearly everything, both great and small, must finally be
"brought within" one finite mind, as only its conscious states.
This position is Solipsism.
If, now, these positions are illustrative of some of the more
important ways in which the results of the individual sciences
are reinterpreted and transformed, it is of interest to contrast
this universe of the sciences in respect to its immensities and
minutenesses, its multiplicities and diversities, with e.g., that
numerical unity to which these characteristics are reduced in
some systems.
It does not in the least, however, lie within our province to
endeavor to reproduce that account which the sciences give of
the various aspects of this universe, but it suffices our purpose
merely to mention some of the most conspicuous of these scien-
tific facts. Thus, if we take the results of even one science,
namely. Physics, we find that it reveals not only the most striking
contrasts between the minuteness and the immensity of things,
but also the almost inconceivable numerical manifol'dness. For,
on the one hand. Physics holds to the existence of minute enti-
ties, called electrons, that are of the diameter of l/100,000th of
that of an average molecule, and that move at the rate of 37,000
miles per second ; on the other hand, there are other entities that;
50 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
are quite as surprisingly large, and that, nevertheless, are made
up of such extremely minute parts. For example, as regards
the spatial size of "things," there are stars or suns which are
many hundreds of times as large as our sun (this being 864,000
miles in diameter) and from which light reaches us only in
100,000 "light-years," a light-year being the total distance that
light travels in one year at the rate of 186,000 miles a second.
If these "scientific facts" are suggestive of the greatness and
smallness of things, one can get an inkling of the numerical
multiplicity of the physical universe by first contrasting, e.g.,
the size of a sun with that of an electron or even an atom, and
then by realizing that these minutenesses are the components of
those immensities.
But nothing has been said thus far of the qualitative diversity
of things, in regard to which science is not less startling. It
may be doubted, if any two individual entities are ever exactly
similar, but, whether they are or not, there are kinds or classes,
and the multiplicity of these is here again almost overpowering.
Thus, e.g., Biology recognizes that there are 500,000 different
species of plants and animals, and Chemistry, that there are
:iillions of qualitatively different compound substances.
These few examples must serve the purpose of suggesting,
though most inadequately, how very complex and manifold this
universe is. But they may suffice also to show hoiv very extensive
is the "material" that is to be manifested by a single unitary
being, or held together in relationship or perhaps in an organic
unity by such a being, or created in whole or in part by finite
minds, if the fact of such activities is the conclusion that we
accept as the result of our philosophizing, thus to maintain that
the entities of science must be transformed.
However, whether it is one of these positions or some other
that is the conclusion with which we issue, in any case, the scien-
tific account of things forms, together with the religious, the
political, the aesthetic, and the common-sense realms, that en-
vironment to which our philosophy must adapt itself as well as
contribute its part, and of which it must be interpretative. But
this is, indeed, now as it always has been, even when it was not
science, but other influences that were paramount. For, from
the time of the Greeks to the present philosophical problems
THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM 51
have arisen because they have been presented by that varied
and complex universe in which men have found themselves as
reflecting beings.
CHAPTER V
THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM
This problem is examined first because of a certain precedence
over the other problems of philosophy. This precedence is in
part historical, in part psychological, and in part methodological.
Historically the ontological problem antedated the other prob-
lems of philosophy in the form of the question as to ivhat is the
fundamental "stuff" or "stuffs," the "material" or "ma-
terials," out of which other "things" are "made," or which
play the role of ultimate reality to other "things" as manifesta-
tions and appeara7ices. This is shown by the well-known an-
swers which were given to the problem, e.g., by Thales
(624-548 B.C.), that all was water, by Anaximenes (about 588-
534 B.C.), that all was air, and by Empedocles (495-435 B.C.),
that there were many fundamental materials, namely, fire, water,
earth, and air. Quite analogous answers to the problem are,
however, offered at the present day in both those monistic phi-
losophies which maintain either that all things are ultimately
psychical or spiritual, or that they are all material, and in those
pluralistic systems which hold that not one, but many irreducible
"stuffs" are in the universe.
These answers indicate, however, that there are other phases
of the ontological problem that strike deeper than does the
problem as to what is the fundamental stuff, material, or sub-
stance of the universe. Logically antecedent to this problem
are the questions (1) whether the universe is made up of stuff
or substance at all, rather than of events, or relations, or even
disembodied qualities, or neutral entities; and (2), if there is
anything ultimate, whether it is 07ie or many?
The ontological problem may have come first historically be-
cause of its psychological preeminence in the intellectual interest
52 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
of the Greek race, and this priority it still possesses, since for
many the bare question, what ''things" ultimately are, quite
outranks in interest the question, ivhat ''things" do, or what
happens.
But to others the problem is of greatest interest because of
the practical bearing on life which certain specific solutions of
it are held to have. Thus, if investigation will only lead to this
result, many a person attaches a peculiar sanctity to the con-
clusion, e.g., that all "things" are ultimately psychical or
spiritual, — a position which is identical with certain idealistic
and theological doctrines. Indeed in this conclusion some find
the only ground or justification for conducting their lives in
accordance with certain ethical principles, especially those of
optimism, whereas a debasement and a pessimism would be
attached to the opposed conclusion, that all "things" are
material.
The ontological problem thus becomes not only prior in inter-
est, but also in procedure for many. The position is taken, that
law and order in the universe, and especially purpose, and a
victory of good over evil, can be guaranteed only if the universe
has a specific ontological character, — namely, that ultimately it
is all rnental or spiritual in its being. Others, on the contrary,
hold that the solution of the problem as to the law and order
and purpose of the universe should not in the least he made
dependent on the solution of the ontological problem. For, it
is argued, if the universe has these characteristics, then they
are ineradicahly there, whether the further character of the
universe be one of complete and exclusive spirituality, or of
materiality, or of something else. Still others contend, that,
while the ontological problem may be first historically, and also
psychologically — for some, — it nevertheless cannot be the first
to receive solution. The reason for this contention is the posi-
tion, held very widely in the philosophy of at least the last
hundred and fifty years, that the solution of all other problems
is dependent on the prior solution of the problem of knowing.
Thus, after this manner, many a philosopher maintains that,
indeed, no other philosophical problem can be satisfactorily
considered, much less solved, until a solution is found for the
question, as to ivhat is involved in the fact, that all things which
THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM 53
are known, even an ultimate "stuff," are in relation to a know-
ing process or mind. It is evident that those who take this
position regard, not the ontological, but the epistemological
problem as prior to all others, — certainly as a matter of method,
and perhaps, also, in respect to psychological interest.
However, at the present time, not all philosophers accept this
much protested priority of the problem of knowing, — indeed
not even as regards its psychological interest, and there is much
evidence to confirm such a disavowal. For the very outcome of
the study of the problem of knowing may be the conclusion
(1) that the fact that knowing is related to every known
"thing," has no bearing as to the character of what is known,
so that, (2) "things" can be genuinely known without previ-
ously ascertaining how, whence, and ivherefore we know them.
Such an absence of the prior investigation of the epistemological
problem has characterized the greater part of the development
both of common sense and of science. Indeed, ever since the
epistemological problem came to the fore in philosophy, espe-
cially with Kant (1724-1804), the larger part of scientific de-
velopment and discovery has been the work of men who have
ignored this problem, and who have contributed directly to the
detailed solution of other problems.
For a number of reasons, therefore, the ontological problem
is placed first in our list. It is a relatively simple problem to
state, if not to solve, and it arises very naturally in our reflective
thinking. It also came first historically. Stated broadly, how-
ever, in the form, Is substance ultimate, or are relations and
events and qualities f and, How is the less idtimate related to
the more ultimate? the ontological problem is part of a still
more inclusive problem, namely, the problem of cosmology. In-
deed, within this last problem there also falls the problem of
knowing, or of knowledge, since it may be asked, whether it is
not alone within a law-abiding universe, a cosmos, that knowing
has its ''place," its function, and its specific relations to other
entities.^
» See Chap. XLIV, i.
54 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER VI
THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM
Briefly, this problem may be said to concern the question
of the order, the laws, and the organization of the universe. It
is the problem of Cosmos versus Chaos. More specifically it is
the question as to whether law and order, e.g., classes, series,
correlated series, and the like, are present among, or absent
from the universe, and, in the former case, what the character
and source of this law and order is.
Clearly, however, the logically prior problem here is whether
law and order are present in or ahsent from the universe, i.e.,
whether the universe is a cosmos at all. For, if there were no
law and order, then it is clear that there would be no further
problems as to their character and source. According, of course,
to the prevailing scientific point of view, this prior problem
seems quite artificial, but it is, nevertheless, regarded as a
genuine problem by at least one contemporaneous philosophical
school. Thus the pragmatists and the modern humanists, the
romanticists, and some of the mystics, frankly contend, that all
that there is of law and order is what human beings "read
into," or impose upon a universe that is of itself chaotic, ca-
pricious, lawless, and orderless.^ However, whether those very
conditions that, on the one hand, permit of, and, on the other
hand, lead to, such an accession and imposition, are not them-
selves identical with law and order and cosmos, is a question
that is not considered by the philosophers of this school.
Opposed to this there is the position, which is much more
frequently taken, that law and order are '' resident'' in ''things,"
and thus present to be discovered, whether by methods difficult
or easy, and notwithstanding that error may precede success.
Differing but slightly from this there is also the position, that
the source of all law and order is a single, infinite spiritual
Being, God, who is either the one substance of the universe, or
^ E.g., James, Some Prohlems of Philosophy, Chaps. X., XIII.; and
Schiller, Studies in Humanism, 1907.
THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 55
its creator, or its architect, or at least its legislator. Each of
these subordinate positions is taken as a result of the endeavor
to solve minor cosmological problems, or groups of problems.
The general cosmological problem is, however, the 7nost in-
clusive of all the philosophical problems. Thus, if there are
ultimate entities, one or many, that ynanifest themselves in other
things as appearances, there is the problem as to the relations
between and among these entities, both manifesting and mani-
fested, both realities and appearances. The cosmological prob-
lem thus includes the ontologieal. But it also includes the
teleological, the theological, the epistemological, the valuational,
and the psychological prrblems. For such questions as those
(1) as to the absence or presence of purpose in the universe,
(2) of the fact and character of the Deity, (3) of the relation
of knowing to that which is known, (4) of the fact and character
of values and worths, and (5) of the nature and function of
consciousness, are each directed to some specific problem con-
cerning one or more aspects of a universe that is a cosmos. A
good part of philosophy and science is to be regarded, therefore,
as aiming to solve the detailed problems of cosmology.
But there are also cosmological problems of more general
character than these last. Thus there is the problem as to
whether, by any possibility, the many laws of the universe
(assuming that there are laws in some sense) may not be merely
specific instances of one fundamental law, so that, side by side
with an apparent pluralism, there is a fundamental logical
monism. There is also the similar question as to whether there
is one fundamental law that applies to all entities. To this
there is, e.g., the affirmative answer, that causation is such a
law, and that all, indeed quite all the entities of the universe
causally affect one another, so that the universe is like, or,
indeed, is an organism." Or, is the universe patterned after the
model of a classification of plants and animals,^ with differences
yet with similarities, so that finally an all-denoting class-concept
is reached that denotes everything, even as "living being" is
the generic class for all plants and animals. And what is such
'E.g., in the philosophy of Fechner (1801-87) and of Paulsen (1846-
1908).
' Aristotle, and, with certain limitations, Plato, and Spinoza.
56 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
an ultimate siimmum genus, if it exists? Is it "existential
entity," with the physical and the mental as species, or is it
mere "entity," or "being," or "subsistent," with "existent"
and "non-existent" (such as, e.g., a perpetual motion machine)
as species ?
Or, again, if the universe is not organized either in this way
or as an organic whole, do its various basic laws form a complete
mutually implicative system, or, are they merely consistent with
one another,* after the model of the postulates (axioms) of
geometry? Or, finally, is the universe stratified, after a rough
analogy with the layers of rock in the earth, so that there are
certain entities, called logically subsequent, that are dependent
on others that are logically prior, but with the latter inde-
pendent of the former? If this is the case, then would not
each later "layer," as being something more than all the pre-
ceding ones, possess the positive freedom of following the law
or laws of its own positive peculiarities? For example, would
not life be "free unto itself," yet law-abiding at that level where
life first exists ? And would not a free will be the law of moral-
ity in that "stratum" where morality alone occurs, namely,
where conscious 'beings first form a society?^
Each of these views can be found somewhere in contemporane-
ous philosophical literature, — a fact which indicates that, taken
broadly in a psychological as well as in a logical sense, they
constitute a list of solutions to a set of problems that concern
the nature of the cosmos.
But there are still other specific and very important cos-
mological problems. One of these concerns the question as to
the types to which the complex entities of the universe belong.
For example, are there not groups of individuals in the universe
that not only resemble one another, so as to form classes, but
that also have an order and form series, after the manner of
the positive integers in order of magnitude? Also, if there
are series, are there not relations betiveen series such that a
particular individual of one series is correlated with one and
only one of another series, after the manner of the correlation
of a particular velocity (of a moving body) with one and only
* The position of modern science. See Chap. XLI , vi.
• See Chaps. XLIII., v., and XLIV., n.
THE TELEOLOGICAL PROBLEM 57
one particular instant of time? Another closely allied cos-
mological problem concerns the questions as to what entities in
the universe are strictly continuous in the precise scientific sense
of this term, and what ones are as strictly discontinuous. Are
there, also, both infinities and finitenesses? Which of these,
indeed, is the universe itself as a whole — in respect to, e.g., its
spatial and temporal characteristics ?
All of these are problems of cosmology that have for the most
part long persisted in both philosophy and science. However,
through recent investigations they have, in some instances at
least, received a seemingly definitive answer, while the princi-
ples and the logic discovered and used in their solution go far
toward solving the other prohlems of cosmology.^
CHAPTER VII
THE TELEOLOGICAL PROBLEM
Stated briefly, the teleological problem may be said to concern
the question, whether or not there is purpose in the universe as
a whole, and, if so, in what sense. It is clear, however, that
this problem logically precedes the problem as to ivhat is the
source and origin of such purpose, since, if purpose were not
in some sense a fact, there could exist no question about its
origin or source.
However, for psychological reasons, these two problems are
frequently confused and their order reversed. The fact of pur-
pose in at least some sense undoubtedly becomes first known in
the realm of our own human desires, ideals, and deeds. Al-
though the analysis that is made of it in this sphere varies
somewhat, nevertheless, in general, purpose is held to involve
(1) the desire or acceptance of something not yet a fact as
(2) worth realizing in the future, and (3) the adoption of some
means to attain this end. But with the idea of purpose thus
once become present, its transfer to other realms is made with
ease, so that it soon may be held to characterize even the uni-
• See Chap. XLIII.
68 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
verse itself as a whole. This specific transfer is accelerated, and
the order of the two problems as to the source and fact of pur-
pose is confused and reversed, if the conclusion has been previ-
ously derived, that the universe is a vast order and uniformity
of "things," a realm of law and adaptation, and that all this
demands an Orderer, a Lawgiver, even a Creator.^ For from
this conclusion there readily follows the conviction, that such
a Being is also a Purposer, and that the Cosmos is one great
system of means to the accomplishment of ends. Thus, without
prior and independent investigation as to whether or not there is
purpose in the universe as a whole, a positive answer to this
problem is derived from one of the specific solutions of the
cosmological problem, i.e., from the possibility of there being
purpose, the conclusion is drawn, that this purpose is actual
in the realm of existing "things."
If, now, for some, the teleological problem receives a positive
solution in this manner, it is clear that the further character of
the teleology that is accepted will depend largely upon the char-
acter of the cosmology from which it is derived. For in each
case here. Lawgiver, Source of law, Orderer, Purposer, on the
one hand, and universe, on the other hand, are held to be in
some sense apart."^ Thus, as one possibility, the two may be
regarded as distinct in the sense that, the universe having once
been made a Cosmos of law and purpose, the Lawgiver and Pur-
poser then withdrew, to leave His work alone ever afterward,
and, indeed, perhaps quite unable subsequently to interfere.
This position is Deism.^ Or it may be held, that the Lawgiver
and Purposer can interfere at any time, either to institute new
instances of law and purpose, or to withdraw old ones, so that
He is ever present and never remote. This view is one form
of Theism.* Both Deism and Theism, in that they are positive
* The Physico-theological argument.
* Cf . H. Hoflding, The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 14-05.
' A product of modern scientific speculation as this developed into
18th century rationalism, and a position taken by a great many of the
philosophers of that (18th) century. See Leslie Stephen, History of
English Thought in the 18th Century, 2 vols.; J. G. Hibben, The Philosophy
of the Enlightenment.
* The position taken by most orthodox Christians and one whose apolo-
getics is found in the works of Kant, Berkeley, Leibniz, Descartes,
Aquinas, and a host of others. Galileo, Newton, and Robert Boyle were
theists.
THE TELEOLOGICAL PROBLEM 59
solutions both of the cosmological and of the teleological prob-
lems, tend to accept a Being who is Himself prior in time to
that Cosmos which He is held io order, perhaps even to create,
but, at least, to use as a means to an end.
Opposed to these there is also the position in which the Or-
derer and Purposer of the universe is regarded as The Ultimate
Eeality, who is eternal in the sense of being timeless, and who,
as thus apart, manifests Himself in the universe of temporal
and spatial things. This view is a modified Theism, which tends
to become Pantheism.^ It is held to account logically for an
immanent as opposed to a transcendent or external teleology,
which is the position of Deism and the first kind of Theism,
Deism, Theism, and Pantheism are all in agreement, however,
in holding not only that there is order and law in the universe,
but also that this establishes the fact both of purpose and a
Purposer. They are in agreement also in holding that this Pur-
poser is external to that to which purpose is given, at least as
a means to an end, namely, the universe. The first two positions
maintain this very clearly, but the third position. Pantheism,
does so, also, since the manifestations of a Deity cannot be
identical with Himself as Manifestor, but must be numerically
distinct from Him.
However, it is quite evident, as has been said, that the teleol-
ogy which each of these three positions accepts, is entirely
subsequent to and dependent upon that specific solution of the
cosmological problem which holds that order and law demand
an Orderer. For, having once reached this last conclusion, it
is easy to attribute purpose to this Being in analogy to the fact
of purpose as we discover it in our own conduct.
But the situation becomes radically different, if the argu-
ments for such an Orderer and Purposer are invalid, for we
are then thrown back upon the bare question. Does purpose
characterize the universe quite hy itself and independent of any
entity that is. external to the universe? But through this ques-
tion the teleological problem leads at once to the further prob-
lem as to whether there are in the universe, side by side with
' The position held by a Jargo number of the great philosophers of
history, notably Roger Bacon, Spinoza, Fechner, Schopenhauer, Hegel,
Bradley, and perhaps Royce.
60 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
those entities which are non-values, such as the physical sciences
deal with, still other entities that are, in contrast, worths or
values.'^ Indeed, it may be asked, whether, if there is purpose,
this does not itself presuppose these value-entities? For, does
not purpose mean, ends deliberated about, chosen among, and
sought for, because they are ultimately worth while for them-
selves, and not merely as means to an end? Are not such ulti-
mate ends worths? Indeed, if some "things" are valuable as
means, does not this imply still other "things" that are valuable
as ends?
This question states the teleological problem in perhaps its
most modern form, but in a way that is, indeed, almost as old
as philosophy itself, since it is the very center around which
the philosophy of Plato turns, and the answer usually given to
it is affirmative. Just as, e.g., there are the realms, or fields,
of motion and of spatial extension, yet with the two not identical,
so it is maintained, there are the two realms of values or worths
and of non-worths, with the two quite distinct and different.
And further, just as it is conceivable that the laws of motion
are not of necessity "legislated" for moving things by an
external agent, but are of "the very nature" of moving
"things," so may values not come from without, but may them-
selves be entities or facts side by side with other kinds of facts.
But also it may well be that, just as one and the same entity
can be, e.g., both spatially extended and moving, so also can an
entity be a value in one realm or relational field, and a non-
value in another. Indeed it may be asked if this is not exem-
plified by such an entity as a picture, which, as a thing of
beauty, is in one relationship an ultimate aesthetic worth, but
which is also a physico-chemical complex of oils and pigments,
and as such a non-worth or physical fact.
However, whether or not one agrees with the positive answers
that are given to these questions, they nevertheless indicate
problems that strike to the very root of the teleological problem,
while in solution of them one may be led to the position, in
place of either Deism, Theism, or Pantheism, that there is in
the universe an efficient value- or worth-principle, and that this,
' The position of Kant, Fichte, Herbart, and, among recent writers,
MUnsterberg ; see his Eternal Values, 1909.
THE TELEOLOGICAL PROBLEM 61
rather than the Orderer, Lawgiver, and Manifestor of tradi-
tional theology, is "the power, not ourselves, that makes for
righteousness. ' ' ^
Still other specific teleological problems concern the questions
as to (1) what the specific purpose of the universe is, if it all
has a purpose, and (2) whether or not there are entities that
are directly opposed to values, or goods, i.e., whether there is an
irreducible and ultimate Bad in the universe, — something not
merely non-value, but positive Evil. The first of these questions
may indeed indicate the proper method of approach to the whole
problem of purpose. For, might not the proposition, that there
are both purpose and a Purposer, perhaps be best established by
first ascertaining what the specific purpose of the universe is?
Historically, the happiness, the Avell-being, and the salvation of
mankind have each been regarded as the specific end "of all
creation," but at the present time there is a reaction against
such an anthropocentric point of view.
As regards the second question, concerning the reducibility
of evil, the fact of at least three different solutions indicates as
many specific subordinate problems. Thus it is asked, Is not
the ultimate character of all things good, so that evil is mere
appearance? The objective idealist answers "yes," since for
him everything else is "absorbed" into One Being that is good.
The evolutionist and pragmatist disagree with this solution, and
maintain that evil is relative to good, and conversely, and that
each is relative to the time and the circumstances, so that neither
is absolute. In turn the realist disagrees with this, and ad-
vances the view that evil as such is ultimate and indestructible
either by argument or by action, although the number of its
concrete instances may be decreased by fighting them with good.
' Hoffding's position in the Philosophy of Religion, pp. 215-278.
62 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER VIII
THE THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM
The teleological problem leads naturally to the theological
problem. Let there be order, regularity, and uniformity in the
universe; let there be an adaptation of one "thing" to another,
e.g., of the eye to light, of body-color to surrounding foliage,
and the like, and the question at once arises. Whence this order
and law, this uniformity, this adaptation? Do they not demand
an Orderer, a Lawgiver, an Adapter, even as the watch implies
a maker, the building an architect, the bridge an engineer?
That they do, is the answer given by the Deist, the Theist, and
the Pantheist, all of whom infer from the observed order and
law and adaptation, the existence of a Being, God, who is their
source. This argument for a Deity is called "the argument
from design. " ^ It is obvious, however, that it makes of the
Deity only the designer, the architect, or the engineer of the
universe, and not the creator of its matter and substance.
But further, the universe consists not alone of static, un-
changeable, resting "things," if, indeed, there are any such
"things" at all. Change, motion, and evolution are also facts,
and indeed may be universal. Then the question arises, Whence
comes this change, this motion, this possibly universal evolu-
tion? Who started all this process going, endowing it, at the
same time, perhaps, with order and law, whereby to fulfil a
purpose ? For must it not have had a starter, an initiator ? Is
not one billiard ball moved by another, and the cue ball in turn
moved by the arm of the billiardist? And does not food make
the player's arm move, while rain and plowing and soil produce
foodstuffs? And were not these happenings caused by other,
• An argument that is used by all who accept a positive teleology,
whether this be immanent or transcendent, and whether it leads to deism,
theism, or pantheism. Among those who Tise this artj^ument are Aristotle,
Augustine, Anselm in the Monologium, Thomas Aquinas, Berkeley, Leibniz,
Ficht?, Hegel, and Royce. 8ee the latter 's Religious Aspects of Philosophy,
188.') ; The Concept of God, 1897; Studies of Good and Evil, 181)8; Th0
World and the Individual, 2 vols., 1900, 1901, and The Problem of Chris-
tianity, 2 vols., 1913.
THE THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM 6^
earlier happenings, and these by still earlier ones, and so on
indefinitely far back? Where shall the stop be made or does
there seem to be no stop at all implied in this (infinite?) series
of causes and effects?
Two positions are taken in answer to this question, the one
holding that there is an end, the other, no end to this series.
The former is that solution which is accepted as the outcome
of the so-called "cosmological argument" for the existence of
God. There must be a -first cause, this argument runs, that is
itself uncaused, in order that it may be adequate to produce or
cause the "world" as a whole. It must itself be uncaused,
since, were it not, there would still be another cause "behind"
it, and so on, so that the problem is repeated until at last there
is reached a first cause which is not in turn effect. This cause
is "first" in the sense that it is either prior temporally to all
effects, or prior metaphysically in that it "underlies" and con-
ditions through all time all other causes and effects. In both
cases, however, such a first cause is identified with God.-
However, in addition to these several problems as to whether
or not there is an architect and possibly a creator of the uni-
verse, or a Being who started all "things" going, or one who
did this and v/ho also continually maintains "things" in a
certain order and to a certain purpose, there is the further aiid
related prohlem, whether or not there is a perfect Being, who
plays one or more of these roles, and who is complete in His
goodness, power, and insight.
There is no doubt that the view that there is such a Being,
and that this Being is God, is a most widespread one. There
is both the idea of a perfect Being, and the belief in His exist-
ence, or His reality. Yet in criticism of this belief it may be
asked, if we do not have many ideas to which there corresponds
no existent object. My idea of a perfectly frictionless machine
does not seem to imply the existence of such an object. No
more does our idea of universal justice among men mean the
actual attainment of this ideal. May it not be asked, therefore,
if the idea of and belief in a perfect Being prove that Being's
' This argument is given by Aristotle, Augustine, Anselm in the Mono-
logium, Thomas Aquinas, Geulinx, Spinoza, Hegel, Ficbte, Bradley, and
many others.
64 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
existence? The answer given to these questions by many is
"yes." For it is argued, that a Being perfect in many ways,
such as goodness and power, would still be imperfect were He
not also real or existent. In other words, that perfection implies
existence, is the reply given to him who doubts. ''Things" with
which we are commonly acquainted, even the whole universe,
are imperfect, it is argued, and these imperfect entities imply
the perfect. The imperfect leaf implies a perfect one as a
pattern or ideal ; the unjust act, a standard just one. We thus
at least have the idea of the perfect, though we cannot see,
touch, or hear this entity. And, since perfection is held to
imply existence, God, as a Perfect Being who is in some relation
to this imperfect world, must be concluded to exist.^ Without
raising the question at this point whether this "ontological
argument" is valid or not, one must admit that it is very widely
advanced and accepted, either clearly or obscurely, as are also
the teleological and cosmological arguments.
Science as such does not, however, concern itself with these
problems, taking merely an attitude of indifference toward
them, but many individual scientists, prompted by a wider
philosophic interest, do attempt solutions of them through the
use, perhaps, of scientific data alone. Most philosophers, how-
ever, have considered that science as such is not capable of giving
either proof or disproof of God's existence, but that both the
problem and the means for its solution lie in quite a different
realm of fact. In accordance with this view different lines of
proof are advanced. One of these argues from the historical
fact of an almost universal belief in a Deity and the effectiveness
of this belief, to the Deity's existence. This is the historico-
pragmatic proof.* Another line of argument bases its proof
on revelation/' However, both of these proofs can be reduced
to the ontological proof, — the historico-pragmatic proof, since it
substitutes for the idea of a perfect Being as "held" by the
hidividual, that same idea as "held" hy many, both historically
and racially; and the proof from revelation, because it argues
' Anaelm, Proslogium, Chap. III., trans, by S. N. Deane; Descartes,
Discourse on Method, and Meditations.
* E.g., Father Tyrell, Lex Orandi, 1903; Lex Credendi, 1906.
' The Apologists, such as Justin the Martyr, Tertullian, Origen, Augus-
tine, Aquinas.
THE THEOLOGICAL PROBLEM 65
from the idea of God as given in revelation to revelation as
given by {an existing) God. In this second proof it is main-
tained that, if tradition is trustworthy, revelation also is, and
then, that God exists because, according to revelation, He asserts
His existence. Appeal is then made to the identity of God with
the Perfect Being, and from His perfection is deduced His exist-
ence and veracity. This veracity guarantees the truth of reve-
lation, and from this last there is in turn derived the trust-
worthiness of that tradition in which both the belief in God and
revelation have been handed down.° This is essentially the argu-
ment of both the Protestant and the Catholic churches, with
the difference, that the former rests its proof on the infallibility
of the Scriptures and the reliability of tradition, whereas the
latter bases its proof on what by its own philosophy is its own
exclusive, God-given ability and knowledge to interpret both
tradition and Scriptures correctly, and to distinguish truth
from falsity.
Each position is difficult to grapple with, since each logically
can deny to him who is "outside" and v/ho may doubt, the very
ability to get at truth, maintaining that this is given alone to
him who believes and accepts and is within the church. Also,
either position may be true, since truth is independent of proof,
while disproof of either is impossible, or, at least, difficult, since
attempted disproof of either position is possible only from a
standpoint that is ' ' outside ' ' the realm of that which it is desired
to disprove, and therefore gets no logical leverage.
The theological problem in its various aspects is one, there-
fore, that has arisen in the past and that still presents itself
for solution. Psychologically it is, perhaps, not a problem to
the unthinking adherent of some orthodox religion. But to the
reverent thinker and critic who does not hesitate to submit any
question to the examination of reason, and who holds that all
of mankind's beliefs and theories must be so subjected, it is a
most important problem.
• A. Sabatier, Religions of Authority.
c
6Q HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
ft
CHAPTER IX
THE PROBLEM OF VALUES
The theological problems which have just been briefly Mis-
cussed are most intimately connected with the problem of values.
A value may be defined, tentatively, as anything that is desired
and accepted as an end to be attained, or as anything that brings
about the attainment of an end. For example, individual and
general happiness are values, as are also a clear conscience, con-
tentment, good health, all-round development, honesty, honor,
loyalty to friends, love, unselfishness, education, exercise, good
laws, and thrift and industry. Some of these, such as the last
five, may be means by which other values are attained. These
other values might therefore be ultimate ends or goods, and the
means to attain them be right ways or mediate values. This
may be the difference between the good and the right.
As already indicated, the problem of values is closely related
to the theological problem. It is, also, no less closely connected
with the teleologieal and the cosmological problems. For it may
be asked. Have not the order, the arrangements, and the exquisite
adaptations which we seem to discover in nature, been instituted
by a Supreme Being primarily for man's welfare, or for his
happiness and contentment, or, at least, for his strength of
character after much trial and tribulation? Do not all "things"
seem finally to lead to that which we regard as good or even as
best, so that they must have been meant for this purpose by a
Supreme Being who so intended and established them, and in
this way Jios revealed a proof of his existence and character?
In terms of the problem of value, therefore, God is that Being
who cares for the good and who also brings about the attain-
ment of or the tendency of "things" toward that which is good,
let this be human happiness, or contentment from well-doing, or
a life in heaven. Then God must himself he good. Indeed, it
may be, that He himself is the Good, and that to attain good
is to be one with God. But if He is good, and so cares for the
good, and brings it about, then must He also be a God who
knows and wills and has power.
THE PROBLEM OF VALUES 67
This teleological argument both for God's existence and for
His nature is advanced. It is clear, however, that, leaving open
the question whether it is a valid argument or not, there would
be no occasion for making it, were one not convinced that there
is something of value, either as an ultimate end, such as happi-
ness and justice on earth, or as a means to these ends, such as
thrift and foresight, honesty and brotherly love.
But there is no denying that values are discovered. Thus,
e.g., we speak of that inherent worth of each personality or soul
which commands our respect, and our recognition of the princi-
ples of duty and justice. Happiness, too, seems to be, under
certain conditions, worth while of itself, and even more cer-
tainly do the sublimity and beauty of nature, as well as of
some of man's creations, such as the beautiful picture and
statue. Or, if these are not inherent worths, then they are at
least valuable as means to some end as a final value, and the-
essence of the situation remains the same. There are values or
worths, some ethical or moral, others assthetic; some are means
to ultimate ends, others are these ends themselves. Every-day
life in all of its relations of love, friendship, occupation, citizen-
ship, religion, art, science, and philosophy is based upon them.
Indeed, to deny values is to presuppose them — unless one's
denial be quite unmotivated.
The existence of values, then, is a fact that has been uni-
versally admitted by all people, of all times. Concerning the
relationship and classification of values, however, there is a
specific value-problem. Is there one highest value to which all
others are subordinate? Is there a highest ethical value? Ought
we, e.g., to make the attainment of happiness, especially of
others, our chief aim of life ? Or ought we to set the unflinching
doing of the right, even at the cost of pain and suffering, above
all else? Or, again, is the harmonious development of our mental
and physical nature that for which we ought chiefly to strive ?
Which standard shall we accept? Indeed, by what test ot
standard shall we be able to reach a decision in this issue between
standards? This, after all, is the important question. For, with
the ultimate value once decided, other values can be "measured"
by it. Yet it may be that there is no ultimate standard, or, at
least, not one that is known. For to know that there is a
68 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
standard, and to knoiv what this standard is, are two distinct
"things." Or, there may be only a standard that changes from
generation to generation, even as it also differs from nation to
nation. Here, therefore, is another problem of values. It is the
problem, not of what the standard is, but whether there is an
absolute and eternal standard that is knowable, though perhaps
now unknown, or, whether there is only a changing standard,
created by the past for the present, but to be supplanted in the
future by that which grows out of this present. Here we have
the contrast and perhaps the conflict between Absolutism, on
the one hand, and Relativism or Evolutionism or Pragmatism,
on the other.
Yet, while it is admitted that we recognize values, accept
them, and act upon this acceptance, since we are concerned with
character, with happiness, with duty and the like, it is still to
be asked. Just what is a value? To exemplify and be specific,
let us ask, whether there would be happiness and character, if
there were no conscious human beings to be happy, to have char-
acter, and to seek these as ends? Or, do these values exist also
for other living beings than man ? However, even granted that
they do so exist, are they not limited to beings that are con-
scious, so that there may be desires, interests, and ideals f This
question is answered in both the affirmative and the negative.
Thus it is held that all values are in some way dependent upon
the presence of consciousness as this is found in living beings,
and that values are facts 07ily if there are beings that have
purposes and interests and ideals, and that use means for the
attainment of ends. This position is taken with reference both
to ethical values and to aesthetic values, such as beauty, in which
latter case it is not unconvincing. For is not that which is
accepted as beauty either in the concrete or as a standard of
beauty known to vary both with the individual and with the
nation or race, as is exemplified by the different Eesthetic
standards, e.g., of the European and the Oriental?
Is not beauty, therefore, dependent upon a subjective factor?
Is the picture beautiful except to the observer? By itself is it
not just so much paint and line? The completely subjective
view of the nature of value, thus suggested, is accepted by some
thinkers. By others, however, it is maintained that at least
THE PROBLEM OF VALUES 69
certain values are quite objective, in the sense that they exist
quite independently of all desire, interest, and appreciation, —
indeed of all consciousness. For example, one may hold the
view, that there must have been value in the universe 'before
consciousness existed, in order that there might be at a later
stage that situation in which there is consciousness and those
values which are dependent on consciousness.
Accordingly we have the problem, Are all values dependent
upon consciousness, or are only some values so dependent; or,
are all quite independent of this entity? Several solutions are
given to this problem, and each has interesting consequences.
Thus, let us first consider the view that all values are wholly
dependent upon a consciousness. It follows from this position,
that there would be no values prior to the existence of con-
sciousness, — a conclusion that is not invalidated by the argu-
ment which maintains, on the one hand, that there always are
values, because there always is a divine consciousness, and, on
the other hand, that there is this divine consciousness, because
there are values. // all values are thus dependent upon a human
or an animal consciousness, and God is defined as that Being
who is identical ivith values, — a current definition — then it fol-
lows either that there is no God in the orthodox sense of the
term, or that God is man-made, or both.
However, as opposed to this extreme, subjectivistic view, it
may be, that there are some values which can be demonstrated
to be independent of all consciousness, so that the Deity may be
identified with that which is value in the universe. For the
conviction, that there exists or that there is actual in the uni-
verse, such a principle of the conservation or even of the
increase of value, may, after all, constitute the deepest and most
fundamental religious consciousness, so that there is a rational
defense of the belief in a Deity who is not a mere replica of
human personality, but who is a Being supra-personal, and
perhaps supra-conscious.
It remains to consider one more phase of the problem of
values, namely, whether Truth itself is not a value} Is it not
' The pragmatists and humanists would say that it is. Cf. also W.
VVindleband, Wiile zur Wahrheit, 1909, and H. Kickert, Die Grenzen der
Naturwissenschaftlichen Be griff shildung, 2nd. ed., 1913} Miinsterberg, op.
cit.
70 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
this, because, e.g., in searching for truth in the spirit of "truth
for its own sake" and quite regardless, as we may think, of
values and their fate, we are nevertheless seeking for something
that is of value? From this cannot the inference be, drawn, that,
because our valuing truth conditions our search for it, and
because truth is valuable, therefore truth is conditioned hy its
value, or by our attitude toward it ?
The reply to this inquiry is, that, while truth undoubtedly
is a value either quite for itself or because of its usefulness, or
both, nevertheless the value aspect of the truth does not con-
stitute the truth, but that the truth and the value are merely
two aspects of one and the same "thing" in different relations.
In support of this position it wall be admitted, that, e.g., one
and the same individual man may be a brother in relation to
one person, and a father in relation to another. Further, while
a father is not of necessity a brother, nor a brother a father,
these two characteristics are quite compatible in the same indi-
vidual. By the same logical principle, there may be, therefore,
"something" that in one relationship is truth, and in another,
value, so that not only is truth a value, but values, as known,
are truths.
To explain this further, let us assume that there is a world
of fact, with no minds or consciousness present in it. Let us
assume, next, that under certain conditions consciousness,
awareness, or "knowing" appears, and that accordingly our
world becomes known (as it really is) in certain details. When
there is this very specific relatio'nship between a knowing process
and that which is known, we will say that truth exists or sub-
sists. Yet it must also be granted that conscious processes can
take place, and yet this specific relationship be lacking, i.e., that
there can be error as well as truth.
Truth, then, is a specific relational state of affairs that sub-
sists between certain conscious processes and that which is
known. It can, perhaps, be defined only in a circle, namely, as
that relational complex which subsists when things arc known
as they really are. But this specific complex is also a value, since
either its attainment is desired or purposed, or it is a means to
something else that is desired. In other words, a certain relation
is, by itself, truth; but this relation may in turn be related to
THE PROBLEM OF VALUES 71
something else even as, e.g., hrotJierliood is a relation that is
, related to sisterhood. Thus that relation which by itself is
V truth, is, in relation to purpose, also a value.
CHAPTER X
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM
The discussion of the preceding chapter has already intro-
duced certain phases of the episteraological problem. Is truth
a value? And, if it is, what is to be inferred from this fact
regarding the further character of science, philosophy, and
common sense ? What is the nature of knowledge and of truth ?
Are they distinct from one another, and both in turn distinct
from fact; or, does knowing in some way itself ''make" fact?
Again, are truth and fact identical? What is the origin of
knowledge? Does it all come from sensation, or does some
knowledge have some other source? What are the limits of
knowledge? Are there realms to which we cannot penetrate
by either intellect, intuition, feeling, or sensation? These are
all special epistemological problems, around which, as a center,
most philosophical investigation of the modern period has
turned.
One of the most important of these problems concerns the
possible distinction between fact, knowledge, and truth. The
prevailing view in both science and common sense is, that fact
is independent of the knowledge of it, that knowledge is a
specific kind of mental process, and that truth is a relation of
"correspondence" between knowledge and fact. Accordingly,
a true idea is regarded as a sort of mental picture of that of
which it is an idea.
This view, however, is not only challenged now, but it also
has been frequently questioned ever since the time of the Eng-
lish philosopher, John Locke (1632-1704), who was its modern
sponsor. All philosophers do not accept the distinction between
fact, knowledge, and truth, and among those who do not are
72 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
the pragmatists, the phenomenalists, and the idealists. Yet
each of these "schools" raises different questions concerning
the distinctness and the relation of these three "entities," and
thus each discovers specific epistemological problems.
The pragmatists, or, at any rate, some pragmatists, maintain
that the very nature of truth, namely, that which is sometimes
called the "correspondence" between an idea and its object, is
only the later experiencing of that to which the idea previously
"pointed." They contend that an "idea becomes true," and
that that which is commonly regarded as the independent object
is only the content and the product of an idea to which truth
has happened, because the idea has led to success and satisfaction
of one kind or another.^ The idea merges, as it were, into an
object, and, behold, there is truth !
This point of view is not altogether easy to understand, but
a figurative description may help us to make the matter clear.
The position may be said to mean, that truth is "made" in
a single line of experience, of ideas, of purposes, and the like.
The opposed and usual position may, in contrast, be described
as the right-angled view. According to the latter there is one
series or line of ideas, and another series of facts, and between
the two, striking across at right angles, as it were, there is the
relation of correspondence.
A problem arises, therefore, because it is so difficult to under-
stand and especially to justify such a "copy theory," as the
"parallel line" and "right-angled view" may also be called.
For there is the question as to how, if we as knowers are on or
are identical with "the idea line," as we seem to be, we can
ever "get off" this line so as to compare it with, and thus dis-
cover that it is a copy of, "the object line." In the case of a
picture and its object one can do this, but one then has the two
entities before him, and readily discovers the "picture" — or cor-
respondence relation. But the critical question arises. How could
a picture itself discover that it is a picture, since it could never
get outside of or beyond itself, thus to look back and compare
itself with its object? Would not a third "point" be necessary,
on which to stand, in order to make the comparison and the
^ E.g., James, Pragmatism, especially Chaps. II., VI., and VII. Cf. also
the works cited in the later discussion of Pragmatism in Chap. XXXIII.
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 73
discovery? Then it may be asked, How can the ego, or the
knowing process, be successful in such an attempt, if the knower
is that very series of ideas which are supposed to be the "copies"
or ''mental pictures"? Is there any proof, or any way of prov-
ing, that an idea is in any sense a copy? Indeed, is it not an
unwarranted assumption, both of common sense and of science,
that such a relation in any way constitutes true knowledge?
This is the problem, and this the criticism made by the prag-
matist, who reaches the conclusion, therefore, that the truth of,
an idea does not consist in a "right-angled" correspondence
between the idea and its object, but that an idea J)ecomes or is
made true through that later experience in which there is some
sort of confirmation, successful working, and satisfaction.^
The pragraatist, therefore, does not distinguish in the same
way as do some other philosophers, fact, truth, and knoivledge.
Fact, for him, is that which fits consistently into a system of
ideas whicii are made knowledge or truths by later experiences.
Fact is the content of that knowledge which thus becomes true.
And, finally, everything is ''experience"; for it is inferred that,
because everything that we mention, think of, and experience, is
mentioned, thought of, and experienced, no object can exist
apart from thinking and experience, and all objects are merely
content of experience or are, indeed, themselves experience.
Truth, knowledge, and fact are thus all reduced to a common
"something," experience, and in this respect do not differ from
one another.^
The phenomenalists and the idealists agree to a large extent
with the pragmatists in this conclusion, although their mode of
approach is somewhat different. For both, facts or "things"
are "made" or constituted, at least in part, by virtue of their
relation to perception, or knowing, or, in general, to experience ;
i.e., since it is held that experience can never he eliminated from
the "things" which are experienced, it is concluded, that the
experienced world is constituted, in part at least, hy the experi-
ence, so that we are confined to experience (as regards that
* See James, Pragmatism, especially Chap. VI.
' This position is taken by, e.g., Professor Dewey all through his writings
of at least the last thirteen or fourteen years; cf. the bibliography of
Chap. XXXIII.
74. HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
which we experience). It is thus that the idealist argues that
the universe itself is psychical or mental* and the phenomenalist
that the knoivn or experienced world is psychical. But the
latter philosopher holds that there is also another, a possibly
non-mental world beyond, that never can ie known, since to
experience it is to alter it.'^ For both idealist and phenomenalist,
however, fact, truth and knowledge are mental in nature. In
\ this respect at least there is no difference between these two
' philosophies.
All philosophers, however, do not agree with the three posi-
tions just presented. For example, the realist does not, and,
as he maintains, for good reasons. He agrees with the prag-
matist that truth may not be identical with a "picture-like cor-
respondence" between idea and object, and that at least some
ideas are tested for their truth by their outcome. But, against
the universality of this last doctrine the realist finds that, while
every idea has an outcome of some sort — an outcome presumably
satisfactory to some mind, especially when there is belief in the
idea — the mere outcome nevertheless fails to give the requisite
distinction between the true and the false. It is not the mere
/outcome, he finds, but the differeyice among outcomes that dis-
itinguishes the true from the false — a difference that may itself
Iwell be conditioned by the respective truth and falsity of that
which has an outcome. Truth and the test of truth, therefore,
may be two very different "things." The truth of an idea
may, indeed, be that very characteristic which conditions the
specific kind of outcome which is a successful test for truth,
when the idea is not antecedently held to be true. Thus con-
ditioned, this outcome in turn is of the kind that may serve as
a test for truth.®
From such discussions, given us by the pragmatists, another
, epistemological problem emerges. Is there an absolute truth to
{ which our knowledge may approach nearer and nearer, though
\never reaching it? Realist, idealist, and phenomenalist for the
■ most part agree that there is, and in this respect are "abso-
* For the subjective idealist the experience is that of a finite conscious
being, while for the objective idealist it is that of an absolute, divine,
conscious Being. Cf. Chaps. XXX., and XXXIV.-XXXVIII.
" For Kant and the Kantians, see Chap. XXIX.
' See Chap. XXXIII., rv., and Chap. XLIV.
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 75
lutists." But the pragmatist demurs.'^ For him, since truth
is "made" by a shifting, evolving experience in which success
and satisfaction may finally emerge, trut\_cfianges. It is rela-
tive to the time, the place, the nation, the sect, and even the
individual. Therefore there are 7nany truths, even though they
conflict, as is well illustrated by the "truths" of Christianity
and of Buddhism. For the pragmatist, both of these religions,
so far as they contain doctrines that succeed, or that have satis-
factory effects, are (theoretically) true.
The argument advanced for this view is two-fold. It is main-
tained, on the one hand, that, because experience "makes" both
truth and fact, and yet itself grows, changes, and varies, there
is also only a shifting truth and fact.^ On the other hand, it
is argued, that the very ideal of absolute truth, as well as all
tests therefor, and all the methods of proof, do themselves but
shift and vary, imbedded as they are in an ever-changing experi-
ence.^
With this view the absolutist disagrees. For him there is
only one truth, one state of affairs, one set of facts, to he dis-
covered in each field. This position, he contends, is established
by the reductio ad ahsurdum of the opposite position, since to
claiyn that all truth is relative and shifting, is to presuppose that
this claim or position is itself an absolute and permanent and
not a relative and shifting truth }° But it is also argued, that,
since truth and fact may be independent of their tests and of
proof, there may be absolute truth and fact, although we have
no absolutely certain methods of identifying or "recognizing"
these in the process of obtaining knowledge.^^
Truth, however, supposing there is one truth about each fact,
or each set of facts, consists of many truths. Truths form a
system. There is the problem, therefore, as to hoiv truths form
this system, how they are related, or what kind of system truths
form. Does, e.g., the relatedness of truths imply that each truth
is dependent upon other truths, so that it is impossible to get
'' E.g., James in his Pragmatism, Schiller in his Humanism, and Dewey
in Essays in Experimental Logic, 1916.
^ James and Dewey, ibid.
® Schiller, ibid.
'" Royce, " The Eternal and the Practical," Phil. Revieio, Vol. XIII.,
p. 103 ff., and "Principles of Logic," op. cit.j cf. Chap. II., supra.
" Cf. Chaps. XXXIII., XLII., XLIV.
76 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
at the truth about any one "thing" unless we also get at the
truth about all other "things"? Or, are truths related and yet
independent, so that it is quite possible to discover now one
truth and now another, as knowledge progresses? The first
view, that truths, because they are related, mutually depend
on and modify one another, like the parts of an organism, is
called the "organic" or "coherence" theory of truth/' The
second view may be called the pluralistic theory. Obviously
the basic problem here is again the question, whether relatedness
as such carries with it a mutually modifying action of related
terms on one another, or whether this is only sometimes the
ease, and thus presents a specific type of relation? ^^
At this point, therefore, the further problem arises, if it is
not to the growth of our united social attempt to obtain knowl-
edge, rather than to the system of truths, that the organic view
applies, — while the system of facts, which we endeavor to know,
is pluralistic in the sense above defined. Indeed, is not even
this very difference itself a state of affairs that is a typical ease
of such pluralism ?
Truth, however, might either be an organic whole, or consist
of truths related to and yet independent of one another, and
yet there might be but One Truth, i.e., one system of truths.^'^
But there would still be the problem as to how we can discover
or make certain that this One Truth has been attained either in
whole or in part, i.e., there is still the question as to what is the
test of absolute truth, and of genuine and certain knowledge.
Indeed to have such truth and knowledge, must we not have
an absolute test? But to have this must we not in turn have
a test for this test, and so on indefinitely ? ^^ Or could a test he
used to test itself f These questions are raised, and many an-
swers are given. Various tests for truth and knowledge are
advanced, but in every case more than one interpretation is
made of their character. Consistency, freedom from internal
contradiction, presupposition by attempted denial, immediate,
direct, and undeniable experience, subsequent verification, self-
evidence, and the inconceivability of the opposite, are among
the tests and criteria that are accepted and used, one or more
** Joachim, The Nature of Truth. " See Chap. XLI., xv.
" Sec Chap. XXVI. " See Chap. XLI., ix.-xi.
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 77
of them, by each of the several philosophies.^® Disagreement
exists, however, as to which of these tests is superior. But
against all other parties the pragmatist maintains that all of
these tests are but useful means to an end, or kinds of satisfac-
tion and success, and thus relative and not absolute. From this
he infers that truth itself bears, or is the same characteristic, —
namely, usefuhiess.
From this inference the absolutist demurs. He grants that
tests and testings may be fallible (though he usually insists upon
the high degree of probability of certain tests as absolute), but
he also maintains not only that there is an absolute truth and
an absolute state of affairs to be discovered, but also that these
may be actually revealed in certain instances even though abso-
lute proof of this is lacking. Truth and knowledge are inde-
pendent of proof, although certainty may not be, and one may
"really know," without being able to demonstrate that he does}"^
Indeed, were this not the fact, then whoever advances the con-
trary position would be quite precluded from maintaining that
his position is itself true, unless it were absolutely established
by absolute tests and proof.
'" Still another epistemological problem emerges in the question
as to what is involved in the fact that knowledge and knowing
appear in many individuals. Is it not therewith necessitated
that these individuals are essentially alike? Must not their
knowing processes, their "thinking machinery," be quite the
same in order that they shall be able to get at the one truth,
or the one set of facts in each case? But how can these con-
ditions be attained, and where can they be found? Are two
individuals ever quite alike? Are not their sense organs dif-
ferent? Do they not, therefore, perceive differently? Are they
not also of different temperaments? Will they not, therefore,
rely upon different tests of truth, and start their arguments
from different convictions? Will even the same word convey
the same meaning to two individuals? With such obstacles as
these, how can there be any such thing as knowledge, which, by
/ its very nature, should be the same for all? How can two iudi-
l viduals ever have one fact revealed to them in precisely the
'" See Chap. XV.
" See Chaps. XXXIII., XLII., and XLIV.
78 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
same way, unless it be by pure chance? Will not one or the
other, perhaps both, distort it?
Both the individualistic position, thus suggested, and its
opposite are taken by philosophers. The problem is that of
the "universality" and common validity of knowledge, and of
the conditions for this. Both positions are compatible with the
view, that facts are facts, — to be got at if possible, — and that
there is but one system of truths, the attainability of which is
an ideal ; but they differ on the question, as to whether it is
possible to get at facts at all, or to attain to the one truth? In
the one position it is maintained that, while there are differ-
ences among individuals, this does not preclude likenesses and
identities in our "knowing apparatus," and that, relying upon
these, we are justified in further claiming that the ideal one
truth may, at least in certain cases, be attained. This is also
possible, since, although there may be no absolute test of absolute
truth, truth may be quite independent of proof and of testing.
The other and opposed position, if it will not admit of likenesses
in knowing processes in the midst of differences, has only one
recourse left. It must acknowledge complete individualism in
respect to intellect, moral judgment, and testhetic feelings and
appreciation. Each individual can rely only upon himself, and
that completely in each of these fields, with no apparent means
of bridging the chasm from one individual to another.
Destructive as this position seemingly is of all motives for
social intercourse and cooperation, it has, nevertheless, been
theoretically maintained now and then ever since the Sophists
first advanced it. But, it may be asked, Is not the means for
the refutation of this position rather freely offered by him who
argues it? If one cannot get beyond the individual peculiari-
ties and differences to that in which individuals are alike, as
they are supposed to be in their "pure reason," then, on the
one hand, why should one ever attempt to convince others of
the truth of the individualistic position? But, on the other
hand, if one makes this attempt, does he not therewith presup-
pose that there is something which is common to and alike in
individuals side by side with differences — something, namely,
that is "over-individual," even as reason is supposed to be? It
suffices to say, that the latter alternative is accepted by most
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 79
philosophers, and that the first alternative is regarded as worthy
of little attention. Yet the problem must be regarded as a
legitimate one, with individualists and "antis" as the eon-
tending parties, and with various ramifications, from both posi-
tions, extending into the solutions given to other philosophical
problems.^**
Suppose it be granted, then, that, side by side with feelings,
desires, motives, and the like, which may be purely individual,
there are also reason, knowing, and knowledge that may be the
same in many individuals, there remain still other problems.
Hotv does knowledge arise? "What is its source? Using the
term "cognition" to designate all perception, memory, imagina-
tion, and reasoning processes, there is the problem, Does all
cognition have the same source? Does it all come ultimately
from, and is it all like in kind to, sensation? Or, is some cogni-
tion, notably reasoning, together with its principles, an inde-
pendent and peculiar kind and source of knowledge in con-
junction with, but different in kind from, sensation?^'* Two
positions are taken in solution of this general problem. Ac-
cording to one, namely, Sensationalism, all cognition, all knowl-
edge, comes from, and is but a transformation of sensation. Ac-
cording to the other, Rationalism, at least spwe knowledge does
not thus originate, but is reason's own peculiar contribution.
Empiricism, in the historical and narrow sense of the term,
either agrees with Sensationalism in '^ reducing" reason to sensa-
tion, or, if it does not go quite so far as this, at any rate denies
reason's independent ability to discover fact and to get at truth,
and allows it by itself only the function of vain speculation
and castle-building. However, we are all empiricists in the
broad meaning of the term, since experience of some kind must
be accepted as the one source of discovery. But historically
the term "empiricism" has been almost exclusively used to
designate the view, that hoth the source of all knowledge and
the test of all truth is ultimately sensation. Then the term
"rationalism" may be used to designate the position, opposed
to this narrow empiricism, that all experience, evei? sensation,
must be subjected to reason's test as the court of last resort.
" See Chap. XLI., vin.
" Bee Chaps. XLI., xiii., XLIII., and XLIV.
80 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
Distinct in some ways from this problem as to whether reason
or sensation furnishes the ultimate test for truth, is the question,
whether reason reveals fact and reality to us, or only invents
schemes that are useful methods for the accomplishment of
practical results and purposes. Both positions are taken, the
former by the intellectualists, the latter by the "antis," and
ioth parties present arguments for their position, the anti-
intellectualists tliereby placing themselves in the embarrassing
position of using intellectual and rational means and principles
in order to establish the very position which denies the validity
of the means by which it has been established. One of their
arguments is that that analysis with which reasoning methods
are at least partly identical, leads to results that are self-con-
tradictory, and therefore false.^° Thus the claim is made that
only immediate and intuitive experience reveals fact, and that
the great fact revealed is that of an ever-flowing and ever-
changing universe, which intellectual analysis "makes" into
a manifold of unchanging elements or parts. Motion is the
typical case selected; and it is argued (falsely) that the analysis
of motion shows, that at every instant a moving body is at a
specific point, and so at rest — rest being tlie contradictory of
the "thing" analyzed, namely, the motion. Thus the conclusion
is reached, that only non-intellectual, non-rational methods, such
as intuition, appreciation, and feeling, reveal reality and fact,
and that accordingly we must be intuitionists, emotionalists, and
evolutionists.
The intellectualist opposes all this with the position that,
although non-rational processes may reveal fact, they are not the
only processes that do this. For it can be shown that reason
and intellect, and the methods of analysis in general, also reveal
reality, and that the falsifying character that is ascribed to
them disappears, if one but state tlieir analytical results
correctly,^^
It remains yet to present one other, very important epis-
temological problem, upon the several solutions of which there
depend some of the most distinctive features of Idealism,
Phenomenalism, and Realism. This problem concerns the ques-
"" E.g., by Bergaon in Creative Evolution in any number of statements.
" See Chaps. XXII., XXIII., and XXIV.
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 81
tion as to what is involved in or implied hy the fact, that every
reality, every fact, even every illusory object that is known,
thought of, conceived, mentioned, or perceived, and the like,
is a reality that is known, thought of, conceived, mentioned, or
perceived, so that any attempt to know a reality as it is as not
so known, is apparently doomed to failure. For, it is asked, Is
not the only world which we can ''get at," one that is related to
our knowing, or to our experiencing in some manner? There-
fore, is not the question, what the world is, as not so related,
incapable of solution, since to attempt to answer it is but ogavn
to relate the xcorld to some "knowing" or "experiencing"? The
difficulties of this situation constitute the so-called ''ego-centric
predicament." ^'
The possibility of a solution to this problem depends on
whether or not the fact, that all reality which is experienced is
related to an "experience" or an "experiencer," implies that a
difference is thereby made to the reality or the entity experi-
enced.-^ For, on the one hand, if the "experiencing" does make
a difference to or does affect the experienced reality in some way
other than to make it "experienced," then clearly unexperienced
realities are different from experienced ones, though we may
never be able either to know in what respects they differ, or,
indeed, experience them in any way. But, on the other hand,
if the "experiencing" makes 7io difference to the reality experi-
enced, then, of course, the reality is the same "when" experi-
enced as "when" not, and exists or subsists as quite independent
of experience, to be experienced only when those specific condi-
tions exist through which experience arises. In fact, objects as
experienced might themselves give evidence not only of their
own independence of experience, but also of the existence or
subsistence of still other objects that have never before been
experienced, at any rate in certain specific ways.
The second position is the one that is at least tacitly held by
the common sense man and by most scientists. It is not, how-
ever, looked upon with favor by many of those who are sophisti-
'' R. B. Perry, " The Ego-centric Predicament," Jonr. of Phil., Psych.,
and Scientific MetJiods, Vol. VIII., pp. 5-14; also see The New Realism,
E. B. Holt and others, Introduction, and Perry, Present Philosophical
Tendencies, Chap. VI.
"' Cf. Chap. XXVI, on The Theories of Relations.
82 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
cated in the ways of philosophy, and who find one reason or
another for maintaining Qiot only that "the world" is always an
experienced one, but also that "experience" affects "the world"
in some way and makes it what it is either in whole or part.
One may be of the opinion that the issue thus raised is to be'
easily settled by appealing to fact, and, indeed, each party seems
to think that it makes just this appeal. But the facts to which
the appeal is made are not simple, especially since such a means
of settling the issue only again repeats the difficulty of finding
a fact that is not experienced in some way.-* However, let it
be granted that all that we can perceive, think of, appeal to,
and the like, is thereby experienced — in some way ; and let it
be granted also — as it must be — that, in the case of all experi-
enced reality, the "experiencing" and the reality are related.
Then what follows from this experienced factf Can it be (cor-
rectly) inferred from the ever repeated presence of "experi-
ence" to "experienced fact," or from the mere fact of the
relatedness of experienced reality to "experience," that the
experiencing affects the reality? Assuredly not! This infer-
ence can be made only provided it is universally true, that,
because entities are related, they affect one another. But this
is the very question at issue. Does relatedness universally carry
with it, or imply, causal dependence and action ? Or is this the
case only with some instances of related terms? And if it is
thus the case, may not the relation in question, namely, that
between "experience" and "object experienced," be one of the
exceptions, so that we should be justified in concluding, with the
realists, that, although "experience" and "experienced entity"
are related, the latter is quite unaffected by the former, and is
experienced as if the experience were not present ?
Whether this conclusion can be established or not, it is,
nevertheless, one that is not accepted by most philosophers,
notably by the idealists and the phenomenalists. These phi-
losophers insist — unconsciously, perhaps, — that relatedness im-
plies dependence, or causal modification; and, secondly, that
experiencing is related to all realities experienced, i.e., re-
dundantly, that all (experienced) realities are experienced reali-
ties. From these premises are derived those consequences which
'* The ego-centric predicament again.
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 8S
are identical with the main features of their philosophical
systems.^^
However, as regards this procedure it is quite clear, that, if
it is assumed (1) that all related terms are mutually dependent
on and affect one another, and (2) that all realities are experi-
enced realities, and so are related to experience, then it follows,
of course, that all experienced realities are experience-modified-
realities. But it is also quite clear, that from this second
premise alone this conclusion cannot be correctly inferred. It
is correctly inferable only if this premise is taken with the other,
the major premise, namely, that all related terms are mutually
dependent on and affective of one another. It is only these two
premises together that imply that an experienced object is
affected by the experience of it, whereby it becomes the experi-
ence-object.
The question at issue between the realist and his opponents
is, therefore, whether this major premise applies to all related
terms, and so to the specific relational situation of "experience"
and reality. Accordingly it is important to ask hoiv the idealist
and phenomenalist endeavor to establish this premise or princi-
ple. The answer is, that there are certain instances in which
the related terms do seem to exert a causal and modifying influ-
ence on one another. Good examples of this are the mutual
dependence of the parts of any organism on one another, the
causal influence of physical masses in accordance with the prin-
ciple of gravitation, and the mutual induction between positive
and negative charges of electricity. Let the knowing, the ex-
periencing, the cognizing of an object be of the type of these
instances, — and that they are is precisely what the phenomenalist
concludes in generalizing from them as typical instances, — and
it then follows (1) that "things" '^ outside" of the "knowing"
and "experiencing" relation are different from what they are
"m" it; (2) that knowing and experience do affect things; and
(3) that the nature of "things" "outside" of this relation can
never be known, since to attempt to know "things" is to affect
and change them. In other words, it follows, on the one hand,
that there is a realm of unknowable, and not merely unknown,
things-in-themselves, and, on the other hand, that our world
" See Chaps. XXIX., XXX., and XXXIII.
84 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
or universe — the only world that we know — is made what it is,
at least in part, by 'being known.
To the support of this conclusion the idealist brings what he
regards as the discovery of certain instances of related terms
that are constitutive of one another either partially or totally.
This seems to be the case, e.g., with dream-objects and, indeed,
with illusory objects in general, as it seems to be the case, also,
with color, odor, and temperature, — provided the world outside
our skins consists only of hard, fast-moving particles or masses.
Why, then, should not all experience be of this type that is
creative of its own content? Certain idealists unhesitatingly
conclude that this is the case, and there results either Subjective
Idealism, if the experience is that of human beings, or Objective
Idealism if it is the experience of a universal consciousness.
The realist opposes both of these conclusions and arguments.
For him, "things" depend upon knowing in no other way than
for being known; knowledge does not condition reality; and
epistemology is only psychologically prior to other philosophical
problems; i.e., one is first interested in the problem, only subse-
quently to arrive at the conclusion, ( 1 ) that knowing and experi-
ence do not make any difference to the "thing" known and
experienced, and so (2) are virtually separable from that
"thing."
The realist reaches this result by finding certain instances
of terms that are related to and yet independent of one another,
and by then looking for other instances. The knoivi7ig processes
of the idealist and the phenomenalist and the theories that they
propose as known and experienced ^'states of affairs" prove to
be excellent initial instances of this compatible relatedness and
independence. For, while the knowledge and the "state of
aft'airs" proposed as true — in their respective theories, are cer-
tainly related, it is nevertheless presupposed, as the very con-
dition for such a "state of affairs" being "the real genuine
one," that it is independent not only of the specific knowing
and experiencing process in the knowing individuals who main-
tain it, but also of any implied repetition of knowing in other
individuals.
Other instances of terms that are both independent and
related are found in the case of the points of space and the
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 85
instants of time. Points and instants are absolute simples that
are not made up of other elements on condition that, if they were
so made up, there would still be some other absolute "simple"
which we should then call a point or an instant. But as "com-
posing" space and time respectively, these "simples" are re-
lated in a very definite way, namely, so as to form a series with
the same relations present as are found, e.g., in the series of
real numbers in order of magnitude. But no point is affected
hy heing related to oilier points on condition that, if it were, it
would be, not simple, hut complex, since it would then be hoth
itself and the affects thus resulting; or, it would be affected by
an infinite number of other points, and so would be infinitely
complex, and thus again presuppose ultimate, simple "ele-
ments" that would be the real points. Then it would be these
elements that would be related and yet independent in the sense
that they would not be affected by other elements. In a per-
fectly analogous way instants can be &hown to be independent
of one another, and yet to be so related so as to form that specific
series which is time.
Still other instances of cosuhsisting relatedness and inde-
pendence are as follows: Space as a whole is related to matter,
but is independent of it. Empty space is quite conceivable, and
is examined scientifically in geometry with no implication of
matter, or of physical forces. So also are matter, motion, and
change in general related to time, and time to them; but time
is independent of all these entities. The clock does not create
time, nor affect it causally in any way; it only measures time
in ^inits that are relative to one another, but time itself is not
relative.
If there are these cases of related and independent terms,
then can it be consistently argued from the fact of mere related-
ness, either that knowing modifies, or that it is in any way
necessary to the existence of, (known) entities? And also can it
be consistently maintained that, if all finite minds were anni-
hilated, there must still be, as necessary to the existence of the
universe, an "infinite" mind or spirit, analagous to a human
finite mind ?
For the realist the answer to these inquiries can only be
**No." For, if there is a single case of the knowing of a genuine
86 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
and true "state of affairs/' then the knowing and the (com-
plex) entity known are, together, one instance, at least, of the
principle, that some entities are related and yet independent, —
and there may be other instances of this principle. This is the
paradox. "Things" are known and are related to the knowing;
but they are known as if they were not known.
But further, entities can become specifically related, and then
cease to be so related. Thus a moving body of a certain volume
occupies a certain space for an instant, and then no longer
occupies it. "Occupying" is the relation that is both gained
and lost. By this and innumerable other instances the realist
is supported in his contention, that "things" can get into and
out of the relation of being known without being affected
thereby, — which alone is the condition on which "things" can
be known as they really are, i.e., on which there can be genuine
knowledge.
But, still further, an entity in gaining and losing a specific
relation can retain its relations to other entities. Thus a man
can retain, his several blood-relationships, and yet gain new
relations of friendship. So also may an entity retain its several
relations to other entities, and yet gain that relation to an organ-
ism which is identical with being experienced in some specific
way.
These are instances of the evidence which the realist finds
in proof of his contention (1) that entities can be related and
yet be independent, (2) that specific relations can be gained
and lost, and (3) that, with this the case, other relations can
stiir persist. Especially does the realist maintain that these
principles apply to the knowing and experiencing situation, and
that thereby a solution is obtained for the ego-centric
predicament.
This solution is essentially the same logically as that which
is obtained in the analysis of space. A point of space cannot
be annihilated in order to determine what effect this annihila-
tion would have upon other points. But by an analysis that
leaves all the points in situ it is found that, as the condition for
a point being a point and not a complex, a point is related to
another point as if it were not so related, i.e., without being
affected in its simplicity by being related. Similarly, while
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 87
knowing and experience cannot be annihilated in the instance
of a known and experienced object, it is discovered by an
analysis in situ, that, as the condition for there being genuine
knowledge in any specific instance, the object is known as if
the knowing were not present. This sohition is presupposed
even for that situation in which the opposed "state of affairs"
is asserted and claimed to be true, as it is in fact by the idealist,
the phenoraenalist, and by some pragmatists. For, notwith-
standing that these philosophers attempt to base their respective
positions on the insolubility of the ego-centric predicament, they
themselves tacitly solve it by an analysis in situ, when they
present specific states of affairs as true.
But further, wdth the realist presenting well-established ex-
ceptions to the position, that all "things" are what they are
because of their relations to other "things," his opponents
cannot maintain the universality of the theory of internal rela-
tions.-® One is thus relieved from the necessity of admitting the
positions frequently taken in epistemology, (1) that no problem
can be isolated, since it is related to, and so modified by, other
problems; (2) that we cannot know the truth about anything
until we know the truth about everything; and, (3) that truth
cannot be truth because it is a value. Contrary to these posi-
tions, which condition various specific tendencies in philosophy,
the evidence just considered shows it to be possible, (1) that
one problem at a time can be studied and solved; (2) that the
knowledge of the "things" involved in one problem will not be
changed by the knowledge of other "things"; and (3) that
truth remains truth, although, as related to appreciation, desire, /
and purpose, it is also a value.
The epistemological problem in its several aspects still per-
sists. In fact it is the problem that is most discussed in con-
temporaneous philosophy. But only one party thinks that it is
not a problem that is logically prior to all others, and this party
— the realists — takes this position because, having considered the
problem, it finds that, in order to know, one need not first fin4
the how or whence or wherefore of "knowing."
="« See Chap. XXVI., ii., 2 and 3.
88 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER XI
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM AND THE NATURE OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
The preceding section has already introduced us to the psy-
chological problem. Perception, thinking, knowing, and, in
general, experience, are undoubtedly facts of some kind, but, of
what kind, is the question. Already two fairly distinct answers
to this question have been found and to some extent examined,
especially as to their implications. By one group of philoso-
phers, the idealists, the phenomenalists, and the pragmatists, it
is maintained, that the cognitive consciousness is such that it
modifies, or even constitutes known and experienced objects.
This position is based on the assumption, that terms which are
related affect one another. Clearly this view makes of con-
sciousness, of knowing, of experience, the kind of "thing" that
can causally affect or even produce the object, and a term that
is a sort of substance is able to do this} By another group, the
realists, it is argued, that the basic condition for genuine knowl-
edge is, that the "thing" which becomes known shall enter into,
and, perhaps, pass out of the cognitive situation without being
affected thereby. This is possible only if the knowing is not a
substance, but a relation, or a dimension, or a quality, or, possibly
and indirectly, an event.^ Although there may be other sets of
conditions in which there is knowing, nevertheless there is much
evidence that the knowing situation arises when the complex or
simple entity that is to become known gets into certain specific
relations with another entity, i.e., with an organism having a
nervous system of a certain degree of complexity, and in a
certain physico-chemical condition. Knowing situations — at
least those with which we are best acquainted — disappear
when this specific complex disappears. But this means
that specific knowings appear and disappear. It follows that
knowing cannot be an absolutely simple term, since such a term,
' See Chap8. XXIX., XXX., XXXIV.-XXXVIII.
* !See Chaps. XLl., xiv. ; XLllL, iii. and XI.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM 89
illustrated by a point and an instant, cannot appear and dis-
appear. Only on the hypothesis, therefore, that knowing is a
relational complex — of a specific kind, — and involving, of course,
a relation between terms, themselves either simple or complex,
can the experienced fact of the appearance and disappearance
of specific knowings be explained.
This is, in brief form, ''the relational view of conscious-
ness." It is one solution of the problem as to ivhat kind of an
entity consciousness is, and is held at the present time by a
number of philosophers.^ It is a view that is also quite com-
patiMe with the more orthodox position of experimental psy-
chology, that specific consciousnesses are events. For events are
themselves relational complexes, — e.g., a specific accelerated
motion is a series of velocities, — and relations can themselves he
related — as are, e.g., ''greater than" and "less than," brother-
hood and sisterhood. Therefore consciousness as an event could
be a complex of specific conscious relations that are themselves
related in a specific way.
This theory is also compatible with the view of a certain very
modern school of psychologists, that the important thing in
psychology is to study the objective manifestations, i.e., the
behavior of organisms.* For, ivhen there are specific physio-
logical conditions in this organic complex, and this in turn is
related in a specific way to the entities to be known, i.e., to the
stimulus, then the knowing is also present, perhaps as a char-
acteristic of the whole complex, organism a7id stimulus. Some-
thing occurs, something is done when this larger complex arises,
and this can be studied as the behavior of an organism stimulated
in a specific manner. The interesting corollary of this position
is, that the knowing can not, in all cases at least, be said to be
located within our bodies. Strictly speaking, it has no locus or
place or position. Its conditions have, but it has not.
"E.g., by F. J. E. Woodbridge, E. B. Holt, W. B. Pitkin, and by the
writer.
* See E. P. Frost, "The Belief in Consciousness," Jonr. of Phil., Psych.,
and Scientific Methods, Vol. XIII., No. 10, and " Cannot Psychology Dis-
pense with Consciousness?" Psych. Review, Vol. XIV., No. 21; D. Miller,
"Is Consciousness a Type of Behavior?" Jonr. of Phil., Psych., and Scien-
tific Methods, Vol. XL, No. 8; E. A. Singer, Jr., "Consciousness and
Behavior," Jonr. of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. XII., No. 9;
Watson, " Psychology as the Behaviorists view it," Psych. Revieio, Vo)
XHI., No. 20. Watson in his Behavior gives a complete bibliography.
90 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
This view that consciousness is a relation is perhaps a difficult
one to grasp. Relations seem to be evasive, evanescent, indeed,
almost negligible "things." Yet are they not facts? And
should we hesitate to admit that consciousness in each specific
instance of its occurrence is a relation, or else a "new" dimen-
sion, if this conclusion is necessary in order to explain other
facts ?
However, many philosophers and psychologists hesitate to
accept this "relational" or "dimensional" theory, and indeed
historically it has not been a widely favored one. Consciousness
has seemed to be, perhaps, too tangible, "solid," and substance-
like, and to involve too much of a continuity and unity of
personality to be a mere relation or a dimension. Indeed, the
traditional view is, that empirically, both by introspection of
one's own mind and by observation of other minds, an entity
is discovered that is an ego, a self, a soul, a "something" that
is of absolute constancy, and anything hut a relation, a dimen-
sion, an event, or a disembodied quality. In fact, it is argued,
that absolute unity and constancy are necessary in order to
account for the continuity of personality and the unity of
knowledge, and that this finally demands a numerically simple
and indestructible entity somewhere in human consciousness.^
Relations, it is contended, appear and disappear altogether too
readily to meet this demand, while complex entities, such as
specific dimensions, disintegrate, or, as existing, presuppose an
absolute unity to bind them together, and qualities imply some-
thing of which they are qualities, and in which they inhere.
Thus runs the argument of the opponents of "the relational
view," and their names include the great names in the history
of philosophy.
A very similar position has been advanced in modern days,
since the law of the conservation of energy and the theory of
evolution have dominated scientific thought, to establish what
amounts to a principle of the evolution and yet of the conserva-
tion of consciousness. It is argued (1) that consciousness is
so different from physical energy, that it cannot "come" from
or arise out of this, yet (2) that it is a fact and must come from
something; and, therefore (3) that there must be a preceding
" E.g., by Plato and Leibniz, and, perhaps, by Kant.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM 91
consciousness out of which it arises or is transformed. Thus
the position is derived, that there is either an all-permeating
universal, yet impersonal consciousness that exists in varying
degrees in animal, plant, molecule, atom,® and even electron, or
a great personal consciousness that "wells up" and is present
in ail "things," and is, perhaps, identical with God J
All this shows that the question of the nature of consciousness
is one of the main philosophical problems. Indeed, it is a very
pressing problem today in this period of revolt against many of
the traditional philosophical methods and positions. His-
torically, in reaching solutions of the problem, the "substance
view" of consciousness has been dominant. But this has been
the case primarily because of the influence of the Aristotelian
tradition, with its preeminent concepts of siibstance and cause.
The other psychological problems are more specific, and fall
within the realm of empirical psychology as this is carried on
by experiment and observation and by statistics. But this is
not to say that the more general and philosophical problem as
to the nature of consciousness is not to be solved by the use of
similar methods, or that the solution of some of these more
specific questions does not aid in the solution of this wider
problem. On the contrary, two at least of the specific psycho-
logical problems are espevrially important philosophically.
Whatever consciousness may ultimately he, we nevertheless
know some of the "things" that it does, and we have an em-
pirical classification of its different forms. Thus we speak of
knowing, feeling, and willing, or of cognition, emotion, and voli-
tion; of deliberation, instinct, and impulse; of attention, dis-
crimination, and analysis; and of perception, memory, imagina-
tion, and reason.
If, now, evidence is found for holding that consciousness
evolves along with the evolution of life, then the question arises,
what kind of consciousness was first. Was it sense perception,
or the mere feeling of pain and pleasure, or an "elementary"
will, and are all kinds of consciousness only gradual modifica-
tions or outgrowths of a first kind ? But these questions suggest
'E.g., by Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, trans, by Thilly. This is
also the position that is at least implicitly taken by most text-books on
psychology.
^ The position of many objective idealists; see Chaps. XXXIV.-XXXVIII.
92 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
others. Thus, instead of arguing, that in order to account for
consciousness in higher forms, notably in man, its presence must
be granted in the lowest forms, and even in atoms and electrons,
could we not start with what we directly find in the lower
organisms, namely tropisms, reflexes, organic discrhninations,
and the like, and then ask, if what we call consciousness in
higher forms is not merely a complex of these purely physio-
logical modes of behavior ? ^
But there is a second psycho-philosophical problem. Certain
philosophical systems that are great not only in their influence
as philosophies, but also in their alliance with the dominating
religions of the world, find reasons for concluding that tlie whole
universe is ultimately conscious or spiritual in nature. What,
then, is the character of this universal spirit or consciousness?
Is it a self, an ego, a spiritual unity? Is it will, knowing, or
feeling? Or, if it is all three of these together, ivhich is domi-
nant, and what is the relation by which the three form one
relational complex? In answering these questions the great
idealistic or spiritualistic philosophers have differed and still
differ.^
One further psychological problem must be mentioned be-
cause, through the solutions that have been given to it,
it has been of great influence on certain philosophical
systems. This problem concerns the nature of illusions,
of dreams, and of hallucinations, and is stated in the
question, Are, or are not, our dreams and especially the
things of ivhich we dream wholly "within our heads," wholly
in our "dream-consciousness"? And yet, it may be asked, are
not dream-objects quite real to us ivhile we dream them. Then
the further question arises, whether it might not be, that every-
thing in the universe, stars and sun and planets, this earth
and all that lives thereon, is but a persistent dream in which
we all share. Here one might still further ask, whether you
would not be only my dream-object, so that I would be all, and
all would be in mef This position, that everything except you
and me and other human beings, as spirits or souls, is a sort
' This is done by, e.g., Jacques Loeb in Physiology of the Brain, and in
The Mechanistic Conception of Life.
• See Chaps. XXXIV.-XXXVIII.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM 93
of dream in which we all share, with dream "effect" following
dream ''cause" with regularity and according to law, is Sub-
jective Idealism. But what right, once thus started, to make
exceptions? To be consistent must one not also grant that all
other human beings are only one's own persistent dream? This
consistent position is Solipsism,
But the instances of normal illusions also set a similar prob-
lem. For example, the rails of the railroad are parallel, but as
we look down the track they appear to converge. Also, the
stick that is straight appears bent, if it is immersed in the water.
But can the rails actually be both parallel and not parallel, the
stick be both straight and bent? Are not parallel and not
parallel, straight and not-straight respectively contradictories, so
that in each instance each characteristic must exist at a different
place or locus? Much traditional philosophy and psychology
have solved these problems by making the "parallelness" and
the straightness in each case the real "objects," and by "put-
ting" the contradictory entities, i.e., the illusory appearances,
ifito some particular consciousness, thus identifying their esse
with their percipi.^'^ For their existence consciousness is held
to be necessary. Therefore, it is further asked. Is not conscious-
ness necessary for the existence of all "things," even of all
so-called real "things"? Could not they also be mere appear-
ances and exist in some personal consciousness, or, if not this,
then at least in some divine consciousness? This position is
again Subjective Idealism, or, carried to its logical conclusion,
Solipsism,
The reply to these arguments can be stated briefly, and,
indeed, on the principle, that one cannot lift himself by his
own boot-straps. If some "things" arc concluded to exist only
"in" consciousness, because other "things" do not, then it
cannot be consistently inferred, that these other "things" also
exist in consciousness. The scientific solution of the problem
of these normal illusions, — if illusions they are — is one that
cuts the very foundation from beneath that argument for
idealism which is based on them. This scientific solution is,
that the illusory appearances do not exist "in" consciousness
at all, but are real parts of that same world of which the real
*" £. g., by A. O. Lovejoy; see the refprences given in Chap. XLIII.
94 HISTORICAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
objects are also parts. Rails and stick hy themselves are re-
spectively parallel and straight. But the complex, rails and
light, has the characteristic of convergence, and the complex^
stick and water and light, the characteristic of bentness. Each
of these contradictory attributes has, indeed, a different locus
from that of the original object, but this locus may quite as
well be another part of the physical world as a part of a
consciousness.
SECTION III
METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
I. THINKING
CHAPTER XII
REASONING BY WORDS, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THINKING
I. INTRODUCTORY
In this section there will be considered the various methods
that are used in attempting to solve philosophical problems.
But, since these methods present problems of their own, we
shall have problems of method, in addition to problems of points
of view, of ontology, cosmology, epistemology, and the like. The
methods to be examined will, however, not be limited to those
that are correct, but will also include those which, though un-
sound, have, nevertheless, been frequently employed to solve
certain problems which have arisen in the development of certain
historical systems of philosophy.
II. THE THINKING SITUATION ^
It is an important, although rather obvious fact, that all
philosophical systems, whatever their differences, must use
'Compare with the account that follows: E. B. LeRoy, La Langue,
1905; H. Odier, Essai d' Analyse Psych, du Mechanisme du Langdge dans
la Comprehension, 1905: H. Steinthal, Einleitung in die Psychologic und
Sprachivissenschaft, 1881; W. Wundt, Sprachgeschichte und kiprachpsy-
chologie, 1901 ; B. Erdmann, Psychologische Untersuchurtgen iiber das
Lesen, 1898; G. VVolil', Psychologic des Erkennens, 1S97; A. Binet, Psy-
chology of Reasoning, 1912; F. Brentano, Psychologic vom empirischen
Standpunkte ; K. 8. Woodworth, " Non-Sensorj' Components of Sense Percep-
tion," Jour, of Phil., Psych, and Scientific Methods, Vol. IV.: also, " Image-
less Thought," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. III., 1906;
and " The Consciousness of Relation " in Essays Philosophical and Psycho-
logical, in Honor of Wm. James, 1908; James, Principles of Psychology,
Vol. 1., p. 243 ff.; J. K. Angell, "Thought and Imagery," Phil. Review,
95
g6 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
words in their processes of reasoning, since they are argued
about and defended, and are thus presented for our acceptance
as true. This is the case even in such an extreme position as
mysticism, where, it is claimed, intuition and ecstasy reveal
certain facts which reason cannot apprehend. When rationally
defended, even such a position is reasoned about by the use of
words, and thus the possibility that reason can discover at least
some facts is presupposed. The problem as to what is involved
in reasoning by the use of words, or of some kind of symbols,
is, therefore, a general problem of method that concerns all
philosophical systems in one way or another, and all philosophiz-
ing to some degree.
Common also to all philosophizing is the method of examining
the "world" about us by some mode of approach, i.e., either by
the senses, or by some other mode. But different individuals
accept different methods of approach, and the regarding of
anything as fact is made dependent on that which is antecedently
regarded as the correct approach. For example, the mystic
regards intuition as the one correct method, and so holds that
all-adsorbing miity which this approach reveals, to be the im-
portant fact, while the intellectualist finds that analysis and
reasoning are correct approaches, and that plurality and differ-
ences are quite as much facts as is unity.
Thus, in all philosophizing and in all philosophical systems
there are ttvo methods, the one, that of reasoning by words and
other symbols, the other, that of observing in some way, both
of which are accepted and used, and freely allowed to supple-
ment each other. Of these the former will be first considered,
since it is that method to which we are of necessity committed
in our endeavor to investigate philosophical problems, methods,
and systems.
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING; SYMBOLS
Words are by themselves only physical objects, i.e., they are
either printed or written marks, or, as spoken words, waves of
air. These objects are words in the usual sense by virtue of
Vol. VI., 1897; E. B. Titcliener, Eaperimental Psychology of the Thought
Processes, 1!)09; VV. B. rillsbury, The Psychology of Reasoning, 1910;
J. JJewey, IJoio We Think; B. Erdmann, " Umrissc zur Psycholofjie des
Denkena," in Phil. Abh. Chr. Bigioart zu seinem lOten Oehurtstage, 1900,
pp. 3-40.
REASONING BY WORDS 97
being associated with certain specific mental processes, namely,
with those which reveal the objects or "things" that are experi-
enced when these mental processes are taking place. The
physical words are, then, symbols for these objects or "things."
It results, that when one perceives or thinks of certain specific
marks or sounds that are word-symbols, one also tends to be
conscious of the objects for which the symbols stand, i.e., to be
conscious of their meaning. This "meaning" consciousness,
therefore, and the consciousness of the words as such, become
associated, and thereafter, each tends to "arouse" the conscious-
ness of the other. But further, the consciousness of a meaning,
once aroused, arouses the consciousness of other meanings, and
so on, at the same time that the consciousness of the words for
these "things" is aroused, and there then occurs a series of
word-images, the earlier images suggesting later ones. Accord-
ingly, when we read or hear words, these suggest or arouse the
appropriate meanings, and when we think quietly, or speak, the
meanings seem to come slightly ahead of the words, and to
suggest them.
Three aspects, therefore, are to be distinguished in the situa-
tion presented by the use and meaning of words. There is
(1) the psychological aspect, Avhieh concerns the consciousness
both of the word-symbols and of the objects and meanings with
which they are associated; (2) the grammatical aspect, and,
(3) the logical aspect, which merges into the grammatical, and
conversely. These last two aspects are, of course, also most
intimately connected with the first aspect, since logical and
grammatical facts are known and have word-symbols associated
with them.
The psychological processes with w^hich we are concerned are
classified as follows : Consciousness, or psychic or mental process,
is the genus, and its three main subdivisions are: cognition,
emotion, and volition, or, using synonyms, knowing, feeling,
and willing. The meaning of each of these is sufficiently well
known to the reader not to demand a discussion. Knowing may,
however, he defined as awareness.
Cognition is in turn classifiable into its specific kinds, namely,
sense perception, memory, imagination, and conception, and
there are, in turn, as many kinds of each of these processes as
98 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
there are specifically different senses, namely, sight, hearing,
"equilibrium," touch, taste, smell, and the "heat," "cold,"
"muscular," and "organic" senses. This means that, with dif-
ferent kinds of sense perception, also memory-, imagination-,
and conception-processes can take place in terms of each sense,
although vision, hearing, touch, and muscularity are the
dominant senses.
There are also processes of self-perception, or of introspec-
tion, that do not take place through the medium of the special
sense organs. In this process of self-perception we become
aware that we are perceiving, remembering, imagining, con-
ceiving, willing, having emotions, and the like. Thus self-
perception also furnishes material or content for subsequent
processes of memory, imagination, and reasoning.
This classification of cognitive processes means that all sorts
of entities, such as things, qualities, events, and relations, can
be perceived, remembered, imagined, conceived, judged, and
reasoned about. Some of these entities are physical, others are
mental, while still others belong to neither of these two classes.
Among these non-physical and non-mental entities are terms,
qualities, relations, and perhaps also events, luhich our reason
shows us would still he facts, even if all physical and mental
entities were annihilated. A good example of such entities,
which may be called (non-existent) subsist ents, are the positive
integers, 1, 2, 3, n — 1, n, n -f- 1, — not these physical marks, of
course, — hut that which these signs symbolize, and that which is
presupposed, biit not made by counting.
Written, printed, and spoken words are used as symbols or
signs by which to indicate both specific individuals and specific
classes of individuals, and classes of these classes, and so on.
To illustrate this, and at the same time to give examples of
some of these classes of entities, the reader's attention may be
called to the fact that he can now experience, by introspection,
a series of (existent) mental processes as he visually perceives
these very words (physical existents). Thus his experience is
at least twofold. However, words or symbols that are used in
reasoning can be known in any one of the several cognitive
processes, and not alone in sense perception; i.e., there are
remembered, imagined, and conceived, as well as perceived
REASONING BY WORDS 99
words. Words read are visually perceived, and words heard are
perceived in hearing. But tvJien we reason in order to write or
speak, we tend to formulate our thoughts in words that are
conceived, though, as ive ivrite or speak, and see and hear, there
are also perceived words. But any kind of a word can be
associated with any particular object or class of objects that is
brought to our knowledge in any way whatsoever. Thus we
have words not only for what we perceive in sensation and in
terms of sensation, but also for what is revealed in our reasoning
processes and in our emotions and acts of will.
IV. GRAMMAR
The differences among the entities that we perceive, remember,
imagine, and get at by reason, or become aware of emotionally,
as in cesthetic and moral feeling, and the like, receive a certain
recognition in the grammatical distinctions and differences of
language. Thus, nouns for the most part symbolize ''things"
and qualities; verbs, prepositions, and conjunctions symbolize
events and relations; and adjectives and adverbs, qualities or
attributes. The grammatical structure of sentences also ex-
presses and reveals to a certain extent the relations between and
among the entities to which our judgments, as psychological,
knowing processes, are directed. In general, grammatical dif-
ferences correspond to objective characteristics of the entities
that are symbolized b}^ the words, and that are known in the
judgment which is verbally formulated.
CHAPTER XIII
THE LOGICAL ASPECTS OF THINKING
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LOGIC
We use our senses to perceive, we remember, we have emo-
tions, and we describe what is thus revealed to us, but sometimes
we do more than this. We reason about "things." It is a most
important question, then, to ask, What is it, when we reason, by
100 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
virtue of tvhich we are enabled to do this? or, Just what do w&
do when ive reason?
As at least a tentative answer to this second question it may
be said, that to reason is to infer, or to learn from something
that is known, something that was previously unknown. To
reason may also mean to systematize, and to ''put" many
"things" together consistently, as is done, e.g., in any science,
though to do this seemingly demands reason in the former
sense.
But the first question is more important for our purposes
than the second, which concerns only the psychological char-
acter of reasoning. What is it in or among the entities that
we reason about that enables us to infer? The answers given to
this question have been both varied and involved. Among them
three principal tendencies are distinguishable, namely, the
realistic, the psychological, and the pragmatic. These are the
three main views as to the nature of logical principles and
entities. All three agree that we reason by using in some way
the peculiar, interesting, and very important relation of implica-
tion, but they differ in their interpretation of the nature and
locus of this relation.
I. THE REALISTIC VIEW OP LOGIC
According to the realistic view, implication is a relation that
is objective in the sense that, although related to, it is inde-
pendent of, the reasoning process that is, in part at least, an
awareness of it. Just as there are relations of similarity, of
difference, and of whole and part, so also, it is held, there are
relations of implication, or of the non-causal, yet necessary con-
nection between "things." By discovering and making use of
these relations in specific instances, we discover other relations,
and from certain entities, other entities}
Just what all the typical situations are that present the rela-
tionship of implication, is difficult to determine, but the follow-
ing is a simple illustration of one such situation: Among the
entities that are discoverable in this universe of many entities
are relations, as has already been emphasized. Instances of
relations are "father of," "equal to," and "precedes." If,
' See Chap. XLI.
THE LOGICAL ASPECTS OF THINKING 101
now, the terms that are related are symbolized by a, h, c, etc.,
then we can have the relational complexes, respectively, a the
father of h, a equals h, and a precedes h. However, it would
seem that none of these relations subsists without, in each case,
another and distinct relation also subsisting, this other relation
being the inverse, or what is sometimes called the converse of
the original. But at the same time that this inverse relation is
distinct from the original relation, it is also necessitated by it,
though not in a causal, but in a logical manner. This specific
logical necessity is an instance of implication. Thus, in the case
of one of our examples, "father of implies or necessitates the
inverse relation, "child of," and these two relations are not
identical. So also a = b implies that h =^ a, and "a precedes
b" implies that "ft follows a." In general we may say that
every relation implies its inverse or converse.'
This being so, we have a most interesting situation. The
proposition just stated means that, with the original relation
aBh given, there is of necessity the inverse relation, hRa. But
this means that aRb and bRa are themselves related both by
implication and by "inverseness." Then, if the proposition
above stated is correct, each of these relations also implies its
own inverse. But this is precisely what we find. The relation
of implication that subsists in that aRb implies bRa, itself
implies the inverse, namely, that "bRa implies aRb, i.e., "aRb
implies hRa" itself implies "bRa implies aRb.'*
This situation need not be analyzed further for our purposes,
for the analysis thus far made discloses the fact, both that the
relation of implication subsists in the midst of, or side by side
with, or on the basis of, other relations, perhaps of very specific
ones, and also that it is itself a basis for still further relations.
Another situation in which we find the relation of implication
cosubsisting with other relations is one that is identical with
the orthodox categorical syllogism of the Aristotelian formal
logic."
The traditional logic of Aristotle is essentially the logic of
classes. A class subsists by virtue of the relation of similarity,
together with, in most cases, that of difference among entities,
and quite independently of their order. This is quite evident
=■ Cf. Chap. XXVII. ' Cf. Chap. XIV.
102 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
when we consider simple examples such as the two classes,
men and vertebrates. Any one individual of the class is in the
relation to the class of being ''a member of" it. But classes
are themselves related by complete, partial, and negative inclu-
sion (i.e., exclusion). Thus, to illustrate, all mew are included
in the larger class vertebrates, but the class vertebrates is only
partially included in the class men, and, finally, the whole class
vertebrates is excluded from the whole class triangles. Such
relations of similarity, difference, member of, and inclusion,
positive and negative, between entities are, now, propositions,
or objective ''state of affairs," and the knowledge of such rela-
tional complexes is in each ease a judgment.
One and the same class, further, can be in one relation to one
class, and in another relation to another class. Thus the class
vertebrates includes the class men, but is included in the class
living beings. With this specific state of affairs subsisting, there
also subsists of necessity the relation of inclusion of the class,
meyi, by the class, animals. This relation is numerically distinct
from the other two relations of inclusion, namely, of men in
vertebrates, and of vertebrates in animals, yet it is related to
them. It is, first, similar to, and, second, implied by them.
Thus we have another case of the relation of implication "resting
on" other relations between terms (in this case those of in-
clusion), and of still another relation or relational complex
resting on it. In the example just given, if we let S symbolize
the class (all) men, M the class (all) vertebrates, P the class
(all) living beings, < the relation ''included in," and ) the
relation of implication, then we have S <. M and M < P, )
8 < P. This relational situation holds good for any classes,
8, M, P, that are related to one another as are the classes, men,
vertebrates, and animals.
In a very similar way the relation of complete exclusion of
a class 8 from a class P is implied by the two relations (1) of
the complete inclusion of the class 8 by M, and (2) of the com-
plete exclusion of 31 from P. Thus, to illustrate, if all proposi-
tions are included in the class of analyzable entities, and all
analyzable entities are completely excluded from the class of
simple entities, it is implied, that all propositions are excluded
from the class of simple entities.
THE LOGICAL ASPECTS OF THINKING 103
Other instances of the relation of inclusion, complete, partial,
or negative, between two classes ''at a time," are discoverable,
and the several relational complexes that thereby subsist, taken
in pairs as premises together with the propositions which they
imply, make tip the several moods of the four figures of the
Aristotelian categorical syllogism. The detailed examination of
these moods and figures may be found in any text-book on logic,
and need not be presented here.
There are a number of other, perhaps many other situations
in which the relation of implication is present. But the instances
given will, it is hoped, make clear what the realistic position
is in regard to the problem of what it is (in the situation rea-
soned about) that enables us to reason, or that we discover and
become aware of when we reason. The solution of this problem
is, that, just as there are "things," qualities, events, and such
relations as membership in, similarity, and inclusion, so also is
there the relation of implication, which, if the former entities
are objective and discoverable, is also of this same character.*
There are many further questions, some of them of extreme
interest, concerning the problem of implication. Thus, if cer-
tain relations are implied by others, which we find to be the
ease, then it may be asked, whether implication is itself implied,
or whether it merely occurs as one among many relations, i.e., as
one that accompanies, but is not necessitated by other relations.
The writer is strongly convinced that the second alternative is
the ease.
Although all the circumstances that surround and perhaps
condition implication may be difficult to discover, nevertheless
the realist holds that to reason correctly, even in the study of
the reasoning situation itself, is to discover (objective) relations
of implication that are independent of the reasoning process,
though related to it. For example, there are i7idividual
* The problem of the nature of implication, the circumstances of its
occurrence, etc., have not as yet been given much attention in philosophical
investigation, although Russell has dealt with it somewhat in his Principles
of Mathematics. The objective view here presented agrees, e.g., with that
of G. E Moore in his article, " The Nature of Judgment," Mind, N. S.,
Vol. VIII., p. 177 ff., and is accepted, I believe, by all realists. Cf., also,
on the realistic interpretation of logic and a criticism of the psychological
and pragmatic tendencies, Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, especially
Vol. 1., 1900, and Vol. II., 1901.
104. METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
"things," that, through the relations of similarity and differ-
ence, form distinct classes. Then there are also the objective
states of affairs of both similarity and difference. But in turn
there are classes that are related to one another by inclusion,
i.e., if A, B, and C are classes, and < symbolizes the relation of
inclusion, A < B, and B <. C. Then, discovering and following
the "threads" of implication, we discover that A <.C. This
is typical of that situation which is present when we reason
by what is called the categorical syllogism.
The categorical syllogism, however, is not the only technical
method of reasoning. There are also other methods, which will
be presented later. Yet in regard to all of them the realistic
position is the same. Not only are indiviO.ual "things" inde-
pendent of knowing, but relations also are, not excepting those
relations of implication which must be discovered when we
reason and reason correctly, and by the discovery of which we
are enabled to ascertain from certain facts other facts that are
necessitated by the facts from which we started.
Indeed it is precisely this objective point of view that is at
least tacitly accepted by every philosopher when he reasons in
order to philosophize. Every philosopher aims to arrive at or
to discover "large" general facts or states of affairs that are
quite independent of his own or anybody else's knowing proc-
esses ; and in presenting his philosophy for acceptance, he tacitly
assumes that he has succeeded. In this respect every philosophy
is realistic.
Eeason may not be the only "method" by which facts are
revealed. Sense perception, memory, emotion, and intuition
must also be admitted to be such avenues of approach. But
reason alone is that method by which these other methods can
be examined, and a conclusion as to their reliability and char-
acter be obtained. Also it is reason alone that can thus examine
itself. Reason is, then, the court of last resort. Indeed it is
accepted as such even by those philosophers who write books
in advocacy of anti-rational positions. Thus, e.g., the mysticism
of a philosopher like Bergson can he ratio)ially supported only
by intellectual methods.
The foregoing analysis presents the realistic view of that
situation which is involved in any attempt to reason and to
THE LOGICAL ASPECTS OF THINKING 105
philosophize hy the use of words. Words are the conventional
instrument for this thinking, and for testing its correctness by
communication with others. But that for which certain words
and phrases are the signs is not the concrete individuals, nor
the consciousness of these, but the various and diverse states of
affairs that hold of these individuals. Certain of these states
of affairs are logical, or involve logical entities, including im-
plication, and when these are discovered, the way is clear to
discover other "things" or entities.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGIZING TENDENCY
The realistic position, that logical entities are objective and
independent of reasoning processes is, however, not accepted
by every one. It is certainly not the traditional view.
The traditional logic is, as we have seen, the logic of classes,
of things, and of qualities. In it the paramount "principles"
are those of identity and of contradiction, and these are made
"laws of thought," or psychological and subjective principles.
To make this statement clear, let us consider, e.g., the proposi-
tion, a stone is hard, i.e., all stones are hard. But there are also
other hard things than stones. Our proposition would seem to
mean, then, that a certain class, stones, are, as a whole, included
in, or identical with a certain part of, a larger class, hard things.
In both cases, now, the principle of identity appears. There is
an identity of "extension" between stones and a certain specific
part of the class, hard things, and, also, hardness is (identical
with) a quality of stones.
Now in accordance with the teachings of the traditional logic
it is impossible to reason without presupposing and using the
principle of identity in both of these senses. Thus, whether
we start with the proposition, "hard things are not mental,"
or with "hard things are physical," and from these and the
proposition, "stones are hard things," conclude that stones are
not mental, but physical, we are presupposing and using iden-
tity in both of the senses just mentioned.
Yet that the principle of identity is not only presupposed in
such instances but also that it is a law of our thinking, i.e., that
it is a psychological and subjective law, is the traditional logical
106 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
doctrine that is reached by the following argument, used either
implicitly or explictly.
Thinking is held to be specifically different from other entities,
or to be sui genesis in at least some aspects, and thus to have
a "nature" peculiar to itself. The proposition is then main-
tained as self-evident, that thinking cannot act in contradiction
to this "nature," but must act in agreement with it. A similar
argument could, of course, be made for almost any entity, e.g.,
for electricity. The next question accordingly is, what those
laws are which, when thinking acts in accordance with them,
"fulfil" and reveal its nature? This question is answered by
finding what laws thinking must follow, whether it will or no,
since, if it can be shown that there are certain laws that thinking
must follow, this necessity can be accounted for by the hypothesis,
that such laws are resident in the thinking process itself, and
"make up" that nature in agreement with which thinking must
act.
But, what laws thinking must follow is ascertained by finding
what laivs or principles are such either that their opposite
cannot be conceived or thought, or that they are presupposed
by their own (attempted) denial.^ By applying these tests,
the conclusion is reached, that such laws must be used, when
we think, indeed even when we endeavor to think without them,
hecause they are laivs of thinking.
This is the argument that is used, either tacitly or explicitly,
in the traditional logic in order to show that not only the law
of identity, but also the laws of contradiction and of excluded
middle are "laws of thought," i.e., laws of a psychological
process.
We may now examine the application of this argument to
each of these laws, at the same time that we give each law
a formulation.
The Law of Identity. Even in the endeavor to think without
/it, the principle is used, (1) that each entity is identical with
itself, i.e., that it is that particular entity and not any other,
and (2) that it retains its peculiar character and its indi-
viduality.
The Law of Contradiction. Even in the attempt to think
" See Chap. XV., iv., 5, 6, 7.
THE LOGICAL ASPECTS OF THINKING 107
without it, the principle is used (1) that each entity cannot be
both that entity and not that entity, and (2) that it cannot both
belong and not belong to a specific class, either as an individual
member or as itself a class. The first formulation of the prin-
ciple is but a restatement of the law of identity as the principle
of the individuality of each entity, even where, as in the class
of the points of space, all individuals seem to be qualitatively
alike. The principle, in this sense, does not mean, however,
that one and the same entity cannot be in two relational com-
plexes at once. For that an entity can have such a dual rela-
tionship is exemplified by a point, which, as the apex of an
angle, is a member of the two lines that form the angle. The
principle of contradiction may be illustrated by that proposition
which concerns it, namely, that it itself cannot he both a
{psychological) law of thought a7id not such a law.
The Law of Excluded Middle. Even in the endeavor to think
without it, the principle is used (1) that each entity, either as
an individual or as a class, must belong either to a class, A,
or to that contradictory class, non-A, which logically includes
everything that the other class does not include. Thus, any
logical principle must be either a (psychological) law of thought
or not such a law.
This position that certain logical principles are laws of
thought, or of mind, or of psychical processes, is well called
**the psychologizing tendency."*^ Its consistent outcome is, on
the one hand, that all logical principles are subjective or mental,
and, on the other hand, that that which shall be regarded as
logical is determined by finding what principles (1) are pre-
supposed by the very endeavor to think without them, or (2)
are of such a character that their opposites cannot be conceived,
or (3) are, perhaps, also self-evident. Historically, as this
tendency has developed, a numerically single "transcendental
ego," and also such "concepts" as quantify, quality, relation,
causation, substance and attribute, possibility, actuality, neces-
sity, unity, plurality, totality, positive, negative, and even time
and space, have been "found" to be such logical principles.
This is notably the case in the Kantian philosophy and tradi-
tion, in which some of these "concepts" are called "categories."
' See Husserl, op. cit., for a criticism of this tendency.
108 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
The argument has been, that one must think in accordance with
some one, or a number of these ; that the very attempt not to do
so but reveals the compulsion to do it; and, therefore, that this
compulsion is to be explained alone by the hypothesis, that these
"concepts" are principles of thinking.''
The sharp difference between this psychologizing tendency
and the opposed realistic position may be brought out by con-
sidering certain consequences of the former position. The
critical examination of the traditional development in philosophy
shows, as we have already found, that there has been a strong
tendency to use the principle, that all entities, because they are
related in any way, are also causally related. This principle is,
therefore, applied to the fact of the relation between knowing
and that which is known. If, now, this knowing has a nature
that consists of laws of thought, categories, and the like, then
those ways in which knowing will affect the entities that are
known will be just these laws and categories. It follows, that,
given an indeterminate "something," an x, to he known, this
X will, as known, bear the "stamp" of these laws and cate-
gories, and any attempt to know an entity without this * ' stamp ' '
will be self-defeating.
In the psychologizing tendency, therefore, logical principles
and entities are "made" subjective or psychical entities that
are attributes of and that inhere in the knowing mind, and that
also are wholly absent from the realm of unknown x's, but that
nevertheless appear to be in the realm of known "things" be-
cause they are "read into" that realm by the causal influence
of the knowing on that which is (to be) known. This philosophy
' Aristotle himself would seem to have accepted the realistic interpreta-
tion of the proposition and the syllogism and, also, of logic. In the
assertion of a proposition he recognized two aspects, a subjective and an
objective. In the subjective there is revealed the speaker's belief or dis-
belief; in the objective the "state of affairs" to which such belief or
disbelief corresponds. See De Interpretatione, p. 23, a 32; p. 24, b 1;
p. 17, a 22. The later subjectivistic and psychological view seems to have
grown up in the tradition because of some lack of clearness in Aristotle's
own mind, and because of the influence of the " thing " and " substance
concepts." This view seems to have been held in modern philosophy by
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and by most writers of
current text-books on logic. The germs of opposition to it are found in
Locke's Sensationalism and Empiricism, in Berkeley's Nominalism, and in
Hume's Positivism; and these "germs" came to their full development in
Pragmatism and Healism. Cf. the later chapters on these positioua.
THE LOGICAL ASPECTS OF THINKING 109
is called Phenomenalism. Concerning its logical genesis it is
only fair to say that the assumption, that there is a causal
influence of knowing on the thing known, while it is made, per-
haps, quite unawares, is due to the influence of the tradition
that comes from Aristotle.
The general realistic criticism of this whole position is, that,
if it is a condition of genuine knowing that "tilings as they
are" should be got at, then (1) the act of knowing cannot alter
the "thing" known, and (2) all categories and logical principles
must subsist, or be facts, in and among the entities known,
whether or not these categories and principles are present in
the knowing process itself.* Indeed, even granting that there
are laws or principles of the psychological process of thinking,
which laws this process follows, nevertheless these same princi-
ples might also hold of other entities, such as physical objects
and events, numbers and space and time; or, it might be, that
certain logical principles hold only of these other "things,"
and that, accordingly, reason viust follow these principles be-
cause, in order to give genuine knowledge, reason must conform
to "things." In fact, that reason must so conform, and not
project itself into and alter those entities that are known by its
means, is the very position that is tacitly assumed by the ad-
herent of the psychologizing tendency, when he reasons about
the character of reason in general, in order thereby to discover
the facts concerning this.^
III. THE PRAGMATIC TENDENCY
The criticism just made of the psychologizing tendency can
also, with equal justification, be directed against that tendency
which has recently received the name of pragmatism.
The pragmatist sets out to study the function and develop-
ment of knowledge, and, within this field, the nature of logic.
He solves the problem by discovering certain "states of affairs"
both by reasoning and by other methods, and, finally, by sys-
tematizing and unifying his results. But in doing all this he
tacitly grants that certain states of affairs imply others, and
" See Chap. II.
• Prominent names among recent writers who take the psychologizing
position in logic are: Sigwart, Bosanquet, Ueberweg, Wundt, Creighton,
Hibben.
110 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
that, in the whole complex state of affairs which his own prag-
matic theory presents, implication, identity, unity, consistency,
and the like, are quite objective in the sense that they are not
dependent on their being known, and also are not invented in
the sense that that part of the human race which is European
in its culture has unconsciously contrived certain means of
thinking, or has formed the habit of thinking in certain ways.
This is the position that the pragmatist takes toward his own
theory, but not that for which he contends explicitly within that
theory itself. For, according to the detailed theory of prag-
matism, all logic is either a mere invention, an intellectual
instrument and machine, or a custom, a belief, that has developed
in the tradition,^^ but in either case something that is useful
as an adaptation to man's environment.^^ Its seeming necessary
character is accounted for by the argument, that we cannot get
out of the tradition in which we are reared, because the very
attempt to do this is itself imbedded in the tradition. This
implies that, had the tradition or the original invention been
different, our logic would also be different. But it is also
argued, that, since the only world which we know is one that
is affected by being known and, therefore, by the "nature" of
the knowing, our present (known) world is made in part by
that very logic which forms part of the tradition. Originally,
and even now, perhaps, there is another world, amorphous and
plastic and quite different from our known world. And, had
another logic been invented and grown up as a racial habit, then
would all mankind be thinking in a world quite different from
that in which they now think and live.^"
This is the pragmatic view of the nature of logic as a method
or as a set of principles by which we reason and investigate
situations, even those that furnish pragmatism itself with its
problems. Clearly this view has many resemblances to the
psychologizing tendency. The latter regards logical principles
as laws of certain psychological processes; the former inter-
" E.g., James, Pragmatism, Chap. V., and Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx,
Chap, v., §§ !J-12.
" Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, 1!)03, and James and Schiller, ihid.
'" Schiller's Humanism, discussed by James in all four of his later
volumes, Pragmatism, Meaning of Truth, Pluralistic Universe, and Some
Problems of Philosophy.
THE LOGICAL ASPECTS OF THINKING 111
prets these principles merely as something which, like word-
symbols, beliefs, and superstitions, are arbitrary and contingent,
and are handed down in the general stream of social transmis-
sion from generation to generation. This inheritance is con-
ditioned chiefly by the psychological process of imitation, while
certain principles have survived and have been transmitted only
because of their usefulness. This usefulness is, indeed, their
truth even as it is the truth also of every principle, hypothesis,
law, and theory that survives and persists.
In further criticism of this pragmatic view, it suffices to com-
ment that, if logic is held to evolve and to be a mere adaptation
together with other "things" like eyes and hands and nervous
systems, and perhaps atoms and worlds and stars, nevertheless
everything cannot evolve. The priiiciples of evolution cannot
themselves be of this process. It is quite pertinent to ask, then,
whether these principles may not themselves be in part logical.
But if they are, then the universality of the pragmatic theory is
invalidated, and we must conclude that at least not all logic,
and, indeed, perhaps no logical principle is merely an evolving
racial instrument and habit.
XL THE TRADITIONAL TECHNICAL METHODS OF
REASONING ^
CHAPTER XIV
THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM
It is not proposed to give in this and succeeding chapters a
detailed account of all the technical methods of reasoning, but
to present only certain typical methods. All the methods pre-
sented will, however, be understood to be open to each of the
three interpretations just discussed, although the writer holds
the realistic interpretation to be alone the correct one.
^ A complete presentation of the traditional methods will be found in
almost any text-book on Logic as well as in such larger treatises as
Sigwart's and Bosanquet's.
112 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
One very common method of reasoning is by what is known
as the categorical syllogism. This method should be presented
and analyzed, since it is one by which much philosophizing is
done, as is illustrated by any of the usual arguments for, or
defenses of, philosophical positions. In making this presenta-
tion the distinctions discovered in the previous analysis of the
thinking situation should be borne in mind.
A typical situation in which a categorical syllogism subsists
is illustrated by that complex state of affairs in which (1) the
class plants is included (related by complete inclusion) in the
larger class living beings, and (2) roses are included in the class
plants, so that (3) they are also of necessity included in
the class living beings. In this situation there are present
(1) relations of similarity, by virtue of which groups of indi-
viduals form respectively the classes, roses, plants, and living
beings, denoted in each case by the concept of the class, namely,
rose, plant, and living being, respectively. (2) Each member
of each class is related to that class as ^'a member of" it, and
the class as a ivhole, i.e., the state of similarity of its members,
is a fact that is different and distinct from the fact of each
individual member.
Each of the relational complexes involved in this situation is
a proposition, but that complex to which we elect to give our
attention at this point is that which is generated (3) by the
relation of the inclusion of one class in another, e.g., of the
class, roses, in the class, plants.
One type of proposition is, therefore, that state of affairs which
is identical with the relationship of inclusion of one class in
another.
But even as classes, and so, also, concepts or states of affairs
that hold of individuals, are related, and, as related, are iden-
tical with one type of proposition, so, in turn, (4) are these
propositions themselves related ; or, as the situation may also
be stated, one class may be related to another class as including
it, and to still another class as being included by it. (5) Such
a relational complex we will define as a specific type of the cate-
gorical syllogism. Thus we have, in the case of the
example given, using the sign < to mean "are included in,"
roses < plants < living beings. But 7-oses < plants, and
THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM 113
plants < living beings, are two distinct states of affairs. They
are each a proposition. Yet together they necessitate or imply
a third distinct proposition, iiamel}', that roses < living beings.
A still further analysis can be made of this specific, yet
typical situation. The printed words, "rose." "plant," and
"living being" are symbols or signs that stand for concepts,
the concept in each case being the objective state of affairs that
holds of all those individual things that share in certain specific
characteristics. Thus, e.g., there is something that "holds good"
of a certain group of objects by virtae of which all are roses.
This something, this state of affairs, is, however, not itself a
rose, but it is a concept that consists of a number of character-
istics which are familiar to all, and which are used when we
recognize a flower as a rose. These characteristics form the con-
notation or intension of the concept, rose; rose connotes them.
On the other hand, the individuals of which the concept holds
form its denotation or extension. In general, the fewer the
characteristics that make up the connotation, the greater is the
denotation of a concept, and conversely. Thus "rose" has a
greater connotation, but a smaller denotation than has "flower";
"flower" a narrower connotation and a wider denotation than
"rose."
A concept denotes the individuals of the class of which it
holds, whether we are conscious of those individuals or not. It
must do this as that state of affairs which holds of these indi-
viduals, whether we are aware of them or not. Therefore, in
order to reason about individuals, once we have discovered the
concept for them, ive need deal only ivith the concept with itsi
connation, and with its relations to other concepts. In some
cases we must first discover the individuals specifically, before
we can get at the concepts for them. This we do in induction.
But in other cases we find the concept first, thus to discover
that there are certain classes of individuals, although, in some
instances, we can never perceive (in any sense) any particular
one of them. This is the case, e.g., in dealing with the points
of space. Such a discovery of a new concept may be made by
discovering what other, related concepts imply — a procedure
that is most important for science and philosophy, since, by it,
we discover certain classes of individuals no one of which, we
114 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
can ever see, touch, or get at by any of the senses. For example,
it is in this way that we are forced to deal with everything that
existed or took place before we who now live were alive.
In accordance with our previous analysis a distinction is to
be made between (1) the words or signs, (2) the percepts of
these signs, (3) the states of affairs or objective concepts holding
good of classes of individuals, (4) these individuals themselves,
and the consciousness both (5) of these individuals and (6) of
the objective concepts. We are not always aware of these dis-
tinctions while we are reasoning, but to fail to distinguish is
not to do away with distinctnesses. As we reason we can give
our attention either to the concepts or to the individuals, but
to the reasoning it makes no difference, in most cases, which we
do. Thus, whether we say *'a rose is a flower," or "roses are
flowers" is, for reasoning, a matter of indifference.
The example just analyzed, namely, the complex state of
affairs, that roses < plants, plants < living beings, implies or
necessitates, roses < living beings, is typical of a class of specific
situations or relational complexes, called categorical syllogisms,
in which the relation of implication is present. Prom many
such cases that have been examined, the generalization is made,
that wherever there are similar situations, there, also, will im-
plication and the complex terms between which it holds be
''present.
Some of the essential characteristics of these situations are
formulated in the text-books as the rules of the categorical syl-
logism, but they are to be regarded as rules for thinking only
because thinking must conform to the structure of reality in
order to issue in knowledge.
One of these rules or principles concerns that which is evident
in our example, namely, that while roses possess certain specific
properties that are not possessed by all flowers, nevertheless
they are included in this larger class. Accordingly, if some-
thing is a fact concerning roses, it is not implied, and should not
be inferred, that that something is also a fact for all flowers.
In general, if something holds of part of a class, that "some-
thing" cannot validly be inferred to hold for the ivhole of that
class. Also, that which holds of a smaller class does not of
necessity hold of the larger class of which the smaller is a part.
THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM 115
It might hold, but. also, it might not. When we infer, that
which we infer should be implied or necessitated. Conversely,
that which is necessitated must be inferred, if we are to infer,
and infer correctly.
That which is necessitated by a proposition or by
propositions of the type we are considering depends upon
the objective circumstance, whether some or all of the
individuals of a class are involved in the specific relationship
of inclusion, complete, particl, or negative, between two
classes. Thus, in the proposition, Boses are flowering plants,
while all rose^ are involved in the relationship asserted,
it is only some flowering plants, namely, those that are roses,
that are also involved. Therefore the converse proposition or
relational complex that is implied by the original one is only
that Some (not all) lowering plants are roses. However, in the
proposition, No men are fishes, or its equivalent. All men are
not fishes, both all men and all fishes are involved in the
relationship of complete negative inclusion, i.e., of complete
exclusion. The converse proposition that is implied is, accord-
ingly, No fishes are men. But, as different from this example,
in the proposition. Some triangles are symmetrical figures,
neither all triangles nor all symmetrical figures are involved in
the relationship, so that the converse proposition (that is)
implied is, Some symmetrical figures are (some) triangles.
However, in the case of the proposition just given, it is not
implied that All triangles are symmetrical figures, though by the
proposition, that All roses are flowering plants, it is implied, that
Some roses also belong to this larger class. Likewise the proposi-
tion, No men are fishes, implies that Some men are not fishes.
But, as different from this, the proposition that Some Euro-
peans are not Frenchmen does not imply that No Europeans are
Frenchmen.
These examples serve to illustrate an important principle,
which is, that the relationship of the whole of a class, either hy
inclusion, or by exclusion, to another class, necessitates the same
relationship for some of the individuals of that class; hut that,
conversely, the relationship of part of a class, either hy inclusion
or by exclusion, to another class, does not necessitate the same
relationship for all the individuals of that class. /
116 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
This is but another formulation of the celebrated Aristotelian
axiom known as the dictum de omni ct nullo, which may also be
stated in the form that Whatever is predicated of a term dis-
trihuted, whether affirmatively or negatively, may be predicated
in like manner of everything contained under it.
In explanation of this formuiation it may be said that a
term is distrihutcd if all the individuals which that term denotes
are involved in any specific relationship either of inclusion or of
exclusion.
Not to observe this dictum, i.e., to distribute, in the conclusion,
as the proposition that is inferred, if not implied, a term that
is not distributed in the premises, is to commit the technical
fallacies either of illicit major or of illicit minor.
However, if the dictum de omni et nullo is a principle that
must be followed in those situations where our reasoning con-
cerns relations of inclusion and exclusion, it is, nevertheless, not
a principle that itself generates that relational complex which is
the syllogism. Rather this complex subsists by virtue of that
twofold relation which a '^middle term" bears to two other
terms, provided, also, all the individuals denoted by this middle
term are involved in one or the other of these two relationships.
This specific condition is usually stated in the form, that the
middle term must be distributed once at least. But it may also
be given the formulation that a syllogism subsists (1) if there
is a class 31 which is related by inclusion or by exclusion, partial
or complete, to each of two other classes, S and P, so that there
is the complex, S R M R P, and so that all the individuals of
the class 31 are involved either in its relation to S or in its rela-
tion to P. HSR 31 R P is the situation or state of affairs in
which M is distributed once, then this complex implies the com-
plex, or proposition, S R P. However, in endeavoring to dis-
cover this implication in any specific case, we must observe the
dictum de omni et nidlo; i.e., 8, the subject, and P, the predicate,
must not be distributed in the conclusion unless they are dis-
tributed in the complex, S R 31 R P, i.e., respectively in the
major premise, 31 R P, and in the minor premise, S R 31.
The syllogism consists in the implication of a proposition,
8 R P, as conclusion, by two propositions as premises. But,
since every proposition implies its inverse, or converse, there
THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM 117
may be, as a major premise, either 31 R P, or P R M, and, as a
miliar premise, either S R M, or M R S. The several combina-
tions of these four propositional forms give what are technically
called the four figures of the syllogism. Thus M R P, S R M,
S R P,is the first figure ; P R M, 8 R M, 8 R P, the second
figure ; 31 R P, M R 8, 8 R P, the third ; and P R 31, 31 R 8,
8 R P, the fourth.
But further, since the relation, R, may be that of inclusion
or of exclusion, partial or complete, between the two terms of
each premise, there are the several so-called moods, which consist
of a7iy two of the four kinds of propositions subsisting as pre-
mises, and of any one of these four kinds subsisting as conclusion.
These four kinds or types of propositions are: The universal
affirmative, All x's are y's, A; the universal negative. No x's are
y's, E; the particular affirmative. Some x's are y's, I; the par-
ticular negative, Some x's are not y^s, 0.
Universal propositions distribute their subjects, negative
propositions their predicates, as do also exclusive propositions
of the type, only x's are y's.
Although the text-books on logic present a list of the several
valid as distinct from the invalid moods of the four figures, such
a presentation and the committing of it to memory are both quite
superfluous, if only the following principles are observed in
using the categorical syllogism : (1) The middle term must be dis-
tributed at least once. (2) No term may be used distributively
in the conclusion, if it is not distributed in the premise in which
it occurs; it should not be so used for the simple reason, that
it is not so implied; i.e., ''some" does not imply "all," nor
does "some not" imply "none." (3) Two negative premises
give no conclusion, for the exclusion of the whole or of part
of two classes from the whole of the third class does not i)nply
the exclusion of those two classes from each other; they may
be so excluded, but, also, they may not. (4) The middle term
must be the same in the two premises; or, stated negatively, one
must guard against an apparent constancy in the meaning of
the middle term, while, nevertheless, a change is introduced
through the use of ambiguous words and phrases. This rule of
procedure also applies both to the minor term, as it appears in
the conclusion as subject, and also in that premise in which it
118 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
occurs, namely, the minor premise, and to the major term, as it
occurs as the predicate of the conclusion and in that premise
which is made the major premise by its presence. Briefly, it is
the same terms, 8 and P, that occur in the complex, 8 B M R P,
and in the conclusion, 8 B P, that is implied by this.
As illustrative of violations of these four rules, the following
examples may be given :
Illustrating false syllogisms in which the middle term is not
distributed: —
I Some symmetrical figures are triangles.
A All rectangles are symmetrical figures.
A Therefore all rectangles are triangles.
Illustrating false syllogisms that employ two negative pre-
mises : —
E No true proposition is dependent on being proved.
E No postulate of geometry is dependent on being proved.
E Therefore no postulate of geometry is a true proposition.
Illustrating false syllogisms in which the major term is dis-
tributed in the conclusion, but not in the premise in which it
occurs : —
A All structures of living beings are " things " that evolve.
E No mineral is a structure of living beings.
E Therefore no mineral is a " thing " that evolves.
Illustrating false syllogisms in which both the middle term
and the major shift in meaning: —
A All that perceives is mind.
A The existence of objects consists in being perceived.
A Therefore the existence of objects depends on mind.
THE TRUTH OF PREMISES 119
CHAPTER XV
THE TRUTH OF PREMISES
I. THE REGRESS OF PREMISES
In the process of reasoning by means of the categorical syl-
logism, as well as by syllogisms of other types, one can distin-
guish the formal correctness of the process from the "' material"
truth of the premises and the conclusion. The reasoning process
is formally correct, if, in the case of the categorical syllogism,
it conforms to some one of the several situations determined by
the principles just laid down. But formal correctness is not of
itself a guarantee of material truth. However, leaving unde-
termined at this point what the nature of "material truth" is,
but distinguishing it only from "formal correctness," it is clear
that there are the following types or variations of reasoning
processes: (1) the syllogism formally correct, and also both
premises and conclusion materially true; (2) the syllogism
formally correct, but premises and conclusion materially false;
(3) both the syllogism (?) formally incorrect, and the premises
and conclusion materially false; (4) the syllogism ( ?) formally
incorrect, but premises and conclusion materially true as proposi-
tions, although not so related as to form a sj^llogism.
The last three "variations" are both interesting and im-
portant, yet it is with the first type that we are here most con-
cerned. For the desideratum is, ivhen we reason by means of
the categorical syllogism, that hoth our reasoning process should
be formally correct, and our conclusion be materially true.
The formal correctness of the reasoning process seems, how-
ever, to be relatively easy to obtain, or to certify. To do this
one need only observe the rules for correct formal reasoning,
such as those rules that have just been presented for the cate-
gorical syllogism. But a more difficult problem is that of
making certain of the material truth of the propositions thati
appear as premises, or as conclusion.
Although, now, there are a number of different interpreta-
tions, by the several philosophical positions, of the nature of
120 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
truth, these can be neglected at this point, since no position
fails to recognize truth {and error) in some sense. Accord-
ingly, without defining truth, it may be said that, in the formally
valid categorical syllogism, the conclusion is materially true, if
the premises are materially true. But the premises are, like the
conclusion, propositions. Accordingly, tlie prohlem of getting
a materially true conclusioyi becomes that of getting two ma-
terially true premises, and of again finding, if possible, tiva
materially true premises that in turn imply each of these pre-
mises. However, these "premises of premises" in turn "rest
on" and presuppose others "still further back," and so on,
indefimtely. What, then, is the outcome of this repeated pre-
supposition of premises? Is there an infinite series of premises
which it is quite impossible to complete, so that the best one can
do is to plunge in mcdias res and boldly assert certain premises?
This might be done either on the ground that, although not
actually inferred deductively from others, these premises might,
nevertheless, be materially true, or on the ground, that there is
a "stopping place" where certain propositions imply, hut are
not implied. But it may also be asked, if there are not other
methods of establishing premises than by means of the cate-
gorical syllogism, or, finally, if all three of these suggestions
might not conform to fact? May not implication be limited in
its range, so that certain propositions are (1) consistent with
other propositions, but not implied by them, and, therefore, are
(2) deductive "starting-places," and must, accordingly, be dis-
covered non-deductively? To the answering of these inquiries
we now turn.
II. COMMON SENSE AND THE SOCIAL TRADITION
The physiological transmission of structural and functional
characters is not the only kind of heredity. There is also a
psychological inheritance through imitation and by precepts,
and the like, from all who have contributed to that whole social
tradition in philosophy, religion, literature, art, science, and
common sense into which each one of us is born. It is in this
way that we obtain a mass of general knowledge to be used as
premises from which to reason, as is illustrated by our common
law, our system of morals, and our common sense. Such sur-
THE TRUTH OF PREMISES 121
vivals are based on a method which in the main conforms to the
canons of correct observation, analysis, and generalization.
This method is, broadly speaking, induction, practised in-
formally, uncritically, unconsciously, almost instinctively.
III. INDUCTION ^
So long as men relied chiefly upon a tradition that vras rooted
in uncritical observation and generalization, comparatively little
ftiat was new was discoverable. Yet it was in this tradition
that men lived until the realization came that the secrets of
nature were beneath the surface, and that, if they were to be
revealed, nature must be analyzed by a method more penetrating
and more discriminating. The time came, first at spasmodic
intervals, but later more continuously, when, by carefully con-
ducted experiments, the aspects of nature were isolated and
their relations to one another ascertained. At the same time
it was fair and natural to suppose that there were otJicr, indeed,
many other instances of these "things" that were thus exam-
ined. But all of these instances could not be observed, e.g.,
either because they were too numerous or too remote, or because
they were in the past or in the future. Yet the conviction was
present, that nature was orderly, that it acted in accordance with
law, that it had uniformity, and that the orderliness, the law,
the uniformities were revealed by the few cases examined with
care and by experiment.
It was in this manner that, e.g., Galileo (1564-1642) discov-
ered that the velocity of bodies falling to the earth increases
with the time, — at that rate, namely, which is given by multi-
plying the time-interval taken to fall a definite distance by this
same time-interval, i.e., by the time squared. Galileo made his
observations on bodies which he either let fall from different
heights on the leaning tower of Pisa, or rolled down different
distances on an inclined plane. From his observations, measure-
ments, and analysis of these motions, in which he distinguished
the distances, the times, the rates, and the change of rate,
Galileo generalized. Thus he discovered the laws of all falling
bodies. But he did not observe all. Too many bodies were
' The best complete discussion of induction is by B. Erdmann, Logik,
2nd ed., pp. 730 ti'.; cf. Venn, Principles of Inductive Logic, 1907, p. 344 ff.,
and J. S. Mill, System of Logic, 7th ed., Bks. III. and IV.
122 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
falling elsewhere than in Pisa, too many, indeed, in Pisa itself,
for him to do this; too many also had fallen before, and too
many would fall after his day.
It is in ways such as the method of Galileo illustrates, that
the scientist proceeds in order to get laws, principles, and gen-
eralizations that can subsequently be used as premises for making
deductions, — such deductions, indeed, as enable men to control
the forces of nature and to make predictions, computations, and
plans that are realized in the concrete facts.
One is not compelled, in all cases, therefore, to continue the
search for premises indefinitely far hack. There is ultimately
an appeal to concrete fact, and a basis for precise generalization.
This procedure may be formulated as follows : —
I. A certain number of typical, particular cases, c^, c,, Cg — Cq,
such as the instances of the motion of falling bodies, are exam-
ined, and are found to have a specific property, P, such as the
property, that the velocity of a falling body is at any instant
directly as the square of the time — typical cases being such as
are taken at random.
II. It is assumed, though not proved (since, e.g., all cases
of the motion of falling bodies cannot be examined) that all
C's are like the relatively few typical cases examined. This
assumption is more justified if the cases are examined by scien-
tific methods of analysis than if they are not. From I. and II.
it is concluded, that
III. All C's have the property, P.
This principle and procedure are present in all induction, as
this is used both in common sense and in science. Clearly, how-
ever, there is an element of risk, of uncertainty in it. Are all
diseases caused by micro-organisms? Science has shown that at
least some are. Are atoms absolutely simple? Science used to
maintain that they were, but does so no longer. In induction,
then, a "leap" is made from "some" to "all," and this leap
is hazardous. For, while "some" is included by "all," "all"
is not implied by "some," as we have previously seen.
IV. HOW FACTS ARE GIVEN
Induction proceeds, first, by examining, in various ways, con-
crete, particular facts that are, if possible, typical cases, and.
THE TRUTH OF PREMISES 123
second, by generalizing from these. Science is built up in part
in this way, as are also common sense and tradition, religion
and philosophy, since each of these is characterized by at least
the claim that facts are given which warrant a generalization
from them. In a broad sense, then, all knowledge is inductive,
^ut ivJiat is a factf Concerning this important question there
is disagreement, not only as regards what shall be accepted 05
fact, but also as regards the criteria, the tests, the methods by
which a distinction is made between that which is accepted as
fact and that which is not. We may, therefore, examine these
two questions together, relying upon the actual procedure which
we find adopted in different fields, both as to what are accepted
as facts, and what as criteria.
1. Sense Experience
In daily life and in scientific investigation we get at what
in these fields are certainly regarded as one class of facts,
namely, those that "come" to us through our senses. Vision,
hearing, touch, smell, and taste and other modes of sensation
are held to reveal facts to us, and, if there are occasional illu-
sions, this fact is itself disclosed by the senses a7id by reasoning
about those data which the senses give us. However, it is not
necessary to go into many of the details of this familiar field.
Things, qualities, events, and relations in the world round about
us become known to us through our senses. For example, this
red book and that brown one, the howling of the wind outside
and the odor of this burning tobacco, the motion of the smoke
as it curls upward and its height from the floor, — all these are,
for me, facts as my senses now reveal them to me, as I sit in my
laboratory. In our usual sense experience we do not go beyond
this, although science and philosophy take us beyond, finally
leading us even to doubt, e.g., that our real eye sees its own real
image in a real mirror. For the process of sense perception has
itself been made the subject of much study in both psychology
and philosophy, one of the important typical problems here
being whether, in perceiving, we get at the object directly, or
have a mental state that is perceived and that copies the object,
so that we perceive the object only indirectly. There are many
other questions concerning sense perception, but common sense
124 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
does not raise them. Rather, whatever may be the manner and
the mechanism of perceiving through the senses, in common
sense it is held that such perception gives us facts.
A great part of scientific investigation, perhaps practically
all of it in the field of the natural sciences, is based on the same
assumption. The perception of the scientist is, however, dif-
ferent in some respects from that of the layman, since his is
a perception that is controlled and assisted by instruments of
observation and of measurement. Telescopes and microscopes,
and, indeed, a variety of machines and instruments enable the
scientist to observe what the layman cannot, and technical
methods of experimentation that are suggested by hypotheses
and theories, reveal to the scientist realities which, without such
methods, would remain hidden. Yet, however much the sci-
entist's perception may be thus controlled and assisted, still, in
the last resort, it is to his sense perception that facts are revealed,
and upon its deliverances that the discovery of specific laws,
principles, and generalizations is based.
2. Intuition, Feeling, and Emotion}
Sense perception, however, is not limited to the disclosure of
"things" that are not ourselves. For we perceive our own
bodies through both vision and touch, and also through our
muscular sensations and a whole group of organic sensations.
But we also perceive, though not through the senses, that ive
have sense percepts, memory, and reasoning processes, and the
like, i.e., we perceive that we are conscious, in several specific
ways. This is self-consciousness. We discover in this way, that
we are also, at times, in certain specific moods, such as those of
joy, sorrow, and expectancy. There is often, also, a feeling of
the wholeness and unity of "things," even of the oneness of
ourselves with nature, as opposed to the analytical and dis-
criminating perception of common sense and science. Must it
not be admitted, that such emotions and feelings also reveal
facts?
If we accept the evidence of those generalizations that con-
''Cf. E. Underbill, Mysticism, 4th od., 1912; F. Von Hiigel, TJxe Mystical
Elements of Religion; A. B. Sharp, Mysticism, Its True Nature and Value,
1910; cf. also James, Varieties of Religious Experience, XVI. -XVII.;
Bergson, all through Creative Evolution, Matter, and Memory, and Time
and Free Will.
THE TRUTH OF PREMISES 125
stitute a good part of traditional religious systems and beliefs,
of moral ideals, of standards of art, and the like, then we can
only answer this question affirmatively. Religion, morality, and
art are based on the deliverances of certain specific emotions
and modes of appreciation, and the facts thus given are often
called values. Sometimes they are given only once in a lifetime,
though more often they are repeated, and they come, also, to
many individuals.
But even in those eases in which it is not so much either the
emotion, or the analytical perception of parts, as it is the in-
tuition of wholes, that is to be emphasized, does not this intuition
also give facts? For example, is not the whole space that the
reader now perceives quite as much a fact as are its parts, i.e.,
hoth the smaller spaces, and the points, of which both whole
and part are composed ? Is not a year as much a fact as a day,
the ivhole motion of a stone as much a fact as the occupation of
specific points at successive instants? Indeed, do not stone and
motion and path and time together form one whole and unitary
fact? And is not the similar fact sometimes experienced, of
the unity of the self and all else, with no distinctness between
the two?
To each of these inquiries the answer "yes" is sometimes
given, with certain definite scientific, philosophical, and religious
positions resulting. But, while in science the whole is given a
status which is equal, as fact and as value, to that of the parts,
in philosophy a more extreme position is frequently taken. The
whole is given a higher status, and the part is regarded as de-
serving and winning a place 07ily in the whole. "With the whole
thus "made" reality, the part is, also, frequently "made" only
appearance, or, when analysis is regarded as serving only our
practical needs, the part is allowed to be only an artefact. Thus
it is that in religion and theology the whole is often identified
with God, while all else is allowed to be but His manifestation.
Self-consciousness, emotions, feelings, and intuitions, then, as
well as sense perception, are accepted as ways and means by
which facts are disclosed, and from which generalizations are
made, thus to furnish premises for deductive procedure, and to
cut off the indefinite regress of premises that seemingly would
otherwise obtain.
126 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
Memory is that specific conscious process hy or in which what
has been experienced is now represented to us. We can remem-
ber, with greater or less detail, that which has been experienced,
and also, perhaps, the time and jylace of the experience. Much
of that which is remembered is imaged in terms of some one of
the senses, but some "things," as e.g., past emotions, are dif-
ficult to image, although they can be remembered. However,
the question that here concerns us is whether memory gives us
facts from which to generalize. Obviously, by definition, facts
that are remembered have been experienced before ; the memory
is not the original experience of these facts. And yet we rely
on it, and must do so, in order to secure the requisite basis for
our generalizations.
Without memory there would be no imngination, since this
process depends upon the materials that memory furnishes. Ac:
Qordingly, without memory, on the one hand, to represent the
past, and, on the other hand, to furnish a basis for the presenta-
tion of the future, our awareness of "things" would be limited
to the immediate present (whatever, in the last analysis, this
"present" may prove to be), so that, unless we could get at
a sufficient nmyiber of concrete facts in the immediate present
to furnish a basis for generalization, we could derive no general
propositions to use as premises. Such propositions are ob-
tained by comparing and analyzing a number of concrete cases,
so as to discover, if possible, similarities, and then to generalize.
But, it would seem, that if there were no memory, no com-
parison would be possible, and, therefore, no similarities be
discovered, and no generalizations be justified. Indeed, if we
were organisms with an awareness of only the immediate present,
we would not even have the tendency to generalize, and then we
could neither think nor reason. But the fact is, that we do
retain, do remember, and, on this basis, do compare and
generalize.
4. Imagination
Does imagination also give us facts, and furnish material for
generalization? Imagination is that conscious process in which
we are aware of at least some entities, or combinations of en-
THE TRUTH OF PREMISES 127
titles, that have not been presented in the past. However, the
materials for imagination to work with must have been given
or be now given in some way, although the complex is new.
Oftentimes, indeed, in fancy and creative imagination, the mode
of the relating of formerly given parts is such that distinctly
new qualities of the whole result. Such a creation is character-
istic of those facts that are given to the imaginations of the
painter, the architect, the sculptor, and the musician, and also,
oftentimes, to those of the scientist and the philosopher. Turner
imaging his sunsets, and Beethoven his symphonies, are cases
in illustration, but Newton also must have reached out in imag-
ination to discover gravitation, and Plato, to get to his Theory
of Ideas.
Imagination is to a large extent free ; it must accept its ma-
terials, but with these once given, what restrictions can be
placed upon it? For example, who would be so bold as to
prescribe future accomplishments of miagination in art? Yet,
free as it is, imagination gives us data, which are facts of some
kind, and from which, especially in the development of re-
ligion and art, generalizations are drawn that oftentimes become
the dogmas for posterit3^ In some fields, therefore, imagination
may act as freely as it will and can.
Has imagination this freedom also in science, or must it in
this field be kept within certain bounds by the exigencies of
prediction, of explanation, of consistent systematization, and
the like? Hypotheses, theories, laws, all play their part in
science, but there are also threads of compulsion, either of im-
plication or of consistency, that are not on the surface. Im-
agination in science plays its part, therefore, by folloiving these
threads as much as possible, until it is finally led to entities that,
previously unknown, thereby become known. It is in this way
that, e.g., gravitation, electro-magnetic waves, osmotic energ\%
and, indeed, a very large number of the other entities of modern
science have been discovered. These were, fir'st, mere hypo-
thetical entities, with possibly feiv connections with observed
facts. But, subsequently, deductions and predictions from them
led to their confirmation. Imagination, having done its work,
was subsequently supplanted by reason.
In contrast with imagination in art, therefore, where it is,
128 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
perhaps, free without limit, in science imagination must be
controlled by the discovery of relations of implication, or, at
least, by such relations as are prescribed by the exigencies of
explanation, prediction, and system.
Which example shall philosophy follow? Shall it be the
example of art, in which imagination, by the freest play, leads
to data that we appreciate and value, or the example of science,
in which lue guard ourselves as much as possible from accepting
anything as fact merely hecause we value it, and in which,
seemingly, ''truth at all costs" is the chief concern. This
question is perhaps one of the most fundamental philosophical
problems. Both motives are present in contemporaneous phi-
losophy, though usually in disguised form. The one motive
would have philosophy an art, an appreciation, a personal
reaction ; the other would have it a science.^
This concludes the consideration of one class of means by
which premises for deductive use are obtained. Appeal is made
to the concrete facts of sense perception, of emotion, of intuition,
of memory, and of imagination. All facts, thus presented, can
be represented in memory, and from typical cases, generaliza-
tions be derived. These generalizations are of the type that
such and such is the positive or negative "state of affairs" for
such and such a class. This method of discovering general
propositions and of putting an end to the indefinite series of
premises is induction.
Our next question is whether there are still other methods by
which premises for deductive purposes can be found. As a
matter of fact, in the history of science and philosophy, a
number of such methods have been accepted as fulfilling this
function. Thus certain geiieral propositions in such sciences as
logic, mathematics, geometry, physics, and ethics have been held
to he true either hecause they were self-evident, or hecause their
opposites were inconceivable, or because they were presupposed
by their aiicmpted denial. Indeed, in many cases, it is on
these grounds tliat certain propositions have been regarded not
only as factually, but also as necessarily true, and have, there-
fore, been called axioms. Frequently, also, some of those prin-
ciples which have been mo>it important as a basis for certain
" Cf. W. T. Marvin, First Book of Metaphysics, Chap. I.
THE TRUTH OF PREMISES 129
specific philosophical systems have heen established hy these
tests.
5. Self -Evidence^
The principle of self-evidence may be stated briefly in the
form of the proposition, that that which is self-evident is true,
or is a fact. As applied, this means that some proposition or
principle appears to be true ''on the face of it," or, that it does
not need proof, or, indeed, that it is, perhaps, incapable both of
proof and of disproof. Examples of propositions that have been
regarded as self-evident, and, therefore, as ultimate and neces-
sarily true, are: (1) the whole is greater than any of its parts;
(2) every effect has a cause; (3) the cause equals the effect;
(4) everything in its individuality is identical with itself and
distinct from every other thing; (5) of two contradictory
propositions, one must be true; (6) everything must act in
accordance with its own nature; (7) we can know only our
own ideas; (8) through a point, C, not on a straight line, D,
there is only one line parallel to D.
However, the position taken at the present day toward the
test of self-evidence is, that it is not a criterion of absolute or
necessary truth, but, at best, only an empirical test, which,
though it may be used on occasion, is very liable to error.
Indeed, the critical examination of, and perhaps the inductive
generalization from, a large number of important historical
instances of principles that have been regarded as absolutely
true because of their self-evidence, but that are now known not
to be true, or, at least, not necessarily true, demands this inter-
pretation. On the other hand, the necessity of using self-
evidence as an empirical criterion, which, though it is liable to
error, nevertheless reveals a fair and perhaps high degree of
probability, can also be shown. For example, that there is a
rigorous logical connection of implication between the premises
and the conclusion of a syllogism, is ultimately accepted only
because of its self-evidence. For if we doubt any specific
* The principle of self-evidence was used, e.g., by Euclid in arriving at
his axioms, and by Aristotle in getting at the intrinsic properties of
things. It was really recognized as a criterion by Descartes, in both his
Meditations and his Discourse, and by Leibniz in his Meditationes de
Vognitione, Veritate et Ideis.
130 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
instance of syllogistic reasoning, and therefore test it for its
validity by further reasoning, then we must accept the logical
connection of the several steps in the final reasoning process,
on the ground alone that they are self-evidently valid or correct.
However, it is evident, perhaps self-evident, that a criterion
of truth can be such a test provided only that it itself is true.
As applied to the criterion of self -evidence this means that the
question must be raised whether it is self-evident, that that
which is self-evident is necessarily true. To the writer of this
book it is 7iot. This alone suffices to show that self-evidence
cannot be an unequivocal and absolutely certain test of truth,
for here there is at least one exception. The principle of self-
evidence is itself not self-evident to every one. It does not stand
its own test. Then it cannot be a necessarily true and abso-
lutely certain criterion.
"We must conclude that self-evidence is only a psychological
test of truth. What is self-evident to one is not to another.
Therefore, so far as this test is accepted and used, as perhaps
it must be in certain cases, there is always the proviso, that it
is liable to error, and is not absolute.
6. The Inconceivability of the Opposite ^
Almost the entire characterization and criticism that has just
been made of the criterion of self-evidence holds also of this
second test or criterion. Historically, this test has been applied
to many principles to which the test by self-evidence has also
been applied, i.e., that which is self-evident has been further
tested by attempting to conceive its opposite, and, with this
attempt failing, has been regarded as necessarily true. This
test may be stated, in the form of the proposition, that that
ivhose opposite cannot he conceived must itself he conceived and
he true, so that we cannot think without it, — if to think is
to conceive. For example, if we cannot conceive that the part
should be equal to, or be greater than the whole, it would be
concluded hoth that it is necessarily true, and that we must
think, that the part is less than the whole. Historically, this
' The principle of the inconceivability of the opposite was recognized,
e.g., by Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology, §§420-437; cf. J. S.
Mill, Logic, 8th ed., II., VII., 1-4.
THE TRUTH OF PREMISES 131
proposition as regards the relation of whole and part was estab-
lished as a principle in just this way — though it is now known
to hold only for finite wholes. For infinite wholes the relation-
ships of "less than," ''equal to," and "greater than" do not
apply at all, or, more accurately, are not -present at all. As
further examples, one may ask, if it can be conceived, (1) that
a "thing" should be hoth itself and something else; and, accord-
ingly, provided mind is different from matter, (2) that mind
should act in contradiction to its own nature. Also, can one con-
ceive, (3) that a thing should cease to be itself and become
something else, i.e., that it should change; or (4) that two
"things" should be related and not influence each other? If
one cannot conceive these propositions, then must one not think
the opposite of each 07ie of them, and conclude that this opposite
is absolutely true?
Such examples might be added to almost indefinitely, with
the result that a list could be obtained which would include
many a proposition or principle that has been of great influence
on both philosophy and science.
But the test of the inconceivability of the opposite proves,
after all, to be, like self-evidence, only a psychological test. It
cannot be absolute, since it has been applied to establish the
truth of many a principle, in both science and philosophy, that
subsequently has been shown to be false. Many an inconceivable
"thing" has turned out to be quite conceivable; as, e.g., the
propositions, that the earth is round; that a moving body con-
tinues to move with no outside force acting on it; that, in a
plane, there may be, through a point, more than one parallel to
a line not containing that point. Therefore, some things at
least that formerly were inconceivable are now no longer so.
Also, that which is inconceivable to one mind is not to another.
All this is evidence that this test does not reveal what must
be conceived. Indeed, to the writer it is not inconceivable, that
the proposition, that that whose opposite is inconceivable is
true, should itself be false. The test does not establish itself,
but, like self-evidence, reveals, not what all must think and
conceive, but only what some must and do think — for psycho-
logical reasons. It is a test that is, at best, only empirical and
quite fallible, having been derived, in fact, by induction from
132 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
certain positive eases for which it has seemed to work success-
fully. But that which is inconceivable today, may nevertheless
he true, and tomorrow be conceived, primarily because it is dis-
covered to he a fact.
7. Presupposition hy Denial "
This principle differs from the tests of self-evidence and the
inconceivahility of the opposite in that it is a logical test, whereas
they are psychological criteria. For to he presupposed is to he
implied. Only if we take something to be presupposed which
really is not, does the psychological factor enter, for then there
is error.
The principle of presupposition by denial is, however, closely
connected with the test by ''the inconceivability of the oppo-
site" and also with the "reductio ad ahsurdum." This latter
test proceeds by first assuming the contradictory of that principle
which is to be established, and by then finding that this con-
tradictory is, in some way, absurd, so that the opposite, the
original principle, must be accepted as necessarily true. But
this raises the question as to what the absurd is. Is it that
which is inconceivable, or, that which is ')>ot yet known, hut
seems most improbable, or, that which is self-contradictory?
The first two kinds of absurdity are, however, only psycho-
logical, for, the absurd, thus defined, has oftentimes proved to
be fact. To this extent the method of reductio ad ahsurdum
turns out to be only a very fallible test. Wireless telegraphy,
and automatic adding machines, and six-day trans-Atlantic
steamships were at one time absurd and inconceivable, but they
subsequently proved to be facts.
However, when the absurd is identified with the self-contra-
dictory, the reductio ad ahsurdum becomes the test of (or proof
by) "presupposition by (attempted) denial." Within the field
of seemingly self-contradictory "things" one can distinguish
self-contradictory terms, such as round-square. But, as distinct
from such terms, there are also self-contradictory propositions;
" The best statement of the principle of presupposition by denial is by
P. Coffey, Logic, 1!)12; ef. Jevons, Principles of Hcienee, 1874. This is also
the principle of Kant's "deduction" of the categories; see Miiller's
translation, p. 21 and p. 4.
THE TRUTH OF PREMISES 133
such as the proposition, there are no propositions. This is self-
contradictory, since it is itself a proposition. Terms as such do
not imply, and so it may be, that, strictly speaking, there are
no self-contradictory terms. Accordingly, a term that seems to
be self -contradictory, such as round-square, may be a mere join-
ing of symbols. But, if this is the case, then it can be proposi-
tions alone that are true on the ground that they are presup-
posed hy their own attempted denial, and by their contradic-
tory. Such a denial is also an ahsurdity, in that it contradicts
itself by presupposing the very "thing" that it denies. Fop
example, the position of the skeptic, that there is no truth, is
self-contradictory and absurd in that it is itself advanced as a
truth, and so presupposes that there is some truth — to the
extent, at least, of one truth. Therefore, the proposition there
is truth, is one that is established by its own denial.
Other examples of propositions which are established or
proved in this manner are: (1) There is thinking; to deny this,
is to think and, therefore, to presuppose that there is thinking;
(2) there are propositions ; that there are not, is itself a proposi-
tion; (3) the principle of excluded middle; to deny this, i.e.,
to assert that there is a third possibility between two contra-
tradictories, presupposes that there is no third possibility be-
tween the two contradictories of the universality of this princi-
ple and some exceptions to it.
But if there are certain propositions which are estal)lished by
the principle of "presupposition by denial," it is important to
determine by what test this principle is itself true. The necessity
of putting the principle to some test is evident, since, if it itself
is not true, it cannot be a (true) test for truth and fact, even
when it is correctly applied. However, as at least a partial
response to this just demand it can be shown, that, unlike the
tests of self -evidence and the inconceivability of the opposite,
this principle does apply to itself, i.e., that it is true by its own
test. This demonstration can be made as follows, though in a
manner that is, perhaps, of necessity somewhat involved.
The question is, whether the principle that "that which is
presupposed by its own denial" is itself presupposed by its own
denial. If it is, then it is true by its own test. To give one
proof, let us call this principle, A, and then deny that this prin-
134 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
ciple is true, i.e., assert that it is false. The problem then is,
Does this denial presuppose the principle in question, namely,
that that which is presupposed by its own denial is true? The
answer to this question is "yes," and the reasons for this answer
are as follows: If the specific denial under consideration is true,
it is true only on the ground of a specific principle, namely,
one that concerns the relationship between a universal affirmative
proposition, A, and a particular negative, 0. litis principle is,
that if a particular negative, 0, is true, the corresponding uni-
versal affirmative. A, must be false, and, conversely, that, if A
is true, must be false. But this principle, holding between
propositions A and 0, is the very principle that, in the instance
under investigation, is identical with proposition A. That is,
it is the principle, that the reason why a contradictory, either
A or 0, must be true, if the other contradictory, or A respec-
tively, is false, is, that a proposition is presupposed (implied)
as true hy its denial (the contradictory). Therefore the denial
of this proposition or principle itself, or the assertion of its con-
tradictory, presupposes this very principle. In other words, this
principle is itself presupposed by its own denial, and, therefore,
applies to itself, or is true by its own test.
The original principle thus confirms itself, and in this respect
is different from the two criteria previously discussed. For
this very reason it is to be regarded as a logical, and not a
psychological criterion. Its norm is w^hat is "presupposed" or
"implied," as against what is "evident" and what is exclusively
"conceivable." The only psychological element that concerns
it, has to do with the question whether or not it applies in a
specific instance. But, if it does apply, it applies logically, —
and not psychologically, as do the other two criteria. Yet it
may be difficult to determine whether or not it does apply in
a particular instance. For example, does it apply to that situa-
tion which is asserted in pragmatism, namely, that there is no
ahsolute truth, hut that all truth is relative, since it (all truth)
is identical only with that which is adaptative, and works and
bring satisfaction? The anti-pragmatist claims that this ivhole
pragmatic theory of truth is advanced, not as a theory that is
true by its own explicit definition of truth as fluctuating, but
as one that is true absolutely, and, therefore, that absolute truth
THE TRUTH OF PREMISES 135
is presupposed by its attempted denial in pragmatism^ The
pragmatist can repudiate this accusation only by the counter
claim of consistency, namely, that his pragmatic theory is itself
true only pragmatically. Which party is correct in his claim?
It is difficult to decide, since there is no criterion or standard
of correctness by which to settle such a question between
standards.*
The difficulty in such an instance is, however, not in the
principle (of presupposition by denial) itself, but in its applica-
tion. But there are many cases in which the application of the
principle is not so difficult, and the resultant demonstration of
truth is entirely clear. For example, geometry is replete with
such instances, as are also logic and the whole modern "theory
of numbers." Some of these instances will be examined in
subsequent chapters.
In summary it may be said, that the principle of presupposi-
tion hy denial is established by induction from those cases
where it applies, and that it also confirms itself. No exception
to it has been discovered in the realm of those instances to
which it has been applied, nor has it been proved false as have
the principles of "self-evidence" and the " inconceivahility of
the opposite." Accordingly, both the principle itself and that
phase of it which is the reductio ad ahsurdimi are to be accepted
as extremely reliable logical criteria.
'' E. g., by Royce, the Eternal and the Practical, Phil. Review, Vol. XIII.,
No. 2, 1904.
^ Consistency, it may be remarked, is open to two interpretations, the
pragmatic and the anti-pragmatic. Common to both is the definition of
consistency as freedom from contradiction. The pragmatist interprets this
as expressing a certain need that we feel, which, when satisfied, is identical
with one kind of truth. The anti-pragmatist interprets it absolutely, as
a characteristic holding of an objective " state of affairs," especially of
that one which characterizes that whole which is the universe. The
universe of facts must be marked Vjy consistency. To the anti-pragmatist
this is self-evident; its opposite is inconceivable. It is, indeed, presupposed
hy its own denial.
136 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
CHAPTER XVI
THE NATURE OF CONTRADICTION
The term contradiction has already been used in a number
of discussions. Thus the "law of eontradietion," "contra-
dictory terms," "contradictory propositions," and "self-contra-
diction" have been referred to, or discussed. The more precise
meaning of the term must now be determined.
On the one hand, contradiction would seem to mean or to
involve negation in some way, and in some sense. Yet, on the
other hand, experience always has a content. ^'Something" is
experienced. Indeed, it would seem to be impossible to experi-
ence, and yet experience nothing. Must there not be, then,
something positive when we experience negation and contradic-
tion, and, if there is, ichat is this positive " something" f^ An
answer to this question may be sought as follows : —
Examples of contradictory terms are, red and not-red, one and
not-one, moving and not-moving : of contradictory propositions,
All even numbers are divisible by two, and. Some even numbers
are not thus divisible; No energy can be destroyed or anni-
hilated, and Some energy can be destroyed: of self -contra-
dictory terms, round-square: of self-co)itradictory propositions,
"Epimenides, being a Cretan, said, 'All Cretans are liars.'"
Some of these examples and the states of affairs typified by them
may now be examined and analyzed.
Let us consider first the contradictory terms, red and not-red.
It may be assumed that all know (to some degree) what is meant
by red, and what red is, and also, that it is generally realized
that the term denotes a certain specific group of colors, namely,
the different kinds of red. There are many reds. But there
are also not-reds, — perhaps, an infinite number of them, includ-
ing not only all the other colors, hut also everything else that,
like motion, space, time, mass, hardness, and electricity, is not
a color at all.
^ Cf. Whitehead, Introduction to Mathematics, on the meaning of zero,
Chaps. V. to VII.; also Russell, Principles of Mathematics, and Scientific
Method in Philosophy (see his index) ; cf. also Bergson, Creative Evolu-
tion, Chap. IV.
THE NATURE OF CONTRADICTION 137
Now it is found to be a fact, that e.g., one and the same
surface is not at the same time and in the same area both red
and blue. It is either red, or some other color. Colors are, as
a matter of fact, of such a character that they exclude one
another from existing at exactly the same time and place. But
a color and something not a color can coexist under these condi-
tions. For example, a specific red and a specific degree of hard-
ness can simultaneously be qualities of one and the same
surface.
In relation to a particular red, then, all other "things" are
(formally) not this red, yet they are first experienced as quite
as positive '"things" as is red itself. Not by themselves, there-
fore, but only in relation to red are they negative entities. How-
ever, among the not-red "things" there are tivo kinds; the one
kind consists of other colors, and these are excluded from co-
existing with red at the same time and place; the other kind
consists of such "things" as hardness, extension, and motion,
that are not so excluded. These other "things" and red can
coexist in the same place and at the same time. It is the first
kind of "thing," namely, the other colors, that is, therefore,
the real contradictory of red, for only between other colors and
red '■s there the specific exclusion. But even this exclusion sub-
sists only under the specific conditions of the same time and
place. For, under the other specific conditions either of dif-
ferent times and the same place, or of the same time, and dif-
ferent places, there can be both red and some other color.
Contradiction in the case of terms is thus shown to be a rela-
tion that is dependent upon, or that is identical with, exclusion.
When and where there is genuine exclusion, there also is con-
tradiction. But the exclusion is itself a positive relation between
positives. Contradiction and negation are, therefore, only
derivatives of this specific relation. For this exclusion to sub-
sist there must be certain specific conditions. The two positive
"things" that exclude each other must (1) belong to the same
kind, i.e., to the same genus, as, e.g., do blue, red, green, and
yellow, as colors. The positive "things" must be, to express
the matter figuratively, like the arms of a lever, parts of the
same complex entity. But, just as a lever must rest on a
fulcrum, so also, in order to have a genuine contradiction or
138 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
exclusion, there must be a "logical fulcrum." This fulcrum
is given, in the instance of the entities just examined, by the
specific conditions of the same place and the same time.
The conditions on which a genuine contradiction subsists be-
tween propositions are essentially the same as those for con-
tradictory terms. In every case of contradictory propositions,
one proposition is negative, at least in its "logical form." But
a proposition is, as we have seen, a relational complex, and,
although there are different types of propositions, all such com-
plexes are identical with positive states of affairs. A negative
proposition is, therefore, merely the fact of the exclusion of one
positive state of affairs by another, but this relationship is itself
positive. It may be that in discovering negative propositions,
we first endeavor to discover the compatibility of one state of
affairs with another, and, failing, formulate the result in a
negative judgment. But this judgment, then, only expresses
the positive fact of the exclusion.
All this may be illustrated by an examination of one of our
previous examples, namely, that which concerns the divisibility
of even numbers by two. Let us grant that there is the objective
state of affairs or proposition, "that all even numbers are divisi-
ble by two," and also, that there is another state of affairs of
"divisibility by two" only with a remainder. If this is the
case, then there is also the state of affairs of the exclusion from
all even numbers of "divisibility by two with a remainder."
But this specific "state of affairs" is also a proposition, which
one asserts in the form of the judgment, that it is false that some
even numhers are not divisible by two. This last could itself
be a proposition, provided only there were a consistent and
implicative number system in which even numbers are divisible
by two with a remainder. But, if this were the case, this would
be a proposition in a distinct and different universe of dis-
course from that in which even numbers are divisible by two,
just as, e.g., the several postulates concerning parallels are in
those distinct universes of discourse which are known respec-
tively as the Euclidean, Lobatschewskian, and Riemannian
geometries.
The examination of further similar instances confirms our
assertion, that the situation as regards contradictory proposi-
THE NATURE OF CONTRADICTION 139
tions is the same in principle as it is in the case of contradictory
terms. Such terms are positive facts or entities that exclude
one another, but that, accordingly , in the case of physical ex-
istents, are either in the same place at different times, or are at
different places at the same time. In the case of propositions
these conditions of place and time do not hold, but, instead,
there are conditions which may perhaps best be called logical,
and hy virtue of which contradictory propositions subsist in
different universes of discourse. These different universes may,
in analogy to different places, be called different logical loci.
The problem of a proposition that is self-contradictory is per-
haps more difficult than that of two propositions that are con-
tradictory of each other, yet the solution of this problem is
similar to that of the two preceding. Propositions, at least
those which are identical with the relation of inclusion, complete
or partial, positive or negative, between classes, have two op-
posites, a contradictory and a contrary. Thus A and 0, and
E and I are pairs of contradictory opposites; and A and E,
I and 0, of contrary opposites, with the latter two called sub-
contraries, as distinct from A and E as contraries. For example,
as opposed to the proposition. Nothing is a proposition, there is
the contradictory opposite. Some "things" are propositions, and
also the contrary opposite. All "things" are propositions. The
first of these is a self -contradictory proposition, and exemplifies
the type.
Self -contradictory propositions imply or presuppose their con-
tradictory opposite. Thus, Nothing is a proposition, implies that
So7ne "things" are propositions, since it itself is a proposition.
Self-contradictory propositions are false for the reason that they
do thus presuppose their contradictory. They are, therefore,
one class of propositions that imply, showing that even so called
false propositions have some status, and must subsist in some
universe of discourse, namely, in one that is excluded from the
universe of true propositions. But, further, in the case of the
example under examination, whereas nothing is a proposition,
implies that some "things" (at least one) are propositions, this
last relational complex or proposition does not exclude, but is
compatible with, the specific suhcontrary state of affairs, that
some "things" are not propositions. These two ''states of af-
140 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
fairs" can cosubsist even as red and extension, mass and motion,
biological and moral situations can cosubsist. As an example of
this we have, within the same universe of discourse both proposi-
tions and the '' elements" or terms of these — some of which "ele-
ment" are not propositions.
From this examination of several instances of contradiction
we reach the conclusion, that this relation is a specific one, and
that it rests in every case upon the positive relation of exclusion
between entities that are themselves positive and not negative
in character. Contradiction is, then, not a law that is resident
in the thinking process, as the psychologizing tendency in logic
interprets it to be, nor is it an instrument invented unconsciously
by the collective ingenuity of men of European stock; but it is
an empirically discovered fact that is characteristic of many
"things" in an empirically discovered world, and thinking must
conform to it only because thinking must conform to "things,"
to facts. And that fact which, above ail, thinking must conform
to, in order that it shall be correct thinking in regard to the
principle of contradiction, is the fact of exclusion.
One of the instances which might be used in our analysis is
the very exclusion or prohibition of thinking certain corrollaries
of the principle of contradiction to be false. For example, to
attempt to think that two contradictories should both be true,
or, that something should be both (1) excluded and (2) not
excluded from a universe of discourse, presupposes, in form, the
very principle of contradiction or of exclusion, and its cor-
rollaries, and, in result, is precluded by this principle. In other
words, the principle of contradiction is itself presupposed in the
very form of the attempt to deny it. It therefore presupposes
itself, or, it excludes its own contradictory.
THE DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM 141
CHAPTER XVII
THE DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM
This method of proof need not long detain us. It is appro-
priately introduced at this point because of its connection with
exclusion and contradiction. A disjunction is an analysis, fol-
lowing the objective facts, into distinct and mutually exclusive
entities. These entities may be either terms, such as "verte-
brate" and "invertebrate," or propositions, such as "all related
terms are dependent on one another," and, "some related terms
are independent of one another." The fundamental principle
of the disjunction, to be observed in all cases, is, that it shoidd
he complete. Since it is identical with exclusion, it is complete
in fact. It therefore should also be complete in those judgments
which aim to assert the facts. The disjunction is expressed as
complete, if all the entities that are excluded by that entity
which forms one member of the disjunction, are expressed or
referred to in the judgment that formulates the disjunction.
This completeness of reference can be obtained either by
enumerating in positive form all the several entities that are
excluded from one another, or by using contradictories, and,
with the disjunction thus expressible in either positive or nega-
tive form, these two forms can be converted into each other.
As an example of these assertions we select the fact that a
particular animal, say, a whale, is either a vertebrate or not
a vertebrate, i.e., an invertebrate, and also the fact, that a whale
is either an invertebrate or a mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian,
or fish, for these five "orders" are the suh-classes of verte-
brates. But, from the fact that a whale is not an invertebrate,
it follows, that it is both a vertebrate and also either a mammal,
bird, reptile, amphibian, or fish. And, by further exclusion, if
the whale is not any one of these last four, it is a mammal.
This example illlustrates the logical structure of the dis-
juntive syllogism. The major premise asserts the exclusion —
exhaustively, if possible. This is done either by using contra-
dicforicr. whiih are always exhaustive, since there is no middle
142 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
ground, or by enumerating all the positive possibilities that
come under either one of the contradictories. The minor pre-
mise consists in the assertion, either that one of the possibilities
is an actuality, or, that it is not. If it is one possibility become
actual, then, since by the law of identity a "thing" is itself
and not something else, and, since by the law of contradiction it
cannot be both itself and something else, there is the implication,
that it is not any of the other possibilities; conversely, if there
is evidence that a "thing" is not any one of a certain set of
possibilities except one, it follows, that it is that one. This asser-
tion or denial, in the minor premise, of one or the other of the
terras of the disjunction in the major premise, follows the usual
principle in logic and mathematics, that to negate a negative
is to affirm. Thus, if the minor premise is of the form A is not
not-B, where the major premise is of the form, A is either B or
not-B, the conclusion is implied, that A is B.
In constructing a disjunctive syllogism by the use of con-
tradictories in the major premise, care must be taken, however,
that the terms of the disjunction are such that, if an entity
"belongs" to one of the two contradictories, it cannot belong to
the other, i.e., is excluded from that other. The danger to be
avoided is illustrated by the judgment that a line must he either
finite or infinite. This judgment is false for the reason that a
line can be hoth finite and infinite — finite in respect to smaller
lines, as units of length, and infinite in respect to points. For
certainly a line is "made up" of both smaller lines and points,
and can, therefore, belong "at the same time" to the two dis-
tinct universes of discourse that logically determine finiteness
and infinity respectively. The genuine exclusion or contradic-
tion in such a case subsists in the fact that as regards points
a line cannot be both finite and infinite, and that, if it is the one,
it is 7iot the other; also, that as regards smaller lines, it cannot
be both finite and infinite, and that, if it is the one, it is not
the other.
The "material" truth of the conclusion of a disjunctive syl-
logism depends, then, upon two conditions: first upon the fact
of the complete and genuine disjunction or exclusion with which
the major premise is identical, and, second, upon the fact, ex-
pressed in the minor premise, that a certain "thing" either is
T^E DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM 143
or is not (identical with, or included in) one of the terms of
this disjunction. Thus the two premises are "materially" true
(1) if the disjunction subsists between genuine contradictories,
and (2) if the "thing" under consideration belongs to the
genus which conditions those contradictories. For example, a
''thing" must be either red or not-red, i.e., some other color,
provided it belongs to the class of colored ''things." Also, in
this instance, the major premise is true, if all positive colors
are enumerated. In general, the major premise is correct, if all
the positive sub-classes of the genus to which the "thing"
belongs, are enumerated.
However, to ascertain whether or not in any particular case
the major premise is materially true in this sense is a problem
for empirical investigation, and here our knowledge is always
fallible. Evidently it is incumbent upon us in this connection
to discover as many actual positive differences among "things"
as we can, and to guard ourselves against inferring, from our
failure to distinguish, the absence of objective distinctnesses.
The minor premise of the disjunctive syllogism is to be estab-
lished by any method which will show that the entity under
investigation is included in, or excluded from, one or more of
the entities involved in the disjunction of the major premise.
While the disjunctive syllogism has a certain limited use by
itself as a method of elimination, its chief value, however, con-
sists in its union with the hypothetical syllogism to form the
dilemma. As an illustration, let us assume, in accordance with
our previous discussion,^ that there are only three possibilities
as to the nature of logical principles and entities, namely, that
they are all either (1) psychological, or (2) instrumental, or
(3) objective. The establishment of any one of these, excludes
the other two, or the disproof of any two establishes the third.
This is disjunctive reasoning, pure and simple.
But how disprove any of these possibilities? To do this one
might show them to be (1) absurd in some sense, i.e., to be incon-
ceivable or self-contradictory, or (2) false as a matter of fact,
or (3) false because they involve consequences that are not facts.
With any of these demonstrations successful for one possibility,
the remaining possibilities would be inferable as true. But,
' Chap. XIII.
9M METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
in a process of this kind, we have a dilemma, or a trilemma,
according as two or three possibilities are enumerated, and their
consequences developed. This method should, accordingly, be
presented in some further detail, with a preliminary presenta-
tion of the hypothetical syllogism, which is a constituent of
every dilemma.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM
The hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms and the dilemma,
while they are methods of establishing conclusions, do not put
an end to the indefinite regress of premises any more than does
the categorical syllogism, for their conclusions are materially
true only provided their premises are materially true. These
premises can in many instances be established by deductions
from other premises, but ultimately an appeal to some other
method of establishment must be made. This has just been
seen to be the case with the disjunctive syllogism. To establish
the major and minor premises of this syllogism there must in
most instances be an appeal to fact; i.e., by some analytical
method one must discover differences among ''things" in order,
first, to set up the disjunction, and, second, to include or not
include the entity under examination in, or to identify or not
identify it with, some one or more of the distinct entities that
are asserted by the major premise.
As a matter of fact, however, all establishment of our judg-
ments is hypothetical or conditioned. This mmt he the case:,
in the absence both of any one absolute test of truth and of the
means for the certain application of such tests as we do have.
All deductive proof, all induction, all self-evidence, all "con-
ceivahility," and all proof through "presupposition by denial"
lack absoluteness both in themselves and in their application.
Therefore, even these methods and tests are, in this respect,
hypothetical in character.
THE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM 145
However, although we have no test or method by which to
insure the absolute correctness either of our tests or our methods,
or of their application, and also no means by which to make
ourselves absolutely certain of the material truth of our pre-
mises, nevertheless, in both cases, a high degree of probability
is attainable in a great many instances. Indeed there is an
immense body of knowledge that is true in this sense, and there
are methods of establishment and of proof that have the same
standing. Thus, a high degree of probable truth characterizes
our knowledge of a great many (1) "things," qualities, and
events, and also (2) of the connections and relations in and
among these entities.
One kind of knowledge is, however, almost exclusively, if,
indeed, it is not, in some cases, wholly a knowledge of connec-
tions. Such knowledge is found, e.g., in pure mathematics and
in logic. This means that e.g., in mathematics we freely assume
or select various differing sets of propositions, and then proceed
to discover their implications. The assumed propositions, pro-
vided they give an implicative system, must be facts in some
sense, though they need not be existent facts.
An illustration of such knowledge is presented by the follow-
ing example from the field of geometry: Let it be assumed (1)
that the spatial universe is bounded by a spherical film and
(2) that all "things," including human beings, change in
size in inverse ratio to their distance from the center of such
a sphere. Then it follows from or is implied by these two
assumptions, that if the boundary of the sphere were ap-
proached, it would continue to seem to be as tremendously,
even as infinitely distant as it would from near the center. For,
although there would be "a smaller and smaller distance to go,"
nevertheless, as the boundary was approached, a human being
and all his means of measurement would approach zero in size.
Accordingly, the distance ever still remaining to be covered,
would continue to seem quite as great, in relation to any ^mit
of measurement, as it now seems to be from our own terrestrial
center, and with our bodies of five cubits stature.^
Who can prove that all this is not the case? For, are not
* This Non-Euclidean world is described by Poincar6, Science and
Bypotheals, trans, by Q. B. Halsted. p. 49 ff.
146 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
size and distance wholly relative? But, if all "things" were
changing size in the same ratio, could we ever become aware of
this from observation? Then is not the above hypothesis one
that cannot be disproved, although, also, it cannot be shown to
state the existent fact? Yet one can make the hypothesis, and
deduce from it, i.e., discover its implications. If we do this,
we are introduced, however, to a world and a space which are
not described by that Euclidean geometry which we learned in
our school-days, but by that other geometry, namely, the
Lobatschewskian, in which parallel lines meet at the boundary
of a sphere, and the sum of the angles of a plane triangle is less
than two right angles.
It is to be carefully noted, however, that in this example it
is not asserted, that either the original hypothesis or its conse-
quences portray the actual state of affairs in the space in which
we live. Indeed, there are reasons, due to the grossness of
measurement, why neither the hypothesis nor its consequences
can be either shown or not shown to accord with this space. Yet
if the original hypothesis could be established for our space,
say, by measurement or experimentation, then would the conse-
quences which have been stated be the fact about our space,
provided those consequences as stated are really implied by the
hypothesis.
Although, now, in this example, the hypothesis can be neither
affirmed nor denied to be the existent fact, and although there
are any number of similar hypotheses, there are, also, an ex-
tremely large 7iumher of propositions, which, as hypotheses for
certain consequences, ca^i he affirmed to be existent facts with, a
high degree of probability. In fact, propositions of this kind
make up the greater part of all the natural sciences. But, with
the hypotheses asserted to be existent facts, the consequences
likewise are so asserted. It is in this way that science becomes
systematic. Connections of various kinds between states of af-
fairs are discovered and asserted in hypothetical propositions.
Thus, to illustrate, we find that if the moon moves around the
earth in a certain path, there will be a solar eclipse. But we
discover that the moon does so move, and we affirm the ante-
cedent — the hypothesis. But therewith, also, we affirm the con-
sequent, namely, the occurrence of the eclipse.
THE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM 147
This example illustrates the structure of the hypothetical syl-
logism. In general, this method of reasoning and of establishing
conclusions consists of a major premise which is the assertion
of a connection between two proposition^, an antecedent and a
consequent, in the typical abstract form, if a is h, c is d. By
the orthodox rules, the minor premise must be either the affirma-
tion of the antecedent, or the denial of the consequent. Af-
firmation of the antecedent carries with it the affirmation of
the consequent : denial of the consequent, the denial of the ante-
cedent. But, denial of the antecedent is usually maintained not
to necessitate the denial of the consequent, nor affirmation of
the consequent, the affirmation of the antecedent, — for there
may be other conditions for the consequent than the particular
antecedent stated. These rules are held to apply to all cases.
Undoubtedly, however, there are some connections between
certain antecedents and consequents so precise and unequivocal
that the limitations stated by these rules do not hold, so that
denial of the antecedent does necessitate denial of the consequent,
and affirmation of the consequent, affirmation of the antecedent.
In illustration, this may be said to be the case with the con-
nection asserted by the premise, if one atom of hydrogen and
two atoms of oxygen combine, water is formed. However, these
unequivocal connections do not seem to be universal. For ex-
ample, if electricity passes through a copper wire, heat is gen-
erated. But from the fact of heat somewhere, we cannot infer
the presence of electricity in a conductor. The rules for the
hypothetical syllogism can only be so formulated, therefore, as
to cover all cases with certainty. This is done by the rule which
demands that we must "either affirm the antecedent, or deny the
consequent."
Our discussion will have made it clear that there is a funda-
mental difference between merely asserting a connection of im-
plication between two propositions, and asserting the existential
character of the antecedent, or denying that of the consequent,
i.e., to assert that if a is h, c is d, and if c is d, e is f, and so on,
is quite different from asserting that a is h.
This difference is most important. Wherever we can discover
connections and yet are not able to assert antecedents or deny
consequents, we can nevertheless discover whole systems of con-
148 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
sistent and implicatively connected propositions which, for this
very reason, and in this very sense, are facts.
This method offers a means of discovering entities that are
not limited to the field of existents. In other vs^ords, it is possible
rationally to discover entities and states of affairs that are con-
trary to existent fact, or that do not exist, i.e., we can discover
what would be the state of affairs, if certain "things" did not
exist, indeed, if nothing existed, — defining an existent as that
which is correlated either with a specific part of space and a
specific part of time (physical existents), or with a specific
time alone (mental existents). Such entities — that do not exist,
but that are, nevertheless, discovered to be facts by developing
consistent systems of propositions, are called suhsistents.^
Indeed, all propositions that concern existents may ultimately
presuppose propositions that concern suhsistents. For example,
propositions concerning matter and conscious processes presup-
pose certain related states of affairs concerning space and time
and numher. But space and time and number, though facts,
are discovered to be, not existents, but subsistents. This dis-
covery agrees with the scientific point of view that these entities
are peculiar "things" that concern infinity, endlessness, con-
tinuity, and the like, and that are studied, not by physical ex-
perimentation, but, independently thereof, by the rationalizing
methods of thought and reason.'
CHAPTER XIX
THE DILEMMA
The dilemma is usually defined in the text-books as a syl-
logism in which the major premise consists of a disjunction
between two hypothetical propositions, the minor premise, of
ya disjunction between two categorical propositions, and the con-
" See Chaps. XLI., XLIV.
" iScientilie proof of this distinction is found in the fact, e.g., that
nowhere in the implicative ayatcra of any kind of geometry are such
entities as mass, momentum, and the like — entities usually identified with
matter and existence — found to be implied. Space is thus demonstrated
to be independent of that ivhich exists, and, in this sense, to be a sub-
sistent.
THE DILEMMA 149
elusion, of a disjunction between either the antecedents or the
consequents of the major premise. To illustrate, we may assert
as a major premise, that, "If education is popular, compulsion
is unnecessary; if unpopular, compulsion will not be tolerated";
and as a minor, that "education is either popular or unpop-
ular"; the conclusion is implied, that compulsion either is
unnecessary, or will not be tolerated.
This example is a constructive dilemma, because a disjunction
between the antecedents of the two hypothetical propositions of
the major premise is asserted as a minor premise. On the other
hand, where a disjunction between the de^iials of the two con-
sequents is asserted, the dilemma is called destructive. In either
case, of course, either the antecedents or the consequents may
themselves be negative in meaning, as is the case with one
antecedent and the two consequents in the example just given,
and the rule then holds, that the denial (in the minor premise)
of a negative is an affirmation.
The technical rules for the dilemma are those of its constitu-
ents. The consequent must genuinely depend in some way on
the antecedent, and the disjunction must be complete. This it
is, if it subsists between contradictories, or if, in the case of
contraries, all the possibilities are recognized and stated. The
minor premise must be a disjunction either between antecedents
asserted or consequents denied.
For our purposes, however, the dilemma may be advan-
tageously defined more broadly as that method of establishing
a position, or of showing the necessity of accepting a proposi-
tion, by demonstrating that the opposed position or positions
lead to consequences that cannot be accepted for the reason
either that they are not facts, or that they are absurd, or incon-
ceivable, and the like. This may be illustrated by an example,
which, though not materially correct in every way, shows the
form of this method of reasoning.
Let us first assert the disjunctive proposition, that we must
either tax ourselves or tax other nations, in order to support
our own government, and then show the necessity of accepting
the first alternative by developing the consequences of the second,
to find that they are not acceptable. This is done as follows:
First, the hypothetical judgment is asserted, that, if we tax
150 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
other nations, we must do this cither by force or by beggary.
If, now, we can show that this consequent must be denied, then
its antecedent must also be denied, and, accordingly, the alterna-
tive, that of taxing ourselves, be accepted.
But this consequent (forcing or begging other nations to pay
our taxes) must he denied because of its consequences — i.e., the
dilemma in which it places us. For, if we force others to pay
our taxes, then we are a pirate nation, while if we ne^ others
to pay our taxes, we are a pauper nation.
But the taxing of others, asserted by our opponent, means
either the forcing of others or the begging of others to pay our
taxes, in order to support our government. Therefore it means
either that we are a pirate nation, or a pauper nation, — a choice
that we cannot, in all conscience, accept.
Therefore, with this disjunctive conclusion thus denied, or
not accepted, its antecedent, namely, that we force or beg other
nations to pay our taxes, is also denied, as is in turn its ante-
cedent, and, therewith, the alternative, that we must tax our-
selves, is asserted.
This example, however, involves a material fallacy in the fact,
both that it ignores the real point at issue concerning the nature
of import duties, namely, the question, whether direct or in-
direct taxation is most advantageous, and, also, that it finally
identifies the method of indirect taxation by import duties with
taxing other nations. However, this material fallacy does not
affect the logical form of the argument.
I This method of establishing propositions by the dilemma is
used very frequently in philosophy, both in getting at basic
positions and in arriving at details. In certain cases it is used
in connection with the reductio ad absurdum ^ and the principle
of "presupposition by denial." To give an illustration, — and
one, also, that is of importance for some of our future discus-
sions — let us examine the question as to whether the "^latural
numbers" are dependent on counting, in order to show that they
are not. Here we shall show that the proposition, that the
natural numbers are not dependent on counting, can be demon-
strated by the fact that the opposed position reduces to on
absurdity; it presupposes its contradictory.
^ Aristotle recognized the reductio ad absurdum, Anal. Prior, 1, v.
THE DILEMMA 151
There is the major premise, that, if numbers depend on
counting, then "1," as that natural number which has no
predecessor, became a fact with the first act of counting; while,
if numbers are not so dependent, then "1" was not made a fact
by the first act of counting.
But there is the minor premise, either that numbers are
thus dependent on counting or that they are not.
The conclusion follows, either that "1" became a fact with
the first act of counting, or that it did not so become.
Let us next examine the consequences of the first of the two
alternatives stated by this disjunctive conclusion. To do this,
let us assume that "1" ivas made a fact hy the first act of count-
ing. Now counting is an act, and an act requires time, and
begins and ends. Then a time is implied, before this first act
of counting took place, when there was no counting. In other
words, the time period when there was 7io counting precedes the
time period when the first act of counting took place. Therefore
this time period — of the first act of counting — cannot be in
correlation with the natural number "1" defined as the only
natural number that has no predecessor, but must be in correla-
tion with, at least, the nattiral number "2," which has a prede-
cessor, namely "1." Therefore ''1" does not depend on
counting.
Our dilemma, therefore, leads to a conclusion consisting of
a disjunction between contrary opposite propositions, one of
which, namely, that "1" depends on counting, reduces to an
absurdity in that it presupposes its opposite, namely, that
"1" does not depend on counting. But this opposite is the
denial of the consequent in one of the hypothetical alterna-
tives of the major premise of the dilemma. Therewith, how-
ever, the antecedent of this consequent is denied, and the
opposite proposition, that numbers are not dependent on count-
ing, asserted.
By quite similar arguments — differing only in ''matter," but
not in form — one can demonstrate that the natural numbers do
not depend on consciousness or knowing in any form, nor on
physical things, nor on space, nor even on time.- All these
entities are numerical in several ways, but the natural numbers
= See Chaps. XLIII., vii.-x., and Chap. XLIV.
152 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
themselves are facts that are quite independent of these other
entities.
This is an important conclusion, — given here in illustration
— since upon the principle which it involves there depends one
of the greatest philosophical systems of history, the Platonic,
with its acceptance of the reality of universals, of abstractions,
and of ideals as independent of the concrete, particular ''things"
of the physical and mental world. It is, indeed, by the principle
just illustrated that such ideals as justice can be proved to be
real although they are never realized in a world of human beings
that exist in space and time.^
CHAPTER XX
ANALOGY
Eeasoning by analogy is a method that is frequently used in
philosophy. For example, in a great many systems the entire
universe is regarded as being like a living organism, and there-
fore as having a unity in the midst of its manifoldness, even as
the parts of a plant or an animal, especially a highly organized
one, influence one another and function together to make one
living being. The same analogy is also frequently used to
demonstrate, further, that the universe is immanently purpose-
ful or teleological. Carried to its consistent outcome, this rea-
soning leads to the conclusion, that the universe is, indeed, an
organism that manifests, perhaps, all the characteristics of life.^
Indeed, if one finds that it is between the universe and higher
organisms, such as ourselves, that the analogy holds, then the
conclusion is reached, that this all-inclusive living being, the
universe, is conscious in all that this may mean, in fact that
it may be self-conscious, have memory, purposes, and aims, and
even a moral consciousness, and, indeed, be a person and a self.^
» See Chap. XLV.
' E.g., by Paulsen in his Introduction to Philosophy, and by Bergson in
Creative Evolution.
' The position of most modern objective idealists; cf. Chaps. XXXIV.-
xxxvm.
ANALOGY 153
Another example of an analogy that is frequently used in
constructing philosophical positions is the argument from the
similarity of the universe to a man-made mechanism or machine.
Such a mechanism reveals a delicate and nice adjustment and
working-together of parts in order to bring about a certain
result and thus accomplish a certain purpose. But this adjust-
ment is brought about by a mechanician and contriver. By
analogy, it is argued that in nature there are discoverable con-
trivances and mechanisms which are even more exquisite and
more beautifully adaptative and purposeful as, e.g., the eye,
the heart, and, indeed, even the v\^hole universe itself. Accord-
ingly it is inferred that for the universe there is also a maker
and a purposer. This conclusion is reached in this way by
those who accept an external teleology as a position that means
a mechanistic view of the physical and even the psychical uni-
verse, and the theistic view that there is a Deity, who, as in
some sense outside the universe, is its mechanist, its designer,
or its architect, if not its absolute creator.^
The logical structure of the argument by analogy becomes
clear through these examples. Given two "things," as, e.g.,
the eye and a watch, that are similar in certain respects, namely,
in the mutual adjustment of structures and the functioning-
together of parts, then are they not similar in further respects,
e.g., that the eye, like the watch, has a maker and a purposer?
By analogy one concludes that this is the fact.
Stated formally this method of establishing premises is as
follows: Certain entities. A, B, and C, are similar in respect to
the characteristics, x and y; but A and B are characterized also
by z; therefore C is also characterized by z.
Clearly the presupposition of this argument is the principle,
that whatever is similar in certain respects is also similar in
others. But it requires only the statement of this presupposi-
tion to make the fact equally clear, that partial similarity does
not of necessity carry with it further, much less, complete
similarity. In certain instances such further similarity is
found ; in other instances it is not. The most that we are justi-
fied in concluding, is, therefore, that if there is some similarity,
there may be more. That it is even highly prohaMe that there
' Cf. Chaps. VI. and VII.
154. METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
is more, can be justifiably asserted provided only that analogy
ceases to be analogy, and becomes induction. Given two typical
and random instances, A and B, with each characterized by an
X, but with X, e.g., causally or functionally connected with y
in these cases; then, if other entities, C, D, E, etc., are char-
acterized by X, they are also, with a high degree of probability,
characterized by y.
The crucial problem, therefore, in employing the argument by
analogy is that of ascertaining whether or not further similarity
really holds or not. But if it does, there is some other reason than
analogy for it so doing. It is by virtue of the fact that the sev-
eral cases are instances of a law, a principle, a type, or a class,
that similarity in respect to certain characteristics carries with
it similarity in respect to others. Thus there is a resemblance
in many respects between the rocks as we find them often in
extremely distinct strata, and the layers of material that are
deposited by the waters of the earth's surface today. Does the
resemblance go further? The geologist advances the inductive
theory that it does, but finds in these two sets of phenomena
the results of the action of a common cause. Even as the sedi-
ments are to be observed today in a process of stratification, so
were the stratified rocks slowly deposited in past ages, gradually
to harden through the addition of other materials.
Can we discover by a similar procedure such features of the
universe as will give inductive proof that it belongs to the type,
organism, or to the type, machine? If we cannot, then to infer
on the basis of analogy that the universe is an organism, or a
machine, is extremely hazardous.
In general we may conclude, that, if reasoning by analogy is
valid, then, paradoxically, this validity rests on some further,
non-analogical basis. At best analogy can serve only as a basis
for the suggestion that there is a certain range of possibilities
within which to investigate. Thus the universe may be an
organism, or it may be a machine; hut it may he neither. On
the basis of analogy one should neither accept nor reject these
possibilities, but should hold his judgment in suspense regarding
them until evidence and proof from ether sources are at hand
to justify a highly probable conclusion one way or the other.
FURTHER IMPLICATIVE SITUATIONS 155
III. ANALYSIS AND THE NEW LOGIC
CHAPTER XXI
FURTHER IMPLICATIVE SITUATIONS AND NEW METHODS
OF ESTABLISHING PREMISES
The discussion of the dilemma and of analogy completes the
presentation of those tests and methods that are used in ordinary
discourse and argumentation in order to establish premises and
furnish proof. But such tests and methods, even if they are
not discredited, as is, e.g., the test by self-evidence, are inade-
quate to deal with all the problems and situations that the
universe presents to the inquiring mind.
The tests and methods that we have been considering are
those that, for the most part, directly constitute the logic of the
tradition. This traditional logic is, as we have seen, the doctrine
that emanated from Aristotle, and is essentially a logic of
classes. As a logic of classes it is, as we have also seen,^ based
on the physical thing as that model in analogy to which all
entities are conceived of and thought about. Accordingly the
principles that form the chief characteristics of this traditional
doctrine are: (1) the relations of similarity and of difference,
of "member of," of additiveness, of inclusion, complete, partial,
and negative, of causation, of inherence, of identity, and of con-
tradiction; (2) the subsistence, by virtue of the first four rela-
tions, of classes (which are either included in or excluded from
other classes completely or partially) ; (3) the principle of iden-
tity as applying to each individual and to each class ; (4) causa-
tion as holding between individuals, and (5) inherence as holding
between the qualities and their sul) stratum, and finally (6) the
propositions that are constituted by any of these relations, — in
their function of relating terms.
This traditional Aristotelian logic has controlled the ma-
jority of the great historical systems of philosophy, and domi-
nates much philosophy even at the present time. Indeed it
^ Chaps. I.-III.
156 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
exercises its influence even on some philosophers who endeavor
to criticize both it and the systems that are built upon it.-
However, in mathematics and in other fields of research in
which appeal is made to fact, and not to authority and tradi-
tion, modern investigation has shown that the logic of classes
is not the only logic, and that the situations described by it
are not the only ones in which the relation of ijnplication is
present.
By way of sharply contrasting the two logics one may say
that, if the logic of the Greek and Medijeval period was, with
few exceptions, one of classes, the logic of modern exact science
is one of series. In such isolated instances as the geometry of
Euclid, the mechanics of Archimedes, and the astronomical
theories of Aristarchus, Hipparchus, and Ptolemy, situations
were recognized in which series and their logic are present. But
this logic received no formulation either from Aristotle or from
his successors in that tradition to which he was the chief con-
tributor. Indeed, not until the Archimedean spirit of an appeal
to nature was revived by such pioneers as Leonardo and Galileo,
and continued by the host of their noble successors, was there
opportunity for a break with the tradition and the use of the
logic of series. Galileo ^ sounded the trumpet call for the
coming advance when, with the insight of genius, he showed by
experiment that uniformly changing velocity, i.e., acceleration,
ife in a functional relaiion to the time series. In such a rela-
tionship there is present much of that logic which received at
least partial formulation in the Calculus of Newton and of
Leibniz, and which has received its more complete statement
in the recent work of such men as Cantor, Dedekind, Peano,
Eussell, and Royce.*
The present knowledge of this modern logic makes it quite
clear that the Aristotelian doctrine wholly omits the formula-
tion of certain logical principles that subsist in certain situa-
tions. These principles are found where there are series. A
series is an ordered class of individuals, in which each individual
* See the modification and the underlying-reality theories of relations,
Chap. XXVI., and the whole of Section 1 of Part II.
• Galileo (Jaliloi, Dialogues, ed. by A. de Salvio, trans, by H. Crew,
1914; cf. Mach, Science of Mechanics, on Galileo.
*See references for Chaps. I. -111., XXVII., XLI.-XLIV.
FURTHER IMPLICATIVE SITUATIONS 157
has a specific "position" in relation to the position of all the
other individuals of the series. The Aristotelian logic is wholly-
incapable of dealing with such entities (series), since it recog-
nizes no principle of order other than that of the positive or
negative inclusion of one class in another. It accordingly is
identical with the (tacit) assumption that individuals or parts
are, in most cases, related only additively to constitute a whole,
and is, therefore, incapable of logically accounting for a whole
that has properties different from those of the parts, as, e.g.,
has a chemical compound in contrast with its elements, and a
living being in contrast with the chemical and physical forces
of which it is composed. For, parts added, i.e., related addi-
tively, give only a swm, i.e., a whole which has properties like
those of the parts.
In contrast with the traditional doctrine, the new logic recog-
nizes, therefore, the principle, that a whole may consist of tivo
or more kinds of parts, and that the individuals of some of
these kinds tnust be related non-additively in order to constitute
the whole. Such a non-additive relation is asymmetrical, and
is present in every series.
But, further, the Aristotelian logic is also wholly ignorant
of the functional relationship, which plays such a dominant role
in modern exact science. Yet that it must be thus ignorant is
to be seen from the fact that it excludes series, and a function
is a correlation between scries. Accordingly the traditional
logic omits the use of the principle, that two entities can be
related and yet be independent.^ This principle is typified in
the character of that relation which subsists between the two
variables (series) of a function. The Aristotelian logic accepts
and insists on the opposed principle, that all relatedness
carries with it the mutual causal modification of the related
entities.
Finally, the traditional logic omits the principle, that a rela-
tion itself unites, in some specific way, the entities related, so
that a substance or substratum is not needed to hold these
entities together and to mediate the relation. Indeed, modern
logic centers very largely on the concept of relations, and the
Aristotelian logic, in contrast, on the concepts of substance and
' Sep Chap XXVI.. n., 1.
158 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
causation. This it must do, since its model is interacting
physical things, with a physical thing defined as a group of
qualities that inhere in a core-like substance.*^
CHAPTER XXII
ANALYSIS
The methods of the new logic are both analytical and syn-
thetical. To analyze is to discover parts — in or of a whole, —
and also the character of the relations between the parts, but,
with this accomplished, there is also synthesis. For the pre-
liminary to the synthesizing of parts experimentally is, after
discovering the parts, to find how to put thera together. But,
if experiment is impossible in certain cases, then, with the
discovery of parts and the specific character of their relatedness,
there already is synthesis. This second method is analysis and
synthesis in situ. We start with a whole, and in it discover
parts ; but the parts are left undisturhed; still we discover that,
related in a certain way, they give the whole "back again." It
is this method of analysis and synthesis in situ that is used in
mathematics, geometry, and to a large extent also in mathe-
matical physics, chemistry, and many other sciences. But it is
an important characteristic of this method, that it is not only
an analysis and a synthesis in situ, but also a means whereby
one discovers facts hy implication and hy type rather than by
the specification of each particular indivitlual.^
Such a procedure may be illustrated by the example of that
analysis of space which is made by geometers at the present
time. In giving this example, some of the teims may be left
undefined, since they will be readily understood in essentially
their correct sense.
The space in which we perceive physical entities is found to
e See Chap. III.
^ Cf. my " Defense of Analysis " in The 'New Realism, and the article by
H. T. Costello, "A Neo-realistic Theory of Analysis," in the Jour, of
Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. X., p. 494 ff.
ANALYSIS 159
consist of three dimensions, with each at right angles to the
other two. Each of these dimensions is itself a straight line
with no breadth or thickness, and thus quite unlike the pencil
or crayon line by which it can be represented. But while this
analysis of space is being made, these three dimensions are left
in situ, since we cannot experimentally separate them. Further,
any one finite line is of definite length in relation to some unit
of measurement, and, therefore, can be analyzed into smaller
lines, even as a foot is analyzable into twelve inches. Each
such smaller line, however, is in turn analyzable into still smaller
lines. Let this analysis, now, be continued and repeated up to
that point beyond which our instruments of measurement do
not take us, and it will be then discovered that the analysis
can be "ideally" continued. This realization is accompanied
by the further discovery that tliere is a limit which the smaller
and smaller lines approach but do not reach, and that this limit
is a point. Such a point, as the limit, has no length, no breadth,
and no thickness. We cannot see or touch it, indeed, in some
cases we cannot even specifically name it. Yet, hy discovering
implications, we find that there are such points, in fact, a whole
class of them. This is knowledge hy type, and not by specifi-
cation.
But the analysis further reveals both the character of the
relation between these points and their numher. The relation
is of the same type as is that relation which subsists between
the positive integers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, n — 1, n, n -\- 1, i.e., it is
asymmetrical and tramitive. This means that, if the symbol <
stands for the relationship of "precedes," then, e.g., 4 < 5, but
not 5 < 4; i.e., the relation is asymmetrical ; also, that, if, 4 < 5
and 5 < G, then 4 < 6; i.e., the relation is transitive, or "goes
across" from 4 to 6. This means that, like the positive integers,
the points of a line form a series, or that the line is a series of
points. Further, the number of points is infinite in the sense
that any finite part of a finite line contains as many points aa
the whole line does, — a discovery that is made by finding that,
in respect to points, the whole line is in one-one correspondence
with a proper part of itself, a "proper part" being defined as
a part that is like tho whole, i.e., that is itself a line. Again,
in this respect iho lino ir-. like the series of positive integers,
160 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
since, in this series, there are as many even integers as there
are odd and even. In other words, the whole series is in one-one
correspondence with a proper part of itself, namely, with the
even integers, as it is, also, with the odd integers.
The example just given is illustrative of a type of whole that
has furnished philosophy and science with many difficult prob-
lems from the time of earliest Greek thought to the present.
However, some of these difficulties have come from the fact
that the analysis which has been attempted has not followed
correct logical principles, or that the logic which is actually
involved in the entities analyzed has not been discovered. In
some cases, also, while the analysis has been correct up to a
certain point, it has been incomplete. Often, also, correct
analysis has been misinterpreted. Accordingly, in the case of
such entities as space, time, and motion, various self-contradic-
tions, and peculiar logical situations called "antinomies" have
appeared to be involved, and have, indeed, been considered to
be back-handed proofs of the correctness of certain philosophical
positions, as, e.g., of Phenomenalism.
CHAPTER XXIII
ANALYSIS BY INCORRECT PRINCIPLES
An example of a philosophy that derives support from the
difficulties that arise from a fanlty analysis of space and time
is Phenomenalism,^ This is the position of the philosopher, Ira-
manuel Kant (1724-1804), who is considered b}^ some to be the
greatest of all modern philosophers. In one part of his work,
The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant develops four so-called
"antinomies." By an "antinomy" Kant means a pair of con-
trary-opposite propositions each of which can be both proved
and disproved. Each can be proved by the rcductio ad ab-
surdum of the other, i.e., each is shown to be presupposed by
its own denial. Thus it is, also, that each can be disproved.
The Second Antinomy is here selected in order to illustrate
' See Chap. XXIX.
ANALYSIS BY INCORRECT PRINCIPLES 161
this peculiar situation and the way in which it is artificially
created by faulty analysis. Kant 's formulation of this antinomy
is as follows: —
Thesis
" Every composite substance in the world is made up of simple parts,
and nothing whatever exists but the simple, or that which is composed
out of the simple."
Proof
*' Assume that composite substances are not made up of simple parts.
Then, if we think all composition to be away, no composite part will
be left. And, by hypothesis, there is no simple part. Hence, nothing
at all will remain, and therefore no substance. Either, then, it is
impossible to think all composition to be away, or even after composition
is thought to be away, there must be something left, which exists
without composition, that is, the simple. In the former case, the com-
posite cannot be made up of substances, for composition is merely an
accidental relation of substances, which may be taken away without at
all affecting their existence as permanent realities. But, by hypothesis,
substances do exist, and hence we must adopt the other supposition,
that the composite substances in the world consist of simple parts.
It directl}' follows, that all the things in the world are simple; that
composition is merely an external state of those things; and that,
although we can never take elementary substances out of their state
of composition and isolate them, reason must think of them as the
primary subjects, which exist as simple beings antecedently to all
composition."
Antithesis
" No composite thing in the world is made up of simple parts, nor
does anything simple exist anywhere in the world."
Proof
" Assume that a composite thing or substance is made up of simple
parts. Then, as no external relation, and therefore no composition
out of substances, is possible except in space, the composite thing must
be made up of exactly the same number of parts as the space which
it occupies. Now, space is not made up from simple parts, but consists
of spaces. Evei'y pai"t of the composite thing must therefore occupy
a space. But the absolutely primary parts of every composite thing
are simple. Hence each of those simple parts occupies a space. Now,
as every real thing, which occupies a space, contains within itself a
number of parts that are outside of one another, and is therefore
composite; and as this real composite thing is not made up of accidents,
since these could not, apart from substance, be outside of one another;
we must conclude, that simple substance is composite. . . ."^
' Watson, The Philosophy of Kant, ed. 1895, pp. 160-161.
162 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
Kant's formulation of this Antinomy is, very evidently, rather
obscure, but if it is subjected to a rather violent paraphrasing,
it is found to mean: —
Thesis: Every (composite) substance is made up of simple
parts as the condition for there being suhstances at all. For
(proof) if there were no simple parts, and yet substances were
derived by composition of parts, then we should have something
"coming" out of nothing — which is impossible. Therefore there
must he ultimate simples (such as are recognized in science
today as atoms, or as electrons) in order that there may be
substance at all.
Antithesis: No substance is made up of simple parts, since
(proof) if a substance "occupies" space (and it does), it is
as "repeatedly divisible," again and again, into ever smaller
parts, as is the space which it occupies, i.e., no "smaller
part," such as an atom or electron, is absolutely simple,
because, as extended in space, it is divisible, and therefore
complex.
A clearer formulation of the same antinomy is one that does
not run the danger of examining both substance and space "at
the same time," but that considers space alone.
Such an antinomy of space may be stated in the form : —
Thesis: Space does not consist of points, revealed by analysis,
but must consist of simple parts or spaces (lines, planes, or
volumes).
Proof: Assume the contrary-opposite proposition, namely, that
space does consist of points. But a point is unextended. There-
fore, if extension be derived from points, — in other words, if
space of one, two, or three dimensions is composed of points,
then something "comes" from nothing, i.e., the extended
"comes" from the ttnextended. But this is (for Kant) im-
possible (perhaps because it is inconceivable). Therefore that
entity to which the analysis of space leads must, by whatever
name it may be called, be extended, i.e., it must itself be space
or extension.
Antithesis: Space does consist of ultimate, unextended simple
parts, i.e., of points.
Proof: Assume the contrary-opposite proposition, namely, that
space does not consist of points, but of spaces, i.e., of lines,
ANALYSIS BY INCORRECT PRINCIPLES 163
planes, and volumes. Then, as extensions, these parts are divisi-
ble, as are their parts in turn, and so on, until finally unex-
tended and absolutely simple parts are reached. Then it is of
such parts, i.e., of points that space consists.^
Kant arrives at this antinomy because he unknowingly ac-
cepts an incomplete and faulty analysis. This is due to the
fact that his attention is directed exclusively to points, and
that he ignores the character of the specific relations between the
points. But points actually are related in a very specific way,
and through the specific relations that hold among them (unex-
tended) points do constitute an extended "something" which
is space of one, two, and three dimensions.
To demonstrate this, one has but to grant the principle, that
points are related non-additively, or more specifically, that they
are related by an asymmetrical and transitive relation^ It
follows from this principle, that that whole which results from
points so related, namely, space of one, two, or three dimensions,
has characteristics that are different from those of the parts,
even so different as to "mean" that extension is derived from
that which is not extended, — just as, by the same principle,
that which is chemical (atoms) is derived from that which is
not chemical (electrons), and that which is life (cells) is de-
rived from that which is not life (physico-chemical forces).
For it is only a whole which is an additive result of its parts,
that must resemble these parts as to its characteristics. Kant,
however, quite neglected all such non-additive relations. But
he was guilty of this neglect because he was unknowingly shut
up within the limitations of the Aristotelian logic, as this had
come down in the tradition.
The modern Kantian, however, concludes that this second, as
well as the other antinomies, confirms the main contention of the
phenomenalistic philosophy, namely, that what we perceive and
know is only appearance, and not ultimate reality. For, — he
argues, that, while we undoubtedly perceive both space and
spatial "things," nevertheless, since iy the antinomy space or
extension is self-contradictory, no better proof than this could
' Cf. Russell's discussion of Kant's Antinomies in The Principles of
Mathematics, pp. 188, 190-193, 259, 458-461.
* See Chap. XLIII., vu., for details.
I6i METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
be had, that the perceived ''world" of sense is mere appearance
or phenomenon.
Modern analytical science, however, solves and disposes of the
second antinomy of Kant by showing that both thesis and anti-
thesis are true. It succeeds in doing this by discovering that,
e.g., the line is made up of two kinds of parts, namely, points
and smaller lines. The former are not related additively to
make up the line, while the latter are so related in certain
respects. Further, the line has certain specific and distinct
characteristics by virtue of each of the two kinds of parts. Thus,
as made up of points, it is infinite, and may also be continuous,
while, as made up of smaller lines, it is finite. It is in this way
that both points and smaller lines cosuhslst as the parts of a
finite line, and with the result that finitude and infinity are not
inconsistent, but quite compatible, as distinct characteristics of
one and the same entity. Thus it is that modern analysis
rationalizes the line, the plane, and the three-dimensional mani-
fold, and avoids those difficulties which were met with by the
earlier analysts.
Much of modern exact science depends upon principles which
the analysis that has just been presented well illustrates. This
analysis leads to the discovery of doth the parts and the rela-
tions between the parts.^ By it such wholes as time, space,
motion, acceleration, and change in general are rationalized
without any contradiction or antinomy appearing. Its results
are, therefore, to be accepted at their face value, and are not
to be regarded either as human inventions, or as mere appear-
ances, and the like, until there are good reasons for so doing.
And up to the present all the reasons that have been advanced
for so regarding these results have been fallacious. They have
been fallacious reasons, either (1) because, with the failure of
the attempt to analyze and to rationalize in accordance with
some one principle, another principle has not been tried ; or
(2) because the analysis has been incomplete, and, therefore,
has not discovered all the parts and all the relations, one of
both; or (3) because the actual results of correct analysis have
been misstated.
Our second example will, therefore, illustrate those difficulties
' Cf . the writer's " Defense of Analysis " in The New Realism.
ANALYSIS BY INCORRECT PRINCIPLES l65
and failures that are conditioned by incomplete analysis, but
that disappear if the analysis be made complete. The example
is that of the incomplete analysis of the continuity of a line.
Because of its incompleteness, the analysis readily leads to an
antinomy of continuity, but an antinomy that as readily dis-
appears if the analysis be made complete.
To demonstrate this, let us consider an instance of an analysis
of the continuity of a line that endeavors to account for this
continuity by means of the concepts of gaps and of hetweenness.
It is then found that it can be both proved and disproved both
that the continuity consists in the absence of gaps, and also in
their presence. This situation constitutes the antinomy :
Thesis: Continuity is the absence of gaps. Proof: Assume that
the line is made up of points, so that, from any one point to
another, there is a distance, or gap. Then, between these points
there are other points, and so on. Therefore, if there are enough
points to ''fill in" all such gaps, the line is continuous. But
there are enough points, since, not only between any two points
is there a third point, but also, in any line or distance, there
is an infinite number of points. Therefore the line is continuous
in that there are no gaps.
Antithesis: Continuity is the presence of gaps in the line.
Proof: Assume that the line is made up of points, and, there-
fore, since there is a point between every two points, that there
are no gaps — all gaps being filled up. Now if, e.g., the line is
of unit length, so that the end points are in correlation with
and 1, then the other points are in correlation with the rational
fractions. For it is the character of these fractions that between
any two of them there is a third. But the rational fractions are
also of such a character (as is well known) that the difference
between any two of them is finite. Accordingly, if the rational
fractions are correlated with the points, as they must be, if any
two of them are correlated with two specific points by any scale
of measurement, then the finite differences between the rational
fractions stand for, or are correlated with, 7iot points, but lines,
distances, or gaps, between points. Therefore continuity con-
sists in, not the absence of gaps, but their presence.
This whole antinomy arises from the fact that the analysis
is made in exclusive reliance upon intuition and self -evidence
166 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
rather than upon intellectual experiment and supplementary
analysis and testings. To intuition the repeated "betweenness"
of points does seem, perhaps, to explain or to define continuity,
but it turns out, in fact, not so to explain or define this, but
to lead to contradictions and antinomies. However, by a sup-
plementary and complete analysis, in which something more
than mere "betweenness" is discovered, the genuine character
of continuity is revealed and all seeming contradictions in it are
removed."
We may next consider an example of getting into a difficulty,
an antinomy, a paradox, through rationalizing and analyzing
by means of an incorrect rather than a correct principle.
Zeno (about 490-430 B.C.) endeavored analytically to ration-
alize, or rationally to analyze motion. He tried to do this in
a number of ways, but found that every analysis of motion
revealed a contradiction somewhere and somehow. Accordingly
he concluded that motion and change in general are only
illusions, and that rest and permanence are alone real.'^
One of his analyses consisted in reducing motion to an ab-
surdity. In doing this Zeno assumed an instance of motion,
say from a point A to a point B. Concerning this he then
argued, that, before one travels this whole distance, one must
travel the first half of it, and, before this half, the first half of
it, and so on. Therefore, he concluded, one barely gets started,
or, indeed, one does not get started at all. For similar reasons,
he argued, one could never qtiite reach a destination, since, if
one has gone half the distance, then, before one can go the
remaining half, one must cover half of it, etc., so that there is
always still remaining a fractional part yet to be traveled.
Therefore in neither case is there motion.
Where, now, is the error in this reasoning? It must be
admitted that analysis does show that a finite distance consists
of, e.g., halves, quarters, eighths, etc., and also that one must
cover the first of these fractional parts before one covers the
subsequent parts. The error in the argument consists, however,
in ignoring the rather technical principle, that, if x and y be
" See Chap. XLIII., vii.-x.
'See Burnett, Early Greek Philosophy, 1892, p. 331 ff.; cf. Russell,
Scientific Method in Philosophy, p. 165 ff., and Principles of Mathematics
in a number of places (see his index).
ANALYSIS BY INCORRECT PRINCIPLES l67
any two commensurable finite quantities of which x <iy ( <
meaning "less than"), there is always a number n such that
nx = y. Contrariwise the error consists in assuming the false
II II
principle, that, if x = , where . is any fractional part of y,
/ \ n n
then n ( — I < 2/- ^s applied to the problem of motion, this
\n/
last assumption means that, even with a start admitted in which
the distance x is traversed in the time t, the distance, y = nx
{y > x), cannot be traveled in the time nt, but only the
y
distance, y —, can be ; in other words it means, that, if a
11/
certain distance x, say, -j- of y, is traveled in the time t, then
4
m the time, ^ X 4, — y cannot be traveled.
Obviously, however, this conclusion is false, if there is such
an entity as uniform rate. For, if there is, then, if any start at
all is admitted, so that a finite distance x is traversed in the
time t, at the rate — , it must be granted that in the time,
nt, the distance nx {=^ y) can be traversed.
One cannot avoid this conclusion by maintaining either that
there is no start, or that the rate itself is changing. For, on
the one hand, finite distances are implied by that which is the
limit of the series of decreasing finite distances, namely, the
point, at which there would be no motion, while, on the other
hand, if there are finite distances, then, for some distance x,
X
no matter how small, there is uniform velocity — .
However, that there are both finite distances and uniform
velocities, is presupposed by those very assumptions which are
used by Zeno to demonstrate that motion is impossible. But
if there are such distances and velocities, then in due time,
motion over any distance y is possible, even though it is true
that any first distance — must be traversed before the second
n
distance is traversed, and, also, that after any first distance JL
n
is traversed, the distance, e.g., -^, must be traversed before the
168 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
next '~ is traversed, and so on. For, although there is a
sum, JL JL. M. — lJI , . . i^ ^ there is also the product ^o
n n" n^ n° ^
Zeno's whole difficulty, therefore, was incurred by rationaliz-
ing in accordance with an incorrect assumption or principle.
It is evident, then, that when one rationalizes, one should use
not only correct methods, but also correct material principles
or premises. Otherwise it is quite easy to create seemingly real,
but actually only artificial difficulties, and to reach seemingly
rational conclusions that contradict sense-given facts, as, e.g.,
the reality of motion.
At this point we may advantageously present still another
example of an attempt at rational analysis by a false principle
rather than by a correct one, of the consequent failure of this
attempt, of the conclusions that are derived from such a failure,
and, finally, of a consistent and satisfactory analysis of the
same complex by a principle that is correct.
Ever since Zeno and the other Eleatics, certain philosophers
have endeavored to analyze change by the use of the two prin-
ciples of identity and contradiction.^ This attempt fails, so
that the conclusion is reached, that change is only appearance,
and that rest and permanence are alone realities.
The analysis that is made may be stated as follows: Under
the influence of the traditional logic, with its dominant concept
of thing, the problem is stated in the form of the question, How
can a thing change? In solution of this, it is found, that the
law of identity applies to a thing, i.e., that a thing is identical
with itself. Change, then, if it is a fact, seems to mean that
a thing ceases to be identical with itself and becomes something
else, i.e., that a thing, A, becomes its contradictory, non-A. At
a certain instant, therefore, the thing is, or seems to be, both
A and non-A, which "condition" violates the principle of con-
tradiction, namely, that a thing cannot both be and 7wt be, have
and not have, a certain property. Change, therefore, involves
this contradiction, or, it may be said to be self -contradictory in
this respect, so that, with it tacitly assumed, that that which is
self-contradictory cannot he real, it must be concluded that
* F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Chaps. I.-V., especially pp.
45-48; also pp. 231-233.
ANALYSIS BY INCORRECT PRINCIPLES 169
change is not real, but only illusory and apparent, while rest
and permanence, or, more generally, that which remains identical
with itself, is alone reality.
Let us now, in contrast, examine the results of the endeavor
to analyze change by the use of other principles than those of
identity and contradiction, with these latter supplemented, how-
ever, and not displaced by such other principles. With our
present knowedge of the several specific kinds of relations, of
the precise nature of continuity, infinity, and the like, let us
assume, at least for the sake of making the experiment, that
change is a continuous series, with all that this means by way
of those logical principles, entities, and relations that a series
involves. The analysis that results not only does not show
change to involve any contradiction, but also reveals the opposed
analysis to be most inadequate.
In the first place, a series is not the mere individuals that are
present in it, but is these individuals related ni a very specific^
way, namely, by an asymmetrical and transitive relation.** Cer-
tain minor limitations of this statement may be neglected here.
And, secondly, a series is continuous, if it is in one-one cor-
respondence with the real numbers, namely, the series of positive
integers, rational fractions, and irrationals in order of magni-
tude.^'^ A series is thus quite consistent with the self-identity
of each of its members, while it is also more than these members.
In a continuous series no member is next to any other, and there
is no finite difference between members, or from any one member
to another member. ^^
If, now, we analyze change in accordance with this logic, we
limit the use of the principle of identity, and accordingly give
up that definition of change which makes it "the ceasing of
something to be identical with itself" and the "becoming some-
thing else." For by this new logic, there is no such ceasing,
although there are individuals, A and B (non-A), that remain
identical with themselves. But there are not only these two
individuals, but there are in a continuous series an infinite
number of individuals betM'een A and B. The change, then, is;
the ordered complex or series of these individuals, each of which,
like the change itself, is identical with itself, and does not
» See Chap. XLIII. " See Chap. XLIII., vii.-x. " /6td.
170 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
change. Change, therefore, is a different kind of entity from
the individuals that are present in it, &nd is not to be analyzed
by the principles that apply to those individuals, any more than
the moral situation is to be analyzed by examining those uni-
verses of discourse from which morality is absent. In a similar
way, "individual" and "change" are entities that belong, each
to a distinct universe of discourse, with each capable of con-
sistent analysis, unless the individuals are simple, each equally
real, and neither to be confused with the other.
CHAPTER XXIV
MISINTERPRETATIONS OF CORRECT ANALYSIS
We now reach the third way in which doubt is thrown upon
the reality of certain entities, e.g., space, time, and motion. This
is done by misinterpreting actual, correct results obtained by
analysis. Misinterpretation is quite excusable, if it is not wilful,
but quite unpardonable, if it is intentional. With Zeno it was
not intentional when he analyzed, e.g., the motion of the arrow,
and interpreted the arrow's being at a point at an instant as
rest. From this Zeno reached the conclusion that motion was
only a sum of rests, and, therefore, was not real, but only ap-
parent.
But Zeno also made a misinterpretation. The arrow's occu-
pation of a point for an instant, is not rest, — whatever else it
may be. To be at rest the arrow must be at a point for at least
two instants, and if for two instants, then for an infinite number
of instants between the two.^ Zeno's conclusion therefore falls
to the ground.
Among contemporaneous philosophers Bergson does not hesi-
tate to accept Zeno's misinterpretation and to base an anti-intel-
lectualistic philosophy upon it.^ Bergson 's argument is, that,
because the analysis of motion leads to its contradictory, rest,
* See Chap. XLIII., vii.-x.
- In Creative Evolution, Matter and Memory, and Time am,d Free Will.
MISINTERPRETATIONS OF CORRECT ANALYSIS 171
the analysis falsifies that which is analyzed.^ However, this
specific analysis is regarded as typical of all analysis, and there-
fore all analysis is held to falsify. Accordingly, the position is
arrived at, that, to get at fact, one must not analyze at all, but
must rely upon the immediate experience of the (unanalyzed)
whole, through intuition, emotion, and the like.*
To refute Zeno and Bergson, and to undermine those philo-
sophical conclusions which the latter bases on that (false)
analysis of motion which he accepts, one has, however, only to
state correctly the actual scientific analysis of motion that is
ready at hand. This analysis shows that the occupation of a
point at an instant is neither rest nor motion. It shows, on the
one hand, that rest is the occupation of a point for two and
indeed for an infinite number of instants, and, on the other
hand, that motion is the one-one correlation of two points and
therefore of an infinite number of points with two instants
and, therefore, with an infinite number of instants. Or, stated
in another way, motion is a series of complexes each of which
is itself a one-one correlation of a point with an instant.^ But
in order to analyze motion in this way into parts that are them-
selves neither motions nor rests, one must accept the two prin-
ciples, (1) that a whole can be made up of two or more kinds
of parts, and (2) that, even though the parts of one type may
be related additively to form the whole, those of certain other
types cannot be so related. In anything that is an ordered class
or series, this last must be the case.
Motion is a series. It consists, in the case of any finite motion,
of smaller motions, but it also consists of another type of parts,
each of which is the complex, point-correlated-with-instant.
These parts, however, are neither rests nor motions; yet, as
related non-additively, or, more specifically, as related asym-
metrically and transitively, they are that whole which is motion,
and which has properties that are different from those of the
parts.
The results of this analysis furnish, therefore, no oppor-
' Bergson, Creative Evolution, pp. 163, 303-313, and a number of other
places. Cf. my " Defense of Analysis " in The New Realism, and H. 3. H.
Elliot, Modern Science and the Illusions of Bergson.
* See Chap. XV., rv., 2, and Chap. XL., vu.-ix.
" See Chap. XLIII., x.
172 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
tunity for a valid claim that analysis falsifies, on the ground
that parts are reached which are the formal contradictory of,
and inconsistent with, the whole. Parts that are different from
the whole are indeed reached by analysis, namely, such parts
as both instants and points, and also those complex parts each
of which is an instant related in a one-one manner to a point.
But none of these parts is of such a character that it is pre-
cluded from cosubsisting with a whole that is a non-additive
result, and that has distinct and peculiar properties of its own.
Such a consistent analysis demands, however, the principles that
are formulated above, and that are accepted in the new logic,
but ignored by the old.
All this presentation of the methods and results of the modern
analysis of space, time, motion, and change is most important
for our purposes. For it shows that, since such entities can be
analyzed and rationalized in a manner that is quite free from
contradictions and antinomies, we are relieved from attaching
any more philosophical importance to them than we attach to
the other innumerable facts of science and common sense.
Nevertheless a great many influential philosophical systems have
been founded in part upon the difficulties and contradictions that
have been found in, e.g., the infinity and the continuity of space
and time, in motion and in change, and the like. Every phi-
losophy must, indeed, consider these problems in connection with
the cosmological problem. But today, with a consistent analysis
of all these entities at hand, one is left free to consider the
fundamental differences between philosophical systems upon
some other basis — a procedure that will be adopted in consider-
ing, in the later sections of this volume, the solution of philo
sophical problems.
THE METHODS OF THE NEW LOGIC 173
CHAPTER XXV
THE METHODS OF THE NEW LOGIC
Summary
The foregoing presentation of analyses that are made of such,
entities as change and motion, shows that there are logical
methods and principles that are quite different from those of
the logic of the tradition. Some of the most essential features
of contrast between the two doctrines may now be advanta-
geously summarized.
I. The new logic is opposed both to the psychologizing tend-
ency, and to the pragmatic. The standpoint of the new logic
is, that logical principles are present in entities, i.e., that they
are objective. Toward them one takes the attitude of empirical
procedure and of discovery. This means that there may be in
this richly endowed universe any number of different logical
principles, entities, and situations. It is, therefore, the em-
pirical study of entities that extends the field of logical science,
and no one should be so brash as to delimit this field to certain
logical principles, thus to preclude the possibility of its exten-
sion by new discoveries. Indeed, the necessity of maintaining
the ''open door'- in this respect, is shown by the fact that it
is impossible to solve certain problems by the principles of the
old logic, but quite possible to solve these same problems by the
new logic.
II. The old logic is a logic of substance and qualities, — of
things with a core in which qualities inhere. The new logic is,
in contrast, one in which these concepts, even if they are not
given up entirely, play a minor part, and the concept of rela-
tion plays the major role.
III. The new logic emphasizes relational propositions, exem-
plified by '^A is less than B.'' These propositions cannot be
reduced to the subject-predicate propositions of the old logic,
in which the predicate is interpreted to be a property of the
;§ubject.^
* Cf. Russell, Principles of Mathematics, in various places, and Royce's
Essay, the " Principles of Logic," in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical
kiciencea.
tl74 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
IV. The new logic consists largely of those principles which
are discovered by the analysis of series. This means, again, that
the new logic recognizes many types of relations which the old
logic quite ignores. The old logic makes no recognition of series,
but only of such wholes as are additive, conceptual, causal,
organic, thing-like (substance and attribute), syllogistic, and
numerically single. The chief relations which the old logic
accordingly recognizes are additiveness, similarity and differ-
ence, causation, inherence, "member of," inclusion, identity,
and contradiction. It therefore omits ynany very fundamental
relations, especially such as are involved in series.
Some of the most important types of these relations are the fol-
lowing: (1) Asymmetrical relations, defined as such relations, R,
between a and h, as preclude the identity of the inverse relation,
E, with the original: e.g., a <h, precludes h <, a. (2) Transi-
tive relations : e.g., a <.h, h <i c implies, a < c. Asymmetrical
and transitive relations are recognized by the new logic as sub-
sisting between individuals as well as between classes ; but, by the
old logic, they are recognized as subsisting only between classes;
e.g., if A, B, and C are three classes, and A is included in B,
and B in C, then A is included in C (3) Correlating relations,
e.g., between the men of a regiment and their guns, where one
and only one specific gun is assigned to each man; such cor-
relating relations are present in one-valued functions. (4) The
new logic recognizes functional relations, where the old logic
accepted only causal relations. The entities that are function-
ally related are variables, and a variable is a series. (5) A
functional relation is identical with a specific type of relation
that is compatible with both r elatedness and independence, as
is illustrated by the relation between time and motion. (6) The
new logic emphasizes the method of using relations of implica-
tion to discover types of entities of which no individual is
specifiable. Thus it is possible to discover that, e.g., V 2 is the
limit of two series, the one series with individuals that are all
greater than this limit, the other series with individuals that
are all less than this limit, without it being possible to specify
that limit, other than to say, that it is a; (ic = V 2 ), and is such
that x'^ ■=■ 2.
V. The old logic ignores this principle and method of dis-
THE METHODS OF THE NEW LOGIC 175
covering limits, although upon it is dependent the discovery,
that a whole can consist of non-finite as well as of finite parts,
e.g., — in the case of a line, — of points as well as of finite smaller
lines.
VI. The new logic solves the problems of infinity and con-
tinuity through its recognition of this principle of limits in
connection with its recognition of asymmetrical, transitive, and
one-one correlating relations.^
VII. The new logic recognizes and uses the principle, that
most wholes are of that type in which the parts are related
non-additively to constitute the whole. This allows for different
kinds of parts in the same whole, each set of parts being related
in perhaps a specifically different non-additive manner. Also,
one class of parts may be related additively, while all others are
related non-additively.
VIII. It results that one and the same whole may belong to
different universes of discourse, — to one, by virtue of one kind
of part, to another, by virtue of another kind. Accordingly
those characteristics of a whole that are the relational result of
one kind of part are not deducible from those that are the rela-
tional result of another kind.^
IX. The old logic accepts the principles of the inconceiva-
bility of the opposite and of self-evidence as norms of absolute
truth ; the new logic looks askance at these tests, and sets up
propositions only as postulates from which to develop conse-
quences.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following are some of the articles and books in which the principles,
the details, and the application of the new logic are ]jresented (cf. the
bibliography for Chap. XLIIL): Cassirer. tiuhptanzhegriff vnd Funktions-
begriff ; Huntington, "The Continuum as a Type of Order," Annals of
Mathematics, 1905; A. B. Kempe, "The Subject-matter of Exact Thought,"
Nature, Vol. XLIII., 1890, p. 156 ff.; Nernst, Theoretische Chemie, trans.
K. A. Lehfeldt, p. 365; C. 8. Peirce, "The Logic of Relations," Monist,
Vol. VII., 1897, p. 353 ff.; Royce, "The Relations of the Principles of
Logic to the Foundations of Geometry," Transactions of the Am. Math,
t^oc. Vol. VI., 1905, p. 161 ff.; also '" The Principles of Logic" in the
Encyclopedia of the PhilosopJiical Sciences; B. Russell, Principles of
Mathematics, 1903, and Scientific Method in Philosophij, 1914; White-
head and Russell, Principia Mathematica ; Whitehead, Introduction to
Mathematics ; J. W. Young, Fundamental Concepts of Algebra and
Geometry.
' See Chap. XLIII., viu.-x. ' See Chap. XLIII., iv., v., vi.
176 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
IV. THEORIES OF RELATIONS
CHAPTER XXVI
THE THEORIES OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL
RELATIONS
I. THE FORMULATION OF THE THEORIES
A FURTHER point of contrast between the old and the new
logic concerns the problem as to how a relation relates. The,
examination of this problem is of fundamental importance, since
certain specific theories that are advanced in solution of it
logically condition each of the great philosophical systems that
we shall examine in detail in Part II.
This problem has itself come to recognition primarily because
of the influence of that relational point of view which is the
core of modern logic. For, if it is not substance and not cause,
but events, disembodied qualities, and relations, especially the
last, that form the basis of the new logic, then the problem
very naturally arises as to how a relation relates.
Whatever the specific character of the relation may be, and
to whatever type of relation it may belong, there are at the
present time two main theories in answer to this problem. Each
theor}^, further, is regarded by at least some of its adherents
as holding exclusively for all relations.
These two main theories are, respectively, those of external
\relations and of internal relations. The latter theory is in turn
subdivided into what may be called the mutual modification
theory, and the underlying- or transcendent-reality theory. The
adherents of each of these theories maintain that their par-
ticular theory can be established both by induction and by
other proof, such as "the presupposition by denial."
In order to formulate these theories, we will use a and h for
the two related terms, K for the relation between the terms,
THEORIES OF RELATIONS 177
and the symbols | for "independent," > for "influences,"
and ^ — y^— ' for "underlying and mediating."
The theory of external relations may then be expressed in
the form oi a\R\h, meaning by this, (1) that, if two terms are
related, neither term influences the other, (2) that the absence
of either term would be ivithout effect on the other, (3) that
either term may come into being and into relation with the
other term without affecting it, (4) that, accordingly, no terra
is complex by virtue of being related, and (5) that no third
term, u, underlying a R b in the sense of « — . — - . is necessary
U
in order to mediate the relationship between a and 6. Briefly,
the theory of external relations is, that relaiedness and inde-
pendence are quite compatible.
The theory of internal relations is a direct denial of these
main propositions of the theory of external relations.
The "modification aspect" of the internal theory may be
expressed by the symbol, a^Rb^, meaning by this, that, if two
terms are related, (1) each term influences the other, (2)
that related terms are complex. (3) that either terra out
of relation with the other would be different from what it
is in relation to that other, (4) that terms are what they
are by virtue of being related to other terms (the organic
view).
This modification theory of relations may, or may not be held
together with the "underlying reality aspect" of the theory of
internal relations. This last theory by itself is expressed by
^ — , — ' , meaning by this, that, if two terms are related, and
V
whether they modify each other or not, there is an underlying
or transcendent reality, U, to mediate this relation, indeed to
make it possible at all.
Some of the adherents of the theory of external relations
regard it as holding without exception for all terras and rela-
tions,^ while others maintain that it holds only for some rela-
tional complexes.^ In contrast with this, the advocates of the
"internal theory," as it may be called, insist, according to that
' I"]. B. Holt in The New Realism and in The Concept of Consciousness.
* The writer in the present volume.
178 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
aspect to which they are inclined, either that the "modification
theory" or the "underlying-reality theory" holds for all rela-
tions.
II. THE PROOFS OR ARGUMENTS FOR THE THEORIES OP RELATIONS
1. The Theory of External Relations
We may first consider the proof of the theory of external
relations. This proof is twofold. One part of it depends on
the result of an appeal to concrete fact; the other part is the
demonstration, that the validity of the external theory is pre-
supposed by that very denial which it receives in the internal
theory. This last demonstration will be presented first.
To prove that there are terms which are related and yet do
not affect, modify, or influence one another: —
First Proof. Let this proposition be denied, i.e., let us assume
that any two related terms do affect each other. Then these
related terms are complex.^ But, as complex, they consist of
parts, which in turn are related. Therefore, these parts must,
by the same hypothesis, also affect one another and be complex,
and so on, in an infinite series. Ultimately, therefore, there
must be simple terms that make all this complexity possible, but
that are themselves not complex. Yet these ultimate, simple
terms are related to one another. Therefore, as related, and
yet as simple, they do not modify one another, but are
independent, — in just this sense, namely, of not modifying one
another.
Points and instants are examples of such ultimate simple
terms, which, though they cannot be isolated or identified by
physical experiment, are nevertheless discovered by an analysis
in situ. It is also found by the same method that these entities
are related, and yet that they do not affect one another, so as
to make one another complex, although as related by specific
relations they form specific complexes, namely, space and time
respectively. The modern analysis of space and time demands,
therefore, the theory of external relations/ and accordingly
' Cf. Kussell, " The Basis of Realism," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scien-
tific Methods, Vol. VIIL, 1911, p. 15811.
* See Chap. XLIII., viu.-x.
THEORIES OF RELATIONS 179
the thesis is proved, that at least some terms do not, as related,
affect or modify one another, and are, in this sense, inde-
pendent.
This same conclusion can also be established by induction,
i.e., we can get instances of related terms that do not affect one
another. Thus it is evident that if, as a result of analysis, one
accepts genuine points and instants, then these are to be regarded
as instances of terms that are both related and independent.
But there are, also, other instances. One of the most frequent
practices of physical science is that of employing methods by
which certain phenomena are isolated, and yet left in situ, i.e.,
in relation both to one another and to other phenomena. Pur-
suing this method, physical science discovers that, although time
is related to space, to matter, and to change in general, it is,
nevertheless, independent of these. In fact, in all physical
science, time is the independent variable. In the case of a
great many phenomena it is a leading problem, therefore, to
find how "things" are related to, or vary with time. This
problem occurs, e.g., in the investigation of the motion of a
falling body, in which case it is found that both the body and
the motion are related to many other "things," but that the
motion, in respect both to itself as motion and to the change of
velocity, or acceleration, is related to time as if this were the
only referent. The distance traveled by a falling body is the
specific function, s = t-, while the velocity is directly propor-
tional to the time elapsed, and the acceleration is directly pro-
portional to the time increment. Distance traveled, velocity,
and acceleration are, therefore, each related to time, but the time
is neither modified nor constituted by virtue of these relation-
ships, as also conversely, neither the space, the velocity, nor the
acceleration are causally affected by the time.
These instances are typical. Mechanics, chemistry, and
physics are replete with cases of functional relationships between
variables, each of which is a series of individuals, just as time
is a series of instants. Each variable, also, is related to many
"things," of which it is independent. There are, therefore,
complex as well as simple entities that furnish data, in respect
to the relatonships in which they stand, for a generalization to
the theory of external relations. This proof by induction con-
180 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
jBrms, therefore, the first, indirect proof of the external theory,
and together, both proofs show that the modification theory of
relations is one that is at least limited in its range, if, indeed, it
is not altogether invalid.
A similar conclusion is also reached as a result of the examina-
tion of both the argument and the empirical evidence for the
underlying-reality theory of relations. This specific theory can
be shown to presuppose its contradictory, or contrariwise, the
theory of external relations can be demonstrated to be presup-
posed by it. To give this proof, let us assume that, in order
that any two terms, a and h, may be related, there must be an
underlying, unitary reality, U, to mediate the relation. Then,
by supposition, this U is simple, and not complex, since, if it
were complex, its parts would, by hypothesis, require another
V to relate them, and so on indefinitely. Let us assume, there-
fore, that V is absolutely simple, and not complex. But even
then, as the mediator of the original relation, it is related not
only to a, b, and R, but also to the complex, a R h, so that,
again, by the original assumption, there is required still another
TJ to mediate this relation, and so on in an infinite regress. For
every U that is thus reached, since each such TJ is related to
that which it mediates, there is implied still another TJ. There-
fore each such TJ is only a member of a series, and not such an
all-including and all-mediating TJ as is sought. The result is,
that no all-relation-mediating TJ is ever arrived at. Even on
the basis of the original assumption, which is thus shown to
be self-contradictory, it is only the series as a whole that includes
every TJ. But an infinite series already subsists in its unity if
specific relations subsist to relate its terms. These relations
are (1) one-one correlating relations between proper part and
whole, and (2) asymmetrical and transitive relations among
the individuals of both whole and part. But another term, out-
side the series, is, by empirical methods, not found to be neces-
sary, in order to give the series unity. The relations already
present suffice to give it this. We may conclude, therefore, that,
in the case of a being related to b {i.e., a R b) the relation
itself is sufficient to give all the unity that there is, even as is
the case with the infinite series. No underlying U is needed
either to give unity to, or to mediate the relation between, the
THEORIES OF RELATIONS 181
related terms. But that the relation is itself thus sufficient, is
precisely the position of the theory of external relations.
The supplementation of this indirect proof of the external
theory by the empirical disproof of the underlying-reality
theory is remarkably easy. Strictly empirical procedure, either
experimental or otherwise, discloses not a single instance of a
one '^ something ," of a TJ, that mediates the relation betweefi
two or more terms. Indeed, every so-called instance proves to
be only one that is inferred from the tacitly or explicitly as-
sumed validity of the underlying-reality theory. Thus, e.g.,
previous to Locke and Berkeley, the position was commonly
taken, that in every physical thing, a suhstance-like sutstratum
or core held the qualities together, but Locke was not very
certain of the presence of this substratum, and Berkeley denied
it entirely for physical things, though he held to an analogous
substance for ideas. Hume, however, denied even such a soul,
or spirit, and held to the factuality only of impressions and
ideas.^ Physics of the present day follows Berkeley's position,
and psychology follows Hume's, so that it is disembodied quali-
ties, events, and relations that are now studied in these sciences.
Indeed both physics and mechanics, in arriving at general laws,
disclose functional relations that are instances of the more
general theory of external relations. This theory has, therefore,
at least some range of application, while the underlying-reality
theory seems to have no validity at all. Whether, now, this is
the case also for the modification theory we shall shortly con-
sider.
The basis on which the theory of external relations rests is,
accordingly, the twofold one, (1) that it is presupposed by its
own denial as this is made in both aspects of the theory of
internal relations, and (2) that it is confirmed by induction
from positive cases of related terms in which no term modifies
others, and no underlying reality is found empirically. There-
fore, at least some terms are related in accordance with the
theory of external relations. Are all terms so related, or, are
some terms related in accordance with the principles of the
modification theory ? '^
' See Chaps. XXX. and XXXI.
"The theory of external relations is accepted, and evidence and proof
182 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
2. The Modification Theory of Relations
The adherents of this theory usually maintain that it is of
universal validity, to the complete exclusion of the theory of
external relations, though not of the underlying-reality theory.
This last theory may, or may not be held together with the
modification theory.
The proof that is presented for this modification theory is
twofold. One proof is the (attempted) reductio ad absurdum
both of the theory of external relations and — for some related
terms — of the underlying-reality theory in the form that has
just been presented. The other proof seems to be inductive.
Let us first consider the argument by which it is attempted
to reduce the theory of external relations to an ahsiirdityJ To
give this proof, let us assume the external theory to apply to
the relational complex, a R h. This means that, though a and b
are related, they are also independent. Then, so the argument
goes, the absurdity appears, that the terms a and b cannot be
related at all, on the ground that, if they are (assumed to be)
independent of each other, they are also independent of R (and
of it are presented by the following writers: Perry, in The New Realism,
in his essay on "Independence"; Russell, Principles of Mathematics,
p. 09 If . and p. 221 ff., and in several other places; "The Monistic Theory
of Truth," Philosophical Essays ; " The Basis of Realism," Jour, of Phil.,
Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. VIII., p. 158 If. ; "On the Nature of
Truth," Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, 1907, N. S., Vol. VII., pp.
28-49; Spaulding, " A Defense of Analysis " in The Keio Realism, p. 155 If.;
Marvin, First Book of Metaphysics, Chaps. VII. -XIII.
For instances of the independence of related terms and for a discussion
of this problem see Chap. II. of this volume; also Perry, "A Realistic
Theory of Independence " in The New Realism ; W. H. Sheldon, " Chance,"
Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. IX., 1912, pp. 281-290;
E. V. Huntington, " Sets of Independent Postulates for tlie Algebra of
Logic," Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. V., 1904;
J. VV. Young, Fundamental Concepts of Algebra and Geometry ; Stout,
"Alleged Self-Contradictions in the Concept of Relation," Proc. Aris. Sac,
Vol. II., pp. 191-192.
' This is very definitely attempted by Bradley in Appearance and Reality,
pp. 1-120, and by Joachim in The Nature of Truth, especially in Chap. III.
The position is also accei)tcd essentially without any examination of its
grounds and almost as self-evident by Bergaon in Creative Fvolution,
pp. 9, 11, 160-16.3, 188, 303, 338-340, and by Wm. James in Pragmatism,
p. 134 ff. Royce, in J'he World and the Individual, in the first four
chapters, especially Chaps. III. and IV., maintains it in the form of the
principle, that relatednrss implies dependence. This is also the position
of Lotze, Metaphysics, I., trans., ed. by Bosanquet, Chap. VI., pp. 166-169.
Bradley, in Essays on Truth and Reality, 1914, does not depart from his
earlier position.
THEORIES OF RELATIONS 183
so are not related,).^ Accordingly it is to be inferred that
in order to get or to have the terms related — which is the
desideratum — there must be other relations to relate the original
relation R to a and to h, and also, as alone consistent with this
implication, still other relations to relate these relations to one
another, and so on, in an infinite series.^ But, it is maintained
(though falsely), an infinite series cannot by its very nature
ever be completed. Therefore it is inferred that, by the princi-
ples of the theory of exter^ial relations, terms are never re-
lated. Accordingly it is inferred, conversely, that, in order to
have terms related, or to explain how a relation relates, one must
accept the "internal theory'' to the effect, that related terms
are dependent in the sense that they influence, modify, and
affect one another}'^ As a result, all terms hecome, or are com-
plex, indeed infinitely so; for, on the one hand, any so-called,
simple term is a complex of the effects produced in it through
its being related to all other terms, and, on the other hand, since
these effects are in turn related, they affect one another, and
so are also complex.
In criticism of this modification theory of relations, one may
attack either the foregoing argument, or the position that the
theory is of universal applicability. But that the theory is of
limited validity and applicability is shown by the fact, that it
leads to the position, that all terms are complex, and thus be-
comes self-contradictory. For complexity presupposes at some
juncture ultimate simples as the components of all else that is
complex, and such simples, though related, must he unmodified
hy and independent of one another. The argument for the
modification theory thus leads to the limitation of the theory
itself.
But, quite apart from this outcome, the argument for the
theory may itself be refuted as regards its logical procedure.
For, at its very beginning, the very question at issue is begged,
when it is assumed that the theory of external relations means
that, if terms are independent, they cannot he related, and that
the relation does not relate them. All the rest of the argument
* Royce, ihid.
' Bradley, Appearance and Reality, pp. 32-33.
*° Maintained by all the adherents of this position.
184 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
proceeds from this unwarranted assumption. Accordingly the
argument is 71 ot in the least a disproof of the theory of external
relations, but is 07ily a denial, and merely to deny is never to
disprove.
Is there any proof or evidence at all, therefore, for the modi-
fication theory of relations, by which this theory can be shown
to hold even for some instances of related terms, if not for all ?
The theory certainly does not hold for simple terms, nor for
those complex terms which, like time, space, motion, and accelera-
tion, are either series or functions in the precise sense of these
terms. But for a specific kind of complex term, namely, for
so-called organic wholes, it does seem to hold.
An example of such wholes is any individual plant or animal.
The parts of these wholes are related, and they do interact
causally — though, perhaps, not because they are related, but
because this is the specific kind of relation between them. Thus,
e.g.f the lungs, heart, muscles, and brain of a vertebrate causally
influence one another, and develop in mutual causal dependence,
in the growth of every individual from a fertilized ovum to
maturity. But living beings, both plant and animal, also
causally interact with their physical environment. In fact it
would seem not only that organic beings, but also that the
"things" of the inorganic world are related to and causally
influence one another. Yet, if this means that the modification
theory of relations is here applicable, it does not mean, how-
ever, that this theory applies to every complex of related terms.
For some entities, as, e.g., motion-related-to-time, are complexes
whose parts are related, yet are causally independent, i.e., whose
parts are related in accordance with the theory of external rela-
tions. In certain complexes, furthermore, certain terms may
be related, and yet be independent, while others are related
causally. Thus, e.g., the parts of a shooting sky rocket are in
causal (chemical) interaction as the rocket moves, and yet the
mass and the changing velocity of the rocket are in a relation
of independence to the chemical composition, to the time, and
to the "path."
This distinction corresponds to that distinction which sub-
sists between causal and functional relations. Functional rela-
tions subsist by virtue of a specific correlating relation between
THEORIES OF RELATIONS 185
the individuals of two series. Thus the changing velocity or
the acceleration of a falling body is a function of the time, but
it (the acceleration) is also, as are the time and the space, a
series. Causal relations, on the other hand, subsist between
complexes that are not series, aWiough functional relations,
series, and the individuals that are in the series, may be present
in these causally related complexes. For example, any living
organism is a complex of organs and processes that are causally
related, but, within these organs and processes, there are strictly
functional relationships of the specific kind that chemistry, espe-
cially physical chemistry, is concerned with.
This position, namely, that there are certain wholes which
consist of complexes which are related dependently and causally,
but that also, within these complexes, there are still other com-
plexes which are related and yet are independent, agrees with
the result previously reached, namely, that the modification
theory of relations "rests on" and presupposes the theory of
external relations. While for each theory there is therefore a
field within which it holds, the theory of external relations is,
in this respect, fundamental to the modification theory.
3. The Underlying or Transcendent Reality Theory of
Relations
The criticism and brief formulation of this specific theory
have already been given.^^ No concrete instances can be found,
other than hy deduction from the theory itself, of an extra
entity that mediates the relations between other entities. Yet
the theory is one which, either as explicitly stated or as tacitly
presupposed, has had a dominant influence in theology, phi-
losophy, and logic down to the present time, and in science
during the middle ages. Upon it, indeed, are based, e.g., certain
of the proofs of the existence, or subsistence of a deity,' ^ as are
also certain doctrines as to the nature of the soul," and much
of the traditional Aristotelian logic.'* However, the theory, as
a theory, did not receive explicit recognition and formulation
'' This chapter, ii., 1.
" 8ee Chaps. XXXIV.-XXXVIII.
*' In Locke, Berkeley, and Kant; see Part II.
" Chap. III.
186 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
until the post-Kantian philosophy appeared, but it was then
advanced as the very core of what was styled a new logic,
namely, the Hegelian.^ ^ Nevertheless, this new logic was really
only a development of the old, since it was derived by a specific
use of the Aristotelian principle of contradiction.
Thus, by the entirely formal use of this principle, there must
be formed or thought, for every term without exception, the
formal contradictory, i.e., for every a, whatever a may be, there
must be thought a non-a. This relation seems to be one of
necessary, logical connection, which may be stated in the form
of the propositions, that for every a there must he a non-a, or,
that a cannot he without non-a, or, that a implies non-a. But^
if a cannot he without non-a, then the two are inseparahle, and,
therefore, form a unity. The important problem for the
theory therefore is, Where is this unity? or, What is its locus?
And the answer is, that the unity cannot be identical with, or
be at the "level" of, a and 7ion-a, since these are numerically
two. Therefore it must be at a different level, either tran-
scendent to or underlying hoth a and non-a, and, also, it must
be an absolute unity,^*^ and not a concealed complexity, since,
if it were complex, the problem would be repeated in regard to
the relatedness of the terms of this complex. This absolute
unity may be symbolized by TJ, and, accordingly, the theory
itself be expressed by the symbol . .
U
As an example of the use to which this theory is put, we
may consider the demonstration, that change is necessary. This
demonstration is not difficult to make, since, if a cannot h&
without non-a, and, if change means that a hecomes h, i.e., non-a,
then it follows, that change must he. This is, indeed, logically
the very demonstration that Hegel himself made of the necessity
of change and evolution.^'' It means that for Hegel and his
faithful followers, not only must there be change, evolution,
" See Chaps. XXXIV. and XXXV.
" Among the prominent modern philosophers who hold this position
are Fichte and Hegel (see Chaps XXXIV. -XXXVIII. ) ; Bradley, Appear-
ance and Reality, p. 520 11'.; Royce, as the outcome of his discussion in
The Spirit of Modern Philosophy and The World, and the Individual;
E. Caird, Evolution of Religion, Vol. I., p. 67 fl'. ; Calkins, Persistent
Problems of Philosophy, p. 418 flf.; T. H. Green, Works, Vol. III., p. 45.
''See Chap. XXXVl.
THEORIES OF RELATIONS 187
and progress, but also that these are logical in character, and
that, underlying them, there is an absolute unity.
Another example of the application of this theory is one in
which it is demonstrated that there is an underlying and
transcendent Unity for the whole universe. To give this demon-
stration, let us select the contradictory terms, self and not-self
(or indeed any other pair of formally contradictory terms),
and then ask, if everything is not either one's self or not one's
self? Then, hy the theory, must there not be One and only One
Being that underlies and is transcendent to all else, and that is
of a different order from the related terms? ^®
Still another example of the application of this theory shows
how, by means of it, one can transcend time, and get to the
timeless, and perhaps to the eternal. For, if the present be a,
all other time, past and future, is, as not-present time, non-a.
Therefore, iy the theory, there is a Z7 that is different from
both a and non-a, and that is in this respect neither past, present,
nor future}^
The underlying-realit}^ theory of relations can be maintained
as valid, at the same time that one also holds, that some related
terms modify one another, and that others are externally re-
lated. Conversely, however, if one accepts the theory of external
relations, there is no necessity for accepting the underlying-
reality theory, since the former theory means, that the fact
that a relation relates its terms accounts for all the unity that
there is in the relational situation.
Criticism of the Argument
The argument for the underlying-reality theory of relations
has already been criticized,^*' and need only be referred to here.
If a first U is found to mediate the relation between a and
non-a, then, since this U is related to the complex, a R non-a,
another U is in turn implied to mediate this relation, and so
on in infinite series. Therefore, either an ultimate underlying
U is never reached, or, if it is, then, although it is related to
** Well illustrated by Bradley's arguments for an Absolute in Appear-
ance and Reality.
'^^ E.g., Bradley's and Royce's Absolute.
"> This chapter, ii., 1.
188 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
the complex of the preceding complexes, this relation does not
demand an underlying reality to mediate it. But, if there is
this one exception, then no relation need demand an underlying
entity to mediate it, and the whole theory falls to the ground.
The only seemingly possible inductive evidence for the theory
is derived from the examination of concepts. Thus if one take
either the psychologizing or the pragmatic view of eoncepts,^^
he might go so far as to maintain that the individuals of what
we now regard as a class, e.g., the class of living heings, would
not be so related as to form this class, if we did not relate them.
For relations of similarity between "things" whereby they
form classes, are, in accordance with these two positions, either
created or invented by having "things" get into relation with
a consciousness, or with something, such as an organism that
relates them. But if this is the case, then at least these rela-
tions, to a consciousness, or to an organism, would not be so
created or invented, since they must subsist before other rela-
tions could be created or invented. But, if some relations are
thus independent, then, clearly, others may also be — especially
those relations of similarity by virtue of which there are classes.
Classes, therefore, would seem to be independent of a relating
consciousness or organism.
However, if a relation is, in this manner, ayi objective entity
that relates "things," then it is specific relations of similarity
that unify individuals into specific classes, so that with the unity
of the class accounted for in this way, there is neither the oppor-
tunity nor the necessity for a transcendent or underlying unity
either to perform the function of mediating the relation, or to
give the class unity. Thus, e.g., in the case of the class of living
beings, there are (1) the individuals; these are related by a
number of specific relations of similarity. Then there is also
(2) the class, as a class, whose members are minified objectively
by each of these specific relations. But (3) each one of the
relations which thus organizes the individuals into a class is
distinct both from the class as a whole, and from its individuals ;
yet these relations, e.g., similarity in respect to structure, are
not, in the usual sense of the term, transcendent, either to the
class as a whole, or to its individuals, even as the class and the
"Chap. XIII.
THEORIES OF RELATIONS 189
individuals are not "outside" of themselves in any sense. The
specific relations of similarity which thus organize the indi-
viduals into a class form, or are, the objective concept.
It goes without saying, perhaps, that this objective concept
can be known quite as well as can either the individuals, or
the class as a whole, and such knowledge can be called an
"abstract idea." Humanity, triangularity, bravery, are exam-
ples. On the other hand, the knowledge of the class as a whole
is a "general idea," — human being, triangle, brave act being
examples. By virtue of abstract ideas we can, without knowing
each individual specifically, know about classes as a whole,
i.e., we can know that there are individuals of a certain type,
because they are related in a specific way. We can know any
individual, although, perhaps, no particular one. In fact, in
certain instances, not only do we not need to know all the
individuals specifically, but, in many cases, we cannot so know
them, for one reason or another. For example, because counting
is a psychological process requiring for each act of counting
a specific time, we cannot, by counting, know specifically all the
individuals of an infinite class. Yet we do know that there are
infinite classes, and that there are individuals which are mem-
bers of these classes, "We thus again discover the important
difference between knowing "things" as individuals, i.e., by
specification, and knowing them by type, by law, by organizing
concepts, or by intension, as it is technically called.
That the concept of a class should be that underlying reality
which mediates the relation between the members of the class
is thus disproved. Yet that the concept performs this function
is precisely that view to which the underlying-reality theory has
been driven by continued and repeated criticism. The result
of this criticism has been, when the adherents of the under-
lying-reality theory have desired to get to an idtimate and funda-
mental unity underlying the whole physical and mental uni-
verse, that they have given up "making" this unity either
physical or mental, and have been compelled to make it a bare
concept. But, by the foregoing criticism, if this ultimate con-
cept were a fact, it would be only that concept or relation of
similarity which organizes a universe into a whole, and the
universe would have only as inach unity as there is siniilarity.
190 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
Unless one could prove, therefore, that any two terms must be
similar in order to be related, the universe or totality of entities
might consist of related, yet of extremely, perhaps of iiholly
dissimilar "things." Or, there might be many kinds of
"things," hut no one kind of these kinds, such as, e.g., mind, or
matter, or existence. However, one cannot exclusively prove
that terms, in order to be related, must be similar. Such a con-
clusion follows only from the postulate, in accordance with the
modification theory of relations, that related terms affect one
another and so cause one another to he similar. But this theory
has been shown not to be universally valid. For it presupposes
that terms, in order that they may be modified, must first be
unmodified and yet related. But such ultimate unmodified, non-
complex terms might be absolutely different, and still be related.
Yet, if terms can be related and yet be wholly dissimilar, there
is no relation of similarity that relates them.
We conclude, therefore, that inductive evidence for the valid-
ity of the underlying-reality theory of relations cannot be
obtained from the examination of concepts. The concept is
either the organizing relation, known in an abstract idea, or the
class as a whole, known in a general idea, but it is not something
more than this relation and this class. There is, therefore, no
one concept, which, as outside the universe, also unifies it.
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that the universe is not one
class, or one kind of "Ihings," but that it is many kinds.^^
CHAPTER XXVII
TYPES OF RELATIONS, OF WHOLES, AND OF UNITIES
I. TYPES OP RELATIONS
Science and philosophy are both concerned with relations
between "things," and, therefore, also with wholes, which are
identical with parts as related in specific ways.
Some of the important types of relations have already been
" See Chap. XLIV., n.
THEORIES OF RELATIONS 191
presented, but these types may here be advantageously sum-
marized, using R for relation, and a, b, c, and d for terms.^
I. Every relation has an inverse. Thus, if a is above b
{a R b), there is the inverse relation, R, b below a; also, if
a=:b, there is the inverse, b =^ a, where R is the relation of
equality.
II. Relations are also classified as dyadic, triadic, tetradic,
etc. A dyadic relation is expressed by the symbol, a R b; a
triadic, hy R (a b c) ; a tetradic, hy R (abed). An example
of a triadic relation is the relational complex, sender of a mes-
sage — message — recipient.
III. Further differences among relations are distinguished
by the names symmetrical, non-symmetrical, and asymmetrical,
and transitive, non-transitive, and intransitive. These different
types may be best considered in the case of dyadic relations.
Symmetrical relations are such as are identical with their own
inverse; i.e., they subsist, if R is the same as R. Examples:
equality, similarity, difference, contradiction, consistency.
Asymmetrical relations are such as always preclude the iden-
tity of the inverse with the original relation. For example, if
a precedes b, it is precluded, that b should precede a. Further
instances are: "greater than," before, "ancestor of," and "fa-
ther of." Asymmetrical relations are sometimes called totally
non-symmetrical. Partially non-symmetrical relations are rec-
ognized by Royce and Russell,^ these relations being such as do
not always preclude the identity of the inverse with the original
relation. Thus, if a is friend of b, it may be that b is friend of
a (symmetrical), but it may also be that b is not a friend of a
(asymmetrical).
Transitive relations are such that, if they hold between a and
b, and between b and c, they also hold between a and c. Equal-
ity, "ancestor of," and "older than," are examples. Intransi-
tive relations are such as are never transitive. Thus, if a is the
mother of b, and b is the mother of c, it is precluded that a
should be the mother of c.
' Cf. Russell, Hcievtific Methvd in Philosophy, p. 40 ff., and p. 124 ff.,
iiiid Frinciples of Mathematics in various places (see his index); also
Koyce in his essay on The Principles ot Logic"' in the Encyclopedia of
the Philosophical iiciences, p. 'J7 ti".
'' Ibid.
192 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
Non-transitive relations are such as are not transitive in some
cases, but are transitive in others. Thus, in the case of men, if
a is half-brother of b, and b is half-brother of c, a is not half-
brother of c, unless a, b, and c have a common parent, which is
not necessary.
IV. Relations are also distin fished as one-one, one-many,
and many-one. If a relation, B, holds only of a to b, but not
of a to c, d, etc., then it is a one-one relation. Thus, if a is the
twin of b, a is not the twin of c. One-one relations are present
in the case of correlated classes, as, e.g., in the possession of a
gun by each man of a regiment; also in correlated series, as,
e.g., the occupation, by the center of mass of a moving particle,
of one and only one point at each instant. If a relation R holds
between a and b, c, d, etc., it is one-many, while the inverse rela-
tion of b, c, and (Z to a is many-one. For example, rest is a
relational whole that is generated by a one-many relation be-
tween one point and an infinity of instants, and, conversely, by
a many-one relation between an infinity of instants and one
point. Existentially this relational whole is generated, e.g., by
the center of mass of a body as it occupies a point for many
instants.
These several types of relations are found not only among
dyadic relations, but also among triadic and tetradie relations.
Thus the relation of similarity, which is symmetrical, holds
between the members of a class, and the class subsists by virtue
of this relation. The class is thus independent of the order of
its members; R {a d c b) is the same as R {a b c d) — as a class.
If, however, a, b, and c are each a class as, e.g., are Frenchmen,
men, and mortals, then the triadic relation, R, of inclusion,
a <ib <C c, is asymmetrical and transitive. In the case of a
mere collection or aggregate, in which the individuals are re-
lated by the minimum of all relations, namely, the additive
relation, as expressed by ''and," the relation is symmetrical
and transitive.
II. TYPES OP WHOLES
If there are terms and relations, then there arc also wholes;
or, conversely, if there are wholes other than absolutely simple
entities, which consist of no parts at all, then there are terms
TYPES OF RELATIONS IpS
and relations. Indeed, a relation may be defined as an entity
which subsists by virtue of there being complex wholes. The
chief types of wholes are as follows : — ^
I. Mere aggregates or collections. In these wholes, in which
the parts may be any type of entity whatsoever, the relations
between the parts are such as are expressed by mere ''and."
No other relations, such as the relations of similarity or of
causation, or those relations that generate order, namely, asym-
metrical and transitive relations, need be present. As an ex-
ample, this page and a chimjera and the number 3 and last
evening's sunset form such a whole.*
II. Classes. A class subsists by .virtue of a relation of simi-
larity, which is symmetrical and non-transitive, between indi-
viduals, which individuals may be either simple or complex.
Together with the relation of similarity, there subsists in all
classes the conjunctive or additive relation expressed by "and."
Further relations, such as those which generate order, are, how-
ever, not necessary to the subsistence of classes. Any indi-
vidual either bears the asymmetrical relation, s, of "belonging
to" a specific class, or does not bear, or stand in, that relation
to that class. Vertebrates, triangles, atoms, are examples of
classes.
III. Series. In a series there are relations of conjunction,
of similarity, and of "belonging to." Yet a series as such
subsists only if its terms are also related by an asymmetrical
and transitive relation. The terms of a series may be absolute
simples, such as the points of a line, or complexes, such as the
lines of a plane. Examples of entities that are series are:
space of one, two, three, or n dimensions; also time, motion,
acceleration, and any qualitative change. Such series are found
to have the same characteristics as have certain specific series
among the real numbers, positive and negative, and zero.
A series is infinite if a one-one relation relates the individuals
of the whole series to the individuals of any part that is similar
' See Chap. XLTII., vii.-x. Cf. Royce, Principles of Logic ; Russell,
Principles of Mathematics, and Scientific Method in Philosophy ; White-
head, Introduction to Mathematics; also the works and articles referred
to in Chaps. III. and XLIII., vii.-x. Either these several kinds of wholes
are recognized by these writers, or the basis for their recognition and
distinction is given.
* Cf. Russell, Principles, p. 69, and Whitehead, op. cit., Chaps. I. and VI.
194 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
in character to the whole. For example, a line is an infinite
series of points, since in any smaller line as a "proper part"
of a larger line, there are as many points as there are in the
larger line as the whole.
A series is finite, if it is not infinite ; or, it is finite in respect
to that by which it is 7iot infinite. Thus, while a line is infinite
in respect to points, it is finite in respect to any smaller line
that is taken as a unit of measurement.
A series is discontinuous if, as is the case with the series of
positive and negative integers and zero . . . -3, -2, -1, 0,
1, 2, 3, . . ., between any two of its terms there is not another
term.
A series is deyise or compact if, like the series of rational
numbers, namely, the integers and rational fractions, positive
and negative and zero, there is, betiveen any two of its terms,
another term.
A series is continuous if, in addition to terms that are in one-
one correspondence with the rational numbers, there are still
other terms that are in such correspondence with the irrational
numbers, with both rationals and irrationals in the order of
their magnitude, as this is determined by the asymmetrical
transitive relation, "less than," or by its converse, "greater
than."
In every series, each member of the series has one and only
one specific "place" or "position." Every series, also, by
virtue of being generated by an asymmetrical and transitive
relation, has a direction, which, however, is not spatial, but
logical. There are other characteristics of series, the mention
of which, however, may be omitted here.^
IV, Specific complexes that are neither collections, classes,
nor series. These wholes are generated by many different types
of relations, either dyadic or polyadic, transitive or non-transi-
tive, symmetrical or non-symmetrical, between terms that are
either simple or complex. A good example of such a whole is
the complex that is formed by the one-one relation between a
point and an instant, in the case of the motion of the center of
mass of a particle. Another good example is that complex
which is generated by the one-many relation of one point to
• See Chap. XLIII., vii.-x.
TYPES OF RELATIONS 195
many instants, and which is identical with rest. Such specific
complexes may in turn be members of a series; e.g., motion is
the series of complexes, each of which is a point-correlated-
with-an-instant.
V. An important specific type of such complexes is the func-
tional whole. The simplest type of this whole is the "one-
valued" function. Such a whole is generated by a one-one rela-
tion that correlates the terms of one series with those of another,
but this relationship of one series to another is not of necessity
itself serial in character, although it may be serial in some cases.
As examples of such wholes we have the well-known facts, that
acceleration is a function of time, and that the pressure of a
gas is a function of the temperature.
VI. Another specific type of complex, and one, also, that has
been of great influence in the development of both science and
philosophy, is the causal or organic whole. It would seem that
the causal relation is asymmetrical and transitive. It is asym-
metrical in that it is precluded that B, as the causal relation
of a to b, or of a on b, should be identical with the inverse rela-
tion, B, of b to, or on, a. The relation, however, is transitive in
that, if a causally affects &, and if b causally affects c, a is a
cause of c. Also, if a affects b, then b is modified and becomes
h -\- e^, (e^ = effect of a), while, if 6 -(- e^ in turn affects c, c
becomes c -\- e {b -\- e°-).
If, however, both that which is acting and that which is
acted upon continues to exist, together with the effects, and if
the causal relation be universal, then the effect affects both the
cause and also that of which the effect is the effect, and effects
affect effects, and so on. Accordingly, each entity in an organic
whole thus becomes infinitely complex, and reflects the whole,
"which is also infinitely complex.
There may, however, be two distinct types of causal or organic
wholes. If the relatedness of terms does not of necessity carry
with it the presence of the causal relation, then, in a whole,
some terms might be related causally, and others not, which
would mean that causation is limited in its field, even as other
relations are limited. This type of limited organic whole seems,
indeed, to be discoverable by empirical investigation in the case,
e.g., of any living organism, or any chemical compound. For
196 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
in such wholes there are, in addition to causal relations, funC'
tional relations and a whole group of non-causal relations that
are present in a functional whole. However, by some phi-
losophers and scientists it is held that the causal relation is
universal, i.e., that two or more terms cannot be related in any
other way, without also being causally related. There accord-
ingly results the infinite complexity of both whole and part.
This position is found by the supporters of the new logic to be
invalid. Nevertheless it has grown up in the Aristotelian tradi-
tion, and has been of profound influence.
One of the important features of the new logic is the position,
that relations are quite as objective as are terms. Among the
relations that fall under one or more of the several types above
presented are (a) implication, (b) consistency (if consistency be
a relation), (e) contradiction.^ Accordingly three further types
of wholes may be added to our list, since each of these specific
relations can relate parts so as to form a whole. An example of
each of these types will make sufficiently clear, without further
discussion, their distinctness. All three may be illustrated from
the field of geometry.
VII. Contradictory wholes. Some relation, such as that of
"and" subsists between Euclidean space and Lobatehewskian.
Since a proposition is a relation between terms, space may be
defined as that system of propositions which are identical with
specific relations between certain entities, whether these be
points, lines, planes, or spheres. But Euclidean and Lobatehew-
skian space are contradictory in the precise sense, that the
latter denies the fifth postulate, the so-called "parallel postu-
late," of the former. The proposition or postulate which is
identical with this denial, together with the other postulates,
implies that kind of space which is known as Lobatehewskian.
However, both this space and the Euclidean are equally real,
although they are contradictories. Together, therefore, they
form a whole, which is a contradictory whole.''
VIII. Consistent wholes. Consistent wholes are such as are
not necessarily implicative in character. Thus, e.g., the efforts
of modern geometers have been in part directed to the problem
of reducing the axioms and postulates of geometry to the
• See Chap. XLI., iii.-v. ^ See Chaps. I. and XLI., v.
TYPES OF RELATIONS 197
smallest possible mimher. One method for doing this has been
to discover a set of entities for which a specific postulate does
not hold, while other postulates do. Then this postulate or
proposition is 7iot implied by these others. In this way a group
of postulates that are consistent with tut not iynplicative of one
another, has been discovered. The postulates are, however,
related. Such a group forms a consistent u'hole.
IX. Implicative wholes. Perhaps few wholes are entirely im-
plicative. Even the situation, A <. B <i C, implies A <. C, is
not wholly implicative, since, if A, B, and C are classes, other
relations than implication are present, namely, the relations of
similarity, difference, "member of," and inclusion. But a
specific space such as is described by both Euclidean and Lo-
batschewskian geometry, illustrates that distinct kind of whole
which is in part implicative and in part merely consistent.
III. TYPES OF UNITY
What the several types of unity are, is an important question
for philosophy, — indeed many systems as, e.g., monistic systems,
not only are chiefly concerned with just this question, but also
are, in part, identical with a specific solution to it. However,
it is evident that, if the conclusion is reached that, e.g., the
whole universe, the human self, the living organism, or the
system of knowledge is in each case a unity, this conclusion must
be supplemented by determining in each case just what kind of
unity each such entity is. And that there are different kinds
of unities is shown by the fact that there are different types
of organizing relations, and, therefore, different kinds of wholes,
each of which not only is itself a unity in some sense, but per-
haps, also, as a complex presupposes unities of a specific kind,
as, e.g., absolute simples.
The classification of wholes just given helps, therefore, to
answer this problem, since it shows that there are at least the
following different kinds of unity: (1) Absolute units, or sim-
ples, that are not composed of any parts ; examples, points, and
instants; (2) unities which, with one possible exception, are
identical with the different kinds of wholes. (3) The possible
exception is that kind of unity which is deduced in the argu-
ment for the underlying-reality theory of relations, and which
198 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
may be called a metaphysical or transcendent unity. However,
as alone consistent with the ar^nient by which it is derived,
this unity should be absolutely simple, since, if it is not, it con-
sists of parts, and thus repeats the very problem, as regards
the relation of these parts, which it is supposed to solve. But,
in our previous criticism it has been found that such a unity
is really never reached, since, as mediating the relation between
the terms which lie above it, it is related to those terms, and
therefore presupposes still another mediating unity, and so on
in an infinite series. On the other hand, if the relation between
such an underlying unity and the terms and relation "above"
it demands, not the underlying-reality theory of relations, but
the modification theory, then the underlying unity is not simple,
hut complex. Indeed, it is evident, that, if strictly empirical
results be departed from, and the universal validity of the
modification theory of relations be insisted upon, all unities
would seem to become organic, causal complexes. Yet we have
seen that this specific theory is also self-contradictory in that
it presupposes, as the "elements" of such infinitely complex
organic wholes, ultimate simples, which simples are related and
yet independent.
We conclude, therefore, that there are to be accepted only as
many specific kinds of unities as are shown by consistent em-
pirical investigation to be specific kinds of organized wholes, or,
as in the case of "numerical simples" such as points and
instants, are presupposed by such wholes. Only provided the
modification theory of relations, or the underlying-reality theory
is postulated, can the conclusion be derived Jiat all such wholes
are, respectively, either organic, or those that are mandatory of
an ultimate, absolute One.
IV. THEORIES OP RELATIONS AND TYPES OP LOGIC
Just as all wholes and all unities are, by the modification
theory of relations, organic, and by the underlying-reality
theory, a manifold of entities that are held together by one
underlying entity, so, according as one or the other of these two
theories is assumed to be universally valid, different types of
theories as to the nature of logical principles and entities are
derivable.
TYPES OF RELATIONS 199
The traditional logic is, as we have seen, derived from the
thing-quality view of "things." Everything which can occur
as the logical subject of a proposition and of which a predicate
is asserted, is, by this logic, made a thing, or a substance witli
qualities. The substance is that in which the qualities inhere ;
it is that which holds them together. But this position as to
the nature of propositions is, as stated in terms of the theories of
relations, the underlying- reality theory. This theory, therefore,
is itself a fundamental postulate of the traditional logic. Ac-
cordingly, with this logic dominant up to the present time, it is
not surprising to find that some of the most influential phi-
losophies are the monistic systems, in which all else is
made the manifold of attributes of One fundamental Being or
Substance, whether this be material or spiritual,*
A derivative of this traditional logic is the constitutive,
a priori logic of Kant, This logic presupposes both the under-
lying-reality and the modification theories of relations. Thus,
if the principles of the ordinary logic be interpreted in accord-
ance with the psychologizing tendency as laws of mind, and
mind be regarded, in accordance with the underlying-reality
theory, as a spiritual substance with attributes, then the laws
of the mind are its attributes. And further, if the mind is
related, in the act of knowing, to the object that is to be known,
and this relation is interpreted by the modification theory, it
follows that objects are perforce modified by the mind's attri-
butes, and are known only as so modified. It results, that
logical principles become constitutive of the known world?
The pragmatic theory of logic to the effect that all logical
principles and entities are merely adaptative inventions of the
human race, is really derived also from the modification theory
of relations as this is applied to human organisms and their
environment. Both human beings and the environment can be
interpreted either as substances with attributes, or as organic
wholes; but in either case human organisms, as beings that
adapt themselves to their environment, are beings in whom the
environment causally works changes, and conversely. But this
is an instance of the modification theory of relations. If, there-
fore, logical principles are only adaptations, then, as such, they
" See Chaps. XXXIV.-XXXVIII. « See Chap. XXIX.
200 METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF METHOD
presuppose the modification theory of relations as applying to
the relation between human beings and their environment.
In criticism it may be remarked that, if this be the case, then
the state of affairs that is formulated by this particular theory
could not itself be a mere adaptation or invention; for its own
objectivity and independence are presupposed in order that
other logical principles may be adaptations. Yet, if one logical
principle is not an adaptation, it may be that none are, and
that, in fact, all logical principles are quite objective.
Modern logic in contrast with these two interpretations and
tendencies, presupposes, therefore, the theory of external rela-
tions. This logic finds that things and their qualities do not
present the only instances of relations, but that relations of a
specifically different kind are involved, e.g., in series, in infinity,
in continuity, in functions, and the like.
V. MATERIAL PRINCIPLES OF PROOF
The three theories of relations that have been discussed are
material principles of proof. That is, if one assumes these
theories, and deduces from them correctly, discovering their
implications, one gets certain definite results. Two of the the-
ories, namely, the ''external theory" and the ''modification
theory," are shown empirically to be valid, each for a certain
sphere of terms and relations, but no convincing empirical evi-
dence for the underlying-reality theory has been found up to
the present.
PART II
THE SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS
THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
THE CRITICISM OF THESE SYSTEMS
SECTION I
INTRODUCTORY
CHAPTER XXVIII
THE PROBLEM ABOUT PROBLEMS
Problems of the point of view, of methods, of theories of
relations and the like, having been examined in the preceding
sections, we are now prepared to inquire how specific solutions
of specific problems are obtained logically hij postulating certain
specific principles or propositions, and hy iuaking deductions
from these principles. Such a method of examining philo-
sophical systems, in a manner that is independent of their his-
torical development, has already been expounded somewhat in
our discussion of the problem of the point of view,^ and it now
remains for us to carry such a method of procedure to com-
pletion.
I. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM
It is a well-known fact that philosophy has developed in
cycles, beginning with the ontological problem among the ear-
liest Greeks, then going through the cosmological, the teleo-
logical, the theological, the ethical, and esthetic problems, and
finally reaching the epistemological problem in Plato and Aris-
totle, only again, on the basis of their epistemology, to return
to the problems of ontology, cosmology, teleology, and the like.
This recurrent series or development, in which the other prob-
lems received solution from the standpoint of the Platonic and
Aristotelian epistemology, persisted up to the time of that
somewhat vague period called the Renaissance, although it did
not even then lose its influence.
The Renaissance was an awakening to new points of view and
of method in literature, art, science, religion, and philosophy.
> See Chap. I.-III.
203
204. INTRODUCTORY
One result was the birth, or rebirth of those empirical methods
which have largely created our modern material civilization.
But, while the Renaissance was characterized by the adoption
of new methods of knowing, it did not apply these to the study
of knowing, as itself constituting a problem. This problem first
received clear recognition in the investigations of Descartes
(1596-1650) and, more especially, of Locke (1632-1704), with
the result that, throughout the modern period which follows these
philosophers, other philosophical doctrines have, for the most
part, been based on epistemologies. Indeed, that characteristic
which marks this whole period in philosophy, even to the present,
is the domination of the epistemological problem, although it
may be, that in the near future, this domination will cease,
because it will be proved, that human beings can know without
first ascertaining how knowledge is possible, and what is its
extent and origin.
Science all through this modern period developed with rapid
strides, and to a large extent independently of the philosophy
of knowledge, both as regards the facts disclosed and the method
of their discovery. This development was characterized by the
use of new means of knowing which for a long time were not
understood in all respects, but which today have become better
known, with the result that there is an increased efficiency in
scientific method. The new logic, with its emphasis of relations,
and the like, is itself a product of the modern study of such
methods, and it is to this new logic that we must turn for the
solution of many problems in both science and philosophy.
With such an extensive scientific development characterizing
the modern period, and yet with so little attention given to the
epistemological problem by the scientists themselves, the ques-
tion arises, why this problem has exercised such a controlling
influence over philosophy. The answer to this inquiry is, that
such an influence has been due not only to the interest in the
knowledge-problem itself, but also to the fact that certain
specific solutions of the problem would seem to present a way
by which men should be able to prove real that which they
would prefer to be real, and also able to prove false or illusory
that which they would have of this character. For it is a fact,
that, for one reason or another, mast men prefer that, e.g., evil
THE PROBLEM ABOUT PROBLEMS 205
were not evil, pain, not pain, hate, not hate, and death, not death,
even as they prefer that such "things" as goodness and
beauty and life and love should not be illusory, but quite real.
All else may be lost, if these but be saved; all else be illusion
and appearance, if these but remain the realities.
But how, indeed, does epistemology offer opportunity for
saving that which men would have saved, and for demonstrating
as illusory or as merely apparent that which men perhaps detest
and abhor? Why, indeed, should appeal be made in any way
to philosophy? Cannot the momentous questions that concern
the saving of what men would, in most cases, prefer to have
saved, be settled on their own merits, or, at least, by an appeal
to science. For does not science reveal to us suns and stars,
the depths of space, and the eons of time; does she not pene-
trate beneath the surface of "things" to disclose otherwise
hidden forces and energies; does she not picture both the macro-
cosmically great and the microcosmically small? Then why,
also, should not God and soul and immortality, justice and
goodness and beauty, come within her realm to lose their secrets
too? The answer is, that science, in that it deals with such
things as suns and stars, energies and forces, molecules and
atoms, has to do with that which is known, hut that, as unknown,
''things'' may be so different from what they are as known,
as to be the realities, with the known "things" mere appear-
ances or illusions, so that it may be among ''things" as unknown
that the science of what is hoped for is to be sought and found.
Who can deny that this may not be so? For does not fire
make the iron red? Then may not the awareness be to both
the fire and the iron, even as the fire is to the glowing and the
redness. Epistemology, or rather, certain epistemological the-
ories accept this analogy as a principle. For they find, not only
that all "things" known are related to the knowing, or to the
knower, and that to know what anything would be, or be like,
as unknown, is impossible, since this would be again to make
the unknown known, but also that knowing makes a difference to
"things," even as the fire does to the iron, so that we can never
know without making such a difference.
How great shall this difference be ? Could it be such a radical
difference as to include such characteristics as extension and
4b§ iNTRODUCTdRY
duration, hardness and coldr, manifoldness and unity? That
ihis is not impossible, is the position that is sometimes insisted
upon by those who emphasize epistemology.
The situation, that knowing eatinot be elithiriated from the
world that we know, is called the "ego-centric predicament";
while the position that knowing makes the world what it is in
at least certain respects, is an instance of the application of
the modification theory of relations. The outcome of these two
premises or postulates is most interesting, and appeals to our
hopes and desires. For known ''things" seem in some instances
to be evil and unfriendly, hopeless and forlorn, ugly and fore-
bidding, rigid and mechanical, and, in general, of little promise.
But, iy the premises just mentioned, may not all these unde-
sirable "things" be due to the difference that is made hy know-
ing? Then enter the realm of the good and the affectionate,
the hopeful and the inspiring, the beautiful and the enlightened,
the plastic and the free, not by knowledge, but by faith and
intuition. These are what one desires, and thus it is that one
can argue oneself into the possibility of their attainment.
II. THE VALUE-CENTRIC PREDICAMENT ^
If the ego-centric predicament is thus taken advantage of, in
order to demonstrate the attainability, or, at least, the reality
of that which one would prefer real, the suggestion lies near
that an analogous predicament may exist through the fact that
our knowing is always related to our desires, our preferences,
our yearnings, and, accordingly, perhaps, that our desires and
preferences cannot be eliminated from our knowing. Such a
situation may be somewhat awkwardly called the value-centric
predicament.^
" See, e.g., James' discussion of tough-mindedness and tendsr-mindednesB
in Chap. I. of Pragmatism. However, why the pragmatist, who is ad-
mittedly a tough-minded individual, should seek to convert the tender-
minded philosopher, whose point of view and system satisfy his own vital
needs, is a puzzle from the standpoint of Pragmatism.
° N. Kemp Smith, "How Far is Agreement Possible in Philosophy?"
Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. IX., p. 701 flf. ; see also
the report of the twelfth annual meeting of the American PhiU)8ophical
Association, J. B. Pratt, Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods,
Vol. X., p. 91 ff.; cf. also Marvin, First Book of Metaphysics, Chap. I.;
Sir Henry .Jones, Idealism as a Practical Need, 19UU; and J. G. Hibben,
Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 1910.
THE PROBLEM ABOUT PROBLEMS 207
This predicament — if it is such — lias two forms of which
the one concerns us chiefly as individuals, the other, our member-
ship in a social group, whether this be narrow in its confines;,
or so wide as to include all human beings.
The effect of the predicament is, accordingly, that, if you
as an individual desire an evil nullified, then do you accept as
true only that philosophy which in some way does away with
evil; but the effect is also, that, if you and I both have those
hopes and longings which are inherited from our forefathers
and from our race, then do we endeavor to save whatever is
thus valued, by accepting only such a transformation of common
sense and of science as will accomplish this result. Yet finally
we may become aware of such an influence of our desires and
preferences on our knowing, and therefore, in the attempt to
eliminate this influence, we may reach that point where ive
prefer truth at all costs — no matter what the truth may prove
to be. But the question then arises, whether we are not thereby
valuing truth itself, and therefore making truth a value, thus
to condition it, like other values, by our preferences and our
desires.
In answer to such an inquiry, it may, however, be further
asked, whether, e.g., the fact that I prefer sincerity in all those
with whom I have to deal in any way, prevents me from discov-
ering that in some cases sincerity is wholly absent? But, if
sincerity can be found to be absent, although I prefer its pres-
ence, then are not my preference and that which I prefer inde-
pendent, although they are r elated f Similarly, does not the
fact, that, although I value truth, I may nevertheless fail to
find it, prove that my valuing and truth are independent, though
related? And finally, if I desire to know, and yet what I desire
to know is the truth for its own sake, no matter what the
specific truth may be, then may not any specific knowing, with
any specific content, be absent, even though I prefer to find such
content present? But does not this possible absence prove that
any specific knowing — of any specific content — although related
to desire and preference, is independent of these? In other
words, is there not at least a virtual elimination of desire and
preference from any specific knowing — an elimination which
means, that, when the desire to know is directed toward getting
20S INTRODUCTORY
at the truth for its own sake, irrespective of what the specific
truth may turn out to be, the value-centric predicament is
solved f
Such a solution of this predicament is, as a matter of fact,
presupposed all through science in its method of awaiting the
outcome of hypotheses and theories, without either believing or
dishelieving them, and the situation is not, of necessity, different
in philosophy. Accordingly we conclude, that, although many
philosophical systems have resulted, at least in part, from the
endeavor to save those worths and values which men would
prefer to he saved, nevertheless, the disinterested attitude is
quite as possible in philosophy as it is elsewhere, and that the
logical justification of this attitude is, that, although "truth
for its own sake" is related to (this specific) preference, the
truth and the preference may, nevertheless, he quite independent.
III. THE SOLUTION OP THE EGO-CENTRIC PREDICAMENT
The same principles which enable us to solve the value-centric
predicament also make it possible to solve the ego-centric pre-
dicament. In fact these principles form a most important
method for both science and philosophy.
In a great many instances of entities which we wish to analyze,
it is impossible experimentally to remove the parts which analysis
discovers. All the parts must be left in situ, and yet, if possible,
we must discover not only the parts, but also the relations
between the parts. This method must be pursued, e.g., in his-
tory, since we cannot alter the past ; in sociologj'^, since we cannot
to any great extent manipulate sociological and economic forces ;
in geometry, since we cannot experimentally remove the parts
of space; and also, in a great many instances, in such sciences
as physics, chemistry, and astronomy. Where we can, we experi-
mentally remove a thing, A, that is in relation to B, from its
presence and relation to B, in order to discover, whether, thereby,
B is altered or removed ; if it is, then we conclude that A influ-
ences, or causes B, or that B is functionally related to A; if it
is not, then A is not such an influence, or cause, or variable.
However, in the fields of research just mentioned, it is im-
possible always to determine experimentally the question of
influence, cause, or function. Therefore, if we analyze, we must
THE PROBLEM ABOUT PROBLEMS 209
leave the parts together, — in situ — to determine their depend-
ence or independence.* Such a procedure is successfully prac-
tised in a great many cases, especially in science, in order to
find specific functional relations. Thus, in the case of a moving
projectile, there is the color, the shape, the chemical composition,
the mass, the gradually retarded motion (negative accelera-
tion), and the explosion that sets the projectile in motion. No
projectile is without all these characteristics, with each one of
them of some specific (numerical) value, as determined by some
scale of measurement; and although any specific value can be
substituted by another specific value of the same character, e.g.,
the mass of 100 lbs. for the mass of 50 lbs., nevertheless no one of
these generic characteristics can be experimentally removed from
a moving projectile. Rather, each such characteristic must be
left in the presence of the others, while their specific relations
to one another are, if possible, determined.
Analysis shows, however, that, e.g., although the retardation
requires time, it does not cause time, nor time cause it, although
the two are related. Rather the retardation is found to be
a function of the time; related to time, and time to it, time is
nevertheless independent of the retardation. The time is the
independent variable, the retardation the dependent variable.
Thus the time is functionally related to the retardation, but is
not an effect of it. In such an instance, therefore, the specific
retardation and the specific time must each be left in situ, and
yet we discover not only that they are different and distinct,
but also that, though related, they are independent.
But there are, of course, causes for the retardation, as well
as for the motion as a whole and for the initial velocity. Dif-
ferent "things" can be distinguished, namely, the distance
traveled, the time required, the initial velocity, the final stop-
ping, the initial "angle of flight," the mass of the projectile,
the force of the explosion, and, finally, the relationships of these
entities to one another can be determined, and theij:* dependence
or independence be ascertained. Omitting unnecessary details,
it may be said, that, by studying various instances of moving
projectiles in which we are obliged to leave in situ the several
parts, it is discovered, that the motion as a whole, with its
*Cf. Chaps. XXII and XXVI.
210 INTRODUCTORY
several characteristics, either depends functionally upon, or is
caused by, (a) the explosive force, (b) the angle of elevation of
the gun, (c) the mass of the projectile, (d) the resistance of
the air. Change any one of these, keeping the others constant,
and the total motion, with its characteristics of change of
velocity and distance covered, is changed. Color, however,
makes no difference, nor does the chemical composition of the
projectile, provided the same mass is retained. Here, then,
analysis in situ reveals two sets of entities that are related to
the motion. One set, namely, the explosion, the force of gravita-
tion, and the mass, are constituent causes, variables or "ele-
ments" in the motion; the other set, namely, the color and
the chemical composition of the projectile, are not such causes,
elements, or variables.
This example illustrates a most important power of achieve-
ment of modern scientific analysis. "Things" can be analyzed,
parts be discovered and distinguished, and yet left in situ, and
relationships be ascertained. Three kinds of relationships ap-
pear, namely, (1) functional, in which an independence of re-
lated terms is discovered ; i.e., the terms are related in such a
way that, if any term were eliminated, the elimination would
make no difference to the other terms. There can be only an
ideal elimination of such parts. Therefore the analysis must be
made in situ. (2) Causal relationships are revealed. In these
a specific dependence of specifically related terms is shown. In
this case certain terms are what they are by virtue of their
relation to other terms; i.e., the relation between them is con-
stitutive. (3) Both non-functional and non-causal relationships.
In these it is shown, both by actual and by ideal elimination,
that there is not only no causal dependence of certain terms,
but also no functional connection. In the case of terms thus
related, each term is independent, no term is constituted by
others, any term can be eliminated without a resulting effect
on others, and no term makes a difference to others. For ex-
ample, mass and time are thus independent.
The ego-centric predicament can be solved, now, by this same
method of analyzing in situ, and of thus discovering parts and
relations, and the specific character of each. This predicament
consists, as we have seen, in the impossibility of experimentally
THE PROBLEM ABOUT PROBLEMS 211
eliminating a knowing process as really occurring, or as implied
as really occurring, from the world that we know. In other
words, the world that we talk about, think about, mention, or
know, is a known world. The predicament has most important
consequences provided knowing makes a difference to the entity
known, but it is of no importance, provided it can be shown,
that knowing makes no difference to that world. If this last
principle can be established, then it follows that the world as
unknown can be quite the same as the world as knoivn, and
knowing must be concluded not to be causally related to that
world.
If, now, it cannot be shown by an experimental elimination
and analysis, that knowing is thus related independently to
the entity known, nevertheless, an analysis in situ, and an ideal
elimination of knowing suffice to furnish this demonstration.
Such an analysis and elimination is, in fact, made by every
philosopher and scientist who, even in a philosophy that ex-
plicitly maintains the opposite, advances any position as a
portrayal of the real state of affairs regarding knowing.^ For
example, if one is a follower of Kant, and accordingly main-
tains, that all knowing makes a difference to the object to be
known, i.e., alters it, modifies it, and the like, so that there is
a specific and marked difference between the object as known
and as unknown, then does not one present this position as the
real state of affairs regarding knowing, with this state of affairs
nevertheless in relation to a specific knowing as its content or
object? But does not one therewith make an exception to the
rule that is stated in the position? For does not one tacitly
grant and presuppose, that here is one instance, at least, in
which knowing is related to its object, and yet does not alter,
modify, or constitute that object? And does not one tacitly
presuppose, that, *"/ this specific knowing were not taking place,
this state of affairs regarding knowing would still persist as the
real one?
To these questions there seems to be no other answer than
"yes." In fact, every philosopher who presents any position
in solution of the problem of knowing, tacitly presupposes
" See the criticisms of systems opposed to Eealism, Chaps. XXIX.-
XXXVIII.; also Chaps. I., II., and III.
212 INTRODUCTORY
that the facts which are therewith known are not causally de-
pendent upon being known, either by himself or any one else.
Every such philosopher thus really solves.the ego-centric predica-
ment for himself. Indeed, he solves it, even though in the
particular solution which he advances, he may make use of this
predicament in order to demonstrate its insolubility, and the
consequences that result from this.
However, with the ego-centric predicament quite soluble in
this way, it should no longer be regarded as serious, or as having
important consequences. For if in one typical instance, know-
ing can be related to, and yet not cause, alter, or modify, that
which is known, so that in this one case knowing is ideally
eliminated, then the presumption is, that in all cases of knowing
the same state of affairs subsists. To advance any other posi-
tion means, that at a certain point an exception is met with that
contradicts such a position. Indeed, that knowing makes a
difference to its object, is a position that is self -contradictory,
while, on the other hand, that knowing is not causally related
to and makes no difference to the object knoivn, is a position
that can be advanced and maintained quite consistently with
itself as a true position.
This position is self-consistent, because the proposition, that
knowing does not make a difference to its object, itself logically
allows one in this very instance to advance this as the real
state of affairs concerning all knowing, including, therefore, the
specific knowing, that this is the state of affairs concerning all
knowing.
This self-consistent position is an instance of the validity of
the theory of external relations which formulates the fact that
terms can be both related and independent. One interesting
and important implication of this position, which is presupposed
by its own denial, is, that knowing or knower cannot be a thing
or substance.^ For, if it were, then it would affect other things.
Therefore, in order to understand the real nature of knowing,
we must not use the traditional logic of substance and attribute,
but the 71CIV logic of relations.'' We must use this logic, because
it is empirically discovered to be that logic which is involved
in any situation of genuine knowing. For knowing turns out
• Cf. Chaps. III., XIII., and XXVII. ' Chap. XXVII.
THE PROBLEM ABOUT PROBLEMS 213
to be, not a thing or substance^ but an event, a relation, a dimen-
sion, or even a disembodied quality, with the object known
entering into and getting out of relation to the knowing, while
still maintaining its relations to other objects.^
The critical study of the opposed position, that knowing is in
some way related causally and constitutively to its object, shows
that this is a conclusion which is derived (1) from the arbitrary,
though unconscious, application of the modification theory of
relations^ to the specific relational complex, knowing and known
object, and (2) from the somewhat surreptitious postulation of
the underlying-reality theory of relations to the knowing, or to
the knower, whereby the knower is regarded, tacitly at least,
as a psychical substance (ego, self, spirit), and, therefore, as a
sort of thing with attributes (the knowing states or processes).
Either of these two postulates has carried with it the other
postulate, and the reason why one or the other postulate has
been made, is, that the model of the particular physical thing,
with the two derivative concepts of substance and of cause,
has for the most part dominated philosophical and even some
scientific thinking from the time of Aristotle to the present."
For in this tradition "things" are regarded not only as
groups of qualities that inhere in a substance, but also as
entities that causally act on, influence, and modify one another,
with the effect dependent not only on the thing acting, but also
on the thing acted upon. Thus the effect cf melting produced
by a red-hot cannon ball an inch from a candle is as much
dependent on the candle as upon the cannon ball. Substitute
an iron bar for the candle, and the effect is different. It is clear,
then, that, if the principle thus illustrated is generalized and
applied to certain problems or situations, certain specific con-
clusions by way of solutions to these problems are deducible.
But it is precisely this generalization and this application that
have been made, at least tacitly, in the reasoning out of a
number of the great philosophical systems of history, especially
those that are based on a prior solution of the problem of
knowledge. The generalization and the application have taken
place pari passu. The generalization has been made on the tacit
or unconscious assumption (1) that the type or model for all,
" See Chaps. XLIII., iii. and xi. ' Chap. XXVI., ii., 2. '" Chap. III.
214 INTRODUCTORY
or for most entities, is that of a thing and its qualities, with the
qualities inhering in the substance of the thing; and (2) that
the most important relation between "things" is the causal.
Thus, in philosophy such entities as matter, soul, God, per-
sonality, the universe, ideas, concepts, and percepts, and, in
science, atom, force, energy, have been made things with attri-
butes, while in logic the result has been, that reasoning has
concerned itself (1) with substance-like individual things and
their identity with themselves, (2) with kinds or classes of
things, and the relationship of inclusion, complete, partial, or
negative, of these kinds, (3) with the causal relationship between
things, and (4) with the kinds of causation.
Aristotle, with substance as his leading category, illustrates
one phase of this influence, as does Descartes with his two
substances, mind and matter, and Spinoza, with his one sub-
stance, God, of which mind and matter are attributes. Modern
Objective Idealism, or Psychism, with its doctrine of one spirit-
ual substance, of which everything else is manifestation or
attribute, exemplifies the same controlling influence," as do
also Locke, Berkeley, and Kant in their respective doctrines of
a mind, a perceiving spirit, and a transcendental ego}- Science
also shows the same influence in its older mechanistic theory,
that all matter and all physical events consist of the motion of
minute extended things or particles.
On the other hand, as illustrating the other main phase of
the influence of this great dominating tendency and tradition,
we have, e.g., the Phenomenalism of Kant, and the Idealism of
Berkeley, with their common position, that we can know only
the (causal) effects of "something" that acts on our "minds."
But also Naturalism (developing out of Hume's Positivism),
Materialism, Pragmatism, and Komanticism are examples of
positions that are developed from the postulate of universal
causal interaction.
The two principles which have thus been used as postulates
from which such specific philosophies have been deduced as
derivative results are respectively, as logically formulated, the
underlying-reality theory of relations, for the substance phi-
^^ E.g., Bradley, Appearance and Reality, pp. 141, 143.
»* Chaps. XXIX. and XXX.
THE PROBLEM ABOUT PROBLEMS 215
losophies, and the modification theory of relations, for the
causation philosophies. Both theories, however, can be present,
in any one philosophy, as applying to different situations.
These two theories together form what we have previously
called the two aspects of the theory of internal relations. Ac-
cordingly, with the problem of knowing the pivotal point for
most modern philosophical systems, it is this theory of relations,
with its two aspects, that has been applied to the several phases
of the relational complex, knowing and known object.
From such an application, or postulation, specific philo-
sophical systems have been derived. This postulation as made
historically, has been, in most cases, unconscious and uncritical,
since it has been due to the influence of the tradition of which
the two aspects of the theory of internal relations form the
logical core. However, at the present time, with the logical
character of the tradition itself come to consciousness, and with
the opposed theory of external relations, as instanced in science,
also known, it is possible to derive the several chief systems of
philosophy in a purely logical manner by freely postulating one
or another of the three theories of relations as applying to the
complex, knowing and known object, in its several aspects, and
by then deducing the logical consequences of these postulates
as so applied.
This method will be pursued in the sections that follow.
Solutions of the other major problems of philosophy will then
be derived logically from these same postulates, or from those
solutions to the epistemological problems which are derived from
such postulates, in a manner that in general corresponds to the
historical dependence of the solution of these other problems on
the prior solution of the problem of knowing.
SECTION II
CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
CHAPTER XXIX
PHENOMENALISM
Phenomenalism may be defined briefly as that philosophical
position which maintains, that, by the very nature of the know-
ing situation, it is possible to know only phenomena or appear-
ances, but not "things" as they really are; or, more briefly still,
that "things" as they really are, are unknoivahle, and not
merely unknown. This position is identified historically with
the name of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
We shall present this position, not as it was consciously
developed, temporally and historically, by Kant and other phe-
nomenalists, but logically, according to those principles that
were unconsciously and uncritically assumed by Kant, and that,
as postulates, form a sufficient basis from which to deduce the
phenomenalistic philosophy. Thus we shall examine this position
much as a modern geometer examines the geometry of Euclid,
namely, not in the sequence in which Euclid developed it, but
critically in regard to the postulates upon which it depends, and
the logical sequence of propositions that result from such postu-
lates.
I. THE LOGICAL DERIVATION OP PHENOMENALISM
In order to make such a logical derivation of Phenomenalism,
let us assume, as Kant really did under the influence of the
Aristotelian tradition, (1) that the knoiving self is a psychical
"thing" with attributes (categories, percepts, concepts, and the
like), i.e., an absolutely unitary being (ego) in which there 'in-
here," or which holds together, certain specific mental attri-
butes * called categories, concepts, percepts, and the like. Let us
symbolize such a self by K8 (knowing self).
' Although in his discussion of the Paralogisms (see, e.g., Watson's
Selections from Kant, pp. 145-155) Kant denies that the concept of suh-
216
PHENOMENALISM 217
Let us also assume (2) that, as numerically distinct from such
a self, there is a "thing" or entity, X,' that is to be known, if
possible.
In thus assuming both KS and X to be thing-like entities, it
may be that the modificatmi theory of relations is also already
assumed for the relational situation ES R X (object-to-be-
known-related-to-the-self-that-knows-that-object), for, in accord-
ance with the traditional logic, things interact; but, if this
assumption is not therewith made, then (3) let it be made
explicitly.
From these three assumptions the consequence can be de-
duced, that KS and X, as in relation to each other, interact, so
that a twofold effect is produced. X acting on KS produces an
effect called sensation, which we will express by KS^,^ while
stance is applicable to the transcendental ego, nevertheless it can be shown
that throughout his entire philosophy Lie regards the knowing self, not
as a process, quality, or relation, but as a substratum-like entity in which
both a priori concepts (categories) and empirical experiences (sensations
and ideas) inhere.
^ Kant's " thing-in-itself," all through his Critique of Pure Reason.
' See Miiller's translation, Transcendental Esthetic, ed. 1896, pp. 16-17.
As here translated, Kant says: —
" Whatever the process and the means may be by which knowledge
reaches its objects, there is one that reaches them directly, and forma
the ultimate material of all thought, viz., intuition (Anschauung) . This
is possible only when the object is given, and the object can be given only
(to human beings at least) through a certain affection of the mind
( Gemiith ) ."
" This faculty (receptivity) of receiving representations (Vorstellungen),
according to the manner in which we are affected by objects, is called
sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) ."
" Objects therefore are given to us through our sensibility. Sensibility
alone supplies us with intuitions ( Anschauungen) . These intuitions be-
come thought through the understanding (Verstand), and hence arise
conceptions (Begriffe). AH thought therefore must, directly or indirectly,
go back to intuitions (Anschauungen), i.e., to our sensibility, because in
no other way can objects he given to us."
" The effect produced by an object upon the faculty of representation
( Vorstellungsfahigkeit), so far as we are affected by it, is called sensation
(Empfindung). An intuition (Anschauung) of an object, by means of
sensation, is called empirical. The imdefined object of such an empirical
intuition is called phenomenon (Erscheinung) ."
" In a phenomenon I call that which corresponds to the sensation its
matter; but that which causes the manifold matter of the phenomenon
to be perceived as arranged in a certain order, I call its form."
" Now it is clear that it cannot be sensation again through which
sensations are arranged and placed in certain forms. The matter only
of all phenomena is given us a posteriori ; but their form, must be ready
for them in the mind (Gemiith) a priori, and must therefore be capable
of being considered as separate from all sensations." (Italics mine.)
$18 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
K8 acting on X produces an effect, X^^, the known object
"over against" the sensation as psychical "attribute."* In
other words, with it necessary, in order to know, that K8
should be related to X, it follows, on the assumption or postu-
late, that relatedness means dependence, and dependence, modi-
fication, that both KS^ and X^^ are of necessity produced in
the act of knowing. Neither is produced without the other,
and each is produced with the other. If there were no K8 to
be in relation to X, there would be only X, but no X^^^; so,
likewise, with no X in relation to KS, there would be no E8^.
But, KS and X are, or, at least, knowing and object known are.
For knowing, as Descartes showed, seems to be implied by its
own attempted denial. Doubt knowing, and there still is
cogitans. Also, to know without knowing something (an object),
seems to be impossible. Indeed, to think of a knowing without
an object known is again to reinstate an object. If, then, both
K8 and X are, and if, being, they are related, and also if, being
related, they interact, then there are, also, K8^ and X^^. K8^
and X^^ as effects imply K8 and X as causes.^ Not only
is X^^ different from X, but, since KS^ is the effect of X
acting on KS, it is also different from KS. KS is the original
thing-self, while KS^ is the stream of sensations, and the like,
which constitute the "empirical self" and which we get at by
introspection and memory. X, on the other hand, is the original
thing -in-it self , the "thing" as it really is, while X^^ is the
thing of the material or physical world, known in sensation,
and in all that knowledge which depends on and is derived from
sensation.
With X and Z^«, and KS and K8^, respectively, dif-
fering and, in some respects, distinct from each other,
it is important to ask. How different are they in each
case, i.e., how does KS differ from KS^, and X from
X^^f In order to determine this, it is evident that one must,
if possible, get at or know X by itself, i.e., as X is unrelated
to and unmodified by KS, in order to contrast X with X^^,
and also get at or know KS, in order to contrast it with KS-^.
* Cf. C. N. Broad. Perception, Phpsics, and Reality, 1014, Chap. V. on
the Causal Theory of Perception, especially pp. 18()-187 and 204-206.
• Pointed out, e.g., by G. E. Schulze in his JEnesidemus, 1792.
PHENOMENALISM 219
Otherwise one must rest content with KS^ and X^^, knowing
only that they are different from KS and X, but not how dif-
ferent.
However, to succeed in such an attempt to know X by itself
is impossible for the reason, that success would mean again to
relate X to KS, and, therefore, to make it X^^. Thus it results
that it is only X^^ that we can know. In other words, the very
attempt to know what "the world" would be like if it were not
known, only again brings in the knowing, and so defeats itself,
since, by assumption, knowing makes a difference to that which
is known.
Here, it is evident, the ego-centric predicament * appears, but
it is also evident that certain specific consequences result from
this, because it is also assumed, that knowing makes a difference
to the object known. Accordingly, with this assumption actu-
ally made, as it was, e.g., by Kant, because of the influence of
tradition, it follows, that, unless the knowing can be eliminated
in some way, such as by the method of analyzing in situ, then
that difference which knowing makes cannot he eliminated from
the known world — which is the only world that we know. Such
an outcome means, however, that our world is one that is made,
at least in part, by knowing, and that it is in just this sense a
world of phenomena or appearances.'' Another world — of things-
in-themselves — of X's is, of course, implied, as standing in con-
trast with these phenomena, but such a world can never be
known — unless to discover that which is implied is to know.
But, if this should be the case, then it must be granted either
that such knowing modifies its object, thereby making that
object mere appearance; or that the object that is known — hy
heing found to he implied — is known as it really is. But, if
this last be the case, then the proposition — basic for Phenomenal-
ism — that ttvo related terms (in this instance, knowing and
object known hy implication) causally influence each other, ia
contradicted, and Phenomenalism as a position becomes self-
contradictory.
The position that is derived logically in this relatively simple
' The writer assumes that this predicament is now understood by the
reader. See Chaps. X., XXVIII., XXXIX., XLI.
^ Terms also used all through the Critique.
220 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
manner is tlie essence of the phenomenalistic philosophy. The
presuppositions or postulates from which the position is derived
are (1) the modification theory of relations, namely, that related
terms as related modify or influence one another; (2) that the
known object and the knowing are (of course) an instance of
related terms; and (3) the ego-centric "situation," to the effect,
that knowing is always present to the (only) world that we
know, and cannot be eliminated in any way — even by an
analysis in situ.
The further development of the position results from the
making of further postulates, one of the important details of
such a development being the conclusion or result, that, although
things-in-themselves, X's, cannot be known (except by implica-
tion), nevertheless the "original" self, K8, can be known in its
real and genuine character.^
To present the logical development of such an outcome, let
us examine the postulates already made, and, if necessary, also
^Critique, Milller's translation, ed. 1896, p. 41; here Kant says:
" We call sensibility the receptivity of our soul, or its power of receiving
representations whenever it is in any wise afl'ected, while the understand-
ing, on the contrary, is with us the power of producing representations,
or the spontaneity of knowledge. We are so constituted that our intuition
must always be sensuous, and consist of the mode in which we are
affected by objects. What enables us to think the objects of our sensuous
intuition is the understanding. Neither of these qualities or faculties is
preferable to the other. Without sensibility objects would not be given
to us, without understanding they would not be thought by us. ' Thoughts
without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.* There-
fore it is equally necessary to make our concepts sensuous, i.e., to add
to them their object in intuition, as to make out intuitions intelligible,
i.e., to bring them under concepts. These two powers or faculties cannot
exchange their functions. The understanding cannot see, the senses cannot
think. By their union only can knowledge be produced. But this is no
reason for confounding the share which belongs to each in the production
of knowledge. On the contrary, they should always be carefully separated
and distinguished."
Also, Kant says (Miiller'a trans., ed. 1896, pp. 4-5-46) :
" On the supposition therefore that there may be concepts, having an
a priori reference to objects, not as pure or sensuous intuitions, but as
acts of pure thought, being concepts in fact, but neither of empirical nor
aesthetic origin, we form by anticipation an idea of a science of that
knowledge trhich belongs to the pure understanding and reason, and bp
which ice may think objects entirely a priori. Such a science, which has
to determine the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such
knowledge, might be called Transcendental Logic, having to deal with
the laws of the understanding and reason in so far only as they refer to
objects a prion, and not, as general logic, in so far iis they refer promiscu-
ously to the empirical as well as to the pure knowledge of reason."
(Italics mine.)
PHENOMENALISM 221
make other postulates. Proceeding in this way we find, that
the postulates already made mean not only that KS and X are
distinct, but also that they are each active. Let us next set up
the two further postulates, (4) that that which is self-evident
is true, and (5) that that whose opposite is inconceivable is
true. We then find hy hoth these tests that it is true (6) that
any active thing, or, that a thing, if it acts, must act in accord-
ance with its own nature.
From this last proposition, as conjoined with postulate (1),
it follows that KS, the knowing self, must, whenever there is
knowing, act in accordance with its own nature — whatever this
nature may be. Accordingly, the problem becomes one of find-
ing, if possible, i.e., of knowing what the nature of KS is. But
this problem is solved by finding and enumerating all those
most generic ways in or by which we must think or know. For,
on the one hand, if a "thing" must act in accordance with its
own nature, and cannot act in contradiction to this nature,
then, on the other hand, and conversely, those ways in which
KS must act or think or know will constitute its nature, and
to discover what those ways are will be to discover and to know
what the nature of KS is. But what those ways are in accord-
ance with which KS must act, is shown by finding what princi-
ples are such that they are either (7) self-evident, or (8) are
presupposed by the very attempt not to use them, or (9) are
of such a character that their opposite is inconceivable.'* For,
if there is revealed in this way a specific compulsion on KS to
use certain principles when it acts or thinks, then by postulate
(6) this compulsion is explainable by the hypothesis, that such
principles make up the nature of KS, so that to know these
principles is to know KS.
With this the method by which there are ascertained those
principles which are apodictic or necessary for thinking and for
* Cf. Chap. XI., v.-vii. ; see the Critique, Miiller's translation, p. 24,
for this principle. Here Kant says: —
" Space is a necessary representation a priori, forming the very founda-
tion of all external intuitions. It is impossible to imagine that there
should be no space, though one might very well imagine that there should
be space without objects to fill it. Space is therefore regarded as a
condition of the possibility of phenomena, not as a determination produced
by them; it is a representation a priori which necessarily precedes all
external phenomena."
222 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
knowing, and which constitute the nature of the '' transcendental
self," K8, it is evident that the particular list of principles that
one may find, is dependent upon the outcome of applying the
criteria by which one determines what one must think. These
criteria are, respectively, as we have seen, self-evidence, the
inconceivability of the opposite, and presupposition hy denial.
But since the first two of these criteria are, as we have previ-
ously discovered, distinctly psychological tests, and the third,
although logical in character, is open to error in its application,
the results obtained by using these criteria vary from individual
to individual, differing with differences in temperament, train-
ing, and intellectual environment and influences. Indeed, only
a meager inquiry shows that what is self-evident to one person
is not self-evident to another, and that that which cannot be
conceived by one is readily conceivable by another. We should,
therefore, expect to find a considerable variation in the lists of
those principles which the several adherents of Phenomenalism
present as categories, or laws of thinking, and such a variation
is found.
For Kant, however, the list of such principles included space,
time, unity, plurality, totality, substance and attribute, cause
and effect, actuality, possibility, necessity, quantity, quality,
relation, modality.
If, now, there are such "laws of thinking," as the attributes
of a thing-like transcendental self, certain interesting conse-
quences follow. First, it follows, that these principles are not
derived from the residts of the seeming action of ordinary
things, X^^'s, on our sense organs (which are also X^^'s) ; i.e.,
they are not derived from our sensations, K8^, but, rather, they
are in some manner "in" the self, KS, and so are prior to
ordinary "things" and sensations. Ordinary "things" and
sensations are constituted by the interaction of KS and X. But
these laws are already in K8 prior to this interaction. Accord-
ingly there can be certain sciences such as those of number, of
space, of time, of space related to time, i.e., of motion, and these
sciences (1) are independent of sense experience, so that (2)
they cannot be contradicted by sense experience, and (3) are
necessarily true.
Secondly, the interesting consequence follows, that these prin-
PHENOMENALISM 228
ciples and all that is rigorously derivable from them are con-
stitutive of the world that we live in and know through our
sensations. For, if that world is the partial effect of the know-
ing self, KS, as it acts on unknowable X's, then the effects so
produced are dependent on that self's nature or attributes. But
some of the more important of these attributes were (for Kant)
space, time, cause, and substance. Therefore the world which
we know is spatial, temporal, causal, and substantial, because
it is made so by being known. In contrast with this world, how-
ever, the unknowable world of X's does not of necessity possess
these characteristics, although it may possess them.
It is evident, therefore, that Phenomenalism allows not only
for two distinct kinds of objects, namely, for things-in-them-
selves, X's, and for phj^sical objects, X^^'s, but also for two
distinct kinds of selves, both of which are, however, known.
Thus, on the one hand, there is the original transcendental
thing-self, KS, with its attributes, namely, tJie principles of
knowing. The traditional definition of a thing, as a unitary
substance in which attributes inhere, is, however, the model for
this conception. This self is sometimes called by Kant the
"transcendental unity of apperception," meaning by this that
knowing in its several forms and in its manifoldness belongs to
a numerically single knower. And, on the other hand, there is
the empirical psychological self, KS^, that consists of the stream
of sensations, memories, concepts, emotions, and the like, and
that is the effect of things-in-themselves, X's, acting on tran-
scendental selves, KS's.
Kant in developing his Phenomenalism explicitly stated that
the laws of the transcendental self, the categories, were applica-
ble only to phenomena, meaning by this, that phenomena must
bear their impress, i.e., that phenomena must be causal, spatial,
temporal, substance-like, etc., because of the effect which knowing
produces on the thing (to be) known.
What, then, about the psychological phenomena of the em-
pirical self that are given by introspection, memory, and the
like? Do the categories apply to them also? Or, just as know-
ing imposes its laws on things-in-themselves to produce physical
phenomena, do, conversely, things-in-themselves, X's, impose
their nature on the transcendental selves in producing the KS^'s,
224 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
so that KS^'s are different from X^^'s, and have different cate-
gories applying to them? Yet again it may be asked, whether,
as known — by a knower — the empirical self should not bear the
impress of all the knowing principles that reside in the tran-
scendental knower, and, therefore, be spatial, causal, temporal,
substance-like, etc.?
Such questions indicate certain inconsistencies in the phe-
nomenalistic philosophy — and Kant himself did not remove them.
But the reason why he did not do so may well be, that they
are inherent in the position and, indeed, irremovable, even as
irremovable as the inconsistency of the Critique of Pure Reason
itself, in, on the one hand, portraying and maintaining it to be
the real and quite knowahle state of affairs concerning the know-
ing situation that, on the other hand, the reality of '^ things" is
unknowable and that our knowledge is limited to appearances.
II. phenomenalism's solution of problems
It is not our purpose, however, to present the m<iny incon-
sistencies that infect the phenomenalistic position. Rather, we
shall state or derive those solutions of other problems which the
position involves as itself a solution of the problem of knowing.
Foremost among such consequences is the opportunity that is
given for putting "all sorts of things" into the realms of
things-in-themselves, the X's, and also of the transcendental
selves, the KS's. Phenomena, both physical and psychological,
i.e., both X^^'s and KS^'s, are causal in character, i.e., are
determined. Therefore in these realms there is no freedom to
do the right, to attain to ideals, and, in reasoyiing, to follow im-
plications rather than mere associations. Psychologically and
physically "man is a machine." But, in the realm of "things"
that are unaffected by knowing, and that are, therefore, perhaps
not causal, not temporal, not spatial, — indeed, not determined
in any way, there may be freedom, with this including the
freedom both of the will and of the reason.
This is the beginning of Phenomenalism's solution of the
value problem. Man is a member of two "worlds"; in one, as
a transcendental self, a KS, he may be free, responsible,
righteous, and immortal, and in this "world" there are values,
and these are attainable. In the other world, the phenomenal,
PHENOMENALISM 225
in which man is psychological and biological, chemical and
physical, he is but the product of circumstances, hereditary and
environmental, as the completely determining causes of all that
he is and does. But, further, the Deity may also be a member
of the transcendental "world," thus having to do with, and
perhaps even Himself being. The principle of worths and values,
and, therefore, not in the least belonging to the realm of the
"things" of common sense and science.
Yet what the Deity's nature is, we cannot know, since hy
knowledge we cannot enter this realm. Only by faith is there
entrance, and by faith there may be revealed a theistic or even
a pantheistic God, who works with a purpose, which, since KS
and X underlie KS^ and X^^, itself underlies or is immanent
in the world of phenomena. In this way does Phenomenalism
solve and connect the axiological (value-), the cosmological, the
teleological, and the theological problems. ^°
In its ethics, therefore, Phenomenalism is opposed to all those
ethical positions that consider only the realm of phenomena, and
accordingly it is opposed to the ethics of pleasure in any form,
be this egoistic or altruistic. Rather, its ethics is absolutistic
and formalistic. Man is both a transcendental and an empirical
self. Part of his transcendental self is his conscience, and this
commands him unconditionally to act out of regard for and in
accordance with the right, and not to condition his motives and
deeds by seeking pleasure or well-being, either for himself or
for others. What the morally right act is in specific circum-
stances, may be difficult to determine, but Phenomenalism holds,
that in any case there is an absolute right, which is to be dis-
covered if possible. As a psychological person, i.e., as a mem-
ber of the world of phenomena, man is subject to motives of
pleasure and cannot escape them. But it is inconceivable that
conscience should approve any act or motive that does not
appear to be right irrespective of pleasurable or useful con-
sequences. This is Phenomenalism's ethical absolutism and
formalism.^^
'" These aspects of the Kantian philosophy have been, perhaps, more
responsible for the dominating influence of Kant than have the more
strictly epistemological features of his philosophy.
'* Kant's ethical position has received more discussion than perhaps any
Other phase of hia philosophy.
226 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
In its solution of the ontological problem, Phenomenalism is
clearly pluralistic, both "quantitatively" and qualitatively, and
in respect, also, to both its initial postulates, and the results
that are derived from these. Thus there is initially postulated
a qualitative dualism of two manifolds, the one of many tran-
scendental selves, the other of 7nany "opposed" things-in-them-
selves; secondly, there results, as qualitatively different from
these two realms, the realm of phenomena, X^^'s and KS-^'s,
and these two are in turn each a manifold, as well as qualita-
tively different from each other. In a number of respects,
therefore, Phenomenalism is pluralistic, both qualitatively and
numerically, in its solution of the ontological problem.
The ontology of the position is, however, not one that is wholly
derived, but one that is in part assumed, even as is part of its
cosmology. Such ontological and cosmological assumptions are
made, as we have seen, in order to solve the epistemological
problem. Thus, e.g., there is assumed an ontological pluralism
of psychical selves and of opposed things-in-themselves in inter-
action. But besides such assumptions, certain other postulates
are also made. For Phenomenalism assumes, and does not prove,
consciousness to be, or to imply, a thing-like self with qualities
or attributes. This basic assumption really conditions the whole
phenomenalistic position. It is tacitly assumed, further, that
all transcendental selves are alike. This assumption makes it
possible also to derive the conclusion, that there is but one
system of truths, and, in this sense, but one Truth which all
transcendental selves are capable of getting at, especially in
the case of those sciences, such as mathematics, geometry, that
are derived only by thinking. Emotions and the like may
differ from man to man, but pure reason is the same in all,
and, for this, there is only one Truth. Phenomenalism is, there-
fore, absolutistic and anti-individualistic in its philosophy of
Truth. There is but one standard, not many. Phenomenalism
maintains this conclusion not only for the a priori sciences of
mathematics and geometry, but also for all the empirical sciences,
such as physics. But, since the "things" with which the em-
pirical sciences deal are made in part by knowing, and since the
transcendental selves are all alike, therefore, in order to have
one Truth in these sciences, things-in-themselves also must all
PHENOMENALISM 227
be alike. Accordingly, you and I can know "one thing" in the
same way, and so have a basis for agreement in our empirical
sciences.
As regards the problem of the origin of knowledge, Phe-
nomenalism clearly holds, both by initial assumption and by
derivation, that some knowledge does not come from sensation,
but from the self-activity of the transcendental ego. In this
respect, therefore, the position is rationalistic. Other knowledge,
however, comes from sensation, so that Phenomenalism is also
sensationalistic.
Given its premises, Phenomenalism is bound to take the posi-
tion, that knowing helps to make facts, or "things." But
knowing, strictly interpreted, connotes the presence of truth.
Therefore, with the knowing self interacting with things-in-
themselves, something is produced that is ioth fact and truth.
Indeed, every fact is a truth, and, conversely, every truth
should be a fact, i.e., a phenomenal fact, either a KS^ or an
But it is at this point that Phenomenalism contradicts itself.
For, while this doctrine is its explicit teaching, Phenomenalism
offers itself as so much genuine (true) knowledge about the
knowing situation, thus tacitly to presuppose that knowing does
not make this situation, hut discovers it.
Here, therefore, are facts that are not made, "colored," or
"constituted," even in part, by being known, but that are pre-
supposed to be known as if the knowing were not taking place,
with truth subsisting as just this specific relation between the
facts known and the knoiving. Those presuppositions on which
the phenomenalistic position itself rests, as a whole, are con-
tradicted, therefore, by its own explicitly stated conclusion, that
facts and truth are made by knowing. Consistently with this
conclusion, the so-called facts about knowing cannot be facts,
since they are not made by knowing. Yet, on the other hand,
with Phenomenalism advanced as the true position concerning
knowing, they are presupposed to be facts.
Phenomenalism is in this respect clearly self-contradictory.
It involves two definitions of fact, and two of truth. By the
implicit presuppositions and definitions on which the position
as a whole rests, facts — the facts about knowing — can be known
228 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
as they really are. These facts are presupposed to be related
to the knowing, but not to he constituted by it. Therefore,
although the knowing cannot be eliminated existentially , it is
eliminated ideally, and is presupposed to be related externally
to that state of affairs which holds of knowing and its object.
As the only condition on which Phenomenalism can be a true
theory, there is presupposed, therefore, a perfect solution of the
ego-centric predicament. Also, the definition of truth which the
position presupposes is, that truth is that relation which holds
between knowing and fact, when the latter is known as it really
is, i.e., as unmodified by, and, in this sense, as quite independent
of knowing. When this specific state of affairs does not exist,
and yet knowing is taking place, there is, accordingly, error.
Such is the definition of error that, seemingly, Phenomenalism
presupposes.
This definition of error is, however, contradicted by the defini-
tions, or by the implications of the definitions that are ex-
plicitly advanced by Phenomenalism. For, by those definitions,
fact and truth are made in the knowing process, and where
there is one, there, also, is the other. Indeed, where there is
knowing, and, therefore, the relation of the knowing self, KS,
to the thing-in-itself, X, there, also, are hoth facts and truth in
the resulting phenomenal realms, K8^ and X^^, but there cannot
he error. Phenomenalism, therefore, in its explicit position,
that knowing makes fact, can find no place for error, and thereby
contradicts the presupposition on which at least the theory as
a whole is based, namely, the presupposition that there are both
truth and error.
In summary, then, it may be said, that Phenomenalism, in its
explicit development, maintains that truth is not constituted by
a "copy" relationship between knowing and fact known, but
that in its foundations, it presupposes just this definition of
truth; in other words, in its explicit development Phenomenal-
ism is pragmatic, i.e., it maintains that whatever is known is,
a fortiori, fact and truth, while in its foundations it is ahso-
lutistic, i.e., it presupposes that there are facts to be known, if
possible, as they really are. Such knowledge is true knowledge,
and one instance of such knowledge is supposed to he the phe-
nomenalistic theory aiout knowledge.
PHENOMENALISM 229
The statement of the other epistemological positions that are
involved in Phenomenalism can be made briefly. First, it is
quite evident that the position accepts the validity of intel-
lectual analysis as a means of getting at fact and truth. Phe-
nomenalism is, therefore, intellectualistic. An opportunity for
non-intellectualism is found, however, in the necessity of satis-
fying the demand, that there should be some method of approach
to the non-phenomenal realm. The immediate revelation, by
introspection, of the dictates of conscience and, perhaps, of the
axiomatic principles of logic and of mathematics, and the like,
is held to characterize such an approach to the transcendental
self, while faith and esthetic appreciation are advanced as non-
intellectual methods of approach to things-in-themselves.
With reference to the problem of the nature of consciousness,
Phenomenalism takes the position, in its basic assumptions, that
consciousness in every form is of the nature of a psychical, thing-
like and suhstance-like ego with attributes, rather than a process
or a relation. Even the empirical psychological consciousness,
as the combined and total effect of the action of things-in-them-
selves on the transcendental self, is of the character only of
a complex of derived attributes that inhere in an ultimate thing-
like self or soul.
This completes the presentation of the main points that are
involved in the logical and the metaphysical "structure" of
Phenomenalism. The position is clearly a product of the Aris-
totelian formal logic as this is applied, as a method, to the
development of a specific philosophy that is involved in the
concepts of substance and cause. The more important details
of the position result from tacitly assuming, historically, be-
cause of the influence of the Aristotelian tradition, — (1) that
both the knowing self and the object known are thing-like
entities, each with a structure of attributes inhering in a sub-
stratum, and (2) that, by virtue of being related, each of these
entities causally affects the other. The position is, therefore,
very distinctly a causation-substance philosophy.
We have given this relatively long account of Phenomenalism,
because of its pivotal position among a number of philosophies
that rest on essentially the same foundation, but that differ in
230 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
certain details. Those other philosophies, for which Phenom-
enalism is logically the center, are Subjective Idealism, Posi-
tivism, Naturalism, Pragmatism, and, perhaps somewhat para-
doxically, Materialism. Some of these, notably the first two,
historically preceded and culminated in Phenomenalism. Ac-
cordingly their logical structure becomes clearer in the light of
that position, Phenomenalism, which, historically, was their
culmination.
in. CRITICISM OP PHENOMENALISM ^2
However, before we examine these other positions, to state
their postulates and derive other propositions from these, we
must present our fundamental criticism of Phenomenalism,
since it is upon the basis of this criticism, as holding not only
of Phenomenalism, but also of other systems, that our gradual,
inductive, and yet rationalistic development of Rationalism and
Realism depends. Also, since our criticism has this specific
outcome, as identical with our final empirical generalization,
the frequent restatement of the same criticism under varying
circumstances {i.e., the repeated criticism of the several phi-
losophies that are opposed to Realism and Rationalism) will
be pardonable, if such criticism is regarded as the citing of
such typical instances as are necessary for the establishment of
any inductive generalization.^^
As is well known, much, and perhaps most modern philosophy
centers around the epistemological problem. This is especially
true of the positions just named. For especially since Kant,
but also since Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, most
philosophers have deemed it necessary to solve the problem of
knowledge, in order subsequently to define the status of that
which is known. In other words, philosophers have set out to
discover the facts, or the states of affairs concerning knowing
and the relation of knowing to the object known, as a pre-
requisite for solving the other problems of philosophy, and, as
a result, they have issued with those definite solutions which
have received such names as Phenomenalism, Subjective Ideal-
ism, Positivism, Pragmatism, and even Materialism. But this
" See the writer's " Logical Structure of Self -refuting Systems," Phil.
Review, Vol. XIX., 1910, pp. 276-301.
" See Chap. XV., m.
PHENOMENALISM 231
means that, whatever has been presupposed as to methods, and
the like, it has at least been presupposed (by the philosophers)
that there are some facts, or state of affairs, (1) that are known
as they really are, (2) that can he known hy others, and (3)
that, though related to knowing, are not caused, altered, modi-
fied, affected, or constituted by virtue of that relation. These
facts or states of affairs, in the instance of the epistemological
problem, concern the knowing situation.
As regards this situation, however, if one endeavors to think
or conceive these facts as they would be, were they not known,
one does not succeed, since thereby is the knowing reinstated.
Clearly, one cannot know entities, either simple or complex,
except as they are known. So much of truth is there in the
ego-centric predicament. But this predicament is itself forth-
with solved in the very presuppositions that are made in any
solution of the problem of knowledge, namely, in the presup-
positions, (1) that, although the facts about knowing are known
facts, the specific knowing {e.g., of the philosopher who knows
them) does not causally affect these facts; (2) that this know-
ing is externally related to these facts, so that (3) the knowing
is ideally eliminated from the (known) facts by an analysis
in situ.
These presuppositions are, however, the main principles of that
position which is called Realism. Other philosophies, therefore,
ultimately rest on this realistic hasis,^^ and differ from Realism
in not carrying through consistently the very principles which
they presuppose and on which they are based. Realism, discov-
ering that these principles are presupposed in any system that
even pretends to portray the facts concerning knowing, extends
these same principles to all cases of knowing. It does this on
the ground of the principle of consistency, which demands that,
if these principles hold for the knowing of the facts concerning
knowing, they must be presumed also to hold for the knowing
of all other facts, until good reasons to the contrary can be
advanced. Realism in taking this position is self -consistent in
its epistemology, while any other philosophy which, like Phe-
nomenalism, takes one position with reference to the knowing
** Cf. Chaps. I., II., and III., and also the later chapters, XXXIX. to
XLV., on Realism.
232 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
of "other facts," and another position as regards the knowing
of the facts concerning knowing, is self -contradictory.
For this reason Realism has a marked advantage over other
positions : it is self-consistent, whereas they are self-contradictory
in that while they are all realistic at a certain point, they depart
from this realism by making arbitrary and sometimes hidden
assumptions, thus to build up reinterpretations that completely
transform and transmute the facts of both common sense and
science. For example, that which to common sense and science
is a physical object, is transformed into mere appearance, or
into spiritual object or "manifestation," or into "human inven-
tion." Realism objects not so much to these conclusions as
such as to the methods by which they are arrived at, for it finds
these methods to be artificial, invalid, and self-contradictory.
On the other hand, if the same principles, logic, and general
methods that are presupposed by any philosophy in getting at
the facts ahout knowing, were used in order to know other fads,
and if these facts should thus be found to be qualitatively dif-
ferent from what common sense and science accept them to be,
then would Realism be quite compatible with at least some of
the conclusions of some of the positions that are opposed to it.
For example, it could accept the position, that the whole uni-
verse is ultimately psychical in character. But Realism finds
that, up to the present time, opposed systems have not thus
been consistently derived, but that, in the method of arriving
at their transforming conclusions, such systems depart from
and contradict the very presuppositions on which, as philoso-
phies, they depend."
BIBLIOGRAPHY
'° The Kantian bibliography is very extensive, and need not be given
here. Thilly, History of Philosophy, pp. 395-396, gives the complete list
of Kant's own works, and the more important volumes on the Kantian
philosophy. The writer recommends Watson's Selections (from the three
Critiques) for the beginner, and, for the more advanced student, Miiller'a
translation. Kant's Criticfve of Pure Reason was first published in 1781,
and a second, revised edition appeared in 1787. His ethical works are,
Griindlage zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785, and Kritik der praktischen
Vernunft, 1788; his chief aesthetic work, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790.
The most thorough-going contemporaneous Kantians are: H. Cohen,
Logik der reinen Erkenntniss, 1902, and P. Natorp, Die logischen Orund-
lagen der Exakten Wissenschaften, 1910. Other philosophers who are
more Kantian than anything else are: Sir William Hamilton, E. Zeller,
K. Fischer, F. A. Lange, H. Vaihinger, B. Erdmann, E. Adickes, A.
Kitschl, K. Lipsius, F. Paulsen, C. Kenouvier.
SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM 233
CHAPTER XXX
SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM
I. LOGICAL DERIVATION
Subjective Idealism is derived by a proof very similar to
that for Phenomenalism. The central prohlem is once more
that of knowing, and the solution of this problem concerns
chiefly the nature of known objects. All objects prove ultimately
to be psychical — except, perhaps, time. To establish this con-
clusion was the purpose of George Berkeley, the founder of the
system, in order thereby to do away with matter completely,
thus to find room for the omnipotence of the Deity.
To deduce this position, not in its historical, but in its logical
order, let us assume : —
1. That there are conscious selves ^ that are spirits, or souls,
with, perhaps, their own laws and qualities; in other words,
that there are psychical "things," which are substance-like
substrata with attributes called ideas.^
2. That a spirit is one, simple, undivided, active being.*
3. That whatever a spirit or soul directly perceives and
knoivs is an idea.^
4. That there are 7io abstract ideas.^
5. That whatever is "given" to a spirit either without or
against its will is caused.^
6. That there is something that acts on (these thing-like),
spirits, and produces in them effects called (sensations and)'
ideas. Let us (with Berkeley) call this "something" God,
defining this Being as an Infinite Spirit,^ and denying all (im-
portant) action of finite spirits on this Infinite Spirit.
Comment: This Infinite Spirit takes the place, logically, of
* Cf. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. Fraser, §§1, 2, 7,
27, 89.
' Ibid., §§ 1, 86, 89. ' Ibid., §§ 7-10, 25.
' Ibid., § 27. • Ibid., §§ 26, 29, 30, 33.
*Ibid., § 1. 'Ibid., §§ 26-30, 51, 67, 60-63, 106, 147.
234. CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
the things-in-themselves of Phenomenalism, only, unlike these,
it is not unknowable, since it can produce in us a true idea of
itself.
7. That time is not a mere idea, but is a "condition" for the
occurrence of ideas, and for the existence of spirits both finite
and infinite.^
8. That so-called physical or material things are (unlike
spirits) only the collection or union of (their) qualities, and
that there is no underlying material substratum or substance in
which these qualities inhere."
9. That certain qualities, such as color, which we perceive (in
so-called physical objects) are the effects, in finite spirits, of
something acting on these, and that accordingly these qualities
are like spirits in nature, i.e., are psychical or conscious.^^
10. That all so-called physical qualities and attributes, even
hardness, solidity, extension, figure, and motion, are, like color,
perceived.^^
11. That only those ''parts'^ of the so-called physical world
that are (concretely) perceived are real.^-
12. That God is, and that His nature is (among other
"things") that of being an eternal perceiver.^^
13. That the reahn of physical things is law-abiding, regular,
and uniform.^^
14. That spirits are distinct and different from ideas, even as
attributes are distinct and different from substance.^^
15. That spirits are in communication.^^
From these assumptions or postulates the following proposi-
tions are derivable : —
1. All so-called physical qualities such as extension, solidity,
figure, and motion are, like color, psychical or subjective, i.e.,
are identical with (sensations or) ideas in some spirit.
2. A physical thing is the collection or union of these ideas
* Cf. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, ed. Fraser, § 26,
^ Ibid., §§ 1, '30-35, 37, 38.
" Ibid., §§ 9-12.
" Ibid., §§ 1, 2, 38, 42-44, 67; cf. references for 2; also Theory of Vision,
§87.
'' Ibid., §§ 3-6.
" Ibid., § 26.
^* Ibid., §S 30-32, 45.
" Ibid., §§ 2, 7, 89, 142.
*' Ibid., § 1, and all through the Principles as a tacit assumption.
SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM 235
that some spirit has, and that are held together by the spirit
which has them.
3. The physical '^ world" is the totality of such things, — each
as a group of sensations that belong to some spirit, with perhaps
many spirits having similar sensations.
4. If a finite spirit does not perceive, nevertheless God, as
the infinite and eternal perceiver, is perceiving, so that physical
things continue to exist as identical with His percepts. There
is, therefore, an order, regularity, and uniformity, a persistence
and constancy in the universe, that are independent of all finite
spirits and of their percepts, but that are dependent upon the
eternal perception of the Deity.
This eternal perception follows from the iheistic definition of
the Deity as an all-knowing, all-perceiving, as well as all-
powerful being, and from the fact that time is "made" inde-
pendent of ideas, even as are spirits. The postulation of the
order, regularity, and uniformity of nature, together with the
assumption, that finite beings might not exist, or might not per-
ceive, demands the conclusion, that the Deity is this eternally
perceiving being, while, conversely, this conclusion, as an
hypothesis, accounts for that order and uniformity.
All these conclusions may be stated together briefly in the
form, that the "world" consists of many finite spirits and one
Infinite Spirit, and of their ideas — time alone being the ex-
ception.
The order of the assumptions and deductions as they are
above stated is not the order of the original argument for Sub-
jective Idealism, as it occurred psychologically in the mind of
Berkeley, and as it was presented in The Principles of Human
Knowledge, — but it is, in fact, almost the inverse of the order
of that historical argument. Berkeley's argument proceeded
from the traditional assumption of the times, as stated in
Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, that certain
qualities of things such as color were subjective or psychical, so
that their esse was their percipi, although they were, in common
sense, "projected" into the object. For Locke, in accordance
with the mechanistic philosophy of his time, these secondary
qualities or sensations were caused by the objective motions, in.
space, of solid, figured particles. But Berkeley argued that alt
286 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
qualities were perceived, and, therefore, that to be consistent,
one must hold either that all were objective or that all were sub-
jective, and of the two possibilities, he chose the second. Fur-
ther, both Berkeley and Locke held the position, although they
did not adhere to it consistently, that only that was a fact or
an existent which was directly perceived, or the idea of which
could be traced back to sense-perception. But neither Locke
nor Berkeley could discover any perception of that substance
which, in accordance with the traditional definition, was held
to be the core or substratum in which physical qualities inhere.
Locke, nevertheless, retained this substance-doctrine, while
Berkeley gave it up. For Berkeley, then, a physical thing ivas
only a group of qualities. It followed — since any physical
quality was identical with a sensation — that a physical thing
was identical merely with a group of sensations, and that na
matter in the sense of a material substratum was existent.
But Berkeley could not escape the influence of the traditional
view that ideas were known by, or belonged to, some soul or
spirit. Faced by the consequence, therefore, that the world of
physical things would be non-existent, if finite spirits should
cease to perceive, he saved that world in its order and uni-
formity by assuming the perception of an infinite and eternal
spirit, God. Thus he made his system comply Avith the demands
of both common sense and science.
However, it is not our purpose to examine Subjective Idealism
in its historical setting, but to consider it as a position which
today, independently of its history, might lay some claim to
acceptance.
The position postulates, in its foundation, the modification
theory of relations as holding for the relation between each
finite spirit, KS, and the infinite spirit, God. It postulates also
the underlying-reality theory of relations as holding for each
spirit, whether finite or infinite. Thus a spirit, as distinct from
sensations and ideas, is maintained to be an underlying psychical
substratum in which sensations and ideas inhere, and which
holds these together as so many attributes. This means that
both kinds of spirits are really postulated as psychical things,
while the infinite spirit is assumed to act on finite spirits so as
to cause in them certain effects, just as in Phenomenalism things-
SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM 237
tn-themselves are assumed to act on transcendental selves.
These effects are sensations and ideas, even as they are in
Phenomenalism. But, whereas in the latter position, there is
"something" to he known, if possible, namely, an X or thing-
in-itself, which is modified by being known, in Subjective Ideal-
ism this is not the case. Rather, in this last theory, it is held
that only the effects or sensations, and that which is derived
from them, namely, ideas, are known. For Subjectivism, also,
specific sensations are identical with the specific qualities of
things, and specific groups of sensations are identical with
specific things. In contrast with this, in Phenomenalism a
sensation and a physical quality are numerically distinct and
yet between the two there is a correspondence which results from
the action of the knowing self on thing s-in-themselves to produce
X^^, and of things-in-themselves on knowing selves to produce
K8^. It is, therefore, indifferent whether we say that we know
the modified things-in-themselves and the sensations, or only
the latter.
Subjective Idealism is derived, then, in much the same way
as is Phenomenalism, but there is the difference, that for Sub-
jectivism knowing makes or creates its object completely,
whereas for Phenomenalism there is an object or thing-in-itself
which is only modified in being known. But this difference is,
perhaps, not essential, since, if things-in-themselves did not exist
at all (and how, in Phenomenalism, they can be known to exist, is
a question), the result would be the same, for we could still
have our sensations and ideas, with these playing quite the
same role as do the physical things of Subjective Idealism. It
is only provided one wishes to account for the occurence of
sensations and ideas, that he must assume some cause, but this
cause might as well be a Deity, as it is maintained to be in
Subjective Idealism, as a group of things-in-themselves, as it
is held to be in Phenomenalism.
n. subjectivism's solution of problems; criticism
With these the main outlines of Subjective Idealism as a
philosophy that gives a specific solution to the epistemological
problem, we may next consider those solutions of other problems
which it either derives or presupposes.
238 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
First, we find that the position rests upon certain assump-
tions, both C'pistcmological and ontological, which it presup-
poses hut does not prove. Thus, e.g., it takes a distinctly realistic
position as regards that complex object or state of affairs con-
cerning which it lays claim to present true knowledge. For it
presupposes that it is quite possible to know the real state of
affairs concerning spirits and their ideas. Accordingly it pre-
supposes that the knowing processes of the investigator, although
they are related to this state of affairs, do not in the least create,
alter, or affect either it or the spirits and ideas of which it
holds. The ego-centric predicament is thus presupposed to be
solved for these specific knowings, and, accordingly, for the
relation between them and their objects, the theory of external
relations is presupposed.
The state of affairs which is thus known concerns, however,
not only finite spirits and their ideas, but also the Infinite Spirit
and His ideas. Toward these entities, and their relationships
to one another. Subjectivism thus assumes a distinctly realistic
position. But this epistemological or logical assumption is itself
the basic ontology of Subjectivism.
This basic ontology is extended by certain cosmological and
further logical doctrines. Thus, as regards the so-called physical
world, Subjectivism maintains that only that which is concretely
perceived is real. For example, the specific color and hardness
of my pen are real, but color and hardness in general are not.
Universal and abstract terms concerning the physical world,
are, for Subjectivism, mere words. They are not even ideas.
This is its Nominalism. It follows from this, that there is no
such "thing" as a physical substance or substratum in general.
But, on the other hand, one does not perceive any particidar,
concrete substratum, but only qualities, and so it follows, that
a substratum does not exist at all.
This ontology is completed by the further assumption, in
accordance with certain scientific theories that were current in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that certain qualities,
such as color (and temperature), though sensed as belonging
to things, are really only psychical and subjective, i.e., it is
assumed that the sensation and the specific color sensed are
numerically identical — although they are distinguished.
SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM 239
The remaining ontology of Subjectivism is inferred from
this assumed basis. Thus from the assumptions, (1) that
some qualities are subjective, and (2) that all qualities are
perceived, it is concluded (3) that all qualities are sub-
jective. From this conclusion together with the postulates
(4) that only that which is perceived is real, and (5) that
there is no perception of material substance, it is concluded
that a physical thing is only a group of sensations or
qualities, and also that there is no material substance in the
world.
That which is regarded as the usual objective cause of sensa-
tions being thus done away with, causation is nevertheless
assumed in order to comply with the fact, that sensations come
to us against our will. This means that some cause for sensa-
tions is postulated, and this cause is identified with God, the
Infinite Spirit.
The completed ontology of Subjectivism, is, therefore, that all
existence is psychical, mental, conscious, or spiritual. This is
the position's Qualitative Monism. Yet there are many finite
spirits, and One Infinite Spirit, each spirit having many ideas.
This is the position's Pluralism.
In its cosmology Subjectivism grants the usual order, regu-
larity, and constancy of the universe, as accepted, e.g., by
science. To account for this, God's eternal perception is postu-
lated. Yet with God as both the eternal perceiver and the cause
of our ideas, there is opportunity for exceptions to the order of
nature, with these exceptions identical, perhaps, with miracles.
Also, with God thus distinct from finite spirits, and, as cause,
in control of ideas, and therefore of qualities and of things
(since a thing is only a group of sensations), there is oppor-
tunity for God to work His purposes and accomplish His aims.
This is Subjectivism's Theism and its Transcendent or External
Teleology, and therewith, also, is the value-problem given a
specific solution.
The solution of the psychological problem which Subjectivism
offers is mostly contained in its basic ontologj\ Specific sensa-
tions and ideas are the possessions or attributes of souls or
spirits. The soul or spirit is the true inward self that underlies,
as a psychical substance, the changing stream of sensations,
240 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
memory, ideas, and the like, which in turn constitute the em-
pirical self.
In its epistemology Subjectivism is absolutistic and realistic.
It claims absolute truth for its own specific account of the
universe as given in its solution of the several philosophical
problems. That account is offered as presenting the states of
affairs of the universe as they really are, and not as they merely
appear, or as we make them, or as they merely satisfy us
and "tvork" successfully. Subjectivism, therefore, in that
epistemological position which it takes toward itself, will
have nothing to do with Phenomenalism, Subjectivism, or
Pragmatism. Indeed, just as each of these positions inter-
prets itself absolutistically and realistically, so also does
Subjectivism.
But Subjectivism clearly involves certain inconsistencies.
Thus it fails to observe consistently its main position, that the
existence of (some) things is identical with their being perceived
or known, for, as is evident, it does not apply this position to
the knowledge of other spirits and of their ideas. If it did this
it would mean, that all other spirits, — even God himself — would
be merely one spirit's ideas, so that the whole universe would
be identical with one spirit's consciousness, cr with the psychical
attributes of a single spiritual substance which is a self. This
consistent development of Subjectivism is called Solipsism. It
is evident, however, that Solipsism does not solve any important
philosophical or scientific problems, since, by bringing every-
thing within one consciousness, it leaves all the problems as to
the further character and relations of "things" still remaining
within that one consciousness.
The other consistent development of Subjectivism makes the
position self-defeating. For, since it is presupposed or main-
tained by Subjectivism that other spirits are not identical with
their percipi (or with their concipi) by any one spirit, the only
consistent conclusion is, that other "things," such as physical
qualities, may also be not so identical, but that they may be
quite as independent of being known and quite as numerically
distinct from ideas as are spirits. In other words, with the ego-
centric predicament presupposed as solved for the knowledge of
spirits, it cannot, without good reasons therefor, be supposed
POSITIVISM 241
to imply special difficulties as regards the knowledge of other
entities.
Similar and closely allied inconsistencies affect Subjectivism
in a number of other respects. Thus concerning the knowledge of
spirits and of their ideas, Subjectivism accepts the position that
true knowledge is a copy of its object, while, as regards the
knowledge of physical qualities, it makes knowing creative. But
the inconsistencies which have been indicated suffice to show that
the position is not one that can lay very strong claim to accept-
ance, although it is a position that, granted its premises, seems
plausible up to a certain point. Accordingly we turn to the
examination of other philosophies.
CHAPTER XXXI
POSITIVISM 1
I. DERIVATION
Positivism is that position which, historically, was arrived at
by avoiding some of the inconsistencies of Subjectivism, and,
although it can, like other positions, be derived logically from
certain assumptions or postulates, nevertheless, to present the
historical derivation is, at this point, advantageous. The logical
derivation will be given subsequently.
The Subjective Idealism or Psychism of Berkeley was derived
' Positivism has attracted a large number of philosophers and scientists,
chief among whom are the following: Hume (1711-1776), Treatise Up^n
Human Nature, 1739-40; five volumes of Essays that include the Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, 1748; Works, ed. by Green and Grose,
4 vols., 1874, new ed. 1909; J. S. Mill (1806-73), Logic, 1843; Principles
of Political Economy, 1848; Utilitarianism, 1861; Examination of Sir
William Hamilton s Philosophy, 18C5; new ed. of Mill's works in the New
Universal Library; Auguste Comte ( 1789-18r>7 ) , Coiirs de Philosophie
positive, 6 vols., 1830-42; abridged trans, by H. Martineau; cf. J. S. Mill,
Comte and Positivism; R. Avenarius, Kritik d. reinen Erfahrung, 1888;
Der Menschliche Welthebriff, 1891; Karl Pearson, Grammar of Science,
1892, 2nd ed., 1900; E. Mach, Analysis of Sensations, 1886, 5th ed., 1906,
trans, by C. M. Williams; also, Popular Scientific Lectures, 4th ed,, 1910 j
Kenan, Taine, Eibot, Tarde, are positivistic.
242 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
from the partial Realism and partial Phenomenalism of John
Locke (1632-1704).- Locke accepted the dominant scientific
view of his time as to the real nature of the external world,
namely, that this consisted only of solid or impenetrable, ex-
tended, figured articles in motion.^ Groups of these particles
were held to act causally on our sense organs, whatever these
organs might be.'' The result was, that in some cases sensations
were like,'^ in other cases ® unlike objective qualities. Thus
sensations of solidity, extension, figure, and motion were like
their causes. Therefore in these cases "things" were known
as they really are, and the known "thing" was distinct from
and independent of the knowing. This is part of Locke's
Realism — a Realism tliat has, indeed, persisted in science in
perhaps only slightly modified form even to the present. In
other cases, however, there was a transformation of quality.
For example, the motion of solid, extended particles produced
(the sensation of) color, but color was very unlike such particles
in motion. This is Locke's Phenomenalism.
Subjectivism, with Berkeley, insists, as we have seen, (1) that
only that which is perceived is real, (2) that material substance
is not perceived, (3) that in the physical world only the quali-
ties are perceived, and (4) that all qualities are, like color, sub-
jective or psychical.
Historically, therefore, Berkeley's Subjectivism was derived
from Locke's Realism and Phenomenalism, although from the
standpoint of modern logical theory, it can, as we have seen,
be derived in a manner that is independent of its historical
development. This is done by assuming God, instead of moving
particles, to be the cause of all sensations^
However, both logically and historically, Subjectivism rests
^ Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by Fraser, 2 vols.
^ Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. II., Chap. VIII., 9, 12,
13, 17, 23, and Chap. XXIII., 26.
* Op. cit., especially, Bk. II., Chap. VIII., 5, 23, 24, 25.
" Op. cit., Bk. II., Chap. VIII., 7, 9, 14, 24.
' Op. cit., Bk. II., Chap. VIII., 7, n, 10, 13, 14, 24.
' Locke, Berkeley, and Kant each clearly assume such a cause. It is
moving particles for Locke, Ood for Berkeley, things-in-themselves for
Kant. However, if all that we can know directly are ideas, then it is clear
that it is only from the assumption or postitlation of the principle of
causation that wo can infer that ideas {as effects) have a cause. And
what difference docs it make hy what name we call this cause?
POSITIVISM 243
upon the assumption that there are thing-like spirits that have
sensations and ideas, ^ and that these last inhere in the spirit,
as qualities in an underlying substratum. Indeed, under the
influence of the Aristotelian tradition, Subjectivism rests on
the assumption, — as a tacit application of the underlying-
reality theory of relations, — that the soul or spirit is a psychical
substance.^ And yet, with it also a basic assumption of Sub-
jectivism, that only that which is perceived is real, this assump-
tion of a spiritual substance cannot consistenily he maintained,
since of such a substance there is no perception.
The dilemma is clear. On the one hand, if there is a spiritual
substance that is independent of and not numerically identical
with the perception of it, then there may also be a physical
substance and physical qualities, one or both, that are inde-
pendent of perception. But, on the other hand, if there is no
physical substance, because it is not perceived, and if physical
qualities are identical with sensations, then, seemingly, one
should conclude that there is no spiritual substance, if there is
no perception of it, and that there are only sensations and ideas.
Positivism in its historical origin takes the second horn of
this dilemma. Discovering the inconsistency between the basic
postulates of Subjectivism, (1) that there are spirits, and (2)
that only that which is perceived is real,^*' Positivism gives up,
the first assumption, and maintains that there are only im-j
pressions (sensations) and ideas. ^^ Only of these are we abso-\
lutely and positively certain. Only sensations and ideas and
the mere proximities, sequences, similarities, and differences
among these, are given as facts?^ All else is only inferred, and
is, therefore, not certain, but doubtful, and, perhaps, not fact at
all, but only belief and superstition and human invention.
Positivism thus puts into the limbo of only the probable and
the possible the many entities which other philosophical posi-
tions either assume as fundamental and as absolutely and neces-
sarily true, or which they reach by inference. Material and
spiritual substances, causes and effects, a numerically single
* Bee the previous chapter.
«Cf. Locke, Bk. II., Chap. XXIII. ff.
^o Berkeley, Principles, §§ 3-6.
*^ Hume, Treatise, Bk. I., Part I., section vi.
** Hume, Treatise, Bk. I., Part I., sections i.-vii.
244 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
underlying reality in the universe, categories of thought, a
deity,^^ logical laws, and many other "things," all sutfer this
fate,^* and only that flow of sensations and ideas which is cen-
tered around the idea of a self remains certain and undeniable.
All else takes its place in the realm of non-fact and error.
But with it thus once demonstrated that sensations and ideas
are the only faets,^^ so that there are no other facts with which to
contrast them, the important and interesting question arises,
whether one is logically justified in regarding these entities as
sensations in the sense in which this term is used in Subjectivism
and Phenomenalism, namely, as something psychical or 77iental.
For, by the traditionally accepted definition, the psychical or
the mental is that which is the manifestation of a spirit, or
that which is not material, or both. But with both spirits and
matter done away with. Positivism can no longer use this
definition. Its sensations and ideas become, therefore, only
imspecifiahle '^elements" or X's — entities that are undefinable
in their essence, that are neither physical nor mental, and that
are contrastahle only as regards their own kinds. Possibly the
excellent opportunity is thereby furnished of getting away from
the necessity of finding what they are, and so of being free to
ascertain tvhat they do, in terms of one another.
If we thus confine and correct Positivism, we have a very
interesting, but a very unusual philosophy. In the historical
development of the position, physical or material substance was
first eliminated, and next, all physical qualities were, like color,
"made" subjective. There remained only spirits and their sen-
sations and ideas. Then spiritual substance was eliminated.
As a result only sensations and ideas were left, with sensation and
existence defined as identical. The further results followed
(1) that there is nothing with which to contrast sensations;
(2) that existents are X's, neither psychical nor physical; and
(3) that, if there were no X's, there would be no existents. Ex-
istents or facts are reduced, therefore, to the mere X's of the
present moment, or, if there is only one X, to this X, — whatever
it may be. Thus developed consistently, Positivism outdoes
"Hume, Treatise, Bk. I., Part IV., section v.
"Hume, Treatise, Bk. I., Part I., section vi; also Bk. I., Part III., in
a number of sections.
" Hume, Treatise, Bk. I., Part II., section vi.
POSITIVISM 245
Solipsism, since, for Positivism, everything is not even my or
your ideas, — within my or your consciousness, but is only an
X, now, and not even past or future nor — consistently — even
present.
It becomes evident, then, that it is impossible consistently to
derive such a position from certain postulates; for the very
character of the position itself precludes any general proposi-
tion, and, therefore, any logical derivation. Indeed, even such
a formulatio7i of the position as has just been given is precluded,
since this formulation would, by the position's own intent, con-
cern only that which now is, but nothing more.
The character of this intent can be further made clear by
asking the Cartesian question : Of what am I most certain, my
conscious processes, or other '* things," my past conscious states,
or my present ones? If one give the answer "my present ones,"
and calls these, not conscious processes, but X's, one has the
meaning of the philosophy of Positivism as this is carried to
the extreme of its consistent logical (?) outcome. But it is
clear that, if / ask this question, the answer refers to my X's,
and if you ask it, it refers to yours, with "I" and "you,"
however, each a mere X. Still, if / ask it, and yet feel that you
also could do so, and get tlie same answer, then, am I not in
some way going beyond my X's to yours, and am I not dealing
with concrete "things" by generic methods, and ascribing
validity and f actuality to what is thus dealt with? Many
"things" may be identical with my X's, or sensations, but if /
endeavor to convince you, that what holds of me also holds of
you, then am I not presupposing that the existence of your X's
is not identical with that of mine? And am I not also presup-
posing, that not only that which is concretely experienced, but
also that whatever can be treated generically is fact as well?
There seems to be no other answer to these questions than
"yes." Positivism at a certain point begins to break down.
By its own intent it would preclude even its own formulation.
But it is formulated, and offered for acceptance. I, if I am a
Positivist, offer the doctrine to you. Therefore I assume your
X's not to be mine, and also formulate the position in generic
terms.
However, that modern development of Positivism which has
gi6 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
been accepted by many philosophers and well-known scientists —
among them, Huxley and Mach — is not of the extreme form
that has just been depicted, but is one that allows of formula-
tion, of propositions, of inference, and the like. Such a Posi-
tivism may be stated and developed logically from the following
assumptions : — '^^
I. There are numerically distinct personalities, each consist-
ing of a succession of occurrences usually called sensations and
ideas, or experiences, but better called undefined and inde-
terminate elements or X's. For each personality these elements
are direct facts, certain and undeniable.
II. These elements occur or happen in conformity with a
certain demerit called order, and of order there are different
instances, such as those which are usually called the relations
(1) of cause and effect, (2) of implication, (3) of similarity
and difference, (4) of reference to the past and future, (5) of
inherence, and (6) of "belonging to." These "elements" occur
in the midst of other "elements," and organize and relate these.
Thus, e.g., "similarity" relates many "elements" called "heat,"
and also many called "candles," and "inherence" connects
"solidity" with "candle"; in turn, "cause and effect" relates
"heat" to "candle" and "melting"; while "similarity" con-
nects other things with "candle" and "melting," with reference
to past, present, and future; and finally "similarity" connects
that series of elements which is "me" with that numerically dis-
tinct series which is "you." Thus, out of certain elements, there
is organized, hy other elements, that which we usually call the
world of qualitatively distinct "things," such as tables and
pens, and kinds of "things" such as plant and aniinal, and very
different kinds such as mind and matter. But the organization
in each case is merely one that itself happens when certain ele-
ments occur around, as it were, certain other elements as organ-
izing centers. All is really mere fact, coming higgledy-piggledy,
here cause, but there none, here similarity, but there difference,
now belonging to a "you," and then to a "me."
The final result, however, is not different from the world of
common sense and science, since everything is called by its usual
name, although all names are really only designations of "ele-
" Mach, Analysis of Sensations, pp. 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 19, and 151 ff.
POSITIVISM 247
ments," or of specific groups of elements. "Element" itself,
therefore, is either only an element, or a group, while "implies"
is still another "element," or group of "elements." But these
two "elements" are connected, so that we have the proposition,
that "element" implies that which is neither existent nor suh-
sistent, neither physical nor psychical, neither inorganic nor
organic, neither term nor relation. For the genus is never
identical with the species. Color is never this red nor this blue.
Therefore, if "element" is the summum genus it is not one of
those groups into which certain "elements" organize others.
Everything can be called "element," just as red, blue, green,
and yellow can be called colors, and different "things" can be
called different "elements," just as red and green can be called
different colors. But there is something in "things" over and
above the mere "element" aspect, just as a red is something
more than 7nere color, and this "something more" persists.
The chief difference made by Positivism concerns the problem,
therefore, as to what shall be selected as the summum genus of —
what shall we say? — "things," entities, or neutral entities —
for each of these is itself a summum genus. Materialism makes
this genus matter, Psychism makes it mind ; but each, therefore,
makes it like one of the S2:)ecies, so that, if Materialism were true,
there would be two kinds of matter, one called mind, the other,
matter; while, if Psychism were true, there would be two kinds
of consciousness.
Positivism, in Hume, Mill, Comte, Spencer, Mach, James,
and Bergson, really makes this summum genus "element," and
thus avoids identifying the genus with the species. Sensation,
and the psychical in general, not only are non-material, or,
perhaps, non-physical, but, with nothing to he opposed to them,
are also non-psychical "elements" or X's. Yet, starting with
a plurality of X's, Positivism must reinstate much of that which
it has previously ruled out. Physical things and human per-
sonalities that know physical things reappear in some form,
though they be but different collocations of (similar) elements.
But there may be as much difference between two such colloca-
tions as there is between the material rose that "by any other
name would smell as sweet," and the spiritual hope "that
springs eternal in the human breast."
248 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
The material and psychical worlds reappear, therefore, m
Positivism. That is to be admitted as a point against the posi-
tion. Yet, in agreement with its contentions, it is also to be
admitted, that neither things nor personalities are what much
traditional philosophy, science, and religion have made them.
Indeed, the real intent of Positivism is to protest against those
traditional views that put a core of material substance into
physical things, and a core of spiritual substance into person-
alities. "Things" and personalities are, for Positivism, groups
of "elements," either those which physiology and psychology
study, or those with which the physical sciences are concerned.
These "elements" are not related additively, but are organized
by some of the many non-additive relations of the types that
have been considered. The wholes that result may therefore
have qualities that are radically different from those of the
parts.
Only of such "elements" and relations, qualities and wholes,
have we positive knowledge. There may be a core-like substance
in "things," in personalities, and perhaps in the whole uni-
verse, but of such a substance we have no knowledge. Yet
around the traditional assumption of such a substance there
center many beliefs, superstitions, and great historical human
errors, — errors that have a practical outcome, undeniably, but
that are nevertheless regarded by Positivism as detrimental,
since it emphasizes the identity of the progress of the human
race with the throwing off of all that is not certain, and with
the acceptance of only that which is undeniable fact.
This indicates how Positivism solves the great majority of
philosophical problems. It puts them into the limbo of the
uncertain, the unknown, and even the unknowable, or regards
them as false problems. Indeed, for Positivism, philosophy is
itself not positive knowledge — except that particular philosophy
which is identical with Positivism's own cpistcmology, and that
ontology on which this epistemology rests.
Positivism's epistemology rests logically (though not his-
torically) on an ontology that is assumed, and not proved,
namely, on an ontology that is monistic in its postulation of
mere "elements" which, as such, are all qualitatively alike, but
that is pluralistic in its results, since it is compelled to grant that
POSITIVISM 249
there are not only many nmnerically distinct ''elements," but
also many qualitatively different collocations of these "ele-
ments. ' '
Positivism's cosmology is that of critical natural science. This
means, among other things, that the "idea" of a universal regu-
larity, uniformity, and following-of-law is mere hypothesis, and
not certain knowledge. Events do seem, indeed, in some cases
at least, to occur with a certain uniformity and regularity, and
the experience of repeated i-equences of specific events undoubt-
edly does give rise to the belief in causes. Given the same
cause, under the same conditions, and the same effect does seem
to occur. From this we generalize, passing beyond the imme-
diately given facts to the hypothesis of the unequivocalness of
the connection of specific causes, conditions, and effects. In this
way, both as individuals and as a race, we come to believe in
the principle of the uniformity of nature so strongly, that, per-
haps, we cannot conceive the opposite to he a fact, and that
the principle of the unequivocal connection of cause and effect
is regarded even as a law of thought.
But Positivism is critical. It warns us not to go beyond the
facts. We should not let the expectation that is generated by
past causal regularities deceive us into accepting the past as
the guarantor of the future. The past may be one thing, but
the future quite another. Only by waiting can one tell.
Positivism is thus indeterministic and tychistic. There may
be determinism, but, if there is, it is limited, for there certainly
is indeterminism. There are events that are not causally con-
nected. There is no universal and unequivocal causal connec-
tion or world order. Indeed, there may he no causes and no
effects. " Things'' may just happen.
Little opportunity is there in Positivism, therefore, for pur-
pose or even for a single direction of all things in the universe.
Positivism, then, has no teleology. You and I may have pur-
poses, and may plan and build. But in the universe there is
no guaranty of order, much less of universal order and purpose.
At least there is no positive knowledge of these. Indeed, the
universe is not even a machine, beautifully and delicately ad-
justed; neither is there God, nor underlyiug unity, as matters
of certain knowledge. In fact, ivith chaos as much a fact as
250 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
cosmos, and with cosmos at best only here and there in the midst
of chaos, the opportunity is small for plan, for order, for unity,
for a working toward ends, and even much smaller for a pur-
poser, an architect, a designer, or a mechanician. It is thus
that Positivism deals with theology and the great religious be-
liefs of mankind. It relegates them to the scrap-heap of super-
stitions, together with other cherished beliefs and theories that
are dear to common sense, religion, science, and philosophy.
With the teleological and theological problems thus dismissed,
certain aspects of the value problem do not present themselves
to Positivism at all. Ethics and assthetics, so far as they are
based on undeniably immediate experiences of course remain.
But in these fields the solution of problems is only that which
is to be expected. (For Positivism the so-called abstract and
general is always resolvable into concrete fact. \ Therefore ivhat
one ought to do is traceable back to what men have done.
For Positivism, races, nations, and sects are facts in the sense
that there are many human personalities who are 7nade up in
part of similar ideas, motives, and aspirations. In this sense
society, as a group of individuals, may demand that one ought,
first of all, to act out of regard for general welfare. Positivism
accepts this demand as a fact, and accordingly becomes Utili-
tarianism. But it also allows one so to act as to contribute to
one's own pleasure, or to reach as perfect development as possi-
ble, provided this does not, in either case, interfere with the
general welfare. Positivism thus, also, is hedonistic and per-
fectionistic. Likewise, in art, one cannot say that one "school"
is correct, another incorrect, by reference to a standard, — since,
for Positivism, there are many standards. Each standard in
its own setting is correct, and no standard can be forced upon
him who will not acknowledge it. In fact, as regards all values,
all standards in ethics and art, Positivism closely approaches
both Naturalism and Pragmatism, into which, as we shall shortly
see, it is very easily transformed.
The solution which Positivism gives to the psychological and
epistemological problems has already been presented at length,
so that only a few more details need be mentioned. For Posi-
tivism there is no soul or spirit, single, simple, and numerically
one. There are only conscious ''happenings." Some of these,
POSITIVISM 251
called memory-images, refer to previous conscious happenings,
and thus organized, conscious "happenings" become person-
alities. But even so, these "happenings" are conscious only by
virtue of being in a certain specific group. By themselves they
are only "elements," and in another group they would be
physical. Thus it is only a difference in the grouping that dis^
tinguishes the physical and the psychical.
Truth, for Positivism, very evidently cannot be defined in
the traditional way, namely, that true knowledge copies reality.
Rather, for Positivism, both truth and fact are made by know-
ing. Indeed it is here, even as it is with the difference between
the physical and the psychical, only a question of a difference in
the grouping. An "element" in one collocation (of elements)
is "impression" or "idea"; in another, it is physical fact; and
in still another it is truth. All knowledge is held to have its
origin in impressions, — when it is forgotten that these ulti-
mately are only indeterminate "elements." This is Sensation-
alism. Further, there is no absolute standard by which true
knowledge can be determined. Fact is fact, and, if one experi-
ences it, no one can say him nay. Thus does Positivism ap-
proach Radical Empiricism and Pragmatism, and thus is it
anti-adsolutistic. But it is also intellectualistic. It holds that
things must be accepted as they are found, and this means, e.g.,
that not only the motion which is immediately experienced as
a whole, hut also the parts into which intellectual analysis re-
solves motion, are facts. Yet Positivism excludes, or tends to
exclude, from the realm of fact that which is given immedi-
ately, e.g., in the religious consciousness, but it may be doubted
whether or not, by its own premises, Positivism is justified in
doing this. However, such an exclusion it nevertheless makes,
at the same time that it prefers and uses intellectual analysis.
In this respect, therefore, Positivism is frankly intellectualistic.
II. CRITICISM
The criticisms that can be made of Positivism are closely
similar to those that already have been made of both Phe-
nomenalism and Subjectivism. At certain points Positivism
shows striking inconsistencies and self-contradictions.
First, the positivist who contends for his position, offering
252 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
arguments for it, and presenting it as a true philosophy, espe-
cially with reference to the problem of knowledge, tacitly pre-
supposes that he is portraying a state of affairs which, though
it is related to his own knowing, is neither dependent on nor
constituted by this. In this case, therefore, knowing and the
known are not identical, and are not to be called mere "ele-
ments," with these elements becoming knowing or object accord-
ing as they are in one group or another. Kather, it is here
presupposed, that there is at least an absolute numerical dis-
tinctness between the knowing and the known, so that, were the
former done away with, the latter would still persist as unal-
tered fact.
But, secondly, such a numerical distinctness between entities
is also presupposed in the detailed theory of Positivism. It
may be, that color and my sensation of color are identical, so
that it is justified to call color a mere "element," which is
neither physical nor psychical. But if I, playing the role of
a positivist, set up the claim really to know about your sensa-
tions, ideas, experiences, or "elements," then, although my
knowing and yours may be like in kind, I presuppose that they
are numerically distinct. They are presupposed to be so dis-
tinct, in fact, that, were my knowing no longer occurring, yours
still would be, even as I have described it in my presumably
true positivistic theory. Here is something, therefore, namely,
your experiences, which / presuppose not to be shifting as "ele-
ments" from one group to another, but to be fixed in that
collocation which is you. In these two cases the ego-centric
predicament is solved by the principle of ideal elimination, and
the theory of external relations is presupposed as valid for the
knowing situation.
But further, if entities, or groups of "elements," can, as in
these instances, be related, and yet be numerically distinct and
independent, then other entities, both simple and complex, also
may be, even such entities as sensation and physical qualities.
Thus, by this principle, an entity, e.g., the brown of my pen-
holder, does not cease either to be a physical brown or to be
distinct from the sensation of it, because I now sense it. Rather,
there is a specific brown, or, if one prefer, an A', that is physical.
It is in a group of other physical qualities to which it is related.
POSITIVISM 253
The complex of these qualities is the penholder. But now, under
certain conditions, this specific brown can get into still other
relations, without losing the relations to the other qualities. It
can, e.g., get into relation with an organism and to the knowing
of or by an organism, and yet be quite as distinct from and
independent of this knowing, as my knowing is (presupposed
to be) independent of your sensations and the like, when I, as
the positivist, advance my theory as a true account of your and
others' knowing. But if this is the case, then the main conten-
tion of Positivism must be given up, even as must that of
Subjectivism.
Both Positivism and Subjectivism presuppose, therefore, as
the very condition of their being advanced as true theories, that
an entity can, without detriment to itself in any way, first be
out of relation to a knowing, then enter into a relation
with a knowing, and again lose this relation. This pre-
supposition is made by the subjectivist concerning the rela-
tion between, on the one hand, spirits and their ideas, and, on
the other hand, his knowing about spirits. It is made by the
positivist concerning the relation between those "elements,"
impressions, or ideas which are you, and his ideas or "elements"
that "refer to you."
Consistency demands, then, that the same presupposition be
recognized and accepted for the knowing of other "things."
This means (1) that in the knowing situation there is a numerical
distinctness betw^een the knowing and the "thing" known; (2)
that, although these two distinct entities may be similar in cer-
tain respects, they may also be dissimilar in others; (3) that
Subjectivism may be forced to admit physical qualities to be
both qualitatively and numerically distinct from the knowing;
(4) that Positivism is compelled to acknowledge that, although
sensation and physical quality are called "elements," they not
only are numerically distinct, but also are different ki7ids of
"elements," even quite as diiferent as common sense usually
regards them to be; and finally, (5) that both Subjectivism
and Positivism must give up their common doctrine that only
the concrete is known; for, if both subjectivist and positivist
can know the general state of affairs about knowing, and its rela-
tion to objects known, then, with the knowing in this case con-
254 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
Crete, but the ''thing" known general, it is presupposed, not
only that the concrete, but also that the general and abstract is
knowahle, and is distinct from the knowing; and also, that
there are not only concrete facts, but also general ones. For
example, length is as much a fact as are long things, and neither
is numerically identical with the knoiving of them, or with the
ivord for them, although each is identical with the content of
knowing, when each is known.
But to be forced to yield this much, is, for both Subjectivism
and Positivism, suicidal. Yielding what each is forced to in the
instances just considered, Subjectivism and Positivism refute
themselves. The subjectivist cannot consistently apply his own
theory to that situation which is the complex of his own knowing
and the state of affairs which he knows, and still retain his Sub-
jectivism, nor can the positivist do any better. Neither can
build his own particular philosophic house upon the sands of
his own detailed doctrines.
The particular situation, therefore, in which, for both the sub-
jectivist and the positivist, there is a knowing of those states of
affairs which are presented in their own (supposedly true)
theories, is an instance of the validity of the theory of external
relations. They are both bound to presuppose the validity of
this theory in this connection, and, therefore, in order to be
consistent, for the knowing situation in general. And yet, with
few exceptions, they reject this theory of relations for other
cases of knowing. Thus, e.g., the subjectivist applies tlie modifi-
cation theory of relations to the relation between finite spirits
and the infinite spirit, making the latter act causally on the
former so as to produce effects called ideas. And the positivist
applies the same theory to his doctrine, that an "element," X,
changes its character with its change of membership in colloca-
tions, this change being due to the influence of the other elements
of the complex. Both subjectivist and positivist, furthermore,
in advancing their theories as holding good for the knowing
situation in general, present a general state of affairs, and so
contradict their other explicit statements, that only the par-
ticular and the concrete is fact and that only such fact can be
known.
Consistency would seem to demand, therefore, that, in con-
POSITIVISM 255
structing a philosophical position, candid recognition be made
of the two principles which our criticism brings out. The first
of these is, that some terms can gain and lose certain relations
to other terms without being changed or affected thereby. One
such relation would seem to be the knowing relation, so that it
may well be, that all terms or 'things" can gain or lose this
relation, without being affected thereby. The second principle
is, that among the terms that can be known, and that are both
numerically distinct from and independent of the knowing, are
general and abstract terms. These are as objective as are par-
ticular, concrete things. This position is, historically, first ad-
vanced clearly by Plato in his doctrine of the reality of uni-
versals, or of ideas ( iSitxi ), as he called them. Indeed,
Plato made universals even more real than concrete things, for
they are timeless, whereas concrete "things" appear, and, after
a time, perish.
Severe as some of these criticisms of Positivism may be, the
position has, nevertheless, many points of merit. Chief among
these is the fact, that it gets away from the domination of the
''substance" concept, and emphasizes relations between what
may be called mere "elements." In doing this. Positivism is
in line with the most important developments in modern logic
and science. Modern science has made its advances and won its
victories by finding what happens and is done, rather than hy
finding, what "things" arc. Relations, events, and unattached
and disembodied qualities concern it more than do substance and
things.
The new logic, which forms a large part of the principles of
modern science, follows the same course. By breaking away
from the model of things ivith a core of substance in which
attributes inhere, and by distinguishing and emphasizing dif-
ferent types of relations between terms, this logic is able to
solve problems that, since they baffled the Aristotelian logic,
finally led to the discovery of the very narrow limitations of
this logic. For example, the old logic, if strictly adhered to,
cannot give an analysis of motion, or of change in general, that
is free from contradiction. But the new logic easily solves this
problem, as we have seen, by its discovery that series are ana-
lyzable into terms that are related in a non-additive way. Mo-
256 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
Hon is such a series, whether it be continuous, or discontinuous,
each term of the series being itself a complex of "an instant
related to a specific point in a one-one m^anner."
In the broad general manner just indicated all modern science
has become positivistic, and some of the results of such a posi-
tivism will be portrayed in a later section. They constitute the
contribution of a method that may be called The New Ration-
alism, the positive content of which is a philosophy that is called
the New Realism. Of this method and position it may be said,
at this point, that in them reason is accepted as being as certain
a revealer of fact as sensation. But the facts thus revealed are
not all of one kind. All are 7iot mere "elements," and nothing
more; neither are all psychical, nor all material. Rather, they
are of the 7nost various kinds. For example, there are generic
facts or states of affairs, and there are concrete, particular facts
that are correlated with specific places and times. There are also
subsistents, which are timeless and spaceless, and there are
existents which are "in" time and space. Existents are of
two kinds, mental and physical, and among these there are as
many different kinds as such special sciences as physics, chem-
istry, physiology, and psychology discover. Also, among sub-
sistents there are both classes and individuals, and as many kinds
as such sciences as ethics, logic, mathematics, and aesthetics
recognize.
For the New Rationalism and the New Realism, then, the
verdict of the special sciences is to be accepted mostly at its
face value, though always with the condition, of course, that
the future may bring the discovery of errors and of new
facts. But, in general, all these kinds of facts receive no uni-
versal reinterpretation and transformation as they do when
they are made "phenomena" for Phenomenalism, "ideas" for
Subjectivism, "elements" for Positivism, matter for Material-
ism, and mere "racial inventions" for Pragmatism. Each of
these reinterpretations is found to be quite unjustified and
invalid, and the criticism which is thus developed is found to
lead to Rationalism and to Realism.
NATURALISM 257
CHAPTER XXXII
NATURALISM
Positivism, under the widespread influence of the natural
sciences during the last century, developed into Naturalism as
that philosophy which contends that only that is fact which
conforms to the most general laws of a certain limited group of
sciences, namely, physics, chemistry, biology, and, perhaps, psy-
chology. Accordingly, one of the chief characteristics of Nat-
uralism, as it is worked out in detail, is, that the principles of
conservation and of evolution are used to apply in some manner
to everything. However, the position is, almost without excep-
tion, not only vague but also neglectful of many problems.
Indeed, very frequently, some of the most important philo-
sophical problems either are ruled out of court with a high hand,
or are not recognized at all because of sheer ignorance. Not-
withstanding this. Naturalism is more widely accepted among
philosophically-minded scientists than any other philosophy.
Naturalism is chiefly characterized by its insistence that all *
fact is either physical or mental, i.e., that all fact is existent..
Inconsistently also with its own presuppositions Naturalism con-
tends that all fact is only concrete and particular, maintaining,'
in its explicit theory, that there is no such "thing" as a general
state of affairs even of a group of concrete "things." Also, ,
there is no such "thing," for it, as a subsistent. Thus, e.g., it 1
contends that there is no such "thing" as a number that is not
the number of something, or a circle that is not the property
of a physical circular object.
With everything thus regarded as either physical or mental,
Naturalism is, nevertheless, frequently most vague and indefinite
in its treatment of the mental. The position tends to be dualistic
in its solution of this problem, but it is not clearly so. It
accepts the physical world at its face value, as this is presented
by astronomy, physics, chemistry, and other natural sciences.
For this realm it usually accepts the law of the conservation of
energy and of matter as the leading principle, while from the
258 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
biological sciences it gets the notion, that everything develops I
and evolves, with consciousness, perhaps, no exception to this, l
But just what consciousness is. Naturalism does not make clear, »
— indeed it does not seem to recognize that consciousness presents I
a serious problem. Sensations, memory images, ideas, and the
like, are spoken about and written of, but little attempt is made
to study these entities. Sometimes they are placed in clear con-
trast with physical entities by the negative characterization, that
they are non-spatial, weightless, and the like. And yet, hy the
argument, that conscious entities are sometJiing, and therefore
cannot come from nothing, nor yet from physical energy, so that
they can come only out of a preceding consciousness of some
kind, the principle of conservation is applied to them even as
it is to the physical world. The result is, that Naturalism
develops into a complete dualism of two energies, the one
physical and the other mental, with each "wherever" the other
is, like the inside and the outside of a sphere.
However, Naturalism does not always take even this fairly
definite position. Sometimes it quite neglects the problem as
to the nature of those processes that are called mental, and,
though it regards them as subject to the law of evolution, omits
to develop the consequences of this assumption. The tendency
thus manifested brings Naturalism to the verge of Materialism —
to the position, namely, that all fact without exception is of the
nature of physical or material "things" — either matter, or
energy, or, as the more sophisticated physicists of the day would
claim, electricity.
As examples of problems that Naturalism quite overlooks,
or is ignorant of, one may cite the questions that concern the
nature of space, time, and number. Naturalism either sees
no problems regarding these entities, or, if it sees problems,
solves them dogmatically and with the maximum of vagueness
and inaccuracy by regarding space, time, and number as attri-
hutes of physical 'things," claiming that, did the latter not
exist, then were the former in no sense fact. In this respect
Naturalism departs widely from the conclusions of science, if
science includes not alone physics, chemistry, biology, and the
like, but also geometry and pure mathematics.
Naturalism, as has been said, has an historical and, to a
NATURALISM 250
certain extent, a logical development out of Positivism. Posi-
tivism was first definitely presented by Hume, but has been
maintained very recently by such writers as Mach. If, now, we
take the "elements" of Positivism and make definite entities
of these, after the manner of the natural sciences in their insist-
ence upon the different kinds of atoms, molecules, cells, etc.,
and if we then further insist, that all 'things" causally interact
and evolve, we have Naturalism.
Thus, from the standpoint of modern logic, Naturalism is
derived by assuming the modification theory of relations to hold
good for everything without exception. Naturalism makes this
assumption in its dogmatic insistence that all "things," even
space, time, and numbers causally affect one another, thereby
producing some "things," and eliminating others. This means,
that, from the standpoint of natural science, everything is either
adapted to or eliminated by its environment, and that some
scheme of evolution, Darwinian, Lamarckian, de Vriesian, or
Bergsonian, is always incorporated in Naturalism.^
On this general naturalistic foundation, five more detailed \
positions are developed. These are (1) Naturalism in its more
detailed form, (2) Materialism, (3) Psychism, (4) Dualism or (
Parallelism, and finally, (5) Pragmatism. Accordingly, each
of these positions is naturalistic.
I. DETAILED NATURALISM ^
Detailed Naturalism merely develops this general naturalistic
foundation by incorporating within itself all the natural
sciences, especially Astronomy, Geology, Mechanics, Physics,
'Among the philosophers who maintain this generic naturalism are:
J. S. Mill, op. cit.; Huxley in his Evolution and Other Essays, and Brooks
in The Foundations of Zoology. It is the position that is also taken by
most biologists, especially by those who are of the mechanistic, and not
of the vitalistic school. Philosophers who are naturalistic, are, e.g.,
Helvetius, Condorcet. Montesquieu. Cf. Lange, History of Materialism,
3 vols., translation by Thomas, 1892.
''Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) is the great exponent of this detailed
naturalism. Spencer's leading concept is evolution, and this he applies
to almost everything, including consciousness in all its aspects. Yet
Spencer is not a parallelist, as are many biologists and psychologists, nor
is he a materialist or a psychist (see the discussion following). Spencer's
works that show this detailed naturalism arc: Principles of Psychology,
1855; First Principles, 1860-62; Principles of Biology, 186-4-67; Principles
of Ethics, 1879-93; Principles of Sociology, 1876-96.
260 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
Chemistry, Biology, and Psychology. It results that such human
''institutions" as the family, government and law, language,
religion, art and literature, and even science itself, are inter-
preted in strict conformity with the evolution of living forms,
while the cosmic evolution of suns and of planets, of atoms
and of chemical compounds, is accepted quite uncritically.
Thus it is, that the ontology, cosmology, teleology, and
ethics of Naturalism are essentially those of the natural
sciences. Such sciences as Mathematics are either ignored
completely, or are transformed into applied sciences in every
instance.
Toward all theology Naturalism takes a skeptical, or at least
an agnostic position. For, with its emphasis upon the senses
as the only revealers of fact. Naturalism finds little evidence of
a God of any kind — not even as an objective entity that is
identical with an effective worth- and value-principle in the
general make-up of the universe. Since God cannot be seen or
touched or heard, and the like, Naturalism concludes that there
is no God, or at least holds its judgment in suspense. And
toward such worths and values as it does accept, Naturalism
takes the position of a thorough-going Evolutionism. Good-
ness and beauty, right and wrong are in each case what they
are, only because they have evolved and survived.
It is toward truth alone that this detailed yet uncritical Nat-
uralism takes an absolutistic, as opposed to a relativistic and
evolutionistic position. For, although the results of the em-
pirical, natural sciences are allowed always to be open to
revision, and to be, in this sense, tentative, nevertheless Nat-
uralism holds that there is nothing in the knowing situation \
to prevent our getting at facts essentially as they are, and that, '.
if facts are thus known, there is truth. For Naturalism, there-
fore, knowing is 7iot constitutive, as it is in Phenomenalism;
nor are all facts psychical in nature, as in Subjectivism; nor
are they mere ''elements," as in Positivism. Rather, facts are
held to be what they are found to be in the natural sciences,
and it is ahso maintained that facts would be quite unaltered,
should all knowing disappear. Naturalism thus accepts the
theory that there is an absolute truth to be attained, and that
true knowledge is a sort of copy of fact.
NATURALISM 261
However, in this respect Naturalism is inconsistent with its
ov/n explicit doctrine, that everything causally interacts with
other things, evolves, and is an adaptation. For, if this ''causal
doctrine" be of universal validity, then, of course, knowing
must also causally interact with that which is known, and, there-
fore, hotJi modify, and he modified. The consistent development
of this universal "causal" doctrine therefore leads to Phe-
nomenalism, so that, not to accept this conclusion, is to gloss
over a glaring inconsistency and contradiction that invalidates
the main naturalistic contention.
While in its explicit epistemology, therefore, detailed Nat-
uralism aligns itself, though somewhat confusedly, with the
traditional "copy-theory" of truth, it does this at the cost of
being inconsistent with its own basic doctrines of a universal
interaction, evolution, and adaptation. The only excuse for its
committing this inconsistency, and yet for not noticing it, is,
that the adherents of Naturalism are carried off their feet by
the methods and results of the natural sciences, and are not
aware either of those delicate questions which are involved in
the problem of knowledge, or of the precise logical principles
whether of the old or of the new logic.
Toward the psychological problem detailed Naturalism main-
tains the negative attitude of ignoring the issue. It rests con-
tent with the vague and uncritical view, that cognitive, emo-
tional, and volitional processes lack such characteristics as ex-
tension and weight, and is satisfied to use the mere names "per-
cept," "idea," "concept," emotion," etc., without further
inquiry, merely insisting that the entities denoted by these
names are "natural things" — whatever that term may mean —
and are, therefore, subject to all those main principles, such as
evolution, to which other "natural things" are subject. How-
ever, Naturalism does not develop the consequences of this posi-
tion, but leaves this to other naturalistic philosophies, such as.
Materialism, Psychism, Parallelism, and Pragmatism. Natural-
ism, like Positivism, also gives up the doctrine of an ego, or a
soul, but offers no substitute for these, other than what it
vaguely calls ideas, percepts, and the like. But what these
entities are, or what consciousness is. Naturalism leaves largely
undetermined.
262 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
n. MATERIALISM, DUALISM, AND PSYCHISM :
MATERIALISM ®
These three positions have the advantage over Naturalism,
that they are the results of recognizing the problem of con-
sciousness, and of attempting to solve it. All three positions
are naturalistic, yet each is a definite and distinct doctrine.
In regard to the other philosophical problems these positions
accept essentially the same solutions as does Naturalism. Thus
their explicit epistemology, ethics, esthetics, theology, teleology,
cosmology, and ontology are essentially those of that theory.
For each the specific position, in each of these several branches,
is one that is derived somewhat uncritically and vaguely by
putting together into one doctrine the results of the natural
sciences. Thus, in each, evolution plays a leading role ; in each
it is contended that everything interacts, evolves, and adapts.
For each, also, there is a conservation of "something" —
something that, in its total quantity, is neither increased
nor decreased, neither created nor destroyed, and that in
the midst of change, only alters, or seems to alter, its form or
qualities.
For modern Materialism this "something" that underlies
everything else, and that both evolves and changes, and yet is
conserved, is physical energy. Accordingly, consciousness is
regarded as only a special kind of this energy, analogous to
electrical or kinetic or potential energy, or else it is regarded
as a factor of some specific physical energy, even as electrical
potential or intensity is an aspect or factor of electrical energy.
Percepts, ideas, emotions, and the like, thus become physical
facts that interact with other physical facts, and that are brought
into existence, in agreement with the principle of evolution, by
' Materialism has appeared many times in the history of philosophy.
Among the ancients Leucippus, Domoeritns, and Lueretiiis were material-
ists. In the seventeenth century Thomas Hobbes ( L'iSS-lfi?!)) , and, in the
eighteenth, Condillac, d'Holbach, Jjamettrie, and Diderot were adherents of
the position. In the nineteenth century, in Germany, Biichner, Kraft iind
moff, 1st ed., 185.5, Moleschott, Karl Vogt, and later, Haeckel, The Riddle
of the Universe, trans, by McCalje, have been widely read, and have been
of much influence. In recent years Ostwald. Naturphilosophie. 1902, trans,
by Seltzer, and J. Loeb, Physiology of the Brain an^ the Mechanistic Con-
ception of Life, are supporters of this position.
NATURALISM 26S
a transformation out of some other kind of physical energy,
or factor thereof. When the specific conditions for this
transformation first occurred in the evolution of life on this
planet, then some specific instance of some specific kind of
consciousness first arose. Also, when similar specific conditions
occur in any individual, as e.g., in the transition from dreamless
sleep to wakening, then again some specific energy-transforma-
tion occurs.
Only in its ontology, then, does Materialism differ from Nat-
uralism, for, while the latter position maintains insistently,
though vaguely, that there is a fundamental difference between
mind and matter. Materialism, using evidence from such sciences
as geology, biology, and physiology, concludes that consciousness
is only matter or energy. For it there is no more difference
between mind and matter than there is between heat and
electricity.
One characteristic of Materialism, however, that is usually
overlooked, even by the materialist himself, is that, consistently
with its own main explicit principles, it is a thorough-going
phenomenalistic philosophy. This is the case, notwithstanding
the fact, that the materialist, like all other philosophers, tacitly
grants, in presenting his position for others to accept, that his
own knowing does not causally affect the state of affairs of which
his materialistic philosophy is an account, and that those know-
ing processes in which he and others know concrete physical
facts, do not affect or constitute these fact^ Nevertheless, by
the foundation principles of Materialism, namely, that all so-
called conscious processes are really physical, and that all
physical ''things" causally interact and affect one another, it is
implied that every specific knowing process must affect, modify,
and alter the thing knoivn. This position, however, is none
other than Phenomenalism. But this consequence of the ex-
plicit teachings of Materialism is in direct contradiction with
that tacit presupposition which the materialist makes with refer-
ence to the relation between his own knowing processes and the
"things" known. For, when the materialist accepts the results
of the natural sciences to incorporate them in his Materialism,
he tacitly assumes that all knowing could be eliminated and yet
material (known) entities be quite unaffected thereby.
264 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
m. UNIVERSAL DUALISM OR PARALLELISM*
The main contention of this position is, that that "some-
thing" which underlies all evolution and yet is conserved in
quantity, is not physical energy alone, but also psychical energy.
The tacit or explicit postulates or assumptions from which this
'^ psycho-physical parallelism" is derived may be stated as
follows : —
I. Introspection is reliable and valid, i.e., its deliverances
•with reference to the nature of consciousness are to be accepted.
This means that consciousness is revealed as fundamentally and
essentially different from physical ''things"; i.e., the former
is given as at least lacking certain characteristics that the
latter have, particularly the characteristics of extension and
mass.
II. All physical "things" are subject to the principle of the
conservation of energy, in accordance with which, in all change,
there is as much energy in the effect as in the cause. Energy
is only transformed. No energy is lost either in specific iso-
lated systems, or in the whole universe. In this respect the
physical universe is a closed series.
The conclusion that is derived from these premises is, that
consciousness can in no case, either in the development of the
individual or in its historical origin, come from physical energy,
since such a transformntion would mean, that some physical
energy disappears as energy, so that the principle of conserva-
tion would be violated. Consciousness is, therefore, left hanging
in the air, unless some way can be found to give it firmer sup-
port. This is accomplished by assuming that
III. In all change it is impossible that something should
come from nothing, and disappear into nothing. Ex nihilo
* This position was first given definite formulation by Descartes in
both his Discourse and his Meditations; the majority of contemporaneous
psychologists previous to the recent behavioristic school have taken this
position in their tcxt-liooks; J. R. Angell is a good e\anij>le. A good state-
ment of the position is given by G. K. Miiller, " Zur Psychophysik der
Gesichtsempfindung," Zcitsch. f. Psych., 1890 (cf. Mach, Analysis of Sensa-
tions, trans., pp. '2(i-40); by Ward, Naturalism avd Agnosticism, Lecture
Xll.; by James, Principles of Psycholocry, Vol. I., Chap. V.; by McDougall,
Body and Mind, Chaps. VII. -XV. ; by 11. R. Marshall, Consciousness, 1909.
The last mentioned volume well illustrates the position as it is formulated
and developed as a current philosophy, but as a philosophy, also, that
almost completely ignores really basic problems.
NATURALISM 265
7iihil fit, nihil ad nihilimi fieri, the scholastics put it. But con-
scious processes are facts. They appear and disappear in the
individual, and they certainly appeared in the evolution of
living beings.
By all three premises together, now, the conclusion is implied,
that each conscious process comes from a preceding conscious-
ness, each quantum of consciousness from a preceding quantum;
in other words, that there is a conservation of consciousness
quite analogous to the conservation of physical energy. And
just as all physical energy is in a process of universal evolution,
cosmic and biological, so also has all evolution another aspect,
namely, the conscious aspect. Living organisms arose from
so-called non-living complexes of energies and forces, but in
reality not only were these earliest living forms conscious, but
so also were their components and predecessors. Physiological
processes of the nervous system, especially of the brain, seem to
be the condition for conscious processes. Really, however, the
latter are only parallel to the former. The constituents of the
nervous system change and are replaced by others in processes
of repair. Therefore these replacing constituents must have
their "conscious side" also. In general, then, wherever there
is matter or physical energy, there, also, is conscious energy.
Every cell, every molecule, every atom and electron is not only
physical, but also conscious. The whole universe is double and
twofold. It is physical, and it is conscious. There are tivo
energies, two conservations, and two evolutions. Neither energy
acts causally on the other, for such action would violate (1) the
postulate, derived from introspection, that each is funda-
mentally different from the other, and (2) that only physical
energy can produce and affect, and be produced and affected by,
physical energy. Accordingly, by these postulates, only like can
act on like, only like produce or be transformed into like, —
physical into physical, conscious into conscious — but no inter-
action between consciousness and physical energy is logically
possible.
This position has, in its general form, occupied a prominent
place in modern philosophy from the time of Descartes to the
present, but especially during the last thirty or forty years, —
the period of the development of experimental psychology —
266 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
when it has received much discussion under the name of
Psycho-physical Parallelism,
Modern psychology with its use of experiment, and of observa-
tion of others as well as of introspection, is emphatic in its
claim to be a natural and empirical science, so that this more
definite Naturalism has appealed to it. For Psycho-physical
Parallelism accepts the facts and results of the physical natural
sciences at their face value, adding to these the detailed facts
of and about consciousness. These, too, are held to be "nat-
ural" and to form the peculiar subject-matter of psychology.
Modern psychology, therefore, by adopting Parallelism, seems
to justify its claim to be a science that is on a par with the
physical sciences, and that at the same time fits into a definite
and consistent philosophical position.
The main characteristics of this position clearly form a solu-
tion to the ontological problem. For Parallelism, there are two
kinds of energy, — two kinds of "something" that is in each
case conserved. In its solution of the other philosophical prob-
lems the position follows closely the main outlines of Natural-
ism. Thus its cosmology and its doctrine of values are those
of the sum total of the physical sciences, including biology.
The position is, therefore, definitely evolutionistic. Every
physical object, indeed every part of every physical object, has,
however, a conscious side or aspect. This feature of the position
is sometimes taken advantage of, however, to introduce a definite
purpose fulness into all "things," and so into the whole course
of a universal evolution. Thus, to do this, one has only dog-
matically to insist, that the fundamental kind of consciousness
in all "things" is Will, in order subsequently to deduce a fore-
sight, a planning, a choosing, and an adapting of means to ends
in all "things."
It is clear, however, if one thus introduces a teleology, either
that the physical side of the universe does not pursue the same
course as it would pursue, if consciousness were not present,
but that it is influenced by the "conscious side," contrary to
the fundamental postulates of the position; or, that physical
occurrences do take place just as they would if no conscious side
were present. But in this second case the "conscious side" be-
comes quite superfluous, since, without consciousness, there
NATURALISM 267
would be exactly the same course of events, past, present, and
future, as there would be with it. This would also be the case
if the "material side" were absent. Two lines parallel to each
other and pointing in a certain direction indicate that direction
no better than does one. The duplication is quite superfluous.
In quite a similar manner, if the universe were double in every
detail, and if all its events, both as a whole and as individuals,
have a certain direction, then, whether this direction be inter-
preted to mean purpose or its lack, it would still be the same
direction, were either one of the two "sides" done away with,
or were either absent.
This is a severe criticism of Parallelism. For it means that
the position, by endeavoring to introduce a teleology through
its "double energy" theory, either violates its own foundation
by introducing interaction, or accepts 07ie energy that is super-
fluous. This may be either physical energy or consciousness.
But the universe does not need both, if each parallels the other
in that way which is alone consistent with the foundations of
the parallelistic position.
From this criticism it is evident that in its epistemology
Parallelism avoids that very damaging inconsistency of which
Materialism is guilty in respect to the relation between the
knowing process and the object known. Materialism should
admit that these interact and so affect each other even as do
other physical processes and objects, but, inconsistently, it does
not admit this for any kind of knowing of any kind of object.
Parallelism, however, by its doctrine of the total absence of
interaction between any kind of knowing process and the
physical world, is not guilty of this inconsistency. At most,
between the physical and the mental there is a relation that
can be interpreted only as external. For each minutest differ-
ence in the one realm there is a corresponding difference in the
other, and yet each would be the same without as ivith the other.
Certain difficulties, however, arise in connection with this doc-
trine when it is applied. For example, it may be asked. What
are the specific correlates of those conscious processes of which
there is introspective knowledge? Are not these correlates
specific brain processes? But, in that case, is it not these proc-
esses that are known, and not outside objects? Yet, have not
268 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
"outside objects" their correlative conscious processes also?
But into these difficulties we need not go, since they are arti-
ficial, arising only as consequences of a position that itself does
not stand the test of criticism.
IV. PSYCHISM ; ^ CRITICISM OP NATURALISTIC THEORIES
That a specific type of Psychism develops out of Naturalism
is quite evident from the preceding discussion. Subjectivism,
with its doctrine that all so-called physical "things" are but
the collection of the percepts and ideas of individual spirits,
is one kind of Psychism, but it is one that retains the finite
ego or soul as a simple, indivisible substance, with God as an
infinite spirit. The Psychism that is derivable out of Natural-
ism, however, recognizes no irreducible and ultimate egos, souls,
spirits, or personalities, and only that kind of a God who is the
sum total of that consciousness, or conscious energy, which is
all, and which all ultimately is. This modern Psychism main-
tains, as its chief tenet, that ultimate reality is consciousness,
or conscious energy.
The possibility of this doctrine has already been indicated in
discussing Parallelism. // there are two substances or energies
in all "things," side by side in the evolution of the universe,
it is implied, that the course of events would be quite the same,
were either energy non-existent. With psychical energy absent,
all would be matter; were there no matter, then would only
conscious energy exist.
To develop such a possible position, let us assume that only
conscious energy exists, and then raise the question, How shall
what seem to be physical "things" be accounted for? The
answer given to this question is ingenious, though not con-
vincing, while it also meets with many difficulties when it is
applied to specific problems. The answer is, that the difference
between the (so-called) physical and the conscious is only one
of point of view, or of approach. Thus the appearance of one
consciousness to another, say, of yours to mine, is held to be
the physical, while a consciousness that appears to itself is the
mental. Accordingly, you can know me only as a physical body,
" This position is developed in C. A. Strong's Why the Mind has a Body,
1903; MaJebranche (1638-1715) was an earlier psychist of this type.
NATURALISM 26d
but / know myself as conscious. One and the same entity, e.g.,
my consciousness is, then, approached in two ways: known by
you, it appears, or is physical ; known by myself it is psychical.
This theory of a universal psychism, — of one psychical sub-
stance or energy, of which specific instances are individuals, or
human personalities, welling-up like the crests of waves upon
the deeper fundament of continuity, — is certainly plausible,
and, perhaps, inspiring. But it is open to the same criticism
as Materialism. Thus, if, as Materialism contends, conscious-
ness is matter or energy, and, therefore, is not what it seems to
introspection to be, the question may be asked in criticism,
whether there is not a form of matter or of energy that does
what consciousness is found empirically to do. Likewise, as con-
cerns Psychism, Avith its position that physical "things" are
ultimately not what they seem, but are really consciousness, it
may be asked, whether there is not a form of consciousness that
does what physical "things'' do, and whether there is not as
much difference between this kind and other kinds of conscious-
ness, as there is between ivhat in common sense and science are
distinguished as the physical and the conscious? The difference
that is introduced by "proving" in some w^ay, either that what
appears to be mental is really physical, or that what appears
to be physical is really conscious, is only one of name, provided
the character and behavior of "things" is ascertained em-
pirically and not artificially by an a priori argument. On the
other hand, if, by "making" the apparently physical really
psychical in character, something is introduced into the physical
world that is in conflict with empirically ascertained physical
principles, then one can no longer maintain the major premise
of Psychism, that the detailed results of empirical investigation
are to be accepted at their face value, and that the apparently
fundamental difference between the physical and the psychical
is due only to a difference in the point of view.
An analogous criticism can be made of Materialism. If by
"proving" and calling consciousness a kind of matter or energy,
no specific difference is introduced into the details of conscious
behavior and action, then nothing is gained, since nothing is
done by matter that is not done by consciousness, and con-
versely. On the other hand, if a specific difference is thus intro-
270 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
duced, then it should be a difference that can be confirmed
empirically, and then there is the possibility of discovering a
conflict between this new specific, "difference-making" element
and other empirically ascertainable differences, so that conscious-
ness can no longer be regarded as something that is to be studied
only by a priori methods, and not empirically, as regards its
details.
This criticism is much the same as that made of Parallelism,
namely, that, if the physical and the psychical are two energies
that are quite parallel and in a one-one correspondence in every
detail, then with reference to what "things" do, this double-
ness is quite superfluous. One or the other energy is a mere
epi-phenomenon. Do away with either, and the course of all
events would be the same. On the other hand, if the doubleness
does make a difference, it can do so provided only one energy
influences the other. But this means to give up Parallelism
and to accept Interactionism.
The fact is, however, that the three positions under discus-
sion are the products of the influence of the old Aristotelian
logic and philosophy, and represent the effect of the continued
domination of the concept of substance.^ That logic, we have
found, is a logic of things, — of attributes that inhere in an
underlying substratum. Also, it is a logic that is interested
in what "things" are, rather than in what they do. Accord-
ingly, it is a logic that is metaphysical in that derogatory mean-
ing of the term which is sometimes so extended by certain
scientists as to include all metaphj^sics and philosophy. This
meaning is derived to a large extent from that mediseval science
and philosophy vv^hieh sought to ascertain the essence rather
than the behavior of "things." The effects which "things" had,
were explained by their essence. For example, opium was held
to produce sleep, because it was a soporific siibstance. Certain
bodies fell, because they were essentially ponderable; others rose,
because they were essentially buoyant. Indeed, as late as the
eighteenth century, heat was held to be caloric substance. The
general result was, in all lines of so-called scientific investiga-
tion, that that which was sought for, was the recondite sub-
stratum, or essence of "things," even though this was "found"
in some instances by a circular definition.
NATURALISM 271
Modern logic and scientific method are characterized by a
strong reaction against this entire ''substance point of view."
It is to be granted, of course, that in certain sciences, notably
in chemistry, search is made to find what "things" are, with
the result that a number of different elements and a great many
different compounds are discovered. But even in this case, what
these elements and compounds are, is largely identical with what
they do. Thus hydrogen is that substance which acts in such
a way on oxygen as to produce water and other compounds ;
it is also that substance which, under certain conditions, exerts
a certain definite pressure. So, also, certain modern mathe-
matical equations that describe electricity show what electricity
does, rather than what it is. These examples illustrate in gen-
eral the point of view, and the results of modern science. In
science little remains of the substance concept.
In philosophy, however, the influence of the concept of sub-
stance still persists. Indeed, most philosophical systems are
derived through the postulation and use of this concept in one
way or another. Phenomenalism and Subjectivism are two
such systems, and now there appear also Naturalism, Material-
ism, Parallelism, and Psychism as systems with a similar founda-
tion. Each of these asks, and answers the question, e.g., What
kind of a thing or substance is the universe? Each is content
to accept the detailed results of the natural sciences in answer
to the other question. What things do? but is not so content
with regard to this "larger" question. All four positions make
the universe, both as a whole and a part, evolve, but they differ
as to what kind of a "thing" an evolving universe is. Nat-
uralism "makes" one part of it physical energy, but remains
non-committal in regard to the other part. Materialism
"makes" the whole a purely physical complex or "thing," while
Psychism "makes" the whole ultimately conscious in character,
a sort of psychical thing, a huge world-soul, sometimes identi-
fying this with God. Both of these last two positions are
monistic ontologies, since ultimately, for them, there is only
one kind of substance, broken up though this may be into many
parts. On the other hand. Parallelism makes the universe two-
fold. It is dualistic. This dualism is overcome, and the equal
status of both the physical and the psychical is kept, only by
272 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
maintaining, in further accordance with the concept of thing,
that both are but aspects or attributes of one universal sub-
stratum, which is substance par excellence. This is Spinoza's
(1632-77) doctrine, which was revived, with certain modifica-
tions, in nineteenth century German Idealism, or Transcen-
dentalism.
Finally, in closing this discussion, we may point out that the
four philosophies under consideration are each completely real-
istic as regards that epistemology which is tacitly accepted by
each in advancing a specific doctrine as true. Not one of them
denies that it is possible for "things" to be known as they really
are. Not one of them is either founded on or itself develops
the position, that knowing affects, alters, or constitutes its
object. Accordingly, not one of them is either phenomenalistic
or subjectivistic as regards itself. Yet, as we have seen. Ma-
terialism should be phenomenalistic, in order to be consistent
with its doctrine of a universal interaction of all "things," but
it does not explicitly recognize this characteristic. Psychism
also should recognize itself as phenomenalistic, since, although
for it all "things" are psychical in nature, it contends that
there is a modification of psychical "things," so that they
appear to be physical under certain conditions. But Psychism,
like Materialism, does not develop this phenomenalism. Paral-
lelism alone, in its doctrine of the absence of interaction between
the physical and the psychical, and of the presence of only an
external relation between these in regard to their correlation
and correspondence, is consistent with the presupposition which
it itself makes in regard to the knowing of that state of affairs
u'hich, described by Parallelism, is the object known. But
Parallelism is also a position that presents a worthless and func-
tionless duplication of the universe.
All these theories, then, if we omit their inconsistencies, are
not opposed to Realism in their fundamental epistemology.
Eealism would be compatible with Psychism, with Materialism,
or with any other ontology, provided these positions could be
established empirically, and provided they could at the same
time give up the doctrine of universal causal interaction so far,
at least, as to make an exception for the relation between know-
ing and the object known. For it is onhi on this last condition
PRAGMATISM 273
that any of these theories can be true, or that the complex
objects described in any of them can be genuinely known.
Finally, it is provided only that this condition is recognized
and observed, that any of these theories can, in its details, be
consistent with its own presuppositions. However, it is by
virtue of the contradiction between their own presuppositions
a7id their explicit doctrines, that Materialism and Psychism are
self -refuting, and may, therefore, be dismissed from further
serious consideration.
CHAPTER XXXIII
PRAGMATISM
Pragmatism is that more specific development of generic Nat-
uralism which endeavors to avoid some of the errors and incon-
sistencies that are implied in detailed Naturalism, Materialism,
Parallelism and Psychism. The name has been characterized by
William James as a new name for an old way of thinking. The
justification for this characterization lies, among other things, in
the endeavor of the pragmatist to glean the grain from the chaff
in the methods and results of modern scientific knowledge. In
other words. Pragmatism is that generalization, in regard to the
epistemological problem, which results from endeavoring to
distinguish wliat is essential to genuine knowing from what is
artificial and superfluous. As a result of this endeavor. Prag-
matism is made up of a number of doctrines, which may be
advantageously examined under three headings, namely, Prag-
matism's Anti-siih stance doctrine, Pragmatism's Anti-intellectu-
alism, and Pragmatism's Evolutionism.
I. pragmatism's anti-substance doctrine
Pragmatism's anti-substance doctrine is a protest against the
domination of the traditional substance concept.^ In making
this protest, Pragmatism aligns itself with Positivism.- Not
* See, e.g., James, Pragmatism, p. 85 flf., and p. 184 f.
' See Chaps. XXXI.-XXXII.
274 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
what "tilings" are, but what happens, what is done, what worTcs,
is regarded as the important question; not essences, but acts
and occurrences, should be the aim of scientific discovery.
Pragmatism thus senses the true tendency of modern scientific
research. It replaces a statical with a dynamical point of view,
and aims, with Positivism, to discover what specific relationships
hold between terms, rather than to find their substance-like
character or essence. It thus conforms to the method of much
of modern exact science in which laws are expressed by equa-
tions that symbolize relationships between variables and other
complex terms.^
iL pragmatism's antmntellectualism
A second constituent doctrine of Pragmatism is its anti-
intellectualism, — a doctrine that in turn has three phases. The
fi7'st of these is determined by the reaction against that specific
type of intellectualism which preceded the Renaissance and
modern scientific development, and which attempted to solve
problems by an appeal to tradition, to authority, and to argu-
mentation, rather than to nature, experiment, and observation.
This intellectualism was largely identical with the use of the
traditional Aristotelian substance-logic, and with the resulting,
perpetual endeavor to find the essences of "things." A phi-
losophy that is directed against such an intellectualism is quite
justified, as the development of science itself shows. But this
does not warrant a universal anti-intellectualism, to the effect,
that intellect and reason can in 7io instance reveal fact and
deliver truth.
A second feature of Pragmatism's anti-intellectualism is
the result of generalizing the rather limited procedure of the
experimental and natural sciences} The method of these
sciences is (a) to observe, sometimes unaided, but more fre-
quently by means of experiment and measurement; (b) to gen-
eralize from typical cases, and to form hypotheses, subsequently
* 8ee Poincare, Foundations of f^cience.
* See, e.g., Jamea, Pragmatism, Chap. VI., and the whole of The Meaning
of Truth. I should say that this is a position in which all the prag-
matists agree, althoii,';h some emjjhaaize more than does James the pur-
posefulnesa and the intention, and the functional and adaptative character
of that which issues in the concrete, verifying experience.
PRAGMATISM 275
to test these and deductions from them by an appeal to observa-
ble fact; (c) to ascertain what terms cannot be removed without
"disturbing" others, and also what terms cannot be varied
without varying others, thus to discover relations of dependence
as well as of independence; (d) to discover, by measurement
and otherwise, what specific functional relations hold good
between terms; and finally (e) upon the basis both of general-
izations as to the presence and action of causes, and of the
discovery of functional relations, to predict and construct the
specific instance, then to await its confirmation by sense
experience.
Now the intellect plays a prominent part in all this procedure
in forming hypotheses to guide observations, experimentation
and measurement, in making generalizations and deductions,
and in forming systems by the interweaving of many generaliza-
tions. But if, through such intellectual methods, there are not
formed generalizations, hypotheses, and systems that lead to
direct confirmation by the sense experience of concrete fact,
then. Pragmatism holds, so much the worse for intellect. For
sense experience is, in the natural sciences at least, regarded as
the ultimate test as to what is fact and knowledge. And it is
by rigidly adhering to this test that science has won that insight
into nature's processes and secrets, which so conspicuously dis-
tinguishes modern knowledge from mediaeval and ancient belief
and surmise.
This feature of the subservience of intellect to sense, of reason
to concrete experience. Pragmatism generalizes into a universal,
though definite anti-intellectualism, and into a definition of
truth. However, this anti-intellectualism does not take the
extreme form, that intellect plays no reliable part in revealing
fact and in delivering truth, but that it can perform this func-
tion provided only that it cooperates with and is checked up by
sense experience. Intellect is thus made, not coequal with, but
subordinate to, sense experience. For example, should such con-
crete things as points be dealt with by intellect, not as indi-
viduals, but as classes, — which is the only way they can be
dealt with, — then, since we are unable to see, touch, or in any
way sen^e a geometric point. Pragmatism doubts the reality
of these entities, and characterizes them as being only inven-
276 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
tions of intellect for the practical purpose of dealing with
space.
The peculiar definition of truth which Pragmatism thus de-
rives, by generalizing from its review of the natural sciences,
is, that truth is confirmation by concrete fact, or experience.^
No longer, however, — in this generalization — are the facts of
sense experience alone insisted upon, but, rather, any concrete
facts, as these are experienced after the manner of the sense
experience of this particular "thing," or that. The develop-
ment of implications by reasoning, the observation of the demand
for consistency and freedom from contradiction, and the like,
are all very well, provided they lead to the experience, in some
way, of a concrete, particular something. But methods, the-
ories, and hypotheses that do not have such alternate practical
outcomes are left hanging in mid-air, as neither true nor false.
The result is, that intellect is displaced from any position of
equality with other "revealers" of fact and of truth. For
intellect seems to be able to deal only with classes and types,
while such experiences as sense perception and emotion reveal
the singular particular "individual." Intellect can deal with
individuals only conceptually, or by the method of intension,
namely, with any individual of a class or type defined in a
certain way. But sensation and emotion reveal a this or a that,
a here or a there, a now or a then. Pragmatism, accordingly, in
that definition of truth Avhich is under discussion, accepts emo-
tional experience and feeling as well as sensation as "revealers"
of those particular facts or workings which constitute the truth
of ideas.
The further result is, that Pragmatism becomes in its anti-
inteilectualism a mixture of sensationalism, emotionalism, and
immediatism.^ Let an idea or belief, e.g., the belief in immor-
tality, lead to a definite emotional satisfaction, thus working
successfully, and then, hy definition, that idea is true. It follows,
e.g., that different religions, various philosophies, different sys-
tems of ethics and of aesthetics, and the like, are all equally true
just so long and as frequently as a specific and satisfactory
emotional result to some one is their outcome. For — for Prag-
matism — the ouicome makes the truth, or is the truth — and not
' James, Pragmatism, Chap. VI. ° Especially in James and Bergson.
PRAGMATISM 277
the mere test. Pragmatism, therefore, does not hold the abso
lutistie position, that there is only one truth, or one system of
truths, but, for it, there are many truths, and many systems, —
as many, in fact, as in some instances there are individuals/
For, so far as in many individuals satisfactory workings result
that do not conflict, although they may differ, to that same
extent are there many individual truths. It is thus that, in its
anti-intellectualism and emotionalism. Pragmatism becomes dis-
tinctly individualistic.
But Pragmatism is also immediaiism. For example, not
points, not lines, not volumes, but space as this is perceived
directly and without any definite outlines, is regarded as the
reality; the parts, such as points, cannot be sensed, and there-
fore are held to be only inventions of the intellect that serve
the practical purpose of dealing with the intuited whole, space.
But perhaps not even space, as thus intuited, is the reality.
For it is sensed, not as pure space, but as a space with "things"
in it, here and there, and moving, — in time. This whole, then,
may be the reality, a world of vaguely continuous and mutually
interpenetrating "things" and qualities, happenings, and rela-
tions, — matter, energy, time, space, ideas, volitions, feelings!
Perception directly distinguishes some of these from others, for
even to it certain lines of separation are evident. But these
lines are not so sharp as intellect in its analysis would find
them. Rather, all "things" are much more alike than science
and intellect would admit them to be. They are even so alike
as to be continuous. Even human personality, the human self,
the knower, may not be different from other "things," but
may be one with them, so that, as thas united, a whole of self
and not-self may be experienced in great throbs of emotion and
ecstasy.
Thus it is, that Pragmatism, as founded on a generalization
from natural science, and as developing on this basis an anti-
intellectualism and immediatism, becomes in its extreme form
anti-scientific, anti-analytical, and, in a very positive manner,
mystical.^ But, thus transformed, for it, all truth is lost;
there is only fad, and, at that, only one great fact or experi-
' JamcB, Pragmatism, p. 78.
* In Bergson, especiahy in Creative Evolution.
278 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
ence, which deserves not even this name, since it is the work
of intellect.
The third feature of Pragmatism's anti-intellectualism is de-
rived by a dialectical and analytical attack on the intellectual-
istic method in general and the analysis with which this
method is identical.** The means of logically establishing
this aspect of Pragmatism is radically different from that which
is used in behalf of the anti-intellectualism just considered.
First, — such is the irony — the intellectualistic assumption is
made, tacitly, and not explicitly, that only that which is free
from contradiction can be fact, and can he true}^ Secondly, it
is assumed, also tacitly, that to intellectualize, rationalize, and
analyze is identical with using the old Aristotelian logic ^^ with
its acceptance of the law of identity as the chief logical principle,
with its subjection to the concepts of substance and thing as the
universal type-phenomena, with the additive relation as holding
exclusively for the composition of parts into wholes, and with
the modification theory of relations as applying to all relations
between terms. Finally, to support this second assumption, this
anti-intellectualism draws upon the results of the natural
sciences, especially upon the theory of evolution, although ^^ it
ignores that real logic which both underlies much of modern
science, and also is so radically different from the traditional
Aristotelian doctrine." Accordingly, the method of rationaliz-
ing is, in both its analytical and synthetical aspects, implicitly
and arbitrarily limited to and identified with the use of the
principles of the latter doctrine.
However, as regards such a procedure, it is clear that no
attempt to invalidate reason as such gains its point unless all
of reason's aspects and methods are considered; and that to
identify rationalization with one specific procedure, and then on
this basis to derive an anti-intellectualism, is an attempt to
invalidate reason which fails, if there are alternative methods
• Especially Bergson in Time and Free Will and Creative Evolution;
cf. in the present volume, Chaps. III.; XXI.-XXV.; XXVI., II., 2; XL.,
VII.; XLIII., VII. -XI.
'" Bergson's major assumption.
" This is shown by penetrating beneath the superficial plausibility of
Bergson's arguments.
" Bergson, Creative Evolution.
" Cf. Chaps. XXI.-XXV.
PRAGMATISM 279
for reason to pursue. But one such alternative, in the ease
under consideration, reason has at its command in the principles
of the new logic.
Reasoning was identified with, and limited to, the use of
certain logical methods by Aristotle. It was still more inti-
mately identified with and limited to these methods in mediasval
and scholastic times, as it is even yet in the minds and teachings
of many philosophers, in the writings of many logicians, and
even in the opinions, though not in the thinking and procedure
of many scientists of the present day. But this identification
and limitation need not be made. Indeed they cannot be, pro-
vided one takes, as one must take, the same position toward
logic that is maintained toward other branches of investiga-
tion, namely, the position, that advance and new discovery is
possible.
Nevertheless, by first inconsistently ignoring this justified,
empirical, and pragmatic demand, and then by identifying reason
with the use of only the one method. Pragmatism seems to
emerge victorious in its propaganda against intellect. Such a
fallacious and yet plausible procedure is, however, not difficult !
To illustrate such a procedure, let us make the two assumptions
previously stated, especially the assumption, that parts are
related additively to form a whole, and then attempt on such a
basis to make a valid analysis of space.^* Now, according to
orthodox geometrical science, space is made up of points that
are unextended. But such points are the contradictory of ex-
tension. Then analysis here leads to the contradictory of the
"thing" analyzed, while the inverse process of synthesis cannot
derive extension from the unextended (since it is assumed that
points can be "put together," or are related only additively) .
Accordingly the dilemma results: Either the immediate experi-
ence or intuition of space as a whole is reliable, or the analysis
into points is. Choose either alternative and the other must be
rejected as false. The older intellectualism chose the second
alternative. Pragmatism in its anti-intellectualism chooses the
first.
Quite similarly Pragmatism contends that the analysis of
motion leads to rests, so that, inversely, synthesis "makes" mo-
>* Cf. Chaps. XXII.-XXIV., and XLIII.
280 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
tion consist of the sum of its contradictories. Accordingly,
motion is chosen as the ' ' real thing, ' ' and the rests are regarded
as only an invention of intellect that serves the purpose, per-
haps, of prediction, and the like.
This argument is generalized, since motion is regarded as
typical of all changed The sciences are then drawn upon to
show that all is change and evolution, as typified by motion.
Accordingly the conclusion is reached that, since change and
evolution cannot be analyzed without the introduction of con-
tradictions, they must be taken at their face value. ^"^ Thus to
the Mysticism that is derived from Immediatism there is now
added that Evolutionism which is derived from the acceptance
of the results of the natural, especially the biological sciences,
and from a specious argument against intellect.
The argument is specious, because those analytical and syn-
thetical results which are accepted as the outcome of intellectu-
alizing, are, as a matter of fact, not those which nfiodern science
really obtains}"^ Accordingly, if one but accept the alternative,
which is ready at hand, of identifying reasoning with the method
of obtaining these genuine scientific results, it will be seen, that
the whole argument against intellect falls to the ground, and
that the supposed contradiction between the immediately given
"thing" and the entities revealed by analysis entirely dis-
appears.
One can, therefore, accept hoth ivhole and part as equally real,
especially if that which is given directly as a whole, e.g., mo-
tion, stands the test, by correct methods, both of analysis into
parts and of synthesis into a rational whole. Indeed it is clear,
that, if rational methods are used in order to attack reason, the
validity of at least some rational methods is presupposed and
accepted. But the further correct use of these same methods
limits Immediatism, and shows that not all "things" are ex-
clusively a7id completely as they are directly experienced.
This is made clear by examining that correct intellectual
analysis of motion which began with the experimental work of
'° This is why Bergson selects motion and its analysis for examination
in the first cliapters of Creative Evolution and in Time and Free Will.
" Bergson, Creative Evolution.
" Cf. Chap. XLIII., and the writer's "Defense of Analysis" in The
New Realism.
PRAGMATISM 281
Galileo, and which was completed by Newton's application of
the Calculus to all cases of motion. The details of this analysis
constitute the science of Mechanics. This science, in turn, falls
within the new rather than within the old logic.
This modern analysis of motion shows, that that state of
affairs which holds at each instant of the motion of a body is
neither rest nor motion-: Rest is the occupation of a point for
at least two, and therefore for an infinite number of instants.
Then that complex which is constituted by the correlation of
one specific point with one specific instant, in the case of a body
moving along a specific path in a definite time, is not rest. But,
also, it is not motion, for motion is the series of such complexes.
Motion, therefore, is a whole that consists of two kinds of parts,
the one, smaller motions, the other, relational complexes ("ele-
ments" as regards motion) that are neither rests nor motions.
These "elements" are complexes in that each is composed of a
point correlated with an instant. ^^
Pragmatism's anti-intellectualistic attack on the analysis of
motion is, therefore, invalid. For correct modern analysis shows
that motion is not made up of its contradictories, rests, but of
parts which are neither like the whole, nor as unlike it as are
rests. Quite similarly, in the modern rationalization of motion
and of that of which motion is typical, namely, change in gen-
eral, the synthesis of wholes out of parts is not that which the
attack on intellect would have it. Clearly, if rests were the
"elements" of motion, and the rests could form a whole only
by being related additivcly, then only a whole that is like the
parts could be obtained from the parts. For the addition of
parts gives only wholes that are like the parts. Dollars related
additivcly give a s\im of dollars, and not a cash book. For,
the order of "things" makes no difference to addition.
2 + 3 = 3 + 2, or, more generally, a -\-h = h -\- a. This is
called the commutative law of addition. Accordingly, if the
"elements" of motion were related additivcly, then, e.g., in the
ease of a falling body, the order of the varying velocities at
different instants would make no difference. In any order, they
would be a whole accelerated motion. But the scientific fact is,
that there is a very definite order among these velocities by
" Cf. Chap. XLIII., X.
282 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
virtue of which they form a uniformly accderated motion. At
every instant there is a different velocity, and between any two
velocities there is an infinite number of others, with some of
these velocities in correlation with rational numbers, and others
in correlation with irrational numbers, but all in a very definite
order, namely, that of magnitude.
The relation between velocities whereby they form accelerated
motion, is, therefore, not additive, but a relation that generates
or determines an order which is fixed, irreversible, and non-
commutative. It is an order that has the same logical char-
acteristics as has the order of the instants of time, or as have
the positive integers in order of magnitude. It is clear, there-
fore, as concerns the character of loholes in contrast with that
of their parts, that a whole which is made up of parts related
additively can only be similar in character to these parts, but
that if a non-additive relation holds between the parts, a ivhole
unlike the parts results.
This last principle is the secret that underlies both the experi-
mental and the intellectual synthesis of modern science}^ For
example, genuine synthesis in the case of all chemical elements,
compounds, and "radicals," brings about new characteristics
in the resulting wholes, as is shown by the fact that hydrogen
and oxygen thus form water, and that carbon, hydrogen, nitro-
gen, oxygen, sulphur, magnesium, and some other elements thus
form that chemical and physical whole, protoplasm, which is
found in all living cells.
In accordance with quite the same principle, motion is "gen-
erated" by non-additive relations between "elements" that are
neither motions nor rests ; space, by non-additive relations be-
tween points that are neither extended, nor, strictly speaking,
unextended ; and time, by non-additive relations between instants
that are neither durations nor their contradictory. Indeed, it
is in accordance with this principle of non-additive synthesis
that all those wholes are formed which are treated in the appli-
cation of the calculus as integrals. In fact, were all wholes
only additive, then would the method and the logical doctrines
of the calculus not form a science at all. Additive synthesis
alone would suffice. But were all wholes only additively com-
'•Cf. Chap. XLUl., iv.-vi.
PRAGMATISM 28S
posed, then would everything be only a mixture, and there
would be "nothing new under the sun."^°
III. pragmatism's evolutionism
"We now reach the third main constituent doctrine of Prag-
matism. If Positivism with its reaction against the substance
concept is the first constituent of this philosophy, and anti-
intellectualism, in its three aspects, is the second, then evolu-
tionism is the third component of the pragmatic mixture.
The acceptance of the general doctrine of the modern scien-
tific concept of evolution together with other scientific results
and theories as the foundation on which to develop a philo-
sophical position is again witness to the close allegiance between
Pragmatism and Naturalism, Naturalism in its earliest days,
as found, e.g., in the works of J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer,
was evolutionistic. But this Naturalism also gave its alle-
giance to the substance concept as this developed into some one
of the three doctrines of Materialism, Parallelism, and Psychism.
In Pragmatism, however, as has been already shown, the sub-
stance concept is dropped, but evolution remains, — to play a
most important, if not a dominant role. As a result, sometimes,
as in the anti-intellectualism just discussed. Evolutionism
emerges as the grand peroration of the pragmatist, but in a
form no longer recognizable as the sober theory of the scientist.
Rather it becomes, as, e.g., with Bergson, the mystical doctrine
of an all-inclusive flux, with even the knowing process absorbed
in this, and with intellect and reason only crystallizing out here
and there to serve purely practical purposes, but not to reveal
fact. Sometimes, however, evolutionism appears in fairly
definite and accurate form as the very basis of Pragmatism.
This is the Pragmatism that is advanced by such American
writers as Dewey and James, and, among English philosophers,
by Schiller.
That which specifically characterizes the position of these
evolutionists, is, that with them, as with the anti-intellectu-
alists, the problem of prime interest is the epistemologieal prob-
lem, and, secondly, that the solution which is given to this
*" Cf. with this examination of Bergson, James, A Pluralistic Universe,
Ghape. VI. and VII.
284 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
problem is derived from a very specific cosmology that is ac-
cepted and postulated as a broad generalization from the nat-
ural sciences, namely, the cosmology of a universal evolution.
However, the Pragmatism of these writers is not completely
anti-intellectualistic, although it is explicitly anti any a priori
philosophy, such as the Kantian, that lays claim to the possi-
bility of arriving at knowledge by pure deduction from "truths
of the reason." In this sense it is radical Empiricism.
This evolutionistic Pragmatism aims to demonstrate that
intellect, reason, perception, memory, emotion, will, and the
psychic processes generally, have all evolved in correlation with
nervous systems and sense organs, and a general complexity of
structure, and the like, in biological evolution. Accordingly,
all these "entities" have only a relative and not an absolute
function. Indeed it is conceivable that, had the environment
been different, something quite different from intellect, percep-
tion, and the rest of the mental processes, or at least something
different by way of specific rational principles and specific modes
of perception, should have evolved. That which has de facto
developed and now persists, enjoys this good fortune only
because it is an adaptation and serves the organism some definite
purpose either directly, or indirectly by correlation with some
directly useful organ or function.^^
The general cosmological position upon which this theory is
founded is, as has just been stated, that everything, or that
almost everything evolves. With this the case, it may be ad-
mitted, perhaps, that the laws of evolution are themselves ex-
ceptions to evolution, although the knowledge of them is not.
Such an admission, however, proves to be extremely dangerous
to the theory. Nevertheless, under the influence of those natural
sciences which do find the principle of evolution valid for many
"things," such as chemical elements, planets, stars, continents,
seas, mountains, plants and animals, races and nations, lan-
guage and religion, it is not surprising that the hypothesis
should be formed, that perception, reason, truth, agsthetic
standards, and the like, should be added to the list.
A critical review of that pragmatism which is founded upon
" Tliis ia the pragmatism of James, Dewey, Baldwin, Schiller, Moore,
Mead, Ames, Boodin, Bawden, and many others.
PRAGMATISM 285
the general doctrine of an evolution of all "things" shows,
Ijowever, that the theory is not based upon any one of the
•specific biological theories of evolution. The general principle
of evolution is, perhaps, as old as Empedocles. It was accepted
by Aristotle and developed by him into a definite and detailed
philosophy — one of the most influential that human culture has
enjoyed. In modern times the Hegelian philosophy also is
distinctly a philosophy of evolution." But it is due to Darwin's
influence that the theory has become the capstone in the edifice
of biological science, and that the general principle has been
accepted and applied in one way or another in nearly every
field of inquir3^^^ Lamarck came earlier than Darwin, but it
was largely due to Darwin's specific theory of the origin of
species that interest was aroused in Lamarck's teachings.
Aristotle's philosophy of evolution and progressive develop-
ment was primarily a theory of universal change, or of uni-
versal motion, although, as such, it was a philosophy that was
inconsistent with his logic. Ilegel developed a general doctrine
of evolution that was a direct consequence of the Aristotelian
logic. He showed that, by the Aristotelian logic, any specific
change meant, that at some specific instant there both is and
is not a certain quality. This is the only way that the change
of a into h, e.g., hard into soft, can be rationalized by the old
logic. At a certain instant, then, something is, by this Hegelian
doctrine, both a and b, i.e., both a and non-a. It is both itself
and its contradictory. By showing further, now, that there is
no entity for which the contradictory cannot, indeed, must not
be thought, i.e., which does not imply its contradictory, Ilegel
identified change with logical necessity, and showed that change
is, in every instance, logically implied and necessitated.
The scientific and positivistic theories of evolution differ
widely from these philosophical theories. Most of them are
based largely upon empirical observation. Darwin's well-
known theory is, that out of the wide range of variations of
structure and of function presented by the individuals of any
" Cf. Chaps. XXXV.-XXXVIII.
^'' See Dewey, Influence of Daricin on Philosophy and other Essays; cf.
Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies (an excellent analysis of Evolu-
tionism in Chap. IX.), and Bawden, Principles of Pragmatiam, Chaps.
I.-V., VIII.
286 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
species, those individuals survive which present the variations
that are the best adapted to the environment. The "sifting"
by the environment is called natural selection. By means of
this selection, as it takes place through successively appearing
generations, a specific line of development is determined, and
organs and functions are formed that are specific adaptations.
As a corrollary, the principle is laid down, that only that which
is useful will persist and develop, and, conversely, that that
ivhich persists and develops must he characterized hy useful-
ness, — past, present, or future.
Lamarck's specific evolutionism is somewhat different. La-
marck held, that if an organism lacks a certain adaptation to
its environment, it ''feels" this lack, and also the need of over-
coming it, and that, accordingly, in response to this felt need,
the effort is made to overcome the lack. Thus, e.g., a giraffe
would stretch its neck for food, and a snake endeavor to squeeze
through a small opening. Such efforts have their effect on the
organism, which is thereby changed in an advantageous direc-
tion. Those organisms which thus succeed in adapting them-
selves to their environment survive and are the ones to repro-
duce their kind, and the next generation inherits the slight
adaptations gained by its parents. Lamarck's doctrine thus
accepts the principle of tJie inheritance of acquired characters.
The principle which appears as a corollary of this Lamarckian
theory is, that not only the useful persists, and that the persist-
ing is useful, but also that whatever is useful and persists was
felt hy the organism to he a need hefore the adaptation ap-
peared, and that it was even aimed at and purposed hy the
organism. Darwinism does not accept this last doctrine, but
finds it sufficient to posit in most cases a scheme of a rigorous
causal selection from those variations in structure and function
that the individuals of any species present. The inheritance of
acquired characters is appealed to only in exceptional instances.
Lamarckism therefore accepts original variations, but bases gen-
uine advance in usefulness of structure and function upon "a
felt lack and need," and the changing accommodations of the
individual in response thereto. Clearly it thus allows for a very
distinct immanent teleology, i.e., for an inherent and somewhat
mystical subconscious, or, perhaps, even conscious purposing
PRAGMATISM 287
faculty or process in every individual organism, possibly in
every part of every organism.
Most of the contemporaneous scientific theories of evolution
are the result of attempts to purify Darwinism and Lamarckism
of their inconsistencies. Such attempts issue in Neo-Darwinism
and Neo-Lamarckism. The one modern theory of note that is
not of this character is the mutation theory of de Vries. Dar-
winism and Lamarckism are essentially theories of the origin
of species, of functions, and of organs, by the gradual accumu-
lation, through successive generations, of minute favorahle dif-
ferences and adaptations. This process is sometimes called con-
tinuous, although it is never this in the strictest sense of the
term. The de Vriesian theory of mutations is, in contrast, that
of the appearance of sudden and fairly large definite differences
in the quantity or quality (one or both) of structure and func-
tion, of the individuals of one generation in contrast with those
of the preceding generations. De Vries observed the produc-
tion, by certain individual primroses, of new species of prim-
rose in the next generation. The test applied was that the new
species reproduces true to type. Others have observed similar
mutations or saltations in several species of plants and animals.
This theory is frequently called one of discontinuous origin as
opposed to the two previous theories of continuity. By it,
definite opportunity is left, however, for a selection by the
environment, since only those mutants which possess favorable
definite variations will survive and reproduce, thus to continue
the species. Accordingly, there is no opportunity for the La-
marckian theory of response to a felt need, and the inheritance
of the resulting acquired characteristics. Indeed de Vries as-
serts that no permanent new characters are ever formed in this
way. The corollary of the de Vriesian theory is, therefore,
similar to that corollary which is derived from the Darwinian
theory, yet with the difference, that in some cases the appear-
ance and persistence of characters does not mean their usefid-
ness. Characters that are indifferent in this respect, or that are
even harmful, may arise and persist for a time.
Pragmatism develops its evolutionism almost entirely by
using either the Darwinian or the Lamarckian scheme. The
de Vriesian theory is neglected, although it might furnish some
288 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
interesting possibilities. However, that which Pragmatism em-
phasizes in these theories is the corollaries rather than the main
principles. From the corollary, that that which has developed
and persists is, a fortiori, useful, or has been, or ivill he, useful,
the inference is drawn as regards the chief problem with which
Pragmatism is concerned, that consciousness in all of its specific
forms, such as knowing, reasoning, the formation of hypotheses,
theories, standards, ideals, and finally even the concept of truth
itself, is merely an adaptation or a useful function and process.
Sometimes there is added to this conclusion the further La-
marckian principle, that all of these entities arise because of a
felt lack and need in certain environmental circumstances, and
also because of the ability of the organism to foresee, to purpose,
to try this means and that, and finally to succeed in producing
what is demanded. The entire cognitive function in all of its
aspects is, accordingly, treated as a planning or purposing, with
ultimate success as the only acceptable outcome.^*
1. Criticism; Truth and Falsity, for Pragmatism
Of this main conclusion, however, the criticism is to be made,
that, from the fact that a function or an organ has persisted
and developed, it does not follow, that such a function or organ
is only useful, and nothing more. Indeed, as an even more
extreme position than this, it can be shown, that persistence and
further development are not even universally applicable criteria
for usefulness, since useless and, in some cases, positively injuri-
ous organs sometimes persist.^^ However, as against this criti-
cism Pragmatism claims that everything must find its place in
the general scheme of usefulness, even all that we usually call
evil, false, and detrimental. For, if everything evolves, then
have not alone the true, the good, and the beautiful, but also the
false, the evil, and the ugly played their usefid part, at least as a
means to useful ends.-*' Indeed, if standards and ideals also
evolve, and if the anti-intellcctualistic and immediatistic con-
tention is accepted, that the outcome is the sole test, then may
** This seems to me to be the type of pragmatism that is upheld by
Dewey and his followers.
"'^ Cf. V. L. Kellogg, Darwinism Today.
*' That they have, is frankly admitted by the pragmatistB.
PRAGMATISM 289
not what some call evil be to others the good, the false at one
period be the true at another, the beautiful to some be the ugly
to others, and, conversely in each case ?
Pragmatism answers all such questions with "yes," as, per-
haps, it is bound to do by its major postulate that all "things"
evolve. For, if everything evolves and changes, then, seem-
ingly, nothing is permanent, there is no standard, all is relative,
and anything may be a means to something else.
The result is, in that realm where the standard is usually j
referred to as truth, and where truth is identified by Prag- {
matism with the satisfactory, the successful, and, especially, the
useful, that everything is true and that there is no such thing
as the false. Thus that very basis of difference hy which truth
might he distinguished from falsity is done away with, and
Pragmatism is not logically entitled to use either term. There-
fore it cannot even claim itself to be a true theory as opposed
to other theories as false. It can only maintain that it itself,
like other theories, is useful in some way, or that it is satisfactory
to some philosophers though not to others, or that it is valuable
as a means to the development of further philosophical theories
as ends.
The pragmatic or utilitarian interpretation of ethical and
EBsthetic standards is also open to this same interpretation. In
reality, in order to have the distinction between the true and
the false, the right and the wrong, good and evil, more than
a merely verbal one, something more than persistence and use-
fulness must be recognized. Indeed, there is no other solution
to this problem of error than the candid admission that to
make a mistake is a possibility, often enough, indeed, an actu-
ality, that is characteristic of each kind of human cognition.
The implications of this admission are, however, interesting.
They are, that cognition is a process, or a relatio7i, or a group
of terms in specific relations, that, in any case, is independent
of that which is known, and that sometimes corresponds to the
reality known, revealing it as it is, and sometimes does not so
correspond." This implication is not compatible with that funda-
mental assumption which underlies the evolutionism of Prag-
*' Chaps. XL., I. and v.; XLI., vii.-xi., also xvi.; also Chaps. XLIV. and
XLV.
290 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
matism, namely, that all things interact.^^ For, if everything
interacts, so that there are causally produced variations, "lacks"
and "needs," and the strivings to remove and to meet these,
and a causal selection of some effects and elimination of others,
resulting in adaptations, then there must he, in some sense at
least, a universal correspondence between adaptation and the
entity to which the adaptation is made. For every effect must
correspond to its causes, every cause to its effects, with the result
that mistakes and errors, as absences of correspondence, cannot
exist.
Pragmatism is thus prohibited, not only from accepting the
implication of that definition of error which makes it identical
with the lack of correspondence between the cognitive process
and the "thing" known, but also from accepting error at all.
And yet, it does maintain that error exists, — most notably in
the instance of those systems that are opposed to Pragmatism.
The only condition on which such acceptance of error can
be justified is, that there is some other than a causal relation
between the knowing process and that which is known. But
the implications of this condition are, on the one hand, those
which correspond closely to the traditional definition of truth,
namely, that it is of the nature of a correspondence between
the knowing and the known, and, on the other hand, that know-
ing is a process, a relational complex {e.g., a dimension), or a
relation, that, in each case, is independent of that which is
known. For only provided that there is independence in the
situation can there sometimes be a lack of correspondence, or
error, and sometimes its presence, or truth.
The necessity of this same hypothesis is to be recognized also
in the instance of the knowing of such non-existential and non-
causal entities as numbers, space, and time, and all consistent
possihilities. Such entities are, but they do not exist. There-
fore between them and knowing there cannot be a causal rela-
tion. Yet they are known! In general, therefore, we are
*' Found explicitly, e.g., in James and Borgaon. (Soe references to
Chap. XXVI., II., 2.) This position of a universal interaction is derived,
as we have seen, from the traditional Aristotelian logic of things. Prag-
matism, therefore, in its hnsic postulate of ivfrraction and of a derivative
universal usefulness and identification of this loith truth, is the product
of the continued influence of this Aristotelian tradition.
PRAGMATISM 291
forced to the conclusion, that, if the endeavor is made to account
for the presence of that correspondence which subsists in the
case of genuine knowledge and truth, we must grant that there
is some other than a causal relation between the knowing process
and the known entity.^''
But, of other relations than the causal there are many, —
some of which we have already examined in detail. One of
the most important of these non-causal relations is found in
functional relationships, in which two variables are related and
yet are independent. One variable is called independent, the
other dependent, but this is not a causal dependence. It is,
rather, only the logical dependence of the logically subsequent
upon the logically prior. The relation between accelerated mo-
tion and time is a good illustration of such a relationship.
Consciousness, or cognition, would seem, therefore, to be some-
thing closely similar to such a dependent variable, with the
known object the independent variable. In the (genuine)
knowing of existing ''things" and processes, there would be,
then, a correspondence between the knowing and the known;
the latter would be logically prior to the former, the former
logically subsequent to the latter. In other words, know-
ing implies something known, and would not exist as this
or that specific knoiving, did not something (to be known)
exist or subsist; but the ''thing" (known) does not imply
the knowing, nor would it cease to be, should the knowing
disappear.
This hypothesis as to the nature of knowing, of the relation
between it and the entity known, and of truth and of error,
satisfies many of the demands that are met with in analyzing
these problems. Some of the further implications of this solu-
tion of these problems are as follows: —
I. In addition to the subsistence of a functional relation
between the knowing and the known, other relations, such as
those of similarity and dissimilarity, asymmetry, and the like,
may also subsist. Such an asymmetrical relation always holds
between the two variables in a functional relationship, and in
all instances of logical priority. Also, if the object known
exists, then are the knowing and the object similar in just this
'* Cf. the section on Eealism.
29i CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
respect, namely, that they both exist; while, if the object does
not exist, but subsists, then are the two dissimilaf', in that the
knowing is existential, and not merely subsistential.
II. Knowing is not a substance nor an essence, even as motion
is not, but is a relational complex that existentially is a function
of time. Thus the opportunity is given for escape from the
trammels of the old logic and the concepts of thing and sub-
stance, and for the interpretation of the nature of knowing and
perhaps of consciousness in general, by means of the concepts
and principles of the new logic, especially by the concept of
relation.
III, Specific instances of cognition, such as perception, mem-
ory, and reasoning, may arise under certain specific conditions,
such as specific causal and functional relationships of a nervous
system and sense organs to the environment, and yet these con-
ditions need not be in the relation of cause to the knowing
process. Yet between or among existing knowing processes
themselves, there may be causal relations. This is analogous
to the situation that subsists, e.g., in the case of motion. A
specific motion is not caused by time, yet one specific motion
may cause another.
TV. If causation and interaction are not universal — and there
is not only no proof that they are, but there is proof that they
are not — then there may be independent causal series. Knowing
processes might be one such independent series, and other ex-
istent objects another, and the two be in relation. Accordingly,
whatever this relation might be, i.e., whether it be one of cor-
respondence or some other relation, its subsistence between
series that are independent would be a matter of the lack of
causal determination, and, in this respect, a matter of mere
chance.
V. Such an hypothesis accounts for the necessity of an
inductive procedure in gaining knowledge, a method, namely,
that is identical with the lack of absolute certainty, and with
the necessity of experimentation, guesses, trials, errors, and the
testing by subsequent working. But the test by successful
working is only an indication of the presence of the relation of
correspondence and of truth, and is not this relation itself.
Truth conditions success, but success and usefulness are not
A
PRAGMATISM 29S
identical with truth, although they may indicate its presence.^"
We must be careful, however, to guard against a misinter-
pretation of the admission, made some pages back, that "to
make a mistake" and "to be in error" is a possibility, often
become actual, for every kind of cognition. For many phi-
losophers are prone to infer from this admission (1) that con-
sciousness in general, or that the knowing process in particular,
is alone co7istitutive of error; in other words, that all error,
including illusions, hallucinations, v^Tong judgments, is either
percipi or concipi in its esse; and (2) that, accordingly, since
some entities are thus subjective in their being, the existence
and the subsistence of all "things" is identical with their
percipi or their concipi.
However, neither of these conclusions is implied by the ad-
mission of error. For, in the first place, if some things, e.g.,
the seeming convergence of the rails of the railroad, were sub-
jective in their being, this would imply other entities that are
not subjective, but objective. Even Subjectivism cannot make
everything subjective, as we have seen.^^ For example, the
existence of a spirit is not identical with the idea or notion of
it that is possessed by another spirit. And, in the second place,
one is not obliged to admit even that all errors or error-objects
are subjective in character. Indeed, other hypotheses account
for them far better. Thus, in the case of perceptual errors of
the type of the apparently bent, but actually straight stick in
the water, the bentness is as ohjective as the straightness. The
bentness is a characteristic of the complex, the stick and the
light as this is refracted by the water; the straightness is the
quality of the stick by itself. Different relational complexes may
** For the development of these hj-potheses, see the section on Realism;
also cf. with the discussion of error just given, Chaps. XLI. and XLIII.,
II., and the references there given; also see Poincare, Value of Science,
Science and Hypothesis, Foundations of Science, trans, by Halsted (the
last inclusive of the two above and of Science and Method) ; Bawden,
op. cit., Chap. VI.; Dewey, Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and otheii
Essays, Chap. IV., especially p. 95; also Chaps. V.-XI. On pragmatism's
doctrine of Truth and Error, see James, Pragmatism, lectures II., VI.,
and VII., and The Meaning of Truth, 1909; also Dewey, Essays in Experi-
mental Logic, 1916; C. S. Pierce, Popular Science Monthly, December
1877, and January, 1878, and Hihhert Journal, II., 1908; Russell, Philo-
sophical Essays, IV., on Pragmatism (one of the best criticisms), and V.
and VII. on the Nature of Truth.
*' Chap. XXX.
S9* CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
have different characteristics, even when one complex is a con-
stituent of another complex, as in this case. In this situation
the only error that is inherently irremovable from consciousness
seems to be that of "taking," in the absence of knowledge of
refraction, what is really a straight stick to be a bent one. But
if knowledge of refraction is present, then two knowing processes
may occur, in each case with that correspondence between the
knowing and its object which constitutes truth. The one process
has the straight stick by itself as its content ; the other, the line
of the stick as refracted by the water, i.e., the bentness.
In the case of another class of errors, namely, those of judg-
ments, of false hypotheses, and the like, the situation is somewhat
different. We have previously presented the evidence for the
philosophical and logical position, that not all entities exist, but
that some only subsist. Numbers, space, and time, and all states
of affairs, are examples of such mere subsistents. An existent
is singular, particular, and concrete, and as such is correlated
with a specific time and place, or at least with a specific time.
A subsistent is not so correlated. The position that there are
entities that are only subsistents results from the fact, that some
specific status must be found for those entities to which we are
led by following out implications, but which do not exist, as,
e.g., the geometrical relations of a perfectly spherical object.
Scientific investigation shows that such entities are implied to
be neither physical nor mental existents, and yet to be facts.
As concerns our specific discussion, therefore, we must ask
the question. What status have hypotheses that are m error, and
yet are internally consistent, examples being some of the great
historical scientific hypotheses such as the Ptolemaic theory that
the earth is the center of the universe with the planets, the
sun and the stars rotating around it. This is, indeed, the
apparent motion. Therefore, the inherent error in the knowing
processes of all those who preceded Copernicus (1473-1543) may
be said to have consisted in "taking" the apparent to be the
real or existential situation. However, there must be something
by virtue of which the apparent is the apparent and the "real,"
the real.
In solution of the inquiry which is thus suggested, it is to
be said, that, if a theory is internally consistent, then between
PRAGMATISM 295
the knowing of that state of affairs which the theory describes
and the (subsistential) entities of which this state of affairs
holds, there is a relation of correspondence. If, now, one takes
these entities to be also existential, and they are not, one is in
error. On the other hand, if they are existential, then there is
not only a correspondence between the knowing process and
the subsistents, but also between the subsistents and the ex-
istents, as well as between the existents and the knowing. But,
because that which one takes to exist does not exist, is no ground
for making it subjective. Rather, if such an entity finds its
place in a consistent and implicative theory, then, although not
existential, it is subsistential, and as objective as any existential
entity.
By this rather complicated theory, error may be defined as
the "regarding" of something as existential that is only sub-
sistential. Only "the regarding," however, is subjective in
character, i.e., conscious, and it is this, also, only to him who is
immediately "making" the wrong identification of the merely
subsistential with the existential. The "regarding" is, there-
fore, the only psychical feature in the whole error situation.
That which is "regarded as" is neither psychical nor physical;
yet it is objective. It subsists.
From the further discussion and development of this theory
of error we refrain, although there are many remaining points
of interest and of difficulty. But the discussion that has been
presented may have sufficed to show (1) that Pragmatism does
not give a satisfactory theory of error is distinction from truth;
and (2) that if, quite independently of pragraatistic doctrines,
the endeavor is made to find a real difference between truth and
error, we are not forced to grant that the esse of error is either
its percipi or its concipi — in other words, that all errors are
constituted by consciousness, or are conscious in nature. So
much the less, therefore, is it justified to infer, as do some
idealistically and subjectivistically minded philosophers, that the
esse of all objects consists in their being known, — i.e., that their
esse is their percipi or their concipi.
2. The Degrees of Pragmatism's Evolutionism
From this discussion of the pragmatic doctrines of truth and
296 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
error we must now return to the consideration of other phases
of Pragmatism's evolutionism. This Evolutionism is advanced
in different degrees by the various adherents of the pragmatic
philosophy.
One "degree" of this evolutionism consists of the teachings
just presented and criticized. Pragmatism takes over the point
of view of the natural, especially the biological sciences, and,
generalizing, maintains that not only organisms, but also ideas,
hypotheses, and theories evolve. But at this stage of its de-
velopment, Pragmatism also accepts unconsciously the realistic
point of view of the sciences, namely, that within the usual
limits of empirical error, organisms, inorganic elements and
compounds, suns and stars, and mental processes, are known
(in these sciences) essentially as they are, unmodified and un-
created by being known. Also, although these sciences are them-
selves regarded as evolving, nevertheless, in this "degree" of
Pragmatism's development, it is never doubted that there is
a standard of absolute truth which is approached nearer and
nearer. Thus the possibility that, although knowing processes
themselves evolve, they should, in the sciences and especially in
the pragmatic theory itself, reveal "things" as they are, is
never questioned. Indeed, in Pragmatism of this degree it is
held that there is a genuine objective evolution, that is known by
the pragmatist, and that "holds" of all, or, at least, of most
"things." In all this. Pragmatism very evidently accepts the
positions, (1) that there is an absolute truth as a standard or
ideal; (2) that knowing, although related to the "things"
known, neither modifies nor constitutes those things; and (3) that
the relation between knowing and the known by which truth is
constituted is one of correspondence^^^ These propositions are,
however, all markedly inconsistent with Pragmatism's own im-
plications, namely, (1) that truth is identical with usefulness
and success; (2) that whatever, by way of ideas, theories, and
the like, is useful and succeeds, is, therefore, true in just this
sense of the identity of the trite with the useful; (3) that all
"things" interact, producing adaptations, and that knowing is
itself an adaptation; and (4) that, accordingly, knowing must
" Cf. for these three points Chap. XL., iii. and vii. ; XLI; and
XLIII.
PRAGMATISM 297
not only be produced or caused, but must itself causally bring
about effects.
In a further or second degree of the development of its evo-
lutionism, Pragmatism aims to correct some of these incon-
sistencies. It still retains its realistic doctrine, derived from the
natural sciences, that the "real nature" of "things" can be
known, and can, therefore, be related to the knowing without
being affected thereby. But it now maintains that, also, all the
principles of proof, all tests and criteria, as well as all specific
theories, have evolved, and have persisted and been accepted
only because of their usefulness. However, the standard of an
absolute truth is still tacitly accepted, both for Pragmatism itself
as a theory, and for the sciences that it accepts. Yet the dif-
ficulty is recognized of finding an absolute criterion and test
by which to make certain that such a truth has been attained.
The position is taken, not that this truth cannot be won, but
that, possibly, it may not have been, except by the merest chance,
as it were, so that, in these circumstances, the only feasible test
is empirical confirmation by immediate experience, success, and
usefulness. At this stage, however, there still remains the incon-
sistency of a presupposed absolutism side by side with an implied
relativism as regards the nature of truth.^^
In the third degree of Pragmatism's development the attempt
is made to remove the ground for this last criticism, by maintain-
ing, that even standards and ideals, in fact, that the very "ideas"
or principles of truth, of right and goodness, of correctness, and,
indeed, of all tests and criteria have evolved, and that these
ideas and principles have persisted, because of their useful and
satisfactory character. But the thought of a realm of facts that
are independent of being known, and that, if known, are not
infiuenced by the knowing, still lurks in the minds of the ad-
herents of this degree of evolutionism, as is shown by the attitude
that is still taken toward their own theory. For it is main-
tained that this, at least, portrays "things" as they are, and
'• These three degrees of Pragmatism's Evolutionism will not be found
to be as sharply distinguished in pragmatic literature as they are here.
They are degrees in the growth of the pragmatic viewpoint until it reaches
the extreme development that is found, e.g , in Schiller's Humanism and
Bergson's Creative Evolution. On the whole, Dewey and James and their
followers represent the first two stages, Schiller and Bergson, the third.
298 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
the natural sciences are still drawn upon to furnish many of the
details. Thus the Realism in the position still persists.
Finally a desperate attempt is made to remove this last incon-
sistency by applying the concept of evolution to the very idea
of a real "ivorld" and to the knowledge of all those details in
terms of which, because of the development of language, of
beliefs, of conventions, and the like, this "world" is thought of
by human beings. All that we regard the "world" to be, either
en masse or in detail, is here interpreted as man-made. This is
Pragmatism's humanism. If man were a lion, then were God
also a lion, said Xenophanes. "But man is man," says Human
ism, and, therefore, is everything after the image of man.^'^
But whether even this advanced degree of Pragmatism's evo-
lutionism is sufficiently consistent is still a question. For, it
is still important to ask, whether man himself is thus known
as he really is, or only as a mere invention, a growth, a "working
point of view," an hypothesis? But, if he is this, then it may
be asked, Where is the leverage, the resting point, the nov ffrco
of the position? Must there not be "somewhere" a reality that
is not man-made, that is 7iot relative, and that is not dependent,
in any way whatsoever, on being known ? Does not the position
presuppose this, and, also, that this reality is correctly known,
even though it be (known) only as a pliable, plastic "some-
thing" that, as knowing processes appear in the evolutionary
series, may be modified, altered, and, in short, "made" in the
form in ivhich it is now known hy virtue of its causal relation
to the knowing process? Finally, is this radical evolutionism
itself man-made and humanistic, and relativistic in the sense,
that another theory might have become man-made? Or does it
present the real state of affairs?
To these inquiries the reply must be, that Humanism presup-
poses a definite ontology, and that it accepts this ontology on
the basis of a realistic epistemology. In this respect it is quite
like, e.g., Phenomenalism. In fact it is a modern recrudescence
of this position, adapted to the demands or influences of the
** Schiller in Humanism, Axioms as Postulates; cf. Schiller in Personal
Idealism, Bergson in Creative Evnintinn. and .lamca in I'ragmatism, Lec-
tures II., VI., and especially VII., p. 242, "Schiller on Humanism";
also, The Meaning of Truth, Lectures III. and V., and Essays in Radical
Empiricism, Chaps. VII. and IX.
PRAGMATISM 299
general theory of evolution. No longer, in contrast with the
earlier pragmatisms, does it preach the doctrine, that it may
be, that we do 7wt know; but, rather, like Phenomenalism, it
explicitly concludes that we cayinot know "things" as they are,
but only as ive make them, and, therefore, as thej^ appear to us.
Also, like Phenomenalism, it implicitly presupposes, as a basis
for this conclusion, a genuine knowledge of some 'things"
as they are, and finally concludes with a theory which,
as a whole, presents a states of affairs that is presumed to be
real, and not ** manufactured" in any sense. Thus it is, that
a realistic epistemology emerges both at the heginning and at
the end of Humanism.^^
rV. GENERAL CRITICISM OF PRAGMATISM
Every degree of the development of the pragmatic position,
except perhaps the first, is open to the charge of the same incon-
sistency of which, in this final degree, Humanism is guilty,
namely, that a non-pragmatic position is tacitly presupposed as
a basis upon which both to develop the pragmatic theory of
knowledge and also to accept the resulting detailed theory as
true. The first degree of Pragmatism seems to escape this incon-
sistency, but this is only because the implications of such an
elementary Pragmatism are not made explicit.
The crucial question is, therefore, whether the pragmatic
theory in its complete development is to be accepted and inter-
preted pragmatically, or not ? "^ Consistency demands that it
shall be so accepted, and yet, if it is so accepted, — on the ground, .
namely, that it is a theory that works well, and is useful and
satisfactory — then one must infer that it is a theory that is true j
only relatively, and not absohitely. But, on the other hand, ,«
Pragmatism is a theory that is advanced as true in the latter, '
and not in the former sense. Also, if Pragmatism is itself '(
interpreted pragmatically on the ground of consistency, yet not
because consistency is useful, but because it is consistency, then, i
again, not a pragmatic, but an absolutistic criterion and char- \
acteristic of truth is accepted. The only escape from this is
=" Cf. Section 4, Chaps. XXXIX. and XL.
^* The question raised, e.g., by Royco in his presidential address, "The
Eternal and the Practical," Phil. Review, Vol. XIIL, No. 2, March, 1904.
300 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
to accept consistency as being merely useful, but this is at the
cost of introducing relativism once more as characterizing, not
only other truth, hut also the triith of Pragmatism itself. On
the other hand, if the pragmatic position, either in its partial or
its complete development, be interpreted frankly as not relative,
as not pragmatic, but as portraying ahsolutely the real state of
of affairs concerning the "things" it investigates, then it is
disloyal to its own theory of truth and of knowledge, and is
open to the charge of inconsistency, even as this is defined by
the very absolutism which is therewith tacitly accepted.^''
This is the dilemma in which Pragmatism finds itself. It
would choose to be relativistic toward everything — except the
pragmatic theory; but toward this it must, seemingly, be abso-
lutistic, though to be this is to incur new difficulties in order to
avoid others. It would hold that all ''things," including all
knowing processes, interact with other "things," with the result
that all "things" are modified by one another, constituted by
one another, and adapted to one another. But Pragmatism
does not take this position as regards those "things" or states
of affairs that are known in the pragmatic theory, and that
are related to the knowing that takes place in the mind of the
pragmatist. Indeed, it cannot take this position toward itself,
without making itself relativistic, and not absolute ; yet it must
take this position toward itself in order to be consistent.
Which horn of the dilemma does Pragmatism "really"
accept? The answer to this inquiry depends psychologically
upon the attitude which one takes toward the character and
use of logical principles. Can such principles be used uncon-
sciously and without having received formulation, or not? Can
one thus unconsciously have his thinking conform to and pre-
suppose certain principles; e.g., can one in asserting and deny-
ing, thus use and presuppose the principle of contradiction?
If these "things" can be done, then the answer to our first
inquiry is quite evident — and it is an answer that is quite in
accordance with that standpoint which is accepted and pre-
sented in our introductory chapters. That answer is, that Prag-
matism itself logically — no matter what attitude the prag-
matist may will explicitly to express in indignant denial of
•' Royce's criticism, ihid.
PRAGMATISM SOI
this — contradicts itself iy explicitly developing the definition of
all truth as relative, and hy then making a tacit exception to
this definition as regards the truth of itself as a theory.
To the writer the fact of this self-contradiction in Prag-
matism makes the theory impossible of acceptance, while it also
furnishes further empirical evidence for Realism. For it is upon
a realistic basis that Pragmatism rests as regards the epi-
stemological interpretation of the knowing of those states of
affairs that form the "content" of the theory itself, or that
are "the objects known" and described in that theory.
The crucial question for Pragmatism therefore is, Shall this
realistic basis be observed and developed further? But, if it
is, what becomes of Pragmatism? And if it is not, what becomes
of Pragmatism's consistency?
V. CONCLUSION
This discussion of Pragmatism has been so long that it may
be well to give a summary. The theory represents the most
modern development of the positivistic and naturalistic tend-
encies in philosophy, as these have been influenced by the nat-
ural and empirical sciences, and especially by the general
doctrine of evolution. The theory is, however, full of incon-
sistencies, some of which are most damaging. If these be dis-
missed by Pragmatism with the claim, that consistency is one
kind of usefulness, but not the only kind, and that, therefore,
it need not trouble itself over these internal difficulties, and
that it itself may be useful and satisfactory and therefore true
notwithstanding them, then, in accepting usefulness and satis-
factoriness as the ultimate characteristic of itself as a theory,
Pragmatism must grant the right of other opposed theories to
maintain this same status, as well as whatever follows from it.
But, one will readily appreciate, that to some philosophers
other theories may be quite as satisfactory and useful as Prag-
matism is to its adherents, and, therefore, by Pragmatism's own
doctrine, be quite as true. Then ivhy — one naturally asks —
advocate Pragmatism as against these other theories ?
The fact is, however, that Pragmatism's identification of
truth with usefulness and resulting satisfaction, and the like,
does not stand the test of criticism. Indeed, Pragmatism does
802 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
not accept this identification in regard to the presumed truth of
its own theory. Toward itself, it takes the position that, al-
though it is a useful and satisfactory theory to the pragmatist,
it is not for these reasons true. Rather, its truth is tacitly held
to "rest" on another relation, namely, that of correspondence
between the known state of affairs described by Pragmatism and
the knowing of this, and it is because the theory is true in this
sense, that it is also useful and satisfactory. Usefulness and
resulting satisfaction are thus tacitly held by Pragmatism to be,
at most, only indications of or tests for its own truth, — a truth
that conditions them, but with which they are not identical.
However, Pragmatism does not consistently stand by even
this last tacitly presupposed position, namely, that the useful-
ness and satisfaction of an idea, a theory, a belief are indications,
or tests of truth. For, toward other theories which are directly
opposed to the pragmatic, and which are satisfactory to their
adherents. Pragmatism takes the position, that, although useful,
these theories are not true;^^ indeed, in their case. Pragmatism
maintains that the very fact, that the idea, or "the holding of
them to be true," itself generates or conditions the effect of
satisfaction, makes against their being true. In these circum-
stances it is quite evident that Pragmatism cannot consistently
advance the doctrine, implied by its evolutionism, that mere use-
fulness and satisfaction are not only "marks" of, but also are
identical with, truth. This identification makes it impossible,
as we have seen, for Pragmatism to recognize as false anything
that has persisted and is still extant. Yet, inconsistently there-
with. Pragmatism regards those theories that are opposed to it
&. thoroughly in error.
On the other hand, if one considers, not the consequences, but
the suppositions upon which the pragmatic theory rests, and the
positions which it takes toward itself, and compares these with
its explicit teachings, one again discovers many inconsistencies.
Explicitly, in its epistemology. Pragmatism is relativistic and
individualistic. But, for itself, it presupposes Absolutism and
a universal standard. Further, explicitly, in its most advanced
degree of development, it is phenomenalistic, with a strong tend<
'"E.g., .Tamos, Pragmatism, Lectures III. and IV.; Pluralistic Universe,
Lectures I., II., III.
PRAGMATISM SOS
ency towards Subjectivism. But, toward itself and in respect
to the ontology upon which it rests, it is frankly realistic. Its
cosmology and teleology are those largely of the generalized
theory of evolution which it obtains from the natural sciences,
and which it both rests upon and further develops. Also, its
ethics and entire theory of values, as explicitly developed, are
evolutionistic and relativistic, while, by its explicit teachings,
the theological problem is as capable of as many solutions as
are satisfactory and useful to different races, nations, and even
individuals.
Toward the problem of the nature of consciousness, Prag-J
matism offers no positive contribution, except by elimination.!
It does, however, get away from any explicit teaching, that there
is an ego or siibstance-like and indivisible, simple soul, or that
consciousness in its several phases is a substance or energy.
Rather, it approaches the realistic position, that consciousness
is either a specific relation or a dimension,^" and the dynamic
view of modern psychology, that consciousness appears and dis-
appears on certain conditions, so that it is the generic name for
a specific set of processes.
For its reaction and protestations against the domination of
the ''thing" and substance concepts in our thinking, Prag-
matism deserves only credit. Yet, since these concepts have
been and still are satisfactory to some thinkers in the develop-
ment of science and philosophy, Pragmatism must admit, by
its explicit teachings as to the nature of truth, the truth of these
concepts.
Like other philosophies. Pragmatism is the result of intel-
lectual endeavor. It therefore presupposes the correctness and
trustworthiness of at least some intellectual methods.*" Yet,
in its extreme form of evolutionism and anti-intellectualism, it
denies to intellect all power to reveal the absolute truth, ascrib- ,
ing to it only the ability to produce falsifications that are
nevertheless useful.*^ In this attack, however, intellect is un-
justifiably limited to the use of only one set of rational princi-
ples, namely, those of the old logic of "things," The attack
'" James, Pluralistic Universe, Lecture V.
*" Cf. Chap. XL., IX., XLL, xii. and xiv.
*' Bergson's position in Creative Evolution.
804 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
fails, however, because in the solution of certain problems, such
as those of motion and change in general, other methods of
analysis and synthesis are at hand for intellect to use. The
attack also fails, if that presupposition which Pragmatism itself
makes as regards its oivn argument be recognized, namely, that
the old logic is valid for the field of ordinary discourse. One
can readily show, therefore, that both intellect and perception
reveal fact, and that truth is obtained by checking each of these
processes by the other.
This, indeed, is the method that has been used by practically
all modern sciences, especially by those natural sciences upon
which Pragmatism in particular is based. Therefore Prag-
matism's anti-intellectualism is acceptable and stands the test
of criticism only in so far as it is a protest against the exclusive
use of the old logic of "things." This was the method of
scholastic science and philosophy, and it has been the method
also of much modern philosophy. But it is not the method and
the iyitellectualism of modern times.
Just as one finds both acceptable and unacceptable doctrines
in Pragmatism's anti-intellectualism, so also does one find them
in its evolutionism. Pragmatism as a philosophical position is
based on the general doctrine of evolution more than upon any
other scientific principle. For, even in that phase of Prag-
matism's anti-intellectualism in which all intellectualizing is
held to be a process of falsifying, and it is concluded, that only
"the evolving" is real, it is only the order of argumentation for
evolutionism, namely, the ratio cognoscendi that is different.
The ratio essendi, the real logic of the order of its argument, is
still the same, namely, that Pragmatism is derived from the con-
cept of evolution as applied to everything.
In its use of the doctrine of evolution. Pragmatism, however,
goes to extremes. It is, undeniably, a fact of science, that many
"things" evolve. The list of "things" that do, includes stars,
and suns and planets, perhaps, also, the chemical elements, cer-
tainly plants and animals, and, finally, such human institutions
as language, religion, literature, art, science, and philosophy.
But, just as the principles of biological evolution do not hold for
all these evolving "things," so, also, is it a question whether
the general principle of evolution applies to all "things" without
PRAGMATISM 305
exception. Pragmatism, somewhat uncritically and vaguely,
maintains that it does. But, it may be asked, whether, e.g., the
principle of evolution, as distinct from the knowledge of this
principle, itself evolves? Certainly the knowledge of it may,
but does it, even if all other "things" do? But further, do
space and time evolve, or does only the knowledge of them? Do
numerical relations, although the evolution of other "things"
may take place in accordance with these? Do those general
logical principles that underlie the very principle of evolution
itself? Finally, do all those states of affairs that hold of those
entities to which we are led by consistent thinking, namely, the
realm of subsistents? Or those ultimate elements, — whatever
these may be, electrons, or something else, — out of which the
existential physical world is "made"?
If the answer to these questions, some or all of them, is
negative, as it must be, then the position that must be taken
toward the principle of evolution is, that its field is limited.
Not all "things" evolve! Some do, hut some do not. Those
which do, are those existents, physical and mental, which are
complex, and not simple. But no subsistents evolve, and some
existents do not, namely, those existents that are absolutely
simple. Only complex existents, correlated as they are with
specific times or places, one or both, are subject to the general
principle of evolution, and that, perhaps, in only the most
general sense of this term as meaning change in composition,
usually from the less to the more complex.
The logical and philosophical position that Pragmatism pre-
supposes or takes toward itself both in its foundation and as a
fully developed, reasoned theory, confirms this criticism of evo-
lutionism. For example, it may be asked: Is the pragmatist
ever found presenting his Pragmatism as a theory that is true
(useful) only today, but that would not have been true a
hundred years ago, or that would not be true a hundred years
hence ? Does he not, rather, offer it for acceptance as a position
which presents a state of affairs regarding knowledge, truth, and
the like, that was a fact before it was known to be a fact, but
that has become known in recent years and that will remain a
fact indefinitely in the future, even though it be for gotten f
Also, does not the pragmatist take the position toward bis own
806 CAUSATION PHILOSOPHIES
theory, that, although the knowledge of it has evolved, the com-
plex state of affairs which it presents has not?
Seemingly, if we can judge by the character of the prag-
matist's own propaganda, only ''yes" can be answered to these
inquiries. But, if a distinction is presupposed between, on the
one hand, that state of affairs which has been fact ''all the
time," and has not evolved, and, on the other hand, the knowing,
which has evolved, then is it not also presupposed that, although
the knowing of the pragmatic theory may be both satisfying
and useful, nevertheless, these characteristics do not constitute
the truth of the theory ? And is it not also presupposed that the
theory is true, because the knowing that has evolved reveals
the real nature of "things," so that there is a relation of cor-
respondence between the knowing and the known ?
Again must our inquiries be answered affirmatively. The
same general position that Pragmatism takes for itself must be
adhered to in the philosophical interpretation of the character
of other attempts to know. There are two realms of entities to
become known when the conditions for knowing have themselves
evolved. These two realms are those of existents and of suh-
sistents.*- Jome existents evolve, and, among these, are specific
knowing processes, which can themselves become known as well
as can other e istents. The evidence is, however, that knowing,
once it exists, is not subject to the same principle of causal
interaction as are other evolving "things." For, although the
knowing is, of course, related to the "thing" known, the two are
independent of each other. The knowing takes place, and knowl-
edge arises, yet in no case with absolute certainty, but only
with tentativeness. Among ideas and beliefs, theories and
hypotheses, there are variations, survivals, and deaths, in fact
a genuine evolution. The useful ideas and theories survive, their
usefulness being conditioned by their truth, a7id not conversely,
until finally a state of affairs is revealed concerning both
"things" that exist and "things" that do not, which knowledge
has a high degree of probable, though, perhaps, never of abso-
lute truth.
Pragmatism in its evolutionism presents much that is true in
this sense. But, just as the theory itself has had a history, and
**Cf. the classification given in Chap. XLIV.
PRAGMATISM 307
has evolved, without that state of affairs which it describes hav-
ing enjoyed the same fate, so Evolutionism may hold of many
"things" without holding of all. This, rather than that uni-
versal evolutionism which Pragmatism maintains, is the verdict
of that modern criticism which is so fortunate as to be free from
the naturalistic bias that is engendered by the undue emphasis
of the natural sciences in respect of their data, their methods,
and their dominant concepts and generalizations.
GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY
The literature on Pragmatism has been very extensive in recent years
in respect to both volumes and articles. The following are some of the
more important volumes by the leading American and English pragmatists:
H. H. Bawden, The Principles of Pragmatism, 1910; J. E. Boodin, Truth
and Reality, 1912; J. Dewey (with his pupils), Studies in Logical Theory,
1903, 2nd ed., 1909, (cf. Empirical Logic, 1916) ; Ethics (with J. H. Tufts),
1909; Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and other Essays; Education and
Democracy, 1916; and many articles in the philosophical journals; Wm.
James, Meaning of Truth, 1909, Pragmatism, 1907, A Pluralistic Universe,
1909, Some Problems of Philosophy, 1910, Memories and Studies, 1911,
Essays in Radical Empiricism, 1912; A. W. Moore, Pragmatism and Its
Critics, 1910; F. C. S. Schiller, Humanism, 1912, and an Essay in Personal
Idealism, ed. by H. Sturt, 1902.
The leading French pragmatist is Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans, by
Mitchell, 1911; Titne and Free Will, trans, by F. L. Pogson, 1910; Matter
and Memory, trans, by Paul and Palmer, 1911.
Among German pragmatists there are: W. Jerusalem, Introduction to
Philosophy, trans., 5th ed., 1910; H. Vaihinger, Die Philosophic als Ob,
1911: Nietzsche was one of the earliest pragmatists, especially in his
" Darwinian Period," — a fact that is generally overlooked. Works, Eng.
trans., ed. by Tille; cf. monographs on Nietzsche by A. Riehl, Vaihinger,
Eisler, Wolf, and Menchen.
Closely allied with Pragmatism and regarded by some as pragmatists
are: Poincare, Science and Hypothesis, Value of Science, Science and
Method; Mach, Science of Mechanics, and Wdrmelehre (last part) ; LeRoy,
in many articles; Karl Pearson, Grammar of Science; Eucken, Main Cur-
rents of Modern Thought, and a number of other volumes.
For a discussion and criticism of Pragmatism see: Wm. Caldwell, Prag-
matism and Idealism; C. S. Peirce, Popular Science Monthly, December,
1877, and January, 1878; G. Tyrell, Christianity at the Crossroads, 1909,
Lex Orandi, 1903, Lex Credendi, 1906; A. O. Lovejoy, " The Thirteen Prag-
matisms," Journ. of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. V., p. 5;
Royce, Presidential Address on " The Eternal and the Practical," PhiL
Review, March, 1904.
SECTION III
SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
OBJECTIVE IDEALISM
CHAPTER XXXIV
INTRODUCTORY
I. OBJECTIVE, SUBJECTIVE, AND PLATONIC IDEALISM
Objective Idealism is the name for that philosophy which
maintains that, while so-called physical entities are not, as
Subjective Idealism holds, either the sensations or the ideas of
finite spirits, they (physical entities) and, also, all other entities
are, nevertheless, in some way psychical or mental in nature,
especially as identical with the mental "contents" of some Abso-
lute Mind, Self, or Spirit. Of all modern philosophical systems
this position has received, perhaps, the fullest development, and
exerted the widest influence in philosophical and especially in
religious circles. Phenomenalism is the only position to dispute
these claims, but Objective Idealism probably far exceeds Phe-
nomenalism in the number both of its adherents and of the
pages offered in its behalf in the classical tomes of such phi-
losophers as Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer,
Bradley, and Royce.
Historically Objective Idealism grew out of Phenomenalism
in the efforts of the critics ^ of this latter theory to remove its
difficulties and to present a coherent and consistent system.
Therefore, thus regarded. Phenomenalism, with its emphasis of
the epistemological problem and of the ego-centric predicament,
becomes the most completely developed and the most influential
of all modern systems. However, while the study of historical
development might reveal a certain continuity between Phe-
• E.g., Fichte.
308
INTRODUCTORY S09
nomenalism and Objective Idealism, criticism from the stand-
points of modern logic shows that the two positions are quite
different in their logical structure. For Phenomenalism is based
on the modification theory of relations, and Objective Idealism
on the underlying- or transcendent-reality theory.
Sometimes Objective Idealism is called Transcendental Ideal-
ism, and, as well, also, Absolute, Epistemological, and On-
tological Idealism. The theory differs (as has just been stated)
from Subjective Idealism, since, whereas this latter theory
makes at least the whole so-called physical world subjective in
its being, Objective Idealism grants the objectivity of that
world with reference to finite conscious individuals, such as
human beings. For Objective Idealism, this "world," with all
its relations, events, objects, and qualities, may be the mani-
festation of One Infinite Spirit, but it is not the mere sensa-
tions or ideas of finite spirits. Indeed, for Objective Idealism,
finite spirits may themselves, like physical "things," be "ab-
sorbed," in some manner, into a single great all-inclusive spirit.
Objective Idealism may, therefore, very properly be called a
psychism, though it is not one that develops out of Naturalism.^
Indeed, it is a psychism that is extremely critical toward all
those naturalistic tendencies that have been discussed under
the captions of Pragmatism, Parallelism, Positivism, and the
like.
It is important to note, however, that, together with Sub-
jectivism, which is also a psychism, Objective Idealism differs
very radically from that other great historical Idealism, the
Platonic. Indeed, this last theory is, strictly speaking, not a
psychism at all, but a Realism of Ideals.^ For it, ideas, per-
cepts, acts of will, and the like, are, as psychical entities, real,
as, also, are physical objects ; and both of these types of entities
can be known "as they really are," unmodified and uncon-
stituted by the act of knowing, and although there is error and
opinion in the midst of truth and genuine knowledge. But,
also, in Platonic Idealism, ''ideals" are maintained to be quite
as real, and quite as genuinely known, as are other entities.
Such ideals are, e.g., those of absolute and perfect truth, of
goodness, and of beauty, and also those of the perfect man, the
» See Chap. XXXII. ' Chaps. XLIV., XLV., and XLVI.
SIO SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
perfect circle, the perfect rose. In fact, for each realm of
existing "things" there is the ideal, the standard, the pattern,
the archetype, which may be approached, but never reached.
Indeed, concrete, particular "things" come and go, appearing
at certain times and, perhaps, also places, but the ideals are
neither here nor there, neither now nor then. They are time-
less, and, in that sense, eternal ; spaceless, and, in that sense,
omnipresent; subsisting, but not existing.
These distinctions between ancient and modern Idealism are
most essential. Clearly, ancient Idealism is not a psychism,
since, for it, all "things" are not ultimately mental in nature,
and there is no insuperable difficulty in the way of knowing
"things" as thej'- are; also, "things" are neither altered by
being known, as in Phenomenalism, nor wholly constituted by
knowing, as in Subjective and Objective Idealism. Ancient
Idealism is, therefore, a Realism not only as regards physical
and mental entities, but also as regards entities that are neither
physical nor mental.
Objective Idealism also, while it is ontologically, in respect to
its conclusions, a psychism, is epistemologically , as regards its
basis, a Realism. Its psychism consists in its final position that
the ultimate nature of all "things" without exception is mental;
its Realism is identical with its position, — taken, perhaps, as a
result of criticism of other philosophies, — that there are no
difficulties inherent in the knowing situation to prevent our
getting at this ultimately psychical character of all "things."*
Yet there are difficulties. For, that all "things" are ultimately
psychical, is a proposition that is not only not evident to direct
experience, but that is difficult to establish. Yet, with this
demonstration once made, Realism again appears, though not
a Realism of the senses and of ordinary experience, but of
rational and also, perhaps, of emotional processes. For by
rather devious rationalizing, the objective idealist finally comes
to know that all "things" are psychical, and, knowing this,
finds this knowledge to be confirmed by an emotional experi-
ence, oftentimes ecstatic in character, in which it is felt, that
all is spirit, and indeed that he himself is one with that spirit
which is all.
* Chaps. XL., in. ; XLIII.
INTRODUCTORY 811
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM OUT OP
PHENOMENALISM
The question has already been discussed, whether the prob-
lems of philosophy are problems because they have appeared in
a specific historical development, or because they concern facts
that present difficulties which are quite independent of history.^
It has also been found, in answer to this question, that, if there
are historical facts — and, of course, there are — there may be
other facts — facts that are not historical or genetic. One can
distinguish, therefore, facts that are not historical, and facts
that are historical. In turn, within the realm of facts that are
genetic in character, there are those specific facts that are
identical with the attempts and endeavors to know — to get
knowledge, and, within this field, there is, again, the still nar-
rower group of facts that are identical with the awareness of
problems.
The fact of the awareness of problems does not imply, how-
ever, that the problems of which there is an awareness are in
every case real problems. Indeed, the mere development of
knowledge and of attempts to know oftentimes produces arti-
ficial problems. On the other hand, if all problems were pro-
duced by the very development of the attempt to know and to
solve them, then would there be no distinction between real and
artificial problems. If there are real problems, therefore, it is
because they concern facts and not because tbey have had, as
problems, a history or development.
Objective Idealism historically became aware of its problems
in reactive criticism of Phenomenalism and in the development
of the monistic, substance doctrine of Spinoza (1632-77). The
historical fact constituted by this reaction against Phenomenal-
ism was the observation of the contradictions that are involved
in this philosophy.
Phenomenalism is, as we have seen, the position, that the
ultimate nature of "things" is unhnowahle, and not merely
unknown, and that only appearances, or phenomena, come within
our ken. The position implies, however, that the unknowable
things-in-themselves are, nevertheless, known to be things, each
of which is identical with itself, all of which subsist as m^awy,
» Chapa. I., XIV., and XXVIII.
312 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
and at least some of which act causally on a thing-like ego to
produce sensations.^ Further, and inconsistently with the com-
pleted form in which the theory is offered for acceptance, Phe-
nomenalism is assumed to present a state of affairs that is reality
and not mere appearance, and that is neither constituted nor
altered by the knowing process to which it is related.
This specific problem as to the character of the relation be-
tween knowing and that which is known, is a real problem, and
Phenomenalism is one result of the attempt to solve it. How-
ever, in the working out of the phenomenalistic solution to this
problem, artificial problems arise, because of the presuppositions
that are made, and because of the logic that is used. For exam-
ple, the problem as to what "forms" or principles are inherent
in the mind, or in reason, is an artificial problem which arises
out of the assumption, that knowing involves a thing-like,
substance-like, spiritual self or ego. So also the problem as
to the continuity and discontinuity of space and time, which
constitutes an antinomy, is artificially produced by ignoring
the modern principle of order, and, accordingly, by assuming
the specific principle of the old logic, that the 07ily way in which
parts form a whole is by being related additively.
One stimulus to the development of Objective Idealism out
of Phenomenalism came from the observation of those contra-
dictions that have just been mentioned as concerning the problem
of knowing. This problem still persists. As involved in this
problem there was for Idealism the further problem, as to
whether the knowing could in any way, — either experimentally
or by an analysis in situ — be removed from that which is known,
so that, indirectly, perhaps, the world could be known as if it
ivere not known. Also there is the problem, as to what the
character of this "world" is, e.g., whether it is one or many,
and, if one, what the nature of this oneness is.
These problems are real, the attempts to solve them constitut-
ing a good part of the development of philosophical thinking
during the last hundred and fifty years. Yet these same prob-
lems can be reopened today as if they had never been examined
before, and the solutions to them compared with those solutions
* Schulze in Mnesidermts, 1792, ed. by Liebert, 1911; J. S. Beck in a
volume published in 1796; and Fichte in his Wiasenschaftslehre.
INTRODUCTORY 313
which were given in the past. In other words, the solutions
of the past, and the logic that underlies these solutions, can
now be reviewed from the standpoint of that more thorough
understanding of logic which we now possess.
If we proceed from this standpoint, and in this way, we
discover that Objective Idealism is correct in its fundamental
criticism, that Phenomenalism, although it explicitly developed
the contradictory position, nevertheless tacitly presupposes that
certain "things," namely, the state of affairs concerning know-
ing, could be known as they really are. It accordingly follows,
for Idealism, that other "things," even the general character of
the whole universe, may also be so known.'' But, if this is the
case, then we have a certain "something" both known and
related to the knowing, and yet independent of the knowing,
and conversely. This state of affairs is, however, a special case
of the validity of the theory of external relations, namely, that
two terms can be related, and yet be independent of each other
in the sense, at least, that neither modifies or constitutes the
other.
This theory of relations is, in general, applicable — as we have
already found — to all those cases of related terms in which any
term can be removed experimentally, and the other terms remain
unaltered, or in which an analysis in situ reveals this same inde-
pendence. Such an analysis is illustrated by all strictly func-
tional relations, as, e.g., the functional relation between time and
motion. Motion and time are related ; but they are independent
in the sense that motion does not "make" time, nor time in
any way act causally on motion. Yet motion presupposes, and
is logically subsequent to time, since there would be time, were
there no motion. The one is the independent variable, the other
the dependent. Specific existential motions are correlated with
specific periods of time, and not with other periods, and these
other time periods are not correlated with those specific motions.
Yet their correlation with motions that can he imagined is im-
plied. In fact, there is no time period for which there is not
implied the possibility of specific motions, imagined, though not
existential. But in the case of all such motions, as well as for
^ Hegel, Logic, Bk. I., i., Chaps. I. and II., and Bk. II.; also Pha-
nomonologie, Chap. III.
314 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
existential ones, the two terms, the motion mid the time, are
independent, though related. This is the logical doctrine that
underlies the modern scientific concept of a functional relation-
ship as different from the causal one.
It is a further fact, that the actual course of events experi-
mentally removes a specific, particular motion from correlation
with certain specific times; e.g., present motions are not cor-
related with past time periods. Thus, even in the case where
the motion is not existential, but imagined, the method of
analysis in situ shows the character of tlie relation between
motion and time to be one qf logical priority and of inde-
pendence. This means that, although the motion con always he
imagined to he present, it can, nevertheless, be ideally eliminated,
50 that we can study time and space without studying motion.
The logical situation concerning knowing and the "thing"
known is quite similar to that which concerns motion and time, —
as it is to the credit of Objective Idealism, in reaction against
Phenomenalism, to have discovered. That a specific knotving,
either existential or subsistential, is correlated with every object
that is known or thought of, is to be admitted. This means that,
although this or that knowing is eliminated by the natural
course of events, nevertheless all knowing cannot he eliminated
from known objects. But this is, of course, a truism. For, first,
one can argue, that, just as anything that we do actually know
is related to the knowing, so also would anything be that we
might know. Secondly, one can argue that the very attempt
to "get at" an object as unknown only again brings in the
knowing — in other words, that knowing is presupposed by the
very attempt to eliminate it. Thirdly, it can be argued, that,
even if the attempt to think away all finite knowing were suc-
cessful, nevertheless the knowing of an infinite being must be
regarded either as possible, or as imaginable, or even as neces-
sary. Fourthly, one may argue, that object implies subject, and
conversely, and then interpret subject as the equivalent of the
knowing process.
One, some, or all of these arguments are advanced by those
who are inclined to accept an idealistic (psyehistic) solution
of the epistemological problem. Indeed, one may put them all
together, and call the situation which they emphasize the ego-
INTRODUCTORY 315
centric predicament. For they all find that, for one reason or
another, we are always in the difficulty of being unable to know
any entity that is not known, in order, if this be desired, to
compare it as unknown with it as known. Or the predicament
is, that we cannot escape the fact that the known world, — the
only world that we know — is, in every instance, related to some
kind of knowing.
It is very evident, however, that this predicament is not a
serious one, if, while the presence of knowing in relation to every
known object is not to be denied, it can nevertheless be shown
that knowing makes no difference to, and neither constitutes
nor alters, that which is known. Such a demonstration is iden-
tical with the ideal elimination of knowing by an analysis in
situ. But that knowing neither constitutes nor modifies its
object, at least in so far as it is finite knowing, is precisely the
presupposition that is made with regard to the knowing of any
state of affairs that is advanced as true by any theory.
It is this presupposition that Objective Idealism recognizes
in its criticism of Phenomenalism. As in the instance of any
functional or external relation between two terms, when neither
can be actually eliminated, but each is related to the other as
if that other were not present, so it is with the relation between
knowing and the known. The object is related to the knowing
as if the latter were not present.
It is in this way, by means of modern logic, that the ego-centric
predicament is solved. Indeed, the predicament is thus shown
not to be serious, or in fact not to be a predicament at all, but
only a problem, which, though real, and not artificial, is never-
theless solved in the presuppositions which are made in present-
ing any specific theory or philosophy as true, or any specific
state of affairs as real.
It is, now, this specific logical doctrine or principle that was
discovered by Objective Idealism, in its criticism of Phenomenal-
ism, to underlie the knowing situation. But since the principle
is also a logical doctrine that underlies the functional relation-
ship, its presence in the knowing situation means, that the relar-
tion between knowing and the entity known is not causal.
This discovery marked a genuine advance in philosophical
thought, quite analogous to the advance, in science, from the
316 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
domination of the concepts of suistance and cause to the use of
the concept of function. It is also a discovery which carries
with it the acceptance of the realistic principle in epistemology,
and means that Objective Idealism, as the doctrine that every-
thing is ultimately psychical, is quite consistent with Realism,
providing conclusive evidence, or correct arguments, could be
found for accepting this conclusion as the final verdict con-
cerning the nature of reality. However, it is just this evidence
and these arguments that are lacking, or that have, at least, not
been found up to the present time.
In summary, we may say, that the ego-centric predicament
is the name, therefore, for the specific state of affairs, that the
knoivn object is always related to knowing, and that it is some-
what difficult to find a way by which the knowing can be elimi-
nated. The proposition, however, that the knowing and the
known object are related, has important consequences provided
only that it is combined with some other general principle which
is also used as a premise for deduction. Thus, that the object
known, thought of, mentioned, and the like, is related to know-
ing, thinking, mentioning, is of consequence only provided such
related terms either affect one another, or demand an under-
lying or transcendent reality to mediate the relationship. The
former assumption is made by Phenomenalism ; the latter by
Objective Idealism. Therefore, although the two systems are
historically continuous with each other, they are also logically
distinct. Each system is based upon or is logically derived from
a different theory of relations.
DERIVATION OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 317
CHAPTER XXXV
THE LOGICAL DERIVATION OF OBJECTIVE
IDEALISxM: CRITICISM
The problem of the unity of the universe is a real and not
an artificial problem, although it is open to question, whether
or not the specific solution which Objective Idealism gives to
this problem is valid or not. The universe is, undoubtedly, a
unity of some kind. It»is, e.g., at least one totality. But whether
or not it is more than this, e.g., whether it is one continuum,
or one organic whole, is very distinctly a further question that
demands the most patient and careful investigation.
However, it is a distinguishing characteristic of Objective
Idealism that it contends that the universe is not merely a
totality, or an organic whole, or a causal system, but, in some
way, an Absolute Unity. In this respect Idealism is Numerical
Monism.
This specific solution to the problem of the unity of the uni-
verse, Objective Idealism derives, however, not by an empirical
and inductive procedure, but by an a priori and deductive
method, in which specific consequences are inferred from specific
assumptions. These assumptions are identical with the postula-
tion of the underlying-reality theory of relations as holding for
the manifold and the totality of the related terms of the uni-
verse. And as we have already seen, this theory of relations
is in turn the result, historically, of the domination of the
concept of substance in the traditional logic and philosophy — a
concept which entered this tradition because of the influence of
the concrete, particular physical thing as the model for thinking.
For, to naive thought, the physical thing does, indeed, appear
to be one suhstance in which many qualities inhere.^ Objective
Idealism, therefore, represents the continued effect, on phi-
losophy, of the influence of this model.
Such an historical development is, however, now subject fo
' Fiehte, Wifssenschaftslehre, trans, by Kroeger, II., ii., p. 160 f.; also
pp. 113, 134-139.
318 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
\, logical formulation, with the result, that a purely logical devel-
s^ opment of Objective Idealism is quite possible.
^ In order to make such a logical presentation and development,
let us, then, assume : —
j/' I. There are many diverse 'HJiings" or entities revealed to
\ our experience.
II. These "things" or entities are experienced as existing or
subsisting as particular, individual entities, i.e., with each entity
itself, and not another — in other ivords, with each entity dif-
ferent and distinct in its individuality from every other entity.
Comment. This is one phase of the principle of identity. In
reference to each entity, other entities are experienced, but are
not it.^
As a generalization from this experience, let us assume
III. // there is one "thing'' A, there is another "thing" B
that is not A, i.e., that is non-A in its individuality — in other
■ ^- words, let us assume that, as we think and know A, ive can also
% think and know non-A.
^ Comment. This is the way in which the principle of contra-
diction is derived empirically, although it has come to be re-
garded, in the traditional logic, as a law that is resident in the
mind, or in the thinking process itself, and, therefore, as a
A-^' law in accordance with which we must think on the ground
that an active entity must act in accordance with its own nature.'
Accordingly, let us assume, further, that
IV. The many "things" that we experience are related in
many specific ivays, and, among these ways, by the relation of
implication, whereby any entity A necessitates {the being of)
' its contradictory non-A, so that, for any entity, A, its contra-
^^y^ dictory, non-A, must be thought.^
^/^ Finally let us assume that
V. // one entity necessitates the being of another entity, the
two entities are inseparable, and
' I. and II. are admitted by Fichto, Sohplling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and
in fact by all their followers and predecessors among objective idealists.
I. and li. merely postulate the " world " to be explained. See Hegel,
Logic, I. and II., pp. 120-177.
' Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre, trans., pp. 159 and 275; Hegel, Logic, II.,
pp. 57-fi2.
* Fichte and Hegel, ibid. On Hegel's Principle of Contradiction, see
J. B. Baillie, Hegel's Logic, 1901.
DERIVATION OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 31£h
VI. // any two entities are inseparable, they in some way
form a unity.
From these assumptions we can now draw certain conclu-
sions : —
Experience gives as a datum the manifoldness of the "things"
experienced, and therewith, also, the individuality of each
entity in its distinctness from others ; i.e., as regards the indi-
viduality of any entity A, any and all other entities are experi-
enced as non-A. From this experience there is derived not only
the generalization, that, if A is, non-A also is, but also the
principle (whether justifiably or not, is a question) that, if A
is, 71071-A must also he. But many entities are experienced — in
many relations. Yet, whatever the specific character of the
relation may be, nevertheless, since a relation by its very nature
holds between at least two terms, each of which is that par-
ticular individual term, and not the other, or another term, all
other relations rest on the specific relation of contradiction,
A R non-A. But this relation is one of necessity, i.e., it is one
whereby if A is, also non-A must he, or, if non-A is, also A must
he. But this means, that, since A and non-A are inseparable and
therefore form a unity, any and all related terms are also in-
separable and form a unity — whatever the specific character of ^
either the terms or the relations may be.
This is the key to the logical derivation of Objective Idealism.
There are many "things" and many relations. But, whatever
the relations and whatever the "things" may be, all other rela-
tions and all other "things" can be "translated" into the
"form" of, and are based on, the relational complex, A B non-A.
In this complex, each term necessitates the other, the two terms
are inseparable, and "somewhere" in the complex there is ahso-
lute unity.
The question next arises, *' Where" is this unity — or, what is
its locus f And the answer is, that the unity cannot be at the
''level" of A and non-A, since they are two, i.e., many, and not
one. Therefore the unity must be at a "level" that is distinct
from the "level" of the manifoldness, A R non-A, and that may
be figuratively described as either "underlying" or "transcend-
ing" such a level.
In critical comment on this argument it should be remarked
S20 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
\ that that particular phase of the principle of contradiction which
. f. the argument employs is one that is only formal, and, therefore,
^^' ^ one that involves no overwhelming diiificulties or damaging con-
^A ^f sequences. "Contradiction" has been previously examined,^ with
the result that it has been found to mean, or to be identical
with, exclusion. In the case of terms this "condition" or relation
** obtains, if the terms are the correlative species (or individuals)
of a (common) genus; i.e., it is such species (or individuals) that
exclude one another into some kind of distinct loci, and that are,
therefore, contradictions. For example, while in reference to
red, not-red denotes everything else than red, nevertheless,
among these other "things," it is only other colors that are
excluded from coexistence with a particular specific red that
exists at a particular time and place. A particular red can,
however, coexist with a particular specific extension, solidity,
smoothness, and the like. None of these characteristics excludes
the others, and yet each in its individuality is different from
each of the others, and these others in relation to any specific
one are not that one, and are, thus, its negative. Accordingly,
if this negative is interpreted as a contradictory, it is merely
a formal contradictory, and as such a contradictory that is quite
harmless.
It is evident, therefore, that Objective Idealism, in deriving
a theory of relations hy ivhich to interpret all relations, especially
that between the knowing and the known, employs a special
phase of the principle of contradiction, namely, one that is only
formal. The plurality of the "things" of the universe is a fact,
and all other "things" in reference to any one positive "thing"
can be characterized negatively. But the experience of the posi-
tive ''thing" precedes its negative characterization, and this
latter step really takes us no further than does that upon which
it depends, namely, upon the empirical, matter-of-fact experi-
ence of a plurality of different "things."
Nevertheless, the negative characterization is made to go much
further by this Hegelian development of the traditional logic,
and by the Idealism that is based upon this. That which is
a positive "thing" is made a negative one that is to be necessi-
tated or implied by, and that is also to be inseparable from, that
' Chap. XVI.
DERIVATION OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 321
which is another positive "thing." Therefore, any term with
its negative is held to form an unimpeachable unity, so that, if
there are two terms which are inclusive of all positive fact, an
all-inclusive unity is easily derivable.
To attain to such a unity is, however, the chief motive of
Objective Idealism, and, by the argument thus far offered, one
seems to be far on the high road to success. Indeed, the pres-
entation of the next step in the argument will make it seem
that the goal has been reached, and that, finally, there stretches
out before the eye of the intellect the panorama of a universe
that in the midst of its manifoldness is Absolute One.
To obtain this view it suffices, if possible, to find a pair of
terms which not only necessitate each other's being and form
a unity, but which also are all-inclusive, i.e., are inclusive of
all that is fact. At first sight any pair of contradictory terms,
as, e.g., A and no7i-A, or this pen and not-this-pen, might seem
to be and may in fact be such a pair. Yet there is the objection
to this possibility, that, over and above the two contradictory
terms of such a pair, there is always a third "something,"
namely, a knowing or cognition (of the pair) that is not included
by those terms. Accordingly, in order to arrive at a pair of
terms that is absolutely all-inclusive, it would seem to be neces-
sary to take, not any pair of contradictories, such as the pair,
this pen and not-this-pen, but only such a pair as will also include
knowing or cognition.
However, knowing or cognition may itself, in any specific
instance, stand in the relation of object, or "thing" known, in
or to a specific knowing, as is illustrated by the series, I know
that I know that I know that, e.g., A necessitates non-A. Seem-
ingly, therefore, in order to arrive at a pair of contradictories
that is absolutely all-inclusive, one of the terms of the pair must
be, not merely any knowing or cognition, but only a knowing
or cognition that is never object, and thus always only subject.
Such an entity would, however, seem to be the term knower,
since, in any specific act of knowing, the knower would seem
never to be the known, the subject never the object.
This recognition that there is in the case of the series, I know
that I know, and so on, a knower that is not "at the same time"
a known, is very evidently only a special phase, again, of that
322 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
ego-centric predicament which is always so basic for all Idealism.
Evidently knowing is itself no exception to the rule, that known
objects are in relation to a knowing. However, that very special
phase of the predicament which is emphasized and used by Ob-
jective Idealism in its basic argument is, that in the knowing
situation there is always present one term, namely, the knower,
which, since it as such is never the known, forms, together with;
the known, an all-inclusive pair of terms. This pair is, knower [
and known, or, negatively, knower and not-knower, self and
not-self, and the like. Accordingly that special phase of the
ego-centric predicament which is thus emphasized may be stated
in the form of a postulate, that
VII. The specific relational complex which is identical with
the pair of contradictory terms, subject and not-suhject (object),
or knower and known, or self and not-self, or ego and non-ego,
is inclusive of all that is reality.
From this postulate, together with the other postulates, the
demonstration, that the universe is One as well as many, is quite
without difficulty.
Contradictory terms necessitate each other's being, — are,
therefore, inseparable, — and, therefore, form a unity. But the
unity must be at a different level from that of the terms, since
these are two. But, also, self and not-self (and the like) are
a pair of contradictories that "include" the universe. There-
fore, for this pair, and so for the universe there is a unity, — an
Absolute Unity — that is implied in the very "essence" of
the relationship between the terms, and that mediates that
relationship.
Such a demonstration ^ is identical, briefly, with deriving con-
• This demonstration is found in Fichte all through his Wissenschafts-
lehre, Werke, Vols. I. and II. It is repeated in many forms and ways,
and one reference is as good as another. It is also found in Schelling,
System des transc. Idealismus, Werke, III., I., p. 600, but especially in
" Vom Ich," Werke, I., i., § 10, p. 100; in Hegel, Encyclop., § 194 et seq.,
Werke, Vol. VI., and in the first two books of the Logic; in Schopen-
hauer, trans., The World as Will and Idea, pp. 142-140.
As further confirming the writer's position that this derivation is the
essence of Objective Idealism, the following quotations are given: —
The first quotation is from the English philosopher, T. H. Green, Works,
Vol. 111., p. 4r). Green says: —
" To assume, because all reality requires thought to conceive it, that
therefore thought is the condition of its existence, is, indeed, unwarrantable.
But it is another matter, if, when we come to examine the constituents
DERIVATION OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 328
elusions from the underlying-reality theory of relations as ap-
plied to such specific complexes as knowing and known, self and
not-self, which are inclusive of all that the universe is, not
excepting the knoiver to whom that universe is related in the
situation of its being a known universe. Accordingly, it is
either from those postulates which have thus far been made, or
from the underlying-reality theory of relations which those
postulates form, or to which they lead, that, together with the
all-inclusive pair of related terms, knoiver and known (not-the-
knower), it seems to be possible to demonstrate with absolute
logical rigor that the whole universe is Absolute One.
This conclusion is identical with one result which it is the
dominant motive of Objective Idealism to obtain, and forms one
necessary step in the demonstration, which Idealism would make,
that the universe is ultimately spiritual in character. Never-
theless, it is a conclusion that is itself not sufficient to establish
this position, since the proposition that the universe is Absolute
One does not imply that it is also spiritual.
Accordingly, in order to demonstrate that the universe is of
this specific character, it must be shown, if possible, that the
only instance of a oneness which holds together a manifold of
related terms (themselves possible manifestations of such a
one) is a self, a knower, or a spiritual being. If this demonstra-
tion can be made, then, by stating this sole condition in the form
of a specific postulate, it is possible logically to develop Nu-
merical Monism into Objective Idealism. Yet, on the other hand,
if this demonstration cannot be made, i.e., if one can find other
instances of an absolute oneness in the midst of a plurality, e.g.,
a material substratum in the midst of physical properties, then
of that which we account real, we find that they all imply some synthetic
action which we only know as exorcised by our own spirit. Is it not
true of all of them that they have their being in relations; and what
other medium do we know of but a thinking consciousness in and through
which the separate can be united in that way which constitutes relation?
We believe that these questions cannot be worked out without leading
to the conclusion that the real world is essentially a spiritual Morld, which
forms one interrelated whole because related throughout to a single
subject."
The second quotation is from the English philosopher, Edward Caird,
who says, in his Evolution of Religion, p. 67: —
" Subject and object are the extreme terms in the diflference which is
essential to our rational life. Each of them presupposes the other, and
therefore neither can be regarded as producing the other. Hence, we are
324, SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
some other form of Monism is as readily derivable as is Objective
Idealism.
From this it becomes clear that whatever more specific phi-
losophies are developed from the postulates and conclusions thus
far presented, depends, not upon discovering the further im-
plications of those postulates and conclusions, but upon making
further specific, independent postulates. Such postulates con-
cern either the nature of Absolute Oneness as such, or, if this
Oneness is assumed to be spiritual in character, because the ego
or self is regarded as the best example of it, they concern and
must assert some specific characteristic as the dominant phase
of that which is spiritual. Accordingly, just as Idealism is
derivable from generic Monism on the assumption that an Abso-
lute One can be only spiritual, so also are such specific phi-
losophies as Theism, Pan-logism, and Ethical and Romantic
Idealism derivable by assuming the dominant character of the
compelled to think of them both as rooted in a still higher principle,
which is at once the source of their relatively independent existence and
the all-eml3racing unity that limits their independence. To put it more
directly, the idea of an absolute unity, which transcends all the oppositions
of finitude, and especially the last opposition which includes all others —
the opposition of the subject and object — is the ultimate presupposition
of our consciousness."
A still more striking statement is made by Professor Mary W. Calkins
in her Persistent Problems of Philosophy, p. 418 f.; Professor Calkins'
formulation of the argument for Absolute Idealism is: —
"I. Ultimate reality is no absolute plurality; it does not consist in
a plurality of utterly disconnected units. For we directly experience
relations and connections; every one of these supposedly discrete, distinct
'units' is both comparable with and dependent on other units: it implies
others in being itself distinct, and it is connected with others by virtue
of their all existing."
" 11. But ultima' reality is, therefore, no mere manifold of units which
are both distinct and yet related. For absolute distinctness and related-
ness are mutually exclusive predicates. If the units remain entirely
distinct, they are, then, distinct from the relations as well as from each
other; in other words, the relations themselves become mere unrelated
units. So long as the units are, by hypothesis, distinct, so long the
supposed relations fail to relate. But relation is experienced, it is immedi-
ately known to exist. Hence the alternative, entire distinctness, must
be abandoned. There results the conception of ultimate reality, not as
mere including system, but as relater of its parts, not as mere one-of-
many, hut as uni(iue Individual. Each one of us has in his consciousness
of self the example of a unicjue being which is a one-of-many."
" III The conclusion that ultimate reality is an Absolute, — that the
irreducible nature of the universe is self, — gives, as the final outcome of
philosophy, the conception of ultimate reality as absolute self."
Another example, making practically the same explicit presentation of
points as does the [ireceding (juotation, and again illustrating the fallacious
procedure just discussed, is found in Taylor's Elements of Metaphjsics: —
DERIVATION OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 325
Spiritual One that underlies the universe to be God, or Intellect,
or Conscience, or Life.
It is, then, to the examination of these more specific Monisms
that we now proceed.
One specific Monism is derived by finding, among the many-
entities that experience reveals, a specific and certain concrete
instance of an entity that is an absolute one — simple, undivided,
and indivisible — and that is not merely an organic whole, which,
while it is one, is also many. Such an entity, it is maintained,
is given in the instance of the unity of the personality, of the
ego or self,'' or of the soul. For, it is maintained, while the
manifold of ideas, emotions, acts of will, and the like, come and
go, — appear and disappear — the personality, the self, the ego
remains. Such a persistence of the personality, or of the self,
" We may conveniently attempt to construct our own theory of the
One and the Many by first excluding views which appear mistaken in
principle, and thus gradually narrowing the issues. Among these mis-
taken views I am forced to reckon all forms of consistent and thorough-
going Pluralism. Pluralism begins by misapprehending the facts upon
which it professes to base itself, and ends by giving an interpretation of
them which is essentially irrational." " Any genuine Pluralism must be
resolute enough to dismiss the idea of a systematic interconnection between
its independent realities as an illusion of the human mind."
" We seem driven, then, to reject the view that the ordered world of
experience can be the expression of a plurality of ultimately distinct and
heterogeneous principles. Because the world as known is an orderly
system, and on any other supposition coherent knowledge is impossible,
tiie world must be regarded as the complete embodiment and expression
of a single ultimate principle."
" The world for knowledge must be an orderly whole or system. To
be a system at all, it must be the development or expression in detail
of a single principle. Therefore it must most certainly be one. But
again, because it is a system, it cannot be a mere unit; it must be the
expression of a single principle in and through a multiplicity of terms
or constituents. To think of the world as a single systematic unity, then,
means to think of it as a manifestation of one perfectly determinate
principle."
" We may take a further most important step forward. In the all-
embracing systematic whole the unity and the multiplicity must be equally
real and each must be real through the other. How is this possible?
Only on condition that the whole system forms a single experience and
that the constituent factors again are single experiences." " It would
be much the same thing if we called it a subject which is the unity of
subordinate subjects " Chap. II., pp. 87-99, passim.
All these quotations wire first given in mv paper, " The Logical Struc-
ture of Self-refuting Systems," Phil. Revieir, Vol. XIX., No. 6, pp. 610-631.
''E.g., all through Fichte's Wisse^ischaftslehre (see the translation),
also in Kant's doctrine of the transcendental ego, and in Berkeley's posi-
tion that the spirit is numerically single (see Chap. XXX).
326 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
is held, further, to be explicable only on the ground that the
self is an absolute one, and not many — even as an organic
whole. For, it is argued, that which is many can be disin-
tegrated in respect to its manifoldness and cease to &e. And,
further, it is contended that the absolute unity of the personality,
of the ego, or of the self, is given to introspection as an imme-
diate, undeniable fact.
From such an instance of an absolute unity in the midst of
plurality — a unity, also, that binds the many together into one —
the argument is readily obtained, that, if the universe can be
proved to be an absolute one, as well as many, then this oneness
must also be of the nature of personality, or of self. For, it
may be inquired, where else is a concrete instance of absolute
oneness discoverable? Is not the self, the ego, the only instance
of this that comes to our experience ?
In comment on this argument it may be inquired, whether it
is not possible that the view, or even the experience, that there
is an absolutely unitary self, ego, or soul, is not itself a product
of the same tradition ® that results in the view that the universe
is absolutely one. In other words, may there not be a tradition
in which there is borne that logic which demands absolute one-
ness in the midst of plurality, and which leads to the interpre-
tation of one instance of such oneness, as demonstrable for the
universe, by analogy with another instance, originally demon-
strable, e.g., in Plato — but later incorporated in the tradition
as orthodox belief and even self-evident fact as regards the
nature of the self. -^i^-
Whether this inquiry be answered with ''yes" or with "no,"
it is, nevertheless, an historical fact in the development of
philosophical theories, that for the interpretation of the nature
of the unity of the universe, recourse has been had to an ego,
a soul, or a personality that is itself regarded or experienced
as absolutely unitary, and as uniting the manifold of the experi-
ences of each personal life into the continuity of a single flow.
Indeed, is not this the only "thing" that such a One — of the
universe — could be ? For, does not the realm of physical entities,
as known by modern science, fail to present an analogy that
' The Ariatott'lian. with its niorU'l of the physical thing defined as $k
unitary substratum in which qualities inhere.
DERIVATION OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 327
serves such a purpose? For example, atoms are, at best, only
either organic unities or mechanistic systems of electrons, and
one electron does not unite others — the atom being only the unity
of electrons in relation, with no empirically found entity, over
and above the relations, to mediate their unity in an atom.
Quite the same ''state of affairs" holds also for molecules, par-
ticles, cells, organisms, and the like. These are unities, but in
so far as they are this, their unity is found empirically to con-
sist in their organization and the constancy of the relations that
generate this organization, and not in the mediation of an abso-
lutely simple and underlying one. Therefore, if appeal is made
to the realm of physical entities for a basis for the analogy we
are seeking, the only possibility of success lies in the instance
of the particular physical thing as this has been defined in the
tradition and is accepted in common sense even today — namely,
as a unitary substratum in which qualities inhere. To interpret
the Oneness of the Universe after this analogy results, however,
in what is termed Materialism — a position that usually arouses
only the most vehement abhorrence. And yet it may be asked,
What, logically, is the difference between this position, which
finds a single substratum to the universe, and calls it Matter,
and that position, which, though calling itself Idealism, finds
a psychical substratum to the universe on the ground of an argu-
ment that springs from a tradition in which the physical thing
has been the dominant influence on philosophy and logic? For,
as we have seen, it is the physical thing, defined as a substratum
in which qualities inhere, that dominates the Aristotelian tradi-
tion,^ and, accordingly, also, the views that develop in this tradi-
tion, particularly the views that in the human personality there
is a substance-like self or ego, and, in the universe, a substance-
like One, — with this One interpreted after analogy to the human
soul. If such a philosophy — of a world substratum — has this
origin, then, although it be called Idealism, does it differ
logically from Materialism, and does the function of its one
universal substratum differ from the function of that substratum
which Materialism also finds for the universe?
The answer is obvious. And yet it is maintained by many —
as well illustrated by Berkeley — that the material substratum
• Cf. Chaps. III. and XXVII.
328 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
of the physical thing is not so certainly given to sense experi-
ence as is the spiritual substratum of the finite self given to
reason and to introspection. Therefore, with it demonstrated
that there is a Oneness — a Substratum in the Universe, this is
interpreted after the analogy with the latter rather than with
the former possibility, so that the One Substratum of the uni-
verse, whose function it is to hold all entities together, and to
mediate all relations, is inferred to be a World-Soul, or World-
Self, that is psychical, and not material or physical in nature.^**
CHAPTER XXXVI
DEVELOPMENTS OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM
I. THEISM AND PANTHEISM
But, with the conclusion of the foregoing chapter once
reached — logically, as just presented, historically, through the
alliance of philosophy and theology, — there lies ready at hand,
as suggested by the dominant interest of the religious conscious-
ness, the further specific conclusion, that a World-soul, AVorld-
self, or World-personality is identical with God, in Whom all
"things" in some manner have their being, Who mediates be-
tween all "things," thus, perhaps, to insure order, design, and
purpose in the universe, and Who is identical, in the highest
degree, with that to which we ascribe highest worth, namely,
personality.
With this conclusion once reached. Objective Idealism is,
however, in a position to become the orthodox apologetic for
Christian theology, notwithstanding that its tendency is away
from Theism and toward Pantheism.
"This is essentially the position of all the objective idealists, although
there arc minor differences as to whether such a Being is personal or
impersonal, etc. fSee, e.g., Hegel, Lofjik, Werke, III., i.. Chap. I.; Encyclop.,
(Jhap. IV., § 51; Phil, of Religion, trans., III., p. 355 et passim.
DEVELOPMENTS OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 320
Theism is the position either that God is apart from the uni-
verse, or that, if the universe is God, He is more. For the first
kind of Theism, God is either the creator of the universe, or
its designer, or at least an active, concrete principle in it that
"makes for righteousness"; for the second kind of Theism, God
is immanent in the universe, and yet is of a different order of
reality from the universe, in that He is both the mediator and
relater of its parts, and the essence of these parts in which He
manifests Himself, although always as a great reserve source
which is more than its manifestations. Yet, if we raise the
question. How God can thus manifest Himself, the answer takes
us in the direction of Pantheism. For, if God but orders and
relates things that exist apart from Him, then is He at best
only a designer and mechanician; also, "things" are related
to Him, so that we again have the problem of the mediation of
this rclatedness. Also, if God is regarded as the creator of the
universe ex nihilo, then is our power to conceive this baffled.
For, how can something be "made" from nothing? And if it
cannot, then must God's creation be but His manifestation in
the sense that this is identical with an emanation from and a
transformation out of Him, with the result, not only that He
is relater and designer, but also that He is all "things" and
that all things are God.
This position is Pantheism. Into it Theism very naturally
and very logically develops. But, underlying both these the-
ological positions are the fundamental logical postulates on
which Objective Idealism is based, namely, that terms in rela-
tion demand and imply a unitary being which transcends, yet
manifests itself in the terms, and mediates the relations between
them. Such a unitary being is, in the specific Monism under
consideration, first identified with a World-self, or World-
personality, and then with God, with the logical result, that
all "things" are psychical or spiritual in character — even those
that seem most persistently to withstand such a "reduction,"
as, e.g., do the entities of the physical universe.
II. PANLOGISM AND ETHICAL IDEALISM
Conclusions very generally similar to those just presented are
found in a number of other monistic psychisms that differ in
830 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
respect to what is accepted as the dominant character of the
Absolute One, while, in turn, what is regarded as such a char-
acter is conditioned by the position that is taken as to what
is the fundamental character of the finite human self; i.e.,
according as this finite self is found to be predominantly an
intellectual and logical self or ego, or an ethical being that
follows the dictates of conscience, or, possibly, a beauty-desiring
soul, so is the Absolute Self regarded as being predominantly
one or the other of these characteristics. Thus, e.g., it can be
demonstrated — by analogy — that that Being which is the One
of the universe is primarily an intellectual Being, the logical
laws of whose mind are the basic principles of all that exists
and subsists. This specific form of Objective Idealism is
Panlogism.^
But also, by a different specific analogj^ it can be demon-
strated that the One is predominantly both a conscience that
inherently respects the principles of right, a tvill that purposes
and contrives to accomplish ends, and an intellect that adapts
means to ends.^ By thus appealing to the analogy of the finite
self or ego, and emphasizing the ethical consciousness as the
fundamental feature of this ego, the psychical monist is able
to maintain that the universe is an ethical system, the funda-
mental laws of which spring from or are identical with the
dominant ethical characteristics of an absolute Ego.
The argument for such an absolute ethical Idealism is some-
times buttressed by an appeal to Phenomenalism. This phi-
losophy, as we have seen, tacitly makes the finite self a psychical
substance that is in causal interaction with things-in-them-
selves, the logical outcome of this assumption being, that know-
ing modifies the object-to-be-known. Yet, inconsistently with
this implied result. Phenomenalism maintains that the nature
of the finite self is quite knowable, — namely, by means, first,
of discovering those principles which we must think, and then,
secondly, of accounting for this necessity on the ground that
such principles are identical with the finite self's own inherent
nature, which nature it cannot contradict. These principles, in
accordance with which we must think, are ways in which we
' The position, e.g., of Hegel, Bradley, and, I should say, of Royce.
" Fichte, Miinsterberg.
DEVELOPMENTS OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 331
relate "things," and it is by virtue of relations that the uni-
verse is a system. Briefly, therefore, in accordance with Phe-
nomenalism, the system of the universe presupposes an ego which
thinks in accordance with certain principles which are the laws
of the ego's own nature; or, conversely, a suhstance-like ego,
thinking in accordance with its own nature, relates otherwise
unrelated "things," and thus makes the universe a system.^
Let us, now, from the standpoint of this position, and with
the main argument for Objective Idealism still in mind, inquire
what the universe would be, if there were no finite egos. Would
it not be only a chaos, or a mass of unrelated "elements"? Let
us next assume just this chaos, and then ask. Whereby would
such a chaos become a cosmosf The answer to this inquiry is
evident. It is, namely, that, with a cosmos depending on know-
ing, or on a knower, and with it quite conceivable, e.g., from the
standpoint of the empirical sciences, that no finite knowers
should exist, there must be a trans-finite, or infinite, absolute
knowing or knower, who relates all the otherwise unrelated terms
of the universe, and in whom the principles of such "related-
nesses" inhere, even as the qualities of a physical thing seem
to inhere in a material substratum.
Untrue, then, to its criticism of Phenomenalism, namely, that
this position implicitly presupposes the possibility of genuine
knowing, and yet explicitly denies this, Objective Idealism uses
the phenomenalistic doctrine, that the ego or self is relater, in
order to demonstrate that the Absolute One is an intellectualistic
or logical ego whose function it is both to mediate all relations
and to relate.
This position is very modern monistic and idealistic doctrine.*
It is maintained, that to know is to systematize, and then, from
the facts (1) that the universe is a system — a cosmos, and (2)
that finite egos are conceivably non-existent, the conclusion is
derived, that the system of the universe implies an Absolute
Ego or Self, that is Absolute One.
In criticism of this argument, it may be said, that while it \
' For this position see Joachim. The Nature of Truth, pp. 78, 114; T. H.
Green, Prolegomena to Ethics; Watson, The Interpretation of Religious
Experience ; Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, Chap. II., § 4, et seq.;
Royce, World and Individual, p. 341 f.
* See note 3; also the quotations given in Chap. XXXV.
332 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
may be granted that the universe is a system, the monistic
conclusion just presented follows from this admission only on
the condition that a certain specific assumption is made, namely,
that, if terms are in specific relations to one another, the fact of
this relatedness implies a transcendent, unitary, and mediating
being. Without this postulate, and with an opposed postulate,
the monistic conclusion does, however, not follow. For, granted
that the universe is a system, and, therefore, a manifold of
terms in relation, then, whatever specific type of system the
universe may be, it is quite possible, that relations themselves
"do the work" of uniting terms, and furnish the universe with
all the unity that it has. This unity, and, therefore, the system
of the universe may be any one of those types that are distin-
guished as, e.g., organic, causal, continuous, discontinuous, and
the like, without being an absolutely simple One. That the
universe is such a One follows only from a specific postulate.
But this postulate is one that is not only not necessarily true —
although it may be true — but that is also open to the criticism
that it is self-contradictory in its implications, as we have previ-
ously seen.
In further criticism of the argument that is under considera-
tion, it may be inquired, whether the position that all terms
or "things" would be unrelated were it not for the agency of
an Absolute One to relate them, does not itself presuppose its
contradictory; i.e., does it not presuppose (1) that, before such
a One could exercise its activity in relating, "things" would
be distinct from it, even though "things" are its manifestations;
and (2) that, as thus distinct, "things" would be either similar
or dissimilar to that which relates them; and (3) that, accord-
ingly, certain relations, namely, those of similarity or of dis-
similarity, would be independent of a relater. But, if there are
some relations, — such as these, that are not "instituted" by an
Absolute One as relater, other, in fact, all other relations may be
similarly independent, so that, if there be an Absolute One, such
a being does not function as the relater of the terms or "things"
of the universe.
These criticisms, however, are either ignored or not accepted
by the objective idealist who derives his position by the argu-
ment that has just been given, and to whom, of course, that
DEVELOPMENTS OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM S33
argument is quite convincing. The result is, that, with it once
regarded as established, that there is an Absolute Knower upon
whom the system of the universe depends, support for an
ethical idealism and monism is obtained from the further phe-
nomenalistie position, (1) that there are two *' worlds," the one
consisting of interacting things-in-themselves and substance-like,
finite egos, the other, of the causal results of this interaction,
these results being called phenomena, and (2) that phenomena
in turn are of two kinds, the one kind being psychical, as the
result of the action of things-in-themselves on finite egos, the
other kind, physical, as the result of the action of finite egos,
with their laws, on things-in-themselves. Since, now, an effect
owes its character both to the "thing" acting and to the "thing"
acted upon, both psychical and the physical phenomena bear
the "marks" of such principles as cause and effect, necessity,
and the like, and in this respect both realms are causally de-
termined. But, further. Phenomenalism, although it tacitly
presupposes the contradictory, explicitly teaches the doctrine of
the unknowableness of things-in-themselves. Accordingly, it in-
fers, that, since these entities are not known to he determined,
they are known not to he determined, so that, it is further
inferred, they furnish opportunity for freedom — in the sense, at
least, of the absence of causal determination.
Phenomenalism and Objective Idealism both make use of this
conclusion in order to establish an Ethical Idealism.^ For, it is
argued, that, on the one hand, to hold a man responsible and
justifiably punishable for his acts, is impossible unless he is
free ; but, on the other hand, as a member of both the psychical
and physical worlds in which every event is caused and deter-
mined, a man is not free ; his every motive, every act, every
apparently free choice is, in reality, only the causal result of
previous acts and, finally, of heredity and environment. This is
the conflict. On the one hand there is the ethical demand that
man shall be free, while, on the other hand, there is the nat-
uralistic conclusion, that man is in all respects only a link in a
inflexible causal chain of heredity, environment, and previous
growth and development.
This problem is regarded as solved by the phenomenalistic
• Fit'hte, in agreement with Kant; see Chap. XXIX.
334. SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
hypothesis, that, if man is a member of two worlds, namely,
those of things-in-themselves and of nature, then freedom may
exist in the former, causal linkage in the latter, with the scien-
tific knowledge of the ''world" demanding this (causal) deter-
mination, and the introspective deliverances of conscience con-
firming the freedom. For, although the regarding ourselves as
free may be the hypostatization of our ignorance of those de-
tailed causes that really compel us to do whatever we do, and,
also, although the conviction that we are free, whether this be
the fact or not, might have the same outcome in our conduct
■as would real freedom, and be quite as valuable ethically, never-
theless it is a fact that our introspection tells us that we are
free. Conscience implies free action, and this in turn is found
only in the realm of things-in-themselves — for Phenomenalism.
Therefore may this realm be, in its real essence, of the very
nature of conscience itself, known, not by sensation, nor by
intellect, but in moral consciousness and feeling.
Then the interesting question arises, if the Absolute One,
Mediator of all relations, Manifestor of all appearances, Source
of all those results which are mutually dependent upon and
relative to one other, Uniter of all-inclusive self and not-self in
the act and implications of knowledge, may not itself be of the
nature of conscience, or of an active, vivifying moral law? The
answer of the ethical monist to this question is not "may," but
"must," and thereby is the easier argument hy analogy but-
tressed by this more complicated argument from Kantian Phe-
nomenalism. But, since the position is thus a derivative both of
this Phenomenalism and of Monism, it stands or falls with these
two positions, and is thereby doomed to failure.
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF IDEALISM S35
CHAPTER XXXVII
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF OBJECTIVE IDEALISM
I. VOLUNTARISM
If the Absolute One be a self or ego, and if, as a self or ego,
it be primarily a conscience, then is it also Will. Thus is
Ethical Monism also Voluntarism. Intellectually, conscience is
that faculty, either complex or simple, to which there are pre-
sented ends to be accomplished, means to these ends, and ideals
or standards under which both ends and means are subsumed
as either good or bad, right or wrong. Emotionally, on the
other hand, conscience is that faculty which can only prefer the
good to the bad, the right to the wrong, and which is itself the
innate respect and reverence for the one, and the abhorrence of
the other. This immanent and "natural" preference is one
phase of choice or will. Will, also, is the act of iveighing and
deliberating over both ends and means, and of then striving to
accomplish the chosen end by this means or that. Thus it is,
that conscience is itself will with an emotionally rooted prefer-
ence for the good and the right for their own sake, and with
an intellectual discrimination between the good and the bad, and
between right and wrong means and ends.
This Ethical Voluntarism readily allies itself with a second
type or more extended form of Voluntarism that has its motive
in the dynamic doctrines of modern science, while these doctrines
are in turn supported by dialectical arguments, derived from
the Aristotelian logic, by which the logical necessity of change
and evolution is demonstrated.
In developing this more extended Voluntarism, appeal is made
to the fact, that, although in comparison with acts of will, intel-
lectual acts and emotions are, perhaps, revealed by introspection
as relatively statical, this, nevertheless, is only comparatively
the case, since modern psychology shows that all empirically
given consciousness is concretely an act or process. This is quite
generally agreed to, whether or not it is further held, that there
336 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
is a static ego or self which unites the manifold of conscious
processes into one personality. But, in acts of will we discover
a resistance to be overcome, a push or a pull against either our
better nature, or against our appetites and desires, and, also, a
counter push or pull, with actions finally emerging. Here,
therefore, is force, — energy, here is vis viva revealed at first
hand.
Most suggestive of further hypotheses now, is the view, that
such a source is that from which our knowledge of the dynamic
springs, and that, with this as an analogy, men have been uncon-
sciously led to suppose that nature itself is identical with change.
But, even if this be the origin of our knowledge of change, it
does not follow, that nature is not really of this character, but
is only thought to be such by man. For the esse of "things"
is not, of necessity, identical with the mode of its discovery,
unless one accept the fundamental premises of such positions
as Phenomenalism, Subjectivism, or Humanism.
However, modern science takes this dynamic view, whatever
interpretation may be given to it. Thus, e.g., in the field of
physical existents, science holds that all is energy, either in the
equilihrium of action and reaction, or of change when the one
force is the greater, the possible exceptions being those ultimate
parts, such as atoms or electrons, out of which specific
energies are made up, although even such seemingly ultimately
statical entities may be only equilibriums between dynamic
forces.
The psychical life is, perhaps, even more evidently one of
change and push and pull, ivith, possibly, not even the same
probability of unchanging entities such as seem to exist in the
physical world, or which the physical world presupposes. For
example, space and time do not change, although "things" in
them may change. Voluntarism, however, neglects these re-
finements, and, also, in its appeal to evolution, is not troubled
by the fact that, if all "things" are held to evolve, this sup-
position is contradicted by the implied fact, that the principles
of evolution and of change do not themselves change, but are
invariants.
The theory of evolution holds in a crude way to the con-
tinuity of the development of higher plants and animals from
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF IDEALISM 337
lower forms, and this evolution is held to extend upward until
it brings the flowering of a fully deliberative will as the crown-
ing glory of nature 's inherent creative impulse. But, downward
also does the continuity extend so as to include the impulsive
acts, the instincts, the tropisms, the chemical and physical
reactions and events, and, finally, the so-called inorganic proc-
esses. Accordingly the question arises, Shall the higher partake
of the nature of the lower, the complex be like the simple, or
conversely? But, we may also ask. What matters it which
hypothesis we choose, since there is continuity between the two
extremes, and each extreme must resemble the other?
For the modern voluntarist this evidence from evolution
counts for much, indeed its weight tips the scales in favor of
the inference, that "the lower" is like "the higher," rather than
conversely. For, it is asked, Do we not get our first-hand
knowledge of force, of energy, of change, from the higher by
an absolutely reliable introspective knowledge of ourselves,
whereas the innermost essence of the life of the lower animals
and of all plants, and of the processes of the inorganic physical
world is concealed from us by the coat of many colors — appear-
ances? Also, must not the lower contain that which the higher
reveals in order to account for the higher realities? For ex-
ample, must not "the lower" be or contain will and conscious-
ness, in order to account for will and consciousness in higher
forms, especially if evolution is continuous? And yet, if will
is present at such lower "levels," e.g., in an amoeba or in an
atom, it is, nevertheless, not a deliberative will, but a wull that
is blind and impulsive, dogged in its urgings, ever unsatisfied
in its attainment, and, perhaps, ever creating new desires, and,
therefore, ever new suffering.
Like in kind, therefore, would be the higher and the lower,
like, that which seems to be as different as are the physical and
the mental, like, the near and the remote. But like they must
he, not only because, as evolution teaches, each is continuous
with the other — roughly so at least, but also because each is but
the upspringing of an Absolute Will that is their creator, their
relater, and their inner nature. Thus is the position taken, that
the essence of physical force and energy is will, and the essence
of will, energy, urging, on-pouring.
S38 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
This is modern Voluntarism, an offshoot of Ethical Monism.
The gap between it and Naturalism is not wide, since to bridge
this gap, one has but to identify the Absolute One of Monistic
Idealism with an Energy whose inner nature is Will. But
whether energy be will, or will be energy, is, perhaps, an option
to which the concrete happenings of the universe are quite
indifferent as long as the Ultimate One plays only the function
of manifesting itself in and of uniting all concrete ''things"
as they are found empirically. For, on the one hand, if will be
energy, as the materialistic monists claim, then the world is
a deterministic system, and there is no opportunity for teleology
in any other sense than that of mere direction and irreversi-
bility, while, on the other hand, if energy be will, yet a will
that merely underlies and relates determined empirical happen-
ings, then, also, is there no teleology in the sense of a purpose
that is aimed at, and of means that are varied to its accom-
plishment.
It is, however, the seeming opportunity of making determin-
ism merely apparent, and thus of finding a fundamental on-
tological basis for a genuine, universal teleology, that chiefly
actuates the modern voluntarist. For, if energy be will mani-
festing itself in the inorganic wqrld, and especially in the realm
of plants and animals, then there certainly does seem to be
opportunity for an immanent teleology, with the result that
the conflict between the act that is hoth determined and pur-
poseful seems to be removable by putting the causal determinism
into the world of appearance, and the purpose a7id freedom of
action into the realm of ultimate reality, namely the Universal
Will. Thus it is that in modern Voluntarism there is still
retained the contrast of the Kantian Phenomenalism between
a realm of appearances and a realm of ultimate realities (things-
in-themselves) , with determinism in the former, and purpose
and freedom in the latter realm. Indeed, all Monism, especially
all Objective Idealism, emphasizes this contrast between the
realm of related terms as appearances, and the reality of the
Ultimate One that relates these.
As regards their "practical outcomes," however, there is a
striking contrast between Ethical Monism and Voluntarism;
for, while the former is essentially a philosophy of optimism,
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF IDEALISM 339
the latter readily becomes a theory of deeply grounded pes-
simism.
The One of Ethical Monism is held to be primarily a moral
self that is the active, living principle of right and justice in
the world, although that such a being cannot consistently be
inferred to be of this character, we shall discover shortly in our
criticism of Objective Idealism. However, this criticism is not
accepted by the adherents of the position. Rather, their phi-
losophy is held both to demand the conclusion and to support
the conviction, that all ''things" work togetlier for good.
The One that mediates all, and that is all, is a moral
entity. Therefore, by that narrow meaning of the term with
which Ethical Monism identifies the moral, all "things"
must be in their essence good, and all evil must be but mere
appearance.
Voluntarism, however, does not, at least as it has been his-
torically developed, incline to this optimism. Eather, the will
of Voluntarism is interpreted more in analogy to those some-
what blind, instinctive and impulsive willings that impel us to
anger and to wrath, and then to regret and to sorrow, or to
desire, and then, following upon satisfaction, to still further
desire, and accordingly to no final satisfaction. Thus it is that
Voluntarism becomes a philosophy of unfulfilment and of ever
returning unquenchable longings and willings. Yet in this
flux we continue to "will to live,"^ and, as a means of living,
to will to have power and to conquer.- Yet what deeper
ground for pessimism than to he a will that forever flows
and surges into ever new longings and ever repeated disap-
pointments 1
Voluntarism is based in part on the scientific and naturalistic
doctrine of the evolution and change of all "things," but when
further support is needed, it accepts this from whatever sources
are available, — even from opposed theories. Accordingly, Vol-
* Schopenhauer (1788-1860), collected works ed. by Deussen, 1911 ff.;
translations: World as Will, and Idea, by Haldane and Kemp, 3 vols.,
1884 ff.; Fourfold Hoot and Will in Nature, by Hillebrand, 2nd ed., 1891;
Basis of Morality, by Bullock. Cf. Sully, Pessimism.
= Nietzsche (1844-1900), col. works ed. by Koegel, 1895 ff.; English
trans, by A. Tille. See especially Jenzeits von Gut and Biise, and Zur
Oenealogie der Moral (Beyond Good and Evil, and The Genealogy of
Morals ) .
340 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
untarism brings to its aid a theory of the logical necessity of
change and evolution. This theory arises in the development
of the Aristotelian logic, and is closely connected with the argu-
ment for an Underlying One. In fact, just as this argu-
ment deduces, from every term's implication of a formal
contradictory, the unity of the two terms, and the underly-
ing locus of this unity, so logical evolutionism deduces, from
the implication of a formal contradictory, the necessity of
change.
In order to make this demonstration one argues, that change
as empirically discovered can only mean logically that A be-
comes B, i.e., non-A, where A and B are things. If, now, when
A becomes B, there is merely an A at one instant, and a 5 at
another instant, no especial difficulty may seem to arise. But
this is only because certain problems are ignored. For there is
the problem as to hoiv a thing, e.g., an atom of carbon, or an
electron, can cease to be itself, and become something else. But
there is also the problem, as to how, if such a becoming seems
to be an empirical fact, — as it does, — this "ceasing" to be one
thing and "becoming" another thing can be rationally under-
stood — indeed, how it can be rationalized at all. For, although
it seems to be readily ascertainable that a thing, e.g., a piece of
ice, can be 7iow A, and then B, or non-A, at instants that are
somewhat remote from each other (the ice can become water),
it is difficult, if not impossible to understand the implied fact,
that, at some one instant the real transformation takes place
{e.g., the ice melts), so that a thing is both A and non-A at the
same instant (the water both solid and liquid).
Change, therefore, presents this specific problem as to how
contradictory attributes can coexist at the same instant. And
the solution to this problem is, that they can not, except in
appearance. For, on the ground of the principle of contradic-
tion, that a thing can not both be and not be (a certain quality
or property), whatever seems to involve the contradiction of
being both A and non-A must be inferred to be only appear-
ance, while reality must be inferred to be that which does not
change.
The essence of change is, therefore, the self-contradictory state
of affairs of A and non-A coexisting at the same instant. But
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF IDEALISM 341
this state of affairs is an instance of logical necessity, in the
sense, as we have already seen, that A implies non-A.^ We must
conclude, therefore, that change, which is empirically discovera-
ble, but which is also self-contradictory, is, nevertheless, logically
necessitated, although in the realm of the manifold of appear-
ances, and not as a characteristic of that One which is tlie
reality.
However, Voluntarism is not alone in employing this argu-
ment in order to demonstrate the necessity of a universal change
and evolution by which to fortify its position, that all is Will,
for other forms of Monism also use it. Thus, e.g., Ethical
Monism employs the same argument in order to show that a
universal ethical advance and progress is logically necessitated,
and Intellectualistic Monism, in order to demonstrate the pres-
ence of a logical necessity in the sequence, e.g., of the several
periods of the development of human institutions. For it can
be thus demonstrated, e.g., that the several phases in the develop-
ment of religious beliefs, of the forms of government and of
social organization, and of scientific theories, could have only
that order ivhich they de facto have had.* Indeed, every
monistic theory can, consistently with its own logical founda-
tion in the underlying-reality theory of relations, use this logical
evolutionism either as a support or as a supplementary doc-
trine. For, even if the One is interpreted after the analogy
of a physical thing with attributes and a unitary material
substratum, the argument for logical evolutionism may still be
used, since this argument forms one aspect or corollary of the
argument for a single underlying reality.^ Emphasize the unity
in the relationship of contradictories, and the conclusion results,
that there is an underlying One ; but emphasize the implication
of the contradictory as identical with the process of one "thing"
becoming another, and we have the conclusion, that, whatever
else they may be, e.g., progress, advance, and betterment, or
the opposite, change and evolution are themselves logically
necessary.
" This is the essence, I believe, of the Hegelian doctrine of the logical
necessity of evolution. It is found in Fichte, in the Wissenschaftslehre,
and in Hegel in the Logic and the Encyclopedia. See Chap. XXXV., il.
* Hegel's Philosophy of History, trans, by Sibree.
» See Chap. XXXV., ii.
342 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
n. VITALISTIC AND ROMANTIC IDEALISM ^
Still another variant of generic Monism is derived by inter-
preting the nature of the One after the analogy of the organism,
or of life, especially as this is regarded in those specific bio-
logical theories that are called vitalistic. Such a specific monism
may be called Universal Vitalism or Romanticism, and is due,
of course, to the influence of the concept of biological evolution
and of the science of biology. Such a monism is, also, clearly
more naturalistic than are those monisms which we have thus
far considered, yet it is, nevertheless, a monism that is an ideal-
ism or psychism, since it is based on a psychistic view of the
organism and of the nature of life.
One and perhaps the chief characteristic of vitalistic theories
in biology is their opposition to, or insistence on the limitatiojis
of, the mechanistic position. The latter position, however, is
itself seldom formulated with precision. Sometimes it is defined
as meaning merely that the organism is determined in all its
structures and functions, and that it acts with such a regularity
and uniformity that experiments can be repeated and "the
same results" again be observed. Also, the position is defined
as meaning that all vital phenomena are identical with
mechanistic entities — without this term (mechanistic) itself
being defined. Or, again, the position is regarded as meaning
(1) that an organism is a special instance of an organized com-
plex of physico-chemical forces, even as any such complex is
specifically different from others; (2) that, accordingly, the
organism has, as a ivhole, specific characteristics, such as repro-
ductive ability, self-maintenance, and selective sensitivity, which
inorganic complexes do not have; (3) that such specific char-
acteristics are not identical with chemical and physical forces,
with molecules, with atoms, or with electrons, although they
act in conformity with these mechanistic entities.
This last mechanistic position is of such a character that it
makes it quite possible to combine both the mechanistic and
vitalistic contentions into a common theory, but this possibility
• The position taken by Bergson in Creative Evohitiov and other works,
and by Eucken in the recent volumes: Main Currents of Afodern Thought,
trans, by Booth; Problems of lAfe, trans, by Hough and Gibson; Value
and Meaning of Life, trans, by Gibson; Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, trans,
by VVidgery; The Life of the Spirit, trans, by Pogson.
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS OF IDEALISM 343
has not been generally recognized by either party. Accord-
ingly Vitalism is also advanced in quite as vague a form as is
Mechanism, namely, as the negative position or contention that
the mechanistic theory does not "account for," "explain," or
describe the organism completely, especially as regards its dis-
tinctly vital characteristics. In other instances, however, Vital-
ism is offered as a much more definite and precise theory,
namely, as the position, that, while the organism is in part
mechanistic, it nevertheless "contains" in every case a mys-
terious entity called an Entelechy that is itself non-meclianistic,
although it may with foresight use mechanistic means to its
own special end — which is the furtherance of Life.''
It is, now, this second type of Vitalism that has especially
appealed to the monistic psychist as a model for his interpreta-
tion of the specific nature of the One. For, if it can be demon-
strated that there is a One, then why should this One not be
Life, as well as Intellect, Will, and the like, especially if
intellect and will are empirically known only in, or as specific
activities of, living beings?
This identification is made de facto,^ and the resulting posi-
tion may be called Monistic Vitalism. Its dominant tenet is i
that the One is Life, and that this One is not mechanistic, al- |
though its functions may be (1) to mediate the relationships'
between mechanistically related terms, (2) to develop and,
evolve into such an intellectualizing-mechanizing stage in the'
case of human beings, and (3) to guarantee an inner purpose-
fulness in all "things."
Monistic Vitalism thus easily develops into Monistic Eo-
manticism. This last position as taken, e.g., in art and litera-
ture, is one that, negatively, is scornful of all traditional prin-
ciples and standards, while, positively, it holds to the rule of
a complete reliance upon the present impression, thus placing
the emotions and the will above the intellect, and adopting the
pragmatic rule of accepting whatever works successfully. Re-
^ Cf. Driesch, Science and Philosophy of the Organism, 1908 ; Loeb,
Mechanistic Conception of Life, 1912; Spaulding, "Defense of Analysis,"
in The New Realism, and Reviews of Driesch in the Phil. Review, Vol. VIII.,
1909, pp. 63 ff. and 436 fif., and of Loeb, in Science, N. S., Vol. XXXVIII.,
pp. 333-336.
* The position taken by Eucken,
344 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
lease from the trammels of the old, freedom to produce the new,
flux and flow according to no law except that of resulting emo-
tional satisfaction, and this, perhaps, to but one individual —
these are the characteristics of Komanticism in the field of the
human arts.
How romantic, indeed, were the universe, if it were of this
kind — a living organism, bound by no law, producing the new,
pregnant with possibilities, full of surprises, surcharged with
vital impulses, which intellectual reflection must follow and
not lead, many and yet One! For the emotionally and
artistically inclined, for the anti-intellectualists, such a plea is
strong, — quite convincing men like Eucken and Bergson.
Such a universal Vitalism and Romanticism is, however, as
much a Monism as are Panlogism, Pantheism, Ethical Idealism,
and Voluntarism, yet such a philosophy is also a Monism that
verges toward Naturalism — although toward a Naturalism that
is also a strongly tinged Psychism. For it is life, not as the
natural sciences usually interpret this phenomenon, but, rather,
as they fail to interpret and explain it, that becomes the model
for the interpretation of the specific nature of the One. Life
as lived, as non-mechanical, non-chemical, non-geometrical, non-
determined, freely creating, ever surging onward, vague and
mystical — such is that Life which is the One. And this Life can
be only of the nature of Mind or Spirit, which, as holding the
many together in relatedness, and as thus not itself an organized
whole, can itself be only Absolute One. Thus it is that Uni-
versal Vitalism and Romanticism emerge as further variants
of generic Monism.
CONCLUSION 345
CHAPTER XXXVIII
CONCLUSION
I. monism's solution op philosophical PROBLEMS: CRITICISM
This detailed discussion of monistic systems may now be com-
pleted by presenting those solutions which these positions give
to the main philosophical problems.
First, it is evident that all these monisms are in their result
predominantly ontologies. They solve the ontological problem
by concluding, not merely that there is a oneness of kind of all
"things," as Subjectivism, Psychism, and Materialism main-
tain, but that there is a numerical One which relates all, is all,
and underlies or transcends all. It is this conclusion that dis-
tinguishes these positions from naturalistic systems. For while
these last positions, in some cases at least, conclude that ulti-
mately all "things" are of the same kind, they nevertheless
admit the genuine distinctness and manifoldness of such similar
"things." Monistic systems also accept a pluralism, but they
insist also upon the numerical oneness of ultimate reality, allow-
ing for a manifoldness only in the realm of manifestations and
appearances. Further, in their identification of the One with
the nature of some finite, entity, such as self, ego, intellect, will,
or life, monistic systems give an answer to the question, What
is the fundamental stuff of the universe? quite as much as did
those earliest ontologies which maintained that this stuff was
water, or air, or fire.
In their cosmology monistic systems follow modern science,
and interpret as mere appearances of One Absolute, all those
detailed entities with the discovery of which science is partly
identical. They also maintain the presence of a law or order
in "things," but make the One the source or the immanent prin-
ciple of this order. Also, as the general concept of evolution
has developed in science, monistic systems have incorporated its
principles in one way or another into their cosmologies.
Further, with the phenomenalistic distinction at hand, of two
orders of reality, the one of appearances, the other, of genuine
346 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
reality, monistic systems claim to avoid those contradictions that
seem to subsist, if one and the same "thing" or event is both
determined and purposeful. For, by this distinction, each and
every entity can be maintained to have its source in a free,
purposing One, and yet to be also a member of a causally deter-
mined series. Such an immanent teleology is accepted by all
monistic systems. By means of the distinction between appear-
ance and reality, such systems claim to be able consistently to
accept both the deterministic cosmology of natural science and
the teleology of an ethics and a religion that demand freedom,
responsibility, conscience, and the victory of the good.
Monistic systems also give a very definite solution to the
theological problem. While perhaps not all such systems ex-
plicitly identify the One of the universe with God, yet, if what
the Deity does is more important than what He is, then is this
identification made by each specific monism. The One is God,
because He is that Being who not only is all, but who unites
and relates all, who manifests Himself in all, and who, in the
midst of seeming machine-like chains of events, guarantees their
inner purposefulness, and perhaps their goodness. Specific sys-
tems may differ as to whether God is predominantly Intellect,
or Will, or Life, but whichever of these He may be held to
be. His most important functions are the same.
In monistic systems, therefore, the Deity is not the first cause
in the temporal series of causes and effects ; nor is He architect,
mechanician, or designer, to stand outside His handiwork and
view it from this angle and from that, ever to bear in mind
the end which He will accomplish ; nor is He merely a Being
that is thought of in a manner consistent and free from con-
tradiction, and that, therefore, if He does not exist, at least sub-
sists. Bather, in Monism, God is a cause that underlies or
transcends, and that is first in just this specific sense; He mani-
fests Himself in all "things" as their essence, and is, therefore,
their immanent architect and designer; He exists neither here
nor there, neither now nor then, and thus is eternal and omni-
present; and, finally, with all finite "things" related by Him,
He, as their relater, is in some vague sense infinite, un-
limited, — and perfect. In this manner does Monism transform
the traditional cosmological, teleological, and ontological proofs
CONCLUSION 347
for God's existence, reinterpreting them in the light of its own
distinction between the apparent and the real, the related and
the relater.
In their solution both of the problem of values and of the
problem of knowledge monistic systems are very definitely ahso-
lutistic, and, therefore, anti-pragmatic and anti-relativistic. In
criticism of relativism, all monistic systems presuppose the prin-
ciple that absolute knowledge is possible in some cases at least,
and accordingly all accept the existence or subsistence of an
absolute good, an absolute truth, and an absolute beauty. Evil,
error, and ugliness, are all undeniably facts of some kind, but
for monistic systems they are mere appearances, and not ultimate
realities. Indeed these entities, as well as the good, the true,
and the beautiful could not be other than they are, since their
appearance is the product of a logical necessity. Other systems
also accept an absolute truth, goodness, and beauty, and a
system of entities that are knowable as they really are, — e.g.,
Realism does this. But this does not carry with it the further
acceptance of the monistic position, that there is One underlying
entity which is either identical with the principle of goodness,
truth, and beauty, one or all of these, or through which these
become facts in the manifoldness of the universe.
It is this specific identification that distinguishes the abso-
lutism of the monistic systems from that of other absolutistic
systems. Other positions maintain that there is a realm of
facts and of states of affairs, some of which are values such as
goodness and beauty, and others, non-values, but all of which
are related in various ways, thus forming some kind of system,
and all of which are knowable, though perhaps in many specific
instances unknown. Every system that presents as true a theory
concerning knowing, makes this presupposition of the absolute
knowableness of some "things," — a presupposition which is
identical with the principle, that there are terms which are
related, and yet do not affect one another.
One can grant, therefore, that all ''things" form a system
in that they are related,^ and yet not be forced, also, to grant
either that there is an effect of each "thing" on every other
thing, with all "things" thereby becoming similar in character,
^ See Chap. XLI., iv.-vi.
348 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
and infinitely complex, or that a relation demands an under-
lying unitary entity as a relater. But it is, of course, just this
last assumption, which is identical with the underlying-reality
theory of relations, that distinguishes Monism from those other
positions which also grant that there is a realm of fact to he
knoivn as it really is, and that this realm is a system. Accord-
ingly, if valid criticism can be brought against this specific
theory of relations, or against its application to the Universe,
we can give up Monism, and yet both retain Absolutism and
maintain that the universe is a system.- Just this conclusion,
however, is one of the findings of The New Realism and The New
Rationalism.
Absoluiistic as they are, therefore, in their position toward
both the knowledge of and the character of the facts which are
denoted by the concepts of truth, goodness, and beauty, monistic
systems are, further, perfectionistic and formalistic in their
position concerning both the factuality of ethical and cesthetic
values, and the knowledge of these, or, negatively stated,
monistic systems are anti-hedonistic, anti-utilitarian, anti-
relativistic, anti-pragmatic. Thus, in the field of ethics, monistic
systems teach the absoluteness of the "standards" of right and
wrong, and of goodness and evil. Each standard is an eternal
fact or entity that is unchanged and unchanging, although its
formulation in the "trial and error" development of knowl-
edge may vary from generation to generation, and from race
to race. Such passing "practical" standards may seem abso-
lute to him who is immersed in the flood of the tradition that
they themselves help to form, and it may even be granted that
in the general conflict of standards, out of which knowledge of
the absolute standards shall emerge victorious, it is better to
have some standard, even though it be false, than to have none.
But still the perfectionism of the monistic systems is not affected
thereby. For, from their standpoint, while, e.g., all the formula^
tions of the principles of right and wrong that have been made
up to the present may be in error, such formulations represent-
ing only attempts to arrive at a knowledge of principles by the
method of trial and error, yet such absolute principles are still
entities that are ever present to be attained, if possible, and that
* Ibid.
CONCLUSION 349
ever challenge us to further gallant effort. Indeed, the sub-
sistence (or existence) of such principles is maintained by
Monism to he implied by the very approximateness of the formu-
lations that mankind has made. For Monism, as part of its
foundation scheme that the positive term implies the negative
as a formal contradictory, must also hold that the relative im-
plies the non-relative, the passing, the eternal, and the ap-
proximating, the limit and the absolute.
However, other positions than Monism accept this absolutism
and perfectionism of standards, so that again it is the identifica-
tion of these with the essence of the One that especially dis-
tinguishes monistic systems. Also, in thorough-going Monism,
this perfectionism is made to concern not only ethical values, but
also aesthetic values, with the modes of tentative approach to
these respectively conscience and (Esthetic appreciation. Yet it
is conceivable, that one might be absolutistic toward ethical
values, and relativistic and pragmatistic toward gesthetic values.
In its attitude toward truth, however, Monism takes the clear
and precise position, that, although truth, as a specific relation
of correspondence between knowing and entity known, is of
value, value does not constitute truth. Truth is just that
specific complex entity which is formed by this specific relation,
while this complex (truth) is itself, in turn, an absolute value
that is both good and beautiful.
In their solution of the several epistemological problems,
monistic systems are all in essential agreement. All are, e.g.,
absolutistic in the way that has just been described. There are
facts to be known, there is one absolute truth to be attained to,
if possible, and the process of finite knowing, in science, phi-
losophy, and common sense, makes neither fact nor truth. This
Absolutism, however, does not exclude tentativeness and error.
The best that we can do, actuated by the appreciation of the
value of truth for its own sake, is to make every effort to know,
even though we may fail. Monistic systems nevertheless take
the position, in their Absolutism, that such possible failure
implies a standard, not yet reached, perhaps, yet ever more
closely approached. Indeed, all knowledge, except that of their
own positions, is usually interpreted by monistic systems as
being of this tentative character, but, toward themselves, each
S50 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
monistic system presupposes, tacitly at least, that it is not
merely an approximation, but a revelation of absolute fact with
little or no ground for doubt. In this manner monistic systems
usually become extremely dogmatic.^
Many monistic systems account for the merely approximating
character of most finite knowledge (the exception being them-
selves) by the hypothesis of the organic theory of truth and of
knowledge, and, indeed, of all fact. Thus, although the demand
for consistency with their fundamental postulate of the under-
lying-reality theory of relations does not compel them to do
this, they nevertheless maintain as regards truth, that any one
truth is that truth only hy virtue of its relation to all other
truths, — in other words, that the modification theory of relations
is valid for the system of truths.
One consequence of this position is, that the attainment of
even one perfect truth is impossible, unless all truths to which
it is related have come to our knowledge. But, it is argued,
success in knowing all truths is impossible, both because the
totality of truths can be arrived at only by gaining a succession
of single truths, and because we as finite beings cannot deal
with a possible infinity of truths and their relationships.* There-
fore, it is inferred, that to finite, human beings there are
accessible only those truths (?) which are partial in the sense
that they consist not of sharply delineated true and false parts,
but of a complex fusion of constituent minor truths and errors.
Only to an infinite, unlimited, perfect mind, that knows all
facts, all truth, and all relationships, simultaneously and imme-
diately, is the whole absolute truth in all its aspects available.^
This position, since it itself is advanced in each case as an
absolute, though single truth, by a philosopher who is a finite
human being (whatever this may mean) is clearly self-contra-
dictory. For, if one truth ( ?), namely, the truth, that no truth
can he known in isolation, can nevertheless be known hy itself,
it follows that many other truths can also be so known. Thus
the organic theory of knowledge, of truth, and of "things,"
' See The New Realism, Introduction.
* Joachim, op. cit.
' Koyce in I'he Spirit of Modern Philosophy, and in The World and the
Individual.
CONCLUSION 351
breaks down at the weakest link of the chain, namely, where it
would connect its own explicit theory with the conditions that
are presupposed in advancing that theory as true.
For monistic positions, therefore, the nature of truth is not
constituted by successful workings, as is contended in prag-
matic systems, but by coherence among truths and by a cor-
respondence between fact and knowing. For, granted, e.g., the
completely intuitive knowing of a single mind that underlies
the universe of organically related facts, then would there be
a perfect correspondence between His knowing and all facts
known. Indeed, since for monistic systems all entities (with
one exception) are the manifestation of such a single Being,
His knowledge and all entities are, perhaps, identical, and not
merely corresponding. But, for finite beings, who are them-
selves mere manifestations, the correspondence is only partial,
incomplete, confused, and vague.
As regards the problem of the test of truth, monistic systems
accept the empirical confirmation in perception both for common
sense and for scientific knowledge. Yet this knowledge is only
of appearances. But that panoramic knowledge which is pos-
sessed by an Entity that underlies all and manifests itself
in all, is held to subscribe to the criteria of coherence, of con-
sistency, of freedom from contradiction, of self -evidence, and
of the inconceivability of the opposite. Thus, coinciding with
the tacit presupposition of each monistic system, namely, that
it itself is absolutely true, there is this special set of tests by
which this absolute truth is held to be guaranteed. But it has
previously been shown ^ both that such tests do not stand their
own test, and that history shows them to be, because of the very
diversity of the systems to which they lead, quite as fallible as
are other tests. Thus it is, that in the working out of philo-
sophical systems, even of ahsolutistic systems, there is no abso-
lute criterion for the attainment of what the absolutist would
have absolute knowledge. No one can do more than attempt to
know, supported by the principle, that absolute truth may be
won, although absolute proof is lacking. On the basis of this
principle, it is possible that facts should be revealed to him
who has no acquaintance with the principles of proof, and,
• Chap. XV., IV., 5, 6, and 7.
352 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
indeed, it is precisely in this way that the untutored person
does know. So, also, can this same principle be the basis for
the philosopher's knowing. It is only the attainment of more
truth that is conditioned by the knowledge of the methods of
proof, and the like, but truth itself is not thus dependent.
The solution which monistic systems give to the problem of
the origin of knowledge is in agreement with the distinction
which they make between appearance and reality. The sciences
and common sense are maintained to be but a knowledge of
appearances, and this knowledge is regarded as the result of both
intellectual and sensational processes, without the former being
a transformation of the latter, and with sensational processes
themselves existing in the realm of appearances. Some knowl-
edge is thus regarded as originating in sensation ; other knowl-
edge as having a purely rational source. But the knowledge that
comes from reason has the advantage, that at least some of it
reveals ultimate reality, and not mere appearance. Sensation
can never lay claim to this prestige. Sensation may be the
stimulus or occasion for the appearance of rational processes,
even as the closing of the key is the occasion for the passing
of the electric current, and reason, thus aroused to action, may
work upon the data of sensation. But when reason is freed
from this bondage, then, by means of such tests as self-evidence,
and the inconceivability of the opposite, and of such methods
as are identical with the very presuppositions of thinking and
knowing, there is opportunity for a knowledge of the ultimate
nature of "things,'^ and not of mere appearances. On this
bnsis it is contended, e.g., that the underlying-reality theory of
relations is the only theory that accounts for relations in a
manner that is free from contradiction and consistent with what
we must think ; that, accordingly, ultimate reality is numerically
One, and, as One, Universal Self, Intellect, Will, Life, Evolu-
tion ; and, finally, that, even as the finite self is but an emana-
tion from or a manifestation of such an "infinite" self, so, also,
are the purely intellectual principles of the finite mind one with
those of the All-mind.
In conclusion, it is not surprising, therefore, to find that
monistic systems, even those which regard the All-One as of
the nature of Life or of Evolution, tacitly make this a unitary
CONCLUSION S53
mibstraium-like, or siibstance-like Being, after the model of the
traditional view, that the attributes of a physical object inhere
in a numerically single underlying substance or suhstratum-like
core. For, although the sciences of the present day have freed
themselves from the influence of this view, and from the logic
that is derived from it, the philosophy and the logic that are
taught in the schools have not. But, as we have seen, the logic
by which the underlying-reality theory of relations is demon-
strated, is, in fact, only the Aristotelian logic of the identity
of a "thing" with itself, and of the implication by each "thing"
of its formal contradictory, carried one step further. Therefore
it is not surprising that the conclusion should be, where this
theory is applied, that the universe is One. What matters it,
then, whether this One be Self, Intellect, Will, Life, or the
Absolute Continuity of One Evolution? Is not the One in
any case but a numerically single substratum to which only a
different nature is assigned after varying analogies? What
matters it which of these analogies is selected, e.g., what matters
it whether Self, or Will, or Life be selected, since in any case
both that from which the analogy is drawn and that to which
it is applied is but an underlying substance that holds in its
absolute unity the manifold of its attributes ?
To these inquiries no other answer can be given than the
answer, "It does not matter"; indeed, no other answer than
this is to be looked for, if the complete development of the
position that we are considering is borne in mind.
That development began with the unconscious influence of
the physical thing — as defined as a substratum or substance
with attributes, — on philosophy, science, and logic, the result
being that the Aristotelian logic is essentially a logic of things
(as thus defined) and, therefore, a logic in which the concepts
of substance and of cause play the leading role, together with
the specific relatfons of similarity and dissimilaritj^ and of
inclusion, complete, partial, or negative. This logic became the
logic of the tradition — of the tradition in which the psychology
and the philosophy of the last three hundred years has devel-
oped — and, accordingly, as due to its influence, there appear the
views, e.g., (1) that the conscious self is a substance, as the
unifying relater of its experiences, and, (2) later, in Objective
554 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
Idealism, that any two terms, as related, demand an underlying
entity to mediate the relationship and to be identical with the
unity which the inseparableness of the related terms implies.
With this specific theory of relations once developed — by the
use of the principle of contradiction — it is then applied to
demonstrate the position, that the Universe as cosmos and as
system is Absolute One. Therefore can this One be only sub-
stance or substratum in its functioning — whatever else it may
be — and by whatever name it may be called — Self, Ego, Will,
Life, Elan Vital, or even Unknowable. For its ** essence" is
its functioning, and not its naming.
Thus it is that the circle is completed, — in other words, thus it
is, that monistic systems both begin and end with substance,
even as might be predicted from the domination in them of
the old logic, and from their ignoring of that modem logic of
series, and of functions, in which empirical evidence is found
for the theory of external relations, and for the principle, that
related terms do not affect each other, nor demand a third entity
to mediate their relation.
n. WHAT CAN THE ABSOLUTE ONE BE?
In the several monisms that have been presented the crucial
point in each instance is the selection of some type-phenomenon
by analogy to which the further character of the universal
underlying one shall be interpreted. Reasons are advanced, of
course, for the selection of one specific type phenomenon rather
than another, but this means only that one positively experi-
enced attribute rather than another is finally chosen and the
World-One made of this character.
However, one may prefer not to select any one type-
phenomenon, but to stop with the general argument for a uni-
versal underlying One, disclaiming the possibility of knowledge
of, or of valid arguments for, the further character of this One.
Such a position may be called Agnostic Monism. It is Monism,
since it maintains that there is a numerically single entity
which makes the universe One; it is Agnosticism, since it con-
tends that the further character of this One is unknowable.
Therefore the One is called The Unknowable.
In the argument for this position it is contended, that, since
CONCLUSION 355
it is the function of the One to mediate all relations between
terms, especially between those terms that are all-inclusive, and
since the evidence for this mediation is derived from the im-
plication, by each term, of its formal contradictory, it is a
question whether this underlying One can he of the nature of
either term. For example, if self and not-self are the contra-
dictory terms, it may be asked, whether that term which medi-
ates the relation between these terms can itself be either a self
or a not-self. For does not the identification of the One with
either term of the two terms between which the One mediates,
imply a specific relation between (1) the One, as so identified,
and as mediating, and (2) the two terms as the mediated, so that
still another mediating and underlying entity is implied,^ which
entity is not either self or not-self,^ — in the example chosen?
Similarly, if good and not-good (evil) are selected as the pair
of contrasting terms, each relative to the other, then the medi-
ating One, even though identified with a Deity, cannot be the
Good. For that which is good by virtue of its contrast with
and limitation by evil, loses this character if it is made all-
inclusive and universal.
The same criticism may be brought against all those specific
monisms that interpret or regard the all-inclusive One as being
of the character of some finite positive "thing." And to the
writer this criticism seems to be quite valid, for reasons that
proceed both from the old and from the new logic, and that
make any form of monism untenable. This criticism may be
considered in some further detail.
First, it is evident that the monist in his endeavor to identify
the One with some positive "thing" is searching for a concept
or for a kind under which everything shall be contained, and
which in turn shall not be contained under any other concept;
i.e., the monist is usually not content to stop merely with the
conclusion, that there is a One, disclaiming knowledge of what
the further nature of this One is, but he wishes to ascertain
the One's further positive nature, thus to show, e.g., that it is
spiritual, or, more specifically, that it is Will, or Intellect, or
'Herbert Spencer, First Principles, ed. 1900 (Appleton), pp. 3-129.
' Cf . Bradley, Appearcmce and Reality, and Taylor, Elements of Meta-
physics.
356 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
Life. To succeed in such an endeavor would be to arrive at
a kind or concept which is all-inclusive, and to find what the
old logic calls the summum genus.
In criticism of this attempt it may first be demonstrated that
even by the principles of the traditional logic, the monist cannot
accomplish his purpose. For it is a principle of this logic, that
a characteristic which differentiates one species of a genus from
another species, ca^mot also be a characteristic of that genus.
The genus includes in its connotation only that which is common
to the several species, while the species are differentiated from
each other by characteristics which the genus cannot have in
its function of including them, and of denoting all the indi-
viduals that the species denotes. For example, vertebrates and
invertebrates are the two great classes of animals. The presence
of a spinal column and a cerebro-spinal nervous system are
the differentia of the former (logical) species, while the lack of
these characteristics and the presence of only a ventral nervous
system is the distinguishing feature of all invertebrates except
the Protozoa and the Porifera, which have no nerve cells at all.
But the logical class or genus, animal, is characterized by none
of these differentia of the species. In turn this genus, animal,
is co-ordinate, as logical species, with the class, plant, with both
of these species in turn subsumed under the next higher genus,
living being. In the connotation of this last genus the specific
characteristics of the two species, plant and animal, are absent.
As, now, we go on upward, as it were, in the survey of these
relations of subsumption of species to genus, we approach the
summum genus. Thus, living being is a co-ordinate species with
non-living being, with both included by the next higher genus,
physical entity ; this genus is, in turn, a co-ordinate species with
psychical entity, with both of these classes under the genus
existent; existent is, in turn, co-ordinate with non-existent sub-
sistent, which denotes such entities as numbers, and laws, as
entities that are not correlated either with a specific time or
with a specific place; the genus for existent and non-existent
subsistent is mere entity, defined as that which can be thought
in consistency with the data of sense experience and the prin-
ciples of correct reasoning.
Have we, now, reached in this term, entity, a summum genus
CONCLUSION 357
which has, by the elimination of the differentia of the logical
species, only the characteristic of being consistently thought,
or are we forced onward to a still higher sitmnium genus of
merely mentionahle "things" which shall include not only
'^things" that can be consistently thought, but also "things"
that cannot he so thought, that are not implied by other
'^ things," and that are, perhaps, self -contradictory?
Either of these options places the monist in a precarious
position. For, if the One is to be all-inclusive, it must be iden-
tical, in some way, with the summum genus, while, on the other
hand, if the One is to have some positive content, beyond that of
being merely the consistently thought or the merely mentionahle,
it must share the characteristics of some of its logical species
and so can not be a summum genus. But the first alternative
is objectionable to most monists, since they wish to identify the
One with some positive content such as self or will, and the
second alternative runs directly counter to the logic of genus
and species.
If the character of the One be only that of being mention-
able,^ then, of course, there is no denying the formal correctness
of this identification; for the absolute One certainly is mention-
able, being at least a combination of words that has a con-
siderable power of verbal suggestion.^** But the monist is, of
course, not content with this, for he would have the One not
only mentionahle, but much more — a self -consistent entity at
least. However, if the monist advances this claim, he has en-
tered the lists, and accepts the chance of defeat. For the One
may prove to be but self -contradictory , — mentionahle, of course,
along with other entities, but, as a species, differentiated from
them. Precisely this seems to be the logical status of the One;
for, if the "office" of the One is that of mediating relations
between terms, then each of these terms is in turn related to
the One as mediator, and a still more ultimate One is demanded
to mediate this relation. Thus the situation that seems to imply
an idtimate One, really implies that no One is ultimate. But
further, if, in addition to performing a mediating function, the
absolute One is to be a smnmum genus, or a kind of all kinds,
• Cf . Chap. XLIV.
" See The New Realism, Introduction, for this fallacy.
358 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
a class of all classes, then it must logically include itself, since
it is an entity and belongs to some species. But this self-
inclusion contradicts the principle of classification advanced by
the traditional logic, namely, that the genus cannot include itself
as a species, or as an individual of any of its own species. This
principle may, however, not be universal, and even by the old
logic there may be one concept that meets this peculiar demand,
this exception being the concept, mentionahle ^'things" — for
these are mentionahle. On the other hand, hy the new logic,
this problem is solved by the realization, that only implication
and objective "states of affairs," and not mere mentioning,
constitute or make a concept.
Here, therefore, entity, with its definition of that which can
he consistently thought, fulfils the demand made on the summum
genus, namely, that it shall include itself; ^^ for this definition
of '^entity" is itself an "ohjective state of affairs" that is im-
plied and consistently thought; and, an entity is an entity.
The options of the monist are, therefore, either to identify
the One with a merely mentionahle entity, at the risk, however,
of such an entity being self-contradictory, or to make the One
an entity that merely possesses the characteristic of heing con-
sistently thought. This last, of course, the monist would claim
the One to be as the result of his argument for it; yet, if he
accept this alternative, he is still logically prevented from
assigning to the One the positive characteristics of any species,
especially of the characteristics of any physical or psychical
existent. The One, therefore, logically remains devoid of all
content except as it is thought as One — and perhaps it is not
even so thought consistently, as we have seen.
Since he thus fails to demonstrate consistently by the old
logic, either that there is an underlying One, or that this One
is identical with some kind of "thing" of positive content, the
monist may next turn to the new logic in the hope of accom-
plishing his purpose. But here failure again awaits him, pro-
vided the results of modern logical analysis are used correctly,
and are not misinterpreted.
By the new logic we may indeed accept one universe, hut a
universe that is one only in the sense that it is a totality of terms
" Cf. Chaps. XLIII. and XLIV.
CONCLUSION S59
and individuals, both simple and complex, classes and series,
states of affairs, existents, and subsistents, that are all related,
though in different ways, and with neither one universal rela-
tion nor one mediator of all relations.^" The universe, therefore,
may be, as a totality, in one-one correspondence with the number
1. However, this oneness does not mediate all relations, nor
make all the parts of the totality like in kind. This position
may be called additive pluralism, and is quite as compatible
with the oneness of totality as is the position which maintains
that there is an absolutely simple One that mediates all relations.
However, the monist is not satisfied with such a hare oneness
of totality, but, having reached by argumentation an Absolute
One, he seeks to find for this, by proper analogy, an appropriate
content. Therefore he may turn, e.g., to the straight line as a
favorable possibility for such an analogy. For a line is granted
to be made up of points, and thus to be a manifold, but it is
also one, and seemingly, as a line, an absolute one, homogeneous
and simple." Have we not, therefore, here an instance of an
entity, which, as either the line itself, or as the relation between
the points, or even as the concept line or 'Qoint, is itself an abso-
lute one that mediates the relations between the many entities
of a manifold, and that is also a specific kiyid of thing?
This suggestion has considerable plausibility, which might be
taken advantage of by the monist. Yet a little rigorous analysis
shows that each of the above possible hypotheses must be re-
jected, even in the face of the fact, that this analogy of the line
is as favorable a possibility as the monist can find. For in the
case of the line the oneness in the midst of multiplicity is much
more apparent even than it is in an organism, or in a chemical
compound, or in a functional complex such as motion, and the
analogy of a point or of an instant, each of which is absolutely
simple, is not promising, since in these instances there is no
multiplicity.
Yet even the analogy of the line fails. For modern logic
shows that a line is a series of an infi7iite number of unextended
elements (points) that are related asymmetrically and transi-
tively, the "result" being that, through the presence of these
non-additive relations, extension of one dimension is derived
" Ibid. " Cf. Chap. XLIII., vn.
360 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
from that which is not extended. However, the asymmetrical
and transitive relation that relates the points is not the only-
relation that is present. For the line consists not only of points,
but also of smaller lines, so that there are also the relations of
the smaller lines to one another, and of the smaller lines to their
points, and of the whole line both to the smaller lines and to
the points. But even if there were not many relations, but only
one, this relation would not be the One, for besides it there
would be the terms to be related. It is fallacious, therefore,
to identify the oneness of the line with any one of the relations
that are involved in it, or with the concept of relations as such.
For the concept of relation cannot itself perform the "function"
of forming an absolute one in the line, since concepts do not
themselves relate, but are objective "states of affairs" that
involve one or more specific relations of similarity.
Failure also meets the attempt to identify either the concrete
oneness of a line or the hare concept of oneness in general with
the all-mediating One.^* A point is an absolute one. So, also,
is a line one, but a one that is at once a totality, a class, and
a series of points. Point is that concept or objective state of
affairs that is defined in a very specific way, in relation to a
line, as the unextended element of space, while a point is any
individual that this concept denotes, or of which this definition
holds. A similar difference subsists between the concept, line,
and any individual line. However, the concrete oneness of any
point of a7iy specific line does not mediate the relations between
all the points of that line, nor does the oneness of the line as
a whole perform this supposed mediation. On the other hand,
the concrete oneness of a line as a whole is a derivative oneness,
since it is logically subsequent to the subsistence of points and of
certain specific relations between points. Given these relations
and points, and the line subsists as one, with the several other
relations above enumerated also subsisting. Thus neither the
oneness of a point, nor the oneness of the line mediates the
several relations that subsist in the line.
It is a very similar state of affairs that is also found wherever
there is a oneness of kind or of class, and of the concept of the
class. The oneness of a single point or instant is not mediated
»* Cf. Chap. XXVII.
CONCLUSION 361
by a relation, but the oneness of the class of points is mediated
or — better stated — organized by the relation of similarity, at the
same time that there are other relations between the points
whereby they form a line. The fact of the similarity of the
points to one another is the class of points, and this entity is
numerically distinct from any one point. But this oneness of
a class is organized by the relation of similarity, but does not
itself mediate this relation.
By the new logic, further, knowing is discovery. When cer-
tain specific discoveries are made, classes or groups of entities
that are related by similarity are revealed. But similarity is
not the only relation present. For example, all points are
similar — as points, but it is not this relation that organizes
points into a line. CJasses may also be similar to one another,
so that there are classes of classes; e.g., both points and instants
are similar in that they are iiidivisihle elements. But between
points and instants there are also other relations. Thus, e.g.,
by virtue of one-one correlating relation between a scries of
points and a series of instants there is an entity which is motion.
However, in all these cases, whatever oneness there is, —
whether it be the oneness of a group of similar entities, or of
two correlated indivisible entities such as a point and an instant,
or of a series, or of one series related to another, and the like,
the oneness, with the exception of the absolute numerical sim-
plicity of, e.g., a point or an instant, is that of certain entities
in certain specific relations. It is, therefore, a oneness of an
organized, but not of an organic whole. Both the relations and
the terms are objective, and the terms standing in specific rela-
tions are an objective state of affairs, that specific class of states
of affairs in which the relation is that of similarity being the
class of objective concepts. The concept is, therefore, not made
by the mind, but is discovered. But over and above the specific
relation of similarity that subsists in such cases, there is no
further additional entity to mediate the relation. Whatever
oneness is present is, therefore, with the exception of the abso-
lute oneness of entities such as a point or an instant, a oneness
of an organized whole that is already one with the relating of
the terms by the relation. Thus it is that modern logic shows
not only that there is no Absolute One to mediate all relations,
862 SUBSTANCE PHILOSOPHIES
and to underlie the universe, but also that, even if there were
such a One, it could not be identified with any concept or kind
of "thing," not even with such kinds as term and relation. For
these are distinct, and are, therefore, two, and not one. Thus it
is, also, that modern logic confirms the results of our previous
criticism, which showed that the argument for the underlying-
reality theory of relations, i.e., for the necessity of a one to
mediate the relation between terms, is self -contradictory . Such
a one, we found, is never reached, provided the argument by
which the attempt is made to reach it, is consistently adhered
to. For any one supposedly final underlying reality whose
function might be that of mediating the relation between two
or more terms, is never final, since, as related to those terms,
it demands a still more final reality.
Nor is the search for an Absolute One aided by the endeavor,
as a last desperate attempt, to identify this One with such
refined concepts as Oneness, relation, term, mentionahle, con-
sistently, thought-entity, and the like. For our present criti-
cism shows, on the one hand, that these concepts are always
such that they allow of "otherness," e.g., term is other than
relation, so that the problem under consideration is repeated in
the form of the question as to what is the nature of that One
which mediates the relation between these contrasted entities.
But our criticism also shows, on the other hand, that a concept
is a specific and objective state of affairs or relation of similarity
among the individuals of a class. Such concepts or relations
organize such individuals, so that the unity that results is only
the unity of ayi organized wholc,^^ but nothing more. In fact,
that each of the specific concepts under consideration is itself
just such a specific organizing relation, is disclosed by only a
slight analysis. Thus, e.g., if there are many individuals which
are each one, or each a relation, or each a term, then are one,
relation, and teryn each a specific instance of a "way" in which
"something" is similar to "something" else; i.e., each of these
concepts is a specific relation of similarity in which individuals
can stand, even as oneness, relation, and term must themselves
be similar to one another in order to belong to the class of
concepts.
"Not organic; cf. Chapa. XLIII., XLVI.
CONCLUSION 363
A similar assertion may also be made of many other entities,
such as those that are referred to in this very discussion, as,
e.g., individual, and class. But our analysis is sufficient to
warrant the conclusion, on the one hand, that there is no other
content or meaning to the term. The Absolute One, than that
it is a mere mentionable, and, on the other hand, that, while
the universe is an organized whole, — indeed, a very complex
organized whole — as such a whole, it is one only in the sense
that the totality of all 'things'' is one. For an Absolute One,
other than the oneness of a totality which allows also of the
fact of an organized whole, there is, then, not only no valid and
consistent evidence or proof, but also no ascertainable positive
content, other than that of being a mere mentionahle. For that
the Absolute One is at least this, certainly can not be denied at
the conclusion of a discussion in which what the nature of the
Absolute One may he has been the leading topic of discourse.
SECTION IV
EEALISM *
FUNCTION PHILOSOPHIES
Realism is that constructive philosophical position which is
derived by an empirical and critical examination of other phi-
losophies, most of which are found to presuppose, or to contain,
explicitly or implicitly, positions and principles that are to be
accepted as true. The systematic and consistent body of these
positions and principles constitutes that philosophical position
which may be called Neo-Realism, and also The New Rationalism.
New Realism, or, as we may call it for the sake of brevity.
Realism, may be presented and discussed to advantage under
two headings, namely,
I. The central doctrine of Realism.
II. The more detailed theory of Realism, including the
Structure of the Universe, and the Realistic Solution of the
main philosophical problems.
I. THE CENTRAL DOCTRINE OF REALISM
CHAPTER XXXIX
THE SOLUTION OF THE EGO-CENTRIC AND VALUE-
CENTRIC PREDICAMENTS
The central doctrine of Realism is identical with that solu-
tion of the ego-centric and value-centric predicaments which is
found, by a critical examination of other systems, to be present
logically in their tacit presuppositions, implications, and admis-
sions, and, psychologically, in the character of those conditions
* The general bibliographv for Realism will be found at the end of
Chap. XLIII,
364
EGO- AND VALUE-CENTRIC PREDICAMENTS 365
that lead to and permit of philosophical deduction and investi-
gation. In presenting the evidence which thus leads to an
empirical establishment of Realism, we need to a large extent,
therefore, only to summarize the criticisms that have been made
at various stages in our previous discussions.
The most important and, perhaps, most essential realistic
doctrine is the solution of the ego-centric predicament} First
we may state, at the risk of repetition, that this predicament is
held to be constituted hy the fact that it is impossible to per-
ceive, remember, imagine, think of, or mention any object that
is not for that reason a perceived, remerribered, imagined, thought
of, or mentioned object, and that is not, therefore, an object that
is in relation to either perceiving, remembering, imagining,
thinking, or mentioning — briefly, to knowing, either actual or
possible. Or, if objection be made to this formulation, then the
predicament may be formulated as meaning that because one
can in some sense think of, or at least name the universe as all-
inclusive, therefore everything is thought of, and so is in relation
to knowing. However, such a knowing is quite different from
that which we usually identify with genuine knowing, namely,
a knowing alout and in some detail, and is at best only a know-
ing at its very minimum, namely, as perhaps a mere mentioning,
if, indeed, it is knowing at all.
But even if it were a fact that the universe both as a whole,
and in every detail, is, as known in some way, related to some
knowing, either past, present, or future, existent or merely
subsistent, this would be of consequence only on certain condi-
tions. One of these conditions is, that two terms— any two —
hy virtue of being related, causally infliience each other, pro-
ducing some effect, modification, or alteration, each on the other.
The other condition is, that aiiy relation between two terms
mtist be mediated by a third entity.^ If the first condition were
the fact, then the further fact that the world which we know
is related to knowledge would have important consequences.
For we should then be obliged to infer that the known world is
one that is affected, altered, or modified by the knowing of it.^
' Cf. Chaps. X., XXVIII., in.
* Cf. Chap. XXVI.
»Cf. Chapa. XXIX.-XXXIIL
366 REALISM
On the other hand, if the second condition were the fact, there
would be the implication, that the known world and the knowing
are related and united by an underlying or transcendent
numerically simple entity that makes everything in some sense
an Absolute One.*
The first position, that two terms affect each other by virtue
of being related, is the now familiar modification theory of
relations ; the second, the familiar underlying-reality theory. Of
fthese two theories the latter has, however, been found not only
to lack all inductive proof, but also to be self-contradictory.^
No concrete entity, i.e., one not merely argued, but found by
some other means of cognitive approach, is discovered em-
pirically to be the universal underlying One that monistic posi-
tions claim; while, as argued, the theory is self-contradictory,
and fails to attain that which it seeks, since at each step of
getting to an underlying entity that shall mediate the relation
between two terms, this entity is in turn found to be related
to the two terms, so that a further, more ultimate entity is
demanded. Thus each "would-be" ultimate presupposes that it
is not ultimate, and hence the self-contradiction. Also, as re-
gards the former, the "modification theory," this is shown by
direct inductive evidence at least not to be universal.*^ For
certain concrete instances are found, e.g., in the case of many
functional complexes, for which this theory does not hold,
and among these complexes is the relational uliole, knowing
and object known. Therewith, however, is the ego-centric
predicament solved. Just how this is the case we shall now
examine.
All through this volume many of the important points of
difference between the old and new logic have been emphasized.
We have seen that the old logic was unconsciously formed and
developed on the model of a physical thing.'' Accordingly the
relations that are emphasized by this logic are chiefly those of
the inherence of qualities in a substratum, of similarity and dif-
ference, of the inclusion of one class in another, of causation,
and of the additiveness of parts to make a whole. From the
same source or influence there also comes the identification of
* Cf. Chaps. XXXIV.-XXXVIII. " Chap. XXVI., ii., 2.
' Chap. XXVI., II., 3. ' Chaps. III., XXVI., and XXVII.
EGO- AND VALUE-CENTRIC PREDICAMENTS 367
all terms, either (1) with "things" that interact, giving the
modification theory of relations, or (2) with "things" whose
relatedness demands another entity to mediate the relations be-
tween them, giving the underlying-reality theory of relations.
But of the non-additive relationship of parts to form a whole,
i.e., of the modern principle of order, and, therefore, of the
relationship of function as sharply diii'erent from that of causey
and of the method of analysis in situ, and the like, the old logic
was entirely ignorant. The formulation of the principles and
the methods that are involved in these situations is identical
with the new logic, both as this has been used unconsciously in
the development of such exact sciences as mechanics, and also
as it has been consciously recognized in recent years. ^
Now it is precisely by either the tacit or the explicit pre-
supposition and use of certain principles of this new logic, more
specifically of the method of analysis in situ, and of a functional
or external relationship, that the ego-centric predicament is
solved, and made no longer a predicament, even by those
philosophies that are explicitly developed from contrary
principles.
The modern investigation and analysis of motion, as illus-
trated by the pioneer work of Galileo in discovering the laws of
motion, is an example of the use of these principles and methods.
Motion cannot be removed from time, nor time from motion in
particular cases of its occurrence, so that the character of their
relatedness can be discovered only by an analysis in situ. But
such an analysis shows that time and motion are related, and
yet that neither is thereby causally influenced in any way by
the other. Neither one "makes" the other, neither affects, modi-
fies, alters, or causes the other. Thus motion in general is found
to be a function of time. Specific motions, with specific
numerical values for (in correlation with) different specific
velocities in the case, e.g., of retarded and accelerated motions,
are functions of specific times, with a one-one correspondence
between each such value and some one instant of the specific
time period concerned.
Innumerable other instances of analysis in situ could also be
given, for the method is a widely accepted logical and scientific
« Chaps. XXI.-XXV., XXVII., XLI., XLIII., and XLIV.
S68 REALISM
means of procedure, upon which some of the greatest modern
discoveries and advances in knowledge have been dependent.
With, now, an analysis in situ the only practical method of
procedure in many cases that require analysis, such an analysis
is also a method that leads to the discovery of relations that
are external.^ The relations between time and motion, and be-
tween time and change of velocity, i.e., of acceleration, are ex-
amples of such relations. Other examples are the relations
(1) between any two points of a line, (2) between any two
instants of time, (3) between a point and an instant, — which
complex is the "element" of motion. In each of these instances
two terms are related that yet do not and cannot causally affect
and modify each other except on the condition that each thereby
becomes complex and so presupposes ultimately simple elements
that are externally related.
The time has been when the two theories of relations that
are opposed to this "external theory" have been based on
grounds that were regarded as self-evident, or as excluding the
conceivahility of the opposite. But today these methods of
establishment are found to be no more than mere psychological
tests, and thus to give proofs which show now one principle
and now another to be "absolutely true," and shift one's con-
victions first to one position and then to another." The evi-
dence for the external theory is, however, not tested by these
criteria. It is a theory which is not self-evident, nor is it one
whose opposite is inconceivable, although the two theories op-
posed to it presuppose it, so that it is presupposed by its own
denial in them.^^ It is, moreover, a theory that is shown by
inductive evidence to be the correct theory for at least some
instances of related terms.
With such examples of scientific analysis in situ and of ex-
ternally related terms before us, the hypothesis is permissible,
that the problem of the relationsliip of knowing to the object
known may be examined by the same method and principles,
with the residt that the knoivn object may be discovered to be
1 elated to the knowing, but not to be caused, altered, or modified
thereby. This hypothesis, however, solves, if it is correct, the
• See Chap. XXVI., ii., 1.
^o Cf. Chap. XV., IV., 5, 6.
" Chap. XXVI., II., 1.
EGO- AND VALUE-CENTRIC PREDICAMENTS 369
ego-centric predicament. But, that it is correct is shown by its
empirical confirmation in a number of instances: —
I. Just in so far as any state of affairs, holding of any en-
tities whatsoever, is advanced in any science or in any philo-
sophical position as a state of affairs that is true, there is presup-
posed (1) that this situation of a known state of affairs can be
analyzed with the knowing left in situ; (2) that these two
terms, namely the knowing and the complex ohject or state of
affairs known, can be distinguished; (3) that, if this particular
knowing were not present, the state of affairs would still be
the same as it is when the knowing is present. This last specific
presupposition, particularly, is the sole logical condition on
which any theory, scientific or philosophical, can (be claimed
to) portray the facts, and, therefore, be (advanced as) a true
theory. And the discovery of this presupposition means that
one has found another instance of the validity of the theory of
external relations. Knowing and known object, complex though
this be, are related ; even the whole universe, if we can use this
term so as denotatively to know all, may not be exempt from
this judgment ; but, whatever the object known may be, it is
presupposed to he related to the knowing as if this were not
taking place, and, therefore, as independent of the knowing.
These presuppositions are made even by those philosophical
systems which, like Phenomenalism, Subjectivism, Materialism,
and Pragmatism, advance explicitly a developed theory of a
different state of affairs, namely, one in which it is maintained
that knowing does make some difference to the object known,
and that the latter is not (causally) independent of the former.^^
For in each of these philosophies this last specific state of
affairs is tacitly assumed to be related to knowing, and yet not
to be either constituted or altered thereby. Thus all these posi-
tions are inconsistent, self-contradictory, and self-refuting.
II. These positions, as well as others, also presuppose that the
ego-centric predicament is solved in a number of other instances
than that of the knowing of those states of affairs which are
represented in their theories as true. Thus (1) Phenomenalism
makes this presupposition in tacitly assuming, e.g., that things-
in-themselves form a manifold, and act on transcendental selves,
" See the criticism of these positions in Chaps, XXIX.-XXXUI.
870 REALISM
and that the "categorical machinery" of the transcendental
self is known. 1^ So also (2) Subjectivism both tacitly assumes
and explicitly concludes that finite spirits, their ideas and "no-
tions," God, and His ideas are not constituted or altered by
the knowing of them — by some finite spirit (Berkeley, or any
other subjectivist).^* (3) Positivism tacitly assumes that im-
pressions (sensations) and the copies of these, called ideas, can
be known as they really are without being constituted or altered
by those ideas in which they are known and to which they are
related/^ (4) Naturalism, Parallelism, Materialism, and Psy-
chism, also, all frankly make the same presupposition regarding
the knowing situation. ^^ Each of these positions is, as we have
seen, the result of an attempt to derive a philosophy by ex-
tending and making universal some rather special scientific view
of the universe, although science for them is, seemingly, linfi-
ited to astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology,
so that, owing to this shortsighted and inaccurate view, these
philosophical positions are open to severe criticism. Neverthe-
less, as generalizations from a limited group of sciences, they
all frankly admit, with these sciences themselves, that the know-
ing and the entities known are totli numerically distinct and
externally related, and thus all rest on the solution of the ego-
centric predicament, not only as regards that general state of
affairs which is the content of their theory in each case, but
also as regards the several more specific objects, qualities, and
relations, the knowledge of which is presented in the details of
their theory. At every point in their explicitly advanced doc-
trines, they therefore grant that the knowing situation can be
examined by an analysis in situ, with the result that knoivi^ig is
found to have no effect on the object as known, and that, al-
though always present to the known world, it is present as if
it were not present.
(5) Pragmatism also makes the same assumptions at a num-
ber of stages in the development of its explicit doctrines as well
as in its fundamental principles. ^^ Thus, e.g., so far as Prag-
matism is an extended and generalized doctrine of evolution, it
^» See Chap. XXIX. " See Chap. XXXT.
" See Chap. XXX. '" See Chap. XXXII.
" See Chap. XXXIII.
EGO- AND VALUE-CENTRIC PREDICAMENTS S71
explicitly accepts the solution of the ego-centric predicament.
It is disloyal to this solution, and becomes self-contradictory, as
do also Naturalism and Materialism, when the doctrine of the
evolution of all "things," including knowing, is based on the
principle of a universal causal interaction. For, very evidently,
if all "things," including consciousness and knowing, causally
affect and are causally affected by other "things," then knowing
makes a dijfere7ice by its very presence, and things are not the
same as known as they are when knowing is absent. This con-
clusion holds of the knowing both of the whole state of affairs
and of all the details presented in these respective theories,
although quite the contradictory position is presupposed in of-
fering these as true theories suitable for popular consumption.
However, to remain consistent with the principle which each of
these theories actually presupposes in that it is advanced as a
theory that presents facts, each must grant that not all "things"
causally interact, but that some, particularly that complex ob-
ject or state of affairs which forms the content of each theory,
and the knowledge of this object, do not. These two terms are
externally, and, as it were, functionally related.
(6) Monistic systems, for the most part, as we have already
seen,^^ frankly admit that the ego-centric predicament is solved.
This, indeed, is the very essence of their historical criticism of
Phenomenalism.^'' Their one concern is to tind evidence or proof
for an Absolute One which shall mediate all relations between all
terms, and manifest itself in the world of concrete entities or
appearances. But monistic sj'stems do not doubt that this One
both in its essence and its activity in manifesting itself can he
known as it really is, and thus be in relation to a knowing, and
yet not be constituted or altered thereby. It is only in so far
as some monistic systems are based on certain specific argu-
ments,^"' that they are derived from the false proposition, that
the ego-centric predicament is insohihle. Thus, e.g., it is a
thorough-going phenomenalistic argument, that, in the hypo-
thetical absence of finite knowers, there must be an infinite
knower to give the otherwise chaotic world the unity and order
of certain relationships. This last is, indeed, a very modern
monistic proof. So also is the argument, that, because all
" See Chap. XXXIV. ^^ See Chap. XXXIV. " See Chap. XXXVIII.
372 REALISM
''things" are related and so affect one another, they are all
alike, and therefore that the universe is 07ie in kind. Against
the first argument it may be said, that, if knowing in no ease
alters or constitutes the terms of the universe, it also need not
constitute the relations of this universe ; while against the
second argument one may insist, until proof to the contrary is
found, that even if all "things" are related, they may never-
theless be independent and not causally connected, and, there-
fore, qualitatively different and unlike. These alternatives to
monism are pluralism.
CHAPTER XL
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES
The central doctrine of Realism is obtained, therefore, by
the solution of the ego-centric predicament. Knowing may not
be existentially eliminated from the known world — indeed, it
may even be granted, that, if we endeavor to think or to know
a world as unknown, we but once again have a world that is
knoAvn and related to knowing. But there is always the possi-
bility that this knowing situation can be dealt with by an
analysis in situ, and the discovery made, (1) that the knowing
and the known are numerically distinct, (2) that these two
terms are related to each other, and (3) that the relation be-
tween them is external. This hypothesis is confirmed by the
several specific cases of knowing just examined. Therefore the!
assertion is justified, that in so far as Realism is identical with?
the solution of the ego-centric predicament and with that posi-i
tion which holds the theory of external relations to apply to I
the relation between knowing and the known. Realism is a posi-
tion that is established by empirical methods and not by a priori
arguments and assumptions. Accordingly, with this empirical
proof at hand, deductive results by way of forming further
hypotheses may be derived from the fact of the external or
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 37S
functional relation of Imowing to the known object, and con-
firmation of these hypotheses be sought for. Some of these
hypotheses are as follows : —
Knowing and known object may he qualitatively different
Hypothesis I. If knowing and object known are numerically
distinct and externally related, the former neither affecting nor
constituting the latter, then may the two in some instances be
qualitatively different. In general the external theory logically
permits very different terms to be related, simple with complex,
and qualitatively unlike with unlike. On the other hand, mutual
causal influences make terms alike. Therefore, if related terms
appear qualitatively different, and there is no reason for trans-
forming this difference into a similarity, this difference may
be accepted as ultimate.
Realism, so far as it is identical with the solution of the
ego-centric predicament, would be quite compatible with the
empirical discovery that all the existential entities of the uni-
verse are like in kind. But by common sense and science they
are not found to be this, while the several demonstrations in
Subjectivism, Positivism, Naturalism, Materialism, and monistic
Idealism for such a likeness of all "things" are either a priori
and so not empirical, or self-contradictory and so not valid.
Therefore, in the absence of valid reasons to the contrary,
Realism concludes, that knowing and the known are in many
cases qualitatively different, even as different as empirical investi-
gation and the results of the sciences show, e.g., physical entities
and such non-existent suhsistents ^ as number, space, and time,
on the one hand, and psychical processes, on the other hand, to be.
Only when one psychical process is the known object to another
process as the knowing process, are knowing and known object
(to this extent) similar, but this similarity does not result from
any causal interaction between the two. Rather, it is purely
incidental to facts, — namely, the facts of the universe, and thus
is quite analogous to that similarity between points which is
quite compatible with the dissimilarity between all points and
all instants as two distinct classes.
With the theory of external relations empirically established
> See Chap. XLIV.
374 REALISM
for the relation between knowing and the knoivn, and also with
an empirical confirmation at hand for the logically consistent
hypothesis of the dissimilarity of knowing and the known, the
further hypotheses are derivable, (1) that external relations
may subsist in a great many other instances in the universe,
and (2) that a great many different kinds of entities may exist |
and subsist and be related in many different ways.- These I
hypotheses taken together mean a logically pluralistic ''world," |
i.e., a "world" or universe that is "made up" of many different ..
kinds of entities, all related, but in qualitatively different waj^s,
some causally, but others not, some dependent, but others not,
and with no single underlying One to mediate all relations.
Illusory objects are objective
Hypothesis II. The second hypothesis that is logically possi-
ble if knowing and known object are numerically distinct and,
in some cases, qualitatively different, and in all cases externally
related, is, that at least many classes of so-called illusory ob-
jects are not constituted by the consciousness of them, but are
quite as objective as are non-illusory entities. This hypothesis
is again one that is confirmed by the results of empirical investi-
gation, and thereby a disproof furnished of a certain specific
argument that is often advanced in support of a position, namely.
Subjectivism, which in some of its doctrines is diametrically
opposed to Realism. Subjectivism in its position concerning
the knowledge of spirits is, as we have seen, realistic ; but in
holding that the physical world is not numerically distinct from
the percepts and ideas of it, but is identical with these, it is
directly anti-realistic.^ For knowing is thus made, not merely
alterative, but constitutive of the physical world.
The logical and historical argument for this position proceeds,
as we have seen, from the assumed subjectivity of some quali-
ties and the impossibility of concretely experiencing a material
substratum, to the denial of this substratum and the inference
that all qualities are subjective.'* But this demonstration is fre-
quently buttressed by the further argument from dreams, hal-
lucinations, errors of judgment, and both normal and abnormal
' See Chaps. XLIII.-XLVI. " Chap. XXX. * Chap. XXX.
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES »75
illusions.^ Thus it is claimed, e.g., that dream objects are purely
subjective, and then, by analogy, that all illusory objects are
also of this "character. It is then argued, that even the normal
objects of the world about us may be, or, in fact, are but one
common illusion or dream, and so entirely subjective.
" One obvious criticism of this argument is, that the illusory
and hallucinatory in any instance implies that which is not of
this character, so that, if the one be subjective, the other must
be objective in the sense of not being constituted by conscious-
ness or by knowing. Yet this objective character need not be
existential ; it may be subsistential, and still meet the logical
requirements of the implication.
But further it is a very general principle of procedure that,
if a specific argument is based on one alternative when other
possibilities exist and are ignored, then that argument is en-
dangered when those other alternatives are considered. Pre-
cisely this situation, however, is found in the case of the argu-
ment, that illusory objects, such as the seeming convergence of
the rails of the railroad, or the seeming bentness of a straight
stick in the water, must be subjective or conscious in character,
because (1) the parallelness and straightness are objective, and
because (2) objectively the coexistence of the contradictory
characters, parallelness and convergence, straightness and bent-
ness, at the same place and time, is impossible. Surely
it is to be admitted that the rails cannot be both con-
vergent and parallel, the stick both straight and bent. But
if for this reason it is inferred that consciousness is the locus
of the convergence and the bentness, then may this inference
itself be in error, provided there are other alternatives for solv-
ing the difficulty. But other alternatives there are. For the
convergence may be a characteristic of, and have a locus
in, the relational complex, light-traveling-in-straight-lines-from-
each-rail-to-the-eyes, or to a photographic plate, and the bent-
ness be a characteristic of the complex, light rays-coming-from-
the-stick-through-the-refractive medium of water. This other
alternative is, indeed, the scientific explanation in each of these
cases. But this explanation is one which means that the dif-
ferent locus which is demanded by the principle of contradiction
" Chaps. X., XXX., XLIII., i., n.
376 REALISM
for the convergence and bentness is found quite as readily in
an objective relational complex as it is in a consciousness or
mind.
With this the case there is a confirmation of the hypothesis
that, if the normal object and knowing are related externally,
are numerically distinct, and in some instances are qualitatively
different, with the known object objective in just these respects,
so also may all illusory objects and the cognition of them be
similarly related.
It is clear, therefore, that if there is this alternative method
for the solution of the problem of certain illusions, one cannot
pass it wholly by, and conclude that the only locus for illusory
objects in general is consciousness, and that all objects might
analogously be conscious in nature. Yet it is just this pro-
cedure that is adopted by many philosophers who first persist
in ignoring the alternative possibility,*' and then insist that
the crucial test of Eealism is its ability to explain error, and that
it fails to do this, and who finally infer not only that all illusory
objects are subjective, but also that all objects may be.
It is by using the other alternative that the subjectivistic
or idealistic argument and conclusion from illusions can be
disproved, and the main realistic position once again be sup-
ported. For other kinds of illusory objects and other instances
of error can be explained in much the same way as are the
instances just considered. Thus, e.g., it will be granted that,
if the theory of external relations has the genuine inductive
basis of a few typical instances, then there may be further
instances for which it holds. One group of these instances is
found in sense perception, and in perceptive judgments. One
need not perceive the whole of an object correctly in order to
perceive part of it as it really is. This is clearly the case, pro-
vided that, although two percepts are related, they do not influ-
ence each other. Thus the superstitious person's perception of
a noise may be correct, but his interpretation of this as the
fluttering form of a ghost be quite wrong. The gliost may not
exist. The person's "taking" it to exist and to be moving
about constitutes his perceptual error. It is just this "taking"
* Lovcjoy, e.g., in his controversy with Cohen in the articles referred to
in Chap. XLIII., i., n., iii.
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 377
a ** thing" to he what it is not, that constitutes many kinds of
error, e.g., in the case of illusory and hallucinatory objects.
But since even here there is a scientific explanation that makes
these objects objective, one cannot safely ignore this and be
free to infer that all such objects are subjective.
It is characteristic of all dreams and hallucinations that they
never present self-contradictory objects. That which is known
in these cognitive processes may not exist, but no character is
ever presented in them that could not exist, or be a fact of some
kind. In accordance with our previous arguments, such objects,
therefore, may be called suhsistent. They have the same status
that have many objects of the imagination and the reason. But,
unless the whole argument for subsistents is invalid, it is not
to be therewith inferred that these dream contents are npt as
objective as any object is, only they may not be existent
objects.
The philosophical position which accounts thus for illusory
and hallucinatory objects and which thus holds to the objec-
tivity of many other kinds of subsistents, as well as of existents,
may itself be in error, of course. For we can only attempt to
know, and there is no absolute test of knowledge. But such
a pan-objectivistic position ^ has the advantage, that it is self-
consistenty that it avoids many of the most patent errors of
other systems, and that it does not fallaciously base its con-
clusions exclusively on one alternative, when there are other
alternatives to be considered.
That many difficulties are present in the general problem of
error, one must frankly admit, as also must one, that all of
these difficulties have not been solved. But the evidence at
hand clearly shows, that the method of procedure must be here,
as it is elsewhere, the empirical one of analyzing data, of forming,
if necessary, alternative hypotheses, and of awaiting the con-
firmation of these by concrete fact and by consistent agreement
with other knowledge.
Eelying upon this method, it would seem, that much that in
the past has been regarded as subjective can with much greater
justification be concluded to be objective, and that the final and
irreducible subjective element in error is only the psychological
' See Chap. XLIV., ll.
S78 REALISM
fact of "taking a 'thing' to be what it is not." If this is the
case, then the solution of this problem belongs not so much to
philosophy as to psychology, for this science can, perhaps, tell
us why we take one "thing" to be another. But if psychology
succeeds in solving this problem, its solution does not do away
with the objectivity of all "things" that are thus confused.
This problem belongs to philosophy perhaps only in so far
as each special science contributes its quota to that general
philosophical account of things that is made up of all special
accounts. In this respect the realistic and objective account of
error that has just been presented is one that contributes its
small share to the ontological and cosmological branches of phi-
losophy,^ For it shows that the universe is not made up merely
of things, each identical with itself, yet similar to and causally
acting on other things, but there are also events and relations
of many kinds, and, as it were, disembodied qualities without
a substratum, and existents and non-existents. Thus the ob-
jective universe contains not only the straight stick, but also
the bentness; not only the parallel rails, but also the con-
vergence ; not only the rustling of the curtain, but also the flimsy
ghOst; not only the existent poisons, but also the imagined
ones of the dream and the hallucination. In this manner does
the realistic account augment the usually accepted objective
richness and manifoldness of the world in which we live.
1. Objects may be genuinely known:
2. They may become known and cease to be known.
3. Not all objects are known.
Hypothesis III. If the ego-centric predicament is solved in
the presuppositions that are made by such philosophies as Phe-
nomenalism and Subjectivism in regard to the knowing both of
complex states of affairs as well as of particular classes of en-
tities, such as things-in-themselves, spirits, and the like, and if
this relation between knowing and entity known is an instance
of external relations, then the hypotheses are permissible, (1)
that the known object can be known as it really is, (2) that it
may become known and cease to be known, and (3) that not all
objects are known.
* See Chaps. XLII. and XLIII.
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 879
The first supposition is, as we have seen, confirmed in the
case of any theory that would present a real state of affairs,
even, indeed, the contradictory one, that "things" cannot be
known as they really are. For, whatever state of affairs is
presented in a philosophy, it is offered as the real state of affairs,
and therefore the presupposition is made that at least some
"things" can be known as they really are. No a priori or logical
obstacle can consistently be placed in the way of the recognition
of this presupposition, since to attempt this, and to claim some
opposed presupposition to be the state of affairs, is again to
conform to this specific presupposition — that something can be
genuinely known. But if some entities can be genuinely known,
it is implied that other, perhaps all other entities may also be
so known ; and also, if no a priori argument can be brought
against the possihility of genuine knowledge, even when such an
argument is attempted (in some cases), it follows that the dif-
ficulties in the way of attaining genuine knowledge are em-
pirical difficulties and not such as are inherent in the knowing
situation. But empirical difficulties are removable by empirical
means, as is shown by the fact that the actual development of
the methods and technique of scientific (and philosophic?)
investigation is in part identical with the discovery of the
nature and conditions of specific errors, and of the means for
avoiding these. Illusions, hallucinations, preconceptions, errors
of measurement, and the like, have become understood, and their
control and elimination has been achieved.
But although it is implied or presupposed that "things" can
be known as they really are, still it may he that few 'things"
are so known. However, this possibility does not imply the
actuality. But there is still the empirical difficult}^ that there
is no absolutely certain test by which to determine whether or
not fact has been thus revealed. The possibility of error is
always present, and the best that one can do is to attempt to
know, and to utilize as many tests as possible. Direct or imme-
diate experience, consistency with other facts, the convincing
appeal to the reasoning of many rather than of one, and the
survival in the struggle for existence among theories, hypotheses,
and methods as knowledge develops, are all tests of knowledge.
Yet even if in this way no knowledge is obtained that is ahso-
380 REALISM
lutely certain, the situation is, nevertheless, saved by the prin-
ciple, that true knowledge is independent of ilie proof that it
is siicli, else were common sense and the earliest knowing of
the race only error and complete illusion. One may conclude,
therefore, (1) that other than those difficulties which may be
removed by empirical methods, there is no obstacle to the gen-
uine knowing of "things," (2) that, accordingly, if some things
are unknown, they are not, for that reason, unknowable, and
(3) that even though absolute proof be lacking, absolute knowl-
edge is quite possible. But, if "things" are genuinely knowable,
and if knowing makes no difference to them, then knowing may
now be present to them and now absent from them, with
"things" hecoming known and then ceasing to be known. Some
"things," therefore, at some times, are unknown.
This hypothesis is not invalidated by the argument, that one
can think the whole universe, and that, therefore, everything
is known, and that nothing is unknown or vnthought. There is
all the difference in the world between knowing "things" in
a lump and knowing "things" in detail and with precision.
Accordingly, when I think the whole universe — whatever this
may mean — it may be that I should call this knowledge; but
there is certainly more knowledge, if I can assert, with proof
therefor, that the universe is, e.g., a mere collection, and not an
organic unity. And there is still more knowledge, of a precise
kind, if I am also perceiving, e.g., that a particular organism
under my microscope is vorticclla, and if I am observing and
understanding its behavior. Therefore, if thinking the whole
universe is to be called knowledge, it is such a knowledge as
allows of the ignorance of details, and the absence of the knowl-
edge of some entities. Accordingly, we must conclude, not only
that all "things" are not known, and are not in relation to
specific knowings, but also that this fact is itself now known.
Indeed this is the view that is taken in both common sense and
science, and that is confirmed by the scientific investigation of
the problem of the knowing.
This conclusion leads, however, to further interesting con-
siderations. It has just been said that there is all the difference
in the world between knowing "things" in a lump and knowing
them in detail. The knowing process in both eases is a specific
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 381
event, taking place at some specific time, in some individual,
yet in the two cases the object is known in a radically different
mariner. I know that there are Chinamen, but I know no
individual Chinaman. I may perceive a space as a whole, but
I may be quite ignorant of the science of spatial relations. So
also I may be able to think the universe, but may know little
of its details. It is, therefore, evident that there are two kinds
of knowing, and that the one does not imply the other, else from
my thinking the universe as such, I might discover its details.
But this possibility is not confirmed empirically. Rather, experi-
ence shows that the universe must be studied in detail and by
analytic induction, and not by deduction from such propositions
as "the universe is thought" or "the universe is One." Even
if these propositions were true, the knowledge of the particular
entities that make up the universe could not be derived from
them, and such entities would remain unknown, were not other
methods at our disposal.
When we ask the question, therefore, Are things unknown?
our affirmative reply is not to be circumvented by the claim,
that all "things" are known because they are thinkable as a
lump-universe. The question refers to detailed knowledge, and
such knowledge we do not possess of all "things."
With this limitation of the meaning of our question, we may
next ask, Are more "things" known than are unknown? And
the answer must be, seemingly, "Yes." The evidence for this
answer is, that human knowledge encompasses the main types
of "things," and that it is chiefly the subordinate and minor
types, and matters of minute detail that yet remain to be
known. This evidence is obtained by the "method of residues,"
in accordance with which, if phenomena are found for which
other phenomena as causes, or as conditions, or as independent
variables, and the like, are not yet known, these explanatory
entities must be sought for, the need for this search being dis-
closed either by experimental analysis, or by the development
of implications. As judged, now, by this twofold method, it
may be asserted, that the main types of entities that ' * make up ' '
the universe are known either descriptively, as in sciences like
biology, or explanatorily, as in sciences like physical chemistry
and mechanics, in which explanation, as correctly understood,
382 REALISM
means not to identify, but to correlate series of specifically dif-
ferent types. Such a correlation allows two or more qualita-
tively distin t series t'^ **act" in conformity with one another,
yet without identity with or the possibility of deduction from
one another, and accounts for the empirical fact that most, if,
indeed, not all of the entities of the universe are susceptible to
a "treatment" by the science of order, i.e., by the principles of
modern logic.^
Other instances of external relations. The Freedom of Reason
Hypothesis IV. If knowing and knoivn object are numer-
ically distinct and externally related, the forr.ier neither affect-
ing nor constituting the latter, then not only is the knowing
situation characterized by the several aspects of the external
relationship, but also there may be other instances of the types
of relations that are involved in the knowing situation.
It may well be that many terms are so related that they
influence one another causally, but it is impossible to maintain
in other than a very arbitrary manner, that this principle holds
of all related terms by virtue of their mere relatedness. Indeed
this cannot be at all validly maintained provided there are one
or more instances of terms that are related and yet causally
independent. One such instance, however, we have found to
be the pair of related terms, knowing and known object. And
another instance is the relationship between time, on the one
hand, and motion and acceleration on the other hand. In this
case time is the independent variable, motion and acceleration,
the dependent variables; time is not the cause of these changes,
nor are they the cause of it; yet time is the condition for their
occurrence, although they do not condition time ; were there no
motion and no acceleration, there would still be time, but were
there no time, they would be impossible.
Time is a one-dimensional series formed by asymmetrically
and transitively related instants. In the case, now, of any
specific finite, accelerated motion, one and only one specific
velocity is related to a specific individual instant. Yet this
instant is related also to other instants, and would retain this
» See Chaps. II., XXVII., XLI., XLIIL, and XLIV., u.
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 38S
relationship even if there were no acceleration and no motion.
Here, therefore, is a case of a term, namely, an instant, that is
in one specific relation to other terms, i.e., to other instants,
and that can, nevertheless, without loss or change of this rela-
tion, "come" into relation with another (complex) term, namely,
a velocity. Also, in the case of that series of points ivhich con-
stitutes the path of a moving body, any one point may retain
its relations to other points, and yet gain and lose the specific
relation of deing occupied by a material particle for an instant.
And finally, in the case of a specific acceleration, which is itself
a series of individually distinct velocities, there is for each
instant of the time and, also, for each point of the path (of the
moving body) one and only one specific velocity, and not an-
other. Each such specific velocity is gained and then lost — by
both the point and the instant to which it is related. In each
of these cases we have, therefore, an external and not a causal
relation. Such a relation also subsists in the case of the relation
between a specific acceleration as a ivhole, and the specific time
and path (as wholes) to which the acceleration is related. The
acceleration, the time, and the path are each a series, and the
relation between them is not causal, but functional or external.
However, with such instances of externally related entities
before us, namely, of relational wholes in which terms gain and
lose specific relations to other terms without being affected
thereby, we must grant the possibility of still other instances of
the same generic situation or state of affairs, and this possibility
is shown by empirical observation to be an actuality. For there
is evidence that, in at least certain instances of the knowing
situation, the object known retains its relationship to other
entities while its gains and loses the knowing relation. For exam-
ple, that this is the fact, is presupposed for any object or entity
being kno^vn as it really is. And since some entities and states of
affairs are assumed or presupposed to be so known, even by those
philosophers who explicitly advance a different theory of know-
ing, one may generalize, and, until good evidence to the con-
trary is found, maintain that only that theory of the knowing
situation is correct which recognizes it to be an indispensable
condition for genuine knowing, that the relation of the knowing
to the object known may be gained or lost without this gain or
384 REALISM
loss having any effect on the object as known. For otherivise,
the knowing in "coming" into relation with the object (to be)
known will modify that object, and, therefore, make it different
as known from what it really is.
Indeed, it may be said, in general, that the relation between
knowing and object known is 720;^ causal, but functional or ex-
ternal. Knowing, thinking, reasoning are related to that which
is known so as to reveal the object as it really is both as a whole
and in some detail, and accordingly in a manner that may be
interpreted as a relation of correspondence after the model of
the functional relationship. From this state of affairs, which
holds both of the knowing situation and of the relation between,
e.g., time and any finite motion, and where we may argue from
either instance to the possibility of the other instance, our
fourth hypothesis is formed.
An object can retain its relation to other objects, and yet
both enter into and lose the knowing relation. So also can a
finite space gain and lose its relation to a specific finite motion.
Generalizing, we may say, (a) that some entities can retain
certain relations, and yet gain and lose others; further, that,
just as motion does not cause time and space, nor they cause it,
and just as time and space would be facts were there no ma-
terial particles either to move or to be at rest, although there
could be no moving or resting material particles were there not
both space and time, so also (b) may there be many instances
of entities so related that one logically {not causally) necessi-
tates the other, but not conversely. Indeed, the knowing situa-
tion seems to present just such an instance. For knowing pre-
supposes "something" that is known, although this "some-
thing" would be a fact, and would retain at least many of its
relations to other entities, were it not known.
Both of these principles or doctrines or hypotheses concerning
relations are parts of the general theory of external relations.'^'*
The one doctrine maintains, that one and the same entity may
stand in many relations to many entities, and may gain and lose
at least some of these relations quite independently of others.
The other hypothesis maintains, that certain entities are in the
relation of a one-sided, non-causal dependence. This relation
'"Chap. XXVI., 11., 1.
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 385
is that of logical suhsequency, with its inverse, the relation of
logical priority. A is logically prior to B, if B presupposes A,
but A does not imply B.^^ Both hypotheses assert in common,
that causal dependence and a resulting change and alteration
of the terms related are not of necessity involved in the mere
fact of relatedness.
Both principles have, however, an extensive empirical basis,
or, if regarded as hypotheses, receive an extensive confirmation
in the realm of both common sense and science. They are also
confirmed in any larger field of human knowledge in which de-
ductions are not made from their explicit denial, as is the case,
e.g., in Naturalism, which applies the principle of causation to
everything, even to human reason and conscience.^- But even
in such a philosophy both principles are presupposed at certain
junctures. They therefore express that which is to be regarded
as one aspect of the structure of the universe.
To give another instance of their occurrence, it may be said,
that, just as time and space are independent of matter and
motion, so are numbers independent of time and space. For
it is implied that were these last two entities not facts, never-
theless the real numbers, namely, the integers, rational frac-
tions, and irrational, both positive and negative, would be facts.
Also, it is implied, that if a continuous space and time were cre-
ated, then would these entities incorporate in themselves in re-
spect to the order of both points and instants, those entities and
relations which are identical with that relational complex which
is called the arithmetical continuum.^^
These specific relations of the number continuum to con-
tinuous space and time, and of these in turn to matter and
motion, are instances of the relation of logical priority. There-
fore, it is very evident that this relation is qualitatively dif-
ferent and distinct from both temporal and spatial priority;
for the priority of numbers to space and time is itself neither
^spatial nor temporal.
If, now, one seeks still other instances of logical priority, his
r^arch is readily and quickly rewarded. For the universe is
" Cf. Chap. XLI., XXII.
" Chaps. XXXII. and XXXIII.
" See Chap. XLIII,, vi,-x.
386 REALISM
found to have that ''structure" which may be described as a
stratification of the main types of entities. This stratification
is due to the fact that each main type is logically necessitated
or presupposed by that type which is logically subsequent, but
which does not, conversely, imply or necessitate it. The fol-
lowing are some of the main types or strata of reality in the
order of their logical dependence, the later named types being
logically prior to the earlier named, the earlier named, logically
subsequent to the later named. The order is: (1) psychical proc-
esses, subdivided, perhaps, in the order of their dependence,
into (a) reasoning, (b) imagination, (c) memory, (d) sense
perception, and (e) certain instincts and instinctive feelings;
(2) animal and plant behavior consisting of reflexes and
tropisms; (3) complex and also relatively simple physiological
processes; (4) chemical and physico-chemical processes; (5)
physical processes and "things," such as heat, electricity, light,
moving bodies; (6) pure, actual motion in accordance with
causes, as specified by the laws of Newton; (7) motion in gen-
eral, subsist ential, and not existential, in accordance with the
general concept of cause, but not as this is specified by the
Newtonian laws or the other orthodox mechanical principles;
(8) space and time (it being difficult to say that either of these
depends on the other) ; and (9) finally, the real numbers,
positive and negative.
There is doubtless opportunity for much correction and ex-
pansion of this list, since the application of the principles which
it illustrates is to be determined only empirically. However,
further details that are involved in this theory of the stratifica-
tion of the universe will be considered in that part of this
section which deals with the realistic and neo-rationalistic
structure of the universe.^*
We may now consider in some detail our second principle,
namely, that "one and the same entity may stand in many
relations to many entities, and may gain or lose at least some
of these relations quite independently of others." The list of
instances by which this principle is empirically confirmed is
too long to enumerate completely, but a number of important
instances may be presented.
" Chaps. XLIIl, and XLIV,
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES SSf
One of these instances is that of the motion of a material
body, or of its center of mass. In this instance (1) each point
remains identical with itself, i.e., is that individual point, and
(2) each point retains its relation to other points, and yet
lacks, gains, and then loses the relation of being occupied at a
specific individual instant by the center of mass. So also does
the center of mass remain that individual center, and yet first
lack, then gain, and then lose its relation of occupying a specific
point for a specific instant.
These are examples of our principle as it is found in the
world of physical events. By them it is shown, however, that
certain events presuppose or imply entities that are independerit
of some, even if not of all relations. Those relations which
form a minimum, and which can only with great difficulty be
postidated as absent (if, indeed, they can be thus postulated
at all), are similarity and difference, and identity or individ-
uality. But other relations, s^ich as causation and correlation,
can readily be lacking.
An entity, such as a point or an instant, that is presupposed
as an idtimate, non-complex element out of which complexes
are *'made," and that is related to other simple elements by
similarity and difference, is logically atomistic. It may gain
and lose other relations without prejudice to its own inherent
character. But whether one can find among the things as op-
posed to the events of the physical world, instances of entities
that are atomistic, and that could lose all of their relations
without being altered thereby, is an open question. It would
seem, of course, that at least most physical tilings such as plants
and animals, chemical mixtures and compounds, are altered and
modified by virtue of gaining and losing relations to other
things. But it would also seem that this implies, on the one
hand, ultimate entities, such as atoms or electrons, that can
gain and lose relationships without being altered thereby, and
that, on the other hand, through the gain and loss of specific
relations, specifically new qualities and characteristics appear
and disappear. In all such cases, however, the whole that results
(from the gaining of new relations) is not the mere additive
result of the parts, but is characterized by qualities which the
parts do not possess. There is, in other words, a non-additive,
388 REALISM
a creative synthesis}^ Recognition of this fact goes far toward
solving such problems as are raised, e.g., in biology between
vitalism and mechanism in the issue as to the nature of the
organism. For if a whole is not the mere additive result of its
parts, then the organism, plant or animal, is marked by char-
acteristics that are not to be found among so-called inorganic
"things," although its ultimate parts are only the same physical
forces and chemical elements that are found in this inorganic
realm.
But in addition to entities such as atoms or electrons, which
in the world of material "things" seem to be presupposed as
unalterable ultimates, in order that the "things" composed of
them may he alterable, there also seem to be many other entities
that can lose or gain certain specific relations without being
altered thereby. Thus, if the relations won or lost can be
those of similarity and difference, of "greater than" and of
"less than," of inclusion and of exclusion, then is there no
alteration of the terms concerned, since 7io causal relation of
necessity accompanies these other relations. The causal relation
may subsist side by side with, but not by virtue of other rela-
tions. Indeed, non-causal relations subsist not only among ele-
ments, such as electrons, but also among the complexes that are
made up of these elements, although the complexes may also be
causally related. And yet in addition to this relation (among
complexes) there may be other relations, the gaining or losing
of which has no modifying influence whatsoever on the entities
concerned, an illustration in point being the relations of
similarity and dissimilarity, of "greater than" and "less than,"
and of inclusion in, and of exclusion from a class.
The same situation in respect to relations is found among
the several other types of entities, namely, among psychical
existents, and among subsistents, only, in the case of the former
there are relations of causation, while, in the case of the latter,
specific causal relations are absent, and other relations play the
dominant role. As regards psychical existents, however, it
would seem doubtful whether there are psychical elements
analogous to the atoms and electrons of the physical world,
although there are doubtless, among psychical entities, relations
" Chap. XLIII., IV., v., VI.
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 389
that are not causal, as well as those that are. Modern psy-
chology is, as is well known, based on the position (or postulate)
that causal relations are present among psychical entities. But
the fundamental error here as elsewhere is to insist either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, that there are no terms that are not
causally related, and no relations that do not of necessity carry
causal relations with them. Such an insistence or postulation
results in Pragmatism and Naturalism, yet it is one that can be
as surely discredited as can anything in the whole field of
science and philosophy.
There may, therefore, be no psychical elements after the
manner of electrons and atoms, and yet there may be a causal
relationship between certain psychical processes, and none be-
tween others. Thus, in so far as particular instances of con-
sciousness appear and disappear, there are conscious processes,
and the opportunity for their causal connection. But, also, in
so far as entities, — including states of affairs, sithsistents and
existents, individual terms, qualities, relations, and events —
must, in order to be known as they really are, not he altered
by the process in which they are known, it must be admitted
that they get into the knowing relation, and yet that there is
an absence of causation.
Further, in so far as any psychical process, such as memory
or perception, is specifically different from other "things." it
is of itself qualitative. But this does not demand a suhstance-
like substratum in which the specifically different quality shall
inhere. Some of the entities of the universe may be substances,
but certainly not all are, and some of those that are not, may,
as it were, be disembodied qualities or entities that are not
qualities of anything, but that are qualitatively different from
other "things." There is a large field for investigation con-
cerning these possibilities, and one cannot make dogmatic asser-
tions as regards the details of the position, that knowing and
perhaps consciousness in general are qualitatively spicijic rela-
tions into which entities get when they become known. But the
evidence is strong against knowing and consciousness being
either substance or energy, or qualities of these entities, and
also against their being causally related to all other "things,"
especially to the entity that is known.
390 REALISM
While, now, both psychical and physical existents are in some,
and doubtless in many eases, subject to causation, suhsistents ^*
lack this relation. Therefore the relations that do hold among
these entities do not carry with them the further relation of
causation and so either the mutual or one-sided alteration of
related terms. Thus, among subsistents, one point does not
cause, alter, or change another point, nor one instant another
instant. Nor is space caused or modified by time, or conversely,
though of course the two are related. Also the perfect circle
is not caused by the physically round things that approximate
to it, nor by the other geometrical figures. Yet suljsistent en-
tities are related to one another, and, in some cases, in such a
way that one entity seems to necessitate, or be necessitated by
others. But this relation is one of implication, and not of
causation.
Whether, indeed, change of any kind is possible in the realm
of subsistents, is an open question. If it is not, then relations
in this realm cannot be won and lost as they are among ex-
istents, and yet, by the method of analysis in situ, it is discov-
ered that certain subsistent entities are externally and func-
tionally related, after the manner of those existents which do
gain and lose certain relations without being altered thereby.
The hypotheses advanced in the foregoing discussion are also
important because of their bearing on still other philosophical
problems. For both the formulation and the confirmation of
these hypotheses we have thus far found a number of instances
(1) of terms that are related and yet that do not causally affect
one another, (2) of entities that are logically prior to others,
and (3) of terms that gain and lose relationships without being
altered thereby. If, now, there are "these instances" — of this
character, there may be still others, of similar character, and
further specific hypotheses can be formed for the solution of
specific problems.
07ie of these problems concerns the, for us, important situation,
(1) that the specific conclusions which one obtains in endeavor-
ing to solve problems by deductive reasoning are conditioned
by the assumptions that one makes, either explicitly or implicitly,
to start with, and (2) that one reaches opposed results by rea-
" See Chaps. XLIII. and XLIV-
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES spi
soning from opposed assumptions}'^ This very possibility, how-
ever, of freeing one's self from one universe of discourse, con-
ditioned by one set of assumptions, and of then putting one's
self into another "universe," leads to the specific hypothesis,
that any specific reasoning process is certainly not causally
related to all other "things," and perhaps not even to
other conscious processes, or even to other specific reasoning
processes.
The meaning of this hypothesis must, however, be made more
clear and precise. To do this, it may be again emphasized, that
one of the main postulates of one great line of philosophical
development is, that, although all "things" may be related in
many other ways, they are also all related causally by virtue
of being related at all.^^ This assumption is, as we have seen,
the product of the domination, in the tradition, of the Aris-
totelian logic, with its emphasis of the physical thing as the
great type phenomenon.^'' It is an assumption that conditions
Locke's philosophy, and through this, Berkeley's and Hume's;
it conditions Kant 's Phenomenalism and the naturalistic systems
of the Mills and of Herbert Spencer ; and, finally, it conditions
modern Pragmatism with its doctrine, that, because of uni-
versal causation, all things evolve, ivith a resulting (causal)
selection of only that which is fit and useful. If, now, causa-
tion applies to all "things," it applies to reason.
Theoretically, therefore, hy this philosophy, we are not free
to reason, in order, in some cases, to arrive at genuine knowing,
tut are forced hy certain causes to reason in certain ways,
namely, in just the way, in each specific instance, that we do
reason. For universal causation means not only that. Whatever
is, is, but also that. Whatever is, must be. If, therefore, "to
reason" be defined as meaning to discover and conform to
(objective) relations of implication, success in reasoning thus
would be a matter of mere chance, in that sense of the term
chance by which it is identical with our ignorance of detailed
yet ruthlessly operating causes.
In accordance, therefore, with any philosophy that maintains
the universality of causation, no reasoning is free to discover
relations of implication, but all so-called reasoning (in normal
" iSee Chap. I. " Chaps. XXIX.-XXXIII. " Chap. III.
S92 REALISM
persons) bears the same relation of causal determination to, say,
other mental processes, that the vagaries of the insane man do
to certain dominating and distorting fixed ideas in his con-
sciousness. The hypothesis of a universal causation is accord-
ingly incompatible with our freedom to change from one set of
assumptions or universe of discourse to another, and, if we do
so change, it is only because we must, and not because ive may.
But at this point the interesting situation is disclosed, that
the very hasis on which this "causal position" is itself taken, in
opposition to the "freedom position," is one that presupposes
the freedom, and not the causation of our processes of assuming
and of reasoning. For, briefly, we seem to be free either to
assume causation, and reason from this assumption, or to assume
the freedom of reason, and to reason from this. Thereby, how-
ever, the position or postulate, that all cur postulating and
reasoning is caused, is itself shown to be self-contradictory, and
the opposed position, that there is a freedom in these processes,
is shown to be self-confirming. The latter assumption is alone
consistent with the way or manner in which it is made, namely,
freely, while the former and opposed hypothesis contradicts the
very condition for its own riaking. The advantage clearly lies
with the second position.
As opposed, therefore, to the naturalistic and pragmatistic
contention, that all entities causally influence, modif}^ and de-
termine one another, we now have the hypothesis, that among
the entities of the universe that are not connected with others
by the relation of causation, reason is one. However, this does
not mean that reason is undetermined, or that it is lawless. It
means, rather, much the same as would a similar statement con-
cerning time and space. These entities are not caused by any-
thing else, nor are their parts, such as instants, points, lines,
and the relations holding between these parts, causally con-
nected. Yet each is a field in which law "holds good" and is
inherent. In this sense each is determined and each has a quale
which the other lacks.
Much the same thing can be said of reason. That reason is
not causally determined hy something else is the one principle
on which one can explain that which is reason's specific func-
tion, namely, the discovering of implications as the objective
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 393
threads of necessity within a complex state of affairs}'^ This is
the principle of the freedom of reason, while the function of
discovering implications is reason's peculiar quale. Performing
this function in innumerable instances under varying specific
circumstances, reason acts in accordance with law,"^ and is
inherently determined; but in so acting it is not caused by,
although it is related to, other events and processes.
This specific hypothesis of the freedom of reason receives
confirmation from two sources. In the first place, as has been
said, the freedom of reason is presupposed as the sole condition
on which the otherwise machine-like causal grasp of tradition,^^
training, and personal predisposition on all our mental proc-
esses can be avoided. If it is open to reason even to help to
discover "things" as they really are, then reason must be free
to conform to "things," — functionally, perhaps, — and not he
completely determined causally by preceding mental processes
after the modus operandi in mente of the insane man. And in
the second place, if we may trust our direct experience, and not
maintain contrary to or against it, that freedom is but ignorance
of detailed causes, then again and again does each one of us
receive direct confirmation of reason's freedom. This occurs
in every case, where, e.g., the possibility of error of judgment
is granted, and the re-examination of grounds is urged. Also,
that we can form hypotheses that are contrary to fact, then to
discover the implied consequences of these, retracing our steps
to begin over again, if error of judgment is surmised, — that we
can do all this is experienced by all of us, especially by one who
insists that this very experience is itself illusory, and that it is
really an instance of determination by detailed causes of which
we are ignorant. For does not he who is himself thus convinced
of the correctness of the naturalistic doctrine, endeavor to con-
vince others, thus tacitly to presume in them the freedom of
their reason to turn from the error of their non-naturalistic way
to the truth of naturalism? But does not the naturalistic and
the pragmatistic philosopher thus contradict in a very practical
way the very teachings and implications of his own philosophy?
'" See Chaps. I., XIII., i., and Chap. XXI.
-'^ See Chap. XLIIL, v. and VI.
«' See Chap. III.
394 REALISM
This principle of the freedom of reason to discover (objective)
implications and to be determined by them and by the structure
of that which is known rather than by preceding physical and
psychical causes, is very similar to the principle of the freedom
of the will. Both principles are opposed to the naturalistic doc-
trine of a universal causation, and yet neither means lawlessness.
For both a free reason and a free will are related to other
entities functionally and externally. Each forms a new and
higher stratum of psychical existence that has its own peculiar
laws of action,-^ and that is related to other strata, but not
causally.
By free reason, now, we discover entities that do not exist
but are nevertheless factsr^ States of affairs holding of ex-
istent entities, relations of implication between these states of
affairs, and logically consistent possibilities are examples of
such facts. Thus only by free reason and not by sense percep-
tion, do we discover, e.g., the perfect circle; for this does not
exist in nature, and so cannot effect us causally. Yet we know
this entity, and from its implications can discover still other
entities, and are actuated and influenced by it as an ideal object.
In quite a similar way, reason, when it is directed to the dis-
covery of ethical values, reveals ideals, which, although they
may never have been realized in human development, neverthe-
less are of just that character, — as ideals — that they demand
realization if possible.-^ The knowledge of these ideals may be
said, in accordance with the terminology of Kant, to come
through "practical reason," while the imperative demand, pre-
sented by them to human action and will, that every effort ought
to be made to realize them, may be said to be given to conscience.
The hypothesis that there is such a freedom of the will by
virtue of which one can act, not in accordance with what has
been, but with what ought to be, is confirmed in two ways. In
the first place, this hypothesis is presupposed as the sole condi-
tion on which a human being can he something other than a
mere machine that is produced by heredity and environment,
and that is causally compelled to do all that it does by antecedent
physical and mental events. It is thus the sole condition on
which a human being can be held responsible for his acts and
" Chap. XLllL, V. and vi. -* Chap. XLTV., u. ■' Chap. XLV.
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 895
his motives in any other sense than, e.g., a stick of dynamite is
held responsible for exploding. The dynamite is kept in a
place where there are causes that prevent its exploding, or
where, if it explodes, it will do the least harm. Such, also, must
be the defense, e.g., for imprisoning a human being, if he is
completely determined causally, and cannot act in accordance
with ideals, thus to hold himself responsible and to feel the
command, "Do the right." To punish him for the sake of
revenge only repeats the problem, since it means either that
men must do this as themselves mere machines, or that society,
in thus proceeding, acts in harmony with that ideal of justice
which our practical reason gives us.
But in the second place, the hypothesis of a free will is con-
firmed by the direct experience of most men. Most men do
have ideals, do feel their command, and do experience the free-
dom to obey this command and to go counter to the desires and
impulses that are causally and instinctively rooted in human
nature.
From the advocate of Naturalism the retort comes, however,
that this direct experience of freedom is but the hypostatization
of our ignorance of detailed causes, and that our so-called volun-
tary acts are really caused, though we do not know by what.
The reply to this retort is, that even causal complexes presup-
pose non-causal terms and relationships. For example, every
mechanism, and every machine presuppose time and space as
entities that are not causally, but that are functionally related
to them. In quite a similar way a human being can, physi-
ologically, and, to a certain extent, psychologically, be a causal
complex, and yet be related to and, indeed, be determined by
entities which, like ideal justice, do not exist, but are neverthe-
less objective facts.-^ Discovered by pure and by practical
reason, these entities appeal to conscience as ideals that are
worthy of the highest regard, and that in their own way actuate
a man to action quite as certainly as do causally-related
entities.
These developments with reference to the freedom of reason
and of will, and, in general, to non-causal relationships
among terms, lead to three further hypotheses, which may
*o See Chap. XLV.
396 REALISM
advantageously be discussed together. These hypotheses are as
follows : —
Philosophical problems not generated hy their history
Hypothesis V. If reasoning processes are free in the sense
that they are not causally related either to other psychical proc-
esses or to the entities reasoned about, then, throughout the
history of human thought, problems in philosophy and science
have been problems, 710^ because they have had a history, hut
because they concern matters of fact. In other words, reason
has been free to investigate fact, and to ignore and challenge
the tradition in every specific field of subject and of method.^^
Truth an external and non-causal relation
Hypothesis VI. If not all "things" are related causally,
and if one and the same "thing" can stand in independent rela-
tionships to different "things," then the natiire of truth may
not be identical, as Pragmatism claims it to be, with causally
determined concrete results, with efficiency, and with the pro-
duction of satisfaction, but it may be an external and non-causal
relation between knowing and that which is known.
The confirmation of this hypothesis invalidates the position
of Pragmatism and of Naturalism that all that survives in a
causal system of a general struggle for existence must for that
reason be usefid, and that truth is identical with this causal
efficiency and usefulness.^ ^
Analysis does not alter the '* thing" analyzed
.'-'Hypothesis VII. If not all "things" are related causally,
then not only can an analysis in situ be made in at least certain
instances, but also certain classes of entities can be experi-
mentally removed from their context without thereby being
altered, and in both cases the parts thus discovered can be
revealed as they really are, both quite unaltered by the analysis,
and in most cases as qualitatively different from the whole that
is analyzed.
With this hypothesis confirmed, the anti-intellectualistic
" Cf. Chap. I. " Chaps. XXXII. and XXXIII.
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES S97
claim, that all analysis as such is falsification, is invalidated;-^
for hy it the discovery of parts, whether these are left in situ
in the whole, or are taken out of it, is possible, at least in many-
cases. The (act of) analysis does not itself alter the entity
analyzed, and the only difficulties in the way of analysis are
empirical.
The confirmation of the first of these three hypotheses is
found in the facts of the historical development of both phi-
losophy^ and science, especially science. Thus, even if there
are certain exceptions, the sciences and most other "bodies of
knowledge" concern matters that yield proMems, not because
these problems have had a history, but because they contain
something of which we are ignorant, and of which we desire
knowledge. The science of history is itself a good example of
this principle, since history deals, not with the history of his-
tory, but with the facts of history, and the case is
quite similar with biology, chemistry, and other sciences.
Indeed, one may go so far as to say, that, if there
were not always questions of fact for an inquiry that is
unbiased by tradition, then would there have been no historical
development of any science — at least there could have been no
start, no first problem. But there have been first problems,
and then new ones which, though they were suggested by
previous problems, nevertheless concerned non-historical facts.
The discovery by Galileo of the functional ]'elationship between
acceleration and time is a good example of both a problem and
a method for solving it that primarily concern fact, and not
history and the historical development of problems.
The bearing of this principle upon the history of philosophy
is important. For by it one can recognize, in the first place,
that certain problems are indeed created by their own historical
genesis, and for that reason are often false problems. Thus,
e.g., the problem as to the weight of phlogiston in the latter part
of the eighteenth century was a false problem that was created
by the antecedent hypothesis {current in that century), that,
all combustible substances contained a substance, phlogiston,
which was given off when things burned. As a result a thing
should be lighter after burning than before. When, however,
" Cf. Chap. XXXIII., I. and il.
SOB REALISM
Lavoisier discovered that the products of combustion were
heavier than the original substance, the discrepancy was ac-
counted for by the further false hypothesis, that phlogiston was
of negative weight, i.e., that it possessed levity.
The very recognition that there is such an historical genesis
of some problems is the touchstone, however, by which to dis-
tinguish in some cases between the true and the false. One thus
becomes free and able to turn from those universes of discourse
in which problems, methods, and solutions are determined by
tradition, authority, and imitation, to those fields in which there
is unbiased, free inquiry into what the facts are, irrespective of
consequences. Indeed, to turn from the traditional view, that all
"things" are causally connected whether by virtue of heing
related in other ways or for some other reason, and to entertain
the opposed hypothesis, is a good example of that freedom of
procedure which is necessary if one woidd investigate facts and
not continue the study of false prohlems.^'^
In conclusion, it may be said, that the study of the historical
and oftentimes distorting influences on the development of
human thought may be of fascinating interest,^^ but that of
equal interest and greater importance are the problems to which,
whether they be new or old, reason turns in its cherished freedom
of breaking from the past in order to look to the future. Even
as the point divides the line into two segments that are not
causally connected, so may reason release us from the thraldom
of the past and place us in the freedom of a realm of new
inquiry that is unbiased by our desires and fears.^^
The second of our hypotheses, the anti-pragmatistic, is con-
firmed in a number of ways, though chiefly, perhaps, by the
tacit presuppositions of Pragmatism itself. For, on the one
hand, by the implicit principles of the pragmatic theory, there
is, as has been previously pointed out,^^ no legitimate oppor-
tunity for the distinction between the true and the false, since,
by these principles, all that is still persisting in the development
of organs, functions, and the like, bears the stamp of either a
present, a lingering, or a coming usefulness. Therefore,
wherever there is occasion for applying Pragmatism's definition
»» Cf. Chap. I. " See Chap. I.
"1 Chap. XXVIII. •' Chap. XXXIII.
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 399
of truth, namely, that truth is identical with usefulness, one
must say, that all persisting theories, laws, and ideas are true.
The attempt to invalidate this conclusion by the argument, that
it leads to the admission of rnany contradictory truths, fails of
its purpose, since Pragmatism, by its own preferred tenets,
accepts no standard, but allows that truth comes to each to
whom satisfaction results from any idea, belief, theory, or law.
For who shall say, that what is useless to one, is not useful
to another ? Then may not I make my own truth, and you make
yours, even though the very "holding of an idea to be true,"
as, e.g., in the lelief in immortality, is the condition for the
satisfactory working of that idea?
This is Pragmatism's own explicit doctrine. No standard of
truth, but many truths, even as many as there are outcomes that
give the warmth of some satisfaction! No falsity — since every-
thing that persists is useful in some sense — to some one !
True, therefore, must be those great philosophical systems that
have so persistently stood the test of time, and that are useful,
in the pragmatic sense, in that they give satisfaction to their
adherents. Such systems include Phenomenalism and Objec-
tive Idealism. Yet, on the other hand, Pragmatism is itself a
philosophy, in respect to a number of specific problems, that
is advanced as true in opposition to these philosophies. Thus
Pragmatism maintains against Phenomenalism, that, e.g., there
are no a priori principles which make up the unchangeable
"sti-ueture of the reason," but that all such so-called categories
are only specific adaptations and convenient modes of reaction.
Against Absolutism Pragmatism maintains that, e.g., the doctrine
of an unchangeahle eternal standard of truth and of right is
false, and that these concepts themselves and all that may come
under them are but ephemeral and changing ideas and ideals.
And against Objective Idealism, Pragmatism holds, that there is
not any One Absolute Spirit, Ego, Self, Reason, or Will. How-
ever, in thus maintaining that these opposed philosophies are
false in such respects, and that it alone is true. Pragmatism
grants a distinction between the true and the false, and thus is
inconsistent with its own explicit doctrine, that whatever per-
sists and develops and is satisfactory and useful in some sense
is a fortiori true.
400 REALISM
But Pragmatism departs from its own explicit teachings in
still other respects. Thus, as concerns itself, it presupposes an
absolute truth, such as certain opposed systems maintain, with
the failure to obtain this truth due only to empirical difficulties,
and not to an evolutionary shifting in truth itself. Also, in
maintaining against other systems that, when the satisfactory
outcome of an idea, a theory, or a belief is itself the result of
holding such an idea to be true, this outcome is not a test or
character of truth, Pragmatism grants that there is a very
fundamental difference betiveen the test and the nature of truth.
Thus, with respect to itself, Pragmatism employs this distinction
in maintaining that the successful working of its own theory is
due, not to the belief in this theory, but to the fact that it repre-
sents or corresponds to an objective state of affairs. But it
thereby "makes" truth a relation of, perhaps, functional cor-
respondence between judgments and objective states of affairs,
and presupposes, tacitly, at least, that its own explicit theory
works successfully because or in that it is true, rather than that
it is true, because it works successfully.
The" third hypothesis, namely, that analysis is as reliable a
method for discovering and revealing entities as are other
methods, such as feeling and intuition, is confirmed in innumera-
ble instances. Such a confirmation is reached by first noting
that over and above an insistence on its empirical difficulties,
there is no attack on analysis ^* as such that is not made either
from the standpoint of the dogmatic assumption, (1) that non-
analytical methods alone reveal facts, or from the demonstration
(2) that analysis introduces contradictions at one or at many
points, or (3) that it, by its very nature, alters and therefore
falsifies the "thing" analyzed. The first, the dogmatic position,
can be neglected, since it very evidently begs the very question
at issue. One can with equal justification dogmatically maintain
that analyses are made as a matter of fact, and do reveal enti-
ties. The second position, that analysis introduces contradic-
tions, is found to be dependent upon the prior misinterpretation
of correct analyses, e.g., that the "elements" of motion are
rests, and therefore collapses as an attack as soon as the
actual results of (correct) analysis are correctly stated.
" Cf. Chaps. XXIl.-XXIV.
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 401
'Accordingly only the third position needs a rebuttal at this
juncture.
This rebuttal is readily found by first ascertaining what that
major principle is from which this third position is derived.
And that principle is readily seen to be the now familiar princi-
ple, that all "things" and entities that are related in any other
way are perforce also related causally. From this principle
several deductions are made. One is, that the very act of
analysis itself causally modifies and so falsifies that which is to
be analyzed; another is, that analysis can proceed only by
removing certain entities out of their collocation and thus away
from the causal influence of other entities, so that, as analyzed,
any complex of parts is not the same as it is as unanalyzed.
Whether this position is disproved, and our hypothesis con-
firmed, finally comes down, therefore, to a question of purel.y
empirical fact, namely, Ave there, or are there not, instances of
terms that are not related causally f To the writer it seems to
be undeniable that many such instances are discovered. The
relations that motion, acceleration, change in general, and
matter bear to space and time are excellent instances. But
this empirical fact, together with the fact that in many attacks
on analysis the actual extant analyses are misstated, leads the
writer to conclude, that the modern attack on analysis fails at
every point, and that our third hypothesis (of the foregoing
three) is empirically confirmed.^^
In no case does the trouble lie with intellect or with analysis
as such, but only with the false presuppositions that are made
with reference both to the character of the relationship between
the parts of a whole, and to the methods that are attributed to
intellect.^® Curiously enough, also, it may be remarked in con-
clusion, all attacks on analysis are themselves made by an
analytical argument and method. The suggestion lies near,
therefore, that the difficulties that may beset analysis are not
inherent, but are only such empirical ones as are common to all
methods of arriving at truth and fact.
These criticisms of Pragmatism and Anti-intelleetualism lead
to the formulation of two final hypotheses, which, as confirmed,
" Chap. XXXIII., I. and ii. •" Chap. XXXIIL, i. and ii.
402 REALISM
make up further fundamental doctrines of Kealism and of
Eationalism.
Individualism and Skepticism are logically false positions
Hypothesis VIII. If Pragmatism (or any other theory)
either presupposes or explicitly accepts the positions, (1) that
there is a difference between truth and falsity, and (2) that it
itself is true in the sense that it is a theory to be generally
accepted, then the two philosophical positions of Individualism
and Skepticism, that are old in history, but that are today
founded on Evolutionism, are false. Skepticism is false in its
position, that there is no truth, if truth is an absolute definite
relationship between the state of affairs to be known and the
knowledge of this, and Individualism is false in its doctrine,
that there are as many truths (in any sense) as there are indi-
viduals.
Analysis reveals facts, and Mysticism {of a certain type, at
least) is false
Hypothesis IX. If there are innumerable instances of reali-
ties that are revealed by analysis, with this a method that is
quite as well authenticated as is the opposed one of intuition
and immediate experience, and also if any explicitly anti-
analytical position can itself he founded and defended only by
ayialytical methods, then must analysis be accepted, together,
perhaps, with intuitive and immediate experience, as revealing
facts, and any type of Mysticism that would deny this must ,be
false.
Both Skepticism and Individualism are derivable, within the
larger frame of Pragmatism, from the assumptions (1) that
Evolution is universal; (2) that all "things" are subject to the
rigorous sifting process of a universal causation; (3) that all
surviving and persisting entities are only of instrumental value
in the furthering of life; and (4) that truth is identical with
usefulness. It is, now, particularly the second of these postulates
that is the basis upon which both the Skepticism and the
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 403
Individualism of the ancients was developed.^^ For, if each
individual is but a congeries of causally interacting atoms, then
there is little probability that any two individuals will be the
same; each individual will be peculiar to himself and different
from every other; and, as between two or more individuals,
words will not mean the same, nor percepts and concepts be
the same, so that in general each individual is completely shut
up within himself.^ ^
Modern Individualism ^^ merely adds to these ancient doc-
trines the further position, that each individual is in all respects
the product of the universal causal process of evolution, and is,
therefore, in constant change, so that (1) the facts and experi-
ences of no two instants are ever the same, except by the rarest
chance, (2) that only the experience of the moment is to be
accepted, and (3) that anything general which might connect
moment with moment must be spurned. Thus, as an advance
on ancient Individualism, we have in the modern doctrine,
owing to the influence of Evolutionism, the individualism of the
passing moment.
Skepticism *^ also, as another conclusion from these same
premises, lags not far behind its mate in running its race and
spending itself. Indeed modern Individualism is one argument
for Skepticism. For, if everything is quite concrete, particular,
and individual, then there is nothing general, and if everything
is shifting and sifting in a universal causal flux and flow, then
there is no place for truth in the sense of a common state of
affairs that is discoverable both to you and to me even as we
change and grow and develop. But Skepticism, as thus derived
from the (incorrect) assumption, that all "things^' change and
evolve, also means, that truth itself must change, and that there
^' Prominent among the Greeks and the Romans who held to the indi-
vidualistic position were Protagoras, Prodicus, Gorgias, and Hippias, the
sophists; also Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius; cf. the dialogues of
Plato; also Epicurus, by A. E. Taylor, and Marius the Epicurean, 2 vols.,
1910, by W. Pater.
^' E. g., Protagoras.
" Among modern individualists are Leibniz, Nietzsche, works ed. by
Tille; Max Stirner (pseud.), Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum ; also, im-
plicitly, if not explicitly, many pragmatists are individualists.
*" In the list of prominent skeptics are Pyrrho (.365-270 B.C.), Carne-
ades (213-129 B.C.), ^nesidemus (active 180-210 A.D.), Montaigne
(1533-92), Pierre Bayle (1647-1706). Also Descartes in his method, and
Hume in certain parts of his philosophy, are skeptics.
'404. REALISM
is no truth in the usual sense of the term. Indeed, in this evo-
lutionistic scheme of "things," truth seems to be regarded as
mere idea or concept that is psychical in character, and that
is imbedded in the same causal flux and flow in which all other
"things" are assumed to be imbedded.
Skepticism is also derived by an (incorrect) inductive gen-
eralization from the admitted growth and development of
science, philosophy, and religion, particularly from the lack of
absolutely certain knowledge, and from the diversity of opinion
in any field, at any time. It is argued that, since there is no
absolute criterion of truth, and since what was once held to be
true is not in every case now so regarded, truth itself is always
shifting. The further conclusion is also drawn, that truth as
absolute is a non-entity, or that it is only a word, or a par-
ticular, concrete experience, recurrent and at present useful,
but open to elimination along with everything else that may
no longer serve the needs of the living organism.
It is quite evident, however, from a little inspection, that
some of these conclusions that are identified with Individualism
and with Skepticism do not follow from the premises that are
assumed. Thus, quite apart from questioning the universality
of the causal relation and of evolution, one may doubt whether
the fact of differences among individuals precludes the possi-
bility of similarities, samenesses, and identities. However,
Individualism, and perhaps also Skepticism, each insists on such
a preclusion, and draws consequences from this. But both posi-
tions contradict themselves, since they both argue from the
similarity of all "things" in respect to their being in the causal
relation, and each also presents itself as a theory for yoii and
me to accept as true. Each position thus presupposes not only
a state of affairs that is common to and that holds of many
instances, as, e.g., the fact of change, but also such a similarity
in our minds as enables us to discover and agree on this state
of affairs, and, discovering it, have our judgments true. But
thereby the valid principle is accepted, that, though "things"
differ in some respects, they do not differ in all. But a simi-
larity in psychical processes together with similarities and
common states of affairs among objects known, furnishes an
adequate and sufficient basis not only for anti-individualism, but
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 405
also for anti-skepticism. Accordingly each of the theories under
discussion presupposes the "anti-doctrine"; Individualism pre-
supposes the truth of its own doctrine, and the convincing char-
acter of this on all right-thinking individuals, and Skepticism
tacitly accepts the same presupposition. In short, both doctrines
refute themselves in this way.
But also from the fact that, e.g., certain theories, laws, and
principles, which were once accepted as true, are now no longer
so regarded, the conclusion does not follow, that there is no
truth at all, or at least none accessible to man. Skepticism in
respect to itself presupposes the direct opposite of this; i.e., it
presupposes not only that there is unchangeable truth, but also
that it itself is a special case of this truth. But, also, in addition
to this criticism, it may be said, that the lack of absolute cer-
tainty as to what is absolutely true does not preclude certain
specific instances of knowledge from being absolutely true. Cer-
tainty has to do with, e.g., the evidence and the testimony that
influence our judgment and convictions, and is in some cases
at least the causal effect of these influences, but truth is a specific
non-causal relation between knowing and that which is known.
Then truth and certainty are not identical. Therefore a judg-
ment may be true, although we have no means whereby to
become certain of it, while, conversely, in a great many notorious
instances, men have been certain of judgments that have not
been true. For example, at one time men were certain that
the earth was flat, that animal and plant species were immutaMe,
and that heavier bodies fell the faster, but these certainties
turned out to be false. On the other hand, when these cer-
tainties began to be questioned, there were judgments, which,
although men were not certain of them, were nevertheless true.
If truth, therefore, is not a psychical process that is concrete
and' causally related to other concrete and particular existing
and occurring "things," but is a non-causal relationship between
the known and the knowing; and, further, if truth is not the
same as certainty, then it follows, (1) that common sense and
science, philosophy and religion may all through their develop-
ment contain true, although, perhaps, not absolutely certain
judgments; (2) that there is an ideal, if not an existent state
of affairs that is identical with absolute truth; and (3) that this
406 REALISM
very specific state of affairs may be approached step by step, by
the winning now of one individual truth and now of another,
with such individual truths 7iot causally modifying one another,
although they are related. A causal relationship, although it
may in some cases hold between judgments, is precluded from
holding between truths by the fact that these are not existent,
but subsistent entities.
In thus formulating those positions which Individualism and
Skepticism tacitly presuppose, yet explicitly deny,'*^ we are also
stating those positions which any other system, such as Phe-
nomenalism and Idealism, also presupposes, and which are also
constituent parts of Realism and of Rationalism. Systems make
these presuppositions whether they will or no; therefore, if a
system denies them explicitly, it is self-nugatory, while, if it
accepts them, it is in this respect self-consistent. These pre-
suppositions, which, as made by any system, whether it explicitly
recognizes them or not, confirm Hypothesis VIII., and become
incorporate principles of Realism and Rationalism, may be given
the following formulation: —
All philosophical systems either explicitly accept or tacitly
presuppose (1) that there is a distinction between truth and
falsity {e.g., as regards themselves and other positions) and,
therefore, (2) that there is such an entity as truth; (3) that
there are similarities among human minds whereby this truth
can be attained by many individuals; (4) that this truth is not
a concrete causally related "thing" or process, but a non-causal
relationship between the known entity and the knowing; (5)
that this relationship is one that is not identical with certainty,
but that may subsist quite independently of proof and of the
application of any criterion of truth, — indeed, in many instances,
quite incidentally ; and (6) that particular truths, although re-
lated, are not causally dependent, and do not modify or influ-
ence one another either positively or negatively.
From these propositions, which imply the falsity of both
; Individualism and Skepticism, and which yet are affirmed by
all systems, even by Individualism and Skepticism in their pre-
suppositions, it follows that hoth Skepticism and Individualism
are false, i.e., that they are self-refuting.
*' Cf. Chap. XLI., viii.-xi.
REALISM'S HYPOTHESES 407
A similar conclusion results in the case of Hypothesis IX.,
that, if there are well authenticated instances in which intel-
lectual analysis reveals fact, then Mysticism,*^ of a certain
type at least, namely, Bergsonian mysticism, and Anti-
intellectualism ^^ are false, and feeling, emotion, and intuition
cannot be accepted as the sole method of approach to reality,
with only an instrumerital role granted to intellect. This con-
clusion is similar to the one preceding, because Anti-intellectual-
ism and Mysticism, if they are defended hy argument, are self-
refuting, and if they are maintained merely dogmatically , are
no better oif in their logical position than are the opposed,
dogmatically asserted positions of Intellectualism and analysis.
Indeed, any position that is presented and defended by argu-
mentation, proof, and the advancing of evidence not only pre-
supposes the validity and the trustworthiness of analysis as a
method of discovering states of affairs as well as other facts, but
also presupposes the propositions just stated above as to the
nature of truth, and the like. Feeling, emotion, intuition, and
ecstasy may be means for getting at reality, or they may not,
but at least that they are not the only means is presupposed
by any position that is analytically defended, even though such
a position explicitly develops the opposed view regarding
analysis. The frank acceptance of these presuppositions makes
Intellectualism and Rationalism self -consistent as regards at
least this point, while the tracing of the implications of these
presuppositions leads to the discovery of entities that are real,
though they do not exist, and of relations that are not causal.*'*'
*^ Among the great mystics of history are the Neoplatonists of the
third and fourth centuries A.D., such as Plotinus, Porphyry, and
Jamblichus; also St. Bernard, Bonaventura, and Meister Eckhart from
the eleventh to the fifteenth century; Thomas a Kempis (1380-1471).
The " mystical quality " is also found in the great majority of philo-
sophical works, notably in those of Plato, Philo, Augustine, Scotus
Erigena, Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus. Nicolas of Cusa, Spinoza, Pascal,
Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and all the recent objective idealiste.
Bergson also is to be ranked as a mystic.
General works on Mysticism are: Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics,
2 vols.; R. B. Jones, Studies in Mystical Religions; Wm. James, Varieties
of Religious Experience ; Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism.
*' Cf. Chap. XXXIII., I. and ii.
" See Chap. XLIV.
408 REALISM
CHAPTER XLI
THE PRINCIPLES OF REALISM
At the beginning of this section the statement was made that
the central doctrines of Realism and Rationalism are derived
from the criticism of opposed positions. This criticism, however,
is specific. By it there are discovered certain propositions,
certain states of affairs which opposed systems presuppose and
imply. Anti-Intellectualism, Mysticism, Individualism, Skepti-
cism, Pragmatism, Naturalism in its several branches, Positivism,
Idealism, and Phenomenalism are the main positions criticized.
The nine hypotheses just discussed are suggested by this criti-
cism, and for these confirmation has been sought and found.
The Realism with which these hypotheses are identical is a
position that accepts at face value the entities which are revealed
by reason as well as those which are given by sense experience
and emotion, and that, therefore, consistently allows its own
rational defense and establishment as presenting an objective
state of affairs that is independent of being known. It is, there-
fore, a realism of suhsistents as well as of existents, of principles
and ideals as well as of physical and mental entities, and of
non-causal as well as of causal relations. Since some of these
characteristics distinguish this position from previous realisms,
e.g., from Scotch Realism,^ it may be called the New Realism.
But also it is new in its Rationalism. For not only does the
logic of Aristotle serve the master, reason, but also that other
new logic which is found to be inherent in and among the com-
plex entities and situation with which reason deals.^ Rational-
ism by recognizing and using this logic is able to solve many
a problem that is insoluble by other, older methods.^
This Realism and Rationalism may now be stated in systematic
and positive form as a constructive system Avhieh shall liave the
title Detailed Realism, or The Realistic Structure of the Uni-
' The position of Reid, MrCdsh. and others.
■' See Cliaps. XXI., XXV., XXVII., XLIIl.
" Cf. Chaps. XXII., XXIH.
THE PRINCIPLES OF REALISM 409
verse. In presenting this position we shall give the realistic
and rationalistic solution of the main philosophical problems
that are outlined and analyzed in Section II. of Part I.
Antecedent and basic principles of this detailed Realism and
Rationalism are, however, the several confirmed hypotheses
that have just been presented in Chapter XL. These hypotheses,
however, involve certain (other) principles which should now
be presented in systematic form as the principles of a con-
structive position and system. These principles are presup-
posed by every philosophical position or system at least at that
point where such a system finds an (objective) state of affairs
which it presents as true, and which it discovers, analyzes, and
defends by reason.
The presentation of these principles in systematic form is
possible through the discovery, n? and among them, of a specific
logical order, which is that of logical priority. This order is
observed in the sequence in which the principles are presented,
logically prior principles being presented antecedently to
logically subsequent principles, with the possibility of error in
detecting this order alv.^ays granted.
The Principles
I. There are propositions.
II. There are terms and relations.
Discussion: It is difficult to determine which of these two
principles or presuppositions is logically prior. For, on the
one hand, a proposition is terms-in-relation,^ and therefore seems
to presuppose both terms and relations. But, on the other hand,
if any philosophy presupposes that there are terms and rela-
tions, such as the relations of implication, similarity, and dif-
ference, "member of," and inclusion, then Principle II. is itself
this presupposition. But this presupposition is itself a proposi-
tion, and therefore presupposes that there are propositions.
Also, that there are propositions is presupposed by itself, since
it is a proposition. This principle thus applies to itself, or is
reflexive. Any philosophy, even one that denies this, presup-
poses that there are propositions.
* Chap. XIII., I.
410 REALISM
It is also difficult to determine whether it is terms or rela-
tions that are logically prior each to the other. On the one
hand, it might seem that, if there were only one term, there
would be 710 relations, i.e., that "a relation is a character that
an object possesses as a member of a collection (a pair," etc.),^
and that, therefore, relations presuppose terms. Yet, on the
other hand, one term might be in relation to itself; e.g., a term
might be identical with itself, with the result, that neither
"term" nor "relation" is logically prior to the other.
However, it is doubtful if a philosophy does not presuppose
more than one term. But, if there are (many) terms, there
are also relations, at least those of conjunction (symbolized by
"and") and of similarity. For terms are at least similar, as
terms.
With these points elucidated, we may next consider certain
important relationships between Principles I. and II., noting
that, if there are these relationships, then each of these Princi-
ples must itself be a (complex) term, i.e. (at least by the defini-
tion quoted above), relationships imply terms. But, if this is
the case, then it is presupposed, that there are relations of im-
plication.
But there are relationships between Principles I. and II.
Therefore these Principles are terms; therefore, again, as terms,
they are similar — and similarity is a relation. But Principles I.
and II. are each terms in relation, and each is a proposition.
Therefore (1) as terms, they are each complex, and so, again,
similar, and (2) at least some terms-in-relation are proposi-
tions.
Whether all terms-in-relation are identical with propositions
may be open to question, but if there are some terms-in-relation
that are not, it is difficult to know what to call them. Yet that
all terras-in-relation are propositions is shown perhaps by the
fact (1) that it seems to be empirically ascertainable that what-
ever implies is a proposition (since typical cases are propositions
that do imply) and (2) that all or any terras-in-relation imply
(since, whatever a relation, R, may be, any complex x R y implies
or necessitates the inverse, y R x.^ The identity of propositions
■ Royce, in his essay on the Principles of Logic; sec Chap. II.
« See Chap. XIII.
THE PRINCIPLES OF REALISM 411
with terms-in-relation would, therefore, seem to be empirically
established.
By this definition, then. Principles I. and II. are each a
proposition ; for Principle I. is a relation of inclusion of proposi-
tions in the class of '' 'things' that are," i.e., the class, entities,
while Principle II. is the relation of inclusion of terms and
relations in this same larger class.''
Further analysis of the "state of affairs" that is identical
with Principles I. and II. would reveal the presence in it of
a number of other relations than those thus far discovered —
e.g., there are the relations of (1) difference of terms and rela-
tions, and (2) "member of," for Principles I. and II. are each
a "member of" the class, propositions. However, into the
further discussion of these refined matters we need not go, since
it is more important to consider the several types of relations
that "give" propositions, and to recognize the fact that there
are other propositions than those which are accepted in the
traditional logic.
The traditional logic is, as we have seen, one that makes
almost^ exclusive recognition of ''class" and of "subject-
predicate" propositions. The latter, however, can be translated
into the former. Thus the proposition, "a stone is hard," while
it is identical with the relation of the inherence of the quality
hardness in the subject, stone, becomes, by translation, "stones
are hard objects," where it is identical v/ith the relation of
inclusion of the class, stones, in the larger class, hard objects.
The relationship of inclusion by which some propositions are
generated, may be, as we have previously seen, complete, partial,
or negative. The relation "member of" (a class) also "gives"
propositions that are illustrated by the proposition, "this object
(that I am now holding) is a pen."
But there are other relations than those just mentioned, and,
therefore, other propositions than those which the traditional
logic recognizes. Such a distinct class of propositions may be
called "relational" to distinguish them from "class" and
"subject-predicate" propositions. Indeed it may be said in
general, that all those relations that are present in series or in
complexes of series, and the like, give relational propositions,
' Qf. Chap. XLIV., u.
412 REALISM
although, "side by side" with these, "class" and "subject"
propositions may also be present. Thus, to illustrate, the sev-
eral relations that are present in that relational complex which
is accelerated motion, give, most of them, relational propositions.
For example, "the instant A pr£££des the instant C," "the
instant B is between A and C," "the point a is in one-one
correlation with the instant A," are all propositions that are
not generated by relations of similarity, '^member of," inher-
ence, or inclusion of any kind. Evidence that there are these
relational propositions is given by the historical fact, that, in
order to deal adequately and precisely with such complexes as
accelerated motion, it was necessary to develop radically new
methods of reasoning, such as the calculus. Indeed the greater
part of modern exact science is identical with the knowledge
of such relational propositions and with what they imply, namely,
other relational propositions.
This suggests our third principle, which is presupposed by any
system of philosophy that is reasoned either in its detailed doc-
trine or in its defense, but which also seems to be logically subse-
querit to the fact that there are entities, namely, propositions,
such as Principles I. and II., that imply.
III. There is {the relation of) implication.
Discussion: The problem of implication, its nature, and the
conditions of its occurrence, is one of the most difficult problems
in all logic and philosophy, as it is, also, a problem that is most
infrequently considered. However, the attempt to examine it
has been made at a number of junctures in this volume,^ with
the result that it has been found (1) that the relation of im-
plication is a specific relation that subsists between propositions; \
(2) that it is, like other relations and terms, objective in the j
sense that it is neither a creation of nor a law or concept of
the knowing mind; (3) that it is identical with a relation of '
necessary connection between propositions, whereby, if proposi-
tion A is, proposition B must be; (4) that it is logically subse-
quent to some other relations, in that it depends on them, al-
though they do not depend on it;** (5) that, therefore, it is a
specific relation that is not itself iynplied, but that merely co- \
subsists with certain other relations; (6) that it is specifically
* See Chap. XIII. • See Chaps. Xlll. and XXL
THE PRINCIPLES OF REALISM 413
different from consistency and contradiction;'^^ (7) that it is
a non-symmetrical and transitive relation, — which allows for its
occasional symmetry, if not for its intransitivity.
To enumerate and present all those types of relational com-
plexes, and all those types of relations that carry w^ith them the
relation of implication would demand that we should examine
all those situations that permit of correct inference. Such a
complete examination of the implicative situation is, however,
not necessary to our purpose, but, instead, the presentation of
a few typical instances will suffice.
1. Every relation, e.g., every dyadic relation, symbolized by
X R y, is one that gives a basis for the implication of its inverse,
y R X. It would seem, then, that, if there were the very minimum
of relations, namely, those of conjunction, expressed by "and,"
and of similarity and, perhaps, of difference, there would also
be implication. For A and B implies B and A, as does also A
similar to B imply B similar to A.
2. In the very typical case of the relation of inclusion of one
class A in another class B that in turn is included in a class C,
there is the relation of implication, for it is implied that A is
included in C. Here two propositions, A R B, and B R C, with
neither implying the other, imply a third, ARC. This is the
case also where an asymmetrical and transitive relation relates,
not classes, but the individuals of a series. Thus, if < be the
sign for any relation, such as "before," "greater than," and
"ancestor of," whereby serial order is generated among indi-
viduals, then A <i B, and B <. C, implies A < C.^^
These are instances of propositions that imply other proposi-
tions, but there are also certain propositions that do not in the
least seem to be implicative of others. For example, "A is taller
than B" does not imply any "hlood relationship'' between A and
B, and "A is similar to B" does not imply that either terra
precedes the other. Implication, therefore, seems to subsist be-
tiveen sorne propositions, hut not between or among all. There-
fore, where it does subsist, there must be certain other relations
on which it rests. However, that implication is objective, is
^* See the next two discussions.
" For further typical implicative situations, see Chaps. XIII., i., and
XXI.
414 REALISM
itself a proposition that is implied by whatever propositions are
employed in any argument either pro or con its hypothetical
subjectivity. For, if one does not dogmatically assert, e.g., the
subjective character of implication, but endeavors to demon-
strate this, then to the investigating mind the propositions that
constitute this demonstration and the relations between these
propositions are objective, and among these relations is im-
plication.
That implication is sometimes symmetrical is shown by dis-
covering specific instances of its symmetry. One such instance
is the complex situation or state of affairs, that (1) if the rela-
tion JK of a to & is, e.g., the asymmetrical relation "greater
than," then the inverse relation, K, is "less than"; but that
(2) between the two complexes, a B b and b B a, there is, in
addition to this "first" relation of "inverseness," the relation
of implication, for any relation x B y implies its inverse y B x,
as we have seen; calling tJiis particular relation of implication
between a B b and b B a the relation B^, it is then to be seen
that (3) the complex {a B b) B.^ {b B a) implies its inverse,
namely, the complex (& B a) B^ {a B b) ; so that (4) JSg ''here"
is symmetrical.
However, in most instances implication is a non-symmetrical
relation in accordance with the definition that "a relation is
non-symmetrical if it is such that it de facto precludes the iden-
tity of the inverse with itself" (the original relation). This
non-symmetry is illustrated in the relationship between time and
motion: motion implies time, but the inverse relation, that of
time to motion, is not one of implication.
IV. There is the relation of contradiction.
Discussion: Although it is, doubtless, somewhat difficult to
discover the exact character of this relation, it is readily demon-
strated that any system of philosophy presupposes it. For who-
ever both asserts and denies, conforms logically to this principle
as holding between that which is respectively asserted and
denied. Thus, e.g., to de7iy contradiction (as a specific state of
affairs in the universe) is to presuppose it.
The difficulties in the problem lie in the concept of the nega-
tive, with which contradiction seems to be most intimately con-
nected, if, indeed, the two are not identical.^^ Thu5, e.g., one
THE PRINCIPLES OF REALISM 415
finds it stated, that contradiction subsists both between classes
and propositions, but that its definition for either of these cases
depends on the concept of negation. This is very evident if,
for example, the contradictory class, symbolized by x, is defined,
in relation to a positive class, x (which itself is "defined by
a certain norm"), as the class that consists of whatever objects
are not x.^^ It is also quite as evident, if, e.g., the contradictory
of the relational proposition, '^A is greater than B," is defined
as "A is not greater than B."
To understand ivhat contradiction is, seems to demand, there-
fore, the understanding of the concept of the negative, or of
negation. But here again difficulties are met with, if, e.g., an
endeavor is made to understand the negative by first under-
standing zero, only in turn to define zero by the use of the
negative. This circle is committed in Mr. Russell's discussion
of his view "that numbers are properties of general terms, not
of physical things or mental occurrences," so that " 'one' is
not a property," for example, "of the moon itself," but only
"of the general term 'earth's satellite.' " "Similarly, is a
property of the general term, 'satellite of Venus,' because Venus
has no satellite." ^*
However, some light is thrown on the nature of the nega-
tive and of contradiction by considering the nature of the
number zero as this occurs in the nnniber series. Briefly, we
will say, that the number zero and the negative numbers are
implied by removing the limitation from the operation of sub-
traction, so that the greater whole number can be "taken from"
the lesser, as well as the lesser from the greater; i.e., so that
x — ^ is possible, whatever " values'' x and y may have. Sub-
traction is the operation, or step of "going" (perhaps that of
moving our attention) — in the series of numbers — from that
which follows to that which precedes, while addition is the inverse
step of "going" from that which precedes to that which
follows. Thus these two operations are defined by reference to
series.
If, now, 4" before a number represents the operation of
"Chap. XVI.
** Hoyce, Essay, op. cit., p. 108.
** Scientific Method in Philosophy, p. 202. Italics mine.
416 REALISM
addition and — that of suhstraction, as, e.g., -f- 5, and — 5,
and if we start with a whole number 5, carefully distin^iishing
between the status of signed numbers and of unsigned, then -|- 5
is a step "forwards" by which we "go" from 5 to 10, and — 5
is the step "backwards" by which we "go" from 5 to 0. There-
fore, the steps — 6, — 7, and the like, taken from 5 as a "start-
ing point," bring us to the negative numbers, — 1, — 2, etc.,
respectively.
It is to be noted here, however, that the sign which is some-
times interpreted as a negative sign, first stands for a very
positive '^ thing, '^ namely, for the step or operation of "going"
from greater to lesser. The same conclusion results, also, from
the further examination of the negative numbers themselves,
and of zero. This examination shows, in the first place, that
the negative numbers are implied facts, and are, therefore, in
some sense entities, namely, subsistents ; ^^ and in the second
place, that we are as free, in performing successively the opera-
tion -f- 1, to start with a negative number or with zero, as we
are to start with a positive whole number.
There may be many other considerations that bear on the
nature of the negative, but, in the opinion of the writer, all of
these lead to but one conclusion, namely, that the number 0,
the negative, negation, and contradiction is in each instance
something that is a positive content of experience. This content
may be the positive fact of, e.g., a difference in the "sense" or
direction of a series, whereby we speak of "backwards" and
"forwards" ; or the difference of individuality, as when we speak
of the points (apexes), A, B, and C of a triangle, or the differ-
ence of qualities, whereby there are the classes, X (animals) and
Y (plants). In each of these instances either or any of the posi-
tive terms can be symbolized by the prefix "not." Thus "back-
wards" is "not-forwards," points B and C are not- A, animals
are not-plants, and conversely. Yet this negative prefix does
not do away with the fact, that the differences among these
entities are positive, although they are open to a negative char-
acterization in relation to one another. These differences subsist
at different and numerically distinct loci that are logical, and,
also, in some instances, spatial and temporal in character. It
" Cf. Chap. XLIV., II.
THE PRINCIPLES OF REALISM 417
is, now, this factual diversity and difference of the entities of
the universe that is that universal fact of exclusion with which
contradiction is identical.^®
It follows that such a formulation of the principle of con-
tradiction as the very usual one of the text-books that "a 'thing*
(entity) cannot hoth be and not he a certain quality" {e.g., that
the motion of a falling body cannot be both continuous and not
continuous) is in reality only a restatement (1) of the em-
pirically discovered fact, that certain characteristics do subsist
at different loci, plus (2) the unjustified conviction that they
cannot have the same locus. For many attributes which have
been regarded as necessarily exclusive, e.g., finiteness and in-
finity, are now known to cosubsist, as, e.g., in the case of a line,
which is infinite in respect to points, but finite as regards
smaller lines as components.
From this example it may be seen that to discover what
entities exclude one another, and what do not, is a wholly em-
pirical matter. Therefore the only norm that is really offered
by the principle of contradiction is, that one should not think
or "take" two or more characteristics or entities that are found
empirically to have different loci, to be at the same locus. Any
two contradictory entities can be at different spatial and tem-
poral loci, or at those logical loci that are called "universes of
discourse."
Self-contradiction subsists, at least in the case of propositions,
when characteristics that are (found empirically to be) exclusive
are brought in some way into the same locus. Thus, e.g., the
statement, "there is no truth," is self-contradictory, because it
presupposes the truth of itself as present in a universe of dis-
course from which, by its own meaning, truth is absent. The
difficulty is resolved by the subsistence of two "universes,"
excluding each other, in one of which truth is present, in the
other, absent. Thus the two propositions, "there is some truth,"
and "there is some not-truth," are both facts.
In two ways, therefore, aiiy system of philosophy presupposes
the relation of contradiction. One of these ways is, that there
is a diversity of entities in the universe, and that among these
there are empirically discovered exclusions. The negative, or
"Cf. Chap, XLIV,
418 REALISM
the contradictory, is merely anotJier name for any one entity,
simple or complex, that is in relation of some kind of difference
to another entity or entities, with the two subsisting at different
loci. Thus when we say, having set out to classify any region
of our world, real or ideal, that "with reference to a given
norm," the individuals of that region will belong either to the
class X or to its contradictory class x, we mean, that, if these
individuals are not in one locus, they are in the other, with both
realms equally positive in character. The other way in which
contradiction is presupposed is normative in character. It
means, that the error should not be committed of "taking" en-
tities that are diverse in character and that subsist at
different loci, to have the same locus. This norm af think-
ing should, of course, be observed by any philosophical
system.
V. There is consistency.
Discussion: The two foregoing discussions of implication and
of contradiction bring us to the discussion of consistency. It is,
perhaps, doubtful if consistency is a relation, and therefore
also doubtful if a system of philosophy presupposes such a rela-
tion. Yet that a philosophy must be consistent is a presupposi-
tion or demand that is made by all philosophies, although one
may ask, whether this means more than that a philosophy must
not be self -contradictory in the sense in which we have just de-
fined this term. Such self-contradiction is illustrated by any
philosophy which maintains that all terms are causally related,
and, therefore, mutually modify one another ; for this means that,
logically, knowing and object known are no exceptions to the
rule, and that, accordingly, knowing affects the object (to be)
known, so that 7io state of affairs (or anything else) can be
known without being modified. Such a position, now, logically
brings itself, as a specific knowing of a specific state of affairs
(the above theory) within this realm in which genuine knowl-
edge is impossible, but it thereby precludes, or makes it im-
possible, that that knowledge with which it as a philosophical
position is identical, should be what it is presumed to be, namely,
genuine knowledge. Thus the position invalidates itself. To
recognize that any philosophy presupposes and is under obliga-
tion to conform to consistency in the sense of the absence of
THE PRINCIPLES OF REALISM 410
such self-contradictions as that just presented, would seem to
be a minimum requirement to ask any philosopher to observe.
The specific self-contradiction just presented is avoided by
accepting the two propositions, that ''some 'things' are causally
related," and that ''some 'things' are not so related. But, if
self-contradiction is to he avoided, it may well be that mere
contradiction, as identical with the relation of difference between
entities that subsist at different loci, is not only presupposed by
all philosophies, hut also is identical with consistency.
Paradoxical though it may seem, thus to identify contradiction
with consistency, and to maintain at the same time, that con-
sistency is independent of implication, the empirical examina-
tion of the evidence at our disposal nevertheless seems to lead
to this conclusion. All facts and entities are, just because they
are facts and entities, consistent with one another. If they
cannot cosubsist, or coexist, "at" or "in" the same locus, then
they must be at different loci, or in different universes of dis-
course. Conversely, the hypothesis, that there are different
universes of discourse, allows for the factuality of all entities
that are experienced. Inconsistency is present, then, as an
error, only when entities which factually are exclusive and have
different loci are "taken" to have the same locus. But entities
as diverse and as in different loci may be quite unrelated by
implication, as can be shown in innumerable instances.
These developments concerning contradiction, consistency, and
implication may be illustrated to advantage by an example from
the scientific field. The geometers, Lobatchewsky, in 1829, and
Bolyai, in 1832, each succeeded in working out a consistent sys-
tem of geometry that differed from the traditional geometry
of Euclid in respect to the postulate and theorems that concern
parallels}'^ Euclid assumed, in "axioms" and theorems, that
through a point P, outside a line L there is only one line parallel
to L. Bolyai and Lobatchewsky, however, assumed that there
is an infinite numher of parallels through P, and then developed
the implications of this and of the other usual postulates, one of
these implications being that the sum of the angles of a {plane)
triangle is less than two right angles.
These two opposed assumptions regarding parallels, in respect
" Cf. Chap. I.
420 REALISM
to which these two geometries differ, may be regarded, now, as
contradictory, i.e., they can at least be formulated in the nega-
tive contrast of ''one parallel" and "not one parallel." They
are of such a character, that, if both were assumed in one
system, together with other postulates, they would lead to all
sorts of difficulties. No ''concrete representation" of the theory
to which they thus might lead is found. On the other hand,
as "placed" in different universes of discourse in recognition
of the empirical discovery of their mutual exclusion, each of
these postulates as to parallels leads to an internally consistent
geometrical system, i.e., one for which a concrete representation
is found.
There are other non-Euclidian systems than that of Bolyai
and Lobatchewsky, as, e.g., that of Riemann,^^ But the point
to be emphasized regarding all of these systems is, that, as
distinct and cosubsisting universes of discourse, they are con-
sistent with one another. This they must be, since each is a
system of entities or of facts that are discovered by reason. Yet,
as consistent in this sense, they are also contradictory of one
another in certain specific respects. But, also, taking the three
systems together as geometrical systems, we have a concrete
representation of geometrical theory. We conclude, therefore,
that in the instance of these systems we have a concrete case
of the identity of consistency with contradiction, and that the
only contradiction that is at all damaging and that is to be
avoided, is that of "taking" the different postulates regarding
parallels into one system or one locus of discourse, when they
should be kept distinct in three loci.
Each of these systems is itself internally consistent, since
a concrete interpretation of each can be given that satisfies all
its postulates. But further, each system is derived by dis-
covering the implications from a relatively few propositions
that are regarded as postulates, and not as axioms. These
postulates, however, do not imply one another, since, if any
one postulate were implied, one would not be obliged to postu-
late it, but would deduce it from the other postulates. Accord-
ingly, in order to ascertain whether a specific proposition is to
be postulated, or whether it can be deduced, one first assumes
•" Cf. Chap. I.
THE PRINCIPLES OF REALISM 421
the formal contradictory of a certain postulate, X, and then
finds that the remaining postulates together with this contra-
dictory give a consistent system. It follows that these remaining
postulates are 7iot implied by X, nor X by them. Any set or
group of postulates that can be successfully submitted to this
test is thereby proved to be a set of propositions that are inde-
pendent (in just this sense of not being implied by one another),
and yet that are, also, consistent. We therefore have a specific
demonstration, that implication and consistency are not only
not identical with, but also independent of, each other, and that
this independence "persists" even in the case of consistent
propositions that do imply one another, but that can be, as
distinct propositions of positive content, transformed into formal
contradictories. This demonstration consists in finding that con-
sistency is sometimes accompanied by implication, and sometimes
not, — in which respect it is similar to the independence of such
relational characteristics as symmetry and transitivity}^
We conclude, therefore, (1) that consistency may cosubsist
with but is not identical with nor dependent upon implication;
(2) that it means the absence of self-contradiction, but (3) that
it is in some cases identical with that contradiction which is
the factual exclusion of entities into different universes of dis-
course, or their factual subsistence at different loci.
Any system of philosophy presupposes consistency in these
three meanings or ways.
VI. There is a system of propositions.
Discussion: Every philosophy makes this presupposition.
With a proposition defined as a relationship between terms,
whether these be simple or complex, and with all philosophical
s^tems presupposing tJiat there are propositions, it is evident
that a philosophical system presupposes that there is a system
of propositions.
A system of propositions may be defined as a set of proposi-
tions that are related either by implication, or by consistency,
or also, if one will, by contradiction. Since a proposition is,
however, a relation between terms, a philosophical system also
presupposes, as possibly included within itself, all the several
kinds of relations as well as all the several kinds of terms or
" See Chap. II., p. 22.
422 REALISM
entities that are known. Although these terms and relations
are too various to enumerate completely, it will be seen that they
include simple and complex terms, and those relations that
generate both classes and series, i.e., relations of similarity and
difference, and of asymmetry and transitivitj'- respectively.
A system may also be defined as an ordered manifold of en-
tities. But entities are ordered by relations. It would seem,
therefore, that there might be "degrees" of order, with certain
"degrees" independent of others. Thus a system from which
all series and whatever depends on series, as, e.g., functions,
should be absent, can be postulated. Such a system would, how-
ever, admit of classes and their relations. The Platonic phi-
losophy is in part identical with such a system.
A system may, also, be only partially implicative in char-
acter, and there would also seem to be systems of contradictory
(consistent) systems, each internally consistent, as illustrated
by the system of geometrical systems. But any system of phi-
losophy that is open to examination and proof, and to rational
defense and development, presupposes a system of propositions,
some of which at least are implicative of one another,^^ and,
therefore, more than merely consistent.
However, that the system of propositions which constitutes
a philosophy is an organic system, is disproved in two ways.
An organic system of propositions is defined as one in which
each proposition is constituted by its relation to all other proposi-
tions, so that no proposition can be genuinely known until all
others are. Clearly such a system is modeled after a completely
causal system.^^ That the system of propositions which are at
our disposal is not organic in this sense is proved by the fact
(1) that there are instances of propositions, as in the geometrical
systems just discussed, that are not implied by, although they
and their contradictories are consistent with, other propositions ;
and (2) that no relation, either of implication or consistency (or
any other relation) between propositions carries with it the
mutual modification or constitution of any one proposition by
others, except as this modification is deduced from the purely
gratuitous assumption (postulation) of the modification theory
of relations. But if a system of propositions is not organic,
" See Chap. XIII. "' See Chap. XXVI., n., 2.
THE PRINCIPLES OF REALISM 423
then an entirely correct knowledge of some (one or more)
propositions is possible, even though other implied or implying,
and consistent or inconsistent propositions are not known.
VII. There are specific processes called knowing, and there
is knoivledge.
Discussion: Every philosophical system presupposes this.
Knowledge may be defined as that which is common to past,
future, and present knowing processes. A knowing process may
be defined as one in which there is awareness, without it being
necessary that there should in turn be an awareness of this
awareness. This corresponds to the distinction between con-
sciousness and self-consciousness. There is positive evidence
that mere consciousness and awareness is identical with a specific
relation w^hose presence is conditioned by a certain complex in
which a nervous system with a cerebral cortex is one term, al-
though there may also be other radically different terms than
such neural complexes as conditions for consciousness. The
conditions for self-consciousness are more specific than are
those for mere consciousness. Special kinds of awareness
are those which are usually called reasoning, imagining,
remembering, and perceiving, and the like, but these processes
can take place without a simultaneous or subsequent conscious-
ness of them.
As thus far defined, no distinction is made between that
knowledge which is true, and that which is not. But perhaps
there is no distinction, since ^'true knowledge" may be a
tautology, and "false knowledge" a misnomer. But, be that as
it may, all philosophical systems presuppose that
VIII. There is truth.
Discussion: Truth may be defined as the subsistence of a
specific relation between the knowing process and the entity
known. Were there not knowing, there would be only fact,
but neither truth nor error. But, secondly, this specific relation
subsists, when, in the awareness, tiie entity is revealed as it really
is. In this state of affairs the knowing and the entity known are
externally related after the model of the functional relationship,
i.e., they are in correspondence.
The objection that this is a question-begging definition of
truth does not invalidate it, but only indicates the difficulty of
424 REALISM
finding a test whereby to ascertain whether knowledge in any
specific instance is true or not. But the presence or absence
of this test is not identical with the presence or absence of
knowledge, for the former concerns proof and the grounds of
conviction, the latter, the presence or absence of truth. "Were
there not this difference, there would 'be no truth unless there
were a test, yet every test would be worthless unless true. The
'principles of proof must themselves, therefore, be submitted to
proof and to testing. But, since with these, as with other proposi-
tions, proof in an indefinite series is impossible, the only alterna-
tive is to accept it as a fact that at some point proof is im-
possible, and that truth is distinct from and independent of
proof, evidence, and testing. This is, indeed, the onl}'^ ground
or principle on which ultimate unproved or unprovable tests
can themselves be true, but it is also a principle that logically
allows itself to he true, although it is not proved. Indeed, were
this principle not thus true, then, since the human race as yet
possesses no complete proof and no absolute test for the absolute
truth of any knowledge, there could be no knowledge. But,
conversely, if the principle is true, then there is implied the
possibility of genuine knowledge, both in the race and in the
individual, antecedent to the demonstration that in any specific
instance there is such knowledge.
This means that facts can be revealed and discovered
antecedently hath to the evidence or proof that this is the case,
and also to the explanation of how they can be these facts. For
example, our ancestors perceived and knew the fact that their
canoes would float on the water without understanding either
the perceiving or the floating. Likewise it is possible that one
should discover that there are certain presuppositions or con-
ditions for knowledge, and yet not understand in all details
how knowledge is brought about. The experience of fact is but
the antecedent occasion for subsequent explanation and proof.
It is a principle, then, that
IX. Truth is distinct from certainty.
Discussion: Certainty is a specific consciousness which has
some other consciousness as its object, and is, perhaps, always
an instance of self-consciousness. It concerns evidence and
proof and the grounds for our convictions. Thus it can be
THE PRINCIPLES OF REALISM 425
causally grounded in personal influences, in tradition, and in
custom. 22 Such, e.g., is the conviction and certainty that attends
our beliefs, the self-evidence of so-called axioms, and, perhaps,
the inconceivability of their opposites.-^ In contrast truth is a
specific relation between knowing and that which is known.
Proof and evidence are, therefore, only methods for attaining
truth, with "successful working" in some cases as one such
test, but with the success conditioned by truth, and not con-
versely.-* This last proposition may be stated in the form of
another principle to the effect that
X. The nature of truth is not the same as the outcome of
knowledge, i.e., of its successful and satisfactory working.
Discussion: This "working" is in many cases brought about
by holding the very "idea" in question to be true, as is illus-
trated by the conviction that a friend is sincere, by the belief
in immortality, and the like. Accordingly it is clear that, in
these circumstances, one is not free to hold one's judgment in
suspense, thus to put an idea or theory to a test that is inde-
pendent of emotion, of desire, of tradition, and of social
pressure, but that in order that an idea or theory should be
true in the sense of working successfully, one must prejudge
the question, and hold something to be true antecedently to
''there being truth." Belief thus generates truth, so that ulti-
mately there is no difference between the true and the false.
But, since belief somewhere, by some one, is always to be
found, it follows that there is only truth, and no falsity. But
also specific disbelief and doubt — somewhere — by some one — are
not absent in respect to any "object of belief," with the con-
sequence that, as regards any such "object" or "idea," there
is always a specific lack of "satisfactory working," so that
there is nothing that is not also false. Thus does the position,
that truth is identical with satisfactory working, reduce to an
absurdity, and the converse position — of science, that truth is
not so constituted, receive confirmation. Not only the absence
of belief, but also of disbelief, or rather the independence of
both, is the state of affairs that is recognized, by science, as the
condition for the bringing about of that kind of satisfactory
outcome and working that is acceptable to science. Such an
" Cf. Chap. III. =■ ' Chap. XV., iv., 4, 5, 6. " Cf. Chap. XXXIII., iv.
420 REALISM
outcome, however, is one that is brought about, not by the
psychological causes of belief, desire, and tradition, but by the
objective realities that are known — else were everything true,
and nothing false, and, also, everything false, and nothing true.
It is because ideas are true that they work satisfactorily where
both belief and disbelief keep aloof. Yet the satisfactory out-
come even here only makes us regard them as true, but does
not make them true.
With truth thus found to be distinct from certainty, and
also from "successful workings," we may now present as our
next principle, that
XI. Although there is no absolute test of absolute truth, and
although certainty may be lacking, nevertheless there may be
true knowledge; the latter is not of necessity absent even when
the two former are not present.
Discussion: This means that true theories, true hypotheses,
and the like, may often be won by guesswork, — an origin which
the history of science shows to have been frequently the case.
We now reach a somewhat different group of propositions,
which, while they have been discussed and developed in a
number of preceding chapters, should now be stated briefly,
since they are principles that all philosophical systems presup-
pose in one way or another, and that, therefore, form an im-
portant part of Realism and Rationalism. The first of these
propositions is that
XII. Analysis is possible.
Discussion : This means that knowledge by analytical means
is possible, but that this does not exclude immediate experience,
such as feeling and intuition, from also revealing fact and
giving truth. ^^ The development of the technique of modern
methods of knowing is identical in part with the development
of methods of analysis. Analysis itself has thus been analyzed,
one result of this being the discovery of methods of analysis
that leave the entities thus discovered in situ. Such methods
are most important, as we have seen, for the solution of the ego-
centric predicament.^^ Analysis shows a great many instances
in which entities are related, not causally, but functionally or
after the manner of the functional relationship, so that one
=■> Chap. XV., IV., 2. =» Chaps. XXVIII. and XXXIX.
THE PRINCIPLES OF REALISM 427
can only dogmatically, but not validly claim that a relation
ipso facto carries with it the modification and alteration of the
related terms. In other words, the theory of external relations
is shown empirically to hold for at least a great many instances
of related terms. Therefore the modification theory of relations
to the effect that all relations a fortiori carry with them a mutual
causal effect of term on term, is shown not to he universal. It
may apply to some instances of related terms, but it certainly
does not to all. And for the underlying-reality theory of rela-
tions it has been already shown that there is only an argument,
and a self-contradictory one at that, but no empirical basis.
With the fact established empirically that there are some
instances of terms that are externally related, it is open to
empirical investigation to disclose others. This search is re-
warded by finding it to be not only a fact of direct observation,
but also a condition of our discovering implication and of know-
ing "things" as they really are (which possibility is accepted
by every philosophy at some point) that
XIII. Reason is free in the sense that it is neither lawless
nor yet causally determined hy preceding psychical processes
in the individual and the race, hut that it follows whither it is
led by the implicative structure of reality.
In other words, reason, in that it is "true to itself," is de-
termined, not by antecedent causes, but by the structure of
that to which it is directed. Thus, e.g., it can study the facts
of development without being causally determined by its own
development. It is free to ignore its own origin.
Discussion : Some of the important results that are obtained
by a reason that is free in this sense, and that can analyze
"things" in situ, as well as discover the implications of experi-
mental analysis, may now be stated, in summary of previous
discussions, as still further principles.
XIV. By an analysis in situ knowing can always he left
in relation to the entity known, and yet the two he discovered
to he in an external relation. Thus the ego-centric predicament
can he granted, and yet he shown to he quite harmless.
Further analysis of the "truth situation" shows that
XV. Although there is only One Truth, this means that there
is one system of many truths, or, more precisely, of propositions
428 REALISM
of ivhich some are merely consistent with, hut not implicative
of, one another, hut that in neither case are either truths or
propositions constitutive of one another.
Discussion: Implication and consistency (if it is a relation)
are as distinctly non-causal, non-constitutive, and external
relations as are any other specific relations that are of this
character.
But it is also shown hy analysis that the One Truth, defined
as one system of many truths (a truth being a known proposi-
tion), need not be an existent system. For there is evidence
that some "things" are unknown — although they are not un-
knowahle. It may therefore be formulated as another principle
that
XVI. The knowahleness of entities implies that, if {true)
knowledge of some or of many entities does not yet exist, there
is, nevertheless, a subsist ent or ideal knowledge that may ''hud
into existence'' under certain specific conditions, and that the
system of such ideal knowings is the system of Ideal Truth.
XVII. The suhsistence of an external relation hetween the
knowing and the entity known logically allows the latter to he
hoth qualitatively and numerically differeni and distinct from
the knowing.
Discussion: This implied result is confirmed by both common
sense and science. It is a result, however, that is directly
opposed to those results that follow logically from the postula-
tion of the theory of internal relations for the knowing situation.
Such results are (1) that knowing modifies the object (to be)
known, (2) that these two entities causally "fuse" together,
so that each is like the other and neither is really distinct, or
(3) that the apparent difference and distinctness are really
illusory, and that the reality is a numerically single underlying
oneness. It is to such a logical origin that certain monistic and
idealistic systems are due.
In this summary there may be given as further principles
the following propositions, though these are to be regarded as
results that are ohtained hy that analysis which is presupposed
to he possihle hy any philosophical system, and which reason is
capable of making by virtue of its freedom to follow implica-
tions.
THE PRINCIPLES OF REALISM 429
XVIII. Particular existing entities are not the only objects
that are open to investigation and analysis, but also classes and
series, states of affairs and non-existent suhsistents, and relations
between all these (includi^ig the relation cf implication), can
be studied, and discoveries ynade concerning them.
XIX. There are two ways of knowing, namely, by "specifica-
tion" and by "type." The former is illustrated by any par-
ticular act of sense perception, the latter by our knowledge of
prehistoric man.
XX. That some and perhaps many "things" are unknown in
either of these two ways is not identical with nor implicative
of their being unknoivable. There are only empirical difficulties
in the way of genuine knowledge, but there is no obstacle in-
herent in the knowing situation itself, contrary to the claim of
many philosophical systems, notably of Phenomenalism.
XXI. Error is an undeniable fact, but it can be explained,
and the means for avoiding it can to a large extent be acquired
by the wiiining of a scientific technique in both analysis and
synthesis. The "taking" of one entity to be another that it is
not, and the localizing of it in some time and place, one or both,
or in some other universe of discourse, to which it does not
belong, are the ultimate errors. But the factual status of all
entities, such as physical and mental processes, dream, illusory,
and normally imagined objects, and all possible objects, can be
found in one consistent system, and all self-contradictions be
avoided. Some entities are existent, while others are only sub-
sistent, but all entities can be related functionally and efficiently,
and not causally, to the knowing process in which they are
"content."
XXII. Among entities various relations are found, an im-
portant case of these being the relation of logical priority, which
is defined as subsisting, if b implies a, but a does not imply b.
By virtue of this relation entities are "stratified" into various
types.
XXIII. Relations are themselves not causally related, causa-
tion itself being a specific relation. Certain relations are, how-
ever, dependent on others, e.g., the converse relation, b R a, on
the original relation, a R b, but this dependence is not causal.
Other relations are not even thus dependent, but are merely
430 REALISM
consiste7it. Thus a term can stand in a number of independent
relations to different terms, losing or gaining any of these rela-
tions without the others. Entrance into and loss of the relation
of a particidar knowing process is an important instance of this
independence. Entities, including terms and relations, can ac-
cordingly he known as they really are, this knowledge heing
sometimes identical with immediate experience, and sometimes
with that which is, or which results from, analysis and reasoning.
This concludes the summary of those principles which, as dis-
covered by the criticism of systems that are explicitly opposed
to Realism and Rationalism, are nevertheless found to be tacitly
accepted and presupposed hy these (opposed) systems. These
principles form the general basis for a constructive and detailed
Realism and it is to the presentation of this constructive posi-
tion that we now proceed.
II. CONSTRUCTIVE AND DETAILED REALISM
CHAPTER XLII
THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM AS SOLVED BY REALISM
I. INTRODUCTORY
It is characteristic of the majority of the philosophical sys-
tems of at least the last century and a half that they have
deemed it necessary to solve the problem of how we know before
they have endeavored to solve other problems. The epistemo-
logical problem has thus had a temporal priority over other
problems, although it is doubtful whether this priority has
been important, and whether it indicates that logical priority
which has been traditionally ascribed to the problem of knowl-
edge.
This traditional position toward the knowledge problem has
THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM 4,31
resulted from the conviction of many philosophers that they
were placed in the ego-centric predicament, — with no way of
getting out. If this is the case, then it would seem, of course,
that we must study knowing before we study "things."
The position taken toward the epistemological problem by
Realism is the same in some respects as that taken by opposed
systems, but is radically different in other respects. Thus,
although both realist and non-realist may each study the prob-
lem first, they reach very different conclusions. For example,
the non-realist concludes, that the temporal priority of the
knowledge problem over other problems rests on or implies
a logical priority, the reason for this conclusion being the tacit
assumption of the theory of internal relations as valid for the
knowing situation. Since hy this assumption knowing does make
a difference to the entity known, it follows, of course, that
knowing must be studied before other "things" are studied, and,
therefore, that the epistemological problem has more than a
merely temporal priority.
The results which the realist reaches are very different from
this. He finds that the priority of the epistemological problem
is only temporal and psychological, but in no way logical. Thus,
although he may study this problem first, he finds that it need
not have heen studied in order to know, or in order to go ahead
and discover various details of reality. And the ground of this
conclusion is, of course, the discovery (1) that there is a virtual
elimination of knowing from the entity known — by the method
of an analysis in situ; and, accordingly, (2) that the relation
between knowing and known object is external; (3) that the ego-
centric predicament is soluble; (4) that knoumig is not con-
stitutive of the object known; and (5) that problems are isolahle,
even as, empirically, they arc isolated.
On this basis the realist discovers that the non-epistemological
problems can be studied before as well as after the problem of
knowledge, and non-developmental and non-historical problems
before as well as after those of development and history,^ In-
deed, the view is taken, that there are good reasons for exam-
ining the facts of knowing, and of development and of history
only after, and not before, other facts are examined. The former
* Cf. Chaps. I and XXVIII.
432 REALISM
are but a small part of the total realm of facts, while the study
of other facts seems to be more illuminative of the study of
knowing than conversely.
It is for these reasons that in the presentation of our o^vn
scheme of constructive Realism we begin, not with the epistemo-
logical, but with the ontological problem, and with those solu-
tions which Realism finds for this problem.
II. realism's solution of the ontological problem
This problem has to do, as we have seen,^ with the question
as to what is the ultimate nature of reality. Is it one both in
kind and number, and, if so, what is this kind; or, is it
many in number while yet one in hind; or is it many
both in kind and number f The answer "yes" to the first ques-
tion gives qualitative and numerical monism ; to the second,
qualitative monism and numerical pluralism ; to the third, both
qualitative and numerical pluralism. Modern transcendental
Idealism, as the doctrine that everything is One Spirit or Con-
sciousness, is an example of the first position ; atomistic Ma-
terialism and Berkeleian Idealism are examples of the second;
and Realism is an example of the third.
Each of these solutions, however, is an answer to a question
that is directed to the universe, and that concerns, therefore, all
the entities of the universe. Nothing can escape this inclusion,
no matter what it may be. The problem raises the question,
therefore, as to whether certain entities really are what they
seem to be, and whether they may not be reduced either to one
kind or to one entity, or to both one kind and one entity.
With the problem thus stated, it is illuminative to remind
ourselves of some of the types of entities that are contained
within this universe, and that, if there is to be a reduction, must
be reduced, either to a qualitative, or to a numerical One, or
to an entity that is both qualitatively and numerically one.
For, that everything must be considered and inchide<\ is made
clear by the fact, that were even one entity omitted, it might
prove refractory to that reduction to which all other entities may
submit themselves, with the result that monism would be im-
"Cf. Clwp V.
THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM 433
possible, and a dualism or a pluralism of some sort would be
the ontology that we would have to accept.
The difficulty of the task that thus lies before the philosopher
who would reduce all "things" to One, either in quality or in
number, is made impressive by a survey of even a small part
of the entities that must suffer such a fate — if this fate be
theirs to suffer. But by this survey there becomes evident, also,
the delicacy of the task of discovering the relations and the
systems of entities of the universe, whether they are "reducible"
or not. For, if they are reducible, the problem of their rela-
tionship as appearances still persists, while, if they are not
reducible, the same problem stands in respect to their "face
value. ' '
Among the most interesting entities that must be thrown into
that total which is the universe, and for which place must be
found, is error.^ For within the universe error is; it is a fact
of some kind. Therefore, if one is a "reductionist" and a
monist, and his opponent is not, then must either the error of
the latter find its niche in the monistic Hall of Fame, or the
error of the former must be distinct and different from the
truth of the latter 's position and find its place in the Eogues'
Gallery of pluralism.
But there is not alone error and truth. There are also words,
and judgments, and attempts to know ; proofs, refutations, agree-
ments, disagreements, convictions, beliefs, hj^potheses, "things"
to know, states of affairs, etc., etc. These are all "somethings"
— although whether they are real or unreal, true or false, actual
or possible, possible or impossible, may be difficult to ascertain.
But at least they are entities of some kind that must in some
manner be recognized in any attempt to reduce everything to
One.
But in addition to judgments, to the attempts to know, and
the like, there are also dijficiilties, and alternative ways of solv-
ing philosophical problems. Also, there are other human beings
whom we would oppose or convince. And there are systems, —
not one, but many, — and postulates and assumptions. Then, too,
there is society, and custom and tradition, and hopes and de-
sires, and, also, the influences of all these on that which some
• Cf. Chaps. X., XLI., xx.
434 REALISM
of us believe or hold to be true. This leads us to recognize that
there are discoveries and inventions, works of art and mechan-
ical constructions, "things good" and "things evil," opinions
and points of view. All of these are facts in some seyise and have
to he taken account of in any system of philosophy that deals
with the universe. Systems of philosophy other than our own
may be mere errors or inventions, but even then they are some
kind of fact or occurrence within the universe, so that our
system is not innocent of their guilt.
But just as there are many philosophical systems, so also
there are science and religion and logic, and different "positions"
within these. All the entities which have appeared in these
developments have some sort of status, either of error, or of in-
vention, or of discovery. In a monistic system all these must
be reduced, while in a pluralistic system their reduction is
found impossible and they all exist or subsist, although, perhaps,
at different places and times, or in other different universes of
discourse.
Science and logic have given us an almost inexhaustible list
of entities only the most important of which can be indicated.
For example, there are simple and complex, real and unreal,
existent and subsistent, inorganic and organic, physical and
mental entities; there are individuals, classes and series, things,
events, qualities and relations; there are continuity and dis-
continuity, infinity, finiteness, and endlessness ; numbers, space
and spaces, and time; dimensions, correspondences, variables
and constants ; intensity, extensity, quantity, magnitude and
measurement ; unity and plurality, fields and domains, universes
of discourse, the positive and the negative, conditions, connec-
tions and meanings. And one cannot neglect consciousness,
sensations, judgments, reason, emotions, instincts, behavior, sat-
isfaction, illusions, electrons, atoms, molecules, particles, forces,
energies, directions, laws. Formidable also is the field of rela-
tions in its resistance 1o the effort to reduce all "things" to
One, for in some sense there are the relations of identity, simi-
larity and difference, inclusion, exclusion and contradiction,
cause and function, dependence and independence, implication
and consistency, whole and part, logical priority, symmetry and
asymmetry, and transitivity and its lack.
THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM 435
Finally, for religion and art, there are goodness and beauty,
evil and ugliness, worth and its opposite ; divinity, the super-
natural, creation, emanation, immanence and transcendence,
heaven and hell, God and immortality, death and salvation.
Be these errors or truths, inventions or discoveries, they must
find their place in The One, if there be One, or must resist
reduction, if there be Many.
This rather long list of entities that in some sense are facts
is merely illustrative of the tremendous manifold of "things"
which make up the totality of the universe, and which must he
reduced in some manner, if Monism is to succeed.
Yet there are those that are not without hope in this task,
as we have already seen, though, in the opinion of the writer,
this hope is not realized. All attempts to ground a Monism
in solution of the ontological problem fail, because they are all
attempts which are based solely on an argument, from specific
postulates, that becomes self-contradictory at a certain points
And a One that is single numerically and qualitatively is not
discovered empirically.
The realist, therefore, can accept no one quality or substance,
no one "stuff," either mind or matter, or some unknown or
unknowable underlying entity, to which all other entities are
reducible, and which they ultimately are, or of which they are
manifestations. Rather, for him, there are kinds that are irre-
ducibly different, and there is an irreducible plurality of these
kinds.^
In accepting this pluralistic ontology the realist and the
modern rationalist do not, however, deny that the numerically
distinct and qualitatively different entities of the universe are
related. Indeed it may be that there are no two entities that
are not related in one or more ways. But it is found that mere
r elatedness does not carry with it either the (causal) dependence
of term on term, or the necessity of an underlying reality to
mediate any relation. Were there such a dependence, and were
it causal, then each related term would partake of the nature
of all the others, all terms would fuse, there would be not many
terms, but One, and this One would be homogeneous in ehar-
* Chaps. XXVI., II., 3, XXXIV., XXXV., and XXXVIII.
» Cf. Chap. XLIV., II.
436 REALISM
acter. Qualitative and numerical monism could thus be in-
ferred, if it could be shown that, because all terms are related,
they causally affect one another. But this is precisely what
empirical evidence refutes, since, as we have previously dis-
covered, there are undeniable instances of external and func-
tional relations, i.e., of terms related and yet independent. Also,
a monistic ontology could be established provided it were an
empirical fact of either sense or reason that an underlying
reality mediates the relation between terms.
Other systems that are monistic ontologies in one way or
another have also been found not to stand the test of criticism.
Chief among these are Subjectivism, Positivism, Materialism,
Psychism, and the mystical Evolutionism of some modern phi-
losophers. All these positions collapse when put to the test of
a critical method whose principles are presupposed as valid by
each of the systems in question.^
For our acceptance, then, there remains only an ontological
pluralism, provided that no empirical evidence, as distinct from
the artificial character of the above mentioned systems, can be
found against this. And none can. No all-inclusive, all-entity-
constituting Being, One in kind and number, is empirically dis-
covered; neither is an entity that is one in kind, hut many in
number, nor is an entity that is many in kind, but one in num-
ber. Indeed there is not even one principle, one proposition, or
one state of affairs, implying all others, that is empirically dis-
coverable, i.e., there is no logical monism.'' Implication is found
to be a relation that is widespread in its subsistence, but it is
not universal. For even as terms are related without being
causally dependent, so are some propositions related without
there being implication between them.
One may conclude, therefore, that, from the proposition that
the entities of the universe form a system, no more unity can be
deduced {as present in the universe) than that there is a system
of individuals, classes, series, and the like, that subsist side by
side "at" some kind of loci, are merely consistent with one
another, and do not imply one another. In other words, from
the relatedness of the entities of the universe, one can no more
• Bee the criticism of these positions in Chaps. XXIX to XXXIII.
' Cf. Chaps. XXXIV.-XXXVIII.
THE ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM 437
conclude to the universality of the implicative relation, than
one can to that of the causal relation, or to the subsistence of
one underlying, all-relation-mediating entity. By empirical
means one cannot go beyond the specific type of relation that is
found in each case. And relations that are neither implicative
nor causal are found a-plenty.
To accept this empirical method and the specificity of rela-
tions thereby discovered is the procedure of Eealism and of
Rationalism. But it is a procedure that leads to the con-
clusion, that Monism of any kind can be grounded only arti-
ficially, and that a Pluralism of many entities, of many kinds,
in many different relations, at many different loci is the only
ontology which stands the test of empirical investigation. Such
an ontology is, however, also a Cosmology. For a universe of
entities that are related in any way is a cosmos. It is, then, to
the task of presenting a realistic and rationalistic cosmology
that we now devote ourselves, with an apology for the very
evident insufficiency of our statement in the light of the great
wealth of material that is at hand.
CHAPTER XLIII
THE REALISTIC SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL
PROBLEM 1
I. NORMAL OBJECTS, II. ERROR, AND III. THE NATURE
CONSCIOUSNESS
The solution which Realism and Rationalism give to the
cosmological problem extends far beyond the answers given to
the questions. Whether law and order are discovered, invented,
or projected into reality? Whether everything is change and
evolution, or there is some rest and permanence? Whether
there is chance and novelty, or only absolute and complete
^Cf. Chap. VI.
488 REALISM
determinism, and eternally old "things"? Kealism answers
these questions, but also does much more. Pluralistic in its
ontology, it arrives also at a broad cosmology in which the
solutions of other philosophical problems are an integral part.
There is little need to restate that Realism maintains that
terms, relations, laws, principles, regularities, order, classes, and
series are discovered, and not invented. Known entity and
knowing process, whatever its further nature hiay be, are found
empirically to be related externally and functionally, so that
there is no empirical reason for transforming, as do all opposed
systems, those relations and entities that are known. System
is found to be as compatible with the lack of universal implica-
tion and causation as it is with them, and the subsistence of
relations not to be identical with the dependence of related
terms, nor mandatory of further transcendent and mediating
entities. Realism thus takes "things" as it empirically finds
them. In this empiricism Realism accepts analysis as one means
of discovering fact, and finds that reason is free to follow the
outline-threads of implication, whereby states of affairs as well
as particular objects become known. Such an empiricism is,
indeed, guaranteed by every philosophical system — even by
those that attempt to insist on contrary doctrines. Relying on
this guarantee. Realism proceeds to the winning of its view of
the detailed nature of the universe — which is that totality of
"things" in which everything must find its place.
Some of the most important entities and principles that are
recognized and used by Realism in building up this detailed
position are: (1) relations ^nd-. organization (not the same as
organic), especially the relations of similarity and difference,
inclusion, "member of," asymmetry, transitivity, correlation,
logical priority, and independence as a very special type that is
distinct from causation; (2) the methods of knowing by type
and of analyzing in situ. The most important general hy-
potheses are those in which the ubiquitous application of the
concepts of substance and cause is looked at askance, and con-
tradiction is robbed of its terrors. And important among special^
problems are those of error and of the nature of consciousness.
These two problems hang together most intimately, and ac-
cording as one solution or another is obtained for them, one
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 439
is forced to accept specific solutions of certain other problems.
Conversely, if one solve other problems first, the solutions thus
obtained (may) have a most important bearing on the solution
of this twofold problem.
In elucidation of the statements it may be said, that, through-
out the greater part of the historical development of philosophy
consciousness has been regarded as a kind of thing, substance,
medium, or menstruum,^ and accordingly, that the problem of
error has been solved by putting all errors entirely into this
conscious medium, thus to make their esse their percipi or
concipi. This is the solution which is made, e.g., of the specific
problem as to the status of the dreamt "falling from a roof,"
of the seen convergence of the parallel rails, and of the apparent
bentness of the straight stick in the water. Thus, in the case
of the last example, it is argued that the stick cannot be hoth
straight and not straight (bent), since these are contradictories;
therefore, to avoid the contradiction, the straight stick only is
accepted as real, while the locus of the bentness is placed in
consciousness.^ For consciousness, conceived of as a substance
or medium, is indeed a sort of receptacle in which all entities
that are not objective can (seemingly) be placed. Historically,
therefore, it has been the concept of substance that, as applied
to consciousness, has conditioned a certain specific solution of
the problem of error. And with all error-objects regarded as
subjective, the next step to Subjectivism has been easy, namely,
to conclude that all objects are in their esse identical with their
percipi or with their coiicipi.^
' Cf. Chap. III.
' Cf. as a typical example of this argument the articles by A. 0.
Lovejoy: "Reflections of a Temporalist on the New Realism," Jour, of
Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. VIII., pp. 589-590; "Secondary
Qualities and Subjectivity," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods,
Vol. XL, p. 214 tf.; "Relativity, Reality, and Contradiction," Jour, of
Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. XI., p. 420 ff.; also see M. R.
Cohen's replies to Lovejoy: "The Supposed Contradiction in the Diversity
of Secondary Qualities," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods,
Vol. XL, pp. 510-512, and " Qualities, Relations, and Things," Jour, of
Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. XL, pp. 617-627; cf., also,
F. J. E. Woodbridge. " The Deception of the Senses," Jour, of Phil.,
Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. X., pp. 5-13, and A. 0. Lovejoy, " Some
Novelties of the New Realism," Jour, of Phil, Psych., and Scientific
Methods, Vol. X., pp. 29-43; also the Essays by Montague and Holt in
The New Realism, and Holt, The Concept of Consciousness, Chap. XIIL
* Cf. Chap. XXX.
440 REALISM
On the other hand, the independent investigation of error in
recent times has been held by some philosophers to lead to the
acceptance of such a view as to the nature of consciousness that
it must be regarded as a substance or medium. The argument
of these philosophers has been, again, that contradictory char-
acteristics cannot coexist, and that accordingly the locus of
apparent "things" can only be in consciousness. Or the argu-
ment has been, that dreamt, imagined, remembered, and con-
ceived objects do not exist, and therefore cannot be efficient in
producing a consciousness of them, so that consciousness itself
must produce them.^
The first of these arguments fails to convince, since it ignores
other possihilities as to the locus of the apparent object, — e.g.,
in the case of the bentness of the stick, the complex, stick, water,
and light. And the second argument also fails, because it
neglects certain efficiencies, which, though not causal, are never-
theless real.^ If these efficiencies are considered, then, e.g.,
dream-objects are as real as are existent ones, although they are
not realities of the same kind as are these last.
From this it is evident that a specific theory as to the nature
of consciousness leads to a specific solution of the problem of
error, and, conversely, that a specific solution of the problem
of error leads to a specific theory as to the nature of conscious-
ness. But it also thereby becomes evident, that another and
different specific theory as to consciousness should lead to a
different solution of error, and conversely, another and different
theory of error to a different view as to the nature of con-
sciousness. These suppositions are confirmed by that account
which Kealism and Rationalism give of both consciousness and
error. Consciousness is found not to be a substance, energy,
medium, or menstruum; error not to be subjective in its locus
and status.
One may start with either problem in order to establish these
conclusions. Thus, on the one hand, one may first ask the
question, What is that condition on which the genuine knowl-
edge of objects, as unmodified by the very act of knowing, is
possible? and then find in answer that this condition is, that
° Lovejoy's articles, cited in note 3, are typical ol this position.
"Cf. Chap. XLIV.
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 441
knowing and object should be externally, i.e., not causally
related.' But the further condition for such a non-causal rela-
tion is, that knowing and consciousness should not be of the
nature of a substance, after the historical model of a physical
thing with a substratum and inhering qualities.^ For, if con-
sciousness were such an entity, it would causally affect that to
which it is related, and so alter the entity to he known. There-
fore, if, as the very condition for there being genuine knowing,
consciousness cannot ie a suhstance, its capacity is lost for
holding or containing all dreamt, illusory, remembered, im-
agined, and conceived objects, after the manner of qualities
inhering in a substratum, and these objects must be in some
other locus.
On the other hand, if one first investigates errors or error-
objects in specific instances, he finds that there already is a
locus for them other than a substance-like consciousness. For
example, in the case of the bentness of the straight stick in
the water, this locus is the complex, stick, water, and light,
while in the instance of the parallel rails it is the complex, rails
and light.^ The substitution of a camera for a perceiving
organism establishes this in both instances.
For all other cases of objects that are illusory or hallucinatory,
remembered or imagined, hypothetical or abstract in general,
a very similar solution can be found. The "force" that his-
torically and traditionally is used to "drive" all such objects
into a receptacle-like consciousness, — already modeled after the
analogy of a physical thing — and that makes of this a sub-
stance, springs either (1) from the necessity of avoiding a
specific contradiction or (2) from regarding only normal
physical objects as possessing efficiency.
However, these two difficulties are avoided, and other possi-
bilities are opened up by bearing in mind the true nature of
contradiction. This is, as we have seen, exclusion}^ Exclusion
is a real fact in the universe. But what features of the universe
are exclusive of one another is to be ascertained only by eni-
^ Cf. the criticisms of opposed theories in Chaps. XXIX.-XXXVIII.,
also in Chaps. I., II., and III.
« Cf. Chap. III.
• Cf . Chaps. X., XI., XL., n., XLI., xx.
^° Chap. XVI.
44S REALISM
pirical investigation. A priori, solidity and color might be
thought to exclude each other from coexisting in the same place
at the same time, but empirically they are found to coexist.
Blue and red, however, are found to exclude each other under
such conditions. If entities are mutually exclusive, they must
subsist in different loci, though it is for empirical investigation
to find out what these loci are. They may be spatial, temporal,
or logical. If entities do not have excluding characteristics,
they may cosubsist at the same locus, whatever this may be.
Thus the ghost that is imagined to be stalking in a room is
really there, though as a non-existing reality. Some place in
the cosmos must certainly be found for it, and if this locus is
not consciousness, it can be space, although the ghost does not
belong to the universe of discourse of existent objects. Once
relieved from the necessity of identifying the locus of all such
entities with consciousness, one is free to find other loci.
And, conversely, one is freed from the hypothesis that con-
sciousness is a substance, by this very possibility of putting
error-objects into some other locus than consciousness.
Analogously, by realizing that entities other than physical
objects have efficiency, and that causation is not the only in-
stance or kind of efficiency, one is relieved from concluding that,
e.g., objects that are remembered and yet no longer exist, are
factual only in a receptacle-like consciousness. Within the
cosmos past time is a reality in some sense, quite as much as
are the future and the "specious" present, and past (physical)
occurrences and objects are also real, though perhaps not as
existing. Yet as real they are efficient, though not causally so —
which they need not be. And as efficient in a non-causal sense,
they account in part for the consciousness of them, — when the
demand is made that this consciousness be accounted for. In
this way one reaches the conclusion, that, e.g., though the red
mittens of his boyhood have long since disappeared into mere
nothingness, still they need not subsist in his consciousness when
he remembers them, but are quite as well oft" with an efficient
subsistence in a time, which, though past, is nevertheless real.
This solution of the twofold problem of error and of the
nature of consciousness, namely (1) that error-objects are not
subjective (conscious) in their locus and character, and (2)
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 413
that consciousness is not a substance, may itself he ohtained
either before other cosmological problems are solved, or after.
In either case, however, the solutions obtained for some problems
are helpful as regards others. There may be a psychological
influence of one procedure on another in solving problems, but,
unless the states of affairs, the entities investigated, are de-
pendent in such a vs^ay as mutually to constitute one another,
one is free both logically and psychologically to begin with
almost any problem. But that there is an independeiice among
states of affairs and universes of discourse, and the like, has
already been shown to be a fact. We are free, therefore, to
solve other cosmological problems in the light of our solution
of the twofold problem of error and the nature of consciousness,
or conversely. But our realistic cosmology must be such as to
include the solution of these problems, since they concern
entities that have some "place" in that totality which is the
universe.
In deriving this detailed realistic cosmology, one should con-
tinually bear in mind the great manifold of entities both in
kind and number that are "somewhere" in the universe. But
one also should not forget that there is not more order in the
universe than there actually is, and that the universe as the
totality of entities is quite compatible with a bare minimum of
relationships, namely, with the merely additive relation ex-
pressed by "and," and with the relations of similarity and dif-
ference. If the presence of only these relations means that the
universe is a Chaos, and not a Cosmos, then Chaos it is. In
fact, certain philosophies, notably Humanism, accept this possi-
bility, and endeavor to make not only the three relations just
mentioned, but also all others, merely human inventions that are
"read into" the universe, but that are not of it. However,
Humanism always neglects to inquire if some order, and, there-
fore, some cosmology is not already presupposed in the very
possibility of these inventions as human institutions.^^
The realist, however, basing his position on rationalism, finds
that there are a great many other relations than those just men-
tioned, and that all relations are objective to the knowing con-
sciousness, and not resident in it.^^
" Chap. XXXIII., V. and vi. " Cf. Chap. II.
444 REALISM
rv. COMPLEX ENTITIES; V. CREATIVE SYNTHESIS; VI. FREEDOM
The physical universe is accepted by Realism essentially as
it is portrayed by the physical sciences, notably astronomy,
physics, chemistry and physical chemistry, physiology, and
biology. "Fundamental" realities other than those which, such
as electrons, are discovered by these sciences, are not accepted,
i.e., the physical universe is not regarded as transformable into,
e.g., One Underlying Spirit, of which all else is manifestation.^^
Yet Realism criticizes these sciences, or, rather, the scientist
who pursues them, when he becomes short-sighted and dogmatic,
and identifies the story which these sciences tell with the whole
story that is to be told. Such dogmatism leads to Naturalism.^*
There is much else in the universe besides those entities that are
studied by the natural sciences.^^
Further, Realism does not consider or regard the physical
sciences to be either entirely correct, or complete. The scientist
makes errors, taking that to be existent which may not be, and
making only approximations in most, if not in all cases. But
there is nothing inherent in this situation either to prevent
errors from being eradicated, and from having their own nature
revealed, or to preclude existent entities from being discovered,
and ever closer approximations made. Also, many entities and
many kinds of entities may be still unknown, but there is nothing
in the knowing situation to make them essentially unknowable. ^'^
Contradictions exist or suhsLst in the realm of the physical
sciences in the sense in which contradiction has been defined, ^'^
but there are no se?/-contradictions, and no contradictions that
cannot be resolved. For example, there are contradictory the-
ories, of course; but this situation can be solved by showing
that the entities denoted by one theory are not in the same locus
or universe of discourse as are those denoted by another,^** and,
therefore, cosubsist. Thus the entities of one theory may be
existents, those of another, non-existent subsistents, such as,
e.g., is the "hypothetical" perpetual motion machine of
" Cf. Chaps. XXXIV.-XXXVIII.
'' Chaps. XXXll., I., II.. and in.
" Cf.. e.g.. Chaps. XL, XXL, XXII., XXV., XXVII., XLV.
'" Chap. XLl., XX.
" Chap. XVI.
"• Cf. Chap. XVI.
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 445
mechanics. For such a machine is a rationally consistent reality.
Likewise each instance of a seemingly damaging and always
formally expressible contradiction in the realm of existent
physical entities, as, e.g., the parallel rails and their apparent
convergence (non-parallel), this red and that blue and that
solidity (both not-red) , can always be solved by finding a dif-
ferent spatial locus, if the entities exclude one another, or a
common locus, if it is a fact that they coexist.
Within this physical universe one finds innumerable instances
of such relations as cause and effect, function, independence,
logical priority, and whole and part, whereby there is organiza-
tion — though in every instance of a specific kind. Accordingly
one finds different types of wholes, of parts, of unities, and of
individuals.^^ Some of these types are not usually noticed by
the natural scientist, and may, therefore, be advantageously
brought to attention in the presentation of a realistic cosmology.
The physical sciences, together with common sense, accept the
existence of individual things, such as tables and books, batteries
and bombs, gas fumes and smoke, though there may not be
agreement as to the definition of a thing, and, therefore, dif-
ficulty in some eases in determining whether "something" is
a thing or not — as, e.g., a current of electricity. But Avithin
that realm in which there is agreement as to what entities are
things, it is recognized that things move and also undergo a
change in quality, and therefore that also there are relations of
causation, and of similarity and difference. But as both similar
and different, things form classes in respect to specific qualities
and characteristics,-" Thus, e.g., there are some beings that
reproduce their kind, are sensitive and respond to stimuli, and
some that do not; and in turn among these beings there are
those that have a nervous system consisting of a brain and
spinal cord, and those that have not. But also, as somewhat
different from these classificatory characters, there are the
electrical, magnetic, thermic, osmotic, chemical, and other
forces that are present in individual physical things, or of which
a particular physical thing is a complex, and in respect to these
characteristics there are also classes. The class in each such
instance is composed of individuals; yet in the midst of the
" Chap. XXVII. '" Cf. Chap. XIII.
446 REALISM
individuality there is a specific similarity, which is the fact of
otie state of affairs for all individuals. This fact, however, is
not identical with any one individual of the class, nor with
the whole group of individuals that make up the class. It is,
rather, "over and above' both individual and group, and may
be called the "objective concept," the knowledge of which is
the subjective concept. States of affairs of this kind hold of the
individuals of all classes, being, in respect to the individuals of
which they hold, inclusive of some, and exclusive of other indi-
viduals, while they may also, as specific states of affairs, them-
selves be members of other classes. Generic facts of this kind
are tacitly recognized, though they are not explicitly formulated
by the physical sciences.
More interesting, however, than these — to the logician — very
trite matters are certain other facts that also are not usually
recognized by the scientist. Certain individual objects, e.g.,
those individuals that go by such names as protozoa, porifera,
and coelenterates, are groups of certain specific biological attri-
butes that are organized' by one or more relations, and that co-
exist in the same place at the same time. But in addition to
the biological properties of these individuals, there are other.
parts, and the attributes of these parts. Thus, e.g., some of the
parts of an amoeba are (1) molecules in colloidal solution, (2)
atoms, and, if modern physics is correct, (3) electrons. Yet
each of these is also a whole as well as a part; in one relation
it is the former, in another, the latter.
In a similar manner any organism is iXHeU.many "things"
at the same time. It is both one and fnawjl; also, both organism
and physiccd object. As an organism it is one and is related to
other organisms in many ways, while as a physical and chemical
object it is subject to gravitation, to thermic and electric forces,
and is a complex, perhaps, indeed, finally an organized group
of a tremendous number of electrons. The fact that it is organ-
ized does not, however, make it organic, for many organized
entities are not organic. Thus, atoms are organized into a
molecule, but the latter is not organic. The organic character
of the organism is identical, rather, with those specific attributes
which appear as a result of its specific organization.
An organism is each one of all these "things" and attributes
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 44,7
by virtue of being an organized whole, or a relational complex.
But it could be a moving body and a chemical complex without
being a living being. Therefore some of the "things" or quali-
ties which an organism is by virtue of the organization of cer-
tain parts, such as colloidal particles, molecules, and atoms,
are 7iot necessitated, implied, or caused by, though they are
compatible with, such parts.
The situation just described as holding for any organism is
one that is found to be repeated for all complex and organized
individuals, living and non-living, plant and animal, in the
physical world, additive wholes alone being the exception. In-
deed it is a situation that is also found in the mental realm, and
in that field which is neither physical nor mental, yet factual,
namely, the field of subsistents. Certain further and important
aspects of this situation should now be mentioned.
In the physical world (and elsewhere) it is an established
empirical fact, that parts as non-additively organized form a
whole which has characterictics that are qualitatively different
from the characteristics of the parts. A simple and familiar
illustration of this is the formation of water out of hydrogen
and oxygen. The relation between hydrogen and oxygen is
7iot additive, but organizing, and the characteristics of the
water are not the same as are those of its chemical components.
Also, the appearance of these 7iew characteristics (of the whole)
is not nullified by the hypothesis that they are potential in the
parts in any sense ; for, even if it be granted that this hypothesis
does anything more than conceal our ignorance, it but repeats
the problem in the form of the question as to Jiow the existential
appears out of the qualitatively different potential. On the
other hand, if the hypothesis, that there are non-additive rela-
tions, is accepted as an empirically established principle from
which deductions concerning specific instances can be made,
then one can understand in just this sense the specific de novo
appearance of certain qualities. "Things" added give merely
a total of the same qualities as the parts have. For example,
one atom of carbon plus another, plus a third, are three times
one atom in respect to all qualities that one atom has. But
three atoms of any kind organized chemically, i.e., related nan-
additively, are a molecule, even as H H organized are water,
448 REALISM
and the resulting whole has characteristics different from those
of the parts.
This process of the formation of new qualities through the
organization of parts into wholes may be called creative syn-
thesis. Just as in the case of classes, in which individuals are
organized by the relation of similarity, the state of affairs of
a specific similarity is itself unitary and not many, and is dis-
tinct both from each individual of the class, and from the class
as a whole, so in other organized wholes a similar situation
is found.-^ Certain specific relations, recognized, named, and
technically formulated in special sciences, organize parts into
wholes, and there are states of affairs resulting that are identical
with new properties, and that are different and distinct from
the individual parts and their properties. Therefore the reduc-
tion of these new properties to those of the parts in the sense of
identification, and the finding of a causal determination also
in this same sense is impossible. The properties of the whole
are, at least some of them, new, and in just this respect are a
''law unto themselves" and in this sense free. This does not
mean that they are lawless, but only that their specific prin-
ciples of "behavior" are not identical with those of the parts.
Such a situation, however, presents certain interesting and
important instances of principles that have been emphasized
throughout this volume. An individual, defined as the sub-
sistence and perhaps coexistence of several qualities, attributes,
or characteristics in the same locus, is m- ny "things" at once,
which, however, are not all causal derivj: lives of one another.
Thus, e.g., an organism is a biological individual, with specific
characteristics that follow biological laws; but it is also a
physical complex of forces that follows the laws of physics, and
a chemical complex of entities that follows the laws of chemistry.
For each biological quality and its changes there are correspond-
ing purely physical and chemical qualities and changes, hut this
relation of correspondence is not causal. Rather, it is func-
tional. The physical and chemical changes could take place
without there being a biological individual. Therefore, it is
their organization by specific organizing relations that "gives"
the organism and the qualities that arc peculiar to it.^^ And
*'Cf. Chap. XXVIl. "' Cf. lialdwiii, Divelopmfnt and Evolution.
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 449
the situation is quite the same as regards inorganic physical
bodies and their chemical constituents. In both cases constit-
uent parts may come and go, hut the organization remains;
the latter is more permanent than the residence in it of the
''material" parts.
At or within each level of phenomena that thus results from
the organization of parts into a whole causal relations exist, and
individuals are found to resemble one another in respect to
these relations. Accordingly empirical causal laws are discov-
erable. Thus, e.g., the entrance of the nucleus of the sperma-
tozoon into the ovum is said to cause cell division. But this
empirical fact, at this level, is neither supplanted by, nor
incompatible with, nor deducible from, the further facts, that
both spermatozoon and ovum are physical bodies and complexes
of chemical compounds, and follow physical and chemical
laws.
From facts of this kind there is derivable an interesting ^
definition of freedom that may best be indicated by first em-
ploying it, to the effect, that at each level or stratum of reality
formed by the non-additive organization of parts into a whole,
qualities or phenomena are free to act in accordance loith their
own nature and their own causal connections iviih other quali-
ties of this level, for the absence of these qualities at other and
"lower" levels is the absence of the occasion either for deter-
mination {or its lack) in respect to these qualities. No higher
level violates the laws of those lower levels which, in individual
instances, are organized in the higher level as its constituent
parts; but also no loiver level causally determines any higher
level. Accordingly there is the interesting and, for the solution
of many a moot question in both philosophy and science, im-
portant principle, that as between any ttvo levels there is (1) no ,
occasion for conflict, but only opportunity for compatibility ; I
yet (2) no possibility of derivation and deduction of higher
levels from lower, and therefore (3) no complete identity of ,
higher levels with lower, so that (4) all levels that are higher |
in relation to others as lower are primarily discoverable and
ascertainable only by inductive and empirical investigation,
although (5) once discovered, the compatibility and correlation
of higher levels with lower is also determinable, so that (6) sub- \
450 REALISM
sequently computations in terms of lower levels may be made
as the means of control and prediction of higher levels, even as
this is done, as a matter of fact, in the instance of every cor-
relation of independent (lower) and dependent variable (higher
level). This principle is illustrated by the fact that in all those
instances in which, by means of the most exact and precise
analysis and measurement, a correlation of all higher levels with
that level which is lowest and most fundamental has been estab-
lished, namely, with the number series, this series is used as
a means of computation and prediction and the like. But this
fact does not mean, certainly, the complete identity of all higher
levels with number.
Freedom consists, therefore, of action in accordance with those
characteristics which subsist at a certain level of organization,
but do not exist at other (lower) levels, yet is quite compatible
with law and determination both at this higher level and at
lower levels. Freedom of this kind subsists at each level of
reality in the universe, not only in the mental, but also all
through the physical and the merely subsistent realms.
An example of this phase of realistic and rationalistic cos-
mology will help both to make our discussion clear, and to
present considerations of very practical bearing.
A human being is, like other living beings, at one and the
same time a biological individual, a complex of chemical com-
pounds, and a physical object. Even that which distinguishes
him as human from other living beings is his pecidiar biological,
physical, and chemical organization. But a human being is also
an ethical and a reasoning being. However, neither his ethical
nor his rational nature conflicts with his biological, his phj^sical,
or his chemical characteristics, since, by virtue of the former
he is something more than — he is over and above — the latter.
The particular ethical and rational characteristics presuppose
the particular biological, physical, and chemical characteristics
embodied in any one human individual, but they cannot be
derived from or identified with these latter, though, once dis-
covered, they can in some way be correlated with them. But
from this there follows the conclusion — of the gravest impor-
tance for the world in the present world-conflict of standards —
that ethics is not a iranch of biology, even as biology is not a
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 451
branch of chemistry and physics, and also that conscience, will,
and reason, although not undetermined and lawless, are never-
theless free — free, however, in the very specific sense of being
realities in a realm from which causation is absent, hut in which
the ideals of right and justice and truth are present as ef-
ficiencies, thus to lead men to 'act as they ought to act, and
to reason as the implicative structure of reality dictates, and
not as tradition and custom and authority would have them
reason.
VII. AND Vm. SPACE AND TIME AS PART OP THE COSMOS
INFINITY AND CONTINUITY ^^
The cosmological principles thus far discovered are further
exemplified by such entities as space and time in contrast with
their constituent parts, and by the relation of the physical
world to these two entities.
It is a commonplace, of course, to remark, that the physical
world is spatial (and temporal), but just what this means, as
a proposition, is anything but a matter of common knowledge.
Accordingly a determination of the more exact and precise
meaning of this statement will be attempted, as an essential part
of our outline of realistic cosmology.
Several meanings to the statement that the physical world is
spatial are distinguishable, as, e.g., that physical objects (1) are
spatially extended, or, (2) as extended, exist in space, or (3)
have the same characteristics as space, or (4) presuppose space.
The latter meaning is, however, most important, since the former
three either reduce to, or depend upon this specific relation of
presupposition. Therefore, with the characteristics of this rela-
tion determined, the former meanings can be made clear, pro-
vided the nature of space itself is first explained.
Physical objects presuppose space in the sense, that they could
not exist were space not a reality, but that space would be a
reality without them. Briefiy, space is logically prior to physical
objects. Physical objects depend on space, but are not caused
by space ; they do not constitute space, and space does not depend
^''Cf. this presentation with Chaps. I., XXL, XXII., XXIII., XXIV.,
and XXVU.
452 REALISM
on them, yet space constitutes them in part, and conditions them,
though not causally.
Space, like time, is an organized whole or relational complex,
that consists of several kinds of parts, and that has various
characteristics. It consists of dimensions, such as lines, planes,
and volumes, in specific relations to one another, and also of
points. Also, any finite space consists of smaller spaces; i.e.,
lines, as finite, consist of smaller lines, planes, of smaller planes,
and volumes, of smaller volumes. These several kinds of parts,
as organized in specific instances by certain specific relations,
form ivJioles; for space is not the merely additive result of its
parts, but is a non-additive whole. Indeed, this is the secret of
the fact (1) that points, defined as the unextended elements of
space, form extension of one dimension, as it is also of the facts,
(2) that lines form a plane, and (3) planes, a three-dimensional
manifold or volume. In space, then, there are embodied specific
organizing relations. These relations are asymmetrical and
transitive, and are similar to the relations of "ancestor of"
and "greater than." Thus, e.g., since the relation "ancestor
of" is not identical with its inverse, "descendant of," it is asym-
metrical, and also, since if A is ancestor of B and B is ancestor
of 0, A is ancestor of C, it is transitive.
But extension as a whole, e.g., any specific extension, is dis-
tinct from both the parts and their relations. Thus a finite
line 'consists of both smaller lines and points; a plane, of both
smaller planes and lines; and a volume, of smaller volumes,
planes, and points. But while the parts (of each kind) and
the relations are individuals, and therefore many, and each be-
longs to a specific type, the whole that results from the organ-
ization of the parts is one, although it has, or, more precisely,
is properties that are different both from the organizing rela-
tions and from certain kinds of parts, if not from others. For
example, a finite line and the smaller lines that are its parts
are of one type, for both are extensions; but the other type of
parts, namely, the points, lack this specific characteristic.
In respect to each of the several different kinds of parts, the
whole that "results" from their organizaiion may have dif-
ferent and distinct characteristics. Thus, e.g., in respect to
smaller finite lines as parts, a line is finite, or, if the parts are
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 453
very small relatively {as units of measurement), endless (which
means, 7iot ivithout end, but only not yet ended or measured) ;
yet, in respect to points the line is also infinite. But since the
line is made up both of smaller lines and of larger ones, and
also of points, it is "at one and the same time ^'endless, finite,
and infinite. These are quite consistent characteristics, since
they concern different phases or aspects of the line, and belong
in different universes of discourse. The line itself, however,
is that unitary entity which is the organization of these
** phases," and of the parts which "condition" them.
The infinity of, e.g., a line consists in the fact that there are
as many points in any finite part as there are in the whole. How
many points, one cannot say, i.e., one cannot count them, or
designate them by any finite number, but one can say "as
many," if not "how many," This definition of infinity is, evi-
dently, in terms of the relation of one-one correspondence be-
tween the points of the whole line and those of any of its proper
parts (smaller lines). It is a definition whose "principle,"
however, allows us also to define a cardinal number as the "class
of all classes that are in one-one correspondence." Thus, e.g.,
in the case of the soldiers of the regiment to whom guns are
assigned, one gun per man, two classes, men and guns, agree in
one characteristic, namely, their cardinal number, N, so that
this is a class of those two classes.-^
This definition of cardinal number clearly makes no distinc-
tion between finite and infinite numbers. However, such a dis-
tinction is made by the definition, that an infinite number is
that class of two classes one of which is a proper part of the
other, as, e.g., the even integers (as well as the odd) are a
proper part of the series of doth odd and even integers. It then
follows that a finite number is one that is not infinite. That
specific state of affairs which is infinity does not hold, there-
fore, of a line in reference to the smaller lines that are its
constituents, for clearly, in reference to these, there are more
constituents in the whole than in any proper part. But, in
reference to points, there is a one-one correspondence between
whole and proper part. It must be, therefore, that points have
'* This is Mr. Russell's definition of cardinal number, which seems to
be accepted by the majority of mathematicians, if not by all.
454 REALISM
no size, no extension, and that they themselves, as individuals,
are neither infinite, finite, nor endless. We may conclude, then,
that these last characteristics result from the organization of
points, and belong to the line as a whole, but not to the points
or to the organizing relations.
If, now, instants, lines, and planes are organized by asym-
metrical transitive relations, we have, respectively, time, planes,
and volumes, as the resulting wholes. Yet of each of these dif-
ferent types of whole, essentially the same propositions hold
that have just been stated as holding for lines. Thus, e.g., time
(all time) is a one dimensional series of instants, related asym-
metrically and transitively, and without beginning and end;
past time, however, ends with the present, as future time begins
with it, yet each is infinite. Any finite period of time, with
two ends, instead of one, is also infinite — in respect to instants ;
but it is finite in respect to smaller times, as opposed to instants,
although it is also endless if these smaller times are so small
that their enumeration is not ended. In a similar way a plane
is infinite in respect to lines, yet also both finite and endless
in respect to smaller planes; a volume, infinite in respect to
both planes and lines (and points), but finite and endless in
respect to smaller volumes.
But there are other characteristics of these wholes that must
also be briefly considered in order that our presentation may
be complete in certain essentials. These characteristics concern
continuity, discontinuity, and ''density." -^ First, it may be
remarked, that owing to the relative grossness of even the most
refined experimental methods, it is impossible to ascertain
whether the space and time of our perception are strictly con-
tinuous or only dense, if they are not, indeed, discontinuous.
The reason for this inability of experimentation is, that the
limits of those errors that are unavoidably incurred in meas-
urement are such as to include the differences between continu-
ous and dense, and perhaps, also, between co7itinuous and
discontinuous space and time.
The differences between these three characteristics or entities,
whichever one space, time, and, also, motion and change in gen-
eral may be, have been technically determined, with very great
^» Cf. Chaps. II., XXII., XXIII., XXIV., XXV.
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 455
precision and exactness, during the last fifty years, chiefly,
however, through the investigation of mimher.
26
IX. NUMBER
In the results thus obtained a cardinal numher is defined as
the number, N, of any two groups of objects, no matter what
their character, that are in one-one correspondence with each
other. A cardinal number is, therefore, the very mi7iimum of
resemblance between two specific groups in respect to their
manifoldness. The group of positive integers, or of natural
numbers, is the group of cardinal numbers, N's, that are thus
discovered. These integers in their natural order, i.e., the order
of magnitude, are a series.
This series may be defined as determined, generated, or or-
ganized by a relation, R, "less than," symbolized by <, that
is (1) "connected," (2) "irreflexive," (3) "transitive for
distinct elements," and (4) "asymmetrical for distinct ele-
ments,"" the two last properties being, perhaps, the most im-
portant ones to which to give our attention. In so far as the
relation < has these four properties, it satisfies respectively
three postulates and one theorem, namely,
"Postulate 1. If a and b are distinct elements of the class, K,
then either a <,b, or b <. a."
"Postulate 2. If a < b, then a and b are distinct.''
"Postulate 3. If a <b and b <. c, then a < c."
'"The presentation that follows is one the essential features of which
may be found in a number of recent treatises on the subject. Tlie best
presentation known to the writer is E. W. Hobson's Theory of Functions
of a Real Variable, 1907 ; other systematic presentations are those of
V\hitehead, Introduction to Mathematics; J. W. Young, Fundamental
Concepts of Algebra and Geometry, especially Chaps. VI. -XI; W. H. and
G. C. Young, Theory of Sets of Points, 1906; G. H. Hardy, Pure Mathe-
matics, 1908, especially Chap. I.; E. Cassirer, Substanzbegriff und Funk-
tionsbegriff, Chap. II. on Number and Chap. III. on Geometry.
Cf., also, as some of the more imi)ortant contributions in the develop-
ment of the modern theory of number, etc. : Bolzano, Paradoxien des
Vnendlichen, 1851 ; R. Dedekind, Stetigkeit und irrat. Zahlen, 1872, and
Was sind und tvas sollen die Zahlen, trans, by Beman as, Essays on
Number 1901; G. Cantor, Grundlagen einer algem. Mannigfaltigkcitslehre,
1883; G. Frege, Die Grundlagen d. Arithmetik, 1884; Russell, Principles
of Mathematics, and Scientific Method in Philosophy in various places;
Koyce, The Principles of Logic, loc. cit.j and E. V. Huntington, " The
Continuum as a Type of Order," Annals of Math., Vols. VI. and VII.,
1905, and The Continuum, 1917.
*'E. V. Huntington, The Continuum, 1917, p. 11, note.
456 REALISM
"Theorem I. If a < & is true, then 6 < a is false." ^*
These postulates can be demonstrated to be consistent and yet
independent.-''
A slight critical inspection of the class of all the natural
numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4 . . . n — 1, n,n -\-l (or the first n of them),
in their natural order, reveals the fact that this class is a series
in that it satisfies these three postulates and Theorem I., and is
generated by a relation which has the properties 1 — 4.
The negative numbers and may be dismissed with the state-
ment, that they are implied by the possibility of a certain
operation, substraction, such that, if a and h are any two nat-
ural numbers, a — b is a number. Evidently, if a <ib, then
6 — a is a positive integer, as, e.g., 3 — 2 = 1; but likewise, for
the operation, a — &, if a < &, there must be negative numbers,
as, e.g., 5 — 7 = — 2, and, in the special case of a = &,
a — & =: 0. In this series of negative and of positive integers
and zero, the asymmetrical and transitive relations above men-
tioned relate any three distinct numbers.
But there are not only natural numbers, such as we have just
examined, but there are also fractions. Fractions, however, are
of two kinds, rational and irrational. Rational fractions may
be defined in a number of ways, one definition being that they
are those numbers which are implied by a certain operation,
namely, division, provided this is not the same as repeated sub-
traction, or identical ivith an integer. Division is defined by
the operation -^ which is such that, if -j- be "taken" b times,
20
A }) = a. If, in a concrete case, this is, e.g., -„-, one can say
'
the result is the same as " taking 7 away twice," and
finding 6 as a remainder, and, in another concrete case, if we
have -=-, this =2. A rational fraction may, therefore, be
D
defined as such a number as is implied by a division that is not
reducible to either of the two cases thus exemplified. As exam-
ples that fulfil these conditions we may cite 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, 1/5.
As characteristic of these fractions it is found, that, if -r-
" Ibid., p. 10. " Jhid., Chap. II.
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 457
c
and —5- be any two such numbers, there is always a fraction
— 7~ _. — betiveen them. Thus, e.g., between 1/4 and 1/2
there is the fraction 3/8, between 1/4 and 3/8 there is the
fraction 5/16, and between 1/4 and 5/16 the fraction 9/32, and
so on to infinity; i.e., between any two rational fractions there
is an infinity of rational fractions.
This characteristic may be used in a second definition of
rational fractions, though not as an exclusive definition, since
irrationals also have the same property. But it is a character-
istic that distinguishes rational fractions (as well as irrationals)
from integers. Rational fractions are numbers such that (1)
between any two there is a third and therefore an infinity of
other similar "elements," so that (2) no rational fraction is
next to any other rational fraction, i.e., no rational fraction has
an immediate successor or an immediate predecessor. In con-
trast with these two characteristics of rational fractions, the
integers, both positive, negative, and zero, in their natural order
are such that the members of some pairs of integers have no
integer between them, and are, therefore, next to each other.
This is the fact, e.g., with the pairs (7, 8), ( — 4, — 3), etc.
However, integers and rational fractions are similar in respect
to the characteristic, that the difference between any two ele-
ments of either class is finite, although this difference may in
some instances be very small. This is quite evident in the case
of the integers, where the difference between any two integers
is always another integer that occupies some place in the series
of integers. Thus, e.g:, 9 — 4=:5;3 — 1 =:■ — 4. But the same
principle holds also of the rational fractions, since the difference
a c •
between any two such fractions, -^ and —-, is itself a fraction,
d
da — c h 1 1 3 J • M -A r\ • i-i.
? — n > ^-d-y -?r ?- — i>v» s^^d IS finite. One important
ha 2 5 10
bearing of this principle is, that if any series, e.g., that series of
velocities which is accelerated motion, were ordered like the
series of rational fractions in order of magnitude, there would
be "sudden jumps," — i.e. (in the instance of accelerated mo-
tion), jumps from one specific finite velocity to another, in
which case continuous change of velocity would be impossible.
458 REALISM
It is evident, therefore, that, if there are series and processes
which are genuinely continuous, they must present a type of
order that is dijferent from and something more than that type
which is presented by the integers and rational fractions in order
of magnitude.
Such a type is found by developing the implications of certain
characteristics of the rational numbers, namely, the integers and
rational fractions. Such a method leads to the discovery of still
another type of numlier, namely, the irrationals, and it is
through these numbers, together with the rationals, that the
precise nature of continuity is established, or that the con-
tinuum is generated. On the basis of the principles that that
which is (found to be) implied must be admitted to be a fact,
irrationals are to be accepted as facts — though of a specific kind
— as much as is anything else which is disclosed either by
reasoning or by sensation.
That characteristic of rational numbers which, through the
development of its implications, most particularly leads to the
discovery of irrationals is called a "cut." A "cut" may be
defined as a separation of an ordered class into two sub-classes,
A-L and A2, such that every element, a^, of one class, A^, pre-
cedes every element a, of the other class Ao.
In the case of the series of all integers (positive, negative,
and zero) this cut is identical with each and every integer; for
each integer a separates the series into two sub-classes, A^ and
An, one of which, A-^, is less than a, and the other, A^, greater
than a. But whatever integer a may be, e.g., 5, then those
integers that are less than a include a last number, and those
that are greater include a first, 4 and 6 respectively in the ex-
ample chosen; also, the number a may be assigned either to
those numbers which are less, or to those ivhich are greater, so
that, in the former case, every number of class Aj and also a
itself < A„, while, in the latter case, every element oi A^ <. a
and also every element of A,. In both cases, A^ has a last, and
A2 a first number, and they are next to each other.
However, this state of affairs is not found for the rational
fractions, as may be made clear by taking an example. Let us
suppose an element, a, say, 1/3, and let this be the last of the
elements of the class 4, all of whose elements (numbers) < all
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 459
those of Ao. Then A^ has a last, but Ao has no first element,
in distinction from the case with the integers. For betiveen
any fraction, ^3 (of -^2)9 and 1/3, there is another fraction,
— ' ^ , and so on, so that 1/3 is not next to any fraction that
is greater.
The interesting question next arises, whether there are also
numbers or "cuts" (A^ A^) of such a character that not only
An has no first (as with the rational fractions), but also that A-^,
which precedes, has (in distinction from the rational fractions)
110 last element. In other words, is there such a "cut" or
number, A^ An, that, to state it somewhat paradoxically, all
those numbers that are less (than all those that are greater)
have no last, and all those that are greater (than all those that
are less) have no first element?
Investigation shows that this question must be answered with
**yes." Again to take an example, there is a number, a, let
us say (V 2 ), such that, if we evaluate it, using rational
fractions (decimals) therefor, and approximating nearer and
nearer, yet getting now a fraction that is too large, and
now one that is too small to equal 2 when "squared,'^
this number a separates the whole class of such (decimal)
fractions into two sub-classes which have the characteristic
that, while all the elements of the one, A-^, are smaller
than all the elements of the other. An, nevertheless in the one,
A-^, there is no "largest" and last element, and in the other, Ao,
no "smallest" or first element. Thus, in our example, in the
first sub-class, A^, there is an infinite series of fractions that
are all greater than any mentionable one, such as 1.4142, but
that are still all less than any one of the infinite series of frac-
tions of the second class, Ao, all of which are greater than any
element of A^ ; yet in this sub-class, A2, there is likewise an
infinite series of fractions that are smaller than any mentionable
one, such as 1.4143. The number a, i.e., the actual number so
inadequately symbolized in our example by V 2 , and impossi-
ble of naming or stating by any decimal, is not a member either
of A^ or of An, and in this respect differs from any rational
fraction, such as 1/3, which is either a member, namely, the last,]
of that series, A^^, all of whose elements are less than all the
460 REALISM
elements of A^ that have no first, or, is the first of that series,
A2, all of whose elements are greater than all those elements
of Ai that have no last element.
Another and less technical way of stating the same thing
is, — to continue the example — that a, as the square root of
2 (V 2 ), is not a member of either the series of rational frac-
tions that are smaller or of those that are greater than a, but is
the limit that is approached by both the smaller rational frac-
tions, A^, as they "become" larger and larger, and by the
larger fractions, A^, as they "become" smaller and smaller.
Between these two series a is "squeezed" in, and to it, as a
limit, one can "come" as near as one pleases, without ever
reaching it ; also between it and any rational fraction ' ' on either
side," the difference is not finite, in contrast with those differ-
ences that subsist between all rational numbers. In this con-
trast there lies, perhaps, the secret of the "ability" of the
irrationals to generate the continuum, in the strictest modern
sense of this term. And also in the fact that an irrational is
not a member of either of the two sub-classes or sub-series that
approach it, we may discover the important principle that a I
limit is not a member of the series of ivhich it is a limit. Such J
a principle has an important bearing on the status of ideals in
questions that concern the logical possibility of any genuine
progress and advance in, e.g., the ethical condition of mankind.
In summary, then, we may assert that modern analysis dis-
closes several different types of numbers, important character-
istics of some of which have just been presented, and that those
types which chiefly concern us, in our discussion of cosmology,
are positive and negative numbers, and zero, and integers, ra-
tional fractions (both rational) and irrationals. There are fur-
ther technical differences between these several types that need
not, however, for our purposes, be considered or presented. Such
differences concern, e.g., such definitions as that integers are
those 7iumbers ivhich are natural; rational numbers, those which
are pairs of integers; and real numbers, those ivhich are classes
or fundamental segments of rationals.
As sufficiently accurate for our purposes, therefore, we may
accept the distinctions above stated, and then point out, that,
if we "take" a certain specific series that is constituted by (1)
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 461
integers, say, — 1, 0, and +1, (2) rational fractions, namely,
the infinity of such fractions between — 1 and 0, and and + 1
respectively, and (3) the irrationals between these two end-
points, -with (4) all elements of these three types in order of
precedence or of magnitude, we then have a series that (5) is
a linear continuum in the most precise modern sense of this
term, and that also (6) is sometimes called a class of real
mimhers.
This series satisfies the three postulates, 1 — 3, and also
Theorem I,, previously stated, and is generated by a relation
that is ''connected," "irreflexive, " asymmetrical, and transi-
tive; hut it (this series) also satisfies a principle which has just
been disclosed in our discussion of "cuts," and which may
now be formulated as Postulate 4 (Dedekind's), and, finally,
satisfies two other postulates, namely, those of (5) density
(illustrated by the rational fractions) and (6) linearity.
Postulate 4. If J.^ a7id A^ are any two non-empty suh-classes
of A, such that every element of A belongs either to A^ or to A^,
and every element of A^ precedes every element of A^, then
there is at least one element a in A such that:
(1) Any element that precedes a belongs to Aj^ and
(2) A7iy element that follows a belongs to A^.^'^
Postulate 5 {postulate of density). If a and b are elements
of the class A, and a <Cb, then there is at least one element
X in A such that a <. x and x < b.^^
Postulate 6 (postulate of linearity). The class A contains a
denumerable sub-class R in such a ivay that between any two
elements of the given class A there is an element of R.^-
In explanation of the terms here used it may be further said
that a class is denumerable if it is such that its elements can be
put into one-one correspondence with the elements of a pro-
gression, the simplest example of which is the series of natural
numbers in the usual order, 1, 2, 3, . . .
Postulates 1-6 and Theorem I. define, in the most accurate
way that modern analysis has yet determined, the linear con-
tinuity of a series. In other words, any series that satisfies these
postulates is a continuous linear series. Such a series is found
in the case of the series of real numbers (positive, negative,
»" Huntington, op. cit., p. 44. »' Ihid. "• Ibid.
462 REALISM
or zero) in their usual order (that of magnitude), and also in
any series that is in one-one correspondence with this series.
Such possibly continuous series are, space of one dimension,
time, motion, acceleration, and qualitative changes in general.
If such series are continuous in the strict sense of this term,
then they conform to that type of order which satisfies the six
postulates and one theorem just referred to. But, as before
stated, experimental verification that there is such conformity
in any specific instance is impossible, owing to the relative
grossness of experimental methods. Therefore, so far as experi-
mental methods can determine, such series as space of one
dimension (and indeed of ?2-dimensions), time, motion, and the
like, may be merely dense, or even discontinuous, but to which-
ever of these characteristics they may conform, a precise defini-
tion of their character is nevertheless at hand.
Thus if space, time, or any other series is dense, it conforms
to the order type of the rational fractions, thereby excluding
the irrationals, and satisfies, with the exception of Postulate 4,
all the postulates 1-6, and Theorem I. ; while, if such series are
discontinuous or discrete, they conform to the order type of
the integers, positive, negative, or zero, and satisfy, with the
exception of Postulate 5, the postulates 1-6, but also two other
postulates, namely,
Postulate 7. Every element of a discrete series A, unless it he
the last, has an immediate successor,^^ and
Postulate 8. Every element of a discrete series A, unless it
be the first, has an immediate predecessor.^*
All the postulates thus far considered can be demonstrated
to be consistent and indepe7ident,^^ and thus to furnish another
instance of that principle, namely, the theory of external rela-
tions, which is one of the main contentions of Realism and
Rationalism.
But our presentation of certain facts discovered by analysis
with reference to the nature of number, makes it possible not
only to state with precision ivhat is the continuity, density, or
discontinuity of any series that may have any of these proper-
ties, but also to define with equal precision certain other char-
acteristics, such as infinity and finitude, that different series
»' Op. cit., p. 19. »* Ihid. '° Op. cit., Chaps. Il.-V.
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 463
may possess, as well as to specify the character of the relations
between different series, and, finally, to determine the status of
number series in a cosmos that ipso facto contains all entities.
Modern analysis would seem to begin, in the investigation of
these problems, with the examination of cardinal numbers, and,
as a result, to define a cardinal number as the class, N, of two
or more classes that are in the relation of one-one correspondence
with one another, — one and only one individual of the one
class corresponding to one and only one specific individual of
the other, no matter what the order. However, if there is a
definite order, as in the case of the points of a line, this one-one
correspondence still holds, subsisting between those points which
make up a proper part and those which make up the whole.
In this case there are as many points in the proper part, defined
as that part which is like the whole, as there are in the whole.
Cardinal number is defined, then, in terms of one-one cor-
respondence, and of "as many as," but not of "how many."
Thus to define cardinal number is to make no distinction
between a -finite and an infinite cardinal. This distinction, how-
ever, is made by the definition, that, if the one-one corre-
spondence is between whole and proper part, the number of
elements is infinite. Finite is then defined as that which is
not infinite, whereby one-one correspondence of whole and
proper part is precluded. Thus, e.g., in respect to a unit of
measurement, a proper part does not contain as many individ-
uals as does the whole, and is, therefore, finite.
Whereas, now, finitude and infinity subsist as a class of
classes independently of the order of the elements of these classes,
and merely by virtue of a one-one correspondence between these
elements, continuity holds only of ordered classes, although the
classes be but segments, or sub-classes, of the same ordered class,
e.g., of the series of real numbers in order of magnitude. "With
as many members in any proper part of such a series as there
are members in the whole to which this part belongs, the
cardinal number of elements in both part and whole is infinite,
yet the continuity of the series is not identical with its infinity.
The continuity consists, rather, in the fact that the series con-
forms not only to those postulates (1-3) (and Theorem I.) that
logically determine a series, but also to the postulates, 4
464 REALISM
(Dedekind's), and 5 (density), and, in the case of a linear
continuum, 6 (linearity). These last postulates may be stated
in simple form as meaning (Postulate 5) that between any two
elements there is another element; and (Postulate 6) that there
are elements such that the sub-class of elements before any
specific element has no last term, and the sub-class after, no
first term — from which it follows that, while the difference be-
tween members of certain pairs of terms of such a series is finite,
the difference between the members of other pairs is not finite.
Accordingly it results, in the case of any entity, such as time,
space, motion, and change, that is (1) a series, and (2) con-
tinuous, that, whereas the series is ''made up" of elements that
are distinct (Postulates 1 and 2), this distinctness does not mean
discontinuity,"® and, also, whereas there are finite differences be-
tween certain elements and others, nevertheless between the
members of other pairs of elements there are no such differ-
ences, and therefore, in the vernacular, no gaps or sudden
jumps — in the case of any kind of change.
X. MOTION, QUALITATIVE CHANGE, AND EVOLUTION
Our long and seemingly digressive discussion of numbers
results, therefore, in conclusions that are of direct bearing on
specific cosmological problems. For space, time, motion, and
qualitative change of many kinds are all facts within the cosmos.
Therefore, through the investigation of number, it can be shown
that each of these is a series, which, if it is in any instance either
continuous, dense, or discrete, is this in a very definite and
precise sense — but in a sense which, although it presents em-
pirical difficulties to analysis, discloses no grounds for dis-
crediting analysis as such.^'^
But our discussion and seeming digression also has an im-
portance of its own. For the number continuum is an entity
which, in the cosmos of the realist, is found to have a status
that is quite independent of space, time, motion, and all quali-
tative change. Indeed cardinal and ordinal numbers, integers,
rational fractions and irrationals, continuity and infinity, finite-
'" Cf. the opposed and inaccurate view of Bergson in Creative Evolution
and elsewhere.
"' Contra Bergaon's view again
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM ^65
aess, discontinuity, and density are each found to be independent
of and logically prior to space, time, motion, and change in
general in the sense, that they are presupposed by these (latter)
complexes, though the converse necessitation does not hold. Or,
to state this another way, it is found that specific propositions
can be asserted or postulated concerning numbers and their
characteristics, and the implications of these propositions he
developed, ivithout space and time being implied. And a similar
statement can be made regarding the relation of every logically
prior science to every logically subsequent one. This means,
e.g., that arithmetic is logically independent of geometry and
of the science of time, as these in turn are logically prior to
and independent of mechanics, physics, and chemistry. Such
an independence is confirmed by the actual procedures respec-
tively of the ''pure mathematician," the geometer, the mecha-
nist, and the physicist, as each pursues his specific investiga-
tions in independence of logically subsequent sciences.
Space, time, motion, acceleration, and change in general are
empirically discovered, and are then found to be similar to the
numbers in their most important characteristics. They "belong
to" order-types that subsist among the number series, they are
correlated with these series, and, in general, are related to the
number series in many ways. Yet these relations are not in-
ternal. They are, rather, external and functional, — in some
cases, indeed, in the precise sense of this term as meaning the
subsistence of a relation of one-one correspondence between two
series.
A similar statement can also be made concerning the specific
instances (1) of the relation of the rest and the motion of a
material particle to space and time; (2) of acceleration to mo-
tion; and (3) of qualitative change in general to space and
time. Thus, e.g., both motion and rest are discovered em-
pirically, and not deduced from space and time. Yet, once
discovered, they are found to presuppose, and in certain respects
to be mnilar to both space and time. These last entities, how-
ever, do not constitute either motion or rest, nor is the relation
between the former two and the latter in any way "internal."
Motion, as it occurs in the existential world, and as also a
fact in the ideal subsistential world of mechanics, is the occu-
466 * REALISM
pation of each point, of a series of points, for a particular
instant, of a series of instants. Each particular point is
occupied for a specific instant, and not for some other; at
instant a^, point h^. is occupied; at instant Uy, point &„ ; at
instant a^, point h^. This is a relation of one-one correspond-
ence between points and instants. The one-one relation, R,
whereby a^ R h^, but not a^ R by, generates the com-
plexes flaj/sJ bx, ttyR by, a^ R bz- Motion itself is, then, the
series of these complexes, this series being in turn generated by
an asymmetrical transitive relation, Ras between these com-
plexes as wholes. But the complex, ax R bx is itself neither
motion nor rest, as it is so often erroneously claimed to be.''®
Yet out of it and similar complexes motion is logically generated
or organized, the secret of this being that the relation, Ra,, is
non-additive, so that a whole results that has different qualities,
as a whole, from those of the parts. It is in this way that
motion is made up of ultimate "elements" that are themselves
neither motions nor rests, even as extension of one dimension is
composed of elements that are not extended, and time, of instants
that are not durations.
Qualitative physical change other than motion, e.g., change
in electrical potential, presupposes space and time in quite the
same sense as does motion, so that we do not need to consider
it in further detail. But, further, both motion and qualitative
change may be either uniform or accelerated. Motion and
change as uniform could, however, be existent facts without
there being any existent acceleration, but the converse possi-
bility does not hold. Rather, acceleration presupposes motion
and change, one or both.
As has been previously stated, it may be impossible, owing
to the relative grossness of empirical methods of measurement,
etc., to determine whether perceptual time and space and ex-
istential motion and qualitative change are continuous in the
precise meaning of this term, or are only dense, or even dis-
continuous. But what can be asserted and justified on the
basis of an empiricism that accepts rational analysis as a means
of discovery, is, that, if either perceptual space, time, motion,
acceleration, or change in general, including a universal Evo-
** For example, by liergson, op. oit.
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 467
lution^^^ is continuous, or only dense, or even discontinuous, then
each such entity possesses one or the other of these character-
istics in that precise sense which is determined in and through
the study of number.
If any of these entities is continuous, it is like the series of
real numbers (in their ''usual" order), and will contain ele-
ments that are ordered through a one-one correspondence with
the integers, the rational fractions, and the irrationals in order
of magnitude. Accordingly no element will be 7iext to any
other, and between certain elements and others there will be
710 finite difference or "distance." Also any "proper part"
will contain as many elements as does the whole, so that both
whole and part are infinite. However, since this one-one cor-
respondence does not hold with reference to finite (measured)
constituents, yet both whole and proper part contain such con-
stituents as elements, the whole that is infinite in one relation-
ship may be finite in another.
But if space, motion, change, and Evolution are relational
complexes of the type of the ordered series of rational numbers
alone, then are they only dense in the precise sense of this
technical term. Accordingly, no element, be it point, line, plane,
or instant, is next to any other, since there is another element
between any two elements, although there are, also, finite dif-
ferences or gaps, small though these be, from element to element.
Further, any dense whole may be both infinite and finite, even
as is the case with any whole that is continuous.
Finally, space, time, motion, change, and Evolution are dis-
continuous, if their elements are related as are the integers
alone. Then every element, except there be a first or last, has
two elements next to it, one before, the other after, and again
are there finite differences. But also, since there are as many
odd integers, and as many even, as there are odd and even,
infinity is quite possible in such a series, side by side with its
discontinuity, and such infinity can also cosubsist with finitude,
provided this last means the presence, in the series, of either
a last element, and no first, or a first element, and no last, as
illustrated by all the negative integers, and by all the positive
^'' For an analysis of these entities see the writer's Essay in The New
Realism.
468 REALISM
integers respectively. But if a series has hoth a first and a last
element, and is discontinuous, then it cannot be both finite and
infinite. For the first element can be put in one-one corre-
spondence Avith 1 and the last with n, and in such a series there
are not as many odd (or even) integers as there are hoth odd
and even.
It is evident, therefore, that in all those cases in which a
unit of measurement is applicable to some entity that permits
of measurement (the condition for this being, perhaps, that
the unit of measurement and the "thing" measured are of the
same magnitude — as a specific property), (1) the application of
such a unit may result in correlating a specific part of the entity
to be measured, namely, that part which has no predecessor,
with the number 1; and (2) that the repeated application of
such a unit may result in correlating other specific parts (of
the entity to be measured) each with the successors of the num-
ber 1, i.e., with the positive integers, so that (3) "in due time"
any integer, n, can be reached in this way. Any entity which
can be thus measured is ipso facto finite, and, also, if it is cor-
related only with such discrete elements (units), discontinuous,
though it may also, in relation to other parts, be continuous.
But it is also evident that whether or not one succeeds in cor-
relating a specific part of the entity to be measured, with the
number, n, even though a first part may be correlated with 1,
depends, in some instances, on the unit of measurement that is
used ; and that, accordingly, if the number n is not reached,
that which is to be measured is endless, while if n is reached
the measured entity has a certain size — that is relative, however,
to the unit of measurement that is used.
It follows from this that certain entities within our cosmos,
e.g., space as a whole, and time as a whole, have no size, and that
they are endless; for no unit of measurement has yet been found
whereby eithei* of these entities has been correlated with a last
integer, n, although, relative to certain arbitrarily chosen units,
certain entities, such as physical and mental existents, are meas-
ured, and have a first and a last element. But even in this case,
what that last integer may be with which such a last element
of a measured entity is correlated, depends upon, or is relative
to the arbitrarily selected unit of measurement. If this be
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 469
small, the thing measured may be very large, while, if the unit
be large, the measured entity may be small, indeed, very small.
But also, any entity which is measured, finite, and of a specific
size on such a basis, may *'at the same time" be quite outside
the universe of discourse of size (and quantity) in respect to
constituents that cannot be correlated with the integers from
1 to 71. Thus, e.g., a line that is a specific length as measured,
is or has, as also ''made up" of points, neither length nor size.
From all this we reach certain conclusions that form an
integral part of realistic cosmology, such as the conclusion, that
the spatial and temporal universe (space and time) is endless
and without size. Likewise the physical universe is as yet end-
less and "sizeless," though in due time, through empirical
methods, it may be measured, and thus have an end, and, in
relation to any arbitrary unit, be of a specific size. This would
be the case whether such a universe is "made up" ultimately
of an energy, e.g., electricity, that is continuous, or of discrete
entities, such as electrons, that are discontinuous. For a fmite-
ness of two ends is compatible with a continuity and an infinity,
although such a finiteness "side hy side" with a discontinuity
precludes an infinity of those elements that are "discontinuous
with" one another.
Finally, as regards those strata of the universe which
are "determined" by the relation of logical priority,*'^ one
must conclude, that such strata in their logical order, e.g.,
number j^P^^^ (. motion, and qualitative physical change, do
— I time )
not form a series that is either continuous or dense, but a series
that is discontinuous; yet a series, also, that has neither size nor
finiteness, since there is no common unit of measurement, i.e.,
common quality that is a magnitude, except the attribute of
manifoldness. Accordingly, if numher as the first stratum can
be correlated with the number 1, space and time as the second
stratum with the numbers 2 and 3, motion with the number 4,
consciousness with the number n, — at present, — it is implied
that there may he other strata, n -j- 1, n + 2, w + 3, ieyond
consciousness which have not yet come within our specific
knowledge.
*" See Chaps. I., II., III., XIII., XLI., and XLIII., iv.-x.
470 REALISM
XI. CONSCIOUSNESS AS A DIMENSION AND A VARIABLE
The foregoing discussion of space, time, number, order, and
the like, enables us now to examine understandingly certain
further specific problems, some solution of which must find its
place in a cosmology. These problems concern the nature of
consciousness,'^^ especially certain specific solutions of this prob-
lem that have been presented in recent philosophical discussion.
These solutions are to the effect that consciousness is either
(1) a relation,*^ or (2) a "new dimension,*^ (or both), or,
perhaps, a disembodied quality, or (3) that it does not exist
at all."
To whichever one of these three (or four) classes of entities
(to which may be added "event") consciousness may belong,
and however great the lack of exactitude in current discussions
of such "theories" may be, still any one of these possible solu-
tions of the problem of consciousness has the merit of being
opposed to the view, that consciousness is in any way a substance.
For that this view must be given up, is a conclusion that we
have been forced to accept again and again by all sorts of con-
siderations—by all sorts of facts.*^ Accordingly, consciousness
" See the volumes, The New Realism, Essays by Holt, Montague, and
Pitkin, also Holt, The Concept of Consciousness, especially Chaps. VI.,
IX., and X., and James, Radical Empiricism, Essay VIII. Also see the
following articles: F. J. E. VVoodbridge, "The Nature of Consciousness,"
Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. II., 1905; "The Problem
of Consciousness," in Studies in Philosophy and Psychology in The
Oarman Memorial Volume; " Consciousness," " The Sense Organs," and
" The Nervous System," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientifio Methods,
Vol. VI. ; " The Deception of the Senses," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and
Scientific Methods, Vol. X.; Wm. James, "Does Consciousness Exist?"
Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. I., and in Essays in
Radical Empiricism; W. P. Montague, " The Relational Theory of Con-
sciousness and its Realistic Implications," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and
Scientific Methods, Vol. II.; B. H. Bode, " Tlie Definition of Conscious-
ness," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. X.; R. F. A.
Hoernle, " Neo-realistic Theories of Consciousness," Proc. Durham Phil.
Soc, Vol. XIII.; G. E. Moore, "The Subject Matter of Psychology,"
Proc. Arist. Soc, Vol. X. ; Perry, " Conceptions and Misconceptions of
Consciousness," Psych. Review, Vol. XL, and in Present Philosophical
Tendencies, Chap. XII. ; C. A. Strong, " The Nature of Consciousness."
Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. IX., pp. 533 S., 561 ff.,
and 589 If.
*^ E.g., by Woodbridge, loc. cit.
** E.g., Pitkin, in The Neiv Realism.
** J. B. Watson and the other " behavioriats."
" See Chaps. I.-llI., X., XL, XXVI., XXiX.-XXXVIII., XL., u., XLI.,
XXI., XLIIL, i.-ui.
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 471
must be either a dimension, a relation, a disembodied quality,
or an event, — or two or more of these ''at the same time."
Which of these is consciousness ?
If, now, one theory that has recently been advanced is correct,
namely, the theory, that consciousness is a "new" dimension,
then, unless this theory is to present a purely arbitrary view, it
must conform to that definition of a dimension which receives
at least fairly general acceptance in scientific circles.
Such a definition is obtained by considering such matters as
we have just previously discussed, and is to the effect, that
a dimension is a linear series*^ (and, therefore, more than a
mere class).
This definition comports with that frequent usage of the term
dimension to characterize, e.g., space as an entity that is of one,
two, three, or even n dimensions. But it is also a definition that
is consistent with the result, which analysis obtains, that the
space to which such a definition is applied, may be continuous,
or dense, or possibly, though questionably, discontinuous.
With this the case, it is necessary to make distinct definitions
for each of these three possible kinds of dimensions, but such
definitions would conform to those postulates *^ by which each
of these characteristics is logically determined.
But dimensions may also vary, as the examination of space
as an example again discloses, as having hoth a first and a last
"element," a first, but no last, and a last but no first; and also
as being either finite or infinite.
Alone common, therefore, to those usages in which the term
dimension is employed {e.g., to space) is the linear serial char-
acter of that which is dimeiisional. Other characteristics are
merely the differentice of the several species of dimensions.
With the definition of a dimension which thus results, namely,
that a dimension is a linear series that is either dense, or
continuous, and the like, — it follows that a great many "things"
in this universe may be dimensional, and that it would not be
surprising if consciousness were included in this class — of
dimensional entities. For a great many entities are series.
Indeed, that they are a series, or else entities that are "ele-
*' Cf. Huntington, op. cit., p. 58.
*' See the immediately preceding discussion of this chapter.
472 REALISM
ments" of or correlations of series, and the like — and not siih-
stances, is one of the most general results of modern scientific
investigation.**
But linear series are organized wholes, or relational complexes,
that satisfy the postulates, 1, 2, 3, 6, and Theorem I. They
therefore involve ''elements" and certain specific types of rela-
tions, namely, those that are asymmetrical, transitive, irreflexive,
and connected.
If the relations that organize elements into linear series or
dimensions are always of this type,*^ then, although in special
series there may also be further specific relations, it is due, in
some cases at least, to the presence of qualitatively different
elements, that certain series are qualitatively different dimen-
sions. Among such qualitatively different series that we have
already considered are: iiine, whose elements are instanis, a
geometrical line, whose elements are points, space of w-dimon-
sions, whose elements are already of n-1 dimensions, motion,
whose elements are points — related in a 1-1 manner to instants.
Other and "new" series or dimensions which, however, we have
not yet considered are: the class of moral values in order of
superiority ; the events of any causal chain, in order of cause
and effect; and, finally, and for us, at this juncture, important,
the class of one's distinct sensations, of such particular kinds as
sensations of color, sound, warmth, or pain, arranged in order
of intensity.
There are undoubtedly, then, many different dimensions —
different in that they are qualitatively distinct — v/hich is quite
possible although all belong to the same class, dimension.
There are, therefore, not only dimensions, which are them-
selves relational complexes, but also relations among or between
dimensions. Thus, e.g., we have just been led to recognize that
there are relations of both similarity and difference among
dimensions — a fact that is not without considerable importance
for us. For it allows us, e.g., in the case of time, to discover a
dimension that is not spatial, and in the case of space, a dimen-
sion that is not temporal, and therefore suggests that certain
dimensions, certain linear series, e.g., moral values, are neither
spatial nor temporal, but quite outside these two universes of
*' Cf. Chap. H. "Cf. Huntington, op. cit., p. 11.
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 473
discourse. Consciousness, also, therefore, if it should prove to
be a dimension, might be both non-spatial and non-temporal,
or either one, and not the other.
But there are not only relations of (1) similarity and (2)
difference among dimensions, but there are also specific rela-
tions of (3) correlation, and (4) "multiple order," as is illus-
trated respectively by that correlation of space with time which
is motion (or velocity), and by space of more than one dimen-
sion (multiple order).
These three cases are, now, to be carefully distinguished in
examining the question, whether consciousness is a "new"
dimension or not; i.e., one should distinguish (1) the fact of
qualitatively distinct linear series from (2) the fact of cor-l
related linear series, and these two cases from (3) the fact of 1
multiply ordered dimensions or series.
With this preparation, we may now endeavor to answer our
question: Is consciousness, either "in general" or in its par- ]
ticular instances, a dimension, and, if it is, what are those dif-
ferentice which distinguish it from other dimensions, and what
are its relations to other dimensions?
In answer to these questions it may be said, first, that con-
sciousness as a generic term is not a dimension, but only an
(objective) concept that is identical with the fact of a resem-
blance in respect to the awareness that characterizes all those
particidar instances which we designate as conscious. Our ques-
tions refer, therefore, to particular entities that are called con-
scious, namely, to sensations, memory images, emotions, and the
like.
With reference, now, to such particular conscious entities, it
seems to be an undoubted empirical fact that certain ones of
them do form a series, and thus are dimension-like. This is the
case, as has already been instanced, Avith sensations of color,
light and shade, sound, warmth, pressure, smell, taste, and pain
in order of, at least, intensity, if not, also, of extensity. Dif-
ferences of intensity may also characterize the different kinds
of images, both of memory and of imagination, and, likewise,
the emotions; but whether or not reasoning is so characterized
is very much open to question.
There is also no doubt that particular conscious processes
474 REALISM
as well as certain manifolds of such processes are serial or
dimensional also in another sense, namely, that they are cor-
related with time — indeed the term conscious process itself, as
process is defined, connotes this correlation. Finally, certain
specific fields of sensations are found empirically to form
multiply ordered classes, as, e.g., sensations of sound as ordered
according to (1) pitch, (2) intensity, and (3) duration.
But these empirical matters have long been accepted as
matters of fact in psychology and philosophy, so that the ques-
tion. Is consciousness a dimension? means something different
from what such affirmative answers as the above would seem to
imply. Thus our question would seem to mean, e.g., in the field
of sensations, not. Is a specific manifold of sensations serial in
such respects as intensity and duration? nor even, Is one par-
ticular sensation serial as having duration f but, Is a particular
sensation a one-dimensional set, over and above such generally
admitted dimensionalities? or, if the qualitative content and
the aivareness can be distinguished, Is either this awareness or
this content a dimension?
If, now, these very specific inquiries are answered in the
affirmative, it is well to inquire further what such answers imply.
They assert that a sensation, an awareness, or a sensation-
content is as such a dimensio7i. But what does this imply?
Our answer is, that it implies, seemingly, that there are elements
— for, up to the present at least, no dimension or series has been
discovered that is not a complex, and that does not as such pre-
suppose elements.
Can, now, such elements be discovered for any particular
consciousness as a dimension, and, if they can be, what is their
character? Are such elements in turn conscious elements —
'' petit es perceptions" — which, as organized asymmetrically and
transitively, are a qualitatively specific dimension that is a
sensation? // they are (conscious), then, however, is the prob-
lem only repeated in the form, Are such (conscious) elements
themselves dimensions? while if they are not conscious elements,
then is this repetition of the problem avoided.
One might as well, therefore, accept "at its own level" the
problem. Is a sensation a dimension — apart from its duration,
its membership in an intensity series, and the like? and not
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 475
attempt to derive such dimensionality from the serial organiza-
tion of "conscious elements." And one must also accept the
problem, Can elements be found whereby as a dimension (if
such a sensation is found to be) it conforms to the requirements
of that definition of a dimension which is generally accepted,
namely, that it is a linear series?
Our answer to this inquiry reintroduces principles that have
frequently appeared, and been frequently used in foregoing dis-
cussions. Is length one or manyf or. Is it both one and many?
Yet how can it be both? Still, if it is both (by some hook or
crook), then as one, is it a dimension? Yet is it not admitted
to be a dimension — not many, but one, — perhaps indeed a
dimension par excellence?
Such puzzles would seem to be solved by the frank admission
that length is one (or would some maintain that it is qualita-
tively two?), and yet that is also many — yet not many lengths
(which but repeats the problem) but many points — organized
in a very specific way — as we have seen. This means that its
organized "manyness" is its oneness, and that its oneness, as
length, is identical with its being a dimensio7i.
Dimensionality, therefore, does not imply either a manifold
of elements that are (of necessity) themselves dimensions, or
its own complexity, but only a manifold of elements that are
(numerically) distinct from itself and that are organized by
very specific relations. This is, indeed, implied in the principle,
that the elements of an n-dimensional manifold are themselves
n-1 dimensions — in other words, that "in" the elements of a
dimension, one dimension "falls out."
Length, then, is a dimension — one, and only one — although!
it is made up of "elements" that are 7iot dimensions. But
length is also a specific quality in the universe, for, although
there are other entities like it "to a greater or less degree,"
there are no others quite like it. Yet it is not a quality that
inheres in a substance (the logical priority of space in reference
to matter is sufficient to establish this fact). And, finally, its
oneness is not violated by the fact that it can be called both
length and (as a member of a class) a dimension.
A specific sensation may, similarly, be regarded (1) as an-
other "new" and distinct quality in the universe, — quit«
4,76 REALISM
analogous to a specific length; (2) it may be one, and yet, as
one, be "conditioned" by the serial organization of many ele-
ments; thus (3) it may be a dimension, whether its elements
are dimensions, or not, but a dimension which in its qualitative
specificity is distinct from its elements (even as length is from
points) and, (4) finally, it may be a quality that does not inhere
in any substance.
But, if all this is the case, what are those elements out of
which such a specific dimension is made? First, in answer to
this inquiry, it has been found, that, on pain of repeating the
problem as to whether a sensation is a dimension or not, the
elements must be different from that wJiole which they 7nake
up.^^ But also, as has been found repeatedly, if elements are
organized, i.e., are not related addiiively, then a whole may
result, with properties very different from its parts or constit-
uents. The former demand coincides, therefore, with the latter
principle.
To conform, now, to both this "demand" and this "princi-
ple," it may be said, that empirically any number of different
kinds of elements (for consciousness) are discoverable — kinds
that are different both from specific sensation-quality and from
one another — but out of which, as organized elements, a specific
sensation, as belonging to the class of awarenesses, may arise.
Such different "elements," although all of them are not known
with accuracy, are those entities that are studied and inve8ti-\
gated in such sciences as neurology, physiology, physics, and!
chemistry.'^ Yet, if not for all sensations, then, at least for
'"This chapter, iv., v., and vi.
"'That there is an organization of such non-sensation elements ia not
invalidated by the objection that such a statement or position can, in last
analysis, only mean that the entities which these sciences " treat of "
are themselves sensations (or expressible in terms of sensations), so that,
ultimately, what we have is sensations-organized give sensations. For
this objection is but a special form of or conclusion from the ego-centric
predicament, to the effect (here) (1) that, because such "elements" as
atoms, molecules, colloidal solutions, nerve- and " sense-cells," nerves,
ether waves, air waves, and the like, are always in relation to some kind
of knowing, this knowing can not be eliminated in any way; and (2) that,
related terms constitute or affect one another, so that (3) atoms, mole-
cules, and the like, are really sense-constituted (mental) entities. Such
a conclusion we have already found to be based ( 1 ) on the purely
gratuitous postulation of the modification theory of relations, and (2) on
the ignoring of a method of virtual elimination of knoioing (of any
specific form) from the entity that is known. Therefore we may say, that
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 477
some specific sensations, e.g., my visual sensation of this specific
green (of this leaf) at this minute, these elements and con-
ditions can be specified, at the present time, with a fair degree
of accuracy.
But such a specification shows that these elements are organ-
ized, and organized serially. Therefore, as is the case with the
serial organization of points "into" length, so also if there is
a serial organization of ether waves, waves of air, physico-
chemical processes both within the organism and without, into
one whole, that whole which results is, in the case we are con-
sidering, the sensation.
All the details of such a serial organization are difficult to
determine, and are as yet far from being determined. But
that the organization is serial is shown by the facts that the
mechanical, physical, and physico-chemical "elements," both
within and without the organism, that "lie at the basis" of any
specific sensation are correlated with (1) the time series, (2)
the space series, (3) are themselves a cause and effect series,.
and (4) involve any number of specific correlations between j
the specific variables (series) that become the special subject-
matter of chemistry, physics, and physiology. '
What all the elements are, which, as organized serially, give
some specific sensation as a unitary entity, is difficult to deter-
mine. Indeed, it is hazardous to preclude certain possibilities,
for which at the present time there is little empirical evidence.
In other words, the conditions for sensation, as well as for other
kinds of coasciousness — indeed other kinds than those with
which we are now empirically acquainted, — may be much more
varied than is at present supposed.
However, whether this be the case or not, there is one error
that is to be guarded against in this field, and that is the error
of assuming and dogmatically asserting that the study, investi-
gation, description, and statement of the *' conditions," "eZe-
ments," organizing relations (and the like) of any specific kind
or instance of consciousness, sensory or other, does away with,
nullifies, or makes a non-fact of the whole that residts from
both those entities that are expre&sible in terms of entities that are
sensed and also those entities that are not so expressible, e.g., masses,
chemical valence, electrolytic conductivity, and the like, are, although
related to consciousness, not themselves conscious in character.
478 REALISM
the organized elements, i.e., the sensation, memory image, ab-
stract idea, and the like. That there is such a nullification is at
least the tacit, if not, indeed, the dogmatic assumption of the
modern school of hehaviorists.
Such an assumption is, however, as little justified in the
case of conscious entities as it is in the case of length, or, indeed,
as it is in the ease of organism, cell, molecule, and atom —
entities which the "behaviorist" repeatedly "uses" in his de-
scriptions and explanations. Were the behaviorist consistent
in his position of displacing the whole hy its parts, then should
he not stop, or rather hold his science in abeyance, until all
has been worked out in terms of some ultimate class of entities
of which all else is composed? But the behaviorist is not thus
consistent. Eather, he deals with such entities as organisms,
organs and stimuli — as wholes, and not as complexes, and, there-
fore, not with their constituent parts. Even so, also, is it quite
permissible, if not, indeed, in some cases necessary, to deal with
those qualitatively distinct entities called sensations, images,
ideas, and the like, at their face value. Both procedures are
possible in some cases, but in some cases not, as is illustrated
by the fact that man's ethical relationships are open to sys-
tematic investigation, in the absence, at the present time, of, e.g.,
any very accurate or certain chemico-physics of his nervous
system.^^
We conclude, and also now generalize, that, although precise
and accurate knowledge is lacking for specific cases, neverthe-
less any specific sensation and any specific consciousness is a
qualitatively distinct dimension in the universe, and, as such, a
unity in its difnensionality, even as is length, although it "re-
sults" from the organization of many other qualitatively dis-
tinct dimensions. This specific qualitative distinctness is that
which is usually characterized as the common attribute of those
facts that we call conscious, namely, as awareness. Awareness
is, therefore, the common property of that which, hy its presence,
is one class of dimensions within the universe.
What, next, is the relation of this dimension to others? On
the one hand, it is, as we have seen, the "result" of the serial
" Cf. my review of Loeb's " The Mechanistic Conception of Life," in
IScience, Vol. XXXVII., p. 333 ff.
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 479
organization of other, specific dimensions. But, on the other
hand, it can also, as in other instances, (3) enter as a component
dimension into still other w-dimensional manifolds, and (2) be
correlated with other dimensions. Thus sensations and other
mental processes have duration, both by themselves and also as
forming a series in some "life history," and so are correlated
with time. In this last respect they are, as themselves dimen-
sions, components of "higher" dimensions. But they also, or,
rather, specific manifolds of them, form series in respect to in-
tensity, cesthetic value, and thus are components of multiply
ordered series.
Ifj^ now, the hypothesis, that particular instances of conscious-
ness are qualitatively distinct dimensions within the universe,
can thus be worked out in some detail, in a fairly satisfactory
manner, the further question now arises, whether this hypothesis
is also compatible with other positions that have been advanced
in this volume. For example, is our present hypothesis con-
sistent with the views (1) that an external relationship is pre-
supposed as the condition for there being genuine knowledge;
(2) that there are non-existent efficiencies, such as ethical ideals,
and (3) that particular conscious entities, such as sensations,
images, emotions, and reasoning processes, appear and disappear,
come and go ?
The answer to each of these questions is "yes," Indeed, in
a way, each has already received such an answer. Thus we
have found that if any kind of a process or event is analyzed,
it proves to be serial in character, and in this respect to be a
dimension. Motion and qualitative change are excellent exam-
ples of this, as we have previously seen.'^^ Then there is no
difficulty in identifying a conscious process and a conscious
dimension, and of thus conjoining the usual psychological with
a philosophical point of view.
But an answer to the first question is also ready at hand.
For it is one of the principles previously developed that a non-
additive relation (such as is present in a group of elements
organized as a dimension) results in a (synthetic) creation ^* of
new properties, which properties are, riot causally, hut function-
ally related to, i.e., correlated with, the {properties of the) con-
•■yn.-ix. of this chapter. "* E.g., this chapter, iv.-vi.
480 REALISM
stituent parts. Such a relation is, however, external. It is
exemplified in the instance of a 2-dimensional spatial manifold
(a plane) in its one-one correlation with a 1-dimensional mani-
fold (a line),^^ and also in the instance of a red-hot iron whose
color, as the iron cools, gradually changes. Such a change of
color is, now, a qualitative change. Undoubtedly it is a change
that is correlated with motion — i.e., with the motion of the
molecules and atoms and, perhaps, electrons that "make up"
the iron, as well as with "ether waves" and the like. But, if
the principle of creative synthesis is correct, the color is not
identical with such motions, nor, if our solution of the problem
of illusory objects ^® is correct, is the color subjective, because
it is not ide^itical with such motions.
By this last solution it is, rather, objective, though its locus
is not the same as is that of motion, i.e., it is not identical with
the "universe of discourse" of motion. Accordingly, the change
of color, which change is itself a series or dimension, is an ob-
jective series that, while it is correlated Avith another, or a
number of other specific series (motions — as well as space), is
not identical with these, much less caused by them, and is in
this sense external.^''
Finally, our second question can be answered affirmatively.
For, on the one hand, we have already found evidence for ac-
cepting non-existent efficiencies,^^ and, on the other hand, if it
is efficiencies of some kind that must be serially organized as
the "condition" for the "appearance" of a particular conscious-
ness as a dimension, then we now have evidence of the serial
organization of non-existent efficiencies in the case of space.
For, if space is the condition for all that (physically) exists, it
does not itself exist, but only subsists. In a manner, therefore,
that is similar to the serial organization of points to form
1-dimension, and of a manifold of one-spatial dimensions to form
a 2-dimensional manifold, etc., any and all non-existent suh-
sistents may be serially organized (as, e.g., are moral values),
and thus as efficiencies account for the appearance of conscious-
ness, if consciousness is to be accounted for in this way — namely,
" Cf. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 60-62.
'" This chapter, i.-iii.
" Cf. Chaps. 1., 11., 111., and the whole of Section IV.
*' This chapter, i.-vi.
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 481
upon the basis of some kind of stimulus (efficiency) — with ac-
companying response.
Two or three further points that are involved in this "di-
mensional view" of consciousness now remain to be discussed.
One of these points concerns the question, whether this view is
reconcilable with the hypothesis, which has also been advanced
in recent discussions, that consciousness is a relation.^^
The reply to this inquiry is, that one can discover certain
possibilities of such reconcilement — certain main outlines — even
if one cannot work out all the details with precision and ac-
curacy, after the manner of certain sciences, e.g., mechanics.
One is thus in much the same position as was Galileo when he
discovered that, e.g., velocity was a function of time (such a
relation being the correlation of two variables) , but was not able
to discover all those details which subsequent analysis has found
in the functional relation.
Such a reconcilement is attainable again upon the basis of
principles that have been previously developed. Thus it has
been found that certain relations as organizing certain com-
plexes are the basis on which other relations rest.^° For example,
the relation of implication rests, in some instances, on a twofold
relation of inclusion between classes, (A <^B, B <. C implies
A < C). Also, if two classes are each organized serially, then
do the relations which so organize the classes, form the basis for
the relation of 1 — 1 ordinal correspondence between the two
classes. And, finally, if certain relations organize elements into
a unitary whole, as, e.g., asymmetrical and transitive relations
organize points into a line, then is there also a relation between
the unitary whole and the organized elements.
The situation is not different in the case of consciousness, if
consciousness in any particular instance is a dimension, and thus
a unitary whole that results from the serial organization of
certain specific ''elements." For under these circumstances
there can be a new relation (as we have found that implication
is new) that may be called the "conscious relation," and there
most certainly is a relation between this new dimension, con-
sciousness, on the one hand, and both its "elements" and other
"things," on the other hand, Bui whether the consciousness
•• By, e.g., Woodbridge, loc. cit. •" Chap, XIIL, i.
482 REALISM
itself can justifiahly be called a relation is questionable, even
as would be the case, if a line were called a relation. A line
is a relational complex, as well as a line, and it can be a related
term in other complexes; but it certainly does not seem to be
a relation. Even so, then, with consciousness as a dimension.
In this respect, therefore, the two recent hypotheses as to the
nature of consciousness, the one, that it is a dimension, the
other, that it is a relation, seem to be irreconcilable, and, to the
writer, the advantage seems to lie with the former hypothesis.
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact, also, that those who
defend the second hypothesis fail to specify to what type of
relations consciousness (as a relation) belongs, — i.e., to specify
whether it is, e.g., symmetrical, asymmetrical, transitive, in-
transitive, and the like. This failure is, accordingly, rather
damaging, in the light of that detailed knowledge of relations
which we now have,''^ to the contentions of those who advance
this second hypothesis.
The first hypothesis seems, therefore, to have the advantage.
For it is an hypothesis that can be worked out in fairly precise
and accurate agreement with the modern theory of dimensions,
and comports accurately, also, with the empirical facts, (1) that
perhaps all of the different kinds of sensation and of images
form series as regards intensity and extensity {e.g., loudness of
tones), (2) that among sensations there are, as we have seen,
some instances of midtiply ordered series, e.g., tones, (3) that
all conscious processes are correlated with the dimension, time,
and (4) that in the field of rational processes, there is a con-
formity with the system 2.^~ Finally, such an hypothesis
conforms to that tendency which is one of the dominant char-
acteristics of modern, exact science, namely, the tendency, or
the effort finally to formulate laws in the form of equations
between variables, of the general form, y = f{x). But a variable
is a series, whether it also be continuous, dense, or discontinuous,
and it is also a dimension, whether it be linear, or multiple.
Therefore, if consciousness is a dimension, it is also a variable,
which means that investigation should be directed to ascer-
taining what variables are specific functions of it, and of what
variables it is a specific function.
•' Chape. II. and XXVII. " See Chap. 11.
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 483
Whether, now, philosophical and psychological investigation
has as yet been directed, to any great extent, at least, to finding
out what the "place" of consciousness as such a variable in the
universe is, may well be doubted. And yet, in the absence of
the precise results that might be won by such a procedure, the
position or hypothesis that consciousness is a dimension, does
seem to solve, in a general way, certain problems that other
hypotheses fail to solve.
One such problem is presented by the question, as couched
in the naturalistic terms of physics, chemistry, and biology, or
in terms, namely, of cause and effect alone, as to how, if any
specific consciousness is the final effect within the hody, or within
the head, or, even more precisely, ivithin the cortex of the hrain,
such a consciousness can ever refer to, or "get out" to, an object
that is remote from the cortex either spatially or temporally.
Thus, to take an example, if my present sensation of a distant
star is only the causal effect in me of a "stream" of light waves
that "started from" the star perhaps many hundreds of years
ago, then is not that which I sense or perceive the causal effect
in me (in my cortex, or brain, or head, or body) and not the
star at all? And does not this compel us to accept that which
is the essential position or conclusion of Subjectivism, that that
which I (directly) know is only my own ideas, as the causal
effects, in me, of some kind of external cause (either God, or
things-in-themselves, and the like) ? Or, if this conclusion itself
in turn gives rise to too many difficulties and problems,^^ then
does not the view that consciousness is an end causal-effect
force us to conclude that it can "get to" its object only by
means of some such medium as potential energy defined as the
inverse of the "incoming streams" of kinetic or active energy? ^*
It is quite clear, then, that if consciousness is regarded as such
a causal-effect, such an "end-term," it most certainly does seem
to be shut in, so that we have the problem as to how it ever
can get out — to have as its "content," e.g., the spatially distant
star, or the temporally distant past or future event. However,
the very statement of the problem in these (causal) terms readily
" See Chaps. XXIX.-XXXII.
'* Montague, in his essay, " Consciousness a Form of Energy," in Essays
in Honor of Wm. James.
484 REALISM
suggests the means of its solution, i.e., it suggests that the way
to solve the problem is to take such a view of the nature of
consciousness, as does not make of it an end-effect in an incom-
ing stream of physical energy. But such a view is the position
or hypothesis that consciousness is a "new" dimension and a
variable. For, if it is a variable, then, a priori, one must grant
that it can enter into the same types of relationship to other
variables that these enter into among themselves. And it is
the possibility of such relationships that solves the problem above
outlined, as well as other problems.
What, then, are some of these types, or, rather, the principles
that are involved in such types of relationships? In answer
to this inquiry, one has first to say, that variables are cor-
related, either in a one-one, one-many, or many-one manner.
But more important is the principle that such correlation allows
of the qualitative discontinuity of the correlated variables, as
well as of the most radical qualitative differences between them.
Thus, e.g., that p = f{t) (pressure a function of temperature)
does not imply that pressure and temperature are identical
qualitatively; while, if a "proper part" of a line is correlated
in a one-one manner with a whole line (in respect, of course, to
points) , then the proper part may be very small, and the whole
very large; indeed an inch is in such correlation with the dis-
tance of a million miles. Further examples of one or the other
of these two principles, or of both together, are the correlations
(1) between time and space, (2) between the gradual change
of color, or of temperature, and the motion of atoms and mole-
cules, and (3) between the points of all space (of any number
of dimensions) and the points of a line.
As applied, now, to the hypothesis that consciousness is a
dimension and a variable, these principles have an important
bearing on the solution of the specific problem just previously
considered, as well as other problems.
For, first, with it granted that the "conditions" for conscious-
ness are both spatial and physical, then, if consciousness itself
is a new dimension that "arises" through the non-additive
organization of such conditions, it follows, that consciousness
itself need not be either spatial or physical in order to be cor-
related with spatial or physical "things," as well as with those
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 485
eutities that are in any way whatsoever qualitatively different
from itself, such as those entities that are neither physical nor
mental (conscious).
In this respect, therefore, consciousness is extra-spatial — i.e.,
non-spatial and extra-physical, and, accordingly, not the kind
of entity that can be spatially shut in within body, head, brain,
or cortex. Clearly, however, if it is not shut in, there is no
problem as to how to get it out — e.g., to the distant star. But,
if it is not shut in, if it is non-spatial in character, then it is
neither here nor there, and yet, even as time can be correlated
with space, without being spatial, so, also, can consciousness be
correlated with spatial "things" without being itself spatial.
Thus it is that we can understand how, e.g., the distant star or,
in fact, any object that is spatially distant from our bodies,
should be "content" of our consciousness, without our conscious-
ness spatially reaching out to the object that is "content." The
consciousness is not "first" in our bodies, brain, or cortex, then
to be got to the distant object, but is, rather, a "new" dimension
that arises from the very special organization of "elements"
of which distant object and body are each members. Yet it must
be admitted, if all this account is true, that why it should be
some members and not others (of the organized series of ele-
ments) that are the specific content of a specific consciousness,
is a special problem that is not yet solved.
However, an account very similar to that just given of the
correlation of the variable, consciousness, with physical and
spatial entities, can also be given for its correlation with entities
that are remote in time, either past or future. For if it is a
principle that proper part is in correlation with whole {e.g.,
an inch with a million miles in respect to points), then a par-
ticular consciousness "lasting" but a short time, can be cor-
related with a much larger time, and thus reach into both the
future and the past, and, accordingly, have as its "content"
an object that itself is correlated with a specific part of such
past or future time. In some such way as this can the fact
be accounted for, that particular complexes that now no longer
exist or that do not yet exist, so that they cannot "send"
incoming streams of energy to my brain, can nevertheless be
"content" of my consciousness.
486 REALISM
Such an account of the ''ability" of consciousness to "tran-
scend" itself temporally and qualitatively is undoubtedly de-
ficient in a great many respects. Yet it is an account that
seems to the writer to have many advantages over that tradi-
tional account which starts with the tacit or explicit assumption,
that consciousness is a substance, or an end causal-effect on an
ego or spirit that is a sutstance, and which is so productive of
false problems and of philosophical culs-de-sac and impasses.
But it is also some such an account as must be made, if thd
hypothesis that consciousness is a dimension is to be anything
more than a purely philosophical speculation. Such an hy-
pothesis and such an account seem, however, to lead in the
direction of philosophical progress and advance to a much
greater extent than does persistent adherence to the traditional
point of view in which consciousness is regarded as a substance,
or in which it is tacitly assumed that problems are solved if
they are ignored.
CHAPTER XLIV
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY AS PART OF
COSMOLOGY
It is quite evident that in the foregoing presentation of
realistic cosmology we have already entered the domain of those
problems that in Section II. of Part I. were called epistemological
and psychological. But why should we not do this? Are not
knowing and consciousness undeniable facts in some sense? Are
they not within the universe, and, indeed, within the cosmos as
that universe in which entities are related not only in one, but
in many ways, with the same type of entity and of relation
recurring, perhaps, many times? Finally, must not all entities
be so related to certain other entities of the cosmos-universe as
to allow themselves to be known, as unmodified by virtue of
being known? For, since in any case it is presupposed tha^
some entities of the universe, be these complex or simple, are
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 487
so known, must it not be granted that all entities are, similarly,
hnowdble, unless very good grounds to the contrary can be
advanced ? Our answer to these inquiries has been given many
times and in many places/ but now all our positive solutions
to these problems take their place in a realistic cosmology and
psychology.
It is epistemological difficulties and problems that force us to
the conclusion that consciousness and awareness cannot be a
substance, and must be either a dimension (variable), a relation,
a quality, or an event. These entities cannot be a substance,
except at the cost of making any genuine knowledge, even of
themselves, impossible.^ But at least some such knowledge is
presupposed by each and every epistemology ! Accordingly,
some alternative hypothesis accounts not only for the situation
that is presented by this presupposition, but also for all other
cases of genuine knowing or awareness.
But there is not alone genuine knowing, but also error — of
many kinds. And yet, with the substance-view of consciousness
invalidated, the possibility of consciousness being a "container"
is invalidated, so that error-objects can no longer be regarded
as subjective in the sense that they are contained in conscious-
ness, but they also must be accepted as objective. The only
residual subjective element in error is, therefore, the ** taking"
of "something" to be that which it is not.
If, now, realistic psychology and epistemology must take their
place in realistic cosmology, all the positive developments and
conclusions, particularly of Chapters XIII., i., XXVII., XL.,
and XLL, must be accepted as accounts of specific phases or
parts of the cosmos, and thus be included realiter in Chapter
XLIII.^'
As a fitting conclusion or complement, therefore, to all these
preceding cosmological accounts, and from the point of view
that any and all entities are "somewhere" in the cosmos and
are objective, we may now attempt a classification of entities
* See, e.g.. Chap. III., and the criticism of systems opposed to realism.
Chaps. XXIX.-XXXVlll.
' See Chap. III.
' For other features of realistic epistemology, see Chaps. I., II., III.,
XII., XIV., XXI.-XXV., XXVI., XXVIII., and the criticism in Chaps.
XXIX.-XXXVII., XLII., XLV., and XLVI.
488 REALISM
whereby some of their relations to one another, and their quali-
tative divergence from one another, shall be presented.
Such an attempt is directed to the recognition of certain
specific types or kinds of entities, and, therefore, to the occur-
rence of certain relations, especially those of similarity and
difference among individuals, and of the inclusion or exclusion,
complete or partial, of the ''resulting" classes.
The individuals of a class are either absolutely simple indi-
viduals, such as points, or complexes. Complex individuals con-
sist, ultimately, of "absolute simples," of which, seemingly,*
there are a number of different kinds, but they may also be
complexes of complexes. In fact, most of the entities or
wholes within the cosmos are of this type. But, in either case,
a complex is a whole that is organized by one or more specific
relations, some of these relations being independent of and
logically prior to others. Thus, among complexes, one can dis-
tinguish mere collections, classes, series, "wholes" of correlated
series, organic wholes, and the like, and then ascertain that
the relations that organize certain of these complexes, as, e.g.,
similarity organizes a class, are independent of those relations
that organize series and organic wholes, as, e.g., an asymmetrical
and transitive relation organizes a series.
The universe, now, is the totality of all entities, whatever
these may be, as related merely additively. The cosmos may be
defined, accordingly, as this universe of entities as related other
than merely additively. Such non-additive relations, which sub-
sist "over and above" mere additiveness, are those relations
that generate classes, series, and the like. But the universe-
cosmos is all-inclusive. There is, then, "place " in it for such
entities as (1) a perpetuum mobile, (2) "phlogiston," the
hypothetical substance that was held, in the eighteenth century,
to be present in all combustible bodies, (3) the snakes of de-
lirium tremens, (4) ghosts, (5) centaurs and satyrs, (6) future
and past happenings in distinction from present, (7) this table
on which I am writing is distinction from (8) table in general,
(9) apparently converging rails and bent sticks, (10) the motion
and rest of material bodies in distinction from (11) space and
time as conditions. The words that have just been used stand
• Bee Chaps. XXI., XXII., XXIII., XXVI., XLIII., iv., vii., viii., ix., x.
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 489
for "things" that are entities in some sense, or that at least
cannot be dismissed as mere nothings, without investigation.
One traditional and short-sighted way of treating this problem
of classifying such entities as have just been mentioned, is to
make some of them '^unreal." False hypothetical entities, such
as "phlogiston," normally and abnormally imagined entities
such as centaurs and the snakes of delirium, and even, indeed,
future events, are often so classified. But manifestly even "un-
real" things are in some sense facts within the universe, so that
it is incumbent on a systematic and scientific investigation to
determine the character of the "unreal," A second traditional
method of classification aims to do this. It places all unreal
entities in the subject, or makes them subjective, in opposition
to other, real entities, as objective. Even space and time and
all relations, as opposed to substance-like terms, have been
"given" this subjective locus by certain philosophical systems.^
This solution of the problem has, indeed, become a ready-made
answer that is accepted without further reflection by perhaps
the majority of philosophically inclined persons. By it, al-
though there is much lack of clearness and precision in the
matter, the subjective is identified with the mental or psychical,
and the objective with the physical, and "the psychical" is then
made to contain all "unreal" entities.
An analysis of this solution shows, however, that it is really
derived by assuming the psychical to be a sort of substance,
whereby it can be a receptacle or container. This view of con-
sciousness is, however, beset with so many difficulties in its im-
plications, etc., that it must be given up, and such an hypothesis
accepted as makes of consciousness a dimension and allows all
entities to be objective in the sense that they are at least not in
a "psychical container."
Proceeding, now, from this point of view, we find that all
entities that come within the field of awareness would seem to
be similar in the respect, at least, that they are mentionable.
"Entity" itself is a means of mentioning them. But not all
" mentionables" are entities. That they are not, is shown by
one or another of the several empirical tests that are at our
disposal. Thus, some "mentionables" are found to be merely
" See Chaps. XXIX. and XXX.
490 REALISM
combinations of words, as, e.g., are "round square" and "black
whiteness." Each part of such combination-words may, per-
haps, be employed in order to mention entities, but the entities
thus indicated, as, e.g., round and square, exclude each other,
and subsist at different loci.
As entities, therefore, we can accept only such as do not
involve, if they are complexes, characters that exclude and force
one another into different universes of discourse, or such as
furnish no occasion for exclusion in that they are absolutely
simple. Let us call whatever fulfils these conditions a '^con-
sistent." All "consistents," then, are to he accepted as entities,
and an entity is to he defined as a "consistent." From this
definition it follows, that whatever appears to, or is given as
content in, any mode of awareness, be this perception, memoiy,
dream, illusion, imagination, reason, or intuition, is therewith
a "consistent" and an entity. For the fact of the mere "given-
ness" of the co-presence of several characteristics estahlishes
their consistency, and, therefore, the "entity-character" of the
complex. The question of exclusion does not, of course, arise
concerning simple entities, or, if the apparently simple proves
to be complex, then its consistency is established with its "given-
ness." By this test certain words or symbols are found not to
designate entities at all, "round square" being a good example.
Individual round things and also roundness are entities, and so
are square thiiigs and squareness, but no "round square" is ever
given in any experience.
Among entities, however, empirical methods reveal two classes,
namely, those that exist, and those that do not exist. The
former are called existents, the latter, non-existent siihsistents,
or merely suhsistents. All existents suhsist, hut not all siih-
sistents exist. In proceeding here one must rely wholly upon
the verdict of empirical methods in science and common sense
in which innumerable things, qualities, events, and relations are
accepted as existing. From such instances one can derive a
partial definition of an existent, namely, that it is an entity that
either has heen, is now, or will he "at" or "in" a particular
place, at a particular time, or merely at a particular time, if
the entity is not spatial, as, e.g., a conscious process is not.*
*See Chap. XLIII., xi.
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 491
"Occupy" or "correlated with" a particular place and time,
or a particular time, alone, are also terms that may here be
used instead of "at" and "in." "Particular place" and "par-
ticular time," are, however, relative matters. By themselves
space and time include individual extensions and durations, even
as any one point is that individual point and not another. But
aside from this individuality there are no differences among
extensions, except those between one-, and two-, and three-
dimensional spatial extensions, and, also, durations. Our living,
however, is '^earth-centered" and twentieth century pivoted,
and in relation to this other spaces and times are particular in
the sense in which the term is used above.
But to be "in" or "at," or "to occupy" a "particular"
space and time, both, or only one, is not enough to define or
characterize existents. For other entities, such as dream objects,
also have this spatial and temporal particularity. Therefore
a complex existent must have that full quota of characteristics,
or he that full quota, which the sciences of physics, chemistry,
biology, psychology, and the like, find it empirically to have.
Existents, thus defined, are of two kinds, namely, physical and
mental. Physical existents are things, forces, energies, qualities
such as solidity and elasticity, relations such as cause and effect,
and events such as the falling of bodies and the flow of electrical
currents. Among such physical entities are both those that are
directly perceived and those that are inferred in order causally
and functionally to explain those things, forces, etc., that are
directly perceived.
Mental existents are, analogously, to be accepted essentially as
they are interpreted by empirical psychology, namely, as proc-
cesses or events that occur at a certain specific time. Seemingly
they occur at a specific time because that which conditions them
(yet does not cause them), namely, a nervous system of a certain
degree of organization, and in a certain specific condition, is at
that time. In this respect, at least, mental events or processes
are temporally "located," and are in a temporal series. How-
ever, this does not mean that they themselves are limited tem-
porally, as are their conditions. For, similarly, an organism
as a whole manifests certain characteristics, such as the power
of "selective response," reproduction, and the like, that are
492 REALISM
conditioned by physical and chemical forces, but that are not
characteristic of these conditions. So also are there finite moral
beings only if there are biological and physiological beings.
Yet the morality subsists only in the field of the relationship
of such biological beings to one another, and not in the condi-
tions. In general, the examination of *any number of concrete
cases shows that the characteristics of the whole may differ
radically from those of its conditions and its parts. The non-
temporal and non-spatial character of consciousness as such,
side by side with the temporal and spatial character of its con-
ditions, is hut another instance of this principle. It is, then,
by an indirect reference to the conditions that the temporal
(and, perhaps, the spatial) location of specific conscious proc-
esses is arrived at. It is for these reasons that we shall classify
existents as of two kinds, namely, physical and psychical, includ-
ing under each of these classes aZ? those suh-classes that are
usually so included in the physical sciences and in psychology.
Empirical methods, experimental, rationalistic and analytical
in character, compel us, next, by a process of exclusion, to accept
another great class of entities for which the name suhsistent is
accepted by a number of investigators.'^ These entities are,
on the one hand, experienced, and are found not to be self-
contradictory ; i.e., they are "consistents." Yet, on the other
hand, they are not existents; for they are found to lack those
qualities, or at least that fidl quota of qualities, including tem-
poral and spatial localization, which psychology and physics
recognize as essential to objects that exist. Therefore they are
excluded from being psychological in character (as tradition
has so long held them to be), by the hypothesis, now accepted
at this point as established, that consciousness is not a substance
or "container." Examples of subsistents are the "perpetual
motion" machine of pure mechanics, the dreamt "falling from
a roof, ' ' the centaurs and satyrs of the Greeks, and the substance,
"phlogiston," of the eighteenth century.
Yet there are differences among subsistents — differences re-
vealed by the mode of their discovery, even as is the case with
color and sound. Thus some subsistents are discovered by
'' E.g., by Holt, Marvin, Perry, Pitkin, and Montague in The Neio
Realism and other voiumeR.
EPISTEMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 493
reason, others by dreaming, still others by "waking" imagina-
tion. For example, it is found by reasoning, that the transfer
of energy in the physical world would take place "round and
round," say, from electric generator back to dynamo and to
fly wheel, provided ever-dissipating heat were not produced,
and also provided that a "potential fall," analogous to the fall
of water through a flume, were not a necessary condition for
each and every transfer of energy. Exist entially, however, ever-
dissipating heat energy (with equalization of temperature) and
"potential gradients" are the facts. Yet "conditions" that are
contrary to these facts can be postulated, and reasoned from,
and thus an ideal, perpetuum mobile, be deduced.
Such a subsistent as a "perpetual motion machine" is both
spatial and temporal, yet is not correlated with a particular
space and time. On the other hand, other subsistents are cor-
related, not with any but with a particular space and time, and
yet are only subsistents because, e.g., in the case of dream-
objects, they lack that fidl quota of attributes which the physical
sciences have found to be empirically necessary for the existent
objects of each special field of investigation.
Finally, there are still other subsistents, especially space,
time, and number, which, on the one hand, are open to investi-
gation by reason, and, on the other hand, are found to be the »«
conditions for, in one way or another, those entities that do
exist. But, as not being such conditions for themselves, they do
not exist, but subsist.
With this as a preliminary discussion and illustration of dif-
ferences that subsist among some of the entities of the universe,
that more complete classification which rests upon these and
still other differences (and similarities) may now be presented.*
' Cf. with the presentation and classification that follows, especially as
sympathetic to the doctrine of "subsistents": Plato, Republic, especially
Books v., VI., and VII., Thecetetus, Parmemides, Phcvdo, and Cratylus ;
A. Meinong, Oegenstandstheorie, 1904, especially the essay by E. Mally,
pp. 121-263, tjber die Stcllung der Oegenstandstheorie im System der
Wissenschaften, 1907; B. Russell, " Meinong's Theory of Complexes and
Assertions," Mind, N. S., XIII., pp. 204 ff., 336 flf., 559 ff.; "On the Rela-
tions of Universals and Particulars," Proc. Arist. Soc, Vol. XI., 1911-
1912; Problems of Philosophy, pp. 127-157; Principles of Mathematics,
p. 449 ff.; R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, Chap. X.; W. H.
Sheldon, " The Metaphysical Status of Universals," Phil. Review., Vol.
XIV., 1905; R. H. Nunn, Aims and Achievements of Scientific method,
p. 4tt.
494
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EPISTEMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY 495
It is to be remarked in final comment on this classification,
that all of the entities included in it — and it is intended that
any kind of "mentionables" which can lay claim to belong to
the universe as a fact of some kind shall be included — are ob-
jective to and independent of the knowing consciousness into
whose field, as a specific dimension or variable, they enter. The
whole scheme of the classification is one that is in denial of the
historic principle, that any entity as known is to some degree
dependent on, or modified by, the knowing. This does not
deny, however, that that series of relating consciousnesses which
is an individual consciousness, or that that series which in history
and tradition is the development and organization of many
individual consciousnesses together, is not characterized by cer-
tain specific attributes of its own. The principle of our classi-
fication would demand only that such attributes and such con-
sciousnesses are quite objective to the consciousness that knows
them. The classification also stands in opposition both to the
monistic principle, that an underlying unitary entity can alone
mediate the relations between the various kinds of entities of
the classification, and to the pragmatic principle, that the sev-
eral types of entities are the mere inventions and useful schemes
of a stream of human consciousness that has come down through
the centuries.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following is a further general bibliography of modern realism:
E. B. Holt, The Freudian Wish, 1916, The Concept of Consciousness, 1914,
The New Realism (with others), 1912; VV. T. Marvin, First Book of Meta-
physics, 1912; R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, 1911, Moral
Economy, 1909, Approach to Philosophy, 1907; B. Russell, Principles of
Mathematics, 1903, Philosophical Essays, 1910, Problems of Philosophy,
1911, Scientific Method in Philosophy, 1914. Articles: Alexander, " Sensa-
tions and Images," Proc. Arist. Soc, Vol. X., 1909-1910; "Program and
First Platform of Six Realists," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific
Methods, Vol. VII., 1910, p, 393 flf.; Dewey, "Brief Studio? in Realism,"
Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. VIII., 1911; Dewey and
Spaulding, " Discussion," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods,
Vol. VIII., pp. 63 ff., 77 ff., 566 ff., 574 ff.; \V. Fite, "Theories of Inde-
pendence," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. X., p. 548 ff.;
E. H. Hollands, " The Externality of Relations," Jour, of Phil., Psych.,
and Scientific Methods, Vol. XL, p. 463 ff.; I. Husik, "Theories of Inde-
pendence," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. X., p. 347 ff. ;
A. O. Lovejoy, cf. note 3 of previous chapter; W. P. Montague, "The New
Realism and the Old," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods,
Vol. IX., p. 39 ff.; and " May a Realist be a Pragmatist?" Jour, of Phil,
496 REALISM
Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. VI., pp. 460 ff. and 485 fT.; G. E.
Moore, " The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception," Proc. Aris. Soc,
Vol. VI., 1905-1906; and "The Refutation of Idealism," Mind, N. S., XII.,
1903, p. 433 ff.; M. T. McClure, A Stvdij of the Realistic Movement in
Contemporaneous Philosophy, dissertation, 1912; E. B. McGilvary, "The
Relation of Consciousness and Object in Sense Perception," Phil. Review,
Vol. XXI., 1912; R. H. Xunn, "Are (Secondary Qualities Independent of
Perception?" Proc. Aris. Soc, Vol. X, 1909-1910; R. B. Perry, "Realism
as a Polemic and Program of Reform," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scien-
tific Methods., Vol. VII., pp. 337 ff. and 365 ff.; J. B. Pratt, "Professor
Perry's Proofs of Realism," Jonr. of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods
Vol. IX., pp. 573 ff.; B. Russell, "The Basis of Realism," Jour, of Phil
Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. VIII., p. 158 ff.; E. G. Spaulding
" Postulates of a Self-critical Epistemology," Phil. Review, Vol. XVIII., p
615 ff.; N. Kemp Smith, "Subjectivism and Realism in Modern Phi
losophy," Phil. Review, Vol. XVII., Stout, " Primary and Secondary Quali-
ties," Proc. Aris. Soc, Vol. IV., 1903-1904; R.'S. Woodworth, "The
Consciousness of Relations," Essays in Honor of Wm. James, p. 485 flf.
CHAPTER XLV
THE REALISTIC DOCTRINE OF VALUES
As included in the classification just presented, one important
group of entities remains to be discussed, namely, the so-called
values or ivorths. These must now be considered in order that
their character and their relationship to the other entities of
the classification may be determined. In other words, their
position in a realistic cosmology must be found in order that
any claim may be set up that this great and perhaps all-
inclusive problem has been examined at all exhaustively.
Several subordinate problems are very generally recognized
as falling under the problem of values.^ For example, What
is the value among all values, in other words, the highest value
in relation to which all others are but species? Is it The Good,
or The Beautiful, or The True? Also, what is the specific rela-
tionship of values to other entities that are not values 1 Further,
' Cf. Chap, IX. ; also see the report of the discussion on values at the
thirteenth meeting of the Am. Phil. Assoc, Jour, of Phil., Psych., and
Scientific Methods, Vol. XI., p. 57 ff., by H. C. Brown; see also Perry,
" The Delinilion of Value," Jour, of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods,
Vol. XL, p. 141 ff.
THE REALISTIC DOCTRINE OF VALUES 497
are values objective, or are they suhjective in the sense that
their esse is their percipi or concipi? For example, is beauty in
an object dependent on one who perceives, or who thinks an
object to be beautiful, or is it not ?
Not all of these questions, however, will be considered, nor
will the question as to whether or not there are values. For,
that there are within the universe certain entities which are
values or worths, is a position that is widely accepted. Few
deny it in theory ; none can deny it in practice.
We shall grant, therefore, the factuality of values, and pro-
ceed to a discussion of a few important problems concerning
them, using for our examination such important instances as
justice, beauty, obligation, and pleasure.
We shall first consider certain typical problems that concern
the cosmological status of justice. As concerns the legal aspects
of this value one need only remind himself that justice is
recognized as perhaps the dominant principle in the legal enact-
ments of modern nations; while to act justly toward and to
think justly of our fellow-men both in those instances that are
covered by law and in those that are not, is a widely accepted
rule of ethical (correct moral) action. The point to be noted,
then, is, that here, as elsewhere, there would seem to be a dis-
tinction between the individuals and the state of affairs that
holds of them. Thus, in this instance, there are just acts and
just persons, and of these, mi that they are similar in respect
to being just, justice holds. Indeed, we have here but another
instance of an objective concept and of the individuals of which
the concept holds, — as, e.g., is the case, also, with humanity and
individual human beings.
One of the important questions that concerns at least certain
classes of values, of which justice is typical, may now be raised
in specific form. What is the status of that perfect justice which
none would be so daring as to claim is realized in any human
society or in the life of any one human being, or, indeed, in
any single human act, but which nevertheless is thought about,
and is considered by at least some philosophers to be implied
by imperfectly just acts. In answer to this question one may
search for evidence, and inquire, if, e.g., the perfect, the
geometrical cizcM^^ceases to be an entity because no physical
'49B REALISM
otject ever attains its perfection? Indeed, does not the very-
imperfection of such physical objects imply tlie perfect, as the
limit of the approximations? And would the perfect circle
cease to he, if all physical objects were annihilated ? Then does
ideal justice, as a standard for men to attain to, if possible,
become less of a fact, because society and poor frail human
beings and their concrete acts fall short of this ideal? Would
it cease to he, should a cataclysm hurtle all human beings forever
into non-existence? And ivas it a non-fact in those far reaches
of past time when to living nature the glow of dawning hu-
manity had not yet come?
The ansiver to these inquiries is almost as old as man's own
philosophizing, and is one that unites modern Realism with
ancient Idealism. It is, that ideals are real. Plato was and
still remains the great spokesman.^ Eternal are justice and
goodness and truth, not because they persist through all time,
but because "in a heaven by themselves" Xhey partake neither
of the nature of "things" that are in time and space, nor, indeed,
of the nature of time and space themselves. Time- and space-
conditioned things — "existents" we call them — approximate to
the ideal in various degrees, but never attain it. Thus are the
leaf, the circle of waves from the pebble, and the wheel that
man makes for his use, all after the model of the perfect circle,
yet are all lacking its perfection. So also are there just-like
men and acts and society, yet do all these fail to attain the ideal.
But the ideal remains, — in accordance with the principle, seem-
ingly, that the limit is not a member of the series of which it is
a limit.
This was the philosophy of Plato — his Idealism and his
Realism, — and, also, is it modern Realism, with its reality of
ideals and its ideal reals. Justice, truth, goodness, and beauty
are "eternal verities" — entities not subject to the stresses and
strains that distort the particular and concrete time- and per-
haps also space-conditioned products of natural processes.
Indeed, did the act or the person become wholly just, and were
there only genuine knowledge and no error, still would these
"concretes" and "particulars" be numerically distinct from
" In, e.g., Plato's Republic, The Thecetetua, Parmenidea, PhcedO) and
iJraiylui.
THE REALISTIC DOCTRINE OF VALUES 499
perfect justice and from complete truth. The perfect circle is
independent of and numerically distinct from the particular im-
perfect instances in nature, but the independence and the dis-
tinctness are between the ideal, or principle, on the one hand,
and the particular existents, on the other hand. Did the latter
attain to the ideal, then would the independence and distinctness
still be a fact. And the case is not different with justice and
the just act, and with truth and concrete knowing.
One question, then, that contributes to the cosmology of
values is answered. Among values, as among non- values, there
are hoth existents and subsist ents, with the former subject to
time and space conditions, and the latter not."^
But there is a second important question, the solution to
which further extends our cosmology. This may be advan-
tageously discussed by considering the nature of beauty in the
particular instance of the beauty of color, of light and shade,
and of outline, of the sea and islands now before me. Old and
traditional, now, is the doctrine, that in the physical world there
are ether waves, chemical pigments and substances, reflecting
surfaces, lengths, heights, distances, and form, hut that the color
of an object is subjective, or that its esse in any particular
instance is its percipi, even as in traditional logic and psychology
the esse of a universal is held to be its concipi. It is likewise
with beauty. For difficult is it, indeed, to find physicist or
psychologist who does not insist that beauty in any particular
instance is dependent on him who perceives and appreciates, and
who does not also interpret this dependence to mean, that the
beauty somehow resides in the perceiving and appreciating sub-
ject. For does not, e.g., the color, according to the traditional
view, there reside? And is not the color identical with one ele-
ment m the beauty of the landscape ?
However, the traditional interpretation confuses two things
that are distinct. "To be dependent on" is not "to be identical
with." Thus, e.g., physical motion, whether uniform or
accelerated, depends on both time and space, yet is not identical
with these, but is, rather, a variable that is correlated with both
time and space, and that may, therefore, be qualitatively dif-
ferent from and so not causally related to these entities.* So,
' See Chap. XLIV., u. * See Chap. XLIII.
500 ■ REALISM
also, is that complex functioning of the human organism which
is called its "living" dependent upon many organs, structures,
and specific processes, but is not identical with any one of these.
In both motion and organism there is organization, by specific
relations, of those parts that enter into the whole, while the
whole is specifically different, qualitatively, from its parts, and
belongs to a different realm of discourse. Thus, e.g., the atom
differs from the electrons that compose it, the molecule from
its constituent atoms, the cell from its molecules and colloidal
particles, and, finally, society from the human individuals that
are its units. Indeed, no realm of fact, whether subsistent or
existent, is exempt from this principle of creative synthesis, in
accordance with which one or more specific organizing relations
so relate parts that there are new qualities in the resulting
whole, and whole and part belong to specifically different uni-
verses of discourse.^
The realm of values is no exception to the validity or applica-
tion of this principle. The physiological organism, either as a
whole, or in respect to certain of its parts, such as eye, optic
nerve, and occipital lobe, itself enters as a part into still other
"larger" complexes that are wholes because of the presence of
one or more organizing relations. And this larger whole, like
other wholes, has characteristics that are different from those
of its constituent parts. Accordingly, it may well be, that, just
as water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen, yet is neither of
these by themselves, but only as they are related and organized
to form a whole, so also are, e.g., the color and beauty of par-
ticular physical objects not identical either with the physio-
logical organism or with any part of it, nor with the physical
entities themselves, but are properties of that whole which is an
organized ivhole of organism and physical entities.
This means, of course, that color and beauty are dependent
in just this specific way on a perceiving and sensitive organism,
but it does not mean that they are resident in the organism, or
that their esse is their percipi by a substance- and receptacle-like
consciousness, as the traditional theory maintains. Indeed, we
can go one step further in this argument concerning the typical
case of the color and beauty of particular physical objects, and
• Cf. Chap. XLIII., v.
THE REALISTIC DOCTRINE OF VALUES 501
raise the question: Granted our principle of creative synthesis,
that wholes have qualities which are different from those of
the constituent parts, and granted also the usual physical view,
that ether waves and chemical pigments are external to and
independent of the sensitive organism, then may not the color
and the beauty as such be qualities of the organized whole, ether
waves and pigments, and so be quite external to and independent
of the organism 1
This question is difficult to answer with assurance, but an
affirmative reply is not weakened by the opposing argument,
that to the person who, e.g., is color blind to red and green,
these colors, are indistinguishable and lack their specific quali-
tative character. For the facts of color vision not only are
quite compatible with, but also they tend to confirm, the hypothe-
sis just advanced.
Color blindness is commonly held to be due to the lack of
a specific photo-chemical process in the retina. Given the three
normal photo-chemical, physiological processes in the retina and
the other normal conditions, and there are perceptions of red
and green, blue and yellow, black and white, but if one of the
first two processes is lacking, there is a specific color-blindness.
In both instances, therefore, the color is partially dependent on
specific chemical processes in the retina. But, if color is thus
conditioned in the eye, may it not also be a fact both outside and
independent of the eye and the organism, when conditions similar
to those in the eye are given? The camera, placed in the proper
position, shows that the convergence of the parallel rails does
not have its esse either in the organism or in consciousness.
Does not color photography, then, reveal an analogous ohjectivity
for color — and for beauty?
This argument that at least certain values are objective in
the sense that they are numerically distinct from and inde-
pendent of hoth a perceiving consciousness and a receptive organ-
ism is, perhaps, a radical departure from traditional views, and
it may frankly be granted to have its weaknesses. But if it is
correct, we must conclude, that those elements which are
(Esthetic idtimates are, together with the wholes that result from
them, quite as objective as are any of the entities in a strictly
non-value field. This means that symmetry and proportion,
502 REALISM
Hogarthian "lines of beauty," color and color combinations,
simple ratios among fundamental tones and over-tones and the
like, are aesthetic ultimates that are not dependent either upon
a changing and developing consciousness, or upon tradition and
fashion, although their recognUion may be thus dependent.
This conclusion receives support from that accumulation of
evidence which makes for the correctness of a general realistic
position, namely, that position which holds to the objectivity
not only of normal and abnormal existent objects, but also of
standards and ideals, and, indeed, of all those entities that are
discovered by reason. It is a position, however, that is not
exclusive of that ''subjectivity" of taste and preference which
must be granted in view of the great diversity of tastes, of
fashions, of "schools," and of conventions. There is evidence
to show that the presence of a sensitive and reacting organism
is not necessary to the existence either of aesthetic elements or
of aisthetic complexes. But, on the other hand, the organism
does enter into the complex whole that exists when an aesthetic
object is perceived and appreciated. It is one participant in a
complex, even as there are other participants. Vary it, and the
resulting properties of the organized complex vary, even as the
perceived color varies from the normal in the ease of a color
blind eye.
One cannot deny, therefore, the reality of the appeal of the
beauty of an object to that person with whom we do not agree.
His organism and his organization may not be wholly like ours.
So also may there be sex, national, and racial differences, of
which some are induced by the development of a tradition which
forms an environment to him who is born in it. Thus may we
account for the fact that the Japanese do not approve of Euro-
pean drawing and painting, and that most of us have to grow
to like the ever new fashions and modes in music, sculpture,
painting, decoration, and dress. Or, it may be, that the realm
of the objectively pleasing and beautiful contains such a wealth
of material, even as does the realm of scientific entities, that
only a selective process can be directed toward it, and that the
basis for this selection is laid down by education, imitation,
and tradition. But in either case, just as there is a range of
distribution of physiological organizations, with the most similar
THE REALISTIC DOCTRINE OF VALUES 503
ones the most frequent, and the deviations rare, so also will
there be norms of taste and of appeal, with the deviations ex-
ceptional, but no less real and well-grounded than the normal.
However, it is not our purpose to present an exhaustive dis-
cussion of the problem of values. Therefore we shall omit the
question as to what the total range of values is, and, also, we
need not make any final definition of these entities. Our purpose
will be accomplished if we keep to that safe ground where we
find certain specific values very generally recognized and ac-
cepted. Thus, without raising and endeavoring to answer the
question, whether there are values wherever there are desires,
or interests, or tendencies, we will next consider the moral situa-
tion as we find this among human beings.
This specific problem is selected because of its bearing on
other, perhaps greater problems, solutions to which must be
given in order to make our realistic philosophy at all complete.
For in this philosophy we must finally consider the great prob-
lems of teleology and theology.
The field of morals is very generally admitted to coincide
with that realm in which there are human beings or person-
alities as they stand in various relationships not only to one an-
other, but also to other living creatures, and even to all nature
and to the universe itself. In contrast, space and time, atoms and
molecules, cells and organs, and even all living beings other
than man, would seem both in their relationships to one another
and to man himself to belong to a realm that is distinctly non-
moral. Men may recognize that in their relationship to some
of these things, notably to "dumb animals," there is a moral
situation; but morality does not seem to concern these entities
by themselves or in their converse relationships to man. Here
there is neither morality nor its opposite.
The moral situation seems, therefore, to occur only under
specific conditions. It is a specifically differentiated universe
of discourse, different from other realms, such as the chemical
and the physical, but not contradicted by them. What, now, is
the ** topography" of this realm, and what are the conditions
under which it exists ?
Certain principles previously ascertained again come to our
assistance in answering these inquiries. First, there is the prin-
504. REALISM
eiple of creative synthesis; parts form wholes which manifest,
or are one or more qualities that are different from those of the
parts. Secondly, there is the principle of freedom; new qualities
are a law unto themselves ; they act in accordance with their
own nature and are free to do this, in that they are specifically
different from the qualities of the parts. Finally, there is the
principle, that one and the same entity can stand in several
relations, and that these relations are not constitutive of one
another. In other words, an entity can be a term that retains
its identity while it is a member of a number of relational com-
plexes ; in one relation it may act as a unit and constituent that,
together with other units, forms a larger whole, while in other
relations it may itself be a resulting whole and a complex.
The application of these principles to the question under
consideration will make these statements clearer, and will con-
nect our present discussion with the previous constructive de-
velopment of our realistic cosmologJ^ Again it will be shown
that ethics is not a phase of biology, even as biology is not mere
chemistry and physics, and these are not mere sciences of space
and time and number.
A molecule is a complex of atoms, even as atoms are in turn
complexes of electrons ; but a molecule has properties not found
among those of the atom, and acts in accordance with these
properties, though compatibly, also, with those of its parts ; yet
in so acting, it acts as a unit. Thus, to illustrate, molecules of
sugar in solution go as wholes, i.e., as units, through certain
membranes; but such molecules are related both to their parts
and to other molecules ; in the one relationship they are complex
wholes, in the other relationship, units — substitutable by other
units (molecules) that are non-electrolytic, as the "laws of solu-
tions" show; yet together with other molecules of sugar and a
solvent, sugar molecules form an aqueous or some other solution ;
but the molecules themselves are not a solution, nor do they
follow the laws of solutions. An analogous state of affairs holds
(1) of the cell in its several relationships to its parts and to
other cells; (2) of an organ, like the heart, in its relationships
to its parts and to other organs; and finally, (3) of the com-
plete and mature organism in its relationships both to its various
organs and to other organisms.
THE REALISTIC DOCTRINE OF VALUES 505
Man, as a human organism, is no exception to these principles.
Complex, indeed "infinitely complex" though this organism may-
be, nevertheless, in certain relationships, it acts as a unit, and is
a constituent of a larger whole. One such whole is society — the
society of human individuals — and this whole possesses char-
acteristics that the units do not have, morality heing one such
characteristic. If this is to say, that there would be no ex-
istential moral act or motive or person, were there only one
human being in the world, then let this be said. The situation
in which morality thus occurs may be and undoubtedly is a
very specific situation, but, once it has appeared, then, as pre-
senting something new, there is freedom in respect to this very
'^newness." However, this is not a freedom of the individual
in the sense of his lawlessness, nor in the sense that it goes
counter to the laws, physiological, chemical, physical, geo-
metrical, and mathematical, of those parts of which he is a
resultant whole. It is the freedom, rather, of the whole to act
in accordance with the nature of those characteristics which it
manifests as a ivliole, which particularize it as a whole, and
which distinguish it from its own parts, from other coordinate
wholes, and from complexes of which it itself may be a part.
The human individual is, now, in quite this sense, free in respect
to his peculiar characteristics as a human organism, i.e., he is
free in respect to his mode of reaction to his environment, as
this is physical, mental, historical, existent, and subsistent. The
"taking place" of some of these modes of reaction is conscious-
ness. Such modes of reaction do not contradict physical and
chemical facts and laws, but are more than these, and in this
sense are free. But it is only when the human individual reacts
in a very specific way, namely, when the personality of other
individuals, and accordingly their desires, motives, rights, and
ideals, are in his field of consciousness, and his in theirs, that
the moral situation subsists and exists.
The individual is thus free in his cognitive consciousness,
but it is society alone that is free morally in the sense above
defined. With but one individual in the world, there would
still be the former, but not the latter freedom. But since it is
a fact that there are many individuals, there are both kinds of
freedom, yet only because, over and above the conditions for
506 REALISM
the existence of the consciousness, there are also the specijfic con-
ditions for the moral situation.
This situation is, then, a characteristic of that whole, society,
which includes, let us say, all human beings, and which may
perhaps be so extended as to include other organisms, and even
inorganic nature. Its antecedent basis is the cognitive (con-
scious) situation, but it itself is not identical with this. For the
moral situation arises only when, within this broader relation,
a very specific cognitive consciousness appears, namely, that
which is the recognition of personality as such. But, with this
recognition once present, then, as constituents of this specific
consciousness, there arises, further, the cognitive consciousness
of respect, of reverence, of rights, and of ''ought." This, there-
fore, is the moral consciousness, — of society — conditioned by the
existence of society, self -legislating and thus free, non-existent
in an individual by himself, but binding upon him as a member
of the complex, and, once arisen, forming part of his own
cognitively conscious field.
With this state of affairs holding of moral phenomena and
their antecedents, and with analogous situations occurring else-
where, there is now revealed both the necessity of an inductive
procedure in studying each higher level of realities, and the
impossibility of reducing the higher to the lower, as well as of
deducing the former from the latter. Empirical entrance must
be made at each level to discover its characteristics. But, once
discovered and analyzed, the characteristics of any level can in
many instances be correlated functionally, though not causally,
with those of lower levels, and in every instance the compatibility
of higher with lower levels must exist or subsist. For, although
different, still, distinct levels are consistent, belonging to different
universes of discourse, and existing or subsisting side by side.
Accordingly both the moral and the cognitive consciousness are
facts side by side with the facts of biology, but the laws of the
latter are not those of the former. Thereby, however, the prac-
tical necessity of discovering and analyzing the principles of
morals on their own basis and level, and the impossibility of
deriving these from and reducing these to the laws of biology,
chemistry, physics, and mechanics, is shown to be due, not to our
ignorance, but to the very structure of reality itself. It is in
REALISM'S TELEOLOGY AND THEOLOGY 507
this way, then, that our philosophy of moral values takes its
place in the larger whole of our realistic cosmology.^
CHAPTER XLVI
REALISM'S TELEOLOGY AND THEOLOGY
In our preceding discussion the conclusions have been reached
(1) that values both exist and subsist, as illustrated respectively
by just acts and by justice; (2) that values are real parts of
the objective world, external to and independent of not only
their being perceived, conceived, and appreciated, but also of
the physiological organism; and (3) that certain values, such
as morality, subsist and exist only in certain situations, as char-
acteristics of wholes that are complex in respect to their parts,
but unitary in respect to other relationships. Our position here,
as elsewhere, is, therefore, one that stands in radical opposition
to that relativism and evolutionism which receives the name of
Pragmatism, and yet it is one that denies, not the fact of change
" The theory of aesthetic and moral values just presented is one that
departs widely from the positions that are taken by most writers. A
brief general bibliography is herewith given, but without reference either
to the agreement or the disagreement with the views above presented.
For aesthetic values: Aristotle, Poetics; I. Babbitt, The New Laokoon,
1910; B. Croce, Esthetic as Science of Expression, trans, by Ainslie, 1909;
Gross, Einleitung in die Aesthetik ; Guyau, Les Problems de EstMtique ;
Him, The Origins of Art ; Kant, Critique of Judgment ; Lessing, Laokoon;
Lipps, Spatial ^Esthetics and Optical Illusions; Vernon Lee and C. Thomp-
son, Beauty and Ugliness; H. R. Marshall, JEsthetic Principles, 1901, also
Pain, Pleasure, and /Esthetics; E. D. Puffer, Psychology of Beauty;
Santayana, The Sense of Beauty; Tolstoi, What is Art? VVoodberry, The
Heart of Man.
For ethical values: Am. Phil. Assoc, discussion at thirteenth annual
meeting, Phil. Review, Vol. XXIII., No. 2; F. Brentano, The Origin of
the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, trans, by Hague, 1902; Dewey and
Tufts, Ethics, 1908; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics; Hoffding, Philosophy
of Religion, Kant, Critique of Practical Reason and Metaphysics of Morals;
Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory; G. E Moore, The Field of Ethics;
Paulsen, System of Ethics, trans, by Thilly; R. B. Perry, The Moral
Economy and Present Philosophical Tendencies, Chap. XIV.; Rashdall, The
Theory of Good and Evil, 2 vols., 1907; Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics;
Spenser, Principles of Ethics,
508 REALISM
and evolution, but only their universality. For there is un-
deniably an existential evolutionary process, and in this process
just aots, motives, and persons appear and disappear, as do also
beautiful "things" and qualities. But justice and beauty and
truth themselves do not change, but remain eternal, quite outside
of time and space.
There is, then, a realm of values that is not subject to the
stresses and strains of this slowly evolving earth and this starry
universe. And such a realm is itself organized, i.e., values stand
in definite relations to one another. They may perhaps be well
described as subsisting in various dimensions, for, on the one
hand, they are not reducible to one another, and, on the other
hand, each would seem to subsist in various degrees. This is
indicated, perhaps, by the fact that in our ordinary discourse
we compare, e.g., any three things of which beauty can be predi-
cated as beautiful, more heautiful, and most heautifid; three
modes of conduct as just, more just, and most just. This means
that, in relation to any two ''things," A and B, that are beautiful
or just, there is another, C, between them, which is of such a
character that the three subsist in the order A, C, B ; then, also,
between A and C there is another degree, D, as there is also
between C and B, and so on. One will readily recognize that
we have here that which fulfils the logical requirements of a
dimension that is at least a dense or compact series ; ^ for the
relation of "less beautiful than" or "less just than" is asym-
metrical and transitive.
The realm of values may, perhaps, be organized also in other
ways, as, e.g., by relations of similarity and difference, which
generate classes in the well known order of genus and species.
But it is not our purpose to become involved in the perplexing
intricacies of the question as to what such a classification or
classifications may be, since such a problem may better be left
to a detailed treatise on values.- Our purpose is, rather, at this
point to consider existential values, and to inquire if there is
anything contained in them or in the situations in which they
occur that throws light upon the teleological problem.^
' Cf. Chap. XLIII., vir., viii., ix.; also A. P. Brogan in Proceedings of
Am. Phil. Assoc, Phil. Revieu\ Vol. XXIV., No. 2.
' 8ee bibliography at end of preceding chapter.
• See Chap. VII.
REALISM'S TELEOLOGY AND THEOLOGY 509
Such an inquiry leads at least to results that are positive,
and to a fairly precise specification of the sense in which there
is teleology in the existential process of the universe. For, that
it is a process in which stars and planets, earth crust and earth
depths, rocks and rills, plants and animals, nay even elements
and atoms participate, is a fact of general scientific acceptance,
albeit science also shows quite as decisively that there are cer-
tain 'things" which are not processes, and do not evolve. Space
and time, numbers, logical principles, and even the principles of
change themselves are examples of such exceptions. Further,
it is good realistic philosophy to accept this scientific position
without its further transformation,* although this does not mean
that the implications of scientific results are not, if possible, to
be discovered, and that, in many instances, to do this is the
special task of the philosopher.
If, now, process is change, then, whether it is evolution or
not (for evolution 7nay imply progress toward a goal), it is at
least direction in the logical sense of this term.^ For change,
whether it be change of position (motion) or of quality, and
whether it be continuous, dense, or discontinuous, both presup-
poses and is correlated with time. But time is a series of
instants related asymmetrically and transitively, and in this
sense has, or is direction. Whether, now, the "world
process" be motion or qualitative change, or hoth, and,
also, whether it be one or many processes, it has direction
because of its correlation with time. In other words, the
process "goes" one way, and one way only, and is, in this sense,
irreversible.
However, not only has the world process direction in this
sense, but there is also empirical evidence to show that the
physical universe has or is direction in still another manner.
There is evidence that the physical universe is ' ' running down. ' '
Seemingly its end (do we here get teleology if reAo? means
end?) is to become wholly "run down," and then, no more
process! The empirical facts in this connection are frequently
referred to in philosophical writings these days, and are used
to support all sorts of conclusions, which oftentimes they
* See Chaps. IV. and XXVIII.
* Cf. Chaps. XL, and XLIIL, vii.-ix.
510 REALISM
do not really support.^ Here these facts need only brief
mention.^
The greater number of physical processes or energy trans-
formations throughout the whole universe are exothermic, i.e.,
they give off heat. Scientifically this means that, side by side
with other energy transformations, as, e.g., that of kinetic energy
into electrical energy, there is always a transformation into heat
energy. But heat energy, like other energy forms, is the product
of two factors, namely, an extensity and an intensity or po-
tential. In the case of heat energy these factors are, respectively,
specific heat and temperature, while in electricity they are those
factors that are measured in coulombs and volts respectively,
and in a gas or vapor, e.g., steam, they are volume and pressure.
The latter case is illuminative of the principles which we wish
to make clear.
The piston-head in the cylinder of a steam engine is forced
back and forth only on condition that there is a difference of
potential, i.e., of pressure on its two sides, and such pressure
varies directly with variations in the temperature, provided the
volume is constant. The pressure is a function of the tempera- ;
ture. From this and similar instances, of which there are many, 1
the generalization is made, as identical in part with "the seconid,
law" of energy (the first law being that of conservation), th^tj
the condition for the occurrence of an event is a differeiice 6f\
potential that is uncompensated by "anything" else. Were!
there not such uncompensated potential differences, then nothing]
could occur.'* There would be no events, no processes at all, but
everything would be at a standstill — at least everything in the
physical universe.
But it is to just such a standstill that our physical universe is
tending. For all other energy transformations are accom-
panied by the production of heat, and heat is an energy that
cannot be confined within limits; it spreads out, and, as it does
this, tends to become of a uniform temperature or potential,
which is the very condition that is inhibitive of process and
event.
* For example, Bergson's use of these facts in Creative Evolution.
'' The best general presentation of those matters is by Soddy, Matter
and Energy, in The Home University Library yeriea.
' iSee Helm, Die Energetik.
REALISM'S TELEOLOGY AND THEOLOGY 511'
The crucial fact here is the impossibility of confining the heat.
In order to confine heat perfect non-conductors would be neces-
sary, but these are not to be found. Were they accessible, then
a means of control, a means of coordinating the heat extensities
and the temperatures, and so of directing the heat energy, would
be available. Indeed, if a similar control of other energies were
also at hand, then would the construction of a perpetual motion
machine be quite possible. However, as "things" actually
stand, no such means of control are at our disposal, and the
unavailability of the greater part of all energy is accepted as
a firmly established conclusion in the physical sciences. Taken
together with the correlation of all change with time, this great
empirical fact of the "running down of the physical universe"
is empirical evidence that it has direction^ although such a con-
elusion is weakened by recent discoveries of radio-active sub-
stances, and, perhaps also, by the "theory of relativity."
Shall we, now, identify this empirically established direction
with teleology ? If we do, we should remind ourselves, however,
that such direction of itself implies no growth in complexity,
no higher organisms developing out of lower ones, 7io purpose
in any usual sense of this term, 7io advance and no progress in
that sense in which we like to think these, but only a mere
asymmetry and "transitivity" of change, a swing ever forward
and never backward, an ever continued expenditure with no
recovery." Indeed, even if we endeavor to interpret this direc-
tional phase of change by the concepts, "means" and "end,"
we get but a paraphrase of our original facts, and are no better
satisfied than before. For both means and end are then but
members of a series, with the means as earlier asymmetrically
related to the end as later.
We must conclude, therefore, that the identification of the
teleology of the existential process with its temporal direction
and its "running down" is not a very satisfactory solution of
the teleological problem. Better perhaps deny teleology alto-
gether, than take the heart out of it by an explanation which
shows that, even if we identify evolution with such phases of
change, there is naught of advance, of progress, of betterment,
in any appealing human sense.
" Cf. Bergson's conclusions, quite opposed to this, in Creative Evolution.
512 REALISM
Fortunately, however, empirical facts forbid our making any-
such identification, or, better, limitation. The physical world-
process is direction in the sense just presented, though its cor-
relation with time is a more firmly established fact than is its
"running down." But the world-process is also more than
direction in either of these two senses. For if we identify change
with evolution we can show empirically that all evolution is
marked by the produciion of something new?'^ New wholes,
and, among these, values arise that did not exist before ; progress
and betterment take place in just this sense.
So far as logic is concerned, change might be limited to mo-
tion, and then there might be no qualitative advance, no appear-
ance of values, and certainly no increase in values. But it is
an empirical fact, that within the universe there are qualities
and qualitative changes. These changes are, frequently, at
least, in correlation with motion, as they are invariably, also,
with time, and perhaps, also, with space ; hut they are not
identical with motion, any more than is that change of motion's
velocity which is acceleration. There are also entities in the
universe that are not change, and that are qualitatively different
from one another. Numbers, cpace and time, and other sub-
sistents, as, e.g., subsistent values, are among such entities. The
physical universe would also seem to contain entities that do
not change or evolve. Thus at the present time electrons are
regarded as playing this role. But, also, as we have seen, there
are organizing relations of various type- and in innumerable
specific instances. Accordingly there is an existential creative
synthesis that is also a temporal process in which there arise
new wholes with new properties. These properties undeniably
have their place in the evolutionary scheme of things.
The general principles that hold for such a creative process
need not be restated ; ^^ it suffices at this point to dwell only
upon the empirical data at our disposal. Thus, when, in the
biological field, we take the evidence at hand and look backward,
we are convinced that those phenomena and qualities which
are presented by, e.g., the protozoa, as the lowest forms of life,
were lacking in those inorganic chemico-physical complexes that
existed before life arose. Similarly these protozoa as the
"See Chap. XLIII., iv.-\x ''Chap. XLllL, ibid.
REALISM'S TELEOLOGY AND THEOLOGY 513
progenitors of multicellular organisms do not present all those
characteristics, such as specific modes of reaction, of sensitivity,
of conduction of stimuli, of sex-reproduction, which these higher
organisms plainly manifest. Also, as we review the evolution
of civilized man, we find that, while our savage ancestors may
have evinced, e.g., the altruistic instincts of kindness toward
and of sacrifice for the young, and perhaps for still other mem-
bers of the tribe, they nevertheless did not manifest that
peculiar state of affairs which is the moral consciousness of
civilized man. Indeed, if one dispute this, and maintain that
there was a moral consciousness among early savage peoples,
with a development only in degree and not in kind, from them
to us, then our point can he made by going still further back,
say, to the period of the ape-like ancestors of man, or even to
our invertebrate progenitors. Somewhere a point is reached
on one side of which the moral situation is lacking, and on the
other is present.
The principle is not different for every quality, characteristic,
and situation (and situations are complex entities with definite
characteristics) that has appeared in the whole evolutionary
process, with the result, that, if this principle is not accepted, it
is at the cost of denying all discontinuous appearances and neiv
^'things," and therefore of maintaining that all is one and
continuous, with differences only of degree, which, if not ap-
parent, are at least potential. Glorious name, indeed, is this to
conjure with, and to pretend to knowledge where we are
ignorant ! But inglorious means is it for denying the facts of
experience, and the wonderful diversity of the qualitative riches
of this universe.
For realism, however, all characteristics, all objects, all situa-
tions and their qualities, even those that are called illusory and
hallucinatory, are real in some sense, for, clearly, within the
universe they must all have their place.^' Then even more
clearly and more strongly, perhaps, do the qualities and situa-
tions and complexes that appear in the great evolutionary proc-
ess of life appeal to our acceptance. Innumerable such entities
there are, that at one time are lacking, but that at another time
are present, having somehow and somewhere sprung into exist-
" Chap. XLHI,, Hid.
514 REALISM
enee when tefore they did not exist. Yet they all had their
antecedents. For that interpretation of evolution which we are
presenting does not in the least deny agency or power, or
efficiency, but, on the contrary, emphasizes these entities.^^ Yet
it does deny the non-creativeness of that great process, and
therefore also the perfect continuity of its career and the eternal
oldness and sameness of all that exists. And, accordingly, it
denies that evolution is mere direction and correlation either
with an asymmetrical time series, or with a ''running down,"
or with both.
Evolution is creative. Direct empirical evidence compels U3
to admit that there is a newness, a creation, an ascent in situa-
tions, in complex states of affairs. And some of these situations
present, as their characteristics, entities that are values. Human
history, if one carefully surveys its long succession of chapters,
but especially if one compares it with the chapters of organic
life that antedated the human, is quite sufficient to convince
one of this.
The moral situation has been selected for such considerations
both because it is typical and because it is important. But a
detailed examination of the data at hand shows that there are
also many other values that, although now existent, have not
always existed.
Here as elsewhere in the evolutionary process, with its ever-
appearing new characteristics and qualities, we cannot, there-
fore, but conclude that there is an efficient agent or power to
produce all values. In other words, there is a power that
"makes for" values, that leads to them, or that produces them.^*
Just which of these terms is best, must be decided by analysis.
But the fundamental fact remains, since there are values, and
these values are produced in the general evolutionary process,
that that which produces or leads to them must for that very
reason, if for no other, itself he a value.
This conclusion, however, brings a new solution to the teleo-
logical problem, and leads us to the very verge of the theological
problem,^^ if, indeed, we are not already in its midst. For, of
" See Chap. XLIII., ii.
*♦ Cf. Holl'ding, Philosophy of Religion, for a similar position.
" Chap. VIII.
REALISM'S TELEOLOGY AND THEOLOGY 515
all that we might seem justified to call "ends," it is values,
especially moral values, that would seem to make the strongest
claim to be so designated. And if a process might seem to
deserve the term teleologieal, for any other reason than that it
is direction, it is because of its creative and accumulative power
to produce that which conforms in some degree at least to the
standards of truth, goodness, and beauty. The several facts,
(1) that concrete situations among human beings take on some
of these value characters in greater or less degree, (2) that,
as they do this, the realm of perfect goodness, beauty, and truth
seem to be ever more nearly approached, and, finally, (3) that
there is such an evolutionary process of advance and progress
as to bring about this approach, are together identical with the
teleological character of our universe.
Whether, now, this teleology be interpreted as "immanent"
or as "transcendent" is, perhaps, a relatively unimportant
question.^^ The former view has, under the influence of Ob-
jective Idealism, become the fashion in most modern philo-
sophical writing, although in traditional philosophy it has been
a transcendent teleology that has been more frequently accepted.
Such a teleology has usually been identified with some such
position as that the existential universe is a mechanism which,
in the hands of an external Agent or Purposer, is the means for
the accomplishment of His ends. Clearly this position is based
on an analogy ^^ with the construction of instruments by human
beings, while the "end" that is "aimed at" is interpreted in
Strictly human, yet more or less vague terms — usually the
former.
In contrast to this, the position that has just been previously
presented is identical with, in its own specific way, both a
transcendent and an immanent teleology. It is an immanent
teleology, since, as regards that great creative evolutionary
process, there is no existential agent that is external to it as a
whole. Its earlier phases are external to its later, and various
phases are discontinuous with one another, as they must be in
order to have the process genuinely creative, but they are all
phases of one total process.
But it is also a transcendent teleology. Justice, as we have
" See Chap. VIII. '' See Chap. XX.
516 REALISM
found, subsists independently of just acts, just motives, and
just persons.^** This does not deny, however, the relatedness
of justice to these existents, but offers only another instance
of the independence, accompanying relatedness, of all subsistents
on existents. Existents, however, are always those particular
instances which, under temporal and spatial conditions, the great
existential evolutionary process creates. They therefore involve
the characteristics that the specific subsistent processes, plus
something more, even as the uniform acceleration of a par-
ticular moving particle (assuming that uniform means con-
tinuous) involves the order of the number continuum and some-
thing more,^^ and, also, the motion of the existent particle some-
thing more than mere continuity, mere space and time, or all
of these together. In a similar way, space and time are some-
thing more than number, although they are each an instance of
the same "order system."
In all these instances, now, the "higher" or more fundamental
may be said to be both immanent in, and also transcendent to
the "lower" "level." And the case is not different with justice
and other values, ethical, aesthetic, and cognitive. These are all
both transcendent to and immanent in their particular existential
instances. Accordingly, an evolutionary process that creates
these instances presents an immanent teleology, while that uni-
verse which is iiiclusive not only of this process, hut also of the
realm of subsistents presents a transcendent teleology.
But a further question now arises. Are the subsistent values
by themselves, in their relations to one another, and in respect
to the realm which they constitute, to be denied agency or
efficiency? We must answer "no." The existential process is
undeniably an efficient one, for it is one that "produces,"
"causes," and "brings about." But to limit efficiency to ex-
istential processes, even though one does keep causation and per-
haps "production'' within this field, is quite unjustified. For
subsistent entities are such that they make a difference to the
other entities of the universe, even though they have no causal
effect. Thus, e.g., the number continuum, space and time, con-
dition other entities, both simple and complex, and in this sense
are active. So also is the entire realm of subsistent values an
" See the preceding chapter. " Chap. XLHI., vn.-x.
REALISM'S TELEOLOGY AND THEOLOGY 517
efficient one, — an effieieney which would seem to be confirmed
by the fact that human beings are actuated by ideals that have
never yet received concrete existential form. For who would
be so rash as to maintain, e.g., that any society of men has
ever yet attained the ideal of an organization in which perfect
justice is rendered to all? Yet who among thinking men denies
that this ideal is something to struggle and to strive for? And
upon whom does the efficiency of this ideal not fall with com-
pelling force?
The realistic solution of the theological problem can now be
stated. Negatively, this solution rejects the pragmatic view, that
"God" is but a successful and satisfactory "working scheme,"
a racially subjective concept become traditional and so almost
immediate to our consciousness, and yet one that is, after all,
only invented as an adaptation to a chaotic environment.^" Re-
jected also are the phenomenalistic view, that God is an object
of faith, but not of cognition, and the objective idealistic view,
that God is a psychical being of the nature of will or of intellect,
an absolute ego, etc., who is relater of all entities, and so the
fundamental underlying reality of the universe.'^ Rejected
are perhaps other views, also. On the other hand, positively,
for realism, God is the totality of values, both existent and sub-
sistent, and of those agencies and efficiencies with which these
values are identical. He is also at once the multiplicity of these
entities and the unity of their organization in that they are
related. This means that God is justice and truth and beauty,
both as these are "above" our world and as they are in it, and
that He is thus both transcendent and immanent. Accordingly,
if God is personality. He is also more than personality even as
the moral situation among men is more than personality. He
is love and affection and goodness, respect and reverence, as
these exist among and in men, but He is these also as they sub-
sist by themselves, and act efficiently upon men. In brief, God
is Value, the active, "living" principle of the conservation of
values and of their efficiency.
Yet God is not all. There are values, but not all is value.
='" See Chaps. IX., X., XIII., ii.. XXXIII
^' See Chaps. XXIX., and XXXIV.-XXXVIII.
518 REALISM
For there are also '^ non-value" entities. But, also, if the uni-
verse is that totality of all entities which are facts in some
sense, there is not only the realm of non-values, such as numbers,
space and time, electrons, atoms, masses, molecules, and the like,
but there is also the realm of falsity and error, and, especially,
of evil and ugliness, that is directly opposed to the true, the
good, and the beautiful. This problem of evil is not an easy
one, and hardly any solution of it will meet with wide accept-
ance. Only a brief analysis of it can be made at this juncture.
Philosophical literature is full of endeavors to argue evil out
of existence, — indeed, out of reality, and it is primarily upon the
basis of the positive evidence by which these arguments can be
shown to fail, that our own positive conclusion is established.
One such argument leads to that monistic and idealistic con-
clusion in which all ^'things" are "made" the manifestations
and mere appearances of one great underlying entity that is
usually interpreted as spiritual in character.^- According to
this position all appearances occur as differentiated into pairs
of terms that are relative and not merely related to each other.^^
Cause and effect, subject and predicate, up and down, good and
evil, are examples. The logical outcome of this position is that
all of these differences disappear in the Absolute One that under-
lies them ; yet the inconsistent reservation is usually made, that
in the instance of good and evil the latter alone loses its identity.
Thus it is that the urgent attempt is made to argue evil out
of existence, and out of reality. However, systems of this type
have been previously found "* to fail in many respects, so that
we omit the further examination of their endeavor to solve the
problem of evil.
Another argument concerning evil claims, however, more seri-
ous attention, namely, that argument which is based on the
general doctrine of evolution, and which accordingly claims that
anything which is a "means to an end" that is itself good, or,
indeed, that anything which is even only an incident in the pro-
duction of good, is a fortiori itself a good. This premise is then
used to demonstrate that everything, e.g., poverty, is either such
'"" See Chaps. XXXIV.-XXXVIII.
" See Chap. XXXV.
*« Chaps. XXXIV.-XXXVJIJ,
REALISM'S TELEOLOGY AND THEOLOGY 519
a mediate or such a final good. For, it is argued, that, e.g.,
poverty is merely an incident in that universal struggle for
existence which is part of the mechanisyn for producing the fittest
dnd the best among human beings. Or, to take another example,
that of ugliness, this is transformed, if not into beauty, at least
into a good and a value. For, it is asked, Is not ugliness a
means in that it not only implies and furnishes a contrast with
its opposite, beauty, but also causes us to appreciate the latter?
And then, finally, there is injustice. Superb role it is held to
play — namely, not only that of making its opposite, justice,
logically possible, as "up" makes "down," but also that of
being in its practice the royal road to its own gradual elimina-
tion and the coming of the opposite ideal, justice. If this argu-
ment holds for such typical cases, it holds also for other instances,
with the result that there is nothing "under the sun" that is
not at least a good as a means to some final end which is itself
either good, or true, or beautiful.
The ways by which this argument can be refuted are found
both in its own inherent weaknesses, and in directly controvert-
ing facts. The weakness of the argument lies in its generaliza-
tion, that, even though ive cannot understand how specific
instances of seeming evils are really goods, nevertheless we
must grant that they are, and act accordingly. Appeal is thus
made to our ignora^ice, and we are asked to convert the proposi-
tion, that we do not know this or that to be evil, into the
proposition, that we know it not to be an evil. But, clearly, if
we are ignorant, then the evidence is neither pro nor con, and
the position, that there are some irreducible evils, is quite ag
justified as is the opposed more optimistic generalization.
However, it is to the acceptance, not of the mere seemingness
of evil and ugliness, but of their actuality, that the great ma-
jority of good men direct their practical activities for human
betterment. Indeed, if the fighting of evil were good merely
because of the fight, and not because of the evil, then would the
fight be self-defeating. Practically and actually, however, men
fight evil, not for the sake of the fight, but because evil is evil,
and because they wish to eliminate it and replace it with good.
Not the fight, therefore, nor the evil, but the fighting evil is
good, and this is so, because evil is evil and good is good.
520 REALISM
"We must conclude, that evil is an entity that retains its own
peculiar character, and that is not transformable into, nor reduci-
ble to, positive values. It is an immediate and self-sufficient
entity that, although it is opposed to, is not in the least dependent
upon, good, although, of course, it is related to good, which is
quite possible, since relatedness does not imply dependence, as
we have repeatedly discovered.
The general character of our solution of the theological prob-
lem, as this is based on our solution of the problem of goods
and of evils, is sufficiently indicated in these considerations.
It is a solution that supports a theistic, and not a pantheistic
position, and that holds to the irreducihle f actuality of evil and
of "powers for evil," as well as of good and of "powers for
good."
God is "above" the world of existents, in that He is Justice
and Goodness and Beauty and Truth as these subsist eternally
is a non-temporal and non-spatial realm. This is transcendent
Theism. But He is in the world even as concrete particular
existences conform in a greater or less degree to these ideals.
Above the world in this sense, God is supernatural, yet this
does not mean that He in any sense contradicts nature. For
God and nature are each a different universe of discourse, a
different realm. But there is also evil, both in a subsistent
realm and in existents, and this can neither be argued out of
its actuality nor reduced to anything else.
The religious consciousness may accordingly be described as
the persistent conviction that there are these two powers, and
that each is efficient in the realm of human motives and acts,
deeds and accomplishments. Eespect and reverence and love
for values and worths and for all that either is these or that
"makes for" them, form part of the religious consciousness.
But another part also is the hatred and detestation of all that
is evil and ugly and false, and the desire and will to fight these.
Such a consciousness is, however, clearly opposed to the passive
and inactive philosophical position that evil is but a means to
an end, or that it is mere appearance, so that "God's in His
heaven, all's right with the world," but it is, rather, the active,
militant attitude of hatred and of combativeness. The passive
position is blighting, but the active is full of life. Yet evil
REALISM'S TELEOLOGY AND THEOLOGY 521
does not therewith become good — as a means to stimulating the
effort for its own annihilation. For it is not the evil, but the
hatred of evil that is the stimulus. Freedom, too, is given for
the fight. For that level of existence at which there is the
love of good and the hatred of evil, is one that is the result
of a creative process in which new "things" appear that, as
new, are free to follow their own nature.
Such a scheme of life is one neither of resplendent optimism
nor of enervating pessimism. Evil is a reality, and deserves
only to be fought. But the means are given to do this. For
there is a Power for good that works not only side by side
with man, but also in him and through him, flowering in that
freedom which is given to his reason to get at truth, to his
emotions to love the beautiful, the good, and the true, and
detest the ugly, the evil, and the false, and to his will and
manhood to engage in the struggle.
INDEX
The Index supplements the Table of Contents, but does not duplicate
it: notes, as well as subject-matter, are indexed. The references are to
pages, f. signifying " and following page," ff., " and following pages."
Absolute One, The ; see One, The Ab-
solute.
Absolute Will, 337 f.
Absolutism, 347 ff . ; in Phenomenal-
ism, 225; in Pragmatism, 296 ff.
Absurd, the, 132 f.; 143 ff.
Acceleration, 281 ff.; see Motion.
Adaptation, 290 ff.
Addition, as an operation, 415 ff.
Affirmation and denial, 147 ff.
Agnostic Monism, 354 f.
All-inclusiveness, of the universe,
432 ff.
Alternative hypotheses, necessity of
using, in problem of error, 377 ff.
Analogy; limitations of, 154; use of,
152 ff.
Analysis, 141 ff., 278 ff.; as valid,
27, 896 ff.; and "thing" ana-
lyzed, 396 ff. ; fact of, as a pre-
supposition, 426 ff.; faulty, 160 ff.;
instances of, 382 ff. ; view of, in
Phenomenalism, 229 f.
Analysis in situ, 27 ff., 86 f., 158 ff.,
208 ff., 210, 367 ff., 390; method
of, as a presupposition, 427.
Anaximenes, 81.
Anselm, 62, 63.
Antecedence; logical, 51 ff., 57; psy-
chological, 51 ff.
Antecedent and consequent, 147 ff.
Anti-iritellectualism, 34, 80 f., 274 ff.;
as a false position, 400 ff.
Antinomies. 35, 160 ff., 165 ff.
Anti-substance doctrine, the, 273 ff.
Apodictic, 221 ff.
Appearance and reality, 205 ff. ; in
monistic systems, 346 ff.
Aquinas, 58, 62 f.
Aristotle, 13 f., 62 f., 101, 108, 116,
129, 150, 203, 214, 285; evidence
of his use of the physical thing
as the model for thinking, 30 ff.
Assumptions, the method of making,
390 ff.
Atoms, 387 f.
Augustine, 62 f.
Avenarius, 46.
Awarene88,478 ; as a dimension,474 ff.
Bacon, Roger, 89.
Baldwin, M., 448.
Bawden, H., 285.
Beautiful, The, 496 ff.
Beauty, 60.
Beck, J. S., 312.
Behavior, 89 f .
Behaviorism, 477 f.
Bergson, H., 36, 43, 124, 136, 152,
170 ff., 276 ff., 290, 297 f., 303,
342 f., 464, 466, 511.
Berkeley, 58, 62, 108, 181, 185, 214,
233 ff., 325, 327.
Biology, 3, 342 ff.
Bolyai, J., 12.
Bosanquet, B., 109.
Bradley, F. H., 10, 59, 63, 168, 183,
187,*214, 330.
Broad, L. N., 218.
Brogan, A. P., 508.
Brown, H. C, 7, 11 f.
Burnet, J., 166.
Caird, E., 186, 323 f.
Calculus, 281 ff.
Calkins, M. W., 186, 324.
Cassirer, E., 175.
Categories, 13, 17, 107, 222 ff.
Causation, 55, 182 ff., 214 f., 402 ff.;
as limited, 292 ff., 448 ff.; as uni-
versal, 391 ff.; as universal, in
Naturalism, 260 ff.; postulate of,
216 ff.; universal, postulate of, as
self-contradictory, 418 f.
Causation-philosophies, 9 f.
Cause, 33, 155 ff.
Causes, 208 ff.; Aristotle's four, 32.
Change, 62, 280 ff.; see Motion; cor-
rect analysis of, 169 f.; incorrect
analysis of, 168 f.; qualitative,
analysis of, 464 ff.
Chaos. 54 ff., 331.
Chemical entities, 444 ff.
Classes, 16, 34, 91, 112 ff., 188 ff.;
contradictory, 415 ff.; definition
of, 193.
Classification, nature of, 15.
Class of classes, 361.
Coffee, P., as a modern schplaatio
523
524
INDEX
showing the character of the
Aristotelian tradition, 31.
Collections, 192 f.
Compact, defined, 194.
Complexes; relational, 101 ff., 112 ff.,
178 ff., 183 ff., 281 ff., 293 ff.,
275 ff., 375 ff., 421 ff., 472 ff.; spe-
cific, as organized wholes, 194 f.
Comte, 46 f.
Concepts. 113 f.; nature of, 188 ff.
Connections, knowledge of, 145 ff.
Connotation, 113 f.
Consciousness; as an end causal ef-
fect, 483 ff. ; as a relation, 481 ff. ;
as a non-spatial, non-temporal,
qualitatively distinct variable,
470 ff., 484 ff. ; as a substance,
439 ff.; as a substance, implica-
tions of theory of, 374 ff. ; as use-
ful, 287 f . ; continuity of, in evo-
lution, 337 ff. ; dimensional and
relational theory of, bibliography
of, 470; problem of the nature of,
89 ff. ; problem of the nature of,
solution in Phenomenalism, 229 f . ;
problem of the first kind of, 91 ff. ;
problem of, and problem of error,
438 ff.; relational view of, 42 f.;
substance view of, as making
genuine knowing impossible, 42;
the religious, 520 f . ; undeniable
fact of, 486 ff.
Conscious processes, classification
of, 97 f.
Conservation; of energy, 90 f.,
257 ff., 262 ff.; of values, 509 ff.;
principle of, in general, 257 ff.
Consistency, 6 ff., 135; as a presup-
position, 418 ff.; as distinct from
implication, 419 ff.; definition of,
421.
'• Consistents," definition of, 490.
Continuity, 57, 161 ff., 165 ff.; analy-
sis of, 451 ff.; and experiment,
462; definition of, 194, 461.
Continuous series, examples of, 462.
Continuum, linear, 461.
Contradiction, 161 ff., 278 ff.; Being
of, as a presupposition, 414 ff.;
fundamental, in Phenomenalism,
227 ff. ; fundamental, in Pragma-
tism, 300 ff. ; in systems opposed
to Realism, 230 ff. ; in Objective
Idealism, 331 ff.; in proof of Ab-
solute One, 357 ff.; law of, 106 f.,
136 ff.; principle of, use of, 285,
318 ff.; principle of, formal use
of, 186 ff.; self-, 6 ff,, 136 flf.
Contradictories, 141 ff., 149 f.
Contradictory, The, 17.
Contradictory attributes, their sub-
sistence in different loci, 375 ff.
Contradictory propositions, 136 ff.
Contradictory terms, 136 ff.
Contraries, 149 f., 161 ff.
Converse, 115; of a relation, 101.
Correctness, formal, of reasoning
process, 119 f.
Correlation, 171 ff., 449 f.; of series,
23; not identical with identity,
381 f., 477 ft".
Correspondence, 290 ff., 448 f .
Cosmological argument, 63.
Cosmological problem, solution of,
in Phenomenalism, 286 f.
Cosmology, of monistic systems,
345 ff. ; of Subjective Idealism,
239.
Cosmos, 54 ff., 58 ff.; the, 437 ff.;
the, for Realism, 443 ff. ; logical
origin of, for Objective Idealism,
331 ff.
Costello, H. T., 158.
Counting, in relation to number,
150 f.
Creative synthesis, and values,
500 ff.
Creighton, J. E., 109.
"Cuts," 458 ff.
Darwin, 285 ff.
Deduction, 16.
Deism, 58 ff.
Deity, The, .')4 ff., 58 ff., 66 f.,
187 ff., 233 ff., 328 ff., 517 ff.; in
monistic systems, 346 ff. ; in Nat-
uralism, 260; in Phenomenalism,
225.
Democritus, 262.
Denial, see Presupposition.
Denotation, 113f.
Density; analysis of, 451 ff.; defi-
nition of, 194; postulate of,
461.
Denumerable, definition of, 461.
Descartes, 46, 58, 108, 129, 204, 214,
264 f.
Design, 62 ff.
Determinism, 338.
De Vries, H., 287.
Dewey, J., 73, 110, 283 ff., 293, 297.
Dictum de omni ct nullo, 116.
Dimensions; and elements, 471 ff.;
definition of, 471; non-spatial and
non-temporal, 472 ff. ; within the
universe, 471 ff.
INDEX
52^
Direction, logical, 194; of processes,
509 flf.
Discontinuity, 161 ff.; analysis of,
451 ff.; definition of, 194, *462; in
evolution, 513 ff.
Discourse, universe of, 175.
Discovery, 24, 27; and Realism,
438 ff.
Disjunction, 141 ff.
Distance, 145 f.
Distinctness; numerical, 498; of
truth and certainty, as a presup-
position, 424 f.; not identical with
discontinuity, 464.
Distribution, 117.
Dream-objects, nature of, 92 S.
Driesch, H., 343.
Dynamic view, the, of modern
science, 336 ff.
Efficiencies; non-causal, 442 ff., 451;
non-existential, 479 ff., 516 ff.
Ego, the, 325 ff. ; as a substance,
33 f . ; Absolute, see Absolute One.
Ego-centric predicament, 219 ff.,
322; as solved in Phenomenalism,
228 f . ; as solved in presupposi-
tions of Subjectivism, 240 f . ; solu-
tion of, 208'ff., 212 ff., 365 ff; see
Predicament.
Electrons, 287 f.
"Elements"; in Positivism, 244 ff.;
psychical, 389 f.
Elimination, virtual, 27 ff., 207 ff.
Elliott, H. S. R., 171.
Emotional experience, 124 f.
Emotionalism, 276 ff.
Empedocles, 51.
Endlessness, analysis of, 451 ff.
Energy, 262 ff. ; conservation of,
510 ff.; as Will, 338 f.
Entelechy, 343.
Entities; of the universe, classifica-
tion of, 486 ff., 494 ; types of, ex-
amples of, 488.
lipistemological problem, 203 ff.,
430; other problems as independ-
ent of, 53 ; solution of, in monistic
systems, 349.
Epistemology; its dominance in
modern philosophy, 25; science as
independent of, 25.
Erdmann, B., 121.
Error; definition of, 295; nature of,
293 ff. ; possibility of, as a pre
supposition, 429; the residual ele-
ment in, 376 ff. ; problem of, and
problem of consciousness, 438 ff. ;
problem of, bibliography of, 439;
problem of, in Pragmatism,
290 ff. : problem of, in Phenom-
enalism, 228 f.
Error-objects, as part of the cos-
mos, 378, 433 ff. ; as subsistents,
377.
Ethical Idealism, 330 f., 333 f .
Ethical Monism, 341.
Ethics, see Values.
Ethics; in Phenomenalism, 225;
not a branch of biology, 450 f .
Eucken, R., 43, 342 f.
Euclid, 6, 129.
Evil, 61; as an entity, 518 ff.; as
appearance, 339; problem of,
204 ff., 518 ff.
Evolution, 90 f., Ill, 257 ff., 262 ff.,
280 ff., 283 ff., 305 ff., 335 ff., 509 ;
concept of, in modern Individual-
ism, 402 ff. ; logical necessity of,
as demonstrable, 186 f ., 285,
340 f . ; see Motion.
Evolutionism, degrees of, in Prag-
matism, 295 ff.
Excluded Middle, law of, 107.
Exclusion, 137 ff., 142 ff., 375 ff.,
441 ff.: contradiction as, 417 ff.
Existents, 148, 244 ff., 294f., 305 f.,
388 ff.; definition of, 490; kinds
of, 491 ff.
Ex nihilo, Principle of, 264 f .
Experience, 73 f . ; and experiencing,
81 ff.
Explanation, 381 f.
External relatedness of Jcnotoing
and known, as a presupposition,
428.
External relations, 313 ff.
Fact; definition of, in Phenomenal-
ism, 227 f.; how given, 123 ff,;
nature of, 71 ff.
Fechner, 59.
Fichte, 10, 62 f., 108, 186, 312,
317 ft'., 322. 325, 330, 333, 341.
Finite, definition of, 194, 463.
Finiteness, analysis of, 451 ff.
Force, origin of the idea of, 336.
Fractions; irrational, 456 ff.; ra-
tional, 456 ff.
Freedom, 56, 333 f., 521, 505 f.; defi-
nition of, 449; of new qualities,
448 ff. ; not identical with lawless-
ness, 392 f.; of the will, 394 f.;
to postulate, 7 ff.
Frost, E. P., 89.
Functions, 39 f., 185.
S26
INDEX
Flinctional relations, 27; between
"levels," 508 f.
Functional whole, definition of, 195.
Galileo, 88, 121 f., 156.
Gaps, 165 IT.
Generalization, 126 ff.
Geometry, 18; as illustrating types
of wholes, 196 f. ; different sys-
tems of, 146 f., 419 ff.; modern
method in, 5 ff.
Geulinx, 63.
Good, Absolute, 347 ; The, 496 ff.
Grammar, 99.
Greek Philosophy, 46 f .
Green, T. H., is'e, 322 f., 331.
Haeckel, 262.
Hegel, 10, 47, 59, 62 f., 108, 186,
285 f., 313, 318 ff., 322, 328, 330,
341.
Helm, G., 510.
Herbart, 60.
Hibben, J. G., 42, 58, 159, 206.
Fistorico-pragmatic proof, 64.
History, definition of, 3 ff.
Hobbes, 262.
Hoffding, H., 43, 58, 61, 514.
Holt, E. B., 81, 89, 177, 492.
Humanism, 298 ff.
Humanists, 54 ff.
Hume, 108, 181, 214.
Huntington, E. V., 12, 175, 455,
461, 471, 472, 480.
Husserl, E., 12, 103, 107.
Huxley, 246.
Idealism, 48 t., 84, 88 ; Ethical,
333 ff.; Objective, 9, 214 f., 272;
Platonic, 308 ff.: Subjective, 9 f .,
92 f.
Idealists, 72 ff.
Ideals, 11, 151 f., 309 ff., 394 f.
Identity, The principle of, 105 ff.
Illusions, problem of, solution of,
92 ff., 374 ff.
Illusory objects, 93 f.
Imagination, 126 f.; in art, 127 f.;
in philosophy, 128; in science,
127 f.
Immediatism, 276 f .
Immensity, 49.
Implication, 7, 10, 18, 86, 99 ff.,
114 ff., 155 ff., 196 ff., 391 ff.,
409 ff. ; absence of, instances of,
413 f.; basis of the relation of,
100 ff.; Being of, as a presuppo-
Bition, 412 ff.; limitations of,
422 ff. ; presehce of, and instances
of, 413 f.
Implications, development of, 145 ff.
Implicative situation, the, 103 ff.
Inclusion, complete, partial, or
negative, relation of, 102.
Inconceivability of the opposite, 8,
130 ff., 221, 368.
Inconceivable opposites, examples
of, 130 f.
Independence, 182 ff., 332; and re-
latedness, 20 ff., 24 ff., 41 ff., 76 ff.,
82 f., 174 ff., 178 ff., 207 ff., 382 ff.,
465 ff. ; and relatedness, instances
of, 84 ff.
Individualism, 77 ff., 402 ff.; bibli-
ography of, 403.
Individuality, 107.
Individuals, 16 f., 112 ff., 445 f.
Induction, 121 ff.; necessity of,
292 f., 449.
Inference, its logical conditions,
99 ff.
Infinity, 159 f.; analysis of, 451 f.;
compatible with finitude, 164;
definition of, 193 f., 463.
Influences, emotional, 8.
Inheritance, 120 f.
Instance, meaning of, 20.
Instances, 121 f., 178 ff.
Instincts, 337.
Integers, 456.
Intellectualism, 80 f .
Interaction, 267, 272, 290; limita-
tions of, 292 f.
Internal relations, formulation of
theory of, 37 ff.
Introspection, 264.
Intuition, 124 f., 277.
Inverse, the, of a relation, 101.
James, Wm., 9, 12, 84, 72 f., 110,
124, 206, 264, 273 ff., 283 ff., 290,
293, 297 ff., 302 f.
Joachim, H. H., 76, 331, 350.
Jones, Sir Henry, 206.
Justice, 152; absolute, 498 ff.; as a
non-causal efficiency, 450 f .
Kant, 47, 58, 74, 90, 108, 160 if.,
185, 214, 216 ff., 333.
Kellogg, V. L., 288.
Kempe, A. B., 175.
Knower, Absolute, The, 333.
Knowing; and known object, as re-
lated and independent, 369 ff. ;
and the system S, 321 ; as a re-
lation or a dimension, 88 ff.; as
INDEX
527
a substance, 88; as constitutive,
223 flf.; definition of, 97; in de-
tail and by " lump," difference be-
tween, 381 ff.; nature of, 212 f.;
subsistent, as a presupposition,
428; the Being of, as a presuppo-
sition of philosophy, 423 ff.;
structure of, in Phenomenalism,
220 f.
Knowing situation, the, 28, 81 ff.,
291 f., 312 ff., 373 ff.; analysis of,
by method of analysis in situ,
211 ff., 369 ff.; and theory of ex-
ternal relations, 41 f.
Knowledge; as an organic system,
76; by specification, 158 f.; by
type, 158 f.; conditions for, 109;
extent of, 381 ff.; problem of, in
development of philosophy, 230 ff. ;
nature of, 71 ff.; origin of, 79 ff.;
origin of, solution of problem of
in Phenomenalism, 227 ; none
other than empirical difficulties
in, 378 ff.
Lamarck, 285 ff.
Law, 62 ff. ; and laws, 54 ff.
"Leap," the inductive, 122.
Leibniz, 47, 58, 62, 90, 108, 129.
Leucippus, 262.
Levels, of reality, 449 f.
Life, 512 ff.
Linearity, postulate of, 46 L
Lobatschewsky, N., 6.
Loci, logical, 139 f.; see Contradic-
tion and Exclusion.
Locke, 46, 71 f., 108, 181, 185, 204,
214, 242 f.
Loeb, J., 92, 262, 343, 478.
Logic, 12 ff.; as objective, 15; dis-
covery in, 29, 173; the constitu-
tive, of Kant, 199 ; the new or
non-Aristotelian, 11, 28 ff., 36 f.,
156 ff., 255 f., 358 ff.; the new,
bibliography of, 175; the new,
contrast with the old, 173 ff.;
pragmatic theory of, 109 ff., 199 ;
principles of, as laws of mind,
106; types of, and theories of re-
lations, 198 ff.
Logic, the " old," or traditional, 28,
101 ff., 105, 199, 340; application
of, 213 ff.; and the new, con-
trasted, 366 ff. ; as transformed
into Hegelian logic ; see Underly-
ing reality theory of relations,
proof of; character of, 32 ff.,
155 ff . ; criticism of, 35 f . ; influ-
ence of, in monistic systems,
352 ff.; origin of, 29 ff.; use of,
279.
Logical entities, objectivity of, 20.
Logical priority; among the sci-
ences, 465 ff. ; as a presupposition,
429 ; instances of, 386 f .
I;Ovejoy, A. 0., 93, 376, 439, 440.
Mach, E., 27, 46, 246 f.
Major term, 117 f.
Malebranche, 268.
Manifoldness of the universe, 49 ff.
Marshall, H. R., 264.
Marvin, W. T., 128, 206, 402.
Materialism, 258, 262 f ., 370 f . ; as a
phenomenalistic philosophy, 263.
Materialists, 262.
McCosh, J., 408.
Measurement, 453; and numbers,
468.
Mechanics, 281 ff.; see Motion.
Mechanism, in biology, 342 ff., 388.
" Member of," relation of, 102.
Memory, 126.
" Mentionables," 489 ff.
Middle term, 116.
Mill, J. S., 46, 121, 130.
Miller, D., 89.
Minor term, 117 f.
Minuteness, 49.
Monism, 371 f., 432 ff.; logical, 24,
55; in subjective Idealism, 239.
Monistic Vitalism, 343 f.
Montague, W. P., 483, 492.
Moods, of categorical syllogism,
117.
Moore, G. E., 103.
Moral consciousness, the, 506 f .
Moral situation, the; its nature,
503 ff., 513 f.
Motion, 179 ff., 184 f., 313, 383 ff. ;
see Acceleration, Analysis, Corre-
lation, Continuity, Density, Dis-
continuitv, Finite. Infinitv, Order,
Series; analysis of, 279 S"., 464 ff.;
analysis of, as evidence for exter-
nal relations, 367 f.; incorrect
and correct analysis of, con-
trasted, 170 ff.; modern and cor-
rect analysis of, 281 ff.; Zeno's
analvsis of, 166 ff.
Miinsterberg, H., 60, 69, 330, 287.
Mysticism, 277 ; as rationally de-
fended, 104; bibliography of, 407;
limited validity of, 407.
Naturalism, 9 f ., 47 f., 214, 370 f..
528
INDEX
392 f., 306, 444 f . ; criticism of,
268 ff. ; as a generic doctrine, 261 ;
bibliography of, 259.
N-dimensions, 473 flf.
Necessity, logical, 115.
Negation, 136 flf.
Negative, the, the nature of, 414 flf.
Neo-realism, 48.
Neo-realists, 46.
New Rationalism, The, 43.
Newton, 58.
Nietzsche, 339.
Non-additive wholes, and values,
496 ff.
Non-epistemological problems, in-
dependence of, 431 f.
Numbers, 18; cardinal, 453 ff.;
analysis of, 455 ff. ; irrational,
458 ff.; natural, 150 f., 456; nega-
tive, as realities, 456; real, 461;
signed, 415 ff.
One, The Absolute, 321 ff., 330 ff.;
as a " mentionable," 358 f. ; as
Oneness, 359 ff. ; as a series,
359 ff.; contradictions in proof of,
357 ff. ; nature of, 354 ff. ; as sum-
mum genus, 356 ff.
One and Many, 446, 475 ff.
One-one correspondence, definition
of, 466.
Oneness, of the imiverse, 327.
One, The, not all-inclusive, 436 f.
One Truth, as a system of truths,
as a presupposition, 427 f.
Ontological argument, 63.
Ontological problem, solution of, in
Monism, 345 ff. ; solution of, in
Phenomenalism, 226.
Ontologv, of Subjective Idealism,
238 f'.'
Order, 11, 13 ff.; see Series, and
Logic.
Organic systems, 422.
Organisms, 55, 184 f., 446 f.
^Organization, 56 ff., 246 f., 446 ff.
Origin of knowledge, in monistic
systems, 352.
Ostwald, W., 47, 262.
Outcomes, practical, 275 ff.
Tan-logism, 9 f., 330.
Pantheism, .59 ff., 329.
Panzoism, 34.
Parallelism, psycho-physical, 264 ff.,
370.
Particulars, 11.
Paulsen, F., 89, 152.
Peirce, C S., 175, 293.
Perfect, The, 497 ff.
Perfect Being, 63 ff.
Perfectionism, in monistic systems,
348.
Perry, R. B., 81, 285, 492.
Personality, the unity of, 325 ff.
Pessimism, 52, 339 ff.
Phenomenalism, 34, 48 f., 88, 108 f.,
160 ff., 214, 298 f., 308, 311 ff.,
330 f., 333 ff., 338; bibliography
of, 232; contrast with Subjective
Idealism, 236 f . ; criticism of,
230 ff. ; in Objective Idealism,
331 ff.
Phenomenalists, 72 ff.
Philosophy; and its environment,
44 ff. ; views as to the nature of,
46.
Physical entities, 444 ff.
Physical Thing, the; definition of,
29; influence of, as a model for
thinking, 32 ff., 213 ff.; influence
on the philosophy of the tradi-
tion, 29.
Pitkin, W. B.. 89, 492.
Plato, 13 f., 60, 90, 152, 203, 255,
326, 498.
Pluralism, 358 ff., 373 f., 385 ff.,
432 ff.; in Subjective Idealism,
239; logical, 24, 43.
Poincare, H., 12, 145. 274, 293.
Points, 162, 178 ff.; see Space.
Positivism, 9 f ., 47 ; bibliography
of, 241; cosmology of, 249; on-
tology of, 248 f . ; presuppositions
and criticism of, 251 ff. ; solution
of problems in, 248 ff. ; teleology
in, 249 f . ; theology in, 249 ; valid
elements in, 255 ff.; "values" in,
250.
Positivists, 247.
Postulates; as consistent, related
and independent, 462; in geom-
etry, as related and independent,
420 ff.; in philosophy, Off.; for
Objective Idealism, 318 ff.; for
Positivism, 245 ff.; for series,
455 ff.; of Phenomenalism, 210 ff.;
of Subjective Idealism, 233 ff.
Postulate, the freedom to, 390 ff.
Postulation; method of, 420 ff.;
method of explicit, 6ff. ; method
of, in philosophy, 203 ff., 215.
Pragmatism, 9 f., 88, 109 ff., 214,
370 f., 392 f., 396, 398 ff., 507;
Absolute, Royce's position of, 18;
as a self-contradictory system.
INDEX
529
134 flp.; bibliography of, 307;
criticism of, 301 ff.; inconsisten-
cies in, 399 ff.
Pragmatists, 46, 54 ff., 72 ff., 284.
Predicament; the ego-centric, 81 ff.,
206, 315 f.; solution of, 365 ff.,
372 ff.; the value-centric, 206 ff.
Premises, 116; establishment of,
144 ff. ; of disjunctive syllogism,
141 ff.; of hypothetical syllogism,
147 ff.
Presupposition by denial, 222; of
the principle of contradiction,
140; instances of, in Individual-
ism and Skepticism, 405 ff. ; proof
of, as a logical principle, 1.33 f.;
psychological element in, 134 f.;
the test of, 132 ff.; use of, 17,
19.
Presupposition of premises, 120.
Presuppositions; of systems opposed
to Realism, 26 ff. ; those accepted
by Realism, 231 f.
Principles; as useful, 288; of induc-
tion, 122 ; of proof. Pragmatism's
view of, 297 f.
Priority, logical, 86, 409 ff. ; princi-
ple of, 384 f.
Problems; artificial, 312; false, 44;
false, in philosophy and science,
397 ff.; philosophical, and history,
397 ff.; philosophical, and their
solution, 5; philosophical, nature
of, 396; real, 312 f.
Product, logical, 17.
Progress, in philosophy, 24; prob-
lem of, 509 ff.
Progression, definition of a, 461.
Proof, material principles of, 200.
Propositions; Being of, as a pre-
supposition, 409 ff . ; contradictory,
415 ff.; examples of, 102; rela-
tional, 173; self-contradictory,
132 f.; self-contradictory, exam-
ples of, 139 f.; types of, 112 ff.,
115, 117, 411 f.
Protoplasm, 282.
Psychism, 268 ff., 370; modern.
Idealism as a, 309 f.
Psychological problem, solution of,
in Subjectivism, 239 f.
Psychology, 299, 335 f . ; of thinking,
bibliography of, 95 f .
Purpose, 55 f .
Qualitative difference, between know-
ing and known object, 373 f.
Qualities; disembodied, 475 ff.;
physical, as subjective, 233 ff.;
new, appearance of, 447 ff.
Rationalism, 48, 79 f., 486; see
Realism.
Rationalization, attack on, 278 ff.
Realism, 11 ff., 23, 25, 43, 84 ff.,
212 ff., 242 f., 272 f., 297 f., 310,
316, 406; and epistemology, 431;
and the problem of error, 374 ff. ;
and the theory of external rela-
tions, 41 ff. ; as a basic position,
9 ff. ; as presupposed by opposed
systems, 369 ff., 408 ff., in logic,
100 ff.; in monistic systems,
347 f.; in Naturalism, 260 f.; in
Phenomenalism, 230 ff.; in phi-
losophizing, 104 ff.; in Positivism,
251 ff.; in Pragmatism, 301 ff.; in
Subjective Idealism, 238 ff. ; The
New, bibliography of, 495 f.
Reality, ultimate nature of, for
Realism, 432 ff.
Reason, Freedom of, as a presuppo-
sition, 393 ff., 427.
Reasoning, 390 ff. ; by the use of
words, 95 ff. ; logical conditions
of, 16, 99 ff.
Reductio ad ahsurdum, 132 f,,
150 ff., 160 ff.
Reduction, of some entities to
others, 432 ff.
Reid, 408.
Relatedness; see Independence.
Relation; definition of, 21; how it
relates, theories as to, 176 ff.; in-
verse, 191 ; of knowing to its ob-
ject, appearance and disappear-
ance of, 380 f .
Relations, 14 ff.; additive, 34 f.,
281 f.; as independent, 70 f., 86,
384 ff. ; see Independence ; asym-
metrical, 191; asymmetrical and
transitive, 36, 159, 455 ff.; see
Space and Time; Being of, as a
presupposition, 409 ff.; causal,
387 ff.; dyadic, 191; external, in-
stances of, 382 ff. ; external, as
found in knowing situation,
212 f.; external, theory of, proof
and criticism of, 17811'.; function-
al, 208 ff., 291 f.; internal, theory
of, application of, 213 ff. ; internal,
theory of, as postulated for know-
ing situation, 216 ff.; intransi-
tive, 191 ; modification theory of,
37 ; modification theory of, evi-
dence for, and proof of, 182 ff,;
5S0
INDEX
modification theory of, in Subjec-
tive Idealism, 236 if. ; non-addi-
tive, 163 f., 281 ff., 387 f., 447 ff.;
non-causal, 387 ff. ; non-symmetri-
cal, 191; non-transitive, 191; not
causally related, as a presupposi-
tion, 429 ; of inclusion and exclu-
sion, 112ff. ; of similarity and
difference, 112 ff.; one-many, 192;
one-one, 192; symmetrical, 191;
theories of, and analysis, 426 f . ;
theories of, bibliogra])hy of,
181 f.; theory of external, formu-
lation of, 38; theory of external,
evidence for, 39 ff. ; theories of,
use of, in deriving philosophical
systems, 365 ff.; transitive, 191;
types of, 100 ff., 174 f., 411 ff.;
types of, in modern logic, 157 ff.;
types of, in traditional logic, 155;
types of, summary, 190 ff.; under-
lying-reality theory of, 38, 317 ff.;
underlying-reality theory of, as a
postulate, 331 ff.; underlying-
reality theory of, criticism of,
180 f., 187 ff.; underlying-reality
theory of, proof of, and evidence
for, 185 ff.
Relativism, in Pragmatism, 300.
Religion, 64 f.
Religious consciousness, the, 69.
Renaissance, 203 f .
Responsibility, 394 f.
Rest, 170ff.
Rickert, H., 69.
Riemann, B., 6.
Romanticism, 342 ff.
Royce, J., 12 ff., 62, 135, 175, 183,
186 f., 191, 193, 229 f., 330 f., 350,
410.
Russell, B., 12, 27, 37, 103, 136,
163, 166, 173, 175, 178, 191, 193,
293, 453.
Sabatier, A., 65.
Schelling, 10, 318 ff.
Schiller, F. C. S., 54, 110, 283, 297 f.
Schmidt, K., 7, 12.
Schopenhauer, 59, 318 ff., 339.
Schulze, G. E., 218, 312.
Science, 179 ff., 204 ff.; as positiv-
istic, 256; influence of, in philos-
ophy, 257 ff. ; modern, logic of,
10, 126 ff. .
Sciences, the natural, procedure of,
274 ff.
Self, Absolute, The; see Absolute
One.
Self-contradiction, 183, 417 ff.
Sflf-contradictory, The, 132 ff.
Self-evidence, 8 f., 165 f., 221, 368;
the test of, 129 ff.
Self-evident propositions, examples
of, 129.
Self-refutation, 274.
Self, the, 233 ff. ; as substance,
216 ff. ; the transcendental,
220 ff.
Sensationalism, 79 f., 276 f .
Sensations (and impressions),
243 ff.
Sense experience, 123 f .
Series, 10, 18, 56 f., 156 ff., 169 ff.;
correlation of, 23 ; definition of,
193: nature of, bibliography, 455;
postulates for, 455 ff.
Sharp, A. B., 124.
Sigwart, C, 189.
Similarity, relation of, 188 ff.
Simples, ^61 ff., 178 ff.
Singer, E. A., 89.
Situation, the thinking, analysis of,
114.
Size, 145 f . ; of the universe, 468.
Skepticism, 402 ff.
Smith, N. Kemp, 206.
Soddy, F., 510.
Solipsism, 93.
Sophists, 78.
Space, 162; analysis of, 279 ff.,
451 ff.; analysis of, modern,
158 ff.; see Analysis, Continuity,
Discontinuity, Density, Finite, In-
finity, Series; the world of, 145 f.
Spaulciing, E. G., 89, 158, 164, 177,
230, 280, 467, 478.
Spencer, 46 f., 130.
Spinoza, 10, 46 f., 59, 63, 108, 214,
311.
Standards; aesthetic, 289; ethical,
289.
States of affairs, 11, 25, 84 ff., 104,
112 ff., 318 f.; as known in dif-
ferent philosophical systems, 369.
Stein, L., 9.
Strata, of the universe, 56.
Strong, C. A., 268.
Stuff and stuffs, 51 ff.
'* Sub-classes," 458 ff.
Subjective Idealism, inconsistencies
in, 240 ff., 243.
Subsistents, 11 ff., 50, 98, 148, 294 f,
305 f., 377 f., 394, 444 f.; and
causation, 390 f.; and existents,
theory of, bibliography of, 403;
definition of, 490) kinds of, 491 ff.
INDEX
531
Substance, 33, 155 ff., 161 f., 214 f.,
270 fT., 308 ff., 435 f., 439 ff.; con-
cept of, as applied to " knowing,"
28, 42; in monistic systems, 353 f.
Substance-philosophies, 9.
Substance view, limitations of,
292 f.
Substratum, of the universe, 328.
Subtraction, as an operation,
416 ff.
Summum genus, 55 f .
Syllogism, the, 119; as included in
the new logic, 36; categorical,
102 ff., lllff. ; incorrect, examples
of, 117.
SjTumetry, 21 f.
Synthesis, 158 ff.; creative, 479 ff.;
see Freedom ; non-additive, 282 ff.
System, meaning of, 421 ff.
System, the Being of, as a presup-
position, 421 ff.
Systems, philosophical and geo-
metrical, comparison of, 5ff. ;
philosophical, classification of,
9ff.
System S, The, 18.
Taylor, A. E., 324 f., 331.
Teleology, 152 f., 266 f.; immanent,
515 ff.; immanent, in Volunta-
rism, 338; transcendent, 515 ff.
Terms, Being of, as a presupposi-
tion, 409 ff. ; self-contradictory,
132 f.
Thales, 51.
Theism, 58 ff., 235 ff., 320.
Theological problem, solution of, in
monistic systems, 346 f.
Thermo-dynamics, 510 ff.
Things-in-themselves, 217 ff.
Thinking, " Laws " of, 222.
Thorndike, E. L., 26.
Time, analysis of, 451 ff ; see Analy-
sis, Continuity, Discontinuity,
Densitv, Finite, Infinity, Series.
Tradition, The Aristotelian, 9 ff.,
24 ff., 64 f., 391 ; character of, 31,
326 ; dominant concepts of, 32 ;
in logic, 105 ff.; influence of, 8 f .
Transmission, social, 111.
Tropisms, 337.
Truth, 19, 144, 276; absolute, 74 ff.;
absolute standard of, in Pragma-
tism, 296; and certainty, not iden-
tical, 405 ff.; as independent of
absolutely true tests, presupposi-
tion of, 420; as relative, 74 ff.;
M a satiBfaction generated by be-
lief, 399 ff. ; as a value, 70 f .,
207 ff. ; as distinct from tests of,
proofs, evidence, and certainty,
424 ff. ; as distinct from success-
ful working, as a presupposition,
425 f.; "copy theory" of, 71 ff.;
definition of, 423; "material," of
premises, 119 f.; nature of, 71 ff.,
396, 405 f.; not identical with
usefulness, 398 ff. ; organic theory
of, 76, 350 f.; Pragmatism's defi-
nition of, 276; pragmatic theory
of, 124 f., 289 ff.; test of, in mo-
nistic systems, 351 f. ; test of, lack
of any absolute, 351 f.; tests of,
psychological, 129 ff.; the Being
of, as a presupposition in philos-
ophizing, 423 ff.; theory of, in
Phenomenalism, 226 f. ; theory of,
in Positivism, 251; the test of,
74 f., 76.
Truths, The system of, 75 ff.
Types of entities, manifold of, as a
presupposition, 429.
Types of knowing, different, as a
presupposition, 429.
Typical cases,
Ueberweg, 109.
Underbill, E., 124.
Unities and wholes, 197 ff.
Unity, 180 f., 197 ff., 319 f.; abso-
lute, 185 ff., 317 ff.; metaphysical
or transcendent, as self-contradic-
tory, 198.
Universals, 11, 152.
Universe, The; as a machine, 153 f.;
as an organism, 152 ff.; as a sys-
tem, see System, 436 ff.; as a
totality, 488 ff.; the, examples of
kinds of entities it includes,
433 ff.; the unity of, problem of,
317 ff.
Unknown, as distinct from unknow-
able, as a presupposition, 429.
" Unreal " entities, nature of, 489 f.
Usefulness, 286 ff., 290 ff.
Values, 60 f., 66ff., 206; aesthetic,
502 f. ; and consciousness, 69 ff.;
as objective, 501 ff.; as qualities
of relational complexes, 499 ff.;
by what conditioned, 68; defini-
tion of, 66 ; conservation of, 69,
509 ff. ; ethical, 394 f . ; examples
of, 497 ff. ; organization of, 508 ff.;
problems of, solution of, in mo-
nistic systems, 347; p.Toblem of.
532
INDEX
solution of, in Phenomenalism,
224 f . ; the ultimate standard of,
67 ; theory of, bibliography of,
507.
Variables, 179 ff.; independent,
382 ff.
Veblen, O., 12.
Velocity, 39 f . ; see Motion.
Venn, I., 121.
Vitalism, 342 ff., 388.
Voluntarism, 9 f.
Von Hiigel, F., 124.
Ward, J., 264.
Watson, J. B., 89.
Watson, John, 331.
Whitehead, A. N., 12, 136, 175,
193.
Wholes; causal, 195 f.; consistent,
196 f.; contradictory, 196; impli-
cative, 197; organic, 184 f.; or-
ganic, definition of, 195 ; organ-
ized, 361 ff., 472 ff.; see Relations,
Space and Time; the experience
of, 125.
Will, Freedom of, 394 f.; in Volun-
tarism, 335 ff.
"Will to live," 339 f.
" Will to power," 339 f.
Windelband, W., 42, 69.
Woodbridge, F. J. E., 89, 481.
Words as symbols, and their mean-
ings, 96 ff.
'•'World," The, as plastic, llOf.
World-soul, 328 ff.
Wundt, W., 109.
Young, J. W., 175.
Zeno, 166 ff., 170 ff.
Zero, 18; as a reality, 456; defim«
tion of, 415 ff.
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