THE MARQUIS DE LA FAYETTE 
 
 IN 
 
 THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. 
 
 WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE 
 
 ATTITUDE OF FRANCE TOWARD THE WAR OF 
 INDEPENDENCE. 
 
 BY 
 
 CHARLEMAGNE TOWER, JR., LL.D. 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES. 
 VOL. I. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 
 J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY. 
 1895. 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1894, 
 
 BY 
 CHARLEMAGNE TOWER, JR. 
 
 ELECTROTYPED AND PRINTED BY J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY, PHILADELPHIA, PA., U.S.A. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 I HAVE endeavored in these volumes to trace the 
 career of the Marquis de La Fayette in America, from 
 the time when he came here in 1777 until he returned 
 to France after the surrender of Earl Cornwallis, in 
 1781. I have used for this purpose the letters preserved 
 among his private papers which were published in his 
 Memoirs and Correspondence by his family after his 
 death, and I have carefully examined a large number 
 of manuscripts in this country, among the official docu 
 ments of the Department of State, as well as in private 
 collections and those of institutions to which access has 
 been granted me. 
 
 I have taken especial care to present in detail the 
 military operations of the Virginia Campaign, during 
 which La Fayette held an independent command, with 
 as close attention to his own statements as possible, fre 
 quently in his own words, in order that I might give a 
 faithful account of the part he played. 
 
 I have followed also with some minuteness of detail 
 the efforts of M. de La Fayette in our behalf at the 
 Court of Versailles during the year 1779 whilst he was 
 in France upon leave of absence ; for his incessant 
 presentation of the American cause at that time to the 
 Cabinet of King Louis XVI., and particularly to the 
 Comte de Vergenues and the Conite de Maurepas, had 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 an influence which contributed very greatly to the ulti 
 mate establishment of independence in the United States. 
 
 In coming before the public with this narrative, I 
 beg leave to acknowledge my obligation to M. Henri 
 Doniol, Correspondant de Flnstitut, Directeur de 1 Im- 
 primerie Nationale, who has rendered an international 
 service to France and America by the publication of his 
 admirable work, " Histoire de la Participation de la 
 France a TEtablissement des Etats-Unis d Amerique." 
 
 Students of American history are indebted to M. 
 Doniol for the collection and arrangement of documents 
 relating to the part which the Government of France 
 took in the uprising of the Colonies of North America 
 against Great Britain, as well as to its participation in 
 the War of Independence and in the establishment of 
 the American people as a nation, which have been pre 
 served in the Archives of France for more than a cen 
 tury, most of them unknown, many of them forgotten, 
 and all of them difficult of access to inquirers upon this 
 side of the Atlantic Ocean. His exceedingly painstaking 
 researches have presented to us the sources from which 
 Americans may obtain a definite comprehension and form 
 a proper estimate of the early relations of France to our 
 country. 
 
 Comparatively few people of the present generation 
 are aware of the inestimable benefits which the French 
 nation conferred upon our forefathers during the Amer 
 ican Revolution, at a time when America was without 
 credit abroad and when our cause aroused no other 
 national sympathy in the world than that of our faithful 
 ally. 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 France had her grievances against Great Britain as 
 well as we, it is true ; and she entered into our contest 
 for reasons which were satisfactory to herself, in the 
 same manner as every nation has enlisted in a foreign 
 cause since the beginning of recorded history. But for 
 us Americans the essential facts to be remembered in 
 connection with the alliance are that we went of our own 
 accord to France to ask for help, and that we received it 
 from her. Not only did she encourage us by the per 
 mission which she granted our agents to obtain supplies 
 and munitions of war in her ports for the maintenance 
 and equipment of the Continental army, but she em 
 ployed her own credit to borrow large sums of money 
 which she advanced to Congress, and she sent her sol 
 diers and her sailors to serve under the command of 
 General Washington and to fight for us in the battles 
 of the Republic. 
 
 Many of the darkest moments of the Revolution were 
 illumined by new hope when means were supplied us, 
 in the midst of an almost desperate struggle, by the 
 powerful hand of France; and the documents in the 
 French Archives bear witness to the constant solicitude 
 with which the American cause was watched over and 
 protected by the Comte de Vergennes, Secretary of State 
 for Foreign Affairs, whose name, with the names of 
 Rochambeau, d Estaing, Gerard, La Luzerne, and de 
 Grasse, must always be held in honor in the United 
 States. 
 
 In quoting from the documents of France, I have 
 usually given, besides the folio and number by which 
 each is designated in the Archives, a reference to M. 
 
VI PKEFACE. 
 
 Doniol s work, in order to assist students in their ex 
 amination of that repository of American history, from 
 which I have obtained much of the genealogy of the 
 Marquis de La Fayette, as well as his coat of arms, 
 which I have reprinted here. 
 
 Through the courtesy of General George Washington 
 Custis Lee I have been permitted to copy the portrait, by 
 Charles Willson Peale, of the Marquis de La Fayette as 
 a frontispiece to the first of these volumes. This por 
 trait, which hung for many years at Mount Vernon, was 
 painted for General Washington, from whom it de 
 scended to its present owner, General Lee. 
 
 I have been honored by Madame Corcelle Marquise 
 de Chambrun, who has sent me a copy of a miniature 
 of Madame de La Fayette painted about the time of her 
 marriage, which I have used at the beginning of the 
 second volume. And I beg leave to return my thanks 
 to M. le Comte d Assailly, who has aided me with a 
 generous interest in my work. 
 
 I desire to express my grateful sentiments to Cornell 
 University for copies of the maps of the Sparks Collec 
 tion, now in its Library, from the originals made for 
 General de La Fayette, showing the operations at 
 Gloucester, at Barren Hill, at Monmouth, and at New 
 port, which I have reproduced; to Harvard University 
 for copies of the Sparks MSS. ; to the New York His 
 torical Society for copies of the Steuben MSS. ; and to 
 the Historical Society of Pennsylvania for copies of the 
 MSS. of General Anthony Wayne. 
 
 I am indebted for valuable assistance in the prepara 
 tion of my work to Hon. A. A. Adee, Assistant Secre- 
 
PREFACE. Vll 
 
 tary of State, to A. R. Spofford, LL.D., the distin 
 guished Librarian of Congress, to M. le Professeur 
 Georges Cardon, of Paris, and especially to my friend 
 and fellow-student Frederick D. Stone, Esq., Librarian 
 of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
 
 The references which, for brevity, have been made 
 in the foot-notes to the " Memoires de ma Main," the 
 " Memoires historiques," and the " Correspondance de 
 La Fayette," are to the " Memoires, Correspondance et 
 Manuscrits du General Lafayette, publics par sa famille," 
 Paris, H. Fournier aine, Editeur, 6 vols., 1837-38. 
 
 CHARLEMAGNE TOWER, JR. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA, December, 1894. 
 
CONTENTS OF VOLUME 1. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN 60 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WITH THE COLO 
 NIES OF NORTH AMERICA 91 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EFFORTS OF THE OOMTE DE VERGENNES TO UNITE FRANCE 
 AND SPAIN IN THE AMERICAN WAR 117 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND 
 THE UNITED STATES 142 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA UPON THE ARRIVAL OF 
 LA FAYETTE 171 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 LA FAYETTE S FIRST SERVICE IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY 
 
 BRANDY WINE AND GLOUCESTER 216 
 
 ix 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE VIII. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 THE PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA IN 1778 . 257 
 
 CHAPTEE IX. 
 
 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES .... 292 
 
 CHAPTEE X. 
 
 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE AND BARREN HILL 317 
 
 CHAPTEE XL 
 
 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, AND BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 343 
 
 CHAPTEE XII. 
 
 THE EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING 394 
 
 CHAPTEE XIII. 
 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIED FORCES AT NEWPORT 431 
 
 CHAPTEE XIV. 
 
 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIED FORCES AT NEWPORT Continued . 456 
 
LIST OF MAPS IN VOLUME I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF BKANDYWINE 222 
 
 MAP SHOWING THE OPERATIONS OF GENERAL DE LA FAYETTE 
 
 AT GLOUCESTER IN 1777 248 
 
 MAP SHOWING THE OPERATIONS OF GENERAL DE LA FAYETTE 
 
 AT BARREN HILL IN 1778 328 
 
 MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH LED TO 
 THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 346 
 
 MAP OF THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 368 
 
 MAP SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE ALLIED FORCES AT NEW 
 PORT IN 1778 . . 456 
 
 LIST OF MAPS IN VOLUME II. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 MAP SHOWING THE POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY THE AMERICAN 
 
 TROOPS AFTER THE RETREAT FROM RHODE ISLAND, 30TH 
 AUGUST, 1778 8 
 
 MAP SHOWING THE ROUTE OF THE MARQUIS DE LA FAYETTE IN 
 
 CHESAPEAKE BAY IN 1781 244 
 
 MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE MARQUIS DE LA FAYETTE AND 
 LORD CORNWALLIS IN VIRGINIA IN 1781 288 
 
 MAP SHOWING THE OPERATIONS OF THE MARQUIS DE LA FAY 
 ETTE BETWEEN RICHMOND AND WILLIAMSBURG IN THE VIR 
 GINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1781 342 
 
 xi 
 
THE MARQUIS DE LA FAYETTE 
 
 IN 
 
 THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 
 
 ONE of the most picturesque and interesting figures 
 of the American Revolution, which counted among its 
 leaders and supporters many of the remarkable men of the 
 eighteenth century, is that of a youth of nineteen, born 
 of an illustrious family of the ancient nobility of France 
 and bred in the midst of the most conservative influences 
 of the old regime, who suddenly came upon the scene as 
 a defender of liberty and a champion of human rights. 
 This young French nobleman, who had left his home and 
 crossed the ocean to fight in the American War of Inde 
 pendence, illustrated to an extraordinary degree the sym 
 pathetic interest with which men in distant parts of the 
 world watched the struggle in w r hich the Colonies of 
 North America were then engaged : the earnestness of his 
 convictions and his zeal in the cause of freedom aston 
 ished the members of the Continental Congress before 
 whom he appeared in the summer of 1777 and announced 
 himself as the Marquis de La Fayette. 
 
 It was difficult then to comprehend, it excites amaze 
 ment even now, that a foreigner should unite his efforts 
 with ours in a contest in which he had no personal inter- 
 
 VOL. I. 1 1 
 
Z THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 
 
 est and no advantage to gain beyond the establishment of 
 a principle, the principle of liberty, upon which is based 
 the system of our national rights. 
 
 Strange as it appeared, however, this was the motive 
 which brought La Fayette to America. With the single 
 thought of aiding in the foundation of the United States 
 as a free and independent nation, he served America with 
 unswerving devotion throughout the War of Independence, 
 and asked for no compensation beyond the privilege of 
 fighting in the Continental army as an American soldier 
 in defence of liberty. 
 
 The enthusiasm which impelled La Fayette thus to 
 espouse the cause of the American people arose from his 
 ardent love of freedom ; the sources of his inspiration are 
 not to be sought amid the influences which were at that 
 time active and which led subsequently to the participa 
 tion of France in the American war, but were the gener 
 ous impulses of his own heart. 
 
 It was believed for a long time, even in France, that his 
 service in America was connected in some manner with 
 the known friendship of the Cabinet of Versailles for the 
 Colonies of North America and with the alliance into 
 which King Louis XVI. entered with us, later, against 
 Great Britain. 
 
 But, while he played a very important part and ren 
 dered valuable services to the United States by negoti 
 ating in our behalf at the French Court after the alliance, 
 it is probable that La Fayette would have come to America 
 if France had never declared war in our favor ; and cer 
 tainly France would have participated in the American 
 Revolution if La Fayette had never existed. 
 
 His coming was so far from being part of the plan of 
 the French ministry that it was opposed and even for 
 bidden by the Government. But the difficulties which he 
 encountered in carrying out his undertaking served only 
 to intensify his efforts. The storm of opposition from his 
 
THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 6 
 
 family, the threatened penalties of disobedience to the 
 King, the separation from those he loved, the grief of his 
 young wife, were all subordinated to the great purpose of 
 his life, his leaving France to help America ; a step which 
 his angry relatives called a coup de tete, but which was in 
 fact an act of chivalry. 
 
 The family of La Fayette was one of the very ancient 
 houses of France. It took its name and title from a small 
 fief in Auvergne, called Fayette, or La Fayette, mentioned 
 in a document which was executed by one of the lords of 
 the tenure, as Villa Faya, about the year 1000. 
 
 At that remote period the ancestors of the La Fayettes 
 had already established their local importance in the prov 
 ince of Auvergne and had begun to form the alliances 
 which, in succeeding centuries, were to connect them with 
 some of the most powerful and distinguished families of 
 the kingdom. The race was a military one. Its represen 
 tatives fought in the wars from the time of the Crusades, 
 with great honor to themselves as well as to the name 
 they bore, and with loyal devotion to France ; many of 
 them having fallen, as the French writers expressively 
 describe it, " morts bravement a 1 ennemi." 
 
 The original family name was Motier ; which became, 
 from the tenure of the seigneurie of La Fayette, Motier 
 de La Fayette. We find it represented in the middle of 
 the thirteenth century by the head of the house, Pons 
 Motier, Seigneur de La Fayette, from whom, through a 
 younger son, the line of our General de La Fayette is 
 derived. This Pons Motier, who died about the year 1300, 
 married, in 1240, Alix Brim de Champetieres, making 
 thus an alliance from which sprang two branches of the 
 family, the elder known by the name of Gilbert Motier 
 de La Fayette, and the younger by that of Roch Motier 
 de Champetieres. The elder of these branches inherited 
 the estates and bore for many generations the title of 
 Seigneurs de La Fayette ; whilst the other, that of Motier 
 
4 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 
 
 de Champetieres, occupied for a long time a position of 
 merely local importance, until, by the failure of heirs male 
 in the elder branch and through substitutions made by will 
 in favor of members of the younger, the titles and estates 
 of the family descended to the Motiers de Champetieres, 
 who were ultimately known as the family of La Fayette. 
 
 The landed possessions of their ancestors were situated 
 near Forez, at the sources of the river Dore, where they 
 continued to reside until the latter part of the fifteenth 
 century. At that time, Gilbert Motier IV. married Isa- 
 beau de Polignac, with whom he moved farther south, to 
 ward Velay, in Auvergne, and established his residence at 
 the castle of Saint-Romain, in the little district of Cha- 
 liergue. Here his descendants remained, and here, also, 
 the descendants of the younger branch came afterward 
 to join them ; for about the year 1600, Jean Motier de 
 Champetieres, who was called Seigneur of Champetieres, 
 le Bouis, de Paulin, and la Garde, Chevalier of the King s 
 orders, and governor of the town and castle of Monis- 
 trol, in Velay, married Jeanne de Polignac, Baronne de 
 Vissac, through whom his descendants, the Motiers de 
 Champetieres, became Barons of Vissac and inherited the 
 ancient castle of Vissac, in Auvergne, whose ruined walls 
 may still be seen, as may also, not very far away, those 
 of Saint-Romain, the feudal residence of the elder branch. 
 Extraordinary measures were taken during several centu 
 ries to prevent the loss of the family name and titles 
 through failure of heirs male in the direct line of descent 
 or by alienation through the marriage of females into 
 other families, and frequently the inheritance was devised 
 to younger brothers, or even to collateral kindred, in order 
 that the continuance of the family might be assured ; a 
 precaution rendered all the more necessary by the ravages 
 of war in a family in which nearly every man was a 
 soldier, and which at times was threatened with extinc 
 tion by losses in battle, so much so, indeed, that it be- 
 
THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 5 
 
 came traditional in the family that the La Fayettes all 
 died in battle and died young. 
 
 A substitution of this character, of very great impor 
 tance to our Marquis de La Fayette, took place at the end 
 of the seventeenth century, by which his branch of the 
 family, the Motiers de Champetieres, inherited the name 
 and estates of the elder branch of Motier de La Fayette 
 and ultimately also the title of Marquis to which they had 
 attained. The Comte Rene-Armand de La Fayette, by 
 his will dated the llth of May, 1692, devised the estates 
 of the house of Motier de La Fayette, and with them the 
 name of La Fayette, to the great-grandfather of our Mar 
 quis de La Fayette, Charles de Motier de Champetieres, 
 Chevalier and Baron of Vissac, Seigneur de Vedieres, 
 Fargettes, Jax, and le Bouschet, to the exclusion of his 
 brother, the Abbe Louis de La Fayette, who was in holy 
 orders, and of his daughter, Marie-Magdelaine Motier, 
 dame de La Fayette, who had become by marriage Du- 
 chesse de la Tremoille. From this time, therefore, the 
 younger branch of Motier de Champetieres assumed the 
 name of Motier de La Fayette ; though the marquisate of 
 La Fayette descended to Mme. de la Tremoille from her 
 father. She devised, however, by her will, dated the 3d 
 of July, 1717, to her cousin, Jacques Roch Motier, the 
 seigneurie of La Fayette, situate in the parishes of Four- 
 nols and Eschandelis, in Auvergne. This cousin, Jacques 
 Roch Motier, having died in war without issue, the title 
 passed to his younger brother, Michel Louis Christophe 
 Roch Gilbert de Motier de La Fayette, the father of our 
 Marquis de La Fayette, who thus became head of the 
 house, both as Baron de Vissac and as Marquis de La 
 Fayette, in succession to a long line of ancestors illustrious 
 in the annals of Auvergne and in the history of France. 
 
 They were distinguished in the wars from very early 
 times, as the family records amply show. Pons Motier 
 de La Fayette was at Acre, in 1250; Jean Motier de La 
 
b THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 
 
 Fayette fell at the battle of Poitiers, in 1356 ; and Gilbert 
 Motier III., Marechal in the wars of Charles VII., is still 
 remembered in France as one of the celebrated leaders of 
 his century. His son, Charles Motier, was knighted at 
 the siege of Rouen, in 1449, and after other military ser 
 vice he appears as Deputy to the States-General at Tours, 
 in 1468. Gilbert Motier IV. was at the Court during the 
 reigns of Louis XI. and Charles VIII. Antoine de La 
 Fayette commanded the King s artillery, and Louis was 
 governor of Boulogne. The Comte Rene-Armand, to 
 whom we have already referred in connection with the 
 substitution made by him under the provisions of his will 
 in 1692, was captain in the King s regiment in 1659, col 
 onel of the regiment of La Fare in 1680, and afterward 
 brigadier of infantry toward the end of that century. 
 The line of Motier de Champetieres kept pace in this ser 
 vice of the King. Thus, Jean Motier de Champetieres 
 was Senechal of Auvergne in 1604. Two of his grand 
 sons were distinguished soldiers : Jean-Marie, Baron de 
 Vissac, spent his life in camps and on the battle-field, 
 through nearly thirty years of service, and we find him 
 Lieutenant du Roi at Strassburg in 1692 ; the other, 
 Claude Motier, " Chevalier de Vissac," died at Troyes in 
 1692, after thirty-eight years of service, having been 
 present at sixty-five sieges and taken part in numerous 
 pitched battles. The grandfather of our Marquis, Edouard 
 Motier, had a brilliant military career, and was wounded 
 at Philipsbourg, at Mons, and at Speyer ; later, his uncle, 
 Jacques Roch Motier, and his father, encountered the 
 destiny of their race. They were both killed in battle, 
 his uncle at the age of twenty-three, and his father, as 
 we shall see, before he had reached twenty-five years. 
 
 Among the women of the family of La Fayette were 
 two especially who added lustre to the name, one, by the 
 charm of beauty and of graceful manner, Louise Motier 
 de La Fayette, the object of great admiration on the part 
 
THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 7 
 
 of King Louis XIII., and the other, by her intelligence 
 and the brilliancy of her imagination, Marie Madelaine 
 Pioche de La Vergne, Comtesse de La Fayette, who was 
 born in 1634 and who married in 1655 Jean Frangois 
 Motier, Comte de La Fayette. She was the celebrated 
 author of " Zai de" and of the " Princesse de Cleves :" 
 the Comte d Haussonville has written in our time a most 
 attractive account of her. 1 
 
 The La Fayettes were very widely related by marriage 
 with prominent families in France, among them those of 
 Polignac, Bourbon-Busset, Marillac, de Tremoille, Mont- 
 boissier, de Lusignem-Lezay, la Riviere, and de Bouille, 
 the latter an illustrious house, from which sprang the distin 
 guished French general of that name, and whose continued 
 public services to France have produced notable men down 
 to our own day, the head of it, the enlightened and courtly 
 Marquis de Bouille, having been Ambassador of France 
 at Madrid within the last twenty years. The father of 
 General La Fayette, Michel Louis Christophe Roch Gilbert 
 de Motier de La Fayette, Marquis de La Fayette, Baron 
 de Vissac, Seigneur de Siaugues-Saint-Romain and Fix, 
 married, on the 22d of May, 1754, Marie Louise Julie de 
 La Riviere, daughter of the Marquis de La Riviere, grand 
 daughter of the Comte de La Riviere and de Ploeuck, 
 lieutenant-general, and captain of the second company of 
 the Mousquetaires du Roi (the Mousquetaires Noirs). 
 Upon the occasion of his marriage with this young lady, 
 whose family possessed an influence at Court which was 
 immediately exerted in his favor, the Marquis de La 
 Fayette, at that time but twenty -two years of age, received 
 the cross of St. Louis and was made colonel of the regi 
 ment of Grenadiers de France. 2 
 
 1 Mme. de La Fayette, par le Comte d Haussonville, de 1 Academic Fran- 
 caise, Paris, 1891. 
 
 2 Curiously enough, there is no record of the date at which the family of 
 La Fayette acquired its title of marquis, or of the services by which it attained 
 
8 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 
 
 He lived during the short period of his married life in 
 the castle of Chavaniac, an ancient " maison forte" which 
 is described by M. Doniol, himself a native of Auvergne, 
 as " a great and rather heavy manor-house fortified in 
 the fourteenth century, situated only a little way from the 
 castles of Saint-Romain and Vissac, though lower down 
 toward the plain. It arrests the attention of the traveller 
 by the odd pigeon-house coverings of its towers, which 
 have lost their symmetry through restorations of the roof 
 after its destruction by fire, and by the crenellated terrace 
 of its dungeon. It formed, with a little village which 
 grew up about its walls upon the rugged hills, a parish of 
 the collecte of Saint-Georges d Aurat, in the i election 
 of Brioude, in the province and generalite of Auvergne. 
 From its windows, through which there is a view far over 
 the surrounding country, the eye discovers the Allier, 
 looking in the direction of Langeac, Paulhaguet toward 
 the north, and here and there farm-houses or neighboring 
 castles built upon the cone-like hills of the volcanic for 
 mation. The landscape, relieved by the fresh green of 
 the valleys, in its setting of mountain ranges whose crests 
 arise in outline one after the other along the sky, and 
 dotted here and there by clumps of fir-trees, has something 
 of the severity of mountain scenery, though tempered by 
 the variety of color and softened by the distant background 
 which the eye can reach." 
 
 To-day the surroundings of this ancient place are not 
 much changed. The village is now the seat of a commune 
 in the canton of Paulhaguet, in the centre of the depart 
 ment of the Haute-Loire, and the little town of Brioude 
 has become the chef-lieu of the arrondissement. The rail 
 ways have penetrated its solitudes, and close by are the 
 stations of Saint-Georges d Aurat, Rougeac, and La Chaux, 
 
 to this distinction. M. Doniol says of it, "A quelle e"poque et par quelles 
 circonstances la seigneurie de La Fayette est-elle devenue un marquisat ? On 
 ne 1 a pas d^couvert." (La Participation de la France, i. 676, note.) 
 
THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 9 
 
 upon the line from Langeac to Puy and to Saint-Etienne. 
 But the old house stands there yet, somewhat grizzled 
 perhaps by time, still looking out over the Auvergne 
 mountains, undisturbed by the lapse of a century and 
 more since the days when it cradled a boy whose career 
 was destined to win the gratitude of a nation and to make 
 its ancient walls the object of affectionate interest across 
 the sea in the New World. 
 
 In it was born, on the 6th of September, 1757, the 
 Marquis de La Fayette of the American Revolution, who, 
 at his baptism upon the following day, in the little church 
 of Chavaniac, as appears by a copy of the parish register 
 now in the archives of the French Ministry of War, was 
 called "tres haut et tres puissant seigneur, Monseigneur 
 Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert Dumotier de La 
 fayette, fils legitime a tres haut et tres puissant seigneur 
 Monseigneur Michel-Louis-Christophle-Roch-Gilbert Du 
 motier, marquis de Lafayette, baron de Vissac, seigneur 
 de Saint-Remain et autres places, et a tres haute tres 
 puissante dame Madame Marie-Louise-Julie Delariviere." 
 
 His father, Colonel the Marquis de La Fayette, was dead 
 when this son was born, having fallen at the head of his 
 grenadiers in the little battle of Hastenbeck, on the 26th 
 of July of that same year, 1757, when he was not as yet 
 twenty-five years of age. La Fayette himself, in writing 
 of it many years later, says that the grenadiers were reck 
 lessly exposed in that engagement by their commander, 
 who, having been ordered to defend a certain point, drew 
 them up on open ground, where they were helplessly de 
 stroyed. The Prince de Chimay, an intimate friend of 
 his father, was killed at the head of the battalion which he 
 commanded, and Colonel de La Fayette, who was next 
 in rank, pressing forward to take his place, was mortally 
 wounded by a discharge from an English battery. 1 
 
 1 M. de La Fayette referred to his father s death as having occurred at the 
 battle of Minden : " Ma nais-sance, qui suivit de pres la mort de inon pere ii 
 
10 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 
 
 Thus the young Marquis de La Fayette was left at his 
 birth alone under the protection of his mother. He found 
 himself not only the head of his house, but also the last 
 male representative of the long line of ancestors from 
 whom he sprang, his father s only brother having been 
 killed in the Italian wars without leaving issue, and the 
 other children in the family being girls. His early years 
 were spent at the old manor-house of Chavaniac, where 
 his grandmother still lived, a woman of strong character 
 and excellent principles, descended from one of the sturdy 
 mountain races of Auvergne, the Suat de Chavaniac. She 
 and the boy s mother, with the assistance of two aunts 
 who came there to live, reared him with tender solicitude. 
 They trained him to manly exercise in the development 
 of a vigorous constitution, dreading the approach of the 
 day when he also should become a soldier and go to the 
 wars, and yet, by force of long family habit, unable to 
 resist the conviction that it would surely come, and that 
 this was, after all, but the natural and proper way for a 
 La Fayette to bear worthily his family name and to sus 
 tain his inherited rank and station. The impressions of 
 these early years in Auvergne sank deeply into the mind 
 of La Fayette. He loved the place, and he spoke of it 
 with tenderness and affection in looking back to it through 
 the complex vicissitudes of his after-life. 
 
 The means of the family at that time were small ; for, 
 although they had landed estates, these do not appear to 
 have been very productive. In former years their reve 
 nues from preferment at Court, or from the service of 
 the King, had stood them in stead ; but now there was 
 nothing of this kind for them, and they were obliged to 
 live frugally for persons of their condition. 
 
 Minden." (Memoires de ma Main, i. 6.) But the battle of Minden was not 
 fought until August, 1759, two years after M. de La Fayette was born. I 
 have, therefore, followed M. Doniol (La Participation de la France, i. 656), 
 who places the death of Colonel de La Fayette at Hastenbeck in 1757. 
 
THE COMIXG OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 11 
 
 At the age of eleven, the young La Fayette was taken 
 to Paris to begin his education, and was placed under the 
 charge of the Abbe Fayon, at the College du Plessis, a 
 school to which were sent at that time young gentlemen 
 of similar rank. During the pursuit of his studies there, 
 his mother s uncle, the Comte de La Riviere, placed him 
 in the army lists, in order that he might secure as early 
 as possible the advantages of military promotion. He 
 was enrolled in the Mousquetaires, and occasionally got a 
 holiday from school in order to be present at a review. 
 In the mean time, his mother, anxious to secure for him 
 all the prestige to which his family connections entitled 
 him, had come up from her province and had been pre 
 sented at Court by her aunt, who had married into the 
 influential family of Lusignem-Lezay : so that in the 
 course of the next few years the young Marquis, who had 
 now grown to be a large-framed and somewhat ungainly 
 boy, as he says himself in his Memoirs, diffident in ap 
 pearing before people, acquired, through contact with the 
 polished society of the Court, the graceful address and 
 the cultivated manner which he retained afterward through 
 his life. 
 
 Very soon after leaving Auvergne to go to school, he 
 had the misfortune to lose his mother, who died in Paris 
 in the year 1770, by which event he was left, at the age 
 of thirteen, without near relatives with the exception of 
 his grandmother. He was no longer poor, however, for 
 his mother s uncle, the Comte de La Riviere, whose death 
 occurred about this time, had made La Fayette his heir 
 and had left to him a very large estate. Placed as he 
 was, therefore, with rank and title at Court, with excel 
 lent conduct in his relations at college, and with more 
 than ordinary means of his own, he became very natu 
 rally an object of interest in the society of the capital ; 
 and it was not long before it was discovered that here was 
 a young gentleman who might be an exceedingly desira- 
 
12 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1774. 
 
 ble match for some one of the daughters of the families 
 seeking at Court suitable alliances with noblemen equal in 
 distinction with themselves. La Fayette s good fortune 
 directed him here as it had done before : he made a con 
 nection which added to the value of his present position 
 the influence and prestige of one of the very great fami 
 lies of France, that of Noailles. He married, on the llth 
 of April, 1774, at the hotel de Noailles, rue St. -Honor e, 
 Mademoiselle Marie - Adrienne - Franchise de Noailles, 
 daughter of the Due d Ayen, Marechal du Camp et 
 Armees du Hoi, afterward Due de Noailles ; and he ob 
 tained a wife who was not only to enjoy the triumph of 
 his youth in his first successes that came very quickly 
 thereafter, but was also to pass with him through the tem 
 pest of the French Revolution, and, in his days of grief, 
 disappointment, and captivity, to support him with almost 
 unequalled devotion. 
 
 Mme. de La Fayette has given us an interesting ac 
 count of this courtship, in the charming narrative written 
 by her in description of her home life and as a tribute of 
 filial affection to the memory of her mother. 1 She says, 
 in speaking of herself and her sister Louise, afterward 
 Vicomtesse de Noailles, " We were scarcely twelve years 
 old when M. de La Fayette was proposed as a husband 
 for one of us, he himself being at that time but fourteen. 
 His extreme youth, and the isolated character of his posi 
 tion, for he had lost all his near relatives and was without 
 any one in whom he had confidence to guide him, as well 
 as his large fortune entirely free from restrictions, which 
 my mother considered a source of grave danger, led her, 
 after careful consideration, to refuse him, in spite of the 
 good reports as to his character that we heard from all 
 those who knew him. She persisted in her refusal for 
 several months." 
 
 1 Notice sur Mme. la Duchesse d Ayen, par Mme. de Lafayette, ea fille. 
 Paris, 1869. 
 
1774.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 13 
 
 During this time, the Due d Ayen, who had selected the 
 Marquis as his son-in-law, stoutly held out against the 
 objections of his wife, with whom he appears actually to 
 have quarrelled upon this subject, until finally, says Mine, 
 de La Fayette, " after he had assured my mother that her 
 daughter should not leave her during the first few years, 
 and after arranging to defer the marriage for two years at 
 least, and having taken steps to complete the education of 
 M. de La Fayette in the mean time, she accepted him 
 whom she afterward cherished as a most tenderly loved 
 son, whose sterling value she learned and justly under 
 stood from the first moment that she knew him. Her 
 consent thus obtained brought about a reconciliation be 
 tween her and my father. Our joy at this event cannot 
 be expressed in words, and the memory of that day, the 
 21st of September, 1772, shall never be effaced either from 
 my heart or from my mind." 
 
 The hotel de Noailles, the family mansion of the Due 
 d Ayen, was in the rue St. -Honors, not far from the 
 palace of the Tuileries, upon ground now occupied by the 
 rue d Alger. There La Fayette lived during the first 
 years after his marriage, like one of the children of the 
 household, pursuing his studies as they did theirs, and 
 going afterward, under the supervision of M. de Noailles, 
 whose military services had brought him into close inti 
 macy with the King and who occupied a very influential 
 position at Court, to the military school for young noble 
 men called the " Academic de Versailles." There the 
 instruction of the good Abbe Fay on was exchanged for 
 the more practical training of a veteran officer, who took 
 the young Marquis in charge, to give him some under 
 standing of matters of warfare and to prepare his mind 
 for the active career of a soldier. 
 
 Nothing could exceed the gentleness of character of the 
 Duchesse d Ayen, who was now a mother to the Marquis 
 de La Fayette, or the charm of the domestic life which she 
 
14 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1774. 
 
 had created for her husband and her family of girls, as it 
 is described by Mine, de La Fayette. Although her rela 
 tion to the Court exacted from her that attention to social 
 duties and to matters of entertainment which was incum 
 bent upon her in her position as a " grande dame," and 
 she fulfilled all these with scrupulous care, as she did 
 every obligation of her life, yet she found time every 
 day to give her personal direction to the education and 
 training of her children, to influence the forming of their 
 characters as each developed toward womanhood, to watch 
 the tendencies of each mind and to guide it toward what 
 was right, and by her own exalted piety to set for them 
 the standard of life which made of them all afterward 
 excellent women. She was a splendid example of virtue 
 and high principle amid the surroundings of the long and 
 dissolute reign then drawing to its close. Her influence 
 was very great upon the mind of La Fayette, toward 
 whom she showed a loving tenderness ; and he mourned 
 her bitterly years afterward, when, during the Reign of 
 Terror in France, she went with admirable fortitude to 
 the guillotine, in expiation of crimes in which certainly 
 the actions of her own life had had no part. 
 
 The first year of the married life of the Marquis de La 
 Fayette passed merrily in the society of a very exclusive 
 collection of young people which formed about the salons 
 of Marie Antoinette, to which he and his wife were freely 
 admitted, amid many balls at the palace, or entertainments 
 at the theatre, after which the Duchesse d Ayen was in the 
 habit of inviting them all to take supper together at her 
 house ; although that sort of amusement was very little to 
 his taste, partly on account of his natural diffidence and 
 partly because his disposition was serious and led him to 
 be reflective rather than gay. He speaks with very slight 
 enthusiasm of " the short favor I enjoyed of a society of 
 young people of whom I was one," of " the unfavorable 
 impression created by my silence" and " the awkwardness 
 
1774.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 15 
 
 of my manners, which never could properly adjust them 
 selves to the required graces of the Court" or to the de 
 mands made upon them by the occasion of a supper in 
 town. 1 
 
 The young noblemen with whom he associated at this 
 time had a meeting-place at a cafe in Paris called the 
 " Epee de Bois," where they indulged their tendency for 
 amusement by parodies upon some of the older people of 
 the Court, by inventing new costumes which they took it 
 upon themselves to introduce and to oblige their elders to 
 wear upon public occasions, thus bringing the old regime 
 into mild ridicule, and by other inventions of the sort, 
 which induced them upon one occasion to enact a travesty 
 of the Parlement, then recently summoned after having 
 been long in abeyance ; an escapade in which La Fayette 
 took a leading part, and which gave offence at the palace 
 and came near making serious trouble for them all. After 
 that they were separated and most of them sent to their 
 regiments. 2 This open disrespect for the institutions of the 
 old regime in France foreshadowed the revulsion of feeling 
 that was about to take place in the nation after the weak 
 and disgraceful reign of Louis XV. ; it showed itself even 
 among the younger members of the aristocracy, w r ho looked 
 to the accession of the new King with a certain feeling of 
 emancipation from the burden of institutions for which 
 they had no reverence. A desire for liberty was in the 
 minds of men ; not strong enough as yet to lead to open 
 expression, but a desire, no doubt, that was a precursor of 
 the Revolution which was gradually making itself felt. 
 
 La Fayette says of himself, " I was delighted with re 
 publican stories, and when my relatives secured a place for 
 me at Court, I did not hesitate to give offence in order to 
 maintain my independence." The Marechal de Noailles 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 7. 
 
 2 Se"iir, Memoires. 
 
 3 Memoires de ma Main, i. 8. 
 
16 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1775. 
 
 was extremely anxious to attach him to the suite of one of 
 the royal princes, a position at that time eagerly sought 
 after, as conferring immediate distinction at Court and 
 opening the way to opportunities of preferment. It was 
 distasteful, however, to La Fayette, who scorned the 
 intrigues of the Court, and whose independent nature 
 made it impossible for him to assume the duties and the 
 daily life of a courtier. It embarrassed him in this case 
 to refuse an offer made by a friend who was interested in 
 him and who desired to do him a favor, so he determined 
 to escape the necessity by giving offence to the Prince. 
 He succeeded in that, and the negotiations were imme 
 diately discontinued. It is said that King Louis XVIII., 
 the personage in question, never forgave him the insult. 
 
 It was whilst his mind was in this somewhat rebellious 
 condition that La Fayette first heard of the event which 
 was to play so important a part in shaping the course of 
 his life, the uprising in the Colonies of North America. 
 He has referred to this in the account of himself given 
 in the Memoirs which he wrote several years later, and 
 which were published by his family after his death ; and 
 he narrated the story very fully to Mr. Jared Sparks in 
 1828, when that gentleman visited him in France for 
 the purpose of obtaining such information as he might 
 be able to give regarding the American Revolution to aid 
 in the preparation of the Writings of Washington, for 
 which Mr. Sparks was then collecting the materials. 1 
 All the circumstances of this incident tend to show that 
 up to that time La Fayette knew nothing whatever of the 
 Americans or of their struggle with the mother-country, 
 and they have a very important bearing upon the analysis 
 of his character and the study of his early career, as well 
 as his relations to the American War ; because they show 
 how spontaneous and real was his enthusiasm for the 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, vol. v., Appendix. 
 
1775.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 17 
 
 cause he adopted, and how absolutely free from selfish 
 motives was the determination which led him to espouse 
 our interests, which made him willing, if necessary, to 
 sacrifice his career in France, to brave the angry protests 
 of his family, to disregard the stern admonition of his 
 Government and run the risk of being treated as a de 
 serter, in order that he might join his efforts to ours in the 
 struggle for liberty. The idea of freedom appears to have 
 aroused a feeling in his mind that brought into play the 
 strongest impulses of his nature, and to have presented to 
 him a conception of heroism which took complete posses 
 sion of his being. He says, in writing, years afterward, 
 of the American cause, " Never had so noble a purpose 
 offered itself to the judgment of men ! This was the last 
 struggle of liberty ; its defeat then would have left it 
 without a refuge and without hope." l 
 
 He knew neither our country nor our people ; he did 
 not speak our language ; it is not probable that up to that 
 time he had ever heard the name of a single American. 
 The story of wrong done to a brave people called forth his 
 sympathy ; their heroic struggle for independence enlisted 
 him in their cause, and he determined to fight for them. 
 
 In the month of August, 1775, the Marquis de La 
 Fayette was attached to the regiment " de Noailles," which 
 was commanded by his cousin the Prince de Poix and was 
 stationed at that time at Metz, when it happened that 
 the Duke of Gloucester, brother of King George III. of 
 England, who was travelling through France with his wife 
 on his way to Italy, stopped for a day or two at Metz and 
 was entertained by the governor, the Comte Charles Fran- 
 ois de Broglie, at a dinner to which the chief officers of 
 the garrison were invited. 2 La Fayette was included in 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 9. 
 
 3 I have chosen to follow M. Doniol in fixing the date of this dinner in the 
 year 1775, although Mr. Sparks, in the Appendix of vol. v. of the Writings of 
 Washington, refers to it as having taken place in the summer of 1776. It is 
 VOL. 1. 2 
 
18 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1775. 
 
 the number ; for, although he was not yet eighteen years 
 of age, his rank and his connection with the powerful 
 house of Noailles entitled him to consideration ; besides 
 which, the Comte de Broglie, himself a soldier of distinc 
 tion, had been the commanding officer of La Fayette s 
 father in the Seven Years War, and saw him fall, and he 
 very naturally singled out the son with a feeling of affec 
 tionate attachment. 
 
 The Duke of Gloucester, who did not agree with his 
 brother the King in all matters, was especially opposed to 
 his treatment of the American Colonies and to the prose 
 cution of the war. He did not hesitate to express himself 
 at times with considerable bitterness in this connection 
 about the attitude of Great Britain. He even spoke occa 
 sionally in the presence of hearers to whom his words had 
 an important bearing and by whom they were carefully 
 reported to superiors who were constantly on the alert to 
 detect the current of popular feeling in England and to 
 anticipate the occurrence of political complications. 
 
 This prince, therefore, in the intimacy of a dinner-table, 
 surrounded by a company of noblemen whose presence 
 
 very probable that La Fayette mistook the exact date, in referring to it many 
 years afterward in conversation with Mr. Sparks, without documents from 
 which to refresh his memory ; for his papers had all been destroyed at Cha- 
 vaniac during the French Revolution. We know from other sources, how 
 ever, that the Duke of Gloucester made his visit to France in 1775. There is 
 a letter in the French Archives (Depot de la Guerre, vol. no. 3694 ; quoted 
 by M. Doniol, La Participation de la France, t. i. p. 108), from the Prince 
 de Montbarey to the Marquis de Castries, dated at Lille, the 30th of July, 
 1775, announcing the arrival of the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester, travel 
 ling as the Earl and Countess of Connaught, which says that they were 
 going to Valenciennes, Rheims, Verdun, Metz, Nancy, Luneville, Strassburg, 
 Munich, Innspruck, Venice, and thence to Rome. Another letter, from the 
 Bishop of Verdun, dated the 7th of August, 1775, to the Comte de Vergennes 
 (Angleterre, t. 511, no. 70), informs the minister that they had been enter 
 tained by the bishop at Verdun, and adds, "Their Royal Highnesses left 
 here yesterday afternoon at three o clock for Metz." Also, a letter from the 
 duke himself, dated at Strassburg, the 25th of August, 1775, thanking King 
 Louis XVI. for his entertainment in France, shows that he was about to leave 
 French territory nt that date. (Angleterre, t. 511, no. 106.) 
 
1775.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 19 
 
 would naturally invite him to throw off his reserve, was 
 not likely to be extremely careful of what he said. In 
 connection with some letters which he had recently re 
 ceived from home, he began to talk of America, He ex 
 plained the causes of the disagreement which had arisen 
 between Great Britain and its Colonies, and he described 
 the outbreak which had occurred, the fixed purpose of 
 the King to bring the Colonists back to subjection, and 
 the repressive measures then being determined upon in 
 England ; while, on the other hand, the Americans, he 
 said, were opposing force by force in the defence of their 
 rights, and from the appearance of things at that moment 
 the war was likely to be a long one. 
 
 This conversation arrested the attention of La Fayette, 
 who became at once intensely interested. He listened to 
 every word that the duke uttered, and he obtained per 
 mission to satisfy the longing for information upon this 
 subject which had suddenly sprung up in his mind, by 
 asking numerous questions, to which the duke replied. 
 
 The impression then made upon him was of the kind 
 which go deep down into men s hearts and remain there 
 forever ; and it took possession of him from that moment, 
 almost to the exclusion of every other purpose. Very 
 many years afterward, he told Mr. Sparks that " the cause 
 seemed to him just and noble, from the representations of 
 the duke himself; and before he left the table the thought 
 came into his head, that he would go to America and offer 
 his services to a people who were struggling for freedom 
 and independence. From that hour he could think of 
 nothing but this enterprise, and he resolved to go to Paris 
 to make further inquiries." 1 
 
 Here, however, he found himself surrounded by grave 
 and unexpected difficulties ; for, in the enthusiasm which 
 impelled him toward the object he now had in view, and 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 445. 
 
20 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1776. 
 
 thinking, naturally enough, only of himself, he had uncon 
 sciously stepped upon the stage before the play was ready, 
 and for a moment there was danger that he might seriously 
 disturb the setting. The attitude of France toward Great 
 Britain in the years 1775 and 1776 was one of extremely 
 delicate adjustment. She was under the jealous and 
 watchful eye of Lord Stormont, the British Ambassador, 
 whom not the slightest movement escaped ; who was ready 
 at any moment to charge her Government with bad faith, 
 or to call the ministry to account for breach of inter 
 national contracts. 
 
 There was a decided sympathy on the part of the 
 French Cabinet toward the American Colonists, through 
 which aid had already begun to go out secretly to them 
 from France ; though the appearance of neutrality was 
 carefully maintained, and peace continued with Great 
 Britain. But it did not suit the plans of the Comte de 
 Vergennes, the Secretary of State in France, to have a 
 young French nobleman like the Marquis de La Fayette 
 make a demonstration before the world in favor of the 
 people whom the English nation at that time called insur 
 gents, and the English Government rebels. 
 
 It was, perhaps, well enough if some obscure subject 
 of the French King should escape out of one of his ports 
 and go to America ; the minister was willing to over 
 look that, and in fact the incident could produce no 
 serious result. But the same procedure upon the part 
 of a man of rank and position like La Fayette might 
 very properly be assumed to have the sanction of the 
 ministry, and, unless it were disavowed, must inevitably 
 compromise the Government. La Fayette discovered 
 this very quickly, and it greatly retarded his progress, 
 though it did not defeat the ultimate fulfilment of his 
 purpose. 
 
 It is not easy to follow his footsteps immediately after 
 he left Metz to go to Paris, for his Memoirs are, unfortu- 
 
1776.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 21 
 
 nately, very meagre as to this part of his life. We know, 
 however, that he kept in view the one object of going to 
 America, though the only reference he makes to it is that 
 " certain circumstances which it is not necessary for me to 
 narrate led me to expect from my family nothing but 
 opposition upon this subject;" 1 and in this he was evidently 
 not deceived ; for Mme. de La Fayette informs us, speak 
 ing particularly of the Due d Ayen, " My father and all 
 my family were violently angry upon hearing of this 
 
 news." 2 
 
 La Fayette naturally confided his ambition to two of 
 his intimate friends, the Vicomte de Noailles and the Vi- 
 comte de Segur, who, being about the same age as himself, 
 were inspired with a desire for glory and grew eager to 
 join him ; but, as they were not independent, as he was, 
 and were obliged to look to their families for support, 
 their circumstances forced them to ask permission, which 
 was promptly refused. La Fayette then turned, with the 
 hope of assistance, to his commander, the Comte de Brog 
 lie, to whom he confided his project. M. de Broglie re 
 ceived it, as all mature advisers had done, with disfavor. 
 He told him that it was fraught with so many hazards, 
 without the prospect of the least advantage, that he could 
 not countenance it. " When La Fayette found him thus 
 determined, he requested that at least he would not betray 
 him, for he was resolved to go to America. The Comte 
 de Broglie assured him that his confidence was not mis 
 placed ; but/ said he, I have seen your uncle die in 
 the wars of Italy, I witnessed your father s death at the 
 battle of Minden, and I will not be accessory to the ruin 
 of the only remaining branch of the family/ He then 
 used all his powers of argument and persuasion to divert 
 La Fayette from his purpose, but in vain." 
 
 1 M6moires de ma Main, i. 10. 
 
 2 Notice sur Mine, la Dnchesse d Ayen, p. 56. 
 8 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 446. 
 
22 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1776. 
 
 Whilst La Fayette was not in the least deflected from 
 his intention, his conduct at this time bears out the de 
 scription given of him by his friend the Comte de Segur, 
 who knew him as well as, if not better than, any other of 
 his companions at this period, when the circumstances of 
 their lives had thrown them together and seemed to prom 
 ise a future in which they saw themselves united in the 
 same career. " His exterior/ he said, " apparently so 
 cold to one who merely saw him, concealed in reality the 
 most active mind, the most determined character, and the 
 most enthusiastic spirit. " l La Fayette renewed his en 
 treaties to the Comte de Broglie, of whom he says, " after 
 he found that he could not stop me, he entered into my 
 plans with a paternal kindness/ 7 and who finally consented 
 to introduce him to the Baron de Kalb, then in Paris, also 
 seeking an opportunity to go to North America. 2 
 
 The Baron de Kalb, as he was called, though his proper 
 name was Johann Kalb, was a German, somewhat over 
 fifty years of age, who had served through several cam 
 paigns in the French army and in the Seven Years War, 
 and had been an officer under the command of the Due de 
 Broglie, by whom he had been created assistant quarter 
 master-general (aide-mar echal des logis) and had been 
 given the rank of lieutenant-colonel. By means of the 
 friendship he had succeeded in acquiring for himself of 
 the Marshal Due de Broglie and of his brother the 
 Comte de Broglie, through his devoted attachment to 
 them and to their interests and his constant readiness to 
 serve them whenever they had occasion to make use of 
 him, Kalb had found opportunity from time to time to 
 gratify the desires of an exceedingly restless nature, and 
 to attain, to some extent at least, the objects of a personal 
 ambition which prevented him from leading a quiet life, 
 such as his ample means would have enabled him to do. 
 
 1 Segur, Memoires, i. 61. a Sparks, ubi supra. 
 
1776.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 23 
 
 Besides his military career, which had given him the 
 reputation of an intelligent and reliable soldier, as he 
 undoubtedly was, he had been employed upon one or two 
 secret missions by the French Cabinet, through which he 
 had come into contact with European political questions 
 .and had acquired some experience of men and of affairs. 
 Upon one of these occasions he had been sent to Holland, 
 and afterward the Due de Choiseul, then Prime Minister, 
 whose practised eye had foreseen, even long before this 
 time, that serious trouble was about to arise between Eng 
 land and her Colonies, had sent him to America toward 
 the end of the year 1767, to make a report upon the con 
 dition of feeling here. 
 
 Kalb was familiar, therefore, with our country, and he 
 spoke English very well. He was at this time about to 
 set out upon another secret mission, under the protection 
 and in the interest of the Comte de Broglie, in further 
 ance of a plan conceived by that nobleman, by which Kalb 
 was to return to America to join the Colonists and to take 
 part with them as a general officer in the American army. 1 
 The interest he showed in America was not, however, born 
 of any attachment that he felt for its people, or of any 
 great sympathy with them in the struggle in which they 
 were by this time fully engaged. His ultimate purpose 
 was to enter a field in which he might win credit and dis 
 tinction for himself, and, upon his return to Europe after 
 the war, to obtain the promotion in the French army which 
 he had coveted for years, but which had been denied him, 
 very probably because as a foreigner he failed to gain ad 
 vancement to the exclusion of men who, being at home, 
 had more influence than he. Through the intervention 
 of the Comte de Broglie at the War Department, and for 
 the purpose of his secret mission to America in the per- 
 
 1 For an account of this see " Le Stathoudorat du Comte de Broglie," 
 Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 50 ; also, Dr. Charles J. Stille, in 
 The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, xi. 369. 
 
24 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1776. 
 
 sonal interest of that gentleman, Kalb was granted a leave 
 of absence for two years, with a promise of promotion, and 
 he obtained subsequently, on the 6th of November, 1776, 
 a commission of brigadier-general for the French Islands. 
 His biographer tells us, " In France he now had little or 
 nothing to hope for, while a wide field was opened to him, 
 on the other side of the ocean. Honor and renown in 
 vited him to try his fortunes there. He made up his 
 mind to go ; resolving, however, before preparing for his 
 departure, to await the expected arrival in Paris of the 
 American Agent, Silas Deane, which was delayed until 
 the beginning of July, 1776." x 
 
 Shortly after this, the news of the Declaration of Inde 
 pendence was received in Europe, where it began to at 
 tract general attention to the war in the English Colonies, 
 which before that, although well understood and watched 
 with great interest by the various Cabinets in Europe, had 
 made little impression upon the mind of the general pub 
 lic. The announcement, however, that England was likely 
 to lose its grasp upon the rich possessions which it held in 
 the New World, and the consequent loss of prestige that 
 it was expected to suffer as an arbiter in shaping the 
 course of European affairs, as well as the necessary weak 
 ening of its power of aggression, always regarded with 
 unconcealed dread and suspicion, produced a violent out 
 break of feeling in France. 
 
 Silas Deane wrote to Congress in November, 1776, " The 
 rage, as I may say, for entering the American service in 
 creases, and the consequence is, that I am crowded with 
 offers and proposals, many of them from persons of the first 
 rank and eminence, in the sea as well as land service." 2 M. 
 Dubois-Martin, secretary to the Comte de Broglie, writing 
 to Kalb a few weeks later, says, " Two persons have to-day 
 informed me that a prohibition has been published against 
 
 1 Kapp s Life of Kalb, p. 81. 
 
 2 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 191. 
 
1776.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 25 
 
 discussing the war in the cafes. The precaution is a timely 
 one, for the war is at present the subject of every conver 
 sation." In November, 1776, Kalb presented himself 
 to Mr. Deane, who immediately reported to Congress as 
 follows : " Count Broglio, who commanded the Army of 
 France the last War, did me the honor to call on me 
 twice yesterday with an officer who served as his Quarter 
 master General the last AVar, and has now a regiment in 
 his service ; but being a German, and having travelled 
 through America a few years since, he is desirous of 
 engaging in the service of the United States of North 
 America. I can by no means let slip an opportunity 
 of engaging a person of so much experience, and who 
 is by every one recommended as one of the bravest and 
 most skillful officers in the kingdom. . . . This gentle 
 man has an independent fortune, and a certain pros 
 pect of advancement here ; but being a zealous friend to 
 liberty, civil and religious, he is actuated by the most in 
 dependent and generous principles in the offer he makes 
 of his services to the States of America." 2 Mr. Deane 
 thereupon engaged Kalb for the American service, with 
 the rank of major-general, and the contract was executed 
 on the 1st of December, 1776, Kalb engaging for him 
 self and for fifteen officers of various grades who were to 
 accompany him. It was intended to send him out from 
 the port of Havre on a vessel sailing ostensibly for Santo 
 Domingo, but in reality bound for the United States, 
 loaded with a cargo of arms, tents, and ammunition for 
 the insurgents. The enterprise failed, however, after Kalb 
 had actually reached Havre, ready to sail, because a delay 
 occurred in loading the vessel on account of news which 
 arrived about that time, of reverses to the American arms ; 
 and before it could be proceeded with, Lord Stormont, 
 who had gained information of this enterprise, made so 
 
 1 Kapp s Life of Kalb, p. 89. 
 
 2 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 191. 
 
26 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1776. 
 
 vigorous a protest that the French ministry was obliged 
 to issue an order prohibiting the expedition ; in conse 
 quence of which it had to be set aside for the moment. 1 
 
 It is at this point that Kalb s movements become of 
 interest in the history of the Marquis de La Fayette, for 
 Kalb turned to him for aid and encouragement in his 
 plans. La Fayette was still bravely struggling against 
 the obstacles that surrounded him, though he was fast 
 approaching the time when he should equip an expedition 
 for himself to set out to America and, as we shall see, to 
 take with him in his following a number of the officers 
 who intended to sail in the expedition from Havre, among 
 whom was Johann Kalb. 
 
 It was toward the end of the year 1776 that the Comte 
 de Broglie, in fulfilment of his promise, had introduced 
 La Fayette to Kalb, about the time when the latter was 
 negotiating with Silas Deane for his entry into the Ameri 
 can service and planning for his departure as soon as pos 
 sible from Havre. The appearance upon the scene of this 
 young nobleman, possessed of family influence and family 
 connection far beyond those of any foreigner who up to 
 that time had openly espoused the American cause, was 
 hailed with great satisfaction not only by Kalb, but also 
 by Silas Deane, to whom about this time he had been 
 presented. Although it was necessary to use great caution 
 in holding intercourse with the American Commissioner, 
 who, as La Fayette said, " was in Paris, but his voice was 
 drowned by the loud protestations of Lord Stormont, and 
 people were afraid to visit him," 2 yet those who knew his 
 official connection with the American Congress held very 
 constant communication with him, and from his little 
 house at Passy he was already carrying on an extensive 
 traffic in arms for the Colonies, which was connived at by 
 the French Government, to be officially denied, however, 
 
 Kapp s Kalb, p. 91. 2 Me moires de ma Main, i. 10. 
 
1776.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 27 
 
 when the British Ambassador followed up its progress too 
 closely, to be allowed then to slumber for a short period, 
 and to be begun again when it seemed safe. La Fayette, 
 piloted by Kalb, escaped the danger of discovery and suc 
 ceeded in obtaining an interview with Mr. Deane, to whom 
 he explained his purpose and declared his intention of 
 going to America. He was very kindly received by the 
 Commissioner, though La Fayette appears to have felt 
 that, after all, he had not much to offer him as an in 
 ducement when it was estimated at its actual value ; for 
 he said afterward, " In presenting my nineteen-year-old 
 face to Mr. Deane, I spoke more of my zeal than of my 
 experience ; though I tried to make as much as I could 
 out of the small excitement that my going away was 
 likely to cause." l Mr. Deane saw value enough at a 
 glance, however, in this acquisition, and did not hesitate 
 to enter into an agreement with the young Marquis. 2 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 11. 
 
 2 Herr Kapp fixes the date of this interview (Life of Kalb, p. 87) between 
 the 1st and the 7th of December, 1770, because the contract executed by 
 Kail) with Mr. Deane is dated the 1st of December and La Fayette is not 
 mentioned in it, while the contract entered into by La Fayette and Mr. 
 Deane, in which Kalb appears as one of the parties, is dated on the 7th of 
 that month. It appears very likely that La Fayette s contract was dated 
 back at the time it was finally executed ; for the negotiations were not con 
 cluded until some time after Kalb returned to Paris, and we know that 
 he spent at Havre the greater part of December, from letters written to him 
 from Paris on the 8th, 14th, and 17th of that month, and that the arrange 
 ments between him and La Fayette and Mr. Deane were not definitively 
 closed until February, 1777. M. Doniol suggests that the selection of an 
 earlier date was made at the instance of Mr. Deane, he having assumed the 
 responsibility of engaging these foreign officers whilst he was the sole repre 
 sentative in France of the American Congress, and that "Deane, acting by 
 himself, probably carried back the date of the contract to a time prior to 
 that at which he learned of the arrival of Franklin, because this arrival 
 modified his official capacity, for he executed it as * Deputy of the American 
 States-General. " (La Participation de la France, ii. 380.) Dr. Franklin 
 arrived in Paris on the 18th of December, 1776. No doubt the date of 
 the contract was assumed for some purpose of convenience, though there 
 is nothing in our documents to show why Kalb s first contract was dated 
 on the 1st of December, and La Fayette s, in which he joined, on the 7th 
 of that month. 
 
28 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1776. 
 
 After the interview which La Fayette had with Mr. 
 Deane his purpose was more strongly fixed than ever, 
 although an official prohibition had come from the minis 
 try which covered his case and that of his two friends the 
 Vicomte de Noailles and the Vicomte de Segur. M. de 
 Noailles, hoping to overcome the objections of his family 
 to his going to America, had applied directly to the War 
 Office for a commission to serve as an officer in the army 
 of the American Colonies, to which application the Prime 
 Minister, M. de Maurepas, replied that he was not aware 
 of the entry of French officers into the service of the 
 English Colonies. A step of this kind would be an act 
 of hostility, assuredly opposed to the wishes of the King. 
 The King, he said, was greatly pleased at the evidence 
 of zeal shown by the Vicomte de Noailles, but he must 
 not think of going to America. Whereupon M. de No 
 ailles and M. de Segur were obliged to abandon their 
 project, " consternes," as Segur says, at this turn in affairs, 
 and mortified at the loss of an opportunity to assert their 
 military talents from which they had hoped to win honor 
 and glory. 1 But La Fayette determined to face the pro 
 hibition alone, and M. Dubois-Martin, secretary to the 
 Comte de Broglie, wrote on the 8th of December to Kalb, 
 who was still at Havre, expecting to sail for America in a 
 few days, " Our young Marquis does not despair ; he still 
 has the greatest desire to go. M. de Noailles, having re 
 nounced his own designs, will probably endeavor to dis 
 suade the Marquis from adhering to his, in which attempt 
 he will, of course, be seconded by his family. The latest 
 news, which occupies all the world here, is the arrival of 
 Mr. Franklin at Nantes. He will set out for Paris to 
 morrow." Instead of allowing himself to be influenced, 
 however, as M. Dubois-Martin suspected he might, into 
 giving up his design and returning quietly to his regi- 
 
 1 Segur, Memoires. 
 
1776.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 
 
 29 
 
 merit, which was indeed what his family earnestly wished 
 him to do, La Fayette set before himself a reminder of 
 the glory of his ancestors as a spur to his own strength 
 of purpose and his desire to follow worthily after those 
 sturdy soldiers in their long history of military prowess 
 in which no La Fayette was ever known to turn back. 
 He selected as his device for the arms he bore, as Marquis 
 de La Fayette, that of the famous marshal of his name 
 who loyally served the King against his enemies in the 
 fifteenth century, the words Cur Non f assuming it, as he 
 says, " in order that they might serve me both as an en 
 couragement and a response," at a time when all his im 
 pulses carried him in one direction and all the influences 
 about him strove to turn him into another. 1 
 
 *, 
 
 THE ARMS OF LA FAYETTE. 
 
 In the mean time, Kalb, who had returned to Paris 
 from Havre, renewed his connection with the Marquis de 
 La Fayette, who had been following with great interest 
 the progress of Kalb s expedition, and who now received 
 
 1 The former device was, " Vis sat contra fatum." 
 
30 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1776. 
 
 him after its failure with many expressions of sympathy 
 and regret. He declared that he was willing to make 
 a trial himself, even if it involved the fitting out of an 
 expedition at his own expense, and he assured Kalb that 
 he should never give up until he had succeeded in going 
 to America; whereupon Kalb s spirits were revived by 
 the hope that he might yet by this means carry out his 
 own designs. He proposed to La Fayette that they 
 should go together to see the Comte de Broglie, who was, 
 as we have seen, sincerely attached to the young Marquis. 
 He was Kalb s patron in his undertaking, though there is 
 no evidence that La Fayette knew it or even suspected 
 that the Comte de Broglie had ambitious designs himself 
 in connection with the American Revolution in further 
 ance of which he was sending out Kalb as his agent. 
 La Fayette has not mentioned it in any of his writings, 
 and the Kalb papers through which Herr Kapp was first 
 to throw light upon the obscure details of this transaction 
 contain nothing that indicates his acquaintance with it. 
 They went together to Ruffec, the country-seat of the 
 Comte de Broglie, with whom they spent two or three 
 days in discussing the plan which La Fayette proposed 
 to adopt. At the conclusion of this visit it was agreed 
 " that the voyage to America must be made, in spite of all 
 obstacles," l and, having discussed the question how this 
 might be done, they decided that La Fayette should buy 
 a ship and a cargo at once. 
 
 The news from America at this time continued to be 
 more and more discouraging, and reports were current in 
 France that General Washington s army had been anni 
 hilated by the British, that his whole force was reduced 
 to three thousand troops, and that the British commander, 
 having driven him out of New York and Long Island, 
 was pursuing him with an army of thirty thousand men 
 
 1 Kapp s Kalb, p. 100. 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 31 
 
 through New Jersey. Even the American Commission 
 ers, in the uncertainty of the moment, when it was impos 
 sible to decide how much truth there might be in these 
 stories of disaster at home, sent word to La Fayette that, 
 under the circumstances, it seemed better to them that he 
 should postpone his undertaking. But he went at once to 
 see Mr. Deane, and, after thanking him for the frankness 
 with which he had pointed out the dangers of an expedi 
 tion, said to him, " Heretofore I have been able to show 
 you only my willingness to aid you in your struggle : the 
 time has now come when that willingness may be put to 
 effective use, for I am going to buy a ship and to take your 
 officers out in it. Let us not give up our hope yet ; it is 
 precisely in time of danger that I want to share whatever 
 fortune may have in store for you." l 
 
 He took steps immediately to put into execution his 
 plan of securing a ship, which was an exceedingly diffi 
 cult thing to do without discovery upon the part of the 
 British Ambassador, whose agents were closely watching 
 every port, and who, upon the slightest intimation that 
 an expedition of this character was fitting out, would 
 have made such representations as to oblige the French 
 ministry to forbid it. So great, indeed, was this danger 
 that La Fayette did not dare to visit Dr. Franklin, who 
 was then in Paris. He was enabled to communicate with 
 him, however, through the mediation of Mr. Carmichael, 
 the secretary to the American Commissioners, who, being 
 less known as an agent of the Colonies, was less likely to 
 attract attention ; 2 and by this means he obtained the ap 
 proval both of Dr. Franklin and of Mr. Deane, whom he 
 kept constantly informed of the progress he was making. 
 He decided, after careful reflection, that Bordeaux would 
 be a safer place for him to negotiate in than any northern 
 port of France, because it was more remote and conse- 
 
 1 M^moires clc ma Main, i. 12. 2 Ibid. 
 
32 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1777. 
 
 quently less carefully watched by Lord Stormont s people, 
 and he turned in that direction to find the ship he sought. 
 For this purpose there happened to be at hand a man 
 exactly suited to the business, in the person of Lieutenant 
 Francois Dubois-Martin, brother to the Comte de Broglie s 
 secretary, who was attached to one of the King s regi 
 ments then stationed at Port-au-Prince. M. Dubois-Mar 
 tin had come to France shortly before that time, commis 
 sioned to buy uniforms for his regiment ; he had executed 
 this commission at Bordeaux, and had then gone to Paris 
 to see his brother before returning to his post. During 
 his visit there he heard of the expedition which Kalb 
 intended to take to North America, and upon expressing 
 a great desire to join it he was enrolled, with the rank of 
 major, among the officers who were to sail from Havre. 
 After the ministerial prohibition and the consequent fail 
 ure of the enterprise, Dubois-Martin had gone again to 
 visit his brother, and he was now upon the point of start 
 ing for the West Indies. La Fayette picked out this man 
 as the agent whom he required ; he had had some busi 
 ness experience in making purchases for his regiment, and 
 in addition to that he had dealt at Bordeaux in this con 
 nection, so that he had a certain familiarity with that city 
 and its merchants, which was, of course, very necessary in 
 carrying out a delicate mission of this kind. Dubois- 
 Martin " le petit Dubois," as he was called by the Comte 
 de Broglie set out at once for Bordeaux, where he very 
 soon made arrangements for a vessel and reported his 
 success to La Fayette. The merchants from whom he 
 bought the ship were Messrs. Recules de Basmarins, Raim- 
 baux et Cie. ; the vessel was commanded by one Captain 
 le Boursier, and it was called La Victoire ; under the 
 agreement, it was to be delivered by the middle of March, 
 1777. The price agreed upon by Dubois was one hun 
 dred and twelve thousand francs for the ship and the 
 cargo, one-quarter of which La Fayette was to pay in 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 33 
 
 cash, and the remainder in fifteen months from the date 
 of delivery. 
 
 During the interval between the date of the purchase 
 of his vessel and the time of its delivery a few weeks later, 
 La Fayette employed his leisure by fulfilling a promise 
 made by him to visit in London his uncle the Marquis de 
 Noailles, then the Ambassador of France to the Court of 
 St. James. He went in company with the Prince de Poix ? 
 and stayed in England three weeks, during which, as a 
 representative nobleman from the French Court, intro 
 duced by the Ambassador, he was received with distin 
 guished attention in English society and was also presented 
 to King George. 1 He has been criticised by English 
 writers for this visit to England at a time when he knew 
 that he was about to take up arms against that country ; 
 but the engagement to go there had been made by him 
 some time previously, and if he had declined at this time to 
 fulfil it he could not have given a sufficient excuse to the 
 Marquis de Noailles, who was expecting him, and who, as 
 La Fayette assured Mr. Sparks, knew nothing of his plans 
 about the American War. " I could not decline the invi 
 tation without exposing my secret, and by accepting it I 
 was able to divert attention from the preparations I was 
 then making." He was fully conscious, however, of what 
 he owed to himself as an honorable man, and during the 
 time he was in London he scrupulously avoided any act 
 that could lead him into a position such as he ought not 
 to occupy, or that could give him any information which 
 he had no right to ; and, as he afterward said, if he in 
 dulged himself in the pleasure that a boy of nineteen 
 might naturally feel in standing before King George, in 
 going to the house of Lord George Germain, Secretary 
 for the Colonies, and in meeting at the opera Sir Henry 
 Clinton, whom he was afterward to meet at Monmouth, 
 
 1 Memoiresde ma Main, i. l. l) > ; Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 447. 
 VOL. I. 3 
 
34 
 
 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 
 
 [1777. 
 
 yet he strictly refused to visit any of the seaports where 
 preparations were being made for the war, especially the 
 harbor of Portsmouth, where he was invited to see an 
 armament then fitting out to go to America. At the end 
 of three weeks he went back to Paris, but, not wishing to 
 arouse the suspicions of his relatives by his return, he con 
 cealed himself at Kalb s house in Chaillot, then a suburb 
 of Paris, where he " remained three days and saw the 
 Americans and a few friends, 7 and it was during this time 
 that he made his final arrangements for setting out. 
 
 The contract which he entered into with Mr. Deane in 
 regard to his serving in the American army, and the rank 
 he was to be given, as well as the various grades of the 
 officers whom he agreed to take with him in his ship, are 
 as follows : l 
 
 " List of Officers of Infantry and Light Troops Destined to Serve in 
 the Armies of the States- General of North America. 
 
 Name of Officers. 
 
 Rank. 
 
 i 
 Commencement of their 
 
 
 
 Pay. 
 
 M. de la Fayette, 
 
 Major-general, 
 
 December 7, 1776. 
 
 Baron de Kalb, 
 
 do. 
 
 November 7, 1776. 
 
 Delesser, 
 
 Colonel, 
 
 December 7, 1776. 
 
 De Valfort, 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 De Fayols, 
 
 Lieutenant- colonel, 
 
 November 20, 1776. 
 
 De Franval, 
 
 do. 
 
 December 1, 1776. 
 
 Dubois Martin, 
 
 Major, 
 
 November 7, 1776. 
 
 De Gimat, 
 
 do. 
 
 December 1, 1776. 
 
 De Vrigny, 
 
 Captain, 
 
 do. 
 
 De Bedaulx, 
 
 
 
 Capitaine, 
 
 Captain, 
 
 December 1, 1776. 
 
 De la Colombe, 
 
 Lieutenant, 
 
 do. 
 
 Candon, 
 
 do. 
 
 November 7, 1776. 
 
 i i The mentioned ranks and the pay, which the most honorable 
 Congress shall affix to them, to commence at the periods marked 
 
 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 220. 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 35 
 
 in the present list, have been agreed to by us the undersigned, 
 Silas Deane, in quality of Deputy of the American States-Gen 
 eral, on the one part, the Marquis de la Fayette and the Baron 
 de Kalb on the other part. Signed double at Paris this 7th of 
 December, 1776. 
 
 "DE KALB, 
 
 a 
 
 THE MARQUIS DE LA FAYETTE, 
 "SILAS DEANE." 
 
 Annexed to the foregoing contract is this special agree 
 ment with La Fayette : 
 
 "The desire which the Marquis de la Fayette shows of serving 
 among the troops of the United States of North America, and the 
 interest which he takes in the justice of their cause, make him 
 wish to distinguish himself in this war, and to render himself as 
 useful as he possibly can ; but not thinking that he can obtain 
 leave of his family to pass the seas and serve in a foreign country, 
 till he can go as a general officer, I have thought I could not 
 better serve my country, and those who have entrusted me, than 
 by granting to him, in the name of the very honorable Congress, 
 the rank of major-general, which I beg the States to confirm to 
 him, to ratify, and deliver to him the commission to hold and 
 take rank, to count from this day, with the general officers of the 
 same degree. His high birth, his alliances, the great dignities 
 which his family hold at this Court, his considerable estates in 
 this realm, his personal merit, his reputation, his disinterested 
 ness, and, above all, his zeal for the liberty of our provinces, are 
 such as have only been able to engage me to promise him the rank 
 of major-general in the name of the United States. In witness 
 of which I have signed the present this 7th of December, 1770. 
 
 " SILAS DEANE, 
 "Agent for the United States of America." 
 
 "On the conditions here explained I offer myself, and promise 
 to depart when and how Mr. Deane shall judge proper, to serve 
 the United States with all possible zeal, without any pension or 
 particular allowance, reserving to myself the liberty of returning 
 to Europe when my family or my king shall recall me. 
 
 "Done at Paris, this 7th of December, 1776. 
 
 "THE MARQUIS DE LA FAYETTE." 
 
 1 We have already referred to the fact that the contract made by Mr. Deane 
 with the Marquis de La Fayette and the Baron de Kalb was not executed 
 
36 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1777. 
 
 La Fayette decided that, in order to set out from France 
 without being restrained by the entreaties of his relatives 
 or the commands of the Government, he must go secretly, 
 without even taking leave of his family. This was all the 
 more trying for him because he loved his young wife 
 tenderly and had one child, a daughter, a little over a 
 year old, both of whom it seemed cruel to leave without one 
 last embrace before starting upon an expedition fraught 
 with great peril and from which he might never return. 
 But he was well aware that this was his only course ; for 
 the Due d Ayen would certainly have had him arrested 
 and placed under orders from the King expressly for 
 bidding him to go to America, if he had by any chance 
 discovered that La Fayette seriously contemplated such 
 a step. He wrote the following letter to announce his 
 
 until some time in February, 1777, though it bears date the 7th of December, 
 1776, and we have called attention to M. Doniol s theory as to the cause of 
 its having been thus dated back. What appears to be extremely probable, 
 from a consideration of all the circumstances, is that the agreement here 
 given between Mr. Deane and La Fayette alone was made soon after the 
 Marquis first met the Commissioner, when he had as yet no definite plan of 
 going to America ; because he declares in it his willingness " to depart when 
 and how Mr. Deane shall judge proper." This date would be, according to 
 Herr Kapp, between the 1st and the 7th of December ; for he fixes the meet 
 ing between these two dates because La Fayette is mentioned in the contract 
 made on the 7th of the month and not in that of the 1st. This may, how 
 ever, be incorrect ; for we shall see below that Mr. Deane said, " It was exe 
 cuted in November last, long before their [his colleagues ] arrival." When 
 La Fayette executed his contract with Mr. Deane in conjunction with Kalb, 
 he had already bought his vessel and cargo, and was able to insert in the 
 document the names of the officers whom he intended to take with him to 
 America. It is most likely that at the execution of this final agreement the 
 contract originally made with Kalb was modified to suit the change that had 
 taken place in his plans, and the written understanding first had by Mr. 
 Deane with the Marquis de La Fayette was redated, or, possibly, re-executed, 
 at the same time ; the two documents having been then united to make sub 
 stantially one contract, bearing date the 7th of December, 1776. M. Doniol s 
 suggestion as to the dating back of the instrument would accord entirely 
 with this ; for we shall see that Mr. Deane says of his agreement with La 
 Fayette, "My colleagues have had no knowledge of it," thus bearing out 
 the idea that he acted alone and wished to fix the date at a time before 
 Dr. Franklin reached Paris. 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 37 
 
 departure, which, although dated in London, was not de 
 livered to the Due d Ayen until La Fayette had left Paris 
 to join his vessel at Bordeaux : l 
 
 " LONDON, 9 March, 1777. 
 
 " You will be surprised, my dear papa, at what I ain about to 
 tell you. It has been harder for me than I can express, not to 
 have consulted you before ; my respect for you, my affection and 
 my confidence in you, must convince you of this ; but my word 
 had been given, and I was bound by it. I am sure you would not 
 have respected me if I had been false to that ; so that I hope the 
 step I am now going to take will give you at least a good opinion 
 of my right intentions. I have found a singularly good oppor 
 tunity to distinguish myself and to gain experience in my pro 
 fession. I am now a general officer in the army of the United 
 States of America. They have lent me their confidence in return 
 for the openness of my conduct and the great interest I have taken 
 in their cause ; while, on my side, I have done everything I could 
 for them ; and their welfare will always be as dear to me as my 
 own. In a word, my dear father, I am now awaiting in London 
 news from my friends ; and as soon as it arrives I shall set out 
 from here, and, without stopping in Paris, I shall go aboard a 
 vessel which I have loaded and which belongs to me. My com 
 panions in the expedition are the Baron deKalb, an officer of the 
 highest distinction, brigadier in the army of the King and major- 
 general in the service of the United States, like myself, and some 
 excellent officers who are ready to share the fortune of my adven 
 tures. I am filled with joy at having found so good an oppor 
 tunity to increase my experience and to do something in the world. 
 I know very well that I am making an immense sacrifice, and it 
 will be harder for me than for any one to leave my family, my 
 friends, and you, my dear father, because I love you all more than 
 any one ever loved before. But, after all, this voyage is not a 
 long one ; people go farther every day for the sole pleasure of 
 travelling ; and, besides, I hope I shall return from it better 
 deserving the esteem of everybody who is kind enough to miss 
 me during my absence. Good-by, my dear father. I hope to 
 see you soon again. Do not withdraw your affection from me, 
 for I earnestly long to deserve it, and I do deserve it by the 
 love I have for you and the respect I shall continue to bear for 
 you all my life. Your affectionate son, 
 
 "LA FAYETTE." 
 
 1 Correspondance de La Fayette, i. 82. 
 
38 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1777. 
 
 This letter was received by the Due d Ayen with disap 
 pointment and chagrin. He went at once to the ministry 
 with the news, and presented the case so forcibly that an 
 order was issued directing La Fayette to return to his duty, 
 and couriers were sent after him on the road to Bordeaux, 
 whither it was learned he had gone. Mme. de La Fayette 
 was greatly distressed at hearing of her husband s depart 
 ure, though she showed that confidence in him which never 
 waned, and the courage which always, through the severe 
 trials of their after-life, bore witness to her patience and 
 her womanly steadfastness. Her mother, the Duchesse 
 d Ayen, encouraged and supported her in this ; for she 
 alone of all the family took the side of La Fayette and 
 foresaw that he had enlisted in a cause that was worthy of 
 him and was likely one day to bring him honor. Mme. de 
 La Fayette says l that, in spite of the anger of her father 
 and all the family, " my mother, anxious for the effect of 
 it upon me, was herself distressed by the thought of the 
 danger and the separation from a son whom she loved so 
 tenderly ; and yet, although she was the last person in the 
 world to be led by ambition, by the thirst for glory, or by 
 the love of enterprise, she judged the undertaking of M. 
 de La Fayette at that time as it was judged two years 
 afterward by every one else. She broke to me herself the 
 news of this cruel separation, and consoled me by seeking 
 every opportunity to help M. de La Fayette, with that 
 nobleness of mind and that elevation of character which 
 were the moving impulses of her nature. " 
 
 In the mean time, La Fayette and Kalb had left Paris 
 on the night of the 16th of March, 1777, for Bordeaux, 
 where they arrived on the 19th, having travelled three 
 days by post. 
 
 The biographer of Kalb has thought it wise to reject 
 the account of the difficulties of this part of the journey 
 
 1 Vie de la Duchesse d Ayen, p. 56. 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 39 
 
 as they are described by La Fayette himself in his " Me- 
 moires" and by Mr. Jared Sparks, 1 out of " a due regard 
 for the truth of history," as Herr Kapp says, " because 
 the ministers, instead of opposing, connived at the journey 
 of Kalb and La Fayette so far as their position allowed 
 them to do so. La Fayette says as much himself, when, 
 in the year 1800, he writes to Madame Geymueller, the 
 daughter of his friend, His [Kalb s] departure was fa 
 vored by the Comte de Broglie and secretly sanctioned by 
 the French Government. What was true of Kalb must 
 apply to La Fayette, for they travelled together." But 
 this last statement is not historically correct. There was 
 a very wide difference between the two men and between 
 their relations to the French Government. Kalb, a for 
 eigner in the French service, was going to America as the 
 agent of the Comte de Broglie, in the furtherance of am 
 bitious plans which the Count desired to have carried out 
 if possible ; and, with this in view, the latter had not only 
 used his influence at the War Office to obtain for Kalb 
 a leave of absence for two years, but had secured a pro 
 motion for him as a reward for going. 
 
 Unquestionably the departure of Kalb, so far as it at 
 tracted any official attention whatever, was connived at by 
 the French Government, as was probably also the depart 
 ure of the other officers who engaged with Silas Deane 
 to accompany him in the expedition ; for, after all, the 
 ministers were very friendly to the Americans, and were 
 quite willing, as we know, to lend them any assistance 
 that they could without exciting the hostility of Great 
 Britain. But the Marquis de La Fayette was a man of 
 very great prominence, whose open declaration in favor 
 of the insurgents by going to America to fight for them 
 was sure to attract public attention. It was likely to em 
 barrass the ministry at an extremely critical moment, and 
 
 1 Meinoires de ma Main, i. 14 ; Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 448. 
 
40 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMEKICA. [1777. 
 
 there was danger that this act might gravely compromise 
 the French Ambassador in London, La Fayette s kins 
 man, under whose protection he had, only a few days be 
 fore, been presented at the English Court. His case, from 
 its very nature, could not be connived at ; not because the 
 ministers did not sympathize with any attempt that might 
 aid the Americans and damage England, but because the 
 particular circumstances of the Marquis de La Fayette 
 obliged them to act. 
 
 The Due d Ayen regarded La Fayette s project as an 
 act of folly, not to call it a disgrace, and he went to the 
 Comte de Vergennes with all the intensity of his family 
 pride aroused, determined that he would prevent it. Ap 
 pealed to thus openly in the case of an officer of the King s 
 army for La Fayette was captain in the regiment de 
 Noailles about to go abroad without leave, there was no 
 course left to the Government but to warn him not to quit 
 the kingdom, and, above all, not to go to America to fight 
 against King George, with whom His Most Christian 
 Majesty was at peace. Therefore La Fayette s difficulties 
 were real. A lettre-de-cachet was despatched after him, 
 which the Marquis says was " peremptory." It forbade 
 him to go to the American continent, under pain of dis 
 obedience, and he was ordered to Marseilles for further 
 instructions. 1 His departure from Paris created an ex 
 traordinary feeling, especially among his younger friends, 
 who sympathized with him in an adventure which many 
 of them would gladly have shared. He became the object 
 of general interest, almost a hero, in the conversations of 
 the cafes, the salons, and the theatres ; and one lady is 
 reported to have exclaimed, in her admiration for him, 
 that if the Due d Ayen treated so badly a splendid young 
 man like La Fayette, he need not expect to marry the 
 rest of his daughters. 2 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 14. 
 
 2 Vie de Mme. de Lafayette, par Mme. de Lasteyrie, sa fille, p. 197, note. 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 41 
 
 But the attitude of the Government gave rise to con 
 siderable uneasiness among the associates of the Marquis 
 de La Fayette, lest the undertaking might result in trouble 
 for him and possibly even be looked upon as a subject of 
 offence on the part of those who had been instrumental in 
 aiding him to carry it out. There is evidence of this in 
 a letter which Mr. Deane felt it necessary to write to M. 
 Gerard, Secretary of the Foreign Office, as follows : 
 
 "SiR, You have enclosed two original letters from the Baron 
 du Kalb, which please to present to his Excellency the Comte de 
 Vergennes, and tell him I refer to iny uniform conduct to justify 
 what I have had the honor of relating to you this evening ; as to 
 facts, Moils. Comte de Broglio has received this evening a letter 
 from Moils, le Marquis de Lafayette which he will communicate. 
 I refer to that Nobleman, and am willing to rely on his relation of 
 this affair, for niy justification, more, for my approbation, since 
 to gain a most gallant and amiable young Nobleman to espouse 
 our cause, and to give to the world a specimen of his native and 
 hereditary bravery, surely cannot be deemed criminal. I have 
 nothing to add to what I have had the honor of relating to you 
 personally upon this subject, except that I rely on the Comte de 
 Broglio to explain any and every part of my conduct in this 
 affair, that my colleagues have had no knowledge of it, as it was 
 executed in November last, long before their arrival, and that I 
 shall do everything in my power to satisfy every one that my con 
 duct has been strictly honourable. I have the honor to be your 
 most obedt. and very humble servant. 
 
 "S. DEANE. 
 
 "Apl. 2, 1777." 
 
 This letter was evidently not delivered, and it was re- 
 addressed by Mr. Deane the next day with the accom 
 panying note : 
 
 " SIR, I sent the inclosed last evening a few minutes after you 
 left Paris, and therefore now send my servant express with it. I 
 cannot but feel uneasy untill I have fully vindicated my conduct 
 in this affair ; and therefore ask you not only to inform him that 
 I rely upon him, to shew these letters, if necessary, in niy justifi- 
 
 1 French Archives, Etats-TJnis, t. 2, Mo. 89 : Doniol, La Participation de la 
 France, ii. 392. 
 
42 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1777. 
 
 cation, to his Majesty and his other ministers. I have the honor 
 to remain with the utmost respect, Sir, your most obedt. and very 
 humble servt. 
 
 11 SILAS DEANE. 
 "PARIS, 3 April, 1777." 
 
 This proves beyond question that the departure of La 
 Fayette was not regarded with indifference by the Cabinet 
 or looked upon in the same light as that of Kalb and 
 the others who accompanied him, that the orders of the 
 Government were not merely formal, and that his going 
 was not connived at. Mr. Silas Deane was probably better 
 informed than any one else, outside of the Cabinet itself, 
 as to the policy of the French Government in regard to 
 the American Colonies. He was in constant intercourse 
 with the ministry upon this subject ; indeed, he was 
 present in France as a Commissioner of the United States 
 Congress, secretly recognized by the Comte de Vergennes, 
 and the agent through whom negotiations were carried 
 on, until the end of the year 1776, for the shipments of 
 arms and munitions of war which were then being made. 
 And yet Mr. Deane was alarmed at the evident disap 
 proval of the conduct of La Fayette on the part of the 
 King and his ministers ; he was fearful that in this matter 
 he had gone one step too far, and that he might have 
 damaged, instead of helping as he had intended to do, the 
 cause of the United States in France : he therefore hastened 
 to clear his colleagues from any responsibility in the con 
 tract with La Fayette, and to assure M. de Vergennes of 
 his honesty of purpose and his friendship toward France. 
 He wrote again, a few days later, directly to the Comte de 
 Vergennes, in transmitting to him some despatches which 
 he had just received from the Congress : 
 
 "PARIS, 5th Apl., 1777. 
 
 "Sin, I have the honor of enclosing to Your Excellency, 
 agreeable to my promise to Mr. Gerard, copies of my letters re^ 
 specting Mons. La Fayette, which I hope will be agreeable, and 
 can only say, I have felt much on the occasion for the delicate 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 43 
 
 honor of the Marquiss, lest some report injurious to him should 
 be spread, in either country ; no country need be ashamed of 
 him, and I am sure he will one day justify to the world that my 
 early prejudices in his favor were well founded." l 
 
 At all events, the King issued a general order through 
 the Ministry of War, which was signed by himself, for 
 bidding any of his officers to take service in the English 
 Colonies, and enjoining such as should arrive in the 
 Islands of America with that purpose in view, " especially 
 the Marquis de La Fayette," to return at once to France ; 
 and secret instructions were sent to the wardens in all the 
 seaports to watch carefully all vessels sailing thence, to 
 search them if necessary, and to prevent the shipment of 
 arms and munitions of war to North America. 
 
 The Marquis de Noailles, the French Ambassador at 
 London, who felt very keenly the discomfort of the posi 
 tion in which he had been placed by this incident, hastened 
 to write to M. de Maurepas, the Prime Minister : 
 
 "LONDON, 8 April, 1777. 
 
 "I learned yesterday, M. le Comte, with extreme surprise, 
 through my letters from Paris, that M. de La Fayette has gone to 
 America. Fortunately for him, his youth may shield him from 
 the responsibility of his thoughtless acts. This is the only conso 
 lation left to me in the chagrin I feel in view of his most inconsid 
 erate behavior. There is no doubt that his plans were made before 
 he came to London, where he spent some fifteen days at the end 
 of February and the beginning of March ; though I wish now 
 that he had intimated to me, even in the most remote way, the 
 voyage upon which he has just started out. I should have had no 
 difficulty in bringing him back to reason, for I should have given 
 him a better understanding of the principles of emulation and of 
 honor, of which he is following now only the idea and not the real 
 substance or the true precepts. He left here a week or ten days 
 before M. de Poix, with whom he came. I asked him his reason 
 for going away, but I was entirely satisfied when he told me that 
 no bad news of any kind was taking him back to France. He 
 
 1 French Archives, Etats-LJnis, t. 2, No. 93 : Doniol, La Participation de 
 la France, ii. 393. 
 
44 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1777. 
 
 concealed his intentions from his travelling companion, from me, 
 and from everybody ; of that there is no doubt in my mind. His 
 presentation at Court here could serve him in no other way than 
 in the fulfilment of a duty which I required of him. It is evident 
 that, with no one but himself to consult, he did not realize, by 
 very much indeed, the consequences of what he was about to do. 
 I confess that if he had seen fit not to come to London to extend 
 his carnival, I should be free to-day from, at least one source of 
 regret ; for I should not be reminded that I had the honor of 
 presenting him to the King of England only a moment before 
 he started out in this most extraordinary proceeding." l 
 
 The Ambassador was, of course, not held in the least 
 responsible for any part of the affair, and indeed very 
 little more was said of it in the despatches ; the Comte de 
 Vergennes merely adding, in his own hand, at the end of 
 an official communication, "It is with great regret, M. le 
 Marquis, that I mention to you M. le M 18 de La Fayette. 
 His age may perhaps justify his escapade ; but I am truly 
 sorry, not only for the interest that you and the Due 
 d Ayen have in the matter, but also because I am afraid 
 he may fall in with some English man-of-war, and, not 
 being distinguished from the mass of adventurers who 
 come into their hands, may be treated with a harshness 
 not entirely unknown to that nation." 
 
 If the minister had nothing more serious to communi 
 cate than his personal fears that something unpleasant 
 might happen to La Fayette, of course M. de Noailles 
 found no further cause to disturb his mind ; though he 
 did not quite lose sight of the subject, for he wrote home 
 that Lord Suffolk had said to him, with a rather malicious 
 expression upon his face, " The winds have been pretty 
 good during the last few days for vessels sailing from 
 England to America ;" by which, the Marquis said, he did 
 not know whether he meant that, in spite of all obstacles 
 thrown in the way by France, England would not give 
 
 1 Angleterre, t. 522, fol. 370 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 396. 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 45 
 
 up her purpose of subduing the Colonies, or whether he 
 merely wanted to draw out some expression in regard to a 
 person closely allied to him who had recently gone to join 
 the American army. 
 
 But the Ambassador added that he felt very much more 
 at ease, afterward, when he heard that the Comte de Bank- 
 lay, marechal-de-camp in the army of the French King, 
 had arrived in London and had petitioned his British 
 Majesty to be allowed to go to America and serve as a 
 volunteer in the army of General Howe, continuing, 
 " They have no longer any ground to reproach us with 
 partiality, since we can point to the example of a general 
 officer who is willing to make all sorts of sacrifices to 
 espouse the cause of England in one of the most serious 
 quarrels she has ever had." This extraordinary offer of 
 M. de Banklay s was actually made in the month of May, 
 1777, and was rejected by Lord George Germain with a 
 polite cynicism which certainly could not have encour 
 aged any one else to follow the example. Having ex 
 pressed the high appreciation with which the King had 
 learned of M. de Banklay s attachment to the English 
 cause, he continued, " The situation of affairs in America 
 and the character of the war now being carried on there 
 would make it impossible for the commander-in-chief to 
 show you the attention due to your rank and your per 
 sonal merit. His Majesty, therefore, prefers to forego the 
 advantage he should gain from your service rather than to 
 expose you to what might be inconvenient or disagree 
 able." M. Doniol testifies that this is the only case of 
 the kind that occurred in France during the war. 1 In the 
 mean time, the latest courier from Versailles had brought 
 the Marquis de Noailles a letter from M. de Vergennes 
 telling him that he need have no further solicitude about 
 his nephew, because " M. de La Fayette has been most 
 
 1 Angleterre, t. 523, No. 47 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 399. 
 
46 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1777. 
 
 fortunately overtaken by the King s messenger at San 
 Sebastian ; he has respected the order of the King, and 
 has immediately returned." 
 
 La Fayette, having reached Bordeaux, in company with 
 Kalb, on the 19th of March, 1777, discovered that his 
 movements were known at Court and that the King s 
 order would issue for his arrest. As he knew that it was 
 likely to overtake him forthwith if he remained in France, 
 he determined to put out with his ship as soon as it could 
 be made ready, and, going to the nearest port in Spain, 
 to await there the ship s papers. 1 But he was delayed 
 several days by the final preparations for his vessel to go 
 to sea, during which time he sent a messenger to Paris to 
 learn the latest news and to see if possibly the interdict 
 might be removed. 
 
 Kalb wrote to his wife from Bordeaux on the 20th of 
 March, " There is still a possibility that our departure 
 may be prevented. I find so many matters still to be ar 
 ranged that the minister will receive notice of the journey 
 of the Marquis in time for his prohibitory order to arrive 
 before we go to sea. Notwithstanding the ardor with 
 which we are at work, nothing is more uncertain than 
 this voyage. At this moment a courier has been de 
 spatched to ascertain the effect produced by the news of 
 our proceedings and to prevent an interdict from issuing." 
 And on the 23d of March he wrote, " We are still igno 
 rant whether our departure will not be prevented, as our 
 vessel, so long detained already, cannot go out into the 
 stream before to-morrow." 2 
 
 They finally went aboard La Victoire, however, on the 
 night of the 25th of March ; and Kalb wrote again to his 
 wife, on the morning of the 26th, " In two hours we shall 
 be in the open sea. We are weighing anchor in the most 
 glorious weather. I shall certainly write you again before 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 448. a Kapp s Kalb, 104. 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 47 
 
 my arrival in America, because we have to enter a Eu 
 ropean port, and shall probably wait at San Sebastian for 
 the return of a courier sent to Paris." 
 
 By the laws of France at that time, it was necessary for 
 every passenger on a vessel going out of a French port to 
 obtain a certificate, signed by the proper official, setting 
 forth the place of his birth, his age, his general appear 
 ance, and his destination. M. Doniol, who leaves no stone 
 unturned under which he is likely to discover the infor 
 mation he seeks, has dug out of the papers of the Admi 
 ralty, preserved in the Tribunal de Commerce at Bor 
 deaux, the record of these certificates or permits issued in 
 1777 to the Marquis de La Fayette, Kalb, and their com 
 panions. That of La Fayette is dated " at Bordeaux, the 
 22d March, 1777," and he is described as " S r Gilbert 
 du Mottie, Chevalier de Chavaillac, age de 20 ans, taille 
 haute, cheveux blond," who is about to embark on " La 
 Victoire, Cap 6 Lebourcier, pour aller au Cap ou ils vont 
 pour affaires." It includes the names of some other 
 members of his following, and is signed by him as Gil 
 bert du Motier, using his family name and his title of 
 " Chevalier de Chavaniac," by which he was probably not 
 known except in his native province. Both of these were 
 evidently spelled in the certificate by an official who knew 
 none too much about orthography and who cared nothing 
 whatever about the particular subjects of the King whose 
 names he was then inscribing. 2 
 
 After leaving Bordeaux, the Victoire was headed for 
 the Spanish coast, and very soon arrived at Los Pasajes, 
 a little harbor on the Bay of Biscay, in the province of 
 Guipuzcoa, a few miles to the east of San Sebastian and 
 only a short distance from the French frontier. Upon 
 going ashore, La Fayette discovered that his troubles were 
 
 1 Doniol, La Participation de la Franco, ii. 384. 
 
 2 See these interesting certificates, as given by M. Doniol, La Participation 
 de la France, ii. 384, 419, 420. 
 
48 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1777. 
 
 not yet ended. The two officers who had been sent after 
 him from Versailles with the King s lettre-de-cachet had 
 followed by land from Bordeaux, and presented the order 
 to him at Los Pasajes. At the same time, letters came 
 to him from the ministers and from some members of his 
 family, insisting upon his return. The lettre-de-cachet 
 commanded him to proceed to Marseilles and to wait there 
 for further orders. The letters from the ministers charged 
 him with violating his oath of allegiance to the King and 
 with rashly committing an act which might involve the 
 Government with other Powers. His family censured him 
 in a tone of pointed reprimand, assuring him that his con 
 duct, if persisted in, would ruin both them and himself. 1 
 This is what La Fayette related upon the subject, in 1828, 
 to Mr. Sparks, who adds to the foregoing, " It must be 
 observed, however, that his wife did not join in this out 
 cry ; she approved of his enterprise from the beginning, 
 and threw no obstacles in his way. The family were pre 
 paring for a tour in Italy, and the design was that he 
 should meet them at Marseilles, go with them on this tour, 
 and thus be diverted from his American project," 
 
 Kalb s annoyance at this delay increased daily, as did 
 also his fear that his own ambition might yet be defeated 
 and that he might be prevented from going to America 
 this time, as he had been before. He wrote to his wife, 
 on the 28th of March, " It will not be necessary to wait 
 here for the return of the courier sent to Paris, because 
 another has been sent to us from Bordeaux, who came 
 here yesterday. He brought the orders of the Court 
 commanding the Marquis to repair to Toulon, there to 
 await the arrival of the Due d Ayen and the Comtesse de 
 Tesse, his sister, and to travel with them to Italy. This 
 is the end of his expedition to America to join the army 
 of the insurgents. He is at this moment leaving for Bor- 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 448. 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 49 
 
 deaux, whence, if possible, he will proceed to Paris, being 
 loath to go to Italy. I am now obliged to wait for the 
 courier whom La Fayette is to send to me, either from 
 Bordeaux, if, on obtaining from the commandant of that 
 place more satisfactory information of the King s com 
 mands, he finds it necessary to abandon the journey, or 
 from Paris, if he is permitted to go there and then fails in 
 securing the consent of the Due d Ayen to his proceeding. 
 Time will hang heavy on my hands here in the mean time. 
 I do not believe he will be able to rejoin me, and have ad 
 vised him to compromise with the owner of the ship at a 
 sacrifice of twenty or twenty-five thousand francs." 
 
 Kalb underestimated, however, the force of character 
 and the determination of the young gentleman whose 
 courage he so readily disposed of. This was not by any 
 means " the end of his expedition," though, it must be 
 confessed, it was rather a staggering blow, for it brought 
 to bear upon him at the same moment all the force of 
 duty to the King and of affection for his family, either of 
 which had always hitherto been the signal for unhesi 
 tating obedience in the mind of La Fayette. He deter 
 mined to go back to France with the officers who bore the 
 King s order, to report himself to the commandant at 
 Bordeaux, and to make a further effort to release himself 
 from the prohibitions by which his steps were now beset. 
 Accordingly, he started for Bordeaux at once, by land, 
 taking the road which leads through St.-Jean-de-Luz. 
 
 " The letters of my family were terrible," he said, in 
 speaking of it several years afterward, and although " the 
 consequences of the anathema, the laws of the realm, the 
 authority and the anger of the Government, influenced 
 me to take this step, yet far more so did the grief and the 
 pregnancy of my dearly loved wife and the thought of my 
 family and friends." He presented himself, therefore, to 
 
 1 Kapp s Kalb, 104. Memoires de ma Main, i. 14. 
 
 VOL. 1. 4 
 
 V^ / 
 .. > \\j k - y 
 
 \\\^ ,-,t ^// 
 
50 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1777. 
 
 M. de Fumel, the commandant at Bordeaux, and made a 
 formal declaration that he alone would be answerable for 
 the consequences of his evasion, for he began to feel 
 assured now that there was very little hope of his obtain 
 ing permission to go, especially after receiving a letter 
 from his intimate friend the Vicomte de Coigny, who 
 wrote from Versailles that there was much excitement 
 against him at Court, that the British Ambassador had 
 made strong representations, and that there was not the 
 remotest prospect of his receiving a favorable reply. 1 
 Thereupon La Fayette decided to go to America, come 
 what might. Whilst he was at Bordeaux, following up 
 the circumstances which led him to this conclusion, Kalb 
 was still aboard La Victoire in Los Pasajes, growing con 
 stantly more impatient as the days went by without bring 
 ing him the tidings he was expecting from the Marquis. 
 He occupied the time which was, as he had foreseen, 
 " hanging heavy on his hands," by writing letters to his 
 wife which show that his disappointment had produced a 
 feeling of irritation toward La Fayette, whom he blames 
 almost in the same breath for not having abandoned the 
 expedition altogether and for not having proceeded with 
 it in spite of remonstrance from anybody. But his let 
 ters are interesting in this connection, and they are also 
 extremely important in the history of La Fayette, because 
 they are, as to many incidents of the voyage which they 
 narrate, the only documents which we now possess. He 
 wrote to her on the 6th of April, a little less than a week 
 after La Fayette had left him to go to Bordeaux, 2 " I had 
 flattered myself with the hope of receiving news from the 
 Marquis from Bordeaux last evening. If they do not 
 arrive to-day or to-morrow, our stay here will be a very 
 long one, as in that case he will not write until he gets to 
 Paris ; for certainly neither M. de Maurepas nor the Due 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 449. 
 3 Kapp s Kalb, 105. 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 51 
 
 d Ayen will permit him to rejoin us. If the Marquis has 
 not already made a bargain with the ship s owner, his 
 blunders will cost him dear. I call them blunders because 
 his course was silly from the moment he could not make 
 up his mind quietly to execute his project, undisturbed by 
 threats. It was the letter of the Vicomte de Coigny, re 
 ceived by the courier sent to him, on his return to Bor 
 deaux, which produced this sudden change of purpose. 
 If that letter had not found him already in the boat which 
 was to carry us aboard our vessel, I believe La Fayette 
 would have returned at once, and in my opinion he would 
 have acted properly. When he asked my advice about 
 what he should do, I thought it my duty to dissuade him 
 from disregarding the wishes of his father-in-law and the 
 commands of the King. On the contrary, I advised him 
 to give way to his family and to avoid a rupture with them. 
 Had he not constantly flattered himself that he had the 
 approval of the Due d Ayen, I should always have warned 
 him not to go so far as he went. He always assured me 
 that his family sanctioned his plans, that his father-in- 
 law himself intended at some time to go to America with 
 the Vicomte de Noailles, and that even Madame de La 
 Fayette had been made acquainted with his intentions by 
 her parents and would approve of them. I have always 
 thought him to blame for keeping the matter secret from 
 his wife until the moment of his departure. If he had 
 told me in Paris what he has admitted since, I should have 
 remonstrated most earnestly against the whole scheme. 
 As it is, the affair will cost him some money. But if it 
 be said that he has done a foolish thing, it may be answered 
 that he acted from the most honorable motives and that he 
 can hold up his head before all high-minded men." And 
 on the same day he wrote, " The reasons which drove us 
 to enter this port still detain us here, for we must have 
 the permission of the Marquis, or of the owner of the 
 vessel, before proceeding on our voyage. By a letter of 
 
52 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1777. 
 
 Messrs. Raimbaux & C ie I learn that he reached Bor 
 deaux on the 3d and immediately sent a courier to Paris, 
 whose return he is awaiting. This shows that he is reluc 
 tant to abandon his project and his vessel, and still hopes 
 to obtain the consent of his family and of M. de Maure- 
 pas. I hardly think he will succeed. It will not be 
 before the llth that I shall know what to expect, even 
 if La Fayette should receive an immediate answer from 
 Paris. This long delay is intolerable. I shall be too 
 late for the opening of the campaign, and am so much 
 the more mortified as Mr. Deane offered me a passage on 
 one of his ships. If the matter be still long protracted, I 
 shall either return to Paris, or betake myself to the Isle 
 of Re or to Nantes, to wait for news from Mr. Deane." 
 
 On the 12th of April he wrote, " At this moment the 
 post brings me a letter from the Marquis dated the 5th, at 
 Bordeaux. He says he was refused permission to proceed, 
 and that he fears being compelled to go to Toulon. He is 
 now waiting for the return of his courier sent to Paris, 
 and will inform me at once of the answer he receives." 
 And again, on the 15th of April, " The Marquis writes 
 from Bordeaux, under date of the 12th instant, that he was 
 on the point of leaving for Marseilles, where the royal 
 order requires him to report himself to-day. He says 
 that the Court devotes great attention to this affair of his, 
 but he still hopes to gain over the Due d Ayen, so as to be 
 at liberty to rejoin me. He therefore requests me not to 
 sail before receiving another letter from him from Toulon 
 or some other point. If I am to wait until he gets to 
 Marseilles, I shall have to stay here until the 26th. La 
 Fayette s letter shows that the ship is still held in his 
 name. He requests me to have an eye to his interests and 
 to see that his investment is realized as soon as possible." 
 
 At that very moment La Fayette had left Bordeaux on 
 his way back to the ship, and had made the final effort 
 which led to his escape from further obstacles and to his 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 53 
 
 actual departure for America. He was joined in Bordeaux 
 by a young French officer, a friend of his, the Vicomte de 
 Mauroy, who had also obtained an appointment from Mr. 
 Deane ; and in company with him he started in a post- 
 chaise to return to Los Pasajes, having written to M. de 
 Maurepas that, as the Government had not absolutely re 
 fused to remove its interdict, he should accept its silence as 
 consent, a " plaisanterie" to which he referred in after- 
 years with a smile. He had told the commandant at Bor 
 deaux that he should go to Marseilles, in compliance with 
 the King s order ; but as soon as he and his companion 
 had got safely outside the town they changed their course 
 and turned their faces toward San Sebastian. Whilst the 
 Vicomte de Mauroy sat in the chaise, La Fayette disguised 
 himself in the costume of a post-boy and went ahead on 
 horseback. 
 
 Everything prospered with them on their journey until 
 they came to St.-Jean-de-Luz, where the daughter of the 
 innkeeper at whose house they stopped recognized in the 
 pretended post-boy the gentleman whom she had seen, only 
 a few days before, travelling toward Bordeaux ; and a sud 
 den exclamation of surprise from her, which was only half 
 suppressed at a sign from La Fayette, came very near 
 exposing him. Some officials who had been following him 
 came up soon after, but, the girl having sent them in the 
 wrong direction, La Fayette and M. de Mauroy were 
 enabled to continue their journey to Los Pasajes, where 
 they arrived safely on the 17th of April. Kalb s last 
 letter from there to his wife was dated on the 17th, and 
 told her, 
 
 " At this moment the Marquis has arrived, and he is 
 prepared to set out with us in a day or two. He came to 
 this conclusion by receiving assurances from every one in 
 Paris that none other than the Due d Ayen had procured 
 the royal order, and that all the world is in favor of La 
 Fayette s enterprise and greatly dissatisfied with his father- 
 
54 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1777. 
 
 in-law for having obstructed his course, and that finally 
 the ministers, on being asked their real sentiments in the 
 matter, answered that they would have said nothing at all 
 but for the complaints of the Due d Ayen. We have 
 therefore resolved to steer for our destined port, if no un 
 foreseen obstacle intervenes. This is the last letter I shall 
 write you, if not from Europe, at least from this harbor." 
 
 The French Government took no further steps to delay 
 longer a project which circumstances had obliged it to 
 notice officially, but to which the ministers themselves felt 
 no very bitter hostility ; serious questions of state in regard 
 to their policy toward Great Britain coming up at this 
 time drove the incident from their minds, and the visit 
 which the Emperor Joseph II. of Austria made at that 
 moment to Paris engrossed the Cabinet with matters of 
 international concern. Everybody in Parisian society was 
 talking of La Fayette s exploit with admiration and ap 
 proval, and M. de Vergennes, the Secretary of Foreign 
 Affairs, remarked that he had heard La Fayette had run 
 off again, but that he should take good care this time not 
 to mention it to the King. 
 
 The Marquis de La Fayette sailed from Los Pasajes for 
 America in La Victoire, on Sunday, the 20th of April, 
 1777. He had with him, besides the Vicomte de Mauroy 
 and Johann Kalb, the following officers : Colonel de Les 
 ser, Colonel de Valfort, Lieutenant-Colonel de Fayolles, 
 Lieutenant-Colonel de Franval, Major Dubuysson, Major 
 de Gimat, Major Dubois-Martin, Captain de Vrigny, Cap 
 tain de Bedaulx, Captain de la Colombe, Captain Capi- 
 taine, Lieutenant Candon, and an American named Price, 
 who had been recommended by Mr. Deane, and who is 
 described in the official permit as " Leonard Price, aged 
 22, native of Sauveterre." 1 
 
 1 Besides these, the certificate of La Fayette contains the names of Jean 
 Simon Camus, Michel Moteau, Francois Aman Roge, and Antoine lledon. 
 Of these, however, Camus is the only one who signed the certificate. 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 55 
 
 Upon getting out to sea, La Fayette ordered his captain 
 to sail directly for the United States, although their papers 
 were taken out for the West Indies. The captain replied 
 that he could not obey that order, because the ship s papers 
 protected them only in going to the West Indies, and if 
 they were caught by an English cruiser making for the 
 United States they would instantly be made prisoners and 
 their cargo seized ; whereupon La Fayette repeated his 
 order to sail for North America, threatening in case of 
 disobedience to put the ship in charge of the second officer ; 
 but, observing an extraordinary unwillingness on the part 
 of the captain, he talked further with him, and discovered 
 that he had smuggled on board the vessel several thousand 
 dollars worth of goods which he intended to sell in the 
 West Indies, and that this was the cause of his fear of 
 being overtaken by an English man-of-war. The cap 
 tain s peace of mind was restored, however, by a promise 
 on the part of La Fayette to indemnify him in case of 
 loss by capture, whereupon he agreed to steer as he was 
 directed to do, 1 and La Fayette, who knew that La Victoire 
 could not make any reasonable show of a fight, with her 
 " two old cannon and a few muskets," having made up his 
 mind to blow her up rather than to be taken by the British, 
 settled himself down for his voyage. 2 
 
 It was a long and a very tedious one. Fortunately, we 
 have some account of it from his own pen ; for, after he 
 had been at sea somewhat over a month, he wrote to Mine, 
 de La Fayette a letter dated on board La Victoire, the 30th 
 of May, 1777 : 3 
 
 u It is from very far away that I am writing to you, dear heart, 
 and to this cruel separation is added the still more dreadful uncer 
 tainty of the time when I shall hear from you again. I hope ; how 
 ever, that it is not very distant, for, of all the many causes that 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 450. 
 
 2 Memoires de ma Main, i. 15. 
 
 8 La Fayette, Correspondance, i. 84. 
 
56 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1777. 
 
 make me long to get ashore again, there is nothing that increases 
 my impatience like this. How many fears and anxieties I have 
 had in addition to the pain of leaving behind me all that is most 
 dear ! How did you take my second departure f Did you love 
 me the less ? Have you forgiven me ? Have you thought that, 
 at all events, we should have been separated, I in Italy dragging 
 along a life with no chance to distinguish myself, surrounded by 
 people who are most hostile to my projects and my views ? But, 
 after all, this reflection could not prevent me from feeling terribly 
 at the awful moment when we were losing sight of land. Your 
 grief, that of my friends, Henriette, 1 it all came before my 
 mind with frightful vividness, and for an instant I felt that 
 I had nothing to say in defence of what I was about to do. If 
 you knew what I have suffered, what weary days I have passed 
 thus flying from everything that I love best in the world ! Must 
 I yet learn, besides all this, that you refuse to forgive me? 
 Indeed, my dear heart, in that event I should be pitiable beyond 
 expression. 
 
 "But I am telling you nothing about myself and my health, 
 and I am sure these things are of interest to you. I have been, 
 ever since my last letter to you, in the most dismal of countries ; 
 the sea is so wearisome, and I believe we have the same doleful 
 influence upon each other, it and I. I ought to have landed 
 before this, but the winds have cruelly opposed me. I shall not 
 see Charlestown for eight or ten days longer. That is where I 
 expect to land, and it will be a great pleasure for me. Once I am 
 there, I shall have every hope of getting news from France ; I 
 shall then learn so many interesting details, not only of what I 
 am going to find before me, but above all about what I have left 
 behind with such great regret. Provided I find that you are well 
 and that you still love me, and that a certain number of our 
 friends are in the same condition, I shall take philosophically 
 everything else, whatever it may be, or from whatever direction 
 it may come. Though, if my heart were wounded in its tender est 
 spot, if you did not love me as before, I should be indeed too mis 
 erable. But I need not fear that, need I, my dear heart ? I was 
 very ill during the first part of the voyage, and I had the conso 
 lation vouchsafed to the wicked, that of suffering in company 
 with many others. I treated myself in my usual way, and I 
 recovered sooner than the rest ; now I am about as well as if I 
 
 1 His first child, born December 15, 1775, who died in 1777, during his 
 absence in America. 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 57 
 
 were on land ; I feel sure that, once I am ashore, I shall have 
 perfect health for a long time to come. Do not allow yourself to 
 feel anxious that I am running great danger in the occupation 
 that is before me. The post of major-general has always been a 
 warrant of long life. It is so different from the service I should 
 have had in France, as colonel, for instance. With my present 
 rank I shall only have to attend councils of war. Ask any of 
 the French generals, of whom there are so many, because, once 
 having attained that rank, they run no further risk and they do 
 not make way for others as they would do in lower grades of the 
 service. In order to show you that I am not trying to deceive 
 you, I will admit that we are in danger at this moment, because 
 we are likely at any time to be attacked by an English vessel and 
 we are not strong enough to defend ourselves. But as soon as I 
 land I shall be in perfect safety. You see that I tell you every 
 thing in order that you may feel at ease and not allow yourself to 
 be anxious without cause. 
 
 "I shall not write you the journal of my voyage, because 
 here one day follows another, and, what is worse, they are all 
 alike. Nothing but sky and nothing but water ; and to-morrow 
 it will be just the same. . . . But now let me talk of more im 
 portant things, of you, of our dear Henriette, of her brother or 
 her sister, whichever it may be, Henriette is so lovable herself 
 that she makes me wish for a girl ; but, whatever our new child 
 may be, I shall welcome it with very sincere happiness. Do not 
 lose a moment in sending me the joyful news of its birth. Mr. 
 Deane and my friend Carmieliael will aid you in this, and I am 
 sure they would neglect no opportunity to make me happy as 
 quickly as possible. Write, or send me a reliable man, like 
 Landin, for example ; for it would be such a pleasure to talk with 
 any one who had seen you. However, do in this matter as you 
 think best. 1 
 
 " 7th June. I am still out upon this dreary plain, which is be 
 yond all comparison the most dismal place that one can be in. I 
 try to console myself a little by thinking of you and of our friends 
 at home, and I picture to myself the joy of meeting you again. 
 What a delightful moment that will be when I come home, when 
 I rush in unexpectedly to take you into my arms, and perhaps I 
 shall find you with your children. I have an exquisite pleasure 
 
 1 La Fayctte s second daughter, Anastasie, was born in July, 1777. She 
 was married, in 1798, to the Comte Charles de Latour-Maubourg. She died 
 in 1863. 
 
58 THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. [1777. 
 
 in thinking of that time. Do not think that it is very distant ; it 
 will seein long enough to me, no doubt, but in point of fact it will 
 not be as long as you imagine. Without being able to foretell the 
 day or the month, without being able to predict the course of 
 events, I know that the exile until next January, prescribed for 
 me by the Due d Ayen, seemed so interminable that I am not 
 going now wilfully to inflict upon myself a long separation. 
 
 But consider the difference between my occupation and my 
 present life and what they would have been if I had gone upon 
 that useless journey. As the defender of that liberty which I 
 adore, free myself beyond all others, coming as a friend to offer 
 my services to this most interesting republic, I bring with me 
 nothing but my own free heart and my own good will, no ambi 
 tion to fulfil and no selfish interest to serve ; if I am striving 
 for my own glory, I am at the same time laboring for its wel 
 fare. I trust that for iny sake you will become a good American ; 
 it is a sentiment made for virtuous hearts. The happiness of 
 America is intimately connected with the happiness of all man 
 kind ; she is destined to become the safe and venerable asylum 
 of virtue, of honesty, of tolerance, of equality, and of peaceful 
 liberty. 
 
 ""We have had small alarms from time to time, but, with a 
 little care and with reasonably good fortune, I hope to get through 
 without serious accident, and I shall be all the more pleased 
 because I am learning every day to be extremely prudent. You 
 remember the Vicomte used to say that i travelling develops the 
 youthful mind, and if he never repeated it more than once every 
 morning and once at night, I should not think that too often, for 
 I am coming more and more to understand the truth of that 
 assertion. I have no idea where he is now, the poor Vicomte, 
 nor the Prince, nor, indeed, any of my friends, and I am suffering 
 cruelly from this lack of news. Whenever you have a good op 
 portunity to talk with any of those I love, give them a thousand, 
 ten thousand kind greetings from me. 
 
 " We have begun to-day to see certain kinds of birds which 
 indicate that the land is near. The hope of arriving there is 
 sweet, for my life in this region is very dull. Fortunately I am 
 well enough now to occupy myself a little, and I spend my time 
 between my military books and my study of English. I am 
 making progress with that language, which will soon become 
 so necessary to me. 
 
 " Adieu. Night coming on obliges me to stop, for I have lately 
 forbidden the use of lights about the ship ; see how careful I am ! 
 
1777.] THE COMING OF LA FAYETTE TO AMERICA. 59 
 
 Good-by, then ; but with my fingers directed a little by the im 
 pulses of my heart, I have no need of lights to tell you that I 
 love you and shall love you all my life." 
 
 In the mean time the American Commissioners in 
 France prepared for La Fayette s reception in the United 
 States by the following letter addressed to Congress : l 
 
 "The Marquis de La Fayette, a young nobleman of great 
 family connexions here and great wealth, is gone to America in a 
 ship of his own, accompanied by some officers of distinction, in 
 order to serve in our armies. He is exceedingly beloved, and 
 everybody s good wishes attend him ; we cannot but hope he may 
 meet with such a reception as will make the country and his ex 
 pedition agreeable to him. Those who censure it as imprudent 
 in him do nevertheless applaud his spirit, and we are satisfied 
 that the civilities and respect that may be shown him will be 
 serviceable to our affairs here, as pleasing not only to his powerful 
 relations, and to the Court, but to the whole French nation. He 
 has left a beautiful young wife big with child, and for her sake 
 particularly we hope that his bravery and ardent desire to distin 
 guish himself will be a little restrained by the General s prudence, 
 so as not to permit his being hazarded much, but on some im 
 portant occasion. 
 
 "B. FRANKLIN. SILAS DEANE. 
 
 " PA HIS, 25 May, 1777." 
 
 Thus came La Fayette to America. Slowly he made 
 his way across the sea, his heart always turning back to 
 his beloved France, whilst his generous sympathy for a 
 struggling nation gave him courage to face the dangers 
 that surrounded him, and filled his mind with noble 
 thoughts of self-sacrifice, of patience, of heroism, in the 
 cause of that liberty which, as he said, he adored. 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 324. 
 
60 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1774. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE TOWARD GREAT 
 
 BRITAIN. 
 
 AT the time of La Fayette s departure for America, 
 France was upon the very verge of war with England, 
 although as yet this was a carefully guarded state secret, 
 and we have no reason to believe that La Fayette had 
 knowledge of it. The outbreak of the American Revo 
 lution was the occasion of this almost hostile attitude of 
 the two countries ; but tjie causes of it are to be sought in 
 the events of many years before. They lay in the deep- 
 seated resentment which had taken hold of the French 
 mind as the result of former humiliation and former defeat, 
 from which the nation had not recovered either in its 
 material resources or in its national pride, injuries which 
 every French statesman believed must be avenged before 
 France could ever again be truly great. England was to 
 them the source of the evil which had befallen their 
 country since the middle of the century. It had made 
 war upon her, it had taken her provinces away from her, 
 it had defeated her armies, and by its superiority at sea 
 it threatened her commerce. It was the "hereditary 
 enemy," whose movements were always to be watched with 
 suspicion, lest success might strengthen its haughty spirit 
 and its insatiable thirst for power should lead to further 
 aggression upon nations not sufficiently strong to resist 
 its ever-increasing force. Men in France believed that 
 peace must be maintained with this enemy as the only 
 hope of present safety, but that peace would last only 
 until the opportunity should occur when the country 
 
1774.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 61 
 
 might safely go to war. Whether the uprising in the 
 Colonies of North America was about to present this 
 opportunity, was a question to which the ministers and 
 diplomatists of France had given, for several years, the 
 closest attention. They followed the course of events with 
 intense satisfaction as the Revolution progressed through 
 the Colonies until it called for serious efforts from the 
 mother-country to control it ; they hailed with delight the 
 news that the Colonists were stubbornly contending for 
 their rights, and that England could no longer command 
 obedience, but was, on the contrary, likely to lose her 
 sovereignty over America altogether. 
 
 Whilst the enemy was thus distracted by party dissen 
 sion at home and weakened by the demands of a war 
 which obliged it to send its navy and its troops to the 
 other side of the world, the day might come when France 
 should strike a blow that would crush her rival, humbled 
 then by the breaking up of its own empire and the loss 
 of its richest possessions. This was the dream of French 
 statesmen ; and in it they saw the glory of France re 
 stored, the prestige of her military power renewed, the 
 strength of her navy increased to command respect for 
 her Hag upon the seas, and her position in the councils of 
 Europe equal once more to that which had been won for 
 her by the great King Louis in the century before. No 
 body in France believed that the Seven Years War was 
 definitively closed. The Treaty of Paris had brought 
 peace, it is true, and its provisions had then been fulfilled 
 for many years, with the renewal of what were made to 
 appear like the most cordial diplomatic relations with 
 Great Britain, based upon assurances of mutual confidence 
 and respect. But to all Frenchmen the Treaty of Paris 
 was not a peace ; it was a cessation of hostilities. Its obli 
 gations, honestly assumed, meant to their minds efface- 
 ment, national destruction and disgrace ; and no man who 
 loved his country could consent to accept the terms of an 
 
62 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1774. 
 
 agreement forced upon her by the disasters at Rossbach 
 and at Minden. 
 
 How true this is may be seen from a state paper ad 
 dressed to King Louis XVI. by his Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs and still preserved in the Archives of France, 1 in 
 which the situation is described with such clearness that 
 no one can doubt the sentiment of the time : 
 
 4 * The humiliating peace of 1763 was bought at the price of our 
 possessions, of our commerce, and of our credit in the Indies ; at 
 the price of Canada, Louisiana, Isle Royale, Acadia, and Sene 
 gal. It established the opinion among all nations that there was 
 left in France neither power nor resource ; the envy which up to 
 that time had been the moving influence in the politics of all other 
 Courts in their relations to France now degenerated into a sort 
 of contempt : the Cabinet of Versailles had neither credit nor in 
 fluence with any Court ; instead of being, as she had formerly 
 been, the centre of every great undertaking, she had now become 
 merely a silent looker-on ; nobody consulted her ; no one even 
 counted as of any value her approval or her dissent. In a word, 
 France, the greatest Power in Europe, had become absolutely in 
 active ; she had lost credit with her allies, and she had no consid 
 eration from other Powers. Such was our sad and humiliating 
 position at the time when Your Majesty succeeded to the throne. 
 . . . We need but to read the Treaty of Paris, and especially the 
 negotiations which preceded it, to comprehend the ascendency 
 assumed by England over France, and to observe how greatly that 
 arrogant nation enjoyed the pleasure of having humiliated us. 
 ... I do not hesitate, Sire, to declare that a people may meet 
 with reverses and may be forced to submit to the imperious law 
 of necessity and of self-preservation j but when these reverses and 
 this humiliation are unjust, when their end and aim are to increase 
 the pride of an arrogant rival, such a people owes it to itself, to 
 its honor, its dignity, and its position before men, to free itself 
 as soon as it is able. If it neglects this and allows fear to turn 
 it from its duty, it but adds degradation to disgrace, and makes 
 itself an object of contempt in its own day and in time to come." 
 
 Curiously enough, it was not a combination of European 
 
 1 Affaires e"trangeres, Memoires et Documents, t. 410, No. 11 : Doniol, La 
 Participation de la France a 1 Etablissement des Etats-Unis d Amerique, i. 2. 
 
1774.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 63 
 
 politics, the intrigues of a European Court, or the ambi 
 tion of a European monarch that was expected now to fur 
 nish the opportunity which France sought of avenging 
 herself, but the remote Colonies of North America, whose 
 existence beyond the Atlantic Ocean was otherwise scarcely 
 ever mentioned or thought of. The uneasiness excited by 
 the passage of the Stamp Act, coming almost immediately 
 after the close of the Seven Years War, arrested the at 
 tention of the Due de Choiseul, Prime Minister of Louis 
 XV., a sagacious observer and an ardent politician, long 
 versed in affairs of state, ambitious beyond aught else for 
 the greatness of France, the exigencies of whose career 
 had obliged him to sign the much-hated Treaty of 1763, 
 and who is said to have consoled himself in that moment 
 of humiliation with the thought that it was a treaty 
 which would soon be broken. He detected, with unerr 
 ing judgment, a weak spot in the British Empire which 
 he was convinced would develop and extend and would 
 some day be the source of serious trouble to the Eng 
 lish Government. He went further than that : he de 
 clared that he saw influences then at work which were 
 destined to reach throughout the Colonies, to incite them 
 against the restraints of the ministerial Government, and 
 ultimately to wrest them from the grasp of the mother- 
 country ; and he announced this opinion to the King as 
 early as the year 1765, a remarkable case of political 
 foresight in a distant observer, who saw in a small cloud 
 upon the horizon a forerunner of the storm that was to 
 come. It was all the more remarkable because nobody in 
 England dreamed of the danger at that time, nor, indeed, 
 had men s minds been brought to consider it in the Colo 
 nies themselves, where a separation from the mother- 
 country was still contemplated " with the utmost horror" 
 almost ten years after the Due de Choiseul had predicted 
 
 1 Marshall, Life of Washington, ii. 397. 
 
64 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1774. 
 
 the Revolution and had devised a plan to be followed by 
 the Government of France at the moment when they 
 should declare their independence. 
 
 It was in this connection that, as we have seen, M. de 
 Choiseul sent the Baron de Kalb to America in 1768. 
 The times, however, were not yet ripe for action. Kalb s 
 mission accomplished nothing. The day of M. de Choi- 
 seul s power at Court came to an end, and his plans were 
 laid aside, to be forgotten for the moment, though they 
 were subsequently to be recalled to mind. The agita 
 tion in the Colonies had not as yet sufficiently united the 
 American people in one common interest capable of 
 holding them together in solid resistance, on the one 
 hand ; while, on the other, France was too weak to go 
 to war again at once, and England was too strong to give 
 any one reason to believe that she could be successfully 
 attacked. 
 
 King Louis XV. died in 1774. With a new reign came 
 a new Cabinet and a new administration, to whom were 
 bequeathed the country in a condition of despondency 
 which, it was afterward said, could hardly be conceived, 
 and the task of re-establishing the dignity of the nation, 
 of strengthening its army, of building up its navy, and, 
 whenever it was possible, of damaging England. 
 
 The new King, whose misfortunes and sad ending must 
 always enlist for him the sympathy of mankind, was 
 young, without experience in governing, and timid in the 
 management of affairs of state. The burden of the realm 
 rested with exceeding heaviness upon his shoulders when 
 he was suddenly called, by the death of his grandfather, 
 to consider subjects and to decide questions which he did 
 not comprehend. His necessities obliged him to form his 
 decisions largely upon the opinions of other men whom he 
 called about him. No doubt Louis was upright and con 
 scientious ; he inherited an absolute authority based upon 
 a volcano then almost ready to burst out and destroy it 
 
1774.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 65 
 
 and him, but he loved France and earnestly longed for her 
 glory, he desired to feel a fatherly affection for his people, 
 whom he did not in the least understand, and his constant 
 wish was to do what was just, honorable, and right, so far 
 as his lights permitted him to discern it. The peculiar 
 sadness in the fate of Louis XVI. is that whilst, as a man, 
 he was one of the best of the French kings, circumstances 
 made him the representative of, and forced him to suffer 
 for, the wrongs and abuses of all his predecessors. He 
 was weak at a time when it is exceedingly doubtful if even 
 the strongest of men could have withstood the fury of the 
 storm that broke over him. 
 
 King Louis XVI. selected his Cabinet in July, 1774. 
 He placed at the head of it the Comte de Maurepas, a 
 man nearing the end of a life filled with reverses and dis 
 appointments, whose strength was too far spent for the 
 struggle with questions of public business, and whose repu 
 tation for frivolity has made it difficult to decide how far 
 he directed the policy of the Government in solving the 
 serious problems that confronted it during the next few 
 years. Nevertheless, M. de Maurepas had rendered good 
 service to France in former days, especially in the recon 
 struction of the navy ; he was devoted to the King, he 
 was an enemy of Great Britain, and Louis kept him near 
 his person, so that he might advise with him every day 
 before taking any step. The famous Turgot was made 
 Controleur-General, or Minister of Finance, M. de 
 Sartine became Secretary of the Navy, and M. de Saint- 
 Germain Secretary of War. But the man who shaped 
 the policy of France, who conceived and executed her diplo 
 macy in the varied and delicate forms of her relations 
 with the Courts of Europe, and who for several years 
 in one sense controlled the Government, was the Secre 
 tary of State, or Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles 
 Gravier, Comte de Vergennes. His enormous correspon 
 dence, still preserved in the French Archives, which was 
 
 VOL. I. 5 
 
66 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1774. 
 
 prepared by his own hand, scrupulously corrected, inter 
 lined, erased, or re-written, letters to his agents, de 
 spatches to the Ambassadors, propositions submitted to 
 the Cabinet, memorials to the King, if taken together 
 would give us almost by itself a history of France during 
 the early years of Louis XVI. 
 
 The Comte de Vergennes, who was born in Burgundy, 
 of a family still existing there, had been trained to the 
 career of diplomacy during the ministry of the Due de 
 Choiseul in the preceding reign, and, having been fortunate 
 enough to take advantage of some opportunities which 
 came in his way, had distinguished himself abroad and 
 given satisfaction at Court. He was sent as Ambassador 
 to the Turkish Porte, and afterward to the Court of 
 Sweden. King Louis recalled him from Stockholm to 
 confide to him the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 The talent of M. de Vergennes was that of an extremely 
 patient, cautious, and painstaking administrator, rather 
 than of a leader who achieved success by daring and en 
 terprise or won admiration by the brilliancy of his con 
 ceptions. But he had one idea to which for him all else 
 in the world was to be subordinated, and that was the glory 
 of France. For this he incessantly thought and planned 
 and labored : he studied the chart of Europe in search of 
 alliances to help her, or of combinations that might pro 
 tect her from injury ; his most cherished hope was that 
 something might happen to weaken her enemies. Upon 
 entering the Cabinet, M. de Vergennes immediately de 
 fined his policy in a memorial to the King, which, reduced 
 to its simplest expression, was, to strengthen France by a 
 close alliance with Spain, and to keep a watchful eye upon 
 the movements of England. By this means he hoped to 
 make France respected in Europe. To be respected, he 
 conceived, is to supplement the strength one already has 
 by adding to it the moral influence of public opinion, 
 which in itself is strength. 
 
1774.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 67 
 
 " The consideration and the influence," he declared, "of every 
 Power are based upon, and measured by, the general opinion as to 
 its intrinsic force. It is, therefore, to establish this opinion and to 
 gain the greatest advantage from it that all our foresight should be 
 exerted. Every nation is respected which is prepared to make a 
 vigorous resistance. . . . Peace has lasted now for twelve years, 
 which is a great prejudice to its continued stability. Therefore 
 we shall not exceed the limit of reasonable foresight if we hold 
 ourselves in readiness for whatever may come. Besides, the best 
 way to assure the duration of peace is not to fear the advent of 
 war. . . . We have close by us a restless and grasping people, 
 more jealous of the prosperity of their neighbors than of their 
 own welfare, powerfully armed, and ready to strike at a moment s 
 warning. Let us not deceive ourselves, for, whatever parade the 
 English ministers may make of their pacific intentions, we cannot 
 safely rely upon them except so long as their domestic troubles 
 continue. These may come to an end, or they may increase to such 
 an extent as to drive the Government to quiet the discontent at 
 home by directing attention to new enterprises abroad. Indeed, 
 the example is not lacking of a case in which the cry of war against 
 France has united parties in Eugland^JLet us suppose that we 
 should find ourselves involved in a naval war, even contrary to the 
 wishes of the Court of London as well as to our own ; we have a 
 treaty with Spain which makes common cause with her in all our 
 wars, offensive or defensive. . . . The engagement is a burdensome 
 one, no doubt ; but, in spite of that, it is probably more advan 
 tageous to France than to Spain. The commerce which England 
 maintains with Spain, in whose markets she finds an outlet for her 
 manufactures and the source of great national wealth, makes her 
 less anxious to seize upon territory which, after all, Spain merely 
 cultivates for others ; but, as she has, on the other hand, nothing 
 to expect from France through legitimate trade, she looks with a 
 jealous eye both upon the wonderful development of our planta 
 tions in America and upon our industrial prosperity in Europe. 
 If there be anything that will impress her and keep her in check, 
 it is the spectacle of France and Spain united, and the certainty 
 that the first cannon fired by her against either will be replied to 
 immediately by both." * 
 
 Here is the motive in French politics at the beginning 
 of the reign of Louis XVI., to wit, the belief that the 
 
 1 Archives of France, Me"moires et Documents, t. 584, No. 9 : Doniol, La 
 Participation de la France, i. li), 20. 
 
68 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1774. 
 
 ascendency of England was a menace to France. Here is 
 ] also the starting-point of the intervention of France in 
 the American Revolution. If civil war was about to dis 
 tract the British Government, and if England s strength 
 was to be exhausted by internal difficulties which would 
 disturb her at home and render het less formidable abroad, 
 the opportunity of aiming a blow at her from the effects 
 of which she could not recover her former advantage, and 
 which would force her to deal with France at least upon 
 equal terms, was likely to present itself; and the purpose 
 of striking this blow was never lost sight of by the Comte 
 de Vergennes. 
 
 It is true that events in the Colonies had hardly devel 
 oped sufficiently in 1774 to foreshadow the definite result, 
 even to the mind of the Secretary of State, who did not 
 grasp the situation at once with the quick discernment of 
 the Due de Choiseul, and, although the conclusion was not 
 reached until after a most complicated series of intrigues 
 and a long course of dissimulation under which prepara 
 tions for war were masked by a pretended desire for peace, 
 yet its logical premises were stated by M. de Vergennes 
 when he declared, in his memoir to the King, that a 
 nation which could free itself from the arrogance of a 
 successful rival, that is to say, revenge itself for former 
 defeat, was bound to do so. This, of course, meant war ; 
 but the Comte de Vergennes never concealed the fact that, 
 in his plan of government, the possibility of war must 
 always be kept in view by France. 
 
 The first news of the outbreak in North America was 
 not received by the Cabinet of Louis XVI. with the feel 
 ing that it was of very grave consequence ; it came through 
 English channels, and when it was reported by the French 
 diplomatic representatives in London it bore the coloring 
 of English opinion, so that M. de Vergennes had the im 
 pression that the revolt would soon be suppressed, and for 
 the moment gave it no serious thought. Possibly he was 
 
1775.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 69 
 
 influenced by a despatch from M. de Guines, the French 
 Ambassador in England, who wrote that Lord Rochford 
 had told him the trouble arose from a lot of descendants 
 of Cromwell who had settled in America and had begun a 
 rebellion, which would, of course, very soon be put down. 1 
 He felt also that, at all events, England was not likely to 
 carry the hostilities with her subjects to the extreme limit, 
 and that she would sacrifice her prestige, in case her 
 measures were not successful, and seek peace with them, 
 rather than run the risk of losing the Colonies and of 
 shaking the empire to its foundations. 2 
 
 But early in the year 1775 the shipments of troops to 
 the Colonies, and the extensive preparations for carrying 
 on the war, attracted his attention to the seriousness of 
 the conflict, and he immediately directed the Embassy in 
 London to follow events as closely as possible and to report 
 every step to him. He was suspicious at that time that the 
 massing of British forces upon the North American con 
 tinent might conceal some ulterior purpose which should 
 threaten danger to the interests of France or her colonies 
 in the West Indies, and he determined not to allow him 
 self to be taken by surprise. From this time, M. de Ver- 
 gennes followed the course of the American struggle with 
 uninterrupted watchfulness, until it absorbed his attention! 
 and led him, three years later, to an open declaration of ; 
 war. 
 
 His first step now, however, was toward the " Family 
 Compact," the famous offensive and defensive alli&nce be 
 tween the houses of Bourbon in France and in Spain, 
 concluded in the preceding reign, which at this moment 
 became the bulwark to which France might fly for safety 
 and under the protection of which she might recover her 
 strength and re-establish her integrity. If the Spanish 
 ships could be united to those of France, they would 
 
 1 Anj^leterre, t. 510, No. 112 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 39. 
 
 2 AnglotLM-re, t. 508, No. 88 : Doniol, i. 42. 
 
70 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1775. 
 
 make an array formidable enough to oppose the great 
 naval forces across the British Channel ; and to attain 
 this unity of strength was especially important, in the 
 opinion of the Cabinet, because close observers of political 
 events at that time agreed that the next war would be at 
 sea. With France and Spain united and ready to oper 
 ate together for their common interest, as described by 
 M. de Vergennes, when the guns of both should answer 
 immediately a shot fired at either, the uprising in the 
 American Colonies might be made use of. He dreamed 
 of a war upon England in which the two Bourbon mon 
 archies should join ; and, by starting with the trouble be 
 tween the Colonies and the mother-country, which should 
 be fomented in every possible manner, much injury might 
 be inflicted upon the common enemy before it should 
 become necessary to declare open hostilities. 
 
 To accomplish this result, he set before himself the task 
 of bringing to his view the King and Cabinet of Spain, 
 of inducing Carlos III. to look with increased solicitude 
 upon the dangers which beset his nephew of France, and 
 of persuading the Spanish Government that its position 
 in Europe and its colonies in the West Indies made its in 
 terests identical with those of France, especially in view 
 of the ever-suspected movements and intentions of Great 
 Britain. The voluminous correspondence of the Secretary 
 with his Ambassador at Madrid and with other persons at 
 the Spanish Court, as well as with the Embassy at London, 
 shows how conscientiously he devoted himself to the ful 
 filment of his duty. 
 
 The Marquis d Ossun, French Ambassador at Madrid, 
 was directed to call the attention of the Spanish Court to 
 the large number of troops then being sent from England 
 to America, and to insist that although this was ostensibly, 
 and perhaps really, for the subjection of the Colonists, 
 yet their presence on that side of the Atlantic Ocean was 
 a source of great danger to the West Indies, because a 
 
1775.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 71 
 
 change might take place in the policy of England and it 
 was impossible to tell what conquests she might undertake 
 next. Her invariable system theretofore, said M. de Ver- 
 gennes, had been based upon her hatred of Spain and 
 France and upon a jealousy which impelled her to injure 
 them whenever she could. Although at that moment her 
 expressions were pacific, it was only because of the internal 
 dissensions which occupied her, and because she feared that 
 the two monarchies would unite, and, taking advantage 
 of so good an opportunity, do her all the damage which, 
 if she were able, she would do them. 1 No reliance could 
 be placed upon any protestation from England as to the pur 
 pose for which these troops were to be employed, nor upon 
 any promise to withdraw them as soon as they should 
 have accomplished what they were sent there for ; because 
 that would only furnish a pretext, under the pretence 
 of keeping them there to re-establish order, of holding 
 them until it should become convenient to send them in 
 another direction, that is to say, against the West Indies. 
 This reasoning won the approval of the Spanish Gov 
 ernment. It convinced the King and his Prime Minister, 
 the Marques de Grimaldi, as well as the Spanish Ambas 
 sador at Paris, the Conde de Aranda, all of whom were 
 now impressed with the impending danger ; and it gave to 
 M. de Vergennes a very considerable influence, as well as 
 an immense advantage, in the purpose he had of uniting 
 the forces of the two countries. It accomplished what he 
 was most anxious for the moment to do, in convincing the 
 Spanish Court that the two Governments were in danger 
 of being attacked and might possibly be called upon to 
 defend themselves. Strange as the idea appears in the 
 light of subsequent events, there is every reason to be 
 lieve that M. de Vergennes was sincere in his statement 
 that he feared an attack from England upon the French 
 
 ne, t. 570, No. 20 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 51. 
 
72 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1775. 
 
 } and Spanish colonies in the event of her having forces in 
 North America which she could dispose of for that pur 
 pose ; he repeated it frequently, and, although he was not 
 sorry to use it as a means to his end in giving a certain 
 dramatic effect to the union with Spain, yet it appears 
 with such emphasis in his correspondence in other direc 
 tions as to have the stamp of genuine feeling. It is im 
 portant also because it undoubtedly influenced him in his 
 connection with the United States. 
 
 The English Government assisted him unconsciously at 
 that juncture by its conduct toward Spain. King Carlos 
 III. already suspected that England had opposed him by 
 comforting his enemy in a recent war he had had with 
 Morocco ; and he was engaged in a contest with Portugal 
 then, which bordered upon war, about the boundary-lines 
 of Paraguay and Buenos Ayres, in which the boldness of 
 the Portuguese minister, M. de Pombal, was so extraordi 
 nary and so persistent that the King and his Cabinet were 
 convinced that his attitude could have resulted only from 
 British encouragement and the assurance of British aid. 
 It happened in addition that the King of Spain was con- 
 
 / templating an attack upon the pirates of Algiers, who 
 were preying upon his commerce and spreading terror 
 throughout the Mediterranean ; an expedition with which 
 he hoped to distinguish his reign and to strengthen his 
 influence in an appeal to the national pride of his sub 
 jects by performing a service which would be received 
 with gratitude by the world. The preparations for this 
 campaign were carried on with the greatest secrecy, but 
 the watchful agents of the British ministry detected un 
 usual activity in the Spanish ports and arsenals, which 
 they reported immediately ; whereupon England made a 
 formal demand upon the Spanish Court to explain the 
 purpose of these extraordinary measures. Not satisfied 
 
 1 with the replies that were made, and without having given 
 the Spaniards notice, the British Government sent a fleet 
 
1775.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 73 
 
 of four ships of the line and two frigates to the Bay of 
 Biscay to watch the movements of Spanish ships. This 
 proceeding was viewed by the King with great indignation. 
 It was construed to mean that Great Britain was acting in 
 concert with Portugal, and that this fleet was ready to 
 defend Lisbon against possible attack, or was about to 
 take part in an enterprise with the Portuguese against the 
 Spanish possessions in South America. It confirmed the 
 belief of Carlos III. that M. de Vergennes was right in 
 his estimate of England, and it visibly increased the in 
 fluence which that minister had at the Spanish Court, 
 
 Thus, by the middle of the year 1775 the Comte de 
 Vergennes had progressed so far that he felt he could rely 
 upon the support of Spain in any eventualities that were 
 likely to occur. The tone of his correspondence with his 
 Ambassadors shows this, especially that of his letters to 
 the Comte de Guines at the Court of St. James. From 
 this time forward the affairs of the American Colonies 
 assumed greater importance in all his calculations, and he 
 began to consider them with unremitting watchfulness, 
 his attitude toward England being always carefully sus 
 tained to express friendship and to inspire confidence in 
 the good intentions of France. He wrote in one of his de 
 spatches to the Secretary of Legation in London, " Upon 
 the departure of Lord Stormont this evening for England, 
 whither he is going on leave, I recalled to him in the 
 most positive manner the sincere and constant intention 
 of the King to maintain peace, friendship, and neighborly 
 relations with His British Majesty, and to contribute in 
 every way to perpetuate the good understanding which 
 now exists between the two countries. I assured the 
 Ambassador that we have no possible desire to profit by 
 their present embarrassment to give them additional cause 
 of uneasiness." 1 
 
 1 Angleterre, t. 509, No. 38 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 71. 
 
74 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1775. 
 
 Whether Lord Stormont was impressed by this assurance 
 or not, we do not know, but it is unlikely that he allowed 
 it greatly to influence his feelings ; for throughout his very 
 active subsequent career at the Court of Louis XVI., in 
 which protestations of friendship were used almost daily 
 to cover up the boldest intrigues, it must be admitted that 
 he served his country well and never for an instant be 
 lieved anything that was told him by an agent of the 
 French Government. 
 
 So far as it was possible for the French Cabinet to bear 
 good will toward any English ministry, the Government 
 of Louis XVI. hoped for the continuance in office of Lord 
 North ; for they believed that during his administration 
 the political troubles at home and the revolt in the Colonies 
 would keep England from any exterior enterprise. They 
 were in momentary fear that the Opposition would come 
 into power under Lord Chatham, who would immediately 
 make peace with the Colonies and then turn, with un 
 governable hatred, upon France ; in which event, as the 
 charge-d affaires in London wrote, the troops in North 
 America would be " like a naked sword in the hands of a 
 madman. 7 Up to this time it was half believed in France 
 that the Opposition party in Parliament had stirred up 
 the discontent in America merely as a pretext to overthrow 
 the ministry ; having succeeded in which, they would im 
 mediately make peace. But in the month of July, 1775, 
 M. de Vergennes changed his mind as to that. He wrote 
 to M. de Guines, " Unless I am mistaken about the situa 
 tion of affairs in America, the English may now increase 
 their forces as much as they choose, they will never again 
 be able by arms to reduce that great continent to subjec 
 tion ; and I doubt if they will succeed better by negotia 
 tions, even if these are conducted by agents most accept 
 able to the Americans. Those people Tiave been forced 
 into a position from which they will not voluntarily retire ; 
 they have discovered their power, and they see how help- 
 
1775.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 75 
 
 less the mother-country is to control them ; the bond of 
 their union has been formed. The Americans may here 
 after be the allies of England ; but I doubt very much 
 whether they will ever acknowledge themselves her sub 
 jects." l Yet he was unable to free his mind entirely from 
 the constant fear that beset him lest some act on the part 
 of England should bode ill to his country, remembering 
 always " with horror," as he said, the sudden attack which 
 crippled France in 1755 ; and he besought the Ambas 
 sador in England to penetrate the secrets of the Court, to 
 get private information from the Opposition in Parliament, 
 to display all possible zeal in every direction, in order to 
 guard against " another similar act of perfidy." " For, 
 while I am far from suspecting the English ministry of 
 evil intentions," said he, " and while this would be a most 
 unfavorable moment to disturb a peace which is necessary 
 to them, yet our past experience should make us wary, 
 for we do not want to be duped a second time." 
 
 Thus, about a year before our Declaration of Indepen 
 dence, the Cabinet of France began seriously to consider 
 the likelihood that the uprising of the American Colo 
 nies would be the occasion of a war between the two 
 Crowns and Great Britain ; and thenceforth it carried on 
 continuously the measures which were declared both at 
 Madrid and at Versailles to be " for the preservation of 
 peace," yet were, none the less for this mask behind which 
 they might be rendered less suspicious, actually prepa 
 rations for an attack upon England. In order to have a 
 fixed understanding with the Spanish Court upon this 
 point, M. de Vergennes sought an early opportunity to 
 bring the subject directly before King Carlos III. himself, 
 and to obtain an expression from him as to his own feeling 
 and the policy which Spain might be relied upon to adopt. 
 The occasion offered itself when Louis XVI. wrote a 
 
 1 An^leterre, t. 511, No. 21 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 89. 
 2 Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 91. 
 
76 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1775. 
 
 formal letter to his uncle, 011 the 7th of August, 1775, to 
 announce the recent birth to the Comte d Artois of a son, 
 in which, by a clever arrangement upon the part of the 
 Secretary of State, was introduced a reference to the matter 
 uppermost in the latter s mind. King Louis was made to 
 say, " I take advantage of this occasion to present to Your 
 Majesty some reflections upon the present state of affairs. 
 I know the aversion which Your Majesty has to war, and 
 I agree sincerely with you in this sentiment. Possibly 
 there never was a time when a war with England seemed 
 less probable. There is not the least cause of dispute 
 between us ; yet the unfortunate policy of that nation 
 makes it impossible for us to count upon anything in re 
 gard to it. England is very much engaged with her 
 Colonies in America, and although I greatly doubt if 
 these will ever again submit to the mother-country, yet 
 some turn of politics might be used to persuade the Eng 
 lish people that the remedy for its present ills lies in a 
 war with us. I think, therefore, that we ought to direct 
 our attention to the preparations which may be necessary, 
 and to unite in taking such precautions as may be most 
 effective in preventing war. . . . Our enemies will respect 
 our power more, the more they see us united and ready to 
 act in concert. Nevertheless, I believe that we ought not 
 now to neglect our precautions. I have therefore given 
 orders to M. de Vergennes to discuss with the Marques de 
 Grimaldi what it will be best for us to do. I trust Your 
 Majesty will approve of my reflections." 
 
 The Spanish expedition against Algiers had failed, and 
 Admiral O Reilly, after having concentrated his attack 
 upon the Algerine fortress, much more easily defended 
 than taken, had returned without having accomplished the 
 purpose of the King, with a diminution of prestige most 
 unacceptable at that moment to the French Court, who 
 
 1 Archives Nationales, annee 1775, No. 21 : Doniol, La Participation de la 
 France, i. 131. 
 
1775.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 77 
 
 were indirectly concerned, and to the disappointment and 
 chagrin of the Spanish Government. Nevertheless, M. de 
 Vergennes faced this temporary reverse with all the hope 
 fulness of spirit that he possessed ; and, while he openly 
 expressed his regret at what had happened, he consoled 
 himself with the reflection that, after all, no great harm 
 had been done ; the fleet had come back uninjured, and, 
 although Spain had not met with the success that all her 
 friends wished for, the expedition had been a formidable 
 one, had demonstrated the naval strength of the kingdom, 
 and by this armament had shown the King s enemies 
 what he w r as able to contribute to a war at sea. In this 
 tone he continued his friendly relations with the Court at 
 Madrid, where it was acceptable, of course, not only to the 
 Cabinet but to the King. 
 
 A few weeks later, he was rewarded by a reply from 
 Carlos III. to the letter of his nephew upon the birth of a 
 Bourbon prince, in which, after expressing the joy he felt 
 at so happy an event, the King turned directly to the sub 
 ject of concerted action by the two Crowns. " Nothing 
 could be wiser than the reflections of Your Majesty upon 
 our attitude toward a certain ambitious Power, which has 
 no other views upon the subject of peace and war than 
 those presented by the attainment of its own purposes 
 or its own private interests. Since we do not wish to 
 pursue a course so reprehensible and so unjust, which 
 accords neither with the maxims of Your Majesty nor 
 with mine, the only road open to us to protect ourselves 
 and to defend our subjects, toward which we are directed 
 both by religion and honor, is to act together in order that 
 we may be in a position to repel force by force. For I 
 am convinced that if the English were to see that we are 
 prepared at every point they would let us alone, and we 
 should still enjoy that peace which we are anxious to pre 
 serve ; but the chief point is, to place ourselves in a posi 
 tion to impress this upon our enemies. ... As the ques- 
 
78 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1775. 
 
 tion of greatest importance for us in relation to England 
 is that of the navy, I think we should give the greatest 
 attention at present to that, for we shall need time to 
 renew it and to increase it. Upon this subject, and upon 
 such other measures as it may be necessary to take, we 
 shall consult through the channel of our ministers and 
 ambassadors, and Your Majesty may rely upon my punc 
 tuality in carrying out all my engagements/ 7 1 
 
 The plans of M. de Vergennes had succeeded thus far 
 quite to the limit of his hopes. He had drawn the bonds 
 of the alliance more closely together, by taking advantage 
 of recent events he had strengthened France with the 
 assurance of support from Spain, and he had interested 
 Spain in the plans he had in view by making clever rep 
 resentations of the danger which threatened the two 
 Crowns and the identity of the interests of both in view 
 of the attitude of Great Britain. He never allowed this 
 idea to be lost sight of in his communications with Madrid, 
 and he grew bolder with the increased feeling of security 
 that he felt from his present situation, in his suggestions 
 as to united action against England, seeking the oppor 
 tunity to introduce a proposition that the war in America 
 might offer a basis for the combined operations of France 
 and Spain. In a despatch on the 28th of July, 1775, to 
 his Ambassador at Madrid, the Marquis d Ossun, whom 
 he requested to regard as confidential all the communica 
 tions he was about to make, though he knew from the 
 character of the latter and from his extremely intimate 
 relations at the Spanish Court that what he was about to 
 say would reach the ears of those for whom it was intended, 
 he took occasion to declare, "The English have incon 
 siderately embarked in a war with their Colonists in 
 America which up to this time has cost them very dear, 
 and is likely in its results to cost them a part of their 
 
 1 Archives Nationales, K 164, No. 3, anne"e 1775, No. 23 : Doniol, La Par 
 ticipation de la France, i. 140. 
 
1775.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 79 
 
 commercial existence. Their weakness which will follow 
 as a necessary consequence will afford an opportunity to 
 the two Crowns, and possibly without even striking a 
 blow, to regain that superiority of consideration and in 
 fluence which is always the reward of a wise and well- 
 directed administration." l 
 
 This was the thin end of the wedge. Almost at the 
 same moment he took pains to have sent to the Spanish 
 King a copy of a letter written from London by M. de 
 Guinea, who reported that he had had a long and intimate 
 conversation, the day before he wrote, with Lord Rocli- 
 ford, and that the latter gentleman had told him that 
 there was a growing sentiment among the followers of 
 both political parties in England that the only way to 
 stop the war in America was to declare war upon France ; 
 that those who favored this idea were not alarmed by the 
 alliance with Spain, because they remembered that Eng 
 land had fought both France and Spain at the end of the 
 Seven Years War, and they asserted that she could do it 
 again, especially after the reverses the Spaniards had met 
 with in the expedition to Algiers, which had had a very 
 damaging effect upon their influence at the English Court ; 
 also that the idea of a disastrous war waged upon Eng 
 land which should result in re-establishing the French 
 in Canada with their distasteful government and religion 
 would be the strongest possible incentive to the Ameri 
 cans, who, if they were called upon thus to choose between 
 England and France, would certainly cling to the mother- 
 country, even at the sacrifice of their independence, be 
 cause under any circumstances they would rather have 
 the English than the French. 
 
 This last assertion touched M. de Vergennes upon a 
 tender spot ; it wounded his national pride, whilst it in 
 creased his bitterness toward England and filled him with 
 
 1 Espagnc, t. 576, No. 173 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 115. 
 
80 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1775. 
 
 alarm for the success of his favorite plan. It had the 
 immediate effect of drawing him nearer to the position of 
 the American Colonies. Taking advantage of the feelings 
 which he knew would be aroused in Spain by this half- 
 concealed threat of Lord Eochford, he went a step further 
 than he had gone as yet, and suggested to the Spanish 
 Court a possible support of the American Colonies and a 
 friendly understanding with them in their struggle. This 
 was the first direct intimation in his diplomatic corre 
 spondence of his purpose to intervene on behalf of the 
 American people ; it appears in his despatch of the 7th 
 of August, 1775, to the Marquis d Ossun, who was in 
 structed to consult with the Spanish ministry upon the 
 subject and to take measures to bring it to the notice of 
 the King : 
 
 "We believe here that upon the first open act of hostility com 
 mitted by England we should no longer feel called upon to use 
 moderation, but that we should instantly seize upon all English 
 ships within our power both in our ports and upon the high seas. 
 This would deprive England of a certain number of sailors, which 
 of all losses is the most damaging to her. We believe, however, 
 that it would be well in this connection to except all such vessels 
 as may be the property of, or be chartered by, the inhabitants of 
 North America ; for it would not be a good policy to throw upon 
 these people the burden of a war of which, after all, they would 
 be merely the innocent cause, or, by inflicting upon them unneces 
 sary hardships, to drive them back and make them willing to bear 
 again a yoke which they are now endeavoring to throw off. It 
 might even be proper for us to issue a joint declaration which 
 should be addressed to them as a free and independent people, 
 inviting them to make use of our respective ports and assuring to 
 them therein the freedom and the privileges of commerce." 1 
 
 Having gone thus far concerning affairs in America, M. 
 de Vergennes began to feel that he lacked reliable infor 
 mation as to what was taking place in the Colonies, and 
 
 1 Espagne, t. 577, No. 15 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 126. 
 
1775.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 81 
 
 that, in fact, he knew little or nothing about the Ameri 
 cans themselves, what manner of people they were, or 
 what they were capable of. His sources of knowledge 
 were almost entirely in England, and he began to discern 
 that what came from there was not correct ; for it now be 
 came evident that both the Government and the people of 
 Great Britain had been mistaken as to the gravity of the 
 contest and the facility with which it could be decided. 
 Men began to feel that neither Lord Chatham nor any one 
 else could bring the Colonies back to their position of de 
 pendence. He decided to send an agent to America able 
 to form an estimate of the country and its resources, of 
 the people, of their character and their military strength; 
 who should take every opportunity of a vessel returning 
 to France to make a detailed report of what he saw, in 
 order that the ministry might judge of the situation as 
 affairs developed, and directly from sources of their own. 
 
 A person of this description was found in London by 
 the Ambassador, M. de Guines, who described him as " a 
 French gentleman, who had been attached to the regiment 
 du Cap, had been in all the English Colonies, and, in 
 fact, had just returned from there; he was very willing to 
 go out again, and, besides the interest he expressed in un 
 dertaking a mission of this character, he had acquaint 
 ances in Boston, New York, Providence, and Philadelphia, 
 through whom doubtless he would be enabled to obtain 
 such information as was required." His name was Achard 
 Bonvouloir ; he was first-cousin to the Marquis de Lam 
 bert. The Ambassador undertook to arrange with him 
 for his adventure in such a way that under any circum 
 stances M. Bonvouloir should not be able to compromise 
 any one but himself; he should have nothing to show by 
 which, in case of his capture or detection, the French 
 Government could be brought into connection with his 
 undertaking ; and this had been agreed to by Bonvouloir 
 at the outset. The price of his services was : 1st, That 
 
 VOL. I. G 
 
82 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1775. 
 
 he should receive a lieutenant s commission in the King s 
 army, in order that he might be entitled to proper con 
 sideration in America, and, if it became necessary in the 
 course of his investigations, that he might the more readily 
 enlist in the army of the " rebels." This commission was 
 to be antedated, because when he had been in America 
 formerly he had given himself out as a French officer, 
 which was not exactly true, although he had been attached 
 as a volunteer to the regiment " du Cap," then stationed 
 in the West Indies. 2d, Two hundred louis a year, out 
 of which he should pay all his expenses. 3d, A letter 
 from the King in which his Majesty should express his 
 appreciation of M. Bonvouloir s zeal in the interests of 
 France, and should recognize his services to the country : 
 this, however, was not to be given to him, but was to be 
 read to him and retained by the Ambassador. 
 
 These conditions were " placed under the eyes of the 
 King" by M. de Vergennes, who announced to the Am 
 bassador that his Majesty approved of them, as well as 
 of the enterprise, and directed M. Bonvouloir to set out 
 immediately for America, especial regard being had, 
 however, to the fulfilment of that part of the contract 
 which made it impossible for Bonvouloir to involve the 
 Government, and it being understood that he should not 
 look for protection if he fell into the hands of the British. 
 The lieutenant s commission was issued from the War De 
 partment by command of the King, and the two hundred 
 louis were paid to him by the Ambassador out of moneys 
 allowed for extraordinary expenditures. His letters were 
 to be addressed to Antwerp and sent under double en 
 velope to a correspondent in Calais, who should not for 
 ward them to Antwerp, however, but should deliver them 
 to the French Ambassador at London. Their substance 
 was to relate exclusively to commercial matters, so devised 
 under a form of cipher that, while they should convey the 
 intelligence desired by the Government, they should not 
 
1775.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 83 
 
 excite suspicion if they came into the hands of those for 
 whom they were not intended. 
 
 Thus equipped, M. Bonvouloir left London on the 8th 
 of September, 1775, which fact the Ambassador reported 
 to M. de Vergennes the same day : " M. de Bonvouloir is 
 sent off. He goes aboard a vessel this evening which will 
 sail during the night for Philadelphia : I have forbidden 
 him even to pronounce the word Frenchman or to enter 
 into any discussion as to our disposition toward the Amer 
 icans. His mission is confined to the duty of giving us 
 such information as may be interesting to us ; he is quite 
 able to accomplish this, but if he fails we shall only have 
 risked two hundred louis in a matter which may become 
 very important." 
 
 The most important part of the mission of Bonvouloir, 
 because it helps materially to determine the attitude of 
 France toward the end of the year 1775, and shows the 
 already fixed determination of the minister to approach 
 the American Colonies in their contest with England, is 
 the special instruction sent to him through the Ambassa 
 dor in London by M. de Vergennes : " You will please 
 reduce his instructions, which are only to be verbal, to 
 two points which appear to me to be the most essential : 
 the one is, to render you a faithful account of events and 
 the general feeling in America ; the other, to reassure the 
 Americans against the fright which it has been sought to 
 stir up among them in regard to us. Canada is the sensi 
 tive point with them : let him give them to understand 
 that we have no thought of that whatever, but that, far 
 from envying the liberty and independence which they are 
 striving to secure, we admire the grandeur and the noble 
 ness of their efforts, that we have no interest in putting 
 obstacles in their way, but, on the contrary, we should be 
 glad if favorable circumstances enabled them to make use 
 
 1 Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 138. 
 
84 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1775. 
 
 of our ports ; the facilities for their commerce which they 
 would find there would quickly prove the esteem we have 
 for them." l 
 
 This is a perfectly clear statement of the intention on 
 the part of the Secretary of State to encourage the " in 
 surgents," and it is probably what he actually meant; 
 but through the maze of diplomatic intrigue which sur 
 rounded the incidents of the time and involved his corre 
 spondence in apparently irreconcilable inconsistencies, it 
 is difficult to determine what was true and what was not : 
 so that if the armed intervention of France had never 
 taken place, there would be present to the hand of the 
 historian an abundance of documents by which it might 
 be made to appear that that monarchy never had any 
 intention of participating in the American Revolution. 
 
 Almost at the very moment when M. de Vergennes was 
 preparing these instructions for Bonvouloir to take to 
 America, he wrote with his own hand to the Ambassador 
 in London, in reply to a report from that personage, that 
 he had done well in his interview with Lord Suffolk to 
 insist upon the friendly intentions of France toward 
 England, and to disabuse his lordship s mind of any fear 
 which he might have conceived that the French Govern 
 ment would think of giving aid to the American Colonies. 
 " For that matter," he wrote, " the Colonies may say what 
 they like, the principles of the King are immutable, and 
 you will not go too far in declaring that, even if His 
 Majesty s interest lay in feeding the flame of rebellion in 
 America, his feeling of justice would forbid him to do so ; 
 and justice is the strongest impulse of his nature." 2 
 
 Thus deliberately was the policy of the French minister 
 planned and carried out, and as deliberately was it dis 
 avowed whenever a question arose as to his friendship 
 
 1 The Comte de Vergennes to M. de Guines, 7th August, 1775 : Doniol, La 
 Participation de la France, i. 156. 
 
 2 Angleterre, t. 511, No. 110 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 149. 
 
1775.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 85 
 
 toward England, with a perfect consistency of falsehood 
 and a continued duplicity which are explicable on no other 
 ground than that of the undoubted fear of England which 
 existed in the mind of M. de Vergennes, and his perhaps 
 inherited belief that the English, as a nation, were to be 
 injured whenever an occasion offered, lest they might other 
 wise have time to injure their neighbors, and that, as 
 individuals, their jealousy and love of conquest made it 
 unsafe ever to tell them the truth. All the associations of 
 his life were connected with hatred of England ; to him, 
 she was always " the enemy ;" and he treated her as an 
 enemy in peace as well as in war. 
 
 He did not always succeed in deceiving her, however, 
 for his attitude and his sentiments were perfectly under 
 stood by Lord Stormont, the English Ambassador, who 
 followed closely upon his footsteps as he advanced toward 
 the American Colonies, and who, watching him with equal 
 bitterness and distrust on his side, frequently in the long 
 chain of incidents that followed detected him almost at 
 the moment when he put forth his hand. It was already 
 suspected, indeed, in London that an alliance was under 
 consideration at Versailles and Madrid between France 
 and Spain and the Colonies, and M. de Vergennes was 
 called upon to deny it on the very day when Bonvouloir 
 sailed for Philadelphia. The French Ambassador re 
 ported that Lord Rochford had presented his compliments 
 to him to announce that a rumor of this character had 
 recently been received from America, and that the British 
 Government would feel great pleasure in being able to 
 deny it upon authority ; to which again M. de Vergennes 
 replied that the King s spirit of justice would forever 
 prevent him from giving encouragement to the rebels : 
 " And this," said he, " is a truth which you must not 
 hesitate to repeat upon every occasion when you can do 
 so without affectation. We do not know what hopes the 
 Americans may entertain, or upon what Power they may 
 
86 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1775. 
 
 rely ; we have as yet had no appeal from them ; but if 
 they were to come to us, we should very properly dismiss 
 them, although we should guard their secret." l 
 
 It was perfectly true that the French ministry had had 
 no direct communication up to that time with the Colonies 
 in America, though M. de Vergennes knew that shipments 
 of munitions of war were being made from French ports, 
 and we have seen that he was himself secretly considering 
 the subject of supporting the Revolution. But he treated 
 the communication of Lord Rochford as a fiction intended 
 to draw from M. de Guines a declaration which he might 
 use in Parliament, and with which he might possibly dis 
 courage the Americans if they entertained a hope of aid 
 from France, although Lord Rochford had said that the 
 information came to General Burgoyne in a private letter 
 from General Lee, who had given his word of honor that 
 the Americans were certain they should be supported by 
 Spain and France. This letter, however, was never shown 
 to the Ambassador. M. de Vergennes repeated his in 
 structions to the Ambassador to keep a watchful eye upon 
 the Colonies, admitting now that he regarded their destiny 
 as of very great importance : "I beg of you to continue 
 to inform us of everything that you hear relating to 
 affairs in America. That is at present the object of our 
 constant attention." 2 It continued to be the point of 
 greatest interest, for he still expected that in some manner 
 England would make peace with her Colonies, and he 
 could not bring himself to believe that either the English 
 ministry or the Opposition in Parliament would force the 
 issue to a point of absolute separation, although he was 
 convinced they could never be brought back by force of 
 arms, and only with great difficulty by negotiation. Not 
 withstanding very great preparations were being made in 
 England to send additional forces to America, to increase 
 
 1 Angleterre, t. 511, No. 160 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 150. 
 
 2 Angleterre, t. 511, No. 44 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 171. 
 
1775.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 87 
 
 the number of regiments employed and the number of 
 companies in the regiments, for carrying on the campaign 
 of the following year, he wrote to M. de Guines in 
 August that this seemed to him like a vain boast, or a 
 threat intended to impose upon the Colonists ; for if the 
 Government had wished to wage active war upon them 
 in its proper sense, and destroy them, it would not have 
 waited until the next year to open the campaign, giving 
 the Americans notice and allowing them, of course, 
 time to prepare also ; it would have surprised them 
 by rapid and well-sustained attacks which the Colonists 
 would not have been able to defend themselves against or 
 to recover from, but which would have borne them down 
 by the mere weight of superior numbers and equipment. 
 Neither did he believe that the English army would march 
 inland from the coast; because, if it did, it would place 
 itself in too great danger of being cut off when it should 
 try to go back. 
 
 But upon the 25th of the same month the Ambassador 
 at London announced that the English Government had 
 issued its proclamation of " Rebellion," which startled M. 
 de Vergennes to such an extent that he freely admitted 
 that it " changes absolutely the order of our combinations 
 and takes away beyond recall any hope of conciliation that 
 might yet have remained/ T He declared that the procla 
 mation which the English had published made it impos 
 sible for them then to turn back ; that the issue had been 
 joined, and that either America must succumb or the 
 ministry itself, a fact the consequences of which Lord 
 Rochford had probably not rightly estimated when he 
 boasted that he had advised the step ; and it seemed to the 
 Ambassador, indeed, that, as things were going then, it was 
 not unlikely that scaffolds would yet be erected in England. 
 
 Nothing could have been more gratifying to M. de 
 
 1 Letter of 3d September, 1775, Angleterre, t. 511, No. 124 : Doniol, La 
 Participation dela France, i. 174. 
 
88 THE HOSTILE SENTIMENT IN FRANCE [1775. 
 
 Vergennes than the increasing embarrassments in Great 
 Britain ; with intense enjoyment he looked on at what, 
 to him, was an act of self-destruction, so opportune, how 
 ever, in the policy of France that what he had not been 
 able to do against England for lack of strength, England 
 was doing against herself, as if playing directly into his 
 hands. To the Marquis d Ossun, at Madrid, he gave open 
 expression of his delight : " If the English are foolish 
 enough to destroy their force by their own force, to ex 
 haust their finances and to engulf themselves in a civil 
 war, why should we interrupt them ? Let us quietly watch 
 them consume themselves, as long as the condition of things 
 will permit them to do it. Even if we do not acquire by 
 it a greater amount of intrinsic force, our relative power 
 is bound to be increased." l He instantly seized upon this 
 opportunity to advance a step further upon the ground 
 he wished to occupy, by assuming a bolder tone in his 
 diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain, making use 
 of the alliance which it was reported King George was 
 endeavoring to conclude with the Empress of Russia. M. 
 de Vergennes did not believe this report in the least ; he 
 had given excellent reasons against its authenticity in a 
 very clever state paper which had elicited from the King 
 of Spain genuine and flattering praise ; but with him 
 everything was an instrument that came to his hand when 
 he could turn it against England, and this news was cur 
 rent, therefore, of course, he was privileged to use it ; and 
 it happened to furnish him an occasion which up to that 
 time he had been embarrassed to find, namely, that of 
 admitting the joint armament of France and Spain and 
 giving to England a presentable reason for it. Therefore, 
 with much assumed apprehension, he instructed the Am 
 bassador in London to intimate to the British Government 
 that the Courts of France and Spain looked with alarm 
 
 1 Letter of 21st November, 1775, Espagne, t. 578, No. 95 : Doniol, La Par 
 ticipation de la France, i. 204. 
 
1775.] TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. 89 
 
 upon the introduction of Russia into the quarrel with the 
 Colonies ; that Russia was a powerful nation both on land 
 and on sea, which would not be likely to enter in with 
 England unless she had something to gain besides the 
 miserable subsidy which might be paid for her troops ; 
 that no doubt she had in this matter some ulterior pur 
 pose which was not disclosed ; that it was not likely that 
 this purpose was in any wise directed against the posses 
 sions of her allies in America, therefore it must be against 
 the West Indies ; in fact, that Spain and France were 
 agreed that they must arm themselves in order to defend 
 their colonies and that they might be ready at any moment 
 to repel attack. The word was spoken. The attitude of 
 the two Crowns was no longer to be merely passive. It 
 took only a few days to dispose of the rumors of a Rus 
 sian alliance ; but M. de Vergennes had gained his point. 
 It was, after all, nothing more than an avowal of what 
 the English Government already knew. They were never 
 blind to what was going on in France. Lord Stormont 
 had begun that remarkable surveillance upon the actions 
 of the ministry which he carried out with unremitting 
 diligence during the next few years, performing a sort of 
 police duty the aim of which was to follow every step that 
 might be taken by which France as a neutral Power 
 should go beyond the limit of international comity, and 
 to prevent any attempt at giving aid or encouragement to 
 the revolted Colonies, with such success that for a tolerably 
 long period he was the most hated man, and perhaps it 
 would not be going too far to say, the most feared, in 
 France. He was now almost daily protesting to the min 
 istry against American ships loading with munitions of 
 war in French ports, against contracts being made for the 
 same purpose by French merchants, to whom he insisted 
 that prohibitions should issue, and obliging the Govern 
 ment at least to promise that it would take repressive 
 measures, or to profess that it had already done so. The 
 
90 HOSTILITY TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN. [1775. 
 
 French began to think that he knew by intuition what 
 they were doing. The first question asked, after they de 
 cided in any case what they themselves would do, was, 
 what Lord Stormont was likely to do ; for he was sure 
 to do something. Consequently M. de Vergennes s an 
 nouncement created no surprise in England, and pro 
 duced no immediate result there. It aided him, however, 
 by keeping alive the interest which he had created at the 
 Spanish Court, where he availed himself of every occasion 
 like this to emphasize the community of purpose in the 
 policy of the two Crowns. The Spanish Government in 
 creased its garrisons in the West Indies, and M. de Gri- 
 maldi announced that he was convinced that this great 
 superiority of armed forces in America was likely to tempt 
 England into some enterprise against the French and 
 Spanish colonies, especially against the former. 
 
1775.] RELATIONS OF FRANCE WITH THE COLONIES. 91 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WITH THE 
 COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. 
 
 THE Comte de Vergennes had now substantially reached 
 the point where the Due de Choiseul had left the subject 
 of the American Colonies several years before ; he was 
 renewing the policy of that statesman, developing it in 
 the light of succeeding events, and preparing to carry it 
 on to completion, with greatly increased likelihood of suc 
 cess, because the Revolution had fairly begun and many 
 of the results which the former minister had merely pre 
 dicted had now actually been produced. He found con 
 siderable divergence of opinion in France as to the policy 
 of encouraging rebellion directed against a recognized au 
 thority, and there was a fear lest this example might even 
 prove dangerous to France in the government of her own 
 colonies, especially if the Americans should establish an 
 independent Power in such close proximity to them, and 
 that Power a republic. The King himself had no sym 
 pathy with the " insurgents," and felt no disposition to 
 encourage them. But the great incentive which the min 
 ister dexterously employed was the belief that the resto-% 
 ration of the glory of France lay in the success of they 
 American Revolution. That overcame all objection, and 
 with it he labored to create sentiment in the ministry. 
 At the close of the year 1775 he prepared a series of 
 notes in which he stated the problem as he understood it, 
 examined it in its bearings upon France, and explained 
 in such detail his views as to the policy to be pursued by 
 the Government that they form a most valuable document 
 
92 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT [1775. 
 
 in which the attitude of France is described in his own 
 language. These notes, which he called " Reflexions," 
 and which were intended only for the eyes of the King 
 and of M. de Maurepas, are preserved in the Archives 
 of France. 1 They present the subject of the intervention 
 of France in the American Revolution, as follows : 
 
 "REFLEXIONS. 
 
 "The quarrel which is now going on between England and 
 her Colonies is one of those events of extreme importance which 
 deserve the attention of all other Powers, by reason of the in 
 fluence which it may have upon the political existence of Great 
 Britain. France especially, and Spain, have an immediate interest 
 in following its details and its progress, and in forecasting its 
 probable effect. 
 
 " There is reason to believe that the object of the Colonies is no 
 longer simply to redress their grievances, but that they have come 
 to the determination to throw off the yoke of the mother- country. 
 England openly imputes this intention to them, and the efforts 
 she is making to overcome it prove to what extent she feels and 
 fears the effects which would result from its execution. 
 
 "If the Colonies are left to themselves, it is probable that 
 Great Britain will ultimately conquer and subject them ; and in 
 that event she will be the mistress to prescribe for them such laws 
 as she may see fit. The result of this forced submission will be, 
 indeed, that the Court of London will be driven into extraordi 
 nary and ever- continuing expenditures in order to restrain and 
 preserve the Colonies, which will retain a perpetual and irre 
 pressible tendency toward independence j but, on the other hand, 
 she will at least continue to hold the mercantile advantages which 
 she has enjoyed up to this time from her commerce with America, 
 /and she will consequently be able to support her manufactures 
 and her shipping. Above all, she will prevent the Colonies from 
 putting into the balance a very considerable weight in favor of 
 any other Power, as they would do if they were independent. 
 So that, by whatever means Great Britain maintains her suprem 
 acy in America, we may fairly say that it will result in very con 
 siderable advantage to her ; whereas, if she lost it, she would 
 suffer an incalculable injury, as we shall show hereafter. 
 
 1 tats-Unis, Me"moires et Documents de 1765 a 1778, t. 1, No. 4 : Doniol, 
 La Participation de la France, i. 243. 
 
1775.] WITH THE COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. 93 
 
 "This twofold truth appears naturally to indicate the part 
 which France should take in the quarrel now existing between 
 England and her Colonies. 
 
 "England is the natural enemy of France. She is an enemy at 
 once grasping, ambitious, unjust, and perfidious. The invariable 
 and most cherished purpose in her politics has been, if not the 
 destruction of France, at least her overthrow, her humiliation, 
 and her ruin. This is the real motive of the wars which for a 
 long period she has waged against us ; this reason of state always 
 dominates every other consideration ; and when it speaks, all 
 means are just, legitimate, and even necessary, provided they are 
 efficient. This condition of things, as well as the care which 
 France is bound to take of its own preservation, authorizes and 
 even invites her to seize every possible opportunity to reduce the 
 power and the greatness of England ; whilst, on the other hand, 
 our policy makes it a duty for us to do so. Starting, then, with 
 this double truth, it becomes necessary for us to inquire whether 
 the attitude and the present circumstances of the Colonies are 
 such as to lead us to this result. They are at open war with the 
 central Government ; their purpose is to throw off the yoke of 
 domination ; they appeal to us to give them aid and succor. If 
 we accede to the wishes of the Colonies, and presupposing that we 
 give them effective assistance, it would seem that the following 
 advantages must result : 1st, the power of England will be re 
 duced, and our own increased to the same degree ; 2d, her com 
 merce will sutler an irreparable loss, whilst ours w T ill be increased ; 
 3d, it is very probable that, in the coui-se of events, we should be 
 able to recover a part of our possessions in America which the 
 English have taken away from us, such as the right to lish on 
 shore, that of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Isle Royale, etc. AVe 
 make no reference to Canada. 
 
 "But it may be said that the independence of the English Col 
 onies will produce a revolution in the New World, that they will 
 scarcely be quiet again and assured of their liberty before they 
 will be seized with a desire for conquest, whence might result the 
 invasion of our colonies and of the rich possessions of Spain in 
 South America. 
 
 "There are two considerations, however, which ought to re 
 assure those who fear dangers of that sort. 1st. The war which 
 the Colonies are now carrying on will exhaust and impoverish 
 them to such an extent that it will be a long time before they can 
 think of taking up arms to attack their neighbors. 2d. There is 
 every reason to believe that if the Colonies attain their purpose 
 
94 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT [1775. 
 
 they will give to their new Government the form of a Eepublic, 
 and it is generally conceded, as the result of experience, that 
 Eepublics very rarely have the love of conquest, and those about 
 to be established in America will have it all the less (for it is un 
 derstood that each province will become a separate Eepublic and 
 that they shall have no relation to each other except that of a 
 political confederation), because they already know the happiness 
 and the advantages of commerce $ they need industries, and con 
 sequently they want peace in order to procure for themselves the 
 commodities of life as well as a great number of things of prime 
 necessity. It is safe to say, therefore, that the fear of seeing the 
 Americans undertake, sooner or later, the invasion of their neigh 
 bors territory is without even a seeming foundation, and is not 
 worthy to be taken into consideration. Even supposing that the 
 Americans should overrun the Spanish possessions, it is by no 
 means certain that such a revolution would be prejudicial to 
 France j I except, of course, the obligations contained in the 
 Family Compact. 
 
 "Admitting, then, the interest that France has in favoring the 
 independence of the English Colonies, it becomes necessary to 
 examine : 1st, what kind of assistance she can give them ; 2d, 
 when this assistance can best be brought to bear ; 3d, what is 
 likely to be the result of it. 
 
 " FIRST POINT. 
 
 " England has subsidized seventeen thousand men in Germany, 
 to whom she adds twenty- odd thousand national troops ; she will 
 therefore have in America an army of less than forty thousand 
 men. The Colonies, on their side, have now on foot fifty thou 
 sand regular troops, well clothed, well armed, well disciplined, 
 and well commanded. They have nearly as many volunteers who 
 serve without pay and only ask to fight, and they will have by 
 next spring more than thirty vessels at sea, of from twelve to forty 
 guns. Finally, they have a treaty of neutrality, and, in case of 
 necessity, of alliance, with five savage nations who hate the 
 English. But they are in need, 1st, of munitions of war ; 2d, of 
 ready money ; 3d, of a good navy. Therefore, in order to assist 
 the Americans effectively, we should have to provide for these 
 three necessities if we concluded at any time to respond to their 
 appeal for help. 
 
 "They would send their vessels into our ports laden with 
 products and take a return cargo of arms and munitions, pay 
 ing for them, not in ready money, but in products to be deliv- 
 
1775.] WITH THE COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. 95 
 
 ered either at Santo Domingo or at one of our ports in Europe. 
 This exchange of traffic could be made without obliging the 
 Government to appear in any way ; we should only need a 
 capable, faithful, and discreet agent in each of our ports where 
 the American vessels came to load or to discharge. This agent 
 would deal directly with the captains of vessels, and they would 
 cover up their transactions so as to escape the protests of the 
 Court of London. We should have no further interest in these 
 shipments, which would be made for the account and risk of the 
 Americans. 
 
 " As to the demand for money, that presents at first sight some 
 rather serious difficulties : while it seems impossible to reject it 
 entirely, we should, however, be obliged to modify and curtail it. 
 The following are the reflections which occur to me upon that 
 subject. The Colonies have established a paper currency for 
 their domestic necessities, which now circulates freely and appears 
 likely to sustain its value ; therefore they would not need specie 
 for the interior of the provinces. They will find it necessary 
 merely for their operations abroad ; that is to say, in paying for 
 their purchases. We might, therefore, it appears to me, reduce 
 their expenditures by supplying to them, so far as possible, the 
 articles which they are obliged to buy abroad, taking in exchange 
 their products and furnishing them, beyond this, with such an 
 amount of specie as might be found necessary in order to keep 
 their affairs in good condition. 
 
 "The subject of the navy cannot be so easily disposed of as 
 the two former. We should not be able to send our vessels to 
 sea without declaring openly in favor of the Colonies and, conse 
 quently, incurring a war with Great Britain ; and if we supplied 
 them clandestinely, the Court of London, upon discovering it, 
 would justly accuse us of being secret abettors of the rebellion in 
 its Colonies. The result of these observations is that the former 
 of these alternatives cannot be carried out until such time as we 
 shall be obliged by circumstances to make war upon the English ; 
 and the latter is surrounded by very great difficulty if we at 
 tempt to conceal it from the Court of London. But there is still 
 a way out. We could send to Santo Domingo, or some other point 
 agreed upon, a number of merchant-ships suitable for war ; the 
 Americans would go there and receive them at their own risk, 
 making fictitious contracts with the French captains. Thus 
 the insurgents would be enabled to increase their navy with 
 our help, without our appearing in any manner as parties to the 
 transaction. 
 
96 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT [1775. 
 
 " SECOND POINT. 
 
 1 1 As to the time at which France should openly assist the Colonies. 
 
 i i According to our information, the insurgents are at present 
 strong enough to resist the forces which England is sending to 
 America ; they have arms and munitions of war, therefore it 
 would not be necessary to supply them with anything now. But 
 it is to be feared that before long they will have exhausted their 
 means, so that the difficulty of increasing their supplies, and the 
 consequent alarm, may weaken their courage and tempt them to 
 abandon their undertaking, by submitting before they are forced 
 by impoverishment to do so. It is, therefore, essential that 
 France should give immediate attention to this point ; she must 
 sustain the courage and the perseverance of the insurgents by 
 nattering them with the hope of effective aid as soon as cir 
 cumstances will permit it. She must give them to understand 
 that the time for giving this aid depends upon their success ; and 
 she must encourage them to believe that the date may be fixed at 
 latest at the end of the next campaign. In this manner France 
 will not be compromised either as to the i insurgents or as to the 
 Court of London, and she will be getting herself ready to strike a 
 decisive blow as soon as events have sufficiently matured to admit 
 of it, 
 
 "THIRD POINT. 
 
 i i What will be the effect of our assistance f 
 
 1 Starting with the principle that we ought to favor the inde 
 pendence of the Colonies, it follows necessarily that we ought to 
 help them as soon as we believe that we can do so with success ; 
 therefore that becomes a point which it is important to consider 
 and to establish. In order to form some estimate in this connec 
 tion, it may be well to await the effect produced by the efforts 
 which the Court of London proposes to make in the coming spring ; 
 its preparations are immense ; they exhaust, or very nearly so, the 
 resources of Great Britain. If the Court does not meet at once 
 with such success as to foreshadow either the submission or the 
 destruction of the Colonies, we shall conclude that Great Britain 
 has not sufficient means to accomplish that undertaking, and then 
 France would risk so much less in coming upon the scene, that is 
 to say, in declaring war, because the forces of the Americans will 
 have been sufficient to arrest the British armies, and by joining 
 with them we shall make their triumph sure. 
 
 "But, laying aside this plan of action, and supposing that 
 France remains absolutely still, that is to say, that she not only 
 
1775.] WITH THE COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. 97 
 
 does not aid the Colonies openly, but does not even give them the 
 least secret encouragement : will such a course protect us against 
 war f Affairs in America present two hypotheses : upon the 
 first, England will triumph over the Americans and subjugate 
 them ; upon the second, that Power will be repelled by them and 
 forced to agree to their independence. In the one case, as in the 
 other, it is possible that the Court of London will feel obliged to 
 attack our colonies : in the former, to avenge the assistance which 
 she will suppose we have given to her Colonies (for she will suppose 
 this if her interests and her views demand it, however passive our 
 conduct may have been) ; in the latter, to indemnify herself at 
 our expense, and at the expense of Spain, for the immense outlay 
 incurred by her in bringing the Colonies to terms. This expe 
 dition will appear easy to the English, and it will be so in fact, in 
 view of the forces both on land and at sea which they will have 
 in America ; and, besides, it will appear necessary to the British 
 ministers, either to establish their reputation and to win glory, or 
 to lessen the reproaches which the nation is sure to cast upon them 
 in the event of failure, perhaps even to save their heads from 
 the scaffold. 
 
 " Consequently, from whatever point of view we consider the 
 outcome of the troubles in America, and whatever our conduct 
 may be at this juncture, it will not assure to us the continuance of 
 peace ; we cannot therefore assume its preservation as the basis 
 of our policy, and since the circumstances of the case, from what 
 ever point of view we consider them, appear certain to lead us 
 into war, it is the part of prudence to make ready in advance the 
 means which will enable us to carry it on with advantage and suc 
 cess. We venture to believe that the most effective means would 
 be to make sure of the Colonies, and, in case of necessity, to make 
 common cause with them." 
 
 This was the programme of the French Cabinet just 
 before our Declaration of Independence. It shows an 
 intercourse with the agents of the Colonies quite beyond 
 what the official correspondence of the time bears witness 
 to, and implies the study of details which we have no longer 
 before us, but of which we distinctly see the traces. It 
 leaves no doubt that it was the intention of France to 
 injure Great Britain the moment an opportunity offered 
 itself in any part of the world, and that, in the opinion 
 
 VOL. I. 7 
 
98 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT [1775. 
 
 of the Secretary of State, that opportunity was at hand 
 in the quarrel of the mother-country with her American 
 Colonies. The most difficult obstacle for M. de Vergennes 
 at the moment was the unwillingness of the King, who 
 wavered between his unquestioned desire on the one hand 
 to do right at all times, and a fear on the other hand that 
 in some way, should he fail to listen to the representations 
 of his ministers of state, who had long experience in 
 affairs and whose judgments must be wise, he might lose 
 the favorable opportunity to re-establish the position of 
 France and thus to render his reign illustrious in her 
 annals. His hesitating mind was influenced also, no 
 doubt, by the opposition at Court on the part of the per 
 sonal enemies of M. de Vergennes, who were jealous of 
 his position in the Cabinet, who had obtained an intima 
 tion of his policy, and who, having no reason to regret 
 its possible failure, took pains that it should be spoken 
 of unfavorably before the King. For a time its progress 
 was absolutely arrested. 
 
 Meanwhile the versatile and indefatigable Caron de 
 Beaumarchais, afterward made famous by his " Marriage 
 of Figaro" and his " Barber of Seville," clever alike in 
 intrigue, in commerce, and in letters, had been employed 
 by M. de Vergennes as a secret agent in London, where 
 his talents and his social qualities gave him admittance to 
 polite society and furnished him an opportunity to note 
 what took place, as well as to glean information from 
 people of all shades of political belief. Independent of 
 the Ambassador, and without official credit, Beaumarchais 
 occupied the position of actual representative in London, 
 and held the confidence of the Cabinet at Versailles, for 
 the moment, to a greater degree than M. de Guines ; and, 
 whilst he ferreted out every chance for intrigue with 
 people, either in England or in any of the ports of France, 
 who were willing to furnish arms or munitions of war, and 
 let slip no bit of news upon which he could base a plan or 
 
1775.] WITH THE COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. 99 
 
 a calculation in favor of the Colonists in America, his 
 reports were received with intense interest at home, where 
 they not only exerted the strongest influence upon the 
 minds of M. de Yergennes and M. de Maurepas, but were 
 instrumental also in determining the King to yield. 
 
 His enthusiasm and his patriotic appeals for the glory 
 of France, his assertion that this was the moment of all 
 others to assure it, which he repeated with increasing fer 
 vor, his ardent representations of the opposition of a great 
 part of the English people to the policy of the ministry, and 
 his reiterated statement that it was the belief of all wise 
 men that this uprising in the Colonies would end in the 
 destruction of the British Empire, which France needed 
 only to help along in order to recover her honor, her 
 power, and her lost possessions, that patriotism summoned 
 her to do this, and that if she failed to listen now she 
 would stand condemned in all history, undoubtedly con 
 tributed largely to the result. 
 
 That he was working directly to influence the King, we 
 know by his letter to M. de Vergennes of the 24th of 
 November, 1775, 1 written at Versailles, whither he had 
 gone from London : 
 
 "MoxsiEUR LE COMTE, Instead of waiting for the King s 
 reply, which will doubtless announce his decision, should you 
 approve of writing to him again that I am here, that you have 
 seen me, that I am trembling lest in a matter so easy and so 
 necessary, perhaps the most important that the King may ever 
 have to decide, His Majesty may choose the negative, and that, 
 whatever his motives, I beg him in mercy not to decide either 
 way without having first allowed me to plead with him for one 
 quarter of an hour, respectfully to demonstrate to him the neces 
 sity of undertaking, the facility of acting, the certainty of succeed 
 ing, and the immense harvest of glory and repose to be obtained 
 for his reign from the smallest seed planted so advantageously 
 now ? May the guardian angel of this state turn favorably the 
 heart of the King, and give us the success so greatly to be desired." 
 
 1 Angleterre, t. 513, No. 3 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 251. 
 
 
100 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT [1776. 
 
 During this indecision the new year of 1776 came in. 
 M. de Vergennes was still surrounded by the intrigues 
 against him at Court, and he had become the object of 
 very serious personal attacks which obliged him to sus 
 pend his correspondence with Beaumarchais arid to give 
 attention to his own defence. But the King s confidence in 
 M. de Vergennes and his attachment for him, as well as the 
 persistent efforts of Beaumarchais, ultimately won the day. 
 
 Precisely how this result was accomplished we cannot 
 tell, because Beaumarchais never disclosed his relations 
 with the ministry ; and, although we know it was through 
 a communication written by him and shown to the King, 
 the document itself is not in the Archives, nor is there 
 anywhere a statement of what it contained. The only 
 trace of it is in the following letter from M. de Vergennes 
 on the 22d of January, 1776, to Louis XVI. : l 
 
 " SIRE, I have the honor to hand to Your Majesty a communi 
 cation from the Sr. de Beaumarchais, without excepting anything, 
 even as to what he intended to say to me alone. If I had felt at lib 
 erty to suppress any part, it would have been that which is purely 
 personal. The question here relates to facts which I am not in a 
 position to verify, and of which the proof would probably be very 
 difficult to establish. What appears to me to be the most impor 
 tant is the description of the actual condition of affairs and the 
 consequences which may possibly result. England is upon the 
 verge of despair. I readily believe, as the Sr. de Beaumarchais 
 intimates, that the change of ministry may not be far off. The 
 ministers have perhaps only a short time left in which to protect 
 themselves against the storm, or to resort to desperate measures 
 to ward off the danger which threatens their heads. This predic 
 tion would seem to call for the most careful foresight on the part of 
 Your Majesty ; though it is perhaps easier to imagine what ought to 
 be done than to point out the means or to put them into execution. 
 
 l Since I shall be able to reply to the Sr. de Beaumarchais only 
 after having heard the orders of Your Majesty, I humbly beg you 
 to appoint a time when I may go to receive them." 
 
 1 Archives Nationales, aimee 1776 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, 
 i. 253. 
 
1776.] WITH THE COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. 101 
 
 The communication from Beaumarchais which accom 
 panied this letter appears to have had the desired result, 
 and to have affected favorably the mind of the King to 
 the policy to be pursued toward England which M. de 
 Vergennes and Beaumarchais were strenuously laboring 
 to carry out; for from this time forward the Secretary of 
 State appears to have had at least ihe -roVal acquifsofcnce 
 in the programme generally outlined by him in the " Re 
 flexions" quoted above. It happened also in this connec 
 tion that an incident at the Court of France offered him 
 at that moment an opportunity to forward his purposes 
 the more comfortably to himself by getting rid for a time 
 of the oppressive watchfulness of Lord Stormont, which 
 he took advantage of immediately. The Comte de 
 Guines, Ambassador at London, whose conduct of diplo 
 matic affairs had for a long time not been satisfactory to 
 M. de Vergennes, had now fallen into disfavor with the 
 King, who directed him to be recalled, and the order 
 was sent on the 26th of January, 177(3. Here was a 
 chance which the Secretary of State could not have pre 
 pared more to his liking ; because if the Embassy at Lon 
 don were left vacant by the French Government, King 
 George would certainly not continue his Ambassador at 
 Paris when France was represented only by a charge-d af- 
 faires in England ; whilst if an English charge were left 
 in Paris he would be much more easy to deal with than 
 the Ambassador, whose personal distinction and social 
 position gave him a far wider range of intercourse and 
 consequently a much larger field of observation ; and when 
 that Ambassador was Lord Stormont, the relief at being 
 free from him for a time was second only to that, which 
 was not then attainable, of getting rid of him altogether. 
 
 Skilfully, therefore, M. de Vergennes approached the 
 King through M. de Maurepas in this delicate matter ; 
 for, whilst he was anxious to have a successor appointed in 
 order to prevent the return to London of M. de Guines, 
 
102 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT [1776. 
 
 in whose ability he had no confidence, he was equally anx 
 ious to have the vacancy continued as long as it reason 
 ably could be ; and in this double purpose he succeeded 
 admirably. The Marquis de Noailles was appointed Am 
 bassador to, England, but with instructions to go to his 
 post six months latex, and, as was expected, the English 
 Cfo^r^meat- gaye *.L0fd Stormont a leave of absence on 
 the 29th of March, and left the Embassy with a charge- 
 d affaires. The French representative in London during 
 the interim was M. Gamier, an old employee of the 
 Foreign Office, who had been eight years in London, who 
 was in perfect accord with M. de Vergennes, and who 
 could be implicitly relied upon to act in sympathy with 
 the aims and purposes of the " Reflexions." 
 
 Thus we find M. de Vergennes, at the beginning of the 
 year 1776, determined upon war ; not avowedly so as yet, 
 except to the King and to the head of the Cabinet, with 
 whom he concerted his plans and discussed the advantages 
 to be obtained for France by a timely intervention in the 
 present disturbances, but fully persuaded, nevertheless, 
 that circumstances were so forming themselves that the 
 time to strike was close at hand ; and this persuasion 
 shaped his policy from that time forward. He never 
 swerved from the direction he had thus taken. Indeed, 
 to all intents and purposes, so far as secret enmity could 
 carry him, and a fixed purpose not only to foment the ex 
 isting embarrassments by encouraging the Revolution in 
 America, but to lend a helping hand whenever he could 
 do so without being obliged to declare himself openly, he 
 was at war already with England. 
 
 Beaumarchais served him as an important factor in this, 
 both at London and in France ; his diplomatic corre 
 spondence with Spain, which is very voluminous at this 
 period, was skilfully framed to keep this purpose con 
 stantly before the Spanish Court ; and he now had 
 Bonvouloir working for it in America. In December, 
 
1776.] WITH THE COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. 103 
 
 1775, after a stormy and dangerous voyage of one hun 
 dred days, Bonvouloir had reached Philadelphia, whence 
 he wrote at once, though his communication did not arrive, 
 by reason of delays and the indirect method of its trans 
 mission, until the last of February, 1776. He reported 
 that he found the country, as he had expected, in an in 
 conceivable state of agitation ; that the confederates were 
 making immense preparations for the campaign of the 
 following spring, in spite of the rigor of the climate, 
 although they needed three important things, a good 
 navy, ready money, and provisions ; but that it must be 
 admitted they were led by " de bonnes tetes." He had 
 succeeded almost immediately in forming relations with 
 the Committee of Secret Correspondence, to whom he was 
 introduced as a private individual by a French bookseller 
 living in Philadelphia, called Daymons. He wrote that 
 he was kept regularly informed as to their deliberations 
 and fully acquainted with what took place even in the 
 utmost secrecy ; that they all said they would fight for 
 their liberty, and would be free, cost what it might, 
 though they knew they were not strong enough to make 
 war at sea, and that they looked to France to help them 
 in this respect and to protect their commerce. Bonvouloir 
 protested that he had never told the committee anything 
 that could indicate a connection of any kind with the 
 French ministry ; though he evidently allowed them to 
 draw their own conclusions as to that, which he imagined 
 they had done, because, he said, he had good reason to 
 know that they would never believe he had come across 
 the ocean in the winter without some very good reason ; 
 and he continued, 
 
 "I have made them no offer, absolutely none, but have only 
 promised to render them every service in my poicer without com 
 promising myself and without being responsible for the reunite in 
 any way. They asked me if France would help them, and at what 
 price. I replied that I believed France wished them well. Whether 
 
104 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT [1776. 
 
 she would help them ? That that might very well be. Upon what 
 basis? That I did not know, but if such a thing happened it 
 would no doubt be upon just and equitable conditions, and, for 
 that matter, if they thought well of it, they should make their 
 propositions ; that I had some good acquaintances, and I should 
 undertake to present their demands, without anything more. 
 
 "They asked me whether I thought it wise for them to send a 
 Deputy Plenipotentiary to France. I answered that I thought 
 that would be precipitate, even hazardous 5 that everything that 
 took place in London was known in France, and what occurred in 
 France was known in London, and that this would be a dangerous 
 step, in the very face of the English ; but that if they authorized 
 me to do so, perhaps I should be able to get a reply which would 
 direct them in their future conduct ; that in the mean time I could 
 not advise them one way or the other, I was merely a private per 
 son, an inquisitive traveller, but I should be delighted if I could 
 be of any service to them through my acquaintances ; that I should 
 not expose them, or myself, or anybody ; that in matters of such 
 gravity it was important to be very careful, especially as I had no 
 right and no authority, and that I should be responsible for only one 
 thing, namely, not to betray their confidence." 
 
 The Committee sent to Bonvouloir, in writing, three 
 questions, to which they asked him to reply. 1st. What 
 was the disposition of the French Court toward the North 
 American Colonies ; whether it was friendly ; and in what 
 way they might have authentic assurance of it. 2d. 
 Whether the Americans could obtain two good engineers 
 in France, well recommended ; and if so, how that might 
 be accomplished. 3d. Whether the Americans could ob 
 tain directly from France arms and munitions of war in 
 exchange for the products of the Colonies ; and whether 
 their vessels would be allowed to enter and clear from 
 French ports. To these questions M. Bonvouloir replied 
 as follows : 
 
 "I shall reply, gentlemen, as positively as I can to the questions 
 you have done me the honor to ask me, and I shall inform you so 
 far as a private man can be informed himself who has no connec 
 tion with the ministry ; but I shall reply according to my con 
 jectures, to public opinion, and to the judgment of some of my 
 
1776.] WITH THE COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. 105 
 
 friends. 1st. You ask what the intention of France is as to the 
 Colonies of North America. I think I am not going too far when 
 I say that she wishes you well, and that I believe she has never 
 had any other feeling than that of good will toward you. But, in 
 order to know this of any one with certainty, the way is to address 
 him directly. The step is a dangerous one in this case, and re 
 quires great caution ; I cannot advise you for it or against it. I 
 shall not assume it myself ; the matter is too delicate. 2d. France 
 is quite able to furnish you two good engineers, and even more. 
 The only way is, to ask for them. I have done this for you, gentle 
 men, without becoming responsible for its success ; although I 
 hope for that, because I have some good correspondents. 3d. 
 Whether you can obtain arms and other munitions directly from 
 France in exchange for your products. As this is a question of 
 one merchant with another, I see no great difficulty as for as 
 France is concerned. I shall give you the address of certain good 
 correspondents, without, however, making myself liable in any 
 way. You can undertake it at your own risk and peril, for it is 
 possible that England may not let you alone, and you cannot 
 expect to be protected ; and I should not advise you to ship every 
 thing to a single port, because that might attract attention. I 
 cannot say whether you will be allowed to enter and clear from 
 French ports ; that would be equal to an open declaration in your 
 favor, and war might follow. But it is possible that the Govern 
 ment might close its eyes to it, which is all you require. I have 
 the honor to repeat to you, gentlemen, that I am not at all respon 
 sible. I am of very small consequence, myself ; I have some good 
 acquaintances, that is all. If I should be so fortunate as to suc 
 ceed, I should be amply repaid by the honor of your confidence 
 and the pleasure of doing you a service." 1 
 
 The Committee of Secret Correspondence, which con-\ 
 sisted of Dr. Franklin, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Johnson, Mr^ 
 Dickinson, and Mr. Jay, some of the bonnes teles who 
 impressed Bonvouloir with being able to take care of 
 themselves, evidently understood very nearly, if not quite, 
 what his relation was to the Government of France, and 
 what conclusions to draw as to the sentiment entertained 
 there toward the Colonies, as well as the probability of 
 a favorable reply if they should adopt his suggestion and 
 
 1 Quoted by M. Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 267. 
 
106 RELATIONS OF THE FKENCH GOVERNMENT [1776. 
 
 make their proposition directly to the Cabinet. They 
 concluded to do this ; and, in order the more effectively to 
 accomplish their object, they determined to have a repre 
 sentative of the Congress in France. For that purpose 
 they selected Silas Deane, of Connecticut, on the 3d of 
 March, 1776 ; and he very shortly afterward set sail for 
 Europe. 
 
 All this was most acceptable to M. de Vergennes ; it 
 confirmed the expectations he had allowed himself to 
 indulge in, and it encouraged him to continue his under 
 taking with renewed vigor. Up to that time he had dis 
 closed his opinion of the situation only to the King and 
 M. de Maurepas, in the analysis contained, as we have 
 seen, in the " Reflexions." Now, however, it became 
 necessary to enlarge his audience, and to secure, if possible, 
 the co-operation of the other members of the King s 
 Cabinet, by whom, if his views met with their approval, 
 they should be officially adopted as the fixed policy of the 
 Government. 
 
 Each minister, or " Secretary of State," as he was called, 
 was absolute in the decision of questions relating to his own 
 department, in regard to which he was responsible only to 
 the King. But it was customary, whenever a matter of 
 very grave importance presented itself to either of the 
 Secretaries, to go to the King and ask that His Majesty 
 yehould designate a Council composed of such other of the 
 ^Secretaries as he might name, to whom the subject-matter 
 should be submitted ; and, after a full discussion, each one 
 present was usually called upon to hand to the King, 
 within a reasonable time, his opinion in writing as to the 
 course proper to be pursued by the Government. 
 
 M. de Vergennes adopted this method, in the following 
 letter to King Louis : 
 
 "SiRE, As it is possible that the crisis in the affairs of North 
 America may extend to the interests of France and Spain, which 
 Your Majesty has with superior wisdom already pointed out, the 
 
1776.] WITH THE COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. 107 
 
 most enlightened foresight may even find itself embarrassed to 
 determine what it would be most advantageous for the two Powers 
 to do under such extremely delicate circumstances. Nevertheless, 
 since it has become indispensable for us to reach some conclusion, 
 I have brought together what have seemed to me to be the most 
 important considerations to serve as a basis of deliberation. I 
 have the honor to transmit them to Your Majesty. I beg you 
 to read them over, and if you consider them worthy of further 
 attention I beg Your Majesty to allow me to transmit copies of 
 them to such of your ministers as you shall think proper to sum 
 mon to the discussion of so grave a question. I shall invite each 
 one of them to furnish, as soon as possible, an opinion in writing. 
 Tiiis union of sentiments and of ideas is, perhaps, the most 
 effective method by which to obtain a satisfactory light upon the 
 subject" l 
 
 The document submitted herewith by the Secretary of 
 State was entitled " Considerations." It enlarged the 
 ideas contained in the " Reflexions," modifying somewhat 
 their too bold statements as to the purposes and ambi 
 tion of France, which it might be safe to express in the 
 close intimacy of the King s own apartment, but would 
 not be wise to declare officially as the policy of the Gov 
 ernment, and it conveyed their meaning in cautious and 
 more skilfully devised language, intended especially to 
 strengthen the interest of the Spanish Court and to foster 
 the sentiment that the unity of the two Crowns was the 
 only warrant of safety for either. The central thought is 
 that favorite maxim of the Comte de Vergeunes, that 
 France and Spain were threatened with war, whatever 
 might be the outcome of the American Revolution ; be 
 cause in the event either of success or of defeat Great 
 Britain would have a pretext for attacking them. This 
 reasoning performed conspicuous service in sustaining the 
 theories and arguments developed by him in the " Con 
 siderations," which are as follows : 
 
 1 Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 271. 
 
 2 It is not dated, but was probably written in March, 1770. 
 
108 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT [1776. 
 
 " CONSIDERATIONS. 1 
 
 "The attitude of England toward her Colonies of North Amer 
 ica, and the possible and probable consequences of the issue 
 of that quarrel, however it may result, undoubtedly present the 
 weightiest reasons for the most serious attention on the part of 
 France and Spain. 
 
 1 i The political calculations which we are able to base upon this 
 great crisis are of such a nature that it is problematical whether 
 the two Powers ought rather to wish for the subjection or the 
 independence of the Colonies, and that in the one case as in the 
 other they will still be threatened by dangers which it is perhaps 
 not in the power of human foresight either to anticipate or to 
 ward off. 
 
 " We shall not enter into the discussion which a development 
 of these reflections would require, but shall confine ourselves to 
 their demonstration by observing that if, on the one hand, we may 
 regard the continuation of the civil war as of infinite advantage 
 to the two Crowns, because it will exhaust both the conquerors 
 and the conquered, yet, on the other hand, we shall still have to 
 fear, 1st, that the English ministry, finding itself unable to con 
 tinue, may hold out its hand toward a reconciliation ; 2d, that 
 the King of England, by conquering British America, may turn 
 it into an instrument with which to subjugate European England 
 also ; 3d, that the English ministry, defeated upon the continent 
 of America, may seek a compensation at the expense of France 
 and of Spain, which would free them from their disgrace and 
 afford them at the same time a means of conciliation with the 
 insurgents, to whom they would open the markets and secure 
 the trade of the Islands ; 4th, that the Colonies, once having 
 become independent, and retaining no attachment to England, 
 might become conquerors by necessity ; because, being overstocked 
 with their own products, they might seek by force an outlet in the 
 sugar islands and in Spanish America, which would destroy the 
 relations of our colonies to the central Government. 
 
 " These different suppositions may point with almost equal 
 certainty to a war, more or less remote, with France and Spain. 
 The first, because the Court of London might be tempted to employ 
 the forces it has collected together in the too easy conquest offered 
 by the West India Islands. The second, because the subjection 
 of the home Government can be accomplished only by fomenting 
 
 1 Etats-Unis, Memoires et Documents de 1765 a 1778, No. 8 : Doniol, La 
 Participation de la France, i. 273. 
 
1776.] WITH THE COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. 109 
 
 the hatred and jealousy of the nation by a war the continuance 
 of which would accustom it to the yoke, and the successful 
 ending of which would make it certain. The third and last, be 
 cause of the desperation of the ministry and the efforts to protect, 
 perhaps, not only the heads of the ministers themselves, but 
 even the person of the King, against the rage of the English 
 people, by securing a conquest as useful as it is brilliant, and one 
 through which they may escape the disgrace of a peace encum 
 bered by the indemnity wrung from defeat, or by offensive terms 
 of reconciliation. 
 
 "Such is, indeed, the actual situation of the Colonies of the 
 two nations that, with the exception perhaps of the Havana, 
 none of them is strong enough to resist even a part of the forces 
 which England is sending to America ; and the physical pos 
 sibility of their conquest is but too evident. 
 
 "As to the moral likelihood of an invasion thus made without 
 cause and contrary to the obligations both of public faith and 
 of existing treaties, we should strangely deceive ourselves if we 
 believed that the English are susceptible to the influence of any 
 such considerations ; neither gratitude nor a fair return for past 
 conduct has any more effect upon them than the sacred rules of 
 morality. It seems, indeed, as if they applauded our moral be 
 havior with a sort of contempt. Experience has but too clearly 
 shown that they regard as honorable and just everything which 
 they consider beneficial to themselves and damaging to their 
 rivals. The maxims of the greater part of their statesmen are 
 well known ; they do not consider the injury which France actu 
 ally does them, but rather that which she might do at some future 
 time. They feel that if England exhausts herself by the present 
 war, and if France and Spain take such measures as their wisdom 
 and their resources dictate, they will be unable at the end of the 
 contest to resist the forces of the two Powers. This reflection has 
 already been made ; already the Opposition seems to have united 
 upon this general principle with the party of the present ministry ; 
 already there is reason to fear that the ministerial party, recog 
 nizing their weakness, may seize the only means left to disengage 
 themselves from the labyrinth in which they are entangled, by 
 giving up the reins of power to the Opposition, and that Lords 
 Chatham, Shelburne, Weymouth, Sandwich, and Richmond may 
 hope in the same manner to govern and to preserve their popu 
 larity by making peace with America and by using the enormous 
 mass of forces now equipped to correct the stipulations of the last 
 treaty of peace, which they have never ceased to attack with the 
 
110 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT [1776. 
 
 utmost fury. The English of all political parties appear to agree 
 in the belief that a popular war with France, or the invasion 
 of Mexico, would end, or would at least soften, their domestic 
 contests and would extinguish their national debt. 
 
 I l In the midst of so many perils, the recognized desire of the 
 King of France and the King of Spain for the continuance of 
 peace warns us to advance with most careful footsteps. If the 
 dispositions of these two Princes were warlike, if they chose to 
 give way to the dictates of their own interests and perhaps to the 
 justice of their cause, which is that of humanity so often offended 
 by England, if their financial and military resources had reached 
 the proper point of development and energy and were propor 
 tioned to their effective power, we should declare to them, no 
 doubt, that Providence has pointed out the moment for the hu 
 miliation of England, that it has struck her with blindness, the 
 certain precursor of her destruction, and that it is now time to 
 take vengeance upon that nation for the menaces it has made ever 
 since the beginning of this century against those who have unfor 
 tunately been its neighbors and its rivals. It would be necessary 
 in that case to neglect no opportunity to make the approaching 
 campaign as active as possible, or to secure advantages for the 
 Americans. The degree of fury and exhaustion of both parties 
 which would result would determine the instant to strike such 
 decisive blows as to force England into the position of a second- 
 rate Power ; to snatch from her the empire which she assumes 
 to exert in the four quarters of the earth with equal pride and 
 injustice ; and to rid the universe of an envious tyrant striving 
 at once to absorb all power and all wealth. 
 
 " But this is not the point of view which the two monarchs are 
 willing to take : their course appears at this juncture to be to 
 confine themselves to a watchfulness which shall be at once cir 
 cumspect and active. 
 
 If this maxim be adopted, it will remain for us to determine 
 by what line of conduct we shall best attain this result. 
 
 II Before concluding definitively, however, we are now in a 
 position to establish certain results of the brief examination which 
 has just been made. 1st. We must avoid compromising ourselves, 
 and we must not arouse those evils which we wish to avert. 2d. 
 We must not flatter ourselves, however, that inaction, even the 
 most absolute and the most rigorous, will protect us from all sus 
 picion ; for we know that our present conduct is not entirely free 
 from it. The English, accustomed to follow the direction of their 
 own interests and to judge other people by themselves, will never 
 
1776.] WITH THE COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. Ill 
 
 believe that we shall let slip so good an opportunity to injure 
 them ; even if they did believe it, they would pretend they did 
 not, if they found an occasion to attack us ; and Europe would be 
 persuaded they were right, however we might deny it. 3d. The 
 continuation of the war, at least for another year, seems desirable 
 for the two Crowns, either because we wish the forces now being 
 sent to America to be occupied in fighting the Colonists, or be 
 cause the ministry would be changed of necessity if peace were to 
 be declared now, or because the English army, weakened either 
 by its victories or by its defeats, would thus be unable to under 
 take a vigorous enterprise, or, finally, because another year added 
 to our measures of activity and watchfulness may in very many 
 respects change the position of affairs. 4th. The most certain 
 means by which to accomplish this result would be, on the one 
 hand, to encourage the English ministry in the belief that the 
 intentions of France and Spain are pacific, in order that they may 
 not hesitate to embark in an active and expensive campaign ; 
 while, on the other hand, we should sustain the courage of the 
 Americans by certain secret favors and by vague hopes which 
 would prevent them from accepting the overtures of peace now 
 being made to them, and which would contribute to ripen the 
 ideas of independence which up to this time have only begun to 
 germinate among them. The ills which the English oblige them 
 to suffer will embitter their minds, they will carry on the war 
 with so much more violence, and, in case the central Government 
 should be victorious, it would require for a long time to come 
 all the forces it can command to check the spirit of independence 
 in the Americans, and it would not dare to expose itself to the 
 efforts, combined with those of some foreign enemy, which they 
 would make to recover their liberty. 
 
 "If we decide that all these considerations are as true and as 
 substantial as they are probable, the natural deductions will appear 
 to be : 
 
 "1st. That we ought to continue dexterously to encourage the 
 feeling of security on the part of the English ministry as to the 
 intentions of France and Spain. 
 
 "2d. That we ought to give to the insurgents secret aid in 
 the way of munitions of war and money ; that the advantages 
 which we have already presupposed will justify this slight sacri 
 fice ; and that no consideration of dignity or of equity would 
 forbid it. 
 
 "3d. That it would not accord with the dignity of the King, or 
 with his interests, to make a treaty with the insurgents ; and this 
 
112 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT [1776. 
 
 is proved by taking a few out of the mass of arguments which 
 might be cited. Such a treaty would at best be valid only after 
 they had secured their independence, and then only until it suited 
 them to break it ; its validity would also be limited by the con 
 tinuance of the form of government under a changing and neces 
 sarily stormy administration ; and, finally, it would remain in force 
 only upon condition that the Navigation Act should not become 
 the basis of a reunion between the mother-country and the Col 
 onies. An alliance of that kind can never be firmly established 
 except upon mutual interest ; and it seems now that it will be 
 time enough to consider the question when the liberty of British 
 America shall have attained an actual existence. 
 
 U 4th. That, if France and Spain give their aid, they must look 
 for their reward in the accomplishment of the political result 
 which for the moment they wish to secure, except so far as this 
 may be modified by subsequent conditions and events. 
 
 1 i 5th. Perhaps we should consider, as a matter of good politics, 
 that a too marked apathy upon our part in the present crisis may 
 be interpreted as the result of fear, and of that immoderate love 
 of peace which during the last few years has been the cause of so 
 many evils and so much injustice ; and that England, encouraged 
 by our supposed cowardice on the one hand and by our lack of 
 means on the other, may become more exacting even than she is 
 now, and may dare anything, either directly and openly, or by the 
 insolence and injustice of her cruisers and her claims of right 
 to search, and by those insults which she never can and never 
 will wish to atone for, and which we never can and never will 
 tolerate. The English respect those only who are strong enough 
 to make themselves feared. 
 
 "6th. The result which the grouping of these facts and sug 
 gestions presents with the strongest evidence of truth is, the 
 necessity of our putting ourselves into such a position that we 
 may either hold the English within bounds, or may render it 
 unsafe for them to attack, or may secure for ourselves the means 
 to punish them. Wisely matured plans for the future which 
 raise the efficient forces of the two monarchies to the level of 
 their real power are at all times useful and proper j but when 
 the public good is threatened by so many dangers upon all sides, 
 an active watchfulness as to the future becomes absolutely neces 
 sary. It presents the only means by which at the same time 
 to guard against possible evils and to repair the injury of those 
 which we have not been able to avoid, especially since of all the 
 conjectures that we are able to form as to the probable turn of 
 
1776.] WITH THE COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. 113 
 
 affairs, the one which is the least supported by the evidence 
 of present facts is that peace can be preserved whatever may be 
 the outcome of the war now going on between England and her 
 Colonies. 
 
 1 These are the various points of view from which this most 
 important question has appeared susceptible of being considered, 
 which it has been intended merely to indicate here to the wisdom 
 and penetration of the King and his Council." 
 
 Stripped of its covering of guarded sentences and diplo 
 matic asseverations as to the intentions of the two Govern 
 ments, and as to the spirit of justice and love of peace 
 which resided in the breasts of the two monarchs, the 
 intention of M. de Vergennes is plainly to be seen in the 
 substance of this document. He needed the assistance of 
 Spain. He had determined that France should make war 
 upon England, but he was unwilling to undertake that 
 task, even during England s embarrassment with her Colo 
 nies, unless he had beside him the soldiers and sailors 
 of the King of Spain and could draw support from the 
 great resources of the Spanish realm. King Carlos III. 
 had no desire, however, to make war upon so formidable 
 an enemy without very great cause, or unless his interests 
 were directly attacked ; he preferred to live in peace, and 
 his desire was to close his reign in tranquillity, if possible, 
 for he was no longer young and he had no ambition for 
 conquest, He regarded England as his enemy, because he 
 suspected her of encouraging people with whom he was at 
 war, as in the case of Portugal, which he believed to be 
 constantly supported, both in Europe and in her posses 
 sions upon the South American continent, by the secret 
 influence of the British Cabinet. Yet it is not likely that 
 of his own accord he would have conceived the idea of 
 fighting England for that, He resented the attitude of 
 M. de Pombal toward Spain, and would gladly have seen 
 the Portuguese Cabinet chastised for conduct which he 
 regarded as offensive and insolent, in the administering of 
 
 VOL. I. 8 
 
114 RELATIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT [1776. 
 
 which chastisement he might even have risked the dis 
 pleasure of Great Britain ; because, while he was honestly 
 inclined toward peace, he would not have hesitated from 
 fear of war to defend the dignity of his throne or the honor 
 of his people. He was a proud king and intensely jealous 
 of his territorial rights ; he had said upon one occasion, 
 " I do not want the possessions of other people, I am only 
 anxious to keep what belongs to me ; but, if anybody 
 wishes to see me, he knows where I am to be found ; and 
 if any one undertakes to attack my Islands, he will find 
 some one there to receive him." 
 
 That sentiment gave the cue to M. de Vergennes ; the 
 way to win over Spain was to prove that the Islands were 
 in danger of attack ; and upon that he erected the extraor 
 dinary theory that England intended to strike at the pos 
 sessions of the two monarchies when she should have 
 finished with the Colonies in America, whatever might be 
 the result of that conflict ; because, if they were defeated 
 there, the British ministry would be obliged, in their 
 political helplessness, to tear from France and Spain a 
 part of their flourishing provinces and throw it down as a 
 bait before the rage and fury of the English people, in 
 order to save themselves from being dragged inconti 
 nently to the scaffold ; or, on the other hand, if the war 
 in America resulted favorably to the mother-country and 
 the Colonies were subdued, the national arrogance of the 
 British would hold unrestricted sway, and they would turn 
 the victorious hordes of North America against the tempt 
 ing islands in the Atlantic Ocean, if for no other reason 
 than to punish France and Spain for the help they would 
 be supposed to have given to the rebels. No plea of inno 
 cence could save the two Crowns ; the English were sure 
 to accuse them, and no possible line of conduct could shield 
 them from an accusation which, although the English 
 knew it to be unjust, they would still pretend there was 
 cause for. Thus war must come, war of insult, of ag- 
 
1776.] WITH THE COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA. 115 
 
 gression, of wanton cruelty, of inconceivable baseness, but 
 yet inevitable war. Nothing remained but to unite the 
 two monarchies as closely as possible under the Family 
 Compact, and to prepare together to resist its dreaded 
 outbreak. 
 
 The real motive in all this argument was cunningly 
 slipped forward under the insinuation that Providence had 
 pointed out the moment for bringing humiliation upon 
 the English people and for reducing their Government 
 from its present supremacy to the degraded level of a 
 second-rate nation ; and there is not much doubt that 
 this would have comprised the whole substance of the 
 document if M. de Vergennes had believed that the dis 
 position of the Spanish Court would justify him in stating 
 explicitly what he intended and what he thought. How 
 much of all this reasoning he really did believe it is im 
 possible at this distance of time for us to determine ; but 
 there can be no question that, in his desire to excite the 
 apprehension of the Spanish King, he greatly overstated 
 what lie considered to be the actual danger of war if 
 France and Spain should remain entirely neutral ; his 
 own subsequent despatches prove this ; for when the 
 Spaniards, after having shown a sudden and unexpected 
 willingness to brave a conflict with England in conse 
 quence of the attitude of Portugal, were in danger of 
 anticipating events and were moving faster than he had 
 intended, he showed how cleverly he could argue upon the 
 other side and prove that, after all, if a war with England 
 was to be expected at some future time, the danger of it 
 was quite remote ; it certainly was not imminent. 
 
 He was aiming a blow at England in connection with 
 which he wanted the support of Spain ; but he did not 
 intend the Spaniards to strike the blow alone, or to strike 
 without the directing hand of the French Cabinet, or at a 
 time which did not seem to France the moment of advan 
 tage ; nor did he desire to strike through the medium of 
 
116 KELATIONS OF FRANCE WITH THE COLONIES. [1776. 
 
 Portugal or Brazil, or to waste substance in any of the 
 petty quarrels in which Spain was here and there in 
 volved. But if he should once have secured the co 
 operation of the Spanish Crown, so that he could count 
 upon it beyond a question, his time and his place were 
 already selected : the time was that moment when Eng 
 land should be most embarrassed by the perplexities of 
 her civil war ; and the place was in the British Colonies 
 of North America. 
 
 This became, from the early part of the year 1776, the 
 settled policy of the Cabinet, which was then very rapidly 
 approaching the point at which France should give effect 
 ive aid to the Colonists ; the Secretary of State clearly 
 denned it in his letter to the Marques de Grimaldi, on 
 the 3d of May, in which he informed him that up to that 
 time the Government had had no understanding with 
 the Americans, directly or indirectly, though it had 
 "allowed them to enjoy all the facilities of trading in 
 its ports and had closed its eyes to the sort of traffic 
 which they had been able to carry on there," adding to 
 this, however, that, as affairs in England were now draw 
 ing near to a crisis, it was the opinion of the Cabinet of 
 Versailles that something more ought to be done for the 
 Colonists than to continue to hold them upon the footing 
 of mere tolerance. 1 
 
 Espagne, t. 580, No. 70 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 374. 
 
1776.] EFFORTS TO UNITE FRANCE AND SPAIN. 117 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 EFFORTS OF THE COMTE DE VERGENNES TO UNITE FRANCE 
 AND SPAIN IN THE AMERICAN WAR. 
 
 IN the mean time the " Considerations" had been sub 
 mitted on the 12th of March, by command of the King, 
 to a Council composed of the following ministers, the 
 Comte de Maurepas, M. Turgot, the Controleur-Gene- 
 ral, M. de Sartine, and the Comte de Saint-Germain, 
 each of whom submitted an opinion in writing, more or 
 less closely following the reasoning of M. de Vergennes, 
 and all of them agreeing with him in his conclusions, 
 except Turgot, who treated the subject very profoundly, 
 but who objected to a policy which was likely to lead the 
 country into war, principally because it would involve 
 enormous expenditures of money and would require the 
 assumption of new financial burdens quite in opposition 
 to his plans of re-establishing the credit of the kingdom 
 by careful administration and rigid economy. 
 
 The protection of the French colonies did not appeal 
 to the mind of M. Turgot as a subject of national impor 
 tance, or one which ought to call forth great solicitude, be 
 cause he had already adopted the theory that no country 
 could long hope to retain its colonists as subjects, the 
 day of colonization under control of the mother-country 
 having gone by ; that the Colonies of Great Britain were 
 at that moment breaking away from her, Spain must pre 
 pare herself to see hers follow before many years, and 
 those of France would naturally travel in the same direc 
 tion. Therefore it would not be wise to engage in a war 
 to protect property of so little value, and if England did 
 
118 EFFORTS TO UNITE FRANCE AND SPAIN [1776. 
 
 attack the French colonies, according to the reasoning of 
 the " Considerations," and should even take^fc^m away, 
 it would only be taking from France what, after all, she 
 must lose, under the most favorable circumstances, sooner 
 or later. 
 
 Nevertheless, the general opinion of the Council was in 
 favor of adopting the arguments and conclusions of the 
 " Considerations," the other ministers agreeing with M. 
 de Vergennes, all of them ambitious for the glory of 
 France, all actuated by a hope of seeing England s power 
 broken, which the economics and political philosophy of 
 Turgot could not destroy. The King consented finally 
 to approve the policy of his ministry in their encourage 
 ment of the American Colonists to rebel against England, 
 to permit connivance at their supplying themselves with 
 munitions of war in French ports, and to allow of their 
 obtaining secret but substantial aid in their struggle from 
 the Government of France itself. 
 
 Louis XVI. was greatly influenced in this connection, 
 no doubt, by a memoir which Beaumarchais, who was 
 always working in entire accord with M. de Vergennes 
 and was still the secret agent of the Cabinet in London, 
 addressed to him about the same time, under the title of 
 " La Paix ou la Guerre ;" l which, taken in connection 
 with the " Considerations," probably achieved the success 
 of winning over the King s mind, and has therefore be 
 come for us an important document in connection with the 
 participation of France in our Revolution. It reads as 
 
 follows : 2 
 
 "LA PAIX OU LA GUERRE. 
 
 "For the King alone. 
 
 " SIRE, The famous quarrel between America and England, 
 which is about to divide the world and to change the system of 
 
 1 It bears the following note, in the hand writing of Beaumarchais : " Remis 
 a M. le Cte. de Vergennes, cachet volant, le 29 Fevrier, 1776." 
 
 * The text is printed by M. Doniol in his "Participation de la France," 
 i. 402. 
 
177(3.] IN THE AMERICAN WAR. 119 
 
 Europe, imposes upon each Power the necessity of considering 
 how the event of this separation may influence it and may become 
 either a benefit or an injury. 
 
 "But certainly the most interested of all the Powers is France, 
 whose sugar islands have always been since the late peace the 
 objects of the regrets and the hopes of the English j desires and 
 regrets which will infallibly thrust us into war unless, by a weak 
 ness which it is impossible to imagine, we should consent to sacri 
 fice our rich possessions in the Gulf to the chimera of a shameful 
 peace more destructive than the very war we so greatly fear. 
 
 "In a former memoir, submitted to Your Majesty some three 
 months ago by M. de Vergennes, I endeavored firmly to establish 
 that Your Majesty s sense of justice could not be wounded in 
 taking certain wise precautions against enemies who never exhibit 
 great delicacy in those which they take against us. 
 
 "To-day, when the moment of violent crisis is rapidly ap 
 proaching, I am forced to warn Your Majesty that the preserva 
 tion of our possessions in America and the peace Your Majesty 
 appears so earnestly to desire depend upon this one proposition : 
 We must help the Americans; which I shall now proceed to de 
 monstrate. 
 
 "The King of England, the Ministers, the Parliament, the 
 Opposition, the nation, the English people, and the parties which 
 are distracting the State, agree that they can no longer flatter 
 themselves with the hope of bringing back the Americans, or that 
 the great efforts now being made to subjugate them will mvrt 
 with success. This is the cause, Sire, of those violent debates 
 between the Ministry and the* Opposition ; of that flow and 
 ebb of opinions accepted or rejected, which, while they do not 
 help their business, serve to put the question in a clearer light. 
 Lord North, afraid to steer alone into the violence of such a 
 tempest, has just taken advantage of Lord (iermaine to shift the 
 whole burden of management upon his ambitious head. 
 
 "Lord Germaine, stunned by the outcries and lashed by the 
 terrific arguments of the Opposition, now says to Lords Shel- 
 burnc and Rockingham, party leaders, In the present state of 
 affairs, gentlemen, do you dare to say to the nation that the 
 Americans will accept the Navigation Act and will come again 
 under the yoke, upon the sole condition, which is contained in Lord 
 Shelburne s plan, that they shall be restored to the position they occu 
 pied before the troubles of 1763? If you dare to say this, gentle 
 men, then assume the ministry and make yourselves responsible 
 for the safety of the State, at your own risk. 
 
120 EFFORTS TO UNITE FRANCE AND SPAIN [1776. 
 
 " The Opposition, although inclined to take the minister at his 
 word, and quite ready to say i Yes/ is deterred only by the fear 
 that the Americans, now perhaps encouraged by their success and 
 emboldened by secret treaties with Spain and France, may refuse 
 those very conditions which they begged for with clasped hands 
 two years ago. 
 
 * On the other hand, Mr. L (M. de Vergennes will give Your 
 
 Majesty his name), 1 the secret agent of the Colonies in London, 
 absolutely discouraged by the failure of the attempts he has made 
 through me to obtain through the French ministry a supply of 
 powder and munitions of war, said to me to-day, For the last 
 time, then, has France absolutely decided to refuse us all as 
 sistance and to make herself not only the victim of England but 
 the wonder of all Europe by this incredible sluggishness? I 
 am obliged myself to answer positively, and I await your reply 
 before I do so. We offer France, as the price of her secret aid, 
 a secret commercial treaty by which we shall turn over to her, for a 
 certain number of years after the declaration of peace, all the ad 
 vantages by which we have enriched England for a century past, besides 
 a guarantee as to her possessions to the extent of our power. Do you 
 not want it I I only ask of Lord Shelburne the time for a vessel 
 to take to Congress the propositions of England and to return, and 
 I can tell you beforehand what the decision of Congress will be in 
 regard to them. They will issue immediately a public proclama 
 tion offering to all the nations of the world, in return for their 
 assistance, the same conditions that I now offer secretly to you. 
 And, in order to retaliate upon France and to force her to make 
 a public declaration in regard to them which will commit her to 
 the extreme, they will send into your ports the first prizes which 
 they may make from the English : so that, whichever way you 
 turn, this war which you fear so much and from which you seek 
 to escape will become inevitable to you, for you will either admit 
 our prizes into your ports or you will forbid them to enter ; if you 
 admit them, a rupture with England is certain ; if you forbid 
 them, Congress will instantly accept peace upon the conditions 
 proposed by the central Government, and the outraged Americans 
 will join all their forces with those of England to fall upon your 
 islands and prove to you that the splendid efforts you have made 
 to defend your possessions are precisely the causes which will 
 deprive you of them forever. 
 
 1 i i Go, sir, back to France and present there this picture of 
 
 1 Arthur Lee. 
 
1776.] IN THE AMERICAN WAR. 121 
 
 our affairs. I shall shut myself up in the country until you re 
 turn, in order not to be forced to give an answer before I shall 
 have received yours. Say to your ministers that I am ready to 
 follow you, if necessary, to confirm these statements ; tell them 
 that I hear that Congress has sent two agents to the Court of Madrid 
 for the same purpose, and I may add also that they have received a 
 very satisfactory reply. Shall the Council of France to-day enjoy 
 the famous prerogative of being alone blinded to the glory of the 
 King and to the interests of his kingdom! 
 
 " This, Sire, is the striking and terrible picture of our situation. 
 Your Majesty sincerely desires peace. The means to preserve it, 
 Sire, will form the subject of examination in this memoir. 
 
 "Let us admit all the hypotheses possible, and let us examine 
 them. 
 
 "What follows is very important. 
 
 "Either England will obtain in the present campaign the most 
 complete success in America ; 
 
 "Or the Americans will repel the English with loss ; 
 
 "Or England will take the course, already adopted by the King, 
 of abandoning the Colonies to themselves and of separating from 
 them on terms of friendship ; 
 
 "Or the Opposition will seize the ministry and will answer for 
 the submission of the Colonies upon condition of their being re 
 stored to their position in 17(53. 
 
 " Here are all the possible events grouped together : is there a 
 single one which will not instantly cause the very war which you 
 wish to avoid! Sire, for God s sake, deign to consider them with 
 me. 
 
 " 1st. If England triumphs over America, it can only be at 
 enormous cost, both in money and in men. Xow, the only com 
 pensation which the English have in view for so great a loss is, to 
 seize in turn the French islands, in order by that means to make 
 themselves the exclusive traders in the precious sugar crop, which 
 alone can repair the damage done to their commerce ; and this 
 capture will also make them forever the absolute possessors of the 
 benefits arising out of the unauthorized traffic now carried on by 
 the continent with these same islands. 
 
 "In that event, Sire, it would only remain for you to choose 
 between beginning too late an unproductive war, or sacrificing to 
 the most shameful, idle peace all your American colonies and of 
 losing two hundred and eighty millions of capital and more than 
 thirty millions of revenue. 
 
 "2d. If the Americans win, they will be free at once ; and the 
 
122 EFFORTS TO UNITE FRANCE AND SPAIN [1776. 
 
 English, made desperate at the sight of their existence reduced 
 by three-quarters, will be all the more ready to redeem their loss 
 by a compensation now become indispensable, in the easy capture 
 of our American possessions ; and we may rest assured that they 
 will not fail to do it. 
 
 "3d. If the English think themselves obliged to abandon the 
 Colonies to themselves without striking a blow, which is the secret 
 wish of the King, the loss will be the same to their existence, and, 
 their trade being equally damaged, the result in our case would 
 be similar to the foregoing j except that in this event the English 
 will be less weakened by a friendly separation than they would 
 have been by a bloody and ruinous campaign, and they will be all 
 the more prepared both in means and in facilities to seize our 
 islands, which they will then not be able to do without if they 
 wish to keep their own and to retain a foothold in America. 
 
 "4th. If the Opposition should come into power and should 
 conclude a treaty of reunion with the Colonies, the Americans, 
 angered against France, whose refusal alone will have driven 
 them to submit to the central Government, threaten even now to 
 join all their forces with those of England to seize our islands. 
 They will indeed unite themselves with the mother- country only 
 upon that condition ; and God knows with what pleasure the min 
 istry, then composed of Lords Chatham, Shelburne, and Rocking- 
 ham, whose feelings toward us are notorious, would adopt the 
 resentment of the Americans and without hesitation would wage 
 the most stubborn and cruel war against you. 
 
 " What is to be done, then, in this extremity, to preserve peace 
 and to retain our islands ? 
 
 You will preserve the peace that you long for, Sire, only by 
 preventing at all hazards a peace between England and America 
 and by preventing the complete triumph of one of them over the 
 other ; and the only way to accomplish this is to give such aid to 
 the Americans as will make their forces equal to those of the 
 English, but nothing more. And be assured, Sire, that the saving 
 now of a few millions may cost France before long much blood 
 and much money. 
 
 "And be assured above all, Sire, that the necessary prepara 
 tions for the first campaign alone will cost you more than all the 
 aid they ask you for to-day, and that the miserable economy of 
 two or three millions will certainly cause you to lose more than 
 three hundred millions in the next two years. 
 
 "If it be said that we shall not be able to help the Americans 
 without offending England and without bringing down upon our- 
 
1776.] IN THE AMERICAN WAR. 123 
 
 selves the very storm which I wish to exorcise, I reply that we 
 shall run no such risk if we follow the plan which I have so often 
 proposed, to aid the Americans secretly without compromising 
 ourselves, imposing upon them as the first condition that they 
 shall never send any of their prizes into our ports, and that they 
 shall commit no act likely to disclose the assistance which they 
 would be sure to lose instantly upon the first indiscretion on the 
 part of the Congress. And if Your Majesty has not at hand a 
 more skilful man to employ in this service, I will undertake it ; 
 and I answer for the treaty without allowing anybody to be com 
 promised, believing that my zeal will better make up for my lack 
 of skill than another s skill could make good the loss of my zeal. 
 
 "Your Majesty will readily see that the success of this plan 
 depends wholly upon rapidity and secrecy ; but one thing which 
 has an extremely important bearing upon both these is, if possible, 
 to send oil to London Lord Stormont, who, by the advantage of 
 his connections in France, is in a position to inform, and does 
 daily inform, the English Government of everything that is said, 
 and every question that is discussed, in Your Majesty s Council. 
 
 "This is very extraordinary, but it is true. The occasion of 
 the recall of M. de Guines is most favorable to us. 1 
 
 England insists absolutely upon having an Ambassador. If 
 Your Majesty were in no hurry to appoint a successor to M. de 
 Guines, but were to send to England a charge- d affaires or a min 
 ister of acknowledged ability, Lord Stormont would immediately 
 be recalled, and it would take a long time for any minister sent 
 here in the place of that Ambassador to make such connections 
 as would enable him to injure us as much as Lord Stormont is 
 now doing. Once the crisis is over, the most insignificant, or 
 the most distinguished, of our noblemen might be sent without 
 risk as Ambassador to London ; the business would either have 
 been accomplished or it would have failed, and everything else 
 would be of minor importance. 
 
 "Your Majesty may judge from these statements whether my 
 zeal is as wise as it is ardent and pure. 
 
 "But if my august master, forgetful of the dangers to which a 
 single word escaping from his lips might subject a faithful servant 
 who recognizes and serves only him, should allow it to be known 
 that lie obtains his secret information through me, scarcely any 
 power could then save me from ruin ; so great is the influence, 
 Sire, of the cabals and the intrigues in the midst of your Court, 
 
 1 Vide supra us to Lord Stormont s recall. 
 
124 EFFORTS TO UNITE FRANCE AND SPAIN [1776. 
 
 which aim to cripple and defeat the most important undertakings. 
 Your Majesty knows better than any one that secrecy is the soul 
 of business, and that in politics a project once disclosed is a 
 project doomed to failure. 
 
 "Ever since I have entered your service, Sire, I have never 
 asked a favor from you, and I never shall ask for anything. 
 Make it impossible, O my master, for others to deprive me of the 
 power to labor to serve you, and my whole existence shall be con 
 secrated to you. 
 
 DE BEAUMAECHAIS." 
 
 Louis XVI. was driven as with a lash into consent to 
 the plans of his Cabinet and to its policy toward England. 
 Whichever way he turned, the door was shut and there 
 was no escape for him ; he was threatened with war, cruel 
 and relentless, no matter what his peaceful intentions 
 were, no matter what his political conduct might be. If 
 he remained neutral between England and the Colonies, 
 he should still have to fight just as if he had openly taken 
 part in the struggle ; and he should be attacked in any 
 event, whether England won or lost in America. Unable 
 to judge for himself through lack of experience, the King 
 was overborne by the burden of government which he 
 had assumed with fear upon his accession to the throne, 
 and which he now carried with many misgivings as to the 
 direction in which he should turn his steps ; and, sur 
 rounded as he was by counsellors who united in represent 
 ing to him that the safety of France was involved in the 
 American war, he did not dare to reject their advice, 
 although Turgot had strongly protested. 
 
 That it would be time enough for France to act when 
 she should see some distinct sign of hostility against her 
 on the part of Great Britain escaped the attention of his 
 wavering mind, and he accepted as truth the sophisms 
 and the inconsistencies of the "Considerations" and of 
 " La Paix ou la Guerre." 
 
 Possibly it was natural for him to do this ; he had no 
 sources of information by which he could obtain other 
 
1776.] IN THE AMERICAN WAR. 125 
 
 reports to test these arguments, or upon which to base a 
 theory of his own in connection with them, even if he had 
 been a statesman capable of using such materials when 
 he had them to his hand. He did not discern, or was not 
 warned by, the deliberate self-contradiction with which 
 Beaumarchais in one sentence presented the American 
 Colonies as ready to offer to all the nations of the world 
 the same price of help that they first offered secretly to 
 France, if she should decline to aid them, and in another 
 declared that they could look to France alone for the assist 
 ance they needed, and that if she failed them they would 
 be driven to submit to the mother-country. The King 
 appears not to have reflected that, in any event, France 
 was in no wise responsible for the American Revolution, 
 and that she was under no obligation to help the Colonists 
 against the King of England, with whom he was at peace ; 
 or that the proposition was monstrous that the Colonies, 
 angered at France, should make peace with England in 
 vengeance upon her, and upon the condition of being 
 allowed to seize the French colonies in the West Indies. 
 Equally outrageous was the supposed threat of the Ameri 
 cans to send their prizes into French ports in order to 
 commit France either to help them or to reject them ; for, 
 as they had no possible claim upon France, such a threat 
 must have been, in view of her acknowledged treaty obli 
 gations, as idle as it was presumptuous. 
 
 Besides, all these specious arguments as to the danger 
 of war might perfectly well have been inverted upon the 
 same premises and presented with equal reason upon the 
 other side. Thus, France would escape war with certainty, 
 whatever might be the outcome of the American Revo 
 lution ; for if England subdued the Colonies it would only 
 be after enormous expenditure both in men and in money, 
 by which she would have been so far exhausted that it 
 would require all her remaining strength to govern them ; 
 and, more than that, as she would then have recovered 
 
126 EFFORTS TO UNITE FRANCE AND SPAIN [1776. 
 
 her possessions, she would have no ambition to go to war 
 again to despoil her neighbors of property to which she 
 had no claim. If, on the other hand, England lost her 
 American Colonies, she must have been crippled to that 
 extent, and in her weakened condition she would not 
 have been able to attack France ; but, if she did so, 
 France had the Family Compact to rely upon, which 
 enabled her at once, in such a case, to join her own 
 forces with those of Spain, and thus place herself beyond 
 the danger of conquest. 
 
 It is fortunate for the United States of America that 
 the King pursued at that moment the course he did ; for 
 the assistance of France in our Revolution was of in 
 estimable value to us, which no American should ever 
 forget nor can ever depreciate ; because there is every 
 reason to believe that if it had not been for the timely 
 intervention of France the Colonies must finally have 
 been overcome by the superior force of Great Britain. 
 Yet the idea is irresistible that if the event had occurred 
 at a time when the French throne was occupied by an 
 experienced statesman, either the American Colonies 
 would have had to do without the aid of France, or the 
 reasons for her participation in the struggle must have 
 been very different from those offered, as we have just 
 seen, to King Louis XVI. ; for it is hard to conceive 
 one of the great monarchs who have made the history of 
 France carried along against his inclination by the sort 
 of argument presented in the " Consider ations" of the 
 Comte de Vergennes, or that set forth in M. de Beau- 
 marchais s memoir, " La Paix ou la Guerre. 7 
 
 The truth is that Beaumarchais knew, and the Cabinet 
 knew, that they were then intriguing against England 
 with the Colonies, and that the French Government was 
 already inviting war by its acts of encouragement toward 
 the revolted subjects of King George. Their conduct was 
 perfectly consistent, because their definite purpose was war, 
 
1776.] IN THE AMERICAN WAR. 127 
 
 and they never wavered from the course which ultimately 
 led them into it ; but when they made their addresses to 
 the King they did not tell him plainly what they must 
 have admitted to themselves, that their motive was not so 
 much the love of the French West Indies, or the fear of 
 losing them, as it was the hatred of England and the hope 
 that by taking advantage of the American Revolution 
 they might cripple her influence and reduce her to the 
 condition of a second-rate Power. 
 
 The person referred to by Beaumarchais in his memoir 
 to the King as Mr. L., whose full name M. de Yergennes 
 would disclose to his Majesty, \vas Arthur Lee, of Vir 
 ginia. He was studying law in London when Dr. Frank 
 lin had been there as the representative of the Colonies a 
 short time before ; and upon Franklin s return to America 
 he had intrusted to Lee the task of negotiating for arms 
 and munitions of war in the English ports as well as in 
 France. In this connection Beaumarchais had fallen in 
 with him almost immediately upon his arrival in Eng 
 land as the secret agent of the French Cabinet, Mr. Lee s 
 solicitations of aid from France were already becoming 
 extremely urgent to Beaumarchais, and he had offered 
 through that gentleman to go to Paris and present the 
 case to the ministry himself, an offer which was imme 
 diately declined, however, by M. de Vergennes, because of 
 the attention such a visit would have been sure to attract 
 from the British Embassy, and its likelihood to lead to 
 complications with England. His requests were conveyed 
 to the Government through the correspondence of Beau 
 marchais, and by the latter also, in a more or less exag 
 gerated form, directly to the King, as we have seen. The 
 statement made upon the authority of Mr. Lee, that two 
 official agents had already been sent upon the same mission 
 to Madrid, and that they had received very satisfactory 
 replies from the Spanish Government, aroused in M. de 
 Vergennes feelings of disappointment and alarm lest so 
 
128 EFFORTS TO UNITE FRANCE AND SPAIN [1776. 
 
 unexpected and undesirable an occurrence should forestall 
 his own purpose and disarrange the plans he had already 
 made for approaching the Spanish Court, and he com 
 municated immediately with the Marques de Grimaldi, at 
 Madrid, to learn whether it were true, and, if so, to what 
 extent the negotiation had proceeded between the Court 
 of Carlos III. and the Americans. M. de Grimaldi an 
 swered, on the 14th of March, 1 " Nobody has applied to 
 us to furnish aid to the revolted Colonies ; consequently 
 it is not a fact that we have given them aid ; we have not 
 even had occasion to consider what we should do ;" which 
 satisfied the French Secretary of State, who wrote at once 
 to Beaumarchais that the statement was untrue. Whether 
 Mr. Lee was deceived or not into believing what he had 
 asserted, is somewhat doubtful from the correspondence ; 
 M. Doniol thinks that in this case he drew from his imagi 
 nation ; 2 although Beaumarchais wrote from London, after 
 telling Lee of the denial of the Spanish Court, that " the 
 man was rather stupefied than astonished" at hearing this 
 news, and that " he cannot imagine how the error could 
 have occurred." 3 
 
 The King s assent having thus been obtained, or to such 
 an extent, at least, as to admit of the further development 
 of the Comte de Vergennes s project in regard to the 
 Colonies, Beaumarchais returned to London, where we 
 find him in April, 1776, intriguing with Arthur Lee and 
 other friends of America, establishing relations with all 
 kinds of people willing to aid in forwarding supplies to 
 the Colonists, especially arms and other munitions of war, 
 and writing to the Secretary of State the most earnest ap 
 peals in behalf of their cause and for the open declaration 
 of amity and common interest with them by France. As 
 Beaumarchais had attracted the suspicion of the Foreign 
 
 1 Espagne, t. 579, No. 114 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 370. 
 
 2 La Participation de la France, i. 370. 
 
 3 Angleterre, t. 515, No. 36 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 413. 
 
1776.] IN THE AMERICAN WAR. 129 
 
 Office in London upon his former visit, he took the pre 
 caution in returning there now of providing himself with 
 at least a show of occupation to account for his move 
 ments, and for that purpose he had obtained from M. de 
 Sartine, the Secretary of the Navy, a commission which 
 authorized him to buy for the Government piasters of 
 Portuguese coinage, to be used in the French West India 
 Islands ; which proved, indeed, a wise step, because he was 
 upon one occasion closely questioned by Lord Rochford, 
 to whom he showed his commission, and he learned sub 
 sequently that the English Government had made inqui 
 ries about him from some of the bankers at the Exchange 
 with whom he had been clever enough to open some real 
 transactions upon the subject of piasters, although that 
 coin had been out of circulation in England for several 
 years. 
 
 The British Government long suspected the secret traffic 
 that was being carried on between France and the Colo 
 nies, and events were now progressing so rapidly that of 
 necessity it could not be a great while before the hostility 
 of the French Cabinet must be either discovered or openly 
 avowed. A vessel called the Dickinson, which had cleared 
 from Philadelphia for Nantes, was taken into the port of 
 Bristol by the captain, an Englishman, who felt it his 
 duty to deliver up his ship rather than to help the enemies 
 of the Government ; and upon examination of its papers 
 it was found that the cargo was consigned to the house 
 of Montaudom Frcres & Cie., of Nantes, to be sold by them 
 in exchange for a return cargo of munitions of war. The 
 British Government immediately called the attention of 
 the French Cabinet to this incident, without forcing an 
 open rupture, and a long correspondence followed, in which 
 the French disavowed any acquaintance with the trans 
 action ; though the moment had come when dissimu 
 lation of that character was scarcely expected any longer 
 to deceive. 
 
 VOL. I. 9 
 
130 EFFORTS TO UNITE FRANCE AND SPAIN [1776. 
 
 The house of Montaudoin Freres were merchants, at 
 Nantes, with whom Dr. Franklin had opened negotiations, 
 two years before, as agents through whom to send forward 
 such arms and equipments as he might be able to obtain 
 in France for the Americans, either by consent of the 
 Government or under its connivance at his schemes. One 
 of the members of the family of Montaudoin was a corre 
 spondent of the Royal Academy of Sciences, which cir 
 cumstance, no doubt, was instrumental in leading to his 
 acquaintance with Dr. Franklin. Another intermediary 
 employed by Franklin was a physician of Paris, called Dr. 
 Barbeu-Dubourg, to whom the great American appears to 
 have had a strong attachment, and whom he called his 
 " dear good friend." This Dr. Dubourg dealt directly 
 with the manufacturers, made the contracts with them, 
 and bought the cargoes, which were then shipped to 
 Nantes and forwarded by the " Montaudoin Freres" to 
 their destination in America. Since the year 1775 the 
 shipments had continued with great activity, under the 
 connivance of high authority ; but latterly the house 
 of Montaudoin had very much enlarged their trade 
 under the actual protection of the ministry ; for M. de 
 Vergennes had adopted the machinery that had been 
 formerly employed by Dr. Franklin, and was using it 
 as a part of his plan against Great Britain by strength 
 ening the actual forces and maintaining the courage of 
 the "insurgents." The Montaudoins knew, of course, 
 although the connection was not avowed, what strong 
 hand it was which not only enabled them to continue 
 their traffic with America, but even assured it to them 
 and permitted them greatly to increase its volume, in 
 spite of protests from the British Embassy which flowed 
 in a continuous stream of complaint, always turned aside 
 by evasive replies and ingeniously polite disavowals from 
 the Secretary of State. 
 
 Beaumarchais struck this note in England, in replying 
 
1776.] IN THE AMERICAN WAR. 131 
 
 to a demand of Lord Rochford that the Cabinet should 
 issue orders against this trade in the French ports, and 
 that the merchants of Nantes should be punished for the 
 part they had taken in it. " Why, my lord," said he, 
 "upon what ground should our Government find fault 
 with the merchants of Nantes ? Are we at war with any 
 one ? On the contrary, in our present state of peace are 
 not our ports open to all the traders of the world ? Before 
 calling upon France, my lord, to explain the negotiations 
 at Nantes, we should have to put a rather extraordinary 
 preliminary question, which is this : Has England the 
 right to restrict our trade on account of a purely personal 
 quarrel in which we neither are, nor wish to be, concerned ? 
 And what treaties oblige us to open or to close our ports 
 to merchant-ships according to the will of the British 
 people ?" If England thought the Americans were rebels, 
 he continued, she was right in fighting them wherever she 
 encountered them, always out of France, of course ; she 
 might run them down at sea, she might capture them and 
 destroy them ; " pardieu, my lord," that was nothing to 
 France ; but to ask that France should interfere with her 
 own merchants who were carrying on their traffic with 
 people at peace with the country, whether that people 
 were to be considered the subjects of England or whether 
 they were a free and independent nation, and to restrain 
 French traders from having natural and proper intercourse 
 with them, the idea was too much ; in speaking of it 
 Beaumarchais became " rouge de colere." 
 
 The clever Frenchman could write good plays, and 
 he could act as well when it was necessary to do so ; in 
 this case he evidently felt that he was acting a comedy, 
 in which possibly he did not even expect to be taken too 
 seriously, although he went into it with all his ingenuity 
 and wit ; but he argued his case with so much assumed 
 earnestness that Lord Rochford either believed him or 
 pretended to believe him, and Beaumarchais wrote to 
 
132 EFFORTS TO UNITE FRANCE AND SPAIN [1776. 
 
 Paris, " Cette declaration nous a tout-a-fait raccommodes, 
 le Lord et moi." * 
 
 The French Cabinet was now at a point where, having 
 decided that its policy was definitively to aid the Ameri 
 cans, the next step to be taken was to advance beyond 
 the stage of mere connivance into the limit of actual 
 effective support. This step was immediately taken, in 
 the following letter from M. de Vergennes to the King, 
 dated 2d May, 1776. It is the first official act of 
 France in her participation in the American War : 
 
 "SiRE, I have the honor to lay at Your Majesty s feet the 
 document which will authorize nie to furnish a million of livres 
 for the use of the English colonies, if you deign to affix to it your 
 approuveV I join with it also, Sire, the reply which I propose 
 to make to the Sr. de Beaumarchais. If Your Majesty approves 
 of this, I beg of you to return it to me immediately. It will be 
 sent without being written in my hand or that of any of my clerks 
 or my secretary. I shall use for this purpose the handwriting of 
 my son, which cannot be recognized, for whose discretion I can 
 answer affirmatively, although he is only in his fifteenth year. 
 
 1 i Since it is important that this transaction should not be dis 
 covered, or at least imputed to the Government, I intend, if Your 
 Majesty will allow me, to send for the Sr. Montaudoin. The pre 
 text I shall give will be to call him to account for his correspond 
 ence with the Americans, but the real purpose is to employ him 
 in forwarding to them the moneys which Your Majesty is pleased 
 to grant them ; and I shall charge him, at the same time, to take 
 all the precautions which he would take if he were making the 
 advance upon his own account. Upon this I take the further 
 liberty most humbly to ask for the instructions of Your Majesty. 
 This done, I shall write to the Marquis de Grimaldi, I shall ex 
 plain our transactions to him in detail, and I shall ask him to 
 duplicate it." * 
 
 The King gave his approval to this proposition, and the 
 Secretary of State wrote, on the following day, the 3d of 
 
 1 Beaumarchais to the Comte de Vergennes, 12th April, 1776, Angleterre, 
 t. 515, No. 76 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 407. 
 
 2 Archives Nationales, K 164, No. 3, annee 1776 : Doniol, La Participation 
 de la France, i. 372. 
 
1776.] IX THE AMERICAN WAR. 133 
 
 May, to the Marques de Grimaldi, the chief minister of 
 Carlos III. of Spain, informing him that France had de 
 cided now to take decisive action in regard to America, 
 but that, of course, whatever were done must be done 
 secretly, in order not to alarm Great Britain and endanger 
 the continuance of peace : 
 
 "As our two august masters do not wish to come into collision 
 with the King of England, with whom they desire to maintain 
 peace and that sort of intercourse which is possible with a nation 
 to whom nothing is sacred but its momentary interests, we should 
 depart from our object and expose ourselves too openly if we fur 
 nished the insurgents with arms, with powder, and with other 
 munitions of war, from our own magazines. But, since they will 
 have no trouble in obtaining these things through the avenues of 
 trade, if they are able to pay for them, the King prefers to supply 
 them the means to giving them anything in kind. Therefore His 
 Majesty has decided to advance to them, as a loan, one million of 
 our livres. The Government will not appear in this matter in any 
 way, but the business will be transacted by a trading company 
 managed by a merchant in one of our seaboard towns, who will 
 demand security, not indeed of much value as an obligation, but 
 sufficient to give color to the reasonable enterprise of a merchant 
 striving to win for himself the largest portion of the commissions 
 in American commerce as soon as the Colonial trade shall be 
 thrown open by the declaration of their independence. We hope, 
 sir, that this unexpected aid, coming to them at a time when per 
 haps the bravest among them are shaken by the arrival of the 
 enormous forces that England is sending out against them, may 
 have the effect of encouraging them, and may make them more 
 tenacious of the resolution they appear to have adopted not to 
 submit to the yoke. These people are sagacious enough to per 
 ceive that aid of this description cannot have come from any ordi 
 nary hand. . . . Your Excellency has already intimated to us that 
 The Catholic King would willingly join in any expenses that we 
 might incur in sending aid to the Americans. The King could not 
 consent that the King his uncle should contribute toward the 
 million which he intends to devote to this purpose ; but, if His 
 Catholic Majesty were himself inclined to treat them with liber 
 ality, and if he thought that our means of forwarding a present 
 to its destination are less likely to arouse suspicion than those 
 which he might obtain in his own realm, Your Excellency will 
 
134 EFFORTS TO UNITE FRANCE AND SPAIN [1776. 
 
 find me at your service in any matter which it may please the 
 King, your master, to decide upon. 1 
 
 In the mean time, upon information received from Lon 
 don that the English Government had ordered its vessels 
 of war to cruise in the Channel and out to sea in order to 
 intercept American ships seeking the ports of France or 
 Spain, instructions were given to the French squadron 
 of evolution to hold itself between Capes La Hague and 
 Finisterre, instead of sailing to the southward as it would 
 otherwise have done to carry out its manoeuvres, so that 
 by this means the English might be kept farther off the 
 coast and ships from the Colonies might have a better 
 chance to run in ; and M. de Vergennes sent a request to 
 the Spanish ministry that the King should also send his 
 vessels to cruise for the same purpose between Ferrol and 
 Cadiz, " acts merely of additional precaution," as it was an 
 nounced, which were intended only to protect the dignity 
 of the two Crowns and to assure their subjects in the 
 enjoyment of their rights. 
 
 The Cabinet denied any hostile purpose in this toward 
 England, but reiterated the right of American ships to 
 trade with France ; and M. de Vergennes defended that 
 position by asserting that, while the King had issued a 
 prohibition in all the French ports as to furnishing the 
 Colonists with munitions of war, yet in regard to fire-arms 
 and powder, while they might be considered as contra 
 band articles in Great Britain, they were articles of trade 
 in France and nothing more. The Secretary of State 
 used every possible color of excuse under which the 
 Cabinet might still permit the " commerce deguise" to be 
 carried on with the Colonies and yet not openly offend 
 England ; for, he said, " Let us not turn the attention of 
 the English from their own matters in North America; 
 this is certainly the least that we can do for them in return 
 
 1 Espagne, t. 580, No. 70 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 375-6. 
 
1776.] IN THE AMERICAN WAR. 135 
 
 for the generous care they have taken to do themselves all 
 the injury that we could possibly wish." l 
 
 Still following the current which was drifting them into 
 war, the French Government issued orders in April, with 
 the approval of the King, that the naval forces should be 
 put in readiness to answer any call that might be made 
 upon them, and that, while four frigates and three cor 
 vettes should be sent into American waters, a fleet of 
 twelve vessels of the line, with the corresponding number 
 of frigates, should be held ready in the port of Brest, with 
 eight vessels of the line and the accompanying frigates 
 to be kept in Toulon ready for immediate service in case 
 of the outbreak of hostilities and the possible blockade of 
 Brest. Armaments so important as these very naturally 
 attracted the attention of the British Government, who 
 immediately addressed inquiries to Versailles in regard to 
 them ; the British representative went personally to see 
 M. de Vergennes, although, with proper discretion, he 
 made no direct assertion of the right of his Government 
 to demand an explanation. M. de Vergennes had no in 
 tention of allowing himself to be caught without an 
 answer to inquiries which he naturally expected, and he 
 was ready upon this occasion, as he always was, to assert 
 the justice of the step which had been taken by the King s 
 order, and the innocence of the motive which actuated 
 his Cabinet ; always ingenious in devising an evasive ex 
 cuse, his reply in this case was particularly so, in shifting 
 the burden of responsibility from his own shoulders to 
 those of the British Government, who might, as he said, 
 render these preparations on the part of France entirely 
 harmless by maintaining peace and strictly prohibiting 
 any of its officers from making a wanton attack upon 
 France. He asserted that the arming of these ships was 
 undertaken only because the French Cabinet was afraid 
 
 1 Comte de VergennoH to M. (itirnier, 11 May, 1776, Angletenv, t. 516, 
 No. 30 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 465. 
 
136 EFFOKTS TO UNITE FEANCE AND SPAIN [1776. 
 
 that some English commander might break away from 
 all control and make war against France in spite of his 
 Government, and that in such an event France ought 
 to be ready. 
 
 However improbable it may seem that a statement of 
 this kind could have been seriously made by one states 
 man to another, and however unlikely to invite the least 
 faith or confidence in explanation of the motives of a 
 Government bearing the relations to another that France 
 bore at this time to England, yet it is what the Comte 
 de Vergennes actually said to the British minister, and 
 what he afterward referred to as thoroughly justifiable. 
 " For," said he, " my reply was frank and honest ; I re 
 assured him in regard to the armaments ; I renewed the 
 declaration of the King s intention, whose sincere desire 
 is to maintain the peace and good understanding which 
 now subsist between the two Crowns ; though I added that 
 while we have entire confidence in the assurances of reci 
 procity given us by his British Majesty, yet, as we know 
 that he may be carried forward against his will, and that 
 some of his subalterns may, perhaps, when he least ex 
 pects it, make engagements which it may not be in his 
 power to break, the recollection of what happened upon a 
 former occasion makes us more vigilant to hold ourselves 
 so that we may not be attacked unexpectedly, and that this 
 is the cause of the activity which may have been noticed 
 in our seaports, but which it is in the power of England 
 to make unfruitful, because upon her conduct will depend 
 everything." 1 
 
 The boldness of this statement made by the usually 
 cautious minister suggests the feeling of almost reckless 
 ness with which the French Cabinet now regarded the 
 likelihood of war with England ; for no one could cer 
 tainly care very much what the effect would be of his 
 
 1 Comte de Vergennes to Marquis d Ossun, 14 May, 1776, Espagnc, t. 580, 
 No. 95 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 465. 
 
1776.1 IS THE AMERICAN WAR. 137 
 
 words who should openly declare to a king like George 
 III. that France was arming because she was suspicious 
 of the movements of some of his subjects, whose actions 
 she knew he could not always control, but for which he 
 might have to be held responsible in open war before 
 long ; and, in fact, M. de Vergennes really cared less, 
 because he thought that England was growing weak 
 enough to be disregarded and France strong enough to 
 avow its true attitude toward the Colonies. 
 
 No doubt it left the British Cabinet free to take this as 
 an indignity or not, and it marked the advanced attitude 
 of France at this time ; there was, indeed, but one step 
 from that point to the tone of defiance with which M. de 
 Vergennes declared to the charge-d affaires at London, in 
 reply to some rather menacing comments made in England 
 upon the presence in Paris of Silas Deane, that certainly 
 the English Cabinet must know " that the King is master 
 in his own house ; he has no intention of accounting to 
 anybody for the foreigners whom he may see fit to admit 
 into his kingdom, and His Majesty is doing now all that 
 Great Britain could ask him to do as an act of grace, 
 when he declines to receive openly a representative of the 
 English Colonies." 1 The truth is that the Comte de 
 Vergennes thought the moment was then very near when 
 he should be ready to declare war. 
 
 In the mean time, King Carlos III. and his minister, 
 the Marques de Grimaldi, had been brought by a long 
 course of argument and persuasion to share to a certain 
 degree, at least, the views of the French Cabinet in re 
 gard to the encouragement of the American Colonies, 
 sufficiently, indeed, to induce them to unite with France 
 in making the proposed loan of two millions of livres ; 
 although they arrived at that conclusion by a different 
 course of reasoning, and were impelled by different mo- 
 
 1 Comte cle Vergennes to M. Gamier, 31st August, 1776, Angleterre, t. 517, 
 No. 15G : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 583. 
 
138 EFFORTS TO UNITE FRANCE AND SPAIN [1776. 
 
 tives, from those of M. de Vergennes and his colleagues. 
 The chief interest of Spain lay in her hostility to Portu 
 gal, with whom her relations had been strained to a dan 
 gerous tension by recent collisions between their respective 
 forces in South America and by the irritating policy of 
 M. de Pombal, which, as has been already intimated, 
 there was good reason to suspect was secretly fomented 
 by Great Britain. This was followed by still greater dis 
 trust of and enmity toward England, which had become 
 extremely acute at the moment when the French ministry 
 was discussing the question of its policy and the likeli 
 hood of an attack upon the West Indies, as set forth in 
 the arguments of the Comte de Vergennes in his " Consi 
 derations," a copy of which had been duly communicated 
 to Madrid. 
 
 It is very probable that this view of the situation was 
 emphasized by the despatches of the Conde de Aranda, 
 Spanish Ambassador at Versailles, whose residence in 
 France brought him into constant communication with 
 the Secretary of State during the period when the subject 
 of war with England was being agitated, and, as it was of 
 considerable importance that he should be made to reflect 
 the sentiments with which it was intended to influence his 
 country toward an alliance with France in an aggressive 
 war against Great Britain when the favorable moment 
 should arrive, it is perhaps reasonable to believe that he 
 had in a measure entered into the spirit of those about 
 him. At all events, the arguments of the Comte de Ver 
 gennes were duly considered by the Cabinet of Madrid in 
 , the presence of the King, before whom the subject of the 
 American war was fully discussed and the danger from an 
 attack upon the Spanish West Indies carefully investi 
 gated, with proper attention to the statement that war was 
 inevitable whichever way the troubles between England 
 and her Colonists should eventuate, and that the only 
 hope of safety was to be found in the joint action of the 
 
1776.] IN THE AMERICAN WAR. 139 
 
 two Crowns, by which the coming attack might be antici 
 pated. 
 
 The Spanish Government accepted the view that war 
 was imminent and that danger was to be feared from Eng 
 land in consequence of her present troubles, but their con 
 clusion led them to an unexpected result and one most 
 unacceptable to M. de Vergennes : they decided not to 
 make war upon England, but to attack Portugal and to 
 annex it to Spain. The opportunity was too tempting 
 both to the ministry and to the nation ; the people loudly 
 demanded the conquest of that kingdom, which they felt 
 ought to belong to the Spanish dominion in order that its 
 boundaries should include the whole Peninsula. While 
 the King was willing to gratify his subjects and at the 
 same time to redress the personal grievances under which 
 he was smarting, the Marques de Grimaldi, a foreign 
 favorite, unpopular at the Court and hated by the people, 
 who sustained himself in the ministry with difficulty 
 under protection of the King, hoped to employ the glory 
 of this conquest to the advantage of his administration 
 and by it to win his way to the heart of the nation which 
 he had never been able to reach. He sent a formal reply 
 to the French ministry, in which he proposed that Louis 
 XVI. should join with Spain by furnishing twenty or 
 thirty thousand men in the immediate conquest of Por 
 tugal, and that, in return for the risks and expenditures 
 of that undertaking, France should indemnify herself by 
 seizing Brazil, in which she should be strengthened by 
 the assistance of Spain. 1 
 
 This was not what had been sought by France ; in 
 deed, it gave rise to great disappointment and discomfort 
 in the Cabinet ; for, aside from the fact that France had 
 no interest in Brazil and did not wish to occupy that 
 country, the idea that Spain should add to her possessions 
 
 1 M. de Grimaldi to the Conde de Aranda, 18th October, 1775, Kspagne, t. 
 578, No. 31 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 305. 
 
140 EFFORTS TO UNITE FRANCE AND SPAIN [1776. 
 
 in Europe was not an agreeable one ; but, above all, the 
 proposition must be rejected because it would divert the 
 attention of England from America to the affairs of the 
 Continent ; it would probably result in a European war, 
 and would be fatal to the plans of M. de Vergennes in 
 America. 
 
 In a situation, therefore, which was intensely embar 
 rassing, the French Secretary of State found himself 
 obliged to reply to this proposal which was based upon 
 the acceptance of his own suggestions, and to perform the 
 extremely delicate operation of modifying his own position 
 without wounding the pride of the Spanish monarch, 
 whilst he retained his ground sufficiently to enable him 
 still to have a basis for further negotiations in the de 
 velopment of his policy, from which he did not wish to 
 recede. Whilst his reply was very like an effort to 
 parry a blow delivered from one s own side, it was most 
 skilfully prepared, and it effected the purpose which for 
 the moment he had in view : it evaded participation in 
 the conquest of Portugal and left undisturbed the cordial 
 relations with Spain. 1 
 
 A voluminous correspondence between the two countries 
 immediately followed, which for the purpose of this nar 
 rative it is necessary only to mention, during the whole of 
 which M. de Vergennes was cautiously returning to the 
 point he had left ; and, after six months of patience and 
 industry, he certainly achieved a diplomatic triumph when 
 he was able to write his despatch of the 3d of May, 1776, 
 to M. de Grimaldi proposing that Spain should advance 
 to the American Colonies a loan of a million of livres. It 
 is true that he was never able to overcome entirely the ob 
 stacle to the complete unity of the two Crowns presented 
 by the radical divergence of the purposes which they had 
 in view ; for, while he succeeded in bringing Spain into 
 
 1 Comte de Vergennes to M. de Aranda, 25th November, 1775, Espagne, t. 
 578, No. 104 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 306. 
 
1776.] IN THE AMERICAN WAR. 141 
 
 an attitude of hostility toward England, it was only 
 through the avenue of conflict with Portugal, and not 
 through the desire for revenge for past injury which was 
 the motive power in France. Yet, in spite of this, he 
 succeeded in obtaining the tacit recognition by Spain of 
 the American Colonies, and the advance to them which 
 he sought. The Spanish letter of credit was sent to 
 the Conde de Aranda enclosed in the following letter 
 from M. de Grimaldi, dated the 27th of June, 1776, at 
 Madrid, in which, after acknowledging the receipt of a 
 letter in which M. de Aranda had informed the minis 
 ter of the relief which M. de Vergennes proposed to send 
 to the revolted Colonies, M. de Grimaldi continued : 
 
 " That wise minister attains by this menus the politic result of 
 contributing to weaken both the English in order to destroy them 
 and the Colonists in order to bring them to reason the moment 
 they become independent. 
 
 "His Majesty applauds these measures of the Court of France, 
 which he regards as quite in accord with the views that France 
 and Spain should always hold ; and, as this interest is a common 
 one between the two monarchies, the King feels that the step 
 which is now about to be taken toward sustaining the insurgents 
 in their state of resistance should be common also. Therefore the 
 King directs me to send you the enclosed letter of credit for one 
 million livres tournois, to be employed for the same purpose. 
 We have not the means for carrying this out directly and with 
 sufficient secrecy, but Your Excellency will agree with the Comte 
 de Vergennes as to the kind of aid to which it will be best to 
 devote this sum and as to the means by which it may reach its 
 destination, either by following the channel already opened by 
 France, or by some other shorter one, as Your Excellency and 
 M. de Vergennes shall decide to be most suitable. 
 
 " In order to avoid comment and not to excite suspicion of any 
 kind, I have let it be understood at the Treasury that this sum is 
 intended for a purchase which Your Excellency is directed to 
 make by order of the King, and I have written this despatch 
 entirely with my own hand, in order that the secret may not 
 be disclosed to anybody." l 
 
 , t. 580, No. 193 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 485. 
 
142 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1776. 
 
 CHAPTEK V. 
 
 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE 
 AND THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 WHILST these events were taking place, Silas Deane, the 
 American Commissioner appointed by the Committee of 
 Secret Correspondence, had arrived in France. Having 
 left America in March, 1776, and gone by way of Ber 
 muda and Spain, in order to escape detection and arrest 
 by the British cruisers, he had arrived in June at Bor 
 deaux, where he spent a week in making negotiations 
 which should enable him to carry out the purpose of his 
 mission ; and, after stopping for a day, en route, at An- 
 gouleme to visit the establishments where at that time 
 the greater part of the cannon used in France were made, 
 he reached Paris on the 5th of July. The instructions 
 given to Mr. Deane by the Committee of Secret Corre 
 spondence, on the 3d of March, at Philadelphia, pre 
 pared, no doubt, by Dr. Franklin, directed him to assume 
 the character, upon his arrival in France, of a merchant 
 engaged in providing goods for the Indian trade, since it 
 was not probable that the Court of France would choose 
 to have it known that an agent from the Colonies was 
 in that country j 1 also that in Paris it would scarcely be 
 necessary for him "to pretend any other business than 
 the gratifying of that curiosity which draws numbers 
 thither yearly merely to see so famous a city." 
 
 He had letters to M. Leray de Chaumont, at the Louvre, 
 Intendant for supplying the French army with clothing, 
 etc., and to Dr. Barbeu-Dubourg, the latter of whom was 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 78. 
 
1776.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 143 
 
 especially recommended to him as " a man prudent, faith 
 ful, secret, intelligent in affairs, and capable of giving you 
 very sage advice." And, while his conversation with these 
 gentlemen might be expected to furnish him " a good op 
 portunity of acquiring Parisian French," Dr. Dubourg 
 would also aid him in presenting himself to M. de Ver- 
 gennes, with whom he was instructed to seek an audience 
 as soon after his arrival as he could do so, " acquainting 
 him that he was in France upon business of the American 
 Congress in the character of a merchant having some 
 thing to communicate to him that might be mutually 
 beneficial to France and the North American Colonies." 
 He was further to say to M. de Vergennes that the Con 
 gress was unable to obtain through the ordinary avenues 
 of commerce the quantity of arms and ammunition needed 
 by the Colonies for their defence, and that, having deter 
 mined to apply to some European Power for a supply, he 
 had been sent out with authority to apply first to France, 
 because of the opinion that if the Colonies should come 
 to a total separation from Great Britain, France would be 
 looked upon as the Power whose friendship it would be 
 fittest for them to obtain and to cultivate ; and that there 
 upon he should ask of M. de Vergennes, on behalf of the 
 Colonies, clothing and arms for twenty-five thousand men, 
 with a suitable quantity of ammunition and one hundred 
 field-pieces. 
 
 When Mr. Deane arrived in France he found that, 
 while Dr. Dubourg had been and was still very energetic 
 and faithful in the cause of America, circumstances had 
 somewhat changed since Dr. Franklin had gone home. 
 M. de Vergennes had employed Dr. Dubourg and his con 
 nections to a certain extent until the fixed determination 
 was reached by the ministry that France should aid the 
 Colonies systematically, when it became necessary that the 
 Cabinet should employ its own machinery with its own 
 system of communication ; and, in order that this should 
 
144 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1776. 
 
 be established upon a basis which would secure efficient 
 service, preserve the secrecy of its actions, and centralize 
 the whole business of credits, purchases, agreements, and 
 shipments, it was obliged to have its own man in charge. 
 That man was Beaumarchais. It was not very long before 
 Mr. Deane discovered that, whilst he was likely to obtain 
 in France all the munitions and supplies that he was 
 authorized to contract for, the influence at Court of Dr. 
 Dubourg and his people had been superseded by that of 
 Beaumarchais. He quickly decided, therefore, that in 
 order to succeed he must deal with him, because in deal 
 ing with Beaumarchais he would be practically dealing 
 with the Government. In the mean time, however, he 
 persuaded Dr. Dubourg to write to the Comte de Ver- 
 gennes and beg for an interview upon a certain day, upon 
 which he went to Versailles with him ; and, although M. 
 Dubourg s letter had not been received by the Secretary 
 of State, that gentleman gave them immediate reception, 
 on the 17th of July, 1776. 
 
 The Comte de Vergennes knew already that Mr. Deane 
 was in Paris, and he had his own reasons for receiving 
 him. This audience was the first occasion upon which 
 the American people treated as an independent nation 
 with a foreign Power. 
 
 The Comte de Vergennes did not speak English, but 
 the interview was conducted by his chief secretary, M. 
 Gerard, who understood it and spoke it well ; and by this 
 means, Mr. Deane said, 1 
 
 "I had an opportunity of conversing freely with him on the 
 subject of my commission for two hours, and was attentively and 
 favorably heard by him, and was asked many questions, which 
 shows that the American disputes had been, and still were, a prin 
 cipal object of attention. I pursued nearly the line marked out 
 by my instructions, stating the importance of the American com- 
 
 1 Silas Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, 18th August, 
 1776 : Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 112. 
 
1776.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 145 
 
 merce, and the advantages Great Britain had received from a 
 monopoly of it. That, all intercourse ceasing between the two 
 countries, the Colonies had considered where they might dispose 
 of that produce, which they necessarily had so large a surplus of, 
 and receive for their raw or first materials the various manufac 
 tures they wanted. That they first turned their eyes on France, 
 as the best country in Europe for them to be connected with in 
 commerce. That I was purchasing a large quantity of manufac 
 tures, for which I expected to pay the money, and that I should 
 want a quantity of military stores, for which remittances would 
 be made. That I doubted not the Colonies had before this de 
 clared independency, and that I should soon receive instructions, 
 in consequence, more full and explicit ; that in the mean time 
 they were very anxious to know how such a declaration would be 
 received by the Powers in Europe, particularly by France, and 
 whether, in such a case, an ambassador would be received from 
 them, etc. ? 
 
 "To which he replied that the importance of the American 
 commerce was well known, and that no country could so well 
 supply the Colonies, and in turn receive their produce, as 
 France ; it was, therefore, the interest of both to have the most 
 free and uninterrupted intercourse, for which reason the Court 
 had ordered their ports to be kept open and equally free to 
 America as to Britain. That, considering the good understand 
 ing between the two Courts of Versailles and London, they could 
 not openly encourage the shipping of warlike stores, but no ob 
 struction of any kind would be given ; if there should, as the 
 custom-houses were not fully in their secrets in this matter, such 
 obstructions should be removed on the first application. That I 
 must consider myself perfectly free to carry on any kind of com 
 merce in the kingdom which any subject of any other State in 
 the world might, as the Court had resolved their ports should be 
 equally free to both parties. That I was under his immediate 
 protection, and should I meet with any difficulty, either from 
 their police, with the rules of which he supposed me unacquainted, 
 or from any other quarter, I had but to apply to him and every 
 thing should be settled. That as to independency, it was an event 
 in the womb of time, and it would be highly improper for him to 
 say anything on that subject until it had actually taken place ; 
 meantime, he informed me that the British Ambassador knew of 
 my arrival, and therefore advised me not to associate with English 
 men more than I was from necessity obliged, as he doubted not I 
 should have many spies on my conduct. . . . He then asked me 
 VOL. I. 10 
 
146 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1776. 
 
 many questions with respect to the Colonies ; but what he seemed 
 most to want to be assured of was their ability to subsist without 
 their fisheries and under the interruption of their commerce. . . . 
 After many questions on this subject, he put this, in which I 
 thought he seemed interested, whether, if the Colonies declare 
 an independency, they would not differ among themselves ? To 
 this I replied that the greatest harmony had as yet subsisted, and 
 that I had no grounds to doubt it in future ; that the common 
 danger which first drove them into measures which must end in 
 such a declaration would subsist, and that alone was sufficient to 
 insure their union. 
 
 1 i He then desired me to give his Secretary my address, and said, 
 though he should be glad to see me often, yet, as matters were cir 
 cumstanced, his house was too public a place, but that I might put 
 the same confidence in his Secretary as in himself, to whom I might 
 apply for advice and direction ; but that whenever anything of 
 importance occurred I need but inform him, and he would see me ; 
 but on common occasions I must address the Secretary, which 
 would be everyway more convenient, as he understood the English 
 language well, and was a person in whom the greatest confidence 
 could be placed. Having settled the mode of intercourse, I ex 
 pressed the sense I had of his Excellency s politeness, and the 
 generous protection he had given me, and on parting said, if my 
 commission, or the mode of introducing the subject, were out of 
 the usual course, I must rely on his goodness to make allowances 
 for a new-formed people, in circumstances altogether unprece 
 dented, and for their agent, wholly unacquainted with Courts. To 
 which he replied that the people and their cause were very re 
 spectable in the eyes of all disinterested persons, and that the 
 interview had been agreeable." 
 
 Whilst Silas Deane was thus with diffidence presenting 
 the interests of his people at the Court of France, the 
 Comte de Vergennes, who was glad of this opportunity to 
 discuss the affairs of America with a person whose opinions 
 might be worthy of consideration through his acquaint 
 ance with the country, dexterously led the conversation 
 toward the two subjects which were uppermost in his 
 mind and in regard to which, as we know, he wished to 
 satisfy himself; namely, whether the Colonies would be 
 able to subsist if they were reduced to their own resources, 
 
1770.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 147 
 
 and whether, when once they were independent of Great 
 Britain, they were likely to weaken themselves by sever 
 ing into disconnected states, or might be counted upon to 
 act as one united nation, inquiries to which Mr. Deane 
 gave satisfactory replies ; though, whilst they attracted his 
 attention, they did not impress him with their real im 
 portance, because he did not suspect indeed, he could 
 not, from the nature of the case, suspect how exceedingly 
 near France was at that moment to taking sides with the 
 Americans and assuming an active share in the war. 
 
 At all events, M. de Vergennes was encouraged by the 
 information he had obtained in this interview. He saw 
 Mr. Deane again a few days later, and gave that gentle 
 man " fresh assurances of the utmost freedom and protec 
 tion in their ports and on their coasts," and, as Mr. Deane 
 reported to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, 
 " that, in one word, I might rely on whatever MOILS. 
 Beaumarchais should engage in the commercial way of 
 supplies, which, indeed, was all I wished for, as I was on 
 the safe side of the question, viz., on the receiving part." 
 Although this was toward the end of July, it was not as 
 yet known in France that the Colonies had declared their 
 independence ; that information did not reach Paris until 
 nearly a month later, in the first half of August, 1770. 
 This much had been accomplished, however, that the 
 United Colonies had directly applied to France first of 
 all foreign nations for assistance, and that they were now 
 carrying out an understanding which had been reached 
 by their representative and the French Government. 
 
 There were abundant means at hand for supplying the 
 demands which Mr. Deane was authorized to present ; for 
 the arsenals of France contained immense quantities of 
 stores, and, in consequence of an improvement in their 
 fire-arms which had recently been adopted by the Ministry 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 112. 
 
148 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1776. 
 
 of War, there were some seventy thousand muskets of the 
 old and heavier pattern lying unused in the magazines, 
 many of them as good as new, with other military stores 
 in proportion. The summer of 1776 was employed by 
 Mr. Deane in negotiating through Beaumarchais for the 
 collecting of such part of this equipment as was required 
 by the Colonies, its purchase from the Government, and 
 its shipment to America; in which matter, as he had 
 the full countenance of the ministry, he received valuable 
 aid from M. Leray de Chaumont, the Intendant, and was 
 enabled through Beaumarchais to deal directly with the 
 Departments of War and the Navy. 
 
 The two millions of livres advanced by the Courts of 
 France and Spain to aid the Colonies were given to Beau 
 marchais, who devised a plan by which all their business 
 in France might be transacted and all their interests pro 
 tected. He established a fictitious trading house, under 
 the name of B,oderique Hortales et Cie., which purported to 
 be the agent of the Colonies in France, and which was, in 
 fact, the intermediary between the American Congress and 
 the French Government. He wrote to the Committee of 
 Secret Correspondence, on the 18th of August, 1776, an 
 nouncing that he had established an extensive commercial 
 house, solely for the purpose of serving them in Europe 
 and of supplying them expeditiously and certainly with 
 clothes, linens, powder, ammunition, muskets, cannon, or 
 even gold for the payment of troops, " and in general 
 everything that can be useful for the honorable war in 
 which you are engaged," adding that he had already pro 
 cured for them two hundred pieces of brass cannon (four- 
 pounders), two hundred thousand pounds of cannon-pow 
 der, twenty thousand excellent fusils, some brass mortars, 
 bombs, cannon-balls, bayonets, platines, clothes, linens, etc., 
 for the clothing of the troops, and lead for musket-balls. 1 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 129. 
 
1776.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 149 
 
 He had correspondents in all the ports of France, who 
 were always ready upon the arrival of American vessels 
 to call upon the captains, to perform services for them, 
 to receive their letters and bills of lading and forward 
 them to Hortales et Cie., who either took the cargo in 
 exchange for arms and munitions of war, or else facili 
 tated the sale and disposal of it otherwise. The articles 
 particularly sought for from America were tobacco, rice, 
 indigo, and wheat or flour, especially tobacco. The 
 business was transacted entirely in Europe, and it was 
 understood that all risks of loss or seizure were to be 
 borne by the Colonies. In this manner great quantities 
 of materials of war were collected to aid the insurgents 
 and were shipped to America. 
 
 All these transactions of Silas Deane in France were 
 immediately reported with tolerable accuracy and minute 
 ness of detail by the agents of the British Government to 
 the Embassy at Paris and to the ministry at home ; and, 
 in consequence, the facility of giving evasive answers 
 which M. de Vergennes had developed by frequent usage 
 was severely strained by the protests and representations 
 that followed on the part of England, and there was no 
 longer any doubt that the attitude of France was well 
 understood on the other side of the Channel. M. Gar- 
 nier, the French charge-d affaires in London, sent home 
 a copy of a remarkable document at that time reported to 
 have been prepared upon this subject by Lord Chatham, 
 which, although strongly partisan, and whether entirely 
 authentic or not, illustrates in an interesting manner the 
 feeling in England, w r here the question was, of course, 
 freely discussed, and shows that the position of the 
 French Cabinet in relation to the Colonies was almost as 
 well understood by English statesmen at the close of the 
 year 1776 as if they had actually been in the counsels 
 of Louis XVI. and his ministers. 
 
 M. Gamier reported that Lord Chatham had said " that 
 
150 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1776. 
 
 he retained the same sentiments which he had always had 
 in regard to America, and of that he had given proof by 
 the Provisional Act which he had presented to the House 
 of Lords. That, relying upon the friendship of Doctor 
 Adington (his physician) , he begged him to preserve this 
 writing, in testimony of what he said, in order that in the 
 event of his succumbing to the long illness with which he 
 was afflicted, the doctor should do him the justice to show 
 that he had remained constantly of the same opinion. He 
 added that unless effectual measures were promptly taken 
 to reconcile the Colonies, he was fully convinced that in a 
 few years France would have one foot in England. That 
 at the present moment the policy of France was, very 
 probably, to wait some time longer before declaring war 
 openly, in order to permit England to involve herself still 
 further in the ruinous war which she was waging against 
 herself in America, and to see how far the Americans, 
 secretly encouraged, would be able to offer resistance." 
 This is almost an echo of the language used by the Comte 
 de Vergennes in his despatches to explain the policy of 
 France. 
 
 Such was the condition of politics when the news ar 
 rived that the American Colonies had declared their inde 
 pendence. For the moment, that very important event 
 excited no especial interest beyond the fact that it was 
 what had been more or less confidently expected. The 
 tone of the Declaration itself, and the enunciation of prin 
 ciples which it contains, were passed over for the most part 
 with the casual notice conceded to an instrument which 
 was regarded merely as marking another incident in the 
 conflict between the mother-country and the Colonists. 
 
 The announcement was made to M. de Vergennes on 
 the 13th of August, by the charge-d affaires at London, 
 as follows : " General Howe announces that the Congress 
 
 1 M. Gamier to the Comte de Vergennes, 6th December, 1776, Angleterre, 
 t. 517, No. 85 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 504. 
 
1770.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 151 
 
 has declared the independence of the United Colonies. 
 It is also known that the Congress has formally declared 
 war against Great Britain, and that this declaration is set 
 forth in twenty-three articles in which it explains the 
 causes which have determined it to take this measure. 
 But the Government has not thought it necessary to take 
 notice of this, and in fact I do not see, myself, that this 
 raising of the bucklers is likely to produce any new 
 sensation here." Gamier, the charge-d affaires, was a 
 friend of the Colonies ; his sympathies were with them in 
 any event that was likely to be of advantage to them ; he 
 simply reflected in this despatch the opinions that he 
 heard expressed in England, and he failed to detect any 
 signs of the great change that was to be wrought in the 
 world by that momentous act of the 4th of July. 
 
 Not so, however, the Comte de Vergennes. To him 
 it announced his opportunity. It was the opened door 
 to all the hopes of his administration ; to the occasion he 
 had sought for years ; to the great ambition of his life ; 
 to the returning glory of France. He grasped the situ 
 ation instantly and made up his mind to act. He was 
 convinced by what had now taken place that the Colonists 
 intended to continue the fight. In his reply to Garnier s 
 communication, he remarked that " this declaration of 
 their independence, directly in the face of Lord Howe, 
 did not look very much as if terror were about to take 
 possession of their souls," and before the end of the month 
 he had formally proposed that France and Spain should 
 begin the war. 
 
 Having asked the King to appoint a " Committee" of 
 the Cabinet for the purpose of considering the political 
 situation and the measures to be taken in view of the 
 circumstances, he prepared a minute, which, although 
 very long, was written entirely in his own hand, an 
 
 1 Angleterrc, t. 517, No. 116 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 561. 
 
152 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC KELATIONS [1776. 
 
 indication of the intense interest he took in the subject 
 and the scrupulous care with which he treated it. This 
 statement was to be read to the committee for their 
 opinion, and if it were duly approved was then to be 
 communicated to the Spanish Court. The committee 
 consisted of the same counsellors of the King as had 
 previously deliberated upon the policy of the two Crowns, 
 namely, M. de Maurepas, M. de Sartine, M. de St.-Ger- 
 main, and M. de Clugny, the successor of Turgot as Con- 
 troleur-General. It met on the 31st of August, in the 
 presence of the King, to whom M. de Vergennes read his 
 minute, which was, so far as there is any evidence in the 
 Archives, unanimously approved. 
 
 Although this document repeats to some extent the 
 arguments which had been offered on former occasions in 
 treating of the subject of Great Britain in her relations 
 to the American Colonies and her attitude of possible 
 danger toward the two Crowns, it is historically impor 
 tant in its bearing upon our Revolution, because, at a 
 moment when the two monarchies were willing to enter 
 into the contest, it presents a full statement of the case 
 on the part of France. 1 
 
 This was the climax of the Comte de Vergennes s 
 diplomacy between the Courts of Versailles and Madrid. 
 It was a distinct proposition to Spain to make war upon 
 Great Britain by taking advantage of its embarrassment 
 in the North American Colonies. The Conde de Aranda, 
 the Spanish Ambassador, who was in close intimacy and 
 entire accord with the Secretary of State, went to his 
 house on the day when the King s Council met, and re 
 ceived from him there a detailed account of the contents 
 of this memoir ; and in the following week, on the 7th of 
 September, he transmitted by courier an official copy of it 
 to the Marques de Grimaldi, at Madrid. The Spanish 
 
 1 See Appendix A. 
 
1776]. BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 153 
 
 Court, thus summoned to decide finally what course it 
 would pursue in so grave a matter, received this com 
 munication with some surprise, but gave to it the serious 
 consideration required by a subject which involved a dis 
 cussion of the whole policy of the Cabinet and an exami 
 nation of all the material resources of the kingdom. The 
 Spaniards had their own grounds for complaint against 
 England, as we have seen, and these they might stretch 
 to the importance of a casus belli^ if they saw fit to do so ; 
 they still retained the old enmity toward Portugal, and 
 the temptation to capture that kingdom once and for all, 
 and to annex it to Spanish territory, made them all the 
 more inclined to encourage a war which was likely to 
 offer them a chance to satisfy their ambition. Besides 
 this, the resources of Spain were in excellent condition, 
 so that she need fear nothing on that score, even in a 
 war against Great Britain ; for, in spite of the unceasing 
 activity with which the Government had during the past 
 year been increasing the navy and strengthening the land 
 forces, which had called for immense expenditures of 
 money, the taxes had not been increased, and the King 
 had declared that it would not be necessary to make new 
 levies then even in case of actual war. 
 
 Therefore, after a very careful examination of the prop 
 osition of M. de Vergennes, the Spanish Cabinet made a 
 reply, at the end of about a month from the time it had 
 received the despatch, which was, upon the whole, favora 
 ble to the plan, and stated clearly the conditions upon 
 which Spain would agree to join in the war; this reply 
 was contained in a letter written by the Spanish Premier, 
 from San Ildefonso, on the 8th of October, 1776, to the 
 Conde de Aranda, at Versailles, to be laid by him before 
 the Court of Louis XVI. 
 
 The chief, and by far the most important, condition 
 made by Spain was that it should be allowed at once to 
 invade the kingdom of Portugal, to conquer it, and to 
 
154 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1776. 
 
 attach it permanently to the Spanish Crown, "for the 
 general satisfaction of the nation" and because it prop 
 erly " belonged to Spain by right of inheritance." This 
 being agreed to, the Spanish Court was willing to unite 
 with France, to determine when the war should be openly 
 declared, how it should be carried on, and what part 
 should be assigned in it to each of the two monarchies ; it 
 conceded that war was inevitable, that it would be just to 
 declare it, that it would be wise to attack England whilst 
 she was engaged with her Colonies, that it might be well 
 to foment a rebellion in Ireland, in which Spain was ready 
 to assist, and, finally, that as soon as France should have 
 shown herself ready to make the attack and to sustain the 
 campaign, Spain would follow ; and although, in calcu 
 lating the results, Spain ran much the greater risk in case 
 of failure, she would adopt whatever measures France 
 considered best to be carried out. 1 
 
 The announcement at Versailles of this decision marks 
 one of those turning-points in the world s progress at 
 which the course of events leads into an unexpected 
 direction and changes the whole narrative of subsequent 
 history from what the promise of it had been but a mo 
 ment before. The Comte de Vergennes had gained the 
 purpose to which he had devoted such incessant and 
 patient labor, and had won a triumph for his diplo 
 macy with the Court of Spain. If he had continued as 
 everything seemed to promise, the whole history of the 
 American Revolution would likely have been different ; 
 the history of Europe at that period would not have 
 been what it is. We should probably have had, at the 
 beginning of the year 1777, the powerful aid of both 
 France and Spain in our struggle for independence, 
 against which Great Britain would have been unable to 
 contend. It is likely that Spain would have taken Por- 
 
 1 M. de Grimaldi to the Conde de Aranda, 8th October, 1776, Espagne, 
 t. 582, No. 21 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, i. 603. 
 
1776.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 155 
 
 tugal, which nothing could have prevented if she had 
 made a sudden attack upon that kingdom with the supe 
 rior forces which she then had at command. As a result, 
 it is conceivable that a European war would have followed 
 in which there would have been engaged a number of 
 Powers which continued, as events turned out, for many 
 years afterward to live in peace. 
 
 At the very moment, however, when M. de Vergennes 
 was about to stretch out his hand to take advantage of the 
 success he had won at the Spanish Court, news came to 
 him of the defeat upon Long Island. This unexpected 
 announcement dashed his hopes and completely disar 
 ranged his plans. It came from M. Gamier, the charge- 
 d affaires at London, in a letter dated the llth of Octo 
 ber, which, derived as it was from English sources, and 
 necessarily affected by the exultation with which the vic 
 tory of General Howe was everywhere received in Great 
 Britain, exaggerated the case far beyond what the cir 
 cumstances warranted. It represented the Americans 
 as having been overwhelmed by a disaster which had 
 not only broken their resistance, but had brought them 
 hopelessly under the control of the English and was 
 likely to force them to lay down their arms upon the fall 
 of New York, which was predicted as sure to follow very 
 soon. 
 
 Although M. Gamier endeavored to offer some morsels 
 of consolation in his letter, derived from the opinions of 
 the Opposition party in England, this news from America 
 was a heavy blow to the Comte de Vergennes, who re 
 ceived it with bitter disappointment. It swept away in 
 an instant all the hopes he had built upon the successful 
 resistance of the Americans to the mother-country ; it 
 destroyed the foundations of his policy of immediate war 
 upon England ; and it made it impossible for him to use 
 the alliance with Spain, whose consent it had been so 
 hard to obtain, now that ho had it ready to his hand. If 
 
156 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1776. 
 
 the American Colonists were substantially conquered, as 
 the English reports asserted, it was an end to the entire 
 policy of his administration in regard to England. If, on 
 the other hand, they were only temporarily crippled, even 
 that modified his plans very seriously, at least for the 
 present. In either event, he could no longer think of 
 war. With mortification he recognized that, while the 
 international relations between England and France were 
 the same as before, he should now be forced to present 
 them differently, and that out of the same set of circum 
 stances from which yesterday he had drawn the reasons 
 for his glowing appeal to arms he must find arguments 
 to-day for maintaining the peace. The Court was at Fon- 
 tainebleau, whither he also had gone in attendance upon 
 the King, and it was there that he received from the 
 Spanish Ambassador the answer of Carlos III. 
 
 Having broken the seals, he immediately called the at 
 tention of Louis XVI. to the document, on the 17th of 
 October, accompanying it with a short note which was 
 entirely free from his former enthusiasm, plainly indi 
 cating his change of attitude, and in which he contented 
 himself with a summary discussion of its contents, saying 
 in conclusion that, after all, " there was now no hurry for 
 these matters." On the following day the King signi 
 fied his accord with this view of his Secretary of State 
 and agreed with him upon the terms of the reply to be 
 sent to the Court of Spain, which terms were commu 
 nicated at once to the Conde de Aranda, in anticipation 
 of the formal declaration which M. de Vergennes should 
 transmit to his sovereign as soon as it could be drawn up. 
 One week later that document was duly prepared, and in 
 submitting it to the King, on the 26th of October, 1776, 
 for his final approval, M. de Vergennes attached to it the 
 following note, which indicates in a few words, quite as 
 
 1 Archives Nationales, K 164, No. 3, annee 1776, No. 16 : Doniol, La 
 Participation de la France, i. 618. 
 
1776.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 157 
 
 well, perhaps, as a much longer explanation would have 
 done, the difference in the attitude of the French Court 
 as it was when it adopted the resolution of the 31st of 
 August in favor of war, and as it had subsequently re 
 adjusted itself upon the announcement of General Wash 
 ington s retreat from Long Island : 
 
 "SiRE, I have the honor to submit to Your Majesty the docu 
 ment which I have prepared in reply to the despatch of the 
 Marquis de Grimaldi to the Comte d Aranda. I have used as 
 the basis of my argument the views and principles which Your 
 Majesty was pleased to communicate to me in your letter of the 
 18th inst. I trust, Sire, that I have conformed to your intentions. 
 I have proposed no active measures, and in this I believe that I 
 am not far from the intentions of the Court of Spain, which appear 
 to me to be not so warlike as its Ambassador supposes. This gen 
 tleman would have an immediate declaration. But that is now 
 very much less pressing than it might have appeared two months 
 ago ; and all that present circumstances seem to demand of the 
 watchfulness of Your Majesty and of that of the Catholic King is 
 to see that the Americans do not succumb for want of means to 
 continue their resistance." 1 
 
 In a word, France had fallen back to the position of 
 secret encouragement and passive indulgence which it had 
 occupied in regard to the Colonies for more than a year. 
 It returned to its connivance at the acts of Colonial agents 
 and the loading of Colonial vessels in French ports ; to 
 the regime of Beaumarchais, of Silas Deane, and of dis 
 simulation before Lord Stormont. In this the policy of 
 the Cabinet had not been changed, but the development 
 of its policy was checked and active measures were for the 
 time indefinitely postponed. 
 
 The Court of Spain accepted the reasons given for what 
 they were worth, not greatly disappointed, perhaps, at 
 finding an opportunity to avoid a difficulty that was not 
 of its own creation ; and, without making serious objec- 
 
 1 Archives Nationales, K 104, No. 3, anne 1776, No. 17 : Doniol, La 
 Participation de la France, i. 620. 
 
158 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1776. 
 
 tion to the change, it held itself as notified that for the 
 present, at least, there would be no war. But M. de Ver- 
 gennes lost ground then which he was not able to recover ; 
 he never induced Spain afterward to accept his views as 
 completely as he had done upon this occasion. The 
 administration of the Marques de Grimaldi had been 
 friendly, even cordial, in its relations to France ; and it 
 was no doubt owing to this that M. de Vergennes had 
 succeeded in creating the sentiment at Madrid against 
 Great Britain which he had fomented, as we have seen, 
 until he almost persuaded the Spanish Court that the 
 interests of the two Crowns were identical and could 
 best be advanced by the policy which he had outlined 
 in connection with the American War. 
 
 There came now, however, a strong revulsion of feeling, 
 which drove M. de Grimaldi from office and altered defi 
 nitively the subsequent relations of the monarchies ; for 
 the note of the French Secretary of State by which he re 
 ceded from his position after obtaining the Spanish King s 
 consent to war was received with a storm of indignation in 
 Spain. The strong political party (the Aragoneses) led 
 by the Prince of Asturias seized this occasion to heap in 
 dignities upon the Premier, whom they had never liked, 
 and whom they now accused as a foreigner of having ex 
 posed the honor of Spain to insult and disgrace ; they had 
 reproached him formerly for the failure of the expedition 
 against Algiers, they now upbraided him for the loss of 
 Portugal and for having allowed M. de Vergennes to trifle 
 with the dignity of the Crown. M. de Grimaldi was 
 weary of a position which had to be constantly sustained 
 against these bitter attacks, and he begged the King 
 to allow him to resign. His request was granted, and at 
 the same time the great wish of his life was gratified, when 
 his master appointed him, in November, 1776, his Am 
 bassador at Rome. The new administration was formed 
 under the Premiership of the Conde de Floridablanca, a 
 
1776.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 159 
 
 Spaniard by birth, by education, and by intensity of pa 
 triotism. His impulses were strongly national, as was also 
 his ambition, and, with the example of the Marques de 
 Grimaldi fresh before him, it was but natural that he 
 should assume a different and a much more independent 
 position in his relations with France. 
 
 At the close of the year 1776, and in the early part of 
 1777, a decided relaxation had taken place, therefore, in 
 the bonds which united the two Crowns upon the subject 
 of Great Britain ; the Comte de Vergennes continued in 
 his despatches to assume that they were acting together, 
 but it soon became evident that his influence was broken ; 
 and, while the feeling of the Spanish Cabinet toward 
 the American Colonies was one of kindness, as was 
 shown by its friendly treatment of American vessels at 
 this time in the ports of Spain, in spite of the protests 
 of the English agents, there was no disposition to treat 
 directly with the representatives of Congress or to make 
 use of the American Revolution as a pretext for war. 
 
 Between England and France the situation was ex 
 tremely delicate. The language of the Comte de Ver 
 gennes had been greatly modified in his despatches to 
 London after the battle of Long Island, and he had re 
 peated to Lord Stormont, at Versailles, the usual as 
 surances of his desire for peace and of good will toward 
 England, yet it was well known in London that he was 
 secretly treating with the Commissioners of the United 
 States and that the French Government was continuing 
 with all possible vigor to strengthen its armament and to 
 increase its land and naval forces. On the other hand, 
 England was increasing the number of her war-ships to 
 such an extent as to cause considerable alarm upon that 
 subject in France. The attitude of the two countries at 
 this time, therefore, although the amicable relations be 
 tween the Courts continued uninterrupted, was decidedly 
 one of mutual watchfulness and suspicion. 
 
160 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1776. 
 
 Lord Stormont, who had now returned to France, com 
 municated to the Cabinet of Versailles with triumphant 
 satisfaction the success of the British arms in America, 
 which certainly was as unpalatable as any announcement 
 he could have made that did not directly threaten the 
 welfare of the kingdom ; and the reply of M. de Ver- 
 gennes taxed the resources of diplomatic courtesy to 
 their utmost limit not to be outdone by his wary oppo 
 nent. It illustrates the French minister s intense anxiety 
 to keep on friendly terms at this period with the English 
 Court. It is, perhaps, all things considered, his master 
 piece in dissimulation : 
 
 "VERSAILLES, the 21st of December, 1776. 
 
 " To M D STORMONT. SIR, I am deeply touched by the atten 
 tion of Your Excellency in permitting me to share with you the 
 joy you feel at the happy news of the successes of the British 
 arms in Connecticut and in New York. I beg Your Excellency to 
 accept my hearty thanks for this proof of friendship, and my sin 
 cere congratulations upon an event so likely to contribute toward 
 the re-establishment of peace in that quarter of the globe. I shall 
 report to the King the communication which Your Excellency has 
 been kind enough to address to me, and I take it upon myself to 
 say that His Majesty will always hear with pleasure of anything 
 that can contribute to the happiness or glory of the King, your 
 master. I have the honor, etc. 
 
 "DE VERGENNES." l 
 
 This letter is interesting, aside from the political events 
 that we have just been discussing, in connection with the 
 history of the Marquis de La Fayette, because it illus 
 trates the sensitive condition of the intercourse between 
 France and Great Britain at the time when that gentle 
 man was planning to set out for America, and the fixed 
 determination of the French Cabinet to allow nothing 
 to occur openly that might disturb the show of cordial 
 
 1 Angleterre, t. 519, No. 106 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 
 107, note. 
 
1776.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 161 
 
 understanding, which, superficial and uncertain of dura 
 tion though it was, had become an important factor in 
 the policy of waiting and watching recently adopted by 
 the Comte de Vergennes. It was only a few months later 
 that La Fayette left Paris to join his vessel at Bordeaux, 
 an event which was noised about at once by the conversa 
 tion of his intimate friends and was made a subject of 
 notoriety by the opposing measures of his father-in-law. 
 The Due d Ayen s angry protests and his appeal to the 
 Government quickly attracted the attention of the Eng 
 lish Embassy, both on account of his distinction at the 
 French Court and of the position of La Fayette him 
 self. When the fact was publicly stated that a man of 
 La Fayette s rank and high connection, an officer at the 
 same time in the King s army, was about to proceed 
 to America to join the Colonists in their present strug 
 gle, it became necessary for the French Cabinet either 
 to use its authority to forbid his departure, or tacitly to 
 avow, in the face of Great Britain, its assent to and 
 approval of his action. This is why the lettre-de-cachet 
 was issued by command of the King for the immediate 
 arrest of La Fayette, with orders to him to proceed to 
 Marseilles; this also is why the Government did not 
 connive at his leaving France, and why the obstacles 
 were thrown in his path against which we have seen him 
 bravely struggling from the time he left Paris until he 
 finally set sail from Los Pasajes. 
 
 The affairs of the American Colonies continued, how 
 ever, to make favorable progress in France under the 
 secret protection of the Government, and the collection 
 and shipment of arms and munitions of war were steadily 
 going on, under the management of Beaumarchais and 
 the general direction of Silas Deane, whose operations 
 were not restricted by the changed attitude of the Comte 
 de Vergennes, except upon occasions when the protests 
 from England became too threatening and it was found 
 
 VOL. 1. 11 
 
162 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1776, 
 
 necessary to keep up appearances by a temporary cessa 
 tion. Congress determined to replace Mr. Deane, as agent 
 of the Colonies, by Commissioners who should be sent to 
 Paris clothed with authority as representatives of the inde 
 pendent nation, authorized to solicit the formal recognition 
 of the King, and to enter into a treaty of commerce with 
 France if that measure could be effected ; and on the 26th 
 of September, 1776, it appointed as such Commissioners 
 Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and Silas Deane. 
 Mr. Jefferson, who was then in Virginia, declined the 
 appointment, and Arthur Lee was selected, on the 22d of 
 October, to take his place. 
 
 Dr. Franklin, the only member of the Commission in 
 America, for Mr. Deane was still in Paris and Mr. Lee in 
 London, made preparations to sail for France immediately, 
 with rare patriotism devoting his wisdom and experience 
 to the service of his country, and facing the hardships of 
 an autumn passage across the Atlantic, although he was 
 at this time seventy-one years of age. 
 
 He set out from Philadelphia on the 26th of October, 
 1776, in the war-vessel The Eeprisal, commanded by 
 Captain Wickes, and arrived in Quiberon Bay after a 
 stormy voyage, though what was then a short one, of 
 thirty days, the ship having on her way taken as prizes 
 two British brigantines, which she brought into the French 
 port. After remaining on board four days to recover 
 from the effects of the voyage, which had considerably 
 reduced his strength, Dr. Franklin went ashore at Auray, 
 in Brittany, whence he wrote to Silas Deane, on the 4th 
 of December, to announce his coming and to inform him 
 of the appointment of the Commissioners, requesting him 
 at the same time to notify Mr. Arthur Lee and to ask 
 him to come to Paris to meet them. 1 From Auray he pro 
 ceeded to Nantes, where he learned for the first time, and 
 
 Diplomatic Correspondence, AVharton, ii. 216. 
 
1770.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 163 
 
 with great satisfaction, of the kind treatment which had 
 been accorded to Mr. Deane in France and of the very 
 promising condition in which the business of the Colonies 
 was at that time in regard to the procuring of arms and 
 equipments for war. But, with due caution, he remained 
 a few days at Nantes before going to Paris, in order to 
 ascertain more fully what the feeling of the French Gov 
 ernment might be toward him and the other Commis 
 sioners when they should announce themselves in the 
 official capacity which they were authorized to assume, 
 unwilling as he was, on the one hand, to embarrass the 
 ministry by his presence if it were not acceptable, and 
 sensitive, upon the other, lest as representatives of the 
 infant Republic they might meet with a rebuff. 
 
 " Our friends in France," he wrote to John Hancock on 
 the 8th of December, " have been a good deal dejected 
 with the gazette accounts of advantages obtained against 
 us by the British troops. I have helped them here to re 
 cover their spirits a little, by assuring them that we still 
 face the enemy, and were under no apprehension of their 
 armies being able to complete their junction. . . . Our 
 voyage, though not long, was rough, and I feel myself 
 weakened by it, but I now recover strength daily, and 
 in a few days shall be able to undertake the journey to 
 Paris. I have not yet taken any public character, think 
 ing it prudent first to know whether the Court is ready 
 and willing to receive ministers publicly from Congress, 
 that we may neither embarrass her on the one hand, nor 
 subject ourselves to the hazard of a disgraceful refusal on 
 the other. I have dispatched an express to Mr. Deane, 
 with the letters that I had for him from the Committee, 
 and a copy of our commission, that he may immediately 
 make the proper inquiries and give me information. In 
 the mean time, I find it generally supposed here that I am 
 sent to negotiate, and that opinion appears to give great 
 pleasure, if I can judge by the extreme civilities I meet 
 
164 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1776. 
 
 with from numbers of the principal people, who have done 
 me the honor to visit me." l 
 
 The arrival of Franklin in Paris, on the 18th of De 
 cember, excited at once the greatest interest in the Ameri 
 can cause ; his character and widely extended reputation 
 made him the centre of observation at the capital, and 
 aroused the liveliest expectation in men s minds as to the 
 purpose of his coming and the probable effect of his mis 
 sion upon the actions of the ministry. It became "the 
 common topic of conversation, and gave birth to a thou 
 sand conjectures and reports" among all classes of French 
 society, even before he had reached the city. 2 The Decla 
 ration of Independence had found an echo of sympathy 
 among the French people, who watched with admiration 
 the brave efforts of a struggling nation to be free, and 
 in the thought of liberty they had already planted the 
 seed of friendship which was ready to burst forth in open 
 welcome to this messenger from the American people, 
 coming to them first of all nations for encouragement and 
 support. 
 
 Franklin found this to be so even at Nantes, as we 
 have seen ; it was emphatically so at Paris, where he was 
 loaded with every possible evidence of consideration and 
 respect, notwithstanding the insinuations that were in 
 dustriously disseminated about him by the jealousy of the 
 English Embassy. "It is very generally believed here," 
 said Lord Stormont, " that he comes in the double capacity 
 of a negotiator and a fugitive ; this suspicion, joined to the 
 knowledge of his former character and to that reputation 
 of duplicity which he has so justly acquired, will, I hope, 
 throw many difficulties in his way ; yet there is certainly 
 some danger to be apprehended from the general partiality 
 of the people of this country to the American cause and 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 221. 
 
 2 S. Deane to Gerard, 18th December, 1776, Etats-Unis, t, 1, No. 99 : 
 Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 102. 
 
1776.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 165 
 
 from the tempting offers which he is probably authorized 
 to make." l 
 
 In the mean time, M. de Vergennes was anxious to 
 meet and converse with him ; and Franklin found that, 
 although the ministry was not prepared to receive him 
 openly as a " Plenipotentiary," it would not deny an 
 audience to him and his colleagues. He therefore pro 
 ceeded to ask for this, on the 23d of December, five days 
 after his arrival, addressing the Comte de Vergeunes as 
 follows : 
 
 "SiR, We beg leave to acquaint Your Excellency that we are 
 appointed and fully empowered by the Congress of the United 
 States of America to propose and negotiate a treaty of ainity and 
 commerce between France and the United States. The just and 
 generous treatment their trading ships have received, by a free 
 admission into the ports of this kingdom, with other considera 
 tions of respect, has induced the Congress to make this offer first 
 to France. We request an audience of Your Excellency wherein 
 we may have an opportunity of presenting our credentials ; and 
 we flatter ourselves that the propositions we are authorized to 
 make are such as will not be found unacceptable. 
 
 1 i With the greatest regard, we have the honour to be 
 " Your Excellency s most obedient and most humble servants. 
 "B. FRANKLIN, SILAS DEANE, ARTHUR LEE." 
 
 This request was complied with after a very short delay ; 
 though the Secretary of State, who was under the strict 
 surveillance in these matters of Lord Stormont and the 
 agents of the British Government, and was constrained 
 to be more circumspect than he would doubtless have felt 
 it necessary to be a few months before, did not invite the 
 Commissioners to Versailles, but appointed an audience 
 in the city of Paris, where he met them secretly on the 
 28th of December. After having listened courteously 
 and attentively to their propositions, and having assured 
 
 1 (irantham Papers, fol. 177. 
 
 2 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 239. 
 
166 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1777. 
 
 them of his good will, he made a report of the interview 
 almost immediately to the Court of Spain. 1 
 
 The times were difficult and dangerous for the negotia 
 tions which Dr. Franklin had come to Europe to under 
 take, and this he saw at a glance, knowing that he must 
 make his way carefully if he wished to succeed at all ; 
 for he felt immediately from this interview and from the 
 intercourse he had with people whose opinion he valued 
 in France, that for some reason, while the nation was 
 favorably inclined to the encouragement of the Colonies, 
 " the Court viewed an approaching war with reluctance." 
 Yet affairs at home were pressing, and impelled him 
 to use the utmost diligence in obtaining assistance from 
 a powerful nation whose recognition of the Colonies 
 would produce at once an immense result in its moral 
 effect upon the people, as well as upon foreign countries, 
 and would furnish to the army and the navy those ma 
 terials of which they stood so sadly in need. 
 
 Urged forward, therefore, by the consciousness of the 
 responsibility resting upon him, dissatisfied also at having 
 been merely admitted to a secret conference with the Sec 
 retary of State when he had announced himself and his 
 colleagues as representatives authorized to treat for an 
 independent people in the formation of an alliance of 
 friendship and commerce, he determined to make a fur 
 ther attempt. Taking Mr. Deane and Mr. Lee with him, 
 somewhat in disregard, perhaps, of the traditional methods 
 of diplomatic procedure in the older Courts of Europe, 
 but undoubtedly justified by the circumstances of the 
 case and by the assurances of good will given him at 
 the first interview, he went with them from Paris to 
 Versailles, where they addressed the following note to 
 M. de Vergennes : 
 
 1 Comte de Vergennes to Marquis d Ossun, 4th January, 1777, Espagne, 
 t. 583, No. 6 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 113. See Diplomatic 
 Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 248. 
 
1777.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 167 
 
 "Dr. Franklin, Mr. Deane, and Mr. Lee present their most 
 respectful coinpliints. to the Count de Vergennes, and request an 
 audience of his Excellency, to-morrow morning, at such hour as 
 he shall be pleased to appoint. 
 
 "VERSAILLES, Jany. 5th, 1777, 6 o clock in the evening." l 
 
 Tliis was upon a Sunday, and the interview asked for 
 was, consequently, to be upon the following Monday 
 morning. M. de Vergennes could not grant it, for abun 
 dant reasons ; since to have received the Commissioners at 
 the Court in Versailles, as they requested, would have 
 been tantamount to the formal recognition of the United 
 States by France, which was above all things what he 
 wished at that moment to avoid, and which, if he had 
 then permitted it, would have been an immediate cause 
 for war with Great Britain. He referred them, therefore, 
 to his chief secretary, M. Gerard, to whom he wrote the 
 same evening, that he wished him to say to the American 
 gentlemen that he should not be at liberty the following 
 day nor upon Tuesday; but he directed M. Gerard to 
 meet them on the latter day at some place in Paris and 
 learn from them the nature of the communication which 
 they wished to make. 2 Dr. Franklin and his colleagues 
 would not leave Versailles, however, without some sort of 
 direct communication with the Secretary of State. They 
 prepared a memorial 3 which they left for him before they 
 came away. The most important part of this document 
 was a formal demand for eight ships of the line com 
 pletely equipped, to be paid for by the United States ; 
 for, said the Commissioners, since other European princes 
 lent or hired their troops to England to be used against 
 America, it would seem just that France should give the 
 same sort of assistance to the United States if she saw fit 
 to do so ; that England ought not to take offence at this, 
 
 1 Etats-Unis, t. 2, No. 8 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 117, note. 
 
 2 Ktats-Hnis, t. 2, No. 9 : Doniol, ii. 117, note. 
 
 3 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 245. 
 
168 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [1777. 
 
 but that, if she did, the combined forces of France, Spain, 
 and the United States would be able to take away her 
 West India islands and to destroy her commerce, thus 
 reducing her to weakness and humiliation. To this the 
 Commissioners added a request for arms and munitions 
 of war, and made offers of union and friendship, with the 
 advantage to accrue, if these were accepted, from the par 
 ticipation in that commerce which had been so fruitful a 
 source of wealth to Great Britain, and which was now 
 about to be taken away from her forever. 
 
 This document was signed by Benjamin Franklin, Silas 
 Deane, and Arthur Lee. 1 The Comte de Vergennes com 
 municated it at once to M. de Maurepas, and the Premier 
 laid it before the King, for the purpose of receiving his 
 orders before agreeing to a reply to it from the Cabinet. 
 Four days later, on the 9th of January, 1777, the formal 
 answer of the Government was prepared, and duly sub 
 mitted to the King, who approved it, thus establishing 
 definitively the relations between France and the United 
 States as they were to continue for a considerable time to 
 come. The request for vessels of war was declined, upon 
 the ground that although the King would gladly give 
 them without compensation, in accordance with the dig 
 nity of his Crown, if circumstances were such that he 
 could properly do so, yet in the present exigency the in 
 terests of the kingdom required him to add to his forces 
 rather than to take away from what he already had; 
 besides, the sending of a few vessels of war to America 
 would not produce the result desired, for they would 
 immediately be followed by a greater number of English 
 vessels, and, no matter under what flag they sailed, 
 a masked squadron would be a legitimate cause for war 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 245. This document, in the 
 Diplomatic Correspondence, is dated at Paris ; but in the French translation, 
 Etats-Unis, t. 2, No. 11, cited by M. Doniol in La Participation de la France, 
 ii. 118, the date is Versailles, 5 janv. 1777." 
 
1777.] BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 169 
 
 with any Power which should undertake to send it, and 
 the same reasons would prevent France from sending her 
 ships of war as convoys for American merchantmen, but 
 that the interests of France and the Colonies, being 
 identical, must draw the two countries together when 
 the right moment should arrive, and that while it was 
 not practicable to force the events which were to pro 
 duce that union between them in the future, the Ameri 
 cans might feel certain of the friendship and sympathy 
 of France. The note closed with this assurance : " The 
 King has no wish to disturb the Americans in the pro 
 curement of such materials as they may be able to find 
 in the course of trade within his kingdom, persuaded that 
 they will strictly conform in their dealings to the express 
 obligation of his treaties ; and, without entering into the 
 question as to what kinds of supplies the Americans may 
 chance to need, His Majesty has decided to establish for 
 them secretly certain resources from which they may 
 obtain the means to strengthen their credit and to increase 
 the number of their purchases." 
 
 This reply was read to the Commissioners by M. Gerard, 
 under the instructions of the Comte de Vergennes, who 
 wished the Americans to understand the friendly attitude 
 of France, but who, in the critical condition of political 
 relations with England, could not permit anything of 
 this character in writing to go beyond the control of the 
 Department. The Commissioners expressed their grati 
 fication to M. Gerard after having heard it read. 
 
 They had every reason to be grateful to France. They 
 had been assured again of her sympathy and friendship ; 
 they had been given permission to obtain in France what 
 ever supplies they needed, so long as they did not com 
 promise the Government ; and, without their solicitation, 
 the King had given them also a large sum of money to 
 
 Etata-Unis, t. 2, No. 13 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 120. 
 
170 BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. [1777. 
 
 help them buy what they required. The last paragraph 
 of the reply of the Government refers to an amount of 
 two millions of livres which King Louis XVI. had 
 directed to be placed to their credit. In a subsequent 
 report to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, the 
 Commissioners wrote that they were informed that a grant 
 had been made to them of two millions of livres from the 
 Crown, of which five hundred thousand were ready to be 
 paid down, and an equal sum was to be paid at the begin 
 ning of April, July, and October ; " that such was the 
 King s generosity, he exacted no conditions or promise of 
 repayment, he only required that we should not speak to 
 any one of our having received this aid. We have ac 
 cordingly observed strictly this injunction, deviating only 
 in this information to you, which we think necessary for 
 your satisfaction, but earnestly requesting that you would 
 not suffer it to be made public." l 
 
 Such, in the early part of the year 1777, was the posi 
 tion of affairs in France, England, Spain, and the United 
 States in connection with the American Revolution ; and 
 it was in the midst of this complicated working of various 
 political interests and diplomatic negotiations that the 
 Marquis de La Fayette, moved by his own inspiration 
 to help the struggling Colonists win their liberty, brave 
 and earnest, of noble mind and generous heart, set out 
 from France to go to North America. 
 
 1 B. Franklin and Silas Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, 
 12th March, 1777 : Diplomatic Correspondence, Sparks, i. 200. 
 
1777.] PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA. 171 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA UPON THE ARRIVAL 
 OF LA FAYETTE. 
 
 LA FAYETTE S vessel, the Victoire, reached America 
 after a voyage of fifty-four days, having sailed from Los 
 Pasajes, as we have already seen, on the 20th of April, 
 1777. It landed at South Inlet, near Georgetown, in 
 South Carolina, on the 13th of June, the last part of the 
 long and tedious voyage having been enlivened, a short 
 time before they saw the coast, by the approach of an 
 armed vessel which the followers of the Marquis mistook 
 for an English man-of-war, but which proved to be an 
 American, with whom the Victoire vainly endeavored to 
 keep up, and also by the presence, off shore, of two 
 British frigates known to be cruising there, into whose 
 grasp there was very serious danger that they might now 
 fall after all their hardships and privations on the sea. 1 
 But, fortunately for them, a strong northerly wind was 
 blowing, which, while it helped them to reach their desti 
 nation, carried the cruisers toward the south and gave the 
 Victoire an opportunity to run in, not the only time in 
 his life, La Fayette said many years afterward, that the 
 elements conspired in his favor. 
 
 The exact place of their landing is described by the 
 Baron de Kalb, in a letter written two days later to 
 his wife, as " at North Island, at the entrance to the 
 Bay of Georgetown, fifteen miles from that town, in the 
 port called South Inlet, in Carolina." He says that, as 
 the wind was unfavorable to them in their efforts to reach 
 
 1 Momoireti de ma Main, i. 16. 
 
172 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1777. 
 
 Charleston, where they intended to disembark, and as no 
 one aboard the ship was sufficiently acquainted with the 
 coast to tell where they were, the Marquis de La Fayette 
 took Kalb, Mr. Price, the Chevalier du Buysson, and some 
 of the other officers 1 with him in the ship s yawl, and, 
 with the lieutenant and seven men to row, went ashore 
 to make inquiries, and to see if they could pick up a pilot. 
 Starting from the ship at two o clock in the afternoon of 
 Friday, the 13th of June, 1777, they rowed up the North 
 Inlet until ten at night without meeting any one except 
 some negroes who were fishing for oysters : these men 
 could give them very little information, however, in reply 
 to their inquiries, beyond the fact that they belonged to an 
 officer in the American army and that there was a pilot at 
 the upper end of the island ; they offered to guide the 
 strangers to the pilot and afterward to take them to their 
 master s house. As the tide had now gone down and the 
 Marquis could make no further headway in the yawl, he 
 determined to leave it behind and to go on with two 
 companions in the negroes oyster-boat, in the hope of 
 obtaining a pilot. About midnight they were set on shore 
 by their conductors, and, seeing a light in the distance, 
 they made their way in its direction. When they ap 
 proached the house from which the light proceeded, the 
 dogs began to bark, and the inmates supposed this to 
 signal the approach of a band of marauders from some 
 of the enemy s ships. A voice called out in the darkness 
 demanding who they were and what they wanted, to 
 which Kalb, who spoke English, replied that they were 
 French officers who had just come ashore to serve in the 
 Continental army, that their ship was at the mouth of 
 the inlet, that they were seeking a pilot to bring her in, 
 and that they asked shelter for the night for themselves. 2 
 
 1 This name appears in Kalb s letters as Brice ; though the name signed to 
 the certificate at Bordeaux, above referred to, is written " Price." 
 
 2 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 450. 
 
1777.] UPOX THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 173 
 
 Thereupon they were immediately invited to come into 
 the house, when upon inquiry and explanation they found 
 they were in the summer residence of Major Benjamin 
 Huger, a highly respected citizen of South Carolina, who 
 received the strangers " with a cordial welcome and a 
 generous hospitality." Having decided that the water in 
 Georgetown Bay was too shallow to admit the Victoire, 
 La Fayette sent a pilot to her with orders to go into 
 Charleston harbor with the cargo and those of the officers 
 who had remained on board, while Major Huger arranged 
 to carry the Marquis, with Kalb and Mr. Price, thither 
 by land. 
 
 The warmth and heartiness of this reception in America 
 delighted La Fayette ; it fulfilled his ideal of the people 
 and the country he had been seeking, in whose interest 
 he had left his own home and friends and for whom 
 he had already undergone considerable anxiety and dis 
 comfort. The attractive surroundings of the place, the 
 kind faces and friendly voices about him, filled him with 
 tender feelings, and the peace and domestic comfort of a 
 gentleman s house after the long weeks spent in the cabin 
 of his ship made it seem like enchantment to him. He 
 told Mr. Sparks that he had " retired to rest rejoiced that 
 he had at last attained the haven of his wishes and was 
 safely landed in America beyond the reach of his pur 
 suers. The next morning was beautiful. The novelty 
 of everything around him, the room, the bed with mos 
 quito-curtains, the black servants who came to ascertain 
 his wants, the beauty and strange appearance of the 
 country as he saw it from his window, clothed in luxu 
 riant verdure, all conspired to produce a magical effect, 
 and to impress him with indescribable sensations." 
 
 In the mean time the Vicomte de Mauroy and six other 
 officers who had remained on board the Victoire set sail 
 for Charleston, where they arrived a few days later, with 
 out having met any of the enemy s cruisers, although M. 
 
174 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1777. 
 
 de La Fayette was so anxious for the fate of his vessel 
 and his companions, from what he had heard after he 
 reached Major Huger s house as to the constant presence 
 along the coast of British men-of-war, that he hastily 
 sent orders after the captain, both by land and by sea, 
 to set the officers and crew ashore and to burn the ship ; 1 
 but, as he said, " through some inconceivable good luck, 
 the wind drove off the frigates for a short time, and my 
 vessel came into port in broad daylight without seeing 
 either friends or enemies." The Marquis set out on horse 
 back for Charleston in company with Kalb, they having 
 been furnished with horses by the kindness of Major 
 Huger ; and the other officers, for whom no conveyances 
 could be procured in that remote district, made the 
 journey on foot. These latter arrived there in a sad 
 condition of clothing and general appearance ; but as 
 soon as it became known in the town who the party 
 were, and what was their errand, they were treated with 
 the greatest courtesy : the Marquis, in particular, as one 
 of them wrote, had shown to him " all the honors due to 
 a marshal of France." 2 Governor Rutledge, General 
 Howe, and General Moultrie called upon him, and, 
 besides receiving him most cordially, showed him the 
 fortifications in the harbor and entertained him and his 
 companions in Charleston, "that charming city," which 
 La Fayette described as "worthy of its inhabitants," 
 and where " everything attested the presence of cultivation 
 and ease." He wrote to Mme. de La Fayette, on the 19th 
 of June, 1777, 3 from Charleston, that everybody whom he 
 met there sought to show him some politeness or atten 
 tion, and that he had reason to feel highly gratified at his 
 reception, although he had not as yet explained his plans 
 
 1 La Fayette, Correspondance, i. 92. 
 
 2 Journal of the Chevalier du Bnysson, Etats-Unis, t. 4, No. 152 : Doniol, 
 La Participation de la France, iii. 215. 
 
 3 Correspondance, i. 93. 
 
1777.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 175 
 
 to any one in detail ; for he judged it better to wait until 
 he should present himself to Congress before making a 
 full statement as to the projects he had in view. He told 
 her that the people were as agreeable as his enthusiasm 
 had represented them. 
 
 "A simplicity of manners, a desire to please, the love of 
 country and of liberty, and a pleasing equality, are to be found 
 everywhere among them. The richest man and the poorest are 
 upon the same social level, and, although there are some great 
 fortunes in this country, I defy any one to discover the least 
 difference in the bearing of one man to another. I began with 
 life in the country at the house of Major Huger ; now I am here 
 in the city. Everything recalls more or less the English customs, 
 though there is more of simplicity here than in England. The city 
 of Charlestown [Charleston] is one of the most attractive, the best 
 built, and inhabited by the most agreeable people, that I have ever 
 seen. The American women are very beautiful, unaffected in man 
 ner, and of a charming neatness, which prevails everywhere in 
 this country and receives the greatest attention, much more so 
 even than in England. What delights me most is, that all the citi 
 zens are brothers. There are no poor people in America, not even 
 what may be called peasants. Every man has his own property, 
 and each has the same rights with the greatest land-owner in the 
 country. The inns are quite different from those in Europe ; the 
 proprietor and his wife sit down with you to the meals and do the 
 honors of the table ; and when you leave, you pay without haggling 
 over your bill. If you do not wish to go to an inn, there are 
 country houses where any one who is a good American will be 
 admitted and entertained as kindly as we receive our friends in 
 Europe. 
 
 "As to myself, I have been welcomed in the most agreeable 
 manner possible by everybody here. I have just this moment 
 returned from a grand dinner that lasted five hours, given by a 
 gentleman of this city in my honor. General Howe and General 
 Moultrie were there, and several of the officers of my caravan. 
 We drank many healths and spoke very bad English, which lan 
 guage, by the way, I am beginning now to use a little. To-morrow 
 I shall go to return my visit. I shall take the gentlemen who ac 
 company me to call upon the Governor, and then I shall make my 
 preparations to leave." 
 
 The cargo of the Victoire could have been promptly 
 
176 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1777. 
 
 disposed of to advantage, but La Fayette discovered at 
 Charleston that the captain had with him a note for forty 
 thousand livres which the Marquis had made in Bordeaux 
 in favor of the merchants from whom he had bought the 
 ship, and that in his haste to escape from France he had 
 signed an agreement, without fully understanding it, by 
 which his vessel and cargo were to return there to be sold, 
 with the condition attached that the note for forty thou 
 sand livres representing his unpaid balance of the pur 
 chase-money should then be first paid out of the proceeds 
 of the sale, and also the additional amount of thirty-five 
 per cent., twenty-five per cent, for insurance and ten per 
 cent, commission. 1 This discovery caused him and his 
 companions great disappointment, for they had expected 
 to obtain money enough from the cargo to make them all 
 comfortable, and the Marquis had promised to provide 
 for everybody ; whereas they found themselves now in 
 the embarrassing position of not having the means to 
 defray the expenses of the long journey that confronted 
 them before they could join the army. After considerable 
 difficulty, however, La Fayette succeeded in negotiating a 
 loan at Charleston of about seven thousand dollars with 
 which to equip his expedition. The Victoire soon after 
 ward set sail for France, but in going out of Charles 
 ton harbor it struck upon the bar and was wrecked. 2 
 
 After having bought such horses and conveyances as 
 they could obtain, and having taken leave of their 
 friends in Charleston, the little company set out upon 
 their journey toward Philadelphia, on the 25th of June ; 
 a journey full of incident, as it proved, and not free from 
 very considerable hardships, owing to the bad roads over 
 which they travelled, the breaking down of their vehicles 
 and the giving out of their horses, and the intense heat 
 of the weather, from which all suffered and several fell 
 
 1 Journal of Du Buysson. 2 Memoires de ma Main, i. 17. 
 
1777.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 177 
 
 ill. The Chevalier du Buysson, who travelled with La 
 Fayette, and who afterward entered the Continental army 
 as aide-de-camp to the Baron de Kalb, at whose side he 
 was when that brave soldier died at the battle of Camden, 
 wrote in his Journal an interesting account of the visit to 
 Charleston and the subsequent events of this journey and 
 of the arrival at Philadelphia. He says, 
 
 "We divided ourselves into three parties. La Fayette, the 
 Baron de Kalb, and those of us who came ashore with them hired 
 four carriages to take us and our luggage. The aide-de-camp of 
 the Marquis undertook to be our guide, although he had no pos 
 sible idea of the country. This was our marching order as we 
 came out of Charleston. The procession was headed by one of 
 the Marquis s people in a hussar s uniform. The Marquis s 
 carriage was a sort of uncovered sofa [sofa dcouvcrt~] upon four 
 springs, with a fore-carriage. At the side of his carriage he 
 had one of his servants on horseback, who acted as his squire. 
 The Baron de Kalb was in the same carriage. The two colonels, 
 La Fayette s counsellors, followed in a second carriage with two 
 wheels. The third was for the aides-de-camp, the fourth for the 
 luggage, and the rear was brought up by a negro on horseback. 
 
 "Four days later, some of our carriages were reduced to 
 splinters ; several of the horses, which were old and unsteadj , 
 were either worn out or lame, and we were obliged to buy others 
 along the road. This outlay took all our money. We had to 
 leave behind us a part of our luggage, and part of it was stolen. 
 We travelled a great part of the way on foot, often sleeping in 
 the woods, almost dead with hunger, exhausted by the heat, 
 several of us suffer ing from fever and from dysentery. At last, 
 after thirty-two days of inarching, we arrived at Philadelphia in 
 a more pitiable condition even than when we first came into 
 Charleston [i.e., those who had gone from Major Huger s on foot]. 
 I think I am safe in saying that in Europe no campaign would be 
 harder to go through than was this journey ; for there the hard 
 ships are not continuous, they are even compensated for by fre 
 quent pleasures ; but here our troubles increased with every day, 
 and they gave us no consolation but the hope of arriving at Phil 
 adelphia. We were encouraged by the bright prospect of the 
 reception we counted upon from the people there, and I can say 
 with truth that this thought would have induced us to undergo 
 much greater hardships with the same willingness and the same 
 VOL. I. 12 
 
178 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1777. 
 
 lightness of heart that I felt after once I had made up my mind. 
 We were all animated by the same spirit. The enthusiasm of La 
 Fayette would have incited all the rest of us, if any one had been 
 less courageous than he." 
 
 It is, indeed, remarkable that throughout La Fayette s 
 career in America his letters invariably express friendship, 
 attachment, and warmth of heart toward the people whose 
 cause he adopted ; the fatigues and hardships he endured 
 never wore out his patience ; the heat of summer and the 
 cold of winter found him ever cheerful and ready ; his 
 criticisms are those of a friend and a lover, and wherever 
 he went he strove to see, and did see, something good and 
 something kind in the world about him. This high- 
 minded devotion won the hearts of those with whom he 
 came in contact ; it endeared him to Washington, to the 
 officers and soldiers of the Continental army, and to the 
 Colonists of a hundred years ago ; it has established his 
 memory in the affection of the American people to-day 
 and for all time to come. 
 
 During his journey to Philadelphia, he wrote to Mme. 
 de La Fayette, on the 17th of July, 1777, from Peters 
 burg, " You have probably [by his former letters] heard 
 of the beginning of my journey and how brilliantly I 
 started out in a carriage. I have to inform you that we 
 are now on horseback, after having broken the wagons in 
 my usual praiseworthy fashion, and I expect to write you 
 before long that we have reached our destination on foot. 
 There have been some fatigues, but, although a few of 
 my companions have suffered from them, I have scarcely 
 noticed them." l And in his Memoires he said, 2 " M. de 
 La Fayette travelled nearly nine hundred miles on horse 
 back to present himself to Congress; passing through 
 the two Carolinas, Virginia, and the States of Maryland 
 and Delaware, he reached the capital of Pennsylvania. 
 
 1 Correspondance, i. 98. 2 Vol. i. p. 17. \ 
 
1777.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 179 
 
 Whilst he studied the language and the people, he saw 
 also agriculture and products that were entirely new to 
 him ; the vast forests, the great rivers, everything, indeed, 
 in this country, give to nature an appearance of youth 
 and of majesty." 
 
 La Fayette arrived in Philadelphia with his little 
 troop on the 27th of July. They went at once to present 
 themselves to Congress, with the papers which they had 
 brought with them from France, and also the contract 
 entered into by them with Mr. Deane. It happened, 
 however, to their disappointment, that they were not the 
 only foreign officers who had come to serve in the Ameri 
 can army, large numbers of adventurers and others having 
 flocked to the Colonies upon the outbreak of the war, 
 chiefly from the West India islands, to offer their services, 
 which were accompanied usually by such exorbitant de 
 mands as to rank and privilege that they could not be 
 complied with ; and in several instances where these men 
 had been granted commissions in the army the feeling was 
 very strong, both among the Continental officers and in 
 Congress itself, that the confidence reposed in them had 
 been misplaced ; so that everybody connected with the 
 Government had become exceedingly sensitive upon the 
 subject of foreigners who asked for commissions in the 
 army. Therefore the arrival of this new set of strangers, 
 who presented the usual demands for appointment in the 
 army, and showed the usual expectation of obtaining high 
 rank, fell at an unfortunate moment for them. They were 
 not at first distinguished from others who had preceded 
 them upon the same errand, but were looked upon 
 as foreigners whom nobody wanted, and their welcome 
 was consequently not so cordial as they had pictured it to 
 themselves whilst they were plodding from Charleston 
 toward Philadelphia. The Chevalier du Buysson says, 
 
 "We arrived on the 27th of July, in the morning. After 
 having brushed ourselves up a little, we went to see the President 
 
180 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1777. 
 
 of Congress, to whom we presented our letters of recommendation 
 and also our contracts. He sent us to see M. Moose [Morris (?)], 
 a member of the Congress, who made an appointment to meet us 
 on the following day at the door of the Congress ; and in the mean 
 time our papers were read and examined. The next day we were 
 punctual in keeping our appointment, but we were made to wait 
 a long time. Finally M. Moose appeared, with another member, 
 and said to us, This gentleman speaks French very well, and he 
 is intrusted with the matters that concern people of your nation 
 ality ; hereafter your communications will all be with him. He 
 
 then went in, and the other member, M. [Mr. Lovell], talked 
 
 with us in the street, where he left us, after having treated us, in 
 excellent French, like a set of adventurers. He ended his speech 
 by saying, Gentlemen, have you any authority from Mr. Deane f 
 We authorized him to send us four French engineers ; but, instead 
 of that, he has sent us Mr. du Coudray and some men who pretend 
 to be engineers but are not, and some artillerists who have never 
 seen service. We then instructed Mr. Franklin to send us four 
 engineers, and they have come. It seems that French officers 
 have a great fancy to enter our service without being invited. It 
 is true we were in need of officers last year, but now we have 
 experienced men and plenty of them. 
 
 "This was our first reception by the Congress, and we did not 
 know what to think of it ; indeed, it would be impossible for 
 any one to be more stupefied than we were. Would it have been 
 possible for M. de La Fayette, M. de Kalb, and M. de Mauroy, 
 followed by ten officers recommended as we had been, and secretly 
 approved, if not openly avowed, by the Government of France, 
 to expect such a reception as this ? 
 
 "We determined to wait and to discover the cause of this 
 affront, if possible, before making any complaint. We attributed 
 it, and rightly, to the misconduct of certain of our compatriots 
 who had preceded us ; for we soon heard of the bad behavior of 
 several of them, and the discredit which their actions had thrown 
 upon letters of recommendation brought by them from our colo 
 nies, and we discovered that certain other things also had had an 
 influence in this connection." 
 
 This was true; the foreign officers had given serious 
 cause for disappointment both in the army and in the 
 country, and they had been for a long time the source 
 of embarrassment to the Commander-in-Chief. General 
 Washington, who had no prejudice whatever against men 
 
1777.] UPOX THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 181 
 
 from other countries, provided they were men of merit, 
 saw the impossibility of satisfying the ambition of most 
 of them, and, what was a great deal more serious, the 
 injustice of putting foreigners into the army with rank 
 superior to our own people who were making sacrifices for 
 the country, and who in many cases had recruited the 
 men whom they now commanded. He wrote early in the 
 year 1777, long before La Fayette s arrival, 1 
 
 "I have often mentioned to you the distress I am every now 
 and then laid under by the application of French officers for 
 commissions in our service. This evil, if I may call it so, is a 
 growing one ; for, from what I learn, they are coming in swarms 
 from old France and the Islands. There will therefore be a ne 
 cessity of providing for them or discountenancing them. To do 
 the first is difficult ; and the last disagreeable, and perhaps im 
 politic, if they are men of merit ; and it is impossible to distin 
 guish these from mere adventurers, of whom I am convinced there 
 is the greater number. They seldom bring more than a com 
 mission and a passport, which, we know, may belong to a bad as 
 well as a good officer. Their ignorance of our language and their 
 inability to recruit men are insurmountable obstacles to their 
 being ingrafted into our Continental battalions ; for our officers, 
 who have raised their men, and have served through the war 
 upon pay that has hitherto not borne their expenses, would be 
 disgusted if foreigners were put over their heads ; and, I assure 
 you, few or none of these gentlemen look lower than field-officers 7 
 commissions. To give them all brevets, by which they have rank 
 and draw pay without doing any service, is saddling the Conti 
 nent with vast expense ; and to form them into corps would be 
 only establishing corps of officers ; for, as I said before, they 
 cannot possibly raise any men." 
 
 And to Richard Henry Lee, in Congress, he wrote, 2 
 
 "Under the privilege of friendship, I take the liberty to ask 
 you what Congress expect I am to do with the many foreigners 
 they have at different times promoted to the rank of field-officers, 
 and, by the last resolve, two to that of colonels! In making 
 
 1 To the President of Congress, 20th February, 1777 : Sparks, Writings of 
 Washington, iv. 327. 
 
 2 17th May, 1777 : Sparks, Writings of Washington, iv. 423. 
 
182 PROGKESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1777. 
 
 these appointments, it is much to be feared that all the attending 
 circumstances are not taken into consideration. To oblige the 
 adventurers of a nation which we want to interest in our cause, 
 may be one inducement ; and to get rid of their importunity, an 
 other ; but this is viewing the matter by halves, or on one side 
 only. These men have no attachment nor ties to the country, 
 further than interest binds them ; they have no influence, and are 
 ignorant of the language they are to receive and give orders in ; 
 consequently great trouble or much confusion must follow. But 
 this is not the worst ; they have not the smallest chance to recruit 
 others ; and our officers think it exceedingly hard, after they have 
 toiled in this service, and probably have sustained many losses, 
 to have strangers put over them, whose merit perhaps is not equal 
 to their own, but whose effrontery will take no denial. 
 
 "The management of this matter, give me leave to add, sir, is 
 a delicate point ; for, although no one will dispute the right of 
 Congress to make appointments, every person will assume the 
 privilege of judging of the propriety of them ; and good policy, 
 in my opinion, forbids the disgusting of a whole corps to gratify 
 the pride of an individual ; for it is by the zeal and activity of 
 our own people that the cause must be supported, and not by 
 a few hungry adventurers. Besides, the error of these appoint 
 ments is now clear and manifest, and the views of Congress evi 
 dently defeated ; for by giving rank to people of no reputation or 
 service, you have disgusted their own countrymen, or, in other 
 words, raised their expectations to an insatiable pitch. For the 
 man who was a captain in France, finding another who was only 
 a subaltern there, or perhaps nothing, appointed to a majority 
 with us, extends his views instantly to a regiment ; in like manner, 
 the field-officer can accept nothing less than a brigade, and so on, 
 by which means the man of real rank and merit must be ex 
 cluded, or perhaps your whole military system disordered. In 
 the mean while I am haunted and teased to death by the impor 
 tunity of some, and dissatisfaction of others." * 
 
 It is not strange that in this condition of public feeling 
 in America the arrival of a new contingent of French 
 officers did not excite great pleasure, or that their recep 
 tion in Philadelphia was, as La Fayette said, " more like 
 
 1 See, also, letters to Major Colerus, 19th May, 1777 : Sparks, Writings of 
 Washington, iv. 429 ; to the President of Congress, 6th June, 1777 : ibid., 
 450 ; to Benjamin Franklin, 17th August, 1777 : ibid., v. 32. 
 
1777.J UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 183 
 
 a dismissal than a welcome." l Having run the risk, how 
 ever, of leaving France against the King s orders, and 
 having displayed an indomitable energy in beating down 
 all obstacles, in crossing the ocean and in the fatigues of 
 the long journey from Charleston, La Fayette was not 
 willing to accept this as final, or to turn back because a 
 gentleman had met him in the street and told him that no 
 more French officers were wanted in America. He de 
 termined to present himself to Congress directly, at all 
 events, and to be heard. He prepared an address to it 
 which he succeeded in having read, setting forth his cir 
 cumstances and the reasons of his being there, in the 
 course of which he said, " After the sacrifices that I have 
 made in this cause, I have the right to ask two favors at 
 your hands : the one is, to serve without pay, at my own 
 expense ; and the other, that I be allowed to serve at first 
 as a volunteer." 
 
 An appeal of this kind, so different in tone from the 
 exactions of other foreign officers with whom the Ameri 
 can Congress had come in contact, attracted immediate 
 attention ; as did, no doubt, the extreme youth of the Mar 
 quis, the letters he brought with him, his unquestioned 
 rank and influence in France, and the enthusiasm displayed 
 by him for the American cause. The Chevalier du Buysson 
 says that Mr. Lovell (" le meme qui nous avoit si mal 
 reyus") was sent to confer with them again, " accompanied 
 this time by another member, who was more skilful, as 
 well as more polite" to them, and that these gentlemen then 
 made a sort of apology to La Fayette. The second mem 
 ber appears to have been sent to sound the Marquis, and 
 in a private interview he promised him anything and 
 everything in order to draw him out. Evidently satis 
 fied with the result of this conference, the member of 
 Congress had a second conference with him, in which he 
 
 1 M6moires de ma Main, i. 18. 2 Ibid., i. 19. 
 
184 PEOGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1777. 
 
 arranged that La Fayette should accept from Congress the 
 rank of major-general, but to date only from that time, 
 without regard to his contract with Mr. Deane, and also 
 without pay or other compensation and without any com 
 mand or the promise of one. This conclusion having 
 been reached, Congress passed the following Resolution, 
 on the 31st of July, 1777 : l 
 
 u Whereas the Marquis de La Fayette, out of his great zeal to 
 the cause of liberty, in which the United States are engaged, has 
 left his family and connections, and at his own expence conie over 
 to offer his services to the United States without pension or par 
 ticular allowance, and is anxious to risque his life in our cause 
 Eesolved, That his service be accepted, and that in consideration 
 of his zeal, illustrious family and connections he have rank and 
 commission of Major General in the Army of the United States. " 
 
 La Fayette s commission was immediately sent to him. 
 It appears 2 that the French Court had insisted that the 
 American Commissioners should write to Congress re 
 questing that the Marquis de La Fayette should not be 
 employed in the Continental service ; but the Commis 
 sioners made no great haste to comply with this, and 
 when the request finally reached America it was too late : 
 La Fayette was already in the army and had begun to be 
 favorably known. 
 
 Upon receiving his commission as major-general, La 
 Fayette wrote to Congress the following letter, the original 
 of which is still preserved in the Archives of the Depart 
 ment of State at Washington : 3 
 
 "To THE HONORABLE M R HANCOK, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS, 
 
 PHILADELPHIA. 
 
 " the 13 august 1777 
 "SIR 
 
 "I beg that you will receive yourself and present to Congress 
 my thanks for the Commission of Major General in the Army of 
 
 1 Journals of Congress, iii. 303. 
 
 2 M6moires de La Fayette, Fragment B, i. 72. 
 
 3 Papers of the Old Congress. 
 
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1777.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 185 
 
 the United States of America which I have been honor d with in 
 their name the feelings of my heart, long before it became my 
 duty, engaged me in the love of the American cause. I not only 
 considered it as the cause of Honor, Virtue, and universal Hap- 
 pinness, but felt myself einpressed with the warmest affection for 
 a Xation who exhibited by their resistance so fine an exemple of 
 Justice and Courage to the Universe. 
 
 "I schall neglect nothing on my part to justify the confidence 
 which the Congress of the United States has been pleased to 
 repose in me as my highest ambition has ever been to do every 
 thing only for the best of the cause in which I am engaged. I wish 
 to serve near the person of General Washington till such time as 
 he may think proper to entrust me with a division of the Army. 
 
 "it is now as an american that PI mention every day to con 
 gress the officers who came over with me, whose interests are for 
 me as my own, and the consideration which they deserve by their 
 merits their ranks, their state and reputation in france. 
 
 "I am sir with the sentiments which every good american 
 owe to you 
 
 " Your most obedient 
 
 "servant the mq is de lafayette." 
 
 La Fayette was not unmindful, in the fulness of his 
 own success, of the French officers who had come with 
 him, and whose expectations were in several cases destined 
 to be sadly disappointed. Some of these men were in 
 timate friends whom he had known at home and whose 
 interests he had close at heart, like the Vicomte de 
 Mauroy and the Baron de Kalb, who still stood waiting 
 for an answer from Congress to their request for employ 
 ment in the army, while others had been entire strangers 
 to him up to the time when he met them on his vessel at 
 Bordeaux. 1 But he generously exerted himself in favor 
 of all, using what little influence he could bring to bear 
 under circumstances that at best offered extremely slender 
 hope of a favorable result. The Chevalier du Buysson 
 said, " He did everything that was possible for our ap 
 pointment, but in vain, for he had no influence. But if 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 19. 
 
186 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1777. 
 
 he had had his way, de Kalb would have been major- 
 general and we should all have had places." 
 
 The Baron de Kalb, especially, felt the mortification 
 of this apparent neglect upon the part of Congress, after 
 having been assured of a command by Mr. Deane before 
 leaving France, and in view of the appointment of a man 
 so much younger than he, and one who had seen so much 
 less service, as La Fayette. The idea stung him, that he 
 should have to return to France in the position of having 
 been rejected after a personal offer of his services to an 
 army of so little prestige as that of the Colonial " insur 
 gents" in North America, and he could not face the loss 
 of influence and support that he was sure to suffer with 
 the Comte de Broglie if, instead of having succeeded in 
 the ambitious plan of the " Stathouderat," for which he 
 had come, he should have been dismissed by the Congress 
 without even a hearing. He wrote an appeal to the Presi 
 dent of Congress, in which the bitterness of his disap 
 pointment is distinctly visible in the sharp criticisms upon 
 the action of Mr. Silas Deane in making an engagement 
 with him which he had no power to carry out, and in the 
 emphatic statement of his own case in view of the circum 
 stances that brought him to America ; and, not without 
 some show of irritation, he asked that he should either 
 receive the appointment in the army which had been 
 agreed upon, or, if he were obliged to return to France, 
 that he should be reimbursed for his outlay in coming 
 to America and the very considerable expense he had 
 been put to after arriving here. 1 " I do not think that 
 either my name, my services, or my person are proper 
 objects to be trifled with or laughed at. I cannot tell you, 
 sir, how deeply I feel the injury done to me, and how 
 ridiculous it seems to me to make people leave their homes, 
 families, and affairs to cross the sea under a thousand dif- 
 
 1 Kapp s Kalb, p. 116. 
 
1777.] UPON THE AKKIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 187 
 
 ferent dangers, to be received and to be looked at with 
 contempt by those from whom you were to expect but 
 warm thanks. ... I should be sorry to be compelled to 
 carry my case against Mr. Deane or his successors for 
 damages. And such an action would injure his credit 
 and negotiations, and those of the state at Court." 
 
 It was a difficult case, for, certainly, Congress had not 
 been instrumental in making these gentlemen leave their 
 homes to come across the sea ; on the contrary, it was 
 greatly embarrassed by their presence, as was also the 
 Commander-in-Chief ; and yet they had come bearing a 
 formal agreement entered into by them with Mr. Deane, 
 the agent of the American Congress. Mr. Deaue had 
 exceeded his authority ; and therein lay the cause of this 
 difficulty. 
 
 In reply to the demands of the Baron de Kalb, M. de 
 Mauroy, and others of their following, Congress took the 
 definite course of disavowing Mr. Deane s appointments ; 
 but, since these gentlemen were undoubtedly entitled to 
 some recognition and proper consideration, it thanked 
 them officially for having come to America, and decided 
 to defray their expenses both in coming here and in 
 returning to France, by a resolution adopted on the 8th 
 of September, 1777, 1 as follows : 
 
 t i Congress took into consideration the report of the Committee 
 on foreign applications, wherein they set forth, That besides a 
 number of officers who are come from Europe and the West 
 Indies of their own accord to solicit for rank and employment in 
 the American Army, there are others who have proceeded upon 
 the encouragement of conventions made and signed at Paris by 
 Silas Deane, esquire, as agent for the United States of Korth 
 America ; that Mr. Deane had no authority to make such con 
 vent ions, and that Congress therefore are not bound to ratify or 
 fulfil them. 
 
 * i Your Committee further report, that the baron de Kalb and 
 the viscount de Mauroy, with a number of officers who came with 
 
 1 Journals of Congress, iii. 377. 
 
188 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1777. 
 
 them from France, have offered their service, provided their en 
 gagements with Mr. Deane, in respect to rank, are fulfilled ; but 
 that the American Army having been arranged before the ar 
 rival of these gentlemen in America, their expectations cannot 
 be complied with without deranging it and thereby injuring at 
 so critical a juncture the American cause ; that the zeal how 
 ever of these gentlemen and their consequent expences merit 
 the attention of Congress ; wherefore your Committee report 
 the following resolve : 
 
 "Resolved, That the thanks of Congress be given to the baron 
 de Kalb and the viscount de Mauroy, with the officers who ac 
 company them, for their zeal in passing over to America to offer 
 their service to these United States, and that their expences to 
 this Continent and on their return to France be paid. 
 
 "Resolved, That Congress agree to the said report and resolve. 
 
 " Ordered, That the baron de Kalb and the viscount de Mauroy 
 be furnished with a copy of the foregoing report and resolution, 
 attested by the secretary ; also that any of the officers accom 
 panying them, who may desire it, be furnished with such a copy. 77 
 
 Thereupon the Baron de Kalb and his followers pre 
 pared immediately for their return, Kalb having received 
 from Congress the sum of money due to them and having 
 distributed it among his companions, and most of them 
 actually returned to France. The party left Philadelphia 
 on the 15th of September. The Baron de Kalb, with 
 Messrs, de Lesser, de Valfort, and du Buysson, concluded 
 to take the Southern route, in the hope of an opportunity 
 to embark from one of the Southern ports ; while Messrs. 
 de Mauroy, de Fayolles, de Franval, de Vrigny, Dubois- 
 Martin, and Candon set out for New England, with the 
 purpose of sailing either from Boston or from Ports 
 mouth. M. de Gimat and M. de la Colombe remained as 
 aides-de-camp to the Marquis de La Fayette, and M. de 
 Bedaulx was made captain by brevet by act of Con 
 gress. 1 M. Capitaine du Chesnoy, a skilful draughtsman 
 and topographical engineer, remained, and became also 
 aide-de-camp to General de La Fayette. 
 
 1 Journals of Congress, 15th September, 1777, iii. 394. 
 
1777.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 189 
 
 But it was not the destiny of the Baron de Kalb ever 
 to see France again : he had proceeded only as far as 
 Bethlehem upon his return, when he was overtaken by a 
 messenger who announced to him that Congress had given 
 him a commission as major-general, 1 for on the 15th of 
 September, 1777, in the session of Congress, it was 
 "Resolved, that another Major-General be appointed in 
 the army of the United States The ballots being taken, 
 baron de Kalb was elected ; " 2 and this commission was 
 shortly afterward " dated the same day with that of 
 the Marquis de La Fayette, agreeable to the baron s 
 request." 
 
 Thus, while Kalb found that he must give up all 
 hope of serving his patron, the Comte de Broglie, in the 
 design of making that nobleman Generalissimo of the 
 American armies, he decided to accept the offer of Con 
 gress, and, remaining in America, to enter the army as 
 a Continental officer. He saw at a glance that a people 
 who were willing to endure the privations and hardships 
 of the campaign of the preceding year, and the sufferings 
 of the winter of 1776-77, who had a Commander-in- 
 Chief like General Washington, able to encourage his 
 countrymen in the darkest hour of their adversity by the 
 example of his own devotion and bravery, and who could 
 hold them together in the face of the vastly superior 
 British forces triumphantly advancing through New 
 Jersey, and lead them to the attack at Trenton and at 
 Princeton when in point of fact he was defeated and 
 almost exhausted, did not need the aid of a foreign noble 
 man either to inspire them in the interest of their cause 
 or to direct them against the enemy. It taxes the imagi 
 nation at this day to conceive that any one had ever 
 thought seriously of such a thing. And yet the Comte 
 
 1 Kapp s Kalb, 118. 
 
 2 Journals of Congress, iii. 395. 
 
 3 Ibid., 410. 
 
190 PEOGEESS OF THE WAE IN AMEEICA [1777. 
 
 de Broglie s idea had nothing in it that was unreasonable 
 from his point of view : the difficulty was that it was 
 based upon premises that were wrong because he did not 
 know the character of the people with whom he was deal 
 ing. The " Stathouderat" was intended to be both ser 
 viceable and beneficent in the struggle for independence 
 of a remote and helpless people ; but, while the American 
 Colonists were remote, they were not helpless. Kalb wrote 
 to his patron that " it is impossible to execute the great 
 design I have so gladly come to subserve," for, he said, 
 it would be regarded no less as an act of shameful injus 
 tice to Washington than as an outrage upon the honor 
 of the country. 1 The subsequent career of the Baron 
 de Kalb is well known and rightly appreciated by the 
 people of the United States : he died like a hero on 
 the 19th of August, 1780, in defence of the American 
 flag. 
 
 The situation in America was not very attractive nor 
 the cause of liberty very enticing to one who was not 
 firmly bound by honor and patriotism to a struggle which 
 called for the sacrifice of everything that men hold dear, 
 in this determined effort to be free, at the moment when 
 the Marquis de La Fayette thus presented himself to 
 Congress and devoted his energy and zeal to the interests 
 of the people. An army composed of men hastily drawn 
 from the pursuits of domestic life, for short terms of 
 service which did not enable them to grow accustomed 
 to the discipline of the camp before it became neces 
 sary to allow them to go home, and to fill their places by 
 others equally unprepared, commanded by officers whose 
 nominations had frequently been controlled by political 
 considerations, " of whom nearly all were inexperienced, 
 many unteachable, and some of untried courage/ 2 with 
 out equipment in arms, without tents or ammunition, 
 
 1 Kapp s Kalb, 127. 
 
 2 Bancroft, History of the United States, ix. 389. 
 
1777.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 191 
 
 many even without clothing, and exhausted by the hard 
 ships of exposure and defeat, this was the spectacle 
 presented during the campaign of the end of the year 
 1776 and the first half of 1777, by the defenders of the 
 independence of the United States of America. The war 
 had broken out at a time when the whole country did not 
 contain supplies of arms, ammunition, and military equip 
 ment enough for even a moderate body of men ; there had 
 been no means of buying these in other countries, because 
 the Government had no money ; no revenues were coming 
 in through the channels of trade, because they were closed ; 
 and there was no power to raise the necessary means by 
 taxation on the part of Congress. Besides this, the 
 population of the Middle States, which were at that time 
 the seat of hostilities, was largely disaffected toward the 
 American cause : wearied by the long duration of the 
 contest which they had not expected, and having lost 
 something of the enthusiasm that followed immediately 
 upon the opposition to Great Britain, many of the in 
 habitants of New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey 
 openly accepted the offers of the British Commissioners 
 and returned to their allegiance, while of those who re 
 mained there were numbers who could not at most be 
 called more than half-hearted friends. 
 
 The incidents of the last campaign, in New York and 
 New Jersey, had been accompanied by such a combina 
 tion of reverses and disappointments that there was little 
 room for encouragement amid the gloom in America, 
 
 Almost at the very moment of the publishing of the 
 Declaration of Independence in Philadelphia, General 
 Howe returned from Halifax, whither he had gone upon 
 the evacuation of Boston, and with an army of veteran 
 troops thoroughly disciplined and splendidly equipped 
 with arms and artillery, accompanied by skilful engineers 
 and reinforced by the recent accession of the subsidized 
 Hessians and Waldeckers, came into New York harbor 
 
192 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1776. 
 
 and landed on Staten Island on the 3d and 4th of July, 
 1776. His purpose was to gain possession of the Hudson 
 River, and, once strongly intrenched there, to cut off 
 communications between New England and the Middle 
 States, whilst the strength of his position would enable 
 him, as occasion might require, to attack the State of 
 New York on the north, to send his troops eastward into 
 Connecticut, or to conduct operations against New Jersey 
 and Pennsylvania, and he would thus at the same time 
 keep open the most direct communication with Canada. 
 He was supported in this plan of operations by a strong 
 naval force commanded by his brother, Admiral Lord 
 Howe, who arrived in American waters and took up his 
 position near Staten Island very shortly afterward, on 
 the 12th of July. 
 
 The campaign was well arranged to succeed ; it had all 
 the advantages that military organization could give it to 
 insure success ; the army and navy had prestige as well 
 as strength, and it was not without reason that the British 
 ministers confidently expected that this year would end 
 the war. At the very outset, indeed, the superiority of 
 this armament seemed to the British Government about 
 to inflict the punishment of an offended King upon his 
 rebellious subjects who had refused his clemency and who 
 even now continued to bear arms in defiance of the offers 
 of pardon and forgiveness which Admiral Howe and his 
 brother were instructed to make to those who would sub 
 mit. But it was not alone the weakened and tattered 
 forces of the Colonists that this splendid array was to 
 contend with in the campaign which followed, with dis 
 aster to the British arms ; there was also to be reckoned 
 the spirit which animated them in a struggle against 
 wrong done to what they held to be sacred and their own. 
 General Washington replied to Sir William Howe s mes 
 senger, sent to offer the royal favor, that "those who 
 had committed no fault wanted no pardon, and that the 
 
1776.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 193 
 
 Americans were only defending what they deemed their 
 indubitable rights." l 
 
 It was this spirit, supported by the patience, the en 
 durance, and the noble courage of Washington himself, 
 that decided the event. General Howe was of a sluggish 
 nature, fond of ease, self-indulgent, cautious to the point 
 of neglecting opportunities, with no great heartiness for 
 his task of subduing a people whom he does not appear 
 to have hated ; he kept a good table, and loved to pass 
 an evening with his mistress or his officers at a game of 
 cards in a comfortable house, forgetful of danger. He 
 had opposed to him in the American commander an 
 austere man, the story of whose life is filled with acts 
 of self-denial that excite the admiration of the hearer, 
 and whose very soul was devoted to the cause of liberty 
 in which he was then engaged ; always alert to impend 
 ing danger, never regardless of the slightest opportunity 
 to take advantage of circumstances, brave to the extent 
 of almost unreasonable exposure in battle, sharing the 
 extremities of a winter campaign in common with his 
 soldiers, a bold fighter who astonished the enemy by 
 turning upon them to strike a blow when they had 
 thought him so far reduced as to be unable to move. 
 
 The first operations of the campaign were very dis 
 astrous to the Americans. The troops concentrated by 
 General Howe in the vicinity of New York were esti 
 mated at twenty-four thousand men, and reinforcements 
 were expected still further to increase their number. 
 Those of General Washington consisted of ten thousand 
 men, which number was enlarged to seventeen thousand, 
 of whom nearly four thousand were sick from exposure to 
 which they were not accustomed ; and with this inade 
 quate force he was in danger of sudden attack, whilst it 
 was necessarv for him at the same time to defend New 
 
 1 Marshall, Life of Washington, ii. 423. 
 VOL. 1. 13 
 
194 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1776. 
 
 4 
 
 York, Governor s Island, Long Island, and Paulus Hook, 
 dividing his forces in the defence of posts some of which 
 were fifteen miles distant from others, with navigable 
 waters between them. " These things," said Washington, 
 " are melancholy, but they are nevertheless true." Yet 
 he added that the superiority of the enemy and the ex 
 pected attack did not seem to have depressed the spirits 
 of his men, and that, " under every disadvantage, my 
 utmost exertions shall be employed to bring about the 
 great end we have in view ; though the appeal may not 
 terminate so happily as I could wish, yet the enemy will 
 not succeed in their views without considerable loss. Any 
 advantage they may gain, I trust Avill cost them dear." 
 
 The attack soon followed. In August, 1776, General 
 Howe made a landing upon Long Island, where he had 
 on the 25th of the month a force of twenty thousand men, 
 which has been since described as the most perfect army 
 of that day in the world, for experience, discipline, equip 
 ments, and artillery, and was supported by more than four 
 hundred ships and transports in the bay, besides ten ships 
 of the line and twenty frigates. 2 On the 27th of August 
 occurred the battle of Long Island, which resulted in dis 
 aster to the Americans and the retreat of their army, three 
 days later, across the East River to New York. Thither 
 they were pursued by the overwhelmingly superior forces 
 of the British general, who came on with resistless power, 
 and before whom they yielded step by step the ground 
 which they were unable longer to defend. New York 
 City was soon entirely in possession of the British, and 
 the army of Washington lay upon the heights of Har 
 lem, worn out, broken, wet from the driving rain to 
 which they were now exposed through loss of blankets, 
 camp-equipage, and tents, almost exhausted by the heavy 
 burden of their adversity. 
 
 1 Marshall, Life of Washington, ii. 429. 
 
 2 Bancroft, History of the United States, ix. 85. 
 
1776.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 195 
 
 This was the situation at the middle of September, a 
 little more than two months from the time when the 
 British force made its appearance in New York harbor. 
 The American position at Harlem was sufficiently strong, 
 protected as it was by an intrenched camp, to relieve it 
 for the moment from the danger of an attack, the pur 
 pose of General Howe being rather to draw the Continen 
 tals into an engagement in the open country, where they 
 would fight under very great disadvantage and would be 
 in extreme danger of annihilation, a purpose, however, 
 which was perfectly understood by General Washington, 
 and which he was careful to frustrate. For a short time 
 in the early part of October the two armies lay opposite 
 each other ; that of Washington preparing, as far as its 
 resources would permit, to regain its strength and repair 
 its losses in anticipation of a further conflict which it 
 was evident could not be long delayed ; that of General 
 Howe waiting quietly for more artillery and military 
 stores which had been ordered forward from Statcn Island, 
 and for reinforcements under General Knyphausen, who 
 joined him shortly afterward with the second division 
 of the German troops. 
 
 It soon became evident to General Washington that 
 the effort of the British now was to gain the rear of his 
 camp, north of Harlem, if possible, and thus to force him 
 from his present position or to surround him and cut him 
 off entirely from communication with the country ; of 
 which, indeed, there was grave danger, for three British 
 frigates had passed up the Hudson River, in spite of the 
 obstructions intended to prevent them, and quite undis 
 turbed by the fire from Forts Washington and Lee, on 
 either bank, while General Howe had already begun to 
 move his army through Hell Gate into Long Island 
 Sound, where they had disembarked at Frog s Point and 
 Pell s Point, and were moving by the way of Pelliam 
 Manor in the direction of New^ Rochelle. At a council 
 
196 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA tl776. 
 
 of the American general officers, on the 16th of October, it 
 was decided that, in view of their exposure to being com 
 pletely cut off and forced to surrender, a change of posi 
 tion must be made and York Island must be abandoned ; 
 with the exception, however, of Fort Washington, in 
 deference to the expressed wish of Congress that the 
 navigation of the Hudson River should be obstructed 
 at all hazards, and because of a lingering hope that in 
 some way the British ships might still be prevented 
 from passing up. 
 
 Immediately upon this decision, the American army 
 began a further retreat toward the north, extending its 
 line in a series of intrenched camps for a distance of some 
 twelve miles beyond King s Bridge, and retiring cautiously 
 until the 26th of October, when General Washington took 
 up a strong position in the high ground at White Plains, 
 his right wing protected by the Bronx, upon which it 
 rested, whilst his left extended northward into the hills 
 behind, holding the advantage of position there and keep 
 ing open a line of retreat should that become necessary. 
 Up to this time the American army had continued to retire 
 before the advancing enemy, and at every point the su 
 periority of General Howe s forces had made itself felt. 
 Long Island was his ; York Island was under his control, 
 for the single garrison at Fort Washington, although it 
 still held out in its hopeless attempt to protect the Hud 
 son River, was within his easy reach at any moment that 
 he should decide to invest it ; and the British war-ships 
 now ascended the stream in order to cover his flank upon 
 that side and to lend additional strength to his position as 
 he advanced toward the north ; yet, in point of fact, he 
 had made extremely little progress toward the subjection 
 of the Colonists or the termination of the war, if we con 
 sider what had been expected of him, and what with 
 reason he might himself have expected from the splendid 
 armament under his command, with all its advantages of 
 
1776.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 197 
 
 munitions, of training, and of numbers. He had suc 
 ceeded only in making a lodgement in the country, and 
 the very fact that he had not done more began to have 
 its effect upon his antagonists, whose spirits revived and 
 whose courage to resist him was daily increased. He had 
 failed in his effort to surprise the American commander 
 and to draw him into an unequal contest in the plain ; 
 while, on the other hand, his own time was being skilfully 
 wasted by the movements of his adversary in a season when 
 the weather was growing unsuitable to military operations, 
 and when it would soon be necessary to close the campaign 
 and to go into winter quarters ; to do which, however, 
 with nothing more gained than at present, would be dis 
 grace. He had forced Washington into a position, at 
 last, among the hills where the advantages were somewhat 
 more equally divided with the Continental army ; for now 
 the number of the American troops was about thirteen 
 thousand, equal to those opposing them under General 
 Howe ; and the encampment at White Plains was so 
 strongly defended that it seemed to the British general 
 very dangerous to attack. Nevertheless it was necessary 
 to do something to prevent further loss of time. He 
 decided to give battle. Therefore, on the morning of the 
 28th of October he led his army out in two columns to 
 the assault of Washington s position, until within three- 
 quarters of a mile of it, when the Americans were seen 
 drawn up in order of battle, confident of the result and 
 well intrenched upon hilly ground. Even then General 
 Howe was unwilling to risk the event of a general en 
 gagement, and, deciding not to attack General Washing 
 ton s centre, the point nearest to him and most exposed, 
 he consumed the day in the investment of a piece of 
 high ground, called Chatterton s Hill, something less 
 than a mile southwest of Washington s camp, Avhich 
 was occupied by a small body of Americans. In this 
 encounter, which is known as the battle of White Plains, 
 
198 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1776, 
 
 he employed some four thousand of his men, the rest of 
 the army having seated themselves on the ground to wit 
 ness the spectacle. 
 
 At the end of the day, General Howe had taken Chat- 
 terton s Hill, but nothing else ; while Washington was 
 preparing for a further resistance, by sending his sick 
 and his stores to the rear of his camp and by throwing 
 up additional works to strengthen his position. The 
 two armies stood thus opposite to each other on the 
 two following days, the 29th and 30th of October, the 
 British waiting for reinforcements which had been sent 
 for from York Island and from Mamaroneck, and which 
 were now expected to come up, in order that the assault 
 might be renewed upon the 31st. But in the mean time 
 a violent rain-storm had set in, which prevented the ful 
 filment of this intention, and on the 1st of November 
 General Howe decided to abandon his attempt at White 
 Plains and to change altogether the plan of his operations, 
 hoping to gain the advantage over Washington which he 
 had thus far failed to attain, by a sudden diversion across 
 the Hudson River and an inroad into the country of New 
 Jersey. He withdrew his army, therefore, from its camp 
 at White Plains to Dobbs s Ferry, and thence retired, a 
 few days later, slowly down the river to King s Bridge. 
 
 General Washington was immediately aware of this 
 purpose, and he rightly conjectured from the enemy s 
 movements that his first step would be the reduction of 
 Fort Washington, in order to secure undisturbed possession 
 of York Island before crossing the river to open a cam 
 paign on the west bank. In order to counteract this pur 
 pose as far as possible, and with a reasonable expectation 
 of checking the British advance into New Jersey, Wash 
 ington directed the evacuation of Fort Washington, with 
 the view of saving his men in the garrison there and 
 of securing the artillery and stores ; and, having left a 
 sufficient body of troops to protect the country to the 
 
1776.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 199 
 
 north of White Plains, he proceeded to Peekskill and 
 crossed the Hudson River with a part of his force on the 
 13th of November, to join General Greene, who was then 
 in command in New Jersey, near Fort Lee. Unfortu 
 nately, this well-conceived plan of General Washington s 
 was not supported by his subordinate officers. He found, 
 to his great disappointment, that Fort Washington was 
 still held, by order of General Greene, and that arrange 
 ments were making to repel the threatened attack. 
 Late though it was for him to take any steps, under this 
 unexpected condition of affairs, he made hasty prepara 
 tions to save the garrison, but this proved to be impos 
 sible ; the position was assaulted on the 16th of Novem 
 ber by the British in great force, and, in spite of a gallant 
 resistance, the fort was captured and the garrison were 
 made prisoners of war. This was the heaviest loss the 
 American army had ever suffered ; it was disastrous at 
 that moment especially, when all its resources were ter 
 ribly reduced and when General Washington was not in 
 a position to spare a single man from his ranks. It 
 deprived him at one stroke of twenty-six hundred ex 
 cellent troops, with all their equipment, and led to the 
 surprise of General Greene by the British, four days 
 later, at Fort Lee, on the narrow strip of high land 
 between the Hudson River and the Hackensack, whence 
 that general was enabled only by a precipitate retreat 
 to save his men, at the expense of their blankets and 
 baggage, a great store of provisions, their tents left 
 standing in the hurry to get away, and nearly all his 
 cannon. 
 
 At this point began General Washington s memorable 
 retreat through New Jersey. Immediately after the cap 
 ture of Fort Lee, his army was drawn up between the 
 Hackensack River and the Passaic, where he was unable 
 to dispute his ground or to protect himself against the 
 extreme dangers which threatened him. He was in a 
 
200 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1776. 
 
 level country, without an intrenching tool of any kind, 
 at the head of a body of about three thousand effective 
 men, who had no tents to protect them against the rigors 
 of the winter season now coming on, and in a section 
 whose inhabitants were not only not friendly to him, but 
 many of them actually hostile. Added to the other diffi 
 culties that were increasing about him to make his situa 
 tion desperate, was the lamentable result of short enlist 
 ments, of the militia as well as of the Continental troops, 
 which made itself felt in the steady melting away of his 
 forces ; the men returned home as their terms expired, 
 sometimes even without waiting to be mustered out, while, 
 of the few not yet absolutely entitled to retire from the 
 field, a large proportion had been engaged to stay only 
 until the 1st of January, and there was no hope of re 
 taining them in the service after that. 
 
 In the mean time Lord Cornwallis had been ordered to 
 the command of the British forces about to undertake the 
 invasion of New Jersey, and he was now moving upon 
 Washington in a direction which threatened to cut the 
 latter off between the two rivers. General Washington 
 retired across the Passaic on the 21st of November, being 
 totally unable to defend himself, and took up a position 
 at Newark, his rear-guard having destroyed the bridge 
 just as the head of Cornwallis s dragoons and grenadiers 
 came up. From Newark General Washington sent an 
 earnest appeal to Congress and to the State of Pennsyl 
 vania, as well as to the Governor of New Jersey, setting 
 forth the dire necessities of the country and begging 
 them to support him by new enlistments and by call 
 ing out the militia, in order to prevent the enemy 
 from overrunning New Jersey and advancing immedi 
 ately to the investment of Philadelphia. Then, after 
 having maintained himself for five days in Newark, he 
 retreated still farther, in the face of Lord Cornwallis s 
 army, which was crossing the Passaic River, and took 
 
1776.] UPOtf THE AKRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 201 
 
 up his post upon the Raritan, at Brunswick, on the 28th 
 of November. 
 
 Whilst Washington was sharply censured in the criti 
 cisms of the time for not checking the enemy and for 
 not doing what it would have been difficult to do even if 
 he had commanded a well-equipped and well-disciplined 
 force, his present weakness was constantly increasing, and 
 he had the mortification, on the 30th of November, of 
 seeing a large part of his remaining army, then en 
 titled to discharge, abandon him almost in the very face 
 of the advancing enemy. 1 He had written, a few days 
 before this, to his brother, in bitter distress, " I am 
 wearied almost to death with the retrograde motion of 
 things." Yet the courage of this extraordinary man 
 never wavered ; his mind possessed an elasticity which 
 enabled him to adjust it to the immediate comprehension 
 of almost any conceivable set of circumstances ; and, 
 whilst his soldiers about him saw nothing but the se 
 rene countenance to which they were accustomed, he 
 kept his few troops in motion in order to conceal his 
 weakness from the enemy, he devised the plans that 
 were necessary for his future operations, and, with entire 
 self-possession, he wrote communications to his general 
 officers, to the Governors and Legislatures of several 
 States, and to Congress. 3 
 
 At Brunswick he kept up the appearance of military 
 strength as long as he was able, always with the pur 
 pose of delaying the enemy and wasting their time, until 
 the advance-guard of Cornwallis actually came in view 
 and forced him from the town. Continuing his retreat, 
 in the same general direction, along the route of the great 
 
 1 Marshall, Life of Washington, ii. 523. 
 
 2 To John Augustine Washington, 19th November, 1776 : Sparks, Writings 
 of Washington, iv. 182. 
 
 3 See Washington s Letters, November and December, 1776 : Sparks, 
 Writings of Washington, vol. iv. 
 
202 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1776. 
 
 modern avenue of traffic to-day between the cities of 
 New York and Philadelphia, Washington retired from 
 Brunswick on the 1st of December, with less than three 
 thousand half-clothed men, to Princeton, and thence to 
 Trenton, where he arrived on the 2d of the month. At 
 this moment Lord Howe and his brother the general, 
 as commissioners of the Crown, issued a proclamation 
 commanding all persons assembled in arms against His 
 Majesty to disband, and offering a full pardon to every 
 person who should submit and claim the benefits of the 
 proclamation within sixty days ; and great numbers of 
 people flocked in every day to make their peace and to 
 claim protection. Indeed, " the contrast between the 
 splendid appearance of the pursuing army, and that 
 made by the ragged Americans who were flying before 
 them, diminished in numbers, and destitute of almost 
 every necessary, could not fail to contribute to the gen 
 eral opinion that the contest was approaching its termi 
 nation." * 
 
 General Washington had left a detachment at Prince 
 ton, to make head against the enemy, with the inten 
 tion, after having transferred his baggage and stores 
 across the Delaware at Trenton, of going back to Prince 
 ton and offering such resistance as he could. But upon 
 his way thither he met his troops retiring before the 
 superior force of Cornwallis, who, as if not already suffi 
 ciently strong to crush the small remnant fleeing before 
 him, had been reinforced by a brigade of fresh troops and 
 was joined by General Howe himself. Washington has 
 tened back, therefore, with his whole army, to Trenton, 
 and there crossed the Delaware River, on the 8th of De 
 cember. " Who can tell what might have happened," 
 says the historian, 2 " if Howe had pushed forward four 
 thousand men by a forced march in pursuit of the Amer- 
 
 1 Marshall, Life of Washington, ii. 526. 
 
 2 Bancroft, History of the United States, ix. 202. 
 
1776.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 203 
 
 leans ?" It is perhaps not impossible to imagine what 
 would have happened. There was very little strength 
 left to resist him if he had done so. The wonder is 
 that he did not. This was the lowest ebb of American 
 independence. Nevertheless, those weary, ragged, bare 
 footed, strong-hearted men were destined to preserve the 
 liberty of their country. 
 
 Before retiring across the Delaware, General Washing 
 ton had destroyed all the bridges along the country 
 roads in the neighborhood of Trenton, and had collected, 
 in security from the enemy, all the boats within a distance 
 of seventy miles up and down the stream ; in addition 
 to this, he posted his troops in such a manner as to guard 
 as well as he could the different points at which it was 
 fordable. As his rear-guard crossed the river, the van 
 of the British army came in sight, the main body of 
 the enemy taking up its position at Trenton. But, sin 
 gularly enough, at this point, when the Americans were 
 driven almost to desperation and were upon the verge of 
 total defeat, the British commander distributed his army, 
 part along the Delaware from Trenton to Bordentown 
 and Burlington, and the remainder at different points to 
 the eastward in New Jersey, with the determination of 
 closing the campaign by going into winter quarters. 
 Misled by his expectation that the American army would 
 dwindle away through the expiration of the limited 
 terms of enlistment, well known to be now drawing to 
 their close, General Howe considered it unnecessary to 
 endure any longer the exposure to the rigors of the season, 
 which were growing daily more severe, and indulged him 
 self in the belief that it w r ould be a comparatively easy 
 matter to put an end to the war by a short campaign 
 early in the following spring. 
 
 Lord Corn wall is returned to New York, where he was 
 about to go aboard the packet which was to take him to 
 England upon leave. General Howe was preparing to 
 
204 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1776. 
 
 celebrate with splendid festivities the honors conferred 
 upon him by King George, and his investiture with the 
 Order of the Bath as a reward for his victory upon Long 
 Island. On the opposite side of the Delaware, Washing 
 ton, to whom all this seemed incomprehensible, did not at 
 first believe that it was the intention of the British to 
 close the campaign, in view of the advantages they already 
 held and of his own enfeebled condition, but suspected it 
 to be merely a mask to conceal a purpose on the part of 
 General Howe to wait a short time until the Delaware 
 should be frozen over, when he could cross his army upon 
 the ice and proceed at once to Philadelphia. Fearing 
 the effect upon the country of further reverses to the 
 American arms and the discouragement that must fol 
 low from the loss of so important a city as Philadelphia, 
 General Washington redoubled his appeals, especially to 
 Pennsylvania and to Congress, for more men ; and he 
 employed every possible means to strengthen himself, 
 not only in readiness to repel an attack, but even to 
 prepare for offensive operations. His solemn words of 
 warning aroused the people of Pennsylvania to a supreme 
 effort, and fifteen hundred men marched to his relief 
 from Philadelphia to Trenton, in addition to a German 
 battalion ordered thither by Congress ; with whom, and 
 with all the New England troops who could be spared 
 from the defence of the north to join him in this extremity 
 he had concentrated along the Delaware something like 
 five thousand men, to guard the crossings and to harass 
 the enemy by small parties whenever an opportunity 
 should occur. 
 
 The protection of Philadelphia became now a subject 
 of the greatest importance, to which all else was neces 
 sarily subordinated, not so much because of the intrinsic 
 value of the city in a military sense, as because Congress 
 was on the point of recruiting an army upon a firmer 
 footing and for a longer term than heretofore, and the 
 
1776.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 205 
 
 loss of Philadelphia was greatly dreaded, " when that 
 army was to be recruited on which the future hopes of 
 America were to rest, and which was to decide her destiny. 
 It was feared, and with much reason, that this event would 
 make so unfavorable an impression on the public mind as 
 to deter the American youth from engaging in a contest 
 becoming so desperate/ The genius of Washington 
 rendered a service to the country at that moment quite 
 as great as that of any single act he performed during 
 the war, and it produced a result the importance of which, 
 in its immediate effect upon the American cause and its 
 bearing upon the ultimate achievement of the indepen 
 dence of the United States, can scarcely be overestimated. 
 He conceived the daring plan of surprising the British 
 and of attacking them in their camps at Trenton and along 
 the Delaware, by a concerted action in which the several 
 detachments of his army were to cross unobserved and 
 make an assault upon the different posts at the same 
 instant. 
 
 The cold was intense, and it was snowing, on the night 
 of Christmas, which was selected as the time for this 
 movement; the river was so full of ice that it was ex 
 tremely difficult to cross ; and to take the artillery over 
 required the utmost labor. Nevertheless, Washington did 
 not hesitate. The attack upon the post at Trenton was 
 to be made by a body of a little over two thousand men, 
 all he could muster from his weakened following, and this 
 was to be led by the General himself. Starting out in the 
 afternoon of the 25th, he proceeded, according to the plan 
 agreed upon, to MacKonkey s Ferry, now called Wash 
 ington s Crossing, where it was expected to transfer the 
 men and the cannon by midnight, after which they were 
 to proceed upon their march of nine miles to Trenton and 
 attack the garrison early in the morning. It was about 
 
 Marshall, Life of Washington, ii. 540. 
 
206 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1776. 
 
 three o clock in the morning before they were all over, 
 and it took them some time to form on the other bank ; 
 after which they set out for their destination in a furious 
 gale of wind and snow, to assault at the end of a long 
 march an enemy who were fresh and well equipped for a 
 
 fight. 
 
 General Washington placed himself at the head of his 
 men, and they all pushed on in the teeth of the storm, 
 until they were well in the town of Trenton at daylight. 
 The garrison was composed of a detachment of Hessians, 
 under Colonel Rail. They were completely surprised : 
 in the midst of a furious attack made upon them by 
 Washington before they had time to form themselves, 
 their commander was mortally wounded ; and in less than 
 forty minutes from the first alarm they were overcome and 
 forced to surrender. Nine hundred and forty-six men 
 gave themselves up as prisoners of war to General Wash 
 ington, who captured with them twelve hundred small- 
 arms, six cannon, and all the standards of the brigade. 
 He had been entirely successful in carrying out his part 
 of the attack ; and, although the other detachments which 
 were to operate with him failed of their purpose by reason 
 of the heavy flow of ice in the river, which made it im 
 possible for them to cross, Washington had gained his 
 point. He had taken a step which not only revived the 
 drooping courage of the people about him, whose country 
 had been overrun by a victorious enemy and was now 
 held apparently without hope of release, but also taught 
 the lesson that the American army, destitute though it was, 
 could still make head against its adversary, in the cause 
 of freedom ; and it renewed confidence throughout the 
 United States both in their General and in the ultimate 
 result of their struggle. There was yet much hardship, 
 there were many bitter trials, in store for the Americans, 
 before the war should be ended, but this little battle had 
 turned the ebbing tide. 
 
1776.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 207 
 
 If the whole of the concerted plan had been carried 
 out, and the rest of his troops had been able to join him 
 at Trenton, as he had expected, General Washington 
 would have moved at once against the enemy, in the 
 hope of breaking all their posts, and of afterward main 
 taining his position once more in New Jersey. But this 
 now was impossible, and he hastened, before the British 
 could be massed against him, to recross the Delaware 
 River. Encumbered as he was with nearly a thousand 
 prisoners and with all the captured baggage and equipment, 
 he marched back to the ferry on the 26th of December, 
 in the driving storm which still continued, and safely 
 transferred his tired and almost frozen men to the Penn 
 sylvania side. 
 
 The news of the battle of Trenton was received with 
 amazement by the British leaders. General Howe deter 
 mined to resume active operations, in spite of the winter 
 season ; and Lord Cornwallis, having abandoned his visit 
 to England, returned to the army in New Jersey, and 
 concentrated a very large force at Princeton, where he 
 protected himself by hastily constructed works. On the 
 2d of January, Cornwallis advanced from Princeton 
 against the army of Washington, who had again crossed 
 the Delaware, on the 30th of December, and had taken 
 a position at Trenton. The superior force of the British 
 at this moment threatened the destruction of the Ameri 
 cans and placed General Washington in an extremely 
 critical situation. Another retreat across the Delaware, 
 to say nothing of the difficulties attending such a move 
 ment, by reason of the ice, which formed an almost 
 impassable barrier but was at no place strong enough 
 to bear the weight of marching upon it, would have 
 been tantamount to the evacuation of New Jersey, and 
 such an acknowledgment of defeat as would have de 
 stroyed the influence upon the country of the victory 
 just gained at Trenton ; and yet to hold out in the 
 
208 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1776. 
 
 face of Cornwallis with the hastily collected body of 
 five thousand men, most of them totally unacquainted 
 with war, of whom Washington was now able to dis 
 pose, would have been certain ruin. But here again 
 the fortitude of Washington seems only to have been 
 increased by the presence of imminent danger, and with 
 mature wisdom and unerring judgment he determined 
 upon the course he was to pursue. The very bold 
 ness of his decision enabled him to carry it out ; for, 
 although he had surpassed all imagination by his attack 
 upon Trenton and had shown the British that he was a 
 desperate fighter who was never beaten whilst he had a 
 single resource, surely, under his present circumstances, 
 there was nothing to lead Lord Cornwallis to expect from 
 him any further offensive operations, when it was not 
 even likely that he would be able to sustain himself until 
 the following day. And yet, in spite of this discouraging 
 situation, Washington succeeded in making another daring 
 attack upon the British. He had drawn up his army 
 along the Assanpink, a small creek which ran through 
 the town of Trenton, where he was awaiting the advance 
 of Cornwallis, who now approached in force, but who 
 was not likely to cross the creek immediately, because 
 the Americans had so disposed themselves that all the 
 fords were guarded. This gave Washington an opportu 
 nity to prepare the movement which he subsequently car 
 ried out, for the British, after having made one or two 
 ineffectual attempts to cross the Assanpink Creek, sat 
 down for the night and lighted their camp-fires, the fires 
 of the Americans burning brightly, in the mean time, 
 upon the other side. 
 
 The plan conceived by General Washington was to slip 
 away quietly at night from the front of Cornwallis, and, 
 by a rapid movement, to gain his rear and assault the 
 garrison at Princeton, which he knew to be held by a 
 small detachment of the enemy, the main forces having 
 
1776.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 209 
 
 been concentrated in the advance upon Trenton ; and, if 
 lie were successful in this first attempt, then to push on 
 quickly to Brunswick, where the principal magazines and 
 the treasure-box lay, under a weak guard, and to make 
 an attack upon that post. If he succeeded in this he 
 would call back Cornwallis to his own defence in the 
 rear, Philadelphia would be relieved from danger, for 
 the present at least, and nearly all of New Jersey would 
 be recovered from the enemy. If he failed, the worst 
 that could happen was that Philadelphia would fall into 
 the hands of Cornwallis, which it was sure to do at all 
 events if the American army were forced to retreat farther 
 inland before him. 
 
 The enemy was completely deceived by the apparent 
 quiet in the American camp, and the British officers, 
 having placed their sentries as usual, lay down to sleep, 
 confident that upon the next day they should bear down 
 upon Washington with such superior weight that he must 
 necessarily succumb, and hoping by this move to close 
 the war. But the situation was very different in Wash 
 ington s camp. As soon as it grew dark he began to 
 remove his baggage to a place of security, and about 
 midnight he moved away with his soldiers so secretly 
 that the British outposts saw nothing and heard nothing ; 
 the American camp-fires were burning all night along 
 the Assanpink, because Washington had left a few men 
 behind to put wood upon them and to keep them bright, 
 and the British sentries were sure that all was right 
 because they saw American sentries moving up and down 
 throughout the watches of the night and early morning. 
 
 In the mean time, Washington was well on his way. 
 He had taken a roundabout road to pass beyond the 
 British flank, and by sunrise on the 3d of January was 
 at Princeton, where he immediately began an attack upon 
 the British regiments in the garrison, which resulted, after 
 a very short engagement, in the retreat of the enemy, 
 
 VOL. I. 14 
 
210 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1777. 
 
 leaving him in possession of the town with nearly three 
 hundred prisoners of war. At Trenton, Lord Cornwallis 
 was astonished in the morning to see nothing of the 
 Americans, but very soon the sound of their cannon came 
 from the direction of Princeton to indicate to him where 
 they had gone ; and in an instant the movement flashed 
 upon his mind, filling him with consternation lest he 
 should have been outdone and the extremely valuable 
 magazines at Brunswick should be captured. He broke 
 up his camp with all possible speed, and started for Bruns 
 wick for the purpose of protecting that post if it were not 
 already too late. He accomplished that object, because 
 General Washington had not been able with his exhausted 
 troops to carry out the whole of his plan, many of his 
 soldiers being without shoes and stockings, most of them 
 wretchedly clad, and all having been exposed without 
 shelter to the winter weather during his recent fatiguing 
 movements in New Jersey. Therefore, just as the British 
 were coming in sight of Princeton, Washington moved 
 out of the town, and, breaking down the bridges over 
 the small streams which he crossed upon his way, turned 
 toward the wooded country and the highlands, where his 
 men found temporary shelter, and on the 5th of the 
 month he took up his head-quarters at Morristown. 
 
 The fighting was now over for the winter. The cause 
 of Independence was still alive. What the following cam 
 paign should bring could not be foretold ; the prospect 
 was gloomy enough ; but the valor of General Washing 
 ton awakened new hope throughout the land, his splendid 
 leadership had driven the enemy back, and on the side 
 of the British the results of this year s campaign were 
 practically nothing. They held posts in New Jersey 
 at Amboy and Brunswick and at Paulus Hook, but the 
 greater part of the State was free. New England was 
 intact except the little island of Rhode Island ; the great 
 territory of New York State, except Fort Niagara, was 
 
1777.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 211 
 
 out of their control ; and they had no footing in the 
 whole of the Southern States from Delaware to Florida, 
 Sir William Howe retired to his quarters in New York 
 City, where and in the adjacent islands his authority still 
 was undisputed, to pass his time agreeably, to wait for the 
 pleasant weather of spring, and to add to his troops by the 
 reinforcements which he had asked for from England, and 
 which the Government was making strenuous efforts to get 
 ready for him. Although it began to be felt in England, 
 after the incidents at Trenton and at Princeton, that Sir 
 William Howe was not prosecuting the war with the 
 energy that had been expected of him, and that he ought 
 to be replaced by a more enterprising commander, lie 
 was protected against this criticism by the favor of the 
 King, who would not assent to his removal, and he was 
 left in New York to waste his time and to give the 
 Americans an opportunity to prepare for the campaign 
 of the following year. He was not granted all the rein 
 forcements that he had asked for at the close of hostilities, 
 but his already superior army was further strengthened by 
 the addition of new levies in England and Ireland and 
 new purchases of troops in Germany, to the extent of some 
 three thousand men. The ministry insisted that he would 
 be able to end the war in a year with what lie had ; and 
 with exceeding bitterness of spirit against the Ameri 
 cans, Lord George Germain wrote to Lord Howe and to 
 Sir William Howe, " It will be incumbent upon you to 
 use the powers with which you are intrusted in such a 
 manner that those persons who shall have shown them 
 selves undeserving of the royal mercy may not escape 
 that punishment which is due to their crimes, and which 
 it will be expedient to inflict for the sake of example to 
 futurity." 
 
 Washington was still holding his position in New Jersey 
 with a force of which the whole number fit for duty did 
 not exceed three thousand men. Many of these were en- 
 
212 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1777. 
 
 gaged for only a few months. The treasury was empty, 
 the government of Congress was lamentably deficient, the 
 recruiting service brought in soldiers very slowly in spite 
 of stupendous efforts on the part of the Commander-in- 
 Chief and the critical condition of the country s affairs. 
 No adversary could have presented a more slender de 
 fence at that moment, if the British had seized the oppor 
 tunity so plainly offered by this inherent weakness. It was 
 not a campaign of British energy, however, fortunately 
 for the American cause. Sir William Howe virtually 
 did nothing until the middle of the following summer, 
 that of 1777 ; and he then changed his plan of campaign 
 once more by deciding to give up the attempt in New 
 Jersey and to proceed against Philadelphia by sea. 
 
 General Washington remained at Morristown, practi 
 cally undisturbed, until the end of May, when he moved 
 his army, now increased to between seven and eight thou 
 sand men, to the higher ground and more advantageous 
 position of Middlebrook, on the north side of the Raritan, 
 in New Jersey, about fifteen miles north of Princeton and 
 some nine miles from Brunswick. Toward the middle 
 of June the British again made a demonstration in New 
 Jersey, proceeding to Brunswick with a splendidly dis 
 ciplined and perfectly equipped army of seventeen thou 
 sand men, the like of which the veteran officers, both 
 German and English, declared they had never seen be 
 fore. Since they were furnished with boats and pontoon 
 bridges, it seemed evident that General Howe s intention 
 was to cut Washington off from Princeton by a rapid 
 march and to cross the Delaware River. Washington 
 disposed his troops, as well as his resources would allow 
 him, to prevent this movement, and on the 14th of June 
 the two armies confronted each other. But General Howe 
 could not decide even then to make an attack, in spite of 
 his superiority of two to one ; and a few days later, on the, 
 19th, he retired with the whole British force to Brunswick, 
 
1777.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 213 
 
 and afterward to Amboy. After some desultory move 
 ments which produced no result, on the 30th of June he 
 evacuated New Jersey, which he never saw again. One 
 is led almost irresistibly to the belief that General Howe 
 was absolutely indifferent to his success in this war. His 
 efforts never went beyond the point of moderate diffi 
 culty ; he sacrificed his military prestige in a series of 
 unmanly failures, which nothing could have accounted 
 for in the case of a soldier interested in his work. 
 
 Instead of seizing now an opportunity to move up the 
 Hudson River in force and to occupy the highlands, so as 
 to be in readiness to support General Burgoyne, who was 
 marching southward from Canada for the purpose of 
 capturing Albany and uniting the British armies in a 
 continuous line north and south so as to cut off New Eng 
 land from the Middle States, Sir William Howe embarked 
 his whole army in the harbor of New York, except such 
 troops as were immediately necessary to defend the posts, 
 and, with a fleet of nearly three hundred vessels, dropped 
 down to Sandy Hook on the 23d of July, and sailed away. 
 
 But the sei/Aire of the highlands in New York, with the 
 consequent control of the Hudson River, was so much in 
 the mind of General Washington, this having been the 
 one movement of the British which he had feared the 
 most, that it seemed improbable to him that Sir William 
 Howe would abandon it at this moment, or that, especially 
 in view of the continued approach of General Burgoyne 
 from the north, the British commander would turn away 
 from a course for which the military reasons were at that 
 time so obvious. He feared that the fleet had put out to 
 sea only in order to mislead him, that if he moved from 
 his strong position at Middlebrook he should expose him 
 self to an attack in case it suddenly returned, and that 
 this was a feint intended to dislodge him, in order that, 
 being set upon by a vastly superior force, he might be 
 destroyed. 
 
214 PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN AMERICA [1777. 
 
 In perfect self-possession, Washington held his camp at 
 Middlebrook, whilst he took the necessary steps to watch 
 the movements of the enemy, to throw his forces against 
 them on the Hudson if they reappeared, or to move 
 toward the south if their designs lay in that direction. 
 
 His anxiety was finally relieved by the news that the 
 British fleet had appeared off the capes of the Delaware 
 on the 30th of July. He then formed his army into two 
 columns and marched to Philadelphia. 
 
 It was at this time that the Marquis de La Fayette 
 had arrived in America and was making his way north 
 ward to present himself to Congress and to enter the 
 Continental army. Having set out from Charleston, as 
 we have already seen, on the 25th of June, he had reached 
 Philadelphia on the 27th of July, only a few days before 
 the British fleet appeared in the Delaware and the Ameri 
 can commander moved his army into Pennsylvania. It 
 was whilst La Fayette was in Philadelphia that he saw 
 for the first time General Washington, for whom he con 
 ceived at once an attachment which was returned by the 
 General in the most kindly expressions of sympathy 
 and good will, and this meeting gave rise to a friend 
 ship that united them in affectionate intercourse during 
 the remainder of their lives. General Washington was 
 at a dinner in Philadelphia, when the young Marquis, 
 who was also a guest, first caught sight of him, " and, 
 though he was surrounded by officers and private citi 
 zens, the majesty of his countenance and of his figure 
 made it impossible not to recognize him ; he was especially 
 distinguished also by the affability of his manners and 
 the dignity with which he addressed those about him." 
 When they were about to separate, Washington took La 
 Fayette aside, spoke to him very kindly, complimented 
 him upon the noble spirit he had shown and the sacrifices 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 20. 
 
1777.] UPON THE ARRIVAL OF LA FAYETTE. 215 
 
 he had made in favor of the American cause, and then 
 told him that he should be pleased if he would make the 
 quarters of the Commander-in-Chief his home, establish 
 himself there whenever he thought proper, and consider 
 himself at all times as one of his family ; adding, in a tone 
 of pleasantry, that he could not promise him the luxuries 
 of a court, or even the conveniences which his former 
 habits might have rendered essential to his comfort, but 
 that, since he had become an American soldier, he would 
 doubtless contrive to accommodate himself to the charac 
 ter he had assumed, and would submit with a good grace 
 to the customs, manners, and privations of a republican 
 army. La Fayette s joy at his success with Congress 
 was redoubled by this flattering proof of friendship and 
 regard on the part of the Commander-in-Chief. His 
 horses and equipage were immediately sent to camp, and 
 ever afterward, even when he had the command of a 
 division, he kept up his intimacy at head-quarters, and 
 enjoyed all the advantages of a member of the General s 
 family. The day after the dinner, Washington inspected 
 the fortifications in the Delaware River, and invited La 
 Fayette to accompany him. 1 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 454. 
 
216 FIRST SERVICE IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY. [1777. 
 
 CHAPTEE VII. 
 
 LA FAYETTE S FIRST SERVICE IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY 
 
 BRANDYWINE AND GLOUCESTER. 
 
 WHEN the Marquis de La Fayette first saw General 
 Washington, in Philadelphia, about the 1st of August, 
 1777, the American army was encamped some five miles 
 north of the city, between Germantown and the Schuyl- 
 kill River, upon an eminence not far from the intersec 
 tion of School House Lane with the Township Line, the 
 present Wissahickon Avenue. 1 The British fleet having 
 withdrawn from the capes of the Delaware and having 
 put to sea again shortly after its appearance there upon 
 the 30th of July, because, as it afterward proved, the 
 admiral concluded that he should not be able to pass the 
 obstructions in the Delaware River so as to approach 
 Philadelphia, General Washington was left in very serious 
 doubt as to the course he should pursue. His uncertainty 
 was greatly increased, and his anxiety aroused, as day 
 after day passed and nothing was heard of General Howe. 
 At the end of the first week in August, whilst he was " yet 
 entirely in the dark as to the destination of the enemy," 2 
 and time enough having elapsed for the fleet to make its 
 appearance in Chesapeake Bay, if that were its destina 
 tion, or to return to New York, the Commander-in-Chief 
 began to fear that the purpose of the British lay to the 
 eastward ; and he decided to prepare for their appearance 
 in that direction by moving his troops toward New Jer- 
 
 1 Baker, The Camp by Schuylkill Falls, p. 1 . 
 
 2 Washington to General Putnam, 7th August, 1777 : Sparks, Writings of 
 Washington, v. 23. 
 
1777.] FIRST SERVICE IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY. 217 
 
 sey and by crossing the Delaware again, 1 with the view 
 of approaching the country of the Hudson River. He 
 set out, therefore, on the 8th of August ; but two days 
 later he was overtaken by an express from Philadelphia 
 announcing that the British fleet had been seen, on the 7th 
 of the month, off Sinepuxent Inlet, to the southward of 
 the capes of the Delaware. He halted immediately, 
 and went into camp on the Old York Road, near the 
 Neshaminy Creek, about half a mile above the present 
 village of Hartsville, in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. 2 
 
 It was there that La Fayette joined the army, as a vol 
 unteer, in the month of August, about a week after he 
 had written his letter of thanks to Congress for the com 
 mission they had granted him, which we have seen above. 
 What he saw there, upon his arrival at head-quarters, is 
 thus described by him in referring to it long afterward : 3 
 " About eleven thousand men rather poorly armed, and 
 much worse clad, presented a singular appearance. In 
 the midst of a great variety of clothing, sometimes even 
 of nakedness, the best garments were a sort of hunting- 
 shirts, loose jackets made of gray linen, very common in 
 Carolina. As for their tactics, it is enough to say that 
 when in the line of battle it became necessary for a regi 
 ment to assume a position to the right without breaking 
 ranks, instead of filing simply to the right, the left began 
 a never-ending countermarch. They w r ere always drawn 
 up in two ranks, the small men in the front ; but with 
 this exception there was no distinction made as to size. 
 In spite of these disadvantages, however, they were fine 
 soldiers and led by zealous officers. Bravery took the 
 place with them of science, and every day improved their 
 experience and their discipline." Upon the arrival in 
 
 1 To General Putnam, llth August, 1777: Sparks, Writings of Washing 
 ton, v. 2(>. 
 
 a Baker, The Camp by Schuylkill Falls, p. 10. 
 8 Me moires de ma Main, i. 20. 
 
218 FIRST SERVICE IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY. [1777. 
 
 camp of this spirited young foreign soldier, Washington 
 said, by way of compliment, " It is somewhat embarrassing 
 to us to show ourselves to an officer who has just come 
 from the army of France," to which La Fayette quickly 
 replied, " I am here to learn, and not to teach ;" an answer 
 so different in tone from what was usual among the Eu 
 ropeans then in the American army that it gave general 
 satisfaction and made friends for him at once. 1 
 
 While the Marquis de La Fayette had obtained a com 
 mission from Congress as major-general, with the under 
 standing that he should serve for the present, at least, 
 as a volunteer and without command, his ambition was 
 very strong, no doubt, to attain and to deserve the full 
 authority of an officer in accordance with his rank. He 
 appears to have understood perfectly his relations at that 
 time to the service, yet in his eagerness to make him 
 self in every respect an American soldier and to identify 
 himself as such with the Continental army it is likely 
 that he expressed to the Commander-in-Chief, who, 
 though favorably impressed by his manners in Phila 
 delphia, knew him then but very slightly, such hopeful 
 ness as to his future as to leave a doubt in the mind 
 of Washington what Congress intended him to do in 
 the case of La Fayette in the matter of an active com 
 mand, when the latter should join the army. Upon the 
 very delicate subject of foreign officers in America, which 
 had already given rise to serious difficulties, General 
 Washington had expressed much solicitude in his letters 
 to Congress, as we have seen ; and now the expected ar 
 rival at his head-quarters of the Marquis de La Fayette 
 appears to have caused him some apprehension lest it 
 might lead to further embarrassment. He wrote, there 
 fore, in this connection to a gentleman in Congress, 2 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 21. 
 
 2 To Benjamin Harrison, from Neshaminy Bridge, 19th August, 1777 : 
 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 35. 
 
1777.] FIRST SERVICE IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY. 219 
 
 " If I did not misunderstand what you or some other member 
 of Congress said to me, respecting the appointment of the Mar 
 quis de Lafayette, he has misconceived the design of his ap 
 pointment, or Congress did not understand the extent of his 
 views ; for certain it is, that I understood him, that he does not 
 conceive his commission is merely honorary, but given with a 
 view to command a division of this army. It is true he has said, 
 that he is young and inexperienced, but at the same time has 
 always accompanied it with a hint, that, so soon as I shall think 
 him fit for the command of a division, he shall be ready to enter 
 upon the duties of it, and in the mean time has offered his service 
 for a smaller command. What the designs of Congress respecting 
 this gentleman were, and what line of conduct I am to pursue to 
 comply with their design and his expectations, I know not, and 
 beg to be instructed. If Congress meant, that his rank should be 
 unaccompanied by command, I wish it had been sufficiently ex 
 plained to him. If, on the other hand, it was intended to invest 
 him with all the powers of a major-general, why have I been led 
 into a contrary belief, and left in the dark with respect to my own 
 conduct towards him? . . . 
 
 u l was going to address Congress for instructions in the case 
 of the Marquis de Lafayette, but upon second thought concluded 
 to ask some direction of my conduct in this matter through a 
 member, and therefore have imposed this task upon you. Let me 
 beseech you then, my good Sir, to give me the sentiments of 
 Congress on this matter, that I may endeavour, as far as it is in 
 my power, to comply with them. . . . The Marquis is now in 
 Philadelphia, but expected up this day or to-morrow." 
 
 Mr. Harrison s reply to this letter gave the General to 
 understand that the appointment was merely an honorary 
 one for the present, and that he was not bound by the 
 tenor of the commission to give him a command, but was 
 to follow his own judgment and discretion in the matter. 
 The question was one which very quickly freed itself from 
 difficulty in the sequel ; for, during the campaign which 
 was then just opening, La Fayette won favor in the army 
 by distinguished bravery and by the display of very 
 considerable military skill, so that before the end of it 
 General Washington assigned to him, with the approval 
 of Congress, the division he so greatly longed for. 
 
220 FIRST SERVICE IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY. [1777. 
 
 La Fayette arrived at the Neshaminy camp the day 
 after General Washington had written to Mr. Harrison, 
 and upon the following day, the 21st of August, he was 
 present at the council of war which had been summoned 
 by the Commander-in-Chief to discuss the situation and 
 to consider the advisability of moving the troops. This 
 was the first council of war that La Fayette attended in 
 America, and upon this occasion he bore the rank of 
 major-general in the service of the United States. 1 
 
 In the absence of information as to the whereabouts 
 of the British fleet, the council of war decided, as the 
 unanimous opinion of the general officers present, that 
 the enemy must have sailed for Charleston ; for if they 
 had gone to Chesapeake Bay they would have been there 
 long since and the fact would have been well established ; 
 besides, there was no place short of Charleston of suffi 
 cient importance to engage their attention. In view of 
 this conclusion, since it was not deemed expedient to 
 transport the army to so distant a point as South Caro 
 lina, where it could not hope to arrive in time to perform 
 any service, the decision was taken to advance immedi 
 ately toward the Hudson River. But, news having been 
 received by Congress that the fleet had reappeared, Presi 
 dent Hancock wrote, on the 22d of August, to General 
 Washington, " This moment an express arrived from 
 Maryland with an account of near two hundred sail of 
 General Howe s fleet being at anchor in the Chesapeake 
 Bay. In consequence of this advice, Congress have 
 ordered the immediate removal of the stores and pris 
 oners from Lancaster and York in this State to places 
 of greater safety." 
 
 This fixed at once the purpose of the Commander-in- 
 Chief. Upon the following day he turned his army 
 toward Philadelphia, and, marching down the Old York 
 
 1 Washington s letter to the President of Congress : Sparks, Writings of 
 Washington, v. 38, and note on page 41. 
 
1777.] FIRST SERVICE IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY. 221 
 
 Road, encamped a few miles north of the city, near Ger- 
 mantown, he himself occupying with his staff, as his 
 head-quarters for the night, " Stenton," the fine old seat 
 of the Logan family, which is still standing. From this 
 point he made preparations to pass through the city the 
 next morning, the 24th of August ; for he had in mind 
 the purpose of showing his troops to the people there, in 
 order to encourage the friends of liberty by the spirit and 
 bearing of its defenders, and to counteract any feeling of 
 disaffection that might have arisen from the near approach 
 of the enemy s threatening force. 1 From Stenton he issued 
 the general order that 
 
 "The army is to march in one column through the city of 
 Philadelphia, going in at and marching down Front Street to 
 Chestnut, and up Chestnut to the Common. A small halt is to 
 be made about a mile this side of the city until the rear is clear 
 up and the line in proper order. . . . The drums and fifes of each 
 brigade are to be collected in the centre of it, and a tune for the 
 quick-step played, but with such moderation that the men may 
 step to it with ease, and without dancing along, or totally disre 
 garding the music, as has been too often the case." 
 
 La Fayette, who rode by the side of Washington through 
 the city, says that the General was very handsome at the 
 head of his troops, and that with sprigs of green in their 
 hats, stepping to the music of the fife and the drum, in 
 the presence of all the citizens, these soldiers, in spite of 
 their nakedness, presented a creditable appearance. 3 After 
 passing through Philadelphia the army advanced without 
 delay to Chester. 
 
 In the mean while, the British commander was ap 
 proaching from the south through Chesapeake Bay ; 
 having met with no opposition, he sailed up to the Elk 
 
 1 Washington to the President of Congress, 23d August, 1777 : Sparks, 
 Writings of Washington, v. 43. 
 
 s Saffell, Records of the Revolutionary War, pp. 333-336. 
 3 Memoires de ina Main, i. 21. 
 
222 FIRST SERVICE IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY. [1777. 
 
 River, at the extreme northern end of the Chesapeake, 
 and made a landing on the 25th of August, near " the 
 Head of Elk," now Elkton, in Maryland, upon the present 
 line of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Rail 
 way. He was at the head of an army of eighteen thou 
 sand veteran troops, who landed from their voyage in 
 excellent condition, who were thoroughly supplied with 
 all the best equipments of war known at that day, and 
 who were commanded, under him, by Lieutenant-General 
 the Earl Cornwallis and Lieutenant-General Knyphausen, 
 officers of long experience and of unquestioned military 
 skill. His attitude was at that moment extremely threat 
 ening. He was but about fifty miles from Philadelphia, 
 the objective point of his expedition, in a country which 
 presented no serious natural obstructions to his progress, 
 and which was not intersected by any streams that were 
 not easily passable. 
 
 The American army was in front of him to dispute his 
 passage. But the contest was an unequal one. General 
 Washington s forces had been increased by the militia 
 of Pennsylvania, by volunteers, and by the division of 
 General Sullivan, who had recently joined him, to some 
 fifteen thousand men ; though of these, by reason of ill 
 ness, lack of clothing, and very defective arms, the number 
 of really serviceable troops was only between eleven and 
 twelve thousand. 
 
 Determined, however, to make a stand against the 
 enemy, the Commander-in-Chief had advanced to the 
 hills beyond Wilmington, when, on the 3d of Septem 
 ber, the British army began its march toward Philadel 
 phia. After one or two skirmishes between the head of 
 the British columns and the advanced posts of the Amer 
 ican army, Washington s main body lay, on the 7th of 
 September, at a little village called Newport, in Delaware, 1 
 
 1 Washington to General Heath, 7th September, 1777 : Sparks, Writings 
 of Washington, v. 55. 
 
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1777.] BRANDYWINE. 223 
 
 upon which place General Howe advanced two days later 
 in force, as if to make an attack, until he had reached a 
 point two miles distant from the post. He did not make 
 an attack, however, which aroused the suspicion of General 
 Washington as to his real purpose, and, as he said, 1 " Upon 
 reconnoitring their situation, it appeared probable that 
 they only meant to amuse us in front, while their real 
 intent was to march by our right, and, by suddenly pass 
 ing the Brandy wine and gaining the heights upon the 
 north side of that river, get between us and Philadelphia, 
 and cut us off from that city. To prevent this, it was 
 judged expedient to change our position immediately." 
 Accordingly, General Washington moved his army back, 
 at two o clock in the morning of the 9th of September, 
 and crossed the Brandywine at Chadd s Ford toward the 
 evening of that day. 
 
 The Brandywine is a very small river made up of the 
 combined waters of two inconsiderable streams, called re 
 spectively the East Branch and the West Branch, which 
 flows through a broken and at some points rather hilly 
 country toward the Delaware River, which it enters after 
 uniting with the Christiana Creek somewhat to the north 
 and east of Wilmington, about twenty-five miles below 
 the city of Philadelphia. It is passable, especially in the 
 late summer season, at a number of shallow places which 
 were well known and utilized at the period of the Revolu 
 tion, among which was Chadd s Ford, where Washington s 
 army intrenched itself on the night of the 9th of Sep 
 tember, and which has since become famous from the 
 battle which took place there two days later. The gen 
 eral direction of the stream at Chadd s Ford is, speaking 
 roughly, from north to south. There are several other 
 fords within a few miles, above and below, notably those 
 known as Trimble s Ford on the West Branch and 
 
 1 Washington to the President of Congress, 9th September, 1777 : Sparks, 
 Writings of Washington, v. 50. 
 
224 BRANDYWINE. [1777. 
 
 Jefferies s Ford on the East Branch, which played a part 
 in the action. The country was at that time thickly 
 covered with forests, though there were numerous roads 
 running through it by which communication was made 
 easy, both from north to south and from east to west. 
 Of these the more important were the main road, which 
 ran east and west and crossed the Brandywine at Chadd s 
 Ford, leading by Welch s Tavern and Kennett Meeting 
 house ; to the north of it, and running in the same di 
 rection, at a distance varying from one to two miles, the 
 highway known as the Street Road ; at right angles with 
 each of these, to the west of the Brandywine, the Great 
 Valley Road, leading toward the north ; on the east side 
 of the Brandywine another, running generally north and 
 south, by Sconneltown, across the Street Road, to the Bir 
 mingham Meeting-house ; while an avenue leading east 
 and west from Trimble s Ford to Jefferies s Ford closed a 
 rude form of quadrangle about the country through which 
 the Brandywine flows, some six or seven miles to the north 
 of Citadel s Ford ; traversed, however, by several by-ways 
 which made any one point within it accessible from the 
 others. 
 
 The position taken by General Washington was on the 
 east bank of the Brandywine, where he constructed in- 
 trenchments upon the hilly ground directly facing and 
 commanding the passage at Chadd s Ford, and drew up 
 his army along the river, with his right extending toward 
 the north, and his extreme left protected by thickly 
 wooded country to the south of the Ford. Here he re 
 mained on the 10th of September, expecting the appear 
 ance of the enemy, having thrown out in the mean time 
 an advanced post, consisting of General Maxwell s light 
 infantry, on the opposite, or west, bank of the Brandy- 
 wine to defend the approaches to the Ford. The Com- 
 mander-in-Chief established his head-quarters at the house 
 of Benjamin Ring, on the road about one mile east of the 
 
1777.] BKANDYWINE. 225 
 
 Ford, and the Marquis de La Fayette lodged in a pictu 
 resque little house about a quarter of a mile farther to 
 the east, on the same road, belonging to Gideon Gilpin, 
 which is still standing and is known throughout the sur 
 rounding country as " La Fayette s Head-Quarters." The 
 right of the American army was commanded by General 
 Sullivan, with six brigades, including those of Lord Stir 
 ling and General Stephen. The extreme left, below the 
 Ford, was held by General Armstrong with the Pennsyl 
 vania militia. General Wayne s division, with Proctor s 
 artillery, occupied the ground at the Ford. General 
 Greene s division (consisting of the brigades of General 
 Weedon and General Muhlenberg), which was accompa 
 nied by the Commander-in-Chief, formed a reserve and 
 took during the battle a central position between the right 
 and the left wing. 
 
 Upon the other side of the Brandywine the whole 
 British army, then about seven miles distant, united at 
 Kennett Square, on the 10th of September, and early in 
 the morning of the llth began its march in two columns, 
 commanded respectively by Lord Cornwallis and General 
 Knyphausen, along the road leading to Chadd s Ford. 
 As soon as this information reached General Washington, 
 shortly after daylight, he put his entire force under arms 
 and prepared to contest the passage of the Brandywine. 
 Soon the outposts under General Maxwell were driven 
 in, after light skirmishes, and the British column under 
 General Knyphausen, consisting of about five thousand 
 men, advanced to Chadd s Ford, where it was drawn up 
 on the heights opposite the American intrenchments, and, 
 opening with its artillery, and making demonstrations of 
 attack, appeared about to undertake the crossing at the 
 Ford. This proved, however, to be merely a feint ; for 
 the main force of the British army had gone in another 
 direction. Instead of advancing toward Chadd s Ford 
 with General Knyphausen, Lord Cornwallis, who was 
 
 VOL. I. 15 
 
226 BKANDYWINE. [1777. 
 
 accompanied by General Howe, moved to the north early 
 in the morning with a column of thirteen thousand men 
 and took the Great Valley Road leading to the upper fords 
 of the Brandywine, Trimble s Ford and Jefferies s Ford, 
 with the purpose of turning the position of the Ameri 
 cans, and, while General Knyphausen diverted their at 
 tention by his parade at Chadd s Ford, of falling upon 
 their rear and enclosing them between the two divisions 
 of the British army. When this movement should have 
 been accomplished, it was the intention of General Knyp 
 hausen to cross the Ford and co-operate by attacking the 
 Americans in front. 
 
 The result of this plan was that the action at the battle 
 of the Brandywine consisted of two distinct encounters ; 
 the one which took place in the afternoon with Lord 
 Cornwallis s flanking column in the neighborhood of 
 the Birmingham Meeting-house, and that which occurred 
 about the same time with General Knyphausen at Chadd s 
 Ford. Toward mid-day, whilst General Washington was 
 watching the enemy at Chadd s Ford, information reached 
 him that a very large detachment of the British, with 
 many field-pieces, had turned into the Great Valley Road 
 and was marching toward the north in the direction of 
 Trimble s Ford and Jefferies s Ford ; it was estimated at 
 about five thousand men by an officer who reported 
 having seen it, and who added that the dust arose be 
 hind for a long distance. Believing from this that the 
 enemy had divided his forces, General Washington de 
 termined immediately to make an attack upon him ; 
 which if it had been carried out without interruption 
 would probably have changed in some very important 
 details the result of the day s work. He directed General 
 Sullivan and Lord Stirling to cross the Brandywine and 
 fall upon the column commanded by Lord Cornwallis in 
 order to keep it in check whilst he himself should cross 
 at Chadd s Ford and assault the division of General 
 
1777.] BRANDY WINE. 227 
 
 Knyphausen. Unfortunately, word was sent at this criti 
 cal moment by General Sullivan to the Commander-in- 
 Chief, who received it after he had actually set his troops 
 in motion to execute this manoeuvre, that counter-intelli 
 gence had been brought to him which led him to be 
 lieve that the reported movement of the British was 
 only a feint, and that the column of Lord Cornwallis 
 had returned to reunite with that of General Knyp 
 hausen ; that a major of militia who had left the forks of 
 the Brandywine late in the day assured him there was no 
 appearance of the enemy in that direction, and that some 
 light horse who had been sent out to reconnoitre the road 
 had returned with the same information. In view of this 
 uncertainty, General Washington suspended his move 
 ment. During the interval of inactivity which followed 
 these conflicting reports, a reputable citizen of the neigh 
 borhood, named Thomas Cheney, familiarly known as 
 " Squire Cheney," rode up in great haste to the head 
 quarters and asked to see the Commander-in-Chief, to 
 whom, upon being admitted after some reluctance on the 
 part of his staff", he announced that the main body of 
 the British army had crossed the Brandywine above and 
 was then coming down on the eastern side so rapidly 
 that if General Washington did not make haste he would 
 be surrounded ; whereupon the General replied that ac 
 cording to intelligence which he had recently received 
 as to the movements of the British this statement could 
 not be true. But Squire Cheney exclaimed with great 
 earnestness, " You are mistaken, general ; my life for it, 
 you are mistaken. Put me under guard until you find 
 my story true." 
 
 Confirmation of it came almost immediately after, in 
 the following despatch sent by General Sullivan to the 
 Commander-in-Chief : 
 
 1 John Hickman, Jr., Esq., in the " Bulletin of the Historical Society of 
 Pennsylvania," September, 1846. 
 
228 BRANDYWINE. [1777. 
 
 "Two o clock P.M. 
 
 "DEAR GENERAL, Colonel Bland has this moment sent me 
 word that the enemy are in the rear of my right, about two miles, 
 coming down. There are, he says, about two brigades of them. 
 He also says he saw dust back in the country for above an hour. 
 
 I am, &c. 
 
 "JOHN SULLIVAN." 
 
 At that moment the American army was virtually de 
 feated ; though it made during the next few hours a gal 
 lant resistance. Its stubborn attempt to retrieve its lost 
 fortune resulted, at all events, in a retreat with compara 
 tively small loss in killed and wounded, and with strength 
 enough left to continue the campaign. If the British 
 movement had been carried out to completion, General 
 Washington s forces must have been utterly destroyed. 
 The column under Lord Cornwallis had made a long de 
 tour by the Great Valley Road to Trimble s Ford, thence 
 eastward to the passage called Jeiferies s Ford, and had 
 already proceeded down the east side of the Brandywine 
 very nearly to the Birmingham Meeting-house. It was 
 then, at about two o clock in the afternoon, only a short 
 distance from General Sullivan s flank and rear, having 
 completed, since it set out early in the morning, a march 
 of nearly seventeen miles. 
 
 The Birmingham Meeting-house,, a fine example of the 
 early places of worship of the Society of Friends, and still 
 in excellent preservation, stands upon the high ground in 
 the hills that rise to the east of the Brandywine, about 
 three miles toward the north from the position occupied 
 by General Washington at Chadd s Ford. Looking to 
 ward the northwest, in the direction from which Lord 
 Cornwallis was then approaching, the ground about the 
 meeting-house and an adjacent hill upon which was the 
 residence of William Jones commanded a slope extending 
 across cultivated fields where the land fell away gently 
 down to the Street Road below, and afforded an excellent 
 situation from which to repel an attack if time were given 
 
1777.] BRANDYWINE. 229 
 
 to dispose a force, and if there were anything like equality 
 of strength in the contending armies. Behind it were 
 dense forests, through which the road ran to Dilworth- 
 town and on to Chester ; and another road led down the 
 hill, toward the southwest, to Chadd s Ford. Upon the re 
 ceipt of the news that Cornwallis s forces were at hand, 
 General Sullivan was sent at once with his own division 
 and the brigades of Generals Stirling and Stephen to face 
 them. Hastily moving his column to the right, General 
 Sullivan advanced up the hills and occupied the advanta 
 geous position about the Birmingham Meeting-house, from 
 which the enemy were at that time actually in sight. 
 General Wayne remained in the position held by him 
 during the morning, to protect the crossing at Chadd s 
 Ford. General Greene s troops were held between these 
 two divisions, with the purpose of aiding either Sullivan 
 or Wayne as the case might require. 
 
 It was at this point that the Marquis de La Fayette 
 performed his first military service in the cause of 
 American independence, displaying a personal devotion 
 in the heat of battle which won distinction for him at 
 once as a soldier, and left him, when the action was 
 ended, one of the heroes of the day. In company with 
 General Washington, he had taken part, as a volunteer, 
 in the movements connected with the crossing of the 
 Brandywine and the disposition of the army at Chadd s 
 Ford, and he was still at head-quarters when the news 
 came of Lord Cornwallis s approach. He saw at a glance 
 that fighting was now about to take place along the right 
 wing, which was sure to be involved almost instantly with 
 the British column ; and, in his eagerness to take part, he 
 begged the Commander-in-Chief to allow him to go with 
 General Sullivan to the front. 1 This request was granted, 
 and he set out. 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 24. 
 
230 BKANDYWINE. [1777. 
 
 Whilst the American troops were forming upon the 
 brow of the hill in front of the Birmingham Meeting 
 house, and before the lines were drawn up in order, 
 through a delay caused by a misunderstanding as to the 
 exact positions to be held by the respective commanders, 
 the British opened the action, about half-past four in the 
 afternoon. The Hessians crossed the Street Road, in 
 front of which they had been halted, and, resting their 
 muskets upon the fence, delivered their fire against the 
 American outposts. This was followed by a furious attack 
 from the whole British column, now formed in line of 
 battle, and very shortly afterward the engagement became 
 general. The onset was so severe that the American right 
 began to waver and quickly gave way. This action left 
 the remainder of the line exposed to a galling fire on 
 its flank, which caused it also to break and fall back in 
 great confusion before the British, to the ground behind 
 the meeting-house and along the road leading to Dilworth- 
 town ; so that very soon the retreat of General Sullivan s 
 men was degenerating into a panic. La Fayette, seeing 
 this, threw himself from his horse, and, plunging in 
 among the hurrying masses, strove to renew confidence by 
 his voice and by his example, in the hope that a stand 
 might yet be made before the enemy, who were now fast 
 approaching. 
 
 By an heroic effort, he succeeded in rallying about 
 himself a number sufficient to check for a moment the 
 headlong flight of the troops, whilst Lord Stirling formed 
 his brigade slightly in the rear upon a gentle rise and 
 opened fire upon the advancing enemy. But the task was 
 too great. Borne down by the weight of superior num 
 bers, the Americans continued to retreat before the left 
 wing of Cornwallis s command, which had not as yet been 
 engaged with General Sullivan, and which now came on 
 with much spirit to the charge. La Fayette maintained 
 his position with General Sullivan and Lord Stirling, who 
 
1777.] BRANDYWINE. 231 
 
 fought here also with great personal gallantry, until the 
 British were within twenty yards of them, when they re 
 tired and escaped into the woods. 1 
 
 During the struggle he had received a musket-ball in 
 his left leg below the knee, but was not conscious of it 
 in the midst of the excitement : shortly afterward his 
 attention was called to it by one of the officers accom 
 panying him, who told him that blood was running out 
 of his boot. With the assistance of his aide-de-camp, 
 Major de Gimat, he remounted his horse, however, and 
 continued with the troops until, weakened by the loss of 
 blood, he was obliged to stop for a time and have a band 
 age put upon his wound. 2 
 
 In the mean time, as soon as the right wing was engaged 
 at the Birmingham Meeting-house, General Washington 
 had pressed forward in great haste from Chadd s Ford 
 with fresh troops, who, although it was impossible to form 
 them for action before that part of the army was completely 
 routed, were still in time to check the pursuit. General 
 Greene moved his division forward, and, by a skilful 
 manoeuvre, opened its ranks to allow the disordered and 
 flying troops to pass, after which they were again closed 
 and he took up a position in a narrow defile, about a mile 
 east of the meeting-house, on the road to Dilworthtown, 
 which he held until nightfall. At Chadd s Ford the mis 
 fortune of the day had also overtaken the division of 
 General Wayne, who, after his flank had been uncovered 
 by the retreat of the right wing, and after a gallant 
 attempt to sustain his position alone, was forced to give 
 way before the column of General Knyphausen, the lat 
 ter having advanced across the Ford and assaulted the 
 American position as soon as the sound of the cannon and 
 musketry announced that Lord Cornwallis was actively 
 
 1 Proceedings of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, vol. i. No. 7, p. 11 ; 
 Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North America, i. 245. 
 a Me"moircs de ma Main, i. 25. 
 
232 BRANDYWINE. [1777. 
 
 engaged toward the north. General Wayne retreated in 
 good order to Chester, where all the American troops were 
 directed by General Washington to concentrate. The 
 road leading thither became a scene of indescribable dis 
 order along the avenue of general retreat of the army, 
 and La Fayette says that " in the midst of this horrible 
 confusion, and with the growing darkness of the night, it 
 was impossible to recognize anybody." He was carried 
 along with the tide until they reached a bridge near the 
 town, where, wounded as he was, and having ridden 
 twelve miles, he stopped and took measures to arrest the 
 hasty flight of the men about him. With great difficulty 
 he succeeded in restoring a degree of order by throwing 
 out guards along the approach to the bridge and stopping 
 the fugitives. Later, the Commander-in-Chief arrived, 
 with the other generals, when La Fayette retired at length 
 and consented to have his wound dressed by one of the 
 surgeons. 1 His conduct during the day had been viewed 
 with the greatest favor by those who shared its incidents 
 with him. He had proved himself a man of courage 
 and a soldier ; and although he had been a few hours be 
 fore but a foreigner, a stranger who had come into the 
 Continental army, he was welcomed that night in the 
 American camp as a tried friend and a comrade. Gen 
 eral Washington directed the surgeon, with almost pa 
 ternal solicitude, to care for his injury ; and, writing to 
 the President of Congress at " Twelve o clock at night," 
 from Chester, to announce the battle, he mentioned in his 
 letter the Marquis de La Fayette. 2 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 25. 
 
 2 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 59. 
 
 Hon. John Blair Linn, of Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, calls my attention to 
 the fact that it was Surgeon William Magaw, of Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, 
 of the First Pennsylvania Regiment, who attended the Marquis de La Fayette 
 at this time ; and that when La Fayette was in America in 1825, Surgeon 
 Magaw, then eighty years of age, called upon him, and, presenting himself, 
 said, " General, do you know me?" Whereupon La Fayette immediately 
 
1777.] BRAND YWINE. 233 
 
 In after-life La Fayette recurred with tenderness and 
 gratitude to the kind consideration and sympathy which 
 he found in the hearts of the American people in the 
 midst of the period of doubt and difficulty through which 
 the country was then passing. " M. de La Fayette was 
 no longer a stranger," said he. " There never was an 
 adoption so complete." And while, in the councils of 
 war, he trembled at the thought that his voice, that of a 
 youth but twenty years of age, might have an influence 
 in deciding questions which should affect the interests 
 of Europe as well as of America, he was admitted to the 
 deliberations of the leaders of the Revolution and took 
 part in the consideration of those measures by which they 
 won success for liberty in the face of all obstacles. 1 
 
 This early recognition of La Fayette is one of the re 
 markable incidents of his career in the Revolution, all 
 the more so when we consider his youth and his lack 
 of experience at that time in the practical affairs of the 
 United States. It was largely due to the earnestness of 
 his character, which commended him to those with whom 
 he shared the difficulties and disappointments of the strug 
 gle, and to his honesty of purpose, that won confidence 
 for him which the history of his conduct throughout the 
 war has shown not to have been misplaced. Whilst he 
 adapted himself with unusual facility to a new national 
 character and to a new set of circumstances, he brought 
 with him into his American life a steadfastness, inherited 
 amid the rugged mountains of Auvergne, which made him 
 a trusty counsellor and a loyal friend. Of his personal 
 courage there was no possible doubt from the first moment 
 that he came into the presence of the enemy. 
 
 It is important to note in this connection, in forming an 
 
 replied, to the great pleasure of the old gentleman, "I am unable to recall 
 your name, but you are the surgeon who dressed my wound at the battle 
 of Brandy wine." 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 28. 
 
234 BKANDYWINE. [1777. 
 
 estimate of the Marquis de La Fayette, that the credit and 
 honor to which he attained so rapidly upon his arrival in 
 this country, and which increased each year during his 
 service of the United States in the Revolution, were based 
 upon his own merit and achievements and the sterling 
 qualities of his mind. He had, it is true, the prestige 
 of high birth, and he was in a sense the representative of 
 a nation whose friendship was very precious to the citizens 
 of the new Republic, then looking to the continent of 
 Europe for encouragement and support. These things had 
 their value in his formal relations to the Government, 
 and would, no doubt, have entitled him under any cir 
 cumstances to respectful consideration ; but they could 
 not suffice to fulfil a career like his. For that which gave 
 La Fayette the affection of General Washington, which 
 won his way to the hearts of the American people and 
 made him one of the leaders in the war of Independence, 
 was neither the nobleman nor the representative ; it was 
 the man, La Fayette himself. 
 
 The night after the action at Brandywine he lay with 
 the army at Chester, and upon the following day he was 
 transported by water to Philadelphia, General Washington 
 having upon that day marched his army back to its former 
 camp near the Falls of Schuylkill, at Germantown. The 
 British occupied the battle-field on the night of the llth 
 of September, attending to their wounded, who were so 
 numerous that it taxed the strength of their surgeons to 
 take care of them, and they were obliged to send to Gen 
 eral Washington for surgeons to look after the wounded 
 American prisoners whom they had taken. 1 That Gen 
 eral Howe made no attempt to follow the Americans 
 that night, or to cut off their retreat, was regarded by La 
 Fayette as a grave error ; and in reviewing the situation 
 in the light of subsequent events and of the added experi- 
 
 1 La Fayette, Memoires de ma Main, i. 26. 
 
1777.] BRAND YWINE. 235 
 
 ence of many years, in after-life, he recorded his deliberate 
 judgment that "if the enemy had then advanced to Darby 
 the American army must have been cut off and destroyed. 
 The British lost a night of precious time, and that was 
 perhaps the greatest of their mistakes during a war in 
 which they made many others besides." 
 
 Whilst the wounded young general was being tenderly 
 cared for in Philadelphia, his first thought was, naturally, 
 of his wife, whom he loved with a deep affection, and from 
 whom he sought to withhold every cause of anxiety when 
 that was possible. He made light to her of the dangers 
 of war, and playfully assured her, as we have already 
 seen, that generals were never exposed to injury, indeed 
 that they lived so long as to keep young men out of pro 
 motion, and that, being a general, he had a warrant of 
 safety ; though it must be confessed that his first encoun 
 ter with the enemy had not proved the exact truth of his 
 assertion. 
 
 The separation from her husband was a sad trial to 
 Madame de La Fayette ; but she endured it with ad 
 mirable courage, and never uttered a word of complaint; 
 for his interests were so intimately her own, that what 
 ever contributed toward his honor and credit became the 
 chief purpose of her life, and she willingly aided him 
 in it. La Fayette s consciousness of this impelled him 
 always to treat her with the tenderest consideration, and 
 his letters show that he was extremely sensitive about 
 anything that might cause her uneasiness or give her 
 pain. Now that the battle had been fought at Brandy- 
 wine and that he was wounded, he grew solicitous lest she 
 should hear the news, possibly in an exaggerated form, 
 through some other channel than his own letters, that 
 she might even be told that he was dead. He hastened, 
 therefore, to write to her the following letter : 
 
 La Fayette, Memoires de ma Main, i. 26. 
 
236 BRANDYWINE. [1777. 
 
 t I write you two words, dear heart, by some French officers, 
 friends of mine, who came out with me, but who have not ob 
 tained commissions and are now returning to France. Let me 
 begin by telling you that I am well, because I shall have to tell 
 you later that we had a battle yesterday in good earnest and 
 that our side did not get the best of it. Our Americans gave way 
 at last, after having shown a firm front for a considerable time, 
 and, whilst I was making an effort to rally them, the English 
 gentlemen paid me the compliment of a musket- ball, which 
 wounded me slightly in the leg. But it is nothing serious, dear 
 heart ; the ball touched neither bone nor nerve, and I shall have 
 nothing worse to endure than to lie flat on my back for a little 
 while though this last provokes me very greatly. I trust, my 
 dear heart, that you will not be uneasy about me. Indeed, this 
 is a good reason why you should be less so than ever, because I am 
 now out of active service for some time to come ; and I beg you 
 to believe that I intend to take good care of myself. This battle 
 will have some bad results for America, I fear. But we must try 
 to make up for it if we can. You ought to have received many 
 letters from me by this time, unless the English are as hostile to 
 my correspondence as they appear to be to my legs. I have had 
 only one letter from you, and I am longing for news. Adieu. I 
 am forbidden to write more than this. For several days past I 
 have had no sleep. Last night we spent in making our retreat 
 and in my journey to this place, where I am exceedingly well 
 taken care of. 7 1 
 
 La Fayette remained but a few days in Philadelphia. 
 The approach of the British, and the probability that they 
 would soon take possession of the city, made it exceed 
 ingly likely, if he stayed there, that he would fall into 
 their hands as a prisoner of war. He was transported, 
 therefore, by water to Bristol, on the Delaware River ; 
 and shortly afterward Mr. Henry Laurens, who was 
 going to join Congress at York, passing through Bristol, 
 took him up in his travelling carriage and conveyed 
 him to Bethlehem, where he was left in charge of the 
 kind and gentle Moravians. There, he says, " the mild 
 religion of this community of brethren, their unity of 
 
 1 From Philadelphia, 12th September, 1777 : Correspondance, i. 100. 
 
1777.] BRANDYWINE. 237 
 
 interests, of education, and of property, presented a wide 
 contrast in this great and innocent family with the scenes 
 of carnage and the convulsions of civil war" which he 
 had just left. 1 
 
 Amid the peaceful influences of these surroundings La 
 Fayette spent about four weeks, waiting for his wound to 
 heal. Full of enthusiasm for the American cause, his mind 
 was active with projects for its advancement, not only at 
 home but also in remote quarters of the globe where the 
 British Government was established and where British 
 interests might be attacked. The enforced quiet of his 
 body appears to have given occasion to an uncommon 
 energy of thought and to the uncontrolled flight of his 
 
 1 In a Diary kept at the Single Brethren s House, which was used by the 
 Continental army as a hospital, is the following entry : " 1777, September 
 21, Sunday. Towards evening, as the wounded began to arrive, the influx 
 of strangers became greater, so that the Inn could not accommodate all. 
 Among others came many French officers and Colonels, and also a General, 
 who is a distinguished Marquis." In the Bethlehem Congregation Diary 
 appear also these entries: 1777, Sept. 21, Sunday. Late in the evening 
 arrived the wounded generals Woodford and the Marquis La Fayette, with 
 a large number of disabled officers. October Hi. The French Marquis, 
 whom we have found to be a very intelligent and pleasant young man, came 
 to bid us adieu, and requested to be shown through the Sisters House, 
 which we were pleased to grant. He was accompanied by his Adjutant, 
 and expressed his admiration of the institution. While recovering from 
 his wound, he spent much of his time in reading, and, among other matter, 
 the history of our mission in Greenland. October 18. The French Marquis 
 and General Woodford left for the army to-day." 
 
 Upon his arrival in Bethlehem, La Fayette was taken to the old Sun Inn, 
 which is still used as an inn, and is much frequented by travellers. 
 
 Mr. John W. Jordan, of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, has 
 kindly communicated to me this note : " When La Fayette reached Bethle 
 hem, the Inn was so crowded that he could only be accommodated over 
 night. Quarters were given him in a house near the Inn, then occupied by 
 the assistants to the farmer ; and Mrs. Barbara Beckel, the wife of the chief 
 farmer of the Bethlehem farms, was deputed to wait upon him. But as that 
 house was inconvenient, and as Mrs. Beckel was unable to give him proper 
 attention there, she had him removed to her own house (on the main street, 
 below the Inn), where a suite of rooms, on the second floor, was put in 
 order for him. Miss Liesel Beckel, who assisted her mother, was living 
 when General de La Fayette revisited the United States. I well remember 
 the house, and I have been in the rooms occupied by La Fayette." 
 
238 BRANDYWINE. [1777. 
 
 imagination ; and whilst " the excellent Moravian brothers 
 were mourning over his warlike folly," l he was planning 
 conquests in the Atlantic Ocean and in the far-off regions 
 of India, to which he summoned not only the French 
 Colonial Governors, but even the ministry of France 
 itself, to aid in establishing the independence of the 
 United States. He proposed to the Marquis de Bouille, a 
 relative of his, then Governor of the Windward Islands, 
 a plan of attack upon the British West Indies, to be 
 carried out under the protection of the American flag ; a 
 plan which M. de Bouille is said, indeed, to have looked 
 upon with considerable favor, though, of course, it could 
 not have been sanctioned at that time by the Government, 
 which was still at peace with England. And, in spite of 
 his somewhat uncertain relations with the French Cabinet 
 after his escape from France and from the lettre-de-cachet, 
 he wrote to the Comte de Maurepas, the Prime Minister, 
 to present a plan of assault, also under the American flag, 
 upon the British agencies in India. The minister did not 
 accept the proposition, but he was struck by the boldness 
 of this conception and the unusual vigor of its advocate, 
 who seemed to him to hesitate at nothing. He remarked 
 afterward in connection with this subject that he verily 
 believed La Fayette would some day strip the palace of 
 Versailles of its furniture for the benefit of " his Ameri 
 can cause ;" for that when once he got an idea into his 
 head there was no telling where he would stop. 
 
 La Fayette suffered considerably from his wound, at 
 Bethlehem. But the lightness of his heart, and his feel 
 ings of kindness and good will to all about him, kept him 
 cheerful ; while his youthful vigor, aided by excellent gen 
 eral health, carried him rapidly toward recovery. There 
 is no trace of sadness or loneliness in his letters of the 
 time ; for it was impossible for him not to make friends. 
 
 Memoires de ma Main, i. 28. 
 
1777.] BRANDYWINE. 239 
 
 His genial temperament won those with whom he lived, 
 so that he does not appear to have felt at any time that 
 he was a stranger in a strange land. His fixed deter 
 mination in coming to America was to share its fortunes, 
 to attach himself to its interests, and to make its people 
 his people. In this he remained perfectly consistent. He 
 realized too, that in this respect his position was different 
 from that of others who had chosen a similar course in 
 enlisting in the war ; but he attributed the result to cir 
 cumstances that lay entirely within his own control and 
 presumably in theirs ; that is to say, that if the other 
 foreign officers did not live happily in America the fault 
 was largely to be sought in their own attitude toward the 
 American people. He said, in speaking of it, whilst he 
 was at Bethlehem, 
 
 "All the foreigners who are in the army, for I shall not men 
 tion those who have not obtained commissions, and who will, 
 consequently, make unfair statements about America when they 
 return to France, because the angry man and the man seeking 
 vengeance are not entirely honest, all the other foreigners now 
 employed here, I say, are discontented, and complaining ; they 
 are filled with hatred toward others, and they are hated them 
 selves. They cannot understand why I, of all the foreigners in 
 America, should be well treated, whilst I do not understand why 
 they should be disliked. For my part, in the midst of the dis 
 putes and disagreements common to all armies, especially when 
 there are officers in them of other nations, I, who am of an easy 
 disposition, am fortunate enough to retain the good will of all, both 
 foreigners and Americans. I love them all ; I hope to deserve 
 their esteem, and so we are mutually satisfied." ! 
 
 In this description of the feelings and conduct of the 
 foreign officers in the Continental army, among whom 
 there was no doubt a great deal of discontent, engendered 
 by jealousy, possibly also by ill will, it is fair to presume 
 that La Fayette had in mind those principally of inferior 
 
 1 To Mme. do La Fayette, 1st October, 1777 : Correspomlance, i. 106. 
 
240 BRANDYWINE. [1777. 
 
 rank who had drifted to this country in search of employ 
 ment from the French Islands or from France itself, in 
 that spirit of adventure which made them unacceptable 
 guests and not infrequently embarrassing companions in 
 arms. Notwithstanding his very general statement in 
 regard to the foreign officers, we must believe that he had 
 some gentlemen in his thoughts to whom, as a matter 
 of course, it did not apply ; because there were honorable 
 exceptions, among the French officers, of men whom La 
 Fayette cherished and whose services entitle them to our 
 grateful remembrance in treating of the incidents of the 
 time. There was, for example, M. de Gimat, La Fayette s 
 own aide-de-camp, who followed him with devotion, and 
 to whom he often affectionately referred as a comrade and 
 a friend ; there was Lieutenant-Colonel Fleury, a distin 
 guished officer of engineers, in charge of the defences at 
 Fort Mifflin, who was wounded while gallantly fulfilling 
 his duty during the British attack upon that post, and who 
 afterward received the thanks of Congress and a medal 
 for his conduct at Stony Point ; l there was the Chevalier 
 du Buysson, aide-de-camp to the Baron de Kalb, who 
 fought heroically at Camden and, though disabled him 
 self, stood near his commander and supported him when 
 the latter fell mortally wounded in the heat of the com 
 bat ; there were M. Mauduit-Duplessis, M. de Gouvion, 
 M. Capitaine de Chesnoy, and, certainly not the least of 
 them all, there was the Baron de Kalb, to whose self- 
 sacrifice La Fayette paid an honorable tribute, nearly 
 half a century later, when visiting the scene of. his hero 
 ism, in the State of South Carolina. 2 General de Kalb 
 was a man of mature judgment, whose long career as a 
 soldier had inured him to the hardships of warfare, in the 
 midst of which he frequently set an example, during the 
 Revolution, of great patience and fortitude. His manner 
 
 1 Journals of Congress, 26th July, 1779. 
 
 2 Kapp s Kalb, p. 250. 
 
1777.] BRAND YWINE. 241 
 
 was affable and his intercourse agreeable with those about 
 him, though his riper age made him, perhaps, less prone 
 to intimacy than he might otherwise have been. It is 
 true that his own criticisms of America, given in the con 
 fidence of private correspondence, were not free from a 
 certain tone of severity ; yet there is no doubt that his 
 bearing as a soldier was always in accord with the obli 
 gations and the dignity of his rank. 
 
 Curiously enough, we have Do Kalb s testimony also as 
 to the frettings and discord among the foreign officers, 
 given a little later, in very much the same language as that 
 of the Marquis de La Fayette. He wrote to Madame de 
 Kalb, on the oth of January, 1778, "On the whole, I have 
 annoyances to bear, of which you can hardly form a con 
 ception. One of them is the mutual jealousy of almost 
 all the French officers, particularly against those of higher 
 rank than the rest. These people think of nothing but 
 their incessant intrigues and backbitings. They hate each 
 other like the bitterest enemies, and endeavor to injure 
 each other wherever an opportunity offers. I have given 
 up their society, and very seldom see them. La Fayette 
 is the sole exception ; I always meet him with the same 
 cordiality and the same pleasure. He is an excellent 
 young man, and we are good friends. ... La Fayette 
 is much liked; he is on the best of terms with Wash 
 ington." There is a refreshing flavor of kindness 
 and gratitude, as well as the tone of a healthy mind, all 
 through La Fayette s correspondence, in the frequent ref 
 erences to himself and his surroundings. Still making 
 light of his wound, he reported to Madame de La Fayette 
 the devoted attention of his surgeons, and the tender 
 care with which his hosts at Bethlehem watched over 
 him whilst he was confined there ; and in explaining to 
 her the details of the campaign, in which it was impossible 
 
 1 Kapp s Kalb, p. 143. 
 VOL. I. 10 
 
242 BKANDYWINE. [1777. 
 
 to conceal the American reverses, he showed an interest 
 in the welfare of this country remarkable for the inten 
 sity of its feeling and highly honorable to him in his 
 loyalty to a cause in which he now regarded himself not 
 only as a defender, but as a patriot. His love for Gen 
 eral Washington was one of the leading motives of his 
 thought. The Commander-in-Chief understood La Fay- 
 ette s nature and estimated his qualities very quickly 
 after having come into contact with him ; he admitted 
 him to an intimacy which grew closer as the war con 
 tinued and gave to the younger man a view of the char 
 acter of Washington which filled him with admiration. 
 In his letter to Madame de La Fayette, from Bethlehem, 
 the 1st of October, 1777, he said, 
 
 "Be entirely free from anxiety as to my wound, for all the doc 
 tors in America are aroused in my behalf. I have a friend who 
 has spoken for me in a way to insure my being well taken care 
 of ; and that is General Washington. That estimable man, whose 
 talents and whose virtues I admired before, whom I venerate the 
 more now as I learn to know him, has been kind enough to me to 
 become my intimate friend. His tender interest in me quickly won 
 my heart. I am established in his household, and we live together 
 like two devoted brothers, in a mutual intimacy and confidence. 
 This friendship makes me most happy in this country. When he 
 sent his surgeon-in- chief to me, he directed him to care for me as 
 if I were his son, because he loved me as much ; and, having 
 heard that I wanted to join the army too soon again, he wrote 
 me a letter full of tenderness in which he admonished me to wait 
 until I should be entirely well. l 
 
 This attachment of La Fayette to General Washington 
 is evident in the frequent references to him throughout 
 his correspondence, in which we not only find the devotion 
 of an ardent friendship in return for acts of kindness, or 
 for the tender consideration with which the Commander- 
 in-Chief treated this young Frenchman, calling forth 
 from him repeated expressions of the warmest gratitude, 
 
 1 Correspondance, i. 105. 
 
1777.] GLOUCESTER. 243 
 
 but have also his deliberate judgment, possessing for us, 
 far more than could the mere references of one friend 
 to the excellent qualities of another, the value of a con 
 temporary estimate of the character of Washington, 
 formed by one who studied him closely and who knew 
 him well. A remarkable example of this occurs in a 
 well-considered letter written by La Fayette in Decem 
 ber, 1777, to his father-in-law, the Due d Ayen, which 
 contains a description of the American situation at that 
 time, set forth with striking conciseness and accuracy, in 
 which he says, 
 
 "Our General is a man truly made for this Revolution, which 
 could not be successfully accomplished without him. I see him 
 nearer than any man in the world ; and I see that he is worthy of 
 the adoration of his country. His warm friendship and his entire 
 confidence in me in regard to all military and political subjects, 
 great and small, that occupy him, place me in a situation to judge 
 of all that he has to perform, to reconcile, and to overcome. I 
 admire him more each day for the beauty of his character and 
 of his mind. Certain foreigners, offended at not having obtained 
 commissions, although that was in no wise his fault, and some 
 others, whose ambitious projects he was not willing to countenance, 
 certain jealous cabaleurs, have striven to injure his reputation ; 
 but his name will be revered in all coming ages by the friends of 
 liberty and of humanity everywhere ; and although I am bound 
 to do honor to my friend, yet I believe that the part he is now 
 sustaining gives me the right to declare how much I respect and 
 admire him." l 
 
 During La Fayette s retirement at Bethlehem, after the 
 battle of Brandy wine, the persistent and desperate strug 
 gle had been kept up by General Washington with his 
 worn-out troops, against the conquest of Pennsylvania by 
 the British and against their possession of the Delaware 
 River. Misfortunes followed one another in unvarying 
 succession, as the Americans were forced to retire before 
 the advancing enemy. Philadelphia was lost soon after 
 
 1 Correspondance dc La Fayette, i. 131. 
 
244 GLOUCESTER. [1777. 
 
 the retreat from Brandy wine, from lack of men to hold it, 
 and Lord Cornwallis entered the city at the head of his 
 British and Hessian grenadiers, on the 26th of Septem 
 ber. The battle of Germantown was fought and lost on 
 the 4th of October, in a valiant attempt to strike a blow 
 for the nation. The American army had retired to a 
 point upon Perkiomen Creek, at Pennybacker s Mills, in 
 the present Montgomery County, and later in October (on 
 the 16th) it moved to Worcester Township, whence it pro 
 ceeded to Whitpaine ; and on the 2d of November, when 
 the British concentrated their forces within Philadelphia, 
 General Washington approached, and went into camp at 
 Whitemarsh, about twelve miles to the north of the city. 1 
 Nothing remained now in the vicinity of Philadelphia to 
 be contested except the control of the Delaware River, 
 which was, of course, necessary for the British to possess 
 in order to have free access by water for the purpose of 
 supplying provisions to the army and the citizens in the 
 town, and also, what was very important to General Howe, 
 to enable the land forces to co-operate with the fleet. 
 Several lines of chevaux-de-frise obstructed the passage of 
 the river a few miles below Philadelphia, which were de 
 fended by two fortifications that still remained in pos 
 session of the Americans, Fort Mifflin, on Mud Island, 
 and Fort Mercer, nearly opposite, on the Jersey shore, 
 at Red Bank, neither of which had been constructed in 
 a manner to withstand a systematic attack by a large 
 force, but which would serve to annoy vessels passing up 
 or down the channel. Whilst the Americans continued 
 to hold these two posts, it was impossible for the Brit 
 ish to remove the awkward and heavy machines which 
 had been sunk in the bed ef the river and completely 
 obstructed its navigation ; yet so long as these impedi 
 ments remained, General Howe was separated from his 
 
 1 Baker, The Camp by the Old Gulph Mill, p. 4. 
 
1777.] GLOUCESTER. 245 
 
 ships. Thus the attention of both armies was directed 
 toward these little forts on the Delaware River, as, for 
 the moment, of paramount importance. Without them, 
 General Howe would be obliged to evacuate Philadelphia 
 and abandon the main purpose of his expedition. On 
 the other hand, General Washington was reluctant to 
 give them up, because they were the only means that 
 remained to him, in his enfeebled condition, of embar 
 rassing the enemy. 
 
 A spirited attack was made by the British forces upon 
 Red Bank on the night of the 22d of October, which was 
 repelled by the garrison and resulted in the death of 
 Count Donop, the Hessian commander of the expedition ; 
 but, while this momentary success afforded great pleasure 
 and encouragement to Congress and to the people, it 
 served only to aid Washington s policy of delay, and to 
 postpone for but a short time the capture of those posts, 
 which, under existing circumstances, was inevitable. 
 Fort Miffiin succumbed on the 16th of November, before 
 a combined assault of the British land and naval batteries, 
 after a most determined resistance and only when the 
 works were so thoroughly reduced to ruins as to afford no 
 further protection to the garrison. Two days later, Fort 
 Mercer surrendered to Lord Cornwallis, who had crossed 
 over from Philadelphia and marched down on the Jersey 
 side with a large force to attack it. 
 
 It was during these operations upon the Delaware River 
 that the Marquis de La Fayette, now sufficiently recovered 
 to join the army, found an opportunity, almost imme 
 diately after his arrival upon the ground, to engage with 
 the enemy and to distinguish himself in a small action 
 near Gloucester, which he conducted with great gallantry. 
 Although his wound was not sufficiently healed to enable 
 him to wear his boot, his impatience to be with the army 
 and his great desire to take part in the remaining move 
 ments of the campaign led him to the head-quarters at the 
 
246 GLOUCESTER. [1777. 
 
 camp, in the present Montgomery County, about the 20th 
 of October. 1 
 
 Shortly after his arrival there the news was received 
 of Lord Cornwallis s expedition into New Jersey, where 
 upon General Washington ordered General Greene to 
 cross the Delaware near Bristol and to march down on 
 the eastern side, for the purpose of opposing him as much 
 as possible, and, if an opportunity offered, of fighting him ; 
 for he hoped that the American force in New Jersey might 
 be augmented sufficiently to cope with this detachment, 
 and if, by good fortune, General Greene should be able to 
 defeat it, the result would cripple General Howe to such 
 an extent that he could not well recover. Always anxious 
 to be at the front when it was likely that there would be 
 work to do, La Fayette, who, as a volunteer, had naturally 
 a wide privilege in serving where he preferred to do so, 
 obtained permission to join General Greene. He had 
 already formed a strong friendship with that officer, whom 
 he met at the camp north of Philadelphia, on Neshaminy 
 Creek, when he first joined the army, and afterward 
 at the battle of Brandywine ; and his presence upon this 
 expedition into New Jersey was evidently very agreeable 
 to General Greene, who wrote from a point called Four- 
 lanes End, near Bristol, on the 20th of November, to 
 Mrs. Greene, as follows : 
 
 i I am now on my march to Bed Bank Fort. Lord Cornwallis 
 crossed over into the Jerseys day before yesterday, to invest that 
 place with a large body of troops. I am in hopes to have the 
 pleasure to meet his Lordship. This eccentric movement will 
 lengthen out the campaign for some weeks at least, and it is possi 
 ble may transfer the seat of war for the winter. . . . The weather 
 begins to get severe, and campaigning of it disagreeable, but ne 
 cessity obliges us to keep the field for some time. ... I lodge in 
 a fine country-house to-night. The Marquis de La Fayette is in 
 
 1 It is likely that La Fayette, who left Bethlehem on the 18th of October, 
 joined the army at Methacton Hill, in Worcester Township, where it en 
 camped from the 16th to the 21st of October. 
 
1777.] GLOUCESTER. 247 
 
 company with ine ; he has left a young wife and a fine fortune of 
 fourteen thousand pounds sterling per annum to come and engage 
 in the cause of liberty this is a noble enthusiasm. He is one 
 of the sweetest- tempered young gentlemen ; he purposes to visit 
 Boston this winter ; if so you ll have an opportunity to see him." 
 
 The Marquis de La Fayette accompanied General 
 Greene to Mount Holly; although, as Fort Mercer had 
 already been abandoned and the Continental troops whom 
 Greene expected had not joined him, there was no oppor 
 tunity to execute a movement against the British. Lord 
 Cornwallis was at Gloucester, nearly opposite Philadel 
 phia, and was engaged in transferring across the river to 
 that city a great quantity of forage and provisions which 
 he had collected through the fertile country of New Jer 
 sey, with a force that was estimated to be about five thou 
 sand men. His situation at Gloucester was entirely secure 
 against attack, because his camp lay immediately under 
 cover of the guns of the British men of war, which had 
 now moved up the Delaware to protect his operations 
 in crossing. On the 2-jth of November, La Fayette left 
 the head-quarters at Mount Holly with about three hun 
 dred men, made up of some one hundred and fifty of 
 Morgan s Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel Butler, and 
 the same number of militia, for the purpose of recon 
 noitring the enemy s position. He proceeded first to a 
 point almost within reach of Gloucester itself, called 
 Sandy Point, a narrow tongue of land separated from the 
 town by a small stream called Newtown Creek; where, in 
 order to assure himself that the enemy were transferring 
 their provisions across the river, he advanced with such 
 boldness that lie could plainly see their movements ; 
 and lie placed himself, to the consternation of those who 
 were with him, in a position where he might readily have 
 been either captured or shot, if the British outposts had 
 
 1 Greene s Life of Greene, i. 514. 
 
248 GLOUCESTER. [1777. 
 
 been alert ; indeed, he admitted, afterward, that this was 
 an imprudence which might have cost him dear, " if 
 those who had it then in their power to kill him had not 
 relied too confidently upon others who ought to have 
 been upon the lookout to make him a prisoner." l Re 
 tiring from Sandy Point, and having crossed Newtown 
 Creek, he proceeded, at about four o clock in the after 
 noon, with his whole force, along the road leading from 
 Haddonfield into Gloucester. When he had come within 
 two miles of the town, he fell in with an advance post 
 of Hessians numbering four hundred men, with several 
 pieces of artillery, whom he immediately attacked and 
 drove in. As the Hessians retreated, La Fayette pressed 
 them, advancing with great caution, however, and taking 
 care to throw out small pickets along the by-ways which 
 crossed the Haddonfield Road, to give him warning of 
 danger upon his flanks and to prevent the enemy from 
 getting behind him to cut off his retreat. He drove the 
 Hessians a mile or more toward Gloucester, killing and 
 wounding fifty or sixty men, when Lord Cornwallis, who 
 supposed that an attack was about to be made by the 
 whole division of General Greene, came up at nightfall, 
 with his grenadiers, to the support of the retreating Hes 
 sians, and La Fayette drew off under cover of the dark 
 ness to rejoin the main body. This small encounter had 
 given La Fayette an opportunity to show considerable 
 military skill in the management of his troops, and he 
 won the good opinion not only of all those about him, 
 but of General Greene himself, who reported it upon the 
 following day to General Washington in a letter in which 
 he says, " The Marquis, with about four hundred militia 
 and the rifle corps, attacked the enemy s picket last even 
 ing, killed about twenty and wounded as many more, and 
 took about twenty prisoners. The Marquis is charmed 
 
 1 Memoires cle ma Main, i. 33. 
 
lift 
 
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 P&&11 
 
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 r-;^-- - 
 
 ..-:;- v-:>-.-:^ ; - v 
 
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1777.] GLOUCESTER. 249 
 
 with the spirited behavior of the militia and rifle corps. 
 They drove the enemy above a mile and kept the ground 
 until dark. . . . The Marquis is determined to be in the 
 way of danger." 
 
 La Fayette himself was full of enthusiasm about the 
 bravery and good conduct of his men. The military 
 instinct was so strong within him that he was as proud 
 of their behavior as if it had been a personal compliment 
 to himself, and he addressed the militia and the riflemen 
 with all the warmth of his heart, in expressing his grati 
 tude. From Haddon field he wrote to General Washington 
 the next day, the 26th of November, 2 
 
 "DEAR GENERAL, I went down to this place since the day 
 before yesterday, in order to be acquainted of all the roads and 
 grounds around the enemy. I heard at my arrival that their main 
 body was between Great and Little Timber Creek since the same 
 evening. Yesterday morning, in reconnoitering about, I have 
 been told that they were very busy in crossing the Delaware. 
 I saw them myself in their boats, and sent that intelligence to 
 General Greene as soon as possible, as every other thing I heard 
 of. But I want to acquaint your excellency of a little event of 
 last evening, which, though not very considerable in itself, will 
 certainly please you, on account of the bravery and alacrity a 
 
 1 Greene s Life of Greene, i. 528. 
 
 1 Correspondence, American edition, i. 120. 
 
 This letter and all those written by La Fayette to General Washington, as 
 well as those to other Americans, were in English, so far as his command 
 of our language extended at that time. They were translated into French 
 for the edition of his Correspondence published by his family in Paris, but 
 were printed in the American edition in the exact wording used by the 
 Marquis. Wherever he wrote in English, therefore, I have quoted from the 
 original ; the translations here used I have made from the text of the French 
 edition, in (5 volumes, Paris, Fournier aine", 1837. 
 
 After the death of General Washington, his family, with delicate consid 
 eration, returned to the Marquis de La Fayette the original letters written 
 by him to the Commander-in-Chief during and after the American War. 
 Washington s letters to him were all lost, however, with La Fayette s other 
 documents, in the destruction of the family records at Chavaniac during 
 the French Revolution. Fortunately, General Washington had kept min 
 utes of most of them, which La Fayette subsequently had copied during his 
 last visit to the United States, in 1824 and 1825. 
 
250 GLOUCESTER. [1777. 
 
 small party of ours showed on that occasion. After having spent 
 the most part of the day to make myself well acquainted with the 
 certainty of their motions, I came pretty late into the Gloucester 
 Boad, between the two creeks. I had ten light-horse with Mr. 
 Lindsey, almost a hundred and fifty riflemen, under Colonel 
 Buttler, and two piquets of the militia, commanded by Colonels 
 Hite and Ellis : my whole body was not three hundred. Colonel 
 Armand, 1 Colonel Laumoy, the Chevaliers Duplessis and Giniat, 
 were the Frenchmen who went with me. A scout of my men, 
 with whom was Mr. Duplessis, to see how near were the first 
 piquets from Gloucester, found at two miles and a half of it a 
 strong post of three hundred and fifty Hessians with field pieces, 
 (what number I did know, by the unanimous deposition of their 
 prisoners), and engaged immediately. As my little reconnoiter- 
 ing party was all in fine spirits, I supported them. We pushed 
 the Hessians more than an half mile from the place where was 
 their main body, and we made them run very fast : British rein 
 forcements came twice to them, but, very far from recovering their 
 ground, they went always back. The darkness of the night pre 
 vented us then to push that advantage, and, after standing upon 
 the ground we had got, I ordered them to return very slow to 
 Haddonfield. The enemy, knowing perhaps by our drums that 
 we were not so near, came again to fire at us ; but the brave Major 
 Moriss, with a part of his riflemen, sent them back, and pushed 
 them very fast. I understand that they have had between twenty- 
 five and thirty wounded, at least that number killed, among whom, 
 I am certain, is an officer ; some say more, and the prisoners 
 told me they have lost the commandant of that body ; we got 
 yet, this day, fourteen prisoners. I sent you the most moder 
 ate account I had from themselves. We left one single man 
 killed, a lieutenant of militia, and only five of ours were wounded. 
 Such is the account of our little entertainment, which is indeed 
 much too long for the matter, but I take the greatest pleasure to 
 let you know that the conduct of our soldiers is above all praises : 
 I never saw men so merry, so spirited, so desirous to go on to the 
 enemy, whatever forces they could have, as that small party was 
 in this little fight. I found the riflemen above even their repu 
 tation, and the militia above all expectations I could have : I 
 
 1 This was the name assumed in America by the Marquis de La Rouerie, 
 who left France because of disappointment in a love-affair. See Townsend 
 Ward, in the Pennsylvania Magazine of History, vol. ii. p. 1 ; Chastellux, 
 Travels in North America, i. 183. 
 
1777.] GLOUCESTER. 251 
 
 returned to them my very sincere thanks this morning. I wish 
 that this little success of ours may please you, though a very 
 trifling one, I find it very interesting on account of the behaviour 
 of our soldiers. 
 
 "Some time after I came back, General Varnurn arrived here ; 
 General Greene is, too, in this place since this morning ; he en 
 gaged me to give you myself the account of the little advantage 
 of that small part of the troops under his command. I have 
 nothing more to say to your excellency about our business on this 
 side, because he is writing himself; I should have been very glad, 
 if circumstances had permitted me, to be useful to him upon a 
 greater scale. As he is obliged to march slow in order to attend 
 his troops, and as I am here only a volunteer, I will have the 
 honour to wait upon your excellency as soon as possible, and I 11 
 set out to-day ; it will be a great pleasure for me to find myself 
 again with you. 
 
 "With the most tender affection and highest respect, I have 
 the honour to be, 
 
 "LA FAYETTE. 
 
 "I must tell, too, that the riflemen had been the whole day 
 running before my horse, without eating or taking any rest. 
 
 "I have just now a certain assurance that two British officers, 
 besides those I spoke you of, have died this morning of their 
 wounds in an house ; this, and some other circumstances, let me 
 believe that their lost may be greater than I told to your excel 
 lency." 
 
 The news of this action was extremely gratifying to 
 General Washington, because it encouraged the militia by 
 an example of their usefulness to the service and was a 
 proof that they had soldierly qualities worthy to be com 
 pared with those of older troops inured to war, an en 
 couragement greatly needed to stimulate enlistments, which 
 were lagging ; and, besides this, it was in accord with the 
 policy of the Commander-in-Chief at that time, namely, 
 to annoy and embarrass the enemy at every point, to cut 
 oft their supplies, to attack their foraging-parties, and, in 
 general, to make their occupation of the country as un 
 comfortable as possible. It brought the Marquis de La 
 Fayette once more into prominence under very favorable 
 
252 GLOUCESTER, [1777. 
 
 circumstances ; and it was the direct cause of his attaining 
 what he so earnestly desired, the command of a division 
 with full authority as a major-general. 
 
 General Washington had written to Congress in his 
 behalf, from the camp at Whitemarsh, soon after La Fay- 
 ette had returned to the army from Bethlehem, evidently 
 willing to accede to the solicitations of the young major- 
 general, who was intensely anxious to serve in a capa 
 city more active and more responsible than that of a 
 mere volunteer. But the Commander-in-Chief was left 
 in doubt upon this subject as to the intentions of Con 
 gress, and, since no official instructions had been given 
 to him in reply to his first inquiry, further than that 
 the rank of major-general had been conferred upon La 
 Fayette without command or compensation, he felt some 
 embarrassment as to what course he ought to take and 
 what he was expected to do. He began to fear that La 
 Fayette had misunderstood the intentions of Congress, or 
 at least had exaggerated the import of his commission ; 
 and yet General Washington held him in such esteem 
 that he wished to promote him. He recognized that La 
 Fayette s earnestness and zeal in the American caus<\ and 
 the services he had rendered, especially in the exertions 
 he made to counteract in France the injurious reports of 
 the war that were spread abroad by the angered and disap 
 pointed Frenchmen returning home without commissions, 
 rendered him worthy of a favorable consideration on the 
 part of Congress. " I feel myself," he wrote to the Presi 
 dent of Congress, "in a delicate situation with respect to 
 the Marquis de Lafayette. He is extremely solicitous of 
 having a command equal to his rank, and professes very 
 different ideas, as to the purposes of his appointment, from 
 those Congress have mentioned to me. He certainly did 
 not understand them. I do not know in what light they 
 will view the matter ; but it appears to me, from a consid 
 eration of his illustrious and important connections, the 
 
1777.] GLOUCESTER. 253 
 
 attachment which he has manifested for our cause, and the 
 consequences which his return in disgust might produce, 
 that it will be advisable to gratify him in his wishes ; and 
 the more so, as several gentlemen from France, who came 
 over under some assurances, have gone back disappointed 
 in thei" expectations. His conduct, with respect to them, 
 stands in a favorable point of view, he having interested 
 himself to remove their uneasiness, and urged the impro 
 priety of their making any unfavorable representations 
 upon their arrival at home ; and in all his letters he has 
 placed our affairs in the best situation he could. Besides, 
 he is sensible, discreet in his manners, has made great 
 proficiency in our language, and, from the disposition lie 
 discovered at the battle of Brandy wine, possesses a large 
 share of bravery and military ardor." l 
 
 When the report of La Fayette s exploit at Gloucester 
 reached General Washington, on the day after it occurred, 
 the 26th of November, lie wrote again to the President of 
 Congress, in a letter which bears evidence of the kindest 
 feeling toward La Fayette, to suggest his appointment to a 
 command. lie enclosed the extract from General Greene s 
 despatch, quoted above, and added, " I should also be 
 happv in their determination respecting the Marquis de 
 Lafayette. He is more and more solicitous to be in 
 actua) service, and is pressing in his applications for a 
 command. I ventured before to submit my sentiments 
 upon the measure, and I still fear a refusal will not only 
 induce him to return in disgust, but may involve some 
 unfavorable consequences. There are now some vacant 
 divisions in the army, to one of which he may be ap 
 pointed, if it should be the pleasure of Congress. I ani 
 convinced he possesses a large share of that military 
 ardor, which generally characterizes the nobility of his 
 country. He went to Jersey with General Greene, and 
 
 1 From Whitemarsh, 1st November, 1777 : Sparks, Writings of Washington, 
 v. 128. 
 
254 GLOUCESTER. [1777. 
 
 I find he has not been inactive there. This you will per 
 ceive by the following extract from a letter just received 
 from General Greene/ 1 
 
 This recommendation and the reports of La Fayette s 
 own conduct were so favorably received by Congress that 
 it voted, upon the same day that the General s letter was 
 received, as follows: "Resolved. That General Washing 
 ton be informed, it is highly agreeable to Congress that 
 the Marquis de La Fayette be appointed to the command 
 of a division in the Continental Army." 2 Three days 
 later, a general order was issued announcing that the 
 Marquis de La Fayette was appointed to the Virginia 
 division lately of General Stephen, whose command had 
 been vacant since the battle of Germantown. The ap 
 pointment was received with satisfaction in the country ; 
 and we happen to have an expression of the popular 
 favor, in a letter written at that time, and quoted by Mr. 
 Sparks, from Patrick Henry to General Washington, in 
 which he says, " I take the liberty of enclosing to you two 
 letters from France to the Marquis de Lafayette. One 
 of them is from his lady, I believe. I beg to be presented 
 to him in the most acceptable manner. I greatly revere 
 his person and amiable character." 3 
 
 The campaign of 1777 was just closing. Active opera 
 tions were threatened for a moment when General Howe 
 led his army out from Philadelphia as far as Chestnut 
 Hill, within a few miles of Washington s position at 
 Whitemarsh, with the evident intention of attacking it. 
 But, having manoeuvred for four days as if about to bring 
 on a general engagement, the British suddenly retired, on 
 the night of the 8th of December, to Philadelphia. They 
 had accomplished nothing whatever as the result of this 
 expedition, except greatly to increase the self-reliance of 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 170. 
 
 2 Journals of Congress, 1st December, 1777. 
 
 3 Sparks, Waitings of Washington, v. 172. 
 
1777.] VALLEY FORGE. 255 
 
 the American army by affording to it the best evidence 
 of the respect in which General Howe held the courage of 
 the men and the military skill of their commander, when, 
 having marched out to fight them, he feared to do so after 
 he discovered that he should have to meet them upon equal 
 terms as to position and numbers. Shortly afterward (on 
 the 19th of December) General Washington withdrew to 
 Valley Forge, where, as La Fayette says, " having skil 
 fully erected, in a few days, a city of wooden huts, the 
 army established itself in its melancholy winter quarters," 
 melancholy indeed, in its nakedness, its privation, its 
 lack of food, its suffering from disease, during that dread 
 ful winter. In the midst of it all, La Fayette, put then, 
 perhaps, to the severest test of his allegiance to American 
 freedom, shared with that devoted army the bitter chances 
 of war. " The unfortunate soldiers," as he tells us, " were 
 in want of everything ; they had neither coats, nor hats, 
 nor shirts, nor shoes ; their feet and legs froze till they 
 grew black, and it was often necessary to amputate them. 
 . . . The army frequently passed whole days without 
 food, and the patient endurance of both soldiers and offi 
 cers was a miracle which every moment served to renew ;" 
 but " the sacred fire of liberty was not extinguished, and 
 most of the people hated British tyranny." Perform 
 ing his military duties with rigid exactness, La Fayette 
 adopted in every respect the American dress and habits. 
 He tried to be even more simple, more frugal, and more 
 self-denying than the Americans themselves. Brought 
 up as he had been in ease and surrounded by personal 
 comforts, he suddenly changed his w r hole manner of living, 
 and his constitution adapted itself to privation as well as 
 to fatigue. 1 This example of single-minded devotion is 
 almost unequalled ; and the fact that it was entirely vol 
 untary adds to the strength of its claim upon our gratitude 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 37. 
 
256 VALLEY FORGE. [1777. 
 
 and respect. Writing home to the Due d Ayen, his letter, 
 full of earnestness, expresses the zeal with which he 
 undertook his task : 
 
 " I have passed the whole summer without obtaining a division, 
 which you know I have always wished for, and I have lived all 
 that time at General Washington s house, where I feel as if I were 
 a friend of twenty years standing. Since my return from Jersey, 
 he has offered me the choice, among several brigades, of the 
 division I prefer, and I have selected one composed entirely of 
 Virginians. It is weak in point of numbers at present, even in 
 proportion to the weakness of the whole army ; it is almost naked, 
 though I have been promised cloth out of which I shall make 
 clothes, and recruits out of which soldiers must be made in about 
 the same length of time ; unfortunately the latter is the more 
 difficult to accomplish, even for more skilful men than I. ... I 
 read, I study, I examine, I listen, I reflect, and upon the result of 
 all this I make an effort to form my opinion and to put into it as 
 much common sense as I can. I am cautious not to talk much, lest I 
 should say some foolish thing, and still more cautious in my actions, 
 lest I should do some foolish thing ; for I do not want to disappoint 
 the confidence that the Americans have so kindly placed in me." l 
 
 1 Correspondance de La Fayette, i. 133-134. 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAIXST CAXADA. 257 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAIXST CAXADA IX 1778. 
 
 IT was at this period, whilst the army was at Valley 
 Forge, that the conspiracy was developed, known as 
 " Con way s Cabal," which had for its purpose the over 
 throw of General Washington and his removal from the 
 command of the army ; in La Fayette s words, " that 
 greatest of calamities, the loss of the only man capable 
 of conducting the Revolution." What this attempt 
 actually was, or how far its influence extended, has not 
 been clearly shown, and will probably never be fully 
 understood. There is no doubt, however, that there ex 
 isted a party in Congress who were personally hostile to 
 the Commander-in-Chief, and that they were followed by 
 certain officers in the army whose ambitious designs or 
 secret jealousy led them easily into an attitude of defec 
 tion and blinded them, for the moment, to every consider 
 ation but that of their own selfish purposes. 
 
 The achievement of General Gates at Saratoga gave 
 him a wider reputation for military genius than he de 
 served ; it filled his mind with an idea of his own great 
 ness and dazzled him with the prospect of an illustrious 
 career, in which he saw himself the head of the nation, 
 the new and successful Commander-in-Chief. This notion 
 unbalanced his judgment. Con way was merely a figure 
 whom accident had brought into the way at an opportune 
 moment and whose turbulent and discontented nature 
 made him a ready tool ; the real conspirator, no doubt, 
 was Gates. He was held up by his secret friends before 
 
 1 Momoires de ma Main, i. 38. 
 VOL. I. 17 
 
258 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 the people as the general who could save the country 
 from threatened destruction ; while Washington was de 
 cried as having failed in the war. It was said that, with 
 forces greatly superior to the enemy, Washington had 
 done nothing; that he had allowed Philadelphia to be 
 captured through mismanagement, and that he had failed 
 of many opportunities to defeat the British. With arti 
 fices of this kind they sought to throw obstacles in his 
 way which should force him to resign. That the party 
 were strong in Congress is evident from the facility with 
 which they succeeded in obtaining the control of military 
 affairs. A new Board of War was formed, of which Gen 
 eral Gates was appointed president, and, in defiance of all 
 propriety, Con way was made Inspector-General, and was 
 raised, above other brigadiers who outranked him, to the 
 grade of major-general. 1 
 
 A part of this plot to alienate from General Washing 
 ton every strengthening influence and to deprive him of 
 his friends was an attempt to win over La Fayette by 
 promises of future military distinction, and by flattery. 
 Conway, who was a soldier of no mean capacity, sought to 
 ingratiate himself with La Fayette by a professed solici 
 tude for his welfare and by a pretended devotion to him 
 as a comrade in the French army, in which Conway had 
 also served, as well as by an appeal to mutual associa 
 tions and friendships in the Old World, which natu 
 rally induced in return feelings of kindness and fellow 
 ship. La Fayette had at that time considerable respect 
 for General Gates, whom he regarded as a good soldier 
 and for whom he shared to a great extent the admira 
 tion which had spread through the whole country in con- 
 
 1 Though La Fayette believed that Charles Lee, and not Gates, would have 
 profited by the success of this plot. " II est remarquable que pour les plus 
 fins Gates n etait pas Fobjet de 1 intrigue. Quoique bon officier, il n avait pas 
 les moyens de se soutenir. II eut fait place au fameux general Lee, alors 
 prisonnier des Anglais, et le premier soin de celui-ci aurait ete de leur livrer 
 et ses amis et toute 1 Amerique." Me"moires de ma Main, i. 38. 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. 259 
 
 sequence of his recent defeat and capture of Burgoyne. 
 We have a letter written by M. de La Fayette to Gates 
 from Bethlehem, immediately after the capitulation, in 
 which he hastened to send to the victorious general his 
 congratulations and to express the hope that he might 
 have an opportunity of knowing him better in the course 
 of succeeding events : 1 
 
 "BETHLEHEM, 14 October, 1777. 
 
 "DEAR GENERAL, I can t let go your express without doing 
 myself the pleasure of congratulating you about your happy and 
 glorious success the fine opportunity of your victory, and the 
 circumstances (the taking fort Montgomery) which it meet with, 
 is to add something yet and to your glory and to the gratefulness 
 of every one who loves the cause we fight for. I find myself 
 very happy to have had the pleasure of your acquaintance before 
 your going to take the command of the Northern Army. I am 
 very desirous, sir, to convince you how I wish to cultivate your 
 friendship, it is with such sentiments and those of the most 
 perfect esteem that I have the honor to be 
 "dear Sir, 
 
 "Your most obedient servant, 
 
 "THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE. 
 
 "I do not wrait from our camp because I am detained yet in 
 this place for some days by my wound of Brandy wine." 
 
 Two months later, he wrote again to General Gates, 
 from "the Gulph," on the 14th of December, 1777, ex 
 pressing the most kindly feelings toward him, with the 
 evident hope that he and Gates should become warm 
 friends, a possibility which, under the circumstances of 
 that general s success and rising fame, La Fayette natu 
 rally contemplated with very great pleasure : 2 
 
 "I have received with the greatest satisfaction the favor of 
 yours. The idea of obtaining your friendship is highly pleasant 
 to me be certain, Sir, that you can depend upon my attachement 
 for ever the only love of glorious and great actions should have 
 
 1 Gates Papers, New York Historical Society. 
 
 2 Ibid. 
 
260 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 inspired me with such sentiments but the knowledge I got of 
 your character adds infinitely to the pleasure which my heart feels 
 in receiving the assurances of your future affection towards a 
 young soldier who desire it very heartily. 7 
 
 But when he discovered through the intercepted cor 
 respondence of Conway and Gates, which Lord Stirling 
 communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, 1 that these men 
 referred contemptuously to General Washington, he was 
 startled by a duplicity which he had never suspected, and 
 he threw, without hesitation, the whole weight of his in 
 fluence, and exerted all the energy of his earnest nature, 
 in loyal defence of his general and friend. During this 
 trying period he saw General Washington frequently in the 
 closest intimacy, and, admitted to his confidence perhaps 
 more than any other officer, he discussed with him the situ 
 ation of the country as well as the subject of this intrigue 
 which now attempted to destroy his honor. Fortunately 
 for us, a part of their intercourse has been preserved in 
 the correspondence which passed between them at that 
 time, which, while it defines the attitude of General Wash 
 ington toward " Con way s Cabal," illustrates the earnest 
 ness of character of the younger man, and the noble 
 dignity and self-possession of the Commander, as well, 
 perhaps, as anything that history has preserved. 
 
 On the 30th of December, 1777, the Marquis de La 
 Fayette wrote, at the Camp, at Valley Forge, to General 
 Washington, 2 
 
 i c MY DEAK GENERAL j I went yesterday morning to headquar 
 ters with an intention of speaking to your excellency, but you were 
 too busy, and I shall lay down in this letter what I wished to say. 
 I don t need to tell you that I am sorry for all that has happened 
 for some time past. It is a necessary dependence of my most 
 tender and respectful friendship for you, which affection is as 
 true and candid as the other sentiments of my heart, and much 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 492. 
 
 2 Correspondence of La Fayette, American edition, i. 134. 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. 261 
 
 stronger than so new an acquaintance seems to admit ; but another 
 reason, to be concerned in the present circumstances, is my ardent 
 and perhaps enthusiastic wishes for the happiness and liberty of 
 this country. I see plainly that America can defend herself if 
 proper measures are taken, and now I begin to fear lest she should 
 be lost by herself and her own sons. 
 
 " When I was in Europe I thought that here almost every man 
 was a lover of liberty, and would rather die free than live a slave. 
 You can conceive my astonishment when I saw that toryism was 
 as openly professed as whiggism itself: however, at that time I 
 believed that all good Americans were united together ; that the 
 confidence of congress in you was unbounded. Then I entertained 
 the certitude that America would be independent in case she 
 should not lose you. Take away, for an instant, that modest diffi 
 dence of yourself, (which, pardon my freedom, my dear General, 
 is sometimes too great, and I wish you could know, as well as my 
 self, what difference there is between you and any other man), you 
 would see very plainly that if you were lost for America, there 
 is no body who could keep the army and the revolution for six 
 months. There are open dissensions in congress, parties who hate 
 one another as much as the common enemy ; stupid men, who, 
 without knowing a single word about war, undertake to judge you, 
 to make ridiculous comparisons ; they are infatuated with Gates, 
 without thinking of the different circumstances, and believe that 
 attacking is the only thing necessary to conquer. Those ideas are 
 entertained in their minds by some jealous men, and perhaps 
 secret friends to the British Government, who want to push you 
 in a moment of ill humour to some rash enterprise upon the lines 
 or against a much stronger army. I should not take the liberty 
 of mentioning these particulars to you if I did not receive a letter 
 about this matter, from a young good-natured gentleman at York, 
 whom Conway has ruined by his cunning, bad advice, but who 
 entertains the greatest respect for you. 
 
 u I have been surprised at first, to see the few establishments of 
 this board of war, to see the difference made between northern 
 and southern departments, to see resolves from congress about 
 military operations ; but the promotion of Couway is beyond all 
 my expectations. I should be glad to have now major-generals, 
 because, as I know, you take some interest in my happiness and 
 reputation : it is, perhaps, an occasion for your excellency to give 
 me more agreeable commands in some interesting instances. On 
 the other hand, General Conway says he is entirely a man to be 
 disposed of by me. lie calls himself my soldier, and the reason 
 
262 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 of such behaviour to me is, that he wishes to be well spoken of at 
 the French court, and his protector, the Marquis de Castries, is an 
 intimate acquaintance of mine ; but since the letter of Lord Stir 
 ling I inquired in his character. I found that he was an ambitious 
 and dangerous man. He has done all in his power, by cunning 
 manoeuvres, to take off my confidence and affection for you. His 
 desire was to engage me to leave this country. Now I see all the 
 general officers of the army against congress ; such disputes, if 
 known by the enemy, would be attended with the worst conse 
 quences. I am very sorry whenever I perceive troubles raised 
 among the defenders of the same cause, but my concern is much 
 greater when I find officers corning from France, officers of some 
 character in my country, to whom any fault of that kind may be 
 imputed. The reason of my fondness for Conway was his being 
 by all means a very brave and very good officer. However, that 
 talent for manoeuvres, and which seems so extraordinary to con 
 gress, is not so very difficult a matter for any man of common 
 sense who applies himself to it. I must pay to General Portail, 
 and some French officers, who came to speak me, the justice to 
 say, that I found them as I could wish upon this occasion ; for it 
 has made a great noise among many in the army. I wish, indeed, 
 those matters could be soon pacified. I wish your excellency 
 could let them know how necessary you are to them, and engage 
 them at the same time to keep peace, and simulate love among 
 themselves till the moment when those little disputes shall not 
 be attended with such inconveniences. It would be, too, a great 
 pity that slavery, dishonour, ruin, and unhappiness of a whole 
 world should issue from some trifling differences between a few 
 men. 
 
 " You will find, perhaps, this letter very useless, and even in 
 opportune ; but I was desirous of having a pretty long conversa 
 tion with you upon the present circumstances, to explain you 
 what I think of this matter. As a proper opportunity for it did 
 not occur, I took the liberty of laying down some of my ideas in 
 this letter, because it is for my satisfaction to be convinced that 
 you, my dear General, who have been indulgent enough to permit 
 me to look on you as upon a friend, should know the confession 
 of my sentiments in a matter which I consider as a very impor 
 tant one. I have the warmest love for my country and for every 
 good Frenchman : their success fills my heart with joy ; but, sir, 
 besides Conway is an Irishman, I want countrymen, who deserve, 
 in every point, to do honour to their country. That gentleman 
 had engaged me by entertaining my head with ideas of glory and 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAIXST CANADA. 263 
 
 shining projects, and I must confess, to ruy shaine, that it is a too 
 certain way of deceiving ine. 
 
 " I wished to join to the few theories about war I can have, and 
 the few dispositions nature gave, perhaps, to me, the experience 
 of thirty campaigns, in hope that I should be able to be the more 
 useful in the present circumstances. My desire of deserving your 
 satisfaction is stronger than ever, and everywhere you will employ 
 me you can be certain of my trying every exertion in my power 
 to succeed. I am now fixed to your fate, and I shall follow it and 
 sustain it as well by my sword as by all means in my power. You 
 will pardon my importunity in favour of the sentiment which 
 dictated it. Youth and friendship make me, perhaps, too warm, 
 but I feel the greatest concern at all that has happened for some 
 time since. 
 
 " With the most tender and profound respect, I have the honour 
 to be, &c. 
 
 " LAFAYETTE." 
 
 To this earnest and sincere declaration of attachment, 
 toward which the Marquis de La Fayette was evidently 
 impelled by the highest sentiments of loyalty to the 
 American cause, as well as of honor and devotion to his 
 truest friend, General Washington replied upon the fol 
 lowing day : l 
 
 " HEAD-QUARTERS, 31 December, 1777. 
 
 "MY DEAR MARQUIS; Your favor of yesterday conveyed to 
 me fresh proof of that friendship and attachment, which I have 
 happily experienced since the first of our acquaintance, and for 
 which I entertain sentiments of the purest affection. It will ever 
 constitute part of my happiness to know that I stand well in your 
 opinion ; because I am satisfied that you can have no views to 
 answer by throwing out false colours, and that you possess a mind 
 too exalted to condescend to low arts and intrigues to acquire a 
 reputation. Happy, thrice happy, would it have been for this 
 army, and the cause we are embarked in, if the same generous 
 spirit had pervaded all the actors in it. But one gentleman, whose 
 name you have mentioned, had, I am confident, far different 
 views ; his ambition and great desire of being puffed off, as one 
 of the first officers of the age, could only be equalled by the 
 means which he used to obtain them. But finding that I was de- 
 
 1 Correspondence of La Fayette, American edition, i. 139. 
 
264 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 termined not to go beyond the line of my duty to indulge him in 
 the first, nor to exceed the strictest rules of propriety to gratify 
 him in the second, he became my inveterate enemy ; and he has, 
 I am persuaded, practised every art to do me an injury, even at 
 the expense of reprobating a measure that did not succeed, that 
 he himself advised to. How far he may have accomplished his 
 ends, I know not ; and, except for considerations of a public 
 nature, I care not ; for, it is well known, that neither ambitious 
 nor lucrative motives, led me to accept my present appointments, 
 in the discharge of which, I have endeavoured to observe one 
 steady and uniform system of conduct, which I shall invariably 
 pursue, while I have the honour to command, regardless of the 
 tongue of slander or the powers of detraction. The fatal tendency 
 of disunion is so obvious, that I have, in earnest terms, exhorted 
 such officers as have expressed their dissatisfaction at General 
 Conway s promotion, to be cool and dispassionate in their decision 
 about the matter ; and I have hopes that they will not suffer any 
 hasty determination to injure the service. At the same time, it 
 must be acknowledged, that officers feelings upon these occasions 
 are not to be restrained, although you may control their actions. 
 
 " The other observations contained in your letter have too much 
 truth in them ; and, it is much to be lamented, that things are not 
 now as they formerly were. But we must not, in so great a con 
 test, expect to meet with nothing but sunshine. I have no doubt 
 that everything happens for the best, that we shall triumph over 
 all our misfortunes, and in the end be happy ; when, my dear 
 marquis, if you will give me your company in Virginia, we will 
 laugh at our past difficulties and the folly of others ; and I will 
 endeavour, by every civility in my power, to shew you how much 
 and how sincerely I am your affectionate and obedient servant." 
 
 La Fayette believed that this was a crisis in American 
 affairs from which very grave results were to be feared by 
 all friends of the nation. He realized the great danger 
 which was now threatening General Washington ; and, 
 aside from his love for his commander, he was convinced, 
 and repeatedly declared, that there was no one to fill his 
 place : with General Washington gone, the liberty of 
 America would have to be abandoned. These considera 
 tions actuated him for the moment beyond all others. 
 They overcame his longing to see France again, they sup- 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. 265 
 
 pressed the yearning toward his wife and children, and 
 they determined him to remain amid the frost and hard 
 ship of Valley Forge in order to counteract any unfavor 
 able influence that might result from his leaving at that 
 time, and to be near General Washington if he were 
 needed. It is evident that his private interests were call 
 ing him back to France, and that the letters of his wife 
 and family urged him to go ; and it w r ould not have been 
 unreasonable if he had taken advantage of the many 
 months of inactivity which were certain to follow^ the 
 close of the campaign, to return to his country after an 
 absence of nearly a year and to embrace his dear ones 
 whom he had left behind, at his coming away, without a 
 farewell. But it was characteristic of La Fayette to sub 
 ordinate personal impulses to his convictions of duty ; 
 and such was his course upon the present occasion. 
 
 He wrote to Madame de La Fayette, from the Camp 
 at Valley Forge, on the 6th of January, 1778, the w r eek 
 after his letter to General Washington, 1 
 
 "What a date, my dear heart, and what a place to write you 
 from in the month of January ! In a camp, in the midst of the 
 forest, fifteen hundred leagues away from you, I am hemmed in 
 by the winter. Not very long ago we were separated from the 
 enemy only by a small river ; but now we are about seven leagues 
 from them, and here the American army intends to spend the 
 winter in their little huts that are not much more attractive than 
 dungeon cells. I cannot tell whether it will be convenient for 
 General Howe to make us a visit in our new settlement ; but we 
 shall try to receive him with proper consideration, if he does. 
 The bearer of this letter will describe to you the attractive sur 
 roundings of the place I have chosen to stay in rather than to 
 enjoy the happiness of being with you, of seeing all my friends, 
 of having every imaginable pleasure. But seriously, dear heart, 
 do you not believe that there must be some very strong reasons 
 to induce me to make this sacrifice ? All my feelings impelled 
 me to go ; but honor counselled me to stay here ; and I am sure 
 that after you know in detail all the circumstances of my present 
 
 1 Correspondance, i. 143. 
 
266 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 position, and when you understand the situation of the army, of 
 niy friend who commands it, and of the whole American cause, 
 you will forgive me, you will approve of my course, I almost 
 dare to say you will applaud me. What pleasure I shall have 
 some day in telling you of all this ! . . . But do not condemn 
 me without a hearing. Besides the reason that I have given you, 
 I have still another, which I should not mention to everybody, 
 because it might appear that I was assuming an air of ridiculous 
 importance. My presence is more necessary to the American 
 cause at this moment than you may imagine ; many foreigners 
 who have failed to obtain commissions, or whose ambitious 
 schemes after having obtained them could not be countenanced, 
 have entered into powerful conspiracies ; they have used every 
 artifice to turn me against this revolution and against him who is 
 its leader ; and they have taken every opportunity to spread the 
 report that I am about to leave the continent. Upon their side, 
 the British have openly declared this to be so. I cannot with 
 good conscience play into the hands of these people. If I were to 
 go, many Frenchmen who are useful here would follow my ex 
 ample. General Washington would be really unhappy if I were 
 to suggest my going away. His confidence in me is greater than 
 I dare to admit on account of my age. In the position that he 
 occupies he is in danger of being surrounded by flatterers or by 
 secret enemies ; but he knows he has in me a loyal friend to 
 whom he may open his heart and who will always tell him the 
 truth. ^s"ot a day passes that he does not hold a long conver 
 sation with me or write me a long letter, and he is kind enough 
 to consult me upon the most important subjects. There is at 
 this moment a particular matter in connection with which my 
 presence here is useful to him. This is not the time for me to 
 talk of going away." 
 
 Assuming then a less serious tone, M. de La Fayette 
 continued, with his usual buoyancy of spirit, 
 
 "You will learn from the bearer of this letter that I am in very 
 good health, that my wound has healed, and that the change of 
 climate has not affected me. Do you not think that, when I go 
 home, we shall be old enough to establish ourselves in our own 
 house, to live happily together, to entertain our friends, and that, 
 in the midst of a delightful freedom, we shall be content to read 
 the foreign newspapers without having the curiosity to go abroad 
 ourselves to trace the course of passing events ? I love to build 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAIXST CANADA. 267 
 
 chateaux en France of happiness and pleasure. You always share 
 them with me, dear heart, and when once we shall be together 
 again nothing shall separate us or prevent us from enjoying the 
 sweetness of loving each other and the most tranquil and delicious 
 happiness. . . . 
 
 " Several of the general officers here have brought their wives 
 to the camp. I am very envious, not of their wives, but of the 
 pleasure they have in being able to see them. General Washing 
 ton too is about to send for his wife. As for the British, they 
 have just received a reinforcement of three hundred demoiselles 
 from New York ; and we captured lately one of their vessels 
 loaded with the chaste wives of officers coming to join their 
 husbands, who were terribly frightened lest they should be 
 kept for the American army." 
 
 The Marquis de La Fayette s reference in this letter to 
 his relations with General Washington is of a highly per 
 sonal nature, which, as he said himself, he would not, as 
 any other prudent man would not, declare openly before 
 the world. But it must be remembered that this was 
 written, in the most intimate privacy, to his wife. The 
 earnestness of his desire to serve and assist his com 
 mander in the midst of the most trying circumstances, 
 and his evident loyalty, expressed out of the fulness of 
 his heart, preserve it from the suspicion of undue self- 
 esteem. Besides, the situation was truly as he described 
 it ; he was very close to the Commander-in-Chief, and we 
 have Washington s own testimony to his confidence in him 
 in connection with this very subject to which La Fayette 
 referred in his letter as " a particular matter." Writing 
 to General Gates upon the question of the intercepted 
 letter of Conway, General Washington declared to him 
 that " neither this letter, nor the information which occa 
 sioned it, was ever directly or indirectly communicated by 
 me to a single officer in this army out of my own family, 
 excepting the Marquis de Lafayette." 
 
 But, in spite of M. de La Fayette s resolution to stand 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 492. 
 
268 PKOJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 by the Commander-in-Cliief during this crisis in his 
 affairs, the conspirators, who were still fomenting hostility 
 and stubbornly developing their intrigue, decided upon 
 removing him from the head-quarters, in order to deprive 
 General Washington of the moral weight of his presence, 
 with the hope, possibly, that, by flattering attentions to 
 him, they might ultimately win him over to their side. 
 La Fayette had come to be looked upon as in some sense 
 the representative of France in America ; for his rank as 
 major-general naturally made him the foremost of the 
 French officers then serving in the Continental army, 
 whose opinions were likely to be adopted by all the others, 
 and his distinguished position at the Court of Versailles 
 was supposed to give him an influence there which would 
 be very potent in the event of the participation by the 
 French Government in the War of Independence. The 
 party of the Cabal appear to have believed that if they 
 could succeed in turning this influence into their own 
 direction there was a chance that it would make them 
 the leaders with whom the French Cabinet would treat in 
 the negotiations which were expected to follow soon, and 
 which were looked forward to with hopeful anticipation 
 by all classes of people in the United States ; and in that 
 event Lee, Gates, and Conway would come forth as the 
 great soldiers of the Revolution, who, by assuming the 
 credit of having established an alliance which should 
 assure the independence of America, might find an easy 
 road to the accomplishment of their purposes, and publish 
 themselves as the saviors of the country. At all events, 
 if they succeeded in nothing more, they were determined 
 to alienate that influence from General Washington ; and 
 consequently their designs were aimed, for the moment, 
 toward the Marquis de La Fayette. 
 
 With exceeding cleverness, they hit upon a plan which 
 would appeal more than any other to La Fayette, because 
 it touched at once his love of France, his desire for glory 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. 269 
 
 in arms, and his readiness to inflict, by his own actions, 
 an injury upon "the hereditary enemy" of his country, 
 whom every Frenchman feared and hated. This was an 
 independent expedition, which he should be appointed to 
 command, against Canada, The expedition, as we see it 
 now, was nothing but a plot, It was not conceived with 
 any regard to its ultimate success ; and it failed because 
 there was not a single element of success contained in it. 
 No military genius had been employed in considering the 
 means and methods by which a campaign of that charac 
 ter might be carried on, and no military preparations had 
 been made ; for there were neither forces at hand for the 
 purpose, nor transportation or provisions with which they 
 could have been supplied if troops enough had been 
 brought together to make even a reasonable demonstration 
 of attack against the enemy s country. Neglect of this 
 kind in an actual military operation would have been 
 disgraceful. The fact, however, that there were men in 
 the American army, possibly also in Congress, who were 
 capable of lending themselves to an unworthy fiction 
 which embarrassed the Commander-in-Chief in one of 
 the darkest hours of the war, and led to a considerable 
 expenditure of money when the country was destitute, is 
 lamentable indeed. 
 
 General Washington knew nothing of it until La Fay- 
 ette received orders from Congress to take command ; he 
 was left intentionally in ignorance, and not only was he 
 not consulted, but he was subjected to the mortification of 
 seeing one of his own officers taken from him and ordered 
 to assume an independent military command over which 
 he, although Commander-in-Chief, should have neither 
 supervision nor control. General Washington received at 
 Valley Forge an official announcement of this expedition 
 from the Board of War, and, without betraying any per 
 sonal feeling at the insult thrust upon him by it, or criti 
 cising the action of Congress, he handed to the Marquis 
 
270 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 de La Fayette the commission which had been enclosed for 
 him as an independent commander-in-chief who should 
 proceed at once to Congress to receive his instructions, 
 with this simple expression of regard : " I would rather 
 they had selected you for this than any other man." * 
 
 On the 22d of January, 1778, Congress had resolved 
 " That an irruption be made into Canada, and that the 
 Board of War be authorized to take every necessary 
 measure for the execution of the business under such 
 general officers as Congress shall appoint, and apply for 
 such sums of money as may be thought by them proper 
 and requisite for the expedition," and upon the following 
 day they proceeded to elect Major-General the Marquis de 
 La Fayette, Major-General Con way, and Brigadier-Gen 
 eral Stark as the officers to conduct the " irruption into 
 Canada." 2 
 
 La Fayette was deceived by the promises that had been 
 made to him as to the support he should receive through 
 out the expedition from Congress and the Board of War, 
 as well as by the representations made by friends of the 
 Cabal of the number of troops that were to be ready for 
 him upon his arrival at Albany, which was to be his point 
 of departure for the campaign, the preparations as to 
 clothing, arms, ammunition, wagons, and all the necessary 
 details of camp equipage, which he believed to have been 
 seriously considered beforehand, but in regard to which, 
 in point of fact, nothing had been done. The idea of 
 wresting Canada from the British fired his mind with 
 ambition to succeed in an undertaking which promised 
 great opportunities for a young commander to distin 
 guish himself before the world in his military profes 
 sion. As a Frenchman he accepted with especial delight 
 the mission to a French province, among a people whose 
 language and attachments made them kindred to him- 
 
 1 Me*moires de La Fayette, i. 73, Fragment C. 
 
 2 Journals of Congress, 22d and 23d of January, 1778. 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAIXST CANADA. 271 
 
 self. To give them liberty by uniting them with the 
 thirteen free States of America was to him an exalted 
 purpose, comparable with the best achievements in the 
 lives of all patriots and soldiers. To have thrown off a 
 hated domination and to have avenged, in the rescue and 
 independence of Canada, one of the sorest humiliations 
 of the Seven Years War, would have made him at once 
 a hero and would have crowned him with glory in France. 
 Nothing could have been a greater inducement to the 
 youthful general. 
 
 But it must be said to the honor of M. de La Fayette 
 that, in the face of these tempting offers which were cun 
 ningly prepared to seduce him by the dazzling prospect 
 of his own greatness, and by fame which seemed almost 
 within his grasp, he held his loyalty supreme. Before 
 his duty as a man he placed nothing else ; his upright 
 principles directed him into the path of right as he saw it 
 and knew it, without regard to self. He would not turn 
 against Washington. 
 
 Immediately upon the receipt of his commission, he de 
 clared that he should not accept it if by so doing he were 
 to be removed from the Commander-in-Chief, and he wrote 
 to Congress that he must decline the command they had 
 offered him unless he could remain under the orders of 
 General Washington and report directly to him. He also 
 presented himself to the committee of Congress, who hap 
 pened at that time to be visiting the camp, and emphati 
 cally announced to them that nothing could induce him 
 to separate himself from the General, but that he should 
 rather stay with him, even as an aide-de-camp, than accept 
 any independent commission which they might present to 
 him. He replied to Congress, in a formal communication 
 addressed to that body, that he would accept the command 
 of the expedition to Canada upon condition that he should 
 be subordinate to General Washington and considered 
 merely as one of his officers detached for a special service, 
 
272 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 also that he should report directly to the General in the 
 first instance and should make the reports of his opera 
 tions to Congress in duplicate, but not otherwise. These 
 conditions were accepted, to the gratification of M. de La 
 Fayette, who thereupon made preparations to start at once, 
 in the dead of winter, upon a campaign which, whatever 
 might have been its promises of success, must necessarily 
 have entailed enormous hardship. 1 
 
 The instructions sent to him by General Gates, as Presi 
 dent of the Board of War, were as follows : 
 
 " Instructions for the Marquis de La Fayette, Major- General in the 
 Army of the United States, commanding an expedition to Canada. 2 
 
 "The Troops selected for the above service consist of the fol 
 lowing Corps, viz. 
 
 Brigadier General Nixon s Brigade. 
 
 Colonel Van Schaick s Beginient. 
 
 Colonel Warner s do 
 
 Colonel J. Livingston s do 
 
 Colonel Hazen s do 
 
 Colonel Bedel s do 
 
 Capt. Whitconib s Bangers 
 
 "These Corps will, at a low estimate, make Two Thousand 
 Five Hundred Combatants ; and all, except Bedel s Eeginient, 
 will rendezvous at Bennington. 
 
 "That will march from Co-os, where it is raised, to the mouth 
 of Onion Biver ; the place appointed for the General Rendezvous. 
 As most of the troops ordered for this service have been upon 
 duty in Canada, there will be no want of any other guides than 
 such as may be chosen from them. General Stark, Colonel War 
 ner and Colo. Bedel, with the Assist. Depy. Qr. Master General, 
 Colonel Hazen, know every road, pass, and post, in the country. 
 You have only to consult with them, as you advance, and, if 
 absolutely necessary, upon your Betreat. 
 
 "Colonel Greaton, the Commanding Officer at Albany, has 
 directions, in concert with the Qr. Master General, the Conimy. 
 Genl. and the Commander of the Artillery at Albany, to provide 
 Ammunition, Provisions, Stores and as many Carriages as may 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 39 and 72. 
 
 J Department of State, Papers of the Old Congress. 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. 273 
 
 be requisite for the intended service. Colonel Hazen is sent for 
 ward to expedite the execution of these orders. You need, there 
 fore, be under no concern, for supplies. 
 
 "As success will depend, principally, upon the vigor, and 
 alertness, with which the enterprise is conducted, the Board 
 recommend it to you to lose no time. The rapidity of your 
 motions, and the consternation of the enemy, will do the business. 
 
 "The season of the year being severe, though healthy, the 
 commissary of clothing, at Albany, is ordered to furnish all the 
 woolens, and every comfort his stores can afford. You will con 
 stantly be in the woods, at night, where the troops are so well 
 acquainted with the mode of covering themselves, that you will 
 find tents unnecessary and cumbersome. 
 
 "The proper officers are now providing Forage, at the general 
 and particular places of rendezvous. 
 
 "Upon your gaining possession of St. Johns or Montreal, you 
 will publish a Declaration of your Intentions to the Canadians, 
 and invite them to join the Army of the United States. Colo. 
 Hazen 7 s Regiment, of four battalions, is to be first compleated to 
 the establishment ; and the officers and soldiers who enlist are to 
 be allowed the bounty, and reward, offered them by Congress in 
 their Resolution of 1776. Unless you shall be of 
 
 opinion, after considering the political complexion of the inhabi 
 tants, that it is not a proper crisis for inviting the Canadians to 
 take an open part with these States ; in which case you will pub 
 lish a Manifesto, requiring a strict neutrality on the part of the 
 Canadians ; and suggesting such other considerations, as you shall 
 deem adapted to the situation of affairs. 
 
 "If, iii)on your entering Canada, you find a general disinclina 
 tion of the natives, to join the American Standard, you will de 
 stroy all the Works and Vessels, at St. Johns, Chamblee and the 
 Isle Aux Noix, and retire by the best route, to the settlement, 
 tluMice to Saratoga, and our present advanced posts on the Wood 
 Creek and Hudson s River. 
 
 "If, on the contrary, the Canadians are ardently desirous of 
 assisting to establish the Freedom, and Independence of America, 
 you will inform them, that when they embark in the Common 
 Canst*, they must determine to receive the Resolves of Congress, 
 and the Currency of America, with that Reverence, and Alacrity, 
 which have ever been manifested in the Acts and Dealings of the 
 Subjects of the United States. 
 
 "They are then to be requested to send Delegates, to represent 
 their State in the Congress of the United States, and to conform, 
 VOL. I. is 
 
274 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 in all political respects, to the Union, and Confederation, estab 
 lished in them. 
 
 "In taking possession of Montreal, which is a principal object 
 of this expedition, you will take into your possession, for the use 
 of the public, all the Arms, Ammunition, and Warlike Stores, 
 together with all the linnens, woolens and Indian goods, that may 
 be found, in, or near the City of Montreal ; making such allow 
 ances for the private property, so secured, as you shall think most 
 consistent with justice and sound policy, and the merits of the 
 respective individuals, to which they belong. In transacting this 
 business, you will take effectual care, to prevent every species of 
 plunder and embezzlement ; as these may tend to raise suspicions, 
 in the minds of the Canadians, that may be both dishonourable, 
 and prejudicial to the interest of the United States. 
 
 " This Board would suggest to you the propriety of calling upon 
 the Governor, Senate and Assembly of the State of New York, 
 now sitting at Poughkepsie, on your way to Albany, and taking 
 their advice upon all such matters as may contribute to the glory 
 and success of your expedition. 7 
 
 In connection with these Instructions, from which Gen 
 eral de La Fayette was justified in believing that the un 
 dertaking had been honestly conceived and thoroughly 
 provided for, in every military requisite, at least, that the 
 season of the year demanded and the state of the country 
 would permit, there is a curious paper still preserved in 
 the Archives of the United States, endorsed " Additional 
 Instructions to the Marquis de La Fayette signed in the 
 hand writing of General Gates/ l the seeming contradic- 
 toriness of which, when compared with the avowed pur 
 poses of the expedition as set forth above, in which the 
 conquest of Canada, the taking of Montreal, and the 
 union of that people with the United States are promi 
 nently held out to La Fayette as the objects which he 
 was to make an effort to attain, bears evidence of the in 
 sincerity which, without question, permeated the whole 
 scheme. In this paper the expedition is reported to 
 Congress as a mere predatory incursion, stripped entirely 
 
 1 Department of State, MSS., Papers of the Old Congress. 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. 275 
 
 of the inducements which alone enlisted La Fayette in the 
 undertaking. It reads as follows : 
 
 "To these Instructions is superadded a cautionary one repre 
 senting to the Marquis, That the primary object is a mere Incur 
 sion or Eavage with a view to destroy the enemy s shipping and 
 stores and to bring away or destroy all such goods as will be of 
 service to the enemy and if brought off as will be useful to the 
 Army of the U. States, and therefore that, if, upon attempting 
 the enterprise, the Marquis shall be of opinion from all circum 
 stances that it is not prudent to proceed on so large a scale as 
 that before mentioned, he will go no farther than a Eavage and 
 bring his troops off after doing what injury he can to the enemy, 
 their vessels, stores or effects. 
 
 "As this Addition is now mislaid, this Board have sent the 
 effect or tenor of it from their memory, that Congress may not be 
 delayed from having all the information the Board can give. 
 
 "HORATIO GATES, 
 
 "President." 
 
 As the Marquis de La Fayette has made no mention 
 in his Memoires and published Correspondence of this 
 " cautionary" instruction, it is possible that he never 
 received it, since the document is said to have been " mis 
 laid ;" or that, if he did receive it, he gave it no serious 
 attention, because he was convinced at the time that lie 
 was being dealt with in good faith ; indeed, he had no 
 reason then to suspect the contrary. But in the light of 
 subsequent events the idea suggests itself that this was 
 artfully conceived in order to dull the edge of expectation 
 in Congress as to a military enterprise that had been 
 allowed to attract very considerable attention, and to 
 shield the Board of War against responsibility for its 
 failure, which, from the nature of the circumstances, must 
 inevitably come, and did come, shortly afterward. 
 
 Nevertheless, La Fayette, after consultation with Gen 
 eral Washington, began immediately his preparations to 
 set out. In order to cross Lake Champlain upon the ice 
 and to return, it was important for him to move at the 
 
276 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA [1778. 
 
 very earliest moment ; and, though the month of 4 not 
 was already gone, he had still to make the long - ^ ave 
 
 from the heart of Pennsylvania to Albany before 
 
 P , . . . , ., >art of 
 
 even lay out the plan 01 his campaign in detail. -but 
 
 Con way, it will be observed, had been selected tc accom 
 pany him as one of the commanding officers of the expe 
 dition, not at the request or with the knowledge of General 
 de La Fayette, but upon the instigation of the Board of 
 War ; and in this selection is very probably to be found 
 one of the leading motives of the scheme. In the insid 
 ious atmosphere of Conway s flatteries and promises, far 
 removed from the personal influences of the Commander- 
 in-Chief, amid new scenes in which he was to be per 
 mitted to amuse himself into forgetfulness of former at 
 tachments by the vanity aroused through having become 
 himself a central figure, it was hoped that his allegiance 
 might gradually be weakened, and that he would fall a 
 victim to the cunning of intrigue. It must be confessed, 
 the plan was well conceived ; but it was measu: ^ to a 
 smaller man than the Marquis de La Fayette. F r ojj 
 not accept of General Conway as his adviser ; *e of 
 rounded himself with friends of his own anx -ntest. 
 Frenchmen then in the American service, and 
 tioned and obtained the consent of Congress to a ... 
 the expedition Major-General the Baron de Kalo, as a 
 companion and adviser in whom he had confidence. Thus 
 he defeated the plot. 
 
 In General Gates s own house, in the presence of the 
 conspirators who were known to be of the Ca ^ 
 Fayette boldly proposed the health of General W V eat 
 ton and called upon them to drink it; which tl "-ore 
 reddening with shame. 1 
 
 He wrote the following letter to the President of Con 
 gress : 2 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. 39. 
 
 2 Department of State, MSS., Papers of the Old Congress. 
 
177t PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAIXST CANADA. 277 
 
 his " YORKTOWX, this 31 January, 1778. 
 
 Kalb , SIR, I beg you would receive yourself and present to 
 who -able Congress my warmest thanks for the mark of con- 
 genj ey have honored me with in appointing me to the coin- 
 Jrl : i Northern Army. I schall be very happy if circum 
 stances, ^ mean such ways of succeeding as will be granted to my 
 desires on every point, enable me to accept a favor which I have 
 received with the most sincere gratefulness as soon as I received 
 notice of the propositions which were made to me by the Board 
 of War, I desired the opinion of the gentlemen from Congress 
 who were in camp, and seeing them convinced as well as myself 
 that I should come here before going to Albany, I got this leave 
 from his excellency G nl Washington, and I repaired to this place 
 in order to know in which light I could consider the expedition 
 proposed to me against Montreal. 
 
 " I have been surprised to receive the news of my appointment, 
 and the instructions of my commission by any other hand than 
 this of my general it engaged me to make this very stranger to 
 my mind and very strange in itself reflexion, that I was not per 
 haps looked on as a detachment of his excellency s army under 
 his immediate command however I hope that idea was ground 
 less anf I find even it was a ridiculous one. I look upon it as 
 a muf iSgher honor and a much pleasanter satisfaction for me, 
 ^ isidered only as an officer of his, under his immediate 
 gi an if I was in any other light it is not for satisfying 
 lir >ride that I speak so, but for the advantage of the thing 
 i* : and for complying to the sentiments which I know to be 
 arts of all the frenchmen who are to come along with me. 
 "it , Sir, an highly pleasant idea for me to think of a large 
 parcell of my countrymen, driving theyr natural and tyrannical 
 ennemy out of the lands they had taken from em, and enjoying 
 all the advantages of liberty, by theyr strict union with thirteen 
 other suites how happy I would be had I the satisfaction of 
 In i instrument of such a revolution, my love for the freedom 
 hid in general, and in this particular instance, my con- 
 >* ty with the Canadians, and the name of frenchman I am 
 with, will be sufficient proofs, if I had believed that I 
 .HI sent for doing good and right to the Canadians, then I 
 
 should not have hesitated an instant to decline this commission 
 but as I am fully convinced that I would promote theyr happiness 
 as well as the advantage of the United States, I shall undertake 
 it with the greatest chearfulness, if those means are taken which 
 I think proper to succeed it is far from the temper of my mind 
 
278 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 to accept the governement of any business which I cou-d not 
 carry to nay own honor, and the utility of the people WiO have 
 put theyr confidence in me. 
 
 "g nl Gates has been pleased to communicate to me one part of 
 the project other instructions will come soon in my hands but 
 I was anxious to make as soon as possible my thanks to the hon 
 orable Congress, and in the same time to let them know which 
 were some of my sentiments about this matter. I went for that 
 purpose as soon as I received the letter of the h ble Board of War. 
 
 * i I shall make use with the greatest pleasure of the liberty 
 which has been granted to me of taking along with us some of 
 the frenchmen who are here and to choose those I am more ac 
 quainted with. I dare answer that the Unit States will be satis 
 fied with theyr services, and the Canadians pleased with theyr 
 manners and good examples. I enclose here the list which I have 
 been permitted to make out. We know all that the name of french 
 men imposes to us great duties to deserve it, but no exertions will 
 be forgotten on our part to show ourselves worthy of the country 
 we have had the advantage to be born in. 
 
 "I entertain the hope that such a collection of frenchmen 
 among whom some are not unknown to the english nation, going 
 for helping Canadians against the common ennerny, will spread 
 troublesome reflexions in the hearts of many in theyr ministry, 
 and be of some weight for declaring war to france this I desire 
 heartily because I am. fully convinced that it is the advantage of 
 my country to take now a more active part in the present contest. 
 
 "The honorable Congress will give me leave to mention them, 
 as a thing of the highest moment that for my operations, princi 
 pally for my councils, and for giving to me theyr advices I have not 
 a sufficient number of general officers with those whom I find the 
 Congress and Board of War have been pleased to appoint to me 
 the only troops who will be at or about Albany are more numerous 
 than any division is now in the Army and if we have some succes 
 I understand it will increase every day aniasingly but it is the 
 least matter, and we must not so much consider the number of 
 men as the importance of our business there will be gveat 
 many instances where I l want the advice and exertions of more 
 than two g nl officers. I think it is as much of my duty as of jiiy 
 delicacy to confess all what I should need, before the same men 
 who appointed me, and with the succes of the enterprise I had 
 desired General M c douggal, not that I am very intimately ac 
 quainted with him, but by the knowledge I have of his rigid and 
 imperturbable virtue the state of his health would not permit 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. 279 
 
 his going now in a so cold country but there is the baron de 
 Kalb who has seen more war than any officer in the continent, 
 who came over with ine, who if I was to point out any of the 
 general officers who are to be in that expedition, had an indubita 
 ble right to my mentioning his name he desires to come with me ; 
 he will be much more useful to America if he is employed there 
 I take the liberty of recommending that in the most strongest 
 terms, not at all because there where are more than two brigadiers 
 it seems it should be two Major Generals, but because I think 
 very firmly that for the good of the service and the succes of the 
 enterprise it is of the highest importance and of an absolute 
 necessity. 
 
 " You will find me, Sir, very difficult and rather too cautious 
 but it come chiefly from my being strongly convinced how far 
 indebted I am to the Congress of the United States for the con 
 fidence they honor me withI want to deserve it, and when mat 
 ters will be settled, then no exertion schall be forgotten on my 
 part for showing myself worthy of such a commission my first 
 step towards Albany will be decisive for my fate therefore I 
 must avoid any inconsidered one if before venturing myself to 
 it I would not insist upon the means of succes I look upon as 
 necessary, then myself and the french officers, whose attachment 
 has connected theyr going there with my having taking that 
 command, we schould take the place of men who could perhaps 
 give a greater weight to that expedition in europe, gain better the 
 hearts of the Canadians, and engage them with little difficulty to 
 raise up against the common ennemy. 
 
 " When I will get the detail of my instructions, the returns of 
 my resources of every kind, and as many intelligences as I can 
 get from the board of "War, then the board will give me leave to 
 consider deeply which objections I can make (for the advantage 
 for the expedition) to what schould be granted to me Knowing 
 the just time at which things will be ready is by circumstances 
 of the highest importance, the quantity and quality of cloathing, 
 of arms which will be delivered to our soldiers, those which are 
 destinated for as many soldiers as will be in our party, and as 
 many Canadians as will serve under the American colours, our 
 magasines, stores of every kind, our provisions, waggons, horses 
 &c. &c. are things of which a single one may throw down all the 
 enterprise but as it is not prohibited to look in a fair prospect as 
 far as it can go, if circumstances would permit to us a longer stay, 
 if a siege of a greater importance was thought proper and ordered 
 by Congress then other steps should be taken and foreseen there 
 
280 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 is one thing of the greatest importance to provide for it is to 
 prevent the enneiny coming up in our rear or obliging us by the 
 least motion to make a precipitate retreat by my being sent there 
 on a political as well as a military [view] I am [inten g ] to beg 
 to Congress instructions from themselves for what I am to do in 
 that [former] way and to give me officers to whom I can have 
 the greatest confidence on every respect what I promise must 
 be relligiously kept, and my honor as well as my love for the 
 french blood obliges me to take care not to make the least mis 
 understanding, as many things as can be foreseen, I want to 
 have them cleared for the others I fancy some liberty will be 
 granted to me, and then Fl judge according to my conscience 
 and the advice of every honest man and warm friend to the 
 american cause I may consult 
 
 " I fancy that I will get the answers Congress will be pleased to 
 make to the several articles of this letter about in the same time 
 that my most interesting business with the board will be done 
 then, Sir, if I can hope to satisfy the views of Congress and the 
 feelings of my own heart, Fl repair immediately to camp, and 
 after taking the leave and the last orders of my general, Fl go 
 as far as possible with the officers who are to follow me, to the 
 place where I hope to show by my conduct my gratefulness and 
 my warm attachement for the United States of America. 
 
 " With the highest regard I have the honor to be, 
 "Sir, 
 
 " Your most obedient servant, 
 
 "THE M s DE LAFAYETTE." 
 
 Truly it was a pity to waste so good a disposition 
 in so poor a cause. It is probable that an attack upon 
 Canada in the winter-time, when the British were not pre 
 pared for active operations, would have been produc 
 tive of good results if it had been made by a sufficiently 
 large and well-equipped force ; and there can be no doubt 
 that an army led by the Marquis de La Fayette, among 
 whose officers were many Frenchmen, some of them distin 
 guished soldiers known by reputation to the Canadians, 
 would have had considerable advantage over almost any 
 other in winning the friendship and co-operation of the 
 inhabitants. But it is also true that the whole available 
 resources of the United States would not have sufficed 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. 281 
 
 at that moment to provide for, and properly to equip, 
 such an expedition ; and none knew this better than the 
 Board of War. 
 
 Nevertheless, La Fayette set out with a hopeful heart 
 and a firm determination to succeed. On the 3d of Feb 
 ruary, 1778, he left the town of York, in Pennsylvania, 
 where Congress then was, and, crossing the Susquehanna 
 River, which was packed with floating ice, he mounted 
 his horse and started with his guide upon the long jour 
 ney of nearly four hundred miles that was to take him to 
 Albany. 
 
 The weather was intensely cold ; the roads were bad, 
 and his progress was very difficult as he advanced, some 
 times in a sleigh, sometimes on horseback, weary and wet 
 and exposed to all the changes of an inclement season. 
 It was much harder than he had expected, this winter 
 work in a Northern climate ; he realized it only after he 
 had made the trial. But it shows the steadiness of his 
 purpose that, having discovered the growing difficulties 
 of his task, he still went on. 
 
 About a week after leaving York, he wrote to General 
 Washington, from Flemington, in New Jersey, 1 
 
 "I go on very slowly ; sometimes drenched by rain, sometimes 
 covered by snow, and not entertaining many handsome thoughts 
 about the projected incursion into Canada ; if successes were to 
 be had, it would surprise me in a most agreeable manner by that 
 very reason that I don t expect any shining ones. Lake Cham- 
 plain is too cold for producing the least bit of laurel, and if I am 
 not starved I shall be as proud as if I had gained three battles. 
 . . . Could I believe, for one single instant that this pompous com 
 mand of a northern army will let your excellency forget a little us 
 absent friends, then I would send the project to the place it comes 
 from. But I dare hope that you will remember me sometimes. 
 I wish you, very heartily, the greatest public and private happi 
 ness and successes. It is a very melancholy idea for me that I 
 
 1 Correspondence, American edition, i. 153 ; Letter of 9th February, 
 1778. 
 
282 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 cannot follow your fortunes as near your person as I could wish. ; 
 but my heart will take, very sincerely, its part of everything 
 which can happen to you, and I am already thinking of the 
 agreeable moment when I may come down to assure your excel 
 lency of the most tender affection and highest respect. 77 
 
 Finally, after struggling on against the severity of the 
 winter, La Fayette arrived in Albany on the 17th of 
 February, but only to find that he had been deceived, and 
 to learn with mortification that his bright anticipation of 
 glorious service in behalf of the United States and for 
 the honor of France was but a dream. Instead of the 
 enthusiasm he expected on every side, he met nothing 
 but discouragement from those he counted upon. He 
 had been spurred on by General Gates to hasten his jour 
 ney, lest General Stark should have preceded him upon 
 the expedition and should have destroyed the British 
 fleet before his arrival ; but, to his amazement, when he 
 reached Albany, General Stark seemed never to have 
 heard of the undertaking. General Conway, who had 
 arrived a few days before, the official representative of 
 the Board of War, with whom this enterprise originated, 
 received M. de La Fayette with the curt announcement 
 that the matter was not to be thought of; and La Fayette 
 had the testimony of experienced officers, like General 
 Schuyler, General Lincoln, and Benedict Arnold (the 
 latter of whom knew, as well as any man then alive, the 
 difficulties of an expedition into Canada) , that it would be 
 impossible to succeed in this attempt. 1 
 
 The ardent young soldier discovered that he had been 
 entrapped. In bitter disappointment, he saw himself 
 artfully removed from the companionship of his beloved 
 friend, the Commander-in-Chief, for a purpose which he 
 began now but too clearly to understand ; and, with a 
 heavy heart, he realized that, in spite of his heroic efforts 
 
 1 See also the letter of Benedict Arnold to Gouverneur Morris, 2d Febru 
 ary, 1778, Appendix B. 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. 283 
 
 to carry out the plan lie had in mind, he must perforce 
 content himself to give it up. 
 
 His correspondence, which fortunately has been pre 
 served to us, tells the story best in the language in which 
 he put it. Two days after his arrival at Albany, he wrote 
 to General Washington, 1 
 
 " DEAII GENERAL, Why am I so far from you and what busi 
 ness had the board of War to hurry nie through the ice and snow 
 without knowing what I should do, neither what they were doing 
 themselves ? You have thought, perhaps, that their project would 
 be attended with some difficulty, that some means had been 
 neglected, that I could not obtain all the success and the im 
 mensity of laurels which they had promised to me ; but I defy 
 your excellency to conceive any idea of what I have seen since I 
 left the place where I was quiet and near my friends, to run my 
 self through all the blunders of madness or treachery, (God knows 
 what). Let me begin the journal of my fine and glorious campaign. 
 
 " According to Lord Stirling s advice, I went by CoryelFs 
 Ferry to Bingo s tavern, where Mr. Duer had given me a rendez 
 vous ; but there no Duer was to be found, and they did never 
 hear from him. From thence I proceeded by the State of Xew 
 York and had the pleasure of seeing the friends of America as 
 warm in their love for the Comuiander-in-Chief as his best friend 
 could wish. I spoke to Governor Clinton, and was much satisfied 
 with that gentleman. At length I met Albany, the 17th, though 
 I was not expected before the 25th. General Couway had been 
 here only three days before me, and I must confess I found him 
 very active and looking as if he had good intentions ; but we 
 know a great deal upon that subject. His first word has been 
 that the expedition is quite impossible. I was at first very diffi 
 dent of this report, but have found that he was right. Such is, 
 at least, the idea I can form of this ill-concerted operation within 
 these two days. 
 
 " General Schuyler, General Lincoln, General Arnold, had 
 written, before my arrival, to General Conway, in the most ex 
 pressive terms, that, in our present circumstances, there was 
 no possibility to begin, now, an enterprise into Canada. Hay, 
 deputy quarter-master-general ; Cuyler, deputy-commissary-gen- 
 eral ; Mearsin, deputy clothier-general, in what they call the 
 
 1 10th February, 1778, Correspondence of La Fayette, American edition, 
 i. 154. 
 
284 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 northern department, are entirely of the same opinion. Colonel 
 Hazen, who has been appointed to a place which interferes with 
 the three others above mentioned, was the most desirous of going 
 there. The reasons of such an order I think I may attribute to 
 other motives. The same Hazen confesses we are not strong 
 enough to think of the expedition in this moment. As to the 
 troops, they are disgusted, and (if you except some Hazen s 
 Canadians) reluctant, to the utmost degree, to begin a winter in 
 cursion in a so cold country I have consulted everybody, and 
 everybody answers me that it would be madness to undertake 
 this operation. 
 
 "I have been deceived by the board of War; they have, by 
 the strongest expressions, promised to me three thousand, and 
 (what is more to be depended upon) they have assured me in 
 writing, two thousand and five hundred combatants, at a low estimate. 
 IsTow, Sir, I do not believe I can find in all twelve hundred fit for 
 duty, and most part of those very men are naked, even for a 
 summer s campaign. I was to find General Stark with a large 
 body, and indeed General Gates had told to me, General Stark will 
 have burnt the fleet before your arrival. Well, the first letter I re 
 ceive in Albany is from General Stark, who wishes to know ivhat 
 number of men, from whence, for tvhat time, for what rendezvous, I 
 desire him to raise. Colonel Bedel, who was to rise too, would 
 have done something had he received money. One asks, what en 
 couragement his people will have, the other has no clothes j not 
 one of them has received a dollar of what was due to them. I 
 have applied to every body, I have begged at every door I could 
 these two days, and I see that I could do something were the ex 
 pedition to be begun in five weeks. But you know we have not 
 an hour to lose, and indeed it is now rather too late, had we 
 everything in readiness. 
 
 "There is a spirit of dissatisfaction prevailing among the sol 
 diers, and even the officers, which is owing to their not being 
 paid for some time since. This department is much indebted, 
 and as near as I can ascertain, for so a short time, I have already 
 discovered near eight hundred thousand dollars due to the Conti 
 nental troops, some militia, the quarter- master s department &c. 
 &c. It was with four hundred thousand dollars, only the half of 
 which is arrived to-day, that I was to undertake the operation, 
 and satisfy the men under my commands. I send to Congress the 
 account of those debts. Some clothes, by Colonel Hazen s activity, 
 are arrived from Boston, but not enough by far, and the greatest 
 part is cut off. 
 
1778.] PEOJECTED EXPEDITION AGAIXST CANADA. 285 
 
 "We have had intelligence from a deserter, who makes the 
 enemy stronger than I thought. There is no such thing as straw 
 on board the vessels to burn them. I have sent to Congress a full 
 account of the matter j I hope it will open their eyes. What 
 they will resolve upon I do not know, but I think I must wait 
 here for their answer. I have enclosed to the president, copies 
 of the most important letters I had received. It would be 
 tedious for your excellency, were I to undertake the minutest 
 detail of everything ; it will be sufficient to say that the want 
 of men, clothes, money, and the want of time, deprives me of all 
 hopes as to this excursion. If it may begin again in the month 
 of June, by the east, I cannot venture to assure ; but for the 
 present moment such is the idea I conceive of the famous incur 
 sion, as far as I may be informed in so short a time. 
 
 "Your excellency may judge that I am very distressed by this 
 disappointment. My being appointed to the command of the ex 
 pedition is known through the continent, it will be soon known in 
 Europe, as I have been desired, by members of Congress, to write 
 to my friends ; my being at the head of an army, people will be 
 in great expectations, and what shall I answer f 
 
 "I am afraid it will reflect on my reputation, and I shall be 
 laughed at. My fears upon that subject are so strong, that I 
 would choose to become again only a volunteer, unless Congress 
 offers the means of mending this ugly business by some glorious 
 operation ; but I am very far from giving to them the least notice 
 upon that matter. General Arnold seems very fond of a diversion 
 against New York, and he is too sick to take the field before four 
 or five months. I should be happy if something was proposed to 
 me in that way, but I will never ask, nor even seem desirous, of 
 anything directly from Congress ; for you, dear general, I know 
 very well, that you will do everything to procure me the only 
 thing I am ambitious of glory. 
 
 "I think your excellency will approve of my staying here till 
 further orders, and of my taking the liberty of sending my de 
 spatches to Congress by a very quick occasion, without going 
 through the hands of my general ; but I was desirous to acquaint 
 them early of my disagreeable and ridiculous situation. 
 
 " With the greatest affection and respect, 
 
 "I have the honour to be, &c." 
 
 M. tie La Fayette decided, as we have seen, to stay in 
 Albany, not only because he was awaiting further orders 
 from the Board of War, to whom he immediately coinmu- 
 
286 PKOJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 nicated his situation, but also because he still entertained 
 the hope that something might yet be done to justify his 
 having gone there, and, as he said to General Conway, 1 
 " by every exertions when I can find any probability not 
 to ruin, or dishonour the troops under my command." 
 
 His earnest appeals to General Gates, to whom, as Presi 
 dent of the Board of War and his superior officer, he 
 showed at least the courtesy of assuming that he also had 
 been misled as to the preparations for the expedition, con 
 tain repeated expressions of his anxiety to accomplish, in 
 one way or another, some effective result. He persuaded 
 himself that he might have succeeded, in spite of all ob 
 stacles, if only time enough had been given him ; and, 
 chafing under enforced idleness and disappointment, he 
 discussed various plans of action, not practicable under 
 the circumstances, which served but to prove the hope 
 lessness of his case. Of these were the diversion against 
 New York to which he referred in his letter to General 
 Washington, and an incursion into Canada for the mere 
 purpose of burning the British fleet. He wrote to Gen 
 eral Gates, 2 
 
 "I confess I was perhaps too sanguine in my hopes, or too quick 
 in my feelings when I saw them deceived ; but consider, Sir, the 
 charming prospect I had before my eyes, and you will conceive 
 how concerned I must be on this occasion. What hurts me more 
 is to think that we want only time, and was I in the month of 
 January I would be certain of carrying the business. I dare say 
 you will be yourself very surprised to see things so different from 
 what they had been represented to you and you had represented 
 to me be certain, Sir, I was never so unhappy as in this circum 
 stance, tho ? the general opinion of every rank and condition in 
 the civil as well as the military line assures me that I could not do 
 anything in our present situation. 
 
 " However I cannot give up all idea of doing something in that 
 quarter. I hear every scheme on this subject and find very little 
 probabilities of succes no body thinks the grand expedition 
 
 1 Letter of 19th February, 1778 : New York Historical Society. 
 
 2 23d February, 1778 : Gates Papers, New York Historical Society. 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. 287 
 
 could be carried, but some speak of burning the fleet by surprise 
 with a detachment General Conway is much against it, and I 
 confess it seems to me he is in right tho doing or trying nothing 
 in tliis moment is exasperating to the last degree. . . . Fort 
 Schuyler should be provided for six months, I l go to that fort, 
 and I l have the honor to write you how I have found it. It seems 
 to me that the people is rather proud of an expedition against 
 New York I am told that in the month of June there is a very 
 easy way into the heart of Canada, in everything you believe I l 
 be useful to the American cause, till the moment perhaps not very 
 far where my business will oblige me to leave this continent, be 
 certain, Sir, that I shall always be ready ; and I dare say where 
 I am obliged to stop nobody will go on." 
 
 It appears also from M. cle La Fayette s letters to Gen 
 eral Gates, as if to add irrefragable proof of the disgrace 
 ful lack of principle upon the part of those concerned in 
 ordering this expedition to be undertaken, that, while no 
 provision had been made for the munitions of war and 
 supplies with which to equip the army, the money which 
 had been promised to the young commander for this pur 
 pose was not provided for him, as indeed, under exist 
 ing circumstances, it could not have been. The pay of 
 the troops was far in arrears, as we have seen ; the quar 
 termaster s department and the commissary s were bare ; 
 and, although M. de La Fayette reported to General 
 Washington the arrival of a sum much smaller than 
 he expected for the equipment of his command, he dis 
 covered, upon the first demand made in that direction, 
 that even this was not for him. So greatly was he dis 
 turbed by this, to him, presumable mischance, that he 
 freely offered his private credit to be used in supplying 
 pressing wants. He wrote to General Gates, 1 " every body 
 is after me for monney be so good as to let me know 
 how I must do I have given leave to every one in public 
 departments if they could borrow on my private credit 
 
 1 23d February and llth March, 1778 : Gates Papers, New York Historical 
 Society. 
 
288 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 for paying their debts, to do it without difficulty." And 
 " we want monney, Sir, and monney will be spoken of by 
 me till I will be enabled to pay our poor soldiers, not 
 only justice and humanity but even prudence obliges us 
 to satisfy them soon ; all the monney goes by other ways. 
 I have seen a letter to Colonel Hay where you tell him 
 that the very same 400,000 dollars you told me were for 
 me, are destinated to him. ... I was a little distressed to 
 know how to employ the monney which I thought was for 
 the expedition till I saw in one of your letters to C L Hay 
 that it was coming for the department." No wonder he 
 wrote to General Gates, 1 " I expect with the greater impa 
 tience letters from Congress and the Board of War where 
 I l be acquainted of what I am to do. I hope the good 
 intentions of honorable Board in my favor could be em 
 ployed in a better occasion indeed, Sir, there has been 
 good deal of deception and neglect in that affair." 
 
 In the mean time the season wore away ; the months 
 of February and March passed, and General de La Fay- 
 ette occupied himself at Albany with such duties as he 
 could find there to do, aiding, in the mean time, the 
 garrison of Fort Schuyler with provisions and clothing, 
 and, at the invitation of General Schuyler, going up the 
 Mohawk Valley to attend a notable council of Indians. 
 La Fayette made terms of friendship with the Oneidas 
 and the Tuscaroras especially. His manners and appear 
 ance pleased them so greatly that they adopted him into 
 their tribes, giving to him the name of Kayewla, formerly 
 borne by one of their warriors ; after which, in order to 
 strengthen the attachment of these people to the American 
 cause, he acceded to their request that they should be 
 allowed to have a fort of their own, and he detached one 
 of his best engineers, M. de Gouvion, to construct it for 
 them. 2 Thus he made an effort to face with a manly heart 
 
 1 Gates Papers, New York Historical Society. 
 s Mdmoires de ma Main, i. 44. 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. 289 
 
 the unfortunate circumstances, which he called, in a let 
 ter to General Washington, " my distressing, ridiculous, 
 foolish, and, indeed, nameless situation," to which the 
 General replied, encouraging him by assurances of friend 
 ship and esteem, and soothing with the utmost tenderness 
 the injuries caused by disappointment and mortification 
 to his over-sensitive nature. 
 
 Washington s letter of the 10th of March 2 seems, in 
 its solicitous tenderness, like one written by a father to 
 his son : 
 
 "MY DEAR MARQUIS, I have had the pleasure of receiving 
 your two favours of the 19th and 23d of February, and hasten to dis 
 pel those fears respecting your reputation, which are excited only 
 by an uncommon degree of sensibility. You seem to apprehend 
 that censure, proportioned to the disappointed expectations of the 
 world, will fall on you in consequence of the Canadian expedition. 
 But, in the first place, it will be no disadvantage to you to have it 
 known in Europe that you had received so manifest a proof of the 
 good opinion and confidence of Congress as an important detached 
 command ; and I am persuaded that every one will applaud your 
 prudence in renouncing a project, in pursuing which you would 
 vainly have attempted physical impossibilities ; indeed, unless 
 you can be chargeable with the invariable effects of natural causes, 
 and be arraigned for not suspending the course of the seasons, to 
 accommodate your march over the lake, the most prompt to slan 
 der can have nothing to found blame upon. 
 
 "However sensibly your ardour for glory may make you feel 
 this disappointment, you may be assured that your character 
 stands as fair as ever it did, and that no new enterprise is neces 
 sary to wipe off this imaginary stain. The expedition which you 
 hint at I think unadvisable in our present circumstances. Any 
 thing in the way of a formal attack, which would necessarily be 
 announced to the enemy by preparatory measures, would not be 
 likely to succeed. If a stroke is meditated in that quarter, it must 
 be effected by troops stationed at a proper distance for availing 
 themselves of the first favourable opportunity offered by the 
 enemy, and success would principally depend upon the sudden 
 ness of the attempt. This, therefore, must rather be the effect 
 
 1 23d February, 1778 : Correspondence, American edition, i. 159. 
 
 2 La Fayette s Correspondence, American edition, i. 161. 
 VOL. I. 19 
 
290 PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAINST CANADA. [1778. 
 
 of time and chance than premeditation. You undoubtedly have 
 determined judiciously in waiting the further orders of Congress. 
 Whether they allow me the pleasure of seeing you shortly, or 
 destine you to a longer absence, you may assure yourself of the 
 sincere good wishes of, 
 
 " Dear Sir, &c. 
 
 "P.S. Your directing payment of such debts as appear to 
 be most pressing is certainly right There is not money enough 
 to answer every demand ; and I wish your supplies of clothing 
 had been better. Your ordering a large supply of provisions 
 into Fort Schuyler was a very judicious measure, and I thank 
 you for it." 
 
 La Fayette s exile to Albany terminated shortly after 
 ward. The influence of the Cabal was weakening to its 
 dissolution in the face of the universal attachment of the 
 people to the person of General Washington. Slander 
 and intrigue could not shake the confidence which they 
 had in his ability to lead them through the perils of their 
 struggle for liberty and ultimately to triumph, in the 
 independence of the United States. 
 
 Conway, deserted by his former associates, without in 
 fluence, without official position, hated and mistrusted, 
 made a humble apology to General Washington for what 
 he had said and done ; and he finally left this country in 
 disgrace to return to France. 
 
 Better influences now prevailing, Congress resolved that 
 the Canadian expedition was impracticable and should be 
 abandoned, directing at the same time that the Marquis 
 de La Fayette and Baron de Kalb should return to the 
 army. In justice to La Fayette, it was resolved " That 
 Congress entertain a high sense of his prudence, activity, 
 and zeal, and that they are fully persuaded nothing has 
 or would have been wanting on his part, or on the part of 
 his officers who accompanied him, to give the expedition 
 the utmost possible effect." 
 
 1 Secret Journal of Congress, March 2, 1778. 
 
1778.] PROJECTED EXPEDITION AGAIXST CANADA. 291 
 
 With infinite relief La Fayette set out upon his return, 
 and he arrived without accident at the head-quarters in 
 Valley Forge, early in April, in time to learn the news 
 which filled his soul with pride, and which was then 
 being hailed with joy throughout the land, that of the 
 alliance of the United States of America with His Most 
 Christian Majesty of France. 
 
292 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE [1777. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 THE political activity of the Cabinet of Versailles 
 during the greater part of the year 1777 was directed 
 toward an effort to return to the situation which had been 
 reached in the month of October of 1776, when the di 
 plomacy of the Comte de Vergennes had prepared the 
 way for united action upon the part of the two monarchies 
 against Great Britain, and when the French Secretary of 
 State, alarmed by the reports of American defeat on Long 
 Island, had suddenly held back at the moment that the 
 Spanish Court was ready to accept his policy of interven 
 tion in the War of Independence. 
 
 Spain, as we have seen, retired from the position which 
 her Government had assumed through the Marques de 
 Grimaldi, and under the more conservatively Spanish 
 administration of his successor, the Conde de Florida- 
 blanca, her ministry was less inclined to regard the inter 
 ests of the kingdom as identical with those of France in 
 matters of colonial policy or in its relations to England. 
 Besides this, it will be remembered, Spanish national 
 pride had been seriously offended by the unexpected re 
 jection on the part of M. de Vergennes of the assent of 
 King Carlos III. to a policy which had been incessantly 
 urged by the arguments and persuasions of the French 
 Foreign Office. 
 
 In order to induce the Court of Madrid to resume its 
 attitude of sympathy and co-operation, the Comte de Ver 
 gennes found himself, therefore, obliged to do much of his 
 former work a second time. He proceeded in this en- 
 
n 
 
 AND THE UNITED STATES. 293 
 
 deavor with skilful method and with remarkable diligence, 
 in carrying along his diplomatic correspondence, as the 
 French Archives fully attest, by a series of documents re 
 lating to the affairs of France and Spain and America, 
 which messengers were constantly bearing from Versailles 
 to Madrid, with every conceivable argument for union 
 of action under the Family Compact, derived from the 
 progress of affairs in the United States or the results of 
 party feeling in England. 
 
 Circumstances were greatly changed, however, and, in 
 spite of his efforts, he did not meet this time with success. 
 The Government of Spain was not inclined toward war 
 with Great Britain. On the one hand, its relations with 
 Portugal were considerably improved ; for, the King of 
 Portugal having died, the source of irritation which had 
 arisen from the policy of his minister, M. de Pombal, who 
 now lost his influence at that Court, was removed. But, on 
 the other hand, what was of much more serious considera 
 tion in Madrid was that the Spanish Colonies in the West 
 Indies were not protected sufficiently against hostile attack, 
 and the great treasure-fleet of Spain, with a cargo valued 
 at some fifty millions of piasters, was preparing to return 
 from Mexico, and, in the event of war, would be exposed 
 upon the high seas to capture or destruction. Therefore, 
 even if the Spanish ministry were inclined to break the 
 existing peace, it could not afford to do so at once, with 
 the risk of endangering these enormous interests of its 
 own. Its diplomatic correspondence in regard to the 
 situation, and in reply to M. de Vergennes, was long, 
 wearisome, and dilatory. 
 
 In the mean time, the attitude of France toward the 
 struggle in the United States had not changed. It was 
 still one of sympathy, of secret encouragement and assist 
 ance, with the promise of open recognition as soon as 
 France should have strengthened herself sufficiently by 
 the co-operation of Spain, or by her own efforts to increase 
 
F 
 
 294 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE [17 
 
 her land forces and to improve her navy, or when Eng 
 land should be wea]|ned by the opposition which she met 
 with in America. True, the Comte de Vergennes had 
 changed the appearance of his relations with the Agents 
 of Congress accordingly as circumstances made it neces 
 sary for him to deal with Great Britain ; but there is no 
 evidence that he ever wavered in his purpose of sus 
 taining the Revolution and ultimately of participating in 
 the war. 
 
 His desire to secure the co-operation of Spain grew 
 more intense because he dared not venture alone into a 
 declaration of hostilities, and yet he was becoming fear 
 ful that unless the Colonies obtained speedy relief they 
 must be forced by their necessities into submission to the 
 mother-country and might accept the conciliatory meas 
 ures which Parliament was then ready to offer for peace. 
 In the event of a reconciliation, the opportunity of 
 France for vengeance would be gone ; and, besides this, 
 the Secretary of State thought it possible that a new dan 
 ger to her welfare might arise from the turning upon her 
 by Great Britain of all its reunited forces, in punishment 
 for the political offence she had committed by secretly 
 aiding the rebellion. 
 
 The American Commissioners in France very quickly 
 grasped the situation, and they took advantage of this 
 argument, almost immediately after the arrival of Dr. 
 Franklin in Paris, to enforce their representations of the 
 state of affairs at home, with a solemnity which unques 
 tionably had its influence at Versailles, where the subject 
 had already been discussed with apprehension in the 
 Cabinet. In the formal appeal for ships of the line, for 
 troops, and for munitions of war which they addressed 
 to M. de Vergennes on the 5th of January, 1777, 1 they 
 said to the minister, 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 245. 
 
1777.] AND THE UXITED STATES. 295 
 
 "We also beg it may be particularly considered, that while the 
 English are masters of the American seas, and can, without fear 
 of interruption, transport with such ease their army from one 
 part of our extensive coast to another, and we can only meet them 
 by laud marches, we may possibly, unless some powerful aid is 
 given us or some strong diversion be made in our favor, be so 
 harassed and be put to such immense distress, as that finally our 
 people will find themselves reduced to the necessity of ending the 
 war by an accommodation. 
 
 "The Courts of France and Spain may rely with the fullest 
 confidence that whatever stipulations are made by us in case of 
 granting such aid, will be ratified and punctually fulfilled by the 
 Congress, who are determined to found their future character, 
 with regard to justice and fidelity, on a full and perfect perform 
 ance of all their present engagements. 
 
 " Korth America now oilers to France and Spain her amity and 
 commerce. She is also ready to guaranty in the firmest manner to 
 those nations all their present possessions in the West Indies, as 
 well as those they shall acquire from the enemy in a war that may 
 be consequential of such assistance as she requests. The in 
 terests of the three nations are the same. The opportunity of 
 cementing them and of securing all the advantages of that com 
 merce, which in time will be immense, now presents itself. If 
 neglected, it may never again return ; and we cannot help sug 
 gesting that a considerable delay may be attended with fatal con 
 sequences. 7 
 
 A little later, they went again to the Secretary of State 
 with the same logic, encouraged, no doubt, by the growing 
 sentiment throughout France in favor of war upon Eng 
 land, which now began to make itself felt on all sides, 
 and by the evident willingness with which their reason 
 ing had been listened to in the councils of the King. 
 They presented the necessities of the United States in 
 view of the great armaments which it was understood 
 England was making ready with the aid of German mer 
 cenary troops, the inconvenience arising from delay in 
 shipping arms and munitions of war which had been 
 promised from France, the great danger to be appre 
 hended from the defection of the negroes, " who, being 
 
296 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE [1777. 
 
 excited and armed by the British, may greatly strengthen 
 the invaders," and they attached the formal declarations 
 
 "That notwithstanding the measures taken to convince the 
 Court of Britain that France does not countenance the Americans, 
 that Court, according to our information, believes firmly the con 
 trary ; and it is submitted to the consideration of Your Excellency 
 whether, if the English make a conquest of the American States, 
 they will not take the first opportunity of showing their resent 
 ment, by beginning themselves the war that would otherwise be 
 avoided ; and perhaps beginning it as they did the last, without 
 any previous declaration. 
 
 "That, upon the whole, we can not on this occasion omit 
 expressing our apprehensions that, if Britain is now suffered to 
 recover the Colonies and annex again their great growing strength 
 and commerce to her own, she will become in a few years the most 
 formidable power by sea and land that Europe has yet seen, and 
 assuredly, from the natural pride and insolence of that people, 
 a power to all the other States the most pernicious and intoler 
 able." 
 
 They submitted, therefore, with all deference to the 
 wisdom of His Majesty and his ministers, whether, if the 
 independence of the United States of America, with the 
 consequent diminution of British power and the freedom 
 of commerce with them, were an object of importance to 
 all Europe and to France in particular, this was not the 
 proper time for effectual exertions in their favor, for be 
 ginning that war which could scarcely be much longer 
 avoided, and which would be sanctified by this best of 
 justifications, that a much injured and innocent people 
 would thereby be protected and delivered from cruel op 
 pression and secured in the enjoyment of their just rights ; 
 than which nothing could contribute more to the glory of 
 His Majesty and of that nation. 1 
 
 During this time, however, the French Foreign Office 
 continued to veil its communications with the Americans 
 with extreme caution, lest these should attract anew the 
 
 1 1st February, 1777 : Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 257. 
 
1777.] AND THE UNITED STATES. 297 
 
 suspicions of the British ministry and embarrass the diplo 
 matic relations, which, to say the least, were then none 
 too cordial. The arrival of Dr. Franklin rendered this 
 especially difficult, because the presence of the distin 
 guished American in Paris became at once the subject of 
 unusual interest, not only among scholars and students 
 whom his literary reputation would naturally attract, but 
 also among men of the world and military men of rank, 
 who began to frequent his little house at Passy to see the 
 celebrated " docteur" and to hear him talk about the 
 Revolution in America. Indeed, the movements of the 
 Continental army were discussed with maps and plans, 
 and the battles fought again, as if France were a partici 
 pant in the struggle and the Parisians were watching 
 interests partly their own. " The conduct of our General, 
 in avoiding a decisive action," wrote the Commissioners, 
 " is much applauded by the military people here, partic 
 ularly Marshals Maillebois, Broglio, and D Arcy. M. 
 Maillebois has taken the pains to write his sentiments of 
 some particulars useful in carrying on our war, which we 
 send enclosed. But that which makes the greatest im 
 pression in our favor here is the prodigious success of our 
 armed ships and privateers. The damage we have done 
 their West India trade has been estimated, in a represen 
 tation to Lord Sandwich, by the merchants of London, at 
 one million eight hundred thousand pounds Sterling, which 
 has raised insurance to twenty-eight per cent., being higher 
 than at any time in the last war with France and Spain." l 
 Nevertheless, the French Secretary of State was deter 
 mined to avoid the acknowledgment of Dr. Franklin s 
 presence openly as long as it could be avoided, and es 
 pecially to create a favorable impression in England. He 
 wrote to the Ambassador in London that he " was still 
 
 1 B. Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee to the Committee of Secret 
 Correspondence, 6th February, 1777 : Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, 
 ii. 261. 
 
298 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE [1777. 
 
 ignorant of the motive of the voyage of this member of 
 Congress/ and he instructed M. de Noailles, in case he 
 should be called upon in England for an explanation, to 
 take refuge behind the general ignorance in this regard 
 which he shared with the ministry. Franklin had been 
 in Paris ten days at that time, and, although M. de Ver- 
 gennes could say that he did not know officially what the 
 purpose of his coming was, for he had not seen him then, 
 yet that statement was dangerously close to the limit of 
 exact truth ; for Franklin, Deane, and Lee had pre 
 sented their credentials and had asked for an audience, 
 which M. de Vergennes accorded them, as we have seen, 
 on the 28th of December, the same day he wrote to the 
 Ambassador in London. 1 
 
 The American Commissioners were not deceived, how 
 ever, by this official denial of their presence, as to the 
 purposes of France. Dr. Franklin s coming had, in 
 fact, given new vigor to the relations already established 
 at the Court by Mr. Silas Deane ; and not only was the 
 assurance of aid to the Colonies reaffirmed, but every 
 facility was presented to the Agents of Congress that a 
 neutral Power could offer the belligerents without occa 
 sioning an immediate outbreak of hostilities. " In our 
 first conversation with the Minister, after the arrival of 
 Mr. Franklin," they wrote, 2 " it was evident that this 
 Court, while it treated us privately with all civility, was 
 cautious of giving umbrage to England, and was there 
 fore desirous of avoiding an open reception and acknowl 
 edgment of us, or entering into any formal negotiation 
 with us as Ministers from Congress. To make us easy, 
 however, we were told that the ports of France were 
 open to our ships as friends ; that our people might freely 
 
 1 Angleterre, t. 519, No. 116 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, 
 ii. 306. 
 
 2 B. Franklin and Silas Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, 
 12th March, 1777 : Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 283. 
 
1777.] AND THE UNITED STATES. 299 
 
 purchase and export, as merchandise, whatever our States 
 had occasion for, vending at the same time our own com 
 modities ; that in doing this we should experience all the 
 facilities that a Government disposed to favor us could, 
 consistent with treaties, afford to the enemies of a friend. 
 But though it was at that time no secret that two hundred 
 field-pieces of brass and thirty thousand fusils, with other 
 munitions of war in great abundance, had been taken out 
 of the King s magazines for the purpose of exportation to 
 America, the Minister, in our presence, affected to know 
 nothing of that operation, and claimed no merit to his 
 Court on that account. But he intimated to us that it 
 would be well taken if we communicated with no other 
 person about the Court concerning our affairs but himself, 
 who would be ready at all convenient times to confer 
 with us." 
 
 The Commissioners added that, during the several con 
 ferences held by them with the representatives of the 
 French Government, every step was taken to gratify 
 England publicly, by attending to the remonstrances of 
 her Ambassador, forbidding the departure of ships which 
 had military stores on board, recalling officers who had 
 leave of absence and were going to join the Continental 
 army, and giving strict orders that American prizes should 
 not be sold in French ports ; " yet, that we might not be 
 discouraged, it was intimated to us by persons about 
 the Court that those measures were necessary at present, 
 France not being yet quite ready for a war, and that we 
 might be assured of her good will to us and our cause." 
 
 Therefore the Commissioners were wise enough to ac 
 quiesce, under circumstances which were already exceed 
 ingly advantageous to the cause they represented, although 
 in some respects, as in the matter of the negotiation of a 
 treaty which they hoped to accomplish, the French Gov 
 ernment had not fulfilled the wishes and expectations of 
 Dr. Franklin. Whilst they exerted all the influence that 
 
300 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE [1777. 
 
 they could bring to bear in this direction, they carefully 
 avoided any attempt to coerce the ministry. Indeed, at 
 the end of May, five months after Franklin s arrival, he 
 and Silas Deane wrote to Congress that, although the 
 treaty of commerce was not as yet being proceeded with, 
 because the plan of the Cabinet appeared to be not to 
 enter into any transaction with the Colonies that might 
 imply an acknowledgment of American independence 
 whilst peace continued between France and England, 
 yet "they tell us we enjoy all the advantages already 
 which we propose to obtain by such a Treaty, and that we 
 may depend on continuing to receive every indulgence in 
 our trade that is allowed to the most favored nations. 
 Feeling ourselves assisted in other respects, cordially and 
 essentially, we are the more readily induced to let them 
 take their own time, and to avoid making ourselves trouble 
 some by an unreasonable importunity. The interest of 
 France and Spain, however, in securing our friendship 
 and commerce, seems daily more and more generally un 
 derstood here, and we have no doubt of finally obtaining 
 the establishment of that commerce with all the formalities 
 necessary." 
 
 Indeed, there was very little ground for reasonable com 
 plaint, and very little doubt that the assertion of the 
 French Cabinet was true that the United States were re 
 ceiving, in fact, the very benefits which they sought in an 
 alliance, so far as those benefits did not imply a partici 
 pation in open hostilities ; for, in the month of March, ten 
 ships, loaded with munitions of war, under the sanction of 
 the Government, by Beaumarchais (Roderique Hortales et 
 Cie.), were crossing the sea to America, the names of some 
 of them having been changed by that clever intermediary 
 in order the better to escape the notice of British spies 
 and to get out of port undisturbed ; and Beaumarchais 
 
 1 25th May, 1777 : Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 324. 
 
1777.] AXD THE UNITED STATES. 301 
 
 said in the report of his movements to M. de Vergennes, 
 " Never was a commercial transaction pressed with more 
 vigor, in spite of every sort of obstacle that I have 
 encountered." 
 
 But at the Court of Spain the earnest solicitations of 
 the French Ambassador still brought forth no definite 
 statement of the part that the Spanish Government was 
 willing to take in conjunction with France when a suitable 
 opportunity should occur to intervene between England 
 and her Colonies. In response to the efforts of M. de Ver 
 gennes to force from the Conde de Floridablanca some in 
 timation, at least, of his general policy under the Family 
 Compact, the Spanish Premier merely declared that " there 
 was too little secrecy at the Court of Versailles" to justify 
 him in expressing his opinions freely, and that later, upon 
 some proper occasion, he should communicate with M. de 
 Vergennes. 2 
 
 It was impossible, therefore, for the French Cabinet to 
 count upon the co-operation of Spain, though that was 
 now the only cause of further delay in its decision to 
 take part openly in the war. The Government of King 
 Louis was ready for the event ; it had made diligent 
 exertions for many months to equip and strengthen the 
 navy, which was looked upon as the most important ele 
 ment of success in the case of a war that must necessarily 
 depend upon the superiority at sea. It is very probable 
 that when M. de Vergennes hesitated, the year before, 
 to undertake hostilities against Great Britain, his hesita 
 tion was largely due to the unfinished condition of the 
 French marine forces at that moment ; but there was no 
 longer evidence of this weakness by the middle of the 
 year 1777 ; for the navy had been reorganized, and was 
 
 1 7th March, 1777 : Letter quoted by M. Doniol, La Participation de la 
 France, ii. 315, note. 
 
 f, * M. d Ossun to the Comte de Vergennes, 7th July, 1777 ; Espagne, t. 585, 
 No. 17 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 442. 
 
302 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE [1777. 
 
 in a state of efficiency which the Secretary of State de 
 clared would last throughout the reign of Louis XVI. 
 and far beyond. 1 
 
 The situation in France had been reduced, then, simply 
 to the decision of the question whether the Government 
 should wait longer, in the hope of inducing the King 
 of Spain to unite in the undertaking, or whether France 
 should go into the war alone. This is evident throughout 
 the voluminous diplomatic correspondence which took 
 place between the Foreign Office at Versailles and the 
 French Ambassador at Madrid during the summer and 
 autumn of 1777. Whilst the conventional language of 
 mutual understanding was constantly employed by M. 
 de Vergennes in all his official communications with the 
 Cabinet of Spain, through which it was made to appear 
 that King Louis XVI. looked with respectful eagerness 
 for the advice and approval of his uncle of Spain in 
 every measure relating to the attitude toward Great 
 Britain, and was solicitous to take no step which had not 
 received the sanction of his ripe experience and wise 
 judgment, France was rapidly approaching the point at 
 which she was to adopt the course of entering alone 
 into the treaty with America and leaving the way open 
 to Spain to follow when it should suit that Government 
 to do so. 
 
 The boldness of certain American privateers, in sailing 
 out of French ports to destroy or capture British mer 
 chantmen and in returning thither with their prizes, left 
 the Cabinet of France no alternative before the protests 
 of the British Ambassador, and forced it to prohibit this 
 use of French protection, which could not be justified 
 upon any principle under the existing treaty obligations 
 of France. Captain Wickes of the frigate Eeprisal, 
 which had conveyed Dr. Franklin to France, committed 
 
 1 M. de Vergennes to the Marquis de Noailles, 2d May, 1777 ; Angleterre, t. 
 523, No. 3 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 446. 
 
1777.] AND THE UNITED STATES. 303 
 
 an act of this sort almost immediately after having set his 
 guest ashore, by cruising in the English Channel and 
 seizing several British vessels, which he carried into 
 L Orient as prizes. Orders were sent to him by the Gov 
 ernment to go out of the port within twenty-four hours ; 
 but, as he complained that his frigate had sprung a-leak, 
 he was permitted to remain until the necessary repairs 
 were made, and was then enjoined to put to sea. As he 
 was not seriously impressed, however, with the disap 
 proval of the French authorities, he associated himself, 
 even then, with two other captains, Nicholson and John 
 son, of the privateers Lexington and Dolphin, and, after 
 another cruise in the Channel, ail three came into France 
 bringing the prizes they had made. 
 
 M. de Vergennes thereupon addressed a note to the 
 American Commissioners in Paris reminding them that, 
 while he had assured them, at their first interview, that 
 they should enjoy in France every security and comfort 
 which had been shown to foreigners, and that every 
 facility should be granted to American commerce com 
 patible with the exact observance of the King s treaties, 
 there was an article which forbade the admission of priva 
 teers into the King s ports, and that the Commissioners 
 had promised to conform to it. He called their attention 
 to the fact that the Reprisal, the Lexington, and the Dol 
 phin had come in for refuge, declaring at the same time 
 that lie believed the Commissioners to be gentlemen too 
 well informed, and too penetrating, not to see how such 
 conduct affected the dignity of the King, his master, 
 whilst it offended the neutrality which His Majesty pro 
 fessed ; that it was by the King s express order that the 
 subject was brought to their notice, with the royal instruc 
 tions which had been sent to the ports that privateers 
 should be sequestered and detained until sufficient secu 
 rity had been given that they would return directly to 
 their own country and not expose themselves by new acts 
 
304 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE [1777. 
 
 of hostility to the necessity of seeking an asylum in the 
 ports of France. 
 
 But in this admonition which the public faith obliged 
 the Cabinet to present to the representatives of Congress, 
 and which the representatives perfectly understood in its 
 bearings upon the political situation at that moment, 
 as, in fact, a mere concession to the demands of England 
 in order to ward off hostilities for a short time, the true 
 relations of France with the United States are definitely 
 expressed by the closing paragraph of the official docu 
 ment, in which the Comte de Vergennes said, " What I 
 have the honor to inform you, sirs, of the King s disposi 
 tion, by no means changes the assurances which I was 
 authorized to make to you at the time of your arrival, and 
 which I again renew, for the security of your residence, 
 and of all such of your nation whom it may suit to reside 
 among us, as well as with respect to the commerce allowed 
 of, which will meet with every facility on our part that 
 our laws and usages will permit." l This was near the 
 close of the period of France s dissembling in her rela 
 tions with Great Britain. The decision of the Cabinet 
 in favor of war was arrived at but a few days later, with 
 the King s full knowledge and assent, and after a mature 
 discussion in the royal presence of the plain question, 
 " whether that was the moment to be taken advantage of 
 in order to place England in such a position that it 
 would be impossible for her any longer to disturb the 
 public order ?" That question being disposed of affirma 
 tively, it remained only to decide what course of action 
 should be pursued in regard to the Americans. 
 
 The Comte de Vergennes presented the subject to Louis 
 XVI. in a document which still remains in the Archives 
 of France, entitled " A memoir communicated to the King, 
 
 1 Comte de Vergennes to the Commissioners, 16th July, 1777 : Diplomatic 
 Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 364. And see the reply of B. Franklin and 
 Silas Deane, 17th July, 1777 : ibid., p. 365. 
 
1777.] AND THE UNITED STATES. 305 
 
 the 23d of July, 1777, and approved by His Majesty the 
 same day." l The argument, which resembles in its gen 
 eral outline that of the " Considerations" of the preceding 
 year, was intended to lead the Cabinet of Spain into the 
 conviction that the two Crowns w^ere alike threatened by 
 the preponderance of Great Britain in the political affairs 
 of Europe, and that it was imperative that the house 
 of Bourbon should seize the opportunity then offered to 
 establish its ascendency by means of the American War. 
 But, while it repeated to some extent the reasoning that 
 had become familiar through frequent presentation at 
 Madrid as well as at Versailles, this paper has a tone of 
 determination, evidently based upon the progress of events, 
 which had been lacking in the documents of 1776, and 
 which indicates that the purpose of France was then 
 definitively fixed. 
 
 The first question to be considered, said M. de Ver- 
 gennes, was " whether it was a matter of indifference to 
 the two Crowns that the American Colonies should sub 
 mit to the yoke of the mother-country, or that they should 
 succeed in their present effort and be free," the reply to 
 which, he declared, was to be found in another question, 
 namely, " Is it good and sound politics to contribute 
 toward the strengthening of an enemy when one has at 
 hand an opportunity to weaken him ?" Evidently no one 
 could hesitate in answer to such a proposition when it 
 promised revenge, glory, and the humiliation of Great 
 Britain. Besides this, he insisted, when the prodigious 
 efforts then being made separately in England and in 
 America were considered, the picture became frightful to 
 contemplate if one imagined those forces reunited and 
 directed against a new object. 
 
 Here is the identical train of thought that we have 
 seen running through French diplomacy ever since the 
 
 1 Espagne, t. 585, No. 5<>. The text is printed by M. Doniol, La Participa 
 tion de la France, ii. 4(50-4 (> .. 
 VOL. I. 120 
 
306 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE [1777. 
 
 outbreak of the troubles in the Colonies, the opportunity 
 to strike at England, and the danger of war with her if 
 the opportunity were neglected. The day had arrived, 
 however, for the Secretary of State to disclose his inten 
 tion. It was too late, he declared, to flatter one s self 
 that "the weak and indirect assistance hitherto sent out 
 parsimoniously and timidly to the Colonies would enable 
 them to make a successful resistance ;" on the contrary, 
 something more must now be done to help them to win, 
 and to deserve their gratitude when peace should be re 
 stored. Their subjugation would be a dangerous weapon 
 in the hand of Great Britain, which France and Spain 
 would regret for centuries having allowed her to snatch 
 away. It might, indeed, he admitted, offend the magna 
 nimity and the religious sentiments of the two monarchs, 
 thus to take advantage of the unhappy situation of Eng 
 land to strike her a blow which, if not mortal, would 
 at least destroy her power and her influence. But a 
 greater interest than these was at stake, and, said he, " It 
 is an accepted doctrine, both in politics and in war, that 
 it is better to forestall than to be forestalled." The two 
 monarchies could soon be ready ; for the French fisher 
 men would be coming home from Newfoundland directly, 
 and the Spanish treasure-fleet would be safely in port 
 from Mexico ; nothing would remain to be done then 
 but to put into execution whatever plan it should be con 
 sidered wise to adopt. 
 
 It was important, however, said M. de Vergennes, 
 not merely to talk well, but to act well. The moment 
 had come either to help the United States effectively and 
 with courage, or else to abandon them altogether ; and 
 the months of January and February of 1778 were the 
 limit of the time after which, if nothing were done, the 
 two Crowns must forever regret the loss of a neglected 
 opportunity. 
 
 A copy of this document, formally approved under the 
 
1777.] AND THE UNITED STATES. 307 
 
 hand of the King, was despatched to the French Ambas 
 sador at Madrid, to be submitted by him to the Conde de 
 Floridablanca. It marks the period at which France, 
 having decided upon the war, exerted her influence to 
 induce the Court of Spain to unite with her. The effort 
 was sustained throughout the rest of the year 1777, with 
 unremitting diligence, and the persuasive powers of the 
 Comte de Vergennes found ample occupation in replying 
 to the objections and discussing the dilatory expedients 
 suggested by the unwilling mind of the Spanish Premier. 
 But the date of an open declaration of hostilities had been 
 fixed ; and, as the event proved, the United States were 
 assured of the participation of France after King Louis 
 XVI. had written his assent upon the Memoire of the 
 23d of July, 1777. 
 
 That Dr. Franklin and his colleagues in Paris were 
 thoroughly informed as to the course of events, and were 
 able to estimate the influences then at work, as well as to 
 perceive the bearing of their results upon the relations of 
 France, Spain, and Great Britain, is evident from their 
 reports to Congress, which bear traces of growing confi 
 dence in the ultimate success of their mission on behalf 
 of the United States. Not only did Dr. Franklin s dis 
 tinguished social position at the French capital enable 
 him to ascertain with precision the drift of national senti 
 ment upon the question of the war with England, but 
 there is no doubt that the opinions of the King and the 
 Cabinet reached him more or less directly through his 
 intercourse with people who occupied high official station 
 at the Court. He could not fail to observe that he was 
 treated with an exceptional courtesy which implied the 
 friendship of France toward America ; and he knew, 
 although the minister never spoke of the matter in his 
 presence, that the large shipments of supplies and mu 
 nitions of war then being made to the United States 
 through Hortales et Cie. were in reality contributions 
 
308 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FKANCE [1777. 
 
 from the King s Government toward the establishment of 
 American independence. 
 
 The summer having passed without an open recognition 
 from France, he and his companions wrote to Congress, 
 on the 8th of September, 1 
 
 "This Court continues the same conduct that it has held ever 
 since our arrival. It professes to England a resolution to observe 
 all Treaties, and proves it by restoring prizes too openly brought 
 into their ports, imprisoning such persons as are found to be con 
 cerned in fitting out armed vessels against England from France, 
 warning frequently those from America to depart, and repeating 
 orders against the exportation of warlike stores. To us it pri 
 vately professes a real friendship, wishes success to our cause, 
 winks at the supplies we obtain here as much as it can without 
 giving open grounds of complaint to England, privately affords 
 us very essential aids, and goes on preparing for war. How long 
 these two parts will continue to be acted at the same time, and 
 which will finally predominate, may be a question. As it is the 
 true interest of France to prevent our being annexed to Britain, 
 that so the British power may be diminished, and the French 
 commerce augmented, we are inclined to believe the sincerity is 
 towards us, more especially as the united bent of the nation is 
 manifestly in our favor ; their not having yet commenced a war is 
 accounted for by various reasons. The Treaties subsisting among 
 the Powers of Europe, by which they are obliged to aid those at 
 tacked more than those attacking, which it is supposed will make 
 some difference, they not being fully prepared, the absence of 
 their seamen in their fishery and West Indies, and the treasure 
 expected from New Spain, with the sugars from the Islands, have 
 all, it is said, contributed to restrain the national desire of a 
 breach with England, in which her troublesome power may be 
 reduced, the wealth and strength of France increased, and some 
 satisfaction obtained for the injuries received in the unfair com 
 mencement of the last war." 
 
 Thus the situation remained outwardly uncertain until 
 the end of the year 1777, the Cabinet of France, in the 
 mean time, still secretly encouraging and assisting the 
 United States, still trying to persuade the Court of 
 
 1 B. Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee to the Committee of Foreign 
 Affairs : Diplomatic Correspondence, "Wharton, ii. 388. 
 
1777.] AND THE UNITED STATES. 309 
 
 Spain, still maintaining, by an exceedingly artificial inter 
 change of assurances of friendship, at least the outward 
 signs of peace with Great Britain. 
 
 But in the month of December the course of events 
 took an unexpected turn in the direction toward which 
 the policy of the Comte de Vergennes had constantly 
 tended, and brought that opportunity which he was 
 awaiting, when reverses to the British arms in America 
 should produce the moment of weakness in the affairs of 
 England which he could justify at once as the motive and 
 the occasion for France to strike her enemy a blow. It 
 came now, when a despatch from the United States Con 
 gress brought to the legation at Passy the astonishing 
 news that the formidable army of General Burgoyne, 
 from which so much had been expected in England, was 
 defeated, captured, and held by the Americans as prisoners 
 of war. This intelligence, which was immediately com 
 municated to the King, aroused the liveliest interest among 
 all classes of people in France. It had an inconceivable 
 effect upon the minds of men, said Beaumarchais ; 1 it was 
 hailed witli expressions of delight throughout the city 
 which seemed like the rejoicing that might follow a 
 French victory won by French arms. 
 
 In this respect, at least, the battle of Saratoga is en 
 titled to be considered as one of the decisive battles of 
 the world, that it marks an epoch in the course of the 
 American Revolution ; for it led to the participation of 
 France in the War of Independence, and it was one of 
 the critical turning-points in the history of freedom in 
 America. " Now is the time to act," said the Comte de 
 Vergennes; " aut nunc ant nunquam : the lost time was 
 perhaps not our fault, but there is no more now to lose." 
 
 1 To the Com to do Yerponnep, 7th December, 1777 ; Angleterre, t. 525, Xo. 
 17 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 642. 
 
 2 To the Comte de Montmorin, 13th December, 1777 ; Espagne, t. 587, No. 
 103 : Doniol, La Participation de la Franco, i. 643. 
 
310 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE [1777. 
 
 No time was lost, indeed, by the Council of the King ; 
 for a note was sent at once to the legation of the United 
 States which formally opened negotiations with the Com 
 missioners of Congress for a treaty of commerce and 
 alliance, and which was the initial step toward the decla 
 ration of hostilities against Great Britain. This note, 
 written upon the gilt-edged paper which Louis XVI. used 
 for his private correspondence, and assented to by his 
 " approuve" on the 6th of December, 1777, 1 announced 
 to the American Commissioners that His Majesty desired 
 them to be informed that the situation of public affairs 
 had made it impossible theretofore for him to accede to 
 their requests, and to testify to the united Provinces of 
 North America by open marks of friendship the interest 
 which His Majesty had always entertained in their cause ; 
 but that, as circumstances appeared then more favorable 
 to the establishment of intimate relations with them, he 
 should no longer decline to listen to any propositions 
 that the Commissioners might have to make to him, to 
 consider them, and to give to the United States every 
 proof that circumstances would permit of his interest and 
 his affection. 
 
 His Majesty reminded the Commissioners, however, 
 that the more he was inclined to give them these proofs 
 of his sentiments the more he should expect from the 
 wisdom and the prudence of the Commissioners them 
 selves, in respecting the motives of secrecy which would 
 not yet allow the King to recognize, and openly declare, 
 the independence of the United States; that His Majesty 
 was bound by the closest ties to the King of Spain, by reason 
 of which he was unwilling to make any engagement to 
 which that Prince was not a party and which was not to 
 be executed in concert with him ; and that therefore, while 
 His Majesty declared that he was disposed to entertain 
 
 1 Angleterre, t. 526, No. 60 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 625. 
 
1777.] AND THE UNITED STATES. 311 
 
 such propositions as the Commissioners might have to 
 make to him, it was with the express reservation that 
 nothing should be concluded without the assent of the 
 King his uncle. 
 
 There can be no reasonable doubt that this document 
 was prepared with the full knowledge and co-operation 
 of Dr. Franklin and his colleagues, and that their reply 
 was composed with the approval of the Secretary of 
 State ; for the terms of the latter so exactly express the 
 arguments of M. de Yergennes, in language so closely 
 resembling that used by him in other documents which 
 relate to the subject at that period, that the evidences of 
 concerted action are distinctly traceable in it. It served 
 the valuable purpose of opening negotiations with the 
 United States upon the basis of an urgent demand made 
 by the Americans themselves that their long-neglected 
 appeal should be heard ; and it became thus the vehicle 
 by which to convey to_the Court of Spain a new presen 
 tation of the A UK ! ;, ^m|H^M|^^ ^ 8 bearing upon the 
 interests of the two Crowns, coupled with the most per 
 suasive solicitations from the Cointe de Vergennes that 
 the monarchies should now unite in a definite policy to 
 ward England ; whilst at the same time the assurance 
 contained in it that the King of France would take no 
 step without the approval and advice of his uncle was 
 intended to exert additional influence at Madrid, as an 
 evidence of the good faith of France. 
 
 The carefully prepared answer of the Commissioners, 
 which supplements the note addressed to them by the 
 Secretary of State, is dated two days later, on the 8th of 
 December, 1777. 1 In it they begged leave to represent to 
 His Excellency the Cointe de Vergennes that it was then 
 nearly a year since they had had the honor of putting 
 into his hands the propositions of Congress for a treaty 
 
 1 B. Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee to the Comte de Vergennes: 
 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. p. 444. 
 
312 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE [1777. 
 
 of amity and commerce, requesting also the aid of ships 
 of war, and offering to join the forces of the United 
 States with those of France and Spain in acting against 
 the dominions of Great Britain, and to make no peace 
 but in conjunction with those Courts if Great Britain 
 should declare war against them, to all which they had 
 received no determinate answer ; but that they were ap 
 prehensive lest a continuance of this state of uncertainty 
 with regard to those propositions, together with the reports 
 that must soon be spread in America of rigorous treatment 
 met with in Spanish and French ports, should give ad 
 vantage to the enemy in making ill impressions upon the 
 minds of the American people, who, from the secrecy en 
 joined upon the Commissioners, could not be informed of 
 the friendly and essential aids that had been generously 
 but privately afforded them. The Commissioners con 
 ceived, therefore, that, present circumstances considered, 
 the completing of such a treato^it that time must have 
 the most happy effect ^MMii^llple credit of the United 
 States abroad and stre^menmgtheir resolution at home, 
 as well as in discouraging and diminishing their internal 
 enemies and in confirming their friends who might other 
 wise waver. 
 
 " And the Commissioners," they added, " are further 
 of opinion that the aid of ships desired might at this 
 juncture be employed with great advantage to America, 
 which when honored with a conference they can more 
 particularly explain. They therefore request Your Ex 
 cellency most earnestly to resume the consideration of 
 those affairs, and appoint them some speedy day of 
 audience thereupon." 
 
 A courier was despatched immediately by M. de Ver- 
 gennes to the French Embassy at Madrid with a copy of 
 this letter from the Commissioners, enclosed in a personal 
 communication to the Ambassador, in which he directed 
 him to present the subject at once to the King s attention, 
 
1777.] AXD THE UXITED STATES. 313 
 
 assuring him that the French Cabinet regarded the situa 
 tion as critical, and earnestly soliciting a prompt reply 
 from the Government of Spain. 1 The appeal was a strong 
 one. It would unquestionably have carried conviction 
 with it in Spain if the Spanish ministry had been open 
 to conviction, and if the Conde de Floridablanca had 
 been willing to accept upon any conditions the policy 
 which had been acceded to by his predecessor in the 
 councils of the King. Spain was not ready for war, 
 however, and this last appeal to her sympathies for it 
 was the last that the French Secretary of State made 
 before the signing of the treaty met with the same re 
 ception that had been accorded to the former representa 
 tions of M. de Vergennes, except that, possibly, it drew 
 forth a more distinct declaration from the Spanish Pre 
 mier, who now said, with considerable warmth, that if 
 France treated with the Americans her act would lead to 
 war, and that there was neither an object to be gained by 
 making war at that timfc nor affixed plan for carrying it 
 out. He would not accept the humiliation of England as 
 a sufficient basis upon which the two monarchies could 
 begin hostilities. 
 
 In the mean time, events were progressing with rapidity 
 at Versailles ; with such rapidity, indeed, that before the 
 courier could return from Madrid with the Spanish reply, 
 favorable or unfavorable as the event might prove, France 
 had committed herself to the United States. The audi 
 ence which the Commissioners had asked for in their note 
 to M. de Vergennes was granted them on the 12th of De 
 cember, four days later, and only one day after the courier 
 had set out for Madrid. Dr. Franklin and his colleagues 
 reported it to Congress on the 18th, in replying to the 
 despatches which had announced the surrender of Bur- 
 goyne, which, they said, had " apparently occasioned as 
 
 1 Cointc de Vergennes to M. de Montmorin, llth December, 1777; E.spagne, 
 t. 587, No. 99 : cited by Doniol, La Participation de la France, ii. 632. 
 
314 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE [1777. 
 
 much general joy in France as if it had been a victory 
 of their own troops over their own enemies." l 
 
 "We took the opportunity," said they, "of pressing the Min 
 istry by a short memorial to the conclusion of our proposed treaty, 
 which had so long lain under their consideration and been from 
 time to time postponed. A meeting was had accordingly on Fri 
 day, the 12th instant, in which some difficulties were mentioned 
 and removed ; some explanations asked and given to satisfaction. 
 As the concurrence of Spain is necessary, we were told that a 
 courier should be despatched the next day to obtain it, which we 
 are since assured was done ; and in three weeks from the time the 
 answer is expected. 2 
 
 " On signifying to the Ministry the importance it might be of 
 at this juncture when probably Britain would make some propo 
 sitions of accommodation that the Congress should be informed 
 explicitly what might be expected from France and Spain, M. 
 Gerard, one of the Secretaries, came yesterday to inform us, 
 by order of the King, that, after long and full consideration of 
 our aifairs and propositions in Council, it was decided, and His 
 Majesty was determined, to acknowledge our independence, and 
 make a Treaty with us of amity and commerce ; that in this Treaty 
 no advantage would be taken of our present situation to obtain 
 terms from us which otherwise would not be convenient for us 
 to agree to ; His Majesty desiring that the Treaty, once made, 
 should be durable, and our amity subsist forever, which could not 
 be expected if each nation did not find its interest in the continu 
 ance, as well as in the commencement of it. It was therefore his 
 intention that the terms of the Treaty should be such as we might 
 be willing to agree to if our State had been long since established 
 and in the fulness of strength and power, and such as we shall 
 approve of when that time shall come ; that His Majesty was 
 fixed in his determination not only to acknowledge, but to sup 
 port, our independence by every means in his power ; that in 
 doing this he might probably soon be engaged in war, with all the 
 expenses, risk, and damage usually attending it, yet he should not 
 expect any compensation from us on that account, nor pretend 
 that he acted wholly for our sakes ; since, besides his real good 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 452. 
 
 2 A second courier was sent to Madrid, on the 13th of December, to inform 
 M. de Montmorin of this interview. Espagne, t. 587, No. 101 : Doniol, La 
 Participation de la France, ii. 037. 
 
1778.] AND THE UNITED STATES. 315 
 
 will to us and our cause, it was manifestly the interest of France 
 that the power of England should be diminished by our separa 
 tion from it. . . . That, as soon as the courier returned from 
 Spain with the concurrence expected, the affair would be pro 
 ceeded in and concluded ; and of this we might give the Congress 
 the strongest assurances in our despatches, only cautioning them 
 to keep the whole for the present a dead secret, as Spain had 
 three reasons for not immediately declaring : her money fleet not 
 yet come home, her Brazil army and fleet the same, and her peace 
 with Portugal not yet quite completed ; but these obstacles would 
 probably soon be removed." 
 
 It is evident that the Commissioners and the Cabinet 
 were in complete accord at that time ; and this docu 
 ment, which constitutes a valuable page of the history of 
 the United States, shows how thoroughly they were ac 
 quainted with the negotiations that were then being car 
 ried forward with Spain, as well as with the discussions 
 upon the situation that were constantly taking place in 
 the King s Council. The echoes of these are distinctly 
 heard between Versailles and Madrid, and prove how 
 deliberately the Government of France entered into the 
 treaty with the United States, after mature consideration, 
 in which the King was finally brought to decide that he 
 would make us his allies, and that through us he would 
 be enabled to wreak his revenge upon the ancient enemy 
 of his house. 
 
 There was no deception as to the motives of France. 
 Franklin and those with him knew perfectly well what 
 were the causes of the hostility that existed between her 
 and the kingdom of Great Britain, and they understood 
 how these causes might be made to serve the interests of 
 the United States of America. That France came into 
 our Revolution for reasons of policy which were satisfac 
 tory to her King and to his Cabinet, and which were strong 
 enough to make them assume the burden and danger of 
 another war, was manifest to the Commissioners, and they 
 so declared it to Congress and to the nation. But what 
 
316 ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND AMERICA. [1778. 
 
 these American patriots expressed their gratitude for, and 
 what it is for us in our day, as well as for Americans 
 yet to come, to remember always to the honor of France, 
 is, that she did enter into our struggle, that she did 
 give us her aid when we needed it, and that, no matter 
 what her own private interests may have been, it was 
 her participation in the War of Independence that made 
 American liberty possible in the eighteenth century. 
 
 The couriers having returned from Spain without the 
 assent of that Government, the King of France decided 
 to wait no longer ; and on the 8th of February Benjamin 
 Franklin and Silas Deane wrote to the President of Con 
 gress, 1 " We have now the great satisfaction of acquainting 
 you and the Congress that the Treaties with France are at 
 length completed and signed. " 
 
 The treaties of commerce and alliance were signed on 
 the 6th of February, 1778. 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence, Wharton, ii. 490. 
 
1778.] VALLEY FORGE AND BARREN HILL. 317 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE AND BARREN HILL. 
 
 No event had taken place since the outbreak of the 
 war which gave so great a degree of encouragement to 
 the American people as the signing of the treaties of 
 commerce and alliance between France and the United 
 States. No single incident in the course of the struggle 
 with Great Britain so clearly foreshadowed the ultimate 
 establishment of independence as did this acknowledg 
 ment of the political existence of the American Gove/n- 
 ment by one of the foremost Powers of the world ; arid it 
 is hardly possible to overestimate the value of the imme 
 diate influence which it exerted at home and abroad, or 
 of the part which it contributed to the final result. It 
 stimulated the whole country to renewed efforts to bear a 
 burden which was fast becoming too heavy for its waning 
 strength ; and in the new hope which this helping hand 
 held forth to a courageous people, it cfcsed the door for 
 ever against the offers of conciliation which the British 
 ministry were making at that very moment, willing then 
 to grant all the claims of right which had been asserted 
 by the Colonists at the outset. Thenceforward the nature 
 of the contest was changed in the eyes of the European 
 Powers who had been watching its progress ; and the 
 conflict which, but the year before, had been the cause, 
 amoSg the petty German princes, of hiring or ^soiling 
 their subjects to Great Britain for the suppression, as it 
 was said, of a mutiny in America, now became a war 
 between the British monarchy on the one hand and the 
 American people and the King of France on the other. 
 
318 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE [1778. 
 
 The alliance with France assured the independence of 
 the United States ; this was one of the conditions upon 
 which the treaty was based ; and, although it was evident 
 that England would not yield readily, and that the war 
 must still go on, possibly with increased bitterness, yet 
 its character would henceforth be essentially different. 
 The existence of the nation had been substantially estab 
 lished. 
 
 The news of the treaties, brought by Mr. Simeon 
 Deane from France, was received with the greatest ex 
 ultation in America. The despatches were delivered by 
 him on Saturday, the 2d of May, 1778, after Congress 
 had adjourned ; but the House was immediately convened, 
 in order that the joyful tidings might be published at 
 once, and on the following Monday the treaties were 
 ratified by Congress; after which, in the overflow of 
 happiness at the event, they were published, in forget- 
 fulness of the proper diplomatic consideration which would 
 have required the consent of both contracting parties to 
 such a proceeding. 
 
 The celebrations which followed produced a holiday 
 even amid the desolation of Valley Forge. General 
 Washington gave a dinner at the head-quarters in honor 
 of the event, and .great rejoicings took place throughout 
 the army, with toasts and songs andfeux dejoie. A letter 
 of Mr. Robert Morris to General Washington, on the 9th 
 of May, reflects the universal sentiment: "When I con 
 gratulate your Excellency on the great good news lately 
 received from France, you will not expect me to express 
 my feelings. Were I in your company, my countenance 
 might show, but my pen cannot describe them. Most 
 sincerely do I give you joy. Our independence ift un 
 doubtedly secured ; our country must be free." 
 
 To the Marquis de La Fayette this news brought un- 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 357, note. 
 
1778.] AND BARREN HILL. 319 
 
 bounded pleasure. It was the fulfilment of his most 
 ardent hopes ; it filled him with pride at the thought that 
 his countrymen were engaged in the cause of American 
 Independence, to which he himself was devoted. It jus 
 tified, to some extent, at least, his own action in leaving 
 France, and gave him reason to believe that his conduct 
 was now approved at home, perhaps even that it had had 
 some influence in guiding public sentiment toward Amer 
 ica. Above all, however, was the joy in his heart which 
 came from the feeling that now the cause of the United 
 States was the cause of France ; for before everything 
 else in the world La Fayette was a Frenchman. He 
 would never have left his country if there had been an 
 opportunity for him to go into active service at home in 
 the practice of his profession ; and there is no doubt that 
 he would rather have gone to war as a subordinate in the 
 armies of France than to have accepted even the highest 
 rank in any other country. But now that it seemed 
 likely that he could serve France in America, in company 
 also with his own countrymen and comrades in arms, in 
 a war of revenge against the enemy whom all French 
 men hated most of all their enemies, he felt that this was 
 an event of crowning good fortune, than which nothing 
 could give him greater happiness or satisfaction. Im 
 mediately upon the arrival of the news in the camp, on 
 the 2d of May, he collected all the other French officers 
 about him and joined with them in the celebration of the 
 event. 1 A few days later, he had the distinguished honor 
 of commanding a part of the army on the occasion of the 
 grand review which General Washington held at Valley 
 Forge in honor of the treaties. This review was made 
 still more impressive by the character given it as an act 
 of national thanksgiving and of reverent acknowledg 
 ment of the divine goodness toward the people of the 
 
 Meinoires de ma Main, i. 46. 
 
320 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE [1778. 
 
 United States in the assurance of their liberties vouch 
 safed to them through the alliance with France. 
 
 The Commander-in-Chief issued a general order at 
 Valley Forge, on the 6th of May, as follows : 1 
 
 * l It having pleased the Almighty Ruler of the Universe to de 
 fend the cause of the United American States, and finally to raise 
 us up a powerful friend among the princes of the earth, to estab 
 lish our liberty and independency upon a lasting foundation ; it 
 becomes us to set apart a day for gratefully acknowledging the 
 divine goodness, and celebrating the important event, which we 
 owe to his divine interposition. The several brigades are to be 
 assembled for this purpose at nine o clock to-morrow morning, 
 when their chaplains will communicate the intelligence contained 
 in the Postscript of the Pennsylvania Gazette of the 2nd instant, 
 and offer up thanksgiving, and deliver a discourse suitable to the 
 occasion. At half after ten o clock a cannon will be fired, which 
 is to be a signal for the men to be under arms ; the brigade inspec 
 tors will then inspect their dress and arms and form the battalions 
 according to the instructions given them, and announce to the 
 commanding officers of the brigade that the battalions are formed. 
 
 "The commanders of brigades will then appoint the field- 
 officers to the battalions, after which each battalion will be 
 ordered to load and ground their arms. At half past eleven a 
 second cannon will be fired as a signal for the march, upon which 
 the several brigades will begin their march by wheeling to the 
 right by platoons, and proceed by the nearest way to the left 
 of their ground by the new position ; this will be pointed out 
 by the brigade inspectors. A third signal will then be given, on 
 which there will be a discharge of thirteen cannon ; after which 
 a running fire of the infantry will begin on the right of Wood- 
 ford s, and continue throughout the front line ; it will then be 
 taken up on the left of the second line and continue to the right. 
 Upon a signal given, the whole army will huzza. Long live the 
 King of France; the artillery then begins again and fires thirteen 
 rounds ; this will be succeeded by a second general discharge of 
 the musketry in a running fire, and huzza, Long live the friendly 
 European Powers. The last discharge of thirteen pieces of artillery 
 will be given, followed by a general running fire, and huzza, The 
 American States." 
 
 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 355 : from the Orderly Book. 
 
1778.] AXD BARREN HILL. 321 
 
 This manoeuvre was successfully carried out ; and the 
 army is said to have presented a brilliant appearance. 
 Major-General Lord Stirling commanded on the right, 
 the Marquis de La Fayette on the left, and the Baron 
 de Kalb on the second line ; and upon the following day 
 General Washington announced in a general order, 
 
 "The Couiraander-in-Chief takes great pleasure in acquainting 
 the army that its conduct yesterday afforded him the highest sat 
 isfaction. The exactness and order with which all its movements 
 were formed, is a pleasing evidence of the progress it has made 
 in military improvement, and of the perfection to which it may 
 arrive by a continuance of that laudable zeal which now so hap 
 pily prevails. The General, at the same time, presents his thanks 
 to Baron Steuben, and the gentlemen acting under him, for their 
 exertions in the duties of their office, the good effects of which 
 are already apparent, and for the care, activity, and propriety 
 with which they conducted the business of yesterday. " 
 
 This period marks an interesting change in the disci 
 pline of the American troops which was due to the per 
 severance and instruction of the Baron Steuben, whose 
 labors transformed the untaught masses of militia and 
 Continental soldiers at Valley Forge from what was, in 
 fact, little more than an aggregation of men totally igno 
 rant of discipline in the military sense, without order, 
 without uniformity of movement, without system in its 
 organization or government, without any kind of instruc 
 tion except such as related to forming or changing front 
 in the face of the enemy, into a trained and organized 
 force. It is one of the strangest features of the American 
 Revolution that, in spite of all their defects, these men 
 had frequently gone into battle and had fought with the 
 superior forces of British and Germans to whom they 
 were opposed, with results that cannot be regarded as other 
 than extraordinary by any one who carefully studies the 
 progress of the war. It was incomprehensible to foreign 
 observers, accustomed to the order and discipline and 
 
 VOL. I. 21 
 
322 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE [1778. 
 
 scrupulously careful preparation for fighting in the 
 armies of Europe. It appeared to foreign military men 
 like a contradiction in terms. Senor Galves, the Span 
 ish Governor of Louisiana, commented upon this with 
 amusement and wonder in writing a despatch to his Gov 
 ernment. " Up to this time/ said he, " we have always 
 supposed that troops should be disciplined and equipped 
 before going into battle, but what has happened here dis 
 proves this theory ; for the Americans, by their courage 
 alone, without training and without breeches, have whipped 
 the British who had both." x 
 
 When Baron Steuben arrived at the camp at Valley 
 Forge, in February, 1778, he found it in a deplorable 
 state. His own relation of it informs us, 2 
 
 "The effective strength of the army was divided into divisions, 
 commanded by major-generals ; into brigades, commanded by brig 
 adier-generals ; and into regiments, commanded by colonels. The 
 number of men in a regiment was fixed by Congress as well as in 
 a company so many infantry, cavalry, and artillery. But the 
 eternal ebb and flow of men engaged for three, six, and nine 
 months, who went and came every day, rendered it impossible to 
 have either a regiment or a company complete ; and the words 
 company, regiment, brigade, and division were so vague that they 
 did not convey any idea upon which to form a calculation, eithei 
 of a particular corps or of the army in general. They were so 
 unequal in their number that it would have been impossible to 
 execute any manoeuvres. Sometimes a regiment was stronger 
 than a brigade. I have seen a regiment consisting of thirty men, 
 and a company of one corporal. . . . Not only the clothes but the 
 arms were carried off by those who had completed their term of 
 service. General Knox assured me that, previous to the estab 
 lishment of my department, there never was a campaign in which 
 the military magazines did not furnish from five thousand to 
 eight thousand muskets to replace those which were lost in the 
 way I have described above. The loss of bayonets was still 
 greater. The American soldier, never having used this arm, had 
 
 1 Comte de Montmorin to M. de Vergennes, 1st June, 1778 ; Espagne, t. 
 589, No. 98 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, iii. 261. 
 
 2 Kapp, Life of Steuben, p. 115. 
 
1778.] AND BARREN HILL. 323 
 
 no faith in it, and never used it bnt to roast his beefsteak, and 
 indeed often left it at home. ... No captain kept a book. Ac 
 counts were never furnished or required. . . . The arms at Valley 
 Forge were in a horrible condition, covered with rust, half of 
 them without bayonets, many from which a single shot could not 
 be fired. The pouches were quite as bad as the arms. A great 
 many of the men had tin boxes instead of pouches, others had 
 cow-horns; and muskets, carbines, fowling-pieces, and rifles were 
 seen in the same company. 
 
 "The description of the dress is easily given. The men were 
 literally naked, some of them in the fullest extent of the word. 
 The officers who had coats had them of every color and make. 
 I saw officers, at a grand parade at Valley Forge, mounting guard 
 in a sort of dressing-gown, made of an old blanket or woollen bed 
 cover. With regard to their military discipline, I may safely say 
 no such thing existed. In the first place, there was no regular 
 formation. A so-called regiment was formed of three platoons, 
 another of five, eight, nine, and the Canadian regiment of twenty- 
 one. The formation of the regiments was as varied as their mode 
 of drill, which consisted only of the manual exercise. Each colo 
 nel had a system of his own, the one according to the English, 
 the other according to the Prussian or the French style. . . . The 
 greater part of the captains had no roll of their companies, and 
 had no idea how many men they had under their orders. When I 
 asked a colonel the strength of his regiment, the usual reply was, 
 Something between two and three hundred men. " 
 
 It is startling to read the account of the internal weak 
 ness and lack of preparation of this Continental army, to 
 whose steady courage and endurance through this time of 
 suffering and trial we owe so great a debt of gratitude ; it 
 is a story which none of us would accept but for the fact 
 that it comes from an authority which we have no right 
 to question. Baron Steuben brought to his task a long 
 experience in military affairs and a knowledge acquired 
 in the war school of Frederick the Great, through which 
 he succeeded, by dint of untiring personal application 
 and extraordinary earnestness of purpose in his under 
 taking, in establishing order, uniformity, and method, as 
 well as strictness of discipline, among the troops. One 
 
324 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE [1778. 
 
 of the first results of his training was the excellent bear 
 ing of the men at the grand review at Valley Forge, to 
 which General Washington referred with evident satis 
 faction in his general order of the 8th of May, quoted 
 above. 
 
 In the midst of the rejoicings over the news from France, 
 General Washington was not blind to the fact that there 
 remained much to be done in America before the war 
 could be ended by the acknowledgment in England of the 
 independence of the United States. 1 His belief was that, 
 although it might be taken for granted that the British 
 force could not be greatly strengthened by new troops, 
 which under present circumstances were not likely to be 
 sent out from England, yet their remaining strength would 
 be dangerous if it should be concentrated and properly 
 directed in the ensuing campaign. From certain move 
 ments lately reported to him, notably the sailing from Phil 
 adelphia of two hundred transport-vessels, he judged that 
 it might be General Howe s purpose to evacuate Rhode 
 Island and move the troops from there to New York to 
 operate along the Hudson River, or possibly to use them 
 in reinforcing Philadelphia ; in which latter event the 
 army at Valley Forge would need to be strengthened 
 immediately. With this object in view, he summoned 
 a council of war at Valley Forge, on the 8th of May, at 
 which were present Major-Generals Gates, Greene, Stir 
 ling, Mifflin, La Fayette, de Kalb, Armstrong, and Steu- 
 ben, with Brigadier-Generals Knox and du Portail. 2 The 
 Commander-in-Chief laid before the council the state of 
 the enemy s forces, which he estimated at something more 
 than sixteen thousand men ; of these about ten thousand 
 were in Philadelphia, four thousand in New York, and 
 about two thousand in Rhode Island. Of the Continental 
 
 1 Letters to Major-General Heath, 5th May, 1778, and to Major-General 
 McDougall, same date : Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 356, 359. 
 
 2 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 360, note. 
 
1778.] AND BARREN HILL. 325 
 
 troops there were at Valley Forge about eleven thousand 
 eight hundred men, including the sick ; and the other de 
 tachments at Wilmington and upon the Hudson River, 
 with reinforcements that might reasonably be counted 
 upon, would swell the number of effective troops to 
 twenty thousand. Thereupon the council was requested 
 to decide what measures it would be best to pursue. 
 
 " After a full and unreserved discussion, it was the 
 unanimous opinion of the council, that the line of conduct 
 most consistent with sound policy, and best suited to pro 
 mote the interests and safety of the United States, was to 
 remain on the defensive and wait events, and not attempt 
 any offensive operation against the enemy, till circum 
 stances should afford a fairer opportunity of striking a 
 successful blow. As the enemy were strongly fortified by 
 nature, and by artificial works, in all their positions, it 
 would require a greatly superior force to attack them, 
 with any hope of a favorable issue. It was agreed that to 
 take Philadelphia by storm was impracticable, and that 
 thirty thousand men would be requisite for a blockade. 
 The Continental force could not be so much increased 
 by the militia, even if that description of troops could 
 be relied on for such an enterprise. In short, strong ob 
 jections were believed to exist against all offensive move 
 ments." Consequently, it was decided to remain quietly 
 at Valley Forge for the present, at least, and await the 
 development of the enemy s plans. 
 
 It became more evident each day, in the mean time, 
 from all information that General Washington could ob 
 tain, that the British were contemplating some movement 
 of importance ; and, as the days wore on, he concluded, 
 rightly, as it afterward proved, that their purpose was to 
 evacuate Philadelphia, a step which now became all the 
 more probable because of the announcement of the treat 
 ies with France. For, if a French fleet were to enter the 
 Delaware River and cut off the communication by sea, 
 
326 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FOKGE [1778. 
 
 and if a sufficient force were to be landed along the river 
 bank to co-operate with the Continental army at Valley 
 Forge, which could have been considerably reinforced in 
 case of necessity, as we have seen by the statements 
 made at the council of war, the situation of General 
 Howe would become at once exceedingly dangerous and 
 embarrassing. In this connection General Washington 
 concluded to send out a detachment toward the enemy s 
 lines at Philadelphia, for the purpose of watching their 
 movements and of keeping the army informed in the 
 event of their attempting to execute any contemplated 
 design, as well as to harass and annoy them if an oppor 
 tunity should offer itself whilst the British were retreat 
 ing. He selected a force for this purpose from among his 
 most reliable troops, and appointed the Marquis cle La 
 Fayette to take command of the expedition, a mark of 
 confidence which not only proves the esteem in which the 
 Commander-in-Chief held La Fayette, but also shows 
 that he valued his judgment as a commander, and his 
 military skill, sufficiently to intrust to him the carrying 
 out of a delicate manoeuvre in the face of the enemy, 
 and to send with him a body of men whom he could not 
 afford, under any circumstances, to have weakened or de 
 stroyed. This gave La Fayette an opportunity to show 
 his coolness and self-possession in the midst of danger, 
 and his skill in extricating himself from difficulty, quite 
 as well as any other performance of his during the war ; 
 and it won for him a special commendation from the 
 General in a letter written afterward to Congress. 
 
 The instructions given to La Fayette by General 
 Washington when he was appointed to this enterprise 
 were as follows : l 
 
 , The detachment under your command, with which 
 you will immediately march towards the enemy s lines, is de- 
 
 1 Sparks, Writing? of Washington, v. 368. 
 
1778.] AND BARREN HILL. 327 
 
 signed to answer the following purposes ; namely, to be a secu 
 rity to this canip and a cover to the country between the Del 
 aware and the Schuylkill, to interrupt the communication with 
 Philadelphia, to obstruct the incursions of the enemy s par 
 ties, and to obtain intelligence of their motions and designs. 
 This last is a matter of very interesting moment, and ought to 
 claim your particular attention. You will endeavour to pro 
 cure trusty and intelligent spies, who will advise you faithfully 
 of whatever may be passing in the city, and you will without 
 delay communicate to me every piece of material information 
 you obtain. 
 
 " A variety of concurring accounts make it probable, that the 
 enemy are preparing to evacuate Philadelphia. This is a point, 
 which it is of the utmost importance to ascertain ; and, if possible, 
 the place of their future destination. Should you be able to gain 
 certain intelligence of the time of their intended embarkation, so 
 that you may be able to take advantage of it, and fall upon the 
 rear of the enemy in the act of withdrawing, it will be a very de 
 sirable event. But this will be a matter of no small difficulty, 
 and will require the greatest caution and prudence in the execu 
 tion. Any deception or precipitation may be attended with the 
 most disastrous consequences. 
 
 "You will remember, that your detachment is a very valuable 
 one, and that any accident happening to it would be a very 
 severe blow to this army. You will therefore use every possible 
 precaution for its security, and to guard against a surprise. Xo 
 attempt should be made, nor any thing risked, without the 
 greatest prospect of success, and with every reasonable advan 
 tage on your side. I shall not point out any precise position 
 to you ; but shall leave it to your discretion to take such posts 
 occasionally as shall appear to you best adapted to the purposes 
 of your detachment. In general, I would observe, that a sta 
 tionary post is unadvisable, as it gives the enemy an opportunity 
 of knowing your situation, and concerting plans successfully 
 against you. In case of any offensive movement against this 
 army, you will keep yourself in such a state as to have an easy 
 communication with it, and at the same time harass the enemy s 
 advance. 
 
 "Our parties of horse and foot between the rivers are to be 
 under your command, and to form part of your detachment. As 
 great complaints have been made of the disorderly conduct of the 
 parties, which have been sent towards the enemy s lines, it is ex 
 pected that you will be very attentive in preventing abuses of the 
 
328 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE [1778. 
 
 like nature, and will inquire how far complaints already made are 
 founded in justice. 
 
 "Given under my hand, at Head Quarters, this 18th day of 
 May, 1778. 
 
 La Fayette accordingly left camp on the 18th of 
 May, with about twenty-two hundred men. One part of 
 these was led by General Poor ; another part consisted of 
 about six hundred Pennsylvania militia, under General 
 Potter ; there was also the independent company of Cap 
 tain Alan MacLean, as well as about fifty Iroquois Indians. 
 He had, as his force of artillery, five pieces of cannon. 
 
 He crossed the Schuylkill River at Swede s Ford and 
 advanced about twelve miles along the eastern bank, fol 
 lowing what is known as the Ridge Road, to a point very 
 near the eleventh mile-stone from the city of Philadelphia, 
 where there was a little hamlet, called Barren Hill, with 
 a church and a graveyard, upon the high ground of the 
 ridge between the Valley of the Schuylkill and the 
 country to the eastward which drains into the Delaware 
 River. From it the Ridge Road runs almost due south 
 to Philadelphia, while to the east there is a road which 
 leads to White Marsh and to Chestnut Hill, and another 
 going in a southeasterly direction to Germantown ; on the 
 west, by a very easy descent, a road ran through Spring 
 Mill to Matson s Ford of the Schuylkill River, at the 
 present town of Conshohocken, some three miles north 
 westerly from Barren Hill. This position, therefore, was 
 extremely well suited to the purposes of La Fayette s ex 
 pedition ; because, whilst it afforded an opportunity of 
 taking up an advantageous position in case of attack, it 
 permitted reconnoissances to be made with ease in any 
 direction, either toward the city, or through the country 
 lying near the Delaware, or along the slope of the river 
 bank on the Schuylkill side, and it admitted the prompt 
 and effective execution of a military operation in case of 
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1778.] AND BARREN HILL. 329 
 
 great good fortune. La Fayette saw the advantages of 
 this situation, and selected it with excellent judgment. 
 
 Drawing up his troops upon a small prominence to the 
 west of the Ridge Road, just south of the hamlet of Bar 
 ren Hill, in a position which commanded admirably the 
 approaches along the highway from Philadelphia, he pro 
 tected his right wing by the abrupt descent which made 
 it inaccessible from the side toward the Schuylkill, whilst 
 his left rested upon a stretch of forest in front of which 
 were one or two substantial stone houses, which could 
 be made to serve as fortifications in case of need. Well 
 in advance of his line he placed his five pieces of cannon ; 
 and beyond these, again, in the direction of Philadelphia, 
 were pickets who guarded the highway for two miles, 
 Captain MacLean s company, which performed this ser 
 vice, having pushed forward as far as the ninth mile-stone 
 from the city, accompanied by the Iroquois warriors, 
 whose methods of warfare made them exceedingly useful 
 in this case as scouts. As his command was now secured 
 against sudden attack upon his front and to his right, it 
 remained for General La Fayette to protect his left flank 
 against surprise from the direction of White Marsh and 
 Chestnut Hill, in which direction he detected the weak 
 ness of his attitude if the enemy should come out in force 
 by the roads to the east of him and turn his position. In 
 order to guard against this misadventure, he assigned the 
 duty of guarding the flank to the militia under General 
 Potter, who was ordered to take his post upon the road 
 leading in a northwesterly and southeasterly direction 
 from Swedes Ford to White Marsh, which formed a junc 
 tion with the roads running into Chestnut Hill and Ger- 
 mantown and was the natural outlet to a force advancing 
 from Philadelphia by any route to the eastward of Barren 
 Hill. For some reason that our documents do not ex 
 plain, the militia failed to carry out this order ; and upon 
 that turned the whole result of the expedition. 
 
330 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FOKGE [1778. 
 
 In the mean time, word of La Fayette s movements 
 was taken to Philadelphia by British spies, and awakened 
 there an extraordinary interest among the officers of the 
 garrison ; for the reputation of the young general had 
 extended within the lines of the enemy through reports 
 coming by way of England which had given a detailed 
 account of his setting out for America, exaggerated some 
 what, no doubt, in many of its attendant circumstances, 
 but substantially true in the main ; and his career was 
 naturally watched with unusual attention, both because 
 his important influence and his rank in Europe would have 
 singled him out, in any event, amid his present surround 
 ings in the Continental army, and especially because, as a 
 French nobleman who had voluntarily entered into the 
 war, and who had never hesitated to express with the 
 utmost freedom his political opinions or to declare his 
 intentions in this connection, he aroused necessarily an 
 indignant protest in the minds of all Englishmen. It 
 would have gratified them to see him defeated ; but it 
 would have produced unbounded joy if he could have 
 been outwitted and captured, if he could have been 
 brought into Philadelphia at the termination of his first 
 enterprise, to be loaded with indulgent courtesy and feted 
 with mock admiration, and later, perhaps, to be returned 
 to France with his heroism reduced to the vainglory of 
 a school-boy, and his prestige extinguished in ridicule. 
 Something of this kind came very near happening at 
 Barren Hill ; and La Fayette was probably never in such 
 grave danger at any other time in the course of his life. 
 If he had been captured upon this expedition, he would 
 inevitably have been ruined. 
 
 The British commanders in Philadelphia seized upon 
 this opportunity with the greatest possible readiness, deter 
 mined to take advantage of it to destroy the small detach 
 ment which was now isolated from the main body of the 
 American army and to bring back La Fayette in triumph 
 
1778.] AXD BARREN HILL. 331 
 
 as a prisoner of war. So great was the importance attached 
 to the result of their undertaking that General Clinton, 
 who at that moment was about to succeed to the command 
 upon the withdrawal of General Howe, decided to lead it 
 in person, in order to be perfectly sure of its success ; and 
 the enthusiasm among the officers attained such a point 
 that General Howe himself, who was still in Philadelphia, 
 preparing for his return to England, chose to accompany 
 the expedition, that he might end his campaigns in Amer 
 ica by taking part in a brilliant stroke from which they 
 all expected great enjoyment and credit. It was not sup 
 posed for a moment that La Fayette could escape capture, 
 because he was to be opposed by a force considerably more 
 than four times as great as his own was known to be ; and, 
 under the plan by which it was intended to cut off his 
 retreat by a rapid movement upon his flank and in his 
 rear, he would have nothing left but to surrender at dis 
 cretion or to fight under enormous disadvantages. The 
 certainty of this prospect afforded such pleasure to Gen 
 eral Howe and General Clinton that they invited a com 
 pany of ladies and gentlemen to an entertainment in Phil 
 adelphia, upon the following day, to meet the Marquis 
 de La Fayette ; l and M. de La Fayette was afterward 
 informed that Admiral Lord Howe had accompanied the 
 expedition as a volunteer, that he might share with the 
 other officers the enjoyment that all anticipated. 
 
 One division of the British army, which consisted of 
 eight thousand men made up of regular troops and Hes 
 sians, with fifteen pieces of field artillery, under the 
 command of General Grant, moved out of Philadelphia to 
 the eastward through Frankford, on the Delaware River, 
 and by a circuitous route advanced to AVhitemarsh, where 
 they took the road leading directly to Swedes Ford. 
 Having reached a point a short distance north of Ger- 
 
 Mi- moires, i. 75 : Fragments extraits de divers Munuscrits, D. 
 
332 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE [1778. 
 
 mantown, General Grant proceeded with his column along 
 this road, in order to gain possession of the avenues of 
 escape for La Fayette in case he should attempt to recross 
 the Schuylkill River either at Swedes Ford or at Mat- 
 son s Ford, and, whilst thus effectually securing the ad 
 vantage of him in the rear, to mass a sufficient number 
 of British troops in that position to check any reinforce 
 ment that might be sent out to him from Valley Forge 
 upon the first signal of alarm. In the mean time, another 
 column, composed of grenadiers, accompanied by a small 
 body of cavalry, under General Grey, had set out from 
 Philadelphia by way of Germantown and was marching 
 along the road which branches off from the highway to 
 Swedes Ford north of Germantown and runs directly to 
 the Barren Hill Church, in order to occupy La Fayette s 
 attention and to open the attack upon his left wing at that 
 point ; 1 whilst a third column was advancing northward 
 along the Ridge Road, to engage him in front of his po 
 sition ; and this force was accompanied by General Clin 
 ton and General Howe in person. 2 
 
 Thus far the enterprise of the British commander had 
 been fully developed in accordance with the plan agreed 
 upon. La Fayette was almost surrounded ; if he retreated 
 toward Swedes Ford, he would fall into the hands of 
 General Grant ; if he moved toward the east, in the hope 
 of gaining the Delaware River, he would meet General 
 Grey, who was in direct communication with General 
 Grant s force, and these two together would have an easy 
 task to perform ; if he tried to escape by the Ridge Road 
 to some lower point on the Schuylkill, he would encounter 
 General Clinton and General Howe in the very way in 
 
 1 Stedman says that General Grey " marched from Philadelphia along the 
 western branch of the Schuylkill," and stationed himself "at a ford two or 
 three miles in front of La Fayette s right flank." History of the American 
 War, i. 377. 
 
 2 Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North America, London, 1787, i. 295. 
 
1778.] AND BARREN HILL. 333 
 
 which those gentlemen hoped to meet him. All uncon 
 scious of the danger he was in, La Fayette was about to 
 carry out the orders of the Commander-in-Chief as to 
 discovering, if possible, the intentions of the enemy, and 
 their probable evacuation of Philadelphia, by sending a 
 messenger to the city who should gather such informa 
 tion as might be current there, for which purpose he had 
 secured a young woman, who, under pretext of visiting 
 her relations, was upon the point of setting out upon 
 that errand. La Fayette was giving her his final instruc 
 tions, upon the morning of the 20th of May, when word 
 was brought to him that a party of dragoons wearing 
 red coats had been seen in the Whitemarsh road. This 
 information contained at the moment nothing startling 
 to his mind, for he had posted General Potter to guard 
 the road to Whitemarsh, and there happened to be some 
 cavalry among the Pennsylvania militia whose coats were 
 red. There was no reason to doubt that the troops 
 reported from there formed a part of General Potter s 
 command. La Fayette had made an appointment to 
 meet that officer upon the Whitemarsh Road that day, 
 and it appears to have been his intention to transfer his 
 detachment thither that night. Nevertheless, he took 
 immediate steps to ascertain the situation, with the result 
 that a report came back to him, soon after, that a column 
 was advancing upon him toward his left wing ; this was 
 the detachment of General Grey, 1 sent forward, as we 
 have seen, by General Grant ; and shortly afterward one 
 of his aides, who had been sent out by him to reconnoitre, 
 returned with the intelligence that General Grant s column 
 was marching along the road leading to Swedes Ford, 
 and that the head of the column had already taken pos 
 session of the only line of escape to Valley Forge from 
 Barren Hill by Swedes Ford. At the same moment, the 
 
 1 Momoires, i. 7G : Fragments extraits de divers Manuscrits, D. 
 
334 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE [1778. 
 
 cry arose among the troops, in La Fayette s presence, that 
 they were surrounded. 
 
 The situation was one to tax severely the young gen 
 eral s courage and presence of mind. He had no one to 
 rely upon for assistance, and to act quickly was the only 
 hope that remained for him. His first step, whilst he 
 assumed as good a countenance as he could before his men, 
 was to change his front, in order to meet General Grey on 
 his left ; this he did by throwing a part of his detach 
 ment beyond the church, and posting some of his force in 
 the churchyard, where the stone wall afforded them ex 
 cellent breast-works against the expected attack in that 
 direction. In the mean time he discovered through his 
 aides, whom he had sent out in haste in all directions, 
 that, whilst they were unable to reach Valley Forge, there 
 was one road along the Schuylkill River which was still 
 open, although General Grant was then as near to it as 
 he was, and if the British troops should advance but a 
 little farther in that direction his only possible chance of 
 escape would be gone. The Whitemarsh Road, which Gen 
 eral Grant was following, formed a junction, not far to the 
 north of Barren Hill, with the road leading to Matson s 
 Ford, directly to the west of where La Fayette now was ; 
 and it was evidently General Grant s intention to cut off 
 that ford of the Schuylkill also, that he might become 
 absolutely master of the situation. The fact that he was 
 rather slow in securing that position, and the good fortune 
 which attended an extremely well devised effort to detain 
 him, saved the Marquis de La Fayette from capture. 1 
 
 La Fayette instantly conceived the idea of gaining 
 Matson s Ford before General Grant could reach there. 
 The conformation of the land at Barren Hill afforded him 
 a very good opportunity to do this. It happens that the 
 
 1 There is a local tradition that General Grant stopped at the Broad Axe 
 Tavern to take his breakfast, and thus gave an opportunity for intelligence 
 to be sent to La Fayette. 
 
1778.1 AND BARREN HILL. 335 
 
 road from Barren Hill to the Schuylkill River falls away 
 rapidly behind a high bank on the northern side, so 
 that, soon after leaving the church, an army marching 
 in the direction of the river would disappear completely 
 from the view of an observer standing upon the high 
 ground, the direction from which a part of General 
 Grant s force was approaching, or on the east, where 
 General Grey was planning the attack. Leaving a small 
 force to make a demonstration about the church, La 
 Fayette gained time by throwing forward false heads of 
 columns toward the north, where the country was heavily 
 wooded, placing them in such a manner that they should 
 appear to be emerging from the forest, for the purpose 
 of misleading General Grant, whilst he formed the re 
 mainder of his detachment in marching order and quietly 
 dropped down the road to the Schuylkill. The false 
 heads of columns arrested the attention of General Grant 
 and held him long enough for the successful execution 
 of this movement ; for whilst he hesitated the Americans 
 were slipping away. 
 
 La Fayette appointed General Poor to command the 
 van, and sent with him his most trusted aide-de-camp, M. 
 de Gimat, whilst he remained behind, and, when sufficient 
 time had elapsed, brought up the rear with all his men. 
 The march was so successfully accomplished that his whole 
 detachment passed safely through Spring Mill and beyond 
 the point at which General Grant could have intercepted 
 it, reaching the passage of the Schuylkill at Matson s 
 Ford and crossing in safety without losing a man, 1 just 
 as the British, who had in the mean time discovered 
 the deception, came up in pursuit. Once upon the other 
 side of the river, La Fayette drew up his men to prepare 
 for an attack and to contest the passage of the ford if the 
 enemy should decide to follow him ; but he was left unmo- 
 
 1 Memoires de ma Main, i. p. 48. Stedman says, however, that the British 
 cavalry " killed or took about forty." History of the American War, i. 378. 
 
336 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE [1778. 
 
 lested; for they retired after having halted for a short 
 time upon the eastern bank, within full sight of his re 
 treating column, the British cavalry and hussars having 
 been detached in a fruitless attempt to overtake him ; and 
 Lieutenant Wickham, who was present, said that when he 
 saw La Fayette s men dotting the water as they forded 
 the Schuylkill they reminded him of " the corks of a 
 fishing seine." l In the mean time, General Clinton, ad 
 vancing along the Ridge Road, quickly drove in the out 
 posts at the very time that La Fayette was retreating, 
 and he is said to have been exceedingly surprised and 
 angered when, upon his arrival at Barren Hill Church, he 
 found nothing there but a column of red-coats marching 
 toward him from the opposite direction, with no enemy 
 anywhere in sight. The only encounter which actually 
 took place occurred a little before that time with Gen 
 eral Clinton s advance guard, and it was one of the most 
 curious in the course of the war. A company of British 
 dragoons, moving along the Ridge Road near Barren 
 Hill, came suddenly upon the Iroquois of La Fayette s 
 force, who were doing picket duty at that point : the 
 savages started up from the ground with their mad war- 
 whoop, and, terrified by the cavalry, which they had never 
 seen before, they instantly fled ; whilst the dragoons, on 
 their side, were thrown into such disorder by a sight and 
 a sound equally new to them, that they retreated hastily 
 in the opposite direction. 
 
 The British troops had had a long and fatiguing march, 
 which ended now in mortification and disappointment ; 
 and, without attempting any further enterprise against the 
 Continental army, General Clinton and General Howe led 
 their soldiers back to Philadelphia, as La Fayette said, 
 " very tired, very much ashamed, and very much laughed 
 at" for their exploit. 2 The Marquis de La Fayette re- 
 
 1 Simcoe s Military Journal, p. 61. 
 
 2 Memoires de La Fayette, i. 76, Fragment D. 
 
1778.] AND BARREN HILL. 337 
 
 mained all night at the western side of Matson s Ford, 
 and upon the following day, having ascertained the with 
 drawal of the British, he recrossed the river and took up 
 his former position at Barren Hill ; after which he pro 
 ceeded to the northward, by the road which he had origi 
 nally taken in leaving the camp of the army, and, passing 
 over again at Swedes Ford, arrived safely at Valley Forge. 
 The alarm-guns which he had fired the day before had 
 been heard in the camp, where the forces were hastily put 
 under arms, and they had been a source of great anxiety 
 to General Washington, who apprehended not only serious 
 difficulty but also an injury to, possibly even the destruc 
 tion of, one of the choicest bodies of his troops. He wel 
 comed the detachment back with infinite pleasure. After 
 having heard their story in detail, he gave the young 
 commander credit for his good judgment and skill, and 
 in writing to Congress, a few days later, he took occasion 
 to mention him with distinction, as follows : l " On the 
 night of the 19th the enemy moved out in force against 
 the detachment under the Marquis de Lafayette, men 
 tioned in my letter of the 18th, which made a timely and 
 handsome retreat in great order over the Schuylkill at 
 Matson s Ford. Our loss was nine men in the whole. 
 The enemy s loss is supposed to be something more. 
 Their march was circuitous and rapid, and I should 
 imagine many of their men suffered from it. General 
 Clinton, it is said, commanded in person." 
 
 It is doubtful if the Marquis de La Fayette ever fully 
 realized how important a crisis for him was this affair 
 at Barren Hill. The subsequent incidents of his life 
 brought reverses, disappointments, sorrows, imprison 
 ment, and defeat, all the vicissitudes that go to make up 
 the sum of experience in a long and eventful career, 
 during which he was applauded, criticised, admired, or 
 
 1 Letter to the President of Congress, 24th May, 1778 : Sparks, Writings of 
 Washington, v. 377. 
 VOL. I. 22 
 
338 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE [1778. 
 
 condemned, according to the feelings that his actions 
 aroused among friends and enemies amid the frightful 
 social disorders through which he was destined to live ; 
 but none of these wrought a personal injury comparable 
 with the blight that must have fallen upon him if his 
 service in the United States had been suddenly cut short 
 on that eventful day in May, 1778. If the misfortune 
 had overtaken him then of being captured by the British, 
 upon the first occasion when he had been intrusted with 
 a separate command, involving, as it would have done, the 
 loss to the Continental army of an extremely valuable 
 body of men, the chances are that he would have been 
 overwhelmed by the consequences, and that his influence 
 would have been damaged beyond repair. The hold he 
 had at that time upon the affairs of the nation was 
 comparatively slight; it might have been broken, and 
 the memory of La Fayette would have become that of a 
 mere incident in the War of Independence ; he would 
 not have had an opportunity to render to this country 
 the valuable services which he rendered afterward, in the 
 councils of war, and in his relations with the French 
 Government and with the French troops in America, as 
 well as on the field of battle ; nor would he have been re 
 warded for the high-minded zeal and self-sacrifice which 
 have forever endeared him to the American people. 
 
 The British sentiment of the time, in Philadelphia, 
 affected to regard this expedition with contempt, probably 
 with a view to concealing the mortification which it really 
 caused in the British army. " The Royal Pennsylvania 
 Gazette" announced that " Intelligence being received that 
 Mr. Washington and his tattered retinue had abandoned 
 their mud holes and were on the march to Germantown, 
 a detachment of British and Hessian troops went out to 
 meet and escort them into the city ; but the rebels, being 
 apprised of their approach, flew back with precipitation 
 to what they call their camp, determined to act no further 
 
1778.] AND BARREN HILL. 339 
 
 on the offensive than might be consistent with their per 
 sonal safety." But, in spite of this pretended scorn for 
 American affairs, common enough, no doubt, at that 
 period, in discussing them, we know, through a letter of 
 Colonel Laurens to his father, 1 " that General Grant had 
 escaped a court martial for his conduct on the affair of 
 Marquis de Lafayette, by his powerful interest, but that 
 he was much blamed and abused in circles of officers." 
 And a little more than one month later the splendidly 
 appointed army of Sir Henry Clinton was in full retreat 
 through New Jersey, with " Mr. Washington and his 
 tattered retinue" in pursuit. 
 
 An incident occurred at Valley Forge about this time 
 which illustrates the confidence with which La Fayette 
 was looked to by his soldiers in matters relating to their 
 personal interests, and the good will with which he re 
 sponded to their wishes, even when he did not agree with 
 their views. An objection was made by some of the 
 officers under his command to the oath of allegiance re 
 cently prescribed by Congress, which was to be adminis 
 tered to every officer in the service of the United States, 
 a certificate as to his having taken it being duly for 
 warded to the office of the Adjutant-General. Whilst 
 the provisions of this order were being carried out in 
 the camp, an extraordinary unwillingness, probably grow 
 ing out of a mistaken conception upon the part of some 
 officers as to the indirect result which such an obligation 
 might have upon future promotion in the service, mani 
 fested itself among the Virginia troops in General Wood- 
 ford s brigade. There is no evidence of disloyalty upon 
 their part ; on the contrary, the officers appear to have 
 subscribed to the oath, though under protest as to the 
 peculiar objections conceived by themselves, which really 
 
 1 John Laurens to Henry Laurens, loth June, 1778: The Army Corre 
 spondence of Colonel John Laurens, by Wm. Gihnore Simms, Publications 
 of the Bradford Club, New York, 1807. 
 
340 LA FAYETTE AT VALLEY FORGE [1778. 
 
 were based upon no reasonable foundation, and do not 
 seem to have been suggested in any other part of the 
 army. The difficulty evidently arose from an exceedingly 
 narrow interpretation of the form of the act of allegiance 
 itself, and especially of the words "and will serve the said 
 
 United States in the office of , which I now hold." l 
 
 After a discussion with the Marquis de La Fayette of 
 the questions which seemed to them to be involved, but 
 which, in his opinion, did not affect their relations to 
 the army in the manner they had assumed, La Fayette 
 acceded to their request that he should submit their case 
 to the Commander-in-Chief, whereupon twenty-six of 
 these officers prepared and delivered to him the following 
 memorial : 
 
 i 1. The tenor of the oath they in some measure consider an 
 indignity ; they will not undertake to determine it unnecessary ; 
 an indignity, as it presupposes that some of them have acted con 
 trary to their sentiments ; it may be unnecessary, for those officers, 
 who ventured their lives and fortunes in support of American 
 Independence, could have no other reason but the apparent one. 
 
 " 2. As many officers at present are injured in their rank, and 
 cannot possibly continue in the army exactly in their present 
 situation, they apprehend it would be an impropriety in them to 
 swear to continue in their present posts, as the rank of the juror 
 is to be taken when the oath is administered. 
 
 "3. Would not the oath debar an officer from the privilege 
 of resigning, when circumstances might render it indispensably 
 necessary that he should quit the army ? 
 
 "4. The taking of the oath, while the present establishment 
 
 1 The oath was as follows : " I do acknowledge the United States of 
 America to be free, independent, and sovereign States, and declare that the 
 people thereof owe no allegiance or obedience to George the Third, King of 
 Great Britain ; and I renounce, refuse, and abjure any allegiance or obe 
 dience to him ; and I do swear, (or affirm), that I will, to the utmost of my 
 power, support, maintain, and defend the said United States against the 
 said King George the Third, and his heirs and successors, and his or their 
 abettors, assistants, and adherents, and will serve the said United States in 
 
 the office of , which I now hold, with fidelity, according to the best 
 
 of my skill and understanding. So help me God." Journals of Congress, 
 3d February, 1778. 
 
1778.] AND BARREN HILL. 341 
 
 continues, most of the subscribers are of opinion, would lay them 
 under a pointed restraint in endeavoring to procure a change, 
 which the whole army have long, not only most ardently wished 
 for, but conceived absolutely necessary for its preservation ; a 
 change, that would put them on an honorable and advantageous 
 footing." l 
 
 General de La Fayette forwarded this document to head 
 quarters with the following letter to the Commander-in- 
 Chief: 2 
 
 "VALLEY FORGE CAMP, the 15th May, 1778. 
 
 "MY DEAR GENERAL, Agreeable to your excellency s orders, 
 I have taken the oath of the gentlemen officers in General Wood- 
 ford s brigade, and their certificates have been sent to the adjutant 
 general s office. Give me leave, now, to present you with some 
 observations delivered to me by many officers in that brigade, 
 who desire me to submit them to your perusal. I know. Sir, 
 (besides I am not of their opinion in the fact itself), that I should 
 not accept for you the objections those gentlemen could have had, 
 as a body, to any order from Congress ; but I confess the desire 
 of being agreeable to them, of giving them any mark of friend 
 ship and affection which is in my power, and acknowledging the 
 kind sentiments they honour me with, have been my first and 
 dearest considerations. Besides that, be pleased to consider that 
 they began by obeying orders, and want only to let their beloved 
 general know which were the reasons of their being rather re 
 luctant, (as far as reluctance may comply with their duty and 
 honour), to an oath, the meaning and spirit of which was, I be 
 lieve, misunderstood by them. I may add, Sir, with a perfect 
 conviction, that there is not one among them but would be thrice 
 happy were occasions offered to them of distinguishing yet, by 
 new exertions, their love for their country, their zeal for their 
 duty as officers, their consideration for the civil superior power, 
 and their love for your excellency. 
 
 " With the greatest respect and most tender affection, I have 
 the honour to be, &c." 
 
 To which General Washington replied as follows : 3 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 307, note. 
 
 1 La Fayette s Correspondence, American edition, p. 170. 
 
 8 Ibid., p. 171. 
 
342 VALLEY FORGE AND BARREN HILL. [1778. 
 
 "CAMP, 17 May, 1778. 
 
 "DEAR SIR, I received yesterday your favour of the 15th in 
 stant, enclosing a paper subscribed by sundry officers of General 
 Woodford s brigade, setting forth the reasons for not taking the 
 oath of abjuration, allegiance, and office ; and I thank you much 
 for the cautious delicacy used in communicating the matter to me. 
 As every oath should be a free act of the mind, founded on the 
 conviction of its propriety, I would not wish, in any instance, 
 that there should be the least degree of compulsion exercised ; 
 nor to interpose my opinion, in order to induce any to make it, 
 of whom it is required. The gentlemen, therefore, who signed 
 the paper, will use their own discretion in the matter, and swear 
 or not swear, as their conscience and feelings dictate. 
 
 1 i At the same time, I cannot but consider it as a circumstance 
 of some singularity, that the scruples against the oath should be 
 peculiar to the officers of one brigade, and so very extensive. 
 The oath in itself is not new. It is substantially the same with 
 that required in all governments, and, therefore, does not imply 
 any indignity ; and it is perfectly consistent with the professions, 
 actions, and implied engagements of every officer. The objection 
 founded on the supposed unsettled rank of the officers, is of no 
 validity, rank being only mentioned as a further designation of 
 the party swearing ; nor can it be seriously thought that the oath 
 is either intended to prevent, or can prevent, their being pro 
 moted, or their resignation. 
 
 " The fourth objection, stated by the gentlemen, serves as a key 
 to their scruples ; and I would willingly persuade myself, that 
 their own reflections will point out to them the impropriety of 
 the whole proceeding, and not suffer them to be betrayed in 
 future into a similar conduct. I have a regard for them all, and 
 cannot but regret that they were ever engaged in the measure. 
 I am certain they will regret it themselves, sure I am, that they 
 ought. I am, my dear Marquis, Your affectionate friend and 
 servant." 
 
 No further action appears to have been taken upon this 
 subject by the officers who signed the memorial, and the 
 incident terminated, so far as we know, with this letter 
 from General Washington to M. de La Fayette. 
 
1778.] RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY. 343 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, AND BATTLE OF 
 MONMOUTH. 
 
 THE uncertainty of communication by letter between 
 Europe and America at this period of the Revolution 
 was a source of great anxiety to M. de La Fayette. 
 Many weeks, and even months, passed away without 
 bringing him news from his wife and children, whose 
 welfare was constantly in his thoughts. His longing to 
 hear from them became so great at times as to cause 
 him mental suffering which far outweighed the privations 
 to which he was subjected, in common with all the army, 
 at Valley Forge. Of these latter he never complained ; 
 but the uncertainty as to his family, whether they were 
 well, whether his second child was born, whether it was 
 a son or a daughter, the thousand questions that suggest 
 themselves to a father s heart in a long absence from 
 home, made the distance across the Atlantic seem to him 
 unlimited in its immensity, and caused the days to lag 
 interminably as they passed by. " Strive at least," he 
 wrote to Mine, de La Fayette, " to give me some con 
 solation. Do not neglect a single opportunity of sending 
 me word of yourself. I have not had news of any one 
 for millions of centuries ! My situation is a cruel one 
 indeed, in this frightful ignorance of all those who are 
 dear to me." l His own letters to France, as also those 
 written to him from home, were sent as occasion offered ; 
 sometimes by French officers returning home, or by those 
 coming to America, sometimes by the hands of private 
 
 1 Correspondance de La Fayette, i. 169. 
 
344 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 gentlemen crossing the ocean, or by ship-captains whose 
 vessels were going directly to ports from which letters 
 could be forwarded, or even by means so extremely 
 uncertain that there was but the merest chance of their 
 arriving at their destination. Aside from accidental 
 delay, from possible negligence upon the part of the 
 numerous carriers to whom letters were confided, and 
 from actual loss, there was always the danger of cap 
 ture at sea to be taken into account by any vessel enter 
 ing or leaving the American ports. In view of the ever- 
 present likelihood of falling in with British cruisers, La 
 Fayette said, 1 " I never write a word to send to Europe 
 without feeling sad for the destiny that awaits it. And 
 certainly, in this regard, I work more for Lord Howe 
 than for any one of my friends." It is remarkable, under 
 the circumstances, that so many letters arrived as we 
 know to have done so ; for, while many undoubtedly were 
 lost, possibly the greater number, yet the published cor 
 respondence of M. de La Fayette shows that those in 
 tended for him occasionally finished their long and cir 
 cuitous voyages and came to his hand. An interesting 
 example of this method of correspondence is thus de 
 scribed by M. de La Fayette himself in writing to his 
 wife from the camp at Whitemarsh : 2 
 
 i You will receive this letter, perhaps, in the course of five or 
 six years, for I am writing to you by an indirect opportunity of 
 which I have no great hopes. Fancy the long journey that my 
 letter will have to make. An officer of the army will take it to 
 Fort Pitt, three hundred miles in the interior of the continent ; 
 thence it will be sent by a boat down the great Ohio Biver, through 
 a country inhabited only by savages ; when once it reaches New 
 Orleans, a little vessel will take it to the Spanish Islands ; from 
 there a ship belonging to that nation will carry it, God knows 
 when, whenever it goes back to Europe. Even then it will be 
 
 1 To the Due D Ayen : Correspondance de La Fayette, i. 124. 
 
 2 Correspondance de La Fayette, i. 115. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 345 
 
 a long way from you ; and only after passing through the sticky 
 hands of all the Spanish postmen will it be able to cross the 
 Pyrenees. It may have been opened and sealed half a dozen times 
 before coming to you ; but then, at last, it will give proof to my 
 dear heart that I neglect no opportunity, even the most remote, 
 to send news to her of myself and to repeat to her how much I 
 love her." 
 
 Whilst he was upon the road toward the camp at Valley 
 Forge, in December, 1777, La Fayette received the news 
 of the birth of his second daughter, Anastasie, 1 which 
 had taken place at Paris on the 1st of July, 1777 ; and, 
 although he appears to have wished very earnestly for a 
 son at that time, to inherit his name and his title, as well 
 as to add lustre to the house of Noailles, this event gave 
 him exceeding pleasure. His letters show the joy that 
 filled his heart at the thought of " embracing his two 
 little girls" upon his return home. Unfortunately, how 
 ever, there was sad news on the way for him. He learned, 
 soon afterward, of the death of his eldest daughter, Hen 
 riette. La Fayette loved this child fondly ; he spoke 
 of her constantly in writing to Mine, de La Fayette, he 
 sent affectionate messages to her, and asked to be told of 
 her, how she was growing, whether she remembered him, 
 picturing to himself the while what happiness he should 
 have in taking her into his arms again, the little 
 daughter who was to be not only his companion, but 
 his best friend, for life. " For you know I am very 
 fond of telling news," he wrote. 2 " I beg you to be so, 
 dear heart, in everything you say about me to Hen- 
 riette, my poor little Henriette ; kiss her a thousand 
 times for me, talk to her of me ; but do not tell her all 
 the ill of me that I deserve. I shall be punished enough 
 if she does not recognize me when I return. That shall 
 be the penance that Henriette shall impose upon me." 
 
 1 Afterward Madame Charles de Latour-Maubourg. 
 
 2 Correspond a nee de La Fayette, i. 100. 
 
346 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1773. 
 
 And again, 1 " I am sure I shall find my poor little Hen- 
 riette very gentle and attractive when I return. I hope 
 she will scold me well, and that she will talk to me with all 
 the freedom of friendship ; for my daughter will always 
 be, I hope, the best friend I have. I shall want to be a 
 father only in the sense of loving her, and my paternal 
 affection will adjust itself perfectly to the relation of close 
 friendship between us." 
 
 The death of this child was a heavy blow to him. In 
 his intense sorrow he wrote to Mme. de La Fayette from 
 Valley Forge, 2 " How terrible my separation has become ! 
 I have never felt before the horror of my situation. 
 My heart is full of my own grief, and of yours which I 
 was not with you to share ; and the great length of time 
 that elapsed before I heard this news adds to my distress. 
 Imagine, my dear heart, my cruel situation : whilst I 
 mourn for the one I have lost, I tremble for the safety 
 of those who are still left to me. The distance from 
 Europe to America never seemed so immense to me as 
 it does now. The dreadful loss of our child is in my 
 thoughts every moment of the day. This news came to 
 me immediately after that of the treaty, and whilst I was 
 bowed down with grief I had to accept congratulations 
 and take part in the public rejoicing." 
 
 Early in the morning of the 18th of June, 1778, Sir 
 Henry Clinton with the British army evacuated Philadel 
 phia. Having crossed the Delaware River to Gloucester, 
 he set out upon his line of march through New Jersey 
 toward New York ; his force was divided into two col 
 umns, one of which he led himself and the other was 
 under Lieutenant-General Knyphausen, aggregating some 
 seventeen thousand effective men, with artillery, full mili 
 tary equipment, and an immense baggage-train which 
 
 1 Correspondance de La Fayette, i. 114. 
 2 16th June, 1778 : Ibid., i/177. 
 
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1778.] AND BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 347 
 
 stretched for nearly twelve miles along the country roads. 
 Proceeding by way of Haddonfield, Mount Holly, and 
 Crosswicks, he advanced to Allentown and Imlaytown, 
 where he arrived a week later, having marched in that 
 time only about forty miles. It was impossible, up to that 
 point, for the American Commander-in-Chief to deter 
 mine with accuracy the purpose of the British general ; 
 for until he should have passed beyond Allentown there 
 were two roads open to him, the one leading directly to 
 Amboy, and the other, more circuitous, to Sandy Hook. 
 Nor was it less difficult to decide from the appearance of 
 his army what policy he intended to adopt, whether 
 to retreat silently to join the garrison at New York, or 
 to open hostilities in an active campaign. The slowness 
 of his march might indicate the latter purpose, from one 
 point of view ; for, while his progress was unquestionably 
 retarded by the weather, which was rainy at that time and 
 exceedingly hot, yet there were details of his movement 
 that appeared to indicate an intention of bringing on a 
 general engagement in New Jersey with the American 
 army. As an alternative to this, it was believed by some 
 that he aimed at an occupation of the passes through 
 the highlands along the Hudson River. 
 
 General Washington, who was fully on the alert as to 
 every movement of the enemy, summoned his generals to 
 a council of war, at Valley Forge, on the 17th of June, 
 as soon as it became evident that an operation of some im 
 portance was about to be undertaken from Philadelphia. 
 To this council he submitted the questions, whether any 
 enterprise ought to be attempted against the enemy at 
 once ; whether the army should retain its present posi 
 tion until the completed evacuation of Philadelphia, or 
 should immediately cross the Delaware ; whether, if the 
 enemy should march through New Jersey, it would be 
 prudent to attack them on their road, or whether it were 
 deemed better to advance directly to the Hudson River in 
 
348 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 order to secure the communication between New England 
 and the other States ; finally, whether, in the event of 
 overtaking the enemy in New Jersey, a partial or a gen 
 eral attack should be made. The opinions given by the 
 general officers were so varied in their conclusions that 
 General Washington requested each to reply in writing 
 upon the following day. This was done accordingly, but 
 by that time the movement of the British into New Jersey 
 had become known, and the question for consideration was 
 whether they should be attacked upon the march. Most 
 of the officers were opposed to an attack, on account of the 
 inequality of force ; prominent among whom was General 
 Charles Lee, then second in command, whose insidious 
 arguments, no doubt, influenced many of them, and whose 
 treacherous proceeding already begun came very near being 
 the means, a short time afterward, of bringing immeasu 
 rable disaster upon the Continental army, at Monmouth. 
 
 In spite of Lee s attempts, however, to deter American 
 soldiers from attacking their enemy in the field when the 
 interests of their country presented an opportunity for its 
 defence, the Commander-in-Chief held to his purpose of 
 carrying on the war by fighting the British as he had 
 done before ; and he was supported in this decision by 
 General Greene, General Wayne, General Cadwalader, 
 and the Marquis de La Fayette. He determined to follow 
 Sir Henry Clinton into New Jersey and to attack him if 
 an opportunity should present. He ordered General 
 Philemon Dickinson, who was then collecting the New 
 Jersey militia, to begin active operations immediately in 
 order to impede the British army, by destroying bridges 
 ahead of it, by felling trees across the roads, and by em 
 barrassing it in every other possible manner upon its 
 march ; and General Maxwell was sent forward with a 
 New Jersey brigade to assist him in this operation. Gen 
 eral Washington set out with the main body of the army 
 from Valley Forge on the 19th of June, and proceeded to 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 349 
 
 the Delaware River, which he crossed on the 22d at 
 Cory-ell s Ferry ; and upon the following day he took 
 up a strong position on the eastern side of the river, at 
 Hopewell. He had ordered General Lee on the 18th to 
 set out with three brigades, ahead of the army, to cross at 
 Coryell s Ferry and to halt at the first strong position 
 after passing the Delaware, till further orders, unless he 
 should receive authentic intelligence that the enemy had 
 proceeded by a direct route to South Amboy, or still 
 lower ; in which event he was to march to the North 
 River. 1 He also directed General Wayne, with two Penn 
 sylvania regiments and the brigade formerly of General 
 Conway, to follow General Lee s division to Coryell s 
 Ferry, leaving a proper distance between the two com 
 mands, so that they should not interfere with each other. 2 
 The remainder of the army left Valley Forge in three 
 divisions, the first of which, composed of General Wood- 
 ford s and General Scott s brigades and the North Caro 
 lina brigade, was commanded by the Marquis de La 
 Fayette ; the other two were under the Baron de Kalb 
 and Lord Stirling, respectively. 
 
 When General Washington had crossed the Delaware 
 with his army and had taken his position in Hopewell 
 Township, about five miles from Princeton, Sir Henry 
 Clinton was encamped in the neighborhood of Allentown, 
 a little to the east of the river, upon the road leading 
 toward Amboy. On the 24th of June, Washington de 
 tached a considerable force to reconnoitre the enemy s 
 position and to harass them upon their flanks and in 
 the rear, by which disposition Colonel Morgan s corps was 
 directed to gain their right flank, General Maxwell to 
 hang upon the left, and General Scott to gall their left 
 flank and rear, while General Cadwalader, with two or 
 
 1 Postscript to General Lee s Instructions : Lee Papers, New York His 
 torical Society, ii. 407. 
 
 2 Instructions to General Wayne : Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 411. 
 
350 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 three hundred Continental troops and his volunteers, ad 
 vanced directly in the rear. 1 Upon the same day, in 
 order to decide what course to pursue from this point, in 
 view of the positions of the two armies, Washington called 
 a council of war, to which he submitted the question 
 whether it were advisable to hazard a general action, and, 
 if so, whether it should be brought on by an immediate 
 general attack, by a partial attack, or by taking such a 
 position as must compel the enemy to become the assail 
 ants. Here again, as before at Valley Forge, General 
 Lee, who appears to have been desperate in his attempt 
 to secure for the British army an undisturbed passage 
 through New Jersey, vehemently denounced the policy 
 of attacking it ; with great eloquence and skilful ad 
 dress he argued that instead of molesting the retreating 
 enemy it would be the part of wisdom to help them for 
 ward, even to build a bridge of gold to let them pass ; 
 that the United States were just upon the threshold of a 
 powerful foreign alliance, which ought to be fostered and 
 encouraged in every possible way, and that that was not 
 the moment in which everything should be placed at the 
 hazard of a single throw ; and, besides this, the British 
 army had never before been so well disciplined, nor so 
 dangerous to attack. In conclusion, he proposed that the 
 American forces should advance immediately to White 
 Plains. 2 
 
 The boldness and plausibility of his harangue carried 
 with him, as upon the former occasion, the sentiment of 
 very many of the officers present, especially of Lord Stir 
 ling and of the brigadier-generals ; so that the council of 
 war gave its decision against the policy of attack. The 
 Marquis de La Fayette, however, stood manfully by the 
 other view. His turn to speak came late in the council, 
 after the others had given their opinions ; but he presented 
 
 1 To General Dickinson : Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 417. 
 
 2 La Fayette, Memoires de ma Main, i. 50. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 351 
 
 his arguments with great earnestness in favor of striking 
 a blow at an enemy who were retiring before them, only a 
 clay s march from the army, and he appealed, with the 
 whole force of his soldierly instincts aroused, to American 
 honor, patriotism, and gallantry not to allow an opportu 
 nity such as that to pass unimproved ; it would be a shame 
 to the leaders of the army, he said, and a humiliation 
 to the soldiers, if the British could traverse the whole 
 country of New Jersey unmolested ; they ought to be 
 pursued, in any event, and, if nothing more were done, 
 their rear-guard ought to be attacked ; the army should 
 manoeuvre in such a manner as to take advantage of posi 
 tion, and watch for a possible separation of forces to cut 
 off detachments, and, if an opportunity presented itself, 
 to strike. He won the support of a few officers, though 
 the majority voted with General Lee. That same evening 
 he continued his arguments before General Washington, 
 in presence of several of the officers, and upon that occa 
 sion he was seconded by General Greene and Colonel 
 Alexander Hamilton. 
 
 The council of war had not agreed to General Lee s 
 proposal to advance to White Plains ; on the contrary, 
 although it decided against a general attack upon the 
 enemy, it favored the reinforcement of the troops then 
 upon the British left flank, by fifteen hundred men, to 
 serve as occasion might offer. Thereupon General Scott 
 was immediately sent forward to the lines with that force ; 
 and upon the following day, the 2oth of June, the army 
 advanced to Kingston. General Washington s purpose, 
 which he maintained through all the wavering opinions 
 of his officers, with that exalted self-possession which never 
 forsook him, was to engage the enemy. Their superior 
 discipline and equipment were no arguments to induce 
 him to stand idly by and look on with his army in order 
 that a hostile British force might quietly traverse one of 
 the American States. He felt no inclination to provide 
 
352 KETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 them with a bridge of gold. His determination was fixed, 
 to act at once, upon his own responsibility if need be, and 
 upon his own judgment of what was right. His views in 
 this direction began to influence some of his generals upon 
 whom he relied, and who were now ready to sustain him. 
 
 On the 25th of June, word was brought to him that Sir 
 Henry Clinton had moved forward from Allentown and 
 was marching in the direction of Monmouth Court-House ; 
 whereupon, with a view to strengthening his advanced 
 forces upon the lines, he ordered General Wayne forward 
 with a detachment of one thousand selected troops. With 
 this addition, the American force then operating against 
 the enemy, in advance of the main army, aggregated be 
 tween four and five thousand men ; and it had become of 
 such importance, from its position and its character, as 
 well as from the circumstances governing his situation, 
 that Washington determined to appoint a major-general 
 to take command of it. This duty fell by right of rank 
 to General Lee, who declined it. General Washington 
 thereupon appointed the Marquis de La Fayette to take 
 command. 
 
 His instructions were as follows : l 
 
 "To THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE: 
 
 "Sin, You are immediately to proceed with the detachment 
 commanded by General Poor, and form a junction as expeditiously 
 as possible with that under the command of General Scott. You 
 are to use the most eifectual means for gaining the enemy s left 
 flank and rear, and giving them every degree of annoyance. All 
 Continental parties, that are already on the lines, will be under 
 your command, and you will take such measures, in concert with 
 General Dickinson, as will cause the enemy the greatest impedi 
 ment and loss in their march. For these purposes you will attack 
 them as occasion may require by detachment, and, if a proper 
 opening should be given, by operating against them with the 
 whole force of your command. You will naturally take such pre 
 cautions, as will secure you against surprise, and maintain your 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, v. 417. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 353 
 
 communication with this army. Given at Kingston, this 25th day 
 of June, 1778. " 
 
 General de La Fayette received this order with great 
 pleasure. It accorded with his opinion expressed in the 
 council of war ; it offered him an opportunity which he 
 had earnestly desired ever since he came to America, to 
 command an active force against the enemy in the field, 
 and opened the way to distinction if he should succeed in 
 acquitting himself acceptably ; besides this, he was acting 
 under the immediate supervision of General Washington 
 in carrying out a plan which the Commander-in-Chief 
 had himself prepared and as to the success of which he 
 felt very great solicitude. Successful management upon 
 this occasion would have meant much even to any of the 
 more experienced officers of the army ; it meant every 
 thing to an ambitious young soldier like La Fayette. 
 Certainly no offer could have been more flattering. He 
 seized it gladly, and set out at once with his detachment 
 upon the course marked out in his instructions. 
 
 By the evening of the same day he had advanced to 
 Cranberry, whence he wrote to General Washington as 
 follows : l 
 
 11 CRANBERRY, half-past nine o clock. 
 
 " [25th] June, 1778. 
 
 "DEAR GENERAL, Inclosed I have the honor to send you a 
 letter which Colonel Hamilton was going to send me from this 
 place when I arrived with the detachment, and which may give 
 yon an idea of the position of the enemy. I will try to meet and 
 collect as soon as possible our forces, tho I am sorry to find the 
 enemy so far down that way. We will be obliged to march pretty 
 fast, if we want to attack them. It is for that I am particularly 
 concerned about provisions. I send back immediately for the 
 purpose, and beg you would give orders to have them forwarded 
 as speedily as possible, and directed to march fast, for I believe 
 we must set out early to-morrow morning. The detachment is 
 in a wood, covered by Cranberry Creek, and I believe extremely 
 
 1 Lee Papers, New York Historical Society, ii. 415. 
 )L. I. 23 
 
354 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 safe. We want to be very well furnished with spirits as a long 
 and quick march may be found necessary, and if General Scott s 
 detachment is not provided, it should be furnished also with 
 liquor ; but the provisions of this detachment are the most neces 
 sary to be sent as soon as possible, as we expect them to march. 
 
 "If anything new comes to my knowledge, I will immediately 
 write your Excellency, and I will send an express in the morning. 
 
 "I have the honor to be &c. 
 
 " LAFAYETTE. 
 
 "I wish also we could get some axes, but it should not stop the 
 so important affairs of provisions. " 
 
 The letter from Colonel Hamilton which La Fayette 
 enclosed in the foregoing was as follows : 
 
 " 25 June, 1778. 
 
 "SiR, We find on our arrival here that the intelligence re 
 ceived on the road is true. The enemy have all filed off from 
 Allen Town, on the Monmouth Eoad. Their rear is said to be a 
 mile westward of Lawrence Taylor s tavern, six miles from Allen 
 Town. General Maxwell is at Hyde s Town, about three miles 
 from this place. General Dickinson is said to be on the enemy s 
 right flank ; but where, cannot be told. We can hear nothing 
 certain of General Scott 5 but, from circumstances he is probably 
 at Allen Town. We shall, agreeably to your request, consider 
 and appoint some proper place of rendezvous for the union of our 
 force, which we shall communicate to Generals Maxwell and Scott, 
 and to yourself. In the meantime I would recommend to you to 
 move toward this place as soon as the convenience of your men 
 will permit. I am told that Colonel Morgan is on the enemy s 
 right flank. We had a slight skirmish with their rear this fore 
 noon, at Eobert Montgomery s, on the Monmouth Eoad, leading 
 from Allen Town. We shall see General Maxwell immediately, 
 and you will hear from us again. Send this to the General after 
 reading it. 
 
 "I am your ob t Serv t, 
 
 "ALEX. HAMILTON. 
 
 "DOCTOR STILE S HOUSE, CRANBERRY TOWN, 9 o clock. 
 "We are just informed that General Scott passed by Hooper s 
 Tavern, five miles from Allen Town, this afternoon at five o clock. 
 
 La Fayette was in excellent spirits, advancing upon the 
 enemy, who were then but a short distance ahead of him, 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 355 
 
 moving toward Monmouth Court-House : full of anima 
 tion at the thought of engaging them, his only fear 
 was that he might not be able to come up with them; 
 but he determined, at all events, to push forward. He 
 wrote again to General Washington, early the following 
 morning, 1 
 
 " AT CRANBERRY, 5 o clock, June [20th], 1778. 
 
 "DEAR GENERAL, I have received your orders for marching 
 as fast as I could, and I have marched without waiting for the 
 provisions tho we want them extremely. General Forman and 
 Colonel Hamilton sat out last night to meet the other troops and 
 we shall be together at Hidestown or somewhat lower. General 
 Forman is firmly of opinion that we may overtake the enemy, 
 for my part I am not so quiet upon the subject as he is, but his 
 sentiment is of great weight on account of his knowledge of the 
 country. It is highly pleasant to me to be followed and coun 
 tenanced by the army that if we stop the enemy and meet with 
 some advantage they may push it with vigor. I have no doubt 
 but if we overtake them we possess a very happy chance. How 
 ever, I would not have the army quite so near as not to be quite 
 master of its motions, but a very little distance may do it. I have 
 heard nothing of the enemy this morning. An officer of militia 
 Says, that after they had pitched their tents yesterday night, they 
 struck them again. But I am inclined to believe they did not 
 go farther, and that the man who brought the intelligence was 
 mistaken. I expect some at Hidestown which I will immediately 
 forward to you. I beg when your Excellency will write to me, that 
 you could let me know the place you have reached, that I might 
 govern myself accordingly. 
 
 u With the highest respect I have the honor to be &c. 
 
 "LAFAYETTE." 
 
 Up to this point the movement against the British army 
 had been carried out precisely as General Washington in 
 tended, in execution of the plan which he had decided 
 upon after concluding to assume the offensive, namely, 
 to press so closely upon the enemy s flanks and in their 
 rear as to annoy and impede them as much as possible 
 
 1 Lee Papers, New York Historical Society, ii. 416. 
 
356 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 by the strong detachment thrown out ahead of his main 
 body, now acting under the Marquis de La Fayette, 
 whilst he should follow closely enough behind to maintain 
 constant communication, in order that if the enterprise 
 of the advanced force should lead to a counter-movement 
 upon the British side and should result in a general en 
 gagement, which was very probable, he might come to its 
 support at once with his entire strength and thus attack 
 Sir Henry Clinton with the whole American army. The 
 difficulty of manoeuvring a retreating force through that 
 part of New Jersey, over roads that necessarily presented 
 many serious obstacles, especially in view of the impedi 
 ment to the British army presented by its enormous 
 baggage-train, which would require almost half its avail 
 able force to protect, gave the American commander rea 
 sonable ground to hope for a happy issue to the event. 
 
 But at this point General Charles Lee, who was the 
 controlling influence and at the same time the evil genius 
 of the battle of Monmouth, interrupted the plan. It is 
 not easy to determine his precise motive in the step that 
 he took, whether it was personal jealousy of the credit 
 which La Fayette was likely to obtain from the expedi 
 tion, in a command which he might have held himself if 
 he would, that aroused him to the purpose of defeating the 
 younger general s prospects now that they were bright 
 ening visibly as the campaign progressed, or whether he 
 became alarmed at the vigorous hostility with which he 
 saw that the enemy was about to be pursued and would 
 certainly be attacked, in spite of his utmost exertions in 
 the councils and in the camp to prevent it. The proba 
 bility is that both these feelings agitated his wayward 
 spirit, and fired him with selfishness and envious hate on 
 the one hand, whilst they drove him, on the other, into 
 the stubborn determination of carrying out his secret 
 purpose by an act of deliberate treachery. He had no 
 love for La Fayette ; for in their views upon the progress 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 357 
 
 of the war they were so entirely opposed to each other 
 that they could not become intimate friends, and Lee was 
 a man who was by nature intensely jealous of other men s 
 success. 1 He hated and opposed Washington throughout 
 his whole career in the army. He longed for the chief 
 command himself, and it was the hope of obtaining this, 
 probably as much as anything else, that induced him to 
 serve in America. He was an Englishman by birth, 
 by education, by early military training, and he always 
 remained an Englishman in sympathy. To have lived 
 upon an estate in England, as an English gentleman, 
 would have fulfilled his ideal of happiness. As it was, 
 his heart was not in the war ; he would gladly have 
 aided the Commissioners to effect a reconciliation, and he 
 was determined to secure for the British army, by every 
 means that lay within his power, an undisturbed passage 
 through New Jersey in this summer of 1778. The first 
 move to make, therefore, at this time, was to stop the 
 progress of La Fayette ; otherwise it would be too late. 
 
 Lee acted upon this impulse immediately, by asking 
 of General Washington the command of the advanced 
 forces, which had been his in the beginning by senior 
 ity. He wrote as follows to the Commander-in-Chief : 2 
 
 "CAMP, AT KINGSTON, 25 June, 1778. 
 
 "DEAR GENERAL, When I first assented to the Marquis de 
 Lafayette s taking the command of the present detachment, I 
 confess I viewed it in a very different light from that in which I 
 view it at present. I considered it as a more proper business 
 of a young, volunteering general, than of the second in command 
 in the army ; but I find it is considered in a different manner. 
 They say that a corps consisting of six thousand men, the greater 
 part chosen, is undoubtedly the most honorable command next to 
 the Commander-in-Chief, that my ceding it would of course have 
 
 1 " Son visage etait laid, son esprit mordant, son cceur ambitienx et avare, 
 son caractere incompatible, et toute sa personne originale." Mmoires de 
 ma Main, i. 49. 
 
 2 Lee Papers, New York Historical Society, ii. 417. 
 
358 KETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 an odd appearance. I must entreat, therefore, after making a 
 thousand apologies for the trouble my rash assent has occasioned 
 you, that, if this detachment does march, I may have the com 
 mand of it. So far personally ; but, to speak as an officer, I do 
 not think that this detachment ought to march at all, until at 
 least the head of the enemy s right column has passed Cranberry ; 
 then, if it is necessary to march the whole army, I cannot see any 
 impropriety in the Marquis s commanding this detachment, or a 
 greater, as an advanced guard of the army ; but if this detach 
 ment, with Maxwell s corps, Scott s Morgan s and Jackson s, is to 
 be considered as a separate, chosen, active corps, and put under 
 the Marquis s command until the enemy leave the Jerseys, both 
 myself and Lord Stirling will be disgraced. 
 
 "I am, dear General, Yours &c. 
 
 " CHARLES LEE." 
 
 Of course it was not a new discovery made now by 
 General Lee that the advanced corps consisted of a body 
 of select troops which the Commander-in-Chief designed 
 to concentrate for active operations, under the command 
 of a major-general. As second in command in the army, 
 he was perfectly acquainted with what was taking place ; 
 and, besides, he was watching the conduct of this cam 
 paign as keenly as any other man in America. He had a 
 special design in doing so. He had begun, even before 
 the army moved out of Valley Forge, to put into ex 
 ecution this design, to shield the enemy, by trying to 
 induce General Washington to draw off into the interior 
 of Pennsylvania, along the Susquehanna River, upon an 
 ingeniously contrived falsehood that Lee believed the 
 British would move toward the south in the direction 
 of the Head of Elk upon evacuating Philadelphia ; by 
 which reasoning, however, the Commander-in-Chief was 
 not in the slightest degree deceived. General Lee had 
 labored strenuously afterward in the councils of war to 
 prevent an attack upon the British during their march. 
 He had refused to command the advanced detachment, 
 probably with the specific determination of not making 
 the attack himself; and he now asked for the command 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 359 
 
 in order to prevent the attack from being made by some 
 body else. That this was his purpose, is evident from his 
 subsequent conduct in the action. After having made 
 his request to General Washington, he appealed to the 
 Marquis de La Fayette to give up the command, saying 
 to him, " I place my fortune and my honor in your hands ; 
 you are too generous to destroy both the one and the 
 other." l 
 
 La Fayette s unselfish conduct throughout this affair 
 does the highest honor to the qualities of his heart and 
 mind. He was proud of his command ; yet in the face 
 of this appeal he consented to give it up, and he sent 
 word at once to General Washington that he would 
 serve under General Lee. A little later in the morning 
 of the 26th, upon which, as we have seen, he had written 
 to the Commander-in-Chief at five o clock from Cran 
 berry, he wrote again as follows : 2 
 
 " ICETOWN [HronTSTOWN], 26th June, 1778. 
 " at a quarter after seven. 
 
 "DEAR GENERAL I hope you have received my letter from 
 Cranberry, where I acquaint you that I am going to Ice Town, 
 though we are short of provisions. When I got there I was sorry 
 to hear that Mr. Hamilton, who had been riding all the night, had 
 not been able to find anybody who could give him certain intel 
 ligence ; but by a party who came back, I hear the enemy are 
 in motion, and their rear about one mile off the place they had 
 occupied last night, which is seven or eight miles from here. I 
 immediately put Generals Maxwell and Wayne s brigades in 
 motion, and I will fall lower down, with General Scott s, with 
 Jackson s regiment, and some militia. I should be very happy 
 if we could attack them before they halt, for I have no notion 
 of taking one other moment but this of the march. If I cannot 
 overtake them, we could lay at some distance, and attack to 
 morrow morning, provided they don t escape in the night, which 
 I much fear, as our intelligences are not the best ones. I have 
 sent some parties out, and I will get some more light by them. 
 
 1 Me 1 moires de ma Main, i. 51. 
 
 2 La Fayette s Correspondence, American edition, i. 178. 
 
360 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 "I fancy your excellency will move clown with the army, and 
 if we are at a convenient distance from you, I have nothing to 
 fear in striking a blow if opportunity is offered. I believe that, 
 in our present strength, provided they do not escape, we may do 
 something. 
 
 " General Forman says that, on account of the nature of the 
 country, it is impossible for me to be turned by the right or left, 
 but that I shall not quite depend upon. 
 
 " An officer just from the lines confirms the account of the 
 enemy moving. An intelligence from General Dickinson says 
 that they hear a very heavy fire in the front of the enemy s 
 column. I apprehend it is Morgan, who had not received my 
 letter, but it will have the good effect of stopping them, and if 
 we attack, he may begin again. 
 
 "Sir, I want to repeat to you in writing what I have told to 
 you, which is, that if you believe it, or if it is believed neces 
 sary or useful to the good of the service and the honour of Gen 
 eral Lee, to send him down with a couple of thousand men, or 
 any greater force ; I will cheerfully obey and serve him, not 
 only out of duty, but out of what I owe to that gentleman s 
 character. 
 
 "I hope to receive, soon, your orders as to what I am to do this 
 day or to-morrow, to know where you are and what you intend, 
 and would be happy to furnish you with the opportunity of com 
 pleting some little advantage of ours. 
 
 " LAFAYETTE. 
 
 "The road I understand the enemy are moving by, is the 
 straight road to Monmouth." 
 
 Upon the same day General Washington wrote, 1 
 
 " CRANBERRY, 26th June, 1778. 
 
 "MY DEAR MARQUIS, General Lee s uneasiness, on account 
 of yesterday s transaction, rather increasing than abating, and 
 your politeness in wishing to ease him of it, have induced me to 
 detach him from this army with a part of it, to reinforce, or at 
 least cover, the several detachments at present under your com 
 mand. At the same time, that I felt for General Lee s distress 
 of mind, I have had an eye to your wishes and the delicacy 
 of your situation ; and have, therefore, obtained a promise from 
 him, that when he gives you notice of his approach and coni- 
 
 1 La Fayette s Correspondence, American edition, i. 180. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 361 
 
 mand, he will request you to prosecute any plan you may have 
 already concerted for the purpose of attacking, or otherwise an 
 noying the enemy j this is the only expedient I could think of to 
 answer the views of both. General Lee seems satisfied with the 
 measure, and I wish it may prove agreeable to you, as I am, with 
 the warmest wishes for your honour and glory, and with the siii- 
 cerest esteem and affection 
 
 1 Your most obedient servant, 
 
 i l G WASHINGTON. > 
 
 At the same time he took occasion to send the following 
 to General Lee : l 
 
 "CRANBERRY, 26 June, 1778. 
 
 "DEAR SIR, Your uneasiness on account of the command of 
 yesterday s detachment fills me with concern, as it is not in my 
 power fully to remove it without wounding the feelings of the 
 Marquis de Lafayette. I have thought of an expedient, which 
 though not quite equal to the views of either of you, may in 
 some measure answer both ; and that is, to make another detach 
 ment from this army for the purpose of aiding and supporting 
 the several detachments now under command of the Marquis, 
 and giving you the command, of the whole, under certain restric 
 tions ; which the circumstances arising from your own conduct 
 yesterday render almost unavoidable. 
 
 "The expedient I would propose is, for you to march towards 
 the Marquis with Scott s and Varnum s brigades. Give him 
 notice, that you are advancing to support him, and that you are 
 to have command of the whole advanced body ; but, as he may 
 have formed some enterprise with the advice of the officers com 
 manding the several corps under his command, which will not 
 admit of delay or alteration, you will give him every assistance 
 and countenance in your power. This, as I have observed before, 
 is not quite the thing ; but may possibly answer, in some degree, 
 the views of both. That it may do so, and the public service 
 receive benefit from the measure, is the sincere wish of, dear Sir, 
 "Your most obedient servant, 
 
 "G WASHINGTON." 
 
 In the mean time, the Marquis de La Fayette was ad 
 vancing against the enemy, with enthusiasm for the work 
 
 1 Lee Papers, New York Historical Society, ii. 421. 
 
362 RETKEAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 that had been set, so happily in accordance with his 
 own most ardent desire, for him to perform. He was 
 almost upon the British ; and, although the lack of pro 
 visions had proved an extremely annoying hinderance to 
 his progress, he continued to strengthen his position, and 
 so to maintain communication with the main army, then 
 only a few miles away from him, that he began to an 
 ticipate the results of an attack which he would have 
 made upon the enemy s flanks and rear the following 
 day. If he had been permitted to do so, the history of 
 that campaign would doubtless have been a very different 
 page from the one we now read ; it is probable that the 
 whole war would have been influenced by it, and the 
 final result more quickly attained. For, under the cir 
 cumstances which governed him at that moment, Sir 
 Henry Clinton was in danger of being seriously crippled 
 in the action which threatened him ; and it was precisely 
 this that he had feared. 
 
 General Washington received the following report from 
 La Fayette on the afternoon of the 26th : l 
 
 "AT ROBINS s TAVERN, half past four. 
 " 26 June, 1778. 
 
 "DEAK GENERAL, I have received your excellency s favor 
 notifying your arrival at Cranberry, and am glad to have antici 
 pated your orders in not going too far. I have felt the unhappy 
 effects of the want of provisions, for I dare say if we had not 
 been stopped by it, as we were already within three miles of the 
 enemy s rear, we would very easily have overtaken them and 
 fought with advantage. 
 
 "I have consulted the general officers of the detachment, and 
 the general opinions seems to be that I should march in the night 
 near them, so as to attack the rear guard when on the march. 
 We have also spoken of a night attack. The latter seems dan 
 gerous. The former will perhaps give them time of escaping, as 
 it is impossible I would move quite close by them, at least nearer 
 than three miles. Col. Morgan is towards the right flank, Gen. 
 
 1 Lee s Papers, New York Historical Society, ii. 423. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 363 
 
 Dickinson is a little upon the left, Gens. Scott and Maxwell have 
 insisted upon going further down than we are now ; for Wayne s 
 and Jackson s corps they have not had provisions at all but will 
 be able to march in the night. I beg you would let me know your 
 intention and your opinion of the matter, my motions depend 
 much upon w r hat the army will do for countenancing them. I beg 
 you would be very particular upon what you think proper to be 
 done and what your excellency will do. I wish indeed you would 
 anticipate the different cases which may happen according to the 
 place where the enemy lays. Gen. Wayne, Col. Hamilton and 
 several officers have gone to reconnoitre it. I fancy they will lay 
 about seven or eight miles from here. Your Excellency knows 
 that by the direct road you are only three miles further from 
 Mon mouth than we are in this place. 
 
 "The enemy is said to march since this morning, with a great 
 confusion and fright. Some prisoners have been made, and de 
 serters come amazingly fast. I believe an happy blow would 
 have the happiest effect, and I always regret the time we have 
 lost by want of provisions. 
 
 1 c I beg you would answer to me immediately, and with the 
 highest respect I have the honor to be &c. 
 
 " LAFAYETTE." 
 
 General Washington had moved forward with the main 
 army from Kingston, where the baggage was left behind, 
 with the purpose of maintaining his distance from the ad 
 vanced corps under La Fayette in such a manner as to be 
 able to support it in case its presence upon the enemy s 
 rear should lead to an engagement ; and on the 26th of 
 June he was at Cranberry, whilst La Fayette had pro 
 ceeded along the Monmouth road to a point about five 
 miles distant from the British camp. The intense heat 
 of the weather, from which the troops were suffering, 
 and a storm that came on, prevented General Washing 
 ton from advancing beyond Cranberry as he had in 
 tended to do ; and, fearing that whilst his main body 
 remained at Cranberry the advanced corps would be 
 too far upon the right to make an attack, or to be sup 
 ported in case of an operation against it on the part 
 of the enemy, he sent an order, late in the afternoon 
 
364 RETKEAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 of that day, to the Marquis de La Fayette to file off by 
 his left toward Englishtown. 1 
 
 This order reached La Fayette too late for him to exe 
 cute it in the evening ; but he did so very early on the 
 morning of the 27th, having written the following letter 
 to General Washington to acknowledge the receipt of his 
 instructions : 2 
 
 "Half-past ten (P. M. 26th), June, 1778. 
 
 "DEAR GENERAL, Your orders have reached me so late and 
 found me in such a situation that it will be impossible to follow 
 them as soon as I could wish. It is not on account of any other 
 motive than the impossibility of moving the troops and making 
 such a march immediately, for in receiving your letter I have 
 given up the project of attacking the enemy, and I only wish to 
 join Gen. Lee. I was even going to set out, but all the Brigadiers, 
 Officers, &c. have represented that there was a material impossi 
 bility of moving troops in the situation where ours find themselves. 
 I do not believe Gen. Lee is to make any attack tomorrow, for 
 then I would have been directed to fall immediately upon them, 
 without making 11 miles entirely out of the way. I am here as 
 near as I will be at English Town. Tomorrow at two o clock I 
 will set off for that place. 
 
 "I do not know if Morgan s corps, the militia, &c. must be 
 brought along with the other part of the detachment. Gen. 
 Forman who don t approve much of that motion, says that our 
 right flank must be secured, unless to incur the most fatal conse 
 quences for the whole army. 
 
 i i I beg your pardon, Sir, if my letter is so badly written, but I 
 want to send it soon and to rest one or two hours. 
 "I have the honor to be &c. 
 
 " LAFAYETTE." 
 
 The disappointment of M. de La Fayette evident in 
 this letter was perhaps not unreasonable in view of his 
 circumstances at that moment ; for they obliged him to 
 give up at once all hope of making the attack upon the 
 enemy for which he had completed his plans during his 
 
 1 Washington to the President of Congress, 1st July, 1778 : Sparks, 
 Writings of Washington, v. 422. 
 
 2 Lee Papers, New York Historical Society, ii. 425. 
 
1778.] AXD BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 365 
 
 operations with the advanced force, and it was especially 
 hard for him to renounce that purpose at the moment 
 when his wishes appeared upon the point of being real 
 ized. The position of the enemy was then so well taken, 
 however, that it would have been out of the question 
 to attack them without the support of the whole Con 
 tinental army ; they had marched that day with extreme 
 caution, having placed all their baggage in front, and be 
 ing protected in the rear by a strong concentrated force, 
 with a rear-guard of a thousand men about four hundred 
 paces from the main body. They lay encamped on the 
 night of the 26th with their van slightly beyond Mon- 
 mouth Court-House, in a position in which both wings 
 were well protected. Colonel Alexander Hamilton, who 
 was with La Fayette, and who happened to be writing 
 to General Washington when the hitter s order arrived to 
 file off by the left, declared that " to attack them in this 
 situation, without being supported by the whole army, 
 would be folly in the extreme. ... If it should be 
 thought advisable to give the necessary support, the 
 army can move to some position near the enemy s left 
 Hank, which would put them in a very awkward situ 
 ation, with so respectable a body in their rear ; and it 
 would put it out of their power to turn either flank, 
 should they be so disposed." l 
 
 Nevertheless, La Fayette obeyed his orders implicitly, 
 and moved with his detachment before daylight, on the 
 morning of the 27th of June, to Englishtown, whither he 
 had been directed to proceed, it having become impos 
 sible to support him properly in his more remote position 
 on the Monmouth road when General Washington had 
 decided to advance from Cranberry by the road lead 
 ing to Englishtown. Besides this, it was Washington s 
 
 1 Hamilton to Washington, 2(3th June, 1778, Evening : Lee Papers, Xew 
 York Historical Society, ii. 424. 
 
366 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 intention to concentrate his forces as a matter of military 
 precaution, in view of his proximity to the enemy. 
 
 Upon arriving at Englishtown, La Fayette yielded the 
 command of the advanced detachment to General Lee, 
 under whom he then served until the crisis came upon 
 the following day at the battle of Monmouth. 
 
 This action, which took place upon the 28th of June, 
 1778, is the most confusing in its movements, and the 
 most difficult to present, or to follow in detail, of any of 
 the battles during the Revolutionary War ; chiefly, no 
 doubt, from the fact that it was not fought upon any 
 principle, or with regard to any general plan calculated 
 either from the disposition of the enemy, the nature of 
 the ground, or the advantages possessed by the Conti 
 nental army ; * the troops were allowed to waste their 
 efforts in small, disunited parties ; they were annoyed 
 and confused by conflicting orders; and, after having 
 been completely disorganized, they were thrown into an 
 unnecessary and, as it was justly called at the time, a 
 shameful retreat. It is a remarkable case, of a detach 
 ment in excellent spirits, fully prepared for action, and 
 almost within musket-shot of the enemy, suddenly turned 
 away, distracted and almost entirely destroyed, through 
 the treachery of its commander. 
 
 On the night of the 27th of June the positions of the 
 two armies were as follows. General Washington had 
 advanced with the main body of his troops along the road 
 leading to Englishtown, and was encamped about three 
 miles west of that place ; General Lee was at Englishtown 
 with his command ; Colonel Morgan s corps was very 
 close upon the enemy s right flank, while General Dickin 
 son, with the Jersey militia, was upon their left : 2 thus 
 
 1 J. Laurens to Henry Laurens, 30th June, 1778 : Simms, Correspondence 
 of J. Laurens, 195. 
 
 2 Washington to Congress, 1st July, 1778 : Sparks, Writings of Washington, 
 v. 424. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 367 
 
 the whole Continental force was so situated as to have 
 been readily concentrated for a general action, with its 
 advanced posts almost touching the enemy s flanks. The 
 British army was encamped in a strong position near 
 Monmouth Court-House, with its right wing extending 
 about a mile and a half beyond the court-house to the 
 junction of the roads leading toward Shrewsbury and 
 Middletown, and its left lying along the road from Allen- 
 town to Monmouth, the same that La Fayette had been 
 following the day before, extending about three miles to 
 the southwest of the court-house ; its best troops were 
 drawn up in the rear, consisting of the grenadiers, the 
 light infantry, and the chasseurs of the line ; each flank 
 was protected by a wood, with a marsh extending toward 
 the rear, and its whole front covered by a wood and for a 
 considerable extent to the left by a morass. 
 
 General Washington was convinced, from his knowledge 
 of the country and from the information obtained by him 
 upon the ground, that if the enemy succeeded in reach 
 ing the heights of Middletown, some ten or twelve miles 
 beyond their present position, they would be so strongly 
 posted that there would be no hope of a successful enter 
 prise against them. Thereupon he determined to attack 
 them in the rear the moment they should get in motion. 
 He informed General Lee of this intention, and ordered 
 him to prepare for an attack and to keep his troops con 
 stantly lying upon their arms to be in readiness at the 
 shortest notice. He took the same measures with the 
 troops composing the main body. 
 
 Whilst General Washington was giving these instruc 
 tions to General Lee, at head-quarters, on the afternoon 
 of the 27th of June, he invited General Wayne, General 
 Maxwell, General Scott, and the Marquis de La Fayette, 
 who were standing near by, to come forward to the place 
 where he was talking, and in their presence he announced 
 that he intended to have the enemy attacked the following 
 
368 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 morning by the troops under the command of General 
 Lee, and requested that officer to call his generals to 
 gether during the afternoon in order to agree upon some 
 concerted plan of action. General Lee assented to this, 
 and promised to meet them at his quarters at five o clock ; 
 after which they separated. General Scott, who appears 
 to have understood the hour appointed to be half-past 
 five, arrived at that time and was told that " General Lee 
 had rode out." General Wayne, however, with General 
 Maxwell and the Marquis de La Fayette, arrived at five 
 and met General Lee. They found his attitude one of 
 complete indifference as to the proposed movement; he 
 held no council with these general officers, he suggested 
 no plan to them, nor did he call upon them for informa 
 tion or for their opinions. He simply informed them that 
 he had nothing to recommend except that they should 
 not dispute as to rank in case he should order forward 
 either the right wing or the left to begin the action ; and 
 the conference lasted only a short time, for, as we have 
 seen, it was over when General Scott arrived half an 
 hour later. In the course of the evening General Scott 
 met General Lee, who told him substantially what he had 
 told the others, namely, that he had no orders, but that 
 they were not to dispute about rank. 1 
 
 It is clear that Lee had already determined to thwart 
 the purpose of the Commander-in-Chief, either by pre 
 venting an attack the next day upon the British army, 
 or, if an attack were made in spite of him, by causing 
 it to miscarry. 
 
 About five o clock in the morning of the 28th of June, 
 word was received at head-quarters that the enemy had 
 begun to march, whereupon General Washington imme 
 diately put his army in motion and sent an aide-de-camp 
 to General Lee directing him to move on and attack them, 
 
 1 Lee s Trial, New York Historical Society : Testimony of General Scott, 
 General Wayne, General Maxwell, and the Marquis de La Fayette. 
 
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1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 369 
 
 unless there should be some very powerful reasons to the 
 contrary ; he announced to him at the same time that 
 he was then marching to support him, and that in order 
 to do this more readily he had ordered his men to leave 
 their packs and blankets behind. 
 
 General Lee accordingly put his troops in motion from 
 the point occupied by him at Englishtown, and advanced 
 in an easterly direction along a road running through a 
 wood about a mile to the north of Moumouth Court- 
 House, and in the direction of the enemy s left flank, who 
 were then retiring from the court-house and moving also 
 in a general easterly direction. General Lee s forces were 
 distributed as follows. In front Colonel Butler, with 
 two hundred men ; then Colonel Jackson, with an equal 
 number ; Scott s brigade, with a part of Woodford s, six 
 hundred men, with two pieces of artillery ; General Yar- 
 num s, about the same number, with two pieces of artil 
 lery ; General Wayne s detachment of a thousand men, 
 with two pieces of artillery ; General Scott s detachment, 
 fourteen hundred men, with four pieces of artillery ; and 
 General Maxwell s, one thousand men, with two pieces of 
 artillery : in all, some five thousand men, with twelve 
 pieces of artillery, exclusive of the militia. 1 About eight 
 o clock in the morning, the van, under Colonel Butler, 
 arrived, toward the north and east of Monmouth Court- 
 House, upon the left flank of the enemy, who were then 
 in full march, moving in great haste and confusion. The 
 main body of General Lee s detachment was formed at 
 the edge of the wood, about half a mile distant north 
 ward from the court-house. At this point General Lee 
 ordered General Wayne to leave his own troops and to 
 take command of those in front, saying that it was a post 
 of honor, and also that, as the enemy were advancing, 
 he should come forward at once. When General Wayne 
 
 1 General Wayne s Testimony, Lee s Trial. 
 VOL. I. 24 
 
370 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 arrived at the front, in obedience to this order, he found 
 there drawn up about six hundred men of Scott s and 
 Woodford s brigades and of General Varnum s brigade, 
 with two pieces of artillery. Upon the reception of some 
 message from General Dickinson as to the enemy s move 
 ments, General Lee ordered a halt to be made here, and 
 shortly afterward he gave the order to advance ; but 
 they had not proceeded far before information reached 
 General Lee that the enemy were advancing toward him 
 at a right angle by a road that ran from the court-house 
 in a northerly direction toward the road he was then fol 
 lowing in the woods ; whereupon he formed some of his 
 men so as to face toward the court-house and to cover the 
 roads in the woods where his troops had advanced and 
 were formed. From there he ordered Colonel Butler with 
 his detachment, and Colonel Jackson with his, to continue 
 toward the front. Colonel Butler formed the advance 
 guard and marched on. The troops then took up the 
 line of march again and followed him until they arrived 
 near the edge of some open ground in view of the court 
 house, where they discovered a body of the enemy s horse 
 drawn up on the northeast side of the village, between 
 them and the court-house. General Lee immediately 
 ordered a halt, and faced some of his troops about so as 
 to make them front toward this body of horse, though 
 keeping the men well under cover of the woods. 
 
 Up to this point, General Lee had carried out the in 
 structions of the Commander-in-Chief, so far, at least, as 
 his actions gave any indication : he had put his troops in 
 motion, he had continued with them and directed their 
 advance, and he had come actually within sight of the 
 enemy. He appears, however, not to have gone be 
 yond this. The moment he had reached the position from 
 which it was intended that he should begin active opera 
 tions against the British army, and when all the circum 
 stances were propitious to the fulfilment of the plan pre- 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 371 
 
 pared by the Commander-in-Chief, General Lee stopped. 
 He never directed the attack to be made ; he did not 
 order a single gun to be fired. He gave the signal for 
 retreat. General Wayne afterward testified as to this 
 precise moment when the enemy s horse were discovered 
 on the road to the northeast of the court-house : 
 
 " General Lee and myself were advancing to reconnoitre the 
 enemy, and bad directed the horse and gentlemen with as to re 
 main under cover. In advancing a piece forward General Lee 
 received some message which stopped him. 
 
 "I went on to a place where I had a fair prospect from my 
 glass of the enemy. Their horse seemed so much advanced from 
 the foot, that I could hardly perceive the movement of the foot, 
 which induced me to send for Colonel Butler s detachment, and 
 Colonel Jackson s detachment, in order to drive their horse back. 
 I then detached part of Butler s people, who drove the horse into 
 the village, by which means I could perceive the enemy were 
 moving from us in very great disorder and confusion. This 
 intelligence I sent by one of my volunteer aids to General Lee, 
 requesting that the troops might be pushed on." 
 
 Shortly after this, General AVayne observed that the 
 enemy had made a halt and appeared to be forming in 
 some order, though they were not in much force as yet, 
 probably six hundred foot and about three hundred horse ; 
 he sent to General Lee to inform him of this and to 
 request again that the troops should be pushed on. One 
 of his aides returned with the order that General Wayne 
 should advance with Colonel Butler s detachment and 
 with that of Colonel Jackson, which had been sent for 
 ward, about four hundred men together, which he did ; 
 whereupon the enemy took up their line of march and 
 moved on. General Wayne crossed the morass about 
 three-quarters of a mile to the east and north of the 
 court-house, at the edge of a road leading to Middle- 
 town, near the road the enemy were marching upon, 
 when the latter halted and fired a field-piece ; the main 
 body of General Lee s troops was at that time still ad- 
 
372 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 vancing, and had arrived at the edge of the inorass some 
 what to the northeast of the court-house. 
 
 Colonel Butler s detachment being in the van, the 
 enemy advanced with about three hundred horse, sup 
 ported by about two hundred foot, and, with the purpose 
 of gaining his right flank, made a charge upon him ; but 
 Butler met them with so determined a resistance and so 
 well directed a fire that they broke and fell back. This 
 was the only encounter which Lee s troops had with the 
 enemy before the retreat, and in this the advantage was 
 decidedly in favor of the American arms. 
 
 General Wayne was looking anxiously now for the ex 
 pected support in order to follow up the advantage gained ; 
 and, believing that it would be sent forward to him at 
 once, he directed Colonel Butler to advance upon the 
 broken column of the enemy. Colonel Butler s force 
 being small, however, he had proceeded only about two 
 hundred yards when the British artillery opened fire 
 upon him with four pieces. In the mean time, General 
 Wayne, who was in the van with Colonel Butler, observed 
 that a force of the enemy, amounting, as he estimated, to 
 some eighteen hundred men, was inclining fast toward his 
 right, apparently with the intention of gaining a piece 
 of high ground nearly in front of the court-house, the 
 head of their column having halted there and formed, 
 and each detachment forming in succession as it came up. 
 He sent one of his aides immediately to order the rest of 
 his troops then in front of the morass to come forward, 
 while the American artillery began to reply to the British 
 fire from a point about half a mile in the rear of Butler s 
 detachment. To his surprise, his aide came back and 
 reported that the troops had been ordered to repass the 
 marsh in their rear, and that they were retiring over it. 
 General Wayne, at a loss to understand this movement, 
 galloped up to the Marquis de La Fayette who during 
 this time was serving as a volunteer, under the orders of 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 373 
 
 General Lee, with the selected troops of the advanced 
 detachment, and was at that moment near Colonel Living 
 ston s and Colonel Stewart s regiments and asked him 
 what he was going to do with the troops. General de La 
 Fayette replied that he had orders to cross the marsh, and 
 that he should form near the court-house and " from that 
 to the woods." Once more General Wayne hastily sent 
 an aide to General Lee, requesting that the troops might 
 be sent forward to his support ; but, as before, word was 
 returned to him that the troops were withdrawing from 
 him, that they had been ordered to retire from the court 
 house, and that they were now doing so ; and almost at 
 the same moment one of General Lee s aides rode up 
 and told him that it was not General Lee s purpose to 
 attack the enemy in front, but that he intended to cut 
 them off and was preparing to throw a detachment upon 
 their left. 
 
 General Scott and General Wayne then retired, with 
 their force, across the morass, leaving Colonel Butler 
 still to hold his post upon the enemy s flank ; and the 
 two generals rode to the court-house to reconnoitre the 
 ground. From there General Wayne sent Major Fish- 
 bourne to General Lee to request that the troops might at 
 least be returned to the position they had last abandoned, 
 which was in a ravine near the court-house, and to say 
 to the general that the number of the enemy did not ap 
 pear to be more than two thousand men, about a mile dis 
 tant, in front. This was about an hour after the charge 
 of the enemy s horse had been repelled by Colonel But 
 ler, who still occupied his former position, advanced some 
 three-quarters of a mile to the north and east of the 
 court-house. Major Fishbourne returned and said that 
 General Lee gave no answer, further than that he would 
 see General Wayne himself, which promise, however, he 
 did not fulfil. In the mean time, to the amazement of 
 both officers and men, none of whom understood what 
 
374 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 purpose they were serving or whither they were going, 
 and without its being threatened in any direction by the 
 enemy, the whole advanced detachment of the army was 
 in retreat ; although the ground occupied by it had been 
 " the best formed by nature for defence of any, perhaps, 
 in this country." 
 
 General Wayne, having failed to obtain support in 
 answer to his repeated demands made of General Lee, 
 was now obliged to send an order to Colonel Butler to 
 fall back, lest in his exposed position he should be sur 
 rounded and taken ; and, having secured that brave 
 officer, General Wayne and General Scott retired to the 
 court-house, where they formed their troops in an orchard 
 near the village. In spite of the neglect shown by his 
 commander to all his former requests for support, Gen 
 eral Wayne sent Major Fishbourne once more, and with 
 him Major Lenox, to beg of General Lee to halt the 
 troops in order to cover General Scott s command ; but 
 those officers returned soon after and reported that the 
 troops were then about a mile away and were still re 
 tiring, " and they believed there would be no stand yet 
 awhile." General Wayne and General Scott held their 
 ground, however, in the orchard near the court-house, 
 until the head of the enemy s column, which was now 
 advancing upon the retiring Continental forces, had 
 passed through the village and had separated them from 
 the body of their other troops toAvard the rear, and at 
 length General Wayne, with a very small company of 
 horse which he had with him, sustained a charge from 
 the enemy ; after which, from absolute necessity, he fell 
 back, embarrassed, disappointed, and justly angered at 
 this unreasonable failure which he and his fellow-officers 
 had been driven into, in spite of their willingness and 
 their efforts to engage the enemy. 
 
 1 General Wayne and General Scott to General Washington, 30th June, 
 1778. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF 3IOXMOUTH. 375 
 
 The Marquis de La Fayette had marched with the ad 
 vanced detachment that morning as a volunteer, and had 
 joined himself, at General Lee s request, to the selected 
 troops in the van, at the head of General Wayne s and 
 General Scott s detachments, 1 in the full expectation of 
 coming to action with the British grenadiers as soon as 
 the troops should overtake the enemy s rear-guard. 2 After 
 he had proceeded about a mile from Englishtown in the 
 direction of the British position, General Lee ordered 
 him to halt. Being anxious to engage with his force, he 
 went to General Lee and asked what was the matter. 
 General Lee told him that the reports as to the enemy s 
 movements did not agree, and therefore he was waiting 
 for further information. Shortly afterward, however, La 
 Fayette was ordered to proceed, and then, again, he was 
 directed to halt, His position at this second halt being 
 very ill suited to any manoeuvre that circumstances might 
 render it necessary for him to undertake, he sent an aide- 
 de-camp to General Lee to inform him of that fact and 
 to ask that he might be allowed to move on to better 
 ground. His aide reported that General Lee said he 
 would provide for him later, but that for the moment 
 it was of no consequence. Just then the message from 
 General Wayne came back to the main body of the 
 detachment requesting of General Lee that some of the 
 troops might be sent forward, and Colonel Jackson s regi 
 ment was pushed up ; whereupon La Fayette, who had 
 now arrived at the morass to the northeast of the court 
 house, and was growing impatient at the delay and fear 
 ful that he might lose an opportunity to engage, quickly 
 pointed out a short road by which this regiment might 
 reach the front ; and shortly afterward he began to ad 
 vance again and crossed the morass to its eastern side. 
 
 Almost at the same time, one of General Lee s aides 
 
 1 Captain Mercer s Testimony, Lee s Trial. 
 
 2 La Fayette s Testimony : see Appendix C. 
 
376 KETKEAT OF THE BEITISH AKMY, [1778. 
 
 said to him that the enemy s rear-guard was sure to be 
 captured, and General Lee himself, who happened to be 
 near by, called out to him, " My dear Marquis, I think 
 those people are ours !" General Lee requested La Fay- 
 ette to order Colonel Livingston s regiment to file off along 
 the wood, and upon his suggestion that the cannon could 
 not be taken that way, Lee answered that they could 
 go along the road. This was at the time when Colonel 
 Butler s force was engaged with the enemy in the van ; 
 and, whilst La Fayette was making every possible effort to 
 proceed toward the front, an order was delivered to him 
 by Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton from General Lee, direct 
 ing that, as a detachment of the enemy were gaining his 
 right, he should oppose them by a counter-movement and 
 gain their left. 1 Whilst La Fayette was preparing, with 
 Colonel Livingston, to execute this order, he noticed, to 
 his surprise, that the troops behind him were beginning 
 to retire, and word was brought to him that they had been 
 ordered by General Lee to take post farther back, toward 
 the village of Freehold : he supposed this to have been 
 done because of their exposed position upon the open 
 ground, and as a precaution against having their flank 
 turned. It was whilst this manoeuvre was being executed 
 that General Wayne galloped up to La Fayette and asked 
 him what he was going to do with the troops ; to which, 
 as we have seen, he replied that they were retiring 
 by command of General Lee, but that he should take 
 
 1 It is important to remember, in this connection, that this order was not 
 an effort on the part of General Lee to check the enemy, but was given at 
 the suggestion of Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Hamilton, who observed 
 some of the enemy s cavalry filing toward their left, as if to attempt some 
 thing on the right of General Lee s troops ; he informed the general of this 
 and submitted to him whether it w r ould not be proper to send some troops to 
 counteract that manoeuvre and turn their left flank ; Lee approved of this 
 suggestion, and authorized him to give orders to that effect to a column on 
 the right. Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, therefore, gave the order to the 
 Marquis de La Fayette, who was leading that column. (Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Hamilton s Testimony, Lee s Trial.) 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 377 
 
 up his position near the court-house and " from that to 
 the woods." Thereupon La Fayette went personally to 
 see General Lee in order to learn the purpose of this 
 movement : he found him near the village, directing the 
 troops to fall still farther back ; and by that time all the 
 columns were beginning to move in retreat. La Fayette 
 found himself, like all the others who served that day 
 under General Lee, swept along by the irresistible and 
 unaccountable movement which had set in toward the 
 rear. In spite of his most strenuous efforts to reach the 
 front, he had not been able to come into action with 
 the enemy, but was prevented from carrying out the one 
 order which General Lee gave him, to move toward the 
 enemy s left flank, by having been abandoned in an ex 
 tremely exposed position in the open plain, whilst the 
 troops who should have been sent to support him in 
 this manoeuvre were withdrawn at the critical moment 
 and sent to the rear by order of General Lee. 1 With 
 the other officers who were about him, he had the mortifi 
 cation of leaving the field without having been permitted 
 to strike a blow. 
 
 General Wayne and General Scott united, two days 
 after the action, in a statement of the case to General 
 Washington, in which they declared to him, " Thus were 
 these several select detachments unaccountably drawn off 
 without being suffered to come to action, although we had 
 the most pleasing prospect, from our numbers and position, 
 of obtaining the most glorious and decisive victory. . . . 
 We have taken the liberty of stating these facts, in order 
 to convince the world that our retreat from the court-house 
 was not occasioned by the want of numbers, position, or 
 wishes of both officers and men to maintain that post. AVe 
 also beg leave to mention, that no plan of attack was ever 
 communicated to us, or notice of a retreat, until it had 
 
 1 General Foreman s Testimony, and La Fayette s Testimony, Lee s Trial ; 
 Memoires de ma Main, i. 52. 
 
378 RETREAT OE THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 taken place in our rear, as we supposed by General Lee s 
 order." l 
 
 What happened to General Wayne, to General Scott, 
 and to the Marquis de La Fayette, happened also to Gen 
 eral Foreman, General Maxwell, General Varnum, and 
 many other officers serving that day under the command 
 of General Lee. Each found himself executing an order 
 of which he did not understand the purpose, and each was 
 withdrawing his troops when his own judgment and the 
 circumstances which governed the situation of both the 
 British and the Continental army convinced him that 
 he ought rather to advance. Confusion broke out every 
 where ; no one knew whither he was expected to go, or 
 what position he was to assume after giving up the one 
 he then occupied ; no general officer understood precisely 
 whether he was to act by himself or to join with the force 
 of some one else ; many of the troops were obliged to 
 retire from the ground they had taken because other 
 troops who should have supported them on the right or on 
 the left were withdrawing and they could not stay behind 
 alone. So, step by step, they were going back over the 
 ground toward Englishtown which they had advanced 
 upon in the morning, with a growing disorder that threat 
 ened soon to break through all restraint and to precipitate 
 the army into a headlong flight before the British column, 
 which had instantly seized upon its advantage and was 
 now advancing in pursuit. 
 
 It is not pertinent to the present inquiry to exam 
 ine in detail the various movements of troops which took 
 place, or to describe with military exactness the positions 
 taken up by each detachment, in the action at Monmouth 
 on the morning of the 28th of June. These are fully 
 and precisely set forth in the testimony taken before the 
 court-martial which afterward tried General Charles 
 
 1 Letter of General Wayne and General Scott to General Washington, 
 30th June, 1778 : Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, ii. 150. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 379 
 
 Lee ; l though some of the evidence then given may be 
 suitably referred to here, in connection with what has 
 gone before and as bearing upon the general result with 
 which we now have to do. 
 
 General Foreman testified that, shortly after the enemy s 
 horse had charged Colonel Butler s detachment, he rode 
 forward to discover the number and the position of the 
 enemy, who he conceived had left their rear-guard at 
 Freehold only to make a demonstration in order to pre 
 vent the Continental forces from advancing. From what 
 he saw of them, he judged that their number did not 
 exceed one thousand men ; whereupon he rode back and 
 informed General Lee of this, describing to him their 
 position, and adding that he believed them to be consid 
 erably in the rear of the column ; he also offered to take 
 a detachment along a road which lay to the left, to double 
 their right flank. The only reply that General Lee made 
 to him was, " I know my business." General Foreman 
 observed, at the same time, that General Lee was ordering 
 a body of troops to march into a wood on the left of the 
 column, which troops, he was informed, w r ere a part of 
 those under the Marquis de La Fayette. A short time 
 later, he saw General Lee riding toward the front ; he 
 noticed that the Marquis de La Fayette ordered Colonel 
 Livingston s and Colonel Stewart s regiments to march 
 toward the enemy s left, and he was informed by General 
 de La Fayette that he had been directed by General Lee 
 to gain the enemy s left flank. General Foreman fur 
 ther testified that General de La Fayette did not gain the 
 enemy s left flank, because, as he supposed, of the retreat 
 ordered at that time to the village, which retreat he pre 
 sumed to have been ordered by General Lee, who was 
 present and did not contradict it. The troops then began 
 to form in the rear of the village, with their left extend- 
 
 1 Published by the Xew York Historical Society, 1873. 
 
380 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 ing to a wood to the northward and their right to the 
 southward ; but before the line was completed the troops 
 again retreated, and the Marquis de La Fayette told him 
 that this was by order of General Lee. 
 
 There appeared by this time much confusion and irregu 
 larity among the troops ; those upon the left of the village 
 were retreating in line, those upon the right, in column. 
 General Foreman inquired of several officers where they 
 were retreating to. They said, to the woods. But upon 
 asking them, further, which woods, they replied that they 
 could not tell whether it was to the wood in front, or to 
 the right, or to the left. General Foreman was present as 
 they moved across Mr. Ray s field, and he saw General 
 Lee ride up to the retiring troops and order them to re 
 treat with more haste. 1 
 
 Major Fishbourne testified that when General Wayne 
 and he had got within a mile of the court-house the 
 enemy were moving toward Middletown, with a body of 
 horse in their rear. General Wayne ordered Major Fish- 
 bourne to go back to General Lee and inform him of this, 
 begging him, at the same time, to forward the troops. He 
 went to General Lee and told him what General Wayne 
 had directed him ; to which the general made no reply, 
 but rode toward the troops. Major Fishbourne returned 
 to General Wayne just as Butler s detachment was moving 
 toward the enemy s left flank : the enemy s horse having 
 made a charge upon him, Butler formed his regiment and 
 gave them a volley, upon which they retired. General 
 Wayne then sent him again to General Lee to inform him 
 that the enemy were retreating, and to request him to 
 send forward the troops. When he delivered this message, 
 General Lee said, " Pho ! pho ! it is impossible !" and 
 asked him who had sent him, but made no further reply ; 
 whereupon Major Fishbourne returned to General Wayne. 
 
 1 General Foreman s Testimony, Lee s Trial. 
 
1778.] AXD BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 381 
 
 Colonel Butler s detachment was ordered by General 
 Wayne to file off to the left into a piece of woods, after 
 which General Wayne crossed the morass and met Gen 
 eral Scott. They ordered Major Fishbourne and Major 
 Byles to go once more to General Lee, to say to him that 
 the enemy were retreating, and to beg him, for God s sake, 
 to send on the troops. To this message General Lee 
 merely answered that he would see General Wayne him 
 self. Major Fishbourne testified, in answer to a ques 
 tion by the court, that General Lee did not see General 
 Wayne, to his knowledge. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Meade testified that he was with 
 General Washington, who, upon hearing the first sound 
 of firing, sent him forward to General Lee to inquire 
 " how matters stood." Whilst he was on his way he met 
 some troops retreating in disorder, their front being a 
 good deal scattered ; as he advanced, however, he found 
 much better order, and, falling in with the Marquis de 
 La Fayette, he asked him where General Lee was. The 
 Marquis directed him to a house called Carr s house, 
 where he saw the general. Upon saying to him that 
 General Washington had sent for information as to the 
 situation of matters, General Lee replied that "they 
 were all in confusion." Thereupon Colonel Meade re 
 peated that General Washington would be glad to know 
 the particulars, and that he would communicate imme 
 diately, through a young gentleman then present, any 
 thing that General Lee might say ; to which Lee an 
 swered again that the troops were all in confusion, and 
 that he had nothing to say. Colonel Meade further 
 testified that he did not hear General Lee give any 
 orders to his troops whilst he was near him, and that 
 no steps were taken either by him or by any of his 
 officers, during that time, to restore order among the 
 troops ; that General Lee was sitting upon his horse and 
 doing nothing. 
 
382 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison, of General Washington s 
 suite, testified that he offered his services to General 
 Washington "to go forward and bring him a true ac 
 count of the situation of matters." After riding a short 
 distance, he came upon a party of Colonel Grayson s regi 
 ment, and asked an officer of it, Captain Jones, the cause 
 of the retreat, whether it was general, or whether it was 
 only a particular part of the troops that were coming off, 
 and was answered that " yonder were a great many more 
 troops in the same situation." Continuing upon his 
 errand, he soon after fell in with Colonel William Smith, 
 whom he asked what was the cause of the retreat of the 
 troops, adding that he had come forward to gain infor 
 mation. Colonel Smith answered that he could not tell 
 the cause, but that he had lost only one man. Colonel 
 Harrison continued down the line, determined to go to the 
 rear of the retreating troops, when he met Colonel Ogden, 
 of whom he asked the same question, whether he could 
 give any information as to why the troops were retreating. 
 Colonel Ogden, who appeared to be " exceedingly exas 
 perated," answered, " By God, they are flying from a 
 shadow !" Colonel Harrison next met Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Rhea, of New Jersey, who was leading a regiment, and 
 who replied to his inquiry that he was greatly concerned 
 because he had no place assigned to him where his troops 
 were to halt ; he was " very much agitated," and expressed 
 strongly his disapproval of the retreat. And so Colonel 
 Harrison met, successively, as he advanced, General Max 
 well, General Scott, Colonel Stewart, and finally General 
 Wayne ; the latter of whom gave it as his opinion that it 
 was impossible to tell the cause of the retreat. 
 
 In the mean time, General Washington, with the main 
 body of the army, was moving forward, according to the 
 plan he had announced the day before, to support Gen 
 eral Lee s detachment as soon as he should receive infor 
 mation that an attack had been made upon the enemy. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 383 
 
 He advanced beyond the meeting-house near Monmouth 
 to the junction of the roads, where he halted for a short 
 time to direct the disposition of the army, and ordered 
 the wing under General Greene to go to the right to 
 prevent the enemy from turning the right flank. 1 Upon 
 proceeding again, and having marched about five miles 
 since starting, General Washington was amazed to find 
 the advanced corps coming toward him in retreat. 2 The 
 first information of this that he had was when he met 
 a fifer coming down the road, who appeared to be greatly 
 frightened. General Washington asked him whether 
 he was a soldier of the army, and why he was return 
 ing in that manner. The fifer answered that he was 
 a soldier, and that the troops who had been advanced 
 were now retreating. The Commander-in-Chief was so 
 surprised and offended at this reply, which he did not 
 believe, that he ordered the man under arrest and told 
 him he should be flogged if he spread such reports in the 
 army. But, upon his having ridden a few paces farther, 
 he met two or three persons more on the road, of one of 
 whom, who wore a uniform, he inquired where they had 
 come from and whether they belonged to the army ; to 
 which he answered that they did, and that the whole ad 
 vanced corps was retreating. The General could not even 
 then believe what they said, for he could conceive no 
 reason for a retreat, and he had heard no firing except 
 the sound of a few cannon a considerable length of time 
 before. Nevertheless he sent Colonel Harrison ahead, as 
 we have seen, and continued, with the greatest anxiety, 
 to advance. When he had gone beyond the meeting 
 house nearly to the edge of the morass which afterward 
 divided the hostile armies during the day, he met two 
 regiments retreating, Colonel Grayson s and Colonel Pat- 
 
 1 Colonel Harrison s Testimony, Lee s Trial. 
 
 2 General Washington to Congress, 1st July, 1778 : Sparks, Writings of 
 Washington, v. 425. 
 
384 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 ton s. The General asked one of the officers whether the 
 whole advanced corps was retreating. He replied that 
 he believed it was ; and he had scarcely spoken when 
 the heads of the columns of the advanced corps began 
 to appear. The first officers whom the General met 
 were Colonel Shreve and Lieutenant-Colonel Khea, at 
 the head of Colonel Shreve s regiment. Greatly alarmed, 
 the General, seeing the advanced troops fall back upon 
 the army without the least notice having been sent to 
 him, asked Colonel Shreve the meaning of the retreat. 
 Colonel Shreve replied, significantly, that he had been 
 ordered to retreat, though he did not say by whom. 
 At the rear of the regiment was Major Howell, who ex 
 pressed himself with great indignation at the retreat and 
 said he had never seen anything like it. 
 
 A moment of intense interest followed almost imme 
 diately upon this, when at the head of the next column 
 appeared General Lee himself. General Washington 
 rode up to him, and, with very evident astonishment, 
 demanded, " What is the meaning of this ?" To which 
 Lee, in great embarrassment at the General s question, 
 
 could only reply, " Sir, sir " Thereupon General 
 
 Washington repeated it, and Lee answered that his infor 
 mation had been confused, and that he did not choose to 
 attack the British army with troops in such a situation ; 
 besides, that the whole undertaking had been contrary 
 to his opinion and advice. General Washington replied 
 that no matter what General Lee s opinion might be, he 
 expected his orders to be obeyed ; and with that he left 
 him and rode toward the rear of the retreating troops. 1 
 
 General Washington had ridden only a short distance 
 when he met his aide, Colonel Harrison, returning from 
 the rear, who reported to him that the British army was 
 within fifteen minutes march of the place where they 
 
 1 Colonel Tilghman s and Dr. McHenry s Testimony, Lee s Trial. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 385 
 
 stood, which was the first intimation the General had 
 of their coming on so rapidly. This made immediate 
 action absolutely necessary, and, although he was not 
 acquainted with the country at that particular point, 
 General Washington seized upon a position at a narrow 
 defile with a morass in front of it, as an advantageous 
 one from which to give the enemy the first check ; which 
 selection proved extremely fortunate in the action that 
 followed. Calling Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsey and Col 
 onel Stewart to him, he said to those officers that he 
 should rely upon them to check the enemy s advance ; 
 whereupon they formed their regiments behind a fence in 
 front of the position, whilst General Wayne, who by this 
 time had come up and who was exceedingly anxious to 
 establish the resistance, began to form the battalions ; 
 General Washington observing to him that he would ride 
 back in the mean time and arrange the disposition of the 
 army whilst these troops held the advance against the 
 enemy. 
 
 The British cavalry came on in full charge with excel 
 lent order to within forty paces, when they were met 
 by a general discharge from the two regiments already 
 formed, which broke them and caused them to fall back. 
 To them succeeded the grenadiers, who now came on to 
 the attack ; they were received in the same manner by 
 the advanced battalions, and an exceedingly hot contest 
 ensued, which resulted in great slaughter among the 
 grenadiers. 
 
 This check of the enemy in front gave time for the 
 formation of the main army, which General Washington 
 disposed to excellent advantage, with the left wing under 
 the command of Lord Stirling and the second line under 
 the Marquis de La Fayette, upon an eminence and in 
 a wood a little to the rear, covered by a morass in front ; 
 on this eminence were placed some batteries which played 
 upon the enemy with great effect, and, seconded by in- 
 
 VOL. I. 25 
 
386 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 fantry detached for the purpose, effectually put a stop to 
 their advance. 1 General Greene, who had previously been 
 ordered to file off by the new church, two miles from 
 Englishtown, into the Monmouth road, now came upon 
 the ground where the Commander-in-Chief was forming 
 the army, and took an advantageous position, in command 
 of the right wing. 
 
 The British troops, thus effectually halted in front, made 
 an effort to turn the left flank of the American position, 
 but were driven back ; they also directed their energy 
 against the right wing, but were obliged to retire before 
 the troops of General Greene, whose artillery shattered 
 their ranks and did great damage to those in front 
 of the left wing. The grenadiers returned several times 
 with stubborn determination to the charge, but each time 
 fell back again before a well-directed fire ; until, finally, 
 General Wayne advanced with a body of troops who 
 pressed them so severely in front that they were com 
 pelled to retire behind the defile where the first stand 
 had been taken at the beginning of the action. The day 
 was by this time drawing to its close, and, when evening 
 came on, the two armies occupied their respective posi 
 tions upon either side of this defile, the British with both 
 their flanks secured by thick woods and morasses, while 
 their front could be approached only through the pass. 
 
 In spite of the strong position of the enemy, however, 
 General Washington determined to attack them ; and, 
 with this view, he ordered General Poor with his brigade 
 and the Carolina brigade to move toward their right, and 
 General Woodford to their left, while he stationed his artil 
 lery in such a manner as to open upon them in front. 
 The difficulties of carrying out this manoeuvre made it 
 impossible to complete it before dark. The Americans 
 remained upon the ground all night, ready to move, as 
 
 1 Washington to Congress, 1st July, 1778, ut supra. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 387 
 
 they had been ordered to do, in the morning. But when 
 day broke there was no enemy in sight : the British army 
 had moved off under cover of the darkness. 
 
 Sir Henry Clinton s report of the affair stated his re 
 treat to have taken place as follows : l 
 
 " I made a disposition of attack on the plain, but, before I could 
 advance, the enemy fell back and took a strong position on the 
 heights above Freehold Court-House. The heat of the weather 
 was intense, and onr men already suffered from fatigue. But our 
 circumstances obliged us to make a vigorous exertion. The Brit 
 ish Grenadiers with their left to the village of Freehold, and the 
 Guards on the right of the Grenadiers, began the attack with such 
 spirit, that the enemy gave way immediately. The second line of 
 the enemy stood the attack, with great obstinacy, but were like 
 wise completely routed. Then they took a third position, with a 
 marshy hollow in front, over which it would have been scarcely 
 possible to have attacked them. However, part of the second line 
 made a movement to the front, occupied some ground on the 
 enemy s left flank, and the light infantry and Queen s Eangers 
 turned their left. 
 
 "By this time our men were so overpowered with fatigue that 
 I could press the affair no further ; especially as I was confident 
 the end was gained for which the attack had been made. I ordered 
 the light infantry to rejoin me ; but a strong detachment of the 
 enemy having possessed themselves of a post which would have 
 annoyed them in their retreat, the 33d Regiment made a move 
 ment towards the enemy, which, with a similar one made by the 
 First Grenadiers, immediately dispersed them. 
 
 "I took the position from whence the enemy had been first 
 driven, after they had quitted the plain, and having reposed the 
 troops till ten at night, to avoid the excessive heat in the day, I 
 took advantage of the moonlight to rejoin Lieutenant-General 
 Knyphausen, who had advanced to Nut Swamp, near Middle- 
 town." 
 
 General Washington in his report to Congress says, 
 
 "In the mean time the enemy were employed in removing their 
 wounded, and about twelve o clock at night marched away in such 
 
 1 Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germain, 5th July, 1778. 
 
388 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 silence, that, though General Poor lay extremely near them, they 
 effected their retreat without his knowledge. They carried off all 
 their wounded, except four officers and about forty privates, whose 
 wounds were too dangerous to permit their removal. 
 
 1 The extreme heat of the weather, the fatigue of the men from 
 their march through a deep sandy country, almost entirely desti 
 tute of water, and the distance the enemy had gained by march 
 ing in the night, made a pursuit impracticable and fruitless. It 
 would have answered no valuable purpose, and would have been 
 fatal to numbers of our men, several of whom died the preceding 
 day with heat." 
 
 Sir Henry Clinton marched through New Jersey with 
 out further incident and crossed his troops at Sandy Hook ; 
 whilst the Continental army proceeded in the direction of 
 the Hudson River. 
 
 The conduct of General Washington on the field of 
 Monmouth illustrates in a rare manner his eminent 
 soldierly qualities. When he came suddenly upon the 
 disjointed masses of his advanced troops falling back in 
 disorder and confusion upon the main body of his army, 
 the position was extremely critical ; the steady advance 
 of the British grenadiers and of the guards had brought 
 them almost within sight of the flying battalions, and 
 the contagion of this unaccountable retreat threatened 
 to spread in every direction and to produce irreparable 
 damage. Washington controlled the situation instantly. 
 His presence inspired every man with courage ; his admi 
 rable self-possession called forth an immediate response 
 in the breasts of the soldiers ; and his determination not 
 to yield a single step before the enemy changed the course 
 of the battle and saved the army from defeat. 
 
 His question to General Lee upon first arriving at the 
 scene of the retreat was one, it is true, of indignation and 
 surprise ; but it justly called Lee to account for what had 
 occurred upon his responsibility, it was made with per 
 fect self-control, and its severity of manner was that of 
 a superior who had the right to ask and to know. There 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 389 
 
 is no evidence of his having expressed violent feeling 
 toward Lee or of his having reproached him with angry 
 words ; indeed, the voluminous testimony bearing upon 
 this incident which was subsequently taken at General 
 Lee s trial is remarkably uniform as to the composure of 
 the Commander-in-Chief and the dignity of his attitude 
 throughout. 
 
 Having made a disposition of his troops upon the very 
 ground where he met them, which the rapid approach of 
 the enemy rendered necessary, he arrested their retreat 
 with the touch of the master-hand, almost at the moment 
 of disaster. 
 
 Those who were near Washington on that day spoke 
 with admiration of the ability he displayed. Alexander 
 Hamilton said 1 that America owed a great deal to Gen 
 eral Washington for that day s work ; for a general rout, 
 dismay, and disgrace would have attended the whole 
 army in any other hands but his. " By his own good 
 sense and fortitude he turned the fate of the day. ... I 
 never saw the General to so much advantage." And 
 Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens, who was then upon 
 the General s staff, wrote to his father, the President of 
 Congress, 2 that his love and esteem for his Commander 
 had been greatly increased by his conduct in this battle, 
 adding, " The merit of restoring the day is due to the 
 General." 
 
 That the battle of Monmouth was not a disaster to 
 the American arms was in itself a distinct gain, equal, 
 at that moment, to a victory. But it was even more 
 than this ; for, although Sir Henry Clinton claimed the 
 victory in his report to the War Office, which was not 
 unnatural from his stand-point, because each army occu 
 pied its ground when night came on, and it was very 
 
 1 Letter to Elias Boudinot, 5th July, 1778. 
 
 2 Letter to Henry Laurens, 2d July, 1778 : Simrns, Correspondence of John 
 Laurens, p. 200. 
 
390 RETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 necessary at that period of the war for the British com 
 mander to send to England the most favorable news he 
 could report within the bounds of reason, yet the Brit 
 ish army had unquestionably withdrawn under cover of 
 the night, and that result, in its moral effect throughout 
 America, was tantamount to a victory in the field. 
 
 The spirit of the troops was excellent, and they fought 
 with great bravery from the moment that General Wash 
 ington re-formed them and arrested the backward move 
 ment; they obstinately withstood the enemy in the en 
 counter that took place at the narrow defile on the edge 
 of the morass ; and their well-directed fire did great 
 injury to the British grenadiers, many of whom fell at 
 this point, among them the Honorable Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Monckton, commander of the second battalion of the 
 grenadiers, a gallant officer, whose loss was greatly la 
 mented in England. His body fell into the hands of 
 the Continental soldiers, by whom it was afterward buried 
 with the honors of war. 1 
 
 The conduct of General Lee appears to have been bad 
 throughout the day, as well after the stand was made as 
 during the retreat which he designed and executed. He 
 did not attempt to redeem himself, either by personal 
 bravery or by his efforts to check the enemy, even after 
 he had been publicly reproved upon the field by the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief. Whilst General Wayne was assisting 
 to form the battalions, under direction of General Wash 
 ington, General Lee approached him and asked why he 
 was forming the troops there, under fire of the enemy s 
 cannon and exposed to the enemy s cavalry ; to which 
 General Wayne answered that it was by the positive order 
 of General Washington ; whereupon General Lee replied 
 that he had nothing more to say. 2 
 
 1 John Laurens to Henry Laurens, 2d July, 1778. Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Monckton s grave may still be seen in the little churchyard near Freehold. 
 
 2 General Wayne s Testimony, Lee s Trial. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MONMOUTH. 391 
 
 It is true that, after General Washington had disposed 
 the battalions in front, and when he was about to return 
 to the main body of the army in order to arrange its posi 
 tion to meet the sudden change of circumstances, he turned 
 to General Lee and asked him whether he would resume 
 command ; to which Lee replied that he would, and added 
 that he should not be the first man to leave the ground. 
 Whether this declaration arose from a consciousness of 
 shame at a sudden call to duty, or whether he designed it 
 for some purpose of his own, it is impossible to determine. 
 At all events, he did not keep his word. 
 
 Colonel Alexander Hamilton says that he was near 
 General Lee for some time afterward, during which he did 
 not hear him direct any measure to be taken to answer 
 that purpose, nor did he see him take any measures 
 himself. 1 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald, who was also present 
 at that moment, testified that he saw General Washing 
 ton ride back to form the main line ; also that he was in 
 the advanced position, near General Lee, who appeared 
 serious and thoughtful, but that he heard no orders given, 
 nor did he see him form any plan to check the enemy ; he 
 was there when General Lee retired from the field, which 
 was not more than twenty minutes or half an hour later. 
 In the mean time a heavy fire began between the troops 
 formed under Colonel Stewart and Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Ramsey and the advanced troops of the British army, in 
 the skirt of the woods, under which the former were 
 obliged to give way and were closely pressed by the enemy 
 until a detachment under Colonel Livingston came to 
 their relief. At that point Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald 
 returned to the rear of Lord Stirling s line, the left wing 
 of the main army, and he saw General Lee there then. 2 
 
 Dr. McHenry saw General Lee where Lord Stirling s 
 
 1 Colonel Hamilton s Testimony, Lee s Trial. 
 
 2 Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald s Testimony, ibid. 
 
392 KETREAT OF THE BRITISH ARMY, [1778. 
 
 line was formed, a short time after Colonel Stewart and 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsey had given way. He was 
 then saying to General Washington that effects such as 
 happened that day would always be the consequence of a 
 great superiority in cavalry. General Lee retired still 
 farther immediately after this ; for Dr. McHenry, who 
 had been sent to the rear to look after the baggage in 
 case the result of the engagement should be unfavorable 
 to the Americans, saw him at Englishtown. He was 
 sitting on his horse, observing to a number of gentle 
 men who stood about him that it was madness to make 
 attempts against the enemy where they possessed so great 
 a superiority in cavalry, and that, under the circum 
 stances, the Americans could not be successful. 1 
 
 Baron Steuben, who was hastening to the front with 
 reinforcements which he had been ordered to bring up, 
 met General Lee at Englishtown, whereupon Lee asked 
 whither he was going. The Baron told him that he had 
 been ordered forward by the Commander-in-Chief, and 
 that the enemy were retiring in confusion. Upon the 
 word " confusion/ General Lee took him up and said 
 that the British were only resting themselves, adding 
 that he was quite sure there was some mistake about those 
 troops having been ordered forward. 2 His evident pur 
 pose was, even up to the last moment, to defeat, by every 
 means within his power, any measure that threatened 
 injury to the British force. 3 
 
 For his conduct at the battle of Monmouth, General 
 Lee was tried before a court-martial which was convened 
 at Brunswick, on the 4th of July, under the presidency 
 of Lord Stirling, and which was composed, besides the 
 president, of four brigadier-generals and eight colonels 
 of the Continental army. 
 
 1 Dr. McHenry s Testimony, Lee s Trial. 
 
 2 Baron Steuben s Testimony, ibid. 
 
 3 See Appendix C. 
 
1778.] AND BATTLE OF MOXMOUTH. 393 
 
 The charges against General Lee were : 
 
 " First : For disobedience of orders, in not attacking 
 the enemy on the 28th of June, agreeable to repeated 
 instructions. 
 
 " Secondly : For misbehaviour before the enemy on the 
 same day, by making an unnecessary, disorderly and 
 shameful retreat. 
 
 " Thirdly : For disrespect to the Commander-in-Chief, 
 in two letters dated the 1st of July and the 28th of 
 June." 
 
 After an exceedingly patient and thorough inquiry, 
 during which the court met at various places along the 
 line of march of the army to the Hudson River, General 
 Lee was condemned, on the 12th of August, "for dis 
 obedience of orders, in not attacking the enemy on the 
 28th of June, agreeable to repeated instructions ; for mis 
 behaviour before the enemy on the 28th of June, by 
 making an unnecessary, and, in some few instances, a 
 disorderly retreat ; for disrespect to the Commander-in- 
 Chief, in two letters dated the 1st of July and the 28th 
 of June." 
 
 He was sentenced by the court "to be suspended from 
 any command in the armies of the United States of North 
 America, for the term of twelve months." 
 
 This sentence was approved by Congress, and was or 
 dered, by a resolution passed on the 5th of December, 
 1778, to be carried into execution. 1 
 
 1 Journals of Congress, 5th December, 1778. 
 
394 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D^ESTAING. 
 
 A PERIOD of the American Revolution had now been 
 reached when the presence of the Marquis de La Fayette 
 in this country acquired a different influence from what 
 it had hitherto possessed, and became a matter of much 
 greater importance than it had been before. This was 
 the result of the introduction into the struggle of a new 
 element, by means of which his personality and his in 
 dividual influence were brought into play in a manner 
 which reflected most honorably upon his devotion to the 
 American cause, and which resulted in lasting and valu 
 able service to the United States. This new element 
 was the armed participation of France in the War of 
 Independence and the actual presence in America of 
 French ships of war and French soldiers. 
 
 The arrival of the Comte d Estaing changed the char 
 acter of the war in this respect, that it closed the period 
 during which the American people faced their enemies 
 single-handed in the contest for liberty. It brought a 
 strong ally to their assistance upon the sea ; it was the 
 forerunner of effective aid on land; and it led to the 
 open avowal, as well as to the considerable enlargement, of 
 that support for which we, as a nation, owe an everlasting 
 debt of gratitude to France. From the moment that the 
 sailing of his fleet for America was known, and that its 
 destination and purpose were placed beyond doubt by the 
 arrival of M. d Estaing in American waters, the treaty of 
 alliance became fully operative and the interest of the 
 French people was definitively fixed upon the establish- 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. 395 
 
 ment of American Independence. Their national strength 
 was brought to supplement our weakness before the over 
 powering superiority of Great Britain in wealth and 
 munitions of war ; their soldiers and sailors thenceforth 
 saluted, and fought for, the American flag ; their prestige 
 as a great people who had now become our allies gave us 
 a new title to recognition among the nations, upon our 
 first introduction to the world. 
 
 The critical situation which developed in the affairs 
 of America and France by reason of the succession of 
 misfortunes that met the Comte d Estaing at every turn, 
 and that ultimately defeated his purposes, during the cam 
 paign of the summer of 1778, threatened for a moment 
 to deprive us at the outset of all these advantages, by a 
 misunderstanding between ourselves and our ally. Dis 
 appointment, on the one hand, which was all the heavier 
 by reason of the bright hopes that had been suddenly 
 destroyed ; the sense of injury, on the other, in the 
 minds of men who felt aggrieved by criticism whilst they 
 were honorably performing their duty as they understood 
 it ; differences of opinion, recriminations, traces of sus 
 picion, perhaps of jealousy, all arising from a combina 
 tion of circumstances which human foresight could not 
 control, strained dangerously the relations between two 
 sets of people who, at best, knew one another but very 
 slightly, whose language, customs, and manners were 
 totally different, and whose traditions were not derived 
 from sources of sympathy or kindred. 
 
 The failure of the expedition of the Comte d Estaing 
 at this critical period of the history of the United States 
 was, in every sense, an extraordinary example of ill luck. 
 Fate itself seemed to have entered into the contest against 
 the French admiral, and, with unremitting spite, to have 
 met him step by step, as if to deprive him of his success 
 and cheat him of his glory, to turn him aside from his 
 path, and to compel him at last, worn out by disappoint- 
 
396 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D^ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 ment, to sail away from our coasts, having accomplished 
 scarcely anything of the purpose for which he had come. 
 And yet, in examining his campaign in the light of his 
 own narrative, as well as in that of such official docu 
 ments as still remain to us, the one feature which makes 
 itself strikingly evident to the student, aside from the con 
 stant recurrence of unavoidable accidents, is the earnest 
 desire of the Comte d Estaing to be of service to America. 
 But, notwithstanding this, his mishaps involved interests 
 of such serious import to the country at that time, which 
 he had been counted upon, in connection with the Con 
 tinental army, to foster and improve, that men s minds 
 were inflamed almost to anger ; and, among a people who 
 discussed public questions with a freedom of speech which 
 at that time was not common in other parts of the world, 
 the range of criticism came close to the limit of bitter 
 ness and brought about a situation which was a source 
 of grave anxiety to all true friends of American liberty. 
 We owe it to the mature wisdom and the soothing influ 
 ence of General Washington in this time of impending 
 trouble, as well as to the generous personal conduct of 
 the Comte d Estaing himself, that the crisis was passed 
 without lasting injury ; and it was happy for America, 
 at that moment, that it counted among its defenders a 
 man whose devotion to its cause had already won for him 
 the confidence of the nation, and who at this juncture 
 came forward to stay the tide of feeling, to explain mis 
 conceptions, to smooth the path that led to unity, and 
 finally to bring about a complete reconciliation : that man 
 was the Marquis de La Fayette. 
 
 The negotiations of La Fayette with M. d Estaing kept 
 open the avenues of communication between the French 
 admiral and the American people ; his knowledge of 
 American affairs, and his acquaintance with our national 
 character, enabled him to present the situation in its true 
 light very frequently where otherwise it would have been 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D^ESTAING. 397 
 
 misconceived ; while, on the other hand, his rank and his 
 position as a French nobleman, a compatriot, and a relative 
 of M. d Estaing himself, gave him access not only to the 
 admiral but to all the captains and officers of the fleet, such 
 as no other man could then have had. He was for a time 
 the ambassador to whom both parties trusted. His man 
 agement of the delicate questions submitted to him for 
 solution is marked with such excellent judgment and so 
 much discretion that it is difficult, in following his course, 
 to realize that the person with whom we are dealing was 
 barely twenty-one years of age. His intense love for 
 France is apparent at every step ; his desire to avenge 
 her wrongs upon her hereditary enemy, and the thought 
 of her glory, filled his mind with enthusiasm ; for this he 
 would willingly have given his life, and he hailed with 
 delighted anticipation the companionship of Frenchmen 
 upon the soil of America. The disappointment which 
 followed fell more heavily upon him, perhaps, than upon 
 any other individual ; it left him, at times, almost in de 
 spair at the discomfiture of the people whom he loved the 
 best, on the one hand, and at the consequent loss of op 
 portunity entailed upon the country of his adoption, on 
 the other. The expressions of anger which he heard 
 about him in the American camp aroused his patriotism, 
 and he suffered with all the sensitiveness of a Frenchman 
 from the wound inflicted by the least shadow of suspicion 
 cast upon the honor of his countrymen ; in a tumult of 
 feeling, he was ready to draw his sword to defend himself 
 and them against criticism, and yet at the same moment, 
 with admirable self-control, he turned to allay, in the 
 interests of peace, the feeling of anger aroused in the 
 minds of his compatriots by similar provocation. 
 
 A Frenchman in his views, in his sentiments, and in 
 his aspirations, his position was one of the most difficult 
 conceivable, because it constantly threatened him with a 
 rupture between his natural attachment and his present 
 
398 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 allegiance. It is the greatest claim to credit that can be 
 made in his behalf, that throughout this incident La Fay- 
 ette never for a moment forgot, or failed to defend, the 
 honor and the interests of America. 
 
 The expedition which had given rise to these difficult 
 questions in America was the first step taken by the Cab 
 inet of King Louis XVI. toward carrying out, upon the 
 part of France, the treaty of alliance entered into with 
 the Commissioners of the United States on the 6th of 
 February, 1778. The King s assent having been ob 
 tained to the commencement of active operations, orders 
 were immediately given for the preparation of a fleet; 
 and within forty-eight hours after the signing of the 
 treaty the chief officer of the squadron had been selected, 
 in the person of Lieutenant-General the Comte d Estaing, 
 upon whom a letter from the King s hand conferred the 
 title of Vice- Admiral in the Seas of Asia and America 
 and supreme command of the fleet designed to operate 
 against Great Britain in the interests of the United 
 States. 1 This gentleman, who was at that time approach 
 ing the age of fifty years, was an officer of the French 
 army, in which his distinguished services, particularly in 
 the wars of India, in connection with which he had twice 
 been a prisoner in England, had given him a high repu 
 tation at home for bravery and for ability as a soldier ; 
 he had already spent two years in the West Indies during 
 the administration of M. de Choiseul, and had acquired 
 there a considerable familiarity with political questions 
 relating to American affairs. He was especially in favor 
 with the King, whose personal friendship he enjoyed by 
 reason of an attachment which grew out of the relation 
 ship of M. d Estaing to the father of Louis XVI., the late 
 Dauphin, with whom he had been educated and whose 
 companion he had been in his youth. 
 
 1 Doniol, La Participation de la France, iii. 175-176. 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. 399 
 
 Although he had previously served chiefly on land, 
 he had commanded vessels, but he had never been in 
 trusted with responsibility as a naval officer alone in 
 charge of a fleet ; which fact, while there was ample pre 
 cedent in the French naval history of army officers com 
 manding at sea, gave serious offence in the service and 
 excited hostility toward him among the captains who were 
 ordered to serve under him. This opposition hampered 
 him considerably, no doubt, from the outset ; it became 
 apparent at various times during the expedition, and it 
 led to bitter criticism and complaint after he returned to 
 France. 
 
 Charles-Henri-Theodat d Estaing, Comte d Estaing du 
 Saillans, was, like the Marquis de La Fayette, a native 
 of the province of Auvergne. His family, like that of 
 La Fayette also, was one of the ancient houses of the 
 realm, of long-established power in its native province 
 and of influence among the nobility, by reason of fre 
 quent service rendered to the King. He was born in 
 1729, at the chateau of Ravel, an old feudal domain, sit 
 uated upon the road from Thiers to Clermont-Ferrand. 
 His father was the Marquis d Estaing, Lieutenant-General 
 of the King s armies ; his mother was a lady of the house 
 of Colbert de Maulevrier. By connections of intermar 
 riage he was related to the Marquis de La Fayette, with 
 whom, by a strange chance, he was about to play so im 
 portant a part in the war in America. 
 
 Immediately upon his appointment by the King, M. 
 d Estaing set about preparing his expedition to put to 
 sea. Proceeding to Toulon, he collected his fleet, and in 
 the course of two months was ready to sail, with twelve 
 ships of the line and fourteen frigates, fully manned and 
 equipped, with an additional force of troops at his dis 
 posal, consisting of one thousand men. 
 
 Besides his military and naval command, he had with 
 him as passengers for America M. Conrad Alexandre 
 
400 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 Gerard de Rayneval, the first minister of France to the 
 United States, Mr. Silas Deane, who was returning at the 
 request of Congress, and five or six officers of the Ameri 
 can navy, who were to aid the admiral in his approach to 
 the American coast and in his landing. Having hoisted 
 his flag upon the Languedoc, one of the finest vessels of 
 the royal navy, he set sail from Toulon on Monday, the 
 13th of April, 1778. 1 
 
 As it was important to conceal from the agents of the 
 British Government the departure of M. Gerard, who as 
 sumed for this occasion the name of M. de Munster (the 
 King having conferred upon him the title of Comte de 
 Munster, from a fief in Lorraine), 2 and of the American 
 officers, he and they were at first embarked upon a vessel 
 which cleared for Antibes, with the understanding that 
 they should join the fleet when it was off Hyeres ; and 
 the expedition itself left the port of Toulon with the an 
 nouncement that it was sailing for Brest. The officers of 
 the different vessels supposed, indeed, that this was true, 
 or that they were proceeding, at least, to a similar desti 
 nation ; for they were under sealed orders which were 
 not to be opened until they had passed the Straits and got 
 under way in the Atlantic Ocean, no one having been 
 admitted to the secret of the purpose of the expedition 
 but the Comte d Estaing, M. Gerard, and, as a matter of 
 course, Mr. Deane and the American naval officers. 
 
 Adverse winds and storms met the fleet at the com 
 mencement of the voyage, hindering it to such a degree 
 that not until the 17th of May, thirty-four days later, 
 was it enabled to make its way out of the Mediterranean, 
 after an incessant contest with its evil fortune, which 
 scarcely ever left it free of impediment from that time 
 forward. 
 
 1 Conde de Aranda to the Conde de Floridablanca, 17th April, 1778 ; 
 Espagne, t. 589, No. 31 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, iii. 181. 
 
 2 Doniol, iii. 181. 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D^ESTAIXG. 401 
 
 Three days afterward, whilst the fleet was heading to 
 the westward under full sail, the admiral directed signals 
 to be given to his captains, instructing each one to break 
 the seals of the package which contained his orders, and 
 then for the first time the secret which had been perfectly 
 kept was disclosed, that the purpose of the expedition was 
 to take part in the American War of Independence. 
 With great solemnity, the Comte d Estaing attended a 
 mass celebrated at that moment, in view of the occasion, 
 on board the Languedoc, surrounded by his staff in full 
 uniform, and accompanied by M. Gerard de Rayneval, 
 now presented as the minister of France to the United 
 States, who stood beside the admiral ; and a war-vessel, 
 La Flore, which had accompanied the fleet for that pur 
 pose, was detached with orders to return to France and 
 carry the news to King Louis XVI. 
 
 This was substantially the declaration of war upon the 
 part of France against Great Britain in the interest of 
 the United States of America. And whilst the enthusi 
 asm of the moment spread from ship to ship amid cries 
 of " Vive le Roi /" these loyal Frenchmen felt with joy 
 that the moment had arrived when the indignity of a 
 similar declaration against their own country made by 
 England, in the year 17 ")O, was about to be avenged. 
 
 To cross the ocean before the British fleet under Ad 
 miral Byron could reach America with reinforcements ; to 
 blockade the Delaware River and to capture Lord Howe ; 
 to destroy the British army in America, and then to repay, 
 in the West Indies, the long list of injuries suffered by 
 France at the hands of her rival, were anticipations of 
 glory which animated every man. The instructions given 
 to the Comte d Estaing by the King of France directed 
 him, first, to come to anchor in the Delaware River ; for 
 which purpose, in view of possible immediate hostilities at 
 that point, ti precise description was given him of the 
 British naval armament in America. He had full power 
 
 VOL. I. 20 
 
402 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 to take whatever measures should appear in his judgment 
 to be necessary or proper according to the attendant cir 
 cumstances. He was to burn all captured vessels which 
 could not serve to strengthen his fleet, and to disembark 
 all prisoners under promise from the American Govern 
 ment not to release them until the King s assent had 
 been obtained. He was to attack the enemy in any place 
 where he could do them the greatest injury and where 
 he could best advance the interests of the King and the 
 glory of his arms ; he was to act alone or in concert with 
 the United States as he might deem best ; and his power 
 was enlarged by supplementary orders under which he 
 might attack the English not only in the Delaware but 
 at New York or any other port of North America. He 
 was not to attempt to make any establishment by con 
 quest on the continent of America ; though he was at 
 liberty to take possession of some island which might 
 be serviceable to commerce or useful as a fishing-station, 
 such as Newfoundland, acquiring it either by force of 
 arms or by negotiation with the United States. He was 
 to keep himself informed of the hostile projects of the 
 United States, and to assist them if they had any design 
 upon Nova Scotia, though in that event he was to stip 
 ulate beforehand for fishing privileges for France and a 
 like concession on behalf of Spain ; he should revive as 
 far as possible the ancient attachment of the inhabitants 
 of Nova Scotia for the King of France, not, however, 
 with a view of establishing the King s authority there, but 
 to aid in securing rights of fishing and to recruit sailors 
 into the French service. In case he should find, upon 
 reaching America, that the British naval force was supe 
 rior to his own, he was to go to Boston or to one of the 
 French islands for safety. He was to obtain provisions 
 and supplies at Boston, and provisions for six months 
 were to be sent to him from Martinique. 
 
 In some respects the most interesting of the items con- 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D J ESTAIXG. 403 
 
 tained in these instructions to the Cornte d Estaing, cer 
 tainly the most important in our day, from an historical 
 point of view, as bearing upon the intentions of France 
 in the part she took in the American Revolution, is that 
 relating to Canada ; because it has not infrequently been 
 asserted that one of the objects which the French Cabinet 
 had in view in aiding this country was the recon quest 
 of that province and the re-establishment of French do 
 minion in America. The Comte d Estaing was expressly 
 prohibited from taking any part in the conquest of Canada 
 otherwise than by cruising in its waters or making attacks 
 upon British posts. He had authority, however, in case 
 he should be convinced that the United States were about 
 to succeed in taking Canada, to promise, both to the 
 Canadians themselves and to the Indians of that country, 
 the protection of the King of France if they would re 
 nounce the supremacy of Great Britain. M. d Estaing s 
 own language in this connection is as follows : " While I 
 am directed to aid the expedition against Canada, and 
 although I am informed that His Majesty will not hold 
 me strictly to the conduct prescribed in the former in 
 structions, every expression indicates the repugnance of 
 the King toward that enterprise." 
 
 The voyage of the fleet was a long, dangerous, and 
 fatiguing one ; the vicissitudes of storm and sea were so 
 great, indeed, that it was considered a triumph in itself 
 that the admiral was able to conduct his expedition to 
 America without serious damage to his vessels or loss 
 of men. It was the 7th of July when he finally cast 
 anchor in the Delaware, after having been at sea more 
 than eighty days, since the loth of April, when he had 
 set sail from Toulon, as we have seen. His first com 
 munication with the shore was a disappointment to 
 
 1 "Extraits cle mes instructions du 27 mars, 1778," and " Extrait dn sup 
 plement de mes instructions du l er avril, 1778," Archives do la Marine, B* 
 143, fol. 9 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, iii. 237. 
 
404 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ? ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 Lira : it brought the news that the British had evacuated 
 Philadelphia and that their fleet had left the Delaware ; 
 therefore that part of his undertaking which related to 
 the blockading of Lord Howe had failed, whereas if he 
 had arrived but a few weeks earlier he might have ac 
 complished his purpose. There remained now nothing 
 to do but to set Mr. Dearie and M. Gerard ashore, and, 
 after communicating with Congress and with General 
 Washington as quickly as possible, to make up for the 
 loss of this first opportunity by some action against the 
 British which should be the source at once of gratifica 
 tion to the Americans and of glory to the arms of France. 
 M. d Estaing hastened, therefore, to announce himself 
 and to declare his readiness to serve the United States, 
 by the following letter, which he addressed on the 8th 
 of July to General Washington : 
 
 "Sm, I have the honor to announce to your Excellency the 
 arrival of the squadron of the King. Charged as I ani by His 
 Majesty with the glorious duty of giving to his allies, the United 
 States of America, an emphatic proof of his affection, I shall 
 have attained my greatest happiness if I succeed in this. My 
 pleasure is greatly increased by the good fortune by which I am 
 permitted to act in concert with a general like your Excellency. 
 The talents and the great actions of General Washington have 
 assured for him in the eyes of all Europe the truly sublime title 
 of the Liberator of America. 
 
 11 1 beg you, sir, to accept the homage which every man, which 
 every soldier, owes to you ; and permit me, at the outset, with 
 military and naval frankness to solicit a friendship which is 
 so nattering to me as yours. I shall endeavor to prove myself 
 worthy of it by my respectful devotion to your country ; this 
 is prescribed for me in my orders, and it accords with the 
 impulses of my heart." l 
 
 The arrival of the French fleet had been reported to 
 General AVashington before he received the admiral s 
 
 1 Archives de la Marine, B 4 146, fol. 53 : Doniol, La Participation de la 
 France, iii. 322. 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D*ESTAIXG. 405 
 
 letter, and he had taken immediate steps to express to 
 him a proper welcome and to supply him with such in 
 formation as he might naturally require upon first coming 
 to shore in a country with which he was not acquainted. 
 From his head-quarters at Paramus the Commander-in- 
 Chief despatched his aide-de-camp Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Laurens to the Comte d Estaing with a letter dated the 
 14th of July, 1 in which, after congratulating him upon 
 his arrival, he informed him that he was then with the 
 main body of the army twenty miles from the North 
 River, which he intended to cross as soon as possible, 
 about fifty miles above New York, after which he pur 
 posed to move down upon the enemy s lines in order to 
 give them all the uneasiness in his power. He assured 
 the Comte d Estaing that he should upon every occasion 
 feel the strongest inclination to facilitate such enterprises 
 as the latter might consider advisable, and added that 
 he might safely confide to Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens 
 any measures or information which he might wish to 
 communicate. 
 
 In the mean time M. d Estaing despatched one of his 
 trusted officers, Major de Choin, with a letter to Congress 
 announcing his readiness to co-operate with the United 
 States. He sent by him also a duplicate of his letter of 
 the 8th of July to be delivered to General Washington, 
 and he recommended M. de Choin to the Commander-in- 
 Chief for the clearness of his intelligence and the pre 
 cision with which he would be able to convey the ideas 
 of the admiral upon the subject of their co-operation and 
 the continuance of the war. 
 
 General Washington replied cordially, upon the receipt 
 of this communication by the hand of Major de Choin, 
 from the camp at Haverstraw Bay, on the 17th of July, 
 to the Comte d Estaing, as follows : 2 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, vi. 1. 
 
 2 Ibid., vi. o. 
 
406 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ? ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 "SiR, I had the honor of receiving, the night of the 14th 
 instant, your very obliging and interesting letter of the 13th 
 dated off Sandy Hook, with a duplicate of another dated the 8th 
 at Sea. The arrival of a fleet, belonging to his Most Christian 
 Majesty, 011 our coast, is an event that makes me truly happy ; 
 and permit me to observe, that the pleasure I feel on the occasion 
 is greatly increased by the command being placed in a gentleman 
 of such distinguished talents, experience, and reputation, as the 
 Count d Estaing. I am fully persuaded, that every possible ex 
 ertion will be made by you to accomplish the important purposes 
 of your destination ; and you may have the firmest reliance, that 
 my most strenuous efforts shall accompany you in any measure, 
 which may be found eligible. I esteem myself highly honored by 
 the desire you express, with a frankness which must always be 
 pleasing, of possessing a place in my friendship. At the same 
 time allow me to assure you, that I shall consider myself par 
 ticularly happy, if I can but improve the prepossessions you are 
 pleased to entertain in my favor, into a cordial and lasting amity. 
 
 "On the first notice of your arrival, and previous to the 
 receipt of your letter, I wrote to you by Lieutenant- Colonel 
 Laurens, one of my aids-de-camp, whom I charged to explain to 
 you such further particulars, as were not contained in my letter, 
 which might be necessary for your information, and to whom it 
 was my wish you should confide your situation, in any meas 
 ures of concert or cooperation, which may be thought to advance 
 the common cause. Major Chouin, who arrived this day at my 
 quarters, has given me a very full and satisfactory explanation on 
 this head ; and in return I have freely communicated to him my 
 ideas of every matter interesting to our mutual operations. These, 
 I doubt not, he will convey to you, with that perspicuity and in 
 telligence, which he possesses in a manner, that amply justifies 
 the confidence you have reposed in him. 
 
 "You would have heard from me sooner in answer to your 
 letter, but I have been waiting for M. de Chouiii s arrival to 
 acquaint me with your circumstances and intentions, and, at the 
 same time, I have been employed in collecting information with 
 respect to several particulars, the knowledge of which was essen 
 tial to the formation of our plans. The difficulty of doing justice 
 by letter to matters of such variety and importance, as those 
 which now engage our deliberations, has induced me to send to 
 you Lieutenant- Colonel Hamilton, another of my aids, in whom 
 I place entire confidence. He will be able to make you perfectly 
 acquainted with my sentiments, and to satisfy any inquiries you 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. 407 
 
 may think proper to propose ; and I would wish you to consider 
 the information he delivers as coming from myself. 
 
 "Colonel Hamilton is accompanied by Lieutenant- Colonel 
 Fleury, a gentleman of your nation, who has distinguished him 
 self by his zeal and gallantry in the present war with England. 
 He has also with him four captains of vessels, whom I hope you 
 will find very useful, from their knowledge of the coast and har 
 bours, and two persons, who have acted a considerable time in 
 the capacity of pilots, and in whose skill, expertness, and fidelity, 
 from the recommendations I have had, I believe you may place 
 great dependence. I am still endeavouring to provide others of 
 this description, who shall be despatched to you, as fast as they 
 can be found. 
 
 "With the most ardent desire for your success, and with the 
 greatest respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, &c." 
 
 The Comte d Estaing, finding that there were no longer 
 any British forces for him to contend with, either in the 
 Delaware River or at Philadelphia, had proceeded to sea 
 again on the 8th of July, and was, at the time he received 
 this letter from General Washington, cruising off Sandy 
 Hook, where he had arrived on the 12th, and awaiting 
 pilots who should conduct his fleet across the bar. His 
 mind was now made up to achieve an immediate success 
 for the French arms and to perform a service which should 
 distinguish their alliance with the United States, by a 
 spirited attack upon New York. 
 
 Before leaving the Delaware, the admiral took leave 
 of M. Gerard de Rayneval, the French Envoy, who dis 
 embarked as quickly as possible in order to reach Phila 
 delphia to present himself to Congress and to deliver his 
 messages of friendship from the King. Leaving the 
 flag-ship, the Languedoc, on the 8th of July, M. Gerard 
 went aboard one of the French frigates, La Chimere, 
 which was to convey him to Philadelphia ; but upon their 
 way up the river they encountered an adverse north wind, 
 which prevented the Chimere from passing the chevaux- 
 dc-frise which still partially obstructed the channel, and 
 the commander, Captain de Saint-Cesaire, set him ashore 
 
408 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ? ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 at Chester, whence he proceeded to the city by land. 
 News of the arrival of M. Gerard had already been 
 brought to Congress, among the members of which, as 
 well as throughout the city, it aroused the keenest in 
 terest ; and measures were taken at once to welcome the 
 King s representative and to receive him with the dignity 
 becoming to his station and his mission. Congress sent a 
 deputation of four of its members, at the head of which 
 was John Hancock, to Chester, where they were received 
 upon their arrival aboard the frigate La Chimere with 
 the same honors that had been prescribed by the Comte 
 d Estaing for M. Gerard himself, and one of the members 
 of Congress delivered an address of welcome ; after which 
 M. Gerard accompanied them to the landing and was 
 seated in the carriage of Mr. Hancock, with whom he 
 drove to Philadelphia. 
 
 Upon his approach to the city, the troops were drawn 
 up on each side of the streets through which he passed, 
 and salutes were fired by the artillery during his progress. 
 He was escorted to the residence of General Arnold, at 
 that time the commanding officer in the city, and was in 
 vited to lodge with him until proper accommodations could 
 be provided for him elsewhere. The reception given him 
 delighted Gerard, who wrote home with enthusiasm of the 
 attentions shown most freely by all classes of the com 
 munity ; and no doubt his reports had an important effect 
 upon the relations between the United States and France. 
 They unquestionably strengthened the alliance, by the 
 assurance they gave of sympathy and cordial friendship, 
 for Gerard declared in his letters to the Comte de Ver- 
 gennes that the kindness of the American people was so 
 great, even upon the part of "the most phlegmatic" of 
 them, that he could not describe it, for fear of being sus 
 pected of exaggeration. 1 
 
 1 Etats-Unis, t. 4, No. 19 : Doniol La Participation de la France, iii. 303. 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D^ESTAIXG. 409 
 
 The Marquis de La Fayette was, at the time of the 
 arrival of the French fleet, with General Washington, 
 who was marching with his main army, in three divisions, 
 of which La Fayette commanded one, through New Jersey 
 toward the Hudson River ; and he had arrived at the 
 camp at Paramus, whence they were just about to cross 
 the Hudson, on the 14th of July, the same day upon 
 which the Commander-in-Chief wrote his first letter to 
 the Comte d Estaing, which was despatched by Lieuten 
 ant-Colonel Laurens, as we have seen above. 
 
 La Fayette hastened to send a message of welcome to 
 his countrymen, in which he expressed something of 
 the happiness and pride with which his heart was full 
 to overflowing. He wrote, on the 14th, a letter to the 
 Comte d Estaing, which appears to have been carried by 
 Colonel Laurens, and which has an especial interest from 
 the postscript, added, as he says himself, at the request of 
 General Washington, in which he mentions several cir 
 cumstances of a personal nature and refers to certain 
 recollections of his home and his family in Auvergne, 
 in order to assure M. d Estaing of the authenticity of 
 his communication, and to give greater credence to the 
 mission of Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, as well as a proof 
 of the genuineness of the despatches of the Commander- 
 in-Chief himself. He went even further, to impress the 
 Comte d Estaing with the genuineness of his letter, and 
 signed it, as he never did any other, with his full name 
 and title : " Gilbert du Motier, M 8 de Lafayette." 
 
 This letter is the beginning of a correspondence between 
 him and the admiral, relating to the successive incidents 
 of the campaign, which extended from the first greeting 
 until the time when the French fleet sailed for the West 
 Indies in October ; and although we do not possess the 
 replies written by the Comte d Estaing, the traces of 
 which are evident, however, from allusions to various 
 subjects that were under discussion between them, these 
 
410 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 letters of La Fayette, taken by themselves, are exceed 
 ingly interesting from the fact that they are, in relation to 
 much that is contained in them, our only sources of infor 
 mation contemporaneous with the events themselves. As 
 testimony bearing upon the incidents of that period of 
 the Revolution given by one of the principal actors, they 
 have for us the value of historical documents. M. de La 
 Fayette, in writing his memoirs many years after that 
 time, passed too lightly over this part of his narrative, 
 the details of which were probably no longer fresh in his 
 mind, and the reader of his extremely interesting descrip 
 tion of the events in which he took part in America must 
 always feel with regret the loss to American history of the 
 fuller account which he might have written, and which he 
 was so well prepared, by his personal experience and his 
 literary attainments, to write, upon his return to France 
 after the war. 1 
 
 La Fayette s first letter to the Comte cPEstaing was as 
 follows : 
 
 " AT THE CAMP NEAR PARAMUS, this 14th of July, 1778. 
 " I have learned with, very great pleasure, Monsieur le Comte, 
 of the arrival of a French fleet upon the coast of America ; I 
 have also an equal pleasure in knowing that you command it ; 
 and this last gives me promise of another, still greater, which is, 
 to hear the news of a victory more important at this juncture, in 
 my opinion, than any other victory could ever have been. I 
 rejoice to think that you are about to deal the first blow to an 
 insolent nation, because I know that you will rightly value the 
 
 1 This series of letters, numbering twenty-seven in all, of dates succeeding 
 one another from the 14th of July to the 20th of October, 1778, was discov 
 ered recently in the Archives of the French Navy, at Paris (Archives de 
 la Marine, B 4 , folios 144 et suivants), by M. Henri Doniol, the distinguished 
 author of the " Histoire de la Participation de la France a FEtablissement 
 des Etats-Unis d Amerique," who immediately appreciated their value, and 
 by whom they were published in extenso, in the " Revue d Histoire diploma 
 tique," sixieme annee, No. 3, in 1892. They appear to have been deposited 
 in the Naval Department by the Comte d Estaing with the other papers 
 relating to his expedition, and their existence was probably unknown to M. 
 de La Fayette himself, as also to the members of his family who published 
 his "MSmoires, Correspondance ct Manuscrits," after his death, in 1837. 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAIXG. 411 
 
 pleasure of humiliating it and because you are sufficiently ac 
 quainted with it to hate it. I have the honor of being united 
 with you in this sentiment as well as by the ties of kindred and 
 by our common origin as Auvergnats, and there is no considera 
 tion in the world that is wanting to make me wish for your suc 
 cess with an ardor which it is impossible for me to express. It is 
 of the highest importance at this moment, for more reasons than 
 one, and I trust, Monsieur le Comte, that I shall soon see that 
 feeling toward you renewed and justified which I saw the English 
 honor you with in London. 
 
 "The news of your arrival, which I had already heard from 
 K"ew York, was confirmed last evening by a letter to me from 
 the President of Congress. I have just replied to him by a mes 
 senger, and I have urged him, as earnestly as possible, not to lose 
 a moment in giving you all the news and all the information that 
 you may be in need of. 
 
 " General Washington will do everything within his power to 
 this end, and you will receive a letter from him at the same time 
 with this. You may count upon him as a man devoted to the 
 French alliance, and as the man who, above all others upon this 
 continent, is disgusted with England. 
 
 "I shall rely upon him to send you the news that I possess; 
 for we have communicated to each other all the information that 
 each of us had, and I could not add anything more. I have sent 
 certain intelligent people to New York, who are sufficiently in 
 the confidence of the English, and I have promised them large 
 rewards if they will bring me an exact list of all the vessels that 
 have sailed or are about to sail, with any other matter which I 
 think you would be glad to know. If I hear of anything im 
 portant, I shall not lose a moment in communicating it to you by 
 every possible means. 
 
 "You will probably have heard of the evacuation of Philadel 
 phia, of the march of General Clinton across Jersey, of the action 
 in which General Washington won the double advantage of re 
 taining the battle-field itself and of inflicting a much greater loss 
 upon the other side ; that march through Jersey must have cost 
 the English, in desertion, in sickness, etc., very nearly two thou 
 sand men. As soon as they had embarked I sent word to the 
 Islands upon two different occasions, as M. de Bouille had re 
 quested me to do. You will certainly be informed that the Eng 
 lish have shipped all the sailors in their port and have armed all 
 their vessels for action, in order to go out and meet you. They 
 have even printed this in their gazette ; and a spy has reported 
 
412 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D^ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 to me that the companies of grenadiers and chasseurs have 
 received orders to join their regiments, which looks like an 
 intention to embark ; he says also that the whole army is in 
 structed to hold itself in readiness. It would be a great pity if 
 they escaped so cheaply ; for if you were to defeat their fleet, 
 and if Admiral Keppel were to be stopped on his way here, they 
 would be in an extremely ugly situation. I leave it to the Gen 
 eral of the army to inform you of his plans ; I shall merely say 
 that we intend to cross the North Eiver and to threaten New 
 York in order to prevent them from stripping themselves of 
 their vessels. The moment that the French flag is seen in the 
 direction of Canada, the half of the inhabitants and the savages 
 will take sides with us. 
 
 1 i If, in talking to you of public affairs, Monsieur le Cointe, I 
 were to take up time in mentioning my own matters, I should 
 tell you how embarrassing is my position here ; for, however 
 agreeable it is to me to be in America, I have always thought, 
 and I have often said so, and written it, here, I should rather be 
 a soldier serving under the French flag than to be a general 
 officer anywhere else. My purpose is, to leave at once for the 
 Islands, for Europe, even for India, if in any one of these three 
 portions of the world we are going to make war. I do not expect 
 to receive any orders ; for I presume there is enough to be done 
 without paying attention to me, but all that I want to know is, 
 whether war has been declared in Europe. 
 
 " If I were not in hope that we shall be able to act in conjunc 
 tion with the fleet, I should go aboard the first vessel I could find 
 and I should ask your permission to follow you in the rear, but 
 as near to you as I could go, that I might be a witness of your 
 success. The army is marching in three divisions ; the one which 
 I command will be the last to cross the river, and I hope to be 
 upon the other side the day after to-morrow. I shall have the 
 honor of writing to you from there. The President of Congress 
 has sent me a printed letter, which doubtless has reached you 
 also, but I shall enclose to you a copy of it with mine. 
 
 "If I can be of service to you, Monsieur le Comte, command 
 me 5 the more you give me to do for you the happier you will 
 make me. The opportunity of being useful, even in the smallest 
 matter, to my native land, which is dearer to me every day that 
 I realize its excellence above all other countries, will always 
 give me the greatest happiness, and I shall also feel an especial 
 pleasure in proving to you my desire to assist you. 
 
 "I hope you may defeat them, Monsieur le Comte ; I hope you 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D*ESTAING. 413 
 
 may send them to the bottom, that you may lay them as low now 
 as they have been insolent before. I hope you may now begin 
 the great work of their destruction, which shall place their nation 
 under the feet of our own. I hope you will show them, to their 
 cost, what a Frenchman can do, a Frenchman and an Auvergnat ! 
 That you may do them as much injury as they wish to do us, is 
 the sincere wish of him who, craving your pardon for the length 
 of his letter, has the honor to be, with the greatest desire to 
 merit some part in your friendship, and with the most respectful 
 attachment, Monsieur le Conite, your very humble and very obe 
 dient servant, 
 
 "THE M 19 DE LAFAYETTE. 
 
 i, . 
 
 P.S. I have this moment arrived at the head -quarters, 
 Monsieur le Conite, and I learn with extreme pleasure that you 
 are now in a position to embarrass seriously the plans of Gen 
 eral Clinton and of Lord Howe. I trust that this will end in a 
 very brilliant manner. General Washington is about to send you 
 Colonel Laurens, his aide-de-camp, to carry his despatches. That 
 is a secret which he has not confided to any one except me, for 
 fear of accident, but he wishes me to send you at the same time 
 some sign by which you will recognize the authenticity of this 
 message. I do not believe that you know my handwriting, but 
 when I refer to our lands in Auvergne, to my chateau of Cha- 
 vaniac, to the fine estate of Pont-du-Chateau and the excellent 
 salmon-fishing that belong to M. de Montboissier ; when I mention 
 Madame de Chavaniac and Mile, du Motier, my aunts, as well as 
 the marriage of my cousin with M. d Abos; these little family 
 details will enable you to recognize me as a genuine Auvergnat. 
 I wish also that you would soon acquaint us with your hand 
 writing, or with a cipher that will protect us from being caught 
 by some deception. Allow me to present to you Colonel Laurens, 
 a confidential aide-de-camp of General Washington, and the son 
 of the President of Congress. He is a young gentleman of in 
 telligence and of attainments, who has the most ardent love for 
 his country. You will give the General and the Congress great 
 pleasure by receiving him witli distinction, and it will have a good 
 effect in many wai/s. You may talk to him confidentially of any 
 thing that you may think proper to communicate to General 
 Washington, because it is quite as if you were speaking to the 
 General himself, who intrusts to him his most important secrets. 
 
 "Adieu, Monsieur le Conite; here is along letter indeed. I 
 trust that Colonel Laurens will bring us back the news of some 
 successful movement or the proposition of some plan that gives 
 
414 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 promise of brilliant results and in connection with which I may 
 be happy enough at last to shed my blood for my country and to 
 be acknowledged by her. 
 
 "I shall end this enormous epistle by signing my name in full, 
 " GILBERT DU MOTIER, M s DE LAFAYETTE. 
 
 A few days later he wrote to the Comte d Estaing, in 
 order to present to him, in the same manner, Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Alexander Hamilton, whom General Washington 
 was sending, as we have seen, with his second letter, to 
 the French admiral i 1 
 
 "AT THE HEAD QUARTERS, NEAR KINGS FERRY, 17 July, 1778. 
 
 "I have already had the honor of writing to you, Monsieur 
 le Comte, a long letter, of which the greater part was probably 
 tedious, and for which I beg to apologize again. My delight at 
 knowing that you are here, and my desire to assure you of a 
 devotion on my part which I earnestly wish may be useful to 
 you, led me to take up my pen, and General Washington obliged 
 me to add, to a letter that was already too long, a quantity of 
 details which certainly must have made it ridiculous ; but he 
 greatly feared that you would doubt the genuineness of his de 
 spatches, and, as he knew that I have the honor to belong to your 
 house and to the province in which it originated, he insisted that 
 I should recite my name, my surname, etc., as well as other par 
 ticular details which not only the English do not know, but with 
 which I am not sure that you are very well acquainted yourself. 
 
 "I take the liberty to-day of writing two words to you in 
 order to present to you Colonel Hamilton, aide-de-camp to Gen 
 eral Washington, who is intrusted with important despatches and 
 who asked to be introduced to you by me. The proofs of his 
 ability which the General has had, as well as his friendship 
 toward him and his confidence in him, have placed him in a posi 
 tion to know all the circumstances of our present situation ; and 
 his own knowledge, added to a quickness of perception which is 
 by no means common, will enable him, I think, to satisfy you 
 in regard to all the information which it is possible to give 
 you. I shall not add any matter of that kind here ; it is all 
 contained in the General s letter, or it has been communicated 
 to Mr. Hamilton, who is perhaps the most capable man of the 
 whole army to convey it to you. 
 
 1 Revue d Histoire diplomatique, sixieme annee, No. 3, p. 407. 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D*ESTAIXG. 415 
 
 " Whatever may be the operations that you determine upon, 
 permit me to renew my most ardent wishes for their success, 
 which are inspired not only by the adoration of our native land 
 which proceeds from my heart, and which every man worthy of 
 the honor of being a Frenchman must feel, but also by an especial 
 interest which I take in your glory. It would be the highest 
 degree of pleasure for me if I were permitted to be a witness of 
 this, before the receipt of orders, or the absence of orders, obliged 
 me to join the French standard in another part of the world. 
 
 "I have the honor to be, with the most respectful attachment, 
 Monsieur le Cointe, your very humble and very obedient servant, 
 
 i LAFAYETTE. 
 
 "P.S. Monsieur de Chouin, who arrived from Philadelphia 
 this morning, is writing to you at this moment, and I believe 
 his presence is very useful here. Of the different projects that 
 have been suggested to you, that of entering New York, if it is 
 possible, has such immense advantages over the rest that I doubt 
 not you will prefer it, and I am persuaded that you should a$k 
 especially to be supported either by the whole or by some part 
 of our army at all points where its aid may be of service to you." 
 
 Whilst these letters and the despatches were on their 
 way to the Comte d Estaing by the hands of Colonel Lau- 
 rens and Colonel Alexander Hamilton, the French fleet 
 was in a situation which was growing more difficult every 
 day. After a voyage which had kept them at sea for 
 three months, the ships were almost out of provisions ; 
 the flour that still remained was spoiling, and there was 
 scarcely any water left to drink. The mission of Major 
 de Choin to Congress was largely for the purpose of ex 
 plaining these necessities and of obtaining fresh supplies, 
 if possible ; but, after considerable delay attendant upon 
 his journey, which occupied two days and two nights be 
 fore he reached Philadelphia, and the loss of two days 
 more before he could see the President of Congress, he 
 was obliged to report that he had met with very meagre 
 success. For, in spite of the cordial willingness of the 
 Congress and of the people of Philadelphia to come to 
 his assistance, the city was almost stripped of every sort 
 
416 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ? ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 of provision, and the country about it, which had felt 
 the ravages of the war, produced little or nothing. M. 
 Gerard, the French minister, reported that, while it was 
 impossible to make more strenuous efforts in regard to 
 everything that concerned the French fleet than he 
 saw being made in Philadelphia, the resources at hand 
 available for the purpose were almost null. So that the 
 admiral had a double reason in leaving the Delaware, 
 namely, to meet the enemy and to replenish the water 
 and supplies at Sandy Hook. 1 
 
 He was without pilots who knew the coast, and he had 
 no means of communicating with the shore, which, in 
 deed, was rendered especially difficult by the fact that the 
 British outposts threatened any landing party, while he 
 and all his people were total strangers to the country. As 
 he lay with his fleet outside of Sandy Hook, his anchorage 
 was extremely difficult ; he was exposed to the roughness 
 of the sea, which caused his cables to cut very quickly, 
 and he was in danger of being driven upon the shore 
 at any moment if a gale were to overtake him in that 
 position. In the mean time, whilst his officers and men 
 were patiently enduring their hardships in the hope that 
 each succeeding day would bring them the opportunity 
 they sought of engaging with the common enemy for the 
 liberties of America and for the glory of France, they 
 were perfectly helpless unless they could co-operate with 
 the Continental army in the development of a plan of 
 campaign which might be agreed upon ; and it had now 
 become an absolute necessity to obtain in some manner a 
 means of communication with Congress and with General 
 Washington. In the face of the difficulties and dangers 
 by which he was surrounded, the personal conduct of the 
 admiral upon this occasion is of more than common inter- 
 
 1 D Estaing s Official Report to the Secretary of the French Navy, 
 Archives de la Marine, B 4 141, folios 227 et suiv. : Doniol, La Participation cle 
 la France, iii. 447. 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAIXG. 417 
 
 est as an historical incident in connection with his un 
 fortunate expedition to America, for which he has been 
 freely criticised and found fault with at home and abroad, 
 because what followed affords us one of those rare glimpses 
 into the merits of human action which of themselves go 
 far toward reflecting the character of men, and proves 
 beyond doubt, if other proof were lacking, that M. d Es- 
 taing was an earnest soldier and a man of courage. He 
 announced that, as he was unwilling to expose any man 
 under his command to dangers that he was not ready 
 to share, and in view of the critical situation of the fleet, 
 he had determined to go ashore himself. Setting out, 
 therefore, in a row-boat with a small force of soldiers and 
 sailors, who accompanied him in boats, he made his way 
 through extremely rough water to the Shrewsbury River, 
 the entrance to which lie discovered after great difficulty 
 and at the cost of the lives of one of his officers and a 
 number of sailors and the destruction of several boats. 
 
 As a result of this effort, he was fortunate enough to 
 meet with Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, who bore with 
 him the letters of General Washington and of the Marquis 
 de La Fayette, and from whom he obtained, to his great 
 relief, the information he sought as to the General s plans 
 of operation, with the welcome news that measures were 
 then being carried out to furnish him with water and 
 provisions, as well as with pilots to conduct his ships 
 into New York harbor. Shortly afterward, Colonel Alex 
 ander Hamilton arrived with further letters from head 
 quarters, and united with Colonel Laurens witli unremit 
 ting industry to further the interests of the fleet and to 
 collect suitable pilots for the ships. A small quantity of 
 fresh water was conveyed aboard, in spite of the difficulty 
 of transportation, and a supply of provisions sufficient 
 to prevent absolute want among the crews, who were now 
 suffering, in the midst of their other difficulties, with the 
 scurvy, which had broken out virulently among them. 
 
 VOL. I. 21 
 
418 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAIXG. [1778. 
 
 The most serious want at the moment was that of pilots 
 who knew the channel : many who had been employed by 
 the British refused their services, and nearly all who could 
 be found near New York were so disaffected that they had 
 no desire to aid the French admiral. The Marquis de La 
 Fayette succeeded at last in inducing one of them who 
 had brought Lord Howe s vessels into port to consent to 
 act, though greatly against his will and not until La Fay 
 ette had promised to send him in a carriage, on account 
 of an illness which he probably exaggerated in order 
 to escape this duty. 1 La Fayette wrote to the Comte 
 d Estaing, from King s Ferry, on the 18th of July, and 
 sent his aide-de-camp, Mr. Nevill, to carry the letter and 
 to announce to the admiral the coming of this pilot. 2 
 
 Thus, while the President of Congress, the Commander- 
 in-Chief, the Marquis de La Fayette, Colonel Hamilton, 
 Colonel Laurens, and very many others loyal to the 
 American cause, were employing every possible means to 
 unite the Continental forces and those of our allies, com 
 munication was established, plans were agreed upon, and 
 the prospect of victory grew bright. The Comte d Es- 
 taing s fleet was greatly superior in armament, and in 
 the number of men it carried, to that of the British ad 
 miral. It was ready for immediate action, M. d Estaing s 
 theory of naval warfare being that the advantage would 
 be gained by a sudden appearance before the place to be 
 attacked and by a rapid stroke which should allow no 
 time for preparing defence ; and the great French men- 
 of-war lay just outside of New York harbor, where the 
 English flag could plainly be seen floating from the masts 
 of hundreds of vessels of various kinds. 
 
 1 Major de Choin wrote to the admiral that, "with the best countenance 
 in the world, he refuses to go ahoard of you, under pretext of a fever, which 
 I wish I had in his place, if it be true that he has it." 
 
 2 La Fayette to the Comte d Estaing, 18 July, Eevue d Histoire diploma 
 tique, ut supra, p. 407. 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D^ESTAING. 419 
 
 For one moment the case of the British in America 
 seemed desperate ; but the next instant the Comte d Es- 
 taing s ill luck intervened to respite them from impend 
 ing evil. It was the unanimous decision of the pilots 
 that the larger of the French ships drew too much water 
 to admit of their being taken across the bar ; and, how 
 ever unwelcome this news was to the French captains, it 
 was found, to their intense disappointment, that it was 
 true. The Comte d Estaing, unwilling to admit the pos 
 sibility of a reverse so absolutely destructive of all his 
 hopes, after having offered fifty thousand French ecus to 
 any pilot who should take them over, made the soundings 
 of the channel himself, and was forced to admit that he 
 must abandon the attempt. 1 His heavy ships of seventy- 
 four, like the Languedoc, drew two or three feet more than 
 the English men-of-war of the same class, which, he was 
 assured by the pilots, never crossed the bar without re 
 moving some of their guns ; and of course he could not 
 afford to do that in the face of an enemy. Therefore, 
 after having lain for eleven days at the entrance to the 
 harbor, he reluctantly admitted that he could not hope 
 to win a victory at New York ; and, with the sad reflec 
 tion that "it is terrible to be within sight of your object 
 and yet to be unable to attain it," he weighed anchor 
 and once more put to sea. In addition to the dangers 
 which made his position off Sandy Hook untenable was 
 the news which Congress sent an American vessel to 
 
 1 " Lcs marges dcs mortes caux quc la cartte dc la do la War specific, tandis 
 que celle de la riviere d Hudson se tait sur cet objet important, ne sont que 
 de quatre pieds et demi anglais qui valient 4 pieds 2 ponces 9 lignes francais. 
 Ce total ne donnerait done a la mer hautte qu 23 pieds 11 pouces. Le tirant 
 d eau du Languedoc est de 22 pieds six ixnices ; celui du Tonnant est de 23 
 pieds 10 pouces, et tons les vaisseaux de 74 de 1 escadre tirent de 21 a 22 
 pieds d eau ; eux seuls peuvent avoir quelleque superiority sur le nombre 
 des vaisseaux de 64 et de cinquante qu ont les Anglais." Correspondence 
 between the Comte d Estaing and M. Gerard, on board the Languedoc, at 
 Sea, 22d June, 1778 ; Archives de la Marine, B* 143, fol. 12 : Doniul, La Par 
 ticipation de la France, iii. 243. 
 
420 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 convey to him, and which reached him there, of the sail 
 ing from England of the strong British armament under 
 Admiral Byron, who might be expected very shortly to 
 arrive, and if this force were united with that of Lord 
 Howe the two would present so formidable an array that 
 M. d Estaing could not hope to compete with them. 
 
 The plan which General Washington proposed in the 
 event of failure at New York which he appears to have 
 anticipated from the reports he had received as to the 
 impediment likely to be presented to the larger French 
 ships of the line by the shallow water on the bar was an 
 attack upon Newport, where the British had established 
 a garrison of six thousand men, with several vessels in 
 the harbor. The capture of this point in co-operation 
 with the land forces of the United States, whilst General 
 Washington, from his position at White Plains, should 
 threaten Sir Henry Clinton and prevent him from ex 
 posing New York by sending reinforcements, and the 
 destruction of the British frigates anchored at Newport, 
 would have been an achievement of which the allies 
 might well feel proud, and would have been a serious 
 blow to British supremacy in America. M. d Estaing an 
 nounced to General Washington through Colonel Ham 
 ilton, whom he had detained until a definite conclusion 
 should be reached, that he should now prepare for the 
 attack upon Newport, an operation which had the double 
 advantage of bringing his forces into direct communica 
 tion with those of the American army and of according 
 exactly with the tenor of the instructions which he had 
 brought with him from France. He sailed from Sandy 
 Hook on the 23d of July, just as the indications of an 
 approaching storm would have obliged him to weigh 
 anchor in any event ; and on the 29th of the month he 
 arrived before Khode Island with his fleet drawn up in 
 order of battle ready to force a passage into Newport, 
 and came to anchor outside of Brenton s Ledge, five 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. 421 
 
 miles below the town. Upon the receipt by General 
 Washington of the letter which M. d Estaing had sent 
 him by the hand of Colonel Alexander Hamilton, from 
 the Languedoc, before leaving Sandy Hook, he wrote 
 to the admiral as follows : l 
 
 "HEAD QUARTERS, 22 July, 1778. 
 
 "SiR, I this moment received the letter, which you did me 
 the honor of writing by Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton. I cannot 
 forbear regretting that the brilliant enterprise, which you at first 
 meditated, was frustrated by physical impossibilities ; but I hope 
 that something equally worthy of the greatness of your senti 
 ments is still in reserve for you. Upon the report made to me 
 by Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, of the depth of water at Sandy 
 Hook, and the draught of your ships of the line, I thought that 
 no time was to be lost in marching a reinforcement to General 
 Sullivan, that he might be in a situation for a vigorous cooper 
 ation. I am happy to find, that we coincided so exactly in the 
 importance of this expedition. 
 
 "Mr. Laurens, who will have the honor of delivering you this, 
 will inform you of my opinion relative to the stationing of a ship 
 of the line in the Sound, as well as of other particulars, which I 
 have communicated to him. I shall not therefore employ your 
 attention farther than to assure you, that you have inspired me 
 with the same sentiments for you, which you are so good as to 
 entertain for me, and that it will be my greatest happiness to con 
 tribute to the service of our great ally in pursuing our common 
 enemy, and to the glory of an officer, who has on every account 
 so just a claim to it, as the Count d Estiiing." 
 
 The Commander-in-Chief had sent orders to General 
 Sullivan, who at this time commanded in Rhode Island, 
 directing him to apply, in the most urgent manner, to 
 the States of Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Connec 
 ticut, to make up a body of live thousand men, inclu 
 sive of those he already had with him, in order to be 
 ready at all points and for all events ; also to establish 
 suitable magazines of provisions and to collect proper 
 boats for a descent. 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, vi. 12. 
 
422 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ? ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 He also determined to send forward as a reinforcement 
 to General Sullivan such a part of his Continental troops 
 as he could reasonably spare without weakening too 
 greatly his own position, and to intrust the command of 
 it to the Marquis de La Fayette. Accordingly he issued 
 to La Fayette the following order i 1 
 
 "WHITE PLAINS, 22 July, 1778. 
 
 " SIR, You are to have the immediate command of that detach 
 ment from this army, which consists of Glover s and Varnum s 
 brigades, and the detachment under the command of Colonel 
 Henry Jackson. You are to march them, with all convenient 
 expedition and by the best routes, to Providence in the State of 
 Ehode Island. When there, you are to subject yourself to the 
 orders of Major- General Sullivan, who will have the command of 
 the expedition against Newport, and the British and other troops 
 in their pay on that and the islands adjacent. 
 
 "If on your march you should receive certain intelligence of 
 the evacuation of Ehode Island by the enemy, you are immedi 
 ately to countermarch for this place, giving me the earliest advice 
 thereof. Having the most perfect reliance on your activity and 
 zeal, and wishing you all the success, honor, and glory, that your 
 heart can wish, I am, with the most perfect regard, yours, &c. 77 
 
 It is very likely that La Fayette had solicited this 
 command, or, at least, that he had sought from the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief an opportunity to serve with whatever 
 detachment of the army should be sent to co-operate with 
 the French troops, although our documents do not prove 
 this. At all events, he eagerly accepted the command 
 now offered him, and, exhilarated by the prospect of the 
 glorious results which appeared to be but a little way 
 off, he started with his men for Providence, his only 
 source of discomfort being the fear that he might arrive 
 too late for the action. Just before setting out, he wrote 
 the following letter to the Comte d Estaing : 2 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, vi. 8. 
 
 2 Revue d Histoire diplomatique, ut supra, p. 407. 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAIXG. 423 
 
 "AT THE HEAD QUARTERS, 22 July. 
 
 "I have this moment received, Monsieur le Comte, the letter 
 that you have done me the honor to write to me by Mr. KeviH. 
 Colonel Hamilton has not yet arrived. The kindness you have 
 shown to me inspires me with an earnest desire to merit your 
 esteem and some part also of your friendship. You have used 
 expressions of compliment toward me which, even after making 
 the proper deductions on behalf of your politeness, are still ten 
 thousand times too great for my slender deserts. But, at the risk 
 of sinking in your estimation after you have come to know me 
 more fully, my feelings toward you so far control my self-esteem 
 that I am delighted at the hope of seeing you soon and of fight 
 ing under your eye. 
 
 "Mr. Laurens will tell you where I am going and what I am 
 doing, and your Frenchman s heart will feel how happy I am. 
 I am leaving my detachment at White Plains with very sincere 
 pleasure, to command the detachment of which you will hear. 
 You have filled me with joy, Monsieur le Comte, by holding out 
 to me the flattering hope that I shall go into action with the 
 infantry that you have on board. I have never heard any news 
 since I came into the world that gave me greater pleasure. I 
 am setting out with this flattering anticipation ; and I am most 
 anxious to deserve the friendship and esteem of our gallant and 
 beloved countrymen. I have never before realized the charm 
 of our profession, Monsieur le Comte, as I do now that I am to be 
 allowed to practise it in company with Frenchmen. I have never 
 wished so much for the ability that I have not, or for the experi 
 ence that I shall obtain in the next twenty years, if God spares 
 my life and allows us to have war. No doubt it is amusing to 
 you to see me presented as a general officer ; I confess that I am 
 forced myself to smile sometimes at the idea, even in this country, 
 where people do not smile so readily as we do at home. 
 
 "I beg you, in the name of your own love of glory, do not 
 begin the operations before we arrive ; I shall hasten the march of 
 my troops as much as possible. I am bound to stay with them, 
 otherwise I should precede Mr. Laurens. This reinforcement will 
 go far toward assuring our success, as you will see by the account 
 that is to be given to you. I declare that if I were to arrive too 
 late I should want to go and hang myself. 
 
 "Adieu, Monsieur le Comte. I am very much hurried ; I am 
 not given time enough to finish my scribbling, still less to write in 
 cipher ; for General Washington is anxious to see his aide-de 
 camp set out. The last words in your letter are entirely in accord 
 
424 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAES T G. [1778. 
 
 with my wishes, and I have an idea upon this subject which I 
 shall humbly ask your permission to submit when we are able to 
 see each other. 
 
 i I love you tenderly, Monsieur le Cornte ; you are the man 
 whom I should have asked for at the head of this fleet, and the 
 man who satisfies my heart ; though this does not prevent rue 
 from entertaining the consideration and respect for you which 
 I owe you for so many reasons. In the mean time, as a result 
 of this respect and of the honor and gratification it is to me to 
 obey you, I shall conclude by assuring you simply of my very 
 sincere attachment and of my very sincere wishes for success and 
 for the glory of the French name." 
 
 Two days later, when he was upon his march toward 
 Providence, he wrote again to M. d Estaing a letter which 
 he sent by Mr. Nevill : l 
 
 11 AT STAMPFORT, 16 miles from White Plains, 
 "24 July, 1778, at noon. 
 
 "This letter is intrusted, Monsieur le Comte, to the same mes 
 senger who, uniting to his ordinary zeal the strongest gratitude 
 for the kindness you have done him the honor to show him, 
 will not delay in handing it to you. You have received one by 
 the hand of Mr. Laurens, written in haste, in which I informed 
 you of all the happiness I am anticipating, and of the flattering 
 prospects which will support me during niy journey, provided 
 that you consider our detachment worth being waited for, which I 
 hope most earnestly. I have the honor to enclose to you herewith 
 a letter which was sent to me last night by your correspondent. 
 
 "I was detained for two days at the head- quarters waiting for 
 Mr. Hamilton, and, as he may have been delayed by some acci 
 dent, I decided to start before his coining, in order not to retard 
 my own arrival and that of my companions at the destination 
 where I am burning to be. I was unable to take leave of Gen 
 eral Washington until very late yesterday. The troops are thirty 
 miles beyond this place, in advance of me, and I am going to 
 join them in order to hasten them. I have written to the officer 
 in command at the place where Mr. Nevill is going, to ask him to 
 use every means to enable him to reach you ; he will return and 
 bring me word from you, unless you have other orders for him. 
 The subject about which I have spoken to you in my first ciphers 
 
 1 Revue d Histoire diplomatique, ut supra, p. 409. 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D^ESTAIXG. 425 
 
 causes me the greatest solicitude, and I confess to you that I shall 
 not have a moment s peace until he comes back to reassure me. I 
 have proposed to General Sullivan that, if he is in a hurry, I shall 
 join him with the most active men from the different regiments. 
 
 "Mr. de Chouin will certainly have informed you that some 
 vessels were seen two days ago which alarmed us upon certain 
 accounts that you will readily understand ; but we have heard 
 nothing further, and we hope that these gentlemen are too much 
 occupied to think of everything. I flatter myself that in a 
 very few days I shall be at the end of my journey. 
 
 "The more I think of the word you have sent me, Monsieur le 
 Comte, the happier I am. I have expressed to M. de Chouin an 
 idea which he believes to be in accord with what he knows to be 
 your purpose, and I am extremely proud. I promise you to use 
 the greatest discretion toward both the Americans and the French 
 men ; it is a measure much more necessary here than anywhere 
 else, for very many reasons. 
 
 " Adieu, Monsieur le Comte. I trust I may soon hear from you 
 and receive a confirmation of the flattering hopes of which my 
 heart is full. Why can I not march as fast as my thoughts, or at 
 least as fast as you can go into action and win the victory f I shall 
 have the honor of writing to you again within two or three days. 
 Nothing has assured me of your kindness toward me, I make bold 
 to say, of your friendship, so much as the amusing criticisms that 
 you make of my talents as a general. I have no greater ambition, 
 Monsieur le Comte, than to appear to you worthy of being a 
 French soldier and of serving as such under your orders. 
 
 "As obedience and respect are two of the three forms of 
 homage which my heart loves to present to you, I shall content 
 myself here with offering you my warm attachment. 
 
 "LAFAYETTE. 
 
 "I beg you to excuse the awkwardness and the bad construc 
 tion of my ciphers ; I am very new at this business, and I fear 
 I have made them as unintelligible to you as they would be to 
 Mylord Howe. 
 
 "I saw a gentleman yesterday who had seen another who told 
 him that he had seen a French vessel which had come to Boston 
 in thirty-six days, by which he had learned that Admiral Keppell 
 had been to inspect the English fleet which it was intended to 
 assign to him, and that he had found it in so bad a condition, 
 both as to the vessels themselves and as to the class of sailors who 
 were on board, that he had refused the command." 
 
426 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 In the mean time, General Washington had decided, 
 upon reflection, after La Fayette had set out with his 
 detachment, that the operation would be strengthened 
 and its chances of success increased if Major-General 
 Greene were assigned to take part in it, not only because 
 of his confidence in that officer s devotion and skill, and 
 of the close friendship that existed between him and 
 the Commander-in-Chief, but also because Greene was a 
 native of Rhode Island and his familiarity with its situ 
 ation and its resources would be of very great service. 
 General Greene himself was extremely anxious to take 
 part in this expedition now about to be made almost 
 within sight of his home, which he had not seen for more 
 than three years, having been for that time in constant 
 active service with the Continental army ; and while his 
 duties as Quartermaster-General would be likely to bring 
 him into close connection with the operations, he was not 
 satisfied with merely that share in the promised success, 
 but desired to be present in his capacity also of a com 
 manding officer. 1 
 
 General Washington acceded to General Greene s wish, 
 therefore ; but, as there were no troops who could properly 
 be spared from the ranks of the main army for this pur 
 pose, the only way by which this could be accomplished 
 was to give him command of part of the troops already 
 detached for service in Rhode Island, dividing the com 
 mand which had been assigned to the Marquis de La 
 Fayette. The Commander-in-Chief wrote accordingly to 
 La Fayette to announce to him this disposition of the 
 forces, in an interesting letter which strikingly illus 
 trates the tender consideration which Washington always 
 entertained for the feelings of the younger man. This 
 letter, which was carried by General Greene, was as 
 follows : 2 
 
 1 Greene s Life of Greene, vol. ii. chap. iii. 
 
 2 Sparks, Writings of Washington, vi. 22. 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D*ESTAING. 427 
 
 "HEAD QUARTERS, WHITE PLAINS, 
 "27 July, 1778. 
 
 "DEAR MARQUIS, 
 
 "This will be delivered to you by Major-General Greene, whose 
 thorough knowledge of Ehode Island, of which he is a native, 
 and the influence he will have with the people, put it in his power 
 to be particularly useful in the expedition against that place ; as 
 well in providing necessaries for carrying it on, as in assisting to 
 form and execute a plan of operations proper for the occasion. 
 The honor and the interest of the common cause are so deeply 
 concerned in the success of this enterprise, that it appears to me 
 of the greatest importance to omit no step, which may conduce to 
 it 5 and General Greene on several accounts will be able to render 
 very essential services. 
 
 "These considerations have determined me to send him on the 
 expedition, in which, as he could not with propriety act nor be 
 equally useful merely in his official capacity of quartermaster- 
 general, I have concluded to give him a command in the troops to 
 be employed in the descent. I have therefore directed General 
 Sullivan to throw all the American troops, both Continental, State, 
 and militia, into two divisions, making an equal distribution of 
 each, to be under the immediate command of General Greene and 
 yourself. The Continental troops being divided in this manner 
 with the militia, will serve to give them confidence, and probably 
 make them act better than they would alone. Though this 
 arrangement will diminish the number of Continental troops 
 under you, yet this diminution will be more than compensated by 
 the addition of militia ; and I persuade myself your command 
 will not be less agreeable, or less honorable, from this change in 
 the disposition. I am, with great esteem and affection, dear Mar 
 quis, your most obedient servant." 
 
 The spirit in which the Marquis de La Fayette re 
 ceived this announcement does great honor to his charac 
 ter. It came to him when his most sensitive feelings 
 were engaged in his command. We have witnessed the 
 delight with which he approached the French admiral, 
 and the enthusiasm with which he looked forward to 
 the occasion when he should act in concert with his 
 countrymen under the standard of his King ; we realize 
 very easily the pride with which he was about to present 
 
428 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ? ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 himself to the admiral as an officer of the American 
 army intrusted with the detachment sent to co-operate 
 with him, the young soldier of Metz who had left his 
 country but a short time previously in danger of censure 
 for a step which the Government discountenanced and 
 which his nearest and best counsellors disapproved of, 
 now a major-general, with honor and recognized position 
 in the country whose cause he had adopted, and sent in 
 a certain sense as a representative of the United States to 
 meet the allied troops of France. This was a situation 
 in which it was not agreeable to him to share his glory 
 with another. Yet he replied to General Washington 
 with a graceful acquiescence to his wishes, in a letter 
 dated at Providence on the 6th of August, 1778 : l 
 
 GENERAL, I have received your excellency s favour 
 by General Greene, and have been much pleased with the arrival 
 of a gentleman who, not only on account of his merit, and the 
 justness of his views, but also by his knowledge of the country 
 and his popularity in this State, may be very serviceable to the 
 expedition. I willingly part with the half of my detachment, 
 though I had a great dependence upon them, as you find it con 
 venient to the good of the service. Anything, my dear General, 
 you will order, or even wish, shall always be infinitely agreeable 
 to me, and I will always feel happy in doing anything which 
 may please you, or forward the public good. I am of the same 
 opinion as your excellency, that dividing our continental troops 
 among the militia, will have a better effect than if we were to 
 keep them together in one wing. 
 
 You will receive, by General Sullivan, an account of his dis 
 positions, preparations, &c. ; I, therefore, have nothing to add, 
 but that I have been on board of the Admiral the day before yes 
 terday. I saw among the fleet an ardour and a desire of doing 
 something, which would soon turn into impatience, if we don t 
 give them a speedy occasion of fighting. The officers cannot 
 contain their soldiers and sailors, who are complaining that they 
 have been these four months running after the British, without 
 getting at them 5 but I hope they will soon be satisfied. 
 
 1 La Fayette s Correspondence, American edition, i. 183. 
 
1778.] EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D J ESTAIXG. 429 
 
 "The Count d Estaing was very glad of my arrival, as he 
 could open freely his mind to me. He expressed the greatest 
 anxiety on account of his wants of every kind, provisions, water, 
 &c. ; he hopes the taking of Rhode Island will enable him to get 
 some of the two above-mentioned articles. The admiral wants me 
 to join the French troops to these I command, as soon as possible. 
 I confess I feel very happy to think of my co-operating with 
 them, and, had I contrived in my mind an agreeable dream, I 
 could not have wished a more pleasing event than my joining my 
 countrymen with my brothers of America, under my command, 
 and the same standards. When I left Europe, I was very far 
 from hoping such an agreeable turn of our business in the 
 American glorious revolution. 
 
 " Though I have no account, neither observations, to give your 
 excellency, as I am here a man of war of the third rate, I will, after 
 the expedition, scribble some lines to you, and join to the account 
 of General Sullivan, the assurance that I have all niy limbs, and 
 that I am, with the most tender affection, and entire confidence, 
 yours, with high respect, 
 
 " LAFAYETTE." 
 
 This letter gave very great pleasure to General Wash 
 ington : it enabled him to gratify the desire of General 
 Greene, whose wish for a command in Rhode Island was 
 paramount, by reason of his years of service in the army, 
 his seniority as a major-general, and his character as a 
 man and a soldier whom Washington loved and respected; 
 and it brought him the assurance of the cheerful obedi 
 ence upon the part of La Fayette to which their relations 
 entitled him, and which he hoped for, even under cir 
 cumstances which he knew to be trying to a man of so 
 sensitive a nature. He wrote to him, immediately upon 
 the receipt of it, from White Plains, on the 10th of 
 August, as follows : l 
 
 "MY DEAR MARQUIS, Your favor of the 6th instant, which 
 came to my hands yesterday, afforded a fresh proof of the noble 
 principles on which you act, and has a just claim to my sincere 
 
 1 s 
 
 >parks, Writings of Washington, vi. 27. 
 
430 EXPEDITION OF THE COMTE D ESTAING. [1778. 
 
 and hearty thanks. The common cause, of which you have been 
 a zealous supporter, would, I knew, be benefited by General 
 Greene s presence at Ehode Island, as he is a native of that State, 
 has an interest with the people, and a thorough knowledge of the 
 country ; and therefore I accepted his proffered services ; but I 
 was a little uneasy, lest you should conceive that it was intended 
 to lessen your command. General Greene did not incline to act 
 in a detached part of the army, merely as quarter master- general ; 
 nor was it to be expected. It became necessary, therefore, to give 
 him a detached command, and consequently to divide the Conti 
 nental troops. Your cheerful acquiescence in the measure, after 
 being appointed to the command of the brigades which marched 
 from this army, obviated every difficulty, and gave me singular 
 pleasure. 
 
 1 L I am very happy to find, that the standards of France and 
 America are likely to be united under your command at Ehode 
 Island. I am persuaded, that the supporters of each will be emu 
 lous to acquire honor, and promote your glory upon this occasion. 
 The courier to Count d Estaing is waiting. I have only time 
 therefore to assure you, that with the most perfect esteem and 
 exalted regard I have the honor to be, my dear Marquis, your 
 obedient and affectionate servant." 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 431 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIED FORCES AT NEWPORT. 
 
 AFTER a rapid march of two hundred and forty miles, 
 during which his anxiety to arrive led him to neglect no 
 means of hastening his footsteps, La Fayette reached 
 Providence, with his detachment of two thousand men, 
 on the 4th of August. He found the fleet there, as he 
 had expected, and he learned that every possible effort 
 was being made in Rhode Island and in the other New 
 England States to assemble the militia, but that, up to 
 that time, General Sullivan had but a comparatively small 
 part of the ten thousand men whom he had expected for 
 his share in the operation at Newport, and that, as it was 
 his plan that the fleet and the army should act together, 
 another unfortunate delay must occur, although the Comte 
 d Estaing was quite ready to move to the attack as soon 
 as he should be informed that it was the desire of the 
 American commander to have him do so. The French 
 officers, who earnestly wished to act at once, were ex 
 ceedingly disappointed at this new obstacle in the way 
 of their success ; their impatience was increased by the 
 sufferings aboard the ships, where the scurvy was carrying 
 off very considerable numbers of men, and the lack of 
 fresh water and provisions terribly reduced the strength 
 of the crews. Soon after the fleet came to anchor, General 
 Sullivan went aboard the flag-ship, and, after explaining 
 his position to the admiral, asked for more time in which 
 to make his preparations for the attack. 1 
 
 1 Comte d Estaing to General Washington, 3d August, 1778 ; Archives de 
 la Marine, B 4 146, fol. 57 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, iii. 370. 
 
432 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 The Comte d Estaing concealed under a polite acqui 
 escence to this request the disappointment he felt at the 
 discovery that the army with which he had come to co 
 operate " was still at home," l or that at least the greater 
 part of it had not yet come into the field. He consented, 
 however, to wait, with a determination always to conform 
 to the expressed wishes of the American general, at what 
 ever cost to himself and his men, in order to perform his 
 duty toward the allies of the King ; and he replied to 
 General Sullivan that he understood the uncertainties of 
 war sufficiently well to know that soldiers and sailors must 
 be ready to meet any circumstances that might arise, and 
 that, whether the expected armament should arrive from 
 England, or not, to strengthen the enemy, he should con 
 tinue to do everything in his power to serve the common 
 cause. But he reminded General Sullivan at the same 
 time, with a courteous insistence upon the necessity of 
 action, that every additional day passed by the fleet in 
 idleness was that much less damage to the enemy ; the 
 truth of which was shown by the subsequent discovery 
 that this delay had given them an opportunity to prepare 
 very important measures for defence which materially 
 changed their attitude when the action finally took place. 
 
 The whole British garrison consisted of six thousand 
 men, under the command of Major-General Pigot, the 
 main body of which was intrenched in Newport itself, 
 with a small detachment stationed at the extreme northern 
 end of the island, in some works which had been thrown 
 up to prevent a descent from the adjacent mainland ; and 
 three regiments, aggregating fifteen hundred men, were 
 posted upon Canonicut Island, immediately to the west. 
 The defences upon the island to the north of Newport 
 were composed of two lines of outworks, supported by 
 several redoubts connected with the lines. The first of 
 
 1 Comte d Estaing s Report to the Secretary of the French Navy, ubi supra. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 433 
 
 these lines extended from Easton Pond near to Tomminy 
 Hill, and then turned off to the water on the north side 
 of Windmill Hill. It was defended by five redoubts in 
 front. The second line was more than a quarter of a mile 
 within this, and extended from the sea to the north side 
 of the island, terminating at a battery called the North 
 Battery. On the south, at the entrance by Easton s Beach, 
 was a redoubt which commanded the pass ; and there was 
 still another redoubt about twenty rods on the north. 1 
 
 There are three entrances from the sea to Rhode Island, 
 before which the French fleet was now lying one on the 
 east, called Seconnet, or the Eastern Passage ; one on the 
 west, between the island and Canonicut, called the main 
 channel ; and one on the west of Canonicut, called the 
 West, or Narraganset, Passage. These waters were de 
 fended by several British frigates and a number of small 
 galleys which had been employed as an additional protec 
 tion to the garrison. It was an extremely critical moment 
 for General Pigot when he found himself threatened, as 
 he then was, by forces enormously superior to his own ; 
 indeed, his case would have been hopeless if he had been 
 attacked at once. The French men-of-war, with their 
 heavy armament, could readily have captured the frigates 
 that were locked in the channels and perfectly helpless 
 before such assailants ; the land forces, separated as they 
 were, would have been weakened immediately by the cap 
 ture in detail of fifteen hundred Hessians posted upon 
 Canonicut Island, and the main body of the British at 
 Newport would have been dealt with, under the fire of 
 the fleet in the East Passage and the main channel, by 
 the land forces under General Sullivan. He had then 
 three thousand Continental troops, counting those who 
 had come with the Marquis de La Fayette and General 
 Greene, besides some fifteen hundred to eighteen hundred 
 
 1 General Sullivan to Congress, 31st August, 1778 : Ainory, Life of Sulli 
 van, p. 85. 
 
 VOL. I. J8 
 
434 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 militia ; and the admiral could have landed from his 
 ships between two and three thousand men of French 
 infantry and sailors, namely, four battalions of five 
 hundred men each, and two battalions of infantry. 1 
 
 It is extremely difficult to criticise the conduct of this 
 campaign without incurring the danger of doing injustice 
 if we attempt to fix the responsibility of its failure upon 
 any one of the men who were earnestly striving, in both 
 detachments of the allied forces, to assure its success. 
 The tangled chain of misfortunes which no human fore 
 sight could have prevented leaves a constant doubt in the 
 mind as to the wisdom or lack of wisdom of the plans, 
 which may have been well laid and might have resulted 
 favorably but for this ; and there is every reason to be 
 lieve that General Sullivan loyally strove for the welfare 
 of his country and its cause, according to his best judg 
 ment, in his effort to make the assault by the co-operation 
 of the French and American forces. But it is impossible 
 to doubt that the most favorable moment was lost by him 
 when he asked the Comte d Estaing for a delay which 
 kept the whole French fleet lying idle for nine days 
 before the harbor of Newport. 
 
 It is true, indeed, that the militia were being collected 
 with all diligence from their homes, and were being hur 
 ried together from the different States of New England ; 
 but it must be taken into account that the British were 
 not idle during the respite thus given them, and that 
 General Pigot took every possible advantage of his slen 
 der resources. He abandoned the island of Canonicut 
 and concentrated his strength by bringing over to New 
 port the fifteen hundred Hessians who had been stationed 
 there ; and when it became evident that preparations for 
 
 1 Colonel Fleury to the Comte d Estaing, 5th August, 1778 : Archives de 
 la Marine, B 4 146, folios 121-124 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, iii. 
 373. Journal de Campagne du Marseillais, 24th July, 1778 : Doniol, ibid., iii. 
 341. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 435 
 
 the assault were being made, he either burned or blew up 
 eight British vessels, to prevent them from falling into the 
 hands of the allies. 1 
 
 Not the least important advantage gained by General 
 Pigot from this unexpected delay was the opportunity 
 given to the British spies, whose service was far better 
 organized than the similar means of obtaining informa 
 tion in the Continental army at Rhode Island, to carry 
 to New York a detailed account of the situation from day 
 to day, by which Lord Howe was enabled to arrive with 
 his fleet in relief of the garrison at the very moment 
 when the combined attack w r as about to be made. Oddly 
 enough, the American commander seems to have left out 
 of his calculations the likelihood that, whilst he was pre 
 paring with careful deliberation to invest one of the 
 strongest British positions in America and to capture one 
 of the most important garrisons, Sir Henry Clinton and 
 Admiral Howe were aware of his movements and would 
 set on foot a counter-movement ; and, being in total igno 
 rance of their purposes, as he appears to have supposed 
 they were of his, the arrival of the British fleet struck 
 him with amazement. " Unexpected, miraculous, and 
 surprising as General Sullivan considered the appearance 
 of this fleet, which he has done me the honor to declare 
 to me in his letter of the 10th of August," said the Comte 
 d Estaing, " nevertheless its existence was a fact." 
 
 In the mean time, the Marquis de La Fayette, whose 
 feeling toward General Sullivan was one of consideration 3 
 and respect which inspired him with an earnest desire to 
 
 1 These were the corvette King Fisher, of sixteen guns, and two galleys?, 
 the Spitfire and the Lamb, in the East Passage ; the frigates Orpheus, Lark, 
 and Juno, each of thirty-two, Cerberus, twenty-eight, and Falcon, fourteen, in 
 the West Passage. (Comte d Estaing s official Report to the Secretary of the 
 French Navy, ubi supra.) 
 
 2 Comte d Estaing to Congress, 26th August, 1778 ; Archives de la Marine, 
 B* No. 146, folios 60-69 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, iii. 384-392. 
 
 8 See La Fayette s letter to Sullivan, in Amory s Life of Sullivan, p. 73. 
 
436 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 co-operate with him in arranging the details of the assault, 
 was incessantly engaged in conveying from the shore to 
 the fleet, and from the fleet back to the head-quarters, in 
 formation and messages, counsels to the French officers 
 which his acquaintance with America and American cus 
 toms enabled him to render of great value to his country 
 men, and assurances from the Comte d Estaing of his 
 understanding of, and acquiescence in, the proposals of 
 General Sullivan. His letters of the 5th and 8th of Au 
 gust clearly indicate the variety of subjects which occupied 
 his attention, as well as the great personal activity with 
 which he performed his mission as ambassador between 
 the allied forces : the distribution of the troops at the time 
 of the attack, the supply of field artillery, of boats for 
 landing, of water for the ships, of bricks with which to 
 build ovens in order that the crews might bake bread out 
 of the little flour that still remained of the four months 
 provisions brought from France, and which was in danger 
 of spoiling if it were not soon used, these, and very 
 many other details, show themselves in his almost daily 
 correspondence with the admiral. 
 
 La Fayette s own personal relations to the French fleet 
 were, under his peculiar circumstances, the cause of some 
 uncertainty to him upon his approach to it, and of no little 
 anxiety as to his reception. Having left France under 
 the ban of the lettre-de-cachet which he had wilfully dis 
 obeyed, he was still subject to the King s orders given to 
 all commanders of vessels to seize him and bring him back 
 a prisoner ; and, if the letter of the law were to be strictly 
 followed, he might be looked upon as a deserter. It is 
 true, of course, as we have already seen, that the French 
 Government had no desire to act harshly with him. To 
 the Comte de Vergennes La Fayette s coming to America 
 was merely an escapade that called for no very serious 
 attention beyond the official steps which reasons of state, 
 in the international relations between France and Great 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 437 
 
 Britain, made necessary at the time. His reception in the 
 United States and his career as an American officer had 
 already made him a hero in France, and the declaration of 
 war by France removed the responsibility for his actions 
 which the Cabinet had made a show of assuming to the 
 British Ambassador at Versailles. Although La Fayette 
 felt that the pardon of the King would probably be granted 
 him without much difficulty upon his return, he deemed it 
 important to prepare the way for this by reporting himself 
 through the admiral to the Secretary of War, and an 
 nouncing to him where he then was, with the request that 
 he might be allowed to stay in America as long as the 
 Comte d Estaing was here. 1 But M. d Estaing had no 
 hesitation in giving a warm welcome to this young noble 
 man, his own relative and countryman, whose generous 
 nature enlisted his entire sympathy and of whose suc 
 cess he was undoubtedly proud. He wrote to him im 
 mediately upon hearing that he had been ordered to join 
 the forces at Newport, in a letter which he sent from the 
 Languedoc by Major Nevill on the 31st of July : " I 
 shall await you, Monsieur le Marquis, with the greatest 
 impatience. It is you who have turned public opinion in 
 our favor and who are now bringing us aid ; a service of 
 prime necessity. You will be able to restore vitality to 
 us ;" and, assuming that La Fayette would take a fore 
 most part in the operations about to be undertaken, he 
 congratulated him in advance : " You will have won a 
 still larger share of glory when I have the honor of 
 embracing you : how much that will console us for !" 
 
 Soon after his arrival at Providence, La Fayette left 
 his camp and went to present himself to the French ad 
 miral aboard the flag-ship, taking with him such of the 
 
 1 La Fayette to the Comte d Estaing, 31st August: Revue d Histoire 
 diplomatique, sixiome anne, No. 3, p. 426. 
 
 2 Archives de la Marine, B* 146, fol. 55: Doniol, La Participation de la 
 France, iii. 338. 
 
438 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 French officers as were then serving in the Continental 
 army and happened to be near enough to accept an invi 
 tation to accompany him. It was the morning of the 4th 
 of August when he made this visit, an interesting note of 
 which was entered in the Journal of the Languedoc kept 
 by the Comte de Cambis, one of M. d Estaing s officers, 
 and is still preserved in the Archives of the French Navy. 
 Arriving on board at nine o clock in the morning, La 
 Fayette was received with the most cordial welcome upon 
 the part of the admiral, with salutations and warm con 
 gratulations from the officers of the ship, and with re 
 peated cries of " Vive le Roi /" by the crew. He spent 
 the day there until five in the afternoon, filled with con 
 tentment at being surrounded by his countrymen once 
 more, talking again in his own language of his home, his 
 friends, of all he loved best ; and when he returned to 
 shore he had the assurance from the Comte d Estaing, 
 which gave him exquisite happiness, that he should be 
 given command of a detachment of the landing party from 
 the fleet in connection with his own Continental soldiers 
 and the militia. This was the subject to which he alluded 
 in his letters to M. d Estaing which we have already seen, 
 as the one thing he earnestly hoped for and about which 
 he was impatient to be reassured. The admiral readily 
 gratified his wish, which no doubt appealed at once to his 
 heart through the enthusiasm of the young soldier and 
 through his devoted attachment to the welfare and glory 
 of France ; he sympathized with him in his desire to win 
 honor in the profession in which he himself had spent long 
 years of his life, and which La Fayette may almost be said 
 to have inherited from many generations of his ancestors 
 who had been warriors under the standard of the King. 
 
 M. d Estaing rightly estimated the position which La 
 Fayette had acquired in America. Whilst he smiled at 
 the generalship of a man of twenty, and jocularly alluded 
 to it in his correspondence with him, he comprehended 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 439 
 
 that this young officer, who had been found worthy of 
 the close friendship of General Washington, and who by 
 his zeal in the cause of American independence had won 
 the esteem of both the soldiers and the citizens of the 
 United States, occupied a position of importance which 
 was likely to prove of valuable service to France. The 
 admiral felt himself bound to report to the ministry at 
 home the step he had taken in receiving M. de La Fay- 
 ette aboard his ship in spite of his attitude of disobedience 
 to the King, justifying it, however, by the assurance that 
 whilst " his extreme impatience to prove that he had come 
 to fight the English in order that he might the better learn 
 to serve his master induced me to receive him aboard the 
 Languedoc, with a personal satisfaction mingled with some 
 anxiety upon political grounds," yet " no one is in a better 
 position than this young general officer to become an addi 
 tional bond of unity between France and America. He 
 enjoys here the highly merited consideration which is due 
 to his zeal, his gallantry, and his wisdom." 
 
 In the course of the day spent by La Fayette on board 
 the Languedoc, during which he was in intimate consulta 
 tion with the Comte d Estaing, the subject of the coming 
 attack was fully discussed by them, the manner of making 
 it, the methods of co-operation, and the disembarkation 
 of the French troops, as well as the minute details that 
 required attention and preparation in a matter of so great 
 importance. We have no direct account of the inter 
 view, of which, indeed, nothing was known, and which 
 was almost forgotten, as one of the incidents of the time, 
 until the fortunate discovery by M. Doniol of the package 
 of letters in the Archives of the French Navy, already 
 referred to, brought to light the communications of La 
 Fayette to the admiral in the midst of these operations, 
 which present an extremely interesting view of the pur- 
 
 1 Comte d Estaing s official Report to the Secretary of the French Navy, 
 ut supra. 
 
440 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 poses of M. d Estaing himself, of his ideas as they are re 
 flected by answers to questions asked or suggestions made 
 by La Fayette, and of the attitude of the French officers 
 toward the plans proposed by General Sullivan. The first 
 of these is a letter of La Fayette, from Providence, on the 
 day after he had been aboard the Languedoc. Upon his 
 leaving the flag-ship, at five o clock in the afternoon, the 
 admiral had sent him on board the frigate Provence, 
 which was ordered to sail with him up the West Passage 
 and to set him ashore at a convenient point from which 
 he might reach Providence. But a fog, which came in 
 shortly after his departure, delayed the Provence, so that 
 it was late in the evening before he arrived at his quarters. 
 In the morning, therefore, he wrote as follows : l 
 
 "PROVIDENCE, 5th August, 1778. 
 
 "I arrived here last night, Monsieur le Comte, and I have 
 spoken earnestly this morning upon the various subjects which 
 you did me the honor to intrust to me, and in regard to which I 
 should be more positive if I had not met here a.n officer whose 
 commission antedates my own, in the person of General Sullivan. 
 He has sent in every direction to collect provisions, some of which 
 have already been sent forward to the fleet ; and orders have been 
 given to bake biscuits at several different places. A man has 
 been sent to you who will point out a better place to obtain water 
 than from the dried-up wells which have been used heretofore. 
 You will also receive several boats loaded with barrels of water, 
 which will bring back any prisoners of whom you desire to be re 
 lieved ; a search is about to be made, with an example as well, I 
 hope, for the militiamen who robbed those whom you intrusted 
 to their charge, and we shall try to disgust them with this English 
 practice. You will receive the field pieces, and the boats will be 
 sent you as well as the horses. Finally, Monsieur le Conite, in 
 stead of six thousand bricks, I have been assured that you will 
 have twenty thousand before long. Would to heaven that our 
 troops were increased in the same proportion as these bricks ; but 
 it seems that, instead of fourteen thousand men, we are able to 
 count upon scarcely ten thousand now, and these have not all 
 
 1 Revue d Histoire diplomatique, sixieme annee, No. 3, p. 413. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 441 
 
 come in ; though the Continental troops are going to join to 
 morrow such of the militia as may be at the common rendezvous. 
 
 "As to the great undertaking, Monsieur le Comte, that in 
 which the success of the expedition, the satisfaction of the fleet, 
 as well as of the land troops, indeed all the advantages that we 
 hope for, are concerned, I cannot boast of having made great 
 progress in my negotiation. 
 
 "The attack at a single point, the concentration of the Ameri 
 can troops, especially of the Continental forces, the rectangular 
 movement which may enclose the English, are the methods that 
 meet with the greatest favor. I have argued that if the enemy 
 were divided in a similar operation they would be much less 
 formidable ; that several false attacks and two real ones would 
 secure for us this advantage, that the English would lose in recon 
 noitring the time which they should employ in marching and in 
 fighting whenever we put them into a situation to commit this 
 folly ; and that, finally, when we should make a descent we should 
 not be obliged to wait until we were nearly all ashore before dis 
 embarking our best forces, as would be the case under the plan 
 now proposed to our troops. 
 
 "I have also said that if it were too much to give you a wing 
 of the army, you would be satisfied with a detachment ; that you 
 would leave to General Sullivan the greater part of his Continental 
 troops ; that a small number of them should be united with the 
 militia, making two or three thousand men altogether, who, by 
 being joined with the French troops, would thus be assured of 
 protection and of a constantly reliable example ; that this de 
 barkation would be made under the fire of the ships, which 
 would enable us to unite with them in the same manner as he 
 should unite with us under the plan of operations which I sub 
 mitted to you. You will observe that, if he does not accept 
 the plan of making the attack upon the redoubts at two points, 
 he still does not lose the advantage of the rectangle in question, 
 but will even give to it a more regular form by prolonging your 
 side. 
 
 "Finally, I added that we not only owe to the fleet this whole 
 expedition, because without the fleet it would not have been un 
 dertaken, but that it is the support from the fleet which will 
 assure our success at the moment of the attack. The sound and 
 the effect of your thunders, the division of the points at which an 
 attack is to be feared, the descent under your fire of a body of 
 troops uncertain in number but recognized to be considerable, 
 whose first steps will disclose to the enemy that there are French- 
 
442 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 men among them, will be the disturbing spectacle presented to 
 the English, and which they will be relieved of if we follow out 
 slavishly the brilliant plan which I had the honor to present to 
 you. 
 
 "But my ideas, Monsieur le Cointe, did not strike either Gen 
 eral Sullivan or General Greene as I could have wished. You 
 will see by the reply of the former, that, if he sends you a rein 
 forcement, it will be of so little importance that the idea would 
 never enter his head that I should prefer it to the command of 
 his wing of six thousand men because it secures me the happiness 
 of serving under your orders as a companion in glory of the 
 Frenchmen, my dear countrymen. Besides, he expects that you 
 will retain command of this whole detachment ; and he considers 
 me to be of a certain usefulness to him, which I do not compre 
 hend myself, with this famous left wing. 
 
 "But I have not omitted to say that the French fleet is pre 
 pared to take an important part in this action ; that our landing 
 party ought to be considered of great value ; that after we have 
 come ashore in safety there will be no objection to changing the 
 arrangement, but that, if there is to be danger to be met, the 
 French troops have the right to participate in it, and that this 
 is the only mark of recognition for which they ask ; so that, in 
 either case, the descent should be made by all at the same time, 
 and in such a manner that each party might be in a position to 
 take advantage of any opportunity to distinguish itself that for 
 tune might offer it. I am aware that it is not pleasant to some 
 people to see the finest scenes in the play taken by foreign actors ; 
 I feel that the Frenchmen will somewhat eclipse their neighbors 
 and that the best dramatic effects will probably fall to their share. 
 General Sullivan s attack, although extremely important in itself, 
 would be rather what they call in comedy en robe de chambre, 
 compared with the spectacle which your fleet and your troops 
 would present ; but, without expecting hearts which are not 
 French to beat with the same emotion that I should feel myself 
 at the sight of the glory won by my countrymen, I should be 
 greatly disappointed if they were not allowed the advantage 
 which I think is rightfully theirs of being brought more nearly 
 into the place which they ought to occupy in this expedition. 
 
 "General Sullivan has no objection, after the landing party 
 shall be no longer under your immediate orders, to permitting it 
 to take up its position where I shall have the honor to command. 
 But that is not in accordance with the plan which you were kind 
 enough to communicate to me. The idea that your troops should 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 443 
 
 come ashore after the descent was substantially accomplished, is 
 not acceptable to me under any consideration. As to the number 
 of men in the detachment which he intends for you, I have told 
 him that I should like to command it, whether it were great or 
 small, and that the pleasure of fighting in view of my own coun 
 trymen could not be made up to me by any conceivable wing ; 
 and that, for that matter, I should resume command of the num 
 ber of troops to which I am entitled after I had rejoined him. I 
 confess to you that I should not like to see the French troops 
 with people whose foreign hearts could not appreciate their value. 
 
 "This part of my letter is immensely long, Monsieur le Cointe, 
 but I am anxious to report to you what I have said, what has 
 been said to me in reply, and to acquaint you with the impres 
 sions that I have obtained. Now I shall ask your permission 
 to add what my limited acquaintance with this country leads me 
 to hope for. Your plan appears to me very far from having 
 failed. If, in your reply to General Sullivan, you mention it 
 again as, in your judgment, necessary to the success of the expe 
 dition, as conforming to your own wishes and to the desires of 
 those who are under your command ; and if you add to this your 
 military conclusions and insist upon them with firmness, these 
 gentlemen will find it easier to submit than to answer you ; and 
 they will then enlarge the detachment which they intend to assign 
 to you. The number has not been definitely fixed in General 
 Sullivan s letter. Appear to be certain then, at least, of two 
 thousand men of whom half or one-third shall be Continental 
 troops. If you should join to this the kindness of asking that I 
 shall command them, or at least that they shall be offered to me, I 
 assure you that my choice will come from my heart and that I 
 shall have reached the utmost limit of my desires. 
 
 "This militia, Monsieur le Comte, will serve at least to make 
 a show, to make a noise, and to inspire fear, whilst your French 
 men are doing the damage ; their method of fighting is so dif 
 ferent from that with which we have lulled the Englishmen 
 here to sleep, that those in Khode Island must surely be aston 
 ished by it. 
 
 "I shall leave to-morrow for the town where the troops are 
 going. Next Sunday lias been fixed upon as the date of the at 
 tack if ice arc ready. You see that there will still be time to send 
 you a reinforcement if you reply at once. This letter will be de 
 livered to you by M. de Gouvion, of whom I have already spoken 
 to you, and whom I now send in order that he may describe to 
 you that part of the island which he has already seen, whilst 
 
444 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 he will be able at the same time to reconnoitre another part of it. 
 M. de Gouvion is liked and esteemed by everybody most capable 
 of forming a judgment about him. He is accompanied by M. de 
 Noirmont, a French officer who is exceedingly anxious to see the 
 fleet, and whom I have the honor of presenting to you. 
 
 " When I know that you have written upon the subjects which 
 you have done me the honor to mention to me, I may, if it seems 
 proper to you, say a word or two about them in my personal 
 letters to the President of Congress, with whom my relations are 
 very good. As to General Washington, I shall leave it to you to 
 write to him, and he will surely not keep the matter a secret from 
 me ; all I wish to know is the date of your letters, so that I may 
 arrange accordingly. 
 
 " Pardon, a thousand times pardon, Monsieur le Comte, for 
 having detained you so long ; I thought that by writing fast I 
 should make my letter short, but the national interests, my desire 
 to succeed in the undertaking which you intrusted to me, the 
 delight which I should feel at seeing the French soldiers in a 
 position where they could do their best, all these things spoke 
 within me at once, and it has not been easy to restrain myself. 
 I shall now hasten to conclude by assuring you, Monsieur le 
 Comte, how greatly I appreciate your kindness toward me and 
 how sincerely and tenderly I am attached to you. 
 
 " LAFAYETTE. 
 
 "I have had the honor of seeing M. de Pleville and of offering 
 him my services as an interpreter and a citizen of Providence." 
 
 We have at present no means of discovering precisely 
 what the errand was upon which La Fayette had gone at 
 the request of M. d Estaing ; their conversations have not 
 been recorded, so far as we know, and the letters of the 
 admiral which would no doubt throw light upon it were 
 probably among the personal documents and other papers 
 of the Marquis de La Fayette which were destroyed at 
 Chavaniac during the excesses of the French Revolution. 
 It is evident, however, that it related chiefly to the plans 
 of the campaign, to the method of uniting the French 
 and the American troops, and especially to the points at 
 which the attack upon Rhode Island should be made. It 
 appears from this letter of La Fayette, of the 5th of 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 445 
 
 August, that both General Sullivan and General Greene 
 were in favor of making a landing at a single point under 
 fire of the ships and an immediate assault upon the gar 
 rison with all the troops, which plan the admiral did not 
 approve of. He evidently insisted that a more effective 
 descent could be made by simultaneous operations at two 
 points at least ; after which, the troops being once safely 
 ashore upon the island, the whole force should be united 
 for an assault upon the enemy s works before the town of 
 Newport. 
 
 It may, or it may not, have been as a result of La 
 Fayette s presentation of the admiral s opinion to General 
 Sullivan that the plan finally adopted was that the island 
 should be approached from two different points ; but it 
 was agreed that the army should be divided into two 
 separate bodies, one under General Greene which should 
 cross over and make its landing from Tiverton, and the 
 other under the Marquis de La Fayette, composed of the 
 French marines, infantry, and sailors, and such Conti 
 nental troops and militia as should have been assigned 
 to his command, which should cross from the island of 
 Canonicut. It was understood that the fleet should have 
 forced the Middle Passage at the proper moment and 
 should have captured the British troops at Canonicut, 
 after which that island should be used by the admiral for 
 his base of operations. Once upon Rhode Island, both 
 divisions of the army would have united in the assault 
 upon Newport. It was not considered necessary to give 
 serious attention to the small British force posted in the 
 works at the northern end of the island, because they 
 were not strong enough to threaten the rear of the army, 
 and after the town had been captured they were certain 
 to fall into the hands of the victors. As we have seen, 
 however, General Pigot rescued his men from Canonicut 
 during the delay which occurred whilst the American 
 forces were being got in readiness, and he afterward re- 
 
446 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 called those at the northern end of Rhode Island ; so that 
 this part of the plan of the allies was defeated before 
 the attack began. La Fayette s allusion to the President 
 of Congress and to General Washington relates to some 
 thing which we have not now the means of determining ; 
 possibly to an operation to be undertaken by the fleet 
 against some of the British provinces or the islands in the 
 West Indies after the capture of Newport. Very natu 
 rally his earnest desire to command the French detach 
 ment was uppermost in his mind and in his correspond 
 ence. His sympathies were with his countrymen to such 
 a degree that he wanted for them all the glory that it 
 was possible to obtain, and the longing of his heart was 
 to share it with them and to be recognized at home as 
 having performed his duty as a Frenchman. His pride 
 in the national greatness of France made all else subordi 
 nate in his mind to the valor and prestige of his country 
 men. If our own country occupied but the second place 
 in the comparison, at this distance of time we can sympa 
 thize with him in the feeling which is the birthright of 
 every loyal man, to look upon his own national cause as 
 the best cause, his own flag as the best flag, and his own 
 countrymen as the best soldiers. 
 
 By General Sullivan s first plan, which he communi 
 cated to the admiral upon the occasion of his visit to the 
 flag-ship immediately after the arrival of the fleet, it was 
 proposed that M. d Estaing should detach a proper force 
 to enter the Eastern and Western Channels and capture 
 the enemy s ships stationed there ; to block the Main 
 Channel with the rest of the fleet, and to cut off the 
 retreat of the British ships, as well as to prevent the 
 arrival of reinforcements for the garrison. The French 
 ships in the Eastern and Western Channels were after 
 ward to cover the descent of the American troops from 
 Tiverton and Bristol. At the moment of the attack, the 
 French fleet was to force the passage into Newport harbor, 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 447 
 
 to bombard the town, and to disembark the marines and 
 infantry at the most suitable point to second the American 
 attack. 1 
 
 The admiral proceeded at once to execute his part of 
 this operation by sending into the Western Passage the 
 ship of the line Sagittaire, on the morning of the 30th 
 of July. The Sagittaire ran by the batteries of the 
 enemy, which opened fire from the west side of Ca- 
 nonicut, and, having returned a broadside, she proceeded 
 to her station without receiving any injury. Shortly 
 afterward an explosion at the enemy s batteries was ob 
 served, which induced the belief that they had been 
 abandoned, as they were subsequently found to have been. 
 The admiral also ordered two frigates, the Aimable and 
 the Alcmene, with the (prize) tender Stanley, to enter 
 the Eastern Passage ; where, upon their approach, the 
 enemy set fire to their frigate the Kingfisher, to the 
 Lamb, and to the Spitfire, cutting the latter adrift to act 
 as a fire-ship. The Comte de Grasse-Limermont was or 
 dered to the command of a boat to tow the Spitfire off, 
 in the performance of which duty he was in imminent 
 danger ; for the vessel blew up after his grapnel was fixed, 
 but, fortunately, injured neither him nor his crew. A 
 French officer, M. de Dorset, sent aboard the Kingfisher 
 to extinguish the flames, had also a marvellous escape ; 
 her magazine blew up after he and his men were upon 
 her deck, but without killing or wounding any of them. 2 
 
 M. d Estaing was anxious to take possession of Canoni- 
 cut Island and to capture its garrison, which he could 
 have done during a general assault by landing troops 
 upon the west side and forcing a passage into the main 
 channel with his large ships, so as to cut off communica 
 tion between Canonicut and Rhode Island and prevent 
 
 1 Simms, Correspondence of J. Lauren?, p. 211. 
 
 2 Comte d Estaing s official Report to the Secretary of the French Navy, 
 ubi supra. 
 
448 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 General Pigot from throwing reinforcements across. But 
 in order to accomplish this end before the combined attack 
 he would have had to sustain alone the attack from the 
 enemy s batteries on Rhode Island, because it was found 
 impracticable to anchor his ships anywhere out of the 
 reach of their deliberate fire. Therefore, as General Sul 
 livan was not ready to make the combined assault upon 
 all the enemy s positions, the admiral was obliged to aban 
 don this attempt and to wait until the American troops 
 should be in readiness to co-operate with him ; and upon 
 the following day, the 31st, he discovered, by a patrol sent 
 out to reconnoitre, that the British had evacuated Canon- 
 icut Island. The Sagittaire, having been reinforced by 
 the Fantasque, sailed to the north of Canonicut, where 
 the British immediately destroyed their frigates Orpheus, 
 Lark, and Juno, of thirty-two guns, the Cerberus, of 
 twenty-eight, and the corvette Falcon, of fourteen. 
 
 In the mean time, the negotiations with General Sul 
 livan were so far successful that the American com 
 mander decided to send a detachment to support the 
 French landing-party when the general attack should be 
 made, and to give the command of it, at the request of 
 M. d Estaing, to the Marquis de La Fayette. Of this 
 we have the proof in La Fayette s letter to the admiral, 
 as follows : l 
 
 " AT THE QUARTERS OF GENERAL SULLIVAN, 
 "the 8th of August, 1778. 
 
 " You will see, Monsieur le Comte, by General Sullivan s letter, 
 that, in consequence of the one which he has received from you 
 this morning, he will send a detachment to join your troops, and 
 he intends to give me the command of it. As agreeable as this 
 hope is to me, I had entirely abandoned it, and I had relin 
 quished my desire to obtain a personal advantage which you re 
 gard as contrary to the general good. But, as your letter had 
 already produced the proper effect, I concluded that my refusal 
 now would merely complicate this matter and that I might appear 
 
 1 Revue d Histoire diplomatique, sixieme annee, No. 3, p. 416. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 449 
 
 to disturb the general plan by my own fancies. I have simply 
 replied that my attachment to America, and my still greater 
 affection for my countrymen, make my situation a delicate one. 
 It has been decided that it is suitable to send me with this de 
 tachment, although it is disproportionate to the command which 
 I should have had ; and I have accepted it because I thought I 
 ought to do so for many reasons, of which I trust you will not 
 disapprove. 
 
 1 i We shall not have as many men, by far, as it was hoped we 
 should. I have suspected this, and it renders our operation in 
 complete because the plan was drawn up before the arrival of the 
 troops. General Sullivan had to recruit an army ; and what an 
 army, if we except the Continental troops ! You must expect 
 to see some curious figures, and mine at the head of them. I 
 shall be mortified, not if these gentlemen are not well trimmed, 
 for they have had neither the time nor the means for that, but 
 if they do not fight as well as one can expect at least from raw 
 troops. 
 
 "It is reported, Monsieur le Cointe, that I am to join you to 
 morrow afternoon, when the enemy will have an opportunity to 
 see us at their ease ; Monday appears to be the day set for the 
 attack, if all u ready. That on the west will succeed certainly, 
 and the reason is easy to imagine ; my detachment, animated by 
 the example, will follow, will show itself, will fire, and that will 
 accomplish something. Our junction with General Sullivan can 
 not be deferred very long ; for, once we are upon the island, the 
 two divisions will be forced to advance, and that will be the 
 means of uniting us. 1 do not think you will have reason to fear 
 what you have slightly touched upon in your letter. 
 
 "Send me word, Monsieur le Cointe, if you consider it indis 
 pensably necessary for me to stay here ; for, in that event, my 
 desire to follow your views will weigh with me beyond every 
 other consideration. But, if you will do me the honor to admit 
 my opinion, I dare to say that a new arrangement under present 
 circumstances would be likely to produce a bad effect ; and it is 
 that which has kept me silent in this matter. 
 
 "Adieu, Monsieur le Comte ; I am obliged to end my letter, 
 and I postpone until to-morrow the pleasure of a longer conver 
 sation, only assuring you at this time of my devoted and sincere 
 attachment." 
 
 It is evident that, while the Comte d Estaing had ac 
 ceded to La Fayette s intense desire to command the de- 
 
 VOL. I. liU 
 
450 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 tachment of French troops, and while he had gone so far 
 as to request this favor from General Sullivan in behalf 
 of his young relative and friend, his own mature judg 
 ment in similar matters had led him to caution La Fay- 
 ette not to press his demand too strongly, but rather to 
 accept the decision of General Sullivan even at the cost of 
 personal sacrifice, if that should be necessary, in order to 
 aid the plans of co-operation by every means in his power, 
 and to contribute toward the success of the undertaking. 
 It is to this that La Fayette referred in his letter when 
 he announced to the admiral that he had been offered the 
 command and had accepted it, with the hope that his 
 action would receive M. d Estaing s approval. Undoubt 
 edly the position of La Fayette was an exceedingly deli 
 cate one, in which nothing but the greatest caution could 
 preserve him from criticism or from the jealousy of other 
 officers, aroused by the suspicion that his request for a 
 particular command was an attempt upon his part to as 
 sume a more prominent share in the expedition than he 
 was entitled to. His active spirit and his enthusiasm for 
 the glory of France made it all the more difficult for 
 him ; and, indeed, he did not escape from creating the 
 very irritation which the more experienced eye of the 
 French admiral had foreseen. 
 
 The delay, and the more or less unimportant differ 
 ences of opinion between the French and the American 
 commanders as to the plan of landing the troops, had 
 produced a slight tension between the allies, which, of 
 course, was not apparent in the friendly relations that 
 were constantly maintained, but which nevertheless caused 
 each side to watch the movements and the purposes of 
 the other with somewhat closer scrutiny. It was ex 
 pected at first that the Comte d Estaing would take com 
 mand himself of the French troops that were to land ; and 
 this appears to have been his intention, if the American 
 general had consented to detach one wing of his army 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 451 
 
 to act with him, or, at all events, a force large enough 
 to make up a command suitable to the dignity of a lieu 
 tenant-general and an admiral of France. When it was 
 decided, however, to send him merely a detachment of a 
 thousand men, because the strength of General Sullivan s 
 army would not permit him to dispose in that manner of 
 a greater force, the admiral acquiesced in this decision, 
 but asked that La Fayette should have the command. 
 He objected also, as we have seen from the correspond 
 ence with La Fayette, to the plan proposed by General 
 Sullivan, that the landing should be made at a single 
 point, which was upon the east side of the island, by the 
 American forces first, under cover of the fire of the French 
 ships, and that when their descent had been effected the 
 French troops should disembark and form a junction with 
 them. 
 
 We happen to have evidence of the feeling toward both 
 La Fayette and the Comte d Estaing in the American 
 camp at that time, in a valuable letter of Colonel John 
 Laurens, written to his father, the President of Congress, 
 on the 22d of August, 1 in which he recounted the inci 
 dent whilst it was still fresh in his mind, as follows : 
 
 " According to the first plan proposed by General Sullivan, the 
 American forces were to land on the east side of Rhode Island 
 under cover of the fire of three frigates stationed in the eastern 
 channel for that purpose. A signal was to be given immediately 
 as our boats should begin to cross, and another when the descent 
 should be eifected. Upon the latter, the French troops were to 
 disembark on the east side of the island, and a junction was to be 
 formed as speedily as possible ; but the ambition of an individual 
 and national pride discovered insuperable obstacles to this disposi 
 tion. The Marquis de Lafayette aspired to the command of the 
 French troops in conjunction with the flower of Gen 1 Sullivan s 
 army. In a visit which he had paid to the fleet, he prevailed 
 upon the Count D Estaing to write upon this subject. The count 
 
 1 The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens in the Years 1777-8, 
 "SVm. (jilmore Simrns, New York, 1867, p. 217. 
 
452 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 intimated in his letter a desire that some good American troops 
 sh d be annexed to the French, adding that if the command of them 
 were given to M. de Lafayette it w d be a means of facilitating 
 the junction between the troops of the two nations, as he was 
 acquainted with the service of both, and that in case any naval 
 operations sh d require his (the count s) return on board the squad 
 ron, the Marquis w d naturally take the command in his absence, 
 which w d prevent many difficulties that w d arise on that account. 
 The Marquis strenuously contended that a considerable detach 
 ment of select troops ought to be annexed to the French. The 
 pride of his nation would never suffer the present disposition to 
 take place, as by it the French battalions w d land under cover of 
 the American fire, and play a humiliating secondary part. 
 
 "The arguments against gratifying him in his request were 
 these : General Sullivan s army contained a very small proportion 
 of regular troops ; it was necessary that a main body capable of 
 resisting the enemy s force should exist, as a contrary conduct w d 
 expose either division to a total defeat or a vigorous attack from 
 the enemy. The Marquis, however, seemed much dissatisfied, 
 and his private views withdrew his attention wholly from the 
 general interest. 
 
 "On the 8th General Sullivan received a letter from the Ad 
 miral, in which he says that the disposition for disembarking is 
 militarily impossible. That the American generals were now for 
 the first time furnished with an opportunity of discovering the 
 value which they set on the French alliance, by the number and 
 composition of the troops which they w d annex to the French. 
 It was not for him to point out the number, but he w d gladly have 
 it in his power to give an account both to the Congress and his 
 King of the American detachm 1 which should be sent to him. 
 In consequence of this letter, it was determined that Jackson s 
 regiment, and as many good militia as in the whole w d amount to 
 1,000 men sh d be sent under the command of the Marquis." 
 
 This account given by Colonel Laurens accords with 
 the statement of the details as they are presented in the 
 correspondence of La Fayette, and in such of the Comte 
 d Estaing s papers as refer to them ; it is imhued, however, 
 with a certain personal feeling, the expression of which 
 was, no doubt, justifiable from the strictly confidential 
 nature of a communication of a son to his father upon 
 subjects which interested them both, and it presents a 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 453 
 
 bias which weakens it somewhat as to the conclusions 
 we should draw from it if we consider it in the strictest 
 sense an historical document. Colonel Laurens, to whom 
 La Fayette referred in the most generous terms, 1 appears 
 not to have had a strong liking for La Fayette, of whom 
 he wrote with a touch of scorn in a letter upon another 
 subject, as we shall see later ; and it would hardly be fair 
 for us, with the cooler judgment of to-day, to accept with 
 out question an opinion formed amidst the storm of dis 
 appointment which arose after the failure of the combined 
 attack upon Newport, in which this young officer alludes 
 to " the ambition of an individual and national pride" 
 in a manner which might lead an incautious observer to 
 regard these things as much more serious obstacles than 
 they were in fact. Colonel John Laurens was one of the 
 most estimable young officers of the Revolutionary War : 
 a man of superior cultivation, of sterling patriotism, and 
 of marked personal gallantry, he rendered distinguished 
 services to the American cause, for which, to the grief of 
 the army and of the nation, he laid down his life. His 
 memory must always be held in honor by his countrymen. 
 At the period of which we are now treating, however, 
 he was but twenty-one or twenty-two years of age ; and 
 lie thought and wrote with the intense feeling of youth. 
 We have a comprehensive view of La Fayette s ambition 
 to command the French troops, in his own letters to the 
 admiral, to whom he freely opened his heart under the 
 circumstances which threw him into contact, in a foreign 
 land, with his compatriot and kinsman, and impelled him 
 to a confidence that was absolute in matters relating to 
 himself. By his own showing, he was loyal to America 
 throughout ; there was, moreover, nothing inconsistent 
 with this loyalty in his ambition, since all were striving 
 for a common purpose and for the success of a common 
 
 1 La Fayette s letter of the 14th of July to the Comte d Estaing, supra. 
 
454 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 cause ; and when he had been warned by M. d Estaing 
 that his wishes might arouse opposition, he declared that 
 he had abandoned them. 
 
 He shared with the Comte d Estaing, it is true, the 
 national pride which demanded that, in any combined 
 operation which might be undertaken, the French troops 
 should have a post similar in honor and equal in danger 
 to that of their allies. In this the Comte d Estaing was 
 asking nothing more than the courtesy accorded by the 
 usages of war everywhere in the civilized world in his 
 time. He could not otherwise justify himself before his 
 country and his King. What seemed unmeaning punc 
 tilio to the men who had left their farms and workshops 
 and counting-houses in New England to come down to 
 fight the British at Newport was in fact but the working 
 of a system upon which standing armies were trained in 
 European countries, and upon which international rela 
 tions were supported, a system which had grown out of 
 the custom of centuries of war and had been approved by 
 universal consent. The Comte d Estaing placed himself 
 and his forces upon an exact equality with the American 
 troops, however small the national importance of the 
 United States or however insignificant their army in 
 the eyes of the world at that time, and he considered 
 himself as serving under the orders of General Sullivan, 
 the commander of the expedition ; this was a duty which 
 he owed to the allies of his King. But it is only just, in 
 the interest of a true understanding of historical events, 
 to remember that, from his stand-point, M. d Estaing was 
 making a concession to circumstances, when he regarded 
 the formidable armament under his command, with the 
 well-equipped and well-disciplined soldiers and sailors of 
 France, as being, in a military sense, upon precisely the 
 same level with a few thousand Continentals and militia 
 men, many of whom had been hastily brought from 
 their homes whilst he was lying in American waters 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 455 
 
 ready to fight, and when he subordinated his thirty 
 years of experience as a soldier to the leadership of a 
 New Hampshire lawyer whom accident had at that mo 
 ment placed at their head. It will be well to remember 
 this side of the case in considering the angry discussion 
 which followed, and to reflect that there were probably 
 real causes of grievance between these two sets of people, 
 so different in their customs and their understanding, or 
 conventional grievances, which appeared equally serious 
 with real ones, upon both sides. 
 
 Finally, after much negotiation between the Comte 
 d Estaing and General Sullivan, during which La Fay- 
 ette had gone incessantly from the shore to the Lan- 
 guedoc and from the Languedoc back to the camp, the 
 tedious delay was overcome ; and on the 8th of August 
 everything was ready. The moment for the attack was 
 definitively fixed and understood by General Sullivan 
 for the morning of the 10th. 
 
 La Fayette gave an interesting account of the troops and 
 the preparations in a letter to M. d Estaing, as follows : l 
 
 u I have just seen a colonel of artillery who is ordered to send 
 us some cannon of respectable calibre. General Greene, the 
 Quartermaster-General, and also Major-General, is superintend 
 ing the collection of the boats, and I think he will ultimately 
 command the militia of Providence, his native place. It seems 
 to me that they are raising a great number of this kind of troops ; 
 those of New England have the reputation of being very brave, 
 and I have no doubt of it, but I think they will find a great dif 
 ference between the kind of war they have been making up to 
 this time and that which awaits them at the attack upon Khode 
 Island. Anything that requires rapid movement does not suit 
 them at all, and surely General Sullivan understands them too 
 well not to make use of them in the manner to which they are 
 best adapted. I am very glad to see him in command here, be 
 cause he is brave and enterprising." 
 
 1 From Norwich, 30th July, 1778 : Revue d Histoire diplomatique, sixieme 
 anne"e, No. 3, p. 411. 
 
456 OPEKATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 OPEKATIONS OF THE ALLIED FOKCES AT NEWPORT. 
 
 (Continued.) 
 
 THE Comte d Estaing had prepared his landing-party, 
 which he divided into four battalions of five hundred men 
 each, composed of sailors and marines, besides the French 
 infantry which he had on his ships, who made up the 
 whole number to about three thousand men. The sailors 
 were armed with muskets such as were carried on ship 
 board, which for this occasion were provided with bayo 
 nets made of the blades of cutlasses from which the hilts 
 had been removed ; these were inserted between the ends 
 of the barrels and the wood and secured by a strong wrap 
 ping of tarred rope. 1 Everything being in readiness, 
 then, for the execution of the combined attack, which, 
 as we have seen, was to be made simultaneously from 
 Tiverton, on the east side, by the American troops, and 
 from Canonicut, on the west side, by the French with the 
 detachment of Americans sent to join them, under the 
 command of the Marquis de La Fayette, the Comte d Es 
 taing entered the main channel on the 8th of August. 
 With eight of his ships of the line he ran by the bat 
 teries on Rhode Island, which immediately opened a heavy 
 fire upon him, to the position he had selected at the 
 northern part of the channel, whence he intended to send 
 his men ashore upon Canonicut to form for the attack 
 and to unite there with the American detachment. He 
 executed this manoeuvre with admirable skill and with 
 
 1 Journal de Campagne du Marseillais : Doniol, La Participation de la 
 France, iii. 341. 
 
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1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 457 
 
 entire success : so that on the night of Saturday, the 
 8th, he was in readiness for the general action on the 
 following Monday morning. He was strictly carrying 
 out the plan, upon his part, as it had been defined by the 
 American commander. 
 
 On Sunday morning he began at seven o clock to dis 
 embark his troops ; and, with some dozen or fifteen 
 flat-boats which had been sent to him for the purpose, in 
 connection with the boats carried by his vessels, he was 
 occupied nearly all the morning in transporting his men 
 and his artillery to Canonicut. As soon as they arrived 
 ashore they were drawn up in order and drilled, so as to 
 accustom them somewhat to their footing upon land, which 
 they had not stepped upon then for nearly four months. 
 At eleven o clock in the morning, whilst this work was in 
 progress, and at the moment when M. d Estaing himself 
 was about to go ashore upon Canonicut, an aide-de-camp 
 arrived from the Marquis de La Fayette, to announce 
 that General Sullivan had not waited for the appointed 
 time, but, as he saw that the British had withdrawn their 
 troops from the fortifications at the northern end of the 
 island when the French vessels were coming up the 
 channel, he had hastened to cross over to take advantage 
 of the position they had abandoned ; that he was now 
 upon Rhode Island with between two thousand and three 
 thousand men, but that, as he had no artillery and was 
 without a considerable part of his munitions of war, he 
 desired the assistance of the admiral. 
 
 This news struck the Comte d Estaing with amaze 
 ment. That General Sullivan had deliberately broken his 
 agreement, without previously notifying him, and without 
 consulting with him as to the possible necessity of a 
 change of policy, was, in his eyes, an act of discourtesy 
 which nothing could explain. It aroused a storm of 
 anger among the officers and men of the French fleet, 
 who protested loudly, upon every side, that they had 
 
458 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 been unfairly treated, and that the dignity of France had 
 been insulted by conduct which was unjustifiable and 
 intolerable. As another unfortunate step in this ill- 
 starred expedition, this event destroyed at once the cor 
 dial relations which had subsisted between the allies at 
 the outset ; it made a serious breach in the confidence 
 with which each side regarded the other, and, without 
 doubt, it had an important bearing upon the subse 
 quent actions of the French commander. The French 
 men began to look with suspicion upon their English- 
 speaking friends, as wilful, careless, and unreliable. The 
 Americans considered the French officers as over-sensi 
 tive, excitable, and absurdly tenacious of their scruples 
 about things that were of no consequence. The ready 
 pen of Colonel John Laurens was employed to inform 
 the President of Congress that l " this measure gave much 
 umbrage to the French officers. They conceived their 
 troops injured by our landing first, and talked like 
 women disputing precedence in a country-dance, instead 
 of men engaged in pursuing the common interest of two 
 great nations." 
 
 The question has frequently been discussed by the his 
 torians of this campaign, with varying degrees of censure 
 upon the French admiral, and an historian of our own 
 day has expressed the opinion that " D Estaing was un 
 reasonably offended at not being previously consulted. 
 He was unduly sensitive and punctilious," which he sup 
 ports by the perfectly true statement that " the war was 
 an American war in America," plainly suggesting the in 
 ference, which is not true, that therefore the Americans 
 might do as they pleased. 2 
 
 The fact is, however, that, under the circumstances of 
 his presence in America as the commander of the King s 
 fleet, by reason of his cordial support of the American 
 
 1 Simms, Correspondence of John Laurens, p. 220. 
 
 2 Amory s Life of Sullivan, p. 74. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 459 
 
 cause and his constantly expressed wish to further the 
 interests of the United States, as well as by the dignity 
 of his own rank and the prestige of the forces which he 
 led, the Comte d Estaing was entitled to be treated upon 
 all occasions with the highest consideration. 
 
 The action of General Sullivan, although insignificant 
 as to its practical results one way or the other, was a 
 breach of professional courtesy. Considered in the ab 
 stract, it was a grave personal offence. M. d Estaing had 
 waited patiently for General Sullivan, under circumstances 
 which were distressing in the extreme both to himself and 
 to all the men of his fleet, until the American forces should 
 be ready to act. He asked for no especial credit for this, 
 because he looked upon it as one of the uncontrollable in 
 cidents of war ; but he believed that in return his services 
 would be recognized, and that proper respect would be 
 shown to him personally. 
 
 After all, the most serious result of this incident, and 
 one which appears to have been lost sight of by most 
 writers upon the subject, was the belief in the mind not 
 only of the Comte d Estaing but of every Frenchman 
 in the fleet, that General Sullivan was jealous of the 
 French prestige, that he was anxious to reap the glory 
 of the action at Newport for himself, and that, in order 
 to make it appear like an American victory with the 
 French acting a secondary part, he had taken an unfair 
 advantage of them and had secretly made a landing upon 
 Rhode Island before they knew that a movement was 
 contemplated. 
 
 We have no reason to-day to believe that this is true 
 of General Sullivan, or that his intentions were other 
 than entirely honorable. But the movement he made was 
 unnecessary at that moment, and the position he gained 
 by it was absolutely without military importance. The 
 British general abandoned the redoubts at the northern 
 end of the island because they were capable of protecting 
 
460 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 only a very small force, and from their isolated position 
 they could not have been held by him after the French 
 fleet came into the channel and the Americans were pre 
 paring to land from Tiverton ; the only advantage thus 
 gained by him was that he secured this small number of 
 men from being made prisoners of war by calling them 
 in to Newport. General Sullivan took the abandoned re 
 doubts, which the British did not want, and which were of 
 so little consequence that they had not even been taken 
 serious account of in the American plan of attack. 1 They 
 neither threatened his position, nor aided him in his plans 
 after he had taken them ; nor was there the least danger 
 that the enemy would return to them ; for all that Gen 
 eral Pigot wished was to withdraw his troops from them. 
 And, in his precipitate haste to land upon Rhode Island, 
 General Sullivan had left his artillery behind ; so that he 
 could not have defended himself if he had been attacked, 
 and he was forced to call upon the fleet for protection. 
 He threw himself open to the angry imputation of the 
 French officers, that his motive was not a fair one ; he 
 fatally injured their good will toward himself personally, 
 and he weakened appreciably their enthusiasm for the 
 American cause. 
 
 M. d Estaing, however, did not permit his personal 
 feelings upon that occasion to influence him against any 
 measure that lay within the strict limits of his duty or 
 that was likely to be of service to the common under 
 taking. He gave orders immediately that the troops 
 already landed upon Canonicut should be transferred 
 from there to Rhode Island, to join General Sullivan, 
 and he detailed two of his ships, the Fantasque and the 
 
 1 "The troops were not to amuse themselves with attacking the works in 
 the northern part of the Island ; but a sufficient detachment was to be left 
 to be a guard upon the troops posted in those works, while the main body 
 was to advance rapidly to the attack of the fort and redoubts, which imme 
 diately environ the town of Newport." Simms, Correspondence of John 
 Laurens, p. 211. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 461 
 
 Sagittaire, to protect their passage. 1 But, unfortunately, 
 at the moment when measures were being taken to carry 
 out this order, and whilst the Fantasque and the Sagit 
 taire were getting under way, the fog which had hung 
 over the entrance to the harbor since early morning 
 lifted, and the lookout at the mast-head of the Languedoc 
 reported a large fleet of war- vessels flying the British 
 flag a short distance out from the main channel, consist 
 ing, so far as could be determined with the glasses, of 
 twenty-six vessels, of which at least fourteen were ships 
 of the line. This was the fleet of Admiral Howe, who 
 had left New York on the 6th of August, upon informa 
 tion given by the British spies of what was taking place 
 at Newport, and who had come out to aid the garrison. 
 
 The situation of M. d Estaing under this sudden change 
 of circumstances was extremely embarrassing both to him 
 self and to all his commanders. His ships were separated 
 in the three channels, he was shut in the harbor where 
 it would be exceedingly difficult to manoeuvre with his 
 larger vessels in case of attack, and a considerable part 
 of his force was already ashore. He decided at once that 
 he must re-embark his men and prepare for action ; and 
 therefore he ordered all the marines, sailors, and infantry 
 on Canonicut Island to return to their ships. He called 
 a council of war on board the Languedoc, which was at 
 tended by all the captains of the fleet ; and it was deter 
 mined that, in view of the fact that the winds were at that 
 season almost constantly unfavorable to vessels going out, 
 all the French vessels should be brought as closely to 
 gether as possible during the night in order to present 
 their concentrated force in the event of attack. This 
 manoeuvre was carried out with partial success, and upon 
 the following morning some of the French ships were still 
 working their way to the positions assigned to them, when 
 
 1 Journal of the Comte de Cambis aboard the Languedoc ; Archives de la 
 Marine, B 4 147, fol. 17 : Doniol, La Participation de la France, iii. 375. 
 
462 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 the wind, which had been variable from the west-southwest 
 to northwest, suddenly changed and blew freshly from the 
 north-northeast; whereupon the French admiral deter 
 mined to stand out with his whole fleet and give battle to 
 Lord Howe, considering that to fight, even under a dis 
 advantage, would be better than to stay there at anchor. 
 He sent word of this determination to General Sullivan, 
 with the promise that as soon as he should have disposed 
 of the British fleet he would return to Newport and aid 
 him again in the attack. 
 
 At half-past seven in the morning of the 10th of Au 
 gust, he gave orders to the fleet to clear the decks for ac 
 tion ; and at half-past eight, to get under way. Under a 
 heavy cannonade from the batteries upon Rhode Island, 
 which were found now to be stronger and much better 
 served than when he had entered, he ran by them a 
 second time, and succeeded in clearing all his ships with 
 out serious damage, although they received here and 
 there a shot, and without losing a man on the flag-ship. 
 At half-past ten they had passed the last English battery 
 and stood out to sea, having left as a protection to General 
 Sullivan three frigates, besides the Stanley (prize) in the 
 East Channel and the galley Dauphin in the West Chan 
 nel. Upon his approach, the British fleet cut their 
 cables and stood out under full sail, leaving behind many 
 of their ships boats, which, in their haste to get away, 
 they had not stopped to pick up. 1 All this took place, as 
 La Fayette said, in describing it, 2 " in the most beautiful 
 weather in the world, and in sight of both the English and 
 the American armies. I never was so happy as upon that 
 day." And indeed it seemed as if the Comte d Estaing 
 had found at last the opportunity he so ardently sought, 
 of measuring his strength with the British and of per- 
 
 1 M. de Cambis, on the Languedoc, ubi supra. 
 
 2 Letter to the Due d Ayen, llth September, 1778 : Correspondance de 
 La Fayette, i. 214. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 463 
 
 forming a brilliant action for the glory of France and for 
 the cause of Independence in America. 
 
 Lord Howe s fleet, which was found to consist of thirty- 
 six sail, of which nine or ten appeared to be smaller 
 vessels, probably the transports upon which he was con 
 voying some four thousand troops to reinforce the garri 
 son at Newport, continued its course under full press of 
 canvas, in the direction of New York, with the French 
 fleet pursuing, throughout that day and the ensuing night ; 
 and upon the next day it became evident that the Comte 
 d Estaing was gaining the advantage of position, whilst at 
 the same time he was overtaking the enemy. About four 
 o clock in the afternoon he gave orders for a general attack, 
 which Admiral Howe, who perceived that he could no 
 longer escape it, was now preparing for, when suddenly 
 the sea became rough and a gale arose of almost unex 
 ampled fury, which concealed the two fleets from each 
 other in the darkness that accompanied it, separated them 
 from each other, and beat upon them all night with such 
 violence that it left them crippled and torn when daylight 
 came, so that neither admiral could think of beginning 
 the combat, but each, occupied entirely with the welfare 
 of his own fleet, took the best course possible to bring his 
 ships with safety into port. During the course of the 
 night the French admiral s ship, the Languedoc, had lost 
 all her masts, and finally her rudder gave way, which left 
 her tossing helplessly about upon the sea ; the ship of the 
 line Cesar was entirely lost to sight, the Marseillais had 
 lost two of her masts, and all had suffered to a greater or 
 less degree, until the Comte d Estaing, almost in despair 
 at the misfortunes which pursued him everywhere and now 
 threatened to overwhelm him, compared himself to a man 
 who had had both arms and both legs cut off at once. 1 
 Whilst the Languedoc was drifting without sail or rudder, 
 
 1 The Comte d Estuing s official Report to the Secretary of the French 
 Navy, ubi supra. 
 
464 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 she fell into the course of a British frigate, the Renown, 
 which immediately attacked her, bringing its guns to bear 
 upon her at the stern and maintaining its position in such 
 a manner that, whilst the flag-ship s guns were for the 
 most part unavailable, the British shot entered at the 
 stern and swept her gun-deck from end to end. Nothing 
 could have saved the ship from capture if the British 
 captain had continued the action, for, as M. d Estaing said, 
 there " would soon have been little left on board to destroy 
 except the officers and men ;" but, for some unexplained 
 reason, the Renown hauled off after having fired three 
 volleys, and continued her course. 
 
 The Marseillais, ship of the line, was similarly engaged 
 with a British ship of fifty guns, the Preston, from which 
 she sustained a warm attack, crippled as she was, but 
 managed to disengage herself after a gallant defence. 
 
 Finally, on the 17th of August, the admiral collected 
 his ships, and, placing the Languedoc, upon which he still 
 remained, in tow of one of the others, he prepared for the 
 return to Newport according to his promise made to Gen 
 eral Sullivan. To this proposal his officers were almost 
 unanimously opposed ; and upon being called to a council 
 they insisted that it was now the admiral s duty, in view 
 of the condition of the fleet and under the provisions of 
 his instructions, to sail at once for Boston, where the ships 
 might be repaired. M. d Estaing overruled them, how 
 ever, to this extent, at least, although their contention 
 showed something of the bitterness which no doubt arose 
 from their jealousy of him personally, that he obliged 
 them to return to Newport first, promising them that he 
 would then conduct the fleet to Boston. " All the opin 
 ions, very many arguments, and the dictates of reason 
 itself," he said, " urged me to steer directly for that port 
 [Boston] ; it was the rendezvous established in my sealed 
 orders. But my duty before all else was, to prove to the 
 new allies of His Majesty that we were ready to sacrifice 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 465 
 
 everything in order to keep a promise that we had once 
 made. Our need of water, and the uncertainty as to what 
 might happen, could not release us from a fixed engage 
 ment, and I felt that I must inform General Sullivan and 
 assist him, by the presence of the fleet, either to conquer 
 or to retreat. And so we came to anchor, without further 
 accident, before Rhode Island." 1 Credit was not given 
 to the Comte d Estaing, at that day, for this determination 
 to keep his word ; nor has it generally been remembered 
 to his honor by the writers who have treated the subject 
 in later times. Men were blinded by disappointment and 
 angered by the loss of an opportunity upon which such 
 promising hopes had rested ; and, in their outbursts of 
 passion, they threw upon him the burden of responsibility 
 for all their ills. However willing he might have been to 
 resume the plan of attack upon Newport where he had left 
 it ten days before, there were two considerations which ma 
 terially changed his attitude now and induced him to pur 
 sue the course he did : one was his greatly weakened con 
 dition, and the other was the fear that the fleet of Admiral 
 Byron, which he knew had left England, might appear 
 at any moment, either alone or in conjunction with Lord 
 Howe, and hold him at its mercy. " The same operation 
 which came near being disastrous to us," he said, " when 
 we had our full strength, would have been all the more 
 imprudent to undertake now, because two vessels reported 
 having chased some ships of the enemy which from their 
 armament were seen to be certainly a part of the squad 
 ron commanded by Admiral Byron. Besides, in order to 
 hope for success, we should have had to disarm the fleet, 
 which, if it had been blockaded or set fire to, between 
 positions held by the enemy, would inevitably have been 
 lost ; and it would have been uselessly sacrificed." 
 
 1 Official Report of the Comte d Estaing to the Secretary of the French 
 
 Navy, ubi supra. 
 3 Ibid. 
 
 VOL. I. 30 
 
466 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 Having thus decided, M. d Estaing despatched one of 
 the officers of his flag-ship, the Comte de Cambis, aboard 
 the Senegal, an English prize taken during the pursuit of 
 Lord Howe, to inform General Sullivan that he was at the 
 entrance to the channel at Newport, but that he did not 
 intend now to go in. M. de Cambis made all haste to 
 carry this message from the admiral ; and, having landed 
 at Point Judith, he met several American officers anxiously 
 waiting there for news of the fleet. The storm which had 
 raged upon the ocean had also fallen with exceeding vio 
 lence upon the country about Newport ; the heavy rain 
 had drenched the troops, whose tents were quickly blown 
 down, and they had suffered greatly from exposure to 
 which most of them were not accustomed. Everybody 
 was alarmed for the welfare of the fleet, which it was 
 known must have been in peril, and General Sullivan had 
 placed lookouts along the coast to bring him any tidings 
 of it that they might be able to obtain. It was one of 
 these parties that M. de Cambis fell in with ; and, in 
 reply to his questions, he learned that General Sullivan 
 was still upon Rhode Island. M. de Cambis wrote a letter 
 to him, in accordance with his instructions, which he sent 
 by one of the American officers, in which he announced 
 to him "that the Comte d Estaing had sent to inform 
 him that the French fleet had returned to Rhode Island, 
 in compliance with the promise which he had made, but 
 that the total dismasting of two of his principal ships by 
 a gale which had come upon him whilst he was pursuing 
 the English obliged M. d Estaing to go into port for a 
 short time in order to make repairs and to put himself in 
 condition to carry on the operations against the common 
 enemy ; that therefore the fleet would not come nearer to 
 Rhode Island, because M. d Estaing feared that if he did 
 so he should not be able in the crippled condition of his 
 vessels to come up sufficiently to the prevailing southwest 
 winds to sail around Nantucket ; and he begged His Ex- 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 467 
 
 cellency General Sullivan to send notice to the French 
 corvette and the three frigates which were in the Eastern 
 Passage, of his departure for Boston, with the request that 
 they should join him there immediately." 
 
 Nothing could exceed the disappointment and discon 
 tent with which this communication was received in the 
 American camp. General Sullivan had not made material 
 progress during the absence of the fleet, it is true, but he 
 had at least been able to hold his own. The situation of 
 the army was critical now, and, whilst he felt certain of 
 carrying the works before Newport if he had the assist 
 ance of the allies, there was little hope of his success if he 
 should be left to fight single-handed. The departure of the 
 fleet at that moment seemed to the Americans unreasonable 
 and unjust ; it aroused a tumult of feeling, in the midst of 
 which many passionate things were said and many acts 
 committed upon our side in which we were not always 
 reasonable or always just ; and, for the time, the sense of 
 loss to ourselves, of threatened defeat, of mortification be 
 fore the eyes of the expectant country, evoked the dormant 
 race feeling which all had hoped was forgotten. It was an 
 instant of very serious danger for America. The loss of 
 Newport was a subject to be treated in cooler moments as 
 totally insignificant, compared with that which we should 
 have sustained in the rupture of our alliance with France ; 
 for the Revolution was not nearly accomplished in that 
 summer of 1778, and we still stood greatly in need of the 
 countenance and support of the French nation which we 
 received, to our advantage and with gratitude, afterward. 
 Fortunately, there were wiser counsels, which ultimately 
 prevailed and counteracted the heedless and somewhat 
 petulant conduct of those who, under the stress of cir 
 cumstances, were unable to see beyond the limit of the 
 then present time. The Comte de Cambis brought with 
 
 1 Journal of the Comte de Cainbis aboard the Languedoe, ubi supra. 
 
468 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 him a letter for General Sullivan, written on the Langue- 
 doc by M. d Estaing on the 21st of August, as follows : l 
 
 "Our cables were cut, and the fire of the batteries, which we 
 were about to pass to attack the enemy s squadron, had com 
 menced, when I received the letter, which you did me the honor 
 to write on the 9th instant. It was not then possible for me to 
 answer it otherwise than by pursuing the English fleet and pre 
 venting it from landing any succors. The Count de Cainbis has 
 been charged to acquaint you with my present situation, and of 
 the necessity which compels me to go to Boston. I could not 
 myself discharge this melancholy duty, because with a vessel 
 deprived of all her masts, her rudder broken and unshipped, one 
 is extremely uncertain of his destiny. I have nevertheless as 
 yet the consolation of being sufficiently master of it to fulfil the 
 promise verbally made, that I would in any event return to you, 
 dead or alive. This promise, and the advantage which our mo 
 mentary presence may render to you, have caused me to shut my 
 eyes to all other considerations. In this perhaps I have been im 
 prudent, and my zeal may have blinded me. I have thought that 
 I could not run too great a hazard to prove, in the name of the 
 King, how much His Majesty is attached to his allies ; but I should 
 be culpable in my duty to America herself, if I could forget for a 
 moment the welfare of a squadron destined for her defence. I 
 regretted to Colonel Fleury that you should have landed on the 
 Island a day before the time agreed upon between us, and I should 
 be greatly afflicted to know that you are in danger. I was in 
 formed that you had then only two thousand men. To decide 
 upon your motives is a wrong which I have not committed. I 
 have refrained from censure ; and the twelve thousand men now 
 under your command will probably prove the correctness of the 
 step by a success which I desire as a citizen, and an admirer of 
 your bravery and talents." 
 
 This letter was written, but had not yet been sent, 
 when M. d Estaing received one from General Sullivan 
 written the day before, as soon as the fleet had been 
 sighted, in which he begged him to join in an attack 
 upon the enemy. The admiral replied to it in a postscript 
 declining to do so, upon the ground of the disabled and 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, vi. 44, note. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 469 
 
 dispersed condition of his fleet, the naval strength of the 
 enemy, the chance that reinforcements might reach them 
 at any moment, and the positive orders of the King, that 
 in case of disaster, or of his finding the enemy s force 
 superior to his own, he should go for safety to the harbor 
 of Boston. 
 
 General Sullivan now turned to La Fayette, with the 
 hope of persuading the admiral to change his resolution 
 and come into Rhode Island, where he promised that pro 
 visions should be procured for his ships, and abundance 
 of fresh water, and even that new masts should be fur 
 nished him and all the repairs made that were necessary 
 after the damage done to his fleet by the storm. La Fay 
 ette set out immediately, accompanied by General Greene 
 and several other officers, for the Languedoc, upon this 
 errand, which he fulfilled with great earnestness and with 
 a sincere wish that the misunderstanding which he already 
 felt very keenly himself might be cleared away, in order 
 that the Americans and his countrymen might again be 
 united. He urged the admiral to accede to General Sulli 
 van s request if it were possible for him under any circum 
 stances to do so, or at least to send a force of infantry 
 and marines to take part in the attack. This latter pro 
 posal the Comte d Estaing was inclined to listen to, pro 
 vided the garrison could be carried by assault within two 
 days ; but as it was impossible to assure him of that, and 
 as he was unwilling to delay his voyage to Boston for 
 a longer time, that hope for aid had to be abandoned. 
 Nevertheless, upon La Fayette s continued entreaties, he 
 called a council of war composed of all his captains, to 
 which he submitted the propositions of General Sul 
 livan. They were unanimously opposed by the council, 
 and it was decided that the fleet should proceed at once 
 to Boston. 
 
 It is extremely difficult to determine from the docu 
 ments now in our possession how far the personal inclina- 
 
470 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 tion of M. d Estaing impelled him to remain at Newport, 
 in spite of the distressed condition of his fleet, to take the 
 chances of escaping the arrival of a superior British fleet 
 and to help General Sullivan in the proposed attack. The 
 popular belief was, at the time, that he would have done 
 so if his officers had been willing, but that they overruled 
 him. It does not appear likely, however, that this was 
 the case. His purpose in returning to Newport was the 
 very honorable one of keeping his word to the American 
 general and at the same time supporting him by his 
 presence if he desired to make a retreat to the mainland. 
 The conciliatory tone of his letter in reference to General 
 Sullivan s movement to the island on the day before the 
 one agreed upon was merely the courtesy of one gen 
 eral officer speaking in friendly terms to another : the 
 lack of consideration which had wounded his feelings 
 upon that occasion was still fresh in his mind ; and while 
 there is every reason to believe that, if his forces had re 
 mained intact, he would loyally have performed his part 
 in the expedition at Newport, yet the reflection is inevi 
 table in studying this subject that circumstances justi 
 fied him in complying with his orders to go to Boston, 
 and there was now no inducement for him to go out of 
 his way to do a favor for General Sullivan by performing 
 an extraordinary service from which that gentleman must 
 reap at least the larger share of the honor and the glory. 
 M. de Cambis reported to him that " the Americans had 
 done nothing as yet, and that the siege of Newport was no 
 further advanced than the day we left." 1 At all events, 
 the opinions of the other French officers were definitively 
 fixed, whatever the admiral may have thought. The in 
 judicious move of General Sullivan had shaken their 
 confidence in the promises now made on his behalf by 
 La Fayette, and M. de Cambis wrote in his journal, what 
 
 1 Journal of the Comte de Cambis on the Languedoc, ubi supra. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 471 
 
 was probably an exact reflection of the sentiment on 
 shipboard, " We have already taken too great risks not to 
 be wary now of their [the Americans ] hopes and prom 
 ises, and we could not forget the unfortunate situation 
 from which only an extraordinary accident happily rescued 
 us when the squadron of Lord Howe appeared two weeks 
 before, to consent to put ourselves back into a position 
 that would have been all the more critical since our fleet 
 was weakened by the absence of one large ship and by 
 two others dismasted, and since we were assured by the 
 discoveries of the Fantasque and the Sagittaire that Ad 
 miral Byron s fleet had arrived." 
 
 On the other hand, the Marquis de La Fayette did not 
 share this feeling with his countrymen toward his com 
 rades in America. His conduct was admirable through 
 out all these negotiations, in which he still continued to 
 take the principal part as intermediary between the two 
 parties, and there is no doubt that he exerted all his 
 powers of persuasion to induce the Comte d Estaing to 
 comply with General Sullivan s request, not only whilst 
 he was on board the admiral s ship, but also after he 
 came ashore again, in his communications from the camp. 
 In his devotion to the American cause La Fayette evi 
 dently acted at the request of General Sullivan ; and he 
 submitted to that officer the letter which he addressed 
 to the Comte d Estaing before it was sent off. Upon his 
 return from visiting M. d Estaing, from whom he had 
 brought a communication to General Sullivan, he wrote : l 
 
 "A r r THE HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL SULLIVAN, 21st August. 
 "I have this moment arrived here, Monsieur le Comte, and I 
 have delivered the letter, which appeared to me very greatly to 
 disconcert the plans of those who were most interested in it. 
 They will communicate to you, at greater length, both their 
 present fears and their hopes which they now see destroyed ; 
 though it seems to me that a great many things had already been 
 
 1 Revue d Histoire diplomatique, sixieine annee, No. 3, p. 418. 
 
472 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 expressed in General Greene s letter. You will receive one from 
 General Sullivan and one from Mr. Hancock, and I am requested 
 to add one to these also. I should make it very long if I were 
 now to repeat all that I took the liberty of saying to you in the 
 conversations you have been kind enough to hold with me ; but 
 it would be exceedingly short if I were not to repeat anything at 
 all. At all events, I may safely say that I have never seen these 
 gentlemen so positive as they now are of the facilities that you 
 will find here, or so confident of our success. They undertake 
 to answer for these things with an assurance which, I must con 
 fess, seems attractive, and of which you will be enabled yourself 
 to judge, for I have advised them to explain their position with 
 great clearness. It is reported here that you have certainly not 
 gone yet, and it is with this hope that these gentlemen are writing 
 to you ; you understand that I cannot resist sending my letter 
 with theirs, but I beg you not to reply to it, because your time is 
 of so much importance to you that I would not have you waste it 
 upon me. But if you have any new orders to give me I earnestly 
 beg you to send them to me, and I shall as faithfully perform them. 
 "I have received to-day the most positive assurances, from the 
 persons who are writing to you, in regard to the matters upon 
 which J was in doubt. I confess that if I accept Mr. Hancock s 
 opinion, I have my misgivings as to the resources you will find at 
 Boston. Pardon me, Monsieur le Conite, if I cause you unneces 
 sary regret, or if I fall into repetitions which are equally so ; I 
 trust you will excuse me in view of the necessity of the case, and 
 of my duty. I share with you most sincerely your feelings upon 
 this occasion, and I believe myself worthy of a part of your affec 
 tion because of the sincerity of my own. Adieu, Monsieur le 
 Comte. My tender attachment for you is joined with the bound 
 less love that I bear for my country and my wishes for the suc 
 cess of our arms, and I shall not be satisfied until I am able to go 
 out either to conquer or to die, with you and under your command. 
 
 " LAFAYETTE. 
 
 "General Sullivan, to whom I have read the greater part of 
 this letter, approves of the assurances I have given you from him, 
 and I shall leave my letter with him to be forwarded to you. In 
 regard to certain matters of which I am necessarily ignorant my 
 self, I am obliged to base our hopes upon those which are held 
 out to me by the people whom I consult." 
 
 This was certainly as strong an appeal as La Fayette 
 could make to the Comte d Estaing under the circum- 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 473 
 
 stances which governed the relations of the two men, 
 since he was but a youth communicating his opinions to a 
 man who was by many years his senior, an untried cap 
 tain in the French service venturing to discuss military 
 questions with the lieutenant-general and admiral of the 
 fleet. No doubt his personal relations with M. d Estaing 
 permitted him to advance in this direction far beyond 
 the limit which his military rank would have prescribed, 
 and he evidently took advantage of them on this occasion 
 to exert every influence at his command to aid General 
 Sullivan and to strengthen the cause of Independence in 
 America. 
 
 It was of no avail, however, for the council of war had 
 already decided, as we have seen, to put in to Boston ; 
 and during the night of the 21st of August, the day upon 
 which La Fayette s letter was written, the fleet weighed 
 anchor and set sail. This was practically the end of the 
 Comte d Estaing s expedition to the United States in 
 1778. We have followed it in its details from the day 
 when the fleet set sail from Toulon ; we have studied its 
 character and noted its vicissitudes ; we have seen with 
 what bright prospect the French standard was unfurled 
 upon the high seas as the emblem of vengeance against 
 Great Britain and of victory for the cause of freedom 
 in America, and finally how M. d Estaing s hopes had 
 to be relinquished when victory seemed almost within 
 his grasp. The best that can be said of the expedition 
 is, that it was a disappointment. It left unfulfilled the 
 anticipations of the French people, by whom this enter 
 prise was looked upon as a new source of national glory ; 
 it left a feeling of discouragement and depression in 
 America which for a moment caused our countrymen 
 to despair of their ultimate success in the struggle for 
 liberty. The mortification arising from our sense of 
 failure led to expressions of resentment which, while 
 they are not to be justified or approved of, are perfectly 
 
474 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 intelligible under the circumstances ; indeed, General 
 Washington pointed out to the Marquis de La Fayette 
 that they "would more than probably have fallen in a 
 much higher degree upon a fleet of our own, if we had 
 one in the same situation." 
 
 As soon as General Sullivan was convinced that the 
 French admiral was really going to Boston, he drew up a 
 formal protest addressed to him, which he caused to be 
 signed by all his general officers except the Marquis de 
 La Fayette, the tone of which reflected rather his own 
 passionate disappointment than the mature judgment of 
 a man who had carefully considered the circumstances 
 before him ; and he hastily despatched Colonel Laurens 
 with it in an American vessel, to overtake the fleet. In 
 addition to speaking of the " ruinous consequences which 
 would result to this army from his abandoning the harbor 
 of Newport at this time," which expression was included 
 in its preamble, 2 this document contained the following 
 arguments among others presented to the Comte d Estaing 
 against his going away : 
 
 " Fifthly, Because the honor of the French nation must be in 
 jured by their fleet abandoning their allies upon an island, in the 
 midst of an expedition agreed to by the Count himself. This must 
 make such an unfavorable impression on the minds of Americans 
 at large, and create such jealousies between them and their hith 
 erto esteemed allies, as will, in a great measure, frustrate the good 
 intentions of His Most Christian Majesty and the American Con 
 gress, who have mutually endeavored to promote the greatest 
 harmony and confidence between the French people and the 
 Americans. . . . 
 
 "Ninthly, Because, even though the facts pretended were fully 
 proved, and it became necessary for the fleet to proceed to Boston, 
 yet no possible reason can be assigned for the Count d Estaing s 
 taking with him the land forces which he has on board, and which 
 
 1 To La Fayette, 1st September, 1778 : Sparks, Writings of Washington, 
 vi. 49. 
 
 2 See the full text in Amory s Sullivan, p. 77. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 475 
 
 might be of great advantage in the expedition, and of no possible 
 use to him in Boston. . . . 
 
 i We, therefore, for the reasons above assigned, do, in the most 
 solemn manner, protest against the measure, as derogatory to the 
 honor of France, contrary to the intentions of His Most Christian 
 Majesty and the interest of his nation, and destructive in the 
 highest degree to the welfare of the United States of America, and 
 highly injurious to the alliance formed between the two nations." 
 
 It is evident that General Sullivan misinterpreted the 
 demands of the situation, as well as the character of the 
 man with whom he was dealing. He justified the writing 
 of this communication upon the ground that " the Count 
 himself wished to remain with us, but was by his captains 
 overruled in council." l This, if true, would merely 
 have added to the indiscretion upon his part of having 
 committed such an act the error of judgment by which 
 he expected through a personal offence toward the Comte 
 d Estaing to draw him away from his own officers, with 
 whom he naturally sympathized and by whose opinions 
 he was influenced. Colonel Laurens overtook the flag 
 ship at the entrance to Boston harbor, and performed his 
 graceless mission of delivering the protest to the admiral, 
 who said in reply that " this paper imposed on the com 
 mander of the King s squadron the painful but necessary 
 law of profound silence." 
 
 General Washington, who plainly saw the danger that 
 lay in this unwary step, wrote to General Sullivan, from 
 White Plains, on the 1st of September, 3 
 
 "The disagreement between the army under your command 
 and the fleet has given me very singular uneasiness. The conti 
 nent at large is concerned in our cordiality, and it should be kept 
 up by all possible means, consistent with our honor and policy. 
 First impressions you know are generally longest remembered, 
 
 1 Letter to Washington, 3d September. 
 
 2 Colonel Laurens to General Washington, 2d September : Sparks, Writings 
 of Washington, vi. 46, note. 
 
 3 Sparks, Writings of Washington, vi. 44. 
 
476 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 and will serve to fix in a great degree our national character 
 among the French. In our conduct towards them we should re 
 member, that they are a people old in war, very strict in military 
 etiquette, and apt to take fire, where others scarcely seem warmed. 
 Permit me to recommend, in the most particular manner, the cul 
 tivation of harmony and good agreement, and your endeavours to 
 destroy that ill humor, which may have got into the officers. It 
 is of the greatest importance also, that the soldiers and the people 
 should know nothing of the misunderstanding, or, if it has reached 
 them, that ways may be used to stop its progress and prevent its 
 effects. 
 
 "I have received from Congress the enclosed, by which you 
 will perceive their opinion with regard to keeping secret the pro 
 test of the general officers. I need add nothing on this head. I 
 have one thing, however, more to say. I make no doubt but you 
 will do all in your power to forward the repair of the Count s 
 fleet, and render it fit for service, by your recommendations for 
 that purpose to those who can be immediately instrumental." 
 
 The enclosure mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief 
 in the last paragraph of his letter related to the action 
 taken by Congress upon the protest sent to the French 
 admiral. When it was read in Congress, in connection 
 with the correspondence relating to it, an order was made 
 that their contents should be kept secret, but that the 
 President should communicate them to M. Gerard, the 
 French Minister, informing him at the same time of the 
 injunction of secrecy. It was also ordered that General 
 Washington should take every measure in his power to 
 prevent the protest from being made public. 1 
 
 The Marquis de La Fayette was incensed at the request 
 that he should attend the meeting at which this protest 
 was being discussed and signed ; for he regarded that 
 measure as an insult to his nation, and the call upon 
 him to take part in it as a personal indignity, which 
 wounded him where he was most sensitive, in his loyal 
 admiration for whatever was French. 
 
 1 Secret Journa 1 . of Congress, i. 89. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 477 
 
 He wrote to M. d Estaing on the 22d of August, 1 
 
 i i You are about to receive a long memoir [the protest], Mon 
 sieur le Comte, and I shall accompany it by a short letter. The 
 condition I am in, the different feelings that animate me, and the 
 outbursts of impatience to which I have given way, make it im 
 possible for me either to talk to you or to write with a quiet 
 mind. Can you believe that I was summoned to a council where 
 a protest was made against a measure taken by the French fleet ! 
 I told these gentlemen that my native land is dearer to me than 
 America, that whatever France does is right, that M. le C te d Es- 
 taing is my friend, and that I am ready to support these opinions 
 by my sword, which has never been put to a better use. I added 
 that if they had shown very little delicacy, upon their part, in 
 summoning me, I should use little also, in my choice of expressions. 
 They all apologized and said that they were far from requiring me 
 to give my vote. In the mean time, M. le Cointe, fancy my situ 
 ation ; for from this time forward I shall be in fear that I may 
 have to resent every word I hear spoken. 
 
 1 i I confess that the general consternation has been far greater 
 than I should ever have thought possible ; it was impossible to 
 foresee the effect which your departure has had upon men s 
 minds. Pardon me, Monsieur le Comte, but this is not the first 
 time that I have transgressed by being too frank ; I told you the 
 other day all that I knew, I shall tell you now what I see, and 
 much more than I expected. My heart will always be open to a 
 man whom I love as I do you. 
 
 " Adieu, M. le Comte. I am told alarming stories about the 
 risks you run in going to Boston, and I am uneasy about it ; I 
 shall have no peace until I know that you have arrived. If I 
 leave the Island I shall go to that city immediately. I hope 
 nobody will be upon Rhode Island after I leave, and that we shall 
 not have to regret any loss, unless I have had a chance, at least, 
 to share in the danger. The last boat will be the one to take me 
 over ; and, in any event, I beg you to accept the homage of my 
 admiration for your virtue, for your patriotism, and for all that 
 makes you loved and respected by . . . 
 
 This letter is extremely interesting as a reflection of La 
 Fayette s character and as a proof that in the midst of 
 this conflict of feeling which arose from the comments all 
 
 1 Revue d Histoire diplomatique, sixieme annee, No. 3, p. 419. 
 
478 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 about him upon the action of his countrymen, whilst he 
 was even upon the point of drawing his sword at times 
 in reply to words spoken in his presence, he continued to 
 do his duty conscientiously as an American soldier, and 
 remained at his post always with the one purpose in 
 view, of furthering the success of the cause of liberty 
 and of being the last man to leave whilst there was 
 danger to be incurred. It is a remarkable example of 
 the subordination of self and personal interests to the 
 higher considerations of devotion and self-sacrifice by 
 which one is bound in the loyal performance of duty. 
 In this La Fayette was a thorough soldier. 
 
 In the mean time, General Sullivan, not content with 
 the demonstration made by him in his protest, issued a 
 general order to the army, on the 24th of September, in 
 which he lamented the sudden departure of the fleet, but 
 added that " he [General Sullivan] yet hopes the event 
 will prove America able to procure with her own arms 
 that which her allies refused to assist her in obtaining." 
 La Fayette, angered by this insinuation of abandonment, 
 immediately called upon General Sullivan and demanded 
 that the words contained in his order should be retracted 
 in a similar order. After he had gone back to his quar 
 ters, the general returned his visit, during which a warm 
 altercation took place between them, which threatened to 
 lead to a duel. 1 But, as a result, General Sullivan said, 
 in an order issued by him on the 26th of September, 
 " It having been supposed by some persons that by the 
 orders of the 24th inst. the commander-in-chief meant 
 to insinuate that the departure of the French fleet was 
 owing to a fixed determination not to assist in the present 
 enterprise ; and as the general could not wish to give the 
 least color to ungenerous and illiberal minds to make 
 such an unfair interpretation, he thinks it necessary to 
 
 1 M6moires de ma Main, i. 57. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 479 
 
 say that as he could not possibly be acquainted with the 
 orders of the French admiral, he could not determine 
 whether the removal of the fleet was absolutely necessary 
 or not, and therefore did not mean to censure an act which 
 the admiral s orders might render absolutely necessary." l 
 
 This painful situation had continued but a short time 
 when La Fayette appealed to General Washington in a 
 letter which reflects his feelings and the strained relations 
 between himself and the other French officers with their 
 American comrades as well as any document that we now 
 possess in relation to the event. It drew from the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief a soothing reply, in which, with his wise 
 judgment and paternal kindness, he touched gently upon 
 the injured places in the young officer s mind, allaying 
 the irritation caused by angry words and personal offences, 
 and encouraging him with assurances of his warm friend 
 ship and affectionate sympathy. At the same time, he 
 wrote conciliatory letters to General Sullivan and General 
 Greene, and shortly afterward the tension was relieved, 
 and the former cordial relations were restored. 
 
 La Fayette s letter to General Washington was as fol 
 lows : 2 
 
 "CAMP BEFORE NEWPORT, 25th August, 1778. 
 
 "MY DEAR GENERAL, I had expected in answering your first 
 letter that something interesting would have happened that I 
 might communicate to your excellency. Every day was going to 
 terminate our uncertainties ; nay, every day was going to bring 
 the hope of a success which I did promise myself to acquaint you 
 of. Such was the reason of my deferring what my duty and in 
 clination did urge me to do much sooner. I am now indebted for 
 two favours of yours, which I beg leave to offer here my thanks 
 for. The first letter reached me in the time we expected to hear 
 again from the French fleet ; the second I have just received. 
 My reason for not writing the same day the French fleet went to 
 Boston was, that I did not choose to trouble your friendship with 
 the sentiments of an afflicted, injured heart, and injured by that 
 
 1 Glover MSS., in the Essex Institute. 
 
 2 La Fayette s Memoirs, American edition, i. 186. 
 
480 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 very people I canae from so far to love and support. Don t 
 be surprised, my dear General ; the generosity of your honest 
 mind would be offended at the shocking sight I have under my 
 eyes. 
 
 " So far am I from a critical disposition that I will not give you 
 the journal of our operations, neither of several instances during 
 our staying here, which, however, might occupy some room in 
 this letter. I will not even say to you, how contracted was the 
 French fleet when they wanted to come in at their arrival ; which, 
 according to the report of the advertors, would have had the 
 greatest effect. How surprised was the Admiral, when, after a 
 formal and agreed convention, one hour after the American gen 
 eral had given a new written assurance, our troops made the 
 landing a day before it was expected. How mortified the French 
 officers were to find out that there was not a gun left in these 
 very forts to whose protection they were recommended. All 
 these things, and many others, I would not take notice of, if 
 they were not at this moment the supposed ground upon which, 
 it is said, that the Count d Estaing is gone on to Boston. Believe 
 me, my dear sir, upon my honour, the Admiral, though a little 
 astonished by some instances of conduct on our part, did con 
 sider them in the same light as you and myself would have done, 
 and if he is gone off, it is because he thought himself obliged by 
 necessity. 
 
 1 i Let us consider, my dear general, the motions of that fleet 
 since it was proposed by the Count d Estaing himself, and granted 
 by the King in behalf of the United States. I will not go so far 
 up as to remember other instances of the affection the French 
 nation have for the Americans. The news of that fleet have occa 
 sioned the evacuation of Philadelphia. Its arrival has opened 
 all the harbours, secured all the coasts, obliged the British navy 
 to be together. Six of those frigates, two of them I have seen, 
 sufficient for terrifying all the trading people of the two Caro- 
 linas, are taken or burnt. The Count d Estaing went to offer 
 battle, and act as a check to the British navy for a long time. At 
 ~New York, it was agreed he should go to Ehode Island, and there 
 he went. They prevented him from going in at first ; afterwards, 
 he was desired to come in, and so he did. The same day we 
 landed without his knowledge ; an English fleet appears in sight. 
 His being divided into three parts by our directions, for, though he 
 is a lieutenant general, he never availed himself of that title, made 
 him uneasy about his situation. But finding the next morning 
 that the wind was northerly, being also convinced that it was his 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 481 
 
 duty to prevent any reinforcement at Newport, he goes out under 
 the hottest fire of the British land batteries, he puts the British 
 navy to flight, and pursues them, and they were all in his hands 
 when that horrid storm arrives to ruin all our hopes. Both fleets 
 are divided, scattered ; the Caesar, a 74 gun ship, is lost ; the 
 Marseillais, of the same size, loses her masts, and after that acci 
 dent is obliged to send back an enemy s ship of 64 ; the Langue- 
 doc having lost her masts, unable to be governed and make any 
 motions, separated from the others, is attacked by a ship of the 
 line against which she could only bring six guns. 
 
 "When the storm was over, they met again in a shattered 
 condition, and the Caesar was not to be found. All the captains 
 represented to their general that, after a so long navigation, in 
 such a want of victuals, water, &c., which they had not been yet 
 supplied with, after the intelligence given by General Sullivan 
 that there was a British fleet coming, they should go to Boston ; 
 but the Count d Estaing had promised to come here again, and 
 so he did at all events. The news of his arrival and situation 
 came by the Senegal, a frigate taken from the enemy. General 
 Greene and myself went on board. The Count expressed to me 
 not so much as to the envoy from General Sullivan, than as to 
 his friend, the unhappy circumstances he was in. Bound by ex 
 press orders from the King to go to Boston in case of an accident 
 or a superior fleet, engaged, by the common sentiment of all the 
 officers, even of Home American pilots, that he would ruin all his 
 squadron in deferring his going to Boston, he called a new coun 
 cil of war, and linding everybody of the same opinion, he did not 
 think himself justifiable in staying here any longer, and took 
 leave of me with true affliction not being able to assist America 
 for some days, which has been rewarded with the most horrid 
 ungratefulness ; but no matter. I am only speaking of facts. The 
 Count said to me these last words : after many months of suffer 
 ings, my men will rest some days ; I will man my ships, and, if 
 I urn assisted in getting masts, &c., three weeks after my arrival 
 I shall go out again, and then we shall fight for the glory of the 
 French name, and the interests of America. 
 
 "The day the Count went off, the general American officers 
 divw a protestation, which, as I had been very strangely called 
 there, I refused to sign, but I wrote a letter to the admiral. The 
 protestation and the letter did not arrive in time. 
 
 "Now, my dear general, I am going to hurt your generous 
 feelings by an imperfect picture of what I am forced to see. 
 Forgive me for it ; it is not to the commander- in- chief, it is to my 
 VOL. I. 31 
 
482 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 most dearest friend, General Washington, that I am speaking. I 
 want to lament with him the ungenerous sentiments I have been 
 forced to see in many American breasts. 
 
 " Could you believe, that forgetting any national obligation, 
 forgetting what they were owing to that same fleet, what they 
 were yet to expect from them, and instead of resenting their ac 
 cidents as these of allies and brothers, the people turned mad at 
 their departure, and wishing them all the evils in the world, did 
 treat them as a generous one would be ashamed to treat the most 
 inveterate enemies. You cannot have any idea of the horrors 
 which were to be heard in that occasion. Many leaders them 
 selves finding they were disappointed, abandoned their minds to 
 illiberality and ungratefulness. Frenchmen of the highest char 
 acter have been exposed to the most disagreeable circumstances, 
 and yet, myself, the friend of America the friend of General 
 Washington. I am more upon a warlike footing in the Ameri 
 can lines, than when I come near the British lines at Newport. 
 
 "Such is, my dear general, the true state of matters. I am 
 sure it will infinitely displease and hurt your feelings. I am 
 also sure you will approve the part I have taken in it, which 
 was to stay much at home with all the French gentlemen who 
 are here, and declare, at the same time, that anything thrown 
 before me against my nation I would take as the most par 
 ticular affront. 
 
 " Inclosed I send you the general orders of the 24th, upon 
 which I thought I was obliged to pay a visit to General Sullivan, 
 who has agreed to alter them in the following manner. Remem 
 ber, my dear general, that I don t speak to the Commander-in- 
 chief, but to my friend, that I am far from complaining of any 
 body. I have no complaints at all to make you against any one ; 
 but I lament with you that I have had an occasion of seeing so 
 ungenerous sentiments in American hearts. 
 
 "I will tell you the true reason. The leaders of the expedi 
 tion are, most of them, ashamed to return after having spoken of 
 their Ehode Island success in proud terms before their family, 
 their friends, their internal enemies. The others, regardless of 
 the expense France has been put to by that fleet, of the tedious, 
 tiresome voyage, which so many men have had for their service, 
 though they are angry that the fleet takes three weeks, upon the 
 whole campaign, to refit themselves, they cannot bear the idea of 
 being brought to a small expense, to the loss of a little time, to 
 the fatigue of staying some few days more in a camp at some few 
 miles off their houses ; for I am very far from looking upon the 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 483 
 
 expedition as having miscarried, and there I see even a certainty 
 of success. 
 
 "If, as soon as the fleet is repaired, which (in case they are 
 treated as one is in a country one is not at war with,) would be 
 done in three weeks from this time, the Count d Estaing was to 
 come around, the expedition seems to offer a very good prospect. 
 If the enemy evacuates New York, we have the whole continental 
 army, if not, we might perhaps have some more men, what num 
 ber, however, I cannot pretend to judge. All that I know is, 
 that I shall be very happy to see the fleet co-operating with 
 General Washington himself. 
 
 "I think I shall be forced, by the board of general officers, to 
 go soon to Boston. That I will do as soon as required, though 
 with reluctance, for I do not believe that our position on this part 
 of the island is without danger ; but my principle is to do every 
 thing which is thought good for the service. I have very often 
 rode express to the fleet, to the frigates, and that, I assure you, 
 with the greatest pleasure ; on the other hand, I may perhaps be 
 useful to the fleet. Perhaps, too, it will be in the power of the 
 Count to do something which might satisfy them. I wish, my 
 dear general, you could know as well as myself, how desirous the 
 Count d Estaing is to forward the public good, to help your suc 
 cess, and to serve the cause of America. 
 
 " I earnestly beg you will recommend to the several chief per 
 sons of Boston to do everything they can to put the French fleet 
 in a situation for sailing soon. Give me leave to add, that I wish 
 many people, by the declaration of your sentiments in that affair, 
 could learn how to regulate theirs, and blush at the sight of your 
 generosity. 
 
 "You will find my letter immense. I began it one day and 
 finished it the next, as my time was swallowed up by those eternal 
 councils of war. I shall have the pleasure of writing you from 
 Boston. I am afraid the Count d Estaing will have felt to the 
 quick the behaviour of the people on this occasion. You cannot 
 conceive how distressed he was to be prevented from serving this 
 country for some time. I do assure you his circumstances were 
 very critical and distressing. 
 
 "For my part, my sentiments are known to the world. My 
 tender affection for General Washington is added to them ; there 
 fore I want no apologies for writing upon what has afflicted me 
 both as an American and a Frenchman. 
 
 " I am much obliged to you for the care you are so kind as to 
 take of that poor horse of mine j had he not found such a good 
 
484 OPEKATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 stable as this at headquarters, he would have cut a pitiful figure 
 at the end of his travels, and I should have been too happy if 
 there had remained so much of the horse as the bones, the skin, 
 and the four shoes. 
 
 " Farewell, my dear general ; whenever I quit you, I meet with 
 some disappointment and misfortune. I did not need it to desire 
 seeing you as much as possible. With the most tender affection 
 and high regard, I have the honour to be, &c. 
 
 "Dear General, I must add to my letter, that I have received 
 one from General Greene, very different from the expressions I 
 have to complain of, he seems there very sensible of what I feel. 
 I am very happy when placed in a situation to do justice to any 
 one." 
 
 To this General Washington replied as follows : 1 
 
 "WHITE PLAINS, 1 September, 1778. 
 
 "MY DEAR MARQUIS, I have been honored with your favor 
 of the 25th ultimo by Monsieur Pontgebaud, and I wish my time, 
 which at present is taken up by a committee of Congress, would 
 permit me to go fully into the contents of it. This, however, it is 
 not in my power to do. But in one word let me say, I feel every 
 thing that hurts the sensibility of a gentleman, and consequently 
 upon the present occasion I feel for you and for our good and 
 great allies the French. I feel myself hurt, also, at every illiberal 
 and unthinking reflection, which may have been cast upon the 
 Count d Estaing, or the conduct of the fleet under his command ; 
 and lastly I feel for my country. Let me entreat you, therefore, 
 my dear Marquis, to take no exception at unmeaning expressions, 
 uttered perhaps without consideration, and in the first transport 
 of disappointed hope. Everybody, Sir, who reasons will acknowl 
 edge the advantages which we have derived from the French fleet, 
 and the zeal of the commander of it ; but, in a free and repub 
 lican government, you cannot restrain the voice of the multitude. 
 Every man will speak as he thinks, or, more properly, without 
 thinking, and consequently will judge of effects without attend 
 ing to the causes. The censures, which have been levelled at the 
 officers of the French fleet, would more than probably have fallen 
 in a much higher degree upon a fleet of our own, if we had one 
 in the same situation. It is the nature of man to be displeased 
 with everything that disappoints a favorite hope or flattering 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, vi. 49. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 485 
 
 project ; and it is the folly of too many of them to condemn 
 without investigating circumstances. 
 
 " Let me beseech you therefore, my good Sir, to afford a healing 
 hand to the wound, that unintentionally has been made. America 
 esteems your virtues and your services, and admires the principles 
 upon which you act. Your countrymen in our army look up to 
 you as their patron. The Count and his officers consider you as a 
 man high in rank, and high in estimation here and also in France ; 
 and I, your friend, have no doubt but you will use your utmost 
 endeavours to restore harmony, that the honor, glory, and mutual 
 interest of the two nations may be promoted and cemented in the 
 firmest manner. I would say more on the subject, but am re 
 strained for the want of time ; and therefore shall only add, that, 
 with every sentiment of esteem and regard, I am, my dear Mar 
 quis, &c." l 
 
 The influence which General Washington exerted upon 
 the troubled spirits in the camp, as well as upon the 
 wounded sensibilities of the French officers in the fleet, 
 by the conciliatory tone of his letters and the wisdom of 
 his counsels, was extremely effective in restoring friend 
 ship, so that even General Sullivan, whose violent expres 
 sions of disappointment were softened by the consideration 
 of more serious questions which affected the welfare of the 
 whole nation, wrote, on the 3d of September, to the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, 
 
 "The justice of the observations in your Excellency s letter, 
 respecting the departure of the French fleet, are so obvious, that, 
 if a consciousness of my duty to yield implicit obedience to your 
 Excellency s commands did not even make that obedience a 
 pleasure, the reasoning alone must have pointed out the part I 
 have to act. I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency, that, 
 though the first struggles of passion, on so important a disappoint 
 ment, were scarcely to be restrained, yet, in a few days, as it has 
 subsided, I found means to restore the former harmony between 
 the American and French officers of the army. The Count 
 
 1 See also General Washington s letters to General Sullivan, 28th of August, 
 to General Heath, 28th of August, to General Greene, 1st of September, to 
 the President of Congress, 4th of September, and to the Comte d Estaing, 
 2d and llth of September, 1778 : Sparks, Writings of Washington. 
 
486 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 d Estaing and myself are in the same friendship as heretofore. 
 The reason of the protest has been explained to him, and he is 
 now perfectly satisfied. He has offered to come on with his land 
 forces, and do everything which I may request of him and his 
 troops ; but the step has become unnecessary." * 
 
 In the mean time the services of La Fayette had again 
 been called upon, and he had been employed, in his ca 
 pacity of ambassador between the two armies, in one last 
 effort which General Sullivan decided to make in order 
 to obtain from the Comte d Estaing an auxiliary force 
 which would enable him to continue the siege of Newport. 
 He therefore requested General de La Fayette to go to 
 Boston, to meet the admiral there, and, after having taken 
 every possible measure which could incite the government 
 of Massachusetts to hasten the repairs to his vessels, to 
 beg of him that he would send his land troops to join the 
 American army in Rhode Island. General Greene an 
 nounced this to General Washington in a letter 2 in which 
 he says, 
 
 "Your Excellency may rest assured that I have done every 
 thing in my power to cultivate and promote a good understand 
 ing both with the Count and the Marquis, arid natter myself that 
 I am upon very good terms with them both. The Marquis s 
 great thirst for glory and national attachment often run him 
 into errors. However, he did everything to prevail upon the 
 Admiral to cooperate with us that man could do. People cen 
 sure the Admiral with great freedom, and many are impudent 
 enough to reproach the nation through the Admiral. General 
 Sullivan very imprudently issued something like a censure in 
 general orders. Indeed it was an absolute censure. It opened 
 the mouths of the army in very clamorous strains. The Gen 
 eral was obliged to explain it away in a few days. The fer 
 mentation seems to be now subsiding and all things appear as 
 if they would go smoothly on. The Marquis is going to Boston 
 also, to hasten the Count s return, and if possible to get the 
 
 1 Amory s Sullivan, p. 79. 
 
 2 28th August, Greenes Life of Greene, ii. 127. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 487 
 
 French troops to join the land forces here, which will the more 
 effectually interest the Count in the success of the expedition." 
 
 La Fayette complied immediately with General Sul 
 livan s request. Mounting his horse, he set out on 
 Friday, the 28th of August, the same day upon which 
 General Greene s letter was written to the Commander- 
 in-Chief, and, having ridden seventy miles in seven 
 hours, he reached Boston just as the French fleet had 
 entered the harbor. It was a personal sacrifice on his 
 part to leave the army at that moment, because every 
 thing indicated that an action was likely to take place 
 with the British forces, from which nothing but the most 
 urgent requirements of duty could have induced him to 
 absent himself. But he consoled himself with the re 
 flection that by making the greatest haste possible he 
 might perform an important service to the country and 
 still be back in time to take his place upon the field. He 
 spent the following day, Saturday, and part of Sunday, 
 in Boston, and on Sunday night he was again before 
 Newport, having made his return journey in six hours 
 and a half. 
 
 General Sullivan had maintained his position on Rhode 
 Island up to the 28th of August with a determination 
 which was extremely creditable to him as a soldier, and 
 at least deserved success. But circumstances were un 
 favorable to him, because he was conducting a siege 
 against a well-appointed and well-disciplined force with 
 an army composed for the most part of raw troops, not 
 more than fifteen hundred of his men having ever been 
 under fire before. Besides this, the militia began to re 
 turn home when it became evident that no immediate 
 assistance was to be expected from the French fleet ; be 
 tween two and three thousand of them left him in a 
 single day, and his army, which he had estimated at be 
 tween eight thousand and nine thousand men, was re- 
 
488 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 duced almost immediately to a total of five thousand, 
 less than the number of British troops known to be 
 under General Pigot s command at Newport. His situ 
 ation was weakened, therefore, to such an extent that he 
 could not hope to accomplish any offensive undertaking ; 
 in fact, it became a question whether he should now be 
 able even to effect a retreat with his army under the 
 difficulties that confronted him in the necessity of trans 
 ferring it to the mainland in the face of the enemy. 
 
 At a council of war called by him, it was decided 
 unanimously that the army should retire to the northern 
 end of the island, to fortify the camp there and to secure 
 the communication with the mainland. He sent forward 
 his stores and baggage at nightfall on the 28th of August, 
 and moved with his troops to Butt s Hill, where he en 
 camped about two o clock in the morning, with his right 
 wing resting upon the west road and his left on the east 
 road, secured by covering and flanking parties toward the 
 water on the right and left, under Colonel Laurens and 
 Colonel Livingston, and by a picket under Colonel Wade. 
 As soon as it was day, the enemy discovered General Sul 
 livan s movement, and early in the morning attacked 
 him with nearly their whole force, divided into two 
 columns. They met with a firm resistance from Colonels 
 Laurens, Livingston, and Wade, to whose assistance 
 General Sullivan sent forward two regiments, directing 
 them to retire upon the main army in the best order 
 they could preserve. This they did with excellent man 
 agement, keeping up as they retreated a steady fire upon 
 the enemy. The British troops advanced very close to 
 the position of General Sullivan s left wing, but were 
 repulsed by General Glover, after which they retired to 
 Quaker Hill, where they formed, about a mile in front 
 of General Sullivan s position at Butt s Hill. A heavy 
 fire of cannon was begun upon both sides about nine 
 o clock, and was kept up, with several skirmishes between 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 489 
 
 the advanced parties, until about ten o clock, when two 
 ships of war belonging to the enemy, and some smaller 
 armed vessels, gained the American right flank and 
 opened fire upon it, whilst the whole British force 
 united, under the fire of the ships, to turn General Sul 
 livan s right. An exceedingly hot contest took place at 
 this point, in which General Greene, who commanded 
 the right wing, distinguished himself by his personal 
 bravery and the skill with which he conducted the ac 
 tion. The British troops were driven back twice, and 
 twice they returned to the attack, to be finally completely 
 routed and fall back in disorder to the hill where they 
 had first formed, leaving large numbers of their dead and 
 wounded behind them. This action lasted about an hour. 
 Afterward the fire of the artillery was continued, with 
 light skirmishes, throughout the day, until nightfall. 
 The American army held its position at Butt s Hill, and 
 the enemy occupied the night in fortifying their camp. 
 Upon the following morning, the 30th of August, Gen 
 eral Sullivan received a letter from General Washington 
 which informed him that Lord Howe had left New York 
 with his fleet l on the preceding Tuesday, the 25th, with 
 the probable design of relieving the garrison at Newport ; 
 and, while the Commander-in-Chief did not directly order 
 him to retreat to the mainland, the tone of his letter 
 indicated his judgment that this step had now become 
 necessary. A council of war which was immediately con 
 vened by General Sullivan unanimously decided that the 
 army should quit the island. 
 
 In order to perform this exceedingly difficult task, 
 which required all the greater caution since the British 
 outposts were only two hundred yards distant from the 
 American sentries, General Sullivan determined to cover 
 his design by an appearance of active preparation for 
 
 1 Letter of 28th August : Sparks, Writings of Washington, vi. 40. 
 
490 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 further hostilities, and ordered several tents to be pitched 
 in sight of the enemy whilst he made an imposing demon 
 stration of employing his whole army in strengthening 
 his fortifications. 
 
 Meanwhile he was sending his heavy baggage and stores 
 to the rear, and these were being shipped across without 
 having aroused the suspicion of the enemy. At dark he 
 ordered all the tents to be struck, and soon after he began 
 crossing his troops. By midnight they were all in safety 
 upon the mainland near Tiverton. It was during this 
 evening that the Marquis de La Fayette returned from 
 Boston. He arrived upon the island at eleven o clock on 
 the night of the 30th, and, notwithstanding his ride of 
 seventy miles, which, as we have seen, he had made in 
 six hours and a half, forgetful of fatigue, he resumed his 
 command at once, and took charge of the rear-guard of 
 the army. He was still in time to fulfil his prediction to 
 the Comte d Estaing that the last boat should be the one 
 to take him over, and that nobody should be left upon the 
 island after he had gone. General Sullivan said of him 
 in his letter to Congress, " The Marquis de Lafayette 
 arrived about eleven in the evening from Boston ; where 
 he had been, by request of the general officers, to solicit 
 the speedy return of the fleet. He was sensibly morti 
 fied that he was out of action ; and, that he might not 
 be out of the way in case of action, he had ridden hence 
 to Boston in seven hours, and returned in six and a 
 half, the distance nearly seventy miles. He returned 
 in time enough to bring off the pickets and other parties 
 which covered the retreat of the army, which he did in 
 excellent order ; not a man was left behind, nor the 
 smallest article lost." 1 This retreat was most fortunate 
 for the American army, because upon the following morn 
 ing Lord Howe s fleet appeared, consisting of one hun- 
 
 1 General Sullivan to Congress, 31st August, 1778. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 491 
 
 dred ships of various kinds, with a strong reinforcement 
 of land troops for the garrison under command of Sir 
 Henry Clinton in person. If General Sullivan had been 
 overtaken by this force while still upon the island, his 
 chances of escaping a disaster would have been slender 
 indeed. Congress recognized his services and voted its 
 thanks to him and the officers and troops under his 
 command for their fortitude in the action of the 29th 
 of August, in which they repulsed the British forces 
 and maintained the field ; and it was resolved that the 
 retreat was prudent, timely, and well conducted. 1 
 
 Whilst La Fayette was in Boston he had employed 
 every inducement at his command to persuade the Comte 
 d Estaing to return to the army with his land forces ; and 
 his arguments were of such weight with the admiral that 
 he agreed to land his battalions of Foix and Hainault 
 and to march with them to put himself under the com 
 mand of General Sullivan at Newport. A session of the 
 Council of Massachusetts was convened, largely through 
 the influence of General Heath and General Hancock, 
 the latter of whom had gone to Boston for the purpose of 
 aiding the restoration of the French fleet, and La Fayette 
 appeared with the admiral at a conference held between 
 him and the Council upon the subjects of providing for 
 the fleet and of reinforcing General Sullivan. When 
 General de La Fayette returned to the army he bore 
 with him a letter from the admiral to General Sullivan, 
 in which M. d Estaing announced his proposal to the 
 Council that he should join the army, and referred to the 
 protest with the assurance that he should not allow the 
 offence given him by that incident to affect his present 
 conduct. " To prove this," he added, " is one of the 
 strongest motives which have determined me to place 
 myself under your orders, as soon as I shall have been 
 
 Journals of Congress, 9th September, 1778. 
 
492 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 honored with a positive answer from the Council. My 
 opinion upon the measures to be taken need never re 
 strain yours. It shall not only be subject to yours, but 
 even remain unrevealed whenever you shall not require 
 me to give it." 1 
 
 There can be no doubt of the earnest desire of M. 
 d Estaing to serve America. His constant efforts to prove 
 this were defeated by a chain of events over which he 
 could have had no control. But his disposition remained 
 steadfast even to this final offer, in which he declared his 
 willingness to sink his own personal feelings as to what 
 had gone before, and to waive his rank, by taking the 
 field at the head of a regiment like any other officer 
 under General Sullivan s command. " I offered and was 
 ready," he wrote to General Washington, 2 " at the head 
 of a regiment, to go and serve under General Sullivan, 
 as I formerly did under Marshal Saxe in the war which 
 terminated in 1748. I should not have taken this step 
 with the idea of strengthening an army with such a hand 
 ful of men, nor of proving what is already known, that 
 the French nation can sacrifice life with a good grace ; 
 but I was anxious to demonstrate that my countrymen 
 could not be offended by a sudden expression of feeling, 
 and that he who had the honor of commanding them 
 in America was and would be at all times one of the 
 most devoted and zealous servants of the United States." 
 After the action at Newport, however, and after the re 
 treat to the mainland had been effected, this offer was 
 no longer available. M. d Estaing s letter to General 
 Washington called forth a reply which, aside from its 
 expression of the generous sentiment with which the 
 Commander-in-Chief addressed a brother officer under 
 peculiarly distressing circumstances, is one of the most 
 important documents we possess as a contemporary esti- 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, vi. 59. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 58. 
 
1778.] OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. 493 
 
 mate of D Estaing, and of the value of his fleet in this 
 expedition. 1 
 
 "To COUNT D ESTAING. 
 
 "HEAD-QUARTERS, 11 September, 1778. 
 
 " SIR, I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 5th 
 instant, accompanied by a copy of two letters to Congress and 
 General Sullivan. The confidence, which you have been pleased 
 to show in communicating these papers, engages niy sincere thanks. 
 If the deepest regret, that the best concerted enterprise and 
 bravest exertions should have been rendered fruitless by a dis 
 aster, which human prudence w r as incapable of foreseeing or pre 
 venting, can alleviate disappointment, you may be assured, that 
 the whole continent sympathizes with you. It will be a consola 
 tion to you to reflect, that the thinking part of mankind do not 
 form their judgment from events ; and that their equity will ever 
 attach equal glory to those actions which deserve success, and 
 those which have been crowned with it. It is in the trying cir 
 cumstances to which your Excellency has been exposed, that the 
 virtues of a great mind are displayed in their brightest lustre, and 
 that a general s character is better known, than in the moment of 
 victory. It was yours, by every title that can give it ; and the 
 adverse element, which robbed you of your prize, can never de 
 prive you of the glory due to you. Though your success has not 
 been equal to your expectations, yet you have the satisfaction 
 of reflect ing, that you have rendered essential services to the 
 common cause. 
 
 "I exceedingly lament, that, in addition to our misfortunes, 
 there has been the least suspension of harmony and good under 
 standing between the generals of allied nations, whose views must, 
 like their interests, be the same. On the first intimation of it, I 
 employed my influence in restoring what I regard as essential to 
 the permanence of a union founded on mutual inclination, and 
 the strongest ties of reciprocal advantage. Your Excellency s 
 offer to the Council of Boston had a powerful tendency to pro 
 mote the same end, and was a distinguished proof of your zeal 
 and magnanimity. 
 
 "The present superiority of the enemy in naval force must for 
 a time suspend all plans of offensive cooperation between us. It 
 is not easy to foresee what change may take place by the arrival 
 of succours to you from Europe, or what opening the enemy may 
 
 1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, vi. 57. 
 
494 OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIES AT NEWPORT. [1778. 
 
 give you to resume your activity. In this moment, therefore, 
 every consultation on this subject would be premature. But it is 
 of infinite importance, that we should take all the means that our 
 circumstances will allow for the defence of the squadron, which 
 is so precious to the common cause of France and America, and 
 which may have become a capital object with the enemy." l 
 
 Finally, M. d Estaing had the consolation of knowing 
 that his conduct of the expedition was understood and 
 appreciated in America by those whose good opinion he 
 valued most, that he had won friendship and esteem which 
 outlived the momentary ill feeling of the people after the 
 events at Newport, and that Congress, speaking for the 
 nation, openly recognized his zeal in the common cause by 
 expressions of cordial sympathy and good will. 
 
 On the 17th of October, 1778, the following Resolution 
 was adopted : 2 
 
 "Resolved, That his excellency count D Estaing hath behaved 
 as a brave and wise officer, and that his excellency and the officers 
 and men under his command have rendered every benefit to these 
 States which the circumstances and nature of the service would 
 admit of, and are fully entitled to the regards of the friends of 
 America. 
 
 " Resolved, That the president transmit the foregoing resolution 
 to his excellency the count D Estaing, and inform him that Con 
 gress entertain the highest sense of his zeal and attachment mani 
 fested in repeated instances, and particularly in his spirited offer 
 to lead the troops under his command from Boston, and to co 
 operate against Ehode Island." 
 
 1 For the Comte d Estaing s account of his expedition, addressed to Con 
 gress, 26th August, 1778, see Doniol, Histoire de la Participation de la 
 France a 1 Etablissement des Etats-Unis d Amerique, tome Hi., Annexe du 
 chapitre vii., p. 384 ; and for his official report to the Secretary of the French 
 Navy, 5th November, 1778, quoted above, see ibid., Annexes du chapitre 
 viii., p. 447. See also the letter of the Comte d Estaing to the Secretary of the 
 Navy, 5th November, 1778, Doniol, La Participation de la France, iii. 361. 
 
 2 Journals of Congress, 17th October, 1778. 
 
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