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GIFT OF 
 i.-'r .H .L .Leupp 
 
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND MOBILIZATION OF 
 A RESERVE FOR THE REGULAR ARMY 
 
 PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS 
 
 AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY 
 
 POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES 
 
 WCD 8106-15 
 
 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON 
 
 NOVEMBER, 1915 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 1916 
 
 522 
 
. > A 
 
 : . ' 
 
 WAR DEPARTMENT, 
 
 Document No. 522. 
 
 Office of the Chief o 
 
SYNOPSIS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 1. Principles governing brochure. . ^ 5 
 
 2. Character of reserve discussed 5 
 
 3. The present "Army reserve " 6 
 
 4. Regulations for "Army reserve " 6 
 
 5. Defects of present law 7 
 
 6. Necessity for change in law 9 
 
 7. Development of reserve 10 
 
 8. Composition of each unit, Regular Army 11 
 
 9. Period with the colors should be definite 11 
 
 10. Degree of readiness of regular reserve 11 
 
 11. Organization of units 12 
 
 12. Mobile troops alone required 12 
 
 13. Distribution in arms of the service 13 
 
 14. Estimate of strength after three years 13 
 
 15. Organization under department commanders 14 
 
 16. Officers for regiments and smaller unite 14 
 
 17. Officers for divisions and brigades 15 
 
 18. Arms and equipment 15 
 
 19. Annual training of reserve 15 
 
 20. Elimination of the unfit 15 
 
 21. Should pay be given for service in reserve? 16 
 
 22. Pay due for annual training 16 
 
 23. Advantages of annual assembly of reserve 17 
 
 24. Mobilization of reserve 17 
 
 25. Notice of mobilization 18 
 
 26. Transportation and subsistence of reservists 18 
 
 27. Record of assembly and physical examination 18 
 
 28. Clothing for reservists 19 
 
 29. Advantages of policy outlined 19 
 
 622 (3) 
 
 667379 
 
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND MOBILIZATION OF A 
 RESERVE FOR THE REGULAR ARMY. 
 
 [A brochure based upon and explanatory of a Statement of a Proper Military Policy for 
 the United States, Sept. 11, 1915.] 
 
 1. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING BROCHURE. 
 
 A Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States, 
 submitted September 11, 1915, contains in Chapter III, Reserves, 
 the following paragraph: 
 
 41. The regular reserve. As the United States should have a mobile force 
 of 500,000 soldiers available at home at the outbreak of war, the Army, with 
 the regular reserve, should amount to this strength. In order to develop the 
 necessary regular reserve with the Army at the strength advocated in this 
 policy, enlistments would have to be for about eight years two with the 
 colors and six in reserve. That would, in eight years, result in approximately 
 the following mobile forces at home available at the outbreak of war : 
 
 (1) Mobile regular troops (combatant) with the colors 121, 000 
 
 (2) The regular reserve 379,000 
 
 Total 500, 000 
 
 During the first weeks of war in this country the military situation will 
 probably be critical. At that time every fully trained soldier should be put 
 in the field. To do that with the small military establishment herein advocated 
 it is necessary that during peace the Army be kept at war strength and that 
 the regular reserve be organized and not kept back to replace losses expected 
 during war. Such losses should be replaced from depot units. 
 
 2. CHARACTER OF RESERVE DISCUSSED. 
 
 Generally speaking, any troops not incorporated in the Regular 
 Army, but intended for reenforcement thereof, constitute a reserve 
 of such Army. This paper deals only with that portion of such a 
 reserve force as is developed through the ranks of the Regular 
 Army and is intended for use jointly with the Regular Army; that 
 which consists of trained and organized mobile troops, ready for 
 use at the outbreak of war under conditions stated in paragraph 6 
 of the " Statement of a proper military policy." 
 
 The estimate of 379,000 men in reserve, stated in the policy. 
 (W. C. D., 9053-90) is based on the experience that while serving 
 with the colors, about 20 per cent per year of our soldiers are lost 
 otherwise than by expiration of enlistment (W. C. D. 9053-43), and 
 on the assumption that such loss while men are furloughed to the 
 
 522 (5) 
 
6 
 
 reserve will be at about half this rate and that about 28 per cent 
 of the Army will be enlisted men with special qualifications needed 
 continuously with the colors. The strength being 231,166 (omitting 
 Philippine Scouts and Porto Rican Regiment), 72 per cent thereof, 
 or 166,500, will develop approximately 379,000 reserves at the end 
 of eight years. 
 
 3. THE PRESENT "ARMY RESERVE." 
 
 It is well, in consideration of this subject, to study the existing 
 law and ascertain whether it will furnish the number of reservists 
 required. 
 
 Section 2 of the act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat, 590, 591; pp. 
 36 and 37, Bulletin No. 15, War Department, 1912), provided for the 
 Army reserve consisting of: 
 
 (1) Class A. Soldiers furloughed and transferred at the expira- 
 tion of three years' service and soldiers furloughed at the expira- 
 tion of four years' service, unless they apply to remain with their 
 organizations until completion of the seven-years' period of enlist- 
 ment, made effective on November 1, 1912, by the act. 
 
 (2) Class B. Soldiers who reenlist in the Army reserve for a 
 term of three years at the expiration of a seven-years' period of 
 enlistment, and persons honorably discharged from the Regular 
 Army who may enlist in the Army reserve for a term of three years. 
 No restriction is placed upon reenlistment of any soldier. 
 
 The same act provided an " auxiliary to the Army reserve " con- 
 sisting of honorably discharged soldiers of the Regular Army not 
 over 45 years of age with character reported at least good, who, when 
 called by proclamation of the President in time of war or when war 
 is imminent, present themselves for reenlistment within a specified 
 period and are found physically qualified for the duties of a soldier. 
 
 4. REGULATIONS FOR "ARMY RESERVE." 
 
 Members of the Army reserve not in active service are not entitled 
 to pay or allowances. If summoned by the President to active service 
 when so authorized by Congress, in event of threatened or actual 
 hostilities, reservists of class A receive during continuance of their 
 service pay and allowances authorized by law for soldiers serving 
 in their organizations and a sum equal to $5 per month for each 
 month they have belonged to the reserve, as well as actual cost 
 of transportation and subsistence from their homes to the places 
 at which they may be ordered to report for duty. They revert to 
 the grade of private on date of reporting for duty. Reservists of 
 class B receive the same, including additional pay for second en- 
 listment. 
 
 Each honorably discharged soldier summoned by the President 
 as part of the " auxiliary to the Army reserve " found physically 
 
 522 
 
qualified and reenlisted in the line of the Army or Hospital Corps 
 receives on reenlisting a bounty computed at rates from $8 to $2 
 per month, according to the period which has elapsed since his last 
 discharge, and not to exceed $300 for any member of such auxiliary. 
 
 Doubtless, because of language employed in the last proviso of 
 section 2, viz, "may summon all furloughed soldiers who belong 
 to the Army reserve to rejoin their respective organizations," and 
 because of the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, 
 October 1, 1912 (pp. 34-39, Bulletin No. 22, War Department, 1912), 
 the Regulations for the Army Reserve, General Orders No. 11, War 
 Department, 1913, as amended, prescribe that the records of class 
 A reservists and of such class B reservists as have been assigned 
 to organizations be kept by the commanders of organizations or 
 chiefs of bureaus, the numbers thereof being noted on monthly 
 returns and the names on December muster rolls, or reported monthly 
 by number, and December 31 by name in letters to The Adjutant 
 General. 
 
 The custodians of such records furnish each reservist whose record 
 is held a postal card once each quarter, on which the reservist 
 reports any change of address or change in name and address of 
 nearest relative. This represents the only measure by which the 
 number of reservists still alive may be estimated. No measure 
 provides verification of physical condition of reservists. 
 
 5. DEFECTS OF PRESENT LAW. 
 
 This law is defective in the following respects : 
 
 (a) It will not develop an adequate reserve. On May 8, 1915, The 
 Adjutant General submitted an estimate of the approximate num- 
 ber of men who under this law will be furloughed or transferred to 
 the Army Reserve. Basing his estimate upon the percentage of men 
 enlisted or reenlisted who did not from 1908 to 1914 reenlist after 
 completing their periods of enlistment, he reported that by Novem- 
 ber 1, 1919, seven years after the seven-years' period became effective, 
 the Army Reserve may amount to 25,624 enlisted men, the number 
 thereafter furloughed to the reserve being approximately equal to 
 those discharged from the reserve. He reported that if all men who 
 did not intend to reenlist be furloughed to the reserve at the expira- 
 tion of three years' service the reserve by November 1, 1919, may 
 amount to 34,000 men. Even if no casualties occur among members 
 of the reserve, its strength will never be sufficient to raise units from 
 peace to war strength if such step be desirable. The Regular Army, 
 including reserve, will never exceed 134,000 men under this law. 
 
 (b) No reliable estimate can be made of the number of reservists 
 to be anticipated. 
 
 522 
 
8 
 
 The estimate given in (a) is confessedly only a guess. As re- 
 enlistment is not limited, and men have the option of serving three, 
 four, or seven years of the period for which enlisted, the reserve de- 
 veloped, as well as the actual strength of the Army, depends upon 
 the business conditions of the country. If labor commands a high 
 price, men who do not desert will seek purchase of discharge after 
 one year's service or furlough to the reserve after three years' service. 
 If times are hard and their station agreeable, they may decide to 
 remain seven years and then reenlist, or may reenlist at expiration of 
 four years rather than pass to the reserve. Their decision may be 
 influenced by conditions prevailing at their stations or their satisfac- 
 tion or dissatisfaction with their commanders or associates. 
 
 (<?) The law by providing that reservists shall, when summoned, 
 "rejoin their respective organizations" countenances the expensive 
 and inefficient system of reduced strength of units in peace. 
 
 In a country of as great area as the United States reservists could 
 not always or usually join "their respective organizations" in time 
 to participate in employment of such organizations when war comes 
 without warning. Even if, after long and expensive journeys, these 
 reservists join the companies from which furloughed, they would not 
 find arms and equipment on hand for issue. If such are kept always 
 with companies, much expense for transportation will result. Officers 
 for a company of Infantry of 150 men cost no more than for a com- 
 pany of 65 men. The same officers can command and administer 
 150 men in war efficiently only if required to command and administer 
 approximately the same sized organization in peace. 
 
 (d) Mobilization must be delayed, even when hostilities are actual, 
 until authority can be obtained from Congress. 
 
 If Congress be not in session, or if, being in session, the question 
 be debated, the transportation, equipment, and training of the Army 
 Reserve may be delayed until a hostile force has effected a landing 
 or crossed our international border. 
 
 (e) Absence of any authority to mobilize, inspect, or train re- 
 servists, except " in event of actual or threatened hostilities " and 
 " when so authorized by Congress," renders uncertain how many 
 reservists may be relied upon and " found physically fit for service." 
 
 Freed from the restraints of discipline and separated from the 
 sanitary conditions surrounding them when with the colors, fur- 
 loughed soldiers may contract vicious habits or incurable diseases, 
 may lose eyesight, hearing, or a limb, and yet be borne on the rolls 
 of " their respective organizations " as potential soldiers when sum- 
 moned. 
 
 (/) Payment of bounties to members of the " auxiliary to the 
 Army reserve" and of sums not thus called, but equivalent to 
 bounties to members of the Army reserve, gives legislative sanction 
 
 522 
 
9 
 
 to a pernicious system of purchasing compliance with his duty by 
 a citizen in the first case and with the obligation voluntarily assumed 
 by a soldier in the second. 
 
 Any ex-soldier whose services are desirable in war will appear 
 somewhere, either as an officer or enlisted man of volunteers, or as 
 an enlisted regular, whether or not it be possible for him to collect 
 a bounty " not to exceed $300." A soldier who has been away from 
 the colors six years and six months will receive the total of $300, 
 as will another who, having been discharged at 21 (after three 
 years' enlistment under former laws), offers to enlist 23 years later, 
 or before he is 45. Is either worth more than a young, healthful 
 college graduate with four years' attendance at such an institution 
 as Cornell and two or three summers at a students' camp? No 
 " bounty " is payable to the latter. 
 
 A member of the Army reserve, sworn to serve seven years, but 
 furloughed during the latter four, may be paid at the rate of $5 
 per month for the entire period spent in the Army reserve. No 
 limit of $300 is prescribed in determining the total of such sums 
 payable. If a soldier has served as a reservist more than five years 
 in various enlistments, he receives more than $300 (pp. 4 and 5, 
 Bulletins 33, War Department, 1913). Why should a soldier be paid 
 for complying with his oath of enlistment ? 
 
 Reports of The Adjutant General show that about 61,033 ex-sol- 
 diers who left the service from June 30, 1910, to June 30, 1914, are 
 now in civil life. Should the President call upon them to present 
 themselves for reenlistment under this Act about June 30, 1916, 
 the possible bounties payable, ranging from $192 to $300 (2 years to 
 6 years, 6 months out of service), amount to $15,000,000. Other 
 ex-soldiers, discharged fiscal years 1891-1909, inclusive, amount to 
 83,000, and their bounties to $25,000,000, a total of $40,000,000 for 
 the " auxiliary to the Army reserve." At the average rate of annual 
 pay of infantry soldiers in a peace strength company ($213 about) 
 this sum, offered to purchase enlistment of 83,000 men, would furnish 
 more than the pay of 10 divisions for one year. If the possible 
 Army reserve after 1919 be estimated at 34,000 men, and the average 
 period of each of these in the reserve be considered two years (half 
 the possible period in reserve during one enlistment), return of 
 these to the colors would cost over $4,000,000 a little more than the 
 pay of one division for a year. 
 
 6. NECESSITY FOR CHANGE IN LAW. 
 
 As this legislation represents our first effort to provide by law 
 for a reserve of the Regular Army, it is not surprising that the 
 result is disappointing. 
 
 30669 No. 52216 2 
 
10 
 
 It was stated in the Keport of the Organization of the Land 
 Forces, 1912 (p. 31) : 
 
 In adopting a new policy in our Army it is important that present conditions 
 should not be disturbed more violently than necessary. 
 
 * * * The important thing is to take a step toward the new policy, leav- 
 ing its perfection to the experience of the future. 
 
 After the experience of the past three years it is necessary that 
 we so change the legislation governing a reserve that such force may 
 be developed regardless of business conditions, developed to an ex- 
 tent sufficient for adequate defense and capable of immediate mobili- 
 zation in organized units composed of men physically fit and prop- 
 erly armed and equipped without the necessity and expense of 
 purchasing compliance with military obligations by payment of 
 bounties. 
 
 7. DEVELOPMENT OF RESERVE. 
 
 If the country can afford the expense, the 500,000 men found neces- 
 sary for immediate use against trained troops of a possible invader 
 should all be continuously with the colors, and continued reenlist- 
 ment of every desirable soldier should be encouraged. The profes- 
 sional soldier should be encouraged to remain permanently in the 
 ranks, and the only reserve required can be gradually absorbed from 
 depot units as casualties occur in war. 
 
 The expense for the Army under this plan would be prohibitive; 
 but, if we do not have reserves, we are committed to a policy of maxi- 
 mum cost. 
 
 If the country can not afford to adopt a system involving maximum 
 cost, it is equally necessary to have ready for immediate mobiliza- 
 tion a force equal in size and as nearly as possible equal in training. 
 
 The military problem is not affected by the financial ability of this 
 country to meet the bill. If the 500,000 men required are not main- 
 tained always with the colors they should at least have served with 
 the colors in the ranks of the Regular Army a period sufficient to 
 receive training that will render each member continuously efficient 
 during his period in the reserve. This period is fixed at two years in 
 the Statement of a Proper Military Policy. The period each such 
 trained soldier must remain in the reserve depends upon the relation 
 of the strength with the colors to the total force required and the 
 percentage of each unit which, because permitted to reenlist, does not 
 contribute toward development of a reserve. In this policy such 
 period is six years, based upon figures shown in paragraph 2 above. 
 
 The economic effect of a reserve system is to reduce the per capita 
 cost of an army of the size demanded by the military situation. 
 Economy suggests designation of a large fraction of the 500,000 
 required as reserves. Effective action in emergency limits such 
 
 522 
 
11 
 
 expansion of the reserve portion to that fraction which can retain 
 efficiency and jointly with the peace nucleus satisfy the demands of 
 the military problem. 
 
 The provision of a reserve is a purely business proposition. 
 
 8. COMPOSITION OF EACH UNIT, REGULAR ARMY. 
 
 The enlisted strength of every unit of the Army should consist 
 of two portions: 
 
 (a) A permanent personnel composed of those men essential to 
 the continued discharge by such unit of its function as a training 
 school for reservists. 
 
 (5) A temporary personnel composed of those citizens who are 
 passed through this training school and prepared for possible serv- 
 ice as members of other (reserve) units of the same or of a similar 
 arm of the service. 
 
 9. PERIOD WITH THE COLORS SHOULD BE DEFINITE. 
 
 While deserving soldiers, who apply and are recommended by 
 their commanders as sufficiently trained, should be granted furloughs 
 to the reserve after a period of less than two years, provided the 
 military situation warrants the grant of such privilege, it must not 
 be optional, as now, for a soldier to remain with the colors longer 
 than two years, unless he be a noncommissioned officer or a man of 
 other technical training essential as a member of the permanent per- 
 sonnel of his organization for the training of other soldiers or the 
 administration of the organization. To permit soldiers generally 
 an option as to length of service with the colors, is to continue the 
 present uncertainty as to the size of reserve that may be developed. 
 The privilege of discharge by purchase should be repealed. Not to 
 exceed 28 per cent of each unit should be permitted to reenlist. 
 
 No soldier, whether with the colors or with the reserve, should be 
 discharged except for expiration of period of enlistment, by sentence 
 of court-martial, or for physical disability or other unfitness for 
 military service. 
 
 10. DEGREE OF READINESS OF REGULAR RESERVE. 
 
 Keserve units supplied with trained personnel should not be con- 
 fused with the force of citizen soldiers discussed in the first section 
 of paragraph 42 of the Statement of a Proper Military Policy. The 
 latter force will probably not have received, in time of peace, suffi- 
 cient training to render it fit for immediate employment against the 
 enemy at the outbreak of war, but the reserve of the Regular Army 
 must be ready for such employment, and hence its members must 
 
 522 
 
12 
 
 have had such training as will fit it for immediate service jointly 
 with that portion of the Kegular Army serving with the colors. For 
 the same reason it must have in peace such organization and equip- 
 ment as will render possible its instantaneous mobilization and trans- 
 portation to the places at which its action is desirable when war 
 becomes imminent. 
 
 11. ORGANIZATION OF UNITS. 
 
 Section 4 of the act of Congress approved April 25, 1914, contains 
 this proviso: 
 
 Provided further, That when military conditions so require, the President 
 may organize the land forces of the United States into brigades and divisions 
 and such higher units as he may deem necessary, and the composition of units 
 higher than the regiment shall be as he may prescribe. 
 
 The reserve of the Army being a part of the Kegular Army, and 
 therefore of the "land forces of the United States," according to 
 the act cited above, this proviso authorizes the organization of 
 reserve units higher than the regiment by Executive orders of the 
 President. Organization of other units regiments and lesser has 
 been provided by various acts of Congress. Because of development 
 of armament and function of certain branches of the service, this 
 legislation requires changes. The organization of various units of 
 the Eegular Army reserve should be the same as the organization 
 of similar units of the Regular Army. 
 
 12. MOBILE TROOPS ALONE REQUIRED. 
 
 The military problem requiring a force of 500,000 men available 
 at home as a mobile force, that portion designated as a regular 
 reserve, must be composed of mobile troops. 
 
 As stated in paragraph 32 of a Statement of a Proper Military 
 Policy, all mine fields and over-sea guns and one-half the guns at 
 home are manned from the Regular Army. The remainder of the 
 guns at home are to be manned by Coast Artillery units of the 
 Organized Militia. 
 
 This arrangement suggests the propriety of assigning enlisted men 
 of the reserve who have received training as members of the Coast 
 Artillery Corps units of the Regular Army to reserve units of Field 
 Artillery. This is especially desirable, as the quota of reservists 
 developed by units of Field Artillery recommended will not be 
 sufficient to furnish personnel for the corps or field army artillery 
 required as a portion of the mobile artillery of the reserve. 
 
 522 
 
13 
 
 13. DISTRIBUTION IN ARMS OF THE SERVICE. 
 
 Based upon the enlisted strength of various units of the Regular 
 Army shown in Tables of Organization, 1914, the 379,000 enlisted 
 members of the reserve would furnish mobile reserve units approxi- 
 mately as follows: 
 
 No. 
 
 Units. 
 
 Enlisted strength. 
 
 Combatant. 
 
 Sanitary. 
 
 Quarter- 
 master 
 Corps. 
 
 Total. 
 
 15 
 3 
 9 
 3 
 10 
 5 
 15 
 
 5 
 
 Divisions Infantry ................................. 
 
 310,095 
 26,931 
 10,980 
 3,297 
 4.940 
 815 
 1,350 
 
 12,390 
 1,344 
 
 6,315 
 810 
 
 328,800 
 29,085 
 10,980 
 3,297 
 4,940 
 815 
 1,350 
 
 Divisions Cavalry 
 
 Regiments, Heavy Field Artillery 
 
 Regiments, Mountain Field Artillery 
 
 
 
 Ponton battalions, Engineers 
 
 
 
 Field battalions, Signal Corps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 358, 408 
 
 13, 734 
 
 7,125 
 
 379,287 
 
 
 No sanitary nor supply units for corps or field army troops nor 
 line of communications troops need be organized in this reserve. 
 Sufficient sanitary and supply units as composite parts of divisions 
 are shown above for units which may anticipate contact with the 
 enemy. Such troops for corps or field army troops and all troops 
 for the line of communications may be supplied by citizen soldiers 
 not necessarily possessing so great a degree of training. 
 
 14. ESTIMATE OF STRENGTH AFTER THREE YEARS. 
 
 Upon the adoption of a policy such as is recommended, the mem- 
 bers of the present Army reserve and such men as have enlisted 
 under the present law will, as furloughs become due, constitute the 
 only reservists until two years from the date the new law becomes 
 effective. As seen in the discussion of the act of August 24, 1912, 
 the size of the reserve during such period will not until November 
 1, 1919, exceed 34,000, if men generally are furloughed at expira- 
 tion of three years' service, or 25,000 if furloughed generally at the 
 expiration of four years' service. 
 
 If legislation pursuant to this policy be adopted so as to give 
 effect thereto July 1, 1916, the Army reserve should by July 1, 1918, 
 equal about 20,000 men. By July 1, 1919, the increment received 
 by the reserve under the new law should be 112,000 (86 per cent of 
 131,000, the added strength of the Kegular Army), which, with what 
 then remains of the "Army reserve," should furnish a reserve of 
 about 135,000 men. 
 
 522 
 
14 
 
 15. ORGANIZATION UNDER DEPARTMENT COMMANDERS. 
 
 Until such time members of the reserve, being dispersed by resi- 
 dence throughout the country and being comparatively small in 
 number, could not well be organized into units larger than com- 
 panies, troops, batteries, etc. Records of reservists should be kept 
 at each department headquarters until administrative units (regi- 
 ments, separate battalions, etc.) can be organized. A soldier fur- 
 loughed to the reserve should, on designation of the place of his 
 intended residence, be directed to report (on blank form prepared 
 for him by his organization commander) to the department com- 
 mander or administrative unit commander of his branch of the 
 service for the area including his selected place of residence. Regu- 
 lations governing his duties and rights should be given him for his 
 guidance. Subsequent instructions should be sent to him, at the 
 address reported by him, from department headquarters or from 
 the headquarters of the administrative unit to which he may be 
 assigned. An officer of the General Staff, under direction of the 
 department commander, should have charge of assignment of all 
 furloughed soldiers coming within the department until adminis- 
 trative units shall have been organized. Thereafter the same officer 
 should care for correspondence concerning assignment of personnel 
 to and supply and mobilization of administrative units organized 
 within the department. 
 
 16. OFFICERS FOR REGIMENTS AND SMALLER UNITS. 
 
 No officers for this reserve of higher grade than captain need be 
 appointed or assigned until the numerical strength of the reserve of 
 any branch of the service residing within a definite area is sufficient 
 to warrant organization of units larger than companies, troops, 
 batteries, etc. 
 
 The supply of officers for the reserve is the subject of another 
 brochure. 
 
 An excellent source of supply of company officers during the early 
 stages of this organization will be found among retired noncommis- 
 sioned officers and ex-noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army 
 living now at various places throughout the country. These should 
 all be given opportunity to compete by examination for appointment 
 to the grades of company officers. Field officers for the reserve 
 should be selected after examination from among retired officers and 
 ex-officers of the Regular Army living within the proper departments 
 'of administrative unit areas. 
 
 522 
 
15 
 
 17. OFFICERS FOR DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES. 
 
 Divisions and brigades when organized should be commanded by 
 officers of the Regular Army, detailed in peace for such duty, ap- 
 pointments as general officers becoming effective only on mobiliza- 
 tion because of actual or threatened hostilities. 
 
 Such appointments should create temporary vacancies in the 
 grades held by such appointees, to be filled in a manner provided for 
 similar temporary vacancies caused by appointments to higher vol- 
 unteer rank under section 8 of the act approved April 25, 1914. 
 
 18. ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. 
 
 Deposits of arms and equipment for this reserve should be placed 
 in storage at Army posts, in Government buildings, and at rifle 
 ranges of the Organized Militia. Where such facilities are not 
 available, at storehouses erected for the purpose. 
 
 At each such location an officer of the reserve, placed on active 
 duty throughout the year, should be custodian of and accountable 
 for the arms and equipment. 
 
 Sites for these deposits, as they are to become mobilization points 
 for the reserve, should be places from which railway communication 
 facilitates prompt dispatch of mobilized units toward camps of con- 
 centration or mobilization. 
 
 19. ANNUAL TRAINING OF RESERVE. 
 
 While every enlisted member of the reserve will have had training 
 sufficient to establish his efficiency before furlough to the reserve, 
 maintenance of that degree of efficiency and demonstration that he 
 is still physically and morally fit for service suggest the propriety 
 of an annual period of inspection and training. 
 
 In the report of the Organization of the Land Forces, 1912, the 
 period recommended for such training was 10 days each year. 
 
 Without this opportunity to determine the physical and moral 
 state of each reservist and his dependability as a possible soldier in 
 war, the country may find, when actual or threatened hostilities 
 cause mobilization of the reserve, that its personnel is not dependable 
 to the extent shown by records of its strength. 
 
 20. ELIMINATION OF THE UNFIT. 
 
 Until mobilization places or camps can be designated for assembly 
 of units as large as regiments, the reserve should have its training at 
 the nearest Army stations. Until units as large as companies, troops, 
 and batteries are organized, individual reservists joining at the 
 nearest Army stations should be attached to regular organizations 
 
 522 
 
16 
 
 of the arm of service appropriate. During the assembly for training 
 each reservist should be physically examined and his conduct and 
 habits observed closely. If he should have developed disease such 
 as to render him probably unfit for service in war, or if his character 
 be such as to render him undesirable as a soldier, he should be dis- 
 charged. Having been examined physically at the time of furlough 
 to the reserve, no right to pension for disability incurred during 
 such status of furlough should be recognized. 
 
 For failure to comply with orders to report for training, a reservist 
 can be tried and punished, if arrested. Whether such disciplinary 
 action should be undertaken or the delinquent discharged for the con- 
 venience of the Government is a question that can be best determined 
 after experience with a reserve system. The controlling policy 
 should be to count upon no strength of the reserve that is not depend- 
 able in case of war. 
 
 21. SHOULD PAY BE GIVEN FOR SERVICE IN RESERVE? 
 
 A wise means of insuring presence of reservists at the annual 
 training is to postpone the delivery to him of any payment author- 
 ized until he has appeared at the designated assembly point and 
 completed the training prescribed. This leads to the question of 
 remuneration for service while on furlough as a member of the 
 reserve. 
 
 Under a system of compulsory service no pay is necessary or wise. 
 The furloughed soldier is a citizen and his annual training is a 
 compliance with the law which specifies the duties demanded of him 
 in return for rights and privileges enjoyed. 
 
 Under a system of voluntary enlistment, some pay, monthly or 
 annual, may be necessary, or citizens will not enlist in sufficient 
 numbers to enable the troops with the colors to develop sufficient 
 reserves. Whatever be the amount found necessary and desirable, 
 payment thereof is for having been ready and dependable as a re- 
 servist for the time for which payment is to be made. To pay by 
 mail on mere report by the reservist that he is alive and residing at 
 his proper address is to pay possibly for one who would not be 
 acceptable as a soldier if called to the colors. 
 
 22. PAY DUE FOR ANNUAL TRAINING. 
 
 Full pay of grade held on furlough, for the period spent in train- 
 ing, and traveling allowances to place of assembly and return to his 
 home should be paid whether any reserve pay be authorized or not. 
 
 Men furloughed as noncommissioned officers should hold such 
 grades during training, subject to reduction if their conduct or lack 
 of efficiency warrant. 
 
 622 
 
17 
 
 When the training is to be had at a point distant from the assembly 
 point or deposit of arms and equipment, transportation should be 
 by organization. 
 
 Transportation from homes to the assembly points should be issued 
 by the reserve officers on active duty at assembly point, or by any post- 
 master to whom transportation requests can be issued as an acting 
 quartermaster. Subsistence for individuals should be provided by 
 reimbursement at reasonable rate per meal instead of by advance of 
 funds. 
 
 23. ADVANTAGES OF ANNUAL ASSEMBLY RESERVE. 
 
 The character of training deemed necessary will be demonstrated 
 only by experience. 
 The main purposes of assembly for training will be : 
 
 (1) Opportunity of reserve officers to acquire some knowledge of 
 their subordinates ; 
 
 (2) Opportunity to eliminate the undesirable and promote the 
 efficient ; 
 
 (3) Opportunity to insure continued acquaintance of men with 
 arms and equipment, the models of which may have changed during 
 their furloughs ; 
 
 (4) Opportunity through joint maneuvers with the troops with 
 the colors to preserve acquaintance with modern and possibly chang- 
 ing methods of tactical training ; and 
 
 (5) Opportunity to verify the number and inspect the condition of 
 men shown by the returns to belong to the reserve. 
 
 Any one of these purposes should prove sufficient warrant for the 
 expense incurred through such periodical opportunity to make an 
 inventory of our reserve and determine its value as a military asset. 
 
 24. MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE. 
 
 The mobilization of a reserve should be subject to orders of the 
 President. Solution of our military problem demands that the re- 
 serve be as ready for prompt action as troops with the colors. It 
 will not be as near the scene of its intended action, but no delay in 
 calling its members to the colors should result through necessity, as 
 under the present law, of waiting for authority of Congress. 
 
 Having been directed by the President, mobilization should pro- 
 ceed under control by department commanders. 
 
 Units having assembled at the points previously designated and 
 used for deposit of arms and equipment for each annual training 
 should be moved by department commanders, according to instruc- 
 tions received by them, either to designated points in the theater of 
 
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 operations or to mobilization or concentration camps. Whether 
 organizations should be held in the areas pertaining thereto for de- 
 livery of animals and motor or wagon transportation or should be 
 sent to camps of mobilization and there supplied with transportation 
 of this kind will depend upon the military situation. Usually the 
 latter course will be preferable, as wagons, harness, etc., from gen- 
 eral supply depots and animals purchased or requisitioned may be 
 more economically and promptly delivered to organizations at camps 
 of mobilization. 
 
 25. NOTICE OF MOBILIZATION. 
 
 Notice of orders for mobilization, however received, should charge 
 each officer and man of the reserve with the duty of reporting at the 
 place where arms and equipment are deposited for his organization. 
 A proper way of serving such notice would be by posting a copy of 
 the proclamation of the President at every post office, railroad station, 
 and telegraph office in the country. This duty could be assigned to 
 postmasters. In addition, written notice should be mailed by the 
 reserve officers on active duty at all the assembly points at which arms 
 and equipment are deposited to each member of the organization re- 
 quired to assemble at such points. These, in blank forms, should be 
 addressed in time of peace, only the date of mobilization being entered 
 before mailing. Addresses should be changed as residences change. 
 
 26. TRANSPORTATION AND SUBSISTENCE OF RESERVISTS. 
 
 Postmasters, designated as acting quartermasters, should be given 
 blank transportation requests with which to furnish reservists trans- 
 portation to places of assembly. After the reserve has been de- 
 veloped to the strength above shown possible, places of assembly will 
 be so numerous and well distributed that, except in the case of mem- 
 bers of Signal Corps, engineers, and possibly certain field artillery 
 organizations, no reservist need travel more than a few hours in 
 order to join. Reimbursement for expense of meals en route, at a 
 rate of 25 cents per meal, should be made after reporting at the 
 assembly point. Officers joining, on mobilization, should receive 
 mileage from homes to places designated for commencement of their 
 duties. 
 
 . 27. RECORD OF ASSEMBLY AND PHYSICAL EXAMINATION. 
 
 No muster will be necessary. Organization rolls should be kept 
 up to date in peace so that notation on such rolls of the date each 
 reservist joins need be the only official record of the date when his 
 service under mobilization is commenced. Physical examination by 
 a surgeon of the reserve should be made as soon as practicable after 
 
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 joining to determine whether his condition warrants service either 
 (1) with his organization or (2) in some less active status with the 
 line of communications troops or at a regimental depot. In some 
 cases physical disability for any use in war may warrant discharge. 
 No soldier should be forwarded with his organization who is not 
 physically fit for service in the field and free from communicable 
 disease. 
 
 28. CLOTHING FOR RESERVISTS. 
 
 Whether each member of the reserve be required to keep himself 
 supplied in peace with one serviceable service uniform, to be worn 
 to place of assembly on mobilization, or the clothing for each organi- 
 zation be deposited with arms and equipment and issued for each 
 training period and on mobilization, can be determined only by ex- 
 perience. As a soldier's title to his clothing is shared by the Gov- 
 ernment until discharge, it is legal and equitable to require him to 
 keep some service uniform during his period of furlough and to use 
 it at each annual assembly for training and on mobilization. 
 
 On the other hand, a furloughed soldier might wear this uniform 
 when not called for training or mobilization, and many would not 
 have serviceable clothing when such is needed. 
 
 An organization will be more uniformly and serviceably clothed 
 if the latter plan be finally adopted, but its adoption will increase 
 considerably the expense of maintaining the reserve. 
 
 29. ADVANTAGES OF POLICY OUTLINED. 
 
 The policy recommended will develop a reserve. Its strength can 
 be definitely estimated. Its efficient employment with the regular 
 troops with the colors whenever circumstances warrant mobilization 
 can be reasonably anticipated. Its adoption will reduce the per 
 capita cost of the force demanded for solution of the national mili- 
 tary problem. 
 
 While more than human foresight is required to frame legislation 
 for which subsequent experience may not suggest the propriety of 
 amendment, the reasons just cited justiiy adoption of legislation 
 giving sanction to the policy. 
 
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 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY