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 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 GIFT OF 
 
 Kate Gordon Moore
 
 PRAGMATISM AND THE 
 PROBLEM OF THE IDEA
 
 Imptimi I^otest 
 
 REMIGIUS LAFORT, S.T.D. 
 
 Librorum Censor 
 
 Peekskill, N.Y. 
 
 April 21, 19 1 5
 
 PRAGMATISM 
 
 AND THE 
 
 PROBLEM OF THE IDEA 
 
 BY THE 
 
 Rev. JOHN T. DRISCOLL, S.T.L. 
 
 AUTHOR OF 
 
 Christian Philosophy : The Soul, and 
 Christian Philosophy : God, etc. 
 
 LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 
 
 FOURTH AVENUE 6* 30TH STREET, NEW YORK 
 LONDON, BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, AND MADRAS 
 
 I915
 
 COPYRIGHT, 1915 
 BY LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
 
 3 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 The present volume is the result of studies 
 carried on for some years in an endeavor to show 
 that the most recent Theory of Philosophy known 
 as Pragmatism rests upon an erroneous philosoph- 
 ical basis. 
 
 That the ground-work of Pragmatism is a false 
 conception of the idea was fully illustrated by the 
 author in a course of lectures delivered at the Cath- 
 ohc Summer School of America during the Session 
 of 1902. This course is summed up in the chapter 
 of the present work entitled Absolute Pragma- 
 tism. A critical analysis of the works published 
 by the leading exponents of Pragmatism has fully 
 confirmed the judgment of the writer. 
 
 The plausibility of the arguments advanced, and 
 the fact that m the last analysis God in the Chris- 
 tian sense of the term is excluded from human thought 
 and life make their theory especially dangerous. 
 
 The proof that Pragmatism is fundamentally 
 false is based on data taken from the writings of 
 Professor Royce and the late Professor James of 
 Harvard, Professor Dewey of Columbia, Professor 
 Schiller of Oxford and Professor Bergson of the 
 College of France, who are recognized as the 
 leaders of the new philosophy.
 
 VI 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 The author gratefully acknowledges the privilege 
 granted by the editors of the American Catholic 
 Quarterly Review and of the North American 
 Review, to reprint articles which appear in 
 Chapters II and TV. 
 
 In presenting the volume to the pubHc the hope 
 is entertained that a discussion of this kind will 
 prove of some value towards the reconstruction of 
 Philosophy on a sane and sound basis.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface v 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 Introductory 
 
 (i) Present period of Philosophy compared to: 
 
 (a) Greek Philosophy at the time of Socrates i 
 
 (b) Scholastic Philosophy of the Xlllth century i 
 
 (2) Place of Psychology in Modern Philosophy: 
 
 (a) the result of the XlXth century thought 2 
 
 (b) theories of evolution made nature of man a \'ital 
 issue 3 
 
 (3) Pragmatism: 
 
 (a) a Philosophy of Tendency based on the purposiveness 
 
 of thought 3 
 
 (b) this tendency twofold: Idealistic and Empirical 4 
 
 (c) not a definite system but a condition of philosophic 
 thought S 
 
 (4) Origin: 
 
 (a) in the evolution philosophy of the XlXth century 5 
 
 (b) crucial problem was the Theistic controversy and re- 
 solved into a discussion of Purpose 7 
 
 (c) in establishing purpose the problem changed from God 
 
 to man, and became one not of origins but of ends 8 
 
 (d) change of base shown : 
 
 in Absolute Pragmatism which reverses process of 
 Hegel •• 8 
 
 in Empirical Pragmatism which regards mental life 
 not as structural but as functioning 9 
 
 (e) hence Empirical Pragmatism is the static psychology 
 
 of Mill, Bain and Spencer viewed as dynamic 9 
 
 (5) Doctrine: 
 
 (a) basis is the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism 10 
 
 (b) constructive element is evolution which defines the 
 idea as a plan of action ic 
 
 vii
 
 viii CONTENTS 
 
 (6) Criticism: page 
 
 (a) the fundamental error of Hegel is that of Pragmatism . lo 
 
 (b) Pragmatism evades the difl&culty by teaching that 
 latent truths are not ideas 12 
 
 (c) issue therefore is on the meaning of the idea 12 
 
 (7) Influence: 
 
 (a) influence of these writers unequal 13 
 
 (b) Empirical Pragmatism harmful: 
 
 presents a philosophic basis for the modem Gospel of 
 
 Success 14 
 
 subversive of morality 14 
 
 leads to disastrous consequences IS 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 Empirical Pragmatism 
 I. Its Postulates: 
 
 (i) Basic postulate is Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism: 
 
 (a) we know not things but the subjective expe- 
 riences of things 18 
 
 (b) this teaching involves: Relativity of Knowl- 
 edge, Agnosticism, Nominalism 19 
 
 (2) Integrating postulate is Evolution: 
 
 (a) an evolutive process of subjective experience. . 20 
 
 (b) hence the teaching that Reality is plastic 20 
 
 (c) this evolutive experience is purposive 21 
 
 (3) Instrumental postulate a so-called Scientific Method 22 
 
 II. Theory of Truth: 
 
 (i) Basis of Truth is subjective experience: 
 
 (a) hence Truth is relative and changeable 24 
 
 (b) conceived as working within experience 24 
 
 (c) no objective truth 25 
 
 (2) Criterion of Truth: 
 
 (a) Instrumental Theory, i.e. an idea is true if and 
 
 in so far as it works 25 
 
 (b) truth relative to needs and desires 25 
 
 (c) hence not the idea but the act of the idea is con- 
 sidered and Truth is the expedient 26 
 
 (d) hence plasticity of Truth 26 
 
 (e) Truth a working hj^iothesis 27
 
 CONTENTS IX 
 
 III. The Problem of Thought: page 
 
 (i) Thought is subjective experiencing 30 
 
 (a) fact and idea are distinctions within experience 30 
 
 (b) subjective and objective 30 
 
 (2) Thought a purposive evolutive process: 
 
 (a) conflict-mediatorial theory 32 
 
 (b) mind a transition-phase of the experiencing 
 process 2>Z 
 
 (c) thinking a mode of adaptative function 2)2> 
 
 (d) mind and will identified 34 
 
 (e) meaning of free-will 34 
 
 (3) The Thought -process explained by the working hy- 
 pothesis: 
 
 (a) thought confined to the judgment of doubt ... 36 
 
 (b) the functioning of the predicate and the 
 subject 37 
 
 (c) thought begins with doubt and develops by 
 experiment 37 
 
 IV. Criticism 38 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 Absolute Pragmatism 
 
 I. Conceptions of Being: 
 
 (i) Realistic 41 
 
 (2) Mystical 42 
 
 (3) Theory of Validity 44 
 
 (4) Synthetic 45 
 
 II. Principles: 
 
 (i) Reality viewed from the side of ideas 45 
 
 (2) Hence fundamental problem is the nature of the 
 idea: 
 
 (a) idea a volitional process 45 
 
 (b) its essentially teleological inner structure 46 
 
 (c) Internal and External meanings of the idea . . 46 
 
 (d) theory of judgment 47 
 
 (e) object of the idea is the purpose of the idea . . 47 
 
 (f) theory of the universal 4Q
 
 : CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (3) Nature of Being and Reality: 
 
 (a) based on the Internal and External meanings 
 
 of ideas 49 
 
 (b) to be is to fulfil a purpose 49 
 
 (c) hence the purpose of the idea is the constituent 
 
 of Being and Reality 5° 
 
 (4) An Idealistic Pantheism: 
 
 (a) no immediate perception of the external world 50 
 
 (b) fimdamental principle of knowledge is that of 
 
 a vast cosmic process 5° 
 
 (c) the Real is the Ideal of our striving 51 
 
 (d) and the Real and Ideal are identified 51 
 
 (5) Nature of Truth: 
 
 (a) the adequate expression of the Internal mean- 
 ing of ideas 52 
 
 (b) by virtue of their purposive selective function 52 
 
 (c) hence not agreement but intended agreement 
 constitutes truth 52 
 
 III. Application: 
 
 (i) Basic concepts of Absolute Pragmatism: idea and its 
 object 53 
 
 (2) These concepts applied to God, the World and the 
 Individual: 
 
 (a) the individual a unique conscious plan 53 
 
 (b) the Absolute the sole integrating Self 54 
 
 (c) individual selves and the Absolute Self 54 
 
 (d) The World of Description and of Appreciation 55 
 
 (e) structure of the World teleological and con- 
 scious 56 
 
 (3) Unity of Being: 
 
 (a) World one with God 56 
 
 (b) no true separation among finite beings 56 
 
 (c) relation of self to other selves and to God 57 
 
 IV. Criticism: 
 
 (i) Classification of Being erroneous 61 
 
 (2) Conception of Being as Validity 62 
 
 (3) The Idea not Will 64 
 
 (4) The Idea and the Object of the idea 67 
 
 (5) Summary 7°
 
 CONTENTS xi 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 Absolute Pragmatism and the Problem of Christianity 
 I. The Problem of Christianity: 
 
 (i) Statement: page 
 
 (a) the problem is the relation of Christianity 
 
 to the mind of to-day 73 
 
 (b) how and in what way can the modern man 
 
 be a Christian 74 
 
 (c) solution sought in Christian social experience 
 
 and in fundamental metaphysical ideas 74 
 
 (2) The modern man 74 
 
 (3) The fundamental metaphysical ideas: 
 
 (a) idea a plan of action 75 
 
 (b) no immediate perception of external things. . . 76 
 
 (c) cognitive process based on interpretation 76 
 
 (d) the World a process of interpretation 77 
 
 (e) the nature of Self 77 
 
 (f) the doctrines of the Individual, the Community 
 
 and the Two Levels 77 
 
 (4) Christianity: 
 
 (a) its origin and doctrine to be sought in the 
 social experience of the Pauline Churches 78 
 
 (b) this experience reveals the three characteristic 
 doctrines of Christianity, viz. Community, Lost 
 State, Atonement and Grace 79 
 
 II. The Christian Doctrine of Life: 
 
 (i) The Problem of Christianity is the Christian Doc- 
 trine of Life 79 
 
 (2) Problem viewed as: 
 
 (a) the problem of human evolution and as such 
 
 the problem of humanity 79 
 
 (b) and as the product of the social experience 
 of the Pauline Churches: as such it is distinc- 
 tively Christian 79 
 
 (c) hence doctrine should be analyzed as a human 
 problem to know what Christianity is 79 
 
 (3) Problem viewed as human : 
 
 (a) natural condition of man one of sin and social 
 chaos 80 
 
 (b) sin increases with advance of culture 8i
 
 xii CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (c) the doctrine of the individual and the Com- 
 munity 8i 
 
 (d) the human philosophy of loyalty 82 
 
 (e) this includes the three ideas 83 
 
 (4) Problem viewed as Christian : 
 
 (a) whole of Christianity summed up in these three 
 ideas 84 
 
 (b) St. Paul's presentation of the doctrine of the 
 Community 84 
 
 (c) hence Christianity a religion of loyalty 85 
 
 (d) The Christian Doctrine of Life 86 
 
 III. The Essence of Christianity: 
 
 (i) The illustration of the Greek philosopher 87 
 
 (2) The solution at variance with Professor Royce's 
 teaching 87 
 
 (3) And is a re-presentation of Strauss' Mythical Theory 89 
 
 IV. Criticism: 
 
 (i) Professor Royce's treatise is based upon his philo- 
 sophical system 9^ 
 
 (2) But this system is erroneous: 
 
 (a) doctrine of the Community rests upon an er- 
 roneous definition of the Self 91 
 
 (b) his philosophy of history an assumption 92 
 
 (c) as is also his doctrine of the Two Levels 92 
 
 (d) fundamental error is the false presentation of 
 
 the idea 93 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 Pragmatism and Humanism 
 I. Notion of Humanism: 
 
 (i) Term directly expresses not a system, but an atti- 
 tude of mind and a resultant method 95 
 
 (2) Doctrine: 
 
 (a) basis is subjective experience 96 
 
 (b) central principle is purposiveness of human 
 thought (i.e. experiencing) and the teleological 
 character of its methods 96 
 
 (c) hence not concerned with origins but with pur- 
 poses and ends 96
 
 CONTENTS xm 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (d) difference between Humanism and Prag- 
 matism 96 
 
 (e) a teleological Psychology which implies ulti- 
 mately a voluntaristic metaphysic 98 
 
 (f) as such a philosophy of life with foundation in 
 Ethics 99 
 
 (g) hence a Personal Idealism conceived as a Meta- 
 physical Voluntarism 100 
 
 II. A Personal Idealism: 
 
 (i) Based on subjective experience: 
 
 (a) the real is what is known-as loi 
 
 (b) Ontology conditioned by Epistomology loi 
 
 (c) fad, truth, reality, objective are distinctions of 
 function within experience 102 
 
 (d) leads to Solipsism 102 
 
 (2) Fundamental principle: man is the measure of all 
 things: 
 
 (a) accepted in the individual and in the generic 
 sense 103 
 
 (b) reality relative to our faculties 103 
 
 (c) an Idealistic Experientalism 104 
 
 (d) the common world a social convention assumed 
 
 for convenience' sake 105 
 
 (3) Hence a psychological side to everything: 
 
 (a) all physical objects become psychological. ... 106 
 
 (b) a Hylozoism or Panpsychism 107 
 
 III. Criticism: 
 
 (i) Humanism based on Phenomenal Idealism of 
 Sensism 107 
 
 (2) Deals with reflective thought 107 
 
 (3) Professor Schiller's douhle-voice 108 
 
 (4) Aim is to establish a harmony not among things 
 
 but among conceptions, beliefs, imaginings iii 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 Pragmatism and Humanism (continued) 
 
 I. Humanism an Ethical Voluntarism: 
 
 (i) This is the integrating principle of Humanism: 
 
 (a) experience conceived as active, i.e. purposive 
 and teleological for ends of practical life 112
 
 xiv CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (b) thought, i.e. experiencing, expressed in terms 
 
 of will 112 
 
 (2) Its basis: 
 
 (a) the assumption that the world of our expe- 
 rience is a cosmos 112 
 
 (b) this harmony the result of purposive thought . . 113 
 
 (c) hence perceptions of Purpose and End domi- 
 nant 113 
 
 (3) The Process: 
 
 (a) the Real is experience manipulated, the True 
 
 is the instrument of the manipulation 113 
 
 (b) ambiguous truths and valid truths 113 
 
 (c) the true and the false are intellectual forms of 
 
 the good and the bad 114 
 
 (d) truth relative to the present purpose, and is 
 falsified and verified in one and same process 114 
 
 (e) necessary truths and necessary errors 115 
 
 (f) hence truth flexible and adjustable 115 
 
 (g) objective truth and social usefulness 115 
 
 (4) This Voluntarism essentially ethical: 
 
 (a) the real and the true subordinated to the good 116 
 
 (b) and so depend on end and purpose, i.e. the will 
 
 to know 116 
 
 (c) Ethics deals with ends, hence Voluntarism is 
 ethical "6 
 
 n. The Making of Truth and of Reality: 
 
 (i) Experience a purposive evolutive integration: 
 
 (a) involves the doctrine that the world is in 
 process n? 
 
 (b) its fundamental principle: the assumption 
 that experiencing makes a difference alike to the 
 systems of truth and to the world of reality 117 
 
 (2) Hence the central teaching: the Making of Truth 
 and of Reality: 
 
 (a) primary reality or appearance 117 
 
 (b) primary and real reality 118 
 
 (c) higher realities are inferences assumed as 
 instruments for the conceptual manipulation of 
 experience 118 
 
 (d) and are judged to be true by their usefulness 119
 
 CONTENTS XV 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (e) hence real fact evolved out of primary fact by 
 a process of selection 119 
 
 (3) Hence the Making of Truth and the Making of 
 Reality fundamentally one: 
 
 (a) reality something which grows up in the mak- 
 ing of truth 120 
 
 (b) and truth a valuation as a successful operation 
 
 on reality 120 
 
 (c) hence truth and error, real and unreal are dis- 
 tinctions of value within experience made by 
 experience functioning, i.e. predicating 120 
 
 (d) subject and object mutually involved and 
 evolved 121 
 
 (e) the process human, painful, arbitrary and con- 
 tinuous 121 
 
 (f) beginnings of knowledge wrapped in mystery 
 
 and the Ultimate Reality a goal 122 
 
 (g) thus reality is plastic, growing, incomplete; 
 becomes determinate by and in the process of 
 knowing 123 
 
 (h) and human truth is not absolute but fluid and 
 fallible 124 
 
 (i) hence conception of freedom as capacity for 
 change 125 
 
 (4) Criticism: 
 
 Limitations to the making of truth and of reality: 
 
 (a) beginning of the process not made 126 
 
 (b) Professor Schiller forced to admit that the 
 making of reahty is merely subjective 127 
 
 (c) and is forced to admit the distinction between 
 discovering and making reality 128 
 
 (d) likewise confesses that the world of common 
 sense and of rigid facts was not made in any 
 human sense 129 
 
 III. Experience and Experiment: 
 (i) Experience means: 
 
 (a) the fact of purposive experiencing 130 
 
 (b) the manner of the experiencing, i.e. experiment 130 
 (2) Experiment: 
 
 (a) evolutionary process carried on by experi- 
 mentation 131
 
 XVI CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (b) means employed are assertions with a view to 
 attain the proposed end 131 
 
 (3) Nature of the process, a working hypothesis: 
 
 (a) assertions tested by the use-criterion 131 
 
 (b) no absolute truth; only approximations 131 
 
 (c) truth and reality is plastic, variable and grows 132 
 
 (d) a difficulty: when consequences are in doubt . . 133 
 
 (e) assertions assumed as means or instnunents 
 because desired 134 
 
 (f) first principles are starting-points and necessary 
 truths mean ?ieedful 134 
 
 (4) Criticism: 
 
 (a) teaching is Scepticism 135 
 
 (b) truth not a working hypothesis 136 
 
 (c) method of Humanism erroneous 136 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 Pragmatism and Hxjmanism (concluded) 
 I. What We Know: 
 
 (i) With Humanism immediate experience is: 
 
 (a) not the act of perceiving external things 138 
 
 (b) but the subject-matter of our thinking 138 
 
 (c) hence differs from Common Sense Realism. ... 139 
 
 (2) Object of our knowledge: 
 
 (a) Humanism by object means purpose 139 
 
 (b) the subjective and the objective 139 
 
 (c) things are as they are known-as 140 
 
 (d) how we perceive the same 140 
 
 (3) Criticism 142 
 
 II. Thought as Purposive Volition: 
 
 (i) Central principle is the purposiveness of thought: 
 
 (a) every cognition a moral act, hence a mode of 
 conduct, initiated and guided by interest or 
 volition 143 
 
 (b) which employs hypothetical assumptions as 
 means 144 
 
 (c) hence faith is at the basis of reason, and by 
 faith is meant the unll-to-believe 144 
 
 (d) hence thought is a wish and originates in sub- 
 jective demands 144
 
 CONTENTS xvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (2) Conception of thought as purposive volition based 
 on the assumption that mental life is an evolution in 
 the time-process: 
 
 (a) hence in a state of Becoming i44 
 
 (b) how the beginnings of thought are explained . . 145 
 
 (c) the process of Becoming a functioning and 
 adaptation ^45 
 
 (d) reason a means for achieving adaptation 145 
 
 (e) reason not a faculty, but an acquired group 
 
 of habits 146 
 
 (3) Mind, Soul, Self: 
 
 (a) a potential unity and a result 146 
 
 (b) no real distinction between thinking, willing, 
 feeling i47 
 
 (c) these only labels for a unitary personality or a 
 reacting organism i47 
 
 III. Criticism: 
 
 (i) All thought not purposive: 
 
 (a) admitted by Humanists I47 
 
 (b) taught by Scholastic Philosophy 148 
 
 (2) The working hypothesis does not explain the process 
 of thought: 
 
 (a) the working hypothesis as used by science. ... 149 
 
 (b) applied to mental life considers judgment as a 
 
 tool or instrument i49 
 
 (c) the idea also a tool slowly fashioned 150 
 
 (d) the imiversal is actually concrete 151 
 
 (3) Hence in last analysis Humanism is based on a 
 wrong conception of the idea 15° 
 
 (4) Summary 15° 
 
 CHAPTER VIH 
 
 Pragmatism and Creative Evolution 
 
 Purpose of Professor Bergson's Metaphysic 153 
 
 I. The Fact of Change: 
 
 (i) Fundamental problem is the meaning of ea;wie«ce . . 154 
 (2) Data for the solution found in our twofold ex- 
 perience: 
 
 (a) this the basic doctrine of Creative Evolution . . 154
 
 xviii CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (b) external experience is of intellect and sense and 
 
 is what is thought 155 
 
 (c) internal experience is of feeling and is what is 
 lived 15s 
 
 (3) Internal experience reveals great fact of change: 
 
 (a) inner life a constant change 156 
 
 (b) hence fundamental reality is Duration, i.e. a 
 continuity which unfolds 156 
 
 (c) states only apparent and artificial 156 
 
 (d) concept of Personality 157 
 
 (e) at basis an undivided flow 157 
 
 (4) Duration: 
 
 (a) the stuff out of which psychic existence is made 158 
 
 (b) a vital force and means creation 158 
 
 (c) revealed in a continuous progress 158 
 
 (d) especially in our personality 159 
 
 (5) Hence Existence is Creative Evolution: 
 
 (a) this fact of inner experience predicated of 
 existence in general 160 
 
 (b) hence Duration is the foundation of our being 
 
 and the substance of the world 160 
 
 II. Change and Permanence: 
 
 (1) Change and Permanence are both facts of inner life 
 
 (a) Prof. Bergson ignores fact of permanence 160 
 
 (b) permanence more fundamental than change. . 160 
 
 (2) Criticism of Prof. Bergson's doctrine of change: 
 
 (a) ambiguous and contradictory 161 
 
 (b) concrete Duration implies permanence 162 
 
 (c) so also does memory and Creative Evolution . . 162 
 
 III. An Ideal Pantheism: 
 (i) An IdeaUsm: 
 
 (a) Duration is Reahty, the Absolute 163 
 
 (b) is a flux, a tendency not a being 163 
 
 (c) Criticism 163 
 
 (2) An Idealistic Evolution: 
 
 (a) the Absolute is a ceaseless evolution of some- 
 thing new 163 
 
 (b) its nature is conscious action 163 
 
 (c) this action twofold: making itself and un- 
 making itself 164
 
 CONTENTS XIX 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (d) hence spirit and matter are not things, and 
 only differ as counter tendencies of the Absolute 164 
 
 (e) matter and intellect of the same nature 165 
 
 (f) natural and artificial systems 166 
 
 (g) physical law a mental relation without objec- 
 tive reality 167 
 
 (h) intellect static and gives not parts but partial 
 views of the whole 168 
 
 (3) Pantheistic: 
 
 (a) action making itself reveals a Pantheism of 
 Manifestation 168 
 
 (b) action unmaking itself shows genesis and 
 nature of intellect 168 
 
 (c) which presents an Idealism of Representation 
 
 and cannot grasp Reality, i.e. Duration 168 
 
 rV. Reality and Feeling: 
 
 (i) Knowledge of Reality twofold, i.e. of thought and of 
 living or feeling 169 
 
 (2) Intellect cannot think Duration: 
 
 (a) cannot grasp matter as a perpetual flux 169 
 
 (b) but only presents what is singled out of reality 
 
 for practical interests 169 
 
 (c) hence its knowledge is static, relative, mechan- 
 ical and symbolical 170 
 
 (3) Feeling gives direct vision of reality: 
 
 (a) hence we must transcend intelligence 170 
 
 (b) by going counter to the natural bent of the 
 intellect 171 
 
 (c) which is the function of philosophy 171 
 
 (4) Criticism 172 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 Pragmatism and Creative Evolution (continued) 
 Theory of Life 
 
 The characteristic doctrine of Creative Evolution 173 
 
 I. Creative Evolution: 
 
 (i) Its sphere i7S 
 
 (2) Nature: 
 
 (a) an ascending movement, called the Absolute, 
 yet dependent and contingent 176
 
 XX CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (b) a vital impetus and a continuous creative 
 progress 176 
 
 (c) the aim is not to annihilate but to magnetize 
 
 and use matter 177 
 
 (3) Creative: 
 
 (a) impetus of Life consists in a need of creation . . 177 
 
 (b) creation had a beginning 177 
 
 (c) need of creation manifest only when creation 
 
 is possible i77 
 
 (d) then the impetus awakens from sleep and the 
 awakening is due to Camot's law 177 
 
 (e) creation does not mean creation of matter nor of 
 energy, but oiform only and of indetcrtnination. . . 178 
 
 (f) creation symbolized: not a thing, but a con- 
 tinuity of shooting-out 179 
 
 (4) Creative action dependent: 
 
 (a) on the resistance from matter and on its own 
 explosive force 180 
 
 (b) how the Absolute overcomes the resistance 
 from matter 180 
 
 (c) as a result matter becomes like India-rubber. . 180 
 
 (5) Organization: 
 
 (a) described as matter marked by the teeth of the 
 Absolute or as a modus vivetidi between two 
 currents 181 
 
 (b) and organisms are accidental excrescences, i.e. 
 marks left on the material tendency by the vital 
 tendency 181 
 
 (c) are means for the progression of Life 181 
 
 (d) progression explained by Weismann's germ- 
 plasm or by a continuity of genetic energy con- 
 tained in sexual elements 181 
 
 (e) the progression or current is Life or Duration . . 181 
 
 (f) adaptation a necessary condition of the evolu- 
 tion 182 
 
 II. Transformism: 
 
 (i) Postulated by the plasticity of matter 183 
 
 (2) Professor Bergson and Transformism: 
 
 (a) admits that it is not proved and may be wrong 183 
 
 (b) holds we must accept it, even if we know 
 nothing about it 184
 
 CONTENTS XXI 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (c) rejects the various scientific theories and holds 
 the philosophical explanation because philosophy 
 is not constrained to scientific precision 184 
 
 (3) Nature: 
 
 (a) effected not by passive but by active adapta- 
 tion 184 
 
 (b) illustrated in the evolution of character 185 
 
 (c) yet Professor Bergson admits the illustration 
 cannot be applied to the organized world 186 
 
 (d) but says this is not necessary for his purpose . . 187 
 
 (4) Process: 
 
 (a) r61e of Life is to engraft onto the necessity of 
 matter the largest possible amount of indetermi- 
 nation 187 
 
 (b) does this by making the best of pre-existing 
 energy, which it fabricates into explosives, repre- 
 senting a storing-house of solar energy 187 
 
 (c) as a result the course of material changes down- 
 wards is not stopped but retarded 188 
 
 (d) thus vegetable and animal life is an effort to 
 accumulate solar energy and let it flow through 
 changeable channels, i.e. organisms 188 
 
 (e) this effort clogged by the organic forms and 
 opposed by contrary forces 188 
 
 (f) so the process is a marking time, often a turn- 
 ing back and reveals a conflict 188 
 
 (5) Organic Life: 
 
 (a) in simplest forms, difficult to determine 
 whether they are vital or physical and chemical . . 189 
 
 (b) vegetable and animal descended from a 
 conamon ancestor 189 
 
 (c) in process of development the vegetable tended 
 principally to storing energy, the animal to ex- 
 ploding energy IQO 
 
 (d) hence vegetable distinguished by comparative 
 immobility or consciousness asleep, i.e. torpor, the 
 animal by mobility or consciousness awake 191 
 
 (e) mobility develops a nervous system, the reser- 
 voir of locomotor activity and the regulator of the 
 organic life 192
 
 xxii CONTENTS 
 
 (6) The Animal Kingdom: _ page 
 
 (a) hence fundamental direction of life is to the 
 animal • ^93 
 
 (b) in the animal kingdom the impetus of Life has 
 won in the arthropods, e.g. insect, and in the 
 vertebrates, e.g. man i93 
 
 (c) the insect is characterized by instinct, man by 
 intellect i93 
 
 (d) hence evolution of the animal kingdom has 
 taken place on two divergent paths, i.e. instinct 
 
 and intelligence ^93 
 
 (e) these are tendencies not things, opposed but 
 complementary i93 
 
 (f) in evolution of Life intellect superior to 
 instinct ^94 
 
 (7) Simimary ^95 
 
 III. A Voluntarism: 
 
 (i) Creative Evolution an evolution of a conscious will 195 
 
 (2) Consciousness: 
 
 (a) in general and in particular 19S 
 
 (b) means mobility, action, choice, willing 196 
 
 (c) the motive power of evolution; as such a 
 conscious willing 190 
 
 (3) Purpose of Creative Evolution: 
 
 (a) to introduce consciousness into matter 197 
 
 (b) and so to create with matter an instrimaent of 
 freedom ^97 
 
 (c) a failure except in case of man I97 
 
 (4) Creative Evolution a conscious striving: 
 
 (a) it is the Will-to-act 198 
 
 (b) implies the power of choice, for the Absolute 
 
 or vital force or conscious will is limited 198 
 
 (c) almost arrested by the hard shell crabs but 
 finds an avenue of escape with arthropods and 
 vertebrates ^99 
 
 (d) even then not a success • • • i99 
 
 (e) the conscious striving is the essence of Life, 
 hence no real individuality, but Panpsychism 200 
 
 (f) Mitigated Finalism 201 
 
 (g) the process of Creative Evolution leads to 
 scissions, divergent tendencies, retrogressions, 
 struggles, accidents and a discord striking and 
 terrible 203
 
 CONTENTS »cm 
 
 IV. Criticism: page 
 
 (i) The exposition the best criticism 204 
 
 (2) Transformism a pure assumption 204 
 
 (3) Basic assumption of Transformism erroneous 205 
 
 (4) Locomotion is not mutation 205 
 
 (5) Creative Evolution had a beginning and will have an 
 
 end 207 
 
 (6) Exposition of law of Conservation of energy 
 erroneous 207 
 
 (7) Order of Life which develops through instinct closes 
 automatically, and is only kept open through intellect, 
 which, on hypothesis, belongs to the Order of Matter. . 208 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 Pragmatism and Creative Evolution (continued) 
 
 Theory of Knowledge 
 
 Place and meaning of Theory of Knowledge 209 
 
 I. The Genesis of Intellect: 
 
 (i) Whole evolution of Life proceeds from a current of 
 existence and the opposing current 211 
 
 (2) Current of existence original and fundamental: it 
 
 is the Order of Life 211 
 
 (3) The contrary current is materiality and contains 
 immanent in itself an order approximately mathematical 211 
 
 (4) Current of Life ascends across the current of matter: 
 
 (a) and fixes its attention on its own movement, i.e. 
 
 in the direction of instinct and intuition 212 
 
 (b) or on the matter it is passing through, i.e. in 
 
 the direction of intellect 212 
 
 (c) so the mind, i.e. the Absolute, goes in two 
 opposite ways 213 
 
 (s) Hence intellect and matter are of same nature and 
 are produced in the same way : 
 
 (a) for Consciousness or Life adapting itself to 
 matter is intellectuality 213 
 
 (b) and this adaptation is consolidation 213 
 
 (c) hence intellect is cut out of Consciousness and 
 
 is a by-product or local effect of evolution 213 
 
 (d) hence genesis of intellect and of material bodies 
 is correlative and there is an agreement between 
 them 214
 
 xxiv CONTENTS 
 
 (6) Nature of Intellect: _ _ page 
 
 (a) its knowledge is abstract, mechanical, artificial, 
 external and symbolical 214 
 
 (b) the concept is a symbol 218 
 
 (c) the moving-picture an illustration of the 
 mechanism of thought 219 
 
 II. Illusions of the Intellect: 
 (i) Illusion of Disorder: 
 
 (a) Disorder a pseudo-idea 221 
 
 (b) for Disorder is only the order we were not 
 expecting 22i; 
 
 (2) Idea of Nothing: 
 
 (a) a pseudo-idea 222 
 
 (b) involves a preference and a substitution 223 
 
 (c) and means the absence not of a thing but of a 
 utility 223 
 
 (3) That the mind imitates the movement of the real: 
 
 (a) this supposes that we can reduce Becoming to 
 ideas 224 
 
 (b) and is due to the moving-picture mechanism of 
 
 the intellect 224 
 
 (4) The attempt to impose on vital phenomena the cate- 
 gories of the intellect 224 
 
 (5) The idea of a general order in nature 225 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 Pragmatism and Creative Evolution (concluded) 
 I. Intellect atid Instinct: 
 
 (i) Nature: 
 
 (a) two psychic tendencies, opposite and comple- 
 mentary, originally fused in one 227 
 
 (b) became separated by the action of the Absolute 
 
 on matter 227 
 
 (c) instinct is the result of the impetus acting on 
 matter directly, completes the work of organiza- 
 tion and is in the Order of Life 228 
 
 (d) intellect is the result of the impetus acting on 
 matter indirectly, and so is in the Material Order 228 
 
 (e) difference between instinct and intelligence ... 228 
 
 (f) Criticism 230
 
 CONTENTS XXV 
 
 (2) Background is Consciousness: page 
 
 (a) consciousness described 232 
 
 (b) canalized in the nervous system 233 
 
 (c) consciousness and brain 234 
 
 (d) inhibition a mechanical function 235 
 
 (e) consciousness and self 235 
 
 II. Nature of Intuition: 
 
 (i) Based on the doctrine of the Two Orders 235 
 
 (2) The characteristic teaching of Bergson's Episte- 
 mology 236 
 
 (3) Opposed to, yet supplementary of, intellect: 
 
 (a) intellect and intuition represent two opposite 
 directions of the action of Consciousness 236 
 
 (b) intuition goes in the direction of Life, intellect 
 
 in the direction of matter 236 
 
 (c) a perfect humanity would contain both, but 
 with us intuition is almost completely sacrificed to 
 intellect 236 
 
 (4) Nature and function : 
 
 (a) grasped by its relations to instinct and to 
 intelligence 236 
 
 (b) instinct is sympathy, i.e. feeling specialized, 
 and intuition is instinct purified, i.e. feeling not 
 specialized 236 
 
 (c) intellect is the condensation of Consciousness 
 with matter, i.e. the nucleus; intuition or feeling 
 is the uncondensed fringe surrounding the 
 nucleus 237 
 
 (d) difference between action of intellect and in- 
 tuition 237 
 
 (s) Theory of Knowledge: 
 
 (a) must be based on intellect and intuition 238 
 
 (b) hence not based on intellect alone 238 
 
 (c) for intellect gives only the negative half of the 
 
 real and cannot reach the fundamental reality .... 238 
 
 (d) hence to intellect must be added intuition. . . . 239 
 (6) The Process by which complete knowledge of the real 
 
 is acquired : 
 
 (a) is to develop intuition, and to expand or tran- 
 scend intellect; this is done in general 239 
 
 (b) in particular by the cultivation of the aesthetic 
 sense 241
 
 xxvi CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (c) by the cultivation of sympathy i.e. instinct . . . 241 
 
 (d) by squeezing intellect and instinct together . . . 242 
 
 (e) by awakening the consciousness that slumbers 
 
 in instinct 243 
 
 (f) by placing ourselves within the vital impetus . . 243 
 
 (g) by making thought coincide with will i.e. 
 feeling 244 
 
 (h) by the amalgamation or mixture of other forms 
 of consciousness 245 
 
 (i) by the manipulation of the formal knowledge 
 
 of intellect 246 
 
 (7) Result of the process twofold: 
 
 (a) the reconciliation of science and philosophy . . . 247 
 
 (b) philosophy enables us to grasp the nature of 
 intellectual knowledge and also by expanding 
 intellect is an effort to dissolve again into the 
 whole 247 
 
 III. Criticism: 
 
 (i) Theory of Knowledge presents a confused mixture 
 of assumptions 247 
 
 (2) Rests on Theory of Life but this was shown to be 
 erroneous 248 
 
 (3) The working hypothesis 248 
 
 (4) Confounds intellect with imagination, e.g. a moving- 
 picture show without an audience 249 
 
 (5) And does so because the image is confounded with 
 
 the idea 250 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 Pragmatism and Scholastic Philosophy 
 The issue presented by the constituent elements of Pragmatism 252 
 I. The Perception of External Things: 
 
 (i) Pragmatism based on the Phenomenal Idealism of 
 Sensism : 
 
 (a) teaches the immediate perception not of things 
 
 but of the conceptions or feelings of things 253 
 
 (b) things mediately or indirectly known 253 
 
 (c) the fundamental teaching of Agnosticism 253
 
 CONTENTS xxvii 
 
 PAGE 
 
 (2) Scholastic Philosophy holds doctrine of Immediate 
 Perception: 
 
 (a) we directly and immediately know things. . . . 253 
 
 (b) in sense-perception three conditions necessary : 
 subject perceiving, object perceived, union or con- 
 tact of subject and object 254 
 
 (c) the union or contact illustrated 255 
 
 (d) the species impressa and the species expressa . . 255 
 
 (e) the knowledge of the not-me primary to the 
 knowledge of the me 257 
 
 (f) error of Pragmatism 258 
 
 II. Evolution: 
 
 (i) The integrating element of Pragmatism 259 
 
 (2) Teaching of Scholastic Philosophy: 
 
 (a) Evolution confounded with fact of growth .... 260 
 
 (b) Evolution as a scientific hypothesis 261 
 
 (c) Evolution as a philosophical theory 264 
 
 III. Theory of Mental Life: 
 
 (i) The soul a simple spiritual principle: 
 
 (a) Pragmatism teaches a Psychology without a 
 soul 267 
 
 (b) Scholastic doctrine of the soul 267 
 
 (2) Contents of mental life, i.e. knowledge: 
 
 (a) Pragmatism confounds thought with sense- 
 experience 268 
 
 (b) Scholastic Philosophy teaches the Essential 
 difference between sense and intellect 269 
 
 (c) for the act of sense is totally different from the 
 
 act of intellect 269 
 
 (d) the act of intellect illustrated 270 
 
 (e) contact of object with sense different from 
 contact of object with intellect 272 
 
 (f) idea and image accompany each other but are 
 different in nature 2 73
 
 PRAGMATISM AND THE 
 PROBLEM OF THE IDEA 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 The present period of philosophic thought can be 
 justly compared to the period of Greek Philosophy 
 at the birth of Socrates and to the philosophy of 
 the Middle Ages at the time of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
 The life-work of Socrates was to show the distinction 
 between true and false knowledge. His method was 
 a process of intellectual analysis. He aimed at 
 pointing out the necessity of forming clear concepts. 
 
 The Middle Ages witnessed the formation of 
 Scholastic Philosophy, rightly described as the 
 greatest monument of carefully reasoned thought 
 which the human mind has ever produced. In the 
 formation of this system, the fundamental problem 
 was the theory of the concept or universal idea. The 
 History of Philosophy records the theories of Con- 
 ceptualism and of Nominalism as opposed to the 
 theory of Mitigated Realism defended by St. 
 Thomas Aquinas with keen analysis and profound 
 learning. The Conceptualists taught that the idea 
 was merely the product of the mind. They were the
 
 2 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 precursors of modern extreme Idealism. The Nom- 
 inalists held that the idea was a name only, some- 
 thing like a tag. They were the precursors of modern 
 Sense-Empiricism. On the contrary, the theory of 
 Mitigated Realism made a distinction between the 
 form of the universal idea and the concrete element 
 in its content. It held that the form of the idea was 
 mental, i.e. that the mind fashioned or elaborated 
 the form, but that the concrete element in the con- 
 tent came through the senses from the world with- 
 out. This theory was summed up in the classic 
 Scholastic phrase that the idea was a mental product 
 with a basis in external reality. Thus on the one 
 hand free play with proper place and proportion 
 were allowed all the processes of mind which in their 
 last analysis centre around the idea, and on the 
 other hand Idealism was guarded against by show- 
 ing that the mind was in direct contact with external 
 reality. This teaching obtained in the Scholastic 
 schools and is viewed as the Scholastic teaching on 
 the nature of the idea. 
 
 In our own time Psychology holds the vital 
 position in philosophic discussion. This came about 
 naturally in the trend of modern thought. Towards 
 the middle of the nineteenth century the Science- 
 Philosophy arose enunciating the philosophic theory 
 of evolution based on data of the Physical Sciences. 
 This theory was confidently claimed to be the 
 solution and explanation of all things. To realize 
 these roseate hopes its advocates contended that
 
 INTRODUCTORY 3 
 
 man also was included in the great evolutive process. 
 Hence discussion about man's place in nature be- 
 came the crucial problem. Had man a spiritual 
 nature with an immortal destiny, or was he the 
 mere product of physical forces evolving more and 
 more perfectly through interminable ages from the 
 lowest forms of life. Thus the nature of man be- 
 came the vital issue in philosophy. Various theories 
 were thereupon proposed to explain the nature of 
 man. They are all psychological because they are 
 based on the data of human thoughts and emotions. 
 The latest to assume proportions and exert influence 
 is called Pragmatism. It, too, is psychological. The 
 purpose of the present volume is to show that 
 Pragmatism, as set forth by its main exponents, is 
 based upon an erroneous analysis of the idea, and 
 that consequently the problem of the idea has 
 assumed an important place in contemporary 
 philosophic thought. 
 
 The term. Pragmatism, is extremely vague. Thus 
 it is that difiiculty is experienced in giving a clear 
 and succinct definition. For the same reason the 
 casual reader is inclined to regard Pragmatism as a 
 new creation without any very definite philosophical 
 antecedents. Applied to designate a prevailing 
 type of philosophic thought. Pragmatism is a mis- 
 nomer. In reality it marks only one phase of this 
 thought. A clearer and more comprehensive term 
 would be the Philosophy of Tendency. All the 
 writers classed as belonging to the school of Prag-
 
 4 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 matism, are characterized alike by the element of 
 tendency. They are not dominated by first begin- 
 nings but by aims and purposes. They are not so 
 much concerned with the past as with the future 
 and results. It is the Becoming, i.e. the To fieri 
 of Hegel in a new form. Hegel viewed the Becoming 
 in the Absolute Idea. Pragmatism considers the 
 Becoming of the idea in the human mind. As human 
 action is colored by aims or purposes, it follows that 
 the Philosophy of Tendency considers the Becoming 
 as purposive or as aiming at definite ends. Now the 
 human tendency of Pragmatism is twofold: it 
 aims at the concrete and practical, or at the ideal 
 and abstract. The former tendency is expressed 
 in Professor James and Professor Dewey and is 
 more correctly termed Pragmatism, i.e. practical 
 philosophy. The latter tendency is best expressed 
 in Professor Royce, who calls himself an Absolute 
 Pragmatist. With Professor Schiller and Professor 
 Bergson we have a mixture of both tendencies; in 
 the former the mixture is more temperate, in the 
 latter we find a mixture of extremes: the extreme of 
 the abstract and the extreme of the sensual; in both 
 the result is unsatisfactory and will not stand the 
 test of rigid scrutiny, especially so in regard to 
 Professor Bergson who tries to combine the extremes 
 into a system by the aid of the most crude imagin- 
 ings, contradictory statements and discarded phil- 
 osophical theories. 
 
 Pragmatism therefore does not express a definite
 
 INTRODUCTORY 5 
 
 system but is a term used to indicate a condition 
 of contemporary philosophic thought. As such 
 it is shown by deeper study to be the direct develop- 
 ment of the philosophy which prevailed during the 
 latter part of the nineteenth century. Apart from 
 the Scholastic system the philosophy of the nine- 
 teenth century developed along two main lines: 
 Empiricism and Idealism. The Empiricism is a re- 
 awakening of eighteenth century materialism and 
 owed its great influence to a reaction against the 
 extravagant theory of Hegel and to the rise of the 
 Physical Sciences. It was an attempt to construct 
 a system of philosophy on the data of the Physical 
 Sciences alone, whence its more specific designation 
 as the Science-Philosophy. 
 
 The Idealism arose with Kant and reached its 
 culmination with Hegel, thereupon dividing into 
 two main streams: the Neo-Kantian and the Neo- 
 HegeHan. About the middle of the century the 
 notion of Evolution appeared and dominated all 
 departments of knowledge. From the beginning 
 Idealism completely absorbed it. The element of 
 Evolution in Hegel differentiates his system from 
 that of Kant. With Hegel evolution is the construc- 
 tive element. His fundamental principle is the evo- 
 lution of the Idea. The idea is viewed by him not 
 in the human mind but in the mind of the Absolute. 
 His system is based on the Psychology of the Abso- 
 lute and from this Psychology he endeavors to 
 construct a world-system. Existing things are
 
 6 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 manifestations which the idea presents in the con- 
 tinuous process of its evolving. The Empiricism 
 of the Science-Philosophy likewise made Evolution 
 the constituent element of its system. Yet with 
 its advocates the use and sphere of Evolution was 
 restricted. The reason was that this Empiricism 
 aimed at fixing man's place in the universe. It 
 was concerned with the origin and place of man 
 and strove to show that man is a product 
 through a long process of evolution reaching back 
 to matter and to the lowest forms of life. The 
 great effort was made to show that there was a 
 continuity in the process of evolution ending with 
 man. 
 
 In proclaiming "the survival of the fittest" as 
 the great principle, Empirical evolutionists aimed 
 at showing that all existing things, man included, 
 were results. Thus purpose and design were ruled 
 out of Philosophy and of Science. Their explanation 
 was known as the mechanical interpretation of 
 nature. Yet by some strange inconsistency they did 
 not employ the element of evolution in the explana- 
 tion of mental life. John Stuart Mill is the logician, 
 Bain the psychologist, Spencer the sociologist of 
 this school. In none of these writers, however, do 
 we find the element of evolution applied to the expo- 
 sition of mental life considered individually or col- 
 lectively. They simply took man as an evolutionary 
 product and regarded the process of evolution as 
 ending with this product. Hence their expositions
 
 INTRODUCTORY 7 
 
 of mental life are static not dynamic, are structural 
 not functional. 
 
 Toward the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
 the influence of these writers was very great. For 
 over twenty years Mill's Logic dominated the Eng- 
 lish mind. Then William George Ward pointed out 
 clearly the weakness of his system. Bain's Sense 
 Empiricism and Determinism were shown to be 
 arbitrary and unsatisfactory. Spencer Hved long 
 enough to see his own system shattered. The crucial 
 point at issue was the Theistic controversy. Theistic 
 writers maintained that no system of philosophy can 
 do away with the element of purpose or teleology, 
 that teleology as a fact of mental life has to be taken 
 into account, that the mechanical view of nature 
 far from being opposed to teleology does in fact 
 imply teleology. Appeal was made to the works 
 of nature but especially to man. Purpose and aim 
 were shown to be characteristic of mental life, were 
 revealed in the structure of the human body, and 
 were the moving causes of the mechanical instru- 
 ments contrived by man for use. The issue was 
 bitterly fought, but the result was a victory for 
 Theistic writers. Purpose and aim were shown to 
 exist in human life. Mill and Bain and Spencer are 
 no longer names to conjure with; they merely recall 
 to the reader shattered systems of false philosophic 
 teaching. 
 
 With the admission of purpose in mental life 
 philosophic thought took a new trend — it became
 
 8 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 saturated with purpose. Hence the Philosophy of 
 Tendency. Like a child with a new toy, these 
 writers seemed oblivious to everything but their 
 new discovery. 
 
 Fifty years ago the philosophic problem was con- 
 cerned with origins, now it is occupied with the 
 striving after aims or purposes. Then the great 
 question at issue was the existence and nature of 
 God. To-day man is the centre of the universe; 
 in fact there is nothing but the human. 
 
 In estabHshing the existence of purpose the con- 
 troversy shifted from God to man. Psychology 
 became the battleground. The result of this change 
 had a marked influence on the development of 
 both the Idealistic and the Empiristic streams of 
 nineteenth century thought. The IdeaHst kept the 
 idea of God, but erroneously conceived His nature. 
 To them God was the Absolute and their systems 
 were Pantheistic throughout. Yet the change in 
 the field of controversy had this result that whereas 
 Hegel began with the Absolute and tried to show 
 that all existing things, especially man, were the 
 manifestations of the evolutive Absolute Idea, 
 Royce reverses the process and, beginning with man, 
 endeavors to prove that the purposive evolution 
 of the human idea develops into the Absolute. 
 With Hegel therefore, the problem was one of origin, 
 and human consciousness was explained as the high- 
 est point reached by the Absolute Idea in the pro- 
 cess of its evolution. With Royce, however, the
 
 INTRODUCTORY 9 
 
 problem is one of purpose and end, i.e. the conscious 
 evolution of the human idea, so that God is con- 
 sidered the aim and end of the process and is nothing 
 more than human consciousness augmented and 
 magnified. Hence the world-theory of Royce is 
 psychological as the reader will readily perceive in 
 the following pages where the basic principle of his 
 system is shown to be contained in the phrase 
 " The object of the idea " and by the word " object " 
 in his teaching is understood "purpose." 
 
 The recognition of purpose in human life had a 
 profound effect upon the empiric stream of nine- 
 teenth century philosophic thought. Mental life 
 began to be considered not as static but as active; 
 not as structural but as functioning. With this 
 viewpoint the element of evolution entered into 
 the Psychology of Empiricism. Mental life was thus 
 considered as a process of acting, functioning, evolv- 
 ing. With this discovery a new name was coined 
 for the supposedly new system and the name is 
 Pragmatism. In reality there is very little that is 
 new in Pragmatism. It is nothing more than the 
 Empiric Psychology of Mill, Bain, and Spencer, con- 
 sidered as functioning or evolving. Thus Professor 
 Dewey complains that Mill's defect was that he 
 did not go far enough, i.e. that he stopped at struc- 
 ture without considering function. Likewise Pro- 
 fessors Small and Vincent in their Manual of 
 Sociology teach that Modern Sociology begins 
 where Spencer ends, i.e. that Spencer presented
 
 lo PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 the structure, whereas Modern Sociology takes 
 structure as a starting-point and is occupied prin- 
 cipally in studying the functions of the social body. 
 Pragmatism is an IdeaHsm. With Professor 
 Royce we have Absolute Idealism inherited from 
 Absolute IdeaHsm of the nineteenth century. The 
 Empiric element in Pragmatism represented by 
 Professor James and Professor Dewey teaches the 
 Phenomenal Idealism of the nineteenth century 
 Empiricism. Hence Pragmatism rests upon an 
 IdeaHstic basis. It deals not with external things but 
 with our subjective ideas or feeHngs of things. Thus 
 it holds that mental life has no conscious direct 
 contact with external reaHty. Its basis therefore is 
 subjective experience. Shut off from contact with 
 external reahty it views the idea in the conscious 
 process of purposive evolution. Hence it is that 
 Pragmatism conceives mental life as a conscious 
 purposive evolutive process, i.e. it conceives the 
 idea in the very process of evolution. Thus the 
 idea is true, if it is vaHd; it is valid, if it works; 
 it works, if it has practical success. Hence 
 Pragmatism is concerned not with thought but 
 with thinking, not with feeling the noun, but with 
 feeling the verb, and this thinking or feeling is 
 a purposive process entire and throughout. Since 
 the purposive process is to them the process of the 
 idea, it follows that the idea is regarded as "a plan 
 of action," and as action in human life is often sy- 
 nonymous with conduct, "conduct" to them is a
 
 INTRODUCTORY ii 
 
 fundamental conception, with this distinction that 
 whereas in ordinary conversation we use the word 
 conduct as having a moral meaning with reference 
 to a principle of right and wrong, Pragmatists by 
 the term conduct mean action without any moral 
 meaning but only its utiHty for producing results. 
 
 The same criticism which dealt a vital blow to 
 Hegel's Metaphysics can be brought against the 
 Pragmatist conception of mental life as a conscious 
 purposive evolutive process. The fundamental 
 principle of Hegel was the evolution of the Absolute 
 Idea. This evolution was constant and continuous. 
 Hence this system postulated motion only, and had 
 no place for rest. Now Physical Science admits not 
 only kinetic energy but also potential energy. If 
 Hegel's principle were true, nature would reveal 
 kinetic energies only. In like manner, if conscious 
 purposive evolution held sway throughout mental 
 life, all knowledge would form part of the process 
 and there would be no latent knowledge, i.e. knowl- 
 edge outside of the process. This teaching, however, 
 is not true, as our experience clearly proves. Mem- 
 ory can be compared to a storehouse of latent 
 knowledge. Both Professor Dewey and Professor 
 James admit the truth of this criticism, and the 
 admission reveals the weakness of their fundamental 
 principle. Professor James calls these latent ele- 
 ments of knowledge not ideas but "latent truths," 
 a delightful illustration of "a contradiction in 
 terms," for according to his teaching a truth is a
 
 12 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 truth because it works, and if a truth is not working, 
 how can it be a truth? 
 
 Pragmatists evade the criticism by maintaining 
 that their basic principle is the purposive evolution 
 of the idea, that the idea is "a plan of action" and 
 therefore that these latent truths or elements of 
 knowledge are not ideas inasmuch as they are not 
 plans of action entering into the conscious process. 
 Hence the issue is centred on the meaning of the 
 "idea." 
 
 Pragmatism proposes the idea as "a plan of 
 action." This teaching is not startHng nor is it 
 new. For centuries Scholastic Philosophy has con- 
 stantly taught that there is an idea exemplaris, i.e. 
 an exemplar idea; or in other words an idea conceived 
 as a plan of action. What is startling and new in 
 the statement of Pragmatists is that the idea is "a 
 plan of action" only. In this teaching Pragmatism 
 comes into direct conflict not only with Scholastic 
 Philosophy but with common sense. Scholastic 
 Philosophy teaches that the idea is the grasping by 
 the mind of the meaning of a thing, i.e. it is the 
 intellectual meaning of an object either existing in 
 nature or pictured as an image in the imagination. 
 This meaning may or may not initiate a course of 
 action; it may or may not become a plan of action. 
 If it does. Scholastic Philosophy terms it an exem- 
 plar idea, i.e. an idea conceived as or connoting a 
 plan of action. The intellectual meaning of a 
 thing may instantly become a plan of action or it
 
 INTRODUCTORY 13 
 
 may not; yet it always has a potency to initiate 
 action. Hence the distinction is made between 
 active and latent ideas or knowledge of things — a 
 distinction recognized by common sense. Modern 
 Pedagogy admits the same distinction when it insists 
 upon the importance of "fruitful ideas," thus main- 
 taining that some ideas are fruitful, i.e. lead to 
 action, and others are not fruitful. Pragmatism re- 
 stricts the meaning of "idea" to a special class of 
 ideas because its main principle is that mental life 
 is an active purposive evolutive process. Hence 
 by the term "idea" it is compelled, in virtue of its 
 basic principle, to accept only ideas that are active 
 and fruitful of effects. But in narrowing the defini- 
 tion of the idea to an idea which initiates action, 
 they not only fail to make active purposive evolution 
 reign supreme throughout the totality of mental 
 life, but really admit its limitations. Thus a sub- 
 terfuge is employed not easily discernible to the 
 ordinary reader but once pointed out is readily 
 understood. 
 
 The influence exerted by the writers criticised in 
 the following pages is not of the same degree. Pro- 
 fessor Royce was more widely read while his system 
 was in process of formation. At present his hold on 
 the American mind is waning fast. Professor Dewey 
 and the Chicago School appeal directly to teachers, 
 and his influence therefore has been primarily 
 academic. Professor Schiller, through his doctrine 
 of Humanism, has struck a more popular vein. The
 
 14 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 teachings of Professor James and of Professor 
 Bergson, on the contrary, are not confined to the 
 classroom. They are read and discussed in business, 
 professional and social circles. The nature of this 
 influence is materialistic and sensual. Their writings 
 are in harmony with a certain trend of modern life, 
 and consequently seem to furnish a philosophical 
 basis for and a justification of this trend. 
 
 In the business and professional world to-day the 
 ruling principle is success. To obtain results is the 
 great purpose and aim. By results is understood 
 material gain. Professor James and Professor Berg- 
 son present a Psychology and a World-Theory con- 
 formable to this frame of mind. This Psychology 
 and World-Theory are really based on the principle 
 that " the end justifies the means." The means em- 
 ployed are not judged with reference to a principle 
 of right and wrong. They are considered to be true 
 and good, if useful or expedient to the purpose in 
 view. Hence the truth or goodness of an action or 
 of conduct is gauged by success alone, and this 
 success is personal and always of a practical kind. 
 
 In making the morality of action or conduct 
 depend on material or practical success, the very 
 notion of morahty is destroyed. Now there is 
 one fact absolutely certain in human life, viz. that 
 there is a moral law of right and wrong based on 
 the very nature of things. The conscience of the 
 individual, the history of the human race, bear 
 witness to the existence and sway of the moral law
 
 INTRODUCTORY 15 
 
 as a fundamental principle and primary conviction 
 in human life. In denying a fundamental principle 
 and primary conviction of human life, Pragmatism 
 is shown to be radically false. 
 
 Moreover, in teaching that practical success is 
 the only test of what is true and good, Pragmatism 
 advocates a principle which leads to most disastrous 
 consequences in individual social and political life. 
 It professedly proclaims that might is superior to 
 right, that trickery and dishonesty are superior to 
 uprightness and truth. The thoughtful reader is 
 appalled at the results which would follow from the 
 rigid application of such doctrines. Law and order 
 would no longer exist. Personal and public con- 
 science would become words with no meaning and 
 the practical man would rule them out of his vocabu- 
 lary. Civilization would be shaken to its very 
 foundations, for our civilization is based on the 
 Christian moral law. 
 
 There is more in human life than the material 
 and sensual. There is more in the universe than the 
 human. God rules in His world and the moral 
 law holds sway. Any school of Philosophy which 
 ignores these truths fails to understand the meaning 
 of nature and to recognize what is deepest in human 
 life. It is with this conviction that the present 
 volume is published. The aim is not only to point 
 out the consequences of the Pragmatic teaching, 
 but primarily to show from a close study of its 
 leading advocates that its doctrine is narrow, one-
 
 1 6 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 sided and false, that its characteristic teaching is 
 the importance attached to purpose and the exclu- 
 sion of first principles, that its basis rests upon an 
 erroneous interpretation of mental life, which a 
 special meaning attached to the word idea in vain 
 attempts to justify.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM 
 
 Pragmatism is best described as a point of view 
 which is based on definite postulates and is ex- 
 pressed in a distinctive way of regarding mental 
 life and conduct. As a point of view it is looking 
 away from first principles and looking to results, 
 which it terms facts. Hence it claims to be an 
 Empirical tendency. The point of view is shown 
 in its theory of truth, its explanation of mental life 
 and in its teaching on the relation of thought to 
 reality. Thus its doctrines have been summed up 
 and set forth in three phases: in psychology by 
 Professor James, who calls his system Radical 
 Empiricism; in logic by Professor Dewey, who 
 proclaims Instrumentalism, and in metaphysics 
 by Professor Royce, who claims to be an Absolute 
 Pragmatist; Schiller, who teaches Humanism, and 
 Bergson, who is known as the Apostle of Creative 
 Evolution. The present chapter is confined to the 
 psychological and logical phases which deal prin- 
 cipally with the theory of truth and the explanation 
 of mental life.
 
 1 8 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 I. Postulates of Pragmatism 
 
 Pragmatism can be understood only by viewing 
 it against a background which it accepts without 
 question. In origin it is a reaction against the 
 extravagant Idealism of the nineteenth century. 
 With the reaction went a leaning to and an accept- 
 ance of the Empirical stream of nineteenth century 
 thought. To this it added its sole characteristic 
 doctrine: insistence on mental activity, which is 
 viewed as a unifying principle for the Empiric 
 background. In the background are found the 
 postulates or assumptions of Pragmatism. The 
 more important of these are: Sensism, Evolution 
 and a so-called Scientific Method. 
 
 Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism is the basic 
 postulate of Pragmatism. Sense-experience is held 
 to be the source and material of all knowledge. 
 Therefore the objects of knowledge are not things, 
 nor the real appearance of things, but their appear- 
 ances as they are viewed within the mind. Thus 
 Professor James holds that our whole conception 
 of an object consists of "sensations and their reac- 
 tions," and that "ideas themselves are but parts 
 of our experience." To confound ideas with sensa- 
 tions by denying a distinction between the two is 
 Sensism, just as to say that the mental appearances 
 are the object of knowledge is Phenomenal Idealism. 
 Again he writes that things are not what they are, 
 but only what and as " they are known as," and
 
 EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM 19 
 
 "for us they are not different if they make no differ- 
 ence." But this is the false principle of the Relativity 
 of knowledge added to the Idealism. Moreover, he 
 tells us that we cannot know substances, either 
 material or spiritual, as such. But this is Agnosti- 
 cism. Besides, to say that " substance is a spurious 
 idea," that it is only " the name for a group of sensa- 
 tions," because phenomena come to us "as groups 
 of sensations," is to propose the false teaching of 
 Nominalism; i.e. our conceptions of things are names 
 only. With Professor Dewey "experience" is the 
 sum and substance of knowledge and of mental 
 life. He denies an ontological distinction between 
 thought and its material, and says this distinction 
 is " within experience " and then only " an economic 
 distinction" to show "a division of labor." Hence 
 the material or subject-matter of thought is not 
 outside of and distinct from the mind. Again he 
 writes that " the distinctions between mind and body 
 and their alleged disparateness and supposed paral- 
 lelism are a pseudo-problem created by a prejudiced 
 metaphysics." Thus the facts with which Pragma- 
 tism deals are mental facts; not things, but the per- 
 ceptions of things; not God, but belief in God; not 
 an external world, but belief in an external world. 
 God and the external world exist for the Pragmatist 
 only because and in so far as these beliefs have 
 the marks of a true belief. Hence God and the 
 external world are known only as inferred from 
 the beliefs.
 
 20 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 Evolution is the constructive or integrating pos- 
 tulate of Pragmatism. The world, i.e. experience, 
 is an evolutive process. Professor James rejects 
 Absolute Monism and Absolute Pluralism. To him 
 the world is one in so far as its parts hang together 
 by any definite connection; it is many just so far as 
 any definite connection fails to obtain; and he adds 
 that "it is growing more and more united by those 
 systems of connection which human energy keeps 
 forming as time goes on." Professor Dewey holds 
 that the evolution process is of experience and in 
 experience, and writes, " Reality must be defined in 
 terms of experience, and judgment appears as the 
 medium through which the consciously effected evo- 
 lution of Reality goes on." Hence thought is not a 
 mere product, but an organic factor in the process. 
 Thus the difference between mind and matter, sub- 
 ject and object, does not mean the existence of two 
 separate and naturally exclusive worlds, but the 
 rich potentiality, the creative activity of one. But 
 this is Ideal Monism. Reality, therefore, does not 
 exist outside the mind. It consists in the mental 
 process of making or remaking the world, i.e. experi- 
 ence. Hence evolution is an essential character of 
 Reality and Reality is change. This fact that "ex- 
 perience " is undergoing change in the evolution 
 process is the Pragmatic doctrine that Reality, i.e. 
 Being, is plastic. Experience is conceived as self- 
 supporting and self-propelling. Thus the principle 
 of continuity is assumed. Reality, i.e. experience,
 
 EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM 21 
 
 is not conceived as individual experience, but as 
 social. Hence the evolution is described as a 
 social process, of which the individual experience 
 or reality is a part. Moreover, Pragmatism holds 
 that Darwin showed the existence of purpose, 
 and hence teaches that the evolution-process is 
 purposive or teleological. 
 
 In criticism it can be said that the evolution 
 postulate is a pure assumption. Reahty is not 
 what is known as, nor is it merely the product of 
 our thought. Realities exist without reference to our 
 minds. The mind finds realities and must conform 
 to them. It is true I can combine realities, e.g. 
 build a house, or dissociate them, e.g. in chemical 
 analysis, but I must conform to certain laws having 
 reference to their properties and action. To make 
 the knowledge of realities constitute realities is 
 idealism. The familiar story of the nine blind men 
 and the elephant comes in illustration. Many 
 realities exist without being known as such and 
 exert an influence upon our lives, e.g. the composi- 
 tion of the atmosphere. Again we are told that 
 private and social consciousness make up experience, 
 but Professor James assures us that experience only 
 becomes experience when known as, and what is 
 not known as does not exist. 
 
 Moreover, to set forth evolution as a world- 
 process, whether real or ideal, is the extreme of 
 Metaphysics, although Professor Dewey is fond 
 of ridiculing Metaphysics. Darwinian evolution
 
 22 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 is discredited by scientists of to-day. The only 
 element of truth in Darwin's system is the fact 
 of growth. He showed that growth is a law of 
 life. But the processes of growth depend upon 
 the nature of the life. The mind grows, but not 
 like the body; Psychology is not Physiology. 
 The body grows, but not like the tree; Physiology 
 is not Botany. The only real advance in Biology 
 within fifty years is Mendel's Law verified of vege- 
 table life only. And Professor Bateson, of Oxford, 
 asserts that had Darwin known of this law, the 
 Origin of Species would not have been written. To 
 conceive the abstract fact of Growth as an integrat- 
 ing principle in a world-process is a pure assumption 
 in contradiction to established truths. Even Pro- 
 fessor James holds that the perception of sameness 
 in kind is a category of common sense, and according 
 to him the one first discovered and used by our 
 lowest ancestors. But how can we recognize same- 
 ness in kind in an ever-changing process of develop- 
 ment where the "experience" is ever plastic and 
 thinking of a thing means its "real modification" 
 with Professor Dewey, or its" transformation " with 
 Professor James, so that the " future .may not iden- 
 tically repeat and imitate the past" ? 
 
 A so-called Scientific Method is the instrumental 
 postulate of Pragmatism. This method is the 
 appHcation of the working-hypothesis of Modern 
 Science to mental life. Evolution explains the 
 "going," the working-hypothesis gives us the
 
 EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM 23 
 
 instrument of the "going" and unfolds the 
 technique of the process. 
 
 The working-hypothesis of science is a "device" 
 or "working-formula" for dealing with scientific 
 problems and accepted provisionally if it does the 
 work. In Hke manner all our theories are viewed 
 as "leadings," "instruments for use," "modes of 
 adaptation" to the ReaHty which is conceived 
 to be in the solution of the mental problem. The 
 sole question in the mind of the Pragmatist is 
 not that the theory or the "idea" with Professor 
 James or the "judgment process" with Professor 
 Dewey be true or false, but will it "work"? 
 The theory is adopted simply for that reason and 
 for that alone. Its value consists in its working 
 quality, and this consists in its adaptability for 
 undergoing real variation in the evolutive recon- 
 struction of experience. Thus, in the sense that it 
 is a useful instrument, the idea becomes a mediating 
 factor or function in the process. 
 
 In criticism we say that men of science explic- 
 itly contrast working-hypotheses with established 
 truths and give provisional assent only to the 
 former. It is Scepticism to hold that all scientific 
 theories are purely working-hypotheses, and it is 
 false to apply the working-hypothesis to mental 
 life and call it a scientific method. Finally, 
 science deals with actual existing things, not with 
 group-sensations.
 
 24 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 II. The Theory of Truth 
 
 Pragmatism tests the truth of a notion by its 
 respective practical consequences. Truth with 
 Professor James is what is "useful" or "expedient"; 
 with Professor' Dewey what is "instrumental" for 
 "satisfaction." Hence truth is relative to the 
 person: what is useful to me may not be useful to 
 you, and what is useful to me to-day may not be 
 useful to-morrow. Thus truth changes with per- 
 sons, times and places. But this is Scepticism and 
 destroys the bases of Physical Science. 
 
 Again, Professor James asks what difference it 
 would practically make to any one if this notion 
 rather than that were true, and answers, "If no dif- 
 ference, the alternative means practically the same." 
 But this is Subjectivism and is contradicted by the 
 history of development in every branch of science. 
 We distinguish pure science from applied science. 
 The truths of pure science are discovered and veri- 
 fied before they are applied to the practical uses of 
 life. Again, practical significance riiay be real or 
 apparent, actual or possible. Yet I do not know 
 the possible practical significance of all things. To 
 make my present knowledge or needs the test of 
 truth is the ego-centric doctrine in an extreme form. 
 But Pragmatism cannot avoid the difficulty, for 
 its basic postulate is "experience." Truth is con- 
 ceived as working within "experience." Hence 
 experience must find within itself the source and
 
 EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM 25 
 
 support of its values of truth and error. Thus 
 Professor James holds that objective truth, i.e. 
 apart from its function in our experience, is not to 
 be found. 
 
 As experience is the basis upon which the theory 
 of truth rests, so the evolution-process furnishes 
 the test of its value. An idea is true if it works, 
 and it works if, in the constant evolutive recon- 
 struction of experience, it is successful in bringing 
 one part of experience in touch with another part, 
 especially in mediating between old opinions and 
 new experience, so as to cause the least possible 
 jolt in the blending. Hence truth is not a property 
 inherent in the idea: it marks the success and effi- 
 ciency of the idea as a useful instrument. 
 
 This is the theory of Instrumentalism proposed 
 by Professor Dewey. The working is prompted by 
 needs, hence it is true for a special purpose. But 
 to assume that the satisfaction of needs is desirable 
 and necessary is Perfectionism in its most flagrant 
 form, although Pragmatists are fond of ridicuHng 
 Perfectionism. Not all our needs or desires should 
 be satisfied, and, with many, restraint should be 
 used. Temperance in thought and action is a 
 cardinal virtue. Discipline of thought and char- 
 acter is the basic principle in education. Hence 
 there is a difference of value in needs and desires. 
 If the value of truth consists merely in the efficiency 
 of work, where is the standard for the difference of 
 value in needs and desires? The act of the idea to
 
 26 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 Pragmatists, not the idea itself, is true, and it is 
 true in so far as it functions or is an adaptation 
 in the evolutive process of experience. Its truth 
 is its utility as a means to an end. An idea is 
 true because it makes itself true by an efficient 
 discharge of its mediating function as an organic 
 part of the process of real change in a developing 
 world. 
 
 Thus with Professor James the true is only *'the 
 expedient" in the way of our thinking, just as the 
 right is only the expedient "in the way of our be- 
 having." As ends constantly change in the experi- 
 encing-process, so do the purposes change, and with 
 the change of purposes comes the corresponding 
 constant changing of the means when judged by 
 the test of expediency. With the change in means 
 goes a corresponding change in truth. What may 
 be true, i.e. expedient and useful to-day, may to- 
 morrow be false, i.e. inexpedient and useless. The 
 ends and means change, because the means, in 
 working, effect a change in the contents of expe- 
 rience. 
 
 This is the Pragmatic Doctrine of the Plasticity 
 of truth. Thus as the postulate of evolution 
 teaches a plasticity of being, so, when viewed 
 as the background of truth, does it teach a plas- 
 ticity of truth. Professor James calls Absolute 
 Truth, i.e. what no further experience will ever 
 alter, "that ideal vanishing-point towards which we 
 imagine all our temporary truths will some day
 
 EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM 27 
 
 converge." Nothing is stable in this teaching. 
 Yet there are stable elements in the physical, 
 mental and moral worlds. These do not impede, 
 but guide and serve action. Orderly activity sup- 
 poses them. Otherwise science could not exist. 
 The very basis and structural elements of a science 
 are made up of definite fixed principles or laws. 
 
 Thus truth as a mental activity appears in the 
 form of a working-hypothesis, with no guide or test 
 except the measure of success which it achieves 
 for the time being. The measure of success justi- 
 fies its use and it is useful "in so far forth" as it 
 succeeds. Applied to business life, this principle 
 implies, if not dishonesty, at least sharp practice. 
 Applied to politics, it does not set forth a high, 
 true ideal of citizenship, but is very welcome to the 
 "grafter." Applied to moral life, it teaches that 
 the end justifies the means. As a working-hypothe- 
 sis, the idea appears as a process, a plan of action, 
 and a process which is only approximately true. 
 Hence there are grades in truth. Some truths are 
 truer than others, i.e. if they are more useful in- 
 struments for the work. If better instruments are 
 found or invented, the old truths, like old clothes, 
 are outworn and discarded, unless a practical mother 
 makes them over for the rising heir. Professor 
 Dewey teaches that truth is what is "instrumental" 
 for "satisfaction," and Professor James says that 
 "individuals will emphasize their points of satis- 
 faction differently."
 
 28 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 In criticism we say that science holds data 
 true prior to the process, hence they are true in 
 some other sense than by being satisfactory. 
 Besides, some truths are not satisfactory just 
 because they are true. Again, men of science 
 distinguish between established truths and work- 
 ing-hypotheses. In taking the latter to illustrate 
 mental activity, Pragmatism assumes as its 
 method that which in science is regarded as 
 giving the least assurance that truth is present at 
 all. Again, a he may be useful at times; if useful, 
 it is true. Moreover, to tell the truth may not be 
 useful or expedient, hence the truth may not be 
 true. The Pragmatist is ever asking the question, 
 What is there in this for me? Thus Professor 
 James says that "we cannot reject any hypothesis 
 if consequences useful to life flow from it." Yet in 
 fact error, delusion and deception appeaHng to 
 human needs and purposes are at times effective 
 in directing human life and conduct. 
 
 Thus, while the postulates of Pragmatism fur- 
 nish the setting for the theory of truth and enable 
 us to see how it works, yet the theory itself is clearly 
 grasped only when viewed as the positive expres- 
 sion of the sole characteristic doctrine of Pragma- 
 tism, viz. its explanation of mental life which sets 
 forth the "idea" or the "judgment process" as a 
 purposive action, thereby combining mind and will 
 in one act. Hence truth with them is not the cor- 
 respondence of an idea within the mind to an object
 
 EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM 29 
 
 outside the mind, but consists in the efficacy of the 
 "idea" or "judgment" as a means or instrument 
 to an end. The end, constantly changing with the 
 constant changing subject-matter or experience, is 
 the ever-present purposive reconstruction of the 
 experience within the mind. The successful work- 
 ing, at best approximate only, and different with 
 different persons, or with the same person at each 
 succeeding moment, is the reconstruction of expe- 
 rience, and this is viewed as reality because it is the 
 effect or result of mental action. 
 
 Thus to Pragmatists truth is the relation or the 
 correspondence of the idea or judgment to reality, 
 i.e. the mental effect which it produces. There- 
 fore the postulates, in furnishing the setting for 
 the Pragmatic theory of truth, are not accepted 
 because they are true in themselves. In fact, 
 they are pure assumptions and considered as 
 true by Pragmatists "inasmuch" and "in so far 
 forth" as they are "useful" or "expedient" for 
 the working presentation of the theory. 
 
 III. The Problem of Thought 
 
 With Professor Dewey the heart of the knowing 
 problem is the relation of thought to its empirical 
 antecedents and to its consequent, i.e. truth, and 
 the relation of both to Reality. To him Reality 
 is not viewed as self-existent outside the mind; it 
 is experience undergoing reconstruction in and
 
 30 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 through the judgment process. Therefore mental 
 life contains no entity as ''soul" or "mind," but is 
 "a stream of consciousness" compounded of "in- 
 stincts," "interests" or "impulses." Hence he 
 defines Psychology as the natural history of the 
 various attitudes and structures through which 
 experiencing passes as mental states in the stream 
 of consciousness. Thus experience is the general 
 term for mental activity; "habit," "attention," 
 "consciousness" are particular works or functions 
 of that activity. 
 
 Experience first comes to the mind unorganized; 
 as such, with Professor Dewey, it is not knowledge, 
 for knowledge he conceives to be organized or 
 reconstructed experience, and as this recon- 
 struction takes place in the judgment-process, 
 there is no knowledge outside of the judgment. 
 "Fact" and "idea" are distinctions within expe- 
 rience, and as such are parts of experience viewed 
 as different simply because they act or function in 
 a different manner; the "fact" is the object within 
 the mind, the "idea" is its meaning. The ante- 
 cedents of thought are not knowledge : only stimuli 
 to knowledge. Hence Professor Dewey says that 
 "the simple idea of sensation is without objective 
 reference"; that "what is perceived immediately is 
 that part of the datum in the mind which is the 
 object of attention"; that "objectivity consists in 
 actually being the object of thought," for "what 
 I do not think about is not objective," and to be the
 
 EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM 31 
 
 object of thought is what is "isolated in the stream 
 of conscious experience by attention with a view to 
 the attainment of a purpose." Thus ''things are 
 apprehended as objective in virtue of the agent's 
 attitude to them; they are not objective antecedent 
 to his attitude." In Hke manner Professor James 
 tells us that things are "as they are known as." 
 Therefore the basis of mental life is Phenomenal 
 Idealism. 
 
 In criticism it can be said that objectivity is 
 defined in a partial and erroneous sense. It is 
 true a mental state may be the object of thought 
 as in meditation. Yet a thing existing outside the 
 mind can be the object of thought, e.g. a child 
 playing with blocks, my friend at solitaire, or a 
 scientist in the laboratory is dealing with real 
 objective things. Again, the objects within the 
 mind come wholly or in part from the outside 
 world. Therefore the term objective primarily and 
 essentially refers to things existing outside the 
 mind. Pragmatism confines the use of the term 
 objective to mental states and makes the distinction 
 between objective and subjective a distinction 
 within the mind because its teaching is based on 
 mental experience, and holds that mental expe- 
 rience is the sole subject-matter of thought. But 
 this contention is contradicted by the happenings 
 of ordinary daily life. 
 
 Moreover, Pragmatism assumes mental experi- 
 ence as the subject-matter of thought because it
 
 32 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 denies immediate knowledge of things external 
 to the mind. Yet Professor Stuart admits that 
 mental "actions are suggested by consciously rec- 
 ognized stimuli" and that the external "object, 
 e.g. a stone, must have a certain meaning as a 
 stimulus first of all."^ These admissions overturn 
 the foundation of his system. The "conscious rec- 
 ognition of stimuli" and the apprehension of their 
 ** meaning" is knowledge. This knowledge may not 
 be classified or as complete as that found in the 
 judgment process, but there can be grades or de- 
 grees of knowledge, and even Professor Dewey says 
 that the knowledge of the judgment process is not 
 final, but provisional only. Hence it is a contra- 
 diction to confine knowledge to the judgment 
 process and admit that we grasp the "meaning" 
 of what stimulates the process. 
 
 Thought for Pragmatism is the name for the 
 process in which instincts and their appreciations 
 interact and reconstruct themselves under the guid- 
 ance of purpose with a view to conscious control. 
 As ideal experience is the basic postulate of mental 
 life, so evolution is the integrating postulate. The 
 first stage of the process arises in inner "distrac- 
 tions" or "tensions" produced by needs of the 
 mental situation. The process is active throughout 
 and is described as a constant movement toward 
 a defined equilibrium or reorganization which is 
 viewed as the fulfilment of the purpose. The 
 
 ' Studies in Logical Theory, pp. 251, 256. ib., pp. 31, 35, 37-40 48.
 
 EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM 33 
 
 **idea" is derived from the situation and mediates 
 as "a plan of action" in readjusting the conflicting 
 elements. This is known as "the conflict-medi- 
 atorial" theory of thought. Mind or consciousness 
 is what it seems to be, viz. a transition-phase of 
 the contents of experience undergoing reconstruc- 
 tion into something else. In this view experience 
 is conceived as dynamic and self-evolving in specific 
 conditions determined and controlled by the specific 
 purposes. 
 
 Knowledge therefore is not a state, i.e. stable, 
 but an action: it is knowing for the present plan 
 or purpose, and the act of knowing is set forth 
 in biological terms. Thus Professor Dewey says 
 that logical theory is an account of thinking as a 
 mode of adaptation and judges its validity by the 
 consequences, i.e. its efficiency in meeting the prob- 
 lem. This view of thought as a dynamic teleo- 
 logical evolution effecting ever-constant change in 
 reality brings out the fundamental doctrine in the 
 Pragmatic theory of thought, viz. the definition of 
 thought as purposive action, and purposive action is 
 conduct, a definition which identifies thought and 
 will and denies any distinction between them. The 
 source of this doctrine is found in the development 
 of modern Psychology. Just as modern Sociology 
 differs from the Sociology of Spencer in this that it 
 takes the Sociology of Spencer, which is structural 
 merely and views it as functional, so that writers 
 hold that Modern Sociology begins where Spencer's
 
 34 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 Sociology ends, in like manner a change in the point 
 of view has taken place in Psychology. The Psy- 
 chology of Spencer, Bain and Mill is structural 
 only. This structural Psychology is now viewed 
 as functioning. 
 
 The evolutive functioning of experience is ex- 
 pressed in the dynamic action of thought, which 
 can be so conceived only by identifying thought 
 and will. The identification becomes necessary 
 from the fact that purpose is now admitted to 
 rule in the world. Thus we can understand why 
 Professor Dewey aims to set forth the natural 
 history of thought, i.e. after Spencer; why he 
 seeks its beginnings in conflict, i.e. after Spencer; 
 why he describes the process as a teleological inte- 
 grating movement toward conscious control, i.e. 
 adding purpose to Spencer's equilibrium; why he 
 considers first principles as results of previous 
 inductions transmitted to us, i.e. after Spencer, and 
 why he explains the thought-process as an adapta- 
 tion not of structure to function as with Spencer, 
 but of function to Reality, which is conceived as 
 the product and result of the thought functioning. 
 Reality therefore is considered as ever in the mak- 
 ing, and here Pragmatism places its doctrine of 
 free-will, which, with Professor James, means the 
 introduction of ''changes" into the world. 
 
 In criticism we say that, although Pragmatists 
 teach the identification of thought and will by ex- 
 plaining thought as purposive action, yet in fact they
 
 EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM 35 
 
 admit the distinction by regarding some thought as 
 not here and now entering into the purposive action. 
 Thus Professor James writes: "The practical value 
 of true ideas is primarily derived from the practical 
 importance of their objects to us. These objects 
 are, indeed, not important at all times, and these 
 ideas, however verifiable, will be practically irrele- 
 vant and had better remain latent. Yet since 
 almost any object may some day become tem- 
 porarily important, the advantage of having a 
 general stock of extra truths, of ideas that shall be 
 true of merely possible situations, is obvious." ^ 
 Professor Dewey writes that "the conflict in thought 
 makes certain elements in experience assume con- 
 scious objectification " ; that "the most char- 
 acteristic trait of consciousness is its selective 
 function with reference to stimuli"; that "the 
 subjective is the holding of contents from defi- 
 nitely asserted position"; that "the objective is 
 that which is carried forward in the process, the 
 subjective is what is left behind" or "excluded from 
 the problem"; that " this subjective may become 
 the initial in other problems and remains a fact, 
 even a worthful fact, as a part of one's inner 
 experience." He admits "abstractions which are 
 without possible reference or bearing" on the spe- 
 cific problem, says "thought starts from a specific, 
 i.e. particular occasion and ends at a specific issue," 
 and holds that "in the history of scientific inquiry 
 ^ Pragmatism, p. 203.
 
 36 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 there is a relegation of accepted meanings into 
 the limbo of mere ideas." ^ 
 
 These words show clearly that there are conscious 
 elements in experience which here and now do not 
 enter into the present purposive thought-process. 
 This means that while all purpose includes the ele- 
 ment of thought, yet all thought-elements are not 
 purposive here and now, although they may become 
 so. But this is the fundamental teaching of Scho- 
 lastic Philosophy, and Professor Dewey's admission 
 of this truth destroys the basic element of his 
 system. In fact, the introduction of purpose as the 
 guiding element in the thought-process apparently 
 makes thought purposive, and in truth much 
 thought is purposive, but closer analysis shows 
 that purpose is selective both in the beginning and 
 throughout the thought-process, and selection means 
 that certain conscious elements of experience are ex- 
 cluded from the present process. They are latent 
 or quiescent and exist in the mind, for Professor 
 Dewey describes them. Therefore all conscious 
 experience is not at the same time purposive 
 action. 
 
 In explaining the technique of thought, Prag- 
 matists appeal to the "working-hypothesis" of 
 Physical Science. To them knowledge is confined 
 to judgment and not to judgment pure and simple, 
 but to a special kind of judgment, viz. the judg- 
 ment whose meaning is uncertain. Hence knowledge 
 
 ^ Studies in Logical Theory, ch. I-IV.
 
 EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM 37 
 
 begins with doubt and is in essence an inquiry. The 
 subject of the judgment is the mental fact, the predi- 
 cate is the idea. The process is the determination 
 of the fact, and the idea accompHshes this after the 
 manner of a working-hypothesis. 
 
 In criticism we may say that knowledge, accord- 
 ing to the expressed statements of Pragmatists, is 
 not confined to the judgment, for they admit con- 
 scious elements in experience which are not included 
 in the judgment process going on here and now. 
 Therefore the technique of the working-hypothesis 
 cannot be applied to all our conscious states, but 
 is confined to the actual judgment process of the 
 moment. 
 
 Furthermore, the working-hypothesis cannot be 
 applied in explanation of all judgment, for there 
 are judgments whose truth is grasped without 
 any process of inquiry, e.g. first principles and 
 axioms. These are the basis of knowledge. To 
 deliberately exclude self-evident truths from being 
 considered knowledge and to confine knowledge 
 to the elucidation of mental situations which are 
 doubtful is to make Scepticism the beginning 
 and basis of knowledge. 
 
 Finally, even in the process of the doubt-judg- 
 ment, the idea is not a working-hypothesis. If it 
 were, then the only difference in ideas would be their 
 efficiency in solving the situation. But the presence 
 of purpose in the process shows clearly that some 
 ideas are selected in preference to others as more
 
 38 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 fitted to meet the situation, and that they are 
 selected because their difference in character is 
 perceived antecedent to their work. 
 
 IV. Criticism 
 
 The postulates in the background of Pragmatism 
 are fragments coming from the broken Science- 
 Philosophy of the last century. They are not true 
 in themselves, and no mere combination can ever 
 make them true. The sole characteristic doctrine 
 of Pragmatism, which forms them into the new 
 combination, is not true; for Pragmatists admit 
 that all conscious elements of experience are not 
 purposive. This means that all thought is not 
 purposive. 
 
 To take the Association-Psychology of Spencer, 
 Mill and Bain, discarded for some years in the 
 schools, and to turn it, by the twist of a word, into 
 a new system, does not make a new system in reahty, 
 but in appearance only. The fundamental difficul- 
 ties unanswerable to the old Psychology are thus 
 carried over into the new and persistently cry out 
 for a solution. To get the old structural mechanism 
 to work by the use of a word will not solve the diffi- 
 culties. The mechanism itself needs attention. 
 
 Thus how can Pragmatism explain unity of con- 
 sciousness, memory, anticipation, personal identity or 
 even reflection? In fact, Pragmatists give minute 
 description of the mental process in all its stages
 
 EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM 39 
 
 and mention the other elements of conscious experi- 
 ence which are outside the process, but forget to 
 explain the most important problem of mental Hfe, 
 viz. who sees all this. Pragmatists expHcitly reject 
 a soul or mind, but in their descriptions of mental 
 life actually postulate its existence. 
 
 There is direct knowledge, e.g. when I deal with 
 external things, as well as reflex knowledge, e.g. 
 meditation. To confound both or to neglect the 
 former and make the logic of reflective thought con- 
 stitute the logical theory is on a par with confining 
 the use of the term knowledge to the judgment of 
 doubt and assume that this kind of knowledge is 
 all we have. 
 
 Mental distinction does not mean actual separa- 
 tion. I can distinguish many elements in combina- 
 tion without thereby separating them. 
 
 In calHng attention to the activity of mental 
 life, Pragmatism insists upon a truth. Mental life 
 is active. Its explanation of this activity, however, 
 is false. This is the purpose of the present analysis, 
 viz. to point out that the distinctive doctrine of the 
 latest philosophical system is based upon the false 
 definition of the idea: the most fundamental and 
 apparently the simplest element in mental life.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 
 
 The most important contribution to Meta- 
 physics in recent years from the pen of an American 
 writer is the publication of the Gifford Lectures 
 delivered by Professor Royce at the University of 
 Aberdeen, entitled The World and the Individual. 
 In these lectures is set forth for the first time the 
 system of Constructive Idealism which has been 
 taking shape in the mind of Professor Royce since 
 the publishing of his early philosophical essays 
 some twenty years ago. The reader faces a theory 
 of the universe set forth with a wealth and vivid- 
 ness of language. This theory is characterized by 
 the dominant element of tendency and is an ex- 
 haustive presentation of what Professor Royce calls 
 Absolute Pragmatism. 
 
 I. Conceptions of Being 
 
 Professor Royce tells us that his Gifford Lectures 
 are "a philosophical inquiry into first principles," 
 and "an apphcation of these first principles to 
 problems that directly concern reHgion," Vol. I,
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 41 
 
 p. vii. By "first principles" he means the prin- 
 ciples of Ontology, and he, therefore, calls his work 
 a treatise on the Metaphysics of Religion, ib., 
 Introduction. To him religion must be studied 
 "primarily as a body of ontological problems and 
 opinions, in other words as, in its theory, a branch 
 of the Theory of Being," ib., p. 11. Yet in the 
 Introductory Lecture of the second volume, he 
 takes the reader into his confidence by the assur- 
 ance that science is " the field of empirically ac- 
 credited facts," religion " the field of facts beyond 
 the range of human experience." Therefore, "an 
 Idealistic Theory of Being Hes beyond all human 
 experience," Vol. II, p. 13; thus his Metaphysics 
 becomes an IdeaHsm, his Ontology an Idealogy. 
 
 Closer and more detailed study places beyond 
 doubt that this is the real value of Professor Royce's 
 contribution to the philosophy of religion. With 
 the avowed purpose of discussing the Metaphysics 
 of ReHgion he first of all proposes a Theory of 
 Being. The Theories of Realism, of Mysticism, 
 of Validity are criticised and set aside as defective. 
 
 The ReaHstic conception of Being is "the typical 
 notion of socially respectable conservatism, when- 
 ever such conservatism begins to use the speech of 
 technical philosophy," Vol. I, p. 91. ReaHsm as- 
 serts "that to be real means to be independent of 
 ideas, which, while other than a given real being, 
 still relate to that being," ib., pp. 92, 62. Hence 
 the world according to ReaHsm is "a world of in-
 
 42 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 dependent Beings," ih., p. 103. The Realistic 
 conception of Being Professor Royce rejects. His 
 reasons are that it "especially tends to sunder the 
 what from the that, the essence from its existence," 
 ib., p. 106. In other words it "sunders external 
 and internal meaning: is exclusively external," 
 ih., p. 75. Hence "its central technical difficulty 
 is the nature of individuality and the naming of 
 universals," ih., p. 76. 
 
 With Realism "independence destroys Hnkages 
 among beings, hence " the problem of the One and 
 the Many proves to be the great test problem of 
 realistic metaphysics," ih., p. 112. If the beings 
 are "mutually independent," "the many entities 
 of this reaHstic world have no features in com- 
 mon," and possess no "common characters," ih., 
 pp. 127, 131. Therefore, "the realm of a con- 
 sistent Realism is not the realm of One nor yet 
 the realm of Many, it is the realm of absolutely 
 nothing," ih., p. 137. Finally it is contradictory 
 for "it asserts the mutual dependence of Know- 
 ing and of Being in the act of declaring Being 
 independent," ih., p. 76. 
 
 The Mystical conception of Being is, to Pro- 
 fessor Royce's view, the opposite of the ReaHstic 
 and must also be rejected. "The mystic asserts 
 that the real cannot be wholly independent of 
 knowledge . . . that the reality of which you think 
 and speak is first of all a reahty meant by you 
 . . . that within you Hes the sole motive to distin-
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 43 
 
 guish truth from error, reality from unreality, the 
 world from the instant's passing contents," ib., 
 p. 189. Hence with Mysticism "To be real means 
 to be in such wise Immediate that, in presence of 
 this immediacy, all thought and all ideas, absolutely 
 satisfied, are quenched, so that the finite search 
 ceases and the Other is no longer another, but is 
 absolutely found," ib., p. 144. In this sense it 
 differs from "common-sense Realism," which 
 "makes the truth an independent Being, that is 
 beyond our striving, in the sense of Being wholly 
 apart from every knowledge which refers to it," 
 ib., p. 173. Professor Royce notes the unrest and 
 aspirations of the human soul and holds that "Pri- 
 marily in seeking Being we seek what is to end our 
 disquietude," ib., p. 154. Thus "Being is once 
 for all, to a finite thinker, at least in part, the Other 
 that he seeks," ib., p. 148. The purpose of the 
 mystic is the dehberate and conscious rejection, 
 as something to be overcome, of "the common- 
 sense antithesis between the immediate and the ideal 
 and between the real and the desirable," ib., 
 p. 155. Hence Mysticism teaches that "to be 
 means to quench thought in the presence of a final 
 immediacy which completely satisfies all ideas," 
 ib., p. 186. "Absolute immediacy" is attained 
 " on the borders of unconsciousness when we are 
 closest to dreamland slumber," ib., p. 168, and 
 "to be possessed of absolute knowledge is to be 
 unconscious," ib.,p. 191.
 
 44 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 Professor Royce rejects the mystical conception 
 of Being for the reason that it is partial and incom- 
 plete; its great fault is that like Realism it goes to 
 an extreme but in an opposite direction. "The 
 Mystic in general knows only Internal Meanings, 
 as the Realist considers only External mean- 
 ings," ih., p. 176. 
 
 The third conception of Being which Professor 
 Royce rejects is termed the Theory of Validity. It 
 differs from the two preceding theories in its desig- 
 nation as a Transformed ReaHsm. Thus "Being is 
 that which is known, is found giving to ideas their 
 validity, as that to which ideas ought to corres- 
 pond," ih., p. 201. "To be real now means 
 primarily, to be vahd, to be true, to be in essence 
 the standard for ideas," ih., p. 202. In this 
 third conception, ReaHty is identified with VaHd- 
 ity, for "what is Being then but the VaHdity of 
 ideas," ih., p. 204. Professor Royce calls this 
 the theory of Critical Rationalism. "God is no 
 longer a person. . . . The impersonal conceptions 
 of a Righteous order of the universe remains," 
 ih., p. 206. This theory according to Professor Royce 
 is found in the teaching of Aristotle, St. Augus- 
 tine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and of Kant, ih., pp. 
 227-239. 
 
 Professor Royce teaches that the defect of the 
 third conception of Being is that it "consciously 
 attempts to define the Real as expHcitly and only 
 the Universal," ih., p. 240, i.e. "bare abstract
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 45 
 
 universal and does not assert the individuality of 
 Being," ib., p. 290. To be or to be valid means 
 that an idea "has truth, defines an experience, that 
 at least, as a mathematical ideal, and perhaps, as 
 an empirical event, is determinately possible," 
 ib., p. 227. 
 
 Thus in this sense real Being is possible Being, 
 i.e. Being "whose ReaHty lies in its VaHdity," ib., 
 p. 233. A negative answer is given to the ques- 
 tion, "Can there be two sorts of Being both known 
 to us as valid but the one individual, the other 
 universal, the one empirical, the other merely 
 ideal, the one present, the other barely possible, 
 the one a concrete life, the other a pure form," 
 ib., p. 261. For these reasons Professor Royce sets 
 it aside for his own explanation which he calls the 
 Fourth or the Synthetic Conception of Being. 
 
 11. Principles 
 
 The method adopted by Professor Royce in 
 dealing with the problem of Reality is to view it 
 "from the side of the means through which we are 
 supposed to attain reality, i.e. Ideas," ib., p. 19. 
 The fundamental question, therefore, is the nature 
 of the idea. 
 
 To Professor Royce "the idea is as much a voli- 
 tional process as it is an intellectual process," ib., 
 p. 311. In fact "all our thinking is itself a process 
 of willing," ib., p. 153. "A color seen, a brute
 
 46 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 noise heard is not an idea," ih.^ p. 24. Hence 
 " the idea is a will seeking its own determination. 
 It is nothing else," ih., p. 332. It appears in 
 consciousness as having the significance of an act 
 of will," ih., p. 23. By way of illustration I am 
 informed that "when I have an idea of the world, 
 my idea is a will, and the world of my idea is simply 
 my own will itself determinately embodied," ih., 
 p. 327. In this sense he speaks of "the essentially 
 teleological inner structure of conscious ideas," 
 ih., p. 310. 
 
 To make clearer and more explicit what he under- 
 stands by the idea Professor Royce distinguishes the 
 "Internal and External meanings" of ideas, Vol. 
 II, Lect. III. By the Internal meaning he under- 
 stands the "conscious inner purpose embodied in 
 a given idea," by the External meaning "the em- 
 bodiment" itself which as such is a part of sensitive 
 experience, Vol. I, p. 308 sq. To a superficial thinker 
 there is a conflict between the external and the in- 
 ternal meaning. This is only apparent. Deeper 
 down there is a harmony inasmuch as the external 
 meaning is subordinated to the internal meaning. 
 For the " external meaning must be interpreted not 
 primarily in the sense of mere dependence upon 
 the brute facts, but in terms of the inner purpose 
 of the idea itself," ih., p. 33. 
 
 Hence the external meaning is only apparently 
 external, and in very truth is but an aspect of the 
 completely developed internal meaning, ih.^ p. 36.
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 47 
 
 The contrast between the internal and external 
 meanings is solved by "conscious selection," ib., 
 p. 31, i.e. by the "conscious inner purpose of the 
 idea," selecting its own partial embodiment or ful- 
 filment. Thus in the idea, conscious selection plays 
 a part analogous to that played by natural and 
 sexual selection in the Darwinian hypothesis as to 
 the development of the organic world. 
 
 On the distinction between internal and external 
 meaning is based the theory of judgment. For 
 " to judge is to bring the what into relation with 
 the that," ib., p. 273. It "is to consider internal 
 meanings with reference to external meanings," 
 ib. By the what Professor Royce understands 
 "the abstractly universal," by the that "the indi- 
 vidual," ib., p. 294. 
 
 We are now prepared to understand what is 
 meant by "the essential relation of idea and ob- 
 ject." This is "the world-knot," ib., p. 431. By 
 the "object" of the idea Professor Royce does 
 not mean the objective content of the idea, i.e. the 
 thing of which the idea is the representation, but 
 "the purpose of the idea." For the word object in 
 the Enghsh language is susceptible of two mean- 
 ings, e.g. the subject-matter and the aim or pur- 
 pose. As can be readily inferred from what has been 
 said Professor Royce so defines the idea "as not 
 formally to presuppose the power of ideas to have 
 cognitive relations to outer objects," ib., p. 20. 
 For he tells his readers that "your intelligent ideas
 
 48 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 of things never consist of mere images of the things, 
 but always involve a consciousness of how you 
 propose to act toward the things of which you have 
 ideas," and therefore, "intelligent ideas belong, so 
 to speak, to the motor side of your life rather than 
 to the merely sensory," ib., p. 22. He admits that 
 **the idea is a representation of a fact existent be- 
 yond itself," ib., p. 23. Yet he maintains that 
 "representative character is not the primary char- 
 acter," for "this is its inner character as relatively 
 fulfilling a purpose," ib., p. 24. Phrases as "fact 
 beyond itself" and "object" are to be interpreted 
 in terms of "purpose." For "the idea in seeking for 
 its object is seeking for the determination of its 
 own just now indeterminate will," ib., p. 333. 
 "This further determination is given only in terms 
 of experience," ib., p. 334. For "my conscious 
 will as expressed in my ideas does logically deter- 
 mine what objects are my objects," ib. Hence " the 
 object sought is simply the precise determination 
 of this very will itself to unique and unambiguous 
 expression. . . . For the object is a true other, 
 and yet it is object only as the meaning of this 
 idea," ib., p. 331. Thus, "whatever the object, 
 it is still the object for a given idea solely because 
 that idea wills it to be such," ib. The determina- 
 tion of the object by the will he calls a "selection." 
 "That an idea has an object depends, at least in 
 part, upon this that the idea selects its object . . . 
 and this selection is manifested in consciousness
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 49 
 
 by what is usually called attention," ib, p. 317. 
 The relation of idea to object is ''essentially the 
 relation of a partial meaning to a totally express 
 rational meaning," and "the relation of partial and 
 total meaning is, at the same time, the relation of 
 any finite will to the expression of the complete 
 content of that same will," ib., p. 431, 
 
 If we bear in mind that the idea is to be inter- 
 preted in terms of "purpose" and that "all our 
 thinking is itself a process of willing" we may be 
 able to grasp the peculiar meaning Professor Royce 
 attaches to the universal. "Ideas as they come to 
 us in their finite imperfections are at first inde- 
 terminate, and for that very reason, vague, gen- 
 eral, or as technical language often expresses it, 
 abstractly universal," ib., p. 336. Hence "an 
 universal, in the abstract sense of the term, is 
 known to us merely as that of which there might 
 be another instance," ib. For, as shall be shown 
 later on, the idea in seeking its own determination 
 assumes more and more unique character. 
 
 The transitions from the idea to Being and Real- 
 ity, and the application of the one to the solution 
 of the other is made very easy in the philosophy of 
 Professor Royce. For " the whole problem of the 
 nature of Being is in the end a study of internal 
 and external meanings," ib., p. 32. Hence, "to 
 be is to fulfil a purpose," ib., p. 335. The Being 
 to which any idea refers is "simply the will of the 
 idea more determinately and also more completely
 
 50 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 expressed," ib., p. 353. The ''purpose" of the 
 idea, the "object" or "other" which it consciously 
 seeks, is, therefore, the constituent of Being and 
 Reality. Thus, "our concept of Being implies that 
 whatever is, is consciously known as the fulfilment 
 of some idea," ih., p. 396. This knowledge is pos- 
 sessed either "by ourselves at this moment, or by a 
 consciousness inclusive of our own," ih. That Pro- 
 fessor Royce proposes a theory of IdeaHstic Panthe- 
 ism is evident from a careful study of the context, 
 ih., pp. 397-400, and will be brought out clearly 
 in the application of the theory to God and to the 
 world. We have no immediate perception of the 
 external world, Vol. II, p. 159, nor have we "fun- 
 damental assurances," i6., pp. 70, 160. For the 
 "idea" is "a conscious striving" and the "object" 
 of the idea is the "purpose" which it consciously 
 seeks. Matter is "mere appearance," ih., p. 
 213, and the fundamental principle of knowledge 
 is that of "a vast conscious process," ih., pp. 
 226-240. 
 
 In seeking its object "any idea whatever seeks 
 absolutely nothing but its own explicit, and in the 
 end complete determination as this conscious pur- 
 pose, embodied in this one way. The complete 
 content of the idea's own purpose is the only object 
 of which the idea can ever take note. This alone 
 is the other that is sought," Vol. I, p. 339. 
 
 In consulting experience "we are simply seeking 
 aid in the undertaking to give our ideas a certain
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 51 
 
 positive determination to this content and no other, ^^ 
 ib., p. 297, but he adds that "we never reach 
 that," ib. Hence ''this individual determination 
 itself remains, so far, the principal character of the 
 Real, and is as an Ideal, the Limit toward which 
 we endlessly aim," ib., pp. 297, 446. The dis- 
 tinction of the Ideal and the Real involves no 
 separation; at the basis they are identified. For 
 "the Real is that which is immediately beyond the 
 whole of our series of possible efforts to bring, by 
 any process of finite experience and of merely 
 general conceptions, our own internal meaning to 
 a complete determination," ib., pp. 280-299. 
 
 Reality thus becomes "the goal of life's journey," 
 ib., p. 188, and "what determines us to acknowl- 
 edge as real a system of particular facts is the 
 Ought," Vol. II, p. 41- 
 
 If we bear in mind that the idea "selects" its 
 own object, i.e. purpose, and if "purpose" con- 
 stitutes the Real, we can understand after some 
 fashion what Professor Royce means when he writes 
 that Being is "a selection from abstractly possible 
 contents," ib., p. 449, that "what is, is a selec- 
 tion from possibilities," ib., that "so long as you 
 define mere universals (i.e vague, indeterminate 
 strivings as they first come to us in their finite 
 imperfections, ib., p. 336), mere general notions 
 of things, you define neither the Being of objects 
 nor the truth of ideas," ib., p. 452. The reason 
 is that "the essence of Being is to be individual,"
 
 52 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 ib., p. 348, and the individual is due to "the 
 selective character of every rational conscious 
 process," ib., p. 449. 
 
 The notion of Truth in the system of Professor 
 Royce, like the notions of Being and of Reality, 
 follows naturally from the notion of the idea. To 
 Him "truth is the adequate expression and develop- 
 ment of the internal meaning of the idea itself," 
 ib., p. 33. Ideas, therefore, "really possess truth 
 or falsity only by virtue of their own selection of 
 their task as ideas," ib., p. 32. And as ideas 
 by "selection" constitute Reality and Being, so 
 also "Being has to be that object which makes 
 ideas true or false," ib., p. 349. An idea is false 
 "unless that kind of identity in inner structure be- 
 tween ideas and object can be found which the 
 specific purpose embodied in a given idea demands," 
 ib., p. 306. Hence "it is not mere agreement, 
 but intended agreement that constitutes truth," 
 ib., p. 307. There is "no purely external cri- 
 terion of truth," ib., p. 306, for the "sole motive 
 to distinguish truth from error is within," ib., 
 pp. 189, 308. "The embodied purpose, the internal 
 meaning, of the instant's act is thus a conditio sine 
 qua non for all external meaning and for all truth," 
 ib., p. 311. In fact purpose is "the test of truth- 
 ful correspondence of an idea to its object," ib., 
 p. 306. We say that "this instant's idea is true, 
 if in its own measure and on its own plan, it cor- 
 responds, even in its vagueness, to its own final and
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 53 
 
 completely individual expression," ih., p. 339. 
 In like manner the error of an idea "is always 
 a failure to win the intended aim of the idea 
 precisely in so far as the idea sought truth," 
 ib., p. 324. 
 
 III. Application 
 
 Thus in a brief outHne, employing as far as pos- 
 sible his own words, I have endeavored to set forth 
 the basal concepts of a philosophical system which 
 has placed Professor Royce the peer of metaphysical 
 writers in America. These concepts are the idea 
 and its object. On these his whole system is con- 
 structed and from their peculiar contents it takes 
 form and existence. To make the exposition com- 
 plete it is necessary to show the application of 
 these concepts to God, to the world, and to the 
 individual. 
 
 To Professor Royce, the absolute is "a system" 
 yet "an unique and individual system," ib., p. 
 563. It is an individual because the act of an indi- 
 vidual is an "insight and a choice," ib., p. 446; 
 Vol. II, Lect. VII, and individuality of self is "the 
 unique conscious plan," ib., pp. 293, 326. The 
 Absolute is not distinct from the world, for he 
 speaks of the "whole individual Being called the 
 World," Vol. I, p. 40, and tells us that "the true 
 World as rightly viewed by an absolute insight 
 would be a world of selves, forming in the unity 
 of their systems, one Self," Vol. II, p. 106. Thus,
 
 54 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 "the Absolute Individual is the sole completely 
 integrating Self," ih., p. 447. He teaches the 
 "infinity of the real system of the Self," ih., 
 p. 451, and holds that "the various individual 
 selves are the various self-expressions of the same 
 system," ih., p. 448. It is wrong to suppose 
 that "a new individual" is a "new thing"; it is 
 only "a new kind of Hfe-purpose, " ih., p. 308. 
 What in ordinary language we term individuals 
 "are all the various expressions of the Absolute in 
 so far as they are many," ih., p. 336, and "are 
 made distinct through their various meanings," 
 ih., p. 239. The soul is "no monad, but a Hfe 
 individuated solely by its purpose," ih., p. 
 238. Hence "it is will in God and in man that 
 logically determines the consciousness of individual- 
 ity," Vol. I, p. 460. Selective attention and the 
 nature of individuahty are "studied as aspects 
 of will," (Vol. I, Supplementary Essay). The 
 world is nothing more than an endless Kette, i.e. a 
 series, ih., p. 588, and "in its entirety an embodi- 
 ment of our own will," Vol. II, p. 61, or "an ex- 
 pression of my will," ih., p. 295. For "the Theory 
 of Being requires us to view every fact of Nature 
 and of man's life as a fragmentary gHmpse of the 
 Absolute life, as a revelation, however mysterious 
 and to us men now in detail illegible, of the unity 
 of the perfect whole," ih., p. 8. 
 
 That this is the logical inference from the notion 
 of Being is evident from the doctrine that "to be
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 55 
 
 means simply to express, to embody the complete 
 internal meaning of a certain absolute system of 
 ideas; a system moreover which is genuinely implied 
 in the true internal meaning or purpose of every 
 finite idea, however fragmentary," Vol. I, p. 36. 
 He confesses that "our ideas imperfectly embody 
 our will, and the real world is just our whole will 
 embodied," ib., p. 37. Hence it is that "my 
 own purpose of comprehension is itself a part of 
 the world-purpose" and "within its limits repre- 
 sents one aspect of truth," Vol. II, p. 107. Thus, 
 "amidst all the complexities of nature and of man's 
 Ufe, we are deahng with fragmentary gHmpses of 
 an Absolute Unity," ib., p. 9. If we ask what 
 is the nature of these "complexities" and "frag- 
 mentary glimpses" we are told that "In case of 
 Nature in general as in particular of man, we are 
 deahng with phenomenal signs of a vast conscious 
 process, whose relation to Time varies vastly, but 
 whose general characteristics are throughout the 
 same," ib., p. 226. Hence, "for our own ideal- 
 istic view, all nature is an expression of mind," 
 ib., p. 158. 
 
 The phenomenal world Professor Royce calls 
 the "World of Description" and from it distin- 
 guishes the world of Appreciation, i.e. the world 
 of socially interrelated selves," ib., pp. 107, 155, 
 309, or "the world of Life," ib., p. 26. The 
 unity of the world is "a unity of consciousness," 
 Vol. I, p. 466. The universe "is a well-ordered
 
 56 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 Infinite Series, which as embodying a single plan 
 may be rightly viewed as forming a totality," 
 Vol. II, p. 146. Hence "the fundamental structure 
 of the universe is essentially both teleological and 
 conscious," Vol. I, p. 432, and "the world is one 
 with God," Vol. II, pp. 271, 292, Lect. III. We 
 ascribe to the true world "a certain eternal type of 
 Being," ib., p. in, and the reason is that "a 
 temporal world must needs be, when viewed in 
 its wholeness, an eternal world," ib., pp. 133, 
 138. As a fact "in defining time, we have already 
 and inevitably defined eternity," for "time viewed 
 in its wholeness is eternity," ib., p. 337, and 
 "the temporal order is identical with the eternal 
 order," ib., p. 386. Thus "the whole real content 
 of this temporal order is at once known, i.e. is con- 
 sciously experienced as a whole by the Absolute," 
 ib., p. 138. In illustration we are told that if you 
 "listen to any musical phase and grasp it as a 
 whole, you thereupon have present in you the 
 image, so to speak, of the divine knowledge of 
 the temporal order," ib., p. 145, the difference is 
 only "one of span," ib. 
 
 The doctrine of the unity of Being impHes 
 "that all selves are known, without any true 
 separation, in the organism of a single world-life," 
 ib., p. 393. Hence "the whole of time will con- 
 tain a single expression of the divine will and 
 therefore, despite its endlessness, the time-world 
 will be present as such a single whole to the
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 57 
 
 Absolute, whose will this is, and whose life all 
 this sequence embodies," ib., p. 147. Thus "the 
 Absolute is identical with our whole will ex- 
 pressed" and "we are the divine as it expresses 
 itself here and now," ib., p, 408. 
 
 Man's personality is "constituted by contrast," 
 ib., p. 425. The contrast between the self 
 and the not-self "comes to us primarily as the 
 contrast between the internal and the external 
 meaning of the present moment's purpose," ib., 
 p. 272. The true self of an individual "is not a 
 datum, but an ideal," ib., p, 287; and "any 
 finite idea is so far a self," ib., p. 272. For "self 
 is created by a life-plan, by possession of an ideal, 
 by an intent to remain other than my fellows, 
 despite my divinely planned unity with them," 
 ib., pp. 268, 276. Hence the self of the indi- 
 vidual "is constituted by contrast with other 
 selves," ib., p. 296. Thus, "when I seek my own 
 goal, I am looking for the whole of myself. In 
 so far as my aim is the absolute completion of my 
 selfhood, my goal is identical with the whole life of 
 God. But, in so far as, by my whole individual self, 
 I mean my whole Self in contrast with the Selves 
 of my fellows, then the completion of my individual 
 expression in so far as I am this individual and no 
 other, i.e. my goal, as this Self, is still not any one 
 point or experience in my life, nor any one stage of 
 my life, but the totality of my individual life viewed 
 as in contrast with the lives of other individuals,"
 
 58 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 ib.,-p. 135. In its entirety the "Self is the whole 
 of a self-representative or recurrent process and 
 not the mere last moment or stage of that process," 
 ib. For "every finite Internal Meaning wins final 
 expression, not merely through the last stage of 
 its life, but through its whole embodiment," p. 270. 
 The absolute is the "one absolutely final and in- 
 tegrated Self," ib., p. 289, and as Self, "is inclu- 
 sive of a variety of various but interwoven Selves," 
 ib., p. 288, nay more, it is "our own very self- 
 hood in fulfilment," ib., p. 302. Thus "man is one 
 with God," ib., pp. 148, 275, 327; Lect. Ill, VII. 
 In describing the Absolute as a self-representative 
 system Professor Royce wishes to insist that "every 
 fact in this system fulfils a purpose," ib., p. 397. 
 He tells us that "longing exists in the Absolute 
 Life and as a significant part thereof," ib., 
 p. 299, that "the Absolute to be complete must 
 include finitude," ib., p. 302, that the Absolute 
 is "thought inclusive of will and expression," Vol. 
 I, p. ix, and aims "to bring into a synthesis the 
 relations of knowledge and of will in our concep- 
 tion of God," ib. Human experience is limited 
 and to him its characteristic limitation is "that it 
 grasps within the narrow Umits of this or that 
 instant, fragments of a meaning which can only 
 be conceived with consistency by regarding it as 
 embodied in an experience of a wider scope, of de- 
 terminate constitution, and of united significance," 
 Vol. II, p. 24.
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 59 
 
 Professor Royce denies the existence of a sub- 
 stantial soul, ib., pp. vii, 60, 267, and holds 
 that God is the only substance, Vol. I, p. 11. "Man 
 is (only) the fragment of a whole, whose inner unity 
 is far beyond the reach of our present form of 
 consciousness," Vol. II, p. 8, and "a new individual 
 life is a new way of behavior appearing amongst 
 natural phenomena," ib., p. 315. To him the 
 principle of morality is *'to harmonize thine own 
 will with the World's will," ib., p. 348, and 
 moral freedom " is to hold by attention or to forget 
 by inattention, an Ought already present to one's 
 finite consciousness," p. 360. 
 
 When Professor Royce speaks of the "back- 
 ground of reality" he means "the world," ib., p. 55. 
 An act of concrete knowledge is "an abstraction 
 from the background." Abstraction is "a selective 
 process" and is very much akin to Kant's apper- 
 ception. In this sense Professor Royce speaks of 
 the "underlying unity of the object of knowledge," 
 ib., p. 56. Hence in the act of knowledge there 
 is no active mind but only idea-forces which in 
 some way, by virtue of the purpose and energy 
 which constitute the internal meaning of the idea, 
 rise over the threshold of consciousness. "This 
 passing moment of consciousness" is "the fragment 
 of our will," whereas "the world in its entirety is 
 the embodiment of our whole will," ib., p. 61. 
 The so-called unity of apperception is to him "as 
 aspect," ib., p. 148, a "fragment," Vol. I, p.
 
 6o PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 401 ; Vol. II, p. 270, of a larger unity, which is "the 
 unity of the world," the "unity of ordered series," 
 ib., pp. 70, 292. The rising of present consciousness 
 out of the background of reaHty is explained by 
 the "recurrent process," ib., p. 297. The charac- 
 teristics of self-recurrency show how it is that a 
 process which in its entirety is considered as the 
 only reaHty, as the Absolute, appears in "frag- 
 ments," or "aspects," or "sensible phenomena," 
 which we call "the empirical self," ib., p. 266, 
 and the "visible world," ib., p. 288. "The 
 ordered series," i.e. the world, is "a unity," because 
 it is "the expression of a single voHtional process," 
 ib., p. 86. Hence "the reaHty is not the world 
 apart from the activity of knowing beings, it is the 
 world of fact and the knowledge in one organic 
 whole," ib., p. 102. For "the world acknowledged 
 as beyond is presented to us at every moment 
 as a single whole within which the facts are present," 
 ib., p. 86. Time and eternity are thus two as- 
 pects of a single process and represent "the twofold 
 view of your nature as a temporal process and as an 
 eternal system of fact," ib., p. 147. 
 
 IV. Criticism 
 
 The attempt to grasp and set forth the system 
 of Professor Royce is by no means an easy task. 
 The pecuHar meaning he attaches to words, many of 
 which have a place in the ordinary vocabulary of
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 6i 
 
 dally intercourse, the singular beauty of the style, 
 the lavish wealth of illustration make the work of 
 a critic one of the greatest difficulty. The exposi- 
 tion presented in the preceding pages may not be 
 exhaustive; at least it is complete in the sense that 
 the reader can gather therefrom the salient features 
 of his philosophical theory. The method adopted 
 is to select the fundamental problem, viz. the nature 
 and meaning of the idea. The reader thus has an 
 insight into the mind of Professor Royce, a clear 
 view of his system and an opportunity to estimate 
 its philosophical as well as its practical value. 
 
 The classification of the Four Conceptions of 
 Being, with which Professor Royce prefaces his 
 treatise, is vague and unsatisfactory when viewed 
 as a classification and erroneous when studied in 
 detail. He admits that he refers to an extreme 
 form of Realism, but this admission shows that his 
 criticism is not broad, nor scholarly, nor exact. 
 In rejecting Realism as a theory which proclaims 
 Being and Reality to be independent of mind, he 
 fails to distinguish between the human and the 
 divine mind. That the world has Being and Reality 
 independent of our minds is a fact which no elabo- 
 rate system of Philosophy can destroy. But no 
 one, unless he be a Materialist and an Atheist, 
 admits that the world is independent of the divine 
 mind. 
 
 A like criticism holds good for his presentation 
 of Mysticism. To the mystic, in his view. Being
 
 62 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 and Reality is what is immediate. But this defi- 
 nition is vague and inaccurate. Mysticism is not a 
 relation of immediacy to any being whatsoever, 
 but to a particular being, viz. God. If Professor 
 Royce's definition were true, the little child at 
 school, who sees for the first time on the black- 
 board the mathematical equation 2 + 2 = 4, and 
 grasps its immediate truth, would be a mystic. If 
 a friend should call on me and we have a heart-to- 
 heart talk, we could not of necessity be called mys- 
 tics. Or take another illustration. A crisis comes 
 in a man's life. He faces the issue and plans his 
 course and conduct. Is he a mystic? Moreover 
 an exact and thoughtful writer would not fall into 
 the error of citing without discrimination St. Ber- 
 nard and the philosophers of the Upanishads as 
 examples of mystics. 
 
 A Hke criticism applies to Professor Royce's de- 
 scription of the Third Conception of Being. The 
 truth of ideas consists in their correspondence with 
 things. The things exist as concrete particular facts. 
 Hence it is not true to say that Being as objective 
 truth is universal. Plato taught archetypical forms 
 or ideas, and the Conceptualists of the Middle Ages 
 held that universals as such were real and existing. 
 Professor Royce evidently is not famiUar with the fa- 
 mous controversy as to the nature of universal ideas 
 which played so prominent a part with the School- 
 men. A universal as such is the creation of the 
 mind, its form is logical, yet it has a basis in reality,
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 63 
 
 because the mind grasps the common nature of in- 
 dividual things. The common nature is denoted 
 by the phrase "ens essentiae," i.e. essence, the 
 existence of the particular fact is called "ens exis- 
 tentiae," i.e. existence. Professor Royce denies the 
 concept of common nature, yet keeps the distinc- 
 tion in the terms the what and the that — the in- 
 ternal meaning and the external meaning, although 
 these terms have a peculiar meaning, because of the 
 peculiar meaning he attaches to the idea. Peter 
 Lombard, Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales, 
 St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas of Aquin, Duns Scotus 
 reflect the development and acme of Scholastic 
 Philosophy, which is justly termed the greatest 
 monument of carefully reasoned thought the world 
 has ever seen. They all taught that a universal 
 idea viewed as a universal was the creation of the 
 mind, but that it had a foundation or basis in exist- 
 ing things inasmuch as the content of the universal 
 idea represented the essence of a particular thing 
 conceived as the same in many individuals. Hence 
 it is that, in Christian Philosophy, God, ch. iv, I 
 infer the existence of objective truth from the con- 
 tent of the idea. It is thus that the reality of the 
 external world enters into the realm of thought, 
 and a discussion conducted on these lines avoids 
 the extreme of Idealism. This concept of the uni- 
 versal also furnishes a sound basis for the distinc- 
 tion between existing and possible things, and in 
 what sense the predicate of reality applies to them.
 
 64 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 Thus the Conception of Being as VaHdity is capable 
 of a true interpretation, and as such can be classed 
 as a Mitigated Realism. 
 
 The Synthetic Conception of Being developed by 
 Professor Royce is the basis of his philosophical 
 system. A critical examination of this solution is 
 of primary importance to the student who wishes 
 to grasp the meaning of his contribution to the 
 Philosophy of Religion or to give a true estimate of 
 its value. What gives to the Synthetic Conception 
 its special characteristics is the phrase ''the object 
 of the idea." This phrase not only constitutes 
 the Synthetic Conception but gives form and 
 substance to Professor Royce's whole theory. To 
 understand the importance of the phrase it is neces- 
 sary to analyze the meaning of the words. 
 
 Professor Royce defines idea in terms of will: 
 "It is as much a volitional process as an intellec- 
 tual process." But this doctrine is contrary to the 
 testimony of consciousness. That intellect and 
 will are different is an elemental fact of conscious 
 experience. The intellect is the cognitive form or 
 mode of our conscious life; whereas the will is the 
 source and spring of motive power. The intellect 
 is primarily and essentially receptive; the will on 
 the contrary is effective. A psychologist would be 
 no more justified in combining intellect and will 
 than would be a physiologist in teaching that the 
 afferent and efiferent nerves have one and the same 
 function. Moreover these faculties are unequal in
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 65 
 
 the individual. Thus, e.g., we find a man who has 
 a weak intellect and a strong will, or another who 
 has a strong intellect and a weak will. Intellect 
 and will are called faculties or modes by which our 
 soul-Hfe is manifested. Hence, although distinct 
 from each other, they are not separated in the sense 
 that they are two entities, but coalesce into a unity 
 by virtue of the spiritual principle, viz. the soul, 
 whose modes of activity they are. Only thus can 
 we reconcile the unity of consciousness with the 
 diverse experiential elements of our conscious life. 
 
 Professor Royce denies the existence of a sub- 
 stantial soul, and in its place accepts the unity of 
 apperception. Now the unity of apperception is 
 a theory of modern Psychology from the time of 
 Kant to explain the phenomena of intellectual life 
 without having recourse to a soul. But what about 
 the phenomena of wiUing? Professor Royce sees the 
 difficulty, and to meet it blends together intellect 
 and will by asserting the primacy of will, i.e. by 
 making intellect a process of willing. Thus he 
 broadens the unity of apperception by making it 
 include the phenomena of wilHng and adds to it as 
 a distinctive characteristic the power of ''selection" 
 or of "choice." This solution may be simple and 
 ingenious, but it is not true. An examination of our 
 conscious fife does not justify the primacy and dom- 
 ination of the will as explained by Professor Royce. 
 While every act of the will is of necessity accom- 
 panied by an act of the intellect in the form of a
 
 66 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 motive yet it is not true to say that every act of the 
 intellect necessarily entails an act of the will. Here 
 we have the crucial point in the problem of free-will. 
 Freedom of will demands the distinction of intellect 
 and will. When we say that the will is free, we 
 mean that it has the power of choice, e.g. that 
 when the mind proposes a course of action, the 
 will can choose either to act or not to act, or to act 
 in one way or the other by a selection among the 
 various motives presented. By the power of "se- 
 lection" Professor Royce understands not the power 
 which the will has to choose among the motives 
 presented by the intellect, for to him intellect and 
 will are one, but the power inherent in the idea to 
 select from "the background of consciousness." 
 By way of illustration I would say: make the 
 unity of apperception a volitional process and 
 endow it with the power of selection from the 
 background of consciousness, and you have some 
 conception of Professor Royce's " idea." 
 
 The doctrine of the idea, as proposed by Professor 
 Royce, is therefore a pure fiction of the mind and 
 at variance with the elemental facts of conscious 
 experience. Moreover is Professor Royce aware 
 that, in setting forth the doctrine of the idea, he has 
 taken an unprotected position and Ues exposed 
 to a merciless crossfire? Let me explain. Pro- 
 fessor Royce is a Phenomenal Psychologist, i.e. 
 he teaches a Psychology without a soul. In the 
 present course on the Philosophy of Religion, he
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 67 
 
 proposes to treat exclusively the Metaphysics of 
 Religion. The fundamental problem of the Meta- 
 physics of Religion is to him the theory of Being. 
 He attempts a restatement of the theory of Being 
 based on the study of the nature of the Idea. Here 
 we have a professed Phenomenal Psychologist 
 writing a treatise on Metaphysical Psychology. 
 The Metaphysics he proposes is a personified idea 
 of a very peculiar structure. The result is that 
 whereas the hypothesis of a soul is simple, nat- 
 ural, justified by and in harmony with the phe- 
 nomena of conscious experience, the hypothesis 
 of the idea, on the contrary, is a pure creation 
 of a subtle fertile mind and contradictory to the ob- 
 vious facts of mental life. Probably Professor Royce 
 might reply that he denies the soul by virtue of 
 ''the mere theoretical consciousness," and admits 
 in its place the idea by reason of "the more 
 explicitly volitional consciousness," p. 27. This 
 distinction is the reason given for designating the 
 World of Description as other than the World of 
 Appreciation. The distinction may be useful but 
 we do not understand it. The difficulty is to admit 
 a theoretical consciousness distinct from a voli- 
 tional consciousness when the mind and the will 
 are unified. 
 
 If we bear in mind that according to Professor 
 Royce the idea is "a will seeking its own determi- 
 nation," Vol. I, p. 332, we can understand that the 
 "object of the idea" is "the complete content of the
 
 68 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 idea's own purpose," ib., p. 329, and as such is the 
 ''other" the ''beyond," the "goal of life's journey." 
 The object, therefore, is not something in the world 
 around us which is grasped by the mind in a cog- 
 nitive act, but the object of our will in the sense that 
 it is the purpose and goal of our striving. This 
 meaning naturally follows from his definition of the 
 idea. In criticism I would say that it is true to 
 call the object of the will's striving a purpose or 
 goal. But it is a mistake to restrict the object 
 of the intellect to the purpose of our conscious 
 tendencies. The object of the intellect is a pur- 
 pose or goal only in case of purposive action. 
 But our intellectual Hfe is cognizant of many 
 objects without thereby viewing them as goals. 
 Speculative or contemplative knowledge as such 
 includes no positive volitional process such as Pro- 
 fessor Royce holds to be constitutive of the idea. 
 
 Again, if the definition of the idea given by 
 Professor Royce is false, so also is the definition 
 of the object false. Now we have seen by an 
 examination of our conscious experience that the 
 idea is a product of the mind, that the mind 
 and the will are distinct and should not be con- 
 founded. Hence, we cannot define idea as "a 
 will seeking to its own determination," ib., p. 
 332. Nor can we define the object of the idea as 
 the purpose or goal of this tendency. 
 
 Finally the error of defining object in terms of 
 purpose is the result of another error, viz. the denial
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 69 
 
 of immediate perception of the external world, 
 Vol. II, pp. 159-161. Hence in his system external 
 things cannot be the objects of ideas. This is 
 Idealism pure and simple. Now it is certain that 
 we have direct and immediate knowledge of the 
 world around us. Through the senses we are 
 brought into direct cognitive contact with external 
 things. The senses of sight and of touch make us 
 aware of extended and resisting bodies. Hearing, 
 smell and taste furnish sounds, odors and tastes. 
 It is true that sounds, odors and tastes do not exist 
 as such independently of us, that they are the 
 product of the stimuh acting upon the sense-organs. 
 Nevertheless, the stimuli are material and external, 
 and therefore in these sensations the external and 
 material elements are present. Aristotle long ago 
 mentioned this distinction in sense-cognitions. 
 Thus we have immediate perception of the external 
 world. The teaching that sensations are the direct 
 object of the mind was introduced into English 
 Psychology by Locke, and has been ever since the 
 fruitful germ of philosophical error. A logical form 
 which has wrought much confusion in contemporary 
 thought is the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism, But 
 this very error is the postulate of Professor Royce's 
 theory of Being, for he writes, "Leave out the realm 
 of the past from our conception of the real world, 
 and our empirical universe at this instant would 
 shrivel for us, into a mere collection of almost 
 uninterrupted sensations," Vol. I, p. 403.
 
 70 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 The reader is now prepared to form some estimate 
 of the philosophical system set forth by Professor 
 Royce. It may justly be called a synthesis formed 
 from the best elements of modern Idealistic Pan- 
 theism merged into one whole. He takes from 
 Kant the unity of apperception and by endowing 
 it with the power of selection makes it not a pure 
 intellectual but an active vohtional process. The 
 moral order of Fichte is static, the purpose-ten- 
 dency of Royce is dynamic. The word idea he 
 takes from Hegel, yet interprets it in terms of 
 Schopenhauer's Will and of Hartmann's Striving, 
 and makes it conscious throughout. By the unity 
 of the "process" he identifies man and the world 
 and God. With Taine and Vacherot he holds that 
 God is the goal, i.e. Dieu Progres, "that far off 
 divine event toward which the whole creation 
 moves," yet differs from them in teaching that the 
 Absolute is not the goal alone, but the goal together 
 with all the machinery of the striving; hence he 
 calls the Absolute a system. With Spinoza he 
 holds that God is the one substance, but differs 
 from him in teaching that consciousness is the sole 
 attribute of that substance, and that material things 
 are only phenomenal "fragments" or "aspects" 
 of the purpose seeking its complete embodiment. 
 By the "dynamo" of ideas, Vol. II, pp. 174-178, 
 he approximates to Leibnitz's " monads" and Fouil- 
 lee's "idea-forces." He starts from what he con- 
 siders an experimental basis, i.e. from the facts of
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM 71 
 
 Experimental Psychology, yet views these facts in 
 the light of the Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism, 
 and thus his system is vitiated in the beginning by 
 a preconceived doctrine of Idealism. In the in- 
 tense introspection and the theory of the Self he 
 shows the influence of the Hindu Pantheism. By 
 teaching that the Absolute is a unity, that in this 
 unity Man, the World and God are unified, that 
 external things are phenomenal fragments or aspects 
 of one great conscious striving process, he seems to 
 hold a Pantheism of Manifestation. 
 
 Upon the whole the Gilford Lectures of Professor 
 Royce are a disappointment to many who have 
 read with dehght his previous pubhcations, and 
 watched with interest the gradual development of 
 his mind. His beautiful and sympathetic tribute 
 to Scholastic Philosophy, which appeared in the 
 Boston Transcript at the death of Pope Leo XIII 
 has endeared him to the great mass of thinkers and 
 writers in this country who look to the Schoolmen 
 for a philosophical solution of the great problems 
 affecting human life and destiny. It seems a pity 
 that Professor Royce has not devoted more time 
 to a careful study of Scholastic Philosophy before 
 he issued these Lectures in their present form. 
 The most interesting feature of his intellectual life is 
 that he has been struggling against a philosophical 
 environment initially created by Locke and Kant 
 and developed in one form or the other by the phil- 
 osophical writers of the nineteenth century. The
 
 72 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 hope was engendered that at the publication of 
 his system, which was in process of formation, he 
 would break from the influence of thinkers whose 
 fundamental principles have been shown to be false. 
 In this sense the lectures are a disappointment. 
 From a literary point of view The World and the 
 Individual are inferior to the Spiritual Aspects of 
 Philosophy. Viewed as a system they are too 
 vague and abstract and transcendental ever to 
 exert an abiding influence on the development 
 of philosophical thought. Subjected to a rigid 
 analysis the principles therein set forth are at 
 variance with the elementary facts of conscious 
 life and are contradicted by the ordinary language 
 and experience of daily existence.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 ABSOLUTE PRAGMATISM AND THE PROBLEM 
 OF CHRISTIANITY 
 
 In a recent work, The Problem of Christianity, 
 the Hibbert Lectures 191 2-13, Professor Royce 
 makes an attempt to set forth a philosophy of 
 Christianity which is based upon human experience 
 and is in essential harmony with the teaching of 
 philosophical Idealism developed in his Gifford 
 Lectures, The World and the Individual. In the 
 Preface he states that these views have been grad- 
 ually maturing since 1908, when he published The 
 Philosophy of Loyalty, and find expression in the 
 Bross Lectures of 191 2 on TJie Sources of Religious 
 Thought. As a logical sequence to the preceding 
 chapter it is necessary to criticise his attempt to 
 apply this Idealism to the Problem of Christianity 
 wherein he discusses the Christian Doctrine of 
 Life with the avowed purpose of setting forth the 
 Essence of the Christian Religion. 
 
 I. The Problem of Christianity 
 
 To Professor Royce the Problem of Christianity 
 arises from the relation of Christianity to the mind
 
 74 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 of to-day. The question he proposes to discuss is 
 "in what way, if in any, can the modern man 
 consistently be, in creed, a Christian?" The two 
 terms of the comparison are clearly stated — viz. 
 Christianity and the modern man. The means of 
 the comparison are twofold: to state in empirical 
 terms certain aspects of Christian social experience 
 and to defend these aspects in the light of a re- 
 examination of certain fundamental metaphysical 
 ideas. Thus three terms enter into the discus- 
 sion: the modern man, a metaphysical theory, 
 Christianity. 
 
 To Professor Royce the modern man is a postu- 
 late and is "one who is supposed to teach what the 
 education of the human race has taught him." 
 "This postulate," he continues, "includes a doc- 
 trine that the human race, taken as a whole, has 
 some genuine and significant spiritual unity, so 
 that its life includes a growth in genuine insight," 
 and adds that this doctrine contains "the implica- 
 tion that in light of common insight gradually 
 attained by the whole race, our creed should be 
 tested and, if needs be, revised." The inference 
 drawn from these words is that the teaching of the 
 modern man is true. Yet in fact we inherit the 
 follies as well as the wisdom of the ages. What 
 criterion is here presented to guide me between the 
 truth and error of the past? Or to guide Professor 
 Royce in disagreeing with traditional Christianity? 
 Why should it be taken for granted that a discus-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CHRISTIANITY 75 
 
 sion of the Problem of Christianity means the 
 revision of Christianity up to the mental state of 
 the modern man? Does not a suspicion enter the 
 mind that the modern man might be revised up 
 to the teaching of Christianity? The term, modern 
 man, therefore is a fiction. Or it may be a modest 
 way by which Professor Royce designates himself. 
 Yet we are told that the test of a scientific dis- 
 covery is the consensus of opinion, and that phi- 
 losophers of to-day *'do not agree regarding any 
 one philosophical opinion." Even Professor Royce 
 explains that these volumes are the exclusive result 
 of his own study, that they contain a new interpre- 
 tation of Christianity, and is at pains to point out 
 how he differs from Hegel, James, Bergson, Pro- 
 fessors Macintosh and Sanday. May not the claim 
 be made that they have inherited the wisdom of 
 the ages? In truth, Professor Royce's doctrine 
 is based on a postulate or assumption which can 
 be maintained only by one who accepts his system 
 of philosophical Idealism. 
 
 Professor Royce admits that he faces the study 
 of Christianity from the viewpoint of Metaphysical 
 Idealism and that he applies the spirit of this Ideal- 
 ism to the problems arising from the study. In 
 this Idealism are found no terms as "soul" or 
 "mind." He admits "the self " or person and holds 
 that it is constituted by conscious memory. The 
 active element in the self is the "idea," which is 
 a "volitional process" and is defined as "a plan
 
 76 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 of action." The ordinary Pragmatist — i.e. Pro- 
 fessor James — is concerned with the direct and 
 immediate effect of the "idea-striving." Professor 
 Royce regards the ultimate purpose or "goal" of the 
 idea and terms himself an "Absolute Pragmatist." 
 
 Professor Royce denies immediate perception of 
 the self or other selves. He deprecates the con- 
 troversy about "percept" and "concept," calls 
 these "sterile," and bases his whole system on a 
 new and integrating cognitive process which he 
 calls interpretation — that is, the mediating be- 
 tween two ideas or processes by means of a third. 
 Only by interpretation do we know the self, for self 
 is not "a datum," but a hfe or process containing 
 three elements: past, present and future. Inter- 
 pretation sums up past experience into present 
 experience, sets for us our future task and thus 
 brings us into touch with the real world. The Real 
 World is therefore the interpretation of our pres- 
 ent experience, namely. Appearance, and the idea 
 of the goal of experience, namely, Reality. By inter- 
 pretation only do we know other selves and things. 
 For they are only "appearances" of reahty, "em- 
 bodiments" of the idea, "signs" with a meaning. 
 The reahty, the idea, the meaning are attained by 
 interpretation, and our interpretations are "signs" 
 to be further interpreted. Thus experience shows 
 that our hfe is a realm of signs and is made up of 
 interpretations of signs. Metaphysics generalizes 
 this doctrine and appHes it to the world at large.
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CHRISTIANITY 77 
 
 Hence the world is a process of interpretation not 
 in its wholeness at any one moment, but through an 
 infinite series of acts whereby the present progress- 
 ively interprets the past to the future, thus con- 
 stituting the temporal order. Thus the universe 
 is one vast cosmic process of humanity moving on 
 to its goal where is attained an all-embracing unity 
 of consciousness. ''The absolute, the sole and 
 supreme Reahty," is the entire process which is 
 essentially social as made up of many individual 
 selves. The aim and result of the process is the 
 Absolute Self, which Professor Royce calls "the 
 ideal community (common self) of all mankind." 
 
 Between the individual self on its way to the 
 goal are various "spiritual communities," that is, 
 common or social selves, through which man has 
 closest relations to the immeasurably vast cosmic 
 process, which is conceived as a process of coherent 
 social evolution. Unity of consciousness con- 
 stitutes the individual self. In like manner a 
 unity of consciousness — a common consciousness 
 among many individuals — constitutes a commu- 
 nity, namely, a common self. This unity of con- 
 sciousness is based upon a common memory and a 
 common ideal or hope among many individuals. 
 As a social being, man lives in communities. The 
 community has a sort of organic unity, a mind of 
 its own, and behaves like a conscious unit or a 
 "suprasensible being." The notion of the com- 
 munity suggests to Professor Royce a solution of
 
 78 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 the philosophical problem of the Many and the One, 
 and also gives occasion to unfold his fundamental 
 religious doctrine of the Two Levels, that is, man 
 the individual and man the community. 
 
 Assuming the principle that religion is the product 
 of certain human needs, Professor Royce seeks the 
 origin and teaching of Christianity in Christian 
 experience, not in the individual religious experience 
 of Professor James, but in "that form of social 
 religious experience which, in ideal, the Apostle 
 Paul viewed as the experience of the Church." 
 For religion is essentially social, in Professor Royce's 
 view, because of man's essential relation to the 
 social evolutive process of the cosmos. He holds 
 that the human individual Jesus is not the founder 
 of Christianity and denies that the Problem of 
 Christianity can be solved by views respecting the 
 person of Jesus. For Christianity preaches sal- 
 vation and salvation cannot come from an indi- 
 vidual, but only from loyalty to a community of 
 ideal purpose. Besides, historical evidence as to 
 Christ's teaching is insufficient. "Humanly speak- 
 ing," Jesus gave "the impetus" to the movement 
 in preaching the Kingdom of Heaven, and humanly 
 speaking this can be explained by "genius." Hence 
 the modern man can be a Christian without hold- 
 ing any definite views about the person of Christ. 
 Nor can the Apostle Paul be considered the founder, 
 for what he taught he learned from the religious 
 experience of the Christian Church. Professor
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CHRISTIANITY 79 
 
 Royce holds that the Christian community was the 
 human founder of Christianity, but has no hypoth- 
 esis about the origin of the community through lack 
 of historical evidence. Yet he maintains that we 
 have "priceless information about the essence of 
 Christianity of the Pauline Churches and their 
 actual life." The interpretation of the social re- 
 ligious experience of these churches reveals three 
 ideas most characteristic of primitive Christianity 
 — viz. the Community, the Lost State of the nat- 
 ural man. Atonement and Grace. The discussion 
 of these ideas is Professor Royce's contribution 
 to the Problem of Christianity on the basis of a 
 social study of Christian origins. 
 
 II. The Christian Doctrine of Life 
 
 Professor Royce holds that the Problem of Chris- 
 tianity is the Christian Doctrine of Life. He says 
 that this can be considered in a twofold light; as 
 the product of human evolution and the outcome of 
 a long history, and as the product of the social 
 experience of the Pauline Churches. In the former 
 view it is "the problem of humanity"; in the latter 
 "it has features distinctively Christian." There- 
 fore, he maintains that the doctrine should be 
 analyzed in its relation to the whole lesson of human 
 history and in the light of a philosophical study of 
 this history, in order to know what Christianity is 
 and means in the religious history of the race.
 
 8o PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 The Christian Doctrine of Life is constituted by 
 the Three Ideas. Professor Royce teaches that 
 these ideas have "a basis in human nature," are 
 "the expressions of universal human needs, inde- 
 pendent of Christianity," are "the verifiable re- 
 sults of the higher social religious experience of 
 mankind," "can be estimated and put into practice 
 without presupposing any one view of God or of 
 revelation," and are "religious, for they relate to 
 the salvation of mankind." This aspect is their 
 "human and empirical aspect," for they furnish "a 
 purely human philosophy of loyalty" and yet "are 
 based upon metaphysical truths whose significance 
 is more than human" (Lect. VIII). 
 
 To Professor Royce the natural condition of man 
 is a state of social chaos. Man is an animal liv- 
 ing in communities. These communities exist in 
 human history in countless different forms and 
 grades "of which the visible and historical Church 
 is one instance." From the communities man de- 
 rives religion, language, civilization and all his 
 natural powers. Constant tension and conflicts 
 exist between self, his fellows and the social will, 
 which produce consciousness of self: that is, con- 
 science. The standard of the social will, namely, 
 the law of St. Paul, is an attempt to bring about 
 social harmony, but in reality creates new and more 
 complex tensions by the application of social dis- 
 cipline. Through this social training our self-will 
 is developed and ideals arise. The more cultivated
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CHRISTIANITY 8i 
 
 the training, the stronger grows the self-will. The 
 evil increases and the burden grows heavier. The 
 individual may obey (conduct), but he inwardly 
 revolts (consciousness of conduct). As culture 
 advances, the revolt (distraction of will) increases; 
 for high social cultivation trains Individualism. 
 Thus the individual is by nature subject to an 
 overwhelming moral burden which springs from the 
 original sin of social contentiousness, and is in- 
 creased by social training and by personal guilt. 
 His natural condition is one of sin, for the sinfulness 
 belongs to the race in its corporate capacity and 
 the social order breeds conscious sinners. No 
 act of his can save him. Escape is not from this 
 type of cultivation — that is, the law. Help 
 (salvation, which is winning the true goal of life) 
 must come from a source above his level — that is, 
 the spirit, which rescues him and lifts him from his 
 fallen state. 
 
 The higher source, whence salvation comes, is, 
 according to Professor Royce, the Community. 
 For communities tend to be organized into more 
 composite communities of still higher grade, of 
 vaster conscious unity. Through the community 
 the individual is most closely related to the world 
 process, shares its spirit and lives its life, a life of 
 ever-increasing conscious unity. Apart from the 
 spirit and life of the community, the individual is 
 viewed as "morally detached" and in *'a lost state." 
 Hence we read that the doctrine of the Community
 
 82 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 is "a doctrine about the being, nature and mani- 
 festation of God." 
 
 Here is unfolded Professor Royce's doctrine about 
 the two levels of human existence: man, the in- 
 dividual, on the level of the flesh and the law, and 
 man, the community, on the level of the spirit. He 
 holds that they are levels of mental human beings 
 and differ as two grades of human life. The in- 
 dividual regards the community as higher, nobler, 
 more powerful, more enduring than himself, and 
 shows this practical faith by devoted loyalty to 
 its interests. He no longer loves according to the 
 flesh — that is, as a mere individual loves a mere 
 individual — but according to the spirit, and this 
 love is loyalty. To him loyalty becomes the 
 solution of the problem of personal life. The loyal 
 *'are, in ideal, essentially kin," in them all is "a 
 spirit essentially one," and as loyalty begets loyalty, 
 the logical development of the loyal spirit is "the 
 rise of the consciousness of the ideal of a universal 
 community of the loyal." Hence the higher of the 
 two levels is essentially, endlessly and divinely 
 above the individual level, and to act as a member 
 of such a community is to win what religion calls 
 salvation. This loyalty, namely, thorough-going 
 devotion to a cause which unites many selves in 
 one, appeals to the individual by fixing attention 
 on a life incomparably vaster than his own, and 
 belongs to no one time, country or people. Hence 
 experience shows that salvation for man lies in the
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CHRISTIANITY 83 
 
 purely human philosophy of loyalty and loyalty is 
 a religion, for it creates a new type of consciousness 
 — love for the community — and thus effects a 
 spiritual transformation in the individual. 
 
 The "Lost State" includes not only the "morally 
 detached" individual — that is, one who has not 
 found his ideal community, but also the individual 
 who, having found it, has lost it by proving false 
 to the ideal — a traitor. Is there any reconcilia- 
 tion between him and his community, his moral 
 world? Not on the part of the traitor; his deed 
 cannot be undone and by it he belongs to the 
 "Hell of the Irrevocable." But atonement can be 
 given the community through heroic deeds per- 
 formed on his behalf by some faithful servant in 
 whom the very spirit of the community is incar- 
 nated. Treason's lost causes have proved to be 
 opportunities for humanity's most triumphant 
 loyalty. It is a human triumph of the creative 
 spirit of humanity that could not undo the trea- 
 son, but, through skill and ingenuity, effected the 
 heroic act which transformed the meaning of the 
 treason and made the world better by a trans- 
 figuration of loss into gain. In illustration, 
 Professor Royce cites the story of Joseph and his 
 brethren, where Joseph is the symbol for the spirit 
 of the family and the result of the atoning act is a 
 more perfect family unity. Through atonement 
 the traitor enters into a saving union with the 
 community, for his act of treason, now trans-
 
 84 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 figured, is part of the community life. Hence 
 atonement is the function in which the life of 
 the community culminates. It teaches that in 
 due time loyal love will oppose its atoning deeds to 
 treason's sin. Professor Royce holds that Chris- 
 tianity expressed this teaching in the symbolic 
 form of a report concerning the supernatural work 
 of Christ, and humanity must express it through the 
 devotion, genius, skill, labor of its loyal servants 
 in whom its spirit is incarnated. The teaching and 
 the symbol, he adds, "are two sides of the same 
 life — at once human and divine." 
 
 The doctrine of the two levels arising from the 
 study of human experience is, according to Pro- 
 fessor Royce, the doctrine out of which the whole of 
 Christianity grows. For Christianity, he tells us, 
 was founded on the idea of a community, whose 
 spirit or life was the spirit or life of its risen Lord, 
 held as a present possession by an ideal common 
 memory of a past event, "the rising of Jesus to the 
 realm of the spirit," and by an ideal common hope 
 of a future event, when, according to the Apostle, 
 "we should rise with him" to the spirit, with love 
 enlivening and completing both memory and hope. 
 This belief, he says, grew out of the Master's teach- 
 ing about the Kingdom of Heaven. Professor 
 Royce holds that, historically speaking, Christian- 
 ity never appeared as the religion taught by the 
 Master, but as an interpretation of his teaching, 
 going beyond it, and this was due to the presence
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CHRISTIANITY 85 
 
 of the founder's spirit. The enlargement of doc- 
 trine is shown especially, he says, in the fact that 
 the Master, like other religious leaders in the 
 world's history, emphasized God and our neighbor 
 only. Whereas the Apostle Paul introduced a 
 third being, a corporate Entity, "the Body of 
 Christ," which he claims to be ''a new revelation" 
 discovered in his experience of an apostle as the 
 product of the Ufe of the Christian community 
 itself and due to ''the spirit of his Lord." To 
 Paul the Church was "the very presence of his 
 Lord," at once "a fact of present experience and 
 a divine creation," hence "a mystery," "whose 
 origin was wholly miraculous." Professor Royce 
 holds that this belief "constitutes a new beginning 
 in the evolution of Christianity." The Master had 
 laid stress on the value of individual life, but St. 
 Paul, as also Professor Royce, holds individuality 
 to be the source of all our sin and woe. Only by 
 ceasing to be a mere individual, through love for 
 the Body of Christ, can one be saved. Thus the 
 neighbor is transfigured as a member of the Beloved 
 Community. We love him not as an individual — 
 this the Master taught, but as a member of this 
 divine community which, in ideal, is one conscious 
 unity of all mankind. The spirit of the "risen 
 Lord," which is the life of the Body, through love 
 becomes our own. Hence love is loyalty and 
 loyalty is Christian faith and Christian faith is 
 grace and grace is the mystery of the incarnation in
 
 86 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 another form. Thus salvation comes through loy- 
 alty, for loyalty involves "an essentially new type 
 of consciousness" — that is, "the consciousness of 
 one who loves the community as a person." 
 
 Professor Royce holds that the Master's teach- 
 ing concerning the Kingdom of Heaven, which the 
 Apostle presented in a new revelation as the Body 
 of Christ, "developed into the conception which the 
 historic Church formed of its own mission," but 
 says that the true Church is "one endlessly and 
 conscious human spirit, whose Hfe is to be hved on 
 its own level"; hence invisible and still to be 
 created by a process of evolution. 
 
 Therefore, according to Professor Royce, an 
 examination into the Christian Doctrine of Life 
 shows (i) how the spirit, the community, the process 
 of salvation, are genuine realities transcending any 
 of their human embodiments; (2) that Christianity 
 is the most effective expression of religious loyalty 
 which the human race has, in its corporate capacity, 
 expressed; (3) that the rock upon which the true 
 and ideal church is built is the doctrine that the 
 community, wherein dwells the divine redeeming 
 spirit, is, through loyalty, the source of salvation. 
 
 Ill, The Essence of Christianity 
 
 The aim and result of the work under discussion 
 is to point out what is vital in Christianity, so that 
 the modern man may know what to hold and be a
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CHRISTIANITY 87 
 
 Christian. Professor Royce gives the solution of 
 the problem by way of an illustration. Let us 
 suppose the case of a young, highly educated Greek 
 philosopher who became a convert of the Pauline 
 Church and, after living the life of an earnest Chris- 
 tian, at length dies. He comes to life in our time, 
 is carefully instructed in our art, history, philos- 
 ophy, and then is brought face to face with Chris- 
 tianity as it now exists. How, asks the Professor, 
 can he, astonished and saddened at the essential 
 changes which have taken place, retain his Chris- 
 tian faith? And answers: 
 
 "The one thing he must hold fast is the Pauline 
 Doctrine of the presence of the redeeming divine 
 spirit in the living church. This is the essence of 
 Christianity in the Pauline Churches and in all the 
 subsequent ages of Christian development. Thus 
 he will keep in touch with historical Christianity. 
 His church will neither be the official church nor 
 the sect. His test of the church will be simply 
 this, that it actually unifies all mankind and 
 makes them one in the divine spirit. All else in 
 Paul's teaching he may come to regard as symbol 
 or as legend. This is in essence the faith of the 
 Apostles" (Lect. XV). 
 
 This solution sounds strange coming from such 
 a source. Professor Royce's volumes are a treatise 
 in religious Social Psychology. A fundamental 
 principle of this Psychology is "that religion springs 
 from our conscious needs" and he expressly states
 
 88 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 that "the religious needs of the modern man are 
 different from any ever before experienced and still 
 greater changes will come in the near future" 
 (Vol. I, p. 387). Why not then give the redivivus 
 young Greek a course in religious Social Psychology 
 and prepare him not only to accept a changed 
 Christianity, but to look with suspicion upon a 
 Christianity that has not changed? Again Pro- 
 fessor Royce teaches that the "person" or "self" 
 is not "a datum," but "a life" or "a process" 
 and applies the description to the individual self, 
 the social self and the absolute self, of which the 
 world-process is the expression. The social or 
 common self — that is, the Community — is the 
 basic idea in his treatise and has a marvelous rich- 
 ness of possible expansion without any limitation 
 or interruption so far as the nature of the common 
 self is concerned. Now both experience and science 
 tell that growth or development is a law of life. 
 On this doctrine of the self, I ask why does Pro- 
 fessor Royce think that his young friend should be 
 surprised or that he should regard the PauHne 
 community as "a datum" or a fixture and not as 
 "a life" or "a process"? In the emergency the 
 simple and consistent course for the author is, 
 not to forget his own philosophy, but to give a 
 clear exposition of his theory of knowledge and 
 of metaphysical idealism to his perplexed friend. 
 Moreover, Professor Royce holds that interpreta- 
 tion is the ruling category of mental life and of the
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CHRISTIANITY 89 
 
 world-process, and that it is of the nature of inter- 
 pretation to create something new. Hence our 
 mental life, our code of morality, everything about 
 us, change at each succeeding moment, as also 
 does the conscious time-stream change. He ap- 
 plies this principle to the PauHne community and 
 says that this being, the Body of Christ, first dis- 
 covered the three ideas constituting the Christian 
 Doctrine of Life in the effort to interpret the 
 Master's teaching, that these ideas were a "new 
 revelation" and *'a new beginning in the evolution 
 of Chris'tianity," and that, furthermore, the dog- 
 mas of the Trinity and of the Incarnation were 
 only symbols whereby the Pauline consciousness 
 attempted to set forth the relations between the 
 Absolute, the Spirit of the Pauline community, 
 and the human founder Jesus. Now the young 
 man should be aware of this. The reader will be 
 forced to conclude that the Greek was totally 
 ignorant both of Professor Royce's philosophy and 
 of the evolutive life of the PauHne Churches as he 
 has described this life. 
 
 In presenting a symbolic interpretation of Chris- 
 tianity, Professor Royce is influenced by his theory 
 of knowledge, which exhibits the "idea" as a 
 conscious idea striving and by his metaphysical 
 IdeaHsm which considers the universe as an ideal 
 evolution of an endlessly creative and conscious 
 human spirit. This evolutive spirit he calls the 
 Universal or the Beloved Community, namely,
 
 go PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 the whole common consciousness of mankind. 
 This is the one reality; all else are figures or symbols 
 — partial embodiments of the reality. Hence 
 God is a symbol for the community as a whole. 
 The historical Church is a partial embodiment 
 and the ideal Church is another name for the com- 
 munity. The ideas making up the Christian doc- 
 trine of Life, the parables of Jesus, the dogmas 
 of the Church are symbols of the evolution process 
 in whole or in part. The human individual Jesus 
 is the incarnation of the Spirit or life of humanity, 
 just as the Christian Church is the incarnation of 
 the Spirit of Jesus, and as we ourselves are the 
 incarnations of humanity's spirit or life, when, 
 through loyalty, we become one with this life or, 
 through heroic deeds, we atone for humanity's 
 wrongs. Hence Professor Royce questions the 
 historical truth of the Gospels and holds that the 
 life of Jesus was "the object of many legendary 
 reports so framed that they include a symboHsm 
 whereby a portion of the true faith is expressed." 
 
 This explanation is not new. He proposes for 
 our acceptance the mythical theory of Strauss 
 written not as a historian nor as a theologian, but 
 as a disciple of Hegel's Idealism. Strauss viewed the 
 Hegelian process in its subjective aspect, sought 
 the basic truths of Christianity in the early Chris- 
 tian consciousness, regarded Christ of the New 
 Testament as the outcome of this consciousness 
 and held that legendary reports and embellish-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CHRISTIANITY 91 
 
 merits were merely symbols for spiritual ideas. But 
 the theory was too fanciful, could not withstand 
 the comparison of the truthful matter-of-fact char- 
 acter of the New Testament writings with the 
 Apocrypha and was rejected by scholars. In Old 
 and New Faith, 1870, Strauss confessed to disap- 
 pointment at the outcome of his labors, 
 
 IV, Criticism 
 
 Professor Royce writes that he has "approached 
 this study not as a historian, nor as a theologian, 
 but as a philosopher." Therefore the criticism 
 regards him as a philosopher only. 
 
 To him the community is the fundamental no- 
 tion in the religious history of the race and in 
 Christianity. The community is the common self 
 and, he says, is constituted by a common conscious- 
 ness. Thus the definition of the community is based 
 upon the definition of the self. He holds that the 
 self is constituted by conscious memory. Hence 
 the individual is a self because he possesses a pres- 
 ent unity of conscious memory ideally extended to 
 the future. But the teaching that consciousness 
 constitutes the self is an error in philosophy coming 
 down from Locke and Kant, Conscious memory 
 makes me aware of my personal identity and pre- 
 supposes it. Memory or loss of memory does not 
 change me or what / did. Forgetfulness, aphasia, 
 dementia^ delirium, sleep, do not change the per-
 
 92 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 son or self, but produce different states of the same 
 self. Hence a distinction should be made be- 
 tween self and the states of the self. Hence the 
 notion of Professor Royce's community is radically 
 erroneous. 
 
 Again, in describing the natural state of man, he 
 adopts the teaching of Hobbes and Spencer. But 
 in fact this teaching is only a philosophical theory 
 and not proved. Rousseau and his followers hold 
 the peaceful state of the natural man. This opinion 
 is a philosophical theory also, and not proved. There- 
 fore upon a philosophical theory not proved and 
 not universally accepted by anthropologists he 
 bases his doctrine of the origin of the community. 
 What becomes of his criterion that the consensus 
 of opinion is necessary for a scientific hypothesis? 
 
 From the notion of the community springs Pro- 
 fessor Royce's doctrine of the Two Levels, which 
 he claims to be the fundamental principle in re- 
 ligious history and in Christianity. Now in fact 
 the careful reader distinguishes three levels — viz. 
 the individual, the community actually existing, and 
 the ideal community, namely, of ideal purpose. 
 He draws on some current sociological psychology 
 to show that actual communities have a mental 
 and ethical unity of their own which makes 
 them appear to the individual as "Suprapersonal 
 beings." He leaves the reader to imply that all 
 this applies to ideal communities. But this implica- 
 tion is not at all clear. True, actual communities
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CHRISTIANITY 93 
 
 may not be made up of soul-mates or affinities, 
 but they have a moral unity, or, to use the author's 
 thought, a unity constituted by the spirit. Why 
 then could not the individual find "his fulfil- 
 ment and moral destiny" in devoted loyalty to 
 actual communities? Furthermore, this current 
 sociological psychology is based on the definition 
 of the self, which was shown to be erroneous, and 
 regards man as an animal progressively evolving 
 a human nature — another philosophical theory 
 not by any means proved. 
 
 The fundamental error of Professor Royce is 
 his teaching concerning the nature of man and of 
 mental life. In denying immediate perception he 
 falls into Phenomenal IdeaKsm which develops into 
 a Metaphysical Idealism where idea, spirit, human- 
 ity are regarded as the only realities. But as a mat- 
 ter of fact these are only personifications. He does 
 not seem to be aware that notion, judgment and 
 reasoning are fundamental elements in our mental 
 life. Finally he defines the "idea" in terms of will. 
 But this is contrary to the testimony of conscious- 
 ness. That intellect and will are different is an 
 elemental fact of conscious experience. The intel- 
 lect is the cognitive mode or form of our conscious 
 life; whereas the will is the source of motive power. 
 A psychologist would be no more justified in com- 
 bining intellect and will than would be a physiologist 
 in blending the afferent and efferent nerves in one 
 act. Moreover, these faculties are unequal in the
 
 94 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 individual. Intellect and will are called modes in 
 which our soul-life is manifested. Hence, though 
 distinct from each other, they are not separated in 
 the sense that they are two entities, but unite in a 
 unity by virtue of the spiritual principle — viz. 
 the soul, whose modes of activity they are. 
 
 Thus the most noteworthy publication of the 
 year on the philosophy of religion, carefully con- 
 structed and written in beautiful language with a 
 wealth of illustration, is, in the last analysis, based 
 upon an erroneous definition of the "idea" — the 
 most fundamental and apparently the simplest 
 element in mental Ufe.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 
 
 The term Humanism is used by Professor Schil- 
 ler to designate a movement which he proclaims 
 to be a reform and an advance in Philosophy. This 
 reform, he assures us, is made necessary by the 
 collapse of current metaphysical systems and by 
 the great progress in Physical Science. That the 
 call for reform and reconstruction in Philosophy 
 is urgent, no candid student of modern thought 
 can deny. The truth of the reasons alleged is like- 
 wise patent to the ordinary mind. But the reform 
 proposed demands attention. This is the purpose 
 of the present study, viz. to show that the philos- 
 ophy outlined by Professor Schiller is vitiated 
 throughout by a method which, far from proving 
 to be the harbinger of peace and reconciliation, 
 tends directly to increase the warring confusion 
 of contemporary philosophic thought. 
 
 I. Notion of Humanism 
 
 The term. Humanism, as employed by Professor 
 Schiller, does not directly designate a philosophical
 
 96 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 system; it rather is restricted to express an atti- 
 tude of mind and a resultant method which tends 
 by ever-increasing application to construct a sys- 
 tem. Professor Schiller says that it is "in itself 
 the simplest of philosophic standpoints, viz. the 
 perception that the philosophic problem conceives 
 human beings striving to comprehend a world 
 of human experience by the resources of human 
 minds" {Studies in Humanism, p. 12), that "man's 
 complete satisfaction shall be the conclusion Phi- 
 losophy must aim at" {ih., p. 13). Thus its starting 
 point, its subject-matter, its aim is man or what is 
 human, and by human is understood "human ex- 
 perience." The world is known only and in so far 
 as it enters into and is colored by this "human 
 experience." On these grounds Humanism is and 
 has been rightly called Personal Idealism. 
 
 In manipulating this world of experience Human- 
 ism accepts and applies the Pragmatic method. Its 
 central principle therefore is "the purposiveness 
 of human thought and the teleological character 
 of its methods" {Humanism, Pref., p. xiii). Hence 
 it turns from beginnings with their first principles 
 and self-evident truths and looks to the end singly 
 and alone. The purpose of the act alone is and can 
 be the test and gauge of its worth. Pragmatism 
 restricts this method to the theory of knowledge; 
 whereas Humanism extends it to every phase and 
 feature of human life. Thus "Pragmatism will 
 seem a special application of Humanism to the
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 97 
 
 theory of knowledge," and Humanism involves 
 "the expansion of Pragmatism." Hence Human- 
 ism is "more universal" as possessing "a method 
 applicable universally, to ethics, to aesthetics, to 
 metaphysics, to theology, to every concern of man, 
 as well as to the theory of knowledge" {Studies 
 in Humanism, p. 16). In this hght Pragmatism is 
 "the forerunner and vice-regent" of Humanism 
 {Humanism, Pref., p. xix), or "an aspect of our 
 Humanism" {Studies in Humanism, p. 437). 
 
 Pragmatism, therefore, is concerned directly with 
 human thought. Humanism with human life in every 
 form and under every aspect. But if we bear in 
 mind that with Pragmatism and Humanism alike 
 thought is experiencing, and experiencing is con- 
 duct or life, any real difference fades away. Hence 
 Pragmatism and Humanism are terms designating 
 the same thing, e.g. human experience, considered 
 under different viewpoints. Pragmatism sets forth 
 a method of thought; Humanism accepts this 
 method, but lays special stress on its contents. 
 From these contents our thought takes human 
 form and color. Humanism, writes Professor Schil- 
 ler, "insists on leaving in the whole rich luxuriance 
 of individual minds, instead of compressing them 
 all into a single type of 'mind' feigned to be one 
 and immutable" {ih., p. 13). 
 
 The constituent element in Humanism, therefore, 
 is a psychological method. This it has in common 
 with Pragmatism. In essence this method is: all
 
 98 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 mental life is purposive {ib., p. lo). Hence 
 mental life is described in voluntarist terms, 
 i.e. in terms of will {ib., p. 128). As a method 
 Humanism is defined "as a conscious applica- 
 tion of a teleological psychology, which implies, 
 ultimately, a voluntaristic metaphysic" {ib., p. 12). 
 Professor Schiller, however, is reluctant to con- 
 sider Humanism a metaphysic. Neither Pragmatism 
 nor Humanism, he says, "necessitates a metaphysic; 
 both are methods" {ib., p. 16). Yet he admits that 
 "if we have the courage and persistence in thinking 
 to the end, we should arrive at Voluntarism" and 
 that "Pragmatism may, somewhat definitely, point 
 to a metaphysic" {ib., p. 11). The reasons for his 
 reluctance are that "we may stop" without think- 
 ing to the end, but this would be at the cost of 
 courage or consistency; and that "metaphysics is 
 the science of the final synthesis of all the data of 
 our experience. But de facto these data are insufl&- 
 cient and individual" {ib., p. 17). This only shows 
 that Humanism is not a metaphysical system per- 
 fected in every detail. Hence in its basic principle, 
 in its working and in its structure. Humanism is 
 essentially a metaphysic. Professor Schiller is 
 aware of this truth, for he writes that "though 
 Pragmatism and Humanism are only methods in 
 themselves, it should not be forgotten that methods 
 may be turned into metaphysics by accepting 
 them as ultimate" {ib., p. 19); that "methods may 
 have metaphysical affinities," thus, e.g. Prag-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 99 
 
 matism is conceived as derivative from "a vol- 
 untarist metaphysic," and "Humanism may be 
 affiliated to metaphysical personalism" {ib., p. 19); 
 that "methods may point to metaphysical con- 
 clusions," e.g. "Pragmatism may point to the ulti- 
 mate reality of human activity and freedom, to 
 the plasticity and incompleteness of reality, to the 
 reahty of the world-process in time," and "Human- 
 ism, in addition, may point to the personality of 
 whatever cosmic principle we can postulate as 
 ultimate and to its kinship and sympathy with 
 man" {ib., p. 19). 
 
 The character of this Voluntarist Metaphysic is 
 revealed through an analysis of its basic principle, 
 viz. all mental life is purposive. This principle must 
 be regarded not in the abstract but in the concrete. 
 Thinking therefore is willing, and willing on and 
 in the contents of experience is conduct or conduct 
 in the making. In this light Humanism is essen- 
 tially a philosophy of human life. It aims at man's 
 complete satisfaction, and by satisfaction is under- 
 stood harmony. Hence it "takes as the sole 
 essential problem of philosophy the harmonizing 
 of a life" (ib., p. 227) through "the all-pervading 
 purposiveness of human conduct" {ib., p. 128) and 
 reinstates "conduct as the all-controlling influence 
 in every department of life" {Humanism, p. 4). 
 
 In the light of such a teleological psychology, 
 decisive weight is given "to the conceptions of 
 Purpose and End," i.e. "the purposiveness of
 
 lOO PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 all our actual thinking and the relation of all our 
 actual realities to the ends of our practical life." 
 Now such a metaphysic is essentially ethical. It 
 means "the sway of human valuations on every 
 region of our experience." Hence Logic and 
 Metaphysics are subordinated to Ethics and 
 ''thus rejuvenated." "The ethical conception of 
 Good assumes supreme authority over the logical 
 conception of True and the metaphysical concep- 
 tion of Real.''' "Our apprehension of the Real, our 
 comprehension of the True, is always effected by 
 beings who are aiming at the attainment of some 
 Good, and choose between rival claimants to reality 
 and truth according to the services they render" 
 {il., p. 8). "Neither the question of Fact, therefore, 
 nor the question of knowledge can be raised without 
 raising also the question of Value. Our "'Facts' 
 when analyzed turn out to be 'Values,' and the 
 conception of 'Value' therefore becomes more 
 ultimate than that of 'Fact.' Our valuations thus 
 pervade our whole experience, and affect whatever 
 'fact,' whatever 'knowledge' we consent to recog- 
 nize." Hence as "there is no hiowing without 
 valuing^' and as "knowledge is a form of value, or, 
 in other words, a factor in a Good," "the founda- 
 tions of metaphysics have actually been found to 
 lie in ethics" {ih., p. lo). 
 
 Humanism, therefore, may be described as a 
 Personal Idealism conceived as a Metaphysical 
 Voluntarist Ethics. To Professor Schiller such a
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM loi 
 
 metaphysic is "an ideal, the theory of a perfect 
 life" (Studies in Humanism, p. 21). 
 
 II. A Personal Idealism 
 
 The starting point and subject-matter of Human- 
 ism is "Experience." For this reason it claims to be 
 an Empiricism {Humanism, p. 229). But its use of 
 the term "Experience" does not imply that things 
 exist in themselves apart from our knowing. This 
 Professor Schiller expressly denies. He holds that 
 "before there can be a real for us at all, the Real 
 must be knowable," that "the true formulation 
 therefore of the ultimate question of metaphysics 
 must become what can I know as real," and that 
 "hence Ontology, the theory of Reality, comes to 
 be conditioned by Epistemology, the theory of 
 Knowledge" {ib., p. 9). Hence reality is what is 
 "known as" and "in so far as known as." For 
 "the fact we start from, and must continue to 
 start from, is not a 'reality' which is 'independent' 
 but one which is experienced"; and hence reality 
 "is never extra-mental" (Studies in Humanism, 
 p. 482). 
 
 Humanism is, therefore, not a Real but an Ideal 
 Phenomenalism. Fact is not independent, but 
 dependent and relative to our knowing {ib., p. 
 181). Professor Schiller distinguishes two mean- 
 ings of "fact." "In the wider sense everything 
 is 'fact' qua experienced, including imaginings,
 
 I02 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 illusions, errors, hallucinations." "In the stricter 
 sense facts are products of this experience ob- 
 tained by processes of selection and valuation " 
 initiated and controlled "by interests, desires and 
 emotions" and therefore "immensely arbitrary" 
 {ib., pp. i86, 187, 188). Hence he speaks of "the 
 individual variations as to the acceptance of 
 fact," says that "our neglect of facts really tends 
 to make them unreal" and that "without a process 
 of selection by us, there are no real facts for us" 
 (ib.) . In this sense he writes " facts are far from being 
 rigid, irresistible, triumphant forces of nature; 
 rather they are artificial products of our selection, 
 of our interests, of our hopes, of our fears. The 
 shape they assume depends on our point of view, 
 their meaning on our purpose, their value on the 
 use we put them to; nay, perhaps, their very reahty 
 on our willingness to accept them" {ib., p. 371). The 
 distinctions of " fact," "truth,"" reahty" are distinc- 
 tions made within experience. The "objective" is 
 "that which he aims at and from" {ib., p. 189), 
 likewise within experience. Hence the starting 
 point, the data, the aim, the results of the process 
 are all based on and within experience. 
 
 Thus "in the end our world is human experi- 
 ence" {Humanism, p. 346). A world which we 
 neither did nor could experience would not be 
 one which we need argue or trouble about. This 
 is the doctrine of Personal Idealism and leads 
 directly to Solipsism. Indeed Professor Schiller
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 103 
 
 says that ''Solipsism is intellectually quite an en- 
 tertaining doctrine, and not logically untenable; 
 it is only practically uncomfortable" {Studies in 
 Humanism, p. 472). Therefore whereas "the fun- 
 damental dictum of Idealism must be formulated 
 as being that Reality is 'my' experience'' {ib., p. 
 469), still it "is not pragmatically workable and 
 must be expanded and subjected to a modification 
 which amounts to a correction" {ib., p. 470). Thus 
 he speaks of "reality largely 'ejected' or extruded 
 from my very consciousness and endowed with an 
 'independent' existence or 'transcendent' reality" 
 and of "the fact that we refused to accept as ours 
 the whole of our experience" {ib., p. 470). 
 
 Again the basic principle of Humanism is the 
 famous saying of Pythagoras that "man is the 
 measure of all things." Professor Schiller accepts 
 it in the individual and in the generic sense, in- 
 cluding man and men. He holds that the principle 
 is "most important" because ''it emphasizes the 
 subjective factor," that "whatever appear to each, 
 that really is to him and also to others in so far as 
 they have to deal with him and his ideas," that 
 "reality is for us relative to our faculties," that 
 "truth is a valuation" hence "subjective judg- 
 ments vary in value and a selection of the more 
 valuable and serviceable is made." These judg- 
 ments of the individual, or "subjective truth," 
 are ratified by other men, i.e. by society, and this 
 ratification or social selection constitutes "ob-
 
 I04 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 jective truth." Hence arise ''growing bodies of 
 objective truth shared and agreed upon by prac- 
 tically all" (ib.,pp. 33-35). 
 
 This teaching Professor Schiller expresses more 
 clearly in what he terms Idealistic Experiential- 
 ism, "a clumsy phrase," he says, used "to desig- 
 nate the view that 'the world' is primarily 'my 
 experience,' plus (secondarily) the supplementings 
 of that experience which its nature renders it neces- 
 sary to assume, such as e.g. other persons and a 
 'real' material world" {Humanism, p. 366). Thus 
 "the world, in which we suppose ourselves to be, 
 is, and always remains, relative to the experience 
 which we seek to interpret by it, and if that ex- 
 perience were to change, so necessarily would our 
 'real' world. Its reality was guaranteed to it, so 
 long as it did its work and explained our experience; 
 it is abrogated so soon as it ceases to do so" (ib.). 
 Thus "in dreams we pass into a new world; we 
 wake in a more 'real' world, in the ex post facto 
 judgment of which the dream-world is fleeting 
 chaotic and unmanageable" {ib.). But "the phil- 
 osophic critic cannot presume the theoretical cor- 
 rectness of our ordinary judgment. To him all 
 modes of experience are, in the first instance, real. 
 He can find no standing-ground outside experience 
 whence to judge it" {ib., p. 367). Hence "all our 
 distinctions between the 'real' and the 'unreal' 
 are intrinsic: it is the dream-world's character 
 itself that leads us to condemn it" {ib., p. 367) as
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 105 
 
 not being "a real explanation^^ of our world {ib., 
 p. 195). Yet "if in our dreams we found ourselves 
 transported into worlds more coherent, more in- 
 telligible, more delightful than that of daily life, 
 should we not gladly attribute to them a superior 
 reality?" {ib., p. 367). Hence "if the whole world 
 be experience, new worlds may be found by psychical 
 transformation, as probably and as validly as by 
 physical transportation" {ib., p. 368). 
 
 But Professor Schiller is somewhat sane, even 
 though inconsistent, and he comes down from the 
 airy flight to earth, if such a thing really exists 
 for the Pragmatist or is merely a supposition for 
 convenience' sake, by "appealing to the great so- 
 cial convention whereby we postulate (for practical 
 purposes) a common world which is experienced 
 by us all. Even during life that convention is main- 
 tained only at the cost of excluding from reality all 
 such experiences as are personal, or divergent, or 
 incapable of forming a basis for common action. 
 At death it breaks down altogether, and the long- 
 suppressed divergence between the world of 'my' 
 experience and the 'objective' world, which is 
 nobody's experience but is supposed to account 
 for everybody's, dominates the situation" {ib., 
 p. 371). Does not this mean that Humanism leads 
 directly to a Solipsism of the most fanciful kind, 
 that the Humanist avoids the consequences during 
 life by the "supposition" of a "social convention," 
 and that at death he becomes a solipsist pure and
 
 io6 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 simple? If Humanism be a "philosophy of life" 
 for ''practical purposes," why can it not work 
 its way along on its own principles without making 
 "artificial" and "contradictory" suppositions to 
 avoid a breakdown? The assumption of "a com- 
 mon world" is "a convention" maintained only 
 at the cost of "excluding from 'reality' all that 
 is personal," yet the essential contention with 
 Humanism is ^'leaving in the whole rich lux- 
 uriance of individual minds . . . the psycho- 
 logical wealth of every human mind and the 
 complexities of its interests, emotions, volitions, 
 aspirations" (Studies in Humanism, p. 13). Here 
 also it may be asked how the Humanist can 
 postulate on "external world" of "other men" or 
 "society" or a "social convention" without having 
 a previous knowledge of them and how does he 
 obtain this knowledge? 
 
 Finally Professor Schiller tells us that "Psychol- 
 ogy is a descriptive science, whose aim is the 
 description of mental processes as such," that it 
 embraces "the whole realm of direct experience," 
 that "it recognizes a psychological side to every- 
 thing that can he known, inasmuch as everything 
 known to exist must be connected with our experi- 
 ence, and known by a psychical process. In so far 
 as any real is known, a process of experiencing is 
 involved in it, and this process appertains to the 
 science of Psychology. Thus all physical objects 
 and questions become psychological, so soon as we
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 107 
 
 ask how they can be experienced" {ib., p. 75). 
 This teaching he pushes to logical conclusion and 
 proposes "Hylozoism or (better) Panpsychism " 
 as "at bottom merely forms of Humanism, — • 
 attempts to make the human and the cosmic 
 more akin, and to bring them closer to us, that 
 we may act upon them more successfully" {ib., p. 
 443). This teaching is amazing when we reflect 
 that it rests upon confounding the ideal repre- 
 sentation of a thing in the mind with the thing 
 itself. 
 
 HI. Criticism 
 
 The radical defect in Professor Schiller's Human- 
 ism is that he exposes a Metaphysics of reflective 
 thought. In like manner Professor Dewey gives a 
 Logic of reflective thought. Reflective thought 
 is necessary, but it must always be tested by con- 
 tact with and application to existing things dis- 
 tinct and separate from ourselves. This test neither 
 Professor Schiller nor Professor Dewey can adopt 
 because their doctrines are based on the Phenomenal 
 Idealism of Sensism. We see Professor Schiller at 
 his desk buried in profound reflective thought. For 
 the time, he forgets the chair in which he sits, the 
 desk before him, the pen and paper. He is not 
 concerned with things as they exist, he is reflecting 
 on their intra-mental representations. His medita- 
 tion is interrupted at times by facts which "are 
 thrust upon him," "unpleasant novelties," as e.g.
 
 io8 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 an unwelcome interruption, but though "facts 
 may at times coerce, it is yet more essential to them 
 to be accepted" and hence what was '^ de facto" 
 thrust upon him" "becomes de jure willed" {ib., pp. 
 189-220). 
 
 Back again therefore he is in reflective thought. 
 Now "ejections" or "extrusions of reality" from 
 his own "consciousness" take place, which are 
 "endowed with an independent existence or trans- 
 cendent reality" {ib., p. 470). They pass and he 
 settles down to reflective thought and views 
 them as representations in his experience. He 
 may remember the fact that at a time he "re- 
 fused to accept as his own, the whole of his 
 experience" (ib.) and "so postulated an extra 
 mental reality" {ib., p. 471). Now, however, all 
 that is a part of his experience. He is aware that 
 there is a difference between discovering a reality 
 and making a reality, for he writes on the paper "a 
 reality is said to be discovered and not made, when 
 its behavior is such that it is practically incon- 
 venient or impossible to ascribe its reality for us 
 entirely to our subjective activity. . . . To wish 
 a chair (or note-paper) and find one, and to wish for 
 for a chair and make one, are experiences which 
 it is not easy to confuse and which involve very 
 different operations and attitudes on our part. In 
 the one case we have merely to look around and 
 our trusty senses present to us the object of our 
 desire in effortless completion. In the other a
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 109 
 
 prolonged process of construction is required" 
 {ib., p. 430). 
 
 Evidently Professor Schiller has opened his eyes. 
 He now admits that ** primary reality may, cer- 
 tainly, in a sense, be called independent of us" 
 {ib., p. 187); that *'he may prefer to sacrifice a 
 cherished prejudice rather than to deny e.g. the 
 evidence of his senses" {ib., p. 189); that "the 
 'correspondence-with-reahty' view of truth" is 
 ''most plausible and least inadequate in its sen- 
 sationalistic form, as referring thoughts to the test 
 of perceptions" and "indeed, it is plainly descrip- 
 tive of processes which actually occur in our know- 
 ing" {ib., p. 177); that "in ordinary life we deal 
 directly with an ' external world ' perceived through 
 the senses; in science, with the same a little less 
 directly; in either case, our hypotheses appeal to 
 some overt visible and palpable fact, by the obser- 
 vation of which they are adequately verified" 
 {ib., p. 362); that "the actual limitation of our 
 power to produce movements to bodies directly 
 touched by our organism is wholly empirical" 
 {ib., p. 380); that "among the major difficulties 
 of Absolutism" is "what may be called the imper- 
 viousness and mutual exclusiveness of minds, which 
 seem capable of communicating with each other 
 only by elaborate codes of signalling and the em- 
 ployment of material machinery" {ib., p. 266); that 
 "the laws of nature, however they may be thought 
 to originate, are de facto the established habits of
 
 no PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 things, and their constancy is an empirical fact 
 of observation" {ib., p. 409)- 
 
 Now Professor Schiller closes his eyes and in 
 reflective thought beholds "the flux of human 
 reahty ' ' through experience. He distinguishes facts 
 forming "coherent systems of interpretation," 
 which he calls "facts of science" {ib., p. 370) from 
 other facts which he calls "crude facts" {ib.) or 
 "sheer, brute uncomprehended" facts {ih., p. 414). 
 He does not ask why they cannot be interpreted 
 or how they came into experience, for "Pragmatism 
 is not laying stress on their origin" {ib., p. 245). 
 In fact he ascribes "novelties in experience" as 
 due to " a providential interposition" or as an "acci- 
 dental variation." "Metaphysically these expla- 
 nations are equivalents" {ib., p. 244). But why 
 resort to Metaphysics when by opening his eyes he 
 can see how things enter into experience and can 
 understand that things unexplained in nature are 
 also unexplained in experience. 
 
 Professor Schiller in an acute criticism of Her- 
 bert Spencer's "strange see-saw in regarding 
 equilibration now as universal death, now as perfect 
 life" accuses Spencer of speaking "with a double 
 voice throughout" {Humanism, p. 219). But this 
 is the great fault with Professor Schiller himself. 
 Now he speaks with his eyes open and is deaHng 
 directly with things. Now he speaks with his 
 eyes shut and is deahn-g with the presentations of 
 things as they appear in reflective thought. He
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM iii 
 
 insists on subordinating the former to the latter; 
 and as to the latter, he is not concerned with their 
 origin but only with the devices which will cause 
 them to coalesce into a harmonious unity of a 
 perfect life. He does not seem to be aware that 
 the harmony he tries to establish is not a harmony 
 among "things" but a harmony among ''concep- 
 tions" "beliefs" and "imaginings."
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM {continued) 
 
 While the basis of Humanism is a Personal 
 Idealism, its integrating principle is an ethical 
 Voluntarism. 
 
 I. An Ethical Voluntarism 
 
 Humanism conceives "experience" as active, i.e. 
 as purposive {Studies in Humanism, pp. ii, 130). 
 Thus it is distinguished from the Empiricism of 
 Bain and Mill. Its main principle is the "pur- 
 posiveness of human thought and experience" 
 {ib., p. 230). The purposiveness of human 
 thought reveals its teleological nature {ib., p. 
 271), i.e. the relation of all our actual experi- 
 ence to the ends of our practical life {Human- 
 ism, p. 8). Desire and will give the initiative, 
 direction and decisive weight to mental action. 
 Hence thought is expressed in terms of will and is 
 the purposive tendency to an end. This Volun- 
 tarism implies "the intrinsic coherence and po- 
 tential harmony of the whole of experience" {ib., 
 p. 346), and is based on the assumption "that the 
 elements of our experience admit of being harmo-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 113 
 
 nized, that the world (i.e. of our experience) is truly 
 a cosmos^^ {ib., p. 349), "not because we have any- 
 formal and a priori assurance of the fact, but be- 
 cause we desire it to be so and are willing to try 
 whether it cannot become so" {ib., p. 189). Its 
 aim is the harmonizing of our experience through 
 our own efforts until we attain complete satisfac- 
 tion (ib., p. 200). We start with immediate ex- 
 perience {ib., p. 192) which is plainly not as yet 
 harmonious {ib., p. 193) and by purposive action 
 for subordinated ends realized in and through the 
 time-process, we attain ever-growing and ever- 
 wider control of experience {ib., p. 105). 
 
 The conceptions of Purpose and of End, there- 
 fore, are dominant factors in experience and "assert 
 the sway of human valuations over every region 
 of our experience" {ib., p. 8). Thus the "Real" 
 is our experience manipulated under the influence 
 of purpose; and the "True" is what is of value for 
 an end {Studies in Humanism, p. 152) conceived 
 as the means or the instrument of the manipulation. 
 Hence the distinction rests on the various behavior 
 of things in experience. 
 
 Professor Schiller discriminates between "prop- 
 ositions which claim to be true" and "valid 
 truths." The "claims" he conceives as "ambigu- 
 ous truth" and "may turn out to be true or 
 false" {ib., p. 144). They only become "valid 
 truths" when verified and they are verified by use. 
 Thus "claims" are tested by their consequences;
 
 114 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 i.e. what follows from their truth for any human 
 interest and especially for the interest with which 
 they are directly concerned, is what establishes their 
 real truth and vahdity {ih., pp. 5, 148, 154). For 
 truth is conceived as human, and "human interest 
 is vital to the existence of truth." Truth is "truth 
 for man,'" i.e. "has a bearing upon some human 
 interest," "its consequences must be consequences 
 to some one for some purpose"; they must be 
 ''practical and ^' good'' {ih., p. 5). Hence "the 
 objects of our contemplation when valued as true 
 become facts'' and "truth is value in the apprehen- 
 sion oi fact" {Humanism, p. 57). As the valuation 
 depends on reference to an end "the true and the 
 false are intellectual forms of the good and the had" 
 {Studies in Humanism, p. 154). Thus e.g. "a 
 truth is what is useful in building up a science; 
 a falsehood what is useless or noxious for the same 
 purpose"; "a science is good if it can be used to 
 harmonize our life; if it cannot, it is a pseudo- 
 science or a game" {ih.). Moreover "the same 
 predication may be true for me and false for you, 
 if our purposes are different," "success in validating 
 a truth is relative to the purpose with which the 
 truth was claimed," "a truth in the abstract, rel- 
 ative to no purpose is plainly unmeaning" {ih., 
 p. 193), and "we declare an old truth false because 
 we are able to find a new one which more than 
 fills its place." Hence "our truth is not 
 merely being falsified, but also being verified in one
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 115 
 
 and the same process; it is corrected only to be 
 improved. And so the Humanist can recognize 
 necessary errors as well as necessary truths, errors 
 which are fruitful of the truths which supersede 
 them." "Our errors were truths in their day. For 
 they were the most adequate ways we then had 
 of dealing with our experience. They were not, 
 therefore, valueless. Nor were they gratuitous 
 errors. More commonly they were natural or 
 even indispensable stages in the attainment of 
 truth." Truth, therefore, is "flexible" as "adjust- 
 ing itself to the demands of life" {ib., pp. 211, 
 212, 213). 
 
 But man is a social being and truth is not merely 
 an individual but "to a large extent a social prod- 
 uct" therefore "it has to win social recognition." 
 This is effected by "the use-criterion" which 
 selects the individual truth-valuations and con- 
 stitutes thereby the objective truth which obtains 
 social recognition. Hence "in the fullest sense" 
 "Truth is the useful, efficient, workable, to which 
 our practical experience tends to restrict our truth- 
 valuations" and "social usefulness is an ultimate 
 determinant of truth" {Humanism, pp. 52-60; 
 Studies in Humanism, pp. 152-153). In this light 
 Professor Schiller conceives Humanism to be "a 
 conscious application to the theory of life of the 
 psychological facts of cognition as they appear to 
 a teleological Voluntarism" ( Humanism, p. 8). 
 
 Now inasmuch as "a theory of life" and its
 
 Ii6 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 method of " teleological valuation" are "the special 
 spheres of ethical inquiry," this Voluntarism is 
 essentially ethical. For "our apprehension of the 
 Real, our comprehension of the True, is always 
 effected by beings who are aiming at the attain- 
 ment of some Good (i.e. an end) and choose 
 between rival claimants to reality and truth 
 according to the services they render." Hence 
 " the ethical conception of the Good has supreme 
 authority over the logical conception of the Triie 
 and the metaphysical conception of the Real.'' 
 Therefore just as the question what is truth, is 
 dependent on the particular purpose and end, 
 in like manner "the ultimate question for phi- 
 losophy becomes — What is reaUty for one aiming 
 at knowing what ? ' Real ' means real for what pur- 
 pose? to what end? in what use? in what con- 
 text? in preference to what alternative belief? 
 The answers always come in terms of the will to 
 know which puts the question. This at once 
 yields a simple and beautiful explanation of the 
 different accounts of reality which are given in the 
 various sciences and philosophies. The purpose 
 of the questions being different, so is their purport, 
 and so must be the answers" (ib., pp. 8-10). But as 
 Ethics is the "science which gives an orderly 
 account of the ends of life that are or should be 
 aimed at" it follows "that our ultimate metaphysic 
 must be ethical" {ib., p. 105) or ^' quasi ethical" 
 (ib., p. 13).
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 117 
 
 II. The Making of Truth and of Reality 
 
 Voluntarist Metaphysics, therefore, exhibits ex- 
 perience as a purposive evolutive integration. Its 
 essence is *'the doctrine that the world is "in 
 process" that "changes" and "novelties occur." 
 The evolutive process is purposive and thus differs 
 from Spencer's which is "physical" and "static" 
 {Studies in Humanism, p. 226). Its fundamental 
 principle is the assumption that "human action 
 is endowed with real agency and really makes a 
 difference alike to the system of truth and to the 
 world of reaHty" {ih., pp. 391, 392). Here are 
 set forth the central teachings of its metaphysic, 
 known as "the Making of Truth" and "the 
 Making of ReaHty." 
 
 The evolutive process starts with the uncritical 
 acceptance of whatever seems to be, i.e. with the 
 assumption "whatever is, is real." This is "pri- 
 mary reality" or "appearance," and "at its level, 
 conceived as purely cognitive, everything would be, 
 and remain, in an unmeaning, indiscriminated flow." 
 "If we were purely cognitive beings, we should 
 also stop with this." But we are "interested and 
 purposive and desirous of operating and control- 
 hng the primary reality" {ih., pp. 220, 221). "The 
 felt unsatisfactiveness of the immediate experience" 
 elicits the purposive action {Humanism, pp. 192, 
 199), for "all actual thinking is impelled by inter- 
 est" {ih., p. 52) and "purpose may be conceived
 
 Ii8 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 as a concentration of interest" {Studies in Human- 
 ism, p. 82). Thus "we are neither disposed nor 
 able to accept our immediate experience as it 
 appears to be," but "are compelled to discount it 
 and treat it as an appearance of something ulterior 
 which will supplement its deficiency" {Humanism, 
 
 P- 193)- 
 
 So we "proceed to distinguish between appear- 
 ance and reality, between primary and real reality" 
 {Studies in Humanism, p. 221). "The immediate 
 experience," therefore, "is the symbol of a higher 
 reality whereof it partly manifests the nature" 
 {Humanism, p. 193). The nature of the purposive 
 action is selective, for "it selects part of the imme- 
 diate experience as of special interest to be operated 
 on or aimed at" and "is, in fact, a biological func- 
 tion" {Studies in Humanism, p. 10), Moreover it 
 selects or makes inferences, assumptions, postu- 
 lates, which function on the selected part of primary 
 reality with a view to control it for the special 
 purpose. If these assumptions do the work, they 
 are called "higher realities." Their reality must 
 be made to depend throughout on their efficiency 
 {Humanism, p. 199). Professor Schiller tells us 
 that "the reahties of ordinary life and science, 
 such as 'the external world' and the existence of 
 other persons are all of this secondary order. They 
 rest upon inferences from our immediate experience 
 which have been found to work." "We then 
 declare real the conception which served our purpose,
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 119 
 
 nay more real, because more potent, than the 
 immediate experience for the satisfaction of our 
 desire" {ib., p. 193). Yet he adds "that the im- 
 mediate experience is after all in a way more real, 
 i.e. more directly real, than the 'higher realities' 
 which are said to explain it" {ib., p. 195). 
 
 These "higher" or "secondary" reahties are 
 said to control the "primary" or "immediate" 
 reahty, when they "interpret" it {ib., p. 51), 
 "explain," "transfigure" it {ib., p. 195), "trans- 
 form," "elucidate," " transmutate " it {ib., p. 199), 
 "alter" it {ib., p. 193, note; Studies in Humanism, p. 
 31), by preparing it for "assimilation" {ib., p. 371) 
 through the "conceptual manipulation" {Human- 
 ism, p. 199), "cognitive elaboration" or "cognitive 
 functioning of experience" {Studies in Humanism, 
 p. 426). Our actual minds possessing some prior 
 knowledge are conceived as the "starting points" 
 of the process or the "platform" from which we 
 operate on the situation that confronts us. The 
 actual procedure is "inductive, experimental, 
 postulatory, and tentative" which issues in an 
 act. "If the consequences are satisfactory, the 
 reasoning employed is deemed to have been pro 
 tanto good, the results right, the operations per- 
 formed valid, while the conceptions used and the 
 predications made are judged true'^ {ib., pp. 184, 
 
 185). 
 
 Thus real fact is evolved out of primary fact by 
 a process of selection {ib., p. 187). What we judge
 
 I20 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 to be true, we take to be real and accept as fact. 
 Hence there is no antithesis of truth and Jad, but 
 reality is conceived as something which grows up 
 in the making of truth, for in the cognitive elabora- 
 tion of experience the making of truth and the 
 making of reality seem to * be fundamentally one 
 {ih., p. 426). Hence it is that we regard the false 
 as a "term attached to an earlier phase of the 
 process which has evolved the truth" and "see 
 the new truth continuously growing out of the old, 
 as a more satisfactory way of handHng the old 
 problems" and "maintain that our errors were 
 truths in their day" {ih., p. 212), for truth is a 
 valuation as "a successful operation on reality" 
 {ih., p. 118). 
 
 In like manner "facts which can be excluded 
 from our lives, which do not interest us, which 
 mean nothing to us, which we cannot use, which are 
 ineffective, which have little bearing on practical 
 life, tend to drop into unreality" {ih., p. 188), for 
 ''real and unreal are really distinctions of value 
 within experience, the unreal is what may safely be 
 ignored, the real what is better to recognize" {ih., 
 p. 480). 
 
 As "the predication of truth" is "dependent on 
 relevance to a proximate purpose" and as "what 
 is true and serviceable for one purpose is not neces- 
 sarily so for another" {ih., p. 156), and as successful 
 predication proves or "reveals" what is real, while 
 unsuccessful predication or "functioning" reveals
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM I2i 
 
 what is unreal, it follows that the designations of 
 'Hrue" and "false," of "real" and "unreal" are 
 commonly interchangeable; for ^^ reality is reality 
 for us and known by us, just as truth is truth for us" 
 {ih., p. 426). 
 
 In the process of "conceptual manipulation of 
 experience" not only is the immediate experience 
 ''interpreted" and "changed," but "the platform" 
 whence the action starts is conceived as changing, 
 for "it is not anchored to the eternal bottom of 
 the flux of time; it floats, and so can move with the 
 times, and be adjusted to the occasion" {ih., p. 190). 
 Thus "the actual situation is a case of interaction, 
 a process of cognition in which the ' subject' and the 
 'object' determine each the other, and both 'we' 
 and 'the reality' are involved, and, we might add, 
 evolved ' ' {Humanism, p. 1 1 , note) . Hence ' ' knowl- 
 edge arises out of pre-existing knowledge" and 
 "the development of mind is a thoroughly personal 
 affair" {Studies in Humanism, p. 186). 
 
 As the process is elicited by interests and carried 
 on by purposive selection. Professor Schiller holds 
 that it is intensely "human" {ih., p. 182), "painful 
 and laborious" {ih., p. 222), "immensely arbitrary" 
 {ih., p. 188) and as a result "in general, the world, 
 as it now appears to us, may be regarded as the 
 reflection of our interests in life" {ih., p. 200). 
 Moreover the process is continuous; it "is as un- 
 ending as the pursuit of happiness" {ih., p. 222) 
 and is conceived as "an integral part of the great
 
 122 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 cosmic striving towards satisfaction and harmony 
 and equilibrium" {Humanism, p. i88). ^'Looking 
 forward the making of truth is clearly a continuous 
 progressive and cumulative process. For the sat- 
 isfaction of one cognitive purpose leads on to the 
 formulation of another." "Looking backwards the 
 situation is less plain," but we are bound "to con- 
 ceive, if possible, the whole process as continuous," 
 for "we can never get back to truths so funda- 
 mental that they cannot possibly be conceived as 
 having been made. There are no a priori truths 
 which are indisputable" {Studies in Humanism, 
 pp. 195-197). 
 
 Pragmatism therefore expressly teaches that " the 
 beginning of knowledge is wrapped in mystery" and 
 in justification holds that it is not really concerned 
 with the "explanation of the past" but "to know 
 how to act with a view to the future." Yet 
 "there would seem to be no actual end in sight" 
 {ib., p. 198) to the time-process, created by our 
 conceptual functioning, in and through which our 
 individual ends were realized {Humanism, pp. 105, 
 106, 109). The absolutely real does not "already 
 exist"; it is an ideal and "will be that which ful- 
 fils our every purpose and which therefore we do 
 not seek to alter but only to maintain" {Studies 
 in Humanism, p. 321); for it is conceived "as 
 capable of including and harmonizing all the lower 
 realities" and "the struggle to attain a glimpse 
 of such an Ultimate Reality forms the perennial
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 123 
 
 content of the drama of philosophy" {Humanism, 
 p. 194). 
 
 Thus Humanism takes "the great thought of 
 Fichte and Hegel that thought and reality, logic 
 and metaphysics belonged together and must not 
 be separated," accepts "the cosmic process as one 
 with the thought process," but corrects the defect 
 of their thought-process by humanizing it {Studies 
 in Humanism, pp. 422-424). The postulate of 
 purposive selection reveals the correlative basic 
 postulate of the evolutive cosmic or time process, 
 viz. the conception of reahty as "plastic, growing, 
 incomplete" {ih., p. 427). True, "we find a world 
 made for us" because "we are the heirs of bygone 
 ages, profiting by their work, and it may be suffer- 
 ing for their folly," but "we can, in part, remake 
 it, and reform a world that has slowly reformed 
 itself" {ih., p. 320). Even "we ourselves are made 
 by a long series of ancestors and these in their turn 
 were inevitably generated by non-human forces — 
 of a purely physical kind" {ih., p. 393). Hence 
 "a really evolving and therefore as yet incomplete 
 reality involves the conception of a determinable 
 indetermination in nature at large" {ih., p. 392). 
 "Previous to our trial" the nature of things "is 
 indeterminate, within Hmits which it is our busi- 
 ness to discover. It grows determinate by our 
 experiments" {Humanism, p. 11, note). 
 
 Hence "the determinate nature of reality does 
 not subsist outside or heyond the process of knowing
 
 124 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 it" (ib.). This "universal flux of reality sways 
 the world of ideas" {Studies in Humanism, p. 205), 
 hence "human truth not absolute, fluid not rigid, 
 chosen not inevitable, born of passion and sprung 
 from desire, incomplete not perfect, fallible not 
 unerrant, absorbed in the attaining of what is not 
 yet achieved, purposive and struggling towards 
 ends" {ih.y p. 208). "To what extent," however, 
 "and in what direction the world is plastic and to 
 be moulded by our action, we do not know as yet. 
 We can find out only by the trying" {Humanism, 
 p. 12). 
 
 To Professor Schiller the assertion that "reality 
 is utterly plastic to our every demand is a travesty 
 of Pragmatism" {ih., p. n, note), yet he says that 
 as "an obvious methodological principle we must 
 regard the plasticity of fact as adequate for every 
 purpose" {Studies in Humanism, p. 445). To the 
 objection that "not all the responses are indeter- 
 minate," he replies "that it is easy to regard them 
 as having been determined by other experiments" 
 {Humanism, p. 12, note), or holds that the principle 
 is methodological not ontological {Studies in Hu- 
 manism, p. 446), or while admitting that "even 
 on the epistemological plane the making of truth 
 seemed to recognize certain limitations," yet "the 
 exact nature of these, being unable to pursue the 
 subject into the depths of metaphysics, we were 
 not able to determine" {ih., p. 426), or "it seems 
 clear that we are not the sole agents in the world,
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 125 
 
 and that herein lies the true explanation of those 
 aspects of the world, which we, the present agents, 
 i.e. our empirical selves, cannot claim to have made. 
 There is no reason to conceive these features as 
 original and rigid. Why should we not conceive 
 them as having been made by processes analogous 
 to those whereby we ourselves make reality and 
 watch its making" {ib., p. 446). As a consistent 
 IdeaHst how can Professor Schiller recognize ''other 
 agents" and "analogous processes"? 
 
 Nevertheless, Professor Schiller's principle de- 
 mands complete plasticity for "a partial plasticity 
 would be nugatory and unworkable" {ib., p. 445). 
 In confirmation he appeals to human freedom. 
 Freedom is a postulate of the Humanist making 
 of reality, and "if human freedom is real, the world 
 is really indeterminate" {ib., p. 411). For "the 
 laws of nature may be regarded as the habits of 
 things, and these habits as behaviors which have 
 grown determinate, and more or less stable, by 
 persistent action, but as still capable of further 
 determinations under the proper manipulation," 
 and "there are no stringent reasons for confining 
 freedom, and the plastic indetermination of habit, 
 on which it rests, to man alone. It may well be 
 a feature which really pervades the universe." 
 Now to the Humanist, freedom is the capacity for 
 change. As to change in the universe Physical 
 Science gives a decided answer. Thus Professor 
 Schiller teaches actual plasticity and is compelled to
 
 126 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 fall back on a hope in a latent plasticity {ib., pp. 
 446-448). 
 
 Though expounding a metaphysical theory Pro- 
 fessor Schiller enjoys poking fun at Metaphysics. 
 He shies it, ostensibly on Pragmatic grounds, 
 when brought face to face with a difficulty of his 
 own making. Yet we cordially assent to the 
 statement, "Metaphysics, though adventurous and 
 so hazardous, are not unbecoming or unmanly . . . 
 what alone renders metaphysics offensive and 
 dangerous are the preposterous pretensions some- 
 times made on their behalf. . . . You must not, 
 therefore, grow fanatical about your metaphysics, 
 but hold them with a candid and constant willing- 
 ness to revise them, and to evacuate your positions 
 when they become untenable" (ib., pp. 437, 438). 
 
 As a matter of fact Humanism recognizes limi- 
 tations in the making of truth and of reality. Thus 
 Professor Schiller tells us that "we do not make 
 truth out of nothing, of course" and that "our 
 truths were made out of previous truths, and 
 built upon pre-existing knowledge; also that 
 our procedure involved an initial recognition of 
 fact" (ib., p. 186). Here is a difficulty, for "although 
 any particular fact can always be conceived as 
 having been made by a previous cognitive op- 
 eration, this latter in its turn will always presup- 
 pose a prior basis of fact. Hence, however rightly 
 we may emphasize the fact that what we call real- 
 ity is bound up with our knowing and depends
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 127 
 
 on our manipulations, there will always seem to 
 be an insuperable paradox in the notion that real- 
 ity can, as such and wholly, he engendered by the 
 consequences of our dealing with it." Professor 
 Schiller recognizes the difficulty and evades it by 
 "fighting shy of metaphysics," by conceiving on 
 the Pragmatic method ''the making as merely 
 subjective, as referring only to our knowledge of 
 reality, without affecting its actual existence," 
 by an appeal to chaos, by the admission that 
 his method cannot give a solution, by maintain- 
 ing that the Pragmatic method "is not disposed 
 to regard initial facts or truths as specially im- 
 portant, even if they could be ascertained," by 
 holding that "even though the Pragmatic method 
 impHes a truth and a reality which it does not 
 make, yet it does not conceive them as valuable" 
 but "only as indicating limits to our explana- 
 tions, and not as revealing the soHd foundations 
 whereon they rest" {ib., pp. 428-435). But to 
 explain reality is to change or make it, and a 
 limit to our explanations is ipso facto a limit to 
 our making. 
 
 Nor can Professor Schiller escape the difficulty 
 by distinguishing between the knowledge of reality 
 and its actual existence, without giving up the basic 
 principle of his system, for Humanism is essentially 
 an IdeaHst philosophy, and how can knowledge 
 and reality be separated in a system whose central 
 principle is that truth and reality grow up in the
 
 128 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 one and same act? It is strange that in explain- 
 ing the vital teaching of Humanism, he should be 
 compelled to give up what is distinctive in his 
 Humanism. 
 
 Again Professor Schiller is forced to make a dis- 
 tinction between ''discovering" reality and "mak- 
 ing" reality and writes "to wish for a chair and 
 find one, and to wish for a chair and make one, 
 are experiences which it is not easy to confuse" 
 {ib., p. 430). Moreover he assures us that "if the 
 objective making of reality should prove illusory, 
 you can take refuge in the subjective making of 
 reality which the Pragmatic method has quite 
 clearly established" {ib., p. 438) "and so it may be 
 denied that we make reality metaphysically, though 
 not that we make it epistemologically" {ib., p. 429). 
 
 Thus all that Professor Schiller said about plastic- 
 ity and the purposive evolutive process was not to be 
 taken seriously after all, and he assures us "that 
 it is quite possible to be a good Pragmatist, without 
 attempting to turn one's method into a meta- 
 physic" {ib., p. 430). But the "making of Reality" 
 is a metaphysic and the real trouble is: the meta- 
 physic will not work. As a consistent Pragmatist, 
 on methodological grounds, he should discard his 
 system. Furthermore primary reality is not made 
 even though Professor Schiller holds that it has a 
 "dubious independence" {ib., p. 201). 
 
 Again when Professor Schiller is asked to explain 
 "the real world of common sense, in which we find
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 129 
 
 ourselves, and which we do not seem to have made 
 in any human sense," he realizes that his "theory 
 of knowledge is confronted with something that 
 claims ontological validity," but complains that "it 
 is requested to turn itself into a metaphysic to 
 answer it. This, of course, it may well refuse to 
 do" {ib., p. 200). On pragmatical grounds he ad- 
 mits that the view of ordinary Realism and of 
 Humanism are "pragmatically valuable truths" 
 {ib., p. 201), yet speaks of "a pragmatically real 
 world" which, "even though it was not made by 
 us" yet "was developed by processes closely anal- 
 ogous to our own procedure" (ib., p. 203). Again 
 we are told that "if we question amiss, nature will 
 not respond and we must try again" {ib., p. 10). 
 But this assumes not that our desires can make a 
 change in things, but that our knowledge is con- 
 ditioned by the world outside us. Furthermore we 
 read that there is "sheer brute uncomprehended 
 fact" {ib., p. 414), but "uncomprehended fact" 
 is a fact "without meaning and meaning depends 
 on purpose, hence not referred to a purpose and so 
 not changed." 
 
 When forced to admit "rigid facts," Professor 
 Schiller seems content to hold that "they are still 
 such that we wa?tt to alter them" {ib., p. 371), or 
 says that there is no reason in this for abandoning 
 our principle, for as " the principle is methodological, 
 it would not affect or undermine the stability of 
 fact wherever that was needed for our action"
 
 I30 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 (ib., p. 446). But if a fact "were needed for action" 
 it would be because it came under the influence 
 of a purpose and as purposive selection effects the 
 change in reality, we should in this case have a 
 fact not changed and nevertheless changed, which 
 is an open contradiction. 
 
 Finally Professor Schiller admits that the making 
 of truth and reahty is "the conceptual manipula- 
 tion of experience" hence wholly subjective, and 
 even then subject to limitations, for the subjective 
 manipulation of experience is actually tested by 
 reference to the ontologically real, though we are 
 asked to close our eyes to this. Professor Schiller 
 may not have been conscious of the humor in the 
 statement when he wrote that there was "not 
 much harm in metaphysics, provided they are not 
 made compulsory, that no one is compelled to 
 advance into them farther than he likes and that 
 every one perceives their real character, and does 
 not allow them to delude him" {ib., p. 437)- 
 
 III. Experience and Experiment 
 
 In setting forth the doctrine that experience is 
 active, Humanism not only views experience as 
 purposive experiencing, it also includes the manner 
 in which the experiencing takes place. From this 
 point of view experience means experiment. Thus 
 the evolutive process exists in and is carried on by 
 experimentation on its contents {Studies in Hu-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 131 
 
 manism, p. 191). We have before us a mental situ- 
 ation which we try to explain. We explain it by- 
 experimenting upon it. Hence we make certain 
 assertions suggested by our practical experience in 
 the hope and expectation that they will prove of 
 value in elucidating the situation with the view to 
 fulfil the special purpose. The experiment is ini- 
 tiated by the purposive selection of the situation 
 and is carried on by the purposive selection of the 
 assertions so as to attain the proposed end. The 
 test of the experiment is the use-criterion. If the 
 assertions are usefid for the proposed end, they are 
 of value and in so far true. If they are useless, they 
 have no value and in so far are false. To find out 
 whether an assertion is true or false, we give it a 
 trial. As we make the selection, make the asser- 
 tions and make the experimental application, we 
 are said to make their truth if the assertions 
 prove useful, or to make their falsity if they 
 prove useless {Humanism, pp. 35, 38, 58; Studies 
 in Humanism, p. 212). 
 
 Hence "truth is essentially a valuation, a lauda- 
 tory labeV given to the experimentation process 
 when successful {Studies in Humanism, p. 211). 
 The "success" of the operation is a term "rela- 
 tive to the purpose." "The same predication may be 
 true for me and false for you, if our purposes are 
 different" {ih., p. 193). 
 
 Furthermore, "experiments are rarely quite suc- 
 cessful," for "we may have had to purchase the
 
 132 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 success we attain by the use of artificial abstractions, 
 or even downright fictions, and the uncertainty 
 which this imports into the truth of our conclu- 
 sions will have to be acknowledged" {ih.). Here 
 it might be asked, How are these artificial abstrac- 
 tions or fictions known as such, if they be useful? 
 For Professor Schiller does not admit absolute 
 truth, i.e. "immutable" truth. On the contrary, he 
 holds "as a general principle that (truths), just 
 because they are human, cannot be absolute," 
 but "need correction" {ih., p. 207). Hence "we 
 shall conceive ourselves to have attained, not 
 complete truths," i.e. experimentations so perfect 
 that they are held to be immutable, "but only 
 'approximations to truth' and 'working hypotheses,' 
 which are at most ' good enough for practical ' pur- 
 poses" and therefore "we shall not have found a 
 truth which fully satisfies even our immediate 
 purpose, but shall continue to search for a more 
 complete, precise, and satisfactory result " (i6., pp. 
 193, 194). And in the search "the Humanist cas 
 recognize necessary errors as well as necessary 
 truths, errors, that is, which are fruitful of the 
 truths which supersede them" {ih., p. 202). 
 
 Thus truth "grows" with the increase of effi- 
 ciency in the experiment and with the change or 
 enlargement of the purposes {ih., p. 211). With 
 this growth there is a concomitant growth in 
 knowledge and reality, for "facts are products 
 of our modes of valuation" {Humanism, p. 163),
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 133 
 
 i.e. of the experimentations considered as useful. 
 If "experiments fail, we shall try again with varia- 
 tions in our methods and assumptions" {Studies 
 in Humanism, p. 194). Hence truth is "variable" 
 {ih., p. 278), "progressive" {ih., p. 276), of "in- 
 definite variety" {ib., p. 277) and "will admit of 
 degrees" {ib., p. 158), because the experimentation 
 is of such a character. 
 
 The use-criterion is not so clear and simple as it 
 looks. The consequences may be in doubt. Pro- 
 fessor Schiller recognizes the difl&culty and tries 
 to solve it by saying that it "is not necessary to 
 contemplate absurdities, e.g. the intrusion of eth- 
 ical or aesthetical motives into the estimation of 
 mathematics." But if "Humanism be a philos- 
 ophy of life" and there is "a psychological side" 
 to everything known, and Psychology is essen- 
 tially ethical, so that the "conception of the 
 Good reigns supreme," why should not mathe- 
 matics be ethical? Again he writes that "these 
 differences already exist and are in no wise created 
 by their being recognized and explained"; or, they 
 "may be settled by enlarging our notions of what 
 constitutes relevant evidence"; or, they may be 
 "composed by an appeal to the supreme purpose 
 which unifies and harmonizes all our ends," i.e. 
 to an "ineffable ideal" of which "in practice we 
 are hardly aware, nor agreed as to what it is." 
 Finally he complains that "the blame, surely, 
 attaches to the distracted state of our thoughts
 
 134 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 and not to the pragmatic analysis of truth," for 
 *'it would surely be preposterous to expect a 
 mere theory of knowledge to adjudicate upon and 
 settle offhand, by sheer dint of logic, all the dis- 
 puted questions in all the sciences" {ib., pp. 155- 
 158). The reason of the breakdown is apparent. 
 The use-criterion of an ideal experimentation, in 
 itself alone, is not sufl&cient to guarantee truth. 
 The whole process must be supplemented and 
 tested by an appeal to the existence and opera- 
 tions of things existing outside and independent 
 of the mind. 
 
 The assertions, made with the view to achieve 
 the purpose proposed. Professor Schiller calls 
 "instruments" although he prefers to consider 
 them as ''the functioning" of experience. They 
 are ''postulates" or "assumptions" "assumed 
 before they can be proved" and because "they 
 were desired" {Humanism, p. 231) and useful as a 
 means to an end! Hence "first principles" are 
 "mere starting-points, variously, arbitrarily, casu- 
 ally selected, from which we hope and try to ad- 
 vance to something better" (Studies in Humanism, 
 p. 432). And "necessary truths" mean "needful," 
 for "necessity is always dependent and so hypo- 
 thetical" {Humanism, p. 36). These postulates 
 are "the product of our volitional activity" and 
 an act of "faith" {Studies in Humanism, p. 357). 
 Thus "we start from the postulates of faith and 
 transmute them slowly into the axioms of reason"
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 135 
 
 {ib., p. 362), and "all the ultimate assumptions of 
 our knowledge are acts of faith," "the exercise of 
 our will to believe" {Humanism, p. 153). All that is 
 required is "that they work" {Studies in Human- 
 ism, p. 432). A "really a priori truth, i.e. a claim 
 which really preceded all experience, would be as 
 likely to be false as true when it was applied" 
 {ib). It would be abandoned when it had "ceased 
 to be of the slightest possible use" {ib., p. 398), 
 though truths so called "may continue to be ser- 
 viceable even after they have been discovered to 
 be false" {ib., p. 397). Hence they are true "be- 
 cause and in so long as they work" {ib., p. 2^4). 
 Self-evidence in no way "is a complete guarantee of 
 truth," but only "seems an accident of our state 
 of mind," for "to none do so many things seem so 
 strongly self-evident as to the insane" {Human- 
 ism, p. 36). But Professor Schiller forgets to tell 
 why they are called "insane." "No science," 
 therefore, "deals with plain facts or rests on abso- 
 lutely certain principles. Its facts are always rela- 
 tive to its principles, and the principles always 
 really rest on their ability to provide a coherent 
 interpretation of the facts." Thus "all proof is a 
 matter of degree and accumulation, and no science 
 is more than a coherent system of interpretations, 
 which, when applied, will work" {ib., p. 386). 
 
 Now such doctrines lead inevitably to Scepticism. 
 The breakdown of Humanism is due to its basic 
 principle of Idealism. Shut up within the con-
 
 136 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 fines of mental life, the Humanist cannot recog- 
 nize a reality apart from him by which he can test 
 his mental operations. If at times he appeals to 
 the truths of Physical Science or admits the partial 
 truth of the "correspondence-theory-of-truth," he 
 does so only by acting inconsistently with his 
 idealistic basis. 
 
 Then regarding mental life as essentially a pur- 
 posive tendency to an end which is the offspring 
 of desire, the Humanist is compelled to regard the 
 particular tendency as "a working hypothesis" 
 whose truth is measured by its capacity to achieve 
 the result. In this he confounds truth with false- 
 hood, and does violence to the principles and meth- 
 ods of reason shown in ordinary hfe as well as in 
 scientific procedure. The truths of life and of 
 science are not simply "working hypotheses," as 
 Professor Schiller would recognize if he should 
 open his eyes and accept the testimony of his 
 ''trusty senses." We can and do use "working 
 hypotheses" but everyone clearly admits their 
 tentative nature. But Professor Schiller has a 
 method and the method leads him to hold that 
 the "anthropomorphic humanism of our whole 
 treatment of experience is unavoidable and obvi- 
 ous" {ib., p. 13). The fault is with the method 
 and the principles which it postulates or assumes. 
 He is a caustic critic of other philosophers, 
 but forgets that some of his criticisms may be 
 applied to himself, as e.g. "the philosopher is a
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 137 
 
 very strange being. He is in the world, but not of 
 it, residing mainly in a 'cloud-cuckoodom' of his 
 own invention" (i.e. make), ''which seems to have 
 no relation to the actual facts of life, and makes 
 no difference to anything or anybody but the 
 philosopher himself" {ib., pp. 351, 352).
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM {concluded) 
 
 With the knowledge that Personal Idealism is 
 the basic principle of Humanism, that Ethical 
 Voluntarism is its integrating principle, the reader 
 is prepared for an evaluation of the constituent 
 principle or essence of Humanism, viz. its peculiar 
 doctrine as to mental life. 
 
 I. What We Know 
 
 Humanism teaches that it "may fairly claim 
 to be the philosophic working out of common 
 sense" {Humanism, Introd., p. xxi), for it "starts 
 with the unanalyzed conceptions of crude com- 
 mon sense" {ib., p. xxiii), viz. "immediate experi- 
 ence and experienced self" {ih., p. xxii). But in 
 fact the starting points for Humanism and for 
 common sense are not the same; they are widely 
 divergent and Humanism can by no means claim 
 to be the philosophic development of common 
 sense, although it wishes to be regarded as such 
 {Studies in Humanism, p. 439). For with Human- 
 ism the "immediate experience" does not mean the
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 139 
 
 act of perceiving external things but the subject- 
 matter of our thought. The former is the basis of 
 Common-Sense Realism which holds that things 
 exist apart and independent of us; the latter is the 
 Phenomenal Idealism of Sensism which teaches that 
 we do not deal with things but with the subjective 
 experiences of things. Thus the Humanist con- 
 siders not God but belief in God, not things but 
 the conceptions or ideal representations of things. 
 
 Humanism uses the terms object and objective 
 but in a meaning peculiar to its own theory. The 
 word object has two meanings: the subject-matter 
 we discuss and the aim or purpose, i.e the objective 
 point of the discussion. The Humanist uses the 
 terms in the latter meaning. Thus "the objec- 
 tive is that which he aims at or from," not that 
 which he considers {ib., p. 189). With Humanism 
 therefore "the external world is the pragmatically 
 efficient part of our total experience, to which 
 the inefficient parts such as dreams, fancies, illu- 
 sions etc. can, for most purposes be referred" (ib., 
 p. 202). "The realities of ordinary life and science, 
 such as the 'external world' and the existence of 
 other persons" are not existing things grasped 
 immediately by the mind, but are "inferences," 
 "postulates," "assumptions" of our experience to 
 be used "for the satisfaction of our desire" and 
 in their nature are "conceptions" {Humanism, 
 p. 193). Hence to the Humanist the distinction 
 between "subjective" and "objective" is "inter-
 
 I40 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 subjective," for "it is the usefulness of some ideas 
 which leads to their (intersubjective) recognition as 
 true and objectively valid and effectively discrim- 
 inates them from the vagrant fancies that are 
 regarded as worthless and therefore remains merely 
 subjective" (ib., p. 258), Thus ''the objectivity of 
 perceptions is essentially practical and useful and 
 teleologicaV {ib., p. 31). This test of teleological 
 usefulness applies not only to individual but also to 
 social objective truth {ib., p. 55). The ''independ- 
 ence" ascribed to certain realities is false as "a 
 metaphysical dogma," for "it does not transcend 
 the cognitive process" and "only means that in 
 our experience there are certain features which it 
 is convenient to describe as 'independent' facts, 
 powers, persons etc. by reason of the peculiarities 
 in their behavior" {Studies in Humanism, p. 461). 
 Things are as they are known-as. Thus the 
 IdeaHsm necessarily implies the relativity of knowl- 
 edge. "Reality is to each man what appears to 
 him" and furthermore "each man perceives" 
 things in a fashion peculiar to himself. Hence 
 "it is foolish even to inquire whether we perceive 
 the same." Our perceptions are individual and 
 cannot be compared. For "I cannot carry my 
 perception into your soul nor you yours into mine, 
 and so we cannot compare them, nor see how far 
 they are alike or not." And even if I could, "wy 
 comparing" would not be "the same as your com- 
 paring them" {ib., p. 317-319)- Sameness therefore
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 141 
 
 does not refer to things but to the experience of 
 things, and the question as to sameness in experi- 
 ences is inscrutable and unmeaning" {Humanism, 
 
 P- 31)- 
 
 By the same Professor Schiller does not mean the 
 
 "indistinguishable," a doctrine which he ascribes to 
 Professor Bradley. To him "logical identity is a 
 postulate" due to selection and assumed for its 
 practical use. "It is a conscious act of purposive 
 thinking, performed in spite of observed differ- 
 ences" and "ultimately one of the devices we have 
 hit upon for dealing with our experience" {Studies 
 in Humanism, p. 85). For, Professor Schiller 
 writes, "by a divine chance" some human beings 
 were "endowed with the ability to agree and act 
 together in some partial ways," and this common 
 action proved of "great advantage," as that they 
 were "enabled to join together and to form a com- 
 munity in virtue of the communion they had 
 achieved," which would make them "stronger by 
 far than those who did not perceive the same" with 
 the result that they would "profit in proportion 
 as they could perceive the same" and so "a world 
 of common perception and thought" would "thus 
 gradually grow up" {ib., p. 318). Initially, there- 
 fore, the same means "a claim that, for our pur- 
 pose," perceptual "differences maybe ignored and 
 the terms treated alike" {ib., p. 85). As a claim it 
 may be true or false; if useful, it will be true, and 
 the use is determined by the consequences. Hence
 
 142 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 "perceiving the same" is "perceiving in such a 
 way that we can act together" it "is not the cause 
 of the common action, but its effect," "not a start- 
 ing-point, but a goal, which in some matters we 
 have almost, and for some purposes we have quite 
 reached," for "we agree about the things which 
 are needed for bare life" {ib., pp. 318, 319) and 
 "this agreement is both difficult, partial and deriva- 
 tive. It is the fruit of much effort and of a long 
 struggle, and not an original endowment" {Human- 
 ism, p. 31). Thus "the objectivity of our percep- 
 tions is essentially practical and useful and teleo- 
 logical," for "sense-perceptions have come to exist 
 as the same'' {ib.), and "logical identity is always 
 made" {Studies in Humanism, p. 118). 
 
 The causes of this lamentable breakdown are 
 Idealism and the purposive character of thought. 
 When we seek from Professor Schiller for the 
 grounds of his IdeaHsm we are told that IdeaKsm 
 is one of "our fundamental assumptions" "as- 
 sumed tentatively" on "the pragmatic test" as 
 "to how it works." Should he not, therefore, as a 
 good Pragmatist put it aside? He tells us that 
 the belief in the world theory of ordinary Realism 
 "has indisputably worked and philosophic argu- 
 ments are impotent against it" {ib., p. 474). On 
 Pragmatic grounds therefore he should be a Realist. 
 But he rejects ReaHsm not as a Pragmatist but as 
 a psychologist for the reason that "the independent 
 reality" "is not after all independent of experience,
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 143 
 
 but relative to the experience which it serves to 
 harmonize" {ib., p. 474) and, abruptly changing 
 position, proposes an Idealistic Realism not as a 
 starting ground but as a goal, i.e. an ideal towards 
 which the whole conceptual manipulation of ex- 
 perience tends and where complete harmony is 
 found {ib., p. 486). 
 
 II, Thought as Purposive Volition 
 
 The central principle of Pragmatism is "the 
 purposiveness of our thought and the teleological 
 character of its methods" {Humanism, Pref., p. 
 xiii). Thought, therefore, is purposive thinking for 
 an end of our practical life. Now as Humanism is 
 *'a philosophy of life," such an end is always moral, 
 and "every cognition" in "potentially a moral 
 act" as having "a practical purpose and value" 
 {ib., p. 15). Hence thought or thinking is con- 
 ceived "as a mode of conduct, as an integral part 
 of active life" {ib., p. 4). Thus to the Humanist 
 the theory of knowledge is in reality a theory of 
 Ethics. 
 
 Again "purpose may be conceived as a concen- 
 tration of interest" {Studies in Humanism, p. 82). 
 Hence "interest starts, propels, sustains and guides 
 the movement of our thought," "effects the neces- 
 sary selection among the objects of our attention" 
 and is "the cause of logical coherence" {Human- 
 ism, p. 54). Thus the end of our thinking depends
 
 144 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 on interest, as also do the means we employ. 
 These means are "hypothetical assumptions," 
 "the product of our volitional activity" {Studies 
 in Humanism, p. 357). Hence "at the very roots 
 of reason, we must recognize an element of faith." 
 Faith, therefore, is "pre-eminently an attitude 
 of will," i.e. a "willing to take upon trust val- 
 uable and desirable beliefs, before they have been 
 proved true, but in the hope that this attitude 
 may promote their verification" {ih.), "a personal 
 affair, an adventure which originates in individual 
 opinions, in choices" {ih., p. 361). Thus "all the 
 ultimate assumptions of our knowledge rest upon 
 an act of faith," which is "the exercise of our will 
 to believe," as e.g. "the principle of contradic- 
 tion" {Humanism, p. 153), "the existence of God" 
 {Studies in Humanism, p. 362) and "the princi- 
 ple of causaHty" {ih., p. 467). This will-to-helieve, 
 therefore, is "the wilHngness to take the risks 
 involved and to abide by the results of subsequent 
 experience" and it takes the risks prompted by 
 "emotional interest and practical value" {Human- 
 ism, p. 5). Our principles are "postulates," our 
 thoughts are "wishes," to be explained by "inter- 
 est" and "desire" {ib., p. 245), i.e. they " originate 
 as subjective demands" {ih., p. 468). The con- 
 ception of thought as purposive volition is based 
 upon the assumption that mental life is an evolu- 
 tion in the time-process {ib., ch. vi), i.e. is in a 
 state of Becoming {Studies in Humanism, ch. ii).
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 145 
 
 Although Humanism is adverse to dealing with 
 beginnings Professor Schiller writes that the human 
 mind "initially commences its career in a jumble 
 resembhng a chaotic rag-bag" {ib., p. 233). Now 
 the perception of this condition is an act, and how 
 reconcile this with the statement that "the pur- 
 posive character of mental Ufe generally must 
 influence also our most remotely cognitive activi- 
 ties"? {Humanism, p. 8). In fact he says that 
 only two views can be held as to the origin of any- 
 thing, "a providential interposition" "or we may 
 reluctantly recognize it as an accidental variation. 
 Metaphysically these explanations are equivalents." 
 Or maintain "nothing has occurred that was not 
 fully contained in and determined by its ante- 
 cedents." The former is the view of Humanism 
 {Studies in Humanism, p. 244). But how explain 
 purpose in a chance origin from chaos? 
 
 In explaining the mental process of Becoming 
 Professor Schiller uses the terms "functioning" 
 and "adaptation." Reason is "like the rest of 
 our equipment, a weapon in the struggle for ex- 
 istence and a means for achieving adaptation." 
 Hence "the use which has developed it, must have 
 stamped itself upon its inmost structure," and 
 "a reason which has not practical value for the 
 purposes of life is a monstrosity, a morbid aberra- 
 tion or failure of development, which natural selec- 
 tion must sooner or later wipe away" {Humanism, 
 pp. 7, 8). Furthermore, we are told that "reason
 
 146 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 is not a faculty. It stands for a group of habits 
 which men (and to some extent some animals) 
 have acquired, and which we find extremely use- 
 ful, nay necessary, for the successful carrying on 
 of life," and "thinking or judging is one of these 
 habits" {Studies in Humanism, p. 356). 
 
 Hence thought, thinking, concepts, first principles, 
 judging are results. Thus ''knowledge grows in 
 extent and trustworthiness by successful function- 
 ing" {ih., p. 194). Considered in the process, how- 
 ever, mind is viewed as a potential unity, i.e. a 
 unity which becomes so {ih., p. 185). The dis- 
 tinction between subject and object is " teleological 
 and is rooted in feeling" {ib., p. 221). Soul also is 
 a potential unity and a result {ib., p. 75) as is also 
 the self, for "our true self is not what underlies 
 thought, will and feehng, but what embraces them 
 in a perfect harmony" {Humanism, p. 225), and 
 "we are not rounded-off and self-complete souls" 
 {Studies in Humanism, p. 379), and "conscious 
 persons of a definite kind" are to be regarded 
 "as mere efficient, though imperfect, concentra- 
 tions of our being upon the practical purposes 
 of normal life" {ib., p. 378). Man himself is an 
 evolutive product, for "we are made by a long 
 series of ancestors, and these in their turn were 
 inevitably generated by non-human forces, of a 
 purely physical kind" {ih., p. 393), and "his- 
 torically man was a knowing being long before 
 he was an ethical being, . . , both in time and in
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 147 
 
 urgency, perceptual adaptation to the physical 
 order took precedence over ethical adaptation to 
 the social order" {Humanism, p. 348). 
 
 Professor Schiller says that "the analysis of 
 psychic process into thinking, willing and feeling, 
 in order to justify the restriction of logic to the first 
 and the exclusion of the two latter is unwarranted" 
 {Studies in Humanism, p. 98) and holds that "all 
 three faculties are at bottom only labels for describ- 
 ing the activities of what may be called indiffer- 
 ently a unitary personality or a reacting organism " 
 {ih., p. 129). He rejects soul-substance as useless 
 {Humanism, p. 223) and says "the activity is the 
 substance" {ih., p. 225). Now Scholastic Philos- 
 ophy maintains the soul to be a substantial activity 
 and avoids the confusion of regarding "indifferently 
 a unitary personality or a reacting organism" 
 as the source of this activity. 
 
 III. Criticism 
 
 In criticism we hold that the basic principle on 
 which rests the Humanist description of mental 
 life, viz. that all thought is purposive, is not true. 
 As a matter of fact all thought is not here and now 
 purposive. The principle of selection, considered 
 by Humanism as so necessary to the purposive 
 operation of thought, is clear proof. For the 
 selective attention picks out some from a more 
 extensive psychical material {Studies in Humanism, 
 p. 95). The material selected enters into the
 
 148 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 psychic process, the material not selected remains 
 outside the process. It is not an answer to hold 
 that only the elements entering into the process 
 deserve the name of thought, whereas the elements 
 remaining outside are not to be called thought. 
 That is a quibble with words. The fact is we 
 know the elements without and the elements within 
 the process, with this difference that the former 
 are not here and now purposive but may become 
 so, and the latter are here and now purposive but 
 may cease to be so, if they cease to be useless or 
 the purposes change. Hence both are the subject- 
 matter of thought. 
 
 This distinction is repeatedly made by Professor 
 Schiller, as e.g. when he says that "differences 
 may be ignored" so we may perceive "the same" 
 {ih., p. 85), that "selection is arbitrary, in that it 
 ignores all the rest of the situation given" {ih., p. 
 191), that "the worthless elements are neglected" 
 whereas "the useful are kept" {ih., p. 233), that 
 "every logical process is essentially a selection from 
 and valuation of a more extensive psychical ma- 
 terial" {ih., p. 95); or when he speaks of "the sub- 
 jective" as not in the process and "the objective" 
 as in the process, or of the "real" and the "unreal." 
 How does he describe them unless he know them, 
 and the knowing is an act of thought. He there- 
 fore distinctly admits that not all the subject- 
 matter of thought is here and now purposive. 
 But this is the teaching of Scholastic Philosophy,
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 149 
 
 which holds that all elements of thought are not 
 here and now purposive, and that what is not here 
 and now purposive may become so. 
 
 In describing the manner in which the function- 
 ing and adaptation of human thought takes place, 
 Humanism makes use of the "working hypothesis." 
 The working of science, it claims, has slowly brought 
 to light the working of thought {ib., p. 64). It is 
 true that the "working hypothesis" is a favorite 
 method of science employed in the effort to explain 
 the nature of physical things. Yet it is essentially 
 tentative, problematic and hypothetical — a pure 
 assumption used only in those cases where no cer- 
 tain or probable indications are given of the fact 
 we wish to explain. Humanism takes this method 
 and employs it exclusively to explain mental life. 
 The purposiveness of mental life shows thought 
 to be a means to an end (Humanism, p. 52, n.); 
 the functioning of mental life shows the elements 
 of the thought-process to be tools or instruments 
 in their nature. Thus the judgment is an instru- 
 ment and functions in an experimental manner. 
 It "refers sooner or later to a concrete situation 
 which it analyzes," and "to be tested, must be 
 acted upon" {ib., pp. 191, 192). Its "actual mean- 
 ing" lies in use, i.e. "in its adjustment to a particu- 
 lar case" {ib., p. 171), and "its objective validity 
 depends on its adaptation to our world" {ib., p. 90). 
 "The concept," likewise, is an instrument by which 
 a "one" controls a "many" {Studies in Humanism,
 
 I50 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 p. 52), "is not unalterable and only relatively con- 
 stant, being essentially a tool slowly fashioned by 
 a practical intelligence for the mastery of its 
 experience" {ib., p. 64). Universals are formed 
 by "abstracting from the particular nature of the 
 psychological imagery" because "identity of mean- 
 ing overpowers diversity of imagery" {ib., p. 94) 
 and "all meaning depends on purpose" {ib., p. 9). 
 In actual use they are "all concrete, for they are 
 apphed to a concrete situation," and are "always 
 particulars, i.e. they are applied to a this in a here 
 and now'' {ib., pp. 172, 173). These fancies can 
 be reduced to the one source: the purposiveness 
 of human thought. Thus the working of this 
 principle in its idealistic setting gives in the last 
 analysis a false conception of the idea, the most 
 fundamental and apparently the simplest element 
 in mental life. 
 
 Such is a brief summary of Humanism. Start- 
 ing out with the avowed purpose of reforming 
 Philosophy, it leaves upon the mind only a deeper 
 conviction of the necessity of a reform. Based 
 on pure assumptions, its fundamental principle 
 and essentially arbitrary method lead to partial, 
 confusing, often contradicting, and erronous ex- 
 planations. A generation ago writers strove in 
 every possible way to eliminate design from Philos- 
 ophy, and in the premature transition from Psy- 
 chology to Sociology, Ethics was passed over.
 
 PRAGMATISM AND HUMANISM 151 
 
 Humanism grasps the place and importance of 
 design and of Ethics, but goes to the opposite 
 extreme. The reason is that Humanism is an 
 ideahstic philosophy of life, dealing only with 
 ideal experience which is to be controlled and 
 adapted by human purposes for human ends. 
 Its logical conclusion therefore is that human 
 purpose sways the world (i.e. of ideal experience) 
 and Ethics reigns supreme. Its characteristic 
 teaching, whence it derives the term Humanism, 
 is that human knowledge is human. 
 
 There is an element of truth in this teaching, 
 but it is distorted and exaggerated beyond all 
 bounds by the method employed and the arbitrary 
 assumptions made. It is a common fact of ordi- 
 nary daily Hfe, and a central truth of Scholastic 
 Psychology, that while the material of thought 
 enters the mind from the outside world through 
 the senses, yet the mind analyzes, compares, ar- 
 ranges, classifies this material and reasons upon 
 it. As a result the material to a certain extent 
 assumes a mental form, but this form is depend- 
 ent on the external nature of the material for its 
 content and on the native character of mental 
 principles. To the Humanist, ideal experience is 
 real, and the real world of ideal experience is made 
 by mental action. But we are told that to make 
 reahty is not to create it, that primal reality is 
 assumed as not made, that the making of reality 
 in fact means the remaking of it (i.e. the rearrange-
 
 152 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 ment). Again we read that the effort is not to 
 make objective reality, but only subjective, for the 
 ''making of reality" is "the conceptual manipula- 
 tion of (ideal) experience." Even then this con- 
 ceptual manipulation meets with obstructions as 
 ''independent," "brute" "crude" facts, and all 
 this in spite of the most gratuitous assumptions 
 and arbitrary means employed. Surely as good 
 Pragmatists we should discard a system Hke 
 Humanism because it does not work, and assume 
 on Pragmatic grounds alone the Scholastic Philos- 
 ophy which sets forth so clearly and so logically 
 the position of Common-Sense Realism.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 Pragmatism and Creative Evolution 
 
 The Philosophy of Tendency has reached its 
 extreme and most fanciful form in the system 
 outlined by Professor Bergson. Unlike Professor 
 Schiller and in line with Professor Royce he aims 
 directly and expressly at setting forth a meta- 
 physic. His purpose is to show that Theory of 
 Knowledge and Theory of Life are inseparable, that 
 the clear grasp of this principle "replaces intellect in 
 the general evolution of life," teaches us "how the 
 frames of knowledge have been constructed" and 
 "how we can enlarge and go beyond them/' shows 
 us "the formation of the intellect, and thereby 
 the genesis of that matter of which our intellect 
 traces the general configuration" {Creative Evolu- 
 tion, Intro., p. xiii). As a result "we cannot and 
 must not accept the relation established by pure 
 intellectualism between the theory of knowledge 
 and the theory of the known, between metaphysics 
 and science" {ih., p. 194). Thus Metaphysics is 
 identified with the theory of knowledge, and like 
 other systems of Pragmatism, though in a form 
 far more radical, the basis and nature of the 
 doctrine is "psychological."
 
 154 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 Professor Bergson like Professor Schiller and all 
 true Pragmatists is modest. He "simply desires 
 to define the method," not to construct a complete 
 system. In fact he tells us that such a system ''will 
 only be built up by the collective and progressive 
 effort of many thinkers, of many observers also, 
 completing, correcting and improving one another" 
 {ib., p. xiv), that "the metaphysic, if possible, can 
 only be a laborious and even painful effort" {An 
 Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 55), for in building 
 it up we must "invert the habitual direction of the 
 work of thought" {ib., p. 70). 
 
 Forewarned, therefore, we may expect to find 
 imperfections, nay even positive errors. In truth, 
 a careful reading shows that his exposition is radi- 
 cally erroneous and needs corrections on vital 
 points, especially Idealism, Evolution, and the 
 theory of Mental Life. 
 
 I. The Fact of Change 
 
 The fundamental problem which Professor Berg- 
 son attempts to solve is the meaning of "exist- 
 ence" {Creative Evolution, p. i.). For data he 
 appeals to "experience." Here at the outset he 
 sets forth the doctrine of the twofold experience, 
 i.e. external and internal, which is the basis of his 
 method and system. 
 
 By external experience is understood "something 
 thought" {ib., p. 9), and it is supposed to include
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 155 
 
 not merely the data which come from the senses 
 but more especially what we acquire through the 
 intellect. For the intellect "is a special function 
 of the mind essentially turned toward inert matter" 
 (ib., p. 206) and is "formed to act on matter from 
 without," thus presenting "external views only," 
 i.e. "parts external to parts" (ib., p. 250). With 
 intellect must be included "consciousness," not 
 consciousness in the wide acceptance of the 
 word, but its product, "the narrowed" or "dis- 
 tinct consciousness" or "retrospective vision," 
 which "is the natural function of the intellect" 
 and therefore concerned with "the already made" 
 (ib., p. 237), i.e. with the "static" or "stable" 
 {ib., p. 163). Thus external experience gives 
 knowledge which is "phenomenal" (ib., p. 360), 
 "relative" {ib., p. 199) or "external and super- 
 ficial" {ib., p. i). 
 
 By internal experience, on the contrary, is under- 
 stood "something lived." "Internal and pro- 
 found," it furnishes real knowledge. For real 
 knowledge is internal. It means the abiHty "to 
 grasp from within" {ib., p. 358), and supposes the 
 internahty of subject in object {ib., p. 307). Hence 
 internal experience presents a ground which "in- 
 tellect does not cover" {ib., p. 359). For it is 
 "the most removed from externaHty and the least 
 penetrated with intellectuahty," and "in its depths 
 we feel ourselves most intimately within our own 
 life" {ib., p. 199).
 
 156 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 On the basis of this twofold experience Professor 
 Bergson explains the meaning of the word "exist." 
 He looks into his inner Hfe and sees looming up 
 large the great fact of "change." The more deeply 
 he penetrates into the depths of his being, the more 
 profound and radical is the change. The change 
 is not merely from state to state, e.g. warm or cold, 
 merry or sad; a state itself is a change, for there 
 is no feehng, no idea, no volition, which is not 
 undergoing change every moment. Even the per- 
 ception of a motionless external object changes, 
 for memory conveys something of the past into 
 the present, and so the state I have now is not 
 the same it was a moment before. If a mental 
 state ceased to vary, its duration would cease to 
 flow. Thus the mental state, as it advances on 
 the road of time, is continually swelHng with the 
 duration which it accumulates, rolling upon itself 
 as "a snowball on the snow." Hence we change 
 without ceasing, and the state itself is nothing but 
 a change, although "it is expedient to disregard 
 this uninterrupted change, and to notice it only 
 when it becomes sufi&cient to impress a new atti- 
 tude on the body, a new direction on the attention. 
 Then, and then only, we find that our state has 
 changed" (ib., p. 2). 
 
 Thus inner experience shows to Professor Berg- 
 son not only change but also facts of "discontinu- 
 ity" in the change, e.g. states of consciousness. 
 But this discontinuity, he says, is only apparent
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 157 
 
 and artificial, and is due to the intellect through 
 interest fixing its attention upon them by a series 
 of separate acts. In reality there is "a gentle 
 slope," not "a broken line," nor "separate steps." 
 The states or incidents are only designs made by 
 the intellect on a continuous background. Each 
 of them is borne by "the fluid mass of our whole 
 psychical existence" and "is only the best illumi- 
 nated point of a moving zone which comprises all 
 that we feel or think or will — all, in short, that 
 we are at any given moment" {ib., p. 3). 
 
 With this notion of personality, Professor Berg- 
 son proceeds to reject the idea of personality as a 
 link connecting states of consciousness. The con- 
 scious states, he says, appear as "distinct and 
 solid colors"; in truth they are "a flux of fleeting 
 shades merging into each other." They are set 
 up as "independent realities"; in truth they are 
 "artificial cut-outs" or "snapshots" made by the 
 intellect on the "flux." There is no real separa- 
 tion; only an undivided flow. As the intellect 
 separates the states artificially, so it unites them 
 artificially by means of "a formless ego, indiffer- 
 ent and unchangeable." But this "colorless sub- 
 stratum," he adds, perpetually colored by that 
 which covers it, is for us as if it did not exist, for 
 we only perceive "what is colored," i.e. psychic 
 states. It has "no reality" and is "merely a 
 symbol intended to recall unceasingly to our con- 
 sciousness the artificial character of the process by
 
 158 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 which attention places clean-cut states side by 
 side where actually there is a continuity which 
 unfolds." With "an impassive ago" and "sepa- 
 rate states," there is no duration, for "an ego 
 which does not change, does not endure," and a 
 state which does not change "does not endure 
 either." The element of "real time" is ehminated 
 and there is presented "only an artificial imitation 
 of the internal Hfe, a static equivalent, which lends 
 itself to the requirements of logic and language." 
 On the contrary, "the psychical life unfolding 
 beneath the symbols which conceal it, we readily 
 perceive" i.e. feel {ih., p. 314). 
 
 Hence Professor Bergson concludes that psychic 
 existence "progresses and endures in real time," 
 "time is the stuff out of which it is made" {ih., 
 pp. 4, 240), and "the flux of time is the reality 
 itself" {ih., p. 344). By "time" he means not 
 abstract or mathematical time. This is static, 
 has no real efiicacy and therefore "is nothing" 
 {ih., p. 39). But by "time" is understood "real 
 time" or "concrete duration" {ih., p. 4), which is 
 "a kind of force" possessing "real efl&cacy" {ih., 
 p. 339) or "vital process" {ih., p. 340), "means 
 creation" {il., p. 343), and reveals its creative 
 power in "a continuous progress of the past which 
 gnaws into the future and swells as it advances" 
 {ih., p. 4). "The past is preserved by itself, auto- 
 matically," and "the present is the condensation 
 of the history that we have lived from our
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 159 
 
 birth," e.g. ''our character'' {ib., p. 5); not by 
 "memory" for ''memory is not even properly 
 speaking a faculty" {ib., p. 4). Yet in other pas- 
 sages we read "immediate experience shows us 
 that the very basis of our conscious existence is 
 memory," i.e. "the prolongation of the past into 
 the present, or, in a word, duration, acting and 
 irreversible" {ib., p. 17); "wherever anything 
 lives there is open somewhere a register in which 
 time is being inscribed" {ib., p. 16), and "the 
 evolution of the living being, like that of the 
 embryo, implies an appearance, at least, of organic 
 memory" {ib., p. 19). Hence "the past, as a 
 whole is made manifest to us in its impulse, it is 
 felt in the form of tendency, although a small part 
 of it only is known in the form of idea" for "we 
 think with only a small part of our past, but it is 
 with our entire past, including the original bent 
 of our soul, that we desire, will and act" {ib., 
 
 P-5). 
 
 The creative efficacy of duration is shown es- 
 pecially in our personaHty. PersonaHty is a 
 growth, "is being built up each instant," so that 
 "each moment of our life is a kind of creation," is 
 "something new, something unforeseeable," and 
 "each of our states being indeed the new form that 
 we are just assuming." Hence "this creation of 
 self by self" is the great fact of our psychic exist- 
 ence. Therefore Professor Bergson concludes that 
 "for a conscious being, to exist is to change, to
 
 i6o PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating 
 ourselves endlessly" {ib., pp. 6, 7). 
 
 Professor Bergson applies the same line of reason- 
 ing and the same conclusions to existence in gen- 
 eral. He tells us that "succession is an undeniable 
 fact even in the material world" where we behold 
 "an unfolding like our own" {ib., p. 9). The liv- 
 ing being seems "to share with consciousness the 
 attributes of continuity in change, preservation of 
 the past in the present, real duration" {ib., p. 23). 
 This "duration is immanent to the whole of the 
 universe," for "the whole has a duration, and so 
 a form of existence Uke our own" {ib., p. 11). 
 Hence "each conscious being taken separately," 
 "the organism which Hves," "the universe as a 
 whole" is "a thing that endures" {ib., p. 15). 
 He concludes therefore that "Duration is the 
 foundation of our being, the very substance of the 
 world in which we live" {ib., p. 39). 
 
 II. Change and Permanence 
 
 In the above analysis of our inner life Professor 
 Bergson rightly calls attention to the fact of change, 
 but he errs radically by claiming that change is 
 the only or the fundamental fact. In truth, we 
 are aware of change, and also of another great 
 fact, viz. permanence or personal identity. This 
 fact of permanence is more fundamental than that 
 of change, for without permanence, change is not
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION i6i 
 
 possible. We change, a thing changes; in the 
 change there is a subject as well as a predicate. 
 Professor Bergson ignores the subject and per- 
 sonifies the predicate, i.e. duration, yet in so doing 
 he gives a partial and radically erroneous descrip- 
 tion of our inner life. So deep-seated is this fact 
 of permanence that Professor Bergson is compelled 
 to recognize it when he speaks of memory or 
 duration ''as a prolongation of the past into the 
 present" {ib., p. 4) and of the present as "a new 
 state" or "form" which our (past) personality 
 assumes. He may use words as he pleases, yet to 
 him the present is the past personality with a new 
 form. 
 
 There is an evident ambiguity in Professor Berg- 
 son's doctrine of change. At times he uses the 
 terms "Duration," "continuous progress," "con- 
 tinuity of Life" and "Time" iib.,p. 27), as abstract 
 personifications. Again he describes change in the 
 concrete, as e.g. when he speaks of the universe 
 or each conscious being or the living organism as 
 a thing that endures {ib., p. 15) or of ''the animal" 
 in its most rudimentary form, or of the develop- 
 ment of the embryo, as a perpetual change of 
 form {ib., p. 18) or of the "vegetable cell" {ib., 
 p. 108) or when he makes "continuity in change" 
 an attribute of duration {ib., p. 23). 
 
 But, as he is treating of concrete duration we 
 must adopt the concrete form of expression and this 
 shows a certain permanence in the change. More-
 
 1 62 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 over the word "Duration" implies both permanence 
 and change. Take e.g. his fundamental principle 
 "to exist is to endure, and to endure is to change." 
 Express this principle in the concrete and we have: 
 "a living being (for here he is deaHng with the liv- 
 ing being) endures in its existence by developing 
 changes through its process of growth." There is 
 nothing startKng in this statement, for we know 
 that growth is a law of life, and as soon as the 
 living being ceases to grow, i.e. to change, it ceases 
 to Hve. Now to admit permanence even to the 
 least possible degree in addition to change is to 
 deny the fundamental principle of his system. 
 
 Again Professor Bergson tells us that "memory 
 is the very basis of our conscious existence" and 
 that it "conveys something of the past into the 
 present." Now applying this concrete duration to 
 myself, how can memory convey something of my 
 past into my present, without supposing my per- 
 manence or personal identity? If "memory is the 
 basis of my conscious existence," personal identity 
 makes memory possible. 
 
 Furthermore Professor Bergson speaks of past, 
 present and future as essential to duration, so that 
 duration could not be conceived without them. 
 Yet if we examine "past, present and future" 
 in the concrete, we find that they could not be 
 conceived without an element of permanence in 
 addition to the element of change. Remove the 
 element of permanence and we have only "an in-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 163 
 
 stantaneous present"; the very criticism he levels 
 at the systems of science {ib., p. 22). 
 
 III. An Ideal Pantheism 
 
 With Professor Bergson, therefore, Duration is 
 Reality, is the Absolute {ib., p. 206). Thus "the 
 Absolute is revealed very near us, and, in a certain 
 measure, in us" {ib., p. 299). It is "a flow," "a 
 tendency," not a being. This Becoming or Dura- 
 tion "is the very life of things, the fundamental 
 ReaHty" {ib., p. 317). But Duration apart from 
 permanence is an abstract personification. Hence 
 the basic principle of his system, and which is 
 Reality itself, is an abstraction, i.e. mental. 
 
 Now Professor Bergson holds that this funda- 
 mental reahty is not given all at once, that its 
 evolution presents "a ceaseless upspringing of 
 something new." Under this aspect it is conceived 
 as "action making itself" {ib., p. 245) or "gen- 
 erating form" {ib., p. 239). This creative action 
 "which for want of a better word we have called 
 consciousness," i.e. consciousness in the wide sense 
 of the word as distinguished from " the retrospective 
 vision" of the intellect, is "arrested" or "momen- 
 tarily interrupted" or "distends." Now "the 
 interruption of a cause being here equivalent to the 
 reversal of the effect" {ib., p. 237), the direction 
 which this reahty (i.e. action) takes, suggests the idea 
 of ''action unmaking itself," and as such is the prin-
 
 1 64 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 ciple of matter and of extension. Hence the action 
 "making itself" tends in the direction of life and 
 of spirit; the action "unmaking itself" in the direc- 
 tion of materiality and of space {ib., p. 212). Thus 
 matter and spirit are of the same substance, viz. 
 consciousness, and differ only in the fact that they 
 are counter tendencies, i.e. matter is a counter or 
 "inverse" tendency to spirit or life. The inter- 
 ruption or relaxing of the life-current causes it 
 to congeal and the congealed parts are matter. Pro- 
 fessor Bergson assures us that "we are not the vital 
 current itself; we are this current already loaded 
 with matter, that is with congealed parts of its 
 own substance which it carries along its course" 
 {ib., p. 239). 
 
 Hence matter in its last analysis is conceived as 
 something negative, i.e. the lack or withdrawal of 
 positive action {ib., p. 209). For illustration Pro- 
 fessor Bergson appeals to mental life. "Suppose 
 we let ourselves go and, instead of acting, dream. 
 At once the self is scattered. Our personality thus 
 descends in the direction of space and of extension. 
 . . . Extension admits of degrees. . . . Sensations 
 are the first steps in the direction of the extended. 
 . . . Matter consists in this very movement 
 pushed further," Therefore he concludes that 
 "physics is simply psychics inverted" {ib., pp. 201- 
 202), that "the regression of the extra-spatial 
 degrades itself into spatiality" {ib., p. 207), that, 
 "matter or mind, reahty has appeared to us as a
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 165 
 
 perpetual becoming; it makes itself or it unmakes 
 itself, but it is never something made" {ib., p. 272), 
 that the task of Metaphysics is "to remount the 
 decline that Physics descends, to bring back matter 
 to its origin, and to build up progressively a cos- 
 mology which would be, so to speak, a reversed 
 psychology" {ib., p. 208). 
 
 Furthermore, just as matter and mind are of the 
 same nature, so are matter and intellect in their turn 
 of the same nature. Matter and intellect belong 
 to the inverse tendency (p. 208), for "the movement 
 at the end of which is spatiahty lays down along its 
 course the faculty of induction as well as that of de- 
 duction, in fact, intellectuality entire" (^6., p. 216). 
 Hence "an identical process must have cut out 
 matter and intellect, at the same time from a stuff 
 that contained both" {ib., p. 199), i.e. mind, or con- 
 sciousness or life, for "mind overflows intellect" 
 {ib., p. 206). Thus intellect is a product, a "de- 
 posit" or "local effect" of the evolution of life, 
 "a flame perhaps accidental," "an emanation" 
 or "an aspect" of life; for it is "a more precise, 
 complex and subtle adaptation of the consciousness 
 of living beings to the conditions of existence that 
 are made for them" {ib., Intro., pp. ix, xiii). 
 
 Hence "intellect and matter have progressively 
 adapted themselves one to the other in order to 
 attain a common form" and "this adaptation 
 has been brought about quite naturally, because it 
 is the same inversion of the same movement which
 
 1 66 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 creates at once the intellectuality of mind and the 
 materiality of matter" {ib., p. 206). The purpose 
 of the adaptation is "to secure the perfect fitting 
 of our body to its environment," ''to represent 
 the relations of external things among themselves," 
 i.e. to "think matter." Hence "intellect traces 
 the general configuration of matter," "is at home 
 among inanimate objects, more especially among 
 solids," "consequently triumphs in geometry, 
 wherein is revealed the kinship of logical thought 
 with the unorganized matter" {ib., Introduction). 
 The function of the intellect, therefore, is prac- 
 tical, i.e. "relative or an appendage to action," 
 prompted by interest for practical utility, "a light 
 to our conduct" {ib., p. 29). Yet we are told that 
 "its eyes are ever turned to the rear" {ib., p. 46), 
 probably because it is in the inverse movement. 
 But as "action is on the surface of things" {ib., p. 
 46), so intellect "grasps the surface of things only" 
 and "is formed to act on matter from without" {ib., 
 p. 250). It "is made to present to us things and 
 states, rather than changes and acts." Yet in 
 reality "there are no things, only actions." 
 "Things and states are only views taken by the 
 mind of becoming." They "result from a solid- 
 ification performed by our understanding," which 
 takes place "by the instantaneous cut which the 
 understanding practises, at a given moment, on 
 the flux of the real," and so "it is absurd to say 
 that new things can join things already existing"
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 167 
 
 {ib., pp. 248-249). "The distinct outlines and 
 individuality of objects are the plan of our eventual 
 action reflected as in a mirror. Suppress this action, 
 and the outlines, i.e. main directions, disappear. 
 Hence bodies we perceive are traced or cut out on 
 the stuff of nature by perception" {ib., pp. 11-12). 
 Thus "the subdivision of matter into separate 
 bodies is relative to our perception, while the build- 
 ing up of closed-off systems of material points is 
 relative to science" {ib., p. 12), whereas "matter 
 looked at as an undivided whole is a flux rather 
 than a thing" {ib., p. 186). 
 
 Artificial systems are to be distinguished from 
 "natural" or "real systems," e.g. the living body. 
 Into the former enters the notion of abstract time, 
 while the natural system "develops along concrete 
 time" {ib., p. 21). To the natural systems Pro- 
 fessor Bergson refers when he speaks of created 
 things as "manifestations" in which "life is scat- 
 tered in proportion to its progress" {ib., p. 103) 
 and says that "the permanence of their form is 
 only the outline of a movement" {ib., p. 128). 
 
 Moreover we read that "law is a relation" {ib., 
 p. 228) or "a bond between two or more terms, 
 established by the mind" {ib., p. 356) and "no law 
 of a physical world taken separately has objective 
 reahty," for "each of them is the work of an in- 
 vestigator who has regarded things from a certain 
 bias, isolated certain variables, applied certain 
 conventional units of measurement." Hence there
 
 1 68 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 is "something artificial in the mathematical form 
 of a physical law and consequently in our scientific 
 knowledge of things" (iJ., p. 218). 
 
 As the intellect is by nature static, so when applied 
 to living things it gives ''symbols," i e. it trans- 
 lates or imitates, not transforms {ib., p. 226). Sci- 
 ence merely "works into a new scheme of the 
 whole the instantaneous and motionless views 
 taken at intervals along the continuity of a move- 
 ment" (ib., p. 32). These systems which it cuts 
 out within the whole "are not parts but partial 
 views of the whole" {ib., p. 31). 
 
 Finally Professor Bergson maintains that "the 
 evolutionist theory, as far as it has any importance 
 for philosophy, consists above all in estabhshing 
 relations of ideal kinship, and in maintaining that 
 wherever there is this relation of, so to speak, 
 logical affiHation between forms, there is also a 
 relation of chronological succession between the 
 species in which these forms are materialized" 
 (ib., p. 25), and that "the whole of the universe 
 is constructed or reconstructed by thought" {ib., 
 
 P- 15)- 
 
 We therefore conclude that an examination into 
 the definition of Reality proposed by Professor 
 Bergson shows that his system of Creative Evolu- 
 tion is a Pantheistic Idealism of Manifestation 
 based upon an abstract idea, i.e. duration, as 
 regards existing things, combined with a Logical 
 Idealism of Representation in relation to our in-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 169 
 
 tellectual knowledge, whether the knowledge be 
 viewed as that of common sense or of science. 
 
 IV. Reality and Feeling 
 
 The twofold experience, viz. of intellect and of 
 life, gives a twofold knowledge of reaHty, the one 
 coming from intellect and senses and expressed in 
 common-sense and in science, the other coming 
 from living or feeling. Now as " the function of 
 the intellect is to preside over actions" and as 
 ''our activity leaps from act to act, it is necessary 
 that matter should pass from state to state, for it is 
 only in a state of the material world that action 
 can fit a result, so as to be accomplished." ''If 
 matter appeared as a perpetual flowing, we should 
 assign no termination to any of our actions," and 
 in assigning an end to our actions, we do so in 
 order that the idea may become an act, yet the 
 end or idea explicitly is pictured to our mind, 
 whereas "the moments constituting the action it- 
 self either elude our consciousness or reach it only 
 confusedly" {ib., pp. 299-300). Accustomed "to 
 think the moving by means of the immovable, the 
 intellect generally refuses to think true duration" 
 (ib.), has no direct vision of reaHty {ib., Intro, 
 p. xiii) ; its object is what is singled out of reaHty 
 (ib., p. 46) for "practical interest, and so we can- 
 not see the real evolution, the radical becoming," 
 and "even when we speak of duration and be-
 
 I70 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 coming, it is of another thing that we are think- 
 ing" {ib., p. 273). Thus what the intellect grasps 
 of the real is static, relative (ib., p. 198), mechanical 
 and symbolical {ib., p. 196). For with its eyes turned 
 backwards, the intellect cannot grasp reality in 
 the making, but only as made, i.e. in the past, 
 and if it grasps real moments of duration and 
 puts these partial static views of the past end to 
 end, it would not give a real reconstruction of the 
 whole, but only an approximation or rather an 
 imitation of the indivisible motor principle (i.e. 
 duration) whence the impetus proceeds {ib., pp. 
 46, 98, loi, 200). But this is "the natural meta- 
 physic of the human mind," and Professor Bergson 
 warns us that we should be "on our guard against 
 it" {ib., pp. 20, 21), for it is the cause of a twofold 
 illusion, viz. "to suppose we can think of the 
 unstable by means of the stable, the moving by 
 means of the immobile" and "to impart into 
 speculation a procedure made for practice" {ib., 
 p. 277). 
 
 To get direct vision of reality, we must go from 
 the experience of intellect to the experience of living, 
 i.e. from thought to feeling {ib., p. 46). Our intellect, 
 being only a divergent product of life, "a part of 
 the whole," is with its categories of unity, multi- 
 pHcity, mechanical casuality and intelligent final- 
 ity, too narrow and rigid for the living" {ib., Intro., 
 p. 10). Hence we must "transcend intelligence" 
 {ib., p. 191). In the effort to do so "we must
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 171 
 
 break with scientific habits which are adapted to 
 the fundamental requirements of thought, we must 
 do violence to the mind, go counter to the natural 
 bent of the intellect. But that is just the function 
 of philosophy" {ib., p. 30). For " the special object 
 of philosophy is to speculate, i.e. to see" (ib., p. 196) 
 "with the spirit," i.e. "that faculty of seeing which 
 is immanent in the faculty of acting" {ib., p. 250) 
 not with matter as intellect and science {ib., p. 196). 
 And as the experience of intellect moves in an op- 
 posite direction to that of living {ib., p. 359) the 
 faculty of spirit "springs up somehow by the twist- 
 ing of the will on itself, when action is turned into 
 knowledge" {ib., p. 250). 
 
 Hence we transcend our consciousness, which is 
 partial and retrospective, by making it coincide 
 with something of its principle, i.e. Hfe, or conscious- 
 ness in the wide sense of the term. It does this by 
 detaching itself from the already made and attaching 
 itself to the being-made; i.e. "turning back on itself 
 and twisting on itself, the faculty of seeing should 
 be made one with the faculty of willing — a pain- 
 ful effort which we can make suddenly, doing 
 violence to our nature, but cannot sustain more 
 than a few minutes" {ib., p. 237) and even then 
 "it is an individual and fragmentary will that we 
 grasp." But if "we not only put back our being 
 into our will" but also "our will itself into the im- 
 pulsion it prolongs, we understand, we feel, that 
 reality is a perpetual growth, a creation pursued
 
 172 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 without end" {ib., p. 239). ''To movement, then, 
 everything will be restored and into movement 
 everything will be resolved" {ib., p. 250). 
 
 Such are the mental gymnastics which phi- 
 losophy, according to Professor Bergson, must 
 perform to get the vision of reahty, in "an effort 
 to dissolve again into the Whole" {ib., p. 191), to 
 attain "that most vast something out of which our 
 understanding is cut" {ib., p. 199). No doubt at 
 all if we attempted bodily gymnastics of the kind 
 we could see "stars" or as Professor Bergson pre- 
 fers "the fiery path torn by the last rocket in a 
 fire-works display" {ib., p. 257). And he says 
 that "these fleeting intuitions which Hght up their 
 object only at distant intervals, philosophy ought 
 to seize, first to sustain them, then to expand them 
 and so unite them together" {ib., p. 268), and that 
 "philosophy ought to follow science, in order to 
 superpose on scientific truth a knowledge of another 
 kind, which may be called metaphysical. Thus 
 combined, all our knowledge, both scientific and 
 metaphysical, is heightened," for "it is reahty itself, 
 in the profoundest meaning of the word, that we 
 reach by the combined and progressive develop- 
 ment of science and philosophy" {ib., p. 199).
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION (continued) 
 
 The Theory of Life 
 
 In the Theory of Life is set forth Professor 
 Bergson's characteristic doctrine of Creative Evo- 
 lution. Our twofold experience reveals two oppo- 
 site movements in the universe, "descent" and 
 "ascent" {ib., p. ii). The original movement was 
 Duration, which by relaxation of tension detends 
 in order to extend. This detension is conceived as 
 an inversion of the original movement, and is at 
 bottom a "suppression," or "interruption," or 
 "diminution of positive reality" {ib., p. 210). In 
 illustration of the "detension" movement, he 
 points to "the indivisible active will" relaxing 
 so that we get "the feeling of extension" {ib., p. 
 207); or he "sympathizes with the inspiration of 
 the poet, follows it with a continuous movement 
 which is, like the inspiration itself, an undivided 
 act; then he relaxes the attention, lets go the ten- 
 sion that is in him, and the sounds, hitherto swal- 
 lowed up in the sense, appear distinctly, one by 
 one, in their materiahty " {ib., p. 209) ; or " the vision 
 we have of the material world is that of a weight
 
 174 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 which falls" {ib., p. 245), or he appeals to a vessel full 
 of steam at a high pressure; the steam thrown into 
 the air is nearly all condensed into little drops which 
 fall back, and this condensation and this fall rep- 
 resent simply the loss of something, an interruption, 
 a deficit; and so " from an immense reservoir of life, 
 jets must be gushing out unceasingly, of which each, 
 falling back, is a world" {ib., p. 247); or he "thinks 
 of an action Hke that of raising the arm; and then 
 supposes that the arm left to itself falls back" 
 (ib., p. 247). He finds, "in this image of a creative 
 action which unmakes itself, a representation of 
 matter" (ib.). 
 
 But these illustrations are not appropriate. 
 They are valid only if we admit that the forces 
 of attraction or of the living organism exist previous 
 to the movement. The weight and drops of steam 
 fall by virtue of attraction, the will relaxes by 
 distraction or bodily fatigue, the idea of extension 
 comes from our senses. Now he is dealing with 
 Duration, the Absolute Reality, and he expressly 
 bases "physical laws (p. 218), organization and 
 extension on the inverse movement," i.e. the move- 
 ment of detension. Hence while these are, accord- 
 ing to his doctrine, the result of "the creative act 
 unmaking itself," they are brought in deliberately 
 to illustrate the unmaking action, and so exist before 
 they are supposed to exist. The Scholastic idea 
 of creation is simplicity and consistency itself 
 compared to this.
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 175 
 
 I. Creative Evolution 
 
 However, it is not the original movement of Du- 
 ration, i.e. prior to its detension, that finds an exclu- 
 sive place in Professor Bergson's Creative Evolution. 
 He needed the material world, or an explanation of 
 its existence, and so he tells us that the Absolute 
 "let himself go" with the result that the "letting 
 go" is the tendency to materiality. But this 
 "letting go" is not complete; the Absolute comes 
 to himself, and tries to get back. So he completes 
 the illustration given by saying that "a small part 
 of the jet of steam subsists, uncondensed, for some 
 seconds; it is making an effort to raise the drops 
 which are falling; it succeeds at most in retarding 
 their fall"; and after the arm has fallen back 
 "there yet subsists in it, striving to raise it up 
 again, something of the will that animates it" {ib., 
 p. 247). So he tells us "in vital activity we see, 
 then, that which subsists of the direct movement 
 in the inverted movement, a reality which is making 
 itself in a reality, which is unmaking itself^' {ih., 
 p. 248). 
 
 Now this is the sphere and purpose of Creative 
 Evolution: a reality making itself in or across a 
 reality unmaking itself. Hence we read that in the 
 universe itself two opposite movements are to be 
 distinguished, "descent" and "ascent." The first 
 only unwinds a roll ready prepared. In principle, 
 it might be accomplished almost instantaneously,
 
 176 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 like releasing a spring. But the ascending move- 
 ment, which corresponds to an inner work of ripen- 
 ing or creating, endures essentially, and imposes its 
 rhythm on the first, which is inseparable from it 
 {ih., p. 11). Thus before Creative Evolution can 
 get to work we are supposed to accept without 
 question these idle and puerile assumptions. In 
 reahty we seem to read some old mythical cosmog- 
 ony instead of the last word on philosophy by a 
 writer of the twentieth century. Why should the 
 Absolute distend, or be distending; how could He 
 lose strength in the fall; why should He reascend so 
 slowly, painfully and imperfectly? Why could He 
 not reascend and absorb all of the downward move- 
 ment, as I could in an instant raise my arm to the 
 height it was before I let it fall? 
 
 The movement of "ascent" is called Duration, 
 Time, Life; it endures of itself, is Absolute and tends 
 in the direction of spirituaUty and freedom. The 
 movement of "descent," on the contrary, goes in 
 .the inverse direction of materiality, necessity and 
 space; it "endures only by its connection with that 
 which ascends'^ (pp. 212, 369). Hence the Abso- 
 lute is limited as to extent and power, is dependent 
 and contingent (p. 235). The ascending move- 
 ment is designated "a vital impetus" which is 
 "a tremendous push"; its essence is "progress, 
 i.e. creation or succession," i.e. "continuity of 
 interpenetration" which is either the cause or the 
 effect of the impetus; its aim is not to annihilate
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 177 
 
 matter or push it out of the way, but only to "mag- 
 netize" matter {ib., p. 99) and use it for its own 
 purposes. Hence Life in its entirety is "a Creative 
 Evolution," "a continuous creative progress" 
 (ib., pp. 22, 223). The essential thing in Life, there- 
 fore, is "continuous progress" (ib., p. 27); for this, 
 creation is necessary, hence "the impetus of Life 
 consists in a need of creation " {ib., p. 251). 
 
 But creation had a beginning, for "at a certain 
 moment, in certain points of space, a visible cur- 
 rent has taken rise; this current of life traversing 
 the bodies it has organized one after another, pass- 
 ing from generation to generation, has become 
 divided among species and distributed among 
 individuals" {ib., p. 26). This visible current, 
 nevertheless, is carried along by "an invisible 
 progress" {ib., p. 27). Yet the need of creation is 
 made manifest to Life, "only when creation is 
 possible. It lies dormant when life is condemned 
 to automatism; it wakens as soon as the possi- 
 bihty of a choice is restored" {ib., p. 261). "The 
 truth is," Professor Bergson assures us, "that life 
 is possible whenever energy descends the incline 
 indicated by Carnot's Law and where a cause of 
 inverse direction can retard the descent" {ib., p. 
 
 256). 
 
 But if Life is condemned to automatism, where 
 is its "tremendous push" {ib., p. 99), and how 
 can its current be described as "intensifying in 
 proportion to its advance" {ib., p. 206), and why
 
 1 78 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 should Life be the resultant of or depending on the 
 interaction of contrary movements of physical 
 energy when it is presented as "an original internal 
 impetus" and "its essence evolution" (p. 22)? 
 We might conceive in Professor Bergson's theory 
 that organization depended on Carnot's Law, 
 but we cannot understand how this law can explain 
 the beginning of Life. For Life is Duration, Time, 
 the Absolute, and here we are told that Life had 
 a beginning due to physical laws. The suspicion 
 arises that Professor Bergson's cosmogony is really 
 physical and that in this case is presented a particu- 
 lar illustration of his teaching that "physics is 
 simply psychics inverted" {ib., p. 202). 
 
 Now Hfe evolves through creation. But the 
 creation does not extend to matter, for matter is 
 due to the inverse movement, whereas "the life 
 that evolves on the surface of our planet is at- 
 tached to matter," hence we see "in life an effort 
 to remount the incline that matter descends" 
 (ib., p. 245). Nor does creation mean the creation 
 of energy, for "at the root of life there is an effort 
 to engraft on to the necessity of physical forces 
 the largest possible amount of indetermination. 
 This effort cannot result in the creation of energy" 
 hence "all that the efifort can do is to make the 
 best of a pre-existing energy which it finds at its 
 disposal" and "this effort itself possesses only the 
 power of releasing" {ib., pp. 114-115). Further- 
 more creation does not apply to physical laws, for
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 179 
 
 life "is riveted to an organism that subjects it to 
 the general laws of inert matter. But everything 
 happens as if it were doing its utmost to set itself 
 free from these laws. It has not the power to 
 reverse the direction of physical changes, such as 
 the principle of Carnot determines it. It does, 
 however, behave absolutely as a force would behave 
 which, left to itself, would work in the inverse 
 direction. Incapable of stopping the course of ma- 
 terial changes downwards, it succeeds in retarding 
 it" {ib., pp. 245-246). 
 
 Thus Creative Evolution is concerned with the 
 "creations of forms" only {ih., p. 239). These 
 "forms, which life cuts out on the action unmak- 
 ing itself, are capable of being themselves pro- 
 longed into unforeseen movements, and represent 
 the action making itself" {ih., p. 248). The 
 creative action is symbolized by a geyser {ib., 
 p. 247), a current (i6., p. 26), a shell (^5., p. 98), a sheaf 
 {ib., p. 117), a great blast raising eddies of dust, 
 which are the living beings {ib., p. 128), an in- 
 visible breath {ib., 128), a full breath {ib., p. 100), 
 a stream {ib., p. 29), by "a centre from which worlds 
 shoot out like rockets in a fire-works display, — 
 provided, however, that I do not present this 
 centre as a thing, but as a continuity of shoot- 
 ing out" {ib., p. 248). For it is an "illusion to 
 think of things which are created and a thing which 
 creates," "there are no things, there only are 
 actions," and "God thus defined, has nothing of
 
 i8o PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 the already made; He is unceasing Life, action, 
 freedom" (ib., p. 248). 
 
 The creative action does not progress in a straight 
 course "like that of a solid ball shot from a can- 
 non." "It suddenly bursts like a shell into frag- 
 ments and these in turn burst into other fragments," 
 i.e. "species and individuals," and "the way it 
 breaks depends on the resistance it meets from 
 inert matter and the explosive force due to an 
 unstable balance of tendencies, which it bears 
 within itself" {ib., p. 98). Being "confronted with 
 matter," i.e. the inverse tendency, "the impetus 
 of life cannot create absolutely but it seizes upon 
 this matter which is necessity itself and strives to 
 introduce into it the largest possible amount of 
 indetermination and liberty" {ib., p. 257). It over- 
 comes the resistance of matter "by humility, by 
 making itself very small and insinuating, bending 
 to physical and chemical laws, consenting even to 
 go part of the way with them Hke a switch of a rail" 
 {ib., p. 98), not at all like a shell, or rocket. "Life 
 had to enter thus into the habits of inert matter in 
 order to draw it little by little, magnetized, as it 
 were, to another track" {ib., p. 99). As a result, 
 matter, i.e. the inverse tendency, "becomes as if 
 it were made of India-rubber," i.e. plastic {ib., 
 p. 252). 
 
 Hereupon creative Duration no longer acts like 
 Rousseau's sagacious primitive; it changes into 
 Hobbes' wild animal or hungry savage and "gnaws
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION i8i 
 
 on things, leaving on tliem the mark of its tooth" 
 (ib., p. 46) and thus shows "the need of creation." 
 Matter so marked is organized. Or Professor Berg- 
 son cites the illustration of a current, and says that 
 the result of the two currents running opposite to 
 each other is "a modus vivendi between them, which 
 is organization" {ib., p. 250). Its principle is "the 
 Becoming" {ib., p. 237). Its real centre is the action 
 and its nature is explosive {ib., p. 92). But organ- 
 isms are only accidental, "excrescences" or "buds 
 caused to sprout by the former germ endeavoring 
 to continue itself in a new germ," "the essential 
 thing is the continuous progress" (p. 27); ''life can 
 progress only by means of the living, which are 
 its depositaries" {ib., p. 231), and the progression is 
 explained either by Weismann's theory of the " con- 
 tinuity of the germ-plasm" or "at least by the con- 
 tinuity of genetic energy" contained in "sexual 
 elements" (pp. 26-27). Thus Life is like "a current 
 passing from germ to germ through the medium of 
 a developed organism" (p. 27), and "the sprout- 
 ing and flowering of these forms, i.e. organisms, 
 are stretched out on an unshrinkable duration, 
 which is one with their essence" (p. 341). 
 
 In illustration Professor Bergson appeals to the 
 phenomena of growing old, "what is vital is the 
 continual change of form, which implies a continual 
 recording of duration" (p. 19) and says that "the 
 evolution of life as a whole from its humblest 
 origins to its highest forms constitutes through
 
 1 82 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 the unity and continuity of the animated matter, 
 which supports it, a single indivisible history" {ib., 
 p. 37). So essential is this change, so essential is 
 the continuity that form is altogether relative to 
 action, so that "everything changes inwardly and 
 the same concrete reahty never occurs" {ib., p. 46), 
 even "the organism reconstructs itself entirely for 
 every new act" {ib., p. 22). If sameness and repeti- 
 tion appear among living beings, this sameness and 
 repetition are merely "accidental," inasmuch as 
 "innumerable Hving beings almost ahke have to 
 repeat each other in space and time for the novelty 
 they are working out to grow and mature" {ib., p. 
 21). Action, therefore, is prior to organization 
 (ib., p. 174), and "the form of the organ only 
 expresses the degree in which the exercise of the 
 function has been obtained" {ib., p. 96). 
 
 From the fact that organization is the modus 
 vivendi between the two currents it follows that 
 "adaptation is a necessary condition of evolution" 
 {ib., p. loi), not in the sense that "outer circum- 
 stances are the directing causes of evolution," but 
 that they are "forces which evolution must reckon 
 with" {ib., pp. 101-102), for "the novelty of forms 
 arises from an internal impetus which is progress 
 or succession" {ib., p. 341), and "life must create 
 a form for itself, suited" however "to the circum- 
 stances that are made for it, i.e. make the best of 
 these circumstances, respond to outer actions by 
 building up a machine which has no resemblance
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 183 
 
 to them. Such adapting is not repeating, but 
 replying^' {ib., p. 58), not passive but active {ib., 
 p. 52). In this sense form and adaptation are 
 contingent; and an explanation is given for "set- 
 backs," "arrests" and "conflict" {ib., pp. 254 
 -255). Hence "adaptation explains the sinuos- 
 ities of the movement, not its general direc- 
 tion, nor the movement itself" {ib., p. 102), 
 for in the great river of life flowing through the 
 body of humanity, "the movement of the stream 
 is distinct from the river bed, although it must 
 adopt its winding course" {ib., p. 270), with this re- 
 minder that "evolution does not mark out a soli- 
 tary route, it takes directions without aiming at 
 ends, it remains inventive, i.e. creative, even in its 
 adaptations" {ib., p. 102). 
 
 II. Transformism 
 
 Hence the plasticity of matter and the general 
 movement of life, which on divergent lines is creat- 
 ing forms ever new, reveal the basic doctrine on 
 which Creative Evolution rests, viz. Transformism. 
 Professor Bergson proposes this teaching. He claims 
 that experience shows that the most complex has 
 been able to issue from the most simple by way of 
 evolution and this has been strengthened by scien- 
 tific discoveries {ib., p. 24). To him the doctrine is 
 probable, not proved; he admits that it may even 
 be wrong, yet maintains that we could and would
 
 1 84 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 continue to establish between forms an ideal 
 kinship and no longer a material affiliation; and 
 that this would be sufficient, for evolution some- 
 where would still have to be supposed, and so "it 
 would simply have been transposed, made to pass 
 from the visible to the invisible" (ib., pp. 24-26). 
 So he decides to "stick to the letter of Transform- 
 ism," the more so because it is "not opposed to 
 special creation" {ib., p. 26). He takes exception to 
 the present forms of Transformism known as the 
 Darwinian, Neo-Darwinian and Neo-Lamarckian as 
 insufficient to solve the problem, not with the in- 
 tention of rejecting them altogether, for "each of 
 them, being supported by a considerable number of 
 facts, must be true in its way. Each of them must 
 correspond to a certain aspect of the process of 
 evolution," whereas "the reahty of which each of 
 these theories takes a partial view must transcend 
 them all, and this reality is the special object of 
 philosophy which is not constrained to scientific 
 precision because it contemplates no practical 
 application" {ib., pp. 84, 85). 
 
 To Professor Bergson, Transformism is not ef- 
 fected by passive adaptation to material forces. 
 He holds that "the inner vital movement is trans- 
 formation" {ib., p. 32). He is forced to maintain, by 
 his Philosophy of Change, that variations, i.e. 
 changes, in the forms of life, i.e. organisms, are so 
 increasing and constant that these forms are only 
 accidental to the one essential thing, or fundamental
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 185 
 
 reality, viz, the continuity of Duration. And as 
 "Duration is an effective action and a reality 
 of its own" {ib., p. 16), "is immanent to the whole 
 of the universe" and "means invention, the crea- 
 tion of forms, the continual elaboration of some- 
 thing new" {ib., p. 11), it follows that the real cause 
 of the variations in form must be sought in the 
 life impetus itself, for "life is a tendency, and the 
 essence of a tendency is to develop in the form of 
 a sheaf, creating, by its very growth, divergent 
 directions among which its impetus is divided" 
 {ib., p. 99). 
 
 In illustration Professor Bergson cites "the evo- 
 lution of that special tendency which we call our 
 character." Our " child-personaHty, though indi- 
 visible, united in itself divers persons, which could 
 remain blended just because they were in their 
 nascent state. But these interwoven personaKties 
 became incompatible in course of growth, and, 
 as each of us can live but one Hfe, a choice must 
 perforce be made. We choose in reahty without 
 ceasing; without ceasing, also, we abandon many 
 things. The route we pursue in time is strewn with 
 the remains of all that we began to be, of all that 
 we might have been. But nature, which has at 
 command an incalculable number of lives, is in no 
 wise bound to make such sacrifices. She preserves 
 the different tendencies that have bifurcated with 
 their growth. She creates with them diverging 
 series of species that will evolve separately. The
 
 1 86 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 bifurcations on the way have been numerous, but 
 there have been many blind alleys, beside the two or 
 three highways; and of these highways themselves, 
 only one, that which leads through the verte- 
 brates up to man, has been wide enough to allow 
 free passage to the full breadth of life" {ib., pp. 99- 
 100). Thus "while life, in its contact with matter, 
 is comparable to an impulsion or an impetus, re- 
 garded in itself it is an immensity of potentiahty, a 
 mutual encroachment of thousands and thousands 
 of tendencies which nevertheless are" thousands 
 and thousands "only when once regarded as out- 
 side each other, that is, when spatialized. Contact 
 with matter is what determines this dissociation" 
 (ib., p. 258). He says that "it is easier to define the 
 method than to apply it," that its appHcation 
 "would be possible only if the history of the devel- 
 opment of the organized world were entirely 
 known," that "such is far from being the case," 
 for "the genealogies proposed are generally ques- 
 tionable," "vary with their authors," "raise dis- 
 cussions which do not admit of a final settlement"; 
 but as these discussions bear "less on the main lines 
 of the movement than on matters of detail," so 
 "by following the main lines as closely as possible, 
 we shall be sure of not going astray," inasmuch as 
 the "aim is only at defining the principal directions 
 of the evolution of the species," and as "not all of 
 these directions have the same interest for us" 
 and "what concerns us particularly is the path
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 187 
 
 that leads to man"; therefore "our main business 
 is to determine the relation of man to the animal 
 kingdom, and the place of the animal kingdom 
 itself in the organized world as a whole" {ib., p. 
 108). 
 
 As matter is "a relaxation of the inextensive into 
 the extensive and thereby of liberty into necessity" 
 (p. 118), so "the role of life is an effort to engraft 
 on to the necessity of matter, the largest possible 
 amount of indetermination," i.e. '' unforeseeable- 
 ness, variety of creative forms" (pp. 96, 114, 116), 
 "freedom" or "movement," for "the initial im- 
 petus of Hfe is essentially directed toward free 
 actions" {ib., p. 254). This it does not by creating 
 matter, nor by creating energy, but by making 
 "the best of the pre-existing energy," i.e. "by 
 securing such an accumulation of potential energy 
 from matter, that it can get, at any given moment, 
 the amount of work it needs for its action simply 
 by pulling a trigger," i.e. by releasing {ib., p. 115). 
 Hence "the evolution of life really continues an 
 initial impulsion and brings life to more and more 
 efficient acts by the fabrication and use of more 
 and more powerful explosives" which "represent 
 a storing house of the solar energy, the degrada- 
 tion of which is thus provisionally suspended on 
 some of the points where it was being poured 
 forth" {ib., p. 246). In this way "life is an effort to 
 remount the inchne that matter descends" al- 
 though "life on our planet is attached to matter,
 
 i88 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 riveted to an organism that subjects it to the gen- 
 eral laws of inert matter" {ib., p. 245) and while "in- 
 capable of stopping the course of material changes 
 downwards, it succeeds in retarding it" {ib., p. 246). 
 
 Professor Bergson tells us that as a matter of 
 fact "the principal source of energy usable on our 
 planet is the sun" {ib., p. 115), but warns us that 
 the origin of energy is a problem which "remains 
 insoluble as long as we keep on the ground of 
 physics" and must be sought "in an extra-spatial 
 process" {ib., p. 244). Hence "all life, animal and 
 vegetable, seems in its essence like an effort to 
 accumulate energy and then let it flow into flexible 
 channels, changeable in shape, at the end of which 
 it will accompHsh infinitely varied kinds of work" 
 {ib., pp. 253-254). 
 
 This is "what the vital impetus passing through 
 the matter, would fain do all at once," but "the 
 impetus is finite and has been given once for all. 
 It cannot overcome all obstacles" {ib., p. 254), it 
 "soon exhausts itself in its very manifestations" 
 {ib., p. 142), for the most living form becomes frigid 
 in the formula that expresses it, and is stifled if it 
 fails to renew itself by a constant effort {ib., p. 127), 
 so that "evolution is not only a movement forward; 
 in many cases it is a marking time and still more 
 often a deviation or turning back" {ib., p. 104), be- 
 cause it is " always opposed " {ib.,p. 254), "paralyzed 
 by contrary forces" or "absorbed in the form it 
 is engaged in taking, at the mercy of the material-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 189 
 
 ity it had to assume" {ib., p. 127), for "the act by 
 which life goes forward to the creation of a new 
 form and the act by which the form is shaped 
 are two different and often antagonistic tendencies" 
 {ib., p. 29), so that "the evolution of the organ- 
 ized world is the unrolling of this conflict" (ib., p, 
 253. Therefore in the process of creative evolution 
 "two things only are necessary: (i) a gradual 
 accumulation of energy; (2) an elastic canaliza- 
 tion of this energy in variable and indeterminable 
 directions, at the end of which are free acts" {ib., 
 p. 255). And while "life chooses the fittest means 
 for this result in the circumstances with which it 
 is confronted" {ib., p. 256), so that "this twofold 
 result has been obtained in a particular way on 
 our planet," yet "it might have been obtained by 
 entirely different means" {ib., p. 255). 
 
 In its primitive contact with matter "life had 
 to enter into the habits of inert matter, in order 
 to draw it little by little, magnetized, as it were, to 
 another track" {ib., p. 99). Thus he holds that "of 
 phenomena, in the simplest forms of life, it is hard 
 to say whether they are still physical and chem- 
 ical or whether they are already vital" {ib.), that 
 "vegetable and animal are descended from a com- 
 mon ancestor which united the tendencies of both 
 in a rudimentary state" {ib., p. 113), that the two 
 tendencies, viz. of gradual storing and of sudden use 
 of energy, were "mutually implied in this rudimen- 
 tary form" {ib., p. 113), so that at first they "were
 
 IQO PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 fused in one" (ib., p. ii6), that "the more the 
 single original tendency grows, the harder it finds 
 it to keep united in the same living being these 
 two elements" (ib.), so that ''of themselves, and 
 without any external intervention, simply by the 
 effect of the duality of the tendency involved in 
 the original impetus and of the resistance opposed 
 by matter to the impetus, the organisms turned 
 some in the first direction," i.e. of storing energy, 
 "others in the second," i.e. of exploding energy. 
 "To this scission succeeded many others. Hence 
 the diverging lines of evolution, at least what is 
 essential in them" {ib., p. 254). 
 
 With the "parting in two" arose "two divergent 
 evolutions"; "the vegetable tending principally" 
 in the direction of storing the energy and "the 
 animal in the direction of exploding it" (ib., p. 116). 
 As the parting or scission was gradual "the animal 
 cell and the vegetable cell are derived from a com- 
 mon stock, and the first living organisms oscillated 
 between the vegetable and animal form, partici- 
 pating in both at once" {ib., p. 112); therefore "the 
 animal forms that first appeared were of extreme 
 simplicity" (ib., p. 99). In fact "no definite charac- 
 teristic distinguishes the plant from the animal" 
 (ib., p. 105), so that "biologists enamored of clean- 
 cut concepts have regarded the distinction between 
 the two kingdoms as artificial" (ib., p. 106), hence 
 "the group must not be defined by the possession 
 of certain characters, but by its tendency to em-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 191 
 
 phasize them," i.e. "taking tendencies rather than 
 states into account" (ib.), i.e. not a static but a 
 dynamic definition {ib., p. 107). 
 
 Now as Duration or movement is the basic 
 reahty, the guiding principle and the aim of Crea- 
 tive Evolution, it follows that the vegetable and 
 animal kingdoms are distinguished in proportion to 
 the movement they exercise. The vegetable takes 
 the energy necessary for Hfe with the principal 
 purpose of storing it; the animal, on the con- 
 trary, takes the necessary energy with the main 
 purpose of using it in explosive action. "The 
 vegetable manufactures the organic substances 
 directly with mineral substances" {ib., p. 112), i.e. 
 "especially carbon and nitrogen which it derives 
 directly from the air and water and soil " {ib., p. 106), 
 and "this aptitude enables it to dispense with move- 
 ment and feeling," so that "the vegetable may be 
 defined by consciousness asleep and by insensibility" 
 {ib., p. 112), i.e. by comparative immobility {ib., p. 
 130). The animal, on the contrary, must obtain 
 energy in food from other animals or vegetables, 
 and ultimately from vegetables. For this "the 
 animal must be able to move" {ib., pp. 106-108). 
 "Between mobility and consciousness there is an 
 obvious relationship" {ib., p. 109), and "the more 
 the nervous system develops, the more numerous 
 and precise become the movements, among which 
 it can choose; the clearer also, is the consciousness 
 that accompanies them," so that "to choose vol-
 
 192 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 untarily between several different courses of action, 
 cerebral centres are necessary, that is, crossways 
 from which paths start, leading to motor mechan- 
 isms of diverse form but equal precision" (ib.,ip. no). 
 Hence "animals, which are obHged to go in search 
 of their food, have evolved in the direction of 
 locomotor activity, and consequently of a con- 
 sciousness more and more distinct," and "from 
 this standpoint we should define the animal by 
 sensibihty and awakened consciousness," i.e. by 
 mobility {ib., pp. 112, 130). Thus, "in the animal, 
 all points to action, that is, to the utilization of 
 energy for movements from place to place," so that 
 "what constitutes animality, is the faculty of util- 
 izing a releasing mechanism for the conversion of as 
 much stored up energy as possible" into "explosive 
 action," i.e. into movement {ib., p. 120). As "the 
 plant has stored up the energy chiefly by the 
 chlorophyllian function, a chemicism sui generis 
 of which we do not possess the key" {ib., p. 253), as 
 "the nervous system arises by a division of labor" 
 {ib., p. no), for "in the beginning the explosion is 
 haphazard and does not choose its course" {ib., p. 
 120), and as "the nervous system is a veritable 
 reservoir of indetermination'' {ib., p. 126) as also " the 
 regulator of the organic life" {ib., p. 123), Professor 
 Bergson concludes: "the same vital impetus that 
 has led the animal to give itself nerves and nerve- 
 centres must have ended, in the plant, in the 
 chlorophyllian function" (i6., p. 114), and as, "from
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 193 
 
 the very first in making the explosive, nature had 
 for object the explosion, then it is the evolution of 
 the animal rather than that of the vegetable, that 
 indicates, on the whole, the fundamental direction 
 of life" {ib., p. 116), for, in this way, "the evolu- 
 tion of Hfe continues an initial impulsion which 
 brings life to more and more efficient acts," i.e. 
 movements, "by the fabrication and use of more 
 and more powerful explosives" {ib., p. 246). 
 
 A study of the animal kingdom. Professor Bergson 
 holds, shows that the impulse of Hfe to movement 
 has gained the upper hand in two directions, viz. 
 in the arthropods, whose culminating species is the 
 insect, and in the vertebrates, which end in man 
 {ib., pp. 131-133). And as "instinct is nowhere 
 so developed as in the insect world," so "the whole 
 evolution of the animal kingdom has taken place 
 on two divergent paths, one of which led to in- 
 stinct and the other to intelligence" {ib., p. 134), 
 not in the sense that either "is ever found in a pure 
 state," for they "always accompany each other"; 
 "they are tendencies, not things," "complemen- 
 tary" yet "opposed" because they develop from a 
 common origin along diverging Hues, and so are 
 "deposited by life along its course" {ib., p. 136). In 
 reality they "are two different methods of action 
 on inert matter, two modes of psychical activity" 
 by which "the life manifested by an organism 
 obtains certain things from the material world" 
 {ib.) ; instinct acting directly on the material world,
 
 194 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 by creating organized instruments to work with, 
 intelligence indirectly through an organism which, 
 instead of possessing the required instrument 
 naturally, will itself construct it by fashioning 
 inorganic matter" (ib., p. 142). Hence the essential 
 feature of human intelligence is "the faculty of 
 manufacturing tools, i.e. unorganized instruments 
 of indefinite variety " (pp. 139-140). 
 
 While ''instinct acts with wonderful precision," 
 so that " most instincts are only the continuance, or 
 rather, the consummation of the work of organiza- 
 tion itself," yet "it retains an almost invariable 
 structure and is necessarily specialized" {ib.)', 
 "the instrument constructed intelhgently, on the 
 contrary, is imperfect, costs an effort, is not easy 
 to handle, but it can take any form, serve any pur- 
 pose, confers on the living being a richer organiza- 
 tion, being an artificial organ by which the natural 
 organism is extended," and so "instead of closing, 
 like instinct, the round of action within which the 
 animal tends to move automatically, it lays open 
 to activity an unlimited field into which it is driven 
 further and further and made more and more 
 free" {ib., pp. 140, 141). Furthermore, the difference 
 between man and animal is one of kind because 
 " the human brain differs from other brains in this 
 that the number of mechanisms it can set up and 
 consequently the choice that it gives as to which 
 among them shall be released, is unlimited. Now 
 from the limited to the unlimited there is all the
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 195 
 
 distance between the closed and open" {ib., p. 263). 
 It is "this freedom that the human form registers. 
 Man continues the vital movement indefinitely, 
 although he does not draw along with him all that 
 life carries in itself." Of the other tendencies "he 
 has kept very little." So the evolution of Hfe is 
 "as if a vague and formless being, whom we may 
 call, as we will, man or superman, had sought to 
 realize himself, and had succeeded only by aban- 
 doning a part of himself on the way," i.e. "the rest 
 of the animal world and even of the vegetable world " 
 {ib., p. 266). Therefore the process of Creative 
 Evolution reveals vegetative torpor, instinct and 
 intelligence as the elements that coincided in the 
 vital impulsion common to plants and animals 
 and which, in the course of a development in which 
 they were made manifest in the most unforeseen 
 forms, have been dissociated by the very fact of 
 their growth {ib., p. 135). 
 
 III. A Voluntarism 
 
 An analysis into the nature of the process shows 
 that Creative Evolution is the evolution of a con- 
 scious will. Hence in concert with metaphysical 
 Pragmatists Professor Bergson proposes a Voluntar- 
 ism. He uses the term consciousness in two senses, 
 consciousness in general, i.e. supra-consciousness, 
 and consciousness in particular, i.e. organic con- 
 sciousness, i.e. of the plant, animal or man. The
 
 196 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 former is "Life" {ib., p. 181) and is "coextensive 
 with universal life" {ib., p. 186). The latter is a 
 particular manifestation or division or distribution 
 (ib., p. 181) of the supra-consciousness as revealed 
 in the particular organism. In both senses the word 
 is synonymous with mobility, movement, action, 
 choice, purpose, willing. In fact we read that "the 
 whole present study strives to prove that the vital 
 is in the direction of the voluntary" {ib., p. 224). 
 Professor Bergson furnishes the proof by simply 
 including the "vital" and the "voluntary" in 
 "consciousness" and by enlarging the meaning of 
 consciousness so as to embrace both. Thus "con- 
 sciousness is the name for the rocket whose ex- 
 tinguished fragments fall back as matter" and 
 is "the name for what subsists of the rocket itself, 
 passing through the fragments and lighting them 
 up into organisms" {ib., p. 261). Hence it is the 
 principle of distention, i.e. materiality, and is illus- 
 trated as "a relaxation of self-consciousness" {ib., 
 p. 207), "a falling and condensation of steam" 
 {ib., p. 247), "a relaxation of the arm" {ib.), as 
 "expressing a deficiency of will" {ib., p. 209). 
 
 Again, consciousness is presented as "the motor 
 principle of evolution" {ib., p. 182), and "the evolu- 
 tion of life" is presented "as if a broad current of 
 consciousness had penetrated matter loaded, as 
 all consciousness is, with an enormous multipHcity 
 of interwoven personalities" {ib., p. 181) or as "a 
 rising wave" {ib., p. 269) or as "the ripening of an
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 197 
 
 idea" (ib., p. 346) or as "the evolution of a personal- 
 ity" (ib., p. 257) or "of a consciousness" {ib., p. 27) 
 or "like conscious activity, is invention, unceasing 
 creation" {ib., p. 23), "a need of creation" {ib., p. 
 261), and this "current that runs through this 
 matter" is "a pure willing thing" (evidently not a 
 tendency), "which we hardly feel, which at most 
 we brush lightly as it passes" {ib., p. 238). 
 
 Furthermore the purpose of Creative Evolution 
 is to introduce consciousness into inert matter. 
 For "the whole history of life up to man has been 
 that of an effort of consciousness to raise matter 
 and of the more or less complete overwhelming of 
 consciousness by the matter that has fallen back" 
 and this effort ''was to create with matter, which 
 is necessity itself, an instrument of freedom," but 
 "everywhere, except in man, it has let itself be 
 caught in the net of mechanical automatism" {ib., 
 p. 264). In this sense consciousness is designated 
 as "mobihty" {ib., p. 163), "indetermination" {ib., 
 p. 114), "freedom" {ib., p. 264), i.e. change, "the 
 continual elaboration of something new" {ib., p. 
 11), "unforeseeable" {ib., pp. 126, 341), "a centre 
 of action" {ib., p. 262) and is represented as 
 "unconscious" {ib., p. 214), as having "had to 
 fall asleep," e.g. in plants {ib., pp. 113, 181), but 
 as "recollections which may awaken" {ib., p. 119), 
 as "distributed among divergent lines of organ- 
 isms" {ib., p. 180), as "infinitely retarded and 
 divided" {ib.), as the cause of "organization"
 
 198 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 {ib., p. 181) and "the animating principle of 
 the organism" {ib., p. 270), as suffering "fatigue" 
 and "being fed with the converted solar energy," 
 as "varying with the power of locomotion and 
 deformation" {ib., p. 26). 
 
 Thus Creative Evolution is described through- 
 out as conscious striving action, the cause and the 
 prolongation of the vital impetus {ib., p. 239). The 
 "Will to Believe" of Professor James here becomes 
 the "Will to Act" and the Will to Act for a con- 
 scious principle implies the power of choice. The 
 reason is that "the force immanent in Ufe," i.e. 
 Duration, Vital Impetus, Consciousness, Will, "is 
 Umited, and that it soon exhausts itself in its very 
 manifestations. It is hard for it to go in several 
 directions at once; it must choose " (f&., pp. 141, 142). 
 And so at first "it succeeded by dint of humihty," 
 "insinuating" itself into matter {ib., p. 98), then "by 
 ages of effort and prodigies of subtlety it induced 
 a number of elements, ready to divide, to remain 
 united; by division of labor knotted between them 
 an insoluble bond" and "thus made them func- 
 tion" {ib., p. 99) ; it " takes directions without aiming 
 at ends," nay even "a mere glance at fossil species 
 shows us that life need not have evolved at all, or 
 might have evolved in very restricted Hmits, if it 
 had chosen the alternative, much more convenient 
 to itself, of becoming anchylosed in its primitive 
 forms" {ib., p. 102). Not satisfied with diplomacy, 
 consciousness manufactures "powerful explosives"
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 199 
 
 and "pulls triggers." After such and more remark- 
 able feats we should expect to find matter, which is 
 explained by "the relaxation of will," thoroughly 
 subdued. But no! The hard shell crabs caused 
 "a sudden arrest of the entire animal world in 
 its progress toward higher and higher mobility," 
 "arthropods and vertebrates escaped, however, 
 and to this fortunate circumstance is due the 
 expansion of the highest forms of life" {ib., p. 131). 
 Strange that the disciples of Isaac Walton and the 
 industrious housewife who seems bent on exter- 
 minating insects are not aware that they owe 
 their very existence to the fact that in the long 
 ago "fishes exchanged their ganoid breastplate 
 for scales," and with the insects "supplemented 
 the insufficiency of their protective covering by 
 an agility that enabled them to escape their 
 enemies and also to assume the offensive"! {ib., 
 
 P- 131)- 
 
 Again, while life in its contact with matter is 
 
 divided actually into "thousands and thousands 
 of tendencies" {ib., p. 258), yet "each of the species, 
 through which life passes, falls into a partial sleep"; 
 "of the four main directions along which animal 
 life bent its course, two have led to bhnd alleys, 
 and, in the other two, the effort has generally been 
 out of proportion to the result" {ib., pp. 128-129); 
 and "even in its most perfect works it is at the 
 mercy of the materiality which it has had to as- 
 sume" {ib., p. 127) and this in spite of the fact
 
 200 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 that "the current intensifies as it progresses" {ib., 
 
 p. 26). 
 
 We might fancy that the lack of success is due 
 to the fact that consciousness "has spHt up," 
 "divided," "developed" on "diverging paths," 
 but Professor Bergson's teaching on individuahty 
 is adverse to the assumption. He distinguishes 
 artificial individuahty, i.e. "the outhnes which 
 we see in an object as the plan of our eventual ac- 
 tion" {ib., p. 11), i.e. an intellectual snapshot, from 
 natural individuality which is produced by contact 
 of the vital tendency with matter, for "matter 
 divides actually what was but potentially mani- 
 fold," and so "individuation is in part the work of 
 matter, in part the result of Hfe's own incHnation" 
 (ib., p. 258). He holds that "individuahty is a char- 
 acteristic property of Hfe " {ib., p. 1 2) ; that "the indi- 
 vidual transmits the vital impetus" {ib., p. 259), but 
 it is "hard to decide in the organic world what is 
 individual and what is not," for " individuahty admits 
 of any number of degrees and is not fully realized 
 anywhere even in man" {ib.,p. 12); that "while the 
 tendency to individuate is everywhere present in 
 the organized world, it is everywhere opposed by 
 the tendency towards reproduction," for hfe pro- 
 gresses by reproduction, which supposes a division 
 and so "in nature there is no absolutely distinct 
 individuality" {ib., p. 42), i.e. a thing absolutely 
 one, i.e. undivided. As "every individual organism, 
 even that of man, is merely a bud that has sprouted
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 201 
 
 on the combined body of both its parents," it follows 
 that "we shall find him solidary with his remotest 
 ancestors, solidary with that little mass of proto- 
 plasmic jelly which is probably at the root of the 
 genealogical tree of hfe," and also "sohdary with all 
 that descends from the ancestor in divergent direc- 
 tions." Hence "the life common to all the living, 
 forms a single whole" {ib., p. 43), for "the continuity 
 ot life implies a multiplicity of elements and the 
 interpenetration of all by all" {ib., p. 162), and "the 
 individual is not sufficiently independent, or cut 
 off from other things, to have a vital principle of 
 its own" (ib., p. 42). But this teaching is the 
 Hylozoism or Panpsychism of Professor Schiller 
 expressed in no less explicit terms. 
 
 His conscious purposive voluntarism constrains 
 Professor Bergson to reject Radical Mechanism, as 
 also Radical Finalism i.e. the carrying out of a pre- 
 conceived plan. His reason is that both theories 
 suppose "all to be given" and "previously ar- 
 ranged," "closes the future," so "time is useless if 
 there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or crea- 
 tion," i.e. change {ib., p. 39). For the same reason 
 he rejects God {ib., p. 196), yet he tells us "that 
 the vital impetus, passing through matter, is 
 finite and it has been given once for all" {ib., 
 p. 254). He says that Radical Mechanism 
 explains "artificial systems," not the order of 
 Life, and that while rejecting Radical FinaHsm, 
 he accepts a Mitigated FinaHsm, for the reason
 
 202 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 that the doctrine on which Finalism rests, i.e. 
 "of final causes, will never be definitely refuted," 
 is "so flexible" and "so comprehensive" that 
 "one accepts something of it as soon as one rejects 
 pure mechanism" (ib., p. 40). So he proposes "ex- 
 ternal finality" which consists not only in "the 
 co-ordination of the parts with the whole of the 
 organism," but also, by reason of the soHdarity 
 of life, in the co-ordination of "each living being 
 with the collective whole of all others" {ib., p. 43), 
 with this reservation, however, that, while life is 
 a tendency to act on inert matter, the direction of 
 the tendency is not predetermined. Life has no 
 "end" in the sense that it is "the realization of a 
 pre-existing model," it is not "an anticipation of 
 the future contained in the present in the form of 
 a represented end," for life "endures in time," 
 i.e. changes, and "the road of Hfe has been created 
 pari passu with the act of travelHng over it, being 
 nothing but the direction of this act itself" (ib., p. 
 51). Hence his FinaHsm is "a particular mode of 
 viewing the past in the light of the present," for 
 it teaches that while "the best interpretation" of 
 the evolution process is "a psychological inter- 
 pretation," yet "this explanation has neither value 
 nor even significance except retrospectively," for 
 the explanation is intellectual, whereas "life goes 
 beyond intellect" (ib., pp. 51-52). 
 
 After this manner Professor Bergson holds that 
 his "philosophy of life claims to transcend both
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 203 
 
 mechanism and finalism" and yet ''represents the 
 organized world as a harmonious whole" {ib., p. 
 50). This "harmony, or complementarity" is 
 ''rather behind us than before," it "is revealed 
 only in the mass," in tendencies rather than in 
 states, and is explained as due to "a vis a tergo," 
 i.e. a kick behind, or to "a tremendous push" {ib., 
 p. 99), or to the fact that "life has taken its leap 
 from a vast spring board" {ib., p. 265). Hence in 
 virtue of "the original common impetus," of the fact 
 that the developing "tendencies were at first fused 
 in one," these tendencies "must keep something 
 in common in spite of the divergence of their 
 efforts." Thus "harmony was complete at the 
 start," is accounted for, not "by a common aspira- 
 tion," nor by "reciprocal adaptations in course of 
 progress," but by "an original identity," i.e. "an 
 identity of impulsion" {ib., pp. 50, 51, 103, 116). But 
 Professor Bergson tells us that "the harmony does 
 not exist in fact: it exists rather in principle," 
 for while "each species and individual retains 
 only a certain impetus from the universal vital 
 impulsion, it tends to use this energy in its own 
 interest" {ib., pp. 50-51). Hence "an irremediable 
 difference of rhythm" {ib., p. 128). Besides, there 
 are "scissions," "diverging lines of evolution," so 
 "this discord among the species will go on increas- 
 ing," "retrogressions, arrests, accidents of every 
 kind," "numberless struggles," and "hence a dis- 
 cord striking and terrible, but for which," he con-
 
 204 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 soles us by adding, "the original principle of life 
 must not be held responsible" {ib., pp. 103, 254, 
 255). Therefore the Theory of Life shows life to 
 be "Creative Evolution," i.e. "true continuity, real 
 mobility, reciprocal penetration" {ib., p. 162), and 
 the domain of Ufe to be "reciprocal interpenetra- 
 tion, endlessly continued creation" {ib., p. 178). 
 
 IV. Criticism 
 
 In criticising the Theory of Life proposed by 
 Professor Bergson we beheve that its exposition 
 is the most telHng criticism. To designate it as 
 a fanciful cosmogony based upon an "ineffectual" 
 abstraction, and full of assumptions, is to use 
 mild terms. 
 
 Again the basic principle of Creative Evolution 
 is Transformism, but he admits that Transformism 
 is "not proved" and "may be wrong," in which 
 case "the doctrine would not be affected in so far 
 as it has a special interest or importance for us," 
 for "the evolutionist theory, so far as it has any 
 importance for philosophy, requires" only "an 
 ideal kinship," i.e. "a logical not "a material 
 afhhation between forms," and "evolution would 
 then simply have been transposed, made to pass 
 from the visible to the invisible," i.e. we could 
 not see the evolution, nor know it really to be in 
 operation, but suppose that it does work {ib., pp. 
 25-26).
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 205 
 
 Besides, the fundamental principle in the evolu- 
 tion process is that the evolution of life has taken 
 place on lines similar to the evolution of a personal- 
 ity. Now this teaching, stripped of its pecuUar 
 words, is the theory of Ontogenesis and Phylo- 
 genesis, viz. that the individual in the course of 
 development from the embryo assumes forms 
 identical to those which appear in the successive 
 evolution of the race. Thus Professor Bergson 
 takes a biological theory proposed by Haeckel, 
 not considered trustworthy by leading scientists of 
 to-day, dresses it up in psychological phraseology 
 and presents it as something new. Yet he cannot 
 get away from its original biological nature, for he 
 tells us that the energy is acquired by and in food, 
 is stored in sexual elements, and that life is prop- 
 agated along biological Hnes. At the same time the 
 process is psychological because he says it is so, 
 or even logical because logical affiliation suffices. 
 This is conceptual manipulation of experience with 
 a vengeance, far beyond what Professor Schiller has 
 attempted. 
 
 Furthermore the fundamental principle of Pro- 
 fessor Bergson's whole system is Duration, Muta- 
 tion, Change. He says that Creative Evolution, in 
 its essence, is the aim, on the part of Life, to intro- 
 duce mobility or movement or change into inert 
 matter, so that life in the external world would be 
 presented as a process similar to the process of our 
 inner life, as he conceives it, i.e. "constant change,"
 
 2o6 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 "the continual evolution or creation of unforeseen 
 forms." Now the term movement is used in two 
 different senses. It may mean mutation, i.e. change, 
 or it may mean local motion, i.e. locomotion, as 
 Professor Bergson spells the word. So the strange 
 fact is presented that organic life, as produced 
 by Creative Evolution, is not determined by muta- 
 tion or change but by the necessities of locomotion. 
 Professor Bergson tells us that animals are dis- 
 tinguished from vegetables by mobility, but mo- 
 bility here means locomotion, for he expressly states 
 that ''animals must go in search of food." In like 
 manner the mobility that saved fishes and insects 
 was "agility of movement." In animal and human 
 life, also, the progress of the nervous system is 
 represented as corresponding to the variety and 
 precision of movement, and consciousness is said 
 to awaken in proportion to movement. But the 
 nervous system is a sensori-motor system regulating 
 our animal and human locomotion. Therefore, 
 locomotion is not mutation, and the inter- 
 mittent use of the same word in two different 
 meanings cannot be considered a strong argu- 
 ment; it rather exposes the falsity of his position. 
 As for movement in the sense of change or crea- 
 tion of new species. Professor Bergson says "often 
 this movement has turned aside; very often, 
 too, it has stopped short; what was to have 
 been a thoroughfare has become a terminus. 
 From this point of view, failure seems the rule,
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 207 
 
 success exceptional and always imperfect" {ib., 
 p. 129). 
 
 Besides, Professor Bergson holds that *'the law 
 of the degradation (i.e. dissipation) of energy is 
 the most metaphysical law of physics, since it 
 points out without interposed symbols, without 
 artificial devices of measurement, the direction 
 in which the world is going. It tells us that changes 
 that are visible and heterogeneous will be more and 
 more diluted into changes that are invisible and 
 homogeneous, and that the instability to which 
 we owe the richness and variety of the changes 
 taking place in our solar system will gradually give 
 way to the relative stability of elementary vibra- 
 tions continually and perpetually repeated" {ib., p. 
 243). So Creative Evolution will have an end, as 
 Professor Bergson says it had a beginning. Life 
 will give way to death, mutation to local motion, 
 for Creative Evolution means the "unceasing crea- 
 tion of new and unforeseeable forms," and how can 
 these be possible when "homogeneous changes" 
 and "elementary vibrations perpetually repeated" 
 only exist. 
 
 Again Professor Bergson modifies the law of the 
 conservation of energy. He holds that this "law 
 cannot express the objective permanence of a cer- 
 tain quantity of a certain thing, but rather the 
 necessity for every change that is brought about to 
 be counterbalanced in some way by a change in 
 the opposite direction," so that it "is concerned with
 
 2o8 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 the relationship of a fragment of this world to 
 another fragment rather than with the nature of 
 the whole" {ib., p. 242). These words would be true 
 if Creative Evolution created new energy. But 
 this Professor Bergson expressly denies. He tells 
 us that Creative Evolution creates the form only, 
 not the energy, and creates the form by converting 
 the potential energy of matter into act. 
 
 Finally Professor Bergson teaches that man is 
 the only thoroughfare, the highest product of evo- 
 lution; and this success he expressly attributes to 
 intellect, which keeps the path of life open and 
 free. In the anthropods, on the contrary, "nature 
 has frankly evolved in the direction of instinct" 
 with the result that "stabiUty" or ''automatism" 
 has ensued, which keeps the path of life "closed." 
 But he holds that "intelligence and instinct are 
 turned in opposite directions, the former towards 
 inert matter, the latter towards life" {ib., p. 176). 
 Therefore, the Order of Life, i.e. Creative Evolu- 
 tion, when left to itself, closes automatically, and 
 is kept open only by intellect, which, Professor 
 Bergson teaches, pertains to the Order of Matter.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION: {continued) 
 
 The Theory of Knowledge 
 
 Professor Bergson teaches that the Theory 
 of Knowledge is inseparable from the Theory of 
 Life. By Theory of Knowledge, however, he does 
 not mean what philosophical writers universally 
 have understood, viz. a treatise on the nature and 
 operations of the intellect. His specific purpose 
 is to show the genesis of intellect in and by the 
 evolution of Hfe, and so include the genesis of intel- 
 lect in the Theory of Knowledge. Hence *'it is 
 necessary that these two inquiries, theory of knowl- 
 edge and theory of life, should join each other, 
 and, by a circular process, push each other on un- 
 ceasingly," for ''a theory of knowledge which does 
 not replace the intellect in the general evolution 
 of life will teach us neither how the frames of knowl- 
 edge have been constructed nor how we can enlarge 
 or go beyond them" {ih., Intro., p. xiii; p. i86). 
 In proposing to set forth the genesis of intellect he 
 boasts that he has gone beyond Plato, Aristotle, 
 Descartes, Kant, Spencer and their followers, all 
 of whom took the intellect without attempting to 
 explain the construction of its forms.
 
 2IO PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 The twofold experience of thought and of feeling 
 give, as we have seen, "the two opposite move- 
 ments of descent and of ascent in the universe" (ib., 
 p. ii); these in turn present a twofold evolution: 
 "the automatic and strictly determined evolution 
 of this well-knit whole is action which is unmaking 
 itself; and the unforeseen forms which life cuts out 
 in it, forms capable of being themselves prolonged 
 into unforeseen movements, represent the action 
 that is making itself" {ib., p. 248); and this twofold 
 evolution unfolds a twofold order: "that of the in- 
 ert and automatic or mathematical" and "that of 
 the vital or the willed" {ib., p. 224). The former order 
 is the order of the inorganic, is the proper sphere 
 of the senses and of the intellect, and represents 
 what is thought; the latter order is the order of 
 the organic, is the sphere of instinct and of 
 intuition, and represents what is lived, i.e. felt 
 {ib., p. 186). Thus order takes two forms: one 
 is the "opposite" of the other {ib., p. 11), the 
 "inverse" of the other {ib., p. 247), "contrary" 
 to the other {ib., p. 222), "contingent" to the 
 other {ib., p. 232), so that "the absence of the 
 one consists in the presence of the other" {ib., 
 p. 233) and "the negation of the one con- 
 sists in the afi&rmation of the other" {ib., p. 
 222). This doctrine of the twofold order is 
 fundamental to Professor Bergson's theory of 
 Knowledge and explains the genesis of intellect, 
 the illusions of the intellect, the relation of intel-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 211 
 
 lect to instinct and consciousness, and place and 
 scope of intuition. 
 
 I. The Genesis of the Intellect 
 
 The whole evolution of life proceeds from a 
 current of existence and the opposing current {ih., 
 p. 182). The current of existence is original and 
 fundamental; it is the order of Hfe; by its relaxa- 
 tion or diminution or detension the opposing current 
 arises. The contrary current, or movement of 
 ''descent," is ''materiahty" {ib., p. 245), and con- 
 tains "immanent" in itself " an order approximately 
 mathematical which produces itself automatically" 
 in proportion to the relaxation {ib., pp. 218, 220). 
 "The power of creation has only to be deviated 
 from itself to relax its tension, only to relax its 
 tension to extend, only to extend for the mathe- 
 matical order of the elements so distinguished and 
 the inflexible determinism connecting them to man- 
 ifest the interruption of the creative act: in fact 
 inflexible determinism and mathematical order are 
 one with this very interruption" {ib., p. 217). This 
 order, called mathematical or "geometry, which is 
 its extreme limit" {ib., p. 223), is in reality only 
 approximately mathematical, for as "matter is a 
 relaxation of the inextensive into the extensive and, 
 thereby, of Hberty into necessity, it does not indeed 
 wholly coincide with pure homogeneous space" {ib., 
 p. 218) which "is the ultimate goal of the mind's
 
 212 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 movement of detension" {ib., p. 212), "yet is consti- 
 tuted by the movement which leads to space, and 
 is therefore on the way to geometry. It is true 
 that laws of mathematical form will never apply 
 to it completely. For that, it would have to be 
 pure space and step out of duration" {ib., p. 218). 
 
 The order of matter awakens ideas of inertia, 
 passivity and automatism {ib., p. 2 23) . It represents 
 a "deficiency of will" and presents "a system of 
 negations, the absence rather than the presence of 
 a true reaUty" {ib., p. 208) because "duration is not 
 the fact of matter itself, but of the life which re- 
 ascends the course of matter" {ib., p. 340). In like 
 manner "the mathematical order is not a positive 
 thing" and there are not "in matter laws compar- 
 able to those of our codes"; in fact, there is "no 
 definite system of mathematical laws at the basis 
 of nature," for "it is the form towards which a 
 certain interruption tends of itself" {ib., p. 219), and 
 so "the idea that the mind forms of pure space is 
 only the schema of the Hmit at which this movement 
 would end" {ib., p. 202). 
 
 Now the current of life ascends across the cur- 
 rent of matter. Life, or consciousness or supra- 
 consciousness or mind, "launched into matter, 
 fixed its attention either on its own movement," 
 i.e. turned in the direction of instinct and intuition, 
 "or on the matter it was passing through," i.e. 
 in the direction of intellect {ib., pp. 181, 182), and 
 hence "split up because of the need it had to apply
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 213 
 
 itself to matter at the same time as it had to follow 
 the stream of life" (ib., p. 178), so "the mind goes in 
 two opposite ways" (ib., p. 223). Thus we are told 
 that "intellectuaHty and materiality are of the 
 same nature and have been produced in the same 
 way" {ib.,p. 219), for "the intellect and matter have 
 progressively adapted themselves one to the other in 
 order to attain at last a common form" (ib., p. 206) 
 inasmuch as "consciousness cannot pass through 
 matter without settHng on it, without adapting 
 itself to it: this adaptation is what we call intel- 
 lectuality" (ib., p. 270) and "this adaptation has 
 been brought about quite naturally, because it is the 
 same inversion of the same movement which creates 
 at once the intellectuality of mind and the material- 
 ity of matter" (ib., p, 206). 
 
 Moreover, by adaptation is understood "con- 
 solidation," for we read that "within the evolution 
 of life and consciousness, the progressive determina- 
 tion of materiality and intellectuality appears by 
 the gradual consolidation of one with the other" 
 (ib., p. 369). In this sense, intellect is said to be 
 "cut out of mind" or consciousness, for "mind over- 
 flows intellect," to be "a by-product of evolu- 
 tion" (ib., p. 49) or "a local effect" (ib., Intro., 
 p. x), to be "detached from a vastly wider re- 
 ahty" (ib., p. 193), compared to which it is 
 "like a solid nucleus formed by means of local 
 concentration" (ib., p. 191) or of "condensation" 
 (ib., p. 193).
 
 214 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 Therefore, not only is the genesis of intellect 
 and the genesis of material bodies correlative, 
 " for we cannot make the genesis of the one with- 
 out making the genesis of the other" inasmuch as 
 "both are derived from a wider and higher form of 
 existence" {ib., p. 187), but the very nature of the 
 intellect is set forth, for "matter is determined by 
 intelligence and there is between them an evident 
 agreement" {ib., p. 199). This agreement is shown 
 in the action of intellect on matter. For while the 
 material order unfolds automatically, yet intellect 
 expands it, for "the more intelligence busies itself 
 with dividing, the more it will spread out in space, 
 in the form of extension adjoining extension, a 
 matter that undoubtedly itself has a tendency to 
 spatiality, but whose parts are yet in a state of 
 reciprocal implication and interpenetration " {ib., p. 
 189). Thus intellect is said "to create order by 
 analyzing the object" and "the more complexity 
 intellect puts into the object by analyzing it, the 
 more complex is the order it finds there," for "the 
 order grows with the complexity, since it is only 
 an aspect of it" {ib., pp. 208, 209). 
 
 As mind is the principle of both orders, of the 
 vital by tension and of the material by detension, 
 so "in general reality is ordered exactly to the degree 
 in which it satisfies our thought," and order is "mind 
 finding itself in things." From this viewpoint 
 order is said to be "a certain agreement between 
 subject and object" {ib., p. 223). In the second
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 215 
 
 place the agreement between matter and intellect 
 is shown in the form and action of the intellect. 
 The intellect is "originally fashioned on the form 
 of matter" {ib., p. 160) and bears upon itself "the 
 general configuration of that matter" {ib., Intro., 
 p. xiii); hence "it treats everything mechanically" 
 (ib., p. 165). 
 
 Intellect itself and its two main functions, viz. 
 "deduction and induction are governed by the prop- 
 erties of matter" (ib., p. 212). All its operations tend 
 to geometry as the goal where they find their per- 
 fect fulfilment; but geometry is necessarily prior 
 to them, for these operations do not construct space 
 but take it as given; hence there is a latent geom- 
 etry immanent in our idea of space which is the 
 mainspring of our intellect and the cause of its 
 working {ib., p. 210). Thus "logic and geometry 
 engender each other"; "it is from the extension of 
 a certain natural geometry that natural logic has 
 arisen," and "geometry and logic are strictly appli- 
 cable to matter" {ib., p. 161). 
 
 Hence the moulds of intellect are fashioned on 
 matter, "its chief object is the unorganized solid" 
 {ib., p. 153); and "it is never at home except when 
 working upon inert matter. It is extended; it 
 presents to us objects external to other objects, and, 
 in these objects, parts external to parts" {ib., p. 
 154). "Its habits and views are static" {ib., pp. 
 298, 300); it "looks from the outside and grasps 
 the ready-made" {ib., p. 200). Constructed as an
 
 2i6 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 instrument of action, i.e. " to act and to know we are 
 acting," it is guided and ruled by the special "work 
 that is being accomplished" {ib., p. 191), hence 
 ''the cerebral mechanism is arranged just so as 
 to drive back into the unconscious almost the 
 whole of the past, and to admit beyond the thresh- 
 old only that which can cast light on the present 
 situation or further the action now being prepared 
 — in short, only that which can give useful work" 
 (ib., p. 5). And as action goes " by leaps, and to act 
 is to readjust oneself" {ib., p. 330), the intellect 
 "regards the object in hand as provisionally final 
 and treats it as a unit" and is directed through the 
 interests of action "to actual or future positions of 
 the object and not to the progress'' {ib., p. 194). 
 
 Hence "of the discontinuous" and of "immobil- 
 ities alone" does the intellect form "a clear idea" 
 {ib., pp. 154, 155). "It forms the idea of mobility 
 by constructing movement out of immobiHties put 
 together, i.e. by substitution, but does not pretend 
 to reconstruct the movement such as it actually 
 is; it merely replaces it with a practical equivalent." 
 Thus "the actual forms which it uses are artificial 
 and provisional" {ib., pp. 155, 156). It cannot 
 grasp reality, i.e. Duration, for "reahty appears as a 
 ceaseless upspringing of something new, which has 
 no sooner arisen to make the present than it has 
 already fallen back into the past; at this exact 
 moment it falls under the glance of the intellect, 
 whose eyes are ever turned to the rear" {ib., p. 47).
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 217 
 
 Even this past it perceives abstractly, i.e. from 
 Duration, by taking snapshots, considering parts 
 outside of parts, although in touch with Duration. 
 Hence its knowledge is abstract, mechanical and 
 artificial and is itself, Professor Bergson says, "an 
 abstract view of the cause of its own being" {ib., 
 p. 53). In like manner it "considers the future 
 abstractly" (ib., p. 53), for "only that is foreseen 
 which is like the past" {ib., p. 28). In this sense 
 it is "the faculty of connecting the same with the 
 same, of perceiving and also producing repetitions" 
 (ib., p. 52). 
 
 Hence "the division of unorganized matter into 
 separate bodies is relative to our senses and to our 
 intellect," for "matter looked at as an undivided 
 whole is a flux rather than a thing" {ib., p. 186); 
 yet he says that "the knowledge of matter which 
 it gives us appears as approximative, but not as 
 relative" {ib., p. 206); that "the qualities of 
 matter are so many stable views that we take of 
 its instability"; that "the form is only a snap- 
 shot view of a transition" and that "our per- 
 ception manages to solidify into discontinuous 
 images the fluid continuity of the real" {ib., p. 
 302). When applied to life, intellect "brings us 
 and moreover only claims to bring us a transla- 
 tion in terms of inertia. It goes all around life, 
 taking from the outside the greatest possible num- 
 ber of views of it, drawing it into itself, instead of 
 entering into it" {ib., p. 176) with the result that
 
 2i8 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 it fails to grasp "the very substance" of things, i.e. 
 Duration, and "the manifold causes and elements" 
 which it attributes to vital phenomena are "only 
 views of the mind" {ib., p. 226). 
 
 From the fact that the intellect in its operations 
 is "discontinuous," and that "it applies forms that 
 are indeed those of unorganized matter," we are 
 enabled to understand the nature of "the concept." 
 "Concepts, in fact, are outside each other, like 
 objects in space; and they have the same stabiHty 
 as such objects, on which they have been modelled. 
 Taken together, they constitute an 'intelligible 
 world,' that resembles the world of solids in its 
 essential characters, but whose elements are lighter, 
 more diaphanous, easier for the intellect to deal 
 with than the image of concrete things; they are 
 not, indeed, the perception itself of things, but the 
 representation of the act by which the intellect is 
 fixed on them. They are, therefore, not images, 
 but symbols. Our logic is the complete set of 
 rules that must be followed in using sym- 
 bols. As these symbols are derived from the 
 consideration of solids, as the rules for com- 
 bining these symbols hardly do more than ex- 
 press the most general relations among solids, 
 our logic triumphs in that science which takes 
 the soHdity of bodies for its object, that is, in 
 geometry" {ib., pp. 160, 161). Therefore, the 
 knowledge of intellect is external, phenomenal 
 and symbolical.
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 219 
 
 In illustration of intellectual action, Professor 
 Bergson points to the cinematograph. The me- 
 chanical contrivance of "moving pictures," he 
 holds, enables us to understand "the mechanism 
 of our thought" {ih., p. 306). In the mechanism 
 of moving pictures we have each colored form or 
 picture distinct and separate, i.e. snapshot views, 
 i.e. qualities, forms, positions, intentions {ih., p. 
 308), and the movement is in the apparatus. This 
 movement consists in juxtaposing form to form or 
 supraposing form on form so rapidly that the move- 
 ment appears to be articulated internally to the 
 forms or pictures. But this is an illusion. The 
 movement is not in them, for they are "so many 
 stable views" {ih., p. 302), but in the machine. It is 
 external, mechanical, artificial, and gives not real 
 movement itself but merely an imitation of move- 
 ment. Thus he adds, "perception, intellection, 
 language so proceed in general" {ib., p. 306). 
 
 The criticism which Professor Bergson makes of 
 intellectual knowledge in general, he applies to 
 science in particular, for "positive science is the 
 work of pure intellect." Hence "science can only 
 act by means of inert matter," "makes use of this by 
 mechanical inventions " and "gives an a priori mech- 
 anistic conception of nature" {ih., pp. 105, 196). 
 Although "inert matter enters naturally into the 
 frames of the intellect" and so science, e.g. physics, 
 in regard "to its general form may touch the abso- 
 lute" {ih., p. 198); yet in regard to "the particular
 
 220 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 cutting out," it "is contingent and relative, relative 
 to the variable it has chosen, relative to the order 
 in which it has successively put the problems" 
 {ib., p. 219). 
 
 Furthermore ''matter is a tendency to constitute 
 isolable systems which can be treated geometric- 
 ally. In fact we shall define matter by just this 
 tendency. But it is only a tendency. Matter 
 does not go to the end, and the isolation is never 
 complete. If science does go to the end and isolates 
 completely, it is for convenience of study" {ib., p. 
 10), and its systems are, therefore, called "artifi- 
 cial" {ib., p. 31) and "abstract," for the systems we 
 cut out within the whole would, properly speaking, 
 not then be parts at all; " they would be partial 
 views of the whole" {ib.), for "the most radical 
 progress a science can achieve is the working of the 
 completed results into a new system of the whole, 
 by relation to which they become instantaneous and 
 motionless views taken at intervals along the con- 
 tinuity of a movement," i.e. it "translates" {ib., pp. 
 31, 32), and is mechanical for the result would be 
 "a pure mechanism over which Duration ghdes 
 without penetrating" {ib., p. 37). 
 
 For like reasons science deals with the ''same,'' 
 with "repetitions'' {ib., p. 29), and its knowledge 
 is "negative," for it is based on the material order, 
 which is negative, and though it "appears to deal 
 with a positive reality," yet it is concerned with 
 "the absence rather than the presence of a true
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 221 
 
 reality" {ih., p. 208), and with the "abstract," i.e. 
 with "what is withdrawn, by hypothesis, from the 
 action of real time" {ih., p. 29), and so "considers 
 them in the abstract" {ih., p. 342). 
 
 Therefore "physical laws" are negative, for they 
 express "this merely negative tendency"; they are 
 abstract, for "none of them, taken separately, has 
 objective reality"; and artificial, for "each is the 
 work of an investigator who has regarded things 
 from a certain bias, isolated certain variables, 
 applied certain conventional units of measurement" 
 {ib., p. 218). As with the intellect, so the knowledge, 
 which science has of the living, is symbolical, for 
 "here the use of conceptual frames is no longer 
 natural" and "it is by accident — chance, or con- 
 vention, as you please — that science obtains a hold 
 of the living analogous to the hold it has on matter " 
 {ib., p. 198). 
 
 II. Illusions of Intellect 
 
 In the doctrine of the twofold order, automatic 
 and willed. Professor Bergson holds we have a ready 
 and sure solution for what he calls the "illusions" 
 of the intellect. 
 
 The first of these illusions is the idea of Disorder 
 {ib., p. 274). This idea, he says, is met in the funda- 
 mental problem of knowledge, but he adds that the 
 idea of Disorder is an illusion, a pseudo-idea, that in 
 reality there is no such thing as Disorder. For, 
 as the two orders are contrary and complementary,
 
 222 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 so that "the absence of the one means the presence 
 of the other," it follows that ''only order is real, 
 and disorder is one of two orders for which we 
 were not looking." Hence "the idea of disorder 
 is entirely practical. It corresponds to the dis- 
 appointment of a certain expectation and does not 
 denote the absence of all order, but only the pres- 
 ence of that order which does not offer us actual 
 interest." This idea is due to "the fundamen- 
 tal illusion of our understanding that we go 
 from absence to presence, from the void to the 
 full," whereas in itself it is "a word" and no 
 more (ib.). 
 
 The second illusion is the idea of Nothing. This 
 idea Professor Bergson says is "the hidden spring 
 of philosophical thinking," for it suggests the in- 
 quiries into the origin of existence inasmuch as 
 "existence appears like a conquest over naught" 
 {ib., p. 275). But he tells us that the idea of nothing 
 "is a pseudo-idea and the problems that are raised 
 around it are pseudo-problems" (ib.,p. 277). He says 
 that the idea of nothing impUes "the annihilation 
 of everything," but "while the mind can represent 
 any particular thing as annihilated, yet the idea of 
 the annihilation of everything presents the same 
 character as that of a square circle: it is not an 
 idea, it is only a word," for "there is no absolute 
 void in nature," and the annihilation of a thing 
 means really the absence of that thing and the 
 presence of another thing in its place.
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 223 
 
 Thus the idea of nothing corresponds to the idea 
 of absence, and there is absence only for " a being 
 capable of remembering and forgetting." All that 
 is expressed negatively by such words as "naught" 
 or "void," therefore, is "not so much thought 
 as feeling, or, to speak more exactly, it is the 
 tinge that feehng gives to thought." Hence 
 "the idea implies on the subjective side a pref- 
 erence, on the objective side a substitution, and 
 is nothing else but a combination of, or rather 
 an interference between this feehng of prefer- 
 ence and this idea of substitution" (ib., pp. 281, 
 282). 
 
 This idea of nothing is due to a fundamental illu- 
 sion of the intellect, for "every human action has 
 its starting point in a dissatisfaction, and thereby 
 in a feehng of absence. Our action proceeds thus 
 from 'nothing' to 'something,' and its very essence 
 is to embroider 'something' on the canvas of 'noth- 
 ing.' The truth is that 'nothing' concerned here 
 is the absence not so much of a thing as of a utihty" 
 {ib., p. 297). Therefore, he tells us, that "the ques- 
 tion: 'why does something exist?' is consequently 
 without meaning, a pseudo-problem raised about 
 a pseudo-idea," and is due to "the fact that the 
 forms of human action venture outside their proper 
 sphere" and "itisinorder to act that we think" {ib., 
 pp. 296, 297), for "intellect is relative to the needs 
 of action. Postulate action and the very form of 
 the intellect can be deduced from it. This form
 
 224 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 is therefore neither irreducible nor inexpHcable" 
 (ib., p. 152). 
 
 A third illusion is " that the mind imitates, by its 
 instabihty, the very movement of the real" {ib., p. 
 308) or, in other words, the belief that "we can 
 reduce things, i.e. becoming, to ideas" (ib., p. 315). 
 But there is ^^ more in a becoming than in the forms 
 passed through in turn, more in the evolution of 
 form than the forms assumed one after another" 
 {ib., p. 316). Hence we "cannot construct changes 
 out of states." It "implies the absurd proposition, 
 that movement is made of immobilities " {ib., p. 308). 
 But "he who installs himself in becoming sees in 
 duration the very life of things, the fundamental 
 reahty." So "from duration we can derive the 
 forms," not vice versa. The illusion is due to the 
 cinematographical mechanism of the intellect, 
 which attempts to derive duration from the forms 
 {ib., pp. 316, 317). 
 
 Another illusion, akin to the former, is the at- 
 tempt to impose on vital phenomena the categories 
 of the intellect, viz. "unity, multipHcity, mechan- 
 ical causaUty, intelligent finaHty" {ib., Intro., 
 p. x). Now the vital order, we are told, consists 
 in the tendential unfolding of countless potential- 
 ities immanent in the vital impulse and is charac- 
 terized by continual creation, freedom, i.e. change, 
 unforeseeability, whereas the intellect is in the 
 material order, being configured to matter, regards 
 the past, and has static forms and habits. Hence
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUITON 225 
 
 the illusion is due to a confusion of the two orders 
 and to an attempt at explaining the evolution of 
 life by a by-product, or part of the evolution, i.e. 
 by the intellect. 
 
 A final illusion is presented in " the idea of a 
 general order of nature, everywhere the same, hover- 
 ing over life and over matter alike" {ib., p. 226). We 
 conceive this idea, according to Professor Bergson, 
 because phenomena of matter and of Hving beings 
 repeat themselves, and reveal characters of likeness 
 and of sameness in form and in function, which 
 enable the mind to generalize. Hence, he adds, 
 "our habit of designating by the same word and 
 representing in the same way the existence of 
 laws in the domain of inert matter and that of 
 genera in the domain of life" {ib.). This illusion 
 is due to ''the confusion of the geometrical order 
 and the vital order," for "in both ancient and 
 modern philosophy the idea of 'generaHty' is an 
 equivocal idea, uniting in its denotation and in 
 its connotation incompatible objects and elements. 
 In both there are grouped under the same concept 
 two kinds of order which are alike only in the 
 facility they give to our action on things. We 
 bring together the two terms in virtue of a quite 
 external likeness which justifies no doubt their 
 designation by the same word for practice, but 
 which does not authorize us at all, in the speculative 
 domain, to confuse them in the same definition" {ib., 
 p. 227). The likeness between the orders is, there-
 
 226 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 fore, external and accidental, for "the vital order, 
 which is essentially creation, is manifested to us no 
 less in its essence" (i.e. creation) "than in some of 
 its accidents, those which imitate the physical and 
 geometrical order; like it, they present to us repe- 
 titions that make generalization possible, and in 
 that we have all that interests us." These "acci- 
 dents" are "the innumerable living beings, almost 
 alike, that have to repeat each other in space and 
 in time for the novelty they are working out to grow 
 and mature" {lb., p. 231). Hence "the repetition 
 which serves as the base of our generalizations is 
 essential in the physical order, which is 'automatic,' 
 accidental in the vital order" (ib.). By a like con- 
 fusion of the two orders Professor Bergson explains 
 the concepts oi chaos , chance Sind anarchy {ib.,p. 237).
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION: (concluded) 
 
 The Theory of Knowledge 
 I. Intellect and Instinct 
 
 The doctrine of the Two Orders is also the basis 
 of Professor Bergson's teaching on the relation of 
 intellect to instinct. He calls intellect and instinct 
 "two tendencies," opposite "and complementary" 
 (ib., pp. 135, 136). They "at their origin interpene- 
 trated each other" (ib., p. 175), i.e. "the original 
 psychic activity included both at once," and "if 
 we went far enough back, we should find intelli- 
 gence and instinct, in this elementary condition, 
 prisoners of a matter which they were not able to 
 control" {ib., p. 141). Now the purpose of Creative 
 Evolution is to introduce indeterminateness into 
 matter, yet "the force immanent in life is limited 
 and must choose between two ways of acting on 
 inert matter," for "it is hard for it to go far in sev- 
 eral directions at once" {ib., pp. 141, 142); and we 
 are also told that "it is no less true that nature 
 must have hesitated between two modes of psy- 
 chical activity — one assured of immediate success, 
 the other hazardous" {ib., p. 143). The reader may 
 not understand all this; however, the choice was
 
 228 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 made. So the force chose to act on matter directly, 
 i.e. by instinct, which is "the faculty of creating 
 organized instruments," and indirectly, i.e. by in- 
 tellect, and this indirect action is effected through 
 the medium or instrumentality of "an organism 
 which fashions unorganized, i.e. artificial instru- 
 ments." 
 
 In the first case "the same principle, i.e. the 
 original psychic activity, remains within itself" {ib., 
 p. 1 68). Therefore instinct "is turned to certain 
 determinations of life" {ib., p. i86), is regarded as 
 "completing the work of organization," so that 
 "there is no sharp line between the instinct of 
 animals and the organizing work of living matter" 
 {ib.,-p. 140), and is in the Order of Life. In the 
 second case the original psychic activity "steps out 
 of itself and becomes absorbed in the utilization 
 of inert matter" {ib., p. 168); therefore intellect 
 "is moulded on the configuration of matter" {ib., 
 p. 186), is regarded as artificially extending the 
 work of organization and is in the inert or Material 
 Order. They are tendencies, therefore "diverge 
 more and more from each other, as they overlap, 
 but are never entirely separated from each other" 
 {ib., p. 142), and "it is at the extremity of prin- 
 cipal lines of evolution that we find intelHgence 
 and instinct in forms almost pure" {ib., p. 174). 
 
 Although of a common origin, Professor Bergson 
 says that instinct and intelligence differ. They 
 differ because "they represent two divergent solu-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 229 
 
 tions, equally fitting, of one and the same problem," 
 i.e. as "means of defence against enemies" {ib., 
 p. 143). But this is a strange mixture of Pro- 
 fessor Bergson's cosmogony and the Darwinian 
 theory. Again we are told that they differ "pro- 
 foundly in internal structure." They "imply two 
 radically different kinds of knowledge" {ib., p. 
 143): "this knowledge is rather acted and uncon- 
 scious in the case of instinct, thought, and conscious 
 in the case of intelligence. But it is rather a dif- 
 ference of degree than of kind" {ib., p. 145), for 
 "knowledge and action are here only two aspects 
 of one and the same faculty" {ib., p. 150). The 
 reader of Creative Evolution is aware that Pro- 
 fessor Bergson is apt to be violent and somewhat 
 unfortunate in the use of figures of speech. Here 
 the fault is found in his use of adjectives, for it is 
 difficult to understand how a "radical difference" 
 is merely one "of degree." 
 
 The "essential difference," however, "from the 
 psychological point of view" is found in "the 
 two objects upon which they are directed." Both 
 are "inherited functions, therefore innate." In- 
 stinct is "the innate knowledge of a thing," it "im- 
 plies the knowledge of a matter," and "this kind of 
 knowledge is formulated in what philosophers call 
 categorical propositions." Intellect, on the con- 
 trary, is "the innate knowledge of relations," 
 imphes "the knowledge of a. form," i.e. something 
 external or the outward aspect of a thing, and
 
 230 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 ''this kind of knowledge is always expressed hypo- 
 thetically" {ih., pp. 145-149). 
 
 Finally "this entirely formal knowledge of in- 
 telligence has an immense advantage over the 
 material knowledge of instinct. A form, just be- 
 cause it is empty, may be filled at will with any 
 number of things in turn, even with those that are 
 of no use. So that a formal knowledge is not 
 limited to what is practically useful, although it 
 is in view of practical utility that it has made its 
 appearance in the world. An intelligent being 
 bears within himself the means to transcend his own 
 nature. He transcends himself, however, less than 
 he wishes, less also than he imagines himself to do. 
 The purely formal character of intelligence deprives 
 it of the balance necessary to enable it to settle 
 itself on the objects that are of the most powerful 
 interest to speculation. Instinct, on the contrary, 
 has the desired materiality, but it is incapable of 
 going so far in quest of its object; it does not specu- 
 late." Hence the ultimate difference is: "There 
 are things that intelligence alone is able to seek, 
 but which, by itself, it will never find. These things 
 instinct alone could find; but it will never seek 
 them" {ih., p. 151). 
 
 In criticism it may be noted that intellect is said 
 "to be configured to matter" and "in the auto- 
 matic order," yet can speculate and has formal 
 knowledge. Now the word formal may be taken 
 in the concrete and in this sense it belongs to the
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 231 
 
 Order of Life, for the purpose of Creative Evolution 
 is the creation of form, or it may be taken in the 
 abstract. In the latter sense we have intellect, 
 essentially existing only as a configuration of 
 matter, yet possessing in itself "empty forms" 
 which "may be filled at will with any number of 
 things in turn." From this teaching it is inferred 
 that the "forms" are part and parcel of intellect 
 and are prior to the particular action of the intel- 
 lect. Yet this is flatly contradicted by Professor 
 Bergson who says: "Knowledge becomes relative, 
 as soon as the intellect is made a kind of absolute. 
 We regard the human intellect, on the contrary, 
 as relative to the needs of action. Postulate action, 
 and the very form of the intellect can be deduced 
 from it. This form is therefore neither irreducible 
 nor inexplicable" nor "independent" {ih., p. 152), 
 and "the needs of action" are the needs of "a 
 practically useful end" {ib., p. 155). 
 
 Moreover instinct is placed in the Order of Life, 
 yet "retains an almost invariable structure, since 
 a modification of it involves a modification of the 
 species," is "therefore necessarily specialized, being 
 nothing but the utilization of a specific instrument 
 for a specific object" {ib., p. 140); whereas "the in- 
 tellect is placed in the order of matter, makes its 
 instrument of unorganized matter" and this "can 
 take any form whatsoever, serve any purpose, 
 free the living being from every new difficulty that 
 arises and bestow on it an unlimited number of
 
 232 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 powers" (ib., p. 141). Yet the Order of Life is, by 
 hypothesis, the order of freedom, while the Material 
 Order is the order of necessity {ib., p. 236). Finally 
 contact with matter is set forth as the determining 
 principle of individuation {ib., p. 258). 
 
 As instinct and intelligence are developed from 
 the same principle, i.e. consciousness or supra- 
 consciousness or mind, they are said to have "the 
 same background, i.e. consciousness which **is 
 coextensive with universal life" {ib., p. 186), and 
 instinct is presented as "not within the domain of 
 intelligence and not beyond the limit of mind" 
 {ib., p. 175). This consciousness is "a rudimentary 
 and vague activity diffused throughout the mass of 
 the organized substance." It is connected with 
 mobility and is "the cause of movement since it 
 has to direct locomotion" and is the effect of move- 
 ment, "for it is the motor activity that maintains 
 it, and, once this activity disappears, consciousness 
 dies away or rather falls asleep." Hence "the 
 humblest organism is conscious in proportion to 
 its power to move freely" {ib., pp. 109, iii). It is 
 described as "the light that plays around the zone 
 of possible actions or potential activity which 
 surrounds the action really performed by the living 
 being. It signifies hesitation or choice" {ib., p. 144) 
 and "is proportionate to the power of choice" {ib., 
 p. 179). But "neither this mobihty nor this 
 choice nor consequently this consciousness involves 
 as a necessary condition the presence of a nervous
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 233 
 
 system; the latter has only canalized in definite 
 directions and brought to a higher degree of per- 
 fection the vague activity" "by giving it the 
 double form of reflex and voluntary activity" (ib., 
 p. 1 10). For, "the nervous system marks out 
 reflex lines on which action will run" and "by their 
 development and configuration indicate more or 
 less extended choice" so that "the awakening of 
 consciousness is the more complete the greater the 
 latitude of choice allowed to it and the larger 
 the amount of action bestowed on it" {ib., pp. 252- 
 262). 
 
 It is natural to suppose therefore that conscious- 
 ness develops with the development of organiza- 
 tion, which is the work of Life. On the contrary 
 "to find probable cases of vegetable consciousness 
 we must descend as low as possible in the scale of 
 plants"; "to find the best specimens of conscious- 
 ness in the animal we must ascend to the highest 
 representatives of the series" although in some ani- 
 mals "the progress of organization must have lo- 
 calized all the conscious activity in nervous centres" 
 with the result "that consciousness is even weaker 
 in animals of this kind than in organisms much 
 less differentiated"; {ib., pp. in, 112). Yet we 
 read that "intelligence points to consciousness, in- 
 stinct," which is in the Order of Life "to uncon- 
 sciousness" {ib., p. 145) and in fact "instincts are 
 more or less conscious in certain cases, unconscious 
 in others" {ib., p. 143).
 
 234 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 In the living being, Professor Bergson tells us 
 "consciousness does not spring from the brain, but 
 brain and consciousness correspond because equally 
 they measure, the one by the complexity of its 
 structure and the other by the intensity of its 
 awareness, the quantity of choice that the living 
 being has at its disposal" {ih., p. 262), and again, 
 ''the consciousness of a living being is inseparable 
 from the brain in the sense in which a sharp knife 
 is inseparable from its edge: the brain is the sharp 
 edge by which consciousness cuts into the compact 
 tissue of events, but the brain is no more coex- 
 tensive with consciousness than the edge with the 
 knife. Thus from the fact that two brains, like 
 that of the ape and that of the man, are very much 
 alike, we cannot conclude that the corresponding 
 consciousnesses are comparable or commensurable" 
 {ih., p. 263). 
 
 But here Professor Bergson changes the meta- 
 phor and, by changing, causes confusion of thought. 
 For if the brain or the nervous system canahzes 
 a vague activity diffused throughout the organism, 
 it forms or moulds or consolidates the knife itself., 
 Professor Bergson holds that the brain of man and 
 that of the animal differ not only in size but also in 
 function, for "in the animal, the motor mechanisms 
 that the brain succeeds in setting up, or, in other 
 words, the habits contracted voluntarily, have no 
 other object nor effect than the accomplishment 
 of the movements marked out in these habits,
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 235 
 
 stored in these mechanisms. But, in man, the 
 motor habit may have a second result, out of pro- 
 portion to the first: it can hold other motor habits 
 in check, and thereby, in overcoming automatism, 
 set consciousness free," and attributes this to "the 
 cerebral mechanisms that correspond to words" 
 {ib., p. 183). 
 
 But inhibition cannot be explained in a mechan- 
 ical manner on materialistic grounds. Again, to 
 explain inhibition by localization of function runs 
 counter to the process of Creative Evolution, for 
 the localization of speech points to automatism, 
 not to free activity {ib., p. 264). 
 
 Finally, the self is explained by consciousness, 
 for it is "the concentration of the different parts 
 of our being in a point, or rather a sharp edge 
 pressed against the future and cutting into it un- 
 ceasingly," "if we let ourselves go, and, instead of 
 acting, dream, at once the self is scattered" {ib., 
 p. 20), and this concentration is "the tension of 
 an indivisible active will" {ib., p. 207). The ten- 
 sion itself is explained by the interests of action, 
 for "each of our acts aims at a certain insertion of 
 our will into reality" {ib., p. 306). 
 
 II. Nature of Intuition 
 
 The doctrine of the Two Orders enables us to 
 grasp the place and scope of intuition in the theory 
 of knowledge.
 
 236 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 Intuition is the characteristic doctrine of Pro- 
 fessor Bergson's epistemology and is considered 
 by him as opposed to, yet complementary of, in- 
 tellect. The fundamental reason of this opposition 
 and complementarity is that intellect and intuition 
 ''represent two opposite directions of the work of 
 consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction 
 of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction and 
 finds itself in accordance with the movement of 
 matter. A perfect humanity would contain both 
 forms," but with us "intuition is almost completely 
 sacrificed to intellect," it is "a lamp almost extin- 
 guished" {ib., p. 267). 
 
 A conception of the nature and function of in- 
 tuition is obtained in its twofold relation to instinct 
 and to intelligence. Now instinct is defined as 
 "sympathy," "a divining sympathy" that creates 
 organized instruments and brings the consciousness 
 of the living being into direct relation with a 
 specific object (ib., p. 175). Hence instinct is feeling 
 specialized, i.e. canalized in specific modes of action. 
 Hence instinct is in the order of life and intuition 
 is nothing more than instinct purified, for "by 
 intuition I mean instinct that has become disin- 
 terested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting on its 
 object and enlarging it indefinitely" {ib., p. 176), 
 i.e. "independent of the interest it has for us" 
 {ib., p. 274); in other words, feeling not specified. 
 
 The relation of intuition to intellect is grasped 
 when we bear in mind how intellect is formed.
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 237 
 
 The intellect is the adaptation of consciousness to 
 matter. The result of this adaptation is that con- 
 sciousness is configured to matter, and the configu- 
 ration is presented as a "luminous nucleus" {ib., p. 
 177) "formed out of the real," i.e. consciousness 
 or feeling, "by condensation" {ib., p. 46). Feel- 
 ing is "an indistinct fringe which fades off into 
 darkness" and which "surrounds the bright nu- 
 cleus in the centre," i.e. "the intellect" {ib.). The 
 "indistinct fringe" is also described as "a fluid 
 surrounding intellect" or "an ocean of life," i.e. 
 feeling {ib., p. 191), so that intellect does not radi- 
 cally differ from the fluid {ib., p. 193). Just as the 
 intellect is "the bright nucleus," the condensation 
 of "darkness into light," or "of the ocean of life" 
 into a particular form, so "intuition is the vague 
 fringe that surrounds our distinct, i.e. our intel- 
 lectual representation," and "this useless fringe is 
 that part of the evolving principle that has not 
 shrunk to the peculiar form of organization, but 
 has settled around it unasked for, unwanted" {ib., 
 
 p. 49)- 
 
 Now intellect and intuition furnish us with the 
 opposite and complementary knowledge of the 
 opposite and complementary parts of reahty. 
 Intellect enables us to grasp the real in its inverse 
 or material tendency, i.e. matter; intuition gives 
 the knowledge of the real in its creative or vital 
 tendency, i.e. spirit and life. The knowledge of 
 intellect is called the knowledge of common sense
 
 238 PR.\GMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 or of science. The knowledge of intuition is called 
 the knowledge of Philosophy or of Metaphysics. 
 In comparison one to the other, Professor Bergson 
 holds that intuition, i.e. the "fringe," is "of more 
 importance for philosophy than the nucleus," i.e. 
 intellect, which "it surrounds," for its "presence 
 enables us to affirm that the nucleus is a nucleus, 
 that pure intellect is a contraction, by condensation, 
 of a more extensive power" {ib., p. 46), whereas 
 intuition is this wider power uncondensed. Again, 
 intuition is in the Order of Life, represents positive 
 creative action and leads us "to the very inward- 
 ness of Hfe." Intellect, on the contrary, is in the 
 Inverse Order, represents a "letting go," i.e. a re- 
 laxation of creative action, and is occupied with 
 external views of things only. 
 
 Hence the basic teaching in the Theory of Knowl- 
 edge is found in the twofold order which sets forth 
 a twofold experience, viz. that of intellect, i.e. of 
 thought which in its nature is feeling condensed, and 
 that of intuition, i.e. of instinct purified, which 
 in its nature is feeling vague and uncondensed. With 
 these two elements furnished by the twofold experi- 
 ence the Theory of Knowledge must be formulated. 
 As twofold experience gives two sources of knowl- 
 edge opposite and complementary, it is evident that 
 the Theory of Knowledge cannot be based on in- 
 tellect alone. For the intellect gives only half of 
 the real, and the half it gives is the real viewed as 
 negative, i.e. as relaxing. The intellect is a "by-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 239 
 
 product" of evolution and therefore, as a part, 
 cannot offer a knowledge of the whole. 
 
 Again, intellect cannot reach the other half of 
 the real, i.e. fundamental reaHty, for "it is charac- 
 terized by a natural inability to comprehend Hfe," 
 i.e. "it proceeds mechanically" {ib., p. 165). "Life 
 has not employed all the psychical potentialities 
 it possesses in producing pure understanding, i.e. 
 in making geometricians. The Kne of evolution 
 that ends in man is not the only one. In other 
 paths divergent from it, other forms of conscious- 
 ness have been developed, which express something 
 that is immanent and essential in the evolutionary 
 movement." "If these were brought together and 
 amalgamated with intellect, the result would be a 
 consciousness as wide as life" {ib., Intro., p. xii). 
 Hence parallel to physics, i.e. intellectual knowl- 
 edge, "a second kind of knowledge ought to have 
 grown up, which could have retained what physics 
 allowed to escape" (p. 342). To intellect there- 
 fore should be added intuition. 
 
 The process by which this other kind of knowl- 
 edge is acquired is somewhat compHcated. It is, 
 on the one hand, "developing intuition" and, 
 on the other, "expanding" or "transcending" 
 intellect. Professor Bergson tells what is neces- 
 sary: "If in evolving in the direct Hne of the verte- 
 brates in general and of man in particular, life has 
 had to abandon by the way many elements in- 
 compatible with this particular mode of organiza-
 
 240 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 tion and consign them to other lines of development, 
 it is the totality of these elements that man must 
 find again and rejoin to the intellect proper in order 
 to grasp the true nature of the vital principle." 
 And "we shall probably be aided in this by the 
 fringe of vague intuition" (i.e. the unshrunken part 
 of the vital principle) "that surrounds our distinct, 
 i.e. intellectual, representations." It is "there, 
 accordingly, that we must look for hints to expand 
 the intellectual form of our thought; from there 
 we shall derive the impetus necessary to Uft us 
 above ourselves" {ib., p. 49). In particular, we can 
 work on instinct, for instinct is sympathy, and 
 intuition is instinct disinterested, hence "if this 
 sympathy could extend its object and also reflect 
 upon itself, it would give us the key to vital opera- 
 tions — just as intelhgence, developed and dis- 
 ciplined, guides us into matter" {ib., p. 176). 
 
 But Professor Bergson cannot mean distinct, 
 specialized instinct, for "instinct retains an almost 
 invariable structure, since a modification of it in- 
 volves a modification of the species, is therefore 
 necessarily specialized, being nothing but the utili- 
 zation of a specific instrument for a specific object" 
 {ib., p. 140). So he must refer to vague instinct, 
 but he forgets to tell us the "object" of this in- 
 stinct, or how it can "reflect upon itself." Therefore 
 both the general and the particular methods present 
 as the ultimate groundwork of the process "a 
 vague fringe" around the intellect, i.e. around our
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 241 
 
 distinct representations, and "a vague instinct." 
 Now these are not different, for Professor Bergson 
 identifies the one with the other when he writes 
 that "the intellect is the luminous nucleus, around 
 which instinct, even enlarged and purified into in- 
 tuition, forms only a vague nebulosity" (ib., p. 177). 
 And as "nebulosity" means what is "cloudy" or 
 "hazy" or "foggy," the process really consists in 
 showing how to pass from the luminous brightness 
 of intellect to a state of cloudiness or haziness or 
 fog represented by intuition. No wonder we read 
 that it is "an infinitely difficult enterprise and 
 which passes the powers of the intellect alone" {ib., 
 p. 207). But as the enterprise is not only possible 
 but even necessary for the Theory of Knowledge, 
 and as Professor Bergson points out the means, 
 we shall briefly set them forth. 
 
 The first means suggested is the cultivation of 
 the aesthetic sense, so pronounced in the artist or 
 the poet. As a result we shall see not from without 
 and for practical interests but from within, so that 
 reality will appear as a continuous creation of 
 unforeseeable forms {ib., p. 177). 
 
 Another means is the cultivation of "sympathy." 
 For while "knowledge properly so called is reserved 
 to pure inteUigence," yet "intuition will suggest 
 to us the vague feeHng, if nothing more, of what 
 must take the place of intellectual moulds." "Then 
 by the sympathetic communication which it estab- 
 lishes between us and the rest of the living, by the
 
 242 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 expansion of our consciousness which it brings 
 about, it introduces us into life's own domain, which 
 is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued 
 creation." And "though I hereby transcend in- 
 tellect, it is from intellect that has come the push 
 that has made it rise to the point it has reached. 
 Without intelHgence it would have remained in the 
 form of instinct, riveted to the special object of 
 its practical interest and turned outward by it 
 into instruments of locomotion" {ib., pp. 177, 178). 
 Hence in "sympathy" we have "the feeling of 
 duration," which is "the actual coinciding of our- 
 self with itself," and by this feeHng "we get back 
 into duration and so transcend intellect" {ib., p. 
 200), for "the veil between consciousness and our- 
 selves is removed" {ib., p. 272). Thus "sympathy" 
 assumes its proper place, i.e. "before perception 
 and knowledge" {ib., p. 174)- But Professor Berg- 
 son has said that "specialized instinct" cannot be 
 transformed or freed from its object, and that 
 intellect is "charged with matter" and created 
 only for matter, that intellect in reality has no 
 "push" in itself, being only something negative, i.e. 
 a relaxation of consciousness. Yet here intellect 
 is presented as pushing instinct into a broader 
 life. Again intellect and instinct represent diverging 
 and opposite tendencies, and how can one push the 
 other? 
 
 The cultivating of sympathy is described as a 
 "squeezing," for we read that "intellect is charged
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 243 
 
 with matter, instinct (i.e. sympathy) with Kfe. 
 We must squeeze them both together in order to 
 get the double essence from them" (ib., p. 178), 
 and this because as "the nucleus has been formed 
 out of the rest by condensation, the whole must be 
 used, the fluid as well as, and more than, the con- 
 densed in order to grasp the inner movement of 
 life" {ib., p. 49)- ^ 
 
 But to squeeze divergent tendencies, they must 
 be brought together, and for this Professor Bergson 
 advocates more violent measures. So we are 
 told that we must awaken "the consciousness that 
 slumbers in instinct" (ib., p. 165). Strange that in- 
 stinct, which is in the Order of Life, should fall into 
 such a profound sleep! We might have supposed 
 that intellect would do this according to Professor 
 Bergson's principles, but, on the contrary, intellect 
 seems to be very wide awake. However, we are 
 not told how to awaken instinct. Possibly the 
 **push" of the intellect does this. Secondly we 
 must place ourselves within the vital impetus; 
 this impetus or current of will is at the basis of our 
 being, but we seem to be outside of it, for "we 
 hardly feel it" and when we do "we only grasp 
 an individual and fragmentary will." "To get it, 
 we must put back our being into our will and our 
 will into the impulsion it prolongs," i.e. the "vis a 
 tergo.^^ Thus "when we contract our whole being 
 in order to thrust it forward," we get "the con- 
 sciousness of becoming" {ib., pp. 237, 239).
 
 244 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 The great obstacle in a performance of this kind 
 is the intellect. Life in general, or consciousness 
 in general, is will, i.e. the vital impetus, but intellec- 
 tual consciousness is not will, but thought. And 
 thought is consciousness in general adapted to 
 matter. Professor Bergson says that "conscious- 
 ness in man is pre-eminently intellect," i.e. 
 thought; "it might have been, it ought to have 
 been, also intuition" {ib., p. 267), i.e. will or feel- 
 ing, but it is not. Now how can thought become 
 will, i.e. how can human consciousness, which is 
 a product of consciousness in general, be made 
 to coincide with its principle? This can be done 
 by getting it away from matter, i.e. "by making 
 it transcend itself," and this is possible because 
 "intellect and feehng are of the same nature." So 
 we read, "in order that our consciousness should 
 coincide with something of its principle, it must 
 detach itself from the ready-made and attach itself 
 to the being-made. It needs that, turning back on 
 itself and twisting on itself, the faculty of seeing 
 should be made to be one with the act of willing — 
 a painful effort which we can make suddenly, doing 
 violence to our nature, but cannot sustain more 
 than a few moments" {ib., p. 237). 
 
 Thus in transcending intellect, i.e. getting it out 
 of matter, we also expand intellect, i.e. make it 
 coincide with something of its principle. The ideal 
 state implies a complete expansion which would 
 give "a consciousness as wide as life." This is
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 245 
 
 obtained by amalgamation, for "if the other forms 
 of consciousness," developed on other paths diverg- 
 ing from the Kne of evolution ending in man, "were 
 brought together and amalgamated with the intel- 
 lect, the result would be a consciousness as wide 
 as life. Such a consciousness, turning around 
 suddenly against the push of life it feels behind, 
 would have a fleeting vision of life complete" 
 {ib., Intro., p. xii). 
 
 The difficulty for the reader in this explanation 
 is to locate the "push." On the original hypothesis 
 the "push" is the vital impetus, and is not so 
 "tremendous" after all, for it becomes atrophied 
 and goes to sleep, e.g. in instinct. Also this push 
 comes from behind, for it is a "m a tergo.'' Also 
 the intellect is described as having "its eyes ever 
 turned to the rear," therefore it ought to see some- 
 thing of the "push," for while in its own nature 
 it is a relaxation or "letting go" {ib., p. 161), yet as 
 a matter of fact we are told that "the relaxation 
 is never complete." Strange to say, the intellect 
 does not see the push. The result of the amal- 
 gamation of other forms of consciousness with in- 
 tellect turns the intellect around in the direction 
 of life. In this position of looking forward, intel- 
 lect cannot see the "push," which on hypothesis 
 comes from behind. So it must turn around again 
 and is rewarded with "a fleeting vision." 
 
 Professor Bergson calls the "amalgamation" a 
 "mixture," for, when explaining the nature of re-
 
 246 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 flex and voluntary actions, he says we must mix 
 both so as to get ''the fluid reality which has been 
 precipitated in this twofold form and which prob- 
 ably shares in both without being either" and this 
 fluid is found in the "undifferentiated protoplasmic 
 mass" and is "the original simple activity," but 
 "became diversified through the very construction 
 of mechanisms like those of the spinal cord and 
 the brain" {ib., p. 366). 
 
 While the hints for expanding intellect come from 
 "the vague fringe," yet Professor Bergson says that 
 "the intellect possesses a means by which it can 
 transcend itself," viz. its formal knowledge, for 
 "a form, because empty, may be filled with 'any 
 number of things in turn." But the intellect gives 
 us only abstract knowledge, i.e. snapshot views of 
 duration, whereas intuition gives us concrete knowl- 
 edge, i.e. of the real or duration itself. The intel- 
 lect by its nature is incapable of grasping the real, 
 i.e. duration, and the filling of the forms will only 
 give "snapshot views." No manipulation of ab- 
 stract forms filled with abstract knowledge, i.e. 
 "events detached from the living whole" {ib., 
 p. 342), will enable us to pass from the ab- 
 stract to the concrete, as is Professor Bergson's 
 aim, when no element of the concrete, i.e. dura- 
 tion, by hypothesis enters into this abstract 
 knowledge. 
 
 The result of the process is, from Professor 
 Bergson's point of view, twofold. First we have
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 247 
 
 the true reconciliation of Science and Philosophy, 
 inasmuch as Philosophy or Metaphysics is pre- 
 sented as "the true continuation of science" {ib., p. 
 371). Science, the work of intellect, deahng with 
 the surface of things and engrossed with practical 
 results, directs our action on things, i.e. gives a 
 workable knowledge useful for the actual needs of 
 practical Ufe. Philosophy, calhng upon intellect 
 "to renounce its most cherished habits" and 
 "certain natural aspirations," seizes "the vague 
 fleeting intuitions, in order to sustain, expand and 
 unite them together." The knowledge it gives 
 "is practically useless," it "will not extend our 
 empire over nature," but it possesses "reahty 
 itself" {ib., pp. 342, 343). The second result is that 
 Philosophy, in grasping what is below the surface 
 of things, enables us to judge the value of intel- 
 lectual knowledge, and in expanding intellect into 
 a consciousness as wide as life, becomes "an effort 
 to dissolve again into the whole" {ib., -p. igi), which 
 is Duration, "the unceasing creation of new and 
 unforeseeable forms" {ib., p. 239). 
 
 III. Criticism 
 
 In criticising the theory of Knowledge set forth in 
 Creative Evolution we premise by observing that, 
 although Professor Bergson writes philosophy in 
 the French language, yet he is not a French phi- 
 losopher. The characteristic trait of the French
 
 248 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 mind is clearness of thought and lucidity of expres- 
 sion. 
 
 Creative Evolution includes "a, certain concep- 
 tion of knowledge, also a certain metaphysics, 
 both of which imply each other" {ib., p. 185). Now 
 the metaphysics, i.e. the theory of Life, is radically 
 erroneous, and as this is the basis of the theory of 
 Knowledge, the latter falls with the former. 
 
 In the theory of Knowledge ''science and meta- 
 physics are two opposed but complementary ways 
 of Knowing" {ib., p. 344) in the sense that ''each of 
 these two lines of thought leads to the other; they 
 form a circle and there can be no centre to the 
 circle but the empirical study of evolution" {ib., p. 
 179). But the evolution described is fundamentally 
 erroneous. Therefore there is no centre to the 
 circle and consequently no circle. Besides, the 
 knowledge which intellect and science possess is 
 an abstract artificial mechanical construction of 
 reahty. On hypothesis they do not grasp reality 
 itself, i.e. Duration. Intuition alone is supposed 
 to reach reality and the knowledge of intuition 
 consists in "vague fleeting visions" of a vague 
 feeling. But this is Sceptical Idealism with a 
 vague feeling as the only avenue of escape. 
 
 This conclusion is strengthened when we bear 
 in mind that the working-hypothesis, so dear to 
 Pragmatists, is extended by Professor Bergson to 
 include not only the operations of the intellect but 
 the very nature and construction of the intellect.
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 249 
 
 So intellectual knowledge by its very nature is 
 abstract, artificial and hypothetical. In fact Pro- 
 fessor Bergson admits that "our habitual manner of 
 speaking, which is fashioned after our habitual 
 manner of thinking, leads us to actual logical 
 deadlocks. But," he adds, "we are not anxious 
 because we feel confusedly that we can always get 
 out of them: all we have to do is to give up the 
 cinematographical habits of our intellect" or "re- 
 vise the bent of our intellectual habits" or "make 
 complete abstraction of the mechanism," i.e. 
 change the nature of the intellect by "abstraction" 
 or by "installing yourself within change" {ih., pp. 
 308, 314). But this is easier said than done as 
 the reader understands upon recalling the means 
 proposed to transcend the intellect. 
 
 Furthermore in defining the intellect as a mech- 
 anism and in describing its working by the mechan- 
 ism of moving pictures Professor Bergson reveals 
 the basic error in his theory of Knowledge, i.e. he 
 confounds intellect with imagination. A classic 
 illustration in Scholastic Philosophy is to compare 
 the imagination to a canvas on which the impres- 
 sions of the senses and the ideas of the intellect 
 are pictured. But the picturing canvas is not all 
 there is to the mental operation. Together with 
 the pictures is the eye of the intellect which sees, 
 criticises, analyzes, compares and reasons on them. 
 So Professor Bergson omits the most important 
 element, viz. the intellect, without which, in fact,
 
 250 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 he could not see the pictures. Thus, whereas the 
 imagination is compared to the pictures, the intel- 
 lect is compared to the audience. Therefore, 
 according to Professor Bergson, we have on suppo- 
 sition a moving picture show, but no one present 
 to say whether the movies are there or not, and no 
 one to tell what the pictures were, not even an 
 operator, for he expressly teaches "there are no 
 things, only tendencies" and things are artificial 
 "cut-outs" from Duration, so the operator would 
 be, in his hypothesis, a part of the moving pictures, 
 not distinct from them. 
 
 Finally, Professor Bergson confounds intellect 
 with imagination, because he confounds the image 
 with the idea. Thus he says that "the idea is 
 the stable view taken of the instability of things" 
 and is the "quality" or "form," "which is a moment 
 of becoming," or "the intention, which is nothing 
 else than the material design, traced out and con- 
 templated beforehand, of the action accomplished," 
 or "the essence, which is the mean form (i.e. 
 image) above and below which the other forms 
 are arranged as alterations of the mean." These 
 ideas or images are "cut out of duration, pure 
 abstractions of the moving reality, snapshots 
 taken at intervals of the flowing, relative to the 
 mind that takes them, and have no independent 
 existence." "These forms the mind isolates and 
 stores up in concepts; their intellectual equivalent 
 is artificial and symbolical" {ib., pp. 315, 317).
 
 PRAGMATISM AND CREATIVE EVOLUTION 251 
 
 Hence in representing the idea as a detached image 
 of a moving reality, i.e. Duration, Professor Berg- 
 son naturally appealed to the cinematograph as the 
 best illustration of the nature and operation of the 
 intellect. Therefore, in the last analysis Creative 
 Evoluton is based on an erroneous conception of 
 the idea, the most fundamental and apparently the 
 simplest element in mental life.
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 
 
 The preceding studies of Pragmatism as set 
 forth and developed along various lines by its 
 principal exponents, show clearly that the constit- 
 uent elements of the system are Idealism, Evolution 
 and a Theory of Mental Life. Idealism is the basic 
 element; Evolution is the integrating element and 
 the Mental Theory may be called the formative 
 element inasmuch as it gives to Pragmatism a 
 peculiar form and character. These three prob- 
 lems, therefore, present a well-defined issue to 
 point out the attitude of Scholasticism toward the 
 latest modern school of philosophic thought. 
 
 I. Perception of External Things 
 
 Some forms of Pragmatism, e.g. the systems elab- 
 orated by Professor Royce and Professor Bergson, 
 teach a Pantheistic Idealism of Manifestation. 
 But this Idealism is a part of their peculiar meta- 
 physics and cannot be regarded as characteristic 
 of Pragmatism properly so called. 
 
 The Idealism which is distinctive of the system 
 itself and which forms the basic element common 
 to all of its exponents, including Professor Royce
 
 PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 253 
 
 and Professor Bergson, is the Idealism which is con- 
 nected with the perception of external things. This 
 Idealism is called the Phenomenal Idealism of 
 Sensism or Mediate Perception. Thus Pragmatism 
 teaches that the perception of external things is 
 not the perception of the things themselves, but the 
 perception of our ideas of the things or the percep- 
 tion of our feelings about things, so that, to reach 
 the things, reasoning or induction is required. 
 Hence thought is concerned directly and primarily 
 with modifications or sensations purely subjective. 
 The result is a Sense-Idealism. And as these 
 sensations are viewed as means by which through 
 reasoning we attain the knowledge of things, we 
 have Mediate or Indirect Perception. In the last 
 analysis this doctrine is a form or rather the fun- 
 damental principle of Agnosticism, for external 
 things are really the unknown cause of our sensa- 
 tions and the ego is the unknown recipient, for 
 Pragmatism does not admit a soul and regards the 
 ego as the resultant of our activities or as present 
 knowledge personified. 
 
 On this point the issue between Scholastic Phi- 
 losophy and Pragmatism is clear and marked. 
 Scholastic Philosophy rejects Mediate Perception 
 as a fundamental psychological error, and main- 
 tains the doctrine of Immediate Perception, i.e. 
 we directly and immediately know existing things 
 themselves. This doctrine of the Immediate Percep- 
 tion of bodies by the external senses is a primitive
 
 254 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 fact clearly attested by consciousness, confirmed by 
 common teaching embodying the experience of the 
 whole human race, viz. that we see with the eyes, 
 hear with the ears, touch with the hands, taste 
 with the tongue and palate, smell with the nose, 
 and that what we see, hear, etc. are things inde- 
 pendent of us in their existence and activities. 
 This primitive fact and the Scholastic theory based 
 upon it are simple and natural, not forced or 
 artificial. 
 
 Scholastic Philosophy holds that, for the per- 
 ception of external objects, three conditions are 
 necessary: a subject perceiving, which it teaches is 
 not the soul only, nor the sense-organ only, but the 
 animated organ or organism, i.e. the conscious 
 living human being, an object perceived and a con- 
 tact or union of the subject and object. This 
 contact or union consists in the action of the object 
 on the sense-organ. 
 
 The most elementary psychological observation 
 tells us that we are in incessant contact with 
 external agents of nature which in their impres- 
 sions upon us make us aware of their actions and 
 of themselves. Sometimes these agents which 
 come into contact with us are the external bodies 
 themselves, as e.g. in the sense of touch. In the 
 other senses we grasp the vibrations of the air or 
 ether resulting from the actions of the bodies. In 
 both cases we directly and immediately perceive 
 objects and their activities external to us. There
 
 PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 255 
 
 is no intermediary between the external object and 
 the sense-organ other than the action of the exter- 
 nal object upon the organ of sense. In this action 
 the contact consists and is described as a union of 
 the object perceived with the subject perceiving. 
 
 St. Thomas Aquinas explains this contact or 
 union by the famiHar illustration of a seal ring 
 impressed in wax. The act of impressing the ring 
 in the wax leaves upon the wax the impressed 
 likeness of the ring. In like manner the contact 
 of the object with the organ leaves an impressed 
 likeness of the object upon the organ according to 
 the specific nature of the organ, whether it be sight, 
 hearing, smell, taste or touch. This impressed 
 likeness is called the species impressa. The result 
 of the impression is the conscious reaction of the 
 sense-organ to the object or agent making the 
 impression. This conscious reaction is the percep- 
 tion of the object, just as the wax, if conscious, 
 would react to the impression of the ring and so 
 would perceive the ring making the impression 
 upon itself. The sentient subject perceives the 
 object therefore, and in so doing, expresses in the 
 imagination a likeness of the object perceived. 
 The conscious expressed likeness of the object 
 perceived made by and in the reaction of the sen- 
 tient subject to the impression is called the species 
 expressa, i.e. the expressed likeness of the object 
 perceived, or the image of the object. Hence the 
 species impressa, i.e. the impressed likeness of the
 
 256 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 object on the organ of sense, is not what is per- 
 ceived in the act of sense cognition, but is the 
 disposing or determining cause by which the organ 
 is placed in sentient contact or union with the 
 object perceived. For example, in the case of 
 sight the sentient contact of the organ with the 
 object is effected by and in the impressed likeness 
 of the object upon the retina, so that an eye without 
 the retina could not see the object because it could 
 not be placed in the sentient contact with the object 
 which is necessary for the sense of sight. But the 
 particular impressed likeness is not what we see; 
 it is in itself a quaHtative modification of the retina 
 and as such is the cause which disposes or deter- 
 mines the eye to the act of seeing, and what we see 
 is the object or agent making the impression. As 
 a necessary modification determining the organ to 
 the act, e.g. of seeing, the species impressa co- 
 operates with the organ antecedently to the act 
 itself and so cannot be considered as an inter- 
 mediary between the act and the object. Like- 
 wise the species expressa or the expressed image 
 of the object is not what is perceived nor is it an 
 intermediary between the organ and the object, 
 for it is the result of the whole process, inasmuch 
 as it is the expressed likeness of the perception itself 
 and thus follows on the perception. 
 
 From the illustrations of the impression on the 
 retina and of the action of the ring on the wax it is 
 clear that the impression of the ring on the wax or
 
 PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 257 
 
 of the object on the retina, i.e. the species impressa, 
 is the one same individual act with the reception 
 of the impression. It is the same indivisible act 
 which the one gives and the other receives. The 
 act therefore is common to both; the giving and 
 receiving is the same act having different relations, 
 i.e. to the agent and to the recipient. As the act 
 of sensation is a conscious act, consciousness grasps 
 the twofold element of the not-me and the me in 
 the one indivisible act: of the not-me as something 
 from without producing the impression and of the 
 me as receiving the impression. It thus perceives 
 the not-me and the me as distinct and exclusive one 
 of the other. Thus e.g. I touch an object which 
 resists; in this one indivisible act I am in contact 
 with or united to the object; in the tactile percep- 
 tion, I am immediately conscious of the not-me 
 and the me known together and known in mutual 
 opposition; I am conscious of two existences by 
 the same indivisible intuition. Thus consciousness 
 gives, as an ultimate fact, a primitive duality, an 
 original antithesis. Hence in every act of sensation 
 we have a twofold knowledge, external, i.e. of the 
 not-m^, and internal and subjective, i.e. of the me. 
 Now the sentient organ is in its nature indetermi- 
 nate, i.e. it cannot determine itself by itself to per- 
 ceive this or that object. The determination which 
 disposes it to the act of perception comes from the 
 action upon it of the external object. Hence the 
 sentient subject is conscious primarily of the ob-
 
 258 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 ject impressing it, i.e. of the external knowledge. 
 Herbert Spencer admits this fact, for he teaches that 
 the external knowledge precedes the internal knowl- 
 edge of our sensations {Psychology,^ II, p. 369). 
 Hence the world is not the unknown cause of our 
 sensations, nor are our sensations confined to internal 
 subjective ideas, feelings or states. Sense-perception 
 consists in the operations of external bodies on the 
 sense-organs. These bodies acting upon us we 
 directly and immediately perceive. 
 
 The error of Pragmatism is that it neglects the 
 distinction between the external knowledge, i.e. 
 of the object impressing us, and the internal knowl- 
 edge, i.e. of the subject modified; or rather it denies 
 the former, and holds the latter to be the only 
 knowledge. Yet the distinction is experimental. 
 The external knowledge is representative ; the in- 
 ternal is affective. The former is prior to the latter. 
 Again their objects are different : the internal knowl- 
 edge consists in noting the subjective modifications 
 of the me, i.e. the effect of the action on me; the 
 external knowledge embraces the extended, lumi- 
 nous actions which have modified the me, i.e. the 
 cause or agent of the subjective feehngs. Besides, 
 they accompany or succeed each other in inverse 
 ratio; one gains in strength and precision what 
 the other loses, i.e. the stronger the organic im- 
 pression, the more obscure is the external perception 
 and vice versa, as, e.g. a fight too brilKant prevents 
 1 Ed., N.Y., 1877.
 
 PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 259 
 
 me from seeing the object and causes pain to the 
 eyes. 
 
 Furthermore, in the normal act of sense-percep- 
 tion it is the determining cause or external agent 
 which we primarily and directly grasp. Pragma- 
 tism holds that we primarily and directly perceive 
 the subjective element, that we ought to project 
 these subjective feelings without us and then cor- 
 rect them by reasoning. But, in fact, this never 
 takes place and besides is clearly impossible. 
 Finally, the same external cause can produce dif- 
 ferent effects, e.g. pain or pleasure, and in very 
 variable degrees according to temperament, habits 
 and dispositions. 
 
 Thus the objective element is clearly grasped 
 and distinguished from the subjective element, 
 as elementary consciousness testifies. Therefore, 
 Scholastic Philosophy holds that the world is not 
 the unknown cause of our sensation, that what we 
 perceive in the act of sense-perception is not the 
 subjective feeling only, but primarily the external 
 bodies acting upon our sense-organs; and in this 
 teaching confirms the knowledge of common-sense 
 as well as furnishes a sure basis for the edifice of 
 the experimental sciences. 
 
 II. Evolution 
 
 The integrating element of Pragmatism is Evolu- 
 tion. This element is essential to all its forms, but
 
 26o PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 takes on local color from the subject-matter and 
 special aim of the writers. As regards Evolution, 
 Scholastic Philosophy is at direct issue with Prag- 
 matism. 
 
 First of all, Scholastic Philosophy teaches that 
 Evolution is based upon a simple fact of ordinary 
 daily experience, viz. the fact of growth. It teaches 
 that growth is a law of Hfe; that every living being, 
 inasmuch as it lives, grows. Jesus refers to this law 
 in the Gospels, e.g. the parable of the sower; a 
 classic phrase in Christian asceticism is "growth in 
 holiness"; and Cardinal Newman in the Essay on 
 Development of Doctrine applies the law to the 
 teachings of the Christian reHgion. But living 
 beings do not grow in the same way; their specific 
 nature influences their development, as ordinary 
 experience shows. The study of the nature and de- 
 velopment of Hving beings in the world around us 
 is the special object of the Natural Sciences. Thus 
 Botany deals with the laws which govern the de- 
 velopment of plant-life. These laws differ from the 
 laws which guide the growth of the human body, 
 as set forth in Physiology, and these in turn differ 
 from the laws of mental development, whose special 
 object is Psychology. Now Evolution is not con- 
 cerned with the laws of growth as observed in the 
 individual or in individuals of the same species. 
 It goes much farther and strives to show the origin 
 of species by maintaining that species grow out of 
 or develop from other species, which in turn de-
 
 PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 261 
 
 velop from others until we reach the beginnings 
 of life. As such, Evolution appears in a twofold 
 form: a scientific hypothesis and a philosophical 
 speculation. 
 
 As a scientific hypothesis, Evolution investigates 
 the genetic relations of systematic species, genera 
 and families and endeavors to arrange them accord- 
 ing to natural series of descent. It strives to prove 
 the descent of present from extinct species and thus 
 is opposed to the constancy or immutability of 
 species. It is not concerned with the origin of life, 
 nor with the act of creation. The attitude which 
 Scholastic philosophers hold to scientific Evolu- 
 tion is twofold: as to principle and as to fact. 
 
 As to the principle, Scholastic Philosophy teaches 
 that ultimately all organisms owe their existence 
 to the Creator, as is set forth in the Biblical account 
 of creation, that the concrete how does not enter 
 into the proposition of faith regarding creation, 
 with the exception of the human soul which, being 
 spiritual in its nature, cannot be transmitted 
 through matter, but requires the creative act. 
 Since, therefore, there is no objection, as far as 
 Catholic faith is concerned, to assuming the descent 
 of all plant and animal species from a few original 
 forms, the question resolves itself into one of fact. 
 
 As to fact, Scholastic writers hold that the scien- 
 tific hypothesis of Evolution is still only a hypothe- 
 sis. By the scientific hypothesis is here understood 
 the general theory regarding the fact of Evolution
 
 262 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 as distinguished from the special theories advanced 
 to explain the general fact of Evolution by an appeal 
 to special causes, e.g. natural selection, environ- 
 ment. The Darwinian explanation is rejected by- 
 scientists, for its principle of natural selection is 
 considered scientifically inadequate, and its teach- 
 ing of indefinite variability or plasticity of forms is 
 contrary to observed facts, which in general show 
 that both in Hving nature and in geological strata 
 there exist types sharply determined from one 
 another. There is no evidence whatever for the 
 common genetic descent of all animals and plants 
 from a single primitive organism. The greater num- 
 ber of botanists and zoologists regard a polygenetic 
 evolution as much more acceptable than a mono- 
 genetic. It is the task of the future to determine 
 the distinct and independent genetic series. Paleon- 
 tology knows nothing of common primeval forms 
 but points to parallel series whose origin is un- 
 known; has no evidence in favor of spontaneous 
 awakening of life and of the ascending development 
 out of primitive protoplasmic masses up to the Cam- 
 brian era; is silent about successive developments 
 anteceding the rich specific fauna of the Cambrian, 
 and the flora of the Post-Silurian eras; gives no proof 
 in a concrete case for the gradual transformation 
 of one species into another; regards the genesis of 
 angiosperms and of vertebrates as an insoluble 
 problem; gives no information about the early his- 
 tory of mammals; presents the genealogy of the
 
 PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 263 
 
 horse, considered the most striking example of an 
 evolutionary series within a mammalian family 
 as scarcely more than a very moderately supported 
 hypothesis; and knows of no records that point to 
 the relationship between the body of man and that 
 of the anthropoid. 
 
 In like manner the study of existing organisms 
 has, up to the present, given no confirmation of the 
 central idea in modern Evolution theories, viz. pro- 
 gressive specific development. E. Wasmann holds 
 that the formation of new species is directly ob- 
 served in but a few cases and onjy with reference 
 to such forms as are closely related to each other, 
 e.g. in the plant-genus (Enothera and in the beetle- 
 genus Dinarda, but Muckermann denies that these 
 variations are examples of the formation of new 
 specific characters. It is true that there are num- 
 berless analogies between plants and animals, e.g. 
 the cell-division, the method of fertilization and 
 other analogies of structure and function, but no 
 serious scientist would ever dream of explaining 
 these by a common origin. On the failure to con- 
 firm progressive specific development is based the 
 saltatory theory proposed by De Vries in accord 
 with the investigations of Abbot Mendel. In fact, 
 Mendel's Law is the only fact of scientific value 
 in modern Biology. On this law the scientific 
 hypothesis of Evolution now rests and looks to 
 the future for more complete and systematic de- 
 velopment.
 
 264 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 As a philosophical speculation, Evolution is not 
 confined to the genetic history of plants and ani- 
 mals upon our earth but is extended to embrace 
 the history of the solar system and of the universe. 
 Thus it considers the entire history of the cosmos 
 as a harmonious development brought about by 
 natural laws. Philosophical Evolution appears 
 in two principal forms: Anti-Theistic and Theistic. 
 Scholastic Philosophy rejects Anti-Theistic Evolu- 
 tion, because the theory in this form cannot account 
 for the first beginning nor for the law of its evolu- 
 tion, since it denies a Personal Creator andLawgiver; 
 again it supposes spontaneous generation, which 
 contradicts the facts of scientific experimentation, 
 and is built upon baseless assumptions. The fore- 
 most defender of Anti-Theistic Evolution is Ernst 
 Haeckel. But his system rests on unfounded gen- 
 eraUties, is constructed on unscientific methods, 
 e.g. frauds, want of distinction between fact and 
 hypothesis, neglect to correct wrong statements, 
 disregard of facts not agreeing with his a priori 
 conceptions, ignorance of history, physics and 
 modern Biology, the use of ridicule when sound 
 arguments fail, and consequently it abounds in 
 numerous errors of every kind. 
 
 The attitude of Scholastic philosophers towards 
 Theistic Evolution is twofold: as to fact and as to 
 principle. As to fact, Scholastic Philosophy seeks 
 in the Natural Sciences for the laws which govern 
 the development of the universe. As to principle it
 
 PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 265 
 
 is not opposed to the Theistic conception. For the 
 principle which guides Scholastic Philosophy in the 
 interpretation of nature is threefold: (a) All things 
 in their existence and nature are referred to God 
 as to their principle and ultimate cause. "In the 
 beginning God created heaven and earth" (Gen. i). 
 (b) Created things in relation to God are termed 
 secondary causes, yet they possess true causal 
 efficiency in virtue of their own proper nature, and 
 in proportion to the exercise of their true causal 
 activities the order and harmony immanent in 
 nature unfolds before our eyes. Thus St. Augus- 
 tine writes, "God governs all things which He has 
 created in such a way that He permits them to 
 exercise and develop their own proper activities" 
 {The City of God, VII, c. 30). And St. Thomas 
 says, "The more potent the cause is, the more po- 
 tent is its efhciency in the sense that its potency 
 is extended to produce more effects" {Of God and 
 His Creatures, tr. by Father Rickaby, S.J., II, c. 
 16), and "since therefore the efficiency of divine 
 providence is the very greatest, it ought to extend its 
 activity through certain means so as to reach the 
 most remote things" {ib., Ill, c. 77). (c) As a cor- 
 ollary Suarez expresses the principle, "God does 
 not interfere directly with the natural order, where 
 secondary causes suffice to produce the intended 
 effect" {De opere sex dierum, II, c. x, n. 13). Thus 
 the power and wisdom of God is not lessened, but 
 is rather enhanced in the production of the universe
 
 266 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 by a single creative act of His will and in its natural 
 development according to laws implanted in it by 
 this creative act. 
 
 But when we pass from the philosophical theory 
 of Evolution considered in itself or in the abstract, 
 i.e. apart from any actual formulation of the theory 
 as found in any existing philosophical system, and 
 take up the consideration of the evolution theory as 
 presented by Pragmatic writers, it is evident from the 
 foregoing pages that Pragmatic evolution is directly 
 opposed to the teaching of Scholastic Philosophy. 
 
 In the first place Pragmatism does not accept God 
 in the Christian meaning of the term. Empiric 
 Pragmatism in fact does not deal with the existence 
 of God, but postulates belief in God if, and in so far 
 as, that belief may be useful to the individual. Ab- 
 solute Pragmatism views God as the extension or 
 integration of human consciousness. God therefore 
 is the product of the human and the human blends 
 into the divine. Creative Evolution likewise is Pan- 
 theistic. Instead of the Personal Creator and Ruler 
 of Scholastic Philosophy we are presented with a 
 caricature of the Almighty. The Absolute appears 
 as a tendency dividing into opposite tendencies, one of 
 which endeavors to overcome the other, and in the 
 endeavor is described as being fed with solar energy 
 as Hmited and dependent. Life and Spirit differ from 
 matter and intellect not in nature but only as counter 
 tendencies. Intellect is configured to matter. 
 
 In describing the evolution process, Empiric
 
 PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 267 
 Pragmatism uses biological terms and with Meta- 
 
 .i;jv L -i 
 
 ERRATUM 
 
 Page 267, line 3, for science read sense. 
 III. Theory of Mental Life 
 
 Pragmatism does not admit the existence of the 
 soul. Hence its Psychology is a Phenomenal Psy- 
 chology, i.e. a Psychology without a soul. It ex- 
 plains the unity of mental life by ''the judging 
 thought," by "present knowledge," by "conscious- 
 ness" or by "the unity of the organism." Thus its 
 explanation is either purely physiological or con- 
 sists in personifying "the unity of apperception," 
 which it takes for granted without the slightest 
 attempt to account for this unity. 
 
 In direct opposition to this teaching Scholastic 
 Philosophy proposes as the basic doctrine of its 
 psychology the existence of a simple spiritual 
 principle in man which it calls the soul. In proof 
 it appeals to the most elemental facts of conscious 
 experience. The most superficial analysis of con- 
 scious Hfe reveals two primary facts: (a) Changes 
 and modifications of thought and feeling, ever vary- 
 ing and ever succeeding one another like a "flow- 
 ing stream"; {b) An active, permanent, substantial 
 basis of these changes and modifications. This 
 second element explains the unity of consciousness, 
 the fact of personal identity and the possibiUty 
 of memory. Without this permanent element and
 
 268 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 its ever-varying modifications, I would not be able 
 to recognize states of consciousness as "states," i.e. 
 in the plural; there would be no past or future, 
 consciousness would be merely a "state," i.e. in 
 the singular, and not a "stream"; nor could I 
 remember the incidents of my life so as to write, 
 e.g. an autobiography, or make an examination of 
 conscience on the actions of the day, or remember 
 what I did a moment ago, or recall the last sen- 
 tence I wrote; nor would I be aware that I who now 
 am writing, am the same person who yesterday 
 paid a visit to a friend, who during the past years 
 lived in such and such places, went to such a school 
 or college or university. The past would be a com- 
 plete blank and, far from entering into the present, 
 would instantly disappear into the unknown. To 
 personify the "present knowledge" or the "present 
 state of consciousness" or "the unity of appercep- 
 tion" is to recognize the active permanent element 
 in conscious life, but not to explain it (cf. Christian 
 Philosophy J The Soul, ch. i). 
 
 In explaining the contents of mental life, i.e. 
 knowledge, the attitude of Scholastic Philosophy 
 to Pragmatism is also clear and well defined. By 
 knowledge or thought Pragmatism understands 
 sense-experience as such and this experience re- 
 fined or modified under the influence of "mind." 
 This refined sense-experience is called "thought" 
 or with Professor Bergson "feeling." Hence thought 
 is of the same nature as sense-experience. Now
 
 PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 269 
 
 Scholastic Philosophy teaches that we have two dis- 
 tinct elements in knowledge, viz. sense-experience, 
 and a higher element, viz. thought, and that the 
 knowledge of sense is essentially different from the 
 knowledge of thought. For proof it appeals to ele- 
 mentary facts of consciousness. 
 
 It is evident to any one who carefully analyzes 
 the facts of the conscious life that the act of sense 
 is totally different from the act of intellect. The 
 object of sense is concrete, singular, individual, i.e. 
 a particular, determined concrete individual thing. 
 We perceive it as this something, here and now, 
 limited by the material determinations of color, 
 size and form. Hence a sensation is quantitative, 
 has extension, can be measured, e.g. in intensity, 
 and localized, e.g. in a sense-organ or in a definite 
 part of the brain. 
 
 The object of intellect, on the contrary, is ab- 
 stract, unextended and immaterial. We have ideas 
 which cannot be referred to a bodily organ. They 
 move on a plane above sense and belong to an 
 order of entities which have nothing in common 
 with sense. We have the conception of God; we 
 speak of His infinity, power, mercy, holiness. Yet 
 these notions cannot be confined within the limits 
 of sense. Ideals of the true, beautiful and good, 
 notions of right and wrong, first principles, in fact 
 the constructive elements and framework of the 
 sciences, of the arts, industry and commerce, have 
 nothing in common with the operation of sense.
 
 270 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 Not only does intellect possess objects which 
 cannot be confined within the representations of 
 the senses, but intellect and sense act in a man- 
 ner totally different when brought in contact with 
 material things. Thus e.g. the sense shows the 
 "round object," the intellect directly and prima- 
 rily grasps the ''roundness"; the sense presents the 
 "moving object," the intellect seizes the "move- 
 ment." Thus while the particular data of our 
 knowledge come from the senses, the intellect 
 grasps these data in an immaterial manner. Hence 
 besides sense-knowledge we have a higher knowl- 
 edge essentially distinct. The higher knowledge 
 has three indissoluble elements: idea, judgment, 
 reasoning; the idea is the basic element. 
 
 Scholastic Philosophy teaches that the intellect 
 is indeterminate, i.e. has no separate forms or ideas, 
 as Plato held, by which it determines itself by itself 
 to the knowledge of definite objects. Hence like 
 the senses it is ultimately indeterminate and re- 
 quires determination from without with this differ- 
 ence that external bodies in contact with the organ 
 of sense determine the act of sensation, whereas 
 the act of sensation awakens, so to speak, the in- 
 tellect which throws its light on the object and by 
 this illumined object is determined to elicit its 
 acts of thought. Hence the act of sensation is 
 analogous to the act of thought. The intellectual 
 determinant is the intellectual species impressa and 
 is not the object perceived but only the determining
 
 PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 271 
 
 cause. Hence the act of knowing is not the act of 
 the object alone nor the act of the subject alone, but 
 the act of subject in so far as it is impressed, ac- 
 tualized, differentiated by the object. The intellect 
 consciously reacts to the determination, and the 
 intellectual expression of the conscious intellectual 
 reaction is the idea or concept, i.e. verbum mentis, 
 the mental word, which takes outward expression 
 in language. 
 
 Hence sense-knowledge is had by contact of the 
 external object with the organ of sense, which con- 
 tact consists in the impression made by the object 
 upon the sense-organ, and intellectual knowledge is 
 had by contact of the external object with the intel- 
 lect, effected by and in the act of sensation. In 
 both cases we directly and immediately perceive 
 the object or agent making the impression, i.e. com- 
 ing in contact with the sense and the intellect, not 
 the how of the impression or contact. In reflective 
 thought the mind may study and analyze and men- 
 tally separate the how and prepare an explanation 
 for the simple indivisible act of contact, as e.g. in 
 the sciences of Logic and of Psychology. In ordi- 
 nary daily life, however, we are conscious that our 
 senses and intellect are in direct contact with 
 things; we are not concerned with the how; in fact 
 never think about it. For example, I strike my 
 foot against a solid object or I burn the tip of my 
 finger; directly and immediately I am conscious of 
 the resistance to the foot and of a hot object burn-
 
 272 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 ing the finger. The anatomist and physiologist by 
 his knowledge of the nervous system may be able 
 to designate the particular nerves which carried the 
 impressions from the foot and the hand to the 
 common sensory in the brain and thus explain 
 the process. But this scientific knowledge does 
 not change the direct perception of the objects. 
 Again I talk to a friend through the telephone or 
 I send him a message on the telegraph wire. What 
 we are directly conscious of is the fact that we are 
 in direct contact with another: I giving, he receiv- 
 ing the message. We do not advert to the wires, 
 poles and keyboards as instruments of the contact, 
 although afterwards upon reflection we may and do 
 recognize them as such. 
 
 While the senses and the intellect are in direct 
 contact with external things, yet the contact of 
 sense is different in nature from the contact of in- 
 tellect. The contact of sense exhibits the external 
 object to the sense as a sense-object, i.e. as extended, 
 figured, sonorous, luminous, etc. The contact of 
 intellect, however, exhibits the external object as 
 an intelligible, and so the intellect seeks its nature, 
 meaning, relation to the objects known, its causes 
 and effects. 
 
 In illustration we appeal to language for language 
 in the expression of thought, and Comparative 
 Philology reveals the structure of language itself. 
 Place a strange object before the eyes of a child 
 and the question spontaneously comes: What is
 
 PRAGMATISM AND SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 273 
 
 that? Thus directly and immediately the mind 
 seeks the whatness of that particular thing. The 
 answer to the question is: That is such or such 
 a thing. The terms are reversed: The subject of 
 the interrogative sentence becomes the predicate 
 of the declarative sentence and the predicate of 
 the interrogative becomes the subject of the de- 
 clarative sentence. The predicate of the declarative 
 sentence explains the meaning and nature of the 
 subject. This predicate is a universal idea, because 
 in giving the nature or meaning of this particular 
 subject, it can also be used as a predicate in many 
 more sentences having different individual sub- 
 jects which nevertheless have the same nature or 
 meaning. Thus language shows how the intellect 
 acts, how in asking and defining the whatness it 
 directly and immediately grasps the universal, 
 and how in seeking the whatness of a particular 
 thing or in applying the whatness to a particular 
 thing it grasps the particular thing also, in a kind 
 of indirect manner. 
 
 By virtue of the union of soul and body in our 
 human composite existent being, intellect and sense 
 always accompany each other; the intellect takes 
 its own immediate object ultimately from sense- 
 experience, but the object is superior to the object 
 of sense-experience. Hence there is no idea without 
 an image of some kind. The idea evokes the image 
 and vice versa. But they are not thereby to be 
 confused or confounded one with the other. The
 
 274 PRAGMATISM AND THE IDEA 
 
 image is the representation on the imagination of 
 a concrete object in a concrete material manner, 
 i.e. it is a picture exact or approximate of the ob- 
 ject. Hence it is concrete and particular. The idea, 
 however, expresses the meaning or definition of the 
 image and as such is universal and can be applied 
 to a number of particular images of the same nature. 
 In direct thought the object of the intellect is ex- 
 ternal things; in reflective thought, however, what 
 we see before the mind's eye are express or ap- 
 proximate or analogous images of the things we 
 are thinking about. When we think of concrete 
 things we can image things expressly. But when 
 we think of immaterial or of spiritual things we 
 must use analogies, signs or symbols. Hence signs 
 or symbols do not refer to the idea but to the imaged 
 picture of the idea. Their very use shows how vast 
 is the difference between the idea and the image 
 and how the intellect reaches out far above and 
 beyond the concrete representations of sense.
 
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