UC-NRLF GIFT OF < v HINDU BOOKS PUBLISHED BY THE TRANSLATOR OF THIS VOLUME. A'tma-bodha, attributed to S'ankara A'charya, with its Commen^ tary ; also the Tattworbodha : being two Treatises of Indian Monism. Mirzapore : 1852. Rdja-nUi ; a Collection of Hindu Apologues, in the Braj-bhasha Lan- guage. Revised edition, with a Preface, Notes, and Supplemental Glos- sary. Allahabad ! 1854. ftdnkhya-pravachana-bhdshya ; a Commentary on the Aphorisms of the Hindu Atheistic Philosophy, by Vijnana Bhikshu. Nos. 94, 97, and 141 of the Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta : 1854-6. Stirya-siddhdnta ; an ancient System of Hindu Astronomy : with Ranganatha's Exposition, the Gtidhdrtha-prakds' aka. Nos. 79, 105, 115, and 146 of the Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta : 1854-1859. Vdsavadat td ; a Romance, by Subandhu : accompanied by S'ivarama Tripathin's Perpetual Gloss, entitled Darpana. Nos. 116, 130, and 148 of the Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta : 1855-1859. A Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems. Published by order of the Government N. W. P Calcutta: 1859. Das'a-rtipa; Hindu Canons of Dramaturgy, by Dhananjaya : with the Exposition of Dhanika, the Avaloka. Bibliotheca Indica, new series. In the press. Bhdratiya-ndtya-s'dstra ; or Bharata's Dramatic Institute. Biblio- theca Indica, new series. In the press. Sdnkhya-sdra ; a Treatise of Sankhya Philosophy, by Vijnana Bhik- shu. Bibliotheca Indica, new series. In the press. A RATIONAL REFUTATION TfJE BY NEHEMIAH NI'LAKANTHA S'ASTRF GORE. "I TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL HINDI', PRINTED AND MANUSCRIPT, FITZ-EDWARD HALL, D. C. L., OXON., H. M.'s INSPECTOR OP PUBLIC INSTRUCTION FOR THE CENTRAL PEOV1HCEI. Calcutta? PRINTED FOR THE CALCUTTA CHRISTIAN TRACT & BOOK SOCIETY. BISHOP'S COLLEGE PRESS, 1862, 1.3) -- NOTICE. It is well known that there are material differences in the representations given by some of the profbundest Oriental scholars of the peculiar tenets of the leading schools of Hindu Philosophy especially those of the Vedanta. The Commit- tee of the Calcutta Christian Tract and Book Society there- fore, beg to intimate that their imprimatur can only be understood as bestowed on the contents of this volume gene- rally and that they must not be regarded as holding them- selves responsible for each and all of its particular views or statements. A work of this kind has long been felt to be a desideratum for educated Hindus many of whom may be bet- ter conversant with English than with Sanscrit. And as the work of a learned Christian Brahmin well acquainted with the distinctive doctrines of his ancestral as well as of his adopted faith, the present volume has much to recommend it to the earnest attention of all candid students of Philosophico- theological Hinduism. XJ/ Y Page. Preface, . vii Liat of the Principal Sanskrit Books quoted in this Volume, .. 281 SECTION I. Chapter 1. On the Uses of an Examination of the Hindu Philoso- phical Systems ; with an Enumeration of these Sys- tems, and a Sketch of the Plan to be pursued in the present Treatise, . . . . . . . . . . 1 2. Of the Dogmas common to nearly all the Systems ; and of the Dogmas peculiar to each of them, the Veda"nta excepted, .. .. .. .. .. .. 8 3. Examination of the Sinkhya Doctrines, ( 1 ) of the Non-existence of God, as concurrent with the Belief in Virtue, Vice, and their Fruits ; and (2 ) of the Acceptance of the Veda as having had no Con- scious Author, and as being irrecusably authoritative, 71 4. Examination of the Srfnkhya Dogma, that Nature is the Material Cause of the World, .. .. .. 79 5. Examination of the Sinkhya Dogma, that Appre- hension, Will, Activity, Happiness, Misery, and other Qualities, do not appertain to the Soul, . . 85 ,, 6. Brief Considerations of one Topic of the Mfma'nsa', with a few Remarks on the Intellectual Peculiarities of the Pandits, and on their Style of Reasoning, .. 103 SECTION II. Chapter 1. Briefly prefatory ; with an Examination of the Nyjiya and Vais'eshika Doctrines touching God, .. .. 108 ,, 2. Examination of the Nyiya and Vais'eshika Tenets relative to the Soul ; namely, that it had no Begin- ning, that it is All-pervading, and that it takes Birth again and again, .. .. .. .. . 118 3. Examination of the Cause, laid down in the Ny&ya, Vais'eshika, and the other Systems, of the Wretched- ness of the Soul, that is, its Bondage, and the Means of escaping therefrom ; a Succinct Description of the True Nature of Virtue and Vice ; and a Criticism of the Views of the Systematists touching Virtue and Vice, their Consequences, &c. : .. .. .. 138 VI CONTENTS. Page, ,, 4. Examination of the Views concerning the State of Emancipation, professed, in common, by the Naiyi- yikaa and by the Vais'eshikas, .. .. .. .. 152 SECTION III. Chapter 1. Description of the Three Sorts of Existence held in the Vedinta : the Key to a Right Understanding of that Scheme of Philosophy, .. .. 156 2. Summary of the Vedinta System, .. .. . 174 3. Examination of the Ved^nta Views concerning the Supreme Spirit,.. .. .. .. .. .. 196 ,, 4. Proof that the Existence of Brahma cannot be dedu- ced from the Position of the Vedinta, that the Inter- nal Organ requires an Illuminator, .. .. .. 212 5. Argument to show, that the Brahma of the Veda*n- tins, as being quite Void of Qualities, is reduced to nothing, 219 6. Strictures on the Position of the Vedintins, that the World is False ; and a Reply to those who suppose, that the Vedintins' Views respecting External Things accord with those of Berkeley, .. .. 235 7. The Soul, being subject to Ignorance, cannot, as the Veda*ntins hold, be One with the Supreme Spirit ; a Description of Ignorance ; and an Argument to show, that the Denial of the Soul's Identity with Brahma is not set aside by taking the Epithet of False, as applied to Ignorance, in the Acceptation of Perishable, .. 243 8. Criticism of the Vedinta Tenet of the Falseness of Ignorance, as set forth in Standard Treatises, and as held by well-read Advocates of the Theory, .. 256 9. Examination of the Tenet of the Veddntins, that there are Three Kinds of Existence. Ignorance can- not be False ; and therefore, the Ignorant Soul can- not be one with the Supreme Spirit, .. .. 263 ,, 10. Examination of the Ved&ntin's Emancipation; Proof that the Vedinta does not deserve to be called Theistic ; and a few Words on the Faculty of Judg- ment, its Power, and its Use, .. PEBFACE THIS essay, in its original form, was published at Calcutta during the last year. It consists of two volumes, in the Hindi language, and is entitled Shad-dars'ana-darpana, and " Hindu Philosophy ex- amined by a Benares Pandit." Scarcely a page of those volumes, however, is here reproduced without much change. To say nothing of less important alterations, whole chapters have been retrenched, and others have been inserted. The notes, throughout, are new. These, equally with the text, are the work of Pandit Nilakantha ; a very few excepted, which the nature of their contents will suffice to distin- guish. The Shad-dars'ana-darpana was addressed to a sec- tion of the author's countrymen. But the pride of the native literati forbids them to have dealings with their vernacular beyond the narrow range of social occasions. Moreover, the technicalities of philoso- phy, among the Hindus, are as yet drawn solely from the Sanskrit. Only a meagre number of those techni- calities are popularly employed; and, of such as are thus employed, not one in ten is fully comprehend- ed by the vulgar. This being the case, the author, as might have been anticipated, discovered, that his Hindi labours had been to little purpose. As for this translation, it was undertaken, at the instance of an Vlll PREFACE. estimable missionary, mainly for the use of his fellow - evangelizers, and of Hindu students of English who may wish to acquaint themselves with the abstruser matters of their ancestral religion. o A familiarity with the sketches of Hindu philoso- phy drawn up by Colebrooke, will be found well-nigh indispensable as a preparation for understanding what is here presented to the reader. Later writers in the same department will, as a rule, be much more likely to mislead than to render any solid assistance. From this stricture a reservation must, however, be made in favour of the Reverend Professor Banerjea, whose Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy are a mine of new and authentic indications. What from the elu- cidations of that learned gentleman, and those of Pandit Nilakantha, it should seem, that, in order really to penetrate the mysteries of Hinduism, we could scarcely do better than commit ourselves to the guidance of Christianized Brahmans. There are scores of terms, belonging to the no- menclature of Hindu philosophy, precise equivalents of which have not yet been wrought out for us with the help of the Latin and Greek. Of the terms in question there are not a few which the translator of these pages has been the first to dress in a Euro- pean garb ; and, that he has had other than moder- ate success, is more than he can venture to suppose. Colebrooke and his successors have, indeed, elaborat- ed many close and felicitous renderings. Still, they have left much unattempted, and something to be amended. Had the translator departed from " na- PREFACE. IX ture," as representing prahrtii* he would hardly have done amiss. Again, " modification" conveys a very much nearer conception ofvrittij denoting several of the " evolutions" of the " internal organ," than is conveyed by "affection." These and many other improvements were thought of when, unfortunately, it was too late, save at the risk of entailing confusion, to introduce them.J * " Originant " might answer, or " evolvant ; " and " originate," or "evolnte," for vikriti. "The Greeks agreed with the cosmogonies of the East in deriving all sensible forms from the indistinguishable. The latter we find designa- ted as the TO ufAOfflov, the udug vgoxoff/Mixbv, the ^dog, as the essen- tially unintelligible, yet necessarily presumed, basis or subposition of all positions. That it is, scientifically considered, an indispensable idea for the human mind, just as the mathematical point, &c. for the geometrician ; of this the various systems of our geologists and cos- mogonists, from Burnet to La Place, afford strong presumption. As an idea, it must be interpreted as a striving of the mind to distinguish being from existence, or potential being, the ground of being containing the possibility of existence, from being actualized." Coleridge's Notes and Lectures on Shakespeare, &c, Vol. II., p. 197. t See pp. 59, 61, and 185, for the characteristics of vritti. A single one was introduced. Between pp. 47 and 111, "sen- tience" and its conjugates are frequently put for chaitanya, &c. See the second note at p. } 76. It was Colebrooke, Professor Wilson, and others who herein set the example which the translator for a while unadvisedly followed. In a considerable number of places, " God" is substituted for IVwara. On this point, as regards the Sankhya and the Yoga, see the Sdn- khyasdra, in the Bibliotheca Indica, Preface, p. 2, foot-note. " Soul," in an accommodated sense, has been chosen to stand forjiva or jimtman. See the notes at pp. 2, 210, and 213. In the latter part of III., 5, inadvertently, and yet naturally enough, " soul " will be found used, more than once, for "the unspiritual part of the soul," as a Hindu would be compelled to express himself. At p. 234,1.5, "soul" occurs twice, where "spirit" is intended. In the fourteenth line of the PREFACE, A glossary has been omitted solely from want of leisure to prepare one. In fact, the necessity which lay upon the translator, of executing his task against time, if he executed it at all. should ex- cuse many of the defects which will be seen to mark his performance. Pandit Nilakantha's dis- quisitions were certainly well worthy of being brought before the public. Even the most advanced of Eu- ropean Sanskrit scholars may therefrom reap in- struction. To such, and to many others who will value them, they might have remained unknown for years, or altogether, had not the translator done for them what he has here done to the best of his opportunities. This work has had the great advantage of being criticized, in its proof-sheets, by the Reverend Dr. Kay, of Bishop's College, Calcutta. By the oblig- ing assistance of the learned and acute Principal, both the author arid the translator have profited largely. CAMP BlLAHARI, JUBULPORE DISTRICT : Christinas, 1861. same page, in place of " I's'wara, no less than the soul," read " I's '\vara. no less than every other individuated spirit." A few more similar mis- takes, the result of unavoidable haste, are noted at the end of the vo- lume. SECTION I. CHAPTER 1. On the Uses of an Examination of the Hindu Philosophical Systems; with an Enumeration of these Systems, and a Sketch of the Plan to be pursued in the present Treatise, I purpose, in this book, to discuss succinctly the six philo- sophical Systems (Dars'anas) of the Hindus. The fundamen- tal authorities of the Hindu religion are the Vedas, the Smritis,* the Puranas, &c. ; not the Systems. Of these the staple is argument. But they profess to derive their views from the Veda and other sacred books. Independent authority, as to those views, they disclaim. Hence it might be supposed, that, in examining the Hindu religion, a discussion of the Systems would be quite unnecessary. Such discussion has, however, these advantages : 1st. The six Systems are not held, by the Hindus, to be the work of ordinary men, but of Rishis ;f and they are adjudged * "The laws of the Hindus, civil and religious, are, by them, believed to be alike founded on revelation, a portion of which has been preserved in the very words revealed, and constitutes the Vedas, esteemed, by them, as sacred writ. Another portion has been preserved by inspired writers, who had reve- lations present to their memory, and who have recorded holy precepts, for which a divine sanction is to be presumed. This is termed Smriti, recollec- tion, (remembered law,) in contradistinction to S'ruti, audition, (revealed law)." Colebrooke. Rather, a code of memorial law is meant by Smriti, as in the text. Again, any composition of a man supposed to be inspired may be denominated Smriti. + Primarily, in the Hindu mythology, Rishi signifies a holy sage to whom some portion of the Veda is said to have bffen revealed. In a vague sense, the word denotes an inspired man. B 2 SEC. L, CHAP. 1. an equality of rank with the Smritis, the Purauas, &c., which are reputed to have similar authorship. If then, on in- vestigation, errors are proved to exist in the former, doubt must attach to the credit of the latter. When it is shown that the very Rishis are wrong, and make gross mistakes in writings by which they undertake to communicate to the world the knowledge of truth and the means of salvation, who can esteem any statement deserving of confidence, simply be- cause it emanated from a Rishi ? 2ndly. Though vulgar Hindus are indifferent to, and un- acquainted with, the dogmas established in the Systems, yet those dogmas are highly considered by the learned. To them those dogmas, concerning God, the world, its origin, the soul,* its bondage, emancipation, and so on, are, as it were, the root and life of the Hindu religion ; while the narratives, and tales, and ritual matters of the Vedas, Smritis, Puranas, &c., may be viewed as its branches. To the learned so excellent do those doctrines appear, and so fully accordant with reason, that they cling to them with the strongest affec- tion ; and the cord of this affection holds them fast to the Hindu faith. It is, therefore, my firm conviction, that if they saw those doctrines to be faulty, and discarded them, they would be led to lose all regard for Hinduism. And such a result would, with God's blessing, attend candid enquiry. Srdly. There is no question that the authors of the systems, and their great expositors, were, in their way, most intelligent and learned men, and acute investigators. But, since, in spite of all the energy they threw into their search after truth they fell into serious errors, it is evident how extremely difficult it is for men to arrive, by their own wisdom, at the true knowledge of God. Add to this, that sages, as in India, so in all other * Throughout these pages, ' soul' is used, in an accommodated sense, to translate jiva ; a term not applied to the Divine Spirit, while it is employed of men, gods, and all other persons. As these have souls, so, it ia thought, have all tilings animal and vegetable. SEC. I, CHAP. 1. 3 countries, have herein failed. Hence, that system, it is esta- blished, is divine, which propounds correct views of God and of His right path. My prayer is, that God may have mercy upon you. Relin- quishing partiality, and with a desire for the salvation of your souls, as you would reach the right path, may you ponder what I am about to set forth. The six Systems are the Nyaya, Vais'eshika, Sankhya, Yoga, Mimansa, and Vedanta. They are also called the six S'as- tras.* The Sankhya and the Yoga agree in all essentials; save that the former does not acknowledge God, while the latter does. Hence, occasionally, in Hindu books, both are denominated Sankhya; the one, atheistic, and the other, theistic. In many places, also, the Mimansa is styled the prior Mimansa, and the Vedanta, the latter Mimansa. The reason of this is, that they are alike concerned with discussing statements of the Veda. The prior Mimansa pertains to its ritual section ; and the latter Mimansa, to its scientific sec- tion. This section, being at the end (anta) of the Veda, is named Vedanta. Thousands of authors, from remote an- tiquity down to recent times, have written treatises on the six Systems. Among these are some known by the name of Sutras, or Aphorisms, which are reckoned the basis of all the rest, and are referred, by the Hindus, to Rishis. Thus, the Nyaya is ascribed to Gotama, or Akshapada ; the Vais'e- shika, to Kauada, or Kanabhaksha ; the Sankhya, to Kapila ; the Yoga, to Patanjali ; the Mimansa, to Jaimini ; and the Vedanta, to Badarayana. The plan which I have resolved upon for criticizing the six Systems is this. In the first place I shall exhibit those doctrines which, with slight deductions, are common to all the Svstems ; and then those distinctive doctrines of all the * By this word, in its wider acceptation, is denoted a body of teaching, revealed, or of human origin, concerned with any subject whatsoever. 4 SEC. L, CHAP. 1. Systems, save the Vedanta, which are especially worthy of examination. In the third section I shall canvass the cha- racteristic doctrines of the Vedanta. The distinctive tenets of the other five Systems I shall deal with in this wise. I have remarked above, that the Sankhya and the Yoga con- sent in all important respects but one. On the ground of this general unanimity, I shall treat of their doctrines together. Then I shall speak of one or two articles of the Mimansa, which are deserving of attention. As for the Nyaya and the Vais'eshika, the learned recognize a close affinity between them. They concede that, for the greater part, nothing found in the one is repugnant to anything occurring in the other, and that, in fact, they supplement each other.* Indeed, Hindus who now-a-days write on the Nyaya, combine the Vais'eshika with it.f The discrepant opinions of these two Systems I shall pass by unnoticed. Their other opinions I shall take account of conjointly. An examination of all the Systems will then follow, in the manner about to be stated. * The seven Vais'eshika predicaments are thus spoken of by Vis'wana'tha Panchanana Bhattacharya : ^ '-cf '' I Siddhdnta-mulctdvali on the first couplet of the Bhdshd-parichchhedu . " And these categories are well-known in the Vai- s'eshika, and are not opposed to the views of the Naiy^yikas." " The Tarka-sangraha, i. e., Tract on the Categories, was composed by the learned Annam Bhatta, with a view to rendering the uninstructed profici- ents in the doctrines of Kanaka and of the Nya'ya." Thus ends the Tarka-sangraha, a Nya'ya manual. The couplet has been translated in accordance with Annam Bhatta's explanation of it in his Tar- kadipikd. Such books as that just cited, the Muktdvalt, and many more, might fairly in respect of their subject-matter, and of the fact that they ignore the Nyya Aphorisms, be entitled to the appellation of Vais'eshika treatises, were it not that, on topics where the Nyaya and the Vais'eshika deviate, as concerning the kinds of proof, the doctrines of the former are strenuously maintained as against thos of the latter. SEC. I., CHAP. 1. 5 Many and voluminous are the books concerned with the six Systems ; and they handle a large variety of topics. I do not, by any means, undertake to pass all these topics under review, but only such as are most considerable. Many of them are common to all the Systems ; while, as to some, the Systems differ among themselves diametrically. Hence, if we investi- gate any one System thoroughly, our decisions will affect no small portion of the others. To me the Nyaya and the Vais'e- sliika seem most reasonable of all. Not to mention their claims to preference on other accounts, they acknowledge a God, eter- nal and omnipotent ; and so are superior to the Sankhya, and to the Mimansa, which deny God ; and to the Vedanta, as well, which identifies souls with Deity. I shall, therefore, apply a searching scrutiny to the whole of the leading opinions of the Nyaya and Vais'eshika. First of all, however, I shall dispose of a few peculiar doctrines of the Sankhya and Mimansa, which call for observation. As was before said, those dogmas of the Yoga, in respect of which it deviates from the Nyaya and Vais'eshika, will be included in treating of the Sankhya ; and I shall dilate on the specialities of the Vedanta in the last section of the volume. It should be borne in mind that, in this work, I shall pre- sent the tenets of the Nyaya and Vais'eshika, not simply as they are expressed in the Aphorisms, but as they have been deve- loped by authors of a later date, both ancient and modern. For, though the Hindus think otherwise, I suspect a differ- ence between the Aphorisms and the treatises founded on them. For instance, these treatises dwell at much length on the subject of God, and adduce numerous arguments in proof of His existence. Indeed, it is ordinarily believed, in the present day, that the capital end of the two Systems in question is, to prove that there is a Deity :* but it is a * In a work of modern date, where an atheist 13 represented as having put to silence antagonists belonging to divers Hindu persuasions, a Tdrkika (or Naiyayikca) is looked to, by the company, as the last refuge in defence of 6 SEC. I., CHAP. 1. singular fact that nothing of this transpires in their Aphorisms. In only a single one of the Nyaya Aphorisms do we find God so much as named ; and it does not indubitably appear from that, that the author of the Aphorisms believed in Him. In that place, God is declared to be the Maker of the world. But it should be known, that the writer of the Nydya-siitra- vritti offers two interpretations of the aphorism referred to, and of the two that succeed it. According to the first of those interpretations, the first of the three aphorisms does not enunciate the view of the author, but is given as the view of an opponent ; and the two ensuing aphorisms are for the purpose of refuting it. The expositor, however, understands that his author did not intend to deny the divine origination of the world, but only to assert that God cannot be the Maker of the world, independently of the works of souls. At the same time, the expositor states that, by some, the purport of the three aphorisms is taken otherwise, that is to say, as designed to the belief in a God. I Vidwan-moda-tarangim, Ms., fol. 4, verso, " When the Veddntin, hearing this, was confounded, they all turned their eyes towards the face of the Tarkika." The following couplet, which has not been traced beyond oral tradition, at once illustrates the irreverence of the Hindu mind, and shows that the Nyaya is prized as the stronghold of theism. The verses are reported falsely, it is hoped to have been uttered by Udayana A'charya, a very celebrated ancient Naiyayika ; in fact, the foremost of Naiyayika writers after Gotama, the author of the Aphorisms, and Vatsyayana, his scholiast, both of whom are reputed inspired. It is said that Udayana, after the trouble of a pilgrimage to the temple of Jagannalha at Pooree, found the door shut, on his arrival. Upon this, the impatient logician thus delivered himself, addressing the inhos- pitable divinity : "Thou art drunk with the inebriation of majesty : me thou scornest. But let the Bauddhas show themselves, and upon me will depend thy very existence." SEC. I., CHAP. 1. 7 establish God's existence.* In a matter so beset with doubt, it is difficult to arrive at certainty. * The three aphorisms referred to will here be given, with the drift of the commentator's remarks. The first is : fci 3TK3T IT^^^m^^^Tcr I " God is *o > the cause, since the works of souls (purusha) are found to be ineffectual." This, in the first place, is assumed to be asserted by an opponent who rejects the dogma taken for granted, by the commentator, to be held by Gotama that God and the works of souls are, in concert, the cause of the universe. On one supposition, the opponent is, to all appearance, a VedsCntin, whose meaning is, "God is the sole cause," i. e., agreeably to one presumed Vedanta view, "sole and material cause" of the universe, and, agreeably to another view, undoubtedly Vedantic, its "sole and illusory-material cause." "In- effectual ;" viz., on some occasions. " The works of souls are found to be" so. Hence, they are not to be accounted a cause. But it is to a second interpretation that the commentator evidently accords his preference. This interpretation supposes an objector to urge simply, that God alone, since the works of souls are ineffectual, is the Author of the universe, independently of such works. Gotama replies : T TT^3i?TT*TT^ W^TTf*f^T^* I " Not so : since, S in default of the works of souls, there is no production of effects." In explication, the commentator argues, resisting the Veda'ntin, that, inas- much as God, in his system, is devoid of volition, if He alone were the cause of the universe, everything would be produced at all times, and be uniform in character. The works of souls must, by consequence, be conjoined with God, in order to an origination of the universe. Anticipating the objection, that, if such weight be attached, as in the last aphorism, to the works of souls, resort must be had to the fiction, that the efforts of souls never miss of their end, the Rishi pronounces : clr^fTf'C- cJf3"l^Tf ?T: I " The efforts of souls are, at times, no cause of effects, because the non-production thereof is caused by that default of works," That is to say, when a man, for instance, is unsuccessful, his failure is due to want of merit. In conclusion, the commentator informs us that the construction of the apho- risms, adopted by some, is as follows. Gotama's purpose is to establish God's existence. He begins by laying down that God is Author of the universe ; and he repels the notion that souls can be so ; as they sometimes fail of bring- ing their efforts to bear, and thus prove themselves to fall short of omni- science. A Mlmansaka antagonist rejoins, in the second aphorism, that it is not HO. But for the works of souls, he contends, effects cannot be produced : 8 SEC. I, CHAP. 2. And, again, the name of God nowhere shows itself in the Vais'eshika Aphorisms. In a few of them there is a pronomi- nal prefix tad which the commentators explain as refer- ring to God. * But I do not mean to enter upon this nice mat- ter. I shall consider the Nyaya and the Vais'eshika doctrines as they are set forth by their expounders, and understood by the Pandits. CHAPTER 2. Of the Dogmas common to nearly all tJie Systems ; and of the Dogmas peculiar to each of them, the Veddnta excepted. I shall first speak of those points on which almost all the Systems are consentaneous. It appears, even on the most cursory inspection of the Sys- tems, that, the Mimansa apart, their end is, to inculcate expedients for salvation, f therefore, the good and evil works of souls suffice, through merit and demerit, to account for the universe ; and God may be dispensed with. To this the answer of Gotama is, that the works of souls cannot of themselves be the cause of the universe, since they are effectual only under God's directing. Seethe Nydya-f&tra-vritti, pp 175-177 ; Book iv, Aphorisms 19,20, & 21. * The third aphorism, for one, is as follows : I Sankara Mis'ra says of this : ^ trrrfSlffT I "The tad refers to God, though He is not previously mentioned, because of His being well-known." Accord- ing to this comment, the aphorism signifies : " The Veda is authoritative, as being God's declaration." But S'ankara, uncertain whether his first exposition be tenable, gives, as a second : SJ^fT cff^fff frTf^fTfoT VR"*T^T ^T^t- 1"S[fcT | " Or, the tad refers to ' virtue' ; because juxtaposed." In this case, the meaning is, that the Veda has authority, by reason that it treats of virtue. Dharma, 'virtue,' is the last word of the preceding aphorism, the second. Vuis'eshiJca-sutropaskdra, Ms., fol. 3, recto. f ^T^^i^r^i 3 TOSTOeiisre^iJiifcTinwf^'irOT w^ft [ Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhAshya, p. 5. "But of the Sankhya SEC. L, CHAP. 2. 9 Again, according to all of them alike, ignorance is the chief system the foremost matters are, the aim of the soul, viz , emancipation, and the means of compassing it, i. e., the discrimination of soul from nature." S^ST ^T^T^RJ TK*} WfsrsrcnT^' | Ny&yar*tora-vritti, p. 198. " Now, the paramount purpose of this system is emancipation." S'ankara A'cha"rya on the Brahma-stitra : Bibliotheca Indica, No. 64, p. 22. " For the destruction of this misconception, the source of all evil, and for the acquisition of the knowledge of the oneness of spirit, are all Ved^nta disquisitions taken in hand." The commentator, Kdmananda, ob- serves that the acquisition indicated leads to emancipation. To anything beyond a very superficial acquaintance with the Mimns the author does not pretend : and yet he is not, on this score, at all in arrear of ninety and nine pandits in every hundred. In seven paragraphs, beginning with that to which this note is subjoined, as many articles of belief are reckoned up. So far as he is aware, the last three are* held, without any deviation from their general character, in the Mfmans ; where- as the first four are, he believes, wholly rejected by it. The Mimausa scheme of philosophy, as laid out by the most accredited writers on it, is not known to deal with emancipation and other high spiritual topics. Only some recent authors, it should seem, hold a different language, and would raise the Mfma'nsa' to a level with the other more conspicuous Systems. Thua, Laug^kshi Bhskara, in his P&rva-mimansdrtha-sangraha, has these words : fr'5jinrart'.i' < irti cTcT ^ v TTW^TcT | " When it, duty, is per- formed with intent of oblation to God, it becomes the cause of emancipation. And let it not be said that there is no authority for observance of duty with such intent ; since there is, as such, in that sacred record the Bhagavad-yitd, this precept : ' Whatever thou doest, whatever thou eatest, whatever thou offerest in fire, whatever thou bestowest away, whatever austerity thou practisest, Kaunteya, do it as an oblation to me.' " See the Bhagavad-yitd, ix., 27. How, it is obvious to enquire, since the Mfnuinsa is atheistic, this can ba other than an innovation ? 10 SEC. L, CHAP. 2. cause of bondage.* And ignorance is this, that the soul, R!p I Tattwa-kaumudi, p. 44. " Bondage is held, in our system, to result from the reverse of knowledge, i. e., from ignorance of the twenty-five principles." I Vijn^TSf 'flSTO'T | Hairnet kos"a. Kshlra Swamin says, in his gloss on Amara : "The notion ' i' is called aham-mati, because there is, in it, the conceit of that's being soul which is not soul : " viz., the mind, the body, and the like ; as is taught in the Systems. The Sanskrit runs : ^Tf facTO Tf^^^^^TffrCTT^T^TfiTrfH^ri^Icr | Clearly, this is not mere want of knowledge or right apprehension, but some- thing positive. Vdchaspati Mis'ra says : f^TT^^tvS^T'HTf^UT ?H TfC- * ^ Tsfff! | Tattwa-kaumudi, p. 44. " Wrong notion is ignorance, nescience, which is a property of the intellect." In like manner says Vijna'na I S&nkhya- pravachana-bhashya, p. 38. "And, for this very reason, nescience is not a negation, but a distinct sort of consciousness, opposed to true science. Thus it has been laboriously established, in the Yoga-bliashya, by the divine Vydsa ." A little before this we read : f SEC. I., CHAP. 2. 11 though distinct from the mind,* the senses, and the body, identifies itself with them. From this identification it is '' Arid non-discrimination, in this system, is not simply a negation." 'Non- discrimination' is, on the showing of the context, one with avidyd, 'nescience' or 'false knowledge.' The author of the Nydya-t6tra- vfitti says, at p. 168 : iWNrt f^mT^TTTC^TTOS^T^f^^r-! " Wrong notion, equivalent to which is false apprehension, is incorrect conviction." As mithyd-jndna i used to signify that special misapprehension which estops release from the world, so, in the Sanskrit vocabularies, mithyd*- mati, 'false conception', is given to express misapprehension in general. Thus Amara and Hemachandia : ^if'rTffl'EZnFrfci'*^: | In short, when- ever the words ajndna, mithyd-jndna, avidyd, &c., occur in the technical use of the Systetnatists, they must be taken to denote something positive, and not negations. Dr. Ballantyne says : " According to the Naiya'yikas. ajndna is merely the privation (abhdva) of jndna." Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy, $c., p. xxxiv. That ajndna is so, in the language of the Nyya, when it represents the great impediment to emancipation, is an allegation which repuires to be substantiated. All the Systems hold misapprehension to be the cause of bondage For the "Veda'nta view of ajndna and avidyd, see the third Section. * It is only to avoid the introduction of a strange Sanskrit word into the text, that 1 have consented to replace manas by 'mind.' The manas in averred, in all the six Systems, to be an internal organ, the organ of cogni tion ; as the eye is the organ of sight. It has dimension, but no other quality of matter ; and, except in the Nyaya, it is perishable. It must be carefully distinguished from the soul of which it is only an instrument. Manas, in the Sdnkhya, the Yoga, and the Vedanta, is also used in a spe- cial sense, for a portion of the internal organ The other portions are, in tha Sa*nkhya, buddhi and ahankdra, 'intellect' and 'egoism;' in the Yoga and Veda'nta, these and chitta, ' thinking.' When severally considered, each of them is called an organ. They are not operations. The renderings and they are the ordinary ones therefore convey but a very imperfect idea of the original expressions. Though all the Systems style the manas an organ, the Sankhya, the Yoga, and the Vedanta do not in fact treat it as such : the Nyaya and the Vai- s'eshika do. No opinion is here pronounced as to the Mitnunsa'. Dr. Ballantyne says, for the instruction of the Hindus: "But our opi- nion is, that there belongs to the human soul a certain natural incapacity (as'akti) to grapp cognitions simultaneously ; and a soul thus distinguished is spoken of as a mind." Synopsis of Science, second edition, p. 6. This he thus puts 12 SEC. L, CHAP. 2. that it conceives of some things as its own, and of other things as belonging to others; and that, through the body, into Sanskrit: ! 'Mind' is here translated by manas : and what must be the Hindu's inference ? Is anything correspondent, even by approach, to the manas recognized in our metaphysic ? It is taught, in all the Systems, that the soul's identifying itself with the mind, the organs, the body, &c., constitutes that misapprehension which entails bondage. But the S^nkhya, the Y"oga, and the Vedanta go further. According to the first two, to regard the soul as one with nature is also a mis- apprehension bearing the same fruit. This is plain from the subsequent pas- Bages: T cT^TT Sdnlhya-pravachana-lhdshya, pp. 40, 41 ; including the 57th aphorism of the Snkhya, Book I. " But, says an objector, if the mere non-discrimination of nature and soul be, through the conjunction of intellect and soul, the cause of bondage, and if the mere discrimination of them be the cause of emancipation, it will follow that, though the conceit of the body and the like being one with soul re- mained, there would be emancipation ; and this is opposed to the Veda, the Smritis, and reason. To this it is replied, by an aphorism : ' Of the non- discrimination of soul from other things, which is because of the non-discrimi- ation of soul from nature, there is the extinction, on that of the latter.' ' Non- discrimination from other things' : the non -discrimination of soul from intellect, &c., which results 'from non-discrimination' of soul 'from nature/ as its cause, non-discrimination from effects being itself an effect, and having for SEC. I, CHAP. 2. 13 it receives pleasure from this object, and pain from that. Hence there arises, in it, desire for what affords pleasure, and its root eternal non-discrimination of the soul from the cause of that effect, nature, is necessarily extinguished, on the extinction of non-discrimination of tout from nature. Such is the meaning. As, when soul is discriminated from body, non-discrimination of the effects of the body, colour and so on, from the Soul is impossible ; so, when soul is discriminated, by its unchangeableness, and other properties, from nature, egoism cannot have place, identifying soul with intellect, &c., possessing the properties of mutability and the like, which are effects of it, nature : there being a parity of reason, and there being extinc- tion of cause. This is the tenor." I Vijniina Bhikshu's Pdtanjala-bhdshya- vdrltika, MS., fol. 12, recto. " The notion, in these eight, which are not soul, viz., in the unmanifested nature, in the great principle, i. e., intellect, in the or- gan of egoism and in the five tenuous particles, that they are soul, is ignorance ; as obscuring right apprehension, it is the eight-fold darkness. In these notions are included those that the body and the rest are soul ; since the body and tha rest are effects of those eight. " | Nyayt-sutra-vritti, p. 198. "Egoism is the conceit of 'I' ; ^j and, when it has for its object the body and the like, it is called false appre- hension." i <* i S'ankara A'chtfrya on the Brahma-sutra : BiUiotheca Indica, No. 64, pp. 20, 2J. " Misconception, we have said, is the notion that a thing is what it is not. It is when a man, accordingly as hia eons, his wife, &c. are in evil case, or in good, by thinking 'I am in evil case,' or ' I am in good case,' imputes properties of things external to himself, to his own soul. Thus, he imputes to his soul properties of the body, when h thinks ' I am stout,' ' I am spare," ' I am fair,' 'I stand,' ' I go,' ' 1 leap.' In 14 SEC. I, CHAP. 2. aversion from what produces pain. And, by reason of desire and aversion, it engages in various good and evil works, from like manner he imputes to his soul properties of the senses, when he thinka 1 1 am dumb,' ' I am impotent,' ' I am deaf,' ' I am one-eyed,' ' I am blind.' And he imputes to his soul properties of the internal organ, such as desire, re- solve, dubiety, and certitude." But the Vedanta goes beyond anything hitherto adduced, in its view of misapprehension. Witness the next extract, which gives particulars surplus to those in S'ankara A'cha"rya. It is from the Veddntn-s&ra, p. 15, Calcutta edition of 1829. I " The Pr^bh^kara and the Krkika argue CKi that ignorance is soul, on the ground of the scripture, ' The other, the inner soul, consisting of bliss,' and so forth ; and because we observe intellect and the rest to merge in ignorance ; and because of the notions, ' I am ignorant/ ' I pos- sess consciousness,' &c. As for the Bha'tta, he asserts that ignorance-enve- loped intelligence is soul, since there is the scripture, ' The soul consists of solid knowledge alone, and is bliss itself,' and so on ; and because, in deep sleep, there are both the light of knowledge and the darkness of ignorance ; and because of the notions 'Myself I know not,' &c. Another Bauddha, one additional to several, before summoned, holds that nihility is the soul, by reason of the scripture, ' In the beginning this was a mere nonentity,' and so forth ; and be- cause, in deep sleep, there is the negation of everything ; and because, in n, man who has waked, of the consciousness which has for its object the memory of his non-existence, the memory, ' In deep sleep I was not." This is not the place to detail minutely the import of ajnana, ignorance, as used in the last extract. A full treatment of the subject will be seen in the third Section. Among the ignorances, the causes of bondage, is, according to the Sa*nkhya, the soul's identifying itself with nature, and, according to the Vedinta, its identifying itself with ignorance, &c, &c , as already noted. But who is ever conscious of committing a mistake of this sort ? Tn fact, these hindrances SEC. L, CHAP. 2. 15 which accrue to it demerit and merit. Then, to receive requital, it has to pass to Elysium, or to Hell, and repeatedly to be born and to die. Thus it is that ignorance gives rise to bondage.* The soul's identifying itself with the body and to liberation are rarely instanced as samples of misapprehension. What ia meant by the soul's identification of itself with the body, and with intellect, can be understood ; for, as stoutness and leanness are properties of the body, BO, in the Sankhya and Veddnta, desire, aversion, &c. are properties of the mind. After this explanation, we see at once what is intended by the pro- position that the notions expressed by ' I desire,' ' I am lean,' &c., evince ignorance, and that, by these notions, a man confounds his soul with his mind, his body, &c. To these more intelligible species of ignorance, as being those generally referred to by Sanskrit writers, the text restricts its attention. * \ ^I^T Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhushya, p. 39 " The series of media through which non-discrimination produces bondage is thus brought together and set forth in the Ifwara-gitd : ' The conception that what is not soul ia aon\ is first: thence come misery, and the other, happiness. All the defects consequential, thereon desire, aversion, &c , are caused, ultimately, by mis- apprehension. The effect of that assemblage, desire, &c. t is defect, i. e., merit and demerit, says the Veda. From this defect is the rise of all the bodies of all." For the Naiya*yika view of the succession here summed up, see the second of Gotama's aphorisms, at the foot of p. 10, supra. Misapprehension, as will be noticed, is the root of all ill. From it arises defect, viz., desire, aversion, and the rest. Thence springs activity ; thence, birth ; and, from it, misery, which is bondage. By activity is meant good and evil acts. Thus the com- mentator : W^V^T^HTf^hffnn'. I Nydya-sHtra-vrUti, p. 8. "Of activity, that is to say, for virtue and for vice." In the aphorism with which we are concerned the absence of ' happiness' and 'misery' may have been remarked between 'false apprehension' and 'defect. 1 They are to be supplied from without; for, as will be manifest from other passa- ges bearing on the subject, defect results immediately from happiness or misery. Nor let the reader be surprized to find misery again at the end of the group. 16 SEC. I., CHAP. 2. so forth is the radical ignorance which involves the soul in The reason is this. In the Hindu Systems, happiness and misery produce defects ; these, activity ; and this, birth. Then birth anew gives rise to happi- ness and misery ; and so on, in a ceaseless round. And thus it has been from eternity. Jt was not for Gotama's purpose, which is to show the origin of misery, to mention happiness with it. The unending reproduction just spoken ^ of is the topic of the ensuing extract : Patanjala-bhdshya-vdrttika, MS., fol. 67, verso. " ' First, by experience of happiness and misery is generated a fund of impressions,' undeveloped impres- sions. Then, owing to special causes, such as time, follows their development ; next is memory of the happiness and misery previously experienced ; afterwards are desire and aversion ; subsequently is activity ; then, again, misery and happiness." f? tcffanft Nydya-stitra-rritti, p. 198. " By mistaking his body, &c. for his s soul, a man takes delight in things delightsome, and is vexed by things vexa- tious." That happiness and misery are held, in the Ny^ya, to be intercalated be- tween false apprehension and defect, conies out from the above. For, where there are delight and vexation, we must presuppose happiness and misery : and antecedent to these is false apprehension. From the following passages of S'ankara A'charya it appears that, unless a man identifies himself, tnisapprehendingly, with his body, &c., all action is impracticable, and of course the consequences thereof, Commentary on the Bramha-sutra : B'ibliotheca Ind'tca, No. 64, p. 17. " Since he who has not the conceit, regarding his body, senses, &c., of 'I' or ' mine ' cannot be a percipient, the instruments of knowledge, the semes, lace uot noted. " The mind, betaking itself to objects, conceives esteem for their SEC. I., CHAP. 2. 19 Again, in the Systems, good works, no less than evil works, contribute to bondage.* The fruit of good works is happiness : and yet they are called a cause of bondage, inasmuch as they preclude the soul from being liberated. For the authors of the Systems regard emancipation as being the release of the soul from the body, the mind, cognition, desire, &c. But good works, for the enjoyment of their desert, compel the soul, until their fruition is consummated, to abide in the body of a god, a man, or some other superior being ;f qualities. From this esteem of them as good comas desire for them. From this desire is man's engaging in action. Let one, therefore, eschew esteem, the origin of all evil." * Virtuous actions, as well as sinful, are said, below, to be a cause, to the soul, and also to the intellect, of bondage. Pdtanjala-bhushya-vtrttika, MS.,/o/. 2, verso. " ' And on this,' by extirpation of the cause, viz., ignor- ance, abstraction of thought (yoga) loosens the bonds, i. e., virtuous and sinful actions, for they bind intellect and soul ; in other words, incapa- citates them for bringing forth desert." For the Naiy^yika view, see the second of Gotama's aphorisms, lately remarked on. The root of misery is, there, activity, the originator, as the commentator has explained, of virtue and vice. Hence, in the Nyya also, good and bad works alike generate misery, and, by consequence, bondage. That the same opinion is held by the Veddnta is manifest from S'ankara A'chaVya's commentary on the Brihad A'ranyaka Upanishad. See the cita- tion at p. 17 supra, especially its concluding sentence. *re Pdtanjala-bhdshya-vdrttika,MS.,fol. 158, recto. " It has been said by Y^jnavalkya : ' Putting aside all other good works, let a man apply himself to the one good work which leads to emancipation ; to wit, the attainment of right apprehension : for all other works are attended by defects, and induce renewal of mundane existence." That good works, in the Nyaya, are a hindrance to emancipation is evident from the Nydyct-Stitra-vriUi. The sixty-first aphorism of the fourth book 20 SEC. I., CHAP. 2. for of works, good or evil, it is impossible to evade the fruit*. of the Nydya-sutra implies that a man who has acquired right apprehension may, on becoming an ascetic, relinquish the maintenance of a sacrificial hearth ; and it is thus intimated that such maintenance can then no longer act as a bar to his being liberated. Relatively to this, an objection is raised, in the preface to the sixty- second aphorism : "Thouh the main- tenance of a sacrificial hearth is not itself a hindrance to emancipation, yet its fruit, Elysium, must be so." To this it is replied, that the ordinary re- quital of this meritorious act does not take effect in the case of the right- ly apprehending ascetic. For his are not the plenary attributes of one who maintains a sacrificial hearth ; those attributes not being rendered com- plete until after his death, at his incremation. A further difficulty is then raised and solved: " Though the requital of the maintenance of a sacrificial hearth is not for that ascetic, nevertheless, there must be a hindrance to hiu emancipation, in the fruits of ihejyotiyhtoma sacrifice, ablution in the Ganges, &c , good works, and in the fruits of injury to animals, sin, which he may have done. Therefore, it is said, in reply, to add another reason, an ' and" is exhibited in the aphorism ; and thus the position is, that mere right apprehension obliterates all works but those that have begun to fructify." Works of this class will be explained a little further on. How far the force of works, virtuous and vicious, extends, is propounded in the ensuing passage : MS., fol. 63, v/ j mo. " But, some one may object : How can they who have reached Elysium, or Hell, incur return of birth, and the like ? For there is no production of merit and demerit in the body a person there tenants ; and, as for the requital of all his old works, it is exhausted there. To this I demur ; for we have heard that works which consign to Elysium, or to Hell, endure until one is born a Brahman, a tree, or as the case may be." * Works of whatever character entail inevitable consequences. The follow- ing half-stanza to this efiect is on the lips of every pandit ; but its authorship has not been discovered. SEC. I., CHAP. 2. 21 Nor is the happiness rewarded by such works a thing pre- eminently desirable. Transitory,* and conjoined with divers inconveniences, itself is misery, f To explain this : to go to Elysium, and to be born of a reputable stock, and to amass wealth, and the like, are the consequences of good works. But these consequences terminate as soon as the fund of merit which earned them is exhausted ; and the very privation of them brings sorrow, which is misery. So long as the soul misapprehends, desire and aversion constantly affect it, the doing good and evil are unavoidable to it, and it has no " Good works, or bad, that are wrought are all of necessity fructuous." TfcT | S&nkhya- ^ \ pravachana-bhashya, p. 62, " That whatever is obtainable by works is non- eternal there is the scripture : ' As perishes the world here, gained by worka, just so perishes the world to come, gained by virtue.' " =^faM 'BT ^RTFT' *P^T tffcT Sffl^F^facTftrfcT I Tatlwa-kau- ->A muili, p. 4. " The perishableness of Elyaium, &c. is inferred from their bein originated entities." For, agreeably to a maxim of all the Systems, every originated entity is non -eternal. Texts from the Nyiya and the \ r eduta may, therefore, here be dispensed with. S&nkhya-pravachana-bhdshya, p 212, "That also, the happiness mentioned in the foregoing aphorism, is mixed with misery. Consequently, those who have a discriminative knowledge of happiness and misery cast the former to the side of the latter." Ibid., p. 232. " Since happiness is thrown to the side of misery, to taste of that is really to taste of this." From the Dinakarl ; the MS. not at hand to refer to. " That also the happi- ness of Elysium and the like, from being known for perishable, is connected with misery, is of course undisputed." 22 SEC. L, CHAP. 2. escape from the gyration of births and deaths.* Nor can any . ~Sj cf | Tallwa-kaumudi, p. 44. " One ignorant of the nature of the soul, performing meritorious observances, and having hU mind corrupted by desire, thereby incurs bondage." In the paragraph to which this note appertains, it has been stated, gene- rally, that good works are a cause of bondage. A few particulars may possess interest to one who would go somewhat further into this topic. Good works may be distinguished, primarily, into incumbent and voluntary. The in- cumbent may, again, be divided into constant and occasional. The voluntary are acts of supererogation, and may be done from the motive of obtaining a determinate reward. Incumbent good works, some Hindus hold, do not avail except to atone for past transgressions, and to purify the intellect ; they thus conducing to the acquisition of right knowledge. Elevation to Elysium, and the like, are not their requital ; and the passages of sacred writings which enunciate that such results are their requital are not to be taken, it is contended, according to the letter, but as eulogistic beyond it. These works, agreeably to the view thus taken of them, do not operate for bondage : and yet more or less of stigma cleaves to them ; for defecation of the understanding, and ritual ordinances, however helpful towards the acquisition of right knowledge, are not deemed altogether good things. Vijna"ua Bhikshu, in answer to the ques- tion, how virtuous works, done without desire of reward, can bring about *v ^ misery, since liberation is promised to them, replies : RT321 5^133 ^cf I ft j Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhdshya, p. 63. "In works, whe- ther those done with desire of reward, or those done without it, there is misery from misery. Why ? Because their reioards do not differ in respect that they are alike effected by works. That is to say, even right apprehen- sion which, through purification of the intellect, is effected by works, since it consists of the three gunas, is of the essence of misery. Such is the sense." As for the Naiyayikas, it is laid down, by them, that all varieties of knowledge, or apprehension, come under the head of the twenty-one species of misery, which are to be got rid of; this riddance constituting emancipation. Thus the Dinakarl: \ "The body, the six SEC. L, CHAP. 2. 23 one forbear virtue, a cause of thraldom, and so escape thral- dom ; for, if, while still in misapprehension, a man, otherwise senses, the mind being the sixth, their six kinds of objects, their six kinds of knowledge, happiness, and misery, are the one and twenty miseries." From this we are to understand, that, though right apprehension is de- sirable, it ia so as the means of salvation, not in itself ; for, viewed intrinsically, it is to be accounted misery. As the Hindus express themselves, it is like the toil which a man goes through in cooking his dinner. But, further, even incumbent good works involve the commission of sin, according to Vachaspati MisTa : ^f^^f%: ^ffl^rtf^IJT^J' JT^Wt^T- f^fcTmErT^r*tj ** " All creatures delight in happiness ; all likewise are discomforted by misery. Grieved by the thought of causing fear to them, Jatavedas, one should not engage in works." Vijndna Bhikshu, to bear out the allegation, that incumbent works oblige to sin, elsewhere says : 'cf | Sdn*hya-pra- vachana-bhdshya, p. 14. "And we have heard that Yudhishthira and others, though war and such like were, to them, incumbent duties, did penance to expiate the sin of killing their kinsmen and others " The fighting of the P^ndavas, here called their duty, was with their own relatives. So much for one theory touching the effect of incumbent good works. Another, and one more accordant with the usual strain of the sacred books, is as follows. In this theory, incumbent good works have all the virtue ascribed to them in the other, and, over and beyond, have for requital what is there de- nied them. Truth to tell, it is very latitudinarian exegesis that treats as eulo- gistic the texts where they are said to be rewarded by migration to Elysium. We read, in an unverified quotation in the Siddhfinta-muktdvaU : 24 SEC. I, CHAP. 2. than after prescribed rules, relinquishes incumbent good works, constant and occasional, by so doing he commits evil. Such works may be given up only according to the rules of asceticism. And yet asceticism is not permitted to all. Thus, it would be improper in a man newly married to a young wife, and who has as yet no offspring ; and to a man who has aged parents to support ; &c. But the greatest diffi- culty is in this, that, though, from having entered upon an ascetic course, a man is dispensed from constant and occa- sional works, still there are many things which, in his own despite, derive merit to him. Such is contact with the water of the Granges ; the merit communicated by which he reaps, " Men of potent observances, who unintermittedly transact their worship at the turns of the day, their sins removed, pass to the Abode of Brahma, where no harm enters." See the Bibliotheca Indica, Vol. ix. p. 134. I have corrected a typographical error. Worship at the turns of the day, that is, morning, noon, and evening, is an incumbent or obligatory duty. The opinion now before us is that of the author of the I'eddnta-sdra, who says, at p. 2 : ?nT*t f^RUT^ftr ^f^fe: ^ WIWW I NJ *. ^m^WTT tj cK^nSZr W IWrtaIW I " Of these constant and other works purification of intellect ia the principal final cause. But concen- tration thereof, of intellect, is the principal final cause of devotions." After cit- ing a couple of passages, the author goes on to declare : I "And the sub- ordinate fruit of constant and occasional works, and of devotions, is the gain- ing the Abode of Progenitors and the Abode of Crahmii " IS'ankara A 'cha"rya is of the same mind, as may be seen in the note at p. 17. He there speaks of two sorts of good works, each of which earns some supernal residence Aud it appears, from the language of his commentator, that constant good works are therein embraced ; fur he says that the ' worshipper of the spirit" is one who engages in such works. In this second theory, then, incumbent good works, no less then voluntary, are a cause of bond;ijj(;. SEC. L, CHAP. 2. 25 whether he will or not.* To free oneself from the fetters of both virtue and vice, right apprehension is the sole remedy. Things being so, the Systems declare that release from transmigration, and all that it entails, can be achieved only by acquiring right apprehension, f And right apprehension consists in the recognition, by the soul, of itself as distinct from the mind, the senses, the body, and all else, f This is the Nydya-sutra-vritti, p. 8. "In fact, even independently of volition, virtue and sin may be produced by touching, for instance, the water of the Ganges." t The twenty-third aphorism of the SdnJchya-pravachana, Book III., is ^[T*TI*r Tiffl' I " From right apprehension is emancipation." For the Nyaya, see the first aphorism of the Nydya-sutra. ^ The Veddnta-paribhdsha has, at p. 48 : ^f Tf ^TT^sfWlW | " And that liberation is to be obtained by right apprehension alone." The word " liberation" is resumed from the previous context. ! I Pdtanjala-bhdshya-vdrttiJca, MS., fol. 153, verso, " But, in reality, solely from the knowledge of the soul's alterity from the intellect, through the removal of ignorance, and other evident media, there is isolation, or emancipation. Such is the sense." In the S^nkhya, equally does bondage result from identifying the soul with mind, and from identifying it with nature. Prior to liberation, the soul must be distinguished from nature, the radical material principle, as well as from mind. This is implied in the excerpt from the Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhashya at p. 8, where it is said that discrimination of soul from nature is the means of attaining the aim of the soul, which is there a technicality equivalent to liberation. At p. 41 of the work just referred to we further read : | "And, as for that also which \j is said in some places, that emancipation comes from the discrimination of the BOU! from intellect alone ; gross intellect and subtile being there comprehend- ed, nature is comprehended in the term intellect." 26 SEC. I., CHAP. 2. principal kind of right apprehension : but several other kinds are also necessary, as, for instance, the disesteeming the things <5 3^ TH^WETTW^f*: 5 I Ny&yn-t&tra-vrUti, p. 216. "And so the Yoga-sutra : ' When, by attending to the auxiliaries to coercion of thought, mental impurities are done away, there is the forth- shining of knowledge until discriminative cognition supervenes.' And the meaning of this is, that, when, by attention to the auxiliaries to coercion of thought, viz., subjugation, normal piety &c., impurity of mind, in the from of nescience and the rest, is done away, the shining forth, or a high degree, of knowledge ensues ; and this subsists until one obtains discrimi- native cognition. And this is immediate apprehension of the difference be- tween the Sankhya's intellect and soul ; but, in our system, it is immediate apprehension of the soul as distinct from the body and so forth." The apho- rism of the Yoga which is introduced is the twenty-eight of the second book. Jagadis'a Tark^lank^ra Bh;itt^ch^rya'a Tarkdmrita, a Naiy^yika treatise, MS. ad init. " And thus it is expressed, that hearing about spirit from sacred books, and consideration and meditation thereon, are originative of a knowledge of the true nature of the soul. One who has heard about soul from scripture is qualified for consideration ; whieh consists in inferring that KOU! is different from other things. And this deduction depends on acquaintance with those other things from which it, sow', differs. Thus, then, the categories are de- scribed in order to show what those other things are." Hence it is evident, that, where the first aphorism of the Ny^ya makes li- beration to result from a knowledge of the truth regarding sixteen things enu- merated, we are to understand, that the consequence follows from one's being enabled, by that knowledge, to discriminate soul from what is not soul. S'ankara A'ch^rya, after dilating on the topic of mistaking soul for other things, and other things for soul, which i called misapprehension, or ignorance, says : s Bibliotheca Jndica, No. 64, p. 16. " And the ascertainment of the nature of reality, through discrimination of those, soul and not tout, they call SEC. L, CHAP. 2. 27 of this world and of the next, and so on.* To gain right ap- prehension, one must study the S'astras ; and to this study clearness of intellect and heart is indispensable. To this end good works are recommended, such as sacrifice, alms, pilgri- Nyaya-sutra-vritti, p. 199. " Those things, colour and the rest, should first be meditated on as deserving to be rejected : subsequently is discrimina- tion of soul from body." Shortly after this we read : <^t"*n^!.*W3}T- *ETt[I 'ETI *TT3"^t2rfW I " Recognition ' as ill is intuition of defects : and it is to be practised." The following couplet is subjoined, by the author, as a sample of the sort of thoughts to be called up, by an aspirant after eman- cipation, when his eyes fall on a woman : t *%& "As for this bag of hide, charged with flesh, blood, and feculency, who is a greater ghoul than the fool that fancies her V Further, it is prescribed : ^Wt^T^RtH^H^^qT VTR^faT I "Also as concerns one's own body and the like should recognition as ill be put in practice." The feelings of an ignorant man towards his enemy are exemplified aa fol- lows : ^rr ?rift " This wretch hates me most cordially for all my felicities. When shall I have the gratification of cutting his throat with a hatchet ?" On the other hand, a right-minded person is said to reflect on his enemy after this fashion : " What offence to me does his body, made up of flesh, blood, and bones ? The real doer of the offence, that is, the offender's soul, which is other than this body, how can I injure that?" A strange way this may seem of reasoning oneself out of an intention to be revenged. But an endeavour must be made to dismiss the sentiment of vindictiveness as well, say the Hindus, and also all affections, whether of aversion or of desire, before a man is in a condition to be liberated. 28 SEC. I., CHAP. 2. mage, repetition of sacred words, austerities, and the like ; but to be performed without desire of Elysium anxl other lower rewards. Therefrom comes the clearness just spoken of, which is of the greatest assistance towards the attainment of right apprehension.* This apprehension the enquirer obtains from the S'astras, and from the tuition of preceptors. And then, for some time, he ponders and reflects on it, and so obtains immediate cognition of his own soul.f On his mastering this * See, for the Sa'nkhya, the extract from the Sdnkhya-pravacfuina-bhdshya at p. 22. For the Nya"ya, seethe passage of the Nydya-sutra-vritti cited at pp. 25, 26. The subjugation and normal piety, spoken of at that place, are just before elucidated in these words : PTTOPTO I "The Yoga-sHtra thus specifies acts of subjugation: 'Not killing, truthful- ness, not stealing, chastity, and self-denial, are acts of subjugation.' Thus it specifies normal piety : ' Purification, serenity, austerity, inaudible repeti- tion, and devotion to God, are normal piety.' 'Inaudible repetition', is reiterating, unheard, a favourite holy text. Others aver, that the forbearing what is forbidden is yama, and that the doing what is prescribed to each several religious stage is niyctma." A Bra'hraan's life is divided, with reference to religion, into four stages. f ' I Veddnta-s&ra, pp. 1 and 2. "Since a man, by abstain- ing, in this birth, or in a former birth, from things done with desire of reward and things forbidden, and by engaging in constant and occasional works, in penance, and in devotion, is thereby purged of all sin, has his mind thoroughly cleansed," &c. This is only a member of a long sentence, not necessary to be given in its entirety. ***** I Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhashya, p. 215. "'Hera also,' '. e., as regards discrimination also, hearing about soul from scrip- SEC. L, CHAP. 2. 29 cognition though desire and aversion do not on that account O ' O altogether take their departure, yet their strength is materially abated : for, however perfect his right apprehension becomes, nevertheless, since he is still connected, through the body, with external objects, it follows, that some traces of desire and aver- sion manifest themselves so long as the soul tenants the body.* When the soul leaves it, those affections disappear entirely. Further, so long as the man of right apprehension has a body, he does more or less of good and evil. Only these do not ripen, in him, into merit and demerit ; and, consequently, they do not entail on him the necessity of visiting Elysium, or Hell, and of ture, and consideration and meditation thereon, are its cause." Also : Tattwa-kaumudi, p. 55. -j ^ " By cultivating, in the manner laid down, an acquaintance with the princi- ple^ by pursuing it with due heed, continuously, and protractedly, knowledge, or right apprehension, is generated, immediately perceptive of the difference between intellect and soul." For the Nyaya, see the Tarkdmrita, cited at p. 27. | Vedanta-s&ra, p. 23. " Till he attaint to immediate cognition, thus described, of that Intelligence which is his own very essence, there being need of the practice of hearing holy writ, consi- deration, meditation, and coercion of thought," &c. &c. * | Nyaya-sutra-vritti, p. 8. "It is meant, that, though even in the possessor of right apprehension desire, &c. continue, yet they are not excessive." No manuscript is accessible to the writer, by which to verify the annexed couplet. It is said to be from the Jivan-mukti-viveka, a Ved&ita work by Mrfdhava A'charya : " Desire and so forth, as fast as they arise, are at once consumed by the fire of discriminative knowledge. How, then, can they grow 1 " 30 SEC. I., CHAP. 2. being born again. And right apprehension has this efficacy, that all good and evil fructescent works excepted, which the soul did previously to acquiring it, is thereby obliterated. Works are of three descriptions, technically designated as accumu- lated, current, and fructescent.* Accumulated works are such, among those done in former lives, as have not yet borne fruit : by the acquisition of right apprehension, these are burnt, or rendered ineffectual. Current works are those which are done in the present life : these have no effect on the posses- sor of right apprehension. Fructescent works are such as were done in former lives, and gave origin to the body now inhabited, determining its duration, and everything appertain- ing to the present state of existence. These three sorts of works resemble three kinds of seed-grain. The seed-grain of works which a man, like a husbandman, has stored in his garner, is ' accumulated ' ; and right apprehension burns it. Again, the seed-grain of works which he is sowing in this life is 'current' ; and it is scorched by right apprehension, so that it brings forth no fruit. Once more, the seed-grain which he sowed in a former birth, and which has already begun to bear, is known as ' fructescent'. Now, these fructescent works cannot be made void by right apprehension, f It is to receive the requital of * Pr&rabdha, the word thus rendered, is defined " which has begun to bear fruit." No single English term, in past or present use, being found that con- veys this idea, I have taken the liberty of coining one. 'Accumulated' and ' current* translate, respectively, sanchita and kriya- mana. A very rare substitute for the latter is dgamin, 'eventual.' I hav doubts about it. See my edition of the Tattwa-bodha, p. 8. Pdtanjat,a-bhdsJtya-vdrttika,MS., fol. 62. recto. "For the function of right apprehension is two-fold, hindrance to the production of works causative of happiness and misery, called affliction, and the combustion of past, i. e., accu- mulated, works ; but its function is not destruction of works generally : for, if it were so, fructescent works would perish with the rest." Frequently, as in several instances in the foregoing passage, the term Tear- SEC. L, CHAP. 2. 31 them that the man of right apprehension has to remain in the body, and to experience divers joys and griefs.* But, this experience ended, he quits the body, and is absolved from the recurrence of birth :f for works are no more his ; and man, literally, ' works,' is unquestionably put for the merit or demerit accruing from them. Refer, for the Ny^ya, to the second citation in the note at p. 20. Vedanta-parlbhdsUa, p. 52. " Those accumulated works alone which are distinct from such as have produced their effects, i. e , distinct from fructescent works, are understood to be effaceable by right apprehension." That coercion of mind in which all thoughts are suppressed is, Vij- na.ua Bhikshu holds, of greater efficacy than right apprehension even, in that it, and it alone, is able to neutralize the effect of works that have begun to bear fruit. The words are : Patanjala-bhashya-varltika, MS., fol. 3, verso. " By mental coercion to the suppressing of every thought, all germs being consumed, even fructesceut works are got over. Thus there is a superiority, in such coercion, over right apprehension." * us I Sankhya-pravachana-b/idshya ^t p. 15S. "Thus, though there is no production of works after right appre- hension, he that is liberated and is still living continues to hold a body, w/U'c/i is swayed by the impulse of fructescent works. This is the sense.'' It is also said : ^tf^?^\^f ^flJTWI^T ^^ I Pdtanjala-bhasIt.ya-vdrUi- ^t ka,M.S.,fol. 76, recto. "The experience of happiness and misery of him who lives ou after emancipation is just a plausible fallacy." T ! I Sankhya-sdra, MS.,/o/. 1, verso. " When there s < is discriminative immediate cognition of soul from what is not soul ; and 32 SEC. I., CHAP. 'L birth is only for the purpose of receiving the recompence of hence removal of all conceit of agency and the like ; and hence surcease of the production of the effects of that conceit, viz., desire, aversion, virtue, vice, and the like ; and when past works are burnt, that is to say, when their auxiliaries, nescience, desire, and so on are extirpated, and therefore cannot begin to bear fruit ; and when fructescent works have been reaped in experience ; birth no longer awaiting, there is liberation, entire cessation of threefold misery. Such is the proclamation by drum of the Veda and Smritis." | Tarlca-dipikA, MS.,fol. 30, verso. " When meditation has been performed according to the rules for coercion of thought enjoined by the Veda ; and when there has resulted immediate cognition of the soul as distinct from the body and so forth ; and when abolition has ensued of the erroneous apprehen- sion, the conceit, that I am body and the like : defects no longer having place ; nor, thereafter, activity ; nor, then, virtue and vice ; nor, then, birth ; past virtue and vice being cancelled by right apprehension, i. e., by Ike imme- diate cognition aforesaid; emancipation is reached, which is the annulment of the last subsisting misery." The man who has secured emancipation and in still in life, and his plenitude of emancipation after parting from the body, are described, by Ved^nta writers, in the next two passages : ^fa^fWt *UH I Veddnta-sdra,?. 27. "The 'liberated, but still living,' is he who by knowledge of pure Brahma, who is his own essence and indivi- / Bible, through removal of ignorance concerning him, Brahma, having obtained immediate cognition of Brahma, who is himself and indivisible ; whence is riddance of ignorance, and of its effects, which are accumulated works, doubt, misconception, Qc., set free from all fetters, abides in Brah- . "\ ma, conscious of being identical therewith." SEC. L, CHAP. 2. 33 past works.* Thus, after death, the man of right apprehen- sion, being divested of not only his body, but likewise of his mind, and of cognition, and of his sense of all things, remains like a stone, f and is forever exempt from the distresses of Ibid., p. 28. " This one, who is liberated, but is still living, experi- encing, merely for the sustentation of his body, happiness and misery, which are brought to him by his own will, or without it, or by the will of others, and which are the effects of fructescent works ; he being the illuminator of the reflexion of his own soul in his internal organ, &c. : when it, the requital of fructescent works, comes to an end, and his vital breath is merged in the supreme Brahma, one with inward joy ; ignorance and its germinal effects being destroyed, remains Brahma, who is absolute isolation, unadulterate bliss, pure of all notion of alterity, individual." * T I Nydya-sutra-vritti, p. 215. " And in liberation there is the non-existence of that." ' Non-existence of that,' of body and so forth; because of the absence of virtue and of vice, originary thereof. Such is the im- port." The aphorism brought in ia the one hundred and tenth of the fourth Book of the Nydya-sutra. "*" ^T'RTf^'Er^fTT^tW^r sHU^TTcTT I Sdnkhya-pravachana-bha- \j\j ^t shya, p. 204. " In coercion of thought, in profound sleep, and in emancipa- tion, oneness with Brahma is realized." These words form an aphorism, the one hundred and sixteenth of the fifth Book of the Sdnkhya-pravachana. The rendering may seem to be free ; but it is implied in the original. Again : H^fcf ifc of souls : r f%ffTTp=inT3!rfr | Tarka-dipikd, MS., fol. 10, recto. "In the case of a jar placed in the kiln, when its atoms assume a new hue, the dark-coloured jar is destroyed, and then a red jar is produced, in the order of two atoms combining at first, and then more. Of this red jar atoms are the material cause ; contact with fire, the incidental cause ; and the desert of souls, and the like, are its impelling cause." The souls meant are those destined to be in any wise aided or harmed by the jar. The objection is supposed, in the Brahma-sutra, that, if I's'wara had made the world, he would be liable to the imputation of unequal dealing and 38 SEC. I, CHAP. 2. which souls are in any wise affected, are the result of good and evil works done by souls. In the Nyaya and Vais'eshika, cruelty : and disparity is everywhere and at all times before us. In reply, *%. g. t> V -V ~. *> ^ there is the aphorism : ^HfTSni?J T ^TTTT^Jc^T c[ cTSTTTl? ^t^Rf | "There is no unequal dealing and cruelty in him; because of reference. Thus it is shown." S'ankara A'chirya comments on this as follows : " Unequal dealing and cruelty do not attach to I's'wara. Why? Because of relativity. If, indeed, I's'wara had independently made this world of in- equalities, without reference to the works of souls, those faults would have been predicable of him. He does not, however, so make it, but with refer- ence, as just mentioned. If it be asked what he has reference to, we reply, to merit and to demerit. Therefore, this world of inequalities is owing to the merit and demerit of the living creatures that are produced ; and so that fault, viz., of making a world of inequalities, is not chargeable upon I's'wara." The MS. from which this passage was taken, occurring in the first quarter of the second book of S'ankara's Srahma-stitra-bhushya, ia not at present accessible to the translator. All changes passing on in the world, in fact, are set to the account of the works of souls. Thus : i A'nandajna"na's gloss on S'ankara A'chaVya's commentary on the Mdndukya Ifpanishad: Bibliotheca Indica, Vol. VIII., p. 327. " By this it is expressed, that what is beheld in the waking state, i. e., all that is perceived, is imagined in Brahma. That what is seen in dreams is imagined in the same is next declared : ' Again, also,' &c. By the word ' again' is intended ' after the xhaustion of a given quantity of merit and demerit, the cause of a given mea- sure of what is allotted to the waking state.' ' AW indicates ' when the works which are the cause of dreams present themselves for requital.' " What is meant by " imagined in Brahma" will be seen early in tho third section. SEC. I, CHAP. 2. 39 every effect is such a result.* Be it ever so trivial or in- significant, it obeys the general law. Let an atom start up in the air, and travel a distance of no more than four fingers : so far as we can perceive, it works no advantage or prejudice to any one ; and yet, either directly or indirectly, some soul or other will, without fail, be affected thereby, for good or for evil, in a greater or in a lesser degree. And so it cannot but be acknowledged, that even this slight circumstance had place in consequence of the acts of souls. That the world originated from a material cause, is likewise a doctrine of all the Systems, f That, out of which anything is * ^flJrWTr=f\I^Tf^'Jr?'^:ifT | TarMmrita, MS., fol. 3, recto. " Causes common to all effects are God, His knowledge, will, and activity, antecedent non-existence, time, space, and desert of souls." Whether the following words of Vijnifna Bhikshu deliver a tenet held by any philosophy but the Yoga, is a point to be decided by further enquiry than is now practicable. f%^T55^TO ^IW TT i shya-vdrttika, MS., fol. 152 verso and 153 recto. " Moreover, it is acknow- ledged on all hands, that, though not productive of substances, the motion of atoms is going on every moment in the ether : and merit or demerit is not the cause thereof; for it does not give rise to any one's experiencing happiness or misery. Nor are I's'wara's will and the like to be held causative of it ; since such an hypothesis is superfluous. Hence, to account, consonantly to the law of parsimony, for the incessant motion of atoms, &c., if the three gunas in general alone are postulated as originating activity, it is made out, that nature, the complex of the three gunas, is independent." t In the Siinkhya, nature is so ; in the Nya*ya, atoms ; and, in the Vedanta, ignorance, or illusion. The appellations given, in various Systems, to the material cause of the universe are rehearsed in this couplet : 40 SEC. L, CHAP. 2. made, or from which any thing proceeds, is called its material cause. Clay is such a cause of a jar ; and gold, of a golden ornament. As every effect must have a material cause, the Systematists deem the ultimate material cause of all effects to be without a beginning.* Since, then, souls are considered to be without beginning, and so the ultimate material cause of the world ; and since birth and death, and the doing good and evil works, and the ar- ranging and disarranging of the multitudinous constituents of the world, in order that those works may reap their fruit, have been going on from eternity ; it is patent, that the maintainers of the six Systems regard the world as having always had existence. To be sure, during its history, it has, from time to time, been resolved into its elements, and then evolved again ; the gross world being sublimated, on the occurrence of this resolution, into its subtile material cause :f but, as those muta- j[f?f | Cited, as from the Brihad-vasishtha, in the Pdtanjala-bhaskya-vdrt- tilca, MS., fol. 74, recto. " That in which the world resides, when divested of name and form, some call nature ; others, illusion ; others, atoms." But it must not be supposed, from this, that the different Systematists consent in respect of the nature of the world's material cause. * That this is the opinion of the S^nkhyas and Naiy^yikas is too well known to require citations in proof. For the Veda*nta, see the passage at p. 35, where ignorance is reckoned as one of six eternals. t Speaking of the consummation of all things, Vijnrina Bhikshu says : Patanjala-bhasliya- vartlika, MS.,/oZ. 115, verso. "When all these evolu- tions from nature have commingled, or united, severally, with their causes, nature and the rest, the effect becomes subtile i. e., undiscernible ; and, there- fore, it is not to be discovered." SEC. I., CHAP. 2. 41 tions have always been taking place, the stream of the world has been flowing on from eternity.* 3? nrf P&tanjala- bhdshyci-varltiTca, MS., fol. 176, verso. "'Adorable time is beginninglesa, and there is no end of it, O twice-born. These, consequently, are unintertnit- ted, namely, the creation, continuance, termination, and quiescence of the world.' Since, by hundreds of such statements, it is settled, that, as the on-flowing of the world had no beginning, so it has no end, *****. Moreover, the scripture ' And further, there is, at last, the surcease of all illusion,' speaks of that surcease only which is known as the ceasing of the operation, in the universal dissolution of the world, of nature, called, in the words cited, illusion." In the aphorism which occurs before the extract from the Brahma-s'&tra- bh&ihya, given at p. 38, it is asserted, that I's'wara makes this world of inequalities with reference to the works of souls. What follows, derived from the same work, puts forward an objection, and rebuts it in the very next aphorism ; the commentator elucidating the whole : f ff ! sr^r cit 42 SEC. I., CHAP. 2. Once more, all the Systematists receive the words of the Veda as unquestionable authority ; and they also accept, as warrants, the Smritis, the Purauas, &c., the work of Rishis, when those books do not thwart with the Veda. The foregoing are the leading dogmas of the Systems ; and, with trifling modifications, all the Systems hold them. An examination of these dogmas is fraught with very great benefit ; for one gains, by it, an acquaintance with the general bias of the minds of the pandits. - I now proceed to sketch the more important doctrines among those which characterize the Systems severally, the Vedanta excepted. The tenets of the Sankhya and Yoga are these. Nature and soul are the ultimate bases of all existent things. Souls are eternal and many. Nature is unintelligent substance, and is the material cause of the world. It consists of goodness, passion, and darkness, in equal proportions.* And here it " 'If it be said, that there are no works, for that there is no diverseness, it is denied; because of unbeginniugnesa.' The absence of diverseness, i. e., of the diversified developement of things, prior to creation being certified by these utterances, " Meek one, this was, at first, merely existent,' and "One only, without a second,' there are then no works, with reference to which a creation of inequalities could originate : and, if works were supposed to have place subsequently to creation, mutual dependence would be the result ; that is to say, works must require diversified developement of things, bodies, &c., and the diversified developement of things, bodies, &c., must require works. Let it be, therefore, that IVwara acts in dependence on works, after the diversified developement of things. There being, before such developement, no works causative of inequalities, it follows, that the first creation ought to be one of uniform equalities. The answer to this is, that it, the argument, is of no weight, ' because of the uubeginningness' of the course of the world. It would have weight, if the course of the world had a beginning. But the continuous operation, in the beginningless course of the world, of works and of inequalities of creation, as mutual causes and effects, after the manner of the seed and the sprout, is not incompatible." * I ^ 3T3HI *fT SEC. I., CHAP. 2. 43 should be borne in mind, that it is not the goodness, passion, and darkness, popularly reckoned qualities or particular states of the soul, that are intended in the Sankhya. In it they are unintelligent substances.* Otherwise, how could they be Pdtanjala-bhdshyct-vdrttika, MS., fol. 73, verso. "The gunas themselves are denoted by the word nature ; and nature does not differ from them. Thus is this pronounced : ' These gunas,' &c. ; these self- same gunas, goodness and the rest, are what is signified by the term nature." In the sixty-first aphorism of the Sdnkhya-pravachana, Book I., nature ia said to be the equilibrium of goodness, passion, and darkness. On this declara- tion Vyndna Bhikshu remarks: cf^t ^T^Tf^^Tnfft *TT | Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhdshya,p. 45, " The ' equilibrium' of those substances, 'goodness' and so forth, i. e., a state in which none is less or more ; in short, a state in which there is not aggregation of less and more. The extractive import is, the state of not being an effect. The gunas, taken collectively, when characterized by the condition of not being effects, make up nature. Such is the sense." Nature is not, then, a substrate of the gunas, but the very gunas in a certain state, that of equivalence. f I Mid. "Goodness and the rest are substances, not specific qualities ; for they tkemstlves possess qualities, those of contact and separation, and also have the properties of levity, mobility, gravity, &c." For the specific qualities, see the Ekdshd-parichchheda, ninetieth stanza. it is a maxim of the Hindus, that endowment with quality is a token of substance alone. There cannot be quality of a quality. The reason why goodness, passion, and darkness are called gunas is sup- V -N posed, by expounders of the Srfnkhya, to be as follows : | Ibid. "The term gu.no. is applied, in this system, and also in the Veda and elsewhere, to these, goodness, passion, and darkness, because they are appliances of the soul, nnd because 44 SEC. I, CHAP. 2. the material cause of earth and like gross things. From nature arise effects, to requite the good and evil works of souls.* First, among these effects, arises the great principle, or intellect ; and, from it, the organ of egoism : and these, too, are unintelligent substances, f From the organ of egoism proceed eleven instruments and five rudiments. The latter are tenuous sources of the gross elements, earth and the rest. The eleven instruments derived from the organ of egoism are the senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, with the tongue, hands, feet, anal orifice, organ of generation, and mind. Intellect, the organ of egoism, and mind, are all term- ed internal organs, or, collectively, the internal organ. J Cer- they form the triple-stranded rope, i. e., the great principle, viz., intellect and the rest, which binds the soul a beast, as it were. " Guna, it must be observed, signifies rope, or cord ; and, likewise, quality ; but not here, as we have seen. * In the Siinkhya, it is not only the works of souls that move nature to bring about reward of good and evil, in the developement of the world, &c. ; but nature has itself an intrinsic power of acting on behalf of the soul. Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhashya, p. 49. " And the egoizer is a substantial internal organ, having self-consciousness for its affection. It is not self- consciousness alone, but inclusive thereof." All the principles of the S^nkhya intellect, the organ of egoism, and mind, being, of course, among them, are said to be substances: ^EfSf ^ TT^- f^SjfcT 5 ?? JHirt ^<4J?5>TT T3" | Ibid., p. 46. " And this group of twenty- five principles is substantial." Dr. J. R. Ballantyne has strangely written: "Souls alone are, in the Sankhya, regarded as substances." Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy, p. xxvii. It seems, oftentimes, as if there were not three organSj so much as one tripartite organ. Each is, however, frequently found styled an organ SEC. L CHAP. 2. 45 titude is the distinguishing property of intellect ; to evolve self- consciousness, that of the organ of egoism ; and to cognize dis- criminatively that of mind.* /6W.,p. 117. "The inter. nal organ, though single, comes to be, in itself, partly cause and partly effect, by virtue merely of its distinction into three states, those of intellect, egoizer, and mind; like the seed, the germ, and the full-grown tree; as.has been said higher up. For this same reason, in the verse of the Va"yu and Ma*tsya, two of the Purdnas, 'Mind, the great principle, under- standing, Brahm, city, intellect, knowledge, and I'sVara,' mind and in- tellect are exhibited as synonymes." ' PdtanyaJa-bh&thya-vdrUika t MS., fol. 4 recto. "'The thinker,' the internal organ in general ; since, in this system, that organ, which is one only, has, simply on account of its possessing a variety of affections, a fourfold division." Thus, while, in the Sa"nkhya, the internal organ has three members, in the Yoga it has four. The Vedanta herein agrees with the Yoga. * ^rHT^^i^f ^ff^"5 | " Intellect is certitude." So runs the thirteenth aphorism of the S&nTchya-pravachana, Book II. Vijn^na Bhik ehu remarks on it : Sf^TlT^ TRWt ^"f^f^fcf | NJ Sdnkhya-pravachana Ihdshya, p. 115. " Intellect is a syno- nyme of the great principle. And its distinguishing affection is certitude, or assurance. As for the enunciation of them as identical, it is because of the indifference between a property and that to which it belongs." In definition of egoism, it is said : T =EffjTTrT^t'S T: f1 T T^ : I ; | Ibid., p. 117. "The egoizer is egoism. It makes \i (karoti)I (aham): hence it is termed egoi/er. Compare kumbhakdra, maker of jars, or potter. It is a substantial internal organ ; and it is called egoism, because of the indifference between a property and that to which it belongs." Strictly speaking, then, egoism is the property of the organ of egoism. 46 SEC. I., CHAP. 2. Soul, say the Sankhyas, is sheer knowledge.* But, on exa- mination, it turns out to be, with them, only nominally so. For, in all knowledge, properly so called, there is apprehen- sion, or cognition, of some object; as, this is ajar, this is cloth, Mind is thus characterized by Va*chaspati Mis'ra ; | Tattwa-kaumu-dt, p. 34. " That, mind, is defined by a state- ment of its distinguishing nature : ' Mind, here, is a cognizer discriminatively. " Mind is denned by its characteristic, cognizing discriminatively. A thing is, at first, indistinctly perceived, by the senses, in the notion 'This is something. Then the mind thoroughly settles, 'It is of this sort, not of that. '" The translator has conformed, in the English of the body of the page, to thia explanation of sankalpa. Vijnana Bhikshu dissents from the foregoing view, and assigns to the mind a function in addition to sankalpa : ^T i f soul,'' reflexion, in the soul, of that affection. In the same page with the Sanskrit last cited we read : " Here, if the fruit right notion is supposed to reside in soul alone, the affec- tion of intellect exclusively is an instrument of right notion ; and, if in intellect alone, the contact of a sense, &c. are exclusively such an instrument. SEC. L, CHAP. 2. 49 and this evolution is called an affection. Thus, the cognition As for the soul, it is only the witness of right notions, not the subject of them. And, if the soul's apprehension and the intellectual affection are equally reckoned right notions, both the aforesaid, viz., the affection of intellect and the contact of a sense, fyc., are instruments of right notion relatively to those notions respectively." But the soul's apprehension is considered, by the Stfnkhyas, as the principal Bort of right notion : tTIcTW^Wrer id, p 96. " But, if the ground of the soul's being thought void of qualities be enquired, the reply is, that the soul's will, &c. can- not be eternal ; for their originatedness is evidenced by consciousness. If originated qualities of soul were admitted, it would be incident to mutation." Cognition is here denoted by the suppletive expression after " will." cii Pdtanjala-bhashya-vdrUika,'M.S.,fol. 164, verso. "But, should it be asked, why the S^nkhya and Yoga are so eager to establish that soul is immutable, hearken. If, in the state of emancipation, any property of the eoul, such as cognition and the like, were to perish, then, owing to 54 SEC. L, CHAP. 2. shape of ajar, of cloth, &c., are reflected in the soul. Conse- this defect of loss, emancipation could not, any more than penury, be the supreme aim of the soul." The meaning is, that such evanescent things as cognition, will, and so forth, cannot have existence in the state of liberation. If they were the soul's qualities, the soul would lose something by being liberated. Hence, to save it from liability to loss, they are represented as having never belonged to the soul. p. 96. " Non-eternal cognition cannot appertain to the eternal soul." Attention should be paid to the circumstance, that, in the Sa'nkhya, the term "cognition" (jnana) denotes two distinct things. One of them is that which we all so denominate. This is really the apprehending of objects ; and, to us, this alone deserves the name it bears. This cognition is that on which we have hitherto been dwelling. But, again, the Sstnkhyas apply the appel- lation of cognition to the soul itself, which they also style intelligence, the intelligent one, &c. Here, however, cognition is so but nominally ; as it is not one with apprehension of objects. Cognition as denoting soul, it is laid down, is eternal. cT^?T*T f*T3lT'iTft 'STf* f%3T Sdnkkya-sdra, MS.,/oL 17, recto. "Therefore, the cognition of soul, which soul itself is eternal, is eternal." That this cognition, by which the soul itself is intended, is cognition only in name, is thus shown: T bhashya-vdrtlika , MS., fol. 136, verso. " In the foregoing sentence, Yajna- valkya, for the purpose of setting forth, that, in liberation there is the at- tainment of the soul's supreme aim, which is the removal of the experience of all misery, has, by the words ' After departure there is no consciousness," expressed, that the soul, though essentially cognition, knows nothing through- out the duration of liberation." Thus, even when liberated, the soul continues to be cognition. If this cog- nition were that which apprehends objects, the soul would be cognizant. Yet it does not possess, when emancipated, any more sentience than a stone. The cognition just spoken of, that which does not apprehend, is eternal The other, which apprehends, and which resides in the soul, as a reflexion, is non-eternal. SEC. I., CHAP. 2. 55 quently, the reflexion, in the soul, of the affection apprehension Sdnkhya-sura, MS., fol. 26, recto. " A Iso the intelligent one's witnessing is impermanent ; it being the reflexion of objects." Since it is but a reflexion, it lasts only during the presence of that which is reflected. It has been abundantly made clear, that the cognition in question is not in- trinsic to the soul. Nevertheless, the Sa'nkhyas are wont to use language from which it seems as if they believed, that the soul itself, as reflected into, were this cognition. ^jrfcTt ^f%ft'*ft$T*T I Ibid., fol. 28, recto. "In NJ truth, I, soul, am the cognition of affections of the internal organ." But this is deceptive. The explanation is thus. Just as crystal which is receiving the reflexion of a rose is said to be red, so the soul, from receiving the relflexSon of intellectual affections, is said to be cognition. In the first case, it is, really, the reflexion of the rose that is red ; and, in the second case, it is the reflexion of the affections, not soul, that is cognition. Though the Sa"ukhyas contend strenuously, that the soul is incognitive, still, with an uneasy consciousness that their view in this behalf is not entirely correct, they compound the matter by giving to the soul the titles of cognition, knowledge, intelligence, &c., and yet refuse to accept the legitimate conse- quences of such a procedure. And this fact will assist us to understand a singularity connected with the Sfokhya system. All such cognitions as "I will," " I am happy," &c. &c., say its advocates, are erroneous ; since qualities which are not proper to the soul are, thereby, attributed to it. Less erroneous, according to those philosophers, and erroneous on a different ground, is the cognition "I know." Here, they say, there is not the attribution to soul of a property alien to it, but, rather, the supposing that cognition is a property of the soul, whereas it is its essence. The untenablenesa of this is obvious. For it is not that cognition, falsely so called by the Sa'nkhyas, namely, the essence of the soul, that is cognized in the consciousness " I know," but that cognition which is truly the apprehension of objects. And this latter cognition is neither the soul itself, nor a property of it No more, on account of this cognition, is the soul real cognition, than it is a real experiencer of happiness and misery, by reason of the reflex- ions of them. For, in the SiCnkhya, happiness, misery, will, and activity, no less than cognition, are evolutions from, and affections of, the internal organ. Their reflexions, not themselves, come in contact with the soul. To recapitulate : the Sa'nkhya holds, that all true cognitions are evolutions from the internal organ. A primary cognition, as " This is ajar," is an affection of that organ, and also an evolution from it ; and its reflexion falls upon the soul. This reflexion is psychic, or secondary, apprehension ; and it likewise is an evolution from the internal organ. 56 SEC. I, CHAP. 2. is the soul's apprehension. In the Sankhya doctrine, then, whether apprehension be considered as an affection of the in- ternal organ, or as a reflexion, in soul, of that affection, it does not appertain to soul, or is not intrinsic to it. Similarly, will and activity also are affections of the internal organ.* Soul, by reason of receiving their reflexions, ac- Furthermore, also the cognition " I cognize the jar" is an affection of the internal organ. Its history is this. The soul, along with a reflexion of the affection of the internal organ, such as "This is a jar," is reflected into the internal organ. This second reflexion is the affection of the internal organ in the form " I cognize the jar ;" and, like all reflexions, it is an evolution from the internal organ. sR^ 1 %cT'^ufclfw*3%craj^-S}Tt 1 ZJ cJf^QJcT I S&nkhya-pravachana-bhdshya. p. 73. "The reflexion of intelligence into intellect is supposed with a view to a ccount for the perception of intelligence." It is meant, that the soul, when it has received the reflexion of an affection of the internal organ, to the end that it may behold itself possessed of that reflexion, must be reflected back into that organ ; just as a man's face must be reflected into a mirror, in order that he may see himself. The reflexion into the internal organ must be reflected back into the soul ; and this ia the soul's self-inspection. urwf i /&*-, p 76. -objects of rifht notion, viz., nature, soul, &c. , are perceived, when borne by the affection known as instrument of right notion, and when, in conjunction with that affection, reflected in the soul. " The notion " 1" is an affection of the internal organ ; but the object of that notion is soul : for the affection " I" is nothing but the soul reflected into the internal organ. Hence, the notions, or affections, of that organ, in the form "I cognize", or " I am happy'', and so forth, mean, that the soul cogni- zes, or is happy, &c. Patanjala-bMshya-varttika, MS., fol. 85, verso. "That evolution which is certitude about, i. e., cognition of, sound and other objects being established to belong to the intellect, its, that evolution's, effects, viz., will, activity, happiness, misery, desert, impression (sanskdra), &c., are established to be properties of the intellect solely." li 18 11 SEC. L, CHAP. 2. 57 counts itself, from ignorance, a wilier and a doer ; and, of course, it befals it to experience happiness, misery, Elysium, Hell, birth, death, &c., the fruits of good and evil works. For, since the soul, though not actually a doer, misappre- hendingly thinks itself one, it is brought into the bondage of experiencing those fruits.* This is what it is for the soul to be bound. By the statement, that the soul, on admitting the reflexions of will, activity, and other qualities of intellect, misappre- hendingly looks upon itself as an agent, &c. , we are to under- Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhashya, p. 226. "'The egoizer, not the soul, is the agent.' That internal organ which haa egoism for its characteristic affection is the egoizer. It alone is endowed with activity." The fifty-fourth aphorism of the Sdnkhya-pravachana, Book VI., is included above. Since the Sankhyas consider the internal organ to be the real agent, or doer of works, the virtue and vice arising from the works are supposed to be that organ's properties, or evolutions from it, as they are styled, and not properties of the soul. Hence, in the penultimate passage of Sanskrit, desert is comprehended among the properties of the internal organ. Desert denotes both merit and demerit. (1 Ibid., p. 35. "Nature executes works, which have fruits, good and evil. Moreover, nature, ranging the three worlds at will, eats those works, in the fruit." Not nature itself, but nature in its evolution the internal organ, is here spoken of as executing works and eating their fruit. Patanjala-bhashya-vdrttika,'M.S.,fol. 57, recto. "For the egoistic notions ' I do', and the like, are, through their production of merit and demerit, the cause of the entire universe." It it meant, that, when a man thinks " I am a doer," he incurs vice or vir- tue from his doings. To the end that their fruit may be reaped, it is that the world is produced. I 58 SEC. L, CHAP. 2. stand it to be meant, that the soul does not really so look upon itself: for, as we have remarked, in the Sankhya system, it has, in truth, no apprehension ; both this and misapprehen- sion being affections proper to the internal organ.* The soul's being misapprehensive is nothing else but its receiving the reflexion of this misapprehension,! an affection of intel- lect. In fact, neither does it at all misapprehend, nor does it at all apprehend. On this topic the followers of the Sankhya allow themselves in singular theories, intelligible only at the cost of close atten- tion. That the soul should be made out destitute of all specific qualities, J such as apprehension, will, &c., is most material to their views ; and hence they altogether refuse to it the possession of apprehension. Now, misapprehension itself is a species of apprehension, mistaken apprehension ; as the taking nacre to be silver. Thus they are driven to regard both sorts of apprehension, the true and the false, as affections of the internal organ, or reflexions, in the soul, of those affec- tions. The precise mind of the advocates of the Sankhya, when * "J^fcT | Ibid., fol. 8, recto. This is an isolated verse, of unknown paternity. " The properties misery and ignorance are nature's, not soul's." After quoting as above, Vijna"na Bhikshu observes, that this and similar passages deny ignorance to the soul. See alao the second passage from the Tattwa-kaumudi, given at p. 10. Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhashya, p. 214. " And this non-discrimination, an affection of the internal organ, becomes, in the shape of reflexion, as it were a property of soul." t^cT ^HJn fnnn"! | Ibid.,p. 96. " Therefore the soul is without NJ qualities." But compare what is said at the foot of pp. 52, 53. See the note at p. 10. SEC. I, CHAP. 2. 59 they call activity an affection of the internal organ, and say, that only from misapprehension does the soul esteem itself an agent, will now become clear to the reader. As is the case with apprehension, will, and activity, so is it with happiness and misery. That is to say, they are all evolutions from the in- ternal organ ;* and their reflexions in the soul are the soul's becoming happy or miserable, f Again, either afresh affec- S&nkkya-prava- chana-bhashya, p. 113. " Though the qualities happiness, misery, &c. are properties of the internal organ, ' there,' viz., in the soul, ia their ' residence,' or abiding, in the form of reflexions, ' owing to non-discrimination,' as a cause." The aphorism elucidated in the eleventh of the sixth Book. Happiness, misery, merit, and demerit are all called evolutions from the in- ternal organ ; and the first two are likewise termed affections of that organ. All affections of the internal organ are held to be objects of consciousness. Cognition, will, activity, happiness, misery, and aversion, being objects of this sort, are affections ; but merit, demerit, and impression, not being objects of consciousness, are not viewed as affections. t A distinction is groundlessly taken, by the Sa"nkhyas, between happiness and misery and the experience thereof. Happiness and misery, they say, reside in the internal organ ; and the reflexions of them, cast on the soul, are the soul's experience of them. Hence it is, that they call the soul the experi- encer, of happiness and of misery, to-wit. But that experience, since it ia only a reflexion, and therefore an evolution from the internal organ, and not intrinsic to the soul, is considered to be false. *TJrt Sunkhya-sara, MS., fol. 30, recto. " Another bondage is the re- flexion, in intelligence, immutable, unaffected, etherlike, of the intellect's misery ; and it is the soul's experience of misery. This too is false in the mirror of intelligence, or soul." It is observable, that, though the Sinkhyas distinguish between happiness and misery and the experience of them, taking thfi former to be affec- tions of the internal organ, aud the latter to be reflexions of those affec- tions, lying on the soul, still they give to these latter as well, the name 60 SEC. L, CHAP. 2. tion of the internal organ, cognizing the soul, when happi- ness or misery is reflected therein, or the reflexion, in the soul, of such an affection, is the soul's cognizing itself as happy or miserable ;* and in this consist all its bondage and wretch- edness. To escape from this wretchedness, he who listens to the Sankhya, and ponders and revolves it, and derives from it this discriminative knowledge, that to do and to experience are qualities of nature alone, for the internal organ is an affection of nature ; and the soul is in every way distinct from nature, and is, in reality, neither doer nor experience!' of happiness or of misery, t and is unchangeable, is released from the captivity of nature. For it is a dogma of the San- khya, that, for shamefastness, nothing surpasses nature. So long as soul does not detect her, she spreads her toils ; but, Of happiness and misery. Sankhya-pravachana-bhdshya, p. 10. "Happiness and misery reside in the soul likewise, in the form of reflexions." * The reflexions, in the soul, of the internal organ's affections happiness and misery are the soul's happiness and misery. Then the soul, together with those reflexions, is reflected into the internal organ : and thus is constituted that organ's affection in the form of '' I am happy" or " I am miserable." Afterwards, the reflexion of those reflexiforra affections is cast upon the soul ; and this is its psychic apprehension of them : in other words, it is the soul's cognition " I am happy" or " I am miserable." ?=ng l tanW%ftnTO ;i ire ci^t^nTTff lffX*inWlTift.f?r | Mid., p. 99. " ID order to ac- count for the complex cognition ' I am happy,' or the like, we believe, that the very affection of intellect takes on a similar form. Acknowledging that there is only the assimilation of the soul to that affection, viz., by the soul's receiving its reflexion, we do not hold that there is, in the soul, any form but that of such affection received by the soul as a reflexion. For, if we held an independent form in the soul, it would follow, that it, the soul, is changeable." Compare what is said at the foot of p. 56, about the affection of the internal organ, in the form of ' I cognize the jar," and its reflexion in the soul. f See the passage from the SdnkJtya-sara , given at p. 59. SEC. I., CHAP. 2. 61 directly when her delusive play is noticed, she flees, in con- fusion, from soul, and her face is never beheld again.* Accordingly, when the soul has acquired right apprehension, accumulated works, are, by its efficacy, done away. And, in- asmuch as it no longer deems itself a doer, its current works, or those which it does day by day, do not devolve upon it . either merit or demerit. Only to exhaust the experience of fructescent works, has it to remain in its body ; and, when these works shall have received their full requital, it will relinquish the body, and there will be no more fear, for it, of Elysium, or of Hell, or of metempsychosis : since then no works will appertain to it, the experience of which will oblige it to tenant a corporeal frame. In connexion with this subject, what I have said above should be kept in remembrance ; that, agreeably to the San- khya, neither apprehension nor misapprehension actually be- longs to soul, both being qualities of the internal organ, f I Sixty-first stanza of the Sankhya-kdrika. " My'opinion is, that nothing is more coy than nature ; which, on finding herself beheld by the soul, does not again come in sight of him." !JSF?T UTT TT^ET tjrmj^irjir qrcrTO3cT I Sdnkhya-pra- ^> \t \i *j o*. + vachana-lhashya, p. 154. "Nature, also when her defects, viz., change- ablenesa, the being filled with misery, &c., have been observed by the soul, abashed, never again approaches him ; like as a woman of good family." Such is the description found of nature, though, in the contemplation of the Sankhya and Yoga systems, it is an insentient principle. f ^frr^ift *3 fcR-^nf^Nrt fcprnita I m*., p. 43. And discrimination and non-discrimination, both which are affections, belong to the mind alone." The discrimination spoken of, that is to say, between soul and nature, is the right apprehension mentioned in the text, which i? to be acquired before emancipation can be realized. 62 SEC. L, CHAP. 2. Therefore, the cognition "I am distinct from nature, and am unchangeable" is an affection of the internal organ : and this organ is an evolution from nature. So it is to be understood, that, as nature, by means of its evolution misapprehension, binds the soul, so, no less, through its evolution right apprehen- sion, does it set the soul free. Hence nature is both the capti- vator and the emancipator of the soul.* According to the Sankhya doctors, the entire office of nature is to bring about the experience and the liberation of the soul, f Nay, these autho- Ibid., "Thua, to whatever soul nature shows itself, as not discriminated therefrom, that very soul, and no other, does it hold captive, through junction, by force of the impression of that non- discrimination. In like manner, to whatever soul it shows itself, as discriminated therefrom, that very soul it releases, through disjunction from itself, by the destruction of the impression aforesaid." t I Ibid., pp. 110, 111. "Nature's fabricating the world is for the purpose of liberating the soul naturally freed from the bondage of m j gerv _ from the misery which is in it, in the form of reflexions, or from that misery which is an affection of the internal organ, and is connected with the soul through the relation of reflexion. Or nature's fabricating the world is for its own behoof, i. e., to deliver itself from veritable misery. Though the aim, in creation, is experience, as well as emancipation, the fatter alone is specified, because it holds the chief place." The first aphorism of the Sdnkhya-pravachana, Book II., is here com- mented on. It is cited in short in the next extract. By nature's creation for itself we are to understand, that it creates inclu- sively for itself, while officially creating for soul. The words subjoined make this evident : ^T5T f^TFj^Tt^T^f ^T^ 3"cZTT*T SEC. L, CHAP. 2. 63 rities even declare, that, in truth, the soul is neither bound nor freed, but that bondage and freedom both appertain to nature ; as is distinctly set forth in the sixty-second stanza of the San- khya-kdrikd.* srsm | X f? Ibid., p. 151. "But, if it be said, that creation, by nature, is laid down in the sentence ' For the liberation of the already liberated soul, or for itself to be for its own, i. e., for nature's, sake also ; it is admitted. Still, abstractedly from service of the soul, there cannot be nature's service of itself. For the good to be done for itself, by na- ture, is the deliverance of itself from the soul, whose experience and emanci- pation it has brought to effect." But how, it may be asked, does nature free the soul by forming the world ? The ensuing extract will disclose the singular view which the advocates of the Srfnkhya cherish on this point : f%^^T^f?TcTt ^TT^ITT foReff^TT- ^Tf^rrc<5Wi *7f??f^n TTC*T*TT yn^aj^h i ibid., P . iss. ^ sj V* ' By transmigration of the subtile body, through birth, is gained immediate discrimination. From this comes the soul's aim, emancipation. Such is the meaning." We are now enabled to see in what sense it is understood, that nature aims to liberate the soul by creating the world. In furnishing the soul with a body, mind, senses, &c., it capacitates the soul to obtain knowledge, which likewise it brings into existence ; and by this knowledge the soul becomes unfettered. " Therefore, in reality, not any soul is bound, or freed, or transmigrates : ilia nature, in relation to various souls, that transmigrates, is bound, and is freed." yfi^^^ clT^cff ^ ! iN ^^^TT^If | Sankhya-pravaehana- bhdshya, p. 155. "Bondage and release belong to nature alone ; because to it, in truth, belongs misery." Respecting the bondage of soul, the same author says: STf^rfsft aTj^Ty g ? - W^lJr^RftJC^lfWl 1 *RT *fcT *Tre s I Ibid., p. 20. "The bond- age of the soul, consisting in its connexion with misery, which is reflexional, is unreal. This is the import." 64 SEC. I, CHAP. 2. Such are the chief doctrines of the Sankhya and Yoga. But, as I have already remarked, there is this great distinction between these systems, that the latter recognizes God, while the former denies Him.* The Sankhyas hold, that the Veda had no author. Yet they do not, like the Mimansakas, contend, that it has existed from eternity. They say, that, at the beginning of each renovation of the universe, it has issued from the mouth of Brahma. He was no conscious composer of it, however : it simply escaped from him like an expiration. Thus the Sankhyas, though maintaining that the Veda origi- nated from Brahma, would have it to be authorless. And they further declare, that, often as the universe has been re- dintegrated, the Veda has as often been produced without the * The ninety-second aphorism of the Sdnkhya-pravachana, Book I., 18 Since the being of IVwara is not proved." Tattwa-kaumudi, p. 51. "'Commencement,' i. e., creation, is executed by nature exclusively, not by IVwara. " Long arguments are entered into by the commentators who wrote the Sdnkhya-pravachana-JiJidshya and the Tattwa-kaumudi, to disprove God's exist- ence. At the same time, neither Vijna'na Bhikshu nor Va'chaspati Mis'ra was a thoroughgoing Sankhya. This is shown, as to the former, by the fact that he strives strenuously to excuse the one error, as he rates it, of the system he so largely endorses. The Yoga, avowedly indeed, is theistic ; but, on near scrutiny, we find this claim to be futile. The god of the Yoga differs in no respect, psychically, from its man or beast. His soul is as incognitive as a clod ; and his internal organ, which creates the world, and which is omniscient and omnipotent, is an evolution from nature. In the matter of omnipresence, or, rather, all- pervadingness, he possesses it, indeed ; but so does every other soul, down to that of a tree. jala-bhdshya-vdrttika, MS. fol. 87, recto. " As for the custom, in Toga trea tises, of saying, that the supreme I'rfwara is omniscient, &c., it is in compli- ance with popular usage." SEC. I., CHAP. 2. 65 least variation whatever, and thus has retained the same form from all duration of time.* Strange indeed are the tenets that have been enumerated. Great labour, as we see, has been expended for the one end Sdnkhya-pravachana-bh&thya, pp. 181, 182 '" The Vedas are not eternal, since there is scripture for their originatedness.' There being the scripture 'He, Brahma, performed austerity, and from him, so doing, the three Vedas were produced,' the Vedas are not from eternity. This is the sense." The forty -fifth aphorism of the Sdnkhya-pravachana, Book V., is herein included Still the Srfnkhyas do not acknowledge, that the Vedas were composed by Brahma. f tn^ETtwiTrrcTT^T^r if^Ro SJ far^r Ibid, pp. 182, 183. "Not from the mere fact of its being uttered by a person, can one say there is producedness of a thing by that person ; since it ia not the wont to speak of the respiration of deep sleep as the production of a person : but, by reason of its production consciously, a thing is said to be produced by a person. The Vedas, however, just like an expiration, and by virtue of desert of souls, issue, spontaneously, from Brahma, without ever being consciously produced by him. Hence they are not productions of a person. And thus the scripture ; ' This, which is the Rig-veda, is the efflation of that great being.' " The last extract, if fully given, would be seen to recite the other divisions of Veda, the Yajash, &c. In proof of the assertion in the last sentence of the paragraph to which this note is attached, we read : ^"fsTcZJcfT^T^Erif'T "5f ^f3TT reconcile the irreconcilable. 72 SEC. I., CHAP. 3. manifest are the tokens, from which it is certain, that some most mighty and ineffable Intelligence framed the world with design.* Any effort directed to an end has, self- evidently, mind for its author ; for only he who knows that a particu- lar end will be accomplished by a given act, will engage in such an act with a view to such an end. We are, therefore, sure, that he who does this act possesses consciousness ; and such a one is called an intelligent being. Now, when, after contem- plating a thing, we are certified that it is intended for a cer- tain end, there is no room for doubt that an intelligent being has had to do with it. To give an example : I find, some- where, a pile of wood sufficient to cook a meal for four men, and as much as they would require of pulse, rice, meal, ghee, vegetables, and so forth, disposed in separate vessels, and a fire- place, and the ground clean round about. Would any scep- tic, I demand, in all the earth, doubt whether the requisites aforesaid were prepared by some one for culinary purposes, or whether they collected together spontaneously and fortuitously. Just so is it with a clock. No one, on examining the arrange- ment of its wheels, will ever entertain a misgiving as to whether it was made by some one, and in order to measure time. Similarly, I maintain, that this world is full of innumerable things, analogous in character to those above mentioned, on scrutinizing which it becomes certain, that they were made for such and such ends. And here it is to be noticed, that, as regards a single thing, that is, not an aggregate made up of many and heterogeneous parts, jointly indicating a distinct final cause, though it be ca- * The dominant argument urged, in defence of the existence of God, by the theistical schools of Hindu philosophy, is, that the earth, the sprout, &,c. must be referred to an agent, inasmuch as they are effects ; according to the maxim, that " every effect implies an agent, as a jar, for instance." Those schools, and likewise the generality of Hindus, are, however, but little con- versant with the teleological argument, the .subject of a portion of the present chapter. SEC. I., CHAP. 3. 73 pable of producing a certain end, still the doubt may arise, con- cerning it, whether that end was contemplated, or whether it be governed by pure chance. For instance, I come upon one or two sticks. They may serve for cooking ; and yet I do not know, for certain, whether they were meant for that purpose. It may be, that they dropped accidentally from off somebody's head. As they would answer for cooking, so they would answer for other ends as well. I might drive off a dog with them ; or I might turn them to account as stakes. No one can say, with perfect positiveness, for what particular end, out of these and others, those sticks were designed. But, when I see together a fagot, and water, and pulse, and meal, &c. &c., no hesitation possesses me, but certainty, that those appliances are for cook- ing. And the ground of this certainty is, that each of them bears a share in cooking : and it is out of question, that all those heterogeneous articles, concurring to one end, could never have come together casually, each in its due measure and appropriate place, but must have been assembled by an intelligent being, and with design. Now, there are, in this world, unnumbered things which, not being single and in- composite, accomplish fixed ends. Had they been isolated, it would have been hard to say whether their ends were not the result of mere chance. But these things are compounded of numerous constituents, gross and subtile ; each of which is necessary, in its proportion, to bring about the end, and is also of due dimension, is adjusted to a fit position, and is constituted of proper material : as, in a watch, the parts that should be made of iron are of iron ; and it is similar as to those that should be of brass, of porcelain, and of glass. Although there are many wonderful things in this world, which we of India did not heretofore thoroughly under- stand, yet the learned of Europe, with their subtle ingenuity, deep investigation, persistent industry, and the help of vari- ous instruments, have so explored the fabric of the body and of vegetable products, the earth, the celestial system, and L 74 SEC. I., CHAP. 3. the nature, varieties, and properties of water, air, light, &c. g considered as made up ot happiness, misery, and insensibility, appurtenances of its cause. And thu.s a cause made up of happi- ness, misery, and insensibility, namely, nature, the uuraamfested, is esta- blished for them, viz., for intellect; c|-c." V^chaspati Mis"ra's language, throughout this passage, is somewhat lax. To exemplify : instead of saying, that an effect is made up of the qualities of its cause, he ought, in strictness of Hindu terminology, to have said, that an effect is beholden, for its own qualities, to those of its cause. So, again, it ia a loose mode of expression, to speak of .nature as being made up of happiness, misery, and insensibility ; since these, in philosophical rigour, are laid down as constituting nature's qualities, or properties. This latter assertion is shown by what follows : ^f^T^T^T^ ciT cT 7T?HT*lt S&nkhya-pramckrttta-bhfakyOi PP- 88, 89. " An for tJie phraseology, that the rjunas, or components of naturn, are made up of happiness, &c., it is accountable for only by the identity, under one as- l/ecl, of a property and that which is propertied ; as we hear it snid, that, mind is one with resolve." * ^T ^ TWrenUI^Tcr^P | Tattwa-knnmudi, p. '20. Nj "The whole, nature, intellect, and so on, are insentient." M 8-2 SEC. I., CHAP. 4. Let the terms prakriti, sattwa, rajas, tamas, buddhi, and ahankdra be taken otherwise than as they are taken in the San- khya, and the result will be very different. Goodness, passion, and darkness, a Naiyayika might argue, may be conditions of soul, and therefore may be alleged, to belong to its nature : for " nature," in such a sense, or swabhdva, is one of the classical acceptations of the multivocal prakriti. When the apprehensive faculties of the soul are in their full vigour, and when the soul is calm and unperturbed, it may be said to be in a state of goodness ; when agitated, and greatly drawn towards external objects, we may speak of it as being in a state of passion ; and, when it is stupefied, one may call it dark. * Again, intellect is a quality of soul ; and to soul apper- tains egoism f also. If we understand, in some such way, the words selected, in the Sankhya, as fundamental technicalifcjes, the things denoted by them can be proved to have existence ; but not othenvise. I am unable to say, with certainty, how the Sankhyas came to entertain such strange ideas on the subject under discussion. Nevertheless, considering the intellectual pecu- liarities of the pandits, and their method of argumentation, I hazard this conjecture. There is no question, that the atheistic Sankhya system was not primeval in India ; for, though the Manu-sanhitd, the Gitd, and other books, in de- scribing the generation of the world, &c., countenance the tenets of the Sankhya, yet God likewise is there acknow- ledged to be the Author of the world. Hence, it seems to mo, that the thcistic Sankhya was first elaborated, and the atheistic, by little and little, at an after-period. The germ of the former * The words goodness, passion, and darkness, with tlieir conjugates, as here employed, and elsewhere, must be understood to be technical, and as inexpres- Bive substitutes, at best, for the sattwa, rajas, t.amas, &c. of the Sanskrit. t In the S&nkhya, buddhi, intellect, is the organ of cognition ; ahankdra, that of egoism : but, in this place, the Nyaya view is adopted, that \a to say, that intellect itself is cognition, and that ahuiikdra itself is egoism. SEC. I. , CHAP. 4. 83 may have been as follows. It is written in the Veda, with refer- ence to God, that, at the time the world was made, " He saw," and that he said " I am one : I would become many." By these words, perception and self-consciousness are implied to have arisen, in God, at the beginning of the universe : and per- ception is intellect; and the notion denoted by "I" is egoism. From this the ancients may have concluded, that God, in order to the construction of the world, assumed intellect and egoism ;* and thus they may have been induced to regard His intellect and egoism as the causes of the world. One will here ask : Though they thus accounted intellect and egoism the causes of the world, still these are only its instrumental causes ; and why do you suppose that they are held, in the Sankhya, to be material causes? The answer is, that the pandits have come, in process of time, to forget the true character of several things which they have been accustomed to treat about. Thus, in many cases, as concerns qualities, which are inseparable from things qualified, they have brought themselves to think of them as independent things possessing qualities. The founders of the Sankhya system, having long * This conjecture proves to be corroborated by the ensuing words of Vijua"- na Bhikshu : | Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhashya, p. 50. "Also in the Veda, by the texts 'He beheld,' ( He saw,' &c., we learn, that, from intellect itself, produced at the outset of creation, was the creation of all besides itself." Os xj Cs Ibid, p. 49. "And this is an expedient argu- ment on this behalf. Since, in passages of the Veda and of the Smritis, such as 'May I become many,' 'May I be produced,' &c., it is set forth, that the creation of the elements and the like is preceded by egoism as a cause, egoism is made out to be the immediate cause of the creation, which creation has an affection of intellect for its mediate cause." 84 SEC. L, CHAP. 4. been used to call intellect and egoism the instrumental causes of the world, passed on to view them as independent objects, and have ended in making them the material causes of the world. In attributing to qualities the nature of indepen- dent objects, nay, in ascribing to them personality, the Hindus, in other instances as well, are seen to go amiss. For example, we find, in the Puranas and other books, accounts of the generation of love, wrath, serenity, content, and such like qualities, taken by themselves, and stories of their nuptials and so forth. The general error here animadverted on is not, howeA^er, peculiar to the Hindus. The old inhabitants of other countries than India were not clear of it. In the second and following centuries of the Christian era, Valentinus, Basilides, and other heretics, as is evidenced by their writings, made intellect, will, and other qualities to possess personality; and they regarded them as makers of the world. The pro- gress in error of the Sankhyas was, it appears to me, some- what similar to that of the Gnostics. It is evident, that, when the people of former ages had quite forgotten the reason which first led them to account intellect and egoism to be the causes of the world, and began to consider them as, in another way, the causes of the world, they likewise changed their ideas of the things denoted by the terms intellect and egoism, began to look upon them as organs of cognition mid egoism, respectively, and as unintelligent substances, and, ima- gining a subtile source from which intellect could be evolved, gave that source the appellatipn of nature. Their reason for making nature to consist of goodness, passion, and darkness, was, perhaps, that intellect is sometimes in a state of goodness, sometimes in a state of passion, and sometimes in a state of darkness ; and hence its cause, nature, must be constituted of three ingredients. When, subsequently, they saw, that the whole world might be derived from this nature, they conclu- ded, that there was no need of a God. It is thus, on conjecture, that the more reoont Sankhya system sprang up ; the doctrines SEC. I., CHAP. 5. 85 of which, on all points, have, it may be, gradually undergone so much of alteration, that there is now not a vestige of simi- larity between it and the scheme from which it descended. CHAPTER 5. Examination of the Sdnkhya Dogma, that Apprehension, Will, Activity, Happiness, Misery, and other Qualities, do not apper- tain to the Soul. To deny that cognition, will, activity, happiness, and misery are qualities of the soul, and to hold them to be affections of the internal organ, is utterly at issue with reason.* I main- tain, that apprehending, willing, doing, &c. are qualities of intelligence. That in which these qualities reside is called an intelligent being ; and the same is a soul. The Saiikhya may reply, that, in his nomenclature, that is called a soul, which is unendowed with apprehension and other qualities. My answer is, that such a soul cannot, in any wise, be proved to have ex- istence, f or to be such a one as I have, or as he has. For it * The S^nkhyas repudiate virtue and vice, withal, as attributes of the soul, and style them qualities of the internal organ. Vijndna Bhikshu, as appears from an extract previously adduced, denounces the Ved^ntins as Bauddhas, for their doctrine, that everything is unreal, virtue and vice included. See the citation from the SdnJchya-pravachana-bhdshya, at the foot of p. 71. But are not the Sankhyas obnoxious to a similar reproach, for denying, that virtue and vice belong to the soul ? It may assist the reader, if he is told, that, in order fully to take in the present chapter, he should give a well-weighed consideration to the conspectus of the Sdnkhya system contained in Chapter 2, and to the passages append- ed in the foot-note!'. t Singular it is, that the evidence brought forward, by the adherents of the Srfnkhya, in proof of the existence of the soul, concludes it intelligent, not insentient, as they would fain have it to be. Witness these words : sr- 86 SEC. L, CHAP. 5. is beyond doubt, that we both apprehend, and will, and ener- gize, and become happy and miserable ; that is, we have the qualities apprehension, will, activity, &c. Nor can our con- sciousness of these things be illusive :* for there is said to be illusion, where there is a notion, but not a corresponding ob- ject; as where, nacre being mistaken for silver, there is the notion of silver, but not silver as the object of that notion. But the like of this cannot have place as concerns our consci- ousness of apprehension, will &c. ; for here a notion and its object are one. Apprehension, will, and the rest are objects ; the consciousness of them is the notion : and, in my opinion, they are identical. To be sure, when the light reveals a Sankhyn-pravachana-bhashya, pp. 53, 54. "Nature, the great principle, and the rest, are ' for another,' i. e., they have for their end the experience of happiness and misery and the liberation of what is other than themselves ; insamuch as they are composite : like a bed, a seat, &c. By this argument, soul, as distinct from nature, and incomplex, is made out to exist." One that experiences and has need of liberation cannot, it is manifest, be insentient. In what manner the Snkhyas go about to show, that the soul is an experiencer, and requires to be freed, and that it is, at the same time, void of sentience, will be seen in the progress of this chapter. It Patar,jala-l>h&shija- vdrttika, MS., fol. 7, verso. "As for the consciousnesses 'lam a doer,' ' I am happy,' &c., since, being comprehended among hundreds of mis- conceptions, such as ' I am fair,' and the like, they are involved in the suspicion of unreliableness, they do not contravene the argument adduced to prove the soul devoid of activity, happiness, $c. On the contrary, the forementioned argument, corroborated by this and other smritis, ' He who beholds all works as done by nature alone, and likewise the soul as no doer, beholds aright,' disproves those consciousnesses, or evinces them to be erroneous." SEC. L, CHAP. 5. 87 jar, the light is the manifester, and the jar is manifested ; but the lio-ht, when we see it, is itself alike manifester and O / t manifested. So, when will arises in me, itself manifests itself ; for I express, that I have a will of something. From this it is plain, that simultaneously* I both will, and am conscious, or have a notion, of willing ; whereas, if those acts, however spe- culatively two, were two in reality, they could not arise in the soul at the same time. Accordingly, since my own conscious- * Farther proof, not only of the simultaneousness, but of the identity, of apprehension and the consciousness of it, of will and the consciousness of it, &c., is found in the fact, that it seems impossible, considering their nature, that unperceived apprehension, will, happiness, or the like, can have existence. To those who think otherwise, that is to say, that will and the conscious- ness of it, for instance, are consecutive and distinct, the author would pro- pound these two questions. Do they hold the notion, that will first arises, and, soon afterwards, the consciousness of it ; and that the two for some time co-exist ? Or do they hold the notion, that an act of the will is fol- lowed by the consciousness of it ? If the first, the Pandit replies, that as is expressed in the text he can- not conceive how two qualities can either arise or remain in the soul together : and herein his opinion is, to some extent, supported by the doctrine of the Naiya'yikas ; who contend, that the specific qualities of the soul are antagonistic to the length of mutually displacing each other. The maxim on the subject is ^Ic*rfqSC8r7TBnrt ^ftTT^TniprfT^^tcT | s ^ In order, however, that one such quality may displace another, their theory is, that the displacing quality must remain with the quality displaced dur- ing the last moment of the subsistence of the latter. See the note at the foot of p. 93. This view the Pandit rejects as an absurdity. To the second position indicated above, the author makes answer, that it ia not consciousness which is there implied, but remembrance. On this ground, additionally to the one just mentioned, he considers as faulty the Naiyayika idea, which supposes, that the consciousness of will co-exists for one moment with will, and then subsists without it. What is here called consciousness, anubhava, as it is esteemed by the Nyya, is not so, its object having de- parted : it is memory. At all events, if it be insisted, that will and the consciousness of will, &c , are distinct, still it is certain, that they are inseparable ; and that they are BO is sufficient to show the Sdiukhyas, that the definition of mistake, given above, is inapplicable to such cases of consciousness. s* SEC. L, CHAP. ;>. ness, and my opponent's, of our acts of apprehension, will, and other qualities, are not distinct from their objects, viz., those acts of apprehension, will, . 5. 99 serve as a sample of the degree to which the common sense of the pandits has become distempered. And I shall now address myself to show what that relation is between the experi- ence of cognition, will, happiness, misery, &c., and that which is in truth the experiencer of them. First, however, I must bestow a few words on the great error, committed by the Sankhyas, of distinguishing between happiness and the like, and their experiences. Who is con- scious of any such distinction ? From experience of happi- ness deduct experience : can one then form any idea what happiness is by itself? Not at all. Consequently, all the qualities of the soul, to-wit, cognition, will, activity, happi- ness, and so on, ought to be regarded as so many different sorts of experience ; as was previously exemplified, in the case of will. Or, should there be some very nice distinction between happiness, or the like, and the experience of it, the two, at all events, are inseparable. It follows, that there is no foundation for the theory of separating cognition &c. from their experiences, on which the doctrine depends, that the internal organ is the subject of happiness and so forth, and that the soul is their experieucer. And now I purpose to make out, that the soul cannot, by any chimerical reflexions of cognition, will, &c., erroneously regarded as experiences of cognition and the rest, become an experiencer thereof. It is self-evident, that the experiences of cognition, will, happiness, misery, &c. are qualities of their experiencer : for a quality is that which cannot exist abstracted from its substrate. For example, the existence of colour, or of taste, or of length, or of breadth, under such abstraction, is impossible. And it is the same as concerns the experience of cognition, or the like, considered severally from its experience. Indeed, experience, thus circumstanced, is brought into- the category of the son of a barren woman and the horn of a hare. From this it is clear, that the experiences of cognition, will, &c. are qualities ; and, being such, they are 100 SEC. L, CHAP. 5. connected with their substrates by the relation through which every other quality belongs to that which possesses it. In the terminology of the Naiyayikas, the relation between quality and substance is that of samavdya. But this sama- vdya, as they describe it, seems to me not only hypothetical, but irrational ; and so I decline to designate by it the relation between quality and substance. To this relation I assign no name whatever. When, in our argumentations, we have reached the boundary of the certain and of the intelligible, there is nothing left for us but to be silent. As for the re- lation of quality and substance, reason teaches us, that it is widely different from sanyoga and such other relations. It is a relation through which quality penetrates and permeates the very essence of substance, and participates in it. Just so does experience with reference to an experiencer. A reflexion, though, in respect of space, it is very near the soul, in fact, within it, like everything else ; for, in the San- khya, the soul is all-pervading, is far remote from its es- sence. In the Sankhya scheme, it is an evolution from the internal organ, and must reside in the soul by the relation of sanyoga^ and not otherwise. Now, how can the soul, by virtue of it, be an experiencer ? For, if it has not experience in its proper essence, it has none at all. Analogically, let it be, that a sage sits ever so close to a fool, or embraces him, if you will : can the fool, in consequence, be pronounced wise? The European physicists, who have explored acoustics, optics, and other similar departments of science, declare, that, when a man sees an object, the following process is transacted. First, the object is imprinted upon the retina, behind which is a sensory nerve connecting it with the brain. The nerve and the brain are, thus, successively affected. Then, owing to some relation between the brain and the soul, that is to say, between matter and what is not matter, the object seen is cog- nized. That relation is incomprehensible : and yet of so much we are certain ; that neither does the object's being re- SEC. L, On4t. 5. 101 fleeted into the eye, nor does the effect produced in the sensory nerve, through the reflexion, nor does the action upon the brain, through the sensory nerve, constitute the soul's cognition. For, though the relation between the brain and the soul is most intimate, still the brain is distinct from the soul, and extrinsic to it. The soul's cognizing consists in this, that itself, that is to say, by its essence, apprehends an object through the eye and the other media enumerated. The conclusion is, that, if the Sankhya's reflexions of the affections cognition, will, activity, happiness, and misery are distinct from the soul's proper essence, they are not the soul's experiences of cognition, will, &c. ; since, though, as to space, they are exceedingly proximate to the soul, yet, viewed essen- tially, they are as distant as the east from the west. Inas- much, therefore, as the soul can neither cognize, nor will, nor energize, nor be happy or miserable, nor be an experiencer of cognition, &c. &c., why should the Sankhyas strive so hard to liberate it? In another way, moreover, the Sankhyas deceive themselves and others. They say, that happiness and the like are not really in the soul, but that, from non-discrimination, the soul thinks itself miserable and bound : this is its wretchedness, emancipation from which is desirable. In this statement there are two great errors. One is this. The non-discrimination spoken of is itself an affection of the internal organ. As such, it has no intrinsic relation to the soul ; only that of a reflexion : and how, then, can the soul be prejudiced by it ? The other error is this. Even if the soul, from non-discrimi- nation, did think itself miserable and bound, which the San- khyas will not grant, still, it could take no harm merely from thus thinking, so long as it did not, in reality, incur misery by reason of non-discrimination. If, then, the Sankhyas con- ceded, that it thus incurs misery, it would be really miserable. And, if they deny and they do deny that it does, it follows, that it stands in no need of being emancipated. 102 %f;.: L> .CHAP. 5. Therefore, that position only, which is laid down in tho sixty-second stanza of the Sdnkhya-kdriM, can be justified on Sankhya principles ; namely, that it is not the soul, but nature, that is hampered and that is disengaged. I have already shown, that the Sankhyas go to all the trouble they take to prove the soul devoid of apprehension, desire, &c., in order that the soul may be proved susceptible of emancipation. * They allege, that, if apprehension, desire, happiness, misery, and the rest be acknowledged to be qualities of the soul, they must be a part of its proper nature : and the nature of anything is inalienable. Only by making out the soul to be unendowed with apprehension and the like, they say, does its emancipation become possible. For, in the view of all the pandits, there is no emancipation apart from insentience. That riddance from pain is indispensable, we all hold alike. Now, let it be granted, for a moment, that these notions are correct ; that is to say, that emancipation cannot take place without the abolition of apprehension, and that misery, like cognition, &c. ? if a quality of the soul, must continue forever. Still, it is improper, out of fear for the soul, to describe a thing as being other than it is, and to give aid to such a deceit by sophistry. I mean, that it is wrong to insist, that apprehension, desire, and so on, which are really qualities of the soul, are not so. Man, we know, is mortal. But, if, from dread of death, I, a man, affirm, that I am not a man, shall I, on that account, escape death ? If, therefore, the Sankhyas arc convinced, that whatever has apprehension, desire, &c. for qualities is doomed to the fear- ful evil of never parting with them, it is the counsel of wisdom, seeing that they are left without resource, to abide their lot in patience, and not to belie reality. * It cannot but seem extraordinary blindness, in the Srfukhyas, not to per- ceive, that the very efforts which they put forth to show, that the soul is capa- ble of being emancipated, go to prove that it has no need of being emanci- pated. SEC. I, CHAP. 6. 103 The truth is, however, that the pandits' notion is baseless, that emancipation consists in definitive alienation of apprehen- sion, &c. And the assertion of the Sankhyas is erroneous, that, whatever has misery for a quality can never be discharg- ed of it. When the cause of misery is removed, the misery likewise takes its departure ; and Almighty God will deliver from it whomsoever He blesses with His grace. I shall treat of these points when I discuss the Nyaya. CHAPTER. 6. Brief Consideration of one Topic of the Mimdnsd, ivith a few Re- marks on the Intellectual Peculiarities of the Pandits, and on their Style of Reasoning. Greatly do the Mimansakas err, in not acknowledging God ;* and, again, while they do not acknowledge Him, in believing in virtue and vice, and in laying upon the heads of men the burthen of rites and ceremonies ; and, lastly, in maintaining, that the Veda has existed from eternity. My refutation, in the third chapter of this section, of the first two of these errors, as held by the Sankhyas, will equally w r ell apply to the Mimansakas. But there is this difference of view between the two schools, as regards the Veda. The Sankhyas hold, that, at the beginning of every renovation of the universe, it issues anew from the mouth of Brahma, but without his composing it ; whereas, according to the Mimansakas, it has always ex- isted : and the same arguments that are good against the for- mer notion are just as cogent when applied to the latter. How- ever, as for this latter view, that is to say, that the Veda was made by no one, but of itself has been in existence from all duration, one may indeed wonder at such an irrational theory. * To name one Mim^nsaka, PaVthasarathi Mifi'ra, in the first chapter of the S'dstra-dtpikd, labours at length to overset the arguments adducible to prove the existence of Deity. 104 SEC. L, CHAP. 6. if asked for their proofs of this, the Mimansakas can only reply, that no name of the writer of the Veda has come down to us. * But what sort of a proof is this ? Many is the book whose au- thor's name nobody knows : but do we infer, therefore, that such a book never had a beginning in time ? Arid how, pray, differs an ancient book from an ancient house ? And who ever concluded, that an old house had been built from the beginning of all things, on the ground, that its builder's name has been lost in oblivion ? There is, in short, only one topic connected with the Mimansa, on which I purpose to remark. It is as follows. To find, that the Mimansa esteems the Veda to be infallibly authoritative, and, nevertheless, decides, that the gods named in it are all imaginary,! and that the relations concerning them there are mere fables ; and to find, that, though Indra is denied to exist, yet to make offerings in his name is suffi- cient to ensure great reward ; cannot but strike one with astonishment. Wherever, allege the Mimansakas, the gods and their exploits are spoken of in the Veda, it is not intended to recount actual facts : the end in view being to magnify the benefit of ritual acts, and so to allure men to engage in them. But how can any one who has the slightest discrimination say, after reading the Veda, that the persons who originally ad- dressed its hymns to Indra and others, did not themselves be- lieve these to be real divinities ? And who can imagine a man's doing worship to an unreal god, and singing praises to a non- entity, and imploring nobody, in the expectation of receiving therefor eminent recompense ? Parthasfirathi Mis'ra, in the first chapter SI of the STdslra-dipikd. " Had there been any author of the Veda, surely remembrance of him would have been preserved by success'ive students of the Veda ; as has been the case in respect of Buddha and others. " Prthasarathi goes on to urge, that, if the Vedas had had an author, it is impossible he could ever have been forgotten. I- S.>,. the extract from the Bkdtta-dlpiki,, cited at p. G7. SEC. L, CHAP. 6. 105 On this subject the Mimansakas seem to reason thus. All our strivings are for the attainment of reward; this re- ward being dependent upon works ; and information about works being obtainable from the preceptive enunciations of the Veda. If we accept these three things, why need we accept more ? If we hold the precepts of the Veda to be true, what harm is there in our looking upon the rest of the Veda as a romance ? And, if reward comes of works, these suffice ; and what is the use of the gods and the rest ? Again, if works give rise to various fruits, then, as a seed possesses an innate power of originating a sprout, so, by maintaining, that works possess an innate energy, we are enabled to account for the production of the world ; and what necessity, in that case, is there of a God? To refute such strange notions may be spared : the very statement of them is refutation. Still, I shall reply to them in the third chapter of the second section, where I speak of the error into which the pandits fall on the subject of virtue and vice. Thus I have examined, in the present and three preceding chapters, the main doctrines of the Sankhya the Yoga in- cluded and of the Mimansa. Any man whose common sense is unsophisticated, on inspecting these doctrines as set forth and defended in the Sankhya and Mimansa, must perceive, that the pandits are most faulty in their manner of ar- gumentation. As compared with those systems, the Nyaya and the Vais'eshika are greatly eligible. And yet their ad- herents also, ancient and modern, betray the intellectual de- fects common to all the pandits ; as will before long be evinced. Even as concerns things that are self-evident, these scholars go deplorably amiss. When a person reaches this state, it is most difficult to bring truth home to him. If a man, for instance, gets to doubt whether he has twenty fingers and toes, who can resolve his misgiving for him ? You count them, one by one, to him ; but, nevertheless, he cannot satisfy himself that they make up a score. After P 106 SEC. L, CHAP. 6. this, there is no hope of removing his uncertainty. Something similar to this state of mind is that of the pandits ; as one can- not but see, on looking into the Sankhya and Mimansa. To dispel their difficulties is, consequently, no easy task ; and yet I have ventured to undertake it. But, such are the peculiarities of my countrymen, as I know from old experience, that they will not understand my answers ; and the real reason is, that they do not wish to understand them. Where there are persons who cannot be reached by rational arguments, we can only commend them to God ; for to Him is possible what to man is impossible. In this, again, the pandits manifest their wrong habits of mind, that, when they set about considering a subject, they do not, first of all, soberly ask themselves what the facts are, bear- ing on it, which they and others are acquainted with. Such is the spell over their minds, and, from prepossession towards what they wish to believe, such is the partiality of their con- templation, that they adopt maxims which are baseless, as if they had no imperfection, and accept defective illustrations in place of proofs, and reason on the strength of them : nor do they reflect whether their arguments are cogent or futile, or whether they may not be met by counter-arguments. And so they go on, rearing one thing upon another, utterly regardless of the preposterousness of their conclusions. One more defect of their intellectual constitution is this, that they fail to enquire what things are within the range of human reason, and what are beyond it. With the short cord of human wit they vainly essay to measure the profundities of God's fathomless perfections, and to determine their limits. He who will act thus cannot but stumble, and at last fall disastrously. People who follow the dictates of common sense steer clear, for the most part, of such errors. Common sense is that sense which is shared by the generality of mankind. By its aid, even the illiterate and rustics are able, in their daily occasions and transactions, to judge between the true SEC. I., CHAP. 6. 107 and the false, and between the useful and the harmful. When any one, abandoning it, sets about adducing grand arguments in support of his favourite notions, he is very apt to get lost in a wilderness of nonsense, and to think, that the ground is above his head and the sky beneath his feet. But, to obey the admonitions of common sense is not the way of the pan- dits ; and so we see how such wonderful dogmas as they pro- fess came to be suggested to them. Their style of reasoning may be illustrated by the fol- lowing story. Once on a time, two men, travelling in company, laid a wager as to who would first reach the end of the next day's journey. One of them, getting up early the following morning, saw that the other was still asleep. With great complacency, he thereupon dressed, tied up his kit, and set off. In his haste, however, unawares to himself, he put on the other's turban instead of his own. Hurrying forward, on reaching the end of the day's journey, he found his companion had not got the start of him, and was not even within sight. And then he sat down, opened his bundle, took out his mirror, and began to inspect himself. Seeing that he had on the other's turban, he flung down the mirror, ex- claiming : " Alas ! well-a-day ! I have taken all this trouble to get here first; and, after all, my friend has outstripped me." On this, a bystander, who had heard his lament, began to reason with him. " What do you mean ?" said he. " Here you are, arrived and waiting ; and how can you say, that your friend has, after all, outstripped you ? Can you be so bewil- dered as to believe, that your sense of self has been transferred to another?" But still he turned a deaf ear. He had resolved on taking it for an invariable rule, that his friend's turban could be on no one's head but his friend's ; and, accordingly, he must infer, that he himself had become the other, and that he had all along been labouring under illusion, in think- ing it was himself who had started first on the day's journey, and prosecuted it, and completed it. SECTION II. CHAPTER 1. Briefly prefatory , with an Examination of the Nyaya and Vais'e- shika Doctrines touching God. I shall now consider the Nyaya and the Vais'eshika. But, as I have before noted, there are many doctrines common to almost all the Systems. -When I take up such points, in dis- cussing the Nyaya and Vais'eshika, what I shall offer will, therefore, be applicable to the Systems generally. At the outset I remarked, that the authors of nearly all the Systems announce, as the great end of their compositions, the attainment of final beatitude. At their respective beginnings, the Nyaya and the Vais'eshika Aphorisms make distinct state- ments to this effect. And so far forth they are worthy of com- mendation ; it being most fitting to all men, and it being of all things most necessary, that they should strive, with their entire might, to find out the means of salvation. Yet I cannot concur with the partizans of the Systems, in regarding right apprehen- sion as the chief cause of emancipation ; my own belief being, that this effect springs from the spontaneous grace of God. I ac- knowledge, indeed, that right apprehension is instrumental to salvation ; but it is not that right apprehension, consisting in discriminating between soul and what is not soul, which the au- thors of the Systems teach to be the sole means thereto. That sort of right apprehension, taken by itself, I hold to be of no benefit ; a position which I shall substantiate by and bye. The sort of right apprehension which I maintain to be benefi- cial is this : rightly to apprehend God, and oneself, and one's SEC. II., CHAP. 1. 109 wretchedness, and the way of escape from it, and what man ought to do, and what he ought to forbear. I do not mean, however, that to acquire, in its entirety, a right appre- hension of these things is absolutely necessary ; for this is impossible to man. I mean, that he ought to make this acqui- sition in so far as it is indispensable to his good. Requisite right apprehension, as concerns God, should be such as to move man to honour, to love, to worship, and to fear Him ; such as to purify man's nature, and to lead him to love virtue and to abhor vice. And, further, a man's right apprehension, pertaining to himself, should be so much as to enable him to appreciate his place in the order of the universe ; to think of himself as he appears in the sight of God ; and to understand his relation to God, and his relations to his fellow-creatures, in order that he may be qualified to act according to those re- lations. And, again, a man's right apprehension should be sufficient to qualify him to realize his own wretchedness, so that he may take thought how to escape from it ; and suffici- ent for him to acquaint himself with the means calculated to bring about such escape, so that he may avail himself of those means. But of these things there is no correct account in the Nyaya, or in the other Systems. Far from it, they inculcate numerous errors concerning them. Most inappropriate is the account given, in the Nyaya and Vais'eshika, of the divine attributes, such as God's greatness, power, wisdom, holiness, and justice. The soul, atoms, the mind, and many other things, no less than God, they hold to have existed from eternity. Like God, they have been, of themselves, from all duration, and were created by no one. How far does this view fall short of God's greatness, absoluteness, and sovereignty ! According to the Naiyayika, souls and atoms are innumerable ; and, if they have always had spontaneous existence, it is manifest, that their existing is not in subordination to the will of God. As they had not their origin from God's will, so neither could 110 SEC. II., CHAP. 1. they be by Him brought to nought. Even if God had willed otherwise, no change could have been operated as to their existence : nor will He be able to operate any such change. How, then, can absoluteness and sovereignty be predicated of God, as regards them ? Him we call absolute and sovereign, on whose will, or permission, everything depends ; and without entire subjection to whose will, nothing can be or happen. If the existence of souls, atoms, &c. be not subject to the will of God, His sovereignty does not extend to their ex- istence. On this principle, God cannot be proved to be God : for God is He who is over all. To this view the pandits would bring forward this objection : " If you deny unbeginning existence to atoms, what cause of the origin of the world can you produce ? For every effect must have a material cause ; as a jar clay. But for the clay, of what will the potter make his jar ? In this way God form- ed the world out of atoms ; and how could He have made it without atoms ?" In reply, I would ask the pandits, whether they consider the power of God to be of like kind to that of the potter. If the powers of the two be similar, then God re- quired limbs and appliances ; just as the potter, in fabricating ajar, is obliged to use his hands, feet, and sundry other im- plements. And, if it be conceded, that God, unlike the pot- ter, had no need of limbs and appliances, but could have made the world by His mere will, where is the difficulty in ac- knowledging:, that He could have created it without a material C5 O/ cause ? By His inscrutable power He was able to originate the entire world, material cause and material effect together. If it be objected, that this is inconceivable, I would ask, whe- ther it be not equally inconceivable, that God could have framed the world out of atoms, by His will alone, and without recourse to bodily members. Do we see, anywhere among men, a workman of such skill, as that, by a simple operation of mind, he can call effects into being ? My opponent may perhaps say, that the human soul answers these con- SEC. II., CHAP. 1. Ill ditions ; for, by its mere will, it sets the hands and feet in motion : and he may add, that, in like sort, at the beginning of the world, God, by His will, imparted motion to the terrene and other atoms. Let the parallelism of the illustration be granted ; yet the main difficulty, that of inconceivability, is still where it was. We know, to be sure, that the soul, by its mere will, moves the hands and feet. But who can comprehend how this comes to pass ? The will is invisible and intangible : resem- bling neither a cord, with which a thing may be brought near; nor a staff, with which a thing may be raised or thrown down. How can it have any influence on the hands and feet, which are insentient matter ? And how can it raise or depress them ? The whole is inconceivable. If, then, the works of God out- reach our conception, how can we assign limits to His power, which is inscrutable ? But the soul's communicating mo- tion to the hands and feet cannot properly be drawn into ana- logy : for the hands and feet are of the body which belongs to the soul ; but terrene and other atoms are not of the body of God, He being bodiless. The difficulty of operating, by the mere will, upon what is not of one's body remains, therefore, precisely where we found it. Nor can you call terrene and other atoms the body of God;* for you can- not maintain, that the qualities and nature of body are possessed by them. Thus, the body influences the soul ; but you cannot affirm, that God is affected by terrene atoms, &c., in the same manner. Since there are, thus, numerous characteristics of body which do not appertain to the terrene and other atoms, * According to the author of the Dinakari, the following opinion was held by the adherents of A'ch^rya, by which title Udayana A'chrya,most probably, is intended : " Let it be granted, that I's'wara possesses an eternal body : still it is not established, that I's'warahas a distinct, or proper, body ; for it is held, by MS, that the atoms themselves are his body." 112 SEC. II., CHAP. 1. if you give the name of God's body to these atoms, still our bodies cannot be adduced as analogous to them. My meaning, in sum, is, that, whereas the tenet, that God created all things by His infinite and inscrutable power, is not open to exception, the opinion, which, in arguing the independent and unbeginning existence of the material world, undeniably abridges God of His supreme absoluteness and plenary sove- reignty, is imbued with error. There are two particular objections, say the pandits, to the view, that souls had their origin from God. The first is, that it involves, as against God, the imputation of unequal dealing and cruelty. The second is, that, if we hold souls to be gene- rated, we must hold them to be destructible. I shall return to these points in a short time. The Nyaya and Vais'eshika dogma, which is also that of the Yoga and Vedanta, that whatever God does, as in fram- ing the world, for instance, He does solely for the purpose of awarding to souls the fruit of their works, He doing nothing of His own free will, is, likewise, exceptionable. On what ground is God believed to be thus fettered ? To know, to will, and to do are natural faculties of an intelligent being ; and, if God is an intelligent Being, it is congruous to maintain, that, by virtue of His free will, He can act whenever it may seem good to Him so to do. To this the pandits would reply, that, if God, without re- ference to the works of souls, of His mere will fashioned the universe, the blemish would be imputable to Him, that there was some want, to satisfy which He engaged in creation :* but, * Nearly all the Hindu philosophers, the Bauddhas included, have taught the eternity of the soul and the tenet of metempsychosis. Had occasion been presented to them of assailing the position, that God created the world irrela- tively to the works of souls, we may judge, from the ensuing passage, how, in X "V $ all likelihood, they would have made answer : SEC. II., CHAP. 1. 113 if it be held, that He did so in accordance with the works of souls, the blemish of His having a want will not attach to Him ; and it follows, that He made the world for the sole purpose of awarding to every one the consequences due to his deeds. My answer is, that neither do I maintain, that God made the world to fulfil any want implying that He lacked aught, to obtain which He engaged in creation : but I do maintain, that, by reason of one of the perfections of His nature, goodness, He was pleased to make manifest, through the medium of creation, His supremely loveworthy and wondrous attributes. God made the world, says my opponent, in order to requite the good and evil deeds of souls. But why should He requite?* The very objection intimated | upff STOW Tattwa-kaumudi, p. 52. "The action of the prudent, or sane, is ever accompanied by wish of self-profit, or else by compassion. And these, being impertinent as concerns the creation of the world, refute the notion, that it, such creation, was due to the act of a prudent person : for there can be no unfulfilled desire of a Lord whose every wish is already satisfied, that he should be creator of the world. Nor could his creative agency be exerted from compassion. Inasmuch as, prior to creation, since the senses, bodies, and objects were as yet unproduced, there was no misery of souls, for dispelling what misery was there scope for compassionate desire ?" Vachaspati MisVa, while engaged in upholding the atheistic doctrines of the Sankhya, writes as above, in opposition to those who maintain the belief of a Creator. The last two words of the Sanskrit are of very doubtful correctness ; but no manuscript is at hand, by which to mend them, if wrong. * We have seen above, at p. 38, that, in the view of the theistic Hindus, to save the Deity from the imputation of unequal dealing and cruelty, it is thought necessary to refer the unequal portions of souls in this world "to the diverse works of those souls in bygone states of existence. To Vachaspati Mis'ra, in his character of advocate on behalf of the Ssfnkhya, this seems unsa- tisfactory. We find him saying : ^ftf ^ ^f^HT^T if ftcT f ^5 fT- s Q 114 SEC. II., CHAP. 1. against me, and which I set aside, here arises, to-wit, that there was some want of God's to be supplied by such requital. If it be replied, that, in virtue of the equity* of His nature, He awards to each the fruit of his works, I rejoin, that it is in virtue of an excellence of His nature, namely His goodness, that He made manifest His supremely loveworthy attributes by creating souls and by making them to rejoice in the contem- plation of His perfections. Any one has discrimination enough to perceive, that, from mere vanity, to go about exhibiting one's importance, under the impulse of a longing to hear it proclaimed by the world, is one thing ; and that it is quite another thing, to make manifest the excellence of anything, because such manifestation is fitting and laudable. When a foolish man, actuated by vanity, goes here and there to display his importance, everybody laughs at him. But, if a learned European were to bring some very extraordinary machine to this country, and invite people to his house, and show them the wonders of the machine free of charge, no one would de- ride him, but, on the contrary, all would thank and praise him for his gratuitous kindness and trouble. Just so, the manifesta- I Tattwa-kaumudi, pp. 52, 53. XJ -J s X " More than this, I's'wara, if moved, by compassion, to create, would create creatures in happiness, not of diverse conditions. If to this it be replied, that the diverseness of the condition of souls is owing to the diverseness of their works, it is a pity, 7 reply, that he, Istwara, prudent, should superintend works ; since, but for his very superintendence, works, being unintelligent, could not proceed to act ; and, consequently, as their effects, viz., the body, the senses, and sense-objects, would not be produced, the n on -production of misery would be a matter of facility." * Indeed, the reply here put into the mouth of the Hindu gives him credit for clearer notions touching God's equity than he could really come by from fitudv of his so-called sacred books. SEC. II., CHAP. 1. 115 tion of anything that is excellent is no fault, but itself an ex- cellence. God, therefore, because of the very excellence of His nature, makes known, through creation, and otherwise, His loveworthy and wondrous attributes. That such attributes, calculated to awaken affection and joy, should forever remain hidden, would seem most unmeet. Let us now consider God's attributes of justice and holiness, as viewed in the Nyaya and Vais'eshika. As for His justice, if we scan these systems superficially, it may seem, that the doctrine of His bestowing requital according to works involves it. And, when the followers of those systems declare, that even the most trifling pain endured in this world must be taken to have had sin for its cause, and that, therefore, a former state of existence must be admitted, or else God's equity suf- fers the imputation of imperfectness, it looks as if they be- lieved, in all its fulness, in justice as an attribute of Deity. On looking more closely, however, we find, that here too they are quite in the dark, as also touching God's holiness. As I have before remarked, the Systems receive the Vedas, the Smritis, the Puranas, &c. as authorities. The former, there- fore, share with the latter any faults ascribable to them on the score of portraying amiss the justice, holiness, and other attributes of God. Let it not be supposed, that I am going out of my way to fasten faults on the Systems. Secrets, which else lurk unperceived, necessarily stand forth in any thoroughgoing examination such as that with which I am occupied. No man is ignorant, that God is just and holy ; and we need not be surprized to find Him so called in religions of human origin. But man, unaided, cannot attain to a correct knowledge of the holiness and other attributes of the Deity. His inability betrays itself, when he ventures into details on the subject, or, incidentally, when he is treating of matters cognate to it. Hence, the express declarations regarding God's holiness and other attributes, which we find 116 SEC. II., CHAP. 1. in a book on any religion, are not a sufficient warrant, in the examination of that religion. Further and fuller explo- ration is indispensable. We should consider all that there is in the book, and also what is there omitted, and likewise all that has legitimate connexion with its subject-matter ; and then we are in a position to pass judgment on it. From the fact, with reference to the Systematists, that they admit as authorities the Vedas, the Puranas, &c., it comes out, that, if the Nyaya and Vais'eshika do not, in express words, militate very greatly against the justice and holiness of God, it is not because the writers on those schemes entertained fit and correct notions of the divine attributes, but simply because they did not dilate on those topics. Had they done so, they would have exhibited errors of every description. Again, if we search out what the Systematists teach con- cerning those things which man is to do, and those things which he is to forbear, and other points allied with religion, we may learn what views they hold of God's justice, and holi- ness, and other attributes. For, so strict is the connexion between morality and theology, that any faults which are found in views about the former imply, of necessity, faults in the views held about the latter. Of morality grossly wrong ideas occur in the Vedas, the Purauas, and the rest ; and, where these err, the Systems participate their errors. I shall, moreover, show, in the sequel, that the doctrines of the Systems, taken by themselves, touching virtue and vice, are signally faulty ; and, such being the case, from this ground also it results, that they mistake as regards holiness and others of the divine attributes. According to the tenets of the Nyaya and Vais'eshika, God can in no wise possess the attribute of mercy. It being one of the dogmas of these systems, that no effect can take place irrelatively to the works of souls, whatever a soul receives must be accounted a consequence of its works; and, if it succeeds in attaining to salvation, it earns salvation. It is SEC. II., CHAP. 1. 117 evident, that there is an exercise of mercy, when God bestows what has not been merited. The existence of such mercy is at variance, however, with the dogmas of the Nyaya, of the Vai- s'eshika, and of all the other Systems. Moreover, since the Nyaya and Vais'eshika deny, that God made the world of His free will, but affirm, that He did so to requite souls, they altogether do away with the goodness which He evinced in creation. When we behold God's world, on every side we perceive evidences of His wonderful goodness and bounty. In the first place, man, before he was created, was nothing ; but, in vouchsafing to him existence, and life, and the faculty of knowledge, how has God constituted him ca- pable of happiness ! Though, now in our fallen state, it is ours to suffer much misery, still all our suffering, nay, death itself, is the fruit of our sin ; and we alone are to blame for it. Had man never sinned, his happiness, and especially that which, by reason of his rectitude of mind and purity of original nature, he would have enjoyed from knowing God, from de- votion and love to Him, and from communion with Him, would have surpassed description. When we behold the sun, the source of so much gladness and benefit, or the moon and the sidereal world, it seems, indeed, as though the goodness of the compassionate Author of our being were holding converse with us in a bodily form. The very trees, which comfort and refresh us, and yield us their luscious fruitage, and the charm- ing mountains and rivers which embellish the earth, almost call upon us, with united voices, to give praise for the love and bountifulness of our merciful Father. But who could adequately depict the countless sources of happiness which God has created ? And each and all of them are manifested to us as tokens of His goodness, when we come to believe, that He fashioned the universe of His own free will, and from the bountifulness of His nature. But the Naiyayikas and Vais'e- shikas, having established it as a maxim, that all things are indebted for their origin to the works of souls, have over- 118 SEC. II., CHAP. 2. spread these glories with the blackness of gloom. And they have transformed God into a hard-natured huckster, who se- cures his pay from his customers, and sells his wares by rigid tale, weight, and measure. So much for the description of the Supreme Being which we meet with in the two most reasonable of the Hindu Systems. CHAPTER 2. Examination of the Nydya and Vais'eshika Tenets relative to the Soul ; namely, that it had no Beginning, that it is All-pervad- ing, and that it takes Birth again and again. Numerous are the faults of the Nyaya and Vais'eshika, even in their account of the soul. Souls they hold to have existed from eternity, and to be, each, diffused throughout all space. I have already pointed out, that, if unoriginated existence be ascribed to any but God, His deity is impugned. I now pur- pose to consider the grounds on which souls are maintained, by the Nyaya and Vais'eshika, to have existed always, and to be diffused everywhere. If we do not so believe, say the advo- cates of those systems, the soul must be perishable. As for existence from all duration, it is argued, that whatever had a beginning will have an end ; as a jar, cloth, &c. ; and, there- fore, if a soul once began to be, it will some time cease to be.* But I would 'ask, what foundation there is for the maxim, that all which has had a beginning shall have an end. Should it be replied, that the history of a jar, or the like, supplies foundation for it, I rejoin, that what may be predi- cated of jars and such-like material things is not on that ac- count predicable of the soul; so great is their disparity. Moreover, the origin, continuance, and termination of any- * What the Hindus esteem to be the most unanswerable argument of the soul's eternity will be considered at p. 124. SEC. II., CHAP. 2. 119 thine; depend solely upon the will of God. If it pleased God, could He not, by His infinite might, preserve a jar for ever and ever ? By evidence* which I do not here adduce, it is establish- ed, that human souls are immortal ; and so it is evident, that it is the will of God, that they should be so. And can anything thwart His power to do as He wills to do ? Can the aforesaid maxim of my opponents obstruct His infinite power ? It is a great mistake, in them, to take up a maxim gratuitously, and then to wish to fetter with it the whole world, nay, God himself, whether it be appropriate or inappropriate. As a proof of the maxim of the pandits, that whatever had a beginning must have an end, it is alleged, that every origi- nated substance is necessarily made up of parts, f and that the parts of anything thus constituted may come asunder, and so the thing some time perish. To this I have to say, as before, that all such suppositions are applicable to material things alone ; and that the origination, continuance, and end of all things depend solely upon the will of God. That the soul is all-pervading must also be believed, say the pandits, if we would consider it to be indestructible, f Ac- * It ia not opportune, at this place, to indicate more distinctly than in this manner, the only certain warrant for believing in the soul's immortality, namely, the Holy Scripture. f* Dharmaritja Ufkshita, speaking of the internal organ, holds this lan- guage : Vedanfa-paribhtishd, p. 3. "The internal organ is not without parts : being an originated substance, it is made up of parts." S&nkhya-pravachana-bh&tkya, p. 35. " And if it were acknowledged, that the soul is ' limited', or finite, like a jar and such other things, since, as is the case with these, it must possess the properties of having parts and of being destructible, the result would be a tenet contra- dictory to that of our system." A nnamBhatta says, speaking of ether: 120 SEC. II., CHAP. 2. cording to them, dimension is of three descriptions ; atomic, intermediate, and infinite. Atomic dimension is the last degree of minuteness. Intermediate dimension is that of ajar, of cloth, or of any originated substance whatsoever. How- ever great it may be, it has limits. Infinite dimension, the third kind, is unlimited. It is this species of dimension which, the pandits teach, belongs to God, to souls, to ether,* to time, and to space ; and whatever has this dimension is all-pervad- ing. Further, according to them, things of atomic or of infinite dimension are indestructible, but those of intermediate dimension cannot be indestructible, f A soul, then, to be in- Tarlca-dipllcd, MS., fol. 7, verso. "As being, like the soul, all-pervading it is, like it, eternal." * A characterization of dkds'a will serve to show how *nadequatively it ia represented by "ether." In dimension, it is, as has been said, infinite ; it is not made up of parts ; and colour, taste, smell, and tangibility do not apper- tain to it. So far forth it corresponds exactly to time, space, I'sVara, and soul. Its speciality, as compared therewith, consists in its being the materi- al cause of sound. Except for its being so, we might take it to be one with vacuity. In passing, this is, doubtless, the fifth element referred to in the following words of Megasthenes, as cited by Strabo : Jloo/; ds roTs rirragGi ffroivfioig irt^vrfi rig sffri (pvffig, e fa 6 ovgavbg nai TO, affrga. Schwan'oeck'a Megasthenis Indica, p. 138. t VijnsCna Bhikshu says of the soul : ^T'fcJWlTfTTrnn'^ ^ETT^^"^!- W*m fWTTfSl^FT j Sdnkhya-pravachana-bhdshya, p. 35. "If it were of intermediate dimension, it must be constituted of parts, and, therefore, would be destructible." The following also refers to the soul : 7f TrarfflffjCJnJff: | cf^T ^TcZI- fsTaifcrq'ST^ T im^TTSafKrpgTJrJnW^TcT | Tarka-dlpiM, MS., fol. 8, verso. "It is not of intermediate dimension. If it were so, from being uneternal, and hence perishable, there would follow the destruction of what is done, and the accession of what is not done." What is meant is this. The works of the soul are assumed to be inalien- able and inevitable. On the theory, then, of the soul's perishableness, its works would miss of their effect, which, by the hypothesis, cannot thus fail. Further, newly created souls would reap fruit which they had not sown. SEC. IL, CHAP. 2. 121 destructible., must needs be, in size, either atomic or infinite. If it be the first, then its qualities, as apprehension, will, &c., cannot be subject to immediate cognition ; for there is another maxim, that the qualities of an atom as, for instance, the colour or taste of earth in its atomic character, are incapa- ble of being so cognized.* It is, however, a fact of universal consciousness, that the qualities of the soul are cognized imme- diately ; and hence the pandits are compelled, on their prin- ciples, to regard the soul as of infinite dimension. The reply which I gave at the end of the last paragraph is equally appli- cable in this place. Another relevant objection that would offer itself to the pandits, is this. " If the soul be not all-pervading, but bounded by the body, it must vary in dimension as the body varies : and the same soul may, in one state of existence, in- form an ant ; in another, a human being ; and, in a third, an elephant. Assuming the soul to be bounded by the body, it must be very minute in an ant ; and, when it passes into a man, or into an elephant, how can it discharge its functions ?f I Siddhanta-muki 'dvati : Bibl-iotJie- ca Indica, Vol. IX., pp. 38, 39. " Since the mind is atomic in dimension, and since grossness is essential in order to perception, if cognition, happiness, &c. had their seat in the mind, they would not be perceived, or immediately cognized." A further objection, and one more ordinarily urged, against the hypothe- tical notion, that the soul is of atomic bulk, will be found in the words of the Sa'nkhya and Vais'eshika writers adduced in the second note forward. t S'ankara A'charya, in the passage about to be cited, is writing against the Bauddhas, who, as he asserts, maintain, that the soul is commensurate with the body, f?<' o o out such a bulk? For it cannot dilate so as to fill it.* We must conclude, consequently, that the soul increases and diminishes with the increase and diminution of the body. And since, thus, from repeatedly increasing and diminishing, it undergoes alteration of constituent parts, it follows, that it must repeatedly be generated and destroyed : for to undergo such alteration is, according to the Naiyayikas, to be generated after having been destroyed." Now, for my part, I repudiate the notion of metempsychosis ; and so I might hold myself dispensed here from returning answer to the pandits. Nevertheless, I reply to them ; since the objection just detailed will recur. A human being has, in infancy, a body of small size as compared with what that body becomes subsequently. They will say, then, that, on my view of the soul's being bounded by the body, it must be, that the small soul of the infant becomes a large soul in the full-grown man : for the small soul of a small body could not take cognizance of the sense of feeling, for instance, from head to foot of a body greatly augmented in magnitude, f To not at hand for reference. "Since bodies are various in dimension, if a hu- maa soul, coextensive, according to the Bauddhas, with the human body, were, by a special maturation of works, to be born an elephant, it would fall short of filling the whole of an elephantine body \_ and, if born a bee, an apian body would be inadequate to contain it." * Vijn^na Bhikshu and Annam Bhatta argue after the manner of the text, in opposition to the view, that the soul is atomic. : I Sankhya-pravachana-bkd- shya, p. 35. " And if the soul were atomic, there would be no accounting for cognition, &c., which extend all over the body." M, MS., fol. 8, verso. " And it, (he soul, is not an atom, as to size ; else it would result, that pleasure would not be perceived throughout the body." t Such an objection is brought by S'ankara A'charya, in continuation of his words quoted in the note before the last : 5EfflT*T ^ET ^fi f^JTsffT I " ' he same objection ap- Sac. II., CHAP. 2. 123 this I say, that, though one holds the soul to be bounded by the body, still it does not follow of course, as an article of belief, that, in proportion as the body changes in size, so does the soul. When a child begins to grow, the apprehension and other facul- ties of his soul increase in strength ; but it is not necessary to say, that his soul itself augments. And, when I allege, that the soul is bounded by the body, my meaning is not, that its dimension tallies exactly with that of the body. I simply intend, that the soul does not reside beyond the body. As for its nature, that is most hard to understand ; and no one, in fact, can give a full description of it. That the soul takes cognizance of the sense of touch in all the parts of a body, small or great, is nothing difficult to it : for, in its operations, it subsidizes all the sense-organs ; and its power of apprehen- sion is more or less in proportion to the vigour of those organs. Thus, a man whose sight is impaired sees ill ; and, when it is improved, he sees better. In like manner, tact is apprehended through the nerves ; and these increase with the body ; and, through them, there is apprehension of tact throughout the parts of the body, whether it be small or great. The truth is, that the nature of the soul transcends our know- ledge, and does not lend itself to description. All that we know of the soul is, that it is something which possesses appre- hension, will, and other qualities. More than this we cannot affirm concerning it ; as, for instance, that, like earth, water, and other material substances, it has dimension and such- like qualities. Much, therefore, that is predicable of a jar, of cloth, and of other material substances, is not to be predi- cated of the soul. Such, however, is the disposition of the pandits, that they refuse to consider what things are within the reach of our understanding, and what things lie beyond. They would fain take the visible and the invisible, God and souls included, and measure them, and turn them round and plies eveu to the case of A state of existence taken by itself, in its several stayes of childhood, middle age, and senescence. ' 124 SEC. II., CHAP. 2. over, and pry into them, and at last get their complete quid- dities inside their fist. To their minds, if one is to know any- thing, one should know everything : otherwise, it is better to know nothing. And so they wander on in the wilderness of vain inquiry. I would remind them, that, be the essence of the soul of what sort soever, its origin, duration, and end are in sub- ordination to the will of God ; and, therefore, if God thinks good that the soul shall exist for ever, it can in no wise incur destruction. But the weightiest reason, in the estimation of the pandits, for arguing, that the soul has existed from all eternity, is as follows. First, they argue, that the doctrine of metempsychosis must be accepted. " Otherwise, the imputation of partiality and cruelty must attach to God. Partiality consists in not looking upon all alike ; in treating some with more favour, and others with less ; in giving some a high rank, and others a lower. Cruelty is uncompassionateness ; the giving pain where no fault has been committed. Now, we see, that, in this world, some enjoy a high rank and great power, and others are wretch- ed, and afflicted with poverty : and what is the reason, that God has ordered it thus? Again, almost all men suffer misery and misfortune ; and what is the cause of this ? It is not enough to say, it is the sins that have been done in the current state of existence ; for it is matter of experience, that many a grievous offender has great power and pleasure, and that many a man whose conduct is observably meritorious is oppressed with poverty and pain. And what can you say with respect to infants and beasts ? Consciously, they have never com- mitted sin ; and yet they suffer greatly. Hence, we maintain the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul, and so remove all these difficulties. We can, therefore, say, when we see a bad man to be powerful and in comfort, that he must have been eminently virtuous in a former state of existence, and is now reaping the reward of his virtiie. Similarly, when we see a good man suffer more than ordinary affliction, Ave are able to SEC. II., CHAP. 2. 125 affirm, that, in a former state of existence he was eminently sinful, and is now receiving retribution for his sin. And, in like manner, infants and beasts undergo punishment for the offences of which, in a prior birth, they were guilty. A single former state of being will not suffice, however ; as the good and evil experienced therein must likewise be accounted for by the works of a birth that preceded. Moreover, the getting a body is also a consequence of works ;* and, therefore, as often as a soul is invested in a body, antecedent works must be postulated in connexion with it. We hold, therefore, that the vicissitude of works and births, the alternate produc- tion of each from the other, has been going on from time without beginning." I reply, that, neither by this reasoning can the soul be proved never to have originated. Even if I admitted the truth of what you have alleged touching the present felicity of some bad men, &c. &c., and metempsychosis as an explanation thereof, still I should not feel myself under any compulsion to argue, that souls have always existed, and that birth and death have had place from a foregone eternity. The difficulties above mention- ed would all be repelled, if it were maintained, that, in the beginning, souls were created by God ; originally in a state of happiness, but condemned, by reason of sin, to repeated embo- diment. But to say, as you do, that works must be taken to have been done prior to the body, for that the having a body is the consequence of works, is in the last degree unreason- able. Your maxim, that every effect must have for its cause the * *Ef f % 1 GR*Tfiff'rf*nnnTOl I Tattwa-kaumudi, p. 43. " For this obtaining a body is due to merit and the like, as causes.' I Ny&ya-s*lra-vri;ti, p. 160. " 'The production' of 'that', i. e., of the body, is ' owing to the aid', or co- operation, of merit and demerit, ' the fruit of foredone' sacrifices, donations, harm, &c." 126 SEC. II., CHAP. 2. works of souls, I have previously exploded : for effects follow from the free will of God. But the pandits say, that the body is intrinsically an abode or site of misery,* and hence is itself a misery. Out of the twenty and one miseries enume- rated by the Naiyayikas, this is one. If, then, God invests a soul with a body, irrespectively of works, He does injustice. My reply is, that the body is not, intrinsically, an abode of misery. On the contrary, not a little happiness is derived by means of it ; and, as for the pain caused by the body, owing to illness, &c. , it is in the power of God to remove it. If He so willed, He might preserve us constantly at ease, though in the body. How crude here also is the reasoning of the pandits ! Those who follow the Nyaya and Vais'eshika, hold, that God exists. Still, when they argue upon other points than His existence, they seem to forget, that He exists, and, as it were, refer all things to a law of chance. For the ground of their doctrine, that misery inevitably accompanies the body, is, that they everywhere see such to be the fact ; and hence they infer, that it is its nature to be so accom- panied, and that God could not make it to be otherwise. In like manner do they err in their maxim, that nothing which has had a beginning can be indestructible. Thus to think will be made out to be proper, when we are convinced, that the course of nature is fortuitous, and subject to some blind law. If, however, God is Governor of the course of nature, all things spring from His will. Some things are perishable, because He wills them to be so ; and, for the same reason, other things are imperishable. In like manner, we men suffer misery, because * ^T - S'ankara A'chtfrya on the Brahma-sHtra : BiHiotlieca Indica, No. 89, p. 115. " And the contact, with one who is embodied, of good and evil cannot be pre- vented." , The < 3T 5 ^'?jEJ of the printed edition has been changed, on manuscript authority, as above. SEC. II., CHAP. 2. 127 it has been decreed fit, in His unfathomable and incomprehen- sible counsel, that thus it should be. If He thought good, it would not be at all difficult for Him to cause, that, though clothed with bodies, we should constantly remain happy. Indeed, it is manifest, from the true Word of God, that, when man was in a state of sinlessness, he was entirely exempt from misery. Neither did sickness, nor sorrow, nor death befal him : nay, the body was, to him, a door to many felicities. Only since he became a sinner has he been subject to the countless griefs of the soul and of the body. Earth, water, air, and all other external objects, were, in the beginning, sources, to him, of happiness only, and afterwards became sources of misery. The doctrine, therefore, of the pandits, that to abide in the body is intrinsically misery, is in every wise erroneous. The refutation which I have detailed, of the notion of an unoriginated succession of works and births of souls, has pro- ceeded on grounds maintained by my opponents. For, as re- gards myself, I reject the doctrine of metempsychosis ; and I account as inadequate all the reasons that they bring forward in support of it.* With respect to the first defect which, accord- ing to them, has place, if metempsychosis be rejected, namely, partiality in God, I reply thus. If you simply mean, that He has not bestowed upon all men equality of rank and happi- ness, your objection has no weight with me : since I hold, that it * This argument against the metempsychosis, however drawn out, will not seem to be gratuitously diffuse, if one but takes these three facts into consi- deration : first, that the doctrine here impeached ia all but ineradicably rooted in the mind of very pandit ; secondly, that, in the estimation of the pandits, any religi >us economy which does not acknowledge it is almost self- evidently false in its very first principles ; and thirdly, and by way of consequence, that the rejection of it by Christianity is, to them, a well-nigh insuperable obstacle to their acceptance of the Gospel. The writer, in here combating a favourite and fundamental dogma, has, with his best thought and diligence, selected and marshalled his reasons in such a manner aa is, he apprehends, best calcu- late! to impress the minds of his erring countrymen, and to win them towards the truth. 128 SEC. II., CHAP. 2. was to show forth His all-sufficient attributes, that God framed the world ; and that He creates souls irrespectively of works ; and that He makes them diverse, as exhibiting the manifold- ness of His creation. For instance, there are souls of one kind, in the form of angels, who surpass man, by far, in rank, majesty, wisdom, power, and other particulars. Inferior to them is man ; and, again, below him are other crea- tures, such as beasts. These varieties we know of: but who shall say how many more different grades there may not be in God's vast universe? Again, there are distinct orders of angels : and of mankind also the ranks are numerous. All o " alike are the creation of God's free will ; and, if He has given a high place to one, and a humble place to another, has any one a claim on Him ? If we, who were once nothing, have, on receiving existence, been given anything whatever, it is from God's mere mercy. And can this mercy become injus- tice, from His giving another more than He gives me ? If any one gives a poor man ten rupees, the man thinks himself great- ly indebted to the giver. But, if the donor gives a hundred rupees to another poor man, does his favour towards the first turn to no favour ? Does he prove himself unjust ? I am aware, that, our nature having become corrupted by sin, almost any man, if he sees that others are favoured beyond himself, takes it ill, and is jealous and unhappy. But this unhappiness arises from the fact, that his nature is corrupt ; and there is no right ground for it There is no injustice, then, in giving less to one, and more to another. If, indeed, all had a claim to receive equally, there would be injustice. No one, however, has any claim upon God. But now you may say, that, though there is no injustice in bestowing mean rank or small power on one, and high rank or great power on another, yet is there not injustice in causing pain gratuitously ? And how many great sinners are happy, and how many good men are miserable ! As for infants and beasts, too, who have never sinned, do not they suffer much SEC. II., CHAP. 2. 12U affliction ? Pray, how are tlieso things to be accounted for ? I reply. Without doubt, the fruit of sin is misery ; and, as all men are sinners, it is meet, that, being so, they should be miserable. There are some men whom we call good ; but, in the sight of God, they are all guilty : for God and man be- hold things under very different aspects. From sin, the dis- cernment of man has become blunted ; and the heinousness of sin is not altogether clear to him. Some men are called good, simply because they are better than most others. And yet there is not, in all the world, even one man whose heart and nature are undefiled by sin. Those, therefore, whom we call good are, before a most holy God, guilty, and deserving of punishment. Moreover, mark, that this world is not man's place of judg- ment. Full judgment will not be till after death ; and not till then will each receive exact and complete requital for his deeds. The present world, like a school, is a place where man is disciplined ; and the happiness or misery which we here experience is not always by way of requital, or, when so, proportioned to our actions. In most cases, God sends hap- piness and misery to men, as being calculated for their good ; but, to us, it is impossible to decide what is for any one's good, or the reverse. For none of us can know another's heart and nature, and his history, past, present, and future, and the even- tual result of his happiness or misery. Should we, then, pro- nounce all misery in this world to be evil, we should err greatly. We ought, rather, to consider misery to be sent to us, in this world, by God, in mercy, for our warning, that we may turn to Him, and so escape future punishment. Therefore, to en- tertain doubt as to God's justice, because of the distresses of this world, is most rash. If a man who has been blindly walking in the path of sin, has his heart opened by some great calamity, and takes warning, repents, and turns to God, must he not look upon that calamity as a great blessing from God ; and will he not praise God for it all his lifelong? 130 SEC. II., CHAP. 2. And do not suppose, that men of proper life and of amiable disposition have no need of the discipline which is furnished by misery. They too commit many an error, and have many a defttet. And often it so occurs, that he who is a chosen ser- vant of God is especially visited with affliction, not for pun- ishment, but to the end, that he may be tried, like gold, in the crucible of misery, and thereby be purified. What folly, then, to let the idea of evil be suggested, whenever one hears the name of misery, and, with one's feeble intellect, to decide as to its hidden causes ! It is often wondered, why, if there was no former state of existence, some persons are born blind, and others are born lame. God has made many men thus, while he has made many of whole body. And it is asked, whether there be not partiality in this. But what are we, to attempt to find out the secret counsel of God ! Can we learn the heart, and nature, and all the external and internal condition of another ? Who shall say what good may not accrue to the immortal souls of the lame and blind, from their few days of misery ? It is very true, that, though God, in His great mercy, sends us various remedial miseries for the eternal benefit of our souls, still, so infatuated are we with sin, that most of us refuse to take warning from our misery, and to repent of our sins, and to tuni to God. The fault is our own, however. As for God's dealing, it is mercy. Is it not written even " in one of the books of the Hindus, " From him whom I would favour, by little and little do I take away the riches" ?* It remains for me to speak of the misery of infants and beasts. And here, entering upon a strict logical argument, I would ask the Hindu : Is it certain, that the suffering of souls can have no just cause but their offences? When a man commits a great state-crime, the king has him executed, &' | This half-couplet is from the Bhayavata-pumna, X., 88, 8. SEC. II. , CHAP. 2. 131 and confiscates his property. -As a consequence, and even though they may have taken no part in the crime, his children and household are involved in extreme distress. But does any one, for this, call the king unjust? Or take this case. The king's subjects are in every way loyal, and their sovereign is perfectly satisfied with them. But an enemy comes to attack him. He orders his people to give him their aid ; and thousands of them suffer greatly, or are slain, and that, al- though they have not offended against their lord, but, on the contrary, have always obeyed liim. Now tell me, whether the king did any injustice in sending them to war. Take a third illustration. A king entrusted his son to a pandit, to be instructed. The pandit was very learned and expert; and the prince, on his part, was of a good disposition, laborious, and heedful of his teacher's directions. The teacher initiated him in every branch of learning. When the prince became a thorough scholar, the pandit took him to the king, whom he addressed as follows : " Sire, I have taught your son all things but one. That one thing is most necessary, in my opinion ; but I cannot teach it to him, till I have your promise of par- don." "Why do you speak thus?" replied the king. "In securing your services, I count myself most fortunate ; and I made over my son to you ; and I am sure, that whatever you propose to do must be for his good." " Very well," said the pandit: "let a horse be saddled." When the horse was brought, the pandit mounted, and called out to the prince. The prince drew near ; upon which the pandit laid his whip over him smartly, and spurred on his horse, telling the prince to run along with him. The king, seeing this, was at his wits' ends, hastened after the pandit, and begged him to tell what it all meant. The pandit reined in his horse, and thus made answer : " Pardon me, Sire, for what I have done. I wish only' good to your son ; and, in my opinion, it was most necessary to teach him the one thing I have now taught him. For he is a prince ; and he was altogether ignorant of the pain 132 SEC. II, CIIAI-. 2. of being beaten and of violent exertion. Ho knew it only by name, as he had never tasted it. On coming to the throne, how could ho have realized the sufferings of others ; and, if any one offended, how, when awarding punishment to him, could the thought have presented itself to his mind, of lean- ing to tenderness and to mercy ? These attributes arc, how- ever, necessary to a good king ; and what I have done was done with a view that he might not bo without them." Now, observe, that the prince had done no wrong in his relations with the pandit; and yet no one would charge the pandit with doing injustice in occasioning him pain. And, if a fool- ish man, ignorant of the pandit's motive, on seeing this strange scene from a distance, had said to himself, that either the prince must have been guilty of some grave fault, or else the pandit was most unjust, what rashness and want of con- sideration would such an inference have manifested ! But do not understand me to mean, that the actions of the king and of the teacher, in these illustrations, afford exact parallels to the ways of God; or that the subjects, whose misery was caused by their king, and the situation of the prince, arc al- together like the condition of infants and beasts ; or that the fruit of the misery of them all is of the same character. I pray you not thus to misapprehend me : for it often happens, in controversy, that, from not sei/ing the drift of one's opponent, one takes words that fall from him, otherwise than as he intend- ed them, and then blames him for opinions which he does not entertain. Do not deal by me in this way. Understand, that my design, in adducing these illustrations, is simply to refute the notion of its being an established fact, that, when misery befals any one, it must be referred to his offen- ces against the author of his suffering, and admits of no other explanation. I have only wished to show the baselessness of this your maxim. The inference of a former state of exist- ence, in the case of children, from observing, that they expe- rience suffering, can have no ground but that maxim ; and, SEC. II. , CHAP. 2. 133 if the maxim is shown to be false, the inference built upon it is so likewise. As for the illustrations of the king and pan- dit, perhaps you will allege, that they do not go to disprove your maxim, that suffering presupposes sin : inasmuch as, accord- ing to your system, the persons who, though they had not offended against the king and the pandit, suffered pain from them, received therein the retribution of sins done in a former birth ; and so their offences are made out to have been the cause of their pain, and your maxim stands intact. I have to reply, that you have not exactly taken in the intent of my illustrations. If the persons in question had sinned in a for- mer birth, they must have been offenders in the sight of God. What I meant was, that they had not offended against the king and the pandit; and yet the king and the pandit, though bringing suffering on them, cannot be called unjust. If there could be no proper reason, other than offences against the causers of suffering, for causing suffering to others, the king and the pandit were certainly unjust. When any one, without due cause, brings about the death of another, even then, suitably to your view, he who dies reaps, in his death, the fruit of the sins of a foregone birth : and is the person who took his life, on that account guiltless ? In conclusion, my illustrations certainly prove, that there may be an adequate cause, other than offences against him who inflicts suffering, to which suffering may be referred ; and, by con- sequence, your maxim is baseless. As concerns the fearful punishment which every evil-doer must suffer in the world to come, that maxim is, indeed, cor- rect ; but there is no satisfactory and convincing proof of ft with reference to the frivolous distresses we suffer in this tran- sitory life. Be assured, also, that the sufferings of infants and beasts, though to the onlooker they seem terrible, arc very trivial in comparison with those of a person of full conscious- ness : for we know, with certainty, that, the less the consci- ousness, the less the pain. In fact, very likely a father and 134 SEC. II., CHAP. 2. mother, when they see their infant in pain, suffer more than the infant itself. As for its pain, though we may see no fruit coining from it now, still you may be sure, that God sent it for some most good and salutary end ; such an end, that, when it becomes known to us, we shall confess, that the misery from the pain is of no account whatever, as weighed against the consequent benefit. Again, we learn, from the true Word of God, that the chief and primary cause of the entrance of pain into this world was sin ; and that all misery has immediate or mediate" connexion with man's bad deeds, or with his evil nature, which is the seed of ill-doing. Nevertheless, I affirm, that, so deep and so far transcending understanding are the ways of Almighty God, and in such a manner does He, in His inscrutable wisdom, educe various results from every single thing He does, that, assuredly, we cannot say, when a soul receives pain in this world, that such pain can have no just cause but in the sin that soul has committed. Many and many a just cause may it have, of which our feeble under- standing can know nothing. How hasty is it, therefore, for us, when we contemplate the sufferings of beasts, or of children, or of any other creature, to make up our minds, forthwith, that they had a former birth, and that they were then guilty of sin. To establish such strange doctrines, satisfactory and convincing evidence is necessary. It is manifest, that me- tempsychosis is most improbable. Hindus, because they have constantly heard of it from their childhood, look upon it as not improbable. Still, in reality, it is exceedingly improbable ; and it does not deserve instant credit, that we have been in exist- ence, times innumerable, and from duration without begin- ning, as gods, men, elephants, horses, dogs, cats, monkeys, mice, scorpions, and centipedes. What scenes we must have passed through, of which we have not, now, even the faintest remembrance ! If it be replied, that, as we who are grown up have forgot many circumstances of our childhood and adole- SEC. II., CHAP. 2. 135 sconce, so we have forgot the circumstances of onr former births, I would ask, whether, in those so many births, we were always like children. Moreover, though we forget many things that passed in our adolescence, there are thou- sands of other things, belonging to that stage of life, which remain in our memories all our lives long. Should it be re- plied, that, not altogether inconceivably, at the time of each new birth, we must forget the transactions of the former birth, I assent. But there are many things that are not altogether im- possible, which, yet, we are unable at once to believe. Is it wholly impossible, that wings should sprout out of an elephant, and that he should soar up into the clouds ? At the same time, if any one should come and tell us, that he had seen such a thing, we should scarcely credit him off hand. Only on his producing the most indubitable evidence of the truth of what he was asserting, should we believe him ; not otherwise. For, in proportion as a thing is extraordinary, we require strong proof of it. And, inasmuch as metempsychosis is in the highest degree improbable, and is supported by no satisfactory and convincing evidence, I cannot accept it ; your maxim, that suffering presup- poses sin, and cannot else be accounted for, being altogether impotent. In my foregoing illustrations I have shown, that suffering may have other just causes. Consider, too, that the king and the pandit, in those illustrations, are infinitely sur- passed, by the Deity, in amplitude and profundity of counsel. Where there is one reason to justify an act of a king, who can say how many there may not be to justify any one act of God ? Can you, indeed, find out the whole mind of God, and say, with assurance, in respect of any particular, that such or such is the cause of it, and that it can have no other cause ? Countless are the things in this world, of which we cannot in the least discover the purpose : and will you therefore conclude, that they exist without a purpose ? Who can tell the bounds of God's wide and complicated universe ? And, as for the innu- merable things which constitute it, who can point out the hid- 130 SEC. II, CHAP. .2. don cause of each, or its result, or its countless relations to other things ? God, keeping in view all this, created the whole, and controls it. Of this whole we see but a very small portion of a part ; and yet, when anything in it seems otherwise than suits us, we begin to raise objections to it. But God, who beholds all, and who knows how everything in it relates to everything else, and the result of each thing, and what conse- quences will finally flow from all things taken collectively, knows, that whatever He has made is in every wise good, and is assigned to its proper place. When a cultivator casts his precious seed into the dust, and presses it down, if a foolish man were to ask him why he was destroying it, would he not smile, and tell him to wait a little, and he would see, that the seed had not been destroyed, but would turn to great profit ? Be advised, that, in like man- ner, God has made this world for some most excellent end. At present, we are unable to perceive what it is ; and some things seem to us to be reversed, and others to be useless, and even wrong. The laws by which God governs the world, and His reasons for them, are so deep, that not only we, but even the angels, stand confounded before them. The foundations of His counsel have been laid time that had no beginning ; and its pinnacle, so to speak, pierces the remotest futurity. Know, however, of a surety, that all things will conspire to a final result, such as shall make manifest His superemincnt glory and His supremely love-worthy attributes. But the pandits do not take these things into their consi- deration. All the actions and plans of God they treat as if they wore those of a man. They cannot realize, that the counsels and the ways of God are far beyond our under- standing, so far beyond it, that, search as we may, we can never find them out. Nor can they believe, that there are, in God's world, things past computation, of which we know not the causes, and of which there arc, nevertheless, numerous anil just causes, known to God. And hence they would settle every- SEC. II., CHAP. 2. 137 thing by their own poor judgment ; and hence they arbitrarily postulate maxims and dogmas. In this lies the root of all their errors. Be persuaded, I entreat you, to quit this most faulty method. If you learn the right method, you shall never go astray. When you have to reason on any matter pertaining to God, first of all consider what things are within the scope of our understanding ; and reason on them alone. As for what transcends our understanding, to be silent regarding it is a token of wisdom. Who knows but God has kept back from us the causes of many things in His creation, expressly with a view to teach us humility, and to discipline our faith in Him ? Indeed, a chief mark of piety is this : that, though many things relating to God seem to us not only to have no obvious causes, but even such is our short sight to be improper, we should yet bow our heads, and confess, with unwavering faith, that they are all most excellent and right. In so doing, our humility and the firmness of our faith are put to the test. When a given thing is referred to God, we must first ascertain, whether it be correctly so referred : if correctly, of course our humble belief in it is justified. Such belief is not, however, binding upon us with regard to what is written of God in your Vedas and Purauas ; for it is not proved, that what is there said of God belongs to Him. On the contrary, thousands of proofs render it most indubitable, that those books were the invention of men. Whatever things we see before us in God's creation the sufferings of children, for instance, are from God, without doubt ; and these, as I have said , we are to believe, with humility, to be most excellent and right. The Naiyayika dogma of the existence of the soul from eter- nity appears, further, as a great error, in that it detracts from the real relation in which the soul stands to God, and from the consequent duties which it owes to God. If I believe, that God created both my soul and body, and that my continuance in life, and whatever I have, are from Him, I must regard Him as having complete authority over me ; and it is seen to T 138 SEC. II., CHAP. 3. bo my duty to love and to honour Him with all my soul and strength, and to remain entirely His. But, if a man believes that his soul is self-existent, and that whatever he receives from God is the fruit of his own works, he must consider God's authority over his soul to be very partial ; and, as a result, the duty of his soul to love and to honour God must likewise be partial. CHAPTER 3. Examination of the Cause, laid down in the Nydya, Vais'eshi- ka, and the otlier Systems, of the Wretchedness of the Soul, tliat is, its Bondage, and the Means of escaping there- from ; a Succinct Description of the True Nature of Virtue and Vice ; and a Criticism of the Views of the Systematists touching Virtue and Vice, their Consequences, fyc. Now, other things with which we ought to acquaint our- selves are, the wretchedness of the soul, the cause of this wretchedness, and the means of getting rid of it. On these topics there are very many errors in what we find in the Nyaya, Vais'eshika, and others among the Systems. All the Systematists concede, that all men are wretched ; their wretchedness consisting in metempsychosis and the resultant suffering. It is not this, in my belief, that constitutes man's wretchedness : and yet his real wretchedness is far mojp ter- rible than any of that nature. But this point I will not pur- sue. Let me ask the Systematists, what is the cause of hu- man wretchedness. They allege, that it is misapprehension, the identifying oneself with one's body and so forth. And, if I wish to know what harm, in their opinion, comes of this, they tell me, that the identifying the body with the soul originates desire and aversion, from which spring good and evil works, whence arise merit and demerit, to reap the fruits of which follow repeated births, Elysium, Hell, happiness, SEC. II., CHAP. 3. 139 and misery : and that such is human wretchedness. All this wretchedness they think the soul can escape from, and then be liberated, on its coining to know itself to be diverse from the body, &c. A full account of this has been given in the second chapter of the first section. All the dogmas of the Systematists on this topic contain grave errors ; and I shall consider those dogmas, one by one, in the present chapter. The matter before us, I implore the reader to remember, is most concerning. It is to the salvation of our priceless souls that it relates ; and it should be pondered with freedom from partiality, and with patience and fixedness of attention. There must be very few who regard the body and soul as altogether one. In general, men know and believe, that the soul, which is intelligent, and the body, which is unintelligent, are of different substances. All men, however, you declare, in saying " I am dark," or " I am fair," evidence, that they labour under misapprehension. I reply, that such locutions do not betoken misapprehension. For, though the soul and the body arc different as to substance, yet God has established so close a connexion between them, that, as it were, the two make up one, and we call both together man. When, there- fore, a man says " I," he does not mean his soul only ; nor does he mean his body only ; but the two. He may predicate of himself things which pertain solely to the body, as when he says " I am dark, or fair ;" and so of things which belong only $p the soul, as when he says " I am conscious, or igno- rant:" but this does not prove him unaware, that his soul is distinct from his body. It is true, that a man sometimes seems to identify his wealth, or the like, with himself, and, when he loses his property, says, "I am lost."* But does any one really believe, that a man who so expresses himself actually regards his property as one with his soul ?f And * The sense of the original ha* hero been preserved at the cost of compro- mising idiom. t It i. singular, that the pandits adduce locutions similar to those in th 140 SEC. II., CHAP. 3. again, since, of the body anil soul, the soul is chief and the more excellent, a man sometimes speaks as though he were soul only, as when he. says " my body," or " 1 shall leave the body." Baseless, therefore, is the opinion of those who maintain, on the ground of such phrases as " I am black," and " I am fair," that men labour under great misappre- hension, a misapprehension which gives rise to all their wretchedness. Again ; though some men may be so ignorant as to identify the soul and body, still, they are not enabled, by being taught their separatencss, to escape from good and bad works. The pandits, however, may argue,* that a conviction of their sepa- ratcness is necessarily operative of such escape. " For, when a man knows, that his soul is separate from his body, he must also believe, that the soul will not perish with the body, but will continue to exist after death, and will receive the requital of its good or evil works. And, when he reflects, that, in order to receive such requital, he must fall into Hell, or go to Elysium ; and that even the happiness of Elysium is alloyed by various kinds of misery ; and that, after all, when his desert is exhausted, the very happiness which was enjoyed becomes a source of misery ; and that successive births and deaths must follow, and various sorts of happiness and misery be experi- enced ; how great is the wretchedness ! And, when, from heed to the numerous admonitions of the scriptures, the vanity of all the happiness of this world and of the next becomes text, to prove the direct opposite. When, they allege, a man whose son is prosperous says " I am prosperous," it is proved, that the man, through ignorance, regards himself as strictly and in fact identical with his son. See the Vedanta-sdra, p. 14 ; and the extract from S'ankara A'cbaVya at pp. 13, 14. * This argument has not been met with ; nor does the author suppose, that a pandit would be likely to employ it. It has been brought forward, and answered, to meet possible contingencies. The Hindu theory in, that the intuition of the soul's separateness from the body and so forth, has the effect of extirpating desire and aversion, and so of conducing to emancipation. See pp. 25 seqq. SRC. II., CHAP. 3. 141 clear to him, ho will assuredly grow averse from both virtue and vice, and will estrange himself equally from good works and from evil." I reply, that the expectation of his doing so is vain. As I have said already, the generality of men know, that the soul is distinct from the body. Interrogate even a very ignorant man, and he will tell you, that he looks to re- ceiving, after death, the fruit of his deeds. But does this prospect keep him from good and evil works ? Perhaps you will say, that the ignorant are, indeed, informed about this matter, but do not seriously reflect upon it ; and hence they do not rid themselves of desire and aversion. If, never- theless, they received instruction, and meditated on the sub- ject, why would they not so rid themselves ? To this I have to say, that it becomes evident, if we thoroughly study the condition of human nature, that no labour such as you have spoken of is enough to root out desire and aversion altogether. And here I must observe, that, to count both good works and evil works a cause of bondage is, to my mind, wholly wrong. A little further on I shall expose the error of the pandits on this point. As for evil works, they are really a cause of bondage. Most necessary is it to avoid them ; and even the consideration of the future punishment which they entail ought to induce men to avoid them. But, alas ! so corrupt is the nature of man, that, let him reflect however much, yet he cannot, on that account, abandon bad works entirqjv. Your solicitude to shun good works is quite super- fluous ; for, so corrupt is the nature of man, that, let his works be ever so good, still there cleaves to them much of evil and imperfection ; and he is incapable of a single good work wrought with purity of body, speech, and heart. For good works a man may receive praise from his fellow-men ; but, in the sight of God, who knows everything without and within, these very works are tainted with evil. Know, then, that miserable man of himself forbears good works : there is no need of pointing out the way to avoid them. But to escape 142 SEC. II, CHAP. 3. from evil works is impossible by any human device. Suppose that one avoids practical theft, murder, adultery, contention, in- justice, and so forth : yet is this the avoidance of all evil works? Not at all. The whole duty of man consists in two things : to love God with all his heart, soul, and strength ; and to love his fellow-men as he loves himself. To do contrariwise, or to do less, is sin. He who does his whole duty must never offend in cither of the two things I have specified. And who can thus never offend ? Most men are unaware of their secret faults, which lie hidden from them ; and, on the ground of certain visible good works, they hug themselves on their goodness. But, if a man habitually explores, with the lamp of discrimi- nation, that gloomy crypt, the dark dungeon of his heart, and looks into all the corners, and weighs all his thoughts, words, and deeds, he perceives, all too plainly, that he is a vile, fallen, weak, and helpless sinner. Countless are the instances of secret pride, hypocrisy, deceit, selfishness, and other ble- mishes, not to be described, that he will discover in himself; and the conviction will be forced upon him, that he does not love God as he ought. Such is the state of man. And be assured, that no man will be saved by right apprehension, or by works, but only by the free grace of God, the means of ob- taining which are indicated in the real Word of God. Again, you yourselves acknowledge, that even he who has attained to fulness of right apprehension, whom you call savcd-in-life, goes on, so long as he is in the body, doing good and bad works : for you hold, that the accumulated works of the rightly apprehensive man are destroyed, and that his current works are inoperative. By this it is proved, that he does works which, but for his right apprehension, Would have produced merit and demerit, that is to say, good works and bad. How, then, is it established, that misappre- hension is the cause of all works ? And what turns out to bo the difference between a man of right apprehension and one of wrong apprehension? You may allege, that there is this SEC. II., CHAP. H. 143 groat difference, that the good and evil works of the misappre- hensive man serve to fetter him, and that the rightly appre- hensive man cannot he fettered by his works. The fallacy of this I shall lay hare in due course. Another, and a greater, error on this point, into which the Systematists fall, is, in saying that virtue itself enthrals the soul. Vice does so, to he sure ; but how can virtue ? The fact is, that the Systematists do not understand aright the nature of virtue and that of vice ; and on this account they go astray so variously. This being the case, I shall first briefly set forth the true nature of virtue and that of vice, and then treat of the errors just adverted to. God created man a moral creature ; capable of knowing God, and his own relations to God and the world ; and capa- ble of honouring and of loving God, his Creator and Lord, and of discharging his duties towards his fellow-creatures. And this capacity also he possesses, of knowing, that to do these things is rig] it, and that to do the reverse is wrong. By a moral creature I mean one who answers this description. And now understand, that, man being a -moral creature, certain things, in respect of his rank and nature, are, of them- selves, binding on him; such as devotion, justice, truth, com- passion, and the like : while other things are, of themselves, wrong for him ; such as atheism, injury to others, uncom- passion, falsehood, and so forth. The former are virtue, and the latter are vice. Now, God, in His essential character, is good and just. Consequently, any action proper for man is, in itself, pleasing to Him ; and any that is improper is dis- pleasing to Him : and, inasmuch as Ho is just by nature, He must show favour to the virtuous, and award punishment to the wicked. Three points are to be kept in view. First : God has not established, without cause and at hap-hazard, the distinction between virtue and vice ; but He has fixed that to be virtue, which is binding on men with respect to their nature and rank, 144 SEC. II., CHAP. 3. and that to be vice, which is wrong for them. Hence, in no circumstances is it right for man to commit sin ; and in no circumstances is it wrong, or unnecessary, for him to do what is right. Secondly : God's favour to the virtuous, and His punishment of the wicked, are not because He receives aught of benefit from our virtue, or aught of injury from our sin. His requital of us is solely because of the justice of His nature. For it is of the essence of justice to reward the virtuous for their rectitude, and to inflict pain on the vicious for their wick- edness. If God did not do thus, He would not be just ; and imperfection would attach to His superlatively excellent and perfect nature. Thirdly : It is not the case, that the good and bad consequences which follow virtue and vice spring spontaneously from works. God has appointed those conse- quences. Such are vice and virtue, and their consequences. But the understanding of man, when it became blind to the justice, holiness, and other attributes of God, got confused as to vir- tue and vice, and took to inventing a variety of perverse doctrines -about them. Such has been, not exceptionally, the history of the Systematists. Of the grounds of the laws of virtue and vice, on which I have touched, they know nothing Otherwise, they would not speak of both virtue and vice as causes of bondage ; nor would they pronounce, that he who wishes for emancipation should be alike free from the one and from the other. The reason why the Systematists hold virtue to be a cause of bondage is this. Good works, they say, hinder the soul of emancipation : for emancipation consists in the soul's indepen- dence of the body, mind, apprehension, will, &c. ; but good works, in order to reap the fruits appertaining to them, compel the soul, until this end is accomplished, to wear the form of a god, or of a man, or such-like. Moreover, happiness, the fruit of good works, is beneath the ambition of a wise man ; it being implicated, in two ways, with misery. In the first SEC. II., CHAP. 3. 145 place, it is fugacious : since whatever lias a beginning must have an end ; and the fruit of virtue, like other things that have not always existed, must pass away. When a man ob- tains happiness, he is happy ; but, when the happiness comes to a period, there supervenes misery : and so happiness itself amounts to misery. In the second place, there is inequality in the fruit of virtue ; that is to say, he whose virtue is incon- siderable is meagrely rewarded, while he whose virtue is more abundant receives a larger recompense. The former must re- pine at seeing the latter ; and thus his very happiness makes him wretched. In this way all happiness whatsoever partakes of the character of misery ; and hence, to be freed from both, and to become insensible, is the most transcendent aspiration of humanity. But how erroneous is all this ! God, I have shown, has ap- pointed those things to be good works, which, in respect of the nature of man, are incumbent on him, -and, for forbearing to do which, man, in the eye of justice, deserves punishment. Can, then, the fruit of those works which are incumbent on man, ever be evil ? In your opinion, since the wish for the fruit of good works, happiness, misbeseems a man of pru- dence, that fruit is an evil. Again, since you maintain, that the true well-being of the soul consists in its parting with appre- hension and will, and in becoming insensible, you ought rather to consider this state to be the fruit of virtue. Herein you have exactly inverted things. What ! has God enacted the law of virtue and vice after the manner of a net, with no. reason but to entangle souls in it, like so many birds, and to divert Him- self withal ? Has He fixed at random, that some works are bad, and that others are good, so that souls may sometimes be entrapped in one snare, and sometimes in the other ? But, if God, simply because of His just and excellent nature, lias established those works to be virtuous, which, in respect of the nature of the soul, are incumbent on it, will not He a sea of mercy and goodness, and Who, as the Father of U 146 SEC. II. , CHAP. 3. all, desires the welfare of all, nay, Who devises a way and a means for the welfare of even such as do what is amiss, give to such as do what is right, that which will constitute their time well-being ? Instead of well-being, will He, indeed, decree to such a soul a recompense to its harm? The fact is, however, that the attainment of a state of insen- sibility is not true emancipation ; and they who, by God's mercy, arrive at true emancipation, will suffer no injury in their faculties, as those of apprehension and will. This I shall show further on. Again, you mistake in arguing, that the fruit of virtue, hap- piness, is perishable. I have already made out your maxim to be utterly baseless, that all products must, as such, come to an end. Further, if perishable happiness is of the nature of misery, it cannot be the fruit of virtue ; for, since that which it is obligatory on man to do is virtue, will God requite with misery him who does what is obligatory ? You think, too, that virtue is a thing which is to be done for only a limited time, after which, it being discontinued, the reward follows. Hence your fear, that the reward also will, after a time, be discon- tinued. As I have said, however, virtue is a thing which it is perpetually incumbent on man to do, whether he be in this world, or in another. As long as he has being, so long should he go on practising virtue. While he continues in virtue, its beneficent requital will ever remain with him ; but, when he falls away from virtue, its reward terminates. But the misery which then ensues is not the consequence of virtue, but of vice ; for even desistance from virtue is vice. Who, one may here ask, is equal to such unintermitted virtue? Grant, that endless happiness is the reward of such virtue as you speak of: still, what shall we profit by hoping for it ? It is true, I reply, that we men have all become so corrupt in our nature, that we are incapable of practising virtue ; and, therefore, if we hope to compass the loftiest aim of man on the strength of our virtue, we shall be benefited SEC. II., CHAP. 3. 147 nothing. But God, in compassion for us sinners, has revealed His Word, and has thereby marked out a way, by following which, all our sins will be pardoned, and that reward, by His mercy, will be bestowed upon us, which would have attached to virtue, had virtue been practicable to us. Then will our fallen nature be purged and purified : the ability to practise virtue will be vouchsafed to us ; and we shall abide near to God, and dwell in the realms of glory, and enjoy everlasting beatitude. The second objection which you oppose to the fruit of vir- tue is, that it implies inequality ; some being rewarded more, and others, less : and this also is a ground of misery. My answer is, that this inequality is no real ground of misery. The misery which proceeds from envy has its real root in man's corrupt nature. Envy is a blemish in humarh nature. It is not found in a pure nature ; it is found in a fallen nature. Of him whose nature is fallen the virtue is not really virtue ; and, accordingly, he cannot obtain the fruit of virtue. How evident is it, from this, that the Systematists were not ac- quainted with the true character of virtue and that of vice ! Little did they know of the nature which virtue requires. How can he whose nature is corrupt do works that are right ? Outwardly, he may imitate them ; but still he retains his corrupt nature, which renders genuine virtue impossible to him. Works only externally good are not the whole of virtue. That, in the sight of God, is virtue, which comes from a pure heart. I will exemplify what I mean. It is proper for a man to show friendship to a friend. But, if a simu- lator, merely from sense of shame, is outwardly courteous to his friends, but inwardly bears them malice, can he, in the sight of God, be a doer of proper works? Know, then, that they alone whose nature is pure are capable of virtue, and that only such as they will receive the reward of vir- tue. Others, they may see, are, for greater virtue than their own, rewarded more largely : but they will not, on that ac- 148 SEC. II., CHAP. 3. count, feel envy. On the contrary, it belongs to a pure nature to take pleasure in the increase of the happiness of others. And thus, that which is a source of misery to an evil nature is, to a pure nature, rather a source of joy. From their ignorance of the true character of virtue, and that of vice, the pandits err, again, in maintaining, that, 011 the acquisition of right apprehension, all previous sins are effaced, and that current works become inoperative, or, in other words, that nothing piacular inheres in the bad actions which the rightly apprehensive man is constantly commit- ting. This is altogether untenable. For what connexion is there between the conviction, that I am not my body, and the effacement of sin ? To sin is to do that which, in all circumstances and conditions, is improper for man ; and hence, by so doing, man becomes, before God, guilty and deserving of punishment. Is all this set aside by my knowing that I am not body? Moreover, if accumulated and current works are obliterated, why not fructescent works as well ? The issue of the whole matter is, that it is vain to hope for salvation on the score of knowing the body to be not identical with the soul ; for this knowledge cannot avail to save a man from evil works, or from their penalty. From this it is clear, that the Hindu, in his ignorance of the nature of virtue and that of vice, supposes their laws to be baseless and fortuitous. He seems to have little notion of the moral goodness or badness of works, and to regard them as producing their effects physically, or mechanically. It plainly appears, from what the pandits have written on this subject, that, in their opinion, pretty much as food possesses an inherent property of appeasing hunger, and as poison possesses an inherent property of causing death, so some works have an innate virtue to ensure celestial happi- ness, while others have the efficacy of consigning to Hell. Whatever produces happiness is virtue ; and whatever pro- duces misery is vice. A foolish man, therefore, who desires SEC. II., CHAP. 3. 141) the happiness of Elysium, &c., will aim to practise virtue. But he who, weary alike of the happiness and of the misery of an existence of vicissitude, gives up both, and yearns after emancipation, will assuredly free himself from such a plague. He cannot, however, rid himself of it readily. For, if, so long as he is in a state of misapprehension, in order to escape from the bondage of virtue, he resolves to give up good works, in so doing he transgresses. Hence he must ac- quire right apprehension, which is the only panacea against virtue. Similarly, with regard to vice, the pandits think, that, as some substances, poison, for instance, possess an innate virtue of injuring, which, yet, under certain conditions, is neu- tralized, so, though bad works have an intrinsic property of entailing evil, as the torments of Hell, yet, in the case of the rightly apprehensive man, that property is ren- dered inefficacious. It is his right knowledge which serves to counteract it. And, therefore, the sin of such a man does not affect him.* But, more especially, the fact of the pandits' maintaining, that good and bad works produce their effects, happiness and misery, in a physical manner, becomes plainly manifest from their invention of requitative efficacy as an objective entity. Their reason for believing in what they style requitative efficacyf is this. " Good works," they say, " are the cause of elysian happiness, and bad works are the cause of infer- nal dolor. And how can this be so ? For, if a man does a good act to-day, he docs not, therefore, at once go to Elysium, * If the Hindus had a correct conception of the moral goodness and bead- ness of actions, they would not be found to argue, that Krishna and other members of the pantheon were not defiled by their deeds of wickedness, simp- ly on the ground that those gods were endowed with great power, and were secured from the evil consequences of what they did. On moral grounds, the very commission of such wickedness is defilement. + In Sanskrit, apilrva. 150 SEC. II., CHAP. 3. but after the lapse of perhaps a long period, when he dies. How, then, a cause being that which immediately precedes an effect, is that good work the cause of his going to Elysium?" Involved in this grave embarrassment, the pandits, with a view to liberate themselves from it, allege, that there is produced, in the soul, by good or by bad works, the quality denominated requitative efficacy ; and it is this which consigns the soul to Elysium, or to Hell. It is, then, through the medium of requitative efficacy that good and bad works lead, respectively, to Elysium and to Hell. This requi- tative efficacy is what they mean by merit or demerit. But what, I would ask, is the necessity of this embarrassment? Good and bad works are not immediately originative of desira- ble and undesirable consequences, but mediately. And how are they so mediately? As I have said before, God, who is just, in consideration of the virtue and vice of men, Himself appoints corresponding reward for them. Since, therefore, this reward depends on the will of God, when it seems proper to Him, He bestows it, at once, it may be, or bye and bye. And so there is no need of the invention of requitative efficacy. One man serves another, and is daily entitled to wages ; and yet his master pays him at a time which he himself determines ; monthly, or half-yearly, or annually. But, possibly, some one may say,* that, as the hireling, from serving his master, becomes entitled daily to his wages, just so man, from doing good works, or evil, becomes an heir of Elysium, or of Hell ; and his having such a heritage is, for him, requitative efficacy. If, I reply, the pandits had said only thus much, there would have been no harm. But they lay down requitative efficacy as being a real and distinct entity. For example, the Naiya- yikas and the Vais'eshikas reckon it among the qualities of the soul, apprehension, will, happiness, misery, and the rest : * Not that any pandit would hold such language ; but a foreigner might, if bent on rationalizing Hinduism. SEC. II., CHAP. 3. 151 and I affirm, that such a thing cannot be proved to exist. Furthermore, I would say to the pandits, that, if you believe in requitative efficacy as a distinct thing generated by good and evil works, you ought to believe it to be generated by service, in the instance of one man who works for another ; for the same objection presents itself in both cases alike. In fact, you ought to believe in a similar efficacy in countless other in- stances besides that of service ; and then, instead of twenty- four qualities, you would have qualities innumerable. The error which I have here charged on the pandits, though it is not perfectly manifest in the Naiyayika and some other Systems, is yet very clear in the Sankhya and Mimansa ; these not believing in God, and yet affirming, that good and bad works, through requitative efficacy, lead to Elysium and to Hell. In their opinion, from casting an offering into the fire, with utterance of the formula " To Indra ; may it speed," re- quitative efficacy is engendered, the which, of its own motion, fructifies in elysian bliss and so forth. What need, then, of God ? How strange is all this ! On the point at present in discussion, the Sankhyas and Mimansakas labour under miserable misconception ; and the rest of the Systematists, also, are more or less in the wrong. For, at the beginning of this book, where I have spoken of the doctrines held in common by the Systems, it will have been seen, that, though the Systematists dissent among them- selves on some few matters, yet, on almost every capital question they are alike as to method of consideration and as to reach and bias of intellect. They have all of them tene- ments of the same sort of foundation, and fabric, and model, however different in outer aspect. One of them may carry a certain error to greater extremes than the rest ; but in these as well inheres that error, in embryo. 152 CHAPTER 4. Examination of the Views concerning the State of Emancipa- tion, professed, in common, by the Naiydyikas and by the Vais' eshikas. I have thus given an account of the Naiyayika and Vai- s'eshika theories as regards God, the soul, the soul's wretch- edness, the cause of that wretchedness, the way of escape from it, and virtue and vice. The treatment of a single topic more will bring this second section to an end. And that topic is, the miserable condition to which the Naiyayikas and Vais'eshikas give the name of emancipation ; their views on this article growing out of their lamentable conceptions touching God, &c. Is to lose the faculties of apprehension, will, and all manifestations of sensibility, and to become like a stone, the loftiest aim of the soul ? In what, I would ask, does this state differ from annihilation ? In reply to two objections of the pandits, the one real, and the other presum- ed : that, if the fruition of happiness be allowed to belong to the state of emancipation, and, if that happiness varies in degree to different recipients, some among the emancipated must bo envious of others less favoured than themselves ; and that, if cognition, will, and other such faculties survive in emancipation, the emancipated might admit evil desires, and hence incur danger of falling into sin ; I maintain, that they ' who know not the power of God, and the greatness of His grace, may have such fears. But we, for our parts, who possess the true Word of God, learn, from it, that such as accept the terms of salvation which God has offered, and become participators in His grace, will be translated, after death, to the abodes of bliss, and that God will so purify their nature, that they shall never more be affected with evil desires, envy, enmity, pride, and such like. To them will be given, in Heaven, celestial and indefectible bodies; and they will retain all the mental characteristics of conscious beings, SEC. II., CHAP. 4. 153 and will bo for ever blest with the beatific vision, and with the highest joy, ineffable and divine, in being near to Him, and in paying Him adoration, and, their nature being made pure, with serenity of soul, and with peace ; their happiness always increasing, and subject to no intermission. And tell me, pray, which state deserves rather to be called the highest aim of man ; this, or one of total unconsciousness ? This latter is, indeed, not the highest aim of man, but, contrari- wise, the lowest of degradations. You say, that souls have existed from all duration, and have, in the meantime, passed through births and deaths unnumbered, suffering incessantly the miseries of an existence of vicissitude. Now and then one has grown wise, and has aspired to escape from its wretchedness, and, to this end, has practised, during several births, austerities, contemplation, and similar observances. And what reward has it received at last, except the becoming insensible, like a stone, a state equivalent to annihilation? Of nothing, then, is the destiny so cruel as is that of the soul. So long as, dating from past eternity, it remains conscious, it is subject to wretchedness ; and it can hope for no exemp- tion from this wretchedness, other than annihilation. If we were atheists, not believing in God, and if our deliverance from misery depended on our own efforts, to look for emanci- pation such as yours might be fitting. But, as we believe in a God, inscrutable in power, replete with all goodness, most bountiful, all-merciful, and the Giver of every felicity ; and as we hope for emancipation at His hands ; it seems to us reasonable to expect an emancipation better than the miser- able state to which you give that name. Two ways of attain- ing the chief aim of the soul are found in the true Word of God ; by human actions, and by the grace of the Lord. Ac- cording to the first, on a man's doing that which it is binding on him to do, the reward of his works is bestowed upon him by God. A soul that should always thus do would be reward- ed with constant happiness ; and to enjoy such happiness is 154 SEC. II, CHAP. 4. the highest aim of man. But, again, it is written, in the Word of God, that it surpasses our strength to follow this way ; for we have all become corrupt, through sin, and our works are unworthy of God's acceptance. Our well-being is, therefore, wholly dependent upon the grace of God. By our works we can merit only Hell ; but, since God is merci- ful, He desires to save us by His free grace. In order that we may secure this grace, He has contrived a wondrous plan, giving proof of His illimitable and ineffable compassionate- ness, and altogether in harmony with His justice and holiness. And, since He has opened, on our behalf, the treasury of His boundless mercies, will He make our highest happiness to consist in being conformed to the condition of a stone ? Endless happiness, whether compassed by works, or by God's grace, alone deserves to receive the name of the highest aim of man. Why, then, will you have it to consist in uncon- sciousness ? The truth is, that this matter cannot be under- stood save with the help of the illumination derivable from God's own Word ; and he who rests solely on his own intelli- gence, in reasoning about it, may well end in some such doc- trine as that of the Systematists ; namely, that to be emancipat- ed is to become unconscious. The speculators just mentioned proceed somewhat as though they thought they were to be saved by a scheme and by labour of their own : and whence can they, unfortunates, hope to obtain everlasting happiness ? Hence it is, that, in their estimation, they will secure every- thing that is to be secured, if only, bereft of all conscious- ness, they get quit of the distress which infests an existence of vicissitude. But know, ye Hindus, that to achieve even thus much is impossible for you. God made the soul cogni- tive ; and who shall make it incognitive ? The nature with which God endowed the soul cannot be annulled by reflect- ing, that " I am not mind, I am not body." Be assured, that our souls will forever continue conscious. Two things are, however, placed before us, between which to make our SEC. II., CHAP. 4. 155 election. God, in His Word, points out the way of salva- tion. If we accept it, we shall make our consciousness the instrument of eternal joy. If, on the other hand, we reject it, we shall make our consciousness the instrument of eternal affliction and torment. As, therefore, you seek for well-being, accept the genuine Word of God. My motive in exposing the faults of the Systems has not at all been, to convict their authors of error, for the purpose of holding them up to ridicule. My aim has been, to show, that whoever whether they, or I, or any one else undertakes to argue, in reliance on unaided reason, about divine and spi- ritual things, must constantly fall into error ; the mind of man being impotent to understand them rightly. When you are convinced, that they are correctly described in the Chris- tian religion, you will know, that this is the true religion of God. Accordingly, it is my wish, that you should study the Christian Scriptures, and with candour. To this study fixed attention, docility, and patient thought are indispensable ; for, when a man has, during a long space of time, entertained any particular set of opinions, he is slow to perceive their faults, and to recognize the excellence of what conflicts with them. But, if you conduct this investigation with humble prayer to God, you shall attain to a knowledge of the truth. SECTION III. CHAPTER 1. Description of the Three Sorts of Existence held in the Vedanta : the Key to a Right Understanding of that Scheme of Philo- sophy. HAVING briefly considered five out of the six great Hindu Systems, I shall, in this section, examine the Vedanta. And to engage in such an examination in the present day is especially important. The Hindus, it is true, refer all the Systems to Rishis ; but, in our time, these systems, the Vedanta apart, have no followers, except perhaps here and there an indivi- dual. As for the Vedanta, it is held by a large majority of all Hindus. The Vedantins argue three sorts of existence ; and one must thoroughly comprehend and ponder them, in order to take in the meaning of their scheme. These they designate as true, practical, and apparent.* That which verily exists is called true, and its existence, true existence ;f and this ex- * frf^nr ^ TO*nfW I Veddta-pari6kd*h&, p. 18. "Exist- ence is of three sorts, true (paramarthika), practical ( vyavaharika), and apparent (prdtibhdsika). True existence is that of Brahma ; practical, that of ether, &c. ; apparent, that of nacririe silver and the like." + Dr. J. R Ballantyne takes paramarthika to denote "being, in its highest sense.'' Christianity contrasted, &c., p. 38. That pdramdrthika, popularly, is everywhere used to signify " true," one may learn without any very laborious search. The adverb paramdrtltatah means " in truth," " indeed," &c. &c. SEC. III., CHAP. 1. 157 istence, according to the Vedanta, is predicable of Brahma exclusively. The second species of existence has the name of practical. The things to which it belongs do not veritably exist : only the misapprehensive, or ignorant, mistake them for existent, and by means of them transact practical life ; whence the epithet. And it must be kept in mind, that, as the things just spoken of are thought to be not veritably existent, but to be imagined by ignorance, precisely so is it with the use made of them. For instance, a man in a dream drinks water, or mounts a horse : the water and the horse are vision- ary ; and so are the drinking and the mounting. If the use to which one puts a thing is veritable, the thing also must be veritable ; for, to have veritable dealings with that which is false is impossible. Can a man in his waking senses bathe in a river that he saw in his sleep ? The things which, agreeably to the phraseology of the Vedantins, are practical, are the very things which all men, themselves excepted, call true : and such are I's'wara, or the maker of the world, souls, and all the world besides.* Their existence these philosophers hold to be the The fact, that the Vedantins, in contradistinguishing practical and appa- rent existence from the first species, style them mithya, or false, is a further proof, that the sense here attached to pdramarthika is alone correct. Though the word is technical with the Vedantins, they have done no violence to its ordinary meaning. Vijn^na Bhikshu, on an occasion where he employs pdramdrlhikatwa, the abstract substantive of pdramdrthika, in the sense of " unchangeableness and eternalness," clearly intimates, that his acceptation of the term, as a follower of the Srfnkhya, is different from that of the VedfCntins. See the Sankhya-pravachana-bhdshya, p. 25. The torture to which Vijn^na habitually and especially in the Sankhya- sdra- subjects the whole compass of the Vedffnta nomenclature, reminds one forcibly of the sanctimonious vocabulary of free-handlers and secularists among our contemporaries in Christian countries. 158 SEC. III., CHAP. 1. result of ignorance.; and such existence is termed, by them, practical. The third species of existence, denominated apparent, A'nanda Giri, commenting on S'aukara A cbaryft a Mtmdu- ki/a-bhdshya : Bibliotheca Indica, Vol. vm., pp. 326, 3'27. " Jf Brahma, secondless, and essentially unconnected with the world, be established by the Veddnta, how is it, that there are souls, subject to three conditions, those of leaking, dreaming, and insenslb'e sleep, and employers of objects ; and how is it, that an IVwara, effecting the experience of souls, is revealed by scripture ; and how is it, that the aggregate of objects subserving experience is found as a thing apart from these f If monism were true, all these would present them- selves as incompatible. With reference to such an objection, it is set forth as follows, with intent to declare, that souls, the world, and I'sVara can all reasonably be admitted as things of imagination surmised in Brahma." A little further on, A'nanda Giri says : ^ETcfT nnfa w^r ^ w^rfrr Trft^ii " Therefore it is enunciated, that the three conditions, and the souls subject thereto, and the illusive Brahma, i. e., /'s'wara, are all imagined in the pure Brahma." The reason why the VedsCntins use such an expression as " silver imagined in nacre," is, of course, that the nacre is the substrate of the imaginary silver. Strictly analogous, in their view, to the nacre and silver of this illustration are Brahma and the world, &c., where they speak of the world, souls, and I's'wara, as imagined, by the ignorant, in Brahma. It is to be understood, that Brahma is not the subject of the imagination, but its object. A most eminent authority in Vedanta matters, Sarvajna'tma Muni, thus instructs the learner : Sankshepa-stariraka, from a MS. not at hand for reference. "All that is devised, or fancied, in the form of the world, of IVa, and of souls, by the ignorance forcibly possessing thce, appears albeit unsubstantial, viz., barren of true existence, substantial, until the sun of right apprehen- sion rises.'' This couplet has been interpreted in accordance with the gloss of Madhu- sudana Saraswati, who takes gddham as an adverb. T's'a, or I's'wara, the maker of t,he world, and souls, since the Vedantins consider them as, no less than the world itself, ignorance-imagined and false, corne under the category of things practical. SEC. III., CHAP. 1. 159 resembles the practical, in that it is false, but, by mistake, seems to be veritable. It differs, however, from the practical in three respects. First, the ignorant, that is to say, ordinary men, do not constantly, but only now and then, mistake for veritable the apparent objects to which it appertains ; as nacrine silver, and the matters of a dream. Nor, secondly, is there any practical dealing with these things. Let a man who mis- takes nacre for silver offer it for sale : he will not get for it the price of silver ; for it will be recognized, by others, as another substance. Thirdly : it is because of ignorance, that the practical seems to be veritable ; but it is by reason, additionally to ignorance, of distance and other causes, called defects, enumerated by the Naiyayikas, &c., that the apparent seems veritable.* Such are the Vedantin's three sorts of existence, the true, the practical, and the apparent. To obtain a just view of the Vedanta doctrine, or even to appreciate its fallacy, it is all-important to master its theory of three existences. It must be understood, that it is not be- cause existent things are in any way to us intelligible of | Veddnta-paribhdshd, p. 12. "Nescience, the cause of mistaking Brahma for ajar, or other practical object, is to be con- sidered as a defect also. When, however, nacre is mistaken for silver an ocular affection, or similar defect, is the cause of the misapprehension." It is not to be understood, that, in the case of nacrine silver, nescience is excluded as a cause. The defects specified are causes additional thereto. This appears from the two pages of the Veddnta-paribhashd preceding that here quoted from. The term dosha, "defect" is a technicality generalizing certain causes of misapprehension. I Bhdsha-parichchheda, 130th couplet. " A defect is a cause of wrong notion ; a virtue, of right notion. Defects are pronounced to be multifarious, as bile, yiviny rise to jaundice, distance, &c." 1GO SEC. III., CHAP. 1. various kinds, that the Vedantins contend for a difference in their existence. In other words, they do not predicate a dif- ference between the existences of things, because one is eternal and another is uneternal, or because one is self-existent and another exists dependency. * It is a difference in the very nature of existing, not in its mode, that they insist upon. Their view on this subject will now be exhibited. To the Vedantins the establishment of monism, or non-dua- lity, is most essential. They wish to make out the soul to be Brahma, and the world to be false ; whence it would follow, that Brahma solely is true, and that nought but him exists, or ever existed, or at any time will exist. From the couplet of the S'iva-gitd which I shall quote in the sixth chapter, and from numberless other passages of Vedanta works, it is mani- fest, that, in their view, the world is false, and imagined by ignorance. Not that they only figuratively call it false, as we sometimes call things of an evanescent and perishable charac- ter ; but they mean, that it is indeed so, like nacrine silver. * As * According to the Vedinta, souls, as souls, and .also ignorance and IVwara, are beginningless and self-existent. Still, we find ascribed to them a different existence from that of Brahma. It is called false. For the unoriginatcdness of souls, &c., see the last quotation in p. 35. The source of the couplet there given has not been ascertained. Its state- ments are, however, called in question by no Veda"ntin. Among the various treatises which cite it is, besides the Siddhanta-ratnamdla, the Krishndlan- kcira of Achyutakrishna Ananda Tfrtha, a commentary on Appayya Dikshita's Siddhanta-lr.s'a. Moreover, it is at the tongue's end of almost every student of the Vedanta. Achyutakrishna reads, as the second quarter of the distich : fT^JT ^T^- likewise, the distinction between the soul and I's'a." This lection is by much to be preferred. Maya, illusion, avidyd, nescience, and ajnana, ignorance, when these two denote collectivity, are synonymes. Nescience and ignorance, when referred to souls in several, are only fractional portions of illusion. See the Ved&nta-sara, pp. 4, &c. * 5T^TftT3 *R f*W W^TfHr^Icn ^^ cl^cf *TZ1T | Veddnta-paribluislta, p. 17. "All other than Brahma SEC. III., CHAP. 1. 161 such silver is nothing, and wholly from ignorance seems to be something, just so, they say, is the world nothing ; it being imagined by ignorance, that is, it seeming, simply by reason of ignorance, to exist. To maintain otherwise would be to surrender non-duality. Further, it is surprizing to find, that the ignorance which imagines the world is laid down as being itself ignorance- imagined, and hence false.* They refuse to grant, that even this is true ; and consistently : else, non-duality would be is false, because other than Brahma. Whatever is thus different is thus false; for instance, nacrine silver." Those of the Systematists who are not' Vedantins apprehend the doctrine under comment in the manner in which it is apprehended in the text. SdnJckya-pravackana-bhd- shya, p. 225. "Not only on the ground of the aforesaid argument are the monists to be shunned, but, further, because there is no proof to establish the uutrueness of the world. To this effect it is set forth, in the aphorism: 'The world is true, since its origination is from a cause that has no defect, and since there is nothing to make out the world to be false.' The objects of a dream, the imagined yellowness of a white conch-shell, &c., are found, among men to be untrue, by reason that they owe their origin to the internal organ, &c., infected by the defects of sleep, &c. This untrueness does not belong to the universe, made up of the great principle and the rest ; for the causes of that universe, nature and the intellect of Iliranyagarbha, the creator, are free from all defect." The aphorism cited in this extract is VI., 52. Vijn^ua, in continuation, will have it, that the Vedantins wrest from their legitimate drift the passages of the Veda which they adduce to establish, that the world is false. For, he says, if those passages mean as is pretended, the result is suicidal ; the Veda being itself of the world. * See the eighth chapter of this section. T 162 SEC. III., CHAP. 1. impeached by the presentation of another entity than Brah- ma, ignorance. Thus it is, that they would establish Brah- ma alone to be true, and all besides to be illusory. When, therefore, they give the epithet of true to the existence of Brahma, and that of practical to the existence of the world, we are to understand, that, in their system, that existence which is indeed real is called true, and the epithet of practi- cal is given to false existence, or existence which in fact is not, but, owing to mistake, seems to have place. In only applying names to real things, and to unreal, there is no fault. The extraordinary error of the Vedantins is of quite another character. I have already said, that they would prove both the world and ignorance to be ignorance-imagined and altogether false. But, earnestly as they desire to have them so, their inner consciousness refuses to rate them as al- together nothing : for the mind of man will not give willing entrance to an absurdity. The world, the Vedantins allege, is veritably nothing, but, because of ignorance, appears to exist ; after the manner of nacrine silver. Now, can the mind assent to the notion, that even that ignorance is nothing what- ever ? Never .: and he who tries to reconcile with it his own views generally, and the common experience of mankind, will encounter obstacles at every step. Moreover, to call such ignorance nothing, is, evidently, most venturesome. Nor do the Vedantins feel, that the world is nought. Let it be believed, that, when they denominate ignorance and the world false, they cannot help fooling, that they are not so far false as to be nothing at all : they must possess some sort or other of existence. On gathering, from this, that the Vedantins allow to the world a certain sort of existence, one might suppose, that they must give up non-duality : for, however they may designate the world's existence, if they concede, that the world really exists, their Brahina does not remain without a second ; and the consequence is duality. This brings us to the knot of SEC. III., CHAP. 1. 163 their error. They argue, as was said before, for distinct kinds of existence, not various modes of existence. The world, according to them, really exists ; but its existence differs from that of Brahma, They call this existence a false existence ; and their so calling it brings them into error : and this error blinds them to their inconsistency. The World's existence is, they allege, false existence ; if true, of course the issue would be duality. Analogously, though a mad- man, alone in a room, thinks himself one of a crowd, his so fancying does not invalidate his being there by himself. Mark, how the Vedantins herein err. Their assertion, that the untrue existence of the world is of no prejudice to mo- nism, would be correct, if they understood such existence to be non-existence ; as is the existence of the aforesaid mad- man's crowd. Since that existence is allowed, by them, to be in fact, they do not mend the matter by calling it ilntrue. As for themselves, they think otherwise. They urge, that we have two* kinds of existence, the true and the untrue. As that thing which possesses the former kind exists, so does that which possesses the latter ; for it has existence : but the thing is untrue, because its existence is of that stamp. And so the doctrine of non-duality is saved uninjured. Observe, that the Vedantins believe in two classes of objects, true and "un- true, and both of them really existent ; only an object of the first class is really real,| and an object of the second class is unreally realj. * For convenience, the third kind of existence is here kept out of sight. t it is not claimed, that the expression " really real," and especially that of " unreally real," does not savour strongly of the absurd. But it is things altogether absurd that are here taken account of. Among unreally real things are included, with the practical, things appa- rent, soon to be spoken of. Added to these, and the true, there is a fourth class, to comprehend positive unrealities. Examples of objects of this class are, the son of a barren woman, a hare's horn, sky -blossoms, &c. &c. Their technical ephithet is tuchchha. The notion of practical existence, entertained by the Vedantins, is, 164 SEC. III., CHAP. 1. Furthermore, the aspect of these classes of objects varies according to the point of view from which they are beheld. summarily, a combination of two contradictory ideas, that of existence, and that of non-existence. This assertion may be made good simply by showing, that, while they endeavour to prove the world, and all other practical things, no less than all that are apparent, to be nothing whatever, they believe, that the same things are something. The first of these antagonistic positions has been illustrated, and will be illustrated further ; and, as for the second, it is evident, on inspecting the books of the Ved^ntins, that they receive as reali- ties the world and whatever else they call practical. Moreover, as has been seen, they comprehend their iVwara, maker of the world, among practical and false objects, and yet believe, that he really exists. On perusing the eighth chapter, the reader will, further, be satisfied, that, though they would prove the ignorance which imagines the world to be nothing at all, yet they cannot but allow, that it has a certain real existence. That the view here taken is correct, confirmation is furnished by the words of two very celebrated Hindu philosophers, Prthasrathi Vlis'ra and Vijna'na Bhikshu, writers on the Mi'msfnsfi and on the Sinkhya, respectively. PaVthasaVathi, refuting the Ved^nta, urges, that, inasmuch as the universe is certified, by perception, to be true, it cannot be made out false. If, he says, it is held, on the word of the Veda, to be false, the Veda itself, as being in- cluded in the universe, must be false ; and, consequently its proof is in valid. Then he introduces a Veda"ntin, and refutes him, as follows : I cfS, and the related note. The statement which we have seen about the identification of three sorts of intelligence is designed to show, that the misapprehension of nacre for silver is an error of perception. This question is one of great difficulty ; but some light will be thrown upon it in the fifth chapter. The idea of identification of three sorts of intelligence may be thus explicated. Intelligence, or Brahma, is, like ether, universally diffused ; and, being so diffused, it is said to be appropriated to everything which it contains. Ether is laid down as being, in reality, one. Still, though the ether in a jar outside a house is said to be distinct from the ether within the house, yet, when the jar is brought into the house, identity is realized of the ether of the jar with that of the house. Similarly, when an affection of the internal organ and the object of that affection become collocal, the Brahma of the affection and that of the object coalesce into one. The doctrine of the impenetrability of matter is unknown to the pandits. In their view, the internal organ and its evolutions are strictly material: and yet an affection of that organ and a material object can take up the same space. * * Ibid., p. 14. " If it be admitted, that apparent silver exists, at the time of id appearance, in the nacre, the cogni- tion, to one not misapprchensive, in the form of 'This is not silver,' of the non-existence, through tripartite time, of silver, would not have place; but the cognition would be in the form of ' This thing is not now silver.' ' If this be affirmed, it is contested : for the object, here, of the cognition ' It is not silver' is not the noa-existence of silver as silver, but the non-existence of apparent silver, as true and practical." Such is the sense of the Sanskrit. Some of its expressions, in a literal re- production, would only perplex the reader, and entail a long comment. It comes out from this, that, in the apprehension of the Vedantins, a thing may, contemporaneously, be both really existent nnd really non-existent. When, from misapprehension, a man takes nacre to be silver, apparent silver, is thought, is really produced, and exists for him. Another looker-on, not SEC. III., CHAP. 1. 171 fold, that, if the silver wore true, or practical, there would be under such a misapprehension, thinks, that there is no silver where the other fancies he sees it. His idea, it is asserted, is authentic ; the non-existence of silver, apprehended by him, being supposed to have reference to apparent silver as true and practical. Language similar to that about apparent objects, in the last extract, is ound concerning practical objects also. The falseness of these objects is defined as follows : ffl'QJ'T^" *6T ^1^- P 18. " By a false thiny is meant that whoso absolute non-existence resides in the entirety of what is erroneously taken for its substrate." This definition is thus applied to things practical. Take a jar, for instance. Its parts are deemed, by the NaiytCyikas and others, to be its material cause and substrate. See pages 94 and 95. But those parts are erroneously so taken, assert the Vedsfntins, by all but themselves ; since a jar, a practical object, being false, has no substrate. In the parts of the jar, wrongly sup- posed to be its substrate, resides the absolute non-existence of the jar itself; and, therefore, the jar is false. The same definition is applied to the jar's parts, the absolute non-existence of which resides in their own parts, the material cause and the substrate of the primary parts. Intermediate effects and causes being traversed, ignorance the material cause and substrate of everything save Brahma, is at length reached ; all the effects on the way having been proved false, since the non- existence of each resides in its material cause. Ignorance then comes to be dealt with. Its non-existence resides in Brahma, the imagined substrate, or, as it is also termed, illusory- material cause, of ignorance, as of all else than Brahma. Everything, Brahma excepted, is, thus, concluded to be false. To this conclusion an exception is suggested and replied to : Tf xf I /&*U, p. 18. "Let it not be thought, that the notion of the falseness of. ajar, or the like, is contradicted by the perception of the jar as existent ; for, since the object, in that percep- tion, is the existence of Brahma , the substrate of the jar, not the existence of the jar, the verity of the jar, &c. is not established." Another answer is subjoined. irrc*rrfh\^fc:? ^ focfan 172 SEC. III., CHAP. 1. no room to speak of misconception ; but, since it is neither, but apparent, misconception lias place.* From this it is clear, that, when the Vedantins call the existence of an apparent thing, a thing really produced, apparent, it is not because the thing differs by nature from other things, but because its existence differs from the existence of other things. If the thing were different simply by nature, and not in respect of existence, how could the apprehension of it be reputed a mis- conception ? The same reasoning will apply to practical things, no less than to apparent : for, as the apprehension, by one Ibid., p. 18. " The perception, that the jar exists, can be made out to be correct, inasmuch as it has practical existence for its object. Conformably to this position, the existence, in Brahma, of a jar as true is denied, not that of a jar as a jar. Thus there is no incongruity. According to this opinion, viz., that in the perception of a jar as existent, practical exist- ence is apprehended, the qualification ' relative to a thing considered as true' is to be added to 'absolute non-existence,' in the definition of falseness, lately given." By the definition of falseness, practical things have no existence ; and yet these words assign to them a sort of existence. On referring, for comparison, to the passage from the fourteenth page of the Viddnta-paribhashd, at pp. 169, 170, the reader will perceive, that practical and apparent things differ in no respect, among themselves, in being both true and false. To return to things apparent, the Vedantins do not, in all cases of misappre- hension, contend for their production. | ST^TSSXt^EW^f^^f^ cT^ef gifcrmf^^^^lfHTCTcr | Ibid., p. U. "Only when &* \ a false thing imagined in one veritable is not in contact with an organ of sense, is an apparent thing acknowledged to be produced." Where, however, the object is near, the Vedantins concur with the Naiy- yikas in admitting anyatha-khyiiti ; for, since the object is brought into contact with an organ of sense, the fact, that the misapprehension, is perceptional, is accounted for. To argue the production of an apparent object may, therefore, here be dispensed with. Veddnta-paribhdshd, p. 10. "Because mis- apprehension about nacrine silver and the like has, for its object, apparent silver, &c., which aro proved, by correct perception in the state of practical existence, to be false.'' SEC. III., CHAP. 1. 17;) labouring under mistake, of nacrine silver, is considered, from the standing point of practical existence, to be misconception ; in like manner, the apprehension of the world, and of the things therein, by those whom the Vedantins call ignorant, or even by the wise while detained in the body, from the stand- ing point of true existence, is considered to be misconception.* Finally, it should be understood, that, in fact, the aim of the Vedantins is, to make out the world, &c. to be veritable non-entities ; for, this unestablished, even so is monism. It is the stubborn and irrefragable actuality of external things that compels them, as it were in their own despite, to enunciate a second kind of existence, one applicable to such things ; and the character which they give to that existence compels them to add a third. Their inward impressions, however, touching their views, vary with varying occasions. Thus, when they turn their contemplation towards the world, it presents itself to them as having really an existence. Then, that no harm may come to their notion of monism, they apply to that existence the epithet of false, and so relieve their discomfort. Yet, when they pass to reflect on their secondless Brahma, and, in order to prove his secondlessness, and the world's fal- sity, assert, that the world is ignorance-imagined, it appears to their minds as if the world were really nothing whatsoever. * Since, according to a tenet of the Ved^nta, all things but Brahma are false, how can the cognition of them be regarded as right notion ? In reply to this interrogatory, it is said : Cited in the Veddnta-paribhdshu, p. 2. " As the notion, that the body is one's self, is imagined, by the ignorant, to be correct ; even so the practical apprehension of worldly things is esteemed to be correct, till one attains to right apprehension of soul." The author of the Veddnta-parilhdsJta expressly states, that, in the fourth quarter of this couplet, there is a contraction of d-tilma-nis'chayut. No one need duubt, that he is in the right. Lauki/cam, he likewise observes, points to practical apprehension of things of the world. 174 SEC. III., CHAP. 2. Their chief aim being as aforesaid, it must, consequently, be borne in mind, and, throughout this work, it is taken as u postulate, that, with the Vedantins, Brahma excepted, all is nihility. In a way, indeed, a real existence is allowed to what is other than Brahma : but, inasmuch as all this has no more substantiality than nacrine silver, however the Vedan- tins speak of it, how can we account it as, in any wise, exist- ence? And, further, it has been made patent, that, according to the Vedantins themselves, only from the standing point of practical existence is reality ascribable to the world ; which, from the standing point of true existence, is devoid of reality of every kind and degree. The Vcdanta recognizes, as existent, an Ts'wara, maker of the world, all-wise, and all-powerful ; and souls, also, and their ignorance, their doing good and evil, their requital in Elysium and in Hell, and their transmigration. And, again, all these are regarded as non-existent, and as absolutely so. Neither are they, nor have they been, nor are they to be. Brahma alone exists, without qualities, and eternal. All besides iVwara, the world, and everything else, has but a false existence, and owes its being to imagination by igno- rance. In very truth, it is nothing. Such, in a few words, is the creed of the Vedantins. CHAPTER 2. Summary of the Vcddnta System. Though the Vedantins allege, that, from the standing point of the true state of existence, Brahma alone is real, and all else is unreal, still, from the standing point of the practical state of existence, I's'wara, souls, and the whole world, arc real, that is to say, practically real, and distinct one front another.* * And they have been distinct from all eternity. Sco the last Sanskrit extract in p. 35. SEC. III., CHAP. 2. 175 Their system, therefore, branches into two divisions ; one of which has to do with the practical state of existence, and the other, with the true state of existence. Great part of the first is seen in one or other of all the remaining Systems. Here, as in the Nyaya and in the Yoga, we find an omniscient and omnipotent I's'wara, framer and ruler of the external world.* Pretty much as in the Sankhya, and in the Yoga, we also here find statements of the order in which the world was developed. That which the Sankhyas call nature, the Vedantins call illu- sion, or ignorance. As for the internal organ, its affections, and many other articles, the Sankhya and the Vedanta coincide to a large extent. In several particulars, however, they join issue. He that would acquaint himself fully with those parti- culars must have recourse to special treatises on the Vedan- ta. It is neither my desire, nor is it my intention, to treat the subject exhaustively ; an examination of its essential features be- ing sufficient for my present purpose. Again, like the rest of the Systematists, the Vedantins receive the Veda, the Puranas, &c., as authoritative. They believe, likewise, in good and bad works, and that, to receive the favourable and unfa- ***** f I S'ankara-A'charya's Brali- ma-sutra-lhdshya, I., 2 ; MS. " And thus the absence, from the standing point of true existence, of a Ruler and ruled is likew ise shown in the I's'wara-gita. * But, from the standing point of practical existence, the Veda itself supports the notion of an I's'wara, &c., by the words ' This is the lord of all ; this, the sovereign of all beings ; this, the protector of creatures ; this, the preserving bridge against the disruption of the worlds.'" By the I's'wara-ytid the Blwgavad-yilu is here meant; the passage omitted, two couplets, V., U, 15, being found there. In S'ankara's days the book now current under the title of /' s'wara-gitd could not have existed. Its minute development of the "Vedanta marks it, undeniably, as a recent com- position 176 SEC. Ill, CHAP. 2. vourable requital to which these give rise, souls must pass to Elysium and to Hell, and again and again take birth, and so forth. To animadvert on the errors of the Vedanta doctrines as confined to the practical state of existence, there is no need ; as I have refuted them, by inclusion, in what I have written touching the Sankhya and the Nyaya. But entirely different from anything as yet encountered is the doctrine of the Vedantins touching the true state of exist- ence, as they phrase it. And this doctrine is summarized in this half couplet : " Brahma is true ; the world is false ; the soul is Brahma himself, and nothing other."* As expanded and expounded by the advocates of the Vedanta, this quotation im- ports as follows. Brahma alone a spirit; essentially exis- tent, intelligence, and joy ;f void of all qualities $ and of all ^raf sure firarc ^fcrt Who wrote this half-couplet is not known, though it is familiar to every Ved^ntin. Selected here for its concisene&s in expressing the substance of the Vediinta, it serves as text to all that follows this second chapter. Preceding it is the line : " In half a couplet I will declare that which is set forth in millions of volumes." t In Sanskrit, sal, chit, and ananda. All three words have numerous syno- nymes. Chit, cliaitanya, &c., "intelligence," when applied to Brahma, are, as will be seen, equally deceptive with the bodha of the soul, professed in the San- khya. Brahma, we shall discover, in utterly destitute of all intelligence to which the name can rationally be allowed. t ?r^ Tfnnt ^3r P- 31 s " Let it not be said, that, if, of two heterogeneous things, one may be a material cause, and the other a material effect, then Brahma himself may be the material cause of the world. For this, Brahma as a material cause is admitted for such in the sense of his being the substrate in misapprehension, of the world, i. e., the substrate of the world, the object misapprehended : since that material causativity which consists in evolving is impossible in Brahma ; he being without parts. Thus, then, the established doctrine is, that the evolutional material cause of the world is illusion, not Brahma." S'ankara A'chaYya often interprets literally those passages of the Upanishads, &c., which seem to speak of Brahma as the world's evolutional material cause ; but he prefers to understand them as setting forth the view which, since his time has generally, if not universally, been adopted by Vedtfntins. S'ankara's opinion may be learned from what follows : Tf 5 SEC. III., CHAP. 2. 181 and form. Agreeably to the Vedanta, of these five, existence, intelligence, joy, name, and form, the first three belong to Brahma, and the other two to illusion.* The existence, intel- *fcT "^fcf ^riftc^T | Commentary on the Aitareya-upa- M nlshad: Bibliotheca Jndica, Vol VII, pp. 175, 176. "'A carpenter, or similar artificer, possessed of material, constructs a house, or the like. This is all right, Of intelligible. But how can the spirit, which is without material, create the worlds V This is no valid objection. Like the foam, a thing developed, existing potentially in water, the universe can exist in its mate- rial cause, known as pure spirit, formless, and undeveloped. Therefore, it is not incongruous to think, that the omniscient, himself the material cause of names and forms, should create the universe. Otherwise, and preferably : as a dexterous juggler without material produces himself as it were another self travelling in the air, so the omniscient Deva, or I's'ivara, being omnipotent and great in illusion, creates himself as it were another self in the form of the universe." Such is the construction put, by S'ankara and by all his discipular successors, on texts of the Hindu scriptures where Brahma is mentioned as a material cause. And to this construction the Vedantins are constrained, as they would render consistent either their own tenets or the CTpanishads themselves. For the Upanishads again and again describe Brahma as being without parts, and as unchangeable ; and this notion would be contravened by that of his being an evolutional material cause. Such being the case, in disputing with Vedantins now-a-days, one will gain nothing by indicating to them, that the prevailing doctrines of their school are out of harmony with those which ob- tained of yore. Their own doctrines, they will reply, do not conflict with those of their predecessors, but only unfold and supplement them. One may find, in the Upanishads, passages inculcating, that the world Is an evolution from illusion, and many such things favourable to the position, that Brahma is v.he world's illusory-material cause only ; and the pandits will urge, and per- haps justly, that, in arriving at their conclusions, they but use different texts for mutual explanation. * f cTcff ^*T*T fl 182 SEC. III., CHAP. 2. ligence, and joy, which appear to be found in all things in the universe, are from Brahma, the illusory-material cause of the universe ; as the existence of nacrine silver is from nacre, the illusory-material cause of the fancied silver. Name and form, appertaining to the universe and its contents, are from illusion, the world's material cause.* The inconsistency and fatuity of the Vedanta, on the point under discussion, are most bewildering to the reader. In the first place he will enquire what is the nature of illusion, also called ignorance. If, he will say, it is that by reason of which the unreal world presents itself as real, after the man- ner of nacre appearing to be silver, it must be misconcep- tion : and how can this be the world's material cause ? And, if it be a material cause, and if the world was made out of it, as a jar is made of clay, why are the name and form of the world said to be false ? I reply, that the difficulty thus ex- pressed is incapable of solution. The Vedantins are herein most inconsistent. In some respects their " ignorance" looks like misconception ; and still they will not name it so, but the cause of misconception,! nay, of the whole world : for they describe it as being, like the Sankhya " nature," a complex " There are five parts predicate : is, appears, is delightsome, form, and name. The first three are of Brahma ; the remaining two, of illusion." This couplet is cited anonymously in the Vedanta-paribhdshd, p. 36. Jagad-rtipam is there given, erroneously, for m&y&-r&pam. * The, Veddntins, when they speak of existence and joy as appearing in external things, are intelligible ; since those things are apprehended as ex- istent, and are supposed to minister delight. But how can intelligence be said to appear in all external things, as in a jar, for instance ? The explanation of our philosophers is, that, inasmuch as such things appear, their appearing is a sign that they are connected with intelligence. Thus : | Vedanta-paribh&shA p. 35. " The conventional expressions ' A jar is,' ' A jar appears,' ' A jar is desirable,' &c., are also from imagining oneness, with the jar, of Brahma, existent, intelligence, and joy." t This will be shown in the seventh chapter. SEC. III., CHAP. 2. 183 of the three gunas, and the world's material cause.* Fur- thermore, they denominate it the power of 1's'wara.f These assertions of theirs have little congruity with each other. Another perplexity is offered to the reader, in their compa- rison of Brahma and the world to nacre and to nacrine sil- ver severally. That comparison, he must of necessity think, could not be intended, by the Vedantins, to be taken in its strict literality. For they cannot mean, he will say, that the ignorant mistake Brahma for the world, just as a man labour- ing under misapprehension mistakes nacre for silver. Brah- ma, he will object, is invisible : how, then, can he become an object of vision, and be mistaken for the world ? Moreover, though a man who takes nacre for silver misconceives, yet the form before his eyes is not a false form, but that of nacre, or, rather, nacre itself. Similarly, if it be held, that " ignorant" men take Brahma to be the world, though their so taking him would be a mistake, it must likewise be believed, that this world, visible, tangible, unintelligent, and changeable, is Brahma ; in other words, that Brahma has these qualities. Let it be granted, that the name of the world is false ; still, how can its form be so ? Difficulties such as these would certainly suggest them- selves to a person of discrimination ; and they are insoluble. At the same time it is true, that the comparison lately men- tioned is adduced in Vedanta treatises of the highest credit, and with the design that its literal import should be accept- ed.! We find it asserted there, that, when a man mistakes Ved&nta-paribhdska, p. 36. " These elements are composed of the three ffunas, because effects of illusion, itself composed of the three gunas." + See the Veddnta-sdra, p. 4 ; where, in a citation from some Upanishad, illusion (mayo) termed ajndna in the text-book is denominated devdtma- sakti, " the proper power of Deva, or 1" s'wara? % To the objection, that Brahma, not being an object of vision, cannot be mistaken for the visible world, this reply is returned by the Veda"ntin : f xf 184 SEC. III., CHAP. 2. naore for silver, false silver is actually produced over the nacre. The nacre is the substrate of the silver, and is called its illu- sory-material cause ; while ignorance is said to be its mate- rial cause. Analogously, in the estimation of the Vedantins, Brahma is universally diffused ; and over portions of him, the world, a thing of falsity, is actually produced :* Brahma is Ved&nta-paribhdsh&, p, 18. " ' How can Brahma, the colourless, be the object of visual or other perception ?' Let not this be asked : for colour and such other things, though colourless, are objects of perception." It is a maxim of all the Hindu schools, that qualities have themselves no qualities ; and hence colour is colourless. Therefore, implies the writer here cited, if the possession of colour were a condition indispensable to perceptibility, colour would be invisible. Sophistry such as this could scarcely be matched. But the objector, probably a Naiyyika, who is thus answered, maintains, that the condition specified holds only in respect of substance, not in respect of qua- lity ; for quality is perceived through substance. To this it is rejoined, that Brahma is denied to be substantial, and that, consequently, the condition does not apply to him. And again, though it were granted, that Brahma is substantial, still, like time, which also wants colour, he could be the object of visual and other perception. How time can be such an object, the Vedan- tiu only knows. * In the Veddnta-paribhdshd, p. 6, we read, that, in perception, the object perceived becomes non-different from the subject of right notion ; but that, in inference, &c., the object does not become so. The author's explanation is this. Non-difference from the subject of right notion does not here mean oneness with it, but the non-possession of an existence distinct from that of such subject. To exemplify : since a jar is imagined in the intelligence which is appropriated to it, the very existence of the jar- appropriated intelli- gence, technically called the object-intelligence, is the existence of the jar. For it is not admitted, that the existence of an imagined thing differs from that of its substrate : ^*rfftfiT*Tcr I Thus it is shown how the object of perception is non-different from the object-intelligence. It remains to show how that object becomes non-different from the intelligence which is the SEC. Ill, CHAP. 2. 185 its substrate, and its illusory-material cause ; and ignorance is its material cause. The world, thus, is false ; and, there- subject of right notion. Intelligence appropriated to the internal organ is call- ed the subject of right notion. When an organ of sense, as the eye, impinges upon an object, the internal organ is said to evolve, to be emitted through the eye, to betake itself to the object, and to be transformed into its shape. This transformed portion of the internal organ is known as an affection. Vide ut supra, p. 4. Along with the internal organ the intelligence thereto appropriated is produced to the object perceived ; that is to say, as the dimensions of that organ are amplified by the evolution, which remains continuous with the source of evolution, so increase the limits of the intelli- gence appropriated to the organ in question : for intelligence being assumed as all-pervading, it cannot be said, literally, to have motion. On a jar being brought within a house, the jar-appropriated ether and the house-appro- priated ether become one ; they being supposed distinct, so long as the jar was outside of the house. Similarly, when the internal organ reaches its object, the intelligence appropriated to that organ becomes one with the object-intelligence; and, since the object is non-different from the object- intelligence, it becomes one with the intelligence appropriated to the internal organ, which intelligence is the subject of right notion. This does not, how- ever, take place in inference ; for, inasmuch as, there, the object does not come into contact with an organ of sense, the internal organ is not thought to be drawn out to that object through an organ of sense. Consequently, as the intelligence appropriated to the internal organ does not reach the spot occupied by the object-intelligence, the two do not become one ; nor does the object of inference become non-different from the subject of right notion. From this it is plain, that a portion of Brahma, a portion designated as object-intelligence, is considered, by the Ved^ntins, to be external to the beholder, and to take up a determinate space ; in which portion of Brahma ajar, for instance, is imagined, through ignorance, to exist. In this exempli- fication, Brahma and the jar are precisely analogous to nacre and the silver for which it is mistaken. Corresponding language will be found in the Vedanta-paribhashd, p. 11 ; where it is expressed, that it is not the whole of intelligence that serves aa substrate to apparent silver, but only so much of it as is appropriated to the present nacre. Though nacre is, in a certain sense, viewed as the substrate of nacrine silver, yet Brahma also, the substrate of everything practical and apparent, is so, and in a truer sense, by virtue of his being the sole veritable entity. It should never for a moment be forgotten, that, with the Vedintins, intelligence always means Brahma. 2 B 186 SEC. III., CHAP. 2. fore, so are its name and form. Its existence in one way is false, and, in another way, is true : the former, when it is viewed as the world ; the latter, when it is viewed as Brah- ma.* Hence the Vedantins maintain, that the world is false ; and, at the same time, that it is identical with Brahma, inas- much as it is Brahma himself that, owing to ignorance, ap- pears as the world. As on all other topics, so on that of the nature of soul, the Vedanta doctrine presents a variety of opinions. The princi- pal, of which all the rest are modifications, are these two.f Some say, that a portion of Brahma, or of the pure spirit, appropriated to the internal organ, constitutes the soul ;$ others, that it is a reflexion of Brahma in the internal organ. It will be made evident, in the sequel, that, on close examina- tion, the internal organ, taken by itself, is found to possess, in the tenets of the Vedantins, those characteristics which are refer- rible to the soul, and by which we recognize the soul as such. * If it be asked, whether the existence apprehended in such a cognition as "A jar is" be that which belongs to Brahma, and is true, or that which belongs to the world, and is false ; the Veda"ntin's answer is twofold, accord- ing to two several theories. The first theory is, that it is Brahma's true existence which is there cognized ; the second, that it is the world's false existence. See the two passages from the Vedanta-paribJidshd, cited at p. 171. t Named, respectively, avachchhiniia-vdda and pratibimba-vada. J The Sanskrit is : Vedanta-paribhAshd, p. 8. Vedanta-paribhushd, p. 41. The tasya, " his," refers to the pure Brahma, mentioned just previously. The theory of reflexion is to be understood in its strict material literality. This appears from the subjoined objection and its answer: 7f x P- 42 - " ' A reflexion of Brahma, he being colourless, cannot be ; for it, a reflexion, is seen of that only which has colour.' Let not this be asserted ; since a re- flexion is seen of colour, itself colourless." SEC. III., CHAP. 2. 187 The views in question, of what makes up the soul, are always inculcated as just described ; and yet the importation into them of the Brahma-element, or reflexion of Brahma, is alto- gether deceptive. And this Brahma -element, or the reflexion of Brahma, it is taught, is not the adjective part of the soul, but its substantive part. This opinion the Vedantins, build- ing on a maxim which will be cited in the fifth chapter, and recurred to in the seventh, believe themselves justified in en- tertaining. When these theories, as has been said, are thoroughly scru- tinized, the soul turns out to be the internal organ. And, if it be so, or even if it be a reflexion of Brahma, can it be one with him? The answer, in consonance with Vedanta no- tions, to this interrogatory will be seen in the seventh chapter. With reference to the soul, the Vedantins hold, that, though it is Brahma, yet, being subject to illusion, or ignorance, it has forgotten its true nature, and, looking upon the internal organ and the body as real, and identifying itself with them, consi- ders itself to be man, or the like. And, although all things in vicissitudinous life are false, from ignorance soul thinks them true, and calls some of them mine, and the rest others', and imagines that some things make it happy, and that others render it miserable. It being thus, there arise, in the soul, desire and aversion, in consequence of which it engages in good works and in bad. Afterwards, to receive the requital of those works, it has to pass to Elysium, or to Hell, and to take birth repeatedly. All these experiences and mutations are, to be sure, false :* but, nevertheless, they seem to it as true ; and hence is all its wretchedness. feR fl " The body, Elysium, Hell, and so both bondage and liberation, are but mere imagination. What, then, have I, essentially intelligence, to do with them ?" 188 SEC. Ill, CHAP. 2. Again, the Veclantins, like the other Systematists, main- tain, that the soul has been, from all eternity, in the bondage of illusion. They do not say, that illusion, or ignorance, came into being at some particular period, and took the soul captive. For, if it thus had origin, it would be necessary to assign a cause of its origin ; and, besides, even after being emancipated, it might, in consequence of the production of some new ignorance, incur jeopardy of being taken captive afresh. On this ground they allege, that illusion has ex- isted from beyond all duration of time,* and that, coetern- ally with it, the soul has been enthralled, and will thus continue until emancipated. But how is "this notion, that il- lusion has always existed, reconcilable with the position, that, besides Brahma, one without a second, nothing ever has been, or is, or is to be ? What, further, becomes of the position, that Brahma is, in his nature, eternally pure, intelligent, and free ? For the soul is Brahma, and yet, having been in bond- age to illusion from all eternity, is impure and unintelligent. With a view to repel these objections, the Vedantins declare, that illusion is a thing of so peculiar a character, that at once ' neither does it exist nor does it not exist. It cannot be said to be, inasmuch as it does not possess true existence. On the other hand, it cannot be said not to be, inasmuch as it possesses the existence called apparent, f This is what they mean in This couplet was supplied by a learned Veda*ntin, and was referred, by him, to the Ashtdvakra-yitd, second canto. * See the first foot-note at p. 35. t Practical and apparent existence, it has been shown, do not at all differ from each other, as regards reality, or falsity. Hence, it is all one, in effect, whether the Vedantius call a thing practical, or whether they call it apparent. The author confesses, that he has seen no passage to support him in classing illusion among apparent objects ; nor would he spontaneously have thought of thus classing it. The authority of an eminent Ved^iitin led him to take the view here assumed as correct. The fact, that illusion never comes into play in practical transactions, may have induced the Vedantins to consider it as apparent. SEC. III., CHAP. 2. 189 saying, that " Illusion cannot be set forth as being either ex- istent or non-existent."* By this device they would preserve intact the dogma of non-duality, and also make out Brahma to be, in his nature, ever pure, intelligent, and free, and at the same time would account for the thraldom of the soul, and its consequent round of trials. For illusion, though it has apparent existence, has not really real existence ; and so the dogma of monism suffers no injury. Again, though il- lusion has not really real existence, yet it possesses appa- rent existence ; and so it is capable of taking the soul captive. And again, the Vedantins say, that, as illusion is only ap- parent, so the soul's being fettered is practical ; that is, as illusion is false, so the soul's being fettered is likewise false. Neither was the soul ever actually fettered, nor is it now fet- tered, nor has it to be emancipated, f \ Ved&nta-tdra, p. 4. snnir This couplet is cited, as from the A.'ditya-purdna, by Vijnana Bhikshu, iu the Yoga-varttika-bhashya ; MS., fol. 79, verso. "Illusion is, by nature, neither a nonentity, nor an entity, nor, indeed, both combined. It is not describable either as existent or as non-existent : it is false, and it is eternal." t % ~J >* -vj These verses are from the Viveka-chuddmani, which is ascribed to S'ankara A'chaVya. " The foolish groundlessly imagine in the true entity, i. e., Brahma, bondage and emancipation, which appertain to the intellect, or internal organ, here; AS they attribute the veil before the eyes, caused by clouds, to the sun itself, 190 SEC. III., CHAP. 2. Accordingly, I warn my readers against being misled by the notions, so prevalent among the vulgar, that, according to the Vedanta, Brahma was once void of qualities, and then, assu- ming them, made the world : and that some small portion of the pure Brahma parted from him, got deluded by illusion, and then became souls ; which souls, when they free themselves from illusion, will be united to Brahma ; &c. &c. The teachers of the Vedanta do not allege, that Brahma was once void of qualities, and subsequently, taking them upon him, formed the universe ; but they allege, that to be without them has ever distinguished him, and ever will distinguish him. * Equally, his possession of qualities, and his operating the origin, continuance, destruction, &c. of the world, are from everlasting; for herein under the idea, that the sun is darkened ; for that, Brahma, is intelligence secondless, unaffected by aught, and indefectible." * * * * * ***** " Destruction is not, nor, again, origination ; nor is any bound, or, yet, taking measures to be liberated; nor is there any aspirant after emancipation, or any one emancipated. Such is the truth." The second of these couplets occurs, as of his own composition, in what passes for the commentary of Gaudapada on the Mdndtikya-upatiishad. See the Bibliotheca Indica, Vol. VIII., p. 432. ,, J I Veddnta-paribhdshd, p. 47. " Though emancipation, Brahma him- self, already has place, yet the mistaking it for non-existent can account for taking action to bring it about." Mark the fallacy of this. Spirit, ever emancipated, and free from bondage, is likewise ever warranted from misapprehension, an affection of the internal organ, which organ is unemancipated from eternity to eternity. In this misreasoning, and in the language in which it is couched, the Vedantins and the S^nkhyas are completely at unity. * See the passage cited at p. 35. Among the six things there reckoned as beginninglesa, the pure Brahma is included. Often in most Vedanta writers, but with especial frequency in the works of S'ankara A'charya, the epithet of " ever and essentially pure, intelligent, and free," nitya-s'uddha- liuddha-mukta-swabhdvam, is found applied to Brahma. Buddha, is here metonymical ; since, in strictness, Brahma is held to be bvdha, " intelligence," not " intelligent." SEC. III., CHAP. 2. 191 the Vedanta is consentient with the other Systems. But his having no qualities is true (pdramdrthika), and his having qualities is practical. The former is really real : whereas the other is not so ; it arising simply from the imputation, by the ignorant, to Brahma, of what does not belong to him. Nor is it asserted, that, at some period, a part of Brahma was separated off, fell into the snare of illusion, and became soul. The accredited doctrine is, that neither Brahma nor any portion* of him can ever be truly beguiled by illu- sion. f And yet the soul has always been what it is, distinct from Brahma,! and has always been ensnared by illusion, or igno- rance, coeval with itself. Nevertheless, the soul is Brahma, and * Pure Brahma, it is maintained, is without parts. In the Mdndukya- upanishad, Brahma is spoken of as of four parts ; three, as the soul (jivdtman), which experiences three states, those of waking, dreaming, and sleeping in- sensibly ; and one, as pure Brahma. A'nanda Giri thus introduces two sentences of S'ankara A'ch^rya, where commenting on the passage adverted to. I Bibliotheca Indica, Vol. VIII., p. 340. " Of the impartite spirit not even two portions can be predicated; still less, four. This is meant by ' How,' <$c. Though, in truth, it has not four por- tions, still an imaginary quaternion of portions, consisting partly of means and partly of end, is not incongruous. With this in view, the first portion of Brahma is etymologized as follows : ' He says,' &c." t Were it otherwise, Brahma would be changeable ; and, in the Veda'uta, he is esteemed to be unchangeable. i fT ^TWiT^ : I Vedanta-paribhasha, p. 32. " And this mutual non-existence, or non-identity, when its substrate is originated, is itself originated ; as the non-identity of cloth in a jar. If the substrate is beginning- less, so is the non-identity ; as that of Brahma in the soul, or that of the soul in Brahma." 192 SEC. III., CHAP. 2. always has been so ; and wherever it is found called a part of Brahma, such language is used only from the standing point of practical existence. Strictly speaking, the soul, in the sense in which it is Brahma, is not so merely as a part of him, but as the whole ; and, in the sense in which it is not Brahma, it is no part of Brahma regarded as a whole, but is entirely dis- tinct from him. Nay, rather than speak of it as being distinct from Brahma, it ought to be said, simply, that it is not Brah- ma. For, from the aspect from which it is not Brahma, Brahma does not exist at all : and how, then, can it be spoken of as distinct from Brahma ? The case is like that of uacrine silver, when thought to be genuine silver : it not being, to the beholder, nacre at all ; wherefore he will not say, that it is dis- tinct from nacre. In the same way, pure Brahma, contem- plated from the standing point of practical existence, has no existence whatever : there is no Brahma, except him that has qualities, or I's'wara, the maker of the worjd ; to which are to be added the world and souls, all quite separate one from ano- ther. From that point of view it is, then, wrong to speak of the soul as being separate from the pure Brahma, Therefore, though the soul, from the standing point of practical exist- ence, has always existed as soul, from the standing point of true existence, it has always been veritably Brahma. And, though the soul has always been Brahma, yet neither to Brah- ma, nor to any part of him, has there ever attached, or can there ever attach, in any way, the least ignorance or alterability. Evermore, in his nature, does he remain altogether pure, in- telligent, and free. From all this it will be patent to the reader, that the Vedan- tin not only holds the ignorance-imagined world, "and its maker, I's'wara, to be practical and false, but maintains, also, that the imaginer of the world and of its maker, namely, ignorance, is apparent and false. The imagining the world and its maker is that which makes soul to be soul ; and hence the soul, as soul, is practical and false : the one Brahma, in his nature ever pure, SEC. III., CHAP. 2. 193 intelligent, and free, alone is true. If, then, it be asked, how it can be, that the soul has, from all eternity, been in captivity to ignorance, and yet is Brahma ; he being, however, unchan- geably pure : the answer is, that, assuredly, it cannot be ; only the misguided Vedantins think that it can. Ignorance, by reason of which the soul, the world, and I's'wara appear, according to them, to exist, they believe to be false, that is, to be nothing ; and, of course, there is nothing that can de- rive impurity or change to Brahma. This will be clearly ex- plained, over and over again, in coming chapters; and so it is unnecessary to dwell on it further on this occasion. And it is highly material that the reader should take notice, that the tenet of the falseness of ignorance is the very key-stone of the Vedanta, and must never be lost from view for a single mo- ment. In constantly recurring to it, as I do in this book, I may be supposed to lay myself open to the charge of tedious and useless repetition. The tenet referred to is, however, not only one of paramount moment, but also difficult to grasp "and to retain ; and, if it be not mastered, the Vedanta is impos- sible to be understood. Further, I would beg the reader to believe, that the Ve- danta, however perspicuously expounded, is most bewildering. Some of my own countrymen, and foreigners, in particular, if they read what I write, may conclude, as the result of a hasty glance, that I have set down many things without having grounds for them, and that I have spun enigmas out of my own brains. All such I entreat to avoid a hasty judgment, and to go through my volume patiently and attentively. They will then, I suspect, change their minds. If, in one place where it is looked for, my authority for a statement be found wanting, it will be seen produced elsewhere, and more appropri- ately ; and, if I do not solve all objections as fast as they arise, still I trust, that a careful perusal of my entire treatise will leave few doubts undispelled. And now I wish to mention one or two things that are very 2 c. 194 SEC. III., CHAP. 2. likely to occur to foreigners who give their attention to the Ve~ danta and the other Hindu Systems. In the first place, there are many expressions, in the treatises on these systems, the precise sense of which they will not apprehend ; and, in the second place, when they come upon glaring absurdities and incongruities, refusing to see them in their true light, they will give them such a turn as to render everything most reasonable and excellent. Whoso would acquaint himself with the philo- sophical opinions peculiar to a strange country, should by no means content himself with simply reading a book or two, whe- ther by himself, or with aid, and then at once set to theorizing about them. If he wishes to understand those opinions really and thoroughly, he must apply himself perseveringly, for se- veral years, to the study of works in which they are set forth ; and he must mix familiarly with the people who profess them, until, by frequent converse, he learns how those people are affected and influenced by their views ; and he must hear thenxspeak about them without constraint, and spontaneously. In short, he must, as it were, become one of themselves ; and then, and not till then, can he certify himself, that he has actually got at the true purport and import of their belief. Leaving this digression, I shall address myself to what re- mains to be said on the Vedanta doctrine of the soul. According to the Vedantins, when the soul, bound by illusion, becomes convinced, that the world is false, and that itself is Brahma, existent, intelligence, and joy, it escapes from further vicissitude, and realizes Brahmahood. But, even after the acquisition of this knowledge, the soul has to tenant the body, till it exhausts the experience of its fructes- cent works ; and so long it cannot evade happiness and mi- sery. This experience exhausted, it obtains disembodied iso- lation, plenary emancipation. In thus determining, the Ve- danta is in unison with all the other Systems ; and also in prescribing purity of intellect as indispensable to emancipative knowledge. This purity is the fruit of good works, such as SEC. III., CHAP. 2. 195 repetition of sacred names, austerities, and pilgrimage, kept up during several births.* In order to gaining emancipative knowledge, the practice of devotion likewise is prescribed. The accounts of I's'wara, found in the Puranas and other books, as that he assumed the forms of Vishnu, S'iva, &c., and achie- ved various actions, are also respected by the Vedantins ;f who, again, hold it proper to go through the sacrifices and other ceremonies enjoined in the Veda. They declare, how- ever, like the other Systematists, that, if a man estranges himself from the world, and gives himself wholly to spiritual studies and exercises, and becomes an ascetic, he must desist from all ritualism. Still they do not impugn the ceremonial portion of the Veda as folly. Notwithstanding the ritual re- nunciation of the ascetic, as has been mentioned, it is not deemed improper for him to engage in mental devotion ad- dressed to Vishnu, Mahadeva, and other first-class deities, forms of 1's'wara. Whoever, therefore, hearing, that the Ve- dantins believe in Brahma without qualities, infer, that they reject Vishnu, S'iva, and the rest of the pantheon, and that they discountenance idolatry and such things,, and that they count the Puraiias and similar writings false, labours under gross error. I Regarded from the standing point of practical era" * "* s ^rf'T^n'n I Veddnta-paribhdskd, p. 49. "And this right apprehension is obtainable by one after elimination of sin ; and this elimination results from performance of good works. Thus is the connexion, mediately, of works with right apprehension." Veddnta- paribkushd, p. 9. " And this supreme I's'wara, though one, yet, because of the difference between the gunas, goodness, passion, and darkness, belonging to illusion, his, 1's'wara's, associate, receives the appellations of Brahm, Vishnu, Mahes'wara, &c." I S'ankara A'charya, while engaged in refuting the Bhagavatas, confines 196 SEC. III., CHAP. 3. existence, these are all real and authoritative. From the stan- ding point of true existence, all things, including even the Upanishads, the source of the Vedanta faith, are looked upon as false. Such are the leading dogmas of the Vedanta. CHAPTER 3. Examination of the Vedanta Views concerning the Supreme Spirit. The first article of the Vedanta creed, as it has been giA'en, is, that ' ' Brahma is true. " However, the Vedantins, in denying all qualities to him, render him such, that it is impossible to himself to the doctrinal moiety of their system, where that moiety is discrepant from the Veddnta, and acknowledges as commendable the whole of its ritua- lism. His words are these : cj^f 3HT eTR^TcT ^U^T T^T^aU! *JTt . 3. SEC. Ill, CHAP. 5. 229 am happy,' ' I am miserable,' &c."* Now, we are certain, that " I cognize" denotes nothing but what we all call cogni- tion ; and what is thus denoted, it is here laid down, is a pro- perty of the internal, organ, and an affection of the same. Not only cognitions of external things, but also cognitions with regard to one's self, or acts of consciousness, the Vedan- tins consider to be affections of the internal organ. For of the latter species are the cognitions " I cognize," " I desire," &c. ; since it is only with the aid of some quality, as cogni- tion, desire, or suchlike, that we become conscious of our souls. We can never cognize the simple substance of the soul ; as the Naiyayikas, too, acknowledge.! And, though the Vedantin, like the Sankhya, calls cognition, desire, &c. r immediate objects of the witness himself, by which the soul is intended ; still neither of them believes those qualities to be cognized by the soul unaccompanied by an affection of the internal organ. $ In other words, those qualities are cognized by the internal organ itself ; and the calling them imrnedi- Veddnla-pari- bhashd, p. 3. t The soul becomes "an object of perception, from connexion with the specific qualities :" ^jpsngj^ f^^mTT 51^71 cT : | Bhdsha'-parichchheda, forty-eighth stanza. s bhdshd, p. 7. " For, to be cognizable by the witness alone is not to become an object of the witness independently of an affection of the internal onjan, but it is to be an object of the witness apart from the aid o/an organ of sense, inference, or such other instrument of right notion." Veddnta-pariMidshd p. 7. 230 SEC. III., CHAP. 5. ate objects of the witness is found, on scrutiny, to be decep- tive. Again, according to the Vedantins, the immediate cognition of the soul, which is said to result from listening to the Ve- danta, and from consideration and meditation on it, namely, the conviction, that one is void of cognition, will, and all other qualities, and of all mutation, and is the pure Brahma, is it- self an affection of the internal organ;* which affection is to be got rid of before emancipation is attainable, f It must now be manifest, that the Vedantins' affection of the internal organ, which has thus been described, is what we mean by cognition, or the apprehension of things, be they external, or internal, i. e. } of the soul and its qualities. And all the divisions which those philosophers make of this cogni- tion, or cognition relative to objects, are affections, as aforesaid. Consequently, the cognition which is given out as a constituent of Brahma, is irrelative to objects ; that is to say, it is not cognition of anything, whether himself or aught else. As we have seen, the Vedantins enunciate, that perceptive right notion is intelligence itself, and that the subject of right notion is intelligence appropriated to the internal organ. From this it seems as if, with them, intelligence itself were " Thus, then, since the definition of the object of perception, as containing the words, ' associated with the affection," fyc., is applicable to the internal organ, its properties, &c. , which are cognizable by the witness alone, there is no deficiency." Hence, the properties of the internal organ, though said to be cognizable by the witness alone, are, in truth, cognized by an affection of that organ. Other- wise, the definition just given would be inapplicable to those properties. For "associated with the affection," &c., see the first note at p. 228. As the Vedintins allege, of the properties of the internal organ, that they are cognizable by the witness alone, so do they allege respecting apparent ob- jects also. Yet, for the cognition of these, too, they contend, that an affection of the internal organ is indispensable. See the Ved&nta-paribhdnha, pp. 7 and 11 * See the Ved&nta-sdra, p. 21. t See the Verfdnta-s&ra, p. 22. SEC. III., CHAP. 5. 231 both cognition and cognizer, and as if the internal organ, its affections, &c., were only media of cognition. Those declara- tions are to be understood as follows. The term cognition, as they apply it to Brahma, means, they say, not cognizing or ap- prehending, but illuminating ; and it is the internal organ that is illuminated, or made capable of cognizing. Thus, in order that their unintelligent Brahma should be made out constitu- tively cognition, they have altered the sense of the word cogni- tion to such an extent, that, in their employment, it signifies, primarily, to illuminate, and, only metonymically, to apprehend objects. That affection of the internal organ which supposing such a thing to exist ought to be veritable cognition, is, there- fore, according to them, but metonymic cognition. * By assert- ing, then, that perceptive right notion is intelligence itself, they mean, that intelligence illuminates the affection. When an affection proceeds from the internal organ, and betakes itself to an object, a reflexion of intelligence falls on that affection ; and so that affection is enabled to cognize the object. But for illumination from intelligence, it could cognize nothing ; for it is pronounced, that " There, namely, as for an affection and the reflexion of Brahma therein, ignorance, veiling the object of cogni- twn, a jar, for instance, is destroyed by the affection which takes the form of that object; and, by the reflexion, the jar is made to appear."f By this it is not to be understood, that the jar is made to appear to the reflexion of intelligence, that is to say, that the reflexion cognizes the jar ; but, that the jar is made to appear to the affection, in other words, that the affection is rendered capable of cognizing the jar. In proof, that such is Veddnta-pa- ribhdshd,p. 2. " An affection of the internal organ, since it is that to which cognition, i. e., Brahma, is appropriated, is itself metonymically denominated cognition." + This well-known passage, a half-couplet, runs thus ; 232 SEC. III., CHAP. 5. the meaning of the Vedantins, I cite this single passage, from among innumerable passages that might be produced : " For the internal organ, if it were not illuminated by the light of intelligence, would be incapable of willing and apprehending its object."* It is evident, from this, that it is the very in- ternal organ, illuminated by intelligence, that cognizes things. But, when they give to intelligence appropriated to the internal organ the name of subject of right notion, we are to understand, that the character which they ascribe to intelli- gence associated with the internal organ, really belongs to that organ. They have a maxim, which all the other Sys- tems subscribe to, that " An affirmation, or a negation, when predicated of anything together with its associate, if debarred from the object substantive, is to be referred to the object adjective."f In their opinion, the quality of being a cognizer cannot be assigned to the soul, and, consequently, is debarred from it. For our cognition of objects is non-eternal ; and, therefore, if it were regarded as constitutive of the soul, the soul would, to their thinking, be made out non-eternal and changeable. $ And, again, if they held that cognition to belong to the soul, they must hold, that will, activity, happi- ness, misery &c., also belong to it ; and the result would be, that the soul is indeed a doer of good and evil, and an ex- * This passage, in Sanskrit and English, will be found at the foot of p. 213. t ^fcfgfow fr fafEfftraifr frJSi ^rv *rf34 SEC. III., CHAP. 5. Vedanta. I have shown, that it is wrong to regard the inter- nal organ, in that system, as a medium of the soul's cognition ; since, on examination, it is found to be no such medium, but itself the cognizer. That which lies beyond this organ is the soul, which never cognizes : and soul is Brahma. Of the soul there are two portions, Brahma and the internal organ. Hence, when the second is parted off, what remains is Brahma. This residue the Vedantins declare to be essentially existence, intelligence, and joy ; and, as has been made evident, it is destitute of all faculty of knowledge and apprehension. The opinion about Brahma, just now arraigned, is based on the error of supposing, that by him is meant Ts'wara ; the difference between the two, which the Vedantins inculcate, being overlooked.* But iVwara, no less than the soul, has, they declare, in order to cognize, &c., need of an internal organ. iVwara, they say, is Brahma associated with illusion ; and they^hold iVwara to be omniscient, omnipotent, &c. &c. Yet the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, &c., belong to XVwara's causal body, which is illusion,! and not to the Brahma-portion of him. By consequence, all Ts'wara's attri- butes, nay, he himself, are false, and imagined by ignorance. Every doubt of the reader, as to the nature of Brahma's cognition, must, by this time, have been dispelled. Alike exists ' without intellect, without intelligence, without even the consciousness of his own existence,' it may be well to repeat here what the Vedantin means by the terms thus rendered. By intellect (or mind) he means an internal organ which, in concert with the senses, brings the human soul into cognitive relation with the external. This, of course, he denies to Brakm, who, as Berkeley says of God, ' perceives nothing by sense as we do.' " Christianity contrasted, &c., p. 47. * That this difference is overlooked in Christianity contrasted, &c., is evident from three things. First : the word Brahma is everywhere translated there by " God." Secondly : the attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, &c., are attributed to Brahma. Thirdly : no intimation even is put forth of any distinction, in the opinion of the Veiltintiiis, between Brahma and IVwara. t >*: note at p. 210 SEC. III., CHAP. 5. 235 parviscience and omniscience, alike knowledge of himself and knowledge of what is not himself, are maintained, by the Vedantins, to be unworthy of Brahrna. What sort of cogni- tion, therefore, can that be which they consider as one of his constituents ? CHAPTER 6. Strictures on the Position of the Vedantins^ that the World is False ; and a Reply to those who suppose, that the Veddntins* Views respecting External Things accord with those of Berkeley, It is maintained, by the Vedantins, that " The world is false ;" in other words, that it owes its origin to ignorance : the truth being, it is alleged, that it never has existed, and does not exist, and never will exist. To this effect the S'iva-gitd declares : ' ' Just as the terrible snake that is imagined in the rope neither had origin, nor is, nor is to be destroyed ; so the world, which has assumed an appearance simply by force of thy illusion, exists in thee, Nflakantha."* I demand of the Vedantins, How is it that you assert false- ness of the world, which is certified to us, by the -senses, &c., to be true ? Since you thus despise those proofs, what credit can be attached to anything that you advance ? Proceeding in this way, you unsettle the foundations of everything, whether as regards this world, or as regards the next. And, on your own grounds, how can you refute the doctrines of others, or establish your own ? No manuscript of the S'ioa-gUd is at this moment at hand ; so that the chapter and verse where this stanza occurs cannot be stated. 236 SEC. III., CHAP. 6. Perhaps you will urge, that, since the senses, &c. often de- ceive us, they are totally unreliable. For instance, \\r are sure, that we see chariots, elephants, and other thing*. in our dreams ; and yet they are proved to be false. I reply, that, if a seeming proof is made out, by a real proof, to be faulty, we reject it. But how can we contemn a proof which cannot be shown to be faulty? As for the things that we see in dreams, we call them false, because, on awaking, we find them to be so ; and their falsity, as being matter of every-day experience, is indubitable. But who has ever found the external objects of nature to be false? Has not every man of all generations borne evidence to their truth ? If you say, that, to a man in dreamless sleep, the world disappears, and that his experience goes to disprove the truth of the world, I demur to the conclusion ; since, a man's cogni- tion being then suspended, he cannot be brought forward as witness for anything that then had place. It is the belief of the Vedantins, that, even in dreamless sleep, there subsists a sort of cognition.* Let this be granted : still, external things are not proved, thereby, to be false. To form any judgment what- ever about them is not competent to his cognition ; and, there- fore, it cannot conclude their falsity. In like manner, a blind man is able to appreciate sound, touch, &c. , but not colours ; and so he can be no witness of their truth, or of their falseness. I would also remind the reader of the argument I employed, when discussing the Sankhya, to prove the existence of God. When we inspect the structure of the world, we become con- vinced, that it was planned, consciously, by some one, for a multiplicity of ends; and this consideration confutes your view, that the world is simply apparent,! and that eternal ignorance is the ground of its semblance. * See a note at p. 224. t Jt is true, that the Vedantins hold the world to be constructed by an intelligent designer, 1's'wara ; and such construction they believe, from the SEC. III., CHAP. 6. 237 Berkeley maintains, that objects of sense are only ideas, they having no existence in themselves and apart from per- ception. This is immaterialism. But he does not hold, that the things which we see, touch, &c., are false : his meaning is, that they are forms of perception. The perception of them constitutes, in his view, their existence ; whereas the com- mon opinion is, that they exist independently of perception. He does not say, however, they are imaginations of eternal ignorance ; and, the Vedanta doctrine, that, on the removal of ignorance, and attainment of right apprehension, the whole world disappears, like a dream on awaking, he knows nothing of whatsoever. Whether his theory be tenable, or untenable, is a matter I am not here concerned with. My present purpose is, to show, that the doctrine of the Vedanta concerning the external world, besides being in conflict with the common opinion, has not so much as a resemblance to that of Berkeley. Yet a resemblance here has been asserted. It has been as- serted, that the Vedantins, when they call sensible objects prac- tical, do not mean, that they are false, but only that they do not exist apart from perception ; and that the world is said, in the Vedanta, to be false, simply from ambiguousness of phraseology. * * But, for my part, I understand the Vedanta otherwise. First. According to Berkeley, objects of sense are forms of perception ; but, according to the Vedantins, objects of sense are distinct from perception, and independent of it. The Vedantins, I have already shown, consider, that the cognition which apprehends external things is an affection of the inter- standing point of practical existence, to have actually taken place. This view of theirs arises, however, from their taking practical things to be real, which things, at the same time, they wonld prove to be nothing, only ignorance- imagined : a combination of incompatible notions ignored in the text, it being aimed at the latter of those notions ; that which, with the Vedantins, is by much the more essential. r See Christianity contrasted, -eflex : on is nothing whatever, taken apart from the face, is the soul, the reflexion of intelligence, or Spirit, in intellects, or internal ori/ann." This is the fifth couplet of the Hastamalaka, which is credulously imputed *o S'ankara A'chirya. The poem is in high esteem among the VecWulins. 240 SEC. 111., CHAP. 7. {Similar thereto is nacrine silver, which is nothing but nacre under the appearance of silver. It is false, as silver, but veritable, as nacre. Of course, this statement will suggest doubts to the reader. First, there is the absurdity of comparing a reflexion and what is reflected to nacrine silver and nacre ; and, again, if the soul, which is laid down as being a reflexion of Brahma, is, after all, nothing but Brahma, how can it be subject to error ? If the soul be a reflexion, not when it is viewed as Brahma, but only when it is misapprehensively viewed as a reflexion, and as something different from Brahma, it comes out, that it is a nonentity.* Who, moreover, is it that sees the soul as a reflexion ? For the soul itself is proved to bo nothing ; and Brahma is not liable to error : and, therefore, a third party is needed to make an error here possible. But the reader must not allow himself to be perplexed or disheartened. If we have already reached what is clearly pre- posterous, there are more things of the same character await- ing us. It is impossible for us to recognize as soul anything other than that which is endowed with apprehension, will, and other like qualities ; and the Vedantins assign away these qualities to the internal organ. As for what they call ignorance, which they distinguish from error, or misapprehension, they are con- strained to ascribe it to the pure Brahma, and not to the in- ternal organ. If it were a reality, we shoufd be obliged to * Vijn^na Bhikshu meets as follows the doctrine animadverted on in the text: bhdskya-vdrttika, MS.,/o2. 28, verso. " If a reflexion be a nonentity, the soul, a reflexion, cannot be identical with Brahma, the object reflected : for then- can be no identity of entity with nonentity. Arid, il to fo not a imncnhf .\ , multeity of souls will bu acknowledged in "(her tortns than ilirirt, terms ; and monism. Kn-.. will go undenionut rated." SEO. III., CHAP. 7. 247 acknowledge, that, in the Vedanta, the soul is Brahma himself. But this ignorance, as we shall shortly discover, is wholly a thing of the imagination. A somewhat detailed account of it will now be given ; and we shall learn what it is, and why the Vedantins are unable to refer it to the internal organ, and are forced to ascribe it to Brahma. The word "ignorance" may mean absence of apprehension, and also misapprehension, or mistake. When the Vedantin says, that the world is imagined by ignorance, common sense supposes, that he intends, by ignorance, misapprehension ; since the absence of apprehension cannot imagine. He con- tends, however, that he intends, by it, neither the one nor the other.* Nevertheless, he takes it to be the imaginer of false objects, and likewise to be eliminable by right apprehen- sion. More than this, he accounts it a thing having an object ; the object being, however, strange to say, not falsity, but verity. Accordingly, say what the Vedantins may, it seems to me, on taking account of the characteristics they attribute to ignorance, that it is a combination of two ideas, namely, the absence of apprehension whose object is verity, and error in mistaking a falsity for a verity : for those characteristics fit nothing save such a combination. The Vedantins hold ignorance to have verity for its object ; and this is not a characteristic of mistake : for mistake is cog- nition whose object is falsity ; as, for instance, the cognition of nacrine silver. Sut ignorance, the Vedantins teach, has verity i. e., pure Brahma, for its object. The Saukshepa-s' driraka I Veddnta-sdra, p. 4. " Ignorance, it is declared, is a something that cannot be described as either existent or non-existent; constituted of the three gunas ; an entity; antagonistic to right apprehension." Tho translation runs as if the original were 'ETT^T^T ! T^l*?J'tj which it ought to Lave been. , 248 SEC. III., CHAP. 7. says : " The impartite intellect alone is subject and object of ignorance"* They declare, that ignorance of which the ob- ject is Brahma, is the cause of this world, a false thing ; and so, that ignorance whose object is nacref, is the cause of false silver. It appears, then, that ignorance, since verity is its ob- ject, is the absence of apprehension of the veritable. For, though the having verity for its object cannot be character- istic of absence of apprehension, just as it cannot charac- terize mistake, absence or negation not being an object-hav- ino- thing ; it is characteristic of apprehension. Hence, though it cannot be said, that the having verity for its object is characteristic of absence of apprehension, still, when the Vedantins assert, that ignorance has verity for its object, what there is of truth in their assertion their confusion of ideas being rejected, may be expressed by saying, that igno- rance is the absence of apprehension whose object is verity, i. e., pure Brahma. And this absence of apprehension is, in my opinion, the power of concealment which they ascribe to igno- rance ; that is to say, its faculty of hiding verity. J For what can concealment of verity be but absence of the apprehension of it? But the Vedantins, instead of acknowledging this power of concealment to be one with ignorance, regard igno- rance as an entity, of which concealment is a power. + See the extract from the Veddnta-paribhdshd, p. 10, cited at p. 168. I * * * * | Veddtita-sdra, pp. 6, 7. " Of this ignorance there are two faculties, known as concealment and delusion. The faculty of concealment ***** is a power such that, by it, ignorance, though limited, by veiling the mind of the beholder, .-is it were covers Spirit, unlimited and irrelate to (lie world." SEC. III., CHAP. 7. 249 If they said no more than this about ignorance, we might conclude it to mean simply absence of apprehension. They consider it, however, to be the imaginer of the false world ; and to be such an imaginer is the work of mistake, not of absence of apprehension. Ignorance, then, since they make it to be the imaginer of the false world, must be misapprehension, or mistake. This mistake is, in my opinion, the Vedantins' se- cond power of ignorance, its deluding power.* " Delusion" is when the false appears in place of the veritable; and this is mistake. But the Vedantins, instead of owning this power of delusion to be one with ignorance, hold it to be a power of ignorance. I will show how the Vedantins here fall into error. Our cognition of the external world, i. e., perception, inference, &c., is, to their thinking, misapprehension ;f and, in order to keep Brahma pure from it, they appropriate it to the internal organ. But this wrong cognition they cannot identify with ignorance ; since they are bent on making ignorance to be the cause of the whole world, so that it may be established as false. If they had said, that ignorance is mistake, an affec- tion of the internal organ, then it might be, for them, the ima- giner of the external world. But how could it imagine the internal organ ? And, if it does not, the internal organ cannot be proved, as they would prove it, to be false. Therefore, with intent to make ignorance the imaginer of the internal Veddnta-sdra, p. 7. " The faculty of delu- sion is a power thus illustrated. As ignorance about a rope produces, by its own force, a false snake, or the like, in the rope which it conceals ; so radical ignorance, viz., that concerning p .re Brahma, brings forth, by its own force, in the Spirit which itself conceals, the universe, made up of ether and the rest." t See the couplet cited in the Vedanln-pnribhasha, given at p. 173, 2 K 250 SEC. TIL, CHAP. 7. organ also,* they insist, that it is something different from mistake, f And here they are forced into fresh and greater absurdities. clef '' Thy mind, generated by thy ignorance, imagines the entire universe." This half-couplet is from the Sankshepa-s'driraka. t It is remarkable, that S'ankara A'charya himself was unguarded in the language he employed regarding this doctrine. In the passage quoted below, "*s "*v he makes ignorance to be one with mistake : cW?W3^TT;JJ!r*T*3r '^ Iffil? cTT ^"fV^jf^T R"?r*rf | " Misapprehension of this description, just before laid down, the learned hold to be nescience." But Pimananda, his commentator, redresses his laxity : ^ETfVUT^n^Wf^rfe'cjfcT 3T*t| r fl t XcETSJ"' I " ^h import is, that they consider misapprehension, as being the product of nescience, to be itself nescience." See the Bibliotheea Indicu, No. 64, p. 16. Here it may be observed, once for all, that, alike as to the Vedanta, and as to the other systems of Hindu philosophy, the higher we ascend the stream of time, the more frequent do we find unphilosophical inexactness of phraseology. This inexactness is, of course, most frequent of all in the works of the inventors of those systems. Their care, it should seem, w:is well-nigh exclusively bestowed upon broad principles ; and the result was somewhat of vagueness, at least, in their modes of expression. Subsequent writers, as commentators and others, have, to' be sure, amended the phraseo- logy of their predecessors. But it has been with a view to remove the appearance of inconsistency in them :jt has not at all been with any inten- tion of introducing new doctrines. These they have not introduced. Of this assertion a justification is offered in the extract, and the annotation thereon, just adduced. With S'ankara, following the Upanishads, apprehen- sion, whether correct or erroneous, will, activity, &c., are properties of the internal organ ; and, further, the whole universe, including the internal organ, is false, and imagined by ignorance, or nescience. How, then, in accordance with his views, could misapprehension and nescience be identical ? It i< desirable to keep ever before the mind the fact, that an uninitiated reader will come upon hundreds of terms and statements, in the expositions of S'ankara and other early Vedantins, which, though seeming, at first sight, contradictory of many things asserted in this volume, are, in fact, not so ; a right understanding of them requiring, that they should be understood with certain qualifications. In order to a full acquaintance with these qualifier- SEC. 111., CHAP. 7. 251 When the Vedantins contend, that ignorance is something different from mistake, though they call it the imaginer of this false world, how can they say, that its imagining is like that of mistake ? For mistake imagines by imputing existence to the non-existent : and hence its object is called false. The Vedantins, in calling the world imagined of ignorance, with a view to establish its falsity, ought to have taken the ima- gining of ignorance to be like that of mistake ; but this was difficult for them to admit, since they had already erred in viewing ignorance as a thing different from mistake. And see the difficulty consequent to them. Their " ignorance," or illusion, like the " natui'e" of the Sankhyas, now begins to ap- pear to them an incognitive substance ; and, as such, what sort of imagining can it possess? Like that of the " nature" of the Sankhyas, and that of the atoms of the Naiyayikas, it is no longer imagining, but positively the material cause of the whole world. And what now ? Does the world turn out to be true, and does non-duality disappear, and duali- ty supersede it ? To this one would be brought, reasoning from their account of ignorance. Yet these results they utterly repudiate. The verity of the world they will never grant. If they did, all their toil would be to no purpose. Neither could the soul be Brahma, nor could emancipation come from right apprehension ; as will be made clear in the ninth chapter. The belief, that the internal organ, &c., the whole world, are false, is the very life of the monistic doc- trine. However, as has 5 been shown, such is the waywardness of the Vedantins' intellect, that, though they consider a thing to be false, and call it practical and apparent, yet, as soon as they have called it so, it begins to look to them real. In like man- ner, since they call the world false, and give the name of ignorance to that which imagines it to be true, they ought not tions, a thorough -going study of the whole scheme of the VecUnta is indispen- sable. No criticism that doea not rest on a wide basis of Ve.ldnU research, can be held satisfactory. SEC. III., CHAP. 7. to regard this ignorance as an unintelligent substance : and yet, as they inconsistently regard the world to be, from one aspect, real, so they regard its cause, ignorance, or illusion, to be, like the " nature " of the Sankhya, an unintelligent substance, and the world's material cause ; and then it seems to them actually, after the manner of u nature," to bring forth the entire uni- verse. Nevertheless, there is no question, that, to prove the world to be altogether false, is the vital principle and main point of the doctrine of non-duality. With this main point we should compare other points of the doctrine ; and, if they are found not to harmonize, we should there leave the matter, and rest convinced of the weakness of the sages whose inconsistency we have detected. We are not to change that main point, thus taking away the essence of the doctrine, and foist a new theory upon the authors of the one in hand, in order that they may be made out to speculate reasonably. Again, it should be borne in mind, that, as I have said before, the Vedantins believe the world to be falsih'able by right apprehension ; whence it is manifest, that they hold the world to be veritably false. And another of their tenets is, that ignorance also, the imaginer of the world, is removable by right apprehension. This tenet supposes a third character of ignorance, which assimilates it both to mistake and to absence of apprehension. If ignorance be, like "nature," the material cause of the world, how is it removable by right apprehension ? By right apprehension of a verity, the error committed in mistaking a falsity for it is undoubtedly removed, and the absence of apprehension of that verity is likewise terminated. Whatever the confusion of the Vedantins on the subject of ignorance, since they make the pure Brahma himself to be the subject of it, and since, in their view, that which is igno- rant is soul, I own, that, in this case, it follows, that the soul is one with Brahma. But now I ask, whether any one is conscious of such ignorance as has been described ? And, if no SEC. III., CHAP. 7. 253 one is, where are we to find a soul that is ignorant ?* If the Vedantins reply, that whoever regards himself as other than Brahma, and the world to be true, &c., is a soul, I know that they mean one of us ordinary mortals. But so to consider a misapprehension, in Vedanta phrase, is not ignorance, but, in their language, an affection of the internal organ. Where, O O ' O 7 then, are we to look for ignorance and the ignorant? Nowhere, of a truth, but in the reveries of the Vedantins. Waiving, however, all this, and taking the words of Vedan- tins as they deliver them, I urge, that, if the soul be igno- rant, it cannot be identical with Brahma ; for he, in their be- lief, is ever pure, intelligent, and free.f * Universal consciousness is appealed to, by the Vedantins, in testi- mony, that this ignorance exists. Thus : ^EHf T^5 T^n^'TW^TcT I sj ** Vcd&nia-sdra, p 4. "From the consciousness 'I am ignorant,' &c." But how can this be ? For the ignorance which is the object of the con- sciousness " I am ignorant" is simply absence of knowledge, or, at most, misapprehension ; and not the extraordinary invention which the Vedantins call ignorance. f ffT Tnrfrmrf^T I fti ^TffT^T'f ftf i srfe rif% : *n ff T^*rre T^Tcf I S'&slra-dipikd MS., fol. 58, ri'.-ir,. "But what is this nescience ? Is it misapprehension ? Or something else, a cause of misapprehension ? If misapprehension, whose? Not Brahma's for he, s you Vcddntins hold, is constitutively pure science. In the sun there can be no place for darkness. Nor can it be souls' ; for these, as you hold, are not distinct from Brahma. And, since, from your premisses, misapprehen- sion cannot exist, no more can a second thing, a cause thereof. Besides, for such as subscribe to misapprehension, or a cause of it, as an entity additional 254 SEC. III., CHAP. 7. But the Vedantins, though they are forced to locate igno- rance iu Brahma, still, in order to make him out to be essen- tially ever pure, intelligent, and free, maintain that ignorance itself is false. Most wonderful is this of all their wonders. And how is ignorance considered, by them, to be false ? I must now address myself to answer this question. On hearing, that the Vedantins regard ignorance as the cause of the world's appearing to be true, one would, of course, sup- pose, that this ignorance was understood, by them, to be itself true. For if ignorance did not actually exist, how could the world, which they hold to be a nonentity, have appearance ? When a man mistakingly sees a snake in a rope, the snake is called false. At the same time, that man's misapprehension is not said to be false, but true. The Vedantins, however, maintain that ignorance is false. We ought, therefore, to enquire, how it is reckoned false, and what is gained to the Vedanta system by so reckoning it. To the first enquiry we get two answers from the Vedan- tins. One is given by those whose mastery of their doctrine is not perfect ; while the other is returned by such as have penetrated their system to its innermost arcana. The latter answer I shall speak of in the next chapter. The former, that which one hears from the bulk of Hindus now-a-days, I shall examine briefly at once. This answer is, that ignorance is called false, inasmuch as it is eliminated by the supervening of right apprehension. But this is highly absurd. That is false which does not exist at all : .but that which exists, and is destroyed at a given time, is not false, but uneternal and perishable.* If a Vedan- to Brahma, monism evaporates. To continue, whence sprang Brahma's mis- apprehension ? For there is no other cause, with you ; Brahma Icing the sole entity. If it be said, that it is natural to him, how, pray, can he whoso nature is science be he whose nature is nescience ?" * Just as Parthasarathi says, in arguing against the Vedantins, with reference to the universe. His words are SEC. III., CHAP. 7. 255 tin replies, that, in his technical language, false means uneter- nal, 1 have to say, that the fault of ignorance in the ignorant Brahma cannot be got rid of by thus denominating his igno- rance ; nor can you thus prove him to be essentially pure, in- telligent, and free. The goodness or badness of a thing de- pends upon its nature, not upon the epithets applied to it. Suppose, that some one held in general esteem goes mad ; whereat his friends are in great grief. A man comes and assures them, that he is not mad ; his madness is false. And he adds, that, according to his own way of speaking, he only is really mad, who has been so from birth. The person mis- called mad was quite in his right mind for the first five and twenty years of his life ; and, therefore, his madness is false. Would this speech be of any consolation to the friends of the respected maniac? Without doubt, the Supreme Spirit is essentially ever pure, intelligent, and free, in the right sense of these terms ; and He is so indefeasibly. Any so-called sacred book that asserts the contrary confutes, by its blas- phemy, its pretensions to divine origin ; and there can be no more certain mark of a false religion than such an assertion. In maintaining, that Brahma, as they describe him, is the Supreme Spirit, and in attributing to that Spirit unworthv and debasing attributes, the Vedantins, though unconsciously, do Him the foulest dishonour. Ordinary Vedantins whom one meets, those who know their doctrine but superficially, though they speak as I have stated, aboTit the falsity of ignorance, entertain, in their minds, a different view. They do not merely believe, as they say they do, that ignorance is perishable, and therefore false ; for Brah- ma, they cannot but feel, would not thus be freed from all defect. They indeed believe, like their better-informed co- religionists, that ignorance is absolutely nothing whatsoever : only they are at a loss to explain themselves. I S'dstra-dipikd, MS.,fol. 58, recto. "From being origina- ted and destroyed, it is simply proved to be non-eternal, not false." CHAPTER. VIII. Criticism of the Veddnta Tenet of the Falseness of Ignorance, as set forth in Standard Treatises, and as held by Well-read Advocates of the Theory. Vedantins who have attained to a thorough comprehension of their system, maintain, that ignorance is imagined by igno- rance, and therefore is false. You will ask, imagined by what ignorance ? The answer is, by itself. To this purpose the Sankshepa-s' driraka says: "In the case of the ignorant one, ignorance is not of its essence : since, for ignorance to be essential to it would belie its nature, intelligence, unchangea- ble, and without a second. Assuredly, ignorance is caused by ignorance exclusively. Nor may self-supportedness here be charged : for, as spirit proves the existence of everything knowable, and of itself also, from possessing the power of cognition ; similarly, self-ignorance may imagine itself and other things. Thus there is no difficulty."* If, endeavouring Sarvajnitman denies, as we have seen, that his position involves self-sup- portedness; but the author of the Snkhya Aphorisms, and Vijnina Bhikshu, are of opinion, that the accusation is fairly brought home to the Vedantins. SEC. III., CHAP. 8. 257 to establish such an impossibility as is here propounded, the Vedantins get confused, and plunge deeper than ever into error, small is the wonder. To illustrate the notion, that ignorance imagines itself, the author just cited instances the soul, which, through cognition, proves the existence of itself, no less than that of things external. But where is the paral- lelism ? The illustration adduced is of no pertinence, except to decoy a man into a maze of words, and then to beguile him by a semblance of reasonableness. The author says, that the soul, by its cognition, proves, that external objects exist, and itself also. But, in proving their existence, does it ima- gine them ? Not at all. They were already actually in being ; and the soul does not invent them, either in imagination, or veritably. Hence, " to prove the existence of," as we find the phrase used above, means only "to apprehend," i. e., 'Ho certify as existent." A person resolved on finding the Vedanta rational, may here insist, that the author intends to show nothing more than what he said in the case of the soul, to-wit, that ignorance proves its own existence ; in other words, that it, already existing, ascertains that it is so. If so, I reply, ignorance is made out to be a verity. As our rationalizer would interpret it, the extract is quite out of place. Further, on his showing, the contradiction which the author Sdnkhya-prj.vachana-bhashya, pp. 173, 174. " But, let the connexion of nescience with spirit be alleged to have place be- cause of nescience itself. Then, since it, nescience, will be untrue, no contact thereof, operative of change, will be wrought in spirit. With reference to this, it is declared : ' If it, nescience, by supposition has place from the con- nexion of itself, there befals mutual dependence.' 'Mutual dependence,' t. e., self-supportedness : or else, an infinite regress, a supplementation here demanded." Jt is because the case in question is one of " self-supportedness," that Vij- niina thus explains " mutual dependence." Aphorism 14 of Book V. is included in the above. 2 L 258 iSK.r. 111., CHAP. 8. deprecates remains intact. Any one who is thoroughly con- versant with the Vedanta will acknowledge, that, when its teachers discourse of ignorance after the manner of the ver- ses I have cited, their purpose is, to prove, that ignorance is false, -just as nacrine silver is, and, therefore, that the soul is essentially ever pure, intelligent, and free. The Sankshepa-s'driraka is an authority of the first rank ; and it may be thought incredible, that it can be so weak as 1 have represented it to be. In anticipation of misgiving, I add, from the commentary of Purushottama Mis ra , the Subodhini, his exposition of the verses in question : " But, one may object, since ignorance, an eternal entity, is, like Brahma, impossible of elimination, how is emancipa- tion, 'which consists in the elimination thereof, to be effected ? Its being eliminable by right apprehension, on the ground of its falseness, is thus established : ' In the case of the ignorant one,' &c. To explain. Is the relation of ignorance to the ignorant one essential? Or is it imagined? It is not the former : ' not of its essence' Why ? l Since, for ignorance to be essential," 1 &c. If ignorance were in spirit essentially, it would be a true entity : but it cannot abide as true in a thing which is self-luminous intelligence, as spirit is; since light is repugnant to darkness. Again : if ignorance were a property of spirit, its being destroyed would alter the spirit, according to the maxim ' A property, acceding, or seceding, changes its subject.' Moreover: if ignorance were a true entity, the result would be duality. Hence, it is meant, there would be contradiction to the scripture which declares, that spirit is intelligence, unchangeable, and without a second. The. latter is admitted : ' Assuredly, ignorance,' &c. The facts standing thus, there is no antagonism ; even as there is none between O the midday glare and the gloom for which the owl mistakes it. Such is the import."* SEC. III., CHAP. 8. 259 As appears clearly from the words of the commentator himself, the author intends to establish, that ignorance is alto- gether false. That the commentator thus understands his intent is purged of all doubt by the illustration of the owl. The darkness which the bird is supposed to recognize, is purely fictitious. In like manner, ignorance, it is maintained, is nothing whatever, and yet imagines itself to exist. I would ask, then, what resemblance there is between igno- rance's imagining itself, and the soul's proving the existence of itself and of other objects ? But observe, that the author's word prasddhayati, " proves as existent," is somewhat liable to mislead. In its connexion, it can signify only " certifies as existent." It looks, however, as if it had the sense of "makes," or "contrives;" and the transition from this to " invents," or " imagines," is not very violent. We now see how the author, beguiled by words, came to the conclusion, that the illustration produced by him was a valid proof that ignorance may imagine itself to exist. Deluded himself, he deludes others. : fa Wr Tffif 260 SEC. III., CHAP. 8. Thus, in one respect, that illustration is inapposite. Still more so is it in another respect. As regards the soul, it exists, and therefore certifies as existent itself and other objects. On the other hand, how can ignorance, if it be nothing, imagine itself, or anything else ? This is a sample of the gross absur- dities which the Vedantins acquiesce in ; and not only are they not abashed by them, but they are perfectly satisfied with them. For instance, Purushottama Mis'ra, near the words I have taken from him, says : "In this system, which maintains that everything transcends explanation, unreason- ableness is no objection."* To accept such views as I have been treating of, supposes abolition of all right judgment. As I observed once before, there are many things pertaining to God, and to other spiritual matters, which our minds are incompetent to lay hold of, and which only bewilder us, the more we reflect on them. Still, if constraining evidence pre- sents itself for believing those things, we are bound to believe them. But, if we receive as true, things which we cannot help perceiving to be false, what are we not to receive ? Why are we not to hold, that Brahma is nothing, and that the soul is nothing ? It is for the reason to decide these points ; and we are not to imitate the Vedantins in abnegating reason, as they do, when it suits their purpose. Utterances similar to that which I have extracted from the Sankshepa-s'dmraka, will be found in the Siddhdnta-les'a, among other books. All those works lay it down, that, as the world is false, is imagined by ignorance, and appears only by reason of ignorance, so the very pivot of the Vedanta sys- tem, ignorance is imagined by ignorance, in other words, is nothing, and, from ignorance alone, seems to be something, f f This doctrine we may find in the Veddnta-sdra even, though not enun- ' very conspicuously. At p. 4 of that work we read : SEC. III., CHAP. 8. Let us dwell upon this extraordinary and extravagant doc- trine a little longer. I say to the Vedantins : If, in order to make out ignorance to be false, you assert, that it is ima- gined by ignorance, how does it not occur to you, that, on the supposition of its being nothing, it is impossible for it to imagine anything, either itself, or the world ? And whence, if it be nothing, is the appearance of the false world ? Your ready answer is, that you do not pronounce ignorance to be altogether nothing. I ask, what sort of thing is it, then ? You reply, that it is an imagination of ignorance. To this I re- join, that an imagination 'of ignorance is nothing: and, if it be considered to be something, your labour is all fruitless ; since, in that case, the soul forfeits its character of being es- sentially ever pure, intelligent, and free. To this you say, that ignorance is not nothing ; that its being self-imagined proves it to be unreal only from the standing p jint of true existence , and that it is not shown to be quite unreal. Ignorance is imagined by ignorance, and hence is called apparent;* and what is so is not entirely nothing, but possesses apparent ex- I "False imputation is the imagining a false thing in a veritable thing ; as a snake in a rope, which, in fact, wuotaauake. In what is now to he treated of, the veritable thing is Brah- ma, the existent, intelligence, and joy, without a second : the false thing is the sum total of the inanimate, viz., ignorance and so forth." That whereby false things are here imagined in the veritable thing, Brahma, is ignorance. And ignorance itself is reckoned among those false things which are thus imagined. Clearly, therefore, ignorance is held to be self-imagined. This is plainly the view touching ignorance taken by the author of the San" khya aphorisms, and by Vijnana Bhikshu, his expositor. See the note at p. 258. * The author would here repeat, that he has not come across any passage in which ignorance is said to be apparent, and not practical. His authority, though good of its kind, is only oral. It is shown, however, at p. 188, that it matters nothing, in effect, in the Verlanta system, whether ignorance be of the one sort or of the other. 262 SBC. III., CHAP. 8. istence. For existence is of three kinds. That which is no- thing whatsoever is known as non-existent ; as the son of a barren woman, for example :* and ignorance, only if it were allowed to have true existence, would prove fatal to the char- acter of spirit as being, by nature, ever pure, intelligent, and free. But see to what the Vedantins thus come. On the one hand, they take ignorance to be nothing at all ; for, other- wise, Brahma could not be essentially ever pure, intelligent, and free ; and, to prove this very point, they assert, that ig- norance is self-imagined. On the* other hand, by giving to that ignorance the epithet of apparent, they at once begin to see a little existence in it, just enough to avail for its self- imagination. They come to such a pass, that the term real, since they take it to signify both false and real, is useless towards distinguishing the one from the other. We ask them, whether, in their apprehension, that which they declare to be apparent really exists : for, if it does not, it can do nothing. Yes, it really exists, they tell us, but as apparent. What can be done for such reasoners ? What words can we employ to convey our meaning to them, and to discover to them what is real and what is false, in other words, what is and what is not ? Our only course, it seems to me, is, to discuss Avith them the subject of their three kinds of existence, the true, the practical, and the apparent, and to point out to them the error of those distinctions. See the second note iti p. 163. 263 CHAPTER 9. Examination of the Tenet of the Veddntins, that there are Three Kinds of Existence. Ignorance cannot be False; and, there- fore, the Ignorant Soul cannot be one ivith the Supreme Spirit. Before I criticize the doctrine of three kinds of existence, I would bespeak from the Vedantin the strictest attention. Without it, he will never be able to get at the truth. Let him lay aside his usual habits of thought for a short hour ; and, while listening to what I have to offer, let him take ac- count of his present consciousness. When you, Vedantin, are assured, with respect to a given thing, that it indeed is, you have a conviction, that its existence is real. And did you ever feel, that the real existence of one thing, recognized by you as existing, was different from the real existence of any other thing so recognized ? Do not all things which you perceive to exist at all, approve themselves to exist in one and the same manner? Again, when a thing appears to you to be non-existent, does it not appear to you to be simply and altogether so, and nothing more or less? It results, that whatever is is, and that whatever is not is altoo-ether ' f O not, with no room for a third condition. How, then, can you prove various sorts of existence ? But here the Vedantin's philosophical prejudice gets the better of him ; and he declares, that he has a consciousness of sundry sorts of existence : for he says, that, when he mistakes a rope for a snake, he becomes conscious of apparent exis- tence ;* it appertaining to such a snake. When, however, you commit such a mistake, does the existence of the snake seem to you different from that of a jar, or the like ? Does not the existence seem to be, in both instances, equally real? Undoubtedly, it does. How, then, is it made out, that, in mis- * See pp. 167, etc. SEC. III., CHAP. 9. taking a rope for a snake, you become conscious of a second kind of existence ? You will reply, that, by reason of mistake, you look upon the snake's existence to be like that of a jar, or similar thing ; but that they who know, that the object be- fore you is a rope, call the snake, seen by you, apparent : and, on that account, to their apprehension, your consciousness concerns an apparent existence. Let them apprehend as they may, what do you apprehend ? You are then conscious of the one sort of existence that you are habitually conscious of. As for the impression of the lookers-on, do they see any descrip- tion of snake? Not at all. They are perfectly satisfied, that no snake is there. So, neither has a man labouring under mistake, nor one that does not so labour, any consciousness of apparent existence ; nor can either of them prove such a thing to be. You will reply, that you are constrained to call such a thing apparent : " for, otherwise, how shall we name a thing that is not, and yet appears ; as a snake surmised in a rope?" But how idle to trouble yourself about naming that which never had any being ! That which is not, but only seems, through error, to be, is altogether non-existent ; and why should you name it ? But the Vedantins say, that, when one mistakes a rope for a snake, the mistake is one of perception. Perception, how- ever, cannot take place without the connexion of an object and an organ of sense. Hence, if, in the case instanced, you did not grant, that there was some sort of snake, there would be nothing for the eye to have connexion with, and there would be no mistake of perception.* My reply is, that the mistake in question is not perceptional, but inferential. Our senses can take cognizance of the qualities of things, as their colour, taste, length, &c. &c., but of nothing beyond these. When, therefore, a man mistakes a rope for a snake, he * Seethe passages from the Vedanfa-paribhAsha, pp. 10 and 13, quoted at pp. 167 ami 168. SEC. 111., CHAP. 9. . 265 merely cognizes, with his eye, something long : and there is no mistake in 'this. And then he infers, that the something Ions is a snake. But the fact of being a snake is not in- o ~ variably concomitant* with length ; for many things besides snakes are long. Hence, since the reason the lengthis fallacious, the inference that a snake is present is erroneous. The mistake of supposing a snake to be seen being, according- ly, not a mistake of perception, it is not necessary to hold that a snake is produced. You, Vedantins, give to objects of mistake the designation of apparent. But mistake is where there is no object, and yet the notion of it. Consider, now, what are the requisites that make mistake to be mistake. In the first place, there is no object : in mistake an object is wanting. The notion of it is all that remains ; and beyond this there is nothing. Whence, then, do you get an apparent object ? Is it brought forth by a mere notion ? Know, for a certainty, that, when a man mistakes a rope for a snake, there are only two things. One is the rope ; and the other is, the man's mistake in surmis- ing it to be a snake. There is nothing else ; and there never was ; and there never will be. Hearing this, the Vedantin asks, in great astonishment, whether apparent things are altogether non-existent. He wishes to know, what difference there is left between sucli ob- jects and the son of a barren woman, f Why do you think, 1 ask, that there is any ?$ But there is, he insists, an immense difference; for that apparent things are, once in a while, sur- mised by people, whereas no one ever surmises the son of a barren woman. My reply is, that the difference is merely one of surmise, not of object. The son of a barren woman * This phraseology is that of the Ny&va. t See the second note in p. 163. J See near the rnd of the passage from Parthnsirathi Mis'ra, at the foot of pp. 164, 1G5. 2 M 266 SEC. III., CHAP. 9. is not surmised, for the obvious reason, that, whoever knows what is meant when a barren woman is spoken of, is aware that she is a woman without a son. What wonder, if no one surmises such a son ! And so, can one who knows a given thing to be a rope ever mistake it for a snake ? He alone who does not know it to be a rope, so mistakes. Similarly, one who does not know what is intended by a barren woman, may take her to be a mother. How you encumber a simple matter with difficulties ! Let it be, the Vedantin here concedes, that a rope mis- taken for a snake, and nacre mistaken for silver, and like things, have been shown to be quite unreal. But he will still maintain, that the things of the world cannot be so. For, he will say, we have dealings with them ; and for this reason though, like apparent things, they are imagined by ignorance, and our learned men believe them to be apparent, for the readier apprehension of the uninformed, they are called prac- tical. If they were altogether unreal, how could we deal with them ? In reply, I ask, whether the dealing is real, or unreal. The Vedantin answers, that it is practically real, and yet not indeed real. And does he not call it ignorance- imagined ? He does, he says. And what does he mean by that term, which he applies to practical dealing and to things practical ? Does he mean appearing, by reason of ignorance, to exist? Or, derived from a substance termed ignorance, after the manner of a germ from a seed ? To this interroga- tory he may return one or other of the following answers. If he speaks from the promptings of common sense, he may say, that " ignorance-imagined" means " appearing, by reason of ignorance, to have existence." On the other hand, should he be thoroughly ensnared by the phraseology of the Vedanta, he will probably say, that it signifies " derived from ignorance," ' or illusion, an unintelligent substance, and the material cause of the world, like the " nature" of the Sankhya scheme. If such, I say to him, be the case, the existence of ignorance SEC. III., CHAP. 9. 267 and of ignorance-imagined things does not differ from that of Brahma. And why, then, do you not call practical dealing and things practical indeed real ? If yon reply, that things sprung from illusion are denominated, in your peculiar lan- guage, practical only, and that the distinction of true is re- stricted to Brahma, I have to say, that, by these terms, you discriminate by class, not by existence ; and thus your divisions of existence fall to the ground. In like manner the Naiyayikas style some things limited in dimension, and others, unlimit- ed ; and, again, some, terrene, and others, igneous, &c. : and is difference as to existence thereby implied respecting them ? And do you mark any difference as to existence, by calling, technically, and so only, one object true, and another, practical ? Both are alike real. And, since both are real, what becomes of the dogma of monism, or non-duality? Can monism be es- tablished by simply showing, that two things are different in kind ? If so, the Naiyayikas, no less than you, are monists ; for they hold, that Ts'wara differs, in very many respects, from everything else. Further, if ignorance does not mean mistake, how is this world got rid of by knowledge ? For nothing except what is mistaken is falsified thereby. But, if the world be made out of ignorance, as a jar is made out of clay, knowledge can never do away with the world. When I find out, that what I mis- took for a snake is a rope, the supposed snake is dispelled : but what knowledge is sucli that it can do away with a jar which stands before me ? Take a club and break it, and it is destroyed, to be. sure. Knowledge, however, cannot destroy it. And, as the world is not falsifiable by knowledge, so your material cause of the world, illusion, if it be not one with mis- take, is not to be got rid of by knowledge ; and then the soul's connexion with the world, and remaining in bondage, are real ; and, therefore, the soul cannot be Brahma. The sense of the term ignorance being paltered with, everything, with you, is inverted. The authors of your system must, by'" ignorance," 268 SEC. III., CHAP. 9. originally have intended "mistake,"* when they spoke of the world as being ignorance-imagined ; and by this epithet they meant to mark things as seeming, by reason of mistake, to have existence. Subsequently, entrapped by sophistry, they began to take a different view of those expressions. Had they not understood them in the way I have shown, the falseness of the world, and monism, and the removableness of ignorance by knowledge, &c. , would never have been suggested to them. By this time, indeed, it will be conceded, that the phrase " ignorance-imagined" can endure no sense but that which I attach to it. Accordingly, since it means " appearing, because of ignorance, to exist," how can a thing so called exist? That which is not, but appears to be, can be said to seem, from ig- norance, to exist. As for what is, and appears to be, it does not seem, from ignorance, but from knowledge, to have existence. How can a thing of the former description have existence? Does ignorance bring it forth, as a snake produces eggs ? As, in discussing the subject of the apparent, I remarked, so now I repeat, that, when one says a thing is not, but is cognized, one denies its existence and affirms only the cognition of it ; beyond which there is nothing. How, then, can your practical be established ? And, as you call practical things ignorance- imagined, so you call practical dealing likewise ; whence it follows, that the latter also is unreal. Then, in order to ac- count for such practical dealing, unreal, and seeming, because of ignorance, to exist, what necessity is there for supposing any kind of real existence in that with which it is concerned ? If a man has dreamed, that he mounted a horse, is there any need of his attributing any kind of existence to such horse ? In short, to be consistent, you ought to regard the things of *Such being the only natural and intelligible conception of ajndna, " igno- rance," regarded as the imaginer of false objects. S'ankara A'chirya, not entirely disengaged from this conception, could, as we have seen, speak of " ignorance" as one with " mistake," though in the teeth of his own doc- Irine, SEC. Ill, CHAP. 9. 269 the world as altogether non-existent, just like nacrine silver and the son of a barren woman. According to your notions, the difference between your three species of objects turns on cognition. There is invariable cog- nition, occasional cognition, and the absence of cognition. Such are the characteristics of those three species. To the first belong the things of this world ; to the second, nacrine silver and the like ; and, to the third, the son of a barren woman. But do not suppose, that these objects therefore differ among them- selves. It is true, that, even to objects purely imaginary we are obliged to give names ; and, if the cognition of one such object differs from the cognition of another, it is permissible, on account of that difference, to attach different names to those objects. Hence, if you only denominated one class of nonentities practical, and another class, apparent, I should not blame you. What I find fault with you for is this, that the terms practical and apparent suggest to you two separate kinds of real existence. Now I wish to explain the nature of existence briefly, and to point out how you err concerning it. Consider, that, when you affirm, as regards what you call a true, a practical, or an apparent, object, that it is; in so affirming, you acknow- ledge, that its existence is, in all three cases, of the same description. What, then, becomes of their difference as to existence, which you affirm ? If you say to yourself, that those objects themselves are of different sorts, namely, true, practical, and apparent, and that, therefore, they differ with respect to existence, I assure you, that this is a mistake. Let it be granted, that they are different, of different species : this fact does not concern their existing, any more than does the fact, that the Naiyayikas divide certain things into limited and unlimited, establish, that those things have various sorts of existence. If the difference you contend for were a reality, it would be based on mental premisses. Thus, when we say, that salt water is different from sweet, we can both conceive 270 SEC. III., CHAP. 9. the ground of the difference, and we can express it in words. But, when you say, concerning objects of three kinds, true, &c., that they are, do you picture to yourself any foundation for their existing diversely ? Do not say, that there are some objects which really differ, but yet the grounds of their differ- ing are not to be known ; and that, in like manner, the ground of the difference between the existences belonging to true and other things is so subtile as to be impossible of discovery. It is only those things that you are not fully acquainted with, of which you can allege, that you are unacquainted with the ground of their differing. Of whatever thing you are certain, whether from perception, from inference, or otherwise, that it is, you know the existence of that thing already. It may be, that you are ignorant of its nature ; still you are not igno- rant of its existence. However you came by your informa- tion, as soon as you know, that a thing is, you are fully aware of its existence. Similarly, if you are sure, that what you style true things, and practical, and apparent, are, you are fully informed of their existence ; and, if they are discrepant as to existence, you must know how they differ. If you do not know how they differ, but if it is clear, from your applying " is" to each of them, that they all appear to exist in one and the same way, what reason have you for speaking of three species of existence ? If you have understood me hitherto, listen a little further. You said, that you believe in different existences of true, practical, and apparent objects, because those objects them- selves differ mutually ; and you remember my reply, based on a concession.* But now I protest against your classifica- tion of objects, heretofore granted for argument's sake. Un- like the Naiyayika division of things into limited and unlimi- ted, it is grounded simply on your supposed difference in the nature of the existence of the aforesaid objects ; and it falls to the ground with the fall of that difference. "~" 2<*7. SEC. III., CHAP. 9. 271 I have now to say, that, even though you proved the world to be imagined by ignorance, and false, still you should not call that ignorance false. When, to make out ignorance to be false, you style it ignorance-imagined, does it not occur to you, that, if it were false, that is to say, no entity, it could not exercise imagination ? In evasioji of this question, you lay down, that ignorance, though ignorance-imagined, and, there- fore, not real from the standing point of true existence, is not altogether nothing ; it being apparent. What can be replied to such an absurdity? Whatever is ignorance-imagined, and, by consequence, not indeed real, is a sheer nonentity, and can imagine nothing. Sometimes, the Vedantins declare, even things that owe their origin entirely to mistake, and are false, are able to produce effects. For instance, what is seen in dreams fore- shows, it is said, good and evil.* Here, too, in my opinion, the Vedantins, from want of right consideration, are wide of the truth. Things that we see in dreams do not foreshow, as they allege they do ; for such things are nonentities. Dreams themselves may foreshow ; and these are entities. The object of a misconception is false ; but the conception itself is true. When a man mistakes a rope for a snake, and is put in bodily fear, we are not to understand, as the Vedan- tins do,f that the snake, for that is nothing, but that the " Nevertheless, ye dwellers in Elysium, a thing seen in a dream certainly becomes indicative, that something real, belonging to the waking state, will be accomplished." This couplet is from the Brahma-gitd, a part of the Stita-sanhita. No MS. of it is at present accessible to the writer. 272 SEC. III., CHAP. 9. man's misconception, which is entitative, is the cause of his fear. By all these considerations it is proved, that, if, as the Vedantins maintain, the regarding the world as true, and the believing oneself to be a soul, are the result of ignorance, then that ignorance cannot be false, but must be true ; and hence, we are indeed ignorant, and, consequently, we cannot be the Supreme Spirit. And just as true are our sinfulness and misery. For there is sin in one's desiring or doing anything which one counts to be wrong : and there are many things which, though we so count them, we all desire and do ; and we are, likewise, all conscious of misery. In treating of the Sankhya system, I have shown, that our consciousness of cognition, will, activity, misery, &c., cannot be an error. Since, then, our souls are sinful, and subject to misery, for this further reason, they cannot be the Supreme Spirit ; which, as the Vedantins confess, is ever pure, and essentially joy. After adverting to a single topic more, I shall bring this chapter to a close. When I was discussing the Sankhya, 3 " The preceptor alone, albeit imaginary, because all-sapient, gives instruction to the full ; as it is the snake, albeit imaginary, and not the befouled ether, that operates for death." The sense is this. Among things imagined, some may produce effects which are beyond the power of other things. Thus, a man may be fatally terrified by a rope mistaken for a snake ; whereas the foul ether, an object equally chimerical, cannot work to the same end. Just so, an instructor, no less than all other men, is imaginary and false ; and yet he is lible to instruct, which other men are not. In Hindu opinion, the ether is always essentially colourless and pure, and only from error is supposed to possess hue. See the note on dkdga, at p. 120. The ignorant, it is said, think the blueness of the sky to be the befoulment of *>ther. The coupJet cited above is from the Sankthepa-farirdka. SEC. III., CHAP. 10. 273 I set down what would bo enough to refute the Vedanta as well. I said, that our consciousness of cognition, will, &c., however we may err as to other things, cannot be erroneous. Consequently, even were I to allow the correctness of the Vedantins' allegation, that to regard the world as true is a misconception, yet so to regard it cannot be false ; since we are conscious, that we have a cognition of the world's truth : a cognition which the Vedantins call erroneous. I repeat, that, if such a misconception as that just spoken of actually infects us, we cannot be the Supreme Spirit. Thus, also, am I able to answer the Vedantins. It was necessary, however, to examine and to expose, from various aspects, the arguments they produce to prove the falsity of ignorance ; for therein, as I have before said, consists the whole strength of the Vedanta doctrine. It was of main importance, also, to refute their errors touching the subject of existence ; those errors being most prejudicial to them in several ways. The labour I have expended on this head should not, then, be viewed as uncalled for. CHAPTER 10. Examination of the Veddntirfs Emancipation; Proof, that the Vedanta does not deserve to be called Theistw ; and a few Words on the Faculty of Judgment, its Power, and its Use. When the notion is refuted, that the soul is identical with Brahma, the refutation follows, by implication, of the notion, that, when the soul attains to right apprehension, viz., the regarding itself as one with Brahma, it becomes liberated from all error, and, being Brahma realized,* is emancipated. For, * This word is a makeshift; and so is "restored," used at p. 246, and else- where. It is impossible to express in rational language what becomes of the soul, when Vedant.ically emancipated. From all eternity it has been Brahma, and therefore has not to become Brahma, or, again, to be restored to Brahma- 2 N 27] >KC. 111., CHAP. 10. since the soul is not at all Brahma, its thinking itself to be so is not right apprehension, but the extreme of misapprehension ; and, for thus thinking, instead of deserving to be emancipa- ted, it deserves severe punishment. Again, the emancipation of the Vedantins is punctually like that of the Nyaya and others among the Systems. In these, as I have said before, emancipation is, to be delivered from all pain, and to remain like a stone, utterly void of in- telligence. And in this there is no experience of happiness. Precisely such is the condition of emancipation according to the Vedantins ; however it may seem, from their language, that it is attended by happiness : for they describe Brahma as being intelligence and bliss. To be emancipated is, with them, realization of Brahmahood ; and from this it should seem, that the emancipated must be happy. I have shown, however, that their Brahma is only nominally intelligence and bliss. He is intelligence that cognizes nothing, and bliss without fruition of happiness. What hope is there, that the soul would be happy, if it came to such a state as this ? We know, that all their doctrines concerning Brahma and the soul are most absurd ; but, accepting them as set forth, we can even show, that their emancipation amounts to annihi- lation. They say, that the soul is false. If so, it can never actually be restored to Brahmahood. For a false thing can- not become true. So long as misapprehension endures, such a thing exists as a semblance ; and, when right apprehension accedes, it vanishes away. To disappear into nothingness is, then, all that the hapless soul could attain to by acquiring right apprehension. hood. Nor does it realize Brahmahood ; inasmuch as, in the state of emanci- pation, it is void of all consciousness. A Vedintiu does not hesitate to say : T%W 5ET*T 5TW WejfcT andfojTfRig fe*T^ | "Being already * \j Brahma himself, it becomes Brahma himself," and ' Free already, it is freed.'' SEC. III., CHAP. 10. 275 Hitherto I have been taken up with the leading doctrines of the Vedanta ; and I have passed by nothing of main import. And now I venture to ask any thoughtful man, whether this scheme deserves to be called theistic. Viewed superficially, it has, I allow, a guise of theism ; and yet, when investigated critically, I cannot see, that it is anything but a sort of atheism. The distinctive article of theism is, the belief in a God : but, God is eliminated from the Vedanta. Its Brahma is neither creator of the world, nor its preserver, nor its lord : in short, the world is out of relation to him. Let the Vedantins give to such an object the title of Brahma, or that of Supreme Spirit ; still their doing so does not make them theists. Greatness does not consist in bearing a great name ; but he that does mighty deeds, and is endowed with extraordinary excellencies, is great, and he alone. Why is God spoken of as supremely great? Because He created all, and regulates and governs all, and because He is omnipotent and omniscient, and endowed with divine attributes. Again, why is it proper for us, and incumbent on us, to honour and to love Him? Because -He made us, and because we are His, and because He is our be- nefactor, and because, by reason of His adorable perfections, He claims the homage of our hearts. The religion which does not recognize in the Supreme the characteristics thus enumerated, does not really recognize God ; and the worship which it teaches is not the worship of God. To devise a strange imagination, and to denominate it Brahma and Su- preme spirit, will in nowise benefit the Vedantins. Moreover, as, to a theistic religion, God and the adoration of Him are essential, so likewise is discrimination between sin and virtue : and this discrimination is ignored by the Ve- danta. Sin and virtue are acknowledged, indeed, from the standing point of practical existence ; but, nevertheless, they come to be, in truth, nothing. The ignorant man, consistent- ly with these views, may dread sin, and follow after virtue : 276 SEC. III., CHAP. 10. but the rightly apprehending' man should spurn at both.* lie has no reason to fear the one, nor any motive for pursuing the other. Wherein, on this score, does the Vedanta differ from atheism ? And can any one hope to be advantaged by such a belief? The Vedantin would fain make out, by his sophistical argu- ments, that I's'wara, the world, and so forth are what he calls false. But, for all that, he is unable to rid himself entirely of the conviction of their self-evident and undeniable realness. Hence, as I have said, they present themselves to him as veri- ties. To do away with the incongruity involved herein, the Vcdantins have set up their theory of various sorts of existence. The objects above mentioned, Fs'wara, &c., which show them- selves as real, they allege to belong to the practical, not to the true ; and so, by fallacies, they solace their mental disquietude. My view, that the Vedanta does not merit a place among theistic religions, is based on a sifting of its leading and fun- damental tenets. Its advocates, of course, here take issue with me. According to them, their system countenances the wor- ship of God, and distinguishes between sin and virtue, &c. &c. ; and such is their inconsistency, that they teach conformably. The harm they do is, therefore, less than would be done by inculcating overt atheism. Still, any scheme must be most per- nicious, which is, in truth, repugnant to theism, even though its maintainers do not clearly perceive such repugnance. Those Vedantins, I have observed, who are naturally least inclined to evil, are lea^t injured by their system. But its effect on " He who has not the notion, that he is a doer, nnd whose intellect is not involved by works, though he were to slay all these denizens of earth, would not, in fad, slay, or be compromised. So runs the Uhagavad-gitd, XVIII. , 17. This is a perfectly laminate deduction from Vedanta premisses. SEC. III., CHAP. 10. 277 those persons who have a strong bias to vice, is, I have like- wise observed, such, that no excess of wickedness seems to them wrong. As for the former class, it is, I think, owing to their addiction to devotional exercises, rather than to mat- ters of doctrine, that they are not equally depraved. But let a man give himself up to the Vedanta, and dwell constant- ly on such thoughts as that he is Brahma, and pure, and that sin and virtue are falsities ; be his natural disposition however favourable, his reverence for God must become less, and his desire to discriminate good and evil must grow cold and languid. And the detection of his sins, and humility and grief because of them, how can these and suchlike, which are most necessary and beneficial to man, be possible to him ? Indeed, it is unavoidable but that the Vedanta should work only prejudice to all whom it influences ; in a lesser degree, certainly, to some than to others : but it cannot im- prove the fallen nature of any single mortal. Reason admonishes us, that the true religion is that which meliorates our natural condition ; which, surely, with eveiy one of us, stands in great need of amendment. The best of men must be, in the eyes of God, grievously imperfect and sinful. Even they require the remedy of the true Faith. Moreover, no man can love God as he ought. One proof of due love to God is, the avoidance of all sin of whatever description : for sin is that which is opposed to the divine commands, and abhorrent to God. Yet there is no one who has not commit- ted sins innumerable ; and the natural man has turned from God, and is on the way to perdition. He wants, then, a religion to instruct him in the knowledge of God, and to lead him to worship and honour Him ; and to show the exceeding heinousness of sin, and its terrible consequences, and how, by repentance and prayer, to free himself from its fetters. That religion from which we learn these things must be, we feel, from God. And, for philosophers themselves corrupt, as being human, to exhort their fellow-men, in contrariety 27S SEC. 111., CHAP. 10. to the teachings of that religion, to regard God as false, to think themselves one with Brahma, and to count sin, and virtue, and their fruits, nonentities, is to administer to a sick man poison, not medicine. Cease, I entreat you, my beloved countrymen, to consider as true a religion which contains such things as these. I shall conclude with a few words on the faculty of judg- ment, God has given this to mankind in general ; and, by reason of it, men believe, that there is a God, maker of the world ; and they know, that it is good to practise virtue, and wrong to do evil, and what is the fruit of each ; and that they should worship God, and secure His favour; and that from His favour springs true happiness. In most cases, such is its force, that, when a man sins, he at once condemns himself for his sin. But, now that man has lapsed from his original condition, his judgment is not so perfect, or so sure, as it was at the beginning of the world. As concerns things of a primary character, it speaks the same language to al- most all ; but, immediately on arriving at particulars, we mark a great discrepancy. Hence the origin of so many religions and sects. And the judgment of a man who accepts a false religion becomes more depraved than it would be otherwise. Nevertheless, let a man's religion be ever so far from the truth, and let his reason be ever so perverted by the lessons he has heard from his youth up, there are certain things in respect of which that man's better judgment will belie his doctrines. Thus is it with the Vedantins. There is no doubt, that the fundamental dogmas of the Vedanta are opposed to all godliness, and are subversive of the principles of morality. It is perfectly certain, that, according to them, one is not called upon to fear and to adore God, to detest sin, and to love virtue. Inconsistently enough, however, there are Vedantins who are earnestly devoted to the worship of what they take to be God. This comes from their following the dictates of their better judgment, the voice of God, SEC. III., CHAP. 10. 279 rather than their own chief tenets. For the same reason it is, that, in the opinion of the Vedantins, even he who has acquired what they call right apprehension is not to do as he lists, but must eschew vice. In several other particulars, too, the Vedantins are seen to follow common sense, in contravention of their system. For instance : since they pro- fess to regard the soul and the Supreme Spirit as one, why should they hesitate to allow, that the latter is changeable and impure ? But not only do they hesitate here, but they refuse to admit, that the Supreme Spirit is other than ever pure, in- telligent, and free. To seem to reconcile this position with the rest of their scheme, costs them great labour. Powerful indeed must be the natural instinct of truth, if, in spite of the causes tending to debilitate it, which I have lately spoken of, it still asserts its prerogative, with some effect, among very misbelievers. Even through their mouths it bears witness against false doctrine, and in behalf of God and the truth. God be praised, that He has suffered us to retain thus much of this illumination ; it being this alone that serves as a safeguard and moral guide to such men as are ignorant of the true religion. Except for it, no one can tell to what depth the human race would not have become degraded ; so sur- charged are false religions with error, so far do they militate against the majesty and purity of God, and so confused and imperfect are their principles of right and wrong. The reason, as we now find it, is, however, inadequate to lead us to the way of salvation, or to purify our corrupt nature. For these ends we must have recourse to the Word of God. And, as regards this Word, when presented, the reason, once more, is of great use, in enabling us to test it, and to recognize it for what it professes to be. Moreover, such is. the efficacy of the Word of God, that, as an enquirer goes on studying it, provided he brings to that study due perseverance, impartiality, humbleness, and abnegation of self, his judg- ment dailv becomes more and more defecated ; and it enables Sac. III., CHAP. 10. him to distinguish clearly between what is true and what is false in matters of religious belief. But the result will not be thus, unless he applies himself to the search of Holy Writ iii the way I have specified. For there are many truths which, though at the first blush they revolt the mind, are seen, after patient investigation, to be quite in accord with all that is reasonable and right. The true religion is now accessible to the people of India. May God, in His infinite mercy, grant, my dear countrymen, that you quench not the divine light which He has lighted in your breasts ; that, on the contrary, you may follow its lead- ing ; that you meekly and patiently try, by it, the Christian Scriptures ; that you take hold on their priceless promises ; and that, in the end, you may inherit, as your everlasting por- tion, the joy of the Heavenly Kingdom. 281 LlST OF THE PRINCIPAL SANSKRIT BOOKS QUOTED IN THIS VOLUME. Nydya-sutra-vritti, by Vis'wanatha Bhattacharya. Calcutta edition of 1828. Bhdshd-parichchheda, by Vis'wanatha Panchanana Tarkalankara Bhattacharya. Edition in the Bibliotheca Indica. Siddhdnta-muktdvali, by the same ; a commentary on the Bhd- shd-parichchheda, and printed with it. TarMmrita, by Jagadisa Tarkalankara Bhattacharya. MS. Tarka-sangraha, by Annam Bhatta. MS. Tarka-dipikd, by the same ; a commentary on the Tarka-san- graha. MS. Vaisfeshiha-sutropaskdra, by S'ankara Milra. MS. Dinakari, by Balakrishna and his son Mahadeva Bhatta Dina- kara. MS. Tattwa-kaumudi, containing the Sdnkhya-kdrikd,-\>\- Vachaspati Misra. Calcutta edition of Samvat 1905. Sdnkhya-pravachana- bhdslnja, by Vijnana Bhikshu. The Trans- lator's edition, in the Bibliotheca Indica. Sdnkhya-s&ra,* by Vijnana Bhikshu. MS. Pdtanjala-bhdshya-vdrttika, or Yoga-bhashya-vdrttika, by Vij- nana Bhikshu. MS. S' ' dstra-dipikd, by Parthasarathi Mi^ra. MS. Purva-mimdnsdrtha-sangraha, by Laugakshi Bhaskara. MS. Bhdtta-dipikd, by Khanda Deva. MS. * The first edition is now passing through the press. The passages of the S6.nkhya-s6.ra quoted in this volume will be found there as below : That cited at page 31, at page 1 . 35, 22. 36, do. 54 23. do, 37. _5o, 40. 59, 43. 80,- -15. 222 12 282 S'ankara Acharya's commentaries on the leading Upanishads, with A'nandajnana's or A'nanda Giri's annotations thereon. Edi- tion in the Bibliotheca Indica. Brahma-sutra-bhdshya, or S'driraka-sutra-bhdshya, and the com- mentary on it ; by S'ankara A'ch^rya and Ramananda Saraswati respectively. Unfinished edition in the Bibliotheca Indica, and MS. Bhagavad-gitd, or I's'wara-gitd, with S'ridhara Swamin's com- mentary, the Subodhini. Bombay lithographed edition. Ashtdvakra-gitd, attributed to Ashtavakra the Muni. MS. Brahma-gitd, a section of the Suta-sanhitd. S'iva-gitd, an episode in the Padma-purdna. MS. Yoga-vdsishtha, attributed to Valmiki. Calcutta edition of 1851 . See p. 177. Sankshepa-s'driraka, by Sarvajnatma Muni. MS. Subodhini, by Purushottama Mi&ra ; a commentary on the San- kshepa-s' driraka, MS. Veddnta-paribhdshd, by Dharmaraja Dikshita. Calcutta edition ofS'aka 1769. Veddnta-s 1 ikhdmani, a commentary on the Veddnta-paribhdshd, by Ramakrishna Dikshita. MS. Veddnta-sdra, by Sadinanda Yogindra. Calcutta edition of 1829. Viveka-chud&mani, attributed to S'ankara A'chdrya. MS. A'tma-bodha, attributed to S'ankara A'ch&rya. The Translator's edition. Mirzapore : 1852. Tattwa-bodha, anonymous ; printed at the end of the A'tma-bodha. Hast&malaka, imputed to S'ankara A'charya. It is printed at the end of the Veddnta-sdra, &c., Calcutta edition of S'aka 1771. Jivan-mukti-viveka, by Madhava A'chdrya. See p. 29. Siddhdnta-ratnamdld. See p. 35. Krishndlankdra, by Achyutakrishna A'nanda Tirtha. See p. 160, Bh&gavata-purdna. Bombay lithographed edition. Vidwan-moda-iarangini, by Chiranjiva Bhattacluirya. Most of the MSS. used for this volume belong to the Translator. Accounts of almost all the works referred to are given in A contri- bution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philo- sophical Systems. Calcutta: 1859. 283 EMENDATIONS AND ADDITIONS. P. 2, note, 1. 2, For " Divine Spirit" read " Brahma and 1's'wara." P. 5, 1. ]3. For " Deity" read " Brahma." P. 7, note, 11. 9 etc. Strike out " presumed." By " sole" cause is meant "irrespectively of the works of souls." P. 8, notes, 1. 2 ab infra. Bead P. 9, note, 1. 5. Read P. J2, note, 1. 2. Read ^icl. L. 15. Read P. 13, 1. 2, Read "arise." Note, 1. 4 ab infra. Read " son." P. 14, note, 1. 11. Read WTO. P. 16, note, 1. 9 ab infra. Read ^^T. Read " Brahma- s&tr a." P. 17, note, I 5. Read P. 21, note, 1. 7 06 infra. Read P. 30, notes, 1. 3 ab infra. Strike out " generally". <5 o P. 37, note, 1. 11 ab infra. Read TTT^. L. 4. " impelling," should N not have been italicized. P. 44, notes, 1. 1. Put a comma after " intellect" P. 45, 1. 3. Supply a comma after "discriminatively." Note, 11. 9 and 3 ab infra, and elsewhere. For " indifference" read " non-difference." P. 60, 1. 9 For "affection" read " evolution." P. 64, note, 11. 9 and 6 ab infra. For " soul" read " spirit." 5P.71 note, 1. 6. Vijnina Bhikshu saya, at p. 23 of the Sdnkhya-pravachana- bhtshya : ?Eref%^T$f^eII f*{i}l-5llfT^rr. &imvrittika is, then, equivalent todvidydka ; and this scarcely differs in import from mdy- ika. " 1 llusory," though an experimental rendering, may, therefore, be al- lowed. P. 77, notes, 1. 6. Rad - nI*W VJ "* P. 80, notes, 1. 5 ab infra. Read cT^TTf?. P. 87, note 1 1. 12. and 21. For " Pandit" read "author." P. 104, note, 1. 3. Read " Vedas." P. 110, 1. 15. Read " as a jar, clay." P. Ill, 1, 17. Put a comma after "body." P. 120, notes, 1 12 Read ^ P. 172, 1.4. Read " a thing, they Hay, really produced." P. 185, note, 1. 4. For " betake" read " protend." P. 205, notes, 1. 22 Italicize " to Brahma." P. 224, 1. 7. Strike out " but," note, 1. 3. read " diverse." P. 231, 1. 16. For " betakes" read "protends." P. 235, 1. 5. Important as is the doctrine of the objectlessness of Brahma's so-called cognition, and though it is acknowledged by very Vedintin, no ex- press statement of it, in any regular Vedinta treatise, has yet fallen in the way of the author. The words about to be cited from Ratuagarbha are more directly enunciative of the doctrine adverted to than anything quoted in the body of this volume. Ratnagarbha is commenting on the Vishnu-Purdna, L,9, 41: ci