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METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
AS ILLUSTRATED BY DESCARTES
BY
LINA KAHN
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty
of Philosophy, Columbia University
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
1918
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
AS ILLUSTRATED BY DESCARTES
BY
LIN A KAHN
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty
of Philosophy, Columbia University
i^eto Pork
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
1918
Copyright, 1918
By COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Printed from type, January, 1918
<7^
'A messieurs les archeveques et eveques de France. Mes-
sieurs: Je cite devant vous Monsieur des Cartes et ses plus
fameux sectateurs: je les accuse d'etre d' accord avec Calvin
et les Calvinistes sur des Principes de Philosophie con-
traire a la doctrine de VEglise: c'est a vous, Messieurs, d en
jugerl" — Louis de la Ville (le Pere de Valois), Sentiments
de Monsieur des Cartes totichant I'essence et les proprietes
du corps opposes d la doctrine de VEglise et conformes aux
Erreurs de Calvin sur le sujet de I'Eucharistie. Paris, 1680.
1/
PREFACE
The present study of Descartes was undertaken for the sake of a
better understanding of the common tendency of philosophers to
deal with the supernatural. Descartes is one of the modern philoso-
phers who, despite a strong preference for scientific investigation of
the world of experience, devoted a great deal of speculation to tradi-
tion. To lift the veil from this mystery, his major as well as his minor
works and correspondence are studied here in the light of his time.
By this method we discover that the conflict between science and
theology brought Descartes to the diplomacy of disguising his scientific
ideas in a theological garb. Historians have overlooked his scientific
side and have brought out only his cautious and timid side. He is
represented in the history of philosophy as a dialectician and a ration-
alist whose main concern was the demonstration of the existence of
God and the soul. The attempt is here made to give to Descartes's
rationalism its proper setting and to present his naturalism as his
genuine philosophy.
Unless otherwise indicated, all footnotes refer to the Adam and
Tannery edition. In most cases the spelling has been modernized.
I take this occasion to express my gratitude for valuable sug-
gestions and helpful criticism to Professor F. J. E. Woodbridge,
Professor W. P. Montague, Professor John Dewey, and Professor
W. T. Bush, all of Columbia University. My warmest thanks are,
however, due to the latter, whose constant advice and, particularly,
encouragement I most highly appreciate.
CONTENTS
Chapter I. Introduction: Persistent Problems of Philosophy.
Chapter II. Progressive Ideas in Descartes.
1. Break with authority and tradition ; sincere inquiry in place of
authority; experience in place of tradition.
2. Nature his primary interest; study of nature by experiment
and observation.
3. Scientific interpretation of the world and of man.
4. Conflict of his scientific ideas with theology.
a. Explaining away of the traditional soul by his physiology
and psychology.
b. Interference of his cosm.ology with the traditional teach-
ings about the "universe" and God.
c. Overthrowing of traditional ethics by his basis for
morality.
d. Undermining of the theory of the Eucharist by his physics.
5. Elimination of the traditional problems of orthodox metha-
physics.
Chapter III. Conservation of Traditions Despite Progressive
Ideas.
1. The principle of God and the principle of clearness and dis-
tinctness of our ideas for the derivation of the existence of the
material world; the Cogito ergo sum; the doctrine of the
clearness of the idea of soul.
2. The traditional problems of God and the soul.
a. Proof of the existence of God; mixture of theology and
traditional philosophy; failure.
h. Proof of the existence of the soul; mixture of accepted
beliefs and his own radical conceptions; failure.
c. Lack of empirical and historical research in his treatment
of traditional problems.
d. Interpretation of the failure in the solution of the tradi-
tional problems; traditional elements of his method;
subject-matter.
3. The loose connection of the traditional problems with the
entire scheme of his system ; motive for treating them.
Vlll CONTENTS
Chapter IV. Explanation of the Conflict between Descartes's
Progressive Thinking and Traditions.
1. His time; history of the dogma, politics, and social conditions;
main tendencies in current thought; main interests.
2. The effect of the conditions of the time on Descartes's philoso-
phy; suppression of his naturalistic tendency; introduction of
theological questions into his philosophy by opposing criti-
cism ; his efforts to keep up with the orthodox tendencies of
the day at the expense of his sincerity in the expression of his
thoughts and the retention of his most valuable production,
Le Monde.
3. Descartes's personality as developed under the influence of the
time.
a. Descent and early education.
b. Characteristics explanatory of his extreme cautiousness;
love of peace and rest.
4. Facts which left in doubt Descartes's sincerity in matters of
belief.
Chapter V. Descartes in the History of Philosophy.
1. Emphasis upon his rationalism to the exclusion of his real
contributions.
2. Motive for the unhistorical reconstruction of Descartes's
philosophy.
Chapter VI. Conclusion.
Supplementary Notes:
a. Descartes's doctrine of extension in the "Calvin Institute".
h. Anticipation of the biological conception of freedom as
exemplified by Bergson.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL AS
ILLUSTRATED BY DESCARTES
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
There is a tendency on the part of philosophers to aspire to heaven
and to explore heavenly regions. Since heaven has been once for all
formed and fixed, the problems of philosophy are always the same.
The persistent problems of philosophy reduce themselves to the ques-
tion of ultimates — the ultimate reality of the world and the ultimate
reality of man. This question comes up in philosophy again and again.
Only the forms in which it appears are different. They differ with the
knowledge, temperament, and surroundings of the philosopher. But
no matter in what form this question comes up and what course the
road of dialectics takes, philosophers all reach regions that transcend
knowledge, and the question being unsolved recurs again.
This question of ultimates has persisted in philosophy under the
influence of theology and gained firm ground in the medieval period
when philosophy was employed as a means for the advancement of
Christian teaching. As taught in Christianity, the kingdom of God
was considered by the philosophers of that period to be the only reality,
and everything was studied in relation to it. While the Scholastics
took it as a matter of fact that God is the ultimate reality and founda-
tion of everything on earth, philosophers of later periods found it
necessary to give this teaching a rational basis, and there resulted a
desperate search for the ultimate which is still continued. Despite the
earnest attempt on the part of the originators of modern philosophy to
get away from the supernatural by suggesting experience as a substitute
for authority and nature as a substitute for theology, scholasticism
persists in philosophy to this very day. Both its subject-matter and
method have been either deliberately or unconsciously continued. The
mathematical method of present-day philosophy has accomplished no
more in the way of proving its presuppositions concerning matters
of fact than did the medieval syllogistic: method, for there is just as
little difference between these two methods as between the medieval
2 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
''soul" and the modern "principle of life" or "consciousness." Many
a philosopher who considers himself above such superstitions as believ-
ing in a soul, wastes, however, a good deal of his ingenuity in investigat-
ing spiritual principles which are to perform the functions of the
old "soul." That the supernatural bears a good deal of responsibility
for the perplexities in which philosophy at present finds itself, a close
and systematic study of the history of philosophy leaves no doubt.
The supernatural, having once appeared in philosophy, has never left
it, or rather, philosophy has never abandoned it. "In the manipula-
tion of that theme, however, three major ideas stand out — God, the soul,
and the universe. It is easy to see what a role these have played if we
only consider what is left when we drop out all speculation about God,
all speculation about the soul, and all speculation about the universe." ^
A consideration of the main topics of the leading philosophers
affirms the truth of this statement. Indeed, there are hardly any
modern philosophers who under one form or another do not give a
more or less prominent place to these ideas in their works. These
three ideas led to many other theological questions which are logically
connected with them. Among these the problem of freedom stands out
conspicuously. Descartes wrote Meditations, in which the existence
of God and the immortality of the^soul are "demonstrated." Spinoza
entitles his sections Concerning God, Of the Nature and Origin of Mind,
Of Human Freedom. God, Freedom and Immortality are the famous
topics of Kant. Leibnitz also deals with the traditional conceptions
of God, whom he very originally calls the dominant monad, but whom
he endows with all traditional attributes and merits. His arguments
for God's existence are medieval, almost the same as used by Des
cartes. The existence of souls he does not even question ; he takes th
existence of soul-monads for granted and builds the whole world ou^"
of them. Wolf, the disciple of Leibnitz, develops the latter's phil-
osophy into a purely scholastic system. Berkeley's whole speculate ^v<
centers around a Deity. Hume, against his own principles, admits a
Deity. Hobbes, having assumed that all spirits, both finite and infinite,
are corporeal, not to fail in consistence, admits at least a corporeal god.
The medieval material of Kant's philosophy was continued by the
Hegelian school, which may be regarded as the revival of scholasticism.
The philosophy of this school differs from that of the medieval only, \
perhaps, in modernized terms. The subject-matter and method are
the same. Subjectivism and absolutism are the net results of crystal-
lized supernaturalism. The absolute of Bradley, in whom modern
> W. T. Bush, "The Emancipation of Intelligence," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific
Methods, Vol. VIII, p. 169.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 3
scholasticism seems to have reached its cHmax, is a good illus-
tration.
Even those modern philosophers who have advocated experience
and observation in opposition to scholasticism did not get away
from it completely. Bacon, who by his experimental method of
research had dug up scholastic philosophy by its roots, preserved
in the prima philosophia a purely scholastic spirit. Hobbes retained in
his materialistic system the scholastic first mover. However, the best
illustration of a return to scholasticism after an attempted emancipa-
tion from it is Descartes. The present study is an inquiry into the
grounds for this conservatism.
CHAPTER II
PROGRESSIVE IDEAS IN DESCARTES
Descartes was at first strongly opposed to scholasticism. Philosophy
signified to him the inquiry after knowledge necessary to man "for the
conduct of his life, for the conservation of his health, and for the
technical arts." ^ It was to make man happier by enabling him through
knowledge of the forces of nature "to enjoy without restriction the
fruits of the earth and all the comforts found therein, and to free him-
self from an infinity of sicknesses of mind and body, and perhaps from
the sicknesses of old age." Such knowledge, he saw, could not be
obtained by the method of the school which, by its very nature, was
not adapted to scientific inquiry. It was an exercise in a skillful deriva-
tion of conclusions from premises which were nothing but presupposi-
tions whose validity had never been questioned. But according to
Descartes "nothing could block the way to knowledge more than to
establish doubtful presuppositions for which we have no positive evi-
dence, but only desire, and to try to derive truth from them," ^ or to
inquire into objects concerning which our minds are incapable of secur-
ing knowledge. People who studied first causes with authoritatively
established principles as the starting-point of the inquiry, he observed,
had less knowledge of the world than those who gathered their knowl-
edge from experience or from books where this experience is recorded.'
He believed that the search for truth would be more successful if it
were conducted on an individual basis. The reasonings of each indi-
vidual about affairs in which he is personally interested and which he
can verify by his own experience, he believed, would lead to more
fruitful results than speculation.* "Good sense," he found, "is of all
1 "Ce mot signifie I'etude de la Sagesse, et que par la sagesse on n'entend pas seulement la prudence
dans les affaires, mais une parfaite connaissance de toutes les choses que I'homme peut savoir, tant
pour la conduite de sa vie, que pour la conservation de sa sante et I'invention de tous les arts." Preface
to Principes, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 2.
2 "Rien ne nous eloigne plus du chemin de la verite que d'etablir certaines choses, comme veritables,
qu'aucune raison positive, mais notre volonte seule, nous persuade, c'est-a-dire lorsque nous avons
invente ou imagine quelque chose, et qu'apres cela nos fictions nous plaisent, comme vous faites a
regard de ces anges corporels, de cette ombre de I'essence divine, et autres choses semblables que
personne ne doit admettre, parce que c'est le vrai moyen de se fermer tout chemin a la verite." Oeuvres,
Vol. V, p. 405, Latin; Transl. by Cousin, Vol. X, p. 296.
' Preface to the Principes, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 2.
* Discours de la Mithode, Oeuvres, Vol. VI, p. 9.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 5
things among men the most equally distributed." This natural capa-
city for reasoning needs only right training to be employed with
success. The proper function of our intelligence, he held, is not to
solve the difficulties of the school, but the different problems of life.^
His method was directed against knowledge that was historically
gathered and transmitted by tradition; it insisted upon sincere inquiry
on the part of the individual and on the use of his own judgment in the
conduct of his life. This method directed the inquirer to the natural
realm. Descartes believed that for the acquisition of knowledge of the
world one has to study the world itself. He protested against the pro-
cedure of philosophers who neglect experience thinking that knowledge
is to be found in their own minds; "ainsi font tous les astrologues, qui,
sans connaitre la nature des astres, sans meme en avoir soigneuse-
ment observe les mouvements esperent pouvoir en determiner les effets.
Ainsi font beaucoup de gens qui etudient la mecanique sans savoir la
physique, et fabriquent au hasard de nouveaux moteurs; et la plupart
des philosophes, qui, negligeant I'experience, croient que la verite
sortira de leur cerveau comme Minerve du front de Jupiter." ^ The
most reliable means for the study of nature was held by him to be
the senses — one must see and hear things just as they are.'' But to
be able to see things just as they are the mind has to be cleared from
transmitted and self-created prejudices.
These ideas were very revolutionary. Philosophy had been in the
middle ages an ally of theology. But Descartes saw that "theology
points the way to heaven" only and, therefore, it could have no place
in the philosophy of one whose purpose was to study the world and
man. Leaving it to God to reveal heavenly truth, he broke with his
medieval predecessors whose interest centered around man's concern
with a beyond, and fixed his attention on problems which were to
promote man's welfare on earth. Forgetting history and tradition
and the methods of the school, he went out to meet the problems of
life and to study nature by experience.
Instead of shutting himself up in his study and brooding over the
difficulties of the school, Descartes rejected all its solutions as doubtful
' " II faut songer a augmenter les lumieres naturelles, non pour pouvoir resoudre telle ou telle difficulte
de I'ecole, mais pour que I'intelligence puisse montrer a la volonte le parti qu'elle doit prendre dans
chaque situation de la vie." Regies, Oeuvres, Vol. XI, p. 204, Ed. Cousin; Adam and Tannery Edition,
Vol. X. p. 361.
6 Idem, p. 380, Adam and Tannery Edition; p. 224, Cousin.
' "II vaut beaucoup mieux se servir de ses propres yeux pour se conduire, et jouir par meme moyen
de la beaute des couleurs et de la lumiere, que non pas de les avoir fermes et suivre la conduite d'un
autre." Preface to Principes, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 3.
6 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
and started on his philosophical career with his eyes wide open to the
world. He plunged into life, according to his own account, "collecting
varied experience." His first works are free from all metaphysical ^
interest. The lost fragments, a treatise on Music, Quelques Considera-
tions sur les Sciences, Algebra, Democritica, Experimenta, Praeambula,
Initium sapientiae timor domini, and Olympica, seem, as their titles
suggest, to be anything but metaphysics. Regulae ad directionem
ingenii,^ his earliest treatise extant, shows that his only concern at the
outset was scientific knowledge, which limits scientific investigation
to objects of which there can be obtained knowledge equal in certainty
to mathematics. ^"^ In this work he looked for no transcendental
principles to support his scientific conclusions. There is no mention
of a "Perfect Being" or of the'' Co gito ergo sum.'' Le Monde has a purely
physical interest. He develops there his system of science by studying
nature independently of all ontology or metaphysics. The meta-
physical principle of God, introduced as if only an appendix to the
argument, despite Descartes's intention to give it the appearance of
importance, has no bearing on the whole scheme of his physics and
seems to be merely a later addition. His science as well as his method
were established first, before he had undertaken any ontological
investigations.
His primary concern was nature. He set out to cultivate a philoso-
phy which would give him "knowledge highly useful in life, and in
place of the speculative philosophy usually taught in the Schools, to
discover a practical philosophy by means of which, knowing the power
and action of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens, and all the other
bodies that surround us, as distinctly as we know the various crafts
of our artisans, we might also apply these forces to all the uses to which
they are adapted, and thus make ourselves the lords and possessors
of nature." ^^ All sciences, even mathematics, he valued only inas-
much as they served this purpose.^^
' Metaphysical is here used in the sense of supernatural, transcending knowledge.
• Regulae ad directionem ingenii (first appeared in Latin, 1701).
1" " II ne faut nous occuper que des objets dont notre esprit parait capable d'acquerir une connaissance
certaine et indubitable." Rigles, Vol. XI, p. 204, Ed. Cousin; Vol. X, p. 362, Adam and Tannery
Edition.
11 "Car elles m'ont fait voir qu'il est possible de parvenir a des connaissances qui soient fort utiles a
la vie, et qu'au lieu de cette Philosophie speculative, qu'on enseigne dans les ecoles, on en peut trouver
une pratique, par laquelle connaissant la force et les actions du feu, de I'eau, de I'air, des astres, des
cieux, et de tous les autres corps qui nous environnent, aussi distinctement que nous connaissons les
divers metiers de nos artisans, nous les pourrions employer en meme fagon a tous les usages auquels ils
sont propres, et ainsi nous rendre comme maitres et possesseurs de la nature. Discours de la Methode,
Oeuvres, Vol. VI, p. 61. Transl. by Veitch.
'2 "Au lieu d'expliquer un Phenomene seulement, je me suis resolu d'expliquer tous les Phenomfines
de la nature, c'est a dire, toute la Physique. Et le dessein que j'ai me contente plus qu'aucun autre que
j'aie jamais eil." Oeuvres, Vol. I, p. 70. "Et m'etant propose une etude pour laquelle tout le temps
de ma vie, quelque longue qu'elle puisse etre, ne saurait suffire, je ferais tres mal d'en employer aucune
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 7
He was eager to get his information from original sources and made
use of every occasion to gather observations which might help him to
understand nature. In travelling from Italy to France he turned
aside at the Alps to measure their heights and to make observations
concerning thunder, lightning, and whirlwinds. While serving in the
army he gathered data on mechanics. He examined the machinery of
strategic equipments whenever he could. In order to learn the natural
order of the stars he observed the comets. ^^ To explain the reflection
of light he studied optics and got a workman to make the lenses
necessary for his experiments. He cultivated in his own garden the
plants which he needed for his scientific research.^* Being interested
in anatomy, he dissected animals. He visited butchers to see animals
killed and then had brought to his house parts which he dissected for
himself at leisure. ^^ To study experimentally the circulation of the
blood, he investigated the structure of the heart of fishes and of ani-
mals.^® And in order to explain memory and imagination, he tells us,
he dissected various specimens. ^^ In the Dioptrics he represents
graphically the human brain on the analogy of that of a calf,
in order to show "what man and animals have in common."
From the study of animals he went on to the study of man, experi-
menting and dissecting with the greatest care and attention. Think-
ing that the application of the laws of medicine would not only
partie a des choses qui n'y servent point. Mais, outre cela, pour ce qui est des nombres, je n'ai jamais
pretendu d'y rien savoir, et je m'y suis si peu exerce que je puis dire avec verite que, bien que j'ai autre-
fois appris la division et I'extraction de la racine carree, il y a toutefois plus de dix-huit ans que je ne
les sais plus, et si j'avais besoin de m'en servir, il faudrait que je les etudiasse dans quelque livre d'Arith-
metique, ou que je tachasse de les inventer, tout de meme que si je ne les avais jamais sii." Oeuvres,
Vol. II, p. i68.
"Vous savez qu'il y a deja plus de quinze ans que je fais profession de negliger la Geometric, et dene
m'arreter jamais a la solution d'aucun probleme, si ce n'est a la priere de quelque ami, comme en cette
occasion." Oeuvres, Vol. II, p. 95.
"Mais je n'ai resolu de quitter que la geometric abstraite, c'est a dire, la recherche des questions qui
ne servent qu'a exercer I'esprit et ce afin d'avoir d'autant plus de loisir de cultiver une autre sorte de
geometric, qui se propose pour question I'explication des phenomenes de la nature." Oeuvres, Vol. II,
p. 268.
"Je vous envoyais la solution de toutes les questions qu'un de vos Geometres avait confesse ne savoir
pas. Mais n'attendez plus rien de moi, s'il vous plait, en Geometric; car vous savez qu'il y a longtemps
que je proteste de ne m'y vouloir plus exercer, et je pense pouvoir honnetement y mettre fin." Oeuvres,
Vol. II, p. 361.
IS Oeuvres, Vol. VI, p. 269, Ed. Cousin.
" "Je laisse croitre les plantes de mon jardin, dont j 'attends quelques experiences pour tacher de con-
tinuer ma Physique." Corr., Vol. IV, p. 442.
'^ "J'allais quasi tous les jours en la maison d'un boucher, pour lui voir tuer des betes, et faisais
apporter de la en mon logis les parties que je voulais anatomiser plus a loisir; ce que j'ai encore fait
plusieurs fois en tous les lieux oil j'ai ete." Corr., Vol. II, p. 621.
"En faisant moi meme la dissection de divers animaux. C'est un exercise oQ je me suis souvent
occupe depuis onze ans et je crois, qu'il n'y a guere de medecinc qui y ait regarde de si pres que moi."
Oeuvres, Vol. II, p. 525.
18 Idem.
" "J'anatomise maintenant les tetes de divers animaux, pour expliquer en quoi consistent I'imagi-
nation, la memoirc." Oeuvres, Vol. I, p. 263.
8 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
secure the health of man, but also make him wiser and increase his
ingenuity, he tells us, he decided to devote all his life to experi-
mental research in this field. ^*
The necessity of sufficient experimentation as the basis of adequate
interpretation is over and over again emphasized. He was sure he
could work out a system of physics if he had the "equipment for making
the necessary experiments." ^^ He hesitated at first to give an explana-
tion of the formation of man on account of want of experience, as he
explained in a letter to Mersenne.^" He appealed to physicians and
surgeons to testify even to his affirmation that there are no sensations
other than those which take place in the brain.
In building his scientific system he constantly referred to the evi-
dence of facts; he verified his hypothetical conclusions as far as possible,
"in making trial in various particular difficulties of the acquired notions
of physics." He appealed to experience to support the mechanical
principle of his physics and his laws of motion.^^
On the basis of experiments and of observations Descartes con-
structed his system of physics expounded in the first treatises, Le
Monde, Dioptrique, and Meteores. In these he gives us a scientific inter-
pretation of the world and man. Nature is the source of all his explana-
tions; and by nature, he understands "not divinity or any other imag-
inary power, but matter itself" ^^ acting according to the laws of
mechanics. From the formation of the celestial sphere and the planets
down to the formation of man, all is explained by mechanical princi-
ples. In Le Monde the world is represented as a self-moving mechan-
ism where every effect has its natural and necessary cause. There is
no question of a creation, for the supposition that matter and motion
ever existed is sufficient explanation, according to Descartes, of the
world's origin and existence. "Qu'on me donne I'etendue et le mouve-
1' Discours de la Methode, Oeuvres, Vol. VI, p. 63.
" "Je ne doute presque point que je ne puisse achever toute la Physique selon mon souhait, pourvu
que j'aie du loisir et la commodite de faire quelques experiences." Corr., Vol. V, p. 261.
2" "Et meme je me suis aventure d'y vouloir expliquer la fagon dent se forme I'animal des le com-
mencement de son origine. Je dis I'animal en general; car pour I'homme en particulier, je ne I'oserais
entrependre, faute d'avoir assez d'experience pour cet effet." Corr., Vol. V, p. 112.
21 "Je n'ai rien du lout considere que la figure, le mouvement et la grandeur de chaque corps, n'y
examine aucune autre chose que ce que les lois des mecaniques, dont la verite peut etre prouvee parune
infinite d'experiences." Principes, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 318.
22 "Sachez done, premierement, que par la Nature je n'entends point ici quelque Deesse, ou quelque
autre sorte de puissance imaginaire; mais que je me sers de cet mot, pour signifier la Matiere meme,
en tant que je la considere avec toutes les qualites que je lui ai attribuees, comprises toutes ensemble,
et sous cette condition que Dieu continue de la conserver en la meme fagon qu'il I'a creee." Le Monde,
Oeuvres, Vol. XI, p. 36.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 9
ment et je vais faire le monde."-* The natural laws are sufficient to
have transformed the world from chaos into its present state. More-
over, the Mosaic story of creation, a central point of the contemporary
metaphysics, gave, according to Descartes, "no explanation of things of
nature." The occult substantial forms or real qualities of his prede-
cessors, a basic element of the orthodox metaphysics, he regarded as a
refuge of ignorance. Though the Bible and the Council of Trent gave
enough justification for the supposition of such fantastical existences,
these "poor innocents" had to be banished from his physics as "chi-
meras," unintelligible and useless for the explanation of facts of
nature. For all qualities, motion, and change, his theory of particles
accounted in a natural way. One and the same matter was the material
out of which heaven and earth and all the products on earth were
formed. Man originated from the same material as plants and animals.
Human life is accounted for in naturalistic terms. Descartes does not
suppose .any other principle of life but the blood warmed by the fire of
the heart. This material^* principle and the proper arrangement of our
organs condition all our life functions; they "exist in us independently
of all power of thinking, and consequently without being in any
measure dependent on the soul." ^^ It seemed more plausible to him to
explain the life of plants, animals and man by a common principle,
namely, heat, than to suppose a special principle of life for each, "car
la chaleur etant un principe commun pour les animaux, les plantes, et
les autres corps, ce n'est pas merveille que la meme serve a faire vivre
un homme et une plante." ^^ Many years of experimentation proved
to him that there is nothing in man that can not be explained in a
natural way.^^ The formation as well as the growth and functions of
the human body he explains scientifically. He does not assume any
supernatural germ in the formation of the foetus; nature is, according to
25 " Je ne m'arrete pas a chercher la cause de leurs mouvements: car il me suffit de penser, qu'elles ont
commence a se mouvoir, aussitot que le Monde a commence d'etre . . . Mes raisons, dis-je, me
satisfont assez la-dessus; mais je n'ai pas encore occasion de vous les dire. Et cependant vous
pouvez imaginer, si bon vous semble, ainsi que font la plupart des Doctes, qu'il y a quelque Premier
Mobile, qui, roulant autour du Monde avec une vitesse incomprehensible, est I'origine et la source de
tous les autres mouvements qui s'y rencontrent." Le Monde, Oeuvres, Vol. XI, p. 11.
2* "Ce que je nomme ici des esprits, ne sont que des corps, et ils n'ont point d'autre propriete, sinon que
ce sont des corps tres petits, et qui se meuvent tres vite, ainsi que les parties de la flame qui sort d'un
flambeau." Les Passions, Art. X, Oeuvres, Vol. XI, p. 335.
25 "Examinant les fonctions, qui pouvaient . . . etre en ce corps, j'y trouvais exactement toutes
celles qui peuvent etre en nous sans que nous pensions, ni par consequent que notre ame, c'est a dire,
cette partie distincte du corps dont il a ete dit ci-dessus que la nature n'est que de penser, y contribae."
Discours, Oeuvres, Vol. VI, p. 46. Transl. by Veitch.
26 Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 122.
2' " Je parlerai de 1 'homme en mon Monde un peu plus que je ne pensais, car j'entreprends d'expliquer
toutes ses principales fonctions. J'ai deja ecrit celles qui appartiennent a la vie, comme la digestion des
viandes, le battement du pouls, la distribution de I'aliment etc., et les cinq sens. J 'anatomise maintenant
les tetes de divers animaux, pour expliquer en quoi consistent I'imagination, la memoire, etc." Corr.,
Vol. I, p. 263.
10 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
him, sufficient for its formation, "provided one supposes nature to act
according to the exact laws of mechanics." ^^ When the objection
arose that it was ridiculous to attribute such an important phenomenon
as the formation of the foetus to such a cause, he said, "mais quelles
plus grandes causes faut-il done que les lois eternelles de la nature?
Veut-on I'intervention immediate de I'intelligence? De quelle intelli-
gence? De Dieu lui-meme? Pourquoi done nait-il des monstres?"
All the movements which accompany our passions or affections are
shown to be produced by the mere mechanism of the body.^^
In his scientific system his real originality and ingenuity are revealed.
Le Monde contains, in germ, theories of present-day science. Descartes
introduced into physics the doctrine of the continuity of matter; he
anticipated modern scientists in his explanation of light, heat, sound,
weight, and in the supposition of a constant amount of matter and
motion ; he first applied the principle of mechanism to the explanation
of the world and man ; he discovered long before Toricelli and Pascal
the fact that the rise of the water in a tube is in exact proportion to the
pressure of the air; he was the first to give a theory of undulation; he
explained the rainbow and its colors; his theory of particles suggests
the molecular theory.
Descartes's scientific ideas of nature and man conflicted with the
teachings of theology. Thus his physiology and psychology do away
with the soul. Descartes's description of man is that of a perfect
automaton, such as he is said to have pictured the animal only. He
himself, however, called special attention to the fact that for the
explanation of the functions of the human body he did not demand
any other organs or principle of life than those similar to the ones that
animals also possess. ^'^ He found that the automaton theory was a
true description not only of animals, but also of man. If art in imita-
tion of nature can produce automata in which all possible movements
take place, there is no reason, he said, why nature itself should not
be able to produce automata which are more perfect than those
28 Corr., Vol. II, p. 525.
2* "J'espere donner cet ete un petit Traite des passions, dans lequel on verra clairement comment
tous les mouvements de nos membres qui accompagnent nos passions ou affections sont produits, selon
moi, non par notre ame, mais pour le seul mecanisme de notre corps." Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 344, Latin;
Transl. by Cousin, Vol. X, p. 240.
^ "Or avant que je passe a la description de Tame raisonnable, je desire encore que vous fassiez un
peu de reflexion, sur tout ce que je viens de dire de cette Machine; et que vous consideriez, premiere-
ment, que je n'ai suppose en elle aucuns organes, ni aucuns ressorts, qui ne soient tels, qu'on se peut
tres aisement persuader qu'il y en a de tout semblables, tant en nous, que mSme aussi en plusieurs
animaux sans raison." Traite de I'Homme, p. 200.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL II
produced by the human hand, and more perfect than the automaton
brute, i. e., a mechanism whose construction can account for all the
manifestations of human life.^^ Nay, rather, he found a soul unneces-
sary in the human body: "il est plus surprenant qu'il y ait une ame
dans chaque corps humain, que de n'en point trouver dans les betes." ^^
Indeed, it is superfluous to add a soul to the machine which Descartes
represented as performing, independently of the soul, the following
functions: " . . .la digestion des viandes, le battement du coeur
et des arteres, la nourriture et la croissance des membres, la respiration,
la veille et le sommeil; la reception de la lumiere, des sons, des odeurs,
des goilts, de la chaleur, et de telles autres qualites, dans les organes des
sens exterieurs ; I'impression de leurs idees dans I'organe du senscommun
et de I'imagination, la retention ou I'empreinte de ces idees dans la
Memoire; les mouvements interieurs des Appetits et des Passions;
enfin les mouvements exterieurs de tous les membres, qui suivent si a
propos, tant des actions des objets qui se presentent aux sens, que des
passions, et des impressions qui se rencontrent dans la Memoire, . ." ^^
If all these functions are performed, as Descartes says,^* by the machine
in a perfectly natural way, through the mere disposition of the organs
with no other principle of life than the blood excited by the material
fire continually kindling in the heart, what is there left for the soul to
do? Nothing, says Descartes himself, but the thinking.^^ But he
accounted even for thinking (by which he understands perceiving,
imagining, remembering, and feeling), as a function of the machine
derived from the mere material principle. In one of his letters he even
expressed the idea that the body can exist without a soul just as the
soul without a body; "on pent appeler ces deux substances acciden-
telles, en ce que ne considerant que le corps seul, nous n'y voyons rien
qui demande d'etre uni a Tame, et rien dans Tame, qui demand? d'etre
uni au corps." ^^ He did not, however, attempt to describe the soul as
existing without a body. In describing the functions attributed to the
soul, he brought in the different organs of the body engaged in per-
forming these functions, "I'ame humaine separee du corps n'a point
31 "II est conforme a la raison que I'art imitant la nature, et les hommes pouvant construire divers
automates, ou il se trouve du mouvement sans aucune pensee, la nature puisse de son cote produire ces
automates, et bien plus excellents, comme les brutes, que ceux qui viennent de main d'homme, surtout ne
voyant aucune raison pour laquelle la pensee doive se trouver partout ou nous voyons une conformation
de membres telle que celle dex animaux." Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 277, Latin; Transl. by Cousin, Vol. X,
p. 206.
32 Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 277.
33 Traite de V Homme, Oeuvres, Vol. XI, p. 201.
34 Idem.
35 "Apres avoir ainsi considere toutes les functions qui appartiennent au corps seul, il est aise de
connaitre qu'il ne reste rien en nous que nous devions attribuer a notre ame, sinon nos pensees." Les
Passions, Oeuvres, Vol. XI, p. 342.
36 Corr.. Vol. Ill, p. 461, Latin; Transl. by Cousin, Vol. VIII, p. S78.
12 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
proprement de sentiment; ^'^ but there is in his Traite de V Homme an
attempt fully to describe the body existing without a soul. Man is
compared to a hydraulic machine, the different parts of which are lik-
ened to the nerves and organs, and the running water to the blood.^'
He found in us no external action, as he says, which could assure us
of the existence of a thinking soul and of the fact that our body is not a
mere machine which moves of itself. ^^ In the Objections et Reponses
he says that it is worthy of notice that no life movements could take
place in us, if, having a soul, we had not the necessary physical condi-
tions; these could, however, be produced in a mere machine if it had
the same physical construction as ours.^" The life of a body depends
not upon the existence of a soul in it. On the contrary, the existence of
the soul depends upon the warmth and movement of the body; and,
therefore, death is caused not by the departure of a soul, but by the
absence of warmth and by the destruction of an important organ. *^
The difference between a living and a dead body, according to Des-
cartes, is just the same as between a machine whose mechanism is in
order, so that the machine is going, and one whose mechanism is
broken, so that the functioning has stopped. ^^
" Corr., Vol. V, p. 402, Latin; Transl. by Cousin, Vol. X, p. 292.
^ "Et veritablement Ton peut fort bien comparer les nerfs de la machine que je vous decris, aux tuyaux
des machines de ces fontaines; ses muscles et ses tendons, aux autres divers engins et ressorts qui servent
a les mouvoir; ses esprits animaux, a I'eau qui les remue, dont le coeur est la source, et les concavites
du cerveau sent les regards. De plus, la respiration, et autres telles actions qui lui sont naturelles et ordi-
naires, et qui dependent du cours des esprits, sont comme les mouvements d'une horloge, ou d'un moulin,
que le cours ordinaire de I'eau peut rendre continus. Les objets exterieurs, qui par leur seule presence
agissent centre les organes de ses sens, et qui par ce moyen la determinent a se mouvoir en plusieurs
diverses fagons, selon que les parties de son cerveau sont disposees, sont comme des Etrangers qui,
entrant dans quelques unes des grottes de ces fontaines, causent eux-memes sans y penser les mouve-
ments qui s'y font en leur presence: car ils n'y peuvent entrer qu'en marchant sur certains carreaux
tenement disposes, que, par exemple, s'ils approchent d'une Diane qui se baigne, ils la feront cacher dans
des rosea ux.
. Et enfin quand I'dme raisonnable sera en cette machine, elle y aura son siege principal dans le
cerveau, et sera la comme le fontenier, qui doit etre dans les regards oii se vont rendre tous les tuyaux
de ces machines, quand il veut exciter, ou empecher, ou changer en quelque fagon leurs mouvements."
Traite de I' Homme, Oeuvres, Vol. XI, p. 130.
5' "Enfin il n'y a aucune des nos actions exterieures, qui puisse assurer ceux qui les examinent, que
notre corps n'est pas seulement une machine qui se remue de soi-meme, mais qu'il y a aussi en lui une
ame qui a des pensees, excepte les paroles, ou autres signes faits a propos des sujets qui se presentent,
sans se rapporter a aucune passion." Corr., Vol. IV, p. 574.
^0 Objections et Reponses, Oeuvres, Vol. II, p. 52, Ed. Cousin.
<i "Voyant que tous les corps morts sont prives de chaleur, et ensuite de mouvement, on c'est imagine
que c'etait I'absence de I'ame qui faisait cesser ces mouvements et cette chaleur . . . on a cru,
sans raison, que notre chaleur naturelle et tous les mouvements de nos corps dependent de I'ame: au
lieu qu'on devait penser, au contraire, que I'ame ne s'absente lorsqu'on meurt, qu'a cause que cette
chaleur cesse, et que les organes qui servent a mouvoir le corps se corrompent." Les Passions, Oeuvres,
Vol. XI, p. 330.
" "Le corps d'un homme vivant differe autant de celui d'un homme mort, que fait une montre, ou
autre automate (c'est a dire, autre machine qui se meut de soi-meme), lorsqu'elle est montee, et qu'elle
a en soi le principe corporel des mouvements pour lesquels elle est instituee, avec tout ce qui est requis
pour son action, et la meme montre, ou autre machine, lorsqu'elle est rompue et que le principe de son
mouvement cesse d'agir." Ibid.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL I3
He superimposes, however, on the mechanically living and thinking
organism a rational soul. But the compromise is unsatisfactory to both
the scientist and the theologian, for Descartes calls attention to the
fact that the rational soul does not participate in any of the functions
described by him as mechanistic. The soul is thus explained away;
the name of soul only is preserved for consciousness.^^ The fact that
he describes the pineal gland as the seat of the soul seems to affirm
that soul stands for the mind only. For in the Passions he alleged
that properly speaking one can not place the soul in one particular
organ to the exclusion of all the others, because the existence of it is
conditioned by the disposition of all the organs of the body; and its
non-existence by their dissociation.^* In his theory of consciousness
there is, however, no room left for the psychical. There are no psychi-
cal images or sensations which in modern psychology are supposed to
constitute the mind. Descartes, on the contrary, emphatically combats
the necessity of their existence.*^ He finds that the problem of knowl-
edge is not solved by the supposition of images, for if the image is the
exact copy of the object there is no difference between cognition of
objects or of images."*^ Neither is there in his psychology any spiritual
principle of unification of thought. The unity of perception and
thought, despite the doubleness of our organs and the manifoldness of
our sensations, is explained as brought about by a corporeal element,
the pineal gland, i. e., that part of the brain which is, as he says, not
double.
The mind he further identifies with the activity of thinking; think-
ing, he says, is not an attribute of something that thinks, but is the
very essence of the mind as extension is the very essence of body."*^
The mind exists only when consciousness exists, i. e., only when we
think. To say that consciousness exists and we do not think is a con-
^ "II n'y a qu'une seule ame dans I'homme, c'est a dire, la raisonnable; car il ne faut compter pour
actions humaines que celles qui dependent de la raison." Oeuvres, Vol. VIII, p. 512, Ed. Cousin.
"Et comme Vesprit ou I'dme raisonnable est distincte du corps . . . c'est avec juste raison que
nous lui donnons a elle seule le nom d'dme." Ibid, p. 513.
"Quod autem animam raiionalem nomine mentis humance appellet, laudo: sic enim vitat aequivo-
cationem, quae est in voce animce, atque me liac in re imitatur." Oeuvres, Vol. VIII, p. 347.
** Les Passions, Oeuvres, Vol. XI. p. 351.
** "II faut, outre cela, prendre garde a ne pas supposer que, pour sentir, I'ame ait besoin de contempler
quelques images qui soyent envoyees par les objets jusques au cerveau, ainsi que font communement nos
Philosophes." Dioptrique, Oeuvres, Vol. VI, p. 112.
<6 "II faut au moins que nous remarquions qu'il n'y a aucunes images qui doivent en tout resembler
aux objets qu'elles representent: car autrement il n'y aurait point de distinction entre I'objet et son
image. II est seulement question de savoir comment elles peuvent donner moyen a I'ame de sentir
toutes les diverses qualites des objets auquels elles se rapportent." Dioptrique, Oeuvres, Vol. VI, p. 113.
By "I'ame" he means here, as explained in the above quotation, the human mind.
" "La pensee n'est pas congue comme un attribut qui peut etre joint ou separe de la chose qui pense;
. . . la pensee constitue son essence, ainsi que I'extension constitue I'essence du corps." Oeuvres,
Vol. V, p. 193, Latin; Transl. by Cousin, Vol. X, p. 147.
14 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
tradiction. This identification of thinking and consciousness explains
his assertion that we always think.'*^ Otherwise he would have to con-
clude that consciousness ceases to exist. '*^ In fact, he says, he could
more easily conceive that consciousness ceases to exist than that
consciousness exists when we do not think.^*^ The "innate idea," mis-
represented in the history of philosophy, is nothing but the natural
capacity of our thinking faculty to form such ideas under certain cir-
cumstances.^^ His discussion of the formation of universals in the
Principles speaks against the innateness of concepts.^^
Descartes's cosmology interfered with the teachings of the church
and theology. The "universe" of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, which
suited the interests of the church, seems to be preserved by Descartes
in name only. It is deprived of all its fundamental characteristics.
Its limits are removed and the world is made infinitely extended.
According to the traditional teaching of theology the attribute of
infiniteness belongs to God only and, therefore, the world can not be
otherwise than limited. Le Monde describes the world as moving of
itself by natural laws, while the traditional theological doctrine holds
<8 "Mais il me semble qu'il est necessaire que I'ame pense toujours actuellement, parce que la pens^e
constitue son essence, ainsi que I'extension constitue I'essence du corps." Ihid.
*' "La raison pour laquelle je croi que I'ame pense toujours, est la meme qui me fait croire . . .
que ce qui constitue la nature d'une chose est toujours en elle, pendant qu'elle existe; en sorte qu'il me
serait plus aise de croire que I'ame cesserait d'exister, quand on dit qu'elle cesse de penser, que non pas de
concevoir qu'elle fiit sans pensee." Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 478.
'" For a similar reason he denied a soul to animals, declaring: "Je ne leur refuse pas meme le senti-
ment autant qu'il depend des organes du corps. Ainsi mon opinion n'est pas si cruelle aux animaux
qu'elle est favorable aux hommes." Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 278, Latin; Transl. by Cousin, Vol. X, p. 208.
51 "Lorsque j'ai dit que I'idee de Dieu est naturellement en nous, je n'ai jamais entendu autre chose,
que la nature a mis en nous une faculle par laquelle nous pouvons connailre Dieu; mais je n'ai jamais ecrit
ni pense que telles idees fussent acluelles ou qu'elles fussent des especes distinctes de la faculte meme que
nous avons de penser. Et meme je dirai plus, qu'il n'y a personne qui soit si eloigne que moi de tout ce
fatras d'entites scholastiques; . . . Je I'ai nomme naturelle, mais je I'ai dit au meme sens que nous
disons que la generosite ou quelque maladie est naturelle a certaines families." Oeuvres, Vol. X, p.
106, Ed. Cousin.
"Selon que I'esprit est determine par soi-meme ou par des causes etrangeres, a considerer tel ou tel
objet, il trouve en lui-meme telle ou telle autre idee de ce qu'il considere." Oeuvres inedites de Descartes,
Foucher de Careil, 1859, p. 65.
"Je n'entends pas que I'idee de Dieu soit en nous autrement que les idees de toutes les verites connues
par elles-memes, je n'entends pas qu'elles soient toujours en acte, representees dans quelque partie
du cerveau, comme des vers se trouvent dans un manuscrit de Virgile, mais elles y sont seulement en
puissance comme diverses figures dans un morceau de cire." Foucher de Careil, Op. Cil., p. 63.
52 "Quels sont les universaux. Qui se font de cela seul que nous nous servons d'une meme idee pour
penser a plusieurs choses particulieres qui ont entre elles un certain rapport. Et lorsque nous com-
prenons sous un meme nom les choses qui sont representees par cette idee, ce nom aussi est universel. Par
exemple, quand nous voyons deux pierres, et que, sans penser autrement a ce qui est de leur nature,
nous remarquons seulement qu'il y en a deux, nous formons en nous I'idee d'un certain nombre que nous
nommons le nombre deux. Si, voyant ensuite deux oiseaux ou deux arbres, nous remarquons, sans penser
aussi a ce qui est de leur nature, qu'il y en a deux, nous reprenons par ce moyen la meme idee que nous
avions auparavant formee, et la rendons universelle, et le nombre aussi que nous nommons d'un nom
universel, le nombre deux. De meme, lorsque nous considerons une figure de trois cotes, nous formons
une certaine idee, que nous nommons I'idee du triangle, et nous en servons ensuite a nous representer
geniralement toutes les figures qui n'ont que trois cotes, etc." Principes, Part I, Section 59, Oeuvres,
Vol. IX.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL I5
the extra-mundane God as the moving cause of the world. Mechanical
laws exclude final causes, which, Descartes found, do not help us to
understand nature. The opposition of the heavens and the earth
which is part of the theological conception of the universe is nullified
in Descartes's system, where the Copernican theory is practically
admitted. Descartes places the earth among the stars and lets it
move around the sun during the year and around its own axis to form
the day.^* This scheme is rejected by the Roman hierarchy whose
teachings seemed to lose their force if the world ceased to be a geo-
centric system. If the earth is at the center, man's position is most
remote from God, who abides beyond the outer sphere of the universe,
and, therefore, man is in a place which is most degraded, for the uni-
verse becomes gradually better as it approaches the sphere of God's
habitation. The church exists to rescue man from his helpless position
and to bring his soul nearer to God. But if the earth is among the
stars, as is held by Descartes, man is too near to heaven to need the
mediation of the church for his salvation. This may, of course, be for
the church a very good reason for putting the earth at the center, but
Descartes in his study of nature looked for no other than astronomical
justification for placing the earth, and he found no instance which
would support its immobility. He even expressed his regret for those
who, trying to make the geocentric system an article of faith, have no
stronger reasons to support this doctrine than those advanced by its
adherents. ^^ He found more convincing the observations related in
Galileo's book, observations which deprive the sun of its movement.
Moreover, Descartes's system brings heaven and earth down to one
level. According to this theory the heavenly bodies, just as the
earthly, gradually arose by purely mechanical laws. There is no
heavenly element in Descartes's system — both the celestial and the
terrestrial spheres are formed from one and the same kind of matter to
which they can be reduced again. The vortex theory is applied also
to the celestial sphere, which is found to consist of many heavens.
His suggestion of the possibility of the existence of many earths con-
flicted with the doctrine of redemption according to which Christ was
incarnated only on one earth. ^^
Descartes's idea of the basis of morality which grew out of his view
of man and nature overthrew traditional ethics. His belief in the equal
distribution of reason among all men led him to the fundamental
s'Le Monde, Oeuvres, Vol. XI, p. 81.
^* "J'ai compassion avec vous de cet auteur qui se sert de raisons astrologiques pour prouver I'immo-
bilite de la Terre; mais j'aurais encore plus de compassion du siecle, si je pensais que ceux qui ont voulu
faire un article de foi de cette opinion, n'eussent point de plus fortes raisons pour la sofltenir." Oeuvres
Vol. I, p. 258.
66 Abbot Terrason, Traiti de I'Infini, 1750. {Philosophical Review, 1905.)
l6 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
precept, "all that is necessary to right action is right judgment."
This setting of morality left no room for any authoritative sanction,
either divine or human — the basis of traditional ethics. With this
rule at the basis, morality was taken out of the hands of authority
and became the private business of every individual. Every one is
master over his own conduct in so far as he has to obey his own reason
only. The problem of vice and virtue, a vital problem of traditional
ethics, was reduced to the question of knowledge and ignorance. If
all that is necessary for right action is right judgment, the problem of
morality centers around the question of how to reach right judgment in
all matters and on all occasions. According to Descartes no right judg-
ment is possible without a thorough understanding of the particular
case in question; it requires knowledge of what we judge. All vice,
according to him, comes from weakness which follows from ignorance;
all virtue, from the firm resolution to do the thing that one considers
to be best after a close examination of the case in question, and to
employ all one's power of mind to know what is best.^® There is no
fixed good; it has to be determined by individual judgment in every
particular case. What is good at one time and one place may not be so
at another time and at another place. It is contrary to reason to hold a
thing as always good, because it proved to be so once. This conflicted
with Christian teaching, according to which, as was objected, the good
is determined by the authority of God. The question of right and
wrong in the pursuit of good and evil Descartes considered to be a
theological question which, therefore, had no place in his natural
philosophy. ^^
Descartes's conception of error left no room for the traditional
problem of the origin of sin, like the Augustinian problem, for instance,
where particular sins are explained by the original sin of mankind,
whose salvation can be brought about by the help of the church. To
Descartes every particular sin is original for itself, and its origin is
the ignorance of the individual. Salvation from sin can be brought
about not by grace and through the church, but by knowledge only.
Everybody wants the good, but not everybody knows how to obtain it.
Morality presupposes the knowledge of other sciences. The cultiva-
tion of the natural reasoning capacity and knowledge of nature are
the two prerequisites for rightness in conduct. For man, being part
of nature and living in a mechanical world, can maintain the integrity
of his existence only by being able to utilize the world for his benefit.
•6 Corr.. Vol. V. p. 83.
'' "Le bien faire dont je parle ne se peut entendre en termes de Theologie, ou il est parle de la Grace,
mais seulement de Philosophie morale et naturelle, ou cette Grace n'est point consideree." Oeuvres,
Vol. I, p. 366.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL I7
Descartes's interpretation of right and wrong action avoided also the
traditional problem of freedom. As a logical consequence of his funda-
mental proposition of morality, evil is not a necessary part of the world
and, therefore, the traditional problem of legitimatizing evil is excluded.
His physics undermined the theory of the Eucharist. In the con-
struction of his system of physics his only concern was as far as possible
adherence to facts and a most intelligible explanation of nature. As
a result, it conflicted with an important doctrine of the church. His
theories of accidents and extension followed out logically undermined
completely the theory of the Eucharist. If, according to Descartes,
accidents have no separate and independent existence, how do the
accidents of the bread and wine remain during the sacrament when the
bread is no longer there and another body is in its place? Despite
the objections made, he persistently asserted that the independent
existence of real accidents is incredible and unintelligible. It seemed
to him a contradiction to say that the accidents of the wine and
bread remained while the wine and the bread changed into another
substance. For if all accidents remained, what was it that changed, he
asked. He was quite confident that even all theologians would have
to agree with him that nothing of that which we perceive by the senses
has changed, "car il est certain que la diversite des noms qu'on leur
a donnes (to the different objects) , ne vient que de ce qu'on a remarque
en elles diverses proprietes qui tombent sous les sens." ^^ He even went
so far as to express hope that a time would come when even all theo-
logians would reject the existence of real accidents as of little certainty
even in matters of belief and as repugnant to reason, and that his
theory would be accepted instead. He neither rejected his principles
nor did he want to attempt a reconciliation of them with the mysteries
of the Eucharist.
Another difificulty with respect to the theory of the Eucharist arose
because Descartes sometimes appeared to identify matter with exten-
sion. If matter and extension are identical, how can the body of Christ
be present in the dimensions of the bread? Descartes saw these difficul-
ties only when his attention was called to the fact that his principles
of physics exposed the theory of the Eucharist to great "danger".
Despite the fact that Descartes "revered theology, and aspired as
much as any one to reach heaven" he was anxious to avoid whatever
was based on divine revelation. He says he preferred rather to keep
ss Corr., Vol. IV, p. 37S.
l8 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
silence concerning such points, wanting neither to accept what was
advanced by the Scholastics or Aristotle nor to advance anything
contrary to the decisions of faith. His decision at the outset was not to
treat any theological questions under the pretext that reason is
impotent to penetrate matters of faith. Whatever is subject to revela-
tion had according to him no place in philosophy, whose business he
held it was properly to investigate only things of which we can obtain
a clear and distinct knowledge; it is vain labor to examine things
which are beyond our comprehension.^^ He drew a sharp line of dis-
tinction between reason and faith. He held that what can be taken on
faith is not always acceptable to reason. When, against his theory of
the gradual development of the world by mechanical laws, it was
objected that the world had existed in its present state since the very
creation, he was willing to accept this latter view on faith, as he said,
but not by reason. His conviction was that questions of faith can not
be demonstrated by reason and that to attempt to demonstrate them
by reason is to do them injustice.
Descartes was strongly opposed to mixing religion with philosophy.
He grew indignant and did not finish a book which was sent to him by
Mersenne, as he explained, "parce qu'il me semblait ensuite qu'il
melait la Religion avec la Philosophic, et . . . cela est entierement contre
mon sens."^" He endeavored to eliminate problems of orthodox meta-
physics from his philosophy. ''i His proposition not to accept anything
as true unless it was clearly seen to be so was hardly favorable to the
interpretation of mysteries. He refused to say anything concerning
the questions of the compatibility of God's omnipotence and of pre-
destination with man's freedom, or anything concerning the question
whether God always made what he knew to be perfect, when these
questions were proposed to him by the Princess Elizabeth. A finite
spirit, he asserted, can not get at the bottom of infinite things. No
considerations could make him undertake an investigation of the
mysteries of grace, of the trinity, or of incarnation. He was anxious
not to let any theology slip into his writing, as he explained . . . "je
m'abstiens, le plus qu'il m'est possible, des questions de Theologie
. . . ".^2 He even avoided a definite answer when his attention was
called to the fact that certain points of his philosophy conflicted with
theology. All the objections against his view of the occult qualities
and his theory of extension which conflicted with the theory of the
^oOeuvres, Vol. II, p. 570.
" "J'ai toujours excepte les choses qui regardent la foi et les actions de notre vie, lorsque j'ai dit que
nous ne devons donner creance qu'aux choses que nous connaissons evidemment." Objections el
Reponses. Oeuvres, Vol. II, p. 77, Ed. Cousin.
62 Corr., Vol. IV, p. 119.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL IQ
Eucharist did not make him attempt at once a reconciHation of his
teachings with matters of belief. He was very unwilling to enter
upon a consideration of the doctrine of the Eucharist on the basis of
his theory. Only when Arnauld objected in the name of the Scholastic
theologians and asked him how he would reconcile his teaching of
extension with that of the Eucharist, he says, he could no longer
remain silent. ^^ He finally ventured an explanation of the doctrine in
such a way, he says, as would be suited to avoiding the calumnies of
the heretics who find it incomprehensible and full of contradictions.
RESUME
To summarize, Descartes set out on his philosophical career as
a naturalist, keeping strictly away from whatever had a supernatural
tinge. His problems were problems of life and his method experimen-
tation, as much as was within his reach, and hypotheses based on
scientific knowledge of the day and on mathematical reasoning.
^ Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 190, Latin; Transl. by Cousin, Vol. X, p. 143. Letlres, Vol. I, p. 32s, Ed. Clerselier.
CHAPTER III
CONSERVATION OF TRADITIONS DESPITE
PROGRESSIVE IDEAS
Despite the fact that Descartes had set out on a new path, that of
naturalism, his later works, the Discourse,'^ the Meditations,^ and the
Principles ^ surprise us with their reaction. Both in subject-matter and
in method he fell back into the error of his predecessors against whom
he had arisen. He tells us in the Discourse that in "pulling down an
old house, we usually preserve the ruins to contribute to the erection
of the new," but Descartes preserved even more than the ruins — a
surprising outcome in view of his preparation for the new structure
and his first attempt at construction. Having first studied his earliest
works where the world and life are represented as going on according
to natural laws only, independent of all supernatural powers, and
where facts are the criterion of truth, we are surprised to find in his
later works that his physics and the very existence of the world are
made dependent on the existence of a Perfect Being; that the principle
of definition is to take the place of facts in the derivation and verifica-
tion of truth about the material world, and that the senses, which
were the most reliable sources of information in the study of nature,
are doubted. He thus returned to authority and tradition discarded |
by him at the outset.
The Cogito ergo sum, which is so glorified in the histories of phil-
osophy as the most original idea of Descartes, is also nothing but a
medieval tradition, and is not the thing for which Descartes is to be
given an immortal place in the history of philosophy. We find the
same in St. Augustine, who in the state of doubt also takes his own
existence as the safest starting-point. Si jailor, sum. The anticipation
of Descartes's principle was pointed out by Arnauld in the second
Objection, where he quotes the corresponding words of both philoso-
phers on that point.^ St. Augustine lets Alipius, in disputing with
Evodius concerning the existence of God, say: " Premierement, je vous
1 Discours de la Methode (first appeared in French, 1637).
2 Miditalions (first appeared in Latin, 1641).
' Principes (first appeared in Latin, 1644).
^Objections el Reponses, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 154.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 21
demande, afin que nous commencions par les choses les plus mani-
festes, savoir si vous etes, ou si peut-etre vous ne craignez point de
vous meprendre en repondant a ma demande, combien qu'a vrai dire
si vous n'etiez point, vous ne pourriez jamais etre trompe." Instead
of this Descartes says: "Mais il y a un je ne sais quel trompeur tres
puissant et tres ruse, qui met toute son industrie a me tromper toujours.
II est done sans doute que je suis, s'il me trompe."
In the same Objection Arnauld has pointed out Descartes's like-
ness to St. Augustine in the problem of the Meditations and the Prin-
ciples, wherein Descartes tries to show that the soul is more clearly
perceived than the body; similarly St. Augustine in the De quantit.
animcB rejects as false the opinion that the perceptions of the soul are
less clear than those of the senses.
The traditional problems of God and the soul are given a prominent
place by Descartes. The treatment of these problems is supposed to
justify .the fame attributed to Descartes by posterity. It does not dis-
play, however, any of his originality or ingenuity. He himself con-
fesses that he made use of the demonstrations of others in his proofs
of the existence of God and the soul, for the reason that it is almost
impossible to discover new ones.^
His arguments concerning God represent, in fact, a mixture of
theology and traditional philosophy. God is endowed with all the
attributes ascribed to him by theology. He is one and eternal; He
has existed from all eternity and will exist to all eternity; He is all-
knowing, all powerful, and is the creator and director of all things.^
(What treason to his Le Monde!) Descartes does not even pretend to
have said concerning God anything more than the theologians did^
to quote his own words: " Je n'ai rien dit touchant la connaissance de
Dieu, que tous les Theologiens ne disent aussi." ^
The various arguments which Descartes uses to prove God's exis- ]
tence go back to St. Augustine. They are either a restatement or a
variation of the latter's ontological argument. Though from the point
5 "Presque toutes les raisons qui ont ete apportees par tant de grands personnages, touchant ces deux
questions, sont autant de demonstrations, quand elles sont bien entendues, qu'il soit presque impossible
d'en inventer de nouvelles: si est-ce que je crois qu'on ne surait rien faire de plus utile en la Philosophie,
que d'en rechercher une fois curieusement et avec soin les meilleures et les plus solides, et les disposer
en un ordre si clair et si exact, qu'il soit constant desormais a tout le monde, que ce sont de veritables
demonstrations." Meditations, Epitre, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 5.
' "Je concois un Dieu souverain, eternel, infini, immuable, tout connaissant, tout puissant et Createur
universel de toutes les choses qui sont hors de lui . . . " Meditations, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 32.
. . Je vois clairement qu'il est necessaire qu'il ait ete auparavant de toute eternite, et qu'il soit
etemellement a I'avenir." Ibid.
' Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 544.
22 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
of view of logic an improvement upon St. Augustine, they are all,
however, equally unsuccessful. In his arguments he involves himself
Jn a circular, reasoning, as was first pointed out by Arnauld. With
regard to Descartes's proof of God by the clear and distinct idea of
Him, Arnauld presents the following passage in the Objections. "II ne
me reste plus qu'un scrupule, qui est de savoir comment il se pent
defendre de ne pas commettre un cercle, lorsqu'il dit que 'nous ne
sommes assures que les choses que nous concevons clairement et dis-
tinctement sont vraies, qu'a cause que Dieu est ou existe'. Car
nous ne pouvons etre assures que Dieu est sinon parce que nous con-
cevons cela tres clairement et tres distinctement . . . " ^
This circular reasoning Descartes repeats again and again. In the
Meditations we find even in one and the same passage the two following
expressions: " Au reste, de quelque preuve et argument que je me serve
(to prove God's existence), il en faut toujours revenir la, qu'il n'y a que
les choses que je congois clairement et distinctement, qui aient la force
de me persuader entierement" and " . . . Je remarque que la
certitude de toute les autres choses en depend (upon the truth of
God's existence) si absolument, que sans cette connaissance il est
impossible de pouvoir jamais rien savoir parfaitement." ^
-^ A similar circular reasoning was pointed out by Arnauld in Des-
cartes's proof from causality. Arnauld correctly saw that Descartes
first used his own existence as a premise for the derivation of God's
existence and then God's existence to explain his own existence.^"
Moreover, his arguments do not give us any empirical ground of
assurance of the universal existence of the innate idea, which is the
main point on which the certainty of the whole proof depends, and
' even less assurance of the existence which they seek to prove. The
idea of the perfect is merely an idea and may have no metaphysical
significance.
Descartes is not more successful in his demonstrations of the exis-
vjence of the soul. In his treatment of the problem of the soul there
lurks a mixture of accepted beliefs concerning the soul and of his own
radical conceptions. He is wavering between the two, trying to do
/justice to the old and not too much injustice to his own. The problem
of the soul is taken up in the form of a demonstration of the distinction
between soul and body. If the arguments dealing with the soul are
supposed to be demonstrations of the soul's immortality, as they are
^Objections et Reponses, Oeuvres, Vol. II, p. 29, Ed. Cousin.
' Meditations, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, pp. 54 and 55.
"> "Et toute la force de I'argument dont j'ai ici use pour prouver I'existence de Dieu, consiste en ce
que je reconnais qu'il ne seiait pas possible que ma nature fdt telle qu'elle est, c'est a dire que j'eusse
en moi I'idee d'un Dieu, si Dieu n'existait veritablement." Meditations, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 41.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 23
taken to be by some, or as even the original title of the Meditations
suggests," they are complete failures. But Descartes does not even
pretend to have attempted to prove the soul's immortality. When
Mersenne pointed to the fact that there is in the Meditations no word
concerning the immortality of the soul, Descartes answered that there
was nothing surprising about that, for he could not at all prove that
God could not destroy the soul after death. ^^ He then asked Mersenne
to change the title of the Meditations from In qua Dei existentia et
animcB imniortalitas demonstratur, to In quihiis Dei existentia et animce
humancB a corpore distinctio demonstratur. In a letter written to Igby
he says that he does not know anything concerning the soul after death
and, therefore, kept silent on this point.
Where he is said to deal with the immortality of the soul his main
concern is, as he himself tells us, to point out the distinction between
mind and body. Whenever he pretends to speak of the soul he speaks
of the mind or consciousness, evidently identifying the soul with the
mind. Mind according to him is thinking itself,^' and he emphasizes,,
the fact that it is distinct from the body. Undoubtedly, mind or think-
ing is not body, but even if we know that thinking is distinct from body
what else do we know of the nature of the mind? If thinking, or mind,
is distinct from, body, thinking, or mind, is distinct from body; this
does not, however, suggest any other property of the mind. Descartes,
however, says in the Discourse that he draws from this the conclusion"
that consciousness or thinking is a substance, which in the Cartesian
language means an indestructible and an eternal being which is inde-
pendent of the body and of the material world. How Descartes by
unbiassed reasoning could ever have come to this conclusion is in-
comprehensible, particularly, if we take into consideration the fact
that he was a genius in mathematics, which means: a perfect
logician.
The logic of the proofs of the soul's immortality did not seem to
satisfy the religious mind more than it did the scientific one Arnauld
questions the legitimacy of the conclusion of the soul's immortality
on the ground of the distinction between soul and body, for according
" Renati Descartes, Medilationes de Prima Philosophia. In qua Dei existentia et animae immor-
talitas demonstratur.
■2 "Pour ce que vous dites, que je n'ai pas rnis un mot de I'lmmortalite de 1' Ame, vous ne vous en devez
pas etonner; car je ne saurais pas demontrer que Dieu ne la puisse annihiler, mais seulement qu'elle
est d'une nature entierement distincte de celle du corps." Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 26s.
'5 "La pensee n'est pas congue comme un attribut qui peut-etre joint ou separe de la chose qui pense,
ainsi que Ton congoit dans le corps la division des parties, ou le mouvement."
"La pensee constitue son essence, ainsi que I'extension constitue, I'essence du corps." Oeuvres, Vol.
X, p. 147, Ed. Cousin; Adams and Tannery Edition, Vol. V, p. 193, Latin.
"La pensee, ou la nature qui pense, dans laquelle je crois que consiste I'essence de I'esprit humain."
Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 221.
24 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
tb the principles of the school the souls of animals are distinct from
their bodies and are, nevertheless, supposed to perish with them.^*
Aside from the fact that the arguments for the distinction between
mind and body do not give us the conclusion of the immortality of the
soul and are failures from the point of view of logic, they do far less
give us the assurance of the actual independent existence of the soul.
TChis, however, even the best logic could not do.
In Descartes's arguments concerning the existence both of the soul
and of God there is no trace of any empirical investigation. The
problems of the Meditations and part of the Principles and of the
Discourse are, on the contrary, built on traditional material imparted
to him from childhood through education, despite his earnest desire
at the start to make his philosophical, scientific pursuits with a mind
as a "tabula rasa" and to lean on experience as main support for his
V philosophical conclusions.
Nor is there any attempt whatsoever at historical research. He
did not let himself be misled by such questions as whether the idea of
God was really innate in all men at all times and all places. He was
not in the least concerned to find out the fact that there are savages
who are wholly ignorant of such pious ideas. Neither was he informed
of such scientific experiments as were performed later in the nineteenth
century, and which revealed, for instance, that a woman, who having
been deaf and dumb all her life, had no idea of a God when her Acuities
Y"were restored. Descartes takes it for granted that the idea o"f the
[. Perfect Being is universally innate and goes on to construct on its basis
arguments in favor of the existence of God quite undeterred by the
fact that in so doing he begs the question. There is another begging
of the question in the argument for God's existence by taking it for
granted that the idea of God is a perfect idea.
The same mistake he commits in his proof of the existence of the
soul by taking it for granted that consciousness exists independent of
— Vthe body and of the material world. In his Meditations he reasons
away his* body and the material world and finds that he is still con-
scious. It is a question whether there would be obtained the same
results were they actually taken away. But, as above pointed out, he
/avoids empirical investigations on these questions.
If Descartes's demonstrations we're intended, as he tells us, to con-
quer non-believers by making matters of faith more intelligible to them,
he failed in his purpose. Descartes's demonstrations are too weak to
mnvert non-believers and despite his demonstrations even believers will
have, just as before, to repeat with St. Anselm "Credo ut intelligam."
^^ Objections et Reponses, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 159.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 25
Descartes himself saw the obscurity of his demonstrations of the
existence of God and of the soul. He justifies the failure of his demon-
strations of the immortality of the soul by the fact that he had never
intended to prove the soul's immortality. All he proposed to do, in
order to comply with the demands of religion, was to prove the dis-
tinction between the soul and the body.^^ He, therefore, did not say
anything concerning the fact that the soul, being in union with the
body, may act with it and part with it.^^
As to the demonstrations of the existence of God, he admits their \
awkwardness and confesses his mistake in supposing that things which
had become clear to him only through habit of thinking them in a
certain way would appear as clear to others. He advances various
reasons to excuse the failure of his demonstrations. In the Discourse
he could not adequately enough elaborate the arguments for God's
existence on account of lack of time, for he had not decided to treat
this subject until the very last moment before publication and, there-
fore, was hurried by the publisher. ^'^ Another reason, which he con-
siders the main one, is the fact that he refrained from considering the
reasonings of the skeptics on this point and did not say all the things
that were necessary "a(Z abducendam mentem a sensibus." ^^ Moreover,
, he says that his demonstrations concerning the existence of God are
intelligible only if one understands his reasonings concerning the incer-
titude of our cognition of the material world if there is no God. This
reasoning, it seems to me, nobody understands. He did not wanlv^
however, to include these arguments in a book which he intended for
everybody, even for women. But did these arguments, which were
sufficiently worked up in his later work, the Meditations, throw
much light on the question of God's existence, or rather more
obscure it?
Are the reasons advanced by Descartes actually the reasons for his
failure? Does the mistake lie only in the negligible treatment of the
problems? Was it not rather on one hand the general defect of his
method and on the other the neglect to consider whether the failure
^5 "L'une desquelles (one of the characteristics of the soul) est qu'elle pense, I'autre, qu'etant unie
au corps, elle peut agir et partir avec lui; je n'ai quasi rien dit de cette derniere, et me suis seulement
etudie a faire bien entendre la premiere, a cause que mon principal dessein etait de prouver la distinction
qui est entre I'ame et le corps; a quoi celle-ci seulement a pu servir, et I'autre y aurait ete nuisible."
Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 664.
'' "Je ne saurais pas demontrer que Dieu ne la puisse annihiler, mais seulement qu'elle est d'une
nature entierement distincte de celle du corps, et par consequent qu'elle n'est point naturelleraent
sujette a mourir avec lui, qui est tout ce qui est requis pour 6tablir la Religion; et c'est aussi tout ce que
je me suis propose de prouver." Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 266.
" II est vrai que j'ai et€ trop obscur en ce que j'ai 6crit de I'existence de Dieu dans ce traite de la
Methode . . . Ce . . . vient en partie de ce que je ne me suis resolu de I'y joindre que sur la fin,
et lorsque le Libraire me pressait." Oeuvres, Vol. I, p. 360.
i8/</., Vol. I, p. s6o.
26 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
of his predecessors to solve these problems lay in the defect of the syllo-
gistic method only or in the nature of the problems themselves?
'■'^ Discontented with the scholastic method of inquiry which led to
knowledge that lacked complete certainty, Descartes looked for
another to give him the certainty of mathematics in all branches of
knowledge. He, therefore, built a new method on the principles of
mathematics. The result is that his method displays all its excellence
when applied to mathematics, as is exemplified in the essay, Geometry,
where, he says, using his method he succeeded in solving problems in
a much shorter way than had been done before him ; but it falls short
in its application to other sciences which are concerned with existences,
and where the investigation of ideas leads to no results. The reason
is that in his method, which was intended for universal application,
Descartes committed the erro r of not discriminating between existen-
tial and logical truth. In the first rule of his method he speaks of truth
without stating what kind of truth. This general defect of his method
reflects on the treatment of the traditional problems also. In applying
this mathematical method to these problems, he handled supposed
facts as ideas; and so even if the conclusions as to the existence of the
supposed facts with which the traditional problems deal were legiti-
mate logically, they would be no proof of the actual existence of these
facts. For no matter how clear and distinct our ideas are, they are
by no means a guarantee that the facts, for which these ideas stand,
exist, and, therefore, a mathematical method can never solve an
existential problem, "Indeed, one of the greatest philosophical dis-
coveries of all times seems to have been made, and made in the .e-
teenth century, namely, the discovery that mathematics is a non-
existential science, and this discovery we owe not to the epistemologist,
but to the philosophical mathematician." ^^
It is interesting to note that Descartes conceives that logic makes no
existential discoveries in the case of the triangle, but fails to see this
when the existence of God is concerned. His method is an improve-
ment on the scholastic method only in so far as its first rule is directed
against authority and tradition; but this rule of his method is disre-
garded in the treatment of the traditional problems in the very fact
that he treats them at all. Aside from this rule, Descartes's method
does not carry us a step further in the study of facts than did the old
method against which he protested. On the other hand, if Descartes's
improved method had shown itself satisfactory for the inquiry into
facts, its application to the traditional problems would have brought
us no better success. His mistake was not only that he applied a
" The New Realism, p. 85.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 2"]
mathematical method to the study of supposed facts, but also that he
did not stop to consider the character of the problems when he was
asked to give a logical demonstration of matters of belief. A due con-
sideration of these problems would have revealed to him the fact that
their nature is such as to guarantee no success even if most carefully
studied by means of the most perfect dialectic. Descartes was aware
that he could discover nothing in this field by means of the senses.
Therefore, he carefully discarded the senses as not reliable when he
betook himself to the treatment of these problems, though the senses
were reliable enough to study the world, and he began the search of
the knowledge of God by the inspection of his own mind, for this is,
as he justly remarks, the only place where knowledge of God can be
obtained, even according to the Holy Scripture.^" What he found there
is nothing but what he had been taught of Him. Descartes does not
pretend to conceive anything of God, but states that he afifirms only
what he knows about Him, and he evidently knew no more about Him
than the theologians knew.
3
The failure to solve these problems does not, however, have any
bearing on the rest of his philosophy. This is due to the fact that these
problems are in very loose connection with the entire scheme of his
system, so that even a complete omission of them would not make his
system suffer any lack. Despite the fact that these problems are
usually taken to be the main topics of Descartes's philosophy, a close
study of his system makes it obvious that his whole philosophical
scheme does not justify the significance ascribed to these problems.
The existence of God and of the soul are made useless from the point
of view of his science. Though Descartes asserts that the demonstra-
tions of God's existence gain clearness when it is understood that His
existence is necessary to assure us of the reality of the occurrences and
facts of the material world, he does not show the necessity of God's
existence in the development of his scientific ideas concerning the
material world. The world being represented as a self -moving mecha-
nism where all phenomena are interconnected by necessary laws and
where every effect has its natural causes, there is no place in it for
divine grace or providence. All functions of life being described in
natural terms, the soul is made superfluous. ^
Considering Descartes's scientific ideas of the world and man it is
obvious that the traditional problems of the existence of God and of
2" Preface to the Meditations, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 5.
28 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
the soul are no natural outgrowth of his philosophical scheme. There
arises, then, the question, what called forth the discussion of these
problems. The answer to this question we find explicitly stated by
Descartes in the preface to his Meditations where the motive is de-
scribed as a purely religious one. His purpose was, he tells us, to
demonstrate by natural reason, for the sake of the atheists and infidels,
religious truth which the believer accepts on faith only. For, he says,
the teachings of the Holy Scriptures are not convincing enough to
unbelievers who may, perchance, look at such teaching which says
that we must believe in God because it is so taught in the
Scripture, and believe in Scripture because it comes from God,
' as reasoning in a circle, and, therefore, they need better demon-
stration.^^
As to the soul, he says, he attempted to prove only what is necessary
to establish and maintain religion, i. e., the soul's distinction from the
body, for the reason that the Lateran Council condemned the opinion,
held by many, that the nature of the soul can not be easily discovered
or that reason even leads to the conclusion that it perishes with the
body, and entreats all Christian philosophers to prove the contrary .^^
These beliefs in the existence of God and the soul, he further says in
the preface to the Meditations, are necessary for the maintenance of
morality. Since vice is often better rewarded than virtue, many would
be inclined to do what is profitable rather than what is right, if there
were no God or no punishment to be feared in the after-life. This
provokes the question why such considerations should have made him
treat the traditional problems. For according to his fundamental princi-
pie of morality right actions are made dependent on nothing else than
thoughtfulness and knowledge. But these considerations did not make
/liim take up these problems on his own account. People interested in
these questions of theology asked him to demonstrate these matters
by the method with which he was successful in the sciences.^^ At first
he hesitated, declaring that the universal belief in God was proof
enough of His existence and that, therefore, an individual ought not to
undertake to convince unbelievers by trying to demonstrate it to
them, unless he were sure really to conquer them.^* Moreover, he did
" MSditations, Dedication.
22 Preface to the Meditations, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. S-
^"D'autant que plusieurs personnes ont desire cela de moi, qui ont connaissance que j'ai
cultiv6 une certaine methode pour resoudre toutes sortes de difficultSs dans les sciences; methode
. . . de laquelle ils savent que je me suis servi assez heureusement en d'autre rencontres;
j'ai pensfi qu'il etait de mon devoir de tenter quelque chose sur ce sujet." Meditations, Epilre,
Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 6.
^ "Le consentment universel de tous les peuples est assez suffisant pour maintenir la Divinite contre
les injures des Athees, et un particulier ne doit jamais entrer en dispute contre eux, s'il n'est tres assure
de les convaincre." Oeuvres, Vol. I, p. 182.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 29
not take up these problems until just before the publication of the
Discourse.
Thus, despite Descartes's plea for a naturalistic philosophy and his
setting out on this new path, he returned to the old with which he had
broken and dealt with the traditional problems for which his scientific
ideas had left no justified place. ^
CHAPTER IV
EXPLANATION OF THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN DESCARTES'S PROGRESSIVE THINKING
AND TRADITIONS
A close and systematic study of Descartes's system leaves one with
the impression of double bookkeeping. On nearly every point of his
' philosophy he gives us two views which are almost directly opposed.
y^e builds a universe first on mechanical and then on supernatural
principles; he gives us a scientific system which excludes God's exis-
tence and the existence of a soul, and then goes ahead and proves their
existence; he assumes a radical theory of conduct which discards
authority and tradition and with it he accepts provisional rules which
are based on authority and tradition. Side by side with his scientific
views which are progressive, but irreligious, he holds traditional views
which are religious, but unscientific. There is in his philosophy a con-
\fiict between progressive thinking and theology, a conflict which can
not be explained by inconsistency on the part of Descartes; he seems,
'Notwithstanding, to be consistent. The scientific views with which he
began are carried through to the very last and are preserved in his
N^orks even where the contrary views are introduced. The conceptions
of his earlier works, of the treatises on the world and man, are pre-
served alongside of the traditional ideas in his later works on the
Principles and the Passions. This persistence on the part of Des-
cartes helps us to sift his genuine philosophy from secondary admix-
tures. What requires elucidation is the way in which the admixtures
'^me into his philosophy. Descartes speculated about first principles,
although he thought such speculation to be of no moment for the
acquisition of useful knowledge, which he considered to be the mission
of philosophy; although even in the preface to the Principles, he still
\pointed to the fruitlessness of an inquiry into first causes,^ ats exempli-
fied by the failure of great minds like those of Plato and Aristotle and
' "Or il y a eu de tout temps de grands hommes qui ont tache de trouver un cinquieme degre pou''
parvenir a la Sagesse, incomparablement plus haut et plus assure que les quatre autres; c'est de cherche''
les premieres causes et les vrais Principes dont on puisse deduire les raisons de tout ce qu'on est capabl^
de savoir; et ce sont particulierement ceux qui ont travaille a cela qu'on a nommes Philosophes. Toute"
fois je ne sache point qu'il y en ait eu jusques a present a qui ce dessein ait reussi." Preface to Prin'
cipes, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. 5.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 3I
their followers; and although in the same preface he still emphasized
the validity of only such a philosophy as gives us scientific knowledge,
indicating his preference for knowledge obtained by the senses to
opinion supported only by dialectic.^
The development of Descartes's thought in his works can be under-
stood only if we study his philosophy in the light of his time and
examine the conditions under which he wrote. An insight into the
history of the dogma, politics, and social conditions of those days
explains to us much of the peculiar course which the development of his
philosophy took.
Descartes lived in a transition period, a time of conflict between the
old and the new orders. The majority constituted, as it usually does, the
conservative element of those days. Authority was still believed by the
majority to be the criterion of truth. The Renaissance, which had sety
out, as it were, to bring about emancipation from authority, had, in
fact, only substituted one authority for another, the authority of the
ancients for the authority of churchmen. Though the great ardor for
historical research of the sixteenth century had considerably decreased
in Descartes's time, the interest in antiquity as the original and most
reliable source was still alive. This interest was kept up particularly
by the religious controversies of those days. Both the Reformers and
the Catholics had recourse to history to prove the agreement of their
assertions with the primitive church. Both went back to their sources
— the Protestants, appealing to the authority of God's word ; the Catho-
lics, appealing to the old authorities of the church. The majority was
not yet ripe for the more radical doctrines brought forth by Descartes
and his progressive contemporaries. The new spirit that had awakened
with the Renaissance and had led up to the Reformation had only
shaken the conceptions inherited from the Roman Empire and persist-
ing through the middle ages, but had not wiped them out altogether.
The traditions of the Holy Roman Empire were too deeply rooted to
be at once completely extinguished. The air was still full of them
throughout the modern period up to the Westphalian peace which is
- "Ainsi toute la Philosophie est comme un arbre, dont les racines sont la Metaphysique, le tronc est
la Physique, et les branches qui sortent de ce tronc sont toutes les autres sciences, qui se reduisent a
trois principales, a savoir la Medecine, la Mecanique et la Morale, qui, presupposant une entiere con-
naissance des autres sciences, est le dernier degre de la Sagesse." Preface to Principes, Oeuvres, Vol.
IX, p. 14.
"Or comme ce n'est pas des racines, ni du tronc des arbres, qu'on cueille les fruits, mais seulement
des extremites de leurs branches, ainsi la principale utilite de la Philosophie depend de celles de ces
parties qu'on ne pent apprendre que les dernieres." Preface to Principes, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. IS-
"Et il me semble que toute la Sagesse qu'on a coutume d'avoir n'est acquise que par ces quatre
moyens; . . . Le premier'ne contient que des notions qui sont si claires d'elles memes qu'on les peut
acquerir sans meditation. Le second comprend tout ce que I'experience des sens fait connaitre. Le
troisieme, ce que la conversation des autres hommes nous enseigne. A quoi on peut ajouter, pour le
quatrieme, la lecture." Preface to Principes, Oeuvres, Vol. IX, p. s.
32 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
regarded as having brought about a complete extermination of those
ideas by its regulations of religious rights and by its settlement of the
question of imperial authority. This peace, however, was concluded
only three years before Descartes's death. In his time the traditions
of the Holy Roman Empire were still alive. He was the witness of the
endless struggles of these old traditions against the new spirit. All
the political struggles, which had originated or become complicated
through the Reformation and the counter-Reformation at home and
abroad, took place during his life. Religious controversies were still
going on. Two years after Descartes's birth the Edict of Nantes was
issued; it did not, however, accomplish its purpose. The struggle
between Reformers and Catholics was carried on even after its declara-
tion. The Edict had not yet been incorporated when the Catholics
protested, and the government after useless threatenings had to make
various restrictions which practically withdrew the rights granted to
the Reformers. The mutual hatred was increased and led to endless
struggles.
The Reformation was limited rather to a change of church doctrines.
It was no real, intellectual emancipation as it is often claimed to be.
The minds both of Reformers and of Catholics were practically on the
same level of development; whichever party had the power in its hands
tried to suppress the other. The orthodox party was the stronger.
Despite the rapid spread of the doctrines of the reformers in the six-
teenth century, the majority of the people in France were Roman
Catholics. The attempts at reform were followed by a strong Catholic
reaction. The counter-Reformation led to an outbreak of great reli-
gious ardor accompanied by austerity and asceticism. Not only were
the masses very religious, but the majority of the higher classes was
firmly orthodox. The great number of churches and convents erected
at that time testifies to the great religious enthusiasm which surpassed
that of all other centuries. While there were no cloisters for women in
the sixteenth century, a considerable number arose in the first half of
the seventeenth century. The greater number of French Catholic
organizations and orders date from that time. There was established
in every diocese a seminary for the preparation of good priests. The
Catholics made every effort to regain the masses by means of missions
and organizations. They conducted a propaganda on a large scale.
The Jesuits and other religious orders had their missionaries in different
parts of the kingdom expounding the Catholic teachings in the streets
and in the market-places. The outbreak of fanaticism was so great
that a particular order was formed — the "Compagnie du Saint-Sacre-
ment" — ^which carried with great pomp the holy sacrament, exposing
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 33
it in squares and halls whenever there was a gathering of the masses.
Spying was part of the duty of such holy orders. One had to be very
careful in one's speech. The slightest freedom caused atheism to be
suspected. This suspicion was not, however, groundless. Free-
thinking had begun to manifest itself. To combat infidels there was
formed a Christian militia, that dreamed of extending the holy armies
all over Europe.
Never before had the clergy had such strong influence in France.
Priests and theologians had never held so many state positions as in
the beginning of the seventeenth century. The king consulted them
in his affairs. They were the leaders in education. Since 1623 the
"Oratory" devoted itself partly to the instruction of youth, but educa-
tion was chiefly in the hands of the Jesuits. In the province of Paris
alone the number of pupils, divided among twelve colleges and one
grammar school, amounted to 13,195. The instruction in these schools
was such as to develop sentiments favorable to the monarchy and to
the dominant church. The students were trained to complete obedi-
ence and submission to authority. The cult of the Virgin in these
schools prepared young people for the different congregations devoted
to the service of the Virgin which they entered on leaving college. It
was not unusual for young men and women, sons and daughters of
aristocratic families, to devote themselves to the cultivation of religious
ideals. The members of these congregations were to serve as examples of
pious devotion and austerity to their other college comrades by laboring
for the salvation of souls and conversion of heretics. A story connected
with the foundation of Port-Royal illustrates how deeply religious
ardor had penetrated the youth. Arnauld, a Jansenist and the repre-
sentative of the University against the Jesuits, had named his little girl
of nine years coadjutrix of the abbess of Port-Royal. When the abbess
died the coadjutrix followed her in the office. At the age of eighteen
she one day imagined that prayers had revealed to her that a true
Christian life was entirely different from the easy life which she led.
She decided to part completely with the world, to retire further into
seclusion, and to accept stricter rules. When on the appointed day
her father came to see her as usual, he could speak to her only through
the gate. Neither requests nor threatenings could move her to change
her decision.
Such religious enthusiasm led to great intolerance, which became so
extreme that the government, itself very conservative and prejudiced,
had often to intervene to decrease it. The masses were not yet pre-
pared for freedom of conscience and tolerance of belief. They still
held the traditional idea, one country and one religion, and worked
34 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
systematically for the extirpation of all heresy. The most widely
spread and, therefore, most persecuted heresy was Protestantism.
The Catholics made repeated attempts to put the Protestants out of
existence, subjecting them to all kinds of oppression and restrictions.
Protestants were repeatedly attacked, their churches burned, and
their people executed. The Catholics, whose teachings were compatible
with political and social conservatism, had the support of the govern-
ment in their fights against dissenters. The government which had
provisionally accepted religious tolerance was hostile to the reformers
on account of their belief in the legitimacy of individual examination.
Nobody in France at that time had the right to act or even to express
himself concerning matters of state or religion, unless the particular
position which he held authorized it. There were two duties imposed
upon every subject of the state— to be religious and to obey the ruler.
After the assassinations of Henry III and of Henry IV the reaction in
France was very strong. Under Louis XIII, when Cardinal Richelieu
was practically ruler, there was a tendency towards absolutism which
reached its climax in Louis XIV. Louis XIV, a devoted adherent of
the church, believed in a kind of exchange between himself and God,
and because of the "divine rights" granted to him by God, was anxious
to serve Him by demanding adherence to orthodox beliefs. Dissenters
from orthodoxy were exposed to great disadvantages. Protestant
schools, where free arts and sciences were taught, were suppressed.
Protestants were for a time even prohibited from publishing books.
They were not allowed to send their children abroad to study, even
when there were no vacancies in the few schools where Protestant chil-
dren were tolerated. The reason for this prohibition was the fear
that the children might be taught maxims which would interfere with
the loyalty due to the Catholic country in which they were born. The
parliament rendered assistance in the persecution of heresy. The
assembly of the clergy did its best in stirring the emperor against dis-
senters, calling his attention to the fact that he must do something
for God, who had done so much for him, and express his gratitude by
extirpating all kinds of heresy. They repeatedly asked the king to
take away from his subjects the claimed liberty of conscience and to
put them to the happy necessity of always being faithful. In 165 1
they sent to the king the following petition : "Nous nedemandons pas.
Sire, a Votre Majeste, qu'elle (Assemblee generale du Clerge) bannisse
de son royaume cette malheureuse liberte de conscience . . . parce
que nous ne jugeons pas que I'execution en soit facile, mais nous sou-
haiterions au moins que ce mal ne fit pas de progres . . ."' The
« Lavisse, Histoire de la France, T. VII,' p. 44.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 35
bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, who as a rule belong to the conserva-
tive party, naturally supported the orthodox church in its fight against
heresy. The oppressions and persecutions succeeded in decreasing
considerably the dissensions; it was impossible, however, to remove
them altogether. The new spirit, a natural development of conditions
and time, could not be killed as easily as individual dissenters or even
masses of them.
The state of affairs in France at that time was very complicated.
In addition to its fight against reformers, the Catholic church itself
was divided by the Jansenist movement. This movement, like any
other ideal which sprang up in those days, was condemned and perse-
cuted. The development of intelligence so emphasized by the Jansen-
ists, was against the interest both of the monarchy and of the church.
Conditions in France were yet more complicated by the question of the
relations of the king, the Pope, and the Church. The king, believing
that he held his office directly from God and that absolute monarchy
was his "divine right," fought against the infallibility claimed by the
Pope on account of his divine ordinance. They were in constant oppo-
sition. This again put the church in an embarrassing situation, for
it had to obey both the Pope and the king. The absolutism claimed by
the king on the basis of his "divine rights" raised again the question of
his relation to the church as her son.
Of these discussions the purely theological question raised by the
Reformation and the counter-Reformation stands out most conspicu-
ously. It constituted the main interest of that time, overshadowing all
other questions. It was the leading point by which all expression of
thought was measured and which complicated all other queries. In
addition to this, loyalty to the monarchy was carefully watched. One
had to be careful not to be accused of disloyalty to the monarchy, of
Protestantism, Calvinism, atheism, or any other "heresy," and also
not to get into conflict with the doctrines of the reformers. An impar-
tial judgment was almost impossible. The situation had a deadening
influence on the intellects of that time. Literature, science, an^
art were neglected. Only in the latter part of the seventeenth century
did the value of science begin to be realized. Louis XIV showed him-
self kindly disposed to science and art, and protected research and
learning; but this was only at the very end of Descartes's life. His
time was very unfavorable for progress of any kind. ^
The foundation of the Catholic church, which was, of course, the
dominant institution, being the perpetuity and persistency of its doc-
trines, the slightest innovation was checked. The main instruments
for the removal of dissensions — the Inauisition, the Index, and the Jes-
36 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
uits, were still freely used in Descartes's time. All publications were
under the control of the Congregation of the Index. Whatever breathed
novelty was suspected. Whatever tended to weaken the claims of the
orthodox church was suppressed. Every new work, whether on cosmo-
logy, physics, physiology, or even medicine, was criticized from the
viewpoint of theology or Aristotle, whose doctrines were interpreted as
favorable to the church. A disagreement with accepted beliefs in
theology or approved authors brought opposition and persecution.
The condemnation of Copernicus and Galileo exemplifies the ecclesiasti-
cal attitude toward scientific inquiry. Experiment and examination,
the main instruments of science, were excluded by the very assertion
of Catholicism. Bossuet, in a work concerning the Catholic Church
written in Descartes's time, praises its faith in tradition and argues
against the method of examination on the ground that, if one were to
examine the thing before believing it, he would have to begin with the
question whether God exists; and such inquiry, he feared, might easily
lead to the denial of God's existence. A good Christian is one who be-
lieves before he examines his belief, and, to quote Bossuet, "il croit
tout avant que d'avoir lu la premiere lettre et que d'avoir seulement
ouvert le livre," ^ i. e., the Holy Scripture. The fear of reason in that
time is typically characterized by Boileau in his interesting Arrets.
Boileau represents the court as examining a request of the University
in which justice is invoked against the unknown lady, called Reason,
who for several years had been forcing herself into the above Univer-
sity. She is accused of having caused vexation by attributing to the
heart, without Aristotle's approval, the duty of making the blood flow
with full force all over the body and circulate with impunity through
the veins and arteries. This assertion she is said to have made on no
other grounds than that of experience, the authority of which has
never been recognized in the above University. After a due considera-
tion of the request, the court ordered that Aristotle should always be
followed and taught by the doctors, masters of art, and professors,
who for this purpose are not obliged to read him to know his lan-
guage and ideas. The blood was prohibited from carrying on its
movement with impunity under the penalty of being completely
delivered over to the faculty of medicine.
Where the belief in authority was still so strong and widespread, the
newly discovered microscope had not much chance to render its ser-
vices. Laboratory research was very backward. Except a few astro-
nomical observations there are hardly any worthy of mention. Conse-
quently, sciences which required laboratory research were not devel-
* Quoted by Lavisse, Op. Cit., Vol. VIP, p. 53-
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 37
Oped. In zoology people still believed in the preformation theory.
Chemistry was not yet freed from alchemy. The belief in astrology
was still extant; the stars justified their existence by their influence
on man's destiny. In anatomy Aristotle's opinions continued to be
respected. Medicine had made no great discoveries either. This
could hardly be otherwise in a time when there was more stress laid
on the fact that the practitioner should be a good Catholic than a
capable physician, and when this profession was temporarily pro-
hibited to those who did not belong to the orthodox church. Moreover,
the college preparation was not adapted to the training of scientists.
The course was exclusively formal, and scholastic methods were still
practised. To some sciences, however, the time was more favorable
than to others, namely, to those which were less liable to interfere with
accepted political and religious beliefs. Mathematics was highly
developed. The syllogistic exercises of scholasticism were evidently
a good preparation for this branch of science which uses the same
method as the one used by scholastic sciences — that of abstract reason-
ing. France became the meeting place of all great mathematicians,
and discoveries of great importance were made. Descartes's analytical
geometry, Leibnitz's and Newton's infinitesimal calculus date from
that time. Geometry was being applied even to matters of physics,
as, for instance, by Galileo, and later by Hobbes. This over-emphasis
on mathematics in the search for truth explains Descartes's error in
falling back into the scholastic method, which he had combatted; he
often employed the mathematical method in the study of existential
truth. Pleading for the importance of experience and observation in
the study of nature, he still often substituted logical truth for facts. A
logical demonstration concerning facts of nature was sometimes taken
by him to be the evidence for those facts. Thus, the fact that we can
infinitely divide a body in imagination was used to prove that that
body is in reality infinitely divisible. He approved of Galileo for usine,
the mathematical method in his physics, and disapproved of Bacon for
saying that mathematics is the servant and not the master of physics.
Though the opposition of the church and state to all innovation
made the progress of science very slow, it could not stop it altogether.
There were minds already affected by the germ of progress, cultivated
in the preceding centuries. The utility of science had been realized
by them. Divine revelation no longer filled such minds with expecta-
tions. There were attempts on the part of men to become through
their own efforts masters over nature, of which philosophy was to give
the explanation. Huygens was not the only one of his time who
believed that philosophy is to give "les connaissances des causes de la
38 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
nature." The definition of a philosopher of those days, which we find
in the Dictionary of the Academy, shows how closely philosophy was
associated with science. A philosopher is defined as "celui qui s'ap-
plique a I'etude des sciences et qui cherche a connaitre les effets par
leurs causes et par leurs principes."* Philosophical research was part
of the work of the Academy of Science. At that time man aspired in
France to a philosophy which would give the explanation of all
physical phenomena, enumerated by Huygens — ^weight, light, cold-
ness, heat; which would disclose the compounds of air, fire, water,
and of all other bodies; which would show how metals, stones, and
grass grow; what the service of respiration to animals is; and through
which a knowledge of all other things, of which the world knows little,
but which would be very useful to know, could be obtained.^ Ex-
periments on these phenomena were to give the foundation for a
philosophy.
There was a pronounced tendency towards a naturalistic philosophy,
but it was suppressed at its very outbreak. Naturalism was not judged
from the point of view of its own merits; religion was the fundamental
interest, and the first question was. What is its relation to religion? It
was found guilty of looking for truth by a different method from the
one religion used, and was thus condemned not as a sterile method in
philosophy, but as a dangerous rival to religion in searching for truth.
The main check to naturalism was the fact that it was associated with
atheism. "It is to be feared that the last heresy should be, if not
atheism, at least a declared naturalism," wrote Leibnitz. Now atheism
was not only against the interest of the church, but also that of the
government which maintained the "divine rights" of kings; thus,
atheism was fatal to the whole social order. Naturalism was, therefore,
persecuted like any other heresy. Imprisonment and the stake were its
rewards. The philosopher of nature was burned at the order of the
parliament in Toulouse. The poet Theophile de Viau barely escaped
the same fate, having been imprisoned by the parliament of Paris.
Such measures were very eflfective. Naturalism was checked while in
its embryonic stage. The best illustration of this is Descartes who, as
has been said, did not feel any call to martyrdom.
The orthodoxy of the day had a deterrent influence on Descartes's
original tendencies and gave the development of his system its peculiar
direction. Naturalistic and practical at the outset, it became under
the stress of circumstances rationalistic and idealistic. His first works,
' Lavisse, Op. Cit. « Lavisse, Op. Cit.
-^uua*
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 39
Le Monde and the other scientific treatises, and his own account of
his procedure in the Discourse bear testimony to the fact that he started
out as a naturalist, and that the natural was emphatically marked off
from the supernatural. Despite the naturalistic philosophy of his first
treatises, which Descartes thought the only philosophy worth while,
we find, in the Discourse, the Meditations, and the Principles, side by
side with it the idealistic and theological problems which were excluded
by his scientific system. But in that time of theological controversies
when the Bible was the source of verification of all truth, it was impos-
sible for the philosophers to keep away from theology undisturbed.
No matter how hard Descartes struggled against dealing with theo-
logical problems he did notsucceed inlaying aside the "divine learning",
as did Bacon. He first ignored religious questions of the day, but they
were forced upon him by the criticism of his writings. The first ques-
tion of his critics was where his writings stood on this or that point of
religion. The central problem around which all reformatory doctrines
turned was the theory of the Eucharist. The decision of the Council of
Trent concerning the sacrament was a very important point, and every
publication that pretended to be orthodox had to reckon with it. Des-
cartes carefully avoided this topic in his physics, but was brought to
the discussion of it by the inquiry concerning the relation of his philos-
ophy to it. " How do you reconcile your philosophy with the theory of
the Eucharist?" Arnauld asked him. If the church teaches us to
believe the presence of Christ not in actual body during the sacrament,
how does the theory which, maintains the identity of body and exten-
sion explain "what is most sacred to the world?" ^ Thus Descartes,
having given no place to this purely theological question in his works,
was forced to the discussion of it in his answers to these objections,
where he was anxious to show that his philosophy agreed with the
decisions of the Council of Trent. ^
Descartes had met with unfavorable criticism even before the appear-
ance of his works ; his doubt and renunciation of all authoritative doc-
trines were known before the publication of the Discourse and aroused
suspicion against him. He, therefore, made it his business to guard
against conflicts with orthodoxy. Having left Paris, he kept track of
all social occurrences which took place there in his absence and regulated
by them his undertakings. "Je n'ai pas jure de ne permettre point que
mon Monde voie le jour pendant ma vie; comme je n'ai point aussi jure
de faire qu'il le voie apres ma mort; mais j'ai dessein, tant en cela qu'en
toute autre chose, de me regler selon les occurrences, et de suivre,
autant que je pourrai, les conseils les plus surs et les plus tranquilles," '
' Oeuvres, Vol. V, p. 190. « Corr.. Vol. Ill, p. 349. ' Oeuvres, Vol. II, p. 552.
40 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
he wrote to Mersenne. The latter kept him informed as to the appear-
ance of new books, new inventions, and new experiments, and of the
attitude of the learned of the school towards them and of their con-
troversies. Descartes was particularly anxious to know the rumors
concerning himself ^° and was very much impressed by those which
were hostile to him. They often influenced his enterprises and led him
to greater caution in the expression of thought, which was already re-
stricted enough, as is seen from his following words : "J'ai vu encore ces
jours un livre qui me donne occasion d'etre dorenavant beaucoup moins
libre k communiquer mes pensees que je n'ai ete jusques ici." The
humors that followed his doubt of generally accepted beliefs were the
stimuli which caused him to undertake the search for first principles
when he would not otherwise have "ventured so soon" on it. Both the
Meditations and Principles were written and published to meet objec-
tions to his heterodoxy. The rumors which had spread in theological
circles concerning the heterodoxy of his philosophy made him take up
problems of reconciling his physics with the Holy Scriptures. Seeing
that despite his precautions his philosophy was found unfavorable to
theology, it dawned upon him "like a miracle" ^^ to expound his new
philosophy in such a way that it would show agreement with the truth
of religion. Before so doing, however, he applied to his friends, Catho-
lic theologians, in order to find out definitely the determinations of the
Council of Trent concerning matters upon which his philosophy
touched; ^^ he thus was inclined to adapt himself to the directions of
the Council of Trent. His original plan, to follow in his conclusions his
own unbiassed reasoning only, was neglected at the thought of possible
persecutions. The exposition of his theories was directed by his desire
to have " Rome and Sorbonne on his side." Theological interests were
carefully taken into consideration; "Je prends soigneusement garde a
ne pas mettre la moindre chose dans mes ecrits que les theologiens
puissent censurer avec raison." ^* To succeed better in that, he willingly
followed the suggestions of his critics, who were theologians. In a
letter to Mersenne we hear that Descartes corrected his metaphysics
in accordance with the objections of Arnauld, a Catholic theologian.
The only reason for these corrections was to show his deference
to Arnauld's criticism and, thus, to induce other theologians to
" "Mais je me promets que vous me continuerez toujours a me mander franchement ce qui se dira de
moi, soit en bien, soit en mal, et vous en avez dorenavant plus d'occasion que jamais, puisque mon livre
est enfin arrive a Paris." Oeuvres, Vol. I, p. 485.
"Si par hasard vous rencontrez quelqu'un qui parle de moi, et qui se souvienne encore que je suis
au monde, je serai bien aise de savoir ce qu'on en dit, et ce qu'on pense que je fasse et o\i je suis."
Oeuvres, Vol. I, p. 135.
" Lettres, Vol. II, p. 164, Ed. Clerselier.
^^Lettres, Vol. II, pp. 164 and 481, Ed. Clerselier.
^3 Objections et Reponses, Oeuvres, Vol. II, p. 74, Ed. Cousin.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 4I
express their opinions to him freely, before the publication of his
works. ^^
The fact that he sent his writings to the faculty of theology of the
Sorbonne and to the Jesuits for examination before their publication is
proof enough that religion and accepted beliefs and customs of the
country were taken into consideration in the exposition of his doctrines.
For the faculty of theology in Paris, the center of all theological
sciences, was one of the most conservative institutions. It stood for the
Catholic cause with fanatic ardor. It worked for the preservation of
orthodoxy in science just as the Pope and the bishops worked for the
preservation of orthodoxy in the church. Its mission was to "deter-
miner et decider tout le dit affaire, en I'honneur de Dieu, exaltation de
la foi catholique et extirpation de cette heresie lutherine, qui commence
fort a pulluler par degu."^^ The faculty of theology together with
the French parliament was the instrument of which the government
made use for its fanatic purposes. When in 1624 there was issued
an edict prohibiting the teaching of anything but Aristotle or approved
authors, it was welcomed by the conservative faculty, which several
years later even asked for a renewal of it. The Jesuits, again, as an
order subservient to the orthodox church, were on their guard against
whatever was destructive of orthodoxy, and on account of their
great influence in educational circles could easily prevent a hearing of
a new theory that they did not find sufficiently orthodox.
Such were the censors which Descartes's works had to pass. Both
the faculty of theology and the Jesuits were to a great extent respon-
sible for the direction the expression Descartes's thought took. It was
of great import to him to have their approval. This, however, could
be obtained only through loyalty to orthodoxy, and he attempted to
give his works at least the appearance of such loyalty. God is always
brought to the front. He is introduced as a sort of appendix to every
argument whether or not room is left for Him. Descartes represents
the world as a mechanism, ever moving, where events take place by
the operation of constant laws, and he refers to God for original and
continual creation. He postulated from the scientific point of view a
constant amount of energy, and brings in God as the preserver of this
energy. Matter is first supposed to have been ever in motion and then
God is said to have put it in motion. In his theory of movement
matter is responsible for irregular and circular movement, and God is
" Je vous envois enfin ma reponse aux objections de M. Arnaut, et je vous prie de changer les choses
suivantes en ma Metapiiysique, afin qu'on puisse connaitre par la que j'ai defere a son jugement, et
ainsi que les autres, voyant combien je suis pret a suivre conseil, me disent plus franchement les ra'sons
qu'ils auront contre moi. Corr., Vol. 3, p. 334.
"Lavisse, Op. Cit., Vol. Vi, p. 356.
42 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
responsible for movement in a straight line. Into the cognition theory
God is introduced to prove the existence of the external world, while
the validity of our ideas was first proved by the argument that there
can be no idea without an external object as its cause. There are
innumerable other instances where God is introduced without giving
additional weight to the theories. The very problems of the Medita-
tions are only additional arguments, which do not contribute anything
to clearing up Descartes's philosophical position. At best they only
testify that Descartes was a pious man.
Nevertheless, the objections made to his philosophy were from the
point of view of contradiction to religion and its dogmas. Descartes
pointed in vain to the fact that his philosophy was in accord with the
determinations of the Council of Trent, and equally vainly asserted
that he believed what he wrote. ^^ Despite the fact that his first pub-
lished works were those which were supposed to testify to his ortho-
doxy, his philosophy met with severe opposition. When Descartes
thought, perhaps, to please the orthodox leaders by his attempt to give
a rational demonstration of matters of faith, he only provoked them by
his failure to justify faith by reason, which the keen eye of the theo-
logians detected at once. His denial of authority and tradition and
the search for a criterion of truth was unorthodox both from the Pro-
testant and the Catholic points of view. The Protestants saw in his
philosophy skepticism, atheism, destruction of the state and the Uni-
versity; the Catholics saw Protestantism, the most persecuted heresy,
evidently, in the conformity of his theory of extension to the Calvin-
istic exposition of the doctrine of the Eucharist, and in the many points
of resemblance to St. Augustine. Moreover, his method of examination
was found to resemble that of the Jansenists, and his philosophy was,
thus, associated with Jansenism. It was also found to contain elements
of Pelagianism.^^ His theory of particles brought upon him the
accusation of following Democritus. Furthermore, the doctrine of
the motion of the earth was heretical.
His most pronounced opponents on the side of the Protestants were,
in Utrecht, Voetius, a minister and theologian, and in Leyden, the whole
faculty of theology, with Revius and Triglandius, first professor of
theology and a former minister, at the head, and in Groningue, Scho-
kius, a disciple of Voetius. Voetius and Triglandius worked very
ardently to destroy Descartes's philosophy. They aroused all the
professors of the theological faculty against him and tried to form a
sort of league to oppress him by all manner of "calumnies." They
resorted to all available means in order to arouse the synod and the
18 Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 349. " Con., Vol. Ill, p. S44-
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 43
magistrates against his teachings as against doctrines dangerous to the
university and to the state. Triglandius found Descartes's Medita-
tions a "these dangereuse, these toute nouvelle et contraire a Aris-
tote." ^^ Voetius wrote seven theses against Descartes which he tried
to pubHsh under different names in different places, so as to make it
appear that Descartes had many opponents in many places. The
three corollaries which he added to his theses illustrate how Descartes's
philosophy was criticized, and what was most effective in those days in
creating enemies of new thought. They were directed against an
atheist, by whom Voetius meant Descartes, whose name he did not
mention, however. These corollaries state that the opinions held by the
atheist Taurellus and David Gorlaus, concerning the fact that man being
composed of body and soul is an accidental being and not a being in
itself, are erroneous; that the theory of the movement of the earth
introduced by Kepler and others, is directly and evidently opposed to
the authority of the Holy Scripture and does not agree with the
philosophy thus far taught; a philosophy which rejects the substan-
tiality of form or of qualities, as maintained by the atheists Taurellus,
Gorlaus, and Bacon, does not agree with the physics of Moses nor with
anything else in the Holy Scriptures. Such a philosophy is favorable
to skepticism and is very dangerous, for it is enough to destroy the
belief in a rational soul, in the procession of the divine persons in the
Trinity, in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, in original sin, in miracles,
in prophecies, in the grace of regeneration, and in the real possession of
demons. Such reasons brought against a new philosophy were enough
to arouse hatred, to the exclusion of all mercy, against it. Descartes
even feared being brought before an ecclesiastical tribunal. His
repeated requests addressed to the curators of the academies in Utrecht
and in Leyden were without results. He even thought at one time of
leaving the province. As soon as he got rid of one enemy he was
attacked by another. Only a few days after his public triumph,
through the thesis of Regius, his disciple, over an attack in Utrecht, he
was again attacked in another thesis of the College of Clermont.
In view of all the objections brought against him, Descartes in
despair exclaimed that the state of affairs was such that one should
not reason at all or at least publicly declare that the theologians have
a right to falsify statements made by others. ^^ A public declaration
against the theologians could hardly have been expected from Des-
cartes or even from a more courageous person than he, at a time when
i^Corr.. Vol. IV, p. 633-
1' "L'affaire est maintenant en tel point, qu'il est necessaire qu'on ne fasse raison, ou bien qu'on
declare publiquement que Messieurs vos Theologiens ont droit de mentir et de calomnier, sans que les
personnes de ma sorte en puissent aucunement avoir justice en ce pays." Corr., Vol. V, p. 42.
44 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
the theologians occupied such a prominent place. To stop reasoning
was for Descartes equally hard . He , therefore , kept firmly to his decision
to be masked before the world, a decision with which he had entered
his philosophical career, as is evident from the following remark in his
memoirs of 1619: "Comme un acteur met un masque pour ne pas
laisser voir la rougeur de son front; de meme, moi qui vait monter sur
le theatre de ce monde ou je n'ai ete jusqu'ici que spectateur, je
parais masque sur la scene." ^° The consequence of this is that we do
hot have Descartes's philosophy openly expressed in its true character.
His free and radical thoughts, which he cherished as a progressive of
his day, are always veiled in conservative covers. Knowing that the
"main reason for rejecting . . . novelties in matters of philosophy
was the fear lest any changes be caused thereby in theology," ^^ he
tried to hide the novelty of his philosophy, carefully introducing into
his system as much of the old orthodox doctrines as would overshadow
the new, and present at least the appearance of the "most ancient
(thought) ever introduced into the world and of the most vulgar ever
taught there." ^^ He never freely and openly expressed what he con-
sidered to be the truth of the case, but always observed, rather, a
double policy. He wrote and published books both for the "glory of
God" and for the benefit of mankind. He concluded his Principles
with an appeal both to the authority of the church and to reason.^^
His explanations for not having treated final causes, questions of mor-
als, or different problems of orthodox metaphysics are such as to satisfy
both the scientific and the religious mind. Thus he explained his
neglect to investigate final causes on the one hand by the fact that
final causes do not explain anything in nature, and on the other, that
it is audacious to attempt to penetrate God's wisdom. One- reason for
not treating the question of good and evil is that this /question is ex-
cluded from his philosophy as a problem of theology, and the other is
"il n'appartient qu'aux Souverains, ou a ceux qui sont authorises par
eux, de se meler de regler les moeurs des autres." ^* Would we not
exclaim, what a contradiction to his fundamental view of conduct, if
we did not know that it was one of the rules of the monarchy which
later, according to a royal declaration of 1683, was even to be taught in
20 Pensee, p. 3, Oeuvres inedites, Foucher de Careil.
" Corr., Vol. I, p. 455-
22 "J'ai tenement compose mes Principes, qu'on peut dire qu'ils ne sont point du tout contraires
a la Philosophie commune, mais seulement qu'ils I'ont enrichie de plusieurs choses qui n'y etaient pas."
Corr., Vol. IV, p. 225.
23 "Je soumets toutes mes opinions au jugement des plus sages et a I'autorite de I'Eglise. Meme je
prie les Lecteurs de n'ajouter point du tout de foi a tout ce qu'ils trouveront ici ecrit, mais seulement
de I'examiner et n'en recevoir que ce que la force et I'evidence de la raison les pourra contraindre de
croire." Principes, Part. IV, § 207, Oeuvres, Vol. IX.
2< Corr, Vol. V, p. 87.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 45
all colleges ? If it does not further explain or , rather, contradict his view
of morality, it testifies, at least, to the fact that Descartes was a loyal
subject of his country. Most characteristic of this double tendency is
the following expression of his principles: "A savoir je ne doute point
que le monde n'est ete cre6 au commencement avec autant de perfection
qu'il en a . . . mais neanmoins, comme on connaitrait beaucoup
mieux qu'elle a ete la nature d'Adam et celle des arbres du Paradis, si on
avait examine comment les enfants se forment peu a peu au ventre des
meres, et comment les plantes sortent de leurs semences, que si on avait
seulement considere quels ils ont ete quand Dieu les a crees : tout de
meme, nous ferons mieux entendre qu'elle est generalement la nature de
toutes les choses qui sont au monde, si nous pouvons imaginer quelques
principes qui soient fort intelligibles et fort simples, desquels nous f acions
voir clairement que les astres et la terre, et enfin tout le monde visible
aurait pu etre produit ainsi que de quelques semences, bien que nous
sachions qu'il n'a pas ete produit en cette fagon ; que si nous la decrivions
seulement comme il est, ou bien comme nous croyons qu'il a ete cree. Et
parce que je pense avoir trouvedes principes qui sont tels, je tacherai ici
de les expliquer." ^^ Another characteristic expression can be quoted on
this point: " Je desire que ce que j'ecrirai soit seulement pris pour une
hypothese, laquelle est peut-etre fort eloignee de la verite; mais encore
que cela fut, je croirai avoir beaucoup fait, si toutes les choses qui en
seront deduites, sont entierement conformes aux experiences." ^^
The results of his research, whose novelty appears even through the^
cover of the conservatism with which it was veiled, were hidden from
the world until after Descartes's death. His Le Monde never saw the
day in its original form; his natural philosophy, as he himself said, was
killed even before its birth. ^''^ He wrote Le Monde in the days when he
looked only to experience to justify what he had reasoned out on the
basis of observations. He was about to publish it when he heard of
the condemnation of Galileo. After that nothing could make him
give his work to the public. If the movement of the earth was declared
heretical, he foresaw the same fate for his Le Monde in which he had es-
sentially accepted the Copernican theory. Moreover, his explanation of
things in Le Monde were so interconnected that the rejection of this
theory, he thought, would lead to the rejection of the whole. ^^ The
25 Principes, Part. Ill, § 45; Oeuvres, Vol. IX. ^ Principes, Part. Ill, p. 123, Oeuvres, Vol. IX.
2' Void enfin les principes de cette malheureuse Philosophie, que quelques uns ont tache d'etouflfer
avantsa naissance. Lettres, Vol. Ill, p. 107, Ed. Clerselier.
28 "Vous savez sans doute que Galilee a ete repris depuis peu par les Inquisiteurs de la Foi, et que son
opinion touchant le mouvement de la Terre a ete condamnee comme heretique. Or je vous dirai que toutes
les choses que j'expliquerais en mon Traite, entre lesquelles etaitaussi cette opinion du mouvement de la
Terre, dependaient tellement les unes des autres, que c'est assez de savoir qu'il y en ait une qui soit fausse,
pour connaitre que toutes les raisons dont je me servais n'ont point de force." Corr., Vol. I, p. 285.
46 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
news of Galileo's condemnation so frightened him that in the first
moment of excitement he decided to burn the papers of his treatise,
and then firmly resolved not to let anybody see them.^^ He refused
even to send his treatise to his friend Mersenne to whom he had some
time before promised it. At the latter's repeated admonitions he asked
him again and again for some extension of time in order to revise and
polish it.^" It was, evidently, at this time that he took up the recon-
ciliation of his physics with the biblical account of Genesis. The result
is that Le Monde contains biblical expressions which have no connection
with the fundamental principles of his physics. That these biblical
expressions are later insertions is beyond doubt. It is confirmed by the
fact that the letter in which Descartes proposed to take up a recon-
ciliation of theology and his physics ^^ dates from 1641, while his
\Le Monde was already completed in 1633.2'
But even this remodelled form with its air of piety, he evidently
found not orthodox enough for the pious minds of his day. It was im-
possible to rewrite it so that some one would not find fault with it.
" Je ne puis si bien faire que certains gens ne trouvent occasion de me
reprendre." No correction could save Le Monde from the heresy in
which it was immersed. He saw no salvation for it unless the funda-
mental thesis, the movement of the earth, was crossed out, but this
could not be done, for the exclusion of this theory would have destroyed
the whole. 2^ He, therefore, refrained from publication and for this
reason only, as he explained, "rien ne m'a empeche jusques ici de pub-
lier ma Philosophic, que la defense du mouvement de la Terre, lequel
je n'en saurais separer, a cause que toute ma Physique en depend. "^^
He decided not to give it to the world until minds were more mature.
There are fruits, he said in one of his letters, which have to be left on
the tree to ripen ; his Le Monde is one of those fruits for the picking of
" "Je m'etais propose de vous envoyer mon Monde pour ces etrennes; mais je vous dirai, que m'etant
fait enquerir ces jours a Leyde et a Amsterdam, si le Syslime du Monde de Galilee n'y etait point,
on m'a mande qu'il etait vrai qu'il avait ete imprime, mais que tous les exemplaires en avaient ete
brflles a Rome au meme temps, et lui condamne a quelque amende: ce qui m'a si fort etonne, que je
me suis quasi resolu de brdler tous mes papiers, ou du moins de ne les laisser voir a personne." Corr.,
Vol. I, p. 270.
*> "Toutefois, parce que j'aurais mauvaise grace, si apres vous avoir tout promis, et si longtemps,
je pensais vous payer ainsi d'une boutade, je ne laisserai pas de vous faire voir ce que j'ai fait le plus t6t
que je pourrai; mais je vous demande encore, s'il vous plait, un an delai pour le revoir et le polir." Corr.,
Vol. I, p. 272.
31 By his Physics he may also have meant his Principles which in fact represents a combination of
Le Monde and the Genesis.
'2 "II n'y aura, ce me semble, aucune difficulte d'accommoder la Theologie a ma fagon de philosopher;
car je n'y vols rien a changer que pour la Transubstantiation. Et je serai oblige de I'expliquer en ma
Physique, avec le premier chapitre de la genese." Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 295.
'' "Je confesse que s'il (le mouvement de la terre) est faux, tous les fondements de ma Philosophic le
sont aussi, car il se demontre par eux evidemment. Et il est tellement he avec toutes les parties de
mon Traite, que je ne Ten saurais detacher, sans rendre le reste tout defectueux." Corr., Vol. I, p. 271.
s« Corr.. Vol. Ill, p. 258.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 47
which no time will be too late.^"'^ We have his repeated assertions that
the state of affairs at that time kept him from publishing this most
valuable work. In a letter to Mr. Pollot he writes: "Si tons les
hommes 6taient de I'humeur que je vous crois, je vous assure que je
n'aurais nullement delibere touchant la publication de mon Monde, et
que je I'aurais fait imprimer il y a deja plus de deux ans." ^^ In another
letter, written in answer to the questions put to him concerning his
belief as to the reality of the quality of weight or the attraction of the
earth, he said: "Je ne saurais expliquer mon opinion sur toutes ces
choses, qu'en faisant voir mon Monde avec le mouvement defendu,
ce que je juge maintenant hors de saison."^''
He was firm in his resolution not to publish his Le Monde until con-
ditions should have changed. The repeated requests of his friends to
give it to the world, and reproaches for keeping the fruits of his studies
to himself, could not make him change this decision; "Sinon que, les
causes qui m'en ont empeche ci-devant n'etant point changees, je ne
dois pas changer de resolution," he wrote to Mersenne.^^ He preferred
to suppress his most valuable production rather than to have the
church against him, as he declared: "... comme je ne voudrais pour
rien du monde qu'il sortit demoiundiscours,ou il se trouvat le moindre
mot qui f fit desapprouve de I'Eglise, aussi aime-je mieux le supprimer,
que de le faire paraitre estropie." ^^ It is probable that at that tlm^^
he destroyed those of his works which are irretrievably lost. For
Galileo's condemnation seems to have very much impressed him. He
was anxious to find out the exact cause of Galileo's condemnation, and
kept on asking Mersenne to let him know whatever he might happen
to hear concerning this matter. *° After this event he closely followed
the literature for and against the movement of the earth, *^ and
'5 "Comme on laisse les fruits sur les arbres aussi longtemps qu'ils y peuvent devenir meilleurs, non-
obstant qu'on sache bien que les vents et la grele, et plusieurs autres hasards, les peuvent perdre k
chaque moment qu'ils y demeurent, ainsi je crois que mon Monde est de ces fruits qu'on doit laisser
mOrir sur I'arbre, et qui ne peuvent trop tard etre cueillis." Corr., Vol. II, p. SS2.
» Corr., Vol. I, p. 518
" Corr., Vol. I, p. 324.
» Corr.. Vol. II, p. 565.
" Corr., Vol. I, p. 271.
<" "Puisque vous avez vu le livre de Galilee, je vous prie aussi de me mander ce qu'il contient et quels
vous jugez avoir ete les motifs de sa condemnation." Corr., Vol. I, p. 298.
Descartes's confused description of the laws of motion is ascribed by Henry More, in his Antidote
against Atheism, of 1712, directly to Galileo's condemnation. "I can not but observe," he says, "the
inconvenience this eternal force and fear does to the Common Wealth of Learning, and how many inno-
cent well-deserving young Wits have been put upon the Rack, as well as Galileo into Prison. For this
frightened Descartes into such a distorted description of Motion, that no man's reason could make
good sense of it, nor Modesty permit him to fancy anything Nonsense in so excellent an Author."
Preface, p. xi.
« "Je vous prie de me mander le nom de ce traite, que vous dites avoir ete fait depuis par un eccle-
siastique, pour prouver le mouvement de la terre, au moins s'il est imprime, et s'il ne Test pas, je pourrais
peut-etre bien donner quelque avis a I'auteur qui ne lui serait pas inutile." Oeuvres, Vol. VI, p. 263,
Ed. Cousin.
48 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
betook himself to a revision of whatever he thought contained illegal
statements, suggestive of favoring the belief in the movement of the
earth. "2
The attitude of the learned of the school towards his works dis-
couraged him to such an extent that at first he did not want to publish
anything at all except his five or six sheets concerning the proof of the
existence of God, declaring, "Je ne sais point de loi qui m'oblige k
donner au monde des choses qu'il temoigne ne point desirer." That
there were quite a few sympathizers encouraged him little when he
thought of the fact that these were helpless while his enemies had all
the power in their hands. ^^
The checking influence which the circumstances of that time had on
Descartes will be better understood through a consideration of his
personality. His aristocratic birth and education contributed a good
deal to the conservatism which we find in his works despite their
promising outset. Descartes descended from an old aristocratic family
and probably inherited many prejudices and traditions characteristic
of the nobility. His nearest relatives on both sides were engaged either
in military or civil service, and there is no reason to suppose that the
narrow-mindedness usually found among the bureaucracy had not
affected the minds of his relatives also. Descartes's father was by
profession a lawyer and held a position as state counselor. Both his
profession and his position were such as to make him conservative.
Of his three children, only Rene Descartes was at all radical. His other
son, a lawyer, was a conservative gentleman to whom anything beyond
interest in the politics of local affairs seemed eccentricity. There is
nothing extraordinary known about his daughter and we can only
suppose that she belonged to the ladies of "good society" who measured
thought and actions by what was accepted. Thus, his close family
circle presented no opportunity for the development of a radicalism
in Descartes.
The education which he received in college was favorable to con-
serving traditions and prejudices imbibed in childhood. He spent nine
*2 "Pour les lunettes, je vous dirai que depuis la condemnation de Galilee, j'ai revu et entierement
acheve le Traite que j'en avais autrefois commence." Corr., Vol. I, p. 322.
" "Et si quelques-uns le desirent, sachez que tous ceux qui font les doctes sans I'etre, et qui preferent
leur vanite a la verite, ne le veulent point, et que pour une vingtaine d'approbateurs qui ne me feraient
aucun bien, il y aurait des milliers de malveillants qui ne s'epargneraient pas de me nuire, quand ils en
auraient I'occasion. C'est que I'experience m'a fait connaitre depuis trois ans, et quoique je ne me
repente point de ce que j'ai fait imprimer, j'ai toutefois si peu d'envie d'y retourner, que je ne le veux
pas meme laisser imprimer en latin, autant que je le pourrai empecher." Oeuvres, Vol. VIII, p. 208,
Ed. Cousin.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 49
years of his youth as a resident pupil in a Jesuit college which was
established primarily for the nobility. The course of study in such a
Jesuit college looked toward a clerical vocation, and the instruction
was conducted accordingly. The first two years of the college period
were devoted mainly to spiritual exercises. The piety implanted in
him at college did not abandon him; it manifested itself in later years
in the observation of religious customs.'*^ The Jesuit college, as an
institution which was protected by the Pope and the state, had as its
chief aim to develop in the students a spirit of loyalty to the king
and to the Pope and submission to all established authority. The
discipline of the college, which required censoring the letters of the
pupils and allowed only witnessed interviews with their relatives and
friends, could not but influence a mind even less impressionable than
Descartes's. Descartes, whom the spirit of radicalism had not yet
affected, and in whom the critical spirit was not yet fully developed,
became very fond of his masters. Moreover, since he had very early
lost his mother and had been separated from his father through the
latter's second marriage, he was probably not spoiled with too much
attention in his childhood, and was, therefore, very grateful for all the
attention that he enjoyed in the college. The fact that he was a
privileged student, one of those for whom Henry IV had erected the
college, and also that he was inquisitive and had a love for study,
had disposed the instructors and the rector of the college in his favor.
The latter, also considering Descartes's weak health, granted to him
little privileges for which Descartes felt grateful all his life. As he was
of a very impressionable disposition, the love for his masters and
teachers inoculated in childhood lasted into his later years, and he
felt embarrassed when he saw that he could no longer accept what they
had taught him, and that the deviation from their teachings might
lead to a break of the friendly relations with them.^^ Nay, this respect
for his educators and their teachings was so deeply rooted in him that
it really was a hard struggle for Descartes to utter things which he
clearly saw his benefactors could not approve. The Jesuits thus played
a considerable part in the development of his intellectual life. They
had a double influence on him: in his childhood through their educa-
tion whose spirit of conservatism had left ineradicable traces, and in
later life through their influential position in France which made him
** "On the occasion of a startling dream he decided to go to Italy "pour former le vceu d'un pelerinage
a Notre-Dame de Lorette." Baillet, La vie de M. Des Caries.
^ "Car, ayant de tres grandes obligations a ceux de votre Compagnie, et particulierement a vous, qui
m'avez tenu lieu de Pere pendant tout le temps de ma jeunesse, je serai extremement marri d'etre mal
avec aucun des membres dent vous etes le Chef au regard de la France. Ma propre inclination,
et la consideration de mon devoir, me porte a desirer passionement leur amitie." Corr., Vol. IV,
p. 156.
50 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
fear to be declared heretical by them. The love for his masters he could
have more easily overcome than his fear of them.
Descartes was, like many aristocrats, a gentleman of settled habits,
to whom the quietude and comforts of his private life meant a great
deal. He would not tolerate the least disturbance in the ways and
habits of his daily life. He excused himself in a letter to M. Pollot for
having left without a good-bye, advancing the fact that, upon leaving
the Princess de Boheme he saw two or three men approaching whom he
heard mentioning his name. For fear that they might stop him and keep
him in conversation over the hour at which he was used to going to bed,
he retired as quickly as possible.'*^ One of his main reasons for living a
life of retirement in the northern corner of Holland was to avoid incon-
veniences caused by Parisian social life, the inconveniences of being
disturbed by his neighbors.'*^ Moreover, he was in childhood of a very
weak constitution. He had inherited, he tells us, a dry cough and a
pale complexion. His health was, therefore, very tenderly cared for
at home and in school, and, though at the age of twenty he was cured of
this inherited weakness, he seemed to have acquired the habit of always
being very mindful of his health. In every undertaking his health
always found first consideration. Believing that the passing from one
extreme to the other to be most dangerous to the health, he was
careful to avoid abrupt changes. He, therefore, before going to
Holland went first to a retired northern place in France in order to get
used to a colder climate and to the life of solitude. Invited to Sweden,
he looked for the season which would make the journey most pleasant
to him who had lived so many years in retirement. The chief aim of
his medical studies was the preservation of his health and the pro-
longation of his life. Health and happiness meant to him "les deux
principaux biens qu'on puisse avoir en cette vie." In his anxiety for
the preservation of his health he valued peace and rest more than
anything else in the world, " . . . ma surete et mon repos .
sont les biens que j'estimele plus aUmonde . . , " 48 His life motto,
therefore, was ''bene vixit, bene qui lahdt." *^
This love for peace and rest explains his extreme caution. Nothing
could move him to change his decision not to publish Le Monde when
he saw his tranquillity threatened. His desire for quietude was stronger
than his belief that everybody is bound by duty to publish his contri-
butions for the benefit of others and for the advancement of science.
Nor did he regret the loss of time in the vain labor of composing a
work which was to be hidden from the world, , if its being hidden was
*6 Corr., Vol. IV, p. io6. " Corr., Vol. I, p. 385- **"*
« Corr.. Vol. IV, p. SS- " Corr., Vol. V, p. 232.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 5I
the price necessary for the maintenance of his peace. ''^ At the instiga- -'
tion of his friend Mersenne, he promised to pubHsh his work only if he
would not have to sacrifice thereby the peacefulness which he en-
joyed. ^^ His first publications, which cost him his tranquillity,
had made his vocation distasteful to him. " Parce que je n'ai pas eu la
meme prudence a m'abstenir d'ecrire, je n'ai plus tant de loisir ni
tant de repos que j'aurais, si j'eusse eu I'esprit de me taire." ^^ Though
he was not unmoved by success, as he says, he nevertheless preferred
oblivion to unfavorable criticism. He dreaded reputation more than
he wished for it, because reputation "to some extent diminishes one's
liberty and leisure." ^^ Liberty and leisure meant so much to him
that no monarch was rich enough, he said, to buy them of him.^*
Paris, where the reaction was very strong, offered little of these treas-
ures. The obstacles which his philosophy encountered there made that
capital unpleasant to him. He confessed to Mersenne that he did not
like the spirit in Paris on account of the many "divertissements" of
Parisian life.^^ By these "divertissements" he may have meant con-
troversies which had been going on there. Being reserved and timid
by nature, he shunned all struggles, and to preserve his rest and quietude
he did not want to trouble himself much in fighting for the truth.
He hesitated to publish even his first works for fear of getting into
controversies which he found were plentiful without his.^® If his works
could not be approved without opposition, he said, he had rather not
publish them at all, as he hoped that if " the truth can not find a place
in France, it will perhaps not fail to find it somewhere else." ^^
The strict censorship in France was one of the reasons which made
him look for a place where his ideals of liberty and leisure could be
better realized. Holland was then the freest of all countries. Liberalism/
had spread there to such an extent that freedom of thought was almost
allowed. This, it seems, was to Descartes the place of abode which
50 "Le desir que j'ai de vivre en repos et de continuer la vie que j'ai commencee en prenant pour ma
devise bene vixit, bene qui latuit, fait que je suis plus aise d'etre delivre de la crainte que j'avais d'acquerir
plus de connaissances que je ne desire, par le moyende mon Ecrit, que je ne suis fache d'avoir perdu le
temps et la peine que j'ai employee a le composer." Corr., Vol. I, p. 285.
" "Si je le puisse faire sans mettre au hasard la tranquillity dont je jouis. C'est pourquoi, encore que
cela n'arrive pas sitot." Corr., Vol. II, p. 553.
" Letlres, Vol. I,^. 104, Ed. Clerselier.
" "Je crains plus la reputation que je ne la desire, estimant qu'elle diminue toujours en quelquefagon
la liberte et le loisir de ceu.x qui I'acquierent." Corr., Vol. I, p. 136.
'* "La liberte et le loisir . . . lesquelles deux choses je possede si parfaitement, et les estime de telle
sorte, qu'il n'y a point de monarque au monde qui fut assez riche pour les acheter de moi. Cela ne
m'empechera pas d'achever le petit traite que j'ai commence; mais je ne desire pas qu'on le sache, afin
d'avoir toujours la liberte de le desavouer." Corr., Vol. I, p. 136.
" "Pour en parler entre nous, il n'y a rien qui fut plus contraire a mes desseins que I'air de Paris, a
cause d'une infinite de divertissements qui y sont inevitable." Corr., Vol. II, p. isi.
" Corr., Vol. I, p. 271.
s' "Si la verite ne pent trouver place en France, elle ne laissera peut-etre pas d'en trouver ailleurs et
que je ne m'en mtits pas fort en peine." Corr., Vol. II, p. 335.
52 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
came nearest to his ideal. "Quel autre lieu pourrait-on choisir au
reste du monde, ou toutes les commodites de la vie, et toutes les
curiosites qui peuvent etre souhaitees soient si faciles a trouver qu'en
celui-ci? quel autre pays, ou Ton puisse jouir d'une liberte si entiere,
ou Ton puisse dormir avec moins d'inquietude, ou il y ait toujours des
armees sur pied, expres pour nous garder, ou les impoisonnements, les
trahisons, les calomnies soient moins connues, et ou il soit demeure
plus de reste de I'innocence de nos aieux." ^^ The "calumnies" of
which Descartes speaks here are the accusations of heterodoxy
which rained upon him from all sides in Paris, but which he did
not admit as just objections leaning upon the orthodox arguments of
his philosophy. Even his love for truth retreated where his rest and
comfort were concerned. The little inconveniences caused by the
objections after the very first publications made him use extreme cau-
tion to avoid further disturbances. He took all care to make sure
before the publication of his works that there was nothing in them that
might arouse suspicion concerning his piety or his loyalty to the estab-
lished order. To succeed better in this he was anxious to have his
works read and criticized by prominent theologians, "afin d'en avoir
leur jugement, et apprendre d'eux ce qui sera bon d'y changer, corriger
ou ajouter, avant que de le rendre public." *^ But before his manu-
scripts were seen by any one else they went through the hands of his
friend Mersenne, a keen theologian, Descartes, however, was careful
not to let even Mersenne see whatever he knew was too heretical, as,
for instance, his Le Monde, which, he saw, could not be hrought up to
the mark of the orthodoxy of the day. Before publishing the Medita-
tions he sent around through Mersenne copies of it to the different
theologians of the Sorbonne. He was anxious to get the approval of
the Sorbonne as a support against the attacks of the minor ecclesiastics,
being aware of the fact that the time had not yet outgrown authori-
tative protections. Even he who felt the weight of an argument was
afraid to acknowledge it before he was sure how the majority would
accept it.^"^ To escape all ecclesiastical suspicion he dedicated his
Meditations to the doctors of the Sorbonne ®^ and was later very disap-
^^Corr., Vol. I, p. 204. ff
w "J'ai maintenant entre les mains un Discours . . . il contiendra une bonne partie de la Meta-
physique. Et afin de le mieux faire, mon dessein est de n'en faire imprimer que vingt ou trente Exem-
plaires, pour les envoyer aux vingt ou trente plus savants Theologiens dont je pourrai avoir connaissance,
afin d'en avoir leur jugement, et apprendre d'eux ce qui sera bon d'y changer, corriger ou ajouter, avant
que de le rendre public." Corr., Vol. II, p. 622.
™ "Je croirais etre injuste, si je desirais qu'on les aprouvat avant qu'on sache comment elles seront
regues du public." Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 597.
'1 "Je le dedierais a Messieurs de la Sorbonne en general, . . . afin de les prier d'etre mes pro-
tecteurs en la cause de Dieu. Car je vous dirais que les cavillations du Fere Bourdin m'ont fait resoudre
a me mdnir dorenavant le plus que je pourrai, de I'autorite d'autrui, puisque la verite est si peu estim^e
lorsqu'elle est toute seule." Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 184. '
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 53
pointed when even it was attacked; "Celui de mes livres auquels ils
s'attaquent est adresse a Messieurs les Docteurs de la Faculte de
Theologie de Paris, et il a ete plus d'un manuscrit entre leur main pour
etre examine avant que je I'aie fait imprimer. De sorte qu'il ne peut
etre soupgonne de contenir aucune chose contre la Religion Chretienne
en general ni contre les moeurs . . . " For the same reason he
points in his Le Monde, which, of course, he first intended to publish, to
the fact that his description of the formation and growth of things in
the world is only the play of his imagination with no intention of
explaining things in the real world. ^^ The same is repeated in the
Principles where Le Monde is practically taken over and which is
written in such a way as to throw sand into the eyes of the Inquisition,
to use an expression of Baillet.^^ To hide the revolutionary attempts
of his Discourse, stress is laid on the biographical sketch. To give
assurance of his innocent intention he pointed to the fact that he named
his treatise not "Traite de la Methode, mais Discoiirs de la Methode,
ce qui est le meme que Preface ou Avis touchant la Methode, pour
montrer que je n'ai pas dessein de I'enseigner, mais seulement d'en
parler." *^
Descartes's refusal to deal with questions which might make hfs
enemies suspicious of his orthodoxy or his loyalty to established insti-
tutions shows that while his love for truth was strong, his love of self
was stronger. Arnauld reproached Descartes for not treating the ques-
tion of error in the pursuit of good and evil, accusing him of fear of
encountering too great an opposition. That this was a weighty reason
he himself confessed, declaring that he declined to give his view con-
cerning morals for the reason that ''Messieurs les Regents de Colleges
sont si animes contre moi,a cause des innocents principes de Physique
qu'ils ont vus, et tellement en colere de ce qu'ils n'y trouvent aucun
pretexte pour me calomnier,que,si jetraitais aprescela de la Morale, ils
ne me laisseraient aucun repos." ^^ The fact that his proof of the exis-
tence of God only caused him to be accused of atheism and skepticism,
made him fear to say anything concerning the soul after death or con-
cerning the question in how far we have to love life and to fear death,
when these questions were put to him. For, he complained, it was
vain for him to have opinions which conformed most closely to religion
and to the welfare of the state, since his opponents tried to convince
'2 "Et mon dessein n'est pas d'expliquer, comma eux, les choses qui sont en effet dans le vrai monde;
mais seulement d'en feindre un a plaisir, dans lequel il n'y ait rien que les plus grossiers esprits ne soient
capables de concevoir, et qui puisse toutefois etre cree tout de meme que je I'aurai feint." Le Monde,
Oeuires, Vol. XI, p. 36.
•5 A. Baillet, La vie de M. Des Cartes, Paris, 1691.
^Corr., Vol. I, p. 349.
» Corr., Vol. IV, p. 536.
54 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
him that his behefs were contrary to religion and to the state. ^* The
rear of unpleasant experiences which the opposition of the Jesuits
might bring him restrained him from openly saying many a thing
which he considered to be true. Thus he declared that he abstained
from directly disproving old principles through the consideration of
Father Charlet, head of the Company of the Jesuits and his edu-
cator, and other prominent members, his friends.*^^ Another statement
of his affirmed more directly that the Jesuits contributed a good deal
toward restraining his liberty in the expression of his thought: " Je suis
marri de la mort de Pere Eustache; car encore que cela me donne plus
de liberte de faire mes Notes sur la Philosophie, j'eusse toutefois mieux
aime le faire par sa permission, et lui vivant." ^^ The same is true of
the school. Though his philosophy is fundamentally opposed to that
of the school, he often refrained from saying things which were against
it " afin de n'insulter point ouvertement a pas une des opinions qui sont
regues dans les ecoles." We hear, in a letter to the Princess Elizabeth,
of a treatise, Traite de Verudition, in which Descartes for a similar
reason refrained from including all that was supposed to be there,
declaring that he was not in a position to despise the enmity of the
school. Believing that the enmity even of an ant may be harmful, or
at any rate, can do no good, he was greatly concerned with gaining the
favorable disposition of his enemies and possible persecutors. We hear
him repeatedly addressing the doctors of the Sorbonne for the extension
of their influence in his favor. He conciliated his previous teachers
to gain their protection from the attacks of the rest of the Jesuits
Nyhom he did not know.'''* His letters to his teachers are full of gratitude
and express appreciation of their virtue and of the doctrines taught
by them which, he assured them, he respected even at the time of
writing these letters.^" But these expressions of gratitude and rever-
se "Car puisqu'un Pere Bourdin a cru avoir assez de sujet, pour m'accuser d'etre sceptique, de ce que
j'ai refute les sceptiques; et qu'un ministre a entrepris de persuader que j'etais Athee, sans en alleguer
d'autre raison, sinon que j'ai tache de prouver I'existence de Dieu; que ne diraient-ils point, si j'entre-
prenais d'examiner quelle est la juste valeur de toutes les choses qu'on peut desirer ou craindre; quel sera
I'etat de I'Ame apres la mort; jusques ou nous devons aimer la vie; et quels nous devons etre, pour
n'avoir aucun sujet d'en craindre la perte? J'aurais beau n'avoir que les opinions les plus conformes a la
Religion, et les plus utiles au bien de I'Etat, qui puissent etre, ils ne laisseraient pas de me vouloir faire a
croire que j'en aurais de contraires a I'un et a I'autre." Corr., Vol. IV, p. 536.
6' "Mais parce que ceux qui y ont le plus d'interet sont les Peres Jesuites, la consideration du Pere
Charlet, qui est mon parent et qui est maintenant le premier de leur Compagnie, depuis la mort du Gen-
eral, duquel il etait Assistant, et celle du Pere Dinet et de quelques autres des principaux de leur Corps,
lesquels je crois etre veritablement mes amis, a ete cause que je m'en suis abstenu (from disproving the
old principles) jusques ici." Corr., Vol. IV, p. 225.
f'^^Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 286.
^^Corr., Vol. I, p. 409.
"> Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 100; Vol. IV, p. 156.
" Principalement parce qu'ayant autrefois ete instruit pres de neuf ans dans un de vos colleges, j'ai
concu depuis ma jeunesse tant d'estime et j'ai encore maintenant tant de respect pour votre vertu et pour
votre doctrine, que j 'aime beaucoup mieux etre repris par vous que par d'autres." Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 100^
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 55
ence for his teachers were dictated rather by the fear of a possible perse-
cution than by love and devotion, although the latter feelings, inocu-
lated in childhood, do not seem to have left him completely. We hear
him in one of his letters rejoicing over the praise received by him from
the two prominent Jesuit-fathers, Pere Charlet and Pere Dinet, for
this gave him hope that the whole Company of the Jesuits would be
on his side. In his anxiety to be considered orthodox he missed no
occasion to assert that his philosophy was perfectly harmless to
theology and that it did not contain anything which could not be
reconciled with religion or with approved authors. '^^
Descartes, as we have shown, particularly anxious to avoid all
conflicts with the church, showed himself, when, in spite of precautions,
he got into conflict, quite ready to take back his statements. At the
news of Galileo's condemnation he did not even think of attempting to
demonstrate the truth of his position which, he found, was in perfect
agreement with facts, but openly declared "je ne voudrais toutefois
pour rien du monde les soutenir (these doctrines) contre I'autorit^
de I'Eglise." ^2 Such a concession on the part of Descartes is interesting,
for he was not of a yielding temper and fought for his opinions when
objections were made from the point of view of science with no bearing
on the teachings of the church. He was provoked when his originality
was disputed in whatever did not interfere with theology.
4
Despite Descartes's efforts, his orthodoxy was very much suspected.
After his death it was inquired whether he was pious or whether he
spoke freely of religion. There had spread rumors that, dying, he
confessed to the Princess of Sweden that he did not believe in God and
immortality. His friends, however, denied that he ever made such
confessions.
This strong suspicion from the side of orthodoxy was due to the fact
that Descartes was ambiguous in his treatment of religious questions.
Despite the fact that he gave in his Meditations such a prominent place
to the proofs of the existence of God and of the distinction between
soul and body, his relation to these questions was such as to trouble
the orthodox mind. As long as Descartes gave us his unbiassed con-
clusions based only on the grounds of experiment and observation, he,
in his account of man, explained away the soul and in his account of the
world left no room for providence and grace. Only when rumors con-
'1 " Puisqu'on ne m'oppose ici que I'autorite d'Aristote et de ses sectateurs, et que je ne dissimule point
que je crois moins a cet auteur qu'a ma raison, je ne vols pas que je doive me mettre beaucoup en peine
de repondre." Vol. VIII, p. 281, Ed. Cousin; Adam and Tannery Edition, Vol. Ill, p. 432, Latin.
" Corr., Vol. I, p. 28s.
56 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
cerning his doubt had spread and he was asked to apply his method to
matters of faith, he gave in his Discourse and his Meditations the
demonstrations concerning God and the soul, so as to testify to his
orthodoxy. In the following works, however, he went back to what he
had said before from the scientific point of view. He thus left in doubt
his sincerity concerning belief in God and the soul. Moreover, the
question of the soul was treated in his works in such an indirect way
that the existence of a soul and its immortality were not even touched
upon; the distinction made between soul and body left the question
of the existence of a soul and its immortality open. Further explana-
tions of his beliefs as to God and the soul, which we find in his corre-
spondence, seem to point rather to the fact that he did not believe in
a soul as conceived in theology, and that God was to him only a con-
x;ept. Thus, in a letter to Mersenne, he saw in the theological ascrip-
tion of extension to God the same mistake as ascribing corporeal exis-
tence to non-existences. With regard to the same question he remarked
that in considering things of thought as existent things the mind plays
only with its own shadows. '^^ In a letter to Elizabeth, the relation of
the soul to the bodyis compared to that of weight to matter. Thesoul is
thus made dependent on the body. In another letter to the same prin-
cess, he says that the soul being united with the body may part with it,
but adds that he did not deal with this question in his works, for this
characteristic of the soul disproves its immortality and his purpose
was to prove it. With regard to a life beyond, he writes to her: "Et
quoique la Religion nous enseigne beaucoup de choses sur ce sujet,
j'avoue neanmoins en moi une infirmite, qui m'est, ce me semble,
commune avec la plupart des hommes, a savoir que, nonobstant que
nous veuillions croire, et meme que nous pensions croire tres fermement
tout ce qui nous est enseigne par la Religion, nous n'avons pas nean-
moins coutume d'etre si touches des choses que la seule Foi nous
enseigne, et ou notre raison ne pent atteindre, que de celles qui nous
sont avec cela persuadees par des raisons naturelles fort evidentes." ^*
In mentioning to her a book by Igby dealing with the soul's state after
death, he remarked: "... laissant a part ce que la foi nous en
enseigne, je confesse que par la seule raison naturelle nous pouvons bien
faire beaucoup de conjectures a notre avantage et avoir de belles
" "Que Dieu est positivement et reellement infini, c'est a dire existent partout . . . je n'admets
pas ce partout . . . croyant . . . qu'a raison de son essence il n'a absolument aucune relation
au lieu . . . Les difficultes suivantes me paraissent naitre du prejuge qui nous a fait croire que
toutes substances, celles-la meme que nous reconnaissons incorporelles, sont veritablement etendues, et
de la mauvaise maniere de philosopher sur les etres de raison, en attribuant les proprietes de I'etre ou
de la chose au non-etre . . . et c'est bien conclure, lorsque vous dites que I'esprit se joue avec ses
propres ombres, lorsqu'il considere les etres de raison." Corr., Vol. V, p. 343, Latin; Transl. by Cousin,
Vol. X, p. 239.
'< Corr., Vol. Ill, p. 580.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 57
esperances; mais non point en avoir aucune assurance." In a letter to
Igby we find the supposition that God in His omnipotence might also
destroy the soul after death.
It is interesting to note that Descartes's statements which may make
one question his belief in the immortality of the soul and in God's
existence were uttered to people whose influence he had no reason to
fear, to the Princess Elizabeth, Henri More, of England, Igby, or
other harmless persons. In his letters to Catholic theologians and
Jesuits, the independence of the soul from the body is insisted upon
and God is spoken of as possessing all attributes ascribed to him by
theology. y
RESUME
A study of Descartes's philosophy in the light of his time has shown
that the mixture of progressive thought and tradition in his philo-
sophical system is due to the circumstances under which he wrote.
Descartes was one of the progressive thinkers of his day; but in that
transition period, when religion was the main interest and theology
the main science, original ideas were suppressed as conflicting with
religious and theological doctrines. Descartes's scientific ideas met with
opposition from the side of orthodoxy at the very outset. Therefore, in
his love for peace and rest on account of weak health and inherited
timidity and conservatism, both of which were strengthened through
the conservative spirit of the Jesuit college, Descartes used extreme
caution ; he turned away from his naturalistic philosophy to the tradi-
tional problems and continued to express progressive ideas only in
disguise.
CHAPTER V
DESCARTES IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
/ I
In the history of philosophy Descartes's fame rests on his treatment
of traditional problems and principles. The following appreciation is
characteristic of the historical reconstruction of Descartes: "La gran-
deur de Descartes, sa vraie grandeur, est dans ces pages immortelles
ou il met en lumiere la preuve de I'existence de Dieu tiree de I'idee que
nous en avons." ^ Similarly the traditional idealistic principles, the
Cogito ergo sum, the principle of distinctness and clearness of our ideas
as the criterion of truth, and the principle of God on which to ground
this criterion, are considered as the most original ideas of his philosophy.
He himself, however, as Falckenberg sees it, attributed to them no
more importance than is attributed to a vestibule as compared to the
whole building. However, " the vestibule has brought the builder more
fame, and has proved more enduring, than the temple: of the latter
only the ruins remain; the former has remained undestroyed through
the centuries." ^ Descartes's real contributions were overlooked: the
originality of his scientific philosophy, his appeal to reason, his recog-
nition of the true justification for individualism — the equal capacity
for reasoning in all men — the true significance of his doubt, met with
no due consideration and appreciation.
The burden of responsibility for such a misrepresentation of Des-
cartes lies partly on Descartes himself, partly on his theological con-
temporaries and the idealistic historians of later periods. As was
pointed out, Descartes was compelled to keep his progressive ideas
behind the screen of orthodoxy. His contemporary friends, to give
his philosophy the appearance of legality and to secure for it a favor-
able reception, emphasized the traditional problems in his philosophy
to the exclusion of everything else. The merits of his scientific theories
were appreciated by them in the light of the Bible and the teachings of
the church. Thus in an article Traite de Vinfini,^ of 1750, by Abbot
Terrason, there is discussed the import of Descartes's suggestion of the
1 E. T. L. Gautier, Portraits du XVII^ siicle.
' Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy, transl. by A. C. Armstrong.
' Philosophical Review, 1905.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 59
possibility of many earths and of the infinity of the world from the
point of view of redemption and the glory of God, to both of which
Descartes's view is shown to be favorable. Descartes's mechanistic
theory is estimated by Henry More in his Antidote against Atheism,
written in 17 12, as a doctrine of Moses contained in the Jewish Cabbala.
In later periods when the historians, themselves philosophers,
thought they had emancipated themselves from traditional beliefs,
they based their reconstruction of Descartes on the belief in a "world
spirit" manifesting itself according to definite laws. From this point
of view the Cogito ergo sum was very much welcomed. Hegel seized
upon it as a justification of his stage division in the process of the
"world-spirit's" manifestation. The Cogito ergo sum was exactly the
identification of Being and Thought which, according to Hegel, the
world-spirit was supposed to have reached on that stage. "In the
celebrated Cogito ergo sum we thus have Being and Thought insepar-
ably bound together." ■* That this identification of Being and Thought
had once manifested itself in St. Augustine, Hegel in his Idea-intoxica-
tion overlooked.
The significance of Descartes's doubt was found by him in the
fact that the renunciation of everything was an affirmation that the
world spirit had arrived at the stage in which "thought commences
from itself."
Thus Hegel approached Descartes's system from the standpoint of
his own philosophy and emphasized in it only those points where he
could locate "universal reflection," which, he declared, should have
first claim upon our attention ; this he found in Descartes's speculation.
The latter's "empirical reflection and reasoning from particular
grounds, from experience, facts, phenomena, being brought into play
in the naivest manner" did not fit into Hegel's scheme, and was thus
left without attention. Descartes's system of Physics, which is the
result of observation and experience, was considered by Hegel as the
work of the understanding and, therefore, as of no special interest to
him. He found it out of place and obscure.
Hegel's philosophy, in alleging that the Prussian state was an evolu-
tion of the world-spirit, had aroused great interest in the past and
influenced the history of philosophy. The standard histories of phil-
osophy written in modern times are by men of this tradition. They
are all written from the same idealistic standpoint. Great injustice
has been done to Descartes by all of them; once framed in idealism,
his true picture never afterward appeared in the history of philosophy.
It can be found in his works only.
« W. Fr. Hegel. Lectures on the History of Philosophy, transl. by Haldane and Simson, p. 228.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
A systematic study of Descartes's philosophy has shown that a com-
plete omission of traditional problems leaves no lack in the philosophi-
cal system. It would, however, cause a break in the history of phil-
osophy. Does this indicate that philosophy in general is bound to deal
with these traditional problems? It has been said that philosophy
begins where science leaves off, and so if the realm of the scientist is all
in this world, the realm of the philosopher is naturally somewhere
beyond. Such a conception of philosophy has undoubtedly been de-
rived from its history. For philosophy, though originally evoked by
facts, has in the course of time drifted away into abstract regions where
shadows take the place of facts. The history of philosophy is full of
problems about problems and not of problems about facts. For the
circumstances that once called forth these problems have passed out of
existence and no longer present problems. The result is that the his-
tory of philosophy is a play of conceptions. It represents a chain of
transformations of one and the same material, which has been worked
over and over again, every philosopher impressing upon it his personal
and national characteristics; the practical Englishman putting upon
it a stamp of common sense, the Frenchman with his love for precision
and clearness making distinctions which the German strains every
nerve to obscure. In German treatment which, as Falckenberg^ says,
"allows the fancy and the heart" to take an important part in the dis-
cussion, the philosophical material resulted in a mystical and poetical
mass of descriptions of imaginary ultimates. The region of ultimates
had been for centuries the home of the philosopher. He descends to
facts only in order to place these facts in the ultimate realm. The
question of ultimates was not, however, born with the philosopher.
It did not bother the minds of the philosophers as long as their inquiries
were directed just by the desire for knowledge. The Greeks were not.
concerned with this question. The problems of the early Greeks, with
whom our philosophical record begins, were called forth by facts of
nature. The fact that things come and go, live and die, started the
Greek on his inquiry. In the Grseco-Roman period the moral issue
had a natural support in the social and political institutions of the day.
» Falckenberg. Op. Cil.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 6l
Even Plato, who was a poet to the depth of his soul, reached his ideals
through the conditions of his time. Protagoras opposed all theories
and looked for truth in a practical way. Aristotle's metaphysics deals
with facts. The starting-point of both Plato and Democritus, the two
opposites, in whom Greek philosophy culminates, is the world of
experience. Only beginning with the medieval period did philosophy
become characterized by a complete disregard of the facts of nature.
The medieval philosophers were concerned with the world beyond,
and, in their striving to come nearer to God, they got more and more
away from God's world. The problems created by the supernatural
took complete hold of philosophy and it became a sort of commentary
on theology. There is in it much about heaven and very little about the
earth. The earthly climate does not seem to agree with the philoso-
pher; he stretches his imagination to heavenly regions and to the clouds.
How many ingenious reveries and poetical fancies are given for the
clearing up of truth? At best the philosopher gives us a picture of his
own world, which is, however, only a very insignificant part of the
whole world. Moreover, "if the mind of man works upon itself, as
the spider works his web, then it is endless, and brings forth, indeed,
cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work,
but of no substance and profit." ^
Can the layman, therefore, be blamed for looking at philosophy
as an idle study? What achievements can philosophy offer to such
criticism? That the philosopher has never proved anything has
become a truism. The philosopher, however, seems to think that it is
his business to deal with questions, the solution of which lies somewhere
beyond. Professor Calkins, in the introduction to Persistent Problems
of Philosophy, admits that philosophers have not done much for the
advancement of knowledge, but concludes with the encouragement to
the idealistic philosopher that to be able to put questions and to know
why one does not know is also an advantage. But has the philosopher
found out why he does not know? It is true the apology of the phil-
osopher has always been the limitation of the human understanding;
it has been found inadequate to penetrate God's council. Despite this
incapacity of the human faculty to grasp divine things, the philosopher
has not given up mingling in God's affairs. Such persistency is worth
inquiry. In connection with this question it must be taken into
consideration that philosophy had been predominantly cultivated by
theologians. In the middle ages philosophy was exclusively in the
hands of monks and priests, that class which feels itself called upon to
mediate between heaven and earth. Therefore, an endeavor on the
' Bacon, Advancement of Learning.
62 METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL
part of those philosophers to get an insight into heaven was quite
natural. The romanticists, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, were theologians.
Of other modern philosophers Berkeley was a bishop, Leibnitz and
Spinoza, students of theology. That theologians should deal with
theological questions is not surprising; but it is a question what made
philosophers, who were not theologians, interested predominantly in
theological problems. The preservation of these problems in philoso-
phy is partly due to the historical interest of the philosopher. To illus-
trate how problems are being perpetually continued in philosophy,
Descartes's distinction between mind and body was the source of
innumerable arguments concerning the ultimate spirituality or mater-
iality of the world. Hobbes thought it was all material, Berkeley
all spiritual. Leibnitz conceived a world of many spirits as more plausi-
ble. Accepting spirit as the reality, he was engaged in disproving the
independent reality of extension, as thought to be held by Descartes.
Locke's dualism led Berkeley to his world of ideas. Berkeley's conclu-
sion supplied the material to Hume. Hume again aroused Kant out of
his "dogmatic slumber." Hume's doctrine of the mind as a bundle of
perceptions made Kant look for relating principles. The distinction
between sense and thought made by Kant's predecessors led him to his
twofold world of noumena. The attempt of Descartes, Leibnitz, and
Berkeley to prove the existence of God on a rational basis made Kant
deal with this question, arguing that it can not be proved by pure
^ reason. Kant's thing-in-itself turned Fichte from his scientific deter-
minism to the elaboration of an absolute self. Schelling and Hegel also
entered the philosophical field by the way paved by Kant's thing-in-
itself, the former developing the thing-in-itself into an unknowable,
and the latter into a self which finds expression in all finite selves.
Hegel in his turn started a school which still blunders in the region
of the Absolute and sees no way out of it into the world of our
experience.
The historical interest was, however, not always the thing that led
philosophers into dealing with traditional material. Descartes, Bacon,
and Hobbes, the pioneers of modern philosophy who intended a com-
plete break with history, are nevertheless engaged in remedying medie-
val philosophy. How it came about that the traditional problems were
continued even by those who attempted to get away from history can
be disclosed only through a study of the philosopher in connection with
/'iTis environment. Thus the study of Descartes in the light of his time
has shown that he was brought to the treatment of traditional prob-
lems not by his interest in life, but by the conflict of free-thinking and
orthodoxy in his day. Professor Bush has shown how the strict
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 63
censorship continued to be a "factor in the genesis of idealism" a good
while after Descartes.^
But no matter what historical background caused the development,
"philosophy" has come to be anything but philosophy, if we take it in
its original meaning, i. e., as the reflection about facts for the sake of a
better understanding and better knowledge of them. The present
state of affairs in philosophy is considered deplorable not only by
laymen, but also by professional philosophers, and various remedies
have been suggested. Among these there is one which, when applied
to the history of philosophy, must necessarily stop the endless chain
of dialectical circles into which the cultivation of the ideals of bygone
times has resulted. This is the fruitful distinction of genuine and arti-
ficial problems, made by Professor Bush in a recent article on the
Emancipation of Intelligence. For, "to show that the problem is about
a fictitious subject-matter is to solve it." The genuineness or artificial-
ity of a problem is, according to Professor Bush, discovered by the
inquiry as to what raised the question; the application of this test to
the history of philosophy has revealed the fact that present-day
philosophy is mainly occupied with animistic traditions and that,
therefore, the greater number of philosophical problems are artificial
problems.
Though the sifting of artificial problems from philosophy may lead
to the discarding of many a good old problem to which professional
philosophy seems to be very much attached and to leaving theology
to the theologian, the philosopher for this reason will not have to
close his shop. For if "philosophy is thought about life, representing
but the deepening and broadening of the common thoughtfulness," *
all problems of life require its services. Even metaphysics, but only
one, whose "greatest ally is Logic," ^ is a necessity in life. For greater
proficiency the philosopher will have, however, to associate with the
scientist, and to go hand in hand with him instead of beginning where
the latter left off, for "toutes les sciences sont filles de la philosophic:
ou plfltot toutes les sciences, en tant qu'elles decoulent de I'observation
et du raisonnement, et qu'elles ne nous donnent que les produits
exactement conformes a la nature des choses, se reunissent pour com-
poser elle-m6me la philosophic." ^
'W. T. Bush, "A Factor in the Genesis of Idealism." Essays Philosophical and Psychological in
Honor of William James.
*R. B. Perry. Approach to Philosophy.
6 F. J. E. Woodbridge, Metaphysics.
• J L. Piestre. Les Crimes de la Philosophte.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
I maintain (p. 27) that Descartes's failure to solve the traditional
problems is partly due to the fact that Descartes did not stop to con-
sider that the nature of these problems is such as to guarantee no
success even if most carefully studied by means of the most perfect
dialectics. Descartes, however, commits this mistake only in his works
that deal with the traditional problems. In his Rules, nevertheless,
he makes the following statement: "The man who faithfully complies
with the former rules in the solution of any difficulty, and yet by the
present rule is bidden to desist at a certain point, will then know for
certainty that no amount of application will enable him to attain to
the knowledge desired, and that not owing to a defect in his intelligence,
but because the nature of the problem itself, or the fact that he is
human, prevents him. But this knowledge is not the less science than
that which reveals the nature of the thing itself; in fact, he would seem
^o have some mental defect who should extend his curiosity farther." ^
The history of philosophy interprets Descartes as maintaining the
identity of matter and extension. It is, however, in his later works
that he expresses himself so as to warrant such a conclusion. In his
Rules, he confutes the scholastic notion of extension and emphasizes
the fact that while body possesses extension, extension is not body}
It is curious to note that Descartes's doctrine of extension is con-
tained in Calvin's Institutes, published originally in Geneva in 1541.
The same conclusion as to the identity of body and extension was
reached by Calvin through theological interest. This theory is ex-
pressed by both authors in similar words. In the Institutes it says:
Quel est nostre corps. N'est-il pas tel; qu'il ha sa propre et certain
measure . . . ? . . . Et ceste est la condition du corps, qu'il
consiste en un lieu certain en sa propre et certaine mesure et en sa
form." ^ The corresponding words in Descartes are: . . . "Nous
trouverons que la veritable idee que nous en avons consiste en cela seul
que nous appercevons distinctement qu'elle est une substance etendue
en longeur, largeur, et profondeur: or cela meme est compris en I'idee
que nous avons de I'espace, non seulement de celui qui est plein de
corps, mais encore de celui qu'on appelle vide." ^ The same identifica-
1 Rules, Works, Vol. I, p. 23. Transl. by Haldane and Ross.
' Rules, Works, Vol. I, pp. 58, 59. Transl. by Haldane ana Ross.
'J. Calvin, Institution de la Religion Chrestienne, texte de 1541, Paris, 1911, p. 641.
*Principes, Part II, Art. XI.
METAPHYSICS OF THE SUPERNATURAL 65
tion of body and extension we find in St. Augustine in the following
passage: "Spatia locorum tolle corporibus, nusquam erunt, et quia
nusquamerunt necerunt." ^ . . . "Prius abs te quaero utrum corpus
nullum putes esse quod non pro niodo suo habeat aliquam longitudinem
et latitudinem et altitudinem? Si hoc demas corporibus, quantum mea
opinio est, neque sentiri possunt, neque omnino corpora esse recte
existimari." ^
Descartes's conception of freedom, which he gives when brought to
this question by discussion, suggests the biological conception as exem-
plified by Bergson. The expressions of both authors on this point
bear close resemblance. Thus Descartes says: " II faut remarquer que
la liberte peut etre consideree, dans les actions de la volonte, ou avant
qu'elles soient exercees, ou au moment meme qu'on les exerce."^
Bergson says: "La these de la liberte se trouverait ainsi verifiee si Ton
consentait a ne chercher cette liberte que dans un certain charact^re
de la decision prise, dans I'acte libre en un mot." ® "L'acte libre se
produit dans le temps qui s'ecoule." ^
6 St. Augustine, Epist. 57, quoted by Bouillier, Hisloire de la Philosophie Carlesienne, Part I, p. 182.
•St. Augustine. De quantit. animce, Chap. IV, quoted by Bouillier, Op. Cit., p. 182.
' Works. Vol. Ill, p. 379-
' H. Bergson, Donnees immidiates de la conscience, p. 132.
» Id., p. 168.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adam, Ch. Vie et Oeuvres de Descartes. 1910.
Baillet, a. La vie de M. Des Cartes. Paris, 1691 ; England, 1692.
Bayle, Pierre. Dictionnaire historique et critique. Rotterdam, 1720.
Bayle, Pierre. Recueil de quelques pieces curieuses concernant la philosophic de
Monsieur Des Cartes. Amsterdam, 1684.
Bouillier, Fr. C. Histoire de la Philosophie Cartesienne. Paris, 1868.
Bryce, J. The Holy Roman Empire. New York and London, 1914.
Calvin, J. Institution de la Religion Chrestienne. Geneva, 1541; Paris, 191 1.
Descartes, Rene. Oeuvres de Descartes publiees par Charles Ada?n el Paul Tannery.
Paris, 1897-1898.
Descartes, Rene. Oeuvres de Descartes publiees par Victor Cousin. Paris, 1824.
Descartes, Rene. Lettres, touchant la Morale, la Physique, la Medecine et les
Mathematiques. Paris, 1667.
Descartes, Ren6. Oeuvres inedites de Descartes par M. Le C. Foucher de Careil.
Vol. I, Paris, 1859; Vol. II, Paris, i860.
Lanson, G. Histoire de la Litterature Frangaise. Paris, 1909.
Lavisse, Ernest. Histoire de France. Paris, 1903.
Louis de la Ville (le Pere de Valois). "Sentiments de Monsieur Descartes touchant
I'essence et les proprietes du corps opposes d la doctrine de I'J^gliseet conformes
aux Erreurs de Calvin sur le sujet de I' Eucharistie." Paris, 1680.
More, Henry. An Antidote against Atheism (Collection of several philosophical
writings). 17 12.
More, Louis T. "The Occult Obsessions of Science — with Descartes as an object-
lesson." Hibbert Journal, Vol. X, April, 1912.
Pluquet, Abbe A. A. Dictionnaire des heresies, 17 16-1790.
Terrason, Abbot. "Traite de I'lnfini," Philosophical Review, 1905.
Voyage Du Monde de Descartes. Paris, MDCXCI.
Suite Du Voyage Du Monde de Descartes. Amsterdam, MDCCXIII.
VITA
Lina Kahn was born in Libau, Courland, November ii, 1887. After
a preliminary preparation at home she went to the gymnasium of
her native town, from which she was graduated in 1903. In 1904 she
completed the normal training course in the same institution. In 1907
she took up her studies, with a major in Germanic philology, at Colum-
bia University. After taking the M.A. degree in 1909 she made
philosophy her major study, and was in residence at Columbia until
1913. when this dissertation was completed and defended.
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