ON SOME OF 
 
 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF BELIEF 
 SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS. 
 
Cambrfoge: 
 
 PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A. 
 AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 
ON SOME OF THE 
 CHARACTERISTICS OF BELIEF 
 
 SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS 
 
 BEING THE HULSEAN LECTURES FOR 1869. 
 
 BY 
 
 J. VENN, M.A. 
 
 FELLOW AND LECTURER OF GONVILLE AND CAIC8 COLLEGE 
 
 CAMBRIDGE. 
 
 - 
 
 
 r/v<v > 
 
 Uonfcon anb OTambrilrge: 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 
 1870. 
 
 [All Rights reserved.} 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 THE following discourses are intended to illus- 
 trate, explain, and work out into some of their 
 consequences, certain characteristics by which the 
 attainment of religious belief is prominently distin- 
 guished from the attainment of belief upon most 
 other subjects. These characteristics consist in the 
 multiplicity of the sources from which the evidence 
 for religious belief is derived, and the fact that our 
 emotions contribute their share towards producing 
 conviction. 
 
 These are facts which, it need hardly be re- 
 marked, have been perpetually noticed before, but I 
 have never met with any attempt to show their full 
 significance, or to work out the inferences which 
 follow from the admission of their existence. 
 
 As there are several questions which will very 
 likely be suggested, and which the necessary brevity 
 of spoken discourses prevented me from discussing at 
 the time, they may conveniently be anticipated here. 
 
 I have avoided, as far as was possible, commit- 
 
vi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ting myself to the doctrines of any particular phi- 
 losophical school. The method of treatment here 
 adopted is logical and not metaphysical, and on the 
 field of logic, as a great authority has told us, people 
 of the most opposite schools may meet and shake 
 hands. Of course, however, there must be some ex- 
 treme views with which one cannot but be in hopeless 
 antagonism. For example, on the theological side, 
 those who range towards the Mystic pole, and hold 
 that we must have an immediate inspiration or reve- 
 lation of religious truth, will naturally resent any 
 attempt to connect our belief so closely as is here 
 done with evidence. Again, on the philosophical 
 side, those who assert that anything in the nature 
 of a miracle is intrinsically impossible, or that from 
 the nature of the human faculties we cannot con- 
 ceive, or therefore to any effective purpose believe 
 in, a God, will certainly reject the attempt to support 
 a doctrine by many converging threads, when in 
 their opinion not one of these threads is really at- 
 tached to any such object as that which they are 
 intended to support. But except in the compara- 
 tively rare cases in which any one's first principles 
 thus put an insuperable bar even to the discussion 
 of such questions as those which follow, it will be 
 admitted that religious conviction is at any rate in 
 great part a matter of evidence : if therefore the 
 effective force of this evidence is found to be vari- 
 
INTRODUCTION. Vii 
 
 able, it seems a point of some importance to make 
 out the explanation of such a fact. 
 
 It has just been remarked that belief is treated 
 in the following pages as being founded solely upon 
 evidence, with the implication that in the thoughtful 
 and sound-minded it is rightfully so founded. This 
 will probably prompt the enquiry, What then do you 
 make of faith f surely it is hardly in accordance 
 with the usage or the teaching of Scripture to make 
 faith little more than an intellectual state, as it must 
 be if it is founded solely upon evidence ? The con- 
 troversy whether faith belongs to the head or the 
 heart is far too ancient and extensive to be lightly 
 revived ; I wish therefore to do no more than ex- 
 press my own view, and this simply for the sake of 
 preventing misapprehension. Faith then, as I un- 
 derstand it, is belief and something more ; the some- 
 thing more being a moral element, namely, confidence 
 or love towards God and our Saviour. In so far as 
 it consists of belief (and it is with this element only, 
 let it be remembered, that we are here concerned) I 
 cannot perceive that it differs in any material way 
 from belief on any other topic whatever. Does the 
 difference lie in the state of mind itself, or in the 
 way in which belief is produced ? Surely in itself the 
 state of mind is one and the same however it may 
 have been brought about. Without attempting to 
 
viii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 offer .a full definition, we may give a valid description 
 by saying that belief is that state of mind in which 
 we are prepared to act upon the truth of any propo- 
 sition in question. If this account be admitted, the 
 description will apply as well to belief in any scien- 
 tific statement as to that in the articles of a Creed. 
 Again, does the difference lie in the grounds of the 
 belief? Not if we lay down the sufficiently general 
 statement that the belief is caused, or should be 
 caused, by evidence. I am quite aware that Bishop 
 Pearson and others try to establish a difference in 
 4he nature of the evidence, saying that Christian 
 belief is distinguished from other kinds of belief by 
 the fact that it rests upon the testimony of God. 
 But what is gained by such a distinction, beyond the 
 occasional opportunity of charging our opponent 
 with disbelieving what God has asserted ? Surely 
 no one denies that the testimony of our Creator is 
 to be accepted without hesitation ; the only matter 
 for discussion is whether a doctrine does rest on that 
 testimony or not. This would equally apply to those 
 who deny the paramount authority of Scripture as to 
 any others ; with them the words of the Bible are 
 not the immediate declaration of God, and they 
 therefore do not undertake to deny what He has 
 asserted. 
 
 I apprehend, therefore, that the belief element 
 of faith does not essentially differ from any other 
 
INTRODUCTION. ix 
 
 act of belief. If this be not the case, one can only 
 remark that we stand sorely in need of a Christian 
 appendix to our familiar works on Psychology and 
 Logic ; and that none of our most devout and ortho- 
 dox Philosophers, such as Butler, Berkeley, and 
 Chalmers, have made any real attempt to supply 
 the deficiency or shown that they believed that it 
 existed. 
 
 The two objections with the statement of which 
 the first Lecture commences are, I apprehend, a sub- 
 ject of perplexity to many. This is more particu- 
 larly the case with the former one, namely, that 
 which lays the stress upon the vagueness and vari- 
 ability of religious convictions. When we have to 
 deal with distinct differences which could be pre- 
 cisely expressed in words, we appear to be at least 
 fighting in the daylight ; but what is to be done 
 when the whole framework of belief, so to say, 
 seems disposed to shift ? To read answers to objec- 
 tions does not seem to bring much profit, the mind 
 appears out of tune for that kind of thing. In 
 olden times the explanation might have been ac- 
 cepted that one was the sport of demons who were 
 practising their temptations unseen. We have aban- 
 doned this supposition now, but too many substitute 
 what, so far as religious truth is concerned, is a far 
 
X INTRODUCTION. 
 
 more potent and malignant enemy. A Psychological 
 answer is readily offered at the present day, which 
 soon turns into a Physiological one, and then where 
 are truth and falsehood ? Instead of fancying grinning 
 apes between our eyes and the pages of Holy Scrip- 
 ture, we say that the nervous system is depressed, or 
 the digestion out of order. It seemed to me there- 
 fore very important to cast about for what may 
 be called a logical explanation, that is to make out 
 that these fluctuations are really connected with evi- 
 dence that has been somehow differently appre- 
 hended. 
 
 With regard to the second of the objections with 
 the statement of which these lectures start. It must 
 be frankly admitted that the explanation does not 
 profess to be conclusive ; I have frequently said during 
 the course of them that it is only meant to palliate 
 and extenuate the difficulty; to claim anything be- 
 yond this would be the grossest presumption. The 
 real mischief of the differences of opinion with w.hich 
 religion is so notoriously infested does not lie so 
 much in these differences themselves, since a very 
 large number of them cannot be considered funda- 
 mental, as in an inference which is very commonly 
 drawn from their existence, viz. that the subject of 
 them is one which proves so intractable by the human 
 mind that it had better be let alone. The complete 
 
INTRODUCTION. xi 
 
 reply to such an inference would of course be found 
 in removing the differences which gave rise to it, but 
 since such a reply implies not merely the being in 
 possession of the truth, but the holding it in such an 
 unmistakeable form that every one will accept it, it 
 would, to say the very least, be the extremity of 
 folly to try in that direction. When a difficulty cannot 
 be removed, the next best thing is to diminish its sig- 
 nificance. This I have attempted to do by suggesting 
 that the cause of these prolonged differences may be 
 assignable to a circumstance already taken account of, 
 namely, that our emotions enter in as part of the 
 premises in the case of religious doctrines. If this be 
 admitted it is a gain in two ways. For one thing 
 it transfers the defect from the object of belief to the 
 evidence in support of it, and so far removes any real 
 hopelessness of ever attaining to a solid conviction. 
 And again, as shown in the second lecture, it opens 
 to us a plausible way of very greatly diminishing the 
 differences. If we were not so thoroughly familiarized 
 with such a state of things there would surely be 
 something little less than shocking in the considera- 
 tion that multitudes of thoughtful and honest people 
 after carefully inspecting the same facts should persist 
 from one generation to another in assigning to them 
 different explanations, and drawing from them con- 
 flicting inferences. In suggesting as a cause of this 
 the intrusion of emotions into the grounds of our 
 
xii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 argument, it should be remarked (as I have been at 
 some pains to show, in the second lecture) that we 
 do not cut ourselves off from the logical treatment 
 of the question. 
 
 It will be seen that I have, throughout these 
 discourses, treated simultaneously the two objections 
 just mentioned. It might have made the argument 
 clearer to have separated them, but this would have 
 demanded more than the allotted space of time, and 
 it was not at all essential, inasmuch as it has been 
 shown that they had a common origin. I merely 
 mention this here, in order to avoid the charge of 
 confusion or inconsistency. 
 
 It may be said that these discourses attempt to 
 give a partial answer to the very wide question, Why 
 do people continue to differ in opinion? It is partial, 
 for in the case of a very large number we can only 
 reply that the natural sluggishness of mind and un- 
 willingness to change are so great that when a differ- 
 ence has once become established, it would be much 
 more reasonable to ask instead the question, What 
 should ever bring them into agreement ? In the case 
 of uncivilized people, and a very great number in 
 every country must still, for intellectual purposes, be 
 placed in this category, a belief when once propagated 
 is persisted in until some very serious cause occurs to 
 
TNT ROD UCTION. xiii 
 
 change it. In seeking therefore to account for differ- 
 ences of opinion amongst such people, we should often 
 have to track them back to that time of haze and 
 darkness in which the formation of a belief has very 
 little indeed to do with evidence. At this point 
 Psychology or even Physiology rightly have it all 
 their own way. Such an enquiry as this would lead 
 us to is a very interesting and important one, but it 
 is far too wide for me to venture to touch upon it 
 here. 
 
 The question to which I have limited myself is 
 much narrower. How are we to account for the fact 
 that differences still exist amongst people who have 
 advanced to the stage in which they recognize to 
 some extent that their belief ought to admit of justi- 
 fication? I have the same evidence before me now 
 that I hadj say, a year ago ; why do I not draw the 
 same conclusion and with equal confidence? I have 
 the same evidence before me as others have, how can 
 our conclusions be at variance? These are questions 
 which it surely concerns the thoughtful and candid to 
 answer if they can. 
 
 One answer, which was onoe very common, per- 
 haps almost universal, but is now rejected as a mark 
 of fanaticism, assigns the cause to prejudice and wilful 
 blindness towards the evidence. That these may be 
 occasional and partial causes no one would think of 
 denying, but I cannot believe that they would ever 
 
xiv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 have been accepted as a general explanation, but for 
 the assumption that something of this kind was 
 required in order to account for the punishment 
 of error. When it is held that error not only as a 
 general rule entails misfortunes, in what may be called 
 a natural way (this is undeniable, being a part of 
 what Bp. Butler calls "the Constitution and Course 
 of Nature"), but also brings on in addition distinctly 
 penal consequences, men would naturally look about 
 for some conduct on the part of the misbeliever that 
 should make him deserving of punishment. And 
 this they could scarcely expect to find except in 
 wilful blindness. But who will consistently hold to 
 this view now? Who will say that the unbeliever is 
 always the one who wilfully rejects evidence and 
 obstinately adheres to preconceived opinions ? 
 
 Moreover, even in the cases in which such moral 
 causes as these are fairly assignable, they seem to 
 require being supplemented by something else. Pre- 
 judice and wilfulness can effect much even when 
 people have begun to enquire, but they cannot effect 
 everything. There must be some external conditions 
 upon which they can work, something which they 
 can make use of as a pretext. 
 
 The first of these lectures is an attempt to ex- 
 plain what the nature of this logical foothold for 
 differences is; in other words, to show what there is 
 
INTRODUCTION. XV 
 
 in the constitution of the evidence which makes it 
 possible for these differences to commence and 
 persist. 
 
 The second meets the question, What then is the 
 criterion of truth ? If you admit that people do not 
 only entertain in good faith the varying judgments 
 they express and act upon, but are almost justified in 
 entertaining them, how are we to decide which of 
 them is right and which wrong ? As I have repeatedly 
 said, no pretence is made altogether to remove the 
 difficulty thus indicated, but considerable help may 
 be afforded in the way of palliating it. 
 
 The third and fourth lectures are devoted to 
 working out into several of their consequences the 
 characteristics of evidence on religious subjects which 
 were explained and illustrated in the first. A certain 
 amount of repetition in the subject matter was ren- 
 dered necessary by the fact that, owing to the time 
 at which the Hulsean Lecturer usually commences 
 his course, hardly any of the undergraduate portion 
 of the congregation was present at the first two 
 sermons. 
 
LECTURE I. 
 
 UPON CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF BELIEF IN 
 COMPLICATED SUBJECTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE 
 WHICH AFFECT MANKIND. 
 
 ECCLESIASTES XI. 7, 8. 
 
 " Truly the light is sweet, and a pleasant thing it is for 
 the eyes to behold the sun; But if a man live many 
 years and rejoice in them all; yet let him remember 
 the days of darkness; for they shall be many" 
 
 No one can be familiar with the current tone of 
 thought and feeling upon religious matters without 
 having had his attention drawn to two characteristics, 
 in both of which, I apprehend, the present age is dis- 
 tinguished from most previous ages. 
 
 (I) The first of these is the indefiniteness of 
 most of the objections to Dogmatic Christianity. 
 Time was when those who rejected its claims did so 
 for the most part upon grounds which they could 
 very clearly state. It was some doctrine which of- 
 fended them, some historic or scientific assertion by 
 which they were staggered. In other words their 
 
 v. L. 1 
 
2 LECTURE I. 
 
 want of confidence in it as a whole was a consequence 
 rather than a cause of their convictions as to some 
 of the details having been shaken. We should not 
 be far amiss in saying that at the present day this 
 state of things is nearly reversed. It is not a 
 doctrine here and there which is exposed to at- 
 tack; it is not that a collision between religion and 
 science is apprehended just at one or another point. 
 Confer with any one who is in doubt and he may, 
 when questioned, allege some difficulties which per- 
 plex him. But are these merely difficulties in the 
 sense in which they may be found in some ordinary 
 and otherwise credible historic narrative, which is 
 accepted at once on the removal of a few doubts? 
 Surely no one will assert that this is the case. On 
 the removal of the first objection the crop that fol- 
 lows seems only the thicker. The resolution of a 
 difficulty produces little more effect in the way of a 
 Restoration of Belief than is produced towards re- 
 storing a house, when we put a piece of sound 
 timber into a floor that is penetrated with dry rot. 
 The most you can extract from such a man is 
 the admission of a feeling of dissatisfaction, per- 
 haps almost an instinct of aversion, which he might 
 find it very 'hard to draw out into articulate ob- 
 jections. 
 
 This feature is comparatively new ; at least in 
 its present prominence and importance. And yet 
 it is, I think, only the outward expression, in a 
 more open form, of a very old and familiar state 
 of feeling. Everyone must be acquainted with 
 
CHARACTER OF MODERN OBJECTIONS. 3 
 
 the way in which his practical hold of his faith is 
 subject to variation without any apparently suffi- 
 cient cause. It is influenced by his outward cir- 
 cumstances, his health, his age; 
 
 " Produced mysteriously as cape 
 Of cloud grown out of the invisible air." 
 
 Sometimes his faith appears extinct, often it 
 burns in a way that only just gives evidence of its 
 existence, occasionally it shews a lurid flare at the 
 approach of danger or death. (I am merely noticing 
 a fact here, which will very shortly be fully dis- 
 cussed.) Now so long as the open disavowal of 
 religion is subject to the disapproval of law or 
 public opinion these fluctuations of belief will not 
 attract much notice. Those whose faith is nearly 
 extinct will either conceal the fact, or, if they avow 
 it, will feel themselves bound to do so under the 
 support of some definite objections. That is, we 
 should then look for some distinct ground of quarrel 
 with religion. 
 
 When, however, restraints are broken through, 
 and men are in the habit of saying what they feel 
 and of criticising as they please, doubts which were 
 formerly suppressed will begin to make their ap- 
 pearance in public. And they will shew them- 
 selves in the shape in which they are experienced. 
 In other words, there will be a wide diffusion of 
 vague and indefinite objection. 
 
 (II) So much for the shape in which doubts 
 hew themselves ; turn now to one of the principal 
 
4 LECTURE I. 
 
 causes of them. Amongst these a prominent place 
 must be assigned to the prolonged, in fact incurable, 
 differences of opinion which exist in the province 
 of religion as compared with that of science. Logi- 
 cally this may seem to be assigning as a cause of 
 doubt the doubt which already exists ; and to some 
 extent this is so. The mere knowledge that any 
 set of doctrines is suspected is itself a cause of 
 additional suspicion. It is a serious cause to those 
 who are obliged, as we all are now to so great an 
 extent, to take their knowledge at second-hand 1 . 
 Every one who feels a rational interest in any 
 subject must find a real cause of perplexity in the 
 knowledge that there are many and important dif- 
 ferences amongst those who have given thought 
 to it. He will at least demand to have some 
 account of the fact, and if possible to know the 
 grounds of it. Now at the present day the con- 
 trast is being more and more significantly pointed 
 out between the compact unanimity which exists 
 in Science, at least upon many topics, and the end- 
 less discords which prevail in religion. Even where 
 
 1 This, I think, is an important consideration, and one which is tell- 
 ing more and more as science grows more extensive. We are all of us 
 in a position in which we can know but little even of the facts in most 
 sciences, and next to nothing about the evidences of these facts. This 
 being the case, what is our security against being misled or deceived 
 when we accept a result on the authority of those who are enquiring at 
 first hand ? Except when we possess the evidence afforded by familiar 
 applications or striking predictions, our main reliance must surely be 
 found in the fact that the genuine students are in substantial agree- 
 ment. If they coincide in their conclusions, we do not doubt that they 
 have arrived at least at some substratum of truth ; if they are still in 
 dispute, we mostly withhold our full assent from any one of them. 
 
CHARACTER OF MODERN OBJECTIONS. 5 
 
 scientific points are still in dispute it is asserted 
 that such points are but few in number, and of 
 small importance, compared with the bulk of those 
 which are universally accepted by the competently 
 informed ; and, what is more, each successive age 
 sees this proportion still further diminished. On 
 the other hand hardly a generation passes without 
 some Church being shattered into sects, or some 
 sect undergoing still further subdivisions, whilst 
 centuries elapse without shewing any sign of reunion. 
 Whenever objections are to be discussed it is 
 well to begin by putting them into as precise a 
 form as possible. I think, then, that those which 
 have been just alluded to might, with their implied 
 inferences, be thus summarily stated ; 
 
 (I) The fact that most persons do not retain 
 their religious convictions with unaltered tenacity, 
 but find them vary exceedingly in practical efficacy 
 according to circumstances, in other words find 
 them somewhat vague and vacillating, suggests 
 the conclusion that these convictions are less the 
 product of objective facts than of our own morbid 
 fancies ; 
 
 (II) The fact of there being such an endless 
 conflict of opinions in religion, (even if we sup- 
 posed each person to retain his own opinion with 
 unwavering stedfastness) is pretty clear proof that 
 the subject-matter in question is one upon which 
 truth cannot be reached. 
 
 Such objections are far too prevalent, and in 
 many cases too sincerely urged for it to be any 
 
6 LECTURE I. 
 
 use to ignore or denounce them. They are urged 
 as complaints by many without the pale, and are 
 felt as stumblingblocks by many within. 
 
 The general design of this course of Lectures 
 is to discuss these objections, or rather to examine 
 the principle upon which they depend (for I think 
 they have a common principle) and to work that 
 out into several of its consequences. In other words, 
 we shall be occupied with some of the characteristics 
 of religious and scientific belief, and the nature of 
 the distinction between them. 
 
 Let us first examine some of the facts. 
 
 Every one must be familiar with the strange 
 way in which without any conscious alteration of the 
 evidence before us, our beliefs upon many subjects 
 do nevertheless vary in their nature and intensity. 
 In other words, though there may have been no 
 appeal to fresh evidence, no re-valuation of the old, 
 and no resort to new principles or methods of proof, 
 our judgments about the facts in question have 
 undergone a change. 
 
 The result might be compared to those alterna- 
 tions of light and dark in a murky foggy day ; the 
 intrinsic brightness of the sun has remained the 
 same throughout, your eyes have not varied in their 
 power, you cannot point out any particular cloud as 
 having caused the change, and yet there is a change. 
 You feel sure that there must be some cause for 
 these effects, but you cannot detect that cause in 
 itself, you can only trace it obscurely from its 
 working. 
 
EXAMPLES OF CHANGES OF BELIEF. 7 
 
 In saying this you will understand that I am 
 not referring to mere states of feeling, to those fits 
 of elation and despondency to which every one is 
 liable ; but to actual beliefs, to beliefs which profess 
 to be founded on evidence and to shew forth their 
 working in our conduct. Closely connected as such 
 mere states of feeling are with our rational convic- 
 tions, they are of course clearly distinct from them. 
 The sound of a trumpet has an inspiriting effect 
 upon those who march to battle, but we ought not 
 to confound this with belief in the successful issue of 
 the struggle. 
 
 Let us take a few examples of the sort of change 
 to which I am referring. They will be simply illus- 
 trative. 
 
 Have you then never known what it was, to 
 form a judgment, and as you think at the time, a 
 final judgment, upon the motives or conduct of any 
 one ? You make up your mind about it, and dismiss 
 the case. But some time afterwards it presents 
 itself to you again, as the phrase is, under a ' new 
 light/ You have not knowingly received fresh 
 evidence, or detected any error in your former con- 
 clusion. But somehow the old elements seem to 
 have unconsciously combined themselves in a some- 
 what different fashion, as though unseen hands had 
 been at work rearranging the materials ; and so the 
 result is that former convictions are shaken. Your 
 judgment is modified, perhaps even reversed. 
 
 Now turn to another example, and one of a more 
 solemn aspect. Everybody is familiar with the fact 
 
8 LECTURE I. 
 
 (explain it how we will) that the approach of death 
 often causes a gre?t change in our religious views. 
 The knowledge of this may sometimes be rhetorically 
 abused by preachers, who yield to the temptation of 
 wielding with little trouble to themselves a terribly 
 potent weapon, but the fact itself is notorious. Take 
 but one instance. I give it simply by way of 
 illustration. 
 
 Almost every one knows something about the poet 
 Heine, and the great change in his religious views 
 produced by the prolonged and terrible sufferings 
 which closed his life. We need not pause to inquire 
 into the exact extent of this change, it may suffice 
 to say now that it was considerable ; but it is worth 
 pointing out that the significance of it is much 
 greater than is commonly supposed. It is not gene- 
 rally remembered that many years before his death, 
 when still in the vigour of health, he had commented 
 upon Schelling's old-age adhesion to Catholicism 
 with a bitter and almost savage contempt, which 
 might well have precluded him in turn from express- 
 ing anything approaching to a recantation. He says 
 there that such cases belong at best to Pathology : 
 the pious have very little cause to sing their hymns 
 of triumph over them. At most they only shew 
 that you cannot hope to convert the freethinker so 
 long as he walks with clear head under the open 
 heaven. He only turns to religion when sick and 
 old, when he can neither enjoy nor think 1 . 
 
 Any approach to a reversal of judgment ought 
 
 1 See Appendix. 
 
EXAMPLES OF CHANGES OF BELIEF. 9 
 
 to count for much when tortured out of one who had 
 formerly pronounced such opinions as these. 
 
 But why need I thus appeal to the experience of 
 another for what your own hearts can supply ? If 
 any one of us came face to face with death, not 
 when worn out with sickness, for men will often long 
 then for any relief; still less when any kind of 
 resource was available in self-defence, for in that case 
 reflection is either distracted, or diverted into action; 
 but with the full life in every limb and with 
 nothing to do but to think, would your convictions 
 about hereafter be what they now are ? Only try 
 to realise fully such a case as this ; say that you 
 were bitten by a deadly serpent, or left on a rock 
 with a rising tide, and knew for certain that you had 
 but a few hours to live : there need be neither fear 
 nor remorse, but when you thus came up to the 
 brink of the abyss and began to look down into it, 
 even though you knew there was no fire there, 
 would not the mere proximity to it give you new 
 views ? Can any one say that such a sight would 
 give him no new convictions, but merely perhaps 
 enliven old ones ? I dare not say so for myself, and 
 should be surprised if many others could l . 
 
 These are salient instances of the kind of change 
 in our views with which we shall be occupied, but 
 
 1 "On dit que si les bommes deviennent religieux ou depots en 
 avan9ant en age, c'est qu'ils ont peur de la mort et de ce qui doit 
 suivre dans uue autre vie. Mais j'ai, quant a moi, la conscience que 
 sans aucune terreur semblable, sans aucun effet d'imagination, le senti- 
 ment religieux peut se developper a mesure que nous avan9ons en age." 
 (Penstes de Maine de Biran, p. 269.) 
 
10 LECTURE I. 
 
 others might be adduced. For example, sickness 
 will often change a man's views of his destiny here 
 and hereafter ; so will old age, so sometimes will be- 
 reavement and disappointment and neglect. It is 
 not merely that such changes of circumstances make 
 a man feel differently, they can also make him be- 
 lieve differently. He may become wiser because he 
 has been made sadder. 
 
 So much for the facts. Let us now come to the 
 explanation of them. Two common explanations 
 may be noticed very briefly, as I should prefer 
 indirectly undermining them by the substitution of 
 a more adequate account, to a direct confutation. 
 
 (I) One of these may be called for want of a 
 better term, the common religious explanation. It 
 assumes that the man whose opinion or rather the 
 expression of whose opinion has been thus changed 
 has been acting a part, has in a word been acting 
 dishonestly. 
 
 On this view the prospect of death terrifies the 
 careless offender into momentary sincerity, and 
 forces him to avow convictions which he had suc- 
 ceeded in suppressing or at least concealing. In 
 other words the truth is got out of him as they 
 used to extort it in that first stage of the old ju- 
 dicial proceedings, in which the rack and thumbscrew 
 were just shewn to the poor culprit who might after- 
 wards have to feel their full force. 
 
 * 
 
 (II) Another explanation might as fairly be 
 called the common irreligious one. It assumes that 
 the ravages of sickness and the near approach of 
 
COMPLICATION OF RELIGIOUS EVIDENC 
 
 death cause such a decay and perturbation 
 
 . . v 't 
 
 faculties that any superstitious fancy has easy accear%"' ;1 
 
 and soon acquires command. The watchmen are 
 grown feeble, and so the powers that prowl in dark- 
 ness have it all their own way. Newton in his old 
 age becoming a commentator on Scripture is a not 
 unfrequent illustration of such a view : Heine, as 
 I have already said, suggested this of Schelling. 
 
 Whatever other objections might be raised to 
 such explanations, they are clearly too partial. They 
 apply to hardly any circumstances but those of 
 danger and approaching death, whereas (what is 
 very important to our argument) similar results are 
 not unfrequently produced by any conditions of 
 acute and prolonged distress. Moreover they are 
 both uncharitable, by which I mean that they under- 
 rate the more honest and sturdy features of our 
 nature. The one makes men too dishonest through- 
 out life, the other makes them too weak and coward- 
 ly at the last, to be true in any but occasional cases. 
 
 I think a better explanation may be obtained 
 if we bear in mind some of the characteristics in the 
 process of the formation of opinions. I do not mean 
 opinions on simple and detached subjects, but rather 
 on those of large inquiry and especially of human 
 interest. As many inferences will follow from these 
 considerations I must ask your attention to them 
 even at the risk of delaying upon topics which to 
 many will seem very obvious. 
 
 (I) First then bear in mind that the evidence 
 on such subjects is multiform in character, and de- 
 
12 LECTURE I. 
 
 rived from various sources. Truth is not drawn 
 from one rill but is distilled from every side through 
 countless channels. In our Systems of Logic, as 
 well as in formal and familiar discussions, we are 
 forced to some extent to neglect this fact, in order 
 to keep the dispute within manageable bounds. 
 Hence the idea is encouraged that when we track a 
 truth backwards and examine its sources, we shall 
 find that many derivative conclusions follow from 
 one more general proposition, that this again is one 
 of many that follow from some still more compre- 
 hensive proposition, and so on. On such a view 
 this process of justifying our beliefs would lead us 
 (as one may say) along a converging cone, till we 
 reached as a centre a few fundamental truths which 
 either stand self-supported, or rest upon an im- 
 mutable basis of experience. That conclusions may 
 be exhibited in this form is indisputable, and it can- 
 not be denied that here and there a comprehensive 
 thinker may have thus tabulated his beliefs upon 
 almost every subject, and reduced them ultimately 
 to a few with which he is irrevocably satisfied. But 
 it is to me quite clear that for most men the process 
 is practically precisely the reverse. The moment 
 you question any proposition, you find it linked 
 by a strictly- logical connection (inductive or ana- 
 logical) with many others. Each of these again, 
 when examined in turn, brings you into contact with 
 many more. You thus seem led along a cone which 
 is continually diverging. 
 
 There is an illustration in Abraham Tucker's 
 

 COMPLICATION OF RELIGIOUS EVIDENCE. 13 
 
 Light of Nature which, quaint and familiar as 
 it may seem, is so much to the point that I 
 cannot forbear from quoting it. Speaking of the 
 grounds of our religious belief, the author rejects the 
 common illustration of a building and the founda- 
 tions on which it rests, as inappropriate to describe 
 the real facts of the case. An apter comparison 
 would be found, he thinks, in one of those Dutch 
 buildings which rest, not on well-laid courses of 
 
 O ' 
 
 brick or stone, but on an assemblage of many piles 
 driven deep into a soft and yielding bank of mud 
 and sand. It may better please the fancy to picture 
 to ourselves a regular building towering in tier 
 above tier of solid masonry, whose foundations we 
 can assign, and can prove that they rest on the 
 firm rock. But such a symmetrical structure is 
 quite unsuitable to describe the circumstances in 
 which we are actually placed. 
 
 (II) But again ; not only are the facts upon 
 which our conclusions rest thus infinite in number, 
 they are also themselves far from possessing that 
 simplicity which we commonly assign to them. Sub- 
 ject them to a high magnifying power and it will be 
 found that they again are resolvable. "What we 
 call a simple fact is in great part the product of our 
 judgment, and therefore often of our fancy, working 
 upon very fragmentary data. What we do in ob- 
 serving a fact is to fill in an outline of which only 
 a point here and there has been actually assigned, an 
 outline therefore which may be no more obligatory 
 than the shapes of the constellations on a celestial 
 
14 LECTlfRE I. 
 
 globe. One man thinks that the points arrange 
 themselves into the shape of a waggon, when to 
 another they more naturally seem to fall into that of 
 a bear. As this opens out to us a very important 
 source of variations of judgment, and one which 
 is seldom fully appreciated, I will give one or two 
 simple illustrations of it. 
 
 We have all experienced the surprise, in going 
 into a dark room, of seeing, as we think at first, 
 some familiar object, which with more light, or after 
 a closer scrutiny, seems entirely to change its appear- 
 ance. It may prove to be another object ; perhaps 
 no object at all, but a mere phantom composed of 
 patches of light and shade. But the judgment at 
 the time nevertheless seemed final; and had the 
 attention been immediately called away we should 
 never have guessed that the object was anything 
 different from what we had at first taken it for. 
 I am speaking, of course, not of spectral illusions, 
 but of such common misjudgments as we are liable 
 to any day of our lives. What amount of work the 
 judgment or fancy had performed in such a case will 
 be best appreciated by attempting afterwards to see 
 the thing again as it had first appeared to us. For 
 this purpose a real effort is required, and we are 
 startled to find then how arbitrary and fantastic the 
 spontaneous arrangement had been. In other words 
 a little more light or a more careful inspection has 
 altogether transformed what we were inclined to call 
 our facts. 
 
 Take another equally simple illustration from 
 
GROUNDS OF DIFFERENCE OF BELIEF. 15 
 
 sounds. If a question is put in an unfamiliar dialect, 
 or in a language which we do not know well, we 
 may fail at first to extract the slightest vestige of 
 meaning from any part of it. And yet the next 
 time it is uttered, perhaps in almost precisely the 
 same tone, we catch the meaning of it quite clearly. 
 What were before mere fragments of sound have 
 now coalesced and sprung into life. So much has 
 been added by the mind, in the process of arrange- 
 ment, that it seems afterwards as hard to rob the 
 sounds of the meaning they have acquired, as it was 
 before to confer any meaning upon them 1 . 
 
 Now this being the case with each separate inlet 
 of knowledge, it will readily be seen what opening 
 there is for differences of judgment and belief when 
 several of these inlets have to be simultaneously 
 employed. A slight disturbance, a little increase or 
 depression in the portion contributed by any one of 
 them, will often produce an immense alteration in the 
 final result. The pilot in a storm may have to shape 
 his judgment by an accurate estimate and correlation 
 
 1 " In aid of the present case, I will only remark, that it would ap- 
 pear incredible to persons not accustomed to these subtle notices of self- 
 observation, what small and remote resemblances, what mere hints of 
 likeness from some real external object, especially if the shape be aided 
 by colour, will suffice to make a vivid thought consubstantiate with the 
 real object, and derive from it an outward perceptibility. Even when 
 we are broad awake, if we are in anxious expectation, how often will 
 not the most confused sounds of nature be heard by us as articulate 
 sounds ? For instance, the babbling of a brook will appear for a mo- 
 ment the voice of a friend for whom we are waiting, calling out our own 
 names." Coleridge's Friend, I. 189. The principle is there applied in 
 a very interesting way to account for Luther's vision of the devil in the 
 tower at Wartburg. 
 
16 LECTURE I. 
 
 of sights and sounds. Anything which affected the 
 testimony of any one of these sources of knowledge 
 on which he had to rely in the hurry of action, would 
 have a most important bearing on his conduct. If 
 the light grew more intense or the roar of the 
 breakers increased, he would judge and consequently 
 act differently. 
 
 You will now see how close is the connection 
 between the two objections with which we started. 
 They were, you remember, first, that each man's 
 group of religious opinions is so liable to fluctuate; 
 at one time seeming almost extinct, and at another 
 fanned into intensity. Secondly, that the particular 
 groups with which different men are furnished are 
 so various. These phenomena have in part a 
 common cause, and but for accidental circumstances 
 would be found to vary with one another. Any- 
 thing which tends to detach from a man's mind one 
 class of the facts which combine in the aggregate 
 to make up his proofs will of course diminish the 
 amount of his conviction ; but since it disturbs at 
 the same time the proportion in which these proofs 
 combined it will naturally alter the group of opinions 
 held by him. And it would do this still more com- 
 pletely but for the fact that whereas we are almost 
 entirely dependent upon our neighbours for the 
 articles of our creed, we are mainly dependent upon 
 ourselves for the degree of conviction with which we 
 entertain them 1 
 
 1 The above paragraph needs perhaps some expansion. What I 
 mean is that if every person had the clearness of head and independence 
 
GROUNDS OF DIFFERENCE OF BELIEF. 17 
 
 >v 
 
 I will pause a moment to indicate here an in 
 ence which will afterwards be drawn out more fully. 
 Any theory of life, that is, any theory of our duty 
 here and our destiny hereafter, must (if one may 
 so say) be many-sided; it must take account of 
 all sides of our nature, and neglect no class of cir- 
 cumstances in which men may be placed. Anything 
 therefore that makes a man either neglect or unduly 
 notice any of these circumstances, will disturb the 
 
 of judgment to work out his own religious creed For Himself, we should 
 find many more individual differences of belief than now prevail. We 
 should not expect to find exactly the same creed, in all its minutiae, 
 prevailing over extensive areas of country, and entertained by people in 
 very different circumstances. I am not here alluding to the case of 
 those who take their doctrines upon authority ; of course they cannot 
 fail to agree; but of those who do attempt to argue and reflect. Even 
 they, to some extent, think in groups ; each tends to come into harmony 
 with his neighbours; and those who deviate from custom seldom do 
 more than take an old system and make some private alterations for 
 themselves. I am far from thinking that they are wrong in thus acting ; 
 in fact, for reasons given in the third lecture and elsewhere, there are 
 strong grounds for presuming that any one who neglects the help af- 
 forded by comparing his own convictions with those of others will fall 
 into error, that is, on subjects which, like theology, do not admit of de- 
 cisive experimental tests. But if we did think in theology, each for 
 himself, more than we now do, I suspect that any one's emotional pecu- 
 liarities would soon stamp their impress deeply on his dogmatic belief. 
 Only one or two leading doctrines might be thus affected at first, but in 
 any closely connected group of doctrines a difference insinuated at one 
 point soon extends to others. Hence, in the case supposed, although 
 the total range of variation could not well be greater than it now is, we 
 should probably find that more differences would exist in any small 
 group of individuals who had been brought up under similar influences. 
 As things now are, the differences of emotional disposition of which we 
 have to speak, expend nearly all their force in loosening or tightening 
 our hold of the entire group of doctrines with which we start; there is 
 still scarcely sufficient independence of judgment to enable them to 
 reach so far as to break up the old group by detaching some of its parts 
 and inserting others. The former moreover involves no trouble, the 
 latter requires considerable attention and power of thought. 
 
 V. L. 2 
 
18 LECTURE I. 
 
 delicate adjustment that should exist, and may there- 
 fore give him an erroneous view of the whole. 
 We sometimes speak, for instance, of certain sad 
 experiences enabling men to see more clearly some 
 truth which they had before neglected. But it is 
 often the seeing now what had not been seen at all 
 before, notwithstanding that the facts about them 
 may have remained unaltered. A single straggling 
 gleam of light may shew you that what you had 
 taken for a cloud-bank is a frowning precipice straight 
 on to which you were drifting. You saw the object 
 before, in one sense, but your judgment about it has 
 quite altered. 
 
 (Ill) The foregoing considerations supply con- 
 ditions; they afford a sort of logical foothold by 
 which bond fide differences of opinion may be re- 
 tained in the face of facts which are equally acces- 
 sible to each party. But something more is wanted 
 in the way of a cause which shall give birth to these 
 differences. 
 
 Remember then that one of these groups of facts 
 on which our conclusions rest is connected with, and 
 in part consists of, emotions. 
 
 The way in which emotions contribute to deter- 
 mine our belief is twofold ; 
 
 (1) There is, first, their subjective influence ; 
 their influence, that is, directly on the mind of the 
 observer. This influence is generally, and on the 
 whole justly, regarded as of a decidedly disturbing 
 character. 
 
 (2) But, secondly, they present themselves in 
 
INFLUENCE OF EMOTIONS. 19 
 
 an objective aspect, as being themselves some of the 
 facts which have to be taken into account in framing 
 or choosing our theories about the world. Under 
 this aspect they have a most important logical 
 bearing. 
 
 o 
 
 The influence of our emotions under the first of 
 these heads has been so constantly remarked that it 
 has passed into a commonplace. No exhortation to 
 the pursuit of truth is complete without a word of 
 warning to the inquirer to divest his mind of all 
 disturbing passions. Sobriety and calmness are the 
 recognised laudatory epithets in reference to our 
 conclusions. 
 
 "The passions," it has been said 1 , "like a fused 
 rnetal, fill up the wide interstices of thought, and 
 supply the defective links; and thus incompatible 
 assertions are harmonised by the sensation without 
 the sense of connection/' 
 
 But in listening to such cautions, let us not run 
 into an opposite error. Emotions must not be neg- 
 lected in their objective aspect. They are a part of 
 human nature, and must therefore have their proper 
 place in any comprehensive theory of man's position 
 and destiny. Just think, for example, what havoc 
 would be made with many of the most favourite and 
 convincing arguments for the immortality of the 
 soul, and for the existence and attributes of God, 
 were our emotional side remodelled, though the judg- 
 ment might be left untouched ! The general preva- 
 lence of certain emotions is one of the premises, and 
 
 1 Coleridge's Lay Sermons, p. 168. 
 
 22 
 
20 LECTURE I. 
 
 a most important one, from which our conclusions 
 about life must be drawn. To appreciate this put 
 such a case as the following: Suppose that from 
 amidst some tribe of Hottentots or Fuegians one 
 man of speculative mind had emerged, rising like a 
 tower above the dead level of animal and savage 
 impulses around him. He ponders on the destiny 
 of his fellow-countrymen, the only men of whom he 
 has any experience. If the common arguments for 
 the immortality of the soul occurred to him, what 
 value do you think he ought to set upon many of 
 them? For instance, many thinkers have, with 
 Pascal, been profoundly impressed by the frustration 
 of worldly desires, the incurable ennui and disap- 
 pointment and misery which prey upon man ; What 
 confirmation would our speculative savage see of this 
 when he reflected upon the feelings of his country- 
 men? "Would he not be led to suspect that his own 
 feelings, with which others seemed to sympathise 
 so little, were the product of an exceptional or dis- 
 eased organisation? 
 
 Others have recognised again, in the boundless 
 desires of man, an intimation that another scene 
 was to dawn upon him, in which these desires 
 were to receive some satisfaction; Would such 
 an argument as this count for much in the case sup- 
 posed ? 
 
 But it may be asked, What is the practical bear- 
 ing of these considerations ? How do they make 
 any opening for variations in our belief? Because 
 / may become highly sensitive, yet others are left as 
 
VALUE OF EMOTIONS AS PROOF. 21 
 
 they were; the average is left untouched, and it is 
 this which is, or ought to be, my real premise; it is 
 with this that the theory has to fit in, and not with 
 my own highly wrought frame, which may, to a 
 great extent, be exceptional. True; but remember 
 that one characteristic of emotions is, that they must 
 be felt in ourselves before they can be perceived in 
 others. Our only way almost of knowing how 
 strongly our fellow-men are affected is by being 
 strongly affected ourselves. We know it is not al- 
 ways easy to bring a healthy man to believe that 
 others are weak and suffer, though the facts are pa- 
 tent before his eyes. But it is next to impossible to 
 make one of slow and sluggish feelings even conjec- 
 ture what may be the turbulence of the passions 
 which surge in the bosoms of those more sensitively 
 organised. Rouse a man to love his neighbour, and 
 by so doing you not only give him a new feeling, 
 you give him also new data, for you make him ap- 
 preciate, as he never did before, the strength of love 
 about him. Of course it is possible that a man may 
 know how others are affected without being similarly 
 affected himself; but as a general rule our own emo- 
 tions are the portal through which we are introduced 
 to an appreciation of those of others. 
 
 Here then, in the considerations which have 
 thus far occupied us, we have found an opening 
 for numerous and important differences of opinion 
 between one person and another, or between the 
 same person at different times. Let us put them 
 together and see what they amount to, and why 
 
22 LKCTURK I. 
 
 they lead us to perplexity in religious matters rather 
 than in any others. 
 
 It is quite true, then, that in the province of 
 science differences of opinion do on the whole tend 
 gradually to diminish and finally to disappear. It 
 is easy to see some of the reasons why this should 
 be so. For one thing it is much more practicable 
 to detach the group of phenomena with which we 
 are concerned from others, and so to reduce our 
 investigation to more manageable dimensions. No 
 science includes more than a fragment, often a 
 very small fragment, of our human experience. 
 Hence the widest of sciences, in the common use 
 of that term, falls far short of the all-comprehen- 
 sive embrace of moral and religious discussions. 
 Again ; if our scientific inferences had led us to 
 different conclusions, we have in most cases a 
 ready verification by a resort to experiment. If 
 we doubt the soundness of our reasoning, we have 
 but to ask, Is the fact so or not ? And it is not 
 often that we have -to wait long for a decisive 
 reply to such a question as this. A resort to ex- 
 perience, on the other hand, in matters where 
 experience must partly consist of our feelings, will 
 sometimes seem only to aggravate the confusion 
 which it was intended to remove. 
 
 Hence, when we step from truths of physical 
 science to those of politics and society, we seem 
 to be moving off the firm land on to a sea which 
 is beginning to heave. Our emotions now come 
 into the discussion, in the double way already 
 
NEED OF A LOGICAL EXPLANATION. 23 
 
 pointed out, and cause us some perplexity. Few 
 persons doubt that there is truth to be found on 
 these topics, or suppose that we shall fail to find 
 it at the last. But the process of finding it is a 
 slow and disappointing one. 
 
 Still more, of course, is this the case with reli- 
 gious truth. I should rather say here that the 
 process of appreciation is hard, since we believe 
 that the truth in its essentials has been already 
 given to us. As religion has reference to all men, 
 at all periods of time and under all their circum- 
 stances, the ramifications of any of its doctrines 
 must of course be infinite. And consequently the 
 difficulty of grasping it with unwavering force will 
 be almost insuperable. The sum of the matter, 
 then, as far as this lecture is concerned, seems to 
 be this; there are causes why religious belief should 
 be less fixed and uniform than scientific belief. 
 These defects cannot be wholly accounted for by 
 prejudice, partiality, and sloth ; they have besides 
 something of a real logical foothold. And this 
 being the case it is best frankly to admit the fact. 
 We shall be occupied in future lectures with some 
 consequences from the fact just mentioned ; I may 
 here indicate in a few words what one of them is. 
 
 If we do not obtain what I have called a logical 
 explanation of these fluctuations and differences in 
 our religious belief, we seem driven to one of two 
 alternatives ; either to adopt a non-logical expla- 
 nation, or to conclude that there is none at all. 
 In the former case we assign as the cause some 
 
24 LECTURE I. 
 
 bodily state or mere feeling, the fault of this being 
 that we are cutting ourselves off from all criterion 
 of truth and falsehood, and degrading religion into 
 a matter of mere taste 1 . In the latter case, (viz. 
 where we can find no explanation) we shall, ac- 
 cording to our temperament, either say with the 
 Positivist, "This is what comes of speculating at 
 all upon such subjects, therefore we had better let 
 them alone," or with many Dogmatists, "This is 
 
 1 I am far from denying that bodily circumstances have some influ- 
 ence upon our religious sentiments and thus upon our convictions ; but, 
 as I have remarked in the preface, in proportion as we find in them 
 the whole explanation of these sentiments and convictions, religion, as 
 a system of doctrines which must be true or false, is altogether dis- 
 posed of. 
 
 There is of course hardly any difference of opinion as to the general 
 existence of religious sentiments ; the only question is, what are we to 
 make of them ? Every believer must connect them with his convictions, 
 and thus give them an objective reference; he will say that they refer to 
 certain facts of history and Revelation, and that if these facts were dis- 
 proved the whole fabric of conviction falls- with them, and that of the 
 sentiments will soon follow. The psychologist as such (I refer to the 
 analytical school of Psychology) does not much trouble himself about the 
 objective facts, but undertakes to explain how the sentiments arise, 
 namely either from our bodily organization or by some law of mental 
 association. Thus in Mr Bain's work a section will be found headed 
 " the religious sentiment," just as others may be headed " wonder" and 
 " awe," and so on. Such an explanation is certainly not incompatible 
 with belief in the truth of the facts of religion, but it seems equally cer- 
 tain that its tendency is to make these facts needless, and thus to 
 prepare the way for a denial of them. The Positivist, again, though he 
 rejects almost all the facts of our religion, fully admits the existence of 
 religious sentiments as a constituent part of human nature. But then 
 what is to be done with them ? It is the knowledge that they cannot be 
 got rid of altogether, and the assumed hopelessness of admitting what 
 to us is the only legitimate explanation, that drive him to such despe- 
 rate straits in the invention of a new religion, and make him, as Mr 
 Goldwin Smith says, devise " a shadowy divinity out of the abstract 
 being of humanity, and a shadowy immortality of the soul out of a 
 figment that the dead are greater than the living." 
 

 VARIOUS CONFIRMATIONS OF THE TRUTH. 25 
 
 what comes of speculating upon them by ourselves, 
 therefore we had better accept them from the 
 Church 1 ." 
 
 The course of this lecture has necessarily led me 
 to be critical rather than constructive. It may seem 
 to some a poor thing merely to account for a diffi- 
 culty rather than to proffer help in the way of 
 removing or reducing it. I shall try, as I have 
 already said, to offer some such help in a future 
 discourse ; at present I will content myself with one 
 suggestion. 
 
 If the vast comprehensiveness and multitudinous 
 proof of any great religious truth seem to baffle our 
 attempts to grasp it steadily, we may remember that 
 these characteristics offer consolation as well. They 
 multiply the occasions on which confirmation of the 
 truth may be found, and enable us to find it through 
 many a strange inlet. For just think how ample 
 is the range of this confirmation ! Close by indeed 
 there is a sort of foreground of obvious facts ob- 
 servable which we may call proof; beyond these, but 
 still in connection, there are other facts which are 
 valuable in corroboration as analogies ; and beyond 
 these again, towards the dim haze of conjecture, 
 where the horizon seems to fade away in metaphors 
 and similes, there crowd upon us intimations and 
 suggestions of every kind. Take for example some 
 doctrine on the truth of which you have been accus- 
 tomed to rely, and ask yourself, On what does it 
 
 1 For a fuller discussion of these latter alternatives see the Ap- 
 pendix. 
 
26 LECTURE I. 
 
 depend ? How is it established ? As you examine 
 its supports you will find them spreading and ramify- 
 ing in all directions, and perhaps at every point 
 becoming obscurer and more difficult to track. And 
 so it must be. I am speaking of course of any of 
 those great religious principles on which men can 
 live, and for which they will care to die. Examine 
 their foundations, and what do you find ? You 
 cannot generally say with ready certainty, " It is 
 proved by such or such another principle, or it is 
 accepted at once upon its own evidence." You will 
 discover its supports to be infinitely more compli- 
 cated than this. You will find that it rests partly 
 upon the harmony and connection which fit it in 
 with other truths (and what an amount and variety 
 does this include!) partly upon your own experience 
 of what it can do for you, partly upon the similar 
 testimony of others. Yes; and you will find its 
 foundations assuming stranger and more varied forms 
 than these. You will find it deriving support now 
 from a pain, a disappointment, a pang of remorse; 
 now from our hopes and aspirations ; now from a 
 pleasure enjoyed and a time of quiet peace. Now 
 it will find confirmation in a temptation withstood, 
 a resolution painfully adhered to and now in our 
 failures and our broken vows. " If any man will do 
 his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be 
 of God." Hence what some might regard as mere 
 trifles have in this way a great and just importance ; 
 partly by recalling to us facts of which we were 
 losing sight, partly by putting us into a sympathetic 
 

 VARIOUS CONFIRMATIONS OF THE TRUTH. 27 
 
 tone and so enabling us to estimate them more 
 fairly ;_ 
 
 "Just when we are safest, there's a sunset touch, 
 A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death, 
 A chorus-ending from Euripides, 
 And that's enough for fifty hopes and fears, 
 As old and new at once as Nature's self, 
 To rap and knock and enter in the soul." 
 
 When a truth is intended for all mankind, every 
 form of human experience, every feature of human 
 human nature, will be found to throw some light 
 upon it, and thus to confirm it. And so it results 
 that wherever we go, in our joy or our sorrow, 
 we may find if we will, that the Spirit which 
 inspired the Scriptures has been there before us. 
 If we ascend into a heaven of joy we may find it 
 there, and if in our grief we descend into the 
 valley of the shadow of death it is there too. 
 
LECTURE II. 
 
 THE CRITERION OF TRUTH. 
 
 ECCLESIASTES XI. 7, 8. 
 
 " Truly the light is sweet, and a pleasant thing it is for 
 the eyes to behold the sun: But if a man live many 
 years, and rejoice in them all; yet let him remember 
 the days of darkness; for they shall be many." 
 
 WE were occupied last Sunday with a consideration 
 of the fluctuations and differences of belief which 
 are found to prevail in various directions, but more 
 especially in religious matters. It may serve to 
 illustrate the nature and import of these charac- 
 teristics of belief if I point out that they may be 
 assigned to three distinct periods or stages, which 
 in most cases might be said, roughly speaking, to 
 succeed one another in historical order. 
 
 There is first of course the primitive stage, in 
 which all men think alike so far as they think at 
 all. On isolated matters of fact, and about the 
 details of ordinary life, differences of opinion must 
 always exist, but on higher subjects the most per- 
 

 STAGES OF UNANIMITY. 29 
 
 feet unanimity prevails. So far as men actually 
 believe, there is conscious agreement ; so far as the 
 saying is true that " he that has never doubted yet 
 has never yet believed," we can at least say nega- 
 tively that there is no difference of opinion. 
 
 But this stage is followed by one in which 
 differences of opinion have become so numerous 
 and obstinate, and have advanced to such impor- 
 tant subjects, that they can no longer be neglected. 
 It is to this stage that Logic appropriately be- 
 longs ; Logic, I mean, of the formal or syllogistic 
 type. The conditions favourable to the full deve- 
 lopment of this art seem to be these : There must, 
 for one thing, be a considerable difference of belief; 
 otherwise the art would be needless, as there would 
 never be any occasion to resort to it. But there 
 must, at the same time, be substantial agreement 
 on other points, that is on certain general or ulti- 
 mate truths, or the art would be impossible. There 
 would in that case be no -common ground from 
 which to start. Such conditions existed pre-emi- 
 nently during the time of speculative activity in 
 the middle ages. The progress of inquiry was 
 then multiplying the occasions of disagreement ; but 
 the stern control of the Church provided at the 
 same time, directly or indirectly, an abundance of 
 general principles to which appeal could be made 
 without fear of denial. Under such circumstances, 
 also, we should naturally look at a later period for 
 an age of Evidences; they are appropriate to a 
 time when, in spite of many differences and doubts 
 
30 LECTURE II. 
 
 about religion, there is nevertheless a broad back- 
 ground of unanimity as to propositions which both 
 parties will frankly and readily accept. 
 
 Sooner or later however there must come the 
 stage in which that universal solvent, the modern 
 spirit of criticism and inquiry, has begun to attack 
 not derivative principles only, but also those which 
 had hitherto been regarded as ultimate and beyond 
 discussion. At this stage the common Logic is 
 powerless. It has not a word to offer at such a 
 conjuncture. For how can men argue to any pur- 
 pose when they cannot find a basis of agreement 
 from which to work ? They can really do little 
 more than state their own opinions each for him- 
 self, and trust that these will carry persuasion. 
 Most persons will admit, I think, that many illus- 
 trations of this state of things are furnished by 
 the present tone of religious discussion and con- 
 troversy. 
 
 In the first of the three stages just indicated 
 the problems with which these lectures are occupied 
 could never arise, since people really have no dif- 
 ferences of opinion of any fundamental character. 
 In the second the resource would be, try to bring 
 your opponent over to your own opinion, either 
 indirectly by acting on the feelings, or directly by 
 persuading the judgment. Work upon him, that is, 
 by logical arguments. In the third we have begun 
 to lose some of our respect towards, and perfect 
 reliance in, these resources. It is hard for the dis- 
 putants to find any common principles, which both 
 

 HISTORICAL CRITICISMS OF BELIEF. 31 
 
 sides will frankly and fully accept, and from which 
 they can argue. 
 
 Now as these differences are thus spreading 
 and intensifying, you will see that a. very important 
 distinction begins to emerge and at last acquires 
 remarkable prominence and importance. The dis- 
 tinction is that between a belief being generally 
 entertained, and its being true. 
 
 In the primitive stage, when there really are no 
 differences worth mentioning, it is clear that no 
 such distinction as this could ever be thought of. 
 But as differences of opinion multiply, those two 
 properties of belief, namely general prevalence and 
 actual truth, begin to become loosened in their 
 mutual cohesion in men's minds, until at last they 
 are entirely split asunder. 
 
 At the present day the separation between them 
 is in fact so complete that they are constantly 
 treated apart from one another. Take up, for 
 instance, a history of opinions such as Mr Lecky's 
 recently published volumes on " Rationalism in Eu- 
 rope," and what do we find there ? One belief 
 seems to follow another like the pictures in a magic 
 lantern. Each of them was held in turn in full 
 conviction, and many of them with passionate at- 
 tachment ; but which of them were true ? Were 
 any of them true ? What is the test of their 
 truth? A particular answer to such questions is 
 doubtless intended to be suggested, but for an 
 articulate assertion of it we must seek elsewhere ! . 
 
 1 " The speculative opinions which are embraced by any large body 
 of men are accepted not on account of the arguments upon which they 
 
32 LECTURE II. 
 
 Take up, again, any work on Psychology, and 
 what do we find ? Even there the question of truth is 
 sometimes overlooked or little regarded. Abundant 
 explanations are given as to the disturbing influ- 
 ence of various circumstances upon the value and 
 accuracy of our judgments ; how passion blinds the 
 reason, how self-interest exerts a bias, and so on. 
 Most true ; but when we recollect that our beliefs 
 are not like mere states of feeling, but may be, 
 in fact must be, right or wrong ; the question again 
 recurs, Are they true or are they false? We do 
 not want to be put off by being told the order 
 in which beliefs have succeeded or will succeed 
 one another, nor yet by being told that belief is a 
 sentiment engendered by such or such causes. 
 
 Of the two classes of questions therefore which 
 now meet us in reference to belief, the first, namely 
 How do they arise ? where do they prevail ? in 
 what order do they succeed one another ? we pass 
 
 rest, but on account of a predisposition to receive them. This predispo- 
 sition depends with many persons entirely upon the circumstances of 
 their position, that is to say, upon the associations of childhood, friend- 
 ship, or interest, and is of such a nature as altogether to dispense with 
 arguments ; with others it depends chiefly upon the character of their 
 minds, which induces them to embrace one class of arguments rather 
 than another. The intellectual character, again, results partly from 
 natural and innate peculiarities, and partly from the totality of influ- 
 ences that act upon the mind." The Rise and Influence of Rationalism 
 in Europe, Vol. n. p 107. 
 
 Such a statement as this is quite appropriate on the part of any one 
 who has already decided that the opinions in question are groundless ; 
 but it is as well to remind the reader that over the whole field embraced 
 by this sort of historical criticism every conviction is soon rotted through 
 and sinks into nothing more than a taste or sentiment, or it may be a 
 passion. A history of religious or political convictions conducted on this 
 system had better be entitled, A history of prejudices. 
 
(STATEMENT OF THE DIFFICULTY. 33 
 
 tff as not concerning us. It belongs rather to the 
 province of Psychology or History. It is with the 
 second that we are now to be occupied, namely, 
 Which of these beliefs is true ? What is the 
 criterion of their truth ? Since the time of Bacon 
 much illustration has been given of the "idols" 
 of the human mind, that is of those deceptive 
 images which flit before us and mislead us in our 
 search after truth. But how are we to know when 
 we are the victims of them ? When is the mind 
 sound and when is it .unsound? I need hardly say 
 that I have not the presumption to offer a new 
 criterion of truth, but at least we may see our way 
 towards effecting some mitigation of the perplexities 
 which encounter us. 
 
 Abandoning, then, the Historical or Psycholo- 
 gical position, suppose that we are confronted with a 
 difference of opinion deliberately adopted and per- 
 sistently maintained : what is to be done ? Such 
 an occurrence is not unknown ; indeed the course 
 of our last lecture has shewn abundant opportunities 
 for it ; How is it to be remedied ? 
 
 I. In science we know what our resource would 
 be, in case such a state of things should be found to 
 exist there. We should have to devise some experi- 
 ment and see which of the conflicting opinions was 
 correct. Of course such an "interrogation of nature" 
 is one to which an answer is only to be got with 
 difficulty ; when however we have succeeded in 
 getting it, it is generally clear and unequivocal. 
 But in reference to religious truth any appeal to 
 v. L. 3 
 
34 LECTl-RK 77. 
 
 experience in the strict sense of the term is mostly 
 out of the question. For one thing the result may 
 have to be waited for, and the time during which 
 we wait may be just the time during which alone we 
 are practically concerned in obtaining an answer. 
 Take, for example, the doctrine of a Future Life. In 
 the case of ninety-nine out of a hundred generations 
 who have lived on earth that question is long past 
 doubt now ; it is settled as decisively and crucially 
 by the result as was ever any physical problem ; 
 but if they cannot tell us what they have found, how 
 are we the wiser by their conclusive knowledge ? 
 Again, in other instances, experiment is not merely 
 delayed ; it is from the nature of the case impossible. 
 An experiment is of course partial; it implies the 
 introduction of a thing into new circumstances, the 
 temporary exclusion of an agent, and so on. In 
 truths therefore which are universal, like some con- 
 cerning the Being and Attributes of God, we can 
 hardly have experimental knowledge in the strict 
 sense of the term 1 . 
 
 1 We are so used to meet the word experimental in religious biogra- 
 phies that it may be forgotten in what a different sense it is there 
 employed. Of course every individual must be the final judge as to his 
 own mental states and the changes they undergo ; he must know whe- 
 ther he is restless or at peace, whether his conscience torments him or 
 not, but more than this is needed for experiment in the common sense 
 of the word. The essence of the term, when used scientifically, seems to 
 imply two things ; namely that knowledge as to objective facts may be 
 thus acquired, and that this knowledge is free and conclusive to every 
 one who chooses to put himself into the right circumstances. But who 
 would claim this in religion 1 Take for example such a doctrine as the 
 Love of God. We cannot prove this to demonstration, in the way in 
 which we can prove that air has weight by temporarily exhausting it from 
 
MODES OF SECURING UNANIMITY. 35 
 
 II. But although decisive experiment fails us, 
 a good deal may still be done towards effecting 
 unanimity in these complicated subjects by the pro- 
 cess which, for want of a better term, may be called 
 " living by the doctrine in question." Many a scheme, 
 which at first struck us as very ingenious, will in this 
 way lose all hold upon the mind without its being 
 strictly disproved. And conversely, other schemes, 
 as to the value of which we were once very doubtful, 
 grow in our estimation as we continue to find them 
 harmonising with our other convictions and adapting 
 themselves to the varying necessities of our daily 
 life. As this process plays a very important part 
 in the formation of our convictions it is worth while 
 calling attention to it. Ask any man immersed in 
 practical affairs what is his guarantee for some rule 
 on which he relies ? He may assign one or two 
 reasons, but these are probably not so much the 
 real sources of his own conviction as grounds for 
 justifying his conduct to others. The reliance which 
 he feels rests rather on the confirmation obtained 
 in daily life, on the way in which his rule harmonises 
 with his other convictions, on the support which it 
 receives from the convictions and the practice of 
 others. Our opinions thus undergo a process (if 
 
 a certain place and then marking the difference ; at least we could only 
 do this by admitting Reprobation, and finding some wretch upon whom 
 the brand of God's wrath was stamped for ever. There are indeed plen- 
 tiful indications of the fact of the Creator's love upon every side of us, 
 abundantly sufficient to confirm the Scriptural revelation of it, but not of 
 that decisive character which forces the man who denies it to lie to his 
 own soul. 
 
 32 
 
36 LECTURE IT. 
 
 one may use a familiar term) of "shading down" 
 which does much to fit each into its relative place. 
 Many of those which were apparently out of place 
 and ex centric in their nature come to be removed, 
 those which were ill-assorted come to be united into 
 closer cohesion. I know no other way than this by 
 which we can practically test any of those compre- 
 hensive moral and religious truths to which we are 
 referring. If any one should reply that such a circuit- 
 ous process is needless, inasmuch as we may often 
 see our way to some short cut for establishing or 
 refuting a proposition by bringing it into connection 
 with other indisputable truths, we might rejoin that 
 even where this resource is available the evidence 
 of these test-truths is not intuitive, but would be 
 found to involve a process precisely similar to that 
 which has been just described 1 . 
 
 1 An example or two may serve to make the above remarks plainer. 
 In former times a philosophical system, such as that of Des Cartes, 
 could be so displayed as to stand or fall by its intrinsic merits in a very 
 short space. Men were expected to think it over and say whether they 
 accepted it or not. But now contrast with this such a modern scheme 
 as the Association Theory, or such doctrines as those of Development, or 
 of the * Survival of the fittest,' or many others that might be men- 
 tioned. How are these to be proved or disproved ? No summary test 
 seems available : certainly it is not to be found within our own minds, 
 and if we seek it in the facts we shall find that these are explicable on 
 more than one hypothesis, the only question being which is the more 
 probable explanation ? The facts to be appealed to are so numerous, 
 especially with the resort now made to the Comparative system, that 
 no other mode of conviction seems attainable but that which is indi- 
 cated above. And if this applies to the establishment of any single 
 philosophical idea, it applies still more to such a group of ideas as go to 
 make up a system or method. When a man has satisfied himself of the 
 truth of some central idea he will, no doubt, very summarily reject or 
 accept a multitude of subordinate doctrines, by one of the short cuts 
 

 MODES OF SECCMING UNANIMITY. 37 
 
 But it should be observed of such a process as 
 this, that, though it can effect much towards making 
 
 alluded to above, but this is a very different thing from admitting that 
 such a central idea itself can be thus summarily criticised. 
 
 With regard to the interdependence of these ideas, one upon ano- 
 ther, not so much by necessary logical connection as by the analogy of 
 their nature and the harmony of their results, there are some admirable 
 remarks in an Essay by De Quincey. I subjoin an extract : 
 
 "The principle is this, that in the grander parts of knowledge, 
 which do not deal much with petty details, nearly all the building 
 or constructive ideas (those ideas which build up the system of that par- 
 ticular knowledge) lie involved within each other ; so that any one of 
 the series being awakened in the mind, is sufficient, (given a multitude 
 of minds) to lead backwards or forwards, analytically or systematically, 
 into many of the rest. If into any Pagan language you had to translate 
 the word loce or purity or penitence, &c. you could not do it. The 
 Greek language itself, perhaps the finest that man has employed, could 
 not do it. The scale was not so pitched as to make the transfer possible. 
 It was to execute organ music on a guitar. There lies the difficulty ; 
 and the principle which meets it is this, that what any one idea could 
 never effect for itself (insulated it must remain an unknown quantity for 
 ever), the total system of the ideas developed from its centre would 
 effect for each separately. To know the part, you must first know the 
 whole, or know it at least by some outline. The idea of purity, e. g. in 
 its Christian attribute, would be utterly incomprehensible, and, besides, 
 could not sustain itself for a moment if by any glimpse it were ap- 
 proached. But when a ruin was unfolded that had affected the human 
 race, and many things heretofore unobserved, because uncombined, 
 were gathered into a unity of evidence to that ruin, spread through 
 innumerable channels, the great altitude would begin dimly to reveal 
 itself by means of the mighty depth in correspondence. One deep 
 calleth to another. One after another the powers lodged in the awful 
 succession of uncoverings would react upon each other ; and thus the 
 feeblest language would be as capable of receiving and reflecting the 
 system of truths (because the system is an arch that supports itself) 
 as the richest and noblest, and for the same reason that makes geometry 
 careless of language. The same principle applies, and a fortiori applies, 
 "to religious truth, as one which lies far deeper than geometry in 
 the spirit of man, one to which the inner attestation is profounder, and 
 to which the key-notes of Science (once awakened on the great organ of 
 the human heart) are sure to call up corresponding echoes. It is not in 
 the power of language to arrest or to defeat this mode of truth ; because 
 when once the fundamental base is furnished by revelation, the human 
 
38 LECTURE II. 
 
 a man's opinions consistent amongst themselves, and 
 bringing him into harmony with those in somewhat 
 similar circumstances, it can effect very little indeed 
 towards securing general unanimity of opinion 1 . It 
 resembles, in fact, such an agency as party organi- 
 zation. A great number of individual eccentricities 
 are loosened and removed ; but the main bulk of 
 opposing opinions continue to confront one another 
 with undiminished force. The all-pervading guerilla 
 warfare which existed before has been merged into 
 the opposition of two or more organized hosts. Now 
 when these parties come into conflict how is the 
 opposition between them to be decided ? 
 
 Here the conclusions arrived at in the last 
 Lecture seem to confront us with a most formidable 
 difficulty. The difficulty consists in this ; the same 
 objective evidence may produce in different minds 
 or at different times different subjective impressions. 
 Or stated in less technical language, the facts before 
 us being the same, different conclusions may be 
 drawn. You will perceive the nature of such a diffi- 
 culty more clearly by putting it into an imaginary 
 form; or rather (what will be abundantly sufficient) 
 by greatly exaggerating acknowledged facts. Sup- 
 pose then that all old people drew one conclusion 
 
 heart itself is able to co-operate in developing the great harmonies of 
 the system, without aid from language, and in defiance of language, 
 without aid from human learning, and in defiance of human learning, by 
 a machinery of spiritual counterpoint." Selections Grave and Gay, 
 vm. 128. 
 
 1 We are speaking of it here not in its scientific, but in its theolo- 
 gical applications. 
 

 CONSEQUENCES OF WANT OF UN AN A 
 
 from some of the facts of life, arid that all young 
 people draw another ; that this conflict existed under 
 all circumstances and in all countries, and having 
 been perpetuated from the earliest records showed 
 no sign of diminution as time advanced. What 
 should we make of such a phenomenon ? The 
 question might refer to facts which, so to say, lay 
 apart from the primary interests of life, and did not 
 therefore imperatively call for a decision. If so, we 
 should, I suppose, be driven to the conclusion that 
 for some reason or other our minds were not fitted 
 for these problems ; we should take it as a warning 
 to keep off such ground. But if the facts were too 
 comprehensive to be evaded, and too important to 
 be neglected, what then ? We should seem to have 
 reached all that the most thorough-going sceptic 
 could desire. The human faculties would be found in 
 hopeless antagonism, and truth or falsehood on such 
 a subject would have lost their meaning. We tell 
 men to test their views in the struggle of life ; they 
 say in reply that they have done so and are doing it 
 continually, and yet that they find themselves in no 
 way tending towards agreement. 
 
 Now something of this difficulty does unques- 
 tionably exist, as I have endeavoured to show. The 
 mere fact that people so generally take different 
 views of the truth and importance of religion when 
 in sickness and in health, when in affliction or joy, 
 is one case in point. Hence the urgent importance 
 of arriving, if we can, at some sort of criterion. 
 
 To begin with, there are two modes (amongst 
 
40 LECTURE II. 
 
 others) of cutting the knot instead of attempting to 
 untie it : 
 
 I. For instance, one may sometimes meet with 
 persons who seem to advocate an extension to our 
 belief of that principle of division of labour which is 
 already admitted in our knowledge. They would 
 say, let the old and sick be left in undisturbed 
 possession of the belief which is so suitable to them, 
 and which is so naturally produced by their peculiar 
 circumstances. But don't let them try to propagate 
 their gloomy convictions and impose them upon 
 alien minds. Leave the young and healthy to their 
 gaiety ; why chill their joy and check its all too 
 fugitive development ? Is not each acting in per- 
 fect harmony with his nature and circumstances ? 
 Such advice is doubtless well meant, but what ren- 
 ders it intolerable, except indeed upon the ground of 
 dramatic propriety, is the fact that the distinction 
 between truth and falsehood is being dropped quite 
 out of sight. These recommendations are all very 
 well as regards men's pursuits and enjoyments, but 
 when they trench upon grounds of 'belief, they are 
 losing sight of the one important question, which 
 party is in the right ? No one who was in earnest 
 would consent to be put off by being told that both 
 parties were acting suitably. 
 
 II. The other of these methods is of a far more 
 seductive and dangerous kind. It counsels us once 
 for all to have done with every topic which is subject 
 to such a taint of uncertainty. The state of feeling 
 out of which this doctrine grows is one upon which 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF WANT OF UNANIMITY. 41 
 
 we have already touched, and which is not hard to 
 understand. The progress of science has led us to 
 care but little for processes or methods in compa- 
 rison with results. Men have learnt to withhold 
 their complete assent, not merely from ingenious 
 hypotheses, but even from strong presumptions of 
 analogy and induction whenever there is a chance 
 of their soon finding the firmer assurance of some 
 independent test. Combine with this the fact that 
 the vast extent of science now forces most men 
 to rely in most subjects very much upon the judg- 
 ment of others, and that in doing this they must 
 take into account whether those others are in agree- 
 ment ; and what will follow ? 
 
 Will not many an active and busy man be 
 inclined to say, ' I have many pressing wants to 
 satisfy, and but little time to think ; 1 for one shall 
 just wait till those who advocate supernatural the- 
 ories are in better agreement. Their differences are 
 a sure sign that there is something wrong, I can't 
 stop to inquire what 1 ?' 
 
 When these feelings begin to be systematized 
 and promulgated abroad as a doctrine, the scheme 
 which they form is what I understand by Secularism. 
 When, in addition, they are founded on a philosophic 
 
 1 It is worth remarking that Des Cartes has expressed a similar 
 opinion, though of course on totally different grounds. With him it was 
 the exuberance of confidence in his own method that made him offer 
 the recommendation. " II ne faut nous occuper que des objets dont notre 
 esprit paroit capable d'acquerir une connaissance certaine et indubi- 
 table," a certainty equal, as he elsewhere says, with that of mathematics. 
 Descartes' works, edited by Cousin, Vol. xi. p. 209. 
 
42 LECTURE II. 
 
 basis, and justified by Psychology and History, we 
 have what is called Positivism. 
 
 These schemes hardly admit of being disproved, 
 any more than the practical resolve which is the 
 germ out of which they spring. They all say to the 
 Theologian, * Your explanation breaks down, therefore 
 we shall shape our conduct in total disregard of it.' 
 All that we can do, then, is to show that we need 
 not be driven to this last resort. This is what I am 
 aiming at, by endeavouring to shew that the diffi- 
 culties, which it is urged drive us to this resort, are 
 much exaggerated, and admit of some explanation. 
 
 To those then who. decline to accept these ways 
 of evading the difficulty, several resources are open 
 for surmounting it. Let us review some of them. 
 
 I. There is one well known opinion that in such 
 circumstances the judgment of the soberminded 
 man, the o-TrovScuos, should be taken as decisive. In 
 such conjunctures, however, as we are now concerned 
 with, there does not seem much prospect of assist- 
 ance here. The entire difficulty which would other- 
 wise have been experienced in forming our judgment 
 about the facts presents itself in an undiminished 
 form in the process of selecting the man who is to 
 pronounce judgment upon them. His judgment is 
 pretty well known beforehand. He is therefore a 
 mere delegate, sent to give a predetermined vote; 
 and therefore the decision which it was intended 
 should be transferred to him is retained and wran- 
 gled over by those who choose him. 
 
 II. Others would say, Each man can judge, or 
 
HOW TO SECURE UNANIMITY. 43 
 
 [ther (for the reason just given) cannot help judg- 
 g, for himself. But let him decide in his cooler 
 moments. He must avoid the times when passion is 
 
 aring in his ears, or indeed when there is disturb- 
 ance of any kind. Let him, in. fact, take a time of 
 dead calm for the purpose. The objection to this 
 lies, I apprehend, in the fact that there is no such 
 period of dead calm. The advice seems to rest upon 
 the assumption that our minds will, as a general 
 rule, find their way straight to the truth, with the 
 exception of occasional temporary disturbances. If 
 so, avoid these, and there is nothing to fear. But 
 if the conclusions reached in my last lecture be sound 
 this advice is founded on error. We are never free 
 
 m warping influences. At the times when we 
 think we are free, the chances are that we are ex- 
 posed to what are really but one class of them, 
 namely, deadening influences. When all in our lives 
 is proceeding easily and pleasantly, men may claim 
 that they are free from bias, but that is the time of 
 course when they will least feel their need for any- 
 thing beyond what is then found to be so com- 
 fortable. 
 
 It is true that during most part of our life we 
 may be cool enough for a physical problem; where 
 the external evidence is clear, it will take a great 
 deal % to make a man misjudge it who has any real 
 care to reach the truth. But, as I have tried to 
 show, there are influences by which we may be af- 
 fected not on exceptional occasions only, but for long 
 periods: and these may affect not merely one person 
 
 
44 LECTURE II. 
 
 here or there, but whole classes. They may appear 
 but slight influences, and yet be of quite sufficient 
 importance to produce serious effects in matters 
 which demand a delicate adjustment of distinct 
 classes of premises. 
 
 III. Another course, and as it seems to me a 
 sounder one, is readily suggested by our previous 
 train of reflection. Evidence on moral and religious 
 subjects is, as we have seen, exceedingly complicated, 
 and also (what is very important) has reference to 
 different classes of our faculties, that is, to our emo- 
 tional as well as our rational side. Now the causes 
 of any persistent collision of judgments commonly lie 
 in the fact that certain men, or men at certain times, 
 are liable to have one or other of these sides of 
 our nature unduly quickened or unduly depressed. 
 Strike, then, a balance by appealing to the judgment 
 of men under different circumstances, and so avoid 
 the errors into which each singly may be liable. 
 Empannel, that is, a more numerous jury, or, what is 
 better still, choose it from distinct classes of society. 
 I think that most persons act almost unconsciously 
 on some such principle as this in some of the lesser 
 matters of life. When you are depressed, for in- 
 stance, and things put on their gloomiest aspect, and 
 the judgment becomes infected with the bias of the 
 feelings, and so evils are more strongly anticipated 
 than at other times, have you never said to your- 
 self, 'I am not now in a fit state to judge; I know 
 that my mind is warped, and I will allow for bias' ? 
 This is a perfectly sound process of judgment; the 
 
QUALIFICATIONS FOR SOUND JUDGMENT. 45 
 
 only complaint to be urged being that we do not suf- 
 ficiently make allowances on both sides. When we 
 are in all the glow of health and spirits, anything 
 gloomy will seem too remote just as before it seemed 
 too near. To be equitable we ought to correct one 
 judgment just as much as the other 1 . 
 
 I cannot see any sound reason why one of these 
 states should be selected as more likely than the 
 other to ensure a correct judgment. As things now 
 are we surely cannot call one of them more 'natural' 
 than the other, nor is one so normal that the other 
 should be neglected. But let us pause for a moment 
 and see what an advocate of each might urge in his 
 own behalf. 
 
 One man, then, will say, the mind, when in full 
 health and strength, is more vigorous. Concentrated 
 attention is then possible, and we can thus follow out 
 our principles into much more remote consequences. 
 In a word, if we are fitter then for science, why not 
 for everything else ? 
 
 True, the other retorts, and therefore in matters 
 
 1 Mr Bain says (The Emotions and the Will, p. 464), "What I 
 should suggest is that even- evening we record the impression of the 
 day, or put down the side which preponderates according to the 
 balance of the motives passing through the mind in the course of 
 that day ; and that this record should be continued during the whole 
 period that this deliberation lasts. It would happen that in some 
 days we feel more acutely the pressure of the motives on one side 
 than on others ; the preponderance being liable to be reversed from 
 day to day in a question where the total of pleasures or pains is very 
 nearly equal. But by allowing a lapse of time we should reduce the 
 casual or accidental biases to a general average, and at the end of the 
 period we have only to sum up the records of the days, and see which side 
 has the majority." 
 
46 LECTURE IT. 
 
 in which close attention is of the greatest, importance, 
 the sick and feeble and those about to die had 
 better defer their judgments to the strong and 
 healthy. We freely resign to you therefore the field 
 of scientific discovery. But why abandon our right 
 of decision in moral and religious questions ? We 
 have not here so much remote consequences to 
 pursue, for which vigorous undiverted attention is 
 needed. The conclusions are mostly drawn from 
 many and various premises by very short and simple 
 inferences. What is wanted therefore is reflection 
 more than discursive power. An occasional lapse 
 of attention is not fatal here, provided only that we 
 can succeed in keeping the proper facts before us. 
 And they might claim more. They might retort 
 that many very important facts of which account 
 ought to be taken are distinctly more likely to have 
 due prominence given to them at such times of weak- 
 ness and depression. All that dark side of life 
 which our social arrangements so persistently and 
 often successfully endeavour to exclude from sight 
 cannot be ignored then. Nor should they be ignored 
 in a really comprehensive judgment. How does Job 
 insist upon this when his friends had been so fully 
 expounding to him the view of life which their own 
 personal experience suggested and confirmed ! " No 
 doubt but ye are the people, and wisdom shall die 
 with you. But I have understanding as well as you ; 
 
 I am not inferior to you: Doth not the ear try 
 
 words, and the mouth taste his meat?... God leadeth 
 counsellors away spoiled, and maketh the judges 
 
QUALIFICATIONS FOR SOUND JUDGMENT. 47 
 
 fools... He discovereth deep things out of darkness, 
 and bringeth out to light the shadow of death." 
 
 Let any unprejudiced person look again at those 
 familiar discussions and say whether Job's friends 
 were more likely than he was to see the truth upon 
 such subjects as occupied their attention then. 
 
 Several considerations might be advanced in sup- 
 port of the fairness of this way of judging. Who, 
 for instance, have, as a matter of fact, had the 
 deepest and truest views of life, even without intro- 
 ducing specially religious considerations 1 ? If we were 
 to exclude such poets and moralists as are not in 
 ealth and vigour, should we be likely to retain the 
 it only ? I think we might claim even those in 
 ninterrupted health and good humour as bearing 
 imilar testimony. What does Wordsworth say in 
 
 1 The following judgment of Mr Mill upon Bentham will serve 
 to illustrate what is meant above : " He had neither internal nor 
 external experience. The quiet even tenor of his life and his healthi- 
 ness of mind conspired to exclude him from both. He never knew 
 prosperity and adversity, passion nor satiety. He never had even 
 the experience which sickness gives. He lived from childhood to the 
 age of eighty-five in boyish health. He knew no dejection, no heavi- 
 ness of heart. He never felt life a sore and weary burden. He was 
 a boy to the last. Self-consciousness, that daemon of the men of 
 genius of our time, from Wordsworth to Byron, from Goethe to Cha- 
 teaubriand, and to which this age owes so much of its cheerful and 
 its mournful wisdom, never was awakened in him. How much of 
 human nature slumbered in him he knew not, nor can we know. 
 He had never been made alive to the unseen influences which were 
 
 acting on himself, nor consequently on his fellow-creatures It is 
 
 obvious what would be likely to be achieved by such a man, what 
 a thinker thus gifted and thus disqualified could do in philosophy. 
 He could with close and accurate logic hunt half truths to their conse- 
 quences and practical applications, on a scale both of greatness and of 
 minuteness not previously exemplified." Essay on Bentham, in Dis- 
 cussions and Dissertations. 
 
48 LECTURE II. 
 
 his Ode about intimations of immortality " In a 
 season of calm weather .... our souls have sight 
 of that immortal sea which brought us hither"? 
 Again; it has been noticed by Dugald Stewart and 
 others that humour is commonly one of the last qua- 
 lities to be attacked and weakened by sickness and 
 the approach of death ; but humour is pre-eminently 
 the faculty of seeing (though under a particular 
 light) broad human characteristics. 
 
 Such a doctrine as this requires however some 
 explanation and correction to guard it from misap- 
 prehension and abuse. Without this it might be 
 taken to be a mere consecration of existing beliefs, 
 whether true or superstitious. First then we must 
 inquire about those afflictive agencies with which we 
 are concerned, and which has such a tendency to 
 stamp one kind of judgment upon our minds. Are 
 they really permanent agencies, that is, are they 
 universal elements of human nature ? 
 
 You will observe that it is essential to our argu- 
 ment that they should be permanent; for if ever they 
 could be got rid of in the progress of society they 
 would have no more logical value than the ague and 
 sickness which are dispelled by improved cultivation. 
 This permanence is clearly the case with death; and 
 therefore the only question remaining here is, are 
 men likely to change in the sentiments with which 
 they regard the prospect of it ? There surely does 
 not seem to be at present the faintest intimation of 
 any such change. In fact far from men growing in- 
 different to death by the casting off of superstitious 
 
PERMANENCE OF AFFLICTION, <&c. 49 
 
 terrors, the tendency is decidedly the other way 1 . 
 With increasing sensibility, culture and sympathy, 
 the shock which it causes, the strange and horrid 
 inroad which it makes into all that we prize and 
 take an interest in, are I think actually increasing. 
 If therefore the Secularist and Positivist expect to 
 reconcile men to it they are indeed sanguine. If it 
 be urged that these refined sentiments are almost 
 unknown to the savage and to those who have to 
 live by incessant toil, but are the mere product of 
 leisure and refinement; we .might fairly demur to 
 the implied assumption that such modes of life make 
 men better fit to judge in the matter. Are refine- 
 ment and culture such unnatural conditions that the 
 judgments they engender should be regarded with 
 suspicion ? We have not time to examine in detail 
 any of the other afflictive circumstances of life, of 
 which I have before spoken, but I think that if you 
 reflect upon them you will find either that they will 
 never, so far as we can foresee, be escaped, or else 
 (what comes to the same thing), that our own 
 estimate of them, whatever they may in themselves 
 be, shows no sign of diminution. The logical im- 
 portance of these considerations -must not be over- 
 looked. If, for instance, all pain sorrow and sickness 
 could be ridded out of the world, religious feelings 
 
 1 "The Greek, for the most part, rose lightly from the banquet 
 of life to pass into that unknown land with whose mystery speculation 
 had but dallied, and of which comedy had made a jest. The Roman 
 lay down almost as lightly to rest after his course of public duty. 
 But now if death could really regain his victory in the mind of man, 
 hunger and philosophy -together would hardly hold life in its course." 
 Gold win Smith's Lectures on the study of English History, p. 39. 
 V. L. 4 
 
, 50 LECTURE II. 
 
 would not improbably begin soon to dwindle away, 
 and eventually might even disappear, through lack 
 of some of their appropriate nourishment. At least, 
 if they subsisted, they would probably be built up 
 into a creed considerably different from that which 
 we now accept. This I have just compared to the 
 extirpation of ague by improved cultivation. A 
 change of outward circumstances would ha ye changed, 
 in one case the sentiments, in the other the bodily 
 health of those exposed to these influences. But we 
 cannot stop at this point : there is a logical distinc- 
 tion between the two cases. If men cease to suffer 
 from illness a century hence, the knowledge of 
 this fact has no effect upon us now. If however 
 they give up their religious belief then, our faith 
 would at once be affected. An argument which is 
 to convince posterity must surely have some weight 
 with us. 
 
 You will not misunderstand me as though I 
 meant to imply that the religious feelings and con- 
 victions are only appropriate to the dark side of life ; 
 as though, except when men were in distress, they 
 need never think of God. Far from it. Turn over 
 the Book of Psalms, and there is not a single happy 
 state, from the joy that exults in the most glorious 
 manifestations of God's power to the quiet content- 
 . ment that is felt amid the still pastures and the 
 brooks, which does not there find a distinctly reli- 
 gious expression. But though these happy expe- 
 riences will blend with our religious convictions 
 would they have been sufficient to have excited 
 
INFLUENCE OF AFFLICTION, &c. 51 
 
 them ? " Before I was afflicted I went astray, but 
 now have I kept thy word," is David's own confes- 
 sion. What chance would Christianity have in a 
 world of healthy happy young people ? They might 
 play with some of its more attractive doctrines, with 
 the pictures and the stories, but would they be com- 
 petent to hand it on to others with its dogmatic 
 character unaltered? And yet those same young 
 people when their convictions are otherwise obtained 
 and supported may exhibit brilliant examples of 
 every Christian grace. 
 
 There are some important qualifications of our 
 principle which must now be noticed. To what sort 
 of doctrines are we to apply the rule that the indi- 
 vidual judgment is liable to be biassed and must 
 therefore be distrusted, whilst truth is rather to be 
 sought in the aggregate judgment as formed and 
 corrected by many minds ? Such a rule, I think, is 
 tenable only under the two following restrictions : 
 
 (I.) In the first place we cannot fairly claim to 
 confirm in this way any truths except those of an 
 elementary kind ; truths, that is, when stated in very 
 general terms, and not when specialized by many 
 limitations. This almost stands to reason, for in 
 proportion as a truth is specialized it becomes less 
 universal, and so fails to answer to the test. In 
 other words, distinct dogmatic statements, and accu- 
 rate definitions of terms, such as those in our Arti- 
 cles, must be supported by independent reasons. In 
 that precise form we cannot appeal to a sufficiently 
 wide corroborative experience; and even if a wide 
 
 42 
 
52 LECTURE II. 
 
 experience were attainable, we could not fairly say 
 that so rough a test as that to which we appeal is 
 competent to decide between one of these precise 
 statements and another. 
 
 (II.) A second condition is that we must be 
 careful that the confirming testimony is really given 
 under sufficiently independent circumstances. A com- 
 mon error is to trust to the mass of those who give 
 their assent, without looking to their varying expe- 
 rience. My conviction of the truth of the doctrines 
 contained in a hymn is not greater when I hear it 
 sung by three thousand voices, than when I repeat 
 it for myself; and I cannot see any better reason for 
 assenting to any dogmatic statement because it has 
 been continuously repeated during many centuries. 
 At least this only gives it the negative value, that 
 had the doctrine been groundless, it would probably 
 have been attacked and refuted during that time. 
 The question is, Do successive generations merely 
 rest their belief of a doctrine each on. the fact that 
 those before them believed it also, or do they rest it 
 on the fact, that their own obscure convictions are 
 strengthened by finding them in accordance with the 
 convictions of others? In the latter case, the argu- 
 ment from general consent 1 rightly claims considerable 
 
 1 This doctrine of "general consent" is referred to very briefly 
 above, as I wished to examine it solely upon logical grounds. It is 
 impossible however to say anything about it without suggesting the 
 celebrated rule of Vincentiu's of Lerins ("quod semper, quod ubique, 
 quod ab omnibus"), with all its theological and ecclesiastical associa- 
 tions. I have not directly mentioned it because such a rule could 
 never have found favour, or even have been adopted, without the 
 existence of a prepossession which cannot be admitted here, though 
 
GENERAL CONSENT. 53 
 
 weight. But I apprehend that the doctrines which 
 it is thus attempted to support are often of such a 
 precisely-worded character as to be much more sug- 
 gestive of the case in which each person's conviction 
 rests really on the conviction of others, than of their 
 being convictions independently grounded, and only 
 deriving support from such agreement. 
 
 I have been commenting, brethren, upon some of 
 the causes of conflict of opinion and consequent 
 doubt, to which we are subject on religious and 
 moral topics. Now so long as we fix our attention 
 upon that conflict itself instead of looking to the 
 causes of it, we may seem to occupy a position in 
 lamentable contrast with that claimed in science. 
 There men, whether they know much or little, at 
 least think alike, or show a strong tendency to do 
 so; their unanimity being secured by the possibility 
 of prompt and decisive experiment : even where such 
 a test is not yet attained, it is confidently expected 
 that it will some day be found attainable. It has 
 been my principal object in this lecture to shew that 
 
 it is perfectly fair on the part of a theologian arguing in support 
 of any particular doctrine. This preposse*ssion is that there must 
 somewhere exist a visible Church in which unity and truth of doctrine 
 are to be found. If this assumption be admitted, the rule in question 
 might serve well enough to detect the doctrines which were essential 
 to such a Church ; but if it be not admitted, what right have we to 
 suppose that any doctrines whatever will be found thus universally 
 to prevail except in a very rudimentary shape? And how are we 
 to admit it without resorting to Biblical or traditional considerations ? 
 
 Those who wish to see all that can be said historically and other- 
 wise on the doctrine of " common sense," which is the philosophical 
 basis of the theological doctrine of general consent, will find it in 
 Hamilton's edition of Reid, pp. 742803. 
 
54 LECTURE II. 
 
 if we direct our observation to the causes of the 
 much more fundamental differences which undoubt- 
 edly exist in non- scientific subjects, instead of laying 
 the stress upon the mere fact of their existence, we 
 may see our way towards a considerable reduction of 
 their importance. We may not have made out any 
 infallible criterion of truth, but we may yet have 
 done much towards smoothing some stumblingblocks 
 out of our way. 
 
 One word in conclusion, brethren, about that 
 rough and ready way of getting rid of all religious 
 difficulties which consists in simply turning the mind 
 away from them. By those who take this course 
 the attempt is naturally made to show that there is 
 a very clear and sharp distinction between (as the 
 phrase is) this world and the next; as though all in 
 the one were plain, and all in the other obscure. I 
 have not space now to do more than express the con- 
 viction, which I think could be abundantly justified, 
 that there exists no such clear line of demarcation. 
 When we leave simple facts and rise to broad gene- 
 ralizations, we shall find that neither in the subject- 
 matter nor in the methods is it possible to say, ' At 
 this point ends the solid earth of our world, and 
 there you launch into the mists and clouds of the 
 other/ 
 
 Let me put this into the form of an illustration. 
 Might we not compare our position here for the in- 
 vestigation of truth to that which would be afforded 
 to men whose only outlook into the world was 
 through a fixed telescope? Straight in the line of 
 
CONCLUSION. 55 
 
 vision all is clear enough, and hardly any two per- 
 sons differ as to what they perceive there. And 
 most rightly do they make use of it for such a pur- 
 pose, for in that field of view is the scene of their 
 ordinary life, and of much that is of pressing daily 
 importance. But then round that centre of clear 
 vision there is a vast prospect, clear enough also in 
 parts, but hazy and obscure towards the edge; so 
 that with strained and aching eyes men can hardly 
 say what is there, and some perceive one thing and 
 some another. Now if they were to insist on in- 
 serting an opaque disk, and so excluding all that 
 hazy outline from the eye, would they be wise? 
 would they have gained anything ? Should no dan- 
 ger be guarded against and no good aimed at until 
 it can be seen straight in the line of vision? It 
 may never come there till we cease to see darkly 
 through a glass ; shall we take no count of it till 
 then? 
 
LECTURE III. 
 
 CONSEQUENCES WHICH FOLLOrf TlfB 
 
 THAT OUR BELIEF RESTS ON VERY COMPLI- 
 CATED GROUNDS. 
 
 JOHN v. 44. 
 
 How can ye believe which receive honour one of another, and 
 seek not the honour which cometh of God only ? 
 
 As we shall be mostly occupied during this and the 
 next Lecture with drawing out certain inferences 
 from the conclusions arrived at in the first and 
 second, and as many of you moreover are here to-day 
 for the first time, I must briefly indicate what the 
 nature of those conclusions was ; 
 
 Summarily stated they were these; Beyond the 
 province of what we commonly call science (within 
 which substantial unanimity is secured by the possi- 
 bility of prompt and decisive experiments) there is a 
 wide extent of very important subjects in which the 
 comparative absence of such unanimity is felt as a 
 serious difficulty, and made a constant matter of 
 reproach. This failing shews itself in two ways ; 
 partly in the differences between one person and 
 another as to what they believe, partly in the varying 
 
RECAPITULATION. 57 
 
 intensity with which the same person holds his 
 belief at one time and another. My first Lecture 
 was an attempt to account for these characteristics, 
 in other words to find out some logical reason for 
 them. (I may pause to remind you that such a 
 reason must be found unless we are to be driven to 
 doubt whether it is any good our thinking about 
 such subjects at all.) I pointed out, in explanation, 
 several respects in which evidence in moral and 
 religious inquiries is broadly distinguished from that 
 in scientific inquiries. They were, first, the vast, 
 indeed indefinite, number of the facts which, as proof, 
 combine to secure our assent. Secondly, each of 
 these so-called "facts" is itself compound, being 
 elaborated by the mind out of a little that is actually 
 given, and much that is supplied. Thirdly, and most 
 important of all, emotions make up one of these 
 groups of facts. 
 
 But to account for differences of opinion causes 
 us to be at once challenged by the inquiry, Do you 
 mean to justify them ? and, if not all of them, then 
 which ? In other words, are we not thus losing 
 all test and criterion of truth ? A way was sug- 
 gested not indeed of altogether removing this diffi- 
 culty, but at least of diminishing it. The main 
 principle of it consisted in correcting the opinions 
 formed under one set of influencing circumstances by 
 those formed under another, instead of adhering ex- 
 clusively to any one, and looking upon all the rest 
 as meant to be final and therefore proved to be 
 erroneous. 
 
58 LECTURE III. 
 
 A very likely reply at this point will take the 
 following form : "We quite admit that you can 
 thus to some extent account for those fluctuations of 
 belief, for indifference, doubt, and so on : but what 
 possible opening is thus gained towards explaining 
 the cases in which the representatives of opposing 
 views confront one another without shewing any 
 sign of change ? In fact what can be made of 
 deliberate differences of opinion, such as those which 
 continue to divide men who seem to have quite 
 made up their minds?" This is, in other words, 
 asking that the general principles laid down in the 
 first Lecture may be applied to a special case. We 
 there found that, besides various favouring conditions, 
 the principal cause of prolonged differences of judg- 
 ment in moral and religious subjects might be as- 
 signed to the fact that emotions are some of the data 
 in these subjects. 
 
 This, by itself, leaves a considerable opening for 
 differences to establish themselves, but its effect is 
 increased tenfold by the fact that our own emotional 
 states are the principal means we have for appre- 
 ciating those of others. The question therefore we 
 have now before us is this, Into what religious 
 doctrines do these emotions enter 1 ? Certainly not 
 into all. No one, in looking over the Athanasian 
 or Nicene Creeds, would undertake to say that our 
 acceptance of many of their clauses was likely to be 
 affected by the temper in which we found ourselves 
 
 1 I mean, of course, what doctrines do they precede as data ? not, 
 what doctrines do they accompany or follow as consequences ? 
 

 EMOTIONS AS A BASIS OF DOCTRINE. 59 
 
 at the time or the circumstances in which we happened 
 to be placed. 
 
 And yet I think that this is really the case with 
 some of them directly and with others by implication. 
 Take, for example, the fundamental doctrine of the 
 Incarnation. This clearly rests in part upon the 
 assumed fact that men are both weak and sinful. 
 Not of course that it is, strictly speaking, proved by 
 these experiences ; but it so far involves or requires 
 them, that were they generally denied the doctrine 
 would soon cease to have any hold upon our minds. 
 It might subsist for a time, in so far as faith is 
 an expression of the lips, but in so far as it is a state 
 which excites feelings and results in action, there 
 would be but little of it left. Now bearing in mind 
 what a range of experience is covered by these 
 familiar expression's, the "weakness" and "depravity 
 of man," and what is the process by which their 
 extent is apprehended, it will readily be seen what 
 an opening is here afforded for differences of judg- 
 ment. I might perhaps express my meaning by 
 saying that there are two factors which combine to 
 establish any of the primary religious doctrines, the 
 absence of either of which would be fatal to their 
 acceptance 1 . The first of these is the historical truth 
 
 1 The following passage from an Essay by M. Guizot, which I have 
 since met with, seems to me to express precisely the above view : 
 
 " La religion Chr&tienne puise sa force k deux sources. L'une est 
 sa verite reelle et historique ; 1'autre est sa profonde harmonie avec les 
 interets et les besoins spirituels et moraux de Fame humaine. Sup- 
 primez 1'un de ces deux elemens d'attrait et d'autorite dans le Chris- 
 tianisme; supposez qu'historiquement il ne soit pas vrai, ou qu'il ne 
 doniie pas satisfaction aux aspirations de Tame vers la solution des 
 
60 LECTURE III. 
 
 of the events narrated (in this case the appearance 
 of our Saviour Jesus Christ upon earth) ; this, of 
 course, is of paramount importance. The other, 
 which is almost equally important,, is the condition 
 of man (in this case his weakness and depravity). 
 If this were denied the former would be so totally 
 robbed of all its significance, that it would be either 
 denied as a fact, or only admitted when reduced 
 to the rank of some quite ordinary human narrative. 
 But how are we to know what is the condition of man ? 
 Simply by observation, which in this case reduces 
 itself mainly to self-inspection. We must judge by 
 our own feelings, employing of course every safe- 
 guard which is at hand to prevent us from taking a 
 limited and partial view. 
 
 Here then is one instance in which states so 
 yielding as our emotions serve as foundations or 
 buttresses to a structure so rigid as a doctrine. 
 Of course the intensity with which such a central 
 truth as the Incarnation is apprehended will affect 
 all our religious convictions. 
 
 When speaking, in my first Lecture, about the 
 courses which lay before us in case we could not find 
 some such means as those just alluded to for at least 
 accounting for the differences and perplexities which 
 confront us, I remarked that we could see at one 
 
 grands problemes qui I'obf&dent; maintenez ensuite, tant qu'il vous 
 plaira ou que vous le pourrez, les formes, les regies, les ceremonies, les 
 symboles, toutes les apparences, toutes les pratiques exterieures de la 
 religion et du respect quo vous aurez la pretension de lui temoigner: 
 vous verrez bientot s'evanouir son efficacite, comme la flamme, la lu- 
 miere et meine la fumee s'evanouissent quaiid lo feu est eteint." 
 
fr*^ 
 
 THE SCEPTICAL CONCLUSION. V 61 
 
 X*V^/* ^ 
 
 point two roads. They begin in much the same 
 way ; the one asserting that since our reason when 
 applied to the subjects in question leads us to such 
 difficulties, we had better let these subjects alone and 
 frame our theories about the world in total disregard 
 of them. The other insists that this is what comes 
 of thinking about them for ourselves, and that we 
 had better therefore take them on ecclesiastical 
 authority. 
 
 It is worth remarking that this latter doctrine is 
 not unfrequently supported by a background of the 
 most thorough-going philosophical scepticism, which 
 loves to embitter the perplexities of our reason 1 . 
 The adherents of an infallible Church are naturally 
 and appropriately the principal supporters of such 
 a line of argument. They have an ulterior design 
 beyond the mere work of demolition. They seek to 
 crumble every other fabric into powder in order 
 to suffer less opposition in the erection of their own 
 dogmatic structure. The choice of the weary way- 
 farer through life would then lie between that and 
 nothing ; shivering with cold and blinded with the 
 tempest, what wonder if he should be ready to turn 
 in at any open door ? Pascal, for instance, is a case 
 in point. In a celebrated passage in his Thoughts, 
 he abandons all possibility of arriving at the truth 
 upon such a question as, for instance, the Being of 
 God, by natural reason; he does not merely assert 
 that reason, left to itself, would stumble and grope 
 along the right path, knowing however that it was 
 
 1 I have discussed this point more fully in 4he Appendix. 
 
62 LECTUftE III. 
 
 the right path (this is a perfectly fair view) ; he goes 
 to the length of asserting that reason would be at an 
 absolute standstill, having not an idea which way to 
 turn. But though reason is at a nonplus as to what 
 we should believe, prudence can suggest what is 
 safest to believe. He compares the solution of such 
 a question to a game of chance. We may not have 
 the slightest reason to guess one event rather than 
 another, and yet the stakes may be such as to make 
 it the height of imprudence not to act upon one 
 assumption instead of the other. Is there a God or 
 not ? Man cannot see his way to saying yes or no ; 
 but since, if there be one, we have all to gain and 
 all to lose according as we believe the fact or not, 
 it is clearly safest to believe. Since, moreover, the 
 Church provides means for helping us to believe, as 
 prudent men let us hasten to adopt them. The 
 appeal is here made in the coarsest form to our 
 fears. It really comes to this, that whatever religion 
 is prepared to bid the highest by the sanctions and 
 rewards which it offers would deserve to be victorious. 
 You will often find substantially the same argument 
 repeated with such an appeal disguised. I cannot 
 pause now to examine this kind of appeal as one 
 would wish to do, but, having called attention to it 
 for the purpose of distinction and rejection, let me 
 just remark that the essence of it is this ; It does 
 not merely admit that the unassisted reason, when 
 undertaking to handle theological subjects, or those 
 connected with theology, will find itself involved in 
 disputes ; it seeks to foment and embitter these 
 
INNOCENCE AND GUILT OF ERROR. 
 
 63 
 
 [isputes, and to prove that they are hopeless. It 
 tys, " This is what comes of thinking ; you will find 
 yourself involved in a maze whence escape is quite 
 hopeless ; then do not think, but assent." To make 
 such an appeal as this fully successful some resort to 
 our hopes and fears seems essential ; without this 
 men would, so to speak, just sit down in uncertainty 
 and wait where they were ; to drive them out of this 
 indifference and force them into selecting a creed we 
 must introduce some kind of rewards and punish- 
 ments. 
 
 (I.) A very important question suggests itself 
 here, to the solution of which we are helped by the 
 principles already laid down. It is that of the inno- 
 cence or guilt of error. On this question there are of 
 course two totally opposed doctrines ; stated in their 
 extreme forms the first of these 
 
 (i) Asserts that erroneous belief is morally 
 wrong, at least when the belief refers to the highest 
 of all truth, namely, religious truth. Of course such 
 a doctrine as this cannot stand by itself, as thus 
 stated, for the acceptance of a whole system of truths 
 cannot be regarded as an act of the will. And if it 
 were not an act of the will, how could the conscience 
 be expected promptly to decide upon it ? How could 
 it be pronounced right or wrong ? Accordingly this 
 doctrine is commonly supplemented, at least in mo- 
 dern times, by the assumption that the evidence in 
 support of the truths in question is so obvious that 
 none but the wilfully blind can fail to be convinced. 
 The fault therefore is here assigned to an assumed 
 
64 LECTURE III. 
 
 carelessness or obstinacy which will not face and 
 examine the evidence. In the words of Barrow, 
 God has provided arguments abundantly sufficient to 
 convince any man " who is not affectedly blind and 
 stupid, or wantonly slothful and careless, or frowardly 
 stiif and obstinate." 
 
 (2) So much for one of these extreme doctrines ; 
 the other asserts that belief is absolutely independent 
 of the will. In the words of a supporter of this 
 view ; " Those states of the understanding which 
 we term belief, doubt, and disbelief, inasmuch as 
 they are not voluntary, nor the result of any exertion 
 of the will, imply neither merit nor demerit in him 
 who is the subject of them. Whatever be the state 
 of a man's understanding with regard to any possible 
 proposition, it is a state or affection devoid equally 
 of desert and culpability. The nature of an opinion 
 cannot make it criminal. In relation to the same 
 subject, one may believe, another doubt, and a third 
 disbelieve, and all with equal innocence 1 ." 
 
 1 I have quoted the above passage from Mr S. Bailey's Essays on 
 the formation and publication of Opinions (first published anonymously 
 in 1828) for its extremely apt expression of the view in question; but it 
 is only fair to the author to say that there are other passages in the 
 same essay which very much qualify the judgment thus enunciated. 
 With the following passage, for instance, few would be disposed to 
 quarrel; "This attribute of drawing and fixing the attention, belongs 
 in a remarkable degree to all strong emotions. Everyone must have 
 felt, while he has been affected by any particular passion, that he could 
 scarcely attend to anything but what had some connection with it ; he 
 must have experienced its power of presenting exclusive and strong 
 views, its despotism in banishing all but its own ideas. Fear, for ex- 
 ample, may so concentrate our thoughts on some particular features of 
 our situation, may so absorb OUP attention, that we may overlook all 
 

 INNOCENCE AND GUILT OF ERROR. 65 
 
 May we not find a much truer view between 
 tese extremes ? Do not both of them lose sight of 
 diat may be called (to borrow a popular term from 
 some of the speculations of natural science) the 
 " struggle for existence " amongst the arguments in 
 support of any complicated truth? No man can 
 attend to all ; they are far too many and various 
 for that. If they were but few in number the 
 neglect of any of them must really be owing to 
 wilfulness or indifference. But when they are very 
 numerous any predominant mental characteristic, 
 any peculiarity in the circumstances amongst which 
 a person lives, may affect his conclusions, by altering 
 the proportions in which the evidence from various 
 quarters flows in. 
 
 We may say, I think, that the causes which 
 together produce in any man that particular group 
 of convictions which we call his belief, may be 
 divided into two classes. They are partly logical, 
 
 other circumstances, and be led to conclusions which would be instantly 
 rejected by a dispassionate understanding. 
 
 "While the mind is in this state of excitement, it has a sort of 
 elective attraction (if we may borrow an illustration from chemical sci- 
 ence) for some ideas to the neglect of all others. It singles out from 
 the number presented to it those which are connected with the pre- 
 vailing emotion, while the rest are overlooked and forgotten. In ex- 
 amining any question, it may really comprehend all the arguments 
 submitted to it; but, at the conclusion of the review, those only are 
 retained which have been attended to, and are in sight, not of such as 
 have been overlooked and have vanished, it is those by which the judg- 
 ment will be determined. In this way self-interest, hope, fear, love, 
 hatred, and the other passions, may any of them draw .the mind from a 
 perfect survey of a subject, and fix its attention on a partial view, may 
 exaggerate the importance of some objects and diminish that of others, 
 and by this virtual distortion of appearances affect its perceptions of 
 truth." 
 
 V. L. 5 
 
66 LECTURE III. 
 
 partly psychological or personal. The former are 
 hardly at all dependent upon the will, the latter 
 to a very considerable extent are so. What is 
 meant by a logical connection between our opinions 
 is so obvious, that we need not pause to examine it, 
 but the psychological may need a moment's illustra- 
 tion. Once admit that the whole atmosphere is, 
 if one may so say, full of arguments, and it will 
 easily be seen that according to a man's character 
 and occupation he will imbibe and assimilate more 
 of one kind than another. If he altogether refuses 
 to think through other persons' experience as well 
 as his own, he may in all sincerity adopt conclusions 
 which others can see to be very < one- sided and 
 imperfect. Admit again that emotions comprise 
 some of our data in reasoning upon moral and 
 religious questions, and the tendency just indicated 
 will be strengthened. Men are notoriously disposed 
 to see in others what they feel in themselves, and 
 hence their character and circumstances will imprint 
 a deeper stamp upon their conclusions. 
 
 Hence, to put the obvious conclusion in the 
 fewest words, we might say that there are at least 
 two ways in which any one may be morally right 
 or wrong in entertaining particular opinions ; de- 
 liberate opinions that is, since we exclude the cases 
 in which passion or sloth come into play. The first 
 is when they are connected, in the way just indi- 
 cated, with right or wrong emotions; (for that such 
 epithets may, in certain cases at any rate, be pre- 
 dicated of our mental states will hardly be denied). 
 
EG.UILT AND INNOCENCE OF ERROR. 67 
 
 second is when they are the result of partial 
 3 following upon partial experience deliberately 
 persisted in 1 . 
 
 Many important conclusions will follow from the 
 admission of the fact that our belief is thus a result 
 contributed by numerous and distinct classes of 
 evidence. Some of them would, I think, present 
 almost insoluble difficulties upon the very common 
 view that belief is a simple state of mind depending 
 upon a comparatively small number of evidences 
 which appeal to the intellectual side of our nature 
 only. When we remember, however, that our af- 
 
 1 The remark may bo added that there is some ambiguity involved 
 in the common phrase 'man's responsibility for his belief.' This may be 
 interpreted in two ways. For one thing it may mean nothing more than 
 that wrong belief frequently involves disastrous consequences in this 
 world, and will probably continue to do so in any future state. For to 
 the Theist who believes that God actually governs the world, conse- 
 quences which are permanent and regular really do assume the form of 
 sanctions; he will be therefore justified in saying that the actions which 
 are thus followed by painful consequences are distinctly forbidden by 
 God. (Any reader of Bp. Butler's Analogy will be familiar with the 
 use he makes of this principle.) In this sense of the word it is a simple 
 matter of fact that we are all responsible for our belief quite irrespective 
 of the question whether we could have known better or not. The child 
 who eats poisonous berries, not knowing that they are hurtful, will 
 perish just as surely as the grown man who designedly eats them in 
 order to destroy himself. 
 
 Usually, however, something different from this is meant. The sanc- 
 tions commonly supposed to be attached to wrong belief are of too ap- 
 palling a character for most persons to bear to think of their falling on 
 those who knew no better. They would therefore say that by responsi- 
 bility they understand our liability not to consequences that are merely 
 natural, but to those which are distinctly penal. I think that this dis- 
 tinction is hard to be maintained, even although it were attempted to 
 support it by saying that actions of the latter class are testified against 
 by our conscience ; Butler, for instance, would not hesitate to say that 
 both classes of action were wrong and therefore to be condemned by 
 conscience. 
 
 52 
 
68 LECTURE III. 
 
 fective side contributes its part as well, which often 
 may be, and sometimes really is, in opposition to that 
 contributed by the intellectual side, we shall perceive 
 that a thoroughly stable compound is hardly to be 
 expected. At least it is only to be expected in 
 persons of considerable reach of imagination and 
 strength of judgment, who are thus able to estimate 
 duly and stedfastly the various conflicting elements. 
 This last is the only logically sound condition, but 
 then men are not like those machines to which we 
 can add a fly-wheel, and so correct the impulses 
 which are at one time in excess by those which 
 at another are in defect. There is therefore, as I 
 have just said, a want of scientific stability and 
 cohesion about our belief and consequently about 
 our practice. "In the day of prosperity there is 
 a forgetfulness of affliction ; and in the day of 
 affliction there is no more remembrance of pro- 
 sperity." 
 
 (II.) For one thing, may we not thus throw 
 some light upon those strange oscillations in belief, 
 those alternations between doubt and conviction, 
 which so often occur? I am not speaking of cases of 
 conversion, of changes complete and final from dark- 
 ness to light, but of those smaller fluctuations of 
 which the spiritual experience of most persons must 
 have furnished examples. To some men no doubt 
 God has granted a clearness of vision undimmed 
 from first to last ; all their life through hardly a 
 cloud seems to pass between them and the sun. 
 But this is far indeed from being the happy ex- 
 
OSCILLATIONS IN BELIEF. 69 
 
 perience of all. Is not the case with most persons 
 this ? They have their days, their irregular seasons. 
 Their faith is sometimes firm, sometimes insecure, 
 sometimes tottering. But these alternations do not 
 appear to be brought about by any adequate cause, 
 nor to be preceded by any sure sign. If any cause at 
 all can be detected it will often appear quite insuffi- 
 cient to account for the effects produced. And so 
 their faith seems to them but little worth, and to 
 others may have the semblance of mere caprice. 
 The satirist will say of them 
 
 "Perhaps Prosperity becalmed his breast, 
 Perhaps the wind just shifted from the East." 
 
 But is it not possible that an explanation may be 
 found which shall transfer the reference from merely 
 physiological states or emotional accidents, to grounds 
 of evidence as to which men can be right or wrong ? 
 (I hardly know how to insist strongly enough that 
 such an explanation is what we should aim at. 
 Once admit that changes in our religious belief are 
 not connected with evidence which has been somehow 
 differently apprehended, and see whither we are led. 
 It is a very short route thence to the conclusion 
 that belief is a mere "sentiment," as the phrase is; 
 and if so the supposed substructure of fact upon 
 which we assert it to rest may easily be a portentous 
 delusion.) Remember, then, that our convictions 
 ought to be the product, and in the case of thought- 
 ful persons whose experience is not unhealthy and 
 exceptional, really is the product, of a large number 
 of distinct groups of facts. Now what seems a mere 
 
LECTURE III. 
 
 may remind us of one or other of these 
 groups which had been suffered almost to drop out of 
 notice, the current of our experience having drifted 
 us out of their way. It is not in itself the cause of 
 the change in our conviction ; it is far too slight and 
 transient to lay claim to this ; but it may remind us 
 of the real cause. When, for instance, a considerable 
 change is produced in any one apparently by a few 
 words of earnest advice, by a narrow escape from, 
 danger or death, by the example of a friend, or even 
 by circumstances more obscure and trifling than, 
 these; it may be that these circumstances really 
 comprise the entire cause of the change. If so they 
 have not much evidential value, and one cannot 
 set much store on convictions which can be swayed 
 in this way. But I should prefer to see in them a 
 mere occasion rather than a cause, and should say 
 that what they do is to remind us of groups of facts 
 which we were getting into the habit of overlooking. 
 The facts were about us, on every side, but we had 
 neglected them; then something replaces them in 
 our attention, and they may thenceforth play their 
 rightful part. 
 
 It may be as well to call attention here to the 
 fact that I am speaking of the mental condition 
 of the thoughtful and sincere alone, and am ad- 
 dressing them only ; we have nothing now to do 
 with those to whom the question has never occurred 
 whether their belief is justified or not. 
 
 (III.) Again, may we not in this way throw 
 some light upon conduct in which many persons can 
 
 
BELIEF IN MIRACULOUS ACCOUNTS. 71 
 
 only perceive a mystery of stubborn blindness; I 
 mean the refusal to be convinced by a miracle even 
 when it is admitted at the time to be inexplicable 
 by natural causes. Going back, for instance, to the 
 behaviour of the Jews in our Saviour's time ; to 
 some this seems unaccountable except upon the sup- 
 position that they were simply determined not to* 
 believe. Without entering on the consideratioa 
 whether such a stretch of power on the part of the 
 will is possible, may we" not discover much in the 
 state of mind referred to which is perfectly intel- 
 ligible and consistent ? The process of reasoning 
 through which it is generally supposed that the 
 observer of the miracle would pass is this ; " Here 
 is a work manifestly beyond the power of man, and 
 it is not diabolic ; hence it must clearly be attri- 
 buted to God, and the immediate performer of it 
 must therefore have been sent by God." Now just 
 consider, in such a case as this, what a mass of 
 important considerations there is beyond the mere 
 physical facts which had been observed, all of which 
 have a possible bearing upon the question whether a 
 miracle had been performed or not. Take but this 
 one step in the reasoning, " He is a messenger sent 
 from God;" this step cannot stand alone, but is 
 closely connected with the answers to these two 
 inquiries ; first, what is the character of God ? viz. 
 is it such as to make a revelation possible or pro- 
 bable ? Secondly, what is the condition of man ? Is 
 it such as to make a revelation necessary or service- 
 able ? By saying that we are brought into connec- 
 
72 LECTUftE III. 
 
 tion with these inquiries I mean that, according as 
 a man adopts one or another answer to them, he 
 may find himself easily disposed to accept the mira- 
 culous explanation, or only able to do so under 
 extraordinary pressure of evidence. Now what I 
 want you duly to appreciate is that these conclusions 
 about the character of God and the condition of man 
 do not stand like isolated inferences which a hostile 
 fact may readily subvert, but that they are the re- 
 sult of broad generalisations and observations. An 
 enormous mass of experience has been fitted into 
 them, and is accounted for by them. The thought- 
 ful man will be conscious of this, for he recognises 
 the theory of life upon which he acts ; but even the 
 thoughtless, according as they consistently lead one 
 kind of life or another, cannot fail to be under the 
 tacit influence of one theory or another. 
 
 This being the case, how will any one be affected 
 when he is confronted by a supposed miracle ? He 
 will not be like one hearing an ordinary story, which 
 he may accept or reject without disturbance to the 
 rest of his convictions. On the contrary the admis- 
 sion of it as a fact may cause a shock which will 
 run through all his moral and intellectual being. 
 Suppose the case of a man immersed in worldly af- 
 fairs, and caring only for them. If he has ever given 
 any thought to his position and destiny, he will 
 have some theory of life which accounts for, and is 
 confirmed by, all his experience. And since a man's 
 experience is what he lives amongst, and above all 
 what he attends to, his experience will be excep- 
 
BELIEF IN MIRACULOUS ACCOUNTS. 73 
 
 tional. Facts which make against his own view will 
 have been overlooked, those which make for it will, 
 by the persistence with which he dwells amongst them, 
 gain undue importance. His mind is therefore like 
 the house occupied by a strong man armed ; no truth 
 which is at all opposed to his predominant way of 
 thought and life can gain entrance except after a 
 desperate struggle. 
 
 This being his condition, a miracle is wrought 
 before his very eyes, or reported on unexceptionable 
 testimony ; what else can we expect but that he 
 should be staggered and perplexed at the time, and 
 then begin to forget all about it ? I think indeed 
 he could more readily accept some story about genii 
 or fairies ; for that would not demand such a wide 
 upheaval of all his old convictions founded on his 
 whole way of life. The miracle, or rather the scheme 
 to which it belongs, can obtain, if one may so say, 
 no hold of his nature. It stands therefore by itself, 
 a single unconnected event, trying to hold its ground 
 against a crowd of hostile convictions. All the 
 future course of his experience is quite out of har- 
 mony with it, and tends steadily to wear away the 
 impression created by it. So striking an event might 
 completely stagger him at the time, but to effect 
 this is to advance but a very little way towards 
 securing his permanent assent. It is merely like 
 killing one sentry, who is but an outpost of the 
 whole army which must be dispersed before a real 
 conquest is effected 1 . 
 
 1 I hope the following extract will not be considered inappro- 
 priate, but it is so precisely illustrative of what would apparently 
 
74 LECTURE III. 
 
 These considerations are often forgotten in current 
 discussions about miracles. For instance, it is a not 
 uncommon device to propose a case in which there is 
 assumed to be some remarkable combination of testi- 
 mony in favour of a miraculous event. We are then 
 expected to give a categorical answer to the question, 
 Should you, or should you not, believe a statement 
 of this kind ? Sometimes, as -by Paley 1 , this is done 
 
 be the feelings of most men in the case in question, that I cannot 
 forbear from quoting it. The reader of the tale will remember that 
 the piece of shagreen was endowed with certain miraculous properties 
 connecting it with the life of the owner. He was determined to 
 counteract these, and accordingly takes it to the leading scientific 
 men in Paris, who meet together and exhaust every effort that 
 science could suggest in vain. They had therefore all the evidence 
 of an isolated miracle that we can conceive attainable. 
 
 " II laissa les deux Savants stupefaits. 
 
 " Gardons-nous bien de raconter cette aventure a PAcademie, nos 
 collegues s'y moqueraient de nous, dit Planchette au chimiste apres une 
 longue pause pendant laquelle ils se regarderent sans oser se coru- 
 muniquer leurs pens6es. 
 
 "Ils etaient comme des Chretiens sortant de leurs tombes sans 
 trouver un Dieu dans le ciel. La science? impuissante ! les acides? 
 eau claire ! La potasse rouge ? deshonoree ! La pile voltai'que et la 
 foudre ? deux bilboquets ! 
 
 "Une presse hydraulique fendue comme une mouillette! ajouta 
 Planchette. Je crois au diable, dit le baron Japhet apres un moment 
 de silence. Et moi a Dieu, repondit Planchette. 
 
 u Tous deux etaient dans leur role. Pour un mecanicien, 1'univers 
 est une machine qui veut un ouvrier, pour la chimie, cette oeuvre 
 d'un demon qui va decomposant tout, le monde est un gaz doue de 
 mouvement. 
 
 " Nous ne pouvons pas nier le fait, reprit le chimiste. 
 
 "Bah! pour nous consoler, messieurs les doctrinaires ont cree ce 
 nSbuleux axiome : Bete comme un fait. 
 
 "Ton axiome, repliqua le chimiste, me semble, a moi, fait comme 
 une bete. 
 
 " Ils se prirent k rire, et diuerent en gens qui ne voyaient plus qu'un 
 phenomene dans un miracle." La Peau de Chagrin. 
 
 1 Paley, it is only fair to say, does not altogether neglect all 
 reference to the being and attributes of God as bearing on the 
 

 BELIEF IN MIRACULOUS ACCOUNTS. 75 
 
 by those who consider that we ought to believe, 
 sometimes by those who regard such an imaginary 
 case as a reduction to absurdity. I think that most 
 of these imaginary examples transgress the appro- 
 priate limits of hypothesis. It is forgotten that 
 whenever we " put a case," by way of test, in any 
 science ; in physics, for example, or in law or 
 morals ; the condition must always be understood 
 that all other things which could affect the result are 
 to remain as they were. The imaginary case in- 
 troduces a perfectly assignable change within deter- 
 minate limits ; but of course the supposition of this 
 change is assumed to be in perfect harmony with all 
 the admitted principles of the science ! . 
 
 credibility of miracles, though with him this reference is not any- 
 thing like so prominent as it is, for example, with Bishop Butler. 
 But in the example which he proposes as a test to decide the question, 
 that, namely, of a miraculous story being testified to by twelve men 
 of undoubted veracity, he certainly claims that we ought to yield 
 our assent to the sheer weight of evidence in favour of even that 
 isolated event, regarded as nothing more than an extraordinary 
 occurrence. 
 
 1 An example or two may serve to illustrate the above remarks. 
 Suppose then that in explaining the laws of motion one were to take 
 as an example a supposed sudden stoppage of the earth in its career, 
 and to say that in that case all the inhabitants, together with every- 
 thing else that was loose on the surface, would fly off into space ; 
 it is clear that, wild as such a supposition seems, it does not trans- 
 gress the fair limits of hypothesis. It only assumes, as I have said 
 above, "an assignable change within determinate limits;" we are 
 not called upon to mention how such a stoppage might occur, and 
 there is nothing in the mere assumption, taken by itself, to prevent 
 us from supposing the laws of motion to retain their integrity every- 
 where else. In other words, in a legitimate hypothesis nothing ought 
 to be introduced which compels us to ask, But could such a change 
 really occur? What consequences does the supposition of the possi- 
 bility of its occurrence entail ? Now contrast with this such a case 
 
76 LECTURE III. 
 
 This condition, however, is by no means always 
 adhered to when we are concerned with a scheme so 
 extensive and profound as a Revelation. When, for 
 instance, I am asked whether or not I should yield 
 rny assent in the case proposed; I inquire at once 
 whether we are to suppose all other things to remain 
 the same ? In other words, am I to approach the 
 question retaining all my present convictions un- 
 altered, as I should do in a scientific example ? If 
 so of course amongst these convictions is the one 
 I now entertain as to the nature and sufficiency of 
 the Christian Revelation. But towards this Revela- 
 tion the new miracle can hardly be considered as 
 neutral ; it must therefore, so to speak, be either 
 a rebel or a subject; it must either enjoy the ad- 
 vantage of being confirmed by Christianity, or 
 the disadvantage of being in conflict with it. In 
 either of these alternatives the problem has by now 
 assumed a very different form from that originally 
 contemplated. 
 
 On the other hand, if I am not to approach the 
 question with my present equipment of religious 
 belief unaltered, one has a right to ask, How much 
 
 as the following : Suppose that a discussion arose about the duty of 
 submission to God. If one of the disputants were to say, But what 
 would be our duty if God were to require a wicked action ] (assuming 
 of course that there is some other standard of right and wrong than 
 the will of the Creator) the proper reply would be, " I cannot permit 
 such a supposition; it would so alter my idea of the Deity as not 
 improbably to shake my belief in His existence. Such a supposition 
 would require the whole question to be reconsidered." And yet it 
 is manifest that a precisely corresponding supposition would be 
 perfectly admissible if we were talking of submission to a human 
 parent. 
 

 BELIEF IN MIRACULOUS ACCOUNTS. 77 
 
 of it is supposed to be suppressed ? If a portion 
 only, how arbitrary this is 1 If the whole, what 
 a distinct moral being I am to become ! For ob- 
 serve what follows on this supposition. That vast 
 mass of fact and inference which we have coordinated 
 and assimilated into our Christian faith is supposed 
 to be shattered to pieces, our scientific knowledge 
 and principles being left untouched. In plain words 
 it comes to this, that I am assumed to be a Secularist 
 or Positivist judging of trie miracle, and as a matter 
 of course I then refuse all credit to it. This is really 
 as if, in illustrating a principle in mechanics, an 
 assumption were made which it turned out when 
 developed would require the solar system to be re- 
 modelled. On these grounds, therefore, it seems 
 that in proposing any imaginary example, such as 
 that under consideration, we can hardly avoid, 
 whether we mean it or not, begging the question 
 one way or the other. 
 
 (IV.) On the principles we have laid down we 
 may now throw some light upon a problem which 
 has probably presented itself to your minds, and may 
 perhaps have been a cause of perplexity, I mean 
 that strange medley of belief and unbelief with which 
 the minds of so many are occupied. Of the better 
 and more hopeful aspect of such a state we might 
 perhaps take the parent of the dumb child mentioned 
 in the Gospels who cried out to our Saviour, " Lord, 
 I believe, help thou mine unbelief." Such a cry is 
 often taken as an indication that he had some faith, 
 though feeble, and was desirous that it might be 
 
, 78 LECTURE III. 
 
 increased. Whatever may have been the individual 
 characteristics of that man, I doubt whether such an 
 explanation, as generally adopted, shows an adequate 
 appreciation of the complexity of the mental state in 
 cases where there is a violent conflict of evidence. 
 Put such an instance as I have mentioned before. 
 Imagine one who has been long immersed in selfish 
 or worldly concerns. These comprising the bulk of 
 the facts with which he is occupied, and scarcely 
 standing in need of any religious explanation, he 
 will probably have no belief worthy of the name 
 about religion. The "trivial round and common 
 task" will not by themselves bring him nearer to 
 God ; the mind must be "set to hallow all we find." 
 Now this being his position, any single event which 
 conflicts with the host of his current associations 
 will (as we have seen) hardly effect an entrance. 
 It may stagger him for the time, but will then most 
 likely be quietly dismissed from the mind. 
 
 Suppose, however, that he is somehow suddenly 
 brought to realize the existence and bearing of a new 
 class of facts of a totally different kind; suppose 
 that he has come to appreciate, no matter by what 
 agency, the guilt and corruption of man. The new 
 order is entirely out of harmony with the old, and 
 we cannot expect the two to settle quietly into 
 combination. There will be a time of disturbance 
 and of ferment until the new arrangement has been 
 effected. "When a man has thus had suddenly 
 opened out before him an entirely new class of 
 considerations, there may well be a time during 
 
MEDLEY OF BELIEF AND DISBELIEF. 79 
 
 which he has grasped the new ideas, and is fully 
 convinced of their truth and importance, but is 
 struggling to fit them into their place and to get 
 out of old grooves of thought and feeling and 
 practice. During his past life his mind has gradually 
 assimilated to itself a vast amount of experience 
 which is mostly of one kind, and is either consciously 
 or unconsciously (namely, by his own reflection, or 
 by following the reflection and the practice of others) 
 built up into a coherent irreligious theory of life. 
 This he is now convinced was a wrong theory. But 
 what is he to do ? For a time he is comparatively 
 helpless, perplexed and staggered ; hardly knowing 
 what to make of the new facts, and yet well con- 
 vinced that they are of vast importance and have 
 a close bearing upon his position and prospects. 
 Well may a man in such circumstances cry out, 
 Help mine unbelief, my perplexity I With the old 
 structure shattered and crumbling about me, help 
 me to build up these materials anew. I begin 
 almost to see rny way towards doing it, but I need 
 time and assistance before the work oau be accom- 
 plished. 
 
 Such a state of perplexity and delay is, I think, 
 as a general rule, the most natural state, and 
 therefore the most healthy and promising. It is 
 more suggestive of a process of genuine and rational 
 conviction, than a sudden rush out of one state into 
 another. 
 
 Another remark may be added. Have we not 
 here an explanation of a fact which hardly re- 
 
80 LECTURE III, 
 
 ceives sufficient recognition, the fact, I mean, that 
 of many persons in reference to many subjects we 
 really cannot say whether they believe or not ? We 
 may often hear it said that any one who attends 
 to a proposition must be in one of the three states of 
 belief, doubt, or disbelief. Upon simple subjects, 
 especially those which are practical, that is which 
 can be at almost any instant translated into action, 
 I think that this is the case. But it certainly does 
 not hold in reference to those subjects which are 
 supported by a complicated mass of evidence arising 
 from widely different sources. 
 
 Adopt what test we will, we cannot always ex- 
 tort from a man a single categorical answer as to 
 what is his mental state on this point. By no self- 
 interrogation can he reach a decisive reply for 
 himself, and if others attempt to judge for him by 
 appealing to the only sure test, viz. that afforded by 
 his conduct, they will probably be baffled by ob- 
 taining several contradictory answers. 
 
 f (V.) Hence, finally, may we not offer some justi- 
 fication of a practice which is often condemned as 
 a sophistical tampering with one's conscience ; I 
 mean the practice of endeavouring to believe, of 
 putting oneself into circumstances favourable for 
 producing one conviction rather than another. One 
 has to speak about this with caution, and yet I dare 
 not pass it by unnoticed. There is perhaps no point 
 whatever upon which the current teaching of religion 
 on the one hand, and of science and philosophy on 
 the other, are in more determined and hopeless 
 
> 
 
 ATTEMPTS TO BELIEVE. \ c 81 
 
 >i>^/ ; &'j ^~ \ 
 antagonism. No quarter whatever is given here/^v/^ 
 
 What is almost universally applauded as a virtue by 
 one party, is almost universally denounced as a vice 
 by the other. 
 
 Before siding, as I do to a great extent, with 
 the religious view, at least within its own province, 
 let us hear the worst that can be said of it from the 
 opposite side. The invidious way of describing the 
 process, by those who condemn it, consists in saying, 
 ' Here is a man who is afraid that the free exercise 
 of his reason would lead him to a conclusion which 
 he does not wish to entertain. He therefore drugs 
 his mind in order to impair the power of admitting 
 new conclusions, or else he impresses on it a bias 
 which shall ensure its moving in the direction he 
 fancies/ Of course, if this were really a full and fair 
 account of the matter such a process would be grossly 
 dishonest. Here, less than anywhere, ought it to 
 receive any countenance. A University would in- 
 deed be wallowing in the mire when it taught or 
 sanctioned the teaching that truth was not to be 
 pursued anywhere, almost anyhow, and at any risk. 
 But I do not think that it is a fair account of the 
 matter. We might better state it thus ; A man 
 may feel convinced that the whole complexion of the 
 life he leads tends to give prominence to one set of 
 facts, and to suppress or impair the influence of 
 another set. This being the case, it is perfectly fair 
 on his part for him to throw some weight into the 
 scale which he knows is being depressed. I" think 
 that such precautions would not be disallowed by 
 
 v. L. 6 
 
82 LEG TUBE III. 
 
 any prudent man, in the instance of lesser matters, 
 say political or social. If you were going into the 
 midst of a society amongst which you well knew 
 that some large class of considerations was neglected 
 or disparaged, and if moreover you felt sure that this 
 was not a mere equipoise to the comparative esti- 
 mate entertained elsewhere, but that they were 
 unduly neglected ; might not any one fairly take 
 measures to guard against the consequent influence ? 
 If he thought this needless, it would probably be 
 either because he confided in the perfect security 
 of his acquired convictions, or else because he felt 
 sure that what he was now about to experience 
 would be likely by sheer reaction to evoke a suffi- 
 cient strength of opposing sentiment. But if he 
 were forced to send his children into a society in 
 which he knew that these partial influences would 
 present themselves armed with the seductive force 
 of sympathy, would he regard such precautions as 
 being wrong or altogether needless ? 
 
 The words of our Saviour which I have taken 
 for my text to-day contain, I think, an application 
 of this truth, "How can ye believe which receive 
 honour one of another ?" He does not here seem to 
 be speaking, at least not immediately, of the guilt or 
 innocence of unbelief; the view He takes is quite 
 different and is very striking. For the present He 
 makes it a question not so much of morality as of 
 prudence ; He appeals rather to their common sense 
 than to their conscience. 
 
 His words seem to ring with that deep com- 
 
CONCLUSION. 83 
 
 passionate sorrow which He who knew what was in 
 man could not but feel when He watched men going 
 on with easy complacent confidence along a road 
 which He saw could lead them nowhere else but 
 where the double-minded go. They are tender with 
 the infinite compassion of One who yearns over 
 those who are now hopelessly incapable of doing 
 anything to help themselves ; and yet at the same 
 time stern with the holiness and justice of One who 
 knows that prudence and foresight might once have 
 stopped them in that career. 
 
 What then was that fatal obstacle which pre- 
 vented them from believing ? It was the " receiving 
 honour of men," probably what is elsewhere called 
 "the fear of man," a timid inability of forming 
 a judgment unless they knew what was the judg- 
 ment of others, an anxious desire to be in harmony 
 with those about them, a restless inquiry what 
 others are saying rather than what they are. This 
 feeling binds all classes in one common bond of 
 mutual fear. If it makes some inquire "Have 
 any of the rulers believed on him ?" it prevents 
 others from expressing their convictions "because 
 they fear the people." 
 
 I have spoken much about the necessity of cor- 
 recting our often exceptional and always partial 
 experience by the experience of others, and of the 
 consequent difficulty of forming an accurate indi- 
 vidual opinion upon religious subjects especially. 
 But there is all the difference on earth between 
 doing this and receiving honour of men. In the 
 
 62 
 
84 LECTURE IIT. 
 
 * 
 
 former the judgment of others is merely a means, 
 it is useful for telling us what is their experience ; 
 in the latter it is an end, we defer to it because we 
 love and fear it. 
 
 For just think what belief in any great Christian 
 truth involves. Take such a doctrine as this ; that 
 we have a Father in heaven who watches over us 
 amidst all the cares and vicissitudes of life. There 
 is much in our experience to suggest and confirm 
 this truth ; but when we thus try to secure it, we 
 have to cling to it in spite of much occasional 
 hostile experience. You may have to shake off, 
 for example, such horrible suspicions as those so 
 bitterly described in Psalm Ixxiii. and in the Book 
 of Ecclesiastes. 
 
 Now to appeal to the experience of other men 
 is most useful ; the more you do this the broader 
 becomes the basis on which you rest, the more 
 massive become your convictions, and therefore the 
 less liable to be upset by any apparently hostile fact. 
 But if, instead of thus making other men's experience 
 a means by which to help us in drawing our con- 
 clusions, we make their opinions an end by which 
 to test our own; if we^ are ever listening to that 
 discordant din of noises to catch whichever is near- 
 est or loudest, how are we likely to entertain real 
 convictions ? 
 
 You may get opinions and views in that way, 
 you may feel likings and dislikings for the opinions 
 and the views of others, but there is little chance of 
 attaining to anything which deserves to be called 
 
CONCLUSION. 85 
 
 a conviction. An Inquisition with its threats of the 
 rack and flames could scarcely work more mischief 
 than this. Open avowed intimidation may induce 
 men to conceal their convictions, but a timid sensi- 
 bility to surrounding opinions may ere long prevent 
 them from having any convictions at all. 
 
 Just as one might address the wretched sickly 
 occupants of some crowded court, not altogether in 
 reproach, for it is not entirely their fault ; nor yet 
 altogether in pity, for it is not entirely their mis- 
 fortune, and say to them, ' How can you expect to be 
 in vigorous health?' So does our Lord seem in 
 these words to address mankind. We may often 
 regard their false superficial judgments, picked up 
 through timid compliance with one another's opinions, 
 as their mingled misfortune and fault, and say to 
 them also, ' How can you expect to believe ?' Do 
 not think that the results of such a temper are only 
 to be looked for in open rejection of the Gospel, or 
 in utter carelessness and indifference. Beyond that 
 there may be a wide-spread spiritual languor and 
 weakness, faith diminishing, love changing towards 
 indifference, devotion waxing cold. This may be 
 assigned to many causes, but one of them may be 
 what our Lord has here pointed out. See whether 
 the honour of man is not occupying too prominent a 
 place in your mind, and whether therefore the sad 
 and solemn inquiry of Christ is not still applicable, 
 How can ye believe ? 
 
LECTURE IV. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS FROM THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN 
 IN THE PRECEDING LECTURES. 
 
 JOHN v. 44. 
 How can ye believe, which receive honour one of another ? 
 
 IN one of Richter's works 1 there is a tale which 
 contains a very striking illustration of that multi- 
 tudinous variety of the evidences upon moral and 
 religious subjects with which we have been occupied 
 during the last three lectures. The particular doc- 
 trine there referred to is that of a Future Life. 
 It seems intended to show that not only is there, 
 what may be called, a central fact of positive testi- 
 mony in support of such a doctrine, but in addition 
 a numerous confirming assemblage of analogies, many 
 of them springing out of the data afforded by our 
 emotional nature. 
 
 It is put into the form of a vision, supposed to be 
 seen by one in that stage of illness in which deep 
 truths not unfrequently present themselves to the 
 mind decked out in all the wild drapery afforded by 
 
 1 Collected Works, Vol. LII. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION. 87 
 
 a delirious fancy. He relates how he seemed to 
 stand with a few survivors amidst the ruins of a 
 world which was fast disappearing into nothingness, 
 without leaving them a single gleam of comfort 
 to brighten their departure. Some they saw who 
 had suffered a life-long sickness and agony, and who 
 now found to their horror that the balance of evil 
 was wholly against them ; some had worn themselves 
 to death for their fellow-men or suffered the sharp 
 pangs of martyrdom, and saw now that they had 
 sacrificed all without the slightest return. He tells 
 how he passed amidst the mouldering remains of his 
 brethren, in some of whose countenances the shattered 
 hopes of a recompence yet lingered by children 
 stiffened in their first smile by a thousand mothers 
 with their coffined infants in their arms how he saw 
 the sages of every land, now dumb for ever, with the 
 light of their truth quenched, silenced as the pall 
 was cast over them, like singing birds when their 
 cage is darkened with a veil; and so one blow 
 continues to succeed another until the climax of 
 all is reached, when the Christ, whom they knew 
 indeed to have died, but to whom, as risen, they had 
 so often sung their Easter hymns of triumph, was 
 found dead without hope of Resurrection : Christ 
 was not risen, so verily their faith was vain. 
 
 Dismal indeed would such a prospect be, but 
 I refer to it here, of course, not in connection with 
 the nature or intensity of the shock it would cause, 
 but solely with the number of points at which that 
 shock would be felt. It may serve as a suggestion, 
 
88 LECTURE IV. 
 
 to such of you as are here to-day for the first time, of 
 the way in which the evidence on such subjects is 
 contributed from many and diverse sources, and at 
 last swells into what we call proofs. Let me pass on 
 now to a few obvious inferences from such a condi- 
 tion of things. 
 
 I. The first thing, then, which I would try to 
 make you adequately appreciate is this ; the pro- 
 digious practical importance of the life you lead upon 
 the convictions you entertain. It is not merely that 
 your active and passive nature will thus be altered ; 
 I mean, it is not merely that you will come to form 
 different habits and take to new modes of life, on the 
 one hand, or contract a somewhat different character 
 and disposition on the other, according as you are 
 surrounded by one set of circumstances or another. 
 Even this would be a great deal, for it would suffice 
 to imbue you with the sympathies and prejudices 
 connected with your mode of life. But this is not 
 all. The really important consideration is that in 
 addition to all this your belief 'may be affected. Not 
 only may you be led by carelessness to neglect or 
 forget certain classes of facts, but even when your 
 attention is aroused and you have grown thoughtful, 
 you may fail to see facts which actually stare you in 
 the face, and may draw conclusions which are grossly 
 incorrect. 
 
 In saying this, let me give one word of explana- 
 tion as to what we mean by a man's believing this or 
 that. Of course it is not meant that he says he 
 believes it. His statements upon the subject are 
 
MODES OF INFLUENCING OUR CONVICTIONS. 89 
 
 only one mode of discovery, and in complicated 
 matters (as we have seen) by no means a perfectly 
 certain mode. The best practical test is found by 
 studying his actions. When a man is acting de- 
 liberately, and knows what he is doing, the question, 
 Does he believe this proposition ? is best answered 
 by others, if they substitute for it the question, Is 
 he acting upon the assumption of its truth ? If he 
 is, I should say he does believe ; if not, no ; quite 
 irrespective of anything he may say or suppose upon 
 the subject. 
 
 We will take this sense of the word, then, in 
 inquiring how any one can succeed in altering his 
 convictions. Instead of dealing with it as a general 
 question, put it in a more concrete form. Suppose 
 then that any one wished to shut out from his rnind 
 any sort of conviction, worthy of the name, about 
 the reality of a future life, or the need of repentance, 
 or any other doctrine of Christianity. What course 
 should he pursue for the purpose? What advice 
 would you give him ? Of course we must assume 
 that he starts in possession of certain advantages, 
 which are far indeed from being the lot of all men ; 
 he must enjoy tolerable health, and be in some 
 degree free from pain and bereavements; without 
 such advantages he hardly could succeed except by 
 an almost wilful drugging of his anxieties, and it is 
 proposed to recommend a more seductive plan. 
 
 (i) One very common resource is to plunge into 
 frivolity. Not necessarily, that is, into guilty ex- 
 cesses, but into that gulf of endless, aimless nothings, 
 
00 LECTURE IV. 
 
 whether fashionable or not, which absorbs so many. 
 In a highly civilized state we are beset with an 
 infinite number of petty necessities, many of them 
 the mere cravings produced by ennui, some excited 
 by the proximity of the object intended to gratify 
 them, some experienced only because other people 
 are accustomed to gratify them. To give way to 
 some of these necessities soon encourages and multi- 
 plies the rest. Hence many persons who might 
 have been driven into better things had the alterna- 
 tive lain between them and nothing, will find full 
 employment of their time in reflecting upon these 
 wants and the best way of satisfying them. 
 
 Here then is one resource, and a very common 
 one. But mark at how many points such a course 
 as this requires to be fenced in, if men are to remain 
 upon it with any feeling of security. Not only are 
 men liable here to all the accidents of ill-health, 
 bereavement, and loss of fortune ; the road, also, is 
 one which grows continually more difficult. Many 
 of the resources depended on are such as cannot pos- 
 sibly satisfy any but the young. The time, therefore, 
 can hardly fail to come when such persons will be 
 either reduced to machines for the unconscious per- 
 formance of their work, or to slaves who know too 
 well what they are doing and hate it. 
 
 (2) Another and safer advice would be, Absorb 
 yourself in business. Thorough devotion to this pur- 
 suit is much more likely to succeed in excluding 
 from the mind all those thoughts that wander through 
 eternity and in restricting them to the length of time 
 
MODES OF INFLUENCING OUR CONVICTIONS. 91 
 
 requisite to secure a fortune, than is devotion to 
 pleasure. Partly because in its origin it appeals to 
 more imperious necessities, partly because no limit 
 is here reached beyond which attainment defeats its 
 end, partly also because the pursuit of this end is 
 hardly at all dependent on youthful health and vi- 
 gour. Let then the man who wishes to forget God, 
 and so to end in practical disbelief of his Revelation, 
 throw himself heart and" soul into the pursuit of 
 gain. By the absorbing influence of such a pursuit, 
 he will do a great deal, under favourable circum- 
 stances, towards ensuring success. Unto him that 
 hath shall be given, from him that hath not shall 
 be taken away even that which he hath. 
 
 (3) A third and even more successful course, 
 open to those who are competent for it, is absorp- 
 tion in some scientific study. In such a pursuit, 
 when carried on exclusively, there is nothing which 
 need lead us further backwards in the pursuit of 
 causes than to some antecedent phenomenon, nor 
 further onwards in tracking out effects than to such 
 results as admitted of sensible experiments. But are 
 not the effects even more decisive than this? (I am 
 still speaking of exclusive devotion to science.) May 
 it not, by its incessant appeal to experiment, tend to 
 disparage all convictions that do not admit of being 
 forced home upon all persons alike, whatever their 
 circumstances or character? Moreover in reference 
 to that dark side of life, of which we have had so 
 much to say; science regards it, and in its own 
 sphere rightly regards it, as simply mischievous. 
 
92 LECTURf IV. 
 
 Objectively it is an evil which we must extirpate as 
 far as possible; subjectively it is a source of erro- 
 neous judgments. May we not thus be in danger of 
 missing the important bearing which these mournful 
 facts have upon the nature of our conclusions when 
 our premises are so far widened as fairly to embrace 
 them? 
 
 The practical outcome of all this is evident. The 
 process of building up and "strengthening our convic- 
 tions is to a considerable extent in our own hands. 
 By not leaving the mind in solitude or vacancy, but 
 promptly supplying all its necessities, whether with 
 solid food or with husks, you may often and for a 
 long time prevent it from feeling any hunger or 
 thirst after righteousness. Of course the mind must 
 
 o 
 
 have some logical foothold to secure such a result, 
 as I am not speaking of any of those freaks of be- 
 lief which are almost capricious. 
 
 But then two questions arise; Is such a process 
 of packing your convictions a fair one ? Is it a pru- 
 dent one or likely to succeed? The first question I 
 have discussed in the former lectures. As a simple 
 matter of drawing conclusions I cannot see that the 
 man who has thus curtailed the facts about which he 
 is really in a fit state to reason, is so competent a judge 
 as he who gives due weight to all. And if it is not 
 fair, it is not likely to be prudent. Only consider 
 what a miserably critical position the man must oc- 
 cupy who is struggling to bank out from him that 
 dark and rising tide of sorrow and sickness and pain 
 and death which is devastating all the country 
 
INFLUENCE OF AFFLICTION. 93 
 
 around him. Hard it is to do it at any time, though 
 when young and strong he may make head against 
 the flood; but as the tide continues to rise he is 
 growing feebler and more lonely, and the points of 
 danger are multiplying, and the prospect of an utter 
 collapse is becoming nearer. Such a sight is one to 
 make any thoughtful mind sad indeed. 
 
 II. Will not the above considerations throw 
 some light upon that process which is so commonly 
 called the * chastening influence' of affliction in certain 
 cases? That this is due to the work of God's Holy 
 Spirit I fully admit, but we may trace somewhat the 
 human side of the means by which He works. Now 
 it is very far from being always the case that suffer- 
 ing produces any permanent effect. (I am speaking, 
 of course, throughout, of its effect upon our belief.) 
 Sometimes men merely repinje when they fall into 
 affliction ; sometimes they actually resent it as an in- ' 
 jury; sometimes they harden themselves against it. 
 Many persons are perplexed at this being the case, 
 and think that the exhibition of such feelings by the 
 sufferer must indicate wilful rebellion on his part: 
 being certain that he must know whose hand is chas- 
 tening him, they can draw but one inference, that he 
 is stubborn. But must this be so? Surely a good 
 deal of ' filling in' is required before a serious change 
 of views can be shown to be anyhow connected with 
 the mere consciousness of suffering. Undoubtedly 
 the wide prevalence of suffering of various kinds is 
 one of the buttresses of our faith : that class of facts 
 requiring explanation will, of course, confirm any 
 
94 LECTURE IV. 
 
 scheme which does explain them. But it takes 
 much to bring this home. When a man has long 
 lived a life of consistent worldliness, and is at last 
 suddenly prostrated by some stroke of affliction, what 
 will follow? Often he will be merely like one who 
 has just stumbled during a brisk walk, who when he 
 recovers himself goes on his way again as before, and 
 never dreams of putting the obstacle into a place in 
 any scheme. If he does reflect upon it he may only 
 reach to regarding it as a hardship or injury. What 
 else can we expect? Where the suffering stands as 
 a thing by itself, as it almost certainly will in the 
 mind of the person upon whom it has thus suddenly 
 intruded; where it has no group of facts to be con- 
 nected with, and therefore no end before it, no part 
 apparently to play; why should it effect more than 
 provoke expressions of dissatisfaction and pain ? 
 Wounded animals merely show signs of suffering, 
 and make efforts to obtain ease; and many a man 
 gets no nearer to reflection, to say nothing of repent- 
 ance, than they do. This is quite to be expected. 
 There is nothing in mere pain, say, taken by itself, 
 that should make us reflect. Just the reverse; its 
 main characteristic is to fix the attention upon itself 
 rather than to make us speculate upon its place in a 
 scheme. 
 
 III. The next suggestion I would make is one 
 that has already been repeatedly given by implica- 
 tion. Let us remember to allow for bias. The 
 meaning of this recommendation will best be seen by 
 examining two queries which it may very well pro- 
 
RESULTS OF BIAS. 
 
 95 
 
 voke. One of them is this. Do you mean that we 
 are to try to believe, and make profession of believ- 
 ing, when all the while we do not ? Certainly not : 
 once admit that the judgment is warped by the life 
 we lead, and it will follow immediately that conclu- 
 sions which would otherwise be accepted will have 
 to be modified. This is a principle upon which we 
 soon learn to act in other directions. No matter 
 how clear an inference may seem, no matter how 
 impossible it may be to divest ourselves of the cus- 
 tomary associations, the judgment can nevertheless 
 shake itself free and accept what it knows to be the 
 truth, and the conduct will be shaped accordingly. 
 Nothing can well appear more "unmistakeable than 
 the size and position of an object under water: but 
 the moment we know that these are distorted, in 
 spite of the intrusion of opposite associations, we 
 shape our conduct by our revised judgment. In 
 other words, we appeal to the deliberate rather than 
 to the spontaneous judgment. Such an appeal is 
 needed in many of the affairs of life. Once get into 
 the vortex of an absorbing pursuit and be left to 
 pursue it in peace and quiet, and you have small 
 chance of seeing other things in a true light. Things 
 of time and sense will seem the only things certain, 
 and therefore the only things to be taken into ac- 
 count. Religion, and all that that word implies, will 
 lose its reality, and seem, if reflected upon, to be 
 nothing else than a product engendered, as the 
 phrase is, by our religious sentiments. But it is 
 perfectly admissible to say, I know this, I know 
 
96 LECTURE IV. 
 
 that my judgment is warped, and therefore it is 
 no treason to that Sovereign power to interpret its 
 real commands in the sense in which we know they 
 ought to be taken. 
 
 Such a plan as this, I think, is far more likely to 
 succeed than any factitious recourse to scenes or 
 meditations of a counteracting character. This, of 
 course, was a common resource in mediaeval times, 
 especially amongst those who lived by rule. So 
 many hours of meditation on penitential, subjects, 
 such and such occasions of enforced familiarity with 
 the outward trappings of death. Attempts of this 
 kind seem founded on a true principle, in so far as 
 they recognize that our convictions are controllable 
 through the medium of our outward circumstances, 
 and that the daily experience of most persons is such 
 as to make their belief develop in a very one-sided 
 form. But these attempts seem liable to failure 
 from the fact of their being artificial. The know- 
 ledge that they were so flagrantly out of ordinary 
 routine should be almost fatal to their success. I 
 am regarding them, of course, as instruments in- 
 tended to work upon the judgment, and not simply 
 to discipline the affections or the will. 
 
 Another objection to the plan of allowing for 
 bias might take this form : Do you wish to frighten 
 us into a change of life by a memento morif Cer- 
 tainly not, if by fear is meant any mental state 
 which disturbs the judgment and renders us unfitted 
 to take a calm and complete view of the evidence 
 which bears on our conclusions. Fear, in this sense, 
 

 
 HOW TO ENLARGE OUR EXPERIENCE. 97 
 
 \Qr 
 
 is of course to be avoided. But in these protests 
 
 against intimidation the fact is often overlooked, or 
 even excluded from notice, that the making up of 
 our judgments really is a very serious matter. It is 
 a process which is carried on far too frivolously 
 about most questions, but when the inquiry is one so 
 solemn as that of our destiny here and hereafter, 
 to neglect relevant facts because they happen to be 
 unpleasant, is sheer madness. Remember that on 
 one supposition only is it legitimate to keep your 
 mind averted from those dark realities which may at 
 any moment strike across your path. It is the sup- 
 position of the secularist. If you are perfectly con- 
 vinced that suffering and death, for instance, are 
 events of which nothing but physical or other natural 
 explanations are possible, so that all those world-old 
 questions Why are they sent? What do they mean? 
 are intrinsically absurd; then clearly the best thing 
 to be done is to try and keep them out of sight. 
 But except on such a supposition we have no right 
 to take this course. One has no patience with those 
 who protest against reminding men of sucli un- 
 doubted facts as that they shall probably suffer 
 and must certainly die, on the plea that to do this 
 is to try and frighten them into particular con- 
 clusions. 
 
 IV. Another suggestion follows in close con- 
 nection with the preceding. It is this ; enlarge 
 I your own experience by appealing to the experience 
 of others. Man's nature is so many-sided and in- 
 tricate that any great scheme like that of Christianity, 
 
 V.L. 7 
 
98 LECTURE IV. 
 
 which is adapted to meet our wants and correct our 
 shortcomings, cannot fairly be viewed in relation to 
 one man alone. Not only has every one his own 
 peculiarities of temperament, but moreover many of 
 us live in an exceedingly artificial state. I mean 
 that in our present highly civilised condition we may 
 succeed in shutting out, at least for a time, many of 
 those experiences which might yet fairly be called 
 universal, and which ought therefore to be taken 
 into account. Some persons may succeed in ex- 
 cluding them almost to the last. Hence, when any 
 one tests a fundamental doctrine of Christianity by 
 the question, " Do I feel any need for it ? Does it 
 correspond to any yearning, or correct any deficiency 
 in me V we may fairly inquire, "Are you in a fit state 
 to judge ?" Admitting that the fact of a religion 
 being out of harmony with the character of man 
 would throw serious doubts upon its truth, we may 
 yet reasonably ask an objector whether his individual 
 experience is such as to make him a fair type of his 
 fellow men. 
 
 As I have already commented upon this I will 
 give but one or two illustrations of what I mean. 
 You may learn much, for instance, by intercourse 
 with those in very different circumstances from your- 
 self; the young may learn from the old, the happy 
 from the afflicted. You need not actually bow to 
 their decision, any more than they need to yours, 
 but you may fairly correct your judgment by theirs. 
 Beliefs which have been burnt into the mind of some 
 sufferer by an experience from which others have 
 
110 W TO ENLARGE OUR EXPERIENCE. 99 
 
 been free will often come to us in the light almost 
 of a revelation, so totally are they unlike anything 
 that our own minds would have spontaneously pro- 
 duced. As you come out of some sick room into 
 the fresh air, do not be too ready to say and think, 
 " Those are the ghastly fancies which are bred of 
 exhaustion and fear *." 
 
 Another valuable help is to be found in religious 
 biographies, or rather we should say autobiographies, 
 for from the nature of the case much depends upon 
 
 1 " The fable of the ancient is still true. The woman even now sits 
 at the portal of life, presenting a cup to all who enter in which diffuses 
 through every vein a poison that will cling to them for ever. The judg- 
 ment may pierce the clouds of prej udice. In the moments of her strength 
 she may even rejoice and triumph in her liberty, yet the conceptions of 
 childhood will long remain latent in the mind, to reappear in every hour 
 of weakness, when the tension of the reason is relaxed, and when the 
 power of old associations is supreme." He adds in a note, " This very 
 painful recurrence, which occupies such an important place in all 
 religious biographies, seems to bo attached to an extremely remarkable 
 and obscure department of mental phenomena which has only been in- 
 vestigated with earnestness within the last few years, and which is 
 termed by psychologists 'latent consciousness,' and by physiologists 
 ' unconscious cerebration' or the * reflex action of the brain.' " (Lecky's 
 A'iw and Progress of Rationalism in Europe, Vol. n. p. 101. 
 
 This doctrine of latent consciousness is far too extensive to be 
 touched upon here, but I cannot think that the application which Mr 
 Lecky makes of it in the above passage is sound. Is it true that old 
 beliefs thus emerge ] Our judgments and convictions often do undergo 
 a change towards the very close of life ; I have offered a reason for this 
 which recognises that they depend to a great extent upon evidence. 
 Mr Lecky appears to assume that beneath the surface of those beliefs 
 in which we live and upon which we act when in health, there is a 
 lower stratum of beliefs which may suddenly emerge during weakness or 
 illness, and then reign supreme. I cannot think that this is the case. 
 Old thoughts recur, and old associations may regain influence, but except 
 to the limited extent which this may involve (as indicated in the text), 
 old beliefs do not seem to sway us ; at least not until the mind begins 
 to wander. 
 
 72 
 
100 LECTURE IV. 
 
 our being able to get access to the diverse experience 
 as nearly as possible at first hand. To give but one 
 instance of what I mean ; Can we learn nothing 
 from such a life as that of Baxter, with his eighty 
 years of bodily suffering, and afflictive experience, 
 and never-ceasing self-questioning ? Or go back to 
 Augustine, or further still to the time of Job, Eccle- 
 siastes or of David ; taking their sayings if you will 
 simply as records of past experience. Such utter- 
 ances as these are most valuable to those who, like 
 so many of ourselves, live softly most of our days. 
 But, remember, that for the purpose in question they 
 must not be read too critically ; I mean they must 
 not be read simply for the purpose of accounting for 
 them. Their convictions do not necessarily want 
 accounting for any more than our own. The cynical 
 explanation is far too ready to suggest itself in such 
 cases ; 
 
 " Not that the grounds of hope were fixed, 
 The elements were kindlier mixed." 
 
 "He that is ready to slip with his feet is as a 
 
 lamp despised in the thought of him that is at ease," 
 Job xii. 5. To make the critical view too prominent 
 will most likely lead you into the habit of regarding 
 your own experience as the normal one, upon which 
 inferences are to be based ; whilst that of others is 
 looked on as exceptional, and therefore the source of 
 morbid opinions. Try rather to read sympathetically ; 
 there is little danger of being carried too far in this 
 direction ; and see, as you do so, whether certain 
 obscure convictions will not become brightened, and 
 
REGARD TO CONSEQUENCES. 101 
 
 some facts, which in the routine of your own life 
 had been almost overlooked, will not assume greater 
 prominence. There can be few more profitable em- 
 ployments than that of studying such utterances in 
 sympathy, saying to yourself as you do so, " These 
 bitter confessions, these stedfast convictions, are those 
 of one who had passed through such experience as I 
 have little conception of: am I quite right in 
 assuming complacently that I alone stand face to 
 face with the truth ? that I see things as they are, 
 whilst he sees them distorted through a medium?" 
 
 "Oh, not alone when life flows still, do truth 
 And power emerge, but also when strange chanee 
 Ruffles its current ; in unused conjuncture, 
 When sickness breaks the body, hunger, watching, 
 Excess, or languor oftenest death's approach, 
 Peril, deep joy, or woe." 
 
 V. There is another remark, suggested by 
 the foregoing reflections, which it is as well to make 
 at this point. Do not be too readily carried away 
 by the very common denunciations against regarding 
 the consequences of the principles you adopt. Such 
 denunciations are not unfrequently groundless, and 
 arise out of a want of appreciation of some of the 
 characteristics of evidence on moral and religious 
 subjects. Where the reasoning rests on a few prin- 
 ciples about which we feel absolutely certain (no 
 matter how these principles may have been acquired) 
 of course the consequences must be faced without 
 fear or compunction. If by a deduction from the 
 axioms of geometry a future life could be disproved, 
 
102 LECTURE IV. 
 
 by all means let the belief in such a doctrine be 
 discarded on the day of the discovery. But when 
 the evidence consists of a multitude of inductions 
 and analogies, the consequences are a most important 
 consideration. 
 
 In these cases, indeed, it is often accidental 
 or dependent on our own choice whether any given 
 proposition is to be regarded as a premise or a 
 conclusion, and one might "just as reasonably be 
 disregarded as the other. If a dozen probable facts 
 confirm one another, any ten you like to begin with 
 will serve as confirmation of the remaining two. 
 I think that one may not unfrequently observe 
 instances in which men have started from some 
 premise, and finding it in apparent opposition to 
 certain recognised conclusions, have abandoned the 
 latter in a moment, when the slightest consideration 
 would have convinced them that the rejected pro- 
 positions had better claims than that which was em- 
 ployed to subvert them. To do this is much as if one 
 were to lean against a mud bank, in trying to throw 
 down a stone wall. Is not the advice to disregard 
 consequences rather like a relic of the sentiments 
 engendered by the old scholastic disputes ? Those 
 who took part in them had to start from certain 
 premises, which if they were not accepted irrevocably 
 would cause the dispute to break down. If discus- 
 sion is a merely artificial matter to be conducted in 
 accordance with rules, all you can do when you trip 
 upon a hostile fact is to yield yourself prisoner ; 
 but if it is a means of honestly endeavouring to elicit 
 
 
PECULIARITIES OF COLLEGE LIFE. 103 
 
 the truth, the best thing to be done is to get up 
 again with your improved knowledge and try again. 
 
 In one case, of course, such advice as that in 
 question is perfectly appropriate ; but then that is 
 a case with which my present argument is not con- 
 cerned. When timidity, selfishness and sloth come 
 into play, and people are induced by these unworthy 
 motives to stop short at a certain point, and refuse 
 either to reject the new fact or to reconsider the 
 old ones, they deserve to be denounced. But then 
 such conduct as this is quite incompatible with 
 sincerity and thoughtful ness, and we need not 
 therefore pause to consider it ; for (as I have seve- 
 ral times remarked) I have been forced, for brevity's 
 sake, to confine myself almost entirely to the case 
 of the sincere and thoughtful. 
 
 But I must not forget, brethren, that I am not 
 speaking to people in general, but to a special 
 audience. Let me gather up again such sugges- 
 tions as have been made, and put them into a 
 form more precisely suitable to the position of the 
 majority of those whom I am now addressing. 
 Many of you are just beginning to enter on a 
 new life here ; a life of which one may say this 
 much for certain, that it is as happy a time as 
 you have ever spent before or are likely to spend 
 in future. You have probably been well and wisely 
 warned against the dangers you may encounter. 
 Dangers enough there are here, as well as else- 
 where, but I have avoided directly employing any 
 such term, for this reason ; with the word danger 
 
104 LECTURE IV. 
 
 we commonly associate the idea of evils which we 
 may fall in with or may escape altogether. "We 
 represent to- ourselves some sin or bad habit, or 
 some religious error, something definite, that is, 
 which we can distinctly anticipate ; whence the con- 
 clusion is easy that we can probably avoid it, and 
 that if we do avoid it, we escape uninfluenced. 
 What I am speaking of on the other hand is not 
 the contingent, but the certain ; not the possible 
 future, but the actual present. I am discussing in- 
 fluences under which you certainly live, and which 
 do without doubt affect our convictions ; the only 
 question is to what extent do they do so ? Let 
 me point out to you a few of the characteristics 
 of college life which peculiarly distinguish it from 
 life elsewhere, confining myself, of course, to such 
 as fall in with the general aim of these Lectures. 
 
 (I) In the first place, then, there is no ques- 
 tion but that you are unusually protected here 
 from a large portion of the dark side of human 
 life. Sorrow and sickness and pain and death are 
 but rare and fleeting visitors amongst us. I do 
 not merely mean that you are called upon actually 
 to suffer less than the common run of men. The 
 very sight of suffering in any of its more acute 
 forms is very unusual here. We seldom see any 
 deep misery, we seldom hear of any lasting pain. 
 Elsewhere the mere existence of friendship, and 
 natural ties, and association with our fellow men, 
 can hardly fail to insure the continual excitement 
 of our sympathies. Most men are so closely con- 
 
PECULIARITIES OF COLLEGE LIFE. 105 
 
 nected with others of different ages and ranks and 
 circumstances, that it is barely possible for them 
 to go on long without encountering much to dis- 
 tress and pain them. Here, on the other hand, 
 you are for the most part artificially protected 
 from most of the events. which wound men's better 
 sensibilities. Such things are heard of, but seldom 
 seen. You are not forced into the contemplation 
 of patience under protracted suffering, of resigna- 
 tion under bitter affliction. 
 
 A single hint on this point will suffice. Some 
 of you may have experienced the strange and so- 
 lemn contrast caused by a sudden change from the 
 happy routine of life here to one of those dis- 
 tressing scenes which men are sometimes called 
 upon to witness. If so, you will have felt what 
 I am alluding to with a power which no words 
 can describe. To say that such scenes give us a 
 " deeper " or a " sadder " view of life, is to use an 
 expression utterly inadequate to express their full 
 effect. "We might rather say that they have power 
 to create within us new convictions. Truths which 
 had been often presented to us before, but w r hich 
 had commonly remained unnoticed, may thence- 
 forth assume a startling importance. Perhaps we 
 may have been in the habit of thinking that we 
 believed them, perhaps we may have regarded them 
 with indifference. The experience of a few days 
 or weeks may burn them indelibly into our minds. 
 
 I cannot but think, also, that a similar effect, 
 though of course in a smaller degree, will have 
 
106 LECTURE IV. 
 
 been experienced by many of you in the alterna- 
 tions between your life here and that at home. 
 Have you never felt, in this way, how a more 
 chequered experience, and exposure to distress 
 through other and wider sympathies, can enable 
 you to grasp new truths ? and deepen your interest 
 in them and your assurance of them ? 
 
 (II) There is another consideration connected 
 with this which is also deserving of notice. If con- 
 tact with suffering and sorrow is essential for the 
 adequate and duly-proportioned belief of any great 
 Christian doctrine, is it not almost equally essen- 
 tial for such belief that there should be intervals 
 of quiet reflection ? But in that incessant social 
 intercourse which the fact of your living close toge- 
 ther, combined with community of pursuits and 
 community of interests, cannot fail to secure, how 
 very little prospect is there of the solitude in which 
 alone such quiet reflection can be attained ! Of 
 course, by solitude I do not mean the mere fact of 
 being alone. You may be alone in study, you 
 may be alone in simple rest from exhaustion, you 
 may be alone in sheer vacancy. In all such cases 
 the mind is either altogether unemployed, or it is 
 concentrated upon something without us. By soli- 
 tude I understand that state in which the mind 
 is forced in upon itself, in which we can review 
 our conduct and motives, in which we reflect upon 
 what we are, and have been, and may be hereafter. 
 
 In most other positions of life, men are not 
 unfrequently thus thrown upon their own resources. 
 

 PECULIARITIES OF COLLEGE LIFE. 107 
 
 They are the more likely to be driven to this, 
 since they will often find themselves in a position 
 in which the only other alternative would be to 
 sink to the veriest frivolity and trifling. But you 
 are under the pressure of no such alternative here. 
 The peculiarity with you is that that incessant 
 social intercourse, which withdraws us from our- 
 selves, presents itself under a very seductive form. 
 It appears not merely innocent, but justifiable, and 
 in many ways delightful and useful. 
 
 Such a situation cannot be without its influ- 
 ence. If our practical acceptance of the truths of 
 the Gospel depends in part upon the need we feel 
 for them, and if the time in which we are mast 
 likely to feel any such need is during our occa- 
 sional solitary hours, what will be the probable 
 effect of filling up those hours with employments 
 which yield real satisfaction ? Such social and in- 
 tellectual pursuits will scarcely supply us with last- 
 ing mental food, but they may satisfy for a long 
 time. In other words, though you may be far 
 indeed from trying to appease your hunger with a 
 stone, you may yet be feasting richly upon that 
 which will prevent you from feeling your need of 
 the bread of life. 
 
 (Ill) There is one other remark I have to 
 make. Elsewhere in life our social and selfish ten- 
 dencies are constantly coming into conflict with 
 each other. If we wish to please others we cannot 
 always continue to please ourselves. If therefore 
 we do not sink into utter selfishness, we have often 
 
108 LECTURE IV. 
 
 occasion to be reminded that we have need of 
 Higher Help. It is during such conflicts that 
 men can really appreciate how sorely they require 
 strength for their weakness, and light for their 
 blindness, and salvation from their selfishness. It 
 is then that we feel our need of a Spirit who shall 
 guide and strengthen us. 
 
 Here again, college life stands in striking con- 
 trast with life elsewhere. There is, perhaps, no 
 other place on earth in which the pursuit of your 
 own happiness is so nearly coincident with securing 
 that of others. "With a large choice of friends 
 each can suit himself according to the humour of 
 the moment. You have common pursuits and com- 
 mon pleasures. The routine of college life assists 
 this tendency by leading each to occupations simi- 
 lar to those in which others are engaged at the 
 same time. The result is that many of you may 
 have scarcely an occasion, perhaps not even an 
 opportunity, for an act of real self-denial through- 
 out the term. By self-denial I mean the having 
 to forego our own pleasure, because it comes into 
 conflict with the pleasure of others. I do not mean 
 a struggle for our own intellectual advantage, still 
 less of course, a scramble for prizes. 
 
 I cannot think that a condition so exceptional 
 as this can be without its influence upon the cha- 
 racter and the belief. It may not actually pro- 
 duce a complacent satisfaction with one's own 
 moral worth, but that I think is the direction in 
 which its tendency lies. It leads a man unduly 
 
CONCLUSION. 109 
 
 [to depreciate the terrible strength of his selfish 
 propensities, it induces him to estimate but slight- 
 ingly the help which is offered to counteract those 
 propensities ; it may loosen his persuasion of the 
 existence of such help. 
 
 FSuch then, I think, are some of the principal 
 respects in which your experience here differs from 
 that of other men elsewhere. None of them can 
 be regarded as unimportant, and their aggregate 
 effect may be considerable. Do not misunderstand 
 me as though I meant to deplore the existence 
 of these exceptional conditions, or to recommend 
 an ascetic escape from them. Most emphatically 
 the contrary. Use your privileges whilst you have 
 them : they will not last too long. Extract to the 
 uttermost the pleasure and the profit which they 
 can lawfully yield : it will be none too great. But 
 use them as not abusing them ; and as you enjoy 
 them bear in mind that they are both exceptional 
 and transitory. 
 
 The final conclusion therefore is simply this ; 
 Do doctrines to which some persons cling as of infi- 
 nite value ever seem to you as of small or no 
 importance ? Are you ever disposed, in fact, to 
 think that you could "get on well enough" with- 
 out truths which others look upon as their stay 
 in life ? If so, just reflect whether this difference 
 may not in part arise from those exceptional cir- 
 cumstances in which you are placed. Our assu- 
 rance of any great truth rests on very varied 
 grounds, and these grounds are mostly to be found 
 
110 LECTURE IV. 
 
 in the details of our practical life. Take the three 
 cardinal doctrines of our Faith ; that we have a 
 Father in Heaven whose creatures we are, and 
 who watches over us amidst all the cares and sor- 
 rows of this mortal life; that we have a Saviour 
 who died for us, that we might be saved from 
 sin and death ; that there is a Holy Spirit whose 
 work it is to sanctify our unruly affections and to 
 grant us that strength to resist temptations which 
 we cannot find in ourselves. Do you suppose that 
 our practical belief of these wide-spreading truths 
 will not take its tone from the influences under 
 which we live, from the cares and trials to which 
 we are subject, from the wants we experience and 
 the satisfaction we find provided for these wants ? 
 
 All I now urge upon you therefore is to guard 
 against such bias ; to recognise freely that your 
 judgment is sure to be imperfect and therefore 
 cannot be final. To employ an old illustration, I 
 only ask you to appeal occasionally from your own 
 judgment when you know it cannot be trusted ; 
 to appeal from what you are now when intoxicated 
 with youth and health and every form of social 
 enjoyment ; to what any of us may soon be, to 
 what all must ere long be, when we have passed 
 into other scenes, and find that many earthly sup- 
 ports upon which, without knowing it, we were 
 accustomed to lean, are torn for ever from us. I 
 do not want even to seem to adopt the cynical 
 tone of one who says to you, "Rejoice, young 
 man, in thy youth, and let thy heart cheer thee 
 
CONCLUSION. Ill 
 
 in the days of thy youth, and walk in the ways 
 of thy heart, and in the sight of thine eyes, but 
 know thou that for all these things God will bring 
 thee into judgment." There is no punishment for 
 mere pleasure ; there is no evil eye above, that 
 loves to take its revenge upon our happiness. 
 Only live with the sobriety of those who know 
 that their life here is exceptional, and the caution 
 of those who know that it may very soon change, 
 and that these circumstances may greatly affect 
 our judgment. "For the thoughts of mortal men 
 are miserable, and our devices are but uncertain ; 
 for the corruptible body presseth down the soul, 
 and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind 
 that rnuseth upon many things. And hardly do we 
 guess aright at things that are upon earth, and 
 with labour do we find the things that are before 
 us ; but the things that are in Heaven who can 
 search out" without in every way widening his 
 experience, and chastening his judgment, and laying 
 open his heart to every influence by which the Holy 
 Spirit is accustomed to teach him the deep things of 
 God? 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 NOTE TO PAGE 8. 
 
 THE following is the passage alluded to in the text ; it is 
 taken from the Salon, ed. 1834, p. 275 : 
 
 " Wir diirfen es nicht verhehlen, weder aus Pietat, noch 
 aus Klugheit, wir wollen es nicht verschweigen : der Mann, 
 welcher einst am kuhnsten in Deutschland die Religion des 
 Pantheismus ausgesprochen, welcher die Heiligung der Natur 
 und die Wiedereinsetzung des Menschen in seine Gottesrechte 
 am lautesten verkundet, dieser Mann ist abtriinnig geworden 
 von seiner eignen tehre, er hat den Altar verlassen, den er 
 selber eingeweiht, er ist zuriickgeschlichen in den Glaubens- 
 stall der Vergangenheit, er ist jetzt gut katholisch und 
 predigt einen ausserweltlichen personlichen Gott, "der die 
 Thorheit begangen habe, die Welt zu erschaffen." Mogen 
 immerhin die Altglaubigen ihre Glocken lauten und Kyrie 
 Eleison singen, ob solcher Bekehrung es beweist aber 
 nichts fur ihre Meinung, es beweist nur, dass der Mensch 
 sich dem Katholizismus zuneigt, wenn er mude und alt wird, 
 wenn er seine physischen und geistigen Krafte verloren, 
 wenn er nicht mehr geniessen und denken kann. Auf dem 
 Todtbette sind so viele Freydenker bekehrt worden aber 
 macht nur kein Riihmens davon ! Diese Bekehrungsge- 
 schichten gehoren hochstens zur Pathologie und wttrden nur 
 
 V.L. 8 
 
114 APPENDIX. 
 
 schlechtes Zeugniss geben fur Eure Sache. Sie bewiesen 
 ain Ende nur, dass es Euch nicht moglich war, jene Frey- 
 denker zu bekehren, so lange sie mit gesunden Sinnen unter 
 Gottes freyem Himmel umherwandelten und ihrer Yernunft 
 vollig machtig waren." 
 
 In support of the other statement in the text I may 
 quote the following passages. They are taken from the 
 preface to his Vcrmischte Schriften, written in the winter 
 of 1854. 
 
 "Gottlob ich war sie los! Ach konnte ich doch alles, 
 was ich einst uber die deutsche Philosophic drucken liess, in 
 derselben Weise vernichten ! Aber das ist unmoglich, und 
 da ich nicht einmal den Wiederabdruck bereits vergriffener 
 Biicher verhindern kann, wie ich jiingst betriibsamlichst 
 erfahren, so bleibt mir nichts iibrig, als offentlich zu gestehen, 
 dass meine Darstellung der deutschen philosophischen Sys- 
 teme, also furnehmlich die ersten drei Abtheilungen meines 
 Buches de 1'Allemagne, die siindhaftesten Irrthumer ent- 
 halten." * * * * 
 
 "Einem ehrlichen Manne bleibt aber unter alien Um- 
 standen das unveraiisserliche Recht, seinen Irrthum offen zu 
 gestehen, und ich will es ohne Scheu hier ausiiben. Ich 
 bekenne daher unumwunden, das Alles, was in diesem 
 Buche namentlich auf die grosse Gottesfrage Bezug hat, 
 ebenso falsch wie unbesonnen ist. Ebenso unbesonnen wie 
 falsch ist die Behauptung, die ich der Schule nachsprach, 
 dass der Deismus in der Theorie zu grunde gerichtet sei und 
 sich nur noch in der Erscheinungswelt kummerlich hin- 
 friste." 
 
 I know that some persons think he was jesting to the 
 last ; but the obvious reply is that such passages as these 
 have no fun in them. Irreverent expressions do occasionally 
 occur, but they seem to me indicative of nothing but the 
 feelings of a born jester face to face with grim realities 
 of which he had hardly thought before. 
 
APPENDIX. 115 
 
 NOTE TO PAGE 61. 
 
 The reference in the text to Pascal affords a good oppor- 
 tunity of discussing two or three questions about which some 
 confusion seems to exist. 
 
 The first of these is the propriety of acting, and avowing 
 that we do act, upon the chance of securing salvation ; in 
 other words of balancing a present loss, certain and small, 
 against a future gain, probable and vast. Pascal's name is 
 often alluded to as that of one who had introduced the Doc- 
 trine of Chances into the question, in some vicious way ; what 
 is there to be discredited in an appeal to these principles ? 
 
 We may obviate at once an answer which is sometimes 
 offered. Some persons seem to think that, if we venture to 
 decide religious questions upon these principles, we are 
 acting upon mere self-interest and neglecting the question 
 as to what is the truth ; that is, we are simply thinking of 
 saving ourselves. I apprehend however that any such anti- 
 thesis as this between self-interest and truth is quite a 
 mistake. Extraneous interests of course may lead a man 
 from attending simply to the truth of a proposition ; he may, 
 for instance, be bribed somehow by additional rewards or 
 punishments into accepting or rejecting it ; but when, as in 
 the case in question, the gain or loss he may incur are the 
 natural and necessary consequences of the events whose 
 truth is in question, it is not easy to see how self-interest 
 could afford to neglect their truth. The fact is that all 
 successful action, and therefore that dictated by self-interest, 
 rests upon truth ; in other words if we wish to succeed we 
 must have as many true beliefs and as few false ones as 
 possible. Every question about practice can be resolved into 
 one about the truth of propositions. This is equally the 
 
 82 
 
116 APPENDIX: 
 
 case with the partial truth of what are called probable 
 events, as with those which we regard as more certain. 
 The successful gamester is the one who most often acts in 
 accordance with the truth in the class of events with which 
 he is concerned ; in other words who most often assigns its 
 due value to the chance of all these events. 
 
 I cannot therefore admit as philosophically correct the 
 common reply that we must simply accept what seems to us 
 most likely to be true. In matters of strict demonstration 
 where things can definitely be shown to be either true or 
 false such a course is sound enough. If a statement is 
 known to be false, no action the success of which presupposes 
 the truth of the statement can be of any use, nor conversely 
 can we be lawfully terrified into admitting its truth by any 
 horrible consequences which might follow were it true and 
 we had neglected it. When however, .as is usually the case 
 in the affairs of life, we are confronted by rival alternatives 
 each of which rests upon a probability only, it is sheer 
 madness to adopt the one which seems the most probable 
 simply because it is so, and in defiance of the loss and gain 
 which we thereby incur. Let any one try to act upon 
 such principles in 'the affairs of common life, and he will 
 soon find them lead him to mischief and destruction. Truth 
 and falsehood are not merely of little or no value except in 
 reference to the practice which rests upon them, and which 
 thus becomes successful or unsuccessful; some philosophers 
 would even go further and assert that the words truth and 
 falsehood have no meaning or explanation except in reference 
 to our conduct. 
 
 I do not mean that we must believe events to be more 
 probably true than they really are ; far from it ; but we 
 must constantly act upon the hypothesis that an event may 
 really happen when we well know that such a contingency is 
 very unlikely. I 'know, say, that the chances are a thousand 
 to one that my house will never be burnt down ; my belief 
 
APPENDIX. 117 
 
 in the contingency is very small, but I act upon the truth 
 of it and insure the house 1 . 
 
 Why then are we to make such a broad distinction between 
 temporal and spiritual matters that a principle of action 
 universally adopted in the one is to be rejected and dis- 
 paraged in the other ? If a man is to be applauded for 
 undergoing the annual sacrifice of paying a premium to 
 guard against the bare chance of having his house burnt 
 over his head, why is he not to submit to the various sacri- 
 fices required by religion, if these sacrifices will in any way 
 remove the chance of a far worse catastrophe ? I mean, why 
 
 1 It may be objected that there is the following reply to the justness 
 of any such parallel as that suggested above ; " I know that in this 
 town one house in a thousand will be burnt down ; I do not know whose 
 house it will be ; so I insure mine. Now suppose I knew that immortal 
 misery awaits even a fraction of the obstinately vicious, it would bo 
 prudent to endeavour to escape at any sacrifice ; but I have not this 
 knowledge. In other words, a foundation of absolute knowledge is the 
 basis of niy conduct in insuring my house, there is no such foundation in 
 the case of morality and religion as connected with a future state." 
 
 It is quite true that the parallel would be much closer in such a case 
 as that here suggested, but I think that that in the text is sufficiently 
 close for similar inferences to be drawn. To discuss the question fully, 
 however, would involve too long a digression for a note, and there is the 
 less occasion for me to do it here, inasmuch as I have already discussed 
 the same question elsewhere (Logic of Chance, pp. 84 91). 
 
 I have there attempted to shew how the theory of Probability may 
 bo applied to events which cannot recur in a. man's life, and as regards 
 which therefore he cannot expect to obtain that justification in the long 
 run which is generally to be obtained as regards the petty ordinary 
 affairs of daily life. I apprehend that we must still refer the event to 
 the nearest allied class of similar events as to which anything like 
 statistical accuracy can be obtained, and judge of it as possessing the 
 degree of probability which those statistics establish for that class of 
 events. In the case of a religious scheme as to which we feel doubtful, 
 if Probabili ty is te be employed at all, we must take account of the argu- 
 ments by which it is supported, and say of it, Statements thus supported 
 are true in such a proportional number of cases ; I shall therefore treat 
 the scheme as belonging to this class. It does not recur, but events 
 thus allied with it do recur, and that is enough for practice. 
 
118 APPENDIX. 
 
 is he not to avow in one case as in the other that these, and 
 these alone, are his motives ? 
 
 There is great danger, I think, in admitting any sharp 
 distinction between the principles upon which we act in 
 regard to our temporal and spiritual interests. We should 
 avoid, as far as possible, breaking the continuity of the 
 future life with the present by avowing motives in the one 
 case which we reject in the other. Those who admit that 
 this continuity is complete ; both on our side, inasmuch as 
 we are the same living thinking beings now that we shall be 
 hereafter, and on that of God, inasmuch as He is equally 
 our Father now as He will be hereafter, will shrink from 
 such admissions. They seem too decidedly to support the 
 opinion of the Secularist, namely that this world is the only 
 one about which sufficient security can be attained to suffice 
 for practical men. 
 
 The real reason, I apprehend, is the following : When we 
 have to do with events of our ordinary life here, even those 
 of such importance as fire and shipwreck, we never doubt 
 that they do or may occur ; we do not think that the 
 benevolence of God is at all at stake by our knowing that 
 we have to act upon these contingencies. Experience is 
 continually proving that houses are liable to be burnt down, 
 it would therefore be the height of folly not to take account 
 of the chance. No general reasoning as to whether God 
 would be likely to suffer such visitations to come upon his 
 creatures is of any avail against the undeniable fact that 
 they do come upon us. When however we contemplate a 
 scheme so comprehensive as a Revelation, which embraces 
 in its scope the destinies of all mankind for all eternity, we 
 cannot help feeling that the fact of having to speculate 
 entirely upon chances would cast serious doubt upon the 
 truth of the religious doctrines involved. For one of the 
 supports of such a scheme is founded on our opinion of the 
 
APPENDIX. 119 
 
 character of God. But for any high estimate of this character 
 confidence on our side and love on that of God are in- 
 dispensable. But how can confidence exist when, not merely 
 an occasional incident, but the whole end and aim of life 
 turns on an awful contingency ? How can love survive the 
 calculations which could scarcely fail to arise as to whether 
 we were not paying too high a premium for the insurance 
 effected? And at the present day, unless we believe in a 
 God of love who expects love in return from His creatures, 
 Theism would not long survive. 
 
 The considerations just mentioned amount, I think, to 
 much the same thing as is often expressed in the statement 
 that we believe in a general but not in a special Providence. 
 In other words, in the common affairs of life we are liable to 
 many a blow which seems to come from no father's hand, 
 and out of the way of which we have therefore to escape, as 
 we best may, by the exercise of prudence and foresight. 
 Sometimes we do seem to trace a purpose in their infliction ; 
 but often we cannot do so, or at least can only blindly guess 
 in the dark. So long as these blows are not crushing and 
 overwhelming, we can get on in spite of them, but what 
 would it be if the sum-total of our conduct in reference to 
 this life and any other had to be carried on upon such" 
 principles as these ? Would not this be leading us backwards 
 towards a heathen conception of the Deity ? 
 
 It is a confirmation of the view just expressed that in 
 proportion as people refuse to introduce, as a portion of the 
 evidence, any considerations about the attributes of God, 
 Pascal's calculations and recommendations would seem quite 
 natural and appropriate. Pascal himself is, I think, a case 
 in point. To the Romanist the doctrines of theology have 
 always been a matter of authority. The tendency therefore 
 is to regard the evil and the good of a future life, as being 
 in a similar category with those of the present. When a 
 
120 APPENDIX. 
 
 doctrine is presented to us peremptorily and dogmatically, 
 if we entertain some doubt as to its truth 'we should, I 
 think, class its possible truth merely amongst other risks, 
 and should see no harm in resorting to ordinary precautions 
 to guard ourselves against loss. So long as it stands on this 
 footing of authority, any uncertainty which we may still 
 feel could hardly be turned into an additional adverse argu- 
 ment ; for us to be at liberty to do this, we must, I think, 
 introduce the character of the Deity into the question as one 
 of the considerations to determine our assent. 
 
 Again, Protestant writers sometimes make the truth 
 of Christianity entirely, or almost entirely, a matter of 
 historical evidence ; that is, they make but little use of 
 the character of God as one of the elements in the proof. 
 So long as any one takes this view there is nothing which 
 could fairly be denounced as selfish in a man's avowedly and 
 openly acting upon the chance of salvation. By doing so he 
 is only taking lawful and proper precautions, he is "insuring 
 his life" in a somewhat higher sense. Passages in illustration 
 might be quoted from Paley, but the following from Locke is 
 perhaps as apposite as any : 
 
 " The rewards and punishments of another life, which the 
 Almighty has established, as the enforcement of His law, 
 are of weight enough to determine the choice, against what- 
 ever pleasure or pain this life can show, when the eternal 
 state is considered but in its bare possibility, which nobody 
 can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquisite and 
 endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a 
 good life here, and the contrary state the possible reward of 
 a bad one, must own himself to judge very much amiss if he 
 does not conclude that a virtuous life, with the certain ex- 
 pectation of everlasting bliss which may come, is to be pre- 
 ferred to a vicious one with the fear of that dreadful state of 
 misery which it is very possible may overtake the guilty. ... 
 
APPENDIX. 1 21 
 
 " Who in his wits would choose to come within a possi- 
 bility of infinite misery, which if he miss there is yet nothing 
 to be got by that hazard ? Whereas on the other side, the 
 sober man ventures nothing against infinite happiness to be 
 got, if his expectation comes to pass. If the good man be in 
 the right, he is eternally happy ; if he mistake he is not 
 miserable, he feels nothing. On the other side if the wicked 
 be in the right, he is not happy ; if he mistake he is in- 
 finitely miserable. Must it not be a most manifest wrong 
 judgment that does not presently see to which side, hi 
 this case, the preference is to be given?" Essay, Bk. II. 
 ch. xxi. 
 
 But although there is nothing illogical in the above mode 
 of arguing, the same cannot be said in favour of that portion 
 of Pascal's advice which suggests a mode of procuring belief, 
 or rather of strengthening it beyond the point of conviction 
 at which it ought to rest. (" Vous voulez aller a la foi, . . . 
 Suivez la maniere par ou ils ont commence' ; c'est en faisant 
 tout comme s'ils croyaient, en prenant de 1'eau benite, en 
 faisant dire les messes 1 .") If a contingency has to be faced, 
 let its chance be taken for what it is worth, as when we 
 insure a house, but not for more than it is worth. Such a 
 determination to intensify one's belief involves, I think, an 
 impossibility to any honest-minded man. But if it were 
 possible thus to superinduce a state of conviction it would be 
 a close parallel to the conduct of those who deliberately get 
 drunk, and then plead that they are not to blame because 
 they could not know what they were doing when intoxicated. 
 I have pointed out indeed, in the fourth lecture, one mode in 
 which we may legitimately try to believe a doctrine to which 
 as yet we hardly give full credit, but this is only in the case 
 in which we have reason to know that we are neglecting a 
 
 1 Pensees de Pascal, as given from the original by Cousin, p. 295 ; 
 the common editions have been much altered. 
 
122 APPENDIX. 
 
 class of considerations which have real probative force ; that 
 is when we have an opportunity of revising ouf conclusions 
 by means of real evidence. If this is asserted also of the 
 effect produced by holy water and masses, well and good; 
 but if not, if any effect that they are conceived to produce 
 upon our convictions is not brought about in a strictly 
 rational and probative way, but only, say, in the way in 
 which opium may bring on drowsiness, one can only remark 
 that such a doctrine evacuates the terms, evidence, and 
 pursuit of truth of most of their meaning. If any device 
 can be found which will help us to true beliefs, by all 
 means let it be welcomed and admitted into our treatises 
 on Logic; but if it does not do so the less we trust to it 
 the better. I am quite aware that with many Romanists 
 the line of reasoning would take the form, "The doctrines 
 in question are certainly true, and the resources which 
 are offered you will help you to believe them ; therefore 
 make use of them." But directly we begin to ask, How 
 are we to know that they are true? this reasoning be- 
 comes inadmissible. It is not sufficient then to show how 
 to bring on a particular belief, even were that possible; 
 it must be shown that the belief so brought on is correctly 
 brought on ; in other words, that the process is a legitimate, 
 logical one. 
 
 The slight vestige of truth which really underlies this 
 doctrine of working up our assent artificially to a higher 
 point, consists in the fact that when a resolution is once 
 formed, even upon slender grounds, we must nevertheless 
 act heartily and efficiently or else let the matter alone. A 
 man who has resolved to insure his house does not dawdle 
 on his way to the office, or neglect any of the requisite 
 steps. As Browning's Bishop Blougram says (who may by 
 the way be recommended as an inimitable psychological 
 study upon this point) : 
 
APPENDIX. 123 
 
 * * * " certain points, left wholly to himself, 
 
 When once a man has arbitrated on, 
 
 We say he must succeed there or go hang." 
 
 But then comes the fallacious suggestion of the sluggish and 
 timid mind, 
 
 " If once we choose belief, on all accounts 
 We can't be too decisive hi our faith," 
 
 a 'decisive' faith being understood to be one which makes 
 dogmatic statements upon very many points, and makes 
 them with very great positiveness. Hearty resolute action, 
 as daily experience proves, is perfectly compatible with the 
 knowledge that we are acting on a mere contingency; but 
 for this purpose there is no necessity to profess that our 
 conviction is more intense than it really is. 
 
 If it be now enquired whether the admissions which 
 have been made do not lead to the conclusion that we 
 ought to accept whatever religion promises the highest 
 rewards and punishments; the reply would be: Yes; the 
 evidence in their favour being nearly the same, and provided 
 always that we exclude from the question all those con- 
 siderations about the character of God which have been 
 previously alluded to. It is as with insurance offices ; caete- 
 ris paribus, the one which offers the best security upon the 
 lowest terms would be preferred : but if its terms are too 
 low, of course they excite suspicion. So with religious evi- 
 dence ; if no general a priori considerations were to be ad- 
 mitted and we found ourselves confronted by two conflicting 
 religious schemes whose historical probability was nearly 
 equal, it would only be prudent and right to accept the one 
 which promised and threatened most. And this prudence, as 
 already pointed out, implies some measure of belief. But of 
 course few high-minded or pious persons would be willing to 
 admit that they were acting thus ; and why not ? Because 
 those considerations as to what a faithful and loving Creator 
 
124 APPENDIX. 
 
 would be likely to set before his creatures cannot be excluded. 
 This, I think, is the true answer to the occasional Romish 
 argument that their own Church is the safest, inasmuch as 
 Protestants admit that Komanists may be saved, whilst 
 Romanists deny the same security to Protestants. Base the 
 religion on mere authority, or mere historical evidence, and I 
 think the above argument ought to convince any prudent 
 man. I fully agree, as has been already said, with those 
 who think that such a way of regarding religious evidence 
 is miserably false and degrading, but so long as the question 
 is treated on the grounds to which it so often is confined, 
 I cannot see what other course should be pursued. 
 
 Another question, suggested by the passage from Pascal, 
 remains to be discussed now. How are we to account for 
 that tendency towards a strong dogmatic faith like that of 
 Rome, which is so often to be witnessed in persons who are 
 involved in some amount of speculative scepticism ? The 
 reality of this tendency, as a matter of fact, cannot I think 
 be denied ; and M. Cousin has shown very clearly how 
 thoroughly Pascal's mind was imbued with it. To examine 
 at all fully the general causes of this tendency would in- 
 volve a very long discussion ; I shall therefore limit myself, 
 as I have throughout these lectures, to a far narrower 
 enquiry, namely, What is the evidential or logical value of 
 this tendency? In what cases can it be justified as a 
 tendency towards truth ? 
 
 Suppose, then, that any one is in considerable doubt 
 about the truth of Christianity, so far as historical evidence 
 is concerned. His belief is certainly in a bad way, but it 
 need not altogether perish. It is quite possible that the 
 other of those two factors, spoken of on page 53, may 
 exercise considerable power. All those sentiments, the satis- 
 faction of which concurs in securing our assent to the Reve- 
 lation, may still be powerful. Taken by themselves they 
 
APPENDIX. 125 
 
 have no power to maintain a rational faith, no more than 
 can a buttress support a wall without foundations; but to 
 carry on the illustration, the existence or absence of but- 
 tresses may make all the difference between a wall standing 
 or falling when its foundations are somewhat loose. I can 
 quite conceive that two persons may be in the same condition 
 of certainty or uncertainty as regards purely intellectual 
 considerations, historical or logical, and yet that the one 
 whose emotional nature was more sensitive should be able to 
 believe, and to justify his belief, when the other found him- 
 self unable to do this. Compare, for instance, such men as 
 Bayle and Pascal ; does any one who has looked into their 
 works suppose that as regards that kind and degree of 
 scepticism which depends upon purely intellectual considera- 
 tions there was any very great difference between them? 
 And yet the tender sensitive mind of the one might be able 
 to rest, and I should say justly so, when the other was left 
 in utter uncertainty. Of course the existence of such a 
 divergency between one mind and another is unsatisfactory, 
 and needs correction (as explained in my lectures), but so 
 long as it exists, divergent conclusions are natural and right. 
 The foregoing remarks will serve to explain the meaning 
 of the difficulty which one may sometimes meet with here, 
 but which seems more prevalent in Romish countries, and 
 which finds expression in the phrase, that " if we are to trust 
 to reason we are sceptics, if to faith, Catholics." I think 
 that the antithesis is very unfairly stated, since faith when it 
 is referred to a complicated system of doctrines, and is thus 
 contradistinguished from reason, can amount to nothing else 
 than belief on insufficient grounds, in other words to pre- 
 judice. That portion, however, of the aid to our convictions 
 which is contributed by the satisfaction of our sentiments 
 and emotions is much more likely to act unconsciously than 
 strictly logical arguments. It is certainly wrong to contrast 
 
126 APPENDIX. 
 
 these aids to our convictions with reason, as though they 
 were not also themselves reasons, but it may nevertheless 
 very likely be the case that many persons do not recognize 
 them as reasons. At the same time, however, they may feel 
 their force, just as ordinary arguments may be quite con- 
 clusive to those who cannot analyse them and who know 
 nothing of logic ; but since they do not perceive that such 
 methods of persuasion deserve to rank amongst evidences, 
 they class them by themselves, and for want of a better term 
 call them faith. 
 
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 THE LOGIC OF CHANCE 
 
 AN ESSAY 
 
 ON THE FOUNDATIONS AND PROVINCE OF THE 
 THEORY OF PROBABILITY, 
 
 WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS APPLICATION 
 TO MORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE. 
 
 BY THE 
 
 REV. JOHN VENN, M.A. 
 
 " It is impossible to read this very clever book without both amusement 
 and instruction." Spectator. 
 
 " Exceedingly well thought out and well written. 1 ' Westminster Review. 
 " A masterly book." Nonconformist. 
 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. LONDON. 
 
HULSEAN LECTUEES. 
 
 By ARCHBISHOP TRENCH. 
 
 The Fitness of Holy Scripture for unfolding the 
 
 Spiritual Life of Man : Christ the Desire of all Nations ; or, the 
 Unconscious Prophecies of Heathendom. Fourth Edition. Fcap. 
 8vo. 5s. 
 
 By the REV. J. MOORHOUSE, M.A. St John's College. 
 
 Our Lord Jesus Christ the Subject of growth in 
 Wisdom. 
 
 Four Sermons preached before the University of Cambridge in 1865 ; 
 to which are added three Sermons preached before the University in 
 February, 1864. Crown 8vo. 5s. 
 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. LONDON. 
 
1 6, BEDFORD STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON. 
 
 January, 1870. 
 
 MACMILLAN & Co.'s GENERAL CATALOGUE 
 of Works in the Departments of History, 
 Biography, Travels, Poetry, and Belles 
 Lettres. With some short Account or 
 Critical Notice concerning each Book. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, and TRAVELS. 
 Baker (Sir Samuel W.). THE NILE TRIBUTARIES OF 
 
 ABYSSINIA, and the Sword Hunters of the Hamran Arabs. 
 By SIR SAMUEL W. BAKER, M.A., F.R.G.S. With Portraits, 
 Maps, and Illustrations. Third Edition, 8vo. 2U. 
 
 Sir Samuel Baker here describes twelve months' exploration, during 
 ii>/iic/i he examined the rivers that arc tributary to the Nile from Abyssinia, 
 including the Atbara, Settite, Royan, Salaam, Angrab, Rahad, Dinder, 
 and the Blue Nile. The interest attached to these portions of Africa differs 
 entirely from that of the White Nile regions, as the whole of Upper Egypt 
 and Abyssinia is capable of development, and is inhabited by races having 
 some degree of civilization; while Central Africa is peopled by a race of 
 savages, whose future is more problematical. 
 
 THE ALBERT N'YANZA Great Basin of the Nile, and Explo- 
 ration of the Nile Sources. New and cheaper Edition, with 
 Portraits, Maps, and Illustrations. Two vols. crown 8vo. i6j. 
 
 ' ' Bruce won the source of the Blue Nile ; Speke and Grant won the 
 Victoria source of the great White Nile ; and I have been permitted to 
 succeed in completing the Nile Sources by the discovery of the great 
 reservoir of the equatorial waters, the Albert N^yanza, from which the 
 rrver issues as the entire White Nile." PREFACE. 
 
 NEW AND CHEAP EDITION OF THE ALBERT N'YANZA. 
 I vol. crown 8vo. With Maps and Illustrations. 7*. 6d. 
 A 
 
GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Baker (Sir Samuel W.) (continued} 
 
 CAST UP BY THE SEA ; or, The Adventures of NED GREY. 
 By SIR SAMUEL W. BAKER, M.A., F.R.G.S. Second Edition. 
 Crown 8vo. cloth gilt, JS. 6d. 
 
 " A story of adventure by sea and land in the good old style. It appears 
 tc us to be the best book of the kind since ' Masterman Ready J and it runs 
 that established favourite very close. " PALL MALL GAZETTE. 
 
 " No book written for boys has for a long time created so much interest, 
 or been so successful. Every parent ought to provide his boy with a copy." 
 
 DAILY TELEGRAPH. 
 
 Barker (Lady). STATION LIFE IN NEW ZEALAND. 
 
 By LADY BARKER. Crown 8vo. "js. 6d. 
 
 " These letters are the exact account of a lady's experience of the brighter 
 and less practical side of colonization. They record the expeditions, ad- 
 ventures, and emergencies diversifying the daily life of the wife of a New 
 Zealand sheep-farmer ; and, as each was written while the novelty and 
 excitement of the scenes it describes were fresh upon her, they may succeed 
 in giving here in England an adequate impression of the delight and free- 
 dom of an existence so far removed from our own highly '-wrought civiliza- 
 tion.'' PREFACE. 
 
 Baxter (R. Dudley, M.A.). THE TAXATION OF THE 
 UNITED KINGDOM. By R. DUDLEY BAXTER, M.A. 8vo. 
 cloth, 4J-. 6d. 
 
 The First Part of this work, originally read before the Statistical 
 Society of London, deals with the Amount of Taxation ; the Second Part, 
 which noT.u constitutes the main portion of the work, is almost entirely new, 
 and embraces the important questions of Rating, of the relative Taxation 
 of Land, Personalty, and Industry, and of the direct effect of Taxes upon 
 Prices. The author trusts that the body of facts here collected may be of 
 permanent value as a record of the past progress and present condition of 
 the population of the United Kingdom, inacpendently of the transitory 
 circumstances of its present Taxation. 
 
HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, &- TRAVELS. 3 
 
 Baxter (R. Dudley, M.A.) (continued} 
 
 NATIONAL INCOME. With Coloured Diagrams. 8vo. y. 6d. 
 
 PART I. Classification of the Population, Upper, Middle, and Labour 
 Classes. II. Income of the United Kingdom. 
 
 " A painstaking and certainly most interesting inquiry." PALL MALL 
 GAZETTE. 
 
 Bernard. FOUR LECTURES ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED 
 WITH DIPLOMACY. By MOUNTAGUE BERNARD, M.A., 
 Chichele Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Oxford. 
 8vo. 9J. 
 
 Four Lectures, dealing with (i) The Congress of Westphalia; (2) Systems 
 of Policy ; (3) Diplomacy, Past and Present; (4) The Obligations of 
 Treaties. 
 
 Blake. THE LIFE OF WILLIAM BLAKE, THE ARTIST. 
 By ALEXANDER GILCHRIST. With numerous Illustrations from 
 Blake's designs, and Fac-similes of his studies of the "Book of 
 Job." Two vols. medium 8vo. 32^. 
 
 These volumes contain a Life of Blake ; Selections from his Writings, 
 including Poems ; Letters ; A nnotated Catalogue of Pictures and Drawings ; 
 List, with occasional notes, of Blake's Engravings and Writings. There 
 are appended Engraved Designs by Blake : (i) The Book of Job, tiventy- 
 one photo-lithographs from the originals ; (2) Songs of Innocence and 
 Experience, sixteen of the original Plates. 
 
 Bright (John, M. P.). SPEECHES ON QUESTIONS OF 
 PUBLIC POLICY. By JOHN BRIGHT, M. P. Edited by 
 Professor THOROLD ROGERS. Two Vols. 8vo. 25*. Second 
 Edition, with Portrait 
 
 " / have divided the Speeches contained in these volumes into groups. 
 The materials for selection are so abundant, that I have been constrained 
 to omit many a speech which is worthy of careful perusal. I have 
 
 
GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 naturally given prominence to those subjects with which Mr. Bright has 
 been especially identified, as, for example, India, America, Ireland, and 
 Parliamentary Reform. But nearly every topic of great public interest on 
 which Mr. Bright has spoken is represented in these volumes" 
 
 EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 AUTHOR'S POPULAR EDITION. Extra fcap. 8vo. cloth. Second 
 Edition. ^. 6d. 
 
 Bryce. THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE. By JAMES BRYCE, 
 B.C.L., Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. [Reprinting. 
 
 CAMBRIDGE CHARACTERISTICS. See MULLINGER. 
 
 CHATTERTON : A Biographical Study. BY DANIEL WILSON, 
 LL.D., Professor of History and English in University College, 
 Toronto, Crown 8vo. 6s. 6d. 
 
 The Author here regards Chatterton as a Poet, not as a mere " resetter 
 and defacer of stolen literary treasures." Reviewed in this light, he has 
 found much in the old materials capable of being turned to new account ; 
 and to these materials research in various directions has enabled him to 
 make some additions. 
 
 Clay .THE PRISON CHAPLAIN. A Memoir of the Rev. JOHN 
 CLAY, B.D., late Chaplain of the Preston Gaol. With Selections 
 from his Reports and Correspondence, and a Sketch of Prison 
 Discipline in England. By his Son, the Rev. W. L. CLAY, M.A. 
 8vo. 15-r. 
 
 " Few books have appeared of late years better entitled to an attentive 
 perusal. . . . It presents a complete narrative of all that has been done and 
 attempted by various philanthropists for the amelioration of the condition and 
 the improvement of the morals of the criminal classes in the British 
 dominions. " LONDON REVIEW. 
 
HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, <S^ TRAVELS. 5 
 
 Cooper. ATHENE CANTABRIGIENSES. By CHARLES 
 HENRY COOPER, F.S.A., and THOMPSON COOPER, F.S.A. 
 Vol. I. 8vc\, 150085, i&r. Vol. II., 15861609, i8s. 
 
 This elaborate work, which is dedicated by permission to Lord Macaulay, 
 contains lires of the eminent men sent forth by Cambridge, after the 
 fashion of Anthony & Wood, in his famous "Athena Oxonienses." 
 
 Dilke. GREATER BRITAIN. A Record of Travel in English- 
 speaking Countries during 1866-7. (America, Australia, India.) 
 By Sir CHARLES WENTWORTH DILKE, M.P. Fourth and Cheap 
 Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s. 
 
 " Mr. Dilke has written a book which is probably as well worth reading 
 as any book of the same aims and character that ever was written. Its 
 merits are that it is written in a Ih'dy and agreeable style, that it implies 
 a great deal of physical pluck, that no page of it fails to show an acute and 
 highly intelligent obsen'er, that it stimulates the imagination as well as the 
 judgment of the reader, and that it is on perhaps the most interesting 
 subject that can attract an Englishman who cares about his country." 
 
 SATURDAY REVIEW. 
 
 Diirer (Albrecht). HISTORY OF THE LIFE OF AL- 
 BRECHT DURER, of Niirnberg. With a Translation of his 
 Letters and Journal, and some account of his works. By Mrs. 
 CHARLES HEATON. Royal 8vo. bevelled boards, extra gilt. 31-5-. 6d. 
 
 This work contains about Thirty Illustrations, ten of which are produc- 
 tions by the Autotype (carbon) process, and are printed in permanent tints 
 by Messrs. Cundall and Fleming, under license from the Autotype Com- 
 pany, Limited ; the rest are Photographs and Woodcuts. 
 
 EARLY EGYPTIAN HISTORY FOR THE YOUNG. See 
 "JUVENILE SECTION." 
 
GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Elliott. LIFE OF HENRY VENN ELLIOTT, of Brighton. 
 By JOSIAH BATEMAN, M.A., Author of "Life of Daniel Wilson, 
 Bishop of Calcutta," &c. With Portrait, engraved by JEENS. 
 Crown 8vo. &r. 6d. Second Edition, with Appendix. 
 
 "A very charming piece of religious biography; no one can read it 
 without both pleasure and profit." BRITISH QUARTERLY REVIEW. 
 
 Forbes. LIFE OF PROFESSOR EDWARD FORBES, 
 
 F.R.S. By GEORGE WILSON, M.D., F.R.S.E., and ARCHIBALD 
 GEIKIE, F.R.S. 8vo. with Portrait, 14^. 
 
 " From the first page to the last the book claims careful reading, as being 
 a full but not overcrowded rehearsal of a most instructive life, and the true 
 picture of a mind that was rare in strength and beauty" EXAMINER. 
 
 Freeman. HISTORY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 
 
 from the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Disruption of 
 the United States. By EDWARD A. FREEMAN, M.A. Vol. I. 
 General Introduction. History of the Greek Federations. 8vo. 
 
 2IJ. 
 
 *' The task Mr. Freeman has undertaken is one of great magnitude and 
 importance. It is also a task of an almost entirely novel character. No 
 other work professing to give the history of a political principle occurs t9 
 us, except the slight contributions to the history of representative govern- 
 ment that is contained in a course of M. Guizofs lectures .... The 
 history of the development of a principle is at least as important as the 
 history of a dynasty, or of a race.' SATURDAY REVIEW. 
 
 OLD ENGLISH HISTORY FOR CHILDREN. By EDWARD A. 
 FREEMAN, M.A., late Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford. With 
 Five Coloured Maps. Extra fcap. 8vo., half-bound. 6s. 
 
 " Its object is to show that clear, accurate, and scientific views of history, 
 or indeed of any subject, may be easily given to children from the very 
 first. . . I have, I hope, shown that it is perfectly easy to teach children, from 
 
HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, & TRAVELS. 7 
 
 the very first, to distinguish true history alike from legend and from "wilful 
 invention, and also to understand the nature of historical authorities, and 
 to weigh one statement against another. . . . . I have throughotit striven to 
 connect the history of England with the general history of civilized Europe, 
 and I have especially tried to make the book serve as an incentive to a more 
 accurate study of historical geography." PREFACE. 
 
 French (George Russell). SHAKSPEAREANA 
 GENEALOGICA. 8vo. cloth extra, 15^. Uniform with the 
 "Cambridge Shakespeare." 
 
 Part I. Identification of the dramatis persona; in the historical plays, 
 from King John to King Henry I' I II. ; Notes on Characters in Macbeth 
 and Hamlet ; Persons and Places belonging to Warwickshire alluded to. 
 Part II. The Shakspeare and Arden families and their connexions, with 
 Tables of descent. The present is the first attempt to give a detailed de- 
 scription, in consecutive order, of each of the dramatis persona; in Shak- 
 speare's immortal chronicle-histories, and some of the characters have been, 
 it is believed, herein identified for the first time. A clue is furnished which , 
 followed up with ordinary diligence, may enable any one, with a taste for 
 the pursuit, to trace a distinguished Shakspearean worthy to his lineal 
 representative in the present day. 
 
 Galileo. THE PRIVATE LIFE OF GALILEO. Compiled 
 
 principally from his Correspondence and that of his eldest 
 daughter, Sister Maria Celeste, Nun in the Franciscan Convent of 
 S. Matthew, in Arcetri. With Portrait. Crown 8vo. 'js. 6a*. 
 
 It has been the endeavour of the compiler to place before the reader a 
 plain, ungarbled statement of J acts / and as a means to this end, to allow 
 Galileo, his friends, and his judges to speak for themselves as far as possible. 
 
 Gladstone (Right. Hon. W. E., M.P.). JUVENTUS 
 
 MUNDI. The Gods and Men of the Heroic Age. Crown 8vo. 
 cloth extra. With Map. icxr. 6d. Second Edition. 
 
 This new work of Air. Gladstone deals especially with the historic 
 element in Homer, expounding that element, and furnishing by its aid a 
 
GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 full account of the Homeric men and the Homeric religion. It starts, afltr 
 the introductory chapter, with a discussion of the several races then existing 
 in Hellas, including the influence of the Phoenicians and Egyptians. It 
 contains chapters on the Olympian system, with its several deities ; on the 
 Ethics and the Polity of the Heroic age ; on the geography of Homer ; on 
 the characters of the Poems ; presenting, in fine, a view of primitive life 
 and primitive societv as found in the poems of Homer. 
 
 "GLOBE" ATLAS OF EUROPE. Uniform in size with Mac- 
 millan's Globe Series, containing 45 Coloured Maps, on a uniform 
 scale and projection ; with Plans of London and Paris, and a 
 copious Index. Strongly bound in half- morocco, with flexible 
 back, 9-r. 
 
 This Atlas includes all the countries of Europe in a series of 48 Maps, 
 drawn on the same scale, with an Alphabetical Index to the situation of 
 more than ten thousand places, and the relation of the various maps and 
 countries to each other is defined in a general Key-map. All the maps 
 being on a uniform scale facilitates the comparison of extent and distance, 
 and conveys a just impression of the relative magnitude of different countries. 
 The size suffices to show the provincial divisions, the railways and main 
 roads, the principal rivers and mountain ranges. "This atlas," writes the 
 British Quarterly, " will be an invaluable boon for the school, the desk, or 
 the traveller's portmanteau. " 
 
 Guizot. (Author of "JOHN HALIFAX, GENTLEMAN.") M. DE 
 BARANTE, A Memoir, Biographical and Autobiographical. By 
 M. GUIZOT. Translated by the Author of "JOHN HALIFAX, 
 GENTLEMAN." Crown 8vo. 6s. 6d. 
 
 " The highest purposes of both history and biography are answered by a 
 memoir so lifelike, so faithful, and so philosophical.' 1 '' 
 
 BRITISH QUARTERLY REVIEW. 
 
HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, & TRAVELS. 9 
 
 HISTORICAL SELECTIONS. Readings from the best Authorities 
 on English and European History. Selected and arranged by 
 E. M. SEWELL and C. M. YONGE. Crown 8vo. 6s. 
 
 When young children have acquired the outlines of history from abridge- 
 ments and catechisms, and it becomes desirable to give a more enlarged 
 view of the subject, in order to render it really useful and interesting, a 
 difficulty often arises as to the choice of books. Two courses are open, either 
 to take a general and consequently dry history of facts, such as Russell's 
 Modern Europe, or to choose some work treating of a particular period or 
 subject, such as the works of Macaulay and Froude. The former course 
 usually renders history uninteresting ; the latter is unsatisfactory, because 
 it is not sufficiently comprehensive. To remedy this difficulty, selections, 
 continuous and chronological, have in the present volume been taken from 
 the larger works of Freeman, Milman, Palgrave, and others, which may 
 serve as distinct landmarks of historical reading. " We know of scarcely 
 anything," says the Guardian, of this volume, "which is so likely to raise 
 to a higher level the average standard of English education." 
 
 Hole. A GENEALOGICAL STEMMA OF THE KINGS OF 
 ENGLAND AND FRANCE. By the Rev. C. HOLE, M.A., 
 Trinity College, Cambridge. On Sheet, is. 
 
 Tne different families are printed in distinguishing colours, thus facili- 
 tating reference. 
 
 A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY. Compiled and 
 Arranged by the Rev. CHARLES HOLE, M.A. Second Edition. 
 i8mo. neatly and strongly bound in cloth, 4$-. 6d. 
 
 One of the most comprehensive and accurate Biographical Dictionaries 
 in the world, containing more than 18,000 persons of all countries, with 
 dates of birth and death, and what they were distinguished for. Extreme 
 care has been bestowed on the verification of the dates ; and thus numerous 
 errors, current in pi\~'ious works, have been corrected. Its size adapts it 
 for the desk, portmanteau, or pocket. 
 
 "An invaluable addition to our manuals of reference, and, from its 
 moderate price, cannot fail to become as popular as it is useful." TIMES. 
 
io GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Hozier. THE SEVEN WEEKS' WAR ; Its Antecedents and 
 its Incidents. By. H. M. HOZIER. With Maps and Plans. Two 
 vols. 8vo. 2%s. 
 
 This -work is based upon letters reprinted by permission from " The 
 Times. " For the most part it is a product of a personal eye-witness of some 
 of the most interesting incidents of a war which, for rapidity and decisive 
 results, may claim an almost unrivalled position in history. 
 
 THE BRITISH EXPEDITION TO ABYSSINIA. Compiled from 
 Authentic Documents. By CAPTAIN HENRY M. HOZIER, late 
 Assistant Military Secretary to Lord Napier of Magdala. 8vo. qs. 
 
 " Several accounts of the British Expedition have been published. .... 
 They have, however, been written by those who have not had access to those 
 authentic documents, which cannot be collected directly after the termination 
 
 of a campaign The endeavour of the author of this sketch has been to 
 
 present to readers a succinct and impartial account of an enterprise which 
 has rarely been equalled in the annals of war" PREFACE. 
 
 Irving. THE ANNALS OF OUR TIME. A Diurnal of Events, 
 Social and Political, which have happened in or had relation to 
 the Kingdom of Great Britain, from the Accession of Queen 
 Victoria to the Opening of the present Parliament. By JOSEPH 
 IRVING. 8vo. half-bound. iSs. 
 
 " IVe have before us a trusty and ready guide to the events of the past 
 thirty years, available equally for the statesman, the politician, the public 
 writer, and the general reader. If Mr. Irving 's object has been to bring 
 before the reader all the most noteworthy occurrences which have happened 
 since the beginning of Her Majesty's reign, he may justly claim the credit 
 of having done so most briefly, siiccinctly, and simply, and in such a 
 manner, too, as to furnish him with the details necessary in each case to 
 comprehend the event of which he is in search in an intelligent manner. 
 Reflection will serve to show the great value of such a work as this to the 
 journalist and statesman, and indeed to every one who feels an interest in 
 the progress of the age ; and we may add that its value is considerably in- 
 creased by the addition of that most important of all appendices, an 
 accurate and instructive index." TlMES. 
 
HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, <S- TRAVELS. u 
 
 Kingsley (Canon). ON THE ANCIEN REGIME as it 
 Existed on the Continent before the FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 Three Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution. By the Rev. 
 C. KINGSLEY, M.A., formerly Professor of Modern History 
 in the University of Cambridge. Crown 8vo. 6s. 
 
 These three lectures discuss severally (l) Caste, (2) Centralization, (3) 
 The Explosive Forces by which the Revolution was superinduced. The 
 Preface deals at some length with certain political questions of the present 
 day. 
 
 THE ROMAN AND THE TEUTON. A Series of Lectures 
 delivered before the University of Cambridge. By Rev. C 
 KINGSLEY, M.A. 8vo. i2s. 
 
 CONTENTS : Inaugural Lecture ; The Forest Children ; The Dying 
 Empire; The Human Deluge ; The Gothic Civilizer; Dietrich's End; The 
 Nemesis oj the Goths; Paulns Diaconus ; The Clergy and the Heathen : 
 The Monk a Civilizer ; The Lombard Laws ; The Popes and the Lombards ; 
 The Strategy of Providence. 
 
 Kingsley (Henry, F.R.G.S.). TALES OF OLD 
 TRAVEL. Re-narrated by HENRY KINGSLEY, F.R.G.S. With 
 Eight Illustrations by HuARD. Crown 8vo. dr. 
 
 CONTENTS: Marco Polo; The Shipwreck ofPelsart; The Wonderful 
 Adventures of Andrew Battel; The IVanderings of a Capuchin; Peter 
 Carder; The Preservation of the " Terra Nova ;" Spitzbergen; D'Erme- 
 nonviltts Acclimatization Adventure ; The Old Slave Trade ; Miles Philips ; 
 The Sufferings of Robert Everard ; John Fox ; Alvaro Nunez; The Foun- 
 dation of an Empire. 
 
 Latham. BLACK AND WHITE : A Journal of a Three Months' 
 Tour in the United States. By HENRY LATHAM, M.A., Barrister- 
 at-Law. 8vo. los. 6d. 
 
 " The spirit in which M^r. Latham has written about our brethren in 
 America is commendable in high degree." ATHEN^UM. 
 
12 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Law. THE ALPS OF HANNIBAL. By WILLIAM JOHN LAW, 
 M.A., formerly Student of Christ Church, Oxford. Two vols. 
 8vo. 21 s. 
 
 " No. one can read the work and not acquire a conviction that, tn 
 addition to a thorough grasp of a particular topic, its writer has at 
 command a large store of reading and thought upon many cognate points 
 of ancient history and geography ." QUARTERLY REVIEW. 
 
 Liverpool. THE LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
 ROBERT BANKS, SECOND EARL OF LIVERPOOL, K.G. 
 
 Compiled from Original Family Documents by CHARLES DUKE 
 YONGE, Regius Professor of History and English Literature in 
 Queen's College, Belfast ; and Author of " The History of the 
 British Navy," " The History of France under the Bourbons," etc. 
 Three vols. 8vo. 42^. 
 
 Since the time of Lord Burleigh no one, except the second Pitt, ever 
 enjoyed so long a tenure of power ; with the same exception, no one ever 
 held office at so critical a time .... Lord Liverpool is the very last 
 minister who has been able fully to carry out his own political views ; who 
 has been so strong that in matters of general policy the Opposition could 
 extort no concessions from him which were not sanctioned by his own 
 deliberate judgment. The present work is founded almost entirely on the 
 correspondence left behind him by Lord Liverpool, and now in the possession 
 of Colonel and Lady Catherine Harcourt. 
 
 " Full of 'information and instruction'' FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW. 
 
 Maclear. See Section,-" ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY." 
 Macmillan (Rev. Hugh). HOLIDAYS ON HIGH 
 
 LANDS ; or, Rambles and Incidents in search of Alpine Plants. 
 
 By the Rev. HUGH MACMILLAN, Author of "Bible Teachings in 
 
 Nature," etc. Crown 8vo. cloth. 6s. 
 
 " Botanical knowledge is blended with a love of nature, a pious en- 
 thusiasm, and a rich felicity of diction not to be met with in any works 
 of kindred character, if we except those of Hugh Miller" DAILY 
 TELEGRAPH. 
 
HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, 6- TRAVELS. 13 
 
 Macmillan (Rev. Hugh), (continued} 
 
 FOOT-NOTES FROM THE PAGE OF NATURE. With 
 numerous Illustrations. Fcap. 8vo. 5-r. 
 
 " Those -who have derived pleasure ana profit from the study of flcnvers 
 tnd ferns subjects, it is pleasing to find, noiu everywhere popular by 
 descending lower into the arcana of the vegetable kingdom, wilt find a still 
 more interesting and delightful field of research in the objects broitglit under 
 review in the following pages" PREFACE. 
 
 r.ll'.LE TEACHINGS IN NATURE. Fourth Edition. Fcap 8vo. 
 6s. See also "SCIENTIFIC SECTION." 
 
 Martin (Frederick)._THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK : 
 
 A Statistical and Historical Account of the States of the Civilised 
 World. Manual for Politician and Merchants for the year 1870. 
 BY FREDERICK MARTIN. Seventh Annual Publication. Crown 
 8vo. I or. &/. 
 
 The new issue has been entirely re-written, revised, and corrected, on the 
 basis of official reports recerved direct from the heads of the leading Govern- 
 ments of the World, in reply to letters sent to them by the Editor. 
 
 "Everybody who knows this work is aivare that it is a book that is indis- 
 pensable to ivriters, financiers, politicians, statesmen, ami all who are 
 directly or indirectly interested in the political, social, industrial, com- 
 mercial, and financial condition of their fellow-creatures at home and 
 abroad. Mr. Martin deserves warm commendation for the care he takes 
 in making * The Statesman's Year Book ' complete and correct.' 1 ' 1 
 
 STANDARD. 
 
 Martineau. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES, 18521868. 
 By HARRIET MARTINEAU. Third Edition, with New Preface. 
 Crown 8vo. Ss. 6d. 
 
 A Collection of Memoirs under these several sections: (i) Royal, (2) 
 Politicians, (3) Professional, (4) Scientific, (5) Social, (6) Literary. These 
 Memoirs appeared originally in the columns of the " Daily News." 
 
I 4 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Masson (Professor). ESSAYS, BIOGRAPHICAL AND 
 C RITIC AL. See Section headed " POETRY AND BELLES LETTRES. " 
 
 LIFE OF JOHN MILTON. Narrated in connexion with the 
 Political, Ecclesiastical, and Literary History of his Time. By 
 DAVID MASSON, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Rhetoric at Edin- 
 burgh. Vol. I. with Portraits. 8vo. i8j. Vol. II. in the Press. 
 
 // is intended to exhibit Milton 's life in its connexions "with all the more 
 notable phenomena of the period of British history in which it was cast 
 its state politics, its ecclesiastical variations, its literature and speculative 
 thought. Commencing in 1608, the Life of Milton proceeds through the 
 last sixteen years of the reign of James I. , includes the whole of the reign 
 of Charles I. ana the subsequent years of the Commonwealth and the 
 Protectorate, and then, passing the Restoration, extends itself to 1674, or 
 through fourteen years of the new state of things under Charles II. The 
 first volume deals with the life of Milton as extending from 1 608 to 1 640, 
 which was the period of his education and of his minor poems. 
 
 Morison. THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SAINT BERNARD, 
 Abbot of Clairvaux. By JAMES COTTER MORISON, M.A. New 
 Edition, revised. Crown 8vo. 7-r. 6d. 
 
 " One of the best contributions in our literature towards a vivid, intel- 
 ligent, and worthy kn&ivledge of European interests and thoughts and 
 feelings during the twelfth century. A delightful and instructive volume^ 
 and one of the best products of the modern historic spirit."" 
 
 PALL MALL GAZETTE. 
 
 Morley (John). EDMUND BURKE, a Historical Study. By 
 JOHN MORLEY, B.A. Oxon. Crown 8vo. *js. 6J. 
 
 " The style is terse and incisive, and brilliant with epigram and point. 
 It contains pithy aphoristic sentences which Burke himself would not have 
 disoi-vned. But these are not its best features : its sustained power of 
 reasoning, its wide sweep of observation and reflection, its elevated ethical 
 and social tone, stamp it as a work of high excellence, and as such we 
 cordially recommend it to our readers" SATURDAY REVIEW. 
 
HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, & TRAVELS. 15 
 
 Mullinger. CAMBRIDGE CHARACTERISTICS IN THE 
 SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. By J. B, MULLINGER, B.A. 
 Crown 8vo. 4$-. 6d. 
 
 " It is a very entertaining and readable book" SATURDAY REVIEW. 
 
 " The chapters on the Cartesian Philosophy and the Cambridge Platonists 
 are admirable." ATHENAEUM. 
 
 Palgrave. HISTORY OF NORMANDY AND OF ENG- 
 LAND. By Sir FRANCIS PALGRAVE, Deputy Keeper of Her 
 Majesty's Public Records. Completing the History to the Death 
 of William Rufus. Four vols. 8vo. ^4 4^. 
 
 Volume I. General Relations of Mediaval Europe The Carlovingian 
 Empire The Danish Expeditions in tke Gauls And the Establishment 
 of Rollo. Volume If. The Three First Dukes of Normandy ; Rollo, 
 Guillaume Longue-F.P&, and Richard Sans-Peur The Carlovingian 
 line supplanted by the Capets. Volume III. Richard Sans-Peur 
 Richard Le- Bon Richard III. Robert Le Diable William the Con- 
 queror. Volume IV. William Rufus Accession of Henry Beauclerc. 
 
 Palgrave (W. G.). A NARRATIVE OF A YEAR'S 
 JOURNEY THROUGH CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
 ARABIA, 1862-3. B y WILLIAM GIFFORD PALGRAVE, late of 
 the Eighth Regiment Bombay N. I. Fifth and cheaper Edition. 
 With Maps, Plans, and Portrait of Author, engraved on steel by 
 Jeens. Crown 8vo. 6s. 
 
 " Considering the extent of our previous ignorance, the amount of his 
 achievements, and the importance of his contributions to our knowledge, we 
 cannot say less of him than was once said of a far greater discoverer. Mr. 
 Palgrave has indeed given a new world to Europe" PALL MALL GAZETTE. 
 
16 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Parkes (Henry). AUSTRALIAN VIEWS OF ENGLAND. 
 By HENRY PARKES. Crown 8vo. cloth. 3^. 6d. 
 
 " The following letters were written during a residence in England, in 
 the years 1861 and 1862, and were published in the Sydney Morning 
 Herald on the arrival of the monthly mails . ... On re-perusal, these 
 letters appear to contain views of English life and impressions of English 
 notabilities which, as the views and impressions of an Englishman on his 
 return to his native country after an absence of twenty years, may not be 
 without interest to the English reader. The writer had opportunities of 
 mixing with different classes of the British people, and of hearing opinions 
 on passing events from opposite standpoints of observation.'" AUTHOR'S 
 PREFACE. 
 
 Prichard. THE ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA. From 
 1859 to 1868. The First Ten Years of Administration under the 
 Crown. By ILTUDUS THOMAS PRICHARD, Barrister-at-Law. 
 Two vols. Demy 8vo. With Map. 2is. 
 
 In these .volumes the author has aimed to supply a full, impartial, and 
 independent account of British India between 1859 and 1868 which is 
 in many respects the most important epoch in the history of that country 
 which the present century has seen. 
 
 Ralegh. THE LIFE OF SIR WALTER RALEGH, based 
 
 upon Contemporary Documents. By EDWARD EDWARDS. To- 
 gether with Ralegh's Letters, now first collected. With Portrait. 
 Two vols. 8vo. 32.$-. 
 
 " Mr. Edwards has certainly written the Life of Ralegh from fuller 
 information than any previous biographer. He is intelligent, industrious, 
 sympathetic : and the world has in his two volumes larger means afforded 
 it of knowing Ralegh than it ever possessed before. The neiu letters and 
 the newly-edited old letters are in themselves a boon." PALL MALL 
 GAZETTE. 
 
HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, & TRAVELS. 17 
 
 Robinson (Crabb). DIARY, REMINISCENCES, AND 
 CORRESPONDENCE OF CRABB ROBINSON. Selected 
 and Edited by Dr. SADLER. With Portrait. Second Edition. 
 Three vols. 8vo. cloth. 36-$-. 
 
 Mr. Crabb Robinson" 1 * Diary extends over the greater part of three- 
 quarters of a century. It contains personal reminiscences of some of the 
 most distinguished characters of that period, including Goethe, Wieland, De 
 Quincey, Wordsworth (with whom Mr. Crabb Robinson was on terms oj 
 great intimacy), Madame de Stael, Lafayette, Coleridge, Lamb, Milman, 
 &c. <5rY. : and includes a vast variety of subjects, political, literary, ecclesi- 
 astical, and miscellaneous. 
 
 Rogers (James E. Thorold). HISTORICAL GLEAN- 
 
 INGS : A Series of Sketches. Montague, Walpole, Adam Smith, 
 Cobbett. By Rev. J. E. T. ROGERS. Crown 8vo. 4*. 6</. 
 
 Professor Rogers' s object in the following sketches is to present a set of 
 historical facts, grouped round a principal figure. The ways are in the 
 form of lectures. 
 
 Smith (Professor Goldwin). THREE ENGLISH 
 
 STATESMEN: PYM, CROMWELL, PI IT. A Course of 
 Lectures on the Political History of England. By GOLDWIN 
 SMITH, M. A. Extra fcap. 8vo. New and Cheapei Edition. 5-r. 
 
 "A work which neither historian nor politician can safely afford to 
 neglect."" SATURDAY REVIEW. 
 
 TacitUS. THE HISTORY OF TACITUS, translated into 
 English. By A. J. CHURCH, M.A. and W. J. BRODRIBB, M.A. 
 With a Map and Notes. 8vo. ioj. 6d. 
 
 The translators have endeavoured to adhere as closely to the original as 
 was thought consistent with a proper observance of English idiom. At 
 the same time it has been their aim to reproduce the precise expressions of 
 the author. This work is characterised by the Spectator as " a scholarly 
 and faithful translation." 
 
 B 
 
i8 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 THE AGRICOLA AND GERMANIA. Translated into English by 
 A. J. CHURCH, M.A. and W. J. BRODRIBB, M.A. With Maps 
 and Notes. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 The translators have sought to produce such a version as may satisfy 
 scholars who demand a faithful rendering of the original, and English 
 readers who are offended by the baldness and frigidity which commonly 
 disfigure translations. The treatises are accompanied by introductions, 
 notes, maps, and a chronological summary. The Athenaeum says of 
 this work that it is " a version at once readable and exact, which may be 
 perused with pleasure by all, and consulted with advantage by the classical 
 student." 
 
 Taylor (Rev. Isaac). WORDS AND PLACES; or 
 
 Etymological Illustrations of History, Etymology, and Geography. 
 By the Rev. ISAAC TAYLOR. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 
 I2s. 6d. 
 
 " Mr. Taylor has produced a really useful book, and one which stands 
 alone in our language." SATURDAY REVIEW. 
 
 Trench (Archbishop). GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS : Social 
 Aspects of the Thirty Years' War. By R. CHENEVIX TRENCH, 
 D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. Fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 " Clear and lucid in style, these lectures will be a treasure to many to 
 whom the subject is unfamiliar.'' 1 DUBLIN EVENING MAIL. 
 
 Trench (Mrs. R.). Edited by ARCHBISHOP TRENCH. Remains 
 of the late MRS. RICHARD TRENCH, Being Selections from 
 her Journals, Letters, and other Papers. New and Cheaper Issue, 
 with Portrait, 8vo. 6s. 
 
 Contains notices and anecdotes illustrating the social life of the period 
 extending over a quarter of a century (1799 1827). // includes also 
 poems and other miscellaneous pieces by Mrs. Trench. 
 
HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, & TRAVELS. 19 
 Trench (Capt. F., F.R.G.S.). THE RUSSO-INDIAN 
 
 QUESTION, Historically, Strategically, and Politically con- 
 sidered. By Capt. TRENCH, F.R.G.S. With a Sketch of Central 
 Asiatic Politics and Map of Central Asia. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d. 
 " The Russo-Indian, or Central Asian question has for several obvious 
 reasons been attracting much public attention in England, in Russia, and 
 also on the Continent, within the last year or two. . . . / have thought 
 that the present volume, giving a short sketch of the history of this question 
 from its earliest origin, and condensing much of the most recent and inte- 
 resting information on the subject, and on its collateral phases, might 
 perhaps be acceptable to those who take an interest in it." AUTHOR'S 
 PREFACE. 
 
 Trevelyan (G.O., M.P.). CAWNPORE. Illustrated with 
 Plan. By G. O. TREVELYAN, M.P., Author of "The Com- 
 petition Wallah." Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s. 
 " In this book we are not spared one fact of the sad story ; but our 
 feelings are not harrowed by the recital of imaginary outrages. It is good 
 for us at home that we have one who tells his tale so well as does Mr. 
 Trevelyan." PALL MALL GAZETTE. 
 
 THE COMPETITION WALLAH. New Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s. 
 " The earlier letters are especially interesting for their racy descriptions 
 
 of European life in India Those that follow are of more serious 
 
 import, seeking to tell the truth about the Hindoo character and English 
 influences, good and bad, upon it, as well as to suggest some better course of 
 treatment than that hitherto adopted." EXAMINER. 
 
 Vaughan (late Rev. Dr. Robert, of the British 
 Quarterly). MEMOIR OF ROBERT A. VAUGHAN. 
 Author of "Hours with the Mystics." By ROBERT VAUGHAN, 
 D.D. Second Edition, revised and enlarged. Extra fcap. 8vo. $s. 
 " // deserves a place on the same shelf with Stanley's ' Life of Arnold,' 
 and Carlyle's ' Stirling.' Dr. Vaughan has performed his painful but 
 not all unpleasing task with exquisite good taste and feeling" NONCON- 
 FORMIST. 
 
 B 2 
 
20 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Wagner. MEMOIR OF THE REV. GEORGE WAGNER, 
 
 M. A., late Incumbent of St. Stephen's Church, Brighton. By the 
 Rev. J. N. SIMPKINSON, M.A. Third and cheaper Edition, cor- 
 rected and abridged. 5-r. 
 
 " A more edifying biography ive have rarely met with." 
 
 LITEKARY CHURCHMAN. 
 
 Wallace. THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO : the Land of the 
 
 Orang Utan and the Bird of Paradise. A Narrative of Travels 
 with Studies of Man and Nature. By ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE. 
 With Maps and Illustrations. Second Edition. Two vols. crown 
 8vo. 24^. 
 
 " A carefully and deliberately composed narrative. . . . We advise 
 our readers to do as we have done, read his book through" TIMES. 
 
 Ward (Professor). THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA IN THE 
 
 THIRTY YEARS' WAR. Two Lectures, with Notes and Illus- 
 trations. By ADOLPHUS W. WARD, M.A., Professor of History 
 in Owens College, Manchester. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 " Very compact and instructive." FORTNIGHTLY REVIF.W. 
 
 Warren. AN ESSAY ON GREEK FEDERAL COINAGE. 
 By the Hon. J. LEICESTER WARREN, M.A. 8vo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 " The present essay is an attempt to illustrate Mr. Frecmarfs Federal 
 Government by evidence deduced from the coinage of the times and countries 
 therein treated of." PREFACE. 
 
 Wilson. A MEMOIR OF GEORGE WILSON, M. D., 
 F.R.S.E., Regius Professor of Technology in the University of 
 Edinburgh. By his SISTER. New Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s. 
 "An exquisite and touching portrait of a rare and beautiful spirit. " 
 
 GUARDIAN. 
 
HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, &> TRAVELS. 21 
 
 Wilson (Daniel, LL.D.). PREHISTORIC ANNALS 
 OF SCOTLAND. By DANIEL WILSON, LL.D., Professor of 
 History and English Literature in University College, Toronto. 
 New Edition, with numerous Illustrations. Two vols. demy 
 8vo. 36^. 
 
 This elaborate and learned work is divided into four Parts. Part I. 
 deals with The Primeval or Stone Period : Aboriginal Traces, Sepulchral 
 Memorials, Divellings, and Catacombs, Temples, Weapons, &c. drv. ; 
 Part II., The Bronze Period : The Metallurgic Transition, Primitive 
 Bronze, Personal Ornaments, Religion, Arts, and Domestic Habits, with 
 other topics ; Part II L, The Iron Period : The Introduction of Iron, The 
 Roman Invasion, Strongholds, &c. 6<r.; Part IV., The Christian Period : 
 Historical Data, the Norrie's Law Relics, Primitive and Mediceval 
 Ecclesiology, Ecclesiastical and Miscellaneous Antiquities. The work it 
 furnished with an elaborate Index. 
 
 PREHISTORIC MAN. New Edition, revised and partly re-written, 
 with numerous Illustrations. One vol. 8vo. 2U. 
 
 This work, which carries out the principle of the preceding one, but with 
 a wider scope, aims to " view Alan, as far as possible, unaffected by those 
 modifying influences which accompany the development of nations and the 
 maturity of a true historic period, in order thereby to ascertain the sources 
 from whence such development and matttrity proceed. 11 It contains, fir 
 example, chapters on the Primeval Transition; Speech; Metals; the 
 Mound-Builders; Primitive Architecture ; the American Type; the Red 
 Blood of the West, 6v. 6r. 
 
SECTION II. 
 
 POETRY AND BELLES LETTRES. 
 
 Allingham. LAURENCE BLOOMFIELD IN IRELAND; 
 
 or, the New Landlord. By WILLIAM ALLINGHAM. New and 
 cheaper issue, with a Preface. Fcap. 8vo. cloth, ^s. 6d. 
 
 In the new Preface, the state of Ireland, with special reference to the 
 Church measure, is discussed. 
 
 1 ' // is vital with the national character. . . . It has something of Papers 
 point and Goldsmith } s simplicity, touched to a more modern issue." 
 ATHENAEUM. 
 
 Arnold (Matthew). POEMS. By MATTHEW ARNOLD, 
 Two vols. Extra fcap. 8vo. cloth. \2s. Also sold separately at 6s. 
 each. 
 
 Volume I. contains Narrative and Elegiac Poems ; Volume II. Dra- 
 matic and Lyric Poems. The two volumes comprehend the First and 
 Second Series of the Poems, and the 'New Poems. 
 
 NEW POEMS. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s. 6a. 
 
 In this volume will be found " Empedocles on Etna ; " " Thyrsis " (written 
 in commemoration of the late Professor C lough ); " Epilogue to Lessings 
 Laocobn ;" "Heine's Grave;" " Obermann once more" All these 
 poems are also included in the Edition (two vols.) abo2>e-mentioned. 
 
POETRY &> BELLES LETTRES. 23 
 
 Arnold (Matthew), (continued} 
 
 ESSAYS IN CRITICISM. New Edition, with Additions. Extra 
 fcap. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 CONTENTS : Preface ; The Function of Criticism at the present time ; 
 The LUerary Influence of Academies ; Maurice de Guerin ; Eugenie 
 de Guerin ; Heinrich Heine ; Pagan and Medieval Religious Sentiment ; 
 Joubcrt ; Spinoza and the Bible ; Marcus Aurelius. 
 
 ASPROMONTE, AND OTHER POEMS. Fcap. 8vo. cloth 
 
 extra. 4s. 6d. 
 CONTENTS : Poems for Italy ; Dramatic Lyrics ; Miscellaneous. 
 
 Barnes (Rev. W.). POEMSOF RURAL LIFE IN COM- 
 MON ENGLISH. By the REV. W. BARNES, Author of 
 " Poems of Rural Life in the Dorset Dialect." Fcap. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 " In a high degree pleasant and novel. The book is by no means one 
 which the lovers of descriptive poetry can afford to lose." ATHENAEUM. 
 
 Bell. ROMANCES AND MINOR POEMS. By HENRY 
 GLASSFORD BELL. Fcap. 8vo. dr. 
 
 " Full of life and genius." COURT CIRCULAR. 
 
 Besant. STUDIES IN EARLY FRENCH POETRY. By 
 WALTER BESANT, M.A. Crown. 8vo. Ss. 6d. 
 
 A sort of impression rests on most minds that French literature begins 
 with the " siecle de Louis Quatorze ;" any previous literature being for 
 the most part unknown or ignored. Few know anything of the enormous 
 literary activity that began in the thirteenth century, was carried on by 
 Rulebeuf, Marie de France, Gaston de Foix, Thibault de Champagne, 
 and Lorris ; was fostered by Charles of Orleans, by Margaret of Valois, 
 by Francis the First ; that gave a crowd of versifiers to France, enriched, 
 strengthened, developed, and fixed the French language, and prepared the 
 way for Corneille and for Racine. The present work aims to afford 
 
24 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 information and direction touching the early efforts of France in poetical 
 literature. 
 
 " In one moderately sized volume he has contrived to introduce us to the 
 very best, if not to all of the early French poets" ATHENAEUM. 
 
 Bradshaw. AN ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN THE STATE 
 OF CHAUCER'S WORKS, AS THEY WERE LEFT AT 
 HIS DEATH. With some Notes of their Subsequent History. 
 By HENRY BRADSHAW, of King's College, and the University 
 Library, Cambridge. \In the Press. 
 
 Brimley. ESSAYS BY THE LATE GEORGE BRIMLEY- 
 M.A. Edited by the Rev. W. G. CLARK, M.A. With Portrait. 
 Cheaper Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 3^. 6d. 
 
 Essays on literary topics, such as Tennyson s "Poems," Carlytis 
 "Life of Stirling" "Bleak House" &c., reprinted from Fraser, the 
 Spectator, and like periodicals. 
 
 Broome. THE STRANGER OF SERIPHOS. A Dramatic 
 
 Poem. By FREDERICK NAPIER BROOME. Fcap. 8vo. 5-r. 
 Founded on the Greek legend of Danae and Perseus, 
 
 Clough (Arthur Hugh). THE POEMS AND PROSE 
 REMAINS OF ARTHUR HUGH CLOUGH. With a 
 Selection from his Letters and a Memoir. Edited by his Wife. 
 With Portrait. Two vols. crown 8vo. 2U. Or Poems sepa- 
 rately, as below. 
 
 The late Professor Clough is well known as a graceful, tender poet, 
 and as the scholarly translator of Plutarch. The letters possess high 
 interest, not biographical only, but literary discussing, as they do, the 
 most important questions of the time, always in a genial spirit. The 
 "Remains" include papers on " Retrenchment at Oxford;" on Professor 
 F. W. Newman's book " The Soul ;" on Wordsworth; on the Formation 
 of Classical English ; on some Modern Poems (Matthew Arnold and the 
 late Alexander Smith\ &<:. &c. 
 
POETRY &> BELLES LETTRES. 25 
 
 Clough (Arthur Hugh), (continued} 
 
 THE POEMS OF ARTHUR HUGH CLOUGH, sometime Fellow 
 of Oriel College, Oxford. With a Memoir by F. T. PALGRAVE. 
 Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 "From tlie higher mind of cultivated, all-questioning, but still conser- 
 vative England, in this our puzzled generation, iue do not know of anv 
 utterance in literature so characteristic as the poems of Arthur Hugh 
 Clough" ERASER'S MAGAZINE. 
 
 Dante. DANTE'S COMEDY, THE HELL. Translated by 
 W. M. ROSSETTI. Fcap. 8vo. cloth. 5-r. 
 
 " The aim of this translation of Dante may be summed up in one -word 
 Literality. . . . To follow Dante sentence for sentence, line for line, 
 word for word neither more nor less has been my strenuous endeavour." 
 AUTHOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 De Vere. THE INFANT BRIDAL, and other Poems. By 
 
 AUBREY DE VERE. Fcap. 8vo. is. 6d. 
 
 "Mr. De Vere has taken his place among the poets of the day. Pure 
 and tender fec ; ing, and that polished restraint of style which is called 
 classical, are the charms of the volume" SPECTATOR. 
 
 Doyle (Sir F. H.). Works by Sir FRANCIS HASTINGS DOYLE, 
 Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford : 
 
 THE RETURN OF THE GUARDS, AND OTHER POEMS. 
 Fcap. 8vo. 7-r. 
 
 " Good wine needs no bush, nor good verse a preface.; and Sir Francis 
 Doyle's verses run bright and clear, and smack of a classic vintage. . . . 
 His chief characteristic, as it is his greatest charm, is the simple manliness 
 which gives force to all he writes. It is a characteristic in these days rare 
 tnough. "EXAMINER. 
 
26 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Doyle (Sir F. H.), (continued} 
 
 LECTURES ON POETRY, delivered before the University of 
 Oxford in 1868. Extra crown 8vo. y. 6d. 
 
 THREE LECTURES : (l) Inaugural ; (2) Provincial Poetry; (3) Dr. 
 Newmarfs "Dream of Gerontius" 
 
 "Full of thoughtful discrimination and fine insight: tJie lecture on 
 ' Provincial Poetry" 1 seems to us singularly true, eloquent, and instructive" 
 
 SPECTATOR. 
 
 Evans. BROTHER FABIAN'S MANUSCRIPT, AND 
 OTHER POEMS. By SEBASTIAN EVANS. Fcap. 8vo. cloth. 
 6s. 
 
 " In this volume we have full assurance that he has ' the vision and the 
 faculty divine? . . . Clever and full of kindly humour" GLOBE. 
 
 Furnivall. LE MORTE D' ARTHUR. Edited from the Harleian 
 M.S. 2252, in the British Museum. By F. J. FURNIVALL, M.A. 
 With Essay by the late HERBERT COLERIDGE. Fcap. 8vo. 7^. 6d. 
 
 Looking to the interest shown by so many thousands in Mr. Tennysorfs 
 Arthurian poems, the editor and publishers have thought that the old 
 version would possess considerable interest. It is a reprint of the celebrated 
 Harleian copy ; and is accompanied by index and glossary. 
 
 Garnett. IDYLLS AND EPIGRAMS. Chiefly from the Greek 
 Anthology. By RICHARD GARNETT. Fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 "A charming little book. For English readers, Mr. Garnet? s transla- 
 lations will open a new world of thought." WESTMINSTER REVIEW. 
 
 GUESSES AT TRUTH. By Two BROTHERS. With Vignette, 
 Title, and Frontispiece. New Edition, with Memoir. Fcap. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 " The following year was memorable for the commencement of the 
 ' Guesses at Truth. ' He and his Oxford brother, living as they did in 
 constant and free interchange of thought on questions of philosophy and 
 
POETRY fr BELLES LETTRES. 27 
 
 literature and art ; delighting, each of them, in Ihe epigrammatic terseness 
 which is the charm of the ' Pensees ' of Pascal, and the ' Caracteres ' of La 
 Bruyere agreed to ittter themselves in this form, and the book appeared, 
 anonymously, in two volumes, in 1827." MEMOIR. 
 
 Hamerton. A PAINTER'S CAMP. By PHILIP GILBERT 
 HAMERTON. Second Edition, revised. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 BOOK I. In England; BOOK II. In Scotland; BOOK III. In France. 
 This is the story of an Artists encampments and adventures. The 
 headings of a few chapters may serve to convey a notion of the character 
 of the book : A Walk on the Lancashire Moors ; the Author his own 
 Housekeeper and Cook ; Tents and Boats for the Highlands ; The Author 
 encamps on an uninhabited Island ; A Lake Voyage ; A Gipsy Journey 
 to Glen Coe ; Concerning Moonlight and Old Castles ; A little French 
 City ; A Farm in the Autunois, &c. &c. 
 
 " His pages sparkle with happy turns of expression, not a few well-told 
 anecdotes, and many observations which are the fruit of attentive study and 
 wise reflection on the complicated phenomena of human life, as well as of 
 unconscious nature." WESTMINSTER REVIEW. 
 
 ETCHING AND ETCHERS. A Treatise Critical and Practical. 
 By P. G. HAMERTON. With Original Plates by REMBRANDT, 
 CALLOT, DUJARDIN, PAUL POTTER, &c. Royal 8vo. Half 
 morocco. 3U. 6d. 
 
 " It is a work of which author, printer, and publisher may alike feel 
 proud. It is a work, too, of which none but a genuine artist could by pas' 
 sibility have been the author" SATURDAY REVIEW. 
 
 Helps. REALMAH. By ARTHUR HELPS. Cheap Edition. 
 Crown 8vo. 6s. 
 
 Of this work, by the Author of "Friends in Council," the Saturday 
 Review says: " Underneath the form (that of dialogue} is so much shrewd- 
 ness, fancy, and above all, so much wise kindliness, that we should think 
 all the better of a man or woman who likes the book" 
 
28 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Herschel. THE ILIAD OF HOMER. Translated into English 
 Hexameters. By Sir JOHN HERSCHEL, Bart. 8vo. iSs. 
 
 A version of the Iliad in English Hexameters. The question of 'Homeric 
 translation is fully discussed in the Preface. 
 
 " // is admirable, not only for many intrinsic merits, but as a great 
 man *s tribute to Genius." ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS. 
 
 HIATUS : the Void in Modern Education. Its Cause and Antidote. 
 By OUTIS. 8vo. Ss. 6d. 
 
 The main object of this Essay is to point out how the emotional element 
 which underlies the Fine Arts is disregarded and undeveloped at this time 
 so far as (despite a pretence at filling it up} to constitute an Educational 
 Hiatus. 
 
 HYMNI ECCLESI^. See "THEOLOGICAL SECTION." 
 
 Kennedy. LEGENDARY FICTIONS OF THE IRISH 
 CELTS. Collected and Narrated by PATRICK KENNEDY. Crown 
 8vo. 7-r. 6d. 
 
 "A very admirable popular selection of the Irish fairy stories and legends, 
 in "which those who are familiar with Air. Croker's, and other selections 
 of the same kind, will find much that is fresh, and full of the peculiar 
 vivacity and humour, and sometimes even of the ideal beauty, of the true 
 Celtic Legend" SPECTATOR. 
 
 Kingsley (Canon). See also "HISTORIC SECTION," "WORKS 
 OF FICTION," and "PHILOSOPHY;" also "JUVENILE BOOKS," 
 a nd" THEOLOGY." 
 
 THE SAINTS' TRAGEDY : or, The True Story of Elizabeth of 
 Hungary. By the Rev. CHARLES KINGSLEY. With a Preface by 
 the Rev. F. D. MAURICE. Third Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 5*. 
 
 ANDROMEDA, AND OTHER POEMS. Third Edition. Fcap. 
 8vo. 5-r. 
 
POETRY &* BELLES LETTRES. 29 
 
 Kingsley (Canon), (continued} 
 
 PHAETHON; or, Loose Thoughts for Loose Thinkers. Third 
 Editidn. Crown 8vo. 2s. 
 
 Kingsley (Henry). See "WORKS OF FICTION." 
 
 Lowell. UNDER THE WILLOWS, AND OTHER POEMS 
 By JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL. Fcap. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 11 Under the Willows is one of the most admirable bits of idyllic work, 
 short as it is, or perhaps because it is short, that have been done in our gene- 
 ration? SATURDAY REVIEW. 
 
 Masson (Professor). ESSAYS, BIOGRAPHICAL AND 
 
 CRITICAL. Chiefly on the British Poets. By DAVID MASSON, 
 LL.D., Professor of Rhetoric in the University of Edinburgh. 
 8vo. 12s. 6d. 
 
 " Distinguished by a remarkable power of analysis, a clear statement 
 of the actual facts on which speculation is based, and an appropriate 
 beauty of Language. These essays should be popular with serious men. " 
 
 ATHENAEUM. 
 
 BRITISH NOVELISTS AND THEIR STYLES. Being a Critical 
 Sketch of the History of British Prose Fiction. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d. 
 
 " Valuable for its lucid analysis of fundamental principles, its breadth 
 of view, and sustained animation of style." SPECTATOR. 
 
 MRS. JERNINGHAM'S JOURNAL. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3*. 6d. A 
 Poem of the boudoir or domestic class, purporting to be the journal 
 of a newly-married lady. 
 
 11 One quality in the puce, sufficient of itself to claim a moment's atten- 
 tion, is that it is unipuf original, indeed, is not too strong a word in 
 the manner of its conception and execution." PALL MALL GAZETTE. 
 
30 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Mistral (F.). MIRELLE: a Pastoral Epic of Provence. Trans- 
 lated by H. CRICHTON. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 " This is a capital translation of the elegant ana richly -coloured pastoral 
 epic poem of M. Mistral which, in 1859, he dedicated in enthusiastic 
 
 terms to Lamartine. // would be hard to overpraise the 
 
 sweetness and pleasing freshness of this charming epic. 1 '' ATHEN^UM. 
 
 Myers (Ernest). THE PURITANS. By ERNEST MYERS. 
 Extra fcap. 8vo. cloth. 2s. 6d. 
 
 " It is not too much to call it a really grand poem, stately and dignified, 
 and showing not only a high poetic mind, but also great power over poetic 
 expression" LITERARY CHURCHMAN. 
 
 Myers (F. W. H.) ST. PAUL. A Poem. By F. W. H. 
 MYERS. Second Edition. Extra fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 "ft breathes throughout the spirit of St. Paul, and with a singular 
 stately melody of versed FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW. 
 
 Nettleship. ESSAYS ON ROBERT BROWNING'S 
 
 POETRY. By JOHN T. NETTLESHIP. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s. 6d. 
 
 Noel. BEATRICE, AND OTHER POEMS. By the Hon. 
 RODEN NOEL. Fcap. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 "Beatrice is in many respects a noble poem; it displays a splendour 
 of landscape painting, a strong definite precision of highly -coloured descrip- 
 tion, which has not often been surpassed" PALL MALL GAZETTE. 
 
 Norton. THE LADY OF LA GARAYE. By the HON. MRS 
 NORTON. With Vignette and Frontispiece. Sixth Edition 
 Fcap. 8vo. 4J. 6d. 
 
 " TJiere is no lack of vigour, no faltering oj power, plenty of passion, 
 much bright description, much musical verse. . . . Full of thoughts well- 
 expressed, and may be classed among her best works." TIMES. 
 
POETRY 5- BELLES LETTRES. 31 
 
 Orwell. THE BISHOP'S WALK AND THE BISHOP'S 
 TIMES. Poems on the days of Archbishop Leighton and the 
 Scottish Covenant By ORWELL. Fcap. 8vo. 5-r. 
 
 " Pure taste and faultless precision of language, the fruits of deep thought, 
 insight into human nature, and lively sympathy. " NONCONFORMIST. 
 
 Palgrave (Francis T.). ESSAYS ON ART. By FRANCIS 
 TURNER PALGRAVE, M.A., late Fellow of Exeter College, 
 Oxford. Extra fcap. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 Rlnlready Dyce Holman Hunt Herbert Poetry, Prose, ana Sen- 
 sationalism in Art Sculpture in England The Albert Cross, &>c. 
 
 SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS AND SONGS. Edited by F. T. 
 PALGRAVE. Gem Edition. With Vignette Title by JE ENS. 3*. 6d. 
 
 " For minute elegance no volume could possibly excel the ' Gem 
 Edition' " SCOTSMAN. 
 
 Patmore. Works by COVENTRY PATMORE : 
 
 THE ANGEL IN THE HOUSE. 
 
 BOOK I. The Betrothal; BOOK II. The Espousals; BOOK III. 
 Faithful for Ever. With Tamerton Church Tower. Two vols. fcap. 
 Svo. I2J. 
 
 %* A New and Cheap Edition in one vol. i%mo., beautifully printed on 
 toned paper, price 2s. bd. 
 
 THE VICTORIES OF LOVE. Fcap. 8vo. 4*. 6d. 
 
 The intrinsic merit of his poem will secure it a permanent place in 
 literature. . . . Mr. Patmore has fully earned a place in the catalogue 
 of poets by the finished idealization oj domestic life''' SATURDAY 
 REVIEW. 
 
32 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 RoSSetti. Works by CHRISTINA RosSETTI : 
 
 GOBLIN MARKET, AND OTHER POEMS. With two Designs 
 by D. G. ROSSETTI. Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 5-r. 
 
 "She handles her little marvel with that rare poetic discrimination which 
 neither exhausts it of its simple wonders by flushing symbolism too far, nor 
 keeps those wonders in the merely fabulous and capricious stage. In fact 
 she has produced a true children's poem , which is far more delightful to 
 the mature than to children^ though it would be delightful to a//." 
 SPECTATOR. 
 
 THE PRINCE'S PROGRESS, AND OTHER POEMS. With 
 two Designs by D. G. ROSSETTI. Fcap. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 " Miss Rossett? s poems are of the kind which recalls Shelley's definition 
 of Poetry as the record of the best and happiest moments of the best- and 
 happiest minds. . . . They are like the piping of a bird on the spray in 
 the sunshine, or the quaint singing with which a child amuses itself when 
 it forgets that anybody is listening" SATURDAY REVIEW. 
 
 Rossetti (W. M.). DANTE'S HELL. See" DANTE." 
 
 FINE ART, chiefly Contemporary. By WILLIAM M. ROSSETTI. 
 Crown 8vo. IDS. 6d. 
 
 . This -volume consists of Criticism on Contemporary Art, reprinted from 
 Fraser, The Saturday Review, The Pall Mall Gazette, and other pub- 
 lications. 
 
 Roby. STORY OF A HOUSEHOLD, AND OTHER POEMS. 
 By MARY K. ROBY. Fcap. 8vo. $s. 
 
 Shairp (Principal). KILMAHOE, a Highland Pastoral, with 
 other Poems. By JOHN CAMPBELL SHAIRP. Fcap. 8vo. 5^. 
 
 " Kilmahoe is a Highland Pastoral, redolent of the warm soft air of 
 the Western Lochs and Moors, sketched out with remarkable grace and pic- 
 turesqueness" SATURDAY REVIEW. 
 
POETRY fr AELLES LETTRES. 33 
 
 Smith. Works by ALEXANDER SMITH : 
 
 A LIFE DRAMA, AND OTHER POEMS. Fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d. 
 
 CITY POEMS. Fcap. 8vo. $s. 
 
 EDWIN OF DEIRA. Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo. $s. 
 
 "A poem "which is marked by the strength, sustained sweetness, and 
 compact texture of real life." NORTH BRITISH REVIEW. 
 
 Smith. POEMS. By CATHERINE BARNARD SMITH. Fcap. 
 8vo. 5j. 
 
 " Wealthy in feeling, meaning, finish, and grace ; not without passion, 
 which is suppressed, but the keener for that " ATHENAEUM. 
 
 Smith (Rev. Walter). HYMNS OF CHRIST AND THE 
 CHRISTIAN LIFE. By the Rev. WALTER C. SMITH, M.A. 
 Fcap. 8vo. 6s. 
 
 " These are among the nueetest sacred poems we have read for a long 
 time. With no profuse imagery, expressing a range of feeling and 
 expression by no means uncommon, they are true and elevated, and their 
 pathos is profound and simple." NONCONFORMIST. 
 
 Stratford de Redcliffe (Viscount). SHADOWS OF 
 THE PAST, in Verse. By VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE RED- 
 CLIFFE. Crown 8vo. ior. 6d. 
 
 " The vigorous words of one who has acted vigorously. They combine 
 thefen'our of politician and poet " GUARDIAN. 
 
 Trench. Works by R. CHENEVIX TRENCH, D.D., Archbishop 
 of Dublin. See also Sections " PHILOSOPHY," "THEOLOGY," &c. 
 
 POEMS. Collected and arranged anew. Fcap. 8vo. ^s. 6d. 
 ELEGIAC POEMS. Third Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d. 
 
34 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Trench (Archbishop), (continued) 
 
 CALDERON'S LIFE'S A DREAM : The Great Theatre of the 
 World. With an Essay on his Life and Genius. Fcap. 8vo. 
 
 HOUSEHOLD BOOK OF ENGLISH POETRY. Selected and 
 arranged, with Notes, by R. C. TRENCH, D.D., Archbishop of 
 Dublin. Extra fcap. 8vo. 5-r. 6d. 
 
 This volume is called a " Household Book," by this name implying that 
 it is a book for all that there is nothing in it to prevent it from being 
 confidently placed in the hands of every member of the household. Speci- 
 mens of all classes of poetry are given, including selections from living 
 authors. The Editor has aimed to produce a book "which the emigrant, 
 finding room for little not absolutely necessary, might yet find room for 
 in his trunk, and the traveller in his knapsack, and that on some narrow 
 shelves where there are few books this might be one." 
 
 " The Archbishop has conferred in this delightful volume an important 
 gift on the whole English-speaking population of the world." PALL 
 MALL GAZETTE. 
 
 SACRED LATIN POETRY, Chiefly Lyrical. Selected and arranged 
 for Use. Second Edition, Corrected and Improved. Fcap. 8vo. 
 
 " The aim of the present volume is to offer to members of our English 
 Church a collection of the best sacred Latin poetry, such as they shall be 
 able entirely and heartily to accept and approve a collection, that is,'in which 
 they shall not be evermore liable to be offended, and to have the current oj 
 their sympathies checked, by coming upon that which, however beautiful as 
 poetry, out of higher respects they must reject and condemn in which, too, 
 they shall not fear that snares are being laid for them, to entangle them 
 unawares in admiration for ought which is inconsistent with their faith 
 and fealty to their own spiritual mother" PREFACE. 
 
POETRY &* BELLES LETTRES. 35 
 
 Turner. SONNETS. By the Rev. CHARLES TENNYSON 
 TURNER. Dedicated to his brother, the Poet Laureate. Fcap. 
 8vo. 4J. 6d. 
 
 " The Sonnets are dedicated to Mr. Tennyson by his brother, and have, 
 independently of their merits, an interest of association. They both love to 
 write in simple expressive Saxon; both love to touch their imagery in 
 epithets rather than in formal similes ; both have a delicate perception 
 of rythmical movement, and thus Mr. Turner has occasional lines which, 
 for phrase and music, might be ascribed to his brother. . . He knows the 
 haunts of the wild rose, the shady nooks where light quivers through the 
 leaves, the ruralities, in short, of the land of imagination." ATHEN^UM. 
 
 SMALL TABLEAUX. Fcap. 8vo. 4?. 6d. 
 
 " These brief poems have not only a peculiar kind of interest for the 
 student of English poetry, but are intrinsically delightful, and will reward 
 a careful and frequent perusal. Full of na'ivett, piety, love, and knowledge 
 of natural objects, and each expressing a single and generally a simple 
 subject by means of minute and original pictorial touches, these sonnets 
 have a place of their own" PALL MALL GAZETTE. 
 
 Vittoria Colonna. LIFE AND POEMS. By Mrs. HENRY 
 ROSCOE. Crown 8vo. gs. 
 
 The life of Vittoria Colonna, the celebrated Marchesa di Pescara, has 
 received but cursory notice from any English writer, though in every 
 history of Italy her name is mentioned with great honour among the poets 
 of the sixteenth century. "In three hundred and fifty years," says her 
 biographer Visconti, "there has been no other Italian lady who can be 
 compared to Aer." 
 
 "It is written with good taste, with quick and intelligent sympathy, 
 occasionally with a real freshness and charm of style." PALL MALL 
 GAZETTE. 
 
36 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Webster. Works by AUGUSTA WEBSTER : 
 DRAMATIC STUDIES. Extra fcap. 8vo. 5* 
 
 "A volume as strongly marked by perfect taste as by poetic power" 
 
 NONCONFORMIST. 
 
 PROMETHEUS BOUND OF AESCHYLUS. Literally translated 
 into English Verse. Extra fcap. 8vo. 3^. 6d. 
 
 " Closeness and simplicity combined with literary skill" ATHENAEUM. 
 
 MEDEA OF EURIPIDES. Literally translated into English Verse. 
 Extra fcap. 8vo. 3-r. 6d. 
 
 " Mrs. Webster s translation surpasses our utmost expectations. It is a 
 photograph of the original without any of that harshness which so often 
 accompanies a photograph" WESTMINSTER REVIEW. 
 
 A WOMAN SOLD, AND OTHER POEMS. Crown Svo. 7* 6d. 
 
 "Mrs. Webster has shown us that she is able to draw admirably from 
 the life / that she can observe with subtlety, and render her observations 
 with delicacy ; that she can impersonate complex conceptions, and venture 
 into which few living writers can follow her." GUARDIAN. 
 
 Woolner. MY BEAUTIFUL LADY. By THOMAS WOOLNER. 
 With a Vignette by ARTHUR HUGHES. Third Edition. Fcap. 
 Svo. 5*. 
 
 " It is clearly the product of no idle hour, but a highly-conceived and 
 faithfully -executed task, self-imposed, and prompted by that inward yearn- 
 ing to utter great thoughts, and a wealth of passionate feeling which is 
 poetic genius. No man can read this poem without being struck by the 
 fitness and finish of the workmanship, so to speak, as well as by the chas- 
 tened and unpretending loftiness of thought which peri'ades the whole." 
 
 GLOBE. 
 
 WORDS FROM THE POETS. Selected by the Editor of " Rays of 
 Sunlight." With a Vignette and Frontispiece. i8mo. Extra 
 cloth gilt. 2s. 6d. Cheaper Edition, i8mo. limp., \s. 
 

 GLOBE EDITIONS. 
 
 UNDER the title GLOBE EDITIONS, the Publishers are 
 issuing a uniform Series of Standard English Authors, 
 carefully edited, clearly and elegantly printed on toned 
 paper, strongly bound, and at a small cost. The names of 
 the Editors whom they have been fortunate enough to 
 secure constitute an indisputable guarantee as to the 
 character of the Series. The greatest care has been taken 
 to ensure accuracy of text; adequate notes, elucidating 
 historical, literary, and philological points, have been sup- 
 plied ; and, to the older Authors, glossaries are appended. 
 The series is especially adapted to Students of our national 
 Literature ; while the small price places good editions of 
 certain books, hitherto popularly inaccessible, within the 
 reach of all. 
 
 Shakespeare. THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM 
 SHAKESPEARE. Edited by W. G. CLARK and W. ALDIS 
 WRIGHT. Ninety-first Thousand. Globe 8vo. $s. 6d. 
 
 "A marvel of beauty, cheapness, and compactness. The whole -works 
 plays, poems, and sonnets are contained in one small volume: yet the 
 page is perfectly clear and readable. . . . For the busy man, above all 
 for the working Student, the Globe Edition is the best of all existing 
 Shakespeare books" ATHENAEUM. 
 
38 GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 Morte D' Arthur. SIR THOMAS MALORY'S BOOK OF 
 KING ARTHUR AND OF HIS NOBLE KNIGHTS OF 
 THE ROUND TABLE. The Edition of CAXTON, revised for 
 Modern Use. With an Introduction by SIR EDWARD STRACHEY, 
 Bart. Globe 8vo. 3*. 6d. Third Edition. 
 
 " // is with the most perfect confidence that we recommend this edition of 
 the old romance to every class of readers." PALL MALL GAZETTE. 
 
 Scott. THE POETICAL WORKS OF SIR WALTER 
 SCOTT. With Biographical Essay, by F. T. PALGRAVE. 
 Globe 8vo. 3-r. 6d. New Edition. 
 
 "As a popular edition it leaves nothing to be desired. The want of 
 such an one has long been felt, combining real excellence with cheapness" 
 
 SPECTATOR. 
 
 Burns. THE POETICAL WORKS AND LETTERS OF 
 ROBERT BURNS. Edited, with Life, by ALEXANDER SMITH. 
 Globe 8vo. 3-y. 6d. Second Edition. 
 
 " The works of the bard have never been offered in such a complete form 
 in a single volume" GLASGOW DAILY HERALD. 
 " Admirable in all respects'" 1 SPECTATOR, 
 
 Robinson Crusoe. THE ADVENTURES OF ROBINSON 
 
 CRUSOE. By DEFOE. Edited, from the Original Edition, by 
 J. W. CLARK, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. 
 With Introduction by HENRY KINGSLEY. Globe Svo. $s. 6d. 
 
 " The Globe Edition of Robinson Crusoe is a book to have and to keep. 
 It is printed after the original editions, with the quaint old spelling, and 
 is published in admirable style as regards type, paper, and binding. A 
 well-written and genial biographical introduction, by Mr. Henry Ktngsley, 
 is likewise an attractive feature of this edition" MORNING STAR. 
 
GLOBE EDITIONS. 39 
 
 Goldsmith. GOLDSMITH'S MISCELLANEOUS WORKS. 
 With Biographical Essay by Professor MASSON. Globe 8vo. 
 
 This edition includes the whole of Goldsmith's Miscellaneous Works 
 the Vicar of Wakefield, Plays, Poems, &c. Of the memoir the SCOTSMAN 
 newspaper writes: " Such an admirable compendium of the facts of 
 Goldsmith's life, and so careful and minute a delineation of the mixed 
 traits of his peculiar character, as to be a very model of a literary 
 biography." 
 
 Pope. THE POETICAL WORKS OF ALEXANDER POPE. 
 Edited, with Memoir and Notes, by Professor WARD. Globe 
 8vo. 3-r. (>d. 
 
 " The book is handsome and handy. . . . TTie notes are many, and 
 the matter of them is rich in interest." ATHENAEUM. 
 
 Spenser. THE COMPLETE WORKS OF EDMUND 
 SPENSER. Edited from the Original Editions and Manuscripts, 
 by R. MORRIS, Member of the Council of the Philological Society. 
 With a Memoir by J. W. HALES, M.A., late Fellow of Christ's 
 College, Cambridge, Member of the Council of the Philological 
 Society. Globe 8vo. 3^. &/. 
 
 " A complete and clearly printed edition of the whole works of Spenser, 
 carefully collated with the originals, with copious glossary, worthy and 
 higher praise it needs not of the beautiful Globe Series. The work is 
 edited with all the care so noble a poet deserves" DAILY NEWS. 
 
 V The Volumes of this Series may also be had in a variety of morocco 
 and calf bindings at very moderate Prices. 
 
GOLDEN TREASURY SERIES. 
 
 Uniformly printed in i8mo., with Vignette Titles by SIR 
 NOEL PATON, T. WOOLNER, W. HOLMAN HUNT, J. E. 
 MILLAIS, ARTHUR HUGHES, &c. Engraved on Steel by 
 JEENS. Bound in extra cloth, 4$. 6d. each volume. Also 
 kept in morocco. 
 
 "Messrs. Macmillan have, in their Golden Treasury Series especially, 
 provided editions of standard works, volumes of selected poetry, and 
 original compositions, which entitle this series to be called classical. 
 Nothing can be better than the literary execution, nothing more elegant 
 than the material workmanship" BRITISH QUARTERLY REVIEW. 
 
 THE GOLDEN TREASURY OF THE BEST SONGS AND 
 LYRICAL POEMS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. 
 
 Selected and arranged, with Notes, by FRANCIS TURNER 
 PALGRAVE. 
 
 " This delightful little volume, the Golden Treasttry, which contains 
 many of the best original lyrical pieces and songs in oiir language, grouped 
 with care and skill, so as to illustrate each other like the pictures in a 
 well-arranged gallery.'" QUARTERLY REVIEW. 
 
 THE CHILDREN'S GARLAND FROM THE BEST POETS. 
 
 Selected and arranged by COVENTRY PATMORE. 
 
 " // includes specimens of all the great masters in the art oj poetry, 
 selected with the matured judgment of a man concentrated on obtaining 
 insight into the feelings and tastes of childhood, and desirous to awaken its 
 finest impulses, to cultivate its keenest sensibilities" MORNING POST. 
 
GOLDEN TREASURY SERIES. 41 
 
 THE BOOK OF PRAISE. From the Best English Hymn Writers. 
 Selected and arranged by SIR ROUNDELL PALMER. A New and 
 Enlarged Edition. 
 
 " All previous compilations of this kind must ttndcniably for the present 
 give place to the Book of Praise. . . . The selection has been mad? 
 throughout with sound judgment and critical taste. The pains involved 
 in f/iis compilation must have been immense, embracing, as it does, every 
 writer of note in this special province of English literature, and ranging 
 over the most widely divergent tracts of religious thought.' 1 '' SATURDAY 
 REVIEW. 
 
 THE FAIRY BOOK ; the Best Popular Fairy Stories. Selected and 
 
 rendered anew by the Author of " JOHN HALIFAX, GENTLEMAN." 
 
 "A delightful selection, in a delightful external form ; full of the 
 
 physical splendour and vast opulence of proper fairy tales." SPECTATOR. 
 
 THE BALLAD BOOK. A Selection of the Choicest British Ballads. 
 Edited by WILLIAM ALLINGHAM. 
 
 " His taste as a judge of old poetry will be found, by all acquainted with 
 the various readings* of old English ballads, true enough to justify his 
 undertaking so critical a task." SATURDAY REVIEW. 
 
 THE JEST BOOK. The Choicest Anecdotes and Sayings. Selected 
 and arranged by MARK LEMON. 
 
 " The fullest and best jest book that has yet appeared." SATURDAY 
 REVIEW. 
 
 BACON'S ESSAYS AND COLOURS OF GOOD AND EVIL. 
 With Notes and Glossarial Index. By W. ALOIS WRIGHT, M.A. 
 
 " The beautiful little edition- of Bacon's Essays, ncnu before us, does 
 credit to the taste and scholarship of Mr. Aldis Wright. . . . It puts the 
 reader in possession of all the essential literary facts and chronology 
 necessary for reading the Essays in connexion with Bacorfs life and 
 times.'" SPECTATOR. 
 
 " By far the most complete as well as the most elegant edition we 
 possess." WESTMINSTER REVIEW. 
 
 D 
 
42 . GENERAL CATALOGUE. 
 
 THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS from this World to that which is to 
 come. By JOHN BUNYAN. 
 
 "A beautiful and scholarly reprint" SPECTATOR. 
 
 THE SUNDAY BOOK OF POETRY FOR THE YOUNG. 
 Selected and arranged by C. F. ALEXANDER. 
 
 "A well-selected volume of sacred fioetry" SPECTATOR. 
 
 A BOOK OF GOLDEN DEEDS of all Times and all Countries. 
 Gathered and narrated anew. By the Author of " THE HEIR OF 
 REDCLYFFE." 
 
 "... To the young, for whom it is especially intended, as a most interesting 
 collection of thrilling tales well told and to their elders, as a useful hand- 
 book of reference, and a pleasant one to take up when their wish is to while 
 away a weary half-hour. IVe have seen no prettier gift-book for a long 
 time" ATHENAEUM. 
 
 THE POETICAL WORKS OF ROBERT BURNS. Edited, with 
 Biographical Memoir, Notes, and Glossary, by ALEXANDER 
 SMITH. Two Vols. 
 
 '''Beyond all question this is the most beautiful edition of Burns 
 yet out " EDINBURGH DAILY REVIEW. 
 
 THE ADVENTURES OF ROBINSON CRUSOE. Edited from 
 the Original Edition by J. W. CLARK, M.A., Fellow of Trinity 
 College, Cambridge. 
 
 " Mutilated and modified editions of this English classic are so much 
 the rule, that a cheap and pretty copy of it, rigidly exact to the original, 
 will be a prize to many book-buyers" EXAMINER. 
 
 THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO. TRANSLATED into ENGLISH, with 
 Notes, by J. LI. DAVIES, M.A. and D. J. VAUGHAN, M.A. 
 
 " A dainty and cheap little edition'' EXAMINER. 
 

 GOLDEN TREASUR Y SERIES. 43 
 
 THE SONG BOOK. Words and Tunes from the best Poets and 
 Musicians. Selected and arranged by JOHN HULLAH, Professor 
 of Vocal Music in King's College, London. 
 
 "A choice collection of the sterling songs of England, Scotland, and 
 Ireland, with the music of each prefixed to the words. HOT.V much true 
 ivholesome pleasure such a book can diffuse, and will diffuse, we trust, 
 through many thousand families" EXAMINER. 
 
 LA LYRE FRANCAISE. Selected and arranged, with Notes, by 
 GUSTAVE MASSON, French Master in Harrow School. 
 
 A selection of the best French songs and lyrical pieces. 
 
 TOM BROWN'S SCHOOL DAYS. By an OLD BOY. 
 
 " A perfect gem of a book. The best and most healthy book about boys 
 for boys that ever was written." ILLUSTRATED TIMES. 
 
 A BOOK OF WORTHIES. Gathered from the Old Histories and 
 written anew by the Author of "THE HEIR OF REDCLYFFE." 
 With Vignette. 
 
 " An admirable edition to an admirable series" 
 
 WESTMINSTER REVIEW, 
 
LONDON : 
 
 K. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS, 
 BREAD STREET HILL. 
 
07 
 
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