m LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE AMERICA IN THE WAR I WHY WE WENT TO WAR Copyright by Sun Printing and Publishing Association. From Underwood & Underwood. President Woodrow Wilson. AMERICA IN THE WAR BY CHRISTIAN GAUSS AUTBOB OF " THE GEBUAN EMFEBOR AS SHOWN BY HIS PUBLIC CTTEBAWCfB* ILLUSTRATED NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1919 COPTHIGHT, 1918, 1919, Er CHARLES SCRIBNER'3 SONS PREFACE I CANNOT pretend that the following account is dispassionate, and I realize that in preparing it I have done what Burke said he did not know how to do. , \ have drawn up an indictment against a whole people for then: complicity in the crimes of the rulers whom they have accepted. As an American of South German blood, I confess readily to an inherited dislike and distrust of the Prussian. I have tried, nevertheless, to represent him in his habit as he lives, and to draw out fully the implications in his attitude and philosophy. My ancestors and the Prussian were poor neighbors, and the traditional bitterness of that quarrel may have obtruded itself. In the interest of making my contentions clear to others not so unhappily familiar with him, I may unconsciously have overstated. For this reason, in dealing with the imme- diate causes of the war, in my desire to be fair I have treated the evidence the more scrupu- vi PREFACE lously. The documents quoted, which consti- tute the most serious indictments of Germany, are therefore drawn wherever possible, and almost entirely, from German sources. The remainder of the volume dealing with our in- ternational relations is based upon official com- munications and the results of government investigations. Though I have presented some material re- cently discovered, and some old material in a new light, much, if not all, of the evidence has already been sifted by abler hands. I wish, therefore, to acknowledge my indebtedness to those upon whose work I have drawn most freely, especially to the Department of Civic and Educational Co-operation of the Com- mittee on Public Information, the value of whose important monographs is not yet suf- ficiently recognized. In preparing Chapter I, I have frequently fallen back upon Conquest and Kultur, by Professors Notestein and Stoll. In Chapter V it has been impossible to add anything of importance to "German War Practices," by Professor Munro, and in Chapter VIII I have PREFACE vii used the materials offered in the digest of "Ger- man Plots and Intrigues," by Professors Sperry and West. Professor Harding's "Outline His- tory of the War," Mr. AltschuPs "German Militarism," and the War Cyclopaedia have been particularly helpful. I have used also the many publications of the American Associa- tion for International Conciliation and am espe- cially indebted to its officers for permission to use their excellent text of Prince Lichnowsky's "Memorandum" in proof. In dealing with the diplomatic correspon- dence between the United States and Germany, I havr quoted the documents from the Special Supplements to the American Journal of Inter- national Law of July, 1915, and October, 1916, where they are accessible in accurate text and ordered form. This phase of the subject has been so authoritatively covered by James Scott Brown in his "A Survey of International Rela- tions Between the United States and Germany, 1914-1917," that no later student can cross his path without being guided and enlightened on the questions of in rnational law involved. Although it has in some cases been impossible viii PREFACE to compare translations with original texts, in no case has any document been cited about whose authenticity or general accuracy there can be any legitimate question. The important statements in Chapter III by Prince Lichnow- sky and Doctor Miihlon have been acknowl- edged by their writers. The incidental sources of information are so varied that enumeration is here impossible, and some of the more im- portant will be referred to in the notes. I could have done justice to the friendly sug- gestions and assistance of my colleague, Pro- fessor Dana C. Munro, only by making this volume much more scholarly and adequate to its purpose. His aid and that of many other friends has made my task a pleasure. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION THE demand for a new edition of this volume after the conclusion of hostilities made possible a complete revision. I take this occasion to thank Professor Henry R. Shipman, of the His- tory Department of Princeton University, for valuable criticisms and suggestions. CHRISTIAN GAUSS. CONTENTS BAPTEB MBZ I. FUNDAMENTAL ANTAGONISMS 1 II. THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD WAR .... 45 in. THE OCCASION OF THE WORLD WAR ... 65 IV. STRICT NEUTRALITY 106 V. ALIENATION OF AMERICAN SYMPATHIES . . 132 VI. THE "LUSITANIA" 160 VII. THE "SUSSEX" AND THE SUBMARINES . . 192 VIII. GERMAN INTRIGUE 208 IX. PEACE PROPOSALS 247 X. THE FINAL CHALLENGE . ILLUSTRATIONS President Woodrow Wilson Frontispiece FACING PAGB British soldiers conducting Belgian refugees to a place of safety 142 The ruins of Louvain 158 A number of boats with Americans on board were tor- pedoed without warning 198 WHY WE WENT TO WAR CHAPTER I FUNDAMENTAL ANTAGONISMS IT is a mistake to believe that a declaration ef war is the beginning of a conflict. It merely marks the transference of that conflict from the field of statesmanship to the field of arms. It is the last gesture of diplomacy, its non pos- sumus in the face of an impending crisis. Wars, recent wars especially, are the final expression of seemingly fundamental and irreconcilable antagonisms between nations or races, and the entire world was called to arms between 1914 and 1918, not so much because boundaries were threatened as because national ideals were at stake. When, on April 6, 1917, Congress called into extraordinary session by President Wilson, declared war upon Germany it meant that since American principles were threatened the peo- ple of the United States could do no less than accept the repeated challenges and meet force * WHY WE WENT TO WAR with force. A desire for peace our government had shown from the beginning. Patience and forbearance had marked all its dealings with the rulers of Germany. Rarely in history had the head of a great Power reasoned so calmly, so earnestly, or for so long a time as did President Wilson with a declared and impenitent ag- gressor. He had even been willing to waive points of honor which had caused wars in the past the destruction of property, the destruc- tion of life, plots of ministers and military at- taches against the sovereignty of the United States. Indeed, a goodly number of American citizens believed that he had been too patient, that the interests as well as the dignity of the United States demanded that the German am- bassador should have been dismissed and de- termined military preparations begun before they were. Yet in the numerous exchanges of notes which had taken place between Woodrow Wilson and Germany's spokesman, one thing only had become clear. Germany either de- liberately would not or could not understand the meaning of the key-words employed clearly and eloquently by the President. Germany did FUNDAMENTAL ANTAGONISMS 3 not comprehend or would not recognize the sig- nificance of words like law, right, freedom, jus- tice, humanity. The diplomatic controversy had not, therefore, been able to clear up the cardinal points at issue. It had merely set them into stronger relief, and made plain that in princi- ples, in ideals, in all that to us makes life worth living, Germany and America were irreconcila- bly at odds. Political differences, Aristotle has said, spring from small occasions, but from great causes. So it was here. The real causes and the real issues of the war are not to be sought in the Balkans or in the sinking of American ships. They are to be sought in certain fundamental national antagonisms. And it is in terms of these that future historians will explain the origins of our war with Germany. Some light we shall, in the present chapter, attempt to throw on the question of why this war, which we did not wish, had to come at all. In later chapters we shall deal with the question of why it had to come in 1917. We have used the word antagonisms after careful deliberation. They were not differences 4 WHY WE WENT TO WAR which admitted of immediate or peaceful ad- justment. The gulf which divided the United States and Prussia was too deep and too wide to be easily bridged. The Prussian detested de- mocracy through interest and principle; to Prussia's governing class the idea of democracy by which and in which we live as a people had been regarded as the corrosive poison which de- stroys great states. The German ideas on the mission of Germany, on the constitution and morality of states and on the place and function of an army were not only divergent from but absolutely incompatible with ours. Had the Prussian been allowed to realize the dearest pur- poses for which he was desperately fighting, and for which he was willing to sacrifice himself, there would and could have been no place in the world for another nation, equal in rights and privileges with his own. Our idea is, live and let live; his idea was, live and let others minister to your life or die. His conception was well ex- pressed by Doctor Carl Peters, the well-known German traveller: "Not to live and let live, but to live and FUNDAMENTAL ANTAGONISMS 5 direct the lives of others, that is power. To bring peoples under our rational influence in order to put their affairs on a better footing, that is more glorious power." Students who had followed the course of Ger- man history since the founding of the German Empire (1871) realized that there was this di- vergence of ideas, but most of them concluded that it was largely a matter of conflicting opin- ion. It did not occur to them that it would ever be translated into terms of war. It is necessary, therefore, for a proper understanding of why we went to war to impress upon ourselves the seri- ousness of the situation which had arisen in 1914. Let us put it clearly before us without bias or prepossession. Here is a story of something which actually happened. In the twentieth cen- tury, on August 3, 1914, before the representa- tives of nearly 70,000,000 people of every class, the speaker arose and announced: :< To-day our armies, your brothers and sons, have been sent, not by your mandate, but by your master's order, into a neighboring unarmed land. It is an invasion by force; they will go with cavalry and cannon to live in that land, to 6 WHY WE WENT TO WAR take possession of telegraph and trains. It is a country with which we are at peace, against which we have no grievance. It has never wronged us. We are even bound by treaty not to do this, and your minister of foreign affairs and your minister of war promised you last year that this would not be done. We have given our word as a nation. I know that what we are doing is contrary to international law. ..." But, you say, at this point delegates, outraged and excited, rose on the right, in the centre, on the left, and interrupted, shouting: "But but this is unheard of this spells national disgrace; this is betrayal of trust, dishonor." No, neither on the left nor in the centre nor on the right. No one rose, no one interrupted. They did not even shuffle their feet. The speaker concluded: "Necessity knows no law." They listened, thought it over, were proud and pleased. They applauded. The listeners were the chosen representa- tives of all Germany. The speaker was Chan- cellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, a German semi- liberal, by your leave, as liberal certainly as were his successors Michaelis and Hertling, and FUNDAMENTAL ANTAGONISMS 7 the occasion was a solemn session of the Ger- man Reichstag.* Just as Von Bethmann-Hollweg represented the attitude of the rulers of Germany, so the audience which approved and applauded rep- resented that of the German people. Those who tried to believe, therefore, that there was a difference between the German people and their rulers and that any serious friction would arise between them so long as they were undefeated were indulging a vain hope. There was no great difference between the German people and their rulers. The important difference was be- tween the German peoplef and ourselves. We in America were unwilling to recognize the seriousness of this situation for two reasons: in the first place we were familiar in this coun- try with a type of German often represented among our immigrants, whom we recognized as * In the above passage I have not quoted or even paraphrased Von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech. I have tried to bring out its implications as they were known to the body he was addressing. f Virtually all classes of the German people acquiesced in and jus- tified the action of the government in invading Belgium. That the government attempted to misrepresent the situation is true, but it is also true that an earnest desire for truth and justice could have made it- self felt. 8 WHY WE WENT TO WAR a good-natured, thrifty, and loyal citizen; and in the second place we felt that the spirit of Ger- many was truly expressed in the works of men like Schiller (1759-1805) and Goethe (1749- 1832), the best-known German poets, who rep- resented the greatest period in German litera- ture. What, we asked, has become of the good fellow we used to know, the docile, blue-eyed, fair-haired German Michel, who loved his pipe and his bowl and his fiddlers three ? * It must be understood that this type of Ger- man had never represented the Prussian. He was usually the South German, and furthermore he exemplified a type and generation which was unfortunately tending to disappear. One of the characteristics of this type had been its readi- ness to accept authority, its docility, and docile the Germans still were; that is why they had changed, for they had accepted a new master who boasted that he had power of life and death upon them.f Why this was so and under what * Michel is the traditional representative of Germany, as Uncle Sam is of the United States and John Bull of England. | See Emperor Wilhelm's speech, November 23, 1891 : " It may come to pass that I shall command you to shoot your own relatives, brothers, yes, parents which God forbid but even then you must follow my command without a murmur." FUNDAMENTAL ANTAGONISMS 9 unhappy compulsion such a transformation had taken place will be later abundantly evident.* Just as the type of German with whom we were familiar for the most part no longer rep- resented the spirit of Germany in 1914, so, too, the best-known German poets were likewise spokesmen of an age and temper that had disap- peared. They had been liberal and cosmo- politan. About 1800 Schiller was developing the theory of the Weliburger, the citizen of the world, and chose as the subjects of his great plays Wilhelm Tell, the Swiss national hero, the Maid of Orleans, the French national heroine, and Mary Stuart, a Queen of Scotland. They were all treated with rich sympathy and under- standing. It is difficult to imagine Hauptmann * The Germany that we were fighting was Prussianized Germany, and it is interesting to note that after the defeat of the German army indica- tions of this divergence between South Germans and Prussians which had always existed in the past began to reappear. The most striking instance of this was the interview given out by Count von Hertling, the Bavarian, who had been chosen as Imperial German Chancellor to suc- ceed Michaelis, and had been in office up to the time when after the defeat of the German armies (October, 1918) negotiations for an ar- mistice were begun by the new government first represented by Prince Max of Baden. Von Hertling died early hi January, 1919, and a few days before his death he is said to have given out an interview in which the following striking sentiments appeared: "The animosity of a great majority of the Germans toward Prussia will have a decisive influence on the future configuration of Central Europe. ... At Munich, as at Stuttgart and Cologne, there is re- 10 WHY WE WENT TO WAR or Sudermann doing as much. Of Jingo pa- triotism Goethe, the large-minded, spoke dis- paragingly as jene alte Romer Tugend, that old- fashioned Roman virtue. Lessing said it was a virtue of which he was happy to say he had little. Herder, one of the few Prussian men of letters of any rank, ran away from Prussian mil- itarism in order to breathe the more liberal air of Catherine the Great's Russia. The difference between these men of letters and their successors becomes plain when we remem- ber that none of them had believed in Kultur. The idea of Kultur would have been as antipa- thetic to them as it came to be to us after 1914. Kultur meant a culture which was strictly and exclusively German and which banned all ele- ments of foreign origin. It implied that there was a particular virtue in everything of Ger- manic origin and invention. It was culture as sentment against Prussia for having so badly steered the common ship, and let it be understood that by Prussia not the country, but the caste and the political system, is meant. If the present ideas follow their course, momentous historical events soon will occur, and the name of Prussia will disappear from the map of Europe." Similar sentiments were expressed by the Socialist Kurt Eisner, head of the Provisional Government in Bavaria after the flight of the King. The plans for a German republic drawn up in Berlin after the abdica- tion of Wilhelm II involved a serious reduction of Prussia's importance in the German confederacy. 11 interpreted by that later generation which be- lieved that echt deutsch was the superlative of ex- cellent. The conception of Goethe and Schiller had been quite the opposite. It involved the idea of a well-rounded personality and thor- oughly human development in the widest sense, and for this reason both of them had drawn widely upon the best ideas and ideals of other peoples in antiquity as well as in modern times. Indeed, Goethe was far more like a Greek of the age of Pericles than a Prussian of 1914. The German had changed as had the spirit of his literature. The good old German Michel had become Prussianized, had donned the spiked helmet and learned to sing Deutschland iiber Alles as a result of the same influences which had transformed the humane conception of cul- ture into the narrow idea of Kultur. Germany had become Prussianized. This important transformation had taken place almost unnoticed by ourselves, for Amer- ica, and indeed modern Europe, lost touch with Germany in the events after 1864, which led to the formation of the German Empire, and from that time on Germany followed a line of develop- 12 WHY WE WENT TO WAR ment toward autocracy, the creation of a great state controlled by an hereditary ruler, which was the direct opposite of the movement which was taking place among the other nations and ourselves. While all other European countries were advancing along democratic lines Germany was going back in spirit to what Prussia had been. In political matters she was the hermit- crab of the nineteenth century. While other governments were reducing themselves to a common basis of liberal constitutions and demo- cratic spirit which bade fair to bring in a new era of varied but none the less equal nations mingling in a larger cosmopolitanism, the Prus- sian sulked in his tent or drilled behind the guard-house. Let us consider how this had come about. In the earh'er hah* of the nineteenth century the Germans had sought to realize in politics two principal ambitions. They desired national unity and they desired liberty. The liberal movement had resulted in the Revolution of 1848, which unfortunately failed to achieve its purpose and incidentally brought as exiles to our country many of the German liberal leaders, like FUNDAMENTAL ANTAGONISMS 13 Karl Schurz. These liberal leaders had seen in the power of the German autocrats, her many kings and princes who were jealous of each other's rights and prerogatives, the chief ob- stacles both to national unity and to democratic government. The discredit into which the liberals fell after the unsuccessful Frankfort Parliament (1848) may be said to have left Germany at the mercy of Bismarck and Prussia, who were to realize for her that other German aspiration toward national unity. The failure of the democratic leaders and the signal triumphs of Prussia in later establishing this national unity, coupled with an unexampled increase in material prosperity, were to beget a type of government and an attitude of mind with which the rest of the world was unfamiliar. Germany was reverting toward monarchical and auto- cratic types of government and diverging from the modern world. It is in this new process of Prussianization that the antagonisms between Germany and ourselves began to develop, for they had their origins in the Prussian character and in cer- tain theories of the state which were promul- 14 WHY WE WENT TO WAR gated and developed about a century ago by theorists like Hegel (1770-1831) and Fichte (1762-1814), who formulated and defended the Prussian state, in terms which we shall consider later. But before discussing these Prussian ideals in detail, it is well to recall the events which led to the unification of Germany. The liberal move- ment had failed. Bismarck and his less capable master Wilhelm I (then King of Prussia) were waiting their opportunity to establish Prussian supremacy and make their state the centre of the new united Germany, which they felt must inevitably come. This they did by a series of three wars. In 1864 they took Schleswig-Hol- stein from Danish control in a war in which Austria was their ally. Austria had been Prus- sia's great rival for German leadership. Two years later, in 1866, as Bismarck planned, hoped, and expected, difficulty arose between Austria and Prussia over the government of the terri- tory taken from Denmark. He provoked a war. The moment was favorable, and after a cam- paign, which lasted but a few weeks, Austria was defeated and Prussia's position as head of the FUNDAMENTAL ANTAGONISMS 15 German states securely established. The in- demnity demanded of Austria ($15,000,000) was small and the punishment inflicted upon her, with the exception of her loss of prestige and position in German affairs, was slight. To com- plete his programme, to quiet opposition to Prussian leadership and autocratic methods at home among the remaining liberals, and to bind the South German states to the new union, he felt that a war with France was necessary, and provoked one in 1870 by deliberately misrep- resenting the contents of a telegram received from King Wilhelm of Prussia.* Owing to Prussia's superior military organiza- tion she achieved complete victory over France with relatively slight losses, took from her Al- sace-Lorraine and an indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs. In addition she succeeded in establishing and proclaiming the birth of the German Em- pire with Prussia at its head in 1871. In attempting to understand the subsequent aggressive attitude of Germany, we must not * This telegram, the famous Ems Despatch was an account by the King of Prussia of his interview with the French ambassador. By manipulating it Bismarck made France appear as an insulted aggressor and fired German sentiment against her, from which the war resulted. 16 WHY WE WENT TO WAR forget the effect of these three wars which she had deliberately provoked, which had been ex- traordinarily successful and had laid the basis for her great commercial prosperity. In the first place it gave immense prestige to her army and in the second place the attitude of a large part of the German population had come more and more to resemble that of an elated people following the advance of a victorious army. In this respect the effect of the Franco-Prussian War was disastrous. It did not unify Germany in the same way that the Italian wars unified Italy. Prussia was not attempting, as the world fondly imagined, to bring about the true na- tionalization of Germany. She wished to create and did create a greater Prussia and gave to the new state instead of liberal institutions her mediaeval-minded monarch and his efficient or- ganization and militarism. The pliant little states of Saxony, Bavaria, and Wurttemberg, with an honorable tradition of decent living and love of literature and art which Prussia never had, were bound to her victorious chariot wheels. They hated Prussia, yet they became her vas- sals. She gave them an ideal Germany only in FUNDAMENTAL ANTAGONISMS 17 name. They lost their independence because they had neither the means nor the will to de- fend it. And they lacked the will since they lacked the tradition of Anglo-Saxon freedom and were used to vassalage. Docility, as we have seen, was inherent in their temperament. Their necks were calloused to the feudal yoke. They wore it lightly, to be sure, for their sub- mission was voluntary and not servile. It was part of their traditional organization. They ac- cepted Prussia as their suzerain. It would be a most serious error, however, to believe that this Prussianized German state was one which existed solely through the force of the ruler. This is very far removed from the truth. Prussia had realized the German desire for na- tional unity. She had succeeded in doing what liberalism had failed to do, and with the con- tinued success and prosperity of the new Ger- man Empire it received first the acquiescence and gradually the enthusiastic support of nearly all elements of the population. Both in its con- stitution and outward principles it came to ex- emplify the ideals of the great majority who later stood behind the Kaiser and his party in 18 WHY WE WENT TO WAR the war as solidly as did any other of the allied peoples behind their government. The Ger- man state was not, therefore, an amalgam forced into cohesion and unity by mere pressure from above. It was the most recent but at the same time the most powerful of all the great single states. This the world was to learn from four years of bitter experience. It withstood many shocks, shocks which would have wrecked many a stanch commonwealth. For it had the two requisites of a stable and enduring state, which Sieyes had pointed out to Napoleon. "Power," he said, "must come from above. Confidence from below." And the German state had not only power and confidence month until the ominous toll has mounted into the hundreds." The note then concluded in a tone and with statements that gave it the character of an ultimatum. "The Government of the United States has been very patient. At every stage of this dis- tressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the most thought- ful consideration of the extraordinary circum- stances of an unprecedented war and to be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and Government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations and assurances of the Imperial Government as of course given in entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Govern- ment so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied THE SUSSEX AND THE SUBMARINES 201 in the law of nations. It has made every al- lowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became un- mistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation. "It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come. It has become painfully evident to it that the position which it took at the very outset is inevitable, namely, the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce, is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incom- patible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of non- combatants. "If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indis- criminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recog- nized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the con- clusion that there is but one course it can pur- sue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an aban- donment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying 202 WHY WE WENT TO WAR vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluc- tance but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations."* The German reply of May 4, 1916, makes a painful impression. Germany had evidently been stung to the quick, for her tergiversating answer to our inquiry had failed to shake our certitude of her responsibility, and the plain statement of facts in our review of the situa- tion amounted to a direct accusation of in- humanity and lawlessness. Her answer was, therefore, given in anger, not in sorrow. It in- cluded, in addition to paradoxical protestations of her entire innocence and of her humanity to non-combatants, accusations against the United States for failing to accept previous proposals of hers and especially accusations against British inhumanity and our own par- tiality to Britain. But it evidently recognized the gravity of the crisis and contained the fol- lowing promises : * 'American Journal of International Law, Special Supplement, Octo- ber, 1916, p. 190. THE SUSSEX AND THE SUBMARINES 203 "The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that the German naval forces have re- ceived the following orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance. "But neutrals can not expect that Germany, forced to fight for her existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interest, restrict the use of an effective weapon if her enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating the rules of international law. Such a demand would be incompatible with the char- acter of neutrality, and the German Govern- ment is convinced that the Government of the United States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the Government of the United States has repeatedly declared that it is determined to restore the principle of the freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it is violated." * It will be seen that Germany, though making a definite promise not to sink merchantmen without warning or without saving human lives, * American Journal of International Law, Special Supplement, Octo- ber, 1916, pp. 198-199. 204 WHY WE WENT TO WAR attempted to make this promise contingent upon some action on our part against Great Britain. This would have made it possible for Ger- many to reopen the question in case negotiations between the United States and Great Britain were not settled to her satisfaction. Washing- ton was, however, determined that this danger- ous question should be settled finally and not conditionally. In the last paragraph of the American reply, therefore, this point was made an issue, and any such interpretation of the promise was specifically precluded. The com- munication was sent to Berlin on May 8, 1916, and read as follows: "DEPARTMENT OP STATE, WASHINGTON, May 8, 1916. "You are instructed to deliver to the Minis- ter of Foreign Affairs a communication textually as follows: "'The note of the Imperial German Govern- ment under date of May 4, 1916, has received careful consideration by the Government of the United States. It is especially noted, as indi- cating the purpose of the Imperial Government as to the future, that it "is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of the war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents," and that it is determined to impose upon all its commanders at sea the limi- THE SUSSEX AND THE SUBMARINES 205 tations of the recognized rules of international law upon which the Government of the United States insisted. Throughout the months which have elapsed since the Imperial Government announced, on February 4, 1915, its submarine policy, now happily abandoned, the Govern- ment of the United States has been constantly guided and restrained by motives of friendship in its patient efforts to bring to an amicable settlement the critical questions arising from that policy. Accepting the Imperial Govern- ment's declaration of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries, the Gov- ernment of the United States will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government, such as will remove the principal danger to an inter- ruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany. "'The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way con- tingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Gov- ernment, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Gov- ernment of the United States notifies the Impe- 206 WHY WE WENT TO WAR rial Government that it can not for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not LANSING."* relative.' If Germany was unwilling to accept this in- terpretation it would be necessary for her to reopen the question. She did not do so and this, therefore, meant that she accepted the American position. In spite of past experiences the United States accepted this promise in good faith. The spirit of fairness which was always manifested toward Germany was further illustrated in the ruling on the case of the Deutschland, the large com- mercial submarine which brought two cargoes of goods from Germany to American ports in this same year. The Allied governments sent notes to the neutral powers stating that, in view of the fact that it was impossible to distinguish the na- * American Journal of International Law, Special Supplement, Octo- ber, 1916, pp. 199-200. THE SUSSEX AND THE SUBMARINES 207 tionality of undersea boats or to determine whether they were armed or unarmed, bel- ligerent submarine vessels, whatever the pur- pose to which they are put, be excluded from neutral waters, roadsteads, and ports. This would have excluded the Deutschland from our harbors. Instead of complying, Secretary Lan- sing ruled in favor of treating the submarine like any other vessel, since "the Government of the United States is at present not aware of any circumstances concerning the use of war or merchant submarines which have ren- dered the existing rules of international law inapplicable to them." Indeed, we made no protest, though many Americans felt we should have done so when, on October 7, the large U-5S came into the harbor at Newport, and a day later sank three British and two neutral steamers between sixty and one hundred miles from the shore. The submarine set the passengers, of whom many were Americans returning from Newfoundland, adrift in small boats, in which a number might have been lost but for the rescue work of the Newport destroyer flotilla. Here the situation was to rest without any further serious crisis until early in 1917. CHAPTER VIII GERMAN INTRIGUE IN addition to Germany's inhumane conduct in Belgium and on the seas, there was yet another factor which contributed to discredit her in American eyes and to force America first to regard her with suspicion and later to distrust her in word and act. This third factor is in its nature more or less imponderable, and it is difficult to calculate its importance in our government's decisions. We may say that in general it was the result of that large category of underhand activities which were entered upon by German officials either for the purpose of deliberately deceiving or of unduly influenc- ing us in favor of the German cause or govern- ment. In pursuing this policy of intrigue and espionage Germany did not hesitate to resort to means which were dishonorable and illegal, and in many cases involved such serious affronts to our sovereignty that in the past we had dis- 208 GERMAN INTRIGUE 209 missed the representatives of foreign Powers for having countenanced or engaged in them. In 1805, for instance, the Spanish minister at Washington, the Marquis of Casa Yrujo tampered with the American press, and at- tempted to bribe a Philadelphia editor to pre- sent the Spanish side of a controversy with the United States. Passports were issued to him and he was dismissed by the infant republic. Nor did we grow less jealous of our sovereign rights with age. During a political campaign the British ambassador, Lord Sackville-West, in reply to a letter, advised Americans of Brit- ish birth to vote for Grover Cleveland. When, after the election, the incident came to light, President Cleveland characterized it in his annual message as, "unpardonable conduct," and explained that, "the offense thus com- mitted was more grave, involving disastrous possibilities to the good relations of the United States and Great Britain, constituting a gross breach of diplomatic privilege and an invasion of the purely domestic affairs and essential sovereignty of the government to which the envoy was accredited." 210 WHY WE WENT TO WAR President Cleveland, therefore, directed that passports be issued to Lord Sackville-West, and Secretary of State Bayard held that cir- cumstances involving interference with Amer- ican suffrage left no other course open to the United States. In what follows it will be plain that the of- fenses committed by Lord Sackville-West and the Marquis of Casa Yrujo were the merest peccadillos compared with the systematic at- tempts of Germany to influence American suf- frage and to disregard the sovereign rights of our government. The field covered by this underhand activity was so large and the means employed so varied that to treat it in all its phases would demand separate volumes. It was furthermore in many cases so cleverly concealed that much of it has not yet come to light, and more than a year after our entrance into the war the trials and confessions of prisoners and suspected persons disclosed almost daily further ramifications of this organized secret plotting.* Thus, for in- stance, on July 11, 1918, at the investigation in New York when Senator King demanded * Cf. the 61es of the New York Times for July, 1918. GERMAN INTRIGUE 211 that the government conduct an investigation into the report that $30,000,000 had been used in that city for purchasing newspapers and spreading propaganda, Deputy Attorney-Gen- eral Becker made the statement that not only this sum but "untold millions," had been put at the disposal of the German agents as a "slush fund." He further announced that at least sixteen New York banks had acted as deposi- taries for German funds, and that an investi- gation was pending to discover how the amounts drawn from these accounts by Ambassador von Bernstorff and his aides had been em- ployed. We are forced to restrict ourselves, therefore, to noting merely some of the characteristic aspects of this wide-spread plot, and in doing so we shall confine ourselves to cases that have been proven by documentary evidence now in the possession of the government. Many of them have been drawn from the careful analysis of the earlier activities of German agents prepared by Professors Sperry and West.* In no cases shall we deal with the ac- 1 " German Plots and Intrigue in the United States during the Period of our Neutrality." Committee on Public Information, Washington. 212 WHY WE WENT TO WAR tivity, even the treasonable acitivity, of isolated and overzealous German sympathizers. Every instance which follows was undertaken at the suggestion or with the knowledge and con- nivance, often the direct collaboration of Ger- man Government officials. Where funds were necessary they were provided by them. The "commander-in-chief" of this organiza- tion was Count von Bernstorff, the German ambassador. Until his dismissal Doctor Dum- ba, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador was his coadjutor, and his chief lieutenants were Cap- tain' von Papen, military attache, and Captain Boy-Ed, naval attache of the German embassy. They were assisted by Doctor Albert, the com- merical attache and Wolf von Igel, secretary to Von Papen, all of them enjoying diplomatic status and diplomatic immunity. Under them served most of the German and Austrian con- suls in this country, a large number of German reservists, hired American journalists, and an odd collection of agitators and desperadoes drawn often from the lowest classes. The following recital of what was done and the methods employed will be sufficient to show GERMAN INTRIGUE 813 the lack of honor and conscience of the Ger- man Government. We have already con- sidered the character of German political morality. It need occasion no astonishment, therefore, if a few selected messages and docu- ments prove that this whole underhand system of violence and deceit was merely an extension of the work of the German Foreign Office and the General Staff. On November 2, 1914, a circular order was issued from the German General Headquarters, "to the military representative on the Rus- sian and French fronts, as well as in Italy and Norway," and it is not improbable that one to the same purport was sent to America. It read: "In all branch establishments of German banking houses in Sweden, Norway, Switzer- land, China, and the United States, special military accounts have been opened for special war necessities. Main headquarters authorizes you to use these credits to an unlimited extent for the purpose of destroying factories, work- shops, camps, and the most important centres of military and civil supply belonging to the enemy. In addition to the incitement of labor troubles, measures must be taken for the damag- 214 WHY WE WENT TO WAR ing of engines and machinery plants, the de- struction of vessels carrying war material to enemy countries, the burning of stocks of raw materials and finished goods, and the depriving of large industrial centres of electric power, fuel, and food. Special agents, who will be placed at your disposal, will supply you with the necessary means for effecting explosions and fires, as well as with a list of people in the country under your supervision who are willing to undertake the task of destruction. "(Signed) DR. E. FISCHER." So general an order, if sent to America, was, however, not sufficient. More definite instruc- tions on the various phases of the work were from time to time forwarded from Berlin to Von Bernstorff. A few sample messages which in one way or another came into our hands will establish the fact. The following are copies of two telegrams sent to the German ambas- sador: "Jan. 3 (1916). (Secret.) General Staff de- sires energetic action in regard to proposed destruction of Canadian Pacific Railway at several points with a view to complete and protracted interruption of traffic. Captain Boehm, who is known on your side and shortly GERMAN INTRIGUE 215 returning, has been given instructions. In- form the Military Attache and provide the nee- essary funds. (gigned) ZlMMERMANN ." "Jan. 26 (1916). For Military Attache. You can obtain particulars as to persons suit- able for carrying on sabotage in the United States and Canada from the following persons: (1) Joseph McGarrity, Philadelphia, Penn. (2) John P. Keating, Michigan Avenue, Chicago. (3) Jeremiah O'Leary, 16 Park Row, New York. One and two are absolutely reliable and discreet. No. 3 is reliable, but not always discreet. These persons were indicated by Sir Roger Casement. In the United States sabotage can be carried out on every kind of factory for supplying munitions of war. Rail- way embankments and bridges must not be touched. Embassy must in no circumstances be compromised. Similar precautions must be taken in regard to Irish pro-German propa- " (Signed) REPRESENTATIVE OF GENERAL STAFF." One of the many violations of our neutrality by Germany was her attempt to start mili- tary expeditions against her enemies from America. These plans likewise were directed from Berlin through Von Bernstorff, as is evi- 216 WHY WE WENT TO WAR dent from the following telegram regarding the status of the organizer of the projected revolt in India: "BERLIN, 4th February, 1916. "To the German Embassy, Washington: "In the future all Indian affairs are to be handled through the Committee to be formed by Dr. Chakraberty. Dhirenda Sarkar and Heramba Lai Gupta who has meanwhile been expelled from Japan, will cease to be indepen- dent representatives of the Indian Independence Committee existing here. " ZlMMERMANN. " There can, therefore, be no doubt that this plot, as President Wilson subsequently said of the German plot generally, "had its heart in Berlin." Like a gigantic octopus it sprawled over our entire country and stretched out its tentacles into every form of our national life. It touched our Congress, our diplomacy, our industry, our press. Indeed so multiform and all-pervasive was it that if we merely sketch a few of its more pronounced phases, it must be understood that they all worked in together GERMAN INTRIGUE 817 and were designed to nullify our neutrality, our national will, indeed our sovereignty. These attacks upon us through German un- derhand diplomacy may be said to have been made along five converging lines. In the first place, they sought through various channels to pervert American opinion and legislation to German ends by the employment of immense sums of money. In the second, they sought to give illegal military aid to Germany directly. In the third place, they attempted to use the United States as a base for German military operations. In the fourth place, they attempted to interfere with American industries, especially the manufacture of munitions and their trans- portation on land and water in order to prevent our resources from being of value to the Allies. In the fifth place, to crown their structure of intrigue they elaborated a system of under- hand diplomacy through which they hoped to foment trouble between America and the Allies generally, and particularly to embroil the United States in a war with Mexico and Japan. This pyramid of plot and intrigue had as its base a wide-spread plan to poison public 218 WHY WE WENT TO WAR opinion* in which probably not less than $50,- 000,000 was spent through Ambassador von Bernstorff, Doctor Dernburg, the former Ger- man Colonial Secretary, and their aides. In addition to their German assistants there were employed a number of American journalists, correspondents, and lecturers like Doctor Wil- liam Bayard Hale, Mr. J. F. J. Archibald, to whom at least one check for $5,000 was given for "propaganda work," and Edwin Emerson, who received $1,000 for "travelling expenses," and many others. Not content with this, how- ever, they bought up and subsidized newspapers throughout the land. It is difficult to follow all of their activities in connection with the foreign-language press already existing in this country, or to know in how many cases they succeeded in bribing editors of our journals in English. Their general procedure is indi- * That the German Government had for many years been employ- ing debatable methods in this regard is painfully evident in the ac- count by Witte, attached for a time, when he was supposed to be only a foreign correspondent, as publicity agent to the German Embassy (1902). His book was written as an attack upon Holleben, and is evi- dently controversial and the work of a mind diseased. This portion of it must be taken with serious reservations. The account of the means and instruments employed to influence American opinion is incidental, and this, with documents cited, is sufficient to arouse astonishment. (Aus Einer Deutschen Botschaft, Leipzig, 1907.) GERMAN INTRIGUE 219 cated, however, by the check for $5,000 which Count von Bernstorff sent to Marcus Brown, editor of Fair Play* the monthly subsidy of $1,750 delivered to Mr. George Sylvester Viereck, editor of The Fatherland, by the com- mercial attache Albert, and the similar monthly subsidy of $1,500 paid to the American Inde- pendent, by Consul-General Bopp of San Fran- cisco. Of the newspapers bought outright by the German Government, and continued os- tensibly as American organs of opinion, the most important was the Evening Mail of New York, for which about $1,500,000 of a seemingly inexhaustible fund was spent. To assist in this attempt at perverting Amer- ican opinion there were founded or encouraged societies, seemingly American, to influence sen- timent and legislation. The most important of these was perhaps the German-American National Alliance, which had already been in existence for the purpose of spreading German influence in America, and which they sought * It has recently (August, 1918) become evident that, in addition to the check paid to the editor, the German ambassador purchased the stock of Fair Play, financially a losing venture, for $15,000, through an American intermediary. (Cf. New York Times files for August, 1918.) 220 WHY WE WENT TO WAR to make a power in politics.* A second, founded for the more immediate purpose of influencing Congress was Labor's National Peace Council, which was financed by Emperor Wilhelm's friend and personal agent, Franz von Rintelen. A third was the American Embargo Conference, which was established to make a determined and concerted effort to prevent the export of munitions after our government had decided that this was entirely proper within the limits of our neutrality. Another means employed by the Embargo Conference was that of dis- tributing to voters over 5,000,000 telegrams to * A striking change in Germany's attitude toward Germans who had emigrated to America is noticeable after about 1900, at the time when the Pan-German movement began to gain momentum. Earlier they had frequently been treated as renegades. After this period, partic- ularly after Prince Henry's visit in 1902, every attempt was made to strengthen their loyalty to the fatherland. The promotion of societies among them was encouraged, and flags were often presented to the Amer- ican societies of German veterans, Landwehr-Vereine, by the German Emperor through his ambassador. (Cf. Aus Einer Deutschen, Botschaft, by Emil Witte, Leipzig, 1907, chap. VII). The teaching of German in American schools was pushed and German-language papers encouraged and. it would seem, subsidized. The leaders of the German-American movement frequently received decorations from Berlin. In his "Life of John Hay," vol. II, p. 290, Thayer says, and we think very truly: "Prince Henry's visit, however, was really intended to solidify the German-American movement in behalf of the Fatherland." The po- litical purpose of the movement is plainer now than it was then, though Doctor von Holleben, German ambassador at that time, was bold enough to say to a reporter: "Any war between Germany and the United States would be in the character of a civil war." (Cf. Witte, Aut Einer Dentschen Botochaft. chap. II.) GERMAN INTRIGUE be sent to Congress demanding an embargo on munitions. On a single day 250,000 identical messages poured into Washington, and in Chi- cago alone the Conference paid the telegraph companies about $20,000. That the results were satisfactory to the German Government is evident from Count von Bernstorff's telegram of September 16, 1916, to the German Foreign Office: "The Embargo Conference, in regard to whose earlier fruitful co-operation Dr. Hale can give informa- tion, is just about to enter upon a vigorous cam- paign to secure a majority in both houses of Congress favorable to Germany and request further support. There is no possibility of our being compromised. Request telegraphic reply." This organization functioned to the very last months of the period of our neutral- ity and later Count von Bernstorff was again to telegraph Berlin for further sums to be spent on this and similar organizations which aimed to force pro-German policies through Congress. "I request authority to pay out up to $50,000 (fifty thousand dollars) in order, as on former occasions to influence Congress through the 222 WHY WE WENT TO WAR organization you know of, which can perhaps prevent war. "I am beginning in the meantime to act ac- cordingly. "In the above circumstances a public official German declaration in favor of Ireland is highly desirable, in order to gain the support of the Irish influence here." There is at present no doubt that actual brib- ery of Congress was intended by Franz von Rin- telen, and it is very possible that the same was true in the case of Count von Bernstorff and his society. Both Congressman Buchanan, who was the president of Labor's National Peace Council, and Ex-Congressman Fowler received money for their assistance in attempting to bribe Con- gress.* Money was also advanced according to the testimony of Meloy to Lamar, "the Wolf of Wall Street," f to be used in procuring the pas- sage of resolutions by Congress which should embarrass the government in the conduct of its relations with Germany. In addition to their purposes in influencing public opinion and legis- lation these and like societies were also used for other ends which do not concern us here. * German Plots and Intrigues. Issued by Committee on Public In- formation, p. 16. GERMAN INTRIGUE 223 The second phase of German intrigue we have described is the attempt to give illegal military assistance to Germany, and the effort to do this assumed likewise various forms. We can deal with only two that are characteristic. Immediately after the beginning of the war the German Government, through the Hamburg- American Line and its officials in New York, endeavored to send coal and other supplies to German war-ships which were raiding com- merce along both our coasts. Such action was a violation of American neutrality, and in order to evade the law the German agents detailed to this work took false oaths before Federal authorities concerning the nature, destination, and cargoes of their vessels. In addition to the aid and comfort given to Germany in this matter the plan was also aimed at causing fric- tion between the United States and the coun- tries with which it was at peace. Some of those implicated were convicted in December, 1915, of conspiracy to defraud the United States. The evidence at the trial proved that fraud and perjury were here, as in every phase of this German activity, committed under the direc- 224 WHY WE WENT TO WAR tion of officials protected by the diplomatic privileges held sacred by other nations. Though the results were meagre, the copy of Captain Boy-Ed's account at a New York bank indi- cates that he paid the Hamburg-American Line more than $3,000,000 for furthering Ger- many's naval operations from the United States. One of the phases of these efforts to give Germany direct military aid is more interest- ing than some, since it has its amusing side. In their eager desire to send troops and muni- tions to the Central Empires the German Em- bassy and its group of plotters overreached themselves very early in the game, and all the stages of their procedure were from the be- ginning known to our Department of Justice. In order to send German reservists abroad it was necessary that they be provided with Amer- ican passports, and with true German efficiency, therefore, an office was established in New York through the German Embassy and directed by Captain von Papen, military attache, where American passports were forged by wholesale. German consuls in distant cities like Chicago GERMAN INTRIGUE 225 and St. Paul were informed concerning this office and sent the reservists from their local- ities to the given address to be supplied. The operations were developed on so large a scale that the busy conspirators did not therefore notice the "infiltration" of a member of the United States Secret Service. They evidently believed that the United States, which sub- mitted to much more serious offenses, would not object, and, unfortunately, this belief in our indulgence was not misplaced. We have seen in the chapter on "Strict Neu- trality" that as early as January 20, 1915, the Secretary of State had called attention to the fact that persons of German nationality, under pretense of being American citizens, had ob- tained American passports for the purpose of returning to Germany without molestation by her enemies, and that "there are indications that a systematic plan" had been devised to obtain American passports through fraud for the purpose of securing passage for German officers and reservists desiring to return to Ger- many, "and that such fraudulent use of pass- ports by Germans can have no other effect than WHY WE WENT TO WAR to cast suspicion upon American passports in general." We have seen also that instead of taking any action against the German Embassy, which was discrediting American passports, our government merely made new regulations, and hoped that "this would prevent any further misuse of American passports."* The "indications" that a systematic plan was on foot were plain indeed. Hans von Wedell, who had managed it under Captain von Papen, took alarm and fled in November, 1914, with money supplied by his employer. There could have been no doubt as to the complicity of the German Embassy in the business, for the follow- ing letter from Von Wedell was in the posses- sion of our secret service: " His Excellency, the Imperial German Ambas- sador, Count von Bernstorff, Washington, D. C.: : . . . My work was done. At my de- parture, I left the service well organized, and * What discredit had been thrown upon all American passports by this counterfeiting is readily apparent. We give but a single instance. Mr. Arthur Gleason, a former correspondent and worker for the Red Cross, writes as follows: * IB October, 1914, two miles outside Ostend, I was arrested as a spy by the Belgians, and marched through the streets in front of a gun in the hands of a very young and very nervous soldier. The fitat- Major GERMAN INTRIGUE 227 worked out in minute detail, in the hands of my successor, Mr. Karl Ruroede, picked out by myself. . . . Also, Ruroede will testify to you that without my preliminary labors it would be impossible for him, as well as for Mr. von Papen, to forward officers in any way what- ever. , . . Ten days before my departure I learned from a telegram sent me by Mr. von Papen . . . that Dr. Starck had fallen into the hands of the British. That gentleman's forged papers were liable to come back and could ... be traced to me. Mr. von Papen had re- peatedly and urgently ordered me to hide my- self. Mr. Igel told me that I was taking the matter altogether too lightly, and that I ought, for God's sake, to disappear. . . . "With expressions of the most exquisite consideration, I am your Excellency's, "Very respectfully, " (Signed) HANS ADAM VON WEDELL." Hans von Wedell had in the words of the song gone and ta'en his wages (we know that in one month Von Papen had advanced to him nearly $3,000), but the office under his successor Ruroede functioned and prospered, for he was told me that German officers had been using American passports to enter the allied lines, and learn the number and disposition of troops. They had to arrest Americans on sight, and find out if they were mas- queraders. A little later one of our American ambassadors verified this by saying to me that American passports had been flagrantly abused." ("Golden Lads," by Arthur Gleason, p. 25.) 2S8 WHY WE WENT TO WAR now assisted by one of our own secret-service men who had entered his employ, and was watched by others. The connection of the of- fice with Von Papen and the German Embassy, and all the details of its operation and the sources of its funds were known to these detec- tives.. On January 2, the diligent Ruroede provided American passports for four German reservists. He had obtained them from the United States secret-service man. He put his four German reservists on board the Norwegian steamer Bergensfjord, but as the big liner dropped down the bay she was followed by a United States revenue cutter. At quarantine federal officers boarded the steamer, arrested the re- servists and brought them back to New York. The chain of evidence was complete. The com- plicity of the German Embassy was evident, but at the time action was only taken against Ruroede, and the German Embassy and the restless Von Papen were allowed to employ their talents elsewhere, and quite naturally the captain came to the conclusion that the Yankees were "idiotic." In this fashion not only were reservists sent abroad, but American GERMAN INTRIGUE 229 passports were procured which were used by German spies in Europe and in England. We have seen that the third line of policy pursued by the German representatives in this country was directed toward using the United States as a basis for hostile operations. These were directed particularly against India, Ire- land, and Canada. In this regard they were very active, though their success can hardly be called brilliant. The attempt to start a revolt in India was begun even before the declaration of war in 1914, and the German agents work- ing with Hindoo revolutionists started opera- tions in San Francisco, where the plotting was carried out under the direction of the German Consul Franz Bopp. With his assistants (they included Captain von Papen and Wolf von Igel) he was finally convicted in the federal court of San Francisco, in March, 1918, for "felonious conspiracy to set on foot a military enterprise to be carried on within the territory of the United States against India." The rami- fications of this plot were almost innumerable, and the amount of fraud and deceit required in prosecuting it through its various stages 230 WHY WE WENT TO WAR would have given pause to any other govern- ment. The telegram already quoted from For- eign Secretary Zimmermann to Count von Bernstorff shows that it was initiated at Berlin, and that its strands passed through our em- bassy. Agents were employed in Switzerland and in all sections of our country, though par- ticularly in Chicago and San Francisco. Large sums were spent in propaganda among the Hindoos in the United States, and bribery was very frequently resorted to. Arms and ammunition were purchased and vessels like the Annie Larsen and the Maverick were char- tered to carry them, and, of course, in order to have them cleared, false manifests were is- sued. When through the failure of some of the complicated arrangements part of these stores of arms and ammunition was landed at Hoquiam, Washington, Ambassador Bernstorff had the effrontery to request that they be turned over to the German consul at Seattle. While plans for supplying the projected Hindoo insurrectionists with arms and men were being carried out from San Francisco, a group of con- spirators in Chicago under German leadership GERMAN INTRIGUE 231 and financed by German money from the Ger- man Embassy was planning a simultaneous in- vasion of India from Siam. Various substations in the plot were established at Hawaii, Manila, and Bangkok. The extent of the plot may be gathered from the fact that in various parts of the country, and especially hi San Fran- cisco, well over a hundred German agents with their Hindoo fellow conspirators were indicted, and most of them convicted. If the Indian plot for all the sums* and in- genuity expended upon it proved a fiasco, much the same was true of the attempt to establish co-operation in America with the Irish Revo- lutionists. The failure was not due, however, to any unwillingness on the part of the im- perial German ambassador to give unstinted aid in these underhand and felonious projects^ which included the shipment of arms and sup- plies from America, and the telegrams from the " Military Information Bureau " in Ne\v York to Von Bernstorff sent in April, 1916, before Sir Roger Casement's blundering expedition, * Chakraberty on the witness-stand admitted having received from Wolf von Igel alone $60,000. 232 WHY WE WENT TO WAR leave no question as to the embassy's complic- ity in the matter. The aid given by Canada to Great Britain in the struggle against Germany early became a thorn in the side of Germany's representa- tives in this country, and they decided to take measures against the Dominion, using the United States as their base of operations. Their plans contemplated not only the crippling of Cana- dian commerce and industry by blowing up bridges, tunnels, canals, and manufacturing establishments, but even the carrying of the war into Canada. In February, 1915, Werner Horn, a German lieutenant, was ordered by Captain von Papen to blow up the Grand Trunk Railway bridge where it crosses from Vanceboro, Maine, into Canada. Von Papen supplied him with $700, and Horn was arrested after he had caused the explosion, was found guilty, and sentenced. Horn's adventure, however, was merely to have been a minor episode in a plot so extensive that it included the blowing up of the tunnels and bridges on the Canadian Pacific Railroad, the locks at Sault Ste. Marie, the tunnels from Port Huron to Sarnia under the St. Clair River, GERMAN INTRIGUE 233 the Welland Canal and important railroad junctions. Conspirators were sent out to do this by German consuls in various parts of the country, notably San Francisco and Chicago, and directly from New York by Von Papen. Enumeration of the various attempts made and of the tools hired by German agents or German-American sympathizers at the instiga- tion of German officials would be monotonous. A single instance must suffice. Captain von Papen picked as one of his col- laborators a German citizen, Von der Goltz. It was decided that he should blow up the Wel- land Canal, the grain-elevators at Fort William, and if possible the Sault Ste. Marie locks and railroad bridges. At the German Club in New York Von Papen supplied him with the neces- sary fuses, wires, and generators, and made^ arrangements through which he should be sup- plied with dynamite by Captain Hans Tauscher. He was further provided with funds by Von Papen, some of them in the form of a check on the Riggs National Bank at Washington (where the German Embassy had its deposits), and started for Buffalo with suitcases contain- ing 100 pounds of dynamite. In Buffalo his 234 WHY WE WENT TO WAR difficulties began when an American confeder- ate of Von Papen's failed to deliver the lat- ter's telegraphic instructions. After Von der Goltz had compromised himself, Von Papen, un- der an assumed name (Steffens), telegraphed his Buffalo agent: "Please instruct Taylor (Von der Goltz) cannot do anything more for him." He did, however, promise to arrange with Am- bassador Bernstorff for Von der Goltz's de- parture, and the arrangement was carried out, as the following receipt will show: YORK, October 1, 1914. "I acknowledge the receipt of $150.00 with the obligation of using the amount for a voyage to Germany. "(Berlin General Staff.) "H. VON DER GOLTZ." The stubs of Von Papen's check-book show that Von der Goltz had received from the German Embassy or its military attache about $1,800. Unlike Von der Goltz, many of the conspira- tors, like those sent out from the San Francisco or Chicago consulates or by Albert Kaltschmidt in Detroit, succeeded in entering Canada and in some cases in causing more or less important explosions. It can be readily imagined that GERMAN INTRIGUE 235 the moral character of some of the agents em- ployed was not very high, and yet some of them when it came to the sticking-point shrank from the wanton destruction of life involved in the tasks set them, as, for instance, when Kalt- schmidt hired Respa to blow up the Windsor Armory, which was filled with soldiers. Respa planted thirty sticks of dynamite as he had been instructed to do, but before leaving, realiz- ing that if his bomb exploded it would blow up the armory and "kill every man in it," he de- liberately fixed the bomb so that it would not explode. Some of Kaltschmidt's other attempts, were, however, more successful. Kaltschmidt was from the first liberally supplied with Ger- man funds by Von Papen's secretary, Wolf von Igel; but the complicity of the German Embassy in the plot is proved beyond question by the following note from Albert, the com- mercial attache of the German Embassy: "H. F. ALBERT, 45 BROADWAY, "NEW YORK, Oct. 4, 1915. "Chase National Bank, 57 Broadway, New York City: " Gentlemen: Please deposit with Knauth, Nachod and Kuhne, New York, $25,000 (twenty- five thousand dollars) for account of Mr. Kalt- 236 WHY WE WENT TO WAR schmidt, Detroit, and charge a like amount to my joint account with J. Bernstorff. ; ' Yours very truly, "HEINRICH F. ALBERT." At the same time that these attempts to cripple Canada were being made, Von Papen and Boy-Ed had devised a plan which they discussed with German reservists, and accord- ing to which they were to seize on the west coast of Canada, a spot where they could land German troops with the aid of German raiders. The reservists in the United States were to be sent to other neutral territory (probably Mex- ico), where they would be embarked. It was believed that this would, in the testimony of one of the confederates, " (1) Prevent the Canadian contingents then under training from sailing for Europe. "(2) Prevent Canada from supplying Eng- land with necessaries on account of their being needed in the country itself. "(3) Bring matters in the United States to a decision, the Government being forced either to supply both parties with arms and ammuni- tion, or to prohibit the export of these articles altogether." GERMAN INTRIGUE 237 This ambitious project, which had been elab- orated in the early months of the war, finally met with objection on the part of Von Bernstorff, who either feared that Canada had become too strong for them, or that the plan would involve them too openly with our government. But it was not only against Great Britain and her allies that the German representatives in this country plotted and acted. Having failed in their attempts to send aid directly to Germany or to cause any serious trouble in the British colonies, they next turned their attention to rendering the United States im- potent by interfering with our manufactures and destroying our commerce. That these plans were made with the full knowledge, and possibly at the suggestion of Germany's am- bassador, is plain from the following communi- cation: "IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY, "WASHINGTON, Nov. 4, 1916. "I hereby permit myself to recommend to you most warmly Dr. Karl O. Bertling, Direk- tor of the Amerika-Institute in Berlin. Dr. Bertling will take the liberty to lay before you some matters pertaining to the activity of the 238 WHY WE WENT TO WAR Central Bureau for German and Austro-Hun- garian workmen. This work as well as the collection of funds for its further extension are worthy of all sympathy. "Dr. Bertling is authorized to receive con- tributions in any amount. Checks are to be made payable to Hans Liebau, Treasurer. "Yours with special respect, " (Signed) J. VON BERNSTORFF." The purpose of this bureau is suggested in the following extract from Liebau's monthly report made to the German Embassy for September, 1916: "Many disturbances and suspensions which war material factories have had to suffer, and which it was not always possible to remove quickly, but which on the contrary often lead to long strikes, may be attributed to the ener- getic propaganda of the employment bureau." The attempt to paralyze industry by the creation of strikes was, as we have seen, the reason for Ambassador Dumba's dismissal. At the time when Dumba received his passports and suspicion was directed toward Von Bern- storff, the latter took the position that "this slander required no answer," and according GERMAN INTRIGUE 239 to Dumba "had the happy inspiration to re- fuse any explanation." But so determined was the German Government to tie up indus- try in this country that, not content with the dil- igence of Von Bernstorff, it sent to America to direct this enterprise the Kaiser's special friend and representative, Franz von Rintelen, of whose activities we have already learned. It was he who had started Labor's National Peace Council, one of whose main purposes was to provoke strikes in munition-factories, and he employed numerous agitators to do this with promises of from $5,000 to $10,000 reward in cases where they promoted "successful strikes." How eager Von Rintelen was to carry out his designs is evident from his proposal to pay the members of the International Longshore- men's Union $10 a week while idle, and at the time of making the proposal he sent word that he had the $1,035,000 necessary for the purpose. While Labor's National Peace Coun- cil was being organized, Von Rintelen's ac- counts with the Transatlantic Trust Company show that he paid out from April to August $468,000. It is pleasant to remember that 240 WHY WE WENT TO WAR here Greek met Greek, and that for all his dili- gence and munificence Von Rintelen received little in return. More successful were the attempts made to start fires and explosions in American muni- tion-factories. It would be impossible to give a list of all these, but some indication of their frequency and seriousness may be gleaned from the fact that at the time when the Ger- man agents were most active in this regard, within twenty-four hours between November 10 and 11, 1915, incendiary fires and explosions took place in the Bethlehem Steel Works, the Midvale Steel and Ordnance Company, the Baldwin Locomotive Works at Eddystone, and the John A. Roebling's Sons Company at Trenton, N. J. But besides the attempt to destroy our munition-factories, determined and systematic attempts, in many cases unfor- tunately successful, were made to blow up ships carrying munitions from this country to Eu- rope. To this end several bomb -manufactur- ing plants were established under the direc- tion of Captain von Papen and Wolf von Igel. When some of the conspirators were brought GERMAN INTRIGUE 241 to trial, one of the witnesses proved to be a detective who belonged to the New York "Bomb Squad." Under the pretense that he was a German secret-service man employed by Wolf von Igel (Von Papen's secretary), he had succeeded in making an appointment with Captain von Kleist, superintendent of one of these factories, and he gave the follow- ing account of the interview: "We sat down and we spoke for about three hours. I asked him the different things that he did, and said if he wanted an interview with Mr. von Igel, my boss, he would have to tell everything. So he told me that Von Papen gave Dr. Scheele, the partner of Von Kleist in this factory, a check for $10,000 to start this bomb factory. . . . He told me that he, Mr. von Kleist, and Dr. Scheele and a man by the name of Becker on the Friedrich der Grosse were making the bombs, and that Cap- tain Wolpert, Captain Bode, and Captain Stein- berg, had charge of putting these bombs on the ships; they put these bombs in cases and shipped them as merchandise on these steamers, and they would go away on the trip and the bombs would go off after the ship was out four or five days, causing a fire and causing the cargo to go up in flames. . . . He also told me that they have made quite a number of these bombs; 242 WHY WE WENT TO WAR that thirty of them were given to a party by the name of O'Leary, and that he took them down to New Orleans where he had charge of putting them on ships down there, this fellow O'Leary." Between three and four hundred bombs were manufactured by this group and fires are known to have been started by them on thirty-three ships sailing from New York alone. There were, however, other factories in the East, and in addition the German consul in San Francisco showed in this regard the same diligence in deviltry that he had in others. It is plain that the German Embassy and the German representatives in this country stopped at nothing in their attempt to advance their cause. We need not, therefore, be sur- prised in considering the last phase of their intrigue and plotting to find that, while they pretended to be at peace with us and protested friendship, they should all the time have been busily engaged in underhand plans to embroil the United States w r ith its neighbors. In this way they thought they could create a situation which would demand our undivided attention, and make it impossible for us either to export GERMAN INTRIGUE 243 munitions or to take any measures against Germany for her violation of our rights. The scheme to which the German officials contin- ually reverted was that of embroiling us with Mexico and Japan. In addition to his work in fomenting strikes Von Rintelen had evidently been given a special commission to start war if possible between ourselves and our southern neighbors. At his trial one of the witnesses testified that Rintelen had explained his pur- poses as follows: "That he came to the United States in order to embroil it with Mexico and Japan if neces- sary; that he was doing all he could and was going to do all he could to embroil this country with Mexico; that he believed that if the United States had a war with Mexico it would stop the shipment of ammunition to Europe; that he believed it would be only a matter of time until we were involved with Japan. "Rintelen also said that General Huerta was going to return to Mexico and start a revo- lution there which would cause the United States to intervene and so make it impossible to ship munitions to Europe. Intervention, he said, was one of his trump cards." Everything that could be done in furtherance of this plan in the way of encouraging and at- 244 WHY WE WENT TO WAR tempting to supply munitions to the Mexican rebels was done, and within Mexico itself Von Rintelen was in connection with other German agents who were conducting a powerful anti- American propaganda. This whole phase of his activity was to culminate in the notorious Zimmermann note, which was, however, not to become known in this country, at least not to the public till after our entry into the war. It will be cited later and proves a fitting climax to the three years of intrigue carried on by diplomats who spent what time they could spare from their underhand plotting, in protest- ing their friendship. The brief summary given above is sufficient to show that Von Bernstorff's activities were such that he deserved to be dismissed long be- fore he was. Our government seems to have been unwilling to act on facts established on unimpeachable evidence. If any one still under the spell of old ideas finds the record incredible or the complicity of the German Embassy in Von Papen's felonious attempts doubtful, he need merely scan the following accounts of the funds deposited to Von Papen's credit di- GERMAN INTBIGUE rectly by the German Embassy. Some of these deposits were made by Ambassador Ton Bexn- storff in person: 1914 Sept. 9 $1,116.20 Bernstorff. " 24 1,100.00 Oct. 21 1,000.00 Nov. 4 583.10 German Embassy. " 25 2,000.00 " Dec. 7 2,583.10 Bernstorff. 1915 Jan. 9 3,000.00 German Embassy. " 15 2,000.00 " " Feb. 5 2,000.00 Bernstorff. *' 24 1,500.00 German Embassy. " 25 3,600.00 " " 20 1,749.30 " May 26 1,166.20 " " June 1 583.10 " " July 20 1,154.30 " * Sept. 7 2,500.00 " " Oct. 14 2,500.00 " In December, 1915, our government finally took action not against Von Bernstorff but against Von Bernstorff's tools, and Von Papen and Boy-Ed were recalled. On that occasion the German Government at Berlin sent to the 246 WHY WE WENT TO WAK United States for publication in the press, the following official statement: "The German Government has naturally never knowingly accepted the support of any person, group of persons, society or organiza- tion seeking to promote the cause of Germany in the United States by illegal acts, by counsel of violence, by contravention of law, or by any means whatever that could offend the American people in the pride of their own authority." It is difficult to assess how far the facts re- counted influenced our government or people, for it is impossible to say how much was definitely known at Washington at any given tune. That these demonstrations of German bad faith became a factor in determining our attitude will be plain from President Wilson's statement which will be quoted in the conclud- ing chapter. CHAPTER IX PEACE PROPOSALS AS the war progressed during the period of **- the negotiations on the submarine ques- tion two things had become clearer with ev- ery month. In the first place, the issues of the war, which had at first been deliberately obscured by German diplomacy, were being gradually disclosed by her unmistakable con- duct. In the second place, as our own experi- ence proved, and as the President with his usual clear-sightedness had discerned, neutrality in so serious a conflict, involving such momentous interests, must become increasingly difficult, if not impossible. For very different reasons, then, by a curious coincidence, von Bethmann- Hollweg and President Wilson put forth at the same time proposals for peace. Perhaps nothing has been so difficult to understand as this seemingly similar action, for to the world at large and, indeed, to many of our people the very divergent motives which governed 247 248 WHY WE WENT TO WAR the Chancellor and our President were not clearly set apart. Let us, therefore, begin by saying that the President's action had been planned long before he knew of the German intention, and if we would understand the two proposals we must consider them separately. Let us examine therefore in some detail the German situation. With the publication of the statements by Doctor Miihlon and Prince Lichnowsky, the belief that Germany was re- sponsible for the war had naturally become a conviction. It is plain also that the German Government began it as a war of aggression, and though many of its subjects were and are still deluded, the progress of the war made its pur- poses clear, even though with characteristic duplicity it attempted to maintain to the end the fiction that it was fighting in self-defense. A large party, indeed, the most influential party in Germany, which included the militarists and Pan-Germanists, had, as we have seen, in- tended that the new war prophesied by Bern- hardi, and looked forward to as "The Day," should at last give Germany a considerable start toward the realization of Gross Deutsch- PEACE PROPOSALS land (greater Germany). The programme, as we saw in Chapter I, included annexation east and west. The adjoining peoples especially toward the east in Russia, the Balkans, and Asia Minor, were to be forced into the Empire, and the Hohenzollerns, who had made them- selves masters of all Germany, were in turn to make themselves masters of Europe and the world. It is in the following language that Naumann, a deputy of the Reichstag and one of the best-known political publicists of Ger- many expresses it: "And over all these; over the Germans, French, Danes, and Poles in the German Em- pire; over the Magyars, Germans, Roumanians, Slovaks, Croats, and Serbs in Hungary; over the Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, and southern Slavs in Austria, let us imagine once again the controlling concept of Mid-Europe." That Germany planned to carry out this programme in the World War became clearer when six of the great industrial and agricultural associations of Germany, on May 20, 1915, presented their petition to the Chancellor. They urged that Belgium should be subject 250 WHY WE WENT TO WAR to Germany in "military and tariff matters, as well as in currency, banking, and post." Northern France as far as the river Somme should also be annexed for "our future position at sea," and the industrial establishments in the annexed territories should be transferred to German hands. From Russia part of the Baltic Provinces and the territories to the south should be taken. Germany's need of new agri- cultural territory, of new mining and industrial districts, especially of the coal and iron of Bel- gium and northern France, was emphasized.* This was to be followed just a month later by a petition signed by 1,341 of the most important members of the university, church, official, legal, literary, and artistic circles. It advocated the annexation of the whole eastern part of France, from Belfort to the coast, and the transfer of the business under- takings and estates to German ownership. Bel- gium was to be held and the inhabitants allowed no political influence in the empire. The oc- cupied part of Russia was to be retained and the land turned over to Germany. Egypt was *See War Cyclopaedia article, "No Annexations, No Indemnities." PEACE PROPOSALS 251 to be taken from England. As to indemnities, "we ought not to hesitate to impose upon France as much as possible."* Subsequent statements to the same purport could be added, but we can be in no doubt where Germany stood after Ambassador Gerard s re- port of his interview with Von Bethmann-Holl- weg, while the German peace terms were still before the world. From the time when the question of peace was first broached Mr. Gerard asked the Chancellor and other officials what Germany's peace terms were. He could never succeed in drawing from them any definite terms, and on several occasions when he asked the Chancellor if Germany was willing to with- draw from Belgium, the Chancellor replied: : 'Yes, but with guarantees." He seemed un- willing to explain, but when pressed and asked directly what these guarantees were he replied: 'We must possibly have the forts of Liege and Namur; we must have other forts and garrisons throughout Belgium. We must have possession of the railroad lines. We must have possession of the ports and other means of com- *War Cyclopaedia, ibid. o WHY WE WENT TO WAR munication. The Belgians will not be allowed to maintain an army, but we must be allowed to retain a large army in Belgium. We must hare the commercial control of Belgium." Mr. Gerard explained that this left little for the Belgians except King Albert's right to an honor guard and residence in Brussels. The Chancellor continued, "We cannot allow Bel- gium to be an outpost (Vorwerk) of England," and Mr. Gerard replied: ' : 'I do not suppose the English, on the other hand, wish it to be- come an outpost of Germany, especially as von Tirpitz has said that the coast of Flanders should be retained in order to make war on England and America!' I continued, 'How about Northern France?' He said, 'We are willing to leave Northern France, but there must be a rectification of the frontier.' I said, 'How about the Eastern frontier?' He said, 'We must have a very substantial rectification of our frontier.' I said, ' How about Roumania ? ' He said, 'We shall leave Bulgaria to deal with Roumania.' I said, 'How about Serbia?' He said, 'A very small Serbia may be allowed to exist, but that is a question for Austria. Aus- PEACE PROPOSALS 233 tria must be left to do what she wishes to Italj, and we must have indemnities from all countries and all our ships and colonies back/ "Of course, 'rectification of the frontier* is a polite term for annexation."* We have considered Germany's war aims. Let us now consider for a moment the military situation when she made her proffers in Decem- ber, 1916. She had been amazingly successful up to this point on practically all fronts. She occupied practically all of Belgium, Serbia> Montenegro, a large part of Roumania, Poland, and important stretches of Russia, and the coal and iron deposits of northern France. Russia at this time was still in the war and, if reorgan- ized and provided with munitions, the lack of which had caused her disastrous retreat, she would become again a formidable enemy. The threat of the Anglo-French successes on the Somme (1916) had become so serious that the militar/ authorities were already considering the retreat to the Hindenburg line in France, * "Mr P* Tears in Germaay," by Junes W. Gerard, pp. S65-SM. 254 WHY WE WENT TO WAR and Von Bissing had expressed the fear that it might become necessary to evacuate Belgium. The situation, therefore, though it appeared outwardly very favorable, was in reality fraught with grave possibilities. The arch-enemy, Eng- land, had not yet been subdued. As the situa- tion presented itself to the Germans it was probably in terms like this: We must either now make peace on the basis of our present very large holdings of territory, and prepare to settle the score with England later, or else start a war to the death on England and de- stroy her commerce and fleet. If peace could be made on the basis of extent of occupied territory (and Germany suggested no other basis), she could not help coming out with enormously extended frontiers. She held all the trumps, and in the diplomatic game she must inevitably win. If, however, the Allies proved unwilling to make peace on such terms, Germany had long been preparing a weapon which the infallible military authorities as- sured her would starve England out and bring her to her knees, probably within three months, within six months at the latest. That weapon PEACE PROPOSALS 255 Was the submarine ruthlessly employed. The one drawback was the possibility of driving sorely tried neutrals into the arms of her enemies. From the American attitude on the Sussex affair it was a plain inference that danger threat- ened from that quarter. The plan to use the submarine ruthlessly had, however, long since been decided upon. Indeed, immediately after the receipt in Berlin of our last Sussex note, Ambassador Gerard was so convinced that the rulers of Germany would at some future date take up ruthless submarine warfare, that he warned the State Department that such war- fare would possibly come in the autumn or at any rate about February or March, 1917.* This may explain why President Wilson made the speeches which so startled America about the great dangers that threatened and the pos- sibilities of the conflagration reaching us from one day to the next. When later, in September, Mr. Gerard returned to the United States, Von Jagow insistently urged him to make every effort to induce the President to take steps * Gerard, "My Four Years in Germany." p. 845. 256 WHY WE WENT TO WAR toward bringing about peace.* Germany had been industriously building submarines and was ready, so she thought, to give England the death-stroke. Any peace that would be concluded would have to be a "German peace," and if peace were refused the blame would be put upon the Allies. The United States and other neutrals could, therefore, offer no objection to Ger- many's using the submarine, and riding rough- shod over neutral rights, as she had already attempted to do at the time of the declaration of the war zone in February of 1915. At the meeting of the Reichstag, therefore, on December 12, 1916, in a speech in which he explained the very favorable situation of the German armies, and denied there was any starvation or any disturbances in Germany, Von Bethmann-Hollweg announced that his Majesty had decided to stretch out his hand for peace at the price of Germany's "free fu- ture." This phrase, whose meaning, like a gas, was capable of indefinite expansion, was one of the * Gerard, "My Four Yean in Germany," p. 84C. PEACE PROPOSALS 37 type that is to be found in every German pro- posal. The communication further insisted that the Central Powers had been obliged "to take up arms to defend justice and the liberty of national evolution." How they had defined justice we had learned from their actions in Belgium and on the high seas, and what they meant b/ national evolution is plain from the exposition by Heir Naumann quoted above. The note made no 'concrete suggestions. Its two material assertions were that the Entente bore the responsibility for beginning the war and that the Central Powers were now vic- torious. The Allies naturally, in the phrase of Lloyd George, refused to put their heads into a noose of which Germany held the free end, and im- mediately and from practically all of the Allied countries came statements to the effect that they could not deal with her on this basis.* The joint Entente reply of December 30, 1916, was to the effect that a mere suggestion, * Premier Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons, December 19. 1910. Premier Briand's speech in the French Chamber of Deputies, December IS. Resolution of the Russian Duma, December 15. Baron fionnino'a speech in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, December 18. 258 WHY WE WENT TO WAR without statement of terms, that negotiations should be opened, is not an offer of peace, and that this sham proposal, lacking substance and precision, appeared to be less an offer of peace than a war manoeuvre, which in fact it was. Considering the character of Germany's two statements and her previous attitude toward treaties it hardly seemed that war could be ended by accepting her word. Let us turn from this to a consideration of the course of our own President. His proposal had undoubtedly begun to take shape in his own mind even before the Sussex affair had been settled. In an address at Washington before the League to Enforce Peace, on May 27, 1916, he had said: "We are participants whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also . . . what affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia." Against her will America had become con- vinced that she could no longer live in the charmed isolation which had been possible in the days of Washington and Monroe. The PEACE PROPOSALS 259 submarine, naval cruiser and transport, the ca- ble and wireless had brought us, whether we would or not, to the shores of Europe. "Amer- ica up to the present time has been, as if by deliberate choice, confined and provincial, and it will be impossible for her to remain confined and provincial. Henceforth she belongs to the world and must act as part of the world. " ; Furthermore, as the President was to announce at Shadow Lawn on October 16: "And now, by circumstances which she did not choose, over which she had no control, she [America] has been thrust out into the great game of mankind, on the stage of the world itself, and here she must know what she is about, and no nation in the world must doubt that all her forces are gathered and organized in the interest of just, righteous, and humane government.'* His whole thought, or as much of it as he dared disclose without violating state secrets at the time, was even more clearly put in his address at Cincinnati on October 26: "I believe that the business of neutrality is over, not because I want it to be over, but * Presideat Wilson, October 5. 1916. 360 WHY WE WENT TO WAR I mean this, that war now has such a scale that the position of neutrals sooner or later becomes intolerable." The burden of unsettled cases against the Allies and the much more serious questions against Germany was becoming so great that there was no telling when we might be forced to break under the strain. The belligerents naturally tended to increase their pretensions. We were the last great independent neutral, yet how long we could remain so was doubtful. If peace was to come before we were forced to enter the war, we must help to make it come.* The decision about the submarine Deutschland had been made against the pro- test of the Allies. Many of our own people were protesting against the conduct of the U-51 in sinking vessels carrying returning Americans just off our coast. Our own people were aroused against the deportation of the innocent civilian population in Belgium and northern France. Thousands of American citi- zens were protesting to Washington against the * How serious this strain was becoming is evident from Secretary Lansing's statement given to the press on December 18, 1916, and imme- diately withdrawn. PEACE PROPOSALS 261 outrage to humanity which we could not sit by and regard with unconcern under penalty of stultifying ourselves. This had impressed Washington so seriously that it had become the subject of correspondence with our ministers abroad.* The reports of Germany's plans which Am- bassador Gerard brought to Washington made it a case of now or never. For this reason and without knowing anything about the German peace manoeuvre, and doubtless without having been impressed by Von Jagow's urging, Presi- dent Wilson prepared an identic note to all the belligerents, which makes no pretense of being purely disinterested. "In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand * Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Duties, European War, No. 4, pp. 357-S7S. 262 WHY WE WENT TO WAR ready, and even eager, to co-operate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with every influence and resource at their command. But the war must first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be concluded they are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate in- terest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situa- tion of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be done civili- zation itself which can never be atoned for or repaired." * ; He asked therefore that the leaders of the several belligerents make statements of the "precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out." It was evident that he hoped to bring about some "concert of free peoples," before "resentments were kindled that could never cool and despairs engendered from which there could be no recovery." The spirit of this communication was worlds removed from that of Germany, and nothing * President Wilson's Peace Note, December 18, 1916. PEACE PROPOSALS 263 proved the insincerity of the German claim so completely as her answer to this frank and direct request. This idea of a peace based on principles plainly embarrassed her. She replied lamely and evasively that it was the view of the Imperial Government "that the great work for the prevention of future wars can first be taken up only after the ending of the present conflict of exhaustion." The reply proved, as all German history might have led us to foresee, that Germany wanted no concert of free peoples and no league to enforce peace. She did not wish to be forced to any statement of principle, so contented herself with assurances of friend- ship and the suggestion that "a direct exchange of views appears to the Imperial Government as the most suitable way of arriving at the de- sired result." In other words she wanted a peace not based on any recognition of the rights of small nations or on any other recognized principle that conflicted with her notion of her own "national evolution" and "free future." * * German Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note, December 26, 1916. It is interesting to note that the German Government made no definite proposal and did not suggest even a return to the "status quo ante bel- lum" either in her own bid for peace or in her reply to President Wilson. 264 WHY WE WENT TO WAR The reply of the Allies was far more definite. They were heartily in favor of the "creation of a league of nations to insure peace and jus- tice throughout the world," and recognized "all the advantages for the cause of humanity and civilization which the institution of interna- tional agreements destined to avoid violent con- flict between nations would prevent."* They insisted, however, with right that the Central Empires were responsible for the war, and pro- tested against the statement made in the Presi- dent's request that all of the belligerents seemed to be fighting for the same thing. For to the last the President had remained charitable and refrained from judging the motives of the Cen- tral Powers. It was natural, however, that the Allies should have refused to allow them- selves to be classed on the same footing with the Central Powers, and Belgium quite cor- Von Bethmann-Hollweg's statement to Ambassador Gerard shows that she counted on much more than this. In President Wilson's Note to the Russian People of June 9, 1917, he makes plain that the status quo ante could not be accepted as a satisfactory basis for future peace. " It was the status quo ante out of which this iniquitous war issued forth, the power of the Imperial German Government within the empire and its wide-spread domination and influence outside that empire. That status must be altered in such fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing from ever happening again." * Entente Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note, January 10, 1917. PEACE PROPOSALS 265 rectly and in a spirit of wounded aggrievance sent a separate note in which she claimed the proud right to say that she had taken up arms to defend her existence, and that it was unfair to think that Germany was fighting for the same principle or the same ends.* All of the Allies, however, agreed that they wished to attain a peace which would assure them "reparation, restitution, and guarantees," to which they held themselves entitled by the aggressions committed against them. With regard to the conditions of peace for the dif- ferent members of the Entente they specified how in general these principles must be applied, though they could not give all of the details until the beginning of negotiations. They closed with their assurance that they wished a peace based upon principles of liberty and justice, and the inviolable fidelity to interna- tional obligations. The results were exactly what might have been expected. Germany could hardly have set forth a principle for which she was fighting, as there was none which she had not violated in her fight. She wanted an- * Belgiam Note Supplementary to Entente Reply. 266 WHY WE WENT TO WAR nexations and prestige. Though the President was probably disappointed since he may have hoped the military situation of Germany was serious enough to abate her pretensions, yet he could hardly have expected much more. He has the satisfaction, however, of having given Germany every opportunity and made her every concession consistent with our honor and independence. The answer of Germany indicated that further efforts along this line would be useless, but the President made one more desperate and unavailing effort by stat- ing before Congress on January 22, 1917, the bases and principles of the peace which Amer- ica could accept, ratify, and assist in maintain- ing. It was to be the peace of justice. The rights of all peoples to determine their govern- ment in the future were to be recognized as well as the rights of all to the free highways of the sea (for which Germany claimed to be contending), and this peace was to be achieved without the crushing of any of the belligerents. It was to be the "peace without victory." But all his eloquence and good-will were wasted on the leaders of Germany. They were not PEACE PROPOSALS 267 willing to consider proposals of principles and had already made their choice. Either the Allies must accept a German peace or America would have to accept the last reckless phase of ruthlessness. CHAPTER X THE FINAL CHALLENGE WHILE the American people were still earnestly discussing President Wilson's proposals for a world peace made in his ad- dress before the Senate on January 22, the German ambassador handed to the Secretary of State along with a formal note a memoran- dum which contained the following statement: "The Imperial Government, therefore, does not doubt that the Government of the United States will understand the situation thus forced upon Germany by the Entente Allies* brutal methods of war and by their determination to destroy the Central Powers, and that the Government of the United States will further realize that the now openly disclosed intentions of the Entente Allies give back to Germany the freedom of action which she reserved in her note addressed to the Government of the United States on May 4, 1916.* "Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures of her enemies by * Any such interpretation of the German note had been specifically precluded by the American note of May 8, 1916. See Chapter VIII. 268 THE FINAL CHALLENGE 269 forcibly preventing after February 1, 1917, in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean all naviga- tion, that of neutrals included, from and to France, etc. All ships met within the zone will be sunk." * The precipitancy of Germany's action showed that this move had been prepared in advance, that she had already decided upon her second alternative, and to any negotiated peace of principle she preferred a ruthless war. The hollowness of her peace proposals had al- ready become painfully evident. She had made the manoeuvre for the reasons discussed in the last chapter and with the hope of dividing the belligerent peoples and of making neutrals be- lieve that a "new situation" had been created. Apart from the great zones declared in the Mediterranean by her obedient ally, Austria- Hungary, prohibited zones extended in a broad belt from Spain to the Faroe Islands. If she could do this there was no reason why she should not extend it to our own three-mile limit, and, indeed, to our very shores. But * Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments, etc.. European War, No. 4, pp. 405-407. 270 WHY WE WENT TO WAR more serious and amazing than the decree of this zone itself was the curt statement that all ships met within the zone would be sunk. We had announced in our note to Germany of April 18, 1916,* that, unless the German Government immediately declared and effected an abandonment of its present methods of sub- marine warfare, the " Government of the United States could have no choice but to sever diplo- matic relations with the German Empire alto- gether." There was, therefore, no possibility of argument or discussion. Germany declared not only that she expected to revert to the methods she had employed before the sinking of the Sussex, but that she planned to enter upon a warfare even more ruthless which would accept no restraint of law whatever. She was threatening not only to violate all rules of international law, but also the solemn promise made to the United States. It was not surprising, therefore, that the President for a time should have been non- plussed. He refused to believe that Germany could mean what she seemed to say and spoke like an honest man, who, stunned by a blow, * Cf. Chapter VIII. THE FINAL CHALLENGE 271 still feels that his hurt may be due not to wil- ful attack but to some incomprehensible ac- cident. Though his course of action was clearly indicated, he still desired to be charitable in his interpretation. In his address to Congress on February 3, he was to take Congress and the people very fully into his confidence: "Notwithstanding this unexpected action of the German Government, this sudden and deeply deplorable renunciation of its assurances, given this Government at one of the most criti- cal moments of tension in the relations of the two governments, I refuse to believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do. I cannot bring myself to be- lieve that they will indeed pay no regard to the ancient friendship* between their people and * This traditional friendship had been insisted upon in many of the German communications with our Government. The following are expressions of German opinion on the United States at the time of the war with Spain: The Cologne Zeitung wrote, on April 22, 1898: "Our sympathy be- longs to Spain, because she represents international law." The Kreutzzeitung of April 28: "The lowest motives brought about this war." Of April 27: "Open greed for plunder occasioned this war." The Vossische Zeitung of April 8: "The American people have not the right to assume at once the r6le of judge and dictator." Of April 10: "The whole American republic was founded upon the violation of the rights of other peoples." The Taegliche Rundschau: "American politicians are pocketbook pa- triots, who allow themselves to be bought and sold by the industrial millionaires. Their God is Mammon, and they betray their own coun- try." 272 WHY WE WENT TO WAR our own or to the solemn obligations which have been exchanged between them, and destroy American ships and take the lives of American citizens in the wilful prosecution of the ruthless naval programme they have announced their intention to adopt. "Only actual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now." There was no possible alternative, and pass- ports were, therefore, issued to Ambassador von Bernstorff by Secretary of State Lansing on this eventful date. Let us try to understand why Germany took upon herself the guilt for this additional breach of faith. But let us not make the mistake of attributing to Germany the ordinary principles of political morality. The explanation was simple, and was bluntly given to the Reichstag by the German Chancellor in an address of January 31. He had been Chancellor at the time of the Sussex negotiations, and the promise made by Germany had been freely given after due deliberation and with the alternative of severing diplomatic relations frankly offered. "The question of the U-boat war, as the gentle- men of the Reichstag will remember, has oc- THE FINAL CHALLENGE 273 cupied us three times in this committee, in March, May, and September, last year [1916]. On each occasion in an exhaustive statement I expounded for and against in this question." (The meeting in May was evidently the one held at the time when, after weighing all sides of the question, he and his government had made the promise to America.) "I emphasized on each occasion," continued Von Bethmann- Hollweg, "that ... I was speaking pro tern- pore, and not as a supporter in principle or an opponent in principle of the unrestricted em- ployment of the U-boats, but in consideration of the military, political, and economic situa- tion as a whole. "I always proceeded from the standpoint as to whether an unrestricted U-boat war would bring us nearer to a victorious peace or not. Every means, I said in March, that is calcu- lated to shorten the war is the humanest policy to follow. When the most ruthless methods are considered as the best calculated to lead us to a victory and to a swift victory, I said at that time, then they must be employed." He had confessed his guilt in the case of Bel- 274 WHY WE WENT TO WAR gium at the beginning of the war. Let us see how he will do it now. He proceeded: "This moment has now arrived. Last Au- tumn the time was not yet ripe, but to-day the moment has come when, with the greatest prospect of success, we can undertake this enter- prise. We must, therefore, not wait any longer. Where has there been a change? "In the first place, the most important fact of all is that the number of our submarines has very considerably increased as compared with last spring, and thereby a firm basis has been created for success. The second code- cisive reason is the bad wheat harvest of the world." We would expect that he would now go on to mention the third and all-important con- sideration, a solemn promise given to another great state. We are mistaken. The promise made is not even mentioned. It had been given only to deceive America and to give Germany time to build more submarines which she had evidently been doing at the very time when the promise was made. Unabashed, he con- tinued : "If we may now venture to estimate the positive advantages of an unrestricted U-boat THE FINAL CHALLENGE 275 war at a very much higher value than last spring, the dangers which arise for us from the U-boat *var have correspondingly decreased since that time." He had consulted not the German people, he had consulted not his conscience, he had consulted Hindenburg, and explained that, "A few days ago Marshal von Hindenburg described to me the situation as follows: 'Our front stands firm on all sides. We have everywhere the requisite reserves. The spirit of the troops is good and confident. The military situation, as a whole, permits us to accept all consequences which an unrestricted U-boat war may bring about, and as this U-boat war in all circum- stances is the means to injure our enemies most grievously, it must be begun.' ' This was all, but it threw a long stream of light over the whole course of the war to which we had deliberately and officially closed our eyes. It explained to us what had happened to the treaty guaranteeing Belgium, it explained to us at last, and made only too clear, the reasons for German atrocities on land and sea. It gave us a stake in this war. It was no longer for us 276 WHY WE WENT TO WAR merely a question of humanity or of principle. It was a question of immediate interest, of self- defense against this hopelessly aggressive and militaristic power whose policy was again threatening not only the foundations of inter- national law but ourselves. The principle or rather the excuse of "mili- tary necessity" had become now merely mili- tary expediency. As Secretary of State Lan- sing was to put it: "It is this disclosure of the character of the Imperial German Government which is the un- derlying cause of our entry into the war. We had doubted, or at least many Americans had doubted, the evil purposes of the rulers of Germany. Doubt remained no longer. "In the light of events we could read the past, and see that for a quarter of a century the absorbing ambition of the military oligarchy which was the master of the German Empire was for world dominion. Every agency in the fields of commerce, industry, science, and diplo- macy had been directed by the German Gov- ernment to this supreme end. Philosophers and preachers taught that the destiny of Ger- many was to rule the world, thus preparing the minds of the German people for the time when the mighty engine which the German Government had constructed should crush all THE FINAL CHALLENGE 277 opposition and the German Emperor should rule supreme." * We were not dealing with a people, we were dealing with a group of irresponsible plotters who had long been accepted as rulers by a people obsessed by the idea of their own su- periority, which raised them not only above other states, but above the right and those laws on which all states are based. If then we came to speak of a war between democracy and autocracy, what we meant will be clear if we compare Germany's course in this affair with President Wilson's, or consider for a mo- ment a sentence in the First Inaugural of the first President of the Republic. At that time Washington had announced: " . . . The foundation of our national policy will be laid in the pure and immutable prin- ciples of private morality, and the pre-eminence of free government be exemplified by all the attributes which can win the affection of its citizens and command the respect of the world. I dwell on this prospect with every satisfaction which an ardent love for my country can in- * Cf. "A War of Self-Defense," by Robert Lansing. Louis F. Post. Committee on Public Information, p. 4. 278 WHY WE WENT TO WAR spire, since there is no truth more thoroughly established than that there exists in the economy and course of nature an indissoluble union between virtue and happiness; between duty and advantage; between the genuine maxims of an honest and magnanimous policy and the solid rewards of public prosperity and felicity; since we ought to be no less persuaded that the propitious smiles of Heaven can never be expected on a nation that disregards the eternal rules of order and right which Heaven itself has ordained; and since the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered, perhaps, as deeply, as finally, staked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people." Instead of any such principle, whenever a question of German policy was to be decided, the Chancellor, who was not responsible to any Reichstag or any people, consulted a Hinden- burg or a Von Tirpitz or a Ludendorff, and in secret decided upon a war or the violation of a treaty. Upon their action there was no check, and argument was useless, since their promises were without value. Aggression was the very condition of the life of this militaristic state, and the natural attitude of all other na- THE FINAL CHALLENGE 279 tions had, therefore, to be one of self-defense un- til the present Germany was overthrown. The fundamental antagonisms which set our- selves and Prussia asunder were now clear as day. It was plain also why Germany received coldly President Wilson's proposal for a Concert of Powers. It was also plain why at The Hague Conference she had stood in the way of general disarmament. The] army was the life of this state, its one reason for being, and Professor Delbriick wrote in 1914: "Any one who has any familiarity at all with our officers and generals knows that it would take another Sedan, inflicted on us instead of by us, before they would acquiesce in the con- trol of the army by the German Parliament." We now understood why she was the only one of the great Powers that had refused to sign with us an arbitration treaty. Weak na- tions she crushed without regard or mercy. In this way she had started the recent war on Serbia, and had achieved her first characteristic triumph in Belgium. Strong nations, of whose power she was more jealous and against whom 280 WHY WE WENT TO WAR her animosity was therefore more particularly directed, she circumvented by ruse and at- tempted to destroy by sudden treacherous strokes. The difference between the spirit of the two nations was illustrated in the treatment accorded to the two departing ambassadors. The German consular officials and representa- tives were treated with courtesy, safe-conducts were procured for them, and on February 14 they departed for Europe. Ambassador Gerard, on the other hand, was held in Berlin against his will from Monday until Saturday, much of that time in his house, cut off from communica- tion with the outside world, his telephone for a time having been disconnected and his mail withheld. He was for some days unable to communicate with other officers or his govern- ment, or to transmit instructions to consular officials. They attempted to dragoon him into signing a treaty, while thus kept in ignorance of events, and it was only after this was dis- covered to be impossible that he was allowed to proceed on his way to Switzerland.* Many Americans, from having heard it repeated so * ''My Pour Years in Germany," p. 383. THE FINAL CHALLENGE 281 frequently in our diplomatic correspondence, had come to believe that there was a particular friendship existing between the German people and ourselves. When Ambassador Gerard re- turned and was free to speak, he told a quite different story. Very early in the war the Amer- ican flag was covered with crape and laid at the feet of the statue of Frederick the Great with a placard insulting our government, and he had had difficulty in having it removed. During the winter of the submarine con- troversy before the sinking of the Lusitania, one of the most conservative newspapers, the Frankfurter Zeitung, printed an interview with Von Tirpitz thinly veiled as a high naval au- thority. In this interview the "high naval authority" advocated ruthless submarine war with England, promising to effect thereby the speedy surrender of that country. After the surrender, which was to include the whole British fleet, the German fleet with this acces- sion of strength was to sail for America and exact from us indemnities sufficient to pay the whole cost of the war. After his fall Von Tirpitz, in a letter to some 282 WHY WE WENT TO WAR admirers who had sent him verses and a wreath, advocated holding the coast of Flanders as a necessity for the war against England and America.* Zimmermann had made it plain to Colonel House on the latter's visit that Germany was ready to go to war with the United States. They were the more ready to do this as they scorned us for our impotence and insisted that "public sentiment of your country is such that you will not be able to raise an army large enough to make any impression." f Germany's purposes toward us were then or were soon to become evident. With char- acteristic indirection before his departure, Von Bernstorff requested the Swiss Minister to say that the German Government was now as be- fore willing to negotiate with the United States, "providing that the commercial blockade against England will not be broken thereby." Secretary Lansing answered to the effect "that the Government of the United States would gladly discuss with the German Government any questions it might propose for discussion * Gerard, "My Four Years in Germany," p. 249. f Ibid., p. 336. THE FINAL CHALLENGE 283 were it to withdraw its proclamation of the 31st of January in which and without previous intimation of any kind it cancelled the assur- ances which it had given." * Ambassador von Bernstorff further requested urgently that no measures be taken until he should have had an opportunity of laying the matter before his own government. The Presi- dent was evidently willing to make this further concession, and took no decisive action until he addressed Congress on February 26, asking for a grant of power. He was still unwilling to make war and hoped that "it will not be necessary to put armed forces anywhere into action," though he held that we must defend our commerce and the lives of our people with great and steadfast purpose. Germany had evidently already put her threat into execution and had sunk on February 3 the American ship Housatonic, and on February 13 the Lyman M. Law. The President, therefore, wished authorization to supply our merchant ships "with defensive arms should that become neces- * Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Duties. European War, No. 4. pp. 414-415. 284 WHY WE WENT TO WAR sary, and with the means of using them, and to employ any other instrumentalities or methods that may be necessary and adequate to protect our ships and their cargoes in their peaceful and legitimate pursuits of the seas." Congress was overwhelmingly in favor of grant- ing this request and more than five hundred out of 531 members of the two Houses of Con- gress were ready and eager to act. But a fili- buster by a handful of "wilful men" led by Senator LaFollette prolonged debate until the expiration of the congressional session March 4, and made action impossible. On March 12, however, orders were finally issued to arm American ships against submarines. There could no longer be any doubt about Germany's intentions. On March 2, she had continued the sinking of American vessels, and there were added to the list the Algonquin, March 2, 1917; the Vigilancia, March 16; the City of Memphis and the Illinois, March 17; the Healdton March 21 (the latter sunk even outside the prohibited zone); and the Aztec, * The right to do this is plainly implied in the President's constitu- tional powers. He wished, however, to feel that he had the authority of Congress behind him. THE FINAL CHALLENGE 285 April 1. Up to this time 226 Americans, many of them women and children, had lost their lives by the action of German submarines. It was not necessary after what had already hap- pened for the German Government to give us any further evidence of perfidy. It was, how- ever, to do so, and to allow by mischance to fall into our hands a despatch which is remark- able, even in the history of her own tortuous and dishonest diplomacy. The document came to the knowledge of our State Department dur- ing the last week in February. It had been forwarded by Zimmermann, the German For- eign Minister to the German Minister in Mex- ico. It had been written on January 19, in other words, while we were still discussing peace, three days before President Wilson is- sued his proposal for world peace, and twelve days before Germany announced her intention of resuming unrestricted submarine warfare. It read as follows: "On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this it is our intention to endeavor to keep neu- tral the United States of America. If this at- 286 WHY WE WENT TO WAR tempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Ari- zona. The details are left to you for settle- ment. You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in great con- fidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States and suggest that the President of Mexico on his own initiative should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan : at the same time offer to mediate between Germany and Japan. Please call to the atten- tion of the President of Mexico that the em- ployment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months." Patience was no longer a virtue. On April 2, the President summoned an extra session of Congress, and addressed the Senate as follows: "... The present German submarine war- fare against commerce is a warfare against Mankind. It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been THE FINAL CHALLENGE 287 sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. ... There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ig- nored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life. "With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it in- volves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war. ... It will involve the utmost practicable co-operation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany. . . . "We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not 88 WHY WE WENT TO WAR upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be de- termined upon in the old unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers, and wars were provoked and waged in the in- terest of dynasties or of little groups of am- bitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make con- quest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly con- trived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the care- fully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the na- tion's affairs. "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of demo- cratic nations. No autocratic Government could be trusted to keep faith within it or to observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner THE FINAL CHALLENGE 289 circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of man- kind to any narrow interest of their own. . . . * ... The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemni- ties for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of man- kind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them. The reasons given by the President set forth so calmly and judicially the main points then immediately at issue that it is hardly neces- sary to discuss them further. He was right in asserting that the war had been brought about without the previous knowledge of the Ger- man people. He was still, however, too charitable in believing that it was brought about without the tacit approval of at least a large majority. Four days later, on April 6, 1917, Congress 290 WHY WE WENT TO WAR decreed that "the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Gov- ernment which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared." The historical documents make plain how slowly, how deliberately, how unwillingly we were pushed into war and for what reasons. Principles were involved and they were, to be sure, the highest principles known to free men. But in the face of the record it is a mistake for any one to believe that we went into this war to fight any other nation's battles. If ever we were threatened in our own existence it was in the years 1914-1917. No cause was ever more truly or directly our own, or involved more completely the fundamental basis of our government than the cause in which we are now engaged. If for the Germans, with their philosophy of aggression, it was a question of "world power or downfall," for us, with our traditions of independence, it was a case of vic- tory or annihilation as a free people. What tolerance and a love of peace could do to prevent this calamity had been done. So long as we had the poor security of "a scrap THE FINAL CHALLENGE 291 of paper" between ourselves and Germany we treated her as a friend. Never until our entry into the war did our government in a single instance deviate from the course of strict neu- trality as interpreted by intelligent, conscientious and impartial judges. We had closed our eyes to Germany's deliberate violation of treaties, to her brutal and inhuman disregard of all the laws of war on land. We had refrained from protesting her offenses against The Hague Con- ventions which we ourselves had signed with her; we had overlooked her attacks on our rights on the seas, and accepted settlements and a promise for the deaths of over two hun- dred of our citizens. Our President worked loyally for a peace of principle at a tune when Germany proclaimed it was her desire to make peace, and yet even while she said it, she was conspiring against us in secret, until for the sake of our existence and our honor we replied at last and declared upon her an honest war in the open. A 000 627 083 9 3 1210 00449 8943