I HB ■3743 : B7 1- CD X >- (^^ ^^Cc^fy (y^iH^iyy\A.^^i^ ^ ■"ice I '37 xVi^D 'o A URIKF roruLAirAcoouNT _- "^ OF ALL TIIL FlNAXCrAT> -PANICS AND COMMERCIAL REVULSIONS m^ IN THE |f UNITED STATES, FROM 1G90 TO 1857 ^^ tL A MORE PAUTICULAR HISTORY OF THE TWO m- GREAT REVULSIONS OF 18 3 7 AND 18 5 7. BY MEMBERS OP THE NEW-YORK PRESS. y.uUivvA Hccording to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by J. C. Hanky, ui the Cleric s OJlicc of the District Co-irt of tho United States, for the Southern District of New-York. NEW-YORK: li J. (J. lIAiSTEY, PUI3LIS11KK. 185T. k RQ3^ ^ TQXJSI^T, WKQLBSAIiE ^C^ENTB. from ^ .- Baker Library xd^icc," CoppERtiKLJ), ''you know. Annual inco .iiutii expenditure — nineteen, nineteen six ; rcsiult — ha ,..o6nie — twenty i)ounilt^. Annual expenditure — twenty pou ^^±\ result— nnsery. The blossom is blighted ; the leaf is witl y^d of day goes down upon the dreary seene, and, in short, you ix floored." — Mr. Micaavbku. PREFACE. 105fil8 Thk difficulties under which the whole country ii^ at present laboring will be richly compensated if they should lead to such a renovation of our business system as shall prevent the recurrence of similar periods of panic aud disaster. To secure this most desirable end, it is, above all other things, necessary, that the causes of financial revulsions should be understood, and their incidents noted. One of the objects of this little work is to aid the public in coming to correct conclusions on this momentous subject. It (jonsists, lirst, of tlid facts of the difierent periods of revulsion in our history, compiled from the records of those periods. Sccondl}^ we have presented a selection of the opinions of eminent individuals respecting the causes of revulsion. Other matters, of interest at the present moment, arc ap pended and interspersed ; the whole forming, we trust, a tinu - ly, interesting and useful compilation. I^TIT'T 3/ PANICS AND RB^VULSIONS. CHAPTER I. PANICS AND REVULSIONS PREVIOUS TO THE GREAT REVULSION OF 1831. The distinction between a Panic and a Revulsion in the commercial world, is obvious. A Panic is a pressure in the money market without adequate cause. A Revulsion, on the contrary, is pressure with adequate cause, and that cause invariably is a previous Destruction of Value. A national Revul- sion is a national pay day. The nation has been drawing on the Future, and the Future dishonors the draft. The forcing process is then applied, wide- spread ruin is the result, and a long period of paralysis ensues. THE REVULSION OF 1690. We must go as far back as 1690 to find the origin of paper money in New England. In that year the pious and warlike colony of Massachusetts, in the excess of its loyalty to the mother country, and its hatred of catholic France, fitted ©ut, at a prodigious expense, an expedition against Quebec. The expedition, commanded by Sir William Phipps, consisted of thirty-four vessels and seven thousand men. The forces reached Quebec in safety, but after landing, fighting two gallant actions, and bombarding the fortress, they were compelled to retire. On their return, eight of the largest ships were wrecked in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the expedition returned frustrated and disheartened. To defray the immense expenses (immense for that period), bills of credit were issued, which first initiated the colonies into the perilous channel of a paper currency. The other colonies followed the example, when- ever an emergency arose. Yery soon, the bills of credit depreciated in value, and produced, in time, great disaster to the infant commerce of the colonies. In New York, then a mere village, it required two dollars of paper to buy one dollar of silver. In Boston, the depreciation was fifty per cent. THE REVULSION OF 1*148. In 1745, Massachusetts, ever ready for a tilt against the French, fitted out a most costly expedition against Louisburgh, a powerful fortress on the island of Cape Breton. The fortress was captured, and the expedition returned cov(ired with glory. But the expense demanded a fresh issue of between two and three millions in bills of credit, which soon depreciated to an unprece- dented and alarming extent^ In the year 1^48, it took eleven hundred pounds /63 2 THE REVULSION OF 1780, ETC. in their paper to purchase one hundred pounds in gold or silver. The paper of all the colonies had wofully fallen in value. To procure a hundred pounds in specie, required In Massachusetts' paper, 1100 pounds, " New York *' 190 " *' East Jersey " 190 " •' West Jersey *' 180 " " Pennsylvania *' 180 " " Maryland " 200 " *' Virginia " 125 '' " North Carolina " 1000 " " South Carolina " TOO " Such facts as these show the cause of the deep-rooted, and not yet eradi cated antipathy of the American people to a paper currency of every descrip- tion whatever. Thus early did they begin to attach an extravagant value to the possession of hard cash. THE REVULSION OF 1780. The Revolutionary war caused the greatest destruction of value which this country has ever known. It cost, in money and money's worth, not less than three hundred milhons of dollars, every dollar of which somebody had to pay. The year of stagnation and prostration which began with 1780, and continued till 1789, were the years in which the country, (without knowing it), was pay- ing for the war. Congress had issued one hundred and sixty miUions of paper money, which after falling lower and lower in value, became in 1780 abso- lutely worthless, and ceased to circulate. The people, impoyerished by the war, without a currency of any kind, except a few millions of specie, without union, without a practicable government, without credit either at home or abroad, would have utterly despaired had not the bounty of the soil and their own industrious hands always secured a sufficiency of the bare necessaries of life. There were no great cities, then, swarming with laborers living from hand to mouth, whom the first shock of a financial reverse deprived of their only means of subsistence. A nation of hardy yeomen, mostly cultivating their own land, making their own clothes, and owning their own houses, is to a great extent, independent of all reverses, except such as destroy or diminish the productions of the earth. With the administration of General Washing- ton and Alexander Hamilton, the country began its wonderful career of business prosperity. SUSPENSION OF SPECIE PAYMENTS BY THE BANK OF ENGLAND IN 1*I9Y. "On the twenty-sixth of February, 1797, Sunday, an order of the Privy Council was transmitted to the Bank of England prohibiting the further pay- ment of specie, until the pleasure of Parliament should be made known. Par- liament took the subject into consideration the next day, February 27th, and approved of the order of the Privy Council. The suspension of specie pay- ments was originally intended to be only a temporary measure, and the strongest assurances were given to this effect on the part of the Bank and the Government. SUSPENSION OF BANK OF ENGLAND. 8 "It was, however, continued, from time to time, but always as a temporary measure, until 1819, 22 years after the suspension, steps began seriously to be taken for resuming specie payments, which were, in fact, resumed on the 1st of May, 1 823. The Bank thus presents the singular example of a virtual insolvency for 26 years, and eventual redemption of its paper and credit ; and this return to specie payment was not attenae'd by any sudden revulsion or commercial shock. Preparations were made for it long beforehand. The amount of the notes of the Bank in circulation was reduced from about £24,000,000 to about £18,000,000. In the mean time a new coinage of gold had been issued, in 1821-22, to the amount of £14,877,547, which supplied the chasm made in the circulation of the country by the reduction of the amount of Bank of England notes, and also went to replenish the vaults of the Bank in preparation for the run that might be made on the resumption of payment ; but the danger was passed with the greatest facility. " The bank notes had depreciated, or, as the phrase was at the time, the price of bullion had gradually risen, so as to be, at one period, at the rate of 14 or 15 per cent. ; and if the Bank had then stopped suddenly, and, if we may imagine it possible, had redeemed the whole of its paper, £25,000,000 or more, with specie, it would have been a gain to the holders of the notes, in the whole, of £3,500,000, and a loss to the then debtors to the Bank of the same amount, assuming the depreciation to be 14 per cent.; while the Bank itself would have lost only the amount of bad debts, which would have been made by such a sudden and tremendous revulsion ; for, the moment of the Bank resuming to pay specie itself, by this very operation, it reduced the payments to the Bank, by its debtors to specie ; for the Bank had a right to demand payment of notes and bills discounted in specie, or, what would have been equivalent, its own notes. Such a measure would evidently have shaken the kingdom to its foundation, and probably have brought down its commercial, financial, and economical system in ruins. Instead of such a catastrophe, either in discon- tinuing or renewing payments of specie, each of which was equally hazardous and difficult, ihe transition in the depreciation of the paper was gradual and almost imperceptible, and after the overthrow of Napoleon, its rise in value was again, for the most part, as gradual, until it arrived to a par with gold, before the resumption of specie payments. In a pohtical, financial, and commercial point of view, this Institution, from the suspension to the resumption of specie payments, presents a stupendous phenomena unparallelled in history. The suspension of payment, in 1797, was one of those bold measures which are justified only by extreme cases, and which, in such cases, are only prudent measures. The whole system of financial administration, and all the commer- cial combinations and connexions of the kingdom, were involved in the affairs of the Institution at the time of stopping, 1797. The holders of the notes, and the depositors, were pressing to the Bank for specie, of which there remained in the vaults only £1,272,000 while the notes and claims outstanding, and which might be demanded, were £8,640,250, and the demands were pouring in with a still increasing tide. It seemed probable that the Bank must stop, after paying out this specie ; the shock, whatever it might be, must be encoun- tered, and it was very justly supposed that it would be in a measure broken, in anticipating the necessity, and stopping with more than a miUion in its vaults, instead of waiting until they should have been emptied. The reasons given in Parliament in favor of this suspension of payment, and of its continuance from time to time, were : — 1. That the Bank could not con- tinue its discounts and its payments in specie ; and if its discount were stopped or greatly reduced, the commerce of the country would be destroyed : 2. That the credit of the government would be lost if the Bank should cease to make advances on its taxes : 8. That specie payments were of no benefit to England, as the specie, on being drawn from the Bank, went abroad : 4. That it was more important that the Bank should exist, than that it should 4 THE PANIC OF 1798 IN THE UNITED STATES, ETC. meet its payments at the expense of its existence : 5. That the commercial arrangements, combinations, and relations, existing in the kingdom, would be broken up by the dissolution of this Institution, and, being once broken up, could never be renewed ; and, 6. That it was better to stop specie payments, while specie and bullion could be kept in the country by that means. Such were the reasons given in favor of the measure, and though it has been cen- sured by some, who have pretended to discover in it the cause of much finan- cial and commercial derangement, yet they do not show by what other course Great Britain could have struggled through the terrible conflicts of that period." THE PANIC OF 1798 IN THE UNITED STATES. This was really a terrible time. We call it a Panic, because, so far as the histbry of the period records, there does not appear to have been any adequate cause for the alarm. In other words, there does not appear to have been a previous destruction of value to a sufficient amount to cause a genuine com- mercial revulsion. The nation thought itself to be on the very eve of a war with France. General Washington had accepted the command of the army, and General Hamilton was his second. An army was raising, and everything foreboded an immediate conflict. Meanwhile the French armies under Bone- parte were filling the world with the fame of their exploits, and England, that bore the brunt of that great struggle, seemed about to be overpowered. A financial panic in London was at its height, and the Bank of England had suspended specie payment. John Adams was president of the United States, and the ahen and sedition laws were in force, keeping the nation in ceaseless and bitter agitation. Political feeling ran so high, that men of opposite parties could scarcely salute one another in the streets, and thousands were of the opinion that the young republic had run its course. In the midst of these events a financial panic arose, and hundreds of merchants failed. In those days, failure to meet an obligation was a serious affair, as imprisonment for debt had no where been abohshed. The prisons of Philadelphia, (then our principal city,) were filled with merchants, many of whom were of old and honorable standing in the business of the country. The panic was severe but brief. The sky soon brightened. Peace was made with France. The elec- tion of Jefferson and Burr in 1800 gave to the democratic party its first tri- umph. The country was satisfied, and bounded forward in its bright career. THE REVULSION OF 1808. A war is, with regard to business, a three-edged sword. The anticipation of it is one disaster ; carrying it on, is another ; paying for it, after it is over, is a third. From 1808 to 1817, the business of the United States was, more or less, affected by the war of 1812. Jefferson's embargo (passed in Decem- ber, 1807) put an end, for a time, to the commerce of Xho, country. It pro- hibited the departure of any merchant vessel from the ports of the United States ! The effect may be imagined. Merchants, clerks, seamen, shipmas- ters, and all the great army of men who are supported by commerce, were deprived of employment and revenue. The great planting interest of the JACKSON'S WAR ON THE UNITED STATES BANK. 6 South was first paralyzed, then ruined. The great cities languished; the farmers of the North, who had been growing rich by supplying the beUigerent powers of Europe with bread and meat, could no longer sell their surplus pro- ductions. Seldom have the temper and patriotism of the country been so severely tried as during the operation of the various embargo and non-inter- course acts of Jefferson and his successor. THE REVULSION OP 1815. This was the year of the general peace. Our own war was at an end, and the exile of Napoleon at St. Helena gave repose to Europe. These happy events, however, brought upon us one of the severest commercial reverses we have ever experienced. Despite the embargo and the war of 1812, a consider- able trade had been latterly carried on between the United States and Europe, and the war itself had given, as war always does, an unnatural activity to many branches of business. With the peace of 1816, ceased for a long time the European demand for American provisions. The currency, too, had be- come exceedingly deranged. In 181 Y, the Bank of the United States began its career by importing into the country over seven miUions of dollars in specie, at an expense of half a million of dollars. Manufactures revived under the operation of the revised tariff, and the country, for the next fourteen years, enjoyed great and nearly uninterrupted prosperity. There were, it is true, occasional periods of panic and disaster, as in 1822 and 1825, but at no time" was there a general revulsion and universal ruin, such as occurred in 1837. CHAPTER II. EVENTS PRECEDING THE GREAT CRASH OF 1837. Our first object shall be to narrate the facts respecting the revulsion of 1837, leaving to another chapter the various opinions respecting it which the time called forth. The facts are few and easy to be understood. GEN. Jackson's war upon the BA^lK of the united states. In the year 1832, the Bank of the United States, situated in the city of Philadelphia, held a position in the finances of the western continent similar to that now enjoyed in the eastern continent by the Bank of England. It had existed for fifteen years, during the greater part of which it had been managed with skill and success. Its capital was 35 millions of dollars, which, owing to the high premium commanded by the stock, was equivalent to near- ly 50 millions. The number of its directors was twenty-five, of whom five were chosen by the federal government, and fifteen by the stockholders. The stockholders were 3400 in number, of whom more than 500 were foreign- ers. The bank had branches in all the principal cities of the Union. Its clear profits in the year 1831, reached the enormous sum of $3,455,598. It 6 VETO OF THE RE-CHARTERING BILL. was the bank in which was deposited the public money, which disbursed the public money, and which, at times Avhen the public money was short, made up the deficiency. The great fact respecting it was, that the bank notes issued by the Bank of the United States were as good as gold in any part of the United States. There was no discount upon them anywhere. A man provided with a sufficiency of United States Bank bills, could travel from Maine to Georgia, and from Georgia to Astoria, without incurring the slight- est loss or inconvenience. In fact, wherever there was a civilized commu- nity on earth, there the bills of this great bank could be exchanged for commodities. In London its credit was as unquestioned as that of the Bank of England. General Jackson was resolved upon the destruction of this institution. His reasons have been variously stated. His enemies said then, and say now, that he destroyed the bank because he personally hated Nicholas Biddle, its celebrated president. Others maintain that the destruction of the bank was a tribute to the known will of a majority of the people, who from time imme- morial had distrusted all banks, and who in particular detested " The Monster," as the Bank of the United States was then called by its opponents. Others again, assert that General Jackson put down the bank for reasons purely patriotic, because he really thought the existence of such a powerful moneyed institution dangerous to liberty, and dangerous to the independence of the Executive. The probabihty is, that all these motives had weight with the General. Whatever his motives may have been, there is no doubt that he accomplished his purpose with indomitable resolution, and in spite of obstacles that would have deterred any man less resolute than himself. At the present time there are few intelligent persons who, on a calm review of the whole transaction, will not admit that the total separation of the general govern- ment from banks and banking, is not merely in accordance with the genius of our institutions, but practically right and wise. VETO OF THE RE-CHARTERING BILL. In 1832, the charter of the Bank of the United States had four years yet to run, and a bill passed both houses of Congress renewing the charter. This bill was laid before President Jackson for his signature on the 4th of July, and on the 10th of the same month he returned it to the Senate vetoed ! His objections to the bill were stated at great length, but the principal objection was expressed with forcible brevity at the beginning of the message, as fol- lows : — " The present corporate body, denominated ' The President, Directors, and Company of the Bank of the United States,' will have existed, at the time this act is intended to take eft'ect, twenty years. It enjoys an exclusive privilege of banking under the authority of the General Government, a monopoly of its favor and support, and, as a necessary consequence, almost a monopoly of the foreign and domestic exchange. The powers, privileges, and favors bestowed upon it, in the original charter, by increasing the value of the stock far above its par value, operated as a gratuity of many millions to the stockholders. REMOVAL OF THE BEPOSITES. 7 *' An apology may be found for the failure to guard against this result, in consideration that the effect of the original act of incorporation could not be certainly foreseen at the time of its passage. The act before me proposes another gratuity to the holders of the same stock, and, in many cases, to the same men, of at least seven miUions more, ^his donation finds no apology in any uncertainty as to the effect of the act. On all hands it is conceded that its passage will increase at least twenty or thirty per cent, more, the market price of the stock, subject to the payment of the annuity of $200,000 per year, secured by the act ; thus adding, in a moment, one fourth to its par value. It is not our own citizens only who are to receive the bounty of our govern- ment. More than eight millions of the stock of this bank are held by foreigners. By this act the American republic proposes virtually to make them a present of some millions of dollars. For these gratuities to foreigners, and to some of our own opulent citizens, the act secures no equivalent what- ever. They are the certain gains of the present stockholders under the oper- ation of this act, after making full allowance for the payment of the bonus. " Every monopoly, and all exclusive privileges, are granted at the expense of the public, which ought to receive a fair equivalent. The many millions which the act proposes to bestow on the stockholders of the existing bank, must come, directly or indirectly, out of the earnings of the American people. It is due to them, therefore, if their government sell monopolies and exclusive privileges, that they should at least axact for them as much as they are worth in open market. The value of the monopoly in this case may be correctly ascertained. The twenty-eight millions of stock would probably be at an advance of fifty per cent., and command in market at least forty -two milhons of dollars, subject to the payment of the present bonus. The present value of the monopoly, therefore, is seventeen millions of dollars, and this the act pro- poses to sell for three millions, payable in fifteen annual instalments of $200,000 each. " It is not conceivable how the present stockholders can have any claim to the special favor of the government. The present corporation has enjoyed its monopoly during the period stipulated in the original contract. If we must have such a corporation, why should not the government sell oftt the whole stock, and thus secure to the people the full market value of the privileges granted ? Why should not Congress create and sell twenty-eight millions of stock, incorporating the purchasers with all the powers and privileges secured in this act, and putting the premium upon the sales into the Treasury ? "But this act does not permit competition in the purchase of this monopoly. It seems to be predicated on the erroneous idea, that the present stockholders have a prescriptive right, not only to the favor but to the bounty of the gov- ernment. It appears that more than a fourth part of the stock is held by foreigners, and the residue^ is held by a few hundred of our own citizens, chiefly of the richest class : for their benefit does this act exclude the whole American people from competition in the purchase of this monopoly." This veto produced an intense excitement throughout the country, which many of our readers will remember. The arguments of Old Hickory were never answered, bnt he was abused without stint. REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITES. The failure of the Bank of the United States to obtain a renewal of its char- ter produced no immediate effect upon the finances of the country. The Bank had four years in which to wind up its affairs, and under so accompHshed a financier as Nicholas Biddle, it no doubt might have transferred its business gradually to other institutions, and gone out of existence without seriously dis- 8 THE INFLATION OF 1885-36. turbing the monetary affairs of the nation. But General Jackson's next blow struck home. Re-elected in 1832 on the bank issue, and in spite of the Bank's active opposition, he was no sooner inaugurated, than he resolved upon his great stroke of removing the pubhc money from the custody of the United States Bank, and distributing it among the local banks of the several States of the Union. In the fall of 1833, no less than eight miUions of the public money were thus removed from the vaults of the great Bank. The effect was imme- diate and disastrous. The Bank, shorn of so much practical capital, was com- pelled to curtail its discounts to such an extent as to render money for a few months exceedingly tight. There were many failures. In a short time, how- ever, the distributed capital began to tell, and an enormous expansion of the currency set in, which not only reheved the business world from its embarrass- ments, but gave an inflation to the affairs of the country of an unparalleled character. State banks were created all over the country, and, governed as most of them were by men unexperienced in banking, they were easily drawn into the seductive snare of excessive issues of paper. THE INFLATION OF 1835-36. In England : — The joint stock banks had increased with startling rapidity. They had begun in 1825, and in September 1835, they numbered 102, exclu- sive of an immense number of branches. During the preceding five months they had been increasing at the rate of five per montn, exclusive of branches; yet there was but a comparatively small increase of their notes — then whence the enormous profits they were known to make ? It was by means of bank credits. Tbey were in the habit of sending the paper they discounted imme- diately dp to*London to be re-discounted there, thus banking to an indefinite extent oii credit. *'To such an extent," said the Edinburgh Review for July, 1836, "had this system been carried, that we are weU assured that certain banks, with less than £500,000 of paid up capital, have discounted bills and made advances to the extent of from^?;<3 to six miUions; and the engagements of others have been even more incommensurate with their capital." The con- sequence of this state of things was, that during the first three months of 1836, one hundred and four joint stock companies were formed in Manchester and Liverpool alone, with an aggregate capital of £3*7, 987, 500 ; and Mr. Poulett Thompson stated in the House of Commons, that the number of fresh compa- nies on the tapis, for every imaginable object, from making railways in Hin- dostan to burying the dead at home, were between three and four hundred, with an aggregate projected capital of nearly two hundred millions sterling. In the United States ;— The inflation is too well remembered among us to require an enlarged statement here. Suffice it to say, that the country lost its senses in its haste to be rich. The credit system was carried to an extent which those who can remember the facts'can scarcely beheve. Men without a thousand dollars of capital bought cotton plantations and slaves, and drew on brokers immediately, on the credit of the first crop, before the seed had been sown. Land speculation was the rage. Millions of acres of land, which BANKS AND BANKING CAPITAL. 9 were valued at prices ranging from one hundred dollars to a thousand dollars an acre, have not yet reached the value at which they were then sold and re- sold. The walls of the streets were covered with maps of towns that were still miles in the woods or feet under water. AIL this will be brought out fully in another chapter. Comparative view of Imports into the United States, and Exports to Foreign Countries for 13 years. V/^or. Imports. Exports of Domestic Total xear. Produce & Articles. Exports. 1824 $80,549,007 $50,649,500 $75,986,657 1825 96,340,075 66,944,745 99,535,388 1826 84,974,477 53,055,710 77,595,322 1827 79,484,068 58,921,691 82,324,827 1828 88,509,824 50,669,669 72,264,686 1829 74,492,527 55,700,193 72,358,671 1830 70,876,920 59,462,029 73,849,508 1831 103,121,124 61,277,027 81,310,583 1832 101,029,266 63,137,470 87,176,943 1833 108,118,311 70,317,698 90,140,433 1834 126,521,332 81,024,162 104,336,973 1835 149,895,742 101,189,082 121,693,577 183d 189.980,035 106,916,680 128,663,040 TABLE OF BANKS AND BANKING CAPITAL IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1792 TO 1836. Year Banks U. S. Bank Total Capital 1792 12 $10,000,000 $18,935,000 1801 33 do 33,550,000 1805 76 do 50,493,000 1811 89 do 52,610,600 1815 208 Defunct 82,209,590 1816 246 do 89,802,422 1820 308 35,000,000 ■ 137,210,611 1830 330 do 145,192,268 1834 507 do 205,123,788 1835 558 do 231,250,337 1836 567 do 251,875,292 1837 677 do 378,421,168 I STRIKES AND TRADE UNIONS. . As the manufacture of paper money proceeded, provisions and other neces- saries of life rose in price, and mechanics universally demanded higher wages. Strikes were the order of the day. We read in the Journal of Commerce of Feb. 1836, as follows : '* On the 23rd inst., the Riggers and Ship-laborers turned out in large num- bers, and went about the wharves in a body, compelling such of their profes- sion as they found at work, to quit the business in. which they were engaged. Almost simultaneously a squad of day-laborers, of another description, chiefly foreigners, went through the burnt district compelling their fellow-laborera about the premises to quit work, because they were receiving $1 a day instead 10 STRIKES AND TRADE UNIONS. of $1 25, which these imported dictators had determined was the rightful sum." In the N. Y. American, of about the same date, we find the following : — " A sea-faring man, from exposure to severe weather, was on his arrival in port sent to the city hospital, where his general health was restored, but both feet were lost. Being cured, he could no longer, by the rule of the hospital, be kept there ; yet to send him forth such a cripple, was to consign him to starvation. Some of the governors, therefore, caused artificial feet to be made for him at a cost of 70 dollars, and then, as he said he had been ac- customed on ship-board to handle the sail-needle, obtained employment for him with a sail-maker, and placed him in special charge of the foreman of the loft, with the request that he might be suffered to earn whatever he could. The cripple, happy and grateful, went to his new trade, and for two days was unmolested, as was his employers ; and it was ascertained that by such work he could earn enough to keep him above want. On the third day, a deputa- tion from the Trades' Union went to the sail-loft — forbade the employment of that helpless sailor — forbade him, in like manner, to work — and he was obliged to relinquish the place. The governors of the hospital received him back within their walls, or he would have been left without a meal, or a place to lay his head." We add one more case. "In March, 1836, a number of Journeymen Gran- ite Cutters, nd^t members of the Union, were obliged to combine in order to protect themselves against its machinations. In their Manifesto they declare that the Unions had formally proscri];)ed all journeymen who refused to join or co-operate with it — had undertaken to prevent such journeymen from ob- taining employment in any town in the United States where Trades' Unions were established — had, to use their own phrase, nullified two Yards, because their proprietors had refused to discharge a foreman at the bidding of the Union — had threatened death, tar and feathers, battery, and every species of personal indignity, to those who might presume to labor in those Yards — and, to intimidate strange journeymen, had declared, that unless they acquiesced, they would forever be objects of persecution — had seduced apprentices from the nullified Yards, and forced them as journeymen upon others — and that such proceedings had caused contracts to the amount of $260,000 to be re- moved to other States." To show the angry spirit that prevailed at that time of universal prosperity, we copy another case from the Journal of Commerce : " Some days back, the journeymen tailors made out a new tariff of prices to be paid by their employers, and also laid down certain rules relative to the manner in which master-tailors should give out work. According to one of these rules, every master tailor should keep a slate hung up in his store, and enter on it every piece of work which he gave to a journeyman to make, and that no journeyman should get work to do except in his turn. For example, if two journeymen successively got each a coat to make, and the one who re- ceived the second was more industrious than the first, or a more expeditious tvorkman, and finished his work sooner, he must wait idle until the other man had also finished his work and was given another job. So that the idle and industrious, or awkward and expert workman were completely on a par by these absurd regulations — to the monstrous injustice of the operative, and serious inconvenience and loss of the employer. The master-tailors very pro- perly refused to adopt so ridiculous a rule, or comply with the new scale of prices dictated by the journeymen, and the latter very generally turned out, and refused to work. Some of the journeymen tailors, however, were willing to work at the old prices, and among them was a man named William Wright, STRIKES AND TRADES UNIONS. 11 in the employment of Messrs. Stokes & Co., Broadway. This man could earn twelve dollars a week, and having a large family to support, was unwilling to remain idle, but was obliged to do so from downright fear, as some of the other journeymen tailors called on him, and threatened him, that if he did not leave his employment they would cut off his hands or kill him I Intimidated by these threats, Wright left his work ; a:^d his employers, in whose service he had been for many years, and who had a great respect for him, having dis- covered that he left them solely from intimidation, determined to prosecute the lawless ruffians who had driven him away, and summoned Wright to the police office yesterday evening in order to obtain his testimony against them. Such a complete system of terror, however, have the journeymen tailors es- tablished in their body, that Wright was afraid to tell the names of any of the aggressors, and though Mr. Wyman said all he could to persuade hira to it, promising him full protection against any consequences, Wright still dechned mentioning any names, lest his doing so might cause his destruction. Finding that threats or promises were alike unavailing, Mr. Wyman was obliged to commit him to prison for refusing to give evidence ; and thus an honest, in- dustrious, poor man, with a large family, has been obliged first to remain idle, and is afterwards committed to prison for fear of disobeying the dictates of a lawless combination." The following advertisement from the papers of the same date, is also sig- nificant : " The public in general, and my binders in particular, are hereby informed that I have now at work four and twenty good permanent workmen, and several more engaged. to commence on the 1st of May, all of whom are little affected with the brutal leprosy of Blue-Monday habits, and the moral gangrene of Trades' Union principles. Hence, my binders may rely upon steady employment, and the pubhc upon good work, punctually performed ; and they and myself find just cause to fehcitate ourselves upon the prompt and effectual disposal, at once and forever, of the inconvenience, injustice and nuisance of perpetual variations, regular combinations, and periodical strikes from marauding gangs of transient and tramping Trades' Unionists, who have proved themselves as destitute of every moral principle as they have become notorious for their wickedness and folly, their presumption, their insolence and audacity. "HORACE H. DAY, " Shoe, Hat and Cap Manufacturer. *' Neio Brunswick^ April 6, 1836." CHAPTER III. DISASTERS JUST PREVIOUS TO THE GREAT REVULSION OF 1837. The reader will bear in mind that the year 1835 was, so far as appearances went, the most buoyant and prosperous year which the business men of the United States had ever known. The country was in the very highest spirits. If ever a warning voice was heard, it was not heeded, and the very prophets themselves scarcely believed their own predictions. Nowhere was the infla- tion of credit carried to a greater extent than in the city of New Yojk. New blocks of costly houses were erected, and that imposing and magnificent region 12 THE GREAT FIRE OF 1835. which we now call "Up-Town," was beginning to rise, like an exhalation, from a wilderness of rock, sand and shanty. Extravagance was the order of the day, — extravagance in business, in speculation, in expenditure, and in talk. " In 1834," said a newspaper of the time, " the current increased. The new squares up-town were built— great profits made in lots near town — speculation began also in the South — cotton culture increased. In 1835 the madness made further progress, and continued increasing up to 1836, in July, when it had reached its height. In the course of these events, prices of everything increased — of lands, cotton, provisions — every article of necessity and use." We now commence our catalogue of disasters with THE GREAT FIRE OF 1835. To convey to our younger readers a vivid idea of this great calamity, which, in the space of about twenty-two hours, destroyed seventeen blocks of postly stores, we cannot do better than copy the following account from " Watson^s Annals of Neiju York ;" " The great conflagration of New York city, in December, 1835, — the greatest wonder and calamity, and befalling the greatest city, hitherto known to the Western world, — were subjects of sufficient excitement and interest, to induce a journey in mid-winter, purposely to visit the. ruins, and to see the havoc and desolation which the devouring element had inflicted. " Such a scene of devastation can only be expected to occur once in a cen- tury, or but once in a life ; and when the spectacle once got up^ is showed off at such tremendous expense, and with such terrific display, it must surely be worth a journey of observation 'to note and observe!' Such thoughts in- fluenced my mind, and induced the visit to the scene of destruction, on Christ- mas-day, the 25th of December, 1835, being eight days after the disaster had closed its career of ravage and dismay. " On my arrival .in the city of New York, my first impulse was to inspect the awful ruins. In doing so, I was necessarily obliged to see, beforehand, the persons of numerous citizens at the wharves and along the streets. Their faces nor actions, indicated none of those excited feelings, which my own . emotion might have suggested as very natural from the occasion. Indeed, it was but too true, that the wonder of the occasion had much subsided ; and this agreed with the fact before observed, in the intermediate journey, that the mass of traveUing passengers — equal to 150 persons, had already found out other topics of conversation and interest. " Soon, however, I entered upon the »cene of ruin, and oh ! what a scene — to comprise an area of forty -five city acres, in absolute destruction. To see still the charred, the blazing and smouldering embers, to scent the tainted air loaded with smoke from the still consuming parcels of cotton, coffee, tobacco, tea, cotton and woollen goods, still resting in cellars, covered with masses of bricks and broken granite. Of 628 buildings of the most costly fabric, of four and five stories height, which were consumed, only one^ a conspicuous Sala- mander^ was remaining ; — Benson's fire-proof copper store, of four stories, upon No. 83 Water street. There it stood unscathed, an Oasis in the sur- rounding desert. " It was passing strange, to contemplate in one view, so great a mass of towering architecture as 528 houses of brick and granite, all prostrated^ all gone down into their own tombs, in their several cellars ; or in some cases tumbling into the narrow streets, and clogging up their passage. Here and there, were to be seen craggcd and dofornicd fraficmenls of standing walls, THE GKEAT FIKE OF 1835. 13 some of one story — some more slender and lofty, of two and three stories, acting as pointers and indices to the ruined area, and warning the inquisitive explorer like myself, to beware of coming within the verge of their expected fall.^ On some they had fallen and broken limbs, even while I was there. Amid these ruins, guided by the remains of the several former streets, were to be seen continuous Hues of male and -ifemale passengers, come in hoHday clothes from country villages, to behold the catastrophe. I speak of them generally as strangers ; for in truth, as I afterwards ascertained, the proper inhabitants of New York had already ceased to visit the place, as an affair of worn-out character, superseded by something more recent and of fresher news. Even as I overheard some gentlemen near the place, conversing and saying, that' " usually their occasions of excitement lasted twenty-four hpurs ; but here was one of thirty-eight hours, and now no longer such." Trtly, this destruction has fallen upon men of peculiar elasticity of spirit and enterprise. It is almost wholly upon the mercantile class, accustomed to risk and chance, and who are habituated to recover from mishaps and disasters. They were very generally insured; and so generally too, that the chief of their present concern, is the probability of the Insurance companies being unable to divide more than an average of fifty per cent. Yet losing as they must, there is no betrayal of heart-sorrow in the countenances of the street walkers, nor in the , congregations of the churches. They still look wholly like their former-selves, ' —yea more, they even give to other charities ; for instance, at Dr. Brodhead's church where I was, they gathered in the annual collection for missionary purposes 820 dollars. ,It is probable that two-thirds of all the famihes in New- York, might themselves become hberal contributors to the sufferers. " I visited the ruins both by day and by night, spending in such observations from one to two hours at a time. It was sad to see the cartloads of goods, which could even at the end of a week or ten days after the fire, still be rescued from the heated cellars. Thus great piles of ready roasted coffee was brought out ; piece after piece of caHcoes and worsted, scorched and smoking, were drawn out of others ; piles of prepared tobacco for chewing ; numerous pigs of lead ; masses of bar iron, and iron chains ; cotton in bales, burning in places and extinguished in others ; laboring men, all dingy with the smut of the fire, working in many places to clear away the rubbish and to still preserve something from the flames. " The best and most extensive perspective view of the whole area, was to be seen from Coenties slip, looking thence across to the line of Wall street as & back ground. I was so impressed with the utility of preserving such a spectacle for people at a distance, and for posterity, that I immediately sug- gested to Col. Stone, the editor of the ' Commercial Advertiser,' that a call should be made for some one or two hthographic views of the scene ; and after I returned home, I directly prompted Mr. Breton to go on and endeavor to execute them. He agreed, but soon after declined, because of the proposed diorama of the same by Wright. Still, however, the print is a desideratum. " The lurid glare of the night spectacle, seen as I saw it on the 28th of December, just before daylight, was awfully impressive. Fires of smaller di- mensions could be seen every here and there, of goods still consuming, and afford- mg enough of illumination amidst the general gloom, to show the explorer his path-way along the former streets. How different the quiet and desolate scene, from its recent busy mart of commerce. I met no individual, heard no voices, and had the whole silence and soHtude to myself. I sat upon a heap of ruins near to a warming fire, and indulged in reveries and musings. 1 thought of ^'yre of old, "whose merchants were princes, and whose mansions were palaces:' I thought of the quickening influences of commerce wherever they are freely indulged and not ignorantly fettered. I thought then of the unwise system which denied to foreign underwriters, (like the Phoenix Com- pany, of London,) the risk of our preservation, and reserved to tJ^emselves the 14 THE GREAT FIRE OF 1835. sole privilege of being responsible for the calamities of their own people. The practical issue is, that the ruin of seventeen millions of property, is a family concern of a ivhole city^ wherein all are mediately or immediately involved. " Although I had not seen the actual conflagration which began at Comstock and Andrews' store, on Merchant street, on the night of Wednesday, the 16th of December, and raged through all the next day until Thursday evening, I could still imagine the terrific and appalling picture : — ' Could see her flames from lofty mansions rise, And send their eddying columns to the skies ; Where spreading fire makes night a brighter day, Nor skill nor courage can its fury stay — The richest merchandize of eveiy name, • The worth of millions feed the flame, ' And one vast ruin meets the aching eye.' " In the time of the fire, when dismay and confusion were at their utmost heif'ht, great prices were offered and given for help in any needed form. Twenty dollars were given for a single cart load, and even one hundred dollars was asked and given. One merchant on South street, by the river side, who saw the high extortion on those who had not their own carmen at hand, offered and actually purchased a horse and cart for five hundred dollars, and thereby saved his o'wn property of $80,000 by removal. My friends Clark and Smith, offered, after the fire had consumed their store, one hundred dollars to sundry bystanders, working men, to pull out their iron chest ; it was soon done, and their books and even notes, were all saved, although so charred and injured, as to be necessary to transcribe the books. " It might surprise many to learn, that while I and others, travelled to the scene from 10(?miles, that there were numerous persons even in New York city, who never waked or heard of the fire. My own kinsman, Mr. B. up town, heard of some cry of fire about the time of his retiring to bed, but Uttle regarded It ; and he and his wife and two servants, actually slept out the whole night in Bleecker street, without knowing that there had been any tire, and that he had actually lost a large store worth $2500 a year rent. " Some others of my friends, near Houston street and Broadway, were at a wedding party, and although they heard of the fire at a distance at nine o'clock, not one of them left^heir entertainment till midnight; and then only one of 'them on his nearer approach homeward, saw or heard enough of the fire to influence him to go on to the place of desolation— there in his gala dress and dancing pumps, he had to set to work earnestly to pack up his store goods near the Exchange, and send them to the Battery ground for safety- he eventually lost $2000. Three of the other guests went home to rest, and never heard of their losses until the next morning, when they found that their stores and all their contents were dissolved in fervent heat. " It is the strangest thing to contemplate, that nearly 600 houses of the loftiest and most- expensive construction, should go down to absolute ruins in so short a space of time. One would think that the bare walls might be found standing ; but it was not so. It is said that they build with insufficient width of wall for such large superstructures of four and five stories ; and above all that the cheaper Ume which they have preferred from Maine, Rhode Island, and Albany &c., has been wholly unequal to that which Philadelphia county supplies to its architecture. The granite and marble pillars on which many of the fronts of the houses rested, were wholly unable to sustain the action of fire and water; 2iVidi fractured and rived m such manner, as to be no support to the walls above them. The narrowness of the streets, and the undue ele- vation of the houses, (a sufficient warning to us,) prevented firemen froin act- ine; with effect. These circumstances, while they hindered men from aiding, greatly increased the action of the heat, so that such an intensity of fire has THE GREAT FIRE OF 1835. 15 never been surpassed. I saw china stores, where the masses of broken china was vitrified in clusters, zinc and copper, from roofs, was found in the drench- ing form of gushing water, the masses of nails, screws, &c., in iron stores, were partially dissolved, and then cooled in union. I preserved some such fragments, and I also brought away a whole ewer, which had endured all the fire, at the china store of John Greenfield and 'Sons, in Pearl street, close to where a china store was blown up, and caused the arrest of the fire at the head of Coenties shp, on Pearl street. "The cause of so much unparallelled havoc, was that of a fierce wind — felt equally all the way to Philadelphia, which was blowing from the north-west during all the night ; and besides this, the weather was too intensely cold, to admit of a due use of the engines and hose. In many places firemen could be seen beating their hose to prevent the formation of ice within them. " It was impossible to find firemen reckless enough to ascend ladders, which might be raised to the eves of houses, of four and five stories — and in narrow streets, the water played so high, necessarily fell back upon the people below. In such extremities, men had to stand useless gazers upon the destruction of their property. " Seventeen blocks, (squares,) containing houses of the largest and most costly construction, were consumed in one night. What an awful picture of the Great Assize, * when the elements shall melt with fervent heat!' '* Explosions were often heard, resulting sometimes purposely from the use of gunpowder, and in otiier cases from the bursting of liquor casks, and from the presence of gunpowder held for sale. These, when they occurred, were subjects of indescribable grandeur and terror — it set every bosom upon the qui vive. " How wonderful, that in so much just cause of personal apprehension and danger, only one person should have been wounded, and one other missing. " It was somewhat peculiar that the fire travelled so readily to loindward^ so that those who conveyed their goods and stored them for safety in the Mer- chants' Exchange and the old Dutch church, should have had them overtaken, even there, by the consuming element, and wholly burned. The best refuge was found in the Bowling Green and Battery, where marine guards with fixed bayonets, gave them protection. "The several streets, after the fire, were seen for several days, choked up with rich merchandizes — all tramped under foot, and almost totally ruined. In short thousands upon thousands of dollars in value, were lying wasted and whelmed in ruin. " Wail after wall, were seen or heard tumbling Hke avalanches to the ground, while flames were darting their tongues of fire, and were heard roaring from roofs and windows, along whole streets. At the same time, firemen worn out with over exertion, were still struggling for mastery over the storm of fire, which seemed to revel in its power, and to mock all human skill and prowess. " The next day, all the city military were put under requisition, to be ready to protect property exposed, and to aid the civil authorities in the preserva- tion of order and the civil rule. *' It was curious to see occasionally, the harvest which occurred to the poor, and to stroUing boys and girls. You could see the rag gatherers, crowding their sacks with scorched fragments of cotton and silk stufts. In one place was the remains of a jeweler's store, in which ragged boys and girls were very busy searching for sundry trinkets. At the china stores, men, women, and children, were engaged raking among broken china and queensware, for small articles unbroken. In one such place, I saw and purchased, as a relic, an ewer in good state.'* The most wonderful circumstance respecting this Great Fire was, that it caused scarcely any failureSj and seemed to produce no serious effect upon 16 THE GREAT FIRE OF 1S85. either the progress of the city or the finances of the country. The city was under such tremendous headway, that the sudden and total annihilation of eighteen millions of property was hardly felt. Every body was amazed at this. It hugely flattered the nationul vanity. In what other country, asked the elated people, could such a catastrophe occur, without bringing ruin upon all concerned ? 528 houses were consumed. On the 1st of October 1836, 167 houses on the burnt district were occupied ; 58 more were finished ; 64 more were roofed ; 82 more were in progress, and nearly every trace of the .fire was obHterated. As a very striking proof of the elasticity of things at that time, note the annexed account of sales of real estate by Jas. Bleecker & Sons, Feb. 23, 1836 — at their sales room, 13 Broad street. The real estate of the late Joel Post. 1 lot on Wall street, corner of Exchange place, 28 feet 6 inches by 63 feet 6 inches - - - - $66,500 1 lot on Wall street, adjoining above, 19 feet by 28 feet, . - 55,750 1 lot on Exchange street, 30 feet 5 inches by 54 feet, - - 46,500 1 lot on Exchange street, 29 feet 7 inches by 52 feet 9 inches, - 41,000 1 lot on Exchange street, 20 feet 4 inches by 45 feet deep, running to a point, 18,100 1 lot corner of William street and Exchange place, 25 feet 11 inches by 52 feet 5 inches, -.-_...._ 46,500 1 lot next but one adjoining, 39 feet 2 inches by 40 feet, - - 38,750 1 lot on William street, next to corner of Wall street, 17 feet 2 inches front, 11 feet rear, and 60 feet deep, .... 25,000 1 lot on Exchange Place, 32 feet 9 inches front by 55 feet deep, 36,500 1 lot adjoining, 26 feet 2 inches by 66 feet, .... 28,250 1 lot in rear on Merchant street, 23 feet 6 inches by 52 fact, 24,250 1 lot fronting on Exchange Place and Merchant street, 20 feet 5 inches by 91 feet, 45,500 1 lot 20 feet 6 inches-23 feet, by 88 feet, .... 47,500 1 lot adjoining, 20 feet 6 inches-24 feet, by 75 feet, - - 38,500 1 lot 20 feet 6 inches-24 feet, by 65 feet, 37,750 1 lot 20 feet 5 inches on Exchange Place, 24 feet on Merchant street, and 60 feet deep, 44,250 1 lot corner of Exchange street and Pearl street, 19 feet 11 inches . front, by 65 feet, 32,500 1 lot on Pearl street, 20 feet by 67 feet, 29,500 1 lot rear on Exchange Place, 28 feet by 64 feet - - . 33,000 1 lot corner Exchange Place and Merchant street, 28 feet 7 inches front, 38 feet 7 inches rear, by 64 feet, - . - - 35,500 $771,100 THE SHORT CROPS OF 1835 AND 1836. Excessive drouth followed by excessive rains, a backward spring and early frosts, did such damage to the crops, that the country did not produce food enough for its subsistence during the winters. As early as the month of October 1835, wheat began to be imported from foreign countries, and con- tinued to be imported until late in the spring of 1837. Ink) the single port of New York, there were imported in October 1835, 18,200 bushels of wheat, 8,600 bushels 17,200 a 68,400 a 109,800 (( 120,100 u THE SPECIE CIRCULAR OF 1836. 11 In February 1836, 36,160 bushels. In August 1836 " March " 42,800 " " September '' *' April " 39,200 " " October " " May *' 31,100 " " Novjember " " June " 16,600 " " December " *' July " 8,000 " Total import for 1836, 493,100 In January 1837 132,600 bushels.In March 1837 413,300 bushels. " February " 179,800 " To April 19, " 135,300 " Total import to April 19th, 1837, 1,369,300 During this period the price of flour ranged from eight dollars per barrel to sixteen, which led in the winter of 1837 to the flour riots in the city of New York, which will be described on a subsequent page. THE SPECIE CIRCULAR OF JULY 1836. This was simply an order from the treasury that public lands must be paid for, henceforward, in specie. Speculation in land had become a mania, sim- ilar to that which has prevailed during the last ten years in stock gambling. That is -to say, milHons of acres were sold at prices utterly fictitious, and paid for in values utterly fictitious. There was no longer any reality in the busi- ness. The effect of the specie circular was to restore it to reality, to prick the bubble, and, for a time to paralyze the busine3s of the coimtry. The specie circular was in no proper sense the cause of the great crash of 1837, but it certainly hastened the catastrophe. Its particular effects upon the finances of the nation, were ably shown at the time by Nicholas Biddle, in a passage which will be quoted in another place. Biddle, like most of the finan- ciers threw all the blame upon the pin which pricked the bubble, instead of the gas which inflated it. The financiers of 1857 are doing the same thing, and so will financiers continue to do, as long as we are subject to revulsions. THE BEGINNING OF THE PRESSURE. The crash of 1837 was fourteen months incoming on! As early as March 1836, money began to tighten at most of the the leading markets of the country, yet the country seemed on the topmost pinnacle of prosperity. We read in the papers of bank stock selling at 80 per cent, premium ; of railroads begun in every direction ; of universal employment for the people ; of univer- sal high prices for produce ; of advancing wages ; of new manufactories ; of new inventions ; of an overflowing spring emigration ; of the marvellous growth of western cities ; of the great prosperity of the planting interests ; and of immense importations. In the midst of all this show of success and advancement, the pressure in the money market begins. It excited little re- mark at the time, and no one dreamt of its continuance. Some papers attrib- uted it to the delay of Congress in voting the annual appropriations, and call- 18 THE PRESSURE OF 183Y. ed upon members to attend to their duties, and relieve the money market by putting the public money into circulation. There was scarcely a whisper that the pressure was any thing but temporary and accidental. CHAPTER lY. THE PROGRESS OF THE PRESSURE. By very slow degrees the pressure increased. The best way of exhibiting its gradual progress, and the little alarm it at first excited, wiU be to copy a few paragraphs from the Press of the years 1836 and 1837. From BicknelVs (Phila.) Reporter of March 20th^ 1836. " Money. — Money continues scarce — very scarce. On Saturday last, good paper was offered at one per cent, per month. The market was somewhat easier yesterday ; very Httle, however. A change for the better must soon take place. The New Yorkers and Bostonians who have been forwarding their stocks to our market for the last fortnight, and have thus been absorbing our capital, will not be permitted to do so any longer with impunity. Our capital- ists have commenced retahating on them, and the New York market will soon be, if it is not already, in as bad a condition as ours. Some think that this will not relieve us — it cannot do otherwise, however." (No hint of the true cause.) From the Baltimore Gazette^ April lOth^ 1836. "The great and apparently unaccountable delay of Congress in making the necessary appropriations for the payment of the current expenses of govern- ment, and more especially to pay the bills drawn by the distant agents and officers of the government, some of which, it is reported, have been protested — has caused very general, and, we fear, too just complaint. Some explanation is certainly due from the representatives to their constituencies for this omis- sion to pay just claims, when the treasury is full to overflowing, and money so scarce as to cause general embarrassment to almost every class of business men." (Equally in the dark.) From Niles' Register^ April 16^A, 1836. "Money seems to be very scarce, though ^aper ought to be plentiful, seeing that in the last six months there have been incorporated in the United States considerably more ih^Ln fifty millions of banking capital, and we have nearly fifty-five millions of surplus in the deposite banks. * * * The responsibili- ties of banks in the United States are six or eight times greater than their means, though all the specie in the land were gathered into their vaults — and there must be a scrabble for it ! * * * The unbounded extent of credit which we have latterly had has arisen from the fact that there was no demand for specie. It remained in the banks, only as ballast stones in the hold of a ship. But let the exchange on England a^-ance one or two per cent, and eleven-twelfths of all our banks will be deprived of their means of accommoda- tion — being also hard put to it to save themselves. A general war in Europe will bring jibout this state of things." (The Specie Circular did it instead. Mr. Niles understood the matter.) From Niks' Register of April 23c?, 1836. *'It is stated from New York that bills on England, owing to the scarcity of THE PRESSURE OF 1837. 19 money, are at five per cent, advance, that is, three and a half per cent, below the real par. * * * We have heard that the United States Bank has been required to reduce its circulation between five and six millions within a few months — and, from the doings in Congress, it seems resolved that it shall sud- denly do more. The bank can — ^but are the geople able to bear it ?" Frcym the Boston Daily Advertiser^ April 20th, 1836. " There has evidently been a great falling off in the amount of business transactions for three or four weeks past, solely on account of the scarcity of money and the difficulty with which negotiations are effected. The lowest street rates for the best notes has been, during the present week, one per cent, per month, and no doubt much has been done at a higher rate. So long as this pressure upon the very vitals of trade continues, a comparatively meagre detail of weekly operations in merchandize generally must be expected. From Mies' Register, May lUh, 1836. *' There is an awful pressure for money in most of the cities. The shavers exact their pounds of flesh." (Yet, at the same date, U. S. bank stock was quoted at 125^. The drouth was killing the early crops and injuring grain.) The congressional appropriations relieve the pressure in the money market for a few weeks (during which the scorched crops were soaked with continual rains,) when the business world were astounded by the failure and arrest of Benjamin Rathbun, of Buffalo, N. Y. From Mies* Register, August \Zth, 1836. '' Great excitement has been created in Buffalo by the failure of Benj. Rath- bun, one of the greatest speculators and business men in that region of enter- prise. Rathbun was an extensive property holder, owned a number -bf stores, employed 1200 workmen and 300 teams, and was engaged in^the erection of a large number of buildings and a splendid exchange at Buffalo, And a large hotel at Niagara Falls. His liabihties are estimated at nearly $6,000,000, and his property at $2,600,000. But the most extraordinary fact developed is, that, of the vast amount due by him, upwards of $1,500,000 is of paper with forged endorsements, which has been shaved at ruinous rates. * * * it is rumored that several banks will suffer severely by this extraordinary event, and it is certain that it will fall heavily upon individuals. But the recuperative energies of Buffalo will soon overcome the shock she has received, and the 'speculations' of Rathbun be only remembered as a caution for the future." Money was tight during the autumn, and even tighter as winter drew on ; the more timid began to be alarmed, and *a considerable number of men were thrown out of employment in consequence of the stopping of manufactories. But the country at large was still hopeful, and the failures were few. From the Providence Courier of December 1st, 1836. " The following transaction, which took place in Boston during the present week, will give some idea of the straits to which even the rich are reduced. A rich man had borrowed ten thousand dollars of an institution, which circum- stances required he should pay on a certain day. He gave his notes to one of our banks for six months on interest, and obtained notes of the bank. He then paid a broker one per cent, to get the money for him, giving these notes as security. The broker obtained the money at two and a half per cent, a month for six months. Thus eighteen hundred dollars were paid for the ten thousand for tho six months. How many can afford such sacrifices long?" 20 THE FLOUR RIOTS. From tJie iV. Y. Journal of Commerce^ December Ith^ 1836. " Notwithstanding the continuance of the pressure, Saturday passed off with- out any commercial disaster. The payments of merchants on that day are said to have been eight milHons of dollars, and not a note lay over. The opinion is gaining ground that the crisis is past, and that the money market will short- ly be easier. We hope so. On Friday, in Philadelphia, the United States Bank discounted $900,000, and the Girard Bank $300,000. Things are becom- ing easier there." From the Journal oj Commerce^ January \st^ 183Y. " On Saturday several of the banks refused to receive merchants' checks in deposit. Immense sums which are usually liquidated by entries on the books of the bank had to be drawn out in bills. The consequence was that some of the banks were exhausted of bills, although a special effort was made to keep up a supply by signing them as fast as possible. After all, in a good many cases, the teller was oblige^ to give due bills for the occasion, which were of necessity passed for money and deposited at other banks. The incident is of no consequence, except as illustrating the importance of that department of the currency called checks. They save the use of a vast amount of bank notes, and lessen immensely the dangers of bank transactions. The refusal to take checks on deposite as usual put the last strain upon the mercantile strength of the city, as it prevented all fiction in payments, and compelled every man to furnish real cash. We are happy to state that so far as we know, every man furnished the cash, and every engagement was fulfilled. The merchants have now been proved in all sorts of ways, and by quadruple power, and stood the test. We hope they may soon be relieved from further testing of their strength." THE NEW YORK FLOUR RIOTS OF 1837. In February, 1831, flour reached what was then considered the enormous price of twelve dollars a barrel, and large numbers of those whom the pressure of the times had deprived of work, were distressed in the extreme, and were in want of the necessaries of life. The rumor was started that the high price of flour was caused by a combination of dealers to hold back an adequate sup- ply from market, and a meeting was called by some arrant demagogues to de- nounce the alleged combination. What followed was thus related by the Commercial Advertiser oi Febm&Tj 14th, 1837 : At four o'clock a concourse of several thousands had convened in front of the city hall, composed, as we are assured, of the very canaille of the city, and combining within itself all the elements of outrage, riot and revolution. Moses Jaques was elected as the fitting chairman of such a meeting. But order was not the presiding genius on the occasion, and the meeting was di- vided into various groups, each of which was harangued by some chosen dem- agogue, after his own fashion and on his own account. Conspicuous among the orators was Alexander Ming, Jr., a patriot who has several times been honored as one of the candidates for the office of register in this city. Ilis discourse on the present occasion, is represented as having been less exciting and inflammatory than were those of his fellow orators, as he confined himself to the currency question — enforcing the doctrines of his colleague of reforms Colonel Benton, and advising people to discard bank notes, and receive nothing but the precious metals. At the close of his harangue, iMing introduced a set of resolutions, of the character of which, we are no further informed than that one of them proposed a memorial to the TEE FLOUR RIOTS. 21 legislature, praying a prohibition of all bank notes under one hundred dollars. The illustrious Bentonian patriot was then uplifted upon the shoulders of the sovereign mob, and borne proudly aloft over to Tammany Hall. There were other speakers, however, who came directly to the business of the meeting, and in the most exciting manner/'4enounced the landlords and the holders of flour, for the prices of rents and provision s. One of these orators, in the course of his address, after working upon the passions of his audience, until they were fitted for the work of spoil and outrage, is reported to have expressly directed the popular vengeance against Mr. Eli Hart, who is one of our most extensive flour dealers on commission. " Fellow citizens !" he exclaimed, " Mr. Ilart has now 53,000 barrels of flour in his store ; let us go and offer him eight dollars a barrel for his flour, and if he does not take it"_liere some person touched the orator on the shoulder, and he suddenly lowered his voice and finished his sentence by saying, " we shall depart from him in peace." The hint was sufficient— and a large body of the meetmg moved off in the direction of Mr. Hart's store in Washington between Dey and Courtlandt streets. The store is a very large brick building, having three wide but strong iron doors upon the street. Being apprised of the approach of the mob, the clerks secured the doors and windows, but not until the middle door had been forced and some twenty or thirty barrels of flour or more, rolled into the street, and the heads stove in. At this point of time Mr. Hart himself arrived on the ground with a posse of officers from the police. The officers were assailed by a portion of the mob in Dey street, their staves wrested from them and shivered to pieces. The number of the mob not being large at this time, the officers succeeded in entering the store, and for a short time interrupted the work of destruction. The mayor next arrived at the scene of waste and riot, and attempted to remonstraf^ with the infatuated multitude on the folly of their conduct— but to no purpose ; their numbers were rapidly increasing, and his honor was as- sailed with missiles of all sorts at hand, and with such fury that he was com- pelled to retire. Large reinforcements of the rioters having arrived, the offi- cers were driven from the field, and the store carried by assault— the first iron door torn from its hinges, being used as a battering ram against the others. The destructives at once rushed in, and the windows and doors of the lofts were broken open — and now again commenced the work of destruction. " Barrels of flour by dozens, fifties and hundreds were tumbled into the street from the doors, and thrown in rapid succession from the windows, and the heads of those which did not break in faUing were instantly staved in. Intermingled with the flour, were sacks of wheat by the hundred, which were cast into the street and their contents thrown upon the pavement. About one thousand bushels of wheat, and four or five hundred barrels of flour, were thus wantonly and foohshly, as well as wickedly destroyed. The most active of the destructionists were foreigners — indeed the greater part of the assem- blage were of exotic origin, but there were probably five hundred or a thou- sand others standing by and abetting their incendiary labors. Amidst the faUing and bursting of the barrels and sacks of wheat, numbers of women were engaged, like the crones who strip the dead in a battle, filling the boxes and baskets with which they were provided, and their aprons with flour, and making off with it. One of the destructives— a boy named James Roach- was seen upon one of the upper window sills, throwing barrel after barrel into the street, and crving out with every throw, ' here goes flour at eight dollai^ a barrel !' Early in the assault Mr. Hart's counting room was entered, his books and papers siezed and scattered to the wind. And herein probably consists his greatest loss. "Night had now closed upon the scene ; but the work qf destruction did not cease until strong bodies of the police arrived, followed soon afterward by / 22 THE GREAT CRASH OF ISSY. detachments of troops. The store was then cleared by justices Lownds and Bloodgood, and several of the rioters were arrested and despatched to Bride- well under charge of Bowyer of the poUce. On his way to the prison, he and his assistants were assailed, his coat torn from his back, and several of the prisoners were rescued. Several more, however, were afterwards cap- tured and secured. " Before the close of the proceedings at Hart's store, however, the cry of * Meech,' was raised — whereupon a detachment of the rioters crossed over to Coenties slip, for the purpose of attacking the establishment of Meech & Co., but the store of S. H. Herrick & Co, coming first in their way, they com- menced an attack upon that. The windows were first smashed in with a shower of brickbats, and the doors immediately afterward broken. Some twenty or thirty barrels of flour were then rolled into the street, and the heads of ten or a dozen knocked in. " The number of rioters engaged in this work was comparatively small, and they soon desisted from their labors, probably from an intimation that a strong body of the poHce were on their way thither. Another account is, that they were induced to desist from the work of mischief, by an assurance from the owner, that if they would spare the flour, he would give it all to the poor to-day. Be this, however, as it may, the ofiicers were promptly on the spot, and by the aid of the citizens who collected rapidly, the wretched rabble was dispersed — some thirty or forty of them having been taken and secured at the two points of action. Unfortunately, however, the ringleaders escaped, almost, if not quite, to a man." CHAPTER V. THE GREAT CRASH AT LAST. The South and Southwest were the first to give way. The Cotton interest was prostrate. The inflation of the last three years had stimulated the pro- duction of cotton to an enormous extent, and the inflation in England, by stimulating manufactures, had kept up the price of the great staple. In the spring of 1837, came the re-action. Manufactures languished. The immense crop of 183G could not be sold. Bankers and brokers who had made large advances upon that crop — advances proportioned to the recent high price of the article — were the first victims ; and in their fall they bore down with them the entire edifice of American credit. About the 15th of March, 1837, the news reached New York, that the great house of Herman, Briggs & Co., of New Orleans, cotton factors, had failed for eight millions of dollars. Before showing the effect of this news upon New York, we may mention, that within a month after the failure of Herman, Briggs & Co., the whole South-west, as though by a simultaneous and irresistible impulse, became bankrupt. In Mobile, nine-tentlis of all the mercantile firms failed. In New Orleans, every house of importance went down ; one concern owing fifteen millions of dol- lars ! The business of shipping cotton and sugar was so completely paralysed' THE CRASH IN NEW-YORK. 23 that days passed without a single transaction of any kind occurring. In a word, the great region of country depending for its resources upon the raising of cotton and sugar, was, in the space of less than four weeks, incapacitated from paying the vast suras which it owed the ijorthern cities, or any consider- able part of the same. In a business sense, for the time being, the South was prostrate and helpless ! Cotton fell, in a few days, from seventeen cents to ten cents ; sugar in about the same proportion, and tobacco was unsaleable at any price. THE CRASH IN NEW YORK. The immediate effect of the news in New York of the great failure at New Orleans was to cause the " suspension " of the then celebrated and im- portant house of J. L. & S. Joseph & Co., who were under acceptances from New Orleans to the amount of several millions of dollars. It was given out (as it always is) that the suspension would be but temporary, and that all debts would be paid with interest. It was even said that the house would re> sume on the following Monday. The suspension, however, turned out to be a most complete and disastrous failure. The house had been eaten hollow by discounters and shavers, and in a few days after the suspension, the furniture of the leading partner was sold at public auction for the benefit of the credi- tors. The failure of this house fell upon the town and country like a thunder- bolt, and from that day the grand crash began. No one yet, however, began to foresee the full extent of the danger, and the commercial papers still flatter- ed their readers from day to day that the crisis had passed^ and that in a few days all would be well again. Note the following extracts from the Journal of Commerce of March 27, 188Y (a few days after the failure of the Joseph's), and from BicknelVs Reproter of March 28th:— Fronn the Journal of Commerce^ March 27, 1887. " \% cannot be denied that people were tremrendously scared last week, and it cannot be denied that after all, they were not much hurt. Only two or three houses could not make notes or draw bills good enough to appease pub- lic anxiety — ^yet almost every note which fell due proved good. * * * Unless the screws can be turned down harder, we may as well give over look- ing for the grand crash which has been so long waited for, and which it was thought must certainly have come last week. The reason why the merchants do not fail is, first, they do not choose to, and, second, they are not obliged to. They are rich, that is the secret of the wonder, and we cannot be mis- taken in believing that this fact having been so abundantly proved, confidence will be resumed." From BicknelVs {Phila.) Reporter of March 28, 1837. " The credit of Philadelphia will not suffer in the slightest degree by the recent disasters There is no city in the Union that contains a larger body of sounder or more upright commercial men, or a greater amount of intrinsic wealth. Our banks are all perfectly safe^ pursuing the even tenor of their way within their means ; and the little storm that we have alluded to will only serve to render the enterprising a little more cautious, and, in the end, to purify the atmosphere of the money market." 24 THE CRASH IN NEW-YORK. Just so^ the commercial papers of 1857 have been talking all through the present revulsion. Just so, class papers will always flatter and delude the class which supports them. In ISS^Z, as in 1857, the New York Herald was the first of the New York papers to get an inkhng of the real nature of the crisis. It told them. as it tells now, the disagreeable truth about the matter, instead of the pleasant lie. The merchants of New York, when the panic of 1837 was getting frantic, sent a deputation to Nicholas Biddle, President of the United States Bank, (then a state institution of Pennsylvania, but retaining, in common parlance, its ancient name,) asking the help of his renowned financial genius to get them out of their difficulties. Mr. Biddle, who was still as completely in the dark respecting the nature and extent of those difficulties as the humblest scribe in his bank, replied, in effect, that, owing to certain accidental and temporary causes, private credit, for the moment, was impaired, and, in consequence, the whole system of foreign and domestic exchanges was deranged. " For this," continued the financier, " the appropriate remedy seems to be, to substitute, for the private credit of individuals, the moi'e known and established credit of the bank, until pubhc confidence in private stability has time to revive. To the foreign exchanges I would apply that restorative by issuing the engage- ments of the bank, payable in London, Paris and Amsterdam, to be remitted in lieu of private bills. These will be ready for the next packet, and they will enable the country to make without injury an early provision for the ad- justment of foreign exchanges by the natural operation of remitting its pro- duce and its coin. A similar operation I shall recommend to the board in respect to the domestic exchanges, by an enlarged and immediate purchase of bills of exchange on the distant sections of the Union." These smooth and plausible words, aided by the operations proposed, gave ', relief to the money market for the space of four days ! To show still further how utterly ignorant financial and commercial writers sometimes are of the real nature of finance and business, we copy another short passage from the Journal of Commerce of the fourth day after Mr. Magician Biddle had waved his healing wand over a paralyzed metropolis. From the Journal of Commerce, April Zd, 1837. *' The past week will long be remembered by our merchants as. a season of trial and difficulty, such as has not before been experienced for many years. It will be remembered also, we trust, as the cribis of the great financial troubles which have been gathering for more than a year past from the com- bined influence of speculation, the surplus revenue, bad government, etc. The first three days of the week were indeed gloomy ; a number of failures occur- red, chiefly, however, of houses essentially sound, but which were unable to sustain themselves under the tremendous money pressure which existed, and what was worse than all, in some of its bearings, Confidence, that essential element of credit, appeared to be entirely at an end. It was a glorious time for panic-makers, croakers, and assassins of credit, and well did they improve the opportunity afforded them. We could mention a dozen of our largest and best houses, who were reported among the fallen, but who still survive THE CRASH IN NEW-YORK. ^ ^1 25 unharmed. The temporary suspension of payments by Messrs. E. M. Morgan & Co., who were agents for 20 or 80 country banks, gave opportunity to the enemies of such institutions to propagate suspicions concerning them ; and all of these troubles were aggravated, we will ^t say wantonly aggravated, by a portion of the press. " Tihus things were proceeding, when, by a concerted movement, between the U. S. Bank and our local institutions, measures were adopted for the re- lief of the community ; and from that moment the state of the money market has been evidently improving. During the last three days, there has not been a single failure. Stocks which had been rapidly declining began to ral- ly, and confidence, though still scarce, was perceptibly gaining ground. We feel assured that these encouraging indications will continue and increase until the money market shall recover* its Uisual healthy condition." (And so on, in the same strain, for half a column.) r Yet, in^two days^ the market was down again to a lower point than ever, and a deeper glgom overspread the city than was ever known before. Read the following : — Fromthe NewYorh Transcript^ April 6, 1837. " Yesterday was a day that tried men's souls ; the money market was tighter than ever. For the first day or two it has been more so than at any time dur- ing the pressure, and should it continue to become more so, things will be brought to a focus pretty quickly, for our merchants will become discouraged and stop when they are solvent. Yesterday there were several very heavy failures, principally among our dry goods people, which class of merchants were considered the cream of New York, and have stood the high price ol money nobly, and so long, that it was thought they would weather the point, and pass the gale unharmed. The payments of the New Yord dry goods jobbing houses were very heavy during the months of April and May, and the small return of money from the South, with the tremendous quantity of \ protested paper, had driven them to despair and eventually to fail. It is es- | timated that the Southern merchants do not pay Jive cents on the dollar of which '\ they owe in New York ; and some of our large Southern houses have, for the last two or three months, paid both sides of their note book, which speaks volumes in their favor." \ • Through the whole month of April, the failures continued, and things grew worse and worse. Toward the close of the month, there was one transient gleam of sunshine afforded by the arrival of favorable news from England. At that time the three great American houses in England were Thomas Wil- son & Sons, Thomas Wilder & Co., and Timothy Wiggins, (the " Three W's.") The news was, that the Bank of England had agreed to assist, those houses to sustain the awful pressure upon them to the extent of £500,000, and that the financial pressure in England seemed to be relieved. For one day the city feebly smiled ; though on that day, many thousand laborers petitioned the Common Council for work, alleging thatiheir families were in want of food. ^ About the 25th of April, the merchants of New York, in desperation, held a meeting at the Masonic Hall, and resolved to send a committee of " not less than fifty," to Washington, to wait on the Presiden.t,and urge the immediate rescinding of the " specie circular" as the only measure of saving the country from " universal bankruptcy." *' The meeting," said the JV. Y. American^ *' was a remarkable one, for the vast number assembled — the entire decorum of 26 THE CRASH IN NEW-YORK. the proceedings — and, especially, from the deep, though subdued, and res- trained excitement, which evidently pervaded the mighty mass. It was a spectacle that could not be looked upon without emotion, that of many thou- sands of men, trembling as it were on the brink of ruin, owing to the mea- sures, as they verily believe, of their own government, which should be their friend, instead of their oppressor — and yet meeting with deliberation and calmness, listening to a narrative of their wrongs, and the causes thereof ; adopting such resolutions as were deemed judicious, and then quietly separ- ating to abide the result of their firm but respectful remonstrances." The deputation, reduced to fifteen, repq^ired to Washington, and sought an interview with the President. The wily and pohtic Van Buren refused to con- fer with them except in writing); and accordingly in entering the " presence," they merely read a statement of their case, and the petition of which they were the bearers. Mr. Van Buren, to his honor, his immortal honor, stood firm to his principles, refused to rescind the specie circular, and thus kept the federal government,- for ever, separate from the financial institutions of the people — which was the great gain to the nation of the revulsion of 1837, and it was worth the price ! ! ! No sooner was this news known than the pressure resolved itself into mere mad and blind panic. Tlie bottom was out. Here is a brief record of some of the events of the first few days of May, ISST. May 4. — John Fleming, President of the Merchants' Bank, fell dead from excessive anxiety with regard to the affairs of the bank. A run set in on all the banks. w^ May 5th. — Merchants failed by whole blocks. " It is in vain to disguise," said the iV Y. American^ " that the whole frame of society is out of joint." / May 6th. — The failures worse and worse. U. S. Bank Stock, for the first ' time in twenty years, fell below par. It was quoted to-day at 98 ; not a stock in the market brought par. \ May 'Zth. — The Dry Dock Bank, after a hard run, stopped payment. May 8th. — Steady drain on the banks. Failures too numerous to chronicle. No bank stock at par, but a few shares of Utica rail road sold at 102. , May 9th. — Furious run on all the banks — depositors and bill holders min- gling in one indiscriminate mass, all desperate to get their money. N. F American said : " The banks are all safe, as the run is ridiculous." Tliat very evening^ a meeting of bank officers was held, at which it was resolved to sus- pend specie payments the next morning. Three banks opposed the measure, namely, the Merchants', the Manhattah, and the Bank of America ; but the ' next morning, they felt compelled to suspend. May 10. — The suspension announced. The city drew a long breath, and felt relieved. At noon, a n>eeting of merchants was held at the Exchange to sustain the banks. President, James Poorman ; Vice Presidents, Nathaniel Prime, Gideon Lee, David Leavitt, P. (Gr. Stuyvcsant, Girtain C. Verplanck, William B. Astor, Urenddent Phelps, Kobort T.onnore, Sto|)hon Whitney, C. THE CRASH IN NEW-YORK. 2*7 H. Russell, Benjamin Birdsall, Joseph Defew, Andrew Lockwood, Philetus H. Woodruff, Samuel Ward ; Secretaries, John H. Stephens, Richard M. Blatch- ford, W. H. Aspinwall. The resolutions were moved by James G. King, and seconded by Nathaniel Prime. May 11th. — Chaos, bewilderment, despondency and lamentation. Three hundred firms in the city had failed. The following table shows that the suspension of specie payments through- out the country proceeded as rapidly as the mail bore the news of the sus- pension in New York : PROGRESS OF BANK SUSPENSION OF ISSt. Planter's and Agricultural Banks, Natchez; - , - - - May 4 State Bank at Montgomery, Ala., "9 New York City Banks, '* 10 Albany, Hartford, New Haven, Philadelphia, Providence, and Balti- more, "11 Mobile and Boston, "12 New Orleans (6 Banks), - - - "13 Washington, D. C, "15 Montreal, "16 Charleston, Cincinnati, and Quebec, - -- - - - -"lY State Bank of North Carolina, ------- "18 Savannah and Augusta, "19 In the crash of 183Y, stocks do not appear to have suffered the extreme fluctuations which they have experienced in IBS'/. Taking the stock of the United States Bank as a specimen, we present the following : Prices of the IT. S. Bank Stock during the crash of 1837. January 6th, March 19th, (( 29th, May 2d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 116 May 11th, 103 (UticaR. R. 113.) 119 (( 12th, 104 118 u 13th, 110 111 u 15th, 110 108 .( 18th, 109J 102 a 19th, 111 98 C( 23d, lOH 96 a 26th, 103 96 a 31st, 101 100 Nov. 24th, 121 " 10th, (suspension,) 100 CONTRACTION OF DISCOUNTS AND CIRCULATION, The following statement was furnished by the Bank Commissioners for the purpose of showing the general condition of the banks in May, as compared with their condition on the 1st of January, 1837 ; 28 HARD CASH AT THE CUSTOM HOUSE. Eighteen New York City Banks. 1st January. 4th May. Loans and Discounts, - - - - 36,442,000 35,685,000 Specie, 3,854,000 2,596,000 Circulation, 8,155,000 4,931,000 Individual Deposites, - - . - 11,180,000 9,536,000 United States " ... - 7,176,000 3,800,000 Sixty-Three Country Banks. 1st January. 4tli May. '"'} Loans and Discounts, . - - - 26,979,000 26,822,000 Specie, 1,459,000 1,100,000 Circulation, 12,461,000 9,601,000 Thus, the City banks had reduced their discounts about $800,000, and their circidation three millions and a quarter I HARD CASH AT THE CUSTOM HOUSE. The government having decreed that nothing but specie should be received at the Custom House, the merchants were so extremely inconvenienced that the Collector, Samuel Swartwout, went to Washington to endeavor to obtain some mitigation of the difficulty. On his return, a meeting of merchants con- vened to hear his report. The New York American says : — " A meeting of merchants, convened to hear the report of the Collector on his return from "Washington, was held at one o'clock at the Exchange. Mr. Swartwout, on presenting himself, was loudly cheered. He stated, that im- mediately on receiving the order requiring specie payments, on Saturday, convinced of the impractibility of enforcing it, he started for Washington to represent the case to the Government. " The Secretary and President both expressed great sympathy with the mer- chants, but the former exhibited the law, which forbade, as he said, any other course. No order, other than that given, could be issued — nor could that be withdrawn. On a suggestion from the Collector, that permission might be given to delay acting on that order, it was replied that such permission would virtually be an infringement of the law, but that in the meantime, the Execu- tive would seek to devise any means which, in addition to an early'call of Congress, might tend to alleviate the sufferings of the country. Mr. S. then added, that as no discretion could be exercised by the Department at Wash- ington, nor authorized in the Collector, he had determined to throw himself on the merchants, on Congress, and on his country, for his justification in con- tinuing to take, until after the meeting of Congress, current notes in payment of duties and bonds. This annunciation was received with deafening cheers, in the midst of which, Mr.f Swartwout left the Exchange. The meeting was then organized, James G. King being called to the chair, and J. A. Stevens appointed Secretary ; when, on motion of Daniel Jackson, seconded by , it was resolved, that the Chairman and Secretary, together with the mover and seconder, be a committee to address, in the name of the meeting, a letter of thanks to Mr. Swartwout for his manly conduct. THE TROUBLES OF A TRAVELLER. The currency being totally deranged, travellers were put to strange shifts. THE TROUBLES OF A TRAVELLER. ' 29 The following narrative appeared in the papers a few days after the suspen- " I left New York on Thursday and anticipating some trouble in passing Utica money, obtained two five dollar New Jei^ey bills, from my obliging friend and kind host, Mr. Bunker. I was able to get over to Philadelphia very well, and received silver to the amount of $1 50, in exchange for one of my bills. I was able to pay my bill in Philadelphia with that and other silver, and had one dollar in specie remaining when I went on board the steamboat for New York. I immediately offered my New Jersey five dollar note, which was refused, and I was informed that no money would be received except specie, and notes of the Philadelphia and New York banks. Whilst this con- versation was going on, a gentleman from Troy offered a five dollar note of the Troy City Bank ; he was promptly told that no Safety Fund notes would be received. As we had^ no Philadelphia or New York City money, we were in some trouble, as it was early in the morning and no broker could be found. We made up our minds to go on at any rate. After we had ascended the Delaware a few miles, we went to the captain and stated our case ; he seemed somewhat provoked that we had come on, for he said he had heard the young man tell us that our money would not be received. He finally, however, con- sented to take my New Jersey five dollar note, if we could muster one dollar in silver, and give us two tickets for our passage. I stated to him that I wanted breakfast, as did also the Troy gentleman ; he said he could not help that. I took therefore two tickets, amounting to six dollars, having just one dollar in silver, and we were compelled to go without our breakfasts. Fortunately, the gentleman from Troy had a shilling and three cents in specie, with which he purchased some gingerbread and apples, which we divided between us, and thus we got back to New York. The Troy gentleman could only pay me in a three dollar Vermont bill, and I had no other bills less than five dol- lars. On my passage up the North River, I paid away this three dollar Ver- mont bill, and took two supper tickets, in order to make change. Thus, in the end, although I had no breakfast, I became entitled to two suppers." THE JOKES OF THE CEASH OF 1831. From the iV Y. Sun. W " During the performance of Brutus at the National Theatre, a gentleman asked his comrade what was the meaning of the letters S. P. Q. R., on the banners. * Why, the meaning is plain enough, Tom,' replied his friend, * it means Specie Payment Quite Rare !'"^ From the Baltimore Gazette. p" A market man at Lowell, Mass., being like every one else, bothered for change, has hit upon a new expedient. With his marketables, he carries a basket from which he makes change^in hens' eggs. Now, unless the Legisla- ture, like some other wise bodies, should enact a penalty ' for issues of so small a denomination,' we don't see why the Lowell man will not get along very well." From the JS^. Y. Commercial Advertiser. " The * egg currency' is certainly better and more convenient than that of ] some countries we wot of — Texas for instance, where th'ey pay in cows for I large sums, and throw in the calves for the change." . HARD TIMES FOR FIVE YEARS. Ten days after the banks of New York had suspended specie payments, Gov. Marcy signed a bill legalizing the suspension, and authorizing the banks 80 HARD TIMES FOR FIVE YEARS. of the state to issue twenty-nine and a half millions of paper. To provide a circulating medium, " shinplasters " were issued in millions. The crops of 183Y were, fortunately, abundant, but during the winter of 1838, there was extreme suffering among the poor, owing to the scarcity of employment. In the life of Horace Greeley, we find the following notice of that dreadful winter. "The winter of 1838 was unusually severe. The times were hard, fuel and food were dear, many thousands of men and women were out of employment, and there was general distress. As the cold months wore slowly on, the sufferings of the poor became so aofgravated, and the number of the unemploy- ed increased to such a degree, that the ordinary means were inadequate to re- lieve even those who were destitute of every one of the necessaries of life. Some died of starvation. Some were frozen to death. Many, through ex- posure and privation, contracted fatal diseases. A large number who had never before known want, were reduced to beg.^ Respectable mechanics were known to offer their services as waiters in eating houses for their food only. There never had been such a time of suffering in New York before, and there has not been since. Extraordinary measures were taken by the comfortable classes to alleviate the sufferings of their unfortunate fellow cit- izens. Meetings were held, subscriptions were made, committees were ap- pointed; and upon one of the committees Horace Greeley was named to serve, and did serve, faithfully and laboriously, for many weeks. The dis- trict which his committee had in charge was the Sixth Ward, the ' bloody ' Sixth, the squalid, poverty stricken Sixth, the pool into which all that is worst in this metropolis has a tendency to reel and slide. It was his task, and that of his colleagues, to see that no one froze or starved in that forlorn and pol- luted region. More than this they could not do, for the subscriptions, liberal as they were, were not more than sufficient to relieve actual and pressing distress. In the better parts of the Sixth Ward a large number of mechanics lived, whose cry was, not for the bread and the fuel ofcharisy, but for Work! Charity their honest souls disdained. Its food choked them, its fire chilled them. Work, give us work ! was their eager, passionate demand. The spring brought relief, but the business of the country remained stag- nant and disordered till 1842. The year 1841 was perhaps the gloomiest of all. The failure of the United States' Bank, in consequence of its ill-judged, but well-meant endeavors to sustain the cotton interest, brought ruin upon thousands, and depressed business to the lowest point. In 1841, more than 3000 houses in Philadelphia stood vacant. But it was darkest just before the dawn of better times. In 1842, the long period of enforced economy on the part of the people, aided by the stimulating tariff of that year, and the hopes infused by a new administration, began to give tone to the body pohtic. From 1842 to 185*7, the country enjoyed great apparent, and some real, pros- perity. The New York banks resumed specie payment in May 1838, but it was not till 1842, that the resumption became general and permanent. Phila- delphia resumed and suspended three times before her final resumption in that year. OPINIONS ON THE CAUSE OF THE REVULSION. 81 CHAPTER VI. OPINIONS RESPECTING THE CAUSE OF THE REVULSION. It is curious to notice how blind many otherwise clear-headed persons were to the true causes of the difficulty of 183Y, or what contradictory opinions were expressed on every hand. OPINION OF THE WHIG PARTr AS EXPRESSED IN THE N. Y. AMERICAN. From the N. Y. Aynerican^ May 5, 1837. " When the cause of our calamities is traced mainly to. misgovernment, we hear it said, ' Oh, for God's sake, do not make this a political matter.' Not make it a political matter? Why,- it is from politics, base, vile, mercenary, personal politics, that the evil is Avhat it is. It is to the fatal popularity of Andrew Jackson, which gave currency to every mearjare that the corruption or resentments of his irresponsible minions and flatterers suggested to him — it is to the dishonorable sycophancy which thought it 'glory enough' to serve under, and render unquestioning obedience to such a chief, that the over- whelming ruin which is desolating this land is, in a large degree, to be ascribed. " True, there has been overtrading — true, there has beei; expansion of the currency — true, there has been a wild spirit of speculation — but all these would have been moderated, controlled, and rendered kss disastrous, if the balance-wheel of our whole monetary system, the Bank of the United States, had not been broken, and if that scarcely less mischievous measure, the forced introduction from Europe to which we were and are in debt, of its specie treasures, had not boen undertaken." THE OPINION OF PRESIDENT VAN BUREN. The extra session of Congress, called to devise measures of relief, began on the fourth of September, 1837. The President's Message was looked for with the most intense interest. Mr. Van Buren gave the following opinion of the causes of the total prostration of credit: — " The history of trade in the United States for the last three or four years, affords the most convincing evidence that our present condition is chiefly to be attributed to overaction in all the departments of business ; an overaction deriving, perhaps, its first impulses from antecedent causes, but stimulated to its destructive consequences by excessive issues of bank paper, and by other facilities for the acquisition and enlargement of credit. At the commence- ment of the year 1834 the banking capital of the United States, including that of the national bank then existing, amounted to about two hundred mil- lions of dollars ; the bank notes then in circulation, to about ninety-five mil- lions ; and the loans and discounts of the banks to three hundred and twenty- four millions. Between that time and the first of January, 1838, being the latest period to which accurate accounts have been received, our banking capital was increased to more than two hundred and fifty-one milHons ; our paper circulation to more than one hundred and forty millions ; and the loans and discounts to more than four hundred and fifty-seven miUions. To this vast increase are to be added the many millions of credit, acquired by means of foreign loans, contracted by the States and State institutions, and above all by the lavish accommodations extended by foreign dealers to our merchants. " The consequences of this redundancy of credit and of the spirit of reck- less speculation engendered by it, were, a foreign debt contracted by our citi- 82 THE OPINION OFcrEESIDENT|VAN BUREN. ; zens, estimated, in March last, at more than thirty millions of dollars; the extension to traders in the interior of our country, of credits for supplies, greatly beyond the wants of the people ; the inyestment of thirty-nine and a half millions of dollars in unproductirve pubhc lands, in the years 1885 and 1836, -whilst, in the preceding year the eales amounted to only four and a half millions ; the creation of debts, to an almost countless amount, for real estate in existing or anticipated cities and villag«es, equally unproductive, and at prices now seen to have been greatly disproportionate to their real value ; the expenditure of immense sums in improvements which, in many cases, have been found to be ruinously improvident ; the diversion to other pursuits of much of the labor that should have been applied to agriculture, thereby con- tributing to the expenditure of large sums in the importation of grain from Europe — an expenditure which, amounting in 1834 to about two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, was, in the first two quarters of the present year, in- creased to more than two milHons of dollars ; and finally, without enumerat- ing other injurious results, the rapid growth among all classes, and especially in our great commercial towns, of luxurious habits, founded too often on merely fancied wealth, and detrimental aUke to the industry, the resources, and the morals of our people. " It was so impossible that such a state of things could long continue, that the prospect of revulsion was present to the minds of considerate men before it actually came. None, however, had correctly anticipated its severity. A concurrence of circumstances, inadequate of themselves to produce such wide- spread and calamitous embarrassments, tended so greatly to aggravate them, that they cannot be overlooked in considering their history. Among these may be mentioned, as most prominent, the great los5 of capital sustained by our commercial emporium in the fire of December, 1885 — a loss, the effects of which were underrated at the time, because postponed for a season by the great facilities of credit then existing ; the disturbing effects, in our commer- cial cities, of the transfers of the public moneys required by the deposite law of June, 1836 ; and the measures adopted by the foreign creditors of our merchants to reduce their debts, and to withdraw from the United States a large portion of our specie. " However unwilling any of our citizens may heretofore have been to as- sign to these causes the chief instrumentality in producing the present state of things, the developments subsequently made, and the actual condition of other commercial countries, must, as it seems to me, dispel all remaining doubts upon the subject. It has since appeared that evils, similar to those suffered by ourselves, have been experienced in Great Britain, on the conti- nent, andi indeed, throughout the commercial world ; and that, in other coun- tries, as well as in our own, the^ have been uniformly preceded by an undue enlargement of the boundaries of trade, prompted, as with us, by unprece- dented expansions of the systems of credit. A reference to the amount of banking capital, and the issues of paper credits put in circulation in Great Britain, by banks, and in other ways, during the years 1834, 1836, and 1886, will show an augmentation of the paper currency there, as much tlispropor- tioned to the real wants of trade as in the United States. Wilh this redun- dancy of the paper currency, there arose in that country also a spirit of ad- venturous speculation, embracing the whole range of human enterprise. Aid was profusely given to projected improvements ; large investments were made in foreign stocks and loans ; credits for goods were granted with unbounded liberality to merchants in foreign countries, and all the means of acquiring and employing credit were put in active operation, and extended in their ef- fects to every department of business, and to every quarter of the globe. The reaction was proportioned in its violence to the extraordinary character of the events which preceded it. The commercial community of Great Britain were subjected to the greatest difficulties, and their debtors in this country were THE OPINION OF NICHOLAS BIDDLE. 83 not only suddenly deprived of accustomed and experienced credits, but called upon for payments, which in the actual posture of things here, could only be made through a general pressure, and at the most ruinous sacrifices. " In view of these facts, it would seem impossible for sincere inquirers after truth to resist the conviction that the causes of the revulsion in both countries have been substantially the same. Two nations, the most commercial in the world, enjoying but recently the highest degree of apparent prosperity, and maintaining with each other the closest relations, are suddenly, in a time of profound peace, and without any great national disaster, arrested in their career, and plunged into a state of embarrassment and distress. In both countries we have witnessed the same redundancy of paper money, and other facilities of credit; the same spirit of speculation ; the same partial successes; the same difficulties and reverses, and, at length, nearly the same overwhelm- ing catastrophe." THE OPINION OF NICHOLAS BIDDLE ON THE EFFECTS OF REQUIRING THE PUBLIC LAND TO BE PAID FOR IN HARD CASH. ** The whole pecuniary system of this country, that to which, next to its freedom, it owes its prosperity, is the system of credit. Our ancestors came here without money — but with far better things — with courage and industry — and the want of capital was supplied by their mutual confidence. This is the basis of our whole commercial and internal industry. The government re- ceived its duties on credi*, and sold its lands on credit. When the sales of lands on credit became inconvenient from the complication of accounts, the lands were sold for what is termed cash. But this was only another form of credit, for the banks, by lending to those who purchased lands, took the place of the government as creditors — and the government received their notes as equivalent to specie, because always convertible into specie. This was the usage — this may be regarded as the law of the country. By the resolution of Congress passed on the 30th of April, 1816, it was declared that " no duties, taxes, debts, or sums of money, accruing or becoming payable to the United States as aforesaid, ought to be collected or received otherwise than in the legal currency of the United States, or treasury notes, or notes of the Bank of the United States, or in notes of banks which are payable and paid on de- mand in the said legal currency of the United States." " This resolution presents various alternatives — the legal currency — or trea- sury notes — or notes of the Bank of the United States — or notes %i specie paying banks. A citizen had a right to choose any one of these modes of payment. He had as much right to pay for land with the note of a specie paying bank, as to pay it for duties at the custom house. If this be denied, certainly any one of them might be accepted by the treasury — but to prescribe all but one — to refuse everything but the most difficult thing — to do this without notice of the approaching change in the fundamen- tal system of our dealings — is an act of gratuitous oppression. " Under the operation of this resolution, the banks had gone on, fearing no- thing, as they only had to provide for the usual specie calls upon them — and saw the country full of specie, with no foreign demand to drain it from them — when, on a sudden, without any intimation of the coming shock, an order was issued by the secretary, declaring that their notes were no longer receivable, and, of course, inviting all who held the notes, or had deposits in these banks, to convert them into specie. It in fact, made at once the whole amount of their circulation and private deposits a specie demand upon them. The first consequence was that the banks nearest the land offices ceased making loans. The next was, that they strove to fortify themselves by accumulating specie. It was just at this moment that the warrants for transfers were put into their liandn. The combination of the two measures produced a double result — first. / 84 THE OPINION OF ^flCHOLAS BIDDLE. t) require the banks generally to increase their specie, and next, to give them the means of doing it by drafts on the deposite banks. The commercial com- mmiity were thus taken by surprise. The interior banks making no loans, and converting their Atlantic funds into specie, the debtors in the inte- rior could make no remittances to the merchants in the Atlantic cities, who are thus thrown for support on the banks of those cities, at a moment when they are unable to afford relief on account of the very abstraction of their specie to the West. The creditor States not only receive no money, but their money is carried aw^ay to the debtor States, who, in turn, cannot use it, either to pay old engagements, or contract new. By this unnatural process, the specie of New York and the other commercial cities is piled up in the West- ern States — not circulated, not used, but held as a defence against the trea- sury — and while the West cannot use it, the East is suffering for the want of it. The result is, that the commercial intercourse between the West and the Atlantic is almost wholly suspended, and the few operations which are made are burdened with the most extravagant expense. In November, 1836, the money has risen to twenty-four per cent. — merchants are struggling to preserve their credit by ruinous sacrifices — and it costs -five or six times as much to transmit funds from the West and South West, as it did in November, 1835, or 34, or 82. Thus while the exchanges with all the world are in our favor — while Europe is alarmed, and the bank of England itself uneasy at the quan- tity of specie we possess — we are suffering because from mere mismanage- ment, the whole ballast of the currency is shifted from one side of the vessel to the other. In the absence of good reasons for these 'measures, and as a pre- text for them, it is said that the country has over-traded — that the banks have over issued, and that the purchasers of public lands have been very ex- travagant. I am not struck by the truth or propriety of these complaints. The phrase of overtrading is very convenient, but not very intelligible. If it means anything, it means that our dealings with other countries have brought us in debt to those countries. In that case the exchange turns against our country, and is rectified by an exportation of specie or stocks in the first in- stance — and then by reducing the imports to the exports. Now, the fact is, that at this moment, the exchanges are all in favor of this country — that is, you can buy a bill of exchange on a foreign country cheaper than you can send specie to that country. Accordingly much specie has come in — none goes out. This, too, at a moment when the exchange for the last crop is ex- hausted, and that of the new crop has not yet come into the market — and when we are on*the point of sending to Europe the produce of the country to the amount of eighty or one hundred millions of dollars. How, then, has the •country overtraded? Exchange with all the world is in favor of New York. How then can New York be an overtrader ? Her merchants have sold goods to the merchants of the interior, who are willing to pay, and under ordinary circumstances able to pay — but by the mere fault of the government, as obvious as if an earthquake had swallowed them up , their debtors are disabled from making immediate payment. It is not that the Atlantic merchants have sold too many goods, but that the government prevents their receiving pay for any. Moreover, in the commercial cities money can be had, though at ex- travagant rates, for capitalists add to the ordinary charges for the use of it a high insurance against the loss of it. It is not then so much that money is not to be procured, as that doubt and alarm increase the hazard of lending it. *' Then as to the banks. It is quite probable that many of the banks have extended their issues — but whose fault is it ? Who called these banks into existence ? The executive. Who tempted and goaded them to these issues ? Undoubtedly the executive. The country five years ago, was in possession of the most beautiful machinery of currency and exchanges that the world ever saw. It consisted of a number of banks protected, and at the same time restrained by the bank of the United States. THE OPINION OF NICHOLAS BIDDLE. 35 "The people of the United States, through their representatives, re-charter- *ed that institution. But the executive, discontented with its independence, rejected the act of Congress — and the favorite topic of declamation was, that the states would make banks, and that these banks would create a better system of currency and exchanges. The states accordingly made banks — and then followed idle parades about the loa'n^ of these banks, and their en- larged dealings in exchange. And what is the consequence ? The Bank of the United States has not ceased to exist more than seven months, and al- ready the whole currency and exchanges are running into inextricable confu- sion, and the industry of the country is burdened with extravagant charges on all the commercial intercourse of the Union. And now when these banks have been created by the Executive, and urged into these excesses, instead of gentle fand gradual remedies, a fierce crusade is raised against them — the funds are harshly and suddenly taken from them, and they are forced to ex- traordinary means of defence against the very power which brought them into being. They received, and were expected to receive, in payment for the government, the notes of each other, and the notes of other banks, and the facihty with which they done so, was a ground of special commendation by the government. And now that government has let loose upon them a de- mand for specie to the whole amount of these notes. I go further. There is an outcry abroad, raised by faction, and echoed by folly, against the banks in the United States. Until it was disturbed by the government, the banking system of the United States was at least as good as that of any other com- mercial country. What was desired for its perfection was precisely what I have so long striven to accomplish — to widen the metallic bases of the cur- rency by a greater infusion of coin into the smaller channels of circulation. This was in a gradual and judicious train of accomphshment. But this miser- able foolery about an exclusively metallic currency, is quite as absurd as to discard the steamboats, and go back to poling up the Mi^^sissippi. Banks may often err from want of skill, and occasionally be as injurious as steam is — ^but it is not the less true, that the banks of this country have been the great in- struments of its improvement, and that, during all the convulsions of the last fifteen years, for every American bank that has failed, at least ten English banks have failed. So with regard to the lands. For the last few years, the amount of the sales of the pubhc lands has been a constant theme of congrat- ulation with the Executive. In the very last message, on the 12th of Decem- ber, 1835, he repeats the same strain. ' Among the evidences of the increasing prosperity of the country^ not the least gratifying is that afforded by the re- ceipts of the public lands^ which amount in the present year to eleven millions of dollars. This circwnstance attests the rapidity with which agriculture^ the first and most important occupation of man^ advanced^ and contributes to the wealth and power of our extended territory ^ In the same message he declared that the circulating medium has been greatly improved. By the use of the State banks, it is ascertained that all the ivants of the community in relation to exohange and currency are supplied as well as they have ever been before? Scarcely seven months elapse when these pastoral and financial visions di- aolve in air. Agriculture ceases to be ' the first and most important occupa- tion of man,' the State banks cease to be the models of exchange and cur- rency — but forth issues the secretary with a declaration that to protect the treasury ' from frauds, speculation, and monopolies in the purchase of public lands,' — from 'excessive bank credits' — from 'ruinous extensions of bank issues' — nothing shall be received for land but gold and silver. " " Now what an exhibition is this ? " The public lands are exposed to public auction, the prices reduced in order to encourage sales, and the President stands by, exulting at the amount, when suddenly he declares that he will permit no speculations, and that he will raise the price of the lands, by raising the price of what alone he will receivcfor 36 - DANIEL WEBSTER^S OPINION, them. Now, supposing it true that men have bought too much land. What right has the President to dictate to the citizens of this country whether they buy too much land, or too much broadcloth ? They might be permitted to know and to manage their own concerns, quite as well as he does, leaving the evil, if it be one, to correct itself by its own excess. If he prohibits the re- ceipt of anything but specie to correct land speculations, he may make the same prohibition as to the duties on hardware, or broadcloth, or wines, when- ever his paternal wisdom shall see us buying too many shovels, or too many coats, or too much champaigne — and this brings the entire industry of the country under his control." DANIEL Webster's opinion. From a Speech delivered at Wheelmg^ Va. {about) May 20, 183Y. " I travel, gentlemen, for the purpose of seeing the country, and of seeing what constitutes the important part of every country — the people. I find everywhere much to excite, and much to gratify admiration, and the pleasure I experience is only diminished by remembering the unparalleled state of dis- tress which I have left behind me, and the apprehensions, rather than the feeling, of severe evils which I find to exist wherever I go. " I cannot enable those who have not witnessed it, to comprehend the full extent of the suffering in the eastern cities. It was painful, indeed, to behold it. So many bankruptcies among great and small dealers, so much property sacrificed, so many industrious men altogether broken up in their business, so many families reduced from competence to want. So many hopes crushed, BO many happy prospects forever clouded, and such a fearful looking for still greater calamities, all form such a mass of evil as I had never expected to see, except as the result of war, of pestilence, or some other external calamity. " I have no wish, in the present state of things, nor should I have, indeed, if the state of things were different, to obtrude the expression of my pohtical sentiments upon such of my fellow-citizens as I may happen to meet, nor, on the other hand, have I any motive for concealing them, or suppressing their expression, whenever others desire that I should make them known. Indeed, on the great topics that now engage public attention, I hope I may flatter myself that my opinions are already known. '* Recent evils have not at all surprised me, except that they have come eooner and faster than I had anticipated. But, though not surprised, I am afflicted ; I feel anything but pleasure in this early fulfilment of my own pre- dictions. Much injury is done which the wisest future counsels can never repair, and much more that can never be remedied but by such counsels, and by the lapse of time. From 1832 to the present moment, I have foreseen this result. I may safely say I have foreseen it, because I have presented and proclaimed its approach in every important discussion and debate in the public body of which I am a member. In 1S32 I happened to meet with a citizen of Wheeling, now present, v.ho has this day ivuiinded meof what I then anticipated as the result of the measures which the administration ap- peared to be forming with regard to the currency. In the summer of 1833, 1 was here, and suggested to friends what I knew to be resolved upon by the executive, namely, the removal of the dcposites, which was announced two months afierward. That was the avowed and declared commencement of the * Experiment.'' You know, gentlemen, the obloquy then and since cast upon those of us who opposed the ''Experiment'' You know that we have been called b.xnk agents, bank advocaters, banlv hirelings. You know that it lias been a thousand times said that the Ex[)eriHient worked admirably, that no- Ihing could be better, that it was the highest ]>ossible evidence of the practi- Ci.l wisdom and F[i{:neily of its contrivers; n\n\ none opiKi^-cd il, dv di.'ubted DANIEL WEBSTER'S OPINION. Sl its eJSiciency, but the wicked or the stupid. Well, gentlemen, here is the end, if this is the end, of this notable '■ Experiment.' Its singular wisdom has come to this — its fine workings have wrought out an almost general bankruptcy. *' Its lofty promises, its grandeur, its flashes, that threw other men'c sense and understanding back into the shade — wheje are they now ? Here is ' the fine of fines, and the recovery of recoveries.' Its panics, its scoffs, its jeers, its jests, its jibes at all former experience, its cry of a * new poUcy,' which was so much to dehght and astonish mankind. To this conclusion has it come at last. * But yesterday, it stood against the world ; Now lies it there, and none so poor to do it reverence.' " It is with no feehngs of boasting or triumph, it is with no disposition to arrogate superior wisdom or discernment, but it is with mortification, with humiliation, with unaffeeted grief and affliction, that I contemplate the con- dition of difficulty and distress to which this country, so vigorous, so great, so enterprising, and so rich in internal wealth, has been brought by the policy of her government. " We learn, to-day, that most of the eastern banks have stopped payment — deposite banks as well as others. The Experiment has exploded. That bubble which so many of us have all along considered as the offspring of con- ceit, presumption, and political quackery, has burst. A general suspension must be the result — a result which has come even sooner than was predicted. Where is now that better currency that was promised ? Where is that specie circulation ? Where are those rupees of gold and silver which were to fill the treasury of the government, as well as the pockets of the people ? Has the government a single hard dollar? Has the treasury anything in the world but credit and deposites in banks that have already suspended specie payments? How are pubhc creditors now to be paid in specie ? How are the deposites which the law requires to be made with the States on the first of July, now to be paid ? We must go back to the beginning and take a new start. Every step in our financial and banking system, since 1832, has been a false step. It has been a step which has conducted us farther and farther from the path of safety. . "The discontinuance of the National Bank, the illegal removal of the de- posites, the accumulation of the pubhc revenue in banks selected by the ex- ecutive, and for a long time subjected to no legal regulation or restraint, and finally the unauthorized and illegal treasury order, have brought us where we are. The destruction of the National Bank was the signal for the creation of an unprecedented number of new State banks. Some of them with more disproportionate, and even more nominal capital, than the National Bank had possessed. These banks lying under no restraint from the general govern- ment or any of its institutions, issued paper corresponding to their own sense of their immediate interests and hopes of gain. The deposite with tlie State banks of the whole public revenue, then accumulated to a vast amount, and making this deposite without any legal restraint or control whatever, increased both the power and disposition of the banks for extensive issue. In fact, the government seems to have administered every possible provocation to the banks to induce them to extend their circulation. It uniformly, zealously and successfully opposed the land bill, a most useful measure, by which accu^ mulation in the treasury would have been prevented ; and, as if it desired and sought this accumulation, it finally resisted, with all its power, the deposite among the States. It is advanced as a reason for the present overthrow, that an extraordinary spirit of speculation has gone abroad, and has Ijeen mani- fested, particularly and strongly in the endeavor to purchase the public land ; but lias not every act of the government directly encouraged this spirit? It 38 DANIEL WEBSTER'S OPINION, accumulated revenue which it did not need, all of which it left in the deposite banks. The banks had money to lend, and there were those w^lio were ready to borrow for the purpose of purchasing lands at government prices. The public treasury was thus made the great and efficient means of affecting those purchases which have since been so much denounced as extravagant specula- tion and extensive monopoly. These purchasers borrowed the public money ; they used the public money to buy the pubHc property ; they speculated on the strength of the public money ; and while all this was going on, and every man saw it, the administration resisted to the utmost of its powder every at- tempt to withdraw this money from the banks and from the hands of those speculators, and distribute it among the people to whom it belonged. If there has been overtrading, the government has encouraged it ; if there has been rash speculation in the public lands, the government has furnished the means out of the treasury. These unprecedented sales of the public domain were boasted of as a proof of a happy state of things, and of a wise administration of the government, down to the moment when Congress, in opposition to ex- ecutive wishes, passed the distribution law, thus withdrawing the surplus re- venue from the deposite banks. The success of that measure compelled a change in the executive policy, as the accumulation of a vast amounfi of money in the treasury was no longer desirable. This is the most favorable motive to which I can ascribe the treasury order of July. It is now said that that order was issued for the purpose of enforcing a strict execution of the law which forbids the allowance of credits upon purchasers of the public lands, but there was no such credit allowed before ; not an hour was given beyond the time of sale. "In this respect, the order produces no differences whatever. Its only effect is to require an immediate payment in specie ; whereas, before, an imme- diate payment in the bills of specie-paying banks was demanded. There was no more credit in the one case than in the other • and the government gets just as much specie in the one case as in the other ; for no sooner is the specie, which the purchaser is compelled to procure (often at great charge) paid to the receiver, than it is sent to the deposite banks, and the govern- ment has credit for it on the books of the bank ; but the specie itself has been again sold by the bank, or disposed of as it sees fit. It is evident that the government gets nothing by all this, though the purchaser, and especially the purchaser of small tracts, are put to great trouble and expense. No one gains anything but the bankers and the brokers. It is, moreover, most true, that the art of man could not have devised a plan more effectually to give the large purchasers or speculators a decided preference and advantage over small purchasers who purchase for actual settlement, than the treasury order of July, 1836. The stoppage of the banks, however, has now placed the ac- tual settler in a still more unfortunate situation. How is he to get money to pay for his quarter section ? He must travel three or four times as many miles for it as he has dollars to pay, even if he should be able to obtain it at the end of that journey. " I will not say that other causes, both at home and abroad, have not had in agency in bringing about the present derangement. I know that credits have been used beyond all former example ; that it is probable the spirit of trade has been too highly excited; that the pursuit of business may have been pressed too fast, and too far. All this I am ready to admit. But, in- stead of doing anything to abate its tendency, our government has been the prime instrunjent of fostering and encouraging it. It has jnirtcd voluntarily,- and by advice, with all control over the actual currency of the country. It has given a free and full scope to the spirit of banking. It has aided the spirit of speculation with the public treasure ; and it has done all this in the midst of loud-sounding promises of an exclusive specie medium, and a pro- fessed detestation of all banking institutions." PANIC AND REVULSION OF 185Y. CHAPTER YII. PANIC AND REVULSIOIir OF 185t. The revulsion from which we are still suffering has been remarkable for its suddenness and severity. On the 23d of August last, the country to all appearance, was in a state of high and general prosperity. The- Fall business had opened well ; in some branches of business, dealers had done as much as they chose to do. Merchants were returning from the watering-places in excellent spirits, without a surmise of disaster. Pleasure-seekers were coming to the metropoUs in crowds to par- take of the rich banquet of delights which the caterers for the public amuse- ment had provided for the opening season. The harvest of grain and grass then fully garnered, was superabundant ; and, though Indian corn was late, yet there was little doubt of its ultimate safety in all the states south of New England. The great staples of the South were in active demand at remuner- ating prices. The manufacturing interests of the North were under a cloud, it is true, but they had long been in that condition, and it excited liitle remark. The shipping interest, since the termination of the Crimean war, had been scarcely paying its way ; but that, too, was an old story. In short, the whole country, on the morning of the last 24th of August, felt satisfied with itself and confident of its future. The following are the prices at which some of the leading stocks were sold at the New York Stock Exchange on that day : — N. Y. Central, 11^ ; Erie, 28 ; Reading, 66 ; Michigan Central, 16 J ; Panama, 90; Illinois Central, 106 ; Dela- ware and Hudson Canal, 114^; Park Bank, 102; American Exchange Bank, 110. We now present the subsequent events in the form of a brief DIARY OF DISASTER. Aug. 24th, 1857. — Failure of the Ohio Life and Trust Company was an- nounced. A few days before, its stock had sold at 102, and it had declared a semi-annual dividend of 5 per cent. The failure astounded the street, and gave a shock to Confidence from which it has not yet begun to recover. This was the beginning disaster. Aug. 25th.— John Thompson failed. The Habilities of the Ohio Life and Trust Company were found to be, at least, five millions, a large part of which were held by New York banks. Increased alarm and distrust. All stocks fell from three to seven per cent. N. Y. Central, 72 ; Erie 22 ; Panama, 86 ; Ilhnois Central, 104. Aug. 26th.— Failure of seven country banks announced. Increasing scarci- ty of money. Further decline in stocks. N. Y. Central, 71 ; Erie, 20; Read- ing, 5