'%■. THOUGHTS AND DETAILS ox THE HIGH AND LOW PRICES OP THE THIRTY YEARS, FROM 1793 TO 1822. IN FOUR PARTS. BY THOMAS TOOKE, F. R. S. SECOND EDITION. LONDON : JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET. MDCCCXXIV. l.ONDON: i'RINlKI) b"! |H()>MS l)A>l«O.V, \> IllTKI Itl Al(<. H3 Tilt ADVEllTISEMENT TO THE SECOND EDITION. The revisal of this work for a second edition has afforded the ojjportunity for various corrections and alterations. The only fresh matter however of any importance, will be found in Part TI. and at the conclusion of Part IV. Part II. is greatly extended by a reference to additional facts, in support of the reasoning against the assumed influence of the monopoly of trade, and of the stimulus to increased production and consumption, arising out of the government ex- })enditure during the war. At the conclusion of Part IV. I have given the substance of some in- formation which has been communicated to me from a highly respectable quarter, relative to the great falling off in the produce of gold and silver in South America. This information, while it has enabled me to rectify an erroneous opinion which I had incidentally expressed on the subject, has a 2 21972a IV suggested some inferences which may be consi- dered as of no small importance with reference to the general question under discussion. The work having been originally w ritten in the latter part of 1822 and beginning of 1823, and the object of it being to account for the fluctu- ation of prices during the thirty years ending in 1822, all allusions to actual prices, and to circum- stances connected with them, must be understood as referring to that period, with the exception of a few instances, in which I have distinctly alluded to prices and circumstances of a more recent date. The Tables of Prices and Quantities in the Appendix to Part IV., with the exception of No. 6, are of the same impression with those which were inserted in the first edition, an extra num- ber having been originally struck off with a view to the contingency of their being, as they now are, available : the saving of expense from this cause admits of the present edition being published at a greatly reduced price. May, 1824, CONTENTS. PART I. ON THE EFFECT OF ALTERATIONS IN THE CURRENCV. Page Preface ----- _ 1 Sect. 1 . — Introduction - - _ . 5 Sect. 2. — Definition of Terms - - _ 7 Sect. 3. — Arguments of those wlio ascribe a greater Effect to the Bank Restriction than that indicated by tlie Diifereace between tlie Market and Mint Price of Gold - 17 Sect. 4. — Examination of the Effect of the Bank Re- striction and Resumption of Cash Pay- ments on the value of the precious Metals in the commercial World - - 19 Sect. 5. — Examination of the Effect of the Bank Re- striction on the economised Use of Money, and on the Facility of Credit - - 32 Sect. G. — Examination of the alleged Connexion be- tween the Bank Restriction and aprogrcs- sivc Advance of Prices - - 45 Sect. 7. — Explanation of the Causes of the Extension and Contraction of Private Paper and Cre- dit - . - - . G3 Sect. 8. — Fluctuation of Prices and of the Amount of Private Paper, from 1807 to 1811 - Ci) I'a-re Sect. 9. — Fluctuation of Prices, and of the Amount of Private Paper, from 181 1 to 1816 - 88 Sect. 10. — Fluctuation of Prices and of the Amount of Private Paper, from ISIG to the passing of Mr. Peel's Bill - - - lOG Sect. 11. — Great Variations in the Amount of Private Paper and Credit, not exclusively incidental to a Currency whose Basis is inconvertible Paper - - - - - 120 Sect. 12. — Reasons for thinking that the State of Prices during the Bank Restriction does not warrant the Presumption of any dimi- nished Value of the precious Metals - 12G Sect. 13. — Survey of Prices down to the close of 1822 131 Sect. 14. — Recapitulation - - - - 140 PART II. ON THE EFFECT OF WAR. Sect. 1. — Introduction - - - - 145 Sect. 2. — Examination of the Effect of Taxation on the Fluctuation of General Prices - 14G Sect. 3. — Examination of the Effect of the extra De- mand or Consumption supposed to arise out of a State of War in general - - 149 Sect. 4. — Examination of the Effect of the extra De- mand or Consumption attributed to the late War - - - - 1G2 Sect. 6. — Examination of the Effect of the Monopoly of Trade during the late War - - 174 Sect, G. — Examination of the Effect of the Stimulus or Excitement supposed to have been oc- casioned by the Government Expenditure during the late War - - - 1 83 Sect. 7. — Effect of War, as obstructing Supply, on general Prices - - - - 208 Sect. 8.— Recapitulation - - - . 220 vu PART III. ON THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS. Page Sect. 1. — Introduction - - - • - 22.3 Sect. 2.— Character of the Seasons from 1(588 to 1792, both Years included - - .. 228 Sect. 3. — Character of the Seasons from 1/93 to 1821, both Years included - - . 25 G Sect. 4. — Effect of Quantity on Price - - 283 Sect. 5. — Application of the Principle of the " Effect of Quantity on Price " to the State of Agriculture, from 1793 to 1812, as expla- natory of the high Price of Corn, during that Period - - - - 301 Sect. G. — Application of the Principle of the " Effect of Quantity on Price " to the State of Agriculture, since 1812, as explanatory of the Fall of Prices - - - 314 Sect. 7. — Recapitulation - . _ . 322 PART IV. ON THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF ALTERATIONS IN THE CURRENCY, OF WAR, AND OF THE SEASONS ; WITH STATEMENTS OF PRICES AND QUANTITIES. Sect. 1. — Introduction - - - _ 32G Sect. 2. — Explanation of an apparent Anomaly in the Fluctuation of Market Prices - - 328 Sect. 3. — Detailed Reference to the Fluctuations of the Prices and Quantities of particular Com- modities - ., _ _ 335 Sect, 4. — Summary of the different Fluctuations ex- hibited in the Table of Prices - 3G9 Sect. 5. — Conclusion . - . . 37(5 SUPPLEMENTARY SECTION. ON THE VARIATIONS IN THE PRODUCE OF GOLD AND SILVER FROM THE SOUTH AMERICAN MINES. CONTENTS OK THE APrENDIX. PART 1. Paw No. 1. — Account of tlic average Market Price of Gold and average per Cent, of the Value of the Currency, from Feb. 1800 to 1821 - 1 No. 2. — A Calculation of the Quantity of Silver and Gold in Europe and in the World in general. Anno 1688 - - _ 2 No. 3. — Amount of Treasure and Bullion imported into and exported from India, from 1808- 1809 to 1819-20 inclusive - - G No. 4. — Prices of Gold and Silver at Paris, and Coinage in the Mints of France, from 1818 to 1823 - - - - 7 No. 5. — An Account of tlie average Prices of Grain j)cr Quarter in England and Wales, on Jan. 1st and July Ist of each Year, from 1792 to 1819 - - - - 11 No. G. — Prices of Beef and Mutton at Smithfield- Market, from January 179C to 1821 - 13 No. 7. — An Account of the Number of (commissions of Bankruptcy issued from 1790 to 1823 11 No. 8. — Specification of the Number of Beasts and Sheep and Lambs brought to Smithficld, with the mean Prices of the best Meat each Month, from 1821 to 1823 - 15 No, 9. — A Statement of the Wages of Labour at Manchester and other principal Seats of the Cotton Manufacture, from 1810 to 1819 16 IX PART II. Pace No. 1 . — An Account of the Tonnage of British Ship- ping cleared out from the different Ports of Great Britain, and of the official Value of the Imports into and Exports from Great Britain, from the Year 1783 to 1823, com- piled from various official and parlia- mentary Papers . . _ No. 2. — An Account of the total Quantity eharged with Duty of the following Commodities in each Year, of the Forty-two Years ending 5th July, 1823: beer (including all kinds), bricks and tiles, candles, hides and skins (charged by weight), malt, salt (duty paid for consumption), soap, and starch No, 3.— An Account, showing the quantity of Tea sold at the East India Company's Sales, from 1782 to 1823 PART III. No. 1. — Extract from the Translation of a Speech made by M. Le Caradeuc de la Chalotais, Pro- cureur-general to the Parliament of Brit- tany, on the 20th of August, 1764 ; when he carried into Court the Edict of the Month of July, 1764, requiring it to be registered . _ - - i No, 2.— Extract of an Address to the different Classes of Persons in Great Britain, on the Present Scarcity and High Price of Provisions, By the Rev. Septimus Hodson, M. B, 1795 - - . - - 7 Xo. 3. — Agricultural Intelligence, extracted from the Farmer's Magazine, Vol. i, p. 102 - 10 No. -1. — Extiact from an Iiujuiry into tlic Causes ami Remedies of the late and Present Scarcity and High Price of Provisions, in a Letter to the Right Hon. Earl Spencer, K, G. First Lord of the Admiralty, aper in this country. It was, as I have before stated, the general answer to all charges against the conduct of the Bank, in suffering the depreciation of its notes, that gold had become scarce, and not paper over abundant: and I am ready to admit that there was ground for so much of the answer as went on a prima facie presumption that gold had become somewhat scarce relatively to a former period ; or, at least, that sup- posing the precious metals to have been otherwise of a given value, the obvious effect of the war, and of the peculiar cir- cumstances attending it, was to enhance their value. Ac- cordingly, the Bullion Heport of IBIO, (p. 2) nearly at its outset states as follows : " It will be found by the evidence, that the high price of gold is ascribed by most of the witnesses entirely to an alleged scarcity of the article, arising out of an unusual demand for it upon the Continent of Europe. This unusual demand for gold upon the Continent is de- scribed by some of them as being chiefly for the use of the French armies, though increased also by that state of alarm and failure of confidence which leads to the practice of hoarding." But this, if true, formed no justification of the departure of the paper from its standard. Whether gold hud increased or diminished in value, it was the business of those who had the regulation of the paper to make It con- form to the value of gold. The promise to pay ought at all times to have been of equal value with the actual payment. All, however, th;.t I mean here to prove is, that the iiijpres- sion was very general at that time, that the value of the pre- cious metals had increased in Europe. 2.7 Much stress has occasionally been laid on the circum- stance of Russia, Austria, and the United Slates of America havin tively: and as far as relates to their aggregate value, there appears to be no sufficient ground for inferring any material variation in it since 1797, as a consequence of the alterations in our cur- rency. But a separate question arises as to the effect of those alterations on the value of gold, as compared with silver: and, as the demand for this country has been almost exclu- sively for gold, it appears reasonable to conclude, that such an extra demand for it would raise its price relatively to silver. This inference appeared to me so plausible, that I was at first disposed to acquiesce in it, as a sufficient expla- nation of the degree (viz. between 4 and 5 per cent.) in which the two metals have receded from their ordinary propor- 39 tion in this market: but the followinjif considerations have since struck me, and incline me, at least, to doubt whether silver may not really have fallen, while gold has merely maintained its former value. If the masses of the two metals in Europe have nut under - gone any alteration, then the change in their relative value can arise only from a difference in the demand for the uses to which they are respectively applicable. Now, supposing the use of them for all other purposes than that of money to be undisturbed, then as, according to the preceding view, gold, during the period in which we sjiared it, was in extra demand, as money on the Continent for military purposes and for hoarding, and was occasionally at an extra price, while on no occasion did it sink below the proportion which existed prior to 1 797, it follows, that when that extra demand ceased by the peace, there would be no motive on the Con- tinent for retaining, at an extra price, so much of the gold as was beyond tlie ordin;,ry purposes ofmere convenience as currency— none being absolutely necessary as the standard or basis of their circulation, whicli is silver. It may, therefore, fairly be questioned whether there is any thing, thus far, of extra demand to account for its extra price relatively to silver : and suj^posing the answer to be in the negative, gold can only have risen in value compared with silver by a falling off in the supply of the former, or by an increase in that of the latter : but gold is a more durable metal than silver, and the sources of supply, al- though very much more limited, are not liable to such great variations as occur in those of silver. In as flxr, therefore, as the recession in the comparative value of the two metals may be referred to a supposed alteration in their relative quantities, the presumption seems to be rather that the supply of silver must have increased, than that of gold fallen off". And the presumption, that silver has increased in quantity in Europe, derives some weight from the con- sideration, that not only the demand for silver to the East Indies, which was very large, (insomuch that in the 30 three years ending 1819-20, tlie balance of import of trea- sure into India on the Company's and private account amounted to nearly nineteen millions sterling)*, has ceased since 1821, but that the stream has reversed its course, and the importations from thence hither have been very consi- derable. I am inclined to think that this cause alone will go far towards accounting for the fall in the price of silver in this market. The supplies come chiefly, if not wholly, in the first instance, to this country ; but being much be- yond what is wanted here for the purpose of coin or manu- factures, the surplus must be re-exported ; but, as in the present state of our trade, having large stocks of foreign raw materials in our market, and an abundance of home produce, while our manufactures still maintain sufficient superiority to admit of their exportation, there is no other adequate return which the Continent can give for our sur- plus silver, than gold : and accordingly, I understand that the principal bullion transactions between this country and the Continent, for some time past, have consisted of exports of silver and imports of gold. But, in order to admit of such transactions being carried into effect, it is necessary that gold should be as much higher, and silver as much lower, in this market than on the Continent, as to defray the charges of transport, interest, and commission, on both sides : and this will account for the disproportion between the two metals being greater here than on the Continent f. This greater disproportion can continue only as long as this * For an account of the total imports of treasure into India from 1808-9 to 1819-20, see Appendix, No, 3. t As the relative proportion of the market prices of gold and silver at Paris may be matter of interest in connexion with the present discussion, I insert in the Appendix (No. 4) a table of the quotations of them for the six years, ending December, 1823, accompanied by an explanation of the footing on which these metals are purchased by the mint, and rc-issucd in the shape of coin. Subjoined to it is a statement of the quantities of gold and silver coined by the mints of France for the same period. 31 market receives tlie chief supplies of silver from the East and West, and dispenses them to the rest of Europe. As far as the supply from the East Indies is concerned, I suspect that it cannot be of long duration, and that in the course of the fluctuations of trade the whole of what has of late been received from thence will eventually be remitted back. The low price of the raw produce of India here, and the necessity of finding returns for British goods sent thither, combined with the financial arrangements of the govern- ment there, have occasioned the remittances of bullion from India to England : if cotton, sugar, rice, and other East India produce, should advance in Europe so as to admit of export from India, the tide will turn again, and the silver will go back. Having thus offered arguments, which to my mind are conclusive, against the presumption of any sensible effect from the alterations in the system of our currency, under the circumstances in which they took place, on the value of the precious metals in Europe, it remains to examine what influence may be ascribed to the second class of circum- stances, which, as a consequence of the Bank restriction, are stated to have affected the value of the currency in this country, in a much greater degree than that indicated by the diflference between paper and gold. 39 SECTION V. Ex.iui; nation of the effect of the Bank Restriction on the eeono- mised Use of Money, and on the Facility of Credit. These circumstances are, in the words of the article in the Review, which I have taken as my text, " that a com- pulsory paper system, established by the Bank restriction, has had the effect of heightening all those expedients, to which a prosperous state of society naturally gives birth, for economising the circulating medium, bringing the whole into activity, and multiplying it virtually by the substitution of credit for currency."" The effect here ascribed to the Bank restriction is re- solvable into two distinct parts : 1. The heightening of all the expedients for economising the circulating medium, and bringing the whole of it into activity. 2. The multiplication of the circulating medium virtually by the substitution of credit for currency. This distinction is a very important one for the purposes of the present inquiry. The expedients for economising the use of the currency, although they do not take date from the Bank restriction, and certainly had their origin in causes wholly distinct from it, did experience a considerable improvement about that time; and this coincidence is assumed by the writer in question as cause and effect. " The universal adoption of paper (he says) led to the universal practice of those expe- dients for economising money, which only partialhj pre- vailed in a mixed currency ; that is, only so far as it con- sists of paper ; since it is by means of paper that the contrivances are carried into effect."' — " And (he adds) 33 there is less temptation to hoard paper than there is to hoard specie ; it is, therefore, always drawn from its hidin^r- place, and circulates freely in the market." This mode, however, of accounting for that coincidence as cause and effect, is not consistent either with the reason of the thing, or with what, both from my own recollection and from that of the best living authorities on that subject, I can state to have been the fact. As to the reason of the thing, the motives to economise the use of the currency are twofold, vin. that of convenience, and that of interest. With regard to the inducement to simplify and spare any unnecessary circuitousness of pay- ment from a view to mere convenience, it is clear that it must exist more strongly in proportion as the currency consists in gi'eat part of coin. And I am perfectly convinced that, if, from any cause whatever, bank notes were totally withdrawn from circulation, the motives to simplify payments on a large scale to the utmost degree would become so in- tense, as possibly to suggest expedients for a still further saving. With regard to the smaller temptation, in point of interest, to hoard paper than specie, and to its therefore circulating more freely, it is to be observed that the tempta- tion to hoard specie is greatest when compulsory paper prevails ; and there is every reason to believe, that in this country much more gold was hoarded after than before the restriction ; but in point of fact, all the larger payments among merchants and bankers were, for some years pre- vious as well as subsequent to the Bank restriction, transacted through the medium of paper ; and as it is to these trans- actions that the economised use of the currency applies, there is not the shadow of a ground for ascribing to motives of convenience, arising out of that measure, the heightening of the expedients of economy. But if the Bank restriction supplied no motives of mere convenience for economising the use of the currency, the circumstances coincident with that measure held out the strongest inducement pos- sible of immediate and obvious advantage to the indi- D 34. vidiials concerned] in large payments to improve to t'ue utmost " the art of transactinff the same business with less money " 'i he circumstances to wliich I allude, and uhich held out this inducement, were the very reverse of those supposed by the reviewer; for he assumes that an indefinite facility of procuring money was a necessary con- sequence of the Bank restriction ; whereas, in point of fact, at the period when the suspension of cash payments at the Hank took place, and for some time after, the suflering from scarcity of money v.as very great. So far from any unusual facility of raising money, there was an utter im- possibility for any merchant to obtain loans or discounts except upon the very best security, nor even upon this to any considerable amount. None but first rate bills, not having more than sixty-five days to run, were discountable at all, and even of this description the Bank did not take all that were offered, having prescribed limits for each house. i\nd as to discounts by private bankers, they were nearlv out of the question, as it was natural they should be, seeinff that while the law restricted the rate of interest on private securities, the rate on public securities through the greatest part of 1 'JQl was considerably higher. The 3 per cent, consols were at one time below 48, Exchequer bills at 'J/. 105. and navy bills above 15 per cent, discount. This enormous rate of interest rendered the use of money, even for the shortest intervals, valuable; and, accordingly, it was about this time that the practice was introduced among the London bankers of borrowing bank notes of one another for only a few hours ; this practice was not only in itself suph an increase in the velocity of the circulation as was equivalent to a saving in the amount of the currency, but, by the value which it conferred on the use of a given sum for even a few hours, was the immediate occasion of devising some of the means of lessening the detention which might be caused by the transmission of any amount beyond the very smallest that might suffice for the mutual adjustment of the daily balances. It is, therefore, to the scarcity of 35 money wliicli, from causes lliat it is foreign to my present purpose to investigate, prevailed about the peiiod of tlie Bank restriction, and not to the opposite effect ascribed to that measure, that the greatest improvement of the expe- dients for economising the use of the currency is owing. Not only, however, are the occasion and object of the improvements alluded to erroneously described, but a most fallacious inference is drawn as to the effect of this " art of transacting the same business with less money"" in dimi- nishing the value of the currency. There is no doubt that, if the number of transactions re- mained the same, and the numerical amount of the currency, consisting of inconvertible paper, were not diminished, the increased velocity and economy of the circulating medium would depreciate its value exactly as much as an addition to its amount, cateris ■paribus, would do, and the evidence and measure of the depreciation would be found in the difference between the paper and its standard. But at the period referred to, and for some years after, while the money transactions of the country were progressively in- creasing, the numerical amount of the currency, according to the received computation, had been diminished. This circumstance of increased transactions and diminished cir- culating medium, formed one of the puzzles to those who, at a subsequent period, contended that- the difference be- tween paper and gold could not be ascribed to an excess of paper. But allowing, for the sake of argument, that the Bank re- striction was the cause (which it was not) of greater economy in the use of the currency, and that this greater economy was one of the causes of a diminution of the value of the currency beyond the degree indicated by the difference between paper and gold ; how happens it that, although all the refined machinery of the banking system subsists unimpaired, and is perhaps undergoing further improvements, it has no longer the depreciating effect ascribed to it? lieally, in order to have been good for any thing in the argument D 2 36 which it was brou the authorities quoted in the review) among the bankers, in their payments on thi- largest scale ; not only is the practice of lodging money with a banker becoming more general, as including a large proportion of the smallest classes of tradesmen ; but there is less detention in the very minutest channels of circulation, inasmuch as, by the institution of savings banks, the most inconsiderable sums, which must, but for this mode of in- vestment, have been dormant as petty hoards in the hands of mechanics and menial servants, have become, and are becoming daily, more available to swell the amount of cur- rency applicable to general purposes. So large is the aggregate saving of the functions of money from the foregoing causes, which have acquired their prin- cipal activity since the period of the Bank restriction, and which have not yet apparently reached their utmost de- velopcment; that, notwithstanding the extended functions of money consequent on an increased population, and on an enlarged scale of pecuniary transactions, a smaller numerical amount is now requisite to circulate commodities at the same prices than befoie that period. Accordingly, if even the country circulation of one-pound notes were now to be withdrawn, so that the currency should be on exactly the same footing as it was before 1797, there is every rctison to believe that the amount of coin requisite for this pnrj)ose would be decidedly less than it was for a few years pre- ceding that date. We may therefore safely dismiss the economised use of the currency from the list of causes concurring to produce the 37 diminution and subacguent increase of the value of the pre- cious metals resulting from the restriction and resumption of cash payments by the Bank. 1 he next effect ascribed to the Bank restriction is " the nuiltiplication of the circulating medium virtually by the substitution of credit for currency." The manner in which the Bank restriction is supposed to have produced these effects, is thus stated : " In such a system, country banks find a less stock necessary to answer demands than they would keep if liable to pay in specie. Ih the former case, one in twenty is deemed sufficient ; in the latter, one-fifth, or perhaps one- fourth, would be the safe proportion. The moral certainty that a banker feels, that he shall not be called upon to dis- count his own notes, is a strong temptation to issue them to the utmost practicable extent. He sets all the canvas his vessel will carry, more than in common prudence he would do if there were any apprehensions of a coming gale. But the Bank restriction was a kind of security against all sud- den and unexpected movements, a sort of monsoon, which, after passing one session of parliament, he was sure would continue to the next ; and while that lasted, nothing was likely to happen that could disturb his course."" " All the merchants examined agree in stating that country paper increased with the increase of Bank paper. If, therefore, the Bank restriction was the cause of excessive issues from the Bank, a fact which is at this time hardly open to dispute, it must be charged with producing that excessive issue of country paper also, which was an inva- riable concomitant of the other." " It has already been observed, that the power of pro- curinn- money, if wanted, is tantamount to the actual pos- session. To use a scholastic phrase, money in posse is etjuivalent for all purposes of trade to money in esse : it gives an equal spirit of enterprise to the buyer ; and, when that power is become notorious, equal confidence to the seller. Now it cannot be doubted that this hypothetical 2.1 972^ 38 wealth was greatly augmented by the system of the Bank restriction. If the Bank was always ready to discount bills upon real mercantile transactions; if country banks, in imitation of this example, did the same; not only were transactions entered into which, without such facility, never could have taken place, but numerous contracts vvereeflPected for vvliich actual payment was not required at the time, and was, in fact, never made; other transactions in the mean time having taken place which either directly or indirectly had the effect of balancing these; thus performing, without regular book entries, the very office of a bank ; the seller building as securely upon the c redit of the buyer (a credit never actually put to the test), as upon his tangible pro- perty." On this statement, I have to observe, as on many others brought Ibrward by the advocates of the doctrine of inde- finite dejjrociation, that the facts assumed, and the in- ferences drawn from them, are equally erroneous. The country banks do not, as far as I can learn, find it necesstiiy to keep any greater reserve, now that they are liable to pay in coin, than they did before the resumption of cash payments; the only difference being, that their re- servf, during the restriction, might consist wholly of Bank of England notes, whereas it must now consist partly of coin; and, considering the great improvements in banking, the probability is, that not so large a reserve is now requisite as previous to 1797. That the Bank i-festriction did not operate as a security against all sudden and une.vpected movements, may be in- ferred from the experience of J 8 10, when there was as vio- lent a crisis of commercial credit as the memorable one which had occurred in 1793; and the number of bankers against whom conmiissions of bankru})tcy were issued was exactly equal in 1810 to what it was in 1793, viz. twenty- si.K in each. And with respect to the " monsoon, which after passing one session of parliament, the country banker was sure would continue to the next: and while that lasted. nolhinj^was likely lo hapijcn thai uoiikl ciistiirl) his course — " we nuiy ask, what the author of this simile has to observe upon the succession of hunicancs which swept away so many bankin\.) Again, on the average of the years 1814, 1815, and 181G, the issues of the Bank of England were larger by three mil- lions per annum than those of the preceding three years. 1811, Average aiuount .... 2.3,282,000 1 2, Ditto .... 23/237,000 13, Ditto .... 21,023,000 3)70,542,000 Mciui of the tliicc ycju-b .... 23,514,000 48 1(SI4, Avcr.-igc amount .... '2(].9()l,{){)0 I.T, Ditto .... 2(i,yy6,()00 16. Ditto .... 2(5,57-4,000 3)80,36 ijOO'O 26,787,000 {Lords' Report, 1819, />. 13.) And yet it must be within general recollection, as well as apparent from the statement referred to, that, during those three years, a great reduction took place in the circulation of country paper ; not to mention the great fall of prices which accompanied this extended issue of Bank of Eno-land notes, and which will be matter for subsequent consideration. So much, in the mean time, for the assertion of the fact of constant coincidence of the increase of country paper with that of Bank of England paper. It appears, then, that there did not exist a perpetual se- curity to country bankers, nor a constant facility of discount to London merchants during the Bank restriction ; that if this security and facility had existed, without sufficient mo- tives for the use of it, there would not necessarily have been an increase of country paper, nor of transactions on private credit; and finally that, on several occasions, a great in- crease of Bank of England notes was accompanied by, or coincident with, a very considerable dimiijution of the cir- culation of every other description of paper. How then, it may be asked, is the great increase of country and private paper generally, which was observable at parti- cular periods during the restriction, to be accounted for? I believe that this question admits of being satisfactorily an- swered ; but I propose to reserve the explanation till I come to the consideration of prices at the period commencing in 1807-8, when the fluctuation of them seems to have been connected with great variations in the amoimt of private, as contra-distinguished from Bank of England paper. 41 In the mean time, however, if the facts and presumptions, stated in tlie passages which I have quoted, had been cor- rect, still there would be no ground for the inference so strenuously contended for; viz. that the Bank restriction diminished the value of our currency in a greater degree than that indicated by the difference between paper and gold. For supposing the restriction to have occasioned a constant excess of Country, as well as of Bank of England notes, it is clear that the aggregate excess, beyond what could have been maintained under a system of convertibility into coin, whatever might be the proportions of the com- ponent parts of the circulating medium, would, according to the now generally received, and, I believe, only true doc- trine of money and exchanges, have equally affected the value of the whole : and the degree of depreciation would have been equally marked by a rise in the price of gold, or by a depression in the exchanges, or by both, whether the circulating medium were really augmented in rmmerical amount, or only virtually enlarged by the substitution of credit for currency. ir> SECTION VI. Exaniin.itioM of tlic .alleged Connexion between the Bank Restric- tion and a progressive Advance of Prices. If the assumed influence of the I^ank restriction and sub- sequent resumption of cash payments, on the value of the precious metals in Europe, and on that portion of the circu- lation of this country which consists of private paper and credit, be proved to be insufficient, upon any general grounds of reasoning, to have produced the alleged effect of a greater diminution of the value of the currency in the first instance, and a greater enhancement, subsequently, than has been in- dicated by the difference betweei papir and gold, it is still contended, by the advocates for the doctrine which I have been combating, that " The constant and invariable con- nexion of increase of price with the Bank restriction, is a forcible proof of such a relation as that of cause and effect subsisting between the two phenomena. The near approach of the termination of that restriction has produced a fall of prices greatly exceeding the difference between paper and gold; thus still further corroborating that connexion, and proving, almost demonstratively, that the prices from 1797 to 1810 were, to a certain degree, artificial; and that the comparison of |:aper and gold, during that period, did not afford a test of their real amount." i\nd, for the more per- fect establishment of this point, upon which so much de- pends, a table is exhibited of prices collected from the tables printed in the parliamentary reports on this subject (gold being reserved for the last column), with the following in- troductory remark : "Itwill be remembered that 3^. 17*. lOl^d is the mint price of an ounce of gold ; so that all above that sum may be regarded as the difference between Bank-paper and gold, — a difference very inconsiderable till the year 46 1810, although the price of labour and of the necessaries of life rose, during the same period, seventy or eighti/, and, m some articles, more than cent, per centy >—• ^ . _ ^ . . ... J .,.,., . ^ . ^^ 00 00 00 OC 00 00 00 00 00 oc 00 ^1 l~-l 1— • — o o o o o o to •£^ w to •~ O -O 00 ^ CV w r o tn ^1 00 "vT ^T "vl Ci Ci 05 Ci Ci o^ ^ g 4^ in oc >C^ to CTi W W — O •;^ to :> en o o o O Cl C O O 4i >^ o "■^^ c *<» «c o o 00 00 CTi Ol O 00 o ry^ (n 5 o w ^l *"" 00 Oi O CO o to en "^ » o o o Ct o *- — O 00 CI CO o 00 • - - ^ - — — — 1— o o o o ^ 1" to w ^ to — ^ c o ^ — 1— • oc 5^ MlM MM ODlCO -WMXl-l^l*"*!" ccl- ■Wh o o o o o o o c c o w o =»: •a O n> =r 1 ra CTj cc oo oo 00 oc ^1 ^1 "^1 ^l C5 c a. •WW ♦Iw M|M ■Wm o|- «;-] M|1-XI— +-1M ■;-iH ■Wm _ ^ , , __ >— .— _i k_. — , . C) 1 p o CO CO k— ' ' ^ c: ^ O to ^^ Cj cr S' c 3 ^ to w Ol ^1 ?0 — ii. CO o O-Hw ^ <^fw a. "VI «3 «o "M 00 00 ^1 ^t ^1 'C oo •Cx ^ g 6^ ^I Oi oo CO ►u 4- cr> Co c^. wi 4^ 00 •' ^1 f-r- 00 cr> C) o Oi Oi >— — O ^J ■l-lHt-'|l->lO|>- o CJ r~ ^ ■~^-^ =: O o^s 5 E Oi ^'' Ci V^ Ot C3' 0> Ci 4i. 4i^ CO lO to to ?^ re re c^ Ci Ci C^ 00 4^ o o Ci cr. to o O 05 a. nters' s per n Co D- >" 4^ ^ to o to *». CO to o o o to OS. N Si Oi to Ol fe. s ^ „ CO ^ o o tr» Or Oi. CI, CL CI. O o c 5— ■X 00 O C^. 2 ^1 •o 5" -) cj» j:^ ^ JJ s; o *Tr ^1 .'^ 3 C ? ? 9 n o" o o o o -^ en O" o « o f» o^ p~ g ^ 47 The first observation I have to make on a reference to this table i.s, that there is no price of" p;o\d quoted in 1800, nor again in 16)9 ; but it appears, from the Appendix to the Commons' BiilUon Report in 18 19 (pagcs294< and 302), that there W' re several transactions in Jbrc'igfi gold coin in those two yeais, and thronj;hout the whole period of the war after \799, fojcisi'U go/d com generally fetched as much as stand- ard gold bullion in this market, whenever there were any transactions at the same time in both. Now, in the year 1 800, there were xceel-ly quotations of the price of foreign gold coin, from the end of May to the middle of December, all at 4/. 5s. per oz., and for the last fortnight in December of that year, and the first fortnight in January, 1801, at4Z. 6s. per oz.; after which, with a trifling fluctuation, and a few intermediate transactions in the market, the price subsided in 1804 to 4/. per oz., at which^ for upwards of a year and a half, viz. from April 1804 to October 1805, there are quotations of both foreign and standard gold, not less than once a fortnight, and generally once a week, arguing great frequency of transactions Again, foreign gold is quoted in February and March 1809, at Al. lOs., and in April and May of the same year, at 4/. 1 I.s., from whence it fell to 4Z. 4s. 6 J. in November 1810. It may be of importance to bear these circumstances in mind, with a view to the cor- rectness of any estimate of the depreciation of bank-notes, as measured by the price of gold. This, however, is a point that may more properly be reserved for discussion, when we come to the consideration of the causes of the principal phenomena exhibited in the relative value of paper and gold. I will now proceed to oaminc the merits of this table, as tending to establish the fact, that " the constant and invariable connexion qfiiicrciti^e of price xcilh the Bank restriction, is a forcible inoqf of such a relation as that of cause and effect sidjsisting betzceen the txvo phenomena.^'' And I have no hesitation in pronouncing the document in ques- tion to be incomplete, inadequate to the object proposed, and calculated, as here I»rought forward, to lead to the most erroneous conclusions. 48 In the first place, it is incomplete and inadequate; be- cause it gives the prices, at intervals, of no less than five years each, between 1795 and 1805 ; and it so happens that 1800 and 1805, which form the points of comparison with the first of the series, include the great rise of necessaries immediately consequent upon two very bad harvests, viz. 1799 and 1804'. The intervals, too, which are passed over, include great fluctuations of price, arising from political ob- structions to importation, as well as from extraordinary casualties of the seasons. It does not state at what time in each year the prices were fixed ; a very important point, where the articles are furnished by contract, which include anticipations of cheapness or dearness, and therefore do not, in all instances, give the actual price in the general market. Nor, in the quotation of the price of meat, does it distin- guish the kind ; and by the way, it so happens, that in the parliamentary tables there is no such word as meat, the column being headed by the word^esh, which probably in- cludes pork : this is a material variance from the original documents, inasmuch as the supply of the navy during the war operated in a greater degree on the price of pork than on that of beef and mutton. In the next place, it is calculated to lead to the most erroneous conclusions ; for there is hardly one article, be- sides flour and meat, included in this extract from the Greenwich contract prices, that can be said to afford any fair ground of comparison forjudging of the relative value of money. Bntter and cheese are affected by the state of our political relations with Holland ; as we depend for part of our supplies on importation from thence. Malt ought not to be introduced, because its price, during the period referred to, includes a varying rate of taxation ; and because, divested of the tax, it must follow the price of barley. Car- penters' wages do not form a fair criterion of the general rate of wages through the country : their occupation re- quires more or less of skill, and it is a description of labour which, during the war, was in constant demand for the purposes of a progressive increase of ship-building, both for 4!) the navy and merchant service. Candles follow, at some interval, the fluctuations of tallow, and this again is an arti- cle, for a large proportion of which we depend on import- ation ; it is liable, therefore, to be affected in a very consi- derable degree, and indeed has been so affected, by obstruc- tions, arising from war or other causes, to our receiving the usual supplies from Russia; but, in point of fact, the price of tallow, and consequently of candles, was lower in 1807 than it had been in 1797. And as to coals, the freight forms so large a proportion of their cost, that the increase of their price proves little else than an increase of freight, which, it is well known, reached a very great height, in con- sequence of the peculiar circumstances of the war. Setting aside, then, the imperfect and inconclusive ex- tract from the Greenwich Hospital account, and referring to commodities on a larger scale for a comparison of prices, let us see how far the allegation of " the constant and inva- riable connexion of increase of price zaith the Bank restric- tion" is borne out by facts. The criterion most commonly referred to, by those who have treated of variations in the value of money, is the price of corn : now, referring for the prices of corn to a table * contained in the Commons' report of 1819 (p. 34' i), it will appear, on a careful inspection of it, that there is nothing like a progressive increase from 1797, commencing, as the reviewer, and so many writers and speakers before him, would lead the public to suppose in 1797. The fact i?, that a great rise occurred two years before the restriction ; that, for two years after, prices rather fell; and that, having again risen in consequence of two succes- sive bad seasons, combined with obstructions to importa- tion from abroad occasioned by the war, they con- tinued to fall till the summer of J 804, when they were as low as in the summer of 179'^, and lower than in January l797t. The comparison of the extreme points formed by * See Appendix to this part, No. 5. t The following extract from the account of Windsor prices of £ 50 these dates, beginning with the date of the Bank restriction, will stand thus : Wheat. Rye. Barley. Oats. Beans. Tease. Oatmeal. s. (I. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. Jan. 1797, r..'i 9 35 7 32 3 18 31 6 3G 6 39 5 Jan. 1804, 52 3 32 3 23 1 1 21 7 37 5 42 3 40 9 (Commons' Report on Resumption of Cash Payments, 1809,;?. 344.; wheat and malt at Eton College, inserted in the Appendix to the Lords' Report on the Corn Laws, 1814, (p. 141.) will serve to confirm this statement. Wheat per bushel. Malt per bushel. L. s. d. L. A'. d. 1792 Michaelmas 7 6 5 H 1 793 Lady Day 7 n 4 9 Michaelmas 6 4 5 2 1 794 Lady Day 6 6 5 3 Michaelmas 7 5 3 1795 Lady Day 8 10.^ 5 3 Michaelmas 11 6 5 5 1796 Lady Day 12 5 9 Michaelmas 8 01 5 1 1797 Lady Day 8 9 4 9 Michaelmas C 9 4 9 1798 Lady Day 6 9 4 9 Michaelmas 6 9 4 9 1799 Lady Day 7 4 4 9 Michaelmas 11 7 5 5 1800 Lady Day 15 9 8 8 Michaelmas 16 9 2 1801 Lady Day 1 2 li 11 2 Michaelmas 10 9 8 1802 Lady Day 8 6 6 2 Michaelmas 8 3i 6 2 1 803 Lady Day 7 6 4 8 Michaelmas 7 6 4 8 1804 Lady Day 7 4A 4 8 51 Hence it appears that there was a decided fall in the pi ice of corn, in the aggrcfrjite, after the lapse of seven years from the Bank restriction, instead of the progressive rise asserted so confidently to have been the necessary effect of that measure. And, although it may be an anticipation of what will come moie properly under consideration among the supposed effects of war on prices, I cannot resist the op- portunity of presenting by a reference to the same table, the following comparisons. Wheat. Rye. Barley. Oats. Beans. Pease. Oatmeal. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. Jan. 1794, 49 8 36 5 33 5 22 1 40 10 41 4 39 3 . . 1804, 52 3 32 3 23 11 21 7 37 5 42 3 40 9 Jul. 1793, 51 3 37 1 32 3 23 5 38 7 38 3 42 9 . . 1804, 52 1 34 27 3 24 1 35 11 38 5 39 6 Here, then, it is evident that, if allowances be made for the difference between paper and gold in the respective periods, the prices of wheat were really lower in the latter than in the former years, between which is an interval com- prising eleven years of war and seven years of Bank restric- tion ; and the prices of spring corn were clearly lower in the aggregate, without that allowance. And there is no doubt, keeping these extreme points in view, that the ex- traordinary fluctuations of price which characterized the intermediate period may be satisfactorily accounted for by a reference to the seasons. For it is matter of historical notoriety, and it may still be in the recollection of many of my readers, that the period in question comprised four sea- sons, viz. 179'!', 179.5, 1799, and 1800, which in their total produce, allowing for extended cultivation, and improve- ments in agriculture, were throughout Europe more defi- cient than any upon record since the memorable dearths at the close of the 17th century: there was likewise a large proportion of severe winters in that interval, and it is well known how great a difference there is between a long hard E 2 .52 winter and an open one, in the consumption of dry food by cattle. On this point I shall have occasion to dwell more at large hereafter. In the meantime, I ask, upon what ground of fact or reasoning can the high prices included in such a period be ascribed in fairness to alterations in the value of the currency beyond the degree indicated by the dif- ference between paper and gold, when, after a sufficient time has elapsed for tiie subsidence of the extraordinary cflPects of such an unusual succession of bad seasons, there is a restoration to a level even somewhat lower than that from which the rise is assumed to have taken place, and to have continued progressive /jj ? I have here confined the examination of the prices of corn to the interval ending with the summer of 1804, be- cause the bad harvest of that year, followed by two seasons of only average produce, occasioned a fresh range of high prices. In lbu7 there was a renewed tendency downwards, but that tendency was soon checked ; and at the close of that year commenced a fresh era, the phenomena of which will require separate consideration. My immediate purpose is merely to negative the assumed invariable connexion of the rise of prices with the continuance of the Bank restric- tion ; and it seems to me that this purpose is sufficiently an- swered, as far as relates to the price of corn, by the full proof here exhibited of the absence of such coincidence for so long a period as the first seven years of the series to which the assertion applies. The article next in importance to corn is meat. Under this term, and for the purposes of the present inquiry, [ in- clude only beef and mutton. Veal, lamb, and pork, depend so much on casualties of demand, as not to admit of any ac- curate average of price. Pork in particular seems in its produce to have scarcely kept pace with the war demand, and accordingly maintained its price, during part of the period to which I am about to refer, when beef and mutton fell. The quotations of beef and mutton at Smithfield market were. 53 .5. ll. s. d. •laiiiiary, 17D7, Beef 3 G to 4 6 Mutton '!• t to 5 .lanuaiy, 1808, Beef 3 () to 5 Mutton 4 4 to 5 4 (See Appendix, No. G.) Milking a difference, at the end of eleven years, so trifling as not to be worth mentioning. There was, indeed, as in the case of corn, an intermediate range of high prices as a consequence of the bad seasons of 1799 and 180'J — but for that very reason, those high piices should be excluded from any ground of inference as to the value of the currency. The following extract from an ac- count of the contracting prices at the Victualling Office, which unfortunately does not go farther back than the com- mencement of 1801, shows the high price which beef had reached after the bad seasons above mentioned, and how progressively it had declined till the end of 1808. The prices here quoted are stated to be for the supply of fresh beef at Deptford yard. 1801. Nov. 695. 7d. per twt. N. B. This is the first date quoted at Deptford ; but there is a quotation for Plymouth Yard in March, 1801, as high as 80*. per cvvt. 1802 No price quoted for Deptford; but the average for Plymouth in that year was bbs. 1803. Dec. 555. 6d. 1804 54*. 8r/. 1805 525. ad. 1806 505. 1807 No price at Deptford ; but at Plymouth it is quoted 455. 8(/. 1808 505. {Appendix to Lords' Report on the Corn Latvs, 1814, p. 137.) It may be worth while to add, as an instance of extraor- dinary fluctuation arising evidently from the effects of the .54 seasons, that the price paid by the \'icUialiing Office for flour in January, 18)1, was as high as \20s. per sack, and in May, 1804, as low as 3S5. 4cL As well might it be said that these instances of a fall in price after 1801 were proofs of an enhancement, or, as it has sometimes been called, an appreciation of the currency, as that the ribe between 1797 and 1801 should be thought to prove the depreciation. It has further been asserted, that laLour, as well as neces- saries, experienced a progressive advance during the period referred to. I have already suggested grounds of objection to the admission of the wages of carpenters, in and near London, as affording a sufficient ground of inference with respect to the general rate ofwages in the country : and the same objection applies, in point of principle, to the admis- sion of the higher price paid for some other descriptions of labour, which happened to be in great relative demand. It is clear that, during the progress of a war, on such a scale as the last, there must have been an unusual demand for full-grown able-bodied men ; and the encouragement held out to a great extension of tillage, during the same period, might be supposed to have added to the demand ; and as the supply could barely, within the period, keep pace with the extra demand, a considerable portion uf that description of pertons might naturally be expetted to command a high rate of wages. Of this description were soldiers, sailors, labourers in husbandry, carpenters, bricklayers, domestic men-servants, and many others. The greater pay which they (subject, however, to many important exceptions) re- ceived, would accordingly afford no grouiul of inference of diminution of the value of the currency beyond the difference between paper and gold*, i^ut the labour that did not * Upon consideration, I am disposed to admit, that tlie rise of wages, extending over such numerous classes of labourers, may l)c looked upon to be the general rule ; and the instances of de- pression, great and marked as they were, to have been the ex- 55 come witliiii the reach of such pecuHarity of demand appears not only not to liave experienced any rise, but actually, in several instances, to have fallen in price during the period in question. 'J'here is, from authentic sources, concurrent tes- timony to this effect. The following statements are extracted from the minutes of evidence in the Lords' Report of 1814 on the corn laws. It should be observed, that these statements were there brought forward to prove a connexion, or, more properly, u general coincidence, between a rise in the price of corn and a fall in the rate of wages, and vice versa. I have nothing to do, in the present stage of my argument, with that asserted connexion * ; it is sufficient for my pur- ceptions. But, admitting the rise of wages to have been as general as it has been assumed to be, the advance is fully ac- counted for, by the rise in the price of necessaries during the period referred to : for, it is clear, that if the accumulation of capital keeps pace with the population, there must be a rise of wages in some proportion to the rise, if this be of any consider- able duration, in the price of provisions and other necessaries of the labourer. The same causes, therefore, which may be adduced to account for the rise in the price of food and other necessaries of the labourer, may serve to account for the rise of wages, inde- pendent of the effect produced by the extra demand which I have noticed for particular descriptions of labour. And as, in point of fact, a great advance in wages occurred in 1795 and 1796, in consequence of the great scarcities immediately preceding the period of the Bank restriction, as moreover, in every instance of any subsequent general advance of money wages, during the in- terval from 1792 to 1814, it can be distinctly traced to a previous rise in the price of provisions, there is no ground whatever for the imputed connexion between the rise of labour and the Bank re- striction, beyond the difference between paper and gold. * From the above note it will be seen, that I do not as- sent to this assumed connexion, but on the contrary, that I am disposed to admit a connexion as in the relation of cause and effect, between a rise in the price of provisions, if of any duration, and an advance in the money wages of labour. At the pose that these statements, as far as tlioy go, prove the ne- gative, and, in some instances, the very reverse of the im- puted progressive advance in the price of labour, as well as of necessaries, from the date, and as a consequence, of the Bank restriction. Patrick Milne, Esq. M.P., examined: " Q. Can you state to the Committee any particular in- stance of agricultural work that you may have contracted for, in a dear year and a cheap year ? — A. I can state a very strong instance, that happened to myself last year : I wished to inclose a farm at the latter end of the year 1812 or the beginning of 1813: I sent for my bailiff, and told him, that I had inclosed, about twenty-five years ago, a good deal of land ; that the inclosure, at that time, cost me three shillings per ell of thirty -seven inches ; that a neighbour of mine, two or three years ago, had made similar inclo.sures, which cost him five shillings per ell ; that I thought he had paid too much, and that I ought to do it cheaper. The answer I got from my bailiff was, that provisions were very high ; that the labourers were doing double work; and that, of course, there was less demand for labour ; and that he could do those inclosures last year at a cheaper rate than I had ever done them ; and he actually executed this in- closure at about two shillings and sixpence per ell. He again came to me, and told me, that I had proposed to him to do some ditching and draining upon another farm, which I did not intend to do till about a twelvemonth after, from the circumstance of not being fully in possession of the whole farm : he requested I would allow him to do it that saujc tiuiej as there can be no doubt of the facts here stated, of a great depression of the wages of particular classes of labourers during periods of the greatest dearth, it may easily be imagined, tliat the sufferings of these classes must have been intense, and that great numbers must have perished in consequence, had it not been for the intervention of tlie Poor Laws, or of tlie benevolent contributions of individuals. •57 season, as he could do it so much cheaper ; and that a great many labourers were idle from having a little work, in con- secjuence of those who were employed doing double work. I desired him to go on with that labour likewise, and he actually contracted for very large ditches at sixpence an ell, which I do not think I could now do under from one shilling to one shilling and sixpence, in consequence of the fall in provisions. " Q. Have you any statement of the price of manufacturing labour, per piece now, in cottons, or in any other com- modity, for any number of years? — A. I have not, from Scotland ; I can very easily get them : but I was at some pains to endeavour to see how far those ideas I had with regard to labour applied to England ; and for that purpose I wrote to jSIanchester and to Stockport, to get statements of their labour in those quarters : and I have two statements, one from Blackburn, which gives the price of manufacturing a piece of common goods, such as they call 74 printing- calicoes, from 179C to ISH : it is here compared with the average price of grain in each year, taken from the record of the Windsor market, kept at Eton College." Mr. Milne delivers in two statements, which I have here compressed into one, omitting the column containing the price of wheat. .58 \rages for weaving the ^ 74s. \\ ages for weaving the 80^ Cumbric at Printing Calico m L unc;ishire. Stockport. Years. Ap ril. .TiiiiC. December. s. d. *. d. s. d. 17C2 8 1793 G 1794 G 1795 7 179C 7 1797 7 G 1798 7 21 6 21 6 1799 7 22 6 21 1800 8 21 21 1801 8 21 22 1802 10 24 23 in Sept. 25.v. 1803 9 20 IG 1804 7 G IG 20 1 805 8 G 19 15 180(5 7 G 15 11 G 1807 7 G 14 14 1808 5 G 11 12 G 1809 6 G IG 16 1810 8 G 15 6 10 1811 5 G 11 11 1812 6 G 11 6 11 1813 8 12 15 1814 10 16 to 17i. In April and May 20.9. to 21*., and some speculators 23)172 gave 225. to 23s. 7 6 aver. The Earl of Mansfield, a member of the committee, de- livered in a letter from his factor in Scotland, Mr. James Wood, containing answers to a set of queries, from which the following are extracts : Q. In what year of the last fourteen was manufacturing labour the lowest? — A. In the year 1811. Q. In what year of those fourteen was manufacturing labour the highest? — A. In the year 18"5. Q. What is the rate of manufacturing labour at present ? — A . A medium between the highest and lowest as above. 59 Tlie average price oi" weaving for the last fourteen years appears to be six shillings. In 1805, nine shillings was paid for weaving a piece; and in 1811, the same work was done as low as three shillings. Thel etter closes with the following passage : " The present rate of ploughman's wages is from sixteen pounds to eighteen pounds, having within these last three years declined from three to four pounds per annum. Day labour is two shillings in summer, and one shilling and sixpence in winter. In every case good hands are meant." The Earl of Lauderdale, likewise a member of the com- mittee, delivered in statements of which the following are copies, omitting only the prices of wheat, which have no- thing to do with my present object, viz. to negative the assertion of a necessary connexion between the Bank re- striction and a progressive advance in the price of labour. no Prices of IVeavinn- per Ell, paid at Glasgow: War. I'jnO Book Mus- 1200 Jaconot I00('5 wide Checks, stout lins 5 wide. -^ wide. made. d. d. d. 1 700 15 ^ 3 8 ^ = ^ -3 1791 15 •a 8 1 ^ -a 1792 1 793 15 15 8 > is .01 .-iikI 5i 179 \ 19 1 S (>^ 5| 17!»5 111 .2 'to 8 .2 '^ fi aiul Gi \79G HI lling addi taken oft Si (H 1797 1798 101 9i 7i 7i .E -^ 6i G 1799 91 ■5 S 71 > G and 6J- 1800 91 J= JO 74 0) -' GJ and 6| 1801 91 5 7f o 6f 1802 ^^? 6 "^ 6i and G 1 803 gfJ ^ C J -irN 5| 180-4 ^n 5^1 51 1 805 111 8^ 5i i 806 12 «.^ 6 1807 <^l flj ^'t O 5i to 6;^ 1808 1809 P G G toGJ 1810 8 55 L'arlvGi to 7i, latterly 51 1811 5 3i 5' to Si 1812 G| 5 51 1813 7f C 5^ and 6 1814 H) 7 . G And not only is the j^f'ogressive advance in necessaries and wages which has been ascribed to the Bank restriction, in a degree beyond the difference between paper and gold, negatived by a reference to the facts which have been here brought forward ; but by the following table it will appear that several leading articles, constituting the raw materials of some of our most important branches of manufacture, besides the principal articles of colonial produce, were as low in 1807 as they had been in the spring of 1797, and in some instances lower. (31 Tablr of Prices, c.rclnsire of Dtiti/ on Impnrfniinn, c.rfraclcd from Vrtncc's Price Curreiil*. Cotton. . Coorgia per lb. PernainhiK'o . licniral& Smut Coffee. . li. 1*. superior, per cut inferior . . Iron .. Swedish p, ton Riissiau .... Madder Dutch p. cwt. Oil .... Galipolyp.ton Greenland . . . Linseed R ape Pepper . E. India black per lb Saltpetre .... per cwt. Silk .... Piedmontese thrown, p.lb. l^eggio Bengal Sugar . . B. P. Jamaica per cwt. . . . E. I. white . . brown. . Refined loaves Tallow . Russia, Y. C. Tar .... American per barrel . . . . Swedish . . . . Tobacco Virginia p. lb. 179 7. £. 5. d. £. s. (l. 1 2 3 1 11 2 2 10 1 5 f) 14 7 5 5 4 G 12 21 10 22 10 20 21 1 10 4 If) 51 70 36 38 50 52 38 40 1 U 1 2i IG 2 19 7 1 13 3 1 G 9 17 2 12 3 14 2 15 3 18 1 10 2 10 4 12 5 12 2 IG 3 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 5 61 9 1807. ,£. .f. d. JO. s. d. 10 12 19 1 10 10 12 5 18 8 4 5 6 10 19 10 20 10 15 10 20 10 17 4 IG G3 G.5 2G 27 36 37 36 37 7i 2 16 2 17 1 10 1 17 18 19 7 12 14 2 18 1 15 3 10 10 2 15 2 10 3 17 2 1;; 2 14 110 13 16 17 4 8 * There is some variation in the quotations of prices from those in the first edition of this work. The difTereuce arises from my having taken tliem, in the first instance, from manuscript draughts of the compiler of the table of prices for the Appendix to Part IV. That manuscript afterwards underwent corrections ; and it is in order to make the quotations correspond with the printed tables that the alterations are now made. These altera- tions, however, are very trilling, and do not, in the slightest de- gree, affect the reasoning or impair the strength of the conclusion deduced from the comparison of the periods in question. 6^2 And of such articles as were higher in 1807 tlianin 1797 there is not one that I am aware of, of which it may not be proved that it existed in a state of scarcity real or appre- hended (relatively to the computed rate of consumption) either from the casualties of the seasons, or from obstruc- tions and increased charges of importation, or from extra war demand. Thus in 1800 and 1801, hemp, from the combined effect of the great demand by the navy, and of an apprehended failure of supply from Russia, in consequence of an embargo by the Emperor Paul, advanced to 86/ per ton ; but it afterwards declined, and in the spring of 1 804 was at 47/. to 4S7., being about 8/. per ton lower than it had been in the spring of 1 797. It rose again subsequently to 1804 in consequence of the precariousness of the state of our intercourse with Russia. The same remark applies to timber and other articles of importation from the Baltic, Having brought the comparison of the prices of commo- dities down to 1807, and proved the absence of any ob- servable connexion of the state of them with the Bank restriction beyond the difference (which was then the most trifling imaginable) between paper and gold, I shall pro- ceed to the examination of the extraordinary fluctuations which have characterized the subsequent period. But those fluctuations were so strikingly accompanied with corresponding variations in the amount of private paper and credit, that the consideration of the circumstances affecting the one will necessarily include a reference to the other. Preparatory, therefore, to entering upon the further ex- amination and comparison of prices, I shall proceed to the explanation, which I had reserved at page 43, of the cir- cumstances upon which any great and sudden variations in the amount of private paper and credit depend. 6J SECTION VII. Explanation of the Causes of the Extension and Contraction of private Paper and Credit. The circumstances most conducive to an enlargement and contraction of the circulation of private paper are identical with those which give rise to a spirit of speculation and over-trading on the one hand, and to stagnation and despondency on the other. The circumstances which give rise to a spirit of specula- tion and over-trading are scarcity, or, in other words, de- ficiency of the supply of some important article or articles compared with the average consumption, and the opening of new and extensive markets, or, in general, of any new sources of demand. Agricultural produce, which forms by far the largest portion as well as the most valuable class of commodities? and which, as it includes the subsistence of the labourer, and supplies the raw materials of some manufactures, affects the value of many other commodities, is that of which any casual scarcity most powerfully contributes to a temporary increase of the circulation of private paper. A great pro- portion of country bank notes is, or was, issued upon the security of landed property and farming stock, upon the stock of country corn-dealers and millers, and upon the personal security of tradesmen within the district of the banks. Now it is clear that upon the occurrence of any tendency to a rise in the price of corn and other agricultural produce from actual or apprehended scarcity, there will be an increased disposition on one side to borrow, and on the other an increased confidence in lending. Some may have 64 in view to buy in anticipation of their own eventual wants, or on speculation of being able to resell at a profit, or to be enabled to purchase landed properly which then appears a beneficial investment. Others are disposed to borrow with a view of being enabled to hold Tor a longer period the articles which they are already possessed of, in the ex- pectation of realizing prices so much higher as will over- balance the expenses of keeping. On the other hand, the lenders, under these circumstances, feel eveiy inducement of interest to extend their advances : if the personal or other security previously offered were just sufficient, it now becomes ample by the rise iji prices which has already oc- curred, and by the further rise which on such occasions is always confidently expected. Thus, a scarcity of agri- cultural produce, which would, under a fixed amount of currency, advance money prices in a ratio more or less be- yond the mere proportion of deficiency, is the occasion of an actual increase in the amount of the circulating medium, which increase is again, while progressive, the occasion of accelerating the rate, and extending the range of the rise in prices. The same effect of generating an increased amount of private paper, and an increased disposition to substitute credit for currency, is observable in the case of a casual deficiency of any other articles of general consumjnion. Thus, any decided deficiency of wool, or cotton, or sugar, &c. will induce speculation, and a multiplication of paper or of transactions on mere credit, in the branches of trade connected with those articles, and according to the number and extent of them, will the effect be perceptible, or not, on the mass of the circulation. Next in importance to a scarcity of agricultural produce, or of imported commodities, as affecting the quantity of private paper, and the amount of operations on credit, is the opening of new and extensive markets. Such openings, when presented to the enterprising spirit of the merchants and manufacturers of this country, are generally seized with avidity, and entered upon to an extent, in most instances, much beyond what the eff'S08 and 18(^9, wlion the obstructions to importation, from political causes, nearly reached their height. And it was about the same time that the deficiency of our own growth of agricultural produce, from the unfavourableness of the seasons, concurred, wiiii the difficulty of obtaining relief by importation, to extend the spirit of speculation to corn. The scarcity, however, of other commodities being first felt, and, in some instances, an apprehension being entertained of a total failure of foreign supply, these took the lead in ex- liibiting examples of the most rapid advance of price. After the attack on Copenhagen, and the final withdraw- ing of our naval and military forces from thence, Russia and Denmark joined in the war against us. The Baltic being thus shut against any direct commercial intercourse with this country, it was not clear that any part of our usual supplies of necessary articles from thence could be obtained by any channel, however circuitous, or at any expense, how- ever great. It was naturally supposed that Russia might, whether compelled by France, or of her own accord, make a point of depriving this country of some of the materials essential to the maintenance of a navy ; and of these the foremost was hemp. This article, in consequence of such apprehensions, advanced from 58/. in the summer of 1807, to 1 18/ per ton, in the course of 1808. Flax, on nearly the same grounds, rose from (58/. to 142/. per ton. Memel timber reached 1?/. per load; having varied, during 1806-7, tVom 3/. 13.s. to 8/. lOs. Deals and other descriptions of wood in proportion. The following are some of the many other articles that participated in the advance : — Baltic linseed rose from 43a. to 1 50s. per quarter. Russia tallow rose from 535. to 1 I2s. per cwt. In consequence of the occupation of Spain by the French, it was imagined that the exportation of wool from thence would be rendered impracticable, or that, at any rate, the unsettled state of that kingdom would materially diminish 71 the produce. Under this impression a very great specula- tion was entered into, and the price rose from 6s. Id. and 65. 9 /. to 22-. and 265 per lb. for the Leonessa, and from 2.S. (id. and 5s. to 1.35. and 1 H^'. for Seville. Our principal dependence for a supply of silk was, at that time, on Italy ; and there was a double ground on which the French, who then exercised dominion over the whole of that country, would do their utmost to prevent our obtaining any from thence. One motive would be that of distressing us, and another would be that of giving a more decided superiority to their own manufactures. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that this article advanced con- siderably, viz. Piedmont thrown silk, from 305. and 425. to 96s. and 112,9. The orders in council on our part, and the non-inter- course acts, and various embargoes, on the part of the United States of America, were calculated to favour specu- lations in the produce of that country ; and accordingly Georgia cotton advanced from 9^. and l.v. to 2^. and 25 6c/. per. lb., and Virginia tobacco from 4:d. and 8d. to 1,9. 4d. and 2s. per lb. Corn, as before mentioned, was not among the foremost of these objects of speculation, because, though the harvest of 1807 was not one of general abundance, nor had the two preceding ones been of more than average produce, so as to create any considerable surplus, it was not decidedly de- ficient; and the price was already at a somewhat elevated range; but the crops of 1808 were partially deficient ; and as the deficiency, however small, could not be made up but by an importation, which was only practicable at an enor- mous expense of freight and other charges, amounting on wheat, in some instances, to 505. the quarter, and upwards, over and above the prime cost ; a speculative demand arose upon the prospect thus held out, of security against inter- ference by importation, except as a consequence of a great rise. The spirit of speculation, thus directed, was confirmed and extended by the result of the harvest of 1809, which was in every respect a bad one ; got in late, and in a damp sprouted condition ; deficient in quantity, and interior in quality. Several other articles niifrjit be enumerated as having ad- vanced considerably, in consequence of actual or appre- hended scarcity arising from the peculiar state of politics. Those which I have mentioned are sufficient to prove that the most important of the two principal conditions on which I have stated the sudden enlargement of private paper to depend, viz. scarcity, actual or apprehended, of agricul- tural produce, and of other articles of extensive consump- tion, was fulfilled in the amplest manner. Now it so happened that the cause next in importance, tending to the same effect, viz. the opening of new markets for our exports, came into operation contemporaneously with the former. The transfer of the seat of government from Portugal to the Brazils, and the virtual emancipation of the Spanls'i colonies from the control of the mother country, opened the trade of a great part of South America in ] 808 ; and as, by the course of the war, we possessed the entire dominion of the seas, it was, in fact, to this country, exclusively of the rest of Europe, that this opening was pre- sented. So vast and comparatively untried a field was not held out in vain to the merchants and manufacturers of this country; and, accordingly, the spiiit of speculation was on the alert to export every article that might, not only pro- bably, but possibly, come into demand. On such an occa- sion there was abundant scope for the display of the avidity, miscalculation, and delusion, which commonly accompany, and possibly may be necessary, however lamentable, con- sequences of the activity, industry, and enterprise which characterise our mercantile and manufacturing interests. Shipmeiits were made to South America to an amount much beyond the proportion of capital which the adven- turers could fairly command, and still more beyond what the consumption of tiie places, for which the investments were destined, could absorb upon the condition of making 73 adequate returns. The same remark applies, in many re- spects, to the shipments to the Baltic, Heligoland, and to Malta, which were, for all practicable purposes, new markets, being resorted to chiefly by new adventurers, who were tempted by the prospect of extraordinary gain, if they eluded the anti-commercial decrees of Bonaparte, and of those powers which were subservient to him; for most of the old establishments had given up altogether, or had sus- pended, till the return of peace, their intercourse with the ports on the Continent, from which, during that period of the war, all direct communication was cut off, As usual, in such cases, the event proved that the prospect of gain was exaggerated, and the risk underrated. These causes of over-trading in speculative exports, coin- ciding with the inducements held out by scarcity to specu- lation in agricultural produce and in imported commodities, combined to realize the process by which private paper is generated and augmented ; and, accordingly, the extension of it was probably greater and more sudden within the two years, viz. 1808 and 1S09} to which I am referring, than had ever before been witnessed within a similar pei'iod. As a large proportion of these speculations took place in 1808, I am satisfied, as well upon the grounds already stated, as from my own distinct recollection of the state of the cir- culation in London, and from what information I had of the state of the country circulation, that the increase of private paper, and of transactions on credit in that year, was very con- siderable, I can recollect, moreover, that there was a great briskness in the general circulation ; a rapidity in the inter- change between goods and money or credit, which is an in- variable attendant on speculative periods. This great increase of paper and of transactions on credit, produced by circumstances favourable to speculation, oc- curred in the first instance, be it observed, unaccompanied by any extension worth mentioning of Bank of England notes; but in 1809, the causes of extended circulation of private paper and credit still subsisting in a greater or less degree, the Bank of England (instead of diminishing its 74 issues, as it ought to have done, with a view to counterba- hince the increase of private paper, and to arrest the fall of the exchantres which had taken phice rapidly at the close uf 18)8) extended the amount of its notes by nearly two mil- lions ; and this extension of Bank of England paper, coming in aid of the increased amount of private paper, doubtless contributed to extend the range of high prices, in the degree marked by the further depression of the exchanges, which continued to fall progressively till the spring of 1810. As, however, the prices of the articles referred to had risen in 1 y()8, in some instances, to their greatest height, without any extension of Bank of England paper, so a large pro- portion, or indeed nearly all of them, fell considerably in the course of 1 8 i 0, notwithstanding an enlargement of the Bank circulation, of no less an amount than seven millions * above what it had been in 1808: and as the growth of private paper had, with the advance of prices in 18( 8, been unac- companied by any increase of Bank paper ; so the destruc- tion of an unprecedented amount of private paper, attended by a fall of prices, rapid beyond example, occurred simul- taneously with the largest addition ever made, within an equal space of time, to the circulation of the Bank of England. The circumstances which led to this fall of prices, and destruction of private paper, were a restoration of compara- tive abundance of commodities for home consumption, and a reaction from the speculative shipments of the two pre- ceding years. As real or apprehended scantiness of supply, and an exaggerated anticipation of demand, had led to high prices and an enlargement of the circulation of private paper, so returning abundance and postponed demand occasioned a recoil of prices and a reduction of private paper to the level from whence both had risen. That there was iu 1808 * 26th Aug. 1808 - - LA7,36'o,2C)C, 26th Aug, 1810 - - 24,446,175 CAppendir to Commons' Report, \S\9, p.2%\.J a real scantiness of supply*, compared with the average consumption, of all the articles which became the objects of speculation, may be proved by reference to the quantities imported of foreign commodities, and to the notoriety of the fact of a decidedly bad harvest in UO!), as affecting our own agricultural produce. This actual deficiency was itself sufficient to justify a great part of the rise; and as, in the early part of the grand experiment (which I date from the close of 1807 and beginning of iSOS) made by Bonaparte to exclude this country from all intercourse with the Con- tinent of Europe, it was uncertain whether a considerable and almost indefinite period might not elapse before the deficiency could be relieved by importation, a further rise was necessary upon two grounds; the one to limit con- sumption, and the other to hold out a sufficient inducement to overcome the very great obstructions to importation. The advance proved, indeed, as is usual in cases of speculation, to be more than adequate to both these purposes. The stocks of those articles which had been most scarce were eked out by economy in the consumption, and, in some in- stances, by the employment of substitutes ; as, for example, * Of the falling off of supply, take the following iiistiinces ; many others might be brought forward, which it would be tedious to enumerate. Lnports into Great- Britain. 1806 1807 1808 Sheep and Lambs' Wool. lbs. 7,333,993 11,708,926 2353,725 Raw and Thrown Silk. lbs. 1,317,841 1,123,9-43 776,114 1 Cotton. lbs. 58, 176,283 74,925,306 43,605,982 And, to show how the importations afterwards increased : 1809 1810 6,845,933 10,936,224 1,199,935 1,792,206 92,812,282 136,488,935 76 iron was extensively substituted for hemp and timber. At the same time, measures were taken, by means of Hcences from the government of this country, and of simulated pa- pers, which were calculated to lull the vigilance or satisfy the scruples of the governments which were the unwilling tools of the French, to obtain a supply by importation. — These measures, which were successful in the main object of obtaining an adequate supply, did not come fully into operation, as to the bulk of the commodities in question, till different periods in 1809 and 1810 ; but between the close of 1809 and the summer of 1810 the importation became considerable. In the summer of 1810, likewise, the coming harvest, for which fears had been entertained, assumed a favourable aspect. There was, accordingly, by the summer of 1810, a great fall in the price of nearly all the articles which had experienced any considerable rise in the two pre- ceding-years; and of a large proportion of them the fall was to the level from whence they had, in that interval, risen, and in a few instances lower. 77 2 ^ o S5 P »J -• 3 . S . 2. § o-cr? s o c :^ n n 05 OJ o< ►-H-tOrf^bOKJCn^JOOl-ioOOO 1— 'COrfi.OWWOOtOClOOO'— o OOOOOOOOOi^^O^O^OO ■ f .a ^ 2 «> ^ s a. o 1^ ^l CO C5 — t—COOCOCOOOOOtOOOOO GOOitOOUitOOOOiOJtOOi— '^>— 1— ■ OOOOOOOOW«OO00Wi— K) ao era H- ?i,l H-i-"K)00tC0-'5Oi-4OOi-'OOOO ooo-ao^oooboajtoooi-'O c, ^ O00000000i-JO>U«OGO«0 00 4i. — oioooootooooooitotoi—tobo OOOOOOOOOOOOO^Oi •- _ »-r ^1 O ^J tOltOWCOOirfi.OCr>OOtOOOOOr~- _ 5: CO S. I §■• GC en — o - 2 ?:*, " 00 OOOOOOOOOOO — O5C0~J' • 1— o I— ►- — -JtOC*5QO^OOtOOOOOr- I— w>— ooo — ooio^ji-oo — of I ©oooooooajsowoi.K)-^?-*'' — ** While this great fall was taking place in the price of the bulk of imported commodities, a total stop was put to our exports to the Baltic, by the extensive confiscations which had occurred in the ports of Germany, Prussia, and Russia. The returns, too, from South America were now coming round, and these left a ruinous loss to the exporters, many of whom had bought the goods on credits maintained by the circulation of accommodation paper. From the close, therefore, of 1S09, through 1810, there was a complete exemplification of the circumstances which I have described as being conducive to a reduction of pri- vate paper, and to a diminution of transactions on credit, viz. stagnation and despondency, as succeeding to a state of speculation and over-trading. And so many circumstances on so large a scale combining in the same direction, the re- duction of private paper, the destruction of credit, and the fall of prices, were greater and more rapid than were ever before or have since been known to have occurred vvithin so short a space of time. A general dismay prevailed throughout nearly all branches of trade during the last six months of 1810 and the few first months of the following year, when the depressing causes had acquired their greatest influence. The following extracts, which I have made from the commercial reports inserted at the end of each number of the Monthly Magazine, convey the best and most accurate description, that I have met with, of the state of distress which then prevailed. Monthly Commercial Report , \st An gust ^ 1810. " Tlie failures of several houses of the very first respectability, both at London and in different provincial towns of Great Britain, have, within the last month, been unprecedented in number and importance. A West India broker, who has long been considered the first in his line, was, we are told, the prime cause of the stoppage of a banking-house, whose credit was previously unim- peached. The several banks in the country, connected with the 79 London liouse, of course shared its fate, and from tliem the evil spread to merchantSj inauufacturers, traders, and, in short, to the very servants and dependants of these, niinibors of whom are thrown out of employment, and their families deprived of bread. Speculations in Spanish wool, an article which has fallen about fifty per cent, are considered as the origin of those unlooked-for disasters. Five Manchester houses have stopped payment in the city, and, we are sorry to add, have involved numerous industri- ous persons, both in town and country, in their ruin. The de- mands upon the five houses are said to amount to tivo mUlions; but it is supposed that their real property will ultimately cover all deficiencies. Speculative exports to South America are the rock upon which these houses have split. In consequence of these unexpected events, public credit is at the present moment as low as ever it has been in the memory of man ; the fluctuation of price in the money market is unprecedented, and the depression so considerable, that omnium is fallen to two and a half per cent, discount. We understand that some respectable merchants have v^'aited upon the Bank directors, in order to solicit their aid to- wards tlie alleviation of the burthens with which our internal commerce is at present borne down. The result of this applica- tion is not as yet publicly known j we trust it will prove favour- able. The renewal of our intercourse with the United States of America has in some sort benefited the manufacturing interests ; but this felicitous effect is almost swallowed up in the vortex of those calamities, which it has been our painful duty to record. '• Holland. — All trade between Great Britain and this devoted country is completely put a stop to by the rigorous execution of the French Emperor's anti-commercial decrees. It is even re* ported that the captains and part of the crews of two vessels were shot for violating the prohibition. " Prussia. — Money is so extremely scarce in the Prussian ports, that the merchants can with difficulty collect sufficient to defray the import duties ; and interest is represented to be at the extm- vagant rate of two and a half per cent, per month." l5^ December., 1810. " A numerical evidence of the present state of trade may be 80 deduced from the number of bankruptcies In the London Gazette, inserted in this Magazine : They amounted this month, in 1810, to 273 The same month, — 1809, — 130 Ditto ... — 1808, — 100 Ditto ... — 1807,— 9/ Ditto ... — 1806, — 65 Ditto ... — 1805, — 87 Ditto ... — 1804, — 60 Besides stoppages and compositions, equal in number to half the traders in the kingdom ! These failures throughout the kingdom have wonderfully affected the manufacture of every description of goods, and a general want of confidence exists between the ma- nufacturer and the export merchant. The speculators at Liver- pool have completely overstocked the different markets of South America, where, at present, English manufactured articles can be purchased at a loss of twenty per cent, to the exporter, with the exception of a few articles, on which little or no credit could be obtained here." 1.9/ Ja/nuary^ 1811. " In our last Report we stated the vast increase of bankrupt- cies within the last month, compared with similar mouths for seven years back, and we regret to say that they still continue to increase in number, and that confidence in the mercantile world seems nearly at an end. " Discount, unless bills, &c. of a few of the first houses in the city, can only be done through the medium of bill-brokers at an extra commission, exclusive of the regular interest. " In Lancashire, the cotton manufacturers appear by the late Gazettes, as well as by private information, to be greatly distressed, and business quite at a stand. In Manchester, and other places, houses stop not only every day, but every hour. Cotton wool is in no demand at any price, and no export of the manufactured goods, except a few fine sorts to Rio, &c. The trade of Birmingham, Sheffield, &c. quite at a stand, and no orders for execution there, except a icw for our home-consump- tion. At London, Liverpool, and Bristol, the king's stores are 81 full of all kinds of colonial produce, as coffee, sugar, rum, &,c. for security of their duties, and the proprietors in the greatest pos- sible distress, not being able to force sales of these articles." To prove that these are not exaggerated descriptions of the commercial distress which prevailed in this country at that period, I need only refer to tlie parliamentary debates in the spring of 1811, from which I have made as many extracts as my limits will permit. Extracts from the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the State of Commercial Credit, 1th March, 1811. " Your committee found that memorials had been presented to his majesty's treasury, towards the latter end of the last and the beginning of the present year, stating the great embarrassmenta and distress v.hich wqvq felt amongst the manufacturers in the cotton trade in Glasgow and Paisley and their vicinity, and prav- ing for public assistance j that the same were confirmed by the representation of a meeting held in the city of London on the 12th of February, which sent a deputation to wait upon the Chan- cellor of the Exchequer with a copy of the resolutions ado.pted at that meeting. These resolutions your committee have inserted in the appendix to this report. " Your committee found, by the evidence of the witnesses thev examined, that those statements and representations were founded on fact. " It appeared to your committee, that the principal part of the distress which was complained of had arisen out of great and ex- tensive speculations, which commenced upon the opening of the South American markets in the Brazils and elsewhere, (o the adventures of British merchants. " Your committee also found that great distress was folt in a quarter which was much connected with this trade, namely, amongst the importers of produce from the foreign West India islands and from South America. " That great part of the returns for the manufactures which G 82 were exported to those parts of the world came home in sugars and coffee, which not being entitled to sale in the home market, tliere were no immediate means of realizing their value. " These representations of the distress experienced in the trade of the cotton manufacturer and exporter, and from the want of market for foreign colonial produce, were also confirmed by respectable merchants and traders in London ; who also stated that the embarrassments were felt in other branches of trade, not connected witli foreign commerce or colonial produce." Extract Jt'om the Speech of the Chaticellor of the Excheguei-, in tJie Debate on the Commercial Credit Bill. " The consideration of this important subject, he observed, divided itself into three heads : — first, the nature and extent of the evils which the manufactures and commerce of the country were enduring ; — secondly, what were the causes of those evils; — and, thirdly, the measures by which the evils might with the greatest probability be removed, ^^'ith respect to the first of these considerations, he apprehended there could be no difference of opinion whatever, but that the nature and extent of the distress described in the Report of the Select Committee rendered it ad- visable that parliament should, if possible, adopt some measure by which that evil might at least be diminished. It appeared distinctly by the report, that the distress, originating with the merchant, and disabling him from paying the manufacturer, was felt most severely by the manufacturer and those employed by him. All the principal manufacturers had been compelled to con- tract, and some wholly to suspend their works. It appeared by the report that there was scarcely a cotton manufacturer in the kingdom who had not diminished, by one half, the number of persons employed in his mills ; and that many of the smaller ma- nufacturers had discharged their people altogether. It appeared also that those who were retained by the first description of ma- nufacturers were retained at a reduced rate of wages. The con- sequences must necessarily be, as they were represented to be in the report of the Select Committee, that the most calamitous distress prevailed throughout many of the manufacturing districts. The report also stated that the merchants who traded with the 83 Western World, not being able to find an adequate market for their produce, this circiiinstaiice aggravated the distress of tlie manufacturers 5 and the whole operating upon the other brandies of trade, although not immediately connected with those to which he had referred, produced a general want of confidence, and suspension of credit, which rerpiired the prompt and effectual application of some adequate remedy." The commercial distress of that period was not confined to the United Kingdom. It prevailed on the Continent of Europe, as may be observed by the foregoing extracts : and that the same description of distress applied to the com- merce of the United States, will appear from the following extract of a letter from New York, dated 1 1 th of February, 1811, communicated to me by a friend largely interested at that time, as well as at the present, in the trade with that country. " Such times for money were never known, and all confidence among merchants is totally and indeed very justly destroyed. Since the middle of December we have had between sixty and seventy failures in this city, and many more are expected to fail in the course of this and the following month." I am indebted to the same friend for the following ex- tract of a letter from his Liverpool house, dated 22d of Nov. 1810. " Liverpool, Nov. 22, 1 8 1 0. " The effects of a vast import of colonial and American pro- duce, far above the scale of our consumption at the most pros- perous periods of our commerce, and attaining a magnitude hitherto unknown to us, have, in the present cramped state of our inter- course with the Continent, developed themselves in numerous bankruptcies, widely spreading in their influence, and unpre- cedented in extent of eml)arrassment ; it is but fair, however, to G 2 84 ascribe a portion of these evils to the consequences of a sanguine indulgence of enterprise in extensive shipments of our manufac- tures to South America, which so confidently followed the ex- pedition to La Plata, and the removal of the government of Portugal to Brazil : they are further aided by the speculations which prevailed during the various stages of the American non- intercourse, and which, unfortunately, were not confined to the duration of the circumstances which excited them. In the struggle to support themselves, the speculators have had recourse to new and extensive engagements in the face of prol>abilIties and facts too incontrovertible to have been slighted, until the united action of the accumulating imports, and the want of an adequate vent, have overwhelmed them. The event only can enable us fully to appreciate the efiects of this imprudence, which more than any preceding defalcations have involved the mercantile character of our country, and destroyed confidence in a degree that will require a long period of prosperous circumstances to retrieve." I have been the more minute in dwelling upon the com- mercial history of tluit period for the following reasons : It exemplifies in the fullest manner the causes of the great fluctuations in the quantity of private paper. It proves that the largest addition ever made within so short a time to the amount of the Bank of England issues * was insufficient to replace fully the amount of private paper destroyed within the same period : for, on a reference to the price of gold and to the state of the foreign exchanges, it will be seen that the former fell from 4/. lis. which it had been at in May, 1809, to 4l. 45. 6d. in Nov. 18 10; and the exchange on Hamburg rose from 2^s. Bd in Nov. 1809, to 31*. 9cL in Sept. 1810 f. It negatives the assumed progressive advance of prices, from the supposed effect of the Bank restriction in di- minishing the value of the currency in a degree much be- * See pnge 42. t Commons' Report, 1819. Appendix, p. 302 and 304. 85 yond th<] difference h^'txceen paper and gold; and suggests adecjuate and intelligible causes for the great variations in price, which occurred in the interval between the close of 1807 and beginning of 1811. Jt proves the total want of foundation for the assertions and inferences contained in the following passage in the article in the Review from which I have so often (iuoted : " We know that when the commerce of a country is in a high degree of prosperity, the balance of payments is in fa- vour of that country ; and this balance is, in the regular state of the currency, indicated by a rise in the exchange. Now it is undeniable that, during the greater part of that period of which we are treating, the trade of the country was in a state of unexampled prosperity. Never were our manufactures more active, nor our shipping more employed. It is needless to dwell upon a fact so notorious. Yet during the whole of that period the exchanges were nominally un- favourable. In 18 10 the depression was so great as to indi- cate a loss of twenty-five per cent, or more with Hamburg. Yet no check had been given to our commerce. On the contrary, the only complaint heard was of the practice of over-trading, encouraged by the extraordinary profits realised yi almost every branch of trade." Such opinions are not confined to the writer of that article ; they prevail pretty generally among persons who are not in business, or who, if in business, are not old enough to have had any direct experience of the vicissitudes attending the period referred to. And as in those tremend- ous fluctuations so large a number of commercial establish- ments were swept away, without leaving a trace of their having existed, the proportion of individuals, who were in- terested in, and who have survived, that critical period, is probably very small compared with those who only know as a matter of general notoriety, that a range of high prices prevailed about the time referred to, and who have no idea of high prices, but as a sign of prosperity. It may, perhaps, be wortli while to venuak that it \vas about the time when the distresses of 1810 were beginning to manifest themselves, that the Bullion Committee, which was appointed in the spring of that year, made its report : and I well remember that among those who were suffering at that period, it was no uncommon thing (more especially with such persons as were advocates for an unlimited paper currency) to ascribe the whole of the fall of prices, and the consequent distress, to the doctrines and recommendations contained in that report. They little thought how innocent the report was of the effects imputed to it ; for, in fact, as has been already stated, the Bank enlarged its issues at that precise period very considerably, without any apparent reference, or rather deference, to the sound and unanswer- able reasonings contained in that luminous production. The recoil of prices of agricultural produce which took place in the summer of 1810, as a consequence of the favourable weather which prevailed during the getting in of the harvest, was of very short duration. The wheat was got in in good condition, and being brought quickly to market, at the same time that a large importation was pour- ing in, the fall of price was rapid ; those who had spe- culated on the previous bad weather were severe sulFerers. and many corn-dealers, among others, were ruined ; a cir- cumstance which contributed, with the others which I have noticed, to contract the issue of paper. But in the following winter it was discovered that the wheat had not escaped injury from the unfavourableness of the early part of the season, and that it was below an average produce; inso- much that, notwithstanding a large importation, the total stock for sale was not more than adequate, at comparatively high prices, to meet the contingencies of a new harvest, 'i'he hay crops, too, proved deficient in an extraordinary degree; which contributed to keep up the price of cattle. And, as in the following year, viz. 1811, there was a great failure of the wheat crop, the prices of agricultural produce 87 generally resumed a tendency upwards ; and the interval of depression in the latter part of 1810 was so short and so partial, that it had no influence upon rents or upon the value of land. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, if the agricultural interest is considered as having proceeded in a course of prosperity unchecked by the events which were so severely felt by the mercantile and manufacturing in- terests, during the period referred to. 88 SECTION IX. Fluctuation of Prices and of the Amount of Private Paper from 1811 to 1816. The suffering state of commerce did not continue, how- ever, in the same degree of intensity beyond the spring of 181 1, when it seems to have reached its height. At that time, as we have seen, it attracted the notice and interference of Parhament. An act was passed in April, 1811, granting a sum, not exceeding six millions of Ex- chequer bills, to be advanced by commissiom rs to the dis- tressed merchants and manufacturers, by way of loan on adequate security. This measure, in consequence of which, however, not more than two millions were eventually ad- vanced, was then, as it probably is still, supposed to have arrested the tendency to depression, and to have contri- buted to the subsequent revival of trade. In that opinion I did not and do not participate. If the causes of abundance of commodities at home and our exclusion from foreign ports had continued, there would have been no ground for a rise of prices : and if prices had not risen, the parties who borrowed the Exchequer bills would have been injured in- stead of benefited by the facility of holding their goods so much longer ; as they would thereby have incurred loss of interest, warehouse rent, and other expenses, and must at last have submitted to the same, if not to lower, prices than they might originally have obtained. But whether the measure was or was not calculated to do the good intended, I believe that it did not come into operation at all, till circumstances had occurred favourable to a revival of the spirit of speculation, and consequently, to a removal of the causes of the then existing distress. 80 Those cii'cumstancca were, the complete expulsion of the French from Portugal, and the progress of the British army in Spain, which opened nearly the whole Peninsula to a commercial intercourse with this country ; the glut of our exports to South America and the West Indies had been carried ofFby low prices, and a brisk demand had succeeded ; the intention of Russia to resist the French was becoming manifest, and an anticipation was confidently entertained of a relaxation of the prohibitions against imports into the Russian ports. The progress of improvement is described in the follow- ing extracts from the periodical work which I have before quoted : Montlily Comviercml Report, \st Jtine, 1811. " The expulsion of the French out of Portugal has once more opened a trade with that country, and, in consequence of it, vast quantities of goods of the manufacture of Great Britain are now shipping for Lisbon and Oporto, among which the manufactures of Manchester, &c. will not be of the least in quantity. Linens, calicos, and woollen cloths, are in great demand in Portugal. " South America. — In our last we stated the trade of this country to be rather brisk, and have the pleasure now to say tliat every mail from the Brazils confirms it." ^ St July, ISn. " Since our last report, the manufactories have revived in a great degree, chiefly owing to large orders for all kinds of woollen, linen, and cotton goods having arrived here for the markets of Portugal and of South America. The goods of Birmingham and Sheffield are also in great demand at these markets. Credit and confidence, we are happy to say, revive, and the towns of Man- chester, Nottingham, &c. feel vast benefit from the happy change that has taken place. " The West India Islands are now in want of all kinds of Bri- tish manufactured goods, as the stock in hand in these islands f)0 has been purchased up with avidity for the Spanish settlements. Irish linen, slieetin-r, &c. render a full profit of twenty per cent, more than the usual profit attaclied to sucli speculations : in fine, in spite of all Buonaparte's edicts and restrictions, the commerce of our country flourishes." This improvement, however, as it so immediately suc- ceeded to a period of great distress, was not yet marked by such eagerness of speculative shipment as had distinguished 180S and ISOy. W hile our export trade was thus slowly recovering, there appeared towards the autumn of that year a more marked tendency to a general advance in the prices of agricultural produce and of imported raw materials. The harvest in this country had turned out unproductive, in an extraordinary degree ; and the same cause of deficiency seems to have ex- tended over the greater part of Europe. There was therefore very little prospect of relief by importation, more especially as the expenses of freight and insurance continued as high as ever. Very high prices of almost all descriptions of agri- cultural produce were the consequence ; and, as the range of high prices (with an interval of depression at the close of 1810, so short as not to have been felt at all by the land- lord, and very little by the farmer) had been of an unusually long continuance, it was hastily concluded, as it unfor- tunately but too often is, that the causes of that high range were permanent. This accordingly was the period in which rents experienced their greatest rise, and speculations in land became most general. Hence naturally arose the ground, already noticed, for an extension of country bank paper; and there is no doubt, as well from the reason of the thing as from the best accessible evidence, that the cir- culation of country |)aper acquired a great extension and briskness, which by the continued operation of the same general causes (the harvest of 1812 having proved partially deficient) continued till the summer of 1813. During the same interval, that is from the summer and 91 autumn of 1811, there occurred a renewed scarcity, partly real and partly apprehended, of many leading articles of importation. In consequence of the discouragement arising from the low prices in this country of 1810 and the be- ginning of 1811, there was little inducement to import in the face of enormous charges ; freights and insurances from the continent of Europe continuing so high that, without an advance of prices here, little or nothing would, in some instances, have been left for prime cost. The stocks, therefore, of wool, silk, cotton*, hemp, flax, tallow, timber, &c. became scanty towards the end of 1811; and there were grounds at the same time for apprehending a further scarcity. The preparations by the French for the invasion of Russia gave reason to fear that, however disastrous to the former it might eventually prove, the intermediate conse- quence would be a cutting off of the supplies of naval stores and of other produce; and as the French spread over Prussia, all shipments from thence became more diffi- cult and hazardous. Our differences with America were then rapidly tending to an open rupture, and the produce of that country naturally participated in the causes of ad- vance. Thus by far the majority, in point of importance, of imported commodities, requisite as raw materials for the supply of our manufactories, and essential for the support of our navy, became, from real and anticipated scarcity, objects of speculation ; which, again, naturally gave rise to an extension of mercantile transactions on credit, both with and without the intervention of paper : and this state of comparative scarcity, which formed the basis of the exten- sion of credit and of the circulation of private paper, con- * This will appear from the following comparison of the im- ports into Great Britain : AVool. Silk. Cotton. 1810.. lbs. 10,936,224 lbs. 1,792,206 lbs. 136,488,935 1811.. 4,739,972 622,383 91,662,344 92 tinued, with only a few variations incidental to peculiarities of demand, till diiferent periods in 181:3. Articles of export experienced a moderate degree of im- provement down to the close of 1812, with the exception of such descriptions as were exclusively or chiefly calculated for the United States — and these of course were much de- pressed by the war which then broke out. By the retreat of tlie French from ?vIoscow, not only the ports of Russia were secured from the danger of being again shut against us, but daily tidings were received of other ports in the north of Europe being opened to a trade with this country ; and sanguine expectations were entertained that the ports of France itself would, at no remote period, be open to us. The new markets, for such they might then be called, thus presented, and the prospect of more, gave rise to a specula- tive demand for all the articles really wanted, and for many others which it was anticipated would probably be wanted, by the countries with which we had thus suddenly come into communication. Colonial produce, as it had been most depressed by our previous exclusion from those markets, experienced the greatest and most rapid advance; but many other articles of export participated in the demand which prevailed thenceforward till the spring of 1814, with greater or less intensity, according as the events of the war seemed to hasten or retard a general peace. The conclusion of the war was then hailed as holding out the prospect of an unlimited consumption, among the inhabitants of the Continent, of the articles from the use of which they had been so long debarred The interval, therefore, between the close of 1811 and the besinninff of 1814 united once more the conditions on which a great extension of private pa})er and of trans- actions on credit has been shown to dejiend ; and there is concurrent testimony that such extension did really take place to a very considerable degree during that interval. But the average circulation of Bank of England notes, from July 1810 to December IS\3, experienced no increase, as 93 will appear from the following statement, extracted from tlie Report of the Lords' Committee, 1819, page 3(23. " Account of the average amount of Bank of England notes in circulation, including Bank Post Bills. 1810 July to December L 24,188,605 1811 January to June 23,47 1 ,297 July to December 23,094,046 1812 January to June 23,123,140 July to December 23,351,496 1813 January to June 23,939,693 July to December 24,107,445 Thus again proving that a great rise of prices, and a con- siderable extension of private paper, might take place with- out any increase of Bank of England notes. And the fall in prices which took place, dating from different periods of 1813, in agricultural produce, and from the spring and summer of 18 1 4, in nearly all other articles (which fall con- tinued till the close of 1816), accompanied by a great re- duction of private paper, and a very large increase of Bank of England notes*, still further exemplifies the view which I have taken of the main causes on which the sudden growth and diminution of private paper, and the greatest fluctua- tions in the prices of commodities, depend. It has indeed been very generally supposed, that the fall in prices, in this instance, viz. from 18 14- to 1816, is suf- ficiently accomited for by the sudden restoration of peace, and the consequent near approach of the termination of the restriction. What effect the peace, or the prospect of it, may have had on prices, independent of the Bank restriction, will be matter of separate inquiry, when the nature and extent of the influence of war and peace on prices come to be con- sidered. It is sufficient, for the present, to observe, that as far as it was the peace, and the peace only, that affected prices, the alleged alteration of the value of the currency was clear of the charge. And as to the assumed effect of * See i)age 43. 94 the near prospect, at that period, of the termination of the restriction, there appears to be no ground \vhatever for the supposition, inasmuch as it is now well known that the Bank was not only perfectly passive as to any preparations for that event, but that it did not scruple to enlarge its issues throughout 1814 and 1815, and part of 1816, the very in- terval during which the fall of prices was greatest. I can state,, moreover, distinctly of my own experience, on a large scale of sales and purchases at that time, that not a single transaction, that I was concerned in or aware of, was entered into with the sliirhtest reference whatever to the termination of the Bank restriction. The tendency to an improvement of the exchanges and to a decline in the price of gold was looked upon to follow, as a matter of course, the cessation of government expenditure abroad, and the great pre- ponderance of our commercial exports, now that the ports of the Continent were opened to us. But, in point of fact, the decline of prices of agricultural produce had begun in 1812, and a considerable number of imported articles had, in the course of 1813, exhibited a tendency downwards ; yet all this while the exchanges were falling, and the price of gold rising ; thus completely nega- tiving the idea that any speculation on the prospect of a resumption of cash payments operated to occasion that fall of prices. Indeed the fact that the fall in agricultural pro- duce, and in commodities imported from the Continent of Europe, took place in 1812 and 1813, in the face of de- clining exchanges and a rise in the price of gold, which en- hanced the cost of importation, and that exportable produce continued rising in the spring of 181 4, in spite of an ad- vancing exchange and a falling price of gold, might be considered by all, who are not wedded to a system, to be decisive on the question of the supposed connexion between the great fidl of prices in 1813 and 1814 and the prospect of the resumption of cash payments. The fall in agricultural produce, which had commenced in the autunui of 1812, became more decided after the 95 harvest of 1813, which proved to be very abundant. It was this decidedly favourable season which developed the full effects of the encouragement that had been held out by the long previous range of high prices to the application of great additional capital to the land. The extent to which that encouragement had operated is stated by the Com- mittee on the Corn Laws, in 1814' (Report p. 3.), in the following terms : " It appears to your Committee to be established by all the evi- dence, that, within the last twenty years, a very rapid and exten- sive progress has been made in the agriculture of the United King- dom : that great additional capitals have been skilfully and suc- cessfully applied, not only to the improved management of lands already in tillage, but also to the converting of large tracts of in- ferior pasture into productive arable, and the reclaiming and in- closing of fens, commons, and wastes, which have been brought into a state of regular cultivation." There had not only thus been an increased breadth of land in improved cultivation, but the produce per acre was- unusually large. The whole fall, resulting from these causes, will clearly appear by the following extracts from the table of prices in the Appendix : Wheat. Rye. Barley. Oats. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. 1812, July 1 140 9 90 77 50 8 1813, Jan. 1 119 10 82 2 64 2 44 3 July 1 116 3 74 2 57 9 42 10 1814, Jan. 1 7Q 7 47 40 7 27 2 July 1 67 9 41 9 35 25 Here is a fall exceeding fifty per cent, within two years, during which the price of gold * attained the greatest height * To put the extent of the fall in the value of wheat in a still' stronger point of view, it may be worth while to compare the 96 that it ever reached, and was, on an average, higher than at any preceding or succeeding period. Moreover, while the dccHne in corn was most rapid, the price of gold was actually rising; viz. from June 181'', when gold was at 51. ~-. 6d. to the close of that year, when it got up to 5l. 1 0^. The fall in commodities imported from the continent of Europe was taking place in proportion as the opening of the ports from whence they were shipped diminished some of the expenses; but the fall was at first slow, because the continued hostility of Denmark, and the war with the United States of America, kept freights and insurances at a high rate. Still it was actual or prospective abundance that occasioned the tendency to a fall at the close of 1813. Tills fall in the prices of agricultural produce, and the de- pression observable in articles of import from the Continent, must have had some effect at that time in diminishin«T the quantity of country bank notes and of private paper, but that effect may have been compensated by the great quan- tity of mercantile paper and of transactions on credit that must have arisen from the .speculations on the indefinite demand of the Continent for colonial produce, and other articles of export from this country. quantity of gol(i which a quarter of wheat would command on the 1st July, 1812, and the 1st Jan. 1814: On the 1st July, 1812, a quarter of wheat, at 1 405. 9d. would, with the price of gold at 41. 18.9. 6d. command 1 •43oz. of gold, which, at 31. 175. 10|(/. is equal to L5 11 4 On the 1st January, 1814, a quarter of wheat at 76s. yd. would, with the price of gold at 51. 105. command only -GDoz. of gold, which at 3/. 17*. 10^(/. is equal to L2 13 8 Being a fall of about 51| per cent. L2 17 8 The metallic price of a quarter of wheat, on the 1st Jan. 1814, was 535. 8(L, being lower than it was on the 1st of Jan. 1797, when the price was 555. 9d. 97 The earlicsl shipments of such exportable commodities as had been bought at the low prices answered of course, and the profits thence arising naturally encouraged the subsequent speculation. This speculation, and the conse- quent over-trading, proceeded to a most extravagant length in the course of 1 S14. It began, as I have already noticed, with the great reverses of the French in IS 12, and went on, with fluctuations, according to the vicissitudes of the subsequent military operations, till the peace of Paris, which was the consummation of the views of the speculators ; the ports of France, as well as those of all the rest of Eu- rope, being opened to a direct commercial intercourse with this country. It had been usual, in former periods, to con- sider that colonial produce should rise in war and fall in peace, in consequence of the difference of the charges of im- portation ; but the period in question was supposed to form an exception to this general rule : it was calculated that the inhabitants of the Continent, having been so long debarred by the anti-commercial decrees of their governments from the enjoyment of sugar and coffee, and of various other de- scriptions of commodities which could then be obtained only from this country, would require a supply, at almost any price, of most of the articles that had been accumulated here during the absence of demand. Proceeding on this supposition, a great number of adventurers, departing from their ordinary pursuits, entered into speculations with an avidity similar to that which we have more recently wit- nessed in the speculations in the foreign stock-market, but on a much larger scale. Many retail tradesmen who failed in ISli and 1815 were, upon a disclosure of their accounts, found to have been concerned in shipments of sugar and coffee to the Continent. The contagion spread to the out- ports ; and it was said that a laige proportion of the shop- keepers residing in them, who failed at that time, owed their ruin to having been tempted into speculations of the kind which I have described. In short, the spirit of over- tradine; in that extensive class of commodities reached the utmost pitch that had ever been witnessed here, as may be H 98 judged by a comparison of the prices of the following ar- ticles in the years 1811, 1812, 1813, and 1814: (a C TO O cr; -TS cr? "< a> CK5 O nnnn o o o =• a> o o 2 7:K D P re a CL D p l3 HH M ^ C3 C ; c/:! C: ^ CJ5 o o =i o ^ re ^ re re "^ ft -« — 0000000 — «— to — coot*< otoo >^ ootoooooocno*«.^oao?= tooo — ^jooio^.u'^i 000000 Ss, ©WOS bO OJi'OOOOOWWJ^ — coot^ oSoOD «0 OOtO — — O — CD©a>lCinO?> 0000 0> OOOOiOiOtOOOOOOOlSl, (Ot- *lw ^ O OS W kO o w o^ — COO to o o> a> O) to tn O t" owooooowto*. — C0Ot*( OOW«0 — O — OiOOtOOQO? «oo«ooito'o>t..ooooooa- OOOOOOOO'CiCTllO^JOt*' — O — OilO — K)OOK) — 00?= lW00500>01tOOOOOCCft?i. ^ "a §- 00 ^ o o> 01 w O 00 Oi ^J 00 O O OS ►01- O OD en >t». tn 00 *- ~J o> o o t-o ►o - o — ooooo*-co>tkiocftor^ — O'^UJIO — tOWOOs'vioO?' WOOOWOtOOOOOOO?- ^ 00 K) ^ ^„ ^ OCoOOOOOOlOi'MlOlOOr^ — o — Olio — tooiOi.ictooai.'' •OOOiOOOjOjOOOOOO?- A reverse, from speculations so cnterccl into and con- ducted, was inevitable; the shippers found to their cost, when it was too late, that the effective demand on the Con- tinent for colonial produce and British manufactures had been greatly over-rated ; for whatever might be the desire of the foreign consumers to possess articles so long out of their reach, thoy were limited in their means of purchase; and accordingly the bulk of the commodities exported brought very inadequate returns. The low prices, which alone the consumers abroad were able to pay, were still fur- ther reduced in value by the advance in our exchanges, which was accelerated by the very extent of those ship- ments. And it is a well known fact, that the losses upon a great proportion of the goods shipped to the Continent in the spring and summer of 18 14* were very great; not less, I have reason to believe from what I heard at that time of the result of many of them, than 50 percent. In some few instances, by rare good fortune, there might be a gain, but in as many there was a total loss. Cases of more aggravated loss occurred where the shippers, unwilling to incur so heavy a sacrifice as would be entailed by remittances at an exchange becoming daily more unfavourable for them, were induced to receive returns in goods which, from this and other causes, coming in excessive quantities, could not be sold here within 30, 40, and sometimes 50 per cent, of the cost ; a process by which, including loss of interest, it may easily be conceived that the whole value of the original in- vestment might be nearly absorbed. The disastrous effects of these ill-judged and extravagantly extensive speculations began to manifest themselves in the numerous failures which took place towards the close of 1814 ; these continued in- creasing in number, as the several losses were ascertained, through 1815 and the early part of 18 16. While so much private paper was in the course of being annihilated, and so great a reduction was going forward in transactions on credit, in consequence of the disasters at- tending the export trade ; a similar process, which had be- H 2 100 gun somewhat sooner, wns in progress in the trade of im- ports from the Continent, and above all, in the inland trade connected with the markets of our own agricultural pro- duce. The decline of prices and the consequent losses in his last, which is the most important of all the branches of industry, had already, towards the close of 1813 and in the early part of i 8 li, occasioned the failure of several country banks; the number of commissions against which in 181 1 amounted to twenty-nine; in this number would probably be included those banks which had suspended payment towards the close of 1813. Through 1 8 1 .0 and a great part of 1 8 1 G all the causes cal- culated to diminish the nmount of private paper canie once more into combined operation ; and there can be no doubt that a vast reduction did take place in the amount of country bank notes, of mercantile bills, and of transactions on credit without the intervention of paper. In this case as in the former period (viz. 1810 and 181 1), the proximate causes of the great destruction of private paper were a fall of prices from abundance, and a reaction from speculative shipments and general over-trading ; the remote causes were, those which constituted the grounds for the speculations and over- trading, viz. scarcity, actual or apprehended, of food and raw materials at home, and new and extraordinary sources of demand for our manufactures and colonial produce abroad. The mere abstraction of these grounds for a rise of prices and for an enlargement of private jiaper, naturally left both to subside to their proper level ; but as rising prices and expanding private paper gave the appearance of pros- perity, so the inevitable recoil of the one and contraction of the other convey the impression of gloom, and are certainly attended with considerable suffering. These alternations having occurred on so terrific a scale in the interval that elapsed between the close of 1 807 and 1816, I may, perhaps, be excused for dwelling somewhat longer upon them. It has appeared that that interval exhibited two distinct periods of rise and fiill of prices, of growth and 101 (liiiiiniition of private paper, viz. from ISO" to isi i, and again from 181 1 to l8l(); and that tlie causes operating in both w ere similar in kind. But they differed in degree and duration, particularly as ap{)lied to agricultural produce ; and an explanation of the circumstances in which they dif- fered may still further elucidate and confirm the reasoning by which I have endeavoured to account for the fluctuations which so preeminently marked the whole interval. Of articles of importation for home consumption, whether as food or as raw materials, the fall of prices in 1810 and 1811 was in some cases not so low as to the level from which they had recently risen, and in but few was it lower. The charges of conveyance of such bulky commodities continuing as high as ever and in some instances higher (as the hos- tility of Sweden then completed our exclusion from direct in- tercourse with the north of Europe, and our disputes with the United States tended evidently to a rupture), it was clear that the importation must quickly fall off, which it accordingly did. Thus, although there was abundance as to the actual stock on hand, there was every appearance of an eventual recur- rence of scarcity. It must be observed further, that as the high prices in 1808 and 1809 had been the condition s'me qua non of a relief from scarcity by diminished consumption and by importation; so the low prices of 1810 and part of 1811 were necessary to carry off the immediate redundance, and to deter importation to the same extent ; but the lowest level requisite for that purpose was higher than in the period previous to 1807 by all the difference of the charges of im- portation in the two periods. As soon, therefore, as the immediate glut was worn off, there was a renewed tendency to speculation upon reduced stocks and eventual scarcity. The fall which took place in wheat upon the large importa- tion of 1810, coinciding with the fine weather which pre- vailed during the harvest of that year, was much less in de- cree and duration than was the case in other commodities, because the actual quantity was soon found to be less than had been estimated, inasmuch as our own crops were ascer- 102 tained to be deficient in a greater degree than could be com- pensated by the importation of that \ear, large as it was. And the still greater failure of the crops in this country in 18 11 coinciding with a similar failure in other parts of Eu- rope, gave a more decided impulse to a renewed range of hifh prices, which lasted more or less till the summer of 1813. Thus, the interval of depression from actual or sup- posed abundance was only momentary ; and there was im- mediately afterwards a constant and quick succession of grounds for speculating on actual or contingent scarcity. But after the harvest of 1 8 1 3 till that of 1 8 1 6 the fall was nearly uninterrupted, because, at every step of it, the eifect of actual was aggravated by that of still greater contingent abundance. In 1814 there was an importation of corn at greatly reduced charges of conveyance, and the large pro- duce of our own crops again in 181.3 was more than suf- ficient to counteract any chtiuce of improvement from the monopoly granted by the corn bill in that year. It is obvious, therefore, why, without any reference to the prospective alterations in the t-ystem of our currency as the cause, the failures of country banks were so much more numerous upon the relapse of prices between 1 8 1 3 and 1816 than in 1 8 10. But, if the recoil of prices of agricultural produce in 1810, and of many other commodities, was not of long duration, and did not proceed below the relatively high level from whence they had risen in the two preceding years; there was a large class of commodities which, having risen but little in 1808 and 1 809, fell in 1810 and 1811 to a lower level than they had ever been at before, and continued depressed for a greater length of time. This remark applies to some branches of manufactures, to those more especially which depended on a demand for the supply of the United States of America, and which were, consequently, very much depressed by the war with those states ; but I now allude to colonial produce, and particularly to coflee and sugar. The depression of coffee, for nearly two years, was not only below the lowest level at which it had ever belbre been, but 103 imich lower than it has ever been since; and sugar was, for bome kinds, at least, lower then than it is even at present. Now, if from the prices of that period (viz. 1810-11) be • deducted, first, the difference betwen paper and gold, and then the difference of freight and insurance compared with the present period, some idea may be formed of the intensity of suffering which must have prevailed amongst the parties concerned in producing and importing such commodities. The reverses in 1810 and 1811, from over- trading and ha- zardous exports, probably exceeded in amount those which occurred from 1814 to 1816. On a comparison of the two periods, my impression is, that the mercantile losses and the consequent destruction of mercantile paper, as well as ofconfidence in transactions on credit, were, if any thing, greater in the first than in the second ; while, on the other hand, the fall of prices of agri- cultural produce was so much greater and longer continued, and the consequent loss of farmers, landlords, and of all per- sons connected with them so extensive, in the period between 1813 and 1816, as to sink into utter insignificance the re- verses experienced by the corn trade in 1810. A compari- son of the number of commissions of bankruptcy issued in the respective periods, distinguishing those against country bankers, tends to confirm this impression ; for it will be ob- served that the commissions against country bankers in 1810, 1811, and 181 '2, were little more than half of those in 1814, 1815, and 1816, while the total number of bankruptcies was greater in the former than in the latter period. 1810) 1811 V 1812) } Total number of Commissions against commissions. bankers. . . 7042 ..... 47 1814 1815 V . . GG27 92 1816 104 On a survey of ihc whole of these Ihictuations from 1807 to 1816, conceiving, as I do, that the commercial reverses between the summer of IS 1 1 and that of l^iln were the in- evitable consequence of the speculations and overtrading of the two preceding years, as also that the still greater re- verses of 1 S 10 and 1811 might clearly be traced to the high prices and over-trading of 1808 and 1809, 1 have no hesi- tation in declaring my firm belief that the whole of that period was productive of a preponderance of suffering and calamity to the commercial interests of this country. The state of high excitement produced by the rapid transitions of political events — the great and feverish activity of adven- turers to elude prohibitory decrees, and to avail themselves of unexpected openings— the extraordinary alternation of scarcity and abundance of all kinds of commodities — the spirit of enterprise displayed in the undertakings of fire- offices, docks, canals, and bridges -the extensive employ- ment of shipping, as transports, at however great a national expense— the high prizes held out where the blanks, how- ever, were in disproportionate number — the splendour of the military achievements which terminated the war — all contribute to cast a glare over the retrospect resembling the sunshine of prosperity. But, confining my observations to the state of commerce, I am satisfied that those who mingled in the scenes, and who were not blinded to all that surrounded them by too intent a pursuit of their own immediate objects, will bear witness with me to the long intervals of gloom — to the sud- den changes from the reputation of fortunes rapidly ac- (juired, to bankruptcy and ruin — to the extreme depression of our manufacturers in 1810, 1811, and 1812 — to the de- struction, or, at least, suspension from business, of a great majority of the old establishments connected with the ports of the continent of Europe, and of the United States of America, which were shut against us by the events of the war — to the confiscations of British property in conse- (jucncc of the French decrees — to the immense losses of 10.5 llic uiulerwritors in is 10, and again in I8M — to the recoil which, even previous to 1314, had begun to lake place in the value of fire-office, canal, dock, and bridge shares— to the depreciation necessarily incidental on a peace to the shipping, and to the foreign establishments dependant for their value on a continuance of the war — and they cannot, I think, avoid coming to the conclusion, that the gloom of adversity really prevailed under that appearance of splen- dour which deluded the superficial or distant observer. A reference to the list of bankrupts for the last thirty years, and a comparison of the annual average number from 1810 to 1816, with that of the preceding and succeeding period *, will go far to bear out this assertion ; and if it be considered that the number of private compositions to that of bank- ruptcies is in the proportion of probably not less than four to one — if further, the number of individuals involved by loss of situation or property in every failure be included in the view, some, though I suspect a very inadequate idea may be formed of the extent of suffering which attended the splendid but unsound state of commerce that prevailed during those years. What, it may be asked, do I mean to say that the country did not advance in wealth during the period in question ? By no means. The country did, I am persuaded, advance in wealth and in population, in spite of the great fluctuations of prices, and of the precarious, and, in the majority of cases, disastrous state of commerce. I am equally convinced, that an accumulation of capital has been going forward, still more rapidly since that time, not- withstanding, what 1 am ready to admit and deplore, the suffering state of the agricultural interest. * Average annual number of bankrupts — For seven years ending 1809 . . 12/2 For seven years ending 1816 . . 2231 For seven years enduig 1823 , . 13.51 For tlie year 1823, the number was only 1070. — For the whole scries, see Appendix. lOf) SECTION X. Fluctuation of I'riccs and of the Amount of private Paper, from 181 G to the passing of Mr, Peel's Bill. If 1 have succeeded in giving a satisfactory solution of the causes of the great fluctuations of price, and of the cor- responding expansion and contraction of private paper and credit which occurred in so remarkable a degree from 1807 to 1816, it may still be a question how for the same mode of reasoning, the same general rule derived from ob- servation, will serve to account for the elevation of prices and the renewed extension of private paper which occurred between the autumn of 1816 and that of 1818, and for the subsequent continued decline of prices and contraction of private paper. I have already pointed out how little coincidence there was in the preceding interval, between the increase or de- crease in the amount of Bank of England notes, and that of private paper, and have, moreovei', remarked that the most striking instances of a great rise of general prices oc- curred without any increase of Hank notes, while, on the other hand, the most memorable instances of a sudden fall took place contemporaneously with large additions to the Bank circulation. But the advocates for the doctrine which ascribes all or nearly all the fluctuations of price to the Bank restriction, overlook some of the real facts when they insist on instances only of coincidence which seem to suit their purpose of proving the connexion which they assume. Thus the article on currency in the Quarterly Review which I have before quoted, has the following passage explanatory, as the writer doubtless thinks, of the whole process of the rise and fall of prices: " From the year 1810 the price of 107 ,r a Jittle this year, because the crops in some parts are found not to be so good as was before expected. " The price of colonial produce has fallen much in France ; but this proves nothing more than the advantage of having the sea free, and the cultivation of sugar, &c. being established throt'gh all parts of the torrid zone. " Although it is difficult, consequently, to judge of the value of money after the variation in the price of such or such an article, nevertheless we can state, that things generally have not fallen in price in France since the depreciation aud the restoration of the paper money of England, except as far as particular circumstances may have contributed ; as the introduction of cheaper and more expeditious processes of fabrication, &c. I do not believe, there- fore, that there is any ground for saying that the fall of prices in England has its analogy on the Continent. It appears to me that it proceeds entirely from the alterations in the value of your money*." Tt will be observed that I have quoted more from Mr. Say's letter tlian what relates to the e.xtra-demand for gold during particular periods of the war, for the purpose of showing that his opinion coincides with mine as to the ab- sence of any rise in the metallic price of corn and other conmiodities, " except as far as particular circumstances may have contributed." Now surely the reasoning of Mr. Say applies with in- finitel}^ more force to the grounds on which corn and other commodities rose in this country during the same interval ; * It is requisite to bear in mind that Mr. Say, in speaking of the currency of this country, proceeds upon the authority of Mr. James, who estimates the depreciation, arising'from the alterations connected witli the Br'.uk restriction, at full fifty per cent. 129 for we had four years of what lie would call famhic, viz. very bad harvests, 1804, 1809, 1811, ami 1816, without the iu- tervt nlion of two seasons in succession ofircncral abundance, or, as he would term it, of "crojis which have been good throunhout," between 1ut it is material further to observe, that while such great stress, in most of the discussions on this subject, has been laid on the circumstance of many articles having risen in price between 1808 and 1814, no attention seems to have been paid to the great and long continued depression of other articles. Colonial produce, notwithstanding the increased charges of importation, was, in several instances, lower than it had ever been before. Many descriptions of manufacturers were in the most deplorable state of depression ; and wages (as 1 have stated at page 55) were in some cases actually reduced, even in nominal amount, at the time when the necessaries of life had risen most. Moreover, various kinds of raw materials, imported at the most extravagant rates of freight and insurance, were sold in 1810 and 181 I, and again in 1813 and 1 81 1-, at prices that would not pay more than the mere charges, without leaving one farthing for prime cost. If, therefore, from these reduced prices be deducted 20 per cent, as about the average difference be- tween paper and gold from 1K03 to 1814, it will leave so low a range, that applying the same rate of deduction to the highest prices at which any considerable sales were made in 18U8 and !.'09, and in 1812 and 181'^, the me- dium or average will afford a result of very moderate metallic prices, by no means justifying the inference of any diminished value of sold and silver. 131 SFXTION XI IT. Survey of Prices down to the close of J 822. Reverting again to the fluctuations of prices in this country, it is of material importance, in estimating tiie degree in which the Bank restriction contributed to the speculations with which they were connected, to recur to the following fact, which I noticed before, viz. that many important articles experienced, between the autumn of J 807 and the first three months of I8O9, nearly as great an elevation as they ever afterwards attained, and in some in- stances a greater : in several, the advance was upwards of 100 per cent. Now the average amount of Bank of Eng- land notes in 1808 experienced no increase worth men- tioning, compared, not only with that of the year before, but with that of the four years preceding. And as the ex- changes were for the first nine months of 1808 hioher than they were on an average in the year 1792, and the price of silver lower*, (no price of gold being quoted in 1808; there * Prices of Silver, and Course of Exchange on Hamburgh. 1792. 1808. Standard Standard XewSp anish Exchange NewSpanishI Exchange Gold per Silver per Dollar > per with Ham- Dollars per with Ham- Our.ce. Ounce. Ounce burgh. Ounce. burgh. Jan. 3 17 6 r> 4 5 21 34 6 34 4 Feb. 3 17 G 5 4 5 3 34 6 5 3 34 4 March, 3 17 6 5 4i .0 ^2 34 G () 34 G April, 3 17 6 5 5 5 4 34 .5 3 1 G May, 3 17 6 5 5i 5 41 34 3 31 9 June, 3 17 6 .5 G 5 5 34 4 f) 3 34 9 July, 3 \7 G 5 G .5 34 .^> .'■) 3 35 3 August, 3 17 G 5 .") 5 4 34 4 5 3 35 2 Sept. 3 17 6 .T .5 .'i 4 34 34 8 N. B. No price of standard silver or gold quoted in 1808. ( Parliamenta:y I'apirs ordered by the House of Commons, 31 arch 4, Ifcll.) k2 132 is no reason to believe that the liank, if it liad then been liable to pay its notes in coin, would have experienced any drain, or seen any ground, from the state of die exchanges, to have reduced its issues. The inference, therefore, is plain, that the great rise of prices in question might, and I have no doubt would, under the peculiar circumstances, have taken place as well without as with the Bank restric- tion. It was not till the close of 1S08, after the greatest part of the rise had taken place, that the preparations which were already in progress by the transmission of funds for the large importation that was forthcoming, in consequence of the great encouragement held out by the high prices here, produced any material impression on the exchanges : then, but not till then, that is, at the close of 1S08 and beginning of 1809, the Bank would, under the liability to pay in coin, have been compelled to contract its issues in order to meet the pressure upon the exchanges. The depression of the exchanges in that year, occasioned in the first instance by an importation of commodities ge- nerally to an almost unparalleled extent, and chiefly in foreign ships, whose owners were to be paid by bills on the continent, was increased by the expenditure of our govern- ment abroad, and by the effects of the very wet harvest in this country rendering a large supply of foreign corn neces- sary. But the reduction of IJank-notes, requisite to have counteracted these causes of depression of the exchanges, would, in all probability, have been small in amount : I judge so from the circumstance that, notwithstanding the addition of about two millions, which the Bank made to its issues in 1 809, when the propriety of an opposite course was clearly indicated, so great was the transition from scarcity to abundance of imported commodities, that a recoil of the prices of those articles which had previously risen most, commenced in the summer of that year ; and soon after, viz. at the close of 1F09 and beginning of IS 10, as ii necessary consequence of the fall of prices of nearly all commodities (I do not include agricultural produce), which iS3 continued from lluU lime, there was u great ilestructioii of private paper. This destruction of private paper seems somcwliat to have preceded the further issue of Bank of England notes, vvhicli took place in IS 10, as the exchanges rather advanced, and the price of gold fell somewhat, in the course of that year, viz. from 4/. 1 Is. to 4/. 45. 6d* There can be little doubt, therefore, that if the Bank had so re- gulated its issues as to have preserved the value of its paper on a level with that of gold, it might have done so, after an intermediate and perhaps very trifling reduction, con- sistently with having a much larger amount of notes in cir- culation in 1810 than it had in 1808. Applying this supposition of what would have been the regulation of the Bank issues, under a liability of paying in coin, to the speculations and fluctuations between 1 807 and 181 1, the probability is, that the rise of prices would have been checked a little earlier, and the fall have proceeded somewhat more rapidly : but the efi^ect of that would have been to have diminished the importation (which proved to be too large) by the close of 1 809, and so far the eventual fall of prices would have been less in 1810 and the early part of 1811 than it actually was; and, in that case, the renewed scarcity of 1811 would have been felt earlier, and there would have been an earlier renewed rise of prices. The conclusion is, that the great and partly speculative rise of prices, connected with a great increase of private paper, in 1808, was uninfluenced in the first instance, though it might have been in some measure extended and protracted, by the Bank restriction ; and that, as the fall was eventually the greater by the delay, the average of the prices, taking the whole range of that fluctuation (at the end of which there was, probably in consequence of the general discredit, less private paper in circulation than before it began), was as low as it would have been if there had been no intermediate enlargement of private paper, and as low, less the difference * Commons' Bullion Report^ 1819, page 304, 134 IjCtwecn paper aiul gold, as it would have been if" the Hank restriction had not existed. Thus far as to the speculation in imports: the same reasoninir applies, in some degree, to the great speculation and consequent enlargement of private paper, connected with the immense shipments to South America. These began in 1808, when tliey would equally have taken place if the Bank restriction had not existed ; they were probably, indeed, somewhat promoted and ex- tended in 1809, the inducement to over-trading still con- tinuing, compared with what they might have been if the restriction had not existed; but in consequence of this ex- tension in 1809 the reaction was so much greater in ixio, and the prices of all the manufactures, afi'ected by the sudden suspension of demand, were depressed in so much greater a proportion as the extension of them had been encouraged by the previous speculative demand : thus the same result fol- lows, viz. that the medium prices of those commodities, in this country, were not affected beyond the degree indicated by the difference between paper and gold, on the average of the three years in question, by the speculation and conse- quent enlargement of private paper, or by the Bank re- striction. From what I have previous^ly stated of the grounds on which the great speculations, both in imports and export?, took place between 1811 and 1814, a similar process of ex- j)lanation would enable me to prove that the enlargement of private paper, during that time, not only did not depend upon the Bank restiiction, except in the degree in which a contraction of the basis must always narrow the super- structure, but that the advance of prices, resulting from that enlargement, was compensated by the eventual decline (a g; eat part of which depended on causes distinct from the change from war to peace), so that the average was at least as low as if the speculation had not existed, perhaps lower*. * In general it may be observed, tliat speculation, wlietlicr nith cajjjlal beloiiifinP niul Lambs. 1819, 135,22(1 949.900 1820, 132,933 947,990 1821, 142,133 1,107,230 1 822, 14-2,043 1,340,1 GO The comparative increase has been equally great at Li- verpool and Hull ; and I am told that the supplies at the other markets in England have been no less superabundant. How, then, can there be any difficulty in accounting for the very low prices of meat at that timef. With regard to imported commodities, it will be seen by a reterence to the detailed statements in the 4th part of this work, that in every case of depression there is, or has been, an excess ofquantity, relatively to the estimated average rate of consumption, fully adequate to account for the present low range; and conversely, that where there is actual or appre- * Tlie harvest of 1823 having proved to be dcTicieuf, prices have advanced considerably, and it is only in consequence of some part of the large surplus of former seasons having come in ai.l of tliat flcfuicncy, that the rise lias not been greater. t It was said that this excessive supply arose from distress, and tliat it could not continue. This docs not appear to have been the case to any extent worth mentioning; for, after a falling off in the numbers during the first six montlis of 182;?, in the cou^^e of v\hich there was a considerable advance of price, the su[)ply increased during tlie latter part of the year, so much as to make the total of 1823 nearly equal to that of 1822, but the price of meat has, notwithstanding, preserved a higher range. (Sec Appcndi.v, No. 8.) 137 bended deficiency, prices not only are not depressed, but arc as liiirh as, in a similar state of actual and contino;cnt rcla- live supply, tlicy would have been in any former state of the current-y, supposing the expenses of conveyance to be the same in each period, and allowing only for the difference between paper and gold. But if a reference to the prices of commodities, combined with tlie quantities and other circumstances affecting them, proves the total absence of any ground for imputing to the alterations in the system of our currency a greater influence than that which has been indicated by the difference be- tween paper and gold ; the same conclusion will be borne out with regard to the asserted influence of those alterations on the wages of labour. As to manufacturing labour, it was proved by the docu- ments which I quoted in Section VI. that so far from a progressive rise of wages having taken place coincidently with the duration of the Bank restriction, there was in many important instances a fall, and that, after a lapse of several years, they were lower than when the suspension of cash payments took place. In order further to prove that as that measure had not the effect ascribed to it, of raising the wages of manufacturing and some other descriptions of labour, so the near prospect afforded by the peace of the termination of the restriction did not depress them, 1 have to refer the reader to a very important statement in the Appendix, (No. 9-) By this statement, which has been com- municated to me from a source that warrants the most perfect reliance on the care and correctness with which the facts have been collected and stated, it will appear, that at Manchester, and the other principal seats of the cotton manufacture, there was no fall, and in several instances a rise in the average of manufacturing labour, from the com- mencement of 1814, after the value of the paper had begun to improve, to the close of I SCO (beyond which date the table does not reach), when its value was completely restored. 138 iuul wlicn a great influx of gokl hatl already taken place*. Other descriptions of labour in the same district appear to have retained a singular degree of steadiness through the whole I eriod of eleven years comprised in that statement. Indeed, by the very authority of Greenwich Hospital prices, it appears that, although the wages of carpenters, &c. had risen greatly during the Bank restriction, they did not fall perceptibly between 1 81.3 and 1821 f, as they ought to have done according to the hypothesis which accounted for the fall in the prices of commodities by the near prospect held out in 1814- of the termination of the Bank restriction. I am assured by an eminent manufacturer, that in the great clothing districts in the west of England with which he is connected, the workmen are and have for some time past been in full employ at wages as high as they were on the average before 1814 : and 1 understand that wages, in other manufacturing places, have not experienced a fall in any thing like the degree in which the prices of necessaries have fallen. The wages of labour generally in London have not, it is well known, fallen in any greater proportion * A statement, to a similar effect, was made by Mr. Pecb in Ills speech on Mr. Western's motion, in Jiuic, 1823. Extractfrom Greenwich Hospital prices, inserted in the Appendix to the Agricultural Report of 1 82 1, p. 443. Carpenters' wages Bricklayers' IVIasons' Plumbers* per day. per day. per day. per day. S. (I. s. d. s. d. s. d. 1814.. 5 G .5 5 9 5 9 181.5.. .0 G 5 1 5 9 5 9 1816.. 5 2 h 1 5 3 .5 9 1817.. .5 2 r» 1 5 3 5 9 I SI 8.. ,5 5 1 U 3 5 9 1819.. .0 2 .5 1 T; 3 ."i 9 1820.. T) 2 .5 1 T) W 5 9 1821.. 5 2 .5 ] ;') 3 5 9 ISO since 18L% than the difiercnce between paper and gold, and in several instances, not so much. And of such de- scriptions of labour as have experienced any further fail, it may be proved that, as they had previously risen from extra demand, arising from causes distinct from the state of the currency, the fall was inevitable from the mere abstraction of such extra demand. 140 SECTION XIV. Recapitulation. I HAVE thus described and attempted to explain tlie most signal instances of the fluctuations of prices, accompanied by the greatest variations in the amount of private paper and credit from the close of 1807 to the present time: and having previously, while adducing arguments and facts in opposition to the opinions and assertions of those who main- tain the doctrine of indefinite dcjircciation, accounted for the state of prices from the date of the restriction bill down to 1807, I will proceed to recapitulate the princijnd j)oints wljich I have thus far endeavoured to establish. That there are reasonable grounds for supposing that the utmost effect of the disengagement and subsequent reab- sorption by this country of the amount of the precious metals which circulated as coin, previous to 1797, cannot have exceeded 1 or at the utmost 2 per cent, on the value of the metals in the commercial world ; but that this effect was probably more than counterbalanced by the increased functions of metallic money on the continent, arising from the wants of the large armies, the practice of hoard- ing, and the diminished circulation of bills of exchange during the war, and by the cessation of these increased functions on the return of peace. That the economy introduced into the use of the currency had no necessary connexion with the Bank restriction : that the utmost effect of this economy has been to obviate the necessity for an increased amount of currency to the full ex- tent that might otherwise appear to have been requisite to correspond with the increase of population and of money transactions : and that, at any rate, as the sujne economical 141 contrivances arc still practised, and arc, if any thinfr, fur- ther ini})roved, they must continue to operate as a cause of diminution of the value of the metals. Tliat there did not exist any constant connexion between the increase of Bank of England notes, and a corresponding increase of country Bank notes and private paper ; for that, in point of fact, the most remarkable instances of a sudden extension of country ILank notes and })rivate paper were not accompanied or inmiediately preceded by an increase of Bank of England notes: that, on the contrary, some of the largest additions to the circulation of the Bank of England were made when there was the greatest destruction of pri- vate paper. That there was not a constant facility of discount of pri- vate paper during the Bank restriction; and that, if there had been, it would not of itself account for the occasional phenomena of sudden enlargement of private paper and credit; for a still greater facility of credit exists at present, but there is an absence of sufficient motives for the employ- ment of it. That the motives for the extended use of private credit, observable at particular periods during the Bank restriction, were speculation on scarcity of articles for home consump- tion, and exaggerated anticipation of demand on the open- ing of new and extensive markets: and that these motives were supplied in so extraordinary a degree by political ob- structions to importation, combined with seasons unpropi- tious to our home j^roduce, and by the events of the war, as fully to account for the great augmentation of the circulation through the medium of private paper — for the great rise of prices — and for the fall, after some interval, in the ex- changes (unaccompanied by any corresponding increase of Bank notes), without referring to the liank restriction any part of these effects, beyond the excess indicated by the dif- ference between paper and gold; for in that degree only would the Inmk, under a liability to pay in specie, have M.2 been obliged to counteract the enlargement of private paper by a reduction of its own issues. That the opposite circumstances, viz. transitions from scarcity to abuniiance, and the reaction from overtrading, are suflicicnL to explain the instances of sudden and exten- sive reduction of private paper, of improvement in the e\- changes, and of a fall in the price of gold, in the lace of an increase of Baidc of England notes. That a continuance of abundance, both of imported commodities and of articles of home produce, and the con- sequent want of any reasonable ground for speculation on a prospect of scarcity, may satisfactorily account for the con- tinued decline in the amount of private paper and of transactions on credit from 1819 to the period when these reached their lowest amount, which appears to have been in the summer of lS!^i2. That consequently there was a tendency to an improve- ment in the value of the circulating medium, by the re- duction of private paper, quite adequate to have produced the restoration of I'ank notes to a par with gold : sup- posing, therefore, that no measures would have been taken by the Bank directors expressly to defeat that tendency, the restoration of the value of the currency to its standard was inevitable, widiout the intervention of j\Ir. PcePs bill. That the susceptibility of a large superstructure of pri- vate paper and credit is not confined to a currency whose basis consists of inconvertible paper: but that a currency consisting of convertible paper and coin, or even of coin only, is, under circumstances in all other respects similar, liable to considerable variation in the amount of the circu- lation, through the medium of private paper. That an exj^ansion and contraction of private paper in this country might, and probably would, have occurred, less only in the degree indicated by the difference between paper and gold, equally without, as with the Bank restric- tion. M.S That, by a reference lo llie particular facts, the variations in the amount of private paper manifestly had not any in- fluence on the average of metallic prices, or of prices less the average difference between paper and gold : thus proving, by a detail of particulars, what would be a de- monstrable inference from the doctrine of the exchanges as now generally received. That there was no p7-02;ressive rise in the prices of necessaries and in the wages of labour during the period of the Bank restriction, and consequently no ground for the assertion so confidently made of the existence of " a con- stant and invariable connexion of increase of price with the Bank restriction, as a forcible proof of such a relation as that of cause and effect subsisting between the two pheno- mena:" for corn was as low in the summer of 1801, and meat as low in ISOS, as they had been in 1797; and many other descriptions of commodities were in J 807, and again in 1810 and 1811, as lov/ as they had been at the com- mencement of the E'ank restriction ; moreover, many de- scriptions of labour were lower in 1811 than in 1797. That in every case the intermediate rise of commodities admits of being accounted lor by circumstances so power- fully affecting the supply and demand, as barely to require the allowance afforded by the difference between paper and gold ; and that therefore there is some ground for the suspicion that the increased functions of metallic money, during particular periods of the war, more than balanced the effect of the disengagement of it from the circulation of this country. That the fall of prices between 181 4 and the autumn of 18 16, the rise from that time to the autumn of IS 1 8, nnd the subsequent decline to the summer of 182,?, may equally be accounted for by circumstances connected with the supply of commodities relatively to the average rate of consump- tion, without referring to alterations in the valucof our cur- rency any part beyond the degree indicated by the differ- 144 dice between paper and f^old, consequently without ascribing any influence to INIr. Peel's bill. And, finally, as the result of the whole of the rcasoiiinir and facts which have been adduced, that the utmost effect of the Hank restriction and resumption of cash payments may be measured by the average difference between the market price and the mint price of gold. PART 11 ON THE EFl'l.CT Ol- WAK SECTION I. Introduction. In estimating the manner and degree in which war and the transition from war to peace may affect general prices, two distinct questions arise: the one is, how far the taxes requisite to defray the extraordinary expenses attending a state of war are calculated to raise prices ; and the other is, whether the prices of commodities in general (including food and necessaries), independent of the degree in which they may be affected directly or indirectly by taxation, are liable to be influenced by war, and in what degree, through the medium of supply and demand. 146 SECTION II. Examination of the Effect of Taxation on the Fluctuation of General rriccs. The effects of taxation on prices are liable to vary accord- ing to the mode in which the taxes are imposed. An income or property tax, equally levied upon all classes, would not, in any way that I can conceive, tend to raise general prices. Taxes levied upon particular commodities have, in ge- neral, the effect of raising the price of those commodities ; and manufiictured articles must be raised in price in some proportion to whatever tax may be imposed on the raw ma- terials. But it does not seem to be a necessary consequence of taxes upon one set of commodities, that all other com- modities, although untaxed, should be raised in price, while there are strong grounds of presumption that, under some circumstances, there might be an opposite tendency. The conditions through which taxes upon one set of com- modities are calculated to have an indirect or circuitous effect in raising the price of untaxed commodities, are, that the objects taxed should be the ingredients or the instru- ments of production ; and that such taxes should not apply generally, and nearly equally to all productions. If the taxes be laid on the ingredients or instruments of production of some particular article and not of others, it is clear that such article must advance in price as the con- dition of continued supply ; without such advance the article would not yield a profit equal to that in other occupations, and it would, after some interval, cease to be produced iu c(jual quantity, till the diminished supply should raise the price in some propoition to the tax. 11<7 But if taxes on the instruments of production, as on corn, or other necessaries of the labourer, or on the materials composing machinery and the implements of husbandry, apply equally, or nearly equally, to all branches of industry, they cannot have the effect of raising the price of the pro- duce to which they are applied; for, provided the power of reproducing in general be not impaired, there will be no inducement to withdraw capital from one occupation and to transfer it to another. An advance of price is not, under such circumstances, a condition of continued supply. In this country the taxes on the necessaries of the la- bourer and on the instruments of production do not apply exclusively to agriculture; they apply, at least in an equal, and probably in more than an equal, degree, to other branches of industry; and therefore, according to the prin- ciples which I have here stated, they are not calculated to have the effect of raising the prices of agricultural produce, nor, in general, of raising the prices of other arti- cles that are not the immediate objects of taxation. It is not my intention, at present, to enter into a detailed statement of the grounds for this opinion, which would in- volve a discussion of the intricate subject of the principles of axation. Nor is it at all essential to the purposes of this inquiry, that I should put the patience of my readers to so severe a trial. It is sufficient to remark, in general terms, that if the level of the prices of articles not taxed, agricul- tural produce, for instance, were raised by the taxes laid on other articles, it would follow, that if the whole amount of taxation levied during a war were continued in peace, there would, as far as taxation is concerned, be no fall of prices in the transition from war to peace. As, therefore, the whole amount of taxation (including land-tax, tithe, and poor-rate) down to the summer of 1 822, was as great as during the war, with the exception of the income tax, the inference is, that in as far as untaxed com- modities and labour were raised by that cause, the same cause subsisting down to the summer of 1822, must have L2 prevented prices from falling to the level to which they would otherwise have declined. And, as I have only to account for the contrast between prices during the war and since the peace, till the close of 1822, the lowest point having been reached before any remission of taxation, the income tax excepted, we may fairly exclude the operation of taxes from among the causes of the fluctuations in the prices of untaxed commodities, such as agricultural produce, or of conimodi- ties divested of the taxes to which they may be liable on im- portation or consumption. I shall therefore proceed to examine how far war, inde- pendent of taxation, njay have contributed to the fluctuation of prices. 149 SECTION III. Examination of the EtFoct of the extra Demand or Consumption supposed to arise out of a State of War in general. Those persons who consider the range of high prices which prevailed from 179') to 1814, as being fully accounted for by the war, proceed on the assumed operation of the following causes : — 1 . An extra demand or consumption arising out of a state of war in general. 2. The extra demand or consumption peculiarly charac- terising the late war. 3. The monopoly of trade enjoyed by this country. And, 4. The stimulus or excitement to increased population, production, and consumption occasioned by the profuse government expenditure during the above period. The reasoning in support of the opinion, that the princi- pal phenomena of high prices may be ascribed to the effects of war, through the medium of extra demand, without any reference to circumstances affecting the supply, may be stated in substance as follows : — That the whole of the government expenditure for naval and military purposes may be regarded as creating a new source of demand for the articles constituting that expendi- ture, and consequently as tending to raise the price of such articles. That not only the price of those commodities, which come directly under the description of naval and military stores, must experience an advance in consequence of the increased demand, but that the price of corn and other necessaries must likewise be affected in a considerable degree by tlie additional consumption occasioned by the maintenance of the men conjposing the fleets and arniies. 150 That not only the demand for seamen and soldiers must tend directly to raise the rate of wages of the description of labourers from amonf; whom these men are taken, and in- directly the rate of wages generally; but that the increased demand for various kinds of manufactured articles requisite for the equipment of fleets and armies, is calculated further to raise the rate of wages ; and that this increased demand for labour, and the consequent advance of wages in general, naturally occasion increased population and increased con- sumption by the labouring classes. Thus, the government expenditure in all its ramifications is thought to extend the sphere and increase the activity of demand for necessaries, to operate directly or indirectly in promoting briskness of circulation, to vivify every branch of industry, and consequently to stimulate exertion to an in- crease of every kind of production. The cessation, by the peace, of all such extra demand, the great customer war being withdrawn, (when by the sti- mulus of previous high prices there was a general increase of production,) would naturally, it is supposed, account for falling markets and consequent distress among the produc- ing classes, and for reduced wages and diminished con- sumption ; these leading, through a long course of suffer- ing, to the only remedy, viz. a diminished production. The fallacy of this doctrine, which represents a general elevation of prices, both of commodities and labour, to be a necessary consequence of a state of war, proceeds (and can- not otherwise than so proceed) on the supposition that the money expended by the government consists of funds di- stinct from and over and above any that before existed ; whereas it is perfectly demonstrable, that an expenditure by government, whether defrayed by immediate taxes to the whole amount, or by loan on the anticipation of taxes to be levied, is nothing but a change in the mode of laying out the same sum of money ; and that exactly to the utter- most farthing what is expended by government wouKl and 151 must have been laid out by individuals upon objects ot'con- sunij)tion, productive or unproductive. I am here supposing that, both on the part of govern- ment and on that of individuals, the habit of hoarding to any extent is out of the question. If government were in the practice of collecting a surplus revenue in coin in time of peace, and of accumulating it as treasure to be expended on the occurrence of a war, then indeed there would be a marked difference in general prices on the transition from peace to war ; but even this addition to the circulating medium would be limited in its effect on prices to the time within which the treasure was m a course of progressive outlay, until its natural distribution into other countries was effected. A similar effect would follow, if individuals were in the habit of hoarding, and if, for the purposes of war, they were obliged to give up their hoards to the use of government. But these suppositions are quite foreign to the practice of the times which are under consideration. But although, upon the breaking out of a war, there would not and could not be any increase in the sum total of demand, (the quantum of the circulating medium remaining unaltered), there would be a disturbance of the relative pro- portion of the prices of commodities. The articles which might suddenly be the objects of government demand would rise; but, on the other hand, those articles which would, but for the war, have been purchased by individuals, from the fund which is withdrawn from them, would experience exactly an equivalent fall; in general, on such occasions, the demand by government, being sudden and on a large scale, for commodities of which the supply has not had time to accommodate itself to such extra demand, may produce a considerable rise in the price of such commodities ; while the corresponding abstraction of demand being spread over an infinitely greater surface, would operate in a manner that might be hardly perceptible, but would not be the less real on the sum of general prices. I have assumed that the quantity of money in circulation 15^2 remains the same. If a state of war incluJes the supposition of an increase in the quantity of money, then indeed the case would be altered. But an increase of currency for government purjioscs must be either in coin, which can only be obtained by cheapness relatively to other countries, and consequently supposes the reverse of dearncss, which is ascribed to war ; or in paper, which involves the question of depreciation, and this has already been disposed of. if the war supplies are raised within the year by direct taxation, that is, by an income or property tax, it is so per- fectly clear, that whatever is expended by government must be exactly so much abstracted from what would otherwise have been the expenditure by individuals, and that there can consequently be no elevation of the aggregate of prices, whatever may be the disturbance of the relative value of commodities and labour among each other, (the aggregate supply of these remaining the same) as to appear like a truism. But it may be a (jucstion whether the raising of money by loan, the interest of which only is to be defrayed by direct taxation, might not enable government to buy to a greater amount than would be counterbalanced by the diminished power of individuals to purchase. A moment's consideration, hov.'evcr, will be sufficient to convince any one that there can be no rise of general j)riccs in this case any more than in the former : the money advanced to go- vernment would, but for such loan, have been laid out equally in purchases, though probably not of the same com- mo'iities, or would have been lent on [)rivate securities to such persons as would have laid it out in purchases. It is precisely of the nature of money advanced by way of mort- gage to individuals; the lender would have, when he had advanced the money, just so much less to lay out as the borrower had more. It may be said that the borrower might spend it in the maintenance of unproductive labour, whereas the lender might otherwise have laid it out repro- ductively : this might or might not be the case, and the diflerence uiight eventually affect the (juantum of jiroduc- 1.53 lion ; but wc have supposed thenggregate supply to be uii- dirninislied by war; for how far it may be calculated to di- minish supply is a separate question. All that is now con- tended for is, that there cannot, by the mere loan to govern- ment, be any addition to the total of demand for commo- dities, whatever might be the difference in the relative pro- portions of them. In the case of indirect taxation, that is, of taxes on com- modities, whether for defraying the whole expenditure or the mere interest of loans, the articles immediately taxed must, as I have already admitted, rise in price in some pro- portion to the tax : but a rise in price from this cause would be unconnected with any increased demand affecting com- modities generally, as is assumed by those who consider that the expenditure of government forms a fresh fund, whether arising from taxes or loans. Viewed therefore upon general grounds, the conclusion appears to be irresistible, that the extra demand or con- sumption arising from government expenditure cannot have the effect of raising the aggregate of prices ; and this con- clusion from general reasoning is fully borne out by a reference to facts. It is of course to be understood that articles which are subject to a tax, such as malt, or to increased charges of importation, such as colonial and foreign produce, or to extra demand for naval and military stores, such as saltpetre and cordage, do not come into the comparison of general prices. With these exceptions, it will appear that there is no observable coincidence of a rise of price during war, and a fall during peace. On the contrary, it so hap) ens that, in the case of agricultural produce, and of several other im- portant commodities, there was for upwards of a hundred years previous to 1193 as low a range of prices during periods of war as during the intervals of peace. This has been eminently the case with respect to wheat ; and the fact is in itself so curious, tliat I am induced to give the follov.ini^ tables. 154. O « S o ^ c _ C CJ C5 ::= 3 « •"C -c <*- •73 a; O «^ a> ^ oT ^r O « !U — > - ^ !5 c 2 "^ above d and prices art 'A. there ninth; uc'h. (J rt (g o3 re j: o^ o o S S ^ IH 2 S 1 ='l .? ^ i 1 times during ere made to isequencfof Spain. M (14 r M are r soft toWi jpend hink lion ather O •^ -T ^ (X3 (>) •'T C-. "o -o a 1^ 'f^. O )riccs price note he A ors I deduc ink r R) M S tc u c - « - •S * o-= a. c to ii > • The the avera Wales, is inserted i Some au should be but this ] S S = 's OOOOOOaOOCOOOOC. 050J £l ^M t^ c 4to — coMt>.coo«ooDC5'-'; ::: <: •>c t^ X Si o — r^ :j I Mt ^Ic*'-it -w -lr< , -M -l-r-H--'-"-i»- ■»^ ,i, -M- -Hr-if -t* >o X — c *^ ^ o O 3-1 ^^ SS C5 — — ^'I'OCC^ClX Ml — — ^~ ■" nr -■ — ■<}' •* O ?4 ^ - -' X t t^ C5 £ :^ M ooMt•«^»^•* >^ •^ - "- - - rj" — — '- o — e<(NO» \-r — ■ • . • en bD • • • • • • j2 60 « tl lo CO r>l CO !?, 'T (U Ol o — ' M CO rr S tr i« «j r^ 00 oi O -i ,?j g ? ^ X < rr T ■* 'T < ifl 1/5 lO iC *0 >, o 4 ■^rfOl'JlXt^^O'-O'J'CCJS — 0'*mt^"'(NXCSCO(NOOj50C>< s^i'^txC^O* — e^MC^OC'trcC'^X— MCrjroi.-SrrooirteO'-^ a^ ;:■ nO^OO — OCOt^MW Jgs^lJJ— — — CSCO(MO»COM X ?■, C — ^» ro -r .^ "o r^ X X Ci 3; w. a. C-. c Oi C-. H.. o o in IN CS M 1-* ? u til « ■* ^ o ^ "^ <^ O-cOfN-- ") X O) o Oh -js ra X O) O — >. K ,>» CD o> o o ^ ^ < _ _ i: — — CS — — — — COCC\ ^o ') I •^5 1 iT 5(i 01 6 s ■^T TTT •^Z TTT 57^7 8 57 Ol 8 ^ -2 T 1 2 I 6 •'4 TTT 5 2| G2 3 2 TTT VJ 9 2 ••' 4 1 1 ; <>i s/« y years. 1 () I 05 ■i'^: 20,^^ y\ vcragc. 2i-(J17 S^-.)62 .V loti 2-555 . K57 FIRST PEACE OF PARIS. Beef. Pork. Butter. ('liesliirc Clieesc. Date. cwt. lb. cwt. lb. lb. lb. 1763 64 65 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 /. s. d. I 5 54 1 5 3^ 1 2 9 1 2 2^ 1 2 6 1 6 3 1 4 1 8 84 d. 9 8 -' ^ TTT 2| t4t 2| tVt 91 1 J •^5 TTT 91 94 ■^5 TTT 2i T^v 2i tVV 91 '7 3 •^4 TTT 91 3» Z| TTT 91 3 a '^Z TTT 3 tVV /. s. d. 1 13 2 1 5 2 3 34 2 12 6 2 9 11 I 18 3 d. ^4 TTT 41 ' 8 ^4 TTT Q 1 16 -"5 TTT 41 8 4 ^4 TIT 41 ^» 3 "il ITT C 1 5 6 0^ TTT r, I 44 •J 4 TTT 4 tVt 5| 5 1 5tV 5| 04 OtV 5i 6| 6i 7 d. 3i 3 IT 3t\ 2' ' 34 3f n 31 3tV 1 1 years 28 J-6, ■■36i ^7t 64 1 ^414 Average. 2i-195 41--418 5-898 3-1G2 WAR. Beef. P ork. Butter. Cheshire Cheese. Date. cwt. lb. cwt. lb. lb. lb. S. rf. d. L 5. d. d. d. d. 1775 10 4i ■3 1 ? •Jl TTT z 4 7i 44 -rV, 5-i-i H 76 8 / Q 2 8 •J TTT 2 2 HI 4i 47 ^2 TT? 6| H 77 8 54 2 2 •J TT^ 2 3 iH Al ■.4 41 TTT 7i 1 78 5 8 2t 2 3 4i ■» 9 ^2 TTT 8 3| ?9 13 2 3i 1 18 6 4 i6 Hi 31 80 11 2 3J A°T 2 9 41 i2 ^4 TTT 7i 3i 81 6 3 2f T^V 1 17 6 4 8 ^ TXT 5-8412 3-7977 82 6 8 93 4 8 ■'T TTT 1 ^? TTT 6-2035 3-7574 8 years. 24i -,V% '^'' 2 TTT 55-357 28-055 Average. 3- 312 4i-758 6-92 3-507 1.58 SECOND TKACi: OI- PAULS. Bee f. Pork Butter. Cheshire Cheese. Date. cwt. lb. cwt. lb. lb. lb. /. s. d. d. /. s. d. d. d. d. 1783 110 r, 96 none bought 6-49 1 7 4-5541 S4 none bought none bought 7-3405 4-5512 85 f 1 5 d j (^ ready money ( 91 t 01 r 2 ."i 0-) \ ready money J 4' 3* 6 AV 4 ' * 119 86 1 8 (3 l4-_ •' TT2 6 44j 4 -^Vt 87 1 G .5 O.I 3 6 ■^1 TIT" K. 84 ■^ 113 4 AV SS 1 9 1 Q 52 •' TTT 2 7 11 C 60 >^ TTT c 42 J TTT 4 »o 8Q 1 9 2 56 2 3 11 41 92 ^T 1 1 T 4 -r'A 3 4^5 no 1 8 9 •• 3 6 2 3 2 11 56 •"2" TT-a 6 VtJ •* -TTT 91 1 8 6 * T IT 2 6 5 43 100 ti -r^ 4 86 * Iff 92 I 8 7 •2 28 * TTT 2 5 4.3 .00 « tV. 480 10 years. •n ■ 8 29 ;-?* 60-890 43-489 Average. 3-119 4|-488 G-089 4-349 The following prices of wool, taken from the same work, will show that that article was, in a very marked degree, higher during the periods of peace, than during those of war. SUFFOLK \\'()0L THE TOD. Peace of Aix- la- ChapcUe. \\ ar. /. s. d. /. s. d. 1/49 - . . 19 1755 - . . 1;^ () 50 - - - 1 1 56 - - - (J 14 51 - - - 1 1 57 - - - 16 6 52 - - - 19 58 - - - 19 53 - - - 15 59 - . - 19 54 - . - 12 6-0 - - - IcS 6 61 - 62 - 8 Years - - 16 14 {] 6 Years 5 7 Average 1/ 10 6 11 Average 16 4^ 159 F irst peace of Paris. War. /. s d. /. s. d. 1763 . . 19 1775 - - IS 64 _ _ 19 6 7^ - - 18 6 65 „ _ 1 71 ' - 18 66 . . 1 1 78 - - 14 6 (^7 . . 19 79 - - 13 6 68 . _ 14 80 - - 11 G 69 _ _ 14 81 - . 10 6 70 - . 14 6 82 - - 10 71 . . 14 ^"" 72 - . 15 8 Years 5 14 6 73 . - 15 6 74 ars 16 6 Average 14 H 12 Ye 10 2 Averaj 16 10 LEWES FINE W OOL THE TOD. War. kSecoii d peace of! 'arib , /. s. (I. s. d. 1775 - - 1 11 1783 - - 14 6 76 - - 1 11 84 - - 18 6 77 - - 1 9 85 - - 18 6 7S - - 1 6 86 - - 16 6 79 - - 1 4 6 87 - - 2 80 - - 1 9 6 88 - . 2 1 6 81 - - 1 17 3 89 - - 2 6 82 - - 1 17 90 - 91 - 92 - 10 Y^ears Average - - 2 2 3 3 7 4 8 Yea rs 12 5 3 A vera 1 10 8 21 4 2 2 5 Other articles might be enumerated as affording a simi- lar result. Nor do the wages of labour appear to have been, in gene- ral, higher during war than in the intervals of peace : this will appear by the following extract from the Greenwich Hospital prices in the Appendix to the Commons' Report on the Resumption of Cash payments (page 'iZS.) 160 Carpenicrs ' Uricklayers | Masons | riumbers per (lay. j per d:iy. | per day. j per day. p fl730 L 1/3.) I War < , -. , - Peace 17501 ^^^'^ 11760. l>eace|,-.„, War {\^ reace < , „, I I/! 80 7S-) 901 it. s. f/. 6 2 6 6 2 6 6 2 6 fi 2 6 .) (J 6 2 (] 6 2 6 G 2 .1, 6 2 4 6 2 4 6 2 4- 6 2 4 6 2 4 2 8 2 8 2 8 2 8 2 8 2 8 2 8 2 10 2 10 2 10 2 10 d. C 6 6 6 3 3 Here then, through the course ot" sucli a series of years, we have surely proof sufficient that it is not a nccessari^ con- sequence of a state of war that wages, agricultural produce, and other articles not taxed, or not the immediate objects of war consumption, should rise; for in fact they were lower, in the majority of instances, during the periods of war, than in the intervals of peace. That they should in some have been lower in war than in peace might, perhaps, to a cer- tain extent, have been owing to a disturbance of the chan- nels of circulation, and to an increase in the functions of money, while the principles and practice of banking and credit were so imperfectly understood. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the greater cheapness of the periods of war must have arisen mainly from their coin- cidence with more favourable seasons. Be this as it may, the fact itself of the relative cheapness of periods of war in the whole term is decisive, at least against the pre- ponderating ellect ascribed to it, of raising the prices of provisions, and of commodities generally, independent of the degree in which they may be taxed ; and what, perhaps, is the most decisive consideration of all against the a^- sumplion of that preponderating influence, is that the period of the greatest cheapness in the whole term of 10."} 161 years, viz. the period between 1740 and 1748, is precisely that of an uninterrupted and very hirge war expenditure, defrayed chiefly by loans *. * The government expenditure arising from the war of that period must be considered to have been very large, relatively to the ordinary peace establishment, and relatively likewise to the general level of the prices of commodities and labour. To con- temporaries it appeared of extraordinary magnitude. Lord Bolingbroke says, " Our parliamentary aids, from the year 1740 exclusively, to the year 1748 inclusively, amount to 55,522,159/. \6s. 3d. ; a sum that will appear incredible to future generations, and is so almost to the present.'" Some Reflections on the present State of the Nation, 1749, edit. 1773, vol. iv. p. 137. 162 SECTION IV. Examinalion of the ElToct of the Exfr.i Dciiiand or Consumption attiil)uted to the late ^Val•. So far as to the presumption of the clTect of war generally, in raising prices : but it lias been asketl, " who, that con- templated the character of the late war, that referred to the great military force which was employed in Europe, and to the consequent demand of all the great articles of consump- tion, could for a moment think of comparing the events of that war, and the state of things growing out of it, with the events and effects of former wars *?" Now, with deference to the high authority from which this question proceeds, I answer, that as to this particular effect of war consumption it is only a question of degree, whatever the difference of the nature of the contest may have i)een in other respects; and further, that upon the general grounds before stated, the extra demand for such objects by the belligerent powers must be compensated, and probably more than compensated, by corresponding privations on the part of their subjects, AVith regard to the alleged influence of war demand in raising the price of provisions, it must doubtless be admitted as operating in the immediate neighbourhood of large armies in a state of active military operations ; for it is scarcely possible that the local supply can accommodate itself, except at a great advance of price, to so sudden and casual a source of extra demand. But applying to this country the supposition of extra demand, arising out of a state of war, it is to be observed, that the quantity of food required for the maintenance of the soldiers and sailors composing the * Lord Liverpool's Speech, Kith .Inly, 1822. IC)3 war establishment is not all so much beyond what would otherwise have been consumed. 'Iheonly effectual addition of demand is for that part which is beyond what would have been the consumption of the same individuals in their former occupations; but from this addition, small as it must be, compared with the mass over which it is distributed, is to be deducted that proportion which was supplied from the places abroad where our fleets and armies were occasionally stationed. Subject to these deductions, if the computation could be accurately made, it would appear that the total of the increase of consumption by the war, relatively to the whole quantity for sale, could have but a very trifling and barely perceptible influence on the price of the principal articles of food *. But, whatever ma}' be the amount of that extra demand for purposes of war consumption, I am inclined to think that it is more than compensated by the diminished consumption of the rest of the community. This diminution of consumption may be effected in va- rious ways by the increased economy which may be ren- dered necessary among the poor, and among the classes immediately above these, in order to meet the additional taxation incidental to war. If the taxation be direct, it is clear that the classes which * The insignificance of the extra consumption or waste of pro- visions by soldiers is expressly admitted by one of the ablest advocates for the doctrine of the great influence of a government expenditure defrayed by loans, on general prices. " Tliat part of the loan which is distributed in pay to the troops is mostly expended in provisions for their maintenance. Probably a greater quantity may be consumed by them as soldiers than if they continued in their usual occupation : and this is much dwelt upon by some writers as the great cause of extra consumption during war ; but I think more importance has been attached to this species of waste than can l)c justly ascribed to it." — Ol>- servat'ions on the Effects produced by the E.vpenditure ofGoiwrn>- ment during the restriction of Cash Payments, hy Williatn Blahe, Esq. F.R.S. (Page 69.) M 2 161 have to pay the tax will have a smaller sum to lay out upon necessaries, or upon indulfrences become necessary by habit; and, in their choice of evils, some may prefer sacrificing a portion of food not absolutely essential to existence, rather than give up any portion of the clothing and fuel to which they have been accustomed. In the case of indirect taxation, that is, of taxes laid on consumable commodities, the same effect will follow. For instance, a poor family, rather than forego its usual quantity of tea, which may be doubled in price by the tax, would pei'- haps abridge its indulgences in an occasional pudding or pie. But the greatest saving of consumption on the part of the bulk of the community, in the case of diminished means, by direct or indirect contributions to the war, is in the re- sort from a higher to a lower description of food: that is, according to the degree of pressure, and particularly when the diminished means happen to coincide with seasons of dearth . It is well known that on such occasions recourse has been had first to the coarser sorts of wheaten flour ; next to barley and oats; then to beans and peas; and finally to potatoes ; not to mention contrivances for the greater eco- nomy in the use of food by soups, &c., which were so fami- liar to the public in particular periods of the war. It has been seen in the tables which I have exhibited in the first part of this work, of the fluctuation of manufacturing wages, how much the funds applicable to the maintenance of that part of the community are subject to occasional abridge- ment ; and it may thence be easily conceived to what an extent the diminution of the consumption of that class alone may go in counterbalancing the extra consumption by sol- diers and sailors. This view of the counterbalancing effects of the pri- vations of the lower classes, under certain circumstances, is strengthened by a reference to the increase of consumption by them under opposite circumstances, such as have of late existed, viz. full wages, and a low price of provisions. In- deed, the striking fact of the increase of consumption of 165 corn and meat, which has taken place withhi tlie last few years, is decisive of the inference as to the process wliich must take place under the opposite circumstances. The assertion of an increase of the consumption of wheat can of course rest only on general observation ; but the information leading to this conclusion is derived from such extensive sources, and from authority which is of so respectable a de- scription, besides that every ground of presumption tends to the same inference a priori, as to leave no reasonable iloubt of the fact of increased consumption*. Whether the increase be to the extent now supposed by those who ven- ture upon suth computations is another question, upon which I shall not at present enter further than to observe, that the lowest estimate affords fair grounds for concluding that the increase of consumption since the peace, and espe- cially within the last three ox four years, has been greater than it was in any equal period of the war, allowing fully for the difference of the population at the two perioils. But while the increase of the consumption of wheat is matter only of inference, though on good grounds, the in- creased consumption of meat is a fact of which the evidence is still more decisive. The returns of the number of cattle and sheep sold at Smithfield will establish this point, as relates to the consumption of London and its neighbour- hood in the last two years, compared with any period of the war; and the returns of the numbers slaughtered at some of the other principal towns in the kingdom seem to place the matter beyond any doubt, and exhibit an extraordinary increase during the last three years, compared with any equal period of the war. Now, as consumption is the measure of the extent of de- mand tj and as the consumption has of late been consider- * See Mr. \V. W . \Miituiores Speech 26th February, 1823. t This is the sense in which Mr. Ricardo uses the word de- mand, and he expressly objects to admit the use of the term when applied to a rhe in the price of a commodity from an alteration UK) ably greater, ami lias incrcasctl at a more raj)icl rale than at any period of the war, it is incumbent on those who ascribe all the phenomena of the high prices of provisions to war demand, to show why the smaller consumption during the ill the value of money. " The dcmaud for a commodity cannot be said to increase if no additional quantity of it be purchased or consumed 5 and yet under such circumstances its money value may rise. Thus if the value of money were to fall, the price of every comraodityw'ould rise, for each of the competitors would be willing to give more money than before on its purchas^e ; hut when its price rose 1 or 20 per cent., if no more were bought than before, it would not, I apprehend, be admissible to say, that the variation in the price of the commodity was caused by the increased de- mand for it." — Principles of Po/ilical Economy and Ta.vation, 3d edition, page 461. There is yet another sense in \\hich tiie word demand is fre- quently used, which is, in my opinion, equally inadmissible in a discussion of this kind ; and that is, where it is applied to signify the increased eagerness or competition of buyers, and consequent advance of price, occasioned by the scarcity of any particular commodity, or in other words, by an under supply of it relatively to the average rate of consumption. But the object of the present discussion is to determine whether the high prices during the war were occasioned by an extra consumption arising out of the war, that is, by a consump- tion beyond the average rate at which it was ])roceeding, inde- pendent of the war, or by an under supply, compared vi ith that average rate ; it is, therefore, of the greatest practical importance so to confine the use of the term, as to preserve the consideration of the alternative of these two causes, or of the proportion in which each operated, perfectly distinct. The advocates of the doctrine of war-demand have not attended to this distinction ; and to the neglect of it may be traced a good deal of the confusion and looseness of reasoning which perv;>dcs their arguments in sup- port of that doctrine. If, in their use of the term, they actually mean an under supply, relatively to what had been, independent of the war, the average rate of consumi)tioii, there is no difference 167 war sliould be connected with a rise of" prices, while the greatly increased consumption since the peace should have been attended by a fall of prices. Considering the pro- gressive increase of population, with the rapid improve- ment of our manufactures, which was going on down to the breaking out of the war, there is every reason to believe that, but for the war, there would have been a still greater consumption of food and other necessaries than actually oc- curred ; and that consequently, supposing the scarcity arising from the seasons, and the obstructions to importa- tion, or the difficulty of obtaining a supply from abroad, to have been the same in peace as in war, we should have had prices full as high, if not higher, less always the difference between paper and gold. It may be said, that the demand or consumption during the war, as regards provisions, was not indeed greater than it is now, nor perhaps so great ; but that it was of a peculiar description, more sudden and relative to a smaller supply. That it was relative to a smaller supply, as compared with the population at the different periods, is what 1 admit, and it is to that relative smallness of supply in the former, and to the abundance in the latter period, that the contrast of prices in the two periods is mainly attributable. The facts of scarcity, as prevailing more or less during the former, and of abund- ance during the latter period, have already been noticed, between us, as it will be seen that I admit the influence of the late war in raising prices, by obstructing and diminishing supply. But it is evident from the general tenor of their reasoning, how- ever loosely expressed, that they do not so understand the term, and that they, in fact, use it synonymously with consumption; for they constantly refer to the war expenditure as having afforded the means of an extra consumption. It is in this sense, Ihere- fore, that I understand and use the term, in its application to the question now under discussion. \(\s and I bhall again have occasion to recur to them ibr the purpose of stating more fully the nature and causes of those circumstances. It is, therefore, only, according to the supposition, upon the peculiarity and suddenness of demand, that the differ- ence of effect upon prices between a given consumption through government and individual expenditure depends. The supposition, however, of a greater influence by govern- ment purchases, than by purchases to a similar extent on the part of individuals, requires but a single remark : a re- ference to the Victualling-office prices will prove that government did not pay more for the same articles, at the same time, than private buyers, and in few instances so much. This remark is applicable to the Victualling-office purchases even in former wars, when it is well known that government contracts were made on terms less advan- tageous, compared witii the market price, than in the last war; the principle of competition having been more exten- sively and systematically acted upon in the latter than at any former period. If then the nature or mode of demand for provisions, arising from government expenditure, is not calculated to produce such an extraordinary effect on prices, still it may be contended that the suddenness of it, before the supply can have accommodated itself to the supposed extra de- mand, is sufficient to account for the rise. But I have already stated grounds for thinking that, as far as relates to provisions, the government demand is not all, or even in great part, beyond what would otherwise have existed; and that at any rate the whole extra quantity consumed by sol- diers and sailors in time of war, beyond what would have been consumed by them in their former occupations, would form so trifling a proportion to the whole mass, as to pro- duce no sensible impression on j)rices. The presumption to this effect is fully confirmed by facts. At the breaking out of the war in 17!J3 there was indeed u trifling rise in the 169 price of provisions: but noL greater than seemed to be taking place from other causes, the season being, as will be seen hereafter, one of indifierent produce. On the 1st January, 1793, immediately preceding the commencement of hostilities, the average price of wheat was ^Ti". 2d.; on the 1st January, 1791', it was 496'. Sd.: the contract price of beef at the Victualling-office in 1793 was l/. \0s. id. per cwt., and in 17^4 1^. 1 15. \()d.; a diflfcrence in both cases not worth mentioning, and fully accounted for by the season. But the renewal of the war in 18().'i was the occasion of a much more sudden increase of demand by the Victualling- office than in 1 793. I do not know what the relative quan- tities purchased were ; but the number of men raised for the army and navy in 1803 and 1801- was, as is well known, nmch larger than in any former period of the war, and therefore the suddenness of the supposed extra demand might be exjiected to have niised prices considerably ; but how stands the fact.' The prices paid by the Victualling- board were as follows; Flour Salt Beef per sack. jier tierce. s. d. I. .y. d. lH03,May .■)2 (i .liinc .V{ '1 . [) y 10 July and Aiii;ust .'>'As. ;ui(l .t4 October o."") . 8 10 4 \bV4. Pc-brunry }.') April aiid M.iy iOs. Id. anrl 38 4 June to Sept ll.v. 8^/. and ofJ October 07 10 . r. 17 6 showing a decline in the piiccs of flour and meat till the suunner of ISOJ, when the effect of the bad harvest of that year began to be felt. The prices of meat continued falhng till the close of 1808. Indeed, this great and sudden de- mand by the Victualling-board had not only no permanent r/o cllect ill raisin;ricii]Uir;tl interest; but it is well known that the fall of priees, which had been progressively taking place in corn till the summer of l sO 4, was productive (as every great fall of prices must be) of considerable distress to that class; and the state of suffering from that cause was tlie ground for passing Mr. Western's corn bill in that year. ^Again, the renewed hostilities of 1815, which terminated with the battle of \\ aterloo, and which, for the short time they lasted, were connected with a greater suddenness, as well as magnitude of preparation, than on any former occa- sion, had not even a momentary effect in arresting the agri- cultural distress, which had begun with the fiill of prices before the termination of the former war. if it be contended that, without laying any stress on the mere suddenness of the demand, the effect on pi ices would bu in proportion to the extent of the expenditure by govern- * As fiirtlicr illustrative of this point, I have to observe, that the price of meat, after a trifling fall at the conclusion of the war in 1801, rose again, in the course of the peace of 1802, to a higher level than it had been at in the last three months of the preceding war J and that it was not till the re-commenceraent of hostilities in 1803 that it again resumed a decided tendency downwards. The following extract from the Farmer's Magazine for Feb. 1S02, \\ ill serve to explain the state of the cattle markets at the relative periods. " It was generally believed that the cessation of hostilities would have had a considerable efl'ect in reducing the value of butcher's meat ; hence a fall from ten to fifteen per cent, took place over the whole kingdom upon that event being declared. This fall, without dispute, proceeded from the force of opinion, as it took place all at once before the least alteration in the demand occurred ; therefore has not been lusting. Instead of continuing to fall, or even remaining at the prices tlien noted, cattle and sheep have risen considerably, and threaten fo advance still higher." 171 nicnt al llic iliflercnt periods; lei the persons liolcliiig this opinion icconcile the following facts to their liyj)olhesis. Wheiit. Kyc . Barley. Oai E. .V d. A'. d. A'. (/. 6-. d. 1793 J Illy 51 ;i 37 1 32 3 23 5 1794 . .01 8 37 9 31 8 22 1 179 'j . . 77 2 57 3 41 10 27 8 l7iH') . . 81 . 41) 8 4() '29 9 G 34 3 24 4 21 15 3 171)7 . (i 179S . , 50 4 31 1 29 4 22 7 1799 Jan. 49 <2 32 3 29 4 19 7 ('-SVc.' yJ/jpend/.r, No. 5, to I'arL \ .) Here are six years of war conducted at a progressively increasing expenditure, and yet the prices of corn, after having been raised by intermediate bad seasons to a great height, subsided to a lower level than they were at in the first ytar of the Mar ; and I can recollect that great com- plaints were made by the farmers of the low prices to which they were obliged to submit at the close of that period *. I have already shown that in 1S04, wlien the expenditure by government was greater than at any former period, prices of corn had declined to the level at which they had been on the lirst breaking out of the war. But, in as far as mere extent of expenditure by the Vic- tualling-office, as well as by other departments of govern- ment, was concerned, there was no period of the war in which it was on so extensive a scale as in the last six months of 1813, when our armies in the Peninsula were almost wholly subsisted by supplies from this country ; when large fleets of victuallers were despatched in succession to the dif- ferent ports of Spain and Portugal ; and when our naval and * In the autunui of 1798 beef in Smithiield market averaged from 2s. '6d. tu 3*. Gc/. per t^toue, mutton from 2.v. 2d. to 2s. lOd. ;uk1 veal from os. Ad. to As. 6d. Hay averaged in St. James's market 2/. 12o. and btraw 1/. 1 65. per load. 17' military establishinenls in general were on a footing of the most profuse exju'iuliturt". And yet it will be seen that this profuse expcnciiture had not power to prevent the great fall in the priee of corn, which I noticed in my former part as having taken place in these six months ; of which fall a fur- ther proof is afforded by the actual purchases of the Victual- ling broad, viz. ,v. d. Ill Sept. 1S12, tlic price paid for llcur jx.-!' \ , .. sack was J Aiul ill NovcMiliei";, 181.') (i.) 2 Making a difference of 4G 5 or upwards of 10 per cent. (Appendix to the Lords Hep. on the Corn Lnu'T, p. \'S^.) The prices of meat, indeed, were rising while wheat and flour were falling ; but this circumstance affords a prima Jacie presumption that the same general cause could not affect both, when they were moving in opposite directions. The dearness of provender in 1810, 1811, and 1«12, result- ing, as I shall hereafter have occasion to show, from the seasons, will fully account for the high prices of meat, with- out resorting to the operation of war demand. W ith regard to other commodities which were not the objects of direct government expenditure, it will be seen by reference to Part 4 of this Work, that there was no ob- servable connexion between a state of war and a lise of prices, or between a state of peace and a fall of prices, ex- cept in as far as might be accounted for by a difference in the charges of importation, or by other circumstances wholly distinct from any conceivable influence of war demand. There are particular articles of which the demand for naval and military purposes forms so large a proportion to the total supply, that no diminution of consumption by in- dividuals can keep pace with the immediate increase of de- mand by government; and, consequently, the breaking out 173 of a war tends to raise the price otsiuli articles to a great relative height; but, even of such articles, if the consump- tion were not on a progressive scale of increase so rapid that the supply, with all the encouragement of a relatively high price, could not keep pace with the demand, the tendency is (supposing no impediment, natural or artificial, to pro- duction or importation) to occasion such an increase of quantity, as to reduce the price to nearly the same level as that from which it had advanced. And accordingly it will be observed, by reference to the same detailed statements, that saltpetre, hemp, iron. Sec. after advancing very con- siderably under the influence of a greatly extended demand for military and naval purposes, tended downwards again whenever that demand was not progressively and rapidly increasing. Any fluctuation independent of variations in the extent of government demand, may be clearly traced to the greater or less obstructions to supply. 171 SECTION V. Examination of the Effect of the Monopoly of Trade during the late War. It has been contended that, admitting no influence by war-demand upon prices, except of articles that are used as naval and military stores, there was a considerable effect produced on general prices by the monopoly which the war, as a consequence of our ascendency at sea, and of our exclusive possession of the East and West Indies, conferred on the trade of this country. As instances of the extent of the monopoly of trade which we thus enjoyed, we are re- ferred to the number of British vessels Vvhich were pro- gressively increasing (and employed at advanced freights) with the continuance of the war ; to the crowded state of the river and of the docks; to the consequently full em- ployment of the various branches of industry connected with the building, repairing, and outfit of ships in the port of London, and in many of the outports; and, in short, to all the signs of great commercial activity. A part of this description is true. Never before was the shipping of this country employed at higher freights ; and scarcely a ship belonging to any other nation could sail without a license from the government of this country. The whole of the exportable produce of the East and West Indies, and of a great part of South America, came to our ports; and no part of the continent of Europe could obtain a supply of coffee, sugar, and other colonial articles, or of the raw materials of some of their manufac- tures, except from this country. So far we may be said to have enjoyed the mono})oly of trade; but the effects of this species of monopoly, in its supposed extension of our ship- 175 pingnnd foreign coniniorcc, liavc boon greatly mistnkon aiul overrated. The following comparative statement will prove that the amount of British shipping annually cleared out from Great Britain fell off considerably on the average of the first ten years of the war, compared with the average of the four years of peace immediately preceding ; that in the ten years ending in 1810, it little more than recovered to the level of 1792 ; and that the increase has been great beyond example since the termination of the war. The comparison stands thus: — Average Annual Tonnage of British Shipping cleared out from Great Britain to all pa~rls oftlie IVorld. 17B9 to 1792 1793 to 1802 1803 to 181C 1814 to 1823 1820 to 1823 1,495,477 1,316,487 1,501,403 2,168,779 2,201,865 {See Appendi.v, No. 1.) I have not the means of referring to official accounts of the number of British ships cleared out from Great Britain anterior to 1789, in order to establish the rate of increase prior to 1793, on a scale of a sufficient number of years. But there is in Chalmers's Estimate, p. 234, an account of the tonnage of British shipping cleared outward from England alone, from which 1 have made the following- extract : — 1783 . 795,669 1788 . 1,243,206 1784 846,355 1789 . 1,336,166 1785 . 951,855 1790 . 1,235,142 1786 982,132 1791 1,333,106 1787 1,104,711 1792 . 1,398,268 By this it will appear that the rate of increase previous to the commencement of the war was very considerable. 17^> Of the tonnage of British ships, registered as belonging to Great Britain, I have no oflicial documents further back than 1 808 ; but there can be no doubt, by inference from the number before stated of ships cleared outwards, that the period between 17.s:5 and 1802 would exhibit a greater rate of increase in the first, than in the last ten of those twenty years. The tonnage registered (exclusive of Irish) since 1802 is as follows: — 1803 to 1813 (annual average) 2,291,940 1814 to 1823 (ditto) 2,565,721 From the amount, however, of tonnage registered during the war, ought to be deducted the ships which were en- gaged as transports, and which could not therefore be con- sidered as forming a part of our mercantile marine. The shipping engaged as transports amounted to no less, on an average of the latter years of the war, than about 700 sail, registering nearly 2o();00() tons; which, deducted from the total amount of registered tonnage, leaves a greatly re- duced quantity of shipping applicable to the purposes of trade during the war, compared with the last ten years of peace. It is to be observed, too, that this smaller amount of shipping during the war was, in consequence of the de- tention of convoys — circuitous voyages, to elude the anti- commercial decrees of the enemy — occasional embargoes, and other causes of delay even in our own or friendly ports — incapable of carrying on nearly so much trade then, as it would at present. The difference hence arising, in the num- ber of voyages performed by the same ship in a given time, will account in some degree for the different proportion of the tonnage cleared outwards, to the amount of registereii tonnage at the several periods. The same circumstance, combined with the advanced cost of building materials, will account for the high freights which prevailed during the war. 177 It may be said that this reduced employment of British shipping, for commercial purposes, was compensated by a greater employment of foreign ships during the war. True ; but does not this circumstance militate with the received ideas of the nature of our boasted monopoly of trade? With regard to the crowded state of the river and of the docks during the war, it is sufficient to remark, as a matter of notoriety, that they have been still more crowded since the peace. And if the building of ships in the river has declined, it is because, in consequence of the greater ex- penses attending the river yards, a large proportion of that branch of business is transferred to the outports, and not because the annual amount of ship-building has diminished during the peace, on a comparison with the average of the war, as must be evident from the statements already given of the relative amount of tonnage at the several periods. Indeed, I am told, that at the outports there is at this time hardly a slip applicable to ship-building unoccupied. And even in the river yards, a considerable degree of activity is at present observable. The most rapid increase of ship- building, however, is that which is going on in British Ame- rica, in consequence of the great cheapness of the materials in that part of the world*. But what must be conclusive on this and all minor points referred to, in proof of the supposed effects of our monopoly * In New Brunswick alone^ vessels of a large class, amount- ing collectively to no less than about 22,000 tons, entitled to British registers, have been in preparation for the last twelve months, and will be ready to come to this country in the course of the ensuing summer (1824). Ships built in that quarter are, as may easily be supposed, from the nature of the timber, less durable, and of an inferior description in every other respect to those built in this country. The regulation of the timber duties, acting as a premium for dry rot, and yielding in impolicy and in- justice to our corn laws only, is calculated greatly to increase the proportion of that inferior, and in every way objectionable class of shipping. N 178 of trade by tlie war, is tliat the aggregate amount of our foreign tratle, wliich can alone be in question as affected by the monopoly, was not nearly so great during the war as it has been since the peace; and that the rate of increase was as great in the peace preceding 1793, as in the succeeding interval of war. This will appear from the following statement : Average annual official value of the Imports into, and Exports from Great Britain : Total Imports. Total Exports. 1783 to 1792 .... £17,257,293 £18,282,860 1 790 to 1 792 1 9,486,676 22,282,720 1 793 to lvS02 25,798,758 30,522,6.38 1803 to 1812 30,697.905 37,834,038 1814 to 1823 35,741,534 54,573,392 1821 to 1823 36,839,617 56,093,473"* {See Appendix, No. 1,) * The reader cannot fail of being struck with the circumstance observable in the above comparative statement of the much greater ratio of increase of the exports than of the imports. It does not enter into the immediate object of the present discussion to re- quire an explanation of this apparent anomaly ; nor am I prepared with materials to enable me to give a complete solution of the difficulty. I will only mention one or two obvious circumstances, which may in a general way account for some part of that dif- ference. Of these^ the principal would, I have no doubt, on a minute investigation, be found in a difference between the official and real values. It is well known that the official values are esti- mated by prices fixed in 1696, and continued, without variation, I believe, except in the article of coffee *, down to the present ♦ The exception of coffee is so important.that I will here notice it. On importation, coffee was valued in the original rates at Tl., while for exportation it was valued at 141. 105. ; the real value not exceeding on an average above 5/. This enormous over-valuation swelled the apparent excess of exports from the time, which was about the beginning of the war, when the supply of the Continent with coffee be- came totally dependent on this country. The mere difflrence between the import 170 By reference to the more detailed statement in the Ap- pendix, it will be observed, that one of the effects of our monopoly of trade was an increase in the exports of foreign and colonial produce, the amount of which must previously have swelled the imports in a corresponding degree. In the interval, however, between !807 and 1814, there was no corresponding export of the colonial produce compulsorily brought hither; as it was only in ISll' that an adequate time. These official values, therefore, form a tolerably good guide as to the variations of quantity at the several periods, bat do not represent the actual value estimated at the prices of the periods to which they refer. It is highly probable, that the improvements of machinery whicli have been going on of late years with astonishing rapidity, have reduced the value of British manufactures exported, in a proportion much beyond that in which the imported raw materials have fallen within the corre- sponding period. This cause of itself may account for no incon- siderable part of the difference. Another cause may be the in- creased inducement by the lowrate of interest, to extend shipments on credit. Several other causes would, I have no doubt, be dis- covered on a more minute examination of details. Still, an excess of exports, although in a very small proportion to the difference in question, must be left to account for the influx of the precious metals, which has taken place since the peace. and export valuation was Tl. 10*. per cwt. ; and this upon an excess of export of 300,000 cwt. and upwards, amounted to upwards of 2,000,000/. according to the years to which it applied. In each of the years 1800 and 1801, this over-valua- tion amounted to about 5,000,000/. So great an error at length attracted notice; and it was corrected in a statement of the official values of imports and exports con- tained in the Finance Report of 180C, for a series of years as far back as 1789. The over-estimate of coffee is, in that statement, expressly deducted from the offi- cial value of each year's export of foreign and colonial produce. And it is from that corrected statement that the official values from 178D down to 1806 are ex- tracted for the Table in the Appendix to this Part. For the period anterior to 1789, I have made the deduction of 7/. 10*. per cwt. on the quantity of coffee exported, as inserted in the Table of quantities in the Appendix to Part IV. The years subsequent to 1806, are taken from the succeeding Finance Repcrtg, and in all these coffee, I understand, is taken at a corrected valuation. n2 ISO vent couKl be found, on ihe opening of the ports of the con- tinent by the peace, for the accumulation of sugar, coffee, &c. that had taken place in tlie preceding five years. The official Value of the colonial produce so accumulated could be little short of fifteen millions sterling. But the circumstance which, more than the monopoly of trade, or any other effect of the war, immediately increased the amount of the imports, and indirectly augmented the exports, was the supply of foreign corn, which we drew so largely during the war. This item alone will be found to constitute a large proportion of the sudden increase ob- servable of both imports and exports in particular years, the year 1802 excepted, the increase in which is clearly attributable to the opening of the ports of Holland and France to us by the peace of Amiens. And large as the imports of corn were during the war, they would have been still larger (the seasons being the same) if we had then been at peace; and if the importation had not been subject to such high freights and insurances as were paid in conse- quence of the war. The foreign expenditure of government was also one great cause of an increase in the amount of the exports; at the same time, this cause is in no way connected with the monopoly ascribed to the war. Even with these causes of additional export during the war, viz. the monopoly of the transit of colonial produce, payments for large importations of foreign corn, and a great foreign expenditure by government; it will be seen that the aggregate amount of exports has been greater in the last ten years of peace than on the average of the whole period of the war, or of the last half of it. And from a reference to the rate at which our foreign commerce was increasing just before the commencement of the war, and at which it has increased since the peace, there is every ground for the conclusion that, great as was the growth of our foreign trade, with the aid of monopoly, during the war, it would have been still greater and more rapid without the war and without the monopoly. isl But, granting the utmost that has ever been claimed for the effects of the monopoly arising out of the war, in ex- tending the shipping and trade of this country, it still re- mains to connect that description of monopoly with the high prices ascribed to it. Now it so happens, that not an article which was the subject ot" that monopoly was, as far as I am aware, at a higher price in this country than it would have been under the most free competition. While that monopoly was most strict, viz in 1811 and 1812, prices of sugar, coffee, dye-woods, cotton, spices, and some de- scriptions of manufacture, which were the objects of our ex- clusive trade, were precisely those which, if a deduction be made for the difference between paper and gold, were more depressed than they ever were before or have been since. And it was only in the almost certain prospect of peace, and consequently of the near termination of the monopoly, that the prices of those commodities experienced any decided advance, viz in 1813-14. Dr. Johnson defines the word " Monopoly" as " the ex- clusive privilege of selling :" but, ifthe thing to be sold exists, and is offered for sale in as unlimited a quantity as it would have been without that privilege, what is the use of it to the party invested with it? If, when the French and Dutch colonies in the V^ est and East Indies were ceded to this country, their produce had been suppressed or destroyed, and their cultivation prohibited, then indeed there would have been something substantial in our monopoly, as far at least as related to price; and the planters, or the proprietors of the produce of our old colonies, would have derived from that circumstance a decided benefit. Instead of which, by a large outlay of British capital, the PVench West-India islands, and the Dutch settlements of Demerara and Suri- nam in the west, and Java in the east, were rendered more productive than they ever before had been. The collective and increased produce from all these sources, when poured into this country, while the export to the Continent was restricted, occasioned the real depression attending a glut, 182 the very opposite state to that whicli is commonly supposed to be the consequence of a monopoly. The very high prices of colonial produce in 1813 and 1814 were, as 1 have already shown, in great part the result of ill-judged speculations, and were not realized by the exporters in the eventual re- turns ; but even supposing these prices to have been realized, they were so transitory, as not to afford a compensation for the long previous depression ; and they cannot at any rate be considered as the result of monopoly arising out of the war, when they were only the consequence of the opening of new markets by a peace. 183 SECTION VI. Examination of the Effect of the Stimuhis or Excitement sup- posed to have been occasioned by the Government Expenditure during the late War. The advocates of the theory which accounts for the high prices observable during the late war, by the excitement or stimulus supposed to arise from the profuse government, expenditure, assume implicitly that the operation of that stimulus was distinctly marked by an inmsually rapid in- crease of population, of production, and consumption ; and that the transition from war to peace occasioned the fall of prices, not by an increased supply or production since the peace, relatively to the same rate of consumption, as during the war, but by a diminution of demand for con- sumption, relatively to the same extent of supply. As these arguments have been repeated by no inconsiderable authorities* since this part of my work was first written, it * " These pecularities (that is, of the late war) were the ««- usually rapid increase of the population^' &c. — (Quarterly Review, No. 57, p. 222.) " It may still most safely be said, that in no txuenty-tiuo years of our histori/, ofiahich we have authentic accounts, has there ever been so rapid an increase of production and consumption, both in respect of quantity and value, as in the twenty-t'voo years ending with 1814."— (Ibid. p. 229.) " The population increased tuith extraordinary rapidity, which necessarily implies such a rise in the money price of labour as, combined with more general employment, and other advantages iu the purchase of clothing and foreign commodities, would enable 181- may be worth while to cxaniinc more in detail than 1 had then the materials or the time to do, the grounds of that assumption : for if the facts do not bear out the supposi- tion of those effects, it is fair to presume that the whole theory of the stimulus of war demand must fall to the ground ; the stimulus being distinctly inferred from the the labouring classes to bring up larger families than before."— (Ibid. p. 2.33.) " Examine the evidence of Alderman Rothwell, Mr. Rous, and various other witnesses, who all agree that during the toar there tvere both greater production and greater consjunpliou." — (Ob- servations, &c. by W. Blake, Esq. F.R.S. p. 67.) " There cannot be a doubt that during the war more produce voas raised, and viorc work done." — (Ibid. p. 72.) " It is to be observed, too, that though in the first instance the demand might be for tlie materials of war, it ivoiild gradually ej'~ tend to almost every commodity ordinarily consumed bif man." — (Ibid. p. 76.) " The low prices (1822) are not confined to corn alone : it is well known that manufactures are less in quantity, and less in price also." — (Ibid. p. 93.) " The e.i'citement was not confined to manufactures. It ex- tended to the producers of the raw materials in every branch of employment : the mines of copper, lead, tin, iron, coals, were all in activity." — (Ibid. p. 89.) •• It appears to me, that in whatever degree minor circum- stances may have co-operated, the great and mighty source of the distresses felt by all classes of producers has l)een the transition that took place at the termination of the war j not the transition from war to peace, in the usual acceptation of those terms ; not the transition that arises from the diversion of capital from one employment to another employment ; not the transition from the waste occasioned by the extra consumption of troops, either at home or engaged in actual warfare ; but tlic transition from an immense, unremitting, protracted, effectual demand for almost every article of consumption to a comparative cessation of that demand."— (Il)id. p. 88.) 185 Rssumed increased rate of population, productirn, and con- sumption, coincidently with the war. As the question in relation to prices refers to a com- parison between the period of war and that of the interval of peace, immediately preceding and surceedins:, it must be with a view to those respective periods that the rate of increase of population, and of production and consumption must be determined. It is not the fact of mere increase, in each of these particulars, during the war, that is the question, but the rate of the increase, because if the rates of increase were as great in the twenty-one years of peace as in the twenty-one years of war, into which the whole in- terval, since the close of the American war in 1782, may be divided, it is clear that we should have to seek, in circum- stances totally distinct from those which were peculiar to the late war, for the causes of that increase. Not that, if the fact were otherwise, it would be sufficient to establish the alleged increase in the relation of cause and effect with the state of war, nor to countervail the arguments founded in principle against that conclusion. But coincidence in point of time often affords a prima facie case of presump- tion of the relation of cause and effect : if, therefore, the assumed fact of coincidence be disproved, not a shadow of jrround will remain for an inference so irreconcileable with all the experience of former times, and with all the de- ductions of reasoning, as that a state of war can, under any circumstances, be in itself favourable to the increase of population, of production, and consumption ; or, in other words, of population and wealth, which the advocates for the theory of war-demand must mean if they mean any thing. Let us then examine the facts, as to these points, under their several heads, viz. — Population, Production, and Consumption. The population returns to parliament being made mostly upon a comparison of intervals of ten years each, do not 186 afibrd means of distinguishing, with perfect accuracy, the total increase of each entire period of peace and war ; but they afford grounds for an approximation to the truth. I confine myself, in this comparison, to the returns for Eng- land and Wales, as these are mostly given together, and therefore more easily referred to. The returns for Scotland give nearly the same result; and what dift'erence there is proves rather in favour of my conclusion. The tables for England and Wales give the following totals : 1770 . . 7,428,000 1795 . . y,055,000 80 . . 7,953,000 1801 . . 9,168,000 85 . . 8,016,000 11 . . 10,502,500 90 . . 8,675,000 21 . . 12,218,500 The rate of increase exhibited by these numbers, omit- ting 1785 and 1795, stands thus : From 1780 to 1790 10 years, 9 per cent. 1790 to 1801 11 years, 5 J per cent, or for 10 years, 5| per cent. 1801 to 181 1 10 years, 14i per cent. 1811 to 1821 10 years, I6i percent. But none of these intervals contain unbroken periods of war and peace. From 1780 till the close of 1782 the de- pressing circumstances which marked the latter part of the American war, and the severe scarcity which occurred in 1782, followed by high prices in the two succeeding years, are sufficient to account for the retarded progress of popu- lation. Among the shorter intervals that are given in these tables, there are two of five and six years respectively, which give unbroken terms of peace and war; these are from 1785 to 1790, and from 1795 to 1801 ; and the result of a con)pari- 187 son of the numbers in them is an increase in the five years of peace amounting to 8^ per cent, equal to 16\ per cent, in ten years ; while in the six years of war the increase was only 11 per cent, or equal to little more than 2 per cent, in ten years. The interval of six years contained, it is true, a large proportion of seasons of dearth, and I have no doubt that the dearth contributed greatly to retard the increase of population ; but the question is not now as to the moving cause, but as to the coincidence of the increased rate of the progress of population with intervals of war. In the period between 1801 and 1811 there was nearly one year and a half of peace, viz. from October, 1801, to April, 1803, and it appears, by a reference to the returns of marriages and baptisms (p. xxiii.) which are given for each year, that that interval of peace, short as it was, being accompanied with favourable harvests and reduced prices, was the foundation of a great part of the increase of popu- lation which was observable through the succeeding inter- val of war. The average number of marriages, from 1 795 to 1800, was TijSSS. They were reduced, apparently in consequence of the dearth, to 69,851 in 1800, and 67,228 in 1801. In the two succeeding years, however, they increased in the following extraordinary degree; viz. to 90,31)6 in 1802, and 94,379 in 1803; from which time they fell off consi- derably ; the average from 1805 to 1810 having been 82,953. But, granting the benefit of this enormous proportion of increase during the short interval of peace, to the whole period of sixteen years, from 1795 to 1811, which is very generally, but erroneously, looked back to as an entire series of years of war, the increase is somewhat under 16 per cent, in sixteen years, or equal to 10 per cent, in ten years; while the ten years from 1811 inclusive, exhibit an increase of 16§ per cent. But these ten years comprise three of war; viz. 1811, 1812, and 1813; and it will be seen by the register of marriages *, that there was a sudden increase of these in 1814 and I81j, sufficient to account for the ac- ceh rated progress which the population has subsequently made. I am inchned, therefore, to think that if there were a census now taken for the ten years of peace which have elapsed, it would exiiibit an increase of population of nearly 20 per cent. But assuming the increase since the termina- tion of the war at only 16^ per cent., it is quite sufficient to establish, in combination with the increase between 1785 and 1790, as compared with the subsequent period, a clear inference that the rate of the progress was much greater in peace than in war. Estimating the proportions in the scale of ten years each, they will stand as follows : — From 1 785 to 1 790, uninterrupted peace . 1 6~ per cent. 1795 to 1801, six of war . 2 per cent. ") 1801 to 1811,5 i!^^P^^^^'!l4apercent.('"l^^''^^"'- ' l^i oi war, ' » J I o 1 1 t 1 o -, , ^ three of war, > „ , . 1811 to 1821, J (. i • . iGspercentt. ' I seven of peace, 5 • » ^ j j^^. ■* Number of Marriages in England and Wales. 1801 fi7,228 1811 86,389 1802 90,390 1812. ...82,066 1803.... 94,379 1813. ... 83,860 1804.... 85,738 1814. ... 92,804 1805.... 79,580 1815. ... 99,944 1800.... 80,754 1810 91,940 1807.... 83,923 1817. ...88,234 1808 82,248 1818 9'2,779 1809 83,369 1819 95,5*1 1810 84,470 1820 96,833 Population Abstract, July, 1822, Prelhmnary Obscrvatiovs, p. 23. t It has been sii])poscd that the latest nturns under the Popu- lation Acts have been made more fully tlrm those preceding, be- 189 Whatever, therefore, may be considered as the effect of an increase of population on prices, there appears not to be the shadow of a foundation, in fact, for the supposition that an unusual rapidity in the rate of increase during the war, is one of the means of accounting for the high range of prices which prevailed in that period ; and there is the best evidence which the case admits of, to prove that the war, so far from having operated as a stimulus to an ac- celerated progress, was, by its aggravating the pressure of dearth from the seasons, a cause of retardation of the general tendency to increase, which was observable from other causes. Having: seen that there is no foundation whatever for the assumption of an unusual rapidity of increase of population during the war, I will proceed to examine whether there is any better ground for the assertion of greater production and consumption in war than in peace. 1 have already (p. 165) had occasion to state the grounds for supposing that the consumption of wheat has greatly increased' of late years, compared with any antecedent period. And if this be admitted, it will clearly follow that the production must likewise have greatly increased, be- cause upwards of five years have elapsed without any im- portation from abroad ; whereas, during the whole of the war, we stood in need of a foreign supply, although the population was then 15 per cent lower than it is now. It may be said, that as the question is confined to the produc- tion in Great Britain; the importation of corn from Ireland should be considered as a foreign supply. Granting this, however, the increased import from Ireland will not com- cause tlie macliinery in the latter period was more perfect. But this remark cannot apply to the variations in the rate of increase from 1 785 to 1 80 1 ; and the extract from the Register of Mar- riages, wliich I have referred ^o, affords a presumption in fa- vour of the correctness of the comparative statement in the text. 190 pensate for the cessation of all foreign supplvj when the great increase of population of late years is taken into account. Of the increased produce of cattle and sheep, the proofs which I have before adduced, and which may be extended by reference to the table of sales at Smithfield, inserted in the Appendix to Part III. are more direct evidence. The inference from this Table is the stronger, inasmuch as the numbers during the war were swelled by the proportion requisite for the Victualling Yard at Deptford, leaving so much less to serve as an index of the supply in the country*. Of the next largest class of productions, viz. those con- stituting the great staple manufactures of the country, there is the most direct and satisfactory proof as to the greater part of them, and the strongest grounds of inference, or of belief founded on general information, as to the remainder, that the rate of increase was as great in the interval of peace preceding 1793 as during the war which then began; and has maintained the same, or, in some instances, an ac- * I am indebted to my friend David Hodgson, Esq. of Liver- pool, for the following information : Aymual average Slaughter ut Liverpool. Beasts. Calves. Sheep. 1803 to 1812.. . . 9,814 17,224 G2,203 1S22. . . . 13,9G3 18,069 80,734 1S23... . 15,217 Jt Manch 19,876 ester. 85,993 Beasts. Calves. Sheep. 1S03 to 1812. . . 10,973 12,070 57,456 1822. . . . 20,240 19,.574 120,409 The average of the ten years, ending in 1812, is extracted from Mr. Hodgson's evidence before the Agricultural Coininittee in 1821. He has not yet been able; to procure the return for Man- chester in 1823. It is probable that it would exhibit a still fur- ther increase. 191 celeratctl progression, since the termination of the war in 1814. It might be sufficient, for the purpose of proving, in a general way, the increased products of some of our most important manufactures, to refer to the Tables inserted in the Appendix to Part IV.; by which it will appear that a great increase of the imports of the raw materials, cotton, sheep's wool, silk, and flax was in progress before 1793, and has continued since 1814- in a greatei' ratio than in the in- terval of war. The information, however, to be derived from cursorily glancing the eye down a long unbroken column of figures is commonly very vague, and supplies very indistinct means of comparison. I have therefore ex- tracted the following compai'ative statement of the quantities imported (deducting the quantities re-exported in their raw state) of the above-mentioned articles, for a period as far back to 1 783 inclusive, as the Custom-house records not destroyed by fire will permit. Average annual Imports of the folloiving raiv Produce, deducting Re-exports. Years. Cotton, Years. * Wool. lbs. lbs. 1783 to 1792.. 22,442,110 1789 to 1792 . 3,070,951 1790 1792.. 30,789,572 1790 1792 . 3,227,427 1793 1802.. 35,642,907 1793 1802 . . 4,934,260 1803 1812.. 71,257,095 1803 1812 . . 7,308,845 1814 1823.. 120,072,989 1814 1823 . . 16,012,379 1821 1823.. 137,777,474 1821 1823 . . 18,627,492 * As the woollen manufactures of this country consist of a large proportion made from native wool, the extraordinary increase of the import of foreign wool during the last ten years, may not be considered as decisive of a corresponding increase of the total manufacture, and it is not probable that the total manufacture can have increased in that proportion. But there is no doubt, from the great increase of the number of sheep slaughtered annually of late years, compared with any antecedent period, that there has been a great increase in the produce of native wool ; l[)^2 Years. Silk. Y ears. * Flax. lbs. cwt. 1785 to 1/92 .. 700,74') 1788 to 1792 . 242,549 1790 1792 .. 827,813 1790 1792 . . 269,887 1793 1802 .. 675,241 1793 1802 . 300,177 1803 1812 .. 891,755 1803 1812 . 301,552 1814 1823 .. 1,011,890 1814 1823 .. 450,157 1821 1S23 .. 2,170,808 1821 1 823 . 593,104 It is clear that these raw materials represent the pro- portional increase of the products of our manufacturing in- dustry, in the branches to which they apply ; and, with the assistance of statements of the official value of the ex- ports of the goods manufactured from tliese raw materials during the same periods, a tolerably correct inference might be drawn of the proportionate increase of the manufactured commodities retained for home consumption. But a state- ment of this kind would lead to details inconveniently voluminous; and it is sufficient for my purpose to refer, in general terms, to the fact which admits of ready proof, if and the returns of cloth manufactured in some of the chief districts leave no doubt of the rapid and progressive increase of this staple branch of industry, * The increased import of flax, if not so striking as that of cotton and sheep's wool, is still remarkal)le, as showing that the manufacture of linen and yarn, for general consumption and ex- port, has increased in a ratio so considerable as more than to compensate for the great extra consumption of sail-cloth and other descriptions of linen, as naval and military stores. The extra consumption of imported flax for naval and military pur- poses, may be computed, on a moderate estimate, at 3000 tons for the fust ten years, and 5000 tons for the last ten years of the war; deducting these quantities from the average imports, the quantities remaining for purposes of general consumption and ex- port during the war, would exhibit a great retardation, compared with the rate of increase during peace. 193 required, that the home consumption of cottons*, woollens, silks, and linens, has increased in a much greater ratio in the peace than during the war. Of cotton goods and linens the increase of export has been considerable, still leaving, however, a large proportion of the raw materials for home consumption ; but of woollens and silks the export has in- creased in a very trifling degree, and leaves the great bulk of the enormously augmented import as an index of the in- creased ratio of the home consumption. The increase of foreign products in general, applicable as objects of home consumption, and as raw materials for various branches of industry, and the increase at the same time of our produce and manufactures for exportation, may be collected from the following statement : Average Jnmial Official Value of Imports into Great Britain (deducting Re-e,vportsJ , and of E.rports of British Produce and Maniifacturesfroin the same. Imports, deducting Re-exports. Exports. £ £ 1783 to 1792 . 12,357,287 13,372,875 1790 — 1792 . 13,893,267 16,689,318 1793 — 1802 . 15,647,614 20,371,514 1803 — 1812 20,439,868 27,586,000 1814 — 1823 22,641,927 41,473,786 1821 — 18:3 26.029,603 45,283,459 The products of the mines of this country do not admit of being ascertained with sufficient accuracy to jus- tify the attempt at a detailed comparative statement; but there is quite enough of general information to be derived from persons conversant with the trades in iron, lead, cop- * Mr. Hiiskisson stated in the House of Commons, on tlie 8th March, 1824, tliat the real value of cotton goods coiisiuned at home, within the la.^t year, arjcuntcd to 32,000,000/. sterling. 191- per*, and tin, to warrant the assertion, that these metals are now produced and consumed in this country, in much greater quantity than at any time during the war, not- withstanding the dimiimtion of the direct government de- mand for them. The enormously increased produce and consumption of coals since 1814, is matter of such notoriety, as to supersede the necessity of any detailed notice. There is no class of commodities, the consumption of which admits of being so well ascertained, as that which comes under the regulations of the excise. For the pur- pose, therefore, of elucidating in the fullest manner the question of the alleged stimulus to an increase of consump- tion arising out of war-demand, and of the advance of prices ascribed to that increase, I have to refer the reader to the following comparative statement of the average quan- tities of some of the principal exciseable commodities, upon which duty has been paid for a considerable number of years past, including nearly equal periods of peace and war. As the detailed account from whence this statement is drawn may enable the reader to correct or confirm my in- ferences by a view of the annual variations, and as a docu- ment of this kind may be available for many useful purposes besides the present, I am induced to give it entire in the Appendix. In the comparative statement which I have extracted from that account, I have included forty years; and the most convenient division has been into twenty-one years of war, and nineteen years of peace. But in the period of twenty-one years, considered in that statement as years of war, viz. from July 1793 to July 1814, there is one year of peace, which I have not detached, in order not to disturb the series. If, however, the interval from July 1 802 to July 1S0:1, which might be looked upon as a period of peace, were detached from the average of the years of war, and * For the quantity of copper anmially sold in Cornwall to the present time, see Appendix No. V. to Part 4. 195 taken as a separate point of comparison, it would have been still more adverse to the theory of war-demand. As it is, the result is quite sufficient to negative that theory. Average Annual Quantity of the following Commodities charged with Excise. Years ending 5th July. 1784 to 1791 — 1794 — 1804 — 1815 — 1821 — 1793 1793 1803 1814 1823 1823 Beer. Barrels. 6,397,892 0,997,717 7,268,692 7,054,630 7,142,618 7,272,621 Candles. Tallow. Sperm. & Wax lbs. 51,369,347 59,133,117 61,008,850 71,259,653 83,471,192 91,289,265 lbs. 343,381 451,579 530,368 707,866 863,036 871,106 Hides. lbs. 30,121,305 37,864,696 39,346,236 46,235,788 45,948,210 46,232,754 Years ending Malt Soap. 5th July. Hard. Soft. Bushels. lbs. lbs. J 784 to 1793.. 25,858,075 35,953,527 2,777,217 1791 — 1793.. 27,014,123 39,808,419 2,807,436 1794— 1803.. 26,204,176 46,391,539 2,531,178 1804— 1814.. 23,708,171 59,445,265 3,496,263 1815 — 1823 .. 24,948,772 62,621,431 5,021,983 1821 — 1823.. 26,907,500 82,753,079 1 5,975,527 Years ending 5th July. Bricks. 1785 to 1793 .. 658,507,043 1791 — 1793 .. 822,233,768 1794— 1803 .. 019,418,319 1804 — 1814 .. 800,156,127 1815 — 1823 .. 898,901,492 1821 — 1823 .. 1020,289,183 (See Apjiendio', No. 9,.J It may be desirable to subjoin a few remarks on each of the articles included in this statement. o 2 190 StronjT and table beer arc blended in tlie same return ; and it is probable that if they were distinguished, they would not convey much additional information calculated to bear on the point under discussion. The oeneral obser%'ation which the return suggests in its present state, is, that the consump- tion has, through the whole period of forty years, varied in a surprisingly small degree. The greatest rate of increase was in the ten years of peace preceding the war; and, after a trifling advance in the first ten years of the war, it actually receded during the last eleven years, ending in July 1814. The nine years of peace, ending July 1823, present a small increase. There can be no doubt that the increased duties checked the consumption during the war, and that the re- duction of the duty on malt has tended to increase the con- sumption of beer in the last two years; but it is precisely my position, that dearness, whether arising from taxation or from the seasons, is calculated to diminish consumption or to retard the rate of its increase. The diminution of the total consumption during the last eleven years of the war is the more remarkable, inasmuch as that period being distin- guished for the occasional assemblage of some hundred thousand volunteer troops for purposes of exercise, in ad- dition to the largest number of regular soldiers ever wit- nessed in this country, there must have been a great extra consumption of beer by these vast bodies, and consequently so much less than usual consumed by the rest of the com- munity. The same remarks, with very little modification, are ap- plicable to malt. The most material difference observable, is the extraordinary variation in short intervals, evidently attributable to the state of the seasons, years of dearth being attended with a great diminution of consumption. It is probable, too, that on these occasions some influence might be felt from the prohibition of distillation from grain, and the substitution of sugar. Of bricks it may be observed, that after a rapid rate of increase to July 179 3, the consumption fell off considerably 197 during tlie first nine years ot" v.ar : it increased ajraiu during the short interval of peace, and continued on an augmented scale during the latter period of war. The in- crease, liowever, from 1S03 to 1814- is easily accounted tor, by the extended consumption arising out of the government expenditure for barracks, martello towers, and fortifications; the sudden cessation of this source of demand will account for the falling off in the first few years after 1814. But the increase, in the three years ending in July 18'2.', has been such as, with the ratio of the three years ending in July 1793, to establish a rate of increase greater in peace than in war. Candles exhibit a rate of increase somewhat greater during peace than during war. The increase in the three years ending in July, 1823, would probably have been still more considerable were it not for the very extensive substi- tution of oil and gas. And, with regard to the period ending in 179.3, it is probable that the actual was greater than the apparent increase. An increased duty of {d. per lb. on tallow candles was imposed in 1785, making the whole duty \ld. per lb. which continued till 1792; after which the additional \d. was taken ofi^, and the rate has remained uniformly at \d. from that time to the present. The reason for the repeal of that additional tax was the facility of evasion arising out of the simplicity and extent of the manufacture; and the clear inference is, that there was an unusual proportion clandestinely made in the in- terval between 1785 and I7y2. The presumption to that effect is strengthened by the circumstance of the sudden increase of avowed consumjition in the year immediately following the removal of the tax. The excise on hides represents the consumption of leather; and the increase which this experienced during the last interval of war, from 1803, is clearly accounted for by the extra consumption which then prevailed for military ac- coutrements to supply the extraordinary levies of volunteers, as well as regulars, and for the supply of our troops abroad as well as at home. It has been computed by persons in- terested in the leather trade, that the extra demand for these temporary purposes in the last ten years of the war did not amount to less than one-tenth of the total consumption, leaving a smaller ratio of increase than in the preceding or succeeding peace for the consumption of the rest of the comnmnity. At the same time, the rate of increase since the peace has been evidently retarded by the heavy addi- tional duty which was imposed in 1813; the effect of that duty in repressing the consumption being clearly proved by the sudden increase of the consumption, in 1823, upon the remission of half the duty. Of soap the increase since 1814 is the more observable, inasmuch as a heavy additional duty was laid on that article in 1816, and has not since been removed. There cannot be any stronger indication of the improvement of the bulk of the population in cleanliness and comfort, than the in- creased consumption of soap and candles. Among the articles included in the account in the Ap- pendix, are salt, starch, and tiles, which I have not com- prised in the comparative statement. The commencement of the salt duties under the excise does not date further back than 1798, and does not, therefore, furnish any guide as to the rate of increase in the preceding peace. IVIoreover, the regulations of the salt duties, as between Ireland and this country, and the drawbacks granted upon the use of salt for the fisheries, throw a considerable uncertainty upon the quantity actually consun^ed. That the operation of the very high duty, to which this article was subject, and which reached its maximum in 1 805, was calculated to reduce the consumption, there can be no doubt; and if there had been any doubt, it would be removed by the fact of the great in- crease of consumption since the duty has been reduced. In its present state, the account of salt, on which duty has been paid, throws no clear light on the question of war-demand ; but it is an article possessing such general interest, that I insert the statement of it in the Appendix. Starch and tiles 199 Ciller iulo llic oiiginal document, and tlicrcfore I allow them to remain as part of it in the Appendix ; but they are not of importance enough to enter into the comparative statement of consumption. Of the consumption of sugar I have not the means of making up a statement from official documents for the same series of years as is embraced by the other accounts here presented. The table of imports and exports, contained in the Appendix to Part IV. might indeed afford an ap- proximation to the truth, but it would be subject to some uncertainty ; and being matter of computation, it could not be admitted on a line of comparison with statements founded on documents strictly official. I shall therefore content myself with the following extracts from Mr. Huskisson's speech in the House of Commons, on the 8th of March, 1824, to prove in general terms, the great increase of con- sumption which has taken place. " In 1791, the whole consumption of sugar in Great Britain and Ireland was only l,4C0,r00 cwt. while in 1823 it was considerably more than doubled." "The average of consumption from 1814 to 1817 was 2,214,000 cwt.; the average quantity from the years 1818 to 1822, was 2,763,000 cwt., being an increase equal to 20 per cent. And it appeared, that for the last year ending the 5th of January, the consumption amounted to 3, 1 30,000 cwt. of sugar, being an increase of,40 percent*." The following is a statement of the annual average sales of tea at the East India House, drawn up from an account which is inserted in the Appendix : lbs. 1783 to 1792 - - - 14,688,608 1790 to 1792 - - - 17,366,355 1793 to 1802 - - - 21,702,850 1803 to 1813 ... 24,2/0,075 1814 to 1823 - - - 26,921,030 1821 to 1823 - - - 27,790,732 * Moruing Chronicle, 9th March, 1824. QOO The sales may be considered as in general representing the consumption ; the only important exception being the amount of sales in I8U; the excess of which was for ex- portation under the inilueiicc of the spirit of speculation in exports which was so prevalent in that year. Assuming then that, with this exception, the sales repre- sent the consumption, it w ill be observed that the consump- tion increased greatly in consccjuence of the Commutation Act in 17S4, which reduced the cost to the consumer; and that it fell off somewhat at the particular periods when the duty was afterwards raised. It is further to be observed, in the case of tea, that the increase of consumption since 1819, is under an increased rate of duty. At the same time, there is reason to sujipose, that in consequence of the increased facility of smuggling since the peace, and an ex- tended practice of adulteiation, the real is greater even than the apparent increase of consumption. It would be a waste of time to attempt to extend the proofs, as might easily be done, to a variety of other articles, from whence the same conclusion would result. The instances which I have here adduced are abundantly sudicient to establish the fact of a greater ratio of production and con- sumption in the twenty-one years of peace than in the twenty-one years of war between 1782 and 1821*. I have already proved in the preceding section on the monopoly of trade, that our connnerce has been increasing more rapidly * The preliminaries of peace with the United States of America were signed at the close of 1 782. The war with France broke out at the beginning of 1793. Preliminaries of peace were signed with Mons. Otto, October, 1801. Renewal of the war in May, 1803. Peace of Paris, May, 181^1. The war with America, which terminated at the close of 1814, and the short war on the return of liuonapaite in 1815, did not arrest the fall of prices which had begun some time before, and cannot tliercfore be brought forward in support of an hypothesis which considers a general rise of prices as a necessary consequenc'e of a war ex- penditure. 201 in peace than in war. But the explanation with which I have thought it desirable to accompany the comparative statement of each class of facts, has of necessity separated them so much as to impair the general view. To obviate this objection, I now lay before the reader a summary, em- bracing all the preceding statements, and giving the results of each in the following table. The number 100 is assumed as the index of the state of commerce, production, con- sumption, and population on the average of the ten years of peace between 1783 and 1792. The second line of figures serves as an index of their state in the three years imme- diately preceding the war, as compared with the whole ten years*, and inarks the progression with which to compare the rate of increase during the war; as this again may be compared with the rate of increase since the termination of the war. * It must be borne in mind, that in the second line, the rate of increase would appear much more rapid if the ten years of peace had been divided into two distinct periods of seven and i/iree years. As the table is constructed at present, the last three years, which exhibit so astonishing a progression, are of course included in the average of the whole ten years. 20^2 "^ ^ 5 " n^ _0 2: a, 5j f— I %.s|S c r 5: •2 ■g '•« ;^ - o* o ■;s "§ CO »c c. >o 1 ■' ^ 2 ^S" cc r— 1^ C ^ a> cs CO — -^ — — CM w U rt >- « ^ Cl I- c^ >o c CM Oi -T T -a 'Z _ rt « o< «o t- 0? 1^ 01 00 V) T e-^ CI — CO — d. i2 ><; ■c M r~ 10 ro 9 i C — c^t '-c 00 — — „ _ _ _ J^ — -3 c^ m -a 3 -C " irj CN «l O-i ■-S ■r a. CN ^ — M — — — CN « CO K* w S c3 "c3 " IN t^ t^ -xj r- ^ f5 S- 0< <0 Oi — — " CS t-. >.!->>-,>-> ;*> C CO w '-• 1— 1 rl >— ^ lO — — — £- Cl CI — 01 0) e- t^ 30 00 00 '*J k" — — — — _ rt P^ -+ CO ~ — J c ^ "* 1-^ s 3 — — — « — i ;z; '^'^^ ■^ IC 1" — 1^ 10 M C3 M CO ^ ^ ^^ ^^ .— . »— M — — '£ — 1(5 m :s 00 — ■" " — . — . 01 a" CO ^— ; — 'i" — 3M «; 1^ v. « — — — ^ — . ;v( X W "-^ ^ -t — tN to t • i-i •73 Ci CTi > ^H ^~ 1— i ^^ •— n^ n- fcX) (U "5 CI 00 t^ 00 C CS CS (N « S to a* — . rf ^o ,^ ,t s c^ GO in U) U5 — — — CN « d 00 CS CO CO 1^ H V^ CT) -J" CS rr PQ 13 00 00 IC CO l?l — • T to 00 00 C3 H 0» C-l CS !N CO CO Cl Oi — CN M !■- t^ 00 00 00 CO c 3 irOi. Lady Day . ..73 (See Appendix No. H.) At Michaelmas, 1704, it fell to is. 431 Per Bushel of 9 Gallons. .?. fl. 17 US. Lady Day . 3 10 Michaelmas . G 6 i;of). Lady Day . 8 1 Micliaclmas . 11 6 1710. Lady Day . 11 G (See Appendix No. 11.) BcinfT a rise of 200 per cent, in two years. We were then indeed at war, as we had, however, been during the previ- ous low prices; but as if to negative the possibility of ascri- bing the rise in this instance to war demand or consumption, it so happens that the price fell again in 1712 to 45. 9d. Nay, even further to prove how independent of the war the fluctuation in price was, having continued at 4?. 9(1. till the peace of Uti'echt, in 1713, immediately after that event, but of course as a consequence of a bad harvest, the price rose (at Michaelmas, 171'^j) to 8^. or 70 per cent. The price likewise rose in France immediately after the peace of Utrecht in a similar proportion. Here, then, in the inter- val of twenty-two years, from 1 692 to 111 3, are no fewer than twelve years of bad or indifferent produce, and conse- quent high prices, arising evidently from inclemency or un- propitiousness of the seasons ; being as large a proportion as I shall have to account for from 1793 to 1813. But that proportion, or thereabouts, might in both cases be supposed to apply generally, and thereby lead to the expectation of the recurrence of a similar number of bad seasons, with more or less regularity in any other equal series; I shall, therefore, proceed to point out a series of greater length, in which the proportion of bad or indifferent seasons was very small, viz. in a series beginning with 1730. It may, however, be desirable to premise, that from 1714- to 17--J there appears to be no remarkable feature of dear- ness or cheapness, and therefore no ground of inference, in the absence of any historical notice, of decided scarcity, or abundance. From 1725 to \1'29, inclusive, was a period '236 of some, though not of a severe degree of dearth, as may be inferred from the state of jirices, and from the change from export to an excess of import in 1728 and 1729*. Of the years 17'27, ll'l'^, and 17'29, the following are the notices in the work I have before referred to : «■ 1/27. — The tinners of Cornwall rise, and plunder the grana- ries in that county, provoked thereto by the scarcity of corn, occasioned by the excess of exportation. " 1728. — An act pa>^sed settling the price of imported corn. The Lords declare the trade and manufactures of England to decay. " 1729. — A general sickness. An act relative to the importa- tion of corn." These sixteen years, viz. from 1714 to \'i'19, if added to the former term of twenty-two, may contribute to reduce the proportion of bad seasons, as comjiared with the whole series of years from 1G92 to 1729, but will still leave a very large proportion of bad and indifferent seasons, even on the extended term of thirty-eight years. From 1730 to 1739, both years included, there does not appear to have been one season attended with any general or marked deficiency. The highest quotation of wheat in this interval is 5s. 9(1. the bushel ofnine gallons at Michael- mas, 1 735, having three years before been as low as 3s. 3d. ; but this advance may be accounted for without the suppo- sition of a bad harvest : first, the cheapness of the pre- ceding years had induced what seems afterwards to have proved to be too large an export f ; and, secondly, barley * See Appendix, No. 11, for prices. The excess of import of wheat was 70,75/ quarters in 1/28, and 21,.">22 in 172!), while for thirty years before and thirty years after there was a constant excess of export. (See Appendix, No 13.) Quarters. t Excess of export in 1733, 427,192 wheat. Ditto l7Zi, 498,190 ditto. (See Ai)pendix, No. 13.) 237 was at a price so high relatively to wheat for some time previous, as to have occasioned more of the former and less of the latter to have been sown : so at least may reasonably be inferred from the following comparison of the prices of wheat and malt. Wheat. Malt. 5. d. s. d. 1732, Michaelmas 3 3 3 2 1735, ditto 5 9 2 10 The conclusion accordingly is, that there was not one de- cidedly bad season in the interval often years, from 1730 to 1739. The winter of 1 739-4'0 is recorded as having been one of unparalleled severity and duration, and the following harvest was unfavourable, insomuch that wheat rose at Michaelmas, 1740, to 75. \0^d. per bushel of nine gallons. From that time there seems to have been again an unin- terrupted series of ten good or abundant seasons, viz. from 1741 to 1751. The testimony to this effect rests on the best possible authority. The author of the celebrated Corn Tracts *, who is so often quoted by Dr. Adam Smith, and who has furnished materials and facts for the great bulk of succeeding writers on the subject of corn, expressly says : (page 20, 2d ed.) " We had ten as good years as ever were known in succession from 1741 to 1751." In addition to this testimony as to the general character attaching to the term from 1741 to 1751, I have met with casual descriptions of particular years; and the following extracts from the letters of Mr. Peter Collinson f , a cele- brated botanist, to Linnaeus, containing those descriptions, * These (of which the first edition appeared in 1758) were published anonymously, but have been generally ascribed to Mr. Charles Smith. t A selection of the correspondence of Linnaeus and other Naturalists, by Sir .las. Edw. Smith, M. D. F. R. S. &c. 1821. 238 may not be iinamusinjr, at the same time that they will tend to form something like a standard of what may be considered as a fine season, to which to refer a comparison of the seasons of more recent occurrence, as well as of those from 179:3 to 1812. " London, Jan. 18, O. S. 1743. *' Wc have now a wonderful fine season, that makes our spring flowers come forth. I am sure you would he delighted to see my windows filled with six pots of flowers, which the gardener has sent me to town *, viz. great plenty of aconites, white and green hellebore, douhle hepatica, crocus, polyanthus, periwinkle, lau- ristinus. vernal red cyclamen, single anemonies, and snowdrops. None of these were brought forward by any art, hut entirely owing to the temperature of the season, though some seasons I have known things forwarder than now." " London, Oct. 26, 1747, O. S. " My garden is in great beauty, for we have had no frost, a long, dry, warm summer, and autumn grapes very ripe. " The vineyards turn to good profit, much wine being made this year in England." " London, Oct. 3, 1748, O. S. " We have had a fine summer. Great plenty of all sorts of fruits and grain, and a very delightful autumn. It is now as warm as summer ; no bearing of fires. My orange trees are yet abroad. My vineyard grapes are very ripe : a considerable quantity of wine will this year be made in England. We have not had one frosty morning this autumn. Marvel of Peru, double-flowered nasturtium, and all other annuals are not touched. My garden makes a fine show." " May 8, 1749. " How the winter has been in Sweden I do not know, but at London the like warmth and mildness were never remembered. Our autumn was long, warm, and dry, with a few slight frosts before Christmas ; but we have had since fine, warm, dry weather, and no frosts or snow. Our gardens were in great beauty in .lanuary and February : ahuouds, apricots, and peaches in blos- * Mr. Collinson's countrv house was at Mill Hill, 239 soiii. Fel». 23. I went into the country. The elm hedtfcs liad small loaves ; staudanl plums, almonds, and crocnses in full blos- som ; gooseberries showing their fruit. In short, it would be endless to talk to you of the wonders of this season. March 5. The fig in my London garden had small leaves when peas and beans under south walls were in blossom." The exuberant abundance, resulting from seasons of which these letters afford a few specimens, is moreover re- ferred to in several pamphlets, to which the dearths of 1757 and of some subsequent periods gave rise. From what the author of the Corn Tracts states, the sea- sons from 1752 to 1755 seem to have been of doubtful pro- duce; for his words are, after mentioning the ten good years in succession, " Nay, if the common opinion is right, we have had sixteen." But we may conclude, that if not decidedly abundant, they were not deficient in any consi- derable degree; for there was a large export in some of those years, a great want of corn being experienced in the south of Europe in that interval, and the prices at home were not raised very materially by that export, I have been induced to trespass on the patience of my readers with so long a detail of the seasons in the interval from 1730 to 1 755, because they present a series of twenty- six years, with the intervention of only one of a decidedly unfavourable character, viz. the winter of 1739-40, followed by a bad harvest; and because the inferences from the fact are of incalculable importance as to the probable or possible effect of such a succession of favourable seasons on prices, independent of any alteration in the currency or in the finan- cial measures of the government, and independent likewise of transitions from war to peace. But confining the comparison to the years ending in 1 75 1 , it appears that there was only one bad or deficient out of twenty-two, while in the equal series ending in 1713, there were twelve bad or deficient. The degree of cheapness resulting from a succession of good seasons, or of seasons unmarked by the intervention 240 of any one of great dcficicncv, is so curious as to be worth ex- hibiting more in detail than is usually clone, as the tables containing average prices are generally confined to the quo- tations of wheat, and do not give the whole range of varia- tions even of that single article. The followinfj are the quotations of prices at Mark-lane and Bear-quay, for fifteen years, and they afford a confirmation in detail of the greatest depression having occurred during a very large government expenditure defrayed by loans : January Prices (jf Grain at Mark-lane and Bear-quay, as given in the Gentleman's Magazine^ exlractcdfrom the Apj)endij' to Sir Frederick Morton Eden's irorh (page 80^. Years. 1742, 1743, 1 7t4, 1745, 174C, 1747, 1748, 1749, 1750, 1751, 1752, ] 753, 1754, ( 1/56, War. Wheat. Barley. Oats. s. d. s. d. s. d. 26 to 29 15 to 20 12 to 15 20 23 15 20 13 16 19 21 11 13 9 12 18 20 12 15 12 16 IG 24 10 12 12 14 27 30 8 12 6 dd. 26 28 13 14 9 12 27 32 17 18 14 16 24 29 14 17 12 14 24 27 14 17 13 14 33 34 17 19 12 6d. 16 29 33 17 18 1 M. i 2 27 33 17 19 12 6(/. 13 24 26 12 14 10 13 22 26 14 15 12 13 The harvests of the four years from 1752 to 1755, although not attended with any marked deficiency of general produce, were considered by the author of the Corn Tracts as having yielded rather scanty or bare average crops. Yet, scanty as they may have been, there was a considerable ex- portation to the south of Europe, where the crops were more deficient than in this country : the exportation was of course, under such circumstances, extended by the bounty somewhat beyond what it otherwise would have been, and the consequent rise in price in 175;i and 17.51-, although the ^•11 average price of wheat was under Ws. per quarter in both of those years, occasioned to a population, accustomed for so long a period to cheapness of provisions, the contrast of dearth, and excited great dissatisfaction at the bounty, as having contributed to it. The following are among the chronological notices of this period, in the work which I have before quoted : — " 1753. The people in the west, Manchester, Yorkshire, and many other counties, rise, on account of the high price of pro- visions, and the exportation of corn : eight people are killed at Leeds." " 1754. For more than sixty years past the French have in- fringed on our vvoollcu manufactures. In cases of need, they are assisted with corn from England, with a large discount or bounty, and with other provisions from Ireland." " 1755. Great quantities of corn and provisions sent to Lis- bon, on account of their distress by the late earthquake." But the harvest of 1756 proved greatly deficient, as well in this country, as through the greater part of Europe. The scarcity thence arising was attended with a very consi- derable advance of price, and with severe suffering among the lower classes, which is thus noticed in the same work : — " 1756. Many insurrections in England, on accountofthescarcity of corn, and the high prices of provisions. The king expresses to the parliament his concern for the sufferings of the poor, and the disturbances to which they have given rise ; and exhorts them to consider of proper measures to prevent the like mischiefs here- after. The exportation of corn prohibited from Christmas." It may be worth while to break the course of this descrip- tion of the seasons, in order to show the prodigious effect on price of one season of decided scarcity, when, from previous exportation or scanty crops, there was no considerable old stock. The quotations of wheat in Mark -lane, in 1756, 242 before the deficiency of the harvest of that year had been ascertained, were 225. to 26s. In January, 17.57, tlie price rose to 495. 50s. Pebruary . . 4/5. 51 5. March . . . 4()5. 545. April . . . 64s. iSIay . . . 64s. June . . . 675. 725. The prices afterwards declined, although slowly, as the deficiency of that year liad been great and general. The six succeeding seasons, viz. from 1757 to 1762, both years included, seem to have been favourable : the particular character of some of them is noticed in CoUinson's letters. " December 25 and 27, 1757. " The extraordinary heat of our summer has ripened all sorts of fruit to perfection. In two gardens I saw this year pomegra- nates against south walls, without any art, ripened beyond what can be imagined in so northern a climate ; they look extremely beautiful, and are of the size of some brought from abroad. Our autumn has been long, dry, and warm, and so continues ; for a few slight frosts have not stripped the garden of flowers at Christ- mas-day. Tiie winter season is not closed before the spring flowers begin ; for there are plenty of polyanthus, narcissus, pan- sies, and sweet violets," 8i.c. "July 25, 1759. *' We had the mildest winter ever known. Our spring was early and very agreeable, and our summer the finest and warmest since 1750. Great plenty of all sorts of grain and fruits. New wheat, of this year's produce, has been the 21st inst. at market." "London, Sept. 2, 1762. " We have had a delightful warm summer ; all the fruits of the earth very good and in great plenty." The season of 1763 is thus noticed by Collinson : — " London, September 15, 1763. " Almost every day rain since the middle of July ; the spring 243 and summer very dry to that time. Wry great plenty of grass, and all sorts of corn, but the weather unkindly for the harvest." Of the succeeding season I find no direct notice by Col- linson ; but as the price* roseat Michaelmas, 1764, the harvcht of that year may be presumed to have been unfavourable ; at the same time, as there was a large export, it is possible that the advanced price may in some measure have been occasioned by an unusual demand for corn abroad. Mr. Collinson gives the following description of the sea- son of l7o5 : — '' London, September 17, 1765. " You, my dear friend, surprise me with telling me of your cold and wet summer ; whereas our summer has been as much in the extreme the other way. For all May, June, and July were excessively hot and dry ; but six or seven rainy days in three months, so that all our grass fields looklike the sun-burnt countries of Spain and Africa. Tlie beginning of August we had some fine rains, but they did not recover our usual verdure ; since to the present writing, hot and dry weather, not a drop of rain for four- teen days. Our hay is very short, and oats and barley a middling crop j but of wheat, which we most wanted, good Providence has favoured us with a plentiful crop and a good harvest, which began two weeks sooner than in common years." After this fine, though not very productive season, there was a series of nearly ten years, marked by a very frequent recurrence of unpropitious seasons: and as henceforward a new epocha commenced in the corn trade of this country, * In the chronological table of prices, and of the events con- nected with them, in the work before referred to, is the following passage : — " 1764. The king reminds his parliament of the high prices of corn, occasioned by the exportation of it. The parlia- ment find the price of beef to be 3d. per lb. to the vendor. Beef, mutton, and veal, at Exeter, 4d. to 4|rf," N. B. In the same work, under the date 17-4', btcf, mutton, veal, and pork, are stated to have been at I ^d. per lb. at Exeter. r2 tharactei ised hy a range ofrelatively high prices, and accom- panied by a change tioni a balance of export to a balance of import of grain, it may be worth while to pause here for the purpose of consideiing some of the phenomena presented by the period ending in 1763. All the writers who have turned their attention to the sub- ject of the prices of corn have been struck with the circum- stance of the cheapness of the period from 1700 to 1765, compared with the average price of the preceding century, and have endeavoured variously to account for that circum- stance. The pamphlets with which the press teemed, upon the change from low to high prices, referred all the pheno- mena of the fluctuation, according as it suited the views of the writers, to the operation of the bounty on exportation. The question respecting the effects of the bounty seems, in- deed, to have given rise to as much controversy at that time as the more recent question of the bank restriction lias since done. The advocates for the bounty contended, that the cheap- ness of corn was wholly attributable to that measure, while, upon every occiuTence of a season of dearth, the scarcity and consequent high jn-ice was by the adversaries of the bounty referred to the excess of exportation which had been thus artificially encouraged. It is not my intention to enter upon a discussion of the principle and policy of the bounty on the exportation of corn * ; I have only the following short remarks to make upon it, as connected with its effects on prices. * The ultimate effect of a bounty on the exportation of corn may, I think, be clearly pioved to be that of raising the price to the consumer at home, by eventually inducing resort to land of an inferior quality, and thereby increasing the cost of produc- tion. On tliis point, as on most others involving .iny important principle in political economy, I have the advantage of agreeing with Mr. Ricardo, who, page 368, Principles of Fulitical Eco- nomy, 5d edition, after observing that the " natural price of corn 245 If the bounty is to have the credit of the low range of prices, which is chiefly observable between 1713 and 1765, bow happens it that a similar degree of cheapness should have prevailed in France during precisely the same interval, as it appears to have done by the following statement of prices, extracted from the article " Corn Laws and Corn Trade,"in the supplement of the Encyclopaedia Britannica? " The following is a table of the price of the septier of thebest wheat, hie dc tete, weighing 2401bs. mark the septier, at the Ro- soy or Paris market for 146 years, ending with 1788 : livres. sous, deniers. 1643, to 1652, 35 14 1 1653, 1662, 32 12 2 1663, 1672, 23 6 11 1673, 1682, 25 13 8 1683, 1692, 22 4 1693, 1702, 31 16 1 1703, 1712, 23 17 1 1713, 1715, 33 1 6 1716, 1725, 17 10 9 1726, 1736, 16 19 4 1736, 1745, 18 15 7 1746, 1755, 18 10 11 1756, 1765, 17 9 1 1766, 1775, 28 7 9 1776, 1785, 22 4 7 1786, 20 12 6 1787, 22 2 6 1788, 24 General average of the 146 ye; ars 24 liv. 1 so. 4 den. is not so fixed as the natural price of commodities, because with any great additional demand for corn, land of a worse quality must be taken into cultivation, on which more labour will be re- quired to produce a given quantity, and the natural price of corn will be raised," adds, " by a continued bounty, therefore, on the exportation of corn, there would be created a tendency to a per- manent rise in the price of corn." 24b This degree of cheapness, be it observed, took place under a system of corn laws, the very reverse of what prevailed in tiiib country, the exportation thence being absolutely prohibited. Accordingly, while the low prices in this country were, by the advocates for the bounty, ascribed to our encouragement of exportation, a similar depression of prices in France was, by most French writers, attributed to the discouragement of exportation, and to the occasional encouragement of importation. So strong was the impres- sion there that the low prices were occasioned by the restrict- ive regulations which prohibited, not only the exportation to foreign countries, but the free circulation from province to province, that in 1763 the government of France was in- duced to issue a declaration, allowing the free circulation of grain in the interior, and an edict in the following year granting a general liberty of export as well as of import, subject only to modification as to the price at which the export was to cease, viz. I'd livres 10 sous the quintal, equal, according to the author of the Corn Tract.'?, to about 48^. the quarter, London measure. The translation of a speech by M. Le Caradcuc de la Chalotais, procureur-gencral to the parliament of Britanny, when he carried into court the edict of the month of July, 1764-, to be registered, is given by the author of the Corn Tracts, and it is so full of valuable information as to the state of the corn trade in France for a century preceding, at the same time that it bears so strongly upon the points which I am discussing, that 1 am induced to insert a considerable part of it in the Appendix, No. I. In this speech we have the confirmation of the fact which I before stated, of the low range of the price of wheat in that country, as well as in this, during the period in ques- tion, and of the fall being attributed to the want of liberty of export. 1 may hereafter have occasion to make some further remarks upon that document ; in the mean time I would ask, whether effects so exactly similar can with any 247 appearance of truth be ascribed to systems so completely opposite ? There must, then, have been some general cause tending to such a similarity of general effect, viz. of the low price of corn in the fifty years preceding 1765. That general cause was sought by Dr. Adam Smith, and other writers, in a sup- posed alteration in the value of the metals. Silver was in- ferred to have increased slowly in value after the close of the 17th century ; and there were some plausible reasons for that opinion, although they have since appeared to be without suf- ficient grounds. The only satisfactory solution of that general efTect will, I suspect, be found in a reference to the fact which I have noticed, of the prevalence of an extraor- dinary proportion of favourable seasons. The description which I have given applies, more or less, to the whole term between 1715 and 1765, but more especially to the seasons from 1730 to 1765. In that interval of thirty-six years, there were in this country only two seasons, as far as I have been able to trace, of great and general scarcity, viz. 1740 and 1756; and there is every reason to believe that the same prevalence of seasons of a favourable description was experienced in France. Mr. Lowe, in his very useful and valuable work on the present state of England, has the fol- lowing remarks, in the justness of which I perfectly concur, on the prevalence of a general similarity of seasons in Eu- rope within certain latitudes. " The public, particularly the untr.ivellcd part of the public, are liardly aware of the similarity of temperature prevailing through- out what may be called the corn-country of Europe, we mean Great Britain, Ireland, the north of France, the Netherlands, Denmark, the north-west of Germany, and, in some measure Poland, and the north-east of Germany. All this tract is situated between the 45th and 55th degrees of latitude, and subject, in a consider- able degree, to the prevalence of similar winds. Neither the superabundance of rain which we experience in one summer, or its deficiency in another, are by any a)eans confined to Great Bri- tain and Ireland j while in winter both the intensity and duration 24-S of frost are always greater on the continent. Exceptions certainly exist in particular tracts ; but in support of our general argument, we have merely to recall to those of our readers who are of an age to recollect tlic early part of the war, or who have attended to registers of temperature, the more remarkable seasons of the present age: thus, in 1794, the spring was prematurely warm on the con- tinent as in England: there, as with us, the summer of 1798 was dry, and that of 1799 wet: again in 1811 the harvest was defi- cient tliroughout the north-west of Europe generally, from one and the same cause, blight ; while that of ISlfi was still more gene- rally deficient, from rain and want of warmth. In regard to a more remote period, we mean the 17th and l8th centuries gene- rally, if the temperature has not been so accurately noted, we find, from the coincidence in prices, that it is highlyprobable that there prevailed a great similarity in the weather of the continent; thus, in France, the latter years of the l7th century, the seasons of 1708 and 1709, as well as several of the seasons between 17G4 and 1 773, were as unpropitious, and attended with as great an advance of price, as in England." (Page 149.) Mr. Lowe considers the cheapness of corn in this coun- try, for the fifty years, ending in 1 7(i5, as in some degree ac- counted for by the exemption from bad seasons; but he likewise attributes a great deal to the state of peace which prevailed during so large a portion of that interval, not ad- verting to the circumstance, that the most striking instauce of cheapness was during a period of war. It would be difficult, indeed, to suppose the occurrence of a series of so many years, with the intervention of only two seasons of decided scarcity, without inferring that a general cheapness of provisions must be the consequence. We come now to a period of dearness of provisions, pre- vailing not only in this country, but in the rest of Europe; and this dearness, like the preceding cheapness, was referred to the most contradictory causes. In France it was ascribed to the recent permissiun of exportation, while in this coun- try it was attributed to tiie temporary suspension of the bounty, and of the liberty of exportation, while others re- 249 ferred it to a previous excess of export ; not to mention the clamours usual upon every occurrence of dearth against farmers, millers, and bakers. Adam Smith, in the follow- ing passage, refers it, in my opinion, to the right cause. " The high price of corn during these ten or twelve years past, indeed, has occasioned a suspicion that the real value of silver still continues to fall in the European market. This high price of corn, however, seems evidently to have been the effect of the extraor- dinary unfavourableness of the seasons, and ought therefore to be regarded not as a permanent, but as a transitory and occasional event. The seasons for these ten or twelve years past have been unfavourable through the greater part of Europe ; and the disor- ders of Poland have very much increased the scarcity in all those countries, which, in dear years, used to be supplied from that market. So long a course of bad seasons, though not a very com- mon event, is by no means a singular one ; and whoever has in- quired much into the history of the prices of corn in former times will be at no loss to recollect several other examples of the same kind. Ten years of extraordinary scarcity, besides, are not more wonderful than ten years of extraordinary plenty. The low price of corn from 1741 to 1750, both inclusive, may very well be set in opposition to its high price during the last eight or ten years." (Vol. I. p. 310. 3ded.) Of the prevalence of a series of bad seasons, or, at least, of the very frequent recurrence of them in this country, and in a still greater degree, perhaps, in the rest of Europe, in the interval between 1765 and 1776, there can be no rea- sonable doubt. The season of 1 766, and some of the effects of the deficient crops of that season, are thus described by Collinson. " London, Sept. 25, 1766. " We have had a most uncommon rainy summer, which was no way propitious to the gi-owth of wheat ; but it pleased Providence to send us the finest hot and dry harvest ever known, yet the warm constant rains drew up the wheat so much to stalk, that the ears are very light. I hope there will be sufficient to support the na- tion, now we have prudently stopped the exportation ; for so great Q50 are the wauts, and the demand for foreign markets was so great and so pressinir, that it advanced the price so considerably as to occasion insurrections in many parts of the kingdom, to stop by force the corn from heing exported ; but now a proclamation is come out to prevent it, 1 hope all will be quiet again." The letters of Collinson are discontinued after the winter of that year; and I have not met with distinct notices of the description of particular seasons from that time till 1776. There are, indeed, in the correspondence of the Abbe Gal- liani, and some other writers at that period, abundant re- ferences to the existence of scarcity in France, approaching to famine, in part of that interval. But the testimony of Dr. Adam Smith, who wrote from personal and i-ecent observa- tion and information, is (juite decisive as to the prevalence of bad seasons in this country, and over a great part of Eu- rope, during the whole period. This change in the cha- racter of the seasons is sufficient to account for the change from our being exporters to our becoming importers of corn. The diflijrence in quantity between the export at one pe- riod, and the import in the other, is not near so great as the probable difference between a good and a bad harvest : it is not necessary, therefore, to resort to the supposition of any alteration in the state of population relatively to the extent of cultivation. It is possible that a rapidly increasing popu- lation might somewhat have outrun the extent of cultivation; but it could hardly have done so to such a degree, and so suddenly, as to account for the transition from a large ex- port of corn in 1764, to an import in 1767*. The able and well informed writer of the article in the Sujiplemcnt of the Encyclop;vdia Britannica, which I have before referred to, ascribes the greater part of the transition from an export to an import to a difference in the consump- tion at the different periods ; but, allowing the utmost for an increase in the rate of consumption, on the ground stated in that article, such a cause is, I ap})rehend, wholly inade- (jnatc to have produced that effect within the period referred * h^ce Appendix, No. XIV. 251 to. Besides, an increasetl consumption may as well be the consequence of cheapness as tiie immediate cause of dearness; and it was the relative dearness which, in that instance, oc- casioned the excess of import. Of the seasons in the seven years, from 1776 to 1782, I have not any distinct record at hand*; but they may, I think, be inferred to have been favourable, and to have been at- tended with fair average crops, because, with an increased and increasing population, the produce was sufficient for the consumption. The whole excess of import of grain of all kinds in those seven years amounted only to 28,978 quar- ters; while of wheat alone there was an excess of export, on the balance of the whole term, amounting to no less a quan- tity than 524, 103 quarters. In point of value, therefore, there was an excess of corn exported in the seven years ending in 1782; and the price was on an average lower in those seven years than in the seven preceding or succeeding : so that the alteration of the corn laws in 1773 had, in no possible view, the effect imputed to it by the advocates of the bounty on ex- port, and of the greater restriction on importation. We had imported largely for the five years preceding that alteration, and we ceased to import on the balance of seven years, in a period during which the law so altered was in force. The harvest of 1782 was very unfavourable. In Scot- land the weather during the whole of that year was as inclement as the season of 17^9 afterwards proved to be; and in the Farmers' Magazine for 1800 there is a minute description of the similarity in point of weather of those two years. In the rest of the island there was a deficiency of produce, although not to so great a degree as in Scotland. A winter of great severity followed, prices rose considerably, and a large importation of corn took place in 1783. As an example of the great and sudden alteration of prices, occasionally arising from the occurrence of even a single bad * lu the Farmer's Magazine for 1801, p. 139, is the following reference to the season of 1 779 : " Suppose a season of great fer- tility, such as the ever-memorabJe year 1779, when the crop was uiw-Jhurth above a uiediurn crop." Q5'2 season, when there is not, as there appears not to have been in this instance, a large stock on hand, I subjoin an extract from the Annals of ,\gricuhure (vol. iii. p. 366) of a com- munication from Mr. William Pitt, dated Pendeford, April 4, 1785, entitled " CONTRASTS." The following contrast of effects arising from dissimilar seasons, now so recent, may perhaps appear striking in some future suc- cession of regular seasons ; and, as they will not take up much room, may be worth preserving from oblivion, by registering it la the Annals of Agriculture. I doubt not but yourself and many others can recollect circumstances more remarkable : the following have come under my own immediate observation. WINTER SUCCEEDING THE HARVEST OF 1781. f.S. d. Barley of the best quality sold in the markets of Staffordshire, our cus- tomary bushel of 9| gallons, down to - 2 Wheat, immediately after the harvest, clean for seed, the above measure per bushel ---050 SPRING SEASON, 1782. Bought sixty bushels of Dutch oats for seed, delivered at home, per bushel - - - - 1 8 "WINTER SUCCEEDING THE HARVEST OF 17S2. I. S. d. Barley of the same (jua- llty sold in the same markets, same mea- sure, common price, per bushel, 7s. to - 7 2 Wheat of the best qua- lity, same measure, per bushel, 105. to 10 6 sriUNG, 1783. Sold out of the product oats that had lain a month in the wet, and so damaged in the stack by rain during making and carrying in bad order, that they niouldctl and grew to- gether, per bushel 3 6 ^5S I. s. d. I. s. d. A friend of mine sold Bought again clover- clover seed of a good seed of the same qua- quality at the common lity for his own sow- market price, which ing, at per cvvt. - 5 10 was per cvvt. - - 1116 1782. Bought Worccs- 1784. Hops inferior in tershire hops, of excel- quality to the oppo- leut quality, at per site, bought at per cwt. ----- 2 2 cwt. - - - - 5 12 The harvest of 1783 does not appear to have been re- markably unfavourable, but it was followed by two severe winters ; and the spring and summer of 1784< were cold and ungenial. The effect of so frequent a recurrence of winters of great severity was felt in a comparative scarcity and high price of animal food ; and this description of dearth in- duced the Corporation of London, in 1786, to appoint a committee for the purpose of inquiring into the causes of the high price of provisions. The first resolution of the committee in their report is sagely couched in the follow- ing terms : " Resolved, that it appears to your committee, from the three different papers mentioned in the evidence of Mr. Montague, principal clerk in the Chamberlain's office, and Mr. Tomlinson, receiver of the tolls in Smithfield market, containing an account of the number of cattle and sheep brought into the said market during the last thirty-six years, that from the year 1732 to 1778, the same had annually increased in a very considerable degree; and that there has been a greater increase from 1778 to 1783; but the decrease that has happened during the years 1 784 and 1785, we are of opinion, from the evidence that has been laid before us, arises from the pernicious system of forestalling in the vicinity of this metropolis." The committee likewise attacked the prevailing tendency to new enclosures as one of the concurrent causes. I should not have noticed this strange document, but for the follow- ing information which the inquiry brought forth. The magistrates of Sunderland, in answer to the inquiries, write, " For the last three years we have had two very dry summers, and three very severe winters, which caused much destruction among sheep and lambs in the spring, and occasioned a great consumption of all kinds of fodder ; and even great quantities of oats were used after haV:, straw, and turnips were eaten up." There are other answers to a similar purport : I shall only further extract the concluding part of one from Arthur Young, dated August, 1780. " Last winter hay, straw, and fodder of all kinds were scarcer and dearer than ever known in this kingdom. Severe frosts de- stroyed the turnips and cattle of all kinds, and sheep suffered dreadfully ; many died, and the rest were in ill plight to fatten early in this summer." Attached to the report of the committee is a statement of the numbers of cattle and sheep sold at Smithfield, from 1 732 to I7B5. Sir Frederic j\I. Eden has inserted that statement in his work, and continued it down to 1795 ; and as a state- ment of that kind in regular series, down to the present time, may be useful, I insert one in the Appendix, No. X Vf. The winter of 1 788-9 was again a very severe one, and followed by a backward spring. The crops of 1789 were indifferent; but prices abroad being relatively high, there was no imj.ortation, and the \Vindsor price of wheat in consequence rose by Lady-day, 1190, to 8^. 3d. the bushel of nine gallons. The only remarkably abundant season in the period after 1786 was the year 179' 5 vvhich is described in the Annals of Agriculture, (vol. .\xiv. p. j'21) as one of singular abundance and felicity. And the produce of that season, co-operating with a large importation, reduced the Wind- sor price of Wheat by Lady-day, 1792, to 5s. 9d. the nine gallon bushel. The year 1 792 is stated in the Annals of 255 K.griculture to have been " remarkable for an extremely wet summer, by which the crop of wheat was much injured every where." On a review of the whole period, from 1782 to 1792, both years included, there seems to have been, after the very bad harvest of nS'S, a large proportion of severe winters and backward springs in the earlier part of the series, and, with the exception of 1791 5 no instance of very abundant produce. Consequently the prices of provisions may be presumed to have been at a somewhat higher level, and the importations of corn to have been on a larger scale than they would have been if the seasons had been of full average produce in the whole term, or, in other words, as favourable as an equal series of consecutive years has been described to have been in some former instances. 'o() SECTION III. Cliaractcrof the Seasons from 1793 to lS2I,both Years included. So much, in my opinion, depends upon the character of the seasons, dating from 17^3, in the explanation of prices, and so little appears to be in the recollection of the public generally respecting them, that I may be allowed to be some- what minute in the description of each. In the Annals of Agriculture, Arthur Young, writing in April, 1795, after describing the summer of 179- as having been extremely wet, and the crops of wheat as having been injured every where, proceeds to say : *' The summer of 1793 was a very dry one, in which, though the wheat was moderate, the spring crops generally proved deficient. In the last summer, 179-1, the wheat turned out, very tinex- vecledly to many growers, a failing produce ; tlie drought in many parts of England parched the spring corn to that degree, that I believe the leguminous crops have scarcely returned even the seed committed to the ground for them. Hence we find that there have been three seasons in succession unfavourable to the pro- duction of same kinds of grain ; the dcarness of all is a natural consequence/' (Vol. xxiv. p. 321.) Of the seasons of 1794 and 1795 there is a very full account in a fragment of what was intended to be a larger work, under the title of " Thoughts and Details on Scarcity," by Mr. Burke, written in November, ll[)5 ; and as every thing that may bear on this subject, from the pen of such a writer, cannot fail of being interesting, I venture to lay before the reader the following extract, which might otherwise ai)pear to be of disproportionate length. 257 " With regard to the harvest of 1 794^ in relation to the noblest grain, wheat, it is allowed to have been somewhat short, but not excessively, and in quality for the scven-and-twenty-years, during which I have been a farmer, I never remember wheat to have been so good. The world were, however, deceived in their speculations Upon it — the farmer as well as the dealer. Accordingly the price fluctuated beyond any thing I can remember ; for at one time of the year I sold my wheat at 14/. per load (I sold off all I had, as I thought this a reasonable price) when at the end of the season, if I had then had any to sell, I might have got thirty guineas for the same sort of grain. I sold all that I had at a comparatively low price, because I thought it a good price, compared with what I thought the general produce of the harvest; but when I came to consider what my own total was, I found that the quantity had not answered my expectation. It must be remembered that this year of produce (the year 1794), short but excellent, followed a year, 1 793, which was not extraordinary in production, nor of a superior quality, and left but little in store. At first this was not felt, because the harvest came in unusually early — earlier than common by a full month. The winter at the end of 1794 and beginning of 1795 was more than usually unfavourable both to corn and grass, owing to the sudden relaxation of very rigorous frosts, followed by rains, which were again rapidly succeeded by frosts of still greater rigour than the first. " Much wheat was utterly destroyed. The clover grass suf- fered in many places. What I never observed before, the rye grass, or coarse bent, suffered more than the clover. Even the meadow-grass in some places was killed to the very roots. In the spring, appearances were better than we expected. All the early sown grain recovered itself and came up with great vigour ; but that which was late sown was feeble, and did not promise to resist any blights in the spring which, however, with all its un- pleasant vicissitudes, passed off very well ; and nothing looked better than the wheat at the time of blooming : but at that most critical time of all, a cold, dry, east wind, attended with very sharp frosts, longer and stronger than I recollect at that time of year, destroyed the flowers, and withered up in an astonishing manner the whole side of the ear next to the wind. At that time I brought to town some of the cars, for the purpose of showing to S 258 my friends the operation of those unnatural fritsts, and according to their extent I predicted a great scarcity. But such is the pleasure of agreeable prospects, th at my opinion was little re- garded. " On threshing, I found things as I expected — the ears not filled, some of the capsules quite empty, and several others con- taining only withered hungry grain, inferior to the appearance of rye. My best ears and grains were not fine ; never had I a grain of so low a quality} yet I sold one load for 21/. At the same time I bought my seed wheat (it was excellent) at 23/. Since then the price has risen, and I have sold about two load of the same sort at 23/. Such was the state of the market when I left home last Monday. Little remains in my barn. I hope some in the rick may be better, since it was earlier sown, as far as I can recollect. Some of my neighbours have better, some quite as bad, or even worse. I suspect it will be found that wherever the blighting wind and those frosts at blooming-time have pre- vailed, the produce of the wheat crop will turn out very indiffer- ent. Those parts which have escaped will, I can hardly doubt, have a reasonable produce. As to the other grains, it is to be ob- served, as the wheat ripened very late (on account I conceive of the blights), the barley got the start of it, and was ripe first. The crop, with me and wherever my inquiry could reach, was ex- cellent, in some places far superior to mine. The clover which came up with the barley was the finest I remember to have seen. The turnips of this year (1795) are generally good. The clover sown last year, where not totally destroyed, gave two good crops, or one crop and a plentiful feed ; and, bating the loss of the rye- grass, I do not remember a better produce. " The meadow-grass yielded but a middling crop, and neither of the sown or natural grass was there in any farmer's possession any remainder from the year worth taking into account ; in most places there was none at all. Oats with me were not in a quan- tity more considerable than in comnioidy good seasons. But I have never known them heavier than they were in other places. The oat was not only a heavy, but an uncommonly abundant crop. My ground under peas did not exceed an acre or there- abouts, but the crop was great indeed. I believe it is throughout the country exid)crant. It is, however, to be remarked, that as 259 generally of all the grains, so particularly of the peas, there wag not the smallest quantity in reserve. The demand of the year must depend solely on its own produce ; and the price of the spring corn is not to be expected to fall very soon, or at any time very low. Uxbridge is a great corn market. As I came through that town, I found that at the last market day barley was at 40^. a quarter ; oats there were literally none, and the inn- keeper was obliged to send for them from London. I forgot to ask about peas. Potatoes were 5s. the bushel. In the debate on this subject in the House, I am told that a leading member of great ability, little conversant in these matters, observed that the general uniform dearness of butcher's meat, butter, and cheese, could not be owing to a defective produce of wheat ; and on this ground insinuated a suspicion of some unfair practice on the sub- ject, that called for inquiry. Unquestionably the mere deficiency of wheat could not cause the dearness of the other articles, which extends not only to the provisions he mentioned, but to every other without exception. " The cause is indeed so very plain and obvious, that the won- der is the other way. When a properly directed inquiry is made, the gentlemen who are amazed at the price of these commodities will tind, that when hay is at six pounds a load, as they must know it is, herbage, and for more than one year, must be scanty j and they will conclude that if grass be scarce, beef, veal, mutton, butter, milk, and cheese, must be dear. " But, to take up the matter somewhat more in detail ; if the wheat harvest in 1794, excellent in quality, was defective in quantity, the barley harvest was in quality ordinary enough, and in quantity deficient. This was soon felt in the price of malt. Another article of produce (beans) was not at all plentiful. The crop of peas was wholly destroyed, so that several farmers pretty early gave up all hopes on that head, and cut the green haulm as fodder for the cattle, then perishing for want of food in that dry and burning summer. I myself came off better than most — I had about tlic fourth of a crop of peas. It will be recollected that, in a manner, all the bacon and pork consumed in this country (the far largest consumption of meat out of towns) is when grow- ing fed on grass, and on whey or skimmed milk j and when fatting partly on the latter. This is the case in the dairy coun- tries, all of them great breeders, and feeders of swine ; but, for S2 260 the much greater part, and in all tlio torn countries, they are fat- tened on l)eans, barley-nical, and peas. When the food of tlic animal is scarce, liis flesh must he dear. This, one would sup- pose, would require no great penetration to discover. This failure of so very large a supply of flesh in one species naturally throws the whole demand of the consumer on the diminished sup- ply of all kinds of flesh, and, indeed, on all the matters of human sustenance. Nor, in my opinion, are we to expect a greater cheapness in that article for this year, even though corn should grow cheaper, as it is to be hoped it will. The store swine, from the failure of subsistence last year, arc now at an extravagant price. Pigs, at our fairs, have sold lately for fifty shillings, which two years ago would not have brought more than twenty. As to sheep, none, I thought, were strangers to the general failure of turnips last year ; the early having been burned as they came up by the great drought and heat ; the late, and those of the early which had escaped, were destroyed by the chilling frosts of the winter, and the wet and severe weather of the spring. In many places a full fourth of the sheep or the lambs were lost ; what re- mained of the lambs were poor and ill fed, the ewes having had no milk. The calves came late, and they were generally an article, the want of which was as much to be dreaded as any other. So that article of food, formerly so abundant in the early part of the summer, particularly in London, and which in a great part sup- plied the place of mutton for near two months, did little less than totally fail. " All the productions of the earth link in with each other. All the sources of plenty in all and every article were dried or frozen up. The scarcity was not, as gentlemen seem to suppose, in wheat only. " As to the lesser articles, they are like the greater. They have followed the fortune of the season. AA'hy are fowls dear? Was not this the farmer's or jobber's fault ? I sc^ld from my yard to a jobber six young and Jean fowls, for four-and-twenty shil- lings ; fowls, for which two years ago the same man would not have given a shilling a piece. He sold them afterwards at Uxbridge, and they were taken to Ivondon to receive the last hand. " As to the operation of the war in causing the scarcity of pro- visions, I understand that Mr. Pitt has given a particular answer to it : but I do not think it worth powder and shot." (Page 33.) 261 As the degree of tlcficiency arising from the excessive drought and scanty crops of 1794, and the want of a sur- plus from ] 793, had not, in consequence of the harvest being unusually forward, and the corn being brought in fine condition, and very early to market, been sufficiently ap- preciated, the price did not rise soon enough to check the consumption; and it was not till the winter and spring fol- lowing that the insufficiency of the stock on hand, to meet the consumption at the average rate, became apparent. At the same time the weather was extremely unfavourable to the growing crops, which were known to have sustained great injury. A very general alarm then arose; the price advanced rapidly, and there was more real ground for apprehending a famine than perhaps even in the more memorable scarcity and higher prices of 1799 and 1800. But the advance in 1795 was checked by peculiar circum- stances. In the early part of that year, and, indeed, for some time previous*, government had taken the alarm at the indications of severe dearth, and adopted some extra- ordinary measures of precaution. All neutral ships, bound with corn to France, were seized and brought into this country, and their cargoes paid for with a profit to the proprietors. This measure was adopted with the double view of relief to ourselves, and distress to the enemy, as a still greater scarcity prevailed in France than here : at the same time the government of this country employed agents * As far back as 1/92 government liad made purchases of foreigu corn, which was then in considerable quantity in Loudon under the king's lock. I have already described the season of 1792 as an indifferent one in this country: in France it was worse, and the French government had employed agents to obtain supplies of corn from hence. Our government, in order to pre- vent the exportation without incurring the invidiousness which would have attended a prohibition of export under the peculiar circumstances of those times, resorted to the measure alluded to ; and it was carried into effect witljout being generally known. 262 to buy corn at llie ports in the 13allic. This was done because it was apprehended that our own merchants would be deterred from purchasing so freely as was desirable, by the great adwincc of price which had taken place in the north of Europe, in consequence of large purchases for account of the French government. Of the policy of this measure, as interfering with the ordinary course and true principles of trade, Mr. Pitt spoke doubtingly ; but rested the justification of it upon the extraordinary and alarming character of the emergency. The measure was, indeed, objectionable upon various grounds, which it would lead me too far to enter upon at present; and I only mention it, because, while it proves the urgency of the crisis, it accounts for the advance of prices, as the thing turned out, not being so great as it otherwise might have been. The government being possessed of a stock of corn both in hand and forth- coming, directed its agents, about the time just before the harvest in 179-5, when the deficiency became most distinctly felt, to distribute their stocks in such portions and at such prices as were likely most effectually to supply the imme- diate exigency. Whatever may be said, and too much cannot, in my opinion, be said against the policy of the measure, it seems to have been conducted with great ability, and to have been favoured by circumstances. If the weather at the harvest of 1795 had not turned out fine, and if the succeeding winter had not been one of the mildest, as the preceding had been one of the severest upon record, prices would have advanced to a greater height, perhaps, than they ever attained ; and the interference by government in artificially keeping down the prices at one time would have aggravated the scarcity, and eventual rise in price, by having kept the consumption up at a greater rate than it could have been, if the market had been allowed to take its natural course; but, as I have observed, circumstances favoured the measure. The mischief to the crops was confined to what had taken place before the harvest ; they were well got in, and therefore applicable to immediate use : the winter wat ^63 o})en, and there was the prospect of relief by an early and abnndant importation, wliich was favoured by a bounty granted by parUament*. Accordingly, the average price of wheat, which in August 1795 reached the height of llos. began to fall after the harvest was secured. In consequence, however, of the alarming discussions in Parliament, in De- cember 1795, there was a renewed rise; and the greatest height was attained in January 1796, after which the decline was progressive. The season of 1796 was happily a plentiful one; and, concurring with an importation amounting to 854,521 quarters of wheat, and with an extended cultivation, occa- sioned a large aggregate }iroduce. The price fell rapidly in the last six months of 1795; the avei'age on the 1st of Jan, 1797, being as low as 55s. 9d., or less than half what it was in August 1795. In 1797 the spring was backward, the summer variable and rather cold, the harvest wet and stormy, and the general reports of the crops unfavourable both as to quality and quantity. In consequence of the apprehensions entertained of injury from the weather, prices advanced from 525. 3(1^ the average of wheat in August, to 59s. id, the average on the 21st October. But, notwithstanding that the result of all that could be ascertained of the crops proved some de- ficiency of quantity, as well as infei'iority of quality, prices declined by the close of the season to an average of 5'2s. Sd. for w heat. This decline was apparently occasioned by the surplus of the former year, combined with a farther im- * An act was passed in 1795, granting a bounty of IGs. to 20*. per quarter, according to quality, on wheat, and 6s. per cwt. on flour, from the south of Europe, till the quantity imported should amount to 400,000 quarters, and from America till it should amount to 500,000 quarters; and 125. to 155. from any other part of Europe till it should amount to 500,000 quarters, and Ss. to 105. after it exceeded that quantity; to continue till the 30th September, 179<^- (Comber on Nat, Subsist, p. 201.) ^64 portation of 407,242 quarters of wheat in 1797. It is con- sequently clear, that if this year's crops had been abundant, the fall of price would have been more considerable. The season of 1 798 proved to be moderately abundant ; and the harvest being early, and the crops well got in, prices declined in the autumn of that year to 47s. ]0d. for wheat, 2ys. for barley, ly^. lOd. for oats; but the further depression was checked by the early severity of the winter which followed, and a fresh cause of high prices occurred, in consequence of two seasons in succession, attended with a still greater degree of scarcity than had marked even those which had occurred only three years before. The season of 1 799, from its commencement to its close, was perhaps as ungenial to the productions of the earth, and to the animal creation, as any upon record ; and the in- clemency extended over a great part of Europe, particularly over those countries which constitute the sources of supply, in ordinary years, to the rest of Europe. In this country, and particularly in the north of the island, many fields of corn were still uncut as late as November, and some were not cleared till the January following. It would be endless to attempt to describe the sterility and desolation which characterized that year: I will only subjoin one or two ex- tracts, in the Appendix, from contemporary publications, of the principal features of that and the following year. No wonder, then, that the price of wheat advanced consi- derably in the course of that year, viz. s. d. 1 st January, 1 799, average price 49 2 J st January, 1800 ditto 92 7 The season of 1800, after a cold, backward spring, as- sumed rather a favourable aspect, the early part of the sum- mer being dry and hot; but the promising appearances were soon changed into the dismal reality of renewed or continued scarcity. A small part only of the crops was got Q65 in before heavy and almost incessant rains began. Of the wheat, that part which was secured in the southern districts of the island before the rains commenced, and therefore in good condition, proved to be light, coarse, and unproductive: this was the quality of the grain generally. But the rains which came on in August caught a considerable portion of the wheat still in the fields, even in the home and some of the southern districts, and injured the whole of the crops in the northern parts of the island. Bad, however, as were the crops in England, they were still worse in Scotland. Considerable purchases were in consequence made in Mark-lane, between the harvest of 1800 and that of 1801, for the purpose of shipping to Scot- land. Under these circumstances, notwithstandinof an im- portation of foreign corn to a very large amount, that of wheat alone being 1, 242,507 quarters; the price of corn advanced to the following rates, on the average^ on the 1st of January, 1801 ; viz. Wheat, 139s. — Rye, 925. 2^Z.— Barley, 805. 1 \d. — Oats, 435. \\d. — Beans, 78s. 7^/.— Peas, 845. 3d— Oatmeal, 745. 8r/. In Mark-lane, in the course of that season, the price of wheat reached the extravagant height of 1805., and the quartern loaf, for four weeks, was at l5. lOjd, being higher than it has before or since been. Not only was there this great rise in every description of corn ; every article of animal food participated in the ad- vance; for, independent of the ungenial influence of such a season as that of 1799 on cattle, sheep, and live stock gene- rally, the deficiency of the pasture, and the extravagant price of fodder of all kinds, occasioned the hurrying of half- fed cattle to market, and produced an eventual scarcity, which was felt for two or three years following. Accordingly, in the spring of 1801, when these causes had produced their full effect, the following were the quota- tions of meat in Smithfield : ,^ 'ZOO s. d. s. (I. Beef 5 to b () \rc\- stone of 81b. ]\liittoii .... ti G 80 \'eal (i 8 G Pork G G 7 In retail Beef 10 10,^ per 11). Mutton Oil 12 Veal 12 1 2 A rise in the price of the produce of the tlairy would na- turally follow from the same general causes. It may be seen by the proceedings in Parliament in 1800, what was the degree of alarm felt by the legislature, and by the government, at the terrific appearance of the continuance of such a state of dearth. A bounty was voted for the im- portation of foreign grain ; but great as were the induce- ments held out by a bounty so framed as to secure to the importer the high minimum price of 1 00s. a quarter, the arrivals from abroad through 1800 were perfectly incom- mensurate with the urgent want that was felt of every de- scription of corn. Having thus given a sketch of the seasons for the eight concluding years of the eighteenth century, it may be desir- able to pause, for the purpose of observing the extraordinary proportion of bad and indifferent harvests, and severe winters, within that period; the effects of scarcity of pro- duce having been aggravated by the greatly increased con- sumption, which is invariably attendant upon long and hard winters. There were in that period, after the indiflercnt and scanty crops of 1792, no fewer than four of great and general deficiency, viz. l794, 1795, 1799, and 1800; two of bare average produce, 1793 and 1797 ; two only of good crops, 17y6 and 17.98; and there were four severe winters among the eight, viz. 1794-5, 96-7,98-9, and 9.9-1800; followed, as such winters almost invariably are, by cold backward springs ; a proportion unparalleled since the close of the seventeenth centurj'. 2G7 The season of .1801 proved favourable on the whole*; and the effect of such a season, co-operating with a con- siderable importation, (that of wheat alone being 1,396,360 quarters) was to depress prices very much. This depres- sion was rapidly in progress before the preliminaries of peace with France were signed, and before the slightest expecta- tion was entertained by the public of such an event. The weather in 1802 was not quite so favourable as that of 1 80 1 , and the produce of the year was not generally con- sidered above an average. The principal feature of the season of 1803 was a drought of several weeks' continuance, and the general produce, thoush ffood, was not large. Unmarked as these two sea- sons were by any character of extraordinary abundance, they seem to have been more than sufficient, with a small importation, to meet the average rate of consumption ; for till the summer of 1801-, after a few intermediate fluctua- tions, prices tended downwards. The following were the average prices for England and Wales : March 3, 1804.. Wheat 495. Gil Rye 335. 2d. Barley 22s. Sd. Oats 19s. Od. As a remedy for the agricultural distress which then pre- vailed, a new corn bill was passed in the session of 1 804. It was at first supposed that the rise of prices, as it immedi- ately followed that measure, was the consequence of it : and * The produce of 1801 is thus described in the closing uuiuber for that year of the Farmer's Magazine : " The favourable prospect presented in our last number is now almost completely realized ; and though the crop of grain in Britain cannot with justice be reckoned uncommonly good, yet from the extensive information transmitted to us, we are war- ranted to pronounce it equal at least to that raised in ordinary years. No shaking winds, nor rotting rains, have prevailed, as in the two preceding years, to destroy the fruits of the husband- man's labour." 268 several petitions were presented to parliament, in the spring of 1805, against the bill, as the alleged cause of the high price. A committee was appointed to take those petitions into consideration, and the evidence clearly proved that a very extensive injury, that had been sustained by the crojis of corn, was the principal occasion of the rise. Indeed, all doubt of the real cause of the advance may now be consi- dered as removed. As the harvest approached, appearances became unfavourable ; and the result justified the appre- hensions, for the crops proved decidedly deficient in (juan- tity, and inferior in quality *. The corn bill was a dead letter, for the price of wheat advanced soon afterwards 205. above the importation rate. The harvest of 1 805 proved to be one of average produce, and the importation was of some magnitude. As soon as the crops were secured, and found to be comparatively pro- ductive, the price of corn fell considerably, viz. from 89*., the average for wheat on July 1, 1805, to 15s. lid., the average on Jan. l, ISOG. There was subsequently an atl- vance, in consequence of the doubtful appearances in the spring and summer of 1806. But as the result of that sea- son was not unfavourable, although the crops were not con- sidered quite equal to those of the preceding year, and * Extract from Farmer's Magazine for Nov. 1804 : " From the various accounts transmitted to us, it appears that iu England wheat turns out a short crop, and that the quality in several cases is of a very inferior description. This is evident, from the average price of flour approaching so near to that of wheat ; a circumstance which cannot happen, unless when the grain is materially defective. Perhaps we are not far from the mark, when we rate the deficiency of produce at one-fourth, com- pared with that of the preceding year. In Scotland, though the grain is in few instances so plump and well coloured as last sea- son, yet the return per acre is much nearer to tlic ordinary pro- duce, than among our southern neighlioursj for in Scotland the rains were later, not so heavy, nor of so long continuation, as with them." 269 althoiigh the importation from the continent did not ex- ceed 200,000 quarters of wheat, prices remained nearly stationary *. The season of 1807 was fine and dry from June till the first week in September, and the crops were secured in most parts of England and AVales in good order. The wheat was generally considered to be about an average crop, but spring corn, beans, peas, and turnips, were greatly de- ficient; and the pastures were much burnt, making fodder scarce; so that the aggregate produce in England and Wales was deficient, but in Scotland it was much more so. The weather in that part of the island was highly unfavour- able to the harvest, as will be seen by an extract from the Farmer's Magazine, inserted in the Appendix. In Ireland, too, the potatoe crops had partially failed. Upon the whole, therefore, the season of 1 807 seems to have been attended with a considerable deficiency of general produce, wheat only excepted. But as the crops of wheat in England were secured in good condition, and came early to market, the price declined till the close of that year, although all other grain advanced considerably. The following winter set in unusually early, which of course increased the consumption of all kinds of grain, more especially as hay was scarce and dear. The appearances that a serious scarcity of food was likely to be felt before the coming harvest, induced parliament, on a report of a committee of the house of Commons, to pro- hibit the distillation from grain f; the same prospect had a * The importation from Ireland was about 100,000 quarters of wheat in that year, an act having passed in the session of 1806, permitting afree intercourse in grain between Great Britain and Ireland. f One of the motives wliicli induced the legislature to prohibit the distillation from grain was, doubtless, to afford some relief to the West India planters, by the substitution of sugar in the dis- tilleries 5 but the immediate occasion and the professed object of the measure were distinctly stated to be the actual and appre- hended deficiency of grain and of potatoes. 270 natural effect on llic corn market, and prices advanced ac- cordingly in the spring of 1808. The crops of 18U8 proved more deficient than those of the preceding year. The memorably hot days in the early part of July were considered to have done great injury to the wheat, and they were followed by a great deal of wet and stormy weather, from that time till the getting in of the harvest. Some of the other crops suffered, although not in the same degree with wheat, and the aggregate produce was below an average. This was the period, too, when our communication with the Continent had become very much obstructed, so as to preclude the expectation of any consi- derable relief from foreign supply. In point of fact, there was an excess of export of about 15,000 quarters of wheat, occasioned probably by the wants of Spain and Portugal. The high price, therefore, (wheat having advanced by July to an average of 81?. Id. per quarter, and by January fol- lowing to 905. 4(7.) was a necessary condition for eking out a reduced supply of our own growth, when the obstructions to importation had become great, and were thought in that year to be insurmountable. Nothing, indeed, can better prove the magnitude of those obstructions, than the circum- stance that an average price of upwards of 80^. when the exchange and the price of gold were nearly at par, was in- sufficient to bring forward any foreign supply worth men- tioning. The harvest of vvheat in 1809 turned out to be worse even than that of 1808. The rains set in in the early part of July, and continued with scarcely any intermission till Oc- tober. It will be sufficient to bring it to the recollection of my readers, if I remind them that that was the season in which the ill-fated expedition to Walcheren took place ; for it must be well remembered how much the calamitous sick- ness which attended it was aggravated by the rains which prevailed, from its embarkation to its return. As a conse- quence of that bad harvest, the average price of wheat was, on the 1st of Jan. 1810, 102a'. 6d. Previously, however, to any indication of mischief to the crops of I809j govern- 271 ment seems to have been alive to the deficiency of the growth of the preceding year, and to have adopted measures for fjicilitating an importation. It appears to have suited the views of the French government, at the same time, to pro- mote an exportation of corn, which happened then to be unusually abundant and clicap in France and the Nether- lands. Licenses were accordingly obtained from both go- vernments, and many cargoes of wheat were received from thence. Measures were likewise taken, when the harvest of 1809 was ascertained to be deficient, to get supplies from other cjuarters, in the anticipation of a further great advance in price which migiit be sufficient to cover the great expense of freight, insurance, and licenses, amounting collectively, in many instances, to from 30s. to 50^. a quarter and up- wards. As a consequence of these measures, about 350,000 quarters of wheat were imported from the Continent in 1809. As prices rose here, notwithstanding this supply from abroad, the inducements to import were continued through the following year, in the course of which the sup- ply of foreign wheat amounted to 1,400,000 quarters. The spring of !810 was singularly cold and ungenial; a series of dry east winds prevailed for many weeks together, and made the hay crops remarkably deficient*. From the same cause, the spring crops and the wheat were generally thin upon the ground ; but in consequence of the weather becoming fine immediately before the harvest, and con- tinuing so during the harvest, the produce turned out to be rather better than had at one lime been apprehended ; and the prices of corn generally, and of wheat in particular, fell in the autumn of that year. The enormous supplies of foreign corn which were poured in during the summer na- turally contributed to this effect ; but the apprehensions which had previously been entertained proved well founded, for it appeared, that notwithstanding the very large im- * The price of hay rose, in the course of the winter following, to 11/. the load. 27^2 portation, there was very little old stock to meet tlie ensuing harvest. The harvest of 1811 was very deficient. The following is an account of it, from one of the circular monthly reports of that period (Oct. 1811). " The state of the wheat crops seems now to be ascertained with probable accuracy throughout the island, as somewhat below an average quantity, and far inferior to that of last year in point of quality. Reckoning both quantity and quality, persons of the most general information decide upon a deficiency of a full third. There will be a considerable quantity of black wheat, and in many l^arts of the north the barley is strongly smutted." This estimate was fully confirmed; for, in another monthly report, in December, 1811, it is said " The former statements respecting the defects of the crops of wheat, both in quantity and quality, are fully and unfortunately confirmed. The autumnal price of wheat is indeed at an enor- mous height, although the farmers have been universally liberal in supplying the markets, considering the season; and as there are various impediments to foreign supplies in times like the pre- sent, the real state of things cannot be too widely promulgated, with a view to timely economy in expenditure." And further from an agricultural report in May, 1 S 1 G, " The stock of wheat on hand, in the most productive eastern counties, is alarmingly deficient, according to the best accounts Avhich can be obtained, and the general opinion is that very con- siderable foreign supplies will be needed, during the summer, to eke out the residue until the new corn shall be fit for use." As a corroboration of the general estimate of the defec- tive state of the crops of that year, I insert, in the Appendix, an extract from the Farmer's Magazine, describing the deficiency very particularly; and the copy of a petition from Liverpool, stating that deficiency as a ground for the application to continue the prohibition of the distillation from grain. 273 It is the more important to bear these particulars in mind, because it was clearly as a consequence of u deficiency so great and alarming, at a time when, om ing to a failure of the harvest of wheat on the Continent, as well as in this country, and of the continuance of exorbitant charges of importation, that the average prices of wheat and other grain reached their greatest height. The deficiency of the stock of grain in the country in the summer of 1812, and the absence of any prospect of considerable relief by im- portation, were the more alarming, as apprehensions were entertained of the result of the coming harvest, which was backward, and presented unfavourable appearances. On the 1st July, the average price of wheat was 140s. 9d. As the want of a surplus of corn in the country on the eve of the harvest of 1 812, and the absence of any prospect of relief by impoitation, made us entirely dependent for sub- sistence upon the produce of the forthcoming crops, and as so much, therefore, turned upon the event of that harvest, it may be desirable to record, somewhat in detail, the pro- spects and eventual estimate of the crops of that year. I therefore insert, in the Appendix, some extracts from con- temporary reports relating to those points. Making all due allowance, the crops of grain, generally, and of potatoes, in that year, appear to have been somewhat under an average. The winter of 1812 began early and severely; it was the memorable one of the retreat of the French from Moscow. This early severity of winter, co-operating with the de- ficiency of stocks of grain, and the absence of any foreign supplies of magnitude, kept prices at a high range, so that they were nearly as high in the spring of 1813 as they had been in the spring of 1 8 1 2. Now, upon a review of these six seasons in succession, each of which was marked by deficiency of produce, at a time when the difficulties of importation were so great, I would ask, whether it requires a resort to the supposition of a depreciation of the currency beyond the degree indicated by the difference between paper and gold, or to the effect T 274 of a war demand, lo account for a range of very high prices during all that interval. Referring to the whole period of twenty years, from 1793 to 1812, both years included, the seasons may be estimated as follows: eleven more or less deficient^, six of average produce f, and three only of abundant crops J. Or, confining the view to the last ten years of the series, it will be found that no fewer than seven were deficient, and three only that can be considered as being of average produce. I shall now proceed to the description of the seasons following 1812, beginnini; with the harvest of 1813. The produce of that year was one of undoubted and general abundance. The weather had proved favourable, upon the whole, to the crops of every description ; and, the extent of tillage having been greatly increased (as appears by the number of new enclosure bills in the preceding five years), at the same time that much fresh capital was applied to land already in cultivation, and that the mode of hus- bandry was greatly improved, the united effect of these causes was felt in a larger aggregate produce of grain than had ever before been realized in this country, in any single year. Mr. Driver, an eminent land-surveyor, in his evidence before the corn committee of the House of Commons, in ISII-, was asked " Do you recollect, witliin twenty years, any harvest so pro- ductive as the last ? — I do not recollect the years, but I think there have been some as productive. " Do you remember any harvest so productive within the last ten years ? — No. I do not think there has been §.'' Mr. Hodgson, of Liverpool, stated it. in his evidence be- * Viz. 1794, 95, 99, 1800, 1804, and 1807, to 1812, t Viz. 1793, 97, 1802, 1803, 1805, 180G. t Viz. 179(), 1798, 1801. § Minutes of Evidence, page 11. 2/5 fore the agricultural committee, in 1821, to be the largest crop he had ever known. " Can you state, as far as your survey was tlien established, what was tlie crop of 1813 ? — We have every reason to believe it was the greatest crop we hare ever known. " AViien you snv, you have every reason to believe it was the grcarest crop you have ever known, you have other reasons for that opinion ? — AVe have oilier reasons, and general observa- tion from the time that the grain of that season remained in con- siderable quantity, I think two or three years afterwards*." In fact, it was not till two or three years after, viz. in 1815, that the superabundance of the produce of IS 1 3 was ascertained, by its still making its appearance in the market. But, while corn was falling in 1813, in consequence of the superabundance of produce, the price of meat kept up, and was at unprecedentedly high prices till the summer and autumn of IS 14. The cause of the relatively high price of meat is easily explained. The remarkably cold spring of 1810 had made grass so short, that hay, for some time after, was from 10/. to 1 iZ. the load; the pastures and turnips were proportionably deficient : and this deficiency was not soon recovered, while the high price of corn, till 1813, did not admit of its bein^ allotted as a substitute for herbaj^e to cattle. The stock of oats had been run so short just before the harvest of 1 8 1 2, that the price, for a week or two, reached 805. per quarter; and there was an instance of a sale as high as 845. Oil cakes, likewise, were at a very high price, in consequence of the scarcity of linseed, arising from the obstructions to importation. It was natural, therefore, that cattle and sheep should become scarce and dear, as a consequence of such dearth of provender, and as a con- sequence, likewise, of the great relative encouragement to extended tillage. But, in 1813, circumstances were re- versed: by the fall in corn, while meat kept up or advanced, there was every inducement to recur to the rearing of stock, * Minutes of Evidence, page 264. T 2 276 and the foundation was laid for the abundance of cattle and sheep which dcpi'esscd the meat market in 1816. The crops of 1814 did not exceed an average in produce per acre ; but the total supply, including the large surplus of the former year, and importations from abroad, which were then coming in at reduced charges, tended, after a little speculation in July, on the reports of injury to the wheat by an extensive blight, to depress the price. 1815 was, upon the whole, an abundant season, and, as a consequence of two abundant seasons out of three, the de- cline of price was great and rapid, till the bad weather, which, for several weeks previous to the harvest of 1816, threatened severe and extensive injury to the growing crops. The apprehensions entertained on this score were fully realized by the result of the harvest of 1 8 1 6. The injury to the crops of corn by a cold backward spring, and a wet summer and autumn, with a singular absence of solar heat, was very great. The quality was almost universally bad, being got in wet, and unfit for immediate use. The prices rose here above 100 per cent., and in France, where the deficiency seems to have been still greater, they rose nearly 200 per cent, above what they had been two years before. The pastures, and green food in general, for cattle, were, however, abundant Though the prices, therefore, of corn rose, as is well known, those of animal food did not partake in the advance, as they had done in consequence of some of the former bad seasons. Of the produce of 1817 various estimates were made. The weather, till harvest, was wet and unfavourable, and the harvest itself was late ; but the weather cleared up in the last few days of August, and it continued favourable through a great part of September. The price of corn fell, in consequence, rapidly for a few weeks, sufficiently to close the ports in November of that year. But as the weather during harvest, though favourable in the main, was foggy and calm, with only short intervals of brilliant sunshine ; and, as the rains again set in before the harvest was fully 277 completed, the samples of new wheat, when brought to market, were found to be damp and cold, and not fit for immediate use. There being, at the same time, very little old corn of good quality remaining, the few samples of the new which were fit for use were in great demand, and fetched very high prices, which opened the ports again in February following. But the eventual produce of 1 817 turned out, as I afterwards understood, to be much better, both as to quality and quantity, than had been originally supposed ; and, upon the whole, it may be considered as having been an average crop; but the impulse to high prices having been given, they did not immediately subside upon the cessation of the original cause. I have already described the season of 1 8 1 S in a former part of this work, and, considering the excellence of the quality and condition of the corn, and that the crops were undoubtedly abundant in Ireland and Scotland, it may be presumed to have been a full average. This estimate of the seasons of 1817 and 1818 corre- sponds with the estimate made by Mr. Hodgson, who con- sidered that they were good crops. Mr. Wakefield, a surveyor of the first eminence, likewise stated that the pro- duce of corn in 1818, notwithstanding the shortness of the straw, was greater than had been expected. But the spe- culation and miscalculation that prevailed as to both seasons, and particularly as to the latter, which was a most extra- ordinary one in every respect, concurred in occasioning a large importation, and in keeping up prices beyond what they would have been, if the result of our own produce had been correctly estimated, and if there had not been considerable delusion as to the operation of the corn bill. The harvest of 1819 proved, in its result, to be likewise a full average in point of quantity, and the quality was also good. Mr. Wakefield considers it as having been a year of abundant produce. Mr. Hodgson, I observe, places it in his scale of the comparative productiveness of the crops, -•278 as being under mi average produce per acre, but admits that the wliole of tlic growth of corn in the united kingdom was beyond an average in point of quantity, and he accounts for this circumstance by the supposition that the extended tillage and diminished number of cattle rendered the pro- duce of wheat, in that year, much larger than was indicated by the figure. I believe that, independent of the ground stated by Mr. Hodgson, for the total produce of 1 8 1 9 proving more considerable than his estimate, as denoted by the figure 28 compared with 32, which, according to his scale, denotes an average, there are other means of accounting for the circumstance, of which I think there is now no doubt, that the aggregate produce of the imited kingdom proved to be clearly beyond an average. That which aflfortlcd the principal ground for rating the wheat crop of 1819 as below an average, was the injury which was known to have been occasioned by a sharp frost in the end of May or the beginning of June in that year. All the wheat, which v.as then about to bloom, v.as found to be materially injured, and not to produce the usual number of grains ; but the mischief did not extend to the north of England, nor to Scotland, where the crops were not in a state sufficiently forward to be susceptible of injury from that cause. The quantity of straw on the ground was uncommonly large in that year. Moreover, in Ireland, the crop of wheat was indisputably abundant, as is proved by the large importations from thence in IS'20. Of the abundance of 1820 there can be no doubt. Mr. Wakefield says, in his evidence, " "^1 he last harvest has been one of the finest ever known in England ;" and he after- wards adds, " I think there is a wonderful quantity of corn in the country. I now think that there is as much corn left in the country as generally in common years there is after harvest*."" And according to Mr. Hodgson's csti- mate, likewise, the crop of wheat, in particular, was very * Rvid. Agricult.Com., page 217, April 5, 1821. 279 considerably beyond an average, huleed, there is evidence of" every kind to prove the very great superabundance of ail descriptions of produce in that year. The season of 1 82 1 is so recent as to require no parti- cular description. It is well known that the rains set in so violently and critically just before, and during the harvest, as very much to endanger, and, in some degree, eventually to injuie, the crops. There was accordingly an extensive speculation, which, for a short time, raised the average price of wheat above 70s. But the quantity turned out be- yond expectation, and seems to have exceeded an average, for there was in the spring of 1 823 some of that year's wheat still remaining in the market. The quality was, indeed, greatly inferior, a large proportion being sprouted, and the whole, on an average, not weighing more than 57 to 58 lb. the bushel. It may be a matter of surprise that, considering the ill condition in which that harvest was got in, so much of the wheat was available for human food, and so little effect of its inferiority perceptible in the bread which was made of it. This I have heard ascribed to greater care than had ever before been taken in the preparation of the wheat for market by a much more extensive practice of kiln- drying, and by a new process to improve the colour. The crops of wheat in 18 22 having been got in remark- ably early, and in very fine condition, came freely to market, while the stock of old corn on hand was still considerable. And as the quality of the old wheat was inferior, there was a great anxiety among the holders of it to realize. There was, consequently, a great pressure of sellers till the close of 1 82 J, when the price of wheat reached its lowest level, the average of the first week in January 182.5 having been 396'. 1 [d. Subsequently, in consequence of an opinion which became prevalent, that the crops of 182J, including all kinds of corn, were deficient, prices advanced, and were as high in the spring of 1823 as they were in particular periods of the war, and as it is only for the decline of prices down to the close of 1 822 that I have to account, I shall exclude 280 that season from the comparison. At the same time, as the spriiifT corn alone of 1822 was supposed to be deficient, and as the wheat came unusually early to market, and in condition for immediate use, none of the effects of the supposed deficiency of that season could be considered as having been felt in arresting the tendency to a decline from the abundance of the former seasons, till the close of 1822. The same remark applies to the meat markets. The severity of the winter of 1822-3, combined with the shortness of turnips and the increased dearness of keep generally, while it tended to aggravate the glut, contributed to reduce the stock of cattle and sheep below Avhat it had been for sometime before; and, as a consequence of that reduction of stock *, prices, as is well known, advanced, and were as high in the spring of 1823 as they were in several periods during the war, I therefore confine the comparison of seasons so as to embrace only the period ending in 18'22, before the de- ficiency of the harvest of that year became matter of specu- lation, and before the severity of the succeeding winter and the backwardness of the spring of 1823 gave further coun- tenance to that speculation. Confining the comparison accordingly, we have nine seasons, among which there is only one, viz. that of 18 IG, which was unquestionably bad, while there are three of great abundance, viz. 1813, 15, and 20, and five of fair average produce, leaving the pro- duce of 1822 out of consideration f. * By the returns of Sinitlifield, and some of the country markets in 1823, it appears that there was not such a reduction from the causes stated in the text as had been supposed, and prices have accordingly rather receded. t From the experience of the markets, and tlie result of general information since the publication of the first edition of this work, there is reason to believe that the crops of 1822, taking into account the superiority of the quality of the wheat, its great weight, and consequently large proportionate yield of flour, amounted to nearly, if not quite, an average. It appears too that 281 If the description of these nine years be compared with that of the nine years from the harvest of 1804 to that of 1812, or again with that of the twenty years from 1793 to 1812, the difference of produce of the respective periods is quite sufficient to account for a very great difference in the average price. there was still no inconsiderable surplus of corn from former years. Otherwise, as the produce of 1822 was not above an average, and as the harvest of 1823 was fully one month later than usual, with a large proportion of the crops got in in a damp condition, and unfit therefore for immediate use (the consump- tion, moreover, having been increased by a severe winter and backward spring), an actual deficiency must have been felt be- fore the new wheat could come regularly into consumption. In- stead of this, the markets, although not so overflowing, and the prices consequently not at so low a range as they had been in the preceding year, were supplied so fully with old corn during and for some time after the harvest of 1823, that the speculation upon the bad weather, which prevailed through the greater part of the time of the getting in of the crops, and upon the general impression of deficiency in the quantity as well as of inferiority in the quality of the produce, was effectually checked ; and prices gave way towards the close of the year. It seems, however, to be generally admit- ted, that the harvest of 1823 was deficient in quantity, and inferior in quality, and the stock of old corn having been gradually dimi- nished, prices have again advanced, and are now (April 1824) at a much higher level than they were during 1822. They would be still higher but for the impression which seems to be gainingground, that there will be corn enough to last at the present rate of con- sumption till the ensuing harvest, supposing it not to be later than usual. At the same time, if appearances, as the season advances, prove to be unfavourable, the market in the absence of any con- siderable surplus of old corn will be particularly sensitive ; and should the coming harvest be decidedly deficient, we may have so great and alarming a rise of prices as may afford a striking exem- plification of the policy of the corn bill. But this is a sub- ject which it would be foreign to my present purpose to pursue, my object being limited to account for the fall of prices down to the close of 1822. 2S^2 The description which I have here given of the seasons may, by some of my readers, be thoiiirht too miiiiite, while to others it may appear that the proofs are not sufticiently detailed and conclusive. To the first I would answer that the inferences with respect to prices to be drawn from the fiict of the relative productiveness of the seasons is so im- portant as to justify a detailed reference to all the evidence readily accessible for the purpose of duly appreciating it. 'i'o the second I can only say that my own recollection of the impression produced at the time upon prices, by the estimated productiveness of each of the seasons from 1793, is perfectly fresh and distinct, and that it is confirmed by the recollection of such of my acquaintance, as were largely concerned in the corn trade during the whole period, and who may be considered competent judges of the general cor- rectness of my description. I m.ust therefore refer those who feel disposed to seek for further confirmation of what I have stated to the only authorities which 1 am aware of as existing, viz. the pamphlets and periodical publications of the day. 283 SECTION IV. Effect of Quantity on Price. In order to judge of the degree in which the variations of the seasons, such as I have described them, are calculated to affect the prices of produce, it may be necessary to pre- mise some general observations on the effects of quantity on price. It is no uncommon thing to meet with persons, who, in reasoning upon prices of corn and other commodities, take for granted that the variations in price must be in exact proportion to the variations in the quantity which may, at different times, be actually in the market or in the country for sale ; and who, if the variations in price do not corre- spond with the variations in quantity in exact proportion, infer that there must be something in the currency, or some unusual cause in operation, to account for what appears to them so anomalous an effect. Thus, if the quantity of corn at any time in the country were ascertained to be eleven millions of quarters, and at another time only ten millions, they would infer that the price in the latter case should advance ten per cent., or in other words, that the smaller quantity should be only equal in value to the larger; and they would infer the same of other commodities. On the other hand, by parity of reasoning, they conclude that prices should fall in proportion to tlie increase of quantity; that is, if the quantity be increased one-tenth, the price should fall nine and one-eleventh per cent.; so as to make the larger quantity of the same value only as the smaller. 384 But experience of the course of markets proves that such a conclusion is perfectly erroneous. jt is found that prices vary in a ratio very different from the variation in quantity, and that the difference of ratio between quantities and prices is liable to alter, according to the nature of the commodity, but is greater, probably, in the case of corn than in that of most other articles of exten- sive consumption. For the present I shall confine my remarks to the general effects of scarcity or abundance on the price of corn; ob- serving only that the same rules apply to other articles, allowing for a difference in degree according as they come more or less under the description of necessaries — according as they are more or less perishable — more or less bulky and expensive to keep in proportion to their value — and ac- cording as a difference in price may extend or limit the consumption. The fact that a small deficiency in the produce of corn, compared with the average rate of consumption, occasionally causes a rise in price very much beyond the ratio of the defect, is obvious upon the slightest reference to the history of prices at periods when nothing in the state of politics or of the currency could be suspected to have had any in- fluence. I had occasion to notice instances of this kind in my evidence before the Agricultural Committee, in 1821*. And some still more striking may be observed in the fluc- tuations which 1 have alluded to in the course of the present work. The reader may satisfy himself still more fully on this point, by referring to the table in the Appendix of the half- yearly Windsor prices, by which he will occasionally perceive a difference in price between the Lady-day and Michaelmas quarter, much beyond any conceivable difference in the pro- duce of the harvest. * Minutes of Evidence, l)agc 229. S85 Some writers have attempted to deduce a strict rule of proportion between a given defect of the liarvest, and the probable rise of price. The rule of this kind that has bct;n most commonly re- ferred to is one by Gregory King, which is introduced in the following passage by D'Avenant : — " It is observed, that but one-tenth the defect in the harvest may raise the price three-tenths ; and when we have but half our crop of wheat, which now and then happens, the remainder is spun out by thrift and good management, and eked out by the use of other grain : but this will not do for above one year^, and Avould be a small help in the succession of two or three unseason- able harvests. For the scarcity even of one year is very de- structive, in which many of the poorest sort perish, either for want of sufficient food, or by unwholesome diet. " We take it, that a defect in the harvest may raise the price of corn in the following proportions : Defect. Above the common rate. 1 tenth / ' 8 "> 1 3 tenths 2 tenths * 1 " ( ' 8 tenths 3 tenths -< >• I '6 tenths 4 tenths t i ^ 2-8 tenths 5 tenths ( 1 4 5 tenths So that when corn rises to treble the common rate, it may be presumed that we want above one-third of the common produce ; and if we should want five-tenths, or half the common produce, the price would rise to near five times the common rate." — (D'Avenant, vol. 11. pages 224 and 225.) It is perhaps superfluous to add, that no such strict rule can be deduced ; at the same time, there is some ground for supposing that the estimate is not very wide of the truth, from observation of the repeated occurrence of the fact, that the price of corn in this country has risen from 100 to 200 per cent, and upwards, when the utmost com- puted deficiency of the crops has not been more than be- tween one-sixth and one-third of an average. All that can be said, thei'efore, in general terms, is that a decided deficiency of supply is commonly attended in the case of corn, more than in that of most other articles, with an advance in price very much beyond the degree of the deficiency. And the reason of the fact is as clear upon a little reflection, as the fact itself is upon the slightest ob- servation. The process by which the rise beyond the proportion of defect takes place, is the struggle of every one to get his accustomed share of that which is necessary for his subsist- ence, and of which there is not enough or so much as usual for all. Supposing a given deficiency, the degree in which the money price may rise will depend upon the extent of the pecuniary means of the lowest classes of the com- munity. In countries where the pecuniary means of the lowest classes arc limited to the power of obtaining a bare subsistence in ordinary times, as in Ireland, and on many parts of the continent, and where neither the govern- ment, as in France, nor the poor laws and contributions by wealthy individuals^ as in England, come in aid of those means, a proportion of the population, according to the degree of scarcity, must perish, or suffer diseases incidental to an insufficient su})ply of food, or to a substitution of in- ferior and unwholesome diet. And the increased compe- tition of purchasers being thus limited to the classes above the lowest, the rise in price may not be very considerably beyond the defect of quantity. But in France *, where it is a part of the general policy of the goverimient to provide by the purchase of corn, in times of dearth, for the subsist- * It may be observed, by the extract in the first part of tliis work (page 179) from Mr. Say's letter, that the fluctuations in the price of wheat in France, in consequence of variations in the seasons, viz. in 1811, and again in I81G, were as great as in this countrv. 287 encc of the lowest classes, and particularly for that of the in- habitants of I'aris; and in this country, where the poor laws create a fund for the maintenance of the lowest classes, - at the expense of all the classes above them — where, more- over, the voluntary contributions of richer individuals swell that fund — it is clear that the competition of purchasers would be greatly increased, while the supply being limited, the price would rise very considerably beyond the ratio of the deficiency. The final effect of a rise in price so much beyond the defect of the crops, when that increased rise is produced by the causes mentioned, is to apportion the pri- vations resulting from scarcity cn'er a larger part of the population; thus diminishing the severity of pressure upon the lowest class, and preventing or tending to prevent any part of it from perishing, as it might otherwise do, from actual want. It is of the utmost importance to bear in mind the opera- tion of the principle of the great increase of price beyond the degree of deficiency, with a view to accounting not only for the high range of prices, but, likewise, for the extra- ordinary prosperity which attended the agricultural in- terest * during the first two-thirds of the period that I am considering, and which cannot, in my opinion, be accounted for in any other way. It is clearly through the medium of increased price of produce, that farmers gained such great profits pending the term of their leases, and that landlords obtained such greatly advanced rents at the granting of new leases I have already given reasons for the conclusion, that alter- * By agricultural inlereat, I mean exclusively farmers and landlords, who are alone benefited by an advance of price result- ing from scarcity. The condition of the labouring classes, even of those employed in husbandry, is well known to be deteriorated in periods of dearth, as the wages of labour never rise in propor- tion to the advance in the price of provisions. ^288 ations in the currency had no influence on prices, beyond the degree indicated by the ditfercnce between paper and gold, and tliat war iiad no influence beyond the obstruction of supply, which could only affect prices in proportion as our own growth was insufiicient to meet the average con- sumption. If prices of produce had risen only in exact proportion to the deficiency of growth; thus, if in commonly good years, an acre of wheat produced .S^ bushels, which sold at Gs. per bushel, but, in a bad season, produced only two-thirds of a crop, or 22 bushels, which sold at 9.9. the bushel, supposing the expenses of getting in the crops to be the same in both cases, the farmer would be neither gainer nor loser by the deficiency of his crops, that deficiency being here assumed to be general. The deficiency would be a general calamity, and farmers and landlords would bear their shares of it in their (|uaUty of consumers. But, upon the principle which I have stated, the case would be widely different. In the event of a deficiency of one-third of an average crop, a bushel of wheat might rise to 18s. and upw^ards*. Now, 22 bushels, at \Ss. per bushel, would be worth 19^. 165., whereas, the 33 bushels at 6s., were worth only 9/. \8s.., making a clear profit to the producer of 100 per cent. This, of course, is an extreme case, and cannot, in general, be of long duration ; it sup- poses no great surplus from former years, and no immediate prospect of adequate relief from importation. \\ hile the deficiency exists, however, whether in realit}', or only in apprehension, such and still greater may be the effect. The more common case, in the period referred to, has been a * Considering the institutions of this country relative to the maintenance of the poor, if there should be a deficiency of the crops amounting to one-third, ivilJiout any surplus from a former year, and ivithuut any chance of relief by importation, the price might rise five, six, or even tenfold. 289 deficiency in a smaller degree, and a smaller per centage of advance, but protracted through a great length of time. For the sake of illustration of the mode and degree in which a deficiency in the crops, compared with an average produce, is calculated to affect the condition of the agricul- tural interest, let us suppose that the average produce of corn in this country were 32 millions of quarters * of all kinds, which would sell at 4O5. per quarter all round as a remunerative price, making an amount of C4 ,000,000/. to be distributed as wages, profit, and rent, among the la- bourers, farmers, and landloi'ds : but by the occurrence of a bad crop, deficient one-eighth, the price advanced to GO*., there would then be 28 millions of quarters at 60s. making 84,000,000/. being a clear addition of 20,000,000/., to be distributed among the farmers and landlords in the first in- stance, as increased profit and rent. I say, in the first in- stance, because increased wages perhaps, and tithes cer- tainly, would form some deduction, if the advance in price, from the continuance of deficiency, lasted for more than one season, or if, by the recurrence of deficiency at short inter- vals, the advance were, on an average, in the same relative proportion. There can be little doubt that, in such a state of things the agricultural interest would enjoy, not only the appear- ance, but the reality of prosperity. Confining, therefore, the view to this part of the effect of high prices, resulting from deficient crops, it might appear that there was a creation of so much additional wealth, as was represented by these 20,000,000/. But following out the view in all its bearings, and tracing the rise of prices from its source, viz. the increased payment by the consumers for a diminished share of food, it will appear that the increased income dis- * It was computed by Dr. Colquhoun, that the consumption of all kinds of grain in this kingdom amounted, in 1812, to 35 millions of quarters, exclusive of seed. u 290 tributed among ihc iigiicultural interest was wholly at the expense of the other orders of the comiminity. The advo- cates, however, for the agricultural claims, which, if they were admitted and could be made operative to their full extent^ would artificially perpetuate the effects that could otherwise arise only from the sterility of the soil or the un- proj^itiousness of the seasons, seem to confine their observa- tion of the consequence of the high price of provisions to the direct and obvious advantages resulting from the increased sum to be distributed amons the farmers and landlords ; and infer that this increased sum is the ci'eation of so much additional wealth. It was the same confinement of view to the increased sum which an advance in the price of corn occasioned to be distributed in the shape of pi'ofit and rent, which led the sect of economists in France, who considered the raw produce of the earth as the only source of wealth, to look upon every advance in the price of that produce as so much additional wealth. An extract, which I insert in the Appendix (No. 10), from a translation of a French work on the Legislation and the Commerce of Corn, written in 1775, will prove that the doctrines of Mr. Webb Hall and of the Agricultural Association of the present day have had their complete counterpart in France. While the fact, indeed, and the reason of the fiict that, as relates to conmiodities generally, and to corn more espe- cially, a deficiency of quantity produces a great relative advance in price, has been repeatedly noticed and variously illustrated by several writers; the converse of the propo- sition, viz. that an excess of quantity operates in depressing the prices of commodities generally, but of corn mere espe- cially, in a ratio much beyond the degree of that excess, was little noticed until the publication of the report of the Agri- cultural Committee in 1821, or, if casually noticed, was not applied systematically in accounting for instances of great depression of prices, and of consequent distress among those who felt the elTocts of that depression. In the report of tiiat Coniiiiittcc, ihc principle to which i am here al- ]uclin<^, and npon which I was particularly examined, is di- stinctly stated, and some of the consequences flowing from it are clearly pointed out. The limits to the possible depres- sion in price from the influence of this principle, when brought into operation by the occurrence of seasons of more than usual abundance of produce, cannot, of course, belaid down with any thing like precision ; but i am convinced, that they exLend to a much lower degree than, even now that the attention of the public is drawn to the operation of the principle, has been conceived to be within the range of pos- sibility. If the advance in price, from deficiency, increase the aggregate value of the smaller quantity, in some instances, to double or more than double the amount in money which the larger or average quantity would have produced, the fall in price from abundance may reduce the value in money of the larger or more than average quantity, to a sum con- siderably less than that which the smaller would have pro_ duced. Thus, suppose that with bad or scanty crops the produce of all sorts of corn were 28 millions of quarters, which, one kind with another, fetched 60s. per quarter, or 84,000,000/,, and that, upon the full restoration of the ordinary produce, or 32 millions of quarters, the price fell to the average rate of 40.?., the 32 millions of quarters would be worth only 64,00t),(;0(7. or 20,000,OOOZ. less than the smaller quantity had bien worth. In this case, by the same sort of, what the French writer last noticed calls, in- terior aritlimetic, by which the 20,030,000/. additional paid by the consumers to the producers of corn had been con- sidered as the creation of so much wealth, the mere cessa- tion of that payment by the restoration of an average quan- tity of produce, would be considered as the destruction of so mucli national capital. But taking the extremes of fluctuation as resulting from a frequent recurrence of bad seasons in one period, com- bined with obstructions by war or by a corn bill to importa- U 2 292 tion, and of more than usually productive harvests in another, this doctrine of the creation of wealth by scarcity, and destruction of it by abundance, will appear in a still more striking point of view. Suppose, for instance, that after the restoration of an average produce of 32' millions of quarters of com, and the average price of 405. two succes- sive seasons of more than common abundance should occur, so as to increase the produce to 36 millions, the price might fall, for one kind with another, to Q,Os. per quarter. Here would be 36 millions of quarters, worth, at 20s. only 36,000,000/., being 28,000,000^. less than the medium, and 48,000,000/. less than the produce deficient by one-eighth. And if after two or three years of this range of low prices, necessary to carry off the glut by exportation, or extra con- sumption, or waste, there should supervene two or three decidedly bad harvests, so as to reduce the quantity again to 28 millions, and the price rise, as it might do, to (jOs., the national gain and the creation of wealth, according to the doctrine in (jucstion, would be no less than 48,000,000/. to be again destroyed by the recurrence of plenty. It is sufficient to have pointed out the practical con- clusions to which this hypothesis leads, to satisfy any un- biassed reader of its absurdity and extravagance. It must be perfectly obvious, that as the additional sum or profit amounting, in some cases, to upwards of 100 per cent, divided among the producing classes in consequence of de- ficiency of harvests, is just so much transferred from the pockets of the consumers, who are not only put on short allowance, but are, in proportion to the larger sum that they pay for that short allowance, deprived of other enjoyments, so the diminished sum received by the producing classes on the return of abundance, whether from extended cultivation, or from a succession of good seasons, is so much remaining in the pockets of the consumers. But, even to the reader who may be satisfied of the ab- surdity of considering the increased gain of the agriculturists arising from tliminishcd produce as so much creation of Q93 weallli, stillj at first view, it may ai)[>car that this is a nicic question of transfer from tlie pockets of one class to lliose of the otlicr, and that the gain of the producers, in case of scarcity, is equal to the loss of the consumers; but a liltle further consideration will show that the difference is very great. In the fii'st place, the gain is of the smaller number, at the expense of the larger: but if this gain of the smaller number is not occasioned by artificial regulations in the nature of monopoly, and arises merely from the casualty of the seasons, the producers are as justly entitled to it as to any part of their property. In the next place, the producers themselves must, in their quality of consumers, pay the ad- vanced price for their food, which will consequently be a deduction from their profits, not to mention the increased price of the seed or other elements of reproduction, while the majority of the community suffer actual privation of the quantity of food as well as of the other enjoyments, which, when they had less to pay for food, they had the means of procuring ; there is, in short, a less sum of the means of subsistence and enjoyment to be distributed among the mass of the population. The reverse of this process upon the occurrence of plenty is so evident, that an attempt to follow it out is superfluous, beyond the mere statement, in general terms, that there is in the latter case an increase in the sum or quantum of actual means of subsistence and enjoyment among the great ma- jority of the community ; a real, palpable increase of wealth. This view of the preponderating evils of scarcity, not- withstanding the prosperity with which it is attended to the producing classes, and of the blessings of plenty, in spite of the distress arising from it to those same classes, is so simple and clear, and so congenial to the good sense and feelings of mankind, that the advocates of the agricultural claims, aware of the unpopularity of lamentation at the con- sequences of abundance, have denied that abundance can be the cause of distress. Plenty, say they, has been universally, by the common sense of mankind, jironounced to be a '29 i^ blessing ; it is what we pray for, and what from infancy we have been taught to c>nsicler as a goocl. It is a preposterous doctrine, therefore, and one that was never heard of before, to assign plenty as a causeof distress ; and (say they) as dis- tress is so generally felt, it must be occasioned by some cause or causes unconnected with abundance. 1 hey might, indeed, go a step further, and contend, that as plenty of food and of other commodities is a blessing, and as at this time there is great distress*, it is impossible that there can be abund- ance. This is no uncommon sophism, although not, per- haps, usually placed in so glaring a form. It consists in substituting a part for the whole : thus the agricultural in- terest is made to represent the v. hole of the conmiunity, and the distressed state of it is brought forward to negative the possibility of the existence of plenty. If I have succeeded in pointing out to the satibfaction of the reader, that the sum total to be divided among the producing classes, upon the occurrence of seasons of more than usual abundance, is below the amount which is the result of an average produce, and greatly below that of a deficient crop, it follows, of course, that plenty, especially when succeeding to scarcity, must be attended with suffer- ing and distress to the agriculturists That the assign- ment of plenty as a cause of distress to the agriculturists is no new doctrine discovered or invented by the po- litical economists of modern times, may be proved by tlie circumstance, that upon almost ever}' occasion of a great I'iill in price from abundance, there have been complaints of distress of a description similar to that which has recently * The distress alluded to in tlie text has (April 1824) disap- peared, witli the superabundance wliicli gave rise to it ; but, if the ensuing harvest should prove to be unusually late, or in any degree deficient, vvc may witness distress of a much more exten- sive and formidable description. These alternations of suflVring among the producers at one time, and among the consumers at another, are an inevitable consequence of the present corn laws. QQ5 prevailed. I believe that the Aict of the j)ievaleiicc orsuch distress has not been unnoticed by some of the writers of antiquity ; but not to alarm the reader by reference to so remote a period, I shall go no further back than to the year 1620, which, I presume, will be sufficiently far to repel the charge of novelty, as applied to the doctrine in question. The price of wheat fell progressively from 1617, when, by the Eton tables, it was 43*. 3cl per quarter of eight bushels, till 1620 and 1621, in both which years it is quoted at 27s. And the effects of this fall are described in the following extracts (which have been obligingly commu- nicated to me by Mr. D'Israeli) from the Sloane MSS. 4174, in the British Museum. " Mr, John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Cadetou. "12 February, 1G20. " We arc here iu a strange state to complain of plenty ; but so it is, that corn bearcth so low a price that tenants and farmers are very backward to pay their rents, and in many places plead disability j for remedy whereof the council have written letters into every shire, and some say to every market- town, to provide a granary or storehouse, with a stock to buy corn, and keep it for a dear year. But though this be well advised, and make a fair show in speculation, yet the difficulties be so many, that it will not be so easy to put it into pracr ice.'' The following was written at the same period. " England was never generally so poor since I was born as it is at this present; inasmuch that all complain they cannot re- ceive their rents. Yet is there plenty of all things but money, which is so scant, that country people ofiFer corn and cattle, or whatsoever they have else, in lieu of rent — but bring no money ; and corn is at so easy rates as I never knew it to be at, twenty or twenty-two pence a bushel, barley at nine pence, and yet Yio quantity will be taken at that price j so that for all the common opinion of the wealth of England, I fear, when it comes to the trial, it will prove as some merchants, who, having carried on a great show a long time, when they are called upon too fast by their creditors, be fair to play bankrupt." 296 1 am likewise indebted to the same gentleman for the following information : ** Sir Synionds d'Ewes, in his unpublished diary, notices, in 1621, the excessive cheapness and plenty of wheat, the conse- quence of which was to reduce the price of lands from twenty years' purchase to sixteen or seventeen*. The best wheat was then 2*. 8d. and 25. 6d. the bushel, ordinary 2.v. ; barley and rye, l5. 3d. *' The farmers murmured ; the poorer sort traversed the mar- kets to find out the finest wheats, for none else would now serve their use, though before they were glad of the coarser rye-bread. This daintiness was soon after punished by the high prices of all sorts of grain every where, which never since abated." Again, in 1670, prices having fallen on a comparison with those which had prevailed during the civil wars, and which had continued more or less high, till ]665i gave oc- casion to considerable suffering. The distress complained of by the agricultural interest was the reason of a new corn bill, imposing duties on the importation amounting to a prohibition. The state of things after that act is thus described by Roger Coke in his treatise, entitled " The Church and State are in equal Danger with Trade," published in IdVl. " Tlic ends designed by the acts against tlie importation of Irish cattle, of raising the rents of the lands of England, are so far from being attained, that the contrary hath ensued. And here 1 wish a survey were taken how many thousand farms are thrown up since this act ; how many thousand farms are abated, some * The fall in the price of land, as indicated by the reduced number of years purchase, has evidently, in this case, been com- puted upon the rents which were paj/able, but jiot paid ; and the uncertainty whether tlie low price of produce might not entail a fall of rent would naturally deter jmrchascrs from giving so much for land as they would have done before the great reduction in the value of the produce. 2y above one-sixth, others above one-fourth, others above one-third : some, I know, which, after two years lying waste, are abated one- half." A great fall, notwithstanding the prohibitory system, having taken place in 1687, the distress thence arising was the cause of the memorable corn bill in 1688, granting a bounty on exportation. After the long period of dearth, which I have described as having occurred between 1692 and 1700, abundance having been restored, and the price of wheat in 1702, not- withstanding the breaking out of the war in the year before, and notwithstanding the corn bill, having fallen upwards of fifty per cent., it might naturally be supposed that rents, founded on the previous long range of high prices, could not easily be paid ; and there happens to be testimony that rents were not paid. Evelyn, in his Diary, January, 1 703, writes, " Corn and provisions so cheape, that the farmers are unable to pay their rents." An interval of comparative dearth again prevailed from 1725 to 1729, and a small importation of corn took place in 1128 and 1729, being the only occasion of an excess of importation during a period of sixty years. But in 1732 the average price of wheat fell to 23s. 8^fZ., having, in 1728, been as high as 4S5. 5ld. per quarter. As might be ex- pected, so great a fall, and to a lower level than had been known for many years before, was productive of consider- able suffering. The following extract describes it in terms, which, with a very few" alterations, might be supposed to have emanated from Mr. Webb Halfs committee. " The interest of our British landholders has been declining several years last past ; it has been a general observation, that rents have been sinking, and tenants unable to make as good payments as formerly, even in counties where there is the greatest circulation of money, the maritime ones, and those near the capital cities of the kingdom. As this is too well known to be their case, tlicy deserve the attention and favour of our legislature : it is 29S proper they should make a tolerable interest of tlitir inoney, as well as adventurers in other businesses, which few of them do, who have not enjoyed their bargains twenty years or a longer time, for lands are much dearer now. Wheat this year and last never mounted, in some of the extreme parts of the kingdom, to above three shillings and eight pence per AVinchester ; barley is now sold iu the west of England for two shillings per AVinchester bushel. Prices are often higher fifty miles round London than elsewhere, which induces several great, men to think that country- men live better than they really do. Country measures (which are frequently larger than the Winchester or legal bushels) con- tribute farther to such mistakes. Before they can pay their rents, wheat of middling goodness ought, I think, to sell for about four shillings and threepence per AA'inchester, not in a few places, but throughout the kingdom ; barley for 25. 6d., peas 2s. 3d., and oats 1*. 6d. per AVinchester, I know informer times less prices were sufficient ; but as circumstances alter, the same thing is altered : corn farms (iron, timber, harvest people, and servants, being much dearer than heretofore) will not yield suf- ficient profit to the occupiers of them, unless they can have such prices, particularly as cattle, pigs, sheep, butter, and cheese, are now one-third part cheaper than formerly, and what is called a living price. " The flourishing condition of the landed interest supports all trade ; most trades now (except those which supply luxury, those of gold and silversmiths, lacemen, vintners, painters, dealers in silks, velvets, and high-priced cloths) are in apparent decay j which is not only proved by the general declarations of trades- men, but by too many instances of bankruptcy amongst them. I wish I could say the present times are not the worst. Our exports are, perhaps, as great as formerly ; whence, then, all this com- plaint ? Our farmers are worse customers than formerly j ne- cessity has compelled them to more carefulness and frugality in laying out their money, than they were accustomed to do in better times." ('i he Landholder's Companion, or AA'^ays and Means to raise the A^alue of Land, by AVilliam Allen, Esq. of Fobstone, in Pembrokeshire, 173-J.) At that time, and for several years afterwards, viz. till ITG'i, tlic price of corn in France was likewise at a very '^99 low range from the same general cause ; and it will be seen by reference to the speech of Mr. tie la Chalotais, which I have before noticed, that it was a period during which great complaints prevailed of the depressed and distressed state of the agricultural classes in that country. The speaker frecjuently alludes to the suffering from plenty; for, in re- connnending the liberty of exportation as a remedy, he expressly says that, " the too great abundance of crops is almost as much to be dreaded as want." He afterwards goes on to say, that " superabundance produces stagnation, and brings with it a vile price." I will only here add, that stagnation and declining prices, and general depression of the landed interest in this coun- try, prevailed more or less during the greater part of the American war, when there was a preponderance of good seasons. In the Annals of Agriculture, (vol. 25, p. 4G0), is the following description in the extract of a letter written by Arthur Young, in 1780, of the fall of prices and conse- quent distress at the period referred to : — '•' In the years 1776, 1777, prices fell considerably; and, in 1779, so low, that very general complaints have been heard of ruined farmers, and distressed landlords j and at the time I am now writing, the fact holds that there is a considerable fall in all products, and great numbers of farmers ruined. I have the prices of wool for forty years now before me, and that which from 1758 to 1767 was from I85. to 21*. a tod, is for 1779, only ]2s.; and was in 1778, but 14^. We must go back to 1754, to find a year so low as the last. Wheat and all sorts of grain are greatly fallen." And again, when after a considerable rise in prices from the bad season of 1782, and some severe winters following, there was a tendency to a restoration of abundance and de- clining prices, fresh complaints arose on the part of the landed interest, and gave occasion to the Corn Bill of 17yi. Of the effects of price as connected with quantity on the prosperous or depressed state of the landed interest since lluly I shall enter more at large in the following section. 300 In the meantime sonic api)logy may be due to my reatlers, for having gone back to periods so remote, for proofs of what appears so clearly to be tiie necessary effect of quan- tity on price, viz. that greater plenty than usual of produce will occasion so great a fall in prices, as to make the larger quantity of less value than the smaller quantity at the pre- vious high prices ; that consequently there must be consider- able loss and pecuniary suffering among the producers, and that such suffering must naturally be the subject of com- plaint. But evident as that proposition may be when distinctly stated to unbiassed minds, it is not the less true that several eminent men in parliament, and some distin- guished writers out of it, have inveighed in terms of in- dignation and ridicule against what they have been pleased to call the novel and outrageous doctrine, that abundance could ever be the cause of distress. 30 1 SECTION V. Api)lication of the Principle of tlio " Effect of Quantity on Price " to the State of Agriculture, from 1793 to 1812, as explanatory of the high Price of Corn, during that Period. Applying the foregoing general observations on the effect of quantity on price, and the illustrations of it, to the state of the corn trade from 1793 to 1822, we can be at no loss to account for the main causes of the prosperity which, with short intervals of depression, attended agricultui-e in the first twenty years, and of the distress which, with the momentary respite of 1817-18, it has experienced for the last ten years. The first great burst of prosperity clearly followed the deficient harvests of 1794 and 1795. The average price of wheat was, in the year 1793, - . . 48s. l\d. and in the years 1795 and 1796, - 75.?. 8d. The consumption of wheat at the close of the last century was estimated at about eight millions of quarters, and of other grain about twenty-two millions of quarters. The deficiency of the crops of 1794' and 1795 was esti- mated at about one-eighth in each year, by Lord Sheffield, in his speech in the House of Conmions, on the 13th De- cember 1 795, and that computation was generally supposed to be near the mark, being founded on the best data ac- cessible ; the account will therefore stand thus : If they had been of ordinary or bare average produce, as that of 1 793, they would have yielded, suppose 302 8,000,000quarters wheat, at4S.?. IW.* - - £19,566,660 but, being deficient one-eighth, 7,000,000 yielded, at 7.">^-. ^d- - - - 26,483,333 making a difference or profit of about 7,000,000/. to be divided in each year, among the agricultural interest, on wheat alone. And as all other grain participated in nearly a j)roportionatc advance, the scarcity being general, as- suming the collective value of all other agricultural pro- duce (exclusive of cattle and sheep) to be more than double of that of wheat, and observing the same proportion of de- fect in quantity, the result would be a gain of no less than 21,000,000/. ; but from this apparent gain is to be deducted the rise in price on that |)roportion of the produce reserved for the seed, and for the maintenance of the farmers' fami- lies and their workinj; cattle. What that deduction should be, I am not competent to say, but I should imagine that between one-fourth and one-third would be an ample allow- ance, and it would still leave from fourteen to sixteen mil- lions of profit to the producers (including the proprietors of tithes) at the expense of the consumers. From that profit there was no drawback by any extra expensivcness of the harvests, as the cn^ps were quickly and well got in, the weather during harvest in each of those years, and particu- larly in 1794, having been favourable. The tithe and poor rates did, indeed, advance, but it was yet only in a small proportion to that greater extra gain. And with respect to the tithe in general, I would here observe, that if it does not keep pace with any great advance of price, so, on the other hand, when once raised in consequence of continued scarcity, it follows the fall froui the return of abundance * As the seasons both of 1/92 and 17.03 have been described as somewhat under an average, this price secuis to be ratlicr too high for tlie basis of comparison j and 42.?. lid. which is tlie average price for 1792, would probably afford a fairer point of contrast, making of course the gain by tlie scarcities of 1 794 and I79.J so niucl) greater. 303 equally slowly; and in proportion as it docs not make a deduction to the full extent of the legal claim during the rise, it continues as a pressure beyond that extent during the fall. Allowing, however, a further deduction for increased tithe and poor rate, to the extent of 2,000,OOOZ. there will remain a net profit of from twelve to fourteen miilions per annum, or from twenty-four to twenty-eight millions in the two years, to be divided among the farmers and landlords, according to the terms of the leases. Now, a clear gain to this extent might easily be con- ceived to operate as a powerful stimulus to extended tillage ; and accordingly the number of bills of inclosure on the average of the three years, ending in 1797, was nearly double of what it had been in '11ct of the high prices for three years, in two of which the produce did not justify so elevated a range, was to increase the supply by importation, as well as by ex- tended cultivation ; and the consequence was, that upon the occurrence of a season of more than usual produce in 1820, after three of avcraj^e growth, there was a surplus of very extraordinary magnitude. Mr. Wakefield stated it as his opinion, that the stock of corn on hand in xVpril, 1821, was as great as it usually is after harvest*. The stock on hand immediately after harvest can hardly be less in average seasons than fourteen or fifteen months' consumption. Now, confining the computation to wheat, and reckoning the consumption to be at the rate of ten millions of quarters per annum, the quantity in the country in April would be between eleven and twelve millions of quarters, and de- ducting the consumption till and during harvest, or about four millions of quarters, there would remain between seven and eight millions of quarters of old wheat at the new har- vest. This is no vague supposition; for it is corroborated, as much as any mere estimate can be, by the concurrent testimony of those who witnessed the large and over- whelming supplies which poured into the market when the speculative rise took place upon the bad weather which prevailed during the harvest of 1821. So large a surplus fully accounts for the subsequent decline in price, even supposing that the produce of 1821, which is now pretty nearly ascertained to have yielded a full quantity, although of inferior quality, had been a bare average ; for it could only be by an extra consumption that, with a subsequent average produce, a surplus so much greater than usual could be reduced. An increased consumption can arise only from an increasing population, which can have but a trifling effect within a year or two, or from such a degree of cheapness as would occasion a larger consumption by the same number. But as it requires a very great elevation of price to eke out a stock deficient only in a very trifling * Minutes of Evidence, Agricultural Committee, 1821. " I think tliat there is a wonderful quantity of corn in the country ; I now think lliat there is as much corn loft in the coundy as j^cncraliy in coiiiuiom years there i< after liarvcst." I'agc '217. 317 degree, so it requires a great reduction of price to induce or admit of an increased consumption, in any proportion to the excess of produce resulting from even a single season of general abundance. The existence of so large a surj)lus, which could not be the effect of the excess of produce beyond an average of the single season of 181:0, even with the addition of the im- portation of 1817 inid 1818, affords the presumption, in addition to that arising from the description of them, that the crops of 1817, 1818, and 1819, collectively, must have amounted to more than sufficient to meet the consumption. The crops of 18'21, badly as they were got in, are sup- posed to have yielded a full average produce. These five seasons, therefore, ending with the harvest of 1821, form, in point of abundance, a sufficient contrast to the scanty supply resulting from the five seasons ending in 1812. If to the superiority of home produce of the five seasons end- ing in 1821 be added the excess of importation in the latter period, and if, in estimating the effect of so great an excess of quantity, it be considered that in the five years ending in Decembei', 1812, actual scantiness of supply was aggra- vated by the absence of relief in prospect from importation ; whereas in the five years recently passed there has been an abundant supply actually in the market, and further, a large quantity ready to be poured in, so as to check the range of speculative advance beyond 80s., there will appear quite sufficient reason for the difference of price at the two periods; allowing only for the depreciation of paper in the former period. But if scarcity or mere scantiness of sup- ply, by its powerful effects in raising prices beyond the ratio of the deficiency, was the occasion of the distribution of such large sums as profit and rent among the producing classes, the return of abundance, and the consequent de- pression of price in a ratio beyond the difference of quan- tity, must occasion losses in proportion to the extent and duration of that fall ; and the losses during the fall would be larger in the aggregate than the gain during the rise, in ;is fur as a resort had Ucvii had to llie cultivation of inferior soils. It may further be remarked, that as the farmers, pending their leases, would be the first gainers during the rise, and the landlords would oisly realize their profit at the ex- l)iration of the leases by an advanced rent; so, in the retrograde process, the farmers v.ould be losers in the first instance, and the landlords eventually at the expiration of the leases, or even before that time, if the losses were greater than what the farmers could sustain : in this case the land- lords must abate or forego their rents, according to circum- stances, in order to save their tenants from insolvency, and their land from deterioration. The exposition here given of the degree in which the seasons have contributed to the prosperity of the agri- cultural interests at one period, and to the subsequent de- pression of them, is connected with the examination of the causes of the high and low prices in the last thirty yeai's, in as much as the great gains, resulting from the scarcity, which, as the consequence of unfavourable seasons, pre- vailed, more or less, during the first twenty years, formed the stimulus which, with short intervals, operated to the extension and improvement of cultivation. On the other hand, a more favourable course of seasons in the nine years ending in the summer of 1822, operating upon that ex- tended and improved cultivation, occasioned the abundance to which the subsequent fall of prices, and consequent agri- cultural distress, may be ascribed. ■* An article in the Quarterly Kevicvi'j No. 57, wliicli contains a critique on this work, has the following passage : " Few persons, we conceive, have ever doubted the great eflect of scanty crops on the price of grain in tlie particular years in which they have occurred. In estimating, consequently, the price of corn at distant periods, it has been generally recom- mended not to inchide years of scarcity in too short an average ; and it has even sometimes been proposed to throw them out en- 319 tirely. But we have met with no writer, who, in considering the causes of a very great rise of prices, spreading itself over so large a period as twenty years, has attributed it almost exclusively to the seasons. We cannot go with Mr. Tookc to the full extent (if this conclusion.'' QHere I have to observe, that it can hardly in fairness be said that I attribute the rise of prices almost exclusively to the seasons, when I admit the depreciation of the currency to the full extent of the difference between paper and gold, and the extra charges and obstructions to importation, as ingredients of that rise of prices. These two items were calculated to form an addition of no less than from 30s. to oOa\ per quarter on imported wheat, on the average, from 1808 to 1813. Allowing then a de- duction to this amount, the remaining part of tlie rise is surely not too much to ascribe to the operation of the seasons. But however the reviewers may be disposed to qualify their assent to my conclusion in this particular instance (and even in this in- stance it is difficult to discover a shade of difference between us), it should seem that they fully agree with me in the position which I have endeavoured to establish relative to the influence of the seasons on prices for periods of considerable length ; for they go on to say,] " Yet we think that the facts which he has produced clearly show, not only that, as a general truth, the effects of the seasons extend themselves at times over periods of considerable length, but that in the particular case referred to they had a much greater influence on the rise of prices than had been generally supposed. As a general truth, we think the position would be confirmed by a reference to other parts of our own history be- sides those examined by Mr. Tooke. " In that very valuable table of prices collected by Sir Fre- derick Morton Eden, in his work on the poor, periods of high and low prices are to be found, of considerable duration, for which it would be very difficult to give any other adequate solu- tion, than the comparative abundance or scantiness of the supplies of corn, arising from the number of favourable or unfavourable seasons included in such periods. " After the great plague, which occurred about the middle of the reign of Edward III., and gave occasion to the first attempt to regulate wages by law, one should naturally have expected that, owing to the great loss of people then sustained, corn would be- 320 come cheaper rather than dearer ; instead of whkh it appears to have risen from about fys. Ad., the average of the first twenty- five years of the reign of Edward III., to 11*. 9(1., the average of the last twenty-six years ; with very little difference in the quan- tity of silver contained in the same nominal sum. For this great rise of bullion prices, spreading itself over a period of twenty- six years, it would be scarcely possible to assign an adequate cause without resorting to a succession of unfavourable seasons. During the reigns of Richard II. and Henry IV., a period of thirty- four years, the bullion price of corn seems to have fallen rather lower than it was in the first half of the reign of Edward III. In the first twenty-three years it was .5s. 7d., and in the last eleven years 6s. Id. ; and as in the latter half of the reign of Ed- ward III. the pound of silver was coined into 255., and at the end of the reign of Henry IV. into 30.v., the bullion price of this period was rather below what it was in the first half of the reign of Edward III. ; and it certainly would be very difficult to explain the low prices of these thirty-four yearsj and the high prices of the preceding twenty-six, without the powerful operation of seasons. " In 1444, other statutes regulating the price of labour were passed, probably owing to the high price of corn, which had risen on an average of the ten preceding years to 10«. 8d., without any further alterations in the coin j and for this rise there seems to be no adequate cause, but a succession of comparatively scanty crops, particularly as after this period there was a continuance of low prices for above sixty years. The average price of wheat from 1444 to the end of the reign of Henry VIII. in 1509, re- turned to about 6s., while the pound of silver being coined into I/. 17*. 6d. instead of ll. 2s. 6d., as at the time of passing the first statute of labourers in 13.50, showed a very decided fall in the bullion price of wheat. This fall, however, was so consi- derable, and lasted for so very long a period, that we cannot at- tribute it wholly to the seasons. Still less are we disposed to attribute it to the cause assigned by Adam Smith — a gradual rise in the value of silver, because, if we refer to his own criterion of value, (aljoiir, we shall find that while the bullion price of corn had been falling, the bullion price of labour had been rising, and consequently, silver had been diminishing, instead of increasing 8-21 in value. These prices of corn and labour could only have arisen from a great and continued abundance of corn, which was evinced by the very large quantity of it awarded to the labourer j and this abundance was occasioned probably by the combined ope- rations of favourable seasons with the introduction of a better system of agriculture, before the distribution of property and the habits of the labouring classes had been so far improved as to encourage a proportionate increase of their number. " The rise in the price of corn during the course of the next century may, no doubt, be easily accounted for by the progress of population and the discovery of the American mines, without any aid from unfavourable seasons, although in fact such seasons did combine with the other causes just mentioned, in raising the price of wheat towards the end of the century from 1594 to 1598. The same cause unquestionably operated for twenty years, about the middle of the subsequent century, from 1646 to 1665 in- clusive, when the price of the quarter of wheat was 9.1. 10*. — con- siderably higher than it was either in the earlier or later part of the century; and it is somewhat singular, that while during a considerable part of the civil wars between the houses of York and Lancaster, and subsequently, corn was remarkably cheap ; during the civil wars under Charles I., and sometime subse(|uently, it was as remarkably dear — a pretty strong presumptive proof that the seasons had more to do with the prices in both cases than the civil wars." 3^2'2 SECTION VII. Recapitulation. The points which I have endeavoured to establish as the result of this examination of the varieties of the seasons, and of their effects on the high and low prices of the last thirty years, are, That seasons of a particular character for productiveness or unproductiveness are liable to occur in very different pro- portions in equal series of years at different intervals ; as, for instance, in one interval, viz. from 1693 to 17 1*, both years included, making twenty-two years, there were twelve seasons more or less unfavourable, or of deficient produce; and, in another interval, from 1730 to 1751, making like- wise twenty-two years, there was only one season, which, from historical record, or by inference from fluctuation of price, can be considered to have been decidedly unpro- ductive. That seasons of nearly a similar description frequently prevailed during the same periods in France, and in some other parts of Europe. That the dearness of corn in the period of twenty-two years ending in 171 4-, and the comparative cheapness in the twenty-two years ending in 17^1, in France, as well as in this country, while the value of money, in other respects, seems to have been fidling, cannot be accounted for satis- factorily, except by the fact of the occurrence of unfavour- able seasons in such different proportions in the two periods. That in the twenty years from 1793 to 1812, both years included, there were no fewer than eleven years of greater or less deficiency of produce arising from the seasons, with a considerable proportion of long and severe winters. 32,3 That in the interval from 1813 to I Hti 1 , both years in- cluded, there was only one decidedly bad season, viz. 1816, and only one very severe winter, viz. 1813-14', while there were three harvests of acknowledged great and general abundance, 1813, 1815, and 1820. That in the first ten years of the period under examina- tion, viz. from 1793 to 1802, both included, the proportion of seasons of scarcity was as great on the Continent of Europe as in this country ; and that, therefore, although the expenses of conveyance were not more than 5-s. per quarter on wheat higher than in peace, no adequate supply could be obtained by importation, except at a great advance in price. That in the ten years from lf-()3 to 1812, both included, the proportion of seasons of deficient produce was somewhat greater than in the first ten years, but the degree of defi- ciency of particular seasons less marked ; that during part of this period, viz. from 1803 to U07, there was a scarcity in some countries, and no general abundance in the rest of Europe, so that there was not, at any one time, the depressing effect of a large contingent supply ; and that during the re- maining five years, viz. from 1808 to 1812, both included, the deficiency of our own produce could not be relieved by a foreign supply, except on the condition of a rise in price sufficient to defray the extraordinary expenses of convey- ance (amounting, in some instances, to upwards of 505. per quarter) arising out of the peculiar character of the war during that period. That in the nine years ending in 1821, the harvests on the Continent of Europe were still more abundant than in this country, so that when, by the single bad season of 1816, our ports were opened, and partly by erroneous estimate of the produce of our own crops, and partly by miscalculation of the effects of the corn bill, they were kept open for the two following years, an importation of extraordinary mag- nitude took place ; and that this great importation, added to three crops of full average and one of superabundant Y 2 3-24 produce, made a surplus or stock on hand at the commence- ment of the harvest of 1821, exceeding, as far as evidence can be procured or conjecture made, the reserve at any harvest during the last thirty years. That a defect or excess in the supply of any commo- dity, and of corn more particularly, affects the price in a ratio much greater than that of the defect or excess in quantity. That under the o; eration of this principle, the scarcity iirising from the seasons, with a very small allowance for the extra expenses of conveyance in consequence of the war, and for the difference between paper and gold, is sufficient to account for the high price of corn during the first fifteen years from 17^3 to 180?. That under the operation of the same principle, a smaller deficiency arising from the seasons, with a very much greater difficulty and expense of importation from the peculiar character which the war assumed, and \\ith a larger allowance for the difference between paper and gold, is suf- ficient to account for the high price of corn for the five years ending in 1812. That, dating from the harvest of 1813, a succession of seasons more or less favourable, operating upon an extend- ed scale and improved mode of cultivation, down to the summer of 1822, with the intervention of one season only of deficient produce, and combined with a very large importa- tion during part of that interval, have been attended with an increase of aggregate produce (juite sufficient upon the principle stated of the effect of quantity on price, to account for the decline which took place down to the close of last year. That while the operation of this principle, under the cir- cumstances stated, accounts for the rise and high level of prices, and for the subsc(juent decline, it fully explains the extraordinary prosperity enjoyed by the agricultural in- terest, with very short intervals of depression during the first twenty years, and for the severe distress which has SQ5 attended that body during the hist ten years of the period in question : but that tiie great prosperity of the agricul- tural interest, as it arose from scarcity, was attended with great suffering to the rest of the community; while the return of abundance which is productive, during the decline of prices, of great distress to that body, is attended with great increase of enjoyment and of real wealth to the rest of the community. PART IV. ON THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF ALTERATION'S IN THE CURREXCY, OF WAR, AND OF THE SEASONS; WITH STATE- MENTS OF PiilCl-S AND QUANTITIES. SECTION I. Introduction. In the last part of this work my remarks on the fluctua- tions of prices were entirely confined to ajTricuhural pro- duce. In the first and second pans the references to the prices and quantities of commodities were apphed only to detached periods, and embraced merely a few articles selected for the purpose of comparison and illustiation. But in order to afford the reader an opportunity of trying the correctness of my conclusions in the preceding pages, by the largest possible induction of facts, I insert a table of the prices of the principal commodiiies which co.ne under the description of general merchandise in the London market, for an uninterrupted series of years, from the com- menceient of 1782 to the close of lt^'22. I consider the information to be derived from a connected view of this kind to be so important, that if I had the opportunity of carrying it further back, I should certainly avail myself of it ; but 1 am not aware of the existence of materials that are accessible for the purpose of a complete series for any period anterior to 1782. The commencement however from that date has consider- able advantages. It gives quotations for upwards of a year 327 before the termination of the war with America, and thus affords some means of judging of the effects of the transi- tion from war to peace in 1 78:^, and again of the transition from peace to war in 1793. The information, too, which is derived from this table, of the state of prices in the ten years of peace before the breaking out of the long war with France, is important, as exhibiting a view which has been very little attended to, of the level from which the subsequent fluctuations took place. 3'2S SECTION II. Explanation of an apparent Anomaly in tlie Fluctuation of Market Prices. In reasoning upon prices, it is desirable, as ftir as it may be practicable, to connect them with quantities. The prices throw a Hght upon the variations of quantity, as variations in quantity serve to explain some of" the phenomena of prices. Of the quantities of articles of home growth, except in the case of Hops, which are the subject of fiscal regu- lation, there are no means of obtaining correct statements. I)Ut of imported commodities, in cases where the duties are levied upon the quantity, and not upon the value, the ma- terials for such statements exist in thex'ecords of the Custom House; and, from the admirable order in which these are kept, they arc accessible at the shortest notice. Accounts of quantities drawn from that source have at various times appeared in pen Tiamcntary paj^ers ; but, as they have been generally moved for in order to illustrate some detached or partial object, they are so dispersed and the periods so broken, as not to admit of easy or ready reference for the jjurj ose of general information, nor to exhibit so entire a display of the iluctunlions of quantity in connexion with tile fluctuations in price, as is essential to the objects of this incjuiry. 1 have therefore procured and inserted in the Appendix statements of quantities of several of the leading articles. The greater part of these statements are from oflicial documents, and some of them reach as far back as the Table of prices, with a chasm only of those years, of which the Custom House records were destroyed by the fire of !S J4. 3^29 To the table, then, of prices, and to the accomj)anying statement of the quantities of some of the articles, in as far as they have not already been included and referred to in the preceding parts of this work, I appeal in further proof of the positions which I have endeavoured to establish. But, prc'[)aratory to a judgment of the inferences to be drawn from a view of the prices exhibited in the table, it may be desirable to make a few explanatory remarks on the effects of quantity on price, in addition to the explanation which I had occasion to give in Section 4, i art 3. Tht explanation which i then gave referred to the ge- neral effects of quantity on price: and I then pointed out the principle by which it is found that prices of most com- modities, and of corn more especially, vary in a much greater ratio than that of the mere defect or excess of quantity. But the time and extent of the operation of that principle are subject to various modifications arising from the great and almost infinite variety of circumstances which may afiect the relations of supply and demand, as far as concerns the market value of a particular commodity. Some of the most important of the modifications, however, to which the application of the principle is liable, may be deduced from experience; and I will state the most striking of those which occur to me, as they may serve to obviate by anticipation some objections which might otherwise be made to the principle itself. The objections to which I allude are that, on referring to comparisons of quantities and prit es, there is not only not an invariable coincidence of a rise upon every diminution of quantity and vice versa, but that prices sometimes fall coincidently with diminishing quan- tities, or rise with increasing ones ; and that there are instances, rare ones indeed, in which the lowest prices coincide with the smallest stock for sale, and the highest prices with the largest stocks. The answer is, that the facts here stated may be admitted as occasionally occurring, and that they are perfectly recon- cileable with the principle which has been laid down. 830 This apparent anomaly may be thus explained : although the cost of production must regulate the price of all com- modities on the average of a certain number of years, the immediate cause of fluctuations in the market value at par- ticular intervals is to be found in the variations of the relative proportion of supply and demand*; but demand, as affecting price, is compounded of actual and prospective want, and supply may be distinguished into actual and con- tingent quantity. The demand for and supply of any particular com- modity may be said to be balanced, and prices to be on a fair level, when the stock for sale is sufficient to cover the consumption at its estimated rate, till the reproduction or importation at the usual time, provided there be no altera- tion in the cost of production or of importation, or in the state of the seasons or of political relations, leading to the anticipation of an alteration in the amount of future supply. The rate of consumption of articles in general use is not liable to great or sudden variations ; and if the actual sup- ply be in the usual proportion, and there be no ground for anticipating any great alteration for the future, prices will, of course, be tolerably uniform. If, however, there should come, whether from a season more than usually abundant, from improvements in ma- chinery or agriculture, or from greater facility and cheap- ness of conveyance, an increased supply; this increased supply can only be got rid of by the persons into whose hands it first comes, by their holding out to the next the inducement of a reduction in price. That reduction, ac- * My observations arc here confiued to the fluctuatious of the market price, resulting from variations iu the proportion of supply and demand as relates to jmrticular connnodities. In the more general application of the terms to all commodities, I fully concur in tlie doctrine laid down by Mr. Millj whOj in his Chapter on Interchange (Elements of Political Economy), proves with great clearness and force of reasoning that the aggregate of demand must always be equal to the aggregate of supply. 331 cording to its amount, tempts the successive dealers to increase tlieir stock ; but, in purchasing a new stock, the value of what they had before is proportionately reduced ; and at some loss upon the whole they induce, by the offer of cheapness, either new consumers to come forw ard, or those who are already consumers to increase their con- sumption. The increase of consumption, however, of articles already in general use is a slow process, compared with the possible increase of supply under the circumstances stated. There will remain, in consequence, a larger surplus than usual to meet the next harvest or the following periodical supply ; and the holders of this increased supply must, by the very supposition of the fall in price, be losers to some extent. Still, if the supply relatively to the estimated rate of consumption could be accurately ascertained, both as to the quantity actually in the market, and as to that which might eventually be forthcoming, there would quickly be an adjustment of the price in some regular proportion to the altered quantity, both actual and forthcoming. But it is not of many articles that the stock actually existing for sale can be ascertained, and there are still fewer of which the extent of contingent supply can be precisely defined. If, therefore, the supply on hand at any time happens to have been under-rated; and if further a second, or still more if a third season of increased supply should occur, every person who has bought with a view to future resale, will lose in proportion to the degree in which he has ex- tended his stock ; and the consumers, (among whom, when speaking of raw materials, manufacturers are usually classed,) most of whom may have been tempted by cheapness to an- ticipate their probable consumption, by extending their stocks, will find that they would have done better if they had postponed their demand. Some of the dealers, by the fall in the value of their stock, become insolvent; others apprehend that they are in danger of becoming so, if the supply, about which they have been so often deceived, should continue to be excessive : they accordingly find it 33^2 to be the part ofpiuilcnce to rc-ist the temptation of clieap- ness, and to diminish, instead of inercasing, their stock. 'J'he consumer too finds that he would liave been a jrainer, if for some time past he had only bought in proportion to his immediate wants ; he, therefore, now conceives it to be his interest to eke out his store to the utmost, that is, not to buy more than he can help in advance. Thus, although the supply may, in consequence of long protracted discou- ragement, be falling off, that part of the demand which consists in the anticipation of future want falls off in a still greater degree, till both reach their minimum ; the con- sumption all the time going on at its wonted rate, or more jirobably increasing, in consequence of cheapness : and in such cases it may be only when the stock is at length dis- covered to be below the immediate want for actual con- sumption, while fresh supplies are remote or uncertain, that any decided improvement takes place*. This is a process which 1 have repeatedly observed to occur in the articles in which I have been practically con- versant, and in most other articles respecting which 1 have had occasion to obtain information. And the general re- mark resulting from it is, that after a glut has been once fully established, it requires a period of falling prices, and diminishing supplies, till it may so happen, though perhaps rarely, that the lowest prices and the smallest stocks will coincide. The converse of the ffrounds on which I have pointed out that reduced prices will occasionally coincide * There is another case in wliich a lower price may often coin- cide with a quantity for sale smaller than on former occasions, and this is when, thougli the stock actually for sale is reduced below its average quantity, there may bo grounds for anticipating supplies of greater magnitude than usual, or beyond the estimated rate of consumption : and both with regard to stocks actually existing, and to sup|)lies forthcoming, il is pcrhajjs scarcely neces- sary to add that, when these are matter of uncertainty, opinion of quantity will act on prices equally, whether that opinion be well or ill founded. 333 with diminished quantities, nuiy be traced, reversing each step, to account for tlie occasional phenomenon ot" rising prices and increasing quantities, till for a very short lime it may occasionally happen that the highest prices will coin- cide with the largest stocks. The process in each direction has, in some degree, been explained in what i stated in the first part of this work on the alternation between speculation and stagnation, or over- trading and undertrading. Thus the lowest price of im- ported articles coincided with the smallest quantities in 1816, and the early part of 1817, wlii!e the highest prices were quoted, nominally at least, when tlie quantities had nearly reached their greatest magnitude in 1818*. J fear that these remarks may appear trite, particu- larly to such of my readers as being engaged in mercan- tile pursuits, have themselves come to the same general conclusions: but I have found several persons, who not being conversant with the details of business, and some * The redaction of the stocks of commodities in 1816 and 1817 is a curious and important fact, and one that has been com- pletely overlooked in the various attetiipts which have been hitherto made to account for the great rise of prices which occurred in 1817 and 1818. The variety and extent of the articles of ravv' produce, which existed in a state of relative scarcity in 1816 and 1817, will be noticed in the sketch which I shall give of some of the principal causes of the fluctuations, that are exhibited in the tables in the Appendix. And if the causes of fluctuation uf raw produce are satisfactorily made out, there can be no difficulty in accounting for the corresponding variations of the manufactured goods into which these materials enter. The speculation arising out of that scarcity has already been described. The effect of the exaggerated demand, and of a rise of prices so much beyond the deficiency, was to bring forward supplies of great magnitude in 1818 ; but the extent of them was not appreciated till after tbey had all arrived, and had been some time at market j being then, and not till then, found so much be- yond the utmost of the estimated rate of annual consumption. SSI even who beinnr eno-agretl in business, but not being accus- tomed to generalize their experience, have been struck with tlie circumstance of reduced prices having accompanied diminished stocks: and thence have concluded that quan- tity does not govern price, according to any general rule. Whereas, in reality, the discrepancy is confined to the quantity actually for sale, compared with what existed at corresponding periods of former seasons, supposing the rate of consumption to be unaltered ; while the general rule applies to contingent, as well as actual supply, and to prospective, as well as to immediate, consumption ; and as opinion of future supply, compared with the demand, ope- rates for some time upon price in the same degree as if it were realized, it is requisite always to make an allowance for that part of the supply and demand which is contingent- It is through the medium of contingent or prospective sup- ply, that any great alteration in the cost of production, if generally known or anticipated, has an immediate effect on prices before any alteration in the quantity at market can take place. This contingency, in most cases, affords lati- tude for the exercise of the most erroneous opinions. Ac- cording as these tend to exaggerate eventual scarcity or abundance, will be the extent of overtrading and specu- lation for a rise of prices beyond the real occasion, or the stagnation and undertrading which occasion a depression below the proper level. It requires occasionally an interval of some length to bring to any test the miscalculations of individuals, whether in exaggerating or underrating the propoi tions of demand and supply of any particular com- modity. S3d SECTION III. Detailed Rffcrence to tlie Fluctuations of the Prices and Quan- tifies of particular Commodities. Bkaking in mind the remarks in the preceding section, Jet us now proceed to pass in review each of the articles enumerated in the tables ; and upon that review, I think, it will appear that the difference in the relative proportions of supply and demand, both actual and contingent, is quite sufficient to account for the fluctuations in price at the several periods, without attributing any effect to the de- preciation of the currency beyond the difference between paper and gold, or to extra demand arising out of the war, except in the case of such articles as are the immediate ob- jects of government expenditure. Ashes and Barilla were subject, through the whole period of the war, to an increased cost of conveyance, by the difference of freight, which, on such bulky articles, formed a considerable proportion of their value. But there were particular periods when we were excluded from direct intercourse with the sources of supply, and the importation consequently became more precarious, as well as more ex- pensive. Accordingly, upon the breaking out of the war with Spain in 1795, from whence we draw our principal supplies of barilla, the price advanced considerably, and of course affected the value of ashes *. Upon the general peace of 1802, prices fell, but they did not advance raa- * Ashes were at a very high price in 1/82, and seem to have fallen 50 per cent, after the close of the American war, as that source of direct supply was again restored. 336 teriully upon the renewal of the war \s itli France in 1805. In U04-5, when hostilities broke out again between this country and Spain, tiie price naturally rose. In 1808, the stocks both of ashes and barilla were greatly reduced. At the same time, we were excluded from direct intercourse with the Baltic; and the freight and insurance from thence rose enormously, as I have already had occasion to observe, and it was for some tine uncertain whether supplies could at any expense be obtained from that quarter. Our dis- putes with America were then beginning, and from the pe- culiar character of the war in Europe at that period, freights generally were at a very great advance. Thus ac- tual scarcity was aggravated in its effects on price, by appre- hended failure of future supply ; and the price rose accord- ingly to an unprecedented height in ISOS, before any mate- rial increase of Bank of England notes, or any observable depression of the exchanges, had taken place. This advance naturally induced great efforts to overcome the obstruction to importation, and those efforts being successful, the sup- plies in 1 809 and 1810 were so large, as to occasion a de- pression of the price in 181 1, to little more than one-third of what it had been two years before. If the diflcrence between paper and gold in 1811 and 1812 be deducted from the prices in those two years, they would be left below the level of the preceding or succeeding periods of peace. The price of ashes advanced, as it may be observed, upon the peace in 18l4, when our intercourse with France (where this description of alkali happened then to be in demand) was restored ; and the highest prices, with the exception of 1808-9, were in 1815-16. The subsequent fall may be sufficiently accounted for by the great increase in the im- portation. Alum, it will be observed, has fallen very consider- ably, and rather suddenly, since 1820. This article seems, till recently, to have been subject to a qualified monopoly ; the sources of supply having been almost ex- clusively confined to two great Yorkshire manufactories. .337 It is supposed that tliere was a secret understanding between them not to undersell each other. The agent of one o^ them, however, with a species of good faith not very uii- connnon in such combinations, is said to have gone on en- laiging his ton to 21, £i, and 23 cwt. As soon as this be- came known to the other, a competition to sell cheap took place; and this is one cause of the fall. During the inter- val of the high prices many other manufactories were esta- blished, especially near Glasgow, where a plumose alum of great purity is largely found. In addition to this, less ex- pensive processes have been discovered, so that the York- shire and other works are conducted with far less cost than formerly. At the same time some manufactories of this article have been established on the Continent. And while the article is thus more extensively and cheaply produced, other substances have been applied by the improvements in chemistry, to some of the purposes for which alum was be- fore exclusively used. In general, it may be observed, as well of ashes and barilla, as of alum, that the whole class of alkalies and mineral substances, applicable to manufactures, are liable to be peculiarly affected by the great improve- ments in chemistry, and that, therefore, if a reduction in price could not be accounted for so clearly as may be done in these instances, it might very fairly be presumed that substitutes had been found, or the use of them superseded by other and improved processes. An inspection of the table of prices will clearly prove the total absence of any coincidence of the fluctuations of this article with alterations in the currency. And, as far as any effect of war and peace can be traced, it would lead to the conclusion that peace was rather calculated to raise, and war to depress, the price ; for after having continued at a remarkably steady price throughout the war, it participated in the general rise of articles of export in 18 14 and 1815. Bristles are now, and have been ever since the peace, at a higher price than they were at during the first thirteen years of the war; that is, till the beginning of 1807. As z 338 we depend for our supply of that article almost exclusively on an importation from Russia, the great advance in 180S arose, not only from the very small actual quantity for sale*, but from the apprehension which then prevailed that all future supply would be intercepted for an indefinite length of time. It may be observed, however, that at the close of 1810, the price had receded 5 J per cent, in consequence of rather a larger supply being brought forward ; but as the charges of importation continued to be as high as ever, the price naturally recovered, although it never again reached the elevation of It^OS. This article, moreover, is one of direct government expenditure, the consumption of it for brushes in the army and navy being considerable. Nevertheless, the increased consumption by the rest of the community, since the peace, seems to have more than made up for the cessa- tion of government demand ; for the importation has been larger in the two last years, than it was, on the average, du- ring the war, and yet the price has, of late, been rising. It is now higher than it wasdui-ing any part of the war, e.\- cepting only the interval between ISO? and 1813, when the charges of importation account for the whole difference of the bullion price on the average of that period. Coffee having been as high since the peace as it was during the greater part of the war, and so very considerably higher than when the depreciation of paper was greatest, is not one of the articles which have been resorted to in proof of a transition from war to peace, or of the depreciation and * I have not a btatcmeut of the total imports of this article ; but as we depend almost exclusively upon Ihissia for our supply of it, an account which I happen to have of the export from Peters- burg will sufficiently prove the great falling ofTiu the supply in 1808 and 1809. 1806 . . 1689 Casks 1807 . . 1446 1808 . . 673 1809 . . 581 1810 . . U20 339 subsequent enhancement of the currency. The French part of the island of St. Domingo alone, before the revo- lution there in 1791, is computed to have produced an- nually 10,000 tons on 3000 plantations: these were nearly destroyed during the troubles which prevailed there, and many of the planters went thence to Jamaica, where they established extensive plantations, which have since made the latter island a source of considerable supply: but many years were required to produce from that and other sources an increased quantity to make up for the deficiency from St. Domingo. Accordingly, the price began to advance in 1791, soon after the revolution in St. Domingo, and, with some intervening fluctuations, maintained a consider- able elevation, till the confiscations in the ports of the Baltic, in 1810, and the rigorous execution of the anti- commercial decrees of the enemy, which were enforced in the other ports of the Continent of Europe, put nearly a stop to all further export. In the interval, the importation to this country was large, being swelled by the produce of the other French West India islands, and of the Dutch Set- tlements in the East and West Indies; but the whole quan- tity from these sources was insufficient by the re-export from hence to fill the chasm created by the cessation of the supply to Europe from St. Domingo : it was, therefore, with few exceptions, in brisk demand ; or, more properly speaking, in a state of relative scarcity through the whole period. By the time, however, that our exclusion from export to the Continent took place, the sources of supply had increased in consequence of the pre\ ious encourage- ment from high prices. An increased import, therefore, while the means of export were obstructed, occasioned the extraordinary glut and low prices of 181 l and IS 12; and it was not till the prospect of peace and the re-opening of the Continental ports, which gave rise to an enormous ex- portation, that the price revived. It has till recently con- tinued at a very high range, in consequence of short sup- plies and an increasing demand; and the small slocks in Z 2 340 liand have given rise to considerable speculations on the estimated supplies of the different years, which have been attended with corresponding fluctuations in price, as may be observed by the table. CoTTox is an article, about which so many elaborate statements have been made, as to leave little furdier to be said. The price rather fell during the two first years from 1793. The rise subsequent to 1793 was owing to scanti- ness of supply, the average importation for five years, from 1793 to 1798, both years included, having been less than in the five years preceding ll'J3. This scantiness of supply occurring at a time when there was a great demand, partly speculative, for our cotton manufactures to the Continent, prices rose nearly 100 per cent., but fell again on the great recoil of the Hamburg speculation in 1799. From that time it declined, with only a little rally in 1804 and 1805, till 1808, when our disputes with the United States tended to excite a speculation, on a falling off of future supply, at the same time that the actual importation, from all parts, was little more than half of what it had been in the pre- ceding year. The price then rose, and the fluctuation, from that time, has been already described. The high price which this article maintained for three years after the peace in 1814, in consequence of a greatly increased con- sumption, by the opening of the Continent of Europe to commercial intercourse, induced such an extended culti- vation, as laid the foundation for the very large supplies which have since been received ; and as the supplies con- tinue to arrive, without any material falling off", the pre- sumption is, that the prices, low as they have been, and continue to be, are sufficient to defray the cost of pro- duction. When our supplies were limited to one source, the relative amount of them was, of course, liable to be affected in a much greater degree by the state of the crops from the influence of the weather, than now that the culti- vation is extended through the whole range of the tropical climates. Any tendency to a material advance in j)rice, 341 from the failure of the crops in tlie United Stales of America, or in the Brazils, would now be checked by tlie prospect that the encouragement thus held out would bring forward, at no very distant] interval, a greatly increased supply from the East Indies. The crops failed in the East Indies two or three years ago ; and the low price at which that description sells here, in comparison with other kinds, has since discouraged the importation from that quarter. But the supplies from other quarters have gone a consider- able way towards making up for the deficiency. It would be difficult for the most determined advocate for either of the exclusive theories of currency or war-demand, to bring the fluctuations of this article in aid of their systems. Cochineal, before South America became open to us, was affected by the war with Spain in 1796, and again in 1804, which rendered our importation precarious, and oc- casionally expensive. It was, moreover, an object of direct war expenditure, and there was an increased consumption from the almost exclusive use of scarlet uniforms by the volunteer corps at particular periods. The price, however, rose in 1813 and 1814, upon the prospect of peace, to a greater height than it ever attained during the war, except in the great speculative demand for Germany in 1798, when it advanced upwards of 100 per cent., but fell again in the following year to the level from whence it had risen. The consumption has, of late, been interfered with by the sub- stitution of lac-dye, which has been imported, to some extent, from India; and the price has, in consequence, de- clined, although not so low as it was previous to the break- ing out of the war. Copper is an object of expenditure by government for the purpose of bolts and sheathing to ships of war. The transports which were in the government service were, like- wise, mostly required to be copper sheathed. The price, accordingly, advanced upon the breaking out of the war, although not very considerably during the first few years of it. In 1796 a fresh source of demand arose from the 31^2 measures taken by government for a new copper coinage, which was partially issued in 1797. The greatest advance, however, took place in 1805, when an increased demand for the purposes of a fresh coinage, which was issued in the following year, in sufficient quantity to fill the circulation, added to the other sources of demand, gave rise to an ex- tensive speculation, and drove the price up to 200/. per ton, a height which it never exceeded, and rarely afterwards reached. After 1808 it fell nearly progressively till the termination of the war, during the last two years of which it was at 130/. and 135/. per ton. If from these prices be deducted the difference between paper and gold, which, in 1813, was about 30 percent, the bullion price would be left no higher than it is at present. It rose a little, for a short time, upon the peace in IBM, and again in 1817. This last considerable rise was in consequence of a demand for export. The subsequent decline is easily accounted for : first, by a greatly increased produce in this country, and, secondly, by new sources of foreign supply*. Of the increased produce, in this country, some idea may be formed, from the statement which I insert, in the Ap- pendix, of the weekly sales of copper ore in Cornwall, for a series of years, commencing in 1800: by this it will be seen, that the produce from that source was, in 1822, larger, by between 2000 and 3000 tons, or nearly half as much again as in the average of the thirteen years from 1800 to 1812. Copper is raised in Anglesey, in Devon- shire, in Ireland, and in small quantities in other parts of the united kingdom ; but all these sources are not, col- lectively, equal to those of Cornwall, and, although the * Tlie new sources of foreign supply to which I allude, are Russia and South America. The former, till 1818, had never exported any quantity worth mentioning: but her exports, com- mencing with that year, have been as follows: 1818 .. 1.').') tons. 1821 .. 5023 tons 1819 .. Mil) 1822 . . 3.545 1820 . . . . 44Gfi 1823 .. 5392 343 mines of Anglesey have fallen off, 1 understand Uiat the aggregate produce of copper, in the united kingdom, is de- cidedly greater than it has been at any former period. Flax, although one of the objects of government ex- penditure, was at a lower price in the first two years of the war which broke out in 179 ;, than it had been on the average of the pi-eceding peace. The first decided advance was in 1795, when the importation had fallen off con- siderably, compared with the preceding year ; at the same time that there was an increasing demand for the navy and merchant shipping. In 1800 and 1801, the price rose still further, in consequence of an embargo in the Russian ports, by the Emperor Paul ; but, after declining a little, when that embargo was removed, the price again advanced, unchecked by the peace of 1802, to a gi'eater height than it had attained during any part of the preceding war, the short interval of the Russian embargo excepted. The fluctuation between 1807 and 1811, that is, an advance of 100 per cent., and a fall again to the level from whence the rise took place, has ah'eady been noticed in the first division of this work, and a reference to the state of the importation will fully explain it, bearing in mind that, in 1 ,s08, there was not only an actual falling off in the import, in con- sequence of the very great expenses and hazard which at- tended all commercial intercourse with the Continent in that year, but the apprehension of failure of future supply. The subsequent rise, upon the short importation of 1811, and the fall in 181 4-, when a large actual supply, by im- portation, concurred with the prospect of abundant con- tingent supply, by the reduced charges of conveyance, are accounted for on obvious grounds. From that time a greatly increased produce of flax in Ireland, following the encouragement held out by the previous high prices, con- tributed to augment the general supply, and depressed the price, in 1816, to as low a rate as it has since been at; but the importation of that and the following year, combined with the bad season of 1816, occasioned a considerable rise 3i4 in 1817, which was protracted through 181 S by a specu- lation on the effects of the drought of that vear. The in- creased importation from the Continent, with the augmented produce of Irehmd, are quite sufficient to account for the low range of prices which has since prevailed. There ap- pears to have been an extended cultivation of flax in Egypt; for, by accounts from Italy, most of the ports of the Medi- terranean, which used to be supplied with the article from Russia, have recently received as much as they could con- sume, on lower terms, from Alexandria. Independent of circumstances arising out of war and peace, to affect the supply of this article, it is liable to be influenced, in a con- siderable degree, by the seasons, both directly and indi- rectly : directly, inasmuch as the weiither may be favour- able or adverse to the growing crops : indirectly, when, by the dearth of provisions, there is an inducement to extend the cultivation of corn or potatoes, at the expense of other productions, to which the same land would otherwise have been applicable. The latter cause, there can be no doubt, contributed, among others, to raise and maintain the price of flax at a much higher level during the war than it could otherwise have been at ; and the cessation of the operation of that cause has naturally occasioned prices to subside to their previous level. Hemp rose very inconsiderably during the first two years of the war, and was actually lower in those two years than it had been in several instances in the preceding peace. In 1795 and 1796, the price advanced rapidly, in consequence of large purchases in Russia, for account of the French go- vernment. The demands by our own government were, likewise, on an increasing scale in those two years ; but as a consequence of the great advance in price, large supplies came forward in 1798; and, notwithstanding that the ex- penditure for naval purposes was on as large a scale as ever, the price declined, in that year, very considerably. Tlie increasing demand for the navy and for the mercan- tile shipping of this country, combined with a progressive 345 demand from the United States of America, again raised the price; but not to the height which it had recently reached, till 1800, when the embargo, by the E^mperor Paul, gave rise to a speculation which drove the price up considerably. 'J'he price, of course, fell after his death on the removal of the embarijo. The fluctuations from 1807 to the close of the war are fully accounted for by the extra- ordinary state of our political relations with the powers of the Baltic. It has of course fallen since the peace on the double ground of the abstraction of direct government de- mand, beyond the small quantity occasionally required to keep up the peace establishment of the navy, and of the removal of the extra charges of importation. The rally in 18KS was in consequence of a short importation in the two preceding years. During the very high prices which pre- vailed between 1808 and 1814, iron came into use as a sub- stitute for hemp in cables, and was found, or supposed to answer so well, that it has been continued and greatly ex- tended since the peace; thus greatly reducing the con- sumption of hemp. But the importation having fallen off in 1821 in a still greater degree than the reduced con- sumption, the price advanced nearly 50 per cent, and after- wards receded in consequence of a large supply. Indigo requires but little notice. The price now is as high as it was during the greater part of the war, notwith- standing the reduced charges of importation ; and as it reached its greatest height upon the prospect of the near termination of the war in 1813 and 1814, it can liardly be brouglit forward as an instance of the indirect effect of go- vernment expenditure in raising prices; nor will a reference to this article countenance the opinion, which ascribes to the bank restriction effects much beyond the degree indi- cated by the difference between paper and gold ; for when that difference was nearly at its greatest height, the price of indigo was considerably lower than on many occasions in the preceding period. It did not participate in the rise which occurred in many other articles between l s 1 6 and 346 1818; and the great advance in it occurred after tlie passing of Mr. PeePs bill. Jt may be said, that the advance is in consequence of deficient crops, — granted; but it deficient crops are allowed to be sufiicient cause of the advance in this instance, by parity of reasoning abundant crops or pro- duce may be allowed to be calculated to depress prices. Hoi'S present a striking instance of the influence of the seasons upon price. The produce of each year is exactly represented by the duty which is taken for the whole pe- riod, embraced by the table at th.e same fixed rate of id. 4| per lb. After 1 808, the table contains the estimate which is made a few weeks before the actual result of the gather- ing, and consequently before the duty is ascertained ; and i may be curious to observe how the price fluctuates with the estimate. It is quite sufficient to refer to the table, in order to be satisfied that the variations in price had no observable connexion with the bank restriction, or with war demand. In 178S, when the duty of the preceding year was 48, '22?/. the price rose to 22(}s. and 340s. which is a higher price, allowing for the difference between paper and gold, than it ever reached during the war. But even in 1813, when the extreme price was 420s. it was in consequence of so small a produce as is indicated by a duty of only 30,000Z. In the latter part of 1817, the price, in consequence of two bad crops in succession, rose by speculation to 7005. per cwt but when the estimate of 18 IS was made, there was a sudden fall to lS5s. which ruined the speculators. This occurred before Mr. Peel's bill was thought of. From 1818 to 1822, both years included, there has been a suc- cession of no fewer than five years, in no one of which has the duty been less than 1;,;0,000/. The average produce of three of these years has been upwards of 200,000/. and the average of the five years upwards of 187,000/. Whereas in the whole preceding term, as far back as 1782, there is no instance of more than three successive years where the pro- duce has exceeded 100,000/. nor is there any instance of a succession of more than three years in which a season of 347 decided deficiency has not occurred. The only interval, during the war, when three seasons of more than average produce had occurred in succession, viz. in I SOS, the price fell to from 60s. to SOs., which is as low as any quotation by the same authority in the last five years. And in IHO*, after two years only of good produce, the price fell to from 605. to His. In I794- and 1801, the price was still lower after single good seasons. Now, without entering into any minute calculation, I am persuaded that it will appear that the produce of the five years ending in 1822 is in a much greater proportion to the existing population than the pro- duce of any former five years to the then amount of popu- lation, and that the excess of produce fully accounts for the low range of prices. Iron. The first considerable rise in foreign iron did not occur till 1 796, when it advanced suddenly about 30 per cent. This was the year before the bank restriction, and the rise occurred in consequence of the importation having fallen off instead of keeping pace with the increasing demand for consumption in this country and in the rest of Europe, as well as in the United States of America ; and the produce of our own mines was at that time comparatively insignificant. Between 1796 and the close of 1800 there was no further advance. But the embargo in lUissia in the latter year had the effect of raising the price 10 per cent, more, and an additional duty of about 1/. per ton had been laid on the importation in the interval between 1 793 and 1798. The advance altogether, therefore, including the new duty, was nearly 10/. per ton since 1195; and this great advance operated as a sufficient premium for ap- plying increased capital to the production of iron in this country, and for bringing into operation for that purpose all the powers of machinery, which was then undergoing a rapid improvement. Thenceforward the produce of iron in this country proceeded so rapidly that, with the aid of further duties, amounting almost to a prohibition of im- portation, it not oidy kept pace with the increasing demand, 348 bill has eventually nearly superseded the use of foreign iron in this country, and has furnished a surplus for ex- portation. The price of foreign iron, accordingly, fell almost progressively from 1 80 1 till the close of the war. Enjrlish iron advanced a little between 1800 and 1803, as a natural ;md inevitable consequence of the high price of foreign iron, which had been further raised by additional duties on importation ; the quality, moreover, had been improved, and it was therefore really worth more, relatively to foreign iron, than it had before been. From 1803 till the close of the war, and further till 1817, being a period of fourteen years, the price maintained a singular degree of uniformity. In 1816 and 1817 a considerable demand for iron from this country to France took place, and con- tinued through 1818 and 1819 on a very extensive scale, which had the effect of raising the price of British iron higher than it had been during any period of the war. But, in 1820, such restrictions were laid on the import into that country as to preclude any further shipments. In the meantime the continued improvements and increased power of machinery having been brought into extended operation, so as to augment the produce while the demand for export to France has fallen off, the subsequent decline is sufficiently accounted for. Lead. Of the fluctuations of this article I have not the means of giving any very clear account, because the pro- duce of the mines, or the extent to which they are worked, seems to vary very considerably. It is an object of direct government expenditure, and is therefore likely to be higher in war than in peace. Partly from extra consumption for naval and military purposes, and partly from casual under- supply, but chiefly from speculation on these combined causes, the price advanced in 1308 to 4-31. per fodder. But this was before any material depreciation of paper, as indicated either by the exchanges or by the price of gold, had taken place; and the price fell during the remainder of the war, so that from the lust six months of 1811 till the j)eacc in 349 1814, when there was a temporary advance, the price, de- (hicting the difference between paper and gold, was very little higher than it has been since 1814. JS'ow, however, as the consumption is greater than it was at any period of the war, the price would be above what it was on the average between 1793 and 1814, were it not for the aug- mented produce from our own mines, at the same time that a much larger produce from the mines of Spain has ma- terially interfered with British lead in foreign markets. Madders are affected in price by the charges of im- portation, but in a greater degree by the difference of sea- sons. The fluctuations of this article are hardly worth re- cording, further than to observe that from 1808 to 1812 the difficulty and risk of connnunication with Holland are quite sufficient to account for the great advance in that in- terval. Since the peace, prices have occasionally been much higher than they were during the first fifteen years of the war. The decline during the last three years is attributable chiefly to a succession of good crops, but in part, likewise, to the circumstance that madder-roots have, of late, been imported in larger quantities than usual from the Medi- terranean, And further, the recent introduction of mun- jeet, an East India root applicable to some of the same purposes as madder, and now coming here in large quan- tities, naturally contributes to the depression of the latter. Oils. — Gallipoli oil, although subject to greatly increased charges of importation (the voyage being a very long one, and the article bulky) during the whole of the war, and more especially during the last five years of it, to an extent fully adequate to account for the advance of price relatively to the period anterior to 1 793, maintained a higher bullion- price during the first six years of peace following 1813 than that of the whole period of the preceding war. The high price which prevailed between the close of 1816 and the beginning of 1819 was the consequence partly of a short importation, and partly of the great advance in the price of rape-seed oil which is extensively used for the same purposes as Gallipoli oil. Tlie subsequent decline is attributable chiefly to an increased importation, and in some degree to the very low price of rape-seed oil. Rape-seed oil advanced in the last six months of IS '6 to a higher price than the average of wliat it had been at during the whole of the war. The deficient importation of rape seed in 18 16, combined with a deficient home growth, accounts, prima J'acie, for a great rise in the oil ; but the price was further advanced in 1 8 1 7 by the extravagant s])eculation which took place in whale-oil ; these descriptions of oil being, ibr some purposes, applicable as substitutes one for the other. The fall of rape-seed oil since 1818 was pro- duced by the opposite state of things to that which had oc- casioned the rise: a large importation of the seed in 1818, a very great increase of the home produce of it since that time, and a fall in the price of whale-oil. The natural price of whale-oil is lower in time of peace than in time of war by the difference of freight and in- surance in the two periods : but the average of the market price, during the first five years following the peace of 18 14, was as high as it had been on the average of the whole war. It was indeed depressed for a short interval, in 1816, to 221. per ton, but it had been as low during part of 1 807 and 1 808, when freights and insurances were very much higher. The fishery in 1817 was unsuccessful, and the speculation which I have alluded to drove the price up, nominally at least, to .59/. But the consumers did not pay that price. The winter of i 817-18 having proved a mild one, admitted of an extensive substitution of rape-oil for the public lamps. The recoil of the speculation and a succession of four abundant fisheries occasioned a decline, nearly pro- gressive, till the close of 1 82 1 *. The fishery of 1 822 proved to be deficient; and the price advanced at one time fifty * There is no doubt that, even with this increased supply, the price would he much higher were it not for the extensive substi- tution of co;d ir;ts for oil. 351 per cent. ; but the rise has been checked by the low price of rape-seed oil. Linseed oil has followed the variations of the seed, and the causes of those variations will be noticed under the head of that article. Provisions. Under this head will be found, in the tables, the prices of Irish mess beef and pork, and of Irish and Dutch butter. As so much has already been said in the course of this work on the subject of the prices of pro- visions, generally, it seems to be almost superfluous to make a separate reference to this particular kind. To a certain extent, the price of this description of provisions must be affected by circumstances connected with the price of corn and meat, and the produce of the dairy in this country; but Irish mess beef and pork were liable to be affected in a peculiar degree by the demands for the Victualling-Office : and butter was further affected by the difficulty and expense of importation from Holland, which would, of course, in- fluence the value of that from Ireland. It v/ill be observed, that, though in 1793 (the first year of the war) the prices advanced considerably, the greatest rise of mess-beef was during the peace of 1802. The general high range beyond the difference between paper and gold will be fully ac- counted for by the state of the seasons, and the difficulties of importation, which I have described as affecting the price of all kinds of provisions, from 17^3 to 18K^. Rice is affected chiefly by the variations of the prices of corn ; and, during the war, it was subject to greatly in- creased charges of importation. Saltpetri, being so great an object of direct war ex- penditure, and being, moreover, an article of great bulk in proportion to its value, and therefore greatly affected by the rate of freight on so long a voyage as that from India, requires little explanation to account for its being higher during the war. The price reached its greatest height in 1795, viz. 1705. per cwt. ; in 1796 it fell at one time to 455. and rose again to 965. It seems to have been affected con- S5'i siderably by the scale of hostilities on the Continent. But in consequence of the discoveries in chemistry, by which the French were enabled to dispense with a foreign supply, and by the increased importation from India to this country, by which we were enabled to supply the rest of the Continent at a reduced cost, the price declined permanently after 1798-9, when it had reached 14o6'., and, never after was so high aslOO.?., except during tlie short interval of speculation in exports in the peace of ISli, and again upon the break- ing out of the war which terminated with the battle of Wa- terloo, in 1815*. The subsequent decline, and the low range in the last few years, may be ascribed to the circum- stance of unusually large quantities having been imported from India at very low freights. It is likewise supposed to be prepared in India at less cost than formerly. Seeds. — I he price of these was affected greatly by the seasons, both here and abroad, and by the charges of im- portation. Sometimes these causes operated in the same, and sometimes in opposite directions, during the war. And in order to show to what an extent the supply fluctuated from these causes, I insert, in the Appendix, a statement of the imports of rape imd cole-seed, linseed and clover-seed, from 1801 to 1822, both years included. Clover-seed rose in the great scarcities following the sea- sons f of 1795-99, and 1800, to a height which was never afterwards exceeded, although the charges of importation • I'lie averaire bullion-price between 1800 and 1814 does not appear to have been so high as it was during the preceding American war. t As a proof of the degree in which this article is affected by tlie seasons, it may be as well to notice the following fluctuations : Spring of 1782 . . 255. to A2s. per cwt. 1783 .. .. 8U. to 1175. 1784. .. . . 185. to 435. 1787 .. a^s. to 1075. 1792 .. . . 1 Ss. to 405. wore increased nearly tenfold in tlie period between 1808 and 181^. In 181G-17 tlic price advanced to 115s. as a consequence of a very short importation; the crops abroad, as well as in this country, having proved to be very de- ficient. A considerable decline took place by the commence- ment of 1818 ; but the great drought of the following sum- mer gave rise to an extensive speculation on a probable deficiency, and the price rose again to such a height as to induce a large importation : this was sufficient, co-operating with renewed abundance here, to depress the price very considerably. Linseed was as low in the spring of 1799, after six years of war, as it had been on the average of the preceding peace- T'he price was naturally affected by the great scarcities which prevailed, boih in this country and on the continent, at par- ticular periods of the war ; and the importation of 1 80 1 having proved very small, the price in the year of peace following was as high as it had been during any part of the preceding war. I have already, in the first part of this work, noticed the great rise in 1808 as a consequence of a very short actual supply, and of apprehensions for the future. There was a short supply in 1811, and again in 1813, which contributed to maintain a considerable elevation of price. In 1 S 1 6, as a consequence of two years of short importation, combined with a speculation on general scarcity of agri- cultural produce, the price rose to 93s. ; and after an inter- mediate decline, it again advanced in 1818, upon an idea that the extraordinary drought, and consequent failure of the turnips in that year, would occasion a very great increase in the consumption of oil- cakes. The speculation upon that point proved to be exaggerated ; the failure of turnips was not so extensive as was expected ; and the importation ol linseed being of iinparalleled magnitude, the price fell, as might be expected, in the following year. The importations have since been considerable; and within the last three years, a new and very extensive source of supply has been A A opened, vi/. Eiryjit ; tVom whence not having before received any quantity worth nientioninuj, the iniportatimi in the hist year has amountod to between thirty and forty thousand quarters. Rape-seed has been affected, hke the otlier seeds, by tlie state of the crops in this country, and of those abroad, and by the expenses of importation. The rise of rape-seed in ISIG was entirely the effect of the season co-operating with a short importation. In loiTand 18 is it was kept at a liigli range by the increased consumption of rape-oil, in consequence of the extravagant speculation which, for twelve months, nearly put a stop to the consumption of whale-oil. As in the other seeds, the subsequent decline is fully accountetl for by the state of the crops. Silks were lower from the breaking out of the war in 1793 to 1797» than they had been in the preceding peace. In 1797, the importation of raw silk was deficient, and the price of China and Bengal, to which the deficiency probably applied, rose considerably in 1 798 : after the average supply was restored by the importations of 17'MJ and 18i)0, prices receded. The price of silks generally rose again in the peace of 1802 to a higher rate than they had been at during the preceding period of war ; and they rather declined again, in consequence of more abundant supplies in the course of the four years following the renewal of the war in 1 803, notwithstanding the increased charges of con- veyance incidental to a state of war. On a general view of the prices of the different kinds, it appears that the average of the whole term of fifteen years, from 179 i to 1807, allowing for the extra charges of freight and in- surance, and for the diffeience between paper and gold, was lower than it had been in the preceding ten yem's of peace. But in 1 807, in consequence of increasing obstacles to our intercourse with Italy, the supply had greatly fallen off compared with that of the three years preceding. In 1>!08 it proved to be still smaller; and in addition to the S55 smallncss of the actual quantity at market, there was for a short interval an apprehension that we should be totally exclucjed from a future supply of some particular descrip- tions. The speculation upon this actual and still more on the apprehended scarcity, drove up the price of Piedmont thrown to \)Qs. and 1125. per lb. and China and Bengal (the importation of which was likewise very short) parti- cipated in the advance. But the advance probably checked the consumption ; for by the close of that year the price of Piedmont thrown and Bengal organzine fell to one-half the prices which they had recently attained. The importation again fell off in 1811; of thrown silk the whole supply of that year was only 20,336 lbs. being less than one-fifteenth part of the consumption on the average of the preceding period of nearly 30 years. Our own manufacture of thrown had indeed increased, but taking raw and thrown together, the importation was little more than one-half of what it had been on the average of the preceding period included in the tables. In 1811 accordingly the price advanced, but, from the failure of the former speculation, not to nearly so high a rate as in 1 808. It was, however, sufficiendy high to bring forward a considerable supply in 1812, and prices fell very much by the close of that year, though the war was then on the largest scale, and the depreciation of paper nearly at its height. The supplies in 1814 and 1815 were considerable, and the prices fell accordingly. But the consumption and exportation, favoured by the fall, left a very short stock on hand at the commencement of 1 8 1 G, when, as I have ob- served will sometimes happen, the lowest prices nearly co- incided with the smallest stocks. It was then that a short importation, occasioned partly by the previous discourage- ment, and partly by failing crops, was the foundation, and a very sufficient one, for a considerable advance in price. The rise was not confined to this country, for the article was scarce and dear in France and Flanders ; and small as the import into Great Britain was in ISIG, an unusual pro- A A 2 35G portion was re eNportcd, chiefly to France. The importa- tion of lyi; being Hkewisc scanty, and coming upon a previously deficient stock, the greatest rise took place, as might be expected, at the close of that and in the beginning of the following year. 15ut by the summer of is 18, the forthcoming supplies being estimated to be more abundant, prices fell ; and it is material to observe, that in this, as in so many other instances, the fall began before Mr. Peel's bill was thought of; and the subsequent abundance of the imports must, one would think, satisfy even the most deter- mined opponents of Mr. Peel's bill, that as far as relates to this ai'ticle at least, the fall of the bullion prices must have been as great, whether that bill had passed or not. Spices. — Pepper has been declining for many years past, with only occasional rallies, partly from speculation, of which this article has always been a favourite object. The most strikincf instances of these rallies, in the general tendency downwards, were the Hamburgh speculation in 1 798, the general speculation in exports, on the opening of the Continent in 1814, and a minor speculation, on a re- duction of the stock for sale in the Company's warehouses, in 1818. This last was overpowered by the eficct of the supplies which were conveyed to the ports of the Continent by American ships direct from Sumatra. The decline, and present low range of prices, may be very fully accounted for by the extended cultivation in Sumatra, from whence the supplies continue to be abundant. The presumption, therefore, is, that the price, low as it is, is a remunerating one. It is to be observed, however, that in the consideration of the price of pepper, generally, allowance is to be made for inferiority in the quality of a very large proportion of the late supplies, compared with what was formerly imported. Cinnamon was in 1784 as high as 20.s.per lb.; from that time it seems gradually to have declined, without any fluctuation worth mentioning, till 1795. The occupation of Holland by the French in that year, bi fore we had the means of ob- 357 tainini>- any direct supplies, had the effect of raising the price to 1S,9. per lb. Soon after, however, when Ceylon fell into our hands, and under a different system from that which prevailed while that island was in the possession of the Dutch, and which consisted in an artificial limitation of supply, the quantity collected there was all brought to this country, and an extension of the cultivation was allowed. The increased supply thus coming forward tended naturally to depress the price; and at the same time as the Dutch East India warehouses in Holland were still well stocked, the depression was increased by the absence of an adequate demiind for export: for nearly ten years, therefore, follow- ing 1 7f)8, this article was at a lower price than it was ever before, or has since been. At the close of 1S07, however, the Dutch stock being somewhat exhausted, all orders from the Continent for spices came direct to this country, liiul the price of cinnamon improved. It maintained a tolerably steady rate from 1 S09, till near the termination of the war, when the great speculative demand upon the prospect of peace raised the price, as has been shown in the first part of this work. The average price since the passing of Mr. Peel's bill has been higher than it was for fifteen years after the bank restriction. And the average price since the peace has been considerably higher than the average of the whole period of war. The variations in ginger, which are very considerable, are referable chiefly to difference of crops ; but I shall content myself with observing that the highest price which this article ever attained was in 1816. The great decline which has since taken place may be ascribed in part to the extent of supplies from the East Indies, the Malabar white interfering more especially with the Barbadoes white ; and in part to a diminished use of ginger generally in Italy, where formerly the consumption was very considerable. Sugar has been very commonly referred to as an article, the variations of which might be brought to prove the effects of war demand, or of an indefinite depreciation of paper, as S5H suited the views of tlie parties wlio maintained either of tliesc exclusive theories. But a short reference to precise dates and prices, and to circumstances affecting the supply and demand at particular periods, will remove this article, as well as the many others which have already been removed, from the list of such as are calculated to give countenance to either of the theories. It so happens that the first great rise in the price of sugar occurred at the close of 1791? be- fore any idea was entertained of our being involved in a war with France; and in 1792, it reached as great an elevation as it ever afterwards attained, with two exceptions, viz. the period of the great Hamburgh speculation, between 1796 and 1799, a period, be it observed, in which the cir- culation of paper is admitted even by the advocates of inde- finite depreciation to have been remarkably contracted ; and again, the extravagant speculation on the prospect of peace in 1813 and 18 14. The occasion of the rise in 17^1 requires only to be mentioned to satisfy the reader that it was fully adequate to produce such an efi'ect. The revolution in the French part |of St. Domingo was the occasion of the de- struction of all the sugar plantations in that island. The extent of these may be conceived, when it is stated tliat the annual produce from that source alone was estimated at no less than 80,000 tons ; and it was sufficient, with the com- paratively small produce of the other French West India Islands, to enable France not only to supply her own con- sumption, but even to re-export a considerable quantit}' to the North of Europe. Such a chasm required some years of increasing produce from other quarters to fill up, and until filled up, the price was naturally much above a re- munerating rate to the producers in the remaining sources of supply, or, in other words, afforded profits much beyond those which were obtained in productions that were not thus casually limited. It was, therefore, the destruction of St, Domingo, as a source of supply, and not the war, which conferred on our West India planters a monopoly of pro- tluction, that enabled them to deiive such large profits 359 during several years vvliicii happened to eoincide with a state ot" war. Hut the encouragement arising honi profits so large naturally occasioned a great increase of cultivation, and sugar being an article which yields a return of produce upon an extended cultivation more quickly than coffee, the increased supply came sooner into ojieration in reducing the profits of the planters ; and, as is usual on such occasions, was sufficient for some time to depress those profits below the ordinary level. As early as \7^9 the supply seems to have outrun what the consumption at the advanced prices could carry off, and thenceforward they declined. The importations in 1801 and i b02 were of extraordinary mag- nitude, and these concurring with the restoration of peace, which reduced the charges of conveyance, accelerated the decline ; but the low price heic, rendered still cheaper to the foreign consumer by the diminished charges of freight and insurance, occasioned a very large export from hence, and produced a rally hefurc the renewal of the war in 180';. After 1804 the price resumed its tendency downwards, and in 1807, before the exclusion of this country from direct intercourse with the ports of Russia, our imports being less, and our exports greater, than they had been in the [)re- ceding year, the gazette average of British })lantation sugar fell to 30s. yt/., which is the lowest point of depression that it has ever reached, with the exception of short intervals in the three last years. Foreign sugar, not being admitted for consumption in this country, was lowest in iSl 1, when the anti-commercial decrees of the French were in full operation. It was only (as I had occasion to state in the first part of my work) upon the prospect of the emancipation of the continent at the close of 1812 that prices recovered ef- fectually. And I have already shown to what an extra- vagant height they were raised by the speculation on the peace in 18 11. The decline from 1814 is not more than commensurate with the enormous increase of supply which has since been poured into Europe from the Havannab, llic Brazils, and the East Indies, and from our own settle- ments of Demerara and Berbice. SniiiTs. French Brandy rose of course on the breaking out of the war, and continued at a price more or less ad- vanced according to the extent of the obstructions to im- portation. These, as I have already observed, were greatest in 1811 and 1812, and the price was then at its highest elevation. Since the peace, the price has gradually re- sumed its ancient level, checked only by the bad season of 18iG, which did extensive mischief to the vines in France. Rum is effected by direct war expenditure, and by extra charges of importation. Subject to an allowance for these circumstances and for occasional speculations on casual de- ficiency of supply, or on suddenness of government demand, there is nothing strikinjr in the fluctuations. The fall since 1 820 was clearly the consequence of the non-intercourse between our West India Islands and the United States of America, which forced all tiie rum tliat had usually found a vent in America to this country, and occasioned a glut which has not yet been got rid off. '^1'allow, in the two first years of the war, was lower than it had been on the average of the preceding peace. In 179j the price advanced very considerably, nearly 100 per cent, in consequence partly of a very short importation, and partly of the deficiency of the home produce of fat from the peculiarities of the seasons of 1 794 and 1 79.5, which have been so fully described. The price afterwards declined, but again advanced in 1799 and 1800-1, in consequence, first, of a deficiency in the home produce from the effects of the season, and subsequently of the embargo by the emperor Paul, which threatened to cut off all future supplies. After an inlermediate depression, a fresh speculation arose in 1802 and 18013 on the deficiency of the home produce occasioned by the great dearth of fodder two years before, and the price of tallow was in consequence raised at the close of 180:5 to a greater hei;L;ht than it had ever before attained. W'iien 361 these disturbing causes were removed, the price gradually declined till the spring of 1807. The treaty of Tilsit naturally gave rise to apprehensions of increased obstructions to future supplies, and those apprehensions were realized. Accord- ingly, in the autumn, the price advanced considerably, and, in the course of the following spring, reached its greatest height. The magnitude of those obstructions, as they existed in 1808, maybe imagined by the circumstance that, notwithstanding the encouragement held out by so enormous a price as 110s. per cwt., the importation was little more than one-quarter of what it had been two years before. Some of the obstructions to importation being overcome in 1809 and 1810, although at a very great expense, the sup- plies were more abundant, and prices fell in 18 10-11; but the great expense of importation still continuing, the sup- plies in 18 11, 1812, and 1813, fell off again ; and this dimi- nution of foreign supply coinciding with a state of the seasons in this country, which had made cattle and sheep scarce and dear, was the occasion of a renewed range of high prices. Through 1814 and 1815 large importations and an abun- dant home produce reduced the price considerably. But, in consequence of two years of short importation, viz, 1816' and 1817, the price rose again, and, in 1818, the extraor- dinai-y character of the summer, which I have already de- scribed, gave rise to a fresh speculation on the idea that the extreme drought and want of fodder would reduce the home produce of fat in a very great degree. The effect of this speculation was to run the price of Russia tallow up to 905., which it reached in September of that year. The im_ portation, however, being larger, and the effect of the season on the home supply being less than was expected, the price began to fall before Mr. PeePs bill was at all the subject of consideration. It is sufficient to look at the imports since that time, combined, as these have been, in the three last years, with an increase of the home produce, to be satisfied that the increase of consumption, great as it has been, must S6'2 be wholly inadequate to keep pace with so very great an increase of the aggregate supply. Tar is very extensively aflected as an object of direct war demand, and is moreover, being an article of great bulk in j)roportion to its value, subject to vary on a very large scale, by the mere difference of freight. The whole of the bullion rise of price, during the last war, may be sufficiently accounted tor by these two causes, allowing for the occa- sional lluctuaiions connected with speculation, or erroneous opinions of individuals in adjusting the supply to the de- mand. The rise in 1808 was not at all beyond the pro- portion of the advance of freight from Archangel and the Baltic, and tliough the freight from America was not in- creased in the same degree, yet as a very large })roportion of the supply of tar came usually from Ixussia and Sweden, any sudden increase in the cost of importation from these sources would, to a certain extent^ govern the market price of the whole. But the advanced price operated as so great an encouragement to increase the supplies from America, that the total importations in 1810 and 1811 were sufficient to depress the price very considerably. At the close of 181 'J, the war with America had the effect of raising the price again, and it reached a great height in 181;). The rally in 1815 was a speculation upon the war which termi- nated with the battle of Waterloo. The trifling improve- ment in 1818 was in a great measure, if not ^\ holly, attii- butable to a rise in freights which had occurred in that and the preceding year; and again that rise of freights was clearly owing to the circumstance of our ports being open to the imporiation of foreign corn. 'i'oBACCo rose, in the first instance, with the increased charges of importation incidental to the war which began in 1793. The great speculation in Germany, between 17})6 and 1799, which applied to all articles of colonial produce, raised the price of tobacco very consiilerably ; but uj)on the recoil of that speculation, the price ilcclined, and continued 363 at a low range till 1808, when our disputes with America gave rise to a fresh speculation and to a further recoil ; tor in 1810, 181 1, and part of 1812, prices were as low as they have been at any time of the succeeding peace. The great rise in 1814, which was owing partly to our renewed inter- course with the continent, and partly to the failure of sup- plies from America, in consequence of the war with that country, has already been described. With the exception of these speculations, the difference of price during the war does not appear, on the average, to have exceeded the dif- ference in the charges of importation at the several periods of war and peace. The varieties, however, of the quality of this article, even under the same denomination, as to the sort, are so great, and so much therefore depends upon the quality of what happens to be in the market, that any con- clusion to be drawn, from a view of the quptations, must be subject to great allowance on that score. Tea is an article of which the price being under the re- gulation of a monopoly, and being coupled moreover with a tax, which has at different periods varied from 12 to 100 per cent., throws little if any light upon the question of variations in the value of money. . It is, however, an object of general interest ; and, as I found it among the articles prepared for my table, I would not reject it. Tin seems to have risen considerably in L791, and to have attained, in 1792, as great a height, within the merest trifle, as it reached during the eight years following, notwith- standing its being an object of direct war expenditure. At the close of 1800 it advanced again and continued to rise, unchecked by the peace in 1802, till 18(^7, when the quo- tation reached 1285. 6d. per cwt. That was the highest price till 1810, when, the market having been previously rendered bare by an unusually large export to India in the three preceding years, a casual demand arose for shipments to France, under license, and the price was driven up by speculation to 1745., from whence, however, it rapidly de- 364 clincd till the close of 1812 to I'Ms. 6(/., wliicli, declucling the diflcrence between paper and gold, was lower than it had been in 171*2. Upon the peace of 1814 it again reached 174,9. The demand, partly speculative, for export to the continent, having abated at the same time that the high price had induced an increased production, aided by im- proved powers of machinery, the price thenceforward de- clined till the spring of 1819, when it seems to have reached its greatest depression. One of the chief causes of the re- duced prices, besides the cessation of the war consumption, is that the produce of tin from the island of Banca has not only been sufficient to supply part of the demand for the East Indies, which had before been principally supplied from hence, but even to afford an export to this country for the purpose of re-exportation to the continent of Europe. During the three years ending in 1820, the East India Company exported no tin at all to India or China, whereas, in the fifteen years preceding, they had shipped, on an average, between five and six hundred tons j>er annum; and in the three years ending in 1 809, the exports by the Company had averaged about 750 tons per animm. The mere cessa- tion of this source of demand will go far towards account- ing for the depression since 1817, when it is considered that the whole annual produce of the mines is computed not much to exceed 3000 tons. Whalebone is now higher than it has ever been during the last forty years, with the exception of i 792 and 1 79:>. The variations in the price of this article are so evidently unconnected with the war and the Bank restrictit)n, that I shall confine myself to observing, that the price is now about six times what it was in 1811 and part of 1812, and twice what it was at the passing of Mr. Peel's bill, without any allowance for the difference between paper and gold. Wheat is inserted in the Table, because it forms one of the nu)&t important among the articles of merchandize in the London market, and because it is desirable to preserve M)5 tlie quotations of prices, as founded on transactions in Mark- lane, both in respect of British and of PoHsh wheal. This latter description may be considered, with allowances for the superiority of its quality, to represent foreign wheat ge- nerally in this market ; and I am not aware that there exists any former table of prices containing quotations of that description. The fluctuations exhibited by the prices of Mark-lane, for wheat generally, will, in several instances, point out the degree in which speculations on the weather prevailed at particular periods, and likewise show the varia- tion in quality by the difference of quotation between the highest and lowest; none of these particulars being shown in the yearly averages, to which most of the tables of the prices of wheat are confined. At the same time, none of my remarks relative to wheat, in the former divisions of this work, are founded on this table, as I have considered that the Eton tables, and the average returns inserted in the several parliamentary reports, are niuch higher authority and better calculated for the purposes of general reasoning. Wool, the supply of which, from abroad, till about the year 1806, came wholly from Spain, began to advance in the latter part of 1791, and reached, in 1792, a height which was not exceeded during the first six years of the war with France, which broke out in the following year. The importation of 1 793 was remarkably short, being little more than one-third of what it had been in the preceding year, and yet the price merely maintained itself without advancing. But, in 1 794, it receded to what it had risen from three years before, although the charges of importation were increased by war freights and insurances. So much for the effects of war demand in raising prices. Between 1796 and 1799, the price advanced, the difficulty and expenses of importation being in- creased by the war which, in the former year, broke out be- tween Spain and this country ; but it was not till 1799 that it reached the same elevation that it had attained in 1192. The utmost advance, liowever, after 1199, above the price of 1792, did not exceed 6(1. per lb. for Lconesa till the general peace at the close of ISO I, when it rose considerably, and continued to advance througli the whole of 180 J. A new war with Spain was superadded to the war with France in iSOt, and yet the price advanced only 3d. above what it had been at in the year before. In 1807, the importation being large, and swelled by supplies from a new source, Germany, the price of the lower sorts gave way a little. But, in 1808, arose the speculation on the short actual importa- tion, and on the apprehended failure of future supplies, which drove the price up in that and the following year nearly 300 per cent., and which I have already noticed in the first part of this work. In 181 1 and 1812, the supplies were again scanty, and prices recovered a little from the depression of the preceding year, which, considering the great cost of the importation, was a ruinous one to the holders. At the close of 1812 began the decline, which, after a momentary »ally in 1817 and 1818, following the very short importation of 1816, has continued till the pre- sent time. To explain the occasion of this decline requires only a reference to the quantities imported in the last live years, compared with the five years ending in 181 '2, or with any other period of five years during the war. Wood. — Under this head Logwood is inserted. It is not an article of great importance. The freight forms a considerable ingredient of the cost, and it is, of course, therefore, on an average, considerably higher in war than in peace. In other respects the observations which have been made relative to articles of colonial produce, generally, will apply to this. The chief ingredient in the value of Fir Timber, after deducting the duty, is the expense of conveyance. Upon the peace with America, in 1783, the price fell 50 per cent., and, after a little fluctuation, rose in 1791, upon the Russian armament, which raised freights in the Baltic, aud occasioned apprehensions for the security of our intercourse 367 with that quarter. Jlicre was no further advance during the two first years after the breaking out of the war with France. The rise in the autumn of \79o was connected with an advance of freight, which was occasioned, at that time, by an unusually extensive employment of shipping for the conveyance of naval stores, and for the importation of corn. It then declined again, and, till 1 799, was not higher than it had been in the American war. But, in 1 799 and 1800, two causes combined to raise the price: viz. the ad- vance in freights, which is always the consequence of large importations of corn ; and restrictive regulations by the Em- peror Paul against the exportation of timber, which were soon followed by a general embargo on the British shipping in the K'ussian ports. In 1 806 the occupation of Prussia by the French was a fresh cause of advance, as it rendered one of the greater sources of supply precarious. To this cause of advance was superadded another and still greater in 180S, by the hostility of Russia and Denmark, which ex- cluded us from direct intercourse with the Baltic, and the freight alone of timber, in the course of that and the follow- ing year, rose, in some instances, to lOZ. per load. After the close of 1808, however, the high price having checked the consumption, and the license system having removed some of the difficulties of importation, the price fell consider- ably ; but the freight and expenses of conveyance continued high, till thecloseof 1812. Itwasabout this time thataheavy additional duty was laid on the importation of timber from the north of Europe, which operated as a great bounty on the shipment of timber from Canada. The importation from our colonies in America thenceforward increased rapidly, more especially after the peace with the United States, which had the double effect of reducing the rate of freight, and of bringing the timber of the United States through our colonies, duty free, into this country. These large supplies fi-om that quarter, and the reduced cost of importa- tion from the Baltic, sufficiently account for the subsequent 3GS full. My observations on the fluctuations of fir timber have been confined to that from the Baltic. The American timber embraces a greater variety of qualities, and the variation in price may sometimes arise from the different (}ualities that happen to be at market. 3G[) SECTION IV. Sinnm:iry of the clifTcrcnt Fluctuations cxliibitcd in llic Tabic of Prices. Having taken a rapid view of the most prominent in- stances of fluctuation in the price of each of the articles mentioned in the tables, it may be desirable, very briefly, to notice the periods in which any striking alteration of prices was extended nearly simultaneously to a large proportion of them. It is a common mistake to date the origin of speculation and high prices from the commencement of the war in 1793. If there had then been a general advance of prices, whence could have arisen the great distress and the extensive failures which pervaded the commercial world? The fact is, that there was a very general fall of prices, those of corn and meat excepted (and there was consequently no agri- cultural distress), from the close of 1792, and the com- mencement of 1793, till the close of 179't- On looking over the Table of Prices, it will appear that there were very few commodities which were not lower at the close of 1792, and at different periods in 1793 and 1794, than they had been in 1 79 1 , and at the commencement of 1 792, and the real fall was still greater than the apparent one, because the cost of importation was greater, by the difference of freights and insurance, after the commencement of the war. This fall was the effect of a recoil from extensive speculations, which were connected with a very great circulation of mercantile paper, extending to the principal commercial places in Europe, and in the United States of America. One of the chief causes of speculation seems to have been the prospect of deficiency of colonial produce, in consequence of the re- 1! 15 370 volution in St. Domingo. Other grounds were afforded by the unsettled aspect of politics ; and some ai'ticles be- sides colonial produce happened likewise to be scarce. As usual in times of speculation, the circulation being en- larged by an extensive superstructure of private paper, many articles for the rise of which there was no sufficient ground of actual or apprehended scarcity participated in the advance. But the rise having been promoted and ex- tended by an enlargement of the circulation of paper and credit without any corresponding enlargement or extension of the basis of the currency ; and the effect of a rise so much, therefore, beyond the immediate occasion being to check consumption, and to increase supply, the fall of prices and consequent destruction of the paper and credit which had been connected with them were inevitable. The lowest point of depression of the prices of such articles as had risen most in 1791 and 1792 seems to have been reached in 1794. In 17L)5 several circumstances combined to occasion a fresh range of high prices. The previous stagnation and comparatively low prices had, by extending consumption, and checking supply, reduced the stocks of most commo- dities. Two successive bad seasons rendered every de- scription of agricultural produce in this country and in the rest of Europe scarce; hence, not only corn and meat, but linseed, rapesccd, and the oils from these, which again affected Gallipoli and whale oil, rose considerably, as did tallow, of which, moreover, there was a very short importa- tion. Silk in Italy, and the vintages in France, were affected by the same cause. There was an extraordinary competition between our government and that of France in the purchase of naval stores in the north of Europe, which raised the prices of hemp, llax, and timber. The prospect of a war between this country and Spain, which broke out in the year following, afferted several descrip- tions of Spanish produce. And as barilla rose, ashes and otlicr alkalies were affected. Colonial produce, of which 371 a scarcity, consequent on the failure of the supplies from St. Domingo, was now felt more generally throughout lui- rope, experienced a fresh rise. There was again, therefore, considerable speculation and enlargement of private paj)er, although, from the absence of so great a facility of credit as had been enjoyed in 1791, there was probably not so great an increase in the circulation. A fresh recoil of prices, fi'om renewed abundance of most articles (colonial pro- duce excepted), occasioned, at the close of 1796, a con- siderable reduction of private paper, and the effect of that reduction in a further fall of prices was increased by a con- traction which at the same time took place in the issues of the Bank of England. Great commercial distress was the consequence, and a low range of prices through 1797 and 1798. In these two last years, however, while most other articles were in a depressed state, colonial produce rose immoderately in consequence of the great speculation in Germany, which I have already had occasion to notice, and which terminated so ruinously in the year following. Ijetween the commencement of 1799 and ISOl a renewed range of high prices is observable. The great scarcity arising from the seasons, the unfavourableness of which again extended over a great part of Europe, affected not only provisions, but all the numerous and important articles which I have before alluded to. And while so many articles were influenced by the seasons, a large and im- portant class of commodities was raised in price by the em- bargo of the emperor Paul in 1800-1, viz. hemp, flax, tallow, bristles, linseed, timber, iron. The extension of private paper naturally arising out of circumstances so favourable to speculation, was checked in its progress by the re-action of the great continental specu- lation at the close of 1799, and by the failures in this country connected with the result of that disastrous speculation : those failures naturally creating a considerable degree of commercial distrust. B B 2 37'2 At the close of IsOl there was a very general tall ot" prices by the coincidence of rencweil abiindancc from a favourable season with the return i)f peace (the preliminaries of which were signed in October of that year), which afford- ed the piospect of future supplies at a reduced cost of im- portation, and which at once withdrew the demand for such articles as were the immediate objects of government expenditure. But a large export, the consequence of an effective demand at low prices for commodities rendered still cheaper to the foreign consumer by the diminished expenses of conveyance, had reduced the stocks of most articles so much that prices were rising at the close of 1 802. Between 1803 and 1807 there was considerable fluc- tuation of particular articles according to the varying as- pect of politics, and according to peculiarities of supply and demand affecting each. But as there was no season of ex- traordinary and general abundance or scarcity (the defi- ciency of corn in 1804 not having been so great as in some former and succeeding instances), there was no general rise or fall of prices ; at the same time it may be observed that, except in the case of such articles as were likely to be ren- dered scarce by the political events then in progress, the tendency was downwards. I have already noticed the great and general advance which took place in 1808, and the subsequent fluctuations accompanied by a great creation and destruction of private paper, and shall not now recur to them, except for the pur- pose of referring the reader to the table of prices and quan- tities, in order that he may see the very great number of articles which participated in the rise, and that he may judge, upon an inspection of the quantities of some of the most important of them, how great a part of the rise was an inevitable consequence of so great a reduction of supply as is observable in that year, combined as the actual scarcity was widi apprehensions of the failure of future supply. The apprehension, which prevailed at intervals, that all future 373 supply might be cut ofT, operated in I'avour of the holders as a temporary monopoly, and there was no assignable limit to the })ossiblc advance till tliat apprehension was removed. The fall of prices between 1809 and 1811 connected with augmented quantities is equally observable. Let the reader look again at the line of quantities in 18 11, and he will be satisfied that there was a sufficient ground for a renewed rise of many articles. But, in this instance, the tendency to speculation was a good deal repressed by the experience of the disasters which had attended the recent speculations in the same articles. All the articles, however, which rose greatly from obstacles to importation in 1811-12 fell thenceforward as the obstacles were removed or dimi- nished, notwithstanding that the war continued and that the depreciation of paper was going on. From the close of 1812 to the summer of ISlt a distinct but numerous and important class of articles which had been most depressed between 1808 and 1812 experienced a great rise; it was, as has already been stated, a rise founded on the speculation or anticipation of the opening of new markets of indefinite extent in the event of a peace. The amount of the exports of the two most important of those articles, viz. coffee and sugar, which may be seen b}' the table of exports, will give some idea of the extent of that speculation. The i-caction from that speculation and the decline of prices, from I'enewed abundance in 181 t and 1815, has already been described. In consequence of the discouragement and despondency arising from so extensive and rapid a fall, there was a ffencral disinclination in 1816 to embark to the accustomed extent in fresh importations. But this state of commercial despondency, which would of itself have led to diminished supplies in 1816, happened to coincide with a very un- favourable season, which occasioned a great deficiency of produce not only in this country but in many other parts 374 of Europe. The inclemency of lliat season occasioned a failure of ihc vintage in France and of the silk crops in Italy, besides directly or indirectly affecting flax, tallow, hops, and numerous other articles. There occurred about the same time an unsuccessful whale fishery. Accordingly the scarcity was very general. There are, indeed, no instances, except those of 1808 and 1811, of a scarcity or falling off so great and so general, of imported com- modities, as in 181G-17. The deficiency is quite striking, upon a reference to those years, in the table of imports ; and several minor articles, not included in that table, were equally deficient. The rise of prices, therefore, between the close of ] 816 and 18 1 S was founded on a great deficiency of actual supply, and it was extended by the spe- culation which 1 have before described, and which, as usual, exaggerated the probable demand, while it underrated the eventual su})ply. That speculation proceeded, in a great measure, on the idea that the prices which had recently prevailed were the result only of sales that had been forced by distress, and that the future level would be considerably higher. Tiie operation of the Corn Bill, too, was inter- preted to be in favour of a renewed level of high prices. The season of i 8 1 8 contributed, as 1 have before stated, to extend the range of miscalculation. Confidence, there- fore, in the maintenance of high prices led to the very large imports in 1818; and the payment to be made for those greatly increased imports, including corn, naturally im- proved the demand, and contributed to raise the price of exportable commodities. Accordingly there were few arti- cles, whether of export or import, that did not participate in the advance at some period between the close of 1816 and that of 1818. The rate of freights, and consequently the value of shipping, were raised at the same time by the greatly increased demand for tonnage to convey the corn, and the many other bulky articles, which constituted the very large importations of 1 8 1 8. 375 It would be superfluous to take any further notice of the low range of prices between 1818 and the close of 1822, as this period has already been so much dwelt upon in the preceding pages of this work ; and I have only further to request the attention of the reader to the greatly increased importation of those articles which have experienced the greatest depression. SJC) SECTION V. Conclusion. The general conclusion to be deduced from the de- tailed statements which I have given of the principal cir- cumstances that have affected the bullion-prices of each of the articles enumerated in the tables, combined with a re- ference to the particular periods when a rise or full, nearly simultaneous, of the mojority of those articles, was observ- able, is That the relatively high bullion-prices of articles divested of taxation, and not the object of immediate war expen- diture, during the twenty years ending with the close of 1812, may be ascribed to the following general causes: The frequent recurrence of seasons of an unfavourable character. The destruction of one great source of supply (St. Do- mingo) ; and prohibitions or obstructions of export from others. The increased cost of importation, by higher freights and insurance, incidental to a state of war generally, and aggra- vated, in an extraordinary degree, by the peculiar character of commercial hostility and exclusion which characterized the last six years of the late war. And that the causes of the decline, which dates from 1813-14, and has continued, after an intermediate rise in consequence of the extensive scarcity of 1816-17, till the close of 1 822, may be classed under the following heads : A succession of more favourable seasons, which have de- veloped the effects of an extended and improved cultivation in this country, and in many other parts of the commercial world. 377 The icmoval of obtnclcs from the several sources of foreign supply ; a great extension of some of them ; and the discovery of new ones, A reduced cost of importation, by the low freights and insurances incidental to a state of peace. Improvements in machinery, in chemistry, and minera- l^cry, tending to reduce the cost of production of numerous articles, or to provide cheaper substitutes. These causes, separately and collectively, account fur so large a proportion of the phenomena of the high and low prices of the last thirty years, as to leave no ground for im- puting to the alterations in the system of our currency any effect beyond the diflerence between paper and gold; or to war demand any influence except in the case of ai'ticlcs which are the immediate objects of government expenditure. Indeed, from reference, wliether to particular facts, as of dates, prices, and quantities ; or to reasoning upon general principles, it is so clear that neither the alterations in the system of our currency, beyond the difference between paper and gold, nor the government expenditure, can have had the influence, so commonly ascribed to them, on the aggregate of prices, divested of taxation, that if any con- siderable part of the variations of the level, in the respective periods, did not admit of being accounted for by the cir- cumstances which I have stated, both generally and in de- tail, there would be no alternative in my opinion but to infer an alteration in the quantity of the precious metals in Europe. But there will be no reason for resorting to that inference, if the causes which have been adduced in the course of the present examination be considered adequate to have produced the effects assigned to them. On the supposition therefore of the sufficiency of those causes to account for the whole difference of prices, it will follow, in as far as there may be any ground of direct information on which to found a belief that the supplies from the mines have varied considerably, either that the variations of supply, 378 however apparently large, have been in a very small propor- tion to the whole mass of the metals; or that circum- stances, affecting the distribution and functions of the metals, and the proportion of paper and credit in the commercial world, at the several periods, have compensated for the variation in quantity, and prevented any sensible influence on prices. 379 SUPPLEMENTARY SECTION. On the Variations in the Produce of Gold and Silver from the South American Mines. From the great influx and accumulation of silver in the markets of Europe, in 1821 and 1822, most of the mer- chants in the bullion trade, with whom I conversed on the subject, were of opinion that the produce of the mines in South America had increased; and this increase was ac- counted for by the supposition that the steam-engines, which had been sent out some years befoi'e, were already in extensive operation. Upon these grounds, I was disposed to acquiesce in the conclusion of an increased produce, and I stated an opinion to that effect in the first edition of the present work. But from subsequent information, I am quite satisfied that the opinion which I then entertained and expressed was erroneous, and that there is sufficient authority to put beyond question the fact that, instead of an increase, there has of late years been a decided diminution of produce from the mines of Spanish America, more espe- cially from those of Mexico, which constitute by far the largest sources of the total supply. Mr. Jacob, who is advantageously known to the public by his travels and statistical researches*, and who is pos- sessed of extensive and apparently accurate information relating to South America, has favoured me with a com- * A View of the Agriculture, Manufactures, Statistics, &c, of Germany, Holland, and France, taken during a Journey through those Countries in 1819, by W. .Jacob, Esq. F.R.S, Mr. Jacob is likewise the author of several other works, and among them of the article " Mexico," in the Supplement to the Eacyclopgedia Britannica. 380 munication in which, after noiicinii the error into which I had fallen, he gives a detailed and elaborate statement of the produce of gold and siher in Spanish America and the Brazils, for some years antecedent and subsequent to 1810, in order to prove the great foiling off that has taken place since that time. According to that statement, the annual supply of gold and silver from the mines of America was, on an average, nearly as follows : 1800 to ISIO. 1810 to 1821. Dollars. Dollars. Mexico 30,000,000 8,000,000 Peru 5,480,000 2,000,000 Buenos Ayres 3,610,000 l,r)00,000 ciiiii 8(;(;,ooo 800,000 New Grenada 2,735,000 2,000,000 Brazil 4,3 10,000 1 ,730,000 47,001,000 10,030,000^ This estimate of the produce before 1810, exceeds the computations made by Humboldt, by Storch, and by the * In the Quarterly Review, No. LTX, article " Mexico," is tlic following quotation of the words of Alainan, minister of finance in Mexico, confirming die fact and explaining tlie causes of tlie faliing off of the produce of the mines since 1810 : " Unfortunately, the revolution of the year 1810 began in the districts in which the richest mines are situated, and their pro- prietors were its first victims. By tlie massacre of some, by the ruin of others from the war and tlie excessive requisitions, by the scarcity of money and the consequent want of utensils and necessaries to continue the works, they ceased, as it were, almost in a moment. The celebrated vein of Guanaxuato, without its ores being impoverished, only gave out, in 1818^ 150,000 marcs of silver and 400 of gold ; whereas its product before the year 1810 was greater than all the mines of Peru together, amounting to 000,000 marcs of silver, and 2000 of gold. In the Mint at Mexico, in 1821, there was coined only 0,000,000 dollars ; where- as previously to 1810, from 25,000,000 to 2b,000,OUO had been 381 autlioritics quoted in the I>ullion Report, none of which state it higher than about 41,000,000 of dollars; and the subsc- aunuaJly coined. Tlie inundation of the mines has been tlic inevitable consequence of their abandonment during the war. The working of them cannot he resumed until the water has been discliarged j and to effect thatj the miners of Mexico, poor in the midst of riches, have neither the machines required to accomplisli it, nor the capitals to procure them." The writer of the article in the Review goes on to say : " In a report from the city of Mexico in 1813, it is stated, that the amount of silver brought to the Mint in the year 1811 was but 3,500,000, and by another, that of the following year, that it amounted to 2,000,000, which was partly from the requisitions made from all the plate of individuals and communities. From the- opinion of those Mexicans who are likely to be best in- formed of the state of their country, we have some reason to conclude, that the average annual product of the several years from 1813 to 1820 was not more than from 4,000,000 to 4,500,000. In 1821, the duty on silver having been reduced from 17 to 3 per cent, in that year, partly owing to such reduction, and partly to the appearance of security to property being restored, the amount of the precious metals increased to more than 5,500,000, and in the next year, 1822, after Iturbide had been proclaimed emperor, to 7,000,000." On each of the other sources of the metals included in the com- parative statement in the text, Mr. Jacob makes the following remarks : ** Of Peru, the produce could only be guessed at from knowing that some of the mines in the south had been stopped since 1811, and that the mines of Pasco, for which the steam-engines had been contracted, had yielded very little. "^ Buenos Ayres was the scene of ravaging wars from 1810, and chiefly in the mining districts. When Pueyredon seized on La Paz and Potosi, in 1811, none of the mines there were at work. " By recent accounts from Chili, the produce of the mines there is stated to be reduced to less than 200,000 dollars. " liy a rei)ort presented to the Congress from tiie Executive Ciovernmcnt of New Granada, it appears, and it is stated boast- 382 quent falling off goes much beyond what is computed in another statement, which has since been communicated to me from a person well versed in the statistics of South America ; but I am disposed to admit that Mr. Jacob's authority carries with it so much weight as to entitle his statement to be received as a nearer approximation to the truth, on a point which does not admit of being precisely ascertained, than is conveyed by any other estimate that I have seen. Mr. Jacob adds, that the produce of the years from 1817 to 1821 was much below the average of the eleven years, and that he believes the falling off in the supply of the precious metals in the twelve years ending 18'22, as compared with the preceding period of the same length, to have amounted to 360,000,000 dollars, which at 4.S'. the dollar, makes 72,000,000/. of sterling money. ^\ssuming the defalcation to be to this extent, the estimate of its operation on prices may be formed on the same grounds as those on which I proceeded in estimating the effect of the disengagement and reabsorption of an amount of from 1 2 to J 5 millions of pounds sterling, by the Bank re- striction and resumption of cash payments; the only difl'er- ence being in degree. On the same grounds then as those upon which it was inferred at page 23 that although, in the ingly, that the working of the miiics has been resumed, and iu the year 1822 produced 1,270,000 dollars. " The state of the Brazil gold washings (and there are no mines worked) is traced from the periodical Portuguese work ' Coreo Brasiliense,' and is confirmed by Adrian Balbi in his ' Essai Statistiquc/ as well as by Koster and other later travellers." In conclusion of his note, dated 14tli May, 1824, communicating the above remarks, explanatory of the comparative statement in the text which I had received from him some months before, Mr. Jacob adds : "I am satisfied that my statement of the produce from 1810 to 1821, is too high, and I should not now, if I were to make the estimate, take the annual average higher tlian 12,000,000 dollars." 383 absence of any sufficient data for computation, it might be unsafe to name any sum as an approach to the value of the whole mass of the precious metals, there would be no hazard in assuming it in general terms to be so large, that an addition to or abstraction from it of 12 to 15 millions, other things remaining the same, would barely make one per cent, and certainly not two per cent, difference in their value; it may be presumed, that a defalcation of 72 millions would barely make six per cent, and certainly not twelve per cent, addition to their value. To this extent it must be admitted that the falling oft" of the produce of the mines, assuming it to be to the amount stated, is calculated, all other things being the same, to have depressed bullion prices. A great difficulty, however, which I feel in allowing for the operation of this cause, to the extent here supposed, is, that the difference in the quantity of commodities, and in the circumstances affecting the contingent, as well as actual supply, compared with the average rate of consumption at the several periods under consideration, accounts fully for the difference of bullion prices. And the only mode of solving this difficulty is by the supposition, in the concluding part of this work, that circumstances affecting the functions of the metals in their various capacities, and in their distri- bution among all the nations of the world, may have been such as to have operated hitherto in preventing any marked difference from being felt in the bullion prices of Europe from the diminution, great as it appears to have been, in the produce of the Spanish American mines. The existence of some of the circumstances of the de- scription here alluded to may be distinctly traced. Such, for instance, is the diminution or cessation within the last four years of the drain of silver from hence to the East Indies and China, and an inversion of the stream, by an importation which is still taking place from the East Indies into this country. At the same time, the importation of the metals from iSouth America has been considerable, from the very circumstances, connected with the disturbed state of that country, which have diminished the produce of the 884 mines. Mr. Jacob states, as relating to Spanish America, that " much of the silver which the circulation required in those countries was sent away, as the scenes of hostility became extended, and they now all have paper money.'"' In Brazil, the government has more recently resorted to a very extensive issue of paper money. Other circum- stances calculated to swell the importation of the metals into Europe are stated in the following extract, which I make from a written communication on the subject, by a gentle- man (a native of Teru) to whom I have alluded at the commencement of this section. — " The immense emigration that has taken place among the old Spaniards has brought over to Europe immense capitals, which otherwise never would have come ; many of them till then buried in the ground, and which had been accumulating in a dormant state for many years; a portion of them, indeed a con- siderable one, not of modern coinage." " Tliat luxury which formerl}^ existed in South America previous to the war, in gold and silver plate of the most massive kind, as well in private houses as in the churches, has disappeared. Most of those rich utensils have lately been melted down. This the Spaniards have always done where they have been able to conquer, seize, and confiscate ; and the South Americans have frequently given up their valuables volun- tarily to meet the exigencies of the state, and of the cause in which they were engaged. These sums have eventually entered into circulation, and have disappeared ; being brought away by Europeans. South America has, in fact, been drained of her specie and precious metals to pay for war supplies and the increased wants of the natives ; but in this Europe has been benefited, at least as far as the re- ceipt of precious metals goes. All this has brought a large influx of precious metals to England, as well as the other competing countries ; but more to England, in consequence of the greater safety in shipping specie on board British men of war stationed in every part of South America, chiefly occupied in conveying money to England." On these grounds, I am still inclined to question whether 385 tlicro mny not have been some increase, or at least, not any decided fallinjT off, in the quantity of the precious metals in l^nrope of late years, notwithstanding an acknowledged falling off in the produce of the mines. In no other way can I account for the circumstance, that the depression of bullion prices since the time when the alleged defalcation of the produce of the mines maybe sup- posed to have produced its full effect, has not been greater than can be distinctly explained, as has been done, by a re- ference in the case of each particular commodity, to quantity compared with the average rate of consumption. If then the depression is adequately accounted for by the quantities, and the quantities again are accounted for by the different circumstances affecting their production and importation, there is no room to assign any part of the depression to the deficiency of the supply of the metals from the mines, although it must be admitted that, all other circumstances being the same, if the produce of the mines had not fallen off, bullion prices would now be higher in some proportion to the larger supply of the metals. There is yet another point of view in which the question may be placed, and from which the same inference may be drawn of the absence of any very sensible effect of the variation of the produce of the mines of South America on the fluctuations of bullion prices, during the interval under consideration. From a reference to the coinage of JMexico, which constituted nearly two-thirds of all that was coined at the royal mints in Spanish America, it appears, that the increase from 1793 to 1810 was not in a greater ratio than the increase between 1782 and 1793, nor nearly so great as the ratio of increase of the twenty years preceding 1782 *. * Account of the Co'mage of Mexico. Total gold and silver dollars- 17G3 to 1772 annual avcra^•c - 13,074,494 1773 to 1782 - - ^ - 18,337,203 1783 to 1792 - - - 20,135,340 1793 to 1802 - - - 22,175,254 1803 to 1810 - - - 23,909,898 Tl'.c above account^ do.vn to 1792, is extracted fiom tlic \\.- c c 38() Now there was no iidvancc of general prices distinctly per- ceptible or worth mcntioninfr between 1782 and 17i)3. The speculations in 17*JI were clearly connected with the revo- lution in St. Domingo (as affecting sugar and coffee), and with the agitated state of politics in Europe: but diere was a reaction from those speculations which, as we have already seen, left the prices of a great proportion of commodities at the close of 1792, and through the whole of 1793, lower than they had been on the average of the ten preceding years. This fall and low range of prices in 1792 and 1793 is the more remarkable, because it occurred coincidently with a circumstance which of itself was apparently calcu- lated to produce a contrary effect. The circumstance to which I allude is that of the memorable issue of assignats in France, at the commencement of the revolution in that country. The tendency of that measure was to banish gold and silver from circulation : and I believe that in point of fact there was very little, if any, coin in circulation at the period when the system of terror and of paper were at their height, which was in 1792 and 1193. It is probable that some portion of the coin displaced by the paper was re- tained in a dormant state in France, but there can be no doubt that a considerable proportion must have been brought away, as the most valuable and portable descrij> pendix to the Bullion Report of 1810. From 1793 to 1810, is taken from a statement in the Courier Newspaper of January 2, 1824, purporting to be extracted from the Consulado, published at Vera Cruz. The presumption in favour of the accuracy of this statement is, that the sums contained in it for the years preceding 1793, exactly correspond with those for the same years inserted in the Bullion Report. It is to be observed, that as Mr. .Jacob estimates the produce of the Mexican mines, from 1800 to 1810, to have averaged thirty millions of dollars, he must suppose tliat nearly seven millions evaded the tax. A proportionate allowance, therefore, according to the amount of the tax, is to be made for the period antecedent to 1793. 387 tion of property, by the numerous emigrants from thence to the other parts of Europe, and chiefly to this country ; besides that the export of coin is in general a necessary effect through the medium of the exchanges, of an excessive and compulsory issue of inconvertible paper. The quantity of coin circulating in France is stated in the Supplement to the Encyclopajdia Britannica, article *' Monej'," on the authority of Peuchet, to be abouL 74- millions sterling. Sup- posing, therefore, that only about one half of the coin was exported from thence, it would amount to a sum of no less than nearly -lO millions of gold and silver suddenly added to the circulation of the rest of the world, and in the first instance to that of the rest of Europe. To this vast amount of gold and silver in the shape of coin, must be added a great quantity of plate, church and private, which must have found its way out of France about the same period. If, then, there was no distinctly perceptible increase of the bullion prices of commodities, notwithstanding a progressive increase of produce of the metals from the mines, and not- withstanding a sudden addition of about 40 millions disen- gaged from the circulation of France, down to the close of 1793, is it not a fair inference, if not an inevitable conse- quence that, the ratio of increased produce from the mines not being greater from 171)3 to 1814, no part of the rise of metallic prices in that interval can be ascribed to that in- creased produce ? But this inference is rendered still stronger, if that be possible, by the consideration that the first great rise of prices, viz. in 17^5 and 1796, occurred coincidcntly with circumstances which must have occasioned a reabsorption into France of a considerable proportion of the metals which had been disengaged from thence. For although the assignats were not suppressed immediately after the fall of Robespierre and the system of terror, in ]7yi<, they were soon after replaced by new forms of paper, mandats, Stc, and these becoming of more difficult circu- lation, were gradually replaced by coin. The complete restoration of a metallic currency was effected before 888 the time of Bonaparte's accession, at the close of 1799, when the prices of corn and other commodities in this country, and throughout Europe, had experienced a still greater rise. The great rise, therefore, of prices in 1795 and 1796, and again in 1799 and 1800, was in spite of an abstraction of an amount of the metals from general circulation much greater than could be replaced by an in- crease within the same time from the mines, even with the addition in the latter years of the amount of coin disengaged by the Bank restriction. Nothing, indeed, can be more striking than this circumstance, viz the little observable in- fluence on prices from the disengagement and reabsorption of a metallic currency in France, in favour of the presumption that the amount of the metals, in general use and circulation, is so large as to make considerable variations in the supply not only of particular years, but of periods of some length, nearly imperceptible in their effects on general prices. Inde- pendent, however, of the argument to be derived from these considerations, against the inference of any effect from the in- creased produce of the mines, on the advance ofprices between 1793 and IS 14, the whole scope of the reasonings founded on facts, brought forward in the course of this work has been to assign causes fully adequate to account for that advance ofprices, without the supposition of any influence from an increased quantity of the metals. If, therefore, there is not sufficient ground, from the rate of increase of the produce of the mines, to infer any marked influence from that cause, on the rise of prices between 1793 and 1814, and if sufficient other causes may be, and have been adduced, to account for the whole of that rise, it seems to follow that the mere ab- straction or cessation of those causes other than the value of the metals would leave prices to subside to the level of what they were in IT92, or in the interval between 1783 and 17D2 ; and that it is only for a fall below that level, in cases in which the decline cannot be accounted for by the seasons, by greater facility of produciion, or by other causes affecting each particular commodity, that we have occasion 38} ) to resort to the supposition of any influence by an alteration in the quantity of the metals. Now, as in most cases, that I am aware of, in which a fall of price below the level of 1792 and 1793, or of the average between 17^3 and 1793, has taken place, the decline may be explained by circumstances peculiar to the commodity, the conclusion is still the same, that no direct influence of the defalcation of the produce of the mines is to be traced in the late fall of prices; and that consequently the presumption must be either that the mass of the metals is so large as to render what might otherwise appear to be considerable variations of su})ply imperceptible in general prices, or that circumstances affecting their func- tions and distribution have counterbalanced those varia- tions. But although I am disposed to think that the diminished produce of the mines of America has not, on the grounds which I have stated, operated in any sensible degree in the depression of prices since 1814, I do not, by any means, underrrate the importance of the fact of the diminution of the quantity of the metals, supposing it to be to any diing near the extent stated by ]\Ir. Jacob. The circumstances which have counterbalanced the effect of that diminution on the bullion prices of Europe may cease to operate, and may be succeeded by others of an opposite description. There may be a renewed export to India, and there may be a reflux to South America*. Independent, however, of these possible causes of drain of the metals out of Europe, the mere continuance of the defalcation of fresh supplies from the mines would be calculated, at no remote period, to be felt in a depression of bullion prices below the lowest rate at which we have seen them since the close of the war. For there is this important distinction between the effects of an increase and of a diminution of the average annual supply * Considerable sliipments of silver are now (May, 1824) making to Columbia in part of the instalment on the large loan lately negotiated for the government of that country 5 and similar shipments liavc recently been made to Mexico. .>!)0 t)f ihc metals. In the case of an augmented produce iVoni the mines, the progressive increase of consumption for pur- poses otlicr than those of money is calculated, in the advance of wealth and luxury, to diminish or neutralize the ellect on prices, whereas, in the case of a diminislied produce, if the consumption for other purposes which had previously ab- sorbed the annual increase continues at its former rate, the whole of the diminution must fall on that portion which is destined to act as money. But supposing a total cessation of fresh supplies, while the consumption for plate and plating were undiminished *, the value of metallic money would rise in a rapidly increasing ratio ; and the effect of that increased value would be felt in a fall of prices not to be accounted for by corresponding alterations in the increased quantity of commodities, or in the increased facility of the production of them. From the great efforts wiiich are now in progress for the application of British capital and machinery to some of the principal mines of Spanish America, it is possible that the produce from them may, at no distant period, be re- stored to what it was before 1810; and if once restored, it may be presumed that, from the improved knowledge of mining, with the aid of machinery of the highest powers, the increase of the precious metals may be so gi'eat as de- cidedly to outrun the rate of consumption for plate and ornament, and consequently to diminish their value, or in other words, to raise bullion prices. In the mean time, however, it is not impossible that the existing defalcation may be felt in a further fall of prices. In this view of the effects of the variations in the produce * It may be said that the consumption for phitc and plating and and Dr. Fiichs, Professor of Medicine at the University of Cassan, have just made ajourncv to Mount Oural, which will promote the interests of science as well as those of the government. These two gentlemen visited the gold mines, which have been discovered within these three years. They have discovered that the mines which are situated to the east of Mount Oural are much richer than those of the opposite side. The former extend from Verkhoturie as far as the source of the river Oural. But the places where the gold is found most abundantly is between Nijne Tajilskoi and Kouseh- toumkoi, in a space of about 300 versts, or 200 English miles. These mines are near the surface, and the golden earth is several arc/lines, each archine is 28 inches in depth. The gold is ob- tained by washing the earth, and this labour is so easy, that it is performed solely by boys. The metal is formed in separate grains, sometimes in large pieces, or masses, weighing six may-cs. 39^2 l}nt in general five zn/nfnic.';, or ribout 15 pennyweights, arc ob- tained from a hundred putids of earth, or r)'200ll)S. troy. The proportion being 1 in 83,200. A single ])ropriet()r, Mr. do Jakow- lefiT, on whose estates tlic richest mines have been discovered, will send this year about 30 poudM (hKJOlbs. troy) of gold to the mint at Petersburg. The other mines of Oural will furnish altogether about 130 jiouds (firCOlbs. troy.) This is, however, only the coniincncement of working the mines. Doctor Fuchs writes, that the gold appears to have been originally combined with the greenstone of Werner, with schistous talc, serpentine, and grey iron J and that these substances having been decomposed, have left the gold by itself." The mercantile advices from St. Petersburg concur in attach- ing considerable importance to this circumstance. In some of the letters which I have seen, it is stated that the supply of iron in Russia is likely to be diminished in consequence of the proprie- tors of some of the iron mines finding a more advantageous em- ployment of their capital by working the gold mines, which have been found on their estates. APPEN DIX TO PART I. APPENDIX TO PAPvT I. No. I. Account (ifthe average market price of Gold, and average per cent, of the value of the currency at the market price of Gold, J^rom February \800 to February 1821, extractedfrom Mr. Mushefs Tables. Average market Average per Cent, of the value of the price of Gold per ounce from Feb. 1800 to I8'il. Currency at the market price of Gold. L. s. d. L. s. d. 1800 3 17 m aar. 1 4 5 91 12 4 2 4 4 92 14 2 3 *4 97 6 10 4 4 97 6 10 5 4 97 6 10 6 4 97 6 10 7 4 97 6 10 8 4 97 6 10 9 4 97 6 10 1810 4 10 86 10 6 11 4 4 6 92 3 2 12 4 15 6 79 5 3 13 5 1 77 2 14 5 4 74 17 6 15 4 13 6 83 5 9 16 4 13 6 83 5 9 17 4 97 6 10 18 4 97 6 10 19 4 1 6 95 11 1820 3 19 11 97 8 1 3 17 lOi 3ar. * By the evidence of Mr. Goldsmid, before the Bullion Com- mittee 1810, the market price of Gold was stated to be 41. per oz, from 1803 to 1809. No. II. A Calculation of the Quuntily of Silver and Gold in England, France, and Holland, in Europe, and in the World in general, and of I he Increaie and Consumption thereof, Anno 1688. (Extracted from a MS.* dated 1696, in the British Museum, Bib. Harl. No. 1898, Plut.':^ C. p. 82.) This calculation is built upon this hypothesis : 1. That the silver and gold in Europe at the discovery of y*" West Indies, near 200 years ago, was but 1.5 millions sterling, but is now about 5 times as much, or 22;) millions. 2. That there has been 520 millions of silver and gold imported into Europe from America, Avithin these last 180 years, besides what has been produced in Europe, or imported into it from Asia and Africa. Whereby the account of Europe stands thus : The existing stock of silver and gold in Europe 180 years ago 45 mills, sterl. Produced in Europe within these last 180 years 8 mills. Imported into Europe from Asia in manu- factures 2 mills. From Africa in gold dust, &c 15 mills. From America in specie 520 mills. In all 5!)0 mills. * Entitled Natural and Politicall Observations and Conclusions upon the State and Condition of J^ngland, by Gregory King, Esq. Lancaster H. Whereof 545 millions having been produced in Europe or im- ported into it within these last 180 years, viz. In the first eighty years, 205 mills, or 2,5(10,000/, p. ann. And in the last hundred years, 340 mills, or 3,400,000/, p, ann. We may conclude, that the existing stock of silver and gold in Europe, Being 200 years ago, 45 mills. Was 100 years ago, 100 mills. And is at present, 225 mills. It has increased : In y*^ first 80 years 55 mills, or 700,000/. p. ann. In ye last 100 years 125 mills, or 1,250,000/. p. ann. 180 mills. So this last 100 years Europe has Produced and imported 340 mills, or 3,400,000/, p, ann. Increased 125 mills, or 1,250,000/. p. ann. Consumed and exported 215 mills, or 2,150,000/. p. ann. Now before we come to the particulars how this 215 millions in gold and silver has been consumed in Europe within this last 100 years, we shall consider in what the 225 millions, which we estimate to be the present stock of Europe, in gold and silver, and things made thereof, doth consist, viz. Coyned silver Coyned gold Bullion Lay plate Church plate Medals and rarities Gold and silver thread ') and wire, and things > made thereof in wear ) Do. in stock for trade.., In England, In France. L. L. 8,500,000 3,000,000 1,000,000 4,000,000 200,000 200,000 400,000 200,000 18,000,000 5,000,000 1,500,000 9,000,000 3,000,000 900,000 1,400,000 G00,000 In Holland. L. 7,000,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 1,500,000 100,000 300,000 100,000 300,000 225 mills. 17,500,000 39,400,000 12,800,000 B 2 Whereupon we have estimated the consumption of y' 315 millions of gold and silver in Europe within this last 100 years, which is 3,150,000/. per ann. as foUoweth : w WM rr f w iquid gold and uried and los known how , xported out c rope by trade, c 5' c p^ Wire eaf and shell g silver ^3 ^ p 05 O thewearof w plate the wear of a? '^^ en P o S* • ^ • O : s^ ! 5' yr the wear of sil the wear of gi waste in coy D D en P ' 2- • • S '. • p • O p i. 3 ■1 • C • c CD 2 o ; c o T - _ C/1 ■ ° I en fc J : ^ O o . 3 3 '■v^ P ^^V'^'>rf ^^ P o P o p f P p GC p P P P 55 S S HM o o o O O O o B" o 5- o o o o o o B-5-B- •tS s S" ►^ o "C TS •T3 "s t; "o p - P ■-1 o p P -1 P ►1 p P p )-4 o o o Ot o o O o o o » "*> »». o ►*» O •-^ ►*> '-'s •-^ ■-»> "^ P to O w^ J^ o Ci lO — ^ o o o fcO o Oi o> to to GO O 3. s. B. 3. 3 5 3.3 3, pr t^ £; ,►— 1=: G K ES C3 « ST en m en en en en en <0 K) W Cn O O O tn Oi O O O O O "o O O O O O O O O O O O o o o o o o o ►- to I— . o OD o r*< GO to to O o o ooo o o o o o o o ooo w to o to .^^ C^' ^ j^ o o O' ooo o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o O Oi K) O tn O O i-'i o o o o o o o o o o o >— to — to o o Ci o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o oioor" o o o o o o o oo o O t»3 to o Oi to Oi OT "VI 00 Whereby it appears that the two principall articles by which the gold and silver of Europe is consumed, is in things made of gold and silver thread and wire, and in coyn or bullion ex- ported in trade; these two articles alone being 7 parts in 8 of the whole consumption of the gold and silver of Europe. As to the world in general, I compute the existing stock 180 years ago at 500 mills. The produce this last 180 years, 1200 millions: the consumption 850 mills. The increase 350 millions, which added to the 500 millions, make y*^ present stock 850 mills. S ^ Si KS W 5-^ H H i r„ St: H ^ i^ 3 • Part te of ni excess o 3 S. g- — *< T" " s • TJ5 3 t3 O 1 1 O '^ he records portations : iportation ' 5' r- p- r i:i C-" f« t^ re 00 tc tc Oi to "^ (30 o 00 < o'^ t;T cr: C O Oi 11% 00 >t. " ^ CO — ^ 4i to oc J- CJ vj Tc to In 1 k: CO ^ crs C/i Cn 00 tc to t, S te) ^ to : ^00 to — KC Ci ^ n n •T3 /» 3 TZ" 1 to oo _ f? ? 35 w 1 4^ 00 o» 00 2. 5 » .u ^ vj ^ 7" o E.|o *. V *. 00 to 00 4- b ' u to — — vj Uj — 4- VI CO — to ' — ^ - O *- c: c *- &a tn Ol lO CO C IC — o CO E o C tc c — tC CO Ol w O' OJ j/C _*. jt. to ! C IC CI Oi 1^ CTi Oi Ci "to "to IC 1 vj c^ _ ^ oc V| C I;! O IC CO ►&. 4. s ° CO CJ 4:. CI to Ot 1 CO C-. Ci e 1=^ .^ ,^ _ O M ^ — o> CO >- — 00 "o ? UT o V) w ~. ' cr o 2 S3 J^ C>5 C vl Oi VJ en w •(>• ^ Ci CI *» to CI VJ IC CJ M ^/S 00 — CO CO lo C 00 IC O^ *vj 4U OJ Oi vj — to VJ Or Vc to (0 >-« ^ P o- 00 to c^, r- "c 00 B P oc ►c c 00 CO o o; "< Ni 4^ o to — VJ O C CJ CP <•• o CT) 0-. Cn CO CO CO CO to O &s w^ CO O -t. to VI 00 c:; IC Ci •^ en to to VI to C. VI — g " o- 5" 4- ^ CI Cb 00 to er 00 tc •^ IC — V, CC o 00 to — 00 to c IC O VJ c:i s. to Oi 4- 4- CI 4i. CO — CO ,' . — 4- O. VI C c: en — VI •*,j a'2 oc ic ic o; Ji c VI ^ OC w' en — ce °' « tc CO CO •- 00 00 P 1 CI ^ to CO Co — to IC •— ' en — to c^ o V| f-J^ ^' "vJ — o c ^ 00 ■M ^ tC CO Oi Cl "in 4i * , 5 S J- OI — CO O to cr IC oi oc ^ 3 Ot C-. — to en •^ 00 cc IC Ci 2 S^ w 4- C fC — 00 to 00 — CI 00 en VI q. S 5 to o c: — 00 c; CO PD 1 o Tc J- "c \n Tc 4- to VI ' r^. ^* en Ci cc — VI to to C-. c: s 00 Oi 4^ C tc 4. to IC CO Ot 1 ,"' 4. ^^ r, f* w ■u ■ CO V| VJ ^G VI c — to C — OD a w 3 >;> vj Ci o 00 to to 00 o S — S-^ - S5 oc _U' tj' C5 p to 00 o c^-« ji o 00 ot C5 CO "vj'*. to cc i?- D T s; ■1. VI Co U VJ O C 32 25 65 Dcccinl)cr 7 50 5 1)0 6 5 31 25 50 It is to be observed that 1000 francs in bars (gold bul- lion) are at a greater premium than 1000 francs in gold coin. In France a kilogramme of gold J'^ fine is coined into 155 pieces of 20 francs, or 3100 francs ; but only 309 1 of these francs arc given to the person who carries, the kilogramme to the mint to be coined. The par price of a kilogramme of bar gold is not 3100 francs, but 3091 ; consequently a buyer of a kilogramme of bar gold in the French market, at 5 per mil. premium, must pay 3100*5 francs for it; but when he buys 155 pieces of 20 francs, which also weigh a kilogramme, at 2| per mil. premium, he must pay 3107*7 francs for them, so that weight for weight a kilogramme of bar gold at 5 per mil. premium, is rather cheaper than a kilo- gramme of coined gold at 2^ per mil. A kilogramme of silver _?_ fine is coined into 200 francs, of which three are retained at the mint for coining the kilogramme. Silver is to gold, in the French coins, as 1 to 15| j but as 197 is the par price of a kilogramme of silver, and 3091 the par price of a kilogramme of gold, silver is to gold really as 1 to 15_19_. 1 o o' In England an ounce of gold is coined into 934^ pence ; but one ounce of standard gold contains 440 grains of pure gold ; 444 grains of pure gold are coined into 943 pence. An ounce of standard silver contains 444 grains of pure silver, which is coined into 62 pence. Silver is to gold in England, when at par, as 1 to \5~1^. One ounce troy is equal to 31*08 grammes. In France the mint constantly buy gold and silver to coin it on their own account, which they can do to more advantage than an individual, because there is an allowance for remedy, of which they can avail themselves, and the expense may not be so great as the law allows. Gold coin, and that by retail, is only at a premium in France at this time of 2^ per mil. ; in the price-current it is marked 1-50 to 2. When silver in bars is at a premium of 1 f. 50 c. per mil., it may, in fact, be at par, or rather under par ; for the mint may possibly have a profit in buying bar silver at 1 1 per mil. which amounts to 986 f. 50 c. per mil,, and which they can issue for 1000 frs. 10 There lias been Cdiiietl in the mints of France — Gold. 1818, Frs. 125,900,000 1819, 51,900,000 1820, 27,000,000 1821, 400,000 1822, 4,718,100 1823, 408,180 Silver. 25,;)00,000 2 1 ,S()(),()00 18,700,000 66,700,000 100,669,314 82,911,680 11 No. V. An Account of the Average Prices of Grain -per Quarter, in Eng- land and Wales, on \st Januarij and \st JuUj, in each Year, from 1/92 to 1819;, hoth inclusive. — (Commons' Report on Re- sutnption of Cash Payments, 1819 — Page 344.) Wheat. Ry e. Barley. Oats. Beans. Peas. Oat- meal. s. d. s. d. s. d. S. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. 1 792. Jan. 1, 42 4 30 2 27 2 17 u 31 8 32 10 33 9 Julyl, 39 2 29 24 8 17 8 30 30 10 32 9 1 793. Jan. \, A7 2 33 8 29 10 18 6 34 8 35 '36 11 July I, 51 3 37 1 32 3 23 5 38 7 38 3 42 9 1794. Jan. 1, 49 8 36 5 33 5 22 1 40 10 41 4 39 3 July 1, 51 8 37 9 31 8 22 1 40 9 41 10 37 11 1795. Jan. 1, 55 7 39 4 34 2 21 11 45 6 51 10 41 July 1, 77 2 57 3 41 10 27 8 47 11 56 10 46 2 1796.Jan. 1, 89 10 54 J 36 7 24 2 43 9 46 8 t6 Julyl, 81 5 46 9 34 3 21 3 39 2 43 1 42 11 1797.Jan. 1, 55 9 35 7 32 3 18 1 31 6 36 6 39 5 July 1, 49 8 29 6 24 4 15 6 24 2 30 10 32 1798.Jan. 1, 51 5 30 10 29 17 9 29 3 33 36 11 Julyl, 50 4 31 1 29 4 22 7 30 8 32 9 38 7 1799. Jan. 1, 49 2 32 3 29 4 19 7 32 5 35 9 38 8 July 1, 64 4 44 6 35 11 30 3 42 8 45 46 2 1800. Jan. 1, 92 7 59 10 45 11 32 5 63 1 59 2 61 5 July 1, 134 5 88 1 69 1 51 1 79 6 78 10 83 5 1801. Jan. 1, 139 92 2 80 11 43 11 78 7 84 3 74 8 Julyl, 129 8 84 1 69 7 37 2 63 1 68 11 73 9 1802. Jan. 1, 75 6 48 2 44 23 4 44 7 44 3 44 5 July 1, Q7 5 42 1 31 3 19 8 34 7 36 37 1803.Jan. 1, 57 1 39 25 7 20 35 39 2 37 1 Julyl, 60 4 36 11 24 9 22 8 34 6 38 11 40 3 1804. Jan. 1, 52 3 32 3 23 11 21 7 37 5 42 3 40 9 July 1 , 52 1 34 27 3 24 1 35 11 38 5 39 6 1805. Jan. 1, 86 2 52 9 43 10 26 11 48 5 51 6 42 6 July 1, 89 58 6 43 6 28 46 11 48 2 44 6 1806. Jan. 1, 7o 11 44 7 37 5 26 7 43 2 42 / 42 10 July 1, 81 10 48 7 37 10 28 9 43 11 42 4 44 7 1807. Jan, 1, 7C^ 9 48 9 40 8 27 8 45 8 48 3 44 3 July 1, 73 5 41 1 36 8 28 6 43 3 50 1 44 9 12 M'heat. Ry e. Barley. Oats. Beans. Peas. Oat- meal. s. d. s. (I. S. dis. d. s. d. s. d.\s. d. 1808.. Tan. 1, 69 5 47 3 39 3 29 S 55 4 71 046 7 July 1 , 81 1 56 2 44 7 38 8 63 3 64 153 1809. Jan. 1, 90 4 59 4 44 6 33 4 64 4 70 151 2 Julyl, 88 1 56 5 44 4 31 11 59 4 61 950 3 1810. Jan. 1, 102 6 59 4 50 6!30 3 56 8 57 5 53 1 July 1, 113 5 64 8 49 9 30 6 56 4 59 654 5 1811. Jan. i. 94 7 51 41 7 26 3 50 4 53 50 f* July 1, 86 11 43 6 38 6 27 5 42 9 44 449 9 1812.Jan. 1, 106 7 55 11 51 4 31 10 57 3 64 8'51 2 July 1, 140 9 90 77 50 8 75 8 72 4'51 6 181 3. Jan. 1, 119 10 82 2 64 2 44 3 87 3 90 248 7 July 1 , 116 3 74 2 57 9 42 10 81 84 145 6 ISM.Jan. 1, 76 7 47 40 7 27 2 52 2 54 536 Julyl, 67 9 41 9 35 25 43 11 47 7,30 8 1815.Jan. 1, 65 8 41 4 32 8 24 4 39 8 44 131 11 Julyl, 67 10 38 11 30 8 25 5 36 2 39 1131 ISlG.Jau. 1, 53 7 34 4 25 11 19 9 31 9 34 027 2 July 1, 73 8 40 2 29 22 3 34 9 34 326 1 1817. Jan. 1, 104 10 63 10 51 11 31 9 61 3 57 9,39 8 July 1, 109 1 65 2 55 6 S9 54 10 52 1 1 44 6 181 8. Jan. 1, 85 4 50 9 45 11 27 10 52 5 51 034. 7 Julyl, 84 4 53 I 48 3 33 57 10 54 136 8 1819.Jan. 1, 78 10 57 9 63 6 35 1 72 3 70 938 6 27th Feb. 1819. (Signed) W. DOWDING. No. VI. Pricps* of Beef and Mutton at Smilhjield Market, to sink the Ojfal, per Stone of Sids. Beef. IMutton. s. d. d. s. ^. *. d. . 1796, 3 to 4 4 3 6 to 5 1797, 3 6 — 4 6 4 4 — 5 1798, 3 — 3 2 3 8 — 4 6 1799, 3 — 4 4 3 — 4 2 1800, 3 6 — 3 4 4 — 5 4 1801, 3 8 — 5 8 5 — 7 1802, 4 6 — 5 8 5 — 7 1803, 4 — 5 6 5 — 6 1804, 4 6 — 5 8 5 — 6 1805, 4 — 5 6 4 4 — 5 6 1806, 4 4 — 5 6 4 8 — 5 8 1807, 4 8 — 5 8 4- — 4 8 1808, 3 6-^5 4 — 5 4 1809, 3 — 5 8 3 4 — 6 1810, 4 8 — 6 4 5 — 6 6 1811, 5 — 6 4 5 4 — 6 8 1812, 5 — 6 4 5 — 6 1813, 5 — 6 4 5 — 6 8 1814, 5 4 — 7 6 — 7 6 1815, 4 4 — 6 4 5 — 6 6 1816, 4 4 — 5 4 4 4 — 5 4 1817, 3 4 — 4 8 3 8 — 4 8 1818, 3 8 — 5 5 — 6 1819, 4 4 — 5 8 5 — 6 1820, 4 4 — 5 4 4 8 — 5 8 1821, 3 8 — 5 4 3 4 — 5 8 1822, 2 8 — 4 2 8 — 4 1823, 2 8—4 2 4 — 3 8 1824, 3 — 4 3 — 3 10 • Extracted from the January Numbers of the Gentleman's Magazine. There are no quotations in it for 1794 and 1795. 14 No. VII. Account of the Number of Commissions of Banlcruptcy issued from 1790 to 1822. Number of com- N^imber of com - missions against missions in each bankers in each Years. year. year. 1790 747 . 1791 769 . 1 1792 934 . 1 1793 . 1,956 . . 26 1794 . 1,041 . 2 1795 879 . 7 1796 954 . 6 1797 1,115 . 3 1798 911 . 3 1799 717 . 6 1800 951 . 8 1801 1,199 . 3 1802 1,090 . 8 1803 . 1,214 . 8 1804 . 1,117 . 6 180.5 1,129 . 9 180G 1,268 . 5 1807 1,362 . 1 1808 1,433 . 5 1809 1,382 . 7 1810 2,314 . 26 1811 . 2,500 . . 4 1812 . 2,228 . . 17 1813 . 1,953 . 8 1814 . 1,612 . 29 1815 2,284 . 26 1816 . 2,731 . . 37 1817 . 1,927 . . 5 1818 1,245 . . 6 1819 . 1,499 . . 1820 . 1,381 . . 1821 . 1,238 . 1822 . 1,094 . . 1823 . 1,070 . . Down to 1018 is extracted from the Appendix to the Lords* Report, p. 426. From that time tlie nmnbers are extracted from the common monthly lists, which do not distinguish the commissions against bankers. 15 O > n > H W 2 "^'aa 5r ^. "^ "^ H J^ ^ " ■^ 1 i a, *- 3" oi tO^»l-iM >^ _»^»H< w « 4^.ii,;i,f-0«00500 — O — — s toWcnooooToo*.cjiosm — Oi m <0*.J_ClX!tOvJccC0— 0»Ji-J ** — wci^*»4-w;oo'. oooiui • CO .^ If. to to ^ CO OOtDO — wiotccoorcM^^ lO (oa;^MoiO — w^otntOi* ^o COtCCCOCOOOi — WO^— CT> ^»= in C»4-Wai03O*.— oooco p- ooooocooooooc M>t^i|^^4^4:.>fk,(kj^bTi^C;fi«^^ bj ^ootcJ»*.>:i*.tocx)OOWO?' ^ C009.^MU4:k4A.t^^^0TCnUT^ § Ji(XC^(XO>OOJOitO"-JU"-?' c CJ5 W —> 4i*.aT.UlCO«>0 — — Ki— so a 0iJ:^0i05*.OC)i:jil0C0O^*0l 52, OlOOJi^*^10CntO — LOOltO o ';do— 'O^00,;»*.4^Cn WC^ — ^IOOO»ICO^*O^JC5 4k oo*^oo«ooo~oooo COOJMUUWMMMM>^.^.(^^ td 04iOtO"-.^it»OT05«OOOOP^ CUU>COMK3MMC;>CUW>(:^>|:^U«> tij c' OSO^-OOWJ^OOtnOOlT'?' Ci w a> ^OiOl^bSO — WOIO — — — s o ^ — oooO\«o — w^cibO'^aT o OK)>-CiOiOOilC05«5y3«OK3 ST M — IO'-'OSC;i^OOt)^0050^W CO CO '.etc — WOOOaWNOOtOOOOC^O 3'^ O OCDbOJilO^-14i-'Oa4i^OO 1 . en 3 P- >&• OlCOOiCT>03KSWOOOCO*»WCO ai— CX)4iOOO!0«)^*500^)'J3 W o OOOOiOOOOOOOOO .^MU>UU^itk4^i{k4^,;:k4:kM«> W bS^OC/T'-O — K34iOOOTWWtO — f^ r^ 4^MMiUM4ki^ll^i(k>l^»t^»^M^ ^ p WN-ooOOOOOOOO^tnOOO?' 03 rO ^ i- !5 ^ ^ 3 p r?i h^ < a g U3 o 1— I ,680 3,677,611 1,910,453 07 44,979,086 24,920,228 60,967,571 3,126,122 4,224,127 1,912,462 08 44,671,111 22,411,139 64,725,251 3,643,879 4,0.04,631 1,907,272 09 47,300,019 22,818,143 53,590,887 3,553,978 3,059,906 1 965,164 10 48,486,914 24,288,426 63,282,665 4,279,306 3,741,503 1,999,508 II 48,895,519 26,801,614 61,009,792 3,277,543 3,979,685 2,038,252 12 52,081,346 18,663,178 62,002,776 4,045,406 3,216,006 2,047,392 13 48,008,970 22,385,292 60,177,702 3,835,752 1,770,942 2,024,161 14 48,878,933 26,118,612 61,264,18213,898,005 3,871,306 2,045,920 15 49,440,826 27,073,982 68,723,292 4,466,354 1,146,436 2,138,842 16 43,881,023 26,260,549 70,451,190 4,544,961 2,867,087 2,003,239 17 43,793,371 17,139,712 64,735,555 3,793,243 2,423,507 1,939,449 18 45,533,650 26,462,932 67,983,858 4,415,873 5,398,051 1,966,150 19 47,189,684 22,344,271 69,221,108 4,747,173 4,198,332 1,928,943 20 44,997,079 24,535,005 } t 6,546,074 \ 74,278,637 5,303,660 4,351,138 1,962,150 21 44,590,945 28,697,057 78,914,979 5,614,200 -1,411,303 1,951,092 22 42,542,343 25,151,507 80,932,043 5,786,637 5,041,884 1,945,095 23 1 51,564,974 26,873,937 88,352, 216JC,525,74-4 5,912,840 2,487,082 Excise Office. London, 22d March, 1824. J. EWBANK, General Accountant. * The Malt Duties are returned for the years ended 24th June, till 1820, when they commence 5 th July. -f Stock on hand. t From 10th Oct. 1798, to 5th July 1799, the date of commencement of the Salt Duties under the management of the Excise Board. c2 No. III. An Account, showing the quantity of Tea sold, at the East-India Company s Sales in the following Years, lbs. lbs. 1782 . 6,283,664 1803 . . 25,401,468 1783 . 5,857,883 1804 . . 23,087,267 1784 . 10,148,257 1805 . . 24,926,560 1785 . 14,967,493 1806 . . 22,887,530 1786 . 15,931,188 1807 . . 24,077,824 1787 . 16,180,686 1 808 . . 25,901,451 1788 . 14.,973,958 1809 . . 21,920,052 1789 . 16,707,612 1810 . . 24,958,255 1790 . 16,693,670 1811 . . 23,058,496 1791 . 17,268,227 1812 . . 24,856,914 1792 . 18,137,108 1813 . . 25,895,005 1793 . 17,373,687 1814 . . 29,597,055 1794 . 19,112,043 1815 . . 27,787,230 1795 . 21,307,609 1816 . . 23,408,195 1796 . 20,577,894 1817 . . 25,428,188 1797 . . 18,780,031 1818 . . 27,370,956 1798 . . 22,813,271 1819 . . 26,235,021 1799 . 24,070,340 1820 . . 26,111,451 1800 . . 23,378,816 1821 . . 27,638,081 1801 . . 24,470,646 1822 . . 27,880,565 1802 . . 25,144,171 1823 . . 27,753,550 APPENDIX TO PART III. APPENDIX TO PART III. No. I. Extract from the translation of a speech made by M.De Caradeuc de la Chalotais, Procureur-general to the jjarliament of Brit- tany, on the 20th of August, 1764 j ivhen he carried into court the edict of the month of Julij, 1 764, requiring it to he re- gistered. GENTLEMEN, I have the honour to inform you of the most signal benefit with which his majesty can gratify his people, a liberty to trade in corn. After having permitted the free circulation in the interior part of the kingdom, by his declaration of the 25th of May, 1763, the king grants by this edict, which I bringinto court, theentire liberty of exportation and importation. He permits all his subjects to trade in all sorts of corn, graiir, pulse, flour, &c. either with natu- ral born subjects or strangers. You may understand this edict. Gentlemen, as a presage of the increase and improvement of agriculture, which will infallibly be the source of the re-establishment and prosperity of the kingdom. In short, thanks to his majesty and the minister who manages his finances, the system of prohibition seems to be abandoned for ever ; a fatal system, which forbids the subjects of the same sove- reign to lend each other mutual assistance, and cuts off betvoeen France and other nations that coinmunication of exchanging su- perfluities for necessaries, Avhich is so conformable to the order of Divine Providence. Particular ])ermissions, that useless resource, which enriched a few private persons at the expense of the nation, will not for the future discourage the farmer. We shall no 2 more be in fear of vaiit, iiur, wliicli is almost as much to be dreaded, the too great abundance of crops. We shall no more fear, above all, excessive variations in the price of corn, equally hurtful with scarcity itself. In short, we may hope for an equ'tta- ble plan of ULvation, founded upon true and simple principles, the cultivation of the lands, and the augmentation of the riches of the state. I shall not stand, Gentlemen, to prove truths, at present too well known, and carried to the highest degree of demonstration by so many solid works, which are the produce of the knowledge of zealous and well-informed citizens. Who is unacquainted, that it is the earth only giveth riches, because it only produceth and reproduccth annually a new stock.'' That the sale of merchandise is the only means to cause a circu- lation of money, which is only the representation of more real riches, the fruits of the earth .'' That a state rich in productions which it can sell, will necessarily be rich in money ? But let its merchandise fail, or find no sales, it feels infallibly the waut of cir- culation of specie, and falls into a languor which, in its effects, is equally bad as poverty. It is therefore certain, that the most useful of all political laws is that which gives the greatest facility to the sale of the productions of the earth. The necessaries for consumption, taxes, even the trade of the nation, all take their rise from the sale of merchandise ; therefore we cannot extend this source too much, nor be too careful how Me straiten it ; if it should be dried up, the evils of the state would be without remedy and without bounds. I shall confine myself. Gentlemen, to a few slight observations on the necessity of the exportation of the principal merchandise (corn) : they may appear unnecessary, since his majesty hath established its truth in a perpetual and irrevocable edict, an edict conformable to the prayers of the nation which obtained it, to that of the states of this province, to experience which is the instructor of man, to the sentiments of Henry the Great and the illustrious Sully, to the ojMuion of all those who have examined this question without prejudice and without interest; an cxaininati(jn in regard to which no one hath hitherto presumed publicly to contradict either the reasons, the facts, or the calculations. But it is requi- site to encourage the timorous, to instruct those who are not as yet fully informed, to remove all mistrust from the people. We have 110 reason to fear wlien we are laying down maxims which promise the good of the state. Is there any necessity, by a long chain of reasoning, to prove, that to prevent the sale of corn is to prohibit the cultivation ? tliat such prohibition hath made the profession of a farmer (in France), although the most necessary, the most unhappy of all the profes- sions in the state ? That a free trade in grain, both within and without the kingdom, is the sole and only means to put the farmer and land-owners in a condition to support public and pri- vate expenses. Let us not fear to descend to particulars ; experience is the foundation of all physical inquiry, calculation is the measure. We arrive at general maxims only by the knowledge of particular facts. The necessary expenses of every cultivation whatsoever are the seed, the ploughing, the manure, the expenses to harvest, to lay up and to preserve the crop. It is necessary that the farmer make interest of the money advanced, wherewith to subsist himself and family, pay tithes, taxes, and his landlord, whose expenses ascer- tain the payment of the other classes of the state, who being com- posed of neither land-owners nor farmers, live at the expense of those who are. The earth does not produce every year the best of grain. It must have years of rest ; it is necessary to take into considera- tion good and bad years, and place to the account unforeseen ac- cidents, for they will not be wanting. Now, in calculating these expenses at the lowest rate possible, it appears that the setier of wheat is barely worth to the farmer that which it cost him ; men well skilled in agriculture have made the calculation, and desire all land-owners to make it themselves: it is a work which relates to all men, and in which all professions are interested. The neat produce of the cultivation of the earth is the only source of the prosperity of a farming state j to know ex- actly what an acre of land, well cultivated, will produce, in dif- ferent kinds of merchandise, according to the difference of the soils, is the fundamental problem of agriculture, commerce, and finances. If the farmer doth not gain all his expenses and wherewith to satisfy all charges, the earth will remain untilled, as more than the moiety in this province duth : the starving proprietor Mill be forced to sustain losses and bankruptcies ; the farmer ruined, badly clothed and badly fed, will sell his little property ; he will take up with his indigent family the art of begging, too common, and which is a disgrace to the nation ; the state itself will suffer ; the taxes will not bo collected but with extreme difficulty, and with the greatest rigour; and it must be acknoM'ledged that this liathbeen the state of the kingdom (of France) for more than an age. In every province the earth shows, in an infinity of places, the marks and vestiges of a deserted cultivation : houses unroofed proclaim desertion and depopulation ; the cities and even the capi- tal are peopled with poor, whilst those who have ruined so many families and enriched themselves with their spoils, make parade of a luxury which is an insult on public misery. There is, moreover, another principle which manifestly proves the price of corn is too low (in France), and that the farmers are far from being in a happy situation. The price of corn ought to be in proportion to the value of every merchandise, and every kind of labour, which, after deducting the value of the material, ought to cost more or less according to what is })aid per day to the workman. It is manifest that for about an age past the prices of labour and merchandise are considerably raised (in France). There is none that for this fifty years past hath not experienced this. The price of corn, which is the measure of the whole, should then have risen in proportion ; in the mean time, it hath not only not increased, but it is a certain fact, that it hath fallen consider- ablj^, and that it would recpiire an age ago a greater weight of silver to pay for a sctier than it doth at present. In 1 649, the Deputy of M , the procureur- general at the Chatelet, said, in his requisition of the 6th of March to the pu/ice, as a known fact, that M'heat was at 15 livres the setier, a moderate price (these are his words) ; but the same setier hath this present year, 1764-, been in Paris at 14 livres, and 14 livres 10 sous. It was of less value in the neighbouring cantons, and of necessity in the country. It appears by the account of prices kept at Paris, that it was Avorth 18 livres 18 sous in 1649; 26 livres 10 sous 5 deniers in 16.50; 25 livres 13 sous in 1651 ; and 24 livres 18 sous in 1652. Tlien the price of wheat hath diminished very much since 1649, that is within 115 vears ; and it cannot be denied that other M'orkmansliip and merchandise, wages, &c. liavc greatly in- creased. What shall we think. Gentlemen, of so great a difference, when we reflect that the mark of silver was in 1 G 19 at 28 livres, 13 sons, 8 dcniers ; that is to say, at almost half less than at this day ? (viz, from 1726 at 54- livres 6 sous ) The value of the setier of wheat (in money at present in use) was, (luring these live years, on the average price, at 42 livres 2 sous ; these prices are calculated in The Essay on Moneys, and in the treatise of the Police of Corn. Ought one to be surprised, after these examples, that his majesty hath fixed the limits of the expcn-tation at 30 livres, the setier Meighing 210 pounds ? It is then proved true to a demonstration, that corn is (in France) at too low a price, in proportion to the advances, to the charges and expenses of the Jiirjncr; in proportion to other works and merchandise, and consequently to both public and private expenses. But to enable the grower to receive back his charges and ex- penses, that he may support and pay all taxes, it is not sufficient even that corn should be of a certain value ; it is necessary that value should be regular, the least subject as possible to variation : if he is not certain of selling, and of selling every year for profit, this uncertainty deprives him of all security, and he loses the courage to till. Now, this was impossible under a system of prohibitions, under a system of temj)orary and particular permissions often granted from interest to importunity, scarcely ever free from suspicions. A state, whose agriculture is under the direction of prohibitive laws, can never cultivate hut for its own necessary use; it can never by good make compensation for bad years, for such a state is poor, when it hath a supeijiuity ofgrain, and it is poor xvhen it hath too little: the superabundance produceth stagnatio7i, and the foiilure produceth ivant : one brings with it a vile price, and the other ex- cessive dearth. These variations, the alternative of liberty and prohibitions, left the farmer in fear, and could not fail to discourage him, be- cause he was obliged to sell at any price whatsoever to satisfy his annual advance. There is nothing but the constant keeping the ports open and a free exportation of grain that can remedy these inconveniences. In time of great plenty that freedom will support 6 cultivation, because the certainty of sales either within the king^ doni or to foreigners, will make both the landlord and farmer con- tentedly see their riches lie idle in their magazines. This confi- dence will make them easj^ and prevent, in unfruitful years, the terrors of want, which often causes real want. The disadvantage of expenses in bad years will be made up by advantageous sales in those which are good; the poor will find himself comforted by the abundant consumption of the rich, and by the circulation. He cannot live if the rich doth not furnish him with the means of subsistence ; and the latter cannot furnish the former therewith, if he doth not draw from the earth sufficient to pay those recom- penses and wages, which are the reward of labour. But that which ought to remove entirely all his fears of want, is that constant nn'iformitij of the price of corn, which exportation will necessarily produce. The principal end of a free exportation is not so much to sell as to support the merchandise at the best price possible, to restore that equilibrium ivhich is supported na- turally in the commerce of other merchandise. No. II. An Extract of an Address to the Different Classes of Persons in Great Britain, on the Present Scarcity ayid High Price of Pro- visions. By the Rev. Septinms Hodson, M. B. 1795. It may fairly then be assumed that the present scarcity of corn is real, and not artificial ; but to establish the fact still more strongly, let us inquii-e into the causes which have combined to produce the situation at which we are so justly alarmed. 1 . It is well known to the corn-factors that the whole stock of the bread corn of last year was so nearly consumed before harvest, that had not the harvest been remarkably early we should at that time have felt a much severer temporary scarcity than we do at present. Instead, therefore, of the markets being supplied after harvest in part with old wheat, new wheat only was brought for- ward ; and that three weeks or a month * earlier than the average time of harvest. Considerably more of the new wheat, therefore, was consumed by Christmas, for example, than in former years ; so that, unless the crops were so abundant as to be equal to this premature consumption, a deficiency must necessarily be felt to- wards the approach of the following harvest. 2. Unhappily, however, the yielding of the last crops was by no means equal to the sanguine expectations which were formed of them. Throughout the southern, eastern, and midland counties, the ear, which looked very promising to the eye, did not yield much more than four-fifths of corn, all the upper part of the ear being merely chaff. This is accounted for by an unexpected frost in the middle of May, when the wheat was in bloom, which cut off the upper part of the bloom which was exposed, but did not injure the lower part of it, which was more sheltered. The * This is nearly one-twelfth of the wliole consumprion ! ! 8 northern counties were not affected by this accident^ the wheat uot being in so forward a state. 3. The premature consumption then of one crop, and the failure of the succeeding crop, will sufficiently account for a scarcity towards the close of the year, without having recourse to the fiction of a monopoly. Our next observations must be applied to the high and unpre- cedented price of butcher's meat. The public opinion does not seem to be made up as to the causes of this additional calamity. The fact seems to be, that the short supply of stock at the present time may be very well accounted for by the circumstances of the last winter. The long continuance of the frost, and the very high price of fodder, made stock of every kind too burdensome for the middling grazier to support. Towards the conclusion of the winter, therefore, the lean cattle of all kinds were sent to market, which used to be kept back till the summer. This evil would not have arisen to the very serious inconvenience which we now feel, if the severe winter had happily been succeeded by a mild and favourable spring. The turnips, however, having been destroyed by the frost, and the grass being checked by the coldness and backwtirduess of the spring, it became necessary to fodder the cattle at a time when, in the usual course of seasons, they should have been fattening upon abundant pasturage ; so that graziers who had struggled through the winter, in hopes of a favourable sj)ring, were still obliged to sell off their lean stock, and prema- turely supply the market with that provision which should have been reserved for the summer and autumn consumption. The toll of Smithfield market affords a strong confirmation of this statement. By this, it api)ears that the quantity of stock brought to market in the months of February, March, and April, 1795, exceed the quantity in the same months in the year 1794, by many thousand head both of beasts and sheep. It is too much to be feared that the graziers, allured by the present enormous prices of meat, still supply the market with stock that ought not to be brought forward for two or three months to come; the evil of which must be most severely felt at no great distance of time. Independently of this unfortunate anticipation of the supply, it M'ill be readily perceived what an immense loss of weight of animal 9 food lias been sustained by tlic slaughter of cattle before they had attained their proper condition. Suppose 15,000 neat cattle to have been brought to market wanting ten stone each of their usual weight, there will then be a deficiency of 150,000 stone weight of beef. Apply this calculation, in a due proportion, to the numbers of sheep which were hastened to the slaughter-house by necessity, and we can be at no loss to account for the present high price of butcher's meat. 10 No. III. Agricultural Intelligence for 1 799, exlravledfrovi the '•' Far ma's Magazine." — Vol. i. p. 102. About the beginning of August, heavy rains, accompanied with cold easterly winds, reduced the summer fallows, and turnip fields, into a perfect mire ; half rotted a great part of the hay, stopped the growth of the second crop of clover, laid down all the strong corn, and effectually prevented the wheat from filling; as that grain cannot arrive at perfection if loaded with moisture at that stage of its growth. The month of September was, on the whole, rather worse ; in- deed, the strong corn lay soaking among water during the greatest part of it. Much of the wheat, from the excess of moisture, died at the root before the ear ripened ; and the straw got a grey colour from the perspiration of the stalk being prematurely stopped ; and, when cut, had an appearance something like as if it had been kiln-dried. The people, in general, were by this time convinced that the grain would necessarily be of inferior quality ; but few believed that it M^ould be so defective in every respect as facts now unequivocally substantiate. Oats, which are a hardy grain, suffered less under these unfa- vourable circumstances, and promised at one time to be generally a medium crop. This has turned out to be the case upon the dry sharp soils ; but those of a different description did not escape so well, and upon the high grounds they were nearly destroyed by two severe nights of frost on the 1 6th and 1 7th of October. Some beans are said to have been also injured at that time ; but we be- lieve that the loss of this grain will be very trifling, as they are usually sown upon deep rich lands. 11 No. IV. Extract from an. Inquiry into the Causes and Remedies of the late and -present Scarcity and High Price of Provisions, in a Letter to the Right Hon. Earl Spenser, K. G. First Lord of the Admiralty, b;c. &;c. 8ic. (Printed for J. Wright, Piccadilly, 1800.) We hear daily from men, by no means deficient in good sense, that one of the principal causes of the present high prices is the quantity of capital in the country, and the facility of obtaining money by credit, whereby dealers are enabled to speculate, and keep corn out of the market. But it will not be alleged that men, however rich, or however much at a loss to employ their money, will engage in any trade but with a view to gain by it. Now, it is evident, that if they keep up the article beyond a cer- tain point, they must lose ; and if it is short of that point, these capitalists are the benefactors and saviours of the community, by feeding the markets, and reserving such a stock, as under the influence of security of property, and the check of competition, will exactly serve to carry us round the year, and on terms pro- portioned to the total quantum of provisions, provided their specu- lations have been made upon sound grounds. It appears that this must have been as nearly as possible the case last year ; for that there is no surplus of last year's crop, nor of the unexampled importations that were made, is proved by its being necessary prematurely to thresh out part of the crop which has just been gathered in, for the daily supply of the mai'ket. This is sufficient answer to those who maintained that corn was unnecessarily kept up ; and after what has been said it would be an insult to the meanest understanding to use any words to disprove that it has been hoarded or thrown into the river. The fact appears clearly to be, that the crop of last year, together with what was imported, has been, with great economy, barely equal to the necessities of the country ; and had the dealers in corn been so blind to their \l 12 own interest as to have lioardcd a montli's supply, over and above what was wanted, after the gathering in of tlie new crop, how much less an evil would this have been tlian to have sold off the whole stock a month before the arrival of the new supply ; in other words, to have created a famine, which I repeat it would have been the infallible consequence of bringing the corn to market at the beginning of the season, at the price of a plentiful year. Ought we not in this, as in other instances, to adore the wisdom and goodness of Divine Providence, which, by the spontaneous and irresistible, though silent co-operation of natural and moral causes, accomplishes the most salutary ends, in spite of the vain efforts and officious interference of human policy ? The want of a surplus essentially distinguishes this year from former years, and goes far towards explaining the continuation of the high prices, more especially when it is taken into account, that the present crop is considerably below an average one * ; and that the potatoes, which have, for many years, been such an inicommon resource, have greatly failed this year, from the following natural cause. The last summer was the hottest and driest of any upon record, no rain having fallen from the 4th of June till the 19th of August, and the heat was unexampled. This forced the potatoes rapidly to maturity without their attaining their usual size, and when the rains came in August, in place of growing larger, they germinated, which has greatly spoiled their quality. It is evident from this, that the utmost economy Mill be necessary in order to carry us round the year. The last argument I shall use in proof of the reality of the scarcity is the immense importation. From the necessity of importation, for many years past, it is evident that the production of this country has not in that time been equal to its wants: the annual average importation for twenty years preceding the present was 1 60,000 quarters ; for the last ten years 400,000 ; but from the 1st of Sejitember, 179I), to the middle of October, 1800, the importation has been between 1,100,000 and 1,200,000 quarters. While this statement proves * The crops upon the cla}' grounds, whicli make a large proportion of the whole, have failed, in consequence of the earth being baked, as it were, by the long and excessive heat which succeeded the wet weather in May. The corn also, which was standing after the l!Hh of August, wlien the rains came on, was generally spoiled, great part of it having growii as it stood. 18 the general deficient state of our agriculture, for a series of years, it carries irresistible conviction, if any proof were still wanting, of the unequalled deficiency of last year ; especially when it is also considered that this corn was attracted hither, notwithstand- ing its being high priced, and hard to be procured abroad ; for the crops were scanty last year in the countries bordering on the Baltic ; and the King of Prussia at one time prohibited the ex- portation of corn from his dominions; and though there was a better crop in America than there had been for some years, it has been deficient there for the last seven years^ on account of the devastation of the Hessian fly. II. No. V. Agricultural Intelligence. — Farmer's Magazine, Nov. 1807. The opinion expressed iii oilr last number respecting the seve- ral corn crops has been verified by tlie result ; with a lamentable addition, that in many of the northern and western districts a large proportion of the crop, at the date of the last accounts, still remained in the field, exposed to ruin and destruction from the ele- ments, and much of it already in a state approaching to rottenness, unless a favourable change of weather soon intervene and prevent such a melancholy catastrophe. From all the accounts commu- nicated to us, it appears that the several crops (wheat excepted) are every where of little bulk ; indeed, more so than in any year since the memorable 1800, when dearth raged through the land. Wlieat, in ev'ery point of view, proves to be the best crop ; and in several of the English counties it is estimated as exceeding the ordinary average, and of superior quality to the grain of the prece- ding year. Barley is probably below par ; but oats, beans, and peas, are greatly defective, the latter articles particularly so. The failure of beans and peas showed itself about the end of July, when a disease, appropriately called the black jaundice, seized them, and completely stopped further improvement. In no season within our remembrance have beans and peas more generally failed than in this one. It was of no importance whether they stood upon a soil which was strong and light, deep or shallow, rich or poor. On almost all they met with the like fate ; and the produce is a small shrivelled grain, hardly of a quality fit to be used for seed next season, unless people are coinj)clled to do so by imperious ne- cessity. Whether the disease which infected these plants was occasioned by insects at the root, or on the stalk, or by atmo- spherical influence, is an undecided question ; but the consequences will be felt in more ways than one, because, in many districts, the working stock are chiefly suj)portcd through the winter montiis upon the fodder of those grains. Supposing the fodder should contain its usual nourishment, which is a doubtful circumstance. 15 still it will not go one-half so far as in former years, having in a manner melted away before harvesting ; of course the expense of supporting working stock must be greatly increased. Notwithstanding the short crop, and the alarming condition in which a great part of it remains, markets are not so materially influenced thereby as might have been expected, having on the whole been dull and lower for wheat than in the preceding I quarter. So far as respects wheat, the want of demand may be attributed to the full stock of flour on hand at the commencement of harvest ; to the general imperfect condition of grain, which would not allow of speculation, especially when the old stock in hand was considerable ; and to the heavy loss sustained last sea- son by corn-dealers, which makes them in this shy of making ex- tensive purchases. The want of oats and beans must, however, ultimately cause a greater demand for other grains, and occasion the prices of the several varieties to be more upon an equal foot- ing than at this time. d2 16 No. VI. Agricultural Intelligence.^— Farmer s Magazine, December, 1811. The weather, during the last three months, has been uncom- monly capricious, constantly running into extremes, thereby gi- ving much trouble and vexation to the corn farmer. The first three weeks of September answered well for executing harvest Avork, but before the end of that month a sequence of wet days occurred which threatened destruction to that part of the crop which remained in the fields. In the northern districts of Eng- land, and through the whole of Scotland, one-half of the corns were exposed for three weeks to rains and storms, in consequence of which many of them were severely sprouted ; and had not a violent tornado ensued on the 13th of October, probably greater losses would have been sustained than were ever known in this country. But though the cut corns were saved by that storm, the unreaped ones (and in some districts the quantity in that situation was considerable) were almost entirely lost, the straw being left nearly as free of grain as if it had passed through the threshing machine. The two succeeding weeks were busily em- ployed in harvesting the crop and sowing wheat ; after which, such heavy falls of rain came on, that it was hardly practicable for some time to plough any ground, unless of the driest kind, with tiie slightest prospect of advantage. Favourable weather, how- ever, having returned, in the latter part of November, the import- a!it process of sowing wheat Mas got accomplished in a much bet- ter way than could have been expected at that advanced period of the year. The wheat crop is less or more a defective one in every district, but more so in some districts than in others. According to our accounts it can rarely be estimated above five-eighths of an average crop, though, what is surprising, the quality of the grain is gene- rally good, a circumstance which seldom happens when the crop is a failing one. Indeed, as the failure this season was not, in 17 many instauces, occasioned by mildew (at least in Scotland), the grain that was in the ear arrived at complete maturity without being stinted of nourishment. The deficiency evidently proceeded from wetness in May — from cold frosty nights in June — from boisterous winds when the plant was under the blossom process — and from want of sun and heat when the grain was formed in the ear of the plant. Wheat is a grain always comparatively unpro- ductive in a cold season such as the last one, and the same remark is applicable to barley, the crop of which, generally speaking, is below an average. Oats, and peas, and beans, may however be considered as fair crops, though, according to our accounts, many of these grains, upon thin soils, suffered so much from the wetness in May and June as not to prosper afterwards. From all these circumstances a rise of corn markets was the ne- cessary consequence, though at this time it would be rather rash to speculate or prognosticate upon their state at a more advanced period of the season, when prices may be supposed to have gained their proper level. The present rate of markets will be seen from the accounts which follow. Hitherto there has been little or no importation from foreign countries, and it is understood that the crops upon the Continent are scantier this season than usual. IS No. VII. At a public meeting of the inhabitants of Liverpool, held on the 4th of November, 1811, John Bourne, Esq. Major, in the chair, it was unanimously resolved, upon the motion of John Gladstone, Esq. seconded by Thomas Rodie, Esq., that a petition should be presented to the Prince Regent, praying that lie would suspend the further distillation of s])irits from grain until the meeting of Parliament. THE HUMBLE PETITION, &c. &c. Showeth, That your petitioners being deeply interested in the welfare of this populous town, and this great manufacturing county, cannot but view with great anxiety the progressive and alarming advance in the prices of corn, in connexion with the fact now ascertained, that the produce of the late harvest is very deficient, and that the weather for gathering it in, in the northern parts of Great Britain, and for preparing the wheat lands generally for the next crops, has been extremely unfavourable. That your petitioners are well informed the jiotatoe crop in Ireland has so materially failed, that this important necessary of life now sells in the Dublin market at the excessive price of six shillings per cwt., from M'hich circumstance your petitioners ap- prehend that the usual sujjplies of corn from Ireland, upon which the numerous population of this town and the county of Lancaster are known in a great degree to depend for subsistence, are likely to be much curtailed. That, in times like the present, when no dependence can be placed on receiving supplies of foreign corn, it becomes of the first importance to liusband to the utmost the crops of this country. That the average M'eekly prices of corn in England and Wales, according to the returns received in the week ending the 26th of 19 Octul)er, as j)uljlislied in the London Gazette of the 2cl of No- vember, are as follows : *. d. Wheat 1 1 6 per quarter. Barley 47 4 Oats 29 10 Which equal, and, in several instances, exceed the prices at the different periods M-hen the legislature, in their wisdom, thought fit to interpose to prevent the distillation of spirits from grain (the year of extraordinary scarcity only excepted), as will appear from the following comparative statement taken from the official returns. Average price of wheat, barley, and oats, in England and Wales, according to the weekly returns nearest to the following periods : Nearest Weekly Returns. Date. Distillation. Wheat. Barley. Oats. S. d. S. d. S. d. 1795 Prohibited. 93 10 45 29 2 1797 Removed. 52 3 28 4 15 10 1800 Prohibition. 133 76 7 41 8 1802 Removed. 76 9 44 1 23 4 1808 Prohibition. 81 6 44 3 38 10 1808 Continued. 92 7 45 10 33 8 1809 Prohibition. 95 7 46 6 34 4 1809 Prohibition. 101 9 50 7 31 11 1810 Prohibition. 101 7 46 5 27 5 1811 The last return. 101 6 47 4 29 10 That on these grounds your petitioners humbly conceive there exists an urgent necessity for the interposition of the royal pre- rogative before the meeting of Parliament, more especially as, should the measure be deferred till that period, the distillers will have laid in their stocks of grain for the season, a large proportion of which will either be distilled or converted into a state unfitting it for the food of man. And your petitioners will ever pray. 20 No. VIII. AgricuUural Intelligence. — Farmer s Magazine, August, 1812. There has seldom, or perhaps never, been a period when the new crop was a subject of greater and more general interest than the present j and it was our particular wish to obtain the best and fullest information of its appearance. We feel very grateful to our correspondents who have enabled us to present reports of it, and of the condition of the industrious poor for the last quarter ; and their communications will certainly be perused with that attention which their peculiar importance must command. Though appearances are different, as might be expected, from the div^ersity of soil and culture, the general character of the ensuing crop, as far as an opinion can be formed of it at this period of the season, must be represented we fear as rather unfavourable. The impression, after a very careful examination of the reports, is, that unless we have two months at least of singularly warm, clear, and dry weather, the grain crops will not reach an average : that common oats, particularly in many situations, and peas and beans generally, must be very late indeed. From recent and afflicting experience of partial failure in the crops of wheat, it is not a matter of surprise if a few of the intelligent writers are a little alarmed at the indications of disease which that crop already exhibits in some districts, and Avhich there was but too much reason to exjiect from the late cold, humid and ungeuial state of the atmosphere. iTiancnesier, ou ""• "" Q.uiltings, 36 do Do. fine Fancy articles PRINTING AND BLEACHING. Calico Printers Bleachers and Finishers Block Cutters Fustian Cutters Warpers Dyers and Dressers Skein Dyers Hat Finishers Tailors Porters Packers • • Shoemakers •• Iron-founders • • Whitesmiths • • Sawyers • • Carpenters ! ' * '■> Stone-masons (allowing for loss of time ? in the winter months) J Bricklayers, do Painters, do Slaters, do • • Plasterers, do ' • Bricklayers' and Plasterers' Labourers Spademen Money actually paid in relief of the^ Poor, exclusive of County Rates, ^ 16 17 1 1 1 6 18 5§ 2 and Constables' Accounts, in the Town of iManchester Deduct for money gained by the la- bour of the Poor in the House '-] The average number of Poor in the " House throughout the year, the averaj^e weekly expense head, for food only, for each year in the'j r, with f se per j year * 1 2 6 1 2 1 1 19 15 9 15 The rate of wages has ni 14 16 15 16 1 7 5 18 6 18 1 16 1 11 3 1 5 15 1 5 1 2 1809-10. 26,300 17 8 178 12 5 2 26,122 5 3 2 385 4 2i No. IX. A Statement exhibiting at one View the Wages of Labour generally in the Toxon of Manchester and the other principal Seats of the Cotton Manufacture : Kith an Account of the Prices of. A ■ i of Provisions, andofthe Monies expended for the Relief of the Poor chargeable to the Toxcnship of Manchester during the Years 1810 to 1818, and to November 'iSth, ISlT"''' ' PROVISIONS. Flour, per dozen lbs. (good seconds) . ,s,o. ,81,. 18.2. 1.13. ,8,. ,.,.. 1816. 1817. 1818. 1819. Remartg. Since added. Tbe 1. .. J. e{ ei I 1 '.'} L. ,. d. 1 'ui BS 30i. per week. 14 16 l> 81 16 19 e outgoings. Ofthis deduction the greale part is for mnding, which is generally The principal articles of manufacture, and J the earnings of men of ordinary ski] working twelve hours per day, have A considerable proportion of the weaving of plain goods is performed by women and children, and their earnings will be according lo llteir strength and skill. The present rate of wages is rather lower than the average of the whole year 1819. ■" L. 1. J. b 7i 7i I i I 11 14 7 5 7 6 8 6 Not sUteA 10 15 6 Not sloted. 18 ■P 1^ If ii ") J 'ej SPINNING. Womendilio 15 6 16 3 16 lOj l\l Si 12 6 9 6 12 7 S W\ Hi 6 4S 11 C Ij 17 i i 18 6- 1 WEAVING. Third do. do. do Dollon cambrics, 60 reed 6-4 PRINTING AND BLEACHING. 8 16 IS 1 2 6 16 W\ 16 19 18 C 1 1 6 1 2 e 18 10 1 1 6 16 18 1 16 U 19 16 15 16 18 6 16 1 11 6 SW^inaW, .. Sloue-aiisons (blowing iforloH of time ( Briclclayeti' anil Plaslercrs' Labourers Money actually paid in relief of the -\ Poor, escluiive of County Hales, j and Coniublts' AccounU, in the i Town of Manchester ] Deduct for money cained by the Ia> ) UurorihePoorinlbeHouM!. .. \ The average number of Poor in the ^ House ihrouglioul the year, with ( Ibe average weekly expense per 1 head, far food only, for each year J 26,300 i7 8 S5,0'2l 10 9 263 18 7 1814-15. 119 13 5 23,961 n i; 43,827 4 187 12 ^ 29,078 16 385 3« «S S,3 366 403 526 -— — 28,914 2 11 427 4 5i 4 H u 3 ai CI 3 ,1i 3 m „—- H o 21 No. IX. Agricultural InleUigence . — Farmer's Magazine, November, 1812. The new crop is generally allowed to have promised a full average produce before the commencement of the bad weather in the earlj' part of October. What part of it was then exposed has suffered much since^, both from wind, rain, and frost. Con- siderable loss has been sustained by handling on the field, and heating in the stack-yard, though comparatively little from a growth in the sheaf. And, at the date of the reports, a good deal of oats and beans still remained to be carried, not only in the northern parts of Scotland but even in several of the English counties. In a harvest so late, and during the latter part of which the weather has been so unpropitious, the climate and elevation of different districts, and the early or late crops commonly cultivated in each, must be duly considered before there can be any approach to a correct estimate of the crop over the whole of the country. Where the crop had been secured in the month of September both the quantity and quality of the grain is very good, and this has been the case with autumn sown wheat, barley, and early oats, in the most forward counties, though even in these the beans, peas, and late oats, are not expected to produce according to their ap- pearance on the ground, or bulk in the stack-yard. But in those counties where wheat is extensively sown through the winter and spring months, in many high and cold situations, where oats, with a little bean or barley, are the principal crop, a great deficiency is to be found both in wheat and oats from the lateness of the season, and the unfavourable weather at and before the time they ought to have been cut and secured. Perhaps it might not be far from the truth to state wheat generally as an average crop — oats 22 rather below one — and beans and peas as very deficient. The growth of barley is not only partial, but so limited, in Scotland, that it has almost lost its place among the regular rotations of modern husbandry. This opinion may not exactly correspond with the report of any particular county, but it is thought to ap- proach the truth, when the crops throughout the whole country are brought under one general view. 123 No. X. Extract from the translation of a French tvork entitled. On the Le- gislation and the Commerce of Corn, wherein the Questions re- lating to Exportation, Importation, Bounties, Prohibitions, Pro- visions of Corn by Public Authority, Sfc. are fully discussed. To xvhich some Notes are added. — Printed for T. Longman, London, 1776. It has been several times alleged, that the people were gainers by a rise of price, because the proprietor, having then a greater revenue, spent more. If corn is worth twenty livres, has it been said, the lands of France will bring in only a thousand mil- lions, and if it is worth thirty livres, the same lands will bring in fifteen hundred millions. So here are five hundred millions more which the proprietors will spend, and it is the people that will reap the benefit of it. After all that I have already said, may I not be dispensed fi'om answering this argument.'' Is it not visible that these fifteen hundred millions, produced by the rise of corn, would be of no more value to the proprietors than one thousand millions, if taxes, labour, and all the other ob- jects of exchange rose in proportion ? Is it not clear that this augmentation of fortune for the pro- prietors of corn is composed only of the diminution of that of the other members of the community ? It is the general harmony which is deranged, and that is all ; for there are not five hundred millions worth of new goods fallen down from the heavens, or sprung out of the earth. If a man has not this simple truth im- pressed or graven on his mind, he will be incessantly tossed about by the most empty reasonings on the pretended gains of the com- munity which are nothing else but a momentary conquest gained by one class of that community over the lot of the others. It is on principles absolutely contrary to those which I advance tlwt those famous calculations of the net produce are founded, so celebrated in the works of the economical wi-iters. We cannot too much applaud the pure and well known zeal of those most worthy persons who distinguish themselves by their attachment 24 to those opinions, and a\c pay tliem a sincere lioniagc ; but we think we may permit ourselves to make some observations on a subject of so great importance, I saw first that they had sought, under different relations, what was the gain of the proprietor after the payment of imposts, and of the expenses of culture ; they have found it — they have named this gain, the net produce — very well — hitherto no new light was discovered ; but here it is that one of the essential reasonings be- gins, and in the sequel of it a tlieory which does not appear to me to be just. They have found that corn sold, say, at twenty livres the septier, gave so much gain or net produce ; and they said, if the price rises to five and twenty or thirty livres, the net produce will instantly be augmented by such a sum. This augmentation, applicable to all the lands in the kingdom, will make several hun- dred millions of increase in the general net produce. Thus, the dearer corn shall be, the more the net produce will increase, and the more considerable will be the national wealth. But we have already shown that this way of judging of the Avealth of a country was absolutely erroneous. If making a septier of corn be called forty livres instead of twenty was sufficient to render the kingdom twice as rich, the monopolists would be the most re- spectable supporters of the prosperity of a state ; an exportation without measure and without limit would become the most sub- lime combination in administration, and a scanty crop v/ould be the greatest blessing we could receive from Providence. Let no one think that I exaggerate in this consequence ; I will try to render this proposition sensible by a very simple calculation which will perhaps throw a new light upon this matter. Let us suppose that the annual consumption of France may be forty-eight millions of scptiers. Let us further suppose that there ought to be a surplus of four millions of septiers in the i)roprietors' liands to keep the balance between the needs of the buyers and of the sellers, and to establish a reasonable price, say twenty livres the septier, for wheat and other grain one with another. As long as these proportions subsist, the proprietors sell or consume every year forty-eight millions of septiers^ which, at twenty livres, make nine hundred and sixty million.s, and there remains in their hands four millions of septiers unsold, which serve every year to temper their power and to maintain the desired price. Let us now suppose that the scantiness of the crops makes an '15 essential part of tliis precious surplus disappear; tlion the strength of the proprietors, and the anxiety of the consumers, are so aug- mented, that tlie forty-eight millions of septiers are sold at thirty- six and perhaps forty livres. Thus, this year when we have re- ceived less from the earth, the corn sold or consumed by the pro- prietors has been represented by a numerary sum twice as great as in the former years. Will they imagine, in that case, that the state has gained nine hundred and sixty millions ? Will they put any confidence in such calculations, which are productive only in proportion to the sterility of the ground, or to the errors of the government ? Surely not. Let them tell us that the population of a state augments — that real riches are accumulated in it — we shall see in these circum- stances the increase of its prosperity ; but that interior arithmetic, which makes higli prices wealth, is, of all measures, the most false and most deceitful. -tf) No. XI. An Account of the fVindsor Prices of Wheat and Malt at Eton College. Wheat per bush. Malt per bush. MHieat per bush. .^lalt per bush. s. d. s. d. .1. d. .h. per bush. s. d. s. d. s. d. .?. d. Lady (lay . . 31iehaelmas. . 17.07 . ditto 8 G 9 9 4 4 9 9 I/ady-day . . Micliaelmas. . 1806 . ditto 10 10 9 5 6 8 8 Lady-day . . Michaelmas. . 1798 . ditto 6 G 9 9 4 4 9 9 L-idy-day . . ]\Iichaelmas. . 1807 . ditto II 8 6 G 6 2 2 Lady-day .. Micliaelmas. . 1799 ditto 7 11 4 7 4 5 9 5 Lady-day .. IMichaelmas. 1808 ditto 9 12 7 7 2 2 Lady-day . . Michaelmas . . 1800 ditto 15 16 9 8 9 8 2 Lady-day . . Michaelmas. 1809 ditto 1? 14 6 7 8 8 2 Lady day . . Michaelmas. . 1801 ditto 22 IJ U I 1 2 8 Lr.dy-day . . Michaelmas. 1810 ditto 15 13 7 7 2 2 Lady-day . . Michaelmas. . 13C2 ditto 8 8 r. 3i 6 6 2 2 I>ady-day . . ]\lichaehnas. 1811 ditto 13 14 «0 6 6 8 8 liady-day . . Michaelmas. . 1803 ditto 7 7 6 6 4 4 8 8 Lady -day .. 3Iichaehiias. . 1812 ditto 17 15 7 8 8 8 Lady day .. . Michaelmas. . 1804 ditto 7 10 ^ 4 5 8 8 Lady-day . . JMichaelmas. . 1 8 1 .3 ditto '7 1.3 10 9 2 8 Lady-day . . . IMichaelmas. . 1 80.T ditto 11 11 7 7 8 8 Lady-day . . . 1814 10 9 6 8 Note. — Tlie foregoing prices of wheat are not tlie best prices, it having been the custom of Eton College to ascertain the highest and lowest priceSj and to fix a medium price, rather above the average, although the reservation in their leases is " according to the price that the best wheat and malt shall be sold for in the market of Windsor." The price of malt is taken according to the best price, after de- ducting tlie duty therefrom. At Michaelm.is, 1 793, the nine gallon measiu-e, which had been calculated upon up to that period, was discontinued, and the sub- sequent prices are according to the eight gallon measure. EDWARD BROWN, Registrar to Eton College. K July 13, 1814. 30 An Accoind of iJic U'huhor Prices of Wheat and Malt at Eton College^ in conlinualion of the return made in 1814. Michaelmas 1S14 I.a(1y-,e,vtrac(cd6i/l/'u'yli(l/ioroft/itCorn Tracts, from Documents laid bcjore Parliament. "Wheat. Earl ey. Malt. Oats, Oatmeal. Rye. Exported Imported Exported Imported Exported Imported Exported Imported Exported Imported To Mi- chaelmas Quarters Quarters Quarters Quarter."! Quarters Quarters Quarters Quarters Qu.irters Quarters 1697 14,698 400 32,855 211 51,811 295 1 2,596 l(i98 6,857 845 50,984 150 44,526 620 151 1,275 3,622 Christ', (to. 28 844 5 2,0,S9 20 68 « 16,99 557 486 75 1,51 1 1,280 301 405 350 tl7()0 49.056 /} 25,896 37,571 234 391 27,231 1701 98,323 I 21,953 50,447 20 285 43,917 1702 90,230 16,280 71,856 1 89 51,710 1 703 106,615 SO 71,523 123,291 159 2 58,438 1704 90,313 1 30,7^9 102,873 219 29,284 1705 96,185 21,386 137,396 1 00 24,059 1706 188,332 n 10,221 141.084 98 62 480 49,892 J 1707 74,15.s 4,771 111,153 12 103 34,032 1708 83,406 86 29,937 97,789 70 67 4,720 1709 169,679 1,552 40,512 606 139,934 1 37 166,512 §1710 13,924 400 5,744 576 79,530 139 125 113 12,215 1711 76,949 8,412 ■39,975 321 37,957 1712 145,191 19,838 191,624 303 17,735 1713 176,227 52,542 217,975 1.376 3S,625 17M 174,821 15 18,579 220,274 21 129 20,455 1715 l66,-i90 5,080 103,365 303 31,161 1716 74,926 14,857 226,617 719 40,123 1717 22,953 18,435 251,083 62 404 23,031 1718 71,800 71,139 303,133 21 868 49,416 1719 127,762 20 9,649 357,499 300 219 45,502 1720 83,084 4,505 252 253,509 2 3,471 49,241 1721 81,632 11,608 445 .338,942 577 69,697 (' 1722 178,880 37,528 366,728 324 42,579 1723 157,719 45,789 305,063 112 541 12,737 1724 245,864 148 10,298 241,895 61,630 516 23,441 17 2S ■204,413 12 13,782 294,025 2,152 1,447 20,539 1726 142,183 20,017 335,925 20 1.412 18,835 1727 30,3 1 5 8,688 100 241,428 15 2,204 9, 1 69 172P 3,817 74,574 \0,025 4 1 3,562 3,503 177,699 15,892 1,808 21,089 1732 202,058 1.3,874 161,075 12,044 1,274 1.5, .53 5 1733 427,199 7 37,598 •1 203,115 9 1,487 28, 1 55 * No export for one year. Bounty on oatmeal commenced. f No bounty for about ten months. § No export for one year. .33 Wheat. Barley. Malt. Oats. Oatmeal. Rye. Exported Iinportcf Fxportcd [mportc; Exported Iniportcil Exported Imported I'^x ported Imported To Mi diaelnias Quarters Quarters Quarters Quartern Quarters Quarters Quarters Quart. rs Quarters Quarters 1734 498,196 6 70,224 1 233,124 9 3,038 10,735 1735 153,343 9 57,520 219,781 6,439 1,920 1,329 1736 118,170 16 6,860 192,602 267 1,196 1,220 1737 46 1.602 32 23,669 103,718 7 1,921 7,849 1738 580,596 2 70,689 1 88,607 21 1,777 36,159 1739 279,542 22 54,447 191,876 32 1,116 29,791 1740 54,390 5,468 24,036 1 145,527 1,333 2,571 8,979 1,090 *I741 45,416 7,540 6,614 15,132 123,357 84,821 1,106 7,622 11,012 1742 293,259 11,482 189,525 25 1,380 63,272 1743 371,431 2 34,995 219,217 12 1,882 88,272 1744 231,984 2 20,090 219,862 67 1,657 74,169 I74.S 324,839 5 .9.5,878 219,354 5 9,770 83,966 1746 130,646 158,719 282,024 20,203 45,782 1747 266,906 103,140 361,289 2, 1 22 92,7 1 8 1748 543,387 6 73,857 349,363 3,768 103,891 1749 629,049 332 52,6'21 40 355,469 1,281 106,312 1750 947,602 279 224,500 330,754 20 4,283 99,049 1751 661,416 3 32,69?,421 2,330 n 42,915 of No export for one year. 34 No. XIV. An Account of the Quantity of the follotmng Grain exported from and imported into Great Britain froin the year 1755. — Extracted from the Appendix to the Lords Ke-port on the Corn Laivs, 1814, JO. 122. M'^heat and Flour. Exported imported 1755 1736 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 17«8 1789 1790 1791 Quarter- 237,466 102,752 11,545 9,234 227,641 393,614 441,956 295,385 429,538 396,857 167,126 164,939 5,071 7,433 49,892 75,449 10,089 6,959 7,637 15,928 91,037 210,664 87,686 141,070 222,26 1 224,059 103,021 145,152 51,943 89,288 132,683 205,466 1 20,536 82,97 1 140,014 30,892 70,626 Barley and Malt. Exported Imported Quarters 5 141,562 20,353 162 3 56 72 1 104,547 1 1 ,020 497,905 349,268 4,378 34 2,510 25,474 56,857 289,149 560,988 20,578 233,323 106,394 5,039 3,915 159,866 80,695 584,183 216,947 110,863 51,463 59,339 148,710 112,656 222,557 469,056 Quarters 381,659 269,950 63,454 11,419 208,797 291,150 413,891 423,064 215,681 246,891 251,927 95,115 18,700 6,587 39,825 170,409 34,198 14,031 2,475 2,911 51,414 136,114 142,725 103,930 85,777 191,563 150,468 127,744 54,065 66,889 166,448 111,598 135,089 212,811 345,685 50,966 41,590 Quarter: c 5,94,', 9,915 42 942 3,228 5,110 4,611 3,736 74,364 20,481 221 29 228 3,068 63,916 171,508 139,451 8,499 7,981 42,714 7,085 352 56 13,592 144,926 77,182 67,212 62,374 43,244 11,479 11,128 29,718 61,134 Oats and Oat- meal. ExporteJ Imported Quarters 3,168 5,490 4,693 1,831 6,937 14,496 11,290 15,992 3,042 3,962 12,382 11,633 10,605 12,104 13,292 28,852 35,233 23,599 18,777 16,433 26,485 34,987 36,614 56,543 22,286 27,023 41,717 23,31? 11,826 13,511 25,273 19,293 17,098 14,418 33,285 14,290 16,498 Quarters 2,886 54,758 9,360 33,622 1,460 4 53 1 7,400 234,899 134,772 108,577 230,639 249,163 194,743 109,466 124,444 212,327 106,820 329,454 399,499 384,942 378,566 366,446 201,170 348,511 195,224 109,446 38,562 228,942 266,998 274,089 478,473 512,004 413,827 437,594 786,546 836,736 Rye and Ryc- mcal. Export d Imjiorted Quarters Quarters 43,446 '29,969 1,695 964 7,862 365 41,509 53,174 57,982 28,629 12,951 27,746 26,295 5 6,045 140 63 65,757 150 57,879 21 71 642 2,179 4,799 9,255 2,260 41,427 2,722 33,574 10,99,9 3,415 946 18,454 1,706 9,327 3,199 1,693 6,306 2,701 10,743 4,003 3,365 81,295 6,73 1 24,779 13,163 28,761 6,736 3,643 12,683 7.054 31,220 40,151 14,845 47 21,682 3,52B 56,378 35 M'heat and Barley and Oats and Oat- Ivyc and Rye i-4 a! >< Flour. Malt. meal. meal. Kx ported Imiiorted Exported lmportc Quarters Quarter- Quarters Quarters Quarters 1792 :i00,278 22,417 49,131 118,526 25,337 1,008,750 16,151 13,027 1793 76,869 490,398 3,462 147,169 1 8,609 722,527 512 55,59-1 17.01 155,048 327,90'2 9,437 128,568 1 6,059 862,979 1,919 25,450 1795 I8,8;5.0 313,793 6,416 18,070 6,867 460,377 274 21,438 1 796" 24,679 879,200 13,133 40,033 12,040 801,373 1 22 1 63,650 17.07 54,525 461,767 \3,V23 64,198 '21,734 609,119 487 8,258 1798 59,782 396,721 15,076 1 16,185 27,258 773,99-1 680 6,925 1799 39,362 463,185 41,386 19,538 21,827 529,539 144 22,751 1800 '22,013 1,264,520 5,808 130,976 12,019 545,018 419 144,531 1801 28,406 I,424,7n6 3,725 113,966 13,316 583,043 1,852 146,732 1802 149,30^ 647.664 7,875 17,555 17,582 583,780 6,484 15,478 ISO,} 76,580 373,725 43,78? 14,05'2 16,533 521,167 1,030 4,099 1804 63,073 461,140 128,469 11,596 19,139 740,393 3,798 2,644 1 80.-J 77,955 920,834 13,457 43,301 16,367 478,411 3,808 24,267 1806 29,566 310,342 23,625 5,385 35,997 540,506 4,020 1,014 1807 24,365 400,759 13,562 22,132 31,369 754,163 956 7,394 1808 77,567 81,466 10,781 33,739 27.293 514,540 3,986 5,172 1809 31,278 4-18,487 10,900 28,420 20,906 1,121,380 711 13,591 1810 75,785 1,530,691 19,590 27,211 25,340 560,044 8,933 90,973 1811 97,765 292,038 64,273 43,651 44,667 233,649 35,523 27,809 1812 46,325 246,376 62,796 75,603 30,453 353,508 21,809 72,818 1813 562,329 82,003 751,954 35,040 *1814 111,477 852,566 54,118 46,031 46,945 815,161 18,980 6,044 1815 227,947 384,475 8,202 29,578 29,608 718,408 17,892 1,806 I81G 121,611 332,491 33,691 78,494 32,470 759,708 8,094 15,117 1817 317,524 1,089,855 64,159 161,812 72,036 1,090,111 46,932 140,092 1818 58,668 1,694,261 18,745 722,843 33,306 2,059,134 '"8 78,085 1819 44,689 625,638 7,396 394,180 38,835 1,376,337 848 18,674 tl820 94,657 996.478 9,967 117,014 28,620 1,599,900 2,488 12,239 * This account is continued after the year 1813 from Tables contained in the Appendix to the Commons' Agricultural Report 1821. The two authorities do not always correspond exactly, but the difference is so inconsiderable as not to be worth mentioning. f The only addition since 1820 would be the exports to, and imports from Ire- land, which are given in the next number, and the imports and exports of bonded wheat. 36 No. XV. An Account of tlie Quantity of Grain, Flour, and Meal, ini- 'porlcd from and crported to Ireland, in the Jolloir'tng- years.— EMracted from the Appendix to the Agricultural Report, 1821,;;. 385. 1 "\^Tiecat and Barley and Oats and Oat- Rye and Rye- t^ Flour. Barky -meal. meal. meal. iti ported!] Exported mported Ilxportel Imported Exported Quarters Imported Exported Quarters Quarters Quarters Quarters Quarters Quarters Quarters 1773 '2,907 739 7,475 190 59,373 215 129 n74 4,423 732 20,222 240 53,492 880 149 866 1775 13,107 1,081 20,344 548 86,7c6 120 32 177« 11,517 37,207 1,929 1,063 88,670 651 ( 30 1777 16,70o 30,286 3,849 608 71,719 4,309 256 1778 2,9^6 53,762 14,150 697 11,847 34,349 17 150 1779 1,777 64,827 3,822 1,899 93,2 1 2 4,384 () 541 1780 2,384 46,43-.> 9,109 43,721 798 C 1781 41,315 2,511 40 7,630 65,967 12,669 0! 1782 4,141) 1,295 11,360 5,606 27,569 836 1783 558 39,482 4,683 3,109 31,439 7,653 1784 14,423 50,26v 153 4,233 1 22,053 2,729 10 1785 23,810 7,^99 23,437 9,820 243,181 717 178() 10,928 8,869 53,601 184 239,011 862 1/87 10,225 974 39,540 1,028 187,369 2,346 t 1788 31,643 790 10,622 2,194 i02- 500 302 ( 1789 57,951 506 9,323 897 294,433 491 i7iJ0 35,444 462 \6,T66 320 387,270 236 356 1791 18,523 1,39V 13,021 505 316,112 265 293 1792 1 ,272 ],80C .5,446 14,270 557,'774 513 491 1793 14,57'- l,'28l 4,285 818 292,533 393 30 1794 9,157 43,097 17,198 1,696 378,609 70 414 '2\ 1795 14,493 804 794 355,204 446 C 1796 4 40y 3,011 341,431 ( 1797 40,565 2,29 1 12,26S 180 334,628 316 ( 1798 I7,49C 9,62(, 49,780 4 362,538 706 1799 1 5,3 1 5 5,202 151 21,678 359,306 1,478 ( 1800 7'i[) 3,726 78 914 2,410 69 ( 1801 524 585 450 374 408 c 1 802 109,51.9 1,200 7,116 1,896 341,931 254 282 1803 6I,27( 2,059 12,879 18,864 266,359 747 75£ 1804 70,100 707 2,521 97,923 240,023 180 20G 1805 84,412 754 15,656 751 203.306 264 235 1806 102,483 2,368 3,327 14,259 357,078 2,654 33( 160 1807 45,1 1( 2,421 23,04>' 1,143 589,649 773 431 l«(i8 43,49fj 28,52 1 30,.'>8(, 2,357 579,974 1,940 573 179 1809 68,121 84 :> 16,619 4,036 845,78:; 141 425 1810 127, 5U 2,354 ^'.,321 1H.432 493,231 2,131 20 37 ci Wla.it and B.irle y and Oats an il Oat- Ityc al d Kvc- >-i Flaiir. Barley -meal. niciil. meal. Importcii Kxportcd Imiiorted Exported Imported Exported Imported Exportod Quarters i^uarter> Quartuih Quarters Quarters Quarters Quarters Quarters 1811 147,567 1,680 2,713 27,663 275,757 547 21 1 B 1 2 160,842 645 43,262 4,306 300,926 7,1 16 177 1813 217,154 2,678 63,560 10,377 691, -4 99 997 420 1814 228,610 2,3'22 17,344 15,56y 565,004 819 4 1815 192,026 447 27,519 1,533 697,933 3,155 213 1816 1 22,836 12,446 63,629 922 684,430 1,648 43 1817 60,817 81,933 28,019 2.9,940 612,103 28,643 614 3,625 1818 111,383 8,276 27,220 16,546 1,072,339 1,417 4 1819 155,980 4, 1 26 2 1 ,834 3,286 790,704 7,257 12 1820 409,28S 6, '34 88,;543 4,48,9 918,362 1,859 138 75 •1821 576,595 9,100 84,933 3,811 1,164,150 991 550 8 1822 -167,489 4,526 22,666 22,726 569,61 1 37,720 353 • The quantities for the two last years are taken from Custom house returns. 38 No. XVI. Cattle, 8ic. sold in Smithfield*. Years. CatUe. Sheep. Years. Cattle. Sheep. 1732 7G,210 514,700 1756 77,257 624,710 1733 80,169 555,050 1757 82,612 574,960 1734 78,810 566,9 1 1758 84,252 550,930 173.5 83,894 590,970 1739 86,439 582,260 \7iG 87,606 587,420 1760 88,594 622,2 1 \7Z7 89,862 607,330 1761 82,514 666,010 1738 87,010 589,470 1762 102,831 772,160 1739 86,787 668,980 1763 80,851 653,110 )7'40 84,810 501,020 1764 75,168 556,360 1741 77,714 536,180 1765 8 1 ,630 537,000 \7VZ 79,601 503,260 1766 75,534 574,7.00 1 743 76,475 468,120 1767 77,324 574,050 1744 76,648 490,620 1768 79,660 626,170 1745 74,188 563,990 1 7(^9 82,131 642,910 1746 71,582 620,790 1770 8h,890 649,090 1747 71,150 621,780 1771 93,573 631,860 1748 67,68 1 610,060 1772 89,503 609,540 1749 72,706 624,220 1773 90,133 609,740 1750 70,765 656,340 1774 90,419 585,290 1751 69,589 63 1 ,890 1775 93,581 623,950 1752 73,708 642,100 1776 98,372 671,700 17.?3 75,252 648,440 1777 93,714 714,870 1754 70,437 631,350 1778 97,360 658,540 1755 74,290 647,100 1 1779 97,352 676,540 • I have extracted the following observations from Sir F. M. Eden's work, but I am inclined to tliink, from what I can collect, that the weight of cattle and sheep, as estimated by him in 1797, is rather overrated. " It is said in the first report of the select committee appointed to take into con- sideration tlie means of promoting tlie cultivation and improvement of tlie waste lands in the kingdom, tliat the size and weight, both of sheep and cattle, have, probably, increased at least one fourth since 1732 ; according to which rate the consumption of meat, with respect to tlie number of pounds, has augmented much more than it has widi respect to the number of cattle and sheep. AYe may form some idea of the size of cattle and sheep in 1 732, from the size at wliicli they were estimated in a work attributed to Dr. D'Avenant, published in 1710; be- tween which period, and 1732, it is probable tliat some (though not very consi- derable) increase in size had t*iken place. The author estimated the weight of a net carcase of black cattle at 370lb. and of a sheuj) at 28lb. Bullocks now killed in London wcigli at an average bOOlb.; calves 148lb., bhcep bOlb., and lambs about 50lb. each." 39 Years. C.ittlc. Sheep. Years. Cattle. iSheep. 1780 102,383 706,850 1802 126,389 743,470 1781 102,543 743,330 ISC'? 117,551 787,430 1782 101,176" 728,970 1804 113,019 903,940 1 78.J 101,K40 701,610 1805 125,043 912,410 1784 98,143 616,110 1806 120,250 858,570 1785 99,047 641,470 1807 134,326 924,030 1786 92,270 665,910 1808 144,042 1,015,280 1787 94,946 668,570 1809 137,600 989,250 1788 92,829 679.100 1810 132,155 962,750 •1789 93,269 693,700 1811 125,012 966,400 1790 103,708 749,660 1812 133,854 953,630 1791 101,164 740,360 1813 137,770 891,240 1792 107.348 760,859 1814 135,071 870,880 1793 116,848 728,480 1815 124,948 962,840 17.04 109,448 719.420 1816 120,439 968,560 1795 1 3 1 ,092 745,640 1817 129,888 1,044,710 I79fa- 1 1 7, 1 52 758,840 1818 138,047 963,250 1797 108,377 693,510 1819 135.226 949,900 1798 107,470 753,010 1820 132,933 947,990 17.99 122,986 834,400 1821 14ti,133 1,107,230 1800 125,073 842,210 1822 142,043 1 ,340, 1 60 1801 134,546 760,560 1823 149,552 1,264,920 * Down to the year 1789 the numbers are taken from Sir F. M. Eden's work on the state of the poor, e.Ktracted originaUy from tlie report of the select com- mittec appointed to take into consideration the means of promoting the cultivation and improremcnt of the waste lands in the kingdom. From the year 1790 tlic numbers are extracted from papers laid before par> liament. APPENDIX PART IV. No. I. TABLE OF PRICES, EXCLUSIVE OF DUTY FROM 1782 TO 1822, BOTH YEARS INCLUDED. 2 ASHES. ^ liner ic an, U. S. Danzig. Carthngcna. East India. Pearl. 1 Pot • 1 Duty. Pearl. Duty. Barilla. Duty. Barilla. Duty. Cll t. cwt , civt. Civt . cxvt. cut. cvct. s. s. s. s. S. S. s. d. s. s. s. d. 1782 None. 64 65 68 70 Free. 46 50 34 35 2 lA 22 24 24 26 5 21 None. 1783 34 26 38 42 34 40 65 26 70 34 Do. 32 40 22 30 Do. 23 24 15 16 Do. None. 30 35 1784 35 22 32 40 27 35 26 42 36 46 Do. 23 26 34 36 2 2^V 16 17 33 35 Do. None. 1785 32 25 35 32 34 18 38 32 Do. 30 32 18 24 Do. 35 20 23 Do. None. 1786 28 32 25 32 37 35 18 6 26 30 36 Do. 18 24 28 31 Do. 22 24 28 29 Do. None. 1787 34 25 28 37 33 35 21 24 33 30 Do. 28 31 24 28 26 32 2 3 29 30 31 32 5 3 None. 1788 28 26 36 34 32 38 22 27 32 36 Do. 26 28 24 26 28 34 Do. 31 32 19 20 Do. None. 1789 34 30 38 38 35 42 27 26 36 40 Do. 30 34 28 32 34 36 None. Do. 19 20 23 25 None. 21 22 Do. None. 1790 38 40 38 42 46 43 29 26 30 20 34 29 31 28 Do. None. 36 40 34 40 Do. 19 20 17 18 Do. None. 1791 38 32 40 34 20 31 25 28 32 29 Do. None. 2 3 15 16 18 19 5 3 None. 34 36 29 32 18 19 1792 32 26 40 35 26 130 38 35 Do. None. Do. 17 18 18 19 Do. None. s ASHES. American, U. S. Danzig. Carthngcna. ILasl India. Pearl. Pot. Duty. Pearl. Duty. Barilla. Duty. Barilla. Duty. ctvt. ciut. civt. cxvt. ctvt. cut. Ctct. S. s. s. or. s. 35 S. s. s. d. s. s. s. d. 1793 27 25 30 33 31 34 28 24 28 36 30 33 Free. 28 30 22 26 2 3 16 20 21 22 15 16 5 3 None. 1794 28 24 29 26 32 31 31 30 27 24 30 32 29 32 Do. 26 28 None af- ter May. Do. 14 15 25 26 Do. None. 1795 28 50 32 54 30 53 50 32 60 56 Do. Uncer- tain. Do. 29 30 35 37 31 32 Do. None. 50 58 46 52 56 58 54 56 33 35 1796 44 58 48 57 Do. 2 4^\ None. 5 6^ None. 50 70 26 52 31 32 1797 30 GO 47 50 60 70 58 68 25 45 43 50 Do. 51 54 2 54-^ 35 37 57 59 5 9A None. 30 48 54 56 43 62 40 47 48 55 46 51 51 55 1798 54 39 61 55 51 45 63 5S 1 4 3 9U 41 45 44 47 7 3A None. 1799 39 41 55 57 41 53 56 64 Do. 46 52 46 48 Do. 48 49 40 42 Do. None. 1800 41 45 39 57 57 45 49 37 59 42 Do. 37 47 36 41 Do. 36 37 27 29 30 31 Do. None. 1801 39 44 36 36 45 59 49 55 29 34 29 41 46 35 Do. 36 40 31 36 Do. 36 38 21 24 Do. None. 36 54 29 35 Free to 12 30 36 16 24 Free to 12 23 2.5 Free to 12 1802 24 43 17 29 May, then !|. IV, then 21 23 May, then None. 29 44 24 31 1 6 3 1U4 26 27 7 7A ASHES. American, U. S. Pearl. Pot. Duty. Da7izig. Pearl. Duty. Carthage)! a. Barilla. Duty. East India. Barilla. IDuty. i8o: 31 22 22 civt. s. s. civt. s. s. 46 45 4/ 26 24 33 41 crct. s. cl. Do. to 5 July, then 1 ]l cuii. s. s. d. 23 28 22 26 30 31 CXJOt. s. d. Do. to 5 July, then 3 IH civf. s. s. 25 26 28 30 27 28 civt. s. d. Do. to 5 hilv, then 8' 74- civt. s. s. Noue. . d. 1804 23 49 39 49 25 34 41 54 Do. to 1 June,then 1 3 26 31 30 33 6 Do. to 1 Jun. then 4 4 27 28 30 31 Do. to 1 Jun. then 9 74- None. 1805 47 53 59 74' 42 44 54 62 Do. to 5 Apr. then 1 34- 38 40 50 56 Do. to 5 Apr. then 4 5 32 33 30 31 35 37 Do. to 5 Apr. then 10 4 None. 1806 64 79 69 84 49 77 44 39 54 61 Do. to 10 May, then 1 44 51 63 None. Do. to 10 May, then 4 8 26 28 32 33 Do. to 10 May, then 10 JU Noue. 1807 49 75 64 73 54 69 44 54 49 69 61 Do. None. 51 53 Do. 32 34 50 52 Do. None. 59 74 57 1808 71 57 77 59 69 89 79 Do. 51 53 59 61 53 55 Do. 59 64 75 80 40 A^ Do. None. 1809 59 84 48 59 50 65 64 44 40 82 54 55 Do. to 5 July, then 4 8 60 61 40 55 54 59 49 54 Do. to 5 July, then 4 8 58 60 44 46 43 47 45 51 Do. to 5 July, then 11 4 None. 1810 45 6! 50 6; 35 49 35 45 30 50 73 47 Do, 59 64 None. Do. 45 49 49 52 35 39 Do. None. 1811 35 23 49 40 30 20 47 30 Do. None till Novenib. 24 29 Do. 35 39 19 24 Do, None. 1812 43 46 23 38 41 Do. to 1 Sep. then 9 4 25 29 None a;]' tcr Feb. Do. to 1 Sep. then 9 4 21 24 29 31 23 25 Do. 19 23 19 21 1] ASHES. American, U. S. Dan zUr. Carthagena. Eaist India. Pearl. Pot Duty. Pearl. Duty. Barilla. Duty. Barilla. Duty. avf. CIV f cwl. Clot. cwt. cvot. civt. CVit. cxvt. s. s. s. s. s. d. s. s. s. d. S. s. s. d. S. s. s. d. 1813 50 37 54 49 34 52 47 11 1 37 38 52 55 11 1 24 25 25 26 11 4 14 15 23 11 4 41 61 39 o4 41 71 44 67 Russia Pe;irl 1814 37 44 59 65 54 44 69 55 Do. 59 62 40 42 Do. 26 16 27 19 Do. 22 16 23 \1 Do. None. 50 60 QQ 68 1815 None. 71 11 57 60 35 ir^ 65 74 78 Do. 52 58 47 52 57 59 Do. 17 25 21 26 Do. 19 11 20 12 Do, 73 "' /■> 73 70 73 55 57 25 26 11 13 1816 52 59 78 80 Do. 40 42 Do. 17 21 Do. 14 15 Do. 63 44 46 53 55 19 22 12 14 43 58 59 30 32 20 90 1817 64 53 55 50 39 52 40 Do. 61 62 49 51 47 50 Do. 12 28 13 29 Do. 12 16 13 20 Do. 1818 57 46 52 59 47 46 43 47 Do. 47 48 38 40 Do. 20 23 21 24 Do. 18 16 19 20 Do. 40 41 16 16 10 O 1 1819 51 30 34 42 23 32 11 2 26 27 29 30 11 2 22 19 23 20 Do. Do. 26 27 1820 33 28 34 31 28 34 22 33 31 Do. 26 27 26 26 27 Do. 19 17 20 17 6 Do. 10 Do. 1821 30 29 31 30 29 34 30 Do. 27 31 30 Do. 17 18 17 6 19 Do. 10 6 10 1 '^ Do. 30 31 32 33 15 16 9 10 34 38 35 33 36 15 1 5 6 1822 33 40 43 36 Do. None. 39 35 37 Do. 16 14 176 17 15 186 Do. 6 10 Do. N. B. After 5 Jan. 1823, the duty on Barilla only 5s.3d. 6 ALUM. BRISTLES. COFFEE. Etiglish in lumps. No duty. St. Petersburg. 1st Quality. Duty. British Plantation, in bund or warehoused. Superior. 1 Inferior. | Duty. St. Dom. for Expor- tation. 1782 per t07i. I. I. 20 21 Clut. I. s. I. s. Not quoted. cwt. s. d. cwt. S. S. 76 81 105 116 75 86 cwt. s. s. 62 68 81 100 60 72 cwt. s. d. Ware- housing 3 6 and Home consump. 38 6 cvjt. S. S. None. 1783 20 21 22 23 Do. 72 57 63 83 66 72 63 70 48 56 54 62 None. 1784 214- 224- 22 21 22 Do. 60 86 73 68 105 80 54 59 76 85 65 72 Do. None. 1785 22 224- 19 20 4 15 5 4 2 4 7 1 44- per doz. lb. 73 71 79 76 68 72 66 70 Do. None. 1786 19 20 20 21 19 19-i^ 4 9 4 12 5 5 5 7 Do. 70 87 80 95 65 70 78 86 Do. None. 1787 19 194^ 174- 18 5 7 6 17 Do. 88 97 96 100 78 86 86 96 Do. None. 1 788 17 171 141 15 6 14 7 17 Do. 92 93 102 105 86 90 90 94 Do. None. 1/89 141 15 131 7 7 9 17 Do. 98 95 106 100 92 96 88 93 Do. None. 1790 13i 124^ 13 13 13i 8 17 9 17 8 7 8 12 Do. 92 70 98 76 86 90 56 66 Do. None. 1791 \:H 14 16 16^ 8 7 8 12 9 7 Do. 71 95 79 105 59 7( 85 95 Do. None. 179:; } 16i 16 9 7 8 17 9 7 Do. 96 109 84 105 12C lOf 85 95 100 108 Do. 70 83 None. 7 ALUM. BRISTLES. COFFEE. E)iglish in lumps. No duty. St. Peters 1st Quality. burg. Duty. British J or Superior. Plantation warchous Inferior. , in bond "d. Duty. St. Dom. for Expor- tation. 1793 per ton. I. I. I6i 16-^ cwt. I. S. I. S. 9 7 10 2 8 7 s. d. 1 41 per doz. lb. cwt. s. s. 90 107 96 115 94 105 ClJOt. s. s. 73 88 83 95 78 93 cxvt. s. d. Ware- housing 3 6 and Home consump. 38 6 cwt. S. S. None. 1794 164- 16| 8 7 6 14 8 7 Do. 96 116 77 95 92 112 85 95 66 76 74 90 None. 1795 16 16| 25 26i- 8 7 9 17 9 2 Do. 94 112 122 145 112 132 72 92 98 118 100 110 Do. None. 1796 25 26i 9 2 9 12 1 5i per do lb. 1 TV z. 118 135 113 126 103 116 100 112 Wareh. 3 8-j^ and H.C 40 5A None. 1797 25 26i- 9 12 7 2 7 7 per doz. lb. 114 126 132 145 133 140 104 110 112 130 120 132 Wareh. 3 lO^V and H. C. 42 4^V None. 1798 25 26^ 7 2 7 7 8 7 9 2 1 11 do. 3 128 138 158 172 120 126 146 157 Do. and H. C. 45 8A None. 1799 25 26| 22 23 7 2 9 5 Do. 156 170 185 196 116 130 146 155 170 184 98 115 Do. None. 1800 22 23 9 7 11 7 Do. 116 130 130 165 118 150 126 150 98 115 115 128 95 115 110 125 Do. None. 1801 22 23 11 7 14 7 9 2 9 7 Do. 131 150 130 160 88 110 115 130 105 128 60 86 Do. None. 1802 22 23 8 17 9 Do. to May, then 2 OA 88 110 96 128 93 115 60 SO 70 ory 68 92 Do. None. '8 ALUM. BRISTLES. COFFEE. English in lumps. No duty. St. Petersburg. 1st Quality. Duty. British Plantation, in bond or ivarehouscd. Superior, i Inferior. Duty. St. Dom. hx Expor- tation. 1803 per ion. I. I. 22 23 CIV I. s. 11 t. I. s. 11 11. s. d. Do. to 5 uly, then 2 3 cxvt. Ctvt. Clvt. s. s. s. s. d. no lo- "r no ^^'arch. 92 120 /O 90g,^^^^^^ In bond. Vr p 142 150 120 140 ..^^^j,^ CKt. s. s. None. 1804 22 23 11 11 11 11 6 11 11 11 8 Do. to 1 Jun. then 2 133 150 1 156 170] 142 150 10 130 40 155 20 140 ^^^l^ch. "4-%^ cwt. H.C. 04: ^ lb. None. 1805 22 23 11 6 11 7 11 8 11 15 Do. 5 Apr. then 2 9 144 165 105 185 140 170 125 140 140 103 115 130 Wareh. 74- ^ cwt. H.C. 6\ ^Ib. None. 1806 22 23 11 7 10 18 11 8 11 10 Do. to 10 May, then 2 11 143 177 152 195 110 145 122 150 115 142 125 150 80 100 100 120 Wareh. 8-i V cwt. H.C. 7 \^ lb. None. 1807 22 23 10 13 10 13 10 3 14 8 Do. to 5 July, then 3 118 140 132 160 112 130 90 117 95 130 70 108 Do. None. 1808 22 23 13 7 i26 224 14 26 5 23i Do. 106 130 95 120 116 130 08 105 00 94 90 115 Do. 90 100 80 90 90 110 1809 22 23 |224- 234^ 154 234 244 164 171 Do. 110 130 105 128 113 138 85 109 75 102 70 110 Cus.&Ex. 055. 4d. 95 110 90 102 90 105 181C 22 23 25 27 24 20 154 12^ 104 13 Do. 114 130 120 140 100 120 90 105 70 112 75 115 08 94 00 8: Do. 90 105 100 112 85 95 181] 24 20 13 184- 174- 20',- 184- Do. 7^} 95 54 73 38 7 25 51 Do. 58 08 30 42 \8V. , 24 26 - 22 24 174^ 194 lOir 18^ 204 174 Do. 5 1 80 71 9(i 20 5( 30 7t 1 Do. 45 Ot 70 76 ALUM. BRISTLES. COFFEE. Encr Ush in St. Peter sburianibuco. Duty. 1813 lb. s. d. s. d. 10 18 2 2 6 lb. s. d. 16 11 per 100 lb lb. s. d. s. d. 14 17 2 2 2 lb. .9. d. 16 11 per 100 lb lb. s. d. s. d. 1 11 2 2 8 2 10 lb. s. d. 16 11 per 1001b 1814 2 3 2 8 2 6 2 10 1 10 2 3 2 2 2 6 Do. 2 2 2 4 2 4 2 6 1 10 2 2 4 2 6 Do. 2 10 3 2 2 2 5 2 7 2 9 Do. 1815 19 2 4 16 2 1 1 11 2 8 16 2 Do. till July, then 8 7 17 1 11 13 14 15 17 12 14 Do. till July, then 8 7 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 7 2 9 1 10 2 1 Do. till July, then 8 7 1816 17 2 14 1 10 Do. 13 15 17 18 15 17 Do. 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 1 10 1 11 Do. 1817 16 1 11 2 2 1 16 ] 11 Do. 17 19 15 18 16 1 10 Do. 19 1 11 2 2 1 1 11 2 Do. 1818 16 2 18 2 2 13 1 11 Do. 16 19 17 1 10 14 16 Do. 1 11 2 2 2 2 1 91 1 11 Do. 1819 13 1 11 11 13 10 16 Oil 13 8 7 till July, then 6 3 14 17 11 13 10 12 Do. 19 1 11 1 41 1 5 Do. 1820 11 14 8 12 Do. 10 12 8 111 6/. per cent, on value. 15 16 1 1 11 6/. per cent, on value. 1821 81 1 1 71 111 9 11 81 1 01 Do, till March then free. 8 10 71 91 91 101 9 11 Do. 1 01 1 11 1 1 1 21 10 11 1 0} 1 11 Do. 1822 8^ 1 11 7 111 Do. 9 101 7 81 Do. 1 01 1 11 10 11 111 1 1^ Do. 14 COTTON WOOL. COCHINEAL. COPPER FLAX. Bengal and Sural. Duty. Spanish, garbled. Duty. British, In cakes or unmanufac. St. Peters 12 Head. burcr. Duty. 1782 lb. s. d. s. d. None. s. d. s. 18 19 lb. d. s. 6 19 6 21 d. 6 6 lb. s. d. 2\ CVct. S. S. 83 86 ton. I. I. 36 38 44 48 .«. d. Free 1783 None. 19 21 13 6 21 6 23 6 15 3 6 Do. 83 86 46 50 40 43 Do. 13 12 13 12 6 15 13 6 15 14 6 6 Do. 83 86 80 83 40 41 45 47 Do. 1784 None. 1785 None. 12 13 14 14 6 Do. 83 7S 82 46 48 36 40 Do. 1786 None. 13 12 14 14 6 13 16 6 Do. 82 38 42 45 47 Do. 1787 None. 14 13 17 6 16 15 19 6 6 Do. 82 80 72 7Q 80 41 46 38 40 44 46 Do. 1788 None. 16 18 14 18 21 16 6 6 3 80 44 45 30 39 42 43 Do. 1789 None. 14 12 13 16 14 15 6 Do. 80 76 80 84 43 44 48 49 Do. 1790 8 10 12 15 13 6 15 18 6 15 6 6 6 Do. 84 . 45 47 47 48 44 45 Do. 1791 8 9i 12 13 13 12 14 13 3 15 14 16 15 3 6 Do. 84 86 90 41 42 35 37 Do. 1792 12 13 11 10 13 14 13 12 15 14 6 Do. 105 35 37 31 32 Do. 15 16 COTTON WOOL.i Bengal and Sural. Duty. lb. s. d. s. d. 10 12 18030 9 1 2 iO 9 1 1804 8 10 10 1 3 1805 ll 2 1 5 1806 10 10 11 13 i«n-0 10 l^^^O 11 1 1 2 3 1808 9 1 1 1 9 1809 1 9 1 2 1 4 1810 1 1 G 1 C) 9 1811 1812 7 9 4 7 6 8 6 H 8 10 COCHINEAL. s. d. 16 8 per iOOlb. Do. 16 \^ per 1001b. Do. Do. Do. 16 11 per 1001b. Do. Do. Do. Spanish, garbled. I Duty. lb. s. d. s. 15 6 18 23 26 22 25 22 25 18 20 26 29 lb. s. d. \\\ 01 26 28 27 30 26 .30 22 27 23 29 19 30 6 20 31 24 29 25 30 32 36 26 32 34 36 30 37 1 1 COPPER British, In cakes or unman ufac. Cld. S. S. 130 140 140 140 156 165 65 200 Do. Do. 32 42 31 35 31 .35 29 31 30 32 29 31 Do. Do. 200 182 162 147 147 200 Do. uncertain till April. 160 160 uncertain. 150 156 140 146 140 146 130 135 FLAX. St, Petershuro- o 12 Head. Duty ton. I. I. 83 84 78 82 s. d. 31 per cvvt. 80 82 82 83 80 82 70 74 72 75 3| per cvvt. 4 per cwt. 7H 7210 41 63 64 67 68 68 70 72 75 65 as 75 80 7ii 80 140 142 per cvvt Do. Do. 140 142 uncertain. 105 107 98 100 98 100 {^S 70 71 72 72 74 100 105 103 105 95 100 103 108 4 per cvvt. Do. Do. Do. 17 COTTON WOOL. COCHINEAL. COPPER FLAX. Bengal and Sitrat. 1 Duty. Spanish, s;nrbled. Duty. British, In cakes or unmanuf'ac St. Peters 12 Head. burg. Duty. 1813 Id. s. d. s. d. 9 Oil 10 1 3 10 16 s. d. 16 11 per 100 1b. IL s. d. s. d, 32 35 48 51 Id. s. d. 2 41 CHit. S. S. 130 135 Ion. L I. 100 102 75 7H 96 100 83 90 s. d. 4f per cvvt. 1814 10 16 11 15 10 1 12 16 Do. 47 52 34 38 Do. None till Dec. 140 120 130 83 90 63 68 68 72 Do. 1815 10 15 7 Oil 10 12 Do. till July, then 8 7 32 35 37 40 30 36 Do. 130 140 120 130 70 72 76 78 68 70 Do. 1816 11 13 10 15 Do. 30 34 23 28 28 33 Do. 120 130 uncert. from Aug.toNov. 85 68 70 43 45 50 52 Do. 1817 10 13 8 11 10 14 Do. 28 34 27 30 Do. 105 133 52 54 69 70 Do. 1818 10 14 9i 1 3 6 11 Do. 27 30 28 32 25 29 26 31 Do. 133 123 No price after Apr. 69 70 65 66 70 72 Do. 1819 61 1 Oi 5 10 6i 11 Do. 24 27 26 30 2 6 No price. 70 72 None. 55 59 50 51 60 61 49 50 5 per cwt. 1820 6i 10 5 9^ 6 9| 5:1: 7^ 61 per cent, on value. 26 30 24 27 Do. Do. 50 55 48 50 52 54 Do. 1821 5 81 5i 8| 51 8 Do, 24 27 19 23 20 22 Do. Do. 52 53 46 47 50 52 Do. 1822 51 8 4f 6 Do. 19 23 18 21 Do. In June 105 95 50 52 44 45 49 50 Do. 18 HEMP. INDIGO. St. Petersburg. Spanish Caraccas. East Indie !. Cl ean. Duty. Duty. Superior. Inferior. Duty. ton. toil. 11 ;. 11 , Zi l. /. s. d. 73 4 s. d. .<;. d. s. d. s. d. 5. d. s. (/. 5. d. s. d. 1782 3H 33 or 9 17 Free. 6 6 8 4 5 6 11 331 36 3 8 10 19 9 10 6 6 6 6 per lb. per cwt 1783 34 24i 37 271 Do. 12 11 19 13 Do. 7 6 10 8 4 6 5 7 Do. 1784 911 29| 23 i 321 Do. 12 7 14 10 Do. 7 6 6 9 7 6 2 7 3 Do. 1785 22 21 24 23 Do. 7 6 12 10 Do. 7 5 6 8 6 3 4 1 9 6 3 3 6 Do. 1786 16 32 17 34 Do. 6 7 10 11 6 Do. 6 5 6 7 6 6 2 3 6 4 4 6 Do. 31 34 7 9 11 7 8 4 6 6 1787 28 30 Do. 7 6 7 9 Do. 9 9 L 3 5 Do. 33 39 No fine. 6 7 6 2 9 4 6 1788 39 28 30 40 29 31 Do. 7 6 9 10 10 6 Do. 6 6 6 3 8 7 9 2 2 9 3 5 4 6 Free. 1789 28 30 26 29 31 27 Do. 6 5 6 10 9 6 Do. 7 8 6 8 10 5 6 6 7 Do. 1790 261 30 23 27 31 24 Do. 5 6 9 11 Do. 7 5 6 9 9 3 6 1 3 6 2 4 9 6 Do. 1791 25 20 26 21 Do. 6 7 6 10 10 6 9 Do. 7 8 9 10 6 5 7 6 8 Do. 1792 23 24 25 26 Do. 7 6 6 11 10 c Do. 9 8 6 10 10 6 7 7 8 8 6 Do. 19 HEMP. INDIGO. St. Pete Clean. rsburg. Duty. Spanish Ca raccas. Duty. East India. Superior. Inferior. Duty. 1793 ton. L I. 26 27 22 23 26 27 ton. s. d. 73 4 or 3 8 per cwt lb. s. d. s. d 7 11 t 7 11 ( 7 10 f . s. d Free. lb. s. d. s. d 7 6 8 5 8 6 10 6 8 9 6 lb. s. d. s. d G 7 C 5 G C 5 9 6 6 s. d. Free. 1794 27 28 29 30 Do. 7 10 6 5 11 C Do. 7 6 9 6 8 6 10 6 3 G 6 4 7 6 Do. 1795 32 33 43 45 Do. 5 6 10 9 5 6 11 3 Do. 8 6 10 G 6 9 7 9 5 7 6 4 6 9 Do. 1796 50 51 58 59 4 Qy\ per cwt 5 5 11 4 6 10 9 Do. 9 6 11 7 9 4 8 6 2 G G G Do. 1797 53 54 37 39 43 44 4 244 per cwt 4 G 11 6 5 9 12 Do. 6 10 7 11 G 19 5 3 9 6 6 Do. 1798 35 37 32 34 38 41 5 2 per cwt 4 6 11 G 5 13 6 22 G per 1001b 8 6 10 6 11 13 6 3 9 8 4 9 10 Do. 1799 34 37 46 47 Do. 5 13 6 4 12 Do. 7 8 6 11 13 9 3 9 6 6 4 10 6 Do. 1800 50 51 72 77 Do. 4 G 12 5 12 3 Do. 8 9 6 9 6 12 3 6 7 6 4 9 9 Do. 1801 80 81 85 8G 43 45 Do. 4 12 3 G 6 12 6 Do. 8 11 6 9 9 11 3 4 9 8 6 9 9 Do. 1802 43 45 31 32 50 51 Do. 6 6 11 G Do. 9 10 6 6 G 8 6 Do. '20 HEMP. INDIGO. St. Petersburg. .s pan 'sh C araccas. East India. Clean. Duty. Duty. Superior. Inferior. Duty. ton. lb lb lb I. I. s. d. S. I i. s. d s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. S. d. 50 51 6 2| 7 6 11 6 14 Of 9 10 9 7 8 9 11 81 1803 54 55 52 53 per cwt 6 6 11 6 per 100 lb. 9 6 11 3 6 9 per 100 1b. 47 48 6 lOi 6 6 11 6 15 7^ 6 11 3 6 9 13 01 18U4 52 53 per cwt 8 9 12 per 1001b. 10 12 7 9 6 per 1001b 54 5G 7 per cwt 8 8 9 11 14 6 15 11| 10 12 8 6 9 6 13 31 1805 48 51 56 57 per 100 lb 10 10 6 13 14 3 6 8 6 3 9 10 6 per 1001b. 57 58 7 51 8 <) 14 17 11 14 8 5 10 6 14 If 180b 51 52 57 58 per cwt 6 6 13 per 100 lb. 11 14 6 4 10 per 100 1b. 62 63 6 13 11 6 14 (i 4 10 14 4 180/ 57 58 65 66 Do. 5 11 Do. 9 6 12 3 9 per 100 1b. G7 68 4 4 9 9 11 12 9 6 12 3 9 1808 117 118 Do. Do. 10 11 9 4 6 9 6 Do. 114 115 9 11 3 3 6 8 6 117 118 4 4 I 8 11 10 11 8 6 o 9 6 11 2 3 6 9 3 1809 uncertain. 94 95 7 8 per cwt Do. 9 8 3 9 10 10 1 4 2 6 9 7 2 Do. 71 72 9 6 12 4 9 75 76 4 8 8 11 16 f 9 6 12 6 4 6 9 1810 57 58 Do. Do. 10 6 14 6 10 Do. 68 72 9 6 12 4 9 1811 68 70 81 K> Do. 5 4 6 14 11 6 Do. 10 8 8 6 12 9 10 6 3 2 3 6 6 9 7 7 6 6 6 Do. 82 ^Ci 99 102 4 9 11 6 9 6 11 6 3 9 8 1812 Do. 4 12 Do. 9 11 3 6 8 Do. 4 9 12 9 6 11 6 4 9 21 HEMP. INDIGO. St. Pda •shurg. Spaniah Caraccns. East India. Clean. Duty. Duty. Superior. Inferior. Duty. to )i. lb. lb . lb I. L s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. .V. rf. A-. d. 1813 81 72 77 72 ^7 74 7S 73 9 n per cwt 4 6 9 9 12 13 6 4f per lb. 9 12 6 11 16 6 4 3 6 (J 9 9 8 11 6 (i 14 4 per 100 1b. 1814 72 41 4") 73 43 47 Do. 6 7 6 9 13 14 13 6 Do. 12 11 16 13 6 7 5 11 10 6 6 21 per lb 45 48 4 4 6 13 12 10 6 12 9 5 10 181 r. 49 51 Do. Do. 10 12 3 6 9 6 Do. 33 34 9 11 4 8 9 1816 35 30 35 36 33 36 Do. 4 3 12 10 6 Do. 9 8 9 11 10 6 4 2 8 7 9 6 Do. 1817 33 30 35 Do. 3 4 5 6 6 11 10 11 6 6 6 Do. 9 8 9 9 6 6 11 10 11 10 6 3 3 5 5 6 6 6 3 8 8 9 8 6 9 Do. 1818 38 39 36 39 40 37 Do. 5 5 6 11 10 6 (i Do. 8 7 9 3 10 9 5 4 3 8 8 7 6 Do. 1819 36 32 33 37 33 34 9 2 5 10 6 5 7 3 9 4 8 7 5 per cwt 4 10 per lb. 7 9 3 6 6 6 per lb. 34 35 4 6 N( 6 11 6 7 9 3 6 6 6 1820 35 35i Do. 3 )ne. 8 Do. 5 6 7 10 2 10 5 Do. 30 301 6 4 8 3 9 6 No fine. 1821 29 27 39 30 271 41 Do. 3 7 9 No 8 fine. 11 6 Do. 6 8 4 8 11 9 3 .5 9 6 6 7 Do. 421 28 27 30 43 30 7 11 (i 8 10 !) 5 6 7 1822 Do. 6 3 11 Do. 8 11 .3 6 7 6 Do. 31 8 3 11 6 9 12 5 9 8 6 HOPS. IRON. Kent Yea r lings, including Duty. Amount of Duty. Eng, in Pigs. No Duty. Russia i n Bars. Duty. Sivedish 'n Bars. Duty. 1782 ctvt. s. s. 30 90 70 135 I. 14,895 s. 12 d 3 ton. I. l. 6 71 ton. I. 15| ton. I. s. d. 2 16 2 ton. L 15f 171 ton. I. s. d. 2 16 2 1783 120 90 210 125 75,716 14 4 6 7i 4 6i 15f lOf Do. 171 15i Do. 1784 80 70 126 105 94,389 17 6 41 6A ^2 "2 3 4 I Of 15i Do. 14f 17^ Do. 1785 80 96 76 118 120 108 112,684 5 2 3 5 5 61 12* 14f Do. 14| 15 Do. 1786 70 50 40 107 68 76 95,973 15 8 5 61 3 5 14 14if Do. 14i 14f Do. 1787 80 160 105 200 48,227 3 4 3 5 41 6 14f 15i Do. 15f Do. 1788 189 220 120 240 340 160 145,168 3 5 3 7 15 13f Do. i-H 16 Do. 1789 110 150 115 155 170 130 104,562 7 4 3 7 4 7 13f 141 Do. 151 16| Do. 1790 95 60 120 80 106,541 9 4 3 7 c 1 71 O2 /2 13 15 Do, 15 17 Do. 1791 80 105 80 120 140 105 90,059 4 1 51 71 5 71 14| 14i Do. I5f 154 Do. 1792 80 50 56 105 60 105 162,112 19 4 5 71 j 14f 1.H 14i Do. 164- 171 Do. 23 HOPS. IRON. Ken t Yea rlings, including Duly. Amount of Duty. Eng. in Pigs. No Duty. Russia I n Bars. Duty. Swedish in Bars. Duty. 1793 cwt. s. s. 56 112 140 230 120 200 /. S. d. 22,619 12 4 ton. I. I. 5 /I ton. I. I. 14 15 15i ton. I. s. d. 2 16 2 ton. L I. 16| 17i 18i ton. I. s. d. 2 16 2 1794 200 50 252 80 205,063 2 5 8 Y21 15i 12 Do. 16 17 Do. 1795 70 90 105 120 82,348 19 3 5 8 13 15| 16 17 Do. 15i 16 16| 18 Do. 1796 84. 56 105 75 75,223 16 5 5 8 161 17i 21i 221 3 1 9A 171 191 21| 22| 3 1 9A 1797 94. 130 100 130 175 112 157,438 12 3 5 8 20 21 21 20| 3 4 7A 21 2U 22 23 20 2U 3 4 7-^ 1798 90 164 115 180 56,032 1 6\ 5 8 201 21f 19| 201 3 15 5A 22 23 21 22 3 15 5^ 1799 210 300 215 378 73,279 15 3 5 8 20 211 Do. 22 23 Do. 1800 320 235 310 353 300 360 72,928 7 6 5 8 5i 9 17 21 21| 23| Do. 2U 23 224- 24 Do. 1801 220 50 320 86 241,227 8 6 5i 9 221 23;- 231 264 18 224 Do. 22 i- 234- 254- 264 204- 224^ j)0. 1802 76 210 130 110 252 180 Old, 15,463 10 6 H 9 181 224 15f 201 Do. 204 224 194 20; Do. 24 HOPS. Kent Yearlings., including Duty. Amount of Old Duty. 1803 1804 cn:t. s. s. 205 230 90 100 /. s. d. 199,205 1 11 Eng. in Pigs. No Duty. tun. L I. 5i 92 126 110 130 60 84 1805 1806 177,617 9 9 74 105 120 147 95 116 116 155 86 102 32,904 12 8 ;^ 153,102 15 11 i^n- ^8 115 ^^^^ 120 150 1808 1809 100,071 15 112 140.^.,,.^n 15 7 60 80^^^^''^-^ ^"^ ' 75 115 84 135 60 110 1810 1811 90 147 76 125 95 140 IRON. Russia in Bars. I Duty. io)i. I. I. 16 20 7 9 7 9 164 15 ton. I. s. d. 4 4 4i Sivcdish in Bars. Duty. ton. L I. 20 22 ton. I. s. d. 4 4 4; 19. 18i 4 17 1 r> > 10 1 1 20^ 20 21- 21 4 17 1 7 9 63,952 estimated 70,000 115 192 130 160 100 147 1812 120 160 140 230 260 280 1810 73,514 7 181 1, estimated 1 40,000 1811 157,085 19 5 1S12, estimated 25,000 15 J- 194 5 7 5| 194- 20-i^ 201 194 144 191 Do 19 21 194 204 Do. 7 9 i4i m 7 9 7 9 141 191 5 1 194 20, Do. 194 174- 204 194 Do. 9 4 Do. 141 181 7 9 141 18^ 161 191 Do. 174 15^ 184. 17'^ 154 17. Do. 154 17. 154 174 9 4 Do. Do. Do. 2.5 HOPS. IRON. Kent Ycarliiws, inctudinp- Encr. in 1 o - o Dutif. Pi^^. R issia in Bars. Swedish in Bars. Amount of Old Duty. No Duty. Duty. Duty. cwt. ton. ton. ton. tc n. ton. s. s. /. s. d. I. /. I. I. I. s. d. l. L I. s. d. 1813 2G0 340 •'00 360 420 ''40 1812 30,633 10 2 1813, estimated 7 9 16,1 1 21 19> 6 9 10 151 161 171 171 6 9 10 '1 30,000 1814 140 HiO 140 200 189 175 1813 131,481 2 7 1814, estimated 137,000 7 9 12^ 16i Do. 161 151 171 161 Do. 1815 IGO 180 168 215 280 250 1814 140,202 6 1 1815, estimated 110,000 7 9 121 161 Do. 151 161 Do. 1815 lOl 171 161 15' 181G 120 280 180 360 123,878 16 3 1816, estimated 7 9 131 12' Do. 151 161 Do. 40,000 111 2 290 400 1816 151 161 None. 151 161 - 1817 500 340 600 640 500 700 46,302 15 9 1817, estimated 68,000 7 9 121 161 1 ("i 1 1 Jg 211 Do. Do. 1817 7 9 161 211 151 161 1818 540 110 640 185 66,522 2 6 1818, estimated 7^ 7 9 7h 151 18 211 21 Do. 181 16 194 17 Do. 200,000 8 [) 20 22 18 181 1818 1819 112 7G 180 100 199,465 13 6 1819, estimated 200,000 8i 8~ 91 9 20 17 24 21 6 10 18 161 19 171 6 10 7G 100 1819 1 7 21 201 191 1820 70 80 70 95 112 100 242,076 2 2 1820, estimated 120,000 81 7i 9 161 141 Do. 161 16 17i 17 Do. 1821 70 63 110 90 1820 138,330 6 7\ 15 20 Do. 16 17 Do. 63 105 1821 b 'J 141 Ibl loi 10 154,609 10 8 63 112 1822 80 60 60 112 90 105 1822 203,724 1 1 9 6 6 61 7" 141 161 16 181 Do. 151 14 161 15^ Do. 26 LEAD. MADDERS. OILS. Englisli in Pigs tVee on board. Dutch Ganioie to Crop. 1 Duty. Gall ipolL Duty. Eiio No* J Linseed iish. Duty. Rape. Greenl. iviihout Casla. Duty. 1782 Fodder of 19^ cwl. 18/. 19 civt. s. d. i 30 70 35 100 cid. s. d. 9 per 236 36/ 45 tun gall. 371. 48 •per tun 252 gall. 71. ds. 5d. 236 gal l. I. 35 36 41 42 236 0-0/252 /. /. /. 24 26 25 28 29 28 gai I. 26 29 252 gnl s. d. 12 2 1783 201 174- 35 90 Do. 45 41 AG 42 Do. 42 43 46 47 26 29 36 37 21 28 22 29 Do. .-„ 16 17i ^^^^18 ISi 30 40 7o 90 Do. 39 51 40 53 Do. 42 43 34 36 38 39 None. 29 34 29 19 30 20 Do. 1785 181 171 40 41 80 85 Do. 50 40 51 41 Do. 39 40 29 30 .38 4226 36 37 20 27 21 Do. 1786 171 181 40 70 85 105 Do. 40 47 41 48 Do. 30 35 36± 32 39 21 17 22 20 Do. 1787 184 221 31 30 100 121 120 After May free. 34 42 Do. 36 40 35 3Q 26 16 20 Do. 1788 224 24 22V 40 22 120 110 Do. 35 39 36 40 Do. 34 35 36 3? 33 34 24 25 23 24 17 15 18 17 Do. 1789 224- 201 20 25 110 120 Do. 42 38 44 39 Do. 33 35 27 28 24 25 29 30 24 25 16 18 17 19 Do. 1790 194- 18t 25 30 120 90 Do. 36 39 43 Do. 30 31 27 28 34 3Q 27 28 17 21 18 23 Do. 1791 181 204- 30 35 90 90 Do. 38 30 40 37 Do. 28 30 26 27 28 29 33 34 30 31 17 23 19 24 Do. 1792 201 35 95 Do. 41 37 45 Do. 17 274 28 29 3 1 32 39 40 23 25 24 26 Do. 27 LEAD MADDERS. OILS. English in Pigs free on Dutch English Greenl. mlliout\ Game tie to Crop. Gallipoh. No Duty Casks-. board. Duty. Duty. Lir isecd Rape. Duty. Fodder nf c vt. CWt. jter tvn per tui 236 ga/ 23C gal 252 gal 252gnl 19i civt. s. s. s. d. 236 gall. 252 gal/. I. /. /. I. I. /. s. d. After 42/ . 46/. 29 97 30 28 39 40 26 27 1793 20^1. 35 90 xMay 56 58 71. ds. 5d. 44 46 20 21 12 2 free. 53 54 34 35 23 24 1794 20| 18 30 25 35 90 80 105 Do. 56 50 60 53 Do. 29 38 30 40 35 42 38 36 44 40 23 25 24 26 Do. 1 yd') 21 40 26 106 100 Do. ^7 65 48 66 Do. 40 50 44 42 52 46 38 58 40 60 25 36 27 37 Do. 1796 21^ 20i 40 30 100 95 Do. Go 46 67 48 7 7 944 46 51 47 52 60 32 36 62 33 38 36 29 35 38 30 36 12 9 A 1797 19^ 30 16 95 90 Do. 51 65 52 70 Do. 50 35 52 37 38 30 34 40 31 35 36 28 31 38 29 32 13 444 19^ 19 16 90 65 68 35 34 36 35 34 35 30 31 1798 12 85 2 3 70 71 9 4 114-J 29 30 27 28 30 244 15 93 60 63 34 35 30 31 1799 204- 21 15 50 20 95 110 100 Do. 66 75 64 68 77 65 Do. 33 48 34 51 33 63 34 64 26 28 27 29 Do. 1800 224 25 28 23 108 113 Do. 65 59 66 62 Do. 52 48 51 53 49 52 63 57 64 59 25 40 26 41 Do. 25 28 23 108 59 61 60 63 52 54 59 47 42 46 ISOl 43 23 116 110 Do. Do. 46 54 47 55 5/ 46 49 45 50 46 Do. 28 334- 23 118 61 63 54 47 46 47 40 42 1802 20 105 Do. 52 53 Do. 40 36 37 n 32 Do. 23 110 62 63 43 33 34 28 LEAD. MADDERS. OILS. English in Dutch 1 English . Greenl. without] Pigs free on Gamene to Crop \ GulUpoli. No Duty. Casks. board. 1 Duty. 1 1 Duty. Linseed. Raj e. Duty. Fodder of en -/. cwt. per tun per tun 236 gall. 236 gal 252 gal 2o2gal 19| cvot. s. s. s. d. 236, aall. 2b2gall. l. I. I. /. /. I. s. d. 1803 334/. S3 21 20 107 102 3 63/. 66 53 641. 68 54 I. s. d. 10 16 6 47 48 64 65 55 56 41 50 45 42 51 46 32 38 34 40 13 9| 1804 33 22 17 102 76 3 4 51 70 52 73 12 74 55 56 49 50 44 61 47 62 36 34 37 35 13 11 1805 344 40 39 41 17 13 96 87 3 5 70 68 74 74 70 7^) 12 5 5 48 50 44 46 61 65 51 62 67 52 34 38 31 35 40 32 13 4i 1806 41 38 17 96 3 8 73 63 76 66 13 1 54 39 42 48 50 36 37 51 34 54 35 27 26 28 27 14 31 1807 38 30 \ 17 18 96 100 Do. 64 68 67 70 Do. 36 37 46 47 40 43 36 30 37 31 26 21 28 22 Do. 46 86 69 84 6S 70 85 7 1 21 22 1808 28 43 46 \7 170 105 Do. Do. 46 47 94 95 32 56 33 57 28 25 30 26 Do. i '-'' 125 36 37 1809 43 38 ' 16 [ 136 116 4 67 77 70 61 70 78 71 65 13 3 4 94 95 168 170 75 76 88 90 56 72 59 57 73 60 36 34 42 37 35 45 7 1810 35 33 i 36 26 126 111 Do. 64 58 66 59 Do. 88 90 51 52 59 61 57 60 64 58 38 43 40 39 44 41 Do. 1 54 55 48 49 64 65 57 58 1811 33 34 27-^ 26 46 111 135 Do. 57 69 59 73 Do. 62 46 66 63 4S 67 42 31 46 33 Do. 1812 271 30 29 1 46 136 1 05 200 None. |105 235 Do. 75 87 69 77 88 97 Do. 60 61 54 55 66 79 76 6S 80 78 34 42 35 35 43 36 Do. 29 LEAD. MADDERS. OILS. Dutch En' rlish. Greenl. without) Pigs free on Gamene to Crop. Gallipoli. No Duty. Cash. 1 board. Duty. Duty. Linseed. Rar e. Duty. Fodder of cwt. civt. per tun per tun 236 gal 236 gall. 252 gal 252 gal 19t}cw^ s. s. Hardly s. d. 236 gall. 252 gall. I. s. d. L I. I. /. I. I. s. d. 29/. any at 83/. 85/. 54 55 76 78 44 45 1813 29 31 market 4 9 95 97 15 12 84 80 82 49 50 36 40 8 31 29 30 bef. Dec 85 90 74 75 63 64 56 60 80 145 30 32 55 128 S7 90 80 82 46 48 55 58 57 58 1814 33 34 60 138 Free. 58 60 Do. 32 36 33 34 Do. 28 30 63 103 65 68 43 44 42 43 42 43 1815 28 25 40 115 50 124 30 105 Do. 69 70 76 78 Do. 46 53 44 48 34 50 36 32 33 44 45 34 35 Do. 1816 25 18 30 105 5/. per 36 lOOcent.oii 75 76 60 61 Do. 44 38 35 57 37 61 35 22 Do. 19 30 ] 20 value. 82 83 56 37 19 83 85 56 57 58 35 3S 1817 18 26 30 126 46 147 Do. 80 81 84 S6 Do. 43 53 49 42 70 64 43 72 65 30 31 58 59 Do. 1818 26 24 26 46 140 .35 130 35 142 Do. 84 86 67 73 85 90 Do. 50 43 58 46 56 54 60 48 58 55 58 59 33 34 41 42 37 39 Do. 1819 27 23 28 35 135 25 120 30 100 5 85 90 57 58 66 67 59 60 15 13 43 41 54 45 48 38 55 46 49 39 36 37 32 33 38 39 33 34 8 3 231 35 80 58 61 38 39 31 32 40 41 30 1 820 23 15 90 Do. 60 64 Do. 46 48 33 Do. 234 15 88 54 5J 43 44 234- 1821 234 15 90 15 85 Do. 554 56 45 501 Do. 31 27 29 43 38 41 37 44 39 42 48 25 19 Do. 23 19 90 504- 31 28 30 29 42 43 22 19 28 26 1822 224- 20 77 Do. 39 Do. 29 30 Do. 23 15 80 42 43 32 30 PROVISIONS. RICE. Irish mess Beef. No Duty. Irish mess Fork. No Duty. Waterford. No Duty. Butter. Dutch. Duty. Cart dina. Duty. Bei gal. Duty. 1782 tierce. s. s. 76 80 80 84 75 82 barrel, s. s. 55 56 54 5: 57 58 cut. s. S. ^f 58 o4 56 c:i-t. s. s. None. cwf. s. d. cxvt . s. s. 22 24 30 31 cn-t. s. d. 7 4 civt. s. s. None. civt. s. d. 17S3 80 88 60 65 58 60 45 50 57 58 53 54 60 61 None. 32 23 30 33 25 32 Do. None. 1784 60 65 60 70 45 50 65 70 68 70 54 55 60 61 None. 26 20 27 21 Do. None. 1785 66 70 70 72 65 70 60 67 58 59 53 54 63 64 None. 19 13 16 20 15 17 Do. None. 1786 70 72 76 77 66 68 75 78 66 67 63 65 65 70 61 62 54 56 63 64 None. 16 20 18 17 21 19 Do. None. 1787 75 78 76 80 uncertain. 75 82 65 70 59 63 uncertain. 55 58 62 64 47 50 52 57 None. 2 6 17 18 186 19 Do. None. 1788 75 82 uncertain. 70 75 56 58 58 60 uncertain. 40 50 52 55 47 50 51 53 None. Do. 18 14 19 15 Do. None. 1789 70 75 65 73 40 50 44 46 50 52 46 48 50 52 None. Do. 14 17 16 15 19 17 Do. None. 1790 65 75 76 80 50 52 45 50 55 60 5 1 55 66 70 None. Do. 17 14 18 15 Do. None. 1791 74 78 76 82 70 75 55 60 60 63 56 58 66 70 47 49 69 70 None. Do. 14 16 15 17 Do. None. 1792 70 75 63 70 75 90 58 60 68 70 69 70 44 47 64 66 None. Do. 14 15 6 18 19 Do. None. 31 PROVISIONS. RICE. Irish mess Irish mess Butter. Bengal. Beef. Pork. ^\'aterfbr(l. L'UroiDia. No Duty. No Duty. No Duty. Du ch. 1 Duty. Duty. Duty. tierce. barrel. cwt. eivt. cwt. cwt. cwt. cwt. cwt. s. s. s. s. S. s. s. A'. s. d. s. s. s. d. s. s. s. d. 1793 75 100 90 105 C^7 70 70 72 62 70 68 65 75 70 None. 2 6 18 19 15 16 7 4 None. 1794 105 92 115 100 74 63 7'o 66 68 70 72 76 68 60 76 78 Do. 17 18 22 23 Do. None. 1795 92 95 90 100 110 110 63 7b 66 84 72 80 74 7(\ 81 76 58 75 Do. 41 43 36 45 37 7 4 till Jul. then Free. None. 1796 95 110 110 125 80 95 84 82 105 105 74 78 76 80 58 73 7.^ 86 2 7i 38 42 20 21 Do. 20 25 10 15 Free, 1797 110 130 125 140 84 90 90 105 115 95 7& 85 70 77 88 73 78 66 S8 77 2 9 20 21 16 17 23 24 18 19 Do. 10 15 9 11 11 13 Do. 1798 130 140 140 147 90 65 95 71 73 60 74 63 67 36 78 54 2 9 and 3/. percent on val. 17 18 15 16 6 10 12 16 18 Do. 110 130 78 80 62 78 18 19 1799 105 110 126 130 50 85 70 95 78 93 82 95 60 96 75 105 Do. 16 17 38 40 Do. 13 16 11 14 36 38 Do. 110 130 ^^^ 95 100 105 100 108 38 39 41 45 22 26 54 56 36 38 6 1800 110 120 95 105 85 90 70 98 Do. Free. 43 45 130 135 140 145 120 125 120 128 unccrt. 1801 MO 60 150 120 150 50 170 120 115 70 1J7 75 112 50 80 116 83 92 Do. 54 56 21 24 34 36 Do. uncert. 25 32 Do. 1802 65 150 120 160 50 100 120 115 79 65 88 80 70 92 80 74 110 98 86 118 Do. 33 36 40 42 29 31 30 33 Do. till Jul. then 8 9 20 30 10 20 11 26 Free. 8 8 9 1803 140 152 150 160 100 105 90 105 115 100 85 114 94 115 104 7b 103 108 95 117 3 6f 31 33 34 35 36 37 34 35 8 9 J 5-jxr 5 U 14 15 11 20 18 30 17 31 9 5A 5 2 32 PROVISIONS. RICE. Iris/ mess Irish 7ness Butter. Care )Una. Ba B eef. Pork. Waterford. gal. No Duty. No Duty. No Duty. Dutch. 1 Duty. Duty. Duty. tierce. barrel. Clvt. cwt. civt. cvot. cvot. cvot. cvot. s. s. s. s. s. S. s. S. S. d. s. s. s. d. s. s. s. d. 1804 150 100 155 110 90 65 70 115 70 7't 105 113 7r) 80 96 98 100 114' 55 66 3 111 90 112 33 20 32 40 35 21 35 50 5 n till .Till, then 4 8 17 10 13 23 27 16 23 33 5 2 till Jul. then 4 8 95 97 7 J 1 00 40 45 Do. 23 33 4 8 1805 ;2^? 130 70 /.') 68 70 100 120 4 Oi 36 41 till Jul. 15 23 till Jul. 140 95 100 96 100 80 85 30 34 then 21 26 then 90 92 100 110 40 45 5 lU 30 34 5 lUV 135 1806 110 130 140 120 140 92 85 95 95 88 100 78 80 96 100 90 92 75 7S 100 118 80 83 100 110 4 31 40 27 27 45 32 35 Do. till Jul. then 6 4 26 22 28 29 5 lUv till Jul. then 6 4 j 90 9 ") 120 1807 jg^ 126 140 95 90 100 108 110 93 None. 100 105 85 102 Do. 25 23 34 30 Do. 25 26 None. Do. 120 122"^ ^-"^ 30 36 100 118 30 36 Do. 1808 120 150 125 160 90 65 105 92 97 110 110 126 100 105 115 117 None. 106 112 100 105 Do. 37 45 35 45 52 45 till April, then None. 45 60 Free. 120 123 58 62 Free. 145 1 50 105 110 116 118 None. 56 60 45 55 1809 147 140 152 145 110 1 10 112 I 15 82 84 95 108 114 116 105 125 4 4 (.0 30 68 32 Do. 0.0 22 60 38 Do. 104 108 100 122 32 36 30 40 |140 155 115 110 120 115 108 110 90 115 30 21 34 25 26 34 1810142 140 145 1 55 90 95 1 22 1 25 80 124 85 105 Do. Do. 18 20 25 26 Do. 160 165 NonetillJul. 1811 175 165 190 170 no 97 115 105 130 132 115 118 120 126 None. Do. 23 27 40 Do. 22 30 25 34 Do. 1 65 167 97 100 126 128 None till .Tunc. pv 130 134 106 110 40 70 80 42 30 46 35 55 36 48 40 64 1812 150 160 152 162 100 120 10_' 122 no 118 118 1 22 / / 82 Do. Do. 1813 None. 150 160 1 90 1 95 1 70 1 75 None. 1 20 1 22 1S5 187 1 65 I 75 117 121 84 90 1 25 1 27 115 120 104 110 ^<' '^ 5 5 90 105 N. after July 80 48 46 84 52 52 Do. 16 4 20 0:1 56 30 40 70 42 54 Do. 33 PROVISIONS. RICE. Irish mess Iri.'^h mess 1 Beef. Pork. Watc rtbrd. ^"'^^'- Cart lima. Bengal. 1 No Duty. No Duty. No Duty. Dutch. Duty. Duty. Duty. tierce. barrel. Civt. civt. civt. cwt. Civt. civt. Cl\:t. s. s. s. s. s. 1^9 S. 124 140 125 138 s. s. None till s. d. j.. s. S. d. s. s. s. d. 1814 178 160 165 165 125 125 130 138 122 137 March. 125 130 90 95 138 140 5 5 36 25 56 40 26 60 20 01 Free. 20 01 25 20 50 40 Free. 100 136 138 133 135 140 90 111 116 140 143 45 48 20 15 40 20 815 165 170 100 120 121 94 105 Do. 20 25 Do. 7 6 140 70 None. 120 124 25 26 100 113 120 103 110 98 114 100 108 Do. 9fJ '^6 15 ''S 816 110 115 85 90 65 70 70 75 02 94 80 68 96 85 77 80 70 74 80 86 till Ap. then 20 20 46 25 58 Do. 15 20 25 23 Do. 817 100 105 120 125 105 108 80 105 90 102 6 80 93 66 115 82 94 70 116 80 90 None. 70 74 None. 1 00 1 05 Do. 42 40 34 51 51 46 36 52 Do. till Ap. then Free. 28 28 24 35 30 28 Do. till Ap. then Free. 818 105 110 6 100 100 112 105 115 116 130 134 None. 126 127 117 118 100 ll!2 110 120 96 101) 115 118 Do. 45 42 53 42 48 44 54 47 Do. 20 16 20 28 25 30 Do. 102 6 102 108 112 115 118 43 45 20 01 17 28 Do. 819 125 92 74 78 74 80 Do. 30 33 till Ap 11 16 till Ap. 115 100 98 100 98 100 36 38 then 13 17 then 125 90 74 75 90 92 18 24 15 9 10 5 125 115 120 130 135 120 90 95 76 90 78 82 78 93 82 84 90 92 None. 18 24 9 10 820 60 67 6 65 72 6 82 86 74 75 86 88 Do. 26 21 27 22 Do. 10 8 12 12 Do. 821 120 125 67 72 6 57 6 86 95 (.8 88 97 72 80 85 40 42 76 82 Do. 21 19 15 20 19 Do. 9 8 10 13 10 12 Do. 11 . J 117 88 90 18 20 10 11 55 57 6 54 84 92 72 74 18 20 8 11 822 110 112 6 80 60 70 70 76 84 88 40 46 Do. 14 18 18 20 Do. 7 8 11 13 Do. 68 75 70 74 19 21 8 12 .34 SALTPETRE. SEEDS. 1 _ Baltic Linseed Forei"7i Rape ing. E(ts:t India i-ouiih. Foi'eign Red Clover. for solving. fur son Duty. Duty. Duty. Duty. cwt. cxvt. ctvf. civf. quarter. cwt. last, Oqr. qr. s. s. s. d. s. s. s. d. s. s. s. d. I. I. s. d. 1782 87 72 67 7 8A 25 57 42 87 2 9 30 42 50 60 2 2 16 23 17 24 Free. 178.3 67 64 Do. 81 37 117 47 Do. 46 58 32 40 Do. 20 28 24 29 Do. 1784 62 64 50 52 Do. 18 33 43 70 Do. 36 45 44 50 Do. 28 32 29 33 Do. 1785 55 53 Do. 44 10 73 45 Do. 40 44 Do. 30 32 Do. 55 47 S3 36 38 26 29 barrel, cont. 1786 56 49 Do. 41 20 45 82 66 102 Do. about 1 qr. 36 38 40 42 Do. 28 29 29 30 Do. 48 39 65 107 40 45 21 22 1787 7 9 40 44 Do. 55 56 Free. 14 15 13 3 65 84 32 38 13 18 39 40 33 34 62 81 35 40 13 18 1788 Do. 12 66 Do. 45 48 Do. 14 Do. 22 00 30 38 10 12 34 35 31 57 32 38 26 32 10 11 1789 40 Do. 25 49 Do. Do. 21 22 Do. 32 33 37 67 18 20 31 33 20 11 14 oo 1790 uncertain 46 50 42 45 Do. 2y 17 72 39 Do. 34 40 29 35 Do. 13 17 Do. 1791 42 44 38 40 Do. 38 27 41 42 Do. 38 10 25 28 Do. 16 14 17 18 16 18 Do. 1792 40 63 Do. 18 27 40 62 Do. 30 35 Do. 15 23 18 25 Do. 35 SALTPETRE. SEEDS. East I lid la 70 ugh. Duty. Foreign R ed Clover. Duty. Baltic Linseed for toivhig. Duty. Foreign Rape for solving. Duty. 1793 civf. s. 64 97 None. 38 40 cut. s. d. 7 9 cwt. s. s. 22 65 18 45 28 72 cut. s. d. 2 9 barrel, s. s. 35 40 38 42 cwt. s. d. Free. last,\()qr I. L 23 25 27 28 20 21 25 26 s. d. 13 3 1794 52 None till Dec. 125 132 Do. 23 63 35 95 Do. 35 40 43 45 Do. 23 24 26 28 24 25 Do. 1795 135 170 155 Free. 66 92 32 60 42 86 Do. 48 52 58 60 40 45 50 56 Do. 26 28 43 44 Do. 1796 155 45 96 56 Do. 45 95 50 135 27 57 Do. 60 63 42 46 Do. 42 45 19 20 13 104-^ 1797 56 59 uncertain 65 68 58 60 3 after- wards 1 111 30 60 42 67 15 40 30 80 3 OA 40 4C 35 40 Do. 16 19 12 13 16 18 14 64^ 1798 60 61 140 145 Do. 30 82 15 32 18 55 5 3-j-(j- 35 38 38 42 30 35 33 37 Do. 16 20 11 13 16 18 15 814 1799 140 143 95 96 Do. 18 50 40 120 Do. 30 3C G5 70 Do. 21 28 53 57 33 47 Do. 1800 95 96 60 61 Do. 30 126 40 85 46 140 Do. 63 68 68 72 50 66 Do. 33 47 43 50 20 38 Do. 1801 CO 61 69 70 52 54 Do. 33 108 40 85 30 60 Do. 65 75 50 56 60 70 1 4 per qr. 20 38 20 28 20 1802 51 52 42 45 Do. 37 87 30 65 50 120 25 83 Do. 60 70 40 53 58 72 48 62 Do. till .June then 2 3 20 28 18 22 20 27 Do. tillJun. then 16 36 SALTPETRE. SEEDS. II 1 Baltic Linseed Foreign i ?r/we ijui India rough. 1 Foreign Red C/o\cr.\ for solving. for sowing. | Duty. Duty. Duty. Duty. Cll /. fci7. Cll't. civt. barrel. civf. last,\Oqr. qr. s. s. s. d. X. 5. s. d. s. s. s. d. I. L s. d. 35 38 11 6 25 85 53 68 48 61 22 28 1803 61 62 then 40 105 6 5i 2 3 32 42 16 47 48 3 70 S3 29 32 1804 47 58 48 60 Do. 30 25 50 78 60 98 Do. till July then 7 21 48 63 50 60 58 65 2 6 30 34 29 33 25 28 33 35 Do. till Jul. then 20 1805 58 85 78 59 95 80 Do. 40 25 30 40 90 60 70 83 Do. till June then 7 3 57 67 45 53 Do. till June then 2 7i 35 40 40 46 27 31 Do. till Jun then 20 444 1806 63 52 68 53 Do. 43 20 53 88 65 80 7 9f 48 55 56 62 2 9 25 29 15 20 21 9^ 1807 51 56 48 52 57 49 Do. 28 18 75 60 Do. 58 64 43 50 57 65 Do. 24 29 21 23 Do. 1808 48 75 49 7S Do. 22 37 67 100 Do. 59 67 107 113 Do. 17 21 34 44 Do. 1809 74 81 75 82 4 40 60 20 50 102 130 75 125 Do. till July then 8 127 150 80 87 80 92 2 8 40 44 42 48 33 38 22 1810 80 76 82 80 Do. 50 65 130 140 Do. 86 102 52 64 Do. 30 36 32 44 Do. 40 92 60 73 28 33 28 33 76 80 60 105 67 77 20 30 1811 69 71 Do. 50 90 Do. 50 63 Do. uncertain Do. 72 76 60 100 85 110 60 74 None. 70 72 60 105 85 107 SO 90 86 1812 64 68 78 Do. 60 50 110 8(^ Do. Do. 48 60 Do. 68 70 70 120 37 SALTPETRE. SEEDS. Baltic Linseed Fo) eign Rape r solving. East India rough. Fore I gn Red Clover. for f.oxiH)ig. .A Duty. Duty. Duty. Duty civt. cwt. ctvt. civi. barrel. cut. last,\Oqr. qr. s. s. S. d. s. s. s. d. s. s. s. d. I. I. s d. 1813 70 77 74 80 ^ 80 70 70 115 80 84 8 till Aug. then 12 75 82 81 85 83 107 2 8 till Aug. then 3 2 47 27 25 52 34 30 22 till Aug then 26 11 85 90 58 44 70 73 58 80 1814 75 100 88 78 105 95 Do. Do. 83 100 36 60 Do. 22 16 29 20 Do. 1815 90 69 102 80 70 105 85 Do. 54 28 70 43 Do. 38 60 37 48 40 60 Do. 16 10 24 15 Do. 1816 71 41 75 42 Do. 28 23 66 40 36 100 11 101 38 55 33 47 72 93 Do. 10 36 15 46 20 40 42 55 - 55 50 63 102 115 78 88 70 88 36 46 1817 37 42 38 44 Do. Do. 40 55 52 62 Do. 25 40 30 46 Do. 34 40 Do. till Dec then 26 11 1818 43 38 44 40 Do. 58 50 60 88 62 100 Do. 50 60 57 73 57 63 Do. 38 20 32 28 42 28 42 34 66 98 Do. 53 61 43 53 47 62 28 34 Do. 1819 38 31 40 35 Do. 33 58 None. till July then 3 4 23 22 28 32 till Jul. then 40 60 20 20 24 20 1820 32 30 36 31 Do. 40 30 64 48 Do. 43 59 37 48 Do. 22 29 25 26 35 29 Do. 1821 27 21 29 22 Do. 35 30 35 48 50 75 Do. .35 46 27 35 31 38 Do. 24 13 28 20 Do. 21 22 35 25 9t 76 63 32 31 40 13 20 1822 29 21 32 22 Do. Do. 34 44 23 30 Do. 15 9 24 12 Do. 25 27 31 37 10 15 38 SILKS. Throxun. Piedmont, i Duty. Ran Reggio. 1 • Duty. Bail China. 1 Duty. Organse. Bengal. Skein. 1 Duty. 1782 lb. S. 25 29 s. 31 32 lb. s. d. K 112 i-rs lb s. 20 21 5. 23 24 lb. s. cL 1 Al lb. s. 19 17 s. 20 22 lb. s. d. 1 41 lb s. 15 6\ 24 lb. S. d. 1 41 1783 25 27 33 32 Do. 22 23 22 26 23 Do. 17 18 19 22 29 24 Do. 15 15 15 24 33 24 Do. 1784 27 26 25 34 35 31 Do. till Au. then 7 4 22 21 23 23 22 24 Do. till Au. then 4 4± 19 17 14 24 24 23 Do. till Aug then 4 41 15 15 15 12 24 23 25 26 Do. till Aug then 4 4i 1785 25 25 31 33 Do. 23 20 20 24 26 21 Do. 14 20 17 23 29 26 Do. 12 16 14 26 29 27 Do. 178G 25 23 31 30 Do. 21 24 21 22 28 22 Do. 26 29 28 28 36 32 Do. 13 18 12 25 25 25 Do. 1787 24 37 32 30 48 46 Do. 22 27 23 28 3 29 26 33 35 3 13 17 24 34 3 1788 28 21 46 30 Do. 24 20 26 30 Do. 25 17 35 23 Do. 16 14 34- 29 Do. 1789 21 24 30 31 Do. 21 24 Do. 15 24 Do. 15 25 Do. 1790 24 25 31 33 Do. 21 23 22 24 Do. 15 14 15 24 26 20 Do. 15 16 25 24 Do. 1791 25 26 33 34 Do. 23 24 24 25 Do. 17 21 20 24 Do. 16 13 24 28 Do. 1792 28 25 34 32 Do. 24 25 25 26 Do. 21 20 24 21 Do. 14 18 28 32 Do. 39 SILKS. Til ro Piedmont. x)n. Duty. Rat Reggio, 0. Duty. Urn China. V. Duty. Organsene. Bengal. Skein. Duty. 1793 lb. s. s. 25 32 22 30 lb. v. d. 7 4 lb. s. s. 26 26 6 21 22 lb. s. d. 3 lb. s. s. 18 21 15 16 lb. s. d. 3 lb. s. s. lb. s. s. 18 31 13 22 lb. S. d. 3 1794 23 31 21 29 Do. 21 23 19 22 23 24 Do. 15 16 16 19 Do. 14 22 9 30 Do. 1795 24 29 29 38 Do 23 24 23 25 Do. 16 19 17 20 Do. 9 31 6 30 Do. 1796 29 33 26 31 27 33 7 8A 23 26 23 27 3 1^ 17 21 18 23 q ] 1 6 6 30 9 27 3 1^ 1797 27 33 24 31 8 O^v 23 26 25 27 o q 1 2 17 18 21 22 3 3U 9 27 6 20 O O-jiT 1798 27 31 23 30 8 7^ 25 27 24 26 None. 3 9U 20 21 6 24 28 3 944 6 20 12 22 3 944 1799 21 28 26 36 Do. None. Do. 24 28 22 24 Do. 14 21 5 22 126 15 Do. 1800 25 35 29 40 Do. Uncert. 17 6 18 Do. 22 6 23 6 23 25 Do. 24 27 26 28 126 16 11 23 Do. 1801 29 40 29 36 29 40 Do. 16 18 None. 20 21 Do. 23 24 21 22 6 Do. 26 28 26 30 11 23 5 20 Do. 1802 30 40 30 36 34 40 Do. 18 19 23 25 6 Do. 22 23 24 26 Do. 26 30 30 35 5 30 116 25 6 Do. 4.0 SILKS. Thrown. Rnxu. Raiv. Ben N O o 55 60 78 85 30 50 30 55 Do. None. None. 1798 59 57 62 77 75 83 19 4 53 65 7G 96 30 50 35 60 Do. None. None. 60 83 17 6 18 2 20 1799 62 50 28 87 Q7 50 96 56 115 80 34 80 30 55 Do. None. None. 32 54 1800 38 34 54 59 54 70 20 50 62 70 84 32 45 40 60 Do. None. None. 59 75 20 1801 47 68 tillMay G7 84 32 53 Do. 74 90 60 70 35 62 then 60 74 20 42 50 60 35 45 32 54 21 10 1802 33 ! 26 29 55 50 52 20 60 46 75 52 20 46 15 40 Do. 55 70 48 G7 43 50 40 48 30 53 22.?. per 180: 40 * 38 41 60 58 60 Do. 45 50 65 70 15 40 20 45 cwt. and 121 per cent, thereon. 59 69 70 8.'. 42 56 45 68 48 ~- SUGARS. M iscavados. B.Pl. Gazette Uast India. riavannnh. For Exportation. Jamaica. Duty. average. "S^'hite. Brown. Duty. White. r>rown. Clvt. cwt. cwt. cwt. Civl. cwt. cwt. cwt. S. s. s. d. s. d. s. s. s. s. s. d. s. s. S. S. 46 62 20 50 65 30 46 66 84 45 65 1804 f, 52 bb 62 64 tillMay then 26 6 58 55 75 72 42 43 56 50 29 U 70 94 60 88 lO 70 44 55 58 7\ 65 27 49 6 67 77 51 62 29 8 GO 80 44 55 1805 40 62 55 Oi 62 72 41 55 70 90 55 65 47 10 1806 41 30 33 29 65 61 64 58 Do. 49 6 45 36 6 62 50 72 65 41 28 55 45 31 66 S7 55 70 None. 47 57 34 44 None. 1807 29 24 26 28 58 52 58 53 Do. 37 10 30 9 32 6 56 35 50 70 50 70 30 20 25 55 33 45 Do. None till Jul. 50 64 40 46 None till Jul. 27 38 24 33 28 53 1 OAO 3o 53 Do. 31 8 48 56 24 45 Do. 36 46 30 35 180b 32 49 49 9 54 62 42 52 50 65 34 46 50 60 After 50 60 July a 51 2 50 54 38 48 50 58 56 62 .33 45 45 50 1809! 36 48 scale 35 8 46 50 30 40 30 48 59 of duty 50 6 55 65 42 50 27to30 47 1810 1"? 58 53 52 52 27 49 6 55 60 45 50 55 66 46 49 29 53 11 61 66 50 60 Do. 60 75 50 55 42 28 42 8-1 48 56 37 45 38 51 25 33 43 53 44 9 54 62 40 52 36 51 25 30 1811 31 49 27 34 11 44 56 31 43 Do. 30 46 22 25 42 58 44 5 53 60 40 51 42 56 26 32 42 58 43 5 55 65 40 50 54 66 32 38 1812 40 55 Do. 41 7 48 b5 39 45 Do. 60 78 42 53 51 61 49 6 53 6b 40 51 51 2> 63 8 -,4 66 82 1813 57 56 67 6H 30 55 56 60 68 41 46 52 54 30 33 72 86 70 83 41 52 80 100 70 7C> 75 A\ 64 75 5 b bO 30 105120 49 SUGARS. ^luscavados. B.Pl East India. Havnnnah, Gazette i or Exportation. Jamaica. Duty. average. White. Brown. Duty. M'liite. 1 Brown. CW f. cvot. cwt. CWt. CW f ctot. cwt. cwt. S. s. s, d. S. d. 77 3| s. s. S. s. S. d. s. s. s. s. 1814 73 92 50 73 m 107 78 90 30 97 2 84 10 90 3 54 3 79 91 ■)5 74 60 65 78 70 58 53 30 54 65 42 30 33 30 106 126 110 134 85 112 96 128 90 100 96 104 70 80 80 92 70 85 75 51 94 120 80 92 1815 50 58 52 '/'2 76 70 Do. 56 81 63 21 57 Oi 60 55 75 57 30 28 48 40 37 74 90 84 95 60 70 58 70 1816 50 42 52 43 70 64 67 61 Do. 27 59 61 45 49 01 60 47 75 60 40 34 55 45 Do. 80 94 50 70 52 73 58 70 44 50 43 67 50 01 46 61 36 46 52 70 44 50 1817 40 45 61 67 Do. 43 91 54 11 49 111 43 58 51 oil 66 60 30 48 37 42 56 52 Do. 58 73 54 70 46 54 45 51 54 9f 47 63 48 10 53 60 37 52 54 70 47 51 1818 52 66 Do. 52 91 55 63 39 54 Do. 68 76 50 58 47 63 47 51 01 46 60 34 45 52 66 34 47 1819 45 33 30 60 57 55 30 28 27 50 91 38 6 42 5f 35 81 46 35 59 50 34 21 45 35 Do. 52 66 42 58 48 60 39 47 33 40 30 56 35 81 40 32 49 54 21 18 35 32 42 58 33 40 1820 32 31 57 51 27 38 11 34 8J Do. 56 70 46 62 36 48 30 37 1821 33 24 26 53 48 50 Do. 35 4 36 2J 28 9 32 30 54 4C 18 15 18 32 29 32 Do. 50 58 35 42 28 36 22 28 32 7 11 30 26 , 31 ' 23 25 53 51 45 53 31 10 34 3. -32 4C 11 3C 35 42 21 27 1822 Do. 27 1^ 30 4^ -32 S30 45 14 115 2^ 3C ! Do. ) 32 37 40 48 22 30 23 28 29 4c 2 ' 1 50 SUGARS. SPIRITS. Free o Loaves. Rejined. 11 board of a Britisli ve Lumps. Crushed. ssel. Bounty. Brand Cogniac. Duty. Rum Jamaica, proof. Duty. 1782 cwt. s. S. 76 86 63 70 cvot. S. S. 70 75 55 65 Clot, s. s. None. cwt. 5. d. 26 gallon, s. d. s. d. 210 3 1 3 4 3 6 gal. s. d. Customs and Excise. 9 H gallon, s. d. s. d. 3 2 3 4 4 6 6 gal. s. d. Customs and Excise. 6 IH 1783 65 78 42 60 53 68 40 58 None. Do. 3 6 3 9 210 3 1 9 6 3 9 4 1 2 2 10 Do. 1784 46 70 43 65 43 65 40 56 None. Do. 3 3 3 6 2 8 2 10 Do. 2 6 3 2 3 6 4 4 5 1785 48 72 45 67 45 55 40 48 None. Do. 2 9 3 2 4 2 5 Do. 2 8 3 8 2 2 2 10 Do. 1786 43 67 50 65 40 48 45 63 None. Do. 2 4 2 6 2 12 4 Do. 2 2 2 8 2 8 3 2 2 4 Do. 1787 52 68 45 64 47 55 43 50 None. Do. 2 4 2 7 2 6 3 2 2 2 4 5 2 2 2 8 3 3 4 4 1788 50 65 46 62 A5 56 43 55 None. Do, 2 6 2 8 2 10 3 2 4 2/ Do. 3 4 3 2 4 3 Do. 1789 46 67 48 72 42 50 50 57 None. Do. 2 4 2 9 3 5 5 4 5 7 Do. 2 6 3 2 2 4 3 Do. 1790 52 74 68 80 50 58 62 72 None. Do. 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 Do. 2 4 3 3 6 4 3 Do. 1791 67 80 90 105 63 73 82 98 None. Do. 6 6 7 6 7 8 6 5 10 4 4 10 2 9 3 9 4 4 5 4 8 1792 95 110 100 115 72 96 87 96 92 105 60 83 None. Do. 6 6 7 6 5 6 6 Do. 4 4 9 3 6 4 8 Do. 51 SUGARS. Refilled. Free on board of a British vessel. Loaves. I Lumps. Crushed. Bounty. 1793 1794 civt. s. s. 85 102 73 dC 81 90 s. s. 82 69 80 9-4 72 ad 86 57 1795 1796 1797 82 94 95 112 97 112 105 122 7() civi. s. s. None. cwt. s. d. 26 SPIRITS. None. 78 86 90 103 92 104 98 112 None. N( Do. Do. 19 6 798 1799 1800 1801 1802 92 112 94 114 91 110 120 138 1 07 1 25 70 96 81 100 84 102 None. 87 103 107 128 00 117 61 83 83 102 73 92 90 108 70 86 82 96 88 104 82 96 83 98 78 92 81 90 70 80 60 80 54 70 64 84| 56 70 60 78; 53 (K) 56 75 51 65 52 72' 46 61 None. Do Brandy. Cogniac. Duty. gallon, s. d. s. d. 6 9 6 6 10 6 Rum, Jamaica, proof. Duty. gal. s. d. 5 10 4 5 7 9 None. 10 110 9 6 10 6 23 6 None. None. None. None. 19 6 9 6 10 6 7 6 8 6 6 8 6 8 till Aug then 7 6 gallon. s. d. s. d. 4 8 5 4 4 4 6 4 4 8 2 6 3 2 3 3 9 gal. s. d. 4 8 5 4 3 4 3 10 8 6 8 9 7 6 8 8 8 6 9 8 4 8 10 9 11 30 33 36 9 5 10 7 Do. 9 9 6 6 8 6 6 8 4 6 6 7 2 7 8 5 4 till Aug then 6 Do. 6 8 Do. 6 7 7 8 7 6 8 8 7 9 8 7 9 8 9 2 9 2 7 2 8 4 6 5 4 3 5 6 3 4 4 5 Do. 3 9 4 6 6 9 8 3 6 9 8 3 7 6 10 4 3 4 9 4 2 5 6 5 6 (J 9 3 6 5 Do. 7 4 Do. 7 6t,\, 52 - SUGARS. SPIRITS. Free on Loaves. Refined board of a I Lumps. ritish vessel. Crushed. Bounty. Brandt^ Cogniac. Duty. Jamaica, Rum. proof. Duty. 1803 ctol s. 58 72 s. 74 82 ctvt. S. S. 53 65 69 79 Clvt. s. S. None. Clvt. s. d. 36 gallon, s. d. s. d. 8 6 9 9 10 6 7 gal. s. d. 9 5 13 lOi gallon, s. d. s. d. 4 5 6 5 6 7 3 3 4 4 9 gal. s. d. 7 6A 11 1^ 1804 64 74 75 88 60 70 67 79 None. 43 6 uncer 7 tain. 13 101 13 Hi 3 4 2 9 5 5 3 9 6 6 11 H 11 2i 1805 74 78 90 93 66 82 69 84 None. Do. 5 6 4 6 6 5 13 IH 14 0^ 5 3 3 6 6 4 3 Do. 1806 67 57 98 79 57 62 44 63 None. 47 81 50 4 2 5 5 3 6 14 OA 14 1 3 4 3 6 4 6 4 6 11 21 11 H 1807 50 43 77 69 39 58 36 51 None. 53 4 5 5 5 6 14 1 16 7 3 4 3 4 6 4 3 Do. 1808 43 60 69 79 36 5] 54 66 42 50 54 60 Do. 6 6 3 6 6 6 7 6 4 6 8 6 Do. 3 6 6 4 6 6 9 Do. 1809 60 57 69 73 75 89 60 73 51 70 63 79 59 63 51 60 63 66 59 63 53 47 8 50 4 6 6 3 6 6 7 6 3 6 7 6 16 7i 5 6 3 9 4 9 6 6 5 6 6 9 11 4| 181C 71 ) 85 57 90 104 72 65 74 78 88 48 61 70 72 80 81 52 5S 45 48 4 49 6 5 6 10 6 7 C 11 C Do. 4 6 4 9 6 6 9 Do. 1811 58 42 55 73 60 68 50 63 34 50 51 60 50 5£ 33 4( 50 5£ 47 9 1 50 4 53 10 6 21 6 13 6 21 11 c 25 C 23 C 25 d Do. 4 6 4 2 4 6 6 5 3 6 3 Do. 181i 57 > 52 63 68 64 78 53 63 44 58 62 72 60 65 44 5C 70 77 , 53 50 4 21 6 15 27 C 16 C 20 71 4 6 4 3 5 6 6 5 3 6 6 Do. 53 SUGARS. SPIRITS. Free Refined. on board of a British vessel. Brand ij. Rum. Loaves. Lumps. Crushed. Bounty. Cogn ac. Duty. Jamaica proof.! Duty. CU. t. Civt. cwt. avt. galk m. gal. gallon. 1 gal. S. s. S. S. s. 5. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. 73 95 70 76 72 81 5 6 7 6 6 6 6 8 8 1813 83 77 98 90 77 87 73 81 78 74 83 81 50 4 13 6 17 14 18 20 71 22 7i 11 6| 118 135 115 130 116 126 128 150 123 135 123 130 35 50 li 35 4 17 6 6 5 3 18 7 6 5 8 1814 142 1)3 168 120 136 154 78 95 138 82 148 95 Do. 6 4 6 8 6 Do. 125 145 115 131 116 122 116 134 106 121 105 115 5 6 6 1 5 9 6 4 6 6 6 1815 90 96 107 III 81 93 93 101 84 95 95 106 35 4 50 11 19 3^ 4 6 3 6 6 4 4 Do. 82 103 79 94 79 87 81 101 78 94 78 63 84 72 50 \\ 46 If 5 6 6 3 3 4 6 1816 67 80 62 73 4 2 4 8 18 9 2 8 3 10 Do. 70 85 64 76 7 10 8 3 9 5 1817 6S 63 76 65 85 82 92 83 63 75 60 73 70 84 62 76 63 72 61 70 80 70 46 If 7 6 8 14 1 7 6 6 10 14 3 Do. 3 6 2 8 3 6 4 6 4 5 6 Do. 68 85 1818 70 68 88 86 63 80 66 82 64 67 72 74 Do. 13 10 5 6 14 6 9 Do. 3 6 3 8 5 5 6 Do. 71 87 58 74 60 70 3 3 4 3 63 81 1819 63 47 53 50 81 71 76 70 57 74 46 64 42 50 60 43 70 66 Do. 4 6 4 4 3 4 6 6 6 8 5 6 18 10 3 3 2 6 4 3 4 11 71 1820 50 49 51 46 75 74 76 68 43 63 46 64 45 55 44 43 65 60 Do. 3 4 2 4 2 9 3 9 4 4 2 Do. 2 6 3 4 3 3 9 5 2 4 Do. 3 4 4 1821 50 37 68 58 44 60 31 50 45 34 66 50 Do. 2 10 4 2 3 10 3 6 4 9 4 2 18 lOf 2 2 1 6 4 3 2 10 Do. 34 59 31 50 34 50 4 3 4 4 3 4 1 6 3 1822 40 60 35 52 32 42 Do. Do. 1 10 3 3 Do. 38 52 32 47 33 44 1 8 3 54. TALLOW. TAR. TOBACCO. R (ssia, Y. C. American. StockJiohn. For Exportation, in King's Warehouses. Duty. Duty. Duty. ^Maryland. Virginia. cvot. Cli4. per barrel p. last per i 'mr)-ei ' p. last lb. lb. s. s. s. s. 12 bar. s. s. 12 bar. d. d. d. d. 1782 37 36 40 38 Free. None. s. d. 12 41 23 24 24 25 s. d. 12 4^ 9 121 11 14" 10 17 11 20 1783 36 29 39 32 Do. None. Do. 20 14 22 15 Do. None. 21 51 41 10 None. 2| 61 1784 33 44 36 46 Do. 20 13 21 14 Do. 20 15 28 16 Do. 4f 9 3 5i 4\ 81 21 6^ 1785 45 42 47 47 43 48 Do. 13 12 14 13 Do. 16 15 17 16 Do. 31 7 2 5 21 7 31 51 H 4\ 1786 46 48 56 48 50 57 Do. 13 16 14 17 Do. 17 19 18 20 Do. 91 7 3 8 21 41 3 5 1787 56 47 57 48 Do. 14 10 14 15 11 15 Do. 15 17 15 16 18 16 Do. 3 81 21 5 21 41 1788 46 33 38 47 34 40 Do. 10 11 11 12 Do. 14 12 15 13 Do. 3 8^ 21 8 3 4f 21 41 1789 39 45 42 41 46 44 Do. 11 13 12 14 Do. 13 14 15 16 Do. 2 8 21 41 1790 41 44 43 45 Do. 13 11 14 12 Do. 14 19 13 16 20 14 Do. 21 6 n 7 21 41 21 3 40 42 12 13 2 7 91 Al •^2 ^2 1791 39 40 Do. 10 11 Do. 16 17 Do. H c 2 4 47 48 13 15 2i 7 2| 41 1792 47 42 48 43 Do. 10 11 Do. 14 15 Do. 21 7 2 7 2^ 41 2 4k 46 47 55 TALLOW. TAR. TOBACCO. R issia. Y. C. American. Stockholm. For Exportation, in King's Warehouses. Duty. Duty. Duty. ]Maryland. Virginia. ctvt. ctvt. per barrel p. last per barrel ;;. last lb. lb. s. s. s. d. s. s. 12 bar. s. s. 12 bar. d. d. d. d. 15 16 s. d 18 19 s. d. 1793 4/ 38 48 39 Fiee. 13 17 14 18 12 A\ 20 21 24 22 12 4i 24- 74- 2f 8 24- 44- n 5 1794 38 50 39 51 Do. 20 17 21 21 18 22 Do. 22 23 21 23 24 23 Do. 24- 8 2i 41 3 5 56 CiS 21 22 23 24 3 8| 34- 94^ 3 5 34- 6\ 1795 78 80 Do. 26 27 Do. 27 28 Do. 63 64 19 20 23 24 1796 68 58 70 60 Do. 20 25 14 21 26 17 11 6\ 23 28 21 24 29 22 13 34- 9f 5 9 4i 7 5i 84- 56 62 20 21 24 25 64- 8 71 12 6\ 9 7^ 12 1797 46 47 Do. 22 23 13 2 A 21 22 13 7^V 49 50 18 19 22 23 1798 49 56 50 57 1 6 20 28 21 29 lO O-j-o- 22 27 23 28 16 O^V 8 13 94- 15 8 13 114- 16 1799 56 65 57 66 Do. 33 29 34 30 Do. 30 27 31 28 Do. 94- 15 4 8 10 15 4 7 1800 58 66 59 68 Do. 26 33 27 34 Do. 27 32 28 34 Do. 4i 9 6 11 44- 8 4 84 GS 70 1801 75 51 58 76 52 59 Do. 35 15 36 16 Do. 34 19 35 20 Do. 6 10| 4 12 44- 8 34- 64 63 61 1802 59 64 60 66 Do. 1/ 22 18 23 Do. 20 25 22 27 Do. 3 11 3| 12 3 64 34 7 56 TALLOW. TAR. TOBACCO. For Exportation, in Kings IVarehouses. Russia, Y. C. A inencan. Stockholm. II Duty. j Duty. Duty. I\Iaryland. | Virginia. Cli't. civt. per barrel p. last J per barrel p. last lb. lb. S. S. s. d. s. ,s. 12 bar. s. S. 12 bar. d. d. d. d. 1803 67 68 76 77 2 Of 22 20 23 23 21 26 s. d. 13 6 27 21 28 23 s. d. 14 11 3 12 5 11 2\ 7 4i 8 72 75 23 25 23 24 5 11 4 10 44- 8 34- 7 1804 68 69 2 3i 20 23 15 21 23 16 7 70 71 26 29 36 38 1805 67 68 61 62 68 70 2 4 26 20 26 28 21 28 16 8 16 101 36 26 33 38 28 34 17 01 17 10 4 12 4 14 34- 7 4 8 1806 66 67 54 55 2 6 27 21 29 23 17 lOf 33 26 36 27 19 Of 4 13 4 8 1807 53 54 71 72 Do. 21 27 23 28 Do. 26 32 27 33 Do. 4 13 5 13 4 8 44- 8 1808 70 71 110 112 Bo. 28 44 29 46 Do. 34 48 35 50 Do. 5 13 94- 15 44 8 16 24 106 110 uncertain 44 No 36 31 46 48 50 9 20 16 24 1809 79 82 91 93 2 8 ne. 38 33 17 lOf 40 50 42 51 17 10 4 11 6 12 44- 10 7 13 83 84 1810 83 84 64 65 Do. 42 23 34 44 28 38 Do. 51 35 48 53 36 50 Do. 6 12 2 9 7 13 3 8 2 10 3 8 1811 61 62 74 75 Do. 41 26 44 27 Do. 46 35 48 36 Do. 3 11 3 12 4 9 4 7 18U , 72 73 - 88 90 Do. 26 32 27 33 Do. 33 38 34 39 Do. 2 12 2 7 4 84- 57 TALLOW. TAR. TOCACCO. Russia, Y. C Duty. Amerit. -an. Duty. Stocklu )lm. Duty. Par Exportation, in Kings IVarehouses. .Maryland. Virginia- 1813 cii:t. s. s. 88 90 82 84 98 100 civl. s. d. 3 2 per barrel s. s. 28 30 None after February. p. last i 12 bar. S. (I 21 41 per barrel s. s. 33 34 30 31 48 54 36 38 p. last 12 bar. s. d. 21 4i Do. lb. d. d. 10 26 lb. d. d. 54 144 10 26 1814 107 110 77 78 87 88 Do. None. 1 Do. 36 38 26 27 35 36 32 34 lOi 24 20 48 10 27 12 36 8 26 22 66 12 36 20 60 1815 81 82 59 GO Do. None. 30 32 24 26 Do. 26 29 35 37 21 22 Do. 6 18 A\ 18 6 20 12 48 10 21 !81G 52 55 46 47 51 52 Do. 16 20 10 11 13 14 Do. 20 21 14 15 20 21 Do. 6i 18 7 18 6 18 10 17 8 14 IS17 53 55 51 52 76 77 Do. 13 14 14 15 13 14 Do. 20 21 17 18 18 19 Do. 7 22 5 20 6 18 5 20 6i 20 6i 13 7 13 6f 9 5i 9 6f 10 1818 1819 75 76 77 78 70 71 89 90 82 83 Do. 14 16 16 20 14 16 17 18 Do. 19 20 21 22 18 19 21 22 Do. 01 20 9 14 No fine. 10 24 ok 10 9 14 7f 12 Do. 17 18 15 16 16 17 21 6 21 22 '\6 17 20 21 21 6 10 24 84 24 5 24 7 23 6i 12 H 11 4 9 5f 11 70 71 62 63 51 52 1820 53 54 62 63 47 48 Do. 13 15 None. 15 16 Do. 20 21 14 16 Do. 7 24 7 20 6 20 5 10 5 lOi 3i 8 1821 47 48 43 44 45 46 39 40 43 44 Do. 14 15 11 12 13 14 Do. 15 14 15 15 16 21 Do. 6 20 34 18 34 13 No fine. 31 8 21 7 3J 7k 182^ 41 42 54 55 I 31 32 40 42 33 3 1 Do. 14 15 9 10 10 14 Do. 23 24 16 17 18 19 Do. 34 13 2| 24 34 7k 3i 8 58 TEA. TIN. WHALEr>ONE. As in E. I. Hyson. Coivpanijs t Congou. Duly. English in bars on board. Jlrili Greenland. >7z FisJicri/ South Sea. Duty. 1782 1783 s. d. s. d. 7 6 13 6 6 8 11 6 lb. s. d. s. d. 4 6 5 6 4 4 5 2 Custom •2o. l(i.3. per cent. Ex. 27 i p. cent. & ]5.1i,/.p. 11). avt. S. d. 83 83 2 ton. I. I. 220 265 200 260 ton. L l. None. Free 7 2 12 6 11 4 4 5 6 4 5 ('. 2//. IIW. p.c.E.28-i p. c. and l.l^.p.lb. 83 2 82 8 200 260 150 200 153 225 None. Do. 1784 7 3 12 4 10 9 4 8 6 4 3 10 4 8 The same tiU Oct. then ]2\ p.C. 82 8 145 200 120 150 160 190 None. Do. 1785 4 8 9 5 8 6 3 10 5 2 8 5 6 12§ per cent. 84 8 140 195 1 20 1 55 None. Do. 1786 5 8 9 4 10 7 Q 2 10 5 6 3 4 7 2 6 6 Do. 84 8 130 150 100 120 160 210 None. Do. 1787 5 2 8 6 4 2 8 2 10 5 3 2 9 4 8 Do. 84 8 180 135 155 195 200 160 180 180 190 140 160 Do. 1788 4 6 9 6 4 6 8 3 6 4 2 9 5 Do. 84 8 77 6 170 180 140 150 120 140 130 160 90 110 Do. 1789 4 6 9 2 10 5 2 6 4 9 Do. 70 6 77 125 135 130 140 80 100 70 85 Do. 1790 4 6 9 5 9 6 2 6 4 9 2 9 4 6 Do. 77 130 150 200 210 70 80 100 110 Do. 1791 !• 1 9 6 4 6 9 6 4 9 6 2 9 4 9 3 5 Do. 77 86 170 180 150 180 200 220 90 95 100 110 Do. 1792 4 7 9 6 4 9 4 6 9 6 3 5 Do. 92 6 103 6 200 220 250 300 100 110 100 120 90 100 Do. 59 TEA. TIN. WHALEBONE. yh in E. I Hyson. Company s Congou. IVareh. Duty. Englisli in bars on board. British Fishery Greenland. South Sea. Duty. 1793 lb. . d. s. d. 4 6 9 6 4 8 4 6 9 10 lb. s. d. s. d. 3 5 2 6 3 121 per cent, on Co.'s saleprices cvot. s. d. 103 6 105 6 ton . I. I. 270 300 230 240 ton. I. I. 90 110 120 150 80 110 Free 1794 4 6 9 4 7 9 6 4 8 9 2 8 4 3 2 4 Do. 103 6 100 6 200 230 130 140 80 110 104 120 85 105 106 120 Do. 1795 4 8 8 4 7 8 3 2 4 6 2 114 Do. 100 6 99 6 130 150 160 180 150 100 120 110 130 Do. 1796 4 6 8 5 8 2114 2 9 4 5 20 per cent. 101 6 102 6 150 115 120 100 110 85 100 Do. 1797 4 7 8 6 4 8 8 2 10 4 5 2 4 3 9 30 per cent. 102 6 115 120 80 88 85 100 70 1^ Do. 1798 4 4 8 4 6 8 2 3 3 9 3 4 3 9 Do. 102 6 98 100 90 105 80 96 70 78 75 90 3 per cent, oa val. 1799 4 6 8 2 4 7 7 3 10 5 8 3 5 3 9 2 5 2 7 2 7 3 1 Do. 102 104 80 96 75 85 75 ,80 65 70 Do. 1800 4 7 4 2 6 4 2 6 6 2 10 3 4 2 10 3 7 3 4 3 7 Do. 104 110 75 82 70 80 65 70 42 52 Do. 1801 4 2 6 6 4 2 5 6 4 3 6 6 3 4 3 7 3 4 3 6 2 10 3 8 Do. 110 111 6 80 85 65 70 56 60 45 50 Do. 1802 4 3 6 6 4 4 6 6 5 6 3 3 8 3 3 9 2 113 8 Do. 114 6 113 6 115 6 65 70 50 60 45 50 Do. CO TEA. TIN. WHALEBONE. As in E. I. Hyson. Company's Wareh. Congou. Duty. English in bars on board. British Fishery. Greenland. South Sea. Duty. 1803 IL s. d. s. d. 5 6 5 5 6 4 5 4 10 lb. s. d. s. d. 2 U 3 8 2 8 3 8 2 6 3 2 65 per cent. cwt. s. d. 1 115 6 ton. L I. 50 60 uncertain. 35 40 30 35 ton. I. I. 45 50 uncertain. 30 35 25 30 ton. s. d. 33 9 1804 4 2 410 4 7 5 4 2 8 3 3 3 13 6 Do. 115 6 30 35 28 30 20 25 20 28 37 6 1805 4 7 5 4 4 8 5 9 3 13 6 2 11 3 8 Do. 113 122 6 28 40 25 30 20 28 38 3 1806 4 8 5 9 4 9 5 8 4 10 5 10 2 11 3 8 2 4 3 7 2 6 3 5 Do. 128 6 124 6 128 6 25 30 20 25 20 28 20 22 40 9 1807 4 10 5 8 4 7 6 2 2 10 3 9 3 13 8 96 per cent. 128 6 20 25 15 23 30 32 20 22 28 29 Do. 1808 4 7 6 4 8 5 9 3 2 3 8 3 3 7 Do. 118 6 120 6 30 32 26 28 35 40 28 29 20 22 Do. 1809 4 8 5 8 5 6 3 3 7 3 1 3 10 Do. 120 6 128 6 30 40 55 60 50 55 55 60 20 22 30 32 25 30 40 1810 4 11 5 10 4 7 5 6 3 1 3 10 3 3 6 Do. 128 6 174 70 75 80 90 75 80 uncertain. 33 40 None. Do. 1811 4 7 5 6 4 9 6 4 7 5 6 2113 6 3 3 8 Do. 174 171 6 155 6 30 40 35 40 22 28 30 32 26 30 Do. 181i^ 4 9 6 4 9 5 6 4116 3 3 8 3 2 3 8 3 3 8 Do. uncertain. 139 6 131 6 40 45 65 70 26 30 30 32 25 30 Do. 61 1 TEA. I TIN. WHALEBONE. A s in E. I. Company s i 1 Vareh. '. English 1 in bars . British Fishery. Hyson. Congou. Duty. 1 on board. Greenland. South Sea. Duty. lb. lb. lb. \ ctot. ton. ton. ton. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. 1 I. I. j L I. s. d. 1813 4 4 (i 11 6 0^ 9 5 lo:: 1 r 0"^ 113 7 3 3 9 96 per cent, j 140 6 1 68 150 70 160 26 30 65 70 75 80 A7 6 1814 6 6 2 7 6 6 10 3 3 5 3 10 3 3 9 Do. 164 6 174 6 168 6 150 70 , J 70 85 ^^?,110 115 ^" 6b 70 Do. 1815 6 5 6 10 6 6 6 3 3 2 3 3 9 2 3 7 7 3 11 Do. 148 6 152 136 6 85 78 110 90 86 80 120 100 40 42 50 52 40 42 Do. 1816 5 4 4 9 6 3 7 5 9 6 6 2 2 2 7 3 11 6 3 6 9 3 7 Do. 136 6 102 6 85 52 75 90 55 78 40 42 45 46 30 32 50 52 Do. 1817 4 4 6 6 3 5 9 2 9 3 5 113 7 Do. 97 103 70 55 80 73 60 84 50 40 50 Do. 4 6 6 97 75 80 40 1818 4 4 4 4 6 6 2 5 10 5 6 4 6 6 2 3 2 113 7 1 3 7 10 3 5 Do, 99 91 6 92 6 75 63 122 118 80 65 125 120 40 30 70 Do. 60 1819 4 5 6 6 1 5 10 9 10 3 6 4 3 6 100 p. c. above 2.s. 90 p. cent under 2*. 77 81 77 6 108 84 123 68 110 86 125 70 60 40 55 30 40 Do. 5 1 5 10 2 5 3 7 77 72 92 73 93 40 60 1820 5 4 6 02 3 3 5 Do. 81 58 59 40 Do. a 7 6 4 i 4 3 6 77 6 63 64 45 1 65 66 5 5 6 2 2 4 3 61 6 3 6 71 3 3 8 3 7 77 6 88 90 45 1821 5 3 5 11 Do. 80 6 70 71 50 Do. 4 5 6 2 81 6 95 75 llOi 40 50 8O' 4 3 6 02 S 3 7 1 1 85 90 60 1822 4 3 0^ 5 10 2 11 6 2 6 3 7 6 3 9 Do. 80 6 81 6 98 6 [120 1230 130 70 80 250150 170 Do. 3 7 5 10 2 7 3 9 220 230 110 125 62 WHEAT. WOOL (Sheep's). English. Foreign. Dantzic and Konigsberg. On foreign Duty. Leonesa. sh. Seville. Ger Saxon. man, Austrian & Bohemian. 1782 qr. s. s. 32 49 44 60 fjr. s. s. r lb. s. d. s. d. 3 3 6 3 13 8 lb. s. d. s. d. 12 19 13 2 6 None. None. 1783 38 58 25 41 44 53 45 57 25 40 28 53 61 6 64 3 3 3 7 3 7 3 10 2 9 3 3 None. None. 1784 30 43 41 56 28 40 30 54 36 51 32 44 6 ports shut in Dec. 3 8 3 9 3 3 7 2 6 3 2 None. None. 1785 32 46 27 38 30 40 Ports shut. 1 3 3 9 3 2 3 10 2 3 2 2 6 None. None. 1786 29 37 32 42 28 37 Do. 3 1 3 10 2 9 3 9 2 6 3 None. None. 1787 33 38 40 48 39 45 Do. 2 9 3 10 19 2 9 None. None, 1788 41 49 37 46 Do. 3 4 3 10 None. None. None. 1789 42 50 48 54 Ports open by proclama- tion. 3 4 3 10 None. None. None. 1790 48 57 40 53 49 62 30 43 34 48 uncertain. 48 59 26 39 33 43 6 ports shut in Dec. 3 3 3 10 None. None. None, 3 6 3 9 3 11 2 2 9 None. None. None. 1791 37 52 29 43 34 47 38 50 25 38 30 41 open in March, shut in Sept. 1792 31 42 43 53 Ports shut. 4 6 4 10 3 7 4 10 None. None, None. 63 WHEAT. WOOL (Sheep's). English. Foreign. Dantzic and Konigsbt-Tg. On foreig)i Duty. Spa Leonesa. nish. Seville. Gen Saxon. nan. Austrian and Bohemian. 1793 qr. s. s. 41 47 47 55 gr. s. s. Shut. qr s. a. lb. s. d. s. d. 4 6 410 3 9 4 10 lb. s. d. s. d. None. None. None, 1794 41 50 50 60 Open in •June. 40 48 50 57 6 3 8 4 3 6 3 10 3 8 4 3 3 6 3 2 None. None. 1795 52 66 98 110 75 95 50 60 88 92 60 90 Do. 3 6 4 2 3 13 2 6 None. None. 1796 107 122 50 66 44 56 62 118 35 60 20 44 On imp bounty in Sep. 2Qs. 3 8 4 3 3 8 4 13 2 6 None. None. 1797 43 53 54 75 30 50 30 45 44 68 27 50 Free. 3 10 4 4 None. None. None. 1798 30 53 22 50 32 54 24 50 17 44 21 47 2 6 3 10 4 4 None. None. None. 1799 32 54 77 108 25 50 68 104 6 in Oct. duty free. 4 4 9 5 5 1 4 9 2 4 3 4 2 4 3 4 None. None. 1800 85 115 50 100 90 165 72 110 46 95 80 150 Bounty accord. to aver. price. 4 4 9 4 7 5 4 2 3 3 4 2 8 4 4 None. None. 1801 70 145 80 180 40 70 68 140 75 170 25 70 Do. to Novem. then free. 5 1 5 4 5 9 6 2 8 4 4 3 4 5 4 None. None. 1802 60 83 40 62 35 83 26 58 Do. 5 9 6 5 10 6 3 2 6 5 3 4 5 None. None, 64. WHEAT. WOOL (Sheep's). Eng lish. Foreign. On Spanish. German. Daiifzic and forei^-n Austrian and Konigsberg. Duty. Leoi csa. Seville. Saxon. Bohemian q r. q -. (p: It ), lb. lb. lb. s. s. S. 5. s. d. S. d. s. d. s. d. s. d s. d. s. d. s. d. d. d. 1803 45 40 48 63 60 65 35 32 34 60 54 57 Free till Jul, after 6d and 124 5 10 6 3 6 6 6 4 5 3 8 5 4 None. None. 1804 35 70 56 120 28 65 55 118 p. cent, thereon 6 6 6 9 3 6 4 10 None, None. 1805 60 30 50 108 75 80 55 34 105 75 6r/.p.qr. and 2i p. cent, thereon 6 6 6 7 6 9 6 9 3 6 410 2 6 4 9 3 6 5 3 None. None. 1806 50 62 58 76 92 85 36 50 72 87 Do. and Si p. cent, thereon 6 7 6 9 3 6 5 3 3 6 6 3 5 9 None. 1807 50 46 55 84 76 80 48 42 50 84 75 76 Do. 6 7 6 9 3 6 5 3 2 6 5 3 5 9 3 6 None. 1808 52 80 78 112 48 75 72 100 Do. 67 100 69 106 2 6 5 5 7 3 6 6 8 6 None. 65 100 60 9£> 76 102 72 98 120 140 60 86 90 110 7 8 9 7 9 6 1809 52 90 55 78 10 22 26 13 18 12 24 88 125 78 115 13 15 40 90 7 116 60 106 60 104 130 140 4 9 7 10 6 7 9 18101 80 1 60 1 128 100 80 60 12b 96 4 70 8 3 5 4 HO 4 7 1811 68 55 95 75 102 92 145 125 60 48 80 75 102 90 145 125 Do. 7 8 8 9 6 3 5 2 6 5 6 7 6 6 7 2 1 9 2 6 73 126 76 130 8 6 100 2 6 6 9 2 6 1812 104 94 164 140 100 90 180 150 Do. 8 6 96 2 5 6 None after October. WHEAT. English. Foreign. On T>Ar\t/\c a.n<\ foreign iKonigsbcrg. Duty. 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 qr. s. s. 88 130 92 135 56 68 65 78 64 82 72 90 52 78 48 6G 56 80 54 6G 56 63 90 134 75 128 65 135 44 98 65 103 65 100 63 80 64 80 bG 72 62 7(i 56 80 qr s. s. 105 135 110 145 50 60 65 78 63 :s (i(i 88 50 70 AG 66 60 78 50 62 45 60 90 130 90 128 80 132 46 94 55 103 55 103 Q5 80 58 62 58 74 63 85 30 63 30 61 50 82 32 65 30 70 22 49 25 50 58 7G 50 GG 52 76 50 76 52 82 50 70 46 50 52 76 46 64 48 64 30 40 None. qr. s. (I 8 9i Ports shut after May. Ports open in Novem. Ports open. Do. Ports shut in Feb. Do. Do. Do. WOOL (Sheep's). Spanish. liconesa. Seville. lb. s. d. s. d. 9 6 9 8 7 9 8 7 6 6 8 7 6 7 6 7 lb. s. d. s. d. 2 5 6 3 6 3 5 6 3 5 6 4 5 6 6 6 5 6 4 3 5 6 4 6 2 3 2 6 4 4 6 Saxon German. Austrian and Bohemian. lb. s. d. s. d. 6 8 6 5 8 3 7 6 3 6 4 6 7 6 8 6 4 6 4 6 8 6 8 9 2 6 4 6 6 6 7 6 9 6 4 6 9 5 5 5 2 3 5 4 4 6 3 6 4 3 3 4 6 3 3 4 2 6 3 6 3 4 6 3 4 6 3 6 5 3 4 3 3 4 6 2 6 4 6 3 3 5 3 3 4 9 3 3 4 9 2 2 6 2 2 3 2 8 3 3 2 2 6 3 4 3 2 2 2 10 2 2 6 19 2 1 10 2 6 10 2 6 2 3 4 6 4 6 4 6 8 6 8 9 4 6 4 6 9 9 6 4 6 5 6 9 6 8 6 5 6 2 6 9 6 8 6 2 8 6 2 8 6 16 7 6 16 8 lb. s. d. s. d. 16 5 2 2 5 6 5 2 2 5 4 6 2 5 2 5 2 8 2 8 3 2 7 6 3 7 9 3 7 9 2 8 2 3 8 2 3 8 2 3 5 6 2 6 6 2 3 5 6 19 6 19 5 6 2 7 9 2 7 9 2 6 6 16 6 2 6 06 WOODS. Logivood Jamaica. Duty. Fir. Jlcmel. Duty. Pine. Quebec. Duty. 1782 /. 11 9 ton. s. I. s. 11 10 9 10 ton. s. d. Free. load. I. s. 3 5 3 10 load, s. d. A 1 I. load, s. I. None. s. load, s. d. 1783 7 10 10 10 Do. 3 10 1 12 Do. None. 1784 12 8 10 13 10 9 10 Do. 1 15 2 10 Do. 1 10 2 15 Free. 1785 11 6 11 10 6 10 Do. 1 15 2 5 1 13 Do. 2 1 2 10 1 6 15 Do. 1786 6 5 10 7 10 6 Do. 1 17 2 1 15 Do. 1 11 1 18 Do. 1787 6 5 6 10 10 6 Do. 1 1 12 5 1 10 6 8 2 1 2 10 2 5 Do. 1788 5 5 5 10 6 5 6 15 6 Do. 1 1 15 11 1 14 Do. 1 1 2 11 2 15 5 Do. 1789 5 4 10 6 4 10 Do. 17 18 1 11 Do. 1 2 1 1 15 5 10 15 Do. 1790 4 6 10 5 10 7 Do. 1 2 10 1 15 2 5 Do. 1 1 1 2 10 15 19 3 Do. 1791 6 10 5 15 Do. 2 3 2 2 3 2 11 Do. 2 1 3 16 2 Do. 4 792 5 5 6 10 Do. 2 2 2 8 13 Do. 1 2 17 2 Do. 67 WOODS. Logti Jamaica. ooc I Duty. Fir. ]Memel. Duty. Pine. Quebec. Duty. 1793 I. 6 6 ton. s. I. 10 s. ton. s. d. Free. 2 2 load, s. I. s. 8 2 9 3 load, s. d. 6 8 1 2 load, s. l. s. 17 2 load, s. d. Free. 1794 8 11 12 13 4 2 2 2 16 5 18 Do. 3 2 2 10 15 Do. 1795 11 16 12 16 10 Do. 2 4 15 3 Do. 3 3 3 10 15 5 Do. 1796 14 13 16 14 Do. 3 2 2 10 2 15 Do. 3 2 5 15 Do. 1797 13 12 14 13 10 Do. 2 3 15 5 3 10 10 2 2 2 16 2 17 15 2 16 Do. 1798 14 40 15 41 Do. 2 3 10 3 3 3 5 Do. 3 3 5 10 3 15 3 10 10 6 Do. 1799 48 12 50 15 Do. 3 4 8 3 10 18 5 Do. 3 15 4 Do. 1800 19 20 Do. 5 5 10 5 15 15 6 Do. 4 4 10 4 15 15 5 Do. 1801 18 14 10 10 19 15 10 Do. 5 4 15 6 5 4 10 Do. 5 4 5 10 10 4 15 Do. 1802 12 11 18 14 13 19 Do. 3 3 12 3 14 4 3 9 16 4 4 3 10 4 15 15 4 1 6 68 WOODS. Logivooc Jamaica. Duty. Fir. Memel. Duty. Pine. Quebec. Duty. 1803 iO)i. I. s. I. s. 20 21 24 25 12 14 ton. s. d. 15 6 load. I. S. I. S. 3 10 3 15 5 5 6 5 3 15 4 5 load, s. d. 16 4 load. I. s. I. s. 3 18 4 3 5 8 5 18 5 13 6 8 load, s. d. 1 6 1804 23 24 17 18 19 21 6 10 3 15 4 3 3 5 20 25 4 18 5 8 3 18 5 15 3 12 4 2 1 6 1 lOi 1805 20 21 23 24 16 17 7 3 3 5 3 15 4 3 10 3 15 25 25 6 3 18 4 18 4 18 5 18 4 8 5 13 1 10 1 11 1806 16 17 18 19 14 15 Do. 3 10 3 15 6 8 6 13 25 6 27 4 4 8 5 13 6 8 6 13 1 11 2 1807 14 15 10 11 Do. 8 8 10 4 5 6 10 6 15 Do. 7 18 8 10 6 13 7 2 7 13 7 18 Do. 1808 10 11 17 18 14 15 7 5i 6 10 7 15 10 17 Do. 7 10 7 15 10 15 16 Do. 1809 14 15 15 16 Do. 14 14 10 11 11 10 27 4 15 17 10 12 Do. 1810 27 28 37 38 16 17 Do. 10 10 11 8 10 9 10 11 10 Do. Do. 1811 16 17 12 13 Do. 11 12 10 10 11 10 11 12 10 Do. 8 12 6 12 7 12 Do. 1812 12 13 13 14 10 11 D(,. 9 10 10 8 10 9 54 8 Red Pine. 10 10 10 9 10 Do. CO WOODS. Logivooc Jamaica. Duty. Fir. Memel. Red Pin Duty. Quebec. e. Duty. 1813 Ion. I. s. I. s. 13 15 10 10 10 15 19 20 10 Ion. s. d. 9 1^ load. I. s. I. S. 7 10 8 5 10 7 8 9 load. load, s. d. I. s. I. s. 9 10 10 .. ,, 10 10 5 ^^ ^ j 9 15 10 '11 11 10 load, s. d. 2 1814 21 22 22 23 15 16 Do. 7 5 7 15 4 10 5 10 Do. 11 11 10 9 10 10 None. 8 15 9 Do. 1815 14 15 9 10 Do. 5 5 10 3 5 3 15 Do. 8 15 9 6 6 15 Do. 1816 8 10 9 10 6 6 10 7 7 5 Do. 3 5 3 15 2 5 3 5 Do. 6 5 6 15 5 5 5 Do. 1817 8 7 8 5 8 10 Do. 3 5 3 15 2 10 2 15 3 5 Do. 5 10 5 15 5 15 6 Do. 1818 8 9 7 5 8 9 2 3 5 3 10 3 10 3 15 Do. 5 15 6 6 6 5 Do. 1819 7 10 8 5 6 Do. 3 10 3 15 2 5 2 15 65 6 6 5 5 5 5 10 Do. 1820 5 6 10 5 10 6 6 6 10 Do. 2 15 3 2 10 2 15 2 10 2 15 Do. 5 5 5 10 4 10 4 15 Do. 1821 6 6 15 9 10 9 15 Do. 3 5 3 10 2 10 55 4 10 4 15 4 4 5 10 1822 9 5 9 10 7 10 8 Do. 2 5 2 10 2 10 2 15 2 15 Do. 4 4 5 4 10 4 15 Do. 70 The prices in the foregoing table are extracted from the New London, now Prince's, and London Price Current, which was esta- blished in 1782, and is the oldest and best authenticated I have been able to meet with. In order to give as general an idea as it is possible in so small a compass of the variations in price for forty years, I have selected the quotations of the first and last months of each year, with the inter- mediate fluctuations where the rise or fall has not been progressive. The figures on the left hand give the lowest quotation of the article, and those on the right the highest ; the range between the two includes, therefore, the necessary scope for the uncertainty of price, which is sometimes observable when the market is in an un- settled state, as well as for the different gradations in quality, which arc very great in some articles, as will be seen by the table. In the column of " Duties" those only are noted which are levied on importation by British vessels. It is hardly necessary to observe, that whenever there is any great distinction in favour of British vessels, it operates to the exclusion of foreign vessels in the importation of those articles to which the distinction applies. The rates of duties were obligingly furnished by Mr. Thos. Cope, of the Long Room, Custom-house, and great pains were taken by him to insure their correctness ; but as several temporary alterations, not noticed in the books of rates, were made in the duties by Orders in Council and otherwise, I have, with a view to still greater cor- rectness, referred to them, and made the proper allowance accord- ingly. It is of course not to be expected that a document of this kind, embracing so long a series of years, and such a variety of articles, should be entirely free from occasional errors ; but I think, from the care and attention bestowed, I am entitled to claim a pretty general dependence upon its accuracy. A. HINRICHS. London, April, 1823. 71 p. S. I have the following additional remarks to make on the three last articles in the table. Wheat (Foreign). The ports were so frequently opened and shut by proclamation, and the rate of duties was so varied, that every particular alteration cannot be expected to be found in a price current not devoted exclusively to that article. N. B. The word " shut," as applying to the whole of 1793, was introduced by mistake, as the ports were open by proclamation in May, and shut again at the low duty in June, Wool (Foreign Sheep's). There is no column of duties attached to this article in the table ; it was duty free till 5 July, 1803, after that time the duties were as follows : s. d. Till 1809, OA per lb. 1809 to 1813, 6 8 per cwt. 1813 to 1819, 7 11 Do. 1819, 5 July, 1 per lb. 1819, 10 Oct. to present time, Qd. per lb. Woods. The duty as quoted for Quebec timber was merely no- minal till 1821 J as it was always remitted on being certified to be fit for naval purposes, and as such certificate was generally forth- coming, of course the duty was not levied. A. H. 72 No. II. ^n Account of the Qnn}iiiiies qfthejbllowing Articles imported into Years. SUGAR. COFFEE. COTTON WOOL. SHEEP'S WOOL. cvcts. qr. lbs. CVitS. qr. lbs. lb. lb. 1781 1782 •• 5,198,778 11,828,039 9,735,663 11,482,083 1783 1784 Records destroy- -ed by fire for these •• 1783 years. 18,400,384 1786 19,475,020 1787 1788 2,066,120 8 23,250,268 20,467,436 32,576,023 32,340" 35,046 1 1789 1,936,440 2 1 17 2*713,114 1790 1,882,106 4 55,988 1 4 31,447,605 3,245,329 1791 1,813,192 2 20 46,102 9 28,706,675 2,776,054 1792 1,989,230 5 69,028 3 17 34,907,497 4,513,976 1793 2,194,726 20 123,750 14 19,040,929 1,891,385 1794 2,519,181 7 278,088 1 5 24,358,567 4,485,582 1795 2,151,272 2 22 360,038 8 26,401,340 4,902,500 1796 2,240,299 1 21 343,427 12 32,126,357 3,454,211 1797 2,139,887 1 26 354,477 2 23,.354,371 4,653,696 1798 2,699,863 3 7 431,576 2 13 31,880,641 2,398,126 1799 3,390,974 2 22 390,237 1 6 43,379,278 5,151,711 1800 3,164,474 1 18 599,428 2 26 56,010,732 8,615,284 1801 3,976,564 1 19 664,442 3 10 5 6,004, 305 1 7,387,107 | 1802 4,297,079 8 460,543 2 6 60,345,600 7,749,112 1803 3,185,849 2 19 219,477 13 53,812,284 6,020,775 1804 3,248,306 2 26 507,432 3 11 61,867,329 8,157,213 1805 3,178,788 1 3 354,061 23 59,682,406 8,546,378 1806 3,815,183 1 9 528,941 10 58,176,283 7,333,993 1807 3,641,310 2 9 417,642 3 6 74,925,306 11,768,926 1808 3,753,485 1 17 726,831 26 43,605,982 2,353,725 1809 4,001,198 1 4 707,906 2 22 92,812,282 6,845,933 1810 4,808,663 12 828,683 2 136,488,935 10,936,224 1811 3,917,627 1 9 559,595 2 12 91,662,344 4,739,972 1812 3,762,182 1 3 405,744 3 12 63,025,936 7,014,917 1813 The records of this year were d 1,029,556 sstr oyedbv fire. 1814 4,035,323 1 25 1 23 60,060,239 15,712,517 1815 3,984,782 13 815,440 1 26 99,306,343 14,991,713 1816 3,760,548 2 12 499,075 2 2 93,920,055 8,117,864 1817 3,795,550 2 5 520,255 2 13 124,912,968 14,715,843 1818 ^,965,947 3 7 427,247 6 177,282,158 26,405,486 1819 4,077,009 6 373,025 12 149,549,97 l!l6, 190,343 1820 1,063,541 25 437,176 2 13 150,043,082:10,04.3,746 1821 4,200,856 2 9 403,035 1 9 130,982,479 16,680,043 1822 3,643,127 2 2 391,650 3 10 141,253,993 1 9,323, ]70i Inspector-General' s Office, 4fh April, 1823. 73 No. II. Great Brilainfrom nil Parts of the World in each Year from 1781 to 1822. SILK (raw) SILK (turown) TALLOW. HEMP (undressed.) FLAX. lb. lb. cn:t. I ir. lb. cvot. qr. lb. cwt. qr. lb. 730,156 473,042 770,989 812,148 344,251 361,448 389 537 306,0401 355,045 2 21 504,071 1 7 201,894 2 9 842,865 393,259 260,126 3 7 472,204 1 10 139,494 1 17 745,440 508,005 255,921 1 12 592,300 20 257,222 17 97Q,&7^ 470,195 104,802 2 18 372,812 2 9 308,101 9 931,8941 436,8311 201,856 1 22 014,302 1 17 243,324 6 1,020,008 241,955 235,009 1 11 553,831 2 9 271,249 1 5 683,228 330,9781 202,173 582,755 2 1 348,307 1 27 730,9981 336,9951 180,807 1 19 574,022 3 15 225,853 2 6 487,63 If 398,9481 330,983 3 5 018,480 2 1 321,239 11 266,2761 401,662 244,041 3 11 488,177 5 209,082 8 730,885 403,130 439,911 3 11 047,833 27 389,987 2 24 l,240,954f AQ7fiS7 450,217 7 752,508 6 418,737 4 833,618 333,717 415,925 1 25 596,419 3 5 410,120 2 26 275,149 332,005 2 9 748,571 2 15 272,035 3 8 559,7291 390,2101 550,749 1 10 488,197 3 5 277,443 I 19 803,799 384,704 537,428 4 729,077 1 23 294,045 1 4 1,032,381 449,182 533,838 1 24 727,319 2 22 352,919 2 8 1,189,706 433,2721 393,81 1 2 2 611,012 24 400,024 2 802,623 515,218 530,052 1 20 729,786 1 25 354,722 20 777,799 340,144 307,398 1 17 750,824 3 23 42], 393 1 12 637,102 139,312 148,282 1 5 259,087 1 24 257,729 18 698,189 501,740 353,177 9 858,875 2 19 533,307 18 1,341,475 450,731 479,440 19 955,799 2 22 511,970 2 20 602,047 20,336 292,534 3 15 458,547 2 15 243,899 1 11 1,330,106 617,885 309,323 3 8 852,015 2 19 ' 5 405,304 1 9 1,634,501 645,722 588,914 3 9 545,380 1 524,757 1 8 1,442,594 357,739 041,041 2 7 731,505 2 20 351,103 13 945,792 192,130 417,109 2 17 369,467 3 23 247,424 24 932,102 245,5911 385,904 1 12 457,200 1 18 452,790 2 5 1,044,647 456,97 H 542,983 18 000,403 1 20 458,898 3 23 1,483,546 287,045^ 581,937 3 4 474,238 2 8 432,090 2 17 2,21 3,9 17f 333,2947^ 805,000 2 5 418,509 440,404 13 2,11 8,645 1 339,0311 019,491 1 23 241,759 1 12 503,947 2 15 2,052,963 f 492,594 782,812 2 1 598,028 2 231 040,547 2 4 W . IRVING ■. 74 No. III. yln ^ccounl of the Quant/lies oft/icfollawhig Articles exported from Years. S(TTy\R (kaw.) SUGAR (refined.) Actual weight exp. COFFEE. COTTON WOOL. civts. < ?'■• lbs cwts. qr. lljs. cwts. q r. lbs. lbs. 1781 1782 1783 1784 ( Record r stroyed s de- jy fire. 96,788 421,229 177,626 201,845 1785 202,954 5 137,489 b 24 '39,000" 2 22 407,496 1786 102,032 13 81,750 3 1 27,324 6 323,153 1787 199,416 I 8 7(i,72,r> 1 19 27,988 2 18 1,073,381 1788 145,257 11 85,401 1 15 30,682 14 853,146 1789 153,813 1 15 138,539 3 11 24,425 7 297,837 1790 142,185 1 3 119,817 4 29,357 3 8 844,154 1791 135,270 3 6 161,594 2 27 34,020 3 23 363,442 1792 243,068 2 14 226,216 3 27 58,621 1 1,485,465 1793 321,364 1 6 115,450 11 96,166 1 11 1,171,566 1794 447,405 14 303,999 2 11 220,667 2 17 1,349,950 1795 365,733 1 13 264,300 1 24 306,565 3 11 1,193,737 1796 366,615 1 5 188,013 2 1 336,339 1 694,962 1797 561,279 15 179,344 2 9 309,268 2 2 609,058 1798 800,804 1 5 248,533 3 23 394,848 15 601,139 1799 410,052 1 23 122,638 1 18 281,507 26 844,671 1800 981,730 15 397,542 2 14 607,104 2 15 4,416,610 1801 635,067 3 16 333,942 12 541,869 3 16 1,860,872 1802 1,142,729 2 26 531,787 1 26 569,395 26 3,730,480 1803 762,919 14 547,274 24 268,392 2 6 1,561,053 1804 454,155 2 10 382,224 3 16 412,850 2 19 503,171 1805 439,662 3 22 390,013 5 332,369 1 11 804,243 1806 307,799 3 4 415,079 3 26 409,189 20 651,867 1807 659,911 3 10 413,960 3 11 424,648 1 24 2,176,943 1808 354,359 1 11 327,243 1 13 250,899 19 1,644,867 1809 713,447 1 17 460,732 10 848,134 9 4,351,105 1810 616,895 2 17 413,208 2 16 215,278 2 8,787,109 1811 519,176 3 3 100,996 1 19 210,036 2 8 1,266,867 1812 674,313 3 1 284,617 2 641,131 14 1,740,912 1813 1814 Records destroy 1,058,040 2 8 ed by fire. 555,335 1 26 6,282,43*7 1,193,561 1 26 1815 870,992 I 16 609,247 10 897,312 2 17 6,780,392 1816 670,508 21 584,182 1 3 729,426 3 16 7,105,054 1817 486,695 3 23 697,085 2 16 490,386 1 8,155,442 1818 486,613 2 15 711,185 1 4 456,615 1 19 15,159,453 1819 409,307 2 20 525,219 2 13 391,276 3 16 16,622,969 1 820 504,302 2 19 679,560 2 27 397,366 2 24 7,410,602 1821 482,812 1 17 645,357 1 5 373,256 14 16,305,892 1822 411,159 1 374,784 2 321,140 1 9 20,220,064 Inspector-Generals Office, 2tUh April, 1823." 75 No. III. Ch-cai Lintain lu all Parts of the Worldin each Year f rum 1781 tu 1822. SHEEP'S SILK SILK T" A T T r •kur HEMP FLAX WOOL. (raw) thrown) (undressed.) (undressed.) lbs. lbs. lbs. cxvts. qr, lbs. cviits. qr. lbs. cvjls. qr. lbs. 367,432 70,912 •44,139 41V28I ' 2 2 12,772* 2 9 11,020 23 56,724 45,190 24,801 37,512 3 8 18,927 2 3 11,803 1 1 90,919 120,049 12,716 15,221 1 7 10,705 20 9,733 3 8 162,660 115,571 46,520 61,487 1 18 14,060 3 17 8,614 7 111,594 106,947 22,736 7,251 4 18,633 9,686 2 15 119,832 69,543 20,067 8,785 3 18 27,372 3 9 3,469 1 20 645,921 66,512 22,428 17,140 6 26,780 2 5 11,429 2 20 87,323 34,514 10,579 4,295 3 23,703 1 12 14,088 3 8 121,442 28,555 2,607 4,172 3 7,009 1 24 3,644 26 67,263 83,135 24,385 7,386 7 6,834 3 11 9,973 3 14 272,080 54,909 27,425 1,093 3 2 3,075 2 9 5,802 18 110,925 88,715 38,927 3,737 24 5,113 3 13,660 3 9 27,405 64,348 17,641 997 23 5,605 1 17 3,316 98,809 42,761 52,117 4,299 13 21,041 2 12 4,087 3 46,979 80,428 38,835 5,151 23 7,276 1 13 19,561 2 11 44,501 30,443 31,239 16,847 3 8 6,486 24 6,172 3 15 195,437 33,504 27,302 16,751 6 4,875 1 4 7,132 3 3 361,267 33,247 36,033 17,901 3 5 36,908 3 16 15,596 13 24,676 24,220 19,346 3,409 14 5,525 3 2,659 2 17 39,788 53,363 73,959 4,937 1 13 2,696 14 3,548 8 57,945 26,125 68,935 6,016 3 9 5,836 3 25 5,535 3 14 21,701 19,257 52,081 5,411 2 6 6,668 3 25 7,158 1 27 23,460 29,671 58,623 2,119 2 25 16,231 3 17 2,069 25 76,090 32,793 21,805 1,381 22 4,298 3 24 2,173 1 7 30,568 20,520 47,782 2,126 2 1 16,934 2 24 19,152 3 4 157,881 23,234 50,001 11,761 2 12 46,288 2 18 68,179 1 27 73,709 28,615 30,681 9,683 12 26,675 16 89,453 3 10 123,795 39,879 32,720 86,327 '60V714 4,042 22 13,811 1 16 27,124 11 149,024 18,271 3 6 32,734 1 18 44,548 3 18 178,886 93,972 51,658 19,127 20 33,724 1 27 18,832 3 27 744,855 300,254 51,567 61,828 3 4 21,008 2 26 24,195 3 3 194,076 74,663 21,200 22,799 3 23,282 3 7 5,441 1 19 97,927 109,902 35,125 7,624 2 IG 42,671 ( 3,104 I 5 475,820 58,659 52,139 39,711 22 31,710 19 11,775 21 95,610 20,455 12,004 21,564 1 1 18,459 1 18,101 1 22 329,509 41,772 21,889 56,871 2 ( .33,416 2 If 8,834 26 245,217 35,511 10,397 22,614 2 5 12,733 2 i ! 7,568 1 4 w. IRVING. 7fi No. IV. A?i Account of the Quantity of Rape and Cole Seed, Linseed or Flax Seed, and Clover Seed white and red, imported into Great Britain from Foreign Countries, from the 5th January, 1801, to the 5th January, 1823. Years. Rape and Cole Seed. Linseed or Flax Seed. Clover Seed. Quarters. bush. Bushels. Cxvt. q. lbs. 1801 8,132 5 614,383i 25,104 1 20 1802 65,146 1,053,340| 55,584 1 27 1803 1,452 3 865,984 49,266 8 1804 8,827 7 l,022,272i 51,798 1 12 1805 9,639 2 1,098,431| 48,540 3 13 1806 25,488 6 843,436 58,306 2 14 1807 13,333 4 1,174,2261 58,385 2 24 1808 50 506,332 25,786 3 5 1809 15,475 2 1,1]9,763| 46,898 1 1810 8,581 7 l,645,598f 72,967 18 1811 2,659 594,0161 43,536 20 1812 8,512 6 _ 977,652f 82,031 15 1813 The Records of this year were destroyed by fire.| 1814 83,500 H 1,3 64,95 9| 42,876 3 3 1815 60,083 1 766,983^: 54,646 2 24 1816 10,857 2 567,138^ 14,986 1 8 1817 33,857 6 1,302,0751 45,984 21 1818 38,723 2J- 1,897,1275 121,448 8 1819 7,169 6 1,156,170- 72,795 1 2 1820 4,154 1,306, 176 J 73,994 3 17 1821 9,091 4i 1,084,9591 65,986 1 1822 30,963 n ],191,198f 40,439 26i Custom- Ho2ise, London, W. IRVING, 77 No. V. Jn Account of the Quantities and average Standard or Price of fine Copper sold in Ores in Cornvcall from the Year 1800 to 1822, both inclusive. Years. Fine Metal. Price. tons. per ton. I. s. d. 1800 5432 133 6 1801 5441 117 6 1802 5419 110 16 1803 5653 121 19 1804 5373 136 5 1805 6186 169 10 1806 6881 136 15 1807 6707 120 1 1808 6737 100 8 1809 6785 143 8 1810 5678 132 16 1811 6139 120 10 1812 6876 111 2 1813 {*yfy^;}3508 115 13 1814 6347 130 10 1815 6526 117 15 1816 6846 109 6 1817 6427 95 12 1818 6469 121 5 1819 6944 137 2 1820 6915 119 1821 7770 97 16 1822 9140 104 N. B. This account refers onlj/ to copper ore sold at the weekly sales in Cornwall. In addition to this, copper is raised in Anglesea, in Devonshire, in Ireland, and in small tpiantities in other parts of the United Kingdom. THE END. LONDON : rniNTED BV THOMAS DAVISON, WIIITEmiAKS. No. VI. j^n Account of the quantities oj" the following Articles, imported into and exported from Great Britain in the Year 1823. Imported from all parts of the world. Sugar cwts. Coffee ditto Cotton wool lbs. Sheep's wool ditto "^ilk, raw ditto Ditto, thrown ditto Tallow cwts Hemp, undressed ditto Flax, undressed cwts Rape and cole seed . . bushels Flax and Linseed .... ditto Clover seed cwts. 4,012,144. 400,620 189,161,435 20,651,4151 2,452,1301 359,641 If 802,200 638,641 601,167 158,347 1,395,8761 31,011 Exported to all parts of the world. i Raw.... 425,435 I Refined 458,172 209,942 11,539,530 197,428 34,034 19,640 23,020 14,720 9,708 Foreign... 9,516 Ditto ...56,093 Ditto 2,581 Inspector GeneraVs Office, 26th March, 1824. W. IRVING. The BiKT)ER is desired to place tliis Page after the Ajpcndix to Part I\' UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY This book is DUE on the last date stamped below PEC'D LDAJRL I\PR09l99p AUG2 8 ' Form L-9-20w-8,'87 WNIVERSITY of CAT-^v UMBAEY L 005 848 313 2 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY AA 001 171 334 4 ■■^'y ': ---A