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Types of Naval Officers 
 
wo R KS BY 
 
 CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN 
 
 The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 
 1660-1783. 
 
 The Influence of Sea Power upon the French 
 Revolution and Empire. Two volumes. 
 
 The Life of Nelson, the Embodiment of the 
 Sea Power of Great Britain. Two volumes. 
 
 The Life of Nelson. Popular edition. One 
 volume. 
 
 The Interest of America in Sea Power, 
 Present and Future. 
 
 Lessons of the War with Spain, and other 
 Articles. 
 
 The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon 
 International Policies. 
 
 Types of Naval Officers, with Some Re- 
 marks ON THE Development of Naval 
 Warfare during the Eighteenth Century. 
 
 Retrospect and Prospect. Studies in Inter- 
 national Relations, Naval and Politi- 
 cal. 
 
Edward, Lord Hawke. 
 
Types 0/ Naval Officers 
 
 Drawn from the 
 
 History of the British Navy 
 
 With Some Account of the Conditions of Naval 
 Warfare at the beginning of the Eighteenth 
 Century, and of its subsequent develop- 
 ment during the Sail Period 
 
 By 
 A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D. 
 
 Captain, United States Navy 
 
 Author of the ''Influence of Sea Power upon History, 
 
 1660-1783," and "Upon the French Revolution 
 
 and Empire;" of "The Life of Nelson," 
 
 and a "Life of Farragut " 
 
 Boston 
 
 Little, Brown, and Company 
 
 19^3 
 
v-^ 
 
 
 Copyright, 1893, 
 By Houghton, Mifflin and Company. 
 
 Copyright, igoi. 
 By a. T. Mahan. 
 
 jill rights rtser-ved 
 
 
 CMVmSITY r»tSS • JOHN WILJOM 
 AND SON • CAMBKIDCR, U. (. A. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 ALTHOUGH the distinguished seamen, whose lives 
 and professional characteristics it is the object 
 of this work to present in brief summary, belonged 
 to a service now foreign to that of the United States, 
 they have numerous and varied points of contact with 
 America; most of them very close, and in some in- 
 stances of marked historical interest. The older men, 
 indeed, were during much of their careers our fellow 
 countrymen in the colonial period, and fought, some 
 side by side with our own people in this new world, 
 others in distant scenes of the widespread strife that 
 characterized the middle of the eighteenth century, the 
 beginnings of " world politics ; " when, in a quarrel 
 purely European in its origin, " black men," to use 
 Macaulay's words, " fought on the coast of Coromandel, 
 and red men scalped each other by the great lakes of 
 North America," All, without exception, were actors 
 in the prolonged conflict that began in 1739 concerning 
 the right of the ships of Great Britain and her colonies 
 to frequent the seas bordering the American dominions 
 of Spain ; a conflict which, by gradual expansion, drew 
 in the continent of Europe, from Russia to France, 
 spread thence to the French possessions in India and 
 North America, involved Spanish Havana in the western 
 hemisphere and Manila in the eastern, and finally 
 
 'SIIS06 
 
VI 
 
 Preface 
 
 entailed the expulsion of France from our continent. 
 Thence, by inevitable sequence, issued the indepen- 
 dence of the United States. The contest, thus com- 
 pleted, covered forty-three years. 
 
 The four seniors of our series, Hawke, Rodney, Howe, 
 and Jervis, witnessed the whole of this momentous 
 period, and served conspicuously, some more, some less, 
 according to their age and rank, during its various 
 stages. Hawke, indeed, was at the time of the Ameri- 
 can Revolution too old to go to sea, but he did not die 
 until October i6, 1781, three days before the surrender 
 of Cornwallis at Yorktown, which is commonly accepted 
 as the closing incident of our struggle for independence. 
 On the other hand, the two younger men, Saumarez and 
 Pellew, though they had entered the navy before the 
 American Revolution, saw in it the beginnings of an 
 active service which lasted to the end of the Napoleonic 
 wars, the most continuous and gigantic strife of modern 
 times. It was as the enemies of our cause that they 
 first saw gunpowder burned in anger. 
 
 Nor was it only amid the commonplaces of naval 
 warfare that they then gained their early experiences in 
 America. Pellew in 1776, on Lake Champlain, bore a 
 brilliant part in one of the most decisive — though 
 among the least noted — campaigns of the Revolutionary 
 contest ; and a year later, as leader of a small contingent 
 of seamen, he shared the fate of Burgoyne's army at 
 Saratoga. In 1776 also, Saumarez had his part in an 
 engagement which ranks among the bloodiest recorded 
 between ships and forts, being on board the British 
 flagship Bristol at the attack upon Fort Moultrie, the 
 
Preface 
 
 Vll 
 
 naval analogue of Bunker Hill ; for, in the one of these 
 actions as in the other, the great military lesson was the 
 resistant power against frontal attack of resolute marks- 
 men, though untrained to war, when fighting behind 
 entrenchments, — a teaching renewed at New Orleans, 
 and emphasized in the recent South African War, The 
 well-earned honors of the comparatively raw colonials 
 received generous recognition at the time from their op- 
 ponents, even in the midst of the bitterness proverbially 
 attendant upon family quarrels ; but it is only just to 
 allow that their endurance found its counterpart in the 
 resolute and persistent valor of the assailants. In these 
 two battles, with which the War of Independence may 
 be said fairly to have begun, by land and by water, in 
 the far North and in the far South, the men of the same 
 stock, whose ancestors there met face to face as foes, 
 have now in peace a common heritage of glory. If 
 little of bitterness remains in the recollections which 
 those who are now fellow-citizens retain of the struggle 
 between the North and the South, within the American 
 Republic, we of two different nations, who yet share a 
 common tongue and a common tradition of liberty and 
 law, may well forget the wrongs of the earlier strife, and 
 look only to the common steadfast courage with which 
 each side then bore its share in a civil conflict. 
 
 The professional lives of these men, therefore, touch 
 history in many points ; not merely history generally, 
 but American history specifically. Nor is this contact 
 professional only, devoid of personal tinge. Hawke was 
 closely connected by blood with the Maryland family 
 of Bladen ; that having been his mother's maiden name. 
 
viii Preface 
 
 and Governor Bladen of the then colony being his first 
 cousin. Very much of his early life was spent upon the 
 American Station, largely in Boston. But those were 
 the days of Walpole's peace policy; and when the mari- 
 time war, which the national outcry at last compelled, 
 attained large dimensions, Hawke's already demonstrated 
 eminence as a naval leader naturally led to his employ- 
 ment in European waters, where the more immediate 
 dangers, if not the greatest interests, of Great Britain 
 were then felt to be. The universal character, as well as 
 the decisive issues of the opening struggle were as yet 
 but dimly foreseen. Rodney also had family ties with 
 America, though somewhat more remote. Csesar Rod- 
 ney, a signer of the Declaration of Independence from 
 Delaware, was of the same stock; their great-grand- 
 fathers were brothers. It was from the marriage of his 
 ancestor with the daughter of a Sir Thomas Caesar that 
 the American Rodney derived his otherwise singular 
 name. 
 
 Howe, as far as known, had no relations on this side 
 of the water ; but his elder brother, whom he succeeded 
 in the title, was of all British officers the one who most 
 won from the colonial troops with whom he was asso- 
 ciated a personal affection, the memory of which has 
 been transmitted to us ; while the admiral's own kindly 
 attitude towards the colonists, and his intimacy with 
 Franklin, no less than his professional ability, led to his 
 being selected for the North American command at the 
 time when the home country had not yet lost all hope 
 of a peaceable solution of difficulties. To this the Howe 
 tradition was doubtless expected to contribute. Jervis, 
 
Preface ix 
 
 a man considerably younger than the other three, by the 
 accidents of his career came little into touch with either 
 the colonies or the colonists, whether before or during 
 the Revolutionary epoch ; yet even he, by his intimate 
 friendship with Wolfe, and intercourse with his last days, 
 is brought into close relation with an event and a name 
 indelibly associated with one of the great landmarks — 
 crises — in the history of the American Continent. Al- 
 though the issue of the strife depended, doubtless, upon 
 deeper and more far-reaching considerations, it is not 
 too much to say that in the heights of Quebec, and in 
 the name of Wolfe, is signalized the downfall of the 
 French power in America. There was prefigured the 
 ultimate predominance of the traditions of the English- 
 speaking races throughout this continent, which in our 
 own momentous period stands mediator between the 
 two ancient and contrasted civilizations of Europe and 
 Asia, that so long moved apart, but are now brought 
 into close, if not threatening, contact. 
 
 Interesting, however, as are the historical and social 
 environments in which their personalities played their 
 part, it is as individual men, and as conspicuous ex- 
 emplars — types — of the varied characteristics which go 
 to the completeness of an adequate naval organization, 
 that they are here brought forward. Like other profes- 
 sions, — and especially like its sister service, the Army, 
 — the Navy tends to, and for efficiency requires, speciali- 
 zation. Specialization, in turn, results most satisfactorily 
 from the free play of natural aptitudes ; for aptitudes, 
 when strongly developed, find expression in inclination, 
 and readily seek their proper function in the body 
 
X Preface 
 
 organic to which they belong. Each of these distin- 
 guished officers, from this point of view, does not stand 
 for himself alone, but is an eminent exponent of a class ; 
 while the class itself forms a member of a body which 
 has many organs, no one of which is independent of the 
 other, but all contributive to the body's welfare. Hence, 
 while the effort has been made to present each in his 
 full individuality, with copious recourse to anecdote and 
 illustrative incident as far as available, both as a matter 
 of general interest and for accurate portrayal, special 
 care has been added to bring out occurrences and actions 
 which convey the impression of that natural character 
 which led the man to take the place he did in the naval 
 body, to develop the professional function with which 
 he is more particularly identified; for personality under- 
 lies official character. 
 
 In this sense of the word, types are permanent ; for 
 such are not the exclusive possession of any age or of 
 any service, but are found and are essential in every 
 period and to every nation. Their functions are part of 
 the bed-rock of naval organization and of naval strategy, 
 throughout all time ; and the particular instances here 
 selected owe their special cogency mainly to the fact 
 that they are drawn from a naval era, 1739-18 15, of 
 exceptional activity and brilliancy. 
 
 There is, however, another sense in which an officer, 
 or a man, may be accurately called a type ; a sense no 
 less significant, but of more limited and transient appli- 
 cation. The tendency of a period, — especially when 
 one of marked transition, — its activities and its results, 
 not infrequently find expression in one or more histori- 
 
Preface xi 
 
 cal characters. Such types may perhaps more ac- 
 curately be called personifications ; the man or men 
 embodying, and in action realizing, ideas and processes 
 of thought, the progress of which is at the time un- 
 noted, but is afterwards recognized as a general char- 
 acteristic of the period. Between the beginning and 
 the end a great change is found to have been effected, 
 which naturally and conveniently is associated with the 
 names of the most conspicuous actors ; although they 
 are not the sole agents, but simply the most eminent. 
 
 It is in this sense more particularly that Hawke and 
 Rodney are presented as types. It might even be said 
 that they complement each other and constitute together 
 a single type ; for, while both were men of unusually 
 strong personality, private as well as professional, and 
 with very marked traits of character, their great rela- 
 tion to naval advance is that of men who by natural 
 faculty detect and seize upon incipient ideas, for which 
 the time is ripe, and upon the practical realization of 
 which the healthful development of the profession de- 
 pends. With these two, and with them not so much 
 contemporaneously as in close historical sequence, is 
 associated the distinctive evolution of naval warfare in 
 the eighteenth century ; in their combined names is 
 summed up the improvement of system to which Nelson 
 and his contemporaries fell heirs, and to which Nelson, 
 under the peculiar and exceptional circumstances which 
 made his opportunity, gave an extension that im- 
 mortalized him. Of Hawke and Rodney, therefore, it 
 may be said that they are in their profession types of 
 that element of change, in virtue of which the profession 
 
Xll 
 
 Preface 
 
 grows ; whereas the other four, eminent as they were, 
 exemplify rather the conservative forces, the permanent 
 features, in the strength of which it exists, and in the 
 absence of any one of which it droops or succumbs. It 
 does not, however, follow that the one of these great 
 men is the simple continuator of the other's work; 
 rather it is true that each contributed, in due succession 
 of orderly development, the factor of progress which his 
 day demanded, and his personality embodied. 
 
 It was not in the forecast of the writer, but in the 
 process of treatment he came to recognize that, like 
 Hawke and Rodney, the four others also by natural char- 
 acteristics range themselves in pairs, — presenting points 
 of contrast, in deficiencies and in excellencies, which 
 group them together, not by similarity chiefly, but as com- 
 plementary. Howe and Jervis were both admirable gene- 
 ral officers ; but the strength of the one lay in his tactical 
 acquirements, that of the other in strategic insight and 
 breadth of outlook. The one was easy-going and in- 
 dulgent as a superior ; the other conspicuous for sever- 
 ity, and for the searchingness with which he carried the 
 exactions of discipline into the minute details of daily 
 naval life. Saumarez and Pellew, less fortunate, did not 
 reach high command until the great days of naval war- 
 fare in their period had yielded to the comparatively 
 uneventful occupation of girdling the enemy's coast with 
 a system of blockades, aimed primarily at the restriction 
 of his commerce, and incidentally at the repression of 
 his navy, which made no effort to take the sea on a 
 large scale. Under these circumstances the functions 
 of an admiral were mainly administrative; and if Sau- 
 
Preface xiii 
 
 marez and Pellew possessed eminent capacity as general 
 officers on the battle-field, they had not opportunity to 
 prove it. The distinction of their careers coincides with 
 their tenure of subordinate positions in the organisms of 
 great fleets. With this in common, and differentiating 
 them from Howe and Jervis, the points of contrast are 
 marked. Saumarez preferred the ship-of-the-line, Pellew 
 the frigate. The choice of the one led to the duties of 
 a division commander, that of the other to the compara- 
 tive independence of detached service, of the partisan 
 officer. In the one, love of the military side of his call- 
 ing predominated ; the other was, before all, the seaman. 
 The union of the two perfects professional character. 
 
 The question may naturally be asked, — Why, among 
 types of naval officers, is there no mention, other than 
 casual, of the name of Nelson? The answer is simple. 
 Among general officers, land and sea, the group to 
 which Nelson belongs defies exposition by a type, both 
 because it is small in aggregate numbers, and because 
 the peculiar eminence of the several members, — the 
 eminence of genius, — so differentiates each from his 
 fellows that no one among them can be said to represent 
 the others. Each, in the supremacy of his achievement, 
 stands alone, — alone, not only regarded as towering 
 above a brilliant surrounding of distinguished followers, 
 but alone even as contrasted with the other great ones 
 who in their own day had a like supremacy. Such do 
 not in fact form a class, because, though a certain com- 
 munity of ideas and principles may be traced in their 
 actions, their personalities and methods bear each the 
 stamp of originality in performance ; and where origi- 
 
xiv Preface 
 
 nality is found, classification ceases to apply. There is a 
 company, it may be, but not a class. 
 
 The last four biographies first appeared as contribu- 
 tions to the "Atlantic Monthly," in 1893 and 1894. I 
 desire to return to the proprietors my thanks for their 
 permission to republish. The original treatment has 
 been here considerably modified, as well as enlarged. I 
 am also under special obligation to Mr. Fleetwood Hugo 
 Pellew, who gave me the photograph of Lord Exmouth, 
 with permission also to reproduce it. It represents that 
 great officer at the age most characteristic of his particu- 
 lar professional distinction, as by me understood. 
 
 A. T. MAHAN. 
 October, 1901. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 I 
 
 Page 
 
 Introductory. — Conditions of Naval Warfare at 
 
 THE Beginning of the Eighteenth Century . . 3 
 
 II 
 
 Progress of Naval Warfare during the Eighteenth 
 Century 
 Hawke : The Spirit 77 
 
 III 
 
 Progress of Naval Warfare during the Eighteenth 
 Century {Continued) 
 Rodney : The Form 148 
 
 IV 
 Howe : The General Officer, as Tactician . . . 254 
 
 V 
 
 Jervis : The General Officer, as Disciplinarun and 
 
 Strategist 320 
 
 VI 
 
 Saumarez : The Fleet Officer and Division Com- 
 mander 382 
 
 VII 
 Pellew: The Frigate Captain and Partisan Officer 428 
 
 Index 479 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Edward, Lord Hawke Frontispiece 
 
 From an engraving by W. HoU, after the painting by Francis Cotes 
 in the Naval Gallery at Greenwich Hospital. 
 
 Page 
 Plan of Byng's Action off Minorca, May 20, 1756 48 
 
 George Brydges, Lord Rodney 148 
 
 From an engraving by Edward Finden, after the painting by W. 
 Grimaldi. 
 
 Richard, Earl Howe 254 
 
 From a mezzotint engraving by R. Dunkarton, after the painting 
 by John Singleton Copley. 
 
 John Jervis, Earl St. Vincent 320 
 
 From an engraving by J. Cook, after the painting by Sir William 
 Beechey. 
 
 James, Lord De Saumarez 382 
 
 From an engraving by W. Greatbatch, after a miniature in posses- 
 sion of the family. 
 
 Edward Pellew, Lord Exmouth 428 
 
 From the original painting in the possession of Orr Ewing, Esq. 
 
TYPES OF NAVAL OFFICERS 
 
TYPES OF NAVAL OFFICERS 
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 Naval Warfare at the Beginning of the Eighteenth 
 Century 
 
 THE recent close of the nineteenth century 
 has familiarized us with the thought that 
 such an epoch tends naturally to provoke an 
 estimate of the advance made in the various 
 spheres of human activity during the period 
 which it terminates. Such a reckoning, however, 
 is not a mere matter of more and less, of com- 
 parison between the beginning and the end, 
 regardless of intermediate circumstances. The 
 question involved is one of an historical process, 
 of cause and effect ; of an evolution, probably 
 marked, as such series of events commonly are, 
 by certain salient incidents, the way-marks of 
 progress which show the road traversed and the 
 succession of stages through which the past has 
 become the present. Frequently, also, such de- 
 velopment associates itself not only with conspic- 
 uous events, but with the names of great men, 
 to whom, either by originality of genius or by 
 favoring opportunity, it has fallen to illustrate in 
 
4- Naval Warl'are at the Beginning 
 
 «< 
 
 action the changes which have a more silent 
 antecedent history in the experience and reflec- 
 tion of mankind. 
 
 The development of naval warfare in the 
 eighteenth century, its advance in spirit and 
 methods, is thus exemplified in certain striking 
 events, and yet more impressively is identified 
 with the great names of Hawke and Rodney. 
 The period of nearly half a generation intervened 
 between their births, but they were contempora- 
 ries and actors, though to no large extent asso- 
 ciates, during the extensive wars that occupied 
 the middle of the century — the War of the Aus- 
 trian Succession, 1 739-1 748, and the Seven 
 Years War, 1 756-1 763. These two conflicts 
 are practically one ; the same characteristic jeal- 
 ousies and motives being common to both, as 
 they were also to the period of nominal peace, 
 but scarcely veiled contention, by which they were 
 separated. The difference of age between the 
 two admirals contributed not only to obviate riv- 
 alry, by throwing their distinctive activities into 
 different generations, but had, as it were, the 
 effect of prolonging their influence beyond that 
 possible to a single lifetime, thus constituting it 
 into a continuous and fruitful development. 
 
 They were both successful men, in the ordi- 
 nary acceptation of the word success. They were 
 great, not only in professional character, but in 
 the results which do not always attend profes- 
 sional desert ; they were great in achievement. 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 5 
 
 Each name is indissolubly linked with a brilliant 
 victory, as well as with other less known but 
 equally meritorious actions ; in all of which the 
 personal factor of the principal agent, the dis- 
 tinctive qualities of the commander-in-chief, 
 powerfully contributed and were conspicuously 
 illustrated. These were, so to say, the examples, 
 that enforced upon the men of their day the pro- 
 fessional ideas by which the two admirals were 
 themselves dominated, and upon which was form- 
 ing a school, with professional standards of ac- 
 tion and achievement destined to produce great 
 effects. 
 
 Yet, while this is so, and while such emphatic 
 demonstrations by deeds undoubtedly does more 
 than any other teaching to influence contempo- 
 raries, and so to promote professional development, 
 it is probably true that, as a matter of historical 
 illustration, the advance of the eighteenth century 
 in naval warfare is more clearly shown by two great 
 failures, for neither of which were these officers 
 responsible, and in one only of which in fact did 
 either appear, even in a subordinate capacity. 
 The now nearly forgotten miscarriage of Ad- 
 miral Mathews off Toulon, in 1744, and the 
 miserable incompetency of Byng, at Minorca, in 
 1756, remembered chiefly because of the conse- 
 quent execution of the admiral, serve at least, 
 historically, to mark the low extreme to which 
 had then sunk professional theory and practice — 
 for both were there involved. It is, however, not 
 
6 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 only as a point of departure from which to esti- 
 mate progress that these battles — if they deserve 
 the name — are historically useful. Considered 
 as the plane to which exertion, once well directed 
 and virile, had gradually declined through the 
 prevalence of false ideals, they link the seven- 
 teenth century to the eighteenth, even as the 
 thought and action — the theory and practice — 
 of Hawke and Rodney uplifted the navy from 
 the inefificiency of Mathews and Byng to the 
 crowning glories of the Nile and Trafalgar, with 
 which the nineteenth century opened. It is thus, 
 as the very bottom of the wave, that those singu- 
 lar and signal failures have their own distinctive 
 significance in the undulations of the onward 
 movement. On the one hand they are not unac- 
 countable, as though they, any more than the 
 Nile and Trafalgar, were without antecedent of 
 cause ; and on the other they serve, as a back- 
 ground at least, to bring out the figures of the 
 two admirals now before us, and to define their 
 true historical import, as agents and as exponents, 
 in the changes of their day. 
 
 It is, therefore, important to the comprehen- 
 sion of the changes effected in that period of 
 transition, for which Hawke and Rodney stand, 
 to recognize the distinctive lesson of each of 
 these two abortive actions, which together may 
 be said to fix the zero of the scale by which 
 the progress of the eighteenth century is de- 
 noted. They have a relation to the past as well 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 7 
 
 as to the future, standing far below the level 
 of the one and of the other, through causes that 
 can be assigned. Naval warfare in the past, in 
 its origin and through long ages, had been waged 
 with vessels moved by oars, which consequently, 
 when conditions permitted engaging at all, could 
 be handled with a scope and freedom not secur- 
 able with the uncertain factor of the wind. The 
 motive power of the sea, therefore, then resem- 
 bled essentially that of the land, — being human 
 muscle and staying power, in the legs on shore 
 and in the arms at sea. Hence, movements by 
 masses, by squadrons, and in any desired direc- 
 tion corresponding to a fixed plan, in order to 
 concentrate, or to outflank, — all these could be 
 attempted with a probability of success not pred- 
 icable of the sailing ship. Nelson's remarkable 
 order at Trafalgar, which may almost be said 
 to have closed and sealed the record of the sail 
 era, began by assuming the extreme improba- 
 bility of being able at any given moment to 
 move forty ships of his day in a fixed order 
 upon an assigned plan. The galley admiral 
 therefore wielded a weapon far more flexible and 
 reliable, within the much narrower range of its 
 activities, than his successor in the days of sail ; 
 and engagements between fleets of galleys accord- 
 ingly reflected this condition, being marked not 
 only by greater carnage, but by tactical combina- 
 tions and audacity of execution, to which the 
 sailing ship did not so readily lend itself. 
 
8 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 When the field of naval warfare became ex- 
 tended beyond the Mediterranean, — for long 
 centuries its principal scene, — the galley no 
 longer met the more exacting nautical condi- 
 tions; and the introduction of cannon, involv- 
 ing new problems of tactics and ship-building, 
 accelerated its disappearance. The traditions of 
 galley-fighting, however, remained, and were rein- 
 forced by the habits of land fighting, — the same 
 men in fact commanding armies on shore and 
 fleets at sea. In short, a period of transition 
 ensued, marked, as such in their beginnings 
 are apt to be, by an evident lack of clearness 
 in men's appreciation of conditions, and of the 
 path of development, with a consequent confu- 
 sion of outline in their practice. It is not always 
 easy to understand either what was done, or what 
 was meant to be done, during that early sail era ; 
 but two things appear quite certainly. There 
 is still shown the vehemence and determination 
 of action which characterized galley fighting, 
 visible constantly in the fierce effort to grapple 
 the enemy, to break his ranks, to confuse and 
 crush him ; and further there is clear indication 
 of tactical plan on the grand scale, broad in out- 
 line and combination, involving different — but 
 not independent — action by the various great 
 divisions of the fleet, each of which, in plan at 
 least, has its own part, subordinate but contrib- 
 utory to the general whole. 
 
 The results, though not unimportant, were not 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 
 
 satisfactory, for men were compelled to see that 
 from various causes the huge numbers brought 
 upon the field lapsed into confusion, and that 
 battle, however well planned in large outline, 
 resolved itself into a mere mass of warring units 
 incoherently struggling one with another. There 
 was lack of proportion between effort exerted 
 and effect achieved. A period of systematization 
 and organization set in. Unwieldy numbers 
 were reduced to more manageable dimensions by 
 excluding ships whose size and strength did not 
 add to the efficiency of the order of battle ; the 
 powers and limitations of those which remained 
 were studied, and certain simple tactical disposi- 
 tions, fitted to particular emergencies, were recog- 
 nized and adopted, — all tending to impart unity 
 of movement and action, and to keep the whole 
 in regulated order under the hand of the com- 
 mander-in-chief, free from confusion. 
 
 To this point there was improvement; but re- 
 action, as often, went too far. The change in 
 accepted ideas is emphatically shown by a com- 
 parison of the Fighting Instructions of 1740 and 
 1756, when the crystallization of the system was 
 complete but disintegration had not yet begun, 
 with those issued in 1665 by the Duke of York, 
 afterwards James 1 1., at the beginning of the second 
 of the three Anglo-Dutch Wars. His in turn 
 are directly deducible from others framed shortly 
 after the first war, in 1652-1654, when sail tactics 
 had not passed the stage of infancy, and were 
 
lo Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 still strongly affected by the galley tradition. 
 There is here found, on the one hand, the pre- 
 scription of the line of battle, — a single column 
 of ships formed in each other's wake, — with the 
 provision that if the enemy is to leeward, and 
 awaits attack, the headmost squadron of the Brit- 
 ish shall steer for the headmost of the enemy's 
 ships. This accords with the general tenor of 
 the later Instructions ; but there occurs else- 
 where, and previously, the direction that, when 
 the enemy is to windward, if the leading British 
 Squadron finds it can weather any considerable 
 part of them, it is to " tack and stand in, and 
 strive to divide the enemy's body," and that, " be- 
 ing got to windward, is to bear down on those 
 ships to leeward of them," which have thus been 
 cut off. 
 
 The thing to be observed here is the separate, 
 but positive, initiative prescribed for a portion of 
 the fleet, with a view to divide the enemy, and 
 then concentrate the whole fleet upon the frac- 
 tion thus isolated. The British van takes a par- 
 ticular, but not an independent, action ; for the 
 other divisions contribute their part to the com- 
 mon purpose. " The middle squadron is to keep 
 her wind, and to observe the motion of the 
 enemy's van, which" [that is, "which" action of 
 the middle squadron] "the last squadron — the 
 rear — is to second ; and both of these squadrons 
 are to do their utmost to assist or relieve the first 
 squadron, that divided the enemy's fleet." Evi- 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 1 1 
 
 dently here we have tactical combination in 
 order to decisive action ; clearly contemplated 
 also beforehand, not merely by a capable individ- 
 ual general, but by the consensus of professional 
 opinion which such a paper as the Fighting 
 Instructions necessarily reflects. The stamp of 
 the galley period is upon this: strenuous and 
 close battle, the piercing of the enemy's order, the 
 movement of the squadrons differentiated, in 
 order that they may in a real and effective sense 
 combine, instead of being merely distributed, as 
 they afterwards were by both the letter of the 
 later Instructions and the tradition by which 
 these became encrusted. Nor should there be 
 overlooked, in this connection, the discretion al- 
 lowed the centre and rear. They are to " keep 
 their wind ; " an expression which leaves optional 
 whether to tack, or stand as they are, whether to 
 engage the separated enemies to windward or to 
 leeward, as occasion may offer, in support of the 
 van. The provisions of 1665 afterwards dis- 
 appear. In 1740, and even as late as 1781, they 
 are traceable only in certain colorless articles, 
 suggestive of the atrophied organs of a body 
 concerning whose past use physiologists may 
 speculate. 
 
 As in the restoration of sounder methods, with 
 which we shall be concerned, this degeneration of 
 ideals was a work of time. In June, 1666, the 
 British met with a severe check in the Four Days 
 Battle, in which Monk, a soldier, commanded in 
 
12 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 chief. This reverse is chiefly to be attributed to 
 antecedent strategic errors, which made a portion 
 only of the available British force bear the brunt 
 of the first three days; but, among the inevitable 
 criticisms, we find stress laid upon fighting in 
 line as essential to success. This insistence 
 upon the line as an effective instrument pro- 
 ceeded, among others, from Sir William Penn, a 
 seaman, and was at that time in the direction of 
 professional advance. The line had not yet ob- 
 tained the general professional acceptance needed 
 to establish and utilize its indisputable value. 
 This process was gradual, but when effected it 
 followed the usual laws of human development ; 
 from a valuable means, it became in men's estima- 
 tion an exaggerated necessity. It came to pass 
 in time that the line no longer existed for tactics, 
 but tactics for the line, in which they found their 
 consummation and end. 
 
 There intervened, however, a happier period, — 
 one of transition, — and in the third Anglo-Dutch 
 war, 1 672-1 674, we seem to find a close approach 
 to just proportion between regularity of formation 
 and decisive tactical purpose ; in which the prin- 
 ciple of the line is recognized and observed, but 
 is utilized by professional audacity for definite 
 and efficient tactical action, aiming at conclusive 
 results. The finest exponent of this, the culmi- 
 nating epoch of naval warfare in the seventeenth 
 century, is the Dutchman Ruyter, who, taken 
 altoijether, was the Q:reatest naval seaman of that 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 13 
 
 era, which may be roughly identified with the 
 reign of Charles II. After that, naval warfare 
 was virtually suspended for fifteen years, and 
 when resumed in the last decade of the century, 
 the traces of incipient degeneracy can already be 
 noted amid much brilliant performance. From 
 that time completeness of military achievement 
 became in men's minds less of an object than 
 accurate observance of rule, and in practice the 
 defensive consideration of avoiding disaster began 
 to preponderate over offensive effort for the de- 
 struction of the enemy. 
 
 In the development of tactical science, the 
 French had played a leading part, as they usually 
 have where reflective mental processes and formal 
 evolution of ideas are concerned. Among admi- 
 rals, the greatest name of this later period is the 
 French Tourville, a master of the science of his 
 profession, and gifted with a personal courage of 
 the heroic type ; while the leading exponent of 
 Tourville's ideas, as well as historian of his 
 achievements, was the French priest Paul Hoste, 
 — chaplain to his fleet, and the father of the sys- 
 tematic treatment of naval evolutions. But with 
 Tourville's name is associated not only a high 
 level of professional management, but a caution 
 in professional action not far removed from 
 timidity, so that an impatient Minister of Marine 
 of his day and nation styled him "poltroon in 
 head, though not in heart." His powers were 
 displayed in the preservation and orderly move- 
 
14 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 ment of his fleet ; in baffling, by sheer skill, and 
 during long periods, the efforts of the enemy to 
 bring him to action ; in skilful disposition, when 
 he purposely accepted battle under disadvantage; 
 but under most favorable opportunities he failed 
 in measures of energy, and, after achieving par- 
 tial success, superfluous care of his own com- 
 mand prevented his blows from being driven 
 home. 
 
 Tourville, though a brilliant seaman, thus not 
 only typified an era of transition, with which 
 he was contemporary, but fore-shadowed the 
 period of merely formal naval warfare, precise, 
 methodical, and unenterprising, emasculated of 
 military virility, although not of mere animal 
 courage. He left to his successors the legacy 
 of a great name, but also unfortunately that of 
 a defective professional tradition. The splendid 
 days of the French Navy under Louis XIV. 
 passed away with him, — he died in 1701 ; but 
 during the long period of naval lethargy on the 
 part of the state, which followed, the French 
 naval officers, as a class, never wholly lost sight 
 of professional ideals. They proved themselves, 
 on the rare occasions that offered, before 171 5 
 and during the wars of Hawke and Rodney, not 
 only gallant seamen after the pattern of Tour- 
 ville, but also exceedingly capable tacticians, 
 upon a system good as far as it went, but de- 
 fective on Tourville's express lines, in aiming 
 rather at exact dispositions and defensive security 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 15 
 
 than at the thorough-going initiative and persist- 
 ence which confounds and destroys the enemy. 
 " War," to use Napoleon's phrase, " was to be 
 waged without running risks." The sword was 
 drawn, but the scabbard was kept ever open 
 for its retreat. 
 
 The English, in the period of reaction which 
 succeeded the Dutch wars, produced their own 
 caricature of systematized tactics. Even under 
 its influence, up to 171 5, it is only just to say 
 they did not construe naval skill to mean anxious 
 care to keep one's own ships intact. Rooke, off 
 Malaga, in 1704, illustrated professional fearless- 
 ness of consequences as conspicuously as he had 
 shown personal daring in the boat attack at 
 La Hougue ; but his plans of battle exemplified 
 the particularly British form of inefficient naval 
 action. There was no sfreat difference in as^orre- 
 gate force between the French fleet and that 
 of the combined Anglo-Dutch under his orders. 
 The former, drawing up in the accustomed line 
 of battle, ship following ship in a single column, 
 awaited attack. Rooke, having the advantage 
 of the wind, and therefore the power of engaging 
 at will, formed his command in a similar and 
 parallel line a few miles off, and thus all stood 
 down together, the ships maintaining their line 
 parallel to that of the enemy, and coming into 
 action at practically the same moment, van to 
 van, centre to centre, rear to rear. This ignored 
 wholly the essential maxim of all intelligent 
 
1 6 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 warfare, which is so to engage as markedly to 
 outnumber the enemy at a point of main col- 
 lision. If he be broken there, before the remain- 
 der of his force come up, the chances all are that 
 a decisive superiority will be established by this 
 alone, not to mention the moral effect of partial 
 defeat and disorder. Instead of this, the impact 
 at Malaga was so distributed as to produce a 
 substantial equality from one end to the other 
 of the opposing fronts. The French, indeed, by 
 strengthening their centre relatively to the van 
 and rear, to some extent modified this condition 
 in the particular instance ; but the fact does 
 not seem to have induced any alteration in 
 Rookes dispositions. Barring mere accident, 
 nothinsf conclusive can issue from such arrancre- 
 ments. The result accordingly was a drawn 
 battle, although Rooke says that the fight, which 
 was maintained on both sides "with great fury 
 for three hours, . . . was the sharpest day's ser- 
 vice that I ever saw;" and he had seen much, 
 — Beachy Head, La Hougue, Vigo Bay, not to 
 mention his own great achievement in the capture 
 of Gibraltar. 
 
 This method of attack remained the ideal — if 
 such a word is not a misnomer in such a case — 
 of the British Navy, not merely as a matter of 
 irreflective professional acceptance, but laid down 
 in the official " Fisfhtinir Instructions." It cannot 
 be said that these err on the side of lucidity ; but 
 their meaning to contemporaries in this partic- 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 17 
 
 ular respect is ascertained, not only by fair infer- 
 ence from their contents, but by the practical 
 commentary of numerous actions under common- 
 place commanders-in-chief. It further received 
 authoritative formulation in the specific finding 
 of the Court-Martial upon Admiral Byng, which 
 was signed by thirteen experienced of^cers. 
 *' Admiral Byng should have caused his ships 
 to tack together, and should immediately have 
 borne down upon the enemy; his van steering 
 for the enemy's van, his rear for its rear, each 
 ship making for the one opposite to her in the 
 enemy's line, under such sail as would have 
 enabled the worst sailer to preserve her station in 
 the line of battle." Each phrase of this opinion 
 is a reflection of an article in the Instructions. 
 The line of battle was the naval fetich of the day; 
 and, be it remarked, it was the more dangerous 
 because in itself an admirable and necessary 
 instrument, constructed on principles essentially 
 accurate. A standard wholly false may have its 
 error demonstrated with comparative ease ; but 
 no servitude is more hopeless than that of unin- 
 telligent submission to an idea formally correct, 
 yet incomplete. It has all the vicious misleading 
 of a half-truth unqualified by appreciation of 
 modifying conditions ; and so seamen who dis- 
 dained theories, and hugged the belief in them- 
 selves as " practical," became doctrinaires in the 
 worst sense. 
 
 It would seem, however, that a necessary 
 
1 8 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 antecedent to deliverance from a false concep- 
 tion, — as from any injurious condition, — is a 
 practical illustration of its fallacy. Working con- 
 sequences must receive demonstration, concrete 
 in some striking disastrous event, before improve- 
 ment is undertaken. Such experience is painful 
 to undergo ; but with most men, even in their 
 private capacity, and in nearly all governmental 
 action where mere public interests are at stake, 
 remedy is rarely sought until suffering is not 
 only felt, but signalized in a conspicuous incident. 
 It is needless to say that the military professions 
 in peace times are peculiarly liable to this apathy; 
 like some sleepers, they can be awakened only 
 by shaking. For them, war alone can subject 
 accepted ideas to the extreme test of practice. It 
 is doubtless perfectly true that acquaintance with 
 military and naval history, mastery of their teach- 
 ings, will go far to anticipate the penalty attach- 
 ing to truth's last arsfument — chastisement; but 
 imagination is fondly impatient of warning by 
 the past, and easily avails itself of fancied or 
 superficial differences in contemporary condi- 
 tions, to justify measures which ignore, or even 
 directly contravene, ascertained and fundamental 
 principles of universal application. 
 
 Even immediate practical experience is misin- 
 terpreted when incidents are thus viewed through 
 the medium of a precedent bias. The Transvaal 
 War, for instance, has afforded some striking 
 lessons of needed modifications, consequent upon 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 
 
 particular local factors, or upon developments in 
 the material of war; but does any thoughtful mili- 
 tary man doubt that imagination has been actively 
 at work, exaggerating or distorting, hastily waiv- 
 ing aside permanent truth in favor of temporary 
 prepossessions or accidental circumstance ? It is 
 at least equally likely that the naval world at 
 the present time is hugging some fond delusions 
 in the excessive size and speed to which battle- 
 ships are tending, and in the disproportionate 
 weight assigned to the defensive as compared to 
 the offensive factors in a given aggregate ton- 
 nage. Imagination, theory, a priori reasoning, is 
 here at variance with rational historical precedent, 
 which has established the necessity of numbers 
 as well as of individual power in battle-ships, and 
 demonstrated the superiority of offensive over 
 defensive strength in military systems. These 
 — and other — counterbalancing considerations 
 have in past wars enforced the adoption of a 
 medium homogeneous type, as conducive both to 
 adequate numbers, — which permit the division 
 of the fleet when required for strategic or tactical 
 purposes, — and also directly to offensive fleet 
 strength by the greater facility of manoeuvring 
 possessed by such vessels ; for the strength of a 
 fleet lies not chiefly in the single units, but in their 
 mutual support in elastic and rapid movement. 
 Well tested precedent — experience — has here 
 gone to the wall in favor of an untried forecast 
 of supposed fundamental change in conditions. 
 
20 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 But experience is uncommonly disagreeable when 
 she revenges herself after her own fashion. 
 
 The British Navy of the eighteenth century in 
 this way received an unpleasant proof of the 
 faultiness of its then accepted conclusions, in the 
 miscarriages of Mathews off Toulon, in 1744, 
 and of Byng off Minorca, in 1756. So fixed were 
 men's habits of thought that the lessons w'ere not 
 at once understood. As evidenced by the dis- 
 tribution of censure, the results were attributed 
 by contemporary judges to particular incidents 
 of each battle, not to the erroneous underlying 
 general plans, contravening all sound military 
 precedent, \vhich from the first made success 
 improbable, indeed impossible, except by an 
 inefficiency of the enemy which was not to be 
 presumed. These battles therefore are important, 
 militarily, in a sense not at all dependent upon 
 their consequences, which were ephemeral. They 
 are significant as extreme illustrations of incom- 
 petent action, deriving from faulty traditions ; 
 and they have the further value of showing the 
 starting point, the zero of the scale, from which 
 the progress of the century is to be measured. 
 In describing them, therefore, attention will be 
 given chiefly to those circumstances which ex- 
 hibit the shackles under which fleet movements 
 then labored, not only from the difficulties inher- 
 ent to the sea and sailing ships, but from the 
 ideas and methods of the times. Those incidents 
 also will be selected which show how false stan- 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 21 
 
 dards affected particular individuals, according to 
 their personal characteristics. 
 
 In Admiral Mathews' action, in February, 
 1744, an allied fleet composed of sixteen French 
 ships-of-the-line and twelve Spanish lay in Tou- 
 lon, waiting to sail for a Spanish port. The 
 British, in force numerically equal, were at 
 anchor under the Hyeres Islands, a few miles to 
 the eastward. They got underway when the 
 allied movement began on February 20th ; but 
 anchored again for the night, because the enemy 
 that day came no farther than the outer road of 
 Toulon. The next morning the French and 
 Spaniards put to sea with a wind at first westerly, 
 and stretched to the southward in long, single 
 column, the sixteen French leading. At 10 a. m. 
 the British followed, Vice-Admiral Lestock's 
 division taking the van ; but the wind, shifting 
 to east, threw the fleet on the port tack, on which 
 the rear under Rear-Admiral Rowley had to lead. 
 It became necessary, therefore, for this division 
 and the centre to pass Lestock, which took some 
 time with the light airs prevailing. Two or 
 three manoeuvres succeeded, with the object of 
 forming the fighting order, a column similar and 
 parallel to that of the enemy, and to get closer to 
 him. When night fell a signal was still flying 
 for the line abreast, by which, if completed, the 
 ships would be ranged on a line parallel to the 
 allies, and heading towards them ; consequently 
 abreast of each other. It would then need only 
 
22 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 a change of course to place them in column, sides 
 to the enemy; which, as before said, was the fight- 
 ing order — the " line of battle." 
 
 The line abreast, however, was not fully formed 
 at dark. Therefore the admiral, in order to hasten 
 its completion, soon afterwards made a night sig- 
 nal, with lanterns, for the fleet to bring-to, — that 
 is, bring their sides to the wind, and stop. He 
 intended thereby that the ships already in station 
 should stand still, while the others were gaining 
 their places, all which is a case of simple evolu- 
 tion, by land as by sea. It was contended by the 
 admiral that Vice-Admiral Lestock's division was 
 then too far to the right and rear, and hence too 
 distant from the enemy, and that it was his duty 
 first to get into his station and then to bring-to. 
 To this the vice-admiral on his trial replied, first, 
 that he was not out of his station ; and, second, 
 that if he were, the later signal, to bring-to, sus- 
 pended the earlier, to form line abreast, and that 
 it was therefore his business, without any discre- 
 tion, to stop where he was. Concerning the first 
 plea, a number of witnesses, very respectable in 
 point of rank and opportunity for seeing, testified 
 that the vice-admiral did bring-to three or four 
 miles to the right and rear of his place in the 
 line abreast, reckoning his station from the admi- 
 ral's ship; yet, as the Court peremptorily rejected 
 their evidence, it is probably proper to accept the 
 contemporary decision as to this matter of fact. 
 
 But as regards the second plea, being a matter 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 23 
 
 of military correctness, a difference of opinion is 
 allowable. The Court adopted as its own the 
 argument of the vice-admiral. Without entering: 
 here into a technical discussion, the Court's ruling, 
 briefly stated, was that the second signal super- 
 seded the first, so that, if the vice-admiral was in 
 the wrong place, it was not his duty to get into 
 the right before stopping ; and that this was 
 doubly the case because an article of the Night 
 Signals (7) prescribed that, under the conditions 
 of the alleged offence, " a fleet sailing before the 
 wind, or nearly so, if the admiral made the signal 
 for the fleet to bring-to, the windward ships 
 should bring-to first." Therefore, if Lestock was 
 to windward, as the charge read, it was his duty 
 to bring-to first and at once. It is evident, how- 
 ever, that even the Sailing Instructions, cast-iron 
 as they were, contemplated a fleet in order, not 
 one in process of forming order; and that to 
 bring-to helter-skelter, regardless of order, was to 
 obey the letter rather than the spirit. Muddle- 
 headed as Mathews seems to have been, what he 
 was trying to do was clear enough ; and the duty 
 of a subordinate was to carry out his evident aim. 
 An order does not necessarily supersede its pred- 
 ecessor, unless the two are incompatible. The 
 whole incident, from Lestock's act to the Court's 
 finding, is instructive as showing the slavish 
 submission to the letter of the Instructions; a 
 submission traceable not to the law merely, but 
 to the added tradition that had then fast hold of 
 
24 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 men's minds. It is most interesting to note that 
 the unfortunate Byng was one of the signers of 
 this opinion, as he was also one of the judges 
 that sentenced Mathews to be dismissed from the 
 navy, as responsible for the general failure. 
 
 During the night of the 2ist the allies, who 
 had stopped after dark, appear again to have 
 made sail. Consequently, when day broke, the 
 British found themselves some distance astern and 
 to windward — northeast; the wind continuing 
 easterly. Their line, indifferently well formed in 
 van and centre, stretched over a length of nine 
 miles through the straggling of the rear. Les- 
 tock's ship was six miles from that of Mathews, 
 whereas it should not have been more than two 
 and a half, at most, in ordinary sailing; for battle, 
 the Instructions allowed little over a half-mile. 
 Accepting the Court's finding that he was in 
 position at dark, this distance can only be at- 
 tributed, as Lestock argued and the Court 
 admitted, to a current — that most convenient 
 of scape-goats in navigation. The allies, too, 
 had a lagging rear body, five Spanish ships 
 being quite a distance astern ; but from van to 
 rear they extended but six miles, against the 
 British nine. It was the distance of the British 
 rear, not straggling in van or centre, that consti- 
 tuted this disadvantage. 
 
 Mathews wished to wait till Lestock reached 
 his place, but the allies were receding all the 
 time ; and, though their pace was slackened to 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 25 
 
 enable the five sternmost Spaniards to come up, 
 the space between the fleets was increasing. It 
 was the duty of the British admiral to force an 
 action, on general principles ; but in addition he 
 believed that the French intended to push for 
 Gibraltar, enter the Atlantic, and join their Brest 
 fleet, in order to cover an invasion of England by 
 an army reported to be assembling at Dunkirk. 
 Clearly, therefore, something must be done ; yet 
 to enter into a general engagement with near a 
 third of his command out of immediate support- 
 ing distance was contrary to the accepted prin- 
 ciples of the day. The fleet was not extended 
 with that of the enemy, by which is meant that 
 the respective vans, centres, and rears were not 
 opposed ; the British van being only abreast of 
 the allied centre, their centre of the allied rear, 
 Lestock tailing away astern and to windward, 
 while the dozen leading French were some dis- 
 tance ahead of both bodies. Now the Fighting 
 Instructions required that, " If the admiral and 
 his fleet have the wind of the enemy, and they 
 have stretched themselves in a line of battle, the 
 van of the admiral's fleet is to steer with the 
 van of the enemies, and there to engage them." 
 There was no alternative course laid down ; just 
 as there was no punishment alternative to death 
 in the Article of War under which Byng was 
 shot. 
 
 Yet the indications all were that to wait for 
 this most formal and pedantic disposition, which 
 
iG Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 ignored every principle of warfare, would be to 
 throw away the chance of battle. The French, 
 fresh from port and clean-bottomed, out-sailed 
 the bulk of the British, as did the Spaniards, 
 though to a less degree ; and it was part of 
 Lestock's defence, admitted by the Court, that, 
 doing his utmost, his division, as a whole, cer- 
 tainly could not get abreast the allied rear. Les- 
 tock, indeed, directly submitted to the Court that 
 the commander-in-chief was at fault in not waiting 
 till his line was thus extended and formed, and 
 then all bearing down together, in line abreast ; 
 although by his own contention no such issue 
 could have been reached that day, unless the 
 allies were obliging enough to wait. " I aver, and 
 I shall die in this opinion, that no man that is an 
 of^cer, who knows his duty, will make the signal 
 for line abreast to steer down upon an enemy, 
 until the fleet has been stretched and extended 
 in a line of battle, according to the 19th Article 
 of the Fighting Instructions. Can it be ser\'ice," 
 he adds, " to bear down so much unformed and 
 in confusion, that the van cannot possibly join 
 battle with, or engage the van of the enemy, the 
 centre with the centre, and the rear with the 
 rear?" 
 
 Mathews not being then on trial, the Court in 
 its finding did not reply directly to this question; 
 but indirectly it left no doubt as to its opinion. 
 " The Admiral, by bearing down as he did 
 upon the rear division of the combined fleet, 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 27 
 
 excluded the Vice-Admiral from any part of the 
 engagement, if he could have come up ; for if 
 both lines had been closed, when the Admiral 
 engaged the Real^ there would have been no 
 more than one ship of the enemy's fleet for 
 the Vice-Admiral and his whole division to have 
 engaged." Again, " It does not appear that the 
 Vice-Admiral was in any part the cause of the 
 miscarriage of his Majesty's fleet in the Mediter- 
 ranean ; the bringing on of the general engage'- 
 ment according to the igth Article of the Fight- 
 ing Instructions . . . not depending upon him." 
 Sixteen officers of the rank of captain and above 
 signed these opinions, and there is no denying 
 the words of the 19th Article; yet one wonders 
 to see no recognition of the necessity of using 
 your opportunity as you find it, of the moral 
 effect of an approaching reserve, which Lestock's 
 division would have constituted, of the part it 
 may take in improving or repairing the results of 
 an action — taking the place of injured friends, 
 preventing injured foes escaping, turning doubtful 
 battle into victory. But no ; these commonplaces 
 of to-day and of all time were swamped by the 
 Fighting Instructions. It will be seen in the 
 sequel what a disastrous moral influence Lestock's 
 aloofness exercised upon a few timid captains, and 
 not improbably upon the entire subsequent course 
 and worst errors of his unfortunate superior. 
 
 One of the witnesses in the ensuing Courts- 
 Martial testified that the commander-in-chief, 
 
28 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 under these perplexing circumstances, went into 
 the stern gallery of the flag-ship Namur, and 
 called to Captain Cornwall of the Marlborough, 
 next astern, asking what he thought. Cornwall 
 replied he " believed they would lose the glory of 
 the day, if they did not attack the Spaniards," — 
 t. <?., the allied rear-centre and rear, — "the Vice- 
 Admiral — Lestock — being so far astern." To 
 which the admiral said, " If you '11 bear down 
 and attack the Real'' — the Real Felipe, Spanish 
 flag-ship, — "I '11 be your second." This was 
 about one o'clock, and the signal to engage had 
 been made two hours earlier, probably with the 
 double object of indicating the ultimate intention 
 of the movements in hand, and the immediate 
 urgency of forming the line. The admiral's 
 words betray the indecision of an irresolute 
 nature and of professional rustiness, but not of 
 timidity, and Cornwall's words turned the scale. 
 The course of the flag-ship Namur had hitherto 
 been but a little off the wind, "lasking" down, 
 to use the contemporary but long obsolete ex- 
 pression, in such manner as to show the admiral's 
 desire to engage himself with the enemy's centre, 
 according to the Fighting Instructions; but now, 
 in hopelessness of that result, she kept broad 
 off, directly for the nearest enemy, accompanied 
 closely by the Norfolk, her next ahead, and by 
 the Marlborough. Rear-Admiral Rowley, com- 
 manding the van, imitated the admiral's example, 
 bringing the French ship abreast him to close 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 29 
 
 action. He also was thoroughly supported by 
 the two captains next astern of him, the second 
 of whom was Edward Hawke, — afterwards the 
 brilliant admiral, — in the Berwick. Two Brit- 
 ish groups, each of three ships, were thus hotly 
 enofasred ; but with an interval between them of 
 over half a mile, corresponding to the places 
 open for six or seven other vessels. The con- 
 duct of the ships named, under the immediate 
 influence of the example set by the two admirals, 
 suggests how much the average man is sustained 
 by professional tone ; for a visible good example 
 is simply a good standard, a high ideal, realized 
 in action. 
 
 Unfortunately, however, just as Hawke's later 
 doings showed the man able to rise above the 
 level of prescribed routine duty, there was found 
 in the second astern of the Namur a captain 
 capable of exceptional backwardness, of reason- 
 ing himself into dereliction of clear duty, and 
 thus effecting a demonstration that the example 
 of timidity is full as contagious and more master- 
 ful than that of audacity. The flag-ships and 
 their supporters ranged themselves along the 
 hostile line to windward, within point-blank 
 range ; according to the 20th Article of the 
 Fighting Instructions, which read, " Every Com- 
 mander is to take care that his guns are not fired 
 till he is sure he can reach the enemy upon a 
 point-blank ; and by no means to suffer his guns 
 to be fired over any of our own ships." The 
 
.30 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 point-blank is the range of a cannon laid level, 
 and the requirement was necessary to efficient 
 action in those days of crude devices for pointing, 
 with ordnance material of inferior power. Even 
 sixty years later Nelson expressed his indifference 
 to improvements in pointing, on the ground that 
 the true way of fighting was to get so close that 
 you could not miss your aim. Thus Mathews' 
 captain placed the Namur, of ninety guns, within 
 four hundred yards — less than quarter of a mile 
 — of the Spanish flag-ship, the Real Felipe, 
 of one hundred and ten guns ; and Cornwall 
 brought the Marlborough immediately in the 
 wake of the Namur, engaging the Spanish Her- 
 cules. But the Dorsetshire, which should have 
 followed the Marlborough, was stopped by her 
 commander, Captain George Burrish, at a dis- 
 tance which was estimated by several witnesses 
 to be from half a mile to nearly a mile from the 
 enemy, or, to use a very expressive phrase then 
 current, " at random shot." The Court-Martial, 
 however, in pronouncing upon this point, decided 
 that inasmuch as a bar-shot came on board the 
 Dorsetshire in this early part of the engagement, 
 she must be construed to have brought-to within 
 extreme point-blank. In view of the mass of 
 testimony to the greater distance, this seems to 
 have been simply giving the benefit of a doubt. 
 
 Thus situated, the action between the Namur 
 and Marlborotigh on the one side, and the Real 
 Felipe and Hercules on the other, was for some 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 31 
 
 time very hot ; but the Marlborough, moving 
 faster than the Nanmr, closed upon her, so that 
 she had to get out of the way, which she did by 
 moving ahead and at the same time hauling to 
 windward, till she reached as far from the Span- 
 ish line as the Dorsetshire had remained. The 
 Court in this matter decided that, after the 
 admiral had thus hauled off, the Dorsetshire was 
 in a line, or as far to leeward — towards the 
 enemy — as the admiral. The Marlborough was 
 thus left alone, exposed to the fire of a ship 
 heavier than herself, and also to that of the 
 Hercules, which was able to train upon her a 
 considerable part of her battery. Under these 
 circumstances, it was the duty of the Dorsetshire, 
 as it was the opportunity of her commander, by 
 attacking the Hercules, to second, and support, 
 the engaged ship ; but she continued aloof. 
 After two hours — by 3 p. m. — the main and 
 mizzen masts were cut out of the Marlborough, 
 and she lost her captain with forty-two men 
 killed, and one hundred and twenty wounded, 
 out of a crew of seven hundred and fifty. Thus 
 disabled, the sails on the foremast turned her 
 head towards the enemy, and she lay moving 
 sluggishly, between the fleets, but not under con- 
 trol. The admiral now sent an oflficer to Bur- 
 rish — the second that morning — to order him 
 into his station and to support the Marlborough ; 
 while to the latter, in response to an urgent rep- 
 resentation by boat of her condition, and that she 
 
32 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 was threatened by the approach of the hitherto 
 separated ships of the Spanish rear, he replied 
 that the Naiuiir was wearhig and would come to 
 her assistance. 
 
 When Burrish received his message, he sent for 
 his lieutenants on the quarter-deck, and spoke to 
 them words which doubtless reflect the reasoning 
 upon which he was justifying to himself his most 
 culpable inaction. " Gentlemen, I sent for you 
 to show you the position of our ships to wind- 
 ward," {i. e. the ships of the centre division 
 behind him, and Lestock's division), " likewise 
 those five sail [Spanish] of the enemy that are 
 astern of us. I have my orders to engage the 
 Real, and you see I am bearing down for that 
 purpose." The lieutenants remarked that he 
 could do so with safety. To this he rejoined, 
 with a curtness that testifies to the uneasiness of 
 his mind, " I did not send for you to ask your 
 opinions, but only to observe that not one of our 
 ships is coming down to my assistance, in order 
 to cut those five sail off, and in case those five 
 sail should oblige me to haul my wind again, and 
 leave the Marlborough, that you may be able to 
 indemnify my conduct, if called in question." 
 One witness also testified that he "was angry 
 that Admiral Lestock's division did not bear 
 down," — which was just enough, — and that "he 
 thought it most advisable to keep his station ; " 
 meaning by this, apparently, to remain where he 
 was. His cross-examination of the evidence was 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 33 
 
 directed to prove the danger to his ship from 
 these remaining Spaniards. This anxiety was 
 wholly misplaced, and professionally unworthy. 
 Quite independent of orders by signal and mes- 
 sage, he was bound, in view of the condition of 
 the Marlborough, to go to her relief, and to as- 
 sume that the three English ships of the centre 
 division, in his rear, would surely sustain him. 
 To base contrary action upon a doubt of their 
 faithfulness was to condemn himself. Four ships 
 to five under such conditions should be rather 
 a spur than a deterrent to an officer of spirit, who 
 understands the obligation of his calling. 
 
 Till this, the Dorsetshire had been under her 
 three top-sails only. She appears then to have 
 stood down under more sail, but very slowly, and 
 here occurred another disaster which was largely 
 chargeable to her being out of her station. See- 
 ing the desperate state of the Marlborough, 
 Mathews, who throughout managed blunder- 
 ingly, with the single exception of the original 
 attack, had thought to aid her and divert the fire 
 of the Real by sending against the latter a fire- 
 ship. It was elementary that vessels of this class 
 needed energetic support and cover in their des- 
 perate work. Small in size, of no battery-force 
 except against boat attacks, loaded with combus- 
 tibles and powder, success in the use of them 
 under an enemy's guns required not only imper- 
 turbable coolness and nerve, but the utmost 
 attainable immunity from the attention of the 
 
 3 
 
34 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 enemy. This could be secured only by a heavy 
 and sustained fire from their own fleet. With 
 the Norfolk, Namicr, Marlborough, and Dorset- 
 shire in close line, as they should have been, and 
 heavily engaged, a fire-ship might have passed 
 between them, and, though at imminent hazard 
 even so, have crossed the four hundred yards of 
 intervening water to grapple the hostile flag-ship; 
 but with the Marlborough lying disabled and 
 alone, the admiral himself acting with indecision, 
 and the Dorsetshire hanging aloof, the attempt 
 was little short of hopeless. Still it was made, 
 and the Anne Galley — such was her odd name 
 — bore down, passing close by the Dorsetshire. 
 
 It became doubly the duty of Burrish to act, 
 to push home whatever demonstration was in 
 his power to make ; the fire-ship, however, went 
 by him and was permitted to pursue her des- 
 perate mission without his support. The Real, 
 seeing the Anne approach, bore up out of 
 her line, and at the same time sent a strongly- 
 manned launch to grapple and tow her out of 
 the way. This was precisely one of the measures 
 that it was the business of supporting ships to 
 repel. The captain of the fire-ship, thrown upon 
 his own resources, opened fire, a most hazardous 
 measure, as much of his priming was with loose 
 powder; but the launch readily avoided injury 
 by taking position directly ahead, where the guns 
 would not bear. The crew of the Anne were 
 now ordered into the boat, except the captain 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 35 
 
 and five others, who were to remain to the last 
 moment, and light the train ; but from some 
 cause not certainly demonstrated she exploded 
 prematurely, being then within a hundred yards 
 of the Real. It is necessary to say that the 
 Court-Martial acquitted Burrish of blame, because 
 he " had no orders to cover the fire-ship, either 
 by signal or otherwise." Technically, the effect 
 of this finding was to shift an obvious and gross 
 blunder from the captain to some one else ; but 
 it is evident that if the Dorsetshire had oc- 
 cupied her station astern of the Marlborough^ 
 the fire-ship's attempt would have been much 
 facilitated. 
 
 The Court decided unanimously that Burrish 
 "ought to have borne down as far to leeward 
 as where the admiral first began to engage, 
 notwithstanding that the admiral might be 
 hauled off before the Dorsetshire got so far to 
 leeward." The point upon which the line should 
 have been formed was thus established by the 
 Court's finding. The subsequent proceedings 
 of this ship need not be related. She now came 
 slowly into close action, but that part of the 
 enemy's order was already broken, and their rear 
 vessels, the fear of which had controlled her 
 captain, passed by as they came up without 
 serious action. 
 
 How far Burrish's example influenced the 
 captains immediately behind him cannot certainly 
 be aflfirmed. Such shyness as he displayed is 
 
^6 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 not only infectious, but saps that indispensable 
 basis upon which military effectiveness reposes, 
 namely, the certainty of co-operation and support, 
 derived from mutual confidence, inspired by mili- 
 tary discipline, obedience, and honor. It is well 
 to note here that the remoteness of Lestock's 
 division thus affected Burrish, who evidently 
 could not understand either its distance or its 
 failure to approach, and who, being what he 
 was, saw himself threatened with want of that 
 backing which he himself was refusing to the 
 l\Iarlboroicgh. While he was blaming Lestock, 
 hard things were being said about him in Les- 
 tock's division ; but the lesson of Lestock's in- 
 fluence upon Burrish is not less noteworthy 
 because the latter forfeited both duty and 
 honor by his hesitation. It is to be feared that 
 the captain of the Essex, following the Dorset- 
 shire, was a coward ; even so Burrish, an old 
 captain, certainly did not cheer his heart by 
 good example, but rather gave him the pretext 
 for keeping still farther off. The rearmost two 
 ships of the division but confirm the evidences 
 of demoralization, and the more so that their 
 captains seem from the evidence to have been 
 well-disposed average men ; but the five Spanish 
 vessels approaching, with the Dorsetshire and 
 the Essex holding aloof, was too much for their 
 resolution — and not unnaturally. Tlie broad 
 result, however, was lamentable; for four British 
 ships feared to come to the aid of an heroic 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 37 
 
 and desperately injured consort, in deadly peril, 
 because five enemies were drawing nigh. 
 
 Upon these four therefore fell, and not un- 
 justly, the weight of national anger. Burrish 
 was cashiered, and declared forever incapable 
 of being an officer in the Navy. Norris, of the 
 Essex, absconded to avoid trial. The two others 
 were pronounced unfit to command, but, although 
 never again employed, mitigating circumstances 
 in their behavior caused them to be retained 
 on the lists of the Navy. It is not too much 
 to say that they were men just of the stamp 
 to have escaped this shame and ruin of reputa- 
 tion, under more favorable conditions of pro- 
 fessional tone. 
 
 Concerning the vice-admiral's action at this 
 time, which had its share in the ruin of these 
 captains, another curious instance of men's bond- 
 age to the order of battle transpires. The three 
 rear ships of his squadron were clean, that is, 
 relatively fast ; and they were rearmost for this 
 very reason of speed, because, when the division 
 led on the other tack, they, as headmost ships of 
 the fleet, would be ready to chase. Nevertheless, 
 when the admiral sent to Lestock in the fore- 
 noon to hurry him into line, no order was given 
 to these ships to press ahead. Why .? Lestock 
 answers that to send those ships ahead, out of 
 the place in the line prescribed to them by the 
 commander-in-chief, was breaking the line, which 
 should expose him to condign punishment ; and 
 
38 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 this opinion the Court also adopts : " The [only] 
 messages sent to the Vice- Admiral by the Ad- 
 miral's two lieutenants were to make what sail 
 he possibly could, and to close the line with his 
 division ; no signal was made for him to chase 
 with his division, or send ships of his division 
 to chase; without which, while the signal for the 
 line of battle was flying, and more especially after 
 the messages brought him, he could not, without 
 breach of duty, either have chased or sent ships 
 to chase out of the line." It is to be noted that 
 the word " chase " is here used in the strictest 
 technical sense, not merely to exclude Lestock 
 from diverting a ship to some other purpose than 
 that of the engagement, but even from shifting 
 her place in the general order in the view of 
 furthering the engagement; for the Court says 
 again : " The Vice- Admiral could not send any 
 ships of his division to the relief of the Namur 
 and Marlborough without breaking the order of 
 battle, there being four ships of the Admiral's 
 division " (to wit, the Dorsetshire and that crowd) 
 " stationed between the Vice-Admiral's division 
 and the Marlborough, which four ships might 
 have gone to the assistance of the Marlborough!' 
 The second in command thus had no liberty 
 to repair either the oversights of his superior, or 
 the results of obvious bad conduct in juniors ; for 
 Burrish's backwardness was observed throughout 
 the rear. There was a long road yet to travel 
 to Nelson's personal action at St. Vincent and 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 39 
 
 Copenhagen, or to his judicious order at Trafal- 
 gar, " The Second in command will, after my 
 intentions are made known to him, have the 
 entire direction of his line." Even that great 
 ofificer Hood, off the Chesapeake in 1781, felt 
 himself tied hand and foot by the union flag at 
 the mizzen peak, — the signal for the line. Only 
 the commander-in-chief could loose the bonds ; 
 either by his personal initiative alone, and vigi- 
 lant supervision, as did Hawke and Rodney, or 
 by adding to this the broad view of discretion in 
 subordinates which Nelson took. Before leaving 
 this subject, note may be taken of a pettifogging 
 argument advanced by Lestock and adopted by 
 the Court, that orders to these three ships to press 
 ahead would have resulted in nothing, because of 
 the lio:htness of the wind then and afterwards. 
 True, doubtless, and known after the fact; but 
 who before the event could predict the uncertain 
 Mediterranean breeze, or how much each foot 
 gained might contribute to the five minutes 
 which measure the interval between victory and 
 defeat. It is not by such lagging hesitations 
 that battles are won. 
 
 It is a trivial coincidence, though it may be 
 noted in passing, that as it was the second astern 
 of the commander-in-chief on whom fell the 
 weight of the disgrace, so it was the second 
 astern of the commander of the van who alone 
 scored a distinct success, and achieved substan- 
 tial gain of professional reputation. Hawke, at 
 
40 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 first bearing clown, had come to close action with 
 the Spanish A'cptuno, a vessel nominally of less 
 force than his own ship, the Berwick. The N'ep- 
 tuno was at length driven out of her line, with a 
 loss of some two hundred killed and wounded. 
 Thus left without an immediate antagonist, 
 Hawke's attention was attracted by another 
 Spanish vessel, the Podcr, of the same nominal 
 force as the Ncphcno, and following her in the 
 order ; with which four or five of the seven British 
 ships, that should have closed the interval between 
 Mathews and Rowley, were carrying on a distant 
 and circumspect engagement, resembling in cau- 
 tion that of the DorsetsJiire and her followers. 
 He carried the Berwick close alongside the new 
 enemy, dismasted her, and after two hours com- 
 pelled her to strike her flag ; the only vessel in 
 either fleet that day to surrender, and then only 
 after a resistance as honorable to Spain as that 
 of the Marlborough had been to Great Britain. 
 Her commander refused to yield his sword to 
 any but Hawke, who also took possession of the 
 prize with a party from his own ship ; thus estab- 
 lishing beyond dispute, by all customary formali- 
 ties, his claim to the one trophy of the day. The 
 occurrences through which she was afterwards 
 lost to the British, so that only the honor of the 
 capture remained, and that to Hawke alone, 
 must be briefly told ; for they, too, are a part of 
 the mismanagement that has given to this battle 
 its particular significance in naval history. 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 41 
 
 As the unlucky fire-ship bore down, Mathews 
 began wearing the Namur, — turning her round, 
 that is, from the wind, and therefore towards the 
 Marlborough and her opponents. In this he 
 seems to have had first in view supporting the 
 fire-ship and covering the Marlborough. Boats 
 were ahead of the latter towing her from the 
 enemy. As she was thus being dragged off, but 
 after the fire-ship blew up, the Namur passed 
 between her and the hostile line; then, hauling 
 to the wind on the starboard tack, she stood north 
 towards Lestock's division. This movement to 
 the rear was imitated by the British ships of 
 the centre, — the Dorsetshire and others, — and, 
 beyond a brush with the rear five Spanish vessels 
 as they came up, the action in the centre here 
 ceased. 
 
 This retrograde movement of Mathews and his 
 division drew the centre away from the van. At 
 about the same time the allied van, composed 
 wholly of French ships, seeing the straits of the 
 Poder and the Real, tacked — turned round — to 
 come down to their assistance. This imposed a 
 like movement upon the British van, lest it should 
 be engaged apart from the rest of the fleet, and 
 perhaps doubled on, by a number of perfectly 
 fresh ships. The Poder, having lost her chief 
 spars, could not be carried off, nor was Hawke 
 able even to remove the men he had thrown 
 on board. She was therefore retaken by the 
 French. Lieutenant Lloyd, the officer in charge, 
 
42 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 escaped with a part of the prize crew, taking with 
 him also a number of Spanish prisoners ; but a 
 junior lieutenant and some seamen were left 
 behind and captured. The Berwick being com- 
 pelled to follow her division, Lloyd could not 
 rejoin her till the following day, and sought 
 refuge for that night on board another ship. 
 
 The next day, February 23d, Mathews had 
 another chance. As he did not pursue during 
 the night, while the allies continued to retire, he 
 was a long way off at daylight ; but his fleet was 
 now united, and the enemy retreating. He need 
 therefore have no anxiety about the crippled 
 Marlborough, but could follow freely ; whereas, 
 the enemy being pursued, their injured ships both 
 retarded the movement and were endangered. In 
 the course of the day, the Poder had lagged so far 
 behind that Admiral Rowley, who had recognized 
 Hawke's enterprise the day before, directed him 
 to move down upon her. As he approached, the 
 French ship in company abandoned her, but in 
 taking possession Hawke was anticipated by the 
 Essex, which Mathews himself had ordered to do 
 so. The captain of the Essex got hold of the 
 Spanish flag, with some other small trophies, 
 which he afterwards refused to give up unless 
 compelled ; and, as Mathews would not give an 
 order, Hawke never got them. Thus curiously 
 it came to pass that the one man who above 
 several misdemeanants distinguished himself by 
 bad conduct, amounting to cowardice, and who 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 43 
 
 ran away to escape trial, kept the tokens of the 
 single achievement of the day from him whose 
 valor had won them. The P^^^^ herself was set 
 on fire, and destroyed. 
 
 The British fleet continued to follow during 
 the 23d, and at nightfall was within three or 
 four miles of the enemy, when Mathews again 
 stopped. The allies, continuing to withdraw, 
 were next morning nearly out of sight, and 
 further pursuit was abandoned. 
 
 Thus ended this almost forgotten affair, which 
 in its day occasioned to an unusual degree the 
 popular excitement and discussion which always 
 follow marked disaster, and but rarely attend 
 success. Besides the particular missteps of Les- 
 tock and the individual captains, which have been 
 mentioned, Mathews's conduct was marked by 
 serious failures in professional competency. The 
 charge preferred against him which seems most 
 to have attracted attention, and to have been 
 considered most damaging, was taking his fleet 
 into action in a confused and disorderly manner. 
 It is significant of professional standards that 
 this should have assumed such prominence ; for, 
 however faulty may have been his previous man- 
 agement, the most creditable part of his conduct 
 was the manner of his attack. He did not wait 
 for a pedantically accurate line, but by a straight- 
 forward onslaught, at a favorable moment, upon 
 a part of the enemy, — and that the rear, — set 
 an example which, had it been followed by all 
 
44 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 who could do so, would probably have resulted 
 in a distinct and brilliant success. He was justi- 
 fied — if he reasoned at all — in expecting that 
 Lestock could get into action as soon as the 
 French van ; or, at the least, before it could 
 reverse the conditions which would have ensued 
 from a vigorous encounter upon the lines of 
 Mathews's attack. It is most doubtful, indeed, 
 whether the French van would have ventured to 
 engage, in the case supposed ; for the French 
 admiral, writing to the French ambassador in 
 Spain, used these words : " It is clear, in the 
 situation I was in, it could not be expected that 
 a French admiral should go to the assistance of 
 the Spaniards ; neither could the vanguard of the 
 fleet do it without runnino: the hazard of beinsr 
 surrounded by the vanguard of the English, 
 which had the wind of them ; but as soon as the 
 English left me I drew together all the ships of 
 both squadrons, and sailed immediately to the 
 assistance of the Real Felipe, in doing which I 
 was exposed to the fire of the whole English 
 line ; but happily the English did not punish my 
 rashness as it deserved." Evidently De Court 
 shared to the full the professional caution which 
 marked the French naval officers, with all their 
 personal courage ; for if it was rash to pass the 
 hostile line after it wore, it would be reckless to 
 do so before. 
 
 Considered simply as a tactical situation, or 
 problem, quite independent of any tactical fore- 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 45 
 
 thought or insight on the part of the commander- 
 in-chief, — of which there is Httle indication, — 
 the conditions resulting from his attack were well 
 summed up in a contemporary publication, wholly 
 adverse to Mathews in tone, and saturated with 
 the professional prepossessions embodied in the 
 Fighting Instructions. This writer, who claims 
 to be a naval officer, says : 
 
 " The whole amount of this fight is that the centre, 
 consisting of eleven ships-of-the-line, together with two 
 of-the-line and two fifty-gun ships of the Rear- Admiral's 
 division [the van], were able to destroy the whole Span- 
 ish squadron, much more so as three of those ships went 
 on with the French [the allied van], and four of the 
 sternmost did not get up with their admiral before it 
 was darkish, long after the fire-ship's misfortune, so that 
 the whole afternoon there were only five, out of which 
 the Constante was beat away in less than an hour ; what 
 then fifteen ships could be doing from half an hour 
 past one till past five, no less than four hours, and these 
 ships not taken, burnt, and destroyed, is the question 
 which behooves them to answer." 
 
 In brief, then, Mathews's attack was so delivered 
 that the weight of thirteen of-the-line fell upon 
 five Spanish of the same class, the discomfiture of 
 which, actually accomplished even under the mis- 
 behavior of several British ships, separated the 
 extreme rear, five other Spanish vessels, from the 
 rest of the allies. Whatever the personal merit 
 or lack of merit on the part of the commander- 
 in-chief, such an opportunity, pushed home by a 
 
46 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 "band of brothers," would at the least have wiped 
 out these rear ten ships of the allies ; nor could 
 the remainder in the van have redeemed the situ- 
 ation. As for the method of attack, it is worthy 
 of note that, although adopted by Mathews 
 accidentally, it anticipated, not only the best gen- 
 eral practice of a later date, but specifically the 
 purpose of Rodney in the action which he him- 
 self considered the most meritorious of his whole 
 career, — that of April 17, 1780. The decisive 
 signal given by him on that occasion, as explained 
 by himself, meant that each ship should steer, 
 not for the ship corresponding numerically to 
 her in the enemy's order, but for the one imme- 
 diately opposite at the time the signal was made. 
 This is what Mathews and his seconds did, and 
 others should have imitated. Singularly enough, 
 not only was the opportunity thus created lost, 
 but there is no trace of its existence, even, being 
 appreciated in such wise as to affect professional 
 opinion. As far as Mathews himself was con- 
 cerned, the accounts show that his conduct, 
 instead of indicating tactical sagacity, was a 
 mere counsel of desperation. 
 
 But after engaging he committed palpable and 
 even discreditable mistakes. Hauling to wind- 
 ward — away — when the Marlborough forced 
 him ahead, abandoned that ship to overwhelming 
 numbers, and countenanced the irresolution of 
 the Dorsetshire and others. Continuing to stand 
 north, after wearing on the evening of the battle, 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 47 
 
 was virtually a retreat, unjustified by the condi- 
 tions ; and it would seem that the same false step 
 gravely imperilled the Berwick, Hawke holding 
 on, most properly, to the very last moment of 
 safety, in order to get back his prize-crew. 
 Bringing-to on the night of the 23d was an error 
 of the same character as standing north during 
 that of the 2 2d. It was the act of a doubtful, 
 irresolute man,— irresolute, not because a coward, 
 but because wanting in the self-confidence that 
 springs from conscious professional competency. 
 In short, the commander-in-chief's unfitness was 
 graphically portrayed in the conversation with 
 Cornwall from the quarter gallery of the flag-ship. 
 " If you approve and will go down with me, I will 
 go down." Like so many men, he needed a 
 backer, to settle his doubts and to stiffen his back- 
 bone. The instance is far from unique. 
 
 In the case of Byng, as of Mathews, we are not 
 concerned with the general considerations of the 
 campaign to which the battle was incidental. It 
 is sufficient to note that in Minorca, then a Brit- 
 ish possession, the French had landed an army of 
 15,000 men, with siege artillery sufficient to 
 reduce the principal port and fortress. Port 
 Mahon ; upon which the whole island must fall. 
 Their communications with France depended 
 upon the French fleet cruising in the neighbor- 
 hood. Serious injury inflicted upon it would 
 therefore go far to relieve the invested garrison. 
 Under these circumstances the British fleet 
 
48 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 sighted Minorca on the 19th of May, 1756, and 
 was attempting to exchange information with the 
 besieged, when the French fleet was seen in the 
 southeast. Byng stood towards it, abandoning 
 for the time the effort to communicate. That 
 night both fleets manoeuvred for advantage of 
 position with regard to the wind. The next day, 
 between 9 and 10 a. m., they came again in view 
 of each other, and at 1 1 were about six miles apart, 
 the French still to the southeast, with a breeze 
 at south-southwest to southwest. The British 
 once more advanced towards them, close hauled 
 on the starboard tack, heading southeasterly, the 
 enemy standing on the opposite tack, heading 
 westerly, both carrying sail to secure the weather 
 gage (Bi, Fi). It appeared at first that the French 
 would pass ahead of the British, retaining the 
 windward position ; but towards noon the wind 
 changed, enabling the latter to lie up a point or 
 two higher (Bo). This also forced the bows of 
 the several French vessels off their course, and put 
 them out of a regular line of battle ; that is, they 
 could no longer sail in each other's wake (F2). 
 Being thus disordered, they reformed on the 
 same tack, heading northwest, with the wind very 
 little forward of the beam. This not only took 
 time, but lost ground to leeward, because the 
 quickest way to re-establish the order was for the 
 mass of the fleet to take their new positions from 
 the Icewardmost vessel. When formed (F3), as 
 they could not now prevent the British line from 
 

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of the Eighteenth Century 49 
 
 passing ahead, they hove-to with their main- 
 topsails aback, — stopped, — awaiting the attack, 
 which was thenceforth inevitable and close at 
 hand. 
 
 In consequence of what has been stated, the 
 British line (B2 — B3) — more properly, column — 
 was passing ahead of the French (F2 — F3), steer- 
 ing towards their rear, in a direction in a general 
 sense opposite to theirs, but not parallel ; that is, 
 the British course made an angle, of between 
 thirty and forty-five degrees, with the line on 
 which their enemy was ranged. Hence, barring 
 orders to the contrary, — which were not given, — 
 each British ship was at its nearest to the enemy 
 as she passed their van, and became more and more 
 distant as she drew to the rear. It would have 
 been impossible to realize more exactly the post- 
 ulate of the 17th Article of the Fighting 
 Instructions, which in itself voiced the ideal con- 
 ditions of an advantageous naval position for 
 attack, as conceived by the average officer of 
 the day; and, as though most effectually to 
 demonstrate once for all how that sort of 
 thing would work, the adjunct circumstances 
 approached perfection. The admiral was thor- 
 oughly wedded to the old system, without an 
 idea of departing from it, and there was a fair 
 working breeze with which to give it effect, 
 for the ships under topsails and foresail would 
 go about three knots ; with top-gallant sails, per- 
 haps over four. A fifty-gun ship, about the 
 
50 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 middle of the engagement, had to close her 
 lower deck ports when she set her top-gallant 
 sails on the wind, which had then freshened 
 a little. 
 
 The 17th Article read thus: " If the admiral 
 see the enemy standing towards him, and he 
 has the wind of them, the van of the fleet 
 is to make sail till they come the length of 
 the enemy's rear, and our rear abreast of the 
 enemy's van ; then he that is in the rear of 
 our fleet is to tack first, and every ship one 
 after another as fast as they can throughout 
 the whole line; and if the admiral will have 
 the whole fleet to tack toorether, the sooner to 
 put them in a posture of engaging the enemy, 
 he will hoist " a prescribed signal, " and fire 
 a gun; and whilst they are in fight with the 
 enemy the ships will keep at half a cable's 
 length — one hundred yards — one of the other." 
 All this Byng aimed to do. The conditions ex- 
 actly fitted, and he exactly followed the rules, with 
 one or two slight exceptions, which will appear, 
 and for which the Court duly censured him. 
 
 When thus much had been done, the 19th 
 Article in turn found its postulate realized, and 
 laid down its corresponding instruction : " If the 
 admiral and his fleet have the wind of the 
 enemy, and they have stretched themselves in 
 a line of battle, the van of the admiral's fleet 
 is to steer with the van of the enemy's, and 
 there to engage with them." The precise force 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 51 
 
 of " steer with " is not immediately apparent to 
 us to-day, nor does it seem to have been perfectly 
 clear then ; for the question was put to the 
 captain of the flag-ship, — the heroic Gardiner, 
 
 — " You have been asked if the admiral did not 
 express some uneasiness at Captain Andrews " 
 
 — of the van ship in the action — " not seeming 
 to understand the 19th Article of the Fighting 
 Instructions ; Do not you understand that article 
 to relate to our van particularly when the two 
 fleets are [already] in a paraUel line of battle to 
 each other?" (As TT, F3). Answer: " I appre- 
 hended it in the situation " [not parallel] " we were 
 in^ if the word For were instead of the word 
 With, he would, I apprehend, have steered directly 
 
 for the van ship of the Enemy." Question. " As 
 the 19th Article expresses to steer with the 
 van of the enemy, if the leading ship had done 
 so, in the oblique line we were in with the 
 enemy, and every ship had observed it the same, 
 would it not have prevented our rear coming to 
 action at all, at least within a proper distance ? " 
 Answer: "Rear, and van too." "Steer with" 
 therefore meant, to the Court and to Gardiner, 
 to steer parallel to the enemy, — possibly like- 
 wise abreast, — and if the fleets were already 
 parallel the instruction would work ; but neither 
 the articles themselves, nor Byng by his signals, 
 did anything to effect parallelism before making 
 the signal to engage. 
 
 1 This wording and punctuation is exact from the text. 
 
52 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 The captain of the ship sternmost in passing, 
 which became the van when the fleet tacked 
 together according to the Instructions and 
 signals, evidently shared Gardiner's impression ; 
 when about, he steered parallel to — " with " — 
 the French, who had the wind nearly abeam. 
 The mischief was that the ships ahead of him 
 in passing were successively more and more 
 distant from the enemy, and if they too, after 
 tacking, steered with the latter, they would never 
 get any nearer. The impasse is clear. Other 
 measures doubtless would enable an admiral 
 to range his fleet parallel to the enemy at any 
 chosen distance, by taking a position himself and 
 forming the fleet on his ship ; or, in this particu- 
 lar instance, Byng being with the van as it, on 
 the starboard tack, was passing the enemy 
 (Bg Bg), could at any moment have brought his 
 fleet parallel to the French by signalling the 
 then van ship to keep away a certain amount, 
 the rest following in her wake. Nothing to 
 that effect being in the Instructions, it seems 
 not to have occurred to him. His one idea was 
 to conform to them, and he apprehended that 
 after tacking, as they prescribed, the new van 
 ship would bear down and engage without 
 further orders, keeping parallel to the French 
 when within point-blank, the others following 
 her as they could ; a process which, from the 
 varying distances, would expose each to a con- 
 centrated fire as they successively approached. 
 
of the Eighteenth Century ^2 
 
 Byng's action is only explicable to the writer 
 by supposing that he thus by " steer with " 
 understood " steer for ; " for when, after the fleet 
 tacked together, the new van ship (formerly the 
 rear) did not of her own motion head for the 
 leading enemy, he signalled her to steer one 
 point, and then two points, in that direction. 
 This, he explained in his defence, was " to put 
 the leading captain in mind of his Instructions, 
 who I perceived did not steer away with the 
 enemy's leading ship agreeable to the 19th Arti- 
 cle of the Fighting Instructions." The results 
 of these orders not answering his expectations, 
 he then made the signal to engage, as the only 
 remaining way perceptible to him for carrying 
 out the Instructions. 
 
 To summarize the foregoing, up to the moment 
 the signal for battle was made : While the fleets 
 were striving for the weather gage, the wind had 
 shifted to the southwest. The French, momenta- 
 rily disordered by the change, had formed in line 
 ahead about noon, heading northwest, westerly, so 
 as just to keep their main topsails aback and the 
 ships with bare steerage way, but under command 
 (F3). The British standing south-southeast, by the 
 wind, were passing (B2— B3) across the head of the 
 enemy's fleet at a distance of from three to two 
 miles — the latter being the estimate by their 
 ships then in the rear. The French having 
 twelve vessels in line and the British thirteen, the 
 gradual progress of the latter should bring their 
 
54 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 then van " the length of the enemy's rear," about 
 the time the rear came abreast of his van. When 
 this happened, the Instructions required that the 
 fleet tack together, and then stand for the enemy, 
 ship to ship, number one to number one, and so 
 alon^r the line till the number twelves met.^ 
 
 This Byng purposed to do, but, unluckily for 
 himself, ventured on a refinement. Considering 
 that, if his vessels bore down when abreast their 
 respective antagonists, they would go bows-on, 
 perpendicularly, subject to a raking — enfilading 
 — fire, he deferred the signal to tack till his van 
 had passed some distance beyond the French rear, 
 because thus they would have to approach in a 
 slanting direction. He left out of his account here 
 the fact that all long columns tend to straggle in 
 the rear ; hence, although he waited till his three 
 or four leading ships had passed the enemy 
 before making signal to tack, the rear had got no 
 farther than abreast the hostile van. Two of the 
 clearest witnesses, Baird of the Portla^id, next to 
 the then rear ship, and Cornwall of the Revenge, 
 seventh from it, testified that, after tacking 
 together, to the port tack, when they kept away 
 for the enemy in obedience to the signal for 
 battle, it was necessary, in order to reach their 
 particular opponents, to bring the wind not only 
 as far as astern, but on the starboard quarter, 
 
 * So far was literalism carried, that, before the signal for battle, Byng 
 evened numbers with his opponent by directing his weakest ship to 
 leave the line, with no other orders than to be ready to take the place of 
 a disabled vessel. 
 
of the Eighteenth Century ^^ 
 
 showing that they had been in rear of their sta- 
 tion before tacking, and so too far ahead after it ; 
 while Durell of the Tride7it, ninth from rear and 
 therefore fifth from van, asserted that at the 
 same moment the British van, which after tacking 
 became the rear, had overpassed the enemy by 
 five or six ships. This may be an exaggeration, 
 but that three or four vessels had gone beyond 
 is proved by evidence from the ships at that end 
 of the line. 
 
 The Court therefore distinctly censured the 
 admiral for this novelty : " Unanimously, the 
 Court are of opinion that when the British fleet 
 on the starboard tack were stretched abreast, or 
 about the beam of the enemy's line, the admiral 
 should have tacked the fleet all together, and 
 immediately have conducted it on a direct course 
 for the enemy, the van steering for the enemy's 
 van," etc. The instructive point, however, is not 
 Byng's variation, nor the Court's censure, but the 
 idea, common to both, that the one and only way 
 to use your dozen ships under the conditions was 
 to send each against a separate antagonist. The 
 highest and authoritative conception of a fleet 
 action was thus a dozen naval duels, occurring 
 simultaneously, under initial conditions unfavor- 
 able to the assailant. It is almost needless to 
 remark that this is as contrary to universal mili- 
 tary teaching as it was to the practice of Rodney, 
 Howe, Jervis, and Nelson, a generation or two 
 later. 
 
56 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 This is, in fact, the chief significance of this 
 action, which ratified and in a measure closed the 
 effete system to which the middle eighteenth 
 century had degraded the erroneous, but com- 
 paratively hearty, tradition received by it from 
 the seventeenth. It is true, the same blunder- 
 ing method was illustrated in the War of 177S. 
 Arbuthnot and Graves, captains when Byng was 
 tried, followed his plan in 17S1, with like dem- 
 onstration of practical disaster attending false 
 theory ; but, while the tactical inefficiency was 
 little less, the evidence of faint-hearted profes- 
 sional incompetency, of utter personal inade- 
 quacy, was at least not so glaring. It is the 
 combination of the two in the person of the 
 same commander that has given to this action its 
 pitiful pre-eminence in the naval annals of the 
 century. 
 
 It is, therefore, not so much to point out the 
 lesson, as to reinforce its teaching by the exem- 
 plification of the practical results, that there is 
 advantage in tracing the sequel of events in this 
 battle. The signal to tack was made when the 
 British van had reached beyond the enemy's 
 rear, at a very little after i p.m. (B3). This re- 
 versed the line of batde, the rear becoming the 
 van, on the port tack. When done, the new 
 van was about two miles from that of the 
 French (F4) ; the new rear, in which Byng was 
 fourth from sternmost, was three and a half or 
 four from their rear. Between this and 2 r. m. 
 
of the Eighteenth Century ^"j 
 
 came the signals for the ship then leading to keep 
 two points, twenty-five degrees, more to starboard, 
 — towards the enemy; a measure which could 
 only have the bad effect of increasing the angle 
 which the British line already made with that 
 of the French, and the consequent inequality of 
 distance to be traversed by their vessels in reach- 
 ing their opponents. At 2.20 the signal for battle 
 was made, and was repeated by the second in 
 command. Rear- Admiral Temple West, who was 
 in the fourth ship from the van. His division of 
 six bore up at once and ran straight down before 
 the wind, under topsails only, for their several 
 antagonists; the sole exception being the van- 
 most vessel, which took the slanting direction 
 desired by Byng, with the consequence that she 
 got ahead of her position, had to back and to 
 wear to regain it, and was worse punished than 
 any of her comrades. The others engaged in 
 line, within point-blank, the rear-admiral hoisting 
 the flag for close action (Bi). Fifteen minutes 
 later, the sixth ship, and rearmost of the van, 
 the Intrepid, lost her foretopmast, which crippled 
 her. 
 
 The seventh ship, which was the leader of the 
 rear, Byng's own division, got out of his hands 
 before he could hold her. Her captain, Frederick 
 Cornwall, was nephew to the gallant fellow who 
 fell backing Mathews so nobly off Toulon, and 
 had then succeeded to the command of the Marl- 
 borough, fighting her till himself disabled. He 
 
58 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 had to bring the wind on the starboard quarter 
 of his little sixty-four, in order to reach the sev- 
 enth in the enemy's line, which was an eighty-gun 
 ship, carrying the flag of the French admiral. 
 This post, by professional etiquette, as by evident 
 military considerations, Byng owed to his own 
 flag-ship, of equal force. 
 
 The rest of the rear division the commander- 
 in-chief attempted to carry with himself, slanting 
 down; or, as the naval term then had it, "lask- 
 ing " towards the enemy. The flag-ship kept 
 away four points — forty-five degrees ; but hardly 
 had she started, under the very moderate canvas 
 of topsails and foresail, to cover the much greater 
 distance to be travelled, in order to support the 
 van by engaging the enemy's rear, when Byng 
 observed that the two ships on his left — towards 
 the van — were not keeping pace with him. He 
 ordered the main and mizzen topsails to be backed 
 to wait for them. Gardiner, the captain, " took 
 the liberty of offering the opinion " that, if sail 
 were increased instead of reduced, the ships con- 
 cerned would take the hint, that they would all 
 be sooner alongside the enemy, and probably 
 receive less damage in going down. It was a 
 question of example. The admiral replied, "You 
 see that the signal for the line is out, and I am 
 ahead of those two ships; and you would not 
 have me, as admiral of the fleet, run down as if 
 I was going to engage a single ship. It was Mr. 
 Mathews's misfortune to be prejudiced by not 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 59 
 
 carrying his force down together, which I shall 
 endeavor to avoid." Gardiner again " took the lib- 
 erty" of saying he would answer for one of the two 
 captains doing his duty. The incident, up to the 
 ship gathering way again, occupied less than ten 
 minutes ; but with the van going down headlong 
 — as it ought — one ceases to wonder at the 
 impression on the public produced by one who 
 preferred lagging for laggards to hastening to 
 support the forward, and that the populace sus- 
 pected something worse than pedantry in such 
 reasoning at such a moment. When way was 
 resumed, it was again under the very leisurely 
 canvas of topsails and foresail. 
 
 By this had occurred the incident of the hi- 
 trepid losing her foretopmast. It was an ordinary 
 casualty of battle, and one to be expected ; but 
 to such a temper as Byng's, and under the 
 cast-iron regulations of the Instructions, it 
 entailed consequences fatal to success in the 
 action, — if success were ever attainable under 
 such a method, — and was ultimately fatal to 
 the admiral himself. The wreck of the fallen 
 mast was cleared, and the foresail set to maintain 
 speed, but, despite all, the Intrepid dropped 
 astern in the line. Cornwall in the Revenge 
 was taking his place at the moment, and fearing 
 that the Intrepid would come back upon him, 
 if in her wake, he brought up first a little 
 to windward, on her quarter; then, thinking 
 that she was holding her way, he bore up again. 
 
6o Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 At this particular instant he looked behind, and 
 saw the admiral and other ships a considerable 
 distance astern and to windward ; much Les- 
 tock's position in Mathews's action. This was 
 the stoppage already mentioned, to wait for the 
 two other ships. Had Cornwall been Burrish, 
 he might in this have seen occasion for waiting 
 himself ; but he saw rather the need of the 
 crippled ship. The Revenge took position on 
 the Intrepid s lee quarter, to support her against 
 the enemy's fire, concentrated on her when her 
 mast was seen to fall. As her way slackened, 
 the Revenge approached her, and about fifteen 
 minutes later the ship following, the Pri7icess 
 Louisa, — one of those for which Byng had 
 waited, — loomed up close behind Cornwall, who 
 expected her to run him on board, her braces 
 being shot away. She managed, however, with 
 the helm to back her sails, and dropped clear; 
 but in so doing got in the way of the vessel 
 next after her, the Tridejit, which immediately 
 preceded Byng. The captain of the Trident, 
 slantino: down with the rest of the division, 
 saw the situation, put his helm up, ran under 
 the stern of the Louisa, passed on her lee side, 
 — nearest the enemy, — and ranged up behind 
 the Reve7ige ; but in doing this he not only 
 crossed the stern of the Louisa, but the bow 
 of the admiral's ship — the Ramillies. 
 
 Under proper management the Ramillies 
 doubtless could have done just what the Trident 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 6i 
 
 did, — keep away with the helm, till the ships 
 ahead of her were cleared ; she would be at 
 least hasting towards the enemy. But the noise 
 of battle was in the air, and the crew of the 
 Ramillies began to fire without orders, at an 
 improper distance. The admiral permitted them 
 to continue, and the smoke enveloping the ship 
 prevented fully noting the incidents just nar- 
 rated. It was, however, seen before the firing 
 that the Louisa was come up into the wind 
 with her topsails shaking, and the Trident pass- 
 ing her to leeward. There should, therefore, 
 have been some preparation of mind for the 
 fact suddenly reported to the admiral, by a 
 military passenger on the quarter deck, that 
 a British ship was close aboard, on the lee bow. 
 It was the Tride^it that had crossed from wind- 
 ward to leeward for the reasons given, and an 
 instant later the Louisa was seen on the weather 
 bow. Instead of keeping off, as the Trident 
 had done, the admiral ordered the foresail hauled 
 up, the helm down, luffed the ship to the wind, 
 and braced the foretopsail sharp aback ; the 
 effect of which was first to stop her way, and 
 then to pay her head off to leeward, clear of 
 the two vessels. About quarter of an hour 
 elapsed, by Captain Gardiner's evidence, from 
 the time that the Ramillies s head pointed clear 
 of the Trident and Louisa before sail was again 
 made to go forward to aid the van. The battle 
 was already lost, and in fact had passed out 
 
62 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 of Byng's control, owing to his previous action ; 
 nevertheless this further delay, though probably 
 due only to the importance attached by the 
 admiral to regularity of movement, had a dis- 
 creditable appearance. 
 
 The Court held that the admiral was justified 
 in not trying to go to leeward of the two ships, 
 under the circumstances when they were seen ; 
 but blamed him for permitting the useless can- 
 nonade which prevented seeing them sooner. 
 The results at this moment in other parts of 
 the field should be summarized, as they show 
 both the cause and the character of the failures 
 due to faulty management. 
 
 The five ships of the British van had already 
 seen their adversaries withdraw after a sharp 
 engagement. This seems to have been due to 
 the fact that two were individually overmatched 
 and driven off; whereupon the other three 
 retired because unable to contend with five. 
 But no support reached the British van at 
 this important moment ; on the contrary, the 
 British rear was now two or three miles distant, 
 astern and to windward. The lagging of the 
 crippled Intrepid held back the Revenge. Corn- 
 wall was detained some time by the old idea 
 that he needed a signal to pass her, because 
 to do so was breaking the order established by 
 the admiral ; but concluding at last that Byng 
 was unaware of the conditions, and seeing that 
 his immediate opponent — the French admiral 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 6^ 
 
 — was drawing ahead, he sent word to the 
 Intrepid to hold her fire for a few moments 
 till he could go by. He then made sail. 
 
 The French rear with its commander-in-chief 
 had been watching the incidents narrated : the 
 crippling of the Intrepid^ the consequent disorder 
 in the British rear, and the increasing distance 
 between it and the van. When the Revenge, 
 however, passed ahead, and Byng disentangled 
 his flag-ship, the moment for a decisive step 
 arrived. The French rear vessels were nearer 
 the British van than Byng's division was. They 
 now filled their topsails, made more sail, stood 
 for the British leading ships, already partially 
 unrigged, passed by, and in so doing gave them 
 the fire of a number of substantially fresh vessels, 
 which had undergone only a distant and ineffec- 
 tive cannonade. Byng saw what was about to 
 happen, and also set more canvas ; but it was no 
 longer possible to retrieve the preceding errors. 
 The French admiral had it in his power very 
 seriously to damage, if not to destroy the hostile 
 van; but in accordance with the tradition of his 
 nation he played an over-prudent game, strictly 
 defensive, and kept too far off. After exchang- 
 ing distant broadsides, he steered northwest to- 
 wards Mahon, satisfied that he had for the time 
 disabled his opponent. The British that eve- 
 ning tacked off-shore and stood to the southeast. 
 Four days later they abandoned the field, return- 
 ing to Gibraltar. The fall of Minorca followed. 
 
64 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 Nothingr could have been much worse than the 
 deplorable management of this action on the part 
 of the commander-in-chief. It is a conspicuous 
 instance of weak and halting execution, superim- 
 posed upon a professional conception radically 
 erroneous ; and it reflected throughout the timid 
 hesitancy of spirit which dictated the return to 
 Gibraltar, under the always doubtful sanction of 
 a Council of War. But the historical value of 
 the lesson is diminished if attention is confined 
 to the shortcomings of the admiral, neglectful 
 of the fact that his views as to the necessity 
 to observe the routine of the Fighting Instruc- 
 tions are reproduced in the evidence of the 
 captains ; and that the finding of the Court 
 censures, not the general idea, but certain details, 
 important yet secondary. Durell, being asked 
 whether the admiral could not have passed under 
 the stern of the Trident, as the Trident had 
 under that of the Louisa, replies, " Yes, but she 
 would have been to leeward of those ships 
 ahead;" that is, to leeward of the line. Gar- 
 diner " knows no other method than what the 
 admiral took, for preserving the line regular." 
 Cornwall cannot pass the Intrepid without a 
 signal, because it would be breaking the order. 
 These were all good men. 
 
 The Court, composed of four admirals and 
 nine captains, the junior of whom had over ten 
 years seniority, give in their finding no shadow 
 of disapproval to the broad outlines of the action. 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 65 
 
 There can be, therefore, no doubt about service 
 standards. The questions put to the witnesses 
 reveal indeed a distinct preference for forming 
 the line of battle parallel to that of the enemy 
 before bearing down, so that all the ships may 
 have the same distance to go, have a clear field 
 ahead of each, and the comparatively simple 
 mutual bearing of "abeam" to observe; but it 
 refrains from censuring the admiral for forming 
 on a line very oblique to that of the enemy, 
 which entailed the burden of changing the rela- 
 tive positions during standing down, so as to 
 arrive all together, on a line parallel to his ; while 
 the course itself being oblique alike to their own 
 front and the enemy's, each preceding ship was 
 liable to get in the way, " to prove an impedi- 
 ment," to its follower, — as actually happened. 
 It was indeed impossible to fault the commander- 
 in-chief in this particular, because his action was 
 conformable to the letter of the Instructions, 
 with which he was evidently and subserviently 
 eager to comply. 
 
 The decision of the Court therefore was, in 
 substance, that in bearing down upon the enemy 
 Byng did not do wrong in starting upon a line 
 oblique to them; but that he should have steered 
 such a course, and maintained such spread of 
 sail, graduated to the speed of the slowest ship in 
 the fleet, that all should reach point-blank range 
 at the same time, and be then ranged on a 
 line parallel to that of the enemy. " When on 
 
66 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 the starboard tack, the admiral should have 
 tacked the fleet all together and immediately con- 
 ducted it on a direct course for the enemy; . . . 
 each ship steering for her opposite ship in the 
 enemy's line, and under such sail as might have 
 enabled the worst sailing ship, under all her plain 
 sail, to preserve her station." It is needless to 
 insist with any naval man, or to any soldier, that 
 such an advance, in orderly fashion, oblique to 
 the front, is unattainable except by long drill, 
 while this fleet had been but a few weeks assem- 
 bled; and the difficulty is enhanced when each 
 ship has not only to keep its station in line, but 
 to reach a particular enemy, who may not be just 
 where he ought, having respect to the British 
 order. The manoeuvre favored by the Court for 
 the fleet as a whole was in fact just that which 
 Byng attempted for his own division, with the 
 results that have been narrated. These were 
 aggravated by his mismanagement, but did not 
 originate from it. 
 
 The invariable result of an attack thus at- 
 tempted, however vigorously made, was that the 
 van of the assailant got into action first, receiving 
 the brunt of the enemy's fire without proper sup- 
 port. Not infrequently, it also underwent a 
 second hammering from the enemy's rear, pre- 
 cisely in the same way as occurred in Byng's 
 action ; and whether this happened or not de- 
 pended more upon the enemy than upon the 
 British rear. In ignoring, therefore, the idea of 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 67 
 
 combining an attack in superior numbers upon 
 a part of the enemy, and adopting instead that of 
 an onslaught upon his whole, all along the line, 
 the British practice of the eighteenth century 
 not only surrendered the advantage which the 
 initiative has, of effecting a concentration, but 
 subjected their own fleets to being beaten in 
 detail, subject only to the skill of the opponent 
 in using the opportunity extended to him. The 
 results, at best, were indecisive, tactically con- 
 sidered. The one apparent exception was in 
 June, 1794, when Lord Howe, after long vainly 
 endeavoring a better combination with a yet raw 
 fleet, found himself forced to the old method ; 
 but although then several ships were captured, 
 this issue seems attributable chiefly to the con- 
 dition of the French Navy, greatly fallen through 
 circumstances foreign to the present subject. It 
 was with this system that Rodney was about to 
 break, the first of his century formally to do so. 
 A false tactical standard, however, was not the 
 only drawback under which the British Navy 
 labored in 1739. The prolonged series of wars, 
 which began when the establishment of civil 
 order under Cromwell permitted the nation to 
 turn from internal strife to external interests, had 
 been for England chiefly maritime. They had 
 recurred at brief intervals, and had been of such 
 duration as to insure a continuity of experience 
 and development. Usage received modification 
 under the influence of constant warlike practice, 
 
68 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 and the consequent changes in methods, if not 
 always thoroughly reasoned, at the least reflected 
 a similar process of professional advance in the 
 of^cers of the service. This was consecutively 
 transmitted, and by the movement of actual war 
 was prevented from stagnating and hardening 
 into an accepted finality. Thus the service and 
 its officers, in the full performance of their func- 
 tions, were alive and growing. Nor was this all. 
 The same surroundings that promoted this 
 healthful evolution applied also a continual test 
 of fitness to persons. As each war began, there 
 were still to be found in the prime of vigor and 
 usefulness men whose efficiency had been proved 
 in its predecessor, and thus the line of sustained 
 ability in leadership was carried on from one 
 naval generation to another, through the sixty- 
 odd years, 165 2-1 713, over which these condi- 
 tions extended. 
 
 The peace of Utrecht in 171 3 put an end to 
 this period. A disputed succession after the 
 death of Queen Anne, in 17 14, renewed the condi- 
 tion of internal disquietude which had paralyzed 
 the external action of England under Charles I.; 
 and this co-operated with the mere weariness of 
 war, occasioned by prolonged strife, to give both 
 the country and the navy a temporary distaste to 
 further military activity. The man of the occa- 
 sion, who became the exponent and maintainer 
 of this national inclination, was Sir Robert Wal- 
 pole ; to whom, during his ministry of over twenty 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 69 
 
 years, can fairly be applied Jefferson's phrase 
 concerning himself, that his "passion was peace." 
 But, whatever the necessity to the country of 
 such a policy, it too often results, as it did in both 
 these cases, in neglect of the military services, 
 allowing the equipment to decay, and tending to 
 sap the professional interest and competency of 
 the ofificers. 
 
 From this last evil the United States Navy in 
 Jefferson's day was saved by the simple fact that 
 the officers were young men, or at the most in 
 the early prime of life, — the Navy itself, in 181 2, 
 being less than twenty years old as a corporate 
 organization. The British Navy of 1739 was in 
 very different case. For a quarter of a century 
 the only important military occurrence had been 
 the Battle of Cape Passaro, in 1718, where the 
 British fleet in a running fight destroyed a much 
 inferior Spanish force ; and the occasion then 
 was not one of existent war, but of casual hostili- 
 ties, which, precipitated by political conditions, 
 began and ended with the particular incident, as 
 far as the sea was concerned. Back of this lay 
 only Malaga, in 1 704 ; for the remaining years of 
 war, up to 1 713, had been unmarked by fleet 
 battles. The tendency of this want of experience, 
 followed by the long period — not of peace only, 
 but — of professional depression resultant upon 
 inactivity and national neglect, was to stagna- 
 tion, to obviate which no provision existed or was 
 attempted. Self-improvement was not a note of 
 
yo Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 the service, nor of the times. The stimulus of 
 occupation and the corrective of experience being 
 removed, average men stuck where they were, 
 and grew old in a routine of service, or, what was 
 perhaps worse, out of the service in all but name. 
 In naval warfare, the Battle of Malaga, the last 
 point of performance, remained the example, and 
 the Fighting Instructions the passively accepted 
 authority. The men at the head of the Navy, to 
 whom the country naturally looked, either had no 
 record — no proof of fitness — because but youths 
 in the last war, or else, in simple consequence of 
 having then had a chance to show themselves, 
 were now superannuated. This very fact, how- 
 ever, had the singular and unfortunate result that, 
 because the officers of reputation were old, men 
 argued, by a curious perversion of thought, that 
 none but the old should be trusted. 
 
 Of this two significant cases will tell more 
 than many words. Mathews, who commanded at 
 Toulon in 1744, was then sixty-seven years old, 
 and had not been at sea between 1724 and 1742. 
 Hawke, in 1747, when he had already established 
 an excellent reputation as a captain, and for enter- 
 prise in recent battle, was thought young to be 
 entrusted with a squadron of a dozen ships-of-the- 
 line, although he was forty-two, — two years older 
 than Nelson at the Nile, but four years younger 
 than Napoleon and Wellington at Waterloo, and 
 one year less in age than Grant at the close of 
 the American Civil War. Such instances are not 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 71 
 
 of merely curious interest ; they are symptoms of 
 professional states of mind, of a perplexity and 
 perversion of standards which work disastrously 
 whenever war succeeds to a prolonged period of 
 peace, until experience has done its work by 
 sorting out the unsound from among the fair- 
 seeming, and has shown also that men may be 
 too old as well as too young for unaccustomed 
 responsibility. The later prevalence of juster 
 views was exemplified in the choice of Wolfe, 
 who was but thirty-two when he fell before 
 Quebec in 1759, charged with one of the most 
 difficult enterprises that had then been entrusted 
 to a British general. 
 
 It is these two factors, therefore, an erroneous 
 standard and a lethargic peace, which princi- 
 pally caused the weakness of the British offi- 
 cial staff for battle service at the period of 
 lowest descent, which was reached in the first 
 quarter of the eighteenth century, but was pro- 
 longed and intensified by a protracted interval 
 of professional apathy. Other grievous evils 
 doubtless existed, serious defects in administra- 
 tion, involving indifferent equipment, bad and 
 scanty provisions, inferior physique in the ships' 
 companies, and wretched sanitary arrangements; 
 but while all these unquestionably gravely affected 
 general efficiency for war, they belonged rather 
 to the civil than the military side of the profes- 
 sion. In the hour of battle it was not these, 
 but the tone and efficiency of the officers, that 
 
72 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 chiefly told. A false pattern of action had been 
 accepted at a moment favorable to its perpetu- 
 ation, when naval warfare on the grand scale had 
 ceased, owing to the decline of the principal 
 enemy, the navy of France; while the average 
 competency of naval officers had been much low- 
 ered through want of professional incentive, and 
 the absence of any sifting process by which the 
 unfit could be surely eliminated. That plenty of 
 good material existed, was sufficiently shown by 
 the number of names, afterwards distinguished, 
 which soon began to appear. Weeding went on 
 apace ; but before its work was done, there had to 
 be traversed a painful period, fruitful of evidences 
 of unfitness, of personal weakness, of low or false 
 professional ideas. 
 
 It is with this period that we have first had to 
 do as our point of departure, by which not only 
 to estimate the nature and degree of the sub- 
 sequent advance, but to illustrate also the part 
 specifically contributed to it by Hawke and 
 Rodney, through their personal and professional 
 characteristics. While types, they are more than 
 mere exponents of the change as a whole, and 
 will be found to bear to it particular relations, 
 — its leaders in fact, as well as in name. It is 
 not merely fanciful to say that Hawke stands 
 for and embodies the spirit of the new age, 
 while Rodney rather exemplifies and develops 
 the form in which that spirit needed ultimately 
 to cloth itself in order to perfect its working. 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 73 
 
 The one is a protest in act against the pro- 
 fessional faintheartedness, exaggerated into the 
 semblance of personal timidity, shown by the cap- 
 tains off Toulon in 1774; the other, in the 
 simple but skilful methods and combinations 
 adopted by him, both represents and gives effect 
 to a reaction against the extravagant pedantry, 
 which it fell to Byng, in all the honesty of 
 a thoroughly commonplace man, to exhibit in 
 unintentional caricature. 
 
 In thus ascribing to these great men com- 
 plementary parts in leading and shaping the 
 general movement, it is not meant that either 
 is deficient on the side attributed to the other. 
 Hawke showed by his actions that he was by 
 no means indifferent to tactical combinations, 
 which is another way of saying that he appre- 
 ciated the advantage of form in warfare ; while 
 Rodney, though a careful organizer and driller 
 of fleets, and patient in effort to obtain advan- 
 tage before attacking, exhibited on occasion 
 headlong, though not inconsiderate, audacity, 
 and also tenacious endurance in fight. Still, 
 it will probably be admitted by the student of 
 naval biography that to him Hawke suggests 
 primarily the unhesitating sudden rush — the 
 swoop — upon the prey, while Rodney resembles 
 rather the patient astute watcher, carefully keep- 
 ing his own powers in hand, and waiting for 
 the unguarded moment when the adversary may 
 be taken suddenly at unawares. Certain it is 
 
74 Naval Warfare at the Beginning 
 
 that, with opportunities much more numerous 
 than were permitted to Hawke, his successes 
 would have been far greater but for an excess 
 of methodical caution. There was a third, who 
 combined in due proportion, and possessed to 
 an extraordinary degree, the special qualities 
 here assigned to each. It is one of the ironies 
 of history that the first Sir Samuel Hood should 
 have had just opportunity enough to show how 
 great were his powers, and yet have been denied 
 the chance to exhibit them under conditions 
 to arrest the attention of the world ; nay, have 
 been more than once compelled to stand by 
 hopelessly, and see occasions lost which he 
 would unquestionably have converted into signal 
 triumphs. In him, as far as the record goes, 
 was consummated the advance of the eighteenth 
 century. He was the greatest of the sowers. 
 It fell to Nelson, his pupil, — in part at least, — 
 to reap the harvest. 
 
 Before closing this part of our subject, the 
 necessary preliminary to understanding the 
 progress of naval warfare in the eighteenth cen- 
 tury, it is pertinent to note the respect in which 
 advance there differs from that of the nineteenth, 
 and in some degree, though less, from that 
 of the seventeenth centuries. The period was 
 not one of marked material development. Im- 
 provements there were, but they were slow, 
 small in ultimate extent, and in no sense revolu- 
 tionary. Ships and guns, masts and sails, grew 
 
of the Eighteenth Century 75 
 
 better, as did also administrative processes; it 
 may indeed be asserted, as an axiom of pro- 
 fessional experience, that as the military tone 
 of the sea-officers rises, the effect will be trans- 
 mitted to those civil functions upon which effi- 
 ciency for war antecedently depends. Still, 
 substantially, the weapons of war were in princi- 
 ple, and consequently in general methods of 
 handling, the same at the end of the period 
 as at the beginning. They were intrinsically 
 more efficient ; but the great gain was not in 
 them, but in the spirit and intellectual grasp 
 of the men who wielded them. There was no 
 change in the least analogous to that from 
 oars to sails, or from sails to steam. 
 
 Under such conditions of continued similarity in 
 means, advance in the practice of any profession is 
 effected rather in the realm of ideas, in intellectual 
 processes ; and even their expert application in- 
 volves mind rather than matter. In the nineteenth 
 century such intellectual processes have been 
 largely devoted to the purposes of material develop- 
 ment, and have found their realization, in the navy 
 as elsewhere, in revolutionizing instruments, in 
 providing means never before attainable. The 
 railroad, the steamer, the electric telegraph, find 
 their counterpart in the heavily armored steam- 
 ship of war. But in utilizing these new means the 
 navy must still be governed by the ideas, which 
 are, indeed, in many ways as old as military 
 history, but which in the beginning of the eigh- 
 
76 Naval Warfare in the Eighteenth Century 
 
 teenth century had passed out of the minds of 
 naval men. It was the task of the officers of 
 that period to recall them, to formulate them 
 anew, to give them a living hold upon the theory 
 and practice of the profession. This they did, 
 and they were undoubtedly helped in so doing 
 by the fact that their attention was not diverted 
 and absorbed, as that of our day very largely has 
 been, by decisive changes in the instruments with 
 which their ideas were to be given effect. Thus 
 they were able to make a substantial and distinc- 
 tive contribution to the art of naval warfare, and 
 that on its highest side. For the artist is greater 
 than his materials, the warrior than his arms ; 
 and it was in the man rather than in his weapons 
 that the navy of the eighteenth century wrought 
 its final conspicuous triumph. 
 
H A W K E 
 
 1705-1781 
 
 THE first great name in British naval annals 
 belonging distinctively to the eighteenth 
 century rather than to the seventeenth, is that of 
 Edward Hawke. He was born in 1705, of a 
 family of no marked social distinction, his father 
 being a barrister, and his grandfather a Lon- 
 don merchant. His mother's maiden name was 
 Bladen. One of her brothers held an important 
 civil office as Commissioner of Trade and Planta- 
 tions, and was for many years a member of Par- 
 liament. Under the conditions which prevailed 
 then, and for some generations longer, the in- 
 fluence attaching to such positions enabled the 
 holder to advance substantially the professional 
 interests of a naval officer. Promotion in rank, 
 and occupation both in peace and war, were 
 largely a matter of favor. Martin Bladen nat- 
 urally helped his nephew in this way, a service 
 especially valuable in the earlier part of a career, 
 lifting a man out of a host of competitors and 
 giving him a chance to show what was in him. 
 It may readily be believed that Hawke's marked 
 
7 8 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 professional capacity speedily justified the advan- 
 tage thus obtained, and he seems to have owed 
 his promotion to post-captain to a superior 
 officer when serving abroad ; though it is never 
 possible to affirm that even such apparent official 
 recognition was not due either to an intimation 
 from home, or to the give and take of those who 
 recognized Bismarck's motto, " Do ut des." 
 
 However this may have been, the service did 
 not suffer by the favors extended to Hawke. 
 Nor was his promotion unduly rapid, to the in- 
 jury of professional character, as often happened 
 when rank was prematurely reached. It was 
 not till March 20, 1734, that he was "made 
 post," as the expression went, by Sir Chaloner 
 Ogle into the frigate Flarnborotigh, on the West 
 India Station. Being then twenty-nine years 
 old, in the prime of life for naval efficiency, he 
 had reached the position in which a fair oppor- 
 tunity for all the honors of the profession lay 
 open to him, provided he could secure occupation 
 until he was proved to be indispensable. Here 
 also his uncle's influence stood good. Although 
 the party with which the experienced politician 
 was identified had gone out of power with Sir 
 Robert Walpole, in 1742, his position on the 
 Board dealing with Colonial affairs left him not 
 without friends. " My colleague, Mr. Cavendish," 
 he writes, " has already laid in his claim for 
 another ship for you. But after so long a voy- 
 age " (he had been away over three years) " I 
 
Hawke 
 
 79 
 
 think you should be allowed a little time to spend 
 with your friends on shore. It is some consola- 
 tion, however, that I have some friends on the 
 new Board of Admiralty." " There has been a 
 clean sweep," he says again, "but I hope I may have 
 some friends amongst the new Lords that will 
 upon my account afford you their protection." 
 
 This was in the beginning of 1743, when 
 Hawke had just returned from a protracted 
 cruise on the West India and North American 
 stations, where by far the greater part of his early 
 service was passed. He never again returned 
 there, and very shortly after his uncle's letter, 
 just quoted, he was appointed to the Berwick, a 
 ship-of-the-line of seventy guns. In command of 
 her he sailed in September, 1743, for the Mediter- 
 ranean ; and a few months after, by his decided and 
 seamanlike course in Mathews's action, he estab- 
 lished his professional reputation and fortunes, 
 the firm foundations of which had been laid dur- 
 ing the previous years of arduous but inconspicu- 
 ous service. Two years later, in 1746, Martin 
 Bladen died, and with him political influence, in 
 the ordinary acceptation, departed from Hawke. 
 Thenceforth professional merit, forced upon men's 
 recognition, stood him in stead. 
 
 He was thirty-nine when he thus first made 
 his mark, in 1744. Prior to this there is 
 not found, in the very scanty records that 
 remain of his career, as in that of all officers of 
 his period while in subordinate positions, any 
 
8o Types of Naval Officers 
 
 certain proof that he had ever been seriously 
 engaged with an enemy. War against Spain 
 had been declared, October 19, 1739. He had 
 then recently commissioned a fifty-gun ship, the 
 Portland, and in her sailed for the West Indies, 
 where he remained until the autumn of 1742; 
 but the inert manner in which Spain maintained 
 the naval contest, notwithstanding that her trans- 
 marine policy was the occasion of the quarrel, 
 and her West Indian possessions obviously en- 
 dangered, removed all chance of active service 
 on the large scale, except in attacking her colo- 
 nies; and in none of those enterprises had the 
 Portland been called upon to share. 
 
 Meantime, a general European war had begun 
 in 1740, concerning the succession to the Aus- 
 trian throne ; and, in the political combinations 
 which followed, France and Great Britain had as 
 usual ranged themselves on opposite sides, though 
 without declaring war upon each other. Further, 
 there had existed for some time a secret defen- 
 sive alliance between France and Spain, binding 
 each party to support the other, under certain 
 conditions, with an effective armed force, to be 
 used not for aggressive purposes, but in defence 
 only. It was claimed, indeed, that by so doing 
 the supporting country was not to be considered 
 as going to war, or even as engaged in hostilities, 
 except as regarded the contingent furnished. 
 This view received some countenance from in- 
 ternational law, in the stage of development it 
 
Hawke 8i 
 
 had then reached ; yet it is evident that if a Brit- 
 ish admiral met a Spanish fleet, of strength fairly- 
 matching his own, but found it accompanied by 
 a French division, the commander of which noti- 
 fied him that he had orders to flight if an attack 
 were made, friendly relations between the two 
 nations would be strained near to the breaking 
 point. This had actually occurred to the British 
 Admiral Haddock, in the Mediterranean, in 1741 ; 
 and conditions essentially similar, but more ex- 
 asperated, constituted the situation under which 
 Hawke for the first time was brought into an 
 action between two great fleets. 
 
 On the nth of January, 1744, when the Ber- 
 wick joined the British fleet, it had rendezvoused 
 at the Hyeres Islands, a little east of Toulon, 
 watching the movements of twelve Spanish ships- 
 of-the-line, which had taken refuge in the port. 
 As these were unwilling to put to sea trusting to 
 their own strength, the French Admiral De 
 Court was ordered to accompany and protect 
 them when they sailed. This becoming known, 
 Admiral Mathews had concentrated his fleet, 
 which by successive reinforcements — the Ber- 
 wick among others — numbered twenty-eight of- 
 the-line when the allies, in about equal force, 
 began to come out on the 20th of February. 
 
 The action which ensued owes its historical 
 significance wholly to the fact that it illustrated 
 conspicuously, and in more than one detail, the 
 degenerate condition of the official staff of the 
 
82 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 British navy; the demoralization of ideals, and 
 the low average of professional competency.^ 
 That there was plenty of good metal was also 
 shown, but the proportion of alloy was danger- 
 ously great. That the machinery of the organi- 
 zation was likewise bad, the administrative system 
 culpably negligent as well as inefificient, had been 
 painfully manifested in the equipment of the 
 ships, in the quality of the food, and in the 
 indifferent character of the ships' crews ; but in 
 this respect Hawke had not less to complain of 
 than others, having represented forcibly to the 
 Admiralty the miserable unfitness of the men sent 
 him. Nevertheless, despite all drawbacks, includ- 
 ing therein a signalling system so rudimentary 
 and imperfect as to furnish a ready excuse to the 
 unwilling, as well as a recurrent perplexity to 
 those honestly wishing to obey their orders, he 
 showed that good will and high purpose could 
 not only lead a man to do his full duty as 
 directed, but guide him to independent initia- 
 tive action when opportunity offered. Under all 
 external conditions of difficulty and doubt, or even 
 of cast-iron rule, the principle was as true then as 
 when Nelson formulated it, that no captain when 
 in doubt could do very wrong if he placed his ship 
 alongside an enemy. That Hawke so realized it 
 brought out into more glaring relief the failure 
 of so many of his colleagues on this occasion. 
 
 * For the account of Mathews's action, including Hawke's personal 
 share in it, see ante, pp. 21-47. 
 
Hawke 83 
 
 But the lesson would be in great part lost, if 
 there were to be seen in this lapse only the per- 
 sonal element of the delinquents, and not the 
 widespread decline of professional tone. Un- 
 doubtedly, of course, it is true that the personal 
 equation, as always, made itself felt, but here as 
 intensifying an evil which had its principal 
 source elsewhere. 
 
 Hawke carried Nelson's maxim into effect. 
 Upon the signal for battle he took his own ship 
 into close action with the antagonist allotted to 
 him by the order of the fleet ; but after beating 
 her out of the line he looked round for more 
 work to do. Seeing then that several of the 
 British vessels had not come within point-blank, 
 but, through professional timidity, or over-cau- 
 tious reverence for the line of battle, were 
 engaging at long range a single Spaniard, he 
 quitted his own position, brought her also to close 
 quarters, and after an obstinate contest, creditable 
 to both parties, forced her to surrender. She was 
 the only ship to haul down her flag that day, and 
 her captain refused to surrender his sword to 
 any but Hawke, whom alone he accepted as his 
 vanquisher. 
 
 A generation or two later Hawke's conduct in 
 this matter would have drawn little attention ; it 
 would not have been exceptional in the days of 
 St. Vincent and Nelson, nor even in that of 
 Howe. At the time of its occurrence, it was 
 not only in sharp contrast with much that hap- 
 
84 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 pened on the same field of battle, but it was 
 somewhat contrary to rule. It possessed so far 
 the merit of originality ; and that on the right 
 side, — the side of fighting. As in all active life, 
 so in war a man is more readily pardoned for 
 effecting too much than too little ; and it was 
 doubly so here, because it was evident from the 
 behavior of his peers that he must expect no 
 backing in the extra work he took upon himself. 
 Their aloofness emphasized his forwardness ; and 
 the fact that through the withdrawal of his 
 admiral for the night, the prize was ultimately 
 retaken, together with an officer and seamen he 
 had placed on board, fixed still further attention 
 upon the incident, in which Hawke's action was 
 the one wholly creditable feature. 
 
 The effect of the battle upon his fortunes was 
 summed up in a phrase. When his first lieuten- 
 ant was sent to report the loss of the prize-crew 
 to Rear-Admiral Rowley, the commander of the 
 division, the latter replied, among other things, 
 that "he had not been well acquainted with 
 Captain Hawke before, but he should now be 
 well acquainted with him from his behavior." 
 Like Nelson at St. Vincent, Hawke was now 
 revealed, not to the navy only but to the nation, 
 — "through his behavior." Somewhat excep- 
 tionally, the king personally took knowledge of 
 him, and stood by him. George II. paid most 
 interested attention to the particulars elicited by 
 the Courts-Martial, — a fact which doubtless con- 
 
Hawke 85 
 
 tributed to make him so sternly unyielding in 
 the case of Byng, twelve years later. To the king 
 Hawke became "my captain; " and his influence 
 was directly used when, in a flag promotion in 
 1747, some in the Admiralty proposed to include 
 Hawke in the retirement of senior captains, which 
 was a common incident in such cases. " I will 
 not have Hawke ' yellowed,' " was the royal fiat ; 
 a yellow admiral being the current phrase for one 
 set aside from further active employment. 
 
 Such were the circumstances under which 
 Hawke first received experience of the fighting 
 conditions of the navy. Whatever his previous 
 attitude towards accepted traditions of profes- 
 sional practice, this no doubt loosened the fet- 
 ters ; for they certainly never constrained him 
 in his subsequent career. He remained in the 
 Mediterranean fleet, generally upon detached 
 services in command of divisions of ships, until 
 the end of 1745. Returning then to England, 
 he saw no further active service until he became 
 a Rear-Admiral — of the White — on July 15, 
 
 1747- 
 
 The promotions being numerous, Hawke's 
 
 seniority as captain carried him well up the list 
 of rear-admirals, and he was immediately em- 
 ployed ; hoisting his flag July 22d. He then 
 became second to Sir Peter Warren, commander- 
 in-chief of the " Western Squadron." This 
 cruised in the Bay of Biscay, from Ushant to 
 Finisterre, to intercept the naval divisions, and 
 
86 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 the accompanying convoys of merchant and 
 transport ships, with which the French were then 
 seeking to maintain their colonial empire in 
 North America and in India : an empire already 
 sorely shaken, and destined to fall finally in the 
 next great war. 
 
 Hawke was now in the road of good luck, pure 
 and unadulterated. His happy action in captur- 
 ing the Podcr illustrates indeed opportunity im- 
 proved ; but it was opportunity of the every day 
 sort, and it is the merit that seized it, rather than 
 the opportunity itself, that strikes the attention. 
 The present case was different. A young rear- 
 admiral had little reason to hope for independent 
 command ; but Warren, a well-tried officer, pos- 
 sessing the full confidence of the First Lord, 
 Anson, himself a master in the profession, was in 
 poor health, and for that reason had applied for 
 Hawke to be "joined with him in the command," 
 apparently because he was the one flag-officer 
 immediately available. He proposed that Hawke 
 should for the present occasion take his place, 
 sail with a few ships named, and with them join 
 the squadron, then at sea in charge of a captain. 
 Anson demurred at first, on the ground of 
 Hawke's juniority, — he was forty-two, — and 
 Warren, while persisting in his request, shares 
 the doubt ; for he writes, " I observe what you 
 say about the ships abroad being under so young 
 an officer. I am, and have been uneasy about it, 
 though I hope he will do well, and it could not 
 
Hawke 87 
 
 then be avoidedr Anson, however, was not fixed 
 in his opposition ; for Warren continued, " From 
 your letter I have so little reason to doubt his 
 being put under my command, that I have his 
 instructions all ready; and he is prepared to go 
 at a moment's notice." The instructions were 
 issued the following day, August 8th, and on the 
 9th Hawke sailed. But while there was in this 
 so much of luck, he was again to show that he 
 was not one to let occasion slip. Admiral Farra- 
 gut is reported to have said, " Every man has one 
 chance." It depends upon himself whether he is 
 by it made or marred. Burrish and Hawke toed 
 the same line on the morning of February 2 2d, and 
 they had had that day at least equal opportunity. 
 Hawke's adequacy to his present fortune be- 
 trayed itself again in a phrase to Warren, " I 
 have nothing so much at heart as the faithful dis- 
 charge of my duty, and in such manner as will 
 give satisfaction both to the Lords of the Admi- 
 ralty and yourself. This shall ever be my utmost 
 ambition, and no lucre of profit^ or other views, 
 shall induce me to act otherwise." Not prize- 
 money; but honor, through service. And this 
 in fact not only ruled his thought but in the 
 moment of decision inspired his act. Curiously 
 enough, however, he was here at odds with the 
 spirit of Anson and of Warren. The latter, in 
 asking Hawke's employment, said the present 
 cruise was less important than the one to succeed 
 it, " for the galleons " — the Spanish treasure- 
 
Types of Naval Officers 
 
 ships — " make it a general rule to come home 
 late in the fall or winter." Warren by prize- 
 money and an American marriage was the richest 
 commoner in England, and Anson it was that 
 had captured the great galleon five years before, 
 to his own great increase; but it was Hawke who, 
 acknowledging a letter from Warren, as this 
 cruise was drawing to its triumphant close, wrote, 
 " With respect to the galleons, as it is uncertain 
 when they will come home and likewise impos- 
 sible for vie to divide my force in the present 
 necessitous condition of the ships under my 
 command, I must lay aside all thoughts of them 
 during this cruise." In this unhesitating subor- 
 dination of pecuniary to military considerations 
 we see again the temper of Nelson, between whom 
 and Hawke there was much community of spirit, 
 especially in their independence of ordinary mo- 
 tives and standards. " Not that I despise money," 
 wrote Nelson near the end of a career in which 
 he had never known ease of circumstances ; 
 " quite the contrary, I wish I had a hundred 
 thousand pounds this moment ; " but " I keep the 
 frigates about me, for I know their value in the 
 day of battle, and compared with that day, what 
 signifies any prizes they might take ? " Yet he 
 had his legal share in every such prize. 
 
 The opening of October 14th, the eighth day 
 after Hawke's letter to Warren just quoted, 
 brouirht him the sis^ht of his reward. At seven 
 that morning, the fleet being then some four 
 
Hawke 89 
 
 hundred miles west of La Rochelle in France, a 
 number of sails were seen in the southeast. Chase 
 was given at once, and within an hour it was evi- 
 dent, from the great crowd of vessels, that it was a 
 large convoy outward-bound which could only be 
 enemies. It was in fact a fleet of three hundred 
 French merchantmen, under the protection of 
 eight ships-of-the-line and one of fifty guns, 
 commanded by Commodore L'Etenduere. The 
 force then with Hawke were twelve of-the-line 
 and two of fifty guns. Frigates and lighter 
 vessels of course accompanied both fleets. The 
 average size and armament of the French vessels 
 were considerably greater than those of the Brit- 
 ish ; so that, although the latter had an un- 
 doubted superiority, it was far from as great as 
 the relative numbers would indicate. Prominent 
 British officers of that day claimed that a French 
 sixty-gun ship was practically the equal of a 
 British seventy-four. In this there may have 
 been exaggeration; but they had good oppor- 
 tunity for judging, as many French ships were 
 captured. 
 
 When L'Etenduere saw that he was in the 
 presence of a superior enemy, he very manfully 
 drew out his ships of war from the mass, and 
 formed them in order of battle, covering the con- 
 voy, which he directed to make its escape ac- 
 companied by one of the smaller ships-of-the-line 
 with the light cruisers. He contrived also to 
 keep to windward of the approaching British. 
 
po Types of Naval Officers 
 
 With so strong a force interposed, Hawke saw 
 that no prize-money was easily to be had, but 
 for that fortune his mind was already prepared. 
 He first ordered his fleet to form order of battle ; 
 but finding time was thereby lost he changed the 
 signal to that for a general chase, which freed the 
 faster sailers to use their utmost speed and join 
 action with the enemy, secure of support in due 
 time by their consorts as they successively came 
 
 up. 
 
 Half an hour before noon the leading British 
 reached the French rear, already under short 
 canvas. The admiral then made signal to en- 
 gage, and the battle began. As the ships under 
 fire reduced sail, the others overtook them, passed 
 by the unengaged side and successively attacked 
 from rear to van. As Hawke himself drew near, 
 Rodney's ship, the Eagle, having her wheel and 
 much of her rigging shot away, was for the time 
 unmanageable and fell twice on board the flag- 
 ship, the Devonshire, driving her to leeward, and 
 so preventing her from close action with the 
 French flag-ship Tonnant, of eighty guns, a force 
 far exceeding that of the DevoiisJiire, which had 
 but sixty-six. " This prevented our attacking Le 
 Monarque, 74, and the To)ina7ity within any dis- 
 tance to do execution. However we attempted 
 both, especially the latter. While we were en- 
 gaged with her, the breechings of all our lower- 
 deck guns broke, and the guns flew fore and aft, 
 which obliged us to shoot ahead, for our upper 
 
Hawke 
 
 91 
 
 guns could not reach her." The breaking of 
 the breechings — the heavy ropes which take the 
 strain of the guns' recoil — was doubtless ac- 
 celerated by the undue elevation necessitated by 
 the extreme range. The collision with the Eagle 
 was one of the incidents common to battle, but 
 it doubtless marred the completeness of the vic- 
 tory. Of the eight French ships engaged, six were 
 taken ; two, the Tonnant and her next astern, 
 escaped, though the former was badly mauled. 
 
 Despite the hindrance mentioned, Hawke's 
 personal share in the affair was considerable, 
 through the conspicuous activity of the flag-ship. 
 Besides the skirmish at random shot with the 
 Tonnant, she engaged successively the Trident, 
 64, and the Terrible, 74, both which were among 
 the prizes. He was entirely satisfied also with 
 the conduct of all his captains, — save one. The 
 freedom of action permitted to them by the gen- 
 eral chase, with the inspiring example of the 
 admiral himself, was nobly used. " Captain Har- 
 land of the Tilbury, 60, observing that the Ton- 
 nant fired single guns at us in order to dismast 
 us, stood on the other tack, between her and the 
 Devonshire, and gave her a very smart fire." It 
 was no small gallantry for a 60 thus to pass close 
 under the undiverted broadside of an 80, — nearly 
 double her force, — and that without orders ; and 
 Hawke recognized the fact by this particular 
 notice in the despatch. With similar initiative, as 
 the Tonnant and hitrepide were seen to be escap- 
 
92 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 ing, Captain Saunders of the Yarmouth, 64, pursued 
 them on his own motion, and was accompanied, 
 at his suggestion, by the sixty-gun ships of Rod- 
 ney and of Saumarez. A detached action of an 
 hour followed, in which Saumarez fell. The 
 enemy escaped, it is true ; but that does not im- 
 peach the judgment, nor lessen the merits, of the 
 ofificers concerned, for their ships were both 
 much smaller and more injured than those they 
 attacked. Harland and Saunders became dis- 
 tinguished admirals ; of Rodney it is needless 
 to say the same. 
 
 In his report of the business, Hawke used a 
 quaint but very expressive phrase, " As the 
 enemy's ships were large, they took a great deal 
 of drubbing, and (consequently) lost all their 
 masts, except two, who had their foremasts left. 
 This has obliged me to lay-to for these two daj's 
 past, in order to put them into condition to be 
 brought into port, as well as our own, which have 
 suffered greatly." Ships large in tonnage were 
 necessarily also ships large in scantling, heavy 
 ribbed, thick-planked, in order to bear their artil- 
 lery ; hence also with sides not easy to be pierced 
 by the weak ordnance of that time. They were 
 in a degree armored ships, though from a cause 
 differing from that of to-day; hence much "drub- 
 bing " was needed, and the prolongation of the 
 drubbing entailed increase of incidental injury 
 to spars and rigging, both their own and those 
 of the enemy. Nor was the armor idea, directly, 
 
Hawke 
 
 93 
 
 at all unrecognized even then ; for we are told 
 of \\\Q Real Felipe in Mathews's action, that, being 
 so weakly built that she could carry only twenty- 
 four-pounders on her lower deck, she had been 
 " fortified in the most extraordinary surprising 
 manner ; her sides being lined four or five foot 
 thick everywhere with junk or old cables to 
 hinder the shot from piercing." 
 
 It has been said that the conduct of one cap- 
 tain fell under Hawke's displeasure. At a Coun- 
 cil of War called by him after the battle, to 
 establish the fitness of the fleet to pursue the 
 convoy, the other captains objected to sitting 
 with Captain Fox of the Kent, until he had 
 cleared himself from the imputation of misbe- 
 havior in incidents they had noticed. Hawke 
 was himself dissatisfied with Fox's failure to 
 obey a signal, and concurred in the objection. 
 On the subsequent trial, the Court expressly 
 cleared the accused of cowardice, but found him 
 guilty of certain errors of judgment, and specifically 
 of leaving the Tonnant \Av\q: the signal for close 
 action was flying. As the Tonnant escaped, the 
 implication of accountability for that result nat- 
 urally follows. For so serious a consequence the 
 sentence only was that he be dismissed his ship, 
 and, although never again employed, he was re- 
 tired two years after as a rear-admiral. It was 
 becoming increasingly evident that error of judg- 
 ment is an elastic phrase which can be made to 
 cover all degrees of faulty action, from the mis- 
 
p4 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 takes to which every man is liable and the most 
 faithful cannot always escape, to conduct wholly 
 incompatible with professional eflficiency or even 
 manly honor. 
 
 The case of Fox was one of many occurring at 
 about this period, which, however differing in 
 detail between themselves, showed that through- 
 out the navy, both in active service before the 
 enemy, and in the more deliberate criteria of 
 opinion which influence Courts-Martial, there 
 was a pronounced tendency to lowness of stand- 
 ard in measuring officer-like conduct and official 
 responsibility for personal action ; a misplaced 
 leniency, which regarded failure to do the utmost 
 with indulgence, if without approval. In the strin- 
 gent and awful emergencies of war too much is at 
 stake for such easy tolerance. Error of judgment 
 is one thing; error of conduct is something very 
 different, and w^th a difference usually recogniz- 
 able. To style errors of conduct "errors of judg- 
 ment " denies, practically, that there are standards 
 of action external to the individual, and condones 
 official misbehavior on the ground of personal 
 incompetency. Military standards rest on dem- 
 onstrable facts of experience, and should find 
 their sanction in clear professional opinion. So 
 known, and so upheld, the unfortunate man who 
 falls below them, in a rank where failure may 
 work serious harm, has only himself to blame; 
 for it is his business to reckon his own capacity 
 before he accepts the dignity and honors of a 
 
Hawke 95 
 
 position in which the interests of the nation are 
 intrusted to his charge. 
 
 An uneasy consciousness of these truths, forced 
 upon the Navy and the Government by wide- 
 spread short-comings in many quarters — of 
 which Mathews's battle was only the most con- 
 spicuous instance — resulted in a very serious 
 modification of the Articles of War, after the 
 peace. Up to 1748 the articles dealing with 
 misconduct before the enemy, which had been in 
 force since the first half of the reign of Charles 
 II., assigned upon conviction the punishment of 
 "death, or other punishment, as the circum- 
 stances of the offence shall deserve and the 
 Court-Martial shall judge fit." After the experi- 
 ences of this war, the last clause was omitted. 
 Discretion was taken away. Men were dissatis- 
 fied, whether justly or not, with the use of their 
 discretion made by Courts-Martial, and deprived 
 them of it. In the United States Navy, similarly, 
 at the beginning of the Civil War, the Govern- 
 ment was in constant struggle with Courts- 
 Martial to impose sentences of severity adequate 
 to the offence ; leaving the question of remission, 
 or of indulgence, to the executive. These facts 
 are worthy of notice, for there is a facile popular 
 impression that Courts-Martial err on the side of 
 stringency. The writer, from a large experience 
 of naval Courts, upon offenders of many ranks, 
 is able to aiifirm that it is not so. Marryat, in 
 his day, midway between the two periods here 
 
g6 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 specified, makes the same statement, in " Peter 
 Simple." "There is an evident inclination to- 
 wards the prisoner; every allowance and every 
 favor granted him, and no legal quibbles attended 
 to." It may be added that the inconvenience and 
 expense of assembling Courts make the executive 
 chary of this resort, which is rarely used except 
 when the case against an accused is pretty clear, — 
 a fact that easily gives rise to a not uncommon 
 assertion, that Courts-Martial are organized to 
 convict. 
 
 This is the antecedent history of Byng's trial 
 and execution. There had been many examples 
 of weak and inefificient action — of distinct errors 
 of conduct — such as Byng was destined to illus- 
 trate in the highest rank and upon a large scale, 
 entailing an unusual and conspicuous national 
 disaster; and the offenders had escaped, with 
 consequences to themselves more or less serious, 
 but without any assurance to the nation that the 
 punishment inflicted was raising professional 
 standards, and so giving reasonable certainty that 
 the like derelictions would not recur. Hence 
 it came to pass, in 1749, not amid the agita- 
 tions of war and defeats, but in profound peace, 
 that the article was framed under which Byng 
 suffered : 
 
 " Every person in the fleet, who through cowardice, 
 negligence, or disaffection, shall in time of action, . . . 
 not do his utmost to take or destroy every ship which it 
 shall be his duty to engage ; and to assist all and every 
 
Hawke 97 
 
 of His Majesty's ships, or those of His allies, which it 
 shall be his duty to assist and relieve, . . . being con- 
 victed thereof by sentence of a Court- Martial, shall suffer 
 death." 
 
 Let it therefore be observed, as historically 
 certain, that the execution of Byng in 1757 is 
 directly traceable to the war of 1 739-1747. It 
 was not determined, as is perhaps generally 
 imagined, by an obsolete statute revived for the 
 purpose of a judicial murder; but by a recent Act, 
 occasioned, if not justified, by circumstances of 
 marked national humiliation and injury. The 
 offences specified are those of which repeated 
 instances had been recently given; and negli- 
 gence is ranked with more positive faults, because 
 in practice equally harmful and equally culpable. 
 Every man in active life, whatever his business, 
 knows this to be so. 
 
 At the time his battle with L'Etenduere was 
 fought, Hawke was actually a commander-in-chief ; 
 for Warren, through his disorder increasing upon 
 him, had resigned the command, and Hawke had 
 been notified of the fact. Hence there did not 
 obtain in his case the consideration, so absurdly 
 advanced for limiting Nelson's reward after the 
 Nile, that he was acting under the orders of a 
 superior several hundred miles away. Neverthe- 
 less, Hawke, like Nelson later, was then a new 
 man, — "a young officer;" and the honor he 
 received, though certainly adequate for a victory 
 over a force somewhat inferior, was not adequate 
 
 7 
 
98 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 when measured by that given to Anson, the First 
 Lord of the Admiralty, for a much less nota- 
 ble achievement six months before. Anson 
 was raised to the peerage ; Hawke was only 
 given the Order of the Bath, the ribbon which 
 Nelson coveted, because a public token, visible 
 to all, that the wearer had done distinguished 
 service. It was at that period a much greater dis- 
 tinction than it afterwards became, through the 
 great extension in numbers and the division into 
 classes. He was henceforth Sir Edward Hawke ; 
 and shortly after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
 signed April 30, 1748, another flag-promotion 
 raised him to the rank of Vice-Admiral, of the 
 Blue Squadron. 
 
 Such rank, accompanied by such recognized 
 merit, insured that he should thenceforth always 
 command in chief; and so it was, with a single 
 brief interval due to a very special and exceptional 
 cause to be hereafter related. During the years 
 of peace, from 1748 to 1755, his employment was 
 mainly on shore, in dock-yard command, which 
 carried with it incidentally a good deal of pre- 
 siding over Courts-Martial. This duty, in his 
 hands, could hardly fail to raise professional 
 standards, with all the effect that precedents, 
 established by the rulings and decisions of Courts, 
 civil and military, exert upon practice. Such a 
 period, however, affords but little for narration, 
 either professional or personal, except when the 
 particular occupations mentioned are the subject 
 
Hawke 99 
 
 of special study. General interest they cannot 
 be said to possess. 
 
 But while thus unmarked on the biographical 
 side, historically these years were pregnant with 
 momentous events, which not only affected the 
 future of great nations then existing, but were 
 to determine for all time the extension or restric- 
 tion of their social systems and political ten- 
 dencies in vast distant regions yet unoccupied 
 by civilized man, or still in unstable political 
 tenure. The balance of world power, in short, 
 was in question, and that not merely as every 
 occurrence, large or small, contributes its some- 
 thing to a general result, but on a grand and 
 decisive scale. The phrase "world politics," if 
 not yet invented, characterizes the issues then 
 eminently at stake, though they probably were 
 not recognized by contemporaries, still blinded 
 by the traditions which saw in Europe alone the 
 centre of political interests. 
 
 To realize the conditions, and their bearing 
 upon a future which has become our present, we 
 should recall that in 1748 the British Empire, as 
 we understand the term, did not exist; that 
 Canada and Louisiana — meaning by the latter 
 the whole undefined region west of the Missis- 
 sippi — were politically and socially French ; 
 that between them the wide territory from the 
 AUeghanies to the Mississippi was claimed by 
 France, and the claim vigorously contested not 
 only by Great Britain herself, but by the thirteen 
 
loo Types of Naval Officers 
 
 British colonics which became the United States 
 of America; that in India the representatives of 
 both mother countries were striving for mastery, 
 not merely through influence in the councils of 
 native rulers, but by actual territorial sway, and that 
 the chances seemed on the whole to favor France. 
 
 In the great struggle for Anglo-Saxon pre- 
 dominance, which had begun under William III., 
 but was now approaching its crisis and final de- 
 cision in the Seven Years War, the determining 
 factor was to be the maritime strength of Great 
 Britain. It is, therefore, the distinctive and dis- 
 tinc^uished sio;nificance of Hawke's career that 
 during so critical a period he not only was the 
 most illustrious and able of^cer of her navy — 
 the exponent of her sea-power — but that by 
 the force of his personality he chiefly shaped the 
 naval outcome. He carried on the development 
 of naval warfare, revolutionized ideas, raised pro- 
 fessional standards, and thereby both affected 
 the result in his own time, and perpetuated an 
 influence, the effect of which was to be felt in the 
 gigantic contests of later days. In this eminent 
 particular, which involves real originality, no sea 
 officer of the eighteenth century stands with him ; 
 in this respect only he and Nelson, who be- 
 longs rather to the nineteenth, are to be named 
 together. 
 
 In the years of nominal peace, 174S-1755, the 
 Navy of Great Britain was permitted by a politi- 
 cally cautious Government to decline much in 
 
Hawke ''lo'i- 
 
 power ; but there was compensation in the fact 
 that that of France drooped equally. In both 
 countries there was then, as there has been ever 
 since, a party opposed to over-sea enterprise. 
 " The partisans of the Ministry," wrote Walpole 
 in 1755, "d — n the Plantations [Colonies], and 
 ask if we are to involve ourselves in a war for 
 them." The French government underwent a 
 like revulsion of feeling as regarded India, and in 
 1754 recalled Dupleix in mid-career, in order to 
 quiet the remonstrances of Great Britain. It 
 would be irrelevant, were it not signally instruc- 
 tive, to remark that both nations passed under 
 the influence of the same ideas a hundred years 
 later. In the middle of the nineteenth century, 
 the preponderant expression in England was that 
 the colonies were unprofitable incumbrances, and, 
 if occasion arose, should be encouraged to sepa- 
 rate rather than urged to remain; while France, 
 through whatever motive, at a critical moment 
 abandoned the field in Egypt, by refusing joint 
 action. It is, therefore, probably the result of 
 a true national genius, asserting itself above 
 temporary aberrations, that the close of the 
 nineteenth century saw France wholly excluded, 
 politically, from Egypt, as she had before been 
 from India, and Great Britain involved in an 
 expensive war, the aim of which was the preser- 
 vation of the imperial system, in the interest 
 not only of the mother country, but of the colo- 
 nies as well. 
 
■102 Types or" Naval Officers 
 
 And that it was in the interest of her colonies 
 was precisely the all important part which differ- 
 entiated the Seven Years War in its day, and the 
 South African War in our day, from the struggle, 
 so disastrous to the Empire, that is known as the 
 American Revolution. " There is no repose for 
 our thirteen colonies," wrote Franklin a hundred 
 and fifty years ago, " so long as the French are 
 masters of Canada." " There is no repose for 
 British colonists in South Africa," was the virtual 
 assertion of Natal and the Cape Colony, " so long 
 as the Boer political methods are maintained in 
 the Transvaal with the pledged support of the 
 Orange Free State." Irreconcilable differences 
 of political and social systems, when brought into 
 close contact, involve irrepressible conflict, and 
 admit of no lasting solution except the subjuga- 
 tion and consequent submersion of one or the 
 other. 
 
 Such a final settlement was attained In North 
 America and in India by the Seven Years War. 
 The full results thereof even we of this day have 
 not yet seen ; for who can yet predict the effect 
 upon the question of the Pacific and of China, 
 that by this war was assured the dominance of 
 the Anglo-Saxon political and legal tradition over 
 the whole American continent north of the 
 tropics, and that the same tradition shall, for a 
 future yet indeterminate, decisively shape the 
 course of India and the Philippines? The pre- 
 ceding war, 1 739-1 748, had been substantially 
 
Hawke 103 
 
 inconclusive on the chief points at issue, because 
 European questions intervening had diverted the 
 attention of both France and Great Britain from 
 America and from India ; and the exhaustion 
 of both had led to a perfunctory compact, in 
 which the underlying contention was substantially 
 ignored in order to reach formal agreement. 
 That the French conquest of Madras, in India, 
 was yielded in exchange for Louisburg and Cape 
 Breton Island, which the American colonists had 
 won for England, typifies concisely the status quo 
 to which both parties were willing momentarily 
 to revert, while they took breath before the inevi- 
 table renewal of the strife, with added fury, a few 
 years later; but then upon its proper scene, the 
 sea and the over-sea regions in dispute. 
 
 In this great arbitrament Hawke was at once 
 called forth to play his part. In 1754 diplomatic 
 contention had become acrimonious, and various 
 events showed that the moment of open conflict 
 was approaching. The squadron in India was 
 then considerably increased. In the beginning 
 of 1755 Hawke was again afloat to command the 
 Channel Fleet, the operations of which extended 
 ordinarily from the Channel, over the Bay of 
 Biscay, to Cape Finisterre. A naval force was 
 collecting at the same time at Portsmouth, under 
 Boscawen, to counteract the preparations the 
 French were known to be making in North 
 America. It sailed soon afterwards, with orders 
 to intercept a squadron convoying reinforcements 
 
I04 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 for Canada ; and on the 8th of June two of these 
 ships were captured off the mouth of the St. 
 Lawrence, the remainder escaping under cover of 
 a fog. In July Hawke went out, with instructions 
 to take any French ships-of-the-line that he might 
 meet; and in August he was further directed to 
 send into port French ships of every kind, mer- 
 chant and other, that he might encounter. Before 
 the end of the year three hundred trading vessels, 
 valued at $6,000,000, had been thus seized. War 
 had not yet been declared, but the captured 
 vessels were held, as on other occasions before 
 and after, as hostages to await the settlement of 
 existing difficulties. 
 
 The French government protested of course, 
 and recalled its ambassador, but it did not pro- 
 ceed to formal hostilities. A great stroke was in 
 preparation at Toulon, which could be covered 
 for a while by diplomatic correspondence, coupled 
 with angry demonstrations on the Atlantic and 
 Channel coasts. On the loth of April, 1756, 
 twelve French ships-of-the-line and fifteen thou- 
 sand troops sailed for Minorca, then a British 
 possession, and in the absence of a hostile fleet 
 effected a landing without opposition. The Brit- 
 ish cabinet having taken alarm too late, Admiral 
 Bynghad sailed from Portsmouth, with ten ships, 
 only three days before the French left Toulon ; 
 when he arrived off Port Mahon, six weeks later, 
 a practicable breach in the works had already 
 been made. The French fleet was cruising out- 
 
Hawke 105 
 
 side in support of the siege, and Byng, whose 
 force had been increased to thirteen ships, engaged 
 it on May 20. The action was in itself indeci- 
 sive; but, upon the opinion of a council of war 
 that nothing more could be done, Byng retired to 
 Gibraltar. The result to him personally is well 
 known. Port Mahon surrendered on June 28. 
 War had by this been declared ; by Great Britain 
 on the 17th of May, and by France June 20, 1756. 
 When the news of Byng's retreat was received 
 in England, Hawke was sent out to supersede 
 him. He went only personally, accompanied by 
 a second in command, but with no fleet, and with 
 sealed instructions. Opening these when he 
 reached Gibraltar, he found orders to send home 
 Byng and his second in command, and to institute 
 an inquiry into the conduct of the captains, sus- 
 pending any one found " not to have acted with 
 due spirit and vigor." An investigation of this 
 kind would enable him to form an opinion of 
 Byng's own conduct even more exact and authentic 
 than his other official opportunities for personal 
 intercourse with the chief actors, but he must 
 have refrained with much discretion from express- 
 ing his judgment on the affair in such way as to 
 reach the public ear. It was stated in the " Gentle- 
 man's Magazine," in 1766, that an inquiry was 
 provoked in the House of Commons, shortly after 
 these events, by Pitt, who took Byng's side ; but 
 that Hawke, being a member of the House, denied 
 some of Pitt's allegations as to the inadequacy of 
 
io6 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 Byng's fleet, on the strength of his own personal 
 observation after taking over the command. 
 Thereupon, so the account says, the categorical 
 test question, the argumcfitu7n ad homviem, was 
 put to him whether with Byng's means he could 
 have beat the enemy ; and the manner of the first 
 Pitt, in thus dealing with an opponent in debate, 
 can be imagined from what we know of him other- 
 wise. Whether the story be true or not, Hawke 
 was not a man to be so overborne, and the reply 
 related is eminently characteristic, " By the grace 
 of God, he would have given a good account of 
 them." Whatever the reason, there seems little 
 doubt that Pitt did not like Hawke ; but the latter 
 was at once too independent to care, and too 
 necessary to be discarded. 
 
 He remained in the Mediterranean only six 
 months, returning to England in January, 1757. 
 His tenure of this command was marked by an 
 incident which exemplifies the vigorous exercise 
 of power frequent in naval commanders, in the 
 days when neither steam nor telegraph existed to 
 facilitate reference home for instructions ; when 
 men with their strong right arms redressed on 
 the spot what they thought a wrong. A British 
 ship carrying supplies to Gibraltar, where Hawke 
 was then lying, was captured by a French privateer 
 and taken into the Spanish port of Algeciras, on 
 the opposite side of the bay. Her surrender was 
 demanded from the governor of the port, Spain 
 being then neutral ; but, being refused, the admiral 
 
Hawke 107 
 
 sent the boats of the squadron and cut her out. 
 This being resisted by the Spanish forts, a hun- 
 dred British seamen were killed or wounded. On 
 the admiral's return home, Pitt is reported to 
 have told him that he thought he would himself 
 have acted in the same way, but would have made 
 some concession afterwards. Hawke replied that 
 his duty, having the country's force in his hands, 
 was to act as he had, — not to make concessions; 
 but that the Ministry could deal with the case 
 subsequently as it thought fit. In other words, as 
 in joint operations with the army, later in the year, 
 he took the ground that the land officers were the 
 judges of their own business, but that he would 
 see them put safe on shore, as a first step ; so 
 in a matter affecting national honor, as he con- 
 ceived it, he would do the seaman's part and 
 redress the injury, after which the civil authority 
 could arrange with the other party. The known 
 details of this transaction are not full enousfh to 
 permit a decided^'opinion as to how far the admiral 
 was justified in his action, judged even by the in- 
 ternational law of the day. It was not necessarily 
 a breach of neutrality to admit a belligerent with 
 her prize; but it would have been, had the French 
 ship gone out from Algeciras, seized her prey, 
 and returned with it. Whatever the facts, how- 
 ever, the episode illustrates interestingly the spirit 
 of Hawke himself, and of the service of that day, 
 as well as his characteristic independence towards 
 superiors when he felt himself right. 
 
io8 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 From this time forward Hawke's service was 
 confined to the Channel Fleet. This was, during 
 that war, the post for the most capable of British 
 officers ; for, while the matter at stake was over- 
 sea predominance and conquest, yet both these 
 depended upon the communications of the French 
 colonies and distant possessions with the mother 
 country. The source of all their strength, the 
 one base indispensable to their operations, was 
 the coast of France ; to close exit from this was 
 therefore to strike at the root. This was much 
 less true for the colonies of Great Britain, at 
 least in America; their numbers, and resources 
 in every way, were so far superior to those of 
 Canada that they needed only to be preserved 
 from interference by the navy of France, — an 
 end also furthered by the close watch of the 
 French ports. This blockade, as it is often, but 
 erroneously, styled, Hawke was the first to main- 
 tain thoroughly and into the winter months ; 
 and in so doing he gave an extension to the 
 practice of naval warfare, which amounted to a 
 veritable revolution in naval strategy. The con- 
 ception was one possible only to a thorough sea- 
 man, who knew exactly and practically what ships 
 could do; one also in whom professional knowl- 
 edge received the moral support of strong natural 
 self-confidence, — power to initiate changes, to 
 assume novel responsibility, through the inner 
 assurance of full adequacy to bear it. 
 
 All this Hawke had. The method, therefore, 
 
Hawke 
 
 109 
 
 the holding the sea, and the exposure of heavy 
 ships to weather before thought impossible, was 
 well within the range of his ability, — of his 
 native and acquired faculties ; but it is due to him 
 to recognize the intellectual force, the originality, 
 which lifted him above the accepted tradition of 
 his predecessors, and by example transmitted to 
 the future a system of warfare that then, as well 
 as in his own hands, was to exercise a decisive 
 effect upon the course of history. It is also to 
 be remembered that he took this weighty step 
 with instruments relatively imperfect, and greatly 
 so. The bottoms of ships were not yet coppered ; 
 in consequence they fouled very rapidly, the 
 result of which was loss of speed. This meant 
 that much greater power, press of canvas, was 
 needed to force them through the water, and that 
 they had to be sent frequently into port to be 
 cleaned. Thus they were less able than ships of 
 later days to overtake an enemy, or to keep off 
 a lee shore, while more intricate administration 
 and more ships were required to maintain the 
 eflficiency of the squadron by a system of reliefs. 
 Hawke noted also another difHculty, — the fatigue 
 of the crews in cleaning their ships' bottoms. It 
 was even more important to success, he said, to 
 restore the seaman, worn by cruising, by a few 
 days quiet and sleep in port, than to clean thor- 
 oughly at the expense of exhausting them. " If 
 the enemy should slip out and run," he writes, 
 "we must follow as fast as we can." Details 
 
iio Types of Naval Officers 
 
 such as these, as well as the main idea, must be 
 borne in mind, if due credit is to be given to 
 Hawke for one of the most decisive advances 
 ever made in the practice of naval campaigning. 
 
 Some time, however, was to elapse before the 
 close watch of the French ports became a leading 
 feature in the naval policy of the government. 
 The early disasters of the war had forced the 
 king, after much resistance, finally to accept the 
 first Pitt as the leading minister of the Crown, 
 in June, 1757. Pitt's military purpose embraced 
 two principal objects: i, the establishment of the 
 British colonial system by the destruction of that 
 of France, which involved as a necessary prece- 
 dent the control of the sea by a preponderant 
 navy ; and, 2, the support of Frederic of Prussia, 
 then engaged in his deadly contest with the 
 combined armies of France, Austria, and Russia. 
 Frederic's activity made a heavy drain upon the 
 troops and the treasure of France, preventing her 
 by just so much from supporting her colonies 
 and maintaining her fleet; but, heavily outnum- 
 bered as he was, it was desirable to work all 
 possible diversion in his favor by attacks else- 
 where. This Pitt proposed to do by a series of 
 descents upon the French coast, compelling the 
 enemy to detach a large force from before the 
 Prussian king to protect their own shores. 
 
 As far as the home naval force was concerned, 
 the years 1757 and 175S were dominated by this 
 idea of diversion in favor of Frederic the Great. 
 
Hawke 1 1 1 
 
 From the general object of these enterprises, the 
 army was necessarily the principal agent ; but the 
 navy was the indispensable auxiliary. Hawke's 
 association with them is interesting chiefly as 
 illustrative of professional character; for there 
 was little or no room for achievement of naval 
 results. The first expedition in which he was 
 concerned was that against Rochefort in 1757. 
 This, though now long forgotten, occasioned by 
 its failure a storm of contemporary controversy. 
 Whatever chances of success it may under any 
 circumstances have had were lost beforehand, 
 owing to the lateness of the season — June — in 
 which Pitt took office. Preparation began at the 
 moment when execution was due. The troops 
 which should have sailed in early summer could 
 not, from delays apparently unavoidable under 
 the conditions, get away before September 10. 
 Hawke himself hoisted his flag — assumed active 
 command — only on August 15. The previous 
 administration was responsible for whatever de- 
 fect in general readiness increased this delay; as 
 regards the particular purpose, Pitt's government 
 was at fault in attempting at all an undertaking 
 which, begun so late in the year, could not expect 
 success under the notorious inadequacy of organi- 
 zation bequeathed to him by his predecessors. 
 But there will always be found at the beginning 
 of a war, or upon a change of commanders, a 
 restless impatience to do something, to make a 
 showing of results, which misleads the judgment 
 
112 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 of those in authority, and commonly ends, if not 
 in failure, at least in barren waste of powder 
 and shot. 
 
 Not the least of the drawbacks under which the 
 enterprise labored was extremely defective infor- 
 mation — especially hydrographic. The char- 
 acter of the coast, the places suited for landing, 
 the depths of water, and the channels, were prac- 
 tically unknown. Hence a necessity for recon- 
 noissances, pregnant of indefinite delay, as might 
 have been foreseen. Amono: Hawke's memo- 
 randa occur the words, " Not to undertake any- 
 thing without good pilots." The phrase is doubly 
 significant, for he was not a man to worry need- 
 lessly about pilots, knowing that pilots look not 
 to military results, but merely to their own 
 responsibility not to take the ground ; and it 
 shows the total ignorance under which labored 
 all who were charged with an undertaking that 
 could only succeed as a surprise, executed with 
 unhesitating rapidity. Hawke himself was 
 astounded at finding in Basque Roads, before 
 Rochefort, "a safe spacious road in which all the 
 navy of England, merchant ships included, may 
 ride without the least annoyance. Before I came 
 here, the place was represented as very diflScult 
 of access, and so narrow that ships could not lie 
 in safety from the forts — nay, the pilots made 
 many batilks before we came in'' In fact, want 
 of good pilotage summed up the fault of the ex- 
 pedition, from its inception in the Cabinet through- 
 
Hawke 113 
 
 out all the antecedent steps of consultation and 
 preparation. Pitt's impetuosity doubtless acted 
 as a spur to laggards, but it was accompanied by 
 a tendency to overbearing insolence that not in- 
 frequently browbeats cautious wisdom. When 
 applied to a man like Hawke, strong in natural 
 temper and in conscious mastery of his profession, 
 the tone characteristic of Pitt provokes an equally 
 resolute self-assertion, as far removed from sub- 
 jection as it is from insubordination ; but friend- 
 ship becomes impossible, and even co-operation 
 difficult. 
 
 Throughout all Hawke kept his head, and made 
 no serious mistake ; but he accepts no unmerited 
 censures. Seeing that the transports are not 
 enough for the healthful carriage of the troops, 
 he so represents it. The government, already 
 impatient at any report of defects, hopes that 
 things are now arranged to his satisfaction. " I 
 am astonished at this expression," he says, " it is 
 my duty to represent defects, but I am satisfied 
 with any decision you make." Again, " I have 
 received your letter signifying His Majesty's direc- 
 tions to use the utmost diligence in embarking 
 the troops and getting to sea. As I cannot doubt 
 my letter of Sunday being immediately communi- 
 cated to you, I should have expected that before 
 yotcrs was sent His Majesty would have been fully 
 satisfied that I needed no spur in executing his 
 orders." As Hawke and Anson — the First Lord 
 — were friends, there can be little doubt that we 
 
114 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 see here a firm protest against the much lauded 
 tone to which the efficiency of the British army 
 and navy under Pitt has been too exclusively 
 attributed. It was in the civil administration, the 
 preparation that underlies military success, which 
 being at home was under his own eye, that Pitt s 
 energy was beneficially felt, and also in his prompt 
 recognition of fit instruments; but he had no 
 need to discover Hawke or Boscawen. He might 
 as well be thought to have discovered the sun. 
 
 In discharging his part of the expedition Hawke 's 
 course is consistent and clear. It must in the 
 first place be recognized that such enterprises are 
 of secondary importance, and do not warrant the 
 risks which are not only justifiable but imperative 
 when a decisive issue is at stake. Hawke's heroic 
 disregard of pilotage difficulties at Ouiberon, in 
 1 759, would have been culpable temerity at Basque 
 Roads, in 1757. But, save delays on this account, 
 no time is lost by him. When the decision to 
 land is reached, he is clear as to the possibility of 
 landing; but when the generals think it impos- 
 sible to effect certain results, he replies that is 
 their business, on which he does not pretend to 
 judge. In his evidence before the Court after- 
 wards, he said, " Whether they should land or 
 not, he constantly thought it the part of the 
 generals to determine. He could not but suppose 
 they were infinitely better judges of their own 
 business than he could be." Their conduct was 
 marked by vacillations strange to him, and which 
 
Hawke 115 
 
 apparently displeased him ; the troops being, on 
 one occasion, embarked in the boats for some 
 hours, and yet returning to the ships without pro- 
 ceeding. He then addressed a formal letter to 
 the commanding general, saying that if he had no 
 further operation to propose the fleet would return 
 at once to England, and he declined to attend a 
 Council of War to decide either of these points. 
 The Army should decide, alone, whether it could 
 effect anything by landing ; if not, he, without 
 asking counsel, would stay no longer. On Octo- 
 ber 7th he reached Spithead. 
 
 Pitt, who had espoused Byng's cause against 
 the previous administration, followed its precedent 
 in throwing the blame on the military and naval 
 leaders. In Parliament, he "declared solemnly 
 his belief that there was a determined resolution, 
 both in the naval and military commanders, against 
 any vigorous exertion of the national power." 
 For far less than this accusation Byng had been 
 condemned ; but in fact the fault at Rochefort lay 
 clearly on those who issued the orders, — upon 
 the Cabinet ; upon the character of the expedition 
 itself, — a great risk for a secondary and doubtful 
 object ; upon the inconsiderate haste which disre- 
 garded alike the season and the inadequate know- 
 ledge ; upon defective preparation in the broadest 
 sense of the words. Diversions, in truth, are 
 feints, in which the utmost smoke with the least 
 fire is the object. Carried farther, they entail 
 disaster ; for they rest on no solid basis of adequate 
 
ii6 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 force, but upon successful deception. Pitt's angry 
 injustice met with its due rebuke the next year at 
 St. Cas. It can scarcely be doubted that words 
 such as those quoted were responsible, in part at 
 least, for the disastrous issue of that diversion, the 
 story of which belongs, if to the navy at all, to the 
 life of Howe. 
 
 That Hawke resented this language can 
 scarcely be doubted, and none the less that he 
 evidently himself felt that something might have 
 been attempted by the troops. He was clear of 
 fault in his own consciousness ; but in the general 
 censure he was involved with his associates — 
 known, so to say, by his friends, implicated in the 
 meshes of a half-truth, where effort to clear one's 
 self results in worse entanglement. He had the 
 manly cast of character which will not struggle 
 for self-vindication ; but his suppressed wrath 
 gathered force, until a year later it resulted, upon 
 occasion of ofificial provocation, in an explosion 
 that has not a close parallel in naval history. 
 
 He had hoisted his flag again on February 
 28, 1758. His first service was directed against 
 a French squadron of five ships-of-the-line, fitting 
 at Rochefort to convoy troops for the relief of 
 Louisburg, in Cape Breton Island, then about 
 to be besieged by British and colonial forces. 
 Hawke's observations of the previous year had 
 ascertained the hitherto unknown facilities of 
 Basque Roads for occupation by a fleet and con- 
 sequent effectual interception of such an expedi- 
 
Hawke 117 
 
 tion. Upon making the land the French vessels 
 were found already in the Roads, therefore soon 
 to sail ; but before this superior force of seven 
 ships they cut their cables, and fled across the 
 shoals up the river Charente, on which Rochefort 
 lies. Hawke, instructed by his previous expe- 
 rience, had earnestly but fruitlessly demanded fire- 
 ships and bomb-vessels to destroy the enemy in 
 case they grounded on the flats ; which they did, 
 and for some hours lay exposed to such an attack. 
 Not having these means, he had to watch help- 
 lessly the process of lightening and towing by 
 which they at last made their escape. He then 
 returned to England, having frustrated the relief 
 expedition but, through defective equipment, not 
 destroyed the vessels. The Admiralty, upon re- 
 ceiving his report of the transaction, made no 
 acknowledgments to him. 
 
 Pitt had profited by Hawke's ineffectual re- 
 quest for small vessels and his suffering from the 
 want of them ; but he utilized the suggestions in a 
 manner that robbed their author of any share in 
 the results. A squadron of that sort was to be 
 constituted, to operate on the French coast in 
 diversions like that of 1757; but it was to be an 
 independent command, under an officer chosen 
 by the Government without consulting the ad- 
 miral. To the main fleet was assigned the nec- 
 essary, but in credit very secondary, office of 
 cruising off Brest, to prevent interruption by the 
 French ships there ; to play, in short, the incon- 
 
1 1 8 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 spicuous role of a covering force, while the light 
 squadron had the brilliant part of fighting. The 
 officer selected for the latter was Howe, deservedly 
 a favorite of Hawke's, but not therefore acceptable 
 to him as a supplanter in his honors. 
 
 The admiral had been for some time superin- 
 tending the equipment of the vessels for the light 
 division, when, on May lo, 1758, Howe reported 
 to him, bringing his orders. Hawke boiled over 
 at once; and, in a heat evidently beyond his 
 will to control, despatched the following letter, 
 three hours after Howe's arrival. 
 
 Portsmouth, 7 o'clock p. m. loth May, 1758. 
 
 Sir, — About 4 o'clock arrived here Captain Howe, 
 and delivered me their Lordships' order of the 9th. In 
 last September I was sent out to command an expedi- 
 tion under all the disadvantages one could possibly 
 labor under, arising chiefly from my being under the 
 influence of land-ofiicers in Councils of War at sea.^ 
 Last cruise (March-April, 1758) I went out on a partic- 
 ular service, almost without the least means of perform- 
 ing it. Now every means to ensure success is provided ; 
 another is to reap the credit; while it is probable that 
 I, with the capital ships, might be ordered to cruise in 
 such a manner as to prevent his failing in this attempt. 
 To fit out his ships for this service I have been kept 
 here,^ and even now have their Lordships' directions, at 
 least in terms, to obey him. He is to judge of what he 
 wants for his expedition ; he is to make his demands, 
 
 • By express orders from the Ministry Councils of War had to be 
 held. 
 
 ^ An application for four days' leave for private business had been 
 refused. 
 
Hawke 119 
 
 and I am to comply with them. I have therefore 
 directed my flag immediately to be struck, and left their 
 Lordships' orders with Vice-Admiral Holburne, For 
 no consequence that can attend my striking it without 
 orders shall ever outbalance with me the wearing it one 
 moment with discredit. 
 
 I am, etc. 
 
 E. Hawke. 
 
 It is impossible to justify so extreme a step as 
 abandoning one's command without permission, 
 and especially under circumstances that permitted 
 the orderly course of asking for detachment. 
 Nevertheless, Hawke did well to be angry ; and, 
 as is sometimes the case, an injudicious and, in 
 point of occasion, unseemly loss of temper, doubt- 
 less contributed to insure for him in the future, to 
 a degree which forbearance or mere remonstrance 
 would not have assured, the consideration essen- 
 tial to his duties. Many will remember the effect 
 produced by Plimsolls unparliamentary outbreak. 
 The erroneous impression, that admirals and gen- 
 erals fit to be employed at all were to be ridden 
 booted and spurred, needed correction. Hawke 
 had misapprehended the intention of the Govern- 
 ment, in so far as believing that the light squadron 
 was to be employed in Basque Roads, the scene 
 of last years failure ; but he was right in thinking 
 that intrusting the enterprise to another, on that 
 occasion his junior, would be a reflection upon 
 himself, intensified by making the command 
 practically independent, while he was limited to 
 
I20 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 the covering duty. Under these circumstances, 
 erroneously imagined by him, the squadron should 
 have been attached to his command, and the 
 particular direction left to him ; the Government 
 giving to him, instead of to Howe, the general 
 orders which it issued, and arranging with him 
 beforehand as to the command of the detached 
 squadron. 
 
 But even under the actual conditions, of an 
 intention to operate on the western Channel coast 
 of France, it would have been graceful and ap- 
 propriate to recognize Hawke's eminent past, and 
 recent experience, by keeping under his command 
 the ships he had himself fitted for the service, and 
 directing him to despatch Howe with the necessary 
 instructions. It was as in the Nile campaign, 
 where the general directions were sent to St. 
 Vincent, with a clear expression of the Govern- 
 ment's preference for Nelson as the officer to take 
 charge. The intended scene of Howe's opera- 
 tions, if not formally within Hawke's district, was 
 far less distant from Brest than Toulon and Italy 
 were from Cadiz, where St. Vincent covered Nel- 
 son's detachment. In the wish for secrecy, per- 
 haps, or perhaps through mere indifference to the 
 effect produced upon Hawke, as a man assumed 
 to need curb and spur, he was left in ignorance, 
 to imagine what he pleased ; and this action, suc- 
 ceeding previous neglects and Pitt's imputations 
 of the previous year, elicited an outburst which, 
 while it cannot be justified in its particular mani- 
 
Hawke 121 
 
 festation, was in spirit inevitable. A man sub- 
 missive to such treatment as he had good cause 
 to suspect, would be deficient in the independence 
 of character, and sensitive regard to official repu- 
 tation, without which he was unfit to command 
 the Channel Fleet. 
 
 Hawke was summoned at once to the Admir- 
 alty, and in the interview which ensued, as shown 
 by the minutes endorsed on his own letter, his 
 misconception as to the quarter in which Howe 
 was to act afforded standing ground for a com- 
 promise. Hawke having committed himself 
 officially, and upon a mistaken premise, the 
 Admiralty had him technically at their mercy ; 
 but such a triumph as they could win by dis- 
 ciplining him would be more disastrous than a 
 defeat. He disclaimed resentment towards any 
 person, and reiterated that his action was in- 
 tended merely to defend his character and honor, 
 which he said — ^ to quote the minute exactly — 
 " were not so much touched as he apprehended 
 when the suspicion he had of Mr. Howe's going 
 to Basque Roads arose — from the Lords asking 
 him some days since for a draft of the Roads." 
 The italics are the present writer's ; but the words 
 as they stand would indicate that he did not yield 
 his view of the matter in general, nor leave 
 hearers under any doubt as to how far he could 
 safely be treated with contumely or slight. There 
 can be little doubt that the substantial result 
 was to strengthen his position in the exact- 
 
122 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 ing duty that lay before him in the following 
 year. 
 
 The whole business was then salved over 
 by the First Lord, Anson, taking command of 
 the Channel Fleet for the particular occasion. 
 Hawke accompanied him as second in command, 
 while Howe went his way with the light squadron 
 and the troops. Both divisions sailed on the ist 
 of June. On the i8th our admiral was so unwell 
 with a severe fever and cold — a complaint to 
 which he was much subject — that he had to ask 
 to be sent into port. He went ashore before the 
 end of the month, and remained unemployed till 
 the following May. 
 
 The year 1759 is the culminating epoch of 
 Hawke's career. In it occurred the signal tri- 
 umph of Quiberon Bay, the seal of his genius, 
 significant above all as demonstrating that the 
 ardor of the leader had found fulfilment in his 
 followers, that the spirit of Haw^ke had become 
 the spirit of the Navy. This year also yielded 
 proof of his great capacity as a seaman and ad- 
 ministrator, in the efficient blocking of Brest, 
 prolonged through six moijths of closest watching 
 into the period of the winter gales, in face of 
 which it had hitherto been thought impossible to 
 keep the sea with heavy ships massed in fleets; 
 for, as he most justly said, in explaining the 
 necessity of maintaining the rendezvous fixed by 
 him, " A single ship may struggle with a hard 
 gale of wind when a squadron cannot. In work- 
 
Hawke 123 
 
 ing against a strong westerly gale in the Channel, 
 where it cannot make very long stretches," — 
 because it finds shores and shoals on either side, 
 — " it must always by wearing lose ground, but 
 more especially if it should so blow as to put it 
 past carrying sail." The method used by Hawke 
 was not only an innovation on all past practice, 
 but, as has before been said, constituted the pat- 
 tern whereon were framed the great blockades of 
 the Napoleonic period, which strangled both the 
 naval efficiency and the commercial and financial 
 resources of the Empire. These were but devel- 
 opments of Hawke's fine achievement of 1759; 
 the prestige of originality belongs to him. Even 
 their success, with better ships and the improve- 
 ment of detail always accompanying habit, is fore- 
 shadowed by his. " I may safely affirm that, 
 except the few ships that took refuge in Conquet, 
 hardly a vessel of any kind has been able to enter 
 or come out of Brest for four months," — ending 
 October loth. "They have been obliged to un- 
 load near forty victuallers at Quimperley and 
 carry their cargoes by land to Brest. It must 
 be the fault of the weather, not ours, if any of 
 them escape." 
 
 It was suitable indeed that so strenuous and 
 admirable an exhibition of professional ability, — 
 of naval generalship, — alike in strategic combi- 
 nation, tactical disposition, and administrative 
 superintendence, should terminate in a brilliant 
 triumph, at once its fruit and its crown ; wherein 
 
124 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 sedulous and unremittent readiness for instant 
 action, comprehended by few, received a startling 
 demonstration which none could fail to understand. 
 As Nelson was pursued by ignorant sneers before 
 the Nile, so Hawke was burned in effigy by the 
 populace, at the very moment when laborious 
 effort was about to issue in supreme achievement. 
 The victory in either case is less than the ante- 
 cedent labor, as the crown, after all, is less than 
 the work, the symbol than the fact symbolized. 
 
 A brief account of preceding conditions, and 
 of the dispositions maintained to meet them, is 
 therefore necessary to due appreciation of the 
 victory of Quiberon Bay. Although the diver- 
 sions of 1758 had not very materially aided 
 Frederic of Prussia, they had inflicted distinct 
 humiliation and harassment upon France. This, 
 added to defeat upon the Continent and in North 
 America, had convinced the French Government, 
 as it convinced Napoleon a half-century later, that 
 a determined blow must be struck at England 
 herself as the operative centre upon which rested, 
 and from which proceeded, the most serious 
 detriment to their cause and that of their allies. 
 It was resolved, therefore, to attempt an invasion 
 of England ; to the threat of which the English 
 people were always extremely sensitive. 
 
 From local conditions the French preparations 
 had to be made in several separate places ; it was 
 the task of the British Navy to prevent the con- 
 centration of these different detachments in a 
 
Hawke 125 
 
 joint effort. The troops must embark, of course, 
 from some place near to England; their principal 
 points of assembly were on the Channel, whence 
 they were to cross in flat-boats, and in the Biscay 
 ports, from Brest to the mouth of the Loire. 
 The Bay of Quiberon, from which Hawke's ac- 
 tion takes its name, lies between the two latter 
 points. It is sheltered from the full force of the 
 Atlantic gales by a peninsula of the same name, 
 and by some shoals which prolong the barrier 
 to the southward of the promontory. 
 
 To cross safely, it was necessary to provide 
 naval protection. To this end squadrons were 
 equipped in Toulon and in Brest. Combined at 
 the latter point, and further strengthened by 
 divisions expected to return from North America, 
 they would constitute a force of very serious con- 
 sideration in point of numbers. Rochefort also 
 was an element in the problem, though a minor 
 one ; for either the small force already there 
 might join the concentration, or, if the port were 
 unwatched, the American or other divisions 
 might get in there, and be at least so much 
 nearer to Brest, or to a neighboring point of 
 assembly, as Quiberon Bay. 
 
 As the French Navy was essential to the 
 French crossing, as its junction was essential to 
 action, as the point of junction was at or near 
 Brest — for there was the district near which the 
 troops were assembling — and as by far the 
 largest detachment was already in Brest, that port 
 
126 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 became the important centre upon blocking which 
 depended primarily the thwarting of the invasion. 
 If the French Navy succeeded in concentrating 
 at Brest, the first move in the game would be lost. 
 Hawke therefore had the double duty of not allow- 
 ing the squadron there to get out without fight- 
 ing, and of closing the entrance to reinforcements. 
 The latter was far the more difficult, and could 
 not be assured beyond the chance of failure, 
 because an on-shore gale, which would carry his 
 fleet into the Channel to avoid being driven on 
 the French coast, would be fair for an outside 
 enemy to run into the port, friendly to him. 
 This actually occurred at a most critical moment, 
 but it could only happen by a combination of 
 circumstances ; that is, by the hostile squadron 
 chancing to arrive at a moment when the British 
 had been blown off. If it approached under ordi- 
 nary conditions of weather it would run into the 
 midst of foes. 
 
 The great names of the British Navy were 
 then all afloat in active command. Rodney was 
 before Havre, which he bombarded in the course 
 of the summer, doing a certain amount of dam- 
 age, harassing the local preparations for invasion, 
 and intercepting vessels carrying supplies to the 
 Brest fleet and coastwise. Boscawen, second only 
 to Hawke, was before Toulon, to hold there 
 the dozen ships-of-the-line under De la Clue, as 
 Hawke was charged to stop the score under 
 Conflans. 
 
Hawke 127 
 
 In broad conception, Hawke's method was 
 simple and can be easily stated ; the difficulty 
 lay in carrying it out. The main body of his 
 force had a rendezvous, so chosen that in violent 
 weather from the westward it could at worst 
 drift up Channel, but usually would have a fair 
 wind for Torbay, a roadstead on the British 
 coast about a hundred miles distant. To the 
 rendezvous the fleet was not tied under ordi- 
 nary circumstances ; it was merely a headquarters 
 which admitted of cruising, but where despatches 
 from home would always find the admiral in per- 
 son, or news of his whereabouts. Near Brest 
 itself was kept an inshore squadron of three or 
 four ships, which under ordinary circumstances 
 could see the enemy inside, noting his forward- 
 ness ; for the cannon of the day could not molest 
 a vessel more than a mile from the entrance, 
 while the conditions within of spars and sails 
 indicated to a seaman the readiness or intention 
 to move, to a degree not ascertainable with ships 
 dependent on steam only. 
 
 With these dispositions, if a westerly gale 
 came on, the fleet held its ground while it could, 
 but when expedient to go put into Torbay. Ow- 
 ing to the nearness of the two places, the weather, 
 when of a pronounced character, was the same 
 at both. While the wind held to the westward 
 of south, or even at south-southeast, a ship-of-the- 
 line could not beat out from Brest; much less a 
 fleet. The instant the wind went east, fair for 
 
128 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 exit, the British left Torbay, with certainty of 
 not being too late ; for, though the enemy might 
 get out before their return, the east wind would 
 not suffer them to close with the French coast 
 at another point soon enough to avoid a meet- 
 ing. While in Torbay the time was improved by 
 taking on board stores and provisions ; nor was 
 the night's rest at anchor a small consideration 
 for seamen worn with continual cruising. 
 
 The practical merits displayed by Hawke in 
 maintaining this simple but arduous service were, 
 first and supremely, the recognition of its pos- 
 sibility, contrary to a tradition heretofore as com- 
 monly and as blindly accepted as those of the 
 line-of-battle, and of the proper methods for fleet 
 attack before described. It must be remembered 
 also that in these wars, 1 739-1 763, for the first 
 time the British Navy found the scene of action, 
 in European waters, to be the Biscay coast of 
 France. In the former great wars of the seven- 
 teenth century, French fleets entered the Channel, 
 and pitched battles were fought there and in 
 the North Sea. Thence the contest shifted 
 to the Mediterranean, where the great fleets 
 operated in the later days of William III., and the 
 reign of Anne. Then, too, the heavy ships, like 
 land armies, went into winter quarters. It was 
 by distinguished admirals considered profes- 
 sionally criminal to expose those huge yet cum- 
 brous engines of the nation's power to the buffet- 
 ings of winter gales, which might unfit them next 
 
Hawke 129 
 
 year to meet the enemy, snugly nursed and 
 restored to vigor in home ports during the same 
 time. The need of periodical refitting and clean- 
 ing the bottoms clinched the argument in favor 
 of this seasonable withdrawal from the sea. 
 
 With this presumed necessity, attention had 
 not been paid to developing a system of mainte- 
 nance and refit adapted to the need of a fleet per- 
 forming what Hawke undertook. In this, of 
 course, there cannot be assigned to him the in- 
 dividuality of merit that may belong to a concep- 
 tion, and does belong to the man who initiates 
 and assumes, as he did, the responsibility for a 
 novel and hazardous course of action. Many 
 agents had to contribute to the forwarding of 
 supplies and repairs; but, while singleness of 
 credit cannot be assumed, priority is justly due to 
 him upon whose shoulders fell not only all blame, 
 in case his enterprise failed, but the fundamental 
 difficulty of so timing the reliefs of the vessels 
 under his command, so arranging the order of 
 rotation in their going and coming as to keep 
 each, as well as the whole body, in a constant con- 
 dition of highest attainable efficiency — in num- 
 bers, in speed, and in health — for meeting the 
 enemy, whose time of exit could not be foreknown. 
 Naturally, too, the man on whom all this fell, and 
 who to the nation would personify success or 
 failure, as the event might be, — terms which to 
 him would mean honor or ruin, — that man, when 
 professionally so competent as Hawke, would be 
 
ijo Types of Naval Officers 
 
 most fruitful in orders and in suggestions to attain 
 the desired end. In this sense there can be no 
 doubt that he was foremost, and his correspon- 
 dence bears evidence of his preoccupation with 
 the subject. 
 
 Into particulars it is scarcely necessary to go. 
 Administrative details are interesting only to 
 specialists. But one quality absolutely essential, 
 and in which most men fail, he manifested in high 
 degree. He feared no responsibility, either 
 towards the enemy, or towards the home authori- 
 ties. Superior and inferior alike heard plainly 
 from him in case of defects; still more plainly in 
 case of neglect. " It is a matter of indifference 
 to me whether I fight the enemy, should they 
 come out, with an equal number, one ship more, 
 or one ship less." " I depend not on intelligence 
 from the French ports; what I see I believe, and 
 regulate my conduct accordingly ; " a saying which 
 recalls one of Farragut's, — " The officers say I 
 don't believe anything. I certainly believe very 
 little that comes in the shape of reports. They 
 keep everybody stirred up. I mean to be whipped 
 or to whip my enemy, and not to be scared 
 to death." Agitation, to a very considerable 
 degree, was the condition of Hawke's superiors ; 
 to say the least, anxiety strained to the point of 
 approaching panic. But Hawke could have 
 adopted truly as his own Farragut's other words, 
 " I have full confidence in myself and in my judg- 
 ment," — that is, of course, in professional mat- 
 
Hawke 131 
 
 ters ; and he spoke reassuringly out of the firmness 
 of his self-reliance. " Their Lordships will pardon 
 me for observing that from the present disposition 
 of the squadron I think there is little room for 
 alarm while the weather continues tolerable." 
 Again, a few days later, " Their Lordships may 
 rest assured there is little foundation for the pre- 
 sent alarms. While the wind is fair for the 
 enemy's coming out, it is also favorable for our 
 keeping them in ; and while we are obliged to 
 keep off they cannot stir." This was in October, 
 when the weather was already wild and the days 
 shortening. 
 
 With equally little hesitancy, though without 
 breach of subordination, he overbears the Admir- 
 alty when they wish to pay what he considers 
 exaggerated care to cleaning the bottoms, trace- 
 able, no doubt, to the prejudices of the Sea Lords. 
 " If the ships take up a month by cleaning, from 
 the time they leave me to their return, it will be 
 impossible for me to keep up the squadron. The 
 only practicable way is to heel, etc., and confine 
 them to ten days in port for the refreshment of 
 their companies in case they should miss the 
 spring tide." " Their Lordships will give me leave 
 to observe that the relief of the squadron depends 
 more on the refreshment of the ships' companies 
 than on cleaning the ships. By the hurry the 
 latter must be performed in, unless the ship con- 
 tinues a month or five weeks in port, which the 
 present exigency will by no means admit of, the 
 
132 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 men would be so harassed and fatigued that they 
 would return to me in a worse condition than 
 when they left me. . . . However, I shall endeavor 
 to comply with all their Lordships' directions in 
 such manner as, to the best of my judgment^ will 
 ajtswer their intentions in e77iploying nie here'' 
 The words italicized strike the true note of subor- 
 dination duly tempered with discretion. 
 
 To the Navy Board, a civil adjunct to the 
 Admiralty, but possessed of considerable indepen- 
 dent power to annoy ofificers in active military 
 service, he took a more peremptory tone. He 
 had discharged on his own authority, and for rea- 
 sons of emergency, a mutinous surgical officer. 
 For this he was taken to task, as Nelson a gen- 
 eration later was rebuked by the same body. " I 
 have to acquaint you," he replied, " that there was 
 no mistake in his being ordered by me to be dis- 
 charged." He then gives his reasons, and con- 
 tinues, " For the real good of the service I ordered 
 him to be discharged, and his crime noted on his 
 list of pay, for your information. I shall not enter 
 into any dispute with you about my authority as 
 a Commanding Officer, neither do I ever think of 
 inconveniences or prejudices to myself, as a party, 
 according to your insinuations, where the good of 
 the service is concerned." It must be added that 
 to subordinates he was as liberal with praise as he 
 was with censure, where either was merited ; nor 
 did he fail in kindly personal intervention upon 
 due occasion for deserving or unfortunate men. 
 
Hawke 133 
 
 More reserved, apparently, than Nelson, he seems 
 to have been like him sympathetic ; and hence it 
 was that, as before observed, it was his spirit that 
 he communicated to the navy rather than a system, 
 admirable as was the strategic system embodied 
 in his methods of blockade. It was by personal 
 influence rather than by formulated precept that 
 Hawke inspired his service, and earned a just claim 
 to be reckoned the greatest force of his century 
 in naval development. 
 
 The general conditions being as described, the 
 fighting in the naval campaign of 1759 began in 
 the Mediterranean. On June 8th Boscawen, hav- 
 ing driven two French frigates into a fortified bay 
 near Toulon, attacked them with three ships-of- 
 the-line. The attack failed, and the British ships 
 were badly injured; a timely lesson on the gen- 
 eral inexpediency of attacking shore batteries with 
 vessels, unless for special and adequate reasons 
 of probable advantage. In July he returned to 
 Gibraltar, to refit and for provisions. In the 
 absence of details, positive criticism is unwar- 
 ranted ; but it is impossible not to note the differ- 
 ence between this step, during summer weather, 
 and the Toulon blockades of Lord St. Vincent, 
 who, when before Brest, modelled his course upon 
 that of Hawke. The port being thus left open, 
 De la Clue sailed on the 5th of August for Brest. 
 On the 17th he was near the straits of Gibraltar, 
 hugging the African coast, and falling night gave 
 promise of passing unseen, when a British look- 
 
134 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 out frigate caught sight of his squadron. She 
 hauled in for Gibraltar at once, firing signal guns. 
 Boscavven'sshipswereinthemidstof repairs,mostly 
 dismantled; but, the emergency not being unfore- 
 seen, spars and sails were sent rapidly aloft, and 
 within three hours they were underway in pursuit. 
 The French division separated during the night. 
 Five ships put into Cadiz. The British next 
 morning caught sight of the remaining seven, 
 among which was the admiral, and a sharp chase 
 resulted in the destruction of five. From Aus^ust 
 iSth the Toulon fleet was eliminated from the cam- 
 paign ; though the vessels in Cadiz remained to 
 the end a charge upon Hawke's watchfulness, 
 similar to that caused by the enemy's divisions 
 expected from America. 
 
 That one of the latter was already on its way 
 home, under the command of Commodore Bom- 
 part, was notified to our admiral on September 
 2istbya despatch from England. He immedi- 
 ately sent a division of heavy ships to reinforce 
 the light squadron to the southward. " If the 
 alarm is great now," he said, " it will be much 
 greater if he get into Rochefort." Further infor- 
 mation from the West Indies contradicted the 
 first report, and on October loth Hawke recalled 
 the ships-of-the-line, apparently at the wish of the 
 Admiralty; for he expresses his regret at doing 
 so, and asks for more of the " many ships " then 
 in England, that Rochefort may be blocked as 
 well as Brest. The incident has now little impor- 
 
Hawke 135 
 
 tance, except as indicating the general national 
 nervousness, and the difficulty under which he 
 labored through force inadequate to the numerous 
 and exacting duties entailed by constant holding 
 the sea in war. From this point of view it bears 
 upon his conduct. 
 
 That Bompart was coming proved to be true. 
 On November loth Hawke anchored with the fleet 
 in Torbay, after three days of struggle against a 
 very heavy westerly storm. " Bompart, if near, 
 may get in," he wrote the Admiralty, " but no 
 ship can get out from any port in the Bay." The 
 weather had then moderated, but was still too 
 rough for boating, even in the sheltered roadstead ; 
 hence he could get no reports of the state of the 
 ships, which shows incidentally the then defective 
 system of signalling. On the 12th he sailed, on 
 the 1 3th was again forced into Torbay by a south- 
 wester, but on the 14th got away finally. On the 
 afternoon of the i6th the fleet was twenty-five 
 miles from the Island of Ushant, near Brest, and 
 there learned from transports, returning from the 
 the light division off Quiberon, that the French 
 fleet had been seen the day before, seventy-five 
 miles northwest of Belleisle ; therefore some fifty 
 or sixty miles southeast of the point where this 
 news w^as received. Conflans had sailed the same 
 day that the British last left Torbay, but before 
 his departure Bompart had opportunely arrived, 
 as Hawke had feared. His ships were not able 
 to go at once to sea on so important a mission, 
 
136 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 but their seasoned crews were a welcome reinforce- 
 ment and were distributed through the main fleet, 
 which numbered twenty-one ships-of-the-line. 
 Hawke had twenty-three. 
 
 Concluding that the enemy were bound for 
 Quiberon, Hawke carried a press of sail for that 
 place. He knew they must be within a hundred 
 miles of him and aimed to cut them off from their 
 port. During the 17th the wind, hanging to the 
 south and east, was adverse to both fleets, but on 
 the 1 8th and 19th it became more favorable. At 
 half-past eight on the morning of the 20th, one of 
 the look-out frigates ahead of the British made 
 the signal for sighting a fleet. It was then blow- 
 ing strong from the west-northwest, and Belleisle, 
 which is ten miles west of Quiberon Bay, and 
 south of which the fleets must pass, w'as by the 
 English reckoning forty miles distant. A course 
 of some fifty or sixty miles was therefore to be 
 run before the enemy could close the land, and 
 there remained about eight hours of sun. 
 
 Hawke's day had come. Towards ten o'clock 
 he had the enemy sufficiently in view to see that 
 they were intent upon securing their arrival, 
 rather than fighting. He therefore made signal 
 for the seven ships nearest them " to chase and 
 draw into a line-of-battle ahead of me, and en- 
 deavour to stop them till the rest of the squadron 
 should come up, who also were to form as they 
 chased that 710 time might be lost in the pursuit." 
 The French " kept going off under such sail as 
 
Hawke 137 
 
 all their squadron could carry and yet keep to- 
 gether^ while we crowded after him with every sail 
 our ships could dear!' The words italicized sum 
 up the whole philosophy of a general chase. 
 The pursued are limited to the speed of the 
 slowest, otherwise he who cannot but lag is 
 separated and lost ; the pursuer need slacken 
 no whit, for his friends are ever coming up to 
 his aid. Overtaking is inevitable, unless the dis- 
 tance is too short. 
 
 At half-past two firing began between the 
 French rear and the leading British. Of the two 
 foremost in the chase, who thus opened the fight, 
 one was the same Dorsetshire which in Mathews's 
 battle had played the laggard. Her captain, who 
 thus rose to his opportunity, was one of the two 
 to whom Hawke addressed the enthusiastic com- 
 pliment that they had " behaved like angels." 
 Hawke himself was at this moment south of 
 Belleisle, with several ships ahead of him ; while 
 the French admiral was leading his fleet, in order 
 better to pilot them over dangerous ground, and 
 by his own action show more surely than was 
 possible by signal what he wished done from 
 moment to moment. At the southern extreme of 
 the shoals which act as a breakwater to Quiberon 
 Bay are some formidable rocks, known as the 
 Cardinals. Around these M. de Conflans passed 
 soon after the firing began, his rear being then in 
 hot action. 
 
 Hawke himself was without a pilot, as were 
 
138 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 most of his captains. The sailing master of the 
 flag-ship was charged with that duty for the fleet, 
 but had of the ground before him no exact per- 
 sonal knowledge ; nor could reliance be placed 
 upon the imperfect surveys of a locality, which 
 it was not the interest of an almost constant 
 enemy to disclose. Enough, however, was known 
 to leave no doubt of the greatness of the risks, 
 and it was the master's part to represent them. 
 The occasion, however, was not one of a mere 
 diversion, of a secondary operation, but of one 
 vital to the nation's cause ; and Hawke's reply, 
 stamped with the firmness of a great ofHcer, 
 showed how little professional timidity had to 
 do with his laudable care of his fleet in Basque 
 Roads two years before. " You have done your 
 duty in warning me," he replied ; " now lay us 
 alongside the French Commander-in-chief." So 
 amid the falling hours of the day the British fleet, 
 under the unswerving impulse of its leader, moved 
 steadfastly forward, to meet a combination of 
 perils that embraced all most justly dreaded by 
 seamen, — darkness, an intricate navigation, a 
 lee shore fringed with outlying and imperfectly 
 known reefs and shoals, towards which they were 
 hurried by a fast-rising wind and sea, that for- 
 bade all hope of retracing their steps during the 
 long hours of the night. 
 
 " Had we but two hours more daylight," wrote 
 Hawke in his ofidcial report, " the whole had been 
 totally destroyed or taken ; for we were almost 
 
Hawke 139 
 
 up with their van when night overtook us." His 
 success would have been greater, though not 
 more decisive of issues than the event proved it ; 
 but nothing could have added to the merit or 
 brilliancy of his action, to which no element of 
 grandeur was wanting. This was one of the 
 most dramatic of sea fights. Forty-odd tall 
 ships, pursuers and pursued, under reefed canvas, 
 in fierce career drove furiously on ; now rushing 
 headlong down the forward slope of a great sea, 
 now rising on its crest as it swept beyond them ; 
 now seen, now hidden ; the helmsmen straining 
 at the wheels, upon which the huge hulls, tossing 
 their prows from side to side, tugged like a mad- 
 dened horse, as though themselves feeling the 
 wild " rapture of the strife " that animated their 
 masters, rejoicing in their strength and defying 
 the accustomed rein. 
 
 The French admiral had flattered himself that 
 the enemy, ignorant of the ground, would not 
 dare to follow him round the Cardinals. He was 
 soon undeceived. Hawke's comment on the 
 situation was that he was "for the old way of 
 fighting, to make downright work with them." 
 It was an old way, true; but he had more than 
 once seen it lost to mind, and had himself 
 done most to restore it to its place, — a new way 
 as well as an old. The signals for the general 
 chase and for battle were kept aloft, and no 
 British ship slacked her way. Without ranged 
 order, save that of speed, the leaders mingled 
 
140 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 with the French rear; the roar and flashes of 
 the guns, the falHng spars and drifting clouds of 
 smoke, now adding their part to the wild mag- 
 nificence of the scene. Though tactically perfect 
 in the sole true sense of tactics, that the means 
 adopted exactly suited the situation, this was a 
 battle of incidents, often untold, — not one of 
 manoeuvres. As the ships, rolling heavily, buried 
 their flanks deeply in the following seas, no cap- 
 tain dared to open his lower tier of ports, where 
 the most powerful artillery was arrayed — none 
 save one, the French Tkesee, whose rashness was 
 rebuked by the inpouring waters, which quickly 
 engulfed both ship and crew. The Snpcrbe met 
 a like fate, though not certainly from the same 
 cause. She sank under the broadside of the 
 Royal George, Hawke's flag-ship. " The Royal 
 George's people gave a cheer," wrote an eye wit- 
 ness, "but it was a faint one; the honest sailors 
 were touched at the miserable state of so many 
 hundreds of poor creatures." Americans and 
 English can couple this story of long ago with 
 Philip's ejaculation off Santiago de Cuba, but 
 three years since : " Don't cheer, boys, those 
 poor devils are dying." 
 
 By five o'clock two French ships had struck, 
 and two had been sunk. " Night was now come," 
 wrote Hawke, *' and being on a part of the coast, 
 among islands and shoals of which we were 
 totally ignorant, without a pilot, as was the 
 greatest part of the squadron, and blowing hard 
 
Hawke 141 
 
 on a lee shore, I made the signal to anchor." 
 The day's work was over, and doubtless looked to 
 him incomplete, but it was effectually and finally 
 done. The French Navy did not again lift up 
 its head during the three years of war that 
 remained. Balked in their expectation that the 
 foe's fear of the beach would give them refuge, 
 harried and worried by the chase, harnessed to no 
 fixed plan of action, Conflans's fleet broke apart 
 and fled. Seven went north, and ran ashore at 
 the mouth of the little river Vilaine which emp- 
 ties into Quiberon Bay. Eight stood south, and 
 succeeded in reaching Rochefort. The fate of 
 four has been told. Conflans's flag-ship anchored 
 after night among the British, but at daybreak 
 next morning cut her cables, ran ashore, and was 
 burned by the French. One other, wrecked on a 
 shoal in the bay, makes up the tale of twenty-one. 
 Six were wholly lost to their navy; the seven 
 that got into Vilaine only escaped to Brest by 
 twos, two years later, while the Rochefort division 
 was effectually blocked by occupying Basque 
 Roads, the islands of which and of Quiberon 
 were cultivated as kitchen gardens for the re- 
 freshment of British crews. 
 
 Of the British, one ship went on a shoal during 
 the action, and on the following day another 
 coming to her assistance also grounded. Both 
 were lost, but most of their people were saved. 
 Beyond this Hawke's fleet suffered little. "As 
 to the loss we have sustained," wrote he, " let it 
 
142 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 be placed to the account of the necessity I was 
 under of running all risks to break this strong 
 force of the enemy." 
 
 A contemporary witness assigns to Hawke's 
 own ship a arge individual share in the fighting. 
 Of this he does not himself speak, nor is it 
 of much matter. That all was done with her 
 that could be done, to aid in achieving success, 
 is sufficiently assured by his previous record. 
 Hawke's transcendent merit in this affair was 
 that of the general officer, not of the private 
 captain. The utmost courage shown by the 
 commander of a single ship before the enemy's 
 fire cannot equal the heroism which assumes the 
 immense responsibility of a doubtful issue, on 
 which may hang a nation's fate ; nor would the 
 admiral's glory be shorn of a ray, if neither then 
 nor at any other time had a hostile shot traversed 
 his decks. 
 
 The night of the 20th passed in anxieties 
 inseparable from a situation dangerous at best, 
 but still more trying to an admiral upon whom, 
 after such a day, night had closed without ena- 
 bling him to see in what case most of his ships 
 were. "In the night," he reports, "we heard 
 many guns of distress fired, but, blowing hard, 
 want of knowledge of the coast, and whether they 
 were fired by a friend or an enemy, prevented all 
 means of relief." In the morning he resumed 
 his activity. Little, however, could be done. 
 The continuing violence of the wind, and igno- 
 
Hawke 143 
 
 ranee of the ground, prevented approach within 
 gun-shot to the ships at the mouth of the Vilaine, 
 while they, by Hghtening and favor of the next 
 flood tide, warped their way inside through the 
 mud flats. 
 
 Hawke remained nearly two months longer, re- 
 turning to England January 17, 1760. He had 
 then been thirty-five weeks on board, without set- 
 ting foot on shore. At the age of fifty-four, and 
 amid such manifold cares, it is not to be wondered 
 at that he should need relief. Rather must he be 
 considered fortunate that his health, never robust 
 in middle life, held firm till his great triumph was 
 achieved. Boscawen succeeded him temporarily 
 in the command. 
 
 He was received in England with acclamations 
 and with honors ; yet the most conspicuous mark 
 of approval conferred on admirals before and after, 
 the grant of the peerage, was not given to him, 
 who had wrought one of the very greatest services 
 ever done for the country. Recent precedent — 
 that of Anson — demanded such recognition ; and 
 popular enthusiasm would have applauded, 
 although the full military merit of the man could 
 scarcely be appreciated by the standards of his 
 generation. That no such reward was bestowed is 
 most probably attributable to Hawke's own indif- 
 ference to self-advancement. If demanded by him, 
 it could scarcely have been refused ; but he never 
 pushed his own interests. His masculine inde- 
 pendence in professional conduct, towards supe- 
 
144 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 riors and inferiors, found its root and its reflection 
 in personal unconcern — as well antecedent as 
 subsequent — about the results from his actions 
 to his fortunes. To do his own part to the 
 utmost, within the lines of the profession he knew, 
 was his conception of duty. As he would not 
 meddle with the land ofificcrs' decision as to what 
 they should or should not do, so he left to the 
 politicians, in w^hose hands the gifts lay, to decide 
 what they would, or should, accord to a success- 
 ful admiral. Pitt, the Great Commoner, left 
 Hawke a commoner. Possibly he recognized 
 that only by stretch of imagination could Hawke 
 be reckoned one of the creations of a great Mini- 
 ster's genius. 
 
 Little remains to tell. On September 3, 
 1762, the admiral's flag was hauled down for the 
 last time. He never w^ent to sea again. In 1766, 
 when Pitt came back to power as Lord Chatham, 
 Hawke became First Lord of the Admiralty, and 
 so remained till 1771. It was a time of unbroken 
 peace, succeeding a period of continuous wars 
 extending over a quarter of a century; conse- 
 quently there was in naval and military matters 
 the lassitude usual to such a period. Hawke is 
 credited with formulating the principle that "the 
 British fleet could only be termed considerable in 
 the proportion it bore to that of the House of 
 Bourbon ; " that is, to the combined navies of 
 France and Spain, over which that House then 
 reigned. The maxim proves that he had some 
 
Hawke 
 
 AS 
 
 claim to statesmanship in his view of affairs out- 
 side his service ; and his manifested freedom from 
 self-seeking is the warrant that no secondary politi- 
 cal motives would divert his efforts from this aim. 
 That he succeeded in the main, that he was not re- 
 sponsible for the fallen condition of the fleet when 
 war again arose in 1778, is evidenced by a state- 
 ment, uncontradicted, in the House of Lords in 
 1779, that when he left office the navy had 139 
 ships-of-the-line, of which 81 were ready for 
 sea. 
 
 In 1765 Hawke, who was then already a full 
 admiral, wearing his flag at the mainmast head, 
 was made Vice- Admiral of Great Britain; an 
 honorary position, but the highest in point of 
 naval distinction that the nation had to give. As 
 one who held it three-quarters of a century later 
 wrote, " It has ever been regarded as the most 
 distinguished compliment belonging to our pro- 
 fession." The coincidence is significant that 
 upon Hawke's death Rodney succeeded him in 
 it; affirming, as it were, the consecutiveness of 
 paramount influence exercised by the two on the 
 development of the Navy. In 1776 the peerage 
 was at last conferred ; seventeen years after his 
 great victory, and when, having passed three score 
 and ten, a man who had ever disdained to ask must 
 have felt the honor barren to himself, though 
 acceptable for his son. 
 
 His last recorded professional utterances are in 
 private letters addressed in the summer of 1 780 
 
146 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 to the commander-in-chief of the Channel Fleet 
 — Francis Geary — who had served with him in 
 the Bay of Biscay, though he missed Ouiberon. 
 He recommends the maintenance of his old 
 station off Brest, and says, " For God's sake, if 
 you should be so lucky as to get sight of the 
 enemy, get as close to them as possible. Do not 
 let them shuffle with you by engaging at a dis- 
 tance, but get within musket shot if you can. 
 This will be the means to make the action deci- 
 sive." In these words we find an unbroken chain 
 of tradition between Hawke and Nelson. One of 
 Hawke's pupils was William Locker; and Locker 
 in turn, just before Hawke's death, had Nelson for 
 a lieutenant. To him Nelson in after years, in 
 the height of his glory, wrote, " To you, my dear 
 friend, I owe much of my success. It was you 
 who taught me, — ' Lay a Frenchman close and 
 you will beat him.' " 
 
 Hawke died October 16, 1781. On his tomb 
 appear these words, " Wherever he sailed, victory 
 attended him." It is much to say, but it is not 
 all. Victory does not always follow desert. " It 
 is not in mortals to command success," — a favor- 
 ite quotation with the successful admirals St. Vin- 
 cent and Nelson. Hawke's great and distinctive 
 glory is this, — that he, more than any one man, 
 was the source and origin of the new life, the new 
 spirit, of his service. There were many brave 
 men before him, as there were after; but it fell to 
 him in a time of great professional prostration 
 
Hawke 147 
 
 not only to lift up and hand on a fallen torch, but 
 in himself to embody an ideal and an inspiration 
 from which others drew, thus rekindling a light 
 which it is scarcely an exaggeration to say had 
 been momentarily extinguished. 
 
RODNEY 
 1719-1792 
 
 UNLIKE Hawke, Rodney drew his descent 
 from the landed gentry of England, and 
 had relatives among the aristocracy. The name 
 was originally Rodcney. We are told by his son- 
 in-law and biographer that the Duke of Chandos, 
 a connection by marriage, obtained the command 
 of the Royal yacht for the admiral's father, Henry 
 Rodney. In one of the trips which George I. 
 frequently made between England and Hanover, 
 he asked his captain if there were anything he 
 could do for him. The reply was a request that 
 he would stand sponsor for his son, who accord- 
 ingly received the name of George ; his second 
 name Brydges coming from the family through 
 which Chandos and the Rodneys were brought 
 into relationship. The social position and sur- 
 roundings resulting from such antecedents con- 
 tributed of course to hasten the young officer's 
 advancement, irrespective of the unquestionable 
 professional merit shown by him, even in early 
 years ; but to them also, combined with narrow 
 personal fortune, inadequate to the tastes thus 
 
George Brydges Rodney, Lord Rodney. 
 
Rodney 149 
 
 engendered, was probably due the pecuniary em- 
 barrassment which dogged him through life, and 
 was perhaps the moving incentive to doubtful 
 procedures that cast a cloud upon his personal 
 and official reputation. 
 
 Rodney was born in February, 1719, and went 
 to sea at the age of thirteen ; serving for seven 
 years in the Channel Fleet. Thence he was 
 transferred to the Mediterranean, where he was 
 made lieutenant in 1739. In 1742 he went again 
 to the Mediterranean with Admiral Mathews, 
 who there gave him command of a " post " ship, 
 with which he brought home the trade, — three 
 hundred merchant vessels, — from Lisbon. Upon 
 arriving in England his appointment by Mathews 
 was "confirmed" by the Admiralty. Being then 
 only twenty-four, he anticipated by five years the 
 age at which Hawke reached the same rank of 
 post-captain, the attainment of which fixed a man's 
 standing in the navy. Beyond that, advancement 
 went by seniority ; a post-captain might be 
 "yellowed," — retired as a rear admiral, — but 
 while in active service he kept the advantage of 
 his early promotion. 
 
 When Rodney was in later years commander- 
 in-chief in the West Indies, he made his son a 
 post-captain at fifteen ; an exercise of official 
 powers which, though not singular to him, is 
 too characteristic of the man and the times to 
 be wholly unmentioned. His own promotion, 
 though rapid, was not too much so for his pro- 
 
150 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 fessional good ; but it is likely that neither that 
 consideration, nor the good of the service, counted 
 for much alongside of the influence he possessed. 
 He appears, however, to have justified from the 
 first the favor of his superiors. His employment 
 was continuous, and in a military point of view 
 he was more fortunate than Hawke was at the 
 same period of his career. Within two years, 
 when in command of a forty-gun ship, he fought 
 and took a French privateer of the same nominal 
 force, and with a crew larger by one hundred 
 than his own. Thence he was advanced into the 
 Eagle, sixty, in which, after some commerce- 
 destroying more lucrative than glorious, he bore 
 an extremely honorable part in Hawke's battle 
 with L'Etenduere, already related. The Eagle 
 was heavily engaged, and was one of the three 
 small ships that on their own initiative pursued 
 and fought, though unsuccessfully, the two es- 
 caping French vessels. Rodney shared Hawke's 
 general encomium, that " as far as fell within my 
 notice, the commanders, their officers, and ships' 
 companies, behaved with the greatest spirit and 
 resolution." Rodney came under his close obser- 
 vation, for, the Eagles " wheel being shot to 
 pieces and all the men at it killed, and all her 
 braces and bowlines gone," she drove twice on 
 board the flag-ship. This was before her pursuit 
 of the two fliers. 
 
 In the subsequent trial of Captain Fox, — the 
 minutes of which the present writer has not seen, 
 
Rodney 151 
 
 — it appears, according to the biographer of 
 Lord Hawke/ that it was Captain Saunders's 
 and Captain Rodney's " sense of being deserted 
 by Fox, and of the two French ships having 
 escaped through his failure of duty, which forms 
 the chief feature of the Court-Martial. Rodney 
 especially describes his being exposed to the fire 
 of four of the enemy's ships, when, as he asserted, 
 Fox's ship might well have taken off some of it." 
 The incident is very noteworthy, for it bears the 
 impress of personal character. Intolerance of 
 dereliction of duty, and uncompromising con- 
 demnation of the delinquent, were ever leading 
 traits in Rodney's course as a commander-in- 
 chief. He stood over his officers with a rod, 
 dealt out criticism unsparingly, and avowed it as 
 his purpose and principle of action so to rule. 
 It is not meant that his censures were unde- 
 served, or even excessive ; but there entered into 
 them no ingredient of pity. His despatches are 
 full of complaints, both general and specific. 
 When he spared, it was from a sense of expe- 
 diency, — or of justice, a trait in which he was by 
 no means deficient; but for human weakness he 
 had no bowels. Hawke complains of but this 
 one captain. Fox, and towards him he seems not 
 to have evinced the strong feeling that animated 
 his juniors. Each man has his special gift, and 
 to succeed must needs act in accordance with it. 
 
 1 Life of Lord Hawke, by Captain Montagu Burrows, Royal Navy, 
 p. 194. 
 
152 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 There are those who lead and those who drive; 
 Hawke belonged to the one class, Rodney to the 
 other. 
 
 In direct consequence of this difference of 
 temperament, it will be found, in contrasting the 
 schools of which Hawke and Rodney are the 
 conspicuous illustrations, that the first represents 
 the spirit, and the second the form, w'hich were 
 the two efficient elements of the progress made 
 during the eighteenth century. The one intro- 
 duces into a service arrested in development, 
 petrified almost, by blindly accepted rules and 
 unintelligent traditions, a new impulse, which 
 transforms men from within, breaking through 
 the letter of the law in order to realize its for- 
 gotten intent ; the other gives to the spirit, thus 
 freed from old limitations, a fresh and sagacious 
 direction, but needs nevertheless to impose its 
 own methods by constraint from without. It is 
 the old struggle, ever renewed, between liberty 
 and law; in the due, but difficult, combination of 
 which consist both conservation and progress. 
 
 And so in the personality of the two great 
 admirals who respectively represent these con- 
 trasting schools of practice ; while we find in 
 both these two elements, as they must exist in 
 every efficient officer, yet it is to be said that the 
 one inspires and leads, the other moulds and com- 
 pels. The one, though seemingly reserved, is in 
 character sympathetic, and influences by example 
 chiefly ; the other, austerely courteous, is towards 
 
Rodney 153 
 
 associates distant and ungenial, working by fear 
 rather than by love. For these broad reasons of 
 distinction it is Mathews's battle that best meas- 
 ures the reaction of which Hawke is the type, 
 for there was especially illustrated defect of spirit, 
 to cover which the letter of the law was invoked ; 
 whereas in Byng's action, extremely bad form, in 
 the attempt to conform to the letter of the Instruc- 
 tions, emphasizes the contrast with Rodney's 
 methods, precise and formal unquestionably, but 
 in which form ceases to be an end in itself and 
 is reduced to its proper function as the means 
 to carry into effect a sound military conception. 
 Of these two factors in the century's progress, it 
 needs hardly to be said that the one contributed 
 by Hawke is the greater. In spirit and in achieve- 
 ment he, rather than Rodney, is the harbinger of 
 Nelson. 
 
 A short time after the action with L'Etenduere 
 the cruise of the Eas^le came to an end. When 
 she was paid off Rodney was presented at Court 
 by Anson, the First Lord of the Admiralty; a 
 merited and not unusual honor after distinguished 
 service in battle. The King was struck by his 
 youthful appearance, and said he had not known 
 there was so young a captain in the Navy. As 
 he was then nearly thirty, and had seen much 
 and continuous service, it is singular that his 
 face should not have borne clear traces of the 
 facts. Anson replied that he had been a captain 
 for six years, and it was to be wished that His 
 
154 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 Majesty had a hundred more as good as he. 
 Making allowance for courtly manners and fair- 
 speaking, the incident may be accepted as show- 
 ing, not only that aptitude for the service which 
 takes its hardships without undue wear and 
 tear, but also an official reputation already well 
 established and recognized. 
 
 Professional standing, therefore, as well as 
 family influence, probably contributed to obtain 
 for him in 1749 the appointment of Commodore 
 and Commander-in-chief on the Newfoundland 
 station; for he was still junior on the list of 
 captains, and had ten years more to run before 
 obtaining his admiral's flag. He remained in 
 this post from 1749 to 1752. They were years 
 of peace, but of peace charged full with the ele- 
 ments of discord which led to the following war. 
 Canada was still French, and the territorial limits 
 between the North American possessions of the 
 two nations remained a subject of dispute and 
 intrigue. The uncertain state of political rela- 
 tions around the Gulf of St. Lawrence added to 
 the responsibility of Rodney's duty, and empha- 
 sized the confidence shown in assigning him a 
 position involving cautious political action. 
 
 Explicit confirmation of this indirect testimony 
 is found in a private letter to him from the Earl 
 of Sandwich, who had succeeded Anson as First 
 Lord in 1748. "I think it necessary to inform 
 you that, if the Governor of Nova Scotia should 
 have occasion to apply to you for succor, and 
 
Rodney 155 
 
 send to you for that purpose to Newfoundland, it 
 would be approved by Government if you should 
 comply with his request. It is judged improper, 
 as yet, to send any public order upon a business 
 of so delicate a nature, which is the reason of my 
 writing to you in this manner; and I am satisfied 
 that your prudence is such as will not suffer you 
 to make any injudicious use of the information 
 you now receive. There are some people that 
 cannot be trusted with any but public orders, but 
 I shall think this important affair entirely safe 
 under your management and secrecy." Lan- 
 guage such as this undoubtedly often covers a 
 hint, as well as expresses a compliment, and may 
 have done so in this instance ; nevertheless, in 
 after life it is certain that Rodney gave proof of a 
 very high order of professional discretion and of 
 independent initiative. It is therefore perfectly 
 reasonable to suppose that he had thus early 
 convinced the Government that he was a man 
 competent and trustworthy under critical condi- 
 tions, such as then characterized the intercolonial 
 relations of the two states. The particular inci- 
 dent is farther noteworthy in connection with the 
 backwardness, and even reluctance, of the Gov- 
 ernment to employ him in the War of the Amer- 
 ican Revolution, though Sandwich was again First 
 Lord, and Rodney a strong political supporter of 
 the party in power. The precise cause for this 
 is probably not ascertainable ; but it is a matter 
 of perfectly reasonable inference that the early 
 
156 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 promise of the young officer had meanwhile 
 become overclouded, that distrust had succeeded 
 to confidence, for reasons professional, but not 
 strictly military. Rodney's war record continued 
 excellent from first to last; one not good only, 
 but of exceptional and singular efficiency. 
 
 In October, 1752, Rodney returned to England, 
 having been elected to Parliament. The Seven 
 Years War, which, after two years of irregular 
 hostilities, began formally in 1756, found him still 
 a captain. With its most conspicuous opening 
 incident, the attempted relief of Minorca, and 
 the subsequent trial and execution of the 
 unsuccessful commander. Admiral Byng, he had 
 no connection, personal or official ; nor was he a 
 member of the Court- Martial, although he seems 
 to have been in England at the time, and was 
 senior to at least one of the sitting captains. 
 The abortive naval engagement off Port Mahon, 
 however, stands in a directly significant relation 
 to his career, for it exemplifies to the most exag- 
 gerated degree, alike in the purpose of the admiral 
 and the finding of the Court, the formal and 
 pedantic conception of a correctly fought fleet 
 action, according to the rules and regulations "in 
 such cases prescribed " by the Fighting Instruc- 
 tions.^ It was Rodney's lot to break with this 
 tradition, and to be the first to illustrate juster 
 ideas in a fairly ranged battle, where the enemy 
 awaited attack, as he had done at Malaga in 1704, 
 
 * For account and analysis of Byng's action, see ante, pp. 47-67. 
 
Rodney 157 
 
 and at Minorca in 1756. Precisely such an op- 
 portunity never came to Havvke; for, although 
 L'Etenduere waited, he did so under conditions 
 and dispositions which gave the ensuing affair 
 a nearer analogy to a general chase than to a 
 pitched battle. Though the British approach 
 then was in a general sense parallel to the 
 enemy's line, it was from the rear, not from the 
 beam; and through this circumstance of overtak- 
 ing, and from the method adopted, their vessels 
 came under fire in succession, not together. 
 This was perfectly correct, the course pre-emi- 
 nently suited to the emergency, and therefore 
 tactically most sound ; but the conditions were 
 not those contemplated by the Fighting Instruc- 
 tions, as they were in the case of Byng, and also 
 in the battle most thoroughly characteristic of 
 Rodney — that of April 17, 1780. The contrast 
 in conduct between the two commanders is strik- 
 ingly significant of progress, because of the close 
 approach to identity in circumstances. 
 
 Rodney accompanied the Rochefort expedition 
 of 1757, under Hawke, some account of which is 
 given in the life of that admiral ; and he com- 
 manded also a ship-of-the-line in Boscawen's fleet 
 in 1758, when the reduction of Louisburg and 
 Cape Breton Island was effected by the combined 
 British and colonial forces. After this important 
 service, the necessary and effectual antecedent of 
 the capture of Quebec and the fall of Canada in 
 the following year, he returned to England, where 
 
158 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 on the 19th of May, 1759, he was promoted to 
 Rear Admiral ; being then forty. He was next, 
 and without interval of rest, given command of a 
 squadron to operate against Havre, where were 
 gathering boats and munitions of war for the 
 threatened invasion of England ; with the charge 
 also of suppressing the French coastwise sailings, 
 upon which depended the assembling of the vari- 
 ous bodies of transports, and the carriage of sup- 
 plies to the fleet in Brest, that Hawke at the 
 same time was holding in check. The service 
 was important, but of secondary interest, and 
 calls for no particular mention beyond that of .its 
 general efficiency as maintained by him. 
 
 In 1 761, Rodney w^as again elected to Parlia- 
 ment, and, with a certain political inconsequence, 
 was immediately afterwards sent out of the coun- 
 try, being appointed to the Leeward Islands 
 Station, which embraced the smaller Antilles, on 
 the eastern side of the Caribbean Sea, with head- 
 quarters at Barbados; Jamaica, to the westward, 
 forming a distinct command under an admiral of 
 its own. He sailed for his new post October 21, 
 1761, taking with him instructions to begin opera- 
 tions against Martinique upon the arrival of troops 
 ordered from New York. These reached Bar- 
 bados December 24th, a month after himself, and 
 on the 7th of January, 1762, the combined forces 
 were before Martinique, which after a month of 
 regular operations passed into the possession of 
 the British on the i6th of February. Its fall was 
 
Rodney 159 
 
 followed shortly by that of the other French Les- 
 ser Antilles, — Grenada, Santa Lucia, and St. 
 Vincent. Guadaloupe had been taken in 1759, 
 and Dominica in June, 1761. 
 
 Up to this time the contest on the seas had 
 been between Great Britain and France only ; 
 but on March 5th a frigate reached Rodney 
 with instructions, then already nine weeks old, 
 to begin hostilities against Spain, whose clearly 
 inimical purpose had induced the British Gov- 
 ernment to anticipate her action, by declaring 
 war. The same day another vessel came in with 
 like orders from the admiral at Gibraltar, while 
 a third from before Brest brought word that a 
 French squadron of seven ships-of-the-line, with 
 frigates and two thousand troops, had escaped 
 from that port at the end of the year. With 
 these circumstances before him Rodney's con- 
 duct was like himself ; prompt and ofHcerlike. 
 Lookout ships were stationed along the length 
 of the Caribbees, to windward, to bring timely 
 intelligence of the approach of the enemy's 
 squadron ; and as its first destination was prob- 
 ably Martinique, the fall of which was not yet 
 known in Europe, he concentrated his fleet 
 there, calling in outlying detachments. 
 
 So far there was nothing in his course mark- 
 edly different from that of any capable officer, 
 dealing with well ascertained conditions within 
 the limits of his own command. Occasion soon 
 arose, however, to require more exceptional ac- 
 
i6o Types of Naval Officers 
 
 tion, and thus to illustrate at once the breadth of 
 view, and the readiness to assume responsibility, 
 which already raised Rodney conspicuously above 
 the average level. On the 9th of March two 
 lookout vessels came in with news that they had 
 sighted a fleet, corresponding in numbers to the 
 Brest division, fifteen miles to windward of Mar- 
 tinique and standing to the southward ; the trade 
 wind making it generally expedient to round the 
 south point of the island in order to reach the 
 principal port on the west side, — Fort Royal. 
 The British squadron at once weighed anchor in 
 pursuit ; but the enemy, having ascertained that 
 the surrender was accomplished, had turned back 
 north, and were soon after reported from Guada- 
 loupe as having passed there, standing to the 
 westward. 
 
 Rodney at once inferred that they must be 
 gone to Santo Domingo. To follow with the 
 object of intercepting them was hopeless, in view 
 of the start they had ; but the direction taken 
 threatened Jamaica, the exposed condition of 
 which, owing to inadequate force, had been com- 
 municated to him by the military and naval 
 authorities there. His measures to meet the 
 case were thorough and deliberate, as well as 
 rapid ; no time was lost either by hesitancy or 
 delay, nor by the yet more facile error of too 
 precipitate movement. Orders for concentration 
 were already out, but the point on which to ef- 
 fect it was shifted to Antigua, where, although 
 
Rodney i6i 
 
 inferior in natural resources to Martinique, the 
 established British naval station with its accu- 
 mulated equipment was fixed ; and the work of 
 provisioning and watering, so as to permit long 
 continuance at sea unhampered by necessity of 
 replenishing, there went on apace. It was the 
 admiral's intention to leave his own command to 
 look out for itself, while he took away the mass 
 of his fleet to protect national interests elsewhere 
 threatened. 
 
 Such a decision may seem superficially a com- 
 monplace matter of course ; that it was much 
 more is a commonplace historical certainty. The 
 merit of Rodney's action appears not only in the 
 details of execution, but in its being undertaken 
 at all ; and in this case, as in a later instance in 
 his career, his resolution received the concrete 
 emphasis that a sharp and immediate contrast 
 best affords. Prior to the enemy's arrival he had 
 laid the conditions before his colleague in service, 
 General Moncton, commanding the forces on 
 shore, and asked a reinforcement of troops for 
 destitute Jamaica, if necessity arose. The result 
 is best told in his own words ; for they convey, 
 simply and without egotistic enlargement, that 
 settled personal characteristic, the want of which 
 Jervis and Nelson in their day noted in many, 
 and which Rodney markedly possessed. This 
 was the capacity, which Sandwich eighteen years 
 later styled " taking the great line of considering 
 the King's whole dominions under your care ; " 
 
1 62 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 an attribute far from common, as Moncton's 
 reply showed. " I acquainted him that I should 
 certainly assist them with all the naval force that 
 could possibly be spared from the immediate pro- 
 tection of His Majesty's Caribbec islands. I have 
 again solicited the General for a body of troops, 
 since the enemy left these seas, and must do him 
 the justice to say, that he seems much concerned 
 at the present distress of Jamaica, but does not 
 think himself sufficiently authorized to detach a 
 body of troops without orders from England. I 
 flatter myself their Lordships will not be dis- 
 pleased with me if I take the liberty to construe 
 my instructions in such a manner as to think 
 myself authorized a7id obliged to succor any of 
 His Majesty's colonies that may be in danger; 
 and shall, therefore, without a moment's loss of 
 time, hasten to the succor of Jamaica, with ten 
 sail-of-the-line, three frigates and three bombs. " ^ 
 
 It was not because, in so doing this, the obliga- 
 tion was absolute, and the authority indisputable, 
 that Rodney's course was professionally merito- 
 rious. In such case his action would have risen 
 little above that obedience to orders, in which, as 
 Nelson said, the generality find " all perfection." 
 The risk was real, not only to his station, but 
 to the possible plans of his superiors at home; 
 the authority was his own only, read by himself 
 into his orders — at most their spirit, not their 
 letter. Consequently, he took grave chance of 
 
 * The italics are the author's. 
 
Rodney ^^3 
 
 the penalty -loss of reputation, if not positive 
 punishment, - which, as military experience 
 shows, almost invariably follows independent 
 action unless results are kind enough to justify 
 it It is, however, only the positive characters 
 capable of rising to such measures that achieve 
 reputations enduring beyond their own day 1 he 
 incident needs to be coupled with Sandwich s 
 compliment just quoted, as well as with the one 
 paid him when on the Newfoundland command. 
 Taken together, they avouch a personality that 
 needs only opportunity to insure itself lasting 
 
 ^Ts it happened, Rodney not only took the re- 
 sponsibility of stripping his own station to the 
 vero-e of bareness in favor of the general interest, 
 but^'in so doing he came very near traversing, 
 unwittingly, the plans of the general government 
 by his local action, laudable and proper as that 
 certainly was. He was, however, professionally 
 lucky to a proverb, and escaped this mischance 
 by a hair's breadth. The purposed detachment 
 had already started for Jamaica, and he was ac- 
 companying it in person, when there joined him 
 on March 25th, off the island of St. Kitt s, not 
 far from Antigua, a frigate bearing Admiralty 
 despatches of February 5th. These required him 
 to desist from any enterprises he might have in 
 hand, in order to give his undivided attention to 
 the local preparations for an expedition, as yet 
 secret, which was shortly to arrive on his station, 
 
164 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 under the command of Admiral Pocock, with 
 ultimate destination against Havana. 
 
 To be thus arrested at the very outset of a 
 movement from which he naturally expected dis- 
 tinction was a bitter disappointment to Rodney. 
 Several years later, in 1771, he wrote to Sand- 
 wich, who was not the First Lord when Pocock 
 was sent out, " I had the misfortune of being su- 
 perseded in the command of a successful fleet, 
 entrusted to my care in the West Indies, at the 
 very time I had sailed on another expedition 
 against the enemy's squadron at Santo Domingo, 
 and was thereby deprived of pursuing those con- 
 quests which so honorably attended upon another, 
 and which secured him such great emoluments," 
 — for Havana proved a wealthy prize. His 
 steps, however, upon this unexpected reversal of 
 his plans, were again characterized by an immedi- 
 ateness, most honorable to his professional char- 
 acter, which showed how thoroughly familiar he 
 was with the whole subject and its possible con- 
 tingencies, and the consequent readiness of his 
 mind to meet each occasion as it arose ; marks, 
 all, of the thoroughly equipped general officer. 
 The order as to his personal movements being 
 not discretional, was of course absolutely ac- 
 cepted ; but his other measures were apparently 
 his own, and were instantaneous. A vessel was 
 at once sent off to Barbados to notify Admiral 
 Pocock that the best place in the West Indies for 
 his rendezvous was Fort Royal Bay, in the newly 
 
Rodney 165 
 
 acquired Martinique. The ten sail-of-the-line, ac- 
 companied by two large transports from St. Kitt's, 
 were then sent on to Jamaica to move troops 
 from there to join Pocock ; the command of the 
 detachment being now entrusted to Sir James 
 Douglas, who received the further instruction 
 to send back his fastest frigate, with all the 
 intelligence he could gather, directing her to 
 keep in the track Pocock would follow, in order 
 to meet him betimes. The frigate thus sent, 
 having first made a running survey of the unfre- 
 quented passage north of Cuba, by which the 
 expedition was to proceed, joined Pocock, and, by 
 the latter's report, acted as pilot for the fleet. 
 " Having taken sketches of the land and cayos 
 on both sides. Captain Elphinstone kept ahead 
 of the fleet, and led us through very well." This 
 service is claimed to the credit of Rodney's fore- 
 sight by his biographer. This may very well be, 
 though more particular inquiry and demonstration 
 by his letters would be necessary to establish 
 specific orders beyond the general instructions 
 given by him. It is, however, safe to say that 
 such particularity and minuteness of detail would 
 be entirely in keeping with the tenor of his course 
 at this period. His correspondence bears the 
 stamp of a mind comprehensive as well as exact ; 
 grasping all matters with breadth of view in their 
 mutual relations, yet with the details at his fingers' 
 ends. The certainty of his touch is as obvious as 
 the activity of his thought. 
 
1 66 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 In accordance with the spirit of his instructions, 
 Rodney went in person to Martinique, the spot 
 named by him as best for the rendezvous, there 
 to superintend the preparations ; to sow the seed 
 for a harvest in which he was to have no share. 
 Incidental mention reveals that the sendinor of 
 the ships-of-the-line with Douglas had reduced 
 him to three for his own command ; and also that 
 Moncton, having now superior authority to do so, 
 found himself able to spare troops for Jamaica, 
 which were afioat in transports by the time 
 Pocock came. In the same letter the admiral 
 frankly admits his anxiety for his station, under 
 the circumstances of the big detachment he had 
 made ; a significant avowal, which enhances the 
 merit of his spontaneous action by all the credit 
 due to one who endures a well-weighed danger 
 for an adequate end. 
 
 The despatch of Pocock's expedition, which re- 
 sulted in the fall of Havana, August 13, 1762, 
 practically terminated Rodney's active service in 
 the Seven Years War. In a career marked by 
 unusual professional good fortune in many ways, 
 the one singular mischance was that he reached 
 a foremost position too late in life. When he 
 returned to England in August, 1763, he was in 
 his full prime, and his conduct of affairs entrusted 
 to him had given clear assurance of capacity for 
 great things. The same evidence is to be found 
 in his letters, which, as studies of official character 
 and competency, repay a close perusal. But now 
 
Rodney 167 
 
 fifteen years of peace were to elapse before a 
 maritime war again broke out, and the fifteen 
 years between forty-five and sixty tell sorely 
 upon the physical stamina which need to under- 
 lie the mental and moral forces of a great com- 
 mander. St, Vincent himself staggered under 
 the load, and Rodney was not a St. Vincent in 
 in the stern self-discipline that had braced the 
 latter for old age. He had not borne the yoke in 
 his youth, and from this time forward he fought 
 a losing fight with money troubles, which his 
 self-controlled contemporary, after one bitter ex- 
 perience, had shaken off his shoulders forever. 
 
 The externals of Rodney's career during the 
 period now in question are sufficiently known ; 
 of his strictly private life we are left largely to 
 infer from indications, not wholly happ3\ He 
 returned to England a Vice-Admiral of the Blue, 
 and had advanced by the successive grades of 
 that rank to Vice-Admiral of the Red, when, in 
 January, 1771, he was appointed Commander-in- 
 chief at Jamaica. At this time he had been for 
 five years Governor of Greenwich Hospital, and 
 he took it hard that he was not allowed to retain 
 the appointment in connection with his new com- 
 mand, alleging precedents for such a favor; the 
 latest of which, however, was then twenty-five 
 years old. The application was denied by Sand- 
 wich. From the earnest tone in which it was 
 couched, as well as the comparatively weak 
 grounds upon which Rodney bases his claims 
 
1 68 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 to such a recognition, it can scarcely be doubted 
 that pecuniary embarrassment as well as mortifica- 
 tion entered into his sense of disappointment. It 
 is the first recorded of a series of jars between 
 the two, in which, although the external forms of 
 courtesy were diligently observed, an underlying 
 estrangement is evident. 
 
 The Jamaica Station at that day required, in 
 an even greater degree than Newfoundland be- 
 fore the conquest of Canada, a high order of 
 political tact and circumspection on the part of 
 the naval commander-in-chief. The island lies in 
 the centre of what was then a vast semi-circulztr 
 sweep of Spanish colonies — Porto Rico, Santo 
 Domingo, Cuba, Mexico, Central America, and the 
 mainland of South America from the Isthmus to 
 the Orinoco. Over this subject empire the mother 
 country maintained commercial regulations of 
 the most mediaeval and exclusive type ; outrag- 
 ing impartially the British spirit of commercial 
 enterprise, and the daily needs of her own colo- 
 nists, by the restrictions placed upon intercourse 
 between these and foreiofners. SmusfSflinc: on a 
 large scale, consecrated in the practice of both 
 parties by a century of tradition, was met by a 
 coast-guard system, employing numerous small 
 vessels called guarda-costas, which girt the Span- 
 ish coasts, but, being powerless to repress effect- 
 ually over so extensive a shore line, served rather 
 to increase causes of vexation. The British gov- 
 ernment, on the other hand, not satisfied to leave 
 
Rodney 169 
 
 the illicit trade on which Jamaica throve to take 
 care of itself, sought to increase the scope of 
 transactions by the institution of three free ports 
 on the island, — free in the sense of being open as 
 depots, not for the entrance of goods, but where 
 they could be freely brought, and transshipped 
 to other parts of the world by vessels of all na- 
 tions ; broker ports, in short, for the facilitation 
 of general external trade. 
 
 To this open and ingenuous bid for fuller ad- 
 vantage by Spanish resort, Spain replied by 
 doubling her custom-house forces and introduc- 
 ing renewed stringency into her commercial 
 orders. The two nations, with France in Hayti 
 for a third, stood on ceaseless guard one against 
 the other ; all imbued with the spirit of exclusive 
 trade, and differing only in the method of appli- 
 cation, according to their respective day-to-day 
 views of policy. The British by the free-port 
 system, instituted in their central geographical 
 position, hoped to make the profits of the middle- 
 man. Rodney reported that the effect had been 
 notably to discourage the direct Spanish inter- 
 course, and to destroy carriage by British colonial 
 vessels in favor of those of France, which now 
 flocked to Jamaica, smuggled goods into the 
 island, and apparently cut under their rivals by 
 the greater benevolence shown them in Spanish 
 ports. " Commerce by British bottoms has to- 
 tally ceased." Herewith, he added, disappeared 
 the opportunities of British seamen to become 
 
lyo Types of Naval Officers 
 
 familiar with the Spanish and French waters, 
 while their rivals were invited to frequent those 
 of Jamaica; so that in case of war — which in 
 those days was periodical — the advantage of 
 pilotage would be heavily on the side of Great 
 Britain's enemies. He also stated that the dim- 
 inution of employment to British merchant 
 vessels had greatly impaired his means of obtain- 
 ing information from within Spanish ports; for 
 British ships of war were never allowed inside 
 them, even when sent with a message from him. 
 The French permitted them indeed to enter, but 
 surrounded them throughout their visits with 
 flattering attentions which wholly prevented the 
 making of observations. 
 
 Under these conditions of mutual jealousy be- 
 tween the governments and officials, with the 
 subjects on either side straining continually at 
 the leashes which withheld them from traffic mu- 
 tually beneficial, causes of offence were quick to 
 arise. Rodney, like Sandwich, was a pronounced 
 Tory, in full sympathy with traditional British 
 policy, as well as an officer naturally of haughty 
 temper and sharing all the prepossessions of his 
 service; but he found himself almost at once in- 
 volved in a difference with his superiors in his 
 political party, which throws a good deal of side 
 light on personal as well as political relations. 
 The British man-of-war schooner Hazuke was 
 overhauled off the Venezuelan coast by two 
 Spanish guarda-costas and compelled to enter the 
 
Rodney 171 
 
 harbor of Cartagena, under alleged orders from 
 the Governor of the colony. After a brief deten- 
 tion, she was let go with the admonition that, if 
 any British ships of war were found again within 
 twelve leagues of the coast, they would be taken 
 and their crews imprisoned. 
 
 Rodney's course was unimpeachable, as far as 
 appears. He wrote a civil letter to the Governor, 
 and sent it by a ship of war, the captain of which 
 was directed to deliver it in person. He was 
 confident, he wrote, that the Governor would dis- 
 avow the action by calling to strict account the 
 officers concerned, and would also confirm his 
 own belief that it was impossible such a menace 
 could have proceeded from any adequate author- 
 ity. A sufficient intimation of what would follow 
 an attempt to carry out the threat was conveyed 
 by the words : " The British officer who has dis- 
 honoured his King's colours by a tame submis- 
 sion to this insult has been already dismissed the 
 service." 
 
 It is difficult to see what less could have been 
 done; but the British government was at the 
 moment extremely reluctant to war, and sensitive 
 to any step that seemed to make towards it. 
 Spain was thought to be seeking a quarrel. She 
 had entered the Seven Years War so near its 
 termination as not to feel exhaustive effects ; and 
 the capture of Havana and Manila, with the pe- 
 cuniary losses involved, had left her merely em- 
 bittered by humiliation, prone rather to renew 
 
172 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 hostilities than to profit by experience. At the 
 same time the foreign policy of Great Britain was 
 enfeebled by a succession of short ministries, and 
 by internal commotions ; while the discontent of 
 the American continental colonies over the 
 Stamp Act emphasized the weakness of her gen- 
 eral position. Barely a year before the Hazoke 
 incident the insult by Spain at the Falkland 
 Islands had brought the two nations to the verge 
 of rupture, which was believed to have been 
 averted only by the refusal of Louis XV., then 
 advanced in years, to support the Spanish Bour- 
 bons at the cost of another war. 
 
 Under these circumstances Rodney's report of 
 the occurrences at Cartagena filled the ministry 
 with apprehensions, and brought him from Sand- 
 wich an expression of dissatisfaction little removed 
 from a reprimand. The communication is remark- 
 able rather for what it intimates, and from the in- 
 ferences naturally deducible, than for its direct 
 utterances. " I cannot help cautioning you, as a 
 friend, to be upon your guard, to avoid by every 
 justifiable means the drawing this country into a 
 war, which, if it comes on too speedily, I fear we 
 shall have cause to lament." The warning is re- 
 newed in a later part of the letter, but in itself 
 has little significance compared with other hints, 
 rather personal than official. " I cannot conceal 
 from you, that many people have industriously 
 spread stories here, that, among the foreign min- 
 isters and others, you have expressed your wishes 
 
Rodney 173 
 
 for a Spanish war." Such expressions — if used 
 — were asserted of the time succeeding his ap- 
 pointment to Jamaica, and near his departure for 
 it ; for Sandwich adds, " This sort of declaration 
 is too Httle founded on your instructions, and too 
 indiscreet, to allow me to give them the least 
 credit." It is clear, however, that he thought 
 them not improbable, — a Spanish war was pop- 
 ular with seamen for the prize-money it brought, 
 and Rodney was poor, — for he adds, " I shall dis- 
 credit the idea till I have received your answer 
 to this letter." He concludes with a warning, not 
 to be misunderstood, that a war, so far from help- 
 ing Rodney, would probably cause his superses- 
 sion. " I will add one word more: Upon a dec- 
 laration of war larger squadrons must be sent out, 
 and, very probably, senior officers to most of our 
 stations in foreign parts." In face of an intima- 
 tion thus thinly veiled, one scarcely needs to be 
 told what was being said round the table of the 
 Cabinet. 
 
 That Rodney would have welcomed war for 
 reasons personal as well as professional, for 
 money and for glory, can readily be believed ; but 
 his measures in this case give no ground for such 
 an innuendo as Sandwich conveyed. Therefore, 
 after making full allowance for the panic of minis- 
 ters ready to fear the worst, and to throw blame on 
 anybody, it is the more significant that he should 
 have been suspected of an unworthy personal 
 motive underlying a worthy official act. It is an 
 
174 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 indication of reputation already compromised by 
 damaging association with pecuniary embarrass- 
 ments ; an evidence of latent distrust easily 
 quickened into active suspicion. An officer of 
 his rank and service, so far from home, and with 
 the precedents of his day, could scarcely be faulted 
 for what he had done to uphold the honor of the 
 country; and his manner of doing it was digni- 
 fied and self-restrained, as well as forcible. There 
 was no violence like that of Hawke at Gibraltar, 
 less than twenty years before, which that admiral 
 had boldly vindicated to Pitt himself ; but there 
 were no weak joints in Hawke's armor. In the 
 particular instance, time and cooler judgment set 
 Rodney right in men's opinion ; but subsequent 
 events showed that his general reputation did 
 not recover, either then, or through his Jamaica 
 career. 
 
 After immediate apprehension had subsided, 
 Rodney's action was justified by the government. 
 Sandwich wrote him, a little later, that no com- 
 mander-in-chief stood upon a better footing, and 
 assured him that his private interests were safe 
 in his hands. Sandwich, however, was an ex- 
 tremely practical politician, who had much per- 
 sonal use for his own patronage ; and Rodney's 
 necessities were great. Fulfilment therefore fell 
 far short of promise. Employment was neces- 
 sary to the admiral, and his hopes fixed upon a 
 colonial governorship when his present appoint- 
 ment should expire ; Jamaica being his first choice. 
 
Rodney 175 
 
 Sandwich renewed assurances, but advised a 
 personal application also to the Prime Minister 
 and other Cabinet officers. New York was men- 
 tioned, but nothing came of it all. After three 
 years Rodney was superseded, with permission 
 to remain in the island instead of returninc: to 
 England. This he declined. " I cannot bear to 
 think of remaining here in a private station, after 
 commanding in chief with the approbation of the 
 whole island." How far this approbation was 
 universal, or unqualified, is perhaps doubtful ; but 
 the letters quoted by his biographer from his cor- 
 respondence bear continuous evidence, in this 
 peace employment, of the activity and perspi- 
 cacity of mind characteristic of his more strictly 
 military proceedings. 
 
 In September, 1774, Rodney landed again in 
 England, a disappointed man and in embar- 
 rassed circumstances. Professional occupation 
 was almost hopeless, for in peace times there 
 were few positions for an officer of his rank ; 
 and, although recognized for able, he had not 
 then the distinction by which he is known to us. 
 It is also evident, from subsequent events, that he 
 just now lacked the influence necessary to obtain 
 a preference over rivals in quest of employment. 
 Under the circumstances, his debts determined 
 his action, and to escape harassments he before 
 long passed over into France and settled in 
 Paris. In that capital, as in London, he mixed 
 with the best society ; and there, as before, the 
 
1-6 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 mode of life among his associates led him beyond 
 his means and involved him in further distresses. 
 Consequently, when war between France and 
 Great Britain became imminent, in 1778, the 
 vigilance of his creditors prevented his going 
 home in person to offer his services. In Feb- 
 ruary of that year, however, he made formal 
 application to the Admiralty to be sent at a 
 moments warning on any enterprise. To this 
 Sandwich, who was still First Lord, despite his 
 previous assurances of friendship, paid no atten- 
 tion beyond the formal customary acknowledg- 
 ment given to all such letters when they came 
 from officers of Rodney's standing. No indica- 
 tion was shown of intention, or even of wish, 
 to employ him. 
 
 Rodney was therefore compelled to look on 
 idly while others, of well-earned reputation indeed 
 but as yet of less experience than himself 
 in high command, were preferred before him. 
 Howe had already been sent to North America 
 in 1776, on a mission at once diplomatic and mil- 
 itary ; and there he still was when war began. 
 As it became imminent, Keppel was appointed 
 to the Channel Fleet, and Byron to the North 
 American command, from which Howe had 
 asked to be relieved. All these were junior to 
 Rodney ; and, as though to emphasize the neglect 
 of him, rear-admirals were sent to the two West 
 India stations, Jamaica and the Leeward Islands, 
 which he had formerly commanded, and to which 
 
Rodney 177 
 
 it would seem, from one of his letters, that he 
 desired to return. He had, too, now reached the 
 rank, the want of which had formed the burden 
 of Sandwich's warning that he was in danger of 
 supersession at Jamaica ; for in a general flag 
 promotion in January, 1778, he had become 
 Admiral of the White Squadron, than which no 
 higher then obtained, commissions as Admirals 
 of the Red not being issued. For this persistent 
 ignoring of an officer of his unquestionable ability 
 there were necessarily reasons more controlling 
 than appears on the surface ; for the naval con- 
 ditions and the national emergency called for 
 men of demonstrated high capacity. Such Rod- 
 ney was professionally ; and although his age 
 — he was now in his sixtieth year — was against 
 him, this consideration did not in those days 
 weigh ; nor should it, unless accompanied by 
 probable indication of powers sapped. 
 
 The conclusion is inevitable that the objection 
 lay in personal record as bearing upon military 
 efficiency. The Administration, responsible for 
 results, knew Rodney's capacity, though its full 
 extent was yet to be revealed ; the question in 
 their minds clearly must have been, " Can we de- 
 pend upon its exertion, full, sustained, and disin- 
 terested.'' " Sandwich, despite the coldness with 
 which he had received Rodney's application, — 
 going so far as to refuse to support it actively, — 
 was apparently in a minority among his colleagues 
 in believing that they could. He declared in the 
 
lyS Types of Naval Officers 
 
 House of Lords that, " When it was first pro- 
 posed in the Council to employ Sir George, I, 
 who knew him from a very young man, declared 
 that Rodney 07ice afloat would do his duty." 
 Naval officers will recognize a familiar ring in 
 these words, and will recall instances where high 
 professional ability has been betrayed by personal 
 foible. Nor does Sandwich stand alone in offer- 
 ing a clue to the hesitation of the Government. 
 Rodney's biographer and son-in-law quotes with- 
 out reprobation the account of Mr. Richard Cum- 
 berland, who professed to have interested himself 
 warmly for Rodney's employment and to have 
 secured the support of the Secretary for War, 
 Lord George Germaine. " The West India mer- 
 chants had been alarmed, and clamoured against 
 the appointment so generally and so decidedly as 
 to occasion no small uneasiness in my friend and 
 patron. Lord George, and drew from him some- 
 thing that resembled a remonstrance for the risk 
 I had exposed him to. But in the brilliancy of 
 the capture of Langara's squadron all was done 
 away, and past alarms were only recollected to 
 contrast the joy which this success diffused." 
 The opposition of the commercial class in the 
 West Indies might arise from an officer's over- 
 faithfulness to duty, as Nelson found to his cost; 
 but it seems clear that in this case distrust rested 
 upon personal observation, which raised doubts as 
 to the singlemindedness of Rodney's administra- 
 tion of a command. Of the particulars of obser- 
 
Rodney 179 
 
 vation or experience from which the feeling 
 sprang, we have no information ; but St. Eus- 
 tatius was destined to show that apprehension 
 was not wholly unfounded. 
 
 A summons to active employment would at 
 once have silenced Rodney's creditors by the as- 
 surance of increase of means, both through regu- 
 lar income and probable prize-money ; Admiralty 
 neglect left him in fetters. Lady Rodney re- 
 turned to England to negotiate the means for 
 his liberation ; but the matter dragged, and in 
 the end he owed his release to the friendly inter- 
 vention of a French nobleman, the Marechal 
 Biron, who volunteered in warm terms to make 
 him an advance to the amount of ^2,000. This 
 chivalrous offer was for some time declined ; but 
 finally conditions became so threatening, and 
 his position so intolerable, that he accepted a 
 loan of about a thousand louis. " Nothing but 
 a total inattention to the distressed state I was 
 in," he wrote to his wife, " could have prevailed 
 upon me to have availed myself of his voluntary 
 proposal ; but not having had, for a month past, 
 a letter from any person but Mr. Hotham and 
 yourself, and my passport being expired, it was 
 impossible for me to remain in this city at the 
 risk of being sued by my creditors, who grew so 
 clamorous it was impossible to bear it ; and had 
 they not been overawed by the Lieutenant of po- 
 lice, would have carried their prosecutions to the 
 greatest length. Their demands were all satis- 
 
i8o Types of Naval Officers 
 
 fied this day," — May 6th, 177S. Friends in 
 England enabled him to repay Biron immediately 
 after his return. 
 
 This benevolent interference on behalf of a na- 
 tional enemy, although in its spirit quite charac- 
 teristic, at once of the country and of the class to 
 which the individual extending it belonged, has 
 retained a certain unique flavor of its own among 
 military anecdotes ; due undoubtedly to the dis- 
 tinction subsequently acquired by Rodney at the 
 expense of the people to which his liberator be- 
 longed, rather than to anything exceptional in 
 its nature. As it is, it has acquired a clear pre- 
 eminence among the recorded courtesies of war- 
 fare. It is pleasant to add that Great Britain had 
 the opportunity in after times to requite Biron's 
 daughters an act from which she had so greatly 
 benefited. They having sought refuge, though 
 with loss of fortune, from the early excesses of 
 the French Revolution, received for some time 
 pensions from the British Government. 
 
 Rodney came back to England feeling any- 
 thing but cordial towards Sandwich, whose de- 
 cided support he had found wanting throughout 
 a very critical period of his career. More than 
 any one else the First Lord had had both the op- 
 portunity and the insight to see his professional 
 value. Tory though Rodney was, he hoped that 
 "Lord Chatham (Pitt) would be minister, and 
 another First Lord of the Admiralty be ap- 
 pointed." " We hear of a change of Administra- 
 
Rodney 1 8 1 
 
 tion. I hope it is true, and that I may have a 
 chance of being employed, should another be at 
 the Admiralty." " The refusal of Lord Sandwich 
 does not surprise me. He cannot say but I have 
 offered my services, and some friend will let the 
 King know I have so done." Apparently he 
 was to be ii^nored as well as overlooked. 
 
 Circumstances, however, soon compelled his 
 employment. Sandwich was an able man, but 
 his personal character inspired mistrust. Not 
 only was he controlled by political considerations 
 in administration ; he was suspected of corruptly 
 using the Navy for party advantage. Whatever 
 might be thought of Byng's conduct, his execu- 
 tion, but twenty years before, was commonly 
 ascribed to political exigency, making him a vica- 
 rious sacrifice to cover the neglects of a Govern- 
 ment. As in Byng's case, the material of the 
 service was believed to be now inadequate to 
 the emergency come upon it ; and it was known 
 to have deteriorated gravely during the seven 
 years of Sandwich's tenure of office. He was a 
 Tory, as were his colleagues of the Cabinet ; the 
 leaders of the Navy in professional estimation, 
 Hawke and Keppel, with other distinguished of- 
 ficers, were pronounced Whigs, whom it was 
 thought the Administration would be willing to 
 destroy. Keppel evidently feared an intention to 
 ruin him by the command of the Channel Fleet, 
 and the public discussion of the Courts-Martial 
 which followed his indecisive action with D'Or- 
 
1 82 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 villiers, in July, 1778, assumed a decided and 
 rancorous party tone. His accuser then was his 
 third-in-command, Vice-Admiral Palliscr, who 
 had left his place on the Admiralty Board to 
 take this position in the fleet ; and popular out- 
 cry charged him with having betrayed his chief 
 in the battle. So far was professional feeling 
 moved that twelve prominent admirals, — not all 
 of whom were Whigs, — with Hawke at their 
 head, presented to the King a memorial, deprecat- 
 ing "particularly the mischief and scandal of per- 
 mitting men, who are at once in high office aitd 
 subordinate 'military co77ima7td, previous to their 
 making recriminating accusations against their 
 commander-in-chief, to attempt to corrupt the pub- 
 lic judgment by the publication of libels on their 
 officers in a common newspaper, thereby exciting 
 mutiny in your Majesty's Navy," etc. The words 
 italicized show that this was aimed at Palliser; 
 and at Sandwich, who inferentially had "per- 
 mitted " his action, and ultimately rewarded him 
 with the Governorship of Greenwich Hospital. 
 
 In this demoralized condition of professional 
 sentiment the Admiralty could no longer com- 
 mand the services of the best men. Howe came 
 home in disgust from America. Keppel threw 
 up the command of the Channel Fleet, and Bar- 
 rington subsequently refused it on the expressed 
 ground of self-distrust, underlying which was 
 real distrust of the ministry. He would serve 
 as second, but not as first. Byron, after reliev- 
 
Rodney 183 
 
 ing Howe in New York, went to the West 
 Indies, there made a failure, and so came home 
 in the summer of 1779. The Channel squadron 
 fell into the hands of men respectable, indeed, 
 but in no way eminent, and advanced in years, 
 whose tenures of ofifice were comparatively short. 
 Hardy was sixty-three, Geary seventy ; and on 
 both Hawke, who was friendly to them, passed 
 the comment that they were " too easy." The 
 first had allowed " the discipline of the fleet to 
 come to nothing," and he feared the same for 
 the other. Not until the fall of the ministry, 
 consequent upon Cornwallis's surrender, was the 
 post filled by a distinguished name, when Howe 
 took the command in 1782. 
 
 The Administration was thus forced back upon 
 Rodney ; fortunately for itself, for, as far as his- 
 tory has since revealed, there was no other man 
 then in the service, and of suitable rank, exactly 
 fitted to do the work he did. Samuel Hood 
 alone, then an unproved captain, and practically 
 in voluntary retirement, could have equalled and 
 surpassed him. Howe, like Rodney, was an ac- 
 complished tactician, and in conception far in 
 advance of the standards of the day. In his 
 place he did admirable service, which has been 
 too little appreciated, and he was fortunate in 
 that the work which fell to him, at the first, and 
 again at the last of this war, was peculiarly suited 
 to his professional characteristics ; but he was 
 not interchangeable with Rodney. In the latter 
 
184 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 there was a briskness of temper, a vivacity, very 
 distinguishable from Howe's solidity of persist- 
 ence; and he was in no sense one to permit "dis- 
 cipline to come to nought," the direction in which 
 Howe's easy though reserved disposition tended. 
 The West Indies were to be the great scene of 
 battles, and, while the tactical ideas of the two 
 appear to have been essentially alike, in the com- 
 mon recognition of combination as imperative to 
 success, the severity of Rodney was needed to jerk 
 the West India fleet sharply out of sleepy tradi- 
 tion ; to compel promptness of manoeuvre and in- 
 telligent attention to the underlying ideas which 
 signals communicate. Flexibility of movement, 
 earnestness and rapidity of attack, mutual sup- 
 port by the essential coherence of the battle order 
 without too form.al precision, — these were the 
 qualities which Rodney was to illustrate in prac- 
 tice, and to enforce by personal impression upon 
 his officers. The official staff of the fleet had to 
 pass under the rod ot the schoolmaster, to receive 
 new ideas, and to learn novel principles of obedi- 
 ence, — to a living chief, not to a dead letter 
 crusted over by an unintelligent tradition. Not 
 till this step had been made, till discipline had 
 full hold of men's affections and understanding, 
 was there room for the glorious liberty of action 
 which Nelson extended to his officers; preaching 
 it in word, and practising it in act. Hawke re- 
 begat the British Navy in the spirit he imparted 
 to it; Rodney, first of several, trained its ap- 
 
Rodney 185 
 
 preaching maturity in habits which, once ac- 
 quired, stand by men as principles ; Nelson 
 reaped the fulness of the harvest. 
 
 On October i, 1779, Rodney was again ap- 
 pointed to the command of the Leeward Islands 
 Station. The year had been one of maritime mis- 
 fortune and discouragement. The French decla- 
 ration of war in 1778 had been followed by that 
 of Spain in June, 1779; and a huge allied fleet — 
 sixty-six ships-of-the-line, to which the British 
 could oppose only thirty-five — had that summer 
 entered and dominated the English Channel. 
 Nothing was effected by it, true ; but the im- 
 pression produced was profound. In the West 
 Indies Grenada had been lost, and Byron badly 
 worsted in an attempt to relieve it. On assum- 
 ing his command, Rodney could not but feel that 
 he had more to do than to establish a reputation ; 
 he had a reputation to redeem, and that under a 
 burden of national depression which doubly en- 
 dangered the reputation of every officer in re- 
 sponsible position. He must have known that, 
 however undeservedly, he had not the full confi- 
 dence of the government, although party and 
 personal ties would naturally have predisposed 
 it in his favor. He therefore entered upon his 
 career under the necessity to do and to dare 
 greatly ; he had not a strong hand, and needed 
 the more to play a game not only strong, but to 
 some extent adventurous. 
 
 To the radical difference between his personal 
 
1 86 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 standing at this opening of his command, and 
 that which he had at its close, in 1782, may rea- 
 sonably be attributed the clear difference in his 
 action at the two periods. The first was auda- 
 cious and brilliant, exhibiting qualities of which 
 he was capable on occasion, but which did not 
 form the groundwork of his professional character. 
 The display was therefore exceptional, elicited by 
 exceptional personal emergency. It was vitally 
 necessary at the outset, if opportunity offered, to 
 vindicate his selection by the government; to 
 strike the imagination of the country, and obtain 
 a hold upon its confidence which could not 
 easily be shaken. This prestige once established, 
 he could safely rest upon it to bear him through 
 doubtful periods of suspense and protracted issues. 
 It would have been well had he felt the same 
 spur after his great battle in 1782. A necessity 
 like this doubtless lies upon every opening career, 
 and comparatively few there be that rise to it ; 
 but there is an evident distinction to be drawn 
 between one in the early prime of life, who may 
 afford to wait, who has at least no errors to atone, 
 and him who is about to make his last cast, 
 when upon the turning of a die depends a fair 
 opportunity to show what is in him. Rodney 
 was near sixty-one, when he took up the com- 
 mand which has given him his well earned place 
 in history. 
 
 He experienced at once indications of the atti- 
 tude towards him ; and in two directions, from 
 
Rodney 187 
 
 the Admiralty and from his subordinates. A 
 month before he was ready, Sandwich urges him, 
 with evident impatience, to get off. " For God's 
 sake, go to sea without delay. You cannot con- 
 ceive of what importance it is to yourself, to me, 
 and to the public " (this very order of importance 
 is suggestive), " that you should not lose this fair 
 wind; if you do, I shall not only hear of it in 
 Parliament, but in places to which I pay more 
 attention. ... I must once more repeat to you 
 that any delay in your sailing will have the most 
 disagreeable consequences." On the other hand, 
 he had to complain not only of inattention on 
 the part of the dockyard officials, but of want of 
 zeal and activity in the officers of the fleet, many 
 of whom behaved with a disrespect and want of 
 cordiality which are too often the precursor of 
 worse faults. Rodney was not the man to put up 
 with such treatment. That it was offered, and 
 that he for the moment bore with it, are both 
 significant ; and are to be remembered in con- 
 nection with the fast approaching future. 
 
 Gibraltar was then at the beginning of the 
 three years siege, and his intended departure was 
 utilized to give him command of the first of the 
 three great expeditions for its relief, which were 
 among the characteristic operations of this war. 
 He sailed from Plymouth on the 29th of Decem- 
 ber, 1779, having under him twenty-two sail-of- 
 the-line, of which only four were to continue with 
 him to the West Indies. With this great fleet, 
 
1 88 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 and its attendant frigates, went also a huge col- 
 lection of storeships, victuallers, ordnance vessels, 
 troop ships, and merchantmen ; the last compris- 
 ing the "trade "for Portugal and the West Indies, 
 as the other classes carried the reinforcements for 
 the Rock. 
 
 On January 7th, the West India trade parted 
 company off Cape Finisterrc, and the next day 
 began the wonderful good fortune for which 
 Rodney's last command was distinguished. It 
 is no disparagement to his merit to say that in 
 this he was, to use Ball's phrase about Nelson, 
 " a heaven-born admiral." A Spanish convoy of 
 twenty-two sail, seven of which were ships of 
 war, the rest laden with supplies for Cadiz, were 
 sighted at daylight of the 8th, and all taken ; not 
 one escaped. Twelve loaded with provisions 
 were turned into the British convoy, and went on 
 with it to feed the Gibraltar garrison. A prince 
 of the blood-royal, afterwards King William IV., 
 was with the fleet as a midshipman. One of the 
 prizes being a line-of-battle ship, Rodney had an 
 opportunity to show appositely his courtliness of 
 breeding. " I have named her the Prince Wil- 
 liam, in respect to His Royal Highness, in whose 
 presence she had the honor to be taken''' 
 
 Repeated intelligence had reached the admiral 
 that a Spanish division was cruising off Cape St. 
 Vincent. Therefore, when it was sighted at i 
 P.M. of January i6th, a week after the capture of 
 the convoy, he was prepared for the event. A 
 
Rodney 189 
 
 brief attempt to form line was quickly succeeded 
 by the signal for a general chase, the ships to en- 
 gage to leeward as they came up with the enemy, 
 who, by taking flight to the southeast, showed 
 the intention to escape into Cadiz. The wind 
 was blowing strong from the westward, giving a 
 lee shore and shoals to the British fleet in the 
 approaching long hours of a wintry night; but 
 opportunity was winging by, with which neither 
 Rodney nor the Navy could afford to trifle. He 
 was already laid up with an attack of the gout 
 that continued to harass him throughout this 
 command, and the decision to continue the chase 
 was only reached after a discussion between him 
 and his captain, the mention of which is trans- 
 mitted by Sir Gilbert Blane, the surgeon of the 
 ship, who was present professionally. The merit 
 of the resolution must remain with the man who 
 bore the responsibility of the event ; but that he 
 reached it at such a moment only after consul- 
 tation with another, to whom current gossip at- 
 tributed the chief desert, must be coupled with 
 the plausible claim afterwards advanced for Sir 
 Charles Douglas, that he suggested the breaking 
 of the enemy's line on April 12th. Taken to- 
 gether, they indicate at least a common contem- 
 porary professional estimate of Rodney's tem- 
 perament. No such anecdote is transmitted of 
 Hawke. The battle of Cape St. Vincent, there- 
 fore, is not that most characteristic of Rodney's 
 genius. Judged by his career at large, it is ex- 
 
190 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 ceptional ; yet of all his actions it is the one in 
 which merit and success most conspicuously met. 
 Nor does it at all detract from his credit that the 
 enemy was much inferior in numbers ; eleven to 
 twenty-one. As in Hawke's pursuit of Conflans, 
 with which this engagement is worthy to be 
 classed, what was that night dared, rightly and 
 brilliantly dared, was the dangers of the deep, 
 not of the foe. The prey was seized out of the 
 jaws of disaster. 
 
 The results were commensurate to the risk. 
 The action, which began at 4 p. m., lasted till two 
 the following morning, the weather becoming 
 tempestuous with a great sea, so that it was 
 difficult to take possession of the captured ves- 
 sels. Many of the heavy British ships continued 
 also in danger during the 17th, and had to 
 carry a press of sail to clear the shoals, on which 
 two of their prizes were actually wrecked. One 
 Spanish ship-ofthe-line was blown up and six 
 struck, among them the flag-ship of Admiral Lan- 
 gara, who was taken into Gibraltar. Only four 
 escaped. 
 
 Two such strokes of mingled good fortune and 
 good management, within ten days, formed a rare 
 concurrence, and the aggregate results were as 
 exceptional as the combination of events. Sand- 
 wich congratulated Rodney that he had already 
 " taken more line-of-battle ships than had been 
 captured in any one action in either of the two 
 last preceding wars." Militarily regarded, it had 
 
Rodney 191 
 
 a further high element of praise, for the enemy's 
 detachment, though in itself inferior, was part of 
 a much superior force; twenty-four allied ships- 
 of-the-line besides it being at the moment in 
 Cadiz Bay. It is the essence of military art 
 thus to overwhelm in detail. A technical cir- 
 cumstance like this was doubtless overlooked in 
 the general satisfaction with the event, the most 
 evident feature in which was the relief of the 
 Government, who just then stood badly in need 
 of credit. "The ministerial people feel it very 
 sensibly," Lady Rodney wrote him. " It is a 
 lucky stroke for them at this juncture." Salutes 
 were fired, and the city illuminated ; the press 
 teemed with poetical effusion. Sandwich, some- 
 what impudently when the past is considered, but 
 not uncharacteristically regarded as an office- 
 holder, took to himself a large slice of the credit. 
 " The worst of my enemies now allow that I 
 have pitched upon a man who knows his duty, 
 and is a brave, honest, and able officer. ... I 
 have obtained you the thanks of both houses 
 of Parliament." The letter does not end with- 
 out a further caution aq-ainst indiscreet talkingr 
 about the condition of his ships. It all comes 
 back on the Government, he laments. What 
 Rodney may have said to others may be uncer- 
 tain ; to his wife, soon after reaching his station, 
 he wrote, " What are the ministers about.'* Are 
 they determined to undo their country ? Is it 
 fair that the British fleet should be so inferior to 
 
1^2 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 the French, and that the British officers and men 
 are always to be exposed to superior numbers? 
 What right had the administration to expect any- 
 thing but defeat ? " Then he passes on to remark 
 himself, what has been alluded to above, the 
 change in his personal position effected by his 
 successes. " Thank God, I now fear no frowns 
 of ministers, and hope never again to stand in 
 need of their assistance. I know them well. All 
 are alike, and no dependence is to be placed on 
 their promises." It is to be feared his sense of 
 obligation to Sandwich did not coincide with 
 the latter's estimate. 
 
 In his official report Rodney gave much credit 
 to his officers for the St. Vincent affair. " The 
 gallant behaviour of the admirals, captains, of- 
 ficers and men, I had the honour to command, 
 was conspicuous ; they seemed animated with the 
 same spirit, and were eager to exert themselves 
 with the utmost zeal." Here also, however, he 
 was biding his time for obvious reasons ; for to 
 his wife he writes, " I have done them all like 
 honour, but it is because I would not have the 
 world believe that there were officers slack in their 
 duty. Without a thorough change in naval affairs, 
 the discipline of our navy will be lost. I could 
 say much, but will not. You will hear of it from 
 themselves ;'' that is, probably, by their mutual 
 recriminations. Such indulgent envelopment of 
 good and bad alike in a common mantle of com- 
 mendation is far from unexampled ; but it rarely 
 
Rodney 193 
 
 fails to return to plague its authors, as has been 
 seen in instances more recent than that of Rod- 
 ney. He clearly had told Sandwich the same in 
 private letters, for the First Lord writes him, " I 
 fear the picture you give of the faction in your 
 fleet is too well drawn. Time and moderation 
 will by degrees get the better of this bane of dis- 
 cipline. I exceedingly applaud your resolution 
 to shut your ears against the illiberal language of 
 your officers, who are inclined to arraign each 
 other's conduct." In this two things are to be 
 remarked: first, the evident and undeniable ex- 
 istence of serious cause of complaint, which was 
 preparing Rodney for the stern self-assertion soon 
 to be shown ; and, second, that such imputations 
 are frequent with him, while he seems in turn to 
 have had a capacity for eliciting insubordination 
 of feeling, though he can repress the act. It 
 is a question of personal temperament, which 
 explains more than his relations with other men. 
 Hawke and Nelson find rare fault with those be- 
 neath them ; for their own spirit takes possession 
 of their subordinates. Such difference of spirit 
 reveals itself in more ways than one in the active 
 life of a military community. 
 
 If there was joy in England over Rodney's 
 achievement, still more and more sympathetic 
 was the exultation of those who in the isolation 
 of Gibraltar's Rock, rarely seeing their country's 
 flag save on their own flagstaff, witnessed and 
 shared the triumph of his entrance there with his 
 
 13 
 
194 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 train of prizes. The ships of war and transports 
 forming the convoy did not indeed appear in one 
 body, but in groups, being dispersed by the light 
 airs, and swept eastward by the in-drag of the 
 current from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean ; 
 but the presence of the great fleet, and the pres- 
 tige of its recent victory, secured the practical 
 immunity of merchant vessels during its stay. 
 Of the first to come in, on January 15th, an eye- 
 witness wrote, " A ship with the British flag 
 entering the Bay was so uncommon a sight that 
 almost the whole garrison were assembled at the 
 southward to welcome her in ; but words are in- 
 sufUcient to describe their transports on being 
 informed that she was one of a large convoy 
 which had sailed the latter end of the preceding 
 month for our relief." The admiral himself had 
 been carried beyond and gone into Tetuan, in 
 Morocco, whence he finally arrived on January 
 26th, having sent on a supply fleet to Minorca, 
 the garrison of which was undergoing a sever- 
 ance from the outer world more extreme even 
 than that of Gibraltar. Upon the return thence 
 of the convoying ships he again put to sea, Feb- 
 ruary 13th, with the entire fleet, which accom- 
 panied him three days sail to the westward, when 
 it parted company for England ; he with only 
 four ships-of-the-line pursuing his way to his sta- 
 tion. On March 27th he reached Santa Lucia, 
 where he found seventeen of-the-line, composing 
 his commaiid. Three weeks later he met the 
 
Rodney 195 
 
 enemy; barely three months, almost to a day, 
 after the affair at St. Vincent. 
 
 The antecedent circumstances of the war, and 
 the recent history of the French navy, gave a 
 singular opportuneness of occasion, and of per- 
 sonal fitness, to Rodney's arrival at this moment. 
 The humiliations of the Seven Years War, with 
 the loss of so much of the French colonial em- 
 pire, traceable in chief measure to naval deca- 
 dence, had impressed the French government with 
 the need of reviving their navy, which had conse- 
 quently received a material development in qual- 
 ity, as well as in quantity, unparalleled since the 
 days of Colbert and Seignelay, near a century 
 before. Concomitant with this had been a sin- 
 gular progress in the theory of naval evolu- 
 tions, and of their handmaid, naval signalling, 
 among French officers ; an advance to which 
 the lucid, speculative, character of the national 
 genius greatly contributed. Although they as 
 yet lacked practice, and were numerically too 
 few, the French officers were well equipped by 
 mental resources, by instruction and reflection, 
 to handle large fleets ; and they now had large 
 fleets to handle. No such conjunction had 
 occurred since Tourville; none such recurred 
 during the Revolution. 
 
 The condition was unique in naval history 
 of the sail period. To meet it, assuming an 
 approach to equality in contending fleets, was 
 required, first, a commander-in-chief, and then a 
 
196 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 competent body of officers. The latter the Brit- 
 ish had only in the sense of fine seamen and gal- 
 lant men. In courage there is no occasion to 
 institute comparisons between the two nations ; 
 in kind there may have been a difference, but 
 certainly not in degree. The practical superiority 
 of seamanship in the British may be taken as a 
 set-off to the more highly trained understanding 
 of military principles and methods on the part of 
 their enemy. For commander-in-chief, there were 
 at this time but two, Howe and Rodney, whose 
 professional equipment, as shown in practice, 
 fitted them to oppose the French methods. Of 
 these Rodney was the better, because possessed 
 of a quicker power of initiative, and also of 
 that personal severity required to enforce strict 
 conformity of action among indifferent or sullen 
 subordinates. 
 
 Rodney has therefore a singularly well defined 
 place among British naval chiefs. He was to 
 oppose form to form, theory to theory, evolution 
 to evolution, upon the battle ground of the sea ; 
 with purpose throughout tactically offensive, not 
 defensive, and facing an adversary his equal in 
 professional equipment. Had he arrived a year 
 before he would have met no fair match in 
 D'Estaing, a soldier, not a sailor, whose defi- 
 ciencies as a seaman would have caused a very 
 different result from that which actually followed 
 his encounter with Byron, who in conduct 
 showed an utter absence of ideas and of method 
 
Rodney 197 
 
 inconceivable in Rodney. The French were 
 now commanded by De Guichen, considered the 
 most capable of their officers by Rodney, whose 
 recent abode in Paris had probably familiarized 
 him with professional reputations among the 
 enemy. Everything therefore conspired to make 
 the occasion one eminently fitted to his capaci- 
 ties. Such are the conditions — the man and the 
 hour — that make reputations ; though they 
 do not form characters, which are growths of 
 radically different origin. 
 
 De Guichen put to sea from Martinique on 
 April 15th, with a convoy for Santo Domingo 
 which he intended to see clear of British inter- 
 ference. Rodney, whose anchorage was but 
 thirty miles away, learned instantly the French 
 sailing and followed without delay. On the even- 
 ing of April 1 6th, the two fleets were in sight of 
 each other to leeward of Martinique, the British 
 to windward ; an advantage that was diligently 
 maintained during the night. At daylight of the 
 1 7th the two enemies were twelve to fifteen miles 
 apart, ranged on nearly parallel lines, the British 
 twenty heading northwest, the French twenty- 
 three southeast. The numerical difference repre- 
 sents sufficiently nearly the actual difference of 
 force, although French vessels averaged more 
 powerful than British of the same rates. 
 
 At 6.45 A. M. Rodney signalled that it was 
 his intention to attack the enemy's rear with his 
 whole force. This was never annulled, and the 
 
198 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 purpose governed his action throughout the day. 
 This combination — on the rear — is the one 
 generally preferable to be attempted when under- 
 way, and the relative situations of the fleets at 
 this moment made it particularly opportune ; for 
 the British, in good order, two cables interval 
 between the ships, were abreast the rear centre 
 and rear of the enemy, whose line was in com- 
 parison greatly extended, — the result probably of 
 inferior practical seamanship. To increase his 
 advantage, Rodney at 7 ordered his vessels to close 
 to one cable, and at S.30, when the antagonists 
 were still heading as at daybreak, undertook to 
 lead the fleet down by a series of signals direc- 
 tive of its successive movements. In this he was 
 foiled by De Guichen, who by wearing brought 
 what was previously his van into position to 
 support the extreme threatened. " The differ- 
 ent movements of the enemy, " wrote Rodney, 
 " obliged me to be very attentive and watch every 
 opportunity of attacking them at advantage;" 
 a sentence that concisely sums up his special 
 excellencies, of which the present occasion 
 offers the most complete illustration. It may be 
 fully conceded also that it would have vindicated 
 his high title to fame by conspicuous results, had 
 the intelligence of his officers seconded his 
 dispositions. 
 
 The forenoon passed in manoeuvres, skilfully 
 timed, to insure a definite issue. At 11.50 
 Rodney considered that his opportunity had 
 
Rodney 199 
 
 arrived. Both fleets were then heading in the 
 same direction, on the starboard tack, and he had 
 again succeeded in so placing his own that, by 
 the words of his report, he expected to bring 
 " the whole force of His Majesty's fleet against 
 the enemy's rear, and of course part of their 
 centre, by which means the twenty sail of British 
 ships would have been opposed to only fifteen 
 sail of the enemy's, and must in all probability 
 have totally disabled them before their van could 
 have given them any assistance." It would be 
 difficult to cite a clearer renouncement of the 
 outworn " van to van," ship to ship, dogma; but 
 Rodney is said to have expressed himself in more 
 emphatic terms subsequently, as follows : " Dur- 
 ing all the commands Lord Rodney has been 
 entrusted with, he made it a rule to bring his 
 whole force against a part of the enemy's, and 
 never was so absurd as to bring ship against ship, 
 when the enemy gave him an opportunity of act- 
 ing otherwise." Though not distinctly so stated, 
 it would seem that his first movement on the 
 present occasion had failed because of the long 
 distance between the fleets permitting the enemy 
 to succor the part threatened, before he could 
 close. He was now nearer, for at this second 
 attempt only an hour proved to be needed for 
 the first British ship to open fire at long range. 
 It may be for this reason, also, that he at this 
 stage threw himself upon his captains, no longer 
 prescribing the successive movements, but issuing 
 
200 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 the general signal to bear down, each vessel to 
 "steer," according to the 21st Article of the 
 Additional Fighting Instructions, "for the ship 
 of the enemy which from the disposition of the 
 two squadrons it must be her lot to engage, not- 
 withstanding the signal for the line ahead will be 
 kept fiying: making or shortening sail in such 
 proportion as to preserve the distance assigned by 
 the signal for the li?te, in order that the whole 
 squadron may, as near as possible, come into 
 action at the same time." 
 
 Unfortunately for his manoeuvre, the Admiral 
 here ran up against the stolid idea of the old — 
 and still existing — Fighting Instructions con- 
 cerning the line-of-battle in action, embodied in 
 a typical representative in the senior captain of 
 his fleet. This gentleman, Robert Carkett, had 
 risen from before the mast, and after a lieuten- 
 ancy of thirteen years had become post in 1758, 
 by succeeding to the command when his captain 
 was killed, in one of the most heroic single-ship 
 fights of the British navy. Unluckily, his sen- 
 iority gave him the lead of the fleet as it was now 
 formed on the starboard tack, and he considered 
 that the signal for attacking the enemy's rear was 
 annulled by the present situation. " Both fleets," 
 he stated in a letter to the Admiralty, " were at 
 1 1. 1 5 parallel to and abreast of each other. As 
 I was then the leading ship, it became my duty 
 to engage the leading ship of the French fleet, 
 as this signal disannulled all former ones rela- 
 
Rodney 20i 
 
 tive to the mode of attack." The word " abreast," 
 critically used, would imply that the fleets were 
 abreast, ship to ship, van to van ; but there 
 appears no reason to question Rodney's state- 
 ment of the facts made to Carkett himself : " For- 
 getting that the signal for the line was only at 
 two cables length distance from each other, the 
 van division was by you led to more than two 
 leagues distance from the centre division, which 
 was thereby exposed to the greatest strength of 
 the enemy, and not properly supported." Rodney, 
 in short, meant by opposite the enemy's ship 
 opposite at the moment the signal was made; 
 and he also expected that the movements of his 
 ships would be further controlled by the words of 
 the 2ist Article, "preserve the distance assigned 
 by the signal for the line," which distance was 
 to be taken from the centre ; or, as sometimes 
 worded in the Instructions, "the distance shall 
 be that between the admiral and the ships next 
 ahead and astern of him." Carkett conceived 
 that he was to attack the ship opposite him in 
 numerical order, that is, the leader of the enemy, 
 and that the remaining British would take dis- 
 tance from him. 
 
 Why the rest of the van should also have been 
 led thus astray can be explained only on the 
 ground that Carkett's general views were shared 
 by the divisional commander, a rear-admiral, who, 
 as was proved a year later, possessed high cour- 
 age of the pure game-cock order, but was wholly 
 
202 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 thoughtless of gaining an unfair advantage, two 
 against one, by tactical ingenuity. The result 
 was that the van as a body left the centre to itself, 
 and thereby not only wrecked the concentration 
 at which Rodney aimed, but was out of hand to 
 support his flag and his division, when badly 
 battered by the enemy's fire. This was the 
 great tactical blunder which brought to nought 
 Rodney's patient, wary manccuvres of the past 
 six hours. To it especially, but not to it alone, 
 he referred in the stinging words of his despatch: 
 " 'T is with concern inexpressible, mixt with in- 
 dignation, that the duty I owe my sovereign and 
 country obliges me to acquaint their Lordships 
 that, during the action with the French fleet on 
 the 17th instant [and] His Majesty's, the British 
 flag was not properly supported." To the specific 
 error of the van was added a wide-spread dis- 
 regard of the order for close action, despite the 
 example of the commander-in-chief, who pressed 
 the enemy so hard that towards the end his 
 flag-ship was to leeward of De Guichen's wake. 
 *' Perceiving several of our ships engaging at a 
 distance, I repeated the signal for close action. 
 With truth, but sorrow, I must say it was little 
 attended to." It is noticeable that one of the 
 ships thus censured, the Cornwall, next ahead of 
 Rodney, lost as heavily in killed and wounded as 
 did the flag-ship herself; one of many instances 
 showing that distance lessened efficiency without 
 increasing safety. The forwardness of Rodney's 
 
Rodney 203 
 
 flag on this occasion proves clearly enough his 
 consciousness that tactics, to succeed, must be 
 more than a veil for timidity; that hard hitting 
 is as essential as skilful leading. 
 
 This combination of steady, patient, wary, skil- 
 ful guidance, with resolute and tenacious personal 
 leadership, constituted the firm tissue of Rodney's 
 professional character, and at no time received 
 such clear illustration as in the case before us ; 
 for no like opportunity recurred. One experience 
 was enough for De Guichen ; he did not choose 
 again to yield the advantage of the weather gage, 
 and he had the tactical skill necessary to retain 
 it in his future contacts with this adversary. 
 The battle of April 12, 1782, upon which Rod- 
 ney's fame has rested, was rather an accident 
 than an achievement, and as a revelation of char- 
 acter its most conspicuous feature is wariness 
 exaggerated into professional timidity. He him- 
 self has weighed the relative professional value 
 of the two affairs. A letter published in 1809, 
 anonymous, but bearing strong internal evidence 
 of being written by Sir Gilbert Blane, long on 
 a trusted physician's terms of intimacy with Rod- 
 ney, states that he " thought little of his victory 
 on the 12th of April." He would have preferred 
 to rest his reputation upon this action with De 
 Guichen, and " looked upon that opportunity of 
 beating, with an inferior fleet, such an officer, 
 whom he considered the best in the French ser- 
 vice, as one by which, but for the disobedience of 
 
204 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 his captains, he might have gained an immortal 
 renown." 
 
 The misconduct of his officers brought out in 
 full vigor the severity which was a salient feature 
 of Rodney's professional character. In the St. 
 Vincent business he may have been partly actu- 
 ated to spare, by the reflection that the offenders 
 were not his own captains; that they were about 
 to quit him finally. Moreover, there had been 
 then a very considerable tangible success ; results 
 cover a multitude of sins. No such extenua- 
 tions applied here. The wreck of his reasonable 
 hopes of personal distinction coincided with failure 
 towards the nation itself. Rodney's hand came 
 down heavy upon the offenders ; but so far as 
 seen it was the hand always of a gentleman. In 
 private letters his full feelings betrayed them- 
 selves in vehemence ; but in public they were 
 measured to austerity. To Carkett, when ques- 
 tioned concerning the rumored expressions in his 
 despatch, he is withering in the pointed enumera- 
 tion of varied shortcomings; but he never lapses 
 into a breach of professional decorum of utter- 
 ance. The unfortunate man represented to the 
 Admiralty his view of the matter, — already cited ; 
 but it bears no indorsement to show that it had 
 passed under Rodney's eye. Captain, ship, and 
 ship's company, were swept away a few months 
 later in the memorable hurricane of October, 
 1780. 
 
 The despatch specified no other delinquent by 
 
Rodney 205 
 
 name ; but the selection of five captains to receive 
 personal commendation, and the persistent refusal 
 of the same to all other subordinates, including 
 the junior flag-officers, made censure sufficiently 
 individual; and the admiral's subsequent line of 
 conduct emphasized rebuke bitterly. The cruise 
 was not yet finished ; for the French having taken 
 refuge at Guadaloupe, it was important to prevent 
 them from regaining Martinique, their chief depot 
 and place of repairs. To intercept them there, 
 Rodney at first took station off Fort Royal, and 
 when compelled for a moment to return to Santa 
 Lucia, kept lookouts to warn him betimes of the 
 enemy's appearance. So, when De Guichen ap- 
 proached from the windward side of the islands, 
 on May 9th, he found the British getting under- 
 way to meet him. From that time until the 20th 
 — eleven days — the fleets were manoeuvring in 
 sight of one another, beating to windward ; the 
 British endeavoring to force action, the French 
 to avoid it. De Guichen's orders from home 
 were "to keep the sea, so far as the force main- 
 tained by England in the Windward Islands would 
 permit, without too far compromising the fleet en- 
 trusted to him." Such instructions compelled him 
 to defensive tactics ; as Rodney's views, and those 
 traditional in his service, impelled him to attack. 
 Hence ensued a struggle of sustained vigilance, 
 activity, and skill, profoundly interesting profes- 
 sionally, but which does not lend itself to other 
 than technical narrative. " For fourteen days 
 
io6 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 and nights," wrote Rodney, " the fleets were so 
 near each other that neither officers nor men 
 could be said to sleep. Nothing but the good- 
 ness of the weather and climate could have en- 
 abled us to endure so continual a fatigue. Had 
 it been in Europe, half the people must have 
 sunk under it. For my part, it did me good." 
 No evidence of professional aptness could be 
 given clearer than the last words. A man is 
 easy under such circumstances only when they fit 
 him. De Guichen asked to be superseded ; " my 
 health cannot endure such continual fatigue and 
 anxiety." Twice the wary Frenchman was nearly 
 caught, but the wind did not favor Rodney long 
 enough to give him the weather position, the 
 only sure one for offence. But, while thus un- 
 able to compass results, he gave conclusive evi- 
 dence of the quickness of his eye, the alertness 
 of his action, and the flexibility which he was 
 enabled to impress upon his fleet by sheer force 
 of personal character. The contest resembled 
 that of two expert swordsmen ; more intermit- 
 tent doubtless, but also much more prolonged. 
 There can be no trifling with such conditions. 
 A moment's relaxation, or inaptness, may forfeit 
 opportunity, offered only by chance and not to be 
 regained by effort. Rodney was fixed that no 
 such slip should occur through the neglect of 
 others, and his stern supervision, as represented 
 by himself to his wife, was that of a slave driver, 
 lash in hand. " As I had given public notice to 
 
Rodney 207 
 
 all my captains, etc. that I should hoist my flag 
 on board one of my frigates, and that I expected 
 implicit obedience to every signal made, under 
 the certain penalty of being instantly superseded, 
 it had an admirable effect, as they were all con- 
 vinced, after their late gross behaviour, that they 
 had nothing to expect at my hands but instant 
 punishment to those who neglected their duty. 
 My eye on them had more dread than the 
 enemy's fire, and they knew it would be fatal. 
 No regard was paid to rank, — admirals as well 
 as captains, if out of their station, were instantly 
 reprimanded by signals, or messages sent by frig- 
 ates : and, in spite of themselves, I taught them 
 to be what they had never been before — officers ; 
 and showed them that an inferior fleet, properly 
 conducted, was more than a match for one far 
 superior." Making allowance for exaggeration in 
 the irresponsible utterances of family life, the 
 above is eminently characteristic of temperament. 
 It must be added, as equally characteristic of an 
 underlying justice which Rodney possessed, that 
 in his oflficial account of these last manoeuvres he 
 gave credit to his subordinates as a whole. " I 
 must inform their Lordships, in justice to the 
 commanders and offlcers of the fleet under my 
 command, that since the action of the 17th of 
 April, and during the pursuit of the enemy's fleet, 
 and in the two rencontres with them, all my officers, 
 of every rank and denomination, were obedient 
 and attentive to orders and signals, and, I am 
 
2o8 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 convinced, if the enemy had given them an 
 opportunity, they would have done their duty to 
 their King and Country." The claims of justice 
 against its own strict requirements he also rec- 
 ognized to Carkett. "Nothing but the former 
 service you had done your King and Country, 
 and my firm belief of your being a brave man, 
 could have induced me, as commander of a great 
 fleet, to overlook." It will not escape attention 
 that this exact observance of credit, where due, 
 lends increased weight to censure, when inflicted. 
 To the pursuit of the French fleet, relin- 
 quished forty leagues eastward of Martinique 
 after the brush of May 19th, succeeded a period 
 marked only by the routine administrative cares 
 attendant upon an admiral charged with the de- 
 fence of a lengthy, exposed chain of islands, and 
 an extensive trade, against enemies numerically 
 much superior. The details serve to show the 
 breadth of intelligence, the sound judgment, and 
 clear professional conceptions that characterized 
 Rodney in small things as well as great ; but it 
 would be wearisome to elaborate demonstration of 
 this, and these qualities he had in common with 
 many men otherwise inferior to himself. Reaction 
 from the opening strain of the campaign, with the 
 relaxation of vigor from the approach of the hot 
 rainy season, now began to tell on his health ; and 
 to this contributed the harassment of mind due 
 to the arrival of a large Spanish fleet, while rein- 
 forcements promised him unaccountably failed to 
 
Rodney 209 
 
 appear. Nevertheless, his personal efficiency was 
 not impaired, and towards the end of July he 
 resolved to execute a project which he had long 
 entertained, of carrying the mass of his fleet from 
 the islands to the Continental waters of North 
 America. 
 
 During the year between his return from Paris 
 and his present appointment, he had laid before 
 the Admiralty two papers, containing an admir- 
 able summary of the leading strategic conditions 
 of the whole scene of war in the western hemi- 
 sphere, with suggestions for action amounting 
 to a plan of campaign. One feature of this was 
 based upon the weather differences, which ren- 
 dered cruising dangerous in the West Indies 
 when most favorable to the northward, and un- 
 sure in North America when most certain among 
 the islands. He proposed to utilize this alterna- 
 tion of seasons, by shifting a mobile reinforcement 
 suddenly and secretly from one end to the other 
 of the long front of operations. This is a com- 
 mon enough expedient in military art, but had 
 rarely received the convincing formulation which 
 he gave it ; while that such a conception was a 
 novelty to the average naval mind of the day, may 
 be inferred from the startled wrath of the admiral 
 in North America at Rodney's unexpected intru- 
 sion upon his bailiwick. 
 
 Sandwich, however, had entertained the project, 
 and in October, 1779, just as Rodney's appoint- 
 ment issued, a vessel sailed from England with 
 
 14 
 
2IO Types of Naval Officers 
 
 letters to Admiral Arbuthnot in New York, 
 directing him to send several ships-of-the-line to 
 the West Indies for the winter campaign. The 
 vessel lost a mast, kept off to Nassau in the 
 Bahamas, and after arrival there her captain, 
 while spending some months in repairs, did not 
 tliink to send on the despatches. Arbuthnot, 
 therefore, received them only on March i6, 1780; 
 too late, doubtless, to collect and equip a force 
 in time to reach Rodney before the affair of 
 April 17th. 
 
 At the end of July, 1780, the conditions in the 
 West Indies were that the allied French and 
 Spanish fleets had gone to leeward from Martin- 
 ique; to Havana, and to Cap Fran9ois, in Hayti. 
 At the latter port was assembling a large trade 
 convoy — three hundred ships, according to Rod- 
 ney's information. He reasoned that this must 
 go to Europe, but would not require the full 
 strength of the French fleet; therefore, transfer- 
 ring his own insight to the enemy's mind, he con- 
 vinced himself that a part of their vessels would 
 seek Narragansett Bay, to reinforce the seven 
 ships-of-the-line that had reached there on July 
 12th, under De Ternay, of whose arrival Rodney 
 now knew. Great possibilities might be open to 
 such a combination, skilfully handled against the 
 inferior numbers of Arbuthnot. " As it plainly 
 appeared to me that His Majesty's territory, fleet, 
 and army, in America were in imminent danger 
 of being overpowered by the superior force of 
 
Rodney 211 
 
 the public enemy, I deemed it a duty incumbent 
 upon me to forego any emoluments that might 
 have accrued by the enterprise intended by Gen- 
 eral Vaughan and myself during the hurricane 
 months, and without a moment's hesitation flew 
 with all despatch possible to prevent the enemy's 
 making any impression upon the continent before 
 my arrival there." The protestation of disinter- 
 estedness here is somewhat intrusive, and being 
 wholly unnecessary excites rather criticism than 
 confidence. 
 
 Although reasonable precautions had been 
 taken for the security of his own station, and all 
 circumstances carefully weighed, there was in 
 this step of Rodney's an assumption of responsi- 
 bility, — of risk, — as in his similar action of 
 1762, before noted. This, as well as the military 
 correctness of the general conception, deserves to 
 be noted to the credit of his professional capacity. 
 Making the land about Charleston, South Caro- 
 lina, he swept along the coast to the northward, 
 until he anchored off Sandy Hook, September 
 14th. The following day he issued an order 
 to Admiral Arbuthnot, directing him to put 
 himself under his command and to obey his 
 instructions. 
 
 Rodney's coming was a grievous blow to Wash- 
 ington, who instead had hoped, as Rodney had 
 feared, the arrival of De Guichen, or at the least 
 of a strong French naval division. The enemy's 
 disappointment is perhaps the best proof of sagac- 
 
212 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 ity in a military movement, but Sandwich's clear 
 approval was also forthcoming. " It is impossible 
 for us to have a superior fleet in every part ; and 
 unless our commanders-in-chief will take the great 
 line, as you do, and consider the Kings whole 
 dominions as under their care, our enemies must 
 find us unprepared somewhere, and carry their 
 point against us." Arbuthnot, nevertheless, saw 
 only personal injury to himself; a natural feeling, 
 but one which should not be allowed display. 
 Rodney had given various particular orders, and 
 had sug:o:ested that it would be better that the 
 commander-in-chief on the station should keep 
 headquarters at New York, leaving the blockade 
 of Ternay, a hundred and thirty miles distant, to 
 a junior admiral; also, he intimated the opinion 
 that such a blockade would be better conducted 
 underway than anchored in Gardiner's Bay, fifty 
 miles from the enemy's port. Though sugges- 
 tion did not override discretion, Arbuthnot re- 
 sented it in all its forms. After explaining his 
 reasons, he added, " How far. Sir, your conduct 
 (similarly circumstanced as you are) is praise- 
 worthy and proper, consequences must determine. 
 Your partial interference in the conduct of the 
 American War is certainly incompatible with 
 principles of reason, and precedents of service. 
 The frigates attending on a cruising squadron 
 you have taken upon you to counter-order, (a due 
 representation of which and other circumstances 
 I shall make where it will have every possible 
 
Rodney 213 
 
 effect), and thus I have been for some time with 
 out even a repeater of signals." 
 
 Though Rodney's step was unusual, his posi- 
 tion as Arbuthnot's superior officer, locally pres- 
 ent, was impregnable. He nevertheless kept his 
 temper under provocation, and the dignified 
 restraint of his reply is notable ; indeed, the 
 only significant feature of this incident, from the 
 biographical point of view. " No offence to you 
 was intended on my part. Every respect due to 
 you, as an officer and a gentleman, my inclination 
 as well as my duty led me to pay you in the 
 strictest sense." He leaves no doubt, however, 
 that he does not intend to allow his functions to 
 lapse into a mere official primacy, — that he will 
 rule, as well as reign. " Duty, not inclination, 
 brought me to North America. I came to inter- 
 fere in the American War, to command by sea in 
 it, and to do my best endeavours towards the 
 putting an end thereto. I knew the dignity of 
 my own rank entitled me to take the supreme 
 command, which I ever shall do on every station 
 where His Majesty's and the public service may 
 make it necessary for me to go, unless I meet a 
 superior officer, in which case it will be my duty 
 to obey his orders." He then proceeds to exer- 
 cise his authority, by explicit directions and some 
 criticism of existino: arranorements. 
 
 Afterwards, in submitting the papers to the 
 Admiralty, Rodney wrote, " I am ashamed to 
 mention what appears to me the real cause, and 
 
214 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 from whence Mr. Arbuthnot s chagrin proceeds, 
 but the proofs are so plain that prize-money is 
 the occasion that I am under the necessity of 
 transmitting them. I can solemnly assure their 
 Lordships that I had not the least conception of 
 any other prize-money on the coast of America 
 but that which would be most honourably ob- 
 tained by the destruction of the enemy's ships of 
 war and privateers — but when prize-money ap- 
 peared predominant in the mind of my brother 
 officer, I was determined to have my share 
 of that bounty so graciously bestowed by His 
 Majesty and the public." Nelson's retort to 
 Arbuthnot's successor, two years later, may be 
 recalled. " You have come to a good station 
 for prize-money." " Yes, but the West Indies is 
 the station for honour." 
 
 The visit to continental waters was on this oc- 
 casion productive of little result. Contrary alike 
 to Rodney's anticipations and those of Washing- 
 ton, De Guichen's whole fleet had returned to 
 Europe. Some slight redistribution of cruisers, 
 the more frequent capture of privateers, with in- 
 creased security to the trade of New^ York and 
 incidental support to some rather predatory land 
 operations, were all that Rodney could show of 
 tangible consequence from his presence. Arbuth- 
 not alone was superior to Ternay if neither re- 
 ceived reinforcements. Rodney's health felt the 
 keener atmosphere, so that he had to go ashore 
 in New York, and he accepted the views ot 
 
Rodney 215 
 
 Arbuthnot as to the strength of the French 
 fleet's position in Newport, without examining 
 it himself. Had he done so, however, it is un- 
 hkely that he would have formed more stren- 
 uous purposes. The disposition of the enemy's 
 squadron there was so imposing that only the 
 genius of a Nelson, mindful as at Revel of the 
 moral influence of a great blow at a critical 
 period of the war, could have risen to the neces- 
 sity of daring such a hazard. His phrase was 
 there applicable, " Desperate affairs require des- 
 perate remedies." There is no indication of this 
 supreme element in Rodney's composition. It is 
 interesting to note, however, that personal obser- 
 vation had given conviction of success at New- 
 port to the ofificer who was afterwards Nelson's 
 gallant second at Copenhagen, — Sir Thomas 
 Graves. 
 
 This paucity of results in no way lessens the 
 merit of the movement from the West Indies to 
 the continent. It was indubitably correct in idea, 
 and, as has been pointed out, the conception was 
 Rodney's own, the possibilities were great, the 
 risk in many ways undeniable ; when these can 
 be affirmed of a military action, failure to obtain 
 results, because conditions take an improbable 
 direction, does not detract from credit. Nor 
 should the obviousness of this measure hide the 
 fact that the suggestion appears to have been 
 original with him, occurring fully developed in 
 his memorandum of May, 1778, to the Admi- 
 
2i6 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 ralty ; whether written in Paris or England does 
 not appear. The transfer of Hotham's squadron 
 to the southward in the following December, 
 1779, enabling Harrington to conquer Santa 
 Lucia, — a place insisted upon in the same mem- 
 orandum as of the first importance, — may not 
 improbably be attributed to this fruitful paper. 
 In the next year, 1 781, a detachment was again 
 sent to New York, and had Rodney been able 
 to accompany it in person there is no room 
 to doubt that he would have saved Cornwallis ; 
 reversing issues, at least momentarily, certainly 
 prolonging the w^ar, possibly deciding the contest 
 otherwise than as befell. 
 
 Rodney's return to the West Indies in Decem- 
 ber, 1780, concluded the most eventful and 
 illustriously characteristic year of his life. The 
 destruction of Langara's fleet in January, the 
 brilliant tactical displays of April 17th, and of 
 the chase manoeuvres in May, the strategic trans- 
 ference in August of a large division, unawares to 
 the enemy, from one point of the field of action 
 to another, are all feats that testify to his great 
 ability as a general officer. Nor should there be 
 left out of the account the stern dignity of con- 
 duct which assured his personal control of the 
 fleet, his certainty of touch in the face of an 
 enemy. Thus considered, it was a year full of 
 events, successful throughout as regards per- 
 sonal desert, and singularly significant of abil- 
 ity and temperament. 
 
Rodney 217 
 
 The year 1781 was far less happy, nor does the 
 great victory, which in 1782 crowned his career 
 with glory, contribute to the enhancement of 
 his professional distinction ; rather the contrary. 
 Upon reaching Barbados, December 5th, he 
 found the island shorn to the ground by the 
 noted hurricane, which in the previous October 
 had swept the Caribbean, from the Lesser Antilles 
 to Jamaica. Eight of the division left by him in 
 the West Indies had been wrecked, — two being 
 ships-of-the-line; and the efficiency of the whole 
 fleet was grievously impaired by the wide-spread 
 injury to vessels. 
 
 An event charged with more serious conse- 
 quences to himself soon followed. On the 27th 
 of January, 1781, at Barbados, despatches from 
 the Admiralty notified him that Great Britain 
 had declared war against Holland, and directed 
 him to proceed at once against the Dutch 
 shipping and West Indies. First among the 
 enumerated objects of attack was the small island 
 of St. Eustatius. This, having enjoyed the ad- 
 vantages of neutrality at a time when almost the 
 whole Caribbean was in hostilities, had become a 
 depot for the accumulation and distribution of 
 stores, commercial and warlike. Ostensibly, it 
 served all parties, giving to and receiving from 
 Europe, America, and the Caribbean alike. The 
 political sympathies of Holland, however, and it 
 may be added those of the West Indies in gen- 
 eral, even of the British islands themselves, were 
 
2 1 8 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 rather adverse to Great Britain in the current 
 struggle ; and this, combined with the greater 
 self-sufficinc:ness of the British naval and commer- 
 cial administration, had made the neutral support 
 of St. Eustatius more benevolent, and much more 
 useful, to the enemies of Great Britain, includ- 
 ing the revolted colonists, than it was to the 
 mother country. Rodney asserted that help 
 from there was readily forth-coming to supply 
 French and Spanish requirements, while profes- 
 sions of inability abounded whenever his fleet 
 made a demand in occasional emergencies. 
 
 He was therefore full of s:all ao^ainst the island 
 and its merchants, the more so because he sus- 
 pected that British subjects, unpatriotically ardent 
 for gain, were largely concerned in maintaining 
 conditions thus hurtful to their country ; and, 
 when the orders to act came, it needed but three 
 days for himself and General Vaughan to sail 
 on an errand of which they probably had previ- 
 ous intimations. On the 3d of February they 
 arrived off St. Eustatius, which in the face of 
 their imposing force submitted at once. They 
 took possession of the island, with goods stored 
 to the estimated value of ^3,000,000, — an im- 
 mense spoil in those days. A Dutch ship-of-war, 
 with a hundred and fifty sail of traders of various 
 nationalities, were also seized; while a convoy of 
 thirty merchant ships, which had sailed thirty-six 
 hours before, was pursued and captured by a 
 British detachment, — the Dutch admiral com- 
 
Rodney 219 
 
 manding the ships-of-war being killed in the at- 
 tendant action. 
 
 From one point of view this was an enormous 
 success, though unproductive of glory. It de- 
 stroyed at a blow a centre of commerce and sup- 
 ply powerfully contributive to the maintenance of 
 the enemies of Great Britain ; both to their 
 hostile operations, and to the indirect but no less 
 vital financial support that trade gives to national 
 endurance, — to the sinews of war. Besides this, 
 however, there was the unprecedented immediate 
 booty, transferable as so much asset to the 
 conquerors. It was upon this present tangible 
 result that Rodney's imagination fastened, with 
 an engrossment and tenacity that constitute a 
 revelation of character. It perverted his under- 
 standing of conditions, and paralyzed his proper 
 action as commander-in-chief. It is needless in 
 this connection to consider whether it was the 
 matter of personal profit, through legitimate prize- 
 money, that thus influenced him, — an effect to 
 some extent pardonable in a man who had long 
 suffered, and still was suffering, from pecuniary 
 straitness, — or whether, as he loudly protested, 
 it was the interest to the nation that made his 
 personal superintendence of the proceeds impera- 
 tive. In either case the point to be noted is not 
 a palpable trait of covetousness, — if such it were, 
 — but the limitation to activity occasioned by 
 preoccupation with a realized, but imperfect, suc- 
 cess. The comparatively crude impression of 
 
220 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 greediness, produced by apparent absorption in a 
 mere money gain, has prevented the perception 
 of this more important and decisive element in 
 Rodney's official character, revealed at St. Eusta- 
 tius and confirmed on the evening of the 12th of 
 April. What he had won, he had won ; what 
 more he might and should do, he would not see, 
 nor would he risk. 
 
 His discontent with his junior flag-officers in 
 the West Indies, and the peculiar demoralization 
 of professional tone at the moment, had made it 
 difficult for the Admiralty to provide him a sat- 
 isfactory second in command. In order to do 
 this, they had " to make a promotion," as the 
 phrase went ; that is, in order to get the man 
 wanted, the seniors on the captains' list were pro- 
 moted down to and including him. The choice 
 had fallen on Sir Samuel Hood, — in later days 
 Nelson's honored Lord Hood, — than which none 
 could have been happier in respect of capacity. 
 It has been truly said that he was as able as 
 Rodney, and more energetic ; but even this falls 
 short of his merit. He had an element of pro- 
 fessional — as distinguished from personal — dar- 
 ing, and an imaginative faculty that penetrated 
 the extreme possibilities of a situation, quickened 
 by the resolve, in which Rodney was deficient, to 
 have all or nothing ; and these invaluable traits 
 were balanced by the sound and accurate judg- 
 ment of a thorough seaman, without which imag- 
 ination lures to disaster. The man who as a 
 
Rodney 221 
 
 junior formed the idea of seizing De Grasse's 
 anchorage in the Chesapeake in 1781, to effect 
 the reHef of CornwalHs, and who in 1782, when 
 momentarily in chief command, illustrated the 
 idea by actual performance under similar condi- 
 tions in the West Indies, rose to heights of con- 
 ception and of achievement for which we have no 
 equivalent in Rodney's career. Unfortunately for 
 him, though thus mighty in act, opportunity for 
 great results never came to him. The hour never 
 met the man. 
 
 Hood with eight ships-of-the-line and a large 
 convoy arrived on the station in January, 1781, 
 and was at St. Eustatius with the commander-in- 
 chief when Rodney received a report, which 
 proved to be false, that eight to ten French ships- 
 of-the-line, with a numerous supply-fleet, had been 
 sighted in European waters evidently bound for 
 the West Indies. He thereupon detached Hood, 
 on February 12th, and directed him with seven- 
 teen of-the-line to await the enemy to windward 
 of Martinique, their probable destination. A 
 month later he ordered the position to be shifted 
 to leeward of the island, in front of the French 
 arsenal port, Fort Royal. Hood dissented from 
 this, remonstrating vigorously, and the event 
 proved him right; but Rodney insisted, the more 
 injudiciously in that he was throwing the tactical 
 burden upon his junior while fettering thus his 
 tactical discretion. Meantime, twenty French 
 ships-of-the-line did sail on March 2 2d for Mar- 
 
222 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 tinique, under Count De Grasse : beginning then 
 the campaign which ended in the great disaster of 
 April 12, 1782, but not until it had been signal- 
 ized by the surrender of Cornwallis, due to this 
 fleet, as Washington said. On the 28th of April 
 it came in sight of Hood ; but, owing to the lee- 
 wardly position insisted upon by Rodney, the 
 English commander could not prevent the junc- 
 tion to it of four French ships then in the port. 
 A battle followed next day, of eighteen British — 
 one having just joined — against twenty-four 
 enemies; odds which, combined with the weather 
 gage held by the French, should have insured 
 them a decisive victory. This result was pre- 
 vented by the tentative action of De Grasse, 
 encountering the tactical capacity and impertur- 
 bable self-possession of Hood. 
 
 Rodney could not have bettered Hood's man- 
 agement, though he of course attributed to him 
 the blame for results. It is evident, however, 
 that for various reasons the commander-in-chief 
 should have been with the body of his fleet. 
 Even barring certain and timely information of 
 the French coming, which Hood at least did not 
 have, there was every reasonable probability that 
 such an expedition would arrive at about the sea- 
 son it did. Hood's insight, which was adequate 
 to divining possibilities as well as to dealing with 
 ascertained conditions, had taught him that the 
 latter half of April — and not sooner — was the 
 time by which the British should be refitted, 
 
Rodney 223 
 
 provisioned and watered full, and in all respects 
 ready for prolonged operations against a powerful 
 enemy ; as well as concentrated to windward. He 
 reasoned thus from the fact that the French navy, 
 to the number of forty odd, — being the combined 
 fleets of D'Estaing from Brest and De Guichen 
 from the West Indies, —had been assembled in 
 Cadiz towards the end of 1 7S0, and did not return 
 to Brest until January, 1781. To refit, sail, and 
 reach Martinique again, would in his judgment 
 postpone arrival to the middle of April, and this 
 respite should be improved by getting the British 
 ships into the best campaigning condition, so as 
 not to be hampered in subsequent movements 
 by necessities of repair and supply. With this 
 persuasion he became eager, by the first of the 
 month, for the admiral's presence; the more so 
 because confident that, if he were on the spot, he 
 would see the necessity of changing position from 
 leeward to windward. " I begin to be extremely 
 impatient for the honour of being and acting 
 immediately under your flag, as I do not find 
 myself pleasant in being to leeward; for should an 
 enemy's fleet attempt to get into Martinique, and 
 the commander of it inclines to avoid battle, 
 nothing but a skirmish will probably happen, 
 which in its consequences may operate as a defeat 
 to the British squadron, though not a ship is lost 
 and the enemy suffer most." 
 
 This is a clear case in which events that actu- 
 ally befell were foreseen; not by supernatural 
 
224 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 illumination, but by the clear light of unbiassed 
 reason acting upon evident considerations. 
 There was but a skirmish, the British did suffer 
 badly, and the consequences were equivalent to 
 defeat ; for, had the whole British force of the 
 line been present to windward, it would have 
 prevented the junction of the French, and there- 
 fore have been so nearly equal to the main body 
 as to have assured an action inflicting very 
 serious injury, incapacitating the enemy for the 
 attacks upon Santa Lucia and Tobago, before 
 which the latter fell, and not improbably deter- 
 ring De Grasse from the expedition to the Chesa- 
 peake which forced the capitulation of Cornwallis. 
 Such deductions are of course dependent upon 
 the contingencies inseparable from warfare. 
 They are not certainties, indeed ; but they are 
 inferences of very great probability. So much 
 hinged upon the presence of an officer with the 
 full discretion denied to Hood ; of the officer 
 ]:)rimarily responsible for the fleet, which was 
 intrusted to him and not to another. 
 
 Probable also is Hood's solution of Rodney's 
 persistence in remaining at St. Eustatius, and 
 keeping the squadron under the command of his 
 second to leeward of Martinique. He was pos- 
 sessed with the fancied paramount necessity of 
 protecting St. Eustatius against a sudden attack 
 by the enemy, which he imagined might be sup- 
 ported by the small division in Fort Royal ; and 
 the value of the booty shut his eyes to every other 
 
Rodney 225 
 
 consideration. As on the evening of the 12th 
 of April, the great day of glory in his career, the 
 captures already made assumed sufificiency in 
 his eyes, and co-operating with surmisings as to 
 what the beaten and scattered French mi^ht do 
 deterred him from further action; so now the 
 prize already secured at St. Eustatius combined 
 with the imaginative " picture he made for him- 
 self" — to use Napoleon's phrase — of its pos- 
 sible dangers, to blind him to the really decisive 
 needs of the situation. It is clear, however, that 
 local naval provision for the safety of a petty 
 island was in point of difHculty, as of conse- 
 quence, a secondary matter, within the compe- 
 tence of many of his captains ; and that the 
 primary factor, on which all depended, was the 
 control of the sea, by the British fleet predomi- 
 nating over the enemy's. Consequently the 
 commander-in-chief should have been where his 
 second w^as, at the centre of decisive action, 
 where an enemy's fleet was to be expected. 
 
 This was the more incumbent because Rodney 
 himself, writing to Admiral Parker in Jamaica on 
 April 1 6th, said, "As the enemy hourly expect 
 a great fleet in these seas, I have scarcely a 
 sufficient number of line-of-battle-ships to block- 
 ade the island of Martinique, or to engage the 
 enemy's fleet should they appear, if their number 
 should be so large as reported," — twenty-four. 
 This report came from French sources, and it 
 will be noted, from the date of his letter, was in 
 
 IS 
 
226 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 his possession twelve days before the enemy 
 arrived. It was both specific and antecedently 
 probable, and should have determined the ad- 
 miral's action. Whether he had similar news 
 from home does not appear. Sandwich writing 
 him on March 21st, the day before the French 
 left Brest, professed ignorance of their destination, 
 but added, " the most prevailing and most probable 
 opinion is that they are to go to the West India 
 Islands, and afterwards to North America." 
 Their number he estimated at twenty-five, which 
 tallied with Rodney's intelligence of twenty-four. 
 The latter was exact, save that four were armed 
 en flute; that is, as transports, with their guns 
 below, to be subsequently mounted. Despite 
 everything, the admiral remained at St. Eustatius 
 until May 4th, when the arrival of a crippled ship 
 from Hood brought him the news of the skirmish. 
 He was attending, doubtless, to details pertaining 
 to his command, but he was chiefly occupied with 
 the disposition of the property seized on the 
 island ; a matter which he afterwards found to 
 his cost would have been much better committed 
 to administrators skilled in the law. " Had they 
 abided by the first plan settled before I left them," 
 wrote Hood, "and not have interfered, but have 
 left the manascement to the land and sea folk 
 appointed for that purpose, all would have gone 
 smooth and easy." 
 
 However this might have proved, the immedi- 
 ate supervision of the island and its spoils was no 
 
Rodney 227 
 
 business for a commander-in-chief in active war 
 time; particularly when it entailed leaving the 
 charge of his main fleet, at a critical moment, to 
 a junior admiral of very recent appointment, and 
 still unproved. It was not the separate import- 
 ance of the position intrusted to Hood that made 
 it peculiarly the station for the commander-in- 
 chief. It might have been intrinsically as im- 
 portant, yet relatively secondary ; but actually it 
 was the centre and key upon which, and upon 
 which alone, the campaign could turn and did 
 turn. Neither was the question one of the rela- 
 tive merits, as yet unknown, of Rodney and 
 Hood. A commander-in-chief cannot devolve 
 his own proper functions upon a subordinate, 
 however able, without graver cause than can be 
 shown in this instance. The infatuation which 
 detained Rodney at a side issue can only be ex- 
 cused — not justified — by a temporary inability 
 to see things in their true proportion, induced on 
 more than one occasion by a temperamental 
 defect, — the lack of the single eye to military 
 considerations, — which could find contentment 
 in partial success, and be indifferent to further 
 results to be secured by sustained action. 
 
 There is a saying, apt to prove true, that war 
 does not forgive. For his initial error Rodney 
 himself, and the British campaign in general, 
 paid heavily throughout the year 1781. The 
 French fleet in undiminished vigor lay a dead 
 weight upon all his subsequent action, which, 
 
228 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 like the dispositions prior to its arrival, under- 
 went the continued censure of Hood; acrid, yet 
 not undiscriminating nor misplaced. As already 
 observed, the surrender of Cornwallis can with 
 probability be ascribed to this loss of an oppor- 
 tunity afforded to strike a blow at the outset, 
 when the enemy was as yet divided, embarrassed 
 with convoy, raw in organization and drill, in all 
 which it could not but improve as the months 
 passed. The results began at once to be ap- 
 parent, and embarrassments accumulated with 
 time. Hood's ships, though no one was wholly 
 disabled, had suffered very considerably; and, 
 while indispensable repairs could temporarily be 
 made, efficiency was affected. They needed, be- 
 sides, immediate water and supplies, as Rodney 
 himself stated — a want which Hood would have 
 anticipated. To increase difficulty, the French 
 mounted the batteries of the vessels enfiute, and 
 so raised their total nominal force to twenty-eight. 
 Hood was unable to regain Santa Lucia, because 
 his crippled ships could not beat against the 
 current. He therefore left it to itself, and bore 
 away to the northward, where he joined Rodney 
 on May nth, between St. Kitts and Antigua. 
 The campaign of 1781, destined to be wholly de- 
 fensive for the British, opened under these odds, 
 the responsibility for which lies in considerable 
 measure on Rodney. 
 
 After the junction, the British fleet went to 
 Barbados, where it arrived May iSth. Mean- 
 
Rodney 229 
 
 time, the French had proceeded in force against 
 Santa Lucia, landing a considerable body of 
 troops, and investing the island with twenty-five 
 sail-of-the-line, two of which with 1300 soldiers 
 went on to attempt the British Tobago. The 
 attack on Santa Lucia failed, and the French re- 
 turned to Martinique; but learning there that 
 Rodney was at sea, heading southward, De Grasse 
 became alarmed for his detachment at Tobago, 
 and moved to its support with his entire fleet. 
 Rodney, knowing of the detachment only, sent 
 against it six ships under Rear Admiral Drake ; 
 a half-measure severely censured by Hood, whose 
 comments throughout indicate either a much su- 
 perior natural sagacity, or else the clearer insight 
 of a man whose eye dwells steadfastly on the mili- 
 tary situation, untroubled by conflicting claims. 
 " What a wonderful happy turn would have been 
 given to the King's affairs in this country had Sir 
 George Rodney gone with his whole force to 
 Tobago as soon as he might, and in my humble 
 opinion ought to have done. Nay, had he even 
 gone when Mr. Drake did, the island would have 
 been saved. I laboured much to effect it, but all 
 in vain, and fully stated my reasons in writing as 
 soon as the intelligence came. Every ship there 
 with all the troops must have fallen into our hands 
 two days before De Grasse got there with his 
 twenty-one sail ; " to which Rodney, in full strength, 
 would again have opposed twenty. " Now the 
 enemy may do as they will ; " for they were united 
 
230 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 in Martinique, twenty-eight to twenty. In short, 
 Rodney saw at Tobago only the one French 
 detachment; Hood saw therein the definition of 
 the enemy's purpose, the necessity laid on them 
 to fly to the aid of their exposed division, and the 
 chance to anticipate them, — to gain an advan- 
 tage first, and to beat them afterwards. 
 
 Rodney's tentative and inadequate action was 
 not improbably induced partly by the "extreme 
 want of water," which he reported in his de- 
 spatches; and this again was due to failure to 
 prepare adequately during the period of respite 
 foreseen by Hood, but unnoted by his own pre- 
 occupied mind. The result is instructive. Drake 
 fell in with the main body of the French, and of 
 course had to retire, — fortunate in regaining 
 his commander-in-chief unmolested. De Grasse's 
 movement had become known in Barbados, and 
 as soon as Drake appeared Rodney sailed with 
 the fleet, but upon arriving off Tobago, on June 
 5th, learned that it had surrendered on the 2d. Its 
 fall he duly attributed to local neglect and cow- 
 ardice ; but evidently the presence of the British 
 fleet might have had some effect. He then re- 
 turned to Barbados, and during the passage the 
 hostile fleets sighted each other on the 9th, — 
 twenty British to twenty-three French; but Rod- 
 ney w^as unwilling to engage lest he might be 
 entangled with the foul ground about Grenada. 
 As that island was then in the enemy's hands, he 
 could get no anchorage there, and so might be 
 
Rodney 231 
 
 driven to leeward of his opponent, exposing Bar- 
 bados. It is perhaps needless to point out that 
 had he been to windward of Martinique when De 
 Grasse first arrived, as Hood wished, he would 
 have been twenty to twenty, with clear ground, 
 and the antagonist embarrassed with convoy. 
 His present perplexities, in their successive 
 phases, can be seen throughout to be the result 
 of sticking to St. Eustatius, not only physically, 
 but mentally. 
 
 And so it was with what followed. On reach- 
 ing Barbados again, he had to report that the 
 French were back in Martinique, and now twenty- 
 eight through the arming of the ships en flute. 
 Despite their superiority, " they do not venture 
 to move," he said somewhat sneeringly, and doubt- 
 less his " fleet in being " had an effect on them ; 
 but they were also intent on a really great 
 operation. On July 5th, De Grasse sailed for 
 Cap Fran9ois in Hayti, there to organize a visit 
 to the continent in support of Washington's 
 operations. Rodney, pursuant to his sagacious 
 plan of the previous years, sent also a detach- 
 ment of fourteen ships under Hood, which he 
 endeavored, but unsuccessfully, to have increased 
 by some from Jamaica. That De Grasse would 
 take his whole fleet to North America, leaving 
 none in the West Indies, nor sending any to 
 Europe, was a step that neither Rodney nor 
 Hood foresaw. The miscalculation cannot be 
 imputed to either as an error at this time. It 
 
232 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 was simply one of the deceptions to which the 
 defensive is ever liable; but it is fairly chargeable 
 to the original fault whereby the French admiral 
 was enabled to enter Fort Royal uninjured in 
 the previous April. From the time his fleet 
 was concentrated, the British had to accept the 
 defensive with its embarrassments. 
 
 Rodney had contemplated going in person with 
 his ships, which Sandwich also had urged upon 
 him ; but his health was seriously impaired, and 
 the necessity for a surgical operation combined 
 to induce his return to England. The final deci- 
 sion on this point he postponed to the last mo- 
 ment of the homeward voyage, keeping a frigate 
 in company in which to go to New York, if 
 able ; but ultimately he felt compelled to give 
 up. This conclusion settled Cornwallis's fate, 
 antecedently but finally. That year Great Britain 
 fell between two stools. In view of De Grasses 
 known expressions, it may be afifirmed with great 
 confidence that he would have seen reason to 
 abandon the Chesapeake, leaving open the sea- 
 road for Cornwallis to escape, had either Rodney 
 or Hood commanded the British fleet there in 
 the battle of September 5th; but Rodney was 
 away, and Hood second only to an incompetent 
 superior. 
 
 Rodney landed in England, September 19th, 
 and was again afloat by December 12th, although 
 he did not finally sail for his station until the 
 middle of January, 1782. This brief period was 
 
"Rodney 233 
 
 one of the deepest military depression ; for during 
 it occurred Cornwallis's surrender, October 19th, 
 under conditions of evident British inferiority, 
 on sea and shore ahke, which enforced the con- 
 viction that the colonies must be granted their 
 independence. Not only so, but the known 
 extensive preparations of the Bourbon courts 
 pointed to grave danger also for the Caribbean 
 colonies, the sugar and import trade of which 
 counted largely in the financial resources of the 
 empire. Amid the general gloom Rodney had 
 his own special vexation ; for, before he left, news 
 was received of the recapture of St. Eustatius 
 by a small French expedition, prior to the re- 
 turn of Hood to the West Indies from the un- 
 fortunate operations on the continent. As in 
 the case of Tobago, Rodney severely blamed the 
 local defence, and very possibly justly ; but atten- 
 tion should not wander from the effect that must 
 have been produced upon all subsequent con- 
 ditions by preparation and action on the part of 
 the British fleet, in the spring of 1781, on the 
 lines then favored by Hood. 
 
 Shortly before he had sailed for home, Rod- 
 ney had written his wife, "In all probability, the 
 enemy, when they leave these seas, will go to 
 America. Wherever they go, I will watch their 
 motions, and certainly attack them if they give 
 me a proper opportunity. The fate of England 
 may depend upon the event." The last sentence 
 was in measure a prophecy, so far, that is, as 
 
234 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 decisive of the original issue at stake, — the sub- 
 jugation or independence of the United Col- 
 onies; but, without further laboring the point 
 unduly, it may be permitted here to sum up 
 what has been said, with the remark that in the 
 summer of 1781 control of events had passed out 
 of Rodney's hands. From the time of the original 
 fault, in suffering the French to meet Hood to 
 leeward of Martinique, with an inferior force, 
 more and more did it become impossible to him 
 to assure conditions sufficiently favorable. With 
 the highest personal courage, he did not have 
 eminent professional daring ; nor, with consider- 
 able tactical acquirement, was he gifted with 
 that illuminative originality which characterized 
 Hood and Nelson. He therefore needed either 
 a reasonable probability of success, or the spur 
 of imminent emergency, to elicit the kind of 
 action needed to save the British cause. The 
 chances to windward of Martinique would have 
 been ninety out of a hundred ; from that time 
 forward they diminished with continually increas- 
 ing rapidity. With such a situation he was not 
 the man to cope. 
 
 On reaching Barbados, February 19, 1782, 
 Rodney learned that the garrison of St. Kitts 
 was besieged in Brimstone Hill, and the island 
 itself beleaguered by the French fleet, thirty- 
 three of-the-line, which Sir Samuel Hood, with 
 two thirds their number, had so far held in check 
 by a series of mana'uvres unusually acute in con- 
 
Rodney 235 
 
 ception and brilliant in execution. Proceeding 
 immediately to Antigua, he there heard on the 
 23d that St. Kitts had capitulated on the 13th. 
 Two days later he was joined by Hood, and then 
 took the united fleet to Santa Lucia, where he 
 was on March 5th. The knowledge of a large 
 supply fleet expected for the French, and essen- 
 tial to the known project of the allies against 
 Jamaica, carried the British fleet again to sea; 
 but it failed to intercept the convoy, and returned 
 once more to Santa Lucia, where it anchored in 
 Gros Ilet Bay, thirty miles from Fort Royal, 
 where the French were lying. Various changes 
 made the respective numbers, when operations 
 opened, British thirty-six of-the-line, French 
 thirty-iive, with two fifty-gun ships ; a near ap- 
 proach to equality. 
 
 Rodney's faculties were now all alert. He had 
 had some needed repose, and he was again under 
 the stimulus of reputation to restore ; for it would 
 have been vain to assert, even to himself, that he 
 was entirely clear, not merely of error, to which 
 the most careful is liable, but of serious fault in 
 the previous year. Moreover, he had been 
 sharply assailed in Parliament for the transac- 
 tions at St. Eustatius on the civil side, distinct 
 from his military conduct. To such ills there is 
 no plaster so healing as a victory ; and the occa- 
 sion about to arise proved, in its successive stages, 
 — until the last, — admirably adapted to his 
 natural and acquired qualifications. First, a 
 
2^6 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 series of manoeuvres protracted over three or four 
 days; and afterwards a hard fought battle, con- 
 verted by a happy yet by no means unusual acci- 
 dent into a decided and showy success. Decided, 
 but not decisive; for, like the soldier desperate 
 in deed before rewarded, but who, when sum- 
 moned again, advised that the chance be given to 
 a man who had not a purse of gold, Rodney pre- 
 ferred to pause on that personally safe side of 
 moderation in achievement which is rarely con- 
 ducive to finality, and is now^hcre so ill-placed as 
 in the aims of a commander-in-chief. The true 
 prudence of war, — as it is also its mercy, to 
 friend and to foe, — is to strike without cessation 
 or slackness till power of future action is crushed. 
 
 De Grasse's immediate task was to protect a 
 large convoy from Martinique to Cap Frangois 
 (now Cap Haytien), in Hayti, a distance of about 
 a thousand miles. Cumbered with merchant 
 vessels, and aware that Rodney would be at once 
 on his track, he could not go straight across the 
 Caribbean ; the British fleet, not so hampered, 
 would be sure to overtake and destroy. He 
 purposed, therefore, to skirt the Antilles, keep- 
 ing continually in reach of a port of refuge. 
 Rodney, knowing the aim to be Jamaica, had 
 little doubt of overtaking in any case, if started 
 promptly. He therefore kept himself in signal 
 touch of Fort Royal by a chain of frigates, ex- 
 tending from its offing to his own anchorage. 
 
 On the 8th of April the French sailed. The 
 
Rodney 237 
 
 British followed instantly, and before sundown 
 had them in sight, not only by lookout vessels, 
 but from the mastheads of the main fleet. At 
 daybreak next morning they were visible from 
 the decks of the British van; a very marked gain. 
 De Grasse saw that at that rate, unless he got rid 
 of the convoy, he would certainly be overtaken, 
 which it was his aim to elude in pursuance of the 
 usual French policy of ulterior purposes; so, 
 beins: then north of Dominica, he sent the mer- 
 chant vessels into Guadaloupe, and undertook 
 to carry the ships-of-war through the passage 
 between the two islands, beating to windward. 
 This would draw the British away from the con- 
 voy, unless they were content to let the fleet go, 
 which was not to be expected. 
 
 Between 8 a. m. and 2 p. m. of April 9th, sev- 
 eral sharp skirmishes took place between the 
 French and the British van, under Hood.^ De 
 Grasse had here an opportunity of crushing a 
 fraction of the enemy, but failed to use it, thus 
 insuring his own final discomfiture. Rodney, 
 who was becalmed with the centre and rear of 
 his command, could do nothing but push forward 
 reinforcements to Hood as the wind served; and 
 this he did. Pursuit was maintained tenaciously 
 during the following night and the next two days, 
 
 1 The writer does not purpose to give an account of these actions, 
 except so far as Rodney himself is concerned. They can be found In 
 Mahan's " Influence of Sea Power upon History," pp. 480-495, or in the 
 " History of the Royal Navy," (Sampson Low, Marston & Co.), edited 
 by Mr. W. Laird Clowes, vol. iii. pp. 520-535. 
 
238 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 — April loth and i ith ; but in sustained chases of 
 bodies of ships, the chased continually drops units, 
 which must be forsaken or else the retreat of the 
 whole must be retarded. So in this case, certain 
 of De Grasses ships were either so leewardly or 
 so ill handled that the bulk of the fleet, which 
 had gained considerably to wdndward, had to bear 
 down to them, thus losing the ground won. 
 Under such circumstances the chapter of acci- 
 dents — or of incidents — frequently introduces 
 great results ; and so it proved here. 
 
 At 2 A. M. of April 12th, De Grasse's flag-ship, 
 the Ville de Paris, and the seventy-four-gun ship 
 Zele, crossing on opposite tacks, came into collision. 
 The former received little damage, but the Zele 
 lost her foremast and bowsprit. De Grasse then 
 ordered her into Guadaloupe, in tow of a frigate. 
 When day broke, about five o'clock, these two were 
 only about six miles from the British rear, under 
 Hood, whose division had been shifted from the 
 van in consequence of injuries received on the 
 9th. The British column was then standing 
 east-northeast, closehauled on the starboard tack, 
 the crippled vessel under its lee, but the French 
 of the main body well to windward. To draw 
 them within reach, Rodney signalled Hood to 
 send chasers after the Zcle. De Grasse took the 
 bait and ran down to her support, ordering his 
 ships to form linc-of-battle on the port tack, which 
 was done hastily and tumultuously. The two 
 lines on which the antagonists were respectively 
 
Rodney 239 
 
 advancing now pointed to a common and not 
 distant point of intersection, which the French, 
 despite the loss of ground already undergone, 
 reached first, passing in front and to windward of 
 the head of the British column. Eight ships thus 
 went by clear, but the ninth arrived at the same 
 moment with the leading British vessel, which 
 put her helm up and ran along close to leeward 
 of the French line towards its rear, followed in 
 so doing by the rest of her fleet. 
 
 The battle thus assumed the phase of two 
 fleets passing each other in opposite directions, 
 on parallel lines; a condition usually unproduc- 
 tive of results, and amounting to little more than 
 a brush, as had been the case in two rencounters 
 between Rodney and De Guichen in the pro- 
 longed chase of May, 1 780. Chance permitted a 
 different issue on this occasion. The wind at 
 the moment of first collision, shortly before 8 
 A.M., was east, and so continued till five minutes 
 past nine, when it shifted suddenly to the south- 
 eastward, ahead for the French, abaft for the 
 British. The former, being already close to the 
 wind, could keep their sails full only by bearing 
 away, which broke up their line ahead, the order 
 of battle as ranged for mutual support; while 
 the British being able to luff could stand into the 
 enemy's line. Rodney's flag-ship, the Formidable, 
 90, was just drawing up with the Glorieux, 74, 
 nineteenth from the van in the French order and 
 fourth astern of the Ville de Paris, De Grasse's 
 
240 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 flag-ship. Luffing to the new wind, she passed 
 through the French Hne at this point, followed 
 by the five ships astern of her; while the sixth 
 astern, the Bedford, 74, luffing on her own ac- 
 count, broke also throus^h the French astern of 
 the Cesar and the Hector, 74's, eleventh and 
 twelfth in their order. The twelve British vessels 
 in rear of the Bedford followed in her wake. 
 Hood was in one of these, the Barfieiir, 90. Of 
 the ships ahead of Rodney the nearest one imi- 
 tated his example instantly and went through 
 the line; the remainder, sixteen in all, continued 
 northward for a space. 
 
 These sudden and unexpected movements over- 
 powered the Cesar, Hector, and Glorietix under a 
 weight of successive broadsides that completely 
 crushed them, separated De Grasse with six com- 
 panion vessels from his van and his rear, and 
 placed the British main body to windward of the 
 French. Both sides were disordered, but the 
 French were not only disordered but severed, into 
 three formless groups, not to be united except by 
 a good breeze and exceeding good management, 
 neither of which was forthcoming. Even to 
 frame a plan operative under such conditions re- 
 quires in an admiral accuracy of judgment and 
 readiness rarely bestowed; but to communicate 
 his designs and enforce execution upon captains 
 under such a staggering shock of disaster is even 
 more uncommon of accomplishment. During the 
 remainder of the day light airs from the eastward 
 
Rodney 241 
 
 prevailed, interspersed with frequent calms ; con- 
 ditions unfavorable to movement of any kind, but 
 far more to the French, deprived of concert of 
 purpose, than to the British, whose general course 
 was sufficiently defined by the confusion of the 
 enemy, and the accident of a small group sur- 
 rounding their commander-in-chief, to capture 
 whom was always a recognized principal object. 
 The very feebleness of the breeze favored them 
 by comparison ; for they had but to go before 
 it with all their light sails, while their opponents, 
 in order to join, were constrained to lateral move- 
 ment, which did not allow the same canvas. 
 
 There was, in short, during the rest of the day 
 an unusual opportunity for success, on such a 
 scale as should be not only brilliant, but really 
 decisive of the future course of the war ; oppor- 
 tunity to inflict a maritime blow from which the 
 enemy could not recover. Does it need to say 
 clearly that here the choice was between a per- 
 sonal triumph, already secured for the successful 
 admiral, and the general security of the nation 
 by the "annihilation " — the word is Nelson's — 
 of the enemy ? That Rodney thus phrased the 
 alternative to himself is indeed most unlikely; 
 but that he failed to act efficiently, to rise to 
 an emergency, for the possible occurrence of 
 which he had had ample time as well as warning 
 to prepare, is but too certain. Even after the 
 British had got to windward of the enemy and 
 seen their disorder, although the signal for the 
 
 16 
 
242 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 line was hauled down, none was made for a gen- 
 eral chase. That for close action, hoisted at i 
 p. M., was discontinued thirty minutes later, when 
 five full hours of daylight remained. Even in 
 example the admiral was slack, by Hood's ac- 
 count. " He pursued only under topsails (some- 
 times his foresail set, and at other times his miz- 
 zen topsail aback) the greatest part of the after- 
 noon, though the frying enemy had all the sail set 
 their very shattered state would allow." Hood, 
 curbed by his superior's immediate presence, 
 did what he could by putting all sail on the 
 BarJIeiir, and signalling the various ships of his 
 personal command to do the same ; " not one but 
 chased in the afternoon with studding sails below 
 and aloft." It was bare poetic justice, therefore, 
 that the Ville de Paris, the great prize of the 
 day, though surrounded by numerous foes, struck 
 formally to him. 
 
 The Hector, Cesar, and Glorteux, already par- 
 alyzed ere the chase began, were the only results 
 of this languid movement, except the French 
 flag-ship and the Ardeiit, 64. The latter was 
 taken because, notwithstanding her being an in- 
 different sailer, she gallantly tried to pass from 
 her own division, the van, to support her com- 
 mander-in-chief in his extremity. It was 6.29 p. m. 
 when the Ville de Paris struck ; sixteen minutes 
 later, 6.45, Rodney made signal to bring-to for 
 the night — to give over pursuit. Only the Ville 
 de Paris and the Ardent can be considered to 
 
Rodney 243 
 
 have been secured by following, after the battle 
 proper closed. 
 
 Nor was any other attempt made to profit by 
 the victory. On the 13th the fleet began to 
 move very slowly towards Jamaica, the local pro- 
 tection of which had become imperative through 
 the failure to annihilate the enemy, who must 
 now go to leeward — to Hayti ; but after four 
 hours Rodney brought-to again, and on the i6th, 
 according to Hood, was in " the exact same spot 
 off Guadaloupe. It has indeed been calm some 
 part of the time, but we might have been more 
 than twenty leagues farther to the westward." 
 The Cesar having been accidentally burned on the 
 night of the battle, the prizes Hector 2iV\A Glorieux 
 were sent ahead in charge of three ships-of-the- 
 line. This was a questionable disposition, as they 
 were advancing in the direction of the enemy, 
 without being covered by the interposition of 
 the main fleet. The Ville de Paris Rodney kept 
 close by his own side, unable to tear himself from 
 her ; so at least said Hood, who " would to God 
 she had sunk the moment she had yielded to the 
 arms of His Majesty," for " we would then have 
 had a dozen better ships in lieu of her." Rodney 
 was so tickled with her that he "can talk of 
 nothing else, and says he will hoist his flag on 
 board of her." 
 
 On April 17th Hood, having vainly urged his 
 commander to improve the situation by more en- 
 ergetic action, represented to him that the small 
 
244 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 detachment convoying the Hector and Glorie2ix 
 might fall in with a superior enemy, if not sup- 
 ported. Rodney then directed him to go ahead 
 with ten ships until as far as Altavela, midway 
 on the south side of Santo Domingo, where he 
 was to await the main body. Hood gave a wide 
 construction to these orders, and pushed for the 
 Mona Passage, between Santo Domingo and 
 Porto Rico, where on the 19th he intercepted two 
 sixty-four gun ships, and two smaller cruisers. In 
 reporting this incident to Rodney, he added, " It 
 is a very mortifying circumstance to relate to 
 you, Sir, that the French fleet which you put to 
 flight on the 12th went through the IMona Chan- 
 nel on the 1 8th, only the day before I was in it." 
 That sustained vigorous chase could not have 
 been fruitless is further shown by the fact that 
 Rodney himself, deliberately as he moved, appar- 
 ently lying-to each night of the first half-dozen 
 succeeding the battle, reached Jamaica three days 
 only after the main body of the defeated French 
 gained Cap Fran9ois, though they had every 
 motive to speed. 
 
 Of the reasons for such lethargic action, wholly 
 inconsistent with true military principle, and bit- 
 terly criticised by Hood, — who afhrmed that 
 twenty ships might have been taken, — Rodney 
 drew up an express account, which cannot be 
 considered as adequate to his justification. In 
 this he argued that, if he had pursued, the enemy, 
 who " went off in a close connected body, might 
 
Rodney 245 
 
 have defeated by rotation the ships that had 
 come up with them, and thereby exposed the 
 British fleet, after a victory, to a defeat." " They 
 went off in a body of twenty-six ships-of-the- 
 line, and might, by ordering two or three of their 
 best-saihng ships or frigates to have shown lights 
 at times, and by changing their course, have in- 
 duced the British fleet to have followed them, 
 while the main of their fleet, by hiding their 
 lights, might have hauled their wind, have been 
 far to windward before daylight, and intercepted 
 the captured ships, and the most crippled ships of 
 the English;" and he even conceived that, as the 
 main body of the British would at the same time 
 have gone far to leeward, the French, regaining 
 their own ports in Guadaloupe and Martinique, 
 might have taken Antigua, Barbados, and Santa 
 Lucia. 
 
 The principal impression produced by this for- 
 mal summary of reasons is that of unwisdom 
 after the event, and that it was elicited by the 
 remonstrances of Hood to himself, which are 
 known to have voiced discontent prevalent in 
 the fleet, and rendered some ready reply expe- 
 dient. The substance of them, when analyzed, 
 is that war must be rendered effective by not 
 running risks, and that calculation to that effect 
 is to be made by attributing every chance and 
 advantage to the enemy, and none to one's self. 
 Further, no account is to be taken of that most 
 notable factor, ultimate risk, — as distinguished 
 
246 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 from present risk. This phantasm, of the sudden 
 assumption of the offensive by a beaten and dis- 
 ordered fleet, which, through the capture of its 
 chief, had changed commanders at nightfall, is 
 as purely and mischievously imaginative as the 
 fiction, upon which it rests, of the close con- 
 nected body. Instead of being close-connected, 
 the French were scattered hopelessly, utterly 
 disabled for immediate, or even proximate, re- 
 sistance to a well sustained chase and attack. 
 During the next twenty-four hours their new ad- 
 miral had with him but ten ships; and only five 
 joined in the following twelve days, to April 25th, 
 when he reached Cap Fran9ois, where four more 
 were found. Six others had strayed to Cura9ao, 
 six hundred miles distant, whence they did not 
 rejoin the flag until May. Neither in Rodney's 
 surmises, nor in the actual facts of the case, is to 
 be found any reasonable excuse for failure to ob- 
 serve the evident military duty of keeping touch 
 with the enemy during the dark hours, — " pur- 
 sue under easy sail," to use Hood's words, " so as 
 never to have lost sight of the enemy in the 
 night," — with a view to resume the engagement 
 next day, at farthest. This, and to regain to 
 windward, were as feasible to the victor as to the 
 vanquished. 
 
 A truer explanation of this grave negligence is 
 to be found in Rodney's more casual words re- 
 corded by Hood. " I lamented to Sir George on 
 the twelfth that the signal for a general chase 
 
Rodney 247 
 
 was not made when that for the line was hauled 
 down, and that he did not continue to pursue so 
 as to keep sight of the enemy all night; to which 
 he only answered, ' Come, we have done very 
 handsomely as it is.' I could therefore say no 
 more upon the subject." He did, however, re- 
 sume the subject with Sir Charles Douglas, the 
 chief of staff. Douglas was of the same opinion 
 as Hood, and for making the suggestion at the 
 proper moment had been snubbed by Rodney, 
 who had established over him a domination of 
 manner which precluded proper insistence, or 
 even due representation, such as became his ofHce. 
 " His answer was, ' Sir George chose to pursue in 
 a body; '" that is, in regular order, not by general 
 chase. " ' Why, Sir Charles,' I replied, ' if that 
 was Sir George's wish, could it have been more 
 effectually complied with than by the signal for a 
 general chase, with proper attention ? Because, if 
 a ship is too wide on the starboard wing, you 
 have a signal to make her steer more to port. If a 
 ship is too wide on the larboard wing, you have a 
 signal to make her steer more to starboard. If 
 a ship is too far ahead, you can by signal make 
 her shorten sail,' " etc. This by daylight ; while, 
 '"if Sir George was unwilling his ships should en- 
 gage in the night, there is a signal to call every 
 ship in, and, that followed by the one for the 
 form of sailing, the fleet might have gone on in 
 sight of the enemy all night in the most compact 
 and safe order for completing the business most 
 
248 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 gloriously the next day.' Sir Charles walked off 
 without saying another word." There was in 
 fact nothing to say. Hood's methods were not 
 only correct, but in no respect novel. Every 
 capable officer was familiar with them before, as 
 well as after the battle. The trouble was that 
 Rodney was content with a present clear success, 
 and averse from further risk. He had reached 
 his limitations. It is known now that Douglas 
 agreed with Hood, but he was too loyal to his 
 chief to say so publicly, then or afterwards ; and 
 especially, doubtless, to so irritable a talker. 
 
 As illustrative of Rodney's professional charac- 
 ter the events of April 8th to 12th are therefore 
 unfavorable rather than the reverse. Concern- 
 ing his stronger qualities their evidence is simply 
 cumulative; the new light thrown reveals defects, 
 not unsuspected excellencies. The readiness in 
 which his fleet was held at Santa Lucia, the 
 promptness with which he followed, the general 
 conduct of the chase as far as appears, though 
 doubtless open to criticism in detail as in the ever 
 censorious remarks of Hood, — all these show 
 the same alert, accomplished, and diligent officer, 
 resolute to the utmost of his natural and ac- 
 quired faculties. It is the same after the battle 
 joins, so long as its progress does not transcend 
 his accepted ideas, — which were much in advance 
 of the great mass of his contemporaries, — though 
 under the conditions he saw no chance to apply 
 the particular methods familiar to his thought. 
 
Rodney 249 
 
 But when sudden opportunity offered, of a 
 kind he had not anticipated, he is found unequal 
 to it. Neither natural temper, nor acquired 
 habit of mind, respond to the call. To pass 
 through the French line, when the wind shifted, 
 was an instigation too sudden and a risk too 
 sreat for his own initiative. The balance of evi- 
 dence shows that it was due to the suggestion, 
 and even more to the pressure, of Sir Charles 
 Douglas. Carried beyond his habitual submission 
 by the impulse of a great thought, and unbur- 
 dened by the ultimate responsibility which must 
 remain with the admiral, the Captain of the Fleet 
 not only urged luffing through the enemy's line, but 
 — so the story runs — in the excitement of the 
 moment, and seeing the chance slipping past, 
 even under the then sluggish breeze, he ordered 
 the helm down. The admiral, thus faced, coun- 
 termanded the order. A moment of silence fol- 
 lowed, during which the two men stepped apart, 
 the admiral even entering the cabin, which w'ould 
 be but a few paces from the wheel. Returning, 
 he permitted Douglas to have his way ; an act 
 which, whether done courteously or grudgingly, 
 does not bespeak professional conviction, but 
 the simple acceptance of another's will in place 
 of one's own indecision. 
 
 The incident is in entire keeping with the 
 picture of Rodney's irresolution, and consequent 
 uncertain course, drawn in successive touches by 
 Hood in the hours and days succeeding the 
 
250 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 victory. Events had called him to deeds beyond 
 his limitations. Age of course counted for much; 
 fatigue, after three days of doubtful chase and 
 one of prolonged battle, for more ; but it may 
 here be recalled that an older man, after a more 
 wearisome and doubtful exposure, willed of his 
 own motion to do what Rodney left undone. 
 Sir Byam Martin has recorded,^ " After the battle 
 of the ist of June, Lord Howe was quite ex- 
 hausted, as well indeed he might, considering 
 that they had been manoeuvring and fighting for 
 three days. Although feeble in body, and so 
 exhausted as to be obliged to sit down in a chair 
 on deck, he expressed a wish to pursue the 
 flying enemy ; but Sir Roger Curtis, the Cap- 
 tain of the Fleet (Chief of Staff, as Douglas to 
 Rodney) said, ' I vow to God, my lord, if you 
 do they will turn the tables upon us.' This 
 anecdote I had from the late Admiral Bowen, 
 who was master of the Queen Charlotte and a 
 party to the conversation." Under circumstances 
 approaching similarity, — so far as North Atlantic 
 fogs and weather resemble West India climate, 
 — Howe was sixty-eight, Rodney sixty-three, at 
 the moment of testing. The one lost the sup- 
 port of the man — Curtis — upon whom he must 
 chiefly rely for observation and execution; the 
 other was urged in vain by the officer who held 
 the same relation to him. Nelson once spoke 
 
 ^ Journals of Sir T. Byam Martin, Navy Records Society, vol. iii 
 P- «37. 
 
Rodney 251 
 
 slightingly of "a Lord Howe's victory, take a 
 part, and retire into port ; " as a trait of official 
 character, however, Howe's purpose was far in 
 advance of Rodney's, as this was viewed by 
 Nelson's ideal admiral, Hood. It is now known, 
 by a letter of Nelson's very recently published, 
 that he held the same opinion of Rodney's remiss- 
 ness in this instance, although he cordially recog- 
 nized the general obligation of the country and 
 the navy to that eminent seaman. Writing in 
 1804 to his intimate friend Cornwallis, one of 
 Rodney's captains, he used these words : " On 
 the score of fighting, I believe, my dear friend, 
 that you have had your full share, and in obtain- 
 ing the greatest victory, if it had been followed 
 up, that our country ever saw." ^ It was a clear 
 case of spirit being brought into subjection to 
 form. 
 
 Rodney's professional career may be reckoned 
 to have ended with his arrival at Jamaica on the 
 29th of April. The change of ministry conse- 
 quent upon Cornwallis's surrender brought into 
 power his political opponents, and in May the 
 new Admiralty superseded him. News of the 
 victory reached England just too late to permit 
 them to revoke the order; his successor, Admiral 
 Pigot, having already sailed. On the 2 2d of 
 July Rodney left Jamaica, and on the 15th of 
 September landed at Bristol. Although not so 
 
 1 The Blockade of Brest, Navy Records Society. Introduction, 
 p. xvi. Author's italics. 
 
252 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 intended, his recall may be considered in line 
 with his proverbial good fortune. He left his 
 successor to grapple with difficulties, and with 
 numbers, the continued existence of which was 
 due chiefly to his own neglect after April 12th, 
 and by the burden of which the conditions of 
 peace were influenced adversely to Great Britain. 
 To quote again Hood's apt comment, " Had Sir 
 George Rodney's judgment, after the enemy had 
 been so totally put to flight, bore any proportion 
 to the high courage, zeal and exertion, shown 
 by every captain, officer, and man under his com- 
 mand in battle, all difficulty would now have 
 been at an end. We might have done just as we 
 pleased, instead of being at this hour (April 30th) 
 upon the defensive." This is ultimate risk, 
 which is entailed by exaggerated concern for 
 immediate apparent security, and ends in sapping 
 endurance. 
 
 The auspicious moment at which the news of 
 the battle reached England, and the surface 
 brilliancy of the achievement, — especially the 
 capture of the enemy's commander-in-chief, — 
 diverted attention from any examination of pos- 
 sible shortcomings. Rodney received a vote of 
 thanks from Parliament, and was advanced to 
 the peerage by the King. A pension of ^2,ocx) 
 per annum was also voted, additional doubtless 
 to a similar sum granted after his destruction 
 of Langara's squadron and relief of Gibraltar. 
 Other rewards and recognition had already at- 
 
Rodney 2^2 
 
 tended his naval career. He had been made a 
 baronet in 1764, at the expiration of his first 
 tenure of the Leeward Islands Station; in 1780 
 the order of the Bath was bestowed upon him, 
 — the distinction being enhanced by not await- 
 ing a vacancy, but making him a supernu- 
 merary member, — and in 1781, upon the death 
 of Lord Hawke, he became Vice-Admiral of Great 
 Britain, the highest professional honor in the 
 service. 
 
 After his return to England Rodney lived 
 generally in retirement. His latter years were 
 harassed by law suits, growing chiefly out of his 
 proceedings at St. Eustatius, and the attendant 
 expenses kept him poor. He died in May, 
 1 792, at the age of seventy-three. 
 
HOWE 
 
 1726-1759 
 
 THE name of Howe, albeit that of a stranger 
 to the land, has a special claim upon the 
 esteem and cordial remembrance of Americans. 
 The elder brother of the subject of this sketch, 
 during the few short months in which he was 
 brousfht into close contact with the colonists of 
 1758, before the unlucky campaign of Ticonder- 
 oga, won from them not merely the trust inspired 
 by his soldierly qualities and his genius for war, — 
 the genius of sound common sense and solidity 
 of character, — but got a deep hold upon their 
 affections by the consideration and respect shown 
 to them by him, traits to which they had been 
 too little accustomed in the British officers of 
 that day. Nor was this attitude on his part only 
 a superficial disguise assumed by policy to secure 
 a needed support. The shrewd, suspicious pro- 
 vincials would soon have penetrated a veil so thin, 
 that covered only the usual supercilious arro- 
 gance which they had heretofore encountered. 
 Lord Howe, almost alone among his military 
 contemporaries, warmly greeted them as fellow- 
 
Richard, Earl Howe. 
 
Howe 255 
 
 countrymen, men of no alien or degenerate blood. 
 He admitted at once the value of their experi- 
 ence, sought their advice, and profited by both ; 
 thus gaining, besides the material advantage of 
 methods adapted to the difificulties before him, 
 the adhesion of willing hearts that followed en- 
 thusiastically, confident in their leader's wisdom, 
 and glowing with the unaccustomed sense of 
 being appreciated, of receiving recognition long 
 withheld, but now at last ungrudgingly accorded. 
 *' The army felt him, from general to drummer 
 boy. He was its soul ; and while breathing 
 into it his own energy and ardor, he broke 
 through the traditions of the service, and gave it 
 new shapes to suit the time and place. . . . He 
 made himself greatly beloved by the provincial 
 officers, and he did what he could to break down 
 the barriers between the colonial soldiers and the 
 British regulars."^ 
 
 In campaign, Lord Howe adopted the tried 
 expedients of forest warfare, associating with 
 himself its most practised exponents ; and on 
 the morning of his death, in one of those petty 
 skirmishes which have cut short the career of so 
 many promising soldiers, he discussed the ques- 
 tion of Ticonderoga and its approaches, lying on 
 a bearskin beside the colonial ranger, John Stark, 
 to whose energy, nineteen years later, was due 
 the serious check that precipitated the ruin of 
 Burgoyne's expedition. Endeared as he was to 
 
 1 Parkman's " Montcalm and Wolfe," vol. ii. p. 90. 
 
256 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 American soldiers by the ties of mutual labors 
 and mutual perils gladly shared, and to all classes 
 by genial bearing and social accomplishments, 
 his untimely end was followed throughout the 
 Northern colonies by a spontaneous outburst of 
 sorrow, elicited not only by the anticipated fail- 
 ure of the enterprise that hung upon his life, but 
 also by a sense of personal regret and loss. Mass- 
 achusetts perpetuated the memory of her grief 
 by a tablet in Westminster Abbey, which hands 
 down to our day " the affection her officers and 
 soldiers bore to his command." 
 
 Captain Richard Howe of the Royal Navy, 
 afterwards Admiral and Earl, succeeded him in 
 the Irish viscounty which had been bestowed 
 upon their grandfather by William III. Of a 
 temperament colder, at least in external manifes- 
 tation, than that of his brother, the new Lord 
 Howe was distinguished by the same fairness of 
 mind, and by an equanimity to which perturba- 
 tion and impulsive injustice were alike unknown. 
 There seems to have been in his bearing some- 
 thing of that stern, impassive gravity that marked 
 Washington, and imposed a constraint upon by- 
 standers ; but whatever apparent harshness there 
 was in the face only concealed a genuine warmth 
 of heart, which at times broke with an illumining 
 smile throucrh the mask that covered it, and was 
 always ready to respond to the appeals of benev- 
 olence. If, as an officer, he had a fault con- 
 spicuously characteristic, it was a reluctance to 
 
Howe 257 
 
 severity, a tendency to push indulgence to undue 
 extremes, into which may perhaps have entered 
 not merely leniency of disposition, but the weak- 
 ness of loving popularity. To be called by the 
 seamen, as Howe was, the " sailor's friend," is in 
 the experience of navies a suspicious encomium, 
 involving more of flattery to a man's foibles than 
 of credit to his discretion and his judgment. But 
 at the time when the quarrel between Great 
 Britain and her colonies was fast becoming im- 
 bittered, the same kindliness, coupled with a calm 
 reasonableness of temper, ruled his feelings and 
 guided his action. Although by political creed 
 a moderate Tory, he had none of the wrong- 
 headedness of the party zealot; and the growing 
 alienation between those whom he, like his 
 brother, regarded as of one family, caused only 
 distress and an earnest desire to avert comino- 
 evils. Influenced by these sentiments, he sought 
 the acquaintance of Franklin, then in London as 
 a commissioner from the colonies ; and the inter- 
 views between them, while resultless by reason 
 of the irreconcilable differences of opinion sever- 
 ing the two parties to the dispute, convinced the 
 wary American of the good will and open-minded- 
 ness of the already distinguished British seaman. 
 The same qualities doubtless suggested the selec- 
 tion of Howe for the mission of conciliation to 
 America, in 1776, where his associate was his 
 younger brother, Sir William, in whom the 
 family virtues had, by exaggeration, degenerated 
 
 17 
 
258 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 into an indolent good humor fatal to his military 
 efficiency. The admiral, on the contrary, was 
 not more remarkable for amiability and resolute 
 personal courage than he was for sustained energy 
 and untiring attention to duty, — traits which 
 assured adequate naval direction, in case concili- 
 ation should give place, as it did, to coercive 
 measures. 
 
 It is to be regretted that the methods, or the 
 opportunities, of naval biographers and historians 
 of the past century have preserved to us little, 
 in personal detail and anecdote, of a period the 
 peculiarities of which, if not exactly picturesque, 
 were at least grotesque and amusing. The 
 humor of Smollett has indeed drawn in broad 
 caricature some of the salient features of the sea- 
 man of his day, which was that of Howe's entrance 
 into the navy; and those who are familiar with 
 the naval light literature based upon the times of 
 Nelson can recognize in it characteristics so simi- 
 lar, though evidently softened by advancing civ- 
 ilization and increased contact with the world, as 
 to vouch for the accuracy of the general impres- 
 sion conveyed by the earlier novelist. It is, how- 
 ever, correct only as a ^(f«^r^/ impression, in which, 
 too, allowance must be made for the animus of 
 an author who had grievances to exploit, and 
 whose great aim was to amuse, even if exact 
 truthfulness were sacrificed at the shrine of exag- 
 gerated portrayal. Though not wholly without 
 occasional gleams of light, shed here and there 
 
Howe 259 
 
 by recorded incident and anecdote upon the 
 strange life of the seamen of that period, the 
 early personal experiences of individuals have 
 had scant commemoration ; and with the excep- 
 tion of St. Vincent, who fortunately had a gar- 
 rulous biographer, we learn little of men like 
 Hawke, Howe, Hood, and Keppel, until, already 
 possessors of naval rank, they stand forth as 
 actors in events rather historical than biograph- 
 ical. 
 
 Of Howe's first services, therefore, not much 
 record remains except a bare summary of dates, 
 — of promotions, and of ships to which he was 
 attached, — until 1755, the beginning of the Seven 
 Years War, when he was already a post-captain. 
 Born in 1726, he entered the navy in 1739, at the 
 outbreak of the war with Spain which initiated a 
 forty years' struggle over colonies and colonial 
 trade. With short intervals of peace, this contest 
 was the prominent characteristic of the middle 
 of the eighteenth century, and terminated in 
 the conquest of Canada, the independence of the 
 United States, and the establishment of British 
 predominance in India and upon the ocean. This 
 rupture of a quiet that had then endured a quar- 
 ter of a century was so popular with the awak- 
 ened intelligence of England, aroused at last to 
 the imminent importance of her call to expansion 
 by sea, that it was greeted by a general pealing 
 of the bells, which drew from the reluctant prime 
 minister, Walpole, that bitter gibe, "Ay, to-day 
 
i6o Types of Naval Officers 
 
 they are ringing their bells, and to-morrow they 
 will be wringing their hands." Howe embarked 
 with Anson's squadron, celebrated for its suf- 
 ferings, its persistence, and its achievements, to 
 waste the Spanish colonies of the Pacific ; but 
 the ship in which he had started was so racked 
 in the attempt to double Cape Horn that she was 
 forced to return to England. The young officer 
 afterwards served actively in the West Indies and 
 in home waters. On the ist of May, 1746, being 
 then in command of a small sloop of war, he 
 was severely wounded in action with a superior 
 enemy's force off the coast of Scotland. A few 
 days before that, on the loth of April, he had 
 been promoted post-captain, being barely turned 
 twenty. Thus early he was securely placed on 
 the road to the highest honors of his profes- 
 sion, which, however, were not to prove beyond 
 the just claim of his already established personal 
 merit. 
 
 During the first thirty months of the Seven 
 Years War, Howe was closely engaged with, 
 and at times in command of, the naval part of 
 combined expeditions of the army and navy, 
 fitted out to harass the French coasts. The 
 chief, though not the sole aim in these un- 
 dertakings was to effect diversions in favor of 
 Frederick the Great, then plunged in his desper- 
 ate struggle with the allied forces of Russia, Aus- 
 tria, and France. It was believed that the last 
 would be compelled, for the defence of her own 
 
Howe 261 
 
 shores against those raids, — desultory, it is true 
 but yet uncertain as to the time and place where 
 the attack would fall, — to withdraw a number of 
 troops that would sensibly reduce the great odds 
 then overbearing the Prussian king. It is more 
 than doubtful whether this direction of British 
 power, in partial, eccentric efforts, produced re- 
 sults adequate to the means employed. In im- 
 mediate injury to France they certainly failed, 
 and it is questionable whether they materially 
 helped Frederick ; but they made a brisk stir in 
 the Channel ports, their operations were within 
 easy reach of England in a day when news trav- 
 elled slowly, and they drew the attention of the 
 public and of London society in a degree wholly 
 disproportionate to their importance relatively to 
 the great issues of the war. Their failures, which 
 exceeded their achievements, caused general scan- 
 dal ; and their occasional triumphs aroused exag- 
 gerated satisfaction at this earlier period, before 
 the round of unbroken successes under the first 
 Pitt had accustomed men, to use Walpole's lively 
 phrase, to come to breakfast with the question, 
 " What new victory is there this morning } " 
 The brilliant letter-writer's correspondence is full 
 of the gossip arising from these usually paltry 
 affairs; and throughout, whether in success or 
 disaster, the name of Howe appears frequently, 
 and always as the subject of praise. " Howe, 
 brother of the lord of that name, was the third 
 on the naval list. He was undaunted as a rock, 
 
262 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 and as silent, the characteristics of his whole 
 race. He and Wolfe soon contracted a friend- 
 ship like the union of cannon and gunpowder." 
 " Howe," he says in another place, "never made 
 a friendship except at the mouth of a cannon." 
 Of his professional merits, however, professional 
 opinions will be more convincing. A Frenchman, 
 who had acted as pilot of his ship, the Magna- 
 nime, when going into action, was asked if it were 
 possible to take a lighter vessel, the Biirford, 
 close to the walls of another fort farther in. 
 " Yes," he replied, " but I should prefer to take 
 the Magnanimey " But why } " it was rejoined ; 
 " for the Biirford draws less water." " True," he 
 said, ''mats le capitaine Howe est jeune et brave '^ 
 Sir Edward Hawke, the most distinguished ad- 
 miral of that generation, gave a yet higher com- 
 mendation to the " young and brave " captain, 
 who at this time served under his orders, — one 
 that must cause a sigh of regretful desire to 
 many a troubled superior. Several years later, 
 when First Lord of the Admiralty, he nominated 
 Howe, in October, 1770, to command a squadron 
 destined to the Mediterranean, when hostilities 
 with Spain were expected. The appointment was 
 criticised on the ground that he was a junior 
 admiral in the fleet, having been very recently 
 promoted; but Hawke, doubtless mindful that 
 the same objection had been made to him at a 
 similar period of his career, answered, in the spirit 
 of St. Vincent defending his choice of Nelson, 
 
Howe 262 
 
 " I have tried Lord Howe on most important 
 occasions. He never asked me /low he was to 
 execute any service entrusted to his charge, but 
 always went straight forward and did itr Some 
 quaint instances are recorded of the taciturnity 
 for which he was also noted. Amid the recrim- 
 inations that followed the failure at Rochefort, 
 Howe neither wrote nor said anything. At last 
 the Admiralty asked why he had not expressed 
 an opinion. In the somewhat ponderous style 
 that marked his utterances, he replied, " With 
 regard to the operations of the troops I was 
 silent, as not being at that time well enough 
 informed thereof, and to avoid the mention of 
 any particulars that might prove not exactly 
 agreeable to the truth." The next year, an army 
 officer of rank, putting questions to him and 
 receiving no answer, said, " Mr. Howe, don't you 
 hear me } I have asked you several questions." 
 Howe answered curtly, " I don't like questions," 
 — in which he was perhaps not peculiar. 
 
 It was during the continuance of these petty 
 descents upon the French coast, in 1758, that 
 Howe was directed to receive on board, as mid- 
 shipman, and for service in the fleet, the Duke 
 of York, a grandson of the reigning monarch ; in 
 connection with whom arose a saying that was 
 long current, perhaps is still current, in the Brit- 
 ish navy. The young lad of nineteen, before 
 beginning his routine duties, held a reception on 
 board Commodore Howe's ship, at which the 
 
264 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 captains of the squadron were presented to him. 
 The seamen, unpractised in ceremonial distinc- 
 tions other than naval, saw with wonder that the 
 midshipman kept on his hat, while the rest un- 
 covered. " The young gentleman," whispered 
 one, *' is n't over civil, as I thinks. Look if he 
 don't keep his hat on before all the captains ! " 
 " Why," another was heard to reply, " where 
 should he learn manners, seeing as how he was 
 never at sea before .'' " 
 
 It is likewise from this period of Howe's career 
 that two of the rare personal anecdotes have 
 been transmitted, illustrative of his coolness and 
 self-possession under all circumstances of danger, 
 as well as when under the enemy's fire ; one of 
 them also touched with a bit of humor, — not a 
 usual characteristic of his self-contained reticence. 
 The service involved considerable danger, being 
 close in with the enemy's coast, which was in- 
 differently well known and subject to heavy gales 
 of wind blowing dead on shore. On one such 
 occasion his ship had anchored with two anchors 
 ahead, and he had retired to his cabin, when the 
 officer of the watch hurriedly entered, saying, 
 "My lord, the anchors are coming home," — the 
 common sea expression for their failure to grip 
 the bottom, whereupon the ship of course drags 
 toward the beach. " Coming home, are they } " 
 rejoined Howe. " I am sure they are very right. 
 I don't know who would stay abroad on such a 
 night, if he could help it." Yet another time he 
 
Howe 265 
 
 was roused from sleep by a lieutenant in evident 
 perturbation : " My lord, the ship is on fire close 
 to the magazine; but don't be frightened; we 
 shall get it under shortly." " Frightened, sir ! " 
 said Howe. " What do you mean ? I never was 
 frightened in my life." Then, looking the un- 
 lucky officer in the face, he continued, " Pray, 
 Mr. , how does a m^Ln/eel when he is fright- 
 ened ? I need not ask how he looksy 
 
 The even, unaffected self-possession indicated 
 by these anecdotes of the early prime of life 
 remained with him to the end, as is shown by 
 another incident collected by a biographer who 
 knew many of his contemporaries. " When 
 Howe was in command of the Channel Fleet, 
 after a dark and boisterous night, in which the 
 ships had been in some danger of running foul of 
 each other, Lord Gardner, then the third in com- 
 mand, the next day went on board the Queen 
 Charlotte and inquired of Lord Howe how he 
 had slept, for that he himself had not been able 
 to get any rest from anxiety of mind. Lord 
 Howe said he had slept perfectly well, for as he 
 had taken every possible precaution he could 
 before dark, he laid himself down with a con- 
 scious feeling that everything had been done, 
 which it was in his power to do, for the safety 
 of the ships, and the lives of those intrusted to 
 his care, and this conviction set his mind at ease." 
 The apprehensiveness with which Gardner was 
 afflicted " is further exemplified by an anecdote 
 
266 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 told by Admiral Sir James Whitshed, who com- 
 manded the Alligator, next him in the line. 
 Such was his anxiety, even in ordinary weather, 
 that, though each ship carried three poop lan- 
 terns, he always kept one burning in his cabin, 
 and when he thought the Alligator was approach- 
 ing too near he used to run out into the stern 
 gallery with the lantern in his hand, waving it 
 so as to be noticed." From Gardner's rank at 
 the time, the conversation narrated must have 
 occurred during the early years of the French 
 Revolution, when Howe was over sixty-seven. 
 As illustrative of character it is particularly 
 interesting, for Gardner was not only a much 
 younger man, but one whose gallantry and com- 
 petence had been eminently proved as a captain 
 in several hard fought battles, while as an admiral 
 in chief command he later acquired considerable 
 reputation as a tactician. 
 
 Composure under suspense is chiefly a matter 
 of temperament ; of the constitutional outfit with 
 which Nature favors some, and does not others. 
 It may be cultivated by its happy possessor ; but 
 when wanting, the sufferer can supply its place 
 only by laborious self-control, the tension of which 
 by itself expends the energies it seeks to main- 
 tain, and so imposes limitations of strength that 
 are often insuperable obstacles to achievement, 
 especially if prolonged. The strain of this en- 
 durance is prominent among those borne by com- 
 manders-in-chief, who can at no moment afford 
 
Howe 267 
 
 to be lax, nor yet precipitate; and it increases 
 with time at compound interest. Howe's native 
 imperturbability was therefore one of the chief 
 factors in his great professional powers, making 
 possible the full exercise of all the others. By 
 dint of it principally he reached the eminence 
 which must be attributed to him as a general 
 officer; for it underlay the full, continuous, and 
 sustained play of the very marked faculties, per- 
 sonal and professional, natural and acquired, 
 which he had. It insured that they should be 
 fully developed, and should not flag; for it 
 preserved his full command over them by deliv- 
 ering him from the factitious burdens of the 
 imagination. 
 
 This quality not only entered into his external 
 professional life, but characterized the habitual 
 temper of his mind. " He divested himself in a 
 remarkable manner," says his biographer, "of 
 every approach to a state of anger or resentment" 
 — instancing herein, it may be noted, the improve- 
 ment of a natural gift ; " and he carefully abstained 
 from all irritating language, whether in speaking 
 or writing. In the perusal of the four hundred 
 letters and upwards that have been mentioned, 
 embracing opinions of, and unreserved discus- 
 sions upon, the merits or otherwise of many and 
 various characters, of all classes of individuals, 
 it did not fail forcibly to strike the reader of them, 
 how invariably, with one single exception, he 
 takes the good natured and favorable side of 
 
268 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 every question. In the whole series, the harshest 
 word employed is ' blockhead,' bestowed on his 
 steward for not taking care of his own interests." 
 This equable frame of mind was thus a funda- 
 mental trait in Howe, private as well as public, 
 personal as well as professional ; not assumed for 
 the moment, but constant in operation. He had 
 none of the irritability attributed to genius, as 
 also he gives no sign of its inspiration, — of 
 originality. He is seen at his strongest in deal- 
 ing stage by stage with difficult situations created 
 for him, following step by step, and step by step 
 checking, the lead of another ; his action being 
 elicited by successive circumstances, not deriving 
 from some creative, far-reaching conception of his 
 own. The temperament is one eminently prac- 
 tical, capable on due opportunity of very great 
 deeds, as Howe showed; for, having improved 
 much native capacity by the constant cultivation 
 of professional knowledge, and with the self-con- 
 fidence which naturally springs from such acquisi- 
 tion, he rose readily to the level of exertion 
 demanded by any emergency not in excess of his 
 abilities, and so long as the need lasted main- 
 tained himself there easily, without consciousness 
 of exhaustive effort, or apprehension of improb- 
 able contingencies. " Never hasting, never rest- 
 ing," might be safely affirmed of him. 
 
 He is seen therefore at his best in a defensive 
 campaign, such as that against D'Estaing in the 
 summer of 1778, which in the writer's opinion 
 
Howe 269 
 
 was his greatest achievement; or again in a great 
 dehberate operation Hke the rehef of Gibraltar, 
 — the one of his deeds most esteemed, it is said, 
 by himself, — protracted over a month in its per- 
 formance, and essentially defensive in character, 
 not only because of the much superior fleet of 
 the enemies, but because the adverse forces of 
 nature and the obstinate incapacity of the cap- 
 tains of supply ships had to be counteracted by 
 unremitting watchfulness, foresight, and skill, 
 dealing however with conditions determined for 
 him, not imposed by his own initiative ; or, finally, 
 in the chase and partial actions of May 28 and 
 29, 1794, in which persistence, endurance, and 
 aptitude are alike and equally displayed, assuring 
 to him beyond dispute the credit of a great tac- 
 tician. Accordingly, in direct consequence of 
 what has been noted, it is as a tactician, and not 
 as a strategist, that he can claim rank ; for what- 
 ever may be the fundamental identity of principles 
 in the military art, whether applied to strategy 
 or to tactics, it in the end remains true that the 
 tactician deals with circumstances immediately 
 before him and essentially transient, while the 
 strategist has to take wider views of more lasting 
 conditions, and into them to introduce his own 
 conceptions to be modifying factors. Creative 
 thought and faculty of initiation are therefore 
 more characteristic of the natural endowments of 
 the born strategist. There is also more room for 
 them in his work, because in the larger and more 
 
270 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 complicated field there is greater elasticity and 
 opportunity to effect new combinations, to con- 
 trive which makes a greater call upon originative 
 power. 
 
 In the chain of eminent typical names which 
 leads up to that of Nelson, there will be found 
 between Howe and his next conspicuous suc- 
 cessor, — conspicuous, that is, not only by merit, as 
 was Hood, but by achievement, which was denied 
 to Hood, — between Howe and Jervis, just that 
 difference which essentially separates the tac- 
 tician from the strategist : the lifting of the eye 
 from the moves of the game immediately before 
 one, to glance over the whole board, to view the 
 wider field, and from its possibilities to form con- 
 ceptions directive of immediate action for distant 
 ends. In both these distinguished general offi- 
 cers, — for such both were, — there is seen a 
 similar close attention to details, based upon and 
 guided by an acquaintance with their profession 
 profound as well as extensive, minute as well as 
 general ; in both the same diligence and iron 
 equanimity in difficult situations, although in 
 Jervis the impression received is rather that of a 
 burden borne with resolute fortitude, whereas in 
 Howe the burden is thrown off by a placid, un- 
 foreboding temper; but in the adoption of meas- 
 ures, those of Howe will be found generally not to 
 extend beyond the situation immediately before 
 him, by which they are dictated, whereas Jervis 
 seeks to bend circumstances to his will, according 
 
Howe 271 
 
 to a conception he has formed of what the situa- 
 tion ought to be, and can be forced to become. 
 
 The idiosyncrasy of either officer is emphasized 
 in their respective plans of campaign, while com- 
 manding the Channel Fleet during the French 
 Revolution. Howe will maintain a certain sta- 
 tion in port, keeping his fleet there in hand, 
 well conditioned, and as far as may be well 
 drilled ; then, when the French do something, he 
 also will do something to counteract them. Jer- 
 vis, on the contrary, confronting substantially the 
 same conditions, frames his measures with a view 
 to prevent the enemy from doing anything, and 
 all the details of his plan rest upon this one idea, 
 to the fulfilment of which they contribute. He 
 puts the fleet at once into the position of action, 
 instead of that of awaiting, as Howe does. Both 
 are charged with the same duty, — the defence of 
 Great Britain, — and by the same Government, 
 which evidently in each case frames its instruc- 
 tions upon the ascertained views of the eminent 
 officer intrusted with the work. To carry out 
 this defensive campaign, Howe of his own choice 
 narrows his strategic plan to the sheer defensive, 
 which follows the initiative of the enemy ; Jervis 
 of set purpose seeks the same object by offensive 
 dispositions, by which the enemy is to be forced 
 to regulate his movements. Howe sees the de- 
 fence of the empire in the preservation of his 
 own fleet ; Jervis in the destruction of the enemy. 
 The one view is local, narrow, and negative ; the 
 
272 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 other general, broad, and positive. As often hap- 
 pens — and very naturally — Jervis's preoccupa- 
 tion with considerations wider than his own com- 
 mand found expression, twice at least, in phrases 
 which pithily summed up his steadfast enduring 
 habit of mind. On the morning of St. Vincent 
 he was overheard to mutter, " A victory is very 
 necessary to England at this time." The present 
 odds to his own fleet, twenty-seven against fifteen, 
 disappeared in the larger needs of the country. 
 Again, when wrestling with the perplexities and 
 exigencies of the wild Brest blockade in mid- 
 winter, in January, 1801, he wrote concerning 
 repairs to his own vessels, " Under the present 
 impending storm from the north of Europe, and 
 the necessity there is of equipping every ship in 
 the royal ports that can swim, no ship under my 
 command must have anything done to her at Ply- 
 mouth or Portsmouth that can be done at this 
 anchorage," — at Torbay, an open though partially 
 sheltered roadstead. Here again is seen the sub- 
 ordination of the particular and personal care to 
 the broad considerations of a great strategic 
 emergency. 
 
 The series of diversions upon the French coast 
 in which Howe was employed during 175S, ter- 
 minated with that season, and he returned to his 
 own ship, the Mag7ianime, rejoining with her the 
 main fleet under Hawke in the great Brest block- 
 ade of 1759. The French Government, after four 
 years of disaster upon the continent, of naval 
 
Howe 273 
 
 humiliation, and of loss of maritime and colonial 
 power, had now realized that its worst evils and 
 chief danger sprang from the sea power of Great 
 Britain, and, like Napoleon a half-century later, 
 determined to attempt an invasion. Its prepa- 
 rations and Hawke's dispositions to counteract 
 them, have been described in the life of that 
 admiral, as have Rodney's bombardment of Havre 
 and interception of coastwise communications; 
 all directed to the same general end of confound- 
 ing designs against England, but no longer as 
 mere diversions in favor of Frederick. Howe 
 was still a private captain, but he bore a charac- 
 teristically conspicuous part in the stormy final 
 scene at Quiberon, when Hawke drove Conflans 
 before him to utter confusion. When the French 
 fleet was sighted, the Magnanime had been sent 
 ahead to make the land. She was thus in the 
 lead in the headlong chase which ensued, and was 
 among the first in action; at 3 p.m., by Howe's 
 journal, the firing having begun at 2.30, according 
 to Hawke's despatch. The foreyard being soon 
 shot away, the consequent loss of manoeuvring 
 power impeded her captain's designs in placing 
 her, but she remained closely engaged throughout, 
 compelling one French vessel to strike and anchor 
 alongside her. The bad weather prevented tak- 
 ing possession that night of the prize, which, in 
 consequence, availed herself of her liberty by 
 running ashore, and so was lost to her captors. 
 
 The Magnanime was reported as having thirteen 
 
 18 
 
274 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 killed and sixty-six wounded, out of a total of 
 hurt not much exceeding three hundred in the 
 entire fleet. The casualty list proves exposure to 
 fire, doubtless; but is no sure test of the effective- 
 ness of a vessel's action. The certainty of Howe's 
 conduct in this affair, otherwise imperfectly de- 
 scribed, rests on a broader and firmer basis of 
 reputation, won by unvarying efficiency in many 
 differing capacities and circumstances. 
 
 He continued to ser\^e, but without further 
 noteworthy incident, up to the peace made in the 
 winter of 1762-63. From that time until the 
 difficulties with the American colonies came to 
 a head in 1775, he was not actively employed 
 afloat, although continuously engaged upon pro- 
 fessional matters, especially as a close student of 
 naval tactics and its kindred subjects, to which 
 he always gave sympathetic attention. During 
 this period, also, he became a member of the 
 House of Commons, and so continued until trans- 
 ferred from the Irish peerage to that of Great 
 Britain, in 1782. In 1770, at the age of forty- 
 five, he became a rear-admiral, and, as has been 
 already stated, received at once a proof of 
 Hawke's high confidence, by being appointed to 
 the command of the squadron destined for the 
 Mediterranean, when hostilities concerning the 
 Falkland Islands threatened with Spain ; a dis- 
 pute chiefly memorable as the means of bringing 
 into the navy both Nelson and Exmouth. In 
 1775 he was promoted to vice-admiral, and in 
 
Howe 275 
 
 February of the following year was appointed 
 commander-in-chief of the North American sta- 
 tion. Together with his military duties, he was, 
 as has before been said, given powers, conjointly 
 with his brother, to treat for the settlement of 
 existing troubles. 
 
 Although his habitual reticence restrained his 
 sentiments from finding expression in positive 
 words, there can be little doubt that the necessity 
 of raising his hand against the Americans caused 
 Howe keener regret than it did to many of his 
 brother officers. He took instant occasion to 
 address to Franklin a personal note, recalling 
 their former association, and expressing an ear- 
 nest hope that their friendship might contribute 
 something to insure the success of his official 
 mission. In the five years that had elapsed, how- 
 ever, Franklin had been in the heat of the politi- 
 cal struggle, and, philosopher though he was, 
 he had not Howe's natural phlegm. Hence, his 
 reply, while marked by respect and even formal 
 cordiality toward the admiral himself, displayed a 
 vivacity of resentment and a bitterness for which 
 the latter had scarcely looked. Still, his habitual 
 equanimity was not ruffled, and he read the letter 
 with the simple comment, " My old friend ex- 
 presses himself very warmly." 
 
 Howe's arrival antedated the signature of the 
 Declaration of Independence by less than a 
 week. During the period of attempted negotia- 
 tion, while scrupulously faithful to his instructions, 
 
276 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 he showed to his late fellow-countrymen all the 
 courtesy and consideration that the most cor- 
 dial esteem could extend. The incident of the 
 official communication addressed by the Howes 
 to Washington, in which they sought to evade 
 giving him the title of "General," is sufficiently 
 familiar; but it is more rarely recalled that, in 
 verbal intercourse widi American officers, the 
 admiral habitually styled him " General Wash- 
 ington," and sent complimentary messages to 
 him as such. He even spoke of the colonies as 
 "states," and at the same time dwelt with evident 
 emotion upon the testimonials of respect and 
 affection which had been shown to his brother's 
 memory by the colonists. 
 
 To narrate Howe's share in the operations by 
 which New York in 1776, and Philadelphia in 
 1777, fell into the hands of the British, would be 
 only to repeat well-known historical episodes, 
 enlivened by few or no incidents personal to 
 himself. In them the navy played a part at once 
 subordinate and indispensable, as is the office of 
 a foundation to its superstructure. The cause 
 of the Americans was hopeless as long as their 
 waters remained in the undisputed control of the 
 enemy's ships ; and it was the attempt of Great 
 Britain to cast aside this essential support, and 
 to rely upon the army alone in a wild and intri- 
 cate country, that led to her first great disaster, 
 — Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga. Upon this, 
 France at once recognized the independence of 
 
Howe 277 
 
 the colonies, and their alHance with that king- 
 dom followed. A French fleet of twelve ships-of- 
 the-line under the Count D'Estaing, left Toulon 
 April 15, 1778, for the American coast. This 
 force far exceeded Howe's ; and it was no thanks 
 to the British Government, but only to the ad- 
 miral's sleepless vigilance and activity, seconded, 
 as such qualities are apt to be, by at least an 
 average degree of supineness on the part of his 
 antagonist, that his scanty squadron was not 
 surprised and overpowered in Delaware Bay, 
 when Sir Henr}^ Clinton evacuated Philadel- 
 phia to retreat upon New York. Howe, who 
 had the defects of his qualities, whose deliberate 
 and almost stolid exterior evinced a phlegmatic 
 composure of spirit which required the spur of 
 imminent emergency to rouse it into vehement 
 action, never in his long career appeared to 
 greater advantage, nor achieved military results 
 more truly brilliant, than at this time, and up to 
 the abandonment of the attack on Rhode Island 
 by the Americans under Sullivan, three months 
 later. Then only, if ever, did he rise above the 
 level of an accomplished and resolute general 
 officer, and establish a claim to genius, of that 
 order, however, which is not originative in char- 
 acter, but signalized by an infinite capacity for 
 taking pains ; and that not for a short time 
 merely, but through a long, protracted period of 
 strain. The display, nevertheless, does not as- 
 sure him a place in the front rank of great com- 
 
278 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 manders, whose actions find their source in the 
 living impulse of their own creative energy; for 
 it is elicited by extreme circumstances alone, 
 by obvious pressure, to which he must adapt 
 himself. This he does with unfailing adequacy, 
 indeed; resolutely checkmating, but never initia- 
 ting. Steady as a rock, like a rock, also, Howe 
 only gave forth sparks under blows that would 
 have broken weaker men. 
 
 D'Estaing was twelve weeks in coming from 
 Toulon to Cape May, but Howe knew nothing of 
 his sailing: until three weeks after he had started. 
 Then orders were received to abandon Phila- 
 delphia and concentrate upon New York. The 
 naval forces were scattered, and had to be col- 
 lected ; the supplies of the army, except those 
 needed for the march across Jersey, were to be 
 embarked at Philadelphia, and the great train of 
 transports and ships of war moved over a hundred 
 miles down a difficult river, and thence to New 
 York. Despite every effort, a loss of ten days 
 was incurred, through calms, in the mere transit 
 from Philadelphia to the sea ; but during this 
 momentous crisis D'Estaing did not appear. 
 Two days more sufficed to bring the fleet into 
 New York Bay on June 29th; but yet the grave 
 admiral, roused to the full tension of his great 
 abilities, rested not. With a force little more 
 than half that coming against him, he knew that 
 all depended upon the rapidity with which his 
 squadron took the imposing position he had in 
 
Howe 279 
 
 mind. Still D'Estaing tarried, giving to his un- 
 tiring enemy twelve more precious days, during 
 which the army of Sir Henry Clinton, reaching 
 Navesink beach the day after the fleet, was 
 snatched by it from the hot pursuit of the disap- 
 pointed Washington, and carried safely to New 
 York. 
 
 In the expected French squadron were eight 
 ships of seventy-four guns or over, with three 
 sixty-fours. To confront these, for the defence 
 of the port, Howe disposed of six, none heavier 
 than a sixty-four ; but they were ranged to com- 
 mand the entrance of the harbor upon a tactical 
 plan that evinced both a careful study of the 
 ground and the resources of a thorough seaman. 
 This instance alone, had Howe never done any- 
 thing else, would have established his reputation 
 as a tactician. The ships, placed in echelon, 
 and enabled to turn their batteries in any direc- 
 tion, by the provision of springs and adaptation 
 to the tide conditions at the moment when 
 alone attack would be possible, could concentrate 
 their entire force of guns upon the enemy, rak- 
 ing them as they advanced up channel ; while, if 
 they succeeded in coming abreast, then also the 
 broadsides would be turned upon them. When 
 D'Estaing at last came, all was ready ; the en- 
 ergy that had improved every fleeting moment 
 then gave place to the imperturbable resolution 
 which was Howe's greatest attribute, and against 
 which, seconded by his careful preparation, sue- 
 
28o Types of Naval Officers 
 
 cess could be won only by a desperate and san- 
 guinary struggle. The attempt was not made. 
 Ten days after arriving, the French admiral again 
 put to sea, heading to the southward. By com- 
 bined energy and skill Howe had won the first 
 move in the game. Clinton's army and New 
 York were saved. 
 
 " The arrival of the French fleet," wrote Wash- 
 ington a little later, " is a great and striking event ; 
 but the operations of it have been injured by a 
 number of unforeseen and unfavorable circum- 
 stances, which have lessened the importance of 
 its services to a sfreat decrree. The lensfth of the 
 passage, in the first instance, was a capital mis- 
 fortune ; for, had even one of common length 
 taken place, Lord Howe, with the British ships 
 of war and all the transports in the river Dela- 
 ware, must inevitably have fallen; and Sir Henry 
 Clinton must have had better luck than is com- 
 monly dispensed to men of his profession under 
 such circumstances, if he and his troops had not 
 shared at least the fate of Burgoyne." If this 
 narration of events is so carefully worded as not 
 to imply a censure upon D'Estaing, it none the 
 less, however unintentionally, measures the great 
 military merit of Lord Howe. 
 
 Nor did this end his achievements. Two or 
 three days after the French departed a small 
 reinforcement from England reached New York, 
 and in the course of a week Howe, who had not 
 failed to keep touch with the enemy's fleet till it 
 
Howe 281 
 
 was ninety miles at sea, heard that it had been 
 seen again, heading for Narragansett Bay, then 
 controlled by a British garrison on Rhode Island. 
 This was in pursuance of a prearranged plan to 
 support the American forces under General Sul- 
 livan, which had already advanced against the 
 place. Adapting anew his action to the circum- 
 stances of the enemy's movements, Howe, though 
 still much inferior, hurried to the spot, arriving 
 and anchoring off Point Judith, at the entrance 
 to Newport, on August 9th, the day after 
 D'Estaing had run the fire of the British works 
 and entered the harbor. With correct strategic 
 judgment, with a flash of insight which did not 
 usually distinguish him when an enemy was not 
 in view, and contrary to his avowed policy when 
 commander of the Channel Fleet, he saw that the 
 true position for his squadron was in face of the 
 hostile port, ready to act as circumstances might 
 dictate. His mere presence blocked this opera- 
 tion also. D'Estaing, either fearing that the 
 British admiral might take the offensive and gain 
 some unexpected advantage, or tempted by the 
 apparent opportunity of crushing a small hostile 
 division, put to sea the next day. Howe, far su- 
 perior as a seaman to his antagonist, manoeuvred 
 to avoid a battle with a force superior by a half 
 to his own ; and this purpose was effected by his 
 skilful management of his fleet, aided by his ad- 
 versary's irresolution, notwithstanding that the 
 unusual action of the wind thwarted his effort 
 
282 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 to control the situation by gaining the weather 
 gage. Both the general manoeuvres, and the 
 special dispositions made of his ships to meet 
 the successive intentions of the enemy, as they 
 became apparent, showed a mind fortified by pre- 
 vious preparation as well as by the natural self- 
 possession for which he was conspicuous. It was 
 eminently a tactical triumph. 
 
 A tremendous gale followed, scattered both 
 fleets, and dismasted several of the French. 
 D'Estaing appeared again off Rhode Island only 
 to notify Sullivan that he could no longer aid 
 him ; and the latter, deprived of an indispensa- 
 ble support, withdrew in confusion. The disap- 
 pointment of the Americans showed itself by 
 mobbing some French seamen in Boston, whither 
 their fleet retired. " After the enterprise upon 
 Rhode Island had been planned," continues Wash- 
 ington, in the letter above quoted, " and was in 
 the moment of execution, that Lord Howe with 
 the British ships should interpose merely to cre- 
 ate a diversion, and draw the French fleet from 
 the island, was again unlucky, as the Count had 
 not returned on the 17th to the island, though 
 drawn from it on the loth; by which the whole 
 was subjected to a miscarriage." What Wash- 
 ington politicly calls bad luck was French bad 
 management, provoked and baffled by Howe's ac- 
 curate strategy, untiring energy, consummate sea- 
 manship, and tactical proficiency. Clinton's army 
 delivered, the forcing of New York frustrated. 
 
Howe 283 
 
 Rhode Island and its garrison saved, by a squad- 
 ron never more than two thirds of that opposed 
 to it, were achievements to illustrate any career; 
 and the more so that they were effected by sheer 
 scientific fencing, like some of Bonaparte's great- 
 est feats, with little loss of blood. They form 
 Howe's highest title to fame, and his only claim 
 as a strategist. It will be observed, however, 
 that the characteristic of his course throughout is 
 untiring and adequate adaption to the exigencies 
 of the situation, as momentarily determined by 
 the opponent's movements. There is in it no 
 single original step. Such, indeed, is commonly 
 the case with a strictly defensive campaign by a 
 decisively inferior force. It is only the rare men 
 who solve such difficulties by unexpected excep- 
 tional action. 
 
 It is indicative of Howe's personal feelings 
 about the colonial quarrel, during the two years 
 in which he thus ably discharged his official 
 duties, that both he and his brother determined 
 to ask relief from their commands as soon as it 
 appeared that all hopes of conciliation were over. 
 The appointment of other commissioners has- 
 tened their decision, and the permission to return 
 was already in the admiral's hands when the 
 news of D'Estaing's coming was received. Fight- 
 ing a traditional foreign foe was a different thing 
 from shedding the blood of men between whom 
 and himself there was so much in common ; nor 
 was Howe the man to dodge responsibility by 
 
284 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 turning over an inferior force, threatened by such 
 heavy odds, to a junior officer before the new com- 
 mander-in-chief came. His resolution to remain 
 was as happy for his renown as it was creditable 
 to his character. After the brief campaign just 
 sketched, true to his steady previous policy, he 
 followed the French fleet to Newport when he 
 heard of its reappearance there, and thence to 
 Boston, coming off that port only three days after 
 it ; but finding it now sheltered under shore bat- 
 teries, impregnable to his still inferior numbers, 
 and learning that it was in need of extensive 
 repairs, he resigned the command in New York 
 to a rear-admiral, and departed to Newport to meet 
 his successor, Vice-Admiral Byron. Upon the 
 latter's arrival he sailed for England, towards the 
 end of September, 1778. General Howe had 
 preceded him by four months. 
 
 The two brothers went home with feelings 
 of great resentment against the ministry. The 
 course of the war had so far been unfortunate. 
 The loss of Boston, the surrender of Burgoyne, 
 the evacuation of Philadelphia, and finally the 
 entrance of France into the contest, constituted a 
 combination of mishaps which certainly implied 
 fault somewhere. As usual, no one was willing 
 to accept blame, and hot disputes, with injurious 
 imputations, raged in Parliament. There is here, 
 happily, no necessity for apportioning the re- 
 sponsibility, except in the case of Lord Howe ; 
 and as to him, it is reasonably clear that all was 
 
Howe 285 
 
 done that could be up to the coming of the 
 French, while it is incontestable that afterwards, 
 with a force utterly inadequate, for which the 
 Government was answerable, he had averted im- 
 minent disaster by most masterly management. 
 His words in the House of Commons were bitter. 
 " He had been deceived into his command, and 
 he was deceived while he retained it. Tired and 
 disgusted, he had desired permission to resign it ; 
 and he would have returned as soon as he obtained 
 leave, but he could not think of doing so while a 
 superior enemy remained in American seas ; that, 
 as soon as that impediment was removed, he 
 gladly embraced the first opportunity of return- 
 ing to Europe. Such, and the recollection of 
 what he had suffered, were his motives for resign- 
 ing the command, and such for declining any 
 future service so long as the present ministry 
 remained in office." 
 
 In terms like these could officers holding seats 
 in Parliament speak concerning the Government 
 of the day. It was a period in which not only 
 did party feeling run high, but corruption was an 
 almost avowed method of political management. 
 The navy itself was split into factions by political 
 bias and personal jealousies, and there was a say- 
 ing that " if a naval officer were to be roasted, 
 another officer could always be found to turn the 
 spit." The head of the Admiralty, Lord Sand- 
 wich, was a man of much ability, but also of 
 profligate character, as well public as private. He 
 
286 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 doubtless wished the success of his department, 
 — under the terrible chances of war no chief can 
 do otherwise, for the responsibility of failure must 
 fall upon his own head ; but through corrupt 
 administration the strength of the navy, upon the 
 outbreak of war, had been unequal to the work it 
 had to do. Some one must suffer for this remiss- 
 ness, and who more naturally than the comman- 
 der of a distant station, who confessed himself " no 
 politician"? Hence, Howe certainly thought, 
 the neglect with which he had been treated. " It 
 would not be prudent to trust the little reputation 
 he had earned by forty years' service, his personal 
 honor and everything else he held dear, in the 
 hands of men who have neither the ability to act 
 on their own judgment, nor the integrity and 
 good sense to follow the advice of others who 
 might know more of the matter." A year later, 
 it was roundly charged that the Channel Fleet had 
 been brought home at a most critical moment, 
 losing an exceptional opportunity for striking the 
 enemy, in order to affect the elections in a dock- 
 yard town. Admiral Keppel considered that he 
 had been sacrificed to party feeling ; and a very 
 distinguished officer, Barrington, refused to take 
 a fleet, although willing to serve as second, even 
 under a junior. "Who," he wrote, " would trust 
 himself in chief command with such a set of 
 scoundrels as are now in office ? " Even a quar- 
 ter of a century later, Earl St. Vincent gave to 
 George HI. himself the same reason for declin- 
 
Howe 287 
 
 ing employment. After eliciting from him an 
 unfavorable opinion as to the discipline and effi- 
 ciency of the Channel Fleet, the king asked, 
 " Where such evils exist, does Lord St. Vincent 
 feel justified in refusing his conspicuous ability 
 to remedy them?" "My life," replied the old 
 seaman, "is at your Majesty's disposal, and at 
 that of my country ; but my honour is in my own 
 keeping, and I will not expose myself to the risk 
 of losing it by the machinations of this ministry, 
 under which I should hold command." To such 
 feelings it was due that Howe, Keppel, and Bar- 
 rington did not go to sea during the anxious 
 three years that followed the return of the first. 
 The illustrious Rodney, their only rival, but in 
 himself a host, was the one distinguished naval 
 chief who belonged heart and soul to the party 
 with which Sandwich was identified. 
 
 Thus it happened that Rodney's period of 
 activity during the war of the American Revolu- 
 tion coincided substantially with that of Howe's 
 retirement. The same change of administration, 
 in the spring of 1782, that led to the recall of the 
 older man, brought Howe again into service, to 
 replace the mediocrities who for three campaigns 
 had commanded the Channel Fleet, the mainstay 
 of Great Britain's safety. Upon it depended not 
 only the protection of the British Islands and of 
 the trade routes converging upon them, but also 
 the occasional revictualling of Gibraltar, now 
 undergoing the third year of the famous siege. 
 
Types of Naval Officers 
 
 Its operations extended to the North Sea, where 
 the Dutch, now hostile, flanked the road to the 
 Baltic, whence came the naval stores essential to 
 the efficiency of the British fleet ; to the Bay of 
 Biscay, intercepting the convoys despatched from 
 France to her navies abroad ; and to the Chops 
 of the Channel, where focussed the trade routes 
 from East and West, and where more than once 
 heavy losses had been inflicted upon British 
 commerce by the allies. All these services 
 received conspicuous and successful illustration 
 during Howe's brief command, at the hands 
 either of the commander-in-chief or of his sub- 
 ordinates, among whom were the very dis- 
 tinguished Barrington and Kempenfelt. Howe 
 himself, with twenty-five sail-of-the-line, in July 
 encountered an allied fleet of forty off Scilly. 
 By an adroit tactical movement, very character- 
 istic of his resolute and adequate presence of 
 mind, he carried his ships between Scilly and 
 Land's End by night, disappearing before morn- 
 ing from the enemy's view. He thus succeeded 
 in meeting to the westward a valuable Jamaica 
 convoy, homeward bound, and taking it under 
 his protection. The allies being afterwards 
 driven south by a heavy gale, the vessels of war 
 and trade slipped by and reached England safely. 
 Thus does good luck often give its blessing to 
 good management. 
 
 To relieve Gibraltar, however, was the one 
 really great task, commensurate to his abilities, 
 
Howe 289 
 
 that devolved upon Howe during this short com- 
 mand. In the summer of 1782, the Spaniards 
 were completing ten heavy floating batteries, ex- 
 pected to be impervious to shot and to combus- 
 tioTi, and from an attack by which upon the sea 
 front of the works decisive results were antici- 
 pated. At the same time prolonged blockade by 
 land and sea, supported by forty-nine allied ships- 
 of-the-line anchored at Algeciras, the Spanish 
 port on the opposite side of the Bay, was produc- 
 ing its inevitable results, and the place was now 
 in the last extremity for provisions and muni- 
 tions of war. To oppose the hostile fleets and 
 introduce the essential succors, to carry which 
 required thirty-one sail of supply ships. Great 
 Britain could muster only thirty-four of-the-line, 
 but to them were adjoined the superb professional 
 abilities of Lord Howe, never fully evoked except 
 when in sight of an enemy, as he here must act, 
 with Barrington and Kempenfelt as seconds ; the 
 one the pattern of the practical, experienced, 
 division commander, tested on many occasions, 
 the other an officer much of Howe's own stamp, 
 and like him a diligent student and promoter of 
 naval manoeuvres and naval signals, to the devel- 
 opment of which both had greatly contributed. 
 To the train of supply ships were added for con- 
 voy a number of merchant vessels destined to 
 different parts of the world, so that the grand 
 total which finally sailed on September nth was 
 183. While this great body was gathering at 
 
 19 
 
290 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 Spithead, there occurred the celebrated incident 
 of the oversetting of the Royal George at her 
 anchors, on August 29th, 
 
 " When Kempenfelt went down 
 With twice four hundred men." 
 
 Howe thus lost the man upon whom principally 
 he must have relied for the more purely tac- 
 tical development of the fleet, opportunity for 
 which he anticipated in the necessarily slow and 
 graduated progress of so large an assemblage. 
 
 The occasion was indeed one that called for 
 deliberation as well as for calculated audacity, 
 both controlled by a composure and ability rarely 
 conjoined to the same great extent as in Howe. 
 Circumstances were more imminent than in the 
 two previous reliefs by Rodney and Darby ; for 
 the greatly superior numbers of the allies were 
 now not in Cadiz, as before, but lying only four 
 miles from the anchorage which the supply ves- 
 sels must gain. True, certainly, that for these a 
 certain portion of their path would be shielded by 
 the guns of the fortress, but a much greater part 
 would be wholly out of their range ; and the 
 mere question of reaching his berth, a navi- 
 gational problem complicated by uncertain winds, 
 and by a very certain current sweeping in from 
 the Atlantic, was extremely difficult for the mer- 
 chant skipper of the day, a seaman rough and 
 ready, but not always either skilful or heedful. 
 The problem before Howe demanded therefore 
 
Howe 291 
 
 the utmost of his seamanlike qualities and of his 
 tactical capacity. 
 
 The length of the passage speaks for the delib- 
 erate caution of Howe's management, as his con- 
 duct at the critical moment of approach, and 
 during the yet more critical interval of accom- 
 plishing the entrance of the supply ships, evinces 
 the cool and masterful self-control which always 
 assured the complete and sustained exertion 
 of his great professional powers at a required 
 instant. Thirty days were consumed in the voy- 
 age from Spithead to Gibraltar, but no transport 
 was dropped. Of the huge convoy even, it is 
 narrated that after a heavy gale, just before reach- 
 ing Cape Finisterre, the full tally of 183 was 
 counted. After passing that cape, the traders 
 probably parted for their several destinations, 
 each body under a suitable escort. The stoppages 
 for the rounding-up of straying or laggard vessels, 
 or for re-establishing the observance of order 
 which ever contributes to regulated movement, 
 and through it to success, were not in this case 
 time lost. The admiral made of them opportu- 
 nities for exercising his ships-of-the-line in the 
 new system of signals, and in the simple evolu- 
 tions depending upon them, which underlie flexi- 
 bility of action, and in the day of battle enable 
 the fleet to respond to the purposes of its com- 
 mander with reasonable precision, and in mutual 
 support. 
 
 Such drill was doubly necessary, for it not only 
 
2g2 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 familiarized the intelligence of the captains with 
 ideas too generally neglected by seamen until 
 called upon to put them into practice, and 
 revealed to them difficulties not realized until 
 encountered, but also enforced recognition of 
 the particular qualities of each vessel, upon the 
 due observance of which substantial accuracy of 
 manoeuvre depends. The experience gained dur- 
 ing this cruise, going and returning, probably 
 opened the eyes of many officers to unsuspected 
 deficiencies in themselves, in handling a ship 
 under the exigencies of fleet tactics. Howe cer- 
 tainly was in this respect disappointed in his fol- 
 lowers, but probably not greatly surprised. At 
 the same time it is but fair to note that the 
 service was performed throughout without any 
 marked hitch traceable to want of general pro- 
 fessional ability. A French writer has com- 
 mented upon this. " There occurred none of 
 those events, so frequent in the experiences of 
 a squadron, which often oblige admirals to take 
 a course wholly contrary to the end they have 
 in view. It is impossible not to recall the 
 unhappy incidents which, from the 9th to the 
 12th of April, of this same year, befell the 
 squadron of the Count De Grasse. If it is just 
 to admit that Lord Howe displayed the highest 
 talent, it should be added that he had in his 
 hands excellent instruments." 
 
 On the loth of October the fleet and store- 
 ships drew nigh the Straits of Gibraltar. On 
 
Howe 293 
 
 that day it was rejoined by a frigate, which 
 forty-eight hours before had been sent ahead to 
 communicate the approach of the relief, and to 
 concert action. She brought the cheering news 
 of the victorious repulse by the British of the 
 grand attack by sea and land upon September 
 13th, with the entire destruction of the trusted 
 floating batteries. Under this flush of national 
 triumph, and with a fair westerly wind, the great 
 expedition entered the straits on October nth, 
 in ranged order for action. The convoy went 
 first, because, sailing before the wind, it was thus 
 to leeward of the ships of war, in position to be 
 immediately defended, if attacked. Two squad- 
 rons of the fleet succeeded them, in line-of-battle 
 ahead, formed thus for instant engagement, Howe 
 leading in the Victory; while the third of the 
 squadrons followed in reserve, in an order not 
 stated, but probably in a line abreast, sweeping 
 a broader belt of sea, and more nearly under the 
 eye of the Commander-in-chief, who, for the pur- 
 poses of the present operation, had left his tradi- 
 tional post in the centre. Howe's reasons for 
 this change of position, if ever stated, have not 
 come under the eyes of the writer; but analysis 
 shows that he was there close to the storeships, 
 whose safe entrance to the port was at once the 
 main object of the enterprise and the one most 
 critically uncertain of achievement, because of 
 the general bad behavior of convoys. There he 
 could control them more surely, and at the same 
 
294 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 time by his own conduct indicate his general 
 purposes to subordinates, who, however deficient 
 in distinctly tactical proficiency, had the seaman- 
 ship and the willingness adequately to support 
 him. 
 
 At 6 p. M. the supply ships were off the mouth 
 of the bay, with the wind fair for their anchor- 
 age ; but, although full and particular instruc- 
 tions had been issued to them concerning cur- 
 rents and other local conditions, all save four 
 missed the entrance and were swept to the east- 
 ward of the Rock. The fleet of course had to 
 follow its charge, and by their failure a new task 
 confronted Howe's professional abilities and en- 
 durance. Fortunately he had an able adviser in 
 the captain of the fleet, who had had long experi- 
 ence of the locality, invaluable during the trying 
 week that ensued. The allies had not yet stirred. 
 To move near fifty sail-of-the-line in pursuit of an 
 enemy, inferior indeed, but ranged for battle, and 
 the precise moment of whose appearance could 
 not have been foreseen, was no slight under- 
 taking, as Nelson afterwards said. It may be 
 recalled that before Trafalgar over twenty-four 
 hours were needed for the allied thirty-three to 
 get out of Cadiz Bay. On the 13th, however, 
 the combined French and Spaniards sailed, intent 
 primarily, it would seem, not on the true and 
 vital offensive purpose of frustrating the relief, 
 but upon the very secondary defensive object of 
 preserving two of their own numbers, which in 
 
Howe 295 
 
 a recent gale had been swept to the eastward. 
 Thus trivially preoccupied, they practically neg- 
 lected Howe, who on his part stripped for action 
 by sending the supply vessels to the Zaffarine 
 Islands, where the vagarious instincts of their 
 captains would be controlled by an anchor on 
 the bottom. On the 14th the allies bore north 
 from the British, close under the Spanish coast, 
 and visible only from the mastheads. On the 
 15th the wind came east, and the convoy and 
 fleet began cautiously to move towards Gibraltar, 
 the enemy apparently out of sight, and certainly 
 to the eastward. On the evening of the i6th 
 eighteen supply ships were at the mole, and on 
 the 1 8th all had arrived. Gibraltar was equipped 
 for another year's endurance. 
 
 We have less than could be wished of particu- 
 lars touching this performance of Howe's, from 
 the day of leaving England to that of fulfilment, 
 five full weeks later. Inference and comment has 
 to be built up upon incidents transmitted dis- 
 connectedly, interpreted in connection with the 
 usual known conditions and the relative strength 
 of the two opposing parties. To professional 
 understanding, thus far supplemented, much is 
 clear; quite enough, at the least, to avouch the 
 deliberation, the steadiness, the professional apti- 
 tude, the unremitting exertion that so well sup- 
 plies the place of celerity, — never resting, if 
 never hasting, — the calculated daring at fit 
 moments, and above all the unfailing self-posses- 
 
296 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 sion and self-reliance which at every instant up to 
 the last secured to the British enterprise the full 
 value of the other qualities possessed by the Com- 
 mander-in-chief. A biographical notice of Howe 
 cannot be complete without quoting the tribute 
 of an accomplished officer belonging to one of the 
 navies then arrayed against him. " The qualities 
 displayed by Lord Howe during this short cam- 
 paign," says Captain Chevalier of the French 
 service, " rose to the full height of the mission 
 which he had to fulfil. This operation, one of 
 the finest in the War of American Independence, 
 merits a praise equal to that of a victory. If the 
 English fleet was favored by circumstances, — and 
 it is rare that in such enterprises one can succeed 
 without the aid of fortune, — it was above all the 
 Commander-in-chief's quickness of perception, the 
 accuracy of his judgment, and the rapidity of his 
 decisions that assured success." 
 
 Having accomplished his main object and 
 landed besides fifteen hundred barrels of powder 
 from his own ships, Howe tarried no longer. 
 Like Nelson, at Gibraltar on his way to St. Vin- 
 cent, he would not trifle with an easterly wind, 
 without which he could not leave the Straits 
 against the constant inset; neither would he ad- 
 venture action, against a force superior by a third, 
 amid the currents that had caused him so trying 
 an experience. There was, moreover, the im- 
 portant strategic consideration that if the allied 
 fleets, which were again in sight, followed him 
 
Howe 297 
 
 out, they would thereby be drawn from any pos- 
 sible molestation of the unloading of the supply 
 ships, which had been attempted, though with 
 no great success, on the occasion of the relief 
 by Darby, in 1781. Howe therefore at once 
 headed for the Atlantic. The allies pursued, 
 and engaged partially on the afternoon and even- 
 ing of October 20th ; but the attack was not 
 pushed home, although they had the advantage of 
 the wind and of numbers. On the 14th of Novem- 
 ber the British fleet regained Spithead. It may 
 be remarked that Admirals Harrington and Mill- 
 bank both praised their captains very highly, for 
 the maintenance of the order in their respective 
 divisions during this action ; the former saying 
 it " was the finest close connected line I ever 
 saw during my service at sea." Howe, who held 
 higher ideals, conceived through earnest and pro- 
 longed study and reflection, was less well satis- 
 fied. It seems, however, reasonable to infer that 
 the assiduity of his efforts to promote tactical 
 precision had realized at least a partial measure 
 of success. 
 
 Another long term of shore life now intervened, 
 carrying the gallant admiral over the change- 
 fraught years of failing powers from fifty-six to 
 sixty-seven, at which age he was again called into 
 service, in the course of which he was to perform 
 the most celebrated, but, it may confidently be 
 affirmed, not the most substantial, nor even the 
 most brilliant, action of his career. During 
 
298 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 much of this intermediate period, between 1783 
 and 1788, Howe occupied the Cabinet position 
 of First Lord of the Admiralty, the civil head 
 and administrator of the Navy. Into the dis- 
 charge of this office he carried the same quali- 
 ties of assiduous attention to duty, and of close 
 devotion to details of professional progress, which 
 characterized him when afloat ; but, w^hile far 
 from devoid of importance, there is but little in 
 this part of his story that needs mention as 
 distinctive. Perhaps the most interesting in- 
 cidents, seen in the light of afterwards, are that 
 one of his earliest appointments to a ship was 
 given to Nelson ; and that the cordiality of his 
 reception at the end of the cruise is said to 
 have removed from the hero an incipient but 
 very strong disgust for the service. " You ask 
 me," wrote the future admiral to his brother, 
 " by what interest did I get a ship.? I answer, 
 having served with credit was my recommenda- 
 tion to Lord Howe. Anything in reason that I 
 can ask, I am sure of obtaining from his justice." 
 At the outbreak of the French Revolution, 
 Howe stood conspicuously at the head of the 
 navy, distinguished at once for well-known pro- 
 fessional accomplishments and for tried capacity 
 in chief command. His rivals in renown among 
 his contemporaries — Keppel, Barrington, and 
 Rodney — had gone to their rest. Jervis, Dun- 
 can, Nelson, Collingwood, and their compeers, 
 had yet to show what was in them as general 
 
Howe 299 
 
 officers. Lord Hood alone remained ; and he, 
 although he had done deeds of great promise, 
 had come to the front too late in the previous 
 war for his reputation to rest upon sustained 
 achievement as well as upon hopeful indication. 
 The great commands were given to these two : 
 Hood, the junior, going to the Mediterranean with 
 twenty ships-of-the-line, Howe taking the Channel 
 Fleet of somewhat superior numbers. 
 
 The solid, deliberate, methodical qualities of 
 the veteran admiral were better adapted to the 
 more purely defensive role, forced upon Great 
 Britain by the allied superiority in 1782, than to 
 the continuous, vigilant, aggressive action de- 
 manded by the new conditions with which he 
 now had to deal, when the great conflagration of 
 the Revolution was to be hemmed in and stamped 
 out by the unyielding pressure and massive blows 
 of the British sea power. The days of regulated, 
 routine hostilities between rulers had passed 
 away with the uprising of a people ; the time 
 foretold, when nation should rise against nation, 
 was suddenly come with the crash of an ancient 
 kingdom and of its social order. An admirable 
 organizer and indefatigable driller of ships, though 
 apparently a poor disciplinarian, Howe lacked 
 the breadth of view, the clear intuitions, the 
 alacrity of mind, brought to bear upon the problem 
 by Jervis and Nelson, who, thus inspired, framed 
 the sagacious plan to which, more than to any 
 other one cause, was due the exhaustion alike 
 
300 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 of the Revolutionary fury and of Napoleon's im- 
 perial power. Keenly interested in the material 
 efficiency of his ships, as well as in the precision 
 with which they could perform necessary evolu- 
 tions and maintain prescribed formations, he 
 sought to attain these ends by long stays in port, 
 varied by formal cruises devoted to secondary 
 objects and to fleet tactics. For these reasons also 
 he steadfastly refused to countenance the system of 
 close-watching the enemy's ports, by the presence 
 before each of a British force adequate to check 
 each movement at its beginning. 
 
 Thus nursing ships and men, Howe flattered 
 himself he should insure the perfection of the in- 
 strument which should be his stay in the hour of 
 battle. Herein he ignored the fundamental truth, 
 plainly perceived by his successor, St. Vincent, that 
 the effectiveness of a military instrument consists 
 more in the method of its use, and in the practised 
 skill of the human element that wields it, than in 
 the material perfection of the weapon itself. It 
 may justly be urged on his behalf that the prepara- 
 tion he sought should have been made, but was not, 
 by the Government in the long years of peace. 
 This is true ; but yet the fact remains that he 
 pursued his system by choice and conviction 
 repeatedly affirmed ; that continuous instead of 
 occasional cruising in the proper positions would 
 better have reached the ends of drill ; and that to 
 the material well being of his ships he sacrificed 
 those correct military dispositions before the 
 
Howe 301 
 
 enemy's ports, instituted and maintained by 
 Hawke, and further developed and extended by 
 Jervis, who at the same time preserved the effi- 
 ciency of the vessels by increased energy and 
 careful prevision of their wants. The brilliant 
 victory of the ist of June has obscured the 
 accompanying fact, that lamentable failure char- 
 acterized the general strategic use of the Channel 
 Fleet under Howe and his immediate successor. 
 
 Once in sight of the enemy, however, the old 
 man regained the fire of youth, and showed the 
 attainments which long study and careful thought 
 had added to his natural talent for war, enabling 
 him to introduce distinct advances upon the tac- 
 tical conceptions of his predecessors. The battle 
 of June I, 1794, was brought about in the follow- 
 ing manner. Political anarchy and a bad season 
 had combined to ruin the French harvests in 
 1793, and actual famine threatened the land. 
 To obviate this, at least partially, the Government 
 had bought in the United States a large quantity 
 of breadstuffs, which were expected to arrive in 
 May or June, borne by one hundred and eighty 
 merchant vessels. To insure the safety of this 
 valuable convoy, the Brest Fleet was sent to meet 
 it at a designated point; five ships going first, 
 and twenty-five following a few days later. Robes- 
 pierre's orders to the admiral, Villaret-Joyeuse, 
 were to avoid battle, if possible, but at all hazards 
 to secure the merchant fleet, or his head would 
 answer for it. 
 
302 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 About the same time, Howe, who had kept his 
 vessels in port during the winter, sailed from the 
 Channel with thirty-two ships-of-the-line. These 
 he soon divided into two squadrons ; one of which, 
 numbering six, after performing a specific service, 
 was not ordered to rejoin the main body, but to 
 cruise in a different spot. These ships were sadly 
 missed on the day of battle, when they could have 
 changed a brilliant into a crushing victory. Howe 
 himself went to seek the French, instead of tak- 
 ing a position where they must pass ; and after 
 some running to and fro, in which the British 
 actually got to the westward of their foes, and 
 might well have missed them altogether, he was 
 lucky enough, on the 2Sth of May, some four 
 hundred miles west of the island of Ushant, to 
 find the larger of their two detachments. This 
 having been meanwhile joined by one ship 
 from the smaller, both opponents now numbered 
 twenty-six heavy vessels. 
 
 The French were to windward, a position 
 which gives the power of refusing or delaying 
 decisive action. The average speed of any fieet, 
 however, must fall below the best of some of the 
 force opposed to it; and Howe, wishing to com- 
 pel battle, sent out six of his fastest and handiest 
 ships. These were directed to concentrate their 
 fire upon the enemy's rear, which, from the point 
 of view of naval tactics, was the weakest part 
 of a line-of-battle of sailing ships ; because, to 
 aid it, vessels ahead must turn round and 
 
Howe 3^3 
 
 change their formation, performing a ^ regular 
 evolution, whereas, if the van be assailed, the 
 rear naturally advances to its help. If this partial 
 attack crippled one or more of the French, the 
 disabled ships would drift towards the British, 
 where either they would be captured, or their com- 
 rades would be obliged to come to their rescue, 
 hazarding the general engagement that Howe 
 wanted. As it happened, the French had in the 
 rear an immense ship of one hundred and ten 
 guns, which beat off in detail the successive 
 attacks of her smaller antagonists; but in so 
 doing she received so much injury that she left 
 the fleet after nightfall, passing the British un- 
 molested, and went back to Brest. One of her 
 assailants, also, had to return to England; but, 
 as the relative force of the units thus clipped 
 from the respective opponents was as three to two, 
 the general result was a distinct material gain for 
 Howe. It is to be scored to his credit as a tacti- 
 cian that he let this single enemy go, rather than 
 scatter his fleet and lose ground in trying to take 
 her. He had a more important object. 
 
 The next morning. May 29th, the French by 
 poor seamanship had lost to leeward, and were 
 consequently somewhat nearer. Both fleets were 
 heading southeasterly, with the wind at south- 
 southwest ; both, consequently, on the starboard 
 tack. Howe saw that, by tacking in succession, 
 his column would so head that several of his ves- 
 sels in passing could bring the hostile rear under 
 
304 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 their guns, and that it was even possible that 
 three or four might be cut off, unless reinforced ; 
 to attempt which by the enemy would involve 
 also tactical possibilities favorable to the Brit- 
 ish. The necessary movement was ordered ; and 
 the French admiral, seeing things in the same 
 light, was justly so alarmed for the result that he 
 turned his head ships, and after them his whole 
 column in succession, to run down to help the 
 rear. Judicious, and indeed necessary, as this 
 was, it played right into Howe's hands, and was 
 a tribute to his tactical skill, by which it was 
 compelled ; for in doing this the French neces- 
 sarily gave up much of their distance to wind- 
 ward, and so hastened the collision they wished 
 to avoid. Although the attack upon their rear 
 was limited to a few desultory broadsides, the 
 two fleets were at last nearly within cannon shot, 
 whereas the day before they had been eight or 
 ten miles apart. Both were now on the port tack, 
 running west in parallel lines. 
 
 Towards noon, Howe saw that the morning's 
 opportunity of directing his whole column upon 
 the enemy's rear again offered, but with a far 
 better chance ; that if his ships manoeuvred well 
 half a dozen of the French must be cut off, unless 
 their admiral, to save them, repeated his previous 
 mana^uvre of running down to their assistance, 
 which would infallibly entail the general engage- 
 ment sought by the British. The signal to tack 
 in succession was again made, and to pass through 
 
Howe 305 
 
 the enemy's line ; but here Howe's purpose was 
 foiled, as Rodney's on April 17th, by the failure of 
 his leading vessel. Her captain, like Carkett, 
 was of considerable seniority, having commanded 
 a ship-of-the-line under Howe at New York, in 
 1778. His conduct during this brief campaign 
 was so unfavorably noticed by his admiral that 
 he asked a Court-Martial, which dismissed him 
 from his ship, though clearing him of cowardice. 
 Upon the present occasion he for some time 
 delayed obedience ; and, when he did go about, 
 wore instead of tacking, which lost ground and 
 caused confusion by going to leeward. The 
 second ship acted well, and struck the French 
 column some distance from its rear, proving 
 Howe right in judging that the enemy's order 
 could there be pierced. As this vessel was not 
 closely supported, she received such injuries 
 from successive fires, that, when she at last 
 found an opening through which to pass, she was 
 unable to manoeuvre. 
 
 Seeing that the van was failing him, Howe, 
 whose flag-ship, the Queen Charlotte, was tenth 
 from the head of his column, now took the lead 
 himself, tacked his own vessel, though her turn 
 was not yet come, and, accompanied by his next 
 ahead and astern, — another striking instance of 
 the inspiring influence of a high example, — 
 stood straight for the hostile order. The three 
 broke through astern of the sixth ship from the 
 French rear, and cut off two of the enemy, 
 
3o6 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 which were speedily surrounded by others of 
 the British. Villaret-Joyeuse then repeated his 
 former evolution, and nothing could have saved a 
 general engagement except the disorder into which 
 the British had fallen, and Howe's methodical 
 abhorrence of attacks made in such confusion as 
 prevailed. Moreover, the decisive result of this 
 last brush was that the French entirely lost the 
 windward position, and the British admiral knew 
 that he now had them where they could not 
 escape ; he could afford to postpone the issue. 
 Accordingly, fighting ceased for the day ; but 
 the French had been so mauled that three more 
 ships had to go into port, leaving them but 
 twenty-two to the enemy's twenty-five. 
 
 To appreciate Howe's personal merit as a 
 tactician, reflection should be bestowed upon the 
 particulars of his conduct on these two days, 
 with which the First of June is not to be com- 
 pared ; for in them culminated, so to speak, a 
 long course of preparation in the study of tactical 
 possibilities, and of the system of signals needed 
 to insure necessary evolutions. His officers, as 
 a body, do not appear to have deser\'ed by their 
 manoeuvring the encomium passed by Rodney 
 upon his, during the long chase to windward in 
 May, 1780; and, as Howe had now held com- 
 mand for a year, this failure may probably be 
 assigned to lack of that punctilious severity to 
 which Rodney attributed his own success. But 
 in the matter of personal acquirement Howe 
 
Howe 307 
 
 shows a distinct advance upon Rodney's ideas 
 and methods. There is not to be noted in 
 Rodney's actions any foreshadowing of the judi- 
 cious attack upon the enemy's rear, on May 28th, 
 by a smart flying squadron. This doubtless pre- 
 sents some analogy to a general chase, but there 
 is in it more of system and of regulated action ; 
 in short, there is development. Again, although 
 Rodney doubtless tacked in succession repeatedly, 
 between May 9th and May 20th, in his efforts to 
 reach the enemy to windward, there does not 
 then appear, nor did there appear on either of 
 the two occasions when he succeeded in striking 
 their column from to leeward, any intention, such 
 as Howe on the 29th communicated by signal 
 and enforced by action, of breaking through the 
 enemy's line even at the cost of breaking his 
 own. Not even on April 12th had Rodney, as far 
 as appears, any such formulated plan. There is 
 here, therefore, distinct progress, in the nature of 
 reflective and reasoned development; for it is 
 scarcely to be supposed that Howe's assiduity 
 and close contact with the navy had failed to 
 note, for future application, the incidents of 
 Rodney's battles, which had been the subject 
 of animated discussion and censure by eye- 
 witnesses. 
 
 It will be recognized that the conception in 
 Howe's mind, maintained unchangeably and 
 carried consistently into effect during these two 
 days, was to attack continually, as opportunity 
 
joS Types of Naval Officers 
 
 offered, the rear end of the enemy's column, which 
 corresponds precisely with the attack upon the 
 flank of a line of battle on shore. Merit does 
 not depend upon result, but fortunate result 
 should be noted for the encouragement and 
 guidance of the future. In consequence of these 
 sustained and judiciously directed movements, 
 and of the steps found necessary by the French 
 admiral because of injuries received, the enemy 
 had lost from their line four ships, of which one 
 was of one hundred and twenty guns, another of 
 eighty ; while of those retained one had lost all her 
 spars save the lower masts, and had thenceforth 
 to be towed in action. Against this was to be 
 set only one British seventy-four, disabled on the 
 28th and returned to port ; their other damaged 
 vessels refitted at sea and stayed with the fleet. 
 On the other hand, Howe's separated division of 
 six remained separated, whereas four fresh French 
 ships joined their main fleet on the 30th. Admir- 
 able tactics were thus neutralized by defective 
 strategy ; and therefore it may with substantial 
 accuracy be said that Howe's professional qualities 
 and defects were both signally illustrated in this, 
 his last conspicuous service. 
 
 The French admiral on the evening of the 
 29th saw that he now must fight, and at a dis- 
 advantage ; consequently, he could not hope to 
 protect the convoy. As to sav^e this was his 
 prime object, the next best thing was to entice 
 the British out of its path. With this view he 
 
Howe 309 
 
 stood away to the northwest; while a dense fog 
 coming on both favored his design and prevented 
 further encounter during the two ensuing days, 
 throughout which Howe continued to pursue. 
 In the evening of May 31st the weather cleared, 
 and at daybreak the next morning the enemies 
 were in position, ready for battle, two long 
 columns of ships, heading west, the British twenty- 
 five, the French again twenty-six through the 
 junction of the four vessels mentioned. Howe 
 now had cause to regret his absent six, and to 
 ponder Nelson's wise saying, "Only numbers 
 can annihilate." 
 
 The time for manoeuvring was past. Able 
 tactician as he personally was, and admirable as 
 had been the direction of his efforts in the two 
 days' fighting, Howe had been forced in them to 
 realize two things, namely, that his captains were, 
 singly, superior in seamanship, and their crews 
 in gunnery, to the French ; and again, that ^ in 
 the^ability to work together as a fleet the British 
 were so deficient as to promise very imperfect re- 
 sults, if he attempted any but the simplest forma- 
 tion. To such, therefore, he resorted; falling back 
 upon the old, unskilful, sledge-hammer fashion 
 of the British navy. Arranging his ships in one 
 long line, three miles from the enemy, he made 
 them all go down together, each to attack a speci- 
 fied opponent, coming into action as nearly as 
 might be at the same instant. Thus the French, 
 from the individual inferiority of the units of 
 
jio Types of Naval Officers 
 
 their fleet, would be at all points overpowered. 
 The issue justified the forecast ; but the manner 
 of performance was curiously and happily marked 
 by Howe's own peculiar phlegm. There was 
 a long summer day ahead for fighting, and no 
 need for hurry. The order was first accurately 
 formed, and canvas reduced to proper propor- 
 tions. Then the crews went to breakfast. After 
 breakfast, the ships all headed for the hostile line, 
 under short sail, the admiral keeping them in 
 hand during the approach, as an infantry officer 
 dresses his company. Hence the shock from end 
 to end was so nearly simultaneous as to induce 
 success unequalled in any engagement conducted 
 on the same primitive plan. 
 
 Picturesque as well as sublime, animating as 
 well as solemn, on that bright Sunday morning, 
 was this prelude to the stern game of war about 
 to be played : the quiet summer sea stirred only 
 by a breeze sufficient to cap with white the little 
 waves that ruffled its surface ; the dark hulls 
 gently rippling the water aside in their slow ad- 
 vance, a ridge of foam curling on either side of 
 the furrow ploughed by them in their onward way ; 
 their massive sides broken by two, or at times 
 three, rows of ports, whence, the tompions drawn, 
 yawned the sullen lines of guns, behind which, un- 
 seen, but easily realized by the instructed eye, 
 clustered the groups of ready seamen who served 
 each piece. Aloft swung leisurely to and fro the 
 tall spars, which ordinarily, in so light a wind, 
 
H 
 
 owe 3 1 1 
 
 would be clad in canvas from deck to truck, 
 but whose naked trimness now proclaimed the 
 deadly purpose of that still approach. Upon the 
 high poops, where floated the standard of either 
 nation, gathered round each chief the little knot 
 of ofificers through whom commands were issued 
 and reports received, the nerves along which 
 thrilled the impulses of the great organism, from 
 its head, the admiral, through every member to 
 the dark lowest decks, nearly awash, where, as 
 farthest from the captain's own oversight, the 
 senior lieutenants controlled the action of the 
 ships' heaviest batteries. 
 
 On board the Queen Charlotte, Lord Howe, 
 whose burden of sixty-eight years had for four 
 days found no rest save what he could snatch in 
 an arm-chair, now, at the prospect of battle, " dis- 
 played an animation," writes an eye-witness, " of 
 which, at his age, and after such fatigue of body 
 and mind, I had not thought him capable. He 
 seemed to contemplate the result as one of un- 
 bounded satisfaction." By his side stood his 
 fleet-captain, Curtis, of whose service among the 
 floating batteries, and during the siege of Gib- 
 raltar, the governor of the fortress had said, " He 
 is the man to whom the king is chiefly indebted 
 for its security;" and Codrington, then a lieuten- 
 ant, who afterwards commanded the allied fleets at 
 Navarino. Five ships to the left, Collingwood, 
 in the Barfleur,v^2.% making to the admiral whose 
 flag she bore the remark that stirred Thackeray: 
 
312 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 " Our wives are now about going to church, 
 but we will ring about these Frenchmen's ears a 
 peal which will drown their bells." The French 
 officers, both admirals and captains, were mainly 
 unknown men, alike then and thereafter. The 
 fierce flames of the Revolution had swept away 
 the men of the old school, mostly aristocrats, 
 and time had not yet brought forward the very 
 few who during the Napoleonic period showed 
 marked capacity. The commander-in-chief, Vil- 
 laret-Joyeuse, had three years before been a lieu- 
 tenant. He had a high record for gallantry, but 
 was without antecedents as a general officer. 
 With him, on the poop of the Montagne, which 
 took her name from Robespierre's political sup- 
 porters, stood that anomalous companion of the 
 generals and admirals of the day, the Revolution- 
 ary commissioner, Jean Bon Saint-Andre, about 
 to learn by experience the practical working of 
 the system he had advocated, to disregard all tests 
 of ability save patriotism and courage, deprecia- 
 ting practice and skill as unnecessary to the valor 
 of the true Frenchman. 
 
 As the British line drew near the French, 
 Howe said to Curtis, " Prepare the signal for 
 close action." " There is no such signal," replied 
 Curtis. " No," said the admiral, " but there is 
 one for closer action, and I only want that to be 
 made in case of captains not doing their duty." 
 Then closing a little signal book he always car- 
 ried, he continued to those around him, " Now, 
 
Howe 313 
 
 gentlemen, no more book, no more signals. I 
 look to you to do the dut}' of the Queen Char- 
 lotte in engaging the flag-ship. I don't want the 
 ships to be bilge to bilge, but if you can lock the 
 yardarms, so much the better; the battle will be 
 the quicker decided." His purpose w^as to go 
 through the French line, and fight the Montagjte 
 on the far side. Some doubted their succeed- 
 ing, but Howe overbore them. "That's right, 
 my lord ! " cried Bowen, the sailing-master, who 
 looked to the ship's steering. " The Charlotte 
 will make room for herself." She pushed close 
 under the French ship's stern, grazing her ensign, 
 and raking her from stern to stem with a wither- 
 ing fire, beneath which fell three hundred men. 
 A length or two beyond lay the French Jacobin. 
 Howe ordered the Charlotte to luff, and place 
 herself between the two. " If we do," said Bowen, 
 '* we shall be on board one of them." " What is 
 that to you, sir.? " asked Howe quickly. " Oh ! " 
 muttered the master, not inaudibly. " D — n my 
 eyes if I care, if you don't. I '11 go near enough 
 to singe some of our whiskers." And then, see- 
 ing by the Jacobins rudder that she was going 
 off, he brought the Charlotte sharp round, her jib 
 boom grazing the second Frenchman as her side 
 had grazed the flag of the first. 
 
 From this moment the battle raged furiously 
 from end to end of the field for nearly an hour, 
 — a wild scene of smoke and confusion, under 
 cover of which many a fierce ship duel was 
 
314 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 fouiiht, while here and there men wandered, lost, 
 in a maze of bewilderment that neutralized their 
 better judgment. An English naval captain tells 
 a service tradition of one who was so busy watch- 
 ing the compass, to keep his position in the ranks, 
 that he lost sight of his antagonist, and never 
 again found him. Many a quaint incident passed, 
 recorded or unrecorded, under that sulphurous 
 canopy. A British ship, wholly dismasted, lay 
 between two enemies, her captain desperately 
 wounded. A murmur of surrender was some- 
 where heard ; but as the first lieutenant checked 
 it with firm authority, a cock flew upon the stump 
 of a mast and crowed lustily. The exultant note 
 found quick response in hearts not given to 
 despair, and a burst of merriment, accompanied 
 with three cheers, replied to the bird's triumphant 
 scream. On board the Brunswick, in her struggle 
 with the Vengeur, one of the longest and fiercest 
 fights the sea has ever seen, the cocked hat was 
 shot off the efiligy of the Duke of Brunswick, 
 which she bore as a figure-head. A deputation 
 from the crew gravely requested the captain to 
 allow the use of his spare chapeau, which was 
 securely nailed on, and protected his grace's wig 
 durino: the rest of the action. After this battle 
 with the ships of the new republic, the partisans 
 of monarchy noted with satisfaction that, among 
 the many royal figures that surmounted the stems 
 of the British iieet, not one lost his crown. Of a 
 harum-scarum Irish captain are told two droll 
 
Howe 315 
 
 stories. After being hotly engaged for some time 
 with a French ship, the fire of the latter slackened, 
 and then ceased. He called to know if she had 
 surrendered. The reply was, " No." " Then," 
 shouted he, "d — n you, why don't you fire?" 
 Having disposed of his special antagonist without 
 losing his own spars, the same man kept along in 
 search of new adventures, until he came to a 
 British ship totally dismasted and otherwise 
 badly damaged. She was commanded by a cap- 
 tain of rigidly devout piety. " Well, Jemmy," 
 hailed the Irishman, " you are pretty well mauled ; 
 but never mind, Jemmy, whom the Lord loveth 
 he chasteneth." 
 
 The French have transmitted to us less of 
 anecdote, nor is it easy to connect the thought of 
 humor with those grimly earnest republicans 
 and the days of the Terror. There is, indeed, 
 something unintentionally funny in the remark 
 of the commander of one of the captured ships to 
 his captors. They had, it was true, dismasted 
 half the French fleet, and had taken over a fourth ; 
 yet he assured them it could not be considered a 
 victory, " but merely a butchery, in which the 
 British had shown neither science nor tactics." 
 The one story, noble and enduring, that will ever 
 be associated with the French on the ist of June 
 is in full keeping with the temper of the times 
 and the enthusiasm of the nation. The seventy- 
 four-gun ship Vengeur, after a three hours' fight, 
 yardarm to yardarm, with the British Brunswick, 
 
3i6 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 was left in a sinking state by her antagonist, who 
 was herself in no condition to help. In the con- 
 fusion, the Vcngeurs peril was for some time not 
 observed ; and when it was, the British ships that 
 came to her aid had time only to remove part of 
 her survivors. In their report of the event the 
 latter said : " Scarcely had the boats pulled clear 
 of the sides, when the most frightful spectacle 
 was offered to our gaze. Those of our comrades 
 who remained on board the Vengeur du Peuple, 
 with hands raised to heaven, implored, with 
 lamentable cries, the help for which they could no 
 longer hope. Soon disappeared the ship and the 
 unhappy victims it contained. In the midst of 
 the horror with which this scene inspired us all, 
 we could not avoid a feeling of admiration mingled 
 with our grief As we drew away, we heard some 
 of our comrades still offering prayers for the 
 welfare of their country. The last cries of these 
 unfortunates were, ' Vive la Republique ! ' They 
 died uttering them." Over a hundred Frenchmen 
 thus went down. 
 
 Seven French ships were captured, including 
 the sunk Vengeur. Five more were wholly dis- 
 masted, but escaped, — a good fortune mainly to 
 be attributed to Howe's utter physical prostration, 
 due to his advanced years and the continuous 
 strain of the past five days. He now went to 
 bed, completely worn out. "We all got round 
 him," wrote an officer. Lieutenant Codrington, 
 who was present; "indeed, I saved him from a 
 
Howe 317 
 
 tumble, he was so weak that from a roll of the ship 
 he was nearly falling into the waist. ' Why, you 
 hold me up as if I were a child,' he said good- 
 humoredly." Had he been younger, there can be 
 little doubt that the fruits of victory would have 
 been gathered with an ardor which his assistant, 
 Curtis, failed to show. The fullest proof of this 
 is the anecdote, already quoted in the sketch of 
 Rodney,^ which has been transmitted by Admiral 
 Sir Byam Martin direct from the sailing-master 
 of the Queen Charlotte, afterwards Admiral 
 Bowen ; but his account is abundantly confirmed 
 by other officers, eye and ear witnesses. Taken 
 in connection with these, Codrington's story of his 
 physical weakness bears the note, not of pathos 
 only, but of encouragement ; for the whole testifies 
 assuredly to the persistence, through great bodily 
 debility, of a strong quality diligently cultivated 
 in the days of health and vigor. In truth, it 
 was impossible for Howe to purpose otherwise. 
 Having been continuously what he was in his 
 prime, it could not be that he would not intend, 
 with all the force of his will, to persevere to the 
 utmost in the duty before him. The faithfulness 
 of a life-time does not so forsake a man in his 
 end. What he lacked in that critical hour was 
 not the willing mind, but the instrument by which 
 to communicate to the fleet the impulse which 
 his own failing powers were no longer able directly 
 to impart. 
 
 1 Ante, p. 250. 
 
3 1 8 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 Lord Howe s career practically ended with this 
 battle and the honors that followed it. Infirm- 
 ities then gained rapidly upon him, and it would 
 have been well had his own wish to retire been 
 granted by the Government. He remained in 
 nominal command of the Channel Fleet, though 
 not going to sea, until the occurrence of the great 
 mutinies of 1797. The suppression — or, more 
 properly, the composing — of this ominous out- 
 break was devolved upon him by the ministry. 
 He very wisely observed that " preventive meas- 
 ures rather than corrective are to be preferred 
 for preserving discipline in fleets and armies;" 
 but it was in truth his own failure to use such 
 timely remedies, owing to the lethargy of increas- 
 ing years, acting upon a temperament naturally 
 indulgent and unapprehensive, that was largely 
 responsible for disorders of whose imminence he 
 had warning. From the military standpoint, the 
 process of settlement had much the air of opera 
 bouffe, — a consummation probably inevitable 
 when just grievances and undeniable hardships 
 get no attention until the sufferers break through 
 all rules, and seek redress by force. The mutinous 
 seamen protested to Howe the bitterness of their 
 sorrow at the sense of wrong doing, but in the 
 same breath insisted that their demands must be 
 conceded, and that certain obnoxious officers must 
 be removed from their ships. The demands were 
 yielded, Howe gently explaining to the men how 
 naughty they had been ; and that, as to the 
 
Howe 319 
 
 unpopular officers, they themselves asked relief 
 from so unpleasant a situation. In his curiously 
 involved style, he wrote : " This request has been 
 complied with, under the pretext of an equal 
 desire on the part of the officers not to be 
 employed in ships where exception, without 
 specification of facts, has been taken to their 
 conduct. However ineligible the concession, it 
 was become indispensably necessary." Under 
 this thin veil, men persuaded themselves that 
 appearances were saved, as a woman hides a smile 
 behind her fan. Admiral Codrington, a firm 
 admirer of Howe, justly said: "It was want of 
 discipline which led to the discontent and mutiny 
 in the Channel Fleet. Lord Howe got rid of the 
 mutiny by granting the men all they asked ; but 
 discipline was not restored until the ships most 
 remarkable for misconduct had been, one after 
 the other, placed under the command of Lord St. 
 Vincent." 
 
 With the settlement of this mutiny Lord 
 Howe's long career of active service closed. 
 Immediately afterwards he retired formally, as 
 he sometime before had actually, from the com- 
 mand of the Channel Fleet, and on the 5th of 
 August, 1799, he died full of years and honors; 
 having lived just long enough to welcome the ris- 
 ing star of Nelson's glory as it burst upon men's 
 sight at Cape St. Vincent and the Nile. 
 
J E R V I S 
 
 1735-1823 
 
 THE renown of Nelson is part of the her- 
 itao:e of the world. His deeds, although 
 their full scope and real significance have been 
 but little understood, stand out conspicuous 
 among a host of lesser achievements, and are 
 become to mankind the symbol of Great Britain's 
 maritime power in that tremendous era when it 
 drove the French Revolution back upon itself, 
 stifling its excesses, and so insuring the survival 
 of the beneficent tendencies which for a time 
 seemed well nigh lost in the madness of the 
 nation. 
 
 The appearance of a prodigy like Nelson, how- 
 ever, is not an isolated event, independent of 
 antecedents. It is the result of a happy meeting 
 of genius and opportunity. The hour has come, 
 and the man. Other men have labored, and the 
 hero enters into their labors ; not unjustly, for 
 thereto he also has been appointed by those 
 special gifts which fit him to reap as theirs fitted 
 them to sow. In relation to Nelson and his 
 career, the illustrious officer whose most distin- 
 
John jervis, Earl St. l^incent. 
 
Jervis 321 
 
 guishing characteristics we have now to trace 
 stood pre-eminent among many forerunners. It 
 was he, above all others, who made the prepara- 
 tion indispensable to the approaching triumphal 
 progress of the first of British naval heroes, so 
 that his own work underlies that of his successor, 
 as foundation supports superstructure. There is 
 not between them the vital connection of root to 
 branch, of plant to fruit. In the matter of pro- 
 fessional kinship Nelson has far more in common 
 with Hood. Between these there is an identity 
 of kind, an orderly sequence of development, an 
 organic bond, such as knits together the series 
 of a progressive evolution. It is not so with 
 Jervis. Closely conjoined as the two men long 
 were in a common service, and in mutual admira- 
 tion and sympathy, it would be an error to think 
 of the elder as in any sense the professional pro- 
 genitor of the younger ; yet he was, as it were, an 
 adoptive father, who from the first fostered, and 
 to the last gloried in, the genius which he con- 
 fessed unparalleled. " It does not become me to 
 make comparisons," he wrote after Copenhagen ; 
 "all agree that there is but one Nelson." And 
 when the great admiral had been ten years in his 
 grave, he said of an officer's gallant conduct at 
 the Battle of Algiers, " He seems to have felt 
 Lord Nelson's eye upon him ;" as though no 
 stronger motive could be felt nor higher praise 
 given. 
 
 John Jervis was born on the 20th of January, 
 
322 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 1735, at Meaford, in Staffordshire. He was in- 
 tended for his father's profession, the law ; but, 
 by his own account, a disinclination which was 
 probably natural became invincible through the 
 advice of the family coachman. " Don't be a 
 lawyer, Master Jacky," said the old man ; " all 
 lawyers are rogues." Some time later, his father 
 receiving the appointment of auditor to Green- 
 wich Hospital, the family removed to the neigh- 
 borhood of London ; and there young Jems, 
 being thrown in contact with ships and seamen, 
 and particularly with a midshipman of his own 
 age, became confirmed in his wish to go to sea. 
 Failing to get his parents' consent, he ran away 
 towards the close of the year 1747. From this 
 escapade he .was brought back; but his father, 
 seeing the uselessness of forcing the lad's incli- 
 nations, finally acquiesced, though it seems likely, 
 from his after conduct, that it was long before 
 he became thoroughly reconciled to the dis- 
 appointment. 
 
 In January, 1748, the future admiral and peer 
 first went afloat in a ship bound to the West 
 Indies. The time was inauspicious for one mak- 
 ing the navy his profession. The war of the 
 Austrian succession had just been brought to an 
 end by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and the 
 monotonous discomfort of hard cruising, unre- 
 lieved by the excitements of battle or the flush of 
 prize-taking, was the sole prospect of one whose 
 narrow means debarred him from such pleas- 
 
Jervis 323 
 
 ures as the station afforded and youth naturally 
 prompted him to seek. His pay was little over 
 twenty pounds a year, and his father had not 
 felt able to give more than that sum towards 
 his original outfit. After being three years on 
 board, practising a rigid economy scarcely to be 
 expected in one of his years, the lad of sixteen 
 drew a bill upon home for twenty pounds more. 
 It came back dishonored. The latent force of his 
 character was at once aroused. To discharge 
 the debt, he disposed of his pay tickets at a heavy 
 discount ; sold his bed, and for three years slept 
 on the deck ; left the mess to which he belonged, 
 living forward on the allowance of a seaman, and 
 making, mending, and washing his own clothes, 
 to save expense. Doubt has been expressed as 
 to the reality of these early privations, on the 
 ground that his father's office at Greenwich, and 
 the subsequent promotions of the young officer, 
 show the existence of a family influence, which 
 would have counteracted such extreme restriction 
 in money matters. The particulars, however, 
 have been so transmitted as to entitle them to 
 acceptance, unless contradicted by something 
 more positive than circumstantial inference from 
 other conditions, not necessarily contradictory. 
 This sharp experience was singularly adapted 
 to develop and exaggerate his natural character- 
 istics, self-reliance, self-control, stern determina- 
 tion, and, it must be added, the exacting harshness 
 which demanded of others all that he had himself 
 
324 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 accepted. His experience of suffering and depri- 
 vation served, not to enlarge his indulgence, but 
 to intensify his severity. Yet it may be remarked 
 that Jervis was at all periods in thorough touch 
 with distinctively naval feeling, sympathizing 
 with and respecting its sensibilities, sharing its 
 prejudices, as well as comprehending its weak- 
 nesses. Herein he differed from Rodney, who in 
 the matter of community of sentiment stood 
 habitually external to his profession ; in it, but in 
 heart not of it ; belonging consciously and wil- 
 lingly to a social class which cherished other 
 ideals of life and action. His familiarity with the 
 service quickened him to criticise more keenly 
 and accurately than a stranger, to recognize fail- 
 ings with harsher condemnation ; but there ap- 
 pears no disposition to identify himself with it 
 further than as an instrument of personal advance- 
 ment and distinction. 
 
 Upon Jervis's naval future, the results of his 
 early ordeal were wholly good. Unable to pur- 
 sue pleasure ashore, he stuck to sea-going ships ; 
 and the energies of a singularly resolute mind 
 were devoted to mastering all the details of his 
 profession. After six years in the Caribbean, 
 he returned to England in the autumn of 1754. 
 The troubles between France and Great Britain 
 which issued in the Seven Years War had al- 
 ready begun, and Jervis, whose merit commanded 
 immediate recognition from those under whom 
 he served, found family influence to insure his 
 
Jervis 325 
 
 speedy promotion and employment. Being made 
 lieutenant early in 1755, he was with Boscawen 
 off the Gulf of St. Lawrence when that admiral, 
 although peace yet reigned, was ordered to seize 
 the French fleet bearing reinforcements to Que- 
 bec. At the same time, Braddock's unfortunate 
 expedition was miscarrying in the forests of 
 Pittsburg. A year later, in 1756, Jervis went to 
 the Mediterranean with Admiral Hawke, sent to 
 relieve Byng after the fiasco at Minorca which 
 brought that unhappy commander to trial and to 
 death. 
 
 Before and during this Mediterranean cruise 
 Jervis had been closely associated with Sir 
 Charles Saunders, one of the most distinguished 
 admirals of that generation, upon whom he made 
 so favorable an impression that he was chosen 
 for first lieutenant of the flag-ship, when Saun- 
 ders, in 1758, was named to command the fleet to 
 act against Quebec. The gallant and romantic 
 General Wolfe, whose death in the hour of vic- 
 tory saddened the triumph of the conquerors, 
 embarked in the same ship ; and the long pas- 
 sage favored the growth of a close personal inti- 
 macy between the two young men, who had been 
 at school together as boys, although the soldier 
 was several years older than the sailor. The 
 relations thus formed and the confidences ex- 
 changed are shown by a touching incident re- 
 corded by Jervis's biographer. On the night 
 before the battle on the Heights of Abraham, 
 
2^6 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 Wolfe went on board the Porcupine, a small sloop 
 of war to whose command Jervis had meanwhile 
 been promoted, and asked to see him in private. 
 He then said that he was strongly impressed with 
 the feeling that he should fall on the morrow, and 
 therefore wished to entrust to his friend the mini- 
 ature of the lady. Miss Lowther, to whom he was 
 engaged, and to have from him the promise that, 
 if the foreboding proved true, he would in person 
 deliver to her both the portrait and Wolfe's own 
 last messages. From the interview the young 
 general departed to achieve his enterprise, to 
 which daring action, brilliant success, and heroic 
 death have given a lustre that time itself has not 
 been able to dim, whose laurels remain green to 
 our own day; while Jervis, to whose old age was 
 reserved the glory that his comrade reaped in 
 youth, remained behind to discharge his last 
 request, — a painful duty which, upon returning 
 to England, was scrupulously fulfilled. 
 
 Although the operations against Quebec de- 
 pended wholly upon the control of the water by 
 the navy, its influence, as often happens, was so 
 quietly exerted as to draw no attention from the 
 general eye, dazzled by the conspicuous splendor 
 of Wolfe's conduct. To Jervis had been assigned 
 the distinguished honor of leading the fleet with 
 his little ship, in the advance up river against the 
 fortifications of the place; and it is interesting to 
 note that in this duty he was joined with the 
 afterwards celebrated explorer, James Cook, who, 
 
Jervis 327 
 
 as master of the fleet, had special charge of the 
 pilotage in those untried waters. Wolfe, Cook, 
 and Jervis form a striking trio of names, then 
 unknown, yet closely associated, afterwards to be 
 widely though diversely renowned. 
 
 When the city fell. Commander Jervis was sent 
 to England, probably with despatches. There he 
 was at once given a ship, and ordered to return 
 with her to North America. Upon her proving 
 leaky, he put in to Plymouth, where, as his mission 
 was urgent, he was directed to take charge of a 
 sloop named the Albany, then lying at anchor 
 near by, and to proceed in her. To this moment 
 has been attributed an incident which, as regards 
 time and place, has been more successfully im- 
 peached than the story of his early privations, in 
 that no mention of it is found in the ship's log ; 
 and there are other discrepancies which need 
 reconcilement. Nevertheless it is, as told, so 
 entirely characteristic, that the present writer 
 has no doubt it occurred, at some time, substan- 
 tially as given by his biographer, who was son to 
 a secretary long in close relations with him when 
 admiral. It would be entirely in keeping with all 
 experience of testimony that the old man's recol- 
 lections, or those of his secretary, may have gone 
 astray on minor circumstances, while preserving 
 accurately the fundamental and only really im- 
 portant facts, which are perfectly consistent with, 
 and illustrative of, the stern decision afterwards 
 shown in meeting and suppressing mutiny of the 
 
328 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 most threatening description. The crew of the 
 Albany, it is said, from some motives of discontent 
 refused to sail. Jervis had brought with him a few 
 seamen from his late command. These he ordered 
 to cut the cables which held the ship to her 
 anchors, and to loose the foresail. Daunted 
 more, perhaps, by the bearing of the man than 
 by the mere acts, the mutineers submitted, and 
 in twenty-four days, an extraordinarily short pas- 
 sage for that time, the Albany was at New York. 
 Here Jervis was unfortunately delayed, and 
 thus, being prevented from rejoining Sir Charles 
 Saunders, lost the promotion which a British 
 commander-in-chief could then give to an officer 
 in his own command who had merited his pro- 
 fessional approval. It was not until October, 
 1 76 1, when he was twenty-six, that Jervis obtained 
 " post " rank, — the rank, that is, of full, or post, 
 captain. By the rule of the British navy, an 
 officer up to that rank could be advanced by 
 selection ; thenceforth he waited, through the 
 long succession of seniority, for his admiral's 
 commission. This Jervis did not receive until 
 1787, when he was fifty-two. 
 
 It was as a general officer, as an admiral com- 
 manding great fleets and bearing responsibilities 
 unusually grave through a most critical period of 
 his country's history, that Jervis made his high 
 and deserved reputation. For this reason, the 
 intervening years, though pregnant with the fin- 
 ished character and distinguished capacity which 
 
Jervis 329 
 
 fitted him for his onerous work, and though by 
 no means devoid of incident, must be hastily 
 sketched. The Treaty of Paris, which in 1763 
 closed the Seven Years War, was followed by 
 twelve years of peace. Then came the American 
 Revolution, bringing in its train hostilities with 
 France and Spain. During the peace, Jervis for 
 nearly four years commanded a frigate in the 
 Mediterranean. It is told that while his ship 
 was at Genoa two Turkish slaves escaped from a 
 Genoese galley, and took refuge in a British boat 
 lying at the mole, wrapping its flag round their 
 persons. Genoese officers took them forcibly 
 from the boat and restored them to their chains. 
 Jervis resented this, as being not only an insult 
 to the British flag, but also an enforcement of 
 slavery against men under its protection ; and so 
 peremptory was his tone that an apology was made, 
 the two captives were given up on the frigate's 
 quarter-deck, and the offending officers punished. 
 The captain's action, however, was not sustained 
 by his own government. It is curious to note 
 that, notwithstanding his course in this case, 
 and although he was not merely nominally, but 
 strenuously, a Whig, or Liberal, in political faith, 
 connected by party ties with Fox and his coterie of 
 friends, Jervis was always opposed to the abolition 
 of the slave trade and to the education of the lower 
 orders. Liberty was to him an inherited worship, 
 associated with certain stock beliefs and phrases, 
 but subordination was the true idol of his soul. 
 
330 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 In 1775 Captain Jervis commissioned the 
 Foudroyant, of eighty-four guns, a ship captured 
 in 1758 from the French, and thereafter thought 
 to be the finest vessel in the British fleet. To 
 this, her natural superiority, Jervis added a degree 
 of order, discipline, and drill which made her the 
 pride and admiration of the navy. He was forty 
 when his pennant first flew from her masthead, 
 and he held the command for eight years, a period 
 covering the full prime of his own maturity, as 
 well as the entire course of the American Revo- 
 lution. It was also a period marked for him, 
 professionally, less by distinguished service than 
 by that perfection of military organization, that 
 combination of dignified yet not empty pomp 
 with thorough and constant readiness, which was 
 so eminently characteristic of all the phases of 
 Jervis s career, and which, when the rare moments 
 came, was promptly transformed into unhesitating, 
 decisive, and efficient action. The Foiidroyaiit, in 
 her state and discipline, was the type in miniature 
 of Jervis's Mediterranean fleet, declared by Nelson 
 to be the finest body of ships he had ever known ; 
 nay, she was the precursor of that regenerate 
 British navy in which Nelson found the instru- 
 ments of his triumphs. Sixty years later, old 
 officers recalled the feelings of mingled curiosity 
 and awe with which, when sent to her on duty 
 from their own ships, they climbed on board the 
 Foudroyant, and from the larboard side of her 
 quarter-deck gazed upon the stern captain, whose 
 
Jervis 331 
 
 qualities were embodied in his vessel and consti- 
 tuted her chief excellences. 
 
 During Jervis's command, the Foudroyant was 
 continuously attached to the Channel Fleet, 
 whose duty, as the name implies, was to protect 
 the English Channel and its approaches ; a func- 
 tion which often carried the ships far into the 
 Bay of Biscay. Thus he took a prominent part 
 in Keppel's battle off Ushant in 1778, in the 
 movements occasioned by the entrance into the 
 Channel of an overpowering Franco-Spanish fleet 
 in 1779 and 1781, and in the brilliant relief of 
 Gibraltar by Admiral Howe towards the end of 
 1782. His most distinguished service, however, 
 was taking, single-handed, the French seventy- 
 four P'egase, in the spring of the latter year. The 
 capture was effected after an action of fifty min- 
 utes, preceded by a chase of twelve hours, run- 
 ning before a half-gale of wind. The Foudroya^it 
 was unquestionably superior in battery to her 
 enemy, who, moreover, had but. recently been 
 commissioned ; but, as has justly been remarked 
 of some of the victories of our own ships over 
 those of the British in the War of 181 2, although 
 there was disparity of forces, the precision and 
 rapidity with which the work was done bore in- 
 controvertible testimony to the skill and training 
 of the captain and crew. Single combats, such 
 as this, were rare between vessels of the size of 
 the Foudroyant and Pegase, built to sail and fight 
 in fleets. That one occurred here was due to 
 
J32 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 the fact that the speed of the two opponents left 
 the British squadron far astern. The exploit 
 obtained for Jervis a baronetcy and the ribbon of 
 the Order of the Bath. 
 
 Sir John Jervis did not serve afloat during the 
 ten years of peace following 1783, although, 
 from his high repute, he was one of those sum- 
 moned upon each of the alarms of war that from 
 time to time arose. Throughout this period he 
 sat in Parliament, voting steadily with his party, 
 the Whigs, and supporting Fox in his opposition 
 to measures which seemed to tend towards hos- 
 tilities with France. When war came, however, 
 he left his seat, ready to aid his country with his 
 sword in the quarrel from which he had sought 
 to keep her. 
 
 Having: in the mean time risen from the rank 
 of captain to that of rear- and of vice-admiral, 
 Jervis's first service, in 1794, was in the Carib- 
 bean Sea, as commander of the naval part of a 
 joint expedition of army and navy to subdue the 
 French West India islands. The operation, al- 
 though most important and full of exciting and 
 picturesque incident, bears but a small share in his 
 career, and therefore may not be dwelt upon in 
 so short a sketch as the present aims to be. At- 
 tended at first by marked and general success, it 
 ended with some severe reverses, occasioned by 
 the force given him being less than he demanded, 
 and than the extent of the work to be done re- 
 quired. A quaintly characteristic story is told of 
 
Jervis 333 
 
 the admiral's treatment of a lieutenant who at 
 this period sought employment on board his ship. 
 Knowing that he stood high in the old seaman's 
 favor, the applicant confidently expected his 
 appointment, but, upon opening the " letter on 
 service," was stunned to read : — 
 
 Sir, — You, having thought fit to take to yourself a 
 wife, are to look for no further attentions from 
 
 Your humble servant, 
 
 J. Jervis. 
 
 The supposed culprit, guiltless even in thought 
 of this novel misdemeanor, hastened on board, 
 and explained that he abhorred such an offence 
 as much as could the admiral. It then appeared 
 that the letter had been sent to the wrong person. 
 Jervis was himself married at this time ; but his 
 well-regulated affections had run steadily in har- 
 ness until the mature age of forty-eight, and he 
 saw no reason why other men should depart 
 from so sound a precedent. " When an officer 
 
 marries," he tersely said, "he is d d for the 
 
 service." 
 
 Returning to England in February, 1795, Jervis 
 was in August nominated to command the Med- 
 iterranean station, and in November sailed to take 
 up his new duties. At the end of the month, in 
 San Fiorenzo Bay, an anchorage in the north 
 of Corsica, he joined the fleet, which continued 
 under his flag until June, 1799. He had now 
 reached the highest rank in his profession, though 
 
334 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 not the highest grade of that rank as it was then 
 subdivided; being a full Admiral of the Blue. 
 The crowning period of his career here began. 
 Admirable and striking as had been his previous 
 services, dignified and weighty as were the re- 
 sponsibilities borne by him in the later part of a 
 life prolonged far beyond the span of man, the 
 four years of Jervis's Mediterranean command 
 stand conspicuous as the time when preparation 
 flowered into achievement, solid, durable, and 
 brilliant. It may be interesting to Americans to 
 recall that his age was nearly the same as that 
 of Farragut when the latter assumed the charge 
 in which, after long years of obscure preparation, 
 he also reaped his harvest of glory. It is like- 
 wise worthy of note that this happy selection 
 was made wholly independent of the political 
 bias, which till then had so often and un- 
 worthily controlled naval appointments. Jervis 
 belonged to the small remnant of Whigs who 
 still followed Fox and inveighed against the cur- 
 rent war, as unnecessary and impolitic. It was 
 a pure service choice, as such creditable alike to 
 the Government and the officer. 
 
 Though distinguished success now awaited 
 him, a period of patient effort, endurance, and 
 disappointment had first to be passed, repro- 
 ducing in miniature the longer years of faith- 
 ful service preceding his professional triumphs. 
 Jervis came to the Mediterranean too late for 
 the best interests of England. The year 1 795, just 
 
Jcrvis 3^s 
 
 ending, was one in which the energies of France, 
 after the fierce rush of the Terror, had flagged 
 almost to collapse. Not only so, but in its 
 course the republic, discouraged by frequent 
 failure, had decided to abandon the control of 
 the sea to its enemy, to keep its great fleets in 
 port, and to confine its efforts to the harassment 
 of British commerce. To this change of policy in 
 France is chiefly to be ascribed the failure of 
 naval achievement with which Macaulay has re- 
 proached Pitt's earlier ministry. Battles cannot 
 be fought if the foe keeps behind his walls. 
 Prior to this decision, two fleet battles had been 
 fought in the Mediterranean in the spring and 
 summer of 1795, in which the British had missed 
 great successes only through the sluggishness of 
 their admiral. *' To say how much we wanted 
 Lord Hood " (the last commander-in-chief), wrote 
 Nelson, " is to ask, ' Will you have all the French 
 fleet or no battle ? ' " Could he have foreseen all 
 that Jervis was to be to the Mediterranean, his 
 distress must have been doubled to know that 
 the fortunes of the nation thus fell between two 
 stools. 
 
 His predecessor's slackness in pushing mil- 
 itary opportunities, due partly to ill health, 
 was mainly constitutional, and therefore could 
 not but show itself by tangible evidences in 
 the more purely administrative and discipli- 
 nary work. Jervis found himself at once under 
 the necessity of bringing his fleet — in equip- 
 
33^ Types of Naval Officers 
 
 ment, in discipline, and in drill — sharply up 
 to that level of efficiency which is essential to the 
 full development of power when occasion offers. 
 This his perfect achievement, of organization and 
 administration, in its many intricate details, needs 
 at least to be clearly noted, even though space do 
 not admit many particulars ; because his capacity 
 as administrator at the head of the Admiralty a 
 few years later has been seriously impugned, 
 by a criticism both partial and excessive, if not 
 wholly unjust. Nelson, a witness of his Mediter- 
 ranean service from beginning to end, lauded to 
 the utmost the excellence there reached, and 
 attributed most of the short-coming noted in 
 the later office to the yielding of a man then 
 advanced in years, to advisers, in trusting 
 whom fully he might well believe himself war- 
 ranted by experience. 
 
 Although, when taking command, his fleet 
 reached the seemingly large proportions of twen- 
 ty-five ships-of-the-line and some fifty cruisers, 
 heavy allowance must be made for the variety 
 of services extending over the two thousand 
 miles of the Mediterranean, from east to west. 
 Seven of-the-line had to be kept before Cadiz, 
 though still a neutral port, to check a French 
 division within. One of the same class was on 
 the Riviera with Nelson ; and other demands, 
 with the necessities of occasional absences for 
 refit, prevented the admiral from ever assembling 
 before Toulon, his great strategic care, much 
 
Jervis 337 
 
 more than a round dozen to watch equal French 
 numbers there. The protection of Corsica, then 
 in British hands ; the convoy of commerce, dis- 
 persed throughout the station ; the assurance of 
 communications to the fortress and Straits of 
 Gibraltar, by which all transit to and from the 
 Mediterranean passes ; diplomatic exigencies 
 with the various littoral states of the inland sea; 
 these divergent calls, with the coincident neces- 
 sity of maintaining every ship in fit condition for 
 action, show the extent of the administrative 
 work and of the attendant correspondence. The 
 evidence of many eye-witnesses attests the suc- 
 cessful results. 
 
 Similar attention, broad yet minute, was 
 demanded for the more onerous and invidious 
 task of enforcing relaxed discipline and drill. 
 Concerning these, the most pregnant testimony, 
 alike to the stringency and the persistence of his 
 measures, may be found in the imbittered expres- 
 sions of enemies. Five years later, when the 
 rumor spread that he was to have the Channel 
 Fleet, the toast was drunk at the table of the 
 man then in command, " May the discipline of 
 the Mediterranean never be introduced into the 
 Channel." " May his next glass of wine choke 
 the wretch," is a speech attributed to a captain's 
 wife, wrathful that her husband was kept from 
 her side by the admiral's regulations. For 
 Jervis's discipline began at the top, with the 
 division and ship commanders. One of the 
 
338 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 senior admirals under him persisting in a remon- 
 strance, beyond the point which he considered 
 consistent with discipline, was sent home. " The 
 very disorderly state of His Majesty's ship under 
 your command," he writes to a captain, " obliges 
 me to require that neither yourself nor any of your 
 officers are to go on shore on what is called plea- 
 sure." " The commander-in-chief finds himself 
 under the painful necessity of publicly reprimand- 
 ing Captains and for neglect of duty, in 
 
 not maintaining the stations assigned to their ships 
 during the last night." In a letter to a lieutenant 
 he says, " If you do not immediately make a 
 suitable apology to Commissioner Inglefield for 
 the abominable neglect and disrespect you have 
 treated him with, I will represent your behaviour 
 to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 
 and recommend your name to be struck ofT the 
 list of lieutenants." Captains of vessels were not 
 only subject to strict regulation as to their personal 
 proceedings, compelled to sleep on board, for 
 instance, even in home ports; but duties cus- 
 tomarily left to subordinates, with results to dis- 
 cipline that might not now obtain but which 
 were in those days deplorable, were also assigned 
 to them. 
 
 " The commander-in-chief has too exalted an 
 opinion of the respective captains of the squadron 
 to doubt their being upon deck when the signal 
 is made to tack or wear in the night, and he re- 
 quires all lieutenants then to be at their stations, 
 
Jervis 339 
 
 except those who had the watch immediately pre- 
 ceding." Nor did he leave this delicately worded, 
 but pointed, admonition, issued in the Mediterra- 
 nean, to take care of itself. In after years, when 
 he was nigh seventy, his secretary tells that on a 
 cold and rainy November night off Brest, the sig- 
 nal to tack being made, he hurried to the cabin to 
 persuade the old man not to go on deck, as was his 
 custom. He was not, however, in his cot, nor 
 could he for a long time be found ; but at last a 
 look into the stern gallery discovered him, in 
 flannel dressing-gown and cocked hat, watching 
 the movements of the fleet. To remonstrance he 
 replied, " Hush, I want to see how the evolution 
 is performed on such a night, and to know 
 whether Jemmy Vashon (commanding the ship 
 next astern) is on deck ; " but soon hearing the 
 captain's well-known shrill voice, crying, " Are you 
 all ready forward ? " he consented then to retire. 
 Post-captains and commanders were required 
 to attend at points on shore where the boats and 
 crews of ships congregated on service ; at landing 
 places and watering places, — scenes fruitful in 
 demoralization, — to maintain order and suppress 
 disturbance. " The Masters and Commanders 
 are to take it in turn, according to rank, to attend 
 the duty on shore at the ragged staff [at Gibraltar], 
 from gun-fire in the morning to sunset, to keep 
 order and prevent disputes, and to see that boats 
 take their regular turns. They are never to 
 be absent from the spot except at regular meal 
 
34^ Types of Naval Officers 
 
 times." " When the squadron is at anchor in 
 Torbay [in the English Channel], a captain of a 
 ship-of-the-line is to command at the watering 
 place at Brixham, taking to his assistance his 
 commanding officer of marines with a party of 
 his men. He also may take with him a lieutenant 
 of the ship and as many midshipmen as he thinks 
 fit; btU he himself is not to quit his command 
 until regularly relieved." A greater stringency 
 is observable at this later date, in the Channel 
 Fleet, than in the Mediterranean ; for at the 
 earlier period the spirit of mutiny had not openly 
 broken out, and he had besides on the distant 
 station better captains than those who had clung 
 to the home fleet under its lax discipline. " Old 
 women in the guise of young men," he affirmed 
 many of them to be. 
 
 There was in fact an imminent necessity that 
 naval rank should be made to feel its responsibil- 
 ities, and to exert its predominance ; to be restored 
 to prestige, not by holding aloof in its privileges, 
 but by asserting itself in act. The preponderance 
 of political and family influence in determining 
 promotion of officers, unbalanced by valid tests of 
 fitness such as later days imposed, had not only 
 lowered the competency of the official body as a 
 whole, but impaired the respect which personal 
 merit alone can in the long run maintain. On the 
 other hand, the scarcity of seamen in proportion 
 to the heavy demands of the war, and the irregular 
 methods of impressment and recruiting then pre- 
 
Jervis 341 
 
 vailing, swept into the service a vast number of 
 men not merely unfit, but of extremely bad char- 
 acter, — " miscreants," to use Collingwood's word, 
 — to be ruled only by fear of the law and of their 
 officers, supported by the better element among 
 the crews. But these better men also were be- 
 coming alienated by the harsh restrictions of the 
 times, and by the procrastination of superiors — 
 Howe, the Sailor's Friend, among others — to 
 heed their just complaints. The stern Jervis, 
 whom none suspected of fatherly tenderness, if 
 less indulgent to culprits, was far more attentive 
 to meet the reasonable demands of those under 
 him. While quelling insubordination mercilessly, 
 he ever sought to anticipate grievance ; exhibiting 
 thus the two sides of the same spirit of careful, 
 even-handed justice. 
 
 Jervis's work during the first eighteen months 
 of his command was therefore not only necessary, 
 but most timely. By improving that period of 
 comparative internal quiet, he educated his officers 
 and men to pass steadfastly, though not unmoved, 
 through the awful crisis of the mutinies in 1797- 
 98. Professional self-respect, a most powerful 
 moral force, was more than restored; it was in- 
 tensified by the added dignity and power manifest 
 in the surroundings of daily life, as well as in the 
 military results obtained. Seamen, like others, 
 deal more conservatively with that of which they 
 are proud because it reflects honor upon them- 
 selves; and they obey more certainly men who 
 
342 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 share their labors and lead them capably in 
 danger, as did Jervis's Mediterranean captains. 
 With himself, severity was far from being the 
 only instrument. Thoroughly capable profession- 
 ally, and thereby commandful of respect, he 
 appealed also to men's regard by intelligent and 
 constant thought for the wants and comfort of 
 those under him ; by evidence of strong service 
 feeling on his own part ; by clear and clearly 
 expressed recognition of merit, wherever found ; 
 by avoidance of misunderstandings through ex- 
 planation volunteered when possible, — not apolo- 
 getically, but as it were casually, yet appealing 
 to men's reason. Watchfulness and sympathetic 
 foresight were with him as constant as sternness, 
 though less in evidence. 
 
 Of this prevalence of kindly naval feeling amid 
 the harshness which seemed superficially the 
 chief characteristic of his rule, many instances 
 could be cited. Passing by the frequent inci- 
 dental praise of distinguished captains, Nelson, 
 Troubridge, and others, he thus advocates the 
 claims of one of the humble, hopeless class of 
 sailing-masters, out of the line of promotion. 
 After an act of brilliant merit in the West Indies, 
 " Mr. White was ambitious to become a lieuten- 
 ant ; but not having served six years in the na\y, 
 and being a master, I could not then comply with 
 his wishes. He is now Master of the Defence, and 
 his captain speaks in the highest terms of him ; 
 and it is a tribute due to ifu memory of Captain 
 
Jervis 343 
 
 Faulknor, — whose certificate of that matchless 
 service is enclosed, — and to the gallantry of Jiis 
 officers and crew, to state the claims of Mr. White 
 to your Lordship, who is the protector of us all." 
 The present and the past, the merits of the living, 
 the memory of the glorious dead, the claims of 
 the navy to see well-doers rewarded, are all pressed 
 into service to support a just request, and with 
 a manifest heartiness which in virtue of its reality 
 approaches eloquence. " I have given an order 
 to Mr. Ellis to command as a lieutenant, he being 
 the son of a very old officer whom I knew many 
 years ; and coming very strongly recommended 
 from his last ship, I place him under your Lord- 
 ship's protection as a child of the sei'vice^ 
 When a man thus bears others' deserts and 
 the profession on his heart, he can retain the 
 affections of his subordinates even though he 
 show all the unbending severity of Jervis, and 
 despite the numerous hangings, which, for that 
 matter, rarely fell except on the hopelessly bad. 
 A most significant feature of his rule as a dis- 
 ciplinarian was his peculiar care of health, by 
 instructed sanitary measures, by provision of 
 suitable diet, and by well-ordered hospital service. 
 This was not merely a prudential consideration 
 for the efficiency of the fleet ; he regarded also 
 the welfare of the sufferers. He made it a rule 
 to inspect the hospitals himself, and he directed 
 a daily visit by a captain and by the surgeons of 
 the ships from which patients were sent, thus 
 
344 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 keeping the sick in touch with those they knew, 
 and who had in them a personal interest. An 
 odd provision, amusingly illustrative of the ob- 
 verse side of the admiral's character, was that 
 the visiting captain should be accompanied by 
 a boatswain's mate, the functionary charged with 
 administering floggings, and, " if they find the 
 patients do not conduct themselves properly and 
 orderly, they are to punish them agreeably to the 
 rules of the Navy." It was, however, on his care 
 of health, in its various exposures, that the ad- 
 miral specially valued himself ; it was, he said, 
 his proudest boast among the services to which 
 he laid claim. 
 
 But while he labored thus for the welfare of 
 the seamen, it was naturally upon the professional 
 tone of his officers that his chief reliance must be 
 placed ; and the leaders among them he grappled 
 to his soul with hooks of steel, as they recognized 
 the wisdom and force of his measures, and the 
 appreciation given to them and others. What- 
 ever beneficent influence mis:ht issue from him 
 as a fountain-head must through them be dis- 
 tributed, and by them reinforced and sustained. 
 " The discipline of the fleet," he said, " is in the 
 ward-room ;" and greatly did he lament the loose 
 insubordinate talk, the spirit of irresponsible criti- 
 cism that found voice at mess-tables, within the 
 hearing of servants, by whom it was disseminated 
 throughout the body of the ship. Not only he, 
 but many, attributed to this hot-bed the fomenting 
 
Jervis 345 
 
 of discontent into organized mutiny. This could 
 not be stopped by direct measures, but only by 
 imposing a feeling of fear, and nurturing that of 
 ofificer-like propriety, by stringent prescription of 
 forms of respect and rigid exaction of their obser- 
 vance. To stand uncovered before a superior, 
 instead of lightly touching the hat, to pay out- 
 ward reverence to the national flag, to salute the 
 quarter-deck as the seat of authority, were no 
 vain show under him. " Discipline," he was fond 
 of quoting, "is summed up in the one word, 
 ' Obedience ; ' " and these customs were charged 
 with the observance which is obedience in spirit. 
 They conduced to discipline as conventional 
 good manners, by rendering the due of each to 
 each, knit together the social fabric and maintain 
 the regularity and ef^ciency of common life ; re- 
 moving friction, suppressing jars, and minister- 
 ing constantly to the smooth and even working 
 of the social machinery. 
 
 By measures such as these, extending to all 
 ranks and every detail, exemplifying, in spirit 
 and in form, the extremes of cordial reward, iron 
 restraint, and weighty punishment, Jervis patiently 
 fashioned the fleet which was to be both a pat- 
 tern for coming days, and the highly tempered 
 instrument to achieve his own victory of Cape 
 St. Vincent and the earlier triumphs of Nelson ; 
 as well as to sustain and to crush the onset of 
 mutiny which soon afterwards shook the Navy to 
 its centre. For purely military action of an 
 
34^ Types of Naval Officers 
 
 aggressive character no opportunity was afforded 
 him. His coming to the Mediterranean coincided 
 with that of Napoleon Bonaparte to the Army 
 of Italy. During 1795, wrote Nelson, if the 
 British fleet had done its duty, the French army 
 could not have moved along the Riviera of Genoa. 
 It failed, and the Austrian general, its ally, also 
 failed to act with vigor. So the year had ended, 
 for the Austrians, with a disastrous defeat and a 
 retreat behind the Apennines. To the Riviera 
 they never returned to receive the cooperation 
 which Jervis stood eager to give. At their first 
 move to cross the mountains, Bonaparte struck, 
 and followed up his blows with such lightning- 
 like rapidity that in thirty days they were 
 driven back over a hundred miles, behind 
 the Adige; their chief fortress, Mantua, was 
 blockaded ; all northwest Italy with its seaboard, 
 including Leghorn, was in the power of France; 
 and Naples also had submitted. Jervis, power- 
 less to strike a blow when no enemy was within 
 reach, found his fleet without a friendly port 
 nearer than Gibraltar, while Corsica, where alone 
 he could expect anchorage and water, was 
 seething with revolt against the British crown, 
 to which, by its own vote, it had been annexed 
 but two years before. 
 
 Amid these adverse circumstances, the only 
 large operation possible to him was the close 
 watching of the port of Toulon, conducted on 
 the same general plan that was afterwards more 
 
Jervis 347 
 
 illustriously exhibited before Brest, between 1800 
 and 1805, under conditions of surpassing diffi- 
 culty. All contemplated movements of the 
 French fleet were thus dammed at the source, 
 for it must first fight the British, after which 
 there was little hope of being in a state to fulfil 
 any further mission. For six months, from April 
 to October, Jervis held his fleet close up to the 
 port, the advanced body two miles from the 
 entrance. The effort was admirable as a pattern, 
 and for disciplinary purposes. The ships, forced 
 to self-dependence, became organically self-reliant. 
 Their routine life of seamanship and military 
 exercise perfected habit and efficiency, and diffi- 
 culties to others insuperable were as the light 
 burdens which a giant carries unwittingly. 
 
 Further than this, achievement could not then 
 go. During the summer Bonaparte held Man- 
 tua by the throat, and overthrew one after an- 
 other the Austrian forces approaching to its 
 relief. Two French armies, under Jourdan and 
 Moreau, penetrated to the heart of Germany; 
 while Spain, lately the confederate of Great 
 Britain, made an offensive and defensive alliance 
 with France, and sent a fleet of over twenty 
 ships-of-the-line into the Mediterranean. Stag- 
 gered by these reverses, the British ministry 
 ordered Corsica evacuated and the Mediterranean 
 abandoned. Jervis was cruelly embarrassed. A 
 trusted subordinate of high reputation had been 
 before Cadiz with seven ships-of-the-line, watch- 
 
348 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 ing a French division in that port. Summoned, 
 in view of the threatening attitude of Spain, to 
 reinforce the main fleet in San Fiorenzo Bay, he 
 lost his head altogether, hurried past Gibraltar 
 without getting supplies, and brought his ships 
 destitute to the admiral, already pressed to main- 
 tain the vessels then with him. Although there 
 were thirty-five hostile ships in Toulon and the 
 British had only twenty-two, counting this divis- 
 ion, there was nothing to do but to send it back to 
 Gibraltar, under urgent orders to return with all 
 speed. With true military insight and a correct 
 appreciation of the forces opposed to him, Jervis 
 saw the need of fighting the combined enemies 
 then and there. 
 
 Unfortunately, the division commander. Admi- 
 ral Mann, on reaching Gibraltar, became infected 
 with the spirit of discouragement then prevailing 
 in the garrison, called a council of naval captains, 
 and upon their advice, which could in no wise 
 lessen his own responsibility, decided to return 
 to England. This culpably unwarrantable act 
 aptly illustrates the distinction, rarely appreciated, 
 between an error of judgment and an error of 
 conduct. Upon arrival, he was at once deprived 
 of his command, a step of unquestionable justice, 
 but which could not help Jervis. " We were all 
 eyes, looking westward from the mountain tops," 
 wrote Collingwood, then a captain in the fleet, 
 " but we looked in vain. The Spanish fleet, 
 nearly double our number, was cruising almost 
 
Jervis 349 
 
 in view, and our reconnoitring frigates sometimes 
 got among them, while we expected them hourly 
 to be joined by the French fleet." " I cannot 
 describe to your lordship," wrote Jervis himself, 
 " the disappointment my ambition and zeal to 
 serve my country have suffered by this diminu- 
 tion of my force ; for had Admiral Mann sailed 
 from Gibraltar on the loth of October, the day 
 he received my orders, and fulfilled them, I have 
 every reason to believe the Spanish fleet would 
 have been cut to pieces. The extreme disorder 
 and confusion they were observed to be in, by 
 the judicious oflficers who fell in with them, leave 
 no doubt upon my mind that a fleet so trained 
 and generally well commanded as this is would 
 have made its way through them in every direc- 
 tion." 
 
 Nelson shared this opinion, the accuracy of 
 which was soon to be tested and proved. " They 
 at home," wrote he to his wife, "do not know 
 what this fleet is capable of performing; any- 
 thing and everything. The fleets of England 
 are equal to meet the world in arms ; and of all 
 the fleets I ever saw, I never beheld one, in point 
 of oflicers and men, equal to Sir John Jervis's, 
 who is a commander-in-chief able to lead them 
 to glory." To a friend he wrote : " Mann is 
 ordered to come up ; we shall then be twenty-two 
 sail-of-the-line such as England hardly ever pro- 
 duced, commanded by an admiral who will not 
 fail to look the enemy in the face, be their force 
 
350 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 what it may. I suppose it will not be more than 
 thirty-four of-the-line." " The admiral is firm as 
 a rock," wrote at the same moment the British 
 viceroy of Corsica. Through all doubts and un- 
 certainties he held on steadily, refusing to leave 
 the rendezvous till dire necessity forced him, lest 
 Mann, arriving, should be exposed alone and 
 lost. At last, with starvation staring him in the 
 face if delaying longer, he sailed for Gibraltar, 
 three men living on the rations of one during 
 the passage down. 
 
 Mann's defection had reduced the fleet from 
 twenty-two vessels to fifteen. A series of single 
 accidents still further diminished it. In a violent 
 gale at Gibraltar three ships-of-the-line drove 
 from their anchors. One, the Coura^eux, stretch- 
 ing over toward the Barbary coast, ran ashore 
 there and was totally wrecked, nearly all her crew 
 perishing. Her captain, a singularly capable sea- 
 man named Hallowell, was out of her upon a 
 court-martial, and it was thought she would not 
 have been lost had he been on board. Another, 
 the Gibraltar, struck so heavily on a reef that 
 she had to be sent to England. Upon being 
 docked, a large piece of rock was found to have 
 penetrated the bottom and stuck fast in the hole. 
 Had it worked out, the ship would have foun- 
 dered. The third vessel, the Zealous, was less 
 badly hurt, but she had to be left behind in 
 Gibraltar when Jervis, by orders from home, took 
 his fleet to Lisbon. There, in entering the 
 
Jervis 351 
 
 Tagus, a fourth ship was lost on a shoal, so that 
 but eleven remained out of twenty-two. Despite 
 these trials of his constancy, the old man's temper 
 still continued " steady as a rock." " Whether 
 you send me a reinforcement or not," he wrote 
 to the Admiralty, " I shall sleep perfectly sound, 
 — not in the Tagus, but at sea ; for as soon as 
 the S^. George has shifted her topmast, the 
 Captain her bowsprit, and the Blenheim repaired 
 her mainmast, I will go out." " Inactivity in the 
 Tagus," he wrote again, " will make cowards of 
 us all." This last expression summed up much 
 of his naval philosophy. Keep men at sea, he 
 used to say, and they cannot help being seamen, 
 though attention will be needed to assure ex- 
 ercise at the guns. And it may be believed he 
 would thus contemn the arguments which sup- 
 ported Howe's idea of preserving the ships by 
 retaining them in port. Keep them at sea, he 
 would doubtless have replied, and they will learn 
 to take care of themselves. 
 
 In quitting the river another vessel took the 
 ground, and had to be left behind. This, how- 
 ever, was the last of the admiral's trials for that 
 time. A few days later, on the 6th of February, 
 1797, there joined him a body of five ships-of-the- 
 line, detached from England as soon as the 
 government had been freed from the fear of the 
 invasion of Ireland, which the French had at- 
 tempted on a large scale in December. On the 
 13th, Nelson, a host in himself, returned from an 
 
35- Types of Naval Officers 
 
 adventurous mission up the Mediterranean. The 
 next day, February 14th, Jervis with his fifteen 
 ships met a Spanish fleet of twenty-seven some 
 thirty miles from Cape St. Vincent, which has 
 given its name to the battle. 
 
 The Spaniards were running for Cadiz, to the 
 east-southeast, — say, across the page from left to 
 right, inclining a little downward, — while Jer- 
 vis's fleet was approaching nearly at right angles 
 from the north, or top of the page. It was in 
 two close, compact columns, of seven and eight 
 ships respectively. The Spaniards, on the con- 
 trary, were in disorder and dispersed. Six of their 
 ships were far ahead of the others, an interval of 
 nearly eight miles separating the two groups. 
 The weather, which was foggy, cleared gradually. 
 Jervis was walking back and forth on the poop 
 with Hallow^ell, lately captain of the wrecked 
 Courageiix, and he was heard to say, " A victory 
 is very essential to England at this moment." 
 As ship after ship of the enemy loomed up 
 through the haze, successive reports were made 
 to him. " There are eight sail-of-the-line, Sir 
 John." " There are twenty sail-of-the-line. 
 Sir John." " There are twenty-five of-the-line, 
 Sir John." Finally, when the full tale of twenty- 
 seven was made out, the captain of the fleet re- 
 marked on the greatness of the odds. " Enough 
 of that, sir," retorted the admiral, intent on that 
 victory which was so essential to England ; " if 
 there are fifty sail, I will go through them." 
 
Jervis 3 $3 
 
 This reply so delighted Hallowell, an eccentric 
 man, who a year later gave Nelson the coffin 
 made from the mainmast of the Orient, that he 
 patted his august superior on the back. " That 's 
 right, Sir John," said he, "and, by G — , we'll 
 
 give them a d d good licking ! " 
 
 When the weather finally cleared, toward 10 a.m., 
 the British were near to the enemy and head- 
 ing direct for the gap, which the Spaniards, 
 too late, were trying to close. Almost at the 
 moment of meeting, Jervis formed his two col- 
 umns into one — the order of battle — " with the 
 utmost celerity ; " thus doubling the length of 
 the line interposed between the two divisions of 
 the enemy. Soon opened the guns of the lead- 
 ing ship, the Culloden, Captain Troubridge ; the 
 reports following one another in regular succes- 
 sion, as though firing a salute by watch. The 
 Cullodens course led so direct upon a Spanish 
 three-decker, that the first lieutenant reported a 
 collision imminent. " Can't help it, Griffiths," 
 replied Troubridge; "hardest fend off." But 
 the Spaniard, in confusion, put his helm up and 
 went clear. By this time the Spanish division 
 on the right, or west, of the British had changed 
 its course and was steering north, parallel but op- 
 posite to its foes. As the Culloden went through, 
 the admiral signalled her to put about and follow 
 it. Troubridge, fully expecting this order, obeyed 
 at once ; and Jervis's signal was scarce unfurled 
 
 when, by the flapping of the Cullodens sails, he 
 
 23 
 
354 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 saw it was receiving execution. " Look at Trou- 
 bridsre ! " he shouted. " Does n't he handle his 
 ship as though the eyes of all England were on 
 him ? I would to God they were, that she might 
 know him as I know him ! " But here a graver 
 matter drew the admiral's care. The Spanish 
 division from the left, steering across his path of 
 advance, approached, purposing in appearance to 
 break through the line. The Victory stopped, 
 or, as seamen say, hove-to ; and as the Spanish 
 admiral came near within a hundred yards, her 
 broadside rang out, sweeping through the crowded 
 decks and lofty spars a storm of shot, to which, 
 in the relative positions, the foe could not reply. 
 Staggered and crippled he went about, and the 
 Victory stood on. 
 
 Meanwhile, the ships which Troubridge and his 
 followers were pursuing drew toward the tail of 
 the British column, and as they did so made a 
 movement to pass round it, and so join their 
 friends who had just been so severely handled in 
 making the attempt to pass through. But Nelson 
 was in this part of the order, there being but two 
 ships behind him. Now, as far as signals went, 
 he should continue on, and, like the others, follow 
 in due succession behind the Cullodcn. He saw 
 that if this were done the Spaniards would effect 
 their junction, so he instantly turned his ship 
 toward the rear, out of her place, and threw her 
 alone across the enemy's advance. It is said that 
 the Captain of the Fleet drew Jervis's attention to 
 
Jervis 355 
 
 this breach of discipline. " Ay," replied the old 
 seaman, " and if ever you offend in the same way, 
 I promise you my forgiveness beforehand." For 
 a while Nelson took the brunt of the hostile fire 
 from half a dozen ships, but not for long. Soon 
 Troubridge, his dearest friend, came up with a 
 couple of others ; and Collingwood, the close as- 
 sociate of early days, who had the rear ship, was 
 signalled to imitate Nelson's act. In doing this, 
 he silenced the fire of two enemies; but, wrote 
 Nelson, " disdaining the parade of taking posses- 
 sion of beaten ships, Captain Collingwood most 
 gallantly pushed on to save his old friend and 
 messmate, who appeared to be in a critical state, 
 being then fired upon by three first-rates, and the 
 Sa7i Nicolas, eighty." To get between Nelson's 
 ship and the San Nicolas, Collingwood had to 
 steer close, passing within ten feet of the latter ; 
 so that, to use his own expression, " though we 
 did not touch sides, you could not put a bodkin 
 between us." His fire drove the San Nicolas 
 upon one of the first-rates, the Sa7t' Josef ; and 
 when, continuing on to seek other unbeaten foes, 
 he left the field again clear for Nelson, the latter, 
 by a movement of the helm, grappled the Saji 
 Nicolas. Incredible as it may appear, the crew 
 of this one British seventy-four carried, sword in 
 hand, both the enemy's ships, though of far su- 
 perior force. " Extravagant as the story may 
 seem," wrote Nelson, " on the quarter-deck of a 
 Spanish first-rate I received the swords of the 
 
356 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 vanquished Spaniards, which, as I received, I gave 
 to William Fearney, one of my bargemen, who 
 placed them with the greatest sang-froid under 
 his arm." 
 
 Four Spanish ships, two of them of the largest 
 size, were the trophies of this victory; but its 
 moral effect in demonstrating the relative values 
 of the two navies, and the confidence England 
 could put in men like Jervis, Nelson, and the 
 leading captains, was far greater. The spirit of 
 the nation, depressed by a long series of re- 
 verses, revived like a giant refreshed with wune. 
 Jervis had spoken truth when he said a victory 
 was essential to Ens^land at that time. The 
 gratitude of the state was shown in the profusion 
 of rewards showered upon the victors. Promo- 
 tions and honors were liberally distributed. The 
 Government had already purposed to recognize 
 Jervis's previous services by raising him to the 
 lower ranks of the peerage ; but this timely tri- 
 umph procured him at one step a higher eleva- 
 tion. He was created Earl of St. Vincent, with 
 a pension of three thousand pounds per annum. 
 
 The tactical decisions made by Jervis on this 
 momentous occasion were correct as far as they 
 went ; but, except the initial determination to 
 attack the larger body of the enemy, because to 
 windward, there is no evidence of tactical ori- 
 ginality in him, no innovation comparable to 
 Howe's manoeuvres on May 28 and 29, — and 
 there was undoubted oversight in not providing 
 
Jervis 357 
 
 by signal against that move of the weather Span- 
 ish division which it became Nelson's opportunity 
 and glory to counteract. It is also possible that 
 the signal to tack in succession, a wholly routine 
 proceeding, might have been made earlier to 
 advantage ; but the writer does not think that 
 the body of the fleet should then have tacked 
 together, as some criticism would have it. Until 
 the British van approached on the new tack, the 
 broadsides of the centre were better ranged on 
 the original line to counteract the efforts, actu- 
 ally made, by the lee Spanish division to break 
 through. As regards the decision not to follow 
 the victory further, which has been censured in 
 the instances of Rodney and Howe, the condi- 
 tions here differed in much. The disparity of 
 numbers was very great ; if many of the enemy 
 had suffered greatly, many also had not suffered 
 at all ; they were now reunited ; above all Jervis's 
 strategic and political insight — far superior to 
 his tactical equipment — had rightly read the 
 situation when he said that what England needed 
 was a victory, — moral effect. The victory was 
 there, undeniable and brilliant, it was better not 
 risked. 
 
 The rest of the Spaniards, many of them badly 
 crippled, took refuge in Cadiz, and there Jervis, 
 after repairing damages, held them blockaded for 
 two years, from April, 1797, to May, 1799. For 
 the greater part of this time the operation was 
 conducted by anchoring the British fleet, a 
 
35^ Types of Naval Officers 
 
 resource which the character of the ground 
 permitted, and which, though not everywhere 
 possible, St. Vincent declared the only way of 
 assuring the desired end of holding a position 
 in all weathers. During this period was ren- 
 dered the other most signal service done by 
 him to the state, in suppressing the mutinous ac- 
 tion of the seamen, which there, as everywhere 
 else in the British navy at that time, sought to 
 overthrow the authority of the officers. 
 
 The cause of the mutinies of 1797 is not here 
 in question. Suffice it to say that, in their origin, 
 they alleged certain tangible material grievances 
 which were clearly stated, and, being undeniable, 
 were redressed. The men returned to their duty ; 
 but, like a horse that has once taken the bit 
 between his teeth, the restive feeling remained, 
 fermenting in a lot of vicious material which the 
 exigencies of the day had forced the navy to 
 accept. Coinciding in time with the risings in 
 Ireland, 1 796-1 798, there arose between the two 
 movements a certain sympathy, which was fos- 
 tered by the many Irish in the fleets, where agents 
 were in communication with the leaders of the 
 United Irishmen on shore. 
 
 In the Channel and the North Sea, the sea- 
 men took the ships, with few exceptions, out of 
 the hands of their officers. In the former, they 
 dictated their terms ; in the latter, after a month 
 of awful national suspense, they failed : the dif- 
 ference being that in the one case the demands, 
 
Jervis 359 
 
 being reasonable, carried conviction, while in the 
 other, becoming extravagant, the Government's 
 resistance was supported by public opinion. It 
 remained to be seen how the crisis would be met 
 in a fleet so far from home that the issue must 
 depend upon the firmness and judgment of a 
 man of adamant. It was no more than prudent 
 to expect that the attempt would be made there 
 also ; and the watchfulness of the superior 
 officers of the fleet soon obtained certain infor- 
 mation of its approach, though as yet without 
 proof adequate to the arrest of individuals. The 
 policy of the admiral, broadly stated, was that of 
 isolating ship from ship — divide et impera — to 
 prevent concerted action ; a measure effected to 
 all practical purpose by his unremitting vigilance, 
 and by the general devotion to his policy among 
 his leading officers. On the other hand, evidence 
 was not wanting that in the ships long under his 
 orders his own character was now fairly under- 
 stood, and obtained for him a backing among the 
 seamen themselves, without which his severity 
 alone might have failed. 
 
 The first overt sign of trouble was the appear- 
 ance of letters addressed to the leading petty 
 officers of the different ships of the Mediter- 
 ranean fleet. These were detected by a captain, 
 who held on to them, and sent to St. Vincent to 
 ask if they should be delivered. Careful to be- 
 tray no sign of anxiety, the admiral's reply was a 
 general signal for a lieutenant from each ship to 
 
J 
 
 60 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 come to him ; and by them word was sent that 
 all letters should be delivered as addressed, un- 
 opened. " Should any disturbance arise," he 
 added, " the commander-in-chief will know how 
 to repress it." 
 
 Disturbance soon did arise, and it is significant 
 to note that it appeared in a ship which, by tak- 
 ing the ground when leaving Lisbon, had not 
 shared in the Battle of St. Vincent. In July, 
 1797, two seamen of the S^. George had been 
 condemned to death for an infamous crime. 
 Their shipmates presented a petition, framed in 
 somewhat peremptory terms, for their liberation, 
 on the ground that execution for such an offence 
 would bring disgrace upon all. The admiral 
 refusing to pardon, the occasion was seized to 
 bring mutiny to a head. A plot to take posses- 
 sion of the ship was formed, but was betrayed to 
 the captain. The outburst began with a tumul- 
 tuous assembling of the crew, evidently, however, 
 mistrustful of their cause. After vainly trying to 
 restore order, the captain and first lieutenant 
 rushed among them, each collaring a ringleader. 
 The rest fell back, weakened, as men of Anglo- 
 Saxon traditions are apt to be, by the sense of 
 law-breaking. The culprits were secured, and at 
 once taken to the flag-ship. A court-martial was 
 ordered for the next day, Saturday ; and as the 
 prisoners were being taken to the court, St. Vin- 
 cent, with a hard bluntness of speech which char- 
 acterized him, — a survival of the frank brutality 
 
Jervls 361 
 
 of the past century, — said, "My friends, I hope 
 you are innocent, but if you are guilty make 
 your peace with God ; for, if you are condemned, 
 and there is dayHght to hang you, you will die 
 this day." 
 
 They were condemned ; but the trial ended 
 late, and the president of the court told them 
 they should have Sunday to prepare. " Sir," said 
 the earl, " when you passed sentence, your duty 
 was done ; you had no right to say that execution 
 should be delayed ; " and he fixed it for eight the 
 next morning. One of the junior admirals saw 
 fit to address him a remonstrance upon what he 
 termed a desecration of the Sabbath. Nelson, on 
 the contrary, approved. " Had it been Christmas 
 instead of Sunday," wrote he, " I would have 
 hanged them. Who can tell what mischief would 
 have been brewed over a Sunday's grog ? " Con- 
 trary to previous custom, their own shipmates, 
 the partners and followers in their crime, were 
 compelled to hang them, manning the rope by 
 which the condemned were swayed to the yard- 
 arm. The admiral, careful to produce impression, 
 ordered that all the ships should hold divine 
 service immediately upon the execution. Accord- 
 ingly, when the bell struck eight, the fatal gun 
 was fired, the bodies swung with a jerk aloft, the 
 church flags were hoisted throughout the fleet, 
 and all went to prayers. Ere yet the ceremony 
 was over, the Spanish gunboats came out from 
 Cadiz and opened fire; but St. Vincent would 
 
J 
 
 62 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 not mar the solemnity of the occasion by shorten- 
 ing the service. Gravely it was carried to its 
 end ; but when the flags came down, all boats 
 were ordered manned. The seamen, with nerves 
 tense from the morning's excitement, gladly 
 hurried into action, and the enemy were forced 
 back into port. 
 
 One such incident was far from ending the 
 ordeal through which the admiral had to pass, 
 and which was prolonged throughout the period 
 of the Cadiz blockade. In May, 1798, when 
 Nelson was sent into the Mediterranean to win 
 the Battle of the Nile, the detachment committed 
 to him was replaced by a dozen ships-of-the-line 
 from the Channel, seething with the mutinous 
 temper which at home had been humored rather 
 than scotched. Immediately on their joining, 
 request was made for a Court Martial on some 
 men of the Marlborough, on board which two 
 violent mutinies had occurred, — one on the 
 passage out. St. Vincent, having known before- 
 hand that this ship had been pre-eminent for in- 
 subordination, had ordered her anchored in the 
 centre of the fleet, between the two lines in which 
 it was ranged ; and the Court met without delay. 
 The remainder of the incident is quoted substan- 
 tially from one of St. Vincent's biographers, for it 
 illustrates most forcibly the sternness of his action, 
 as well when dealing with weakness in ofificers 
 as with mutiny in crews. The written order to 
 the commander of the division of launches appears 
 
Jervis 363 
 
 among the earl's papers, as does also a similar 
 one in the case of a mutiny on board the Defence 
 some months earlier. The ulterior object of 
 parading these boats was kept profoundly secret. 
 They appeared to be only part of the pageantry, 
 of the solemn ceremonial, with which the wisdom 
 of the great commander-in-chief providently 
 sought to invest all exhibitions of authority, in 
 order to deepen impression. 
 
 The object of the last mutiny on board the 
 Marlborough had been to protect the life of a 
 seaman forfeited by a capital crime. No sooner 
 was one sentenced to die than the commander- 
 in-chief ordered him to be executed on the fol- 
 lowing morning, " and by the crew of the Marl- 
 borough alone, no part of the boats' crews from 
 the other ships, as had been used on similar 
 occasions, to assist in the punishment, — his 
 lordship's invariable order on the execution of 
 mutineers. On the receipt of the necessary com- 
 mands for this execution, Captain Ellison of the 
 Marlborough waited upon the commander-in-chief, 
 and reminding his lordship that a determination 
 that their shipmates should not suffer capital 
 punishment had been the very cause of the ship's 
 company's mutiny, expressed his conviction that 
 the MarlborougJi s crew would never permit the 
 man to be hanged on board that ship. 
 
 " Receiving the captain on the Ville de Paris s 
 quarter-deck, before the officers and ship's com- 
 pany hearkening in breathless silence to what 
 
364 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 passed, and standing with his hat in his hand over 
 his head, as was his lordship's invariable custom 
 during the whole time that any person, whatever 
 were his rank, even a common seaman, addressed 
 him on service, Lord St. Vincent listened very 
 attentively till the captain ceased to speak; and 
 then after a pause replied, — 
 
 " ' Do you mean to tell me, Captain Ellison, that 
 you cannot command his Majesty's ship, the 
 Marlborough? for if that is the case, sir, I will 
 immediately send on board an officer who can.' 
 
 " The captain then requested that, at all events, 
 the boats' crews from the rest of the fleet might, 
 as always had been customary in the service, on 
 executions, attend at this also, to haul the man 
 up ; for he really did not expect the Marlborough s 
 would do it. 
 
 "Lord St. Vincent sternly answered: 'Captain 
 Ellison, you are an old officer, sir, have served 
 long, suffered severely in the service, and have 
 lost an arm in action, and I should be very sorry 
 that any advantage should be now taken of your 
 advanced years. That man shall be hanged, at 
 eight o'clock to-morrow morning, and by his own 
 ship's company : for not a hand from any other 
 ship in the fleet shall touch the rope. You will 
 now return on board, sir ; and, lest you should 
 not prove able to command your ship, an officer 
 will be at hand who can.' 
 
 " Without another word Captain Ellison in- 
 stantly retired. After he had reached his ship, 
 
Jervis 365 
 
 he received orders to cause her guns to be housed 
 and secured, and that at daybreak in the morning 
 her ports should be lowered. A general order 
 was then issued to the fleet for all launches to 
 rendezvous under the Prince at seven o'clock on 
 the following morning, armed with carronades 
 and twelve rounds of ammunition for service ; 
 each launch to be commanded by a lieutenant, 
 having an expert and trusty gunner's-mate and 
 four quarter gunners, exclusive of the launch's 
 crew. The whole were to be under the com- 
 mand of Captain Campbell, of the Blenheim, to 
 whom, on presenting to him the written orders 
 under which he was to act. Lord St. Vincent 
 further said, ' he was to attend the execution, and 
 if any symptoms of mutiny appeared in the Marl- 
 borough, any attempt to open her ports, or any 
 resistance to the hanging of the prisoner, he was 
 to proceed close touching the ship, and to fire 
 into her, and to continue to fire until all mutiny 
 or resistance should cease ; and that, should it 
 become absolutely necessary, he should even sink 
 the ship in face of the fleet.' 
 
 " Accordingly, at seven the next morning, all 
 the launches, thus armed, proceeded from the 
 Prince to the Blenheim, and thence. Captain 
 Campbell having assumed the command, to the 
 Marlborough. 
 
 " Having lain on his oars a short time along- 
 side, the captain then formed his force in a line 
 athwart her bows, at rather less than pistol shot 
 
366 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 distance off, and then he ordered the tompions 
 to be taken out of the carronades, and to load. 
 
 " At half-past seven, the hands throughout the 
 fleet having been turned up to witness punish- 
 ment, the eyes of all bent upon a powerfully 
 armed boat as it quitted the flagship ; every one 
 knowing that there went the provost-marshal 
 conducting his prisoner to the Marlborough for 
 execution. The crisis was come ; now was to be 
 seen whether the Marlborough's crew would hang 
 one of their own men. 
 
 " The ship being in the centre between the 
 two lines of the fleet, the boat was soon along- 
 side, and the man was speedily placed on the cat- 
 head and haltered. A few awful minutes of uni- 
 versal silence followed, which was at last broken 
 by the watch bells of the fleet striking eight 
 o'clock. Instantly the flagship's gun fired, and 
 at the sound the man was lifted well off ; 
 but then, and visibly to all, he dropped back 
 again ; and the sensation throughout the fleet 
 was intense. For, at this dreadful moment, when 
 the eyes of every man in every ship was straining 
 upon this execution, as the decisive struggle 
 between authority and mutiny, as if it were 
 destined that the whole fleet should see the 
 hesitating unwillingness of the Marlhorougli s 
 crew to hang their rebel, and the efUcacy of 
 the means taken to enforce obedience, by an 
 accident on board the ship the men at the yard- 
 rope unintentionally let it slip, and the turn of 
 
Jervis 367 
 
 the balance seemed calamitously lost; but then 
 they hauled him up to the yard arm with a run. 
 The law was satisfied, and, said Lord St. Vin- 
 cent at the moment, perhaps one of the greatest 
 of his life, * Discipline is preserved, sir ! ' " 
 
 Again a year later, in May, 1799, when twenty- 
 five French ships-of-the-line broke through the 
 wretchedly inefficient guard at that time kept 
 before Brest, and entered the Mediterranean, a 
 reinforcement of over a dozen was sent from the 
 Channel to Lord St. Vincent, who was found then 
 in Port Mahon, Minorca. Sir Edward Pellew, 
 captain of one of the new-comers, asked a Court- 
 Martial upon a mutiny that had occurred just 
 before leaving the home port. St. Vincent at 
 first demurred, startled, according to Pellew's 
 biographer, by the extent of the plot then re- 
 vealed, and thinking it politic to suppress the 
 facts ; but it is alleged with equal probability 
 that he was indignant at being continually called 
 upon to remedy evils due to the general indis- 
 cipline of the Channel Fleet. " What do they 
 mean by invariably sending the mutinous ships 
 to me ? Do they think that I will be hangman to 
 the fleet ? " Both versions are likely enough to be 
 correct. There is a limit to all human endur- 
 ance, and the earl was now broken in health ; 
 he was sixty-four, had borne his load for three 
 years, and was on the point of resigning his 
 command to Lord Keith. The Court, however, 
 was ordered, and three men were sentenced to be 
 
360 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 hanQ:ed. Pellew then interceded for one, on 
 the ground of previous good character. " No," 
 repUed St. Vincent. " Those who have suffered 
 liitherto have been so worthless before that their 
 fate was of little use as an example. I shall 
 now convince the seamen that no character, 
 however good, shall save a man who is guilty of 
 mutiny," 
 
 But St. Vincent was not content w^ith mere 
 repression. Outwardly, and indeed inwardly, 
 unshaken, he yet unwearyingly so ordered the 
 fleet as to avoid occasions of outbreak. With 
 the imposing moral control exerted by his un- 
 flinching steadiness, little trouble was to be 
 apprehended from single ships ; ignorant of what 
 might be hoped from sympathizers elsewhere, 
 but sure of the extreme penalty in case of failure, 
 the movements lacked cohesion and were easily 
 nipped. Concerted action only was to be feared, 
 and careful measures were taken to remove 
 opportunities. Captains were forbidden to enter- 
 tain one another at dinner, — the reason, neces- 
 sarily unavowed, being that the boats from 
 various ships thus assembling gave facilities for 
 transmitting messages and forming plans ; and 
 when ships arrived from England they underwent 
 a moral quarantine, no intercourse with them 
 being permitted until sanctioned by the admiral. 
 When the captain reported to him, his boat, 
 while waitinc:, was shoved off out of earshot. It 
 is said that on one occasion a seaman in such 
 
Jervis 369 
 
 a boat managed to call to one looking out of a 
 port of the flag-ship, '• I say, there, what have you 
 fellows been doing out here, while we have been 
 fighting for your beef and pork ? " To which the 
 other replied, " You 'd best say nothing at all 
 about that out here, for if old Jarvie hears ye 
 he '11 have ye dingle-dangle at the yard-arm at 
 eight o'clock to-morrow morning." 
 
 The severe strain of this prolonged watchful- 
 ness told on even his iron hardihood, and it would 
 almost appear that some of the rough practical 
 jokes told of this period must represent reaction 
 from the tension under which he necessarily was 
 through the grave anxieties pressing upon him. 
 Humor he certainly had, but at this time it often 
 showed itself in horse-play, so fantastic as to sug- 
 gest some unusual exciting cause. Thus, for one 
 such prank he seemed to draw his inspiration from 
 the Sunday celebration of Divine Service. Upon 
 its conclusion, he framed and published a new 
 signal, for " all chaplains," the employment of 
 which, however, was postponed to an occasion 
 suited to his lordship's fun. " A few days after it 
 blew great guns from west-southwest, which is 
 directly into the Bay of Cadiz. The inshore 
 squadron lay six miles from the flag-ship, directly 
 to leeward, and up went the signal for all chap- 
 lains. It was a hard pull for the rowers, and no 
 luxury for the sitters. When they reached the 
 quarter-deck of the Ville de Paris, literally 
 drenched with salt-water, the admiral presented 
 
 24 
 
370 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 them to ' Bishop Morgan,' as he called the chap- 
 lain of the flag-ship, and desired that they would 
 go down into the ward-room and hold a conclave." 
 One who has had a pull of that kind, as most offi- 
 cers have in their day, can understand that the 
 humor was less appreciable to the victims than 
 to the author. 
 
 " He sometimes amused himself by paying a 
 visit to the quarter-deck at what most people 
 would deem very unseasonable hours. Coming 
 up one morning at half-past two, in the middle 
 watch, he sent for Colonel Flight, the command- 
 ing officer of marines. Up came the colonel, 
 armed at all points, supposing that some enter- 
 prise was in hand. ' I have sent for you,' said 
 the Chief, in the quiet and gentlemanly style 
 which he could always command, ' I have sent 
 for you. Colonel, that you might smell, for the 
 first time in your life, the delicious odors brought 
 off by the land wind from the shores of Andalusia. 
 Take a good sniff, and then you may go and turn 
 in again.' " 
 
 "A lieutenant one day came on board to 
 answer a signal. Lord St. Vincent thought 
 there was about him too much embonpoint for 
 an officer of that rank. ' Calder,' said he to the 
 captain of the fleet, ' all the lieutenants are run- 
 ning to belly ; they have been too long at anchor 
 (for the fleet was still off Cadiz); block up the 
 entering port, except for admirals and captains, 
 and make them climb over the hammocks.' The 
 
Jervis 371 
 
 entering port in a three-decked ship being on 
 the middle deck, the difference between going 
 into that and climbing over the hammocks may 
 be compared to entering the drawing-room by 
 the balcony window, or mounting to the parapet 
 and taking the attics by storm. There was also 
 great inconvenience, and even expense, attending 
 this painful operation, since in those days all 
 officers wore white knee-breeches, or shorts, as 
 they were called, and many useful garments 
 which could not readily be replaced, were torn 
 and spoiled in this attempt at juvenile activity, 
 and many oaths probably sworn, which but for 
 this needless exertion would not have been 
 elicited." 
 
 A more pleasing, and it may well be believed 
 much more characteristic, instance of his playful- 
 ness has also been transmitted; one illustrative 
 too of his deep fund of kindliness which was 
 shown in many acts, often of large pecuniary 
 liberality, and tinged especially with a certain 
 distinct service coloring, with sympathy for the 
 naval officer and the naval seaman, which must 
 have gone far to obtain for him the obedience 
 of the will as well as submission of conduct. 
 He wisely believed in the value of forms, and 
 was careful to employ them, in this crisis of the 
 mutinies, to enforce the habit of reverence for 
 the insignia of the state and the emblems of 
 military authority. Young lieutenants — for there 
 were young lieutenants in those days — were 
 
372 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 directed to stand cap in hand before their supe- 
 riors, and not merely to touch their hats in a 
 careless manner. " The discipline of the cabin 
 and ward-room ofificers is the discipline of the 
 fleet," said the admiral ; and savage, almost, were 
 the punishments that fell upon ofificers who dis- 
 graced their cloth. The hoisting of the colors, 
 the symbol of the power of the nation, from 
 which depended his own and that of all the 
 naval hierarchy, was made an august and impos- 
 ing ceremony. The marine guard, of near a 
 hundred men, was paraded on board every ship- 
 of-the-line. The national anthem was played, 
 the scarlet-clad guard presented, and all ofificers 
 and crews stood bareheaded, as the flag with 
 measured dignity rose slowly to the staff-head. 
 Lord St. Vincent himself made a point of attend- 
 ing always, and in full uniform ; a detail he did 
 not require of other ofificers. Thus the divinity 
 that hedges kings was, by due observance, asso- 
 ciated with those to whom their authority was 
 delegated, and the very atmosphere the seaman 
 breathed was saturated with reverence. 
 
 The presence of Lord St. Vincent on these 
 occasions, and in full uniform, gave rise to an 
 amusing skit by one of the lieutenants of the 
 fleet, attributing the homage exacted, not to the 
 flag, but to the great man himself; and this, 
 becoming known to the admiral, elicited from 
 him in turn the exhibition of practical humor to 
 which allusion has just been made. Parodying 
 
Jervis 373 
 
 the Scriptural story of Nebuchadnezzar's golden 
 image, the squib began : — 
 
 " I. The Earl of St. Vincent, the commander- 
 in-chief, made an Image of blue and gold, whose 
 height was about five feet seven inches, and the 
 breadth thereof was about twenty inches " (which 
 we may infer were the proportions of his lord- 
 ship). " He set it up every ten o'clock a. m. on 
 the quarter-deck of the Ville de Paris, before 
 Cadiz." 
 
 Passing from hand to hand, it can be under- 
 stood that this effusion, which was characterized 
 throughout by a certain sprightliness, gave more 
 amusement to men familiar with the local sur- 
 roundings, and welcoming any trifle of fun in the 
 dulness of a blockade, than it does to us. At 
 last it reached the admiral, who knew the author 
 well. Sending for him on some pretext, an hour 
 before the time fixed for a formal dinner to the 
 captains of the fleet, he detained him until the 
 meal was served, and then asked him to share it. 
 All passed off quietly until the cloth was removed, 
 and then the host asked aloud, " What shall be 
 done to the man whom the commander-in-chief 
 delights to honour .f* " "Promote him," said one 
 of the company. " Not so," replied St. Vincent, 
 •' but set him on high among the people. So, 
 Cumby," addressing the lieutenant, " do you sit 
 there," — on a chair previously arranged at some 
 height above the deck, — " and read this paper to 
 the captains assembled." Mystified, but not yet 
 
374 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 guessing what was before him, Cumby took his 
 seat, and, opening the paper, saw his own parody. 
 His imploring looks were lost upon the admiral, 
 who sat with his stern quarter-deck gravity un- 
 shaken, while the abashed lieutenant, amid the 
 suppressed mirth of his audience, stumbled 
 through his task, until the words were reached, 
 " Then the Earl of St. Vincent was full of fury, 
 and the form of his visage was changed against 
 the poor Captain of the Main-Top," who had not 
 taken off his hat before the Image of blue and 
 gold. Here a roar of laughter from the head of 
 the table unloosed all tongues, and Cumby 's pen- 
 ance ended in a burst of general merriment. 
 *' Lieutenant Cumby," said the admiral, when 
 quiet was restored, "you have been found guilty 
 of parodying Holy Writ to bring your commander- 
 in-chief into disrespect ; and the sentence is that 
 you proceed to England at once on three months' 
 leave of absence, and upon your return report to 
 me to take dinner here again." 
 
 Compelled by general break-down of health to 
 seek rest at home, St. Vincent returned to Eng- 
 land in August, 1799. He was not left long in 
 repose. The condition of the Channel Fleet as 
 regards discipline has already appeared, and the 
 very recent incident of the escape of the great 
 French fleet from Brest, coupled with the equally 
 humiliating and even more threatening experience 
 of the same character in 1796, when the invasion 
 of Ireland was attempted, — both which occurred 
 
Jervis 375 
 
 under the same British commander-in-chief,-- 
 showed the urgent necessity of placmg in control 
 the only man of suitable rank, whose complete 
 adequacy to such a post had been demonstrated. 
 St. Vincent accordingly hoisted his flag m April, 
 
 1800. 1. t. 
 
 In the effort to restore discipline, he here en- 
 countered not only opposition, intensified by the 
 greater desire for shore privileges that always 
 attends a home station and the proximity of wives 
 and children, but something very like an attempt 
 at combination against his orders - a very grave 
 military offence -on the part of the captains. 
 All this he trampled down with severity amount- 
 ino- to ruthlessness. The insubordinate toast - 
 " May the discipline of the Mediterranean never 
 be introduced into the Channel Fleet -was 
 met face to face by republishing every^^^^^^^^^,^ 
 restriction upon which the discipline of the Med- 
 iterranean had rested. In the more distinctly 
 military part of his task, the closing of the port 
 of Brest to evasions by the enemy, such as those 
 just mentioned, he achieved a noteworthy success. 
 Modelling his scheme upon that of Hawke, forty 
 years before, he gave to it a development a 
 solidity, and an extension which his distinguished 
 forerunner had not been able to impart. Hawke 
 had not the advantage, which St. Vincent had, of 
 following a period of inefficiency, the remembrance 
 of which compelled the Admiralty vigorously to 
 support all measures of the commander-m-chiet, 
 
376 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 if they desired to replace the interminable uncer- 
 tainties and anxieties of the last administration of 
 the fleet by a sense of security, and consequent 
 popular content. 
 
 St. Vincent's institution and maintenance of 
 the Brest blockade must be regarded under two 
 principal heads. There is, first, the usefulness of 
 the blockade as an instrument to the general 
 ends of the current war, which is the strategic 
 point of view, involving a conception permanent 
 in character; and there are again the local dis- 
 positions, arising from the local conditions, that 
 may rightly be styled tactical, and vary from port 
 to port thus watched. The former, the strategic, 
 was more directly in line with his natural gifts ; 
 and in the possession which the idea took of him 
 is to be found the germ of the system that thence- 
 forward began to throttle the power of the French 
 Revolution, whether under the Republic or the 
 Empire. The essence of the scheme was to cut 
 loose from the beach, and keep to the sea; ever 
 watchful, with the same watchfulness that had not 
 only crushed mutiny, but by diligent care fore- 
 stalled occasions of revolt. " Our great reliance," 
 he said, — not directly in reference to the blockade, 
 but to the general thought of which the blockade, 
 as instituted by him, was the most illustrious ex- 
 emplification, — " is on the vigilance and activity 
 of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in the number 
 of which, by applying them to guard our ports, in- 
 lets, and beaches, would in my judgment tend to 
 
Jervis 377 
 
 our destruction." Amplified as the idea was by 
 him, when head of the Admiralty, to cover not only 
 Brest but all ports where hostile divisions lay, it 
 became a strategic plan of wide sweep, which 
 crushed the vitality of the hostile navies, isolated 
 France from all support by commerce, and fatally 
 sapped her strength. To St. Vincent, more than 
 to any one man, is due the effective enforcement 
 and maintenance of this system ; and in this 
 sense, as practically the originator of a decisive 
 method, he is fairly and fully entitled to be con- 
 sidered the organizer of ultimate victory. 
 
 The local dispositions before Brest will not 
 here be analyzed.^ Suffice it to say that, as 
 revealed in Jervis's correspondence, they show that 
 equipment of general professional knowledge, 
 that careful study of conditions, — of what cor- 
 responds to " the ground " of a shore battle- 
 field, — and the thoughtful prevision of pos- 
 sibilities, which constitute so far the skilful 
 tactician. The defence and the attack of sea- 
 ports, embracing as they do both occupation of 
 permanent positions and the action of mobile 
 bodies, are tactical questions; differing much, 
 yet not radically, from field operations, where 
 positions are taken incidentally, but where move- 
 ment of armed men is the principal factor. In 
 the one sense St. Vincent displayed a high degree 
 of aptitude for ordered permanent dispositions, 
 
 * This has been done by the author elsewhere (Influence of Sea 
 Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, Vol. I. pp. 371-377). 
 
378 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 which is the side of tactics most akin to strategy. 
 On the more distinctively tactical side, in the 
 movements of a fleet in action, he had little 
 opportunity. As far as shown by his one battle. 
 Cape St. Vincent, it would not appear that either 
 by nature or cultivation he possessed to any great 
 extent the keen insight and quick appreciation 
 that constitute high tactical ability. 
 
 Earl St. Vincent rendered three great servi- 
 ces to England. The first was the forming and 
 disciplining the Mediterranean fleet into the per- 
 fection that has been mentioned. Into it, thus 
 organized, he breathed a spirit which, taking its 
 rise from the stern commander himself, rested 
 upon a conviction of power, amply justified in 
 the sequel by Cape St. Vincent and the Nile, 
 its two greatest achievements. The second was 
 the winning of the Battle of St. Vincent at a most 
 critical political moment. The third was the sup- 
 pression of mutiny in 1 797 and 1 798. But, in esti- 
 mating the man, these great works are not to be 
 considered as isolated from his past and his future. 
 They were the outcome and fruitage of a char- 
 acter naturally strong, developed through long 
 years of patient sustained devotion to the ideals 
 of discipline and professional tone, which in them 
 received realization. Faithful in the least, Jervis, 
 when the time came, was found faithful also in 
 the greatest. Nor was the future confined to 
 his own personal career. Though he must yield 
 to Nelson the rare palm of genius, which he 
 
Jervis 379 
 
 himself cannot claim, yet was the glory of Nel- 
 son, from the Nile to Trafalgar, the fair flower 
 that could only have bloomed upon the rugged 
 stalk of Jervis's navy. Upon him, therefore. Nel- 
 son showered expressions of esteem and rever- 
 ence, amounting at times almost to tenderness, 
 in his early and better days. In later years their 
 mutual regard suffered an estrangement which, 
 whatever its origin, appears as a matter of feeling 
 to have been chiefly on the part of the younger 
 man, whose temper, under the malign influence 
 of an unworthy passion, became increasingly im- 
 bittered, at strife within itself and at variance with 
 others. The affectionate admiration of St. Vin- 
 cent for his brilliant successor seems to have re- 
 mained proof against external differences. 
 
 It was poetic justice, then, that allotted to St. 
 Vincent the arrangement of the responsible expe- 
 dition which, in 1798, led to the celebrated Bat- 
 tle of the Nile ; in its lustre and thorough work- 
 manship the gem of all naval exploits. To him 
 it fell to choose for its command his brilliant 
 younger brother, and to winnow for him the 
 flower of his fleet, to form what Nelson after the 
 victory called " his band of brothers." " The 
 Battle of the Nile," said the veteran admiral, 
 Lord Howe, "stands singular in this, that every 
 captain distinguished himself." The achievement 
 of the battle was Nelson's own, and Nelson's only ; 
 but it was fought on St. Vincent's station, by a 
 detachment from St. Vincent's fleet. He it was 
 
380 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 who composed the force, and chose for its leader 
 the youngest flag-ofiicer in his command. Bit- 
 ter reclamations were made by the admirals senior 
 to Nelson, but St. Vincent had one simple suffi- 
 cient reply, — "Those who are responsible for 
 measures must have the choice of the men to 
 execute them." 
 
 When St. Vincent, in 1799, quitted the Medi- 
 terranean, he had yet nearly a quarter of a 
 century to live. His later years were distin- 
 guished by important services, but they embody 
 the same spirit and exemplify the same methods 
 that marked his Mediterranean command, which 
 was the culminating period of his career. In 
 1 80 1, when Pitt's long term of office came to an 
 end, he became First Lord of the Admiralty, — 
 the head of naval affairs for the United King- 
 dom, — and so continued during the Addington 
 administration, till 1804. In 1806, at the age of 
 seventy-two, he was again for a short time called 
 to command the Channel fleet; but in 1807 ^''^ 
 retired from active service, and the square flag 
 that had so long flown wuth honor was hauled 
 down forever. 
 
 The rest of his life was spent chiefly at his 
 country-seat, Rochetts, in Essex, sixteen miles 
 from London. Having a handsome income, 
 though not wealthy, he entertained freely ; and 
 his retreat was cheered by frequent visits from 
 his old naval subordinates and political friends. 
 Generous in the use of money, and without chil- 
 
Jervis 381 
 
 dren for whom to save, the neighborhood learned 
 to love him as a benefactor. In cases of ne- 
 cessity, his liberality rose to profusion, and he 
 carried into the management of his estate a 
 carelessness he never showed in administering 
 a fleet. It is told that he once undertook to 
 raise a sum by mortgage, in entire forgetful- 
 ness of a much larger amount in bank. Far 
 into old age he retained the active habits of 
 his prime. To say that he rose at four, asserts 
 a biographer, would be to understate the case ; 
 he was frequently in the fields at half-past two 
 in the early summer dawn of England, — always 
 before his laborers, — and he was not pleased if 
 his male guests did not appear by six. To ladies 
 he was more tolerant. With mind unclouded 
 and unweakened to the last, he retained his inter- 
 est in public affairs and in the navy, contributing 
 to the conversation which animated his home the 
 judgment of an acute intellect, though one deeply 
 tinged by prejudices inseparable from so strong a 
 character. Thus honored and solaced by the 
 companionship of his friends, he awaited in calm 
 dignity the summons, which came on the 13th of 
 March, 1823. He was two months over eighty- 
 eight when he passed away, the senior admiral of 
 Great Britain. 
 
SAUMAREZ 
 
 1757-1836 
 
 THESE were honourable among the thirty," 
 says the ancient Hebrew chronicler, "yet 
 they attained not unto the first three." Since 
 that far-away day, when the three mighty men 
 broke through the host of the Philistines that 
 they might bring their chieftain water from the 
 well of Bethlehem, to how many fighters, land 
 and sea, have these words been applicable ! — 
 men valiant in deed, wise in council, patient in 
 endurance, yet lacking that divine somewhat 
 which, for want of a better name, we call genius. 
 Of such an one now, and, in contrasted sequence, 
 of another of his peers, we are about to give an 
 account ; men who in their respective careers 
 illustrated more conspicuously, the one the 
 distinctively military, the other the more purely 
 nautical, aspects, in the due blending of which 
 the excellence of the profession is realized ; fore- 
 most, both, among the ocean warriors whose 
 pennants flew through the wild scenes where 
 England's flag was called to brave the battle and 
 the breeze, 
 
James, Lord de Saumare^. 
 
Saumarez 383 
 
 " Till danger's troubled night depart, 
 And the star of peace return." 
 
 James Saumarez was born on the nth of 
 March, 1757, in Guernsey, one of the Channel 
 group of islands that still remain attached to the 
 English crown, — the sole remaining fragment of 
 the Norman duchy to which the kingdom itself 
 was for a while but an appendage. In Saumarez's 
 childhood, French was still so generally spoken 
 there that, despite the very early age at which 
 he went to sea, he always retained a perfect mas- 
 tery of that language ; and it is recorded that 
 one of his uncles, being intended for the sea ser- 
 vice, was sent to school in England when ten 
 years old, in order to acquire the use of English. 
 From such a stock, whose lineage among the 
 gentry of the island can be traced to the four- 
 teenth century, sprang three distinguished ofificers 
 of this name, destined to illustrate the British 
 flag by their deeds in several wars, in which their 
 chief opponent was the French navy. Among 
 these, the subject of this article attained the most 
 brilliant renown. Eighteen months older than 
 Nelson, not even Nelson saw more or harder 
 fighting than did James Saumarez, nor bore 
 himself more nobly throughout their day and 
 generation. 
 
 Having early shown a taste for the navy, his 
 father, who had six sons and a restricted income, 
 obtained of a naval captain to have his name 
 borne on the books of a ship of war at the early 
 
384 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 age of ten ; a curious custom of that day allowing 
 such constructive service to be counted in the 
 time prescribed for attaining a lieutenant's com- 
 mission. The boy did not actually go afloat 
 until 1770, when a little over thirteen. This first 
 employment kept him from home continuously 
 for five years, a period spent wholly in the Medi- 
 terranean, and for the most part in the Levant ; 
 the active naval war then existing between Tur- 
 key and Russia, in the waters of Asia Minor, 
 necessitating a special protection to British in- 
 terests. It is a singular circumstance that this 
 sea, esteemed so important to Great Britain, was 
 never again visited by him, with the exception of 
 the few brief months from May to October, 1 798, 
 when, as second in command, he followed Nel- 
 son's flag during the pursuit of Bonaparte's fleet 
 which ended in its destruction at the Battle of the 
 Nile. 
 
 Returning to England in 1775, his actual and 
 constructive service permitted Saumarez to ap- 
 pear for examination for a lieutenancy. This he 
 passed, but was not at once promoted. The 
 troubles with the American colonies had now be- 
 come open hostilities, and he was appointed, as 
 master's mate or passed midshipman, to the 
 Bristol of fifty guns, selected as flag-ship for 
 the expedition against Charleston. This duty, 
 which, by bringing him immediately under the 
 eyes of the naval commander-in-chief, placed him 
 also on the highway to advancement, he owed to 
 
Saumarez 385 
 
 Admiral Keppel, then one of the leading flag 
 officers of the British navy. His uncle, Philip 
 Saumarez, and Keppel had shared the perils and 
 sufferings of Anson s well-known expedition to 
 the South Seas in 1 740. Together they had buf- 
 feted the wild weather off Cape Horn, with ships' 
 companies more than decimated by scurvy; to- 
 gether they had spread terror among the Spanish 
 colonies of the Pacific ; together they had cap- 
 tured the great galleon off Manila ; and Keppel 
 still retained an affectionate interest in the kins- 
 man of his old shipmate, who had long since 
 fallen gloriously on the deck of his ship, in close 
 action with a French vessel of far superior force. 
 The squadron, which was commanded by Com- 
 modore Sir Peter Parker, assembled at Cork, 
 whence it sailed in January, 1776. Embarked on 
 board the Bristol was Lord Cornwallis, afterwards 
 so closely, and for himself disastrously, associated 
 with the course of the American Revolution. 
 Struck by Saumarez's activity and efficiency, he 
 offered him a commission in his own regiment, 
 with the position of aide-de-camp to himself. The 
 young seaman, having a naturally strong mili- 
 tary bent, which at that moment seemed more 
 likely to receive satisfaction on shore than at sea, 
 and swayed doubtless also by the prospect of a 
 powerful patron, in the days when patronage had 
 so much to do with men's careers, was on the 
 point of accepting ; but his messmates chaffed 
 him so mercilessly upon adopting a profession 
 
 25 
 
386 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 which habitually supplied them with derisive illus- 
 trations and comparisons, that he finally declined. 
 Many years later, when Saumarez was among the 
 senior captains of the navy, the two gentlemen 
 met as guests at the table of the head of the Ad- 
 miralty, who upon hearing the incident from Corn- 
 wallis remarked that he would have deprived the 
 navy of one of its best officers. 
 
 Owing partly to delays inseparable from sailing 
 vessels, and partly to the dilatoriness with which 
 war was most often waged before the days of the 
 French Revolution, the British expedition did 
 not appear off Charleston until the beginning of 
 June, 1776. To Americans who know their own 
 history, the stirring story of Fort Moultrie and 
 its repulse of the British fleet has been familiar 
 from childhood. Few are the American boys to 
 whom the names of Jasper, of Marion, and of 
 their brave commander, Moultrie himself, are un- 
 known. But while all honor is due to the band 
 of raw provincials who at this critical moment — 
 one week before the Declaration of Independence 
 was signed — withstood the enemy, and for the 
 moment saved the province, the steady, obstinate 
 valor shown by the seamen of kindred race, who 
 contended with them, was no less brilliant, and 
 was even more severely tested. The loss of the 
 fort was thirty-seven killed and wounded ; that 
 of the Bristol alone was one hundred and eleven 
 out of a crew of three hundred and fifty; and 
 during much of the action, which lasted thirteen 
 
Saumarez 387 
 
 hours, she was powerless to return the raking 
 fire of the enemy, in consequence of shot severing 
 the ropes that kept her broadside in position. 
 Saumarez was here for the first time engaged, 
 and had two narrow escapes. Once, when point- 
 ing a gun, a cannon-ball entering the port swept 
 away seven of the eight men who served the 
 piece; and somewhat later another ball struck 
 off the head of a messmate by whom he was 
 standing, covering him with blood. 
 
 In this, his maiden action, Saumarez gave full 
 proof of the steady courage which ever dis- 
 tinguished him ; and it is worthy of passing 
 remark that, in the doggedness of the fighting 
 and the severity of the slaughter, the battle was 
 typical of a great part of his after experience. 
 Several death vacancies resulting among the 
 officers, he was promoted to be lieutenant a 
 fortnight later ; and when the Bristol went north 
 he was again actively engaged in the operations 
 on Long Island, and along the East and Hudson 
 rivers, up to the evacuation of New York by the 
 Americans. His conspicuous activity at length 
 obtained for him the command of a galley, with 
 which he was sent to Rhode Island in February, 
 1778. The judgment of the illustrious Rodney, 
 as well as the repeated efforts of the Americans 
 to regain control of Narragansett Bay, may be 
 cited against the opinion expressed by Bancroft, 
 that the seizure of this important naval centre by 
 the British was a mistake. The tenure of the 
 
388 Types of Naval Officer? 
 
 island, however, depended upon the control of 
 the surrounding waters, and upon the active 
 destruction of the American means of transport. 
 Saumarez's galley was one of the force stationed 
 in the eastern, or Seakonnet, passage; and in the 
 five months thus employed it is recorded that he 
 was forty-seven times under fire. 
 
 Sullivan was at this time preparing for his 
 attack upon the British lines, expecting co-opera- 
 tion by the French fleet. This arrived on the 
 29th of July, and six days later Seakonnet Chan- 
 nel was entered by a detachment superior in force 
 to the British there. The latter burned their 
 ships and retreated to Rhode Island, where the 
 officers and seamen, Saumarez among them, con- 
 tinued actively engaged in the defence of the 
 works. On August 8th, the main French fleet, 
 under the Count d'Estaing, ran the batteries of the 
 principal channel, and anchored off the north end 
 of the island, seriously increasing the perils of the 
 defenders ; but next day the appearance of Lord 
 Howe with an inferior squadron lured the French 
 admiral out of the bay, his vessels were crippled 
 by a storm, and he abandoned the coast. Sul- 
 livan, deprived of an essential factor in his 
 scheme, had then to fall back ; and the British 
 captains, with their crews, being no longer needed, 
 returned to England to seek other ships. 
 
 Both by fortune and by choice, Saumarez's lot 
 throughout life was thrown with the line-of-battle 
 force of the navy, that body of heavy fighting 
 
Saumarez 389 
 
 ships which constitute the true backbone of a 
 sea service, because their essential function is to 
 fight, not singly, but in masses, co-operating with 
 others like themselves. In that respect they cor- 
 respond to the solid masses of infantry, which, 
 however disposed tactically, form the strength of 
 armies. The aptitudes of brilliant ofificers differ. 
 Some are born frigate-captains, partisan warriors, 
 ever actively on the wing, and rejoicing in the 
 comparative freedom and independence of their 
 movements, like the cavalry raider and outpost 
 officer. Of this type was Pellew, Lord Exmouth, 
 a seaman inbred, if ever there was one, who in 
 this sphere won the renown most distinctively 
 associated with his name, while giving proof 
 throughout a long career of high professional ca- 
 pacity in many directions. But while Saumarez, 
 in his turn, was occasionally employed in frigate 
 and light cruiser service, and always with great 
 credit, his heart was with the ship-of-the-line, 
 whose high organization, steady discipline, and 
 decisive influence upon the issues of war appealed 
 to a temperament naturally calm, methodical, and 
 enduring. " He always preferred the command 
 of a ship-of-the-line to a frigate," says his biogra- 
 pher, who knew him well, — " notwithstanding the 
 chances of prize-money are in favor of the latter ; " 
 and he himself confirmed the statement, not only 
 by casual utterance, — " My station as repeating 
 frigate is certainly more desirable than a less con- 
 spicuous one, at the same time I would rather 
 
390 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 command a seventy-four," — but by repeated for- 
 mal applications. In variety and interest of 
 operations, as well as in prize-money, did a cruis- 
 ing frigate have advantages ; for much of the 
 time of ships-of-the-line passed necessarily in 
 methodical routine and combined movements, 
 unfavorable to individual initiative. Neverthe- 
 less, their functions are more important and more 
 military in character. In accordance with this 
 preference Saumarez is found, whether by his 
 own asking or not, serving the remaining three 
 years of his lieutenant's time upon vessels of that 
 class; and in one of them he passed through his 
 next general action, a scene of carnage little infe- 
 rior to the Charleston fight, illustrated by the 
 most dogged courage on the part of the com- 
 batants, but also, it must be said, unrelieved by 
 any display of that skill which distinguishes 
 scientific warfare from aimless butchery. This, 
 however, was not Saumarez's fault. 
 
 Towards the end of 1780, Great Britain, hav- 
 ing already France, Spain, and America upon her 
 hands, found herself also confronted by a league 
 between the Baltic states to enforce by arms 
 certain neutral claims which she contested. To 
 this league, called the Armed Neutrality, Holland 
 acceded, whereupon England at once declared war. 
 Both nations had extensive commercial interests 
 in the Baltic, and it was in protecting vessels 
 engaged in this trade, by a large body of ships of 
 war, that the only general action between the two 
 
Saumarez 391 
 
 navies occurred. This was on the 5th of August, 
 1 78 1, in the North Sea, off the Dogger- Bank, 
 from which it has taken its name. 
 
 At the time of meeting, the British, number- 
 ing six ships-of-the-line, were returning from the 
 Baltic ; the Dutch, with seven ships, were bound 
 thither. Despite the numerical difference, no 
 great error is made in saying that the two squad- 
 rons were substantially of equal force. Each at 
 once ordered the merchant vessels under its pro- 
 tection to make the best of their way towards 
 port, while the ships of war on either side began 
 to form in order of battle between the enemy and 
 their own convoy. The lists being thus cleared 
 and the lines ranged, the British vessels, which 
 were to windward, stood down together, after 
 what was then the time-honored and unintelligent 
 practice of their service, each to attack one of 
 the Dutch ; disdaining to attempt doubling upon 
 any part of the hostile line. Their ideal appears 
 to have been that of the tournament, where every 
 advantage of numbers and combination was re- 
 jected in order to insure that the test should be that 
 of individual courage and skill. So strong was this 
 tradition in the British navy that its ablest con- 
 temporary chronicler, James, has sought to explain 
 away, half apologetically, the advantage gained by 
 Nelson in doubling on the French van at the 
 Nile. 
 
 The Dutch, equally quixotic, refrained from 
 taking advantage of the enemy's inability to use 
 
2g2 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 his broadsides while thus approaching nearly 
 head-on. Arrayed in a close column, the ships 
 about six hundred feet apart, the crews at the 
 guns, and the marines drawn up on the poops, 
 they waited in silence until the English, at 
 8 A. M., were in position at half musket shot. 
 Then the battle-flag was hoisted by each admiral, 
 and all opened together, the conflict raging with 
 fury for nearly four hours. It was the first time 
 since the days of the great De Ruyter, more than 
 a century before, that these kindred people had 
 thus met in fair fight upon the sea. Equal in 
 courage and in seamanship, and each neglecting 
 to seek a tactical advantage, the usual result fol- 
 lowed. Many men were killed and wounded, no 
 ship was taken, and the combatants separated 
 after a drawn battle ; but as one Dutch ship sank 
 the next day, and their convoy could not proceed, 
 the British claimed a victory. Their own mer- 
 chant vessels, being on the return voyage, were 
 able to complete it. 
 
 Saumarez had shown his usual gallantry, and 
 was again promoted. On the 23d of August, 
 eighteen days after the action, he was made com- 
 mander into the Tisiphone, a small but fast 
 cruiser, technically called a fireship, and attached 
 to the Channel fleet. In December, the British 
 government learned that a large number of trans- 
 ports and supply ships were about to sail from 
 Brest for the West Indies. These were to carry 
 troops and stores to the fleet of Count De Grasse, 
 
Saumarez 393 
 
 who had returned to Martinique after the sur- 
 render at Yorktown, and was now about to 
 undertake the conquest of Jamaica. It was im- 
 perative to intercept an expedition so essential 
 to the success of the French plan, and Admiral 
 Kempenfelt — the same who afterwards, in the 
 Royal George, " went down with twice four hun- 
 dred men " — was sent in pursuit with twelve 
 ships-of-the-line. The Tisiphone accompanied 
 them as lookout vessel, and on the 12th of 
 December, 1781, being then well ahead of the 
 fleet, she was able to signal the admiral that the 
 enemy was in sight to leeward with seventeen of- 
 the-line ; but that the latter, instead of being 
 between the British and the transports, were on 
 the far side. Kempenfelt, an able tactician as 
 well as seaman, seized his advantage, pushed 
 between the men-of-war and the convoy, and car- 
 ried off fifteen sail laden with military and naval 
 stores, of great money value and greater military 
 importance. More could not be done without 
 risking a battle with a too superior force. It 
 was essential, therefore, to apprise the British 
 commander in the West Indies of the approach 
 of the French reinforcements as well as of Kem- 
 penfelt's successes, and the Tisiphone was the 
 same day despatched on this errand. 
 
 Although he knew it not, Saumarez was now 
 being borne by the tide which leads on to fortune. 
 The next step in promotion then fixed, and still 
 fixes, the seniority of a British officer, and the 
 
394 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 Tisip}io7ies mission led him straight to it. 
 Easily outsailing the unwieldy mass of enemies, 
 he reached Barbados, and there learned that the 
 British fleet, under Sir Samuel Hood, was an- 
 chored off the island of St. Christopher, then 
 invaded by a French army supported by De 
 Grasses fleet. The tenure of the island depended 
 upon a fort on Brimstone Hill, still held by the 
 British ; and Hood, though much inferior in force, 
 had by a brilliant tactical move succeeded in 
 dislodging De Grasse from his anchorage ground, 
 taking it himself, and establishing there his fleet 
 in such order that its position remained impreg- 
 nable. The French, however, continued cruising 
 to the southward, off the adjoining island of 
 Nevis, where they interposed between Hood and 
 Saumarez; and the latter could reach his com- 
 mander only by threading the reefs lining the 
 passage between the two islands, — a feat con- 
 sidered hazardous, if not impracticable. Never- 
 theless, the Tisiphone effected it by diligent care 
 and seamanship, joining the fleet on January 31st, 
 1782. 
 
 Saumarez now found himself in the midst of the 
 most active operations, at the opening of a cam- 
 paign which promised to be of singular and 
 critical importance. But in the midst of his re- 
 joicing at the good fortune which had transferred 
 him from the comparative inactivity of the Channel 
 fleet, a momentary reverse befell. Called by 
 signal on board the flag-ship, he received a bag of 
 
Saumarez 395 
 
 despatches, with orders to sail that night for 
 England. As he went dejectedly down the ship's 
 side to his boat and was shoving off, the gig of 
 a post-captain pulled alongside. " Hallo, Sau- 
 marez," said its occupant, " where are you going ? " 
 " To England, I grieve to say." " Grieve ! " re- 
 joined the other. " I wish I were in your place. 
 I have been wanting this long time to go home 
 for my health. Hold on a moment ; perhaps it can 
 be arranged." The new-comer, named Stanhope, 
 went at once to the admiral, who a few minutes 
 later sent for Saumarez. Hood had learned to 
 value the active young ofHcer who had taken a 
 forward part in the guerilla enterprises of the 
 fleet. "Captain Saumarez," he said, "you know 
 not how much I wish to serve you. Captain 
 Stanhope shall go home, as he desires, and you 
 shall have command of the Russell^ The same 
 night the Tisiphone sailed ; Saumarez remaining 
 as an acting post-captain, with a ship of seventy- 
 four guns under him. 
 
 Thus it happened that two months later, at 
 the age of twenty-five, Saumarez commanded a 
 ship-of-the-line in Rodney's renowned battle of 
 the 12th of April; with one exception the most 
 brilliant and decisive action fought by the British 
 navy in a century. This circumstance alone 
 would have insured the confirmation of his rank 
 by the Admiralty, even had he not also eminently 
 distinguished himself ; but it was for him one of 
 those periods when inconstant fortune seems bent 
 
396 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 upon lavishing her favors. He was near the 
 head of the British column, as the hostile 
 fleets passed in opposite directions, exchanging 
 broadsides. As his ship cleared the French rear, 
 a neighboring British vessel, commanded by one 
 of the senior captains, turned to pursue the 
 enemy. Saumarez gladly imitated him ; but 
 when the other resumed his former course, 
 because the admiral of the van, his immediate 
 superior, had not turned, the Russell kept on after 
 the French. At this moment, Rodney in the 
 centre, and Hood in the rear, favored by a change 
 of wind, were breaking through the French line. 
 The Russell's course carried her toward them, 
 and consequently, in the melee which followed, 
 she had the distinguished honor of engaging De 
 Grasse's flag-ship, and of being in action with her 
 when she surrendered. Indeed, although Sau- 
 marez with characteristic modesty refrained from 
 pressing his claim, he always, when questioned 
 on the subject, maintained that although the 
 enemy's vessel certainly struck to Hood's flag- 
 ship, she did so immediately upon the latter 
 joining the Russell. 
 
 However regarded, this was a brilliant achieve- 
 ment for so young a captain, less than a twelve- 
 month having elapsed since he was but a 
 lieutenant. Rodney, who had meanwhile sig- 
 nalled his van to go about, was somewhat per- 
 plexed at finding a single ship thus opportunely 
 in the direction whence the Russell appeared; 
 
Saumarez 
 
 397 
 
 and, upon being informed that she belonged to 
 the van squadron, declared that her commander 
 had distinguished himself above all others in the 
 fleet. It proved, in fact, the keen military sense 
 of the demands of an occasion which constitutes 
 the born corps or division commander. This was 
 Saumarez's third general action, at a time when 
 Nelson, although three years a post-captain, had 
 commanded only frigates, and had never seen a 
 battle between fleets. But, if Saumarez used well 
 the singular opportunities with which fortune 
 favored him, it was characteristic of Nelson 
 that his value transpired through the simplest 
 intercourse and amid the most commonplace in- 
 cidents of service. Men felt, rather than realized, 
 that under the slight, quaint, boyish exterior there 
 lay the elements of a great man, who would one 
 day fulfil his own boast of climbing to the top of 
 the tree ; and he had been made a full captain in 
 1779, when not quite twenty-one. According to 
 the rule of the British service, already mentioned, 
 this assured for life his precedence over Sau- 
 marez, promoted in 1782. 
 
 The latter, however, if outstripped by a younger 
 competitor, who was to become the greatest of 
 British admirals, had secured a position of van- 
 tage for that great war which then lay in the womb 
 of the future. Returning to England in 1782, 
 he passed in retirement the ten years that pre- 
 ceded the outbreak of hostilities with the French 
 republic. During this period he was twice called 
 
398 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 out for service upon occasions of war threatening, 
 — in 1787 with France, and in 1790 with Spain; 
 but though in each case appointed to a ship, the 
 employment went no farther, as hostilities were 
 timely averted. This protracted withdrawal from 
 active pursuit of his profession, viewed in connec- 
 tion with his prolonged and eflficient service of 
 the twenty following years, may be taken as indi- 
 cating two things : first, that to professional ex- 
 cellence once attained such a break is not as 
 fatal as is commonly argued ; and second, con- 
 sidered with his favorable entertainment of Corn- 
 wallis's proposal to exchange into the army, this 
 contentment with shore life during the peace 
 confirms the remark already made, that, although 
 a thorough seaman, Saumarez was so incidentally. 
 His quickening interest was in the military rather 
 than the nautical side of his calling. Pellew, on the 
 contrary, now eagerly sought duty at sea, impelled 
 thereto by clear restless predilection as well as, 
 possibly, by need of increased income. It was 
 during this interval of repose, in 1788, that Sau- 
 marez married ; a step which did not in his case 
 entail the professional deterioration charged 
 against it by the cynical criticisms of St. Vincent. 
 At this time, also, he made a trip to France, upon 
 the occasion of sinking the first cone of the great 
 Cherbourg breakwater, designed to give the 
 French navy a first-class arsenal upon the Chan- 
 nel, — a purpose which it now fulfils. Louis 
 XVI. was present at this ceremony, and treated 
 
Saumarez 399 
 
 Saumarez with much attention. This was the 
 only time that he ever set foot upon French soil, 
 althousfh his home was in sight of the coast and 
 he spoke the language fluently. 
 
 When war with France again began, in 1 793, 
 Saumarez was appointed to the frigate Crescent, 
 of thirty-six guns, with which he served actively 
 in the Channel. In her, on the 20th of October, 
 1793, he succeeded in intercepting the French 
 frigate Reunion^ of substantially equal force, 
 which he had learned was in the habit of quit- 
 ting Cherbourg in pursuit of British merchant 
 vessels every night, returning in the morning. 
 The ensuing action called for an exhibition of 
 seamanship which showed he had not lost aptitude 
 during his retirement. In the beginning he 
 placed the Crescent on the weather quarter of the 
 French ship, — that is, on the windward side, but 
 a little to the rear. This was well judged, because 
 (i) the all-important rudder is thus less exposed, 
 (2) in case of an unfavorable accident the adversary 
 tends to leave rather than to approach, and (3) 
 the vessel, moving ahead, is at once under com- 
 mand to stop short of the opponent. After being 
 placed, speed was regulated by backing or filling 
 the mizzen-topsail, thus maintaining the relative 
 positions, and directing fire upon the enemy's 
 rudder. In this situation the fore-topsail yard 
 and foretopmast of the Crescent were shot away 
 in quick succession, and the ship flew up head 
 to wind, bringing all her sails aback. For a 
 
400 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 moment she was in an awkward plight, but the 
 Reunion, drawing away, could not rake ; and Sau- 
 marez, by adroit management of the rudder and 
 sails, backedVx'i s\\\'^ round, — always a nice opera- 
 tion and especially when near an enemy, — till the 
 wind came again abaft, restoring the normal con- 
 ditions of moving ahead under control of the helm. 
 The contest was then renewed, and ended in the 
 surrender of the French vessel. The disparity of 
 loss — I British to ii8 French — proved the dis- 
 cipline of the Crescent and the consummate sea- 
 manship of her commander. For this exploit 
 Saumarez was knighted. Faithful to his constant 
 preference, he as soon as possible exchanged into 
 a ship-of-the-line, the Orion, of seventy-four guns. 
 In her he again bore a foremost part, in 1795, in 
 a fleet-battle off the Biscay coast of France, 
 where three enemy's ships were taken ; and two 
 years later he was in the action with the Span- 
 iards off Cape St. Vincent, of which an account 
 has been given in the sketch of Earl St. Vincent. 
 After this Saumarez remained on the same station, 
 blockading Cadiz. 
 
 In the following year, 1798, it became necessary 
 to send a small detachment into the Mediter- 
 ranean, and off the chief arsenal of the enemy, 
 Toulon, to ascertain the facts concerning a great 
 armament, since known as Bonaparte's Egyptian 
 expedition, which rumor said was there in prep- 
 aration. The hazardous nature of the duty, 
 which advanced three ships of medium size, un- 
 
Saumarez 401 
 
 supported, in the very teeth of over a dozen 
 enemies, many of superior strength, demanded 
 the utmost efficiency in each member of the little 
 body so exposed ; a consideration which doubtless 
 led Lord St. Vincent to choose Saumarez, though 
 one of the senior captains, for this service, of 
 which Nelson, the junior flag officer of the fleet, 
 was given charge. 
 
 It seems scarcely credible that, when it was 
 afterwards decided to raise this detachment to 
 fourteen ships-of-the-line, sufficient to cope with 
 the enemy, both St. Vincent and Nelson wished 
 to remove Saumarez, with his antecedents of 
 brilliant service, so as to allow Troubridge, his 
 junior, to be second in command. The fact, how- 
 ever, is certain. Nelson had orders which would 
 have allowed him to send the Orion back, when 
 thus proceeding on a service pregnant with danger 
 and distinction, to the immeasurable humiliation 
 of her brave commander. After making every 
 deduction for the known partiality for Troubridge 
 of both St. Vincent and Nelson, it is difficult to 
 avoid the conclusion that Saumarez, with all his 
 undoubted merit, was in their eyes inferior to 
 Troubridge in the qualities necessary to chief 
 command, in case of Nelson's death, at a junc- 
 ture which called for the highest abilities of a gen- 
 eral officer. The moment was too critical to 
 permit mere favoritism to sway two such men 
 against their judgment. As it was, however, 
 
 Nelson felt he could not part with so efficient a 
 
 26 
 
402 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 ship; and he therefore contented himself with 
 giving Troubridge and Saumarez each a sub- 
 division of four vessels, keeping six under his 
 own immediate direction. 
 
 As all know, the French, when found, were at 
 anchor. Thus surprised, the British fleet was 
 hurled at them in a single mass ; nor was there 
 any subordinate command exercised, by Saumarez 
 or any other, except that of each captain over his 
 particular ship. Nelson's first expectation was to 
 overtake the unwieldy numbers of the enemy, 
 amounting to over four hundred sail, at sea, and 
 there to destroy both convoy and escort. In such 
 an encounter there would be inestimable tactical 
 advantage in those compact subdivisions, which 
 could be thrown as units, under a single head, in 
 a required direction. For such a charge Sau- 
 marez possessed most eminent capacity. 
 
 The warm family affection that was among the 
 many winning traits of Saumarcz's symmetrical 
 and attractive character impelled him to copious 
 letter-writing. Hence we have a record of this 
 pursuit of the French fleet, with almost daily 
 entries ; an inside picture, reflecting the hopes, 
 fears, and perplexities of the squadron. Bona- 
 parte's enterprise has been freely condemned 
 in later days as chimerical ; but it did not so 
 appear at the time to the gallant seamen who 
 frustrated it. The preparations had been so 
 shrouded in mystery that neither Nelson nor his 
 government had any certainty as to its des- 
 
Saumarez 403 
 
 tination, — an ignorance shared by most of the 
 prominent French officials. When, after many 
 surmises, the truth gradually transpired, the Brit- 
 ish officers realized that much time must yet 
 elapse before the English ministry could know- 
 it. Two months, for instance, passed before 
 news of the Battle of the Nile reached London. 
 Then, if India were the ultimate object, to which 
 Egypt was but the stepping-stone, four months 
 more, at least, would be needed to get a naval 
 reinforcement to the threatened point. What if, 
 meanwhile, the ally of France in the peninsula, 
 Tippoo Saib, had been assembling transports 
 with the secrecy observed at Toulon and the 
 other ports whence the divisions had sailed .? " I 
 dined with Sir Horatio to-day," writes Saumarez 
 on June 15th, nearly four weeks after Bonaparte's 
 starting, " and find that his intelligence extends 
 only to the enemy's fleet having been seen off 
 Sicily ; but we have reason to suppose them 
 gone for Alexandria, the distance from which to 
 the Red Sea is only three days' journey. They 
 may soon be transported thence by water to the 
 East Indies, with the assistance of Tippoo Saib ; 
 and with their numerous army they expect to 
 drive us out of our possessions in India. This 
 profound scheme, which is thought very feasible, 
 we hope to frustrate by coming up with them 
 before they reach the place of their destination." 
 A week later, Nelson received off Sicily news 
 of the surrender of Malta to the French. In 
 
404 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 accordance with the views above expressed, Sir 
 James now — June 2 2d — gave Nelson his written 
 opinion, favoring the course adopted of seeking 
 the enemy off the coast of Egypt ; one of the 
 most responsible decisions ever taken by an ad- 
 miral in chief command, especially at the begin- 
 ning of a career, as Nelson then was. " We are 
 now crowding sail for Alexandria ; but it is very 
 doubtful if we fall in with them at all, as we are 
 proceeding on the merest conjecture, and not on 
 any positive information. If, at the end of our 
 journey, we find we are upon the wrong scent, 
 our embarrassment will be great indeed. Fortu- 
 nately, I only act here en second ; but did the 
 chief responsibility rest with me, I fear it would 
 be more than my too irritable nerves would bear." 
 Nelson, in truth, was passing these hours in a 
 fever of anxiety, scarce able to eat or drink. Yet 
 at that very moment the British were crossing 
 the enemy's wake, unseeing and unseen, and 
 barely fifty miles separated the two fleets. 
 
 The perplexity foreshadowed by Saumarez actu- 
 ally fell upon the English admiral, through his 
 reaching Alexandria three days before the French. 
 Harassed out of his better judgment, he hurried 
 back to the westward, touched at Sicily, and 
 thence once more to Egypt. Meantime, the 
 French had landed successfully. On the ist of 
 August the British fleet again sighted Alexan- 
 dria ; saw the French flag on the walls, but no 
 ships of war. " When the reconnoitring squad- 
 
Saumarez 
 
 405 
 
 ron made the signal that the enemy was not 
 there," wrote Saumarez, " despondency nearly 
 took possession of my mind, and I do not re- 
 member ever to have felt so utterly hopeless or 
 out of spirits as when we sat down to dinner. 
 Judge, then, what a change took place when, as 
 the cloth was being removed, the officer of the 
 watch hastily came in, saying, ' Sir, a signal is 
 just now made that the enemy is in Aboukir Bay, 
 and moored in a line of battle.' All sprang from 
 their seats, and, only staying to drink a bumper 
 to our success, we were in a moment on deck." 
 As the captain appeared, the crew hailed him 
 with three hearty cheers, a significant token of 
 the gloom which had wrapped the entire squadron 
 through the recent ordeal of suspense and disap- 
 pointment. 
 
 It is only with Saumarez's share in this re- 
 nowned battle that we are here concerned. As 
 is generally known. Nelson's tactics consisted in 
 doubling upon the van and centre of the enemy, 
 who lay at anchor in a column head to wind, 
 or nearly so. Their rear, being to leeward, was 
 thus thrown out of action. The French had 
 thirteen ships-of-the-line, of which one was of 
 one hundred and twenty guns, and two eighties. 
 The British also had thirteen, all .seventy-fours, 
 and one of fifty guns ; but one of the former 
 going aground left them equal in numbers and 
 inferior in force. There were two successive 
 acts in the drama. In the first, ten British 
 
4o6 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 ships engaged the eight leading French ; in 
 the second, the fifty and two of the seventy- 
 fours, which had been belated, came upon the field 
 and strengthened the attack upon the enemy's 
 centre. The Orion, being third in the order, 
 was one of the five vessels which passed within 
 the French, and fought on that side. In so doing, 
 she described a wide sweep around her two pre- 
 decessors. While thus standing down to her 
 station, an enemy's frigate, the Serieuse, opened 
 fire upon her, wounding two men. It was then 
 part of the chivalrous comity of fleet-actions that 
 frigates should not be molested by the ships-of- 
 the-line, so long as they minded their own busi- 
 ness, — an immunity which of course ceased if 
 they became aggressive. Saumarez was urged to 
 return her fire. " No," he replied, " let her alone ; 
 she will get bolder and come nearer. Shorten 
 sail." She did draw nearer, and then the Orio7i, 
 swinging sharply towards her, let drive her broad- 
 side of double-shotted guns. All the masts of 
 the unlucky frigate went overboard, and she 
 shortly sank, nothing but her poop being visible 
 the next day. The helm of the British vessel was 
 then shifted, but so much ground had been lost 
 that she could anchor only abreast the fifth 
 French ship; the interval left being filled by 
 those who followed. In this position the O^'ion 
 silenced her immediate opponent, the Peuple 
 Souverain, which, being in an hour and a half to- 
 tally dismasted, cut her cables and dropped out of 
 
Saumarez 407 
 
 the line ; the contest being then continued with 
 the sixth in the French order, the Franklin, 
 next ahead of the flag-ship, Orie?it. The Orion 
 was thus near by the latter when she blew up, 
 but the few burning fragments which fell on 
 board were quickly extinguished. 
 
 Twenty-four hours after the battle, Saumarez, 
 who had been delayed till then by a severe 
 wound from a splinter, went on board the flag- 
 ship to call on the admiral ; and to this visit we 
 owe the knowledge of two closely related inci- 
 dents, recorded by his biographer and friend, 
 which are significant at once of his individual 
 ideas on tactical combination, and of the lack of 
 personal sympathy apparent between him and 
 Nelson. He " found several of his brother offi- 
 cers on the quarter-deck, discussing the merits of 
 the action. Some regret having been expressed 
 at the escape of the two sternmost ships of the 
 French line. Sir James said to the admiral, ' It 
 was unfortunate we did not — ' and was proceed- 
 ing to say ' all anchor on the same side.' But, 
 before he could finish the sentence, Nelson 
 hastily interrupted him, exclaiming, ' Thank God 
 there was no order ! ' Then turning the conver- 
 sation, he entered his cabin and sent for Captain 
 Ball. . . .We may relate the circumstances which 
 induced Saumarez, without the least intention to 
 ofifend, to make the observation at which offence 
 was taken. It was Nelson's custom, when in com- 
 munication or company with the captains under 
 
4o8 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 his command, to converse with them on the vari- 
 ous modes of attacking the enemy under different 
 circumstances ; and, on one of these occasions, 
 Sir James Saumarez, who had seen the evil con- 
 sequences of doubling on the enemy, especially in 
 a night action, had differed with the admiral in 
 that plan of attack, saying that ' it never required 
 two English ships to capture one French, and 
 that the damage which they must necessarily do 
 each other might render them both unable to fight 
 an enemy's ship that had not been engaged ; 
 and, as in this case two ships could be spared 
 to the three-decker, everyone might have his 
 opponent.' " 
 
 Inasmuch as Nelson, in pursuance of his previ- 
 ously announced idea, had himself in the flag-ship 
 — the sixth to enter action — set the example of 
 doubling, by anchoring on the side of the enemy's 
 line opposite to that of his first five ships, and in 
 doing so had deliberately taken position on one 
 side of a French vessel already engaged on the 
 other, Saumarez's remark was substantially a 
 censure, inopportune to a degree singular in a 
 man of his kindly and generous temper ; and its 
 reception by Nelson is not a cause for surprise. 
 On the other hand, as a matter of tactical criti- 
 cism, based upon tactical conceptions previously 
 adopted, if we assume it to be true that two 
 British ships were not needed to capture one 
 French, it may yet be confidently afifirmed that 
 to attack with decisively superior force a part 
 
Saumarez 
 
 409 
 
 of the enemy's order — to combine in short — is 
 shown by experience to attain the same degree of 
 success more certainly and at less cost than the 
 simple distribution of effort advocated by Sauma- 
 rez. To double, and to beat in detail, remained the 
 ideal of Nelson, as it had been of Howe. It was 
 by him applied then and afterwards to all cases, 
 small or great, actual or supposed. To it he 
 chiefly owed his dazzling successes, and this 
 divergence of ideals marks the difference in 
 professional insight which mainly determines 
 the relative positions of Nelson and Saumarez 
 in naval biography. It indicates the distinction 
 between the great general officer and the accom- 
 plished and resolute division or corps commander. 
 At the Battle of the Nile Saumarez received 
 the only wound that ever fell to him throughout 
 his numerous meetings with the enemy, being 
 struck on the thigh and side by a heavy splinter, 
 which had killed two officers before reachincr him. 
 The total loss of his ship was forty-two killed and 
 wounded, out of a crew of six hundred. Ten 
 days after the action he was ordered to take 
 charge of six of the prizes, which had been partly 
 repaired, and with seven of the fleet to convoy 
 them to Gibraltar. At the same time he was 
 notified that the Orion was to go home as soon 
 as this duty was performed. A more charming 
 prospect can scarcely be imagined than this re- 
 turning to his family after a long absence, fresh 
 from the completest achievement ever wrought 
 
41 o Types of Naval Officers 
 
 by the British navy; but even his tranquil tem- 
 per, whose expressions never lapse into the 
 complaints of Nelson or the querulousness of 
 Collingwood, was tried by the slow progress of 
 his battered and crippled squadron. " The prizes 
 get on very slowly," he writes ; " but I am en- 
 dowed with unparalleled patience, having scarcely 
 uttered a murmur at their tardiness, so perfectly 
 satisfied am I with the prospect before me." 
 Some time later he notes: " We have been three 
 weeks effecting what might be accomplished in 
 two days. This extraordinary delay makes me 
 more fractious than can be imagined, and I begin 
 to lose the character for patience which I had given 
 myself, by so tiresome a situation." It was still 
 the season of westerly winds, and the voyage from 
 Alexandria to Gibraltar occupied sixty-nine days. 
 The Orion was now completely worn out, hav- 
 ing been continuously in commission since the 
 war began in 1793. Besides the three general 
 actions in which Saumarez commanded her, she 
 had borne a valiant part in Howe's great battle of 
 the 1st of June. " This last business has so 
 shattered the poor Orion',' wrote Saumarez, " that 
 she will not, without considerable repairs, be in a 
 state for more service." On reaching^ EnMand 
 she was paid off ; and in February, 1 799, he 
 was appointed to the Ccrsar, of eighty-four guns, 
 one of the finest ships in the navy, which was to 
 bear his flag in the last and most brilliant episode 
 of his hard-fighting career. 
 
Saumarez 411 
 
 A year later, Lord St. Vincent, having re- 
 turned from the Mediterranean, took command 
 of the Channel Fleet, and at once instituted in 
 its methods, and particularly in the blockade of 
 Brest, changes which gradually revolutionized the 
 character of the general naval war ; baffling be- 
 yond any other single cause the aims of Napo- 
 leon, and insuring the fall of his empire. One 
 of the new requirements was the maintenance of 
 a powerful advanced division of six or eight ships- 
 of-the-line, within ten miles of the harbor's mouth. 
 It was a duty singularly arduous, demanding 
 neither dash nor genius, but calmness, steadiness, 
 method, and seamanship of a high order, for all 
 which Saumarez was conspicuous. From either 
 side of the Bay of Brest a long line of reefs pro- 
 jects for fifteen miles to the westward. Far in- 
 side their outer limits, and therefore embayed by 
 the westerly winds which blow at times with 
 hurricane violence, was the station of the ad- 
 vanced squadron, ofif some well-marked rocks of 
 the northern reef, known as the Black Rocks. 
 On this spot, called Siberia by the seamen, dur- 
 ing fifteen weeks, from August to December, Sir 
 James Saumarez kept so close a watch that not a 
 vessel of any force entered or left Brest. " With 
 you there," wrote Earl St. Vincent, " I sleep as 
 sound as if I had the key of Brest in my pocket." 
 No work ever done by him was more meritorious 
 or more useful. Near its expiration St. Vincent 
 wrote to him, " The employment you have con- 
 
412 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 ducted is the most important of this war." He there 
 demonstrated that what before had apparently been 
 thought impossible could be done, though involv- 
 ing a degree of anxiety and peril far exceeding 
 that of battle, while accompanied by none of the 
 distinction, nor even recognition, which battle 
 bestows. " None but professional men who have 
 been on that service," says his biographer with 
 simple truth, "can have any idea of its diffi- 
 culties, — surrounded by dangers of every kind, 
 exposed to the violence of storms, sailing amidst 
 a multitude of rocks and variable currents in the 
 longest and darkest nights, and often on a lee shore 
 on the enemy's coast, while the whole of their fleet 
 is near, ready to take advantage of any disaster." 
 Collingwood, who in the next war succeeded 
 to the same unenviable duty, wrote home that, 
 even in the summer month of August, " I bid 
 adieu to comfortable naps at night, never lying 
 down but in my clothes. An anxious time I 
 have of it, what with tides and rocks, which 
 have more of danger in them than a battle once 
 a week." In this laborious task Saumarez was 
 the patient, unobserved pioneer. 
 
 There was one man, however, who could and 
 did recognize to the full the quality of the work 
 done by Saumarez, and its value to those saga- 
 cious plans which he himself had framed, and 
 which in the future were to sap the foundations 
 of the French power. That man was St. Vin- 
 cent. " The merit of Sir James Saumarez," he 
 
Saumarez 413 
 
 said, " cannot be surpassed ; " and again, to Sau- 
 marez himself, " The manner in which you have 
 conducted the advanced squadron calls upon me 
 to repeat my admiration of it." Succeeding soon 
 after to the post of First Lord of the Admiralty, 
 he gave him an opportunity for distinction, which 
 resulted in an action of singular lustre and strik- 
 ing success. 
 
 Bonaparte, long before returned from Egypt, 
 and now, as First Consul, practically the abso- 
 lute ruler of France, had overthrown all ene- 
 mies on the Continent. Peace with Austria, after 
 her disasters of Marengo and Hohenlinden, had 
 been signed in February, 1801. The great ob- 
 jects of the French ruler now were to compass 
 a maritime peace and withal to retain Egypt, 
 associated from far back with the traditional 
 policies of France, and moreover a conquest in 
 which his own reputation was peculiarly inter- 
 ested. To compel Great Britain to peace, he 
 sought, by diplomacy or force, to exclude her 
 commerce from the Continent, as well as to 
 raise up maritime enemies against her. Thus 
 he had fostered, if not actually engendered, the 
 Baltic league of 1801, shattered by Nelson at 
 Copenhagen ; and for this purpose he intended 
 to occupy both Portugal and the kingdom of 
 Naples. A powerful British expedition against 
 Egypt had entered the Mediterranean. It was 
 essential either to attack this directly, or to crip- 
 ple its communications. Unable to do the for- 
 
414 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 mer, and persistently thwarted in his attempts 
 to reinforce his own troops in that distant de- 
 pendency by the close watch of the British navy, 
 of which Saumarez gave so conspicuous an illus- 
 tration before Brest, Napoleon resorted to the 
 common and sound military expedient of col- 
 lecting a threatening force upon the flank of 
 his enemy's line of communications. He directed 
 a concentration of the Spanish and French na- 
 vies at Cadiz, which, by its nearness to the straits, 
 met the desired requirement. Among others, 
 three French ships were ordered thither from 
 Toulon. 
 
 The British ministry was informed that at Ca- 
 diz were collecting Spanish vessels, said by report 
 to be intended against Portugal. This is unlikely, 
 as Bonaparte could have subdued that country 
 from the land side by the assistance of Spain ; 
 moreover, the object of the concentration is stated 
 in his letters. A squadron of five ships-of-the 
 line was accordingly formed, and placed under 
 the command of Saumarez, who on the ist of 
 January, 1801, had been made a rear admiral. His 
 orders were to go off Cadiz, where he would find 
 two more vessels, and to prevent the enemies 
 within the port from sailing, or from being joined 
 by any from outside. Whatever Bonaparte's 
 object, it would be thwarted by a force thus inter- 
 posed, in a position to meet either one or the 
 other of the converging detachments before they 
 could unite. 
 
Saumarez 41^ 
 
 Saumarez sailed on his mission June 16, 1801, 
 and on the 28th arrived off Cadiz. On the 5th 
 of July he was informed that three French ships 
 had anchored off Algeciras, the Spanish port on 
 the west side of Gibraltar Bay, confronting the 
 British fortress on the east side. This was the 
 division from Toulon, which upon reaching 
 the straits first learned of the British squadron 
 that effectually prevented its entrance to Cadiz. 
 
 Saumarez at once started for Algeciras with 
 six of his ships-of-the-line, the seventh being 
 out of recall to the northward. The followins: 
 day, July 6th, he entered the bay, and found the 
 French moored in a strong position, under cover 
 of Spanish land batteries, and supported by a 
 number of gunboats. Still, though difficult and 
 doubtful, the enterprise was not hopeless ; and, 
 as the breeze allowed his vessels to head for 
 the enemy, he steered to engage at once. Un- 
 fortunately, the wind fell as the squadron drew 
 nigh, and only four ships were able to take 
 their intended places ; the other two had to an- 
 chor outside their consorts, and fire as they 
 could through the intervals. This mishap les- 
 sened by one-third the fighting power of the 
 British, and, coupled with the acknowledged su- 
 periority of guns on solid ground over those 
 afloat, reduced them to inferiority. Their dis- 
 advantage was increased by the arrangements of 
 the French admiral, carefully elaborated during 
 the two preceding days. Had the preparations 
 
4i6 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 of Brueys at the Nile equalled those of Linois at 
 Algeciras, Nelson's task must have been harder 
 and his victory less complete. Nevertheless, after 
 an en^aocement of an hour and a half, the British 
 fire so far prevailed that the enemy resorted to a 
 measure for which precautions had been taken 
 beforehand. Lines had been run from each French 
 ship to the shoal water lying close inside them ; 
 and by means of these they were warped away 
 from their opponents until they took the ground. 
 This increase of distance was in every way a gain 
 to the party standing on the defensive, and a corre- 
 sponding loss to the assailants. Saumarez ordered 
 the cables cut and sail made to close once more ; 
 but the light and fickle airs both baffled this ef- 
 fort and further embarrassed the British, through 
 the difficulty of keeping their broadsides in posi- 
 tion. Here happened the great disaster of the day. 
 One of the outer ships, the Hannibal, tried to pass 
 inside the headmost of the French, not realizing 
 that the latter had moved. In so doing she 
 ran aground close under a battery, to whose 
 fire she could make no reply. After a brave and 
 prolonged resistance, in which she lost seventy- 
 five killed and seventy wounded out of a crew 
 of six hundred, and had many of her guns dis- 
 mounted, she hauled down her flag. By this 
 time another ship, the Po7npee, was dismasted, 
 and success was plainly hopeless. The British 
 admiral, therefore, ordered the action discon- 
 tinued, and withdrew to the Gibraltar side ; 
 
Saumarez 417 
 
 the Potnpee having to be towed away by the 
 boats of the squadron. 
 
 Saumarez had failed, and failure, however ex- 
 plained, can hardly be carried to a man's credit ; 
 but his after course, by wresting success out of 
 seemingly irretrievable disaster, has merited the 
 highest eulogium. Maintaining both courage 
 and energy unimpaired, every effort was instantly 
 made to get the ships once more into fighting 
 condition, that the attack might be renewed. 
 " Tell the Admiralty," said he to the bearer of 
 his despatches, " that I feel confident I shall soon 
 have an opportunity of attacking the enemy again, 
 and that they may depend upon my avaiHng 
 myself of it." 
 
 The opportunity did come. On the morning 
 of July 9th, the Superb, the seventh ship, which 
 had not been in the action, was seen rounding 
 the west point of the bay under all sail, with 
 a signal flying that the enemy was in pursuit. 
 A few moments later appeared five Spanish 
 vessels, two of which, the Real Carlos and the 
 Hermenegildo, carrying each one hundred and 
 twelve guns, were among the largest then afloat. 
 On board them had embarked a number of the 
 jeunesse doree of Cadiz, eager to join the trium- 
 phal procession which it was thought would soon 
 enter the port, flushed with a victory considered 
 by them to be rather Spanish than French, and 
 escorting the rare trophy of a British ship-of- 
 the-line that had struck to Spanish batteries. 
 
 27 
 
41 8 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 Besides the two giants, there were a ninety-gun 
 ship and two seventy-fours ; and the next day a 
 French vessel of the latter class joined, making a 
 total reinforcement of six heavy ships. 
 
 To these Saumarez could oppose but five. 
 The Hannibal he had lost. The Pompee could 
 not be repaired in time ; her people were there- 
 fore distributed among the other vessels of the 
 squadron. Even his own flag-ship, the CcEsar, 
 was so injured that he thought it impossible to 
 refit her ; but when her crew heard his decision, 
 one cry arose, — to work all day and night till 
 she was ready for battle. This was zeal not ac- 
 cording to knowledge ; but, upon the pleading of 
 her captain in their name, it was agreed that they 
 should work all day, and by watches at night. 
 So it happened, by systematic distribution of 
 effort and enthusiastic labor, that the Ccesar, 
 whose mainmast on the 9th was out and her rig- 
 ging cut to pieces, was on the 12th able to sail in 
 pursuit of the foe. 
 
 During the forenoon of the latter day the 
 combined squadron was seen getting under way. 
 The wind, being easterly, was fair for the British, 
 and, besides, compelled the enemy to make some 
 tacks to clear the land. This delay was inval- 
 uable to Saumarez, whose preparations, rapid as 
 they had been, were still far from complete. Not 
 till one in the afternoon did the headmost Span- 
 iards reach the straits, and there they had to 
 await their companions. The Hannibal was un- 
 
Saumarez 419 
 
 able to join them, and reanchored at Algeciras. 
 At half-past two the Cczsar hauled out from Gib- 
 raltar mole, her band playing, " Cheer up, my 
 lads, 't is to glory we steer ! " which was answered 
 from the mole-head with " Britons, strike home ! " 
 At the same moment Saumarez's flag, provision- 
 ally shifted to another vessel, was rehoisted at her 
 masthead. The rugged flanks of the rock and 
 the shores of Algeciras were crowded with eager 
 and cheering sight-seers, whose shouts echoed 
 back the hurrahs of the seamen. Rarely, indeed, 
 is so much of the pride and circumstance, if not 
 of the pomp, of war rehearsed before an audience 
 which, breathless with expectation, has in it no 
 part save to admire and applaud. 
 
 Off Europa Point, on the Gibraltar side, there 
 clustered round the Ccesar her four consorts, 
 all but one bearing, like herself, the still fresh 
 wounds of the recent conflict. Four miles away, 
 off Cabrita Point, assembled the three French of 
 Linois's division, having like honorable marks, 
 together with the six new unscarred arrivals. At 
 8 p. M. of the summer evening the allies kept 
 away for Cadiz ; Linois's division leading, the 
 other six interposing between them and the five 
 ships of Saumarez, which followed at once. It 
 was a singular sight, this pursuit of nine ships 
 by five, suggestive of much of the fatal differ- 
 ence, in ideals and efficiency, between the navies 
 concerned. Towards nine o'clock Saumarez or- 
 dered the Superb, whose condition alone was 
 
420 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 unimpaired by battle, to press ahead and bring 
 the rear of the enemy to action. The wind was 
 blowing strong from the east, with a heavy sea. 
 At half-past eleven the Superb overtook the Real 
 Carlos, and opened fire. Abreast the Spanish 
 vessel, on her other side, was the Hermenegildo. 
 The latter, probably through receiving some of 
 the Superb' s shot, fancied the ship nearest her to 
 be an enemy, and replied. In the confusion, one 
 of them caught fire, the other ran on board her, 
 and in a few moments there was presented to the 
 oncoming British the tremendous sight of these 
 two huge ships, with their twenty hundred men, 
 locked in a fast embrace and blazing together. 
 At half-past two in the morning, having by 
 that time drifted apart, they blew up in quick 
 succession. 
 
 Leaving them to their fate, the hostile squad- 
 ron passed on. The Superb next encountered 
 the St. Anioine, and forced her to strike. Soon 
 afterwards the wind died away, and both fleets 
 were much scattered. A British ship brought 
 to action one of the French which had been 
 in the first battle ; indeed, the French accounts 
 say that the latter had fought three enemies. 
 However that may be, she was again severely 
 mauled ; but the English vessel opposed to her 
 ran on a shoal, and lost all her masts. With this 
 ended the events of that awful night. 
 
 The net results of this stirring week completely 
 relieved the fears of the British ministers. What- 
 
Saumarez 421 
 
 ever the objects of the concentration at Cadiz, 
 they were necessarily frustrated. Though the 
 first attack was repulsed, the three French ships 
 had been very roughly handled ; and, of the re- 
 lieving force, three out of six were now lost to the 
 enemy. " Sir James Saumarez's action has put 
 us upon velvet," wrote St. Vincent, then head of 
 the Admiralty; and in the House of Peers he 
 highly eulogized the admiral's conduct, as also 
 did Nelson. The former declared that " this gal- 
 lant achievement surpassed everything he had 
 ever met with in his reading or service," a state- 
 ment sufficiently sweeping; while the praise of the 
 hero of the Nile was the more to be prized be- 
 cause there never was cordial sympathy between 
 him and Saumarez. Closely as they had been 
 associated, Nelson's letters to his brother officer 
 began always " My dear Sir James," not " My 
 dear Saumarez." 
 
 In this blaze of triumph the story of Saumarez 
 fitly terminates. He was never again engaged in 
 serious encounter with the enemy. The first war 
 with the French republic ended three months 
 after the battle of Algeciras. After the second 
 began, in 1803, he was, until 1807, commander- 
 in-chief at the Channel Islands, watching the 
 preparations for the invasion of England, and 
 counteracting the efforts of cruisers against Brit- 
 ish commerce. In 1808, in consequence of the 
 agreements of Tilsit between the Czar and Napo- 
 leon, affairs in the Baltic became such as to de- 
 
422 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 mand the presence of a large British fleet, — first 
 to support Sweden, then at war with Russia, and 
 later to protect the immense British trade, which, 
 under neutral flags and by contraband methods, 
 maintained by way of the northern sea the inter- 
 course of Great Britain with the Continent. Of 
 this trade Sweden was an important intermediary, 
 and her practical neutrality was essential to its 
 continuance. This was insured by the firm yet 
 moderate attitude of Sir James Saumarez, even 
 when she had been forced by France to declare 
 war ag^ainst Great Britain. 
 
 It may be said without exaggeration that from 
 this time, and until the breach between Napoleon 
 and Russia in 1 8 1 2, the maritime interest of the war 
 between Great Britain and France centred in the 
 Baltic. Elsewhere the effective but monotonous 
 blockade of the continental ports controlled by 
 the French Emperor absorbed the attention of 
 the British fleets. Of great battles there were 
 none after Trafalgar. To Saumarez, therefore, 
 fell the most distinctive, and probably also the 
 most decisive, field of work open to the British 
 navy. The importance of the Baltic was two- 
 fold. It was then the greatest source of materials 
 essential to ship-building — commonly called 
 naval stores; and further, the Russian part of its 
 coast line, being independent of Napoleon's direct 
 regulation, was the chief means of approach by 
 which Great Britain maintained commercial in- 
 tercourse with the Continent, to exclude her 
 
Saumarez 
 
 4^3 
 
 from which had become the leading object with 
 the Emperor. The contravention of his poHcy in 
 this way, in disregard, as he claimed, of the agree- 
 ments existing between him and the Czar, led 
 eventually to the Russian war, and so finally to 
 his own overthrow and the deliverance of the 
 Continent from his domination. 
 
 The historical significance of the position now 
 occupied by Saumarez, and its importance to the 
 great issues of the future, are thus manifest. It 
 was a post that he was eminently qualified to fill. 
 Firm, yet calm, sagacious, and moderate, he met 
 with rare efficiency the varied and varying de- 
 mands of those changeful times. The unremit- 
 ting and well directed efforts of his cruisers broke 
 up reciprocal commerce between the countries 
 surrounding the narrow inland sea, so essential 
 to their welfare while submitting to Napoleon ; 
 while the main fleet sustained the foreign trade 
 with Russia and Sweden, carried on through 
 neutral ships for the advantage of Great Britain. 
 Two instances will illustrate his activities better 
 than many words. In the year 1809 four hundred 
 and thirty local vessels were captured, averaging 
 the small size of sixty tons each, three hundred 
 and forty of which belonged to Denmark, then 
 under Napoleon's absolute sway. At the close of 
 the open season of 18 10, the merchant ships for 
 England, which ordinarily were despatched under 
 convoy in bodies of five hundred, numbered, 
 according to Saumarez's flag-lieutenant and biog- 
 
424 Tvpes of Naval Officers 
 
 rapher, no less than one thousand vessels, gath- 
 ered in one mass. 
 
 As long as Sweden remained friendly, the 
 admiral's duties, though weighty, did not differ 
 materially from those usual to his profession ; but 
 when she was unwillingly forced into a declara- 
 tion of war by Napoleon, his task became more 
 complicated and more delicate. The British 
 minister having to leave, Saumarez succeeded to 
 a diplomatic situation, in which the problem was 
 to support the interests and dignity of his own 
 nation, without transforming the formal war into 
 actual hostilities, and substituting imbitterment 
 for the secret good will of the Swedish govern- 
 ment and people, who, in common with the 
 Russian nobles and subjects, were alienated by 
 the imperious and merciless exactions of the 
 French demands. The secret aim of Great Britain 
 was so to nourish this ill-will towards France, and 
 so to avoid causes of offence by herself, as to 
 convert covert hostility into open antagonism, 
 and thus to reverse the political and military com- 
 binations of Europe. In the absence of regular 
 accredited diplomatic representatives, Saumarez 
 became at once the exponent and the minister of 
 this vital policy. He had to avoid quarrels, and 
 yet at the same time to restrain Sweden from acts 
 of injury to which she was constantly impelled 
 by the Emperor, whose purpose naturally was 
 exactly the opposite of his ; and who sought fur- 
 ther to estrange all people from Great Britain. 
 
Saumarez 425 
 
 In the performance of this task Saumarez's 
 success was not only complete, but peculiarly his 
 own. His temper was at times severely tried, 
 but it never got beyond his control. He repressed 
 injury, and demanded satisfaction for it, when 
 committed ; but, relying with good reason on the 
 motives of the Swedish government, he contrived 
 to secure redress without resorting to force, which, 
 however understood by statesmen, would enrage 
 the peoples he had to conciliate. After the ordeal 
 was over, and Russia was at war with France, a 
 leading Swedish statesman wrote to him : " You 
 have been the guardian angel of my country ; by 
 your wise, temperate, and loyal conduct, you have 
 been the first cause of the plans which have been 
 formed against the demon of the continent. . . . 
 Once more I must tell you, that you were the 
 first cause that Russia had dared to make war 
 against France ; had you fired one shot when we 
 declared war against England, all had been ended 
 and Europe would have been enslaved." Sau- 
 marez, an extremely religious man, may have 
 reflected that " he who ruleth his spirit is greater 
 than he that taketh a city." 
 
 Though in the strictest sense professional, the 
 Baltic service of Saumarez involved little of purely 
 military interest. Shortly after his assuming the 
 command, in 1808, a Russian fleet which had 
 been keeping the sea took refuge, on the 
 approach of the allied British and Swedes, in a 
 harbor on the Gulf of Finland. Saumarez fol- 
 
426 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 lowed close upon their heels, and after a consul- 
 tation and reconnoissance of the position, which 
 consumed two days, secured the co-operation of 
 the Swedish admiral for an attack on the day 
 following; an essential condition, for the Russian 
 force was superior to his own in the proportion of 
 eight to six. Unhappily, the wind shifted, and 
 blew an adverse gale for eight days ; at the end 
 of which time the enemy had so far fortified the 
 surroundings that Saumarez thought it inexpedi- 
 ent to attack. In this decision he was supported 
 by the opinion of captains of such established 
 reputation as, joined to his own brilliant record, 
 must be taken to justify his action, which seems 
 to have caused some dissatisfaction in England. 
 On the face, it could not but be a disappointment 
 to people accustomed to the brilliant victories of 
 Nelson, and his apparent invincibility by obstacles; 
 but in the end it was all for the best, for doubt- 
 less the mortifying destruction of a Russian fleet 
 would not have furthered the reconciliation, which 
 soon became a leading object with the British 
 government and the great bulk of the Russian 
 nation. It is, however, probable that to this 
 frustration of public expectation, which had been 
 vividly aroused by preceding accounts of the con- 
 ditions, is to be attributed the delay in granting 
 the peerage, eagerly desired by Saumarez in his 
 later days, — not for itself merely, but as a recog- 
 nition which he not unnaturally thought earned 
 by his long and distinguished service. 
 
Saumarez 427 
 
 Saumarez held the Baltic command througrh 
 five eventful years, — from 1808 to 1812. After 
 Napoleon's disastrous Russian expedition, affairs 
 in that sea no longer required a force adequate to 
 his rank, and he then finally retired from service 
 afloat, still in the full maturity of a healthy prime, 
 at the age of fifty-five. The remainder of his life, 
 with brief exception, was passed in his native 
 island of Guernsey, amid those charms of family 
 affection and general esteem which he had de- 
 served by his fidelity to all the duties of the man 
 and the citizen. Though so far removed from 
 the active centres of life, he kept touch with it by 
 the variety of his interests in all useful and be- 
 nevolent undertakings, to which an ample fortune 
 allowed him freely to contribute. " The hopes 
 entertained of his assistance and sympathy," ob- 
 serves his biographer, " were never disappointed." 
 Among naval biographies, there is none that pre- 
 sents a more pleasing picture of genial and digni- 
 fied enjoyment of well-earned repose. In 1831, 
 upon the accession of William IV., the Sailor 
 King, the long-coveted peerage was at last be- 
 stowed. Lord de Saumarez died on the 9th of 
 October, 1836, in his eightieth year. 
 
P E L L E W 
 
 1757-1833 
 
 LIKE the English tongue itself, the names 
 of British seamen show the composite 
 origin of their nation. As the Danes after 
 the day of Copenhagen, to them both glorious 
 and disastrous, claimed that in Nelson they 
 had been vanquished by a man of their own 
 blood, descended from their Viking forefathers; 
 as Collingwood and Troubridge indicate the 
 English descent of the two closest associates of 
 the victor of Trafalgar; so Saumarez and the 
 hero of this sketch, whose family name was 
 Pellew, represent that conquering Norman race 
 which from the shores of the Northern ocean 
 carried terror along the coasts of Europe and 
 the Mediterranean, and as far inland as their 
 light keels could enter. After the great wars 
 of the French Revolution and the Battle of 
 Algiers, when Lord Exmouth had won his renown 
 and his position had been attained, kinship with 
 him was claimed by a family still residing in Nor- 
 mandy, where the name was spelled " Pelleu." 
 Proof of common origin was offered, not only in 
 the name, but also in the coat of arms. 
 
Edward Pellew, Lord Exmouth. 
 
Pellew 429 
 
 In England, the Pellew family was settled in 
 the extreme southwest, in Cornwall and Devon- 
 shire, counties whose nearness to the great 
 Atlantic made them the source of so much of 
 the maritime enterprise that marked the reign of 
 Elizabeth. Lord Exmouth's grandfather was a 
 man of wealth ; but, as he left many children, 
 the juniors had to shift for themselves, and the 
 youngest son, Samuel Pellew, the father of the 
 admiral, at the time of the latter's birth com- 
 manded a post-office packet on the Dover sta- 
 tion. He accordingly made the town of that 
 name the home of his wife and children ; and 
 there Edward, the second of his four sons, was 
 born, April 19, 1757. Their mother was the 
 daughter of a Jacobite gentleman, who had been 
 out for the Pretender in 1715, — a fact which 
 probably emphasized the strong Hanoverian sym- 
 pathies of Samuel Pellew, whose habit was to 
 make his children, every Sunday, drink King 
 George's health upon their knees. 
 
 In 1765, when the future admiral was only 
 eight years old, his father died, and the mother 
 making an imprudent marriage three years later, 
 the children were thrown upon the world with 
 small provision and scanty care. The resolute, 
 active, and courageous character of the lads, 
 however, brought them well forward among 
 their equals in age. At school Edward was 
 especially distinguished for fearlessness. Of this 
 he gave a marked instance, when not yet twelve, 
 
430 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 by entering a burning house where gunpowder 
 was stored, which no other of the bystanders 
 would approach. Alone and with his own hands 
 the lad brought out the powder. A less com- 
 mendable but very natural result of the same 
 energetic spirit was shown in the numerous 
 fio:htins: matches in which he was enoraged. 
 Being threatened with a flogging for one of 
 these, the circumstance became the immediate 
 occasion of his going to sea. If flogged, he 
 declared, he would run away ; and as a decided 
 taste for seafaring life had already manifested it- 
 self, his guardian thought better to embrace at 
 once the more favorable alternative and enter 
 him regularly in the navy. He thus went afloat 
 towards the end of 1770, the date at which Nel- 
 son, also, though one year younger, began his 
 career. 
 
 His first cruise was in the Mediterranean. 
 It came to a premature end through a quarrel 
 between the commander of the ship and one of 
 the midshipmen. In this the captain was clearly 
 and grossly in the wrong ; yet nevertheless carried 
 his resentment, and the power of oppression in 
 his hands, then little restrained by law, so far as 
 to expel the youngster from the ship and set him 
 on shore in Marseilles. Pellew insisted upon 
 accompanying his messmate, and the two lads of 
 fourteen, aided by some of the lieutenants, secured 
 a passage home. It shows a pleasing trait in our 
 hero's character that, some years afterwards, he 
 
Pel lew 43 1 
 
 advanced materially the professional fortunes of 
 the son of the officer who had thus abused his 
 authority. 
 
 He next passed under the command of a 
 Captain Pownoll, between whom and himself 
 were established such warm relations, of affec- 
 tionate interest on the one side and reverential 
 regard on the other, that Pownoll became a 
 family name among the descendants of the 
 admiral. He himself gave it to his first-born, 
 and it still appears in the present generation. 
 Under him, also, Pellew was brought into direct 
 contact with the American Revolution ; for on 
 board the frigate Blonde, Pownoll's ship, General 
 Burgoyne embarked in 1775 for Canada, there 
 beginning the undertaking which ended so dis- 
 astrously for him. It is told that when the dis- 
 tinguished passenger came on board, the yards 
 being manned to receive him with the honors due 
 to his rank, he was startled to see on one yard- 
 arm a midshipman standing on his head. Upon 
 expressing alarm, he was laughingly reassured by 
 the captain, who said that Pellew — for he it was 
 who put this extra touch upon the general's recep- 
 tion — was quite capable of dropping from the 
 yard, passing under the ship's bottom, and coming 
 up on the other side. A few days later the young 
 officer actually did leap from the yard-arm, the 
 ship going fast through the water — not, however, 
 as bravado, but to aid a seaman who had fallen 
 overboard, and whom he succeeded in saving. 
 
43 2 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 Throughout his youth the exuberant vitality 
 of the man delighted in these feats of wanton 
 power. To overturn a boat by press of canvas, 
 as a frolic, is not unexampled among lads of dar- 
 ing ; but it is at least unusual, when a hat goes 
 overboard, to follow it into the water, if alone in 
 a boat under sail. This Pellew did, on one occa- 
 sion, when he was old enough to know better ; 
 being at the moment in the open Channel, in a 
 small punt, going from Falmouth to Plymouth. 
 The freak nearly cost him his life ; for, though 
 he had lashed the helm down and hove-to the 
 boat, she fell off and gathered way whenever he 
 approached. When at last he laid hold of her 
 rail, after an hour of this fooling, barely strength 
 remained to drasx himself on board, where he fell 
 helpless, and waited long before his powers were 
 restored. It is trite to note in such exhibitions 
 of recklessness many of the qualities of the ideal 
 seaman, though not so certainly those of the fore- 
 ordained commander-in-chief. Pellew was a born 
 frigate captain. 
 
 At the end of 1775 the Americans were still 
 engaged in the enterprise against Quebec, the 
 disastrous termination of which is familiarly 
 known. After the fall of General Montgomery 
 in the unsuccessful night assault of December 
 31, 1775, the American operations were reduced 
 to a land blockade of the town, which was cut off 
 from the sea by ice in the river. A close invest- 
 ment was thus maintained for five months, until 
 
Pellew 433 
 
 the early part of May, 1776, when the place was 
 relieved by the arrival of a small naval force, 
 commanded by Captain Charles Douglas. Im- 
 mediately upon its appearance the commanding 
 British general Carleton, attacked the besiegers, 
 who, already prostrated by disease and privation, 
 abandoned their positions and fell back upon 
 Sorel, at the mouth of the river Richelieu, the 
 outlet from Lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence. 
 Here they remained until June, when the enemy, 
 who had received heavy reinforcements, advanced 
 in overpowering numbers. The Americans again 
 retired above the rapids of the Richelieu to St. 
 Johns. Thence there is a clear channel south- 
 ward ; and embarking there, the retreating force 
 without further molestation reached Crown Point, 
 a fortified post a hundred miles distant, at the 
 head of the lake, commanding the narrow stream 
 to which it is reduced in its upper part. Twelve 
 miles above Crown Point is Ticonderoga, the 
 well-known border fortress of the Colonial and 
 Revolutionary wars ; and for fifteen or twenty 
 miles farther the stream is navigable for boats of 
 some size, thus affording an easy means of com- 
 munication in those early days of impassable 
 forests and scanty transport. 
 
 Though greatly superior on land, the British 
 had now for a time to stay their pursuit ; for the 
 water highway essential to its continuance was 
 controlled by the flotilla under the command of 
 
 Benedict Arnold, forbidding further advance until 
 
 28 
 
_|.'54 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 it was subdued. The presence of these vessels, 
 which, though few, were as yet unopposed, gained 
 for the Americans, in this hour of extremity, the 
 important respite from June to October, 1776; 
 and then the lateness of the season compelled 
 the postponement of the invasion to the follow- 
 ing year. The toil with which this little force 
 had been created, a few months before, was thus 
 amply justified ; for delay is ever to the advantage 
 of the defence. In this case it also gave time 
 for a change of commanders on the part of the 
 enemy, from Carleton to Burgoyne, which not 
 improbably had a decisive effect upon the for- 
 tunes of the next campaign. 
 
 As soon as established at St. Johns, the Brit- 
 ish took steps to place a naval force upon the 
 lake, an undertaking involving trouble and delay, 
 notwithstanding their greatly superior resources 
 in men and material. Some thirty fighting ves- 
 sels, suitable to the waters upon which they were 
 to act, were required, and also four hundred bat- 
 eaux for the transport of the troops. These had 
 either to be built upon the spot, despite the lack 
 of all dockyard facilities, or else to be brought 
 bodily from the St. Lawrence, by road, or through 
 the rapids of the Richelieu, until the deep water 
 at St. Johns was reached. In this hardy, stren- 
 uous work, Pellew naturally was conspicuously 
 active ; and in its course he gained a particular 
 professional accomplishment which afterwards 
 stood him in good stead. Several vessels were 
 
Pellew 43 5 
 
 built upon the shores of the stream ; among others, 
 one of one hundred and eighty tons, the Infiex- 
 ible, whose heavier timbers were brought overland 
 to St. Johns. The construction of these craft 
 was superintended by a lieutenant — afterwards 
 Admiral Schank — of scientific knowledge as a 
 ship architect ; and through close association 
 with him Pellew's instinctive appreciation of all 
 things nautical received an intelligent guidance, 
 which gave him a quick insight into the probable 
 behavior of a ship from an examination of her 
 build, and enabled him often to suggest a suitable 
 remedy for dangerous faults. During this period 
 of equipment occurred a characteristic incident 
 which has only recently become public through 
 a descendant.^ " On the day the Inflexible was 
 launched, Pellew on the top of the sheers was 
 trying to get in the mainmast. The machinery 
 not being of the best gave way, and down came 
 mainmast, Pellew, and all, into the lake. ' Poor 
 Pellew,' exclaimed Schank, ' he is gone at last ! ' 
 However, he speedily emerged and was the first 
 man to mount the sheers again. ' Sir,' Admiral 
 Schank used to conclude, ' he was like a squirrel.' " 
 Thirty days after the keel of the Inflexible was 
 laid at St. Johns, the vessel herself not only was 
 launched, but had set sail for the southward. 
 She carried eighteen twelve-pounders, nine on a 
 side, and was thus superior in power, not only to 
 any one vessel of the Americans, but to their 
 
 1 Fleetwood Hugo Pellew, in " Our Naval Heroes." 
 
436 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 whole assembled flotilla on Lake Champlain. 
 Except the principal pieces of her hull, the timber 
 of which she was built was hewed in the neigh- 
 boring forest ; and indeed, the whole story of the 
 rapid equipment of this squadron recalls vividly 
 the vigorous preparation of Commander Perry, of 
 the United States navy, in 181 3, for his success- 
 ful attempt to control Lake Erie. The entire 
 British force, land and naval, now moved toward 
 Crown Point. On the nth of October the 
 American flotilla was discovered, a short distance 
 above Plattsburg and about twenty miles from 
 the foot of the lake, drawn up between Valcour 
 Island and the western shore, which are from one- 
 half to three-fourths of a mile apart. It lay there 
 so snugly that the British, wafted by a northwest 
 wind, had actually passed to the southward with- 
 out seeing it, and the discovery was purely acci- 
 dental, — a fact which suggests that Arnold, who 
 must have felt the impossibility of a force so 
 inferior as his own contesting, or even long 
 delaying, the enemy's advance by direct oppo- 
 sition, may have entertained some purpose of 
 operating in their rear, and thus causing a diver- 
 sion which at this late season might effectually 
 arrest their progress. It is true that such a 
 stroke would frightfully imperil his little squad- 
 ron ; but, in circumstances of absolute inferiority, 
 audacity, usually the best policy in war, offers the 
 only chance of success. Mere retreat, however 
 methodical, must end in final destruction. To 
 
Pellew 437 
 
 act towards St. Johns, trusting to dexterity and 
 to local knowledge of the network of islands at 
 the foot of the lake to escape disaster, or at least to 
 protract the issue, offered the best chance ; and 
 that the situation thus accepted would not be 
 hopeless was proved by the subsequent temporary 
 evasion of pursuit by the Americans, even in the 
 open and narrow water of the middle lake. 
 
 The British moved to attack as soon as the 
 hostile shipping was discovered. Pellew was sec- 
 ond ofificer of the schooner Carleton, of twelve 
 guns, the third vessel of the flotilla in point of 
 force. The wind being contrary, and apparently 
 light, the Carleton alone of the sailing vessels got 
 into action ; and although she was supported by 
 a number of rowing gunboats, whose artillery 
 was heavy, the match was unequal. According 
 to Arnold's own account, he had disposed his 
 gunboats and gondolas " on the west side of 
 Valcour Island, as near together as possible, 
 and in such a form that few vessels can attack 
 us at the same time, and those will be exposed 
 to the fire of the whole fleet." To this Cap- 
 tain Douglas, in his report of the occurrences, 
 adds the suggestive particular that the Carleton, 
 by a lucky slant of wind, fetched " nearly into 
 the middle of the rebel half-moon, where she 
 anchored with a spring on her cable." The 
 position was one of honorable distinction, but 
 likewise of great exposure. Her first officer lost 
 an arm; her captain. Lieutenant Dacres, was so 
 
43 8 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 severely wounded that he was about to be thrown 
 overboard as dead ; and Pellew, thus left with- 
 out a superior, fought the vessel through the 
 engagement. When signal was at last made to 
 withdraw, the Carleton was able to do so only 
 by help of the gunboats, which towed her out 
 of fire. On the other hand, Arnold's flag-ship, 
 the schooner Royal Savage, which had fought 
 in advance of her consorts and under canvas, 
 fell to leeward, and came there under the dis- 
 tant fire of the Inflexible, by which she was 
 badly crippled. She then was run ashore on the 
 southern point of the island, where she fell mo- 
 mentarily into the hands of the British, who 
 turned her guns on her former friends. Later 
 in the day, it seeming probable that she might 
 be retaken, she was set on fire and burned to 
 the water's edge. Thus abandoned, she sank 
 to the bottom, where her hull rests to this day. 
 During the recent summer of 1901 some gun- 
 carriages have been recovered from her, after 
 lying for a century and a quarter beneath the 
 surface of the lake. 
 
 Pellew's personal activity and strength en- 
 abled his gallantry to show to particular ad- 
 vantage in this sanguinary contest. When the 
 Carleton, in her attempt to withdraw, hung in 
 stays under the island, her decks swept by the 
 bullets of the riflemen on shore, it was he who 
 sprang out on the bowsprit to bear the jib over 
 to windward. When the tow-rope was cut by 
 
Pellew 439 
 
 a shot, it was Pellew again who exposed his 
 person for the safety of the vessel. His two 
 seniors being forced by their wounds to leave 
 the schooner, he succeeded to the command, 
 in which he was afterwards confirmed. In this 
 sharp affair the Carleton lost eight killed and 
 six wounded, — about half her crew, — and had 
 two feet of water in her hold when she anchored 
 out of range. 
 
 Towards evening the Inflexible succeeded in 
 getting within point-blank range of the American 
 flotilla, " when five broadsides," wrote Douglas, 
 *' silenced their whole line ; " a sufficient testi- 
 mony to the superiority of her concentrated 
 battery over the dispersed force of all her nu- 
 merous petty antagonists. The British then an- 
 chored to the southward of Arnold's little force; 
 but that active and enterprising officer succeeded 
 in stealing during the night between the enemy 
 and the western shore, and retired towards Crown 
 Point. The chase to windward continued during 
 the next day, but a favorable shift of wind, to 
 the north, reached the British first, and enabled 
 them to close. Arnold again behaved with the ex- 
 traordinary bravery and admirable conduct which 
 distinguished him in battle. Sending on the bulk 
 of the squadron, he took the rear with two galleys, 
 covering the retreat. Fighting like a lion, he op- 
 posed the enemy's advance long enough to secure 
 the escape of six of his vessels ; and then, seeing 
 his one consort forced to strike, he ran his own 
 
440 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 galley ashore and set her on fire. " Arnold," says 
 the naval historian Cooper, " covered himself with 
 glory, and his example seems to have been nobly 
 followed by most of his officers and men. The 
 manner in which the Congress was fought until 
 she had covered the retreat of the galleys, and the 
 stubborn resolution with which she was defended 
 until destroyed, converted the disasters of this 
 part of the day into a species of triumph." " The 
 Americans," says a contemporary British writer, 
 " chiefly gloried in the dangerous attention paid 
 by Arnold to a nice point of honor, in keeping 
 his flag flying, and not quitting his galley till 
 she was in flames, lest the enemy should have 
 boarded and struck it." 
 
 Pellew received like recognition, not, perhaps, 
 from the popular voice, but from his of^cial su- 
 periors. Douglas, the senior naval officer at 
 Quebec, who was made a baronet in reward of 
 these operations. Lord Howe at New York, and 
 the First Lord of the Admiralty in England, all 
 sent him personal letters of commendation; and 
 the two latter promised him promotion as soon 
 as he came within their respective jurisdictions. 
 His continuance at the front of operations during 
 this and the following year therefore postponed 
 his deserved advancement to a lieutenancy, by 
 retaining him from the "jurisdiction" of those 
 able to bestow it. 
 
 The two gallant enemies were soon again 
 broucrht toirether in an incident which came near 
 
Pellew 441 
 
 to change the career of one of them, and, in so 
 doing, to modify seriously the fortunes of many 
 others. Arnold having one day pulled out on 
 the open lake, in his venturesome manner, Pel- 
 lew gave chase in another boat. The Americans 
 being hard pressed and capture probable, Arnold 
 unbuckled his stock and himself took an oar. 
 So nearly caught was he, that he had to escape 
 into the bushes, leaving behind him stock and 
 buckle ; and these, as late as sixty years after, 
 remained in the possession of Pellew's brother. 
 Had he thus been deprived of the opportunity 
 that Saratoga gave him the next year, Arnold's 
 name might now be known to us only as that 
 of the brave officer who kept his country's flag 
 flying till his vessel was in flames. 
 
 On the 14th of October Carleton landed at 
 Crown Point, which the Americans had aban- 
 doned; but the lateness of the season deterred 
 him from advancing against Ticonderoga, and 
 he soon afterwards returned to Canada. The 
 full import of this halt is too easily overlooked, 
 with consequent failure to appreciate the mo- 
 mentous influence exerted upon the course of the 
 Revolutionary War by this naval campaign, in 
 which Pellew bore so conspicuous a part. It 
 has never been understood in America, where the 
 smallness of the immediate scale has withdrawn 
 attention from the greatness of the ultimate issue, 
 in gaining time for the preparations which re- 
 sulted in the admittedly decisive victories about 
 
441 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 Saratoga. " If we could have begun our expe- 
 dition four weeks earlier," wrote a German gen- 
 eral there present, " I am satisfied everything 
 would have been ended this year [1776]; were 
 our whole army here, it would be an easy matter 
 to drive the enemy from their entrenchments 
 at Ticonderoga." The delay, not of four weeks 
 only, but of the whole summer, was obtained 
 by the naval force organized upon Champlain 
 by Arnold and his superior, General Schuyler. 
 The following year the invasion was resumed, 
 under General Burgoyne. Pellew accompanied 
 him with a body of seamen, taking part in all 
 the operations down to the final surrender. 
 Burgoyne, indeed, afterwards chaffed him with 
 being the cause of the disaster, by rebuilding 
 the bridge which enabled the army to cross from 
 the east bank of the Hudson to the west. 
 
 Returning to England in the early part of 1778, 
 Pellew was made lieutenant, and in 17S0 we find 
 him again serving under Captain Pownoll, as first 
 lieutenant of the Apollo frigate. On the 15th of 
 June, in the same year, the Apollo met the 
 French frigrate Slanislas. A severe action fol- 
 lowed, and at the end of an hour Pownoll was 
 shot through the body. As his young friend 
 raised him from the deck, he had barely time to 
 say, *' Pellew, I know you won't give his Majesty's 
 ship away," and immediately expired. The en- 
 gagement lasted an hour longer, when the enemy, 
 which had all the time been standing in for the 
 
Pel lew 443 
 
 Belgian coast, took the ground, the most of her 
 spars, already wounded, going overboard with the 
 shock. The Apollo had hauled off a few mo- 
 ments before, finding that she had less than five 
 feet of water under her keel. 
 
 Though unable again to attack the Stanislas, 
 which claimed the protection of the neutral flag, 
 the result was substantially a victory; but to 
 Pellew's grief for the death of a tried friend was 
 added the material loss of a powerful patron. 
 Happily, however, his reputation was known to 
 the head of the Admiralty, who not only pro- 
 moted him for this action, but also gave him a 
 ship, though a poor one. After a succession of 
 small commands, he w-as fortunate enough again 
 to distinguish himself, — driving ashore and de- 
 stroying several French privateers, under circum- 
 stances of such danger and difficulty as to win 
 him his next grade, post-captain. This step, 
 which, so far as selection went, fixed his position 
 in the navy, he received on the 25th of May, 1782. 
 
 The ten years of peace that shortly followed 
 were passed by many officers in retirement, which 
 we have seen w^as contentedly accepted by his 
 distinguished contemporary, Saumarez; but Pel- 
 lew was a seaman to the marrow, and constantly 
 sought employment afloat. When out of occupa- 
 tion, he for a while tried farming, the Utopian 
 employment that most often beguiles the imagi- 
 nation of the inbred seaman in occasional weariness 
 of salt water; but, as his biographer justly re- 
 
444 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 marks, his mind, which allowed him to be happy 
 only when active, could ill accommodate itself 
 to pursuits that almost forbade exertion. " To 
 have an object in view, yet to be unable to ad- 
 vance it by any exertions of his own, was to him 
 a source of constant irritation. He was wearied 
 with the imperceptible growth of his crops, and 
 complained that he made his eyes ache by watch- 
 ing their daily progress." 
 
 His assiduous applications, however, were not 
 wholly unavailing to obtain him the professional 
 employments usually so hard to get in times of 
 peace. For five of the ten years, 1 783-1 793, he 
 commanded frigates, chiefly on the Newfoundland 
 station ; and in them, though now turning thirty, 
 he displayed the superabundant vitality and rest- 
 less activity that had characterized his early youth. 
 " Whenever there was exertion required aloft," 
 wrote a midshipman who served with him at this 
 period, " to preserve a sail or a mast, the captain 
 was foremost in the work, apparently as a mere 
 matter of amusement, and there was not a man 
 in the ship that could equal him in personal activ- 
 ity. He appeared to play among the elements in 
 the hardest storms. I remember once, in close- 
 reefing the main topsail, the captain had given 
 his orders from the quarter-deck and sent us aloft. 
 On gaining the topsail yard, the most active and 
 daring of our party hesitated to go upon it, as the 
 sail was flapping violently, making it a service of 
 great danger; but a voice was heard from the ex- 
 
Pellew 445 
 
 treme end of the yard, calling upon us to exert 
 ourselves to save the sail, which would otherwise 
 beat to pieces. A man said, ' Why, that 's the 
 
 captain ! How the did he get there? ' He 
 
 had followed us up, and, clambering over the 
 backs of the sailors, had reached the topmast 
 head, above the yard, and thence descended by 
 the lift," — a feat unfortunately not easy to 
 be explained to landsmen, but which will be 
 allowed by seamen to demand great hardihood 
 and address. 
 
 All this was the simple overflow of an animal 
 energy not to be repressed, the exulting prowess of 
 a giant delighting to run his course. It found 
 expression also in joyous practical jests, like those 
 of a big boy, which at times had ludicrous conse- 
 quences. On one occasion of state ceremony, 
 the king's birthday, Pellew had dressed in full 
 uniform to attend a dinner on shore. The weather 
 was hot, and the crew had been permitted an 
 hour's swimming around the ship. While his 
 boat was being manned, the captain stood by the 
 frigate's rail watching the bathers, and near by 
 him was one of the ship's boys. " I too shall 
 have a good swim soon," called the latter to a 
 comrade in the water. " The sooner, the better," 
 said Pellew, coming behind him and tipping him 
 overboard. No sooner had the lad risen to the 
 surface from his plunge than it was plain that he 
 could not swim ; so in after him went the practi- 
 cal joker, with all his toggery. " If ever the cap- 
 
44^ Types of Naval Officers 
 
 tain was frightened," writes the officer just quoted, 
 " it was then." 
 
 But along with all this physical exuberance and 
 needless assumption of many of the duties of a 
 foremast hand, Pellew possessed to a very remark- 
 able extent that delicate art of seamanship which 
 consists in so handling a ship as to make her do 
 just what you want, and to put her just where she 
 should be; making her, to use a common sea 
 expression, do everything but talk. This is a 
 faculty probably inborn, like most others that 
 reach any great degree of perfection, and, while a 
 very desirable gift, it is by no means indispensable 
 to the highest order of naval excellence. Nelson 
 did not at all equal Pellew in this respect, as is 
 indicated by an amusing story transmitted by a 
 Colonel Stewart, who served on board the great 
 admiral's flag-ship during the expedition against 
 Copenhagen : " His lordship was rather too apt 
 to interfere in the working of the ship, and not 
 always with the best judgment or success. The 
 wind, when off Dungeness, was scanty, and the 
 ship was to be put about. Lord Nelson would 
 give the orders, and caused her to miss stays. 
 Upon this he said, rather peevishly, to the officer 
 of the watch, ' Well, now see what we have done. 
 Well, sir, what mean you to do now ? ' The 
 officer saying, with hesitation, ' I don't exactly 
 know, my lord. I fear she won't do,' Lord Nelson 
 turned sharply to the cabin, and replied, ' Well, I 
 am sure if you do not know what to do with her, 
 
Pellew 447 
 
 no more do I, either.' He went in, leaving the 
 officer to work the ship as he liked." Yet Nelson 
 understood perfectly what ships could do, and 
 what they could not ; no one could better handle 
 or take care of a fleet, or estimate the possibility 
 of performing a given manoeuvre ; and long be- 
 fore he was called to high command he was dis- 
 tinguished for a knowledge of naval tactics to 
 which few, if any other, of his time attained. He 
 was a great general officer ; and whether he had 
 the knack of himself making a ship go through 
 all her paces without a fault mattered as little as 
 whether he was a crack shot with a gun. 
 
 A ship is certainly the most beautiful and 
 most graceful of machines ; a machine, too, so 
 varied in its movements and so instinct with life 
 that the seaman affectionately transfers to her 
 credit his own virtues in handling her. Pellew's 
 capacity in this part of his profession was so 
 remarkable that it is somewhat singular to find 
 him, in his first frigate action, compelled to dis- 
 card manoeuvring, and to rely for victory upon 
 sheer pluck and luck. When war with the 
 French republic began in 1793, his high reputa- 
 tion immediately insured him command of a 
 frigate, the Nymphe. The strength of England 
 as a naval power lay largely in the great reserve 
 of able seamen manning her merchant ships ; but 
 as these were scattered in all quarters of the 
 world, great embarrassment was commonly felt at 
 the outbreak of a war, and especially when it 
 
448 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 came with the unexpected rapidity of the revolu- 
 tionary fury. As the object of first importance 
 was to get the fleets of ships-of-the-line to sea, 
 Pellew had to depend chiefly upon his own inde- 
 fatigable exertions to procure a crew for his ves- 
 sel. Seamen being hard to find, he had on board 
 a disproportionate number of landsmen when the 
 N'yjnp/ic, on the 19th of June, 1793, encountered 
 the French vessel Cleopatre, of force slightly in- 
 ferior, except in men, but not sufBciently so to 
 deny the victor the claim of an even fight. 
 
 A peculiar incident preceding the action has 
 interest, as showing the strong preoccupation of 
 men's minds at the opening of war, before meet- 
 ings with the enemy have lost novelty. Pellew's 
 younger brother, Israel, a commander in the 
 navy, being otherwise unemployed, had come out 
 with him for the cruise. The Cleopatre having 
 been first seen in the early morning, Edward 
 would not have him called till just as \.\\q Nymp/ie 
 w^as closing. As he came on deck, the brother 
 said affectionately, " Israel, you have no business 
 here. We are too many eggs from one nest. I 
 am sorry I brought you from your wife." But 
 the other was unheeding, his eyes fixed upon the 
 stranger. " That 's the very frigate," he cried, 
 " that I 've been dreaming of all night ! I 
 dreamt that we shot away her wheel." And, 
 hastening to the after-gun, he made the French 
 ship's wheel the object of an unremitting fire. 
 
 By the way the enemy was handled it was evi- 
 
Pellew 
 
 449 
 
 dent that she was well manned and ably com- 
 manded. She had, in fact, been in commission 
 for over a year. Great as was his own skill, Pellew 
 could not venture upon manoeuvres with a green 
 crew, untrained save at the guns, and only filled 
 the night before by pressing from a merchant 
 vessel. He therefore determined upon a simple 
 artillery duel. The Frenchman waited under 
 short canvas, while the Nymphe, with greater 
 way, drew slowly up on his starboard, or right- 
 hand side ; both ships running nearly before the 
 wind, but having it a little on the left side. Each 
 captain stood uncovered, and as the bows of the 
 Nymphe doubled upon the stern of the Cleopatre, 
 within three hundred feet, a French sailor was 
 seen to run aloft and fasten a red cap of liberty to 
 the mainmast head. The eyes of the British sea- 
 men were fastened upon their commander, await- 
 ing the gesture which he had set, instead of word 
 of mouth, for opening fire. At quarter-past six 
 he gave it, raising his cap to his head. A furious 
 cannonade at once began, and, the Nymphe short- 
 ening sail as soon as fairly abreast her antago- 
 nist, the two frigates continued on parallel lines, 
 maintaining their relative positions as though at 
 anchor, and rolling easily in the soft summer 
 sea under the recoil of their guns. So nearly 
 matched were the gunners that the conflict, un- 
 usually deadly though it was, might have lasted 
 long, but at a little before seven Israel Pellew's 
 
 dream was fulfilled. The Frenchman's wheel 
 
 29 
 
450 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 was shot away, and, the mizzenmast going over- 
 board at the same time, the Clcopatrc yielded to 
 the impulse of her forward sails, turned sharp 
 round to the right, and ran perpendicularly into 
 the Nymphc. The British boarded her, fixed in 
 this disadvantageous position, fought their way 
 aft, and, although the French crew was numeri- 
 cally superior, in ten minutes hauled down the 
 colors. In this brief hour they had lost twenty- 
 three killed'and twenty-seven wounded, the enemy 
 sixty-three killed and wounded, out of ships' com- 
 panies numbering respectively two hundred and 
 forty and three hundred and twenty. 
 
 This was the first decisive frigate action of the 
 War of the French Revolution, and in conse- 
 quence great was the enthusiasm aroused. Lord 
 Howe wrote to Pellew, " The manner in which 
 you have taken the enemy's ship will set an ex- 
 ample for the war." In truth, however, while 
 admitting the soundness of Pellew's judgment in 
 adopting the course he did, the actual demand 
 upon his personal skill was less, and in so far the 
 credit due therefore less, than in the second suc- 
 cessful frigate action, in the following October, in 
 which Sir James Saumarez commanded. Not 
 only was the French vessel's superiority in force 
 more marked in the latter instance, but Saumarez's 
 ship there met with an accident similar in char- 
 acter to that which befell the Clcopatrc, from the 
 consequences of which she was extricated by his 
 masterly seamanship. Still, it may with fairness 
 
Pellew 451 
 
 be argued that, as the one action from its attend- 
 ant circumstances evidenced the individual skill 
 of the commander, so the other testified to the 
 antecedent preparation and efficiency of the crew, 
 which are always to be attributed to the care of 
 the captain, especially under the conditions of 
 Pellew's enlistments. Both captains fully de- 
 served the reward of knighthood bestowed upon 
 their success. Israel Pellew was promoted to 
 post-captain. 
 
 During the first three years of this war British 
 commerce in the neighborhood of the Channel 
 suffered most severely from French cruisers. 
 The latter resumed the methods of Jean Bart 
 and other celebrated privateers of the days of 
 Louis XIV.; the essence of which was to prey 
 upon the enemy's commerce, not by single ves- 
 sels, but by small squadrons of from five to 
 seven. Cruisers so combined, acting in mutual 
 support, were far more efficient than the same 
 number acting separately. Spreading like a fan, 
 they commanded a wider expanse than a ship 
 alone ; if danger arose, they concentrated for 
 mutual support; did opportunity offer, the work 
 was cut out and distributed, thus insuring by 
 co-operation more thorough results. At the sug- 
 gestion of Sir Edward Pellew, the British Ad- 
 miralty determined to oppose to these organized 
 depredators a similar system. Groups of crack 
 frigates were constituted, and sent to cruise 
 within the limits of the Channel Fleet, but inde- 
 
452 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 pendent of its admiral. In these Pellew served 
 for the next five years, much of the time as squad- 
 ron commander; to him a period of incessant, 
 untiring activity, and illustrated by many brilliant 
 and exciting incidents, for which the limits of 
 this sketch afford no space. 
 
 There are, however, two episodes in which he 
 was so distinctly the central figure that they 
 demand at least a brief narration. In January, 
 1796, while his ship was repairing, a large East 
 Indiaman, the Dutton, carrying some six hundred 
 troops and passengers, was by a series of mishaps 
 driven ashore on the beach of Plymouth, then an 
 unprotected sound. As she struck, all her masts 
 went overboard, and she lay broadside to the 
 waves, pounding heavily as they broke over her. 
 Pellew was at this moment driving to a dinner 
 with his wife. Seeing crowds running from 
 various directions towards the same quarter, he 
 asked the reason. Upon learning it, he left his 
 carriage and hurried to the scene. When he 
 arrived, he recognized, by the confusion on board, 
 by the way the ship was laboring, by the poverty 
 of the means that had been contrived for landinc: 
 the imperilled souls, — only a single hawser hav- 
 ing been run to the shore, — that the loss of 
 nearly all on board was imminent. Night, too, 
 was falling, as well as the destruction of the ves- 
 sel impending. After vainly offering rewards to 
 the hardy boatmen standing by, if they would 
 board the wreck with a message from him, he 
 
Pellew 453 
 
 said, " Then I must go myself." Though then 
 close to forty years of age, his immense personal 
 strength and activity enabled him, though sorely 
 bruised thereby, to be hauled on board through 
 the breakers by the hawser, which alternately 
 slacked and then tightened with a jerk as the 
 doomed ship rolled to and fro in the seas. Once 
 on board, he assumed command, the want of 
 which, through the absence of the proper captain, 
 had until then hampered and well-nigh paralyzed 
 all effectual effort. When his well-known name 
 w^as spoken, three hearty cheers arose from the 
 troops on board, echoed by the thousands of spec- 
 tators on shore ; and the hope that revived with 
 the presence of a born leader of men showed it- 
 self at once in the renewed activity and intelli- 
 gent direction of effort, on the decks and on 
 the beach. The degree of the danger can be 
 estimated from the fact that boats from the ships 
 of war in port, his own included, tried in vain to 
 approach and had to run for safety to the inner 
 harbor. With sword drawn, — for many of the 
 soldiers were drunk and riotous, — Pellew main- 
 tained order, guided with a seaman's readiness 
 the preparations for landing, and saw the women, 
 the children, — one child but three weeks old, 
 — the sick, landed first, then the soldiers, lastly 
 the seamen. When he himself was transferred 
 to the beach by the same means that his skill 
 had contrived for others, but three persons re- 
 mained on board, officers of the ship, who eased 
 
454 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 him on shore. The injuries he had received in 
 his perilous passage out, and which confined him 
 to his bed for a week, forbade his being last. To 
 the end of his life, this saving of the crew of the 
 Dutton was the action in which he took most 
 pride. 
 
 The year that opened with this magnificent 
 act of self-devotion saw Pellew, at its close, bear- 
 ing a seaman's part in the most serious crisis that 
 befell his country during the wars of the French 
 Revolution. The end of 1796 and the earlier 
 months of 1797 marked the nadir of Great 
 Britain's military fortunes. The successes of 
 Bonaparte's Italian campaign were then culmi- 
 nating ; Austria was on the point of making 
 peace with France ; England was about to find 
 herself alone, and the discontent of the seamen 
 of the navy, long smouldering, was soon to break 
 out into the famous and threatening mutinies of 
 the Channel Fleet and of the Nore. At the same 
 time France, relieved on her eastern frontiers, felt 
 able to devote seventeen ships-of-the-line and 
 eighteen thousand troops to the invasion of 
 Ireland. 
 
 Pellew, with two frigates besides his own, was 
 stationed off the mouth of Brest harbor to watch 
 the enemy's movements; the main British fieet 
 being some fifty miles to seaward. To this 
 emergency he brought not only the intrepidity 
 of a ofreat seaman and the ardor of an anxious 
 patriot, but likewise the intense though narrow 
 
Pellew 455 
 
 Protestant feeling transmitted from a past, then 
 not so remote, when Romanism and enmity to 
 England were almost synonymous. " How would 
 you like," said he to an officer who shared Pitt's 
 liberal tendencies, " to see Roman Catholic chap- 
 lains on board our ships ? " and to the end of his 
 life he opposed the political enfranchisement of 
 persons of that creed. 
 
 The French expedition against Ireland sailed 
 from Brest on the i6th of December, 1796. Hav- 
 ing sent off successively each of his consorts with 
 information for the fleet, Pellew remained with 
 his own ship alone, the Indefatigable^ at the 
 moment of the final start. There are two prin- 
 cipal channels by which Brest can be left, one 
 leading to the south, the other due west. The 
 French admiral had at first intended to use the 
 former ; but, the wind showing signs of an un- 
 favorable shift, he endeavored to change the 
 orders just as night was falling. The weather 
 being hazy, his signals were understood by but 
 few of the forty-odd vessels composing the force. 
 Eight or ten joined him; the remainder followed 
 the original instructions and went out by the 
 south. Pellew attached himself to the admiral's 
 division, kept along with it just out of gunshot, 
 and by making false signals, burning blue lights 
 and sending up rockets, introduced into the at- 
 tempts to convey the wishes of the commander- 
 in-chief such confusion as rendered them utterly 
 futile. Having satisfied himself as to the general 
 
456 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 direction taken by the enemy, he left them, and 
 made all sail for Falmouth, where he arrived on 
 the 20th. 
 
 The general fortunes of the expedition do not 
 belong to the present story, Suflfice it to say 
 that the greater part reached Ireland safely, but 
 through stress of weather was unable to land the 
 troops, and went back to France by detachments, 
 in January, 1797. It is during this process of 
 return that Sir Edward Pellew again appears, in 
 perhaps the most dramatic incident of his stir- 
 ring career. 
 
 On the afternoon of January 13th, being then in 
 company with the frigate Amazon, and about one 
 hundred and twenty miles west of Brest, a French 
 ship-of-the-line was discovered. The stranger, 
 named the Droits de V Homme, was returning 
 from Ireland, and heading east. The frigates 
 steered courses converging towards hers, seeking 
 to cut her off from the land. The weather was 
 thick and gloomy, with a strong west wind fast 
 rising to a gale. At half-past four, as night was 
 falling, the French ship carried away her fore 
 and main topmasts in a heavy squall ; and an 
 hour later the hidefatigable, now under close 
 reefs, passed across her stern, pouring in a broad- 
 side from so near that the French flag floated 
 across her poop, where it was seized and torn 
 away by some of the British seamen. The 
 enemy, having on board nearly a thousand 
 soldiers besides her crew, replied with rapid 
 
Pellew 
 
 457 
 
 volleys of musketry, and, as the frigate passed 
 ahead, sheered impetuously towards her, attempt- 
 ing to board, and in her turn grazing the 
 stern of the Indefatigable. In another hour the 
 Amazon drew up, and then the British vessels 
 took their positions, one on either bow of the 
 Droits de V Homme ^ whence, by movements of 
 the helm, they alternately raked her. The labor 
 of the gunners, however, was arduous, due to the 
 deep rolling of the ships, on board which, also, 
 the seas poured in volumes through the gun- 
 ports. On the main decks the men fought up to 
 their middles in water, the heavy cannon broke 
 away from the breechings, or ropes used to con- 
 trol them, and even iron bolts tore out from the 
 ships' sides under the severe recoil of the guns. 
 Thus through the long winter night the three 
 ships rushed headlong before the gale towards 
 the French coast, intent on mutual destruction ; 
 the constant storm of shot, though flying wild 
 under the violent motions of the vessels, tearing 
 through spars and rigging, and crippling them in 
 much that was essential to their safety. 
 
 At four o'clock in the morning of the 14th, 
 long before daybreak, land was sighted right 
 ahead. The Indefatigable hauled at once to 
 the southward, the Amazon to the northward ; 
 the enemy alone, seemingly unconscious of the 
 danger, kept on, and as she passed Pellew's ship 
 fired a broadside which severely wounded all 
 the masts. The situation of the combatants was 
 
458 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 wtll-nigh desperate. They had reached the coast 
 of France at a point where it forms a deep recess, 
 called Audierne Bay, from either side of which 
 project capes that must be cleared in order to 
 gain once more the open sea. One only of the 
 three escaped. The Droits de V Homme, un- 
 manageable for want of sail power, tried to 
 anchor, but drove, and struck on a shoal some 
 distance from the beach. Of sixteen hundred 
 souls on board when the battle began, over one 
 hundred had been killed ; and of those who sur- 
 vived the fight three hundred perished in the 
 wreck. The Amazon, likewise crippled, though 
 not so badly, had gone ashore to the northward 
 only ten minutes after she ceased firing. Of her 
 people, but six were drowned. The htdefatigable, 
 beating back and forth against the gale before the 
 scene of the French disaster, upon which her crew 
 gazed with the solemn feeling that such might 
 soon be their own fate, succeeded at last in clear- 
 ing the southern cape. At eleven o'clock, nearly 
 twenty-four hours after first meeting the foe, and 
 with six feet of water in her hold, she passed 
 only three-quarters of a mile outside of the Pen- 
 marcks, a rocky promontory thirty miles south 
 of Brest. 
 
 This remarkable encounter is said to have sug- 
 gested to Marryat the vivid sea picture with 
 which " The King's Own " ends. Pellew's un- 
 usual personal endurance was signally illustrated 
 on the same day, very shortly after the safety of 
 
Pel lew 459 
 
 the ship from wreck was assured. Her principal 
 sails had been so torn by shot as to require 
 immediate renewing, and this had scarcely been 
 done when two vessels were sighted, one of which 
 was for the moment supposed to be the Amazon, 
 whose fate was yet unknown. Pellew gave orders 
 to chase, but his oflBcers represented to him that, 
 whatever he himself was capable of, the ship's 
 company was too exhausted for present further 
 exertion ; and that, besides, the ammunition was 
 very short, almost the last filled cartridge having 
 been expended. Under these circumstances he 
 was compelled to desist. 
 
 The interest of Pellew's career centres mainly 
 in his command of frigates. This independent 
 but yet restricted sphere afforded the fullest 
 scope for a conspicuous display of those splendid 
 qualities — fearlessness, enterprise, sound judg- 
 ment, instant decision, and superb seamanship 
 — which he so eminently possessed. He was, 
 above all, the frigate captain. " Nothing like 
 hesitation was ever seen in him. His first order 
 was always his last ; and he often declared of 
 himself that he never had a second thought 
 worth sixpence." In 1799, by a new Admiralty 
 rule, he was transferred to the Impetueux, a ship- 
 of-the-line, and thenceforth served in that class 
 of vessel until his promotion to admiral. 
 
 As a general officer, Pellew had no opportun- 
 ity to show whether he possessed ability of the 
 highest order. For five years he held the com- 
 
460 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 mand in India ; and soon after Collingwood's 
 death he was, in 181 1, appointed commander-in- 
 chief in the Mediterranean. On both stations 
 he evinced that faculty for careful organization, 
 systematic preparation, and sagacious distribution 
 of force which carries success up to the point 
 which administrative capacity can reach. His 
 ability in planning, while yet a subordinate in 
 command of squadrons, had been recognized by 
 St. Vincent durino: his manaccement of the Brest 
 blockade. " The disposition made by Sir Edward 
 Pellew for the descent on a certain point is the 
 most masterly I have ever seen. . . . Although 
 the naval command in Ouiberon may appear too 
 important for a captain, I shall not divest him of 
 it, unless I am ordered to do so; feeling a 
 thorough conviction that no man in His Maj- 
 esty's Navy, be his rank ever so high, will fill it 
 so well." At the time this was written, June, 
 1800, he had seven ships-of-the-line under his 
 orders. After the Peace of Amiens, when war 
 again began in 1803, he commanded a similar 
 division watching the Spanish port of Ferrol, in 
 which, although formally neutral, a French divi- 
 sion lay at anchor ; and in discharge of this duty, 
 both as a seaman and an administrator, he again 
 justified the eulogium of the old Earl, now at the 
 head of the navy as First Lord. 
 
 In 1804 he was promoted Rear- Admiral, and 
 soon afterwards assigned to the East India 
 Station, which he held from 1805 ^^ 1809. Here 
 
Pellew 461 
 
 no naval actions on the great scale were to be 
 fought, but under his systematic organization 
 of convoys and cruisers for the protection of 
 commerce the insurance premium — the war risk 
 — on the most exposed routes fell markedly, — for 
 the port of Bombay fifty per cent less than at 
 any former period of hostilities ; while the losses 
 by capture, when the merchants observed his 
 instructions, amounted to but one per cent on 
 the property insured, which was less than those 
 caused by the dangers of the sea, and consider- 
 ably less, also, than the average war losses in 
 other parts of the world. All this shows great 
 ability, carefully utilized in diligent preparation 
 and eflficient precaution ; and the same character- 
 istics are to be observed in his administration of 
 the Mediterranean command, of wider scope and 
 more purely military importance. Nevertheless, 
 it gives no sure proof of the particular genius 
 of a great captain. Whether, having forged his 
 weapon, Pellew could also wield it; whether, 
 having carefully sowed, he could also reap the 
 harvest by large combinations on the battle-field, 
 must remain uncertain, at least until probable 
 demonstration of his conceptions is drawn from 
 his papers. Nothing is as yet adduced to warrant 
 positive inference. 
 
 Pellew's Mediterranean command coincided in 
 time with the period of Napoleon's falling for- 
 tunes. After Trafalgar, the Emperor decided to 
 increase his navy largely, but to keep it in port 
 
462 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 instead of at sea, forcing Great Britain also to 
 maintain huge fleets, the expense of which, con- 
 curring with the commercial embarrassments that 
 he sought to bring upon her, might exhaust her 
 power to continue the war. In consequence of 
 this policy, British military achievement on the 
 grand scale was confined to the army in the 
 Spanish peninsula; and in the bestowal of re- 
 wards, after Napoleon's first abdication, but one 
 peerage was given to the navy. The great claims 
 of Sir James Saumarez, who was the senior of 
 the two, were disregarded on the ground that his 
 flag was not flying at the moment, and Pellew 
 was created Baron Exmouth. 
 
 During the process of settlement which suc- 
 ceeded the final fall of Napoleon at Waterloo, Lord 
 Exmouth remained in the Mediterranean. In the 
 early part of 18 16 he was ordered to visit with his 
 fleet the Barbary ports, and to compel the uncon- 
 ditional release of all slaves who were natives of 
 the Ionian Islands ; they having become subjects 
 of Great Britain by the terms of the peace. For 
 many years, while the powers of Europe were 
 engrossed in the tremendous strife of the French 
 Revolution, these piratical states, under pretence 
 of regular hostilities, had preyed upon the coasts 
 as well as upon the commerce of the weak 
 Mediterranean countries, and captives taken by 
 them were kept in bitter slavery. Nelson in his 
 correspondence, in 1796, mentions a curious inci- 
 dent which suflficiently characterizes the general 
 
Pellew 463 
 
 motives and policy of these barbarian Courts. 
 He asked an Algerine official visiting his ship, 
 why the Dey would not make peace with 
 Genoa and Naples, for they would pay well 
 for immunity, as the United States also at that 
 time did. The reply was, " If we make peace 
 with every one, what is the Dey to do with his 
 ships ? " In his later experience with the Medi- 
 terranean the great admiral realized yet more 
 forcibly the crying shame of Great Britain's 
 acquiescence. " My blood boils that I cannot 
 chastise these pirates. They could not show 
 themselves in this sea did not our country per- 
 mit. Never let us talk of the cruelty of the 
 African slave trade, while we permit such a 
 horrid war." The United States alone, although 
 then among the least of naval powers, had taken 
 arms before 1805 to repress outrages that were 
 the common reproach of all civilized nations, — a 
 measure the success of which went far to establish 
 the character of her navy and prepare it for 181 2. 
 Lord Exmouth was also directed to demand peace 
 for Sardinia, as well as for any other state that 
 should authorize him to act for it. Only Naples 
 availed itself of this opportunity. 
 
 As far as his instructions went, his mission 
 was successful, and, by a happy accident, he was 
 able at Tunis and Tripoli to extort further from 
 the rulers a promise that thereafter captives 
 should be treated as in civilized countries ; in 
 other words, that they should no longer be re- 
 
464 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 duced to slavery. Algiers refused this conces- 
 sion ; and the admiral could not take steps to 
 enforce it, because beyond his commission. The 
 Dey, however, undertook to consult the Porte; 
 and the fleet, with a few exceptions, returned to 
 England, where it arrived towards the end of 
 June. 
 
 Meanwhile British public feeling had become 
 aroused ; for men were saying that the outrages 
 of the past had been rather welcome to the com- 
 mercial selfishness of the country. The well- 
 protected traders of Great Britain, shielded by 
 her omnipotent navy, had profited by crimes 
 which drove their weaker rivals from the sea. 
 Just then news came that at the port of Bona, 
 on the Algiers coast, where there was under the 
 British flag an establishment for carrying on 
 the coral fishery, a large number of the fisher- 
 men, mostly Italians, had been wantonly slaugh- 
 tered by a band of Turkish troops. To insist, 
 arms in hand, upon reparation for such an out- 
 rage, and upon guarantees for the future, would 
 doubtless be condemned by some of our recent 
 lights ; but such was not then the temper of 
 Great Britain. The government determined at 
 once to send a fleet to the spot, and Lord Ex- 
 mouth was chosen for the command, with such a 
 force as he himself should designate. The gist 
 of his instructions was to demand the release, 
 without ransom, of all Christian slaves, and a 
 solemn declaration from the Dey that, in future 
 
Pellew 465 
 
 wars, prisoners should receive the usage accorded 
 them by European states. Great Britain thus 
 made herself, as befitted the obligation imposed 
 by her supreme maritime power, the avenger of 
 all those oppressed by these scourges of the sea. 
 The times of the barbarians were fulfilled. 
 
 During a long career of successful piracy, the 
 port of Algiers had accumulated an extensive 
 and powerful system of defences. These had 
 doubtless suffered in condition from the nonchalant 
 fatalism of Turkish rule, encouraged by a long 
 period of impunity ; but they constituted still, 
 and under all the shortcomings of the defenders, 
 a most imposing menace to an attacking fleet. 
 To convey a precise impression of them by 
 detailed verbal description would be difficult, and 
 the attempt probably confusing. It may be said, 
 in brief, that the town faces easterly, rising 
 abruptly up a steep hill ; that from its front there 
 then projected a pier, nearly a thousand feet long, 
 at whose end was a circular fort, carrying seventy 
 guns in three tiers ; from that point a mole ex- 
 tended at right angles to the southward, — par- 
 allel, that is, in a general sense, to the town 
 front, but curving inward through the southern 
 half of its length, so as better to embrace and 
 shelter the vessels inside. This mole was some- 
 what over a thousand feet in length, and had 
 throughout two tiers of guns, linked at their 
 northern extremity to the circular fort at the pier 
 end. These principal works were flanked and 
 
 30 
 
466 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 covered, at either end and on the hillside, by 
 others which it is unnecessary to particularize. 
 The total number of guns bearing seaward num- 
 bered near three hundred, of very respectable size 
 for that day. The basin formed by the pier and 
 the mole constituted the port proper, and in 
 it, at the time of the attack, was collected the 
 entire Algerine navy, nine frigates and corvettes 
 and thirty-seven gunboats, the paltry force that 
 had so long terrorized the Mediterranean. 
 
 In prevision of his present enterprise, Lord 
 Exmouth before leaving the Mediterranean had 
 despatched a light cruiser to Algiers, on a casual 
 visit similar to those continually made by ships 
 of war to foreign ports. Her commander. Cap- 
 tain Charles W^arde, received from him very 
 precise and most secret instructions to examine 
 closely into the defences and soundings ; to do 
 which it was necessary not only to observe every 
 precaution of seeming indifference, — even to 
 the extent of appearing engrossed with social 
 duties, — but also to conduct under this cover 
 measurements and observations of at least ap- 
 proximate correctness. This duty was performed 
 with singular diligence and success, with the 
 double result of revealing the hopeless inaccuracy 
 of existing charts and of placing in Exmouth 's 
 hands a working plan of the ground, perfectly 
 trustworthy for his tactical dispositions. 
 
 As before remarked, in the sketch of Lord 
 St. Vincent, the defence and attack of seaporrs. 
 
Pellew 467 
 
 involving as they do both occupation of perma- 
 nent positions and the action of mobile bodies, 
 are tactical questions. They differ much, though 
 not radically, from operations in the open sea, 
 or in the field, where positions may be taken 
 incidentally, but where the movements of mo- 
 bile bodies are the principal factor. In this 
 way, though without using the word tactical, 
 Exmouth treated the problem before him. Fur- 
 nished, thanks to his own foresight and Warde's 
 efHciency, with reliable information concerning 
 the preparations of the enemy, he calculated the 
 dispositions necessary to meet them and to crush 
 their fire. Having assigned to the hostile works, 
 severally and collectively, the force needed to 
 overbear them, and having arranged the anchor- 
 ing positions for the vessels of his command 
 with reference to the especial task of each, as 
 well as for mutual support, he had substantially 
 his plan of battle, afterwards communicated to 
 the fleet before going into action ; and the same 
 data afforded the foundation for his statement to 
 the Government of the number and character 
 of ships needed for success. 
 
 To the surprise of the Admiralty, Lord Ex- 
 mouth asked for but five ships-of-the-line, five 
 frigates, and five smaller vessels, to which were 
 added four mortar boats to play upon the town 
 and arsenal. When met with expressions of 
 doubt, he replied, *' I am satisfied, and take the 
 responsibility entirely upon myself." To satisfy 
 
468 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 the hesitancy of the Government, he left with 
 the Secretary to the Admiralty a written state- 
 ment that his every requirement had been ful- 
 filled, and that to him alone, therefore, would 
 failure from deficient power be attributable. On 
 the eve of departure he said to his brother Israel, 
 " If they open fire when the ships are coming 
 up, and cripple them in their masts, the diffi- 
 culty and loss will be greater; but if they allow 
 us to take our stations, I am sure of them, for 
 I know that nothing can resist a line-of-battle 
 ship's fire." He trusted to the extreme care of 
 his preparations, which neglected no particular 
 of equipment or organization, elaborating every 
 detail of training and discipline, and providing, 
 by the most diligent foresight and minute in- 
 struction, that each officer concerned should know 
 exactly what was expected of him. In short, 
 it was to perfection of quality, and not to an 
 unwieldy bulk of superfluous quantity, that Ex- 
 mouth confided his fortunes in this last hazard. 
 
 The fleet sailed from England on the 28th 
 of July, 18 1 6, was joined at Gibraltar by a Dutch 
 squadron of five frigates, whose commander asked 
 to share the coming contest, and on the 26th of 
 August was off the north point of Algiers Bay, 
 some twenty miles from the town. At daybreak 
 the next morning, the weather being almost calm, 
 a fiag of truce was sent in, bearing the British 
 demands. During its absence a breeze from the 
 sea sprang up, and the fleet stood in to a mile 
 
Pellew 469 
 
 from the works, where it stopped to await the 
 reply. At two p. m. the boat was seen returning, 
 with the signal that no answer had been given. 
 The flag-ship queried, " Are you ready ? " Each 
 ship at once replied, " Yes ; " and all filling away 
 together stood down to the attack, the admiral 
 leading. 
 
 The Algerine batteries were fully manned; 
 the mole, moreover, was crowded with troops. 
 With singular temerity, they fired no gun as the 
 ships came on, thus relieving the most anxious 
 of Exmouth's preoccupations concerning the dif- 
 ficulties before him ; fearing, seemingly, that, if 
 otherwise received, the prey might turn and es- 
 cape. The British, on their side, observed the 
 utmost silence ; not a gun, not a cheer, marred 
 the solemn impression of the approach. The 
 flag-ship, Queen Charlotte} piloted by an officer 
 who had served continuously with Exmouth since 
 1793, anchored by the stern across the mole head, 
 at a distance of fifty yards, her starboard batter- 
 ies pointing to sweep it from end to end. Still 
 no souna of battle, as she proceeded to lash her 
 bows to those of an Algerine brig lying just 
 within the mole. This done, her crew gave three 
 cheers, as well they might. Then the stolid, 
 unaccountable apathy of the barbarians ceased, 
 and three guns in quick succession were fired 
 
 * This Queen Charlotte was the successor of the ship which carried 
 Howe's flag on the First of June, and which had been destroyed by 
 fire off Leghorn in 1800. 
 
470 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 from the eastern battery. Stirred by a movement 
 of compassion, Lord Exmouth, from the flag- 
 ship's poop, seeing the Moorish soldiery clus- 
 tered thick upon the parapets to watch the ships, 
 waved to them with his hand to get down. At 
 the first hostile gun he gave the order " Stand 
 by ! " at the second, " Fire ! " and simultaneously 
 with the third the Queen Charlottes broadside 
 rang out, and the battle began. 
 
 The other vessels of the squadron were not all 
 as successful as the flag-ship in taking the exact 
 position assigned, and the admiral's plan thereby 
 suffered some of that derangement to which every 
 undertaking, especially military and naval, is lia- 
 ble. This, however, produced no effect upon 
 the general result, except by increasing somewhat 
 the lists of killed and wounded, through loss of 
 advantageous offensive position, with consequent 
 defect in mutual support. But the first broadside 
 is proverbially half the battle. It was a saying 
 of Collingwood to his crew, in a three-decker like 
 the Queen Charlotte^ that if they could deliver 
 three effective fires in the first five minutes no 
 vessel could resist them ; and this was yet more 
 certain when opposed to the semi-discipline of 
 adversaries such as the Algerine pirates. Ex- 
 mouth's general design was t'o concentrate his 
 heavy ships at the southern end of the mole, 
 whence the curve in the line of batteries would 
 enable them to enfilade or take in reverse the 
 works at the northern extremity. Here were to 
 
Pel lew 471 
 
 be the two three-deckers, with a seventy-four be- 
 tween them, all three in close order, stem to stern. 
 The two-decker, however, anchored some seven 
 hundred feet astern of the Queen Charlotte, the 
 intervening space being left empty until filled 
 by a thirty-six-gun frigate, upon whose captain 
 St. Vincent passed the eulogium, " He seems to 
 have felt Lord Nelson's eye upon him." The 
 two remaining seventy-fours placed themselves 
 successively close astern of the first, which was in 
 accord with the original purpose, while the other 
 three-decker took the right flank of the line, and 
 somewhat too far out ; in which exposed and un- 
 intended position, beyond the extreme north 
 point contemplated for the British order, she 
 underwent a very heavy loss. 
 
 In general summary, therefore, it may be said 
 that the broadsides of the ships-of-the-line were 
 opposed from end to end to the heavy central 
 batteries on the mole, while the lighter vessels en- 
 gaged the flanking works on the shore to the south- 
 ward, thus diverting the fire which would have 
 harassed the chief assailants, — a service in which 
 the Dutch squadron, composed entirely of frig- 
 ates, rendered important assistance. The bomb 
 vessels from the rear threw their shells over the 
 fighting ships into the town and arsenal, and in 
 the admiral's report are credited with firing all the 
 shipping in the harbor, except one frigate, creat- 
 ing a conflagration which spread over the arsenal 
 and storehouses. Soon after the contest opened, 
 
47 '2 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 the thirty-seven Algerine gunboats, crowded with 
 troops, were seen advancing under cover of the 
 smoke to board the flag-ship. The attempt, rash 
 to insanity, met the fate it should have expected ; 
 thirty-three were sent to the bottom by the guns of 
 the Leander, stationed ahead of the Queen Char- 
 lotte, and commanding the entrance to the port. 
 An hour later, Lord Exmouth determined to set 
 fire to the remaining frigate. The service was 
 performed by an officer and boat's crew, with a 
 steadiness which elicited from him such admira- 
 tion that, on the return of the party, he stopped 
 the working of the ship's upper battery to give 
 them three cheers. As the hostile vessel burned, 
 she drifted so near the Quec7i Charlotte as nearly 
 to involve her in the same fate. 
 
 From three to ten p. m. the battle lasted, steady 
 disciplined valor contending with a courage in no 
 way inferior, absolutely insensible to danger, but 
 devoid of that coherent, skilful direction which is 
 to courage what the brain and eye are to the 
 heart. *' I never," wrote Exmouth to his brother, 
 " saw any set of men more obstinate at their guns, 
 and it was superior fire only that could keep them 
 back. To be sure, nothing could stand before 
 the Queen Charlottes broadside. Everything 
 fell before it, and the Swedish consul assures me 
 we killed above five hundred at the very first fire, 
 from the crowded way in which the troops were 
 drawn up, four deep above the gunboats, which 
 were also full of men. It was a glorious sight," 
 
Pellew 473 
 
 he continues, " to see the Charlotte take her an- 
 chorage, and to see her flag towering on high, 
 when she appeared to be in the flames of the 
 mole itself; and never was a ship nearer burnt ; it 
 almost scorched me off the poop. We were 
 obliged to haul in the ensign, or it would have 
 caught fire." He was himself struck thrice, 
 though not seriously injured. A cannon-ball 
 carried away the skirts of his coat, and one glass 
 of the spectacles in his pocket was broken, and 
 the frame bulged, by a shot. 
 
 At ten p. M., the ammunition of the fleet run- 
 ning short, and its work being substantially ac- 
 complished, the ships began to haul off. The sea 
 defences and a great part of the town were in 
 ruins. " To be again effective," wrote Exmouth, 
 " the defences must be rebuilt from the founda- 
 tion." The flanking batteries and the hill forts 
 continued to annoy the vessels as they retired, 
 but the spirit of the Dey was broken. Towards 
 eleven a light air from the land sprang up, which 
 freshened into a violent and prolonged thunder- 
 storm, lasting for three hours ; and the flashes of 
 heaven's artillery combined with the glare of the 
 burning town to illuminate the withdrawal of the 
 ships. 
 
 The following morning the Dey signified his 
 submission, and on the 30th of August Lord 
 Exmouth made known to the fleet that all the 
 terms of Great Britain had been yielded ; that 
 Christian slavery was forever abolished, and that 
 
4~4 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 by noon of the following day all slaves then in 
 Algiers would be delivered to his flag. This was 
 accordingly done, the whole number amounting 
 to 1642; which, with those previously released 
 at Tunis and Tripoli, raised to 3003 the human 
 beings whom Exmouth had been the instru- 
 ment of freeing from a fate worse than death. 
 Of this total, but eighteen were English ; the 
 remainder were almost wholly from the Mediter- 
 ranean countries. On the 3d of September, just 
 one week after the attack, the fleet sailed for 
 England. 
 
 Profuse acknowledgment necessarily awaited 
 the hero of a deed in which national exulta- 
 tion so happily blended with the sentiment of 
 pity for the oppressed. The admiral was raised 
 to the next rank in the peerage, and honors 
 poured in upon him from every side, — from 
 abroad as well as from his own countrymen. His 
 personal sense of the privilege permitted him, 
 thus to crown a life of strenuous exertion by a 
 martial deed of far-reaching beneficence, was a 
 reward passing all others. In the opening words 
 of his official report he voices his thankfulness: 
 " In all the vicissitudes of a long life of public 
 service, no circumstance has ever produced on 
 my mind such impressions of gratitude and joy 
 as the event of yesterday. To have been one of 
 the humble instruments in the hands of Divine 
 Providence for bringing to reason a ferocious 
 Government, and destroying for ever the horrid 
 
Pellew 
 
 475 
 
 system of Christian slavery, can never cease to 
 be a source of delight and heartfelt comfort to 
 every individual happy enough to be employed 
 in it." 
 
 Here Lord Exmouth's career closes. Just 
 forty years had elapsed since as a youth he had 
 fought the Carleton on Lake Champlain, and he 
 was yet to live sixteen in honored retreat ; bear- 
 ing, however, the burden of those whose occupa- 
 tion is withdrawn at an age too advanced to form 
 new interests. Though in vigorous health and 
 with ample fortune, " he would sometimes con- 
 fess," says his biographer, " that he was happier 
 amid his early difficulties." The idea of retire- 
 ment, indeed, does not readily associate itself 
 with the impression of prodigious vitality, which 
 from first to last is produced by the record of 
 his varied activities. In this respect, as in others, 
 the contrast is marked between him and Sau- 
 marez, the two who more particularly illustrate 
 the complementary sides of the brilliant group of 
 naval leaders, in the second rank of distinction, 
 which clustered around the great names of Nelson, 
 Howe, and Jervis. In the old age of Saumarez, 
 the even, ordered tenor of his active military life 
 is reflected in the peaceful, satisfied enjoyment of 
 repose and home happiness, of the fruits of labors 
 past, which Collingwood, probably without good 
 reason, fancied to be characteristic of his own 
 temperament. Lord Exmouth, compelled to be 
 a passive spectator, saw with consequent increased 
 
476 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 apprehension the internal political troubles of 
 Great Britain in his later days. Though not a 
 party man, he was strongly conservative, so that 
 the agitations of the Reform era concealed from 
 him the advantages towards which it was tending, 
 and filled him with forebodings for the future of 
 his country. 
 
 Like his distinguished contemporary. Admiral 
 Saumarez, and like many others of those lion- 
 hearted, masculine men who had passed their lives 
 amid the storms of the elements and of battle, 
 — and like our own Farragut, — Lord Exmouth 
 was a deeply religious man. Strong as was his 
 self-reliance in war and tempest, he rested upon 
 the Almighty with the dependence of a child 
 upon its father. His noble brother. Sir Israel 
 Pellew, who had followed Nelson into the fire at 
 Trafalgar, departed with the words, " I know in 
 Whom I have believed ; " and of the admiral 
 himself, an ofHcer who was often with him during 
 the closing scene said, " I have seen him great in 
 battle, but never so great as on his deathbed." 
 
 Lord Exmouth died on January 23, 1833. He 
 was at the time Vice-Admiral of England, that 
 distinguished honorary rank having been con- 
 ferred upon him but a few months before his 
 death. 
 
 Of the last four admirals whose careers have 
 been here sketched, Howe alone inherited for- 
 
Pellew 477 
 
 tune and high social rank ; but he also fought his 
 way far beyond the modest position bequeathed 
 to him by his brother. Eminent all, though in 
 varying manner and degree, each illustrated a 
 distinct type in the same noble profession. All 
 were admirable officers, but they differed greatly 
 in original endowments and consequent develop- 
 ment. It was intuitive with St. Vincent to take 
 wide and far-sighted views, and to embody them 
 in sustained, relentless action. Endued by nature 
 with invincible energy and determination, he 
 moved spontaneously and easily along his difficult 
 path. He approached, although he did not attain 
 genius. In Howe is seen rather the result of 
 conscientious painstaking acting upon excellent 
 abilities, but struggling always against a native 
 heaviness and a temper constitutionally both 
 indolent and indulgent; a temper to which 
 indeed he does not yield, over which he triumphs, 
 but which nevertheless imposes itself upon his 
 general course with all the force inseparable from 
 hereditary disposition. A man of talent, he 
 educates himself to acquirements which in his 
 rival have the character of perception ; and only 
 under the spur of emergency does he rise to the 
 height of greatness. Both were great general 
 officers, a claim which can scarcely be advanced 
 for Saumarez and Exmouth, able, brilliant, and 
 devoted as they were. Saumarez was the stead- 
 fast, skilful, accomplished master of his profes- 
 sion, but one whose aptitudes and tastes placed 
 
478 Types of Naval Officers 
 
 him in the great organization of the fleet, as a 
 principal subordinate rather than as head. Ex- 
 mouth was the typical, innate seaman, intensely 
 active, whose instincts are those of the partisan 
 warrior, and who shines most in the freedom of 
 detached service. All bore a conspicuous part 
 in the greatest war of modern times, with honor 
 such that their names will be remembered as 
 long as naval history endures. 
 
Index 
 
Ind 
 
 ex 
 
 Aboukir Bay, 405. 
 
 Age, standard of, a factor in effi- 
 ciency, 70. 
 
 Albany, sloop, 327, 328. 
 
 Alexandria, 403 ; 404 ; battle off, 
 405-408; 410. 
 
 Algeciras, allied fleet anchored at, 
 2S9; French ships anchor off, 
 415; Saumarez starts for, 415; 
 Saumarez finds French ships 
 moored at, 415; Hannibal re- 
 anchors at, 419; crowded with 
 eager sight-seers, 419; renewed 
 battle off, 420. 
 
 Algiers, battle of, 428 ; policy of, 
 462, 463 ; Nelson denounces, 463 ; 
 refuses demand of Lord Ex- 
 mouth in regard to treatment of 
 captives, 464 ; Italian coral fish- 
 ermen slaughtered on coast of, 
 464 ; Lord Exmouth demands re- 
 lease of Christian slaves in, 464 ; 
 its system of defences, 465 ; navy 
 of, in port, 466; Capt. Warde 
 examines defences in port of, 
 466 ; Lord Exmouth sails against, 
 468 ; battle at bay of, 470-473. 
 
 Algiers, Dey of, 463 ; consults the 
 Porte, 464 ; makes submission to 
 Exmouth, 473 ; delivers up Chris- 
 tian slaves, 473, 474. 
 
 Alligator, ship, 266. 
 
 Altavela, 244. 
 
 Amazon, ship, 456; fight of, with 
 Droits de r Homme, 456, 457 ; 
 wreck of, 458, 459. 
 
 Amiens, Peace of, 460. 
 
 Anglo-Dutch war, marks period 
 
 of transition in naval warfare, 
 12. 
 
 Anglo-Saxon predominance, begin- 
 ning of the struggle for, 100; ap>- 
 proaching its crisis, 100. 
 
 Anson, Lord, takes command of 
 Channel fleet, 122; presents 
 Rodney at court, 153 ; succeeded 
 by Earl of Sandwich, 154; 385. 
 
 Antigua, 163; 228; 245. 
 
 Apollo, frigate, 442 ; engages Stan- 
 islas, 442 ; 443. 
 
 Arbuthnot, Admiral, ordered to 
 send ships to West Indies, 210; 
 his force added to Rodney's, 211; 
 regards himself injured, 212. 
 
 Ardent, ship, 242. 
 
 Arnold, Benedict, 433; 436; 437 ; 
 bravery of, in battle, 439 ; retires 
 toward Crown Point, 439 ; Coop- 
 er's praise of, 440; 441 ; 442. 
 
 Articles of War, modified, 95. 
 
 Audierne Bay, 458. 
 
 Austria.peace signed with, 413; 454. 
 
 Baltic league, fostered by Napo- 
 leon, 413; shattered by Nelson, 
 413 ; Saumarez disturbs, 422, 423. 
 
 Baltic Sea, affairs in, 421. 
 
 Barbados, injuries at, by hurricane, 
 217 ; British fleet arrives at, 228 ; 
 Rodney returns to, 230; Rodney 
 unwilling to fight French, off, 
 230; Rodney reaches, 233; 245; 
 Saumarez reaches, 394. 
 
 Barfleur, ship, 240; 242; 31 1. 
 
 Barrington, declines command 
 of Channel fleet, 182; refuses 
 
 31 
 
482 
 
 Index 
 
 command of a fleet, 286; de- 
 nounces ministry, 286; 287; sec- 
 ond to Howe, 2S9; 297. 
 
 Bart, Jean, French privateer, 451. 
 
 Basque Roads, its character as a 
 harbor, 112; 141. 
 
 Bedford, ship, 240. 
 
 Berwick, ship, 79, 81. 
 
 BiRuN, Marechal, makes money 
 advance to Rodney, 179. 
 
 Black Rocks, reef, 411. 
 
 BUnhcim, ship, 351 ; 365. 
 
 Blonde, ship, Burgoyne embarks 
 on, 431. 
 
 Bombay, 461. 
 
 BoMPART, Commodore, leaves 
 America, 134; his arrival, 135. 
 
 Bonaparte, see Napoleon. 
 
 BoscAWEN, Admiral, fleet under, 
 collecting at Portsmouth, 103 ; 
 sails to intercept French squad- 
 ron, 103, 104 ; loses two ships, 
 104 ; before Toulon, 126; at- 
 tacks French frigates near Tou- 
 lon, 133 ; his failure, 133 ; returns 
 to Gibraltar, 133 ; criticism of, 
 133 ; surprised while repairing, 
 134 ; his rapid movements, 134; 
 goes in pursuit of De la Clue, 
 134 ; destroys five French ships, 
 134; succeeds Hawke tempo- 
 rarily, 143. 
 
 Boston, loss of, 284. 
 
 Brest, Hawke's efficient blockade 
 of, 122; movements of French 
 navy at, 126; De la Clue sails 
 for, 133; Conflans's ships escape 
 to, 141 ; Rodney operates against, 
 1 58 ; Jervis closes port of, 375 , 
 392; blockade of, 411; bay of, 
 411; Pellew stationed off, 454; 
 French expedition against Ire- 
 land sails from, 455. 
 
 Brimstone Hill, 234; 394. 
 
 Bristol, %\{\^, 384; 385: 386; 387. 
 
 British Empire, non-existent in 
 1748,99. 
 
 British Ministry, apprehensive over 
 schooner Hawke incident, 172; 
 cautions Rodney, 172; learns 
 that Spain is concentrating ves- 
 sels at Cadiz, 414. 
 
 Brueys, at Battle of Nile, 416. 
 
 Brunswick, ship, 314; 315. 
 
 Burford, ship, 262. 
 
 Burgoyne, 276; 284; 431; 434) 
 leads renewed invasion, 442. 
 
 BURRISH, Capt. George, off Tou- 
 lon, 30 ; his address to his lieu- 
 tenants, 32 ; decision of court in 
 case of, 35 ; cashiered, 37. 
 
 Byng, Admiral, his incompetency 
 at Minorca, 5, 20 ; finding of 
 courtmartial of, 17 ; one of the 
 judges of Mathews, 24; his 
 punishment, 25 ; his situation at 
 Minorca reviewed, 47-63 ; auth- 
 or's criticism of, 64 ; discussion 
 of trial of, 64 ; article under 
 which he was convicted and ex- 
 ecuted, 96, 97 ; his sailing for 
 Minorca, 104; arrival off Port 
 Mahon, 104; engages French 
 fleet, 105 ; retires to Gibraltar, 
 105; news of retreat of, reaches 
 England, 105 ; superseded by 
 Hawke, 105; sent home, 105; 
 inquiry concerning in House of 
 Commons, 105; defended by 
 Pitt, 105 ; his execution a politi- 
 cal exigency, 180. 
 
 Byron, given North American 
 command, 176; 2S4 ; relieves 
 Howe and goes to West Indies, 
 183 ; 284 ; his failure and return 
 to England, 183. 
 
 Cabrita Point, 419. 
 
 Cadiz, French ships escape to, 134 ; 
 336; 347 ; Spaniards running for, 
 352 ; Spanish gunboats leave, 
 361 ; blockade at, 362 ; Saumarez 
 blockades, 400; French and 
 Spanish navies concentrated at. 
 
Index 
 
 483 
 
 414 ; Saumarez ordered to block- 
 ade, 414; Saumarez arrives off, 
 415; Saumarez prevents en- 
 trance of French ship to, 415; 
 object of concentration at, frus- 
 trated by Saumarez, 421. 
 Cadiz, Bay of, 369. 
 Casar, ship, Saumarez appointed 
 to command, 410 ; injured at 
 Algeciras, 418; refitted, 41S; 
 hauls out from Gibraltar mole, 
 419; sails for Algeciras, 419; 
 appears off Europa Point, 419. 
 Campbell, Captain, aids in sup- 
 pressing mutiny on board ship 
 Marlborough, 365. 
 Cape Horn, 260. 
 Cape Passaro, Battle of, 69. 
 Cape St. Vincent, see St. Vincent, 
 
 Cape. 
 Cap Fran9ois, 231 j 236 ; 244 ; 246. 
 Captain, ship, 351. 
 Cardinals, The, rocks, 137, 139. 
 Carkett, Captain, 200; his dis- 
 obedience of Rodney's orders, 
 200, 201. 
 Carleton, General, 433 ; 434. 
 Carleton, schooner, 437 ; Pellew 
 left in command of, 438 ; obliged 
 to withdraw, 438: 439; 475. 
 Cartagena, harbor of, schooner 
 Haivke taken to, 171; governor 
 of, Rodney demands schooner 
 Hawke from, 171. 
 Char, ship, 240. 
 Champlain, Lake, 433; 436; battle 
 
 on, 436, 437; 442; 475- 
 
 Chandos, Duke of, 148. 
 
 Channel Fleet, Keppel appointed 
 to command of, 176; 183; 271; 
 281 ; 286; 2S7 ; Howe takes com- 
 mand of, 299 ; Howe remains in 
 nominal command of, 318 ; Howe 
 formally retires from command 
 of, 319; Jervis attached to, 331 ; 
 rumor concerning command of, 
 337 ; lack of discipline in, 367 ; 
 
 374; 375," St. Vincent again 
 called to command of, 380 ; Tisi- 
 phone attached to, 392; 394; St. 
 Vincent takes command of, 41 1 ; 
 451 ; 454- 
 Channel Islands, Saumarez com- 
 mander-in-chief at, 421. 
 Charente, river, French vessels 
 
 flee up, 117. 
 Charleston, British fleet arrives off, 
 
 386. 
 Cherbourg, Saumarez present at be- 
 ginning of work on breakwater at, 
 398 ; frigate Reunion quits, 399. 
 Chevalier, Captain, tribute of, 
 
 to Admiral Howe, 296. 
 Cliopdtre, ship, fight of, with 
 
 Nympke, 448, 449. 
 Clinton, Sir Henry, his evacu- 
 ation of New York, 277 ; at Cape 
 May, 278; reaches Navesink, 
 279 ; 280. 
 CoDKiNGTON, Lieutenant, 311; 
 
 316. 
 COLLINGWOOD, 311; Criticises 
 movement of Admiral Mann, 
 34S; at battle off Cape St. Vin- 
 cent, 355; 410; off Brest, 412; 
 Pellew succeeds, 460. 
 Conflans, opposed by Hawke, 
 126; sails, 135; his fleet breaks 
 apart and flees, 141 ; his flagship 
 destroyed, 141 ; 273. 
 Cook, James, master of fleet at 
 
 Quebec, 326, 327. 
 Cooper, naval historian, his opin- 
 ion of Arnold, 440. 
 Copenhagen, 413; 446. 
 Cornwall, 429. 
 Cornwall, ship, 202. 
 CoRNWALLis, Lord, his fate in 
 America, settled, 232 ; his sur- 
 render, 233 ; surrender of, 
 change of ministry consequent 
 upon, 251 ; offers commission to 
 Saumarez, 385 ; meeting of, with 
 Saumarez, subsequently, 385. 
 
484 
 
 Index 
 
 Corsica, 333 ; 337 ; in revolt against 
 Britain, 346; evacuated by Brit- 
 ish, 347. 
 
 Cotirai^eux, ship, wrecked on Bar- 
 bary coast, 350; 352. 
 
 Crescent, frigate, Saumarez ap- 
 pointed to command, 399 ; action 
 of, with French frigate R^unioHy 
 399. 400. 
 
 Crown Point, 433 ; 439 ; Pellew 
 lands at, 441. 
 
 CulloJen, ship, 353, 354. 
 
 CUMBKRT.AND, Richard, his re- 
 mark concerning Rodney, 178. 
 
 CuMBY, Lieutenant, parody by, 
 upon Admiral Jervis, 373 ; pre- 
 tended revenge of Admiral upon, 
 
 374. 
 Cura9ao, 246. 
 
 Curtis, Fleet Captain, 311. 
 Curtis, Sir Roger, 250. 
 Czar of Russia, 421. 
 
 Dacrf.s, Lieutenant, wounded, 
 
 437, 438- 
 
 Declaration of Independence, 275. 
 
 De Court, Admiral, his comments 
 on engagement off Toulon, 44; 
 81. 
 
 Defence, ship, 342 ; 363. 
 
 De Grasse, Count, fleet under, 
 sails for Martinique, 221, 222; 
 sights Hood's division, 222 ; 
 gives Hood battle, 222 ; moves 
 to support his detachment at 
 Tobago, 229; sails for Hayti, 
 231 ; protects convoy from Mar- 
 tinique to Cap Fran9ois, 236; 
 is followed by Rodney, 236; 
 separates ships of war from 
 convoy, 237 ; fails to use his 
 opportunity, 237 ; condition of 
 ships of, 238 ; flagship of, collides 
 with ZeU, 23S ; battle with 
 Rodney, 23S-242 ; disaster to 
 squadron of, 292 ; transports 
 sail to carry stores to, 392 ; off 
 
 St. Christopher, 394 ; Saumarez 
 engages flagship of, 396. 
 
 De Guichen, sails from Mar- 
 tinique, 197 ; his battle with Rod- 
 ney, 200-206 ; asks to be relieved, 
 206; his fleet returns to Europe, 
 214; 239. 
 
 De la Clue, Admiral, sails for 
 Brest, 133; near Gibraltar, 133; is 
 seen by British frigate, 134 ; pur- 
 sued by Boscawen, 134; fireships 
 destroyed by Boscawen, 134. 
 
 De Ruyter, pronounced great- 
 est naval seaman in era of 
 Charles IL, 12, 13. 
 
 D'EsTAiNG, Count, Howe's cam- 
 paign against, 268, 269; leaves 
 Toulon for America, 277 ; his 
 arrival delayed, 279; strength 
 of squadron of, 279 ; arrives, 279 ; 
 sails southward, 280 ; enters 
 harbor of Newport, 281; again 
 puts to sea, 281 ; fleet of, scat- 
 tered, 282 ; appears again off 
 Rhode Island, 282 ; retires to 
 Boston, 282 ; runs batteries at 
 Seakonnet channel, 38S ; is lured 
 out of bay, 3S8 ; abandons coast, 
 38S. 
 
 Devonshire, 429. 
 
 Devonshire, ship, 90, 91. 
 
 Dey, of Algiers, see Algiers, Dey of. 
 
 Dominica, 237. 
 
 Dorsetshire, frigate, 41, 46, 137. 
 
 Douglas, Sir Charles, his criti- 
 cism of Rodney's encounter with 
 De Grasse, 247 ; 433 ; 437 ; on 
 battle of Lake Champlain, 439; 
 commands Pellew, 440. 
 
 Douglas, Sir James, 165. 
 
 Drake, Rear Admiral, sent by 
 Rodney against De Grasse, 229; 
 forced to retire before superior 
 force, 230. 
 
 Droits de P Homme, ship, fight of, 
 with IndefiUigahU and Amazon, 
 456, 457 ; wreck of, 45S. 
 
Index 
 
 485 
 
 Dungeness, anecdote of Nelson 
 off, 446, 447. 
 
 DuPLKix, recalled from India by 
 French government, loi. 
 
 Dutton, ship, driven ashore at 
 Plymouth, 452 ; her troops, pas- 
 sengers, and crew saved through 
 action of Admiral Pellew, 452- 
 454- 
 
 Eagle, ship, 90, 153. 
 East Indies, 403. 
 
 East India, station, Pellew as- 
 signed to, 460. 
 
 Egypt, 403; 404; 413- 
 Ellis, Lieutenant, 343. 
 Ellison, Captain, Earl St. Vin- 
 cent's rebuke to, 363, 364. 
 Elphinstone, Captain, 165. 
 Erie, Lake, 436. 
 Essex, ship, 112. 
 Europa Point, 419. 
 ExMOUTH, Lord, see Pellew. 
 
 Falkland Islands, incident at, 
 brings Great Britain and Spain 
 on verge of rupture, 172. 
 
 Falmouth, 456. 
 
 Faulkner, Captain, 342, 343. 
 
 Fearney, William, bargeman, re- 
 ceives surrendered Spanish 
 swords from Nelson, 356. 
 
 Ferrol, Spanish port of, Pellew 
 watches, 460. 
 
 Fighting Instructions, of 1740 and 
 1756, compared with those of 
 1665 1 Rooke's tactics adopted 
 in, 16. 
 
 Finisterre, Cape, 291. 
 
 Finland, gulf of, Russian fleet takes 
 refuge in, 425. 
 
 First Consul, Napoleon as, 413. 
 
 Flamborough, frigate, 78. 
 
 Flight, Colonel, Admiral Jervis 
 plays joke upon, 370. 
 
 Formidable, flagship of Rodney, 
 239- 
 
 Fort Moultrie, see Moultrie Fort. 
 
 Fort Royal, 235. 
 
 Foudroyant, ship, 330 ; 331. 
 
 Four Days Battle, British meet 
 severe check in, 11 ; attributed 
 to strategic errors, 12 ; Penn's 
 criticism of, 12. 
 
 Fox, Captain, criticised for con- 
 duct in battle off La Rochelle, 
 93 ; court-martialled, 93 ; retired 
 as a rear-admiral, 93. 
 
 Fox, Charles J., supported in Par- 
 liament by Admiral Jervis, 332. 
 
 France, abandons Egypt, loi ; 
 sends fleet and force against 
 Minorca, 104 ; declares war 
 against Great Britain, 105 ; 
 captures British supply vessel 
 off Gibraltar, 106 ; sends squad- 
 ron to convoy troops to Cape 
 Breton, 1758, 116; ships of, flee 
 up river Charente, 117 ; vessels 
 of, make their escape, 117; de- 
 termines to invade England, 124 ; 
 preparations of, for invasion of 
 England, 124, 125; war between 
 Great Britain and, imminent, 
 176; declares war against Great 
 Britain, 185 ; expedition of, 
 against Ireland, sails from 
 Brest, 455 ; failure of expedi- 
 tion of, against Ireland, 456. 
 
 Fran9ois, Cap, 231 ; 236; 244 ; 246. 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin, on French oc- 
 cupation of Canada, 102 ; receives 
 note from Admiral Howe, 275 ; 
 bitter reply of, 275 ; Howe's com- 
 ment on, 275. 
 
 Franklin, ship, 406. 
 
 Frederick the Great, 260. 
 
 Free ports. Great Britain insti- 
 tutes, in West Indies, 169 ; 
 effect of, 169 ; Rodney's report 
 concerning, 169 ; 170. 
 
 French Navy, see Navy, French. 
 
 French, the, their part in develop- 
 ment of tactical science, 13; sea- 
 
486 
 
 Index 
 
 men mobbed in Boston, 282 ; 
 land in Egypt, 404. 
 
 Gai.i.ky fighting, its superiority in 
 effectiveness to that in sailing 
 vessels, 7; its decline, 8; its 
 traditions linger, 8. 
 
 Gardner, Lord, 265. 
 
 Geary, Francis, Hawke's advice 
 to, 146. 
 
 George I., King of England, 
 stands sponsor for infant Rod- 
 ney, 148. 
 
 George II., King of England, 
 takes knowledge of Hawke, 84. 
 
 George III., King of England, 
 conversation of, with Earl St. 
 Vincent, 287. 
 
 Gibraltar, Rooke's capture of, 16; 
 Byng retires to, 105 ; Hawke 
 reaches, 105 ; Boscawen returns 
 to, 133; De la Clue near, 133; 
 187 ; joy at, over Rodney's vic- 
 tory off Cape St. Vincent, 193, 
 194 ; 269 ; Howe's relief of, 288 - 
 295 ; Jervis at relief of, 331 ; 346 ; 
 348 ; three ships wrecked at, 
 350; Saumarez convoys prizes to, 
 409 ; 410 ; Saumarez withdraws 
 from Algeciras to, 416; Exmouth 
 joins Dutch fleet at, 468. 
 
 Gibraltar, ship, injured on a reef, 
 
 350- 
 
 Glorieux, ship, 239. 
 
 Great Britain, declares war against 
 France, 105 ; institutes free ports 
 in Jamaica, 169 ; effect of this 
 movement, 169; foreign policy 
 of, enfeebled, 172 ; on verge of 
 rupture with Spain over Falk- 
 land Islands incident, 172; war 
 between France and, imminent, 
 176 ; pensions daughters of 
 Marechal Biron, 180; declares 
 war against Holland, 217; Na- 
 poleon seeks to exclude com- 
 merce of, 413. 
 
 Great Britain, Navy of, see A^avy of 
 Great Britain. 
 
 Greenwich Hospital, Palliser ap- 
 pointed to governorship of, 182. 
 
 Grenada, captured by British, 159. 
 
 Gros Ilet Bay, 235. 
 
 Guadaloupe, 237 ; 238 ; 243 ; 245. 
 
 Guernsey, Island, James Saumarez 
 born on, 3S3 ; later years of 
 Saumarez at, 427. 
 
 Hallowell, Captain, 352; eccen- 
 tric response of, to Jervis, 353. 
 
 Hannibal, ship, loss of, at Alge- 
 ciras, 416; 418; re-anchors at 
 Algeciras, 419 
 
 Havana, Rodney at fall of, 166, 
 loss of, embitters .Spain, 171. 
 
 Havre, Rodney operates against, 
 158. 
 
 Hawke, Admiral, development of 
 naval warfare identified with 
 name of, 4 ; uplifted the navy, 6 ; 
 off Toulon, 29, 39, 40; his cap- 
 ture of the Spanish vessel, Poder, 
 40; his birth and parentage, 77 ; 
 his promotion to post-captain, 
 78 ; appointed to the Berwick, 
 79; sails for the Mediterranean, 
 79; loses his political influence, 
 79; war against Spain declared, 
 80; sails for West Indies in 
 Portland, 80; war of Austrian 
 succession, 80; before Toulon, 
 81 ; his exceptional conduct in 
 battle, 81 ; is complimented by 
 Rear-Admiral Rowley, 84 ; effect 
 of the battle on his fortunes, 84; 
 the king takes knowledge of him, 
 84 ; becomes a rear-admiral, 85; 
 hoists his flag, 85 ; cruises in the 
 Bay of Biscay, under Sir Peter 
 Warren, 85 ; joined to Warren 
 in command, 86; goes to sea in 
 command, 86 ; subordinates 
 pecuniary to military considera- 
 tions, 88 ; descries the enemy off 
 
Index 
 
 487 
 
 La Rochelle, 89 ; overhauls fleet 
 of French merchantmen con- 
 voyed by Commodore L'Eten- 
 duere, 89; orders general chase, 
 90; overtakes the French rear, 
 90; his brilliant victory, 91 ; his 
 report of the engagement, 92; 
 calls a council of war, 93 ; dis- 
 pleased with Capt. Fox, 93 ; ac- 
 tually commander in battle with 
 LEtenduere, 97 ; given Order 
 of the Bath, 98; now known as 
 Sir Edward Hawke, 98; pro- 
 moted to rank of vice-admiral, 
 98 ; in dock yard command, 98 ; 
 most illustrious naval officer, 100; 
 revolutionizes naval ideas, 100 ; 
 his part in arbitrament with 
 France, 103 ; again in command 
 of a fleet, 103; sails against 
 French, 104; seizes 300 trading 
 vessels, 104; supersedes Byng, 
 105; reaches Gibraltar, 105; 
 sends Byng home, 105 ; institutes 
 inquiry into conduct of Byng's 
 captains, 105 ; denies allegations 
 of Pitt in House of Commons, 
 105 ; disliked by Pitt, 106 ; returns 
 to England, 106 ; recaptures Brit- 
 ish supply vessel in Spanish port, 
 107; his characteristic indepen- 
 dence illustrated, 107 ; his ser- 
 vice henceforth confined to Chan- 
 nel fleet, 108; maintains blockade 
 of French ports, 108 ; his expedi- 
 tion against Rochefort, in; 
 controversy concerning it, in; 
 his maxim concerning pilots, 112; 
 his surprise at Basque Roads, 
 112; characterization of that 
 harbor, 112; his coolness, 113; 
 his self-assertion, 113; his bold 
 disregard of pilotage difficulties 
 at Quiberon, 114; declines to 
 attend a council of war, 115; 
 reaches Spithead, 115; resents 
 language of Pitt, 1 16 ; his service 
 
 against French squadron, 1758, 
 1 16; his failure to destroy French 
 squadron through defective 
 equipment, 117 ; practically sup- 
 planted by Howe, 118; al)andons 
 his command in an indignant 
 note, 1 18, 1 19 ; his anger in some 
 respects justified, 119; is sum- 
 moned to the Admiralty, 121 ; 
 defends his action, 121 ; his posi- 
 tion strengthened, 121; accom- 
 panies Anson as second in com- 
 mand, 122; culminating epoch 
 in career of, 122 ; his triumph at 
 Quiberon Bay, 122; his capacity 
 as a seaman proved, 122; his 
 efficient blockade of Brest, 122; 
 is burned in effigy, 124; opera- 
 tions at Brest, 126; his double 
 duty there, 126; his difficulties, 
 126; opposes Conflans, 126; his 
 method at Quiberon analyzed, 
 127-130; assures the Admiralty, 
 131 ; his great tact in correspon- 
 dence, 132; discharges a mutin- 
 ous surgical officer, 132 ; defends 
 his act, 132 ; his liberality toward 
 subordinates, 132 ; watches 
 French ships at Cadiz, 134 ; 
 sends ships to reinforce light 
 squadron, 134; recalls ships-of- 
 the-line, 134 , anchors in Torbay, 
 135; receives news of French 
 fleet, 135; crowds all sail for 
 Quiberon, 136; sights the French 
 fleet, 136 ; gives pursuit, 136. 
 137 ; opens fire, 137 ; his orders 
 to his sailing master, 138; is 
 overtaken by night, 139 ; follows 
 French fleet round The Cardi- 
 nals, 139; sinks two French 
 ships, 140; cowes the French 
 navy, 141 ; his losses at Quibe- 
 ron, 141 ; his feat at Quiberon 
 analyzed, 142; returns to Eng- 
 land, 143 ; is succeeded by Bos- 
 cawen temporarily, 143 ; received 
 
488 
 
 Index 
 
 with honors, 143 ; denied a peer- 
 age, 143; his indifference to self- 
 advancement, 143 ; his indepen- 
 dence in professional conduct, 
 toward superiors, 143, 144; hauls 
 down his {lag, 144; becomes first 
 Lord of the Admiralty, 144 ; made 
 vice-admiral of Great Britain, 
 145; the peerage conferred, 145; 
 his advice to Geary, 146; his 
 death, 146; his distinctive glory, 
 146; his opinion of Howe, 262 ; 
 
 273- 
 
 Hawke, schooner, 170, overhauled 
 by Spanish coast guard vessels, 
 170 ; taken to Cartagena, 171. 
 
 Hayti, 231 ; 236. 
 
 Hector^ ship, 240. 
 
 Hermenegildo, ship, 417; 420; re- 
 markable loss of, 420. 
 
 Hohenlinden, 413. 
 
 Holland, Great Britain declares 
 war against, 217 ; 390. 
 
 Hood, Sir Samuel, strength of his 
 powers, 74; made second in 
 command to Rodney, 220; ar- 
 rives at West India station, 221 ; 
 his disagreement with Rodney, 
 221; gives battle to De Grasse, 
 222; urges Rodney to effect a 
 coalition of forces, 223 ; joins 
 Rodney at St. Kitts, 228; criti- 
 cises Rodney's movement against 
 De Grasse at Tobago, 229; de- 
 fends St. Kitts, 234 ; urges Rod- 
 ney to more energetic action, 
 243; criticises Rodney, 244-246; 
 his comment on Rodney, 252 ; 
 in command of Mediterranean 
 fleet, 299; anchors off St. Chris- 
 topher, 394 ; appoints Saumarez 
 to command Russell, 395. 
 
 Horn, Cape, 260. 
 
 HosTE, Paul, historian of achieve- 
 ments of Tourville, 13. 
 
 HowK, Lord, his important mis- 
 sion, 176; his return from 
 
 America, 182 ; his character and 
 temperament, 183, 184 ; anec- 
 dote of, recorded by Sir Byam 
 Martin, 250 ; 254 ; his especial 
 claim on esteem of Americans, 
 254; respect in American colo- 
 nies for his elder brother, 254- 
 256; succeeds to the peerage 
 held by his brother, 256; char- 
 acter compared with that of his 
 brother, 256; his early service, 
 259; enters the navy, 259; em- 
 barks for Pacific in Anson's 
 squadron, 259; serves in West 
 Indies, 260 ; his part in Seven 
 Years War, 260 ; his friendship 
 with Wolfe, 262 ; characteriza- 
 tion of, by a French pilot, 262 ; 
 Hawke's opinion of, 262, 263 ; his 
 taciturnity, 263 ; receives the 
 Duke of York, 263 ; his coolness 
 and self-possession, 263 ; anec- 
 dotes of, 264, 265 ; his composure 
 under suspense, 266, 267, 268 ; 
 his campaign against D'Estaing, 
 268 ; contrasted with Jervis, 270, 
 271 ; at Quiberon, 273; in House 
 of Commons, 274 ; becomes 
 rear-admiral, 274 ; in confidence 
 of Hawke, 274 ; appointed to 
 command squadron, 274 ; vice- 
 admiral, 275 ; commander-in- 
 chief of North American station, 
 275; given treaty powers, 275; 
 addresses note to Franklin, 275; 
 his comment on Franklin's re- 
 ply, 275; concerning his letter 
 to Washington, 276; his opera- 
 tions about New York, 276; 
 author's characterization of, 277, 
 278 ; learns of coming of 
 D'Estaing, 278 ; concentrates 
 at New York, 278 ; disposition 
 of squadron of, against D'Es- 
 taing, 279, 2S0 ; mancEuvres to 
 avoid battle with D'Estaing, 
 281 ; fleet of, scattered, 2S2 ; 
 
Index 
 
 489 
 
 highest title of, to fame, 283 ; 
 follows French fleet to New- 
 port, and Boston, 2S4 ; resigns 
 command, 2S4 ; succeeded by 
 Vice-admiral Byron, 284; sails 
 for England, 284 ; words of, in 
 House of Commons, 284; again 
 brought into service, 2S7 ; en- 
 counters allied fleet off Scilly, 
 288 ; tactical manoeuvre of, off 
 Land's End, 288 ; relief of 
 Gibraltar by, 288, 295; tribute 
 of Chevalier to, 296 ; headed for 
 Atlantic, 297 ; is pursued by 
 allies, 297 ; regains Spithead, 
 297 ; on shore duty, 297 ; as 
 first Lord of Admiralty, 298 ; 
 appoints Nelson to a ship, 29S ; 
 at head of navy at outbreak of 
 French revolution, 29S ; takes 
 command of Channel fleet, 299 ; 
 encounters French fleet and con- 
 voy, 301, 302 ; gives chase, 302 ; 
 tactical skill of, 303, 304 ; analy- 
 sis of tactics in fight with Vil- 
 laret-Joyeuse, 306, 307 ; attacks 
 latter, in force, 310; conduct of, 
 in action, 311 ; victory of, over 
 French fleet, 315, 316 ; career 
 of, ended, 318 : in nominal com- 
 mand of Channel fleet, 318 ; 
 suppresses mutinies, 318 ; active 
 service of, closed, 319 ; retires 
 formally from command of 
 Channel fleet, 319 ; estimate 
 of, of Battle of the Nile, 379; 
 appearance of, off Rhode Island, 
 388,409; commends Pellew, 440; 
 again commends Pellew, 450, 
 
 476, 477- 
 
 Howe, General, departs for Eng- 
 land, 284. 
 
 Hudson, river, 442. 
 
 Hyeres Islands, 21. 
 
 Indefatigable, ship, 455 ; fight of, 
 wit. Droits de rHomme, 456, 
 
 457 ; narrow escape of, from 
 
 wreck, 458. 
 India, 403. 
 Inflexible, ship, 435 ; launch and 
 
 description of, 435, 436 ; in battle 
 
 of Lake Champlain, 438, 439. 
 Intripide, ship, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 91. 
 Ionian Isles, slaves, natives of, 
 
 released by Pellew, 462. 
 Ireland, French expedition against, 
 
 sails from Brest, 455 ; expedition 
 
 reaches, 456. 
 
 Jacobin, ship, 313. 
 
 Jamaica, threatened by Brest fleet, 
 160; 161 ; succored by Rodney, 
 162; 163; station, Rodney ap- 
 pointed to command, 167 ; 
 station, required high degree 
 of executive ability to com- 
 mand, 168; its situation in rela- 
 tion to Spanish colonies, 168 ; 
 free ports instituted in, 169 ; 
 Rodney moves toward, 243 ; 
 
 393- 
 
 James II., Duke of York, his fight- 
 ing instructions, 1665, 9. 
 
 Jervis, Admiral, contrasted with 
 Howe, 270-272, 320 ; contrasted 
 with Nelson, 321 ; his opinion of 
 Nelson, 321 ; birth of, 321, 322 ; 
 early life of, 322 ; runs away to 
 sea, 322 ; sails for West Indies, 
 322 ; early privations, 323 ; con- 
 trasted with Rodney, 324 ; cruises 
 in the Caribbean, 324; returns 
 to England, 324 ; is made lieu- 
 tenant, 325; with Boscawen in 
 the St. Lawrence, 325 ; goes to 
 Mediterranean with Hawke, 325 ; 
 relieves Byng, 325 ; associated 
 with Sir Charles Saunders, 325 ; 
 intimacy with Wolfe, 325; in 
 command ol Porcupine, 326 ; con- 
 versation of, with Wolfe before 
 battle of Plains of Abraham, 326 ; 
 leads fleet against Quebec, 326; 
 
490 
 
 Index 
 
 goes to England after fall of 
 Quebec, 327 ; appointed to com- 
 mand a ship, 327 ; ordered to 
 return to North America, 327 ; 
 puts in at Plymouth, leaking, 
 327 ; given command of sloop 
 Albany, 327 ; conquers mutinous 
 sailors, and sets sail, 328 ; ar- 
 rives at New York, 32S ; pro- 
 moted to post-captain, 328; an 
 admiral at fifty-two, 328 ; com- 
 mands frigate in Mediterranean, 
 328 ; resents insult to British flag, 
 by Genoese officers, 329 ; forces 
 an apology, 329 ; opposed to 
 abolition of slave trade, 329; 
 commissions the Foudroyant, 
 330; attached to the Channel 
 fleet, 331 ; in Keppel's battle off 
 Ushant, 331 ; at Gibraltar with 
 Howe, 331 ; captures French ship 
 Pegase, 331 ; receives a baronetcy, 
 332 ; receives Order of the Bath, 
 332; takes seat in Parliament, 
 332 ; supports Fox, 332 ; attains 
 rank of rear-admiral and of vice- 
 admiral, 332 ; is again afloat, 332 ; 
 on service in Caribbean Sea, 
 332; his brusque treatment of a 
 lieutenant, 332,333; his attitude 
 toward matrimony, 333 ; returns 
 to England, 333 ; appointed to 
 command Mediterranean Sta- 
 tion, 333; joins fleet in San 
 Fiorenzo Bay, ^tZ}) ! reaches 
 grade of admiral of the Blue, 
 334 ; reaches crowning period of 
 his career, 334 ; disposition of 
 fleet of, 336; as strict disciplina- 
 rian, 337 ; anecdotes concerning 
 this characteristic of, 337-340; 
 his care of health of officers and 
 men, 343, 344 ; embarrassment 
 of, 347 ; disappointment of, at 
 Admiral Mann's failure to obey 
 orders, 349; cheerfulness of, un- 
 der discouragements, 351 ; rein- 
 
 forcements reach, 351 ; encoun- 
 ters large Spanish fleet, 352 ; 
 courageous remark of, 352 ; 
 victory of, at Cape St. Vincent, 
 352-357 ; gratitude of England 
 toward, 356; created Earl of St. 
 Vincent, 356; analysis of move- 
 ments of, in battle of Cape St. 
 Vincent, 356, 357 ; blockades 
 Spanish at Cadiz, 357; suppresses 
 mutinous action of seamen, 358, 
 359 ; action of, in case of sea- 
 men, of ship St. Gi;orgt;,2,(>o, 361 ; 
 repels attack of Spanishgunboats 
 from Cadiz, 361, 362; stern re- 
 pression of mutiny by, on board 
 ship Marlborough, 362-367 ; stern 
 rebuke of, to Capt. Ellison, 363, 
 364 ; brusque reply of, to Sir 
 Edward Pellew, 367 ; sternness 
 of, 36S ; forbids captains to dine 
 each other, 368 ; quaint humor 
 of, 369 ; anecdotes of, 369, 370 ; 
 reverence of, for the flag, 372 ; 
 satire upon, by Lieutenant Cum- 
 by, 373 ; pretended revenge of, 
 foJ"' 373. 374; decline of health 
 of, 374; return of, to England, 
 374 ; placed in command of 
 Channel fleet, 375; establishes 
 rigid discipline in same, 375; 
 closes port of Brest, 375 ; anal- 
 ysis of last named movement, 
 376; three great services of, to 
 England, 378 ; discipline of, of 
 Mediterranean fleet, 378; win- 
 ning by, of Battle of St. Vincent, 
 378 ; suppression of mutinies by, 
 378; contrasted with Nelson, 
 378. 379; Nelson's esteem for, 
 379 ; Nelson's differences with, 
 379 ; arranges expedition which 
 led to Battle of the Nile, 379; 
 credit due, for same, 379, 380 ; 
 later years of, 3S0 ; succeeds 
 Pitt as First Lord of the Ad- 
 miralty, 380; retires from active 
 
Index 
 
 491 
 
 service, 3S0; hauls down his 
 flag, 3S0; country seat of, 380; 
 closing years of, 3S0, 381 ; liber- 
 ality, of, 381 ; active habits of 
 in old age, 381 ; death of, 
 381. 
 Judith, Point, 281. 
 
 Keith, Lord, 367. 
 
 Kempenfelt, Admiral, 288; sec- 
 ond to Howe, 289; death of, 
 290 ; sent in pursuit of Da 
 Grasse, 393 ; makes valuable 
 capture, 393. 
 
 Keppel, Admiral, appointed to 
 Channel fleet, 176; resigns com- 
 mand of Channel fleet, 182 ; cha- 
 grin of, 286; 287 ; Jervis with, at 
 Ushant, 331 ; assists Saumarez 
 in advancement, 384, 385 ; com- 
 panion of uncle of Saumarez, 
 385- 
 
 Land's End, Howe's tactical 
 movement off, 288. 
 
 Langara, his fleet destroyed by 
 Rodney, 216. 
 
 Leander, ship, 472. 
 
 L'EXENDufeRE, Commodore, at- 
 tacked by Hawke, 89; Hawke 
 commander in battle with, 97 ; 
 
 157- 
 
 Leghorn, in power of France, 346. 
 
 Lestock, Vice-Admiral, off Tou- 
 lon, 21, 22; his part in trial of 
 Mathews, 21-25; his own trial 
 and defence, 26. 
 
 Levant, the, 384. 
 
 LiNOis, at battle at Algeciras,4l6; 
 his division in second attack, 
 419. 
 
 Lisbon, 350. 
 
 Lcniisa, ship, 60, 61 , 64. 
 
 Louis XVL, treats Saumarez with 
 attention, 398, 399. 
 
 Lowther, Miss, betrothed of Gen. 
 Wolfe, 326. 
 
 Madras, French conquest of, 103; 
 yielded in exchange for Louis- 
 burg, 103. 
 
 Magnanime, ship, 262; 272; 273. 
 
 Malaga, movements of Rooke off, 
 15; battle, 69, 70; 156. 
 
 Malta, Nelson receives news of 
 surrender of, to the French, 403. 
 
 Manila, loss of, embitters Spain, 
 171. 
 
 Mann, Admiral, discouragement 
 of, 348 ; calls council of ofticers, 
 34S; returns to England, 348; 
 deprived of command, 348 ; 
 Jervis's criticism of, 349 ; Nel- 
 son's criticism of, 349 ; effect on 
 fleet of defection of, 350. 
 
 Mantua, blockaded, 346. 
 
 Marengo, 413. 
 
 Marlborough, frigate, 41 ; 42 ; 57 ; 
 mutinies on, 362-367. 
 
 Marseilles, 430. 
 
 Martin, Sir Byam, records anec- 
 dote of Lord Howe, 250. 
 
 Martinique, Rodney operates 
 against, 158; captured by Brit- 
 ish, 158; 165; 236; 245; 393. 
 
 Marryatt, Capt., Peter Simple 
 quoted, 95, 96; source of sea 
 picture in his The King's Own, 
 458. 
 
 Mathews, Admiral, off Toulon in 
 1774, 5; description of engage- 
 ment, 21, 22, 41, 42, 43; court- 
 martial of, 27, 28 ; author's criti- 
 cism of, 45, 56. 
 
 Mediterranean, fighting begins in, 
 1759, 133 ; Nelson returns from 
 cruise in, 351, 352; 400; 411; 
 British expedition enters, 413; 
 Pellew cruises in, 430 ; Pellew is 
 appointed Commander-in-chief 
 in, 460; 461. 
 
 Millbank, Admiral, 297. 
 
 Minorca, Byng's incompetency at, 
 5, 20; affair at, reviewed, 47-63; 
 French send a fleet against, 104; 
 
492 
 
 Index 
 
 French fleet lands at, 104; 156; 
 
 367- 
 
 Mona Passage, 244. 
 
 MoNCToN, General, his reluctance 
 
 to move, 161 ; sends troops to 
 
 Jamaica, 166. 
 Monk, commands in Four Days 
 
 battle, II. 
 Montague, ship, 312; 313. 
 Montgomery, fall of, 432. 
 MoREAU, French general, 347. 
 Moultrie, Fort, attack of British 
 
 fleet on, 386. 
 Mutiny, in British navy, 1797, 358, 
 
 359; on ship Marlborough, 363- 
 
 3^7- 
 
 Naples, Kingdom of. Napoleon 
 designs to occupy, 413; 463. 
 
 Napoleon Bonaparte, contem- 
 porary of Jervis, 346 ; before 
 Mantua, 347; 402; 403; 411; 
 practically absolute ruler of 
 Europe, 412; designs to occupy 
 Portugal and Kingdom of 
 Naples, 413; threatens Saum- 
 arez's flank, 414; concentrates 
 Spanish and French navies at 
 Cadiz, 414; agreement of, with 
 Czar, at Tilsit, 421 ; breach of, 
 with Russia, 422 ; forces Sweden 
 to declaration of war, 422 ; 454 ; 
 decline of, coincides with Pel- 
 lew's advance, 461. 
 
 Narragansett Bay, 210; D'Es- 
 taing's fleet at, 2S1 ; 3S7. 
 
 Naval Warfare, in i8th century, 
 3, et seq.; Hawke and Rodney 
 identified with, 4 ; advance in, 
 shown by two great failures, 5 ; 
 waged with vessels moved by 
 oars, 7 ; such method more re- 
 liable than by sail, 7 ; its scene 
 long in the Mediterranean, 8 ; 
 introduction of cannon in, 8; a 
 period of systematiration sets 
 in, 9; period of transition in, 
 
 12; Tourville's influence on, 14; 
 peace of Utrecht closed transi- 
 tional period in, 68 ; Napoleon's 
 influence on, 68, 69; conditions 
 of, in 1 8th century, 74, 75; ad- 
 vance of, in 19th century. 
 
 Navy, French, its movements at 
 Quiberon Bay, 125; attempts to 
 concentrate at Brest, 126; van- 
 quished by Hawke, 141 ; con- 
 centrated at Cadiz, 414. 
 
 Navy of Great Britain, in 1739, 69; 
 permitted to decline, 100. 
 
 Navy of U. S., in 1812, 69. 
 
 Nelson, Admiral, his remarkable 
 order at Trafalgar, alluded to, 7 ; 
 on true way of fighting, 30 ; on 
 the comparative value of prize 
 money, 88; 146; appointed to 
 command a ship by Howe, 298 ; 
 letter of, to his brother, 29S; 
 opinion of, of Jervis's Mediter- 
 ranean fleet, 330; remark of, 
 concerning Hood, 335 ; criticises 
 movements of British fleet, 1795, 
 346' his criticism of Admiral 
 Mann, 349 ; return from mission 
 up Mediterranean, 351, 352; at 
 battle off Cape St. Vincent, 355; 
 receives Spanish surrender, 355, 
 356 ; approves sentence of sea- 
 men of ship St. George, 361 ; 362 ; 
 contrasted with Jervis, Earl St 
 Vincent, 378, 379 ; esteem of, for 
 Jervis, 379; credit due to, for 
 victory of the Nile, 379 ; con- 
 trasted with Saumarez, 383 ; 401 ; 
 402 ; his lack of personal sym- 
 pathy with Saumarez, 407 ; 
 Saumarez's unfortunate remark 
 to, 407 ; at battle of the Nile, 
 407-409; 410; Baltic league 
 shattered by, 413; eulogizes 
 Saumarez in House of Lords, 
 421 ; seamanship of, contrasted 
 with that of Pellew, 446; anec- 
 dote of, 446 ; mentions incident 
 
Index 
 
 493 
 
 of Algerine policy, 462, 463 ; de- 
 nounces Algerine piracy, 463 ; 
 Israel Pellew with, at Trafalgar, 
 476. 
 
 Nevis, island, 394. 
 
 Newport, D'Estaing enters harbor 
 of, 281. 
 
 Nile, battle of, 362 ; Admiral 
 Howe's estimate of, 379 ; credit 
 due to Admiral Lord St. Vin- 
 cent for, 379, 380 ; Saumarez 
 cruises in, 384 ; 403 ; description 
 of battle of, 405-408 ; Saumarez 
 wounded at, 409. 
 
 Nore, threatening mutinies of, 
 
 454- 
 
 NoRRis, Captain, absconds to 
 avoid trial, 37. 
 
 Nytnphe, frigate, Pellew in com- 
 mand of, 447 ; 448 ; fight of, 
 with Cleop&tre, 448, 449. 
 
 Orient, ship, Nelson's coffin made 
 
 from mainmast of, 353 ; blows 
 
 up, 407. 
 Orion, ship, Saumarez appointed 
 
 to command, 400 ; 401 ; 406 ; 
 
 409; 410. 
 
 Palliser, Vice-Admiral, accused 
 
 of betrayal of his chief, 182 ; 
 
 twelve admirals memorialize the 
 
 king against, 1S2. 
 Paris, Rodney settles in, 175. 
 Parker, Admiral, Rodney writes 
 
 to, 225. 
 Parker, Commodore Sir Peter, 
 
 385- 
 
 Passaro, Cape, Battle of, 69. 
 
 P^gase, ship, 331. 
 
 Pellew, Admiral, asks for court- 
 martial upon a mutiny, 367 ; 368 ; 
 389 ; 428 ; of Norman extrac- 
 tion, 428 ; early orthography of 
 name, 428 ; settlement of family 
 in England, 429 ; father of, 429; 
 fearlessness of, at school, 429; 
 
 goes afloat, 430; sides with a 
 companion in a quarrel and 
 leaves the ship, 430; intimacy 
 of, with Captain PownoU, 431 j 
 brought in contact with Ameri- 
 can revolution, 431 ; at recep- 
 tion of Burgoyne on ship Blonde, 
 431 ; saves a sailor from drown- 
 ing, 431 ; exuberant vitality of, 
 431 ; anecdote of recklessness 
 of, 431 ; anecdote of accident to, 
 435 ; second officer of Carleton, 
 437 ; in battle of Lake Cham- 
 plain, 436, 437 ; by loss of su- 
 periors left in command, 438 ; 
 gallantry of, in contest, 438 ; is 
 commended by Douglas, Lord 
 Howe and the Admiralty, 440 ; 
 is promised promotion, 440; 
 gives chase to Arnold, 441 ; 
 lands at Crown Point, 441 ; ac- 
 companies Burgoyne, 442 ; re- 
 turns to England, 442 ; promoted 
 to a lieutenancy, 442 ; serves 
 under Capt. Pownoll, 442 ; lieu- 
 tenant of frigate Apollo, 4^2 ; 
 meets French frigate Stanislas, 
 
 442 ; action with, 442 ; succeeds 
 to command at death of Pownoll, 
 442 ; grief of, for death of Pow- 
 noll, 443 ; gains promotion, 443; 
 destroys French privateers, 443; 
 wins grade of post-captain, 443 ; 
 in time of peace tries farming, 
 
 443 ; commands frigate on New- 
 foundland Station, 444 ; per- 
 sonal activity of, 444 ; anecdotes 
 of, 444, 445 ; his knowledge of 
 seamanship, 446 ; 447 ; in com- 
 mand of Nymphe, iAl ; at fight 
 between Nymphe and Cleop&tre, 
 448, 449 ; Lord Howe com- 
 mends, 450 ; opposes French 
 privateers, 451, 452; directs res- 
 cue of troops, passengers, and 
 crew of ship Dution, 452-454; 
 stationed off Brest, 454 ; dis- 
 
494 
 
 Index 
 
 couraged appointment of Roman 
 Catholic chaplains, 455 ; opposes 
 enfranchisement of Roman Cath- 
 olics, 455 ; follows French expe- 
 dition against Ireland, 455, 456; 
 sails for Falmouth, 456; fights 
 Indefatigable and Amazon against 
 Droits de V Homme, 4 56-4 5!^ ; 
 narrow escape of, from ship- 
 wreck, 458 ; great personal 
 endurance of, illustrated, 459 ; 
 eminent qualities of, 459; holds 
 command in India, 459, 460 ; 
 appointed commander-in-chief in 
 Mediterranean, 460 ; made a 
 rear-admiral, 460 ; assigned to 
 East India station, 460; Medi- 
 terranean command of, coincides 
 with Bonaparte's falling for- 
 tunes, 461 ; created Baron Ex- 
 mouth, 462 ; visits Barbary ports, 
 462 ; compels release of slaves, 
 462 ; demands peace for Sar- 
 dinia, 463 ; arranges with Tunis 
 and Tripoli for treatment of caf>- 
 tives, 463 ; Algiers refuses con- 
 cession to, regarding treatment 
 of captives, 464 ; demands release 
 of all Christian slaves in Algiers, 
 464 ; despatches cruiser to Al- 
 giers, 466 ; instructions of, to 
 Capt. Charles Warde, 466 ; asks 
 for small force against Algiers, 
 467 ; preparations of, against 
 Algiers, 46S ; sails for Algiers, 
 463 ; joins Dutch fleet at Gibral- 
 tar, 46S ; arrives at Algiers Bay, 
 468 ; serves demands on Dey of 
 Algiers, 468 ; receives no an- 
 swer, 468 ; opens battle, 469, 
 470; is slightly wounded, 473; 
 receives submission of Dey, 473 ; 
 frees Algerian, Tunisian, and 
 Tripolitan slaves, 474 ; returns 
 to England, 474 ; close of career 
 of, 475; later days of, 475, 476; 
 religious nature of, 476; death 
 
 of, 476; rank of, at death 
 476. 
 
 Pellew, Israel, bravery of, in 
 fight between Nymphe and 
 CUopAtre, 448, 449 ; promoted 
 to post-captain, 451 ; 476. 
 
 Penmarcks, rocks, 45S. 
 
 Penn, Sir William, his criticism 
 of Four Days Battle, 12. 
 
 Perry, Commander, 436. 
 
 Peuple Souverain, ship, 406. 
 
 Philadelphia, evacuation of, 284. 
 
 PiTf, William, defends Admiral 
 Byng, 105 ; his dislike of Hawke, 
 106; his military purpose, no; 
 proposed series of descents on 
 French coast, no; his impetu- 
 osity a spur to laggards, 1 13 ; his 
 energy felt in civil administra- 
 tion, 114; blames military and 
 naval leaders, 115; his injustice 
 meets rebuke, 116; profits by 
 Hawke's suggestions, 117; 
 leaves Hawke a commodore, 
 144 ; succeeded by Lord St. 
 Vincent in Admiralty, 380. 
 
 Plattsburg, 436. 
 
 Plymouth, ship Dutton driven 
 ashore at, 452. 
 
 PococK, Admiral, 164; 165. 
 
 Poder, ship, 41, 42, 43, 86. 
 
 Point Judith, 281. 
 
 Pompee, ship, dismasted at Al- 
 geciras, 416 ; withdraws under 
 tow, 417; 418. 
 
 Porcupine, sloop-of-war, 326. 
 
 Portland, ship, 80. 
 
 Port Mahon, surrendered, 105; 
 156; 367. 
 
 Porto Rico, 244. 
 
 Portugal, Napoleon designs to 
 occupy, 413; 414. 
 
 PowNOLL, Captain, intimacy of, 
 with Pellew, 431 ; commands fri- 
 gate Apollo, 442 ; death of, 442. 
 
 Prince, ship, 365. 
 
 Prince William, ship, 188. 
 
Index 
 
 495 
 
 Quebec, 432. 
 
 Queen Charlotte, ship, 250, 265 ; 
 
 305; 311; 313; 317; 469; 470; 
 
 472; 473- 
 Quiberon Bay, Hawke's disregard 
 
 of pilotage difficulties at, 114; 
 
 Hawke's triumph at, 122; 
 
 France determines to invade 
 
 England, 124; location of, 125; 
 
 Hawke crowds all sail for, 136; 
 
 islands of, cultivated as kitchen 
 
 gardens, 141 ; Howe at, 273 ; 460. 
 
 Ramillies, ship, 60, 61. 
 
 Real, ship, 41, 44. 
 
 Real Carlos, ship, 417; 420; re- 
 markable loss of, 420. 
 
 Red Sea, 403. 
 
 Reunion, frigate, quits Cherbourg, 
 399; meets British frigate Cres- 
 cent, 399 ; action of, with Cres- 
 cent, 399, 400. 
 
 Revenge, ship, 59 ; 60 ; 62. 
 
 Rhode Island, Saumarez sent to, 
 387 ; British retreat to, 387. 
 
 Richelieu, river, 433 ; 434. 
 
 Robespierre, orders of, to Ad- 
 miral Villaret-Joyeuse, 301. 
 
 Rochefort, Hawke's expedition 
 against, iii ; Conflans's vessels 
 escape to, 141. 
 
 Rochetts, country seat of Lord St. 
 Vincent, 380. 
 
 Rodney, Admiral, development of 
 naval warfare identified with 
 name of, 4 ; uplifted the navy, 6 ; 
 before Havre, 126; succeeds 
 Hawke, 145; his descent, 148; 
 his father in command of the 
 royal yacht, 148; George I. his 
 sponsor, 148; given the name of 
 the king, 148; his advancement, 
 148; contrasted in temperament 
 with Hawke, 152; presented at 
 Court, 153; complimented to 
 the king, 153; appointed Com- 
 modore, and commander of 
 
 Newfoundland station, 154; let- 
 ter to, from Earl of Sandwich, 
 'S4> '55; *'^^ Earl's confidence 
 in, 1 55 ; returns to Kngland, 1 56 ; 
 elected to Parliament, 156; no 
 connection with Minorca inci- 
 dent, 156, breaks with tradition, 
 156; accompanies Rochefort ex- 
 pedition under Hawke, 157; 
 commands ship-of-theline under 
 Boscawen, at Louisburg, 157; 
 again returns to England, 157; 
 promoted to rear-admiral, 158; 
 operates against Havre and 
 Brest, 158; again elected to Par- 
 liament, 158; appointed to Lee- 
 ward Islands station, 158; sails 
 for his new post, 158; begins 
 operations against Martinique, 
 158; begins hostilities against 
 Spain, 159; receives intelligence 
 of approach of Brest fleet, 160; 
 gives pursuit, 160 ; hastens to 
 succor of Jamaica, 160; takes 
 the responsibility, 162, 163; his 
 bitter disappointment, 164; or- 
 dered to join expedition under 
 Pocock, 164; his letter to Earl 
 of Sandwich, 164; goes to Mar- 
 tinique, 166; at fall of Havana, 
 166 ; active service in Seven 
 Years War terminated, 166; re- 
 turns to England, 1763, 166; 
 made a vice-admiral of the Blue, 
 and vice-admiral of the Red, 
 167; appointed commander-in- 
 chief at Jamaica, 167 ; governor 
 of Greenwich hospital, 167 ; his 
 report concerning free-ports, i6g, 
 170; was a pronounced Tory, 170 ; 
 demands of governor of Carta- 
 gena delivery of captured war 
 schooner Hawke, 171 ; disturl)s 
 British ministry by Hawke inci- 
 dent, 172; Sandwich's caution- 
 ary letter to, 172, 173 ; his act 
 justified by government, 174; 
 
496 
 
 Ind 
 
 ex 
 
 Sandwich reassures him, 174; 
 his hopes for a colonial appoint- 
 ment, 174; Jamaica his first 
 choice, 174; Sandwich's renewed 
 assurances, 175; is superseded, 
 175; has permission to remain at 
 Jamaica, 175; lands in England, 
 175; lacked influence to obtain 
 preferment, 175 ; settles in Paris, 
 175; becomes pecuniarily in- 
 volved, 175; applies to Admir- 
 alty for employment, 176; his 
 application disregarded, 176 ; ad- 
 miral of white squadron, 177; 
 declaration of Sandwich con- 
 cerning, in House of Lords, 178 ; 
 Richard Cumberland's remark 
 concerning, 17S; detained in 
 France by creditors, 179; Lady 
 Rodney's efforts to release, 179 ; 
 Marechal Biron makes advance 
 to, 179; demands of creditors of, 
 satisfied, 179, 180; repays Biron, 
 180; returns to England, 180; 
 appointed to command Leeward 
 Islands station, 1S5; analysis of 
 his powers in 1782, 186; Sand- 
 wich urges him to sea with all 
 despatch, 187; sails from Plym- 
 outh, 187 ; captures a Spanish 
 convoy, 188; sights Spanish 
 fleet, off Cape St. Vincent, 188; 
 is congratulated by Sandwich, 
 190; letter of latter to, 191 ; let- 
 ter to, from I^dy Rodney, 191 ; 
 his reply, 193 ; his report of bat- 
 tle, 192; Sandwich's letter to, 
 193 ; England's joy over achieve- 
 ment of, 193; reaches St. Lucia, 
 194; place of, among naval chiefs, 
 196; follows De Guichen's sail- 
 ing from Martinique, 197; over- 
 takes French fleet, 197; attacks 
 the enemy, 198; criticises mis- 
 conduct of his officers, 204 ; his 
 stern discipline, 206, 207 ; makes 
 suggestions to the Admiralty, 
 
 209 ; sails for North American 
 coast, 211 ; anchors off Sandy 
 Hook, 211; his coming a grievous 
 blow to Washington, 211; dis- 
 claims intention of offending 
 Arbuthnot, 213; lands at New 
 York, 214; returns to West In- 
 dies, 216; destruction of Lan- 
 gara's fleet by, 216; reaches 
 Barbados, 217; vessels lost in 
 hurricane, 217 ; ordered to pro- 
 ceed against Dutch shipping, 
 217; captures St. Eustatius 
 island, 218; captures Dutch fleet 
 of merchant ships, 218; author 
 criticises hampering of Hood, 
 222 ; writes to Admiral Parker, 
 225 ; is advised of approach of 
 French fleet, 225, 226; devotes 
 himself to supervision of St. 
 Eustatius island, 226; his error, 
 227 ; sends small force against 
 De Grasse, 229; forced to retire, 
 230; his return to England, 232; 
 again afloat, 232 ; sails for his 
 station, 232 ; reaches Barbados, 
 234 ; learns of capitulation of St. 
 Kitts, 235; takes united fleet to 
 Santa Lucia, 235: is assailed in 
 Parliament, 235; follows French 
 fleet from Martinique, 236; 
 pushes reinforcements to Hood, 
 237 ; battle with De Grasse, 23S- 
 242 ; his victory, 242 ; moves 
 toward Jamaica, 243 ; is criticised 
 for lethargic action, by Hood, 
 244 ; his defence, 244, 245 ; anal- 
 ysis of character as shown in 
 battle with De Grasse, 248, 249, 
 250 ; his professional career 
 ends, 251 ; is superseded, 251 ; 
 succeeded by Pigot, 251 ; leaves 
 Jamaica and lands at Bristol, 251; 
 Hood's comment on, 252; re- 
 ceives thanks of Parliament, 252; 
 advanced to the peerage, 252 ; is 
 voted a pension, 252 ; his other 
 
Index 
 
 497 
 
 honors, 253; made vice-admiral 
 of Great Britain, 253; his troub- 
 lous later years, 253; death of, 
 253 ; in accord with Lord Sand- 
 wich, 287. 
 
 Rodney, Lady, goes to England 
 to obtain pecuniary relief for 
 husband, 179; her letter to hus- 
 band concerning victory off Cape 
 St. Vincent, 191, 192. 
 
 RooKE, Admiral, his movements 
 off Malaga, 15. 
 
 Rowley, Rear-Admiral, off Tou- 
 lon, 21, 28 ; compliments Hawke, 
 84. 
 
 Royal, Fort, 235. 
 
 Royal George, ship, 140; loss of. 
 
 290 ; 393 < 
 Royal Savage, schooner, 438. 
 Russell, ship, Saumarez appointed 
 
 to command, 395 ; 396. 
 Russia, Sweden at war with, 421 ; 
 
 breach of, with Napoleon, 422 ; 
 
 fleet of, takes refuge in Gulf of 
 
 Finland, 425. 
 Russia, Czar of, 421. 
 
 St. Antoine, ship, 420. 
 
 St. Christopher, island, 394. 
 
 St. Eustatius, island, captured by 
 Rodney, 217, 218 ; recaptured by 
 French, 233; Rodney assailed in 
 Parliament for acts at, 235. 
 
 St. George, ship, 351 ; two seamen 
 of, condemned for infamous 
 crime, 360; outburst of crew of, 
 360; execution of seamen of, 361. 
 
 St. Johns (Canada) ; 434, 435 ; 
 437- 
 
 St. Kitts, 163 ; 165 ; 228 ; is be- 
 sieged by French, 234; capitu- 
 lates, 235. 
 
 St. Lawrence, river, 433 ; 434. 
 
 St. Vincent, Cape, captured by 
 British, 159; Spanish fleet 
 sighted by Rodney, off, 188 ; 
 battle off, 190 ; victory of Jervis 
 
 at, 345 ; 353 ; 355 ; Jervis's battle 
 off, 352-357 ; Saumarez at battle 
 off, 400. 
 
 St. Vincent, Earl, declines a com- 
 mand, 286; denounces ministry 
 to George IIL, 287 ; Admiral 
 Jervis created, 356; 359; 360 ; 
 361 ; 362 ; 364 ; 367 ; 368 ; 370 ; 
 .372; 373; 374; 375; 376; 377; 
 379 ; 3'^° ; 3^' ; 4°' ; assumes 
 command Channel fleet, 411 ; 
 complimentary note of, to Sau- 
 marez, 411, 412; his praise of 
 Saumarez, 412, 413; recognizes 
 ability of Pellew, 460, see also 
 Jervis. 
 
 Sainte-Andr6, Jean Bon, 312. 
 
 Sandwich, Earl of, letter from, to 
 Rodney, 154,155; his confidence 
 in Rodney, 155; his cautionary 
 letter to Rodney, 172, 173 ; dis- 
 regards Rodney's application for 
 employment, 176; his remark 
 concerning Rodney in House of 
 Lords, 178 ; urges Rodney to 
 sea with all despatch, 187 ; con- 
 gratulates Rodney, 190; private 
 letter from, to Rodney, 193; 
 character of, 285, 286. 
 
 Sandy Hook, Rodney anchors off, 
 211. 
 
 San Fiorenzo Bay, 333; 348. 
 
 San Josef , ship, 355. 
 
 San Nicolas, ship, 355. 
 
 Santa Lucia, island, captured by 
 British, 159; 228; French pro- 
 ceed against, 229; failure of 
 attack on, 229; Rodney takes 
 united fleet to, 235; 245; 248. 
 
 Santo Domingo, 244. 
 
 Saratoga, 276 ; 441 ; 442. 
 
 Sardinia, Lord Exmouth demands 
 peace for, 463. 
 
 Saumarez, Admiral, 382 ; birth of, 
 383 ; his mastery of French lan- 
 guage, 383; lineage of, 383 ; con- 
 trasted with Nelson, 3S3 ; early 
 
 32 
 
498 
 
 Index 
 
 taste of, for navy, 383 ; begins 
 career at early age, 383, 384 ; goes 
 afloat at thirteen, 384; cruises 
 in Mediterranean, 384 ; follows 
 Nelson in pursuit of Bonaparte's 
 fleet, 384 ; return of, to England, 
 3S4; examined for promotion to 
 lieutenancy, 384 ; appointed Mas- 
 ter's Mate, 384 ; owes advance- 
 ment to Admiral Keppel, 384, 
 385; sails in squadron com- 
 manded by Commodore Sir 
 Peter Parker, 3S5 ; offered com- 
 mission by Lord Cornwallis, 385 ; 
 meeting of, with Cornwallis 
 subsequently, 3S5; arrives off 
 Charleston, 3S6; aids in attack 
 on Fort Moultrie, 3S6; courage 
 of, in action, 387 ; promotion of, 
 to lieutenancy, 387 ; in command 
 of a galley, 3S7 ; is sent to Rhode 
 Island, 387 ; stationed at Sea- 
 komet, 388 ; returns to England, 
 388 ; his lot thrown with lirte-of- 
 battle force, 388, 389 ; in action 
 with Dutch off Dogger Bank, 
 391, 392; again promoted, 392 ; 
 made commander of Tisiplume, 
 392 ; on the tide which leads to 
 fortune, 393 ; reaches Barbados, 
 394 ; joins fleet, 394 ; encounters 
 French fleet under De Grasse, 
 394 ; effects brilliant manoeuvre, 
 394 ; ordered to England, 395 ; 
 Hood substitutes another officer, 
 395; appointed to command 
 Russell, 495 ; an acting post-cap- 
 tain, 395; bravery of, in Rod- 
 ney's renowned battle, 395, 396 ; 
 engages De Grasse's flagship, 
 396; brilliant manoeuvre of, 
 
 396 ; promoted and returns to 
 England, 397 ; in retirement, 
 
 397 ; marries, 398 ; makes trip 
 to France, 398 ; at beginning of 
 work on Cherbourg breakwater, 
 398; receives attention from 
 
 Louis XVL, 39S; appointed to 
 command Crescent, 399 ; inter- 
 cepts French frigate R^uuion, 
 399; analysis of action between 
 Crescent and Reunion, 399; is 
 knighted for victory, 400 ; ap- 
 pointed to ship-of-the-line Orion, 
 400 ; captures three French 
 ships, 400; at battle off Cape 
 St. Vincent, 400; blockades 
 Cadiz, 400 ; operates off Toulon, 
 400; inferior to Trowbridge in 
 eyes of St. Vincent and Nel- 
 son, 401 ; given equal command 
 with Trowbridge, 402 ; his at- 
 tack upon French fleet before 
 Toulon, 402; as a letter writer, 
 402 ; his record of pursuit of 
 French fleet, 402 ; favors seeking 
 enemy off coast of Egypt, 404 ; 
 reaches Alexandria, 404 ; returns 
 westward, 404; again sights 
 Alexandria, 404 ; despondency 
 of, 405 ; learns of proximity of 
 enemy in Aboukir Bay, 405 ; 
 share of, in battle of the Nile, 
 405; wounded, 407, 409; unfor- 
 tunate remark of, to Nelson, 
 407, 408; losses of, at battle of 
 Nile, 409 ; convoys prizes to 
 Gibraltar, 409; ordered to home 
 station, 409; impatient at delays, 
 410; reaches England, 410; ap- 
 pointed to command the Ccssar, 
 410; at blockade of B'rest, 411 ; 
 St. Vincent's flattering note to, 
 411, 412 ; importance of situation 
 of, off Brest, 412; St. Vincent's 
 praise of, 412, 413; Napoleon 
 threatens flank of, 414; given 
 command of a squadron, 414; 
 now a rear-admiral, 414 ; ordered 
 to blockade Cadiz, 414 ; sails on 
 his mission, 415; arrives off 
 Cadiz, 415; learns of French 
 vessels at Algeciras, 415; starts 
 for Algeciras, 415; finds French 
 
Index 
 
 499 
 
 fleet moored at, 415; steers to 
 engage French, 415; failure of 
 wind interferes with plans of, 
 415; disaster to two ships of, 
 416; withdraws to Gibraltar, 
 416; failure of, 416; confident 
 despatch of, to Admiralty, 417 ; 
 fresh opportunity of, 417 ; learns 
 of approach of Spanish fleet, 
 417, 41S ; sails in pursuit of 
 Spaniards, 41S; gives battle off 
 Algeciras, 420 ; St. Vincent's 
 praise of, 421 ; St. Vincent eulo- 
 gizes, in House of Lords, 421 ; 
 eulogized by Nelson, in House 
 of Lords, 421 ; never again en- 
 gaged in serious encounter with 
 enemy, 421 ; commander-in-chief 
 at Channel Islands, 421 ; insures 
 Swedish neutrality, 422 ; main- 
 tains importance of Baltic, 421 ; 
 disturbs commerce between 
 nations on the Baltic, controlled 
 by Napoleon, 422 ; succeeds to 
 diplomatic situation, 424 ; suc- 
 cess of, 425; praise of, by Swed- 
 ish statesman, 425; follows Rus- 
 sian fleet in Gulf of Finland, 
 426; retires from service, 427; 
 later life at Guernsey, 427 ; re- 
 ceives peerage from William IV., 
 427 ; death of, 427 ; 476 ; 477. 
 
 Saumarez, Lord de, 427. 
 
 Saumarez, Philip, 3S5. 
 
 SAUNDERS,'Captain, his conduct in 
 battle off La Rochelle, 92. 
 
 Saunders, Sir Charles, associated 
 with Jervis, 325 ; 328. 
 
 ScHANK, Admiral, 435. 
 
 Schuyler, General, 442. 
 
 Scilly, Howe encounters allied 
 fleet off, 288. 
 
 Scrieiise, frigate, 406. 
 
 Seven Years War, contrasted with 
 American revolution, 102 ; result 
 of, in North America and India, 
 102 ; finds Rodney a captain, 
 
 156; Rodney's career in, termi- 
 nated, 166; Howe's part in, 260. 
 
 Siberia (on French coast), 411, 
 
 Sicily, 403 ; 404. 
 
 Smuggling, in West Indies, 168, 
 169. 
 
 Sore!, town of, 433. 
 
 South African war, contrasted 
 with American revolution, loi. 
 
 Spain, refuses to surrender British 
 supply vessel captured by the 
 French, 106; Great Britain be- 
 gins hostilities against, 159; in- 
 creases custom-house force in 
 West Indies, 169 ; seeks a 
 quarrel with Great Britain, 
 171 ; embittered by loss of 
 Havana and Manila, 171 ; near 
 verge of rupture with Great 
 Britain, over Falkland Islands 
 incident, 172; declares war, 185; 
 fleet of, enters English Channel, 
 185 ; navy of, concentrated at 
 Cadiz, 414. 
 
 Spanish colonies, in West Indies, 
 their geographical relation to 
 Jamaica, 168; smuggling in, 168. 
 
 Stamp Act, discontent over, in 
 American colonies, 172. 
 
 Stanislas, frigate, 442 ; goes 
 aground off Belgian coast, 442, 
 
 443- 
 
 Stewart, Colonel, 446. 
 
 Superb, ship, 417 ; 419; 420. 
 
 Sweden, British fleet supports, 
 421; 424; forced by Napoleon 
 to declaration of war, 424. 
 
 Tagus, river, 351. 
 
 Ternay, Admiral, 212; 214. 
 
 Terrible, ship, 91. 
 
 Thesee, ship, 140. 
 
 Ticonderoga, 433 ; 441 ; 442. 
 
 Tilsit, agreements at, 421. 
 
 TiPPOO Saib, 403. 
 
 Tisiphotie, ship, 392 ; 393 ; 395. 
 
 Tobago, attack on, 229 ; Drake 
 
500 
 
 Index 
 
 meets De Grasse, off, 230 ; sur- 
 renders to De Grasse, 230. 
 
 Tortnant, ship, 90, 91. 
 
 Torbay, British fleet leaves, 128. 
 
 Toulon, Admiral Mathews off, 5, 
 20; engagement off, 21, 22; de- 
 scription of action off, 30, 31 ; 
 movements of fleet criticised, 
 11, 34 ; 346 ; 348 ; Saumarez 
 operates off, 400 ; 403 ; 414 ; 415. 
 
 TouRViLLE, characterization of, 
 13 ; his death, 14. 
 
 Trafalgar, 422 ; 461 ; 476. 
 
 Transvaal, war in, some lessons 
 from, 18. 
 
 Trident, ship, 60, 61, 64, 91. 
 
 Tripoli, agrees to treat captives as 
 civilized countries, 463; releases 
 Christian slaves, 474. 
 
 Troubridgk, Captain, 353 ; gal- 
 lantry of, at battle off Cape St. 
 Vincent, 353 ; 35s ; 401 ; 402. 
 
 Tunis, agrees to treat captives as 
 civilized countries, 463 ; delivers 
 up Christian slaves, 474. 
 
 Turkey, troops of, slaughter coral 
 fishermen on Algerine coast, 464. 
 
 Unitkd States, Navy of, see Navy 
 
 of United States. 
 Ushant, island, Howe encounters 
 
 French fleet off, 302 ; Jervis in 
 
 battle off, 331. 
 
 Valcour Island, 436; 437. 
 
 /V«^«/r, ship,3i4 ; 315; loss of, 316. 
 
 Victory, ship, 293 ; 354. 
 
 Vilaine, river, 141, 143. 
 
 ViLLARET-JoYKUSE Admiral, or- 
 ders of Robespierre to, 301 ; en- 
 counters fleet under Howe, 302 ; 
 306; attacked by Howe in force, 
 310; record of, 312. 
 
 Vtlle de Paris, flagship of De 
 Grasse, collides with ZeU, 238 ; 
 strikes her flag,242j 363; 369; 373. 
 
 Walpole, on the Colonies, loi. 
 
 Warde, Captain Charles, instruc- 
 tions of Lord Exmouth to, 466 ; 
 examines defences and sound- 
 ings in port of Algiers, 466. 
 
 Washington, George, Rodney's 
 coming to American coast a 
 grievous blow to, 211; 214 ; con- 
 cerning letter of Howe to, 276 ; 
 279 ; comment of, on arrival of 
 D'Estaing, 2S0; letter of, con- 
 cerning movement against Rhode 
 Island, 282. 
 
 West Indies, smuggling in, 16S; 
 Arbuthnot ordered to send ships 
 to, 210 ; conditions in, 1780, 210 
 Rodney returns to, 216; 392; 
 
 393- 
 
 White, sailing-master, com- 
 mended by Jervis, 342, 343. 
 
 Whitshed, Admiral Sir James, 
 266 ; his anecdote of Lord Gard- 
 ner, 266. 
 
 William III., King of England, 
 grantor of peerage to grandfather 
 of Lord Howe, 256. 
 
 William IV., King of England, 
 a midshipman at taking of Span- 
 ish convoy, iSS ; confers a 
 peerage on Admiral Saumarez, 
 427. 
 
 Wolfe, General, Howe's friend- 
 ship with, 262; intimacy of, with 
 Admiral Jervis, 325, 326; anec- 
 dote concerning, 326; message 
 of, by Jervis, to Miss Lowther, 
 326. 
 
 York, Duke of, received on ship- 
 board by Howe, 263; holds re- 
 ception, 263, 264. 
 
 Yorktown, 393. 
 
 Zealous, ship, 350. 
 ZHe, ship, 238 ; collides with flag- 
 ship Ville de Paris, 23S. 
 
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