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A REVIEW OF THE HISTORY 
 OF INFANTRY 
 
A REVIEW OF 
 
 THE HISTORY OF 
 INFANTRY 
 
 E. M. LLOYD, 
 
 COLONEL, LATE ROYAL ENGINEERS, 
 
 AUTHOR OK 
 kAUBAN, MONTALEMBERT, CARNOT : ENGINEER STUDIES." 
 
 LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 
 
 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON 
 
 NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA 
 
 1908 
 
 All rights reserved 
 

PREFACE 
 
 In a boat-race each man of a crew must do his best and 
 all must pull together. So in war: individual efficiency 
 nmst go along with united action. Lord Wolseley has 
 said in praise of drill that "it not only trains the body, 
 but it disciplines the nund at the same time. It teaches 
 men the first rudiments of obedience ; and if I were asked 
 what is the greatest of all military virtues, a virtue even 
 higher than courage, I should reply it was absolute un- 
 questioning obedience." ^ On the other hand, Lord Roberts 
 has pointed out that "the backbone of a thorough 
 military training is the careful and gradual instruction 
 of the individual, officer or soldier, in every duty he may 
 be called on to fulfil, and the development to the utmost 
 of his mental and physical powers. But such develop- 
 ment is impossible unless free play is given to individual 
 intelligence and initiative." ^ 
 
 These doctrines are not contrary to one another, but 
 supplementary; they are the two halves of the truth. 
 Sometimes the one needs emphasising, sometimes the 
 other. As Dragomirov says : " In order to carry out 
 military duties we require punctuality and promptitude 
 in the execution of orders, based upon a boundless 
 devotion, and sustained by the active working of the 
 
 1 R.U.fi.F. Journal, 189.5, p. .50. 
 
 » Preface to Infantry Training (1902). 
 
 2H>^:\'yo 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 intelligence." i It is one object of drill to make certain 
 motions become second nature to the soldier, so that 
 he will execute them instinctively in the excitement of 
 action. But, in these days especially, he must be some- 
 thing more than a machine. He must learn to combine 
 reason with instinct, self-reliance with self-surrender. 
 
 In Herbert Spencer's Sociology the militant type is 
 treated as the forerunner of the industrial type, not as its 
 companion and counterpoise. It is admitted to have 
 played a useful part in the evolution of society, by 
 welding tribes into nations, and training men for voluntary 
 co-operation ; but its work is done and it is doomed to 
 disappear. If so, the more progressive peoples, being 
 the first to lose their militant characteristics, are bound 
 to fall a prey to the less progressive. But history 
 shows that success in war has been due quite as much 
 to industrial traits — individual energy and enterprise, as 
 to militaiit traits — subordination and cohesion. Indus- 
 triahsm not only supplies the sinews of war, improved 
 weapons, and accessories of all kinds; it demands and 
 develops characteristics which are indispensable to the 
 soldier. Nation after nation has gained predominance 
 by one kind of excellence, and lost it by want of the 
 other kind. For continuous success the two must go 
 hand in hand. In short, for war as for peace, in- 
 dividualism and collectivism must be harmonised. 
 
 A distinguished officer has declared his conviction 
 "that up-to-date civilisation is becoming less and less 
 capable of conforming to the antique standards of 
 military virtue, and that the hour is at hand when the 
 modern world must begin to modify its ideals, or prepare 
 to go down before some more natural, less complex, and 
 less nervous type. . . . City-bred dollar-hunters are 
 
 • R.U.S.I. Journal, 1887, p. 973. 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 becoming less and less capable of coping with such 
 adversaries as Deerslayor and his clan." • True enough : 
 but after all Deerslayer was a product of civilisation, 
 and was on the whole a better Kghthig man than 
 Chingachgook. 
 
 ' A Staff-Officer's Scrap-book, vol. i. p. 5. 
 
 't 
 
"Ne lisez pas I'histoire pour apprendre 
 I'histoire, mats pour apprendre la guerre, la 
 morale et la politique" — Belleisle. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 I. THE GREEKS 
 
 PASS 
 
 Persians and Greeks— The Spartan hoplite — The Athenians : Mara- 
 thon and Plataea— The Peloponnesian war — Professional soldiers : 
 Xenophon and Iphicrates — The Thebans: Epamlnondas — 
 Philip of Macedon — Alexander in Asia : combined tactics— The 
 successors of Alexander 1 
 
 II. THE ROMANS 
 
 Latin characteristics : the legion— Manipular tactics : sword and 
 pilum — Romans and Greeks : Pyrrhus — Romans and Cartha- 
 ginians : Hannibal — The conquest of Greece : legion and 
 phalanx— Professional soldiers: Marius— The legionary under 
 Caesar — The reforms of Augustus- The later empire : frontier 
 defence 
 
 III. THE MIDDLE AGES 
 
 The Franks : beginnings of feudalism — Charlemagne and his succes- 
 sors—Mercenaries : the Crusades— Burgher militia — Feudalism 
 in England — The armies of Edward III. — The archer and the 
 dismounted man-at-arms — Crccy and Poitiers — Agincourt : de- 
 fensive tactics — The free companies, and the beginning of 
 standing armies: Charles VII.— The Swiss — The downfall of 
 Charles the Rash 
 
 IV. THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 Growth of standing armies — Swiss and German mercenaries — 
 French, Italian, and Spanish foot — " The great captain " in 
 Italy— Influence of artillery and small arms — Harquebus 'and 
 musket — The Spanish discipline — The failure of Spain — Organ- 
 isation and tactics of infantry — The Dutch order : Nieuport — 
 
 English infantry : disuse of the bow 
 
 ix J 
 
CONTENTS 
 V THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus-The fewe „a,_Fvench infantry under 
 
 r ;J "irrJu/ois-Defensive -Ji--— Monte- ^^^ 
 cucooli-The Turks-Luxemburg and Catinat . 
 
 VI. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY : 1. 
 
 supersession of t.e nratcMock >^^ ^^^^^^tgtln r^tt T-M^. 
 %iUebytUebayonet-Conseque ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^,„ , 
 
 S^lS^a^Eoy^^Higbia^-- 
 
 deductions from them . • ■ • 
 
 VII. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: II. 
 
 The seven Years' ^^-^-T^^J^ ^'i:ZC^ 
 The British at ^^"^ff^-f^'^J^S tactics-French advocates 
 rtrcrriSeCarcrrricanlnaependence-Thetwo- ^^^ 
 
 deep line - 
 
 VIII. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1792-1815) 
 
 „ ;„ i7Q2_The volunteers: Valmy— Du- 
 
 State of the French f™? \° ^!^;^,l_The campaign of 1793-The 
 
 n^ourie. invades the ^^t^^f "^^J.^.e, „£ the failure of the 
 
 amalgamation: campaign °"';* . tio^_Bonaparte in Italy 
 
 ,Uies-Bepublican tactics and g^^^^^^^^ 
 
 -Changes made ^^J ^^'"^ •/"'^' f '' .,h columns-French and 
 and Auerstedt-lncreased -- "J * ^^^^^J sab-gal-British light 
 English in the ?— IV^sX and the Ir of liberation- 
 infantry— The invasion of Russia ana . . 18 
 Ligny and Waterloo .••■•■ 
 
 IX. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: I. (1816-1866) 
 
 Xnfantry formations after ^-^^^^ -l7^-"rbe::tS::-The 
 fm-cinirarTrwa?^-: the breechloader . • . 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 X. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY : II. (1867-1900) 
 
 PAG 
 
 The Franco-German war— The Russo-Turkish war— Tactical deduc- 
 tions and discussions— Magazine rifles and quick-firing guns— 
 The war in South Africa — The Russo-Japanese war . . 2£ 
 
 TiTLKS OF Works referked to in the Footnotes . 291 
 INDEX 297 
 
A REVIEW OF THE HISTORY 
 OF INFANTRY 
 
 THE GREEKS 
 
 Herodotus tells us that when Greek met Persian at 
 Platsea, "in courage and in strength the Persians were 
 not inferior, but they were without armour, and moreover 
 they were unversed in war and unequal to their opponents 
 in skill." 1 It seems strange that this should be said of 
 the picked troops of a wealthy empire which had con- 
 quered all its neighbours, and was now dealing with the 
 burghers of some small city-states. But it is explained 
 by the history of the two races and the character of 
 their respective countries. 
 
 Medes and Persians were highlanders, bred in the 
 mountain ranges which run south from Ararat. The 
 bow was their native weapon. As children they were 
 taught to ride, to shoot, and to speak the truth. Horses 
 were at one time rare among them, but (if we may believe 
 Xenophon -) Cyrus taught his mountaineers to look upon 
 it as discreditable for any man who had a horse to go on 
 foot. In the open plains of Mesopotamia he had found 
 that he must have cavalry to reap the fruits of victory ; 
 but infantry never reaches a high standard where foot 
 service is despised. 
 
 ' Herodotus, ix. 62. " Cyropmkia, iv. 8. 
 
^■■■•..•■■■;; -THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 Horse and foot alike relied chiefly on missiles. The 
 frieze of Darius' palace at Susa shows us the men of 
 his footguards, armed with a seven-foot spear and a bow 
 of half that length, with felt caps or turbans, and long 
 tunics with loose-hanging sleeves. Large quivers are on 
 their backs. Herodotus says that they had a sort of 
 scale armour and shields of wicker-work, and a dagger 
 hung from the girdle on the right.i 
 
 Such men were ill-fitted for hand-to-hand encounter 
 with the Greek hoplites. In Greece, and especially in 
 Peloponnesus, the conditions were singularly favourable 
 for the production of good infantry, well trained and 
 well equipped. It was "a land of hills in the midst of 
 the sea." Its mountains cut it up into cantons, and 
 hindered the growth of any widespread despotism. Its 
 valleys were too narrow to give much scope for cavalry. 
 Its soil demanded labour, but not incessant labour; and 
 its bracing yet genial climate encouraged an active out- 
 door life. The people had the hardiness and indepen- 
 dence of mountaineers, while the neighbourhood of the 
 sea saved them from the rudeness and poverty of 
 mountaineers. They borrowed their weapons and armour 
 and learnt skill in metal-work from trading peoples, 
 Carians and Phcenicians. Their warlike aptitude was 
 developed by an incessant struggle for existence. 
 
 This was especially the case with the Spartans. "Few 
 against many," they had conquered the valley of the 
 Eurotas, and to maintain themselves against their subject 
 races they needed every man they could muster, and the 
 best organisation and training. The features of the 
 military spirit — fortitude, obedience, conservatism, super- 
 stition, imperiousness and contempt for the weak- 
 characterised the Dorian race as a whole, and were most 
 
 ' Herodotus, vii. CI, 
 
THE GREEKS 3 
 
 fully developed in Laced;emon. Sparta was a camp rather 
 than a city, and every man of military age was said to be 
 on guard. Not blending with the former inhabitants, the 
 Spartans drew their fixed share of the produce of the 
 land as a tribute from the Helots, and devoted them- 
 selves to military training as a soldier caste. From the 
 age of seven the young Spartan was practised in athletic 
 exercises. At eighteen he received his arms, and was 
 instructed in the use of them. At twenty he took his 
 place in the ranks, and not till ten years later was he 
 reckoned a fully trained soldier, and allowed to marry. 
 
 The whole strength of a Spartan army lay in its heavy- 
 armed infantry (hoplites). It was left to Helots to serve 
 as light infantry, throwing darts and stones ; and though 
 the richer citizens had to provide some cavalry, it was 
 held in so little esteem that they did not serve in it 
 themselves. Even the band of 300 picked youths who 
 formed the king's bodyguard, and bore the name of 
 " Horsemen," fought on foot. The equipment of the 
 hoplite — brazen helmet, breastplate and greaves, oval 
 shield, sword and spear — is reckoned to have weighed 
 about three-quarters of a cwt./ but a slave helped to carry 
 it on the march, and a Spartan force could cover 100 
 miles in three days on occasion.- The spear was not 
 more than 9 feet long; it was wielded with one hand, 
 and was levelled at the height of the hip for a charge. 
 
 The Spartan system of command seemed to Thucydides 
 worthy of particular mention : " [the king] gives general 
 orders to the polemarchs, which they convey to the 
 commanders of lochi ; these again to the commanders 
 of pentecosties, the commanders of pentecosties to the 
 commanders of enomoties, and these to the enomoty." * 
 
 ' Riistow and Kochly, p. 44. - Herodotus, vi. 120. 
 
 ' Thucydides, v. 66. 
 
4 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 This marks out the enomoty, or band of sworn comrades, 
 as the tactical unit. At Mantinea (b.c. 418) its strength 
 ■was about thirty men ; it formed four files with an average 
 depth of eight men.^ Xenophon, a Httle later, speaks of it 
 as forming sometimes three, sometimes six files, according 
 (we may suppose) as it was eight deep or four deep. As 
 to the larger units, Thucydides reckons four enomoties to 
 the pentecosty, and four pentecosties to the lochos, but 
 Xenophon halves these numbers. The point is not of 
 much importance, as the units were drawn up side by side 
 in phalanx, with no second line or reserve. They were 
 local not numerical units, and their strength would vary 
 with the population of the ward from which they came 
 and the number of classes called out. All Spartans were 
 liable to military service from twenty to sixty years of 
 age, but the youngest and oldest classes were seldom sent 
 into the field. 
 
 Originally the other Laconians (Periceci) formed separate 
 lochi, but this was altered in the course of the fifth century 
 B.C. During the Peloponnesian war the decline in the 
 number of Spartans made it necessary to use even Helots 
 as hopUtes in distant expeditions.^ 
 
 As the best men were placed in the front ranks, it was 
 important that those ranks should always be presented 
 to the enemy from whatever quarter he might attack. 
 The men were therefore taught to countermarch, and to 
 move in column of sections, from which they could either 
 wheel into line to a flank, or prolong the front of the 
 leading section.^ Constant practice gave them a pro- 
 ficiency in drill which served them well in emergencies, 
 such as that of Mantinea,* where bad leadership had 
 opened a gap in their line through which the enemy 
 
 1 Thucydides, v. 68. - IK, iv. SO. 
 
 ^ Riistow, i. 26, &c. ' Thucydides, v. 72. 
 
THE GREEKS 5 
 
 forced his way. At Thermopylae, we are told, " being 
 men perfectly skilled in fighting opposed to men who 
 were unsldlled, they would turn their backs to the enemy 
 and make a pretence of taking to flight." ' 
 
 On the march each man was allowed G feet, both in 
 breadth and depth, but ranks and files closed up for the 
 fight, and even locked shields. A battle was regarded 
 as a duel, and the tactics were of the simplest, a direct 
 advance and engagement along the whole line. But 
 there was always a tendency to drift to the right, each 
 man seeking protection for his unshielded side,^ and this 
 habitually led to the outflanking of the left of each army 
 by the other. 
 
 In advancing to the attack, " the Lacedremonians moved 
 slowly and to the music of many flute players," ^ in order 
 that they might keep their ranks even, and deliver their 
 blow as a whole. The battle was a festival, to be entered 
 upon in choicest clothing, with hair dressed and garlanded, 
 but there must be no disorderly eagerness for the fray. 
 After victory they did not follow fast or far in pursuit. 
 They disliked fighting on rough ground, or breaking 
 through artificial obstacles, where disorder was inevitable. 
 They were essentially line-of-battle troops. In the third 
 Messenian war they invited the Athenians to aid them 
 in taking Ithome because of their greater skill in siege 
 operations.* 
 
 War demands other things besides discipline and 
 stubborn courage. The Athenians, with their quicker 
 intelligence and more varied life, found compensations for 
 their inferiority at " push of pike." They were better 
 seamen and marines, and their naval predominance 
 brought them wealth with which to hire mercenaries, 
 
 ' Herndntiis, vii. 211. ' Thnoyilidi'?, v. 71. 
 
 ' Jb., ti'J. ' JO., i. 102. 
 
6 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 and support their fighting men. They had learnt the 
 vahie of bowmen from the Persians, whom they had 
 been the first to encounter. It seems probable that 
 Marathon, which has been ranked among the decisive 
 battles of the world, was really little more than a rear- 
 guard action. The greater part of the Persian army, 
 including the cavalry, had re-embarked, when Miltiades 
 saw his opportunity and fell upon the covering force. 
 There is nothing to show that the Athenians suffered 
 much from the Persian archery, in fact their whole 
 loss is put at less than 200 men ; but when they met 
 the same invaders again at Plataea, eleven years after- 
 wards, they were provided with bowmen procured from 
 Crete. 
 
 Either on this account, or because he thought Athenian 
 no match for BcBotian hoplites, Pausanias proposed that 
 the Athenians should face the Persians and the Lace- 
 daemonians should deal with the renegade Greeks who 
 formed the right wing of the invading army; but the 
 Boeotians frustrated this arrangement. When the Lace- 
 djemonians found themselves assailed, first by clouds of 
 mounted archers, and then by foot archers, Pausanias 
 sent an urgent message to the Athenian commanders to 
 lend him their bowmen if they could not come them- 
 selves to help him. The Athenians had their own hands 
 full, and the Lacedaamonians, charging the line of wicker 
 shields which covered the foot archers, drove the Persians 
 back to their intrenched camp ; but it was not till the 
 Athenians came up after defeating the Boeotians that 
 the camp itself was carried. 
 
 The Athenians soon had bowmen of their own, drawn 
 from the lowest class of citizens, who did not serve as 
 hoplites. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war 
 their field forces mustered 13,000 hoplites, 1200 horse- 
 
THE GREEKS 7 
 
 men, and IGOO arcliers.i They also hired Rhodian and 
 Thessalian .slingers, TEtolian and Acarnanian javelin-men, 
 and Thracian peltasts, who fought hand lo hand with 
 sword and buckler. The sea was the Athenian element, 
 and whether for naval actions, or for descents upon the 
 coast, a mixture of light and heavy armed troops was 
 essential. The aflair of Sphacteria (425 B.C.) illustrated 
 their co-operation. A body of 420 Lacedaemonians, of 
 whom less than half were Spartans, was blockaded in a 
 small island, from which they could not escape. After 
 trying in vain to starve them out, the Athenians landed 
 800 hoplites, and some thousands of light troops, to 
 make an end of them. The Lacediomonians, few as they 
 were, tried to close with the hoplites ; " but having light- 
 armed adversaries both on their flank and rear, they 
 could not get at them or profit by their own military 
 skill, for they were impeded by a shower of missiles from 
 both sides. Meanwhile the Athenians, instead of going 
 to meet them, remained in position, while the light-armed 
 again and again ran up and attacked the Lacedaemonians, 
 who drove them back where they pressed closest. But 
 though compelled to retreat, they still continued fighting, 
 being lightly equipped and easily getting the start of 
 their enemies. The ground was difficult and rough, 
 the island having been uninhabited; and the Lacedss- 
 monians, who were encumbered by their arms, could not 
 pursue them in such a place." - At length when the 
 Lacedtemonians were completely .surrounded, and one- 
 third of their number had been killed, the remainder 
 surrendered; and it says much for the Spartan prestige 
 that this should have been regarded as a serious blow 
 to it. " It was universally imagined that the Lacedte- 
 monians would never give up their arms, either under 
 
 > Thucydides, ii. 13. ■' lb., iv. 33. 
 
8 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 pressure of famine, or in any other extremity, but would 
 fight to the last, and die sword in hand." ^ 
 
 The duration of the Peloponnesian war increased the 
 demand for mercenaries, and made soldiering a profession. 
 At first only light troops, they soon began to serve also 
 as heavy infantry, especially when they were maintained 
 as a standing force by Persian satraps or other despotic 
 rulers. They were usually raised as companies of about 
 100 men. They received good pay, but had to pro- 
 vide their own arms and equipment. In the contingent 
 which accompanied the younger Cyrus to Cunaxa there 
 were 11,000 hoplites and 2000 light-armed men. During 
 the subsequent retreat of the Ten Thousand, the prolonged 
 service in the field, the variety of enemies encountered 
 and of countries traversed, suggested changes in tactical 
 formations and in individual equipment. There was 
 need of something more flexible and mobile than the 
 simple hoplite phalanx, and there was frequent occasion 
 for the combined action of the different arms. The 
 hoplites were formed into small company columns with 
 a depth of sixteen men, and with wide intervals between 
 them. The peltasts and archers were sometimes in front, 
 sometimes in the intervals.- It was also found advisable 
 to provide a reserve in some cases, by posting bodies of 
 200 men behind the wings and centre. Corps of cavalry 
 and slingers had to be improvised, for they had formed 
 no part of the Greek contingent.^ 
 
 The influence of this more varied campaigning may be 
 traced in the reforms introduced by Iphicrates. He was 
 an Athenian and a leader of mercenaries, who first saw 
 service in Thrace, perhaps under Xenophon. About 
 390 B.C. he astonished Greece by routing a Lacedisemonian 
 
 ' Thucydides, iv. 40. ^ Xenophon, Aimbasis, iv. 8, v. 4, vi. 5. 
 
 ■■> lb., iii. 3. 
 
THE GREEKS 9 
 
 battalion of 600 men near Lechanim. It was on the 
 march, unaccompanied by cavalry or light troops, when 
 he attacked it with his peltasts, supported by some 
 Athenian hoplites. The younger men of the battalion 
 were ordered out to drive the peltasts away, but the latter 
 fell back on their own hoplites, and then returned to the 
 assault with fresh volleys of javelins. Some cavalry 
 joined the Lacedemonians, but proved of little assistance, 
 as instead of pursuing boldly, it kept abreast of the foot. 
 The Lacedemonians made a stand on a hillock for a time, 
 but on the approach of the Athenian hoplites they fairly 
 took to flight, with a loss of nearly half their men and 
 lasting damage to their reputation.' 
 
 The credit which Iphicratos won by this achievement 
 was enhanced by the admirable training and discipline 
 of his men, and by many instances of his wiliness and 
 resource. He taught his soldiers to be prepared for every 
 emergency by false alarms, ambuscades, panics, and 
 feigned desertions, for war had by this time become an 
 affair of stratagems rather than a duel. He altered their 
 equipment, making it cheaper — an important point for 
 mercenaries — and lighter, so that they could carry pro- 
 visions on the march and move more rapidly on the field 
 of battle. He gave them quilted linen jerkins and leather 
 boots. The small round shield, or pelta, 2 feet in diameter, 
 worn on the left arm, left both hands free to wield the 
 spear; and this enabled him to increase the length of 
 the spear to 12 feet or more, giving advantage of reach 
 over the hoplite, and better protection against cavalry. 
 The sword was also lengthened to 3 feet ; the hoplite's 
 sword was little more than a dagger. 
 
 It has been suggested^ that the long spear and long 
 
 ' Xonojihon, Iklknka, iv. .''). 1.'?, &i;. 
 '^ Ru8tow and Kochly, p. 1(!3. 
 
lo THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 sword were not given to the same men ; that there were 
 two classes of peltasts, one armed with spears and the 
 other with javelins and swords for hand-to-hand fight- 
 ing. But there is no positive evidence of this distinction. 
 They seem to have formed a medium infantry, available 
 as light troops or as infantry of the line, and they may 
 have chosen their weapons according to the occasion. 
 
 As light troops came to play a more important 
 part, so also did cavalry. Greek horsemen had no 
 stirrups and were easily unhorsed. They could do 
 nothing against unbroken hoplites except annoy them 
 with darts. They fought in loose order and made little 
 use of shock, but tried to fall unawares upon a flank. 
 Thessaly and Bceotia with their more open valleys fur- 
 nished the best cavalry ; that of the Lacedemonians was 
 the worst. The Boeotians attached a footman to each 
 horseman, and the intermixture of horse and foot by 
 placing small parties of light-armed men in the intervals 
 between the troops was a recognised practice. The strength 
 of a troop was about sixty men. The best weapons for 
 horsemen, according to Xenophon, were a short stabbing 
 sword and a pair of cornel-wood spears, one of which 
 might be hurled as a javelin. 
 
 However serviceable the new type of infantry might be 
 for minor warfare, the Laceda3monian hoplite retained his 
 supremacy in pitched battles in the open field. Even to 
 repulse him was reckoned a great achievement. The 
 Athenians put up a statue to Chabrias to celebrate such a 
 success. In 378 b.c. their troops in concert with the 
 Thebans awaited the attack of the Lacedasmonian phalanx. 
 The front ranks dropped on the right knee and propped 
 their shields against the left, and such a hedge of spear- 
 points was presented by the long spears that Agesilaus 
 thought it prudent to draw off his men. But seven years 
 
THE GREEKS ii 
 
 afterwards, at Leuctra, Thebes won a very difterent sort of 
 victory, and robbed the Spartans of their pro-eminence. 
 
 A well-fed race, with rich pastures and no commerce, the 
 Bceotians had always shown themselves strong and stub- 
 born soldiers.' Three hundred of them had turned the 
 scale at Syracuse. Thebans were Boeotians and something 
 more. They were " a conquering caste in an alien land," 
 with an infusion of Phoenician, or at all events non- 
 Hellenic blood. The military organisation of Sparta is 
 said to have owed much to Timomachus, who came from 
 Thebes, and claimed descent from Cadmus. There was 
 perhaps some far-off kinship between Hannibal and 
 Epaminondas. 
 
 It was a Theban custom, of which the origin is un- 
 explained, to fight in deep formation. At Delium (424 
 B.C.) their phalanx was formed in twenty-five ranks, and 
 this massive column broke through the Athenian left, 
 while the Athenian right got the better of the other 
 Boeotians. The timely appearance of some cavalry, which 
 the Theban commander had sent round a hill unperceived 
 to support the left wing, decided the day. At Corinth 
 and at Coronea (394 B.C.) the Thebans had to deal with 
 the Lacedaemonians. Placed on the right of the army, 
 in each case they defeated the allies of Sparta, but were 
 themselves defeated by the Lacedicmonians, who had been 
 equally successful on the other wing, and whose discipline 
 enabled them to wheel promptly and attack their 
 enemies in succession. At Coronea the Thebans, aban- 
 doned by their allies and hard pressed by Agesilaus, 
 succeeded in cutting their way through, though with 
 heavy loss. 
 
 After the recovery of the Cadmea the Sacred Band 
 was formed, a military brotherhood of 300 chosen 
 
 ' Thucydidcp, vii. 43. 
 
12 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 Thebans, quartered there and maintained at the public 
 expense, that they might devote themselves to military 
 exercises. In 375 B.C. Pelopidas at the head of this band 
 encountered two Lacedaemonian battalions, as he was 
 marching along the shore of the Copais Lake. Forming 
 his men in column, he boldly charged them, though they 
 were three times his own number, and not content with 
 breaking through, he completely routed them. 
 
 Epaminondas, then, had troops on whom he could rely, 
 and who were accustomed to fight in deep formation, 
 when he persuaded his colleagues to risk a pitched battle 
 in the open field near Leuctra (371 B.C.) He had only 
 6000 hoplites, Cleombrotus had 10,000, but only 4000 
 were Lacedaemonians. Of these, the Spartans, who had 
 been one-half at Platijea, were now little more than one- 
 sixth. But if the Theban column was no novelty, Epami- 
 nondas used it in a way that was new. Hitherto battle after 
 battle had followed the same course : each side successful 
 on the right wing, each side defeated on the left. In the 
 final collision between the two victorious wings the better 
 discipline of the Lacediemonians had always prevailed. 
 To obtain something more than a local and temporary 
 success, Epaminondas determined to direct his column, 
 while it was fresh and in good order, against the best 
 troops of the enemy. These were always on the right, or 
 near it, and were in this case drawn up twelve deep.^ So 
 he placed the Theban column on the left of his line, and 
 he gave it a depth of fifty ranks. But this massing of 
 troops on the left weakened the centre and right, especi- 
 ally as he was largely outnumbered. To postpone collision 
 with the enemy on that side, he adopted an echelon 
 formation, an " oblique phalanx," introducing for the 
 first time the distinction of an offensive and a defensive 
 
 1 Hdlcnica, vi. 4, 12. 
 
THE GREEKS 13 
 
 wing. Vegetins compares this order of battle to a 
 builder's level, or in other words to a right-angled 
 triangle of which one side would be in the original 
 alignment.' 
 
 Such dispositions would be of no avail unless they took 
 the enemy by surprise. Accordingly Epaminondas began 
 the battle by a cavalry engagement, not as usual upon 
 the wings, but in the space between the two armies. The 
 Lacedemonian cavalry, according to Xenophon, had never 
 been in wor.se condition. They were soon driven in upon 
 the infantry of the centre, causing some confusion ; and 
 before the mischief was repaired the Theban column was 
 at hand. It struck, not upon the extreme right of the 
 enemy, but upon the junction of right and centre, that is 
 to say, the left of the Lacedaemonian corps. 
 
 This necessarily exposed the column to attack on its 
 outer flank while checked in front, as the Imperial Guard 
 was attacked by the Fifty-Second at Waterloo. The 
 Spartan king, Cleombrotus, attempted such a movement, 
 but Epaminondas had provided against it by detaching 
 the Sacred Band under Pelopidas. These picked troops 
 fell upon the Lacedaemonians while they were wheeling, 
 and the Theban column, pressing on unhindered, broke 
 through and separated them from their allies, who were 
 ready enough to leave the field. One-fourth of the 
 Laced;emonians and more than half of the Spartans fell. 
 
 The victory gave the Thebans a primacy which lasted 
 only up to the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea 
 (•"362 B.C.). In that battle nearly all the Greek peoples 
 had a share. Athenians and Lacedaemonians fought side 
 by side, but the Thebans with their allies outnumbered 
 them. Epaminondas' tactics were in the main the same 
 as at Leuctra, but this time he surprised the enemy by 
 
 ' Vegetius, iii. 20, 
 
14 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 leading them to believe that he had no intention of 
 fighting that day. Under cover of a hill he drew files 
 from his wings and moved them to the front to form 
 his "ram." Then he led his army forward, using his 
 cavalry and light troops to occupy the attention of the 
 Athenians who were on the left, and prevent their send- 
 ing assistance to the Lacedemonians on the right. He 
 reserved a body of horse and foot intermixed to cover 
 the left flanks of his column. 
 
 The charge of that column is likened by Xenophon to 
 the impact of a trireme end-on.^ Where it struck the 
 enemy's line it shattered it, as at Leuctra, and their 
 whole army took to flight. But Epaminondas' death 
 in the moment of victory paralysed his troops, and the 
 battle was practically a drawn one. It is doubtful 
 whether Xenophon's metaphor is to be taken to imply 
 that the head of the column was wedge-shaped, like the 
 beak of a ship. We know that later, among the Romans, 
 there was a formation known as cuneus or caput 
 porcinum which was really wedge-shaped,^ although the 
 word cuneus was also constantly used for troops in mass 
 irrespective of shape. " Column " in its military sense is 
 a modern term, but it seems safe to say that it was a 
 column rather than a wedge that won the victories of 
 Leuctra and Mantinea. 
 
 Philip of Macedon spent some years in Thebes while 
 Epaminondas lived, and afterwards turned to account 
 not only the lesson of those victories, but the im- 
 provements in the military art which more than half 
 a century of war had developed in Greece. The Mace- 
 donian tribes, when they had been welded into a nation, 
 
 1 HcUcnka, vii. 5, 23. 
 
 - e.rj. JSMa.n, cap. 47. Something of the kind was observed among the 
 Arabs in their attack upon the British square at Abuklea. See Wilson, 
 
 From Korti to Khartum, p. 27, 
 
THE grp:eks is 
 
 furnished him an abundance of hardy and docile recruits, 
 as Russia did to Peter the Great. His wars with his 
 immediate neighbours gave his troops field training, 
 enlarged his territories and his recruiting ground, and 
 enriched him with gold and silver mines. His wealth 
 enabled him to maintain a standing force. The world 
 was familiar with armies that were national but not stand- 
 ing, such as the Greek burgher levies, and with armies that 
 were standing but not national, such as the mercenaries 
 in Persian or Carthaginian service ; but a national stand- 
 ing army, a professional army with a national spirit, was 
 something new.^ 
 
 His standing force of infantry, known as Jlypa^ists, 
 corresponded to the medium infantry of Iphicrates, but 
 had short spears which allowed of greater activity. They 
 numbered perhaps 6000 men (six battalions) in time of 
 war. For "shot," to use the old expression, he had 
 Macedonian bowmen and Thracian javelin-men. His 
 heavy uafantry of the line was furnished by a general 
 levy of freemen not of noble birth, organised in six 
 territorial brigades of 3000 to 4000 men. It was a 
 provincial militia called out for war and bound to serve 
 for a fixed time. This was the famous Macedonian 
 phalanx. The normal depth of formation was sixteen 
 ranks, and the units were the file of sixteen men, the 
 section of four files, the company of sixteen files, and 
 the battalion (ehiliarchia) of sixty-four files. If the 
 numbers fell short, the depth was reduced to perhaps 
 twelve men in a file. 
 
 The Macedonian hoplite wore a leather jacket with 
 metal plates, light greaves, and a round hat. He had a 
 short sword and a small shield, but a very long spear 
 {sariaaa). According to Polybius, the length was 14 
 
 1 Hocrarth, p. .<;]. 
 
1 6 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 cubits (21 feet), of which 10 cubits were to the front 
 and 4 to the rear of the hoplite when the spear was 
 levelled.! Hence five rows of spear-points would show 
 beyond the front of the phalanx. The eleven hinder 
 ranks held their sarissse inclined upwards over the 
 shoulders of the men in front of them, to intercept 
 missiles. They added weight to the charge, and made 
 it impossible for the front ranks to face about. 
 
 The cavalry was of two kinds, heavy and light. The 
 former was recruited from the Macedonian nobility, and 
 seems to have formed fifteen territorial squadrons of 
 about 200 men, in addition to the royal squadron or 
 horseguards, made up of youths who had served as 
 pages at court. The sarissophori or lancers, perhaps 
 1000 strong, were armed with a light sarissa longer 
 than the spear of the heavy cavalry. 
 
 The battle of Chreronea (3.38 B.C.) crowned the work of 
 twenty years by which Philip had been gradually securing 
 for himself the headship of Greece. His task was made 
 easier by the decline of Sparta, the jealousies of the lead- 
 ing states, and the growing distaste of the Athenians for 
 personal military service. At Chseronea he had only to 
 deal with Theban and Athenian troops. We know little 
 of the details of the battle. The numbers on each side 
 were about equal — over 30,000 men — and the fighting was 
 prolonged;^ but it is said that Philip purposely delayed 
 the issue, as he knew that his troops had more staying 
 power than the impetuous Athenians. It was on the left, 
 
 1 Polybius, xviii. 29, 30. He sa3's that originally the length was 16 
 cubits. So also ^lian (cap. xiv.) and Polya;nus (II. xxix. 2). It has 
 been urged by Riistow and Kochly (p. 238) that such spears would be 
 quite unmanageable, and that we should read feet for cubits ; but there 
 are said to be lances of German landesknechts which have shafts 24 feet 
 long (Demmin, Ams and Armour, p. 416). 
 
 = Frontiuus, II. i. 9. 
 
THE GREEKS 17 
 
 where Alexander commanded against the Thcbans, that 
 victory first declared itself, and the vigorous use of the 
 cavalry in pursuit marked a new departure in Greek 
 warfare. The Theban Sacred Band was cut to pieces. 
 
 Some years before, Demosthenes had told the Athenians 
 that Phihp made war in a diiferent manner from their 
 old enemies ; he was regardle.ss of seasons, and he fought 
 with light troops. Probably he referred to the Hypas- 
 pists among others. " It is altogether a mistake to say, 
 as is so often done, that the phalanx formed the kernel of 
 the Macedonian army. It was the bulk of the army, but 
 not its kernel." 1 It was the piece de risistance. Alex- 
 ander, when he invaded Asia, followed the example of 
 Epaminondas, dividing his army into an offensive and a 
 defensive wing, and making his advance in echelon. 
 But the two wings, instead of differing in depth, differed 
 in composition. The offensive wing consisted of light 
 infantry (chiefly Thracian), the Hypaspists, and the Mace- 
 donian cavalry, supported by some brigades of the phalanx. 
 The greater part of the phalanx formed the defensive wing, 
 which was covered on its outer flank by Thessalian and 
 other Greek cavalry. He had 5000 horse to 30,000 foot. 
 
 Alexander had to do with an enemy vastly superior in 
 numbers, but inferior in quality and in manoeuvring 
 powers. This determined him to deliver his attack on 
 one wing, that he might not be enveloped. Alike at the 
 Granicus, at Issus, and at Arbela, he struck with his right. 
 At Issus the supporting brigades of the phalanx had a 
 severe struggle with the Greek mercenaries in Persian 
 pay until the Hypaspists and cavalry, having routed the 
 Persian left, took the mercenaries in flank. At Arbela the 
 defensive wing was so hardly pressed by Indian and 
 Persian cavalry that Parmenio had to send to Alexander 
 
 • Riistow and Kiichlv, p. 2Ciii. 
 
1 8 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 for help. In the battle on the Hydaspes against Porus 
 the left of the enemy was again selected for attack; 
 Hypaspists and light troops seem to have been the only 
 infantry engaged. When Alexander reorganised his army 
 after his return from India, he proposed to use Orientals 
 for the phalanx to the extent of three-fourths. Only the 
 three leading men and the last man of each file were to be 
 Macedonians; the rest were armed with bows and javelins. 
 
 In the wars of Alexander's successors armies were more 
 alike in numbers and quality, and mobility lost some of 
 its importance. But the increasing use of elephants went 
 along with a deterioration of infantry. Posted at inter- 
 vals of 50 yards or so along the whole front of each army 
 with shot between them, they made any general advance 
 and engagement of the foot difficult. Practically the 
 fighting was done by the cavalry on the wings, and the 
 infantry of the line only served to fill the space between 
 them. What had hitherto been the best elements of the 
 infantry were attracted to the cavalry, and their places 
 were taken by mercenaries or subject races. 
 
 In Europe this was not the case to the same extent as 
 in Asia. Value continued to be attached in Greece to 
 heavy infantry, but it was concentrated upon the phalanx. 
 " What had formed in the time of Philip and Alexander 
 merely a solid base for the free activity of the other kinds 
 of foot, now came to be regarded as the instrument for 
 deciding the issue, and obtaining the victory." i Men tried 
 in vain to make it flexible and mobile without forfeiting 
 its own special characteristic, impenetrability. The im- 
 possibility of this was shown at Cynos-cephaLe (197 B.C.) 
 and Pydna (168 B.C.) when the Macedonian phalanx was 
 worsted by the Roman legions ; but these actions may be 
 better dealt with as incidents of Roman history. 
 
 ' Riistow, i. 22. 
 
II 
 
 THE ROMANS 
 
 One result of the battle of Pydna was that a number 
 of leading members of the Achaean league were exiled 
 to Italy, on a charge of hostility to Rome. Among these 
 was Polybius, to whom we owe the best account of the 
 Roman army. He was tutor of the younger Scipio 
 Africanus, and was afterwards with him at the destruction 
 of Carthage. He set himself to write the history of the 
 half-century in the course of which '• almost the Avhole 
 inhabited world " had been brought under the dominion 
 of Rome, and he talked with men who had fought against 
 Hannibal. 
 
 When Polybius describes the army which conquered 
 Carthage and Greece we are on firm ground. How it 
 came to be what it was is a more obscure matter, but 
 one which cannot be altogether passed over. There is a 
 significant contrast between Athenian and Roman names, 
 between Themistocles or Pericles and C. Julius Csesar 
 or M. TuUius Cicero. At Athens personality was de- 
 veloped ; at Rome the individual was one of a clan and 
 existed for the State. The son was bound to reverence 
 the father, the citizen to reverence the ruler, and all 
 to reverence the gods. Religion was of a practical kind, 
 an affair of ritual, the due discharge of which would bring 
 its reward to the community. It supplemented police 
 regulations, and powerfully reinforced the claims of the 
 State on the individual. 
 
20 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 These features were not peculiar to Rome : they were 
 common to the Latin peoples of Central Italy. But Rome 
 enjoyed special advantages which helped to give her 
 predominance. Planted on hills on the northern border 
 of Latium and on the banks of the Tiber, she became 
 both a frontier fortress and a centre for trade. The 
 unhealthiness of the Campagna may have tended also 
 to increase her population, by drawing to the city 
 farmers who would otherwise have lived on their land.i 
 Owing to some such causes Rome grew, and the Romans 
 got the better of neighbours of the same sturdy stock 
 as themselves. But to maintain and extend their 
 authority all their energies had to be bent towards 
 military efficiency. Only on one point did they sacrifice 
 it: they changed their commanders frequently, and 
 substituted untried for tried men, lest the too successful 
 leader should become a danger to the State. Their native 
 sense of law and order gave stability to their institutions, 
 and laid a firm foundation for their future empire, a 
 foundation which grew broader with each successive 
 conquest. 
 
 A normal Latin township was reckoned to consist of ten 
 wards {curim), each^comprising ten families (gentes) or one 
 hundred households. Each household had to furnish 
 one foot soldier (miles, one of a thousand), and each 
 family one horseman (eques). But in the earliest days 
 the three tribes of Rome yielded a levy (legio) of three 
 times that strength, 3000 foot and 300 horse.- Before long 
 the one legion was increased to four. The reforms which 
 bear the name of Servius extended the duty of military 
 service, and its privileges, from the original burgher 
 families to later comers. A property classification was 
 introduced : the first three classes formed the heavy 
 
 1 Mommsen, vol. i. p. 49. - lb., p. 72. 
 
THE ROMANS 21 
 
 infantry, but only the first class was bound to be fully 
 equipped with arras and armour. It furnished the front 
 ranks of the legions, which were drawn up for battle 
 six deep in continuous line, like the Greek phalanx. 
 The fourth and fifth classes served as light troops 
 (rorarii), armed with slings and darts. Men were liable 
 to military service from seventeen to sixty years of ago, 
 but the seniors (those over forty-six) were reserved as 
 a rule for garrison duty. The liability of the juniors was 
 discharged by sixteen campaigns on foot or ten on horse- 
 back. The cavalry, which was held in high estimation, 
 was increased to 1800, or 15 per cent, of the heavy 
 infantry. The poorest class (proletarii) was exempt 
 from taxation, and from military service, except in 
 great emergencies, when they were equipped at the cost 
 of the State. Carpenters, smiths, and musicians were 
 attached to the legions, and also a certain number of 
 light-armed substitutes to take the place of disabled 
 legionaries. 
 
 It is supposed to have been during the Samnite wars 
 that the Romans made a fundamental change in their 
 tactical formation. The extended line was ill adapted 
 to mountain warfare. The disaster of the Caudine forks 
 (321 B.C.) was the result of an attempt to march a Roman 
 army through the Southern Apennines into Apulia. It 
 found itself caught in a trap, with defiles which it could 
 not force before and behind it. Whether as a result of 
 this disaster or not, continuous lines were given up, and 
 the legion was subdivided into thirty maniples which 
 were placed chequerwise in three lines (luistati, principes, 
 triarii) so that the maniples of the second line were op- 
 posite intervals in the first line. It was a handy flexible 
 formation which adapted itself readily to broken ground, 
 and aftordud strong reserves. It was in fact something 
 
22 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 like that which Xenophon's Greeks had to improvise in 
 forcing their way through the mountains of Kurdistan. 
 
 The maniples of the first two lines were normally 120 
 strong, those of the third line 60. The men seem to have 
 been drawn up six deep, as before ; but after a time light 
 troops, better armed and organised than before, and re- 
 named velitcs, were incorporated in the maniples, and 
 formed a seventh and eighth rank when not detached. 
 They numbered 1200.^ 
 
 The triarii were the oldest soldiers. They were some- 
 times called pilani, and the others antepilani, and these 
 names seem to be survivals from the earlier phalanx for- 
 mation, when the front ranks had spears and the men 
 behind threw javelins. The best men, the principes, 
 would then form the two front ranks.^ But when the 
 manipular organisation was introduced the youngest men 
 were sent to the front, and while they retained the name 
 hastati they were armed with the pilum. The principes 
 became the supporting line, and were similarly armed. 
 The veterans now became a reserve, and exchanged the 
 pilum for the spear. 
 
 The primary weapon of the Roman soldier was the 
 sword. Polybius says that the Romans surpassed all 
 other people in their readuiess to adopt foreign fashions 
 when they were better than their own ; they had borrowed 
 their sword from Spain. It was a straight, two-edged 
 weapon, 2 feet or less in length. It had a very sharp 
 point, and was used for thrusting rather than cutting. It 
 hung on the right side, and there was a dagger on the 
 left. The shield, said to have been borrowed from the 
 Samnites, was rectangular, 4 feet long and 2^ feet wide, 
 curved in its width. It was of wood, covered with canvas 
 and hide, bound and bossed with iron. 
 
 I Marquardt, p. 40, &c. " lb., p. 13. 
 
THE ROMANS 23 
 
 The pilum, a javelin nearly 7 feet long, was given to 
 the men of the two front lines to enable them to close 
 with adversaries armed with long spears, especially the 
 Macedonian sarissa. According to Polybius,^ each man 
 had two, a heavy pilum with a shaft 3 inches thick, 
 and a lighter one like an ordinary hunting-spear. The 
 latter became afterwards the only pattern.- The head 
 was barbed, and various methods were adopted to secure 
 it to the shaft, and to prevent the enemy from throwing 
 the javelin back, or disengaging it from his shield. Thrown 
 by hand at 30 paces, it would go through an inch of fir 
 or half an inch of oak. By the use of a leather thong 
 {amentum) the range could be doubled. 
 
 The legionaries had brass helmets, with lofty plumes to 
 add to their height and "strike terror into the enemy," 
 leather corslets with iron rings forming a sort of chain 
 mail, or in default of these, metal breast-pieces, 9 inches 
 square, and greaves or leggings. The light troops had 
 round bucklers and leather head-pieces. They were 
 armed with a sword and several darts, which were about 
 half the length of the pilum. From the time of the long 
 siege of Veil (406 B.C.) it had become the practice to give 
 pay for military service, and this made it possible to exact 
 something like uniformity of equipment. The horse 
 soldier received three times as much as the foot soldier.^ 
 
 To allow the foot soldier to use his weapons freely 
 6 feet of front was given to each file ; so that a maniple 
 occupied 40 yards, and a legion half a mile, of front. Two 
 legions with a corresponding force of allies made up a 
 consular army. The two Roman legions formed the centre 
 of the line, and the allies the wings. In cavalry the pro- 
 portions were unequal. There were 300 horse to each 
 Roman legion, and 600 to each legion of the allies ; in 
 
 ' Book vi. 22. ' Marquardt, p. 31. ^ Polybius, vi. .^9. 
 
24 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 addition to which the allies also furnished extr aor dinar ii, 
 picked troops (both horse and foot) for special use. The 
 strength of a consular army, therefore, was nearly 19,000 
 foot and 2400 horse. 
 
 Six military tribunes were appointed for each legion. 
 They superintended the enrolment of it, and commanded 
 it in turn. The men of the legion then elected sixty 
 centurions, two for each maniple, and the centurions chose 
 lieutenants to assist them. The latter were posted on the 
 right and left of the rear rank, the centurions on the right 
 and left of the front rank. 
 
 The Romans had an uniform pattern of camp which 
 Polybius describes. He remarks that the Greeks disliked 
 the toil of digging, and thought no defences so good as 
 those afforded by nature ; so they took pains to choose a 
 site of great natural strength, and varied the arrangements 
 of their camp to suit it. But the Romans preferred to 
 expend great labour in intrenching that they might secure 
 a plan of encampment which should be convenient and 
 familiar to all.^ 
 
 In 280 B.C. Pyrrhus came to Italy, invited by the 
 Tarentines to help them against Rome, and the first 
 collision between Greeks and Romans took place at 
 Heraclea. It was ten yeai's after the close of the last 
 Samnite war, and in the interval the Romans had been 
 fighting successfully against Etruscans and Cisalpine 
 Gauls, so that " they came to the contest like trained 
 and experienced gladiators." ^ The battle was an obstinate 
 one, and Pyrrhus owed his victory to his elephants, who 
 scared the Roman horses and drove them back in con- 
 fusion upon their foot. 
 
 Next year he won a second victory at Asculum. The 
 battle was again fought in an open plain, well suited to 
 1 Polybius, vi. 42. « lb., ii. 20. 
 
THE ROMANS 25 
 
 his phalanx and his elephants. The laltcr it was his 
 custom to keep in reserve, to decide the action. He had 
 intermixed bands of Italians (probably Samnites) with 
 the divisions of his phalanx, that he might be able to 
 fight the Romans in their own fashion.* In this case, 
 however, the phalanx vindicated itself. The Romans 
 tried in vain to open gaps in the serried lines of pikes, 
 hacking at them with their swords, or seizing them with 
 their hands. At length they gave way, and the elephants 
 coming up put them to the rout. It has been conjectured 
 that it was this experience which led to the adoption of 
 the pilum by the hastati and principes. 
 
 Little came of this victory. It cost Pyrrhus many men 
 whom he could not easily replace, while fresh legions were 
 always forthcoming. He took his troops away to Sicily, 
 and it was not till four years afterwards (275 B.C.) that he 
 again tried conclusions with the Romans. At Beneventum 
 the elephants proved, as they were apt to do, a broken 
 reed. At first they drove the Romans back to their camp 
 on one wing, but, wounded by missiles, they turned round 
 and broke through the phalanx, opening a way for the 
 legionaries, who won a complete victory. Pyrrhus re- 
 treated to Tarentum, and went back to Epirus. 
 
 The further trials of strength between the Greek and 
 Roman infantry took place in Greece three-quarters of 
 a century afterwards. Meanwhile Rome, mistress of 
 Italy, had to deal with her most formidable antagonist, 
 Carthage. Drawn together for a time by common danger 
 from Pyrrhus, the two States soon quarrelled after his 
 departure. " How fair a battlefield we are loavino- for the 
 Romans and Carthaginians," he said, as he left Italy. 
 WeU matched in strength, the two powers were quite 
 unlike, as unhke as the Swiss to the Venetians. Car- 
 
 ' Polj'biiis, xviii. 28. 
 
26 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 thage had a population of nearly three-quarters of a 
 million, and could furnish at need a citizen militia of 
 40,000 men. But the citizens, essentially traders, had 
 no taste for war. They furnished officers, but the rank 
 and file was made up of subject races or mercenaries. 
 "There were in the army Iberians and Celts, men from 
 Liguria and the Balearic Islands, and a considerable 
 number of half-bred Greeks, mostly deserters and slaves ; 
 while the main body consisted of Libyans." ^ Carthage 
 carried on war as a trade, and from her conquests she 
 drew recruits for her army, as well as tribute and products 
 for trade. But Polybius points out how wide is the dis- 
 tinction "between the character of troops composed of 
 a confused mass of uncivilised tribes, and of those which 
 have had the benefit of education, the habits of social 
 life, and the restraints of law."^ This is said with im- 
 mediate reference to a mutiny which broke out among 
 the Carthaginian mercenaries after the close of the first 
 Punic war, and which developed into a ferocious mer- 
 cenary war lasting more than three years ; but it has a 
 wider bearing. 
 
 The first Punic war was fought for the mastery of 
 Sicily, and ended in favour of the Romans owing to 
 the astonishing energy and success with which they 
 created a navy, and defeated Carthage on her own 
 element. " The two nations engaged were like well-bred 
 game-cocks that fight to their last gasp," ^ and the peace 
 made after twenty-three years of war was little more 
 than a truce to recover breath. On land Rome met 
 with one disaster, the destruction of the army of Regulus 
 near Tunis (255 B.C.). He had 15,000 foot but only 
 500 horse, while the Carthaginians mustered 12,000 foot 
 and 4000 horse, with 100 elephants. They had given 
 1 Polybius, i. 67. '^ lb., i.^ii. C/. vi. 52. ' Jb., i.5H. 
 
THE ROMANS 27 
 
 the command to a Lacedaemonian, Xanthippus, who 
 t'oniicd a line of elephants in front of the heavy infantry, 
 and placed the cavalry and light infantry on the wings. 
 Instead of the usual chequerwise order of the legion, 
 Regulus drew up his maniples in deep columns ynih 
 lanes between them through which the elephants might 
 pass. This so far proved successful that, though many 
 men were trampled down, the columns forced their 
 way through the line of elephants, and reached the 
 Carthaginian phalanx. But there they were checked, 
 and the hinder ranks had to face about to engage the 
 Carthaginian cavalry, which had easily routed the Roman 
 horse and fell on the rear of the legions. Only about 
 2000 men escaped, and for some years afterwards the 
 Romans took care not to tight battles in the open field 
 where they would have to face an elephant charge." 
 
 Carthage found in Spain compensation for the loss of 
 Sicily, and it was from Spain that Hannibal set out in 
 218 li.c. to invade Italy. He passed the Pyrenees with 
 50,000 foot, 9000 horse, and 37 elephants. The infantry 
 was three-tifths Libyan and two-fifths Spanish, and the 
 cavalry mainly Numidian. This army had shrunk to 
 20,000 foot and 6000 horse when it reached the valley 
 of the Po;- but he was joined there by some Cis- 
 alpine Gauls, and he had also some light-armed troops, 
 Ligurians and Balearic slingers. Altogether he had 38,000 
 men, of whom one-fourth were mounted, when he en- 
 countered a Roman army of about equal strength, but 
 much weaker in cavalry, on the Trebia. 
 
 Hannibal was a master of stratagem. By the time the 
 
 battle began the Romans were chilled by fording the 
 
 river and faint for want of food, and they had used up 
 
 many of their javelins in skirmishing with the Numidian 
 
 ' Polybius, i. 39. 2 Jb., iii. 35, 56 
 
28 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 horse. His own heavy infantry was fresh and well fed. 
 His cavalry on the wings soon routed the Roman cavalry, 
 and fell upon the flanks of their infantry. His light 
 troops and elephants joined in these flank attacks, and 
 an attack was also made on the Roman rear by a force 
 of 1000 horse and 1000 foot which had been placed in 
 ambush. But in spite of all these adverse circumstances 
 the legionaries were so much the better men that 10,000 
 of them cut their way through the middle of the Cartha- 
 ginian army, and finding it impossible to regain their 
 own camp, marched in close order to Placentia. 
 
 In the following year (217 B.C.) Hannibal surprised a 
 Roman army in the defile of Trasimene. It found itself 
 blocked in front and rear, as in the Caudine valley a 
 century before. Here again 6000 men succeeded in 
 breaking through the troops enveloping them, though 
 they were overtaken and forced to surrender next day. 
 The Libyan infantry was rearmed in the Roman manner 
 from the spoils of this battle. 
 
 The moral effect of these victories and confidence in 
 his own skill made Hannibal gladly accept battle against 
 odds of nearly two to one. At Cannae (216 B.C.) he had 
 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. The two consuls 
 opposed to him had eight Roman legions with their quota 
 of allies, numbering 80,000 foot and 6000 horse ; but the 
 heavy losses of the two previous years must have told 
 severely on their quality. Each consul commanded in 
 chief on alternate days, ^milius Paullus, a tried soldier, 
 was resolved to avoid battle in the open plain on account 
 of the enemy's superiority in horse ; but Terentius Varro, 
 who was rash and inexperienced, thought otherwise, and 
 played into Hannibal's hands. He left 10,000 men in a 
 camp on the left bank of the Aufidus, took the rest of 
 the army across, and drew it up facing south with its 
 
THE ROMANS 29 
 
 right resting on the river. Hannibal followed suit, and 
 drew up his army opposite, with Cannto to his loft roar.i 
 The Numidian cavalry was on the Carthaginian right, the 
 Spanish and Gallic cavalry on the left. Of the infantry, the 
 Gauls and Spaniards were intermixed in the centre, and 
 the Libyans were to right and left of them. He pushed 
 forward his centre and made his line of battle convex, 
 in order that the Gauls and Spaniards might be first 
 engaged, and the African troops be held in reserve. The 
 Gauls were armed with a broad sword, and used the 
 edge only, not the point. Open order was necessary for 
 them to wield their weapon, and their line was long and 
 thin. The Roman order on the contrary was very deep. 
 The maniples were closer together than usual, and the 
 depth of each maniple was several times greater than 
 its front." This was probably due to want of space for 
 their large numbers. It seems to imply that their front- 
 age was not more than one-fourth of what was customary, 
 so that the whole of their infantry would not occupy 
 more than two miles. 
 
 While the cavalry were engaged with one another on 
 the wings, there was a skirmish of light-armed troops 
 in the centre. When these fell back, the Roman line 
 began to press upon the convex front of the Gauls and 
 Spaniards. It yielded and gradually became concave ; 
 the maniples of the Roman centre pushed onward, and 
 those of the wings drew towards the centre, where the 
 stress of the battle lay. It seemed as though the Cartha- 
 ginian army would be cut in two, as at the Trebia. But 
 the Libyans on the wings were now faced left and right, 
 
 ' On this vexed question I have adopted the view taken by Mr. Strachan- 
 Davidson in his Selections from Polyhius, which is supported by Sir 
 Edward Fry (English Bittorical Review, October 1897). 
 
 * Polyhius, iii. 113. 
 
30 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 and wound inwards and rearwards as the Gauls and 
 Spaniards fell back,^ until as pincers they had fairly 
 enclosed the Roman wedge, when they fell with fury 
 upon its flanks. 
 
 By this time the Carthaginian cavalry on the left wing 
 had routed the Roman cavalry opposed to it, had joined 
 the Numidians on the right, and defeated the allied 
 cavalry. Leaving the Numidians to pursue, it had then 
 fallen upon the rear of the legions. Surrounded on all 
 sides, the Romans seem to have lost hope. They made 
 no vigorous effort to break through, but were pressed 
 together and gradually cut down. Five-sixths of their 
 whole army perished, while the Carthaginian loss was 
 under 6000. Polybius regards the battle as "a lesson to 
 posterity that in actual war it is better to have half the 
 number of infantry, and the superiority in cavalry, than 
 to engage your enemy with an equality in both," but he 
 recognises elsewhere that it was to the skill and genius of 
 Hannibal that the Romans owed their defeats.- 
 
 The Carthaginians would have crucified Varro ; the 
 Romans thanked him for not despairing of the Republic ; 
 but they took more care in future to secure competent 
 commanders. Their demeanour after so crushing a blow 
 explains better than anything else how they came to 
 conquer the world. Napoleon has endorsed the often 
 expressed opinion that if Hannibal had marched on Rome 
 after Cannse it would have fallen into his hands. On the 
 other hand, Polybius makes the general reflection that he 
 should have reserved his attack upon the Romans until he 
 had first subdued other parts of the world.* The two criti- 
 
 ' " Paulatim invicem sinuantibus procedentibusque ad prjeceptum 
 cornibus, avide insequentem hostem in mediam aciem suam recepit." — 
 Frontinus, II. iii. 7. 
 
 2 Polybius, iii. 117, xviii. 28. ^ lb., xi. 19. 
 
THE ROMANS 31 
 
 cisms may be said to cancel one another. So solidly 
 based a power was not to be overturned at a stroke. It 
 could only be crushed by a well-compacted coalition of 
 the various peoples which it had subdued one by one. 
 For such a coaUtion Hannibal's small army offered a 
 nucleus. Yet in spite of his brilliant victories, attach- 
 ment to Rome, or fear of her, prevented any such general 
 adhesion as he hoped for. Capua joined him, but on 
 condition that its citizens should not have to fight for 
 him. Other cities closed their gates, and he had not the 
 means for successful sieges. Carthage, which might have 
 furnished them, sent him mere driblets, and as his army 
 wasted away, it had to be recruited from the men ot 
 Southern Italy. 
 
 Polybius was filled with admiration of the skill which 
 enabled Hannibal to maintain himself for sixteen years 
 in Italy, with an army of many races which never showed 
 disaffection, but obeyed him alike in good and bad fortune, 
 and was never beaten in any important action. But he 
 was equally struck with the energy of the Romans, who 
 while they were threatened by their great enemy, carried 
 the war into Spain and Sicily, and finally into Africa. It 
 was to their mixed constitution that he attributed the 
 high spirit and unity of purpose which carried them in 
 this and other cases through disaster to empire : the 
 partition of power between consuls, senate, and people.^ 
 
 In 202 B.C. Hannibal was recalled to Africa to defend 
 Carthage, and met with his first defeat at Zama. The 
 Romans had been careful since Canna; to avoid pitched 
 battles in the open field. Hannibal seems to have had 
 slightly the advantage in numbers, and the difference in 
 quality must have been very marked that led Scipio to 
 refuse the terms he offered. The Romans had secured 
 
 ' Polybius, xi. 19, viii. 3, vi. 18. 
 
32 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 Massinissa and his Numidian horsemen as alUes, and in 
 cavalry Hannibal was outnumbered by two to one. As 
 usual, the weaker cavalry were soon driven off the field, 
 and the conquerors, after pursuing them for some distance, 
 fell upon the rear of the infantry. That infantry was 
 of three kinds. In first line Hannibal placed 12,000 
 mercenaries, in second line Libyans and Carthaginians, 
 and behind them again the veterans whom he had 
 brought with him from Italy. In front of all was a line 
 of more than 80 elephants. 
 
 To encounter the elephants, Scipio did as Regulus had 
 done ; he placed the principes behind the hastati, and 
 the triarii behind the principes, leaving lanes (tem- 
 porarily occupied by velites) for the elephants to pass 
 through. He also left wide spaces between the lines of 
 maniples. The elephants charged without much effect, 
 and did as much harm to their own side as to the enemy. 
 When they were gone the infantry of the two armies 
 closed. "As the combatants used their swords and not 
 their spears, the superiority was at first on the side of the 
 dexterity and daring of the mercenaries, which enabled 
 them to wound a considerable number of the Romans. 
 The latter, however, trusting to the steadiness of their 
 ranks and the excellence of their arms, still kept gaining 
 ground, their rear ranks keepmg close up with them and 
 encouraging them to advance; while the Carthaginians 
 did not keep up with their mercenaries, nor support 
 them, but showed a thoroughly cowardly spirit."^ 
 
 There was not much hope for a city whose citizens 
 behaved so badly, even when sandwiched between better 
 troops. At length the mercenaries gave way, and in their 
 retreat killed many of the Carthaginians, who fled along 
 with them. On the approach of this mixed mass, 
 
 1 Polybius, XV. 13. 
 
THE ROMANS 33 
 
 Hannibal had to order his veterans to lower their spears 
 that their ranks might not be broken through. After an 
 interval came the final struggle between these veterans 
 and'Scipio's legions. Principcs and triarii were moved up 
 into line with the hastati before the charge was made. 
 "Being nearly equal in numbers, spirit, courage, and 
 arms, the battle was for a long time undecided," but the 
 Roman cavalry with Massinissa's Numidians decided it by 
 attacking Hannibal's troops in rear. The Carthaginian 
 army was destroyed, 20,000 being killed, and nearly as 
 many made prisoners, while the Roman loss was reckoned 
 at 1500.1 
 
 It was by Hannibal's advice that Carthage at once 
 submitted after this defeat; we may be sure, therefore, 
 that she had no alternative. The nation of shopkeepers 
 had not the staying power of the nation of farmers. She 
 was not of one mind : there was a peace party as well as 
 a war party. There was a wide interval between rich 
 and poor, and small love between herself and her subjects. 
 Above all, her citizens had learnt to depend on hiring 
 others to fight for them, instead of fighting for them- 
 selves. " I do affirm," says Machiavelli,^ " 'tis not money 
 (as the common opinion will have it) but good soldiers 
 that is the sinews of war; for money cannot find good 
 soldiers, but good soldiers will be sure to find money." 
 Hannibal's own career shows that this is too absolute; 
 but at all events mercenaries must not be able to despise 
 those who hire them. 
 
 The submission of Carthage left the Romans free to turn 
 their attention to Greece. Philip V. of Macedon had made 
 a treaty with Hannibal after Canna3, and a small con- 
 tingent of his troops had taken part in the battle of 
 Zama. Rome declared war against him, and at Cynos- 
 
 ' Polybius, XV. 14. - Discourses on Livy, II. ,x. 
 
34 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 cephalee (197 B.C.) the legion was again pitted against the 
 phalanx. The battle developed itself accidentally out of 
 an encounter of light troops, and on hilly ground ill suited 
 to the phalanx. Philip had formed only part of his army 
 on the top of the hill, when the approach of the legions, 
 driving his light troops before them, obliged him to 
 attack. Their arms and the depth and closeness of their 
 formation, together with the fall of the ground, gave the 
 Macedonians the advantage in the first onset, and they 
 forced back the Romans in their front. But the Roman 
 right wing, headed by some elephants, pushed up to the 
 top of the hiil where the rest of the Macedonians were in 
 the act of forming, and easily dispersed them. A tribune 
 with twenty maniples then fell on the rear of the division 
 which was pressing the Roman left. " The nature of the 
 phalanx is such that the men cannot face round singly 
 and defend themselves: this tribune, therefore, charged 
 them and killed all he could get at ; until, being unable 
 to defend themselves, they were forced to throw down 
 their shields and fly; whereupon the Romans in their 
 front, who had begun to yield, faced round again and 
 charged them too."' 
 
 Polybius follows up his account of this battle by a com- 
 parison of the Roman and Macedonian modes of fighting. 
 A charge of the phalanx was irresistible so long as it kept 
 its order ; for the Romans being at 6 feet, the others at 
 3 feet intervals, each legionary of the front rank had 
 ten spears to encounter. But the ground must be level 
 and free from obstacles, and even on such ground the 
 order of the phalanx was apt to be broken by success as 
 well as by failure, and it was no longer fit to meet an 
 attack. Besides it must be used as a whole, and was 
 unsuited to the emergencies of war, to seizing points of 
 
 ' Polybius, xviii. 26. 
 
THE ROMANS 35 
 
 vantage, to haphazard collisions, and to siege warfare. 
 "The Roman order, on the other hand, is flexible: for 
 every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well 
 equipped for every plan, time, or appearance of the enemy. 
 He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, 
 whether he is required to light in the main body, or in 
 detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself." ^ 
 These remarks were borne out by the battle of Pydna 
 (168 B.C.), when Perseus, the son of Philip, met with a 
 crushing defeat from L. ^milius PauUus. The phalanx, 
 fighting on level ground, bore all before it, and drove the 
 legions back upon a hill near the Roman camp. Here 
 the fortune of the day changed. The ranks of the phalanx 
 had become disordered in the hurry of pursuit; small 
 bodies of the Romans broke in at the gaps, while others 
 attacked it m flanks and rear. In hand-to-hand fighting 
 the Macedonians were at a disadvantage both as to sword 
 and shield, and in the end they were routed. 
 
 While Greece and Spain, North Africa and Asia Minor 
 were being gradually brought under Roman rule, the 
 Roman army underwent a change. The small farmers 
 who had been its backbone disappeared from its ranks. 
 War had lessened their numbers and mterfered with their 
 work, especially prolonged war in foreign lands. The 
 population of the city increased, food was imported and 
 sold at a low price, money became plentiful, and the small 
 farmers found themselves forced to sell their land to 
 wealthy men who cultivated it by slave labour, or turned 
 it into pasture. 
 
 While the middle class was disappearing, the upper 
 class, grown rich and luxurious, disliked military service 
 except in high command. Subject provinces furnished 
 
 ' Polybius, xviii. 32. 
 
36 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 special troops : heavy cavalry from Thrace, light cavalry 
 from Africa, light infantry from Liguria and the Balearic 
 Isles ; and the poorer townsfolk were ready and eager to 
 serve in the legions. The property qualification had been 
 lowered by the middle of the second century B.C., and by 
 the end of that century it was done away with altogether. 
 When Marius raised an army for the war against Jugurtha, 
 the senate allowed him to accept all free-born citizens 
 who offered themselves. A few years later, Roman 
 citizenship was conferred on all Italians, and the dis- 
 tinction between Romans and aUies was no longer main- 
 tained in the legions. 
 
 This changed the character of the Roman soldiery. 
 The farmer or burgess militiaman had been eager to get 
 back to civil life; the enlisted proletarian depended on 
 his pay, the camp wfid his home, and he prolonged his 
 service to the utmost. The usual term was twenty-five 
 years, and he was not allowed to marry. As Gibbon put 
 it: "War was gradually improved into an art and de- 
 graded into a trade." The soldiers looked to their own 
 general, and based their hopes on him, without concerning 
 themselves much about the Republic. 
 
 As the army became more professional, a more thorough 
 drill was introduced, based on the training of gladiators. 
 The organisation of the legion was altered by Marius, or 
 rather the Roman legions were brought into conformity 
 with those of the allies. Instead of thirty maniples, they 
 were made to consist of ten cohorts. The distinction of 
 velites, hastati, principes, and triarii was swept away; 
 henceforward there was only one kind of legionary soldier 
 for all purposes, armed with sword and pilum, and only 
 one standard, the eagle. Cavalry ceased to form part of 
 the legion. The cohorts were disposed in three lines 
 according to the general's discretion. The number of 
 
THE ROMANS 37 
 
 ranks in a cohort was sometimes increased to ten, and the 
 tiles were made closer ; so that a legion with four cohorts 
 in lirst line might occupj^ onl}- a quarter of a mile of front, 
 instead of half a mile. The larger units and the closer 
 formation may have been the result of Marius's experience 
 against the hordes of Cimbri and Teutones, or of the 
 greater numbers which it had become habitual to bring 
 into the Held. 
 
 Each cohort, being made up of three maniples or six 
 centuries, had six centurions, who might rise to the 
 position of primipUus, or first centurion of the legion, 
 but seldom obtained any further promotion. Each 
 cohort had its own ensign, and a silver eagle was given 
 to the legion. On the march the legionary was loaded 
 "like a sumpter mule," with clothing, rations, cooking 
 implements, and intrenching tools. To carry these more 
 conveniently, Marius provided him with a forked pole, 
 which was known as Marius's mule, and is represented 
 on Trajan's column. The soldier had often to carry 
 also three or four stakes, with side shoots that might 
 be intertwisted, to form a stout palisade.^ Yet he was 
 expected to march twenty miles or more in a day. 
 
 If the professional soldier of the later days of the 
 Republic was inferior in some respects to the citizen- 
 soldier of earlier times, if he was less patriotic and 
 religious, and looked more to plunder and promotion, 
 he was as enduring and stout-hearted as ever, and he 
 knew his business better. He was incessantly employed 
 either in military exercises or on civil works. Josephus, 
 a century after the downfall of the Republic, was full of 
 admiration of the Roman soldiers that Titus led against 
 Jerusalem. "Neither can any disorder remove them 
 from their usual regularity, nor can fear affright them 
 ' Polybius, xviii. 18. 
 
38 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 out of it, nor can labour tire them." Body and soul 
 were strengthened by exercises and hardened by fear; 
 for death was the penalty, not only of running away, 
 but of sloth. " When they come to a battle the whole 
 army is but one body, so well coupled together are their 
 ranks, so sudden are their turnings about, so sharp their 
 hearing as to what orders are given them, so quick their 
 sight of the ensigns, and so nimble are their hands when 
 they set to work; whereby it comes to pass that what 
 they do is done quickly, and what they suffer they bear 
 with the greatest patience." ^ 
 
 Examples of their behaviour under all conditions of 
 warfare are to be found in Csesar's Commentaries. Their 
 readiness to endure privation was shown at Avaricum 
 (52 B.C.). When Cajsar offered to raise the siege if they 
 found the scarcity of food intolerable, they assured him 
 they would rather bear anything than fail to avenge the 
 slaughter of their fellow-countrymen.^ The labours they 
 would undertake were exemplified at Alesia (52 B.C.), 
 where the lines of circumvallation and contravallation 
 were together 25 miles in length, and had to be 
 guarded by 50,000 men against a more numerous enemy 
 within, and a very much larger relieving army outside.^ 
 Even bolder, though less successful, were the lines by 
 which Cffisar invested Pompey's army at Dyrrhachium, 
 shortly before Pharsalia : a chain of twenty-four redoubts 
 with a circuit of 15 miles, to which an outer chain was 
 afterwards added.* 
 
 Nothing tests troops more than a surprise. Six 
 legions were intrenching their camp on the Sambre 
 (57 B.C.), two others with the baggage train were still 
 on the march in rear, the cavalry and light troops had 
 
 1 Jewish War, iii. cli. 5. - De hello gallico, vii. 17. 
 
 ^ II., p. 71, &c. ■■ De hello drill, iii. 44. 
 
THE ROMANS 39 
 
 been sent over the river and were skirmishing on the 
 fringe of a wood in which the Nervii and their allies, 
 numbering some 60,000, lay concealed. Suddenly the 
 Gauls issued from the wood, forded the Sambre, driving 
 the Roman horse before them, and fell upon the legions 
 at work. "So short was the time allowed us, and so 
 eager for fight was the enemy, that the men not only 
 could not fix their plumes, but could not even put on 
 their helmets and take the covers off their shields. Each 
 man joined the nearest ensign rather than search for his 
 own company when he might be fighting." ^ 
 
 The two legions in the centre soon repulsed their 
 assailants and followed them to the river. The two on 
 the left did more ; they crossed the river in pursuit, and 
 took the enemy's camp. But meanwhile the Nervii, the 
 bravest of the tribesmen, had enveloped the legions on 
 the right (Seventh and Twelfth) and gained possession 
 of the unfinished camp of the Romans. Ctesar, on join- 
 ing his right wing, found the men crowded together and 
 discouraged, with no reserve to help them. He retired 
 them a little and placed them back to back, to show 
 a double front to the enemy. The two legions that 
 formed the rearguard hurried up, and the Tenth legion 
 (one of those which had taken the enemy's camp) was 
 sent back to give assistance. The cavalry rallied, and at 
 length by united efforts the Nervii were overpowered 
 and cut to pieces, after fighting obstinately behind a 
 i-ampart of dead bodies. 
 
 Sometimes Cajsar had to check the ardour of his men, 
 sometimes to reprove their rashness, greed for booty, and 
 disregard of orders." Occasionally, as at D3Trhachium, 
 they gave way to panic which even he was unable to 
 overcome, or broke out into mutiny {e.g. the legions in 
 
 ' Bd. gal., ii. 16-28. « lb., vii. 19, 52. 
 
40 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 Campania, when ordered to Africa). But on the whole, 
 as Mommsen says, "perhaps there never was an army 
 which was more perfectly what an army ought to be." i 
 
 Its quality was shown at Pharsalia (48 B.C.), where it 
 encountered an army of more than twice its numbers, 
 trained in the same fashion, and commanded by a general 
 whom some people are disposed to rank even higher than 
 Caesar. Pompey had 7000 horsemen, Caesar only 1000 ; 
 but the latter intermixed infantry with his cavalry, and 
 formed a corps of six cohorts to support them. These 
 cohorts, using their pila as spears, charged Pompey's 
 cavalry as it was preparing to fall upon the flank of the 
 legions, and drove it off the field. Then they wheeled 
 round the enemy's left, and assisted Ca3sar's front attack 
 by an attack in rear. 
 
 Pompey, distrusting his infantry, kept them halted, 
 that they might be fresh and in good order when Caesar's 
 men arrived fatigued and out of breath. But, as Caesar 
 says, " there is a certain alacrity and ardour of mind 
 planted by nature in every man which is inflamed by 
 the desire of fighting, and which commanders ought not 
 to repress, but to excite. Nor was it idly laid down of 
 old that the trumpets should sound, and the whole army 
 raise a shout, whereby, as they reckoned, the enemy 
 would be struck with terror and our own men en- 
 couraged." ^ He had the advantage of this stimulus 
 without disordering his troops, for they were well enough 
 in hand to halt and recover breath before closing. The 
 Pompeian legions, assailed on both sides, held their 
 ground for a time, but at length fled to their camp. 
 The battle had lasted till noon and the weather was 
 extremely hot, yet Caesar persuaded his troops to storm 
 the camp, and to pursue the enemy for several miles, 
 
 1 Mommsen, iv. 366. - Bel. civ., iii. 92. 
 
THE ROMANS 41 
 
 twice intrenching themselves in the course of their 
 advance. 
 
 The reduction of the legionaries to a single type, a 
 " handy man "fit for any job, even to attack cavalry, 
 was not without its drawbacks. The auxiliaries on 
 whom dependence was placed for cavalry and light 
 troops often failed, and the legionary had to deal with 
 a more mobile enemy whom he could not bring to close 
 combat. In his second invasion of Britain Ctesar found 
 this the case, and shortly afterwards the troops under 
 Sabinus and Gotta were destroyed on the march by 
 the desultory tactics of Ambiorix,^ as the legions of 
 Varus were afterwards destroyed by Arminius. In the 
 African war (4G B.C.) Caesar found himself enveloped 
 in an open plain near Ruspina by a great force of 
 cavalry and light troops, chiefly Numidian. He had 
 oO cohorts, but only 400 horsemen and 1.50 archers. 
 The enemy closed in and threw darts into the cohorts. 
 When the latter charged, the horsemen retired, and 
 waited for their opportunity when the ranks should be 
 broken in pursuit or in combat with the light troops. 
 C;esar had to check the sallies of his men, and they 
 were gradually pressed together into a circle ; a good 
 target for missiles. Caesar saw that he must break the 
 enemy's ring surrounding him ; so he drew his troops 
 out in as long a line as he could, made alternate cohorts 
 face about, burst the ring with his flank cohorts, and 
 then charged the two halves of it. He was then able 
 to make good his retreat to his camp.2 
 
 The army of Crassus, attacked in similar fashion by 
 the Parthians near Carrha; (53 B.C.), was not so fortunate. 
 It consisted of seven legions with 4000 cavalry and 4000 
 slingers and archers. It was in the open desert between 
 
 ' Ikl. (jal., V. It;, ;i.-). - BMum Africa, pp. 14-17. Cf. Stoflfel, ii. 287. 
 
42 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 the Euphrates and Tigris, when it found itself un- 
 expectedly in presence of the Parthian army, which 
 consisted wholly of mounted archers and lancers. The 
 legions were formed into a square, and the archers were 
 sent forward ; but they were soon overpowered, not only, 
 by numbers, but by the greater range of the Parthian 
 bow. P. Crassus with a select corps of 6000 horse 
 and foot charged the enemy as they were closing round 
 the square. The Parthians fled before him, and when 
 his ardour had carried him far from the main body, 
 they turned upon his corps, surrounded it and destroyed 
 it. Then going back to the square, they poured arrows 
 into it for the rest of the day. At night they left it, 
 and the remains of the Roman army escaped to Carrhte, 
 where there was a Roman garrison. Further losses were 
 incurred in continuing the retreat from Carrhfe, and only 
 one-fourth of the army reached Syria.^ 
 
 The professional army initiated by Marius extended the 
 Roman dominion to the Rhine and the Euphrates, but it 
 inflicted on the commonwealth two generations of civil 
 war. It was an instrument in the hands of ambitious 
 leaders who took sides for or against class privilege. 
 The soldiers were no longer the soldiers of the Re- 
 public, but the soldiers of Sylla or Marius, Pompey or 
 Caesar. The establishment of the empire brought about a 
 change in this respect. Following the example of Julius, 
 Augustus took the title of Imperator, and the army had 
 henceforward a permanent commander-in-chief to whom 
 it swore obedience. He appointed permanent chiefs, 
 his legates, to the several legions, instead of letting the 
 command fall to the military tribunes in rotation. 
 
 The aim of Augustus was to consolidate, not to enlarge, 
 
 • Mommsen, iv. 331. 
 
THE ROMANS 43 
 
 the empire; and though some annexations were found 
 necessary to obtain a scientific frontier, the army became 
 a means of defence rather than a means of conquest. It 
 became a standing army, for it had to meet an ever- 
 present danger from the peoples beyond the frontier. 
 The legions had grown numerous during the civil wars ; 
 they were reduced to twenty-five, and were practically 
 localised. Under Tiberius there were eight on the Rhine, 
 six in the countries south of the Danube, four in Syria, 
 four in Africa, and three in Spain. To make them fit 
 to act separately, 120 horsemen were added to each 
 legion. 1 
 
 Auxiliary troops raised in the provinces were attached 
 to the legions and were commanded by their legates. 
 They were cohorts of .500 or 1000 men, some wholly of 
 foot, others including horsemen to the extent of one- 
 fourth. Some were armed according to the custom of 
 their country with bows, slings, &c. ; others were equipped 
 and trained in the Roman manner. There were also 
 bodies of horsemen of about the same strength as the 
 cohorts. 
 
 In the armies of the Republic there had been a body- 
 guard for the commander-in-chief which was styled the 
 praatorian cohort. This corps was raised to nine cohorts 
 by Augustus, and did guard duty in Rome, and at the 
 imperial residences elsewhere. It comprised horse and 
 foot, grew by degrees to 50,000 men, and played a 
 prominent part in the making and unmaking of em- 
 perors till it was abolished by Constantine. 
 
 Under the system adopted by Augustus and his suc- 
 cessors, the empire " presented to its foes a hard shell 
 and a soft kernel." - There were no reserves of troops 
 in the interior, and when legions were drawn from the 
 
 ' Marquanlt, p. lUH. - Oman, p. (i. 
 
44 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 frontier to support rival claimants to the imperial title, 
 the outer barbarians broke through the shell. The 
 Goths crossed the Danube, stormed Philippopolis, and 
 destroyed the emperor Decius and his army (a.d. 251). 
 A few years afterwards another emperor, Valerian, had to 
 surrender to the Persians, who overran Syria and stormed 
 Antioch. 
 
 When order was restored by Diocletian at the end of 
 the century, new corps were formed to serve as an 
 imperial field force. The legions of these Palatini and 
 Coviitatenses numbered only 1000 men, and comprised 
 both horse and foot. They had auxiliary cohorts attached 
 to them, and themselves contained a large barbarian 
 element which increased as time went on. They were 
 moved from one region to another as occasion arose. 
 The older legions, left as garrison troops on the frontiers, 
 gradually became bodies of military colonists rather than 
 soldiers. Service in them was unpopular, for the work 
 was hard, discipline severe, and rewards tardy.i The 
 cavalry was again withdrawn from them and separately 
 organised. From one-tenth it rose to about one-third 
 of the infantry. The strength of the frontier army is 
 reckoned at 060,000 by Mommsen, and the field force, or 
 emperor's army, at something under 200,000, making a 
 total of more than half a million of men, of whom nearly 
 160,000 were mounted. 
 
 The provinces were crushed under the burden of such 
 a provision for defence, aggravated as it was by lavish 
 expenditure on public works and public sports. Hope, 
 energy, courage, and enterprise died out, and the people 
 looked to Ca3sar for everything. The increase of cavalry 
 was partly to make up for the deterioration of the in- 
 fantry, partly to meet the swarms of barbarian horsemen, 
 ' Vegetius, ii. 3. 
 
THE ROMANS 45 
 
 but it did not always serve its purpose. At Adrianople 
 (378 A.D.) the emperor Valens met the fate of Decius, and 
 his army was cut to pieces by the Goths. His successor, 
 Theodosius, adopted the dangerous expedient of enhsting 
 the Gothic horsemen, not as individual recruits, but as 
 bands under their own chiefs, and with their help he 
 subdued the Gallic legions which had rebelled against 
 him. 
 
 The Goths themselves were worsted by Belisarius a 
 century and a half afterwards, but he attributed his 
 success to his mounted archers, borrowed from Asiatic 
 warfare. Procopius has described these troops : " They 
 come to the fight cuirassed and greavcd to the knee. 
 They bear bow and sword, and for the most part a lance 
 also, and a little shield slung on the left shoulder, worked 
 with a strap, not a handle. They are splendid riders, 
 can shoot while galloping at full speed and keep up the 
 arrow flight with equal ease whether they are advancing 
 or retreating. They draw the bow-cord not to the breast, 
 but to the face or even to the right ear, so that the 
 missile flies so strongly as always to inflict a deadly 
 wound, piercing both the shield and cuirass with ease." ^ 
 
 The bow was also becoming more and more the weapon 
 of the foot soldier, and foimd its way into the ranks of the 
 legion. A fragment of Arrian, who was governor of 
 Cappadocia in the time of Hadrian, shows how he pro- 
 posed to draw up his troops to meet a Scythian enemy. 
 His two legions were to be formed eight deep, the four 
 front ranks armed with the pilum, the others with 
 spears. Behind them there was to be a rank of foot 
 archers, and in rear of these the horse archers, who were 
 to shoot over their heads. There were to be bodies of 
 light troops (Armenian archers, &c.) on each wing, with 
 
 ' Oman, p. 23. 
 
46 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 heavy infantry in front of them. The cavalry which was 
 armed with lance and sword was to be in rear, prepared to 
 meet flank attacks. The enemy's charge was to be met 
 with a general volley of arrows, darts, and stones. If it 
 was nevertheless pushed home, the second and third 
 ranks must close up, and with the first rank must pre- 
 sent the points of their pila to the horses, while those 
 behind them threw their weapons.^ 
 
 With this we may compare the rules given by Vegetius - 
 three centuries afterwards for the drawing up of infantry. 
 It is true that he habitually " mixes up and confuses the 
 rules and habits of his own and of earlier times" (Lipsius), 
 but in this case he had evidently the warfare of his own 
 day in view. The men were to be formed in six ranks. 
 The two front ranks should be armed and armoured for 
 hand-to-hand fighting, but the men of the second rank 
 should also have bows. Light-armed men with bows, 
 darts, &c., formed the third and fourth ranks, and slingers 
 the fifth ; while the sixth, like the triarii of old, was to 
 consist of the most trusty and best-equipped men, as a 
 reserve. The light-armed troops should run out and 
 engage the enemy, but if they failed to drive him back 
 they should take shelter behind the front ranks, whose 
 duty it was to stand immovable as a Avail. 
 
 Such a formation would hardly resist a very serious 
 shock. A happier combination was tried by Narses at 
 Tagina; (5.52 a.d.). He dismounted his heavy cavalry — 
 Lombards, Heruli, &c. — and placed them in the centre of 
 his line, between wings of foot archers wheeled up to cross 
 fire in their front. Repeated charges of the Gothic horse- 
 men were repulsed, and when at length they gave way, 
 the Roman cavalry, which had been held in reserve, 
 completed the victory.^ This was an anticipation of the 
 
 1 Guischardt, ii. 152, &c. = Vegetius, iii. 14. ^ Oman, p. 34. 
 
THE ROMANS 47 
 
 English tactics of the fourteenth century, but it stands 
 alone. Infantry continued to decline in general esti- 
 mation, and came to be regarded as only fit for mountain 
 warfare or garrison duty. 
 
 Vegetius ^ complained that the armour which had been 
 cheerfully borne in earlier times was discarded in his day. 
 It was probably found to give only partial protection from 
 missiles, and to be seldom needed for anything else ; but 
 its discontinuance became a reason for avoiding hand-to- 
 hand combat. 
 
Ill 
 
 THE MIDDLE AGES 
 
 While the Goths, Lombards, and other races which had 
 settled in the plains of Eastern Europe became nations 
 of horsemen, the races which occupied North Germany 
 and Scandinavia were accustomed to fight on foot. 
 Tacitus says that the chief strength of the Germans 
 was in their infantry ; their cavalry was not well mounted, 
 and had no skill in evolutions.^ It was the same with 
 the Franl^s. As described by Agathias in the sixth 
 century, " they wear neither mail-shirt nor greaves, and 
 their legs are only protected by strips of linen or leather. 
 They have hardly any horsemen, but their foot soldiery 
 are bold and well practised in war. They bear swords 
 and shields, but never use the sling or bow. Their 
 missiles are axes and barbed javelins." ^ The francisca 
 was their special weapon, as the seax or short sword 
 was the weapon of the Saxons. It was a single-bladed 
 axe with a curved edge, which could be either thrown 
 or wielded, like a tomahawk. 
 
 Theodebert, the grandson of Clovis, invaded Italy with 
 an army of 100,000 men in 539 a.d., when Belisarius 
 was at war with the Goths. Both sides made overtures 
 to the king of the Franks, but he fell upon both and 
 scattered them. Fifteen years afterwards the Franks 
 again descended into Italy, but Narses obtained a com- 
 plete victory over them at Casilinum by means of his 
 
 I Ocrmania, p. 6. = Oman, p. 52. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 49 
 
 mounted archers. Formed in a dense mass, checked in 
 front, and threatened on both flanks, they were a helpless 
 target for arrows for some hours, but at length broke and 
 were cut to pieces. They fared better at the battle of 
 Poictiers (732 a.d.). They stubbornly resisted, "as if 
 they were frozen to the ground," all the assaults of the 
 Moorish cavalry, and turned back the tide of Saracen 
 invasion. 
 
 But in two or three centuries this sturdy infantry had 
 become a thing of the past. Mounted men-at-arms were 
 the only soldiers of any account in France; and it was 
 nearly a thousand years before French infantry recovered 
 their reputation. General Susane begins his history of 
 it by remarking that infantry always shares the lot of 
 the mass of the population. When men are slumbering, 
 careless or brutalised, under the weight of their chains, 
 it is abject and despised ; and it only shows what it is 
 capable of when privilege and inequality have been 
 displaced by a social system which pays more respect 
 to the dignity of man. Whether or not this is true as 
 an universal proposition, it is certainly true of French 
 infantry. It declined with the growth of the feudal 
 system, and was at its best after the Revolution. 
 
 The germ of feudalism is to be seen in Tacitus's 
 description of the German tribes, though the fruit was 
 slow in forming : " It is the renown and glory of a 
 chief to be distinguished for the number and valour of 
 his followers. ... To defend, to protect him, to ascribe 
 one's own brave deeds to his renown, is the height of 
 loyalty. The chief fights for victory ; his vassals fight for 
 their chief . . . men look to the liberality of their chief 
 for their war-horse and their blood-stained and victorious 
 lance. Feasts and entertainments, which, though inelegant, 
 are plentifully furnished, are their only pay. The means of 
 
 D 
 
THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 50 
 
 this bounty come from war and rapine It is a duty 
 
 among them to adopt the feuds as well as the friendships 
 of a father or a kinsman." ^ 
 
 Bands held together by ties of this kmd might co 
 for a time into an army, but they fought for pe 
 not for national objects. Their chiefs claimed the ngh 
 of private war, and courts of justice were --ely court 
 of conciliation whose awards were not bmdmg. In the 
 rudest times there was little difference of equipment 
 between one man and another, but the conquest of the 
 Roman provinces put wealth and technical skill at their 
 disposal, and the art of the armourer fostered inequal y^ 
 The weight of armour tempted men to ride, and rapidity 
 of movement was important for the forays and skirmishes 
 of which private war mainly consisted. Hence the chief 
 and his chosen followers became mounted men-at-arms 
 Those who had neither horses nor armour fought at 
 great disadvantage and were held in contempt The 
 Ly name "infantry" is significant. It dates from a 
 time when those who went afoot were the lads m attend- 
 ance on armoured horse soldiers for whom the term 
 miles came to be reserved. 
 
 Charlemagne resisted this tendency. While exacting 
 due service from his vassals, and doing his best to secure 
 a large and well-armed force of cavalry, he msisted on 
 the old principle of the "ban," that every IVeeman was 
 bound to serve at the king's summons. In order to 
 obtain a well-equipped infantry militia instead of a mere 
 
 horde of peasants, such as would be yielded by a levy 
 en .nassX provided that the smaller owners sho^d 
 be grouped, and that one of them should eo as the 
 
 reVesentati;e of the group, armed at their joint cost. 
 But under his successors this militia fell mto disuse. 
 
 1 Gerinania, pp. 13, &c. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 51 
 
 Something more mobile and efficient was required to 
 meet sudden descents of the Danes upon the coasts 
 which formed the chief danger to the peace of the 
 kmgdom. In 86G a.d. Charles the Bald issued an edict 
 that all freeholders who had or might have horses should 
 jom the host mounted, but by the end of the tenth 
 century it had become exclusively a feudal host, made 
 up of the contingents of lords who had received grants 
 of land as fiefs or benefices, and were under contract to 
 bring their quota of mounted men into the field. 
 
 Fiefs and offices (dukes, counts, &c.) which were at first 
 revocable or for life only, became hereditary, and the 
 inroads of the Northmen gave the holders of them an 
 opportunity to buUd strongholds in which they could 
 defy the king himself. CivU wars among the Carolingian 
 prmces weakened their authority, and enabled some of 
 their vassals to become stronger and more independent. 
 In the general struggle for existence the weaker lords 
 sought safety by "commending themselves" to the 
 stronger lords, surrendermg their lands, and receiving 
 them back as fiefs. The freemen of the conquered (Gallo- 
 Roman) race fared worse. Some of them were allowed 
 to contmue to hold land subject to a quit-rent, but the 
 bulk of them became serfs. After a time there was no 
 land without its lord, and the lords took care not to aive 
 arms or training to an alien and oppressed peasantry. 
 Froissarts description of the Jacquerie^ shows how the 
 pea.sants, unarmed as they were except with knives and 
 staves, would now and then rise, and revenge themselves 
 on theu- lords by fearful outrages. 
 
 Besides the valets of the men-at-arms, foot archers 
 and crossbowmen were required, especially for garrisons 
 and sieges. These were mostly mercenaries drawn from 
 i. 182. 
 
52 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 various quarters, and the term solidarii (soldiers) came 
 into use for hired men early in the eleventh century .^ 
 The army of adventurers with which William of Nor- 
 mandy invaded England comprised not only bowmen, 
 but some mail-clad infantry armed with spears and 
 swords. The Crusader armies also were largely composed 
 of foot, and they had the more need for missile weapons 
 as they had to deal with an enemy skilled in the use 
 of the bow. The, earlier Crusaders suffered much from 
 their inferiority in this respect. In 1104 a.d. they met 
 with a disaster on the very ground, near Carrhie, where 
 the Parthians had routed Crassus's legions.^ 
 
 The victories of Cceur de Lion were due to skilful co- 
 operation of heavy cavalry and crossbowmen, whose bolts 
 were further ranging and more deadly than the Turkish 
 arrows.*^ So deadly were they that in 1139 A.D. the 
 second Lateran Council condemned the use of the cross- 
 bow, except against infidels ; but it spread nevertheless, 
 especially in France, Italy, and Germany. Borrowed 
 from the balista, it seems to have been made available 
 as a hand weapon only about the beginning of the 
 eleventh century. 
 
 About this time a burgher militia began to grow up 
 in the French towns. They obtained charters, either by 
 purchase from their lords, who were in want of money 
 for Crusades, or by appeals to the king. "The king 
 has been said to be the founder of the communes, but 
 the reverse is more nearly the truth ; it is the communes 
 that established the king," says Michelet. They were 
 enabled by their charters to maintain a well-armed 
 force, which was liable to be summoned for the king's 
 service, though it was seldom willing to go far from 
 
 ' Hallam, Middle Ages, i. 2G2. = Oman, p. 321. 
 
 3 Jb., pp. 306-317. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 53 
 
 home. The towns of Picardy sent companies of cross- 
 bowmen to the army with which Philip Augustus won 
 the battle of Bouvines (1214 a.d.). But he owed his 
 victory to his men-at-arms. The French communal 
 troops proved no match for the Flemish foot. The men 
 who distinguished themselves most were some Braban9on 
 mercenaries in King John's pay, who refused to surrender 
 and were cut to pieces. 
 
 The wealthy and turbulent cities of Flanders provided 
 a sturdy militia, whose reputation gained greatly by their 
 victory at Courtrai (1302 a.d.). It was something new 
 and marvellous, as Villani says, for a feudal army of 
 50,000 men, including 7500 cavalry and 10,000 crossbow- 
 men, to be beaten by 20,000 burghers. The result was 
 due to that arrogance and eagerness to be foremost which 
 was so often fatal to the French chivalry. The flanks 
 as well as the front of the Flemings were covered by a 
 ditch. The leaders of the Italian mercenaries proposed 
 to march round and post their men where they could 
 intercept supplies. " The Flemings," they said, " are 
 great eaters and drinkers ; if we keep them long fasting, 
 they will grow faint. They will quit their ground ; and 
 then the cavalry can charge and rout them without risk." 
 But these " Lombard counsels " were scouted. The foot 
 were not to be allowed to have the honour of the vic- 
 tory. The men-at-arms dashed to the front, floundered 
 into the ditch, and were speared or struck down by 
 " godendags," long-handled maces with iron spikes, like 
 the Swiss " morning-star." * 
 
 But two years afterwards it was shown near Lille that 
 a much larger number of Flemish burghers was no match 
 for a feudal army properly handled, and this was con- 
 firmed at Cassel in 1328, and again at Roosebecke in 
 
54 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 1382, when Van Artevelde was killed with 25,000 men. 
 If infantry was to recover its old position it must combine 
 excellence in the use of missiles with excellence in hand- 
 to-hand fighting, and it was the association of the English 
 archer with the dismounted man-at-arms that gave the 
 first real shock to the feudal military system. 
 
 In England armies had passed through the same 
 changes as in France, but the soil was less congenial 
 to feudalism. Jutes and Anglo-Saxons came over in 
 bands from different districts, and were only by slow 
 degrees amalgamated into a nation. The Britons were 
 mostly driven westward, instead of forming a subject 
 population. The "folk" of each tribe controlled its 
 affairs, and imposed restrictions on the right of private 
 war. For war with other tribes, or defence against a 
 foreign enemy, there was a general levy, the " fyrd." " The 
 folk-moot was in fact the war-host, the gathering of every 
 freeman of the tribe in arms. . . . But the strength of 
 an English army lay not only in these groups of villagers. 
 Mingled with them were the voluntary war bands that 
 gathered round distinguished chiefs." ^ These bands of 
 retainers were better equipped and more serviceable than 
 the men of the fyrd, and superseded it in the time of 
 stress caused by the inroads of the Norsemen. The 
 sufferings of the people added to the power of the kings, 
 who gave grants of land to their companions or " thegns," 
 subject to the obligation of military service. The larger 
 landlords made similar grants to their " cnihts " ; '^ some- 
 times weapons were provided as well as land. In Alfred's 
 time it was enacted that all owners of 5 hides of land 
 
 ' Green, pp. 172-173. Cf. Chadwick, p. 159. 
 
 ^ Maitland, pp. 298, 304. In England "knight" came to stand for 
 the highest class of soldiery, while in Germany it dropped down to camp- 
 followers. The knight was miles, not cqucs, while his equivalent abroad 
 was " Ritter " or " chevalier." 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 55 
 
 (probably 600 acres) should be reckoned as thegns and 
 bound to thegn service, while smaller owners must com- 
 bine to furnish an armed man for every 5 hides. 
 
 In England as in France, danger led the smaller land^ 
 owners tojlace themselves under the protection of 
 greater men, and to take an oath of fealty pledging 
 themselves to be faithful and true, to love all that 
 their lord loves and eschew all that he eschews.* The 
 overlords took a similar oath to the king, and the king 
 looked to them to bring the due number of armed men 
 into the field. In this way something very like the 
 feudal system was to be found in England before the 
 Conquest, but it was developed by William I., who made 
 grants to his followers on feudal tenure, and fixed the 
 number of knights they were to furnish without much 
 regard to hidage, by units of five or ten. The feudal 
 force of England a century after the Conquest is estimated 
 at 5000 knights.- 
 
 The coming of the Normans brought depression of the 
 peasantry. A good deal of the land became the lord's 
 domain-land, and "churls" mostly saiak into "villeins," 
 serfs bound to the soil. Nevertheless, the divisions be- 
 tween classes were less sharp than in France. Between 
 lords and villeins there were sokemen, who were freemen 
 and freeholders in a limited sense; they served in the 
 wars, and formed the yeoman class, described by Raleigh 
 as "an order of men which generally have composed 
 our better sort of foot soldiers, and with which few parts 
 of the world besides England are acquainted." ^ The 
 Norman kings were not obliged or disposed to give their 
 great vassals the independence and power which they 
 enjoyed in France. William and his successors always 
 
 • Maitland, p. 69. ■ Round, pp. 261, 289-293. 
 
 ' Orrery, p. 62. Cf. Bacon, Essay xiix. 
 
56 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 had mercenary troops in their pay, which might be used 
 against rebellious lords, and they encouraged the pay- 
 ment of scutage in lieu of military service as it furnished 
 them with the means of hiring knights. Private war 
 was restricted, and few nobles had strong castles except 
 during the years of anarchy which preceded the rule of 
 Henry II. The barons, when resisting aggressions of the 
 crown, and the king, when upholding the royal authority, 
 felt the need of help from the lower classes, and had 
 to buy it by concessions. As time went on the status 
 of the villeins improved, the services due from them to 
 their lords were defined, they became well-to-do, and 
 were able to commute their obligations for money which 
 was readily accepted by lords bound on Crusades or 
 distant expeditions. By the middle of the fourteenth 
 century a large proportion of the peasantry had become 
 hired labourers instead of villeins. There is a ring of 
 good fellowship which would have seemed strange to a 
 French prince in the speech of the Black Prince to his 
 archers before the battle of Poitiers.* 
 
 The armies which Edward III. led to France were 
 national armies of paid soldiers. The drawbacks of feudal 
 service had been keenly felt by Edward I. m his Welsh 
 and Scottish wars. It yielded an ill-trained and undis- 
 ciplined host which was not bound to remain more than 
 forty days in the field.^ The twelfth century alternative, 
 to accept scutage and hire foreign mercenaries,^ had been 
 checked by Magna Carta, and could only be adopted on 
 a small scale, as in the case of Gascon crossbowuien. The 
 king might bargain with his vassals that they should 
 furnish him with a reduced number of knights for an 
 increased period, and so obtain a more useful force ; but 
 this method did jiot prove sufficient, and Edward I. intro- 
 1 Baker, p. 146. " Scott, i. 244, ii. 333. ' Morris, p. 35. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 57 
 
 duced thesystem of payment in spite of the opposition of 
 the greater lords.i Of the 2400 men-at-arms which he 
 took with him to Scotland in 1298, more than half were 
 receiving wages from him.- In the fourteenth century 
 this developed into the indenture system, under which 
 tEe king made contracts with certain leaders to furnish 
 so many men at fixed rates of pay. 
 
 For the foot English kings depended mainly on county 
 levies. Military service, which was tending to become a 
 matter of privilege abroad, was insisted on as the duty of 
 all freemen. The arms and equipment which they were 
 bound to have, according to their means, were specified 
 by Henry II. in the Assize of Arms of 1181. The rules 
 were revised by Henry III. in 1252, and by the Statute of 
 Wmchester (1285); the bow was introduced among the 
 weapons, and periodical inspection of arms was provided 
 for. When a war broke out, commissioners of array were 
 sent to the counties to take over from the sherifts the 
 number of men called for, and to see that they were well 
 chosen.^ Acts of Parliament provided that men sent 
 abroad on the king's service should be at the king's 
 wages (1344), and that no one should be forced to serve 
 without the sanction of Parliament, unless he was bound 
 by the terms of his tenure (1351).^ The foot were formed 
 into bands of a score, a hundred, or a thousand, under 
 vintcnars, centenars, and millenars. The muster rolls of 
 1339 show that out of a levy of 11,200 men (exclusive of 
 men-at-arms) half were armed with hand weapons and 
 the other half were archers.'' 
 
 The bow was little used in England before the Conquest. 
 It always played an important part in naval warfare, and 
 just as the Athenians and the Genoese were quick to re- 
 
 « Morris, pp. 57, 68. ^ lb., p. 202. » lb., p. 92. 
 
 * Scott, i. 264, ii. 332. '• Oman, p. 593. 
 
58 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 cognise its value, so the Vikings of the north made it one 
 of their weapons, and prided themselves on their skill 
 with it.i They seem to have dropped it when they 
 settled in England. The " huscaiies " or bodyguard of 
 Canute were armed with the two-handed Danish axe, and 
 that weapon largely superseded the Saxon spear. At 
 Hastings Harold's best troops fought in the Danish 
 fashion, on foot, armed with axes, and awaiting attack 
 behind a stockade.- They may have hung their shields 
 on the stockade, as was done on the bulwarks of ships. 
 But William was well provided with bowmen and cross- 
 bowmen, as well as with mailed horsemen, and it was by 
 the co-operation of archers and cavalry that the battle 
 was won. " The Saxon mass was subjected to exactly the 
 same trial which befell the British squares in the battle of 
 Waterloo — incessant charges by a gallant cavalry mixed 
 with a destructive hail of missiles." ^ The stockade gave 
 little protection against the curved flight of arrows, espe- 
 cially when they were aimed high, as the duke directed. 
 Darts, axes, and stones made a feeble reply to them ; and 
 sorties upon the assailants, sometimes provoked by feigned 
 flights, ended in the rout of the men who made them. At 
 length the Norman horsemen forced an entrance, and the 
 English broke up. 
 
 From that time forward archers formed an important 
 part of English armies, and archery was encouraged as a 
 national sport. Fitzstephen speaks of it as one of the 
 pastimes of Londoners in the time of Henry 11.^ Richard 
 I. took a thousand bowmen with him when he went to 
 Palestine.^ Henry III. m the Assize of Arms of 1252 
 required all forty-shilling freeholders to provide them- 
 selves with bow and arrows, and arrows were sometimes 
 
 ' Oman, p. 92. - EwjHsh Historical Review, ix. (1894), pp. 1, 208, &c. 
 
 ^ Oman, p. 161. ^ Brand, ii. 392. ^ Scott, ii. 78. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 59 
 
 e xacted for the tenure of lands. But the Norman bow 
 was under live feet in length, and had no great range or 
 penetration. The early Plantagenets preferred the cross- 
 bow. The six-foot long-bow with its cloth-yard shaft 
 dates from the time of Edward I., and probably from his 
 wars in Wales. 
 
 According to Giraldus Cambrensis, the South Welsh, 
 especially the men of Gwent, excelled in archery. They 
 had bows of elm so stout that they would serve for 
 cudgels, and could send the point of an arrow through 
 a three-inch door.i It became a rule in later days that 
 the length of a bow should equal the archer's reach with 
 his arms outstretched, and Welshmen are abnormally 
 long in the arm. Three hundred Welsh archers 
 formed part of the first expedition to Ireland ; and 
 the secret of success in Irish warfare, Gerald says, 
 lay in mixing archers with the troops of knights.^ 
 The spear was the weapon of the men of North 
 Wales. The South Welsh were Edward's allies, and 
 in the first war against Llewelyn (1277) there were 
 special corps of sagittarii nearly all of whom came 
 from Gwent. 3 
 
 At Falkirk (1298) five-sixths of the foot in Edward's 
 army were Welsh. They numbered more than 10,000 
 men. Falkirk was a repetition of Hastings. \y'allace's 
 horsemen and light troops were soon driven away, and 
 the solid rings or " schlldrons " of his spearmen were 
 at length demoralised and broken by the combined 
 action of the English heavy cavalry and archers. At 
 Bannockburn (i:;l-±) a much larger English army — 
 
 ' Works, vi. 54, 177. In a trial made before Edward VI. in 1550, 
 some archers shot through a one-inch board of well-seasoned timber 
 (Longman, p. 431). 
 
 - Morris, p. 18. ' lb., p. ^4. 
 
6o THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 though its numbers must have been vastly exaggerated by 
 the chroniclers — was less skilfully handled and met with 
 disaster. The Scottish and English accounts differ, and 
 may be best reconciled by supposing that Baker describes 
 what took place on the English right, Barbour what 
 occurred on the left. On the right, then, the English 
 cavalry advanced along the Roman road with bogs on 
 either side of them, and floundered into the pits or 
 trenches which the Scots had dug in front of their 
 position covered with grass and brushwood. The archers 
 whom they had left behind, were brought up to help 
 them, but did more harm than good ; for being in rear 
 instead of on a flank, most of their arrows fell short of 
 the enemy and wounded their own horsemen.^ On the 
 left there was firmer ground, and there the archers 
 were thrown out on the flank, after crossing the burn, to 
 prepare and support the advance of the knights. But 
 they were rolled up and swept away by a well-timed 
 charge of a small body of light horsemen. 
 
 At Halidon Hill (1333) the tables were turned. 
 Edward III. was besieging Berwick ; the Scots marched 
 to its relief, and were obliged to be the assailants. 
 Adopting a plan which had proved successful the year 
 before at Dupplin Muir, Edward made his knights dis- 
 mount, and formed them in three bodies or " battles " 
 with wings of archers. The archers were posted in 
 marshy ground which probably secured them from 
 direct attack. The Scots were blinded by the rain of 
 arrows as they advanced, and though they began to 
 mount the slope on which the men-at-arms were drawn 
 up, their courage failed, and they fled. Edward re- 
 mounted his men and pursued them for several miles. 
 The chronicler says: "Ibi didicit a Scotis Anglorum 
 
 1 Baker, p. 8. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 6i 
 
 generosilas dextrarios reservare venacioni fugienciuin 
 et contra antiquatum morem suorum patruni, pedes 
 pugnare." ^ 
 
 But it was by no means a new departure for English 
 knights to fight on foot. To say nothing of the times 
 before the Conquest, Henry I. won two victories with 
 dismounted knights: Tenchebrai (1106) over his brother 
 Robert, and Bremule (1119) over Louis VI. of France. 
 At Tenchebrai he followed Robert's example in making 
 his knights dismount "ut constantius pugnarcnt," but 
 he kept a small body of French knights on horseback 
 and posted them at some distance on his right, to charge 
 the flank and rear of the enemy. At Bremule (according 
 to Ordericus Vitalis) he dismounted 400 knights out of 
 500 in an open plain, and awaited the charge of the 
 French knights, who as usual preferred to fight on 
 horseback. They won some success at first, perhaps 
 against Henry's mounted detachment, but they could 
 not break the men on foot ; many of their horses were 
 killed, and the riders made prisoners ; the rest fled, 
 including Louis himself. The Anglo-Norman knights 
 remounted, and pursued them so vigorously that the 
 French king was driven to take refuge in a wood, and 
 his horse and banner were captured. 
 
 Again at the Battle of the Standard (1138) the EngHsh 
 knights fought on foot, drawn up with the Yorkshire 
 levies of spearmen and archers that had been brought 
 together to check the Scotti.sh invasion. The Highlanders 
 refused to let King David's knights lead the way, and 
 claimed the front place. Their wild rush made only a 
 momentary impression on the armoured spearmen, and 
 they bristled like hedgehogs, we are told, from the 
 arrows of the archers. Their ardour was quenched, and 
 
 » Baker, p. 51. 
 
62 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 the Scottish army melted away to the rear, in spite of 
 some success achieved by a small body of mounted 
 knights.^ 
 
 Three years later, at the battle of Lincoln, Stephen 
 fought on foot with the greater part of his knights and 
 with the burghers of the city. He had two bodies of 
 horsemen, but they were routed and driven off" the field, 
 and the horse and foot of the two earls (Gloucester and 
 Chester) then combined against the king's corps,^ the 
 foot charging it in front, while the horse fell upon its 
 flanks and rear. After a stout resistance it broke up, 
 many of the men seeking refuge in the city, and Stephen, 
 who continued fighting by his standard, was overthrown 
 and made prisoner. 
 
 Considering the weight of armour, it must have been 
 a disagreeable necessity for knights to fight on foot. 
 There seem to have been two motives for it : to encourage 
 and stiffen bodies of less well-armed footmen which had 
 been brought into the field, or to make a stand against an 
 enemy to whom they were unequal as cavalry, either in 
 numbers or quaUty. The French knights were said to be 
 terrible on horseback, but little to be feared on foot.^ The 
 Germans were described as unskilful horsemen, and better 
 able to strike with the sword than to thrust with the 
 lance,* and it became recognised as a Teutonic custom to 
 dismount in grave emergencies. But probably it was a 
 question of horses rather than of men. Matthew Paris 
 speaks of English knights being mounted " in equis satis 
 bonis, licet non Hispanis, vel Italicis, vel aliis preciosis." ^ 
 William the Conqueror had a Spanish charger, and the 
 infusion of Arab blood made the horses of Southern 
 Europe generally sought after ; but in England only 
 
 1 Oman, pp. 386-391. - lb., p. 394. ^ Scott, ii. 511. 
 
 ' Delpech, ii. 24,S. ^ lb., i. 439. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 63 
 
 the richest barons and knights could afford them. In 
 the thirteenth century plate armour began to come into 
 use, superseding mail. As it developed the weight to 
 be carried by a barded war-horse increased, and became 
 s omething over 25 sto ne.^ Flanders and the north of 
 France produced the animals best suited to such heavy 
 loads ; - they could not move rapidly for any distance, but 
 men on lighter horses were at a great disadvantage in 
 direct collision. 
 
 Such considerations as these, together with his previous 
 experience at Halidon Hill, led Edward III. to make his 
 Knight s dismount, when he turned to offer battle to Philip 
 of Valois at Crecy (1346).' Hejiad about 4000 cavalry, 
 but nearly half of these were " hobelars," light-armed men 
 mounted on little nags : and of the men-at-arms only 
 one-fourth were " knights " in the restricted sense which 
 the word had reached by that time. The rest were 
 variously described as squires, sergeants, &c. In Philip's 
 army there were 12,000 men-at-arms, of whom two-thirds 
 were "gentils gens,"^ and about 60,000 foot, mainly com- 
 munal troops, but including 6000 Genoese crossbowmen 
 and other mercenaries. The English army was under 
 20,000 men all told, but there were 10,000 archers, of 
 whom one-fourth were mounted.^ 
 
 To make up for the disproportion of numbers an 
 advantageous position was chosen between Crecy and 
 Wadicourt, fronting south-cast. The right flank was 
 covered by the forest of Crecy. There was a shallow 
 valley in front, and in rear there was a small wood, by 
 the side of which the king caused a park to be made, 
 "and there was set all carts and carriages, and within 
 the park were all their horses, for every man was afoot ; 
 
 ' Scott, i. 219. ' Delpech, i. 412. " Chandos Herald, p. 310. 
 
 * English Historical Review, xiv. 7G7. 
 
64 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 and into this park there was but one entry." i The 
 men-at-arms were formed in three "battles" with corps 
 of archers, as_ at Halidon Hill ; that of the Prince of 
 Wales was in front, that of Lord Northampton (rather 
 weaker than the others) was in immediate support "on 
 a wing," and that of the king was in reserve on higher 
 ground. Thus they were in echelon right in front. 
 
 At the battle of Bouvines (1214) the French cavalry 
 were told — "One knight should not make another his 
 shield; draw up so that all the knights may be in the 
 front line." ^ It seems likely that this was the general 
 rule, and that at Crecy (as at Agincourt) the English 
 men-at-arms were four deep. Behind them there would 
 be hobelars, and other men less well armed, " rascals 
 that went afoot with great knives," Welsh or Irish. 
 Villani says that the English, when fighting on foot, 
 formed a compact body, almost round (like a Scottish 
 schildron), and that each lance was held by two men.^ 
 An eighteen-foot lance was unwieldy for a single man 
 on foot, but the common practice was to cut it down 
 to a length of five feet, that dimension referring no 
 doubt only to the part in front of the hand-grip. 
 
 According to Baker of Swynbrook, the archers were 
 placed, not in front of the men-at-arms, but at the sides 
 of the king's army, like wings, so that they might not 
 get in the way of the men-at-arms, nor meet the enemy 
 face to face, but discharge their arrows at his flanks. 
 Similarly a Valenciennes chronicler says that King 
 Edward "ne fist que deux batailles d'archiers a deux 
 costes en la maniere d'un escut ; et au milieu d'eulx 
 se tenoit le prince de Galles." * Froissart, on the con- 
 
 ' Froissart, book i. chap. 128 (Lord Berners' translation). 
 = Oman, p. 469. ' Scott, i. 311. 
 
 * English Historical Revieio, xii. 432. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 65 
 
 trary, says of the Prince's "battle" that the archers 
 were placed in front in the form of a "herse," and the 
 men-at-arms at the back.^ He mentions that in the 
 course of the fight some of the French knights went 
 round the archers, and others broke through them, and 
 fought hand to hand with the Prince's men-at-arms. 
 King Philip would gladly have done the same, but 
 there was such a great hedge of archers and men-at- 
 arms in front that he could not. 
 
 Sir John Smythe, who wrote when archers were still 
 to be seen in the field, and described how they were 
 drawn up by "our most skilful and warlike ancestors," 
 helps us to reconcile these conflicting statements. He 
 says they were formed " into hearses — that is broad in 
 front and narrow in flank, as for example if there were 
 25, 30, 35, or more or fewer archers in front, the flanks 
 did consist but of seven or eight ranks at the most. . . . 
 They placed their hearses of archers either before the 
 front of their armed footmen, or else in wings upon the 
 corners of their battles, and sometimes both in front and 
 wings." ^ A contemporary plate of the battle of Pinkie 
 (1547) shows the archers extended across the whole front 
 of the three corps which are advancing to attack the 
 Scots.^ George Monk, writing during the Civil War, 
 shows how musketeers forming wings to a body of pike- 
 men should be moved forward and spread out across its 
 front for more eft'ective fire.* We may conclude that 
 the archers at Crecy were formed by companies of 100 
 men in oblongs not more than eight men deep, with open 
 ranks and files, that their normal position was on the 
 
 ' " Missent les archiers tout devant en fourme de une eroe, et les gens 
 d'armes ou fons " (Rome MS., Luce's edition, iii. 416). The other 
 versions are not quite so definite. Cf. Erujliah Historical Rericw, x. 538, 
 733, and xii. 427. 
 
 " .Smythe, p. .SO. ' Cockle, p. 8. ■* Monk, chap. xv. 
 
 E 
 
66 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 flanks of the men-at-arms and a little in advance of 
 them, but that they may also have formed a continuous 
 screen in their front, at all events at the beginning of 
 the action. Shallow pits were dug in front of the line 
 of battle, and would give the archers some protection 
 from charging horsemen. ' 
 
 It was late in the afternoon when the French army 
 came up, but the impetuosity of the lords, each eager 
 to be foremost, disregarded Philip's orders to halt. The 
 Genoese crossbowmen were sent forward, weary from a 
 long march, and their bowstrings wet from rain, for 
 they could not be taken off' and put under cover like 
 the string of the longbow. As they came on they gave 
 great shouts at intervals to scare the English, and when 
 they reckoned themselves within range they shot fiercely; 
 but their bolts fell short. " Then the English archers 
 stept forth one pace and let fly their arrows so wholly 
 and so thick that it seemed snow. When the Genoese 
 felt the arrows piercing through heads, arms, and breasts, 
 many of them cast down their crossbows and did cut 
 their strings and returned discomfited." - 
 
 The French men-at-arms charged through the cross- 
 bowmen by the king's orders, spearing and trampling 
 them, but they were themselves shot down by English 
 arrows, or overthrown by one another in the press. As 
 King Edward wrote, there died more than 1500 knights 
 and esquires in the part of the field where the armies 
 first came together. Nevertheless "the battle was very 
 tough and lasted long, for it lasted from before the 
 hour of vespers till evening, and the enemy bore them- 
 selves very nobly and often rallied." * They made three 
 main attacks, directing their efforts against the English 
 
 1 Baker, p. 84. ' Froissart, book i. chap. 130. 
 
 » Edward to Sir T. Lucy (Chandos Herald, p. ."ilO). 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 67 
 
 inen-al-aniis, and apparently neglecting the archors. The 
 Prince's " battle " was so hard pressed that Northampton 
 moved up to its assistance, and the king also sent some 
 twenty or thirty knights in reply to an urgent appeal. 
 But the "battles" remained unbroken, the English losses 
 were trifling, and in the course of the night the French 
 army melted away, leaving many thousands on the 
 field. 
 
 It was not the first time that crossbow and longbow 
 had been pittied one against the other, but the conditions 
 at Crecy made the most of the advantages which be- 
 l opged to the lat ter. The six-foot bow had longer range 
 than the ordinary crossbow, and three or four times 
 tEielrate15T Hre. A good archer could shoot two arrows . 
 in a minute ; he would seldom miss at 2:^0 yards (the 
 standard practice range) and could send his arrows twice 
 that distance. On the other hand, the crossbow required 
 less strength and skill; it could be used lying down or 
 Uadeir cover; its bolts were much cheaper than arrows, 
 and much more plentiful. The archer in the field had 
 only his sheaf of twenty-four arrows, and in provisioning 
 a place for a siege the allowance of bolts for each cross- 
 bow was ten times that of arrows for each longbow. At 
 .short ranges the crossbow was reckoned the more ac- 
 curate weapon, and Edward III. told the Sherifi's of 
 London in 1349 to encourage the use of it, as well as 
 the use of the longbow.^ 
 
 The French learnt at Crecy that they must be ready 
 to fight on foot; but they did not learn to choose the 
 defensive, nor did they provide themselves with better 
 shot. In the army of 50,000 men with which Philip's 
 successor, John, attacked the Black Prince near Poitiers 
 (September 19, 1356) there seem to have been only 
 ' Scott, ii. 110. 
 
68 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 2000 crossbowmen, and their shooting had no great 
 fi-o.t Fdward was returning from his raid to the 
 loS: Hetad only BOOO men (English ^d Gas.n 
 of whom 3000 were men-at-arms and 2000 archers^ 
 Findtg himself overtaken, he chose a strong position 
 on the ric^ht bank of the Miosson, " among hedges, vines 
 a^d bush;." The English were short of food and migh 
 Tave been starved out, if John had sent a force to ^he 
 left side of the stream to bar their hne of retreat. Ap- 
 pth n ive of this, they were in the act of crossing the 
 r'am when the battle began, and the rearguard was 
 
 nrrita continuous hedge along ^^ front of t.^ 
 position except for one gap where the road o the ford 
 pa sed trough it. The hedge was lined with archer . 
 Td a stone-rthrow behind the gap Salisbury's men-at^ 
 ..0.S were drawn up on foot, with their archers n f.n 
 of them " in manner of a herse." On the left was War 
 ik' "battle," while that of the Prince was held m 
 eserve The French army was also in three mam 
 bod es the right under Orleans, the left under Normandy, 
 afd L reserve under the king. Most of the men - 
 arms were dismounted, but mounted corps of a few 
 Tndred men on barded horses were sent aW t ", 
 th. archers The horse-armour proved ot httle 
 eTvL r he :^hers extended and struck the horses 
 rrnk They became unmanageable, and caused con- 
 Lion n the rinks of foot behind them The Prince 
 made better use of his cavalry, sending -a 1 corps ^f 
 to charge the enemy in flank and rear, while they were 
 en.ageS There were collisions between the bodies of 
 UsXntecl men-at-arms, but on a narrow front where 
 personal strength told for more than --^^^ J^^^ 
 English were nearly worn out by repeated assaults. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 69 
 
 and many of the archers had spent all their arrows, 
 before the battle was won.' 
 
 Though the treaty of Bretigny made peace between 
 France and England, French and English bands con- 
 tinued to tight with one another as auxiliaries in other 
 quarrels. The war had produced one great French leader, 
 Bertrand du Guesclin. At Cocherel (1364), finding his 
 enemy strongly posted on a hill, he took care not to 
 repeat the mistake of Poitiers. He feigned a retreat, 
 and owing to the impetuosity of the captain of the 
 English contingent, he drew them down from the hill, 
 and engaged them on equal terms. When the English 
 saw the French turning on them, " a little they recoiled 
 back and assembled together all their people, and then 
 they made way for their archers to come forth on 
 before, who as then were behind them. And when the 
 archers were forward then they shot fiercely together, 
 but the Frenchmen were so well armed and so strongly 
 pavised that they took but little hurt." - There were 
 only 300 archers, one-fourth of the total of the men-at- 
 arms. The Captal de Buch, who was in chief command, 
 came down from the hill with the rest of his men, to 
 support the English; but he was captured by a chosen 
 band of Breton horsemen told off to fall on his rear, 
 and after an obstinate light nearly all his men were 
 killed or taken prisoners.^ 
 
 At Auray in the same year Du Guesclin was less 
 fortunate. He was with Charles of Blois, one of the 
 claimants of the Duchy of Brittany. Montfort, the rival 
 of Charles, had Chandos to assist him, and followed 
 his advice that " it is better to act on the defensive, for 
 
 ' Baker, pp. 113-153; Chandos Herald, pp. Gl-32; Fioissart, book i. 
 chap. lr)9-l(;c. 
 
 • Kroissart, i. chap. 221. ' Luce, pp. 44-1-44S. 
 
70 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 those who attack first generally get the worst of it." 
 The victory was won, not by the English archers, who, 
 as at Cocherel, made little impression on the plate 
 armour of the dismounted men-at-arms, but by the 
 judicious use of a small reserve which Chandos had pro- 
 vided. Its leader, Calverley, had been most unwilling 
 to be left behind, but he kept his men well in hand, 
 reinforcing one weak point and then another. Charles 
 of Blois was killed, and Du Guesclin was made prisoner. 
 
 Three years later he was again taken prisoner at Najera 
 (1367) after fighting gallantly as the ally of the Castilians 
 against the army of the Black Prince. Here again 
 English and French fought on foot, and the novel 
 feature of the battle was the encounter of the Spanish 
 genetours or light horsemen with the English men-at- 
 arms and archers. The arrows of the latter soon drove 
 the genetours ofi' the field, for their horses were un- 
 armoured, and they could not get near enough to throw 
 their javelins. 
 
 Du Guesclin was made constable in 1370. He made it a 
 rule to avoid pitched battles with the English, but in 
 a few years of harassmg warfare he expelled them from 
 nearly all the French territory which they had gained. 
 The lesson was soon forgotten, and at Agincourt (1415) 
 another constable gave Henry V. the opportunity to 
 outdo Poitiers. Henry was marching north to Calais 
 with an army reduced to less than 10,000 men. The 
 constable, D'Albret, had declined opportunities of attack- 
 ing him, but took up a position barring his road with an 
 army six times as numerous. Between the woods of 
 Agincourt and Tramecourt there was half a mile of 
 ploughed land through which the road ran, and the 
 French army was posted a little to the north, closing 
 the mouth of this defile. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 71 
 
 St. Remy says : " They had sufficient archers and 
 crossbowmen, but they were unable to use their bows 
 from the narrowness of the place, which did not aflbrd 
 room for more than the men-at-arms." There were 
 three corps, one behind another, in very deep formation ; 
 and, as usual, each of the French knights claimed to be 
 in front. All were on foot with the exception of the 
 rearguard, and of two bodies of about 600 horsemen 
 in front of each wing, who were to ride down the English 
 archers. 
 
 Henry took care not to play his opponent's game by 
 trying to force a passage. He drew up his army about 
 a mile to the south, in front of Maisoncelle. He had only 
 about a thousand men-at-arms, and narrow as the field 
 was, he was obliged to place his van and rearguard in 
 line with his main body, leaving himself no reserve, and 
 having nowhere more than four ranks. In the intervals 
 between the corps he placed masses of archers; but just 
 before the battle began, their marshal, by the king's 
 order, led the archers forward, and posted them in 
 advance of the line in two wings {au froncq devant en 
 deux ellcs)} Some days before the king had told them 
 to provide themselves with stout stakes, six feet long, 
 and these they planted at a slope in front of them as 
 chevaux de frise? 
 
 For some hours of St. Crispm's day (October 15) the 
 two armies faced one another without moving, each 
 waiting for the other to attack. At length, finding it 
 was necessary to sting the French into action, Henry 
 made his men advance slowly " in fine order," giving 
 a great shout as they halted from time to time, until 
 the archers came within extreme bow-shot of the enemy. 
 As soon as the mounted men who were in front of the 
 
 ' St. Kumy, i. 253. - Gesta, pp. 12, Cd. 
 
72 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 wings of the French army began to feel the English 
 arrows, they charged; but the ground was sodden, and 
 under the rain of arrows few of them were able to reach 
 the stakes, which the archers had refixed. Most of them 
 found their horses unmanageable, and rode back upon 
 their own vanguard, which was toiling after them, and 
 in which they caused much confusion. It pressed on, but 
 not with an even front: "either from fear of the arrows, 
 ... or that they might more speedily penetrate our 
 ranks to the banners, they divided themselves into three 
 troops, charging our lines in the three places where the 
 banners were." ' 
 
 The English men-at-arms were forced to give ground, 
 but soon recovered themselves. Meanwhile the archers 
 plied the flanks of the enemy with their arrows, and 
 when the arrows were expended they "quitted their 
 stakes," and fell on with swords, axes, and hammers. 
 Archers and men-at-arms together hewed their way 
 through the ranks of the French vanguard, and into the 
 corps behind it. The rearguard being still mounted, 
 and seeing the fate of the two first lines, took to flight. 
 Even French writers estimate the French loss at 10,000 
 men, six times as much as that of the English. 
 
 The following is the comment of Jean de Eueil,- 
 whose father and uncles fell at Agincourt, and who was 
 himself a distinguished captain in later years : " The 
 night before, they (the French) lay in a field where 
 they were up to the knees in mud, and next morning 
 they marched across a stretch of ploughed land to meet 
 their enemy; and they went so far to seek them that 
 
 ■ Gesta, p. 53. 
 
 ^ Le Jouvencel, part ii. chap. xvii. This is a i-omance written uiidor his 
 supervision, and founded on his own career, describing the education of 
 a soldier of the fifteenth century. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 73 
 
 when it came to fighting they arrived few in numbers, 
 one after another, and were out of breath, and were 
 discomfited. And therefore, a corps on foot should never 
 march, but should always await the enemy standing still. 
 For when they march, as they are not all of the same 
 strength, they cannot keep their order. A mere bush 
 is enough to break them up. A power which marches 
 against another power is undone, unless God help it. 
 So let him who can, choose a good position and without 
 loss of time." 
 
 Elsewhere ^ Bueil considers the question how a leader 
 is to act if his enemy adopts these defensive tactics. 
 He should select the best position he can find near 
 them, and get command of the river, if there is one ; 
 for it will not only serve as a protection, and to water 
 the horses and cattle, but it makes provisioning easier. 
 He should deprive the enemy of these facilities, and 
 should make raids round them to intercept their sup- 
 plies, so that they may be forced to move, and either 
 to attack him on his chosen ground, or give him the 
 opportunity of attacking them on the march. 
 
 If the enemy are weaker than he and are likely to 
 escape, and the leader therefore decides to attack them 
 in position, he should choose the weakest side, and make 
 feigned attacks on other sides. Instead of closing with 
 the enemy, he should force them to close with him, or 
 be killed off man by man; and he should leave their 
 rear open for flight, for the cowards will make off and 
 will dismay the brave, and the fugitives can be over- 
 taken afterwards. Men-at-arms should be formed in 
 a solid mass (grosne toarhe) to enable them to break 
 through the enemy's corps ; for a corps broken through 
 is lost, and if it is thin it is easy to break. Horsemen 
 
 ' chap. ix. 
 
74 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 should never be put in front of foot, but always on the 
 wings. 
 
 Such were some of the lessons learnt in the forty years 
 of war which ended in the second expulsion of the 
 English from France. The French had found it neces- 
 sary to follow the English example, and the war was 
 carried on, not by feudal armies, but by bands of paid 
 soldiers under chiefs who had a contract with the king. 
 In time of truce their pay ceased, and they went in 
 search of employment and plunder. After the peace of 
 Bretigny (1360) several thousand men who had been in 
 English pay found their way to Italy, where they were 
 known as the White Company, and played a part in the 
 wars between Florence and her neighbours. Their leader, 
 John Hawkwood, won great renown, and founded a 
 school of condottieri. Similarly, after the truce of 1444, 
 the Dauphin (afterwards Louis XI.), to relieve France 
 of the burden of the Ecorcheurs, as some of these bands 
 were significantly called, led an army of them against 
 the Swiss. Bueil, who had learnt his trade under La 
 Hire, and had become a leading captain, was in imme- 
 diate command of the troops which won the battle of 
 St. Jacob. Some 2000 Swiss rashly crossed the Birs, 
 and assailed a force many times their own strength.' 
 They were cut to pieces, but at a cost which led Louis 
 to hold them in great respect ever after. 
 
 It was on the return of the bands from this campaign 
 that Charles VII. entered upon a reorganisation which 
 laid the foundation of the French standing army. Fifteen 
 companies of 100 " lances " each, making a total of 9000 
 men, were taken into permanent pay as regular troops 
 {compagnies d'ordonnance), and the rest of the men 
 were disbanded.^ 
 
 ' Bueil, i. p. cvi. ' lb., p. exxviii. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 75 
 
 Three years afterwards Charles tried to raise a militia 
 of bowmen. He ordered each parish to provide a " free 
 archer." This force was reorganised by Louis XL in 
 1-4G9, and was formed into four corps each consisting of 
 eight companies of .^00 men. Some were armed with 
 bills or pikes, others with bows or crossbows. But the 
 men had no common bond and no exercise in time of 
 peace ; the men-at-arms made a mock of them, and after 
 their misbehaviour at Guinegate * (1479) Louis found it 
 better to take money from the parishes and to hire 
 Swiss. An earlier attempt of the same kind had been 
 made at the end of the fourteenth century. Orders had 
 been given that in France, as in England, all the people 
 should learn the use of the bow, and practise it as a 
 pastime ; but the nobles, it is said, became alarmed at 
 their proficiency, and the orders were cancelled.^ 
 
 Some of the professional soldiers were of course drawn 
 from the lower classes, but it was held in France that 
 
 " Pour vestir fer et en armes combattre, 
 Dieu et nature ont noblesse ordonnee."^ 
 
 The industrial classes contributed little directly in the 
 way of men, but they found money. The suliermgs of 
 France made the people rally round the king, and their 
 support enabled Charles VIL to transform the taille into 
 a tax payable to the crown, instead of the feudal lord, 
 and variable at the king's pleasure. This gave him and 
 his successors the means of maintaining a standing army. 
 It paved the way for absolute monarchy in France, as 
 French kings had not to promise redress of grievances 
 in order that their chambers might vote supplies. 
 One immediate result was that, with the help of the 
 
 ' Susane, i. 43, is, 74. - Napoleon III., iv. hl'.l. 
 
 ' ]iueil, i. p. xxviii. 
 
ye THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 brothers Bureau, Charles was able to provide himself 
 with a train of artillery for which medieval fortifications 
 were no match. The towns and castles of Normandy 
 were retaken from the English with astonishing rapidity, 
 and guns began to count for something even in the 
 open field. At Formigny (1450) a force of 5000 English, 
 who had chosen a good position and intrenched it, were 
 so galled by two culverins that they sallied out, and in 
 the mAUe which ensued three-fourths of them were 
 killed. Three years afterwards, when Jean de Bueil 
 was besieging Castillon in Guienne, the aged Talbot 
 tried to storm the French intrenchments in order to 
 raise the siege. But his horse was killed by a culverin 
 shot, his men were repulsed, and he was himself de- 
 spatched by an archer as he lay on the ground.^ 
 
 While the chivalry oi France was being taught by the 
 English that it was best to fight on foot and to await 
 attack, and that well-equipped men-at-arms, with the 
 help of archers, could hold their ground against great 
 odds, the Swiss were giving the knights of Germany 
 still stranger lessons. Few in number, with scanty 
 armour, and with little use of missiles, they charged 
 and overthrew them whether mounted or on foot. At 
 Morgarten (1315) the success of the Swiss might be 
 explained by the ground; they caught the Auslrians at 
 advantage between lake and mountain. But at Laupen 
 (1339) the country was fairly open and fit for cavalry. 
 Yet 900 men of the forest cantons held their own against 
 three times their number of heavy horsemen, until the 
 men of Berne, after routing the Burgundian foot, came 
 to their assistance. 
 
 When Leopold of Austria encountered the Swiss at 
 Sempach (1386) he made his knights dismount and 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES jj 
 
 await attack, according to the approved English prac- 
 tice. The Swiss were outnumbered (by three to one, 
 according to their own account), but they charged down 
 upon the Austrian Hne in a single deep column. They 
 were repulsed, but the Austrians made no counter- 
 attack. The Swiss tried again and again, each of the 
 four cantonal contingents taking the head of the column 
 in turn, and at length Arnold of Winkelried broke the 
 Austrian array. When once intermingled, lances were no 
 match for halberds ; Leopold and half his men were killed. 
 
 Having won freedom at home, the Swiss soon sought 
 to win money abroad. Following the example of the 
 free companies, bands of them descended into Italy. 
 A body of -iOOO was met and worsted at Arbedo (1422) 
 by Milanese troops under Carmagnola, one of the best 
 of the condottieri. Finding that his horse could make 
 no impression on them, he caused them to dismount, 
 " and engaging them (the Swiss) smartly in that posture, 
 he put them all to the rout and most of them to the 
 sword." 1 This led the Council of Lucerne to decree 
 " that as things had not gone altogether well with the 
 Confederates," there should be a larger proportion of 
 pikes in future. 
 
 The league of the three forest cantons, formed in 1315, 
 had become a league of eight cantons by the middle of 
 the fourteenth century, and included two important 
 towns, Berne and Zurich. The combination of townsfolk 
 with peasantry added to their strength. The halberd — 
 which had the edge of an axe, the spike of a spear, and 
 usually a hook at the back, with a six-foot staff — was at 
 first the principal weapon ; but some of the men, chiefly 
 townsmen, had pikes ten feet long. The forces of the 
 urban cantons were made up of two classes, the citizens, 
 
 ■ Machiavelli, p. 452, 
 
78 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 and the men of the dependent communes, who were 
 sometimes officered by the citizens. The communes 
 formed separate mihtary units, unless they were small; 
 the townsmen were organised by guilds. A Zurich 
 muster-roll of 1444 shows that in a levy of 2770 men 
 (of whom 639 were townsmen) three-fifths had halberds, 
 one-fifth pikes, and one-fifth missile weapons. These 
 were mostly crossbows, but there were 61 hand-guns.^ 
 Body armour was almost confined to breast-plates and 
 head-pieces; many of the men had none. The propor- 
 tion of mounted men was very small, consisting only 
 of the wealthier citizens. The fighting value of the 
 Swiss lay, not in drill or equipment, but in their indi- 
 vidual courage, strength, endurance, and activity, and 
 in the national spirit developed among them. Their 
 ferocity helped to make them formidable. The taking 
 of prisoners was forbidden unless they were likely to 
 yield large ransoms. 
 
 The full levy of a canton was called a "banner," as 
 it had the cantonal banner with it, borne in the middle 
 of the main body, and guarded by files of halberdiers. 
 About one-fourth of the levy formed vanguard and rear- 
 guard, and these comprised all the shot, and a large 
 proportion of pikes. If van and rear closed on the main 
 body the whole would form a cross, which is mentioned 
 by Machiavelli as a Swiss formation ; but habitually the 
 three bodies were kept apart and in echelon, so that 
 they might be the better able to make flank attacks or 
 to guard against them. When a great confederate army 
 was formed by several cantons, it was also divided into 
 three bodies, each capable of fighting independently, and 
 having its own vanguard and rearguard. The depth of 
 the files varied with the numbers, for the several corps 
 ' Kustow, i. 1()3. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 79 
 
 were made approximately squares, in order that they 
 might be handier for manoeuvres, and ready to meet 
 attacks from any quarter. A communal unit furnished 
 so many files, according to its strength, and the men of 
 a file were commonly armed alike. 
 
 If a foreign prince asked for Swiss mercenaries, and 
 the request was granted by the diet of the League, the 
 diet fixed the contingent of each canton ; the cantonal 
 governments settled how many men should be furnished 
 by each commune, and the men were chosen by the 
 municipal officers or the captains. There were always 
 more men willing to go than were needed. When the 
 whole force came together it chose its leaders. The price 
 of mercenaries was about four florins a month. Payment 
 was made to the diet, which divided the sum received 
 among the cantons." 
 
 Reference has abeady been made to the fight of 
 St. Jacob (1444) between the French ^cwcheurs and 
 the Swiss. " Noblemen who had been present in many 
 engagements with the English and others have assured 
 me," says a French writer (quoted by Michelet), "that 
 they never saw or met with men who defended them- 
 selves so stoutly, or exposed their lives so daringly and 
 rashly." Louis saw that it was better to have such men 
 as allies than as enemies. He contrived to bring them 
 into the field against his rival, Charles of Burgundy 
 (known as Charles the Bold in his earlier years, but 
 latterly as Charles the Rash); and he afterwards hired 
 6000 of them himself, setting an example which his 
 successors followed for three centuries. 
 
 Charles, though a bad general, was an indefatigable 
 soldier and a painstaking organiser. Dissatisfied with the 
 feudal militia, he set to work in 1471^ to form a standing 
 
 ■ Kohler, p. 2:i. 
 
8o THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 army like that which had been initiated by Charles VII. in 
 France. This rose to the number of 2200 " lances," each 
 consisting of eight men, viz. a man-at-arms, a coutillier, 
 three mounted archers, and three men on foot, armed 
 ■with pike, crossbow or culverin. They were divided into 
 companies of 100 lances. The mounted men and the 
 infantry formed separate companies, but acted together, 
 the pikes being drawn up in line or square in front of 
 the archers, and reinforced by dismounted men-at-arms. 
 In addition to these 18,000 regulars {ordonnances'^) who 
 were mostly recruited from abroad, he had more than 
 2000 English archers, and other mercenaries, and a large 
 train of artillery. The wealthy cities of the Low Coun- 
 tries groaned under his exactions for the maintenance of 
 troops which failed him when they were put to the test. 
 
 The aggressions of Charles had raised enemies on all 
 sides, and among these was Berne, which dragged the 
 rest of the cantons along with it. While the duke was 
 besieging Neuss, in 1474, the Swiss helped to defeat his 
 lieutenant in Franche Comte ; and in the following year, 
 while he was annexing Lorraine, they attacked his ally, 
 the Duchess of Savoy. At the beginning of 1476 he 
 crossed the Juras with 25,000 men, declaring that he 
 would teach those peasants what war was like. He took 
 Granson, on the lake of Neuchatel, hanged the garrison, 
 and then marched along the lake to meet the army of the 
 Confederates, which was coming up to save the town. It 
 numbered about 16,000 foot and 500 horse. The Bur- 
 gundian cavalry charged the Swiss vanguard, but it was 
 reinforced and stood its ground. There was no room for 
 cavalry to manoeuvre between the hills and the lake, and 
 they masked the fire of the guns, so Charles told them to 
 fall back to more open country. As soon as the two wings 
 
 ' Toutey, p. '20i 71. 
 
THE MIDDLE AGES 8i 
 
 of cavalry were seen to be wheeling off to the rear, the 
 infantry drawn up behind them took it as a signal for 
 retreat, and made off with all haste, leaving the guns on 
 the field. Charles tried to rally them in vain, and the 
 cavalry soon followed them. It was a victory won, not by 
 hard fighting, but by the prestige of the Swiss and the 
 bad handling of the Burgundians. The Swiss were apt " to 
 strike their enemies with terror at their mere approach," 
 as the people of Strassburg had said when they asked 
 Berne to send them 400 men a few months before. 
 
 Charles himself, however, was not cowed, and in three 
 months he had got together a larger army than that 
 which was scattered at Granson. He reorganised his 
 regulars in eight battalions of 2000 men each, of whom 
 only one-fifth was mounted. In June he laid siege to 
 Morat, and on the 22nd he was attacked there by the 
 Confederate army sent to raise the siege. Including 
 auxiliaries from Alsace and Lorraine, it numbered 25,000 
 men or more. The advance of the Swiss was screened by 
 woods ; it took Charles by surprise, and his men were not 
 in their places. He had made an intrenchment, and 
 mounted guns to guard the flank of the position which 
 covered his principal camp ; but the Swiss worked round 
 it, and the Burgundian battalions which were first brought 
 up found themselves assailed both in front and in flank. 
 They gave way, and Charles tried in vain to fall back to a 
 fresh position. His men broke and fled ; but, hemmed in 
 by the lake, it was not easy for them to escape, and the 
 Burgundian army was practically destroyed. Its loss is 
 reckoned at 22,000. The Swiss owed their victory partly 
 to the tactical skill of their Austrian leader, Herter, but 
 mainly to their rapidity of movement and impetuosity in 
 attack. 
 
 There was little chance that the fortune of war would 
 
 F 
 
82 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 be reversed when Charles met the Swiss for the last 
 time near Nancy (January 5, 1477). He had raised a 
 fresh army, but it had dwindled during the siege of 
 Nancy to 10,000 men or less, of whom not more than 
 half could be trusted. Rene, the dispossessed Dukeot 
 Lorraine, brought up nearly double that number to raise 
 the siege, and his force included 8000 Swiss, enlisted 
 with the approval of the League, but not under " banners. 
 Against advice, Charles determined to fight, and chose 
 a position south-east of Nancy with his left on the 
 Meurthe. There were woods on his right, and these 
 toc^etherwith a snowstorm, concealed the movements of 
 Rene's army. While half of it attacked in front the 
 other half fell upon the right flank of the Burgundians. 
 Soon both flanks were turned, the guns were taken, the 
 cavalry rode off, and the infantry were cut to pieces 
 Charles disappeared; a body said to be his was found 
 some days afterwards, and was buried at Nancy One 
 of his principal officers, Campobasso, had deserted before 
 the battle, and helped to intercept the fugitives. 
 
 The armies of Charles the Rash cannot be regarded 
 as the best type of medieval armies. Every race and 
 every weapon were to be found in their ranks but they 
 were held together only by a cash nexus, ihere was 
 no common or prevailing nationality, and httle attach- 
 ment to the duke or confidence in him. Yet the down- 
 fall of the house of Burgundy, "the most flourishing 
 and celebrated of any m Christendom,- when it seemed 
 to be on the point of establishing a middle kmgdom 
 between France and Germany, made a deep impression. 
 After this achievement of the Swiss peasantry it was idle 
 to say that the wearmg of armour and the use of weapons 
 was reserved by God and nature for persons of quahty. 
 
 1 Commines, i. 34£ 
 
IV 
 
 THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 GuizOT has remarked that in the sixteenth century the 
 history of Europe becomes essentially diplomatic. Kings 
 who had hitherto been engaged in putting their own 
 houses in order, now found leisure to look abroad. To 
 bring other countries under their rule by wars or mar- 
 riages became their chief business ; and while the stronger 
 powers aimed at predominance, the weaker sought to 
 maintain the balance of power. This interest in foreign 
 politics was the cause as well as the effect of the growth 
 of royal authority. It demanded more highly organised 
 armies, capable of prolonged service abroad, and available 
 for crushing resistance at home ; and means for the 
 maintenance of such armies were furnished by the 
 wider dominions and greater wealth of the jDrincipal 
 states. 
 
 The Swiss had shown that good infantry could win 
 battles, either alone or with a small proportion of horse ; 
 and the comparative cheapness of foot soldiers made all 
 countries try to obtain troops on the Swiss model or up 
 to their standard. The Swiss retained their pre-eminence 
 for some time. " They are, to speak the truth, a very 
 warlike people," says Montluc, " and serve as it were for 
 bulwarks to an army : but then they must never want 
 either money or victuals ; for they are not to be paid 
 with words." They were apt to " carry themselves very 
 frowardly and obstinately " towards their employers, and 
 
84 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 sometimes failed them. They were enhsted either as 
 independent bands, or by agreement with the cantons 
 or the Confederation. In the latter case they carried 
 banners, and no man might fight against the banner of 
 his own canton or that of the Confederation under pain of 
 death. On this ground the Swiss hired by Ludovico 
 Sforza refused to fight the French army at Novara, in 
 1500 ; they could not do it, they said, without the leave of 
 their lords. 
 
 The earliest competitors of the Swiss as mercenaries 
 were the German landsknechts (lansquenets). It is said 
 that they were finer-looking men than the Swiss, and 
 better equipped, but not so stout-hearted, or well disci- 
 plined.^ They were freely enlisted in bands under well- 
 known captains, and owed their development in the first 
 instance to Maximilian, who recruited them in his 
 hereditary states. Most of them were armed with swords 
 and pikes, which soon increased in length from 10 feet 
 to 1 8 feet or more, but some had halberds and some had 
 firearms. In the Swiss bands also there were three 
 times as many pikes as halberds by the end of the 
 fifteenth century. 
 
 The French kings were mainly dependent on Swiss 
 and German mercenaries for their infantry. Henry VII. 
 of England told his Parliament in 1491: "France hath 
 much people and few soldiers. They have no stable 
 bands of foot. Some good horse they have." And 
 Machiavelli reported, when on a mission to France in 
 1510 : " All the nobility are devoted to military life, 
 hence the French men-at-arms are of the best in Europe. 
 The foot soldiers on the other hand are bad, being com- 
 posed of rabble and labouring folk subject to the barons, 
 and so oppressed in every act of life that they are vile. 
 
 ^ Commines, ii. 260. 
 
 i 
 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 85 
 
 Exception, however, must be made of the Gascons, who 
 being near to Spain, have something of the Spaniard, 
 and are a trifle better than the others, although in recent 
 times they have proved themselves rather thievish than 
 valiant. Yet they behave well in the defence and attack 
 of fortresses though badly in the open field. In this, too, 
 they are the reverse of the Germans and Swiss, who are 
 unrivalled in the field, but worth nothing in attack or 
 defence of fortified places." ^ 
 
 The bands of I'icardy and Piedmont, the first raised by 
 Louis XI. in 1 180, the second by Louis XII. in 1507, were 
 the beginning of the native French infantry. Bayadr 
 took charge of a company of 500 foot, which played a 
 principal part in the capture of Genoa, and many men- 
 at-arms served under him. After the Swiss had failed 
 Francis I. at Pavia (1525) he tried to provide a native 
 substitute for them by the creation of his " Legions," 
 seven provincial corps of which the strength was 
 fixed at 6000 each. But the legionaries proved poor 
 soldiers, and would not fight without Swiss or Germans 
 to support them ; the gentry complained of their mis- 
 behaviour, and it was found better to revert to a money 
 tax in lieu of personal service.- These provincial troops 
 survived, however, as a militia until the Revolution. 
 They were occasionally called out, and were of some 
 service to Louis XIV. in his later wars. 
 
 In 1506 Machiavelli persuaded the Florentines to raise 
 a militia for the defence of their liberties, instead of 
 trusting to mercenaries. It behaved well when Florence 
 was besieged in 1529, but was not able to prevent the 
 restoration of the Medici. Itahans ranked high as officers 
 and engineers, owing to their alert intelligence and large 
 practical experience of war ; but as mere fighting material 
 
 ' Villari, i. 477. » Vaissiere, p. i^H. 
 
86 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 they were no match for Swiss or Germans. With Spain 
 the case was different. Spaniards, unsurpassable in fight- 
 ing behind walls, have not generally shone in the open 
 field. At Najera in the fourteenth century as at Tala- 
 vera in the nineteenth, they compared unfavourably with 
 French and English. Wellington found them " children in 
 the art of war " ; but Gonzalo of Cordova showed in Italy, 
 as Hannibal had shown before him, that they could hold 
 their own with any troops in Europe. 
 
 " The Great Captain " and his officers had learnt their 
 trade in the ten years' war of Granada (1481-1491). A 
 corps of Swiss mercenaries was employed in it ; and in the 
 small army which Gonzalo took to Naples in 1495 there 
 was a proportion of pikes, which was increased to one-third 
 at the end of his first campaign. But the bulk of his foot 
 were armed with sword and buckler; hardy and active, 
 they were excellent light troops, but unused to fighting in 
 close order. It was in Calabria and the Southern Apen- 
 nines that he won his first successes, which helped to 
 drive the French out of Naples. In 1502 war broke out 
 again between French and Spaniards in Southern Italy, 
 and Gonzalo was blockaded in Barletta. A Spanish force 
 on its march to him from Reggio was intercepted by 
 D'Aubigny, one of the French commanders, but " by the 
 help of their bucklers and the agility of their bodies, 
 having got under their pikes, and so near that they could 
 come at them with their swords, the Spaniards had the 
 day with the slaughter of most of the Swisses." ^ A week 
 afterwards (April 27) Gonzalo, unaware of this victory, 
 and hard pressed for food, marched out from Barletta and 
 intrenched himself on a hill at Cerignola. He had 3000 
 Spanish foot and 2000 Germans. Nemours, the French 
 viceroy, attacked him with a force of Swiss and Gascons ; 
 ' Machiavelli, p. 53. 
 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 87 
 
 but the attacks were repulsed, Nemours was killed, the 
 French army was routed, and the Spaniards gained pos- 
 session of Naples. 
 
 At the battle of Ravenna (1512) artillery for the first 
 time played a decisive part in the field. The cavalry of 
 the Spanish army was so galled by the French guns that 
 they left their position and advanced to the attack, 
 followed by the foot. The French won a complete vic- 
 tory, yet the manner in which the Spanish infantry, 
 under Peter of Navarre, made good their retreat added 
 to their reputation. "At the first encounter with the 
 Lance-knights they were somewhat shaken by the firm 
 and close order of the pikes, yet coming afterwards to 
 the sword's point, many of the Spaniards covered with 
 their targets, running with their daggers and short 
 weapons between the legs of the Lance-knights, they 
 came with a wonderful slaughter almost to the very 
 midst of their squadron." ' Finding the day was lost, 
 they retired slowly, beating off all the charges of the 
 French, and killing Gaston de Foix, who himself led one 
 of them. Peter of Navarre (the man who first showed 
 what might be done with gunpowder in mines) was taken 
 prisoner. 
 
 The increased use of firearms, and especially of artillery, 
 was detrimental to the shock tactics of the Swiss. They 
 resisted change, and made it their rule to go straight 
 for the guns. Death was the penalty for any man who 
 broke rank, or even showed signs of fear. At Novara 
 (1514) they redeemed the credit which they had lost there 
 fourteen years before, by a night sortie in which they 
 routed the French besieging army and took their guns. 
 At Melegnano (1515) they attacked the French army 
 with the same impetuosity, and in greater force, but not 
 
 ' Guicciardini, p. 41b. 
 
88 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 under cover of darkness. The country was intersected 
 with ditches, which furnished successive lines of defence, 
 and hindered movement. They forced the French to fall 
 back, but the guns and the Gascon crossbowmen inflicted 
 heavy loss on them and kept them in check, until 
 (oQ the second day of the fighting) the approach of 
 the Venetian army obliged them to retreat to Milan, 
 whence they returned to their own country with lessened 
 
 Having re-entered the service of France, they met with 
 another reverse at the aifair of La Bicocca (1522). Some 
 8000 of them insisted on trying to storm Lntrenchments 
 held by Spanish shot, without waiting for the turning 
 movement which their commander, Lautrec, wished to 
 make. They broke in, but before they could re-form 
 they were charged by landsknechts, and were beaten 
 with a loss of nearly half their number. It was perhaps 
 from the discouragement of this affair that three years 
 afterwards at Pavia the Swiss "did nothing answer the 
 valour they had been accustomed to show in battles." ^ 
 Attacked by the Spaniards both in front and flank, they 
 broke and fled ; owing to their behaviour, to the effec- 
 tiveness of the Spanish infantry fire, and to his own 
 impetuosity, Francis I. lost the day and became the 
 prisoner of Charles V. 
 
 In his dialogues on the Art of War, Machiavelli com- 
 pared the Swiss pikemen to the Macedonian phalanx 
 and the Spanish sword-and-bucklermen to the Roman 
 legionaries. He thought that the phalanx was bound 
 to fail, as it had failed in ancient times, against good 
 infantry armed with weapons better suited for hand-to- 
 hand fighting. He would give swords and bucklers to 
 half his foot, pikes to one-third, and the remaining sixth 
 ' Guicciardini, p. 636. 
 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 89 
 
 should be light troops, armed with harquebuses, cross- 
 bows, partizans or halberds. Brantome speaks slightingly 
 of " ce bon galant de Machiavel, mauvais instructour de 
 guerre certes " ; but he says the Duke of Guise told him 
 that he would give a good account of a battalion of 
 5000 or 6000 Swiss if he had 1500 young and active 
 soldiers (Basques, Gascons, or Spaniards) armed with 
 good harquebuses and long daggers, and formed in four 
 or five bands, to attack and retire alternately after the 
 Arab fashion.^ Soldiers of repute in later days — Maurice 
 of Nassau, Rohan, and MontecucoUi — bad a leaning 
 towards bucklermen. Nevertheless the long pike (5^ 
 to 6 yards) prevailed, and for two centuries held the 
 first place among hand weapons. The Spaniards them- 
 selves discarded their bucklers, and halberds became 
 confined to the colour-guard and the sergeants. They 
 were more convenient to carry and to use in a me'Zee, 
 but they were not so well suited to orderly fighting in 
 close formation, and were at any rate reserved for the 
 rear ranks. 
 
 Sir John Smythe, writing at the end of the sixteenth 
 century, described how pikes should charge. There 
 should be no fencing with the enemy, but the first four 
 ranks should close up, and level their pikes. "Moving 
 forward together pace with pace and step with step, 
 carrying their pikes firmly with both their hands breast 
 high, their points full in their enemy's faces, they do 
 altogether give a puissant thrust." If this does not 
 overthrow the enemy they must drop their pikes or 
 throw them forward into the enemy's ranks, and 
 attack with sword and dagger, one in each hand.'- The 
 Spanish sword, which was longer and more sharp-pointed 
 than those of the Swiss and Germans, found favour 
 
 ' Susane, i. 177. = /nstntcUuna ami (Inlcrs Military, \\\\. 25, &c. 
 
90 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 generally; Smythe complained that good old-fashioned 
 broadswords of three-quarters of a yard were being super- 
 seded by rapiers of a yard and a quarter. 
 
 The Spaniards made more use of defensive armour than 
 the Swiss, and this gave them an advantage in close fight- 
 ing. Their pikemen wore morions, gorgets, corslets, and 
 tasses (jointed thigh-pieces); and other nations followed 
 their example in so far as the individual soldier could be 
 persuaded to bear the burden. Men grew impatient of it 
 as firearms became more effective, for the armour increased 
 in weight and was a doubtful protection. 
 
 Hand-guns may be traced back to the fourteenth 
 century. They were small cannon mounted on sticks, 
 with a touch-hole to which a match was applied. They 
 were chiefly used in sieges, and in the fifteenth century 
 they came to be known as hand-culverins. They threw 
 leaden bullets of an ounce or two, and weighed about 
 10 lbs. Charles of Burgundy attached a " coulevrinier " 
 to each lance, and Edward IV., when he landed at 
 Ravenspur in 1471, brought with him 300 culverin-men 
 whom Charles had obtained for him. The Swiss also 
 were well provided with them. In the latter part of the 
 fifteenth century the hand-gun was made into a match- 
 lock by the addition of a cock to hold the match and a 
 trigger to bring it down on the pan. The stock was also 
 curved or crooked, so that the piece could be aimed and 
 fired [ from the shoulder. " Hakenbiichse," or simply 
 " haken," was the name given to such arms in Germany. 
 This became hackbuss or haquebut in England, as im- 
 ported direct, and harquehos after passing through Italy 
 and France. The latter name, especially in its Latinised 
 form, arciis husus, suggests connection with the cross- 
 bow; but this was probably mistaken etymology, like 
 " Lance-knights." 
 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 91 
 
 Germans and Spaniards took readily to firearms, while 
 the English preferred the longhow, and the Gascons 
 the crossbow. There was groat variety in the length, 
 weight, and calibre of the firearms. There were demi- 
 haques, probably for use on horseback; and again there 
 were haquebuts and harquebuses a croc, that is to say, 
 with a hook to catch on a wall or stand, and take the 
 recoil. These wall-pieces sometimes weighed as much 
 as 50 lbs., and had bullets of 3 or 4 ounces, while 
 the ordinary harquebus bullet weighed about 1 ounce. 
 In 1520 the Spaniards took an important step by the 
 adoption of a portable fork. This enabled them to bring 
 into the field an arm 6 feet long and weighing about 
 15 lbs., which fired a 2-ounce bullet and had an 
 effective range of 400 paces. This weapon soon became 
 known as the musket {i.e. sparrow-hawk). Musketeers 
 carried fifteen rounds of ammunition, the charges being 
 in separate wooden cases hung from a bandoleer. Ten 
 men per company of the Spanish shot at Pavia were 
 armed with muskets, and helped to win the battle, for 
 the unwonted penetration of their bullets disordered the 
 ranks of the French men-at-arms. The Spaniards were 
 broken up into small parties, which moved about rapidly, 
 "donnant des tours et faisant des voltes de ra et de 
 lit, d'une part et d' autre." ' 
 
 Bayard had been killed by a harquebus ball the year 
 before ; and though firearms were less accurate than the 
 crossbow, and took longer to load, French leaders soon 
 found it best to adopt them for half their shot. Montluc 
 helped to bring this about, though he regarded the 
 harquebus as " the Devil's invention to make us murther 
 one another," and wished to God that this accursed 
 engine had never been inv(!nted. The French harque- 
 
 ' Brantome, i. 2!t7. 
 
92 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 buses were often light, taking bullets of less than an 
 ounce in weight. Those that were of normal bore came 
 to be distinguished as arquebuses de calibre, and were 
 called in England calivers.i 
 
 There were mounted harquebusiers in the army with 
 which Charles VIII. invaded Italy in 1494. The use of 
 firearms by mounted men increased, and as the lighted 
 match was embarrassmg on horseback, a wheel-lock 
 which struck sparks was introduced for their benefit, 
 though it was too expensive for general use. Wheel- 
 lock pistols (so called because their bore corresponded 
 to the coin) became a favourite weapon for cavalry by 
 the middle of the sixteenth century. The proportion of 
 horse to foot decreased, and the character of the horse 
 changed. The " furnished lance " — the man-at-arms with 
 his attendants — died out. The German heavy cavalry 
 (Reiters) were mostly individual troopers, formed in very 
 deep squadrons, sometimes of fifty ranks, and armed with 
 pistols. They were supplemented by separate bodies of 
 light horsemen armed with lance or harquebus. The 
 Reiters wore armour proof against the harquebus, and 
 this led Alva to raise the proportion of musketeers in 
 a company to one-fourth of the shot; in time they 
 became more than half. 
 
 The excellence of the Spanish infantry was generally 
 recognised. La None held them up as an example to his 
 countrymen for their subordination and good-fellowship, 
 for the pains taken by the older soldiers to teach the 
 young ones their duty, and for their strictness in regard 
 to the wearing of armour." Sir Roger Williams, Avho had 
 served with them and against them, spoke of the careful 
 selection of officers, and declared that " no army that ever 
 I saw passes that of Duke de Parma for discipline and 
 
 ' Grose, ii. 295. - La Noue, p. 174. 
 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 93 
 
 good order." As for the race from which they sprang, he 
 said it was well known that they were the basest and most 
 cowardly of people : one Englishman was a match for 
 three Spaniards. But practice had made them perfect. 
 "Their state is governed with two sorts of people, captains 
 and clergy. As the captains' ambition persuades the king 
 to increase his wars to maintain their estate in wealth and 
 greatness ; so doth the clergy persuade him also to wars 
 to maintain their state against them of religion. By this 
 means the state of Spain during this government can 
 never be without wars ; continual wars must make expert 
 soldiers." » None but trained soldiers were brought into 
 the field, their places in the Spanish garrisons being taken 
 by recruits {besonios). 
 
 WiUiams's insular contempt for the raw material was 
 unwarranted. The Spanish recruit, drawn chiefly from 
 the more rugged provinces of the north, was hardy, tem- 
 perate, patient of fatigue and privation, quick to learn the 
 use of arms, and apt for all kmds of service under good 
 leadership. He respected authority, but he was greedy of 
 money, and mutinied if he was kept long without pay or 
 plunder. But the main causes of the excellence of the 
 Spanish infantry at this particular time are those which 
 Williams indicated. The long struggle with the Moors 
 had thrown the whole energy of the nation into a military 
 channel, while intensifying its stress on creed. War was 
 the only fit occupation for an hidalgo, unless he turned 
 monk; and every one wished to pass for an hidalgo. 
 There was a general distaste for trade and agriculture. 
 The discovery of America opened fresh fields for adven- 
 ture, and the gold that came from it made industry less 
 imperative. Devotion to church and king had become a 
 passion, and to serve in the wars was to serve both. The 
 
 ' Williams, p. 11. 
 
94 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 bond of comradeship was developed by prolonged service 
 among alien peoples in Italy or the Low Countries, and 
 also the bond of attachment to their officers. The officers 
 were the pick of the nation, for men of the highest rank 
 were proud to have the charge of a company of foot, and 
 often preferred it to a cavalry command. 
 
 The battle of Mook (1574), though a small aifivir, showed 
 the superiority of the Spaniards to the French and Ger- 
 man mercenaries which the Nassau princes at first brought 
 against them. Lewis of Nassau was trying to join his 
 brother, William of Orange, with 6000 foot and 2000 horse 
 when he was intercepted by Sancho d'Avila, who had 
 only 4000 foot and less than 1000 horse. D'Avila attacked 
 the Nassau army, though its front was covered by in- 
 trenchments, and its left rested on the Meuse ; and after 
 some hard fighting he completely routed it, killing the 
 commander and half his men.^ Next day the Spaniards 
 mutinied, elected a chief according to their custom, 
 marched to Antwerp and quartered themselves on the 
 wealthiest citizens, until they received a sufficient instal- 
 ment of the arrears of pay that were due to them. 
 
 With the best troops in Christendom, the widest 
 dominions, and a stream of gold and silver flowing in 
 from America it seems strange that Philip II. should 
 have failed to crush the insurrection in the Low Countries, 
 and that his failure should have been due to want of 
 money. There is no better example of the extent to 
 which industrial efficiency lies at the root of military effici- 
 ency. Industry of all kinds was despised and neglected 
 in Spain, and trade suffered from Government restric- 
 tions. The treasure that came from the other side of the 
 Atlantic soon found its way to other countries where it 
 could be used as capital for production. It did little per- 
 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 95 
 
 manent good to the Spaniards, and its abundance raised 
 prices. The share of it that went into the king's coftcrs 
 seems to have been under a miUion of ducats a year. 
 When Alva left the Netherlands in 1573 the war was 
 costing more than seven millions a year. His army 
 numbered 62,000 men, but of these only 8000 were 
 Spimiards, for the scanty population of the Peninsula 
 could not bear the continuous drain upon it. Many pro- 
 vinces were exempt from service abroad, so that the 
 burden fell mainly on Castile. 
 
 Even before war began in the Netherlands the expendi- 
 ture was in excess of the revenue, and the loans raised 
 by Philip and his father had mounted up to thirty-five 
 millions, or aliout seven years' income. A third of the 
 revenue came from the Low Countries, and was cut off by 
 the war. Half of the provinces were lost to Spain, and the 
 other half were ruined. Antwerp, the centre of the world's 
 trade, and the richest city in Philip's dominions, was 
 throttled by the Dutch and sacked by the Spaniards. 
 It lost half its population, and its trade passed to 
 Amsterdam, furnishing the United Provinces with fresh 
 means of resistance, and helping the Dutch to gain 
 a predominance at sea which ultimately secured their 
 independence. 
 
 The burghers of Holland were even less able than 
 German mercenaries to face Spanish troops in the field 
 But they could fight behind walls, and their cities, even if 
 taken, cost the Spaniards losses which they could ill afford 
 Things looked black for the States in 1585, when 
 William the Silent had been killed, Parma had retaken 
 Antwerp, and Elizabeth was at length moved to inter- 
 vene. Yet the Englishmen who went out with Leicester 
 were astonished at the flourishing aspect of the United 
 Provinces, the wealth of the cities, and the industry of the 
 
96 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 people ; while Parma was telling Philip that no language 
 could describe the misery of the " reconciled provinces " — 
 Artois, Hainault, and Flanders. Practice and regular 
 pay soon raised the quality of the Dutch troops, and 
 the methodical genius of Maurice of Nassau developed a 
 mode of warfare in which the spade played a leading part, 
 and formed a new school of tactics. 
 
 The bands or companies of hired soldiers raised by 
 captains were combined into larger units under the 
 "regiment" of a captain-general or colonel. The latter 
 name at first denoted the body, not the chief, and seems 
 to have been derived, like cornet, from " corno," a horn ; 
 for the wings sometimes protruded like horns.^ Follow- 
 ing the Spanish custom, the word was at first spelt 
 coronell in England, and it is still pronounced accordingly. 
 The strength and number of companies in a regiment 
 varied widely. In 1526 Frundsberg formed a regiment 
 of thirty- five companies with a total of 12,000 men ; but 
 ten companies of 300 men each was the normal strength 
 of German regiments. The French and Spanish com- 
 panies were smaller. Alva took with him to the Nether- 
 lands forty-nine companies of foot averaging 180 men each. 
 They formed four Tercios, a name borrowed originally 
 (according to Hexham and Lord Orrery) from the three 
 divisions of an army— van, battle, and rear. 
 
 Regiments were administrative, not tactical units. The 
 tactical unit was the battalion, a square or rectangle 
 formed of the pikes of so many companies, drawn up 
 side by side, with their shot variously disposed inside or 
 outside. " When the enemy are superior in horse and 
 we few or none, it is good to get the four fronts of the 
 battle of equal resistance both to ofiend and defend," 
 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 97 
 
 says an Irishman ^ who served with the Spaniards. 
 Apprehension of cavalry caused a preference for large 
 squares. When Charles V. marched against the Turks 
 in 1532 his pikemen, numbering 70,000, are said to have 
 been formed into three vast squares. At Dreux (1562) 
 the 5000 Swiss of the Catholic army, " beset on all sides, 
 but standing firm in a close order and doubled battalia " - 
 (('.('. twice as many men in rank as in file), beat oft' the 
 repeated charges of some 4000 Huguenot horse supported 
 by harquebusiers, and shattered a regiment of lands- 
 knechts. Their obstinate resistance allowed Guise with 
 the other division of the CathoHc army to win the day. 
 
 But large squares were slow and unwieldy, especially on 
 broken ground ; and they offered good targets for artillery, 
 as was shown at St. Quentin (1557). La Noue argued that 
 two squares of 2000 men supporting one another would be 
 better able to cross open country in face of cavalry than 
 a single square of 4000 men. The increasing numbers of 
 shot, and the larger part they came to play, affected the 
 question. Large hollow squares afforded them a better 
 refuge when they were driven in, for by doubling the 
 number of files of pikes the interior space was increased 
 fourfold. But it took time to get a large number of men 
 into and out of a square, and while they were inside they 
 could be practically of no use ; nor did a mere envelope of 
 pikes offer the resistance of a solid body. It was found 
 better to form the shot round the square as an " impale- 
 ment" of three or four ranks, so that they could be 
 sheltered from cavalry by the projecting pikes and could 
 use their weapons. Small squares served better for this 
 disposition than large ones, and placed chequerwise they 
 formed "cross-battles," with space between them for 
 baggage. 
 
 ' Barry, p. 1.30. « Davila, p. 82. 
 
 G 
 
98 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 The proportion of shot in the infantry rose in the course 
 of the century from one-fourth to three-fifths, even with 
 well-organised troops like the Spaniards. In the Hugue- 
 not and Catholic levies of the French wars of religion it 
 sometimes amounted to nine-tenths. Chiefs of experience, 
 like Montluc and La Noue, opposed the current in vain. 
 " Harquebusiers without pikes," said the latter, " are arms 
 and legs without a body." Frenchmen generally disliked 
 the pike and the corslet. As a French captain explained, 
 " we have not such personable bodies as you Englishmen 
 have to bear them ; neither have we them at that com- 
 mandment as you have ; but are forced to hire other nations 
 to supply our insufficiency." i As usual in civil wars, raids 
 and surprises played a prominent part, and for such expedi- 
 tions harquebusiers and light horsemen were best fitted. 
 
 Troops that were weak in pikes or heavy cavalry 
 avoided pitched battles, and if they were forced to fight 
 they sought, by choice of ground or use of intrenchments, 
 to delay collision and develop fire-effect. This was 
 especially the case in the Low Countries after the early 
 defeats incurred by the princes of Nassau. If cavalry 
 charges on flank or rear could be guarded against, the 
 depth of formation might be reduced and the front 
 broadened. The normal order of a battalion was a central 
 body of pikes with sleeves or wings of shot, as with the 
 men-at-arms and archers of the fourteenth century. The 
 shot were thrown forward to skirmish as the enemy 
 approached, and covered the front of the pikes, falling 
 back on either hand when collision was imminent. If the 
 units were large and the sleeves consequently wide, cavalry 
 could break through them on a broad front. This was 
 another reason for preferring small battalions, some of 
 which could be held in reserve and brought up quickly. 
 
 ' Scott, ii. 60. 
 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 99 
 
 Miuhiavclli at the beginning of the century had recom- 
 mended battaKons of 400 men, formed in three lines after 
 the Roman fashion. Maurice, who was also a careful 
 student of the Greek and Roman writers on tactics, came 
 to much the same conclusion. Putting aside the notion 
 of a square, large or small, he regulated the depth of his 
 formation by what was needed for attack and defence. 
 Ten ranks gave sufficient solidity to the pikes, and also 
 suited the shot, as they gave sufficient time for reloading. 
 " Our discipline of embattailing our army," wrote Lord 
 Burgh in 1595, "is according to the Roman dizeniers, 
 every tenth man knowing his place, and the soldiers 
 distributed into lines after their tenths, who going before 
 them bring them to their ranks. Our form is curious and 
 ready ; I would the exercise against our enemy might 
 commend our order." 1 Count Lewis William of Nassau, 
 stadtholder of Friesland, with whom Maurice discussed 
 these questions, and who had written a work on the 
 second Punic war, thought the new order too shallow ; 
 he preferred to follow the Emperor Leo, and form the 
 infantry sixteen deep. 
 
 Events, however, justified Maurice. Hexham, who has 
 given the best Enghsh description of the Low Country 
 practice, says: "The fittest number of men to make a 
 division of is accounted to be 500 pikes and musketeers, 
 that is 25 files of pikes and 25 files of musketeers, or more 
 or less of one or of the other as they fall out. This 
 number being so embattled makes an agile body, and the 
 best to be brought to fight, and two of them being joined 
 near one another can best second and relievo each other, 
 better than your great phalanges, which are unwieldy 
 bodies." ^ The three divisions of the infantry (van, battle, 
 and rear) each constituted a brigade, and each brigade 
 ' HutfieldiMSS., v. 288. ^ Hexham, i). IS). 
 
loo THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 was formed in three lines, with a space of 100 yards 
 between the first and second, and 200 yards between the 
 second and third. The battalions of each line stood in 
 echelon to those in front of thera, and were single or in 
 pairs according to the strength of the brigade. It had 
 been the custom for the ranks of musketeers to relieve 
 one another after firing by the countermarch of files, and 
 the intervals between files were made wide enough for 
 this. Maurice formed his musketeers into sections of 
 about four files, with passage-ways between the sections, 
 and made the men countermarch by ranks. 
 
 " The true rules of war," says a soldier trained in the 
 Dutch school, " are never to fight but upon two occasions : 
 the one being upon a great advantage, the other on a 
 great necessity." ' Regardless of sneers at " these digging 
 moles whom with undeserved fame the spade hath 
 raised," ^ Maurice avoided battles ; and his new order was 
 first put to the test against his will. He had invested 
 Nieuport (1600) when the Spaniards came up unexpectedly 
 to its relief. The two armies were nearly equal in num- 
 bers, about 10,000 foot and 1500 horse. The dimes or 
 sandhills east of the haven formed the central part of the 
 position which Maurice took up. They had a width of 
 about a quarter of a mile. On the left, between the 
 dunes and the sea, there was a strip of shore which nar- 
 rowed to 30 yards as the tide rose ; and on the right there 
 was a level space of 150 yards between the dunes and the 
 field enclosures, known as the greenway. The position, 
 therefore, had a front of less than half a mile, and the 
 central part of it was unsuited to cavalry. This enabled 
 Maurice to draw up his army with its three brigades, one 
 behind another instead of side by side. The vanguard, 
 commanded by Francis Vere, was in front ; it consisted of 
 ' Dalton, ii. 403. - Hatfield MSS., v. 285. 
 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY loi 
 
 1600 English (24 companies) and 2500 Frisians (17 com- 
 panies). Two companies of Maurice's guards were added 
 to it. According to the order of battle (as given by 
 Hexham) the English were to form two pairs of battalions 
 in front line, and the Frisians two pairs of battalions in 
 second line, the latter bemg placed in echelon on the 
 outer flanks. There was to be no third line, as the other 
 brigades furnished reserves. 
 
 This symmetrical arrangement had to be modified to 
 fit the ground. Vere describes the dunes as "so con- 
 fusedly packed together, so brokenly and steeply, that 
 the troops could neither well discover what was done 
 a stone's oast before them, nor advance forward in 
 any order, to second if need were." ' He placed 300 men 
 on a prominent hillock, and 200 on another which was 
 100 yards in rear of it and rather higher. These east 
 and west hills were connected by saddles on the north 
 and on the south. On the south saddle Vere posted 500 
 Frisian musketeers, to fire upon any horse that might 
 advance along the greenway. On the north saddle he 
 posted 700 of the English, so forming a cross-battle of 
 1700 men. The rest of the English (650) were placed 
 on the sands in two battalions, and behind them, nearer 
 to the sea, were the rest of the Frisians (2000) in two 
 pairs of battalions, guarding a battery of six guns which 
 .swept the shore. 
 
 The archduke Albrecht who commanded the Spaniards 
 tried first to push along the shore, but his cavalry was 
 driven back by the fire of the battery. His chief reliance 
 was upon his foot, so he turned towards the dunes, and 
 his van attacked the troops posted on east hill. His 
 pikemen were massed in four large squares of more than 
 1000 men each, one forming the van, two the centre, and 
 
 ' Vere, p. MS. 
 
102 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 one the rear. The centre battalions came up on the 
 left of the van, and the rear on the left of the centre 
 but were checked by the fire of the Frisian musketeers 
 There was an obstinate fight for the east hill. Vere 
 called up all his English troops, but he was overmatched, 
 and was not reinforced by the other brigades. He was 
 wounded, and his men were driven down to the battery 
 on the shore. A charge of cavalry checked the Spaniards 
 in their pursuit and saved the guns. The English rallied 
 and advanced again, and Maurice moved up the centre 
 brigade upon their right. The reserve cavalry charged 
 along the greenway, and routed the Spanish horse on 
 that side. The heavy masses of the Spanish foot, dis- 
 ordered by prolonged fighting on broken ground, and 
 wearied by a long march under a July sun, at length 
 gave way. The admiral of Aragon, who was one of the 
 prisoners taken, ascribed the victory to Maurice's judg- 
 ment in placing his artillery and in husbanding his 
 infantry and cavalry, instead of engaging them all at 
 once, as the Spaniards did. 
 
 "If you intend to have a well-commanded army you 
 must pay them punctually, and then your general can 
 with justice punish them severely." i Regular pay and 
 good administration, as against systematic neglect, was 
 transferring to the Dutch the pre-eminence which had 
 belonged to the Spaniards. Antonio Donato pronounced 
 the States' soldiers to be the best in the world, and gave 
 the first place to the English infantry, " best beloved by 
 the natives; brave, patient veterans."^ The war in the 
 Low Countries was indeed, as some one wrote to Wal- 
 singham in 1585, " a school to breed up soldiers to defend 
 the freedom of England, which through these long times 
 
 1 Monk, p. 22. - Motley, iv. 520. 
 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 103 
 
 of peace axid quietness is brought into a most dangerous 
 estate if it should be attempted." ' The character of 
 the English people is described by Meteren and Rohan 
 nmch as it was described by Frolssarl two centuries 
 before: they were stout-hearted and vehement, proud, 
 cruel, and suspicious of strangers. But under the Tudors 
 they had fallen behind other countries in military prac- 
 tice. There was no standing army, and the county militia 
 (or trained bands) was worth little. In 1574 Elizabeth 
 had occasion to intimate to one of the lord-lieutenants 
 that "besides the lack of furniture of armour, Her 
 Majesty also perceiveth that in the whole realm there 
 is lack of men exercised and trained in feats of war, 
 either to wear their armour, to use their weapons, to 
 march in order, to do such things as be requisite";^ and 
 the case was no better at the time of the Armada. 
 
 When a force was raised for service abroad, the men 
 were no longer as of old the retainers or tenantry of their 
 leaders. The Tudors had done their best to destroy the 
 feudal bond, and no badges were allowed but the St. 
 George's cross. The companies for the Low Countries 
 were raised largely by "press," in default of volunteers; 
 the press was sometimes "so disorderly performed . . . 
 that it is a grievance at home and a scandal abroad " ; ^ 
 and the better sort of the men pressed provided "paddy 
 persons" as their substitutes. Leicester's muster-master 
 complained to Walsingham of the bands sent out as raw, 
 weak, ill-equipped, and ill-armed, and said that " if they 
 should be carried to the field no better trained than yet 
 they are, they would prove much more dangerous to their 
 own leaders and companies than any ways serviceable on 
 their enemies." ^ The wastage from death, disease, and 
 
 > Scott, i. .379. 2 76., ,350. 
 
 » Dalton, i. 82. « Motley, i. 371. 
 
104 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 desertion was very large, sometimes 75 per cent, in a 
 year; yet these men with proper handling were turned 
 into excellent soldiers. 
 
 Spears, bills, and bows were the English weapons for 
 the greater part of the century. A few foreign harque- 
 busiers, horse and foot, fought under Somerset at Pinkie 
 (1547), and by degrees firearms superseded bows, and 
 pikes superseded the shorter hand weapons. The best of 
 the London trained bands had discarded the bow by 1559, 
 and all of them had done so by 1588. In 1595 the Privy 
 Council decided that it should be disused altogether by 
 the regular trained bands throughout the country. It 
 had its advocates, however, then and for long after- 
 wards; foremost among them being Sir John Smythe, 
 who had served under Alva and Montmorency, and dis- 
 liked the new fashions brought over from the Low 
 Countries. 
 
 He claimed for the bow that it was much lighter than 
 the musket, and had a longer range and more accuracy 
 than the harquebus or caliver, which was of no account 
 beyond four score paces. It could shoot four or five 
 times as fast, and was much less apt to fail or to get out 
 of order in bad weather. Arrows made worse wounds 
 than bullets, and many ranks of archers could shoot at 
 one time, instead of two ranks only. 
 
 A more practical soldier, Sir Roger Williams, took the 
 other side, resting his case on the musket rather than the 
 harquebus. When men had been three months in the 
 field, he said, not one in ten had strength enough to 
 shoot much beyond a furlong. Bowmen were afraid of 
 musketeers, and in shooting from cover they were much 
 more exposed. Arrows hurt horses, but could not pene- 
 trate good armour, like the musket-ball. They could not 
 be so readily supplied in the field as powder and bullets. 
 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 105 
 
 He considered that 500 musketeers would be of more use 
 than 1500 archers. 
 
 "As for shooting four for one," says another writer, 
 " there is no archer that can shoot two for one, if the 
 harquebuzier be perfect and well trained." 1 This, how- 
 ever, seems to rest on a strange underestimate of what 
 could be done with the bow, for he claims that with a 
 harquebus he could fire forty shots an hour. For the 
 liarquchus a croc the rate of tire was even slower, twenty- 
 tive shots an hour; while a good archer could .shoot ten 
 arrows in a minute. But whatever we may think of the 
 weight of argument on each side, the longbow went the 
 way of the crossbow, and the English people lost a valuable 
 asset. " When I was in the French king's service, amongst 
 the old bands of footmen," says Barwick, "I did greatly 
 commend the force of the longbow, but how was I 
 answered : to be short even thus, ' Non, non, Anglois, 
 vostre cause est bien salle, car dieu nous a donnes moyen 
 de vous encountrer apres un autre sorte que en temps 
 passe.' . . . Now, saith he, the weakest of us are able to 
 give greater wounds than the greatest and strongest 
 archer you have."^ 
 
 ' Barwick, p. 17. - Ih., p. 14. 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 The Dutch war of independence was practically brought 
 to an end by the truce of 1609. From its character and 
 conditions, infantry had played the chief part in it, and 
 the fire-action of infantry had been greatly developed. 
 Cavalry had won some victories [e.g. Turnhout) and con- 
 tributed to others, but it had nevertheless declined in 
 numbers and in general estimation. In 1567, 6000 Swiss 
 escorted Charles IX. from Meaux to Paris undeterred 
 by the Huguenot horse which hung round them. Sir 
 Roger Williams knew no reason why 2000 pikemen and 
 1000 musketeers should not be able to make good their 
 retreat across ten miles of open country in spite of 3000 
 horsemen, however well equipped.^ Gerard Barry, who 
 served with the Spaniards, held that good cavalry "are 
 not comparable to deal with resolute foot, except upon 
 manifest and great advantages, and in place or ground of 
 great favour for them." " Lord Wimbledon deplored the 
 distaste which Englishmen had taken to service on horse- 
 back, for which their national character so well fitted 
 them.3 
 
 When the twelve years' truce expired, and Maurice and 
 SpLnola again faced one another on the lower Rhine, the 
 cavalry of the two armies numbered only 10,000 out of a 
 total of 60,000. The war which was then resumed in 
 the Low Countries, and went on till 1648, was of much 
 
 1 Williams, p. 43. - Barry, p. 135. ^ Dalton, ii. 329. 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 107 
 
 the saiiie character as before, a war of sieges and in- 
 trenched positions. But it was now merely one section of 
 the Thirty Years' war, the great coUision between the Pro- 
 testants of the north and the Cathohcs of the south, and 
 the most eventful fighting took place elsewhere. The Ger- 
 man war of religion was carried on largely by adventurers 
 and mercenaries, who had no base, no system of supplies, 
 but lived upon the country. For such soldiering mounted 
 men were most fitted, because of their mobility ; and for 
 the same reason, the lighter classes of cavalry were prefer- 
 able to the heaviest class. Full armour must be made 
 intolerably heavy to be even pistol-proof, and if it was not 
 proof the broken fragments of it made wounds worse. It 
 wore out the horses, and if the riders were dismounted 
 they were helpless. It was generally reduced, therefore, 
 to back and breast plates, with a pot-helmet or skull-cap. 
 Leather in the form of buff-coats and top-boots replaced 
 arm-guards, thigh-pieces, greaves, and solerets of steel. 
 
 The lance was laid aside, and shock tactics were super- 
 seded by fire tactics. Cavalry charged at the trot, and 
 when close to the enemy caracolled ; that is to say, suc- 
 cessive ranks fired, turned to the left, and filed off to the 
 rear. Only when the enemy was shaken by this fire, did 
 they push in and engage hand to hand. In dealing with 
 infantry the carbineers or harquebusiers charged first, 
 and the cuirassiers, if there were any, followed in support, 
 to take advantage of any disorder which the others might 
 cause.i They were armed with sword and pistols. 
 
 Dragoons (or dragooners), so named from their weapon, 
 which was a short piece of musket calibre, now began to 
 form a recognised part of an army. " The dragoons," says 
 Ward,- " are no less than a foot company consisting of 
 pikes and muskets, only for their quicker expedition they 
 ' Ward, p. 317. - Ih., p. 294. 
 
io8 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 are mounted upon horses." Monk lays down that there 
 should be a troop of dragooners to every regiment of horse. 
 Sometimes the cavalry soldiers took up musketeers be- 
 hind them, and Maurice (in 1603) had 3000 pack-saddles 
 or "cushions" made, for two musketeers each. The 
 causes which led to the introduction of mounted infantry, 
 led also to the equipment of cavalry for fighting on foot, 
 e.g. the " mousquetaires " of the guard of Louis XIII. 
 
 In the desultory fighting of the wars of religion light 
 horsemen proved very useful ; Croats and Hungarians 
 (Hussars) trained on the Turkish frontier came to be in 
 request elsewhere, and were even taken into the French 
 service. Altogether it appears that in the middle of the 
 Thirty Year.s' war nearly one-third of the soldiers who 
 took part in it were mounted ; on the battle-fields the 
 proportion was larger, owing to the detachment of foot for 
 garrison duties. At Freiburg in 1644 there were as many 
 horse as foot on both sides. Montecuccoli put the mounted 
 men at two-fifths of an army. Monk (who had served in 
 the Low Countries, and wrote in 1646) was of much the 
 same opinion : for the open field there should be two foot 
 to one horseman, besides dragoons ; but " where the ser- 
 vice of your army shall be most in sieges," the proportion 
 might be three or even four to one.* Rohan would have 
 three to one for an open country, five to one for a close 
 country.- 
 
 The proportion was four to one in the army which 
 Gustavus Adolphus brought to Germany in 1630. 
 Sweden was a poor country and horses were scarce. 
 When the British Government talked of withdrawing 
 its troops from the Peninsula in 1811, Wellington replied 
 that the choice lay between fighting the French abroad 
 or at home. Similarly it was in self-defence that 
 » Monk, p. 35. - Rohan, p. 265. 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 109 
 
 Gustavus went to the aid of the German Protestants. 
 If they were crushed by the Catholic powers his own 
 turn would come next. As he wrote to Oxenstiern : 
 " We must remove the seat of war to some other quarter 
 than Sweden, for we are nowhere weaker than in Sweden." ' 
 His intention at first was to " clear the seaside " between 
 the Elbe and the Oder, and make that country the base of 
 his further operations. But success depended on his 
 rallying to him the disheartened Protestant princes, and 
 he found himself obHged to cut loose from his base and 
 to plunge into Southern Germany. His achievements 
 swelled his numbers. He had nearly 50,000 men under 
 his immediate command at Nuremberg in 1632, besides 
 garrisons and detachments; and more than one-third of 
 his men were mounted. Mobility was essential for his 
 method of warfare. 
 
 Gustavus was only thirty-five years of age when he 
 came to Germany, but he had been fighting for his 
 crown for half that term ; and in Poland he had had to 
 do with an enemy strong in cavalry, and a country 
 which favoured its use. He had done his best to adapt 
 horse, foot, and artillery to fighting under such condi- 
 tions. His horse consisted of cuirassiers and dragoons. 
 The latter were light cavalry capable of service on foot, 
 rather than mounted infantry. The cuirassiers had 
 breast-plates and head-pieces, but their equipment was 
 otherwise light. They were armed with sword and pistols, 
 and sometimes with the old Gothic weapon, the war- 
 hammer. They were formed three deep, in squadrons of 
 about 300 men. The caracole system of the German 
 Reiters was discarded by Gustavus. Fire might be used 
 to bewilder the enemy at the moment of collision, but 
 horse and sword should settle the business. The men 
 ' Geijer, p. 258. 
 
no THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 of the first rank, or first and second ranks, might dis- 
 charge one of their pistols when they were near enough 
 to see the whites of their enemies' eyes, but must then 
 draw swords and close, and the charge was made at 
 speed. 
 
 In order that they might act upon these rules, and 
 yet not forfeit the support of firearms, detachments of 
 musketeers were posted in the intervals between the 
 squadrons. At Leipzig we are told: "The horsemen on 
 both wings charged furiously one another, our horsemen 
 with a resolution abiding unloosing a pistol till the 
 enemy had discharged first, and then at a near distance 
 our musketeers meeting them with a salvo ; then our 
 horsemen discharged their pistols, and then charged 
 through them with swords; and at their return the 
 musketeers were ready again to give the second salvo of 
 musket amongst them."i 
 
 The Swedish infantry was raised by compulsory levy. 
 The nobility and their personal servants were exempt 
 from service on foot. From the rest of the population 
 one man in ten was chosen, "fresh and sound, strong of 
 limb, and, so far as can be discerned, courageous, in 
 years from eighteen to thirty and upwards." - As the 
 whole population was less than a million and a half, a 
 levy yielded under 15,000 men. The native contingent 
 had to be supplemented by foreign recruits, and half of 
 the infantry which Gustavus took to Germany consisted 
 of Scots and Germans. His revenues were insufficient 
 for the maintenance of his army, but he received sub- 
 sidies from England, France, and Holland ; and in course 
 of time so much was brought in by local requisitions 
 that war became the chief industry of the State. 
 
 The Swedish foot, if few in numbers, was of excellent 
 • Monro, p. GH. - Geijer, p. .224. 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY m 
 
 quality. It was drawn chielly from a thriving and sturdy 
 peasantry, staunchly Protestant, and bound to its king 
 by a century of conflict with foreign princes and the 
 privileged orders of Sweden. Gustavus was a happy 
 compound of impetuosity and shrewdness, originality and 
 sound judgment. He neglected nothing, great or small, 
 that had to do with the efficiency of his troops, and was 
 not more distinguished as a leader than he was as an 
 organiser. His Polish experience led him to adopt a 
 new tactical formation for his infantry, a modification 
 of the Dutch order. His ^battalions consisted of four 
 companies with a normal strength of 54 pikemen and 
 72 musketeers, but one-third of the musketeers were 
 detached, either to guard the baggage or for other 
 employment. He was content with six ranks instead 
 of ten, and his battalions had, therefore, 36 files of pikes 
 and 32 files of musketeers, making 408 men in all.^ 
 
 Instead of being coupled as they were by Maurice, 
 the battalions were grouped by threes into brigades, the 
 middle one being pushed forward a little beyond the 
 alignment of the other two, so that they made three 
 limbs of a cross. The musketeers took post according 
 to circumstances in front, in rear, or on the flanks. The 
 brigades were drawn up in two lines, and those of the 
 second line could readily move up into or through the 
 intervals of the first line, which were equal to the frontage 
 of the pikes of a brigade (108 yards). This wedge-like 
 formation of the brigades, a sort of combination of line 
 and column, helped them both m attack and defence ; 
 and at the same time it facihtated the prompt extension 
 and retirement of the nmsketeers. The author of "the 
 Swedish Discipline" (1632) claims for it that one part 
 so fences, so backs, so flanks another, is so ready to 
 
 ' .Swedish Discipline, pp. 79, &c. 
 
112 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 second or relieve another, that though the men may 
 indeed be killed, very hardly shall the whole order be 
 routed. 
 
 The number of companies in a regiment was raised 
 from eight to twelve in order that the battalions of one 
 regiment might form a brigade. But the wastage in 
 the course of a campaign often made this impracti- 
 cable; the Scots brigade which fought at Leipzig was 
 made up of four regiments. Clothing was not uniform,^ 
 but coloured scarves or badges were used to distinguisli 
 regiments from one another. Besides the " commanded " 
 musketeers, i.e. the men detached from their battalions, 
 there were some regiments which consisted exclusively 
 of musketeers. These usually marched in the vanguard 
 and were specially employed on expeditions. Taking 
 them into account, the musketeers formed two-thirds of 
 the Swedish infantry. 
 
 By adopting a musket rather lighter than the Spanish 
 one, with a calibre of 12 bullets to the pound, Gustavus 
 was able to dispense with the fork. In the Polish war 
 he had provided his men with " Swedish feathers," iron- 
 pointed stakes which served as a rest for the musket 
 and a fence against horsemen, like the stakes of the 
 archers ; but he discarded them in Germany, where his 
 movements were rapid. For bandoleers and charge-cases 
 he substituted pouches and paper-cartridges, which allowed 
 of quicker loading. 
 
 To render his artillery more effective and more mobile, 
 he made his guns shorter and adopted cartridges and 
 case-shot. In 1626 he introduced the so-called leather 
 guns, 4-pounders (or less) which weighed only 1 cwt., 
 and could be- handled by two men. They had copper 
 barrels reinforced with iron hoops and rope, and an outer 
 
 " Geijer, p. 229. 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 113 
 
 skin of leather. Five years afterwards he replaced them 
 by iron guns which were heavier but would bear a larger 
 charge. These pieces weighed about 5 cwt. ; two of them 
 were attached to each regiment of infantry, and they 
 could fire three shots while a musketeer fired two.^ 
 
 The battle of Breitenfeld or Leipzig (16^.1) was won 
 mainly by the Swedish cavalry and artillery ; the infantry 
 of the first line were hardly engaged. The Saxons, who 
 formed the left half of the Protestant army, were worsted 
 by the Imperialist horse, and Tilly followed up the suc- 
 cess with his infantry. Having routed the Saxons, he 
 fell on the left flank of the Swedes. To hold him in 
 check, Gustavus sent a regiment of cavalry, and two 
 brigades of foot from his second line. They drove off 
 the Croats and engaged the Imperialist infantry. The 
 encounter is described bj' Lieut.-Colonel Muschamp, 
 who commanded the musketeers of a Scottish regi- 
 ment: "First giving fire unto three little field pieces 
 that I had before me, I suffered not my musketeers to 
 give their volleys till I came within pistol-shot of the 
 enemy; at which time I gave order to the three first 
 ranks to discharge at once, and after them the other 
 three ; which done we fell pell-mell into their ranks, 
 knocking them down with the stock of the musket and 
 our swords." - 
 
 Meanwhile on the other wing the Swedish cavalry 
 under Gustavus himself drove Pappenheim's horse off 
 the field: "The enemy being fierce and furious, while 
 as ours were stout and slow, the enemy was made weary 
 when ours were fresh." " Tilly's guns, which were on high 
 ground behind his original line of battle, were taken, and 
 
 ' Pruit (Its campaynes de Guitave Adolphe (Brussels, 18S7). This book 
 contains a useful list of works dealing with these campaigns, and with 
 subsequent wars down to the present day. 
 
 * Swedish Discipline, p. 24. ■■ Monro, p. 69. 
 
 H 
 
114 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 were turned upon his own troops. Gustavus fell upon 
 their rear, and the Imperialists broke and fled. 
 
 Elsewhere, as here, we find the musketeers engaging 
 freely in hand-to-hand fighting without the aid of pikes. 
 In the storming of Frankfort-on-the-Oder fifty musketeers 
 were the first to enter the town ; they were charged by 
 horse, but with their backs against a wall drove them 
 ofi by volleys. In the desperate fighting which took 
 place when Gustavus attacked the camp of Wallenstein 
 near Nuremberg, the musketeers had the chief part. 
 The rapid strokes by which Gustavus effected so much 
 were actually made with cavalry and musketeers alone. 
 
 The special brigade-formation described above was 
 hardly put to the test until his final victory at Llitzen 
 (1632). There the Swedish infantry attacked the big 
 battalions of the Imperialists, not (as at Leipzig) in 
 some disorder, but in a well-prepared position. It was 
 the counterpart of Nieuport, and showed the advantage 
 of small units for attack no less than for defence. 
 Wallenstein's infantry was formed in squares of about 
 3000 men with bands of musketeers at the angles. 
 Four of these squares were drawn up as a cross in the 
 centre ; the fifth was with the cavalry of the right wing. 
 There was a battery of seven guns in front of the centre, 
 and one of fourteen guns near some windmills on the 
 right. In front of the batteries ran the road from 
 Llitzen to Leipzig ; its ditches had been deepened and 
 were manned by a double line of musketeers. The 
 garden walls of Liitzen were also held by musketeers, 
 and covered the right of the Imperialists; while their 
 left rested on the Flossgraben, which was fordable but 
 had high banks.^ 
 
 ' See Colonel Stammfort's plan, attached to the French translation of 
 Gualdo's History (Berlin, 1772). 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 115 
 
 These obstacles on the flanks hampered the Swedish 
 cavalry, and the infantry was ordered forward without 
 waiting, as usual, for the defeat of the enemy's horse 
 on the two wings. There were four brigades in first 
 line and four in second line, making a total of about 
 10,000 men. The centre battalion of each brigade, the 
 point of the wedge, seems at Llitzen to have been twice 
 as strong as the flank battalions. The companies were 
 much below their normal strength, but there were about 
 sixteen of them in each brigade. Crossing the road, 
 three brigades of the first line seized the seven-gun 
 battery, and then fell upon the leading square of the 
 Imperial foot and upon the one Avhich stood on its 
 left rear. Both these heavy masses were shaken and 
 disordered, though in numbers they were nearly twice 
 as strong as their assailants. 
 
 The fourth brigade of the Swedish first line consisted 
 of German troops under Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. It 
 was not able to keep pace with its fellows, being checked 
 by the guns of the windmill battery and a convergent 
 fire of musketry. The cavalry to the left of it was also 
 checked; and Piccolomini's cuirassiers found themselves 
 free to go to the help of the .shaken infantry in the 
 centre. Charged by cavalry and attacked by the two 
 other squares of foot, the three Swedish brigades, reduced 
 by this time to about one-fourth of their strength, were 
 driven back across the road. It was in hastening to 
 remedy this reverse that Gustavus was killed. He had 
 been leading the cavalry of his right wing, which had 
 met with some success but was now obliged to retire. 
 
 The advantage lay with the Imperialists, but Wallen- 
 stein's unwieldy bodies confined themselves to a passive 
 defence, and allowed Bernhard (who succeeded to the 
 command of the Swedish army) to make his preparations 
 
ii6 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 for another attack. The weakened first line of infantry 
 was reinforced by two brigades from the second line, and 
 was supported by the other two brigades and by four 
 squadrons of horse. The second advance met with 
 success both on the wings and in the centre. The 
 arrival of Pappenheim with eight regiments of horse 
 threatened to turn the scale once more in favour of the 
 Imperialists ; but he was killed, and by nightfall Wallen- 
 stein's army was in full retreat, leaving 6000 men on 
 the field. The Swedish victory is said to have been 
 largely due to Kniphausen's handling of the two reserve 
 brigades, " doing no niore with them than fair and softly 
 advance them towards the enemy at such time as he 
 saw the brigades of the van to get any ground of them. 
 The distance of his rear from the front was about 
 600 paces, and at that scantling he still kept him- 
 self behind the other." ^ This gave confidence to the 
 fighting line; and at length he brought up his brigades 
 into it, to meet the final eftbrt of the Imperialists to 
 keep their hold of the windmills. 
 
 It would be difficult to point to any three campaigns 
 which have made such a mark on the art of war as those 
 of Gustavus in Germany. He united the merits of his 
 two predecessors, Maurice of Nassau and Henri IV. The 
 excellent organisation of all arms, the skill with which 
 they were combined, the boldness of his conceptions, the 
 admirable discipline which he maintained, the masterly 
 handling of his troops on the field of battle, set a new 
 standard for the conduct of armies. The Scot, Monro, 
 waxes eloquent in his praise, and gives us a vivid picture 
 of his personality : ever impatient when works were not 
 advanced to his mind ; misliking an officer that was not 
 as capable of understanding his directions as he was ready 
 
 ' Swedish Intelligencer (1633), part 3, p. 147. 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 117 
 
 in giving them, yet always making sure that they were 
 understood; always able to do himself what he ordered 
 to be done ; of wonderful judgment in the " point of 
 recognoscing," and thinking nothing of this kind could 
 be well done which he did not himself; careful of the 
 health of his men, and gaining his ofiicers' love by 
 sharing their labours and dangers. 
 
 The reputation of the Swedes survived Gustavus. 
 Under Baner and Torstenson they continued to show 
 themselves more than a match for the Imperialists. 
 The campaigns of Charle.s Gustavus in Poland and 
 Denmark (1650-59) gave fresh proof of their excellence ; 
 and the astonishing career of Charles XII. was due to 
 the quality of the troops which he found ready to his 
 hand. He was himself pre-eminent in courage and 
 fortitude, but his reckless demands of men and money 
 exhausted his country. No population could stand a 
 continuous drain of 5 per cent, for the army. Discontent 
 weakened the royal authority, and in the eighteenth 
 century Sweden became less military as she became 
 more republican. 
 
 The wedge-shaped brigade of Gustavus soon dropped 
 out of use, for the massive formations against which it 
 was directed were abandoned before the middle of the 
 seventeenth century. Linear formations became general, 
 though the size of units and width of intervals varied. 
 France succeeded Sweden as the leading power in the 
 coalition against the house of Habsburg, and many 
 soldiers trained in the Swedish discipline were brought 
 into the French service by Richelieu. One of the first 
 of these was Sir John Hepburn, who formed a regiment 
 (Hebron) out of the remains of the Scottish regiments 
 which had fought under Gustavus. It passed into the 
 British service on the restoration of Chaiies II., and 
 
ii8 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 survives with an unmatclied record of service as the 
 Royal Scots. Richelieu's subsidies enabled Bernhard of 
 Saxe- Weimar to conquer Alsace, and at his death in 
 1639 his troops passed into French pay and served 
 under a French commander. 
 
 Louis XIV. found at his accession 139 regiments of 
 foot, of which 20 were foreign. Of the native regiments 
 those formed out of the " old bands " — Picardie, Piemont, 
 and some others — were good, but the rest were not to 
 be depended on. "Men were enlisted by force," says 
 Sully, "and made to march by the stick. Their pay 
 was wrongfully kept back, they were continually 
 threatened with prison, and the gallows were ever 
 before their eyes." They shrank from service abroad, 
 and it was difficult to persuade them to cross the Rhine. 
 The men deserted, and the officers complained of the 
 hardships of campaigning.^ Rohan, it is true, showed 
 in the Valtelline how much might be done with French 
 infantry in a kind of warfare which suited them ; but in 
 the line of battle they were apt to prove unsteady {e.g. 
 Marfee, 1641). 
 
 Rocroy (1643), the first great victory won by the French 
 over a foreign enemy for nearly a century, was won by the 
 skilful handling of the cavalry and the coup d'mil of 
 their leader ; the defeated infantry acquitted themselves 
 more creditably than the infantry of the winning side. 
 The latter began to give way as soon as the cavalry on 
 their left were beaten. The word went round — "La 
 journee est perdue! en retraite!" The rearward move- 
 ment was only stopped by the vigorous efforts of Sirot, 
 who commanded the reserve. Meanwhile Enghien (after- 
 wards Conde) had routed the Spanish left and fell on 
 the rear of their infantry. But when all other units 
 
 » Bourelly, i. 54, 66. 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 119 
 
 had been broken up and driven oiF the field, five Spanish 
 regiments of foot stood their ground. Drawn up in an 
 oblong of (3000 men enclosing their guns they beat oil 
 three attacks, and it was only when their gun-ammuni- 
 tion was exhausted that a fourth attack, prepared by 
 artillery and made by horse and foot in concert upon 
 three sides, proved successful. Three-fourths of the 
 Spaniards were killed or wounded, and if their sun set, 
 it set gloriously at Rocroy.^ 
 
 The French owed much to the Dutch school as well 
 as to the Swedes. Many of their best officers came from 
 it. Turenne served a five years' apprenticeship under 
 his uncle, Frederick Henry, and learned the art of sieges 
 before Bois le Due. The Dutch exercises were adopted 
 in France early in the reign of Louis XIII. The normal 
 strength of French regiments was twenty companies of 
 fifty men each, one regiment forming one battalion, but 
 there were wide variations. Two-thirds of the men were 
 musketeers, some of whom were detached to support the 
 cavalry. According to the elder Puysegur,' a battalion 
 of 800 men six deep required rather more than 100 paces 
 of front. If it were stronger the depth of the files should 
 be increased, not the frontage. The intervals between 
 battalions should be equal to their front, so that first 
 line and second line could pass through one another 
 without hindrance. The second line should be 300 to 400 
 paces from the first, and the reserve 600 to 700 paces from 
 the second. 
 
 In England, when the civil war broke out, there were 
 no regular troops except a few small garrisons. The 
 militia or " trained bands," which were relied upon for 
 home defence, were raw recruits unwilling to serve out- 
 
 • Aumale, iv. 79, &c. 
 
 « Instrucliom militaircs {1<;59). 
 
I20 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 side their own counties; and with the exception of the 
 London trained bands they played a small part in the 
 war. On both sides regiments of volunteers were raised, 
 and there was a great demand for officers of some military 
 experience to lead them. Many Scots who had served in 
 Germany were employed, though, as Clarendon remarks, 
 " it was no easy thing to value that people at the rate 
 they did set upon themselves." Of the English leaders, 
 Essex and Waller, Goring and Hopton had seen some- 
 thing of war, mostly in the Low Countries ; and this was 
 the case also with Monk and with the major-generals of 
 the armies, Astley and Skippon, who were well versed in 
 the practice of the Nassau school. 
 
 As usual in civil wars, discipline was slack at first 
 and the foot was not of high quality. It was thought 
 a wonder that the City trained bands should beat off 
 Rupert's horse on Newbury Heath. Newcastle's white- 
 coats showed remarkable tenacity at Marston Moor, and 
 so did the Welshmen at Naseby. On the whole the 
 Royalist foot was better than the Parliamentary foot. 
 Colonel Slingsby describes how his regiment repulsed three 
 charges of horse at Cheriton (March 23, 1643) : " The 
 foot keeping their ground in a close body, not firing till 
 Avithin two pikes' length, and then three ranks at a time, 
 after turning up the butt end of their muskets, charging 
 their pikes, and standing close, preserved themselves and 
 slew many of the enemy." ' 
 
 It was cavalry that played the decisive part in the 
 battles of the civil war. Here also the Royalists had the 
 advantage, until Cromwell's rare capacity as an organiser 
 and leader of horse made itself felt. He alone, according 
 to Clarendon, knew how to make his men charge home 
 without letting them get out of hand ; and after driving 
 ' Hopton, p. 102. 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 121 
 
 the enemy's cavalry off the field he fell on the flank or 
 rear of their infantry. His Ironsides charged Ln close 
 order at a " round trot," and " disputed it with sword and 
 pistol" till they found a gap by which they could break 
 into the squadrons opposed to them. Rupert, who had 
 served with the Swedes, caused the Royalists to adopt 
 Swedish tactics, including the " interhning " of the horse 
 with platoons of musketeers, and the reserving of the 
 horsemen's own fire that there might be no check to 
 their speed. On both sides the Swedish practice of draw- 
 ing up cavalry in three ranks and infantry in six ranks 
 was generally followed. Both sides made use of dragoons. 
 
 The Parliament had much more command of money 
 than the king, and its troops were better paid and 
 equipped than the Cavaliers. It was believed at first 
 that the kmg would be unable to raise an army at all; 
 but owing to local and personal jealousies the war went 
 on for three years without decisive result. In 1645 
 Parliament framed the new model army to be wholly 
 at its own disposal. It was to number 22,000 men, viz. 
 eleven regiments of horse (6600), one regiment of dragoons 
 (1000), and twelve regiments of foot (14,400). The foot 
 regiments consisted of twelve companies of 100 men, of 
 whom two-thirds were musketeers and one-third pikes. 
 Hitherto clothing had been of various colours, but in 
 the new model army horse and foot alike wore red, the 
 several regiments being distinguished by facings. The 
 officers were carefully selected by Fairfax, the commander, 
 and Skippon, his major-general. Recruits were readily 
 found for the horse, but the pay of a foot soldier was only 
 one-third of the pay of a trooper, and impressment had to 
 be employed to fill the ranks of the infiintry regiments. ^ 
 
 The cost of the army was about £700,000 a year; it was 
 
 ' Firth, pp. 34, &c. 
 
122 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 assessed upon the counties which were best able to bear 
 it, and the men received their pay with comparative 
 punctuaHty. As in the Low Countries at the beginning 
 of the century, regular pay brought order and discipline, 
 and decisive success soon followed. After defeating the king 
 at Naseby, Fairfax conquered the west, which welcomed 
 relief from Cavalier exactions, and in fifteen months of 
 continuous campaigning he brought the war to an end. 
 Local corps were disbanded or incorporated in the new 
 model, which by 1649 had grown to 44,000 men, and cost 
 a million and a half. In Cromwell's hands it became a 
 most formidable instrument for use at home or abroad, as 
 was proved in Scotland, Ireland, and the Low Countries. 
 
 The Scots had shown themselves more than a match 
 for Charles I. in the Bi'^hops' wars, and as allies of the 
 Parliament they had done their full share of the work at 
 Marston Moor. But at Dunbar (1G50) they were routed by 
 Cromwell with an army of half their strength, an army 
 weakened by hardships and exposure. The victory was 
 largely due to the carelessness of the Scots, and the skill 
 with which Cromwell threw himself unexpectedly upon 
 their right wing, attacking it both in front and in flank. 
 But even this would not have led to such decisive results 
 if the English had not been the better men, both horse 
 and foot. An eye-witness says : " I never beheld a more 
 terrible charge of foot than was given by our army, our 
 foot alone making the Scots foot give ground for three- 
 quarters of a mile together." i The Scottish losses in killed, 
 wounded, and prisoners exceeded the numbers of the 
 English army. 
 
 When there were no more enemies to be subdued within 
 the British Isles the army was still maintained to uphold 
 an unstable government of its own creation. France and 
 
 » Firth, Tratis. R. Hist. Soc, xiv. 44. 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 123 
 
 Spain bid against one another for its services, and Crom- 
 well chose alliance with France. At the battle of the 
 Dunes (1658) Turenne's army included nearly GOOO Eng- 
 hsh foot, while three battalions of Royalists (mainly Irish) 
 were on the opposite side.i The seven English regiments 
 (m two lines) formed the left of Turenne's infantry, and as 
 the army advanced towards the enemy they got ahead of 
 the right. In front of them there were four battalions of 
 old Spanish foot holdmg a dominant and outlying sand- 
 hill, and on the left of these were the Royalists. Turenne 
 says : — 
 
 " The English who were in the left wing, coming the first 
 to that Down which was foremost, ascended with two bat- 
 talions to attack it, and for some time they crossed pikes 
 with the Spaniards ; but the great resolution of the former, 
 aided by a detachment of foot from the English main 
 body which came upon the enemy in Hank, put a Spanish 
 regiment into disorder, and soon after to flight." - 
 
 The Duke of York (afterwards James II.), who was in 
 command of the Royalists, was sent to reinforce the 
 Spaniards on the sandhill, and was an admiring witness of 
 the English attack. He says in his Memoirs : " They 
 advanced with a great deal of confident courage, but with 
 so much heat that they left the French a good way behind, 
 and might have paid dearly for their temerity, if a right 
 use had been made of their imprudence. ... It was Lock- 
 hart's regiment which charged Boniface's Spaniards ; Fen- 
 wick, who was lieutenant-colonel of it, being got to the 
 foot of the sandhill, and finding it very steep, made a halt 
 to give his troops time to breathe, in order to ascend 
 afterwards with more vigour. While they were thus pre- 
 paring themselves, their forlorn hope opening to the right 
 and left, to make room for them to mount the sandhill, 
 
 • Firth, Trans. R. Hist. ISoc. , -wii. 67-86. ^ Ramsay, ii. 18S. 
 
124 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 made an unintermitted fire upon Boniface; and the moment 
 the regiment moved to the attack they gave a great shout. 
 Though the lieutenant-colonel received immediately a 
 musket-shot through the body, which made him drop, yet 
 the major, one Hinton, led on the battalion, which made 
 no stop till they were within a pike's length; and not- 
 withstanding the vigorous resistance of the Spaniards, 
 who had the advantage of the upper ground, and were 
 fresh, whereas the English were fatigued and almost out 
 of breath with climbing the sandhills, Boniface was driven 
 down. ..." 1 
 
 This success was followed up and the other regiments 
 of the Spanish army gave way in succession. The Royalists 
 lost more than half their number. The English claimed 
 that they won the battle by themselves ; - they at all events 
 played the leading part in it, as Vere's men had done at 
 Nieuport. Tlic Enghsh regiments were specially raised for 
 service abroad, but they consisted largely of old soldiers. 
 Half of the men were pikes, and half musketeers ; 400 
 " firelocks " are also mentioned as taking part in the attack 
 of the sandhill. 
 
 In 1668, after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, Louvois 
 set to work to organise, unify, and discipline the French 
 army. It had grown in numbers, and by 1672 it 
 amounted to ] 5.5,000 men, of whom 28,000 were cavalry. 
 Its fundamental fault was the purchase system, which 
 prevailed in France and elsewhere. Commissions were 
 bought and sold, and were in fact contracts granted to 
 the nobility to supply, feed, and equip men at fixed 
 rates. The men were neglected and the State defrauded. 
 Louvois could not do away with this system, but he 
 took measures to guard against its abuses. By strict 
 ' Ramsay, ii. 501. - Clarke Papers, iii. 158. 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 125 
 
 inspection and heavy penalties he put down pn sae-vulantx 
 — sham soldiers presented at musters — insisted on proper 
 clothing, arms, and equipment, and gradually brought 
 about the adoption of uniform. The king's fondness for 
 reviewing his troops and the emulation of the colonels 
 contributed to this change, which was also found to be 
 a help in maintaining discipline and checking desertion. 
 The disuse of armour had something to do with it. " The 
 French temperament," says Feuquieres, " does not accord 
 well with the use of defensive armour," and corslets were 
 given up by the French pikemen before the middle of the 
 seventeenth century.^ 
 
 A model regiment, the Regiment du Roi, was formed 
 in 1662, and its lietitenant-colonel. Martinet, was made 
 inspector-general of infantry in 1668, with sub-inspectors 
 under him. In the instructions given to him Louvois 
 said : " It is not enough that companies should be up 
 to their strength, we must try to make them consist 
 of men who are fit for service as regards their age, their 
 clothing, and their arms. . . . We must not demand of 
 the officers that all the men shall be dressed alike, or in 
 clothes equally new ; that would be asking too nmcli ; but 
 on no account must it be permitted that their soldiers 
 should be ill-shod or ill-clad, or that their arms should be 
 unserviceable, whether from the calibre or the quality of the 
 muskets." - Their drill and exercises were to be watched. 
 The maintenance of discipline and subordination among 
 the officers also fell within the province of the inspectors. 
 
 By the creation of infantry brigadiers, of whom Martinet 
 .was one of the first, the charge of brigades was withdrawn 
 from the colonels who might happen to be the seniors, 
 and given to specially selected men ; and at the same 
 time a way was opened by which capable officers who had 
 'JSusane, i. 190. ^ Rousset, i. 208. 
 
126 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 not the means to purchase a regiment might be ad- 
 vanced to higher commands. The stress laid on reviews 
 led to improvements in drill. The troops were taught 
 to take new formations simultaneously by word of com- 
 mand, instead of being placed in them successively by 
 the sergeant-major. Drill instructors rose in estimation, 
 but sometimes indulged in pedantries; and the rigidity 
 imposed by them discoiu-aged individualism, and led to 
 the discontinuance of infantry skirmishing. 
 
 The successes of Louis XIV. in the latter half of the seven- 
 teenth century were largely due to the increased efficiency 
 of his troops, but even more to Louvois's organisation 
 of magazines, and the care he bestowed on the supply 
 services. As Lord Orrery wrote in 1676 : " The French with 
 great prudence attack places in the beginning of the 
 spring, when there is no army to relieve them ; and in the 
 summer, when the whole confederacy is in the field, they 
 are usually on the defensive, and cover what they have 
 took ; and in my weak judgment they do at least as 
 much by their always providing well to eat, and by their 
 intrenched encampings, as by their good fighting, which 
 questionless is the most hopeful and most solid way of 
 making war." * 
 
 This method was the more successful owing to the 
 cautious tactics which began to find favour generally, 
 each side seeking to guard against defeat instead of 
 bidding for victory. The Swedish leaders, confident 
 in the excellence of their men, had liked to put their 
 fortune to the touch, and to fight battles even with 
 odds against them ; but it became the rule for the 
 weaker side to look out for strong defensive positions, 
 and only attack the enemy if he could be taken at 
 great disadvantage. The state of the country, especially 
 
 ' Orrery, p. 1 39. 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 127 
 
 in South Germany — the hills, woods, and swamps— made 
 it easy to choose such positions, which could be quickly 
 fortified, and could not be stormed without heavy loss; 
 while the bad roads and difficulties of supply made it 
 a slow business to turn them. Enghien's impetuosity 
 made him fling himself against intrenched positions at 
 Freiburg (1644) and Allerheim (1645), but the results 
 were not encouraging. The risk of failure was great, 
 and the fruit of victory was small. 
 
 One recommendation of this war of positions was that 
 an army gained strength as it fell back, and lost strength 
 as it advanced. Enghien and Turenno had 28,000 men 
 when they united on the Rhine in July lG4."i. They 
 had only 17,000 when they attacked Mercy at Allerheim 
 a month later; by that time his numbers were nearly 
 equal to theirs, and he was very strongly posted. In 
 1653 Turenne paralysed an army much stronger than 
 his own by shifting from one position to another. In 
 1674, when he had failed in his attack on the Im- 
 perialists at Enzheim, and reinforcements had brought 
 their numbers up to more than twice his own, he placed 
 himself on ground where they did not venture to attack 
 him, and hindered them from doing anything else. He 
 had learnt, as he said, method and secrecy from his 
 uncle, the Prince of Orange ; and from Bernhard of Saxe- 
 Weimar he had learnt to do great things with small 
 means, and not let his head be turned by success.^ 
 
 The memoirs of Montecuccoli, the able opponent of 
 Turenne, give us the reasoned views of a soldier who 
 had seen varied service, against the Turks as well as 
 against the Swedes. Linear formations for the infantry 
 are assumed as a matter of cour.sc, but not the small 
 tactical units and the open spacing of Maurice or Gus- 
 1 Maio, p. 22. 
 
128 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 tavus. A regiment forms one battalion of 1500 men, of 
 whom one-third should be pikes. If drawn up six deep 
 there would be long wings of musketeers, through which 
 the enemy's cavalry might force their way on a broad 
 front. The battalion is therefore formed ten deep, the 
 six ranks of pikes in the centre having two ranks of 
 musketeers in front of them, and two in rear of them. 
 Of the ranks in front of the pikes one should be armed 
 with swords and bucklers instead of muskets. Assuming 
 that one-sixth of the musketeers are detached, and 
 allowing a pace and a half for each file, the frontage of 
 the battalion is 192 paces ; the interval between bat- 
 talions is 18 paces. A force of 24,000 infantry drawn 
 up on these principles, with six battalions in first line, 
 six in second line, and four in reserve, would occupy 
 only 1400 paces. To these he would add 12,000 cavalry, 
 2000 dragoons, and 2000 light horse, making an army 
 of 40,000 men, of whom two-fifths would be mounted. 
 The horsemen should be mainly on the wings, but 
 infantry, cavalry, and artillery should be so joined 
 together or intermixed that they could afford mutual 
 succour when needed. The front of the whole army 
 would be about two miles. 
 
 The leading idea of Montecuccoli's order of battle is 
 resistance. " The secret of success," he says, " is to have 
 a solid body so firm and impenetrable that wherever it is 
 or wherever it may go, it shall bring the enemy to a stand 
 like a mobile bastion, and shall be self-defensive." ^ He 
 would only mvite a battle where the chances of success 
 are great, or where the enemy has much to gain by avoid- 
 ing it. In a strong position and with guns well placed for 
 effect he would prefer to await the enemy's onset ; but on 
 level ground it is more inspiriting to be the assailant. In 
 1 Montecuocoli, p. 223. 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 129 
 
 advancing, the intervals must be strictly maintained, and 
 a continuous fire must bo kept up. If the enemy gives 
 way he should be pursued by the light horse, and by 
 detachments told oif for the purpose, but the order of 
 battle must not be broken. There must be no caracolling 
 by the cavalry, but the front rank should have mus- 
 ketoons. 
 
 Montecuccoli's stress on solidity was no doubt mainly 
 due to his experience against the Turks, an enemy superior 
 in numbers and mobility who were to be beaten only by 
 order and discipline. In his " Maxims applied to warfare 
 against the Turk in Hungary " he describes the character- 
 istics of the Turkish armies. Their despotic government, 
 their incessant wars, the high rewards (hero and hereafter) 
 for military merit, and the rigorous punishments combine 
 to produce good leaders and good troops. The men are 
 brave, obedient, sober, and abstemious ; they are healthy 
 and capable of great exertions. War being the only 
 business they esteem there is no lack of recruits, and they 
 can form very large armies. They have well-filled maga- 
 zines, so that they can subsist in wasted lands, and they 
 carry with them a prodigious quantity of baggage; but 
 they do not begui a campaign till the crops are forward 
 enough to provide forage. They make the peasants of the 
 country furnish them with transport and with pioneers. 
 They all have tents, and there is a swarm of camp- 
 followers and attendants, so that the soldiers have nothing 
 to do but to fight. 
 
 They like to make their wars short and sharp. They 
 court decisive battles in the open field, and having their 
 troops always ready they invade the enemy's territory at 
 once. On the battle-field they use their large numbers to 
 envelop the enemy, forming in long lines curved like a 
 crescent, infantry in the centre, cavalry on the wings. 
 
I30 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 They detach parties to work round to the rear, reach the 
 enemy's baggage and cause disorder. They advance to 
 the attack with formidable shouts, fall back and advance 
 again, trying by every means to loosen the order of the 
 troops opposed to them, and to find gaps into which they 
 may penetrate. 
 
 But they have defects of which advantage may be taken. 
 They understand little about fortification or the handling 
 of artillery, and are very inferior to the Imperialists in 
 accuracy of drill. Their horsemen have coats of mail and 
 shields, but not cuirasses ; their agility is marvellous, but 
 they cannot sustain the shock of a squadron in heavy 
 armour and close order. Their arms are lances, scimitars, 
 maces and battle-axes, together with fire-arms, bows or 
 darts. Their horses and elephants may be scared by 
 grenades, and by the fire of small guns discharged as one 
 advances. Their best infantry, the Janissaries, are armed 
 with sabres and long muskets of rather small bore ; they 
 have greater range and penetration than the muskets of 
 the Imperialists, but are less accurate, as the men do not 
 use forks. They have no pikes, and so cannot stand the 
 shock of heavy cavalry or of infantry with pikes. 
 
 The Janissaries (Yani chari, or new soldiery) were mainly 
 drawn from the Christian population. A tribute of one 
 male child in ten was exacted. The boys were taken from 
 their parents at the age of ten or twelve, made into Mus- 
 sulmans, lodged in barracks at Constantinople and other 
 cities, and trained for seven years before they were 
 drafted into the army. Their devotion to the Sultan 
 and to the cause of Islam surpassed that of the Turks. 
 
 In the last decade of the century France fought single- 
 handed in the Netherlands against Dutch and English, 
 Germans, Danes, and Spaniards. It was mainly a war of 
 positions and sieges; but Luxemburg, who was a better 
 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 131 
 
 tactician than William III., won three victories in the 
 field — Fleurus, Steenkerquo, and Neerwinden (or Landen). 
 He owed them chiefiy to his cavalry, which was more 
 numerous and better than that of the allies. The French 
 infantry was still inferior. At Fleurus (1690) it is said 
 that " the French horse were forced to rally their foot 
 several times and to bring them up under their covert." 
 Luxemburg was amazed at the tenacity of the Dutch 
 infantry when they were overmatched and enveloped. 
 " The French infantry," we are told, " could not so much 
 as dare look them in the face; could the Dutch be left 
 alone to them, they would esteem them as nothing." ^ 
 
 In 1691 Louis XIV. sent Luxemburg instructions to 
 make use of the cavalry rather than engage in an infantry 
 fight, " which involves heavy loss and is never decisive ; " 
 and in reporting his victory at Steenkerque (1692) 
 Luxemburg explained that he had been forced by cir- 
 cumstances in that case to depart from these instructions. 
 This battle was brought on by an ill-managed attempt at 
 surprise on the part of the allies. Their vanguard, con- 
 sisting of English and Danish infantry, found itself 
 engaged with an increasing proportion of the French 
 army. It was scantily supported, and after some success 
 it was obliged to retreat with a loss of nearly half its men. 
 At Neerwinden (1693) the French were 80,000, the allies 
 50,000. William's confidence in his infantry and his 
 weakness in cavalry led him to stand his ground and 
 intrench his position. Luxemburg's skilful tactics con- 
 verted odds of three to two into odds of three to one at 
 the decisive point. The French infantry stormed the 
 villages on which the right of the allies rested, and 
 opened the way for their cavalry into the heart of the 
 position. Apart from their advantage in numbers, the 
 ' Sawle, p. 8. 
 
132 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 infantry were here employed by Luxemburg in a kind of 
 fighting for which they had special aptitude. Their dash 
 in attack and their alertness to seize opportunities found 
 scope in affairs of posts ; but when lines came in collision 
 in the open field the "close and punctual fire" of the 
 allied battalions was too much for them. 
 
 It was in Italy, under the leadership of Catinat and 
 against Piedmontese, Spaniards, and Imperialists, that 
 they showed to most advantage. After the victory of 
 Marsaglia (1693) Catinat wrote to the king: " I believe 
 there never was an action which showed better what your 
 majesty's infantry is capable of." i They came on hardily 
 with fixed bayonets, drove off the squadrons which Prince 
 Eugene of Savoy had intermixed with his foot, and held 
 their own against the foot until the defeat of the allied 
 cavalry on the wings caused Eugene to retreat. It is said 
 to have been the experience of the French in Italy that 
 led them to abandon the pike a few years afterwards.^ 
 Pikemen were ill-suited to operations in the Alpine 
 valleys, and the musketeers learned to do without 
 them. 
 
 1 Catinat, ii. 337. "- Saxe, Reveries, chap. 7^ 
 
VI 
 
 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY : I 
 
 I\ the course of the seventeenth century the firelock 
 was gradually superseding the matchlock as an infantry 
 weapon. The earliest form of firelock, the wheel-lock, 
 was expensive, and was also found to be " too curious 
 and too soon distempered with an ignorant hand."i It 
 made way for the snaphance (Schnapphahn or snap- 
 cock 2) in which a spark was struck by flint and steel, 
 and which came to be known, therefore, as the fusil. 
 Adopted in the first instance for fowling-pieces, it was 
 soon turned to military use, especially for mounted men. 
 Monk, writing in 1646, recommended it for picked shots 
 in the infantry, as well as for cavalry and dragoons ; and 
 in 1660, when he was commander-in-chief, he ordered 
 the matchlocks of his regiment, the Coldstream, to be 
 exchanged for "snaphance muskets." In France, Louvois 
 at first set his face against fusils for the infantry, and 
 ordered his inspectors to break up any they found, and 
 replace them with matchlocks at the cost of the captains. 
 But in 1670 a small proportion was allowed, and in the 
 following year a regiment of fusiliers was formed to serve 
 as guards for the artillery. 
 
 On behalf of the matchlock it was said that " firelocks 
 are apter to misgive than musket.s through the defect of 
 
 1 Scott, ii. 285. 
 
 - It is a doubtful point whether poachers and thieves (Chcnapans) gave 
 ibuir name to the weapon, or took their name from it. 
 
134 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 the flints and springs," i and that they were less durable. On 
 the other side it was urged that the matchlock took longer 
 to " make ready " ; the priming was apt to be deadened 
 by wet, or blown away by wind ; the store of match was 
 heavy to carry, and troublesome to dry : there was great 
 risk of accidents from sparks of the lighted match, and 
 it betrayed men at night. The butt of the matchlock 
 had to be placed against the chest, six inches below the 
 chin,^ while the butt of the iirelock was brought to the 
 shoulder, so that the eye could look along the barrel. 
 The fire of the fusil was, therefore, more accurate as well 
 as more rapid. Files could be made closer when the risk 
 of premature ignition by sparks was removed. The old 
 attitude — head erect, elbows high, left leg bent, right leg 
 stretched out — was no longer needed: men could fire 
 like sportsmen, "who shoot to kill, and not merely to 
 make a noise." ^ 
 
 Fault was found with the equipment of the musketeer, 
 as well as with his weapon. The cross-belts, sword-belt, 
 and bandoleer were heavy and cumbrous; the wooden 
 charge-cases attached to the bandoleer entangled men 
 when countermarching, and rattled so much that orders 
 could not be heard, and secrecy was out of the ques- 
 tion; the charges were apt to catch fire, or to get wet, 
 and men could not load with them so quickly as with 
 cartridges. By degrees bandoleers were given up, and 
 waist-belts with cartridge pouches came into use, first 
 for fusiliers, and then generally. The sword was hung 
 from the waist-belt, and was retained in spite of com- 
 plaints that it was heavy, tripped men up when running, 
 and cau.sed confusion in close order movements. 
 
 » Gaya(1678). 
 
 - Sometimes, it seems, it was placed against tlie stomach, and the kick 
 of it caused injuries (Rousset, iii. 325). 
 •' Puysegur. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 135 
 
 As tirc-arms improved a " charge " of infantry came to 
 mean a tire-fight at close quarters till one side or the 
 other gave way, rather than actual collision. Even on 
 the battle-field the part played by pikemen became less 
 prominent. There was little scope for them in the 
 attack or defence of intrenched positions ; and they 
 were too slow for surprises and minor operations, especi- 
 ally in broken country. To enable musketeers to face 
 cavalry without the aid of pikes various devices were 
 tried, such as the Swedish feathers adopted, but after- 
 wards discarded, by Gustavus. Barrifi'e (who wrote 
 before the English civil wars) mentions that the heads 
 of the forks were sometimes unscrewed, and the stems 
 fixed in the muzzles of the muskets. Daggers, known 
 as bayonettes, were found better suited for such use, and 
 Puysegur sent out parties in 1647 armed with bayonets 
 instead of swords, the blade and the handle being each 
 one foot long, and the handle shaped for insertion in 
 the musket.i The regiment of fusiliers formed in 1671 
 was provided with these plug bayonets, and their use 
 soon spread. The English troops at Tangier had had 
 them eight years before, and a warrant of 1672 directs 
 their issue to dragoons. 
 
 But a bayonet that hindered firing when it was fixed 
 was inconvenient, and sometimes disastrous, as at Killie- 
 crankie in 1689. Chevaux de frise offered another 
 means of protecting musketeers against cavalry, and 
 were widely used, especially against the Turks. In 1687 
 Louvois consulted Vauban about them, and Vauban pro- 
 po.sed instead a socket bayonet which would not prevent 
 firing or loading. Instructions were issued in 1689 that 
 all the French infantry in the field should have bayonets 
 of this kind.2 Something of the sort is said to have been 
 
 ' Hcott, ii. .SI5. - Kousset, iii. 32G. 
 
136 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 adopted by one regiment more than ten years before, 
 viz. a sword with a copper ring instead of a guard, and 
 another at the pummel. Vauban also contrived a fusil 
 musket which could be used either as firelock or match- 
 lock, but it was soon set aside. It was at his instance 
 that the use of the pike was entirely abandoned by the 
 French infantry in 1703.' In England the proportion 
 of pikes had dropped by that time to a mere " piquet " ^ 
 of fourteen men per company, and the French example 
 was soon followed. 
 
 France was behind other nations in discarding the 
 matchlock. The Brandenburg infantry adopted the fusil 
 and bayonet in 1689.' The Danish contingent employed 
 in Ireland in 1690 was so armed.* So also were the 
 British guards, and half the musketeers of other regi- 
 ments. After the battle of Steenkerque the French 
 soldiers armed themselves, so far as they could, with 
 their enemies' firelocks,^ throwing away their pikes and 
 muskets; and the king gave orders that in future half 
 the musketeers of regiments serving in the field should 
 have fusils. The matchlock was not entirely superseded, 
 however, till 1708. The French muskets were of smaller 
 calibre than those of other countries, and the lighter 
 bullet (twenty to the pound) had no doubt something to 
 do with the less effectiveness of their fire. 
 
 In the sieges of the Thirty Years' war much use was 
 made of hand grenades. In 1667, the year in which 
 Louis XIV. gained possession of Lille, Tournai, and other 
 Spanish fortresses, he ordered that four "grenadiers" 
 should be added to each of the twenty companies of the 
 regiment Du Roi ; and three years afterwards those men 
 were gathered together into a grenadier company." Such 
 
 * Riistow, ii. 185. " Fortescue, i. 326. " Meyer, i. 114. 
 
 ^ Wallou, p. 433. '' Rousset, iii. 330. « Rustow, ii. 104. 
 
 I 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 137 
 
 companies were added by degrees to other infantry regi- 
 ments, and in 1678 they were introduced into the English 
 army. Companies of horse grenadiers were also formed.^ 
 Tall, strong men were chosen for grenadiers. They carried 
 three grenades in their pouches, and were armed with 
 firelocks, bayonets, and hatchets to open paHsades. To 
 enable them to sling their firelocks more readily, and 
 leave their hands free for their grenades, they had tall 
 caps instead of broad-brimmed hats. They were expected 
 to play a part, not only in sieges, but in the field, and to 
 assist a battalion in square to beat off cavalry charges. 
 The use of the grenades proved exceptional ; but the 
 grenadier companies soon became picked corps, available 
 for arduous enterprises, and survived for nearly two 
 centuries. 
 
 Towards the end of the seventeenth century there were, 
 therefore, four kinds of infantry — pikemen, musketeers, 
 fusiliers, and grenadiers. During the war of the Spanish 
 succession these were practically reduced to one kind, all 
 foot soldiers being armed alike with firelock and socket 
 bayonet. This simplified formations and tactics. Ranks 
 were reduced to four, sometimes to three. This did not 
 increase the frontage of a battalion, for the change in the 
 fire-arm allowed the width of files to be made two feet or 
 less instead of three feet. The intervals between bat- 
 talions were reduced to a few paces, that the fire-line 
 might be as nearly continuous as possible. Battalions 
 were no longer divided into three bodies, a centre and two 
 wings, but into two, a right wing and a left wing. Each 
 wing was subdivided into divisions, platoons, and sections. 
 In the French service a platoon was one-eighth, in the 
 British service it was one-sixteenth of the battalion, 
 exclusive of the grenadiers. Fire had hitherto been given 
 
 ' Fortescue, i. 325. 
 
138 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 by successive ranks; it was now delivered usually by 
 platoons or divisions in fixed order, forming three or 
 more " firings." 
 
 With three ranks, as in the British service, the front 
 rank knelt and the other two ranks closed up and locked. 
 The fire of the front rank was often reserved. If the 
 battalion was advancing towards the enemy, it halted to 
 allow one group of platoons to fire, and then marched 
 slowly on till the order was given for another group to 
 make ready. Care was taken that half the battalion 
 should always be loaded. After delivering a volley at 
 close quarters, an attack might be made with the bayonet 
 under cover of the smoke ; " but if you don't follow your 
 fire that moment, but give them time to recover from the 
 disorder yours may have put them into, the scene may 
 change to your disadvantage."* Sometimes all three 
 ranks fired standing, but accidents were apt to happen to 
 the men of the front rank from carelessness on the part of 
 the third rank. The French battalions were formed four 
 deep, and the rule with them was that the first and second 
 ranks should kneel, and the third rank stoop, when firing.'-^ 
 
 Brigades consisted of from four to six battalions. The 
 number of brigades in each line of infantry depended on 
 the strength of the army ; but the line was divided into a 
 right wing and a left wing, each commanded by a lieu- 
 tenant-general. It remained the custom to place the 
 infantry in the centre of the line of battle, and the cavalry 
 on both sides of it ; but where allied armies were in the 
 field together this held good of each army separately, so 
 that (as at Blenheim) two wings of cavalry formed the 
 centre of the whole. The increasing size of armies also 
 made it necessary sometimes to depart from the rule, to 
 suit the features of the field of 1 
 
 1 Bland, p. 1,33. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 139 
 
 It was with cavalry that Marlborough won his most 
 brilliant victories in the war of the Spanish succession. 
 There is nothing to show that the French cavalry was not 
 what it was under Luxemburg, but it had no longer such 
 preponderance in numbers. The military administration 
 of Louis XIV. had begun to suffer from senile decay; 
 generals were chosen on other grounds than capacity ; and 
 they had to deal with a man who, in Voltaire's words, was 
 more of a king than William III., as much of a statesman, 
 and a far greater captain. Marlborough was a firm behever 
 in shock action for cavalry. " He would allow the horse 
 but three charges of powder and ball to each man for a 
 campaign, and that only for guarding their horses when 
 at grass, and not to be made use of in action." * He re- 
 introduced the wearing of breast-plates which had been 
 dropped. 
 
 He had a singular gift for detecting the weak point in 
 his adversary's line of battle, and for misleading him about 
 his own intentions. He delivered his blow vigorously at 
 the right place and took care to bring up reserves for his 
 cavalry, and to give it all needful support from infantry. 
 It was in this way that Blenheim (1704) and Ramillies 
 (1706) were won. In the former the French army was cut 
 in two, in the latter it was rolled up from right to left. 
 In both cases some battalions of infantry were intermixed 
 with the French squadrons to support them, according to 
 the custom that prevailed ; and in both cases when the 
 hor-semen fled the foot were left, says Kane, " to the fury 
 of our troops to be cut to pieces to a man, which is 
 generally the fate of foot that are interlined with horse 
 when they arc once routed." - 
 
 It was in the hard fought battle of Malplaquct (1709) 
 that infantry played the most prominent part. In the 
 
 ' Kanr, p. 110. •-• fh.. pp. HI, C(l. 
 
MO THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 belt of woods which stretches for nearly ten miles south- 
 west of Mons there is a gap about a mile and a half wide 
 near Malplaquet. Villars was advancing by this gap to 
 the relief of Mons when he found Marlborough in his 
 front and decided to fight on the defensive. " For choice 
 I should have preferred a cavalry action," he wrote 
 to the king (September 10), "but our position is so 
 strong that we have good reason to hope for success if 
 the enemy attack us." i Marlborough and Eugene post- 
 poned the battle till September 11, to give time for all 
 their available troops to come up ; and Villars had forty- 
 eight hours to prepare his position. He occupied the 
 gap with his right and centre. The right, consisting of 
 sixty-three battalions, was very strongly intrenched, and 
 extended into the Bois de la Lainiere, which covered the 
 right flank. In the centre the ground was better suited 
 for cavalry action, and here the intrenchments were made 
 with intervals through which horsemen could pass. They 
 were guarded by seventeen battalions of infantry, -svith 
 cavalry drawn up behind them. The left (thirty-eight 
 battalions) held the southern end of the Bois de Sars. 
 It was thrown forward, so that it crossed fire with the 
 centre, and it was covered by successive lines of parapet 
 and abattis. ^ 
 
 Villars had 60,000 foot and more than 30,000 horse; 
 the allies were a little stronger in infantry, but not so 
 strong in cavalry. They decided to make their chief 
 effort against the French left where the woods screened 
 a turning movement. Eighty battalions were directed 
 against the Bois de Sars and drove the French out of it 
 after four hours' fighting. Villars brought up his reserves 
 and drew the infantry of his centre to his left, but could 
 
 1 Vault, ix. 344. 
 
 ' See the plans given in vol. xiii. of the Bevuc d'llistoirc (1904). 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 141 
 
 not regain his hold of the wood. He was wonndcd and 
 had to leave the field. 
 
 The intrenchnients of the centre were now only lightly 
 held by some of the French guards detached from the 
 right. They were easily carried by Lord Orkney with 
 thirteen battalions (British), and the allied cavalry followed 
 through the intervals, and formed on the plain beyond. 
 Lord Orkney writes : " As our horse got on the other 
 side, their horse came very near ours. Before we got 
 thirty squadrons out they came down and attacked ; and 
 there was such pelting at one another that I really never 
 saw the like. ... At first we pushed them, but it did not 
 last long ; for they pushed back our horse again so much 
 that many of them run through our retrenchments. The 
 gens d'armes .advanced out ; the right of my foot gave 
 them such a fire that it made all that body retreat 
 prodigiously; and then our horse pressed them again." ^ 
 
 After some hours of this work, Boufflers (who had 
 succeeded to the command of the French) saw that the 
 battle was lost past recovery, and gave orders for retreat. 
 These orders were received with much discontent on the 
 right, where thirty Dutch battalions had been trying 
 with mistaken persistence to storm works held by more 
 than twice their number.'^ Their gallantry had not been 
 thrown away, however, for it had detained the larger part 
 of the French infantry in this part of the field. It was 
 "a very murdering battle," as Marlborough said.^ The 
 French lost 11,000 men, the allies twice as many, the 
 Dutch being the chief sufierers. The cost was out of 
 proportion to the results achieved. In the words of 
 Marlborough's apologist, " those who judged impartially 
 were of opinion, that all things considered, the allies 
 
 ' English HUtorical Review, xix. .320. 
 
 ^ Kewx d'Histoire, xiii. 61. ^ Coxe, ii. 4(52. 
 
142 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 gained indeed a very remarkable and glorious victory, 
 but paid so dear for it that some said, Uvo such victones 
 more ivould have undone them ; and on the other hand, 
 there were not wanting those that aflSrmed, that though 
 the French were beaten from their fortified camp, and 
 lost the field of battle, yet they retrieved their former 
 reputation." ^ 
 
 In France the troops were extolled at the expense of 
 their general. Villars was blamed for fighting on the 
 defensive, for presenting his flanks like horns to the 
 enemy, and weakening his centre. The battle became 
 a point of departure for French military criticism. Folard 
 took it as an instance of the mistake of ignoring the 
 temperament of troops, which in the case of the French 
 is so essentially aggressive. The abandonment of the 
 pike had led to mere' fire tactics and shallow formations, 
 which suited foreigners better than Frenchmen. He 
 pointed out how the infantry on the right, " weary of a 
 passive attitude, which is never to their taste, and crushed 
 by the fire of the Dutch battalions, who being better 
 drilled, more phlegmatic, and more adapted to that 
 style of fighting were more than a match for them, 
 took counsel of their own courage; and without orders 
 suddenly made so fierce a sortie against the firing lines 
 that they broke them up, killed most of the men, and 
 drove back the rest upon their cavalry." ^ If they had 
 been properly supported the battle would have been 
 won. 
 
 He proposed his system of columns as specially appro- 
 priate to the French character, which is " infinitely better 
 suited for shock and for coups de main than for standing 
 still and firing." Each column was to consist of two or 
 three battalions ; it would have a front of twenty -four to 
 
 ' Hare, p. 205. a Chabot, i. 335. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 143 
 
 thirty files, and a depth of forty or fifty ranks. One-fifth 
 of the men were to be armed with partisans, and placed on 
 the front and flanks. When a column had burst through 
 the enemy's line, the right half was to face to the right, 
 and the other half to the left, and they were to roll up the 
 line in both directions. 
 
 Maurice de Saxe, who had also been present at Mal- 
 plaquet (as a boy of twelve), commented on it in much 
 the same spirit in his Reveries, which were written in 
 1732, though not published till twenty-five years after- 
 wards. Instead of continuous, or nearly continuous, lines 
 of intrenchment, he would have placed three or more 
 redoubts in the Malplaquct gap. This was the method 
 applied so successfully by Peter the Great at Pultowa in 
 the same year (1709). It would have effectually barred 
 the gap to the enemy, and would have given space for 
 vigorous counter-attacks so congenial to French troops. 
 He agreed with Folard as to the use of columns for 
 attack, but he thought Folard's columns too large. His 
 "centuries," as he called them, were to have eight ranks 
 and twenty files. They were to be separated by intervals 
 equal to their own front, and their advance was to be 
 covered by skirmishers who would fall back into these 
 intervals. 
 
 He pictured his encounter with deployed battalions: 
 " I am eight deep against men who are only four deep ; I 
 have nothing to check me, no loss of dressing or crowding 
 up; I shall cover two hundred paces sooner than they 
 will cover one hundred ; I shall be through the enemy in 
 a moment if it comes to cold steel ; and if he fires he is 
 done for."' He made light of fire-effect in such cases, 
 and preferred plug bayonets to socket bayonets because 
 they hindered firing. He even proposed to give pikes to 
 
 ' Saxc, p. 23. 
 
144 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 the third and fourth ranks, and make them sHng their 
 fire-arms ; because otherwise the front ranks must kneel, 
 and once down it is not easy to get them up again. His 
 proposals were evidently made with an eye to the special 
 characteristics of French troops. 
 
 The doctrine that the French should always attack 
 found favour, but it was sometimes misleading. At 
 Dettingen (1743) Noailles had succeeded in bringing 
 George II. and his army (Austrians, British, and Hano- 
 verians) into a very tight place. The Main was on their 
 left, the mountains on their right ; the French were 
 strongly posted in front of them and had occupied 
 Aschaffenburg in their rear ; they were short of supplies, 
 and were raked by French batteries on the other side of 
 the river. Instead of standing their ground, the French 
 advanced from Dettingen to meet the alUes. Their 
 cavalry had some success at first, but made no serious 
 impression on the allied infantry, and sufiered much from 
 its fire. As for the foot, Noailles had to report that few 
 regiments behaved well, and the Guards very ill. The 
 allied infantry, he says, stood like a wall of brass, " from 
 which there issued so brisk and well sustained a fire that 
 the oldest officers owned that they had never seen any- 
 thing like it, incomparably superior to ours." ^ 
 
 The fire of the British infantry is thus described by an 
 officer of the Guards : " They were under no command by 
 way of Hyde Park firing [i.e. by platoons], but the whole 
 three ranks made a running fire of their own accord, and 
 at the same time with great judgment and skill, stooping 
 all as low as they could, making almost every ball take 
 place." '^ And an officer of the Welsh Fusiliers says: 
 "What preserved us was our keeping close order and 
 advancing near the enemy ere we fired. Several that 
 
 > Noailles, i. 123. = Chequers Court MSS. (1900). 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 145 
 
 poppetl at one hundred paces lost more of theii* men and 
 did less execution ; for the French will stand fire at a dis- 
 tance, though 'tis plain they cannot look men in the 
 face." ' The French loss was about one in ten, that of the 
 allies one in fifteen. 
 
 A writer of the time complains that the French, pre- 
 ferring the use of the bayonet to musketry, were apt to 
 fix bayonets too soon. With bayonets fixed only one 
 round could be tired to much purpose ; for the bayonet 
 made it diflicult to ram down the charge, the men put 
 in powder and ball without ramming, and the eifect was 
 very small.^ This is an example of the negligence and 
 lack of discipline which pervaded all ranks of the armies 
 of Louis XV. " The officers do not know how to com- 
 mand or to secure obedience, and those who do know 
 are often afraid to do it, lest they should bring on them- 
 selves the hatred of their comrades, who believe that 
 punishment makes the men desert, or should incur 
 blame from their colonels, who are not aware of the 
 importance of discipline, and have usually no idea 
 of it : " ^ so writes the chief of Marshal Saxe's staff in 
 1744. If Saxe won victories nevertheless, it was because 
 he knew the strong and weak points of his troops, and 
 had the dexterity to secure favourable conditions for 
 them. 
 
 At Fontenoy (1745) he had an opportunity of applying 
 his principles for the preparation of a battle-field. The 
 allies under the Duke of Cumberland were marching to 
 the relief of Tournay, and though Saxe had the advan- 
 tage in numbers he meant to fight on the defensive. 
 But instead of continuous intrenchments, he made use 
 of redoubts and villages, with wide intervals for counter- 
 attack. One of these intervals, between Fontenoy and 
 
 ' Gentleman's Mayazine, 1743, p. 38G. ' CoUd, i. 163. » lb., 169. 
 
146 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 Barry wood, was no less than half a mile, and here the 
 British and Hanoverian infantry broke through. There 
 were twenty battalions of them, about 13,000 men, and 
 if drawn up as usual in two lines they would have a 
 front of 1200 yards. But the narrowness of the space 
 and the fire from both flanks restricted them to a front 
 of three battalions, the brigade of Guards ; the other 
 brigades were behind the Guards, or in column on the 
 flanks, the whole forming three sides of a square. 
 
 There were twenty battalions of French infantry drawn 
 up in two lines to guard the interval. They were driven 
 back in disorder by the volleys of successive units of 
 this square which, in Voltaire's words, " continually moves 
 on at a slow pace, never getting into confusion, and re- 
 pulsmg all the regiments which confront it one after 
 the other." ^ The old rule, that battalions should halt 
 for each volley, had been changed by this time. They 
 kept on the move, but stepped short ; while the platoons 
 in their turn stepped out, halted and fired. The square 
 penetrated 300 yards into the French position, and 
 reached the camp. But the British cavalry, which was 
 in rear, had no room to come forward ; and the French 
 cavalry charged the front and flanks of the square again 
 and again, making no impression on it, but hindermg 
 its advaiice or deployment. 
 
 The Dutch not having succeeded in their attack on 
 Fontenoy, "we found ourselves," says Ligonier, who was 
 in command of the British infantry, " under a cross-fire 
 of artillery and musketry, as well as fire from their front, 
 and it was necessary to retire as far as the line between 
 Fontenoy and the fort near the wood. . . . Having had 
 orders to make a second attempt, our troops ... a second 
 time made the enemy give way ; and they were once 
 
 " Siecle de Louis XV., p. 157. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 147 
 
 more pushed as far as their camp with great loss of 
 men, which we too felt on our side." ' There the square 
 was again brought to a check ; Saxe made arrangements 
 for a combined attack upon it by horse and foot; and 
 at the end of three hours the word was given for retreat, 
 which was carried out in good order. About one-third 
 of the men were left on the field. 
 
 The lesson was not thrown away upon Saxe. Five 
 years afterwards, in a letter to the Minister of War, he 
 intimated that what the English had done at Fontenoy 
 was not a thing that could be done with French troops. 
 He added: "Our infantry, though the bravest in Europe, 
 is not fit to stand a charge in a position where infantry 
 less brave, but better drilled and in a better formation, 
 can close with it; and the successes we have had in 
 battles can be attributed only to chance, or to the skill 
 our generals have shown in reducing engagements to 
 sudden dashes or affairs of posts, where the bravery and 
 persistence of the troops usually win if the general takes 
 care to support them." - 
 
 He was even more frank with Frederick the Great, to 
 whom he wrote (September 1746): "The French are what 
 they were in Caesar's time, and as he has described them, 
 brave to excess but unstable ; capable of holding a post 
 to the last man, when the first excitement is over; for 
 in affairs of posts, if you can get them to hold out for 
 a few minutes, they warm to their work ; but bad at 
 manoeuvring in open country. ... As it is impossible 
 for me to make them what they ought to be, I get what 
 I can out of them, and try to leave nothing of importance 
 to chance."' 
 
 He avoided battles as much as he could, and won his 
 
 ' ErujUah Historical Review, xii. 523, &c. 
 
 « Grimoard, v. 297. = Jb., iii. 1«2. 
 
148 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 campaigns mainly by outmanceuvring and outmarching 
 his enemy. The two offensive battles which he fought 
 and won, Rocour (1746) and Laeffelt (1747), were singu- 
 larly alike in their general features.* In each case he 
 had a numerical superiority of about one-third, and he 
 took advantage of the fact that he was dealing with an 
 army of allies, slow to assist one another, to increase 
 this superiority. He made a mere demonstration against 
 the right, and threw his whole weight against the left. 
 Both battles were reduced to affairs of posts in which 
 the assailants were three or four times as strong as the 
 defenders. Little came of these victories, but they 
 served his purpose, to satisfy the French demand with- 
 out much risk of disaster. The attacks were made by 
 columns of brigades with a front of a battalion; and no 
 less than forty-nine battalions took part in the final 
 assault on Laeffelt." 
 
 The battles of Fontenoy and Laeffelt resemble those 
 of Steenkerque and Neerwinden, fought half a century 
 before. The British were again beaten by the French, 
 alike in attack and in defence. They showed their old 
 hard-fighting qualities ; but they were led by men who, 
 though able and soldierly, were no match in military 
 talent for Luxemburg or Saxe. 
 
 The English regiments which fought so well at Fon- 
 tenoy had to deal soon afterwards with a very different 
 enemy. They were recalled to meet the insurgent 
 Highlanders Avho had routed Cope at Prestonpans and 
 were invading England. The invasion was abandoned 
 at Derby without a fight, and the retreating Jacobite 
 army was followed into Scotland by General Hawley, 
 who engaged it at Falkirk. In his orders, issued at 
 
 ' See Journal of R. U.S. Institution, xxxvjii. 1247, &c., " The Campaigns 
 of Saxe." * Rochambeau, i. 53. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 149 
 
 Edinburgh a few days before this action, he explained 
 to his men the Highlanders' way of fighting: — 
 
 "They commonly form their front rank of what they 
 call their best men or true Highlanders, the number 
 of which being always but few, when they form in 
 battalions they commonly form four deep, and these 
 Highlanders form the front of the four, the rest being 
 Lowlanders and arrant scum. Wlien these battalions 
 come within a large musket-shot or three score yards, 
 the front rank give their fire and immediately throw 
 down their firelocks and come down in a cluster with 
 their swords and targets, making a noise and endeavour- 
 ing to pierce the body or battalion before them, becoming 
 twelve or fourteen deep by the time they come up to 
 the people they attack. The sure way to demolish them 
 is at three deep to fire by ranks diagonally to the centre 
 where they come, the rear rank first, and even that 
 rank not to fire till they are within ten or twelve paces ; 
 but if the fire is given at a distance you will probably 
 be broke, for you never get time to load another cartridge, 
 and if you give way you may give your foot for dead, for 
 they being without a firelock or any load no man with his 
 arms, accoutrements, &c., can escape them, and they give 
 no quarter ; but if you will but observe the above direc- 
 tions they are the most despicable enemy that are." ' 
 
 His precepts were sound enough, but he placed his men 
 under every disadvantage for acting on them. He had 
 three regiments of dragoons and twelve battalions of 
 infantry, besides militia. He drew them up on a hillside, 
 with the rain driving in their faces, and with their left 
 overlapped by the enemy's line. He had left his guns 
 behind, and he sent forward his dragoons to charge the 
 unbroken front of the Jacobite army. They were driven 
 
 ' U.S. Magazine, April 1897. 
 
ISO THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 back on the left wing of the infantry, and the Highlanders 
 followed hard upon them. The foot regiments, assailed 
 both in front and flank, gave a feeble volley from their 
 wet firelocks, and then broke and ran, one after another. 
 Only three regiments on the right stood their ground, 
 and covered the flight of the rest. 
 
 Three months afterwards musket and bayonet vindi- 
 cated themselves as more than a match for sword and 
 buckler. At Culloden it was the Highlanders that fought 
 at disadvantage. They were jaded with a fruitless night 
 march, and there were many absentees. The English 
 guns, distributed by pairs in the intervals between the 
 infantry battalions, galled them into a charge which was 
 made without orders or concert. Nevertheless their right 
 wing had some success. It broke through the interval 
 between the two regiments on the left of the line, tempo- 
 rarily capturing the guns there, and killing or wounding 
 more than 200 men. But it was repulsed by the second 
 line, and scattered by the dragoons. The battle was over 
 in half-an-hour, and the Highland army was dissolved. 
 
 Cumberland, writing to Ligonier, said : " Sure never 
 were soldiers in such a temper. Silence and obedience 
 the whole time, and all our manreuvres were performed 
 without the least confusion ... it was pretty enough to 
 see our little army form from the long march into three 
 lines twice on our march, and each time in ten minutes." ^ 
 He had issued instructions that in using their bayonets 
 the men should thrust, not at their own assailants who 
 could parry with their targets, but at the assailants of 
 their right-hand men. 
 
 By the middle of the eighteenth century Prussia had 
 stepped into the position which Sweden had held a 
 
 ' Stowe MSS. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 151 
 
 century before as the pattern of excellence in infantry. 
 The earher victories of Frederick the Great were due, 
 as he himself freely admitted, to the soldiers which he 
 found ready to his hand. The sufferings which Branden- 
 burg underwent in the Seven Years' war had prepared it 
 to make sacrifices for self-defence. The people owed 
 much to their princes, who had in fact formed the 
 country by drainage works and settlement. The Hohen- 
 zoUerns had a high sense of national duty, and were not 
 obliged to defer to a nobility, or to respect municipal 
 rights. It was only in his outlying possessions that the 
 Great Elector met with opposition to the paternal des- 
 potism which he established. His scattered territories 
 without natural frontiers depended on good troops for their 
 security, and it was only by the most careful husbanding 
 of the country's resources that money could be raised 
 to pay the troops. He managed to maintain an army 
 of 24,000 men, which played a creditable part in the 
 German resistance to Louis XIV., and beat the Swedes 
 at Fehrbellin (1675). He added Magdeburg and a large 
 part of Pomerania to the dominions which passed to his 
 successor in 1688, and became the kingdom of Prussia 
 in 1700. 
 
 The Prussian troops wore among the best elements in 
 the composite armies of the allies during the war of the 
 Spanish succession. They were largely subsidised by 
 richer countries ; but when Frederick William, " the 
 Serjeant-king," acceded to the throne, he made it his 
 great aim to maintain a large army without the help 
 of subsidies. In the course of his reign (1713-1740) he 
 raised its numbers from 30,000 to nearly 80,000 men, 
 and this with a population of two millions and a quarter 
 and a revenue not much exceeding one million sterling. 
 Four-fifths of his revenue was spent on the army. France 
 
152 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 with ten times the population and eight times the revenue 
 had an army only twice as large. 
 
 To keep up this force Frederick William had to do as 
 the Swedes had done, to combine the compulsory service 
 of his own subjects with the enhstment of foreigners. 
 In 1733 he introduced a canton system by which each 
 regiment was assigned to a particular district whence 
 it drew the native portion of its recruits. There was a 
 general roll on which all males were inscribed, and from 
 this roll the men were chosen by the captains of com- 
 panies and the headmen of cantons conjointly. To ease 
 the burden on industry, there was exemption for certain 
 classes, such as skilled labourers, and for certain towns, 
 as Berlin. The men chosen continued to serve as long 
 as they were fit for service, but they were sent home 
 on furlough as soon as they had been trained, and were 
 only called up for two or three months of each year. 
 They received no pay while on leave, but the captains 
 were allowed to draw pay for them, and this went to 
 cover the cost of bounties for the foreign recruits. 
 
 The proportion of foreigners was at first one-third, but 
 afterwards rose to one-half. They were drawn chiefly 
 from the smaller German states. A service in which 
 economy of administration was carried to the highest 
 pitch offered little that was attractive. The pay of the 
 foot soldier was only three halfpence a day, the food, 
 clothing, and quarters were rough, and whatever the 
 term of engagement it was practically for life. Prussian 
 recruiting agents were widely spread, and resorted to all 
 methods, including kidnapping, to catch recruits.* The 
 men once caught were carefully guarded lest they should 
 
 ' This was especially the case with tall men, for whom the king had a 
 passion. It is reckoned that he spent nearly two millions sterling on 
 recruits for his giant grenadiers. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 153 
 
 desert, if only to re-enlist for a fresh bounty. Many of 
 them were of bad character, controllable only by strict 
 discipline and severe punishments. 
 
 " All that can be done with the soldier," .says Frederick 
 ui his military testament, " is to give him esprit de corps, 
 i.e. a higher opinion of his own regiment than of all the 
 other troops of the country, and since the officers have 
 sometimes to lead him into the greatest dangers (and he 
 cannot be influenced by a sense of honour) he must be 
 more afraid of his officers than of the dangers to which he 
 is expo.sed." > So argued Xerxes, as Herodotus tells us 
 (book vii. c. 10.'!). 
 
 The officers, drawn almost wholly from a poor and 
 prolific nobility, had little sympathy with their men. 
 But as compared with the officers of other armies their 
 professional standard was high. They learned their busi- 
 ness thoroughly, and promotion went by seniority and 
 merit, not by family or favour. They were assisted by 
 excellent under-officers (sergeants, corporals, &c.), most of 
 whom were promoted from the ranks, but some came from 
 the cadet schools and rose to be officers.^ 
 
 The characteristics of the Prussian army influenced its 
 tactics. At the outset of Frederick's instruction to his 
 generals (issued in 17.")3), he says: "Our regiments con- 
 sist, half of our own people, and half of foreigners, who 
 have enlisted for money. The latter, having no further 
 ground of attachment to the state, try to get away at the 
 first opportunity. The prevention of desertion becomes, 
 therefore, an object of importance." ^ On this account 
 encampments shouhl not be near woods, and may even 
 be intrenched ; there should be frequent roll calls and 
 patrols ; marauding should be severely punished ; men 
 should not be allowed to fall out on the march; night 
 ' Friedrich, p. 204. - Colin, i. I'.'j. ' Kiiediich, p. 3. 
 
154 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 marches and night attacks should be avoided. It was 
 partly for the same reason that loose fighting and indi- 
 vidual initiative were discouraged, rigidity and mechanical 
 precision were aimed at. 
 
 But there were other reasons for precision. Leopold 
 of Anhalt, " the old Dessauer," whom Frederick called the 
 creator of the Prussian army, had fought with distinction 
 under Eugene at Blenheim and Malplaquet, and against 
 Charles XII. at Stralsund. He was cousin of William III., 
 and was of kin, therefore (like Turenne), to Maurice of 
 Nassau. His experience of war and his disposition led 
 him to favour offensive tactics ; at the same time he laid 
 great stress on fire effect. " Good shooting, quick loading, 
 intrepidity, and vigorous attack : " ^ these were his deside- 
 rata. The fourth rank was of hardly any value for fire ; it 
 was looked to chiefly to stiffen and reinforce the other 
 three ranks. Holding that it was not needed for such 
 infantry as the Prussian, Leopold persuaded Frederick 
 William to do away with it. With closer files the dress 
 hitherto worn was inconvenient ; the men entangled one 
 another in turning or kneeling. So the ample skirts and 
 loose folds of the coat were trimmed away ; the sabre was 
 shortened and drawn up to the thigh.'-* 
 
 Loading was accelerated by the general adoption of iron 
 ramrods. They had long been in use for pistols and 
 carbines, and file-leaders had them to deal with obstinate 
 bullets; but for the common soldier wooden ramrods 
 were thought good enough, and these were apt to break if 
 they were not carefully handled. In 1698 Leopold pro- 
 vided all the men of his own regiment with iron ramrods, 
 and twenty years afterwards they were ordered to be 
 supplied to the whole of the Prussian infantry. The men 
 were taught to load so .smartly that they could fire five 
 
 1 Jahus. p. 1664. = Colin, i. 176. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 155 
 
 rounds a minute ; though it seems doubtful whether the 
 rate actually attained in the field with ball cartridge was 
 more than four rounds a minute. The ordinary rate in 
 other armies at that time and for long afterwards was two 
 or three rounds a minute. Napoleon reckoned that sixty 
 shots could be fired in thirty minutes or even in twenty, 
 but one shot in every six or seven would be a misfire.^ 
 
 " There is no necessity for firing very fast ; a cool well- 
 levelled fire with the pieces carefully loaded is much 
 more destructive and foi-midable than the quickest fire in 
 confusion." This was Wolfe's opinion;- and the small 
 number of rounds carried by the soldier made it neces- 
 sary to be sparing of rapid fire. The British infantry at 
 Fontenoy had twenty-four rounds per man. The Prussians 
 carried thirty rounds, and after Mollwitz (where they 
 ran short of ammunition) Frederick gave orders that 
 an additional thirty rounds should be carried by the 
 regimental transport, and issued before a battle. But 
 the time of trial for the soldier's nerves was the time 
 during which he was unloaded, and an abridgment of 
 the loading process had a value apart from the actual 
 number of rounds fired. As Saxe wrote shortly before 
 his death : " Troops that have fired are undone, if those 
 opposed to them have reserved their fire." ^ 
 
 So far as fire effect is concerned, troops advancing must 
 be at a disadvantage] compared with troops standing still. 
 The compensation lies in the moral effect of attack, the 
 threat of hand-to-hand encounter. Saxe held that "it 
 is no use wishing to do two things at once: I mean, 
 to charge and to stand fast. In the one case fire is 
 necessary, in the other not at all, and yet it is not so 
 easy to prevent it." * On this account he preferred plug 
 
 ' Napoleon I., xxxi. 4H(). - yinyth, p. 377. 
 
 ' Griraoard, v. 2'Jli. ■■ liCvirics, p. 32. 
 
1S6 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 bayonets. Leopold liad a more phlegmatic infantry to 
 deal with, more amenable to discipline. He trusted to 
 the method which the English exemplified at Dettingen 
 and Fontenoy, steady and continuous advance in slow 
 time, with volleys at intervals. The men of the first 
 rank were made to load and fire with bayonets fixed, 
 and Frederick (in 1742) extended the rule to all three 
 ranks. 
 
 Great pains were taken to deliver the attack before 
 the enemy was ready for it, and this was to be done, 
 not by hurry, but by precision of movement. " Although 
 the general movements of the infantry may appear slow 
 and solemn, yet they are so accurate that, no unnecessary 
 time being lost in dressing or correcting distances, they 
 arrive sooner at their object than any other, immediately 
 form, and at the same time proceed in perfect order to 
 the attack." ' The fullest advantage was taken of the 
 reduction in the number of ranks, and the closing in 
 of ranks and files, which followed from the change 
 of weapons of the infantry {vide p. 137). Leopold re- 
 introduced marching in step, which had been used by 
 the Greeks and Romans, the Swiss and the Swedes, but 
 had not been general hitherto. It became necessary if 
 men were to move in close order, and without it (as Saxe 
 said) it was impossible to make a vigorous charge : " one 
 will always reach the enemy with open ranks." 
 
 In the seventeenth century a force in column of march 
 had a length two or three times as great as it had in line 
 of battle. It took a long time for the rear to close up, 
 and for the force to form line. But when the ranks were 
 reduced to three, and the distance between them to one 
 pace, it became possible to form columns with a front 
 suited to ordinary roads without exceeding the length 
 
 ' Dandas, p. 9. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 157 
 
 in line. The Prussians marched usually in column of 
 sections (thirty men or ten tiles), or, if the roads were 
 narrow, in column of subsections, and could wheel at once 
 into line. The celerity with which they formed in order 
 of battle at Mollwitz and elsewhere was in marked con- 
 trast to the leisureliness of other nations. In former 
 days, says Dundas (writing in 1788), " hours were taken up 
 in forming in line of battle in the processional manner, 
 which was then the only one known ; and when such line 
 was once formed, it was difficult to make any considerable 
 alteration in it without much previous explanation and 
 endangering the order of the whole." ' 
 
 The Prussian regiments consisted of two battalions, 
 each of which had five companies of "musketeers" and 
 one company of "grenadiers." In the field the four 
 grenadier companies of two regiments were grouped as 
 a grenadier battalion. The musketeers were formed into 
 four divisions, each of two platoons, the platoon consist- 
 ing of seventy-five men or twenty-five files. In presence 
 of the enemy movements were made in column of 
 divisions or platoons, and line was formed either (a) to 
 a flank, by the simultaneous wheel of the divisions, or (b) 
 to the front, by halting the leading division and march- 
 ing the rest half-right, or half-left, into the alignment. 
 Frederick preferred the former method when it could be 
 used without exposing his flank to the enemy. Squares 
 were formed from line by wheeling, the two centre 
 platoons standing fast. 
 
 Each battalion was divided into two firings, viz. odd 
 and even platoons. The platoons of each firing fired in 
 succession from right to left. When the attack was made 
 by a brigade or a whole wing, the firing was by battalions 
 instead of platoons. Fire was opened at 200 paces from 
 ' Dundas, p. 7. 
 
158 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 the enemy. There were battahon guns in the intervals 
 between battalions, which kept a little in front of the line, 
 and fired as they moved forward. The intervals were 
 much too small to allow the second line to advance 
 through them. It could only relieve the first line by a 
 " passage of lines " : the first line filing to the rear by 
 platoons through gaps made m the second hne by break- 
 ing off files.i This was a manoeuvre hardly to be executed 
 when there was real need for it; it was tried, but found 
 impracticable by Girard's corps at Albuera. 
 
 The weapon forged by Leopold showed its quality at 
 Mollwitz(1741), though Frederick had not yet learnt how 
 to handle it. The Austrians had 10,000 foot and 8500 
 horse ; the Prussians 16,800 foot, but only 4500 horse. 
 The Austrians were taken by surprise, and to gain time 
 their cavalry charged the Prussian right, routed the horse 
 on that wing, and took the guns. They broke in between 
 the lines of infantry, and at the end of two hours the 
 situation was so grave that Schwerin persuaded the king 
 to leave the field. But when asked about the line of 
 retreat, Schwerin's answer was, "Over the body of the 
 enemy." He led the infantry steadily forward : " The 
 whole front seemed to be moved by a single impulse," 
 says an Austrian account ; " it came on step by step with 
 astonishing uniformity. At the same time their artillery 
 [the battalion pieces] was served without intermission 
 with shot and case, and as soon as they were within good 
 range their musketry fire was not silent for a moment, 
 but was like a continuous roll of thunder." ^ The Austrian 
 infantry could not be brought to charge them, but gathered 
 into deep masses round the colours ; and at length Neip- 
 perg gave orders for retreat, which was covered by the 
 cavalry. 
 
 1 Riistow, ii. 234. ^ Kriege Friedrichs, i. 400. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 159 
 
 According to Frederick, the victory was largely due to 
 the happy chance that he had placed some spare battalions 
 on the right of the infantry, between the first and second 
 lines. He had also posted two battalions of grenadiers 
 among the squadrons of the right wing, to make up for 
 their inferiority in number. Instead of breaking and 
 letting themselves be cut to pieces when the horsemen 
 were routed, these battalions faced some of their men 
 about, so as to show front in opposite directions, beat off 
 the Austrian horse, and eventually rejoined the rest of the 
 infantry. 
 
 At Hohenfriedberg (1745) the honours were divided 
 between the general and his troops. By artifice and by 
 rapidity of movement Frederick succeeded in surprising 
 the Austro-Saxon army, and routed the Saxons, who 
 formed its left wing, before the Austrians were in line. 
 The latter were then attacked in flank as well as in front, 
 and were beaten with a loss of more than 10,000 men. The 
 Prussian cavalry had a brilliant share in this victory. 
 Frederick says that he found it at his accession more pon- 
 derous and less spirited than that of any European army ; 
 but he had taken great pains with it after Mollwitz. The 
 men were not good riders, and had been trained to fight on 
 foot with fire-arms. Frederick declared he would cashier 
 any officer who waited to be attacked, instead of attacking. 
 It was the old German fashion to charge at the trot, and 
 the French fashion to charge at the gallop but in loose 
 order (en faurrageurs^). Speed was regarded as incom- 
 patible with closeness of formation. With the help of 
 Seydlitz, Frederick taught his cavalry to increase their 
 pace gradually as they neared the enemy, and yet keep 
 knee to knee. 
 
 At Kesselsdorf (1745) " the old Dessauer " had a last 
 » Guibert, i. 74, 369. 
 
i6o THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 opportunity, two years before his death, ot showing how to 
 use the troops he had trained. He had 30,000 men ; the 
 Saxons (assisted by an Austrian corps) had less cavalry, 
 but rather more infantry, and were strongly posted. Two 
 attacks on the village of Kesselsdorf failed; but the Saxons, 
 issuing for a counterstroke, masked their own guns. 
 Leopold brought his cavalry down on them, and his 
 infantry rallied and stormed the village. He pushed 
 his success so promptly and skilfully that nearly 7000 
 prisoners were taken. 
 
 " Such an army was capable of getting a general out of 
 a scrape, and the king has owned that he was more than 
 once indebted to it in that way : " so wrote Frederick in 
 his memoirs,! and Soor (1745) was an example of it. He 
 found the Austrian army unexpectedly on his right flank, 
 but the hesitation of the enemy and the mobility of his 
 own troops enabled him to form front to that flank and to 
 win the victory. 
 
 The Silesian wars were no sooner over than Frederick 
 set himself to note what he had learnt from them. In 
 1748 he wrote his "general principles of war applied to 
 the tactics and discipline of the Prussian army," which 
 was issued confidentially five years afterwards, and is 
 commonly known as his " military instruction to his 
 generals." He points out that Prussian wars should be 
 short and vigorous : " a prolonged war would gradually 
 undermine our admirable discipline, depopulate the 
 country, and exhaust our resources." The Prussians, 
 therefore, should take the offensive : " the whole strength 
 of our troops lies in attack, and we act foolishly if we 
 
 1 CEuvres, i. 176. Wellington is reported to have said the same : 
 " quand je me mets dans I'embarras, men arm(5e m'en retire " (Wood, 
 Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign, p. 193). 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY i6i 
 
 renounce it without good cause." ' The attack of villages 
 and intrenchments should be avoided if possible, for 
 they cost many men, the flower of the infantry. It is 
 in battles in the open field that Prussian troops find 
 their opportunit}-. 
 
 The one aim of their drill is to enable them to 
 niana'uvre and form up more quickly than the enemy, 
 to attack him with energy while he is unprepared, and 
 to settle the affair more speedily than has hitherto been 
 the custom. Cavalry is to be hurled at him with such 
 impetuosity that even the cowards must needs do their 
 duty. The infantry must march briskly forward, with a 
 good countenance and in good alignment. They should not 
 fire till the enemy begins to give way ; then they should 
 pour in volleys by battalions. 
 
 This was a change in Prussian practice, and was in 
 fact a counsel of perfection which, as Frederick was aware, 
 could not always be carried out. After describing a new 
 order of battle of his contrivance, he remarks : " It will 
 be said that I forbid shooting, and yet that the way in 
 which I draw up my troops hinges on nothing else than 
 the fire of my infantry. To this I answer that one of 
 two things will happen : either my infantry will fire 
 although it is forbidden, or my orders will be obeyed and 
 the enemy will give way." - He told a French visitor 
 (the Comte de Gisors) that the Prussian fire which was 
 so much talked of was the thing which he himself cared 
 least about, because those fine volleys which gave so 
 much pleasure at drill were soon out of the question 
 in a real engagement.^ Even with Prussian troops, it 
 was not always easy to get them forward when they 
 had once begun to fire, as Prince Augustus found at 
 Auerstedt. 
 
 ' Krie<lricli, pp. GO, HG. - Ih., p. 81. ' Rousset, p. lO.'J. 
 
 L 
 
1 62 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 In the new order of battle referred to above some 
 battalions were to be placed at the extremities of the 
 wings to support the cavalry, and to be used afterwards 
 to take the enemy in flank. They were to be assisted 
 in this by the three battalions which the experience of 
 Mollwitz had taught him to place at each end of his 
 two lines of infantry, to close the space between them. 
 In the second line of infantry there were to be some 
 squadrons of dragoons, to fall on the enemy's foot as 
 soon as it began to cluster round the colours, as the 
 Austrian battalions were apt to do. The main thing, 
 he says (in his Gedanken of 1755 ^), is that one arm 
 should be supported by another, that cavalry should be 
 stiffened by infantry and artillery, and that one should 
 always have cavalry on the spot to help the infantry. 
 
 But he had already thought out another order of 
 battle, his " oblique order," as he called it, which proved 
 to be his chief means of victory. In this "you refuse 
 one wing to the enemy and strengthen the one which is 
 to attack. With the latter you do your utmost against 
 one wing of the enemy which you take in flank. An 
 army of 100,000 men taken in flank may be beaten by 
 30,000 in a very short time. . . . The advantages of this 
 arrangement are (1) a small force can engage one much 
 stronger than itself; (2) it attacks the enemy at a 
 decisive point; (3) if you are beaten, it is only part of 
 your army, and you have the other three-fourths which 
 are still fresh to cover your retreat." - 
 
 This oblique order might be brought about by two 
 methods, or by a combination of them. The line of 
 battle might be formed parallel to the enemy, and the 
 attack delivered in echelon at one end of the line, 
 being headed by a picked corps. In open country this 
 
 > Friedricb, p. 140. - lb., p. 64. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 163 
 
 might be the only course available, and it was at least 
 as old as Epaminondas. But where the ground, fog, or 
 darkness gave concealment, the line might be formed at 
 an inclination to that of the enemy, and overlapping 
 it, and this made the attack much more effective. It 
 needed coup d'osil on the part of the general, a capable 
 staff, and troops that could form quickly and accurately 
 on the line chosen. It might be done by deployment, 
 or by a wheel into line from column. Frederick preferred 
 the latter method (as already mentioned) when he could 
 make use of it without lending his own flank to the 
 enemy.' 
 
 > Friedricb, p. 3G. 
 
VII 
 
 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY : II 
 
 In the Seven Years' war Frederick found that the Austrian 
 generals had learnt his maxim : " Always try to do what 
 the enemy wants you not to do." Instead of playing into 
 his hands by fighting battles in the open field, they chose 
 strong positions and fortified them. Their artillery was 
 more numerous than his, was better served, and had a 
 longer range. As he afterwards wrote from bitter ex- 
 perience : " The attack of a well-defended position is a 
 tough job : you may easily be repulsed and beaten. It 
 will at all events cost you some 15,000 or 20,000 men, 
 which makes a cruel breach in an army. Recruits, sup- 
 posing you can get enough of them, will make up the 
 number, but not the quality, of the soldiers you have lost. 
 Your country becomes depopulated in renewing your army ; 
 your troops deteriorate ; and if the war is a long one, you 
 find yourself at the head of peasants, ill-drilled and ill-dis- 
 ciplined, with whom you hardly dare to face the enemy." i 
 The two first battles of 1757— Prague (May 6) and 
 Kolin (June 18)^cost him nearly one-third of the 100,000 
 men which he had brought into Bohemia. In each case 
 he found the Austrians strongly posted, and marched 
 along their front to turn their right. In each case the 
 rearward part of his army was drawn prematurely into 
 action during the march owing to its nearness to the 
 enemy. His object was frustrated : the battle raged more 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 165 
 
 or less along the whole front, and the attack on the 
 enemy's right was ill-supported. At Prague the numbers 
 were nearly equal. The Austrians on the right, after 
 repulsing the Prussians, followed them up, became sepa- 
 rated from the left, and gave Frederick an opportunity 
 of cutting their army in two. At Kolin the Prussians 
 were very inferior in numbers, especially in infantry. 
 They were beaten after four hours of hard fighting which 
 cost them 40 per cent, of their strength. 
 
 But if flank marches were hazardous for Prussian troops, 
 much more were they hazardous for inferior troops against 
 Prussians, even if they were made at safer distance. At 
 Rossbach (November 5, 1757) Frederick with less than 
 22,000 men was in presence of a Franco-German army 
 nearly three times as numerous. Its commanders, finding 
 he would not attack thorn, resolved to force him back by 
 turning his left. They swept round to the south of his 
 position, and seeing his troops march off, they were per- 
 suaded that the Prussians were in full retreat. They 
 hurried on ; but suddenly the Prussian cavalry came over 
 a ridge, and charged like a wall upon the front and flank 
 of the German horse which formed the head of the allied 
 army in its order of march. The horse, though reinforced, 
 were driven ofi' the field. The French infantry began to 
 deploy, under fire of Prussian guns on higher ground ; but 
 before it could complete its deployment, it was attacked 
 by the Prussian infantry which advanced in echelon from 
 the left. 
 
 Alterations had been made recently in the French evolu- 
 tions, and as Voltaire says, " the soldier did not know 
 where he was : his old way of fighting was changed, and 
 he was not used to the new way." ' Some of the battalions 
 wore in line, and some in column. Under the fire of the 
 ' Siecle de Louis XV., p. ;J4'J. 
 
1 66 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 Prussian infantry, which struck them both m front and 
 flank, " one saw their columns," says Frederick, " crowding 
 towards the left; they soon squeezed up the deployed 
 battalions between them ; the mass of this infantry became 
 every moment denser, more unwieldy, and more confused ; 
 the more it threw itself to the left, the more was it out- 
 flanked by the Prussian front." ^ They gave way, and a 
 charge by Seydlitz's squadrons completed their discom- 
 fiture. The other troops followed their example, and the 
 Franco-German army was routed with a loss of 8000 men. 
 The Prussian loss was 541 : only seven Prussian battalions 
 were actually engaged, and they did not fire more than 
 fifteen rounds per man. 
 
 This was Frederick's only personal experience of French 
 troops. He held them cheap, both men and officers, and 
 in his military testament he remarked of one of the 
 Prussian princes that he ought not to be given an inde- 
 pendent command at first, for he had only fought French- 
 men hitherto. 2 Frederick declared that in the Seven 
 Years' war he was being throttled by three women — Maria 
 Theresa, Elizabeth, and Madame de Pompadour ; but the 
 pressure of Russia was intermittent, if severe, and of 
 France he was soon practically relieved by England. The 
 army under Ferdmand of Brunswick, which was in British 
 pay, exceeded 90,000 men m the latter half of the war, and 
 of these one-fourth were English. Frederick also received 
 a British subsidy which covered about one-third of his 
 expenditure. 
 
 Just a month after Rossbach, Frederick won a still 
 more brilliant victory over the Austrians at Leuthen. 
 He had marched back in all haste to Silesia, had gathered 
 up the fragments of the army which had been beaten at 
 Breslau, and advanced with 30,000 men against 80,000. 
 
 ' (Euvres, iii. 217. " Friedrich, p. 227. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 167 
 
 He found that the Austrian line of battle extended over 
 five miles of undulating country, and that woods and 
 hollows would hide the movements of his own troops. 
 He resolved " to place his whole army on the left flank 
 of the Imperialists, to strike his hardest with his right, 
 and to refuse his left, with such precautions that there 
 should be no fear of mistakes like those which had been 
 made in the battle of Prague, and had caused the loss of 
 that of Kolin." 1 On this flank there were marshes 
 wrongly supposed to be impassable; the Austrians 
 believed their right flank to be the one most exposed 
 to attack ; and Daun was hurrying there with reinforce- 
 ments, while Frederick was wheeling his columns into 
 line opposite the left, at an angle of about sixty degrees 
 with the prolongation of the Austrian front. 
 
 The attack was delivered by the vanguard of ten 
 battalions, supported by the first line which advanced 
 in echelon from the right. The Austrian left was driven 
 in upon the centre, and the battalions sent to reinforce it 
 were unable to deploy and were broken one after another. 
 Pivoting on its centre, the Austrian army swung round, 
 and formed a ragged line facing south instead of west. 
 Its cavalry tried to fall upon the Prussian left flank, 
 but were charged and dispersed by the Prussian cavalry, 
 which then fell on the flank and rear of the Austrian 
 infantry. The battle lasted little more than three hours, 
 and the Austrians were so demoralised that, besides 
 10,000 killed and wounded, they lost more than 20,000 
 men as prisoners within the next few days. It was a 
 masterpiece, as Napoleon has said, which would alone 
 suffice to immortalise Frederick ; but it was Prussian 
 drill that made it possible. 
 
 The quality of the troops was even more conspicuous 
 ' CEuvres, iii. 238. 
 
1 68 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 under adverse circumstances, as at Hochkirch (October 14, 
 1758). Frederick allowed himself to be surprised in the 
 early morning by an army which in infantry was double 
 his strength, and his right tlank was driven in. " Beaten 
 by 8 A.M., having lost nearly all its guns and abandoned 
 its standing camp, his army makes the finest retreat in 
 the world, and halts within a league of the battle-field ; 
 there its attitude is so imposing that we throw up re- 
 doubts and return to the defensive four days after our 
 successes : " so writes a French officer who was on Daun's 
 staff.i Yet the Prussian infantry had lost 8000 men out 
 of 29,000. 
 
 At Torgau (November 3, 1760) a desperate situation 
 led Frederick to attack an army half as large again as 
 his own, and so strongly posted that he found it necessary 
 to divide his own army in two, and make separate attacks 
 from north and south. As was to be expected, accidents 
 baulked his combinations. The attacks were not simul- 
 taneous ; the guns were delayed by the rough ground, and 
 the cavalry came up late ; the infantry advanced under a 
 storm of fire which swept away nearly the whole of the 
 first line. The repeated efforts of the northern force, 
 which was led by Frederick, met with only partial success ; 
 but the Prussians clung to the ground they gained, and 
 Ziethen, pushing in from the south after dark, seized the 
 key of the position. The victory cost Frederick one-third 
 of his army, and is characterised by Napoleon as the only 
 one in which he displayed no talent. 
 
 In speaking of his antagonists and their methods of 
 warfare, at the end of 1758, Frederick said : " The Russians, 
 rude and incapable, don't deserve to be mentioned." - 
 True as this might be of the officers, he had already 
 found at Zorndorf (August 25, 1758) that the men were 
 1 Waddington, ii. 319. = Friedricli, p. 1(52. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 169 
 
 not to be despised. His infantry had given way before 
 them both on the left and centre, and as he himself 
 wrote, " everything would have gone to the devil if it 
 had not been for my brave Seydlitz and the courage of 
 my right wing." ' Thanks to his cavalry, he remained 
 muster of the field after twelve hours' fighting ; but the 
 Russians confronted him for some days, ready to try 
 conclusions again, though they had lost more than half 
 the men who took part in the battle. It should be added 
 that in cavalry the Prussians were two to one, but in 
 infantry only two to three. 
 
 In spite of this experience, Frederick attacked the 
 Russians again next year at Kunersdorf (August 12, 
 1759). They had defeated his lieutenant, Wedell, three 
 weeks before at Paltzig with heavy loss. They were in a 
 strongly intrenched position, and numbered 63,000 men 
 (including 18,000 Austrians under Loudon) ; he had only 
 48,000 men. He threw his whole army on their left 
 flank, carried their intrenchments, and drove theu- left 
 wing in \ipon their right. But their stubborn resist- 
 ance and Loudon' .s skill saved them from a repetition of 
 Leuthen. They rallied on a hillock in the centre of their 
 po.sition, and the Prussians tried in vain to get possession 
 of it. There was not room for an advance in line or 
 echelon on a broad front, and the cavalry and artillery 
 could afford little support to the infantry, which was 
 already exhausted with marching and fighting. Yet 
 Frederick would not listen to the advice of his generals, 
 to rest content with what he had gained. He used up his 
 last reserves to no purpose, and at the end of eight hours 
 some vigorous counter-attacks drove his troops from the 
 field in utter rout. He wrote that night : " Out of an 
 army of 48,000 men I have not 3000 left. At tht 
 • Waddingtou, ii. 275. 
 
I70 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 moment they are all in flight, and I have no longer any 
 control over my men." ^ 
 
 Lloyd, the historian of the Seven Years' war, in which 
 he had himself taken part as a commander of Austrian 
 light troops, compares the characteristics of the armies 
 engaged in it. So far as raw material is concerned he 
 gives the palm to the Russians. They are obedient, 
 patient under hardships, dull but tenacious of impressions 
 once received, " little disposed to reason about causes and 
 events, and therefore very proper to form a good soldier." 
 Their reverence for their prince inspires them with en- 
 thusiasm, and this gives them an advantage over the 
 Austrians whom they otherwise resemble. 
 
 The Prussian army, he says, owes its victories to its 
 facility in manoeuvring, its leader, and its discipline : 
 " Should this spring languish but for an instant only, the 
 machine itself, being composed of such heterogeneous 
 matter, would probably fall to pieces." 
 
 The French are lively, impulsive, and volatile ; im- 
 petuous and formidable in attack, but if repulsed not 
 easily persuaded to try again ; " and as their vanity will 
 never let them confess they are in the wrong, they throw 
 the fault on their leaders, become mutinous and desert." 
 
 " The English are neither so lively as the French nor so 
 phlegmatic as the Germans ; they resemble more, how- 
 ever, the former, and are therefore somewhat lively and 
 impatient. If the nature of the English constitution per- 
 mitted some degree more of discipline, a more equal distri- 
 bution of favours, and a total abolishment of buying and 
 selling commissions, I think they would surpass, at least 
 equal, any troops in the world." - 
 
 The defects here glanced at were dwelt upon by Mau- 
 
 ■ Waddington, iii. 171). - Lloyd, ii. pp. xxxv., &c. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 171 
 
 villon, the biographer of Ferdinand of Brunswick. From 
 the purchase system it follows, he says, " that their officers 
 do not trouble their heads about the service ; and under- 
 stand of it, very few excepted, absolutely nothing whatever, 
 and this goes from the ensign up to the general. Their 
 home customs incline them to the indulgences of life ; 
 and, nearly without exception, they all expect to have 
 ample and comfortable means of sleep. This leads them 
 often into military negligences, which would sound in- 
 credible were they narrated to a soldier. To all this is 
 added a quiet natural arrogance which tempts them to 
 despise the enemy as well as the danger ; and as they very 
 seldom think of making any surprisal themselves, they 
 generally take it for gi-anted that the enemy will as little." ^ 
 He adds that they look down on their allies as well as 
 their enemy, and are therefore not easy to co-operate with. 
 
 These charges are to some extent borne out by British 
 officers themselves. General Kane writes : " I am sorry 
 to say that I have not known, among all the nations 
 I have served with, any officers so remiss on duty as 
 the generality of our own countrymen ; who in other 
 respects, not only equal, but in a great measure excel." - 
 General Bland (another veteran of Marlborough's cam- 
 paigns) says: "It is allowed by all nations that the 
 English possess courage in an eminent degree; but at 
 the same time they accuse us of the want of patience, 
 and consequently that which it produces, obedience." ^ 
 
 The Duke of Cumberland tried to raise the standard 
 of discipline and efficiency; but he added thereby to his 
 own unpopularity, and was said to be treating the soldiers 
 " rather like Germans than Englishmen." He had an 
 eye for men of merit ; he put Wolfe in command of a 
 battalion when he was only twenty-three, and gave him 
 ' Carlyle, ix. 147. '- Kane, p. 139. = Bland, p. 147. 
 
172 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 "particular marks of his esteem and confidence." Wolfe, 
 writing to a friend after Braddock's disaster, said: "I 
 have but a mean opinion of the infantry in general. 
 I know their discipline to be bad, and their valour 
 precarious. They are easily put into disorder, and hard 
 to recover out of it." He also spoke of the extreme 
 ignorance of the officers. He was apt, however, to express 
 himself strongly; and not long afterwards we find him 
 declaring that there are some incomparable battalions, 
 " the like'of which cannot, I'll venture to say, be found 
 in any army." ^ 
 
 His own regiment, the 20th, had so high a reputa- 
 tion that men of rank who wished to learn soldiering 
 sought service in it. It was one of the regiments 
 which afterwards justified Wolfe's statement at Minden 
 (August 1, 1759), while he was wearing himself out before 
 Quebec. " I have seen what I never thought to be 
 possible," wrote the French commander, Contades, "a 
 single line of infantry break through three lines of cavalry 
 ranked in order of battle, and tumble them to ruin."- 
 He had brought his army out into the plain north of 
 Minden, where his flanks were covered by a river and a 
 swamp ; and he meant to strike with his right and guard 
 with his left. Nearly all his cavalry (sixty-three squad- 
 rons out of eighty-five) were in the centre, which made 
 an elbow in his line of battle. While his right still 
 delayed, his centre was attacked by three brigades of 
 infantry — two British and one Hanoverian — which by 
 some misunderstanding advanced alone from the right 
 of the allied army. The three battalions of Waldegrave's 
 brigade (12th, 37th, and 23rd) led in line. Kingsley's 
 brigade (20t.h, 51st, and 25th) and the Hanoverians 
 formed a second line, in echelon to right and left of 
 
 ' Wii-ht, pp. oil, :!;!.■!. - Carlvio, viii. KiS. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 173 
 
 the leading brigade. They had to cross three-quarters 
 of a mile of open ground under the tire of more than 
 sixty guns. " But notwithstanding the loss they sustained 
 before they could get up to the enemy, notwithstanding 
 the repeated attacks of all the enemy's cavalry, notwith- 
 standing a lire of musketry well kept up by the enemy's 
 infantry, notwithstanding their being exposed in front 
 and flank, such was the unshaken firmness of those 
 troops that nothing could stop them, and the whole 
 body of French cavalry was totally routed." ' 
 
 As soon as Prince Ferdinand saw what was being 
 done by the British and Hanoverian infantry, he moved 
 forward two other brigades of foot in support of them, 
 and sent orders to Lord George Sackville to advance with 
 the British and Hanoverian cavalry (thirty-two squadrons) 
 on the right wing. Sackville's tardy obedience forfeited 
 the opportunity of making the victory as complete as that 
 of Rossbach. The French retreated with a loss of 7000 
 men. The loss of the allies was only 2800, but half of 
 it fell on the six British battalions, which had 44 per 
 cent, of their strength killed or wounded. 
 
 " It is always the case that the longer war lasts the 
 more the infantry deteriorates, and the more the cavalry 
 on the contrary improves." - Such was Frederick's experi- 
 ence, and it took him seven years to restore his infantry 
 to full efficiency. The most arduous part of the task 
 was to reconstitute and train the corps of officers. Under 
 the pressure of war men had been admitted who did 
 not belong to the nobiUty. These people were now got 
 rid of, or transferred to garrison regiments; for though 
 they might have merit and talent, the king distrusted 
 their sense of honour. To ensure uniformity, district 
 
 • Operalums of the Allied Army under Prince Ferdinand, p. 1(11. 
 * (Euvrcs, V. 170. 
 
174 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 inspectors were appointed — eight for the infantry, four 
 for the cavalry. The troops were not only drilled, 
 but practised in military operations, and there were 
 mancEuvres on a large scale both in spring and autumn. 
 
 The " General Principles," written after the second 
 Silesian war, needed revision, and in 1771 Frederick 
 issued a fresh work for the guidance of his inspectors 
 and oiBcers. The title of it, " Elements of Castrame- 
 tation and Tactics," indicates the change in his pouit 
 of view. The first fourteen articles (out of thirty-eight) 
 are on the art of encamping, or in other words have 
 reference to the defensive. " In the warfare of the 
 present day affairs of posts and artillery combats are 
 everything," he says. Cavalry must be kept well out 
 of the way, hidden in hollows if possible, till the 
 opportunity comes for it. In delivering attacks the 
 bulk of the army should be kept 800 paces from the 
 enemy, that being the utmost range of case-shot. A 
 special corps of attack must be pushed forward, therefore, 
 a hammer to deal the first blow. It may be preceded 
 sometimes by light troops, which are not much to be 
 depended on, but will serve to draw the enemy's fire 
 and cause some disorder in his ranks. 
 
 The principles of fortification and siege operations were 
 applied by Frederick to defence and attack in the field, and 
 he was careful to make the fire of his artillery converge 
 upon the point of attack. He had come to rate the effect 
 of infantry fire and the advantage of rapid loading more 
 highly than he did at first as a means of winning battles. 
 He gave several examples of attacks made under different 
 conditions of ground. Supposing there were a village lying 
 in advance of the enemy's main position, he formed his 
 corps of attack in columns, allowing plenty of room for 
 batteries between them. He provided guns and howitzers 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 175 
 
 in the large proportion of five or six to every thousand 
 men. In 1759 he had introduced a hattery of light six- 
 pounders with mounted detachments, the beginning of 
 horse- artillery. Renewed after Kunersdorf, and again 
 after Maxen, it showed its value at Reichenbach 
 (August IG, 1762) acting in concert with the cavalry.^ 
 
 The increased use of artillery in the field involved an 
 increase in the number of horses and waggons, which 
 lengthened out columns on the march, or caused them 
 to use several roads instead of one. To guard them- 
 selves against surprise, whether in movement or in 
 camp, armies found it necessary to have a screen of 
 light troops, which might also be used to strike at the 
 enemy's line of operations and intercept his convoys.^ 
 Thus infantry had no sooner been reduced to a single 
 type, at the beginning of the century, than it began to 
 diverge again into two types. These differed in their 
 function and charactei", rather than in their equipment. 
 Croatia and other half-civilised countries on the Turkish 
 frontier provided the Austrians with excellent light 
 troops, both horse and foot, of which Trenck's Pandours 
 were a conspicuous example. Frederick found them a 
 thorn in his side, as Saxe had done in the Nether- 
 lands. He consoled himself with the reflection that 
 they kept his men on the alert and inured them to 
 war. He formed some light battalions, composed chiefly 
 of deserters, and towards the end of his reign he had 
 three regiments of light infantry and a Jilger regiment 
 of two battalions, one of which was armed with rifles. 
 
 Light troops were at first raised as independent com- 
 panies, and so came to be known as " free corps " ; and 
 the name fitted their loose order and habits so well 
 
 ' Frietlricb, p. 202. - Mauvillon, cbap v. 
 
176 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 that it was retained after they were formed into batta- 
 lions. It was a kind of soldiering that suited the French, 
 and under the encouragement of Saxe light troops to the 
 number of about 5000 men were raised and attached to 
 his army. The Grassin regiment, which played an im- 
 portant part at Fontenoy and afterwards, consisted of 
 nine companies of 100 foot and two squadrons of 150 
 horse. Saxe also raised a regiment of mounted scouts, 
 recruited in Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe. 
 For the foot corps smugglers and vagabonds who knew 
 the country were the choicest material. 
 
 In 1759 light companies (chasseurs) were formed for 
 all the battalions of Broglie's army in Germany. It 
 had been the custom to employ the grenadiers as skir- 
 mishers, but they were not well suited to it, being the 
 biggest and strongest men of the regiment. It was 
 found better to treat them as a reserve for emergencies 
 or as a picked corps for assaults, and to leave skirmishing 
 and outpost work to the light infantry who were small 
 and active.^ Both grenadiers and light companies were 
 often withdrawn for a time from their regiments, and 
 formed into special battalions. At the end of the war 
 the French light companies were broken up, and were 
 replaced by legions of horse and foot mixed, about 400 
 strong; but in 1776 the light companies were restored 
 to the battalions. A few years afterwards several batta- 
 lions of chasseurs_^^ied were raised, attached at first to 
 the chasseurs a cheval, but soon separated from them. 
 
 In the British army the evolution of light troops 
 took a course of its own. Independent companies of 
 Highlanders had been raised in the early part of the 
 century to keep the Jacobites in check. In 1739 some 
 of them were brought together to form the first Highland 
 ' Rochambeau, i. 130, 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 177 
 
 regiment, the Black Watch ; and at the beginning of the 
 Seven Years' war other regiments of Highlanders were 
 raised for service in America. The Royal Americans 
 (afterwards the 60th Rifles) was raised at the same time, 
 mainly from foreigners in Pennsylvania; and Bouquet, 
 a Swiss who commanded one of its battalions, was one 
 of the first men to recognise that light infantry was 
 needed for American warfare, and that hints must be 
 taken from backwoodsmen and Red Indians. Lord Howe 
 shared and developed these views, and in the expedi- 
 tions against Louisburg and Quebec small corps of light 
 infantry drawn from the line battalions played a leading 
 part. There was also a separate light battalion (Gage's) 
 raised in America, and another (Morgan's) was raised in 
 Ireland for service in Germany. Towards the end of the 
 war the light troops in Ferdinand's army rose to 8000, 
 or 10 per cent, of its strength.^ Light companies were 
 formed by regiments serving at home, and were sent on 
 active service. A few years afterwards (in 1771) the 
 normal peace establishment of infantry battalions was 
 augmented by a light company, which henceforth paired 
 off with the gi-enadier company.- 
 
 Along with these tendencies in the direction of a 
 looser order of fighting for infantry there were other 
 tendencies in the opposite direction. After the Seven 
 Years' war, the Prussian manoeuvres were attended by 
 many officers from other countries, eager to learn the 
 secret of the Prussian victories. " Old Frederick laughed 
 in his sleeve," says Napoleon, "at the parades of Pots- 
 dam, when he perceived young officers, French, English, 
 and Austrian, so infatuated with the manoeuvre of the 
 oblique order, which was fit for nothing but to gain a 
 
 ' Dundas, p. 265. ' Davis, iii. Ill, 163. 
 
 M 
 
1 78 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 few adjutant-majors a reputation."! But Frederick seems 
 to have bad more faitli in mechanism than Napoleon 
 had. His inspections were formidable ordeals, and bis 
 generals, anxious to win praise or escape blame, vied 
 with one another in complicated evolutions. The art 
 of drill came to be taken for the art of war. 
 
 Foreign officers were the more disposed to lay stress 
 upon it because they saw so much else to disapprove of 
 in the Prussian army. The large proportion of foreigners, 
 the harsh discipline, the scanty pay and food of the men, 
 their bad quarters and indifferent equipment — all results 
 of the endeavour to maintain an army out of proportion 
 to the resources of the country — were in striking contrast 
 with the past achievements of the troops and with their 
 beautiful manoeuvring. Other armies, if they could only 
 learn this art, would be much better than the Prussian. 
 
 "The first principle of the Prussian system is sub- 
 ordination, and the first maxim ' not to reason but to 
 obey.' The effects of these are attention, alertness, pre- 
 cision, and every executive quality in the officers, which, 
 assisted by the constant exercise of the soldiers upon 
 the soundest principles of tactics, enable the troops to 
 practise with wonderful ease and exactness manoeuvres 
 that others hardly admit in theory." So wrote an acute 
 observer, Burgoyne^ (of Saratoga fame); at the same 
 time he pointed out that it was necessity, not choice, 
 that had led the King of Prussia to reduce his men " as 
 nearly as possible to mere machinery," and that while 
 the system produced excellent sergeants and subalterns, 
 its effect was bad on the higher officers, who needed 
 " other qualifications than those of mere execution." 
 The disasters of Maxen (1759) and Landshut (1760) 
 are illustrations in point. 
 
 > Napoleon, xxxii. 243, - Fonblanque, pp. 62, &c. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTUIIY 179 
 
 The Prussian evolutions, as elaborated by Saldern, were 
 presented in an English dress by Colonel (afterwards Sir 
 David) Dundas in his " Principles of Military Movements," 
 which formed the basis of the Field Exercise of the Infantry 
 issued by authority in 1792. Up to this time there had 
 been no uniformity in battalion movements ; each regi- 
 ment had its own method : " Hence (as Wolfe wrote in 
 1758) the variety of steps in our infantry and the feeble- 
 ness and disorderly floating of our lines." ^ The change 
 was much needed, but was not an unmixed benefit. 
 Capricious variety was replaced by servile adherence, and 
 in a few years Moore was complaining of " those damned 
 eighteen manoeuvres." - It was a principal aim of Dundas 
 to correct the " independent ideas " of light infantry, which 
 had come increasingly into fashion owing to the war of 
 American Independence. He held that their modes of 
 fighting " are certainly not calculated either to attack or 
 repulse a determined enemy, but only to annoy a timid 
 and irregular one " ; and he doubted the expediency of 
 light companies in battalions.^ 
 
 In France, German fashions had already begun to pre- 
 vail before the middle of the century. They were first 
 introduced for the German troops in French pay, Saxe 
 setting the example, and soon spread to the French regi- 
 ments. In the matter of uniform, says General Susane, 
 " folds, facings, pockets, and lining were reduced to fictions 
 indicated by a piping. About the same time and for the 
 same reasons we borrowed from Germany cross-belts 
 which compressed the chest, but had the advantage of 
 throwing the sword to the rear to knock against the calves, 
 and the cartridge-box to quarrel with the havresac ; long 
 gaiters, which squeezed the legs and stopped the circu- 
 lation in that useful member of the foot-soldier ; stocks, 
 
 • Wright, p. 418. * Buubury, p. 46. "■ Dundas, p. 14. 
 
i8o THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 which forced him to keep his head up, even with the sun 
 in his eyes, and their corollary, the shako, which has to 
 be balanced ; curl-papers for the hair and tight queues. 
 The soldier was uncomfortable, it is true, but he was 
 sinart."^ His toilette was said to take him three hours 
 a day.2 
 
 This style of dress, and the precision of drill which went 
 along with it, were uncongenial to the French soldier, and 
 were largely due to the wish to make a good show at 
 reviews. But for accuracy of movement and for the 
 maximum of fire effect it was necessary that files should 
 touch : and it was impossible to reduce them from 3 feet 
 to 1 foot 9 inches Avithout alteration of clothing and 
 equipment. The changes marked a stage in the develop- 
 ment of linear tactics. German methods of discipline 
 were also borrowed, but in this as in other matters there 
 was no uniformity ; colonels of regiments were allowed 
 great freedom. 
 
 The work done liy Dundas for England was done for 
 France by Guibert, whose Essai gendral de tadique was 
 first published in 1770. He was then only twenty-seven, 
 but he had seen something of the Seven Years' war as a 
 boy, his father having been chief staff-officer to Marshal 
 Broglie, and at one time a prisoner with the Prussians. 
 An ardent admirer of Frederick, whom he ranked even 
 higher than Giesar, he found much to criticise in the 
 Prussian army. Even its boasted rapidity of fire was only 
 obtained at the expense of good shooting, to which much 
 more attention ought to be paid. In engagements with 
 infantry he preferred file-firing to volleys ; but troops 
 advancing with fixed bayonets should not fire at all. 
 
 The two features of Frederick's system which Guibert 
 particularly admired and recommended were (1) the 
 1 Susane, i. 236. - Guibert, i. 161. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY i8i 
 
 oblique order, including all dispositions which enabled an 
 army to deliver its attack at one or more points, without 
 exposing itself to attack at other points ; (2) the close 
 column of mana-uvre, which Frederick had latterly adopted 
 as the most effective means of applying the oblique order. 
 This method of " ployment " and " deployment " Guibert 
 (like Dundas) regarded as the great modern discovery, 
 much handier and more expeditious than the older 
 method of breaking into open column from line, maintain- 
 ing distance on the march, and then wheeling back into 
 line. To give it full scope he would disregard inversion, 
 and let companies and battalions form up in any order 
 that might be most convenient. 
 
 He allowed that columns should be used in certain 
 cases, not only for manoeuvre, but for attack, e.g. in the 
 attack of posts, or where the ground did not admit of 
 advance on a wide front; but under ordinary circum- 
 stances the three-deep line should be regarded as the true 
 fighting formation. This was in accordance with the 
 existing practice, and with the prevailing sense of the 
 best French officers. The regulations issued in 1776, 
 after three years of preparation and experiment, were 
 based generally on linear tactics, but included (as previous 
 regulations had done) the formation of columns of attack 
 for use in special cases. These were columns of platoons 
 or divisions (one-eighth or one-fourth of a battalion) ac- 
 cording as they consisted of one or two battalions. 
 
 There were many, however, who still shared the opinion 
 of Folard and of Saxe, that a deep order was better suited 
 to French soldiers than a shallow order, and that the 
 column should be the normal, not merely the occasional, 
 fighting formation. This view found an indefatigable advo- 
 cate in Menil-Durand, an otKcer of engineers, described 
 by Rochambeau as "a great geometrician but a very 
 
1 82 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 mediocre tactician." ^ His first scheme, brought forward 
 ia 1755, was based on plesions (or oblongs) of thirty-two 
 ranks and twenty-four files, drawn up chequerwise ; and, 
 like Folard, he proposed to arm some of the men on the 
 front and flanks with short pikes or partizans. In 1774 
 he presented his system in a modified form, dropping his 
 Greek and Latin names, and accommodating himself to 
 the battalion organisation. This gave him a column 
 of twenty-four ranks and sixteen files. The battalion 
 columns were to be in pairs side by side; they were to 
 advance without firing, but were to have a screen of skir- 
 mishers in front of them, formed by their grenadiers and 
 chasseurs. Only when some obstacle prevented their 
 coming to close quarters with the enemy should they 
 deploy into line and have recourse to fire. 
 
 Menil-Durand found a powerful patron in Marshal 
 Broglie, who had won more credit in the Seven Years' 
 war than any other French commander, and had made 
 good use of columns of attack at Bergen and elsewhere. 
 By his influence a comparative trial took place at a camp 
 near Bayeux, in 1778. The marshal himself directed the 
 operations of the troops manoeuvring on the new system, 
 while Rochambeau commanded the infantry of the oppo- 
 site force, which was to conform to the Regulations of 
 1776.- The general opinion pronounced in favour of 
 Rochambeau, who, according to Guibert, showed that 
 "the modern system of tactics is susceptible of every- 
 thing, adapts itself to everything, employs columns when 
 they are needed — and columns simpler than those of M. 
 de Menil-Durand — combines them, and intermixes them 
 with deployed battalions, supports a line with them, &c." * 
 
 The result was that the Regulations of 1776 remained 
 
 ' Kochambeau, i. 226. - lb., 225-232. 
 
 ■' Guibert, iii. 212. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1S3 
 
 unchanged. They were practically reproduced in the 
 Regulations of 1791, which continued in force through- 
 out the wars of the Republic and Empire,' and which were 
 mainly the work of Guibert. But his victory over Menil- 
 Durand was the victory of common sense over exaggera- 
 tion, rather than that of the ordre mince over the oi'dre 
 profonde. 
 
 In his Defense du syf<t(Sme de guerre moderne (1779) 
 Guibert took care to recognise the value of the column 
 as a fighting formation in combination with luie. Some- 
 times the attacking battalions should be alternately in 
 column and deployed, sometimes the deployed battalions 
 should support the columns, sometimes they should be 
 supported by them ; there should be no universal and 
 exclusive method. Columns have the advantage of de- 
 livering a rapid succession of strokes at a particular point. 
 Their density gives confidence to the men themselves, and 
 intimidates the enemy. Their narrow front may enable 
 them to find a line of approach where they will escape 
 much loss by the enemy's fire. 
 
 " Such are the advantages of the column ; but it has 
 also undoubtedly some inconveniences. It is subject to 
 undulation, tumult, and disorder. If its flanks come 
 under a brisk fire, if it does not surmount the obstacles 
 m its path at the first efibrt, the men close up and press 
 one on another, the ranks become mixed, the officers 
 cannot make themselves heard, the mass sways, scatters, 
 and cannot be rallied except a long way off, and then 
 not as a column." '^ 
 
 Even if it carries the point attacked, it is not in 
 much better case, for it becomes so disordered that it 
 may be driven out again, as happened several times at 
 Neerwinden (1693). 
 
 » Duruy, A., p. 250. ^ Guibert, iii. 250. 
 
1 84 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 As to the appeal made to the national vanity by 
 Menil-Durand, in giving the title of ordre frangais to 
 his system, Guibert spoke out with wholesome plainness. 
 Frenchmen are not the only people to whom attack is 
 congenial: if they were the assailants at Crecy and 
 Poitiers, they were the assailed at Blenheim and Minden. 
 If no nation has such capacity for a first effort as the 
 French, none is more easily discoui'aged or more im- 
 pressionable ; none has lost so many battles by want of 
 discipline, or lost them so completely. It is less impor- 
 tant to have an order which will favour the strong points 
 of the national character, than to have one which will 
 counteract its i 
 
 The Prussian achievements had shown, perhaps more 
 forcibly than ever before, how large a part discipline 
 plays in military success. The armies of the French 
 RepubHc were soon to remind the world that there are 
 other factors to be taken into account ; and the war of 
 American Independence taught the same lesson. 
 
 It was regarded as sound and wholesome doctrine, 
 on which the authority of all governments hinged, that 
 " trained troops are invincible against any number or any 
 position of undisciplined rabble."^ So thought General 
 Burgoyne when he went to America; but he began to 
 feel misgivings after watching the action at Bunker Hill 
 (June 17, 1775). He wrote: "The defence was well con- 
 ceived and obstinately maintained ; the retreat was no 
 flight : it was even covered with bravery and military 
 skill, and proceeded no farther than to the next hill, 
 where a new post was taken." ^ Two thousand British 
 infantry succeeded in dislodging some 4000 New England 
 
 1 Guibert, iii. 211), &c. - Fonblanqnc, p. 1!)3. 
 
 ^ lb., pp. 142, &c. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 185 
 
 militia from intrenchments thrown up in the night ; but 
 only after two failures, and with a loss of half their 
 number, killed or wounded. The militiamen were with- 
 out bayonets, and their ammunition ran short. 
 
 The impression made on the British was such that 
 in the following March, when the Americans had thrown 
 up batteries on Dorchester heights to cannonade Boston, 
 Howe thought it better to hasten his evacuation of the 
 city than to attempt to storm the works. In his sub- 
 sequent operations he showed that he had passed from 
 undue confidence to excessive caution. The command 
 of the sea gave the British troops a great advantage for 
 operations near the coast, and in open country their 
 superiority was well-marked. The victories of Camden 
 (August IG, 1780) and Guilford (March 15, 1781) were 
 won by Cornwallis agamst odds of two to one. But in 
 wooded country the case was different. 
 
 In some "Reflections upon the War in America" 
 Burgoyne wrote : " It is not to be expected that the 
 rebel Americans will risk a general combat or a pitched 
 battle, or even stand at all, except behind intrenchments 
 :vs at Boston. Accustomed to felling of timber and to 
 grubbing up trees, they are very ready at earthworks 
 and palisading, and will cover and intrench themselves 
 wherever they are for a short time left unmolested with 
 surprising alacrity. . . . Composed as the American army 
 is, together with the strength of the country, full of 
 woods, swamps, stone walls, and other inclosures and 
 hiding-places, it may be said of it that every private man 
 will in action be his own general, who will tui-n every 
 tree and bush into a kind of temporary fortress, from 
 whence, when he hath fired his shot with all the delibera- 
 tion, coolness, and certainty which hidden safety inspires, 
 he will skip as it were to the next, and so on for a long 
 
1 86 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 time till dislodged either by cannon or by a resolute 
 attack of light infantry." ^ 
 
 Eighteen months afterwards he himself fell a victim 
 to such tactics, and was forced to surrender at Saratoga 
 (October 12, 1777). That disaster brought France into 
 the field as the ally of the Americans, and practically 
 settled the issue of the war, though it lasted four years 
 longer. 
 
 At the end . of that time the American troops were 
 of very different quality from what they were at first. 
 The provincial militia sometimes drove Washington to 
 despair. "To lean on the militia," he wrote, "is to lean 
 on a broken reed. Being familiar with the use of the 
 musket they will fight under cover, but they will not 
 attack or stand in the open field." They came and 
 went according to their pleasure, or the exigencies of 
 their farms: "There is not time to drill the men before 
 they are gone, and discipline is impossible because if it 
 was enforced they would go." With difficulty Washing- 
 ton persuaded Congress to enlist men for the battahons 
 of " the continental army " with the obligation to serve 
 till the end of the war, and to let him appoint the 
 regimental officers, who were at first elected by their 
 men. Even then he found it necessary to take the 
 men on their own terms; and the total number of 
 soldiers enlisted durmg the war (230,000) was nearly 
 ten times the average strength of the army, so that it 
 was practically renewed annually. The " continental " 
 battalions, however, became very superior to the militia 
 in steadiness and discipline, and some excellent officers, 
 such as Nathaniel Greene, rose to high command. 
 Foreign officers, especially Baron Steuben, a Prussian 
 veteran, served as drill instructors.^ 
 
 ' Fonblanque, p. 209. " Greene, pp. 286-292. 
 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 187 
 
 The influence of American warfare in developing 
 light mfantry in the British army has been already 
 mentioned. It also introduced the practice of forming 
 line with two ranks instead of three. Many officers 
 disapproved of this. General Clinton thought disasters 
 such as that of Tarleton at Cowpens (January 17, 1781) 
 were to be expected from "our flimsy order of two 
 deep and open files." ^ Dundas says (in 1788) : " The 
 method almost universally adopted in our infantry, and 
 in ours only, of forming two deep, and at open files . . . 
 was not produced by the experience of the German 
 war, but by that of the first American. The desultory 
 service there carried on by small bodies of men, and 
 the then deficiency of movement and want of flexibility 
 in our solid battalions, made us run into the other 
 extreme, and first introduced it as proper for that 
 country; review appearance continued it; and the new 
 military modes, brought into fashion by the light in- 
 fantry, have tended to make it the prevalent order of 
 the service."- He held that a two-deep line was incon- 
 veniently long if the force was considerable, that it was 
 unfit to cross bayonets with a line formed three deep, 
 or to resist the attack of determined cavalry, and that 
 it would soon be reduced to single rank in action. It 
 was not till 1824 that the two-deep formation was 
 ofiicially adopted in the field exercise as the normal 
 formation for British infantry, though it had been 
 habitually used in the Peninsula. 
 
 ' Clinton- Cormaallis Controversy, i. 320. 
 2 Dundas, p. 53. 
 
VIII 
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1792-1815) 
 
 " They will be beat ; they want discipline ; they have no 
 subordination:" such was the prediction which Arthur 
 Young heard on all sides when the French declared war 
 against Austria m April 1792. He was unwilling himself 
 to play the prophet, but " thus much I may venture, that 
 the expectation of destruction to France has many diffi- 
 culties to encounter. Give all you please to power of field 
 evolution, depending on the utmost strictness of discipline 
 — you nuist admit that it bears only on the question of 
 battles. But guarded as France is, by the most important 
 fortresses the world knows, why hazard battles ? . . . Oil 
 and vinegar, fire and water, Prussians and Austrians, are 
 united to carry war among twenty-six millions of men, 
 arranged behind one hundred of the strongest fortresses in 
 the world." ^ He came to the conclusion that if these 
 people cared for freedom, as they seemed to do, and were 
 but tolerably united, the attack would be full of diffi- 
 culties. Even he did not dream, however, that before 
 the end of the year the invasion would be repelled, the 
 Austrians would be driven out of their own Netherlands, 
 and the French be masters of Mayence. 
 
 To a professional eye the French army was in a deplor- 
 able state at this time. As Trochu has said, the French 
 are a warhke rather than a military people, and discipline 
 had always been slack. There had been little sympathy 
 
 ' Young, p. 35tj. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 189 
 
 between officers and men, drawn as they were from widely 
 different classes; and the progress of the Revolution had 
 increased their alienation. In May 1791 the National 
 Assembly authorised the soldiers to attend meetmgs of 
 the patriotic clubs, where they were incited against their 
 officers: and in August it decided that half the vacancies 
 caused by the resignation of officers should be filled by the 
 promotion of under-officers.^ This gave a fresh spur to 
 intrigue and insubordination, and by the time war began 
 two-thirds of the officers had emigrated. The ranks also 
 were thinned ; for many men deserted from the regular 
 corps to join the national guards or the volunteers, and 
 recruits were hardly to be had. In June 1792 the regular 
 troops numbered less than 180,000 men, and not more 
 than half of them were available for the field armies. 
 
 The national guards, started at Paris in 1789, had 
 spread over the whole country, and had superseded the 
 provincial militia. They were enrolled for local duty 
 only, but in 1791 the Assembly called upon them to 
 furnish 101,000 volunteers as a reinforcement for the 
 armies on the frontiers. These volunteers formed separate 
 battalions, and were allowed to choose their own officers. 
 The generals complained that they were apt to choose 
 intriguers, talkers, and drinkers, rather than men of 
 capacity; but at all events among those chosen were 
 Davout, Jourdan, Lecourbe, Marceau, Massena, Oudinot, 
 Pichegru, and Victor, who had served in the regular 
 army. Others, such as Lannes, Moreau, St. Cyr, and 
 Suchet, had had little if any military training, but soon 
 showed their fitness for command. Not only patriotism 
 and warlike ardour, but ambition and " la carriei-e ouverte 
 aux talens," drew young men from the civil professions. 
 
 But whether the choice was good or bad, the system 
 
 ' The old name, bas-ojicicrs, had been changed into tous-officicrs. 
 
I90 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 made it diftlcult for the officers to exert any authority, 
 especially as they had practically no means of punish- 
 ment, and the ruling powers in Paris encouraged insub- 
 ordination. It was the duty of the Departments to clothe 
 and equip their volunteers, but the duty was very imper- 
 fectly performed ; the men joined the armies destitute 
 and pillaged freely. 
 
 Rochambeau, who commanded the army of the north, 
 protested against offensive operations with such troops 
 until they had had some training in field service, and 
 wished to assemble them in intrenched camps. He was 
 overruled, and on April 29 two corps were sent across the 
 frontier : one directed on Tournay, the other on Mons. 
 They were to encourage the Belgians to rise, and to divert 
 attention from the advance of La Fayette on Namur. 
 As'soon as they came in contact with the enemy they fell 
 into confusion, and fled back in panic to Lille and Valen- 
 ciennes. At Lille they killed their commander, Dillon, 
 and they tried to do the same to Bu-on at Valenciennes. 
 The men who behaved worst on this occasion were dragoons 
 of the regular army. 
 
 Dumouriez, at that time minister for foreign affairs, 
 was chiefly responsible for this abortive offensive. He 
 was appointed to the command of the army of the north 
 just before the Austro-Prussian army of invasion crossed 
 the French frontier near Longwy (August 19). It was 
 very reluctantly that he gave up his plan of carrying 
 liberty into the Belgian provinces, to go to meet the 
 allies in the Argonne, and adopt a trivte defensive. His 
 ability and resolution, coupled with Brunswick's caution, 
 brought the invasion to an end in the cannonade of Valmy 
 (September 20, 1792), and turned it into a disastrous re- 
 treat. The numbers were about equal. The quahty of the 
 French troops was not severely tested, but at all events 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 191 
 
 they faced the renowned soldiers of Prussia with so good 
 a countenance that the attack was not driven home. 
 
 In July the Assembly had declared the country in 
 danger, and the generals were allowed to requisition the 
 Departments for the men necessary to keep up the 
 numbers of their troops. Recruits were much needed, 
 for the volunteers were free to leave at the end of each 
 campaign if they had given two months' notice to their 
 captains.^ But the new recruits — volontaires for^s as 
 they called themselves— had neither the ardour nor the 
 physical fitness of the volunteers of 1791. Substitutes 
 were allowed, with the result (as Carnot reported) that 
 men who had sold themselves like cattle made a trade of 
 deserting and re-enlisting, and that able-bodied persons 
 were replaced by cripples and bad characters. If such 
 men were destitute, as they mostly were, it was usually 
 because they had sold their arms and clothes. Arms, 
 indeed, were so scarce that at one time the war minister, 
 Scrvan, suggested that two ranks should be armed with 
 pikes and the other two with fowling-pieces. Biron, who 
 commanded in Alsace, wrote (September 9) : " I am told 
 that you mean to withdraw from the army of the Rhine 
 nearly all the troops of the line, and to replace them by 
 twice as many national volunteers; this is simply to 
 deprive me of all means of defence while doubling the 
 means of consumption." - 
 
 As soon as Brunswick's army began its retreat from 
 Champagne, Dumouriez recurred to his plan of invading 
 the Netherlands. He had 70,000 men, nearly three times 
 the number of the Austrian troops there, and he arranged 
 to advance simultaneously on Tournay, Mens, Charleroi, 
 and Namur. To those who advised him to follow the 
 example of Turenne and Saxe, and have one siege army 
 
 ' Rousset, Let Vdontaires, p. 27. ' Rousset, p. 100. 
 
192 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 and one covering army, he replied : " We are not making 
 war in the old fashion ; Belgium is waiting for me ; I am 
 sure of six provinces out of ten, and the inhabitants will 
 arm at my approach ; there is no reason to be afraid of 
 penetrating by four points at once ; the more points the 
 Austrians occupy, the more impossible becomes their 
 defence." ^ 
 
 His tactics corresponded to his strategy. At Jemappes 
 (November 6, 1792) the Austrians were strongly posted; 
 but they numbered only 13,000, while Dumouriez had 
 40,000. He had twice as many guns as they had, and 
 his guns included horse artillery, which had been lately 
 introduced into the French service. He attacked on both 
 flanks, as well as in front. His artillery, distributed over 
 an arc of ITiO", helped him by the convergence of its fire. 
 Of his infantry about one-third were regulars, and as a 
 rule one battaHon of the line was brigaded with two 
 battahons of volunteers. Whole battalions were thrown 
 forward as skirmishers, supported by light cavalry ; they 
 swarmed round the Austrian works, and drove the 
 gunners from their guns by a rain of bullets. The 
 attacking troops showed some unsteadiness, and lost 
 heart at times ; but they responded to the appeals made 
 to them, and the battle was won. It carried with it the 
 conquest of Belgium, encouraged the troops, and raised 
 their reputation both at home and abroad. 
 
 So many of the volunteers availed themselves of their 
 right to go home at the end of the campaign, that the 
 French army in the Netherlands was reduced to half its 
 strength, just at the time when England and Holland 
 were added to the enemies with which it had to reckon. 
 Dumouriez was bent, nevertheless, on invading and revo- 
 lutionismg the Dutch provinces, where he hoped to find 
 
 ' Chuquet, Jemappes, p. 74. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 193 
 
 the supplies which he was unable to draw from France. 
 But the advance of the Austrians from the lower Rhine 
 interfered with his projects. He was obliged to go to 
 meet them, and a battle was fought at Neerwinden (March 
 18, 1793). This time the numbers were nearly equal. 
 The French had gone through great hardships, and had 
 lost much of their ardour. They were short of officers, 
 and would not obey those they had. The want of a 
 trained staff was especially felt. They were beaten, and 
 Belgium was lost as quickly as it had been won. Du- 
 mouriez, who had been for some months at open war with 
 the Jacobins in Paris, saved his head from the guillotine 
 by deserting to the enemy. 
 
 In 1793 the French Republic had to deal with foreign 
 enemies on all its frontiers, and with insurgents in La 
 Vendee and the south. But it was on the northern 
 frontier that the danger was greatest. By midsummer 
 the allies, 75,000 strong, were besieging Conde and Valen- 
 ciennes. The French army numbered only 40,000 ; and 
 its new commander, Custine, though a man of energy and 
 ambition, found it necessary to improve its organisation 
 and discipline before attempting operations. In this work 
 he was thwarted by the war minister, Bouchotte, the 
 creature of the Paris Commune. The Pere Duchesne 
 lampoons were distributed throughout the army, denounc- 
 ing all aristocrats and Custine in particular. Some bat- 
 talions tore them up, declaring that " Custine was a brave 
 man, and these insults could only serve to destroy the 
 confidence which the army had in its general." ^ The fall 
 of Conde (July 12), without any attempt having been 
 made to relieve it, gave his enemies their opportunity ; 
 Custine was summoned to Paris and guillotined, to the 
 regret of such men as Davout and St. Cyr. 
 
 ' Rousset, p. 217. 
 
194 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 Valenciennes surrendered on July 28, and the allies 
 might have gone on to Paris ; or as their cautious com- 
 mander, Coburg, wished to do, they might have kept 
 together and widened the gap made m the fortress-barrier. 
 But they distrusted one another, and were bent on pur- 
 suing their separate interests instead of the common 
 object. Coburg with 36,000 men laid siege to Quesnoy, the 
 Duke of York (under imperative orders from England) 
 marched northward to besiege Dunkirk, and the Dutch 
 lay round Menin. While the allies were dispersing the 
 French were gathering. In February the Convention had 
 decreed a levy of 300,000 men, and by August the total 
 strength of the Republican forces had risen to half a 
 million. Reinforcements from the armies of the Rhine 
 and the Moselle brought the arm^^ of the north up to 
 90,000. 
 
 The committee of public safety had been formed in 
 April to control the executive. Carnot joined it in August, 
 and was specially charged with the movements of the 
 armies. Under his directions Houchard, who was now 
 commanding the army of the north, advanced with 4"), 000 
 men in the beginning of September to raise the siege of 
 Dunkirk. York had 34,000 men (of whom less than 4000 
 were British) ; 20,000 were engaged in the siege, and the 
 rest formed a covering corps, separated from the main 
 body by a swamp. The covering corps, mainly Hano- 
 verians, was attacked and defeated by Houchard at Hond- 
 schoote (September 8), and the whole force narrowly 
 escaped disaster. Houchard had meant to begin the 
 attack with his right ; but his centre, suffering from 
 artillery fire, broke loose, dissolved into skirmishers, and 
 worked up under cover to the enemy's position. Twice 
 they were beaten back by the steady fire and advance of 
 the Germans; but they swarmed forward again along the 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 195 
 
 whole line, and after four hours' fighting, Wallmoden, 
 seeing that his men and their ammunition were exhausted, 
 fell back to a position in front of Furnes which covered 
 York's withdrawal. 
 
 The incompleteness of his success cost Houchard his 
 head. Jourdan, who succeeded him, won the battle of 
 Wattignies (October 15 and IG) by the same kind of fight- 
 ing. Coburg having taken Quosnoy was blockading 
 Maubeuge. He had nearly "lO.OOO men, but Clerfayt's 
 corps on the right bank of the Sambre was under 20,000, 
 and had six miles of broken country to hold. Jourdan 
 while engaging this corps along its whole front, concen- 
 trated 20,000 men against its left. "Throwing forward 
 repeatedly whole battalions of skirmishers," ' and taking 
 advantage of the ravines, he enveloped the left and forced 
 it back. Clerfayt's centre and right were obliged to follow 
 suit and to cross the Sambre, and the blockade was raised. 
 
 The allies had so managed matters that in both these 
 battles they were outnumbered by two to one, and the 
 French, having the initiative, could make the most of 
 their loose tactics. It was not merely that the French, 
 being untrained and undisciplined, fought better in loose 
 order than in close ; their natural aptitude enabled them 
 to fight better than their opponents in loose order. A 
 Prussian officer wrote of them in May : " In the woods, 
 where the soldier breaks rank and has no drill movements 
 to carry out, but only to tiro under cover of the trees, they 
 are not only equal but superior to us ; our men, accus- 
 tomed to fight shoulder to shoulder in the open field, 
 found it difficult to adopt that seeming disorder which 
 was yet necessary if they were not to be targets for the 
 enemy." - 
 
 In the winter of 1793-4 the amalgamation of the regu- 
 ' Duhesme, p. 70. ' Cliuquet, Valenciennes, p. 9G. 
 
196 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 lars and volunteers, which had been decreed in February 
 1793, began to be carried out. The infantry was formed 
 into demi-brigades of three battalions, one from the line 
 and two from the volunteers ; henceforward they were to 
 wear the same uniform,^ draw the same pay, and all have 
 the right of electing their officers up to the rank of cap- 
 tain. Numerals were substituted for the time-honoured 
 names of regiments — Picardie, Piemont, Navarre, &c. 
 There were 209 demi-brigades of the line and 42 of light 
 infantry ; the latter formed partly out of the regular chas- 
 seurs a j^ied, partly out of free corps raised for service in 
 the Alps and Pyrenees. The battalions consisted of one 
 grenadier company and eight fusilier companies, and had 
 a strength of nearly 800 men. 
 
 The amalgamation was only one sign among many of a 
 new order arising out of chaos. The committee of public 
 safety imparted vigour and unity to the whole military 
 mechanism. Men could be requisitioned, not only as 
 soldiers but for transport service or manufacture. 
 Horses could be taken both for draught and for cavalry 
 use. Supplies of all sorts became more plentiful. The 
 officers, especially those who had risen from the ranks of 
 the regular army, were as a whole superior to the aristo- 
 cratic officers of the old regime. They had been tested by 
 two campaigns ; the nois}' patriots had been sifted out, 
 and the best men were rising to high command. They no 
 longer dreamed, like La Fayette and Dumouriez, of playing 
 a political part, or even planning their own campaigns. 
 They were the zealous and docile servants of the com- 
 mittee, and their armies were reduced or reinforced 
 according to the plans prepared in Paris to meet the 
 exigencies of the war as a whole. 
 
 > Tbe Hue battalions exclianging their white coats for the blue coats of 
 the national guard. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 197 
 
 The campaign of 1794 began with the siege of Lan- 
 drecies. Coburg had 160,000 men, but only half of them 
 were available for the siege and covering army ; the rest 
 were guarding the Netherlands frontier. The French 
 armies of the north and the Ardennes, under Pichegru, 
 numbered 180,000 men, exclusive of garrisons. Pichegru 
 failed in his attempts to raise the siege of Landrecies, 
 which surrendered on April 30. But it was the Repub- 
 lican strategy to attack the flanks as well as the centre ; 
 and when Pichegru found the centre too strong for him 
 he threw his whole weight into these flank attaclcs. On 
 the day on which Landrecies fell, Moreau and Souham 
 with 50,000 men took Menin and Courtray, while Carnot 
 was sending orders to Jourdan to bring 45,000 men from 
 the Moselle to reinforce the attack on the Sambre. 
 
 The advance of the French into Flanders threatened 
 the Ime of communication of the British and Dutch, 
 and the allies moved northward to repel it. They even 
 hoped to cut off the invaders : but their movements 
 were so badly combined that two columns under York, 
 numbering 18,000 men, had to deal unsupported with 
 at least 40,000 Frenchmen.^ York's troops were on the 
 march, near Tourcoin (May IS), when they were attacked 
 in front and on both flanks, and were driven back in 
 disorder on Tournay with a loss of sixty guns. The 
 honours of the day again fell to the French skirmishers ; 
 " as sharp-sighted as ferrets, and as active as squirrels," 
 according to Sir Robert Wilson,- they poured through 
 the gaps between the several bodies and enveloped them. 
 In square or in column the French infantry could be 
 broken by the British and Austrian cavalry {e.g. April 
 24 and 26 and May 10), but in swarms they were formi- 
 dable and could sting intolerably. As the Duke of York's 
 
 ' Revue d'lluloirc, xxix. UG. » Randolph, i. 8U. 
 
198 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 aide-de-camp wrote : " No mobbed fox was ever more put 
 to it to make his escape than we were, being at times 
 nearly surrounded." ^ 
 
 Four days afterwards the French, encouraged by their 
 success, attacked the allies in their camp at Toumay. 
 They were beaten off with heavy loss, but only after 
 twelve hours' fighting. Early in June Jourdan was on 
 the Sambre with 90,000 men. After repeated failures 
 the French established themselves on the left bank and 
 gained possession of Charleroi. They were attacked by 
 Coburg with 50,000 men, and the battle of Fleurus was 
 fought (June 26). The French had intrenched their posi- 
 tions, which extended over a semicircle of twenty miles. 
 In some parts they held their ground, in others they 
 gave way. Marceau's divisions — and there was no better 
 leader — were broken, and most of his men fled in panic 
 across the river. The allies might have won if they had 
 persisted, but Coburg broke off the battle and gave orders 
 for retreat. 
 
 A fortnight later the French were in Brussels, the 
 armies of Pichegru and Jourdan had united, and the 
 allies had fallen back to Antwerp, Louvain, and Namur. 
 A few days afterwards they separated ; the Austrians, who 
 had for some time been lukewarm about the defence of 
 the Netherlands, crossed the Meuse at Liege and Maes- 
 tricht, while the English and Dutch went northward to 
 cover Holland. 
 
 That a nation which had taken its army to pieces, got 
 rid of the officers, and flooded the ranks with raw material, 
 should beat the combined forces of its neighbours, while 
 it was itself torn by civil war, was an astonishing thing 
 which men sought to explain in different ways. The 
 
 ' Calvert, p. 220. Cf. raited Service MayaUiie, August 1897, p. 517, 
 " Letters of a Staff Officer." 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 199 
 
 Archduke Charles, who had taken part in the campaign, 
 said of the allies' failure : " We must ascribe this wholly 
 to the mistakes made by our generals and taken ad- 
 vantage of by our opponents. . . . Ignorance, indolence, 
 and egoism are to blame for all our misfortunes." * 
 
 Another eye-witness, Scharnhorst, who was at that 
 time an officer of Hanoverian artillery, Justly argued 
 that there were deeper and more general causes. Chief 
 among these were the rivalries and divergent aims of the 
 allied powers, and the half-heartedness of their people. 
 The powers employed in this war less than one-third 
 of the troops which they maintained on a peace footing. 
 As for the population and civil administration, the war 
 was carried on in the Netherlands " like a private enter- 
 prise, out of which all hoped to make money, but for 
 which no one would make sacrifices." France enjoyed 
 great advantages in the compactness of her territory, and 
 the strength of her frontiers, guarded on the north-east 
 by a triple line of fortresses. Owing to the demolition 
 of the Belgian fortresses by Joseph II., the allies were 
 dependent on field intrenchments ; and this led them 
 to adopt a cordon system, to cover the country, which 
 absorbed half their troops. 
 
 As regards the troops themselves, Scharnhorst says 
 that the alUes made the mistake of holding their enemy 
 too cheap. In cavalry the allies were superior both in 
 number and quality. Their infantry also was better 
 in some respects : they could beat oft' cavalry charges, 
 and if they failed in an attack they could try again. 
 These things the French could not do, owing to their 
 want of drill and discipline, and in open country they 
 were no match for the allies, if the numbers were at all 
 equal. " In affairs of posts, and in all kinds of lighting 
 ' Karl, pp. 4-U. 
 
200 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 on intersected ground, they showed greater aptitude, and 
 one may even say more courage, than the allied armies. 
 The soldier of the latter, trained in regular movements 
 and taught to act like a machine, but not versed in the 
 art of taking advantage of the ground (every ditch 
 tree, or hillock), and studying order and mutual support 
 when in loose formation, was inferior to the nimble and 
 quick-witted Frenchman. The incessant and better-aimed 
 fire of the latter, his good and numerous artillery, his 
 superiority in numbers and frequency of relief, caused 
 the allies to find that at the end of a hard day's fight- 
 ing in close country they had incurred heavy loss (at 
 all events in wounded) with no decisive result ; or having 
 used up their ammunition and giving way to fatigue, they 
 left the field to the enemy. It is an established fact that 
 the French skirmishers decided most of the affiiirs m this 
 war, and were better than those of the allied armies." ^ 
 
 The evolution of the Republican tactics has been weU 
 described by Duhesme, who commanded a battalion of 
 volimteers in 1793 and a brigade in 1794. He shows 
 how the habit of skirmishing spread throughout the 
 infantry, which was for the most part unfit to mancEuvre 
 in close order. By the end of 1793 the battahons were 
 practically all light infantry; they acted independently, 
 dissolved into skirmishers when they engaged, and in 
 this way won the battles of Jemappes, Hondschoote, and 
 Wattignies. But in 1794 it was found that the Austrians 
 had taken steps to meet this mode of fighting. Coburg 
 had given orders that one-third of a battalion should be 
 used for skirmishing, one-third as supports, and one-third 
 as a reserve. When the French tried to raise the siege 
 of Landrecies, they came in contact with outlying 
 detachments of the covering army. 
 
 ' iScharnhorst, p. 54. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 201 
 
 " These advanced guards, well handled, only disputed 
 their ground long enough to make us waste time and 
 men. They brought us from one position to another 
 till they reached that which they really meant to defend. 
 There they let us use up and scatter our last battalions, 
 whose ardour generally shattered itself against their 
 intrenchments. Then fresh troops issued from them in 
 the most perfect order ; they, in their turn, threw out 
 skirmishers upon our flanks, and thus they charged at 
 advantage troops dispersed and fatigued, corps in disorder 
 and unable to rally most of their men." > 
 
 Experience of this sort taught the French generals to 
 keep their troops more in hand, and to have a chain of 
 close columns behind the flexible and mobile line of 
 skirmishers and their immediate supports. These were 
 usually battalion columns with a front of one or two 
 platoons, disposed chequerwise in two lines. The columns 
 were sometimes deployed when they came under fire, or 
 if they were acting on the defensive. In the autumn of 
 1794 there was a lull in the operations which allowed 
 the troops to be exercised in drill and field duties. The 
 camps became more orderly and regular, but they were 
 laid out on new principles. " No more first line, no more 
 second line, no more cavalry on the wings : the arrange- 
 ment of our armies was no longer the same ; it was broken 
 up into divisions of ten or twelve battalions ; the cavalry 
 was distributed among these divisions, four to six squadrons 
 to each, except one-fourth of it which was kept together, 
 and formed the reserve of the army." 2 A division had 
 its own outposts, furnished by its light demi-brigades ; 
 and it often had a front of two or three leagues, the 
 troops being placed on the higher ground, and the 
 intervening hollows being left unoccupied. The armies, 
 ' Duliesiue, p. 72. - lb., \\. Tli. 
 
202 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 therefore, took up a great deal of room, three or four 
 times as much as in former days, with advanced guards 
 thrown far to the front. It was an accepted principle 
 that to outflank the enemy was to beat him, and that 
 an army could not extend itself too much.^ In advanc- 
 ing, the divisions moved by parallel roads and acted 
 more or less independently. Great scope was given to 
 divisional commanders to show their capacity to handle 
 the three arms in combination. 
 
 Besides the tactics and organisation of the Republican 
 armies there are two other points to be noticed : their 
 moral and their mobility. The standard of discipline in 
 the narrower sense — instinctive obedience — was still far 
 from high, and remained so throughout the wars of the 
 Empire. As Napoleon wrote to his brother Joseph 
 (June 22, 1806): "The Frenchman has never been 
 obedient, and is still less so since the war and the Revolu- 
 tion have excited him." But experience had taught all 
 ranks the need of subordination, and as the unfit had been 
 weeded out there had grown up that mutual confidence 
 between officers and men which secures the main purpose 
 of discipline, common action for an end. Their Re- 
 publican ardour supplied them with that enthusiasm 
 which, as Lloyd pointed out (p. 170), is an essential m- 
 gredient in the best soldiers; and their alertness of mind 
 and body gave them the individual initiative and enter- 
 prise which their tactics demanded. If they were deficient 
 in the discipline which consists in doing what one is 
 told, they excelled in that higher kind of discipline which 
 makes a man anticipate orders, and do what his superior 
 would wish him to do. The hope of honours and rewards 
 was more than an equivalent for the fear of punishment 
 on which Frederick had relied. The election of officers by 
 
 1 Foy, i. 10(5. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 203 
 
 their men had been dropped, and strict rules were laid 
 down for promotion. 
 
 Before the Revolution the feeding of the troops was left 
 to the commissariat, who obtained their supplies usually 
 from magazines or by local purchase. They magnified 
 their olHce, and claimed that the general should not only 
 let his chief supply officer know beforehand of his in- 
 tended movements, but should take him into counsel. 
 The very large numbers of men in the Republican armies, 
 and the want of money, compelled a change of system. 
 The troops lived on the country they occupied, either by 
 requisitions or by pillage. It became the business of the 
 commanders of divisions to see to the subsistence of their 
 men, and the commissaries sank into subordinate agents. 
 The collection of supplies was one reason for the wide 
 extension of the armies, as it became increasingly difficult 
 when they were concentrated and stationary. In rich and 
 populous countries, such as the Netherlands and the 
 Rhineland, the troops could be fed well enough by requi- 
 sitions; but they failed when the country was poor or 
 when the troops were in rapid movement. There was 
 nothing for it then but for the men to help themselves ; 
 pillage was winked at or even enjoined, and the habit of 
 marauding became confirmed. " Our mode of feeding our 
 armies is odious," writes an oflScer in 1813; "it is sub- 
 versive of all subordination and of every principle of 
 generosity and civilisation." ' 
 
 It was the result of necessity rather than of choice, and 
 it had at all events the advantage that it enabled the 
 French to cut down their transport. This was reduced in 
 other ways also. Tents were not carried ; subalterns and 
 captains of infantry were not allowed horses, but shared 
 the burdens of their men. The French infantry had only 
 ' Fantin des Odoards, p. 373. 
 
THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 one-tenth of the number of baggage animals that were 
 attached to the Prussian infantry. The mobihty which 
 this diminution of trains gave them was increased by 
 the marching powers of the French soldiers, in respect 
 both of endurance and speed. On the battle-field they 
 broke loose from the regulation pace (seventy-six steps a 
 minute) and manoeuvred in quick time or even at the 
 double. 
 
 The mobility of the Republican troops was serviceable 
 to them in the Netherlands and on the Rhine, but it was 
 in Bonaparte's Italian campaigns that its full value was 
 brought out. For instance, Massena's division, after fight- 
 ing at St. Michel, east of Verona, marched in the night 
 sixteen miles to Rivoli, helped to win the battle there 
 next day (January 14, 1797), and on the loth marched 
 twenty-five miles towards Mantua. The brigades, formed 
 in deep columns, " struck the enemy's front like a 
 battering-ram, while the light infantry skirmishers 
 gained the flanks, crowned the heights, carried alarm 
 and confusion into the enemy's rear, and hindered or 
 even cut off his retreat." ' Napoleon afterwards said 
 that in his early campaigns, if he was in a difficulty about 
 feeding his men, he had only to throw himself on the 
 rear of his enemy to find plenty.^ The masses of prisoners 
 taken by the army of Italy astonished the armies north 
 of the Alps, who were accustomed to regard the capture 
 of 5000 men as a great achievement. 
 
 Marmont says that Napoleon, unsurpassed as a strate- 
 gist, was deficient in the art of handling troops on 
 the battle-field, having had no practical experience in 
 command of a brigade or division.^ The man who was 
 beaten at Salamanca was hardly entitled to pass judg- 
 ment on the man who won Austerlitz, but at all events 
 
 I Duhesme, p. 95. - Jomini, i. 334. ■' Marmont, p. 26. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 205 
 
 Napoleon seems to have concerned himself much less 
 than Frederick did with details of " sergeantry." The 
 drill-book of 1791 remained in force throughout his 
 roign, except for some minor modifications, but corps 
 commanders were allowed much freedom in the use 
 of it.i 
 
 The conscription law passed in 1798 had provided 
 permanent machinery for maintaining the French armies 
 at the required strength. It yielded 80,000 conscripts a 
 year, if necessary, and the total number of officers and 
 men when Napoleon became emperor was over 400,000. 
 The "grand army" which he formed for the invasion 
 of England, and eventually led against Austria in 1805, 
 was not far short of 200,0u0 men. For the better control 
 of such large numbers, Napoleon grouped the divisions 
 into army corps, and formed the heavy cavalry into a 
 separate corps. This practically confined the generals 
 of division to the command of a single arm, and gave 
 them less scope than they had had under the Republic. 
 The demi-brigades became regiments again in October 
 180?), but kept their numbers. 
 
 By the conscription law all Frenchmen became liable 
 to service for four years on reaching the age of twenty, 
 and were to be called up as they were needed ; but 
 Napoleon allowed of substitutes in order that he might 
 keep a good proportion of old soldiers. Companies of 
 "voltigeurs" were added to all battalions in 1805 to be 
 used especially as skirmishers, not with the object of 
 creating a special class of infantry, but to turn to account 
 the conscripts who were below the standard height. As 
 soon as he was appointed to command in Italy, Napoleon 
 
 ' See for instance the military studies prepared by Ney in 1804 for the 
 guidance of his troops in the camp at Montreuil, printed at the end of 
 his Memoirs. 
 
2o6 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 revived the practice of detaching the grenadier companies 
 from their battalions. In 1805 he formed a division of 
 grenadiers under Oudinot as a reserve for the army, and 
 he afterwards detached the voltigeurs also, and coupled 
 them with the grenadiers. He had a strong leaning 
 towards picked corps, though he was alive to the injurious 
 eliiect on the army at large if much of its cream was taken. 
 The Guard when first formed, at the end of 1799, was 
 limited to about 2000 men. By the end of 1813 its 
 infantry had been gradually increased to eight divisions, 
 amounting to 72,000 men. Its value, not only as a 
 reserve on the field of battle, but as a training-school for 
 under-officers, was held to justify the increase;' but its 
 growth was at once cause and consequence of the deterio- 
 ration of the troops as a whole. It drew its recruits partly 
 from other corps, partly from the levies of conscripts. 
 
 The dress of the infantry was altered and made looser 
 to suit its mode of fighting. A shako was substituted 
 for the three-cornered hat, and the gaiters were shortened. 
 The facings of the coat, instead of being mere oi-nament, 
 were made to afford a double covering to the chest, and 
 the men were provided with overcoats, a necessary pro- 
 vision for men who habitually bivouacked, and had often 
 to face winter campaigns. The muskets were of an old 
 pattern (1777), effective up to 200 yards and with an 
 extreme range of about 500 yards. The calibre was two- 
 thirds of an inch, and the weight (with the bayonet) 
 11 lbs. This was rather less than the weight of the 
 English muskets, which were five inches shorter, but had 
 a calibre of three-quarters of an inch. The rate of fire 
 for a continuance was about two shots a minute, but 
 misfires were frequent. Each man carried sixty rounds 
 of ammunition.^ 
 
 • Correspondance, November 16, 1813. - Balagny, i. 23, 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 207 
 
 Napoleon held that " the fire-arm is everything, the rest 
 nothing " ; the very opposite of Souvorov's saying about the 
 bullet and the bayonet. He was not incluied, therefore, 
 to trust wholly to columns and skirmisher swarms against 
 troops in line. Nor did he admire the Republican system 
 of extending to envelop the enemy. Jourdan's defeat at 
 Stockach (March 23, 1799) was due to this : " His divi- 
 sions were too far apart, and hi.s field of battle was three 
 times what it should have been." ^ The Austrians had 
 made the same mistake at Rivoli. To avoid disaster 
 and to secure decisive results, Napoleon liked to have 
 his troops under his own eye and hand. " The army 
 should be kept united," he said ; " the largest possible 
 force should be concentrated on the field of battle, and 
 every opportunity should be taken advantage of, for 
 fortune is a woman." - 
 
 At the passage of the Tagliamento (March 16, 1797) the 
 leading demi-brigades had their second battalions de- 
 ployed with the first and third battalions in close column 
 on the flanks of the second, by Napoleon's order.^ At 
 Marengo Desaix's demi-brigades had two battalions 
 deployed and the third in column 200 paces in rear.* 
 In November 1805, when he was about to meet the 
 Russians and to settle (as he said) whether the French 
 infantry was the second or the first in Europe, Napoleon 
 issued instructions for the formation of the brigades. If 
 circumstances allowed, the first regiment should have 
 its two battalions deployed; the two battalions of the 
 second regiment should be in close column of divisions, 
 to the right rear and left rear respectively of the line 
 
 ' Napoleon I., xxx. 2(>3. ' lb,, xxxi. U.S. 
 
 ' Correspondance, March 17, 1797. 
 
 ♦ So the brigade reports indicate (Cugnao, L'armAe de reserve, ii. 397). 
 A different formation is shown in the picture of the battle which serves as 
 frontispiece to Home's Pricis of Modern Tactics. 
 
208 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 so formed. By this means the enemy would be met by 
 the tire of the line, and the columns would be in readi- 
 ness to engage his columns. If the division had a fifth 
 regiment, it should be held in reserve 100 paces to the 
 rear. There should be a squadron or a troop of cavalry 
 behind each brigade, and the guns should be placed 
 between the deployed battalions and on their flanks.^ 
 
 These directions were not closely followed at the battle 
 of Austerlitz (December 2, 1805). For instance, in St. 
 Hilaire's division of Soult's corps the fifth regiment, in- 
 stead of being in reserve, led the advance, throwing out 
 skirmishers. The other four regiments were side by side 
 in column of divisions, each having one battalion behind 
 the other. At Pratzen they came upon the head of a 
 Russo- Austrian column (Kollowrath's), and while engaged 
 with it they were attacked on their right flank by part 
 of another column. The leading battalions deployed on 
 a crooked front, and the rest were brought up to fill gaps 
 in the first line, so that at length nearly the whole division 
 was fighting in line.- 
 
 The experience ot 1805 caused the Austrians to issue 
 new drill regulations in which the formation and de- 
 ployment of columns of divisions were included, and 
 fighting in loose order was for the first time recognised. 
 Prussia did not at once follow this example. Her troops 
 had not come into collision with the French since the 
 early years of the Revolution, and the repulse of Hoche 
 at Kaiserslautern (November 30, 1793) had confirmed 
 their belief in their own superiority. It was allowed that 
 Napoleon's soldiers had some good qualities, but after 
 all they were " the men of Rossbach " ; defeat would mean 
 rout with them. However it might be in close and hilly 
 
 ' Correspondanoe, November 26, 1805. 
 
 ' See Sevue d'Histoire, June and August 1907, and plans attached. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 209 
 
 country, they were no match for Prussians in the open 
 field. Schamhorst, who had recognised their merits as 
 skirmishers (see p. 200), thought that the Prussians had 
 the advantage not only in discipline, but in the quality 
 of their officers — their skill, bravery, and high sense of 
 duty. 
 
 At the same time he and other men of capacity were 
 not blind to the need of reforms in the Prussian army. 
 Frederick William III., on his accession (in 1797), charged 
 a mihtary commission to work out a scheme. He wished 
 to have a larger proportion of native recruits, to raise 
 the strength of the battalions, to improve the instruc- 
 tion of the younger officers and the food of the men. 
 He declared that for some years past there had been a 
 great falling off in zeal and emulation among the officers 
 generally ; and if this were not corrected " our fine army, 
 which served as a pattern for all Europe, will break down, 
 and will retain only the memory of its brilliant past." ^ 
 But he had not the vigour to carry through the changes 
 which he saw to be necessary in the face of strong opposi- 
 tion. Even his efforts to cut down the excessive trans- 
 port of the army proved fruitless. 
 
 The number of men that Prussia could put into the 
 field, under 200,000, was plainly inadequate to a single- 
 handed contest with France : and many proposals were 
 made for the establishment of a militia, or the adoption 
 of universal service. The Prussian system of giving fur- 
 loughs to native recruits as soon as they were trained 
 lent itself to these plans, which foreshadowed the sub- 
 sequent reforms of Scharnhorst. But most of the older 
 officers shook their heads at such schemes. It was by 
 precision of drill that Frederick's army had won its 
 victories against great odds. This precision had been 
 
 ' Goltz, p. 172. 
 
2IO THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 maintained, and even carried to a higher pitch ; and 
 " as compared with battalions which mancEuvred with- 
 out a fault, the idea of a levy in mass could only seem 
 a caricature of soldiering." ^ 
 
 Civil objections reinforced military, and had come to 
 carry more weight. Powerful class interests opposed 
 the withdrawal of the existing exemptions from mili- 
 tary service, and the imposition of the higher taxation 
 which any substantial increase in the armed forces of 
 the countiy would involve. There was also a fear that 
 such an increase would be regarded by Napoleon as 
 a symptom of hostility and would hasten a collision. 
 The consequence was that little was done beyond the 
 addition of a fifth company to the service battahons 
 of the infantry, bringing their strength up to nearly 
 800 men. 
 
 The three light infantry regiments formed by Frede- 
 rick the Great had been expanded by his successor 
 into twenty-four battalions of "fusiliers," and the Jager 
 corps had been increased to three battalions. Ten men 
 per company of the line battalions and twenty per com- 
 pany of the fusilier battalions were armed with rifled 
 carbines and practised in shooting at a target up to 
 300 paces. This gave a total of about 23,000 men (or 
 more than one in six) who were trained to act as light 
 infantry. Many officers held this proportion to be in- 
 sufficient, and wished the battalions to be formed two 
 deep in line, the third rank being used for skirmishing. 
 Some of them, e.g. Gneisenau, had taken part in the 
 war of American independence, and had learnt the 
 value of skirmishing there; others were impressed by 
 the victories of the French Republicans. On the other 
 side it was urged that fighting in loose order lent itself 
 > Goltz, p. 156. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 211 
 
 to skulking and desertion, unfitted men for fighting in 
 line, and checked the use of the bayonet; it had been 
 adopted by the French only from force of circumstances, 
 and they were now reverting to the older formations. 
 By 1806 the reaction had gone so far in Prussia that 
 even the fusilier battalions used only a fraction of their 
 men as skirmishers. 
 
 Many hard things were said of the Prussian army 
 after its defeat ; but it seems to have been painstaking, 
 zealous, well drilled and disciplined. The muskets, says 
 Clausewitz, were in a high state of polish, but they were 
 the worst in Europe, and the artillery was inferior to 
 the French. The chiefs were old men formed m the 
 school of Frederick, where men learned to obey rather 
 than to command. They followed the letter instead of 
 the spirit of Frederick, who was ever on the watch to 
 adapt himself to new conditions. There were cliques 
 and jealousies among them, and the king's presence 
 with the army made Brunswick only a nominal com- 
 mander-in-chief. In Jomini's words, it was " a fine 
 army, well trained and well disciplined, but without 
 able leaders and without national reserves." ' 
 
 " It seems that what is most to be feared among the 
 Prussians is their cavalry ; but with the infantry you have, 
 if you always take care to be able to form square, you 
 have little to fear : " so wrote Napoleon to Soult (October 
 .'>, 1806). The attair at Saalfeld a few days afterwards 
 showed that the Prussian cavalry was not a match for the 
 French; and the mistake was made of distributing it 
 among the divisions, so that it was disabled from playing 
 any such part as it had done under Seydlitz. 
 
 The defeat of the Prussian troops at Jena (October 14) 
 was hardly a reproach to them. They were outnumbered 
 
 ' Jomini, i. lOti. 
 
212 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 ultimately by two to one. Hohenlohe was hampered by 
 his instructions, was ill informed, and allowed his divisions 
 to be engaged and beaten one after another. At the crisis 
 of the battle, when he tried to recover Vierzehnheiligen- — 
 instead of following Frederick's advice, to use columns in 
 such a case (see p. 174) — he let eighteen battalions remain 
 halted in line for two hours, carrying on an ineffectual 
 fire-fight with the French in the village. His aide-de- 
 camp says : " The enemy's skirmishers took advantage 
 of all the inequalities of the ground, lay down behind them 
 and fired into our ranks. Even their batteries were 
 screened by the crests, or sunk in the ground, so that only 
 the muzzles of the guns could be seen. The skirmishers 
 fell back under protection of these batteries, or covered 
 them when they changed position. We lost a lot of men 
 without seeing an enemy." ^ 
 
 But the battle of Auerstedt, fought on the same day, 
 was a more conclusive proof of the superiority of the 
 French soldiers, apart from the personality of the emperor, 
 which Wellington reckoned as equivalent to 40,000 men. 
 The main Prussian army under Brunswick, accompanied 
 by the king, was retreating towards the north-east when 
 it met the corps of Davout, which was marching in the 
 opposite direction to take the Prussians in rear, on the 
 assumption that they were still near Jena. There were 
 50,000 men under Brunswick of whom 9000 were cavalry. 
 Davout had only 27,000 in all, and only 1400 cavalry. 
 In guns (including battalion guns) he was outnumbered 
 by five to one. 
 
 It was in the mist of the early morning that the cavalry 
 of the advanced guard under Blucher encountered the 
 leading French division (Gudin) at Hassenhausen. Blucher 
 charged repeatedly but was beaten off. At 9 a.m. Friant's 
 
 ' Scvue d'Bisloire, November 1906, p. 474. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 213 
 
 division came up on the right of Gudin, and at 10.30 
 Morand's came up on the left. The French, who by that 
 time were hard pressed by two Prussian divisions, now 
 began to gain ground; and the arrival of a third Prus- 
 sian division did not arrest their progress. Brunswick 
 was mortally wounded early in the day, and at 2.30 the 
 king gave orders for retreat, though two of his five 
 divisions had as yet taken hardly any part in the battle. 
 The retreat soon became a rout, and the Prussians were so 
 demoralised that 3000 prisoners and 115 guns were taken 
 by the small force of light cavalry at Davout's disposal. 
 
 The result was so astonishing that both Frederick William 
 and Napoleon were at first incredulous as to the relative 
 strength of the combatants. It was due partly to the 
 tardiness of the Prussians, the want of mutual support be- 
 tween the three arms, and the neglect to make use of their 
 reserves. Their generals were nearly twice the age of the 
 French leaders: Brunswick was seventy-one, Mollendorf 
 eighty-two, Kalkreuth sixty-nine, while the average age of 
 Davout and his lieutenants was under forty. But it was 
 due also to the admirable quality of the French officers 
 and men, their trust in one another and ready co-operation, 
 the tenacity with which they held their ground, and the 
 boldness with which they took the ott'ensive with no 
 reserves behind them. The battle cost them more than 
 25 per cent, of their strength. 
 
 As Rossbach set the French to learn Prussian tactics, 
 so Jena made the Prussians turn to French formations. 
 The old belief that " in war everything depended on 
 advance in echelon and vigorous attack by battalions" 
 was shaken. The problem of satisfactorily combining 
 linear tactics with the free use of skirmishers was dropped, 
 and along with it went the control of musketry fire, on 
 which so nuich stress had been laid. The column as a 
 
214 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 fighting formation was introduced into the Prussian regula- 
 tions in 1812, and was used in the war of liberation.^ 
 
 One should change one's tactics every ten years, Napo- 
 leon said : and by the time the Austrians and Prussians 
 had adopted the French mode of fighting, the French 
 were beginning to alter it, making their columns more 
 massive but less handy. There were several reasons for 
 the change. Napoleon's policy, especially in Spain, made 
 ever increasing demands for troops, and in order to provide 
 officers for the new levies, the infantry regiments were 
 reorganised, the number of battalions being increased to 
 five (including a depot battalion) and the number of com- 
 panies in each of the four war battalions being reduced to 
 six. The companies were made larger than before, having 
 a strength of 140 officers and men ; but when the grena- 
 diers and voltigeurs were detached, as was usually the 
 case, the battalion column foi-med a small unit of little 
 more than 500 men.^ 
 
 Such columns were rather feeble for attack, especially 
 if the men were young and the officers few. It was by 
 moral effect, rather than by actual use of fire or steel, 
 that columns did their work ; and the moral eftect might 
 be expected to increase with the size of the columns 
 within the limits of mobility. The tendencies of Im- 
 perialism were against the independence and initiative 
 which were characteristic of the battalion columns in the 
 Republican days, and there was not room for them on 
 the Napoleonic battle-field. At Eylau (February 8, 1807) 
 Augereau's corps occupied a space of less than a mile. 
 When he was ordered to attack, his two divisions had to 
 advance in two columns, and then deploy their leading 
 brigades while the rear brigades formed squares. During 
 
 1 Goltz, p. 371. ^ Correspondance, February 18, 1808. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 215 
 
 this operation they were under a storm of fire from the 
 enemy's guns ; the Russian infantry advanced to meet 
 them, the cavalry charged them, and the corps fell back 
 in disorder, having lost 5000 men out of 12,000.' 
 
 In 1809 the French had again to deal with the Austrians, 
 who were now fighting in battalion columns, and were 
 under the able leadership of the Archduke Charles. In 
 the two chief battles of the campaign, Essling and Wagram, 
 as at Austerlitz, Napoleon struck at the enemy's centre. 
 At Essling (May 22) only part of the French army was on 
 the left bank of the Danube, and it was necessary to gain 
 ground to make room for the remainder. Lannes was 
 ordered to advance between Aspern and Essling, a space 
 of about a mile. He formed his three divisions in columns 
 of regiments, and advanced in echelon from the right. 
 When enough ground had been gained they were to deploy 
 on an oblique line, refusing the left. The Austrians were 
 falling back, the deployment had begun, and everything 
 seemed to promise well, when news came that the bridges 
 over the main arm of the Danube had been swept away, 
 and Napoleon was obliged to withdraw his troops into the 
 island of Lobau. 
 
 At Wagram (July 6) he himself superintended the for- 
 mation of Macdonald's corps, which was to break through 
 the Austrian centre, and he adopted the Austerlitz forma- 
 tion on a larger scale. Eight battalions were deployed, 
 forming two lines of four battalions each, the second Ime 
 was closed upon the first, and the remaining thirteen 
 battalions were formed in close column on the two wings.* 
 
 ' Extracts from Augereau's report are given in Marion's Memoir of 
 Senarmont. He says nothing of the snowstorm on which Napoleon laid 
 stress, as accounting for the disaster. 
 
 ' Such is Macdonald's version (HecoUections. p. llJli). Lamarque says 
 that his division was in column of deployed battalions one behind the 
 other, but perhaps he refers to the wing columns. 
 
2i6 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 The whole made three sides of a square (like the English 
 at Fontenoy) numbering about 10,000 men, and the rear 
 was closed by cavalry. The corps succeeded in its mission, 
 but not without support, and it met with very heavy loss 
 (at least three men out of four). Meanwhile on the ex- 
 treme right Davout's divisions were fighting in battalion 
 columns as in the old days, and driving the enemy before 
 them. 
 
 " In the late wars there have been many instances," says 
 Jomini,! " in which Russian, French, or Prussian columns 
 have carried positions with supported arms, without firing 
 a shot ; it is the triumph of momentum and of the moral 
 elfect which it produces ; but against the murderous fire 
 and the sang froid of the English infantry, columns did 
 not have the same success." The campaigns of '93 and '94, 
 in which the English shared in the discomfiture of the 
 allies, had taught the French to hold them cheap. So 
 also in Holland in 1799 they were no match for the 
 Republican troops when fighting in loose order among 
 the sandhills.2 In Egypt and at Maida they had shown 
 their quality, but the disparagement of them remained 
 practically undisturbed until the war in the Peninsula. 
 A French officer noted in his diary after the battle of 
 Corunna that the English had behaved well, and were not 
 degenerate, as they were often said to be.^ 
 
 In after years Marshal Bugeaud used to say, "The 
 British infantry is the most formidable in Europe ; luckily 
 there is not much of it ; " and he gave a vivid picture 
 of the normal course of the battles between French and 
 English, though he seems to have had little experience 
 of them himself.* Foy, who had ample experience, says 
 
 1 Jomini, ii. 231. ^ Bunbury, p. 26, 
 
 ' Fautin des Odoards, p. 203. • Trochu, p. 239. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 217 
 
 that the English possess the most vakiable of all quali- 
 ties on the field of battle, self-possession in anger. The 
 infantry is the best part of their army. Not so supple 
 and swift as the French, they are more silent, cooler, 
 more obedient ; hence their fire is better aimed and more 
 destructive. They have not the patience of the Russians 
 under a cannonade, but they keep their formations better. 
 When attacked they begin with volleys of battalions, 
 followed by well-sustained file fire. In advancing they 
 fire without breakmg rank. Deployed in line, they do 
 not hesitate to attack columns with the bayonet. But 
 the leader who wishes to use this infantry without com- 
 promising it, must move it seldom and with caution, 
 and must reckon more on its fire than on its mananivrcs.' 
 
 Marbot attributes the excellence of the British musketry 
 to the large amount of target practice and to the forma- 
 tion in two ranks. So far as ordinary regiments of the 
 line were concerned, there was no target practice. The 
 absence of a third rank had no doubt some effisct, allow- 
 ing better aim ; but the deadliness of British volleys had 
 been recognised at Dettingen and Fontenoy, when there 
 were three ranks. The regulations still regarded three 
 ranks as the normal formation, but one of the first 
 orders issued by Sir Arthur Wellesley when he landed 
 in Portugal was, " The order of battle of the army is to 
 be two deep" (August 3, 1808). If something more solid 
 was needed, to resist cavalry for instance, the men were 
 formed four deep. 
 
 The first important action fought in the Peninsula 
 struck the keynote. At Vimiero (August 21, 1808) the 
 leading French brigade, formed in one close column, and 
 preceded by skirmishers, mounted a hill on which the 
 ."(Oth regiment was drawn up in line. The colonel (after- 
 
 ' Foy, i. 207, 283. 
 
2i8 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 wards Sir G. T. Walker) wheeled his right wing into 
 echelon of companies about four paces to the left, to 
 bring it to bear on the flank of the column.^ Then he 
 ordered a volley and a charge. The column was broken 
 and driven down the hill. 
 
 At Busaco (September 29, 1810) Nay's columns were 
 similarly repulsed by the Light Division. Those of 
 Regnier, three columns of regiments, succeeded in estab- 
 lishing themselves for a time on the I'idge which formed 
 the British position ; but they were attacked from both 
 sides, and being unsupported they were at length driven 
 down the mountain side. 
 
 The battle of Albuera (May 16, 1811) is, however, a 
 more striking example of the success of line against 
 column, because it was fought at great disadvantage, 
 and was purely a soldier's victory. Soult was marching 
 with 23,000 men to relieve Badajoz ; Beresford was bar- 
 ring his way with 30,000 men, of whom only one-fourth 
 were British. Skill and mobility enabled Soult to place 
 the bulk of his troops on the right flank of the allies, 
 threatening to roll up their line. A new front had to be 
 formed hastily; there was some disorder and symptoms 
 of retreat, which led Soult to push on with the fifth 
 corps in its original close formation. It seems to have 
 been in three contiguous columns of deployed battalions,^ 
 one division being behind the other, and the whole 
 numbering about 10,000 men. On its left there was a 
 force of 3500 cavalry, and there was a strong brigade 
 of infantry as a reserve in rear. 
 
 Beresford had ordered up Stewart's division from the 
 
 1 Fyler, p. 105. 
 
 ^ The fact that during the action " un passage de lignes" was ordered, 
 though it could not be carried out, shows that the battalions were de- 
 ployed ( Victoires., Conquctes, dr., xx. 241, &c.). 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 219 
 
 original centre, to support the Spaniards on the right. 
 By the time it arrived the Spaniards were giving way. 
 Colborne, who commanded the leading brigade, wrote 
 two days afterwards: "We were brought up under 
 very disadvantageous circumstances, and obliged to 
 deploy under the enemy's fire. The regiments were 
 ordered to charge before the deployment was complete, 
 and without support : in the act of charging two very 
 heavy columns, a regiment of Polish cavalry passed by 
 our right, which was unprotected, and having gained 
 our rear, the three right-hand regiments were almost 
 destroyed." ^ The fourth regiment, which was left behind, 
 held the ground until Hoghton's brigade came up in 
 line and relieved it. The three battalions of that 
 brigade sustained the fight for some hours, holding the 
 fifth corps in check ; but the fire was so heavy that one 
 of them (the 57th) lost throe-fourths of its men, earning 
 the name of " the Diehards." 
 
 Two brigades of Cole's division — one British and one 
 Portuguese — had joined the army just as the battle began, 
 and had been placed by Beresford about half a mile to the 
 right rear of the new front, to cover his line of retreat, 
 with strict injunctions to remain there. But the situa- 
 tion had become so grave that while Beresford was fetch- 
 ing Portuguese reinforcements, Cole allowed himself to be 
 persuaded to attack the French columns in flank. In doing 
 this he ran risk of being attacked on his own right flank 
 by the enemy's cavalry, which was very superior to that 
 of the allies. He advanced, therefore, in echelon from 
 the left, two battalions of the British (fusilier) brigade 
 being deployed, and the third in quarter distance column, 
 forming square at every halt, to cover the right of the 
 brigade. The Portuguese echelons followed, and a volley 
 
 ' Moorc-ymith, p. 160. 
 
220 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 from them drove off the Polish lancers when they tried 
 to fall upon the fusiliers.' 
 
 While Cole was advancing, Abercrombie's brigade of 
 Stewart's division deployed to the left of Hoghton's 
 brigade, and the French columns found themselves simul- 
 taneously assailed on_both flanks. The scene that followed 
 has been described once for all by Napier. The French, 
 enveloped and unable to extend their front, or to make 
 effective reply to the convergent fire to which they were 
 exposed, became discouraged. There was " un mouvement 
 tres pronon^e de fluctuation " ; ^ the leading regiment, 
 having lost 600 men, gave way, and the others followed 
 in succession. The fifth corps became a confused mass 
 of fugitives which could not be rallied till it reached the 
 ground from which it had started in the morning. The 
 total French loss in the battle seems to have been 7000.^ 
 That of the allies was about the same, and half of it fell 
 on the British infantry, being a loss of two men out of 
 three. 
 
 A few weeks before Albuera, an action was fought at 
 Sabugal (April 3) between the Light Division, 3000 strong, 
 and Regnier's corps of 11,000 men. In this action, which 
 Wellington described as " one of the most glorious that 
 British troops were ever engaged in," they were the assail- 
 ants, and bad weather delayed the two other divisions 
 which were to have co-operated with the Light Division. 
 In a private letter Wellington said : " We have given the 
 French a handsome dressing, a.nd I think they will not 
 say again that we are not a manoeuvring army. We may 
 not manoeuvre so beautifully as they do, but I don't desire 
 better sport than to meet one of their columns en masse 
 with our lines." 
 
 1 Journal of the R. U.S. InsUlution, xxxix. 903, >S:c. 
 
 - Lapene, p. 162. " Napier, vi. 313. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 221 
 
 The question presents itself, how was it that the French 
 skirmishers had no such eiiect on the British lines as they 
 had on the Prussians at Jena. For one thing, Wellington 
 placed his battalions, if he could, where the ground gave 
 them some cover, behind the crest of a ridge, for instance, 
 or made them lie down, instead of letting them be a target 
 for artillery and musketry. But in any case the British 
 skirmishers were more of a match for the French than the 
 Prussians had been. The tradition of hght infantry fight- 
 ing, formed in America, had never quite died out. In 
 1798 Lord Cornwallis wrote to Arthur Wellesley, with re- 
 ference to the threatened invivsion of England : " The 
 system of David Dundas and the total want of light 
 infantry sit heavy on my mind." ^ But apart from light 
 companies, a regiment of light infantry had been raised in 
 1794 (the 90th Perthshire Volunteers, noAV the second 
 battalion of the Scottish Rifles). In 1800 a corps of rifle- 
 men was formed, which became the 95th and then the 
 Rifle Brigade. William Stewart, who commanded one of 
 the divisions at Albuera, was its lieutenant-colonel ; and 
 he borrowed his system of training from German sources, 
 having served with the Austrians in the campaign of 1799 
 and watched the Tyrolese Jiigers. His system was in its 
 turn the foundation of the Shorncliflt' drill, by which Sir 
 John Moore formed the regiments of the Light Division. 
 In the Peninsula those regiments (43rd, 52nd, and 95th) 
 were brought by Craufurd " to a state of discipline and 
 knowledge of the duties of light infantry which never was 
 equalled by any division in the British army, or surpassed 
 by any division of the French army." ^ There were also 
 good foreign corps of light troops serving under Welling- 
 ton, such as the Portuguese Ca9adorcs, the fifth battalion 
 
 • C'ortiwa/lis Correspondence, ii. IVM. 
 ' Sir George Napier, p. 224. 
 
222 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 of the 60th (formed as a rifle battalion in 1797), and two 
 battalions of the King's German Legion. 
 
 The divisions of the Russian army consisted of three 
 brigades, one of which was a Jager brigade : but it did 
 not diifer essentially from the others. The Russians did 
 not take readily to light mfantry work ; they fought best 
 in line or column. There were six battalions in a brigade, 
 and four companies of 250 men in a battalion. They 
 made use of battalion columns, having a front of one 
 company and a strength of 1000 men, for the grenadiers 
 were not detached.^ The battle of Borodino (September 7) 
 was the only pitched battle of the campaign of 1812. The 
 French owed their victory, so far as it deserves the name, 
 mainly to their cavalry and artillery. Napoleon rejected 
 Davout's proposal that he should turn the Russian left, 
 lest the enemy should retire without fighting, and de- 
 liberately took the bull by the horns. He had 125,000 
 men massed in a space of less than three miles, but he 
 found once more how difficult it was to dislodge Russians 
 by a front attack, especially when they had the help of 
 intrenchments. The final attack on the grand redoubt 
 was made by a brigade which had in first line two bat- 
 talions deployed flanked by two in column, and in second 
 line four battalions deployed ; but the redoubt was actually 
 carried by cuirassiers, who made their way into it by its 
 open gorge. 
 
 In the war of liberation (1813-14) both sides fought 
 in the French fashion, but the French armies consisted 
 largely of boys called up before their time. It was only 
 the genius of Napoleon, and the experience and capacity 
 of the officers of all ranks, that enabled them to make 
 head against the allies, who had the advantage in quality, 
 
 ' Riistow, ii. 331. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 223 
 
 and latterly in numbers also. There was no want of dash 
 in the young conscripts, but they lacked strength and 
 were demoralised by defeat. "Every Frenchman is a 
 soldier in six weeks, an advantage appertaining to no 
 other state," wrote Sir Robert Wilson after the battle of 
 Leipzig ; 1 but quickness could not make up for immaturity, 
 and the wastage was great. "It is the massacre of the 
 Innocents over again," said Drouot, as he saw the con- 
 scripts falling at the battle of Laon.2 
 
 It was a very different army that Napoleon led against 
 Blucher and Wellington in 1815. The men were seasoned 
 .soldiers, devoted to their emperor and eager to fight; 
 but the brigades and some of the regiments were newly 
 formed, officers and men did not know one another, and 
 mimy of the generals were suspected of disloyalty. The 
 material was excellent, but it was loosely held together.' 
 The Prussians had the advantage in this respect ; the 
 officers were experienced and trusted by their men. Most 
 of the men had served in the war of liberation, and they 
 were animated by love of country and hatred of the 
 enemy. The reforms introduced by Scharnhorst had 
 taken effect by this time. The obligation to serve was 
 universal, but it was settled by lot which men should 
 join the colours. After three years they passed to the 
 reserve, and two years later to the landwehr, which had 
 its own regiments distinct from the standing army. There 
 was a first and a second call of landwehr, and the men 
 spent seven years in each. One-third of Blucher's infantry 
 wius landwehr. At Ligny (June 16) the forces engaged 
 were nearly equal, but the French were weaker in infantry, 
 stronger in cavalry and guns. Wellington thought the 
 Prussians were badly drawn up, and predicted that they 
 would be " damnably mauled." They were dotted about 
 
 ' Wilson, ii. 185. « Segur, p. 347. ^ Charras, p. 61. 
 
224 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 on ground falling to the front, making good targets for 
 artillery, and they had undertaken to defend two villages 
 (Ligny and St. Amand) which lay too far in advance of 
 their position. The battle was mainly a fight of battalion 
 columns for the possession of these two villages. At the 
 end of five hours the Prussians were beaten, but they 
 retreated in the night unpursued, and were able to pro- 
 mise Wellington that they would come to his assistance 
 two days afterwards. 
 
 The army with which Wellington, relying on Prussian 
 aid, made his stand at Waterloo (June 18), numbered 
 nearly 68,000 men. But out of 50,000 infantry less than 
 15,000 were British; 4500 belonged to the Kmg's German 
 Legion ; the rest were Dutch-Belgians of doubtful staunch- 
 ness, or newly raised Germans. In point of numbers. 
 Napoleon's army was equal to Wellington's in infantry, 
 superior by one- fourth in cavalry, and had five guns 
 to three. 
 
 Reille, who had seen much service in Spain, was ques- 
 tioned by the emperor about the English army, and 
 said that "in a good position, such as Wellington was 
 accustomed to choose, he considered it invincible by a 
 front attack, because of the calm tenacity and good 
 shooting of its infantry. Before one could attack it with 
 the bayonet one might expect to lose half one's men ; 
 but it was less supple, less ready in manoeuvring than 
 our own." He advised Napoleon, therefore, to manasuvre, 
 but was met by an exclamation of incredulity.^ At St. 
 Helena Napoleon praised Turenne for always observing 
 two maxims: "(1) Do not make front attacks on positions 
 which you can gain by turning them. (2) Do not do 
 what the enemy wants you to do, and avoid it just 
 because he wants it. Shun the battle-field which he has 
 
 ' Segur, Mdlanges, p. 273. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 225 
 
 reconnoitred and studied, much more that which he 
 has fortified and where he is intrenched." ' 
 
 But at Waterloo he disregarded these maxims. It was 
 Welhngton's hope that he would be attacked in front, 
 and he would allow of no intrenchments lost they should 
 discourage a front attack. His fear was that Napoleon 
 would turn his right, and move on Brussels by the Hal 
 road, as the French had done in 1794, after Fleurus. 
 To guard against this contingency, he left nearly 15,000 
 men at Hal, though he could ill spare them. 
 
 Wellington had chosen his ground, as usual, so that 
 his troops should have cover. The position was two 
 miles long, and was divided in half by the Charleroi- 
 Brussels road, which ran at right angles to it. Napoleon 
 saw that the right (or western) half was held in more 
 strength than the left, and he decided to make his main 
 eSbrt against the left. If he succeeded, the troops on 
 the right would be cut off from the Brussels road and 
 from the Prussians. He reckoned that the chances were 
 nine to one in his favour, as the English were the only 
 good troops in the allied army.= 
 
 The attack was made about 1.30 p.m. by the four 
 divisions of D'Erlon's corps, numbering nearly 17,000 
 men. It had been prepared by the fire of eighty guns 
 placed on a spur GOO yards from the position. The 
 divisions advanced in columns of deployed battalions 
 with intervals of 400 paces between them. One brigade 
 of Alix's division (formed in column of attack) moved 
 upon La Haye Sainte by the Brussels road ; the other 
 brigade (four battalions) was on its right. To the right 
 of Alix's division came Donzelot's (nine battalions), then 
 Marcognet's (eight battalions) and Durutte's (eight batta- 
 lions). West of the Brussels road, a division of Rcille's 
 
 ■ Napoleon I., xxxii. 1:^3. " 76., xxxi. 187. 
 
226 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 corps moved forward in support, with a division of 
 cuirassiers. 
 
 The part of the position against which this attack was 
 directed was held by two brigades of Picton's division 
 (3000 men) and two Hanoverian brigades (5000 men). 
 In front of them was Perponcher's Dutch-Belgian division 
 (4300 men), Bylandt's brigade being on the forward slope, 
 and Saxe-Weimar's holding hamlets on the left. The 
 French columns advanced in echelon from the left, and 
 Bylandt's brigade gave way before them. The skir- 
 mishers of Picton's division were driven in, and the gun 
 detachments of the twenty pieces which were on the 
 crest of the ridge had to leave their guns. The right 
 brigade of Alix's division had nearly reached the Wavre 
 road, which ran along the crest, when it was met by 
 a volley and a charge from Kempt's brigade, and was 
 thrown into confusion. Donzelot's column crossed the 
 road, and part of Pack's brigade fell back in disorder; 
 but the Union brigade of dragoons (1000 sabres. Royals, 
 Inniskillings, and Scots Greys), passing through the inter- 
 vals of the British line, fell upon the French infantry, 
 which broke and fled down the slope and across the 
 valley. The right column (Durutte) was less severely 
 engaged, but fell back when the others were routed. 
 The loss of the corps, including prisoners, is reckoned 
 at 5000 men. 
 
 The unexpected charge of the British cavalry, which 
 gave the French no time to form square, was the main 
 cause of their defeat ; but they had suffered much in 
 their slow approach over sodden ground covered with 
 standing crops. De Lacy Evans says : " The enemy's 
 column [Donzelot's] near which I was, on arriving at the 
 crest of the position seemed very helpless, had very little 
 fire to give from its front or flanks, was incapable of 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 227 
 
 deploying, must have lost many of its officers in coming 
 up, was tired into, close, with impunity, by stragglers of 
 our infantry who remained behind." ' 
 
 The attack of D'Erlon's corps was to have been 
 supported by Lobau's corps, but it had already become 
 necessary to send the latter eastward to hold the 
 approaching Prussians in check. Before the end of the 
 (lay nearly half of the Imperial Guard was sent to help 
 Lobau, so that the troops available against Wellington 
 were reduced by one-fourth. 
 
 Nevertheless, and though the grand attack had failed, 
 the strain on the British became very severe as the 
 day wore on. " It has been a damned nice thing — the 
 nearest run thing you ever saw in your life : " so 
 Wellington told Creevey next day. The capture of 
 La Haye Sainte (towards 6 p.m.) enabled the French 
 skirmishers to establish themselves within sixty yards 
 of the centre of the position, and to bring up guns ; 
 while the incessant charges of the French cavalry kept 
 the allied infantry in squares. The 27th regiment had 
 more than two-thirds of its men shot down ; the 30th 
 and 73rd, formed in one square, lost 40 per cent. 
 Kielmansegge's Hanoverian brigade suffered so much 
 that it gave way, leaving a gap in the position ; and 
 some Nassau troops, brought up to fill the gap, also 
 gave way, and fired at Wellington when he tried to 
 rally them. But the head of a second Prussian corps 
 (Ziethen) was by this time within two miles of the 
 allied left, and soon allowed the Duke to draw some 
 of his troops from that part of the position. 
 
 About 7.30 P.M. Napoleon sent forward the Guard 
 to decide the battle, as it had decided that of Ligny 
 at the same hour two days before. But of the twenty- 
 ' Waterloo Letters, p. (51. 
 
228 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 four battalions, ten were engaged with the Prussians, 
 seven were kept back as reserves, and only seven took 
 part in the attack. These were all of the Middle 
 Guard, and with one battalion left behind they made 
 up its four regiments. The average strength of the 
 battalions was 500 men. They were at first formed 
 in squares, the weaker battalions being coupled, so that 
 there were two squares of grenadiers on the right and 
 three of chasseurs on the left.^ They advanced in 
 echelon from the right, and the five squares seem to 
 have become two columns, one of grenadiers leading, 
 and one of chasseurs following to its left rear. They 
 were directed, not against the weakened centre of the 
 position, but towards the right, where Maitland's brigade 
 of Guards (1500 men) was posted, with Adam's brigade 
 (2500 men) on its right.^ 
 
 The two brigades were formed four deep to meet the 
 attack, as the Duke expected that cavalry would take 
 part in it; and the men were lying down behind the 
 crest of the ridge. When the column of grenadiers 
 had come within fifty paces, the Guards rose, fired a 
 volley, and charged ; the column, " crippled and broken, 
 retreated with the utmost rapidity," ^ says General 
 Maitland, and the Guards, after pursuing it down the 
 slope, returned to their position. The second column 
 (chasseurs) soon approached the right of Maitland's 
 brigade ; but Colborne, colonel of the 52nd (of Adam's 
 brigade), wheeled his regiment 70° to the left, so that 
 its front was nearly parallel to the flank of the column, 
 and advanced upon it in two lines, thi-owing out one 
 company as skirmishers. The column halted, and its 
 
 » Houssaye, pp. 389, &c. 
 
 = Vniled Service Magazine, April 1900, pp. SS-fi;", '■ Tlie La.st French 
 Charge at Waterloo." 
 
 ' Waterloo Letters, p. 245. 
 
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 229 
 
 Hank sections wheeled up to form a line facing the 
 52nd; but when that regiment charged, it broke "into 
 the wildest confusion," and fled to the low ground south 
 of La Haye Sainte.i 
 
 The troops of D'Erlon's corps had renewed their 
 pressure on the allied centre and left when the Imperial 
 Guard advanced, but they fell back when they saw it 
 was beaten, and soon the whole French army was in 
 (light. 
 
 " Never did I see such a pounding match. Both were 
 what the boxers call ' gluttons.' Napoleon did not 
 manoeuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old 
 style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style. 
 The only diflercnce was, that he mixed cavalry with 
 his infantry, and supported both with an enormous 
 quantity of artillery. I had the infantry for some time 
 in squares, and we had the French cavalry walking 
 about us as if they had been our own. I never saw 
 the British infantry behave so well." - 
 
 Such was Wellington's account of the battle to 
 Beresford a fortnight afterwards. 
 
 ' Waterloo Letters, p. 2'Ja. - Gurwood, p. 872. 
 
IX 
 
 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: I. (1816-1866) 
 
 Bitter experience set the continental powers to the work 
 of amending their military institutions during and after 
 the Napoleonic wars. England had fared better, and had 
 reason to be proud of the part which her soldiers, as well 
 as her sailors, had played. There was strong popular 
 pressure for retrench'nent, but none for reform in army 
 matters. The limited Enlistment Act, passed in 1806, 
 had not fulfilled Windham's anticipations, and in 1829 it 
 was dropped, to be revived in a different form twenty years 
 later. Recruits were tempted by bounties to engage for 
 life, and flogging was freely used to check desertion and 
 maintain discipline. The well-earned weight of Welling- 
 ton was on the side of conservatism. He regarded it as 
 inevitable that the British soldier should be drawn from 
 the dregs of the population, and should be subjected to a 
 more severe system than was needed for soldiers drawn 
 from all classes under conscription. There was a differ- 
 ence, too, in the officers : " The duty of a subaltern officer, 
 as done in a foreign army, is not done at all in the cavalry 
 or the British infantry of the line. It is done in the 
 Guards by the sergeants." ^ 
 
 The militia, as remodelled by the elder Pitt in 1757, 
 was raised by ballot, hut substitutes were allowed. In the 
 great war the militia was embodied, and the price of sub- 
 stitutes rose high (to £60 or more). This interfered with 
 
 ' Gurwood, p. 920. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 231 
 
 recnuting for the regular army, which was allowed, there- 
 fore, to obtain men from the militia. About 4U per cent, 
 of its recruits were drawn from this source,' and they were 
 men already trained ; so that the militia became a feeder 
 to the array, as well as a reserve. In 1808 a "local 
 militia " was created, to be i-aised by ballot without sub- 
 stitutes, but its ranks were mainly filled by means of a 
 small bounty. At the end of 1813 this force numbered 
 nearly 300,000 men, the volunteers and yeomanry 65,000, 
 the general militia 83,000, and the regulars 237,000, 
 making a total of 685,000 men found by a population of 
 less than twenty millions. After the peace of 1815 the 
 Ballot Act was suspended, the volunteers disappeared, the 
 militia and yeomanry became mere cadres, and the army 
 was reduced to about 100,000 men. It was an aggregate 
 of regiments, without higher organisation, without trans- 
 port, and with few opportunities of training outside the 
 barrack square. 
 
 The linear tactics had served the British so well that 
 they remained substantially unchanged. The formation 
 in two ranks, which had long been customary, received 
 official recognition in 1824 ; and the drill-book of that 
 year also took account, for the first time, of the training 
 of light infantry. Otherwise there was little alteration 
 in the system of infantry movements which Dundas had 
 borrowed from the Prussians ; and even fifty years later 
 it could be said that " the fighting tactics of Frederick 
 the Great, improved by the Duke of Wellington to suit 
 the arms of his day, are still alone to be found in our 
 Field Exercise Book."- 
 
 It was much the same with the French regulations : 
 those of 1831 followed the general arrangement and the 
 spirit of Guibert's compilation of 1791, and the regulations 
 ' Goodenough, p. 23. " Wolseley, p. 273. 
 
232 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 of 1862 were on the same lines as those of 1831.' The 
 drill-book of 1791 lent itself, as already pointed out (p. 
 183), either to column or linear tactics. Some military 
 writers {e.g. Rogniat), influenced by the British victories, 
 advocated the habitual use of line rather than column, 
 whether for attack or defence. Bugeaud was inclined to 
 favour it, because it alone " allows infantry to make use of 
 its fire, which is its main strength." - Morand, one of the 
 most distinguished of the divisional generals of the Empire, 
 maintained that no formation suited the various contin- 
 gencies of the battle-field so well as the battalion column, 
 formed on the centre by divisions (or double companies) 
 at platoon distance. The columns should be in one or two 
 lines, with deploying intervals between them, with their 
 light companies skirmishing in front, and their grenadiers 
 as a reserve in rear.^ Jomini also held that battalion 
 columns formed the best order of attack. All agreed in 
 blaming the massive columns which had been made use 
 of in the later years of the Empire : " Such masses are 
 exposed to the ravages of artillery, and involve a loss of 
 mobility and momentum without any gain of strength." * 
 The formation of infantry in two ranks, instead of three, 
 was much discussed. Jomini thought it would be of 
 advantage as diminishing the depth of columns ; but 
 "what European army (except the English) could be 
 trusted in line only two deep." ^ The Archduke Charles 
 had come to the conclusion, after trial with Austrian 
 troops, that a third rank was necessary for a bayonet 
 charge or to resist cavalry, and desirable for a steady 
 advance and for musketry fighting.*' Four days before 
 the battle of Leipzig Napoleon had issued orders that all 
 
 Trochu, p. 210. 
 
 - Tbiry, p. 10. 
 
 Morand, pp. 137, &c. 
 
 * Jomini, ii. 228. 
 
 Jomini, ii. 226. 
 
 ' Karl, pp. 4, &c 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 233 
 
 the infiintry should be t'ormed two deep. This was partly m 
 order that the battalions might seem to the enemy to be 
 half as strong again as they were, but also because he was 
 satisfied that the fire of the third rank and the bayonet of 
 the third rank were of no value.' Indeed they were worse 
 than useless, for they caused so many injuries among the 
 young conscripts that Napoleon at first believed they were 
 mutilating themselves on purpose. As St. Cyr says, what- 
 ever may be laid down as to the first rank kneeling when 
 the three ranks have to fire, or the third rank only loading 
 for the second, all ranks will fire, with or without orders, 
 when they hear the bullets whistle past their ears.- Mar- 
 mont declared that there was nothing to justify a third 
 rank ; nevertheless it was retained as an optional formation 
 in the French service till 1859, and even then old soldiers 
 shook their heads at its abandonment on the eve of a war. 
 In the Prussian service also the third rank was retained, 
 but it was to be used in the field for skirmishing ; so that 
 the battaUon was practically two deep in line, or eight 
 deep in column, formed on the two centre subdivisions.' 
 The strength of the battalion was 1000 men, on a war 
 footing ; but, mainly for the sake of economy, it consisted 
 of four companies only. After the peace of 1815 there 
 was a reaction towards the rigid close-order drill of the 
 old school, as the best training for short-service soldiers. 
 The king, Frederick William III., inclined that way, as 
 did his second son, afterwards William I. The drill-book 
 of 1812, inspired by Scharnhorst, was supplemented by a 
 series of orders which restrained the freedom it had given 
 to commanders.'' The inspections of the troops took place 
 on the drill-ground, and were concerned with movements 
 in close order. 
 
 ' Corrciipondance, October 13, 1813. = Gouvion St. Cyr., vol. i. p. xliv. 
 ' Riistow, ii. 322. « Blunic, p. 90. 
 
234 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 After the accession of Frederick William IV. the advo- 
 cates of progress met with more attention. A new drill- 
 book, issued in 1847, gave full recognition to the company 
 column as a handy alternative to the battalion column. 
 The company column was six deep or twelve deep. To 
 meet the varying requirements of the skirmisher-fight it 
 was found better to use whole companies as units than to 
 depend on the third-rank men. The two flank companies 
 were sent forward to form the skirmish line and its sup- 
 ports, the two centre companies (or at least one of them) 
 being kept in column as a reserve. This led to more 
 independent action on the part of the captains of com- 
 panies, who passed to some extent out of the control of 
 the battalion commandsr.^ 
 
 The methodising of skirmishing, the full development 
 and maintenance of musketry fire as a preparation for the 
 decisive shock by columns, and in combination with the 
 action of artillery and cavalry, had become the chief 
 military problem ; and its importance grew with every 
 improvement in fire-arms. After prolonged trials, flints 
 were superseded by percussion caps, which reduced mis- 
 fires to insignificance, lessened recoil and improved the 
 shooting, both in accuracy and rapidity. A percussion 
 musket was adopted for the British infantry in 1842. 
 Even with this improved weapon it was found that half 
 the shots missed a six-foot target at 200 yards. 
 
 It had long been known — at all events from the middle 
 of the sixteenth century — that better shooting was ob- 
 tained from rifled barrels. But they were expensive, and 
 the gain in accuracy was counterbalanced by difficulty 
 and delay in loading, as the spherical bullet had to be 
 forced down (sometimes with a mallet) to take the 
 grooves. They were used at first for target shootmg and 
 > Rustow, ii. 334. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 235 
 
 sport. In the latter part of the seventeenth century some 
 of the German princes employed mountaineers as sharp- 
 shooters, who brought their rifles with them. Louis XIV. 
 followed the example, and in 107!) he ordered that two 
 men in every company of horse should be armed with 
 rifled carbines. As in the case of the grenadiers, these 
 carbineers were soon gathered into separate companies, 
 and the companies brought together into brigades, form- 
 ing one of the most distinguished corps of the French 
 army. Rifled arms were also supplied for two men in 
 every company of foot. The bullets were made of two 
 sizes, the smaller to be used when speed in loading was 
 more important than accuracy. 
 
 The corps of J<\gers and chasseurs raised in the latter 
 part of the eighteenth century were armed with rifles, 
 wholly or partially. The British corps formed in 1800 
 (which ultimately became the Rifle Brigade) had the 
 Baker rifle, 2 feet 6 inches in length of barrel, and with 
 bullets 20 to the pound. A marksman was expected to 
 hit a target 4 feet in diameter twice out of three times at 
 200 yards, but the rate of firing was only one round per 
 minute. The need of special ammunition for riflemen 
 was a drawback : it was the cause of the loss of La Haye 
 Samte at Waterloo. The Jagers of the King's German 
 Legion who formed the garrison expended all their 
 cartridges, and the reserve supply could not be found.' 
 
 Napoleon laid stress on uniformity of armament, and 
 rifled carbines were provided only for the officers and 
 under-officers of the voltigeurs, not for the men.^ France 
 alone had no corps of riflemen, until improvements 
 mainly due to French officers gave rifles a new value. 
 Spherical bullets were replaced by elongated bullets 
 hollowed at the base, which were expanded to take the 
 
 ' Omptctla, p. :!(I9. - Corrcspondance, March 1.3, IS04. 
 
236 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 rifling by the explosion of the powder charge. This not 
 only got rid of the difficulty of loading, but gave increased 
 range and accuracy and allowed the calibre to be reduced. 
 The change, worked out during the second quarter of 
 the nineteenth century, produced a weapon so superior 
 to the smooth-bore musket that it was bound to super- 
 sede it. 
 
 The Minie rifle was introduced into the British service 
 in 1851 for the infantry generally; it was replaced by 
 the Enfield pattern four years afterwards. In Austria 
 and Russia the course adopted at first was to arm a 
 certain number of men in each company with rifles. 
 The French had formed, in 1838-40, a special corps of 
 chasseurs a pied, trained to manoeuvre at five miles an 
 hour (pas gymnastique). These troops were intended 
 for service in Algeria. They were armed with rifles 
 {carabines a tige) and sword bayonets. The number of 
 battalions, ten in 1840, rose to twenty in 1853, and they 
 became the light infantry of the French army. There 
 was another special corps, the Zouaves, which was raised 
 for Algerian warfare. Named after a tribe of Kabyles 
 the (Zouaoua), it was meant to consist mainly of natives, 
 and the uniform was a modified Eastern dress. But many 
 of the natives deserted at Abd-el-Kader's call in 1839, and 
 the African element was reduced to one company in each 
 battalion. Trained by Lamoriciere to work and to fight, 
 like the Roman legionary, and constantly in the field 
 against a mobile enemy, the Zouaves became a model 
 of efliciency, a picked corps to which officers and men 
 sought admission. In 1852 they were raised to three 
 regiments of three battalions each, and soon afterwards 
 they were armed with rifles.^ The French infantry 
 generally were not so armed till 1857. 
 ' [Aumale], pp. 1 1-89. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 237 
 
 A breech-loading rifled musket (the needle gun) had 
 been invented by Dreyse, and was adopted by the 
 Prussian Government in 1841. A stock of these arms 
 was gradually accumulated in the arsenal at Berlin, to 
 be issued to the troops in case of war, and take an enemy 
 unawares. The disturbances of 1848 put an end to all 
 secrecy about this weapon, and the whole of the Prussian 
 infantry was gradually provided with it between 1853 and 
 1858.' Seven shots a minute could be fired with it ; but 
 there was much doubt abroad as to its suitability for 
 general use in the field. As regards the effective range 
 and accuracy of musketry fire, they may be said to have 
 been increased fourfold by the adoption of rifles with 
 elongated bullets. But men must be good shots to turn 
 the new arms to full account, and much more attention 
 began to be paid to instruction in musketry. So little 
 had been done in former days that we find Berthier 
 giving orders, on the eve of passing the St. Bernard in 
 1800, that all the conscripts should fire a few shots, 
 " that they may know which eye to aim with and how 
 to load their muskets."- Napoleon In 1811 approved ot 
 target practice for the recruits, but desired that inferior 
 powder should be used for it.^ 
 
 After nearly forty years of peace between the great 
 powers, came the Crimean war, and for the first time 
 British troops encountered Russians. Each adhered to 
 their old tactics, and it was once more line against 
 column. At the battle of the Alma (September 20, 1854) 
 two-thirds of the Russian army held that part of the 
 position against which the British attack was directed, so 
 that the numbers there were equal — 24,000 on each side. 
 
 ' Rustow, ii. .37r>. - nerr^cagaix, i. 399. 
 
 ■' Corre.sjxjndance, October :J0, 1811. 
 
238 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 The Russians had the advantage in guns and cavah-y. 
 On arriving within a mile of the Russian batteries, four 
 divisions of British infantry deployed into two hnes, with 
 one battalion of riflemen thrown forward as skirmishers. 
 The troops then advanced under a heavy fire of artillery. 
 They had to pass through vineyards, and to cross a stream 
 with high banks ; and on the right a village which had 
 been set on fire stood in their way. Consequently the 
 attack was begun, not in orderly lines, " but with such 
 attempts at lines as the men themselves, instinctively 
 seeking their own companies, succeeded in making, that 
 is to say, a line chiefly of groups and masses." ' Some 
 battalions had to reform column, and two on the left 
 formed square to resist cavalry. 
 
 Codrington's brigade of the Light Division, with the 
 two battalions to right and left of it, advanced upon 
 the main battery and carried it, the guns being with- 
 drawn from it on their approach. But a heavy Russian 
 column of four battalions, supported by others, forced 
 them to fall back to the stream, having lost 25 per cent, 
 of their men. There they were relieved by the brigade 
 of Guards, which advanced in better order, drove back 
 the Russians, and reoccupied the battery. The French 
 had crossed the Alma lower down, and had cHmbed the 
 heights, meeting with comparatively little resistance. 
 They now threatened the left flank of the Russians, 
 who after three hours' fighting retreated on Sebastopol. 
 Their loss had been very heavy, double the loss of the 
 allies. 
 
 Nearly all the British infantry were armed with rifles, 
 but only a small proportion of the Russians. Moltke, 
 commentmg on the battle ten years afterwards, attri- 
 buted their defeat partly to this difference of armament, 
 
 ' Hamley, p. 5G. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 239 
 
 partly to their neglect of intrenchnients and reliance on 
 bayonet attacks by massive columns. At the same time 
 he pointed out that the British line had become "an 
 irregular chain of skirmishers, in which the men, not 
 only of different companies, but even of different regi- 
 ments, got so mixed up together that it became no longer 
 possible to fire volleys, or to make any regular move- 
 ments."' His conclusion was that small columns are 
 best for attack, line for receiving attack, and that the 
 Prussian system of company columns meets all con- 
 tingencies. 
 
 At the battle of Inkerman (November 5) the parts were 
 reversed : the Russians were the assailants. Under cover 
 of the morning mist, 15,000 men suddenly attacked the 
 Inkerman plateau, which formed the right of the British 
 positions. They were supported by a powerful artillery, 
 and were confronted by only 3600 men ; yet they were 
 driven back so shattered and disorganised that they could 
 not be brought forward again. By the Czar's order the 
 leading troops had been formed in company columns; 
 but owing to the cramped space and broken ground they 
 soon gathered into dense crowds on which the British 
 tire told very severely. The rifle was of even more 
 service here than at the Alma ; the Russian gunners 
 were shot down at a range of half a mile. The British 
 line again resolved itself into a chain of knots and groups 
 of men fighting independently. 
 
 Renewed attacks were made by fresh regiments, for 
 36,000 men had been directed against the plateau ; and 
 these attacks were pushed with more vigour, and met 
 with some success. " What a slaughter yard ! " said 
 General Bosquet, as he rode past the Sandbag battery, 
 which was taken and retaken several times. But the 
 
 ' MoUke, pp. (il, .332. 
 
240 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 numbers of the allies rose to 12,000, of whom more than 
 half were French ; their artillery became predominant ; 
 and by midday the Russian general recognised that his 
 attempt had failed. It had cost him over 10,000 men, 
 more than three times the loss of the allies. Making 
 all allowances for the difficulties attending it, it ought 
 to have succeeded. Fifty' years afterwards an eye- 
 witness wrote of the Russian assault on the Motien-ling 
 (July 17, 1904) : " It is passing strange that soldiers so 
 steady and formidable in retreat should be so slow and 
 so sticky in the attack. They exposed themselves for 
 a time with admirable coolness to heavy losses in in- 
 ferior positions. Then, with equal indifference to danger, 
 they withdrew to their camp." ^ 
 
 Towards the end of the siege the Russians made an- 
 other attack in force upon the intrenched positions on the 
 Tchernaya, held by 18,000 French and 9000 Sardinians 
 (August 16, 1855). The Russians brought up 48,000 
 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and more than 300 guns. They 
 twice forced the Traktir bridge over the river, and pressed 
 up the slope of the French position ; but were driven back 
 again by the charge of the French infantry, and at length 
 retreated, having lost 8000 men. They showed astonish- 
 ing fortitude and tenacity in defence of their own works, 
 but in the field they certainly fell short of their old 
 achievements in the wars of Frederick and Napoleon. 
 Their strength had always lain in shock tactics, and the 
 increased effect of fire-arms would in any case have told 
 against them, even if they had been as well armed as their 
 opponents. 
 
 If the French happened to play a secondary part at the 
 beginning of this war, they made up for it afterwards ; 
 and by storming the Malakhow they took Sebastopol. An 
 ' Hamilton, ii. 27y. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 241 
 
 Italian officer who was present at the siege praised the 
 extraordinary solidity of the English, but found them 
 otherwise inferior to the French in the art of war : less 
 skilful in manoeuvring, less vigilant against surprise, and 
 less fit to look after themselves in respect of shelter and 
 subsistence.' 
 
 The war of Italian liberation in 1859 gave better oppor- 
 tunities of judging of the army of the Second Empire. It 
 contributed two-thirds of the Franco-Sardinian forces, 
 which, like the Austrians opposed to them, numbered 
 about 200,000 men. The French regiments of the line 
 were still only partially armed with rifles, and the Lorenz 
 rifle with which the Austrians were armed was better than 
 the French weapons. On the other hand, the French had 
 some rifled guns, which now appeared for the first time on 
 the battle-field and doubled the effective range of artillery. 
 
 Under the law of 1S32 only about one in four of the 
 young men who reached the military age was called up to 
 serve in the French army, and the term of service was 
 seven years. Substitutes were allowed, and in 1855 the 
 State undertook to provide them, exonerating conscripts 
 for a fixed payment. The result was that one-third of the 
 men in the ranks had more than seven years' service, 
 having been tempted to re-engage by bounties and pen- 
 sions. This system suited Napoleon III. on political 
 grounds, and was in harmony with the views of his uncle, 
 who said that soldiers should be encouraged by all means 
 to remain with the colours.^ In the Austrian army the 
 term of service was eight years, but men were kept only 
 two or three years with the colours ; " and the young 
 Austrians were no match for the unyielding tenacity 
 which distinguished the French regiments, stiffened by 
 
 ' Govone, p. 85. - Napoleon I., .x.xxi. ,304. 
 
 Q 
 
242 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 long years of service, and by previous experience of war." ^ 
 Two-thirds of the French subalterns and captains had 
 risen from the ranks, but only a small proportion of the 
 staff or commanding otBcers. The Austrians and French 
 were organised in army corps ; the Sardinians in strong 
 divisions which included two battalions of sharpshooters 
 (bersaglieri). The Austrians had reserve divisions of 
 cavalry outside the corps organisation. 
 
 At Montebello (May 20), the first action of the war, a 
 reconnaissance in force made by five Austrian brigades 
 was brought to a check by a single French division, which 
 inflicted on them a loss double its own. " The French 
 distinguished themselves by tactical skill, good use of the 
 ground, and above all by a vigorous offensive." ^ The 
 Austrian commander was led to report that he had been 
 engaged with at least 40,000 of the enemy. This informa- 
 tion, which was quite misleading, was regarded by Gyulai, 
 the commander-in-chief, as a mo.st valuable result of the 
 reconnaissance, justifying his own dispositions. 
 
 At Magenta (June 4) the French infantry again showed 
 itself very superior in energy and perseverance, in sagacity 
 and initiative.^ The frontal attack on the canal which 
 formed the Austrian line of defence was made some hours 
 before Macmahon was ready to support it by his flank 
 attack from Turbigo. The bridges were stormed by the 
 grenadiers and Zouaves of the Imperial Guard, and were 
 held against three times their own numbers until other 
 corps came up. As in the days of the Revolution, the 
 French attacked in battalion columns of double com- 
 panies covered by skirmishers : whole battalions sometime.s 
 fed the skirmisher-line ; and its fire told very severely on 
 the Austrian columns. 
 
 The same qualities were shown at Solferino (June 24). 
 1 [Moltke], p. 185. ' - lb., p. 50. ^ lb., p. 96. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 243 
 
 As Chesney says : " The capture of ihe hill of Solferino 
 was the fruit of long light infantry training, improved by 
 experience in rough Algerian skirmish, and stimulated to 
 the utmost quickness consistent with order by the example 
 of the dashing Zouave — the pattern of such soldiers — and 
 by the natural intelligence of the French recruit." > But 
 a more remarkable feature of this battle was the prolonged 
 and successful stand made in the plain of Medole, mainly 
 by Niel's corps, against the three corps which constituted 
 the first Austrian army. The French, though superior in 
 cavalry and artillery, had only 30,000 infantry here to 
 oppose to .50.000; and the men were for the most part 
 armed with smooth-bore muskets. According to Niel, " so 
 long as it was a musketry fight I lost ground, owing to the 
 enemy's advantage in number. Then I formed a column 
 of attack with one of the battalions of my reserve, and we 
 won back with the bayonet more than we had lost with 
 the fusilade." ^ Three successive efforts on the part of the 
 Austrians failed ; and the French had begun to take the 
 otlensive in this part of the field, when a violent thunder- 
 storm put an end to the battle. The loss of Niel's corps 
 was over 20 per cent. 
 
 A general order issued by the French emperor shortly 
 afterwards directed that, when fighting on the defensive, 
 " the lines of infantry will be disposed, when the ground 
 permits, alternately in battalions deployed and in bat- 
 talions in double colunm ; useless fire of skirmishers will 
 be avoided ; and while the deployed battalions engage in 
 file-firing, the others will beat the charge and attack the 
 enemy with the bayonet." ^ 
 
 The French troops had, as of old, the defects of their 
 qualities. Napoleon III. had thought it necessary to 
 
 ' Edinburgh Review, January IHHii. 2 Duquet, p. 28S. 
 
 ' Hamley, Operations of War. p. 323. 
 
244 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 caution them at the beginning of the campaign : " In 
 battle remain in close order, and do not leave your ranks 
 to rush forward. Be on your guard against too much 
 dash ; that is the only thing I am afraid of." ^ Those 
 impetuous rushes, well described as a fmte en avant, 
 under provocation of the enemy's fire, were frequent 
 incidents according to Trochu, who was one of the best 
 divisional commanders. He attributed them largely to 
 Algerian warfare, which had developed individualism to 
 excess ; for though the French temperament was always 
 vehement, it had shown itself capable of self-control in the 
 great wars.- He complained also of the enervating effect 
 of picked corps, such as the Imperial Guard (revived in 
 1854) and the chasieiors a pied, which made the mass 
 of the army a mere residuum. At the same time he 
 recommended that each battalion should have its com- 
 pany of sharpshooters, as he was convinced that the 
 ordinary soldier never aims in action. 
 
 But Trochu Avas an exception. The war of 1859 left 
 the French army as a whole well pleased with itself, and 
 with a good opinion of its opponent. It was the received 
 belief that Austria came next to France as a militar}' 
 power, and that the Prussian army was little better than 
 a militia, looking well on paper but unfit for war. 
 
 Before this belief was put to the proof there was a war 
 on the other side of the Atlantic which in scale and 
 character was unprecedented. It is reckoned that the 
 number of men taking part in it at one time reached a 
 million and a half, and that the total loss of life was half 
 a million. Never was so much inventiveness and resource 
 brought to bear on a war, or such lavish expenditure. 
 " No European general has yet been called upon to carry 
 ' [Olberg], p. 24. ^ Trochu, p. 204. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 245 
 
 on a campaign in a wilderness of primeval forest, covering 
 an area twice as large as the German empire, and as thinly 
 populated as Russia. Nor has any government been 
 obliged to organise enormous armies for the invasion of 
 such a territory from a multitude of untrained and in- 
 experienced civilians, with the help of a handful of regular 
 officers, and to manufacture, to collect and issue, the whole 
 of the miitericl needed for their use." ' 
 
 The regular troops of the United States numbered 
 17,000 officers and men at the outbreak of the war. 
 They were not all immediately available, being scattered 
 in small detachments on the western frontier, to guard 
 it against Indians ; but they did something to stiffen the 
 earlier armies of the North. Of the officers, about one- 
 third resigned, and entered the service of the Southern 
 Confederacy; the rest, so far as they could bo spared 
 from their regiments, were used for staff and technical 
 duties and for the higher commands. There were also 
 many retired officers, who had received a military edu- 
 cation at West Point, and had perhaps served in the 
 Mexican war. But the great bulk of the troops on both 
 sides were quite untrained when they took the field, 
 officers as well as men. They were " volunteers," and the 
 officers were at first elected by their men. 
 
 Individually the Southerners wei-e better material for 
 soldiers, except in the west. They were country-bred, 
 good shots and good horsemen ; while the northern 
 armies were recruited from townsmen, and had a large 
 foreign element, 10 per cent. Germans, and 10 per cent. 
 Irish. The Southern States were more whole-hearted 
 and more ready to make sacrifices for their cause. They 
 had only eight millions of whites as against nineteen 
 millions, and they soon adopted conscription, which was 
 
 ' Henderson, p. 234. 
 
246 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 gradually extended up to men of fifty years of age. 
 This enabled them to make good losses in their regiments 
 by drafts, and give them tried leaders : while in the 
 North, for political reasons, new regiments were raised 
 under untried men. 
 
 In equipment the South was at great disadvantage. 
 Its artillery was inferior, and the stock of rifles had to be 
 supplemented by flint-lock muskets and fowling-pieces. 
 The southern soldiers sought to make good their de- 
 ficiencies by captures from the enemy. The battle-field 
 was their harvest ; but their eagerness for spoil hindered 
 them from making the most of their successes. Boots 
 constantly failed them, and this had much to do with 
 the prevalence of straggling, which sometimes reduced 
 their available numbers by one-third. Under such con- 
 ditions the Confederate soldier was much like the French 
 Republicans who overran Western Europe. General D. H. 
 Hill has described him : " Self-reliant always, obedient 
 when he chose to be, impatient of drill and discipline, 
 he was unsurpassed as a scout or on the skirmish line. 
 Of the .shoulder-to-shoulder courage, bred of drill and 
 discipline, he knew nothing and cared less. Hence, on 
 the battle-field, he was more of a free lance than a 
 machine. Whoever saw a Confederate line advancing 
 that was not crooked as a ram's horn ? Each ragged 
 rebel yelling on his own hook and aligning on himself." ' 
 
 There was much the same independence among the 
 soldiers of the North. The officers were apt to neglect 
 orders which they disapproved, and to indulge freely 
 in criticism of their superiors. Political influence was 
 paramount for some years. But towards the end of the 
 war the teaching of experience and the abundance of 
 supplies made it possible to weed out the ineflicient, 
 ' Henderson, Jackson, ii. 4-lU. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 247 
 
 and to raise the standard of discipline. Lincoln, who 
 had thwarted M'Clellan, gave Grant his lull support. 
 
 Of the British soldiers at Waterloo Wellington said : 
 " Many of my troops were new, but the new tight well, 
 though they manoeuvre ill; better perhaps than many 
 who have fought and bled."i His defensive tactics re- 
 lieved them from manoeuvring. In the American Civil 
 war, the loose organisation, the inexperienced .staft', and 
 the thickly wooded country were additional reasons for 
 fighting on the defensive. In the first battle of the war 
 (Bull Run, July 21, 1861) the Federal regiments which 
 attacked proved incapable of movement under fire. 
 They showed no want of courage, but they broke into 
 fragments, and their firing was wild. They gave way 
 before Jackson's counterstroke ; but " the same want of 
 discipline that had driven them in rout to Washington 
 had dissolved the victorious Confederates into a tumul- 
 tuous mob."- 
 
 Even when the troops on both sides had gained ex- 
 perience, the defence retained its advantage. Cover was 
 generally to be had, in the form of log breastworks or 
 intrenchmcnts, and frontal attacks were always bloody 
 and often fruitless. At the second battle of Manassas 
 (August 29 and 30, 1862) the Confederates repulsed 
 repeated assaults with heavy loss; but when they took 
 the offensive they were soon brought to a check. Even 
 at Chancellorsville (May 5, 1863) the Federals contrived 
 to rally and show front against the unlooked-for and 
 overpowering flank attack of Jackson's corps. Jackson 
 himself said : " My men sometimes fail to drive the 
 enemy from his position, but to hold one, never ! " ^ 
 Again and again the Federals found tiiat odds of two 
 
 ' S. Rogers' Recollections, p. 209. 
 
 •-• Henderson, Jackson, i. 198. " Ih., ii. 419. 
 
248 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 to one would not enable them to storm Confederate 
 positions. Grant liked to say that he never manoeuvred, 
 and to trust to continuous hammering ; but at Cold 
 Harbour (June 3, 1864) his " thinking bayonets " refused 
 to respond to his order for a fresh assault when 13,000 
 of them had already fallen that morning. 
 
 In the attack on Lee's intrenchments round Spottsyl- 
 vania Court-house (May 12, 1864) 20,000 men were 
 directed on a salient angle, and were formed in line 
 of battalion columns in mass. The Confederate com- 
 mander at that point says: "This column came up in 
 large numbers, but in great disorder, with a narrow 
 front, but extending to the rear as far as I could see." ^ 
 It forced its way over abattis and intrenchment under 
 a heavy fire, and captured 4000 men ; but it was brought 
 up by an inner line, and was driven back by a counter- 
 stroke. This attack was made at 4.30 a.m. 
 
 Usually the battalions were deployed, and attacks 
 were made in Une, covered by skirmishers. The men 
 opened out as they advanced, so that they practically 
 came on in successive waves of skirmishers, and gained 
 ground by successive rushes. Bayonets were so little 
 used that many men threw them away. The actions 
 were decided by fire, but there was little fire-discipline, 
 and ammunition generally ran short. Towards the end 
 of the war the Confederates formed corps of sharp- 
 shooters for outpost work. They were first-rate marks- 
 men, and their rifles were often fitted with telescopic 
 sights. They were subdivided into groups of fours, which 
 messed and slept together and were never separated in 
 action.- 
 
 The infantry tactics took small account of cavalry. 
 It was at first weak in numbers and not highly trained, 
 ' Henderson, p. 336. ^ Henderson, Jackson, ii. 585. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 249 
 
 and the wooded country was ill-suited to it. Mounted 
 men were valuable for outpost duties, and for raids on 
 the enemy's communications, and their numbers became 
 large ; but they were mounted rifles rather than cavalry. 
 Even when they encountered one another they fought 
 with revolvers and carbines, not with sabres, and they 
 usually fought on foot. " It was very easy," says a Con- 
 federate horseman, "to charge down a road in column 
 of fours, but very hard to charge across country in 
 extended line and keep any sort of formation. Then 
 we never used sabres, and long guns were not exactly 
 the weapons for cavalry evolutions. We found the 
 method of fighting on foot more effective; we could 
 manffiuvre with more certainty, and sustain less, and 
 inflict more, loss." ' 
 
 It was the Confederate leaders — Morgan, Forrest, and 
 Stuart — who first showed how much could be done with 
 independent divisions of horse, but the Federals followed 
 the example. At length, in the spring of 1865, Sheridan 
 played the principal part in bringing about Lee's surrender. 
 At the head of a mounted corps of 10,000 men, armed 
 with breech-loading and repeating carbines, he turned 
 the right of the Confederate positions at Petersburg, 
 and obliged Lee to retreat westward to save his com- 
 nmnications. Moving parallel to him, Sheridan cut in 
 between the Confederate corps and forced Ewell to 
 surrender. Finally he headed the retreating army at 
 Appomattox Court-house (April 8), and barred its road 
 till the Federal infantry came up.- 
 
 The American Civil war showed plainly what changes 
 
 were bound to follow on the adoption of arms of precision : 
 
 looser fighting formations, advance by rushes, dismounted 
 
 action of cavalry, increased use of the spade, and 
 
 ' Denison, p. 444. * Sheridan, ii. 148-204. 
 
2SO THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 diminished use of sword and bayonet. But its imme- 
 diate influence on tactics was not nearly so great as it 
 was on naval warfare and siege operations. The American 
 battles were described in Germany as conflicts between 
 armed mobs, from which there Avas nothing to learn, and 
 their lessons had to be repeated on European battle-fields. 
 Moltke, however, recognised that the fire of stationary 
 troops was so much more effective than that of troops 
 advancing, that it would be well to combine as far as 
 possible a tactical defensive with a strategical offensive.' 
 
 Bi-eech- loaders had been largely used by the cavalry in 
 the American war, but not by the infantry. Lee, indeed, 
 was unwilling to see his men armed with them, because 
 the ammunition would be more quickly expended and 
 less readily supplied. Cartridges containing their own 
 means of ignition could not be improvised; and it was 
 also thought that serious injuries might be caused by 
 their accidental explosion. The war of 1864 between 
 Germany and Denmark showed that the drawbacks had 
 been exaggerated, and were outweighed by the advantage 
 of more rapid fire. The needle-gun justified the hopes 
 built on it ; and Prussia found herself once more, as in the 
 middle of the eighteenth century, in the enjoyment of a 
 temporary superiority of fire over all other powers. They 
 prepared to follow her example, but it was a work of time ; 
 and to reap the benefit of the difference in weapons, the 
 Prussian Government hastened on the inevitable struggle 
 with Austria for the leadership of Germany. 
 
 In 1850 Prussia had had to forego that leadership, and 
 to submit to the humiliation of Olmiitz, because her army 
 when mobilised was found unfit for war. The landwehr, 
 according to the scheme initiated by Scharnhorst, was 
 
 ' MUitair WochoMatt, July 8, 18G5. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 251 
 
 meant to consist of trained soldiers, men who had served 
 three years with the colours and two years in the reserve. 
 But in the long spell of peace after Waterloo financial 
 considerations had been paramount, and the peace 
 footing of battalions of the standing army was so low 
 that only half the conscripts of each year could find a 
 place in the ranks. The rest passed direct to the 
 landwehr, where they had hardly any training. In 1837 
 the service with the colours had been reduced to two 
 years, to allow more men to share in it, but this lowered 
 the quality of the line battahons as much as it improved 
 the landwehr. The latter was especially defective in the 
 matter of cavalry and train. The officers who had only 
 .served in the army as " one year volunteers " were not 
 qualified to make up for the shortcomings of their men. 
 Many of them, officers and men, were married, and were 
 unwilling to be called from civil life to fight in execution 
 of a policy of which, perhaps, as citizens they disapproved. 
 The mobilisation of the Prus.sian army in 1859 furnished 
 fresh evidence of the defects of its organisation, and 
 William I., who had always taken the deepest interest in 
 its efficiency, resolved to make it as far as possible inde- 
 pendent of the landwehr. The number of conscripts to 
 be called up yearly was raised from 40,000 to 63,000 (a 
 change warranted by the growth of the population), and 
 the term of service was made three years with the colours, 
 and four years (instead of two) in the reserve. These 
 changes doubled the strength of the army, including the 
 reserve, and made it unlikely that the landwehr would be 
 called upon for anything beyond garrison duty in time of 
 war.* The term of landwehr service was reduced by five 
 years. 
 
 ' The landwehr were actually engaged in ISGC only against the 
 Hanoverians at Langensalza (Blume, p. 217). 
 
253 THE HISTORY Of INFANTRY 
 
 In spite of the parliamentary deadlock caused by the 
 refusal of the Lower House to vote the necessary supplies, 
 the scheme was carried through. The enlargement of the 
 army quickened the promotion of officers, which had been 
 very slow, and the unfit were weeded out ; so that a new 
 spirit pervaded the whole body. When Bismarck brought 
 matters to an issue with Austria in 18G6, the changes had 
 had time to produce nearly their full effect. The minor 
 states of Germany declared against Prussia, but they were 
 balanced by Italy, which was on her side. The Austrian 
 empire had more than twice the area and revenue, and 
 nearly twice the population, of Prussia ; yet the Prussian 
 armies were numerically stronger than the Austrians in 
 Bohemia, even with the Saxon contingent thrown in. 
 
 In 1859 the Austrian infantry had been better armed 
 than the French. Napoleon III. had told his troops : 
 " Arms of precision are only dangerous at a distance. 
 They will not prevent the bayonet's being, as in former 
 days, the terrible weapon of the French infantry." i The 
 French had made it their aim accordingly to come to 
 close quarters, and they had been victorious. The 
 Austrians now determined to adopt similar shock tac- 
 tics against the needle-gun, overlooking the fact that its 
 advantage lay, not in range and accuracy, but in rapidity 
 of fire at short ranges. The Prussians had been told to 
 reserve their fire till the enemy came within a quarter of 
 a mile, to have a comparatively thin firing-line, since one 
 man was a match for three of the enemy armed with 
 muzzle-loaders, and to keep small columns near at hand 
 in readiness for counterstrokes. They were also told to 
 throw out few skirmishers, but this injunction soon 
 came to be disregarded, as it was found that the breech- 
 loader could be best used in loose order. Companies 
 
 ' LOlberg], p. 195. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 253 
 
 dissolved themselves into skirniishcr swarms, one after 
 another. 
 
 The difference of arms and tactics caused a striking 
 disparity of losses in every engagement. At Nachod 
 (June 27) the advanced guard of the "ith Prussian corps 
 {G}, battalions) held its ground for two hours against three 
 Austrian brigades (L'l battalions), giving time for the 
 main body of the corps to debouch from a defile. The 
 Austrians fell back defeated, having lost five times as 
 many men as the Prussians. At Trautenau, on the same 
 day, they were more successful : the 10th Austrian corps 
 (Gablenz) drove the first Prussian corps back into the 
 mountains. Yet here the loss of the victors was nearly 
 four times as great as that of the troops they de- 
 feated. 
 
 In the course of this action seven Pru.ssian companies 
 on a low ridge, with a front of half a mile, were attacked 
 by seven Austrian battalions. The Austrians were formed 
 in double-company columns (three to each battahon) and 
 in two lines. The attack was made in echelon from the 
 right, and was supported by two batteries, which soon 
 silenced the Prussian guns opposed to them. Covered 
 by a thick belt of skirmishers, the columns of the first 
 line advanced to within 150 paces of the position, meaning 
 to carry it with the bayonet. " The Prussian companies 
 of the first line were almost entirely extended, and the 
 small volleys of the supports soon turned into an anni- 
 hilating quick fire like that of the skirmishers." '■ One 
 of the two companies in reserve came up into the fire- 
 line and delivered two volleys, and then several com- 
 panies charged. The Austrians fell back, incurring fresh 
 losses, " for it is against retreating troops that the breech- 
 loader is most deadly." ^ Two nut of the four battalions 
 
 ' KutiDC, pp. 71. &c. - Ik, p. 97. 
 
2 54 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 engaged lost nearly [ half their men. A second advance, 
 combined with a turning movement, caused the Prussians 
 to withdraw. 
 
 The battle of Koniggratz (July 3), where, for the first 
 time on a European battle-field, more than 200,000 men 
 were engaged on each side, was fought by the Austrians 
 under the discouragement of the earlier encounters, and 
 told the same tale. Benedek fought on the defensive in 
 a prepared position, though at first he had odds of five 
 to three in his favour. The battle had lasted four hours 
 when the Crown Prince's army came up, and the corps 
 told off to meet it were already shaken. The Prussian 
 Guards gained possession of Chlum, the key of the 
 Austrian position, without much difficulty ; and the two 
 reserve corps sent by Benedek to recover it were repulsed 
 with heavy loss. The battle cost the Prussians 9000 men ; 
 it cost the Austrians 4", 000, of whom more than 18,000 
 were killed or wounded. 
 
 The Austrians were so heavily handicapped in this 
 war by the difference of weapons that it is hardly neces- 
 sary to look further for an explanation of the result. It 
 was in infantry fighting that they failed ; in cavalry and 
 artillery they more than held their own. But Colonel 
 Stoffel, the clear-sighted French attache at Berlin, found 
 other causes than the breech-loader for the Prussian suc- 
 cess. The education and sense of duty of the people, and 
 consequently of the soldiers drawn from it; the high 
 tone and thorough instruction of the whole body of 
 officers ; the unique efficiency of the general staff with 
 Moltke at its head ; these advantages would have brought 
 about the defeat of the Austrians even if they had had 
 breech-loaders. The value of the latter lay chiefly in 
 quick loading. Austrian officers said, " Our soldiers are 
 demoralised, not by the rapidity of your fire . . . but 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 255 
 
 bcciuiso yon arc always ready to fire." ' 'I'ho lotal ex- 
 penditure of infantry ammunition in the war was only 
 two million rounds, or about seven rounds per man, on 
 the Prussian side. 
 
 Under the fire of rifled guns it was impossible to operate 
 with large bodies of men without incurring heavy losses. 
 Small columns, of one or two companies, were used on 
 both sides ; though the multiphcation of units was in- 
 convenient and made control difhcult. Consequently the 
 actual conduct of the light fell to the captains of com- 
 panies, and one of the ablest of them (Captain May) 
 attributed the Prussian success largely to this fact. They 
 were old enough to know their work thoroughly, and not 
 so old as to have lost their spring. Ten years later the 
 bold active spirit was apt to be quenched by the routine 
 of service, children, and rheumatism. They had a per- 
 sonal hold, too, of their men, with whom attachment 
 to their officers, when there was good ground for it, 
 was a stronger motive than ambition or patriotism ; for 
 " the desire heartily to admire some one " is a marked 
 characteristic of the North German soldier.^ 
 
 ' Stoffel, p. \i<\. = [May], pp. 13-lG. 
 
X 
 
 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: II. (1867-1900) 
 
 Napoleon III. meant to fish in the troubled waters of 
 Germany, and to secure some extension of the French 
 frontier towards the Rhine. He was foiled by Bismarck, 
 with the help of Roon and Moltke, and he only succeeded 
 in delaying the unification of Germany. Discontent at 
 his failure shook his throne, and drove him against his 
 will towards a war with Prussia. Both sides actively 
 prepared for what was seen to be inevitable. The result 
 of the war of 1866 was to increase the population of 
 Prussia to twenty-four millions, to which nearly six 
 millions might be added for the smaller states of the 
 North German confederation, formed under her leader- 
 ship. The Prussian military system was extended over 
 the whole area of the confederation, but with reduction of 
 the term of landwehr service to five years ;i and it was 
 settled that the effective strength of the federal army 
 should be 1 per cent, of the population on a peace footing, 
 and 3 per cent, on a war footing. This would yield in 
 course of time nearly a million of trained soldiers under 
 thirty-three years of age. 
 
 The cavalry was increased, and the criticisms of Moltke 
 on the overcaution with which it had been handled in 
 1866 2 lja(j a marked effect on its subsequent use both 
 in reconnaissance and on the battle-field. The artillery 
 
 » Blume, p. 254. - R.U.S.I. Journal, 1. 22U. 
 
THE NINETP:ENTH century 257 
 
 had also failed to support the infantry as it should have 
 done : and arrangements were made to correct this in 
 future, and to bring as many batteries as possible into 
 play from the outset, instead of holding some of them 
 in reserve. The smooth-bore guns were got rid of alto- 
 gether, and the steel breech-loaders substituted for them 
 were superior to the bronze muzzle-loaders of the French 
 artillery both in range and accuracy. The French 
 mitrailleuses, from which much was expected, proved 
 of less value than field guns. On the other hand the 
 needle-gun had only half the effective range of the 
 French chassepot, and its rate of fire was less by one- 
 third. The number of rounds carried by the Prussian 
 soldier was raised from 60 to 80 ; the French, whose rifle 
 was of smaller bore (-51 inch), carried 90 rounds. 
 
 Stotfel kept the French Government well informed of 
 all that was being done to improve the Prussian army, 
 in the light of the experience lately gained, and he 
 warned it that Prussia would prove a far more formi- 
 dable antagonist than Austria. At the same time Trochu 
 was trying to open the eyes of his fellow-countrymen to 
 the defects of the French military system.' Napoleon III. 
 was not blind to these defects, especially to the want of 
 reserves, and wished to follow the Prussian example of 
 three years' colour service. But his generals were against 
 changes which would sacrifice quality to quantity, and 
 his ministers insisted that the burden of military ser- 
 vice must not be more widely extended nor the cost 
 increased. 
 
 The new military law passed at the beginning of 1868 
 was a compromise. The term of service with the colours 
 was reduced from seven years to five, to be followed by 
 four years in the reserve. Exoneration by payment was 
 
 • L'armiefranniisc enimi. 
 
 K 
 
258 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 abandoned, but substitutes were allowed. Conscripts who 
 were not called up for service (either as exempt, or as 
 having drawn lucky numbers) were to be attached for 
 five years to the garde nationale mobile. This new 
 auxiliary force was meant to relieve the army of garrison 
 duty, but it was in no way comparable to the landwehr. 
 It would be practically, untrained, and no money was 
 voted for it. The law met with strong opposition in the 
 Chamber, and was described by Jules Favre as an attempt 
 to turn France into a barrack instead of a workshop. 
 It was reckoned that army and reserve together would 
 amount to 800,000 men, and the garde mobile would 
 add 400,000.1 
 
 Marshal Niel, the author of the new law, died in 1869, 
 and it had not had much effect when war was declared 
 (July 15, 1870). The emperor had been led to expect 
 that, however inferior in total numbers, he would have 
 the advantage at the outset, and could take the initiative ; 
 but the machinery of mobilisation worked so badly that 
 at the end of three weeks there were only 220,000 French 
 soldiers assembled on the eastern frontier.- By that time 
 three German armies had begun to cross it, and had 
 beaten the French at Worth and Spicheren (August 6). 
 They included the forces of the South German States, and 
 numbered nearly half a million. Behind them were such 
 ample reserves that in the course of the next six months 
 more than 600,000 men were able to follow them into 
 France. Bad generalship aggravated a situation which 
 was nearly hopeless from the first, and led to unexampled 
 disasters. More than :J00,000 French soldiers had become 
 prisoners of war within three months; the Imperial army 
 had practically disappeared. 
 
 But the question that concerns us here is, how did the 
 1 OUivier, x. 328. # ^ La Chapelle, p. 202, 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 259 
 
 German infantry compare with the French infantry ; and 
 the evidence hardly bears out Prince Hohonlohe's asser- 
 tion that the German is the most perfect infantry that 
 has yet been seen, or that can be imagined.^ The officers 
 were admirable in all respects ; the men compared favour- 
 ably with the French as regards order, discipline, and 
 patient endurance. But short-service soldiers are more 
 dependent than others on their officers, and (in Hoenig's 
 words) when the Germans lost their officers they lost their 
 heads. " Our national strength," says Meckel, " does not 
 lie in dispersion, where each man fights for himself. . . . 
 Though our soldier is accustomed in peace to careful 
 drill, strict discipline, and unconditional obedience, in 
 battle he is confused by disorder, and by the withdrawal 
 of his accustomed leaders. ... It is not so with soldiers 
 of the Latin races. Among them, the individual has more 
 self-consciousness, and a greater tendency to act for him- 
 .self. He does not regard his officer as a demi-god : he 
 likes to feel himself untrammelled and without a master." ^ 
 In all armies there are skulkers, but the German conscript 
 seems to have been more than usually prone to seek safety 
 in action by dropping into a ditch or furrow, or sneaking 
 oft" to the rear. 
 
 As the Frent-h had the better rifle, they had been told 
 to make the most of it; to dig shelter trenches, await the 
 enemy, and crush him by fire before attacking. This 
 made it necessary for the Germans to depart from the 
 defensive tactics which Mollke had recommended (p. 250), 
 to push in to the shorter ranges which suited their 
 weapon, and to utilise their superior numbers by operat- 
 ing on the enemy's flanks while holding him in front. 
 But Moltke had not changed his opinion. In the in- 
 
 > Letters on Infantry, p. 1. 
 
 2 A Summer-night's Dream {i'.H. Mayazinc, June 1890). 
 
26o THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 structions issued in 18G9 to commanding officers he said: 
 " There can be no question tliat the man who stands still 
 and fires has the advantage of the man who fires as he 
 moves forward ; that the ground is a help to the former, 
 an obstacle to the latter ; and that if excited elan is met 
 by steady tenacity, fire-effect, which has gained so much 
 in our days, will decide the issue. If we are able to take 
 up a position which the enemy is likely to attack, whether 
 for military or political reasons or from mere national 
 vanity, it seems thoroughly advisable to avail ourselves 
 of the advantages of the defensive before we assume the 
 oiTensive." 
 
 Worth was an example of the new French tactics. The 
 battle lasted ten hours and the result was for some time 
 doubtful, but fresh troops came up in the course of the 
 day which ultimately gave the Germans a superiority of 
 nearly three to one in infantry and more than three 
 to one in artillery. They were able to turn both flanks 
 of the French position while pressing it in front, 
 and Macmahon was at length driven from the field 
 with a loss of nearly half his army. The defence was 
 passive as a whole, but there were some brilliant local 
 counterstrokes. In the attack on Elsasshausen, for 
 instance, the historian of the Prussian 50th Regiment 
 records that "the fire became heavier, and a regiment 
 of Turcos (Algerians), firing and yelling, came bounding 
 through the smoke. This was too much for even Prussian 
 grenadiers, and away they all went, followed up by the 
 Turcos, towards a small knoll which stands 100 yards or 
 so north of the Niederwald. In vain the ofiBcers tried to 
 halt the men. Fortunately, at this moment, a battery of 
 artillery deployed upon the knoll, and a company in good 
 order took post alongside. The flying troops were halted, 
 and a murderous fire was poured into the pursuing 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 261 
 
 Turcos, who were within 60 yards of the guns. Their 
 chiirge was checked, and as they fled back the Prussians 
 resumed their advance on ELsasshausen." ' 
 
 Much of the fighting took place in the woods on each 
 flank, where the French, especially the Zouaves, showed 
 themselves, man for man, more than a match for the 
 Germans. In the centre, the French fighting line was 
 placed, not on the crest of the high ground, but on the 
 forward slope, in order to have a better field of fire over 
 the Sauer valley. Consequently it was exposed, and its 
 supports also, to the crushing tire of the German guns. 
 It was their assistance which enabled the German infantry 
 to gain ground, and come within ranges suited to their 
 weapon. The advance was commonly made in three 
 lines. "The first line, composed of about two-thirds of 
 the attacking force, moved forward in line of company 
 columns at deploying interval. When the enemy's fire 
 began to be felt, one-third (seventy rifles) of each company 
 was extended, while the remainder of the company, ad- 
 vancing in column of sections, formed the support and 
 reserve. The second line was almost always stronger 
 than the third line, and advanced either in line of 
 company columns, or in line of half battalion columns, 
 at deploying intervals ; but these columns nearly always 
 deployed and extended when they came under heavy 
 fire. In some cases there was no third line. ... It was 
 iiot till after a long and constantly fluctuating struggle, 
 swinging backwards and forwards, and swallowing up the 
 supports, the reserves, and in many cases, even the second 
 and third lines, that the Gorman companies were able 
 to establish themselves within 400 to ."lOO yards of the 
 enemy's front. This was the time when counter-attacks 
 were frequent, the attacking line being over and over 
 
 ' lUiideison, Wonl., p. 7.'.. 
 
262 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 again driven back with heavy losses, both in men and 
 in moral; and as a very general rule it was not until 
 the artillery came up in support to within 1200 to 900 
 yards of the defence that the fire - position could be 
 considered as definitely occupied." ^ 
 
 Even then it was usually necessary to attack the flanks 
 as well as the front in order to subdue the fire of the 
 defence suflaciently to admit of approach to closer quarters. 
 When this seemed to be secured, groups from the firing 
 line advanced and were joined by others, until at length 
 the whole body rushed forward to the assault. If the 
 time was ripe the defenders did not wait to cross bayonets, 
 but there were many instances of prematui-e assault. 
 
 Not only in the wood fighting, but in the more open 
 country, units were broken up and intermingled in the 
 course of the advance ; the conduct of the fight fell to the 
 company leaders, who were in some cases sergeants, in 
 others colonels or generals. It was a mass of disordered 
 battalions belonging to two different army corps that gave 
 way before the charge of the Turcos. This confusion and 
 absence of control were unavoidable under the new condi- 
 tions imposed by the breech-loader, but they were very 
 distasteful to many of the older officers, including King 
 William. He had refused to sanction a revision of the 
 drill-book (which dated from 1847) by the light of the 
 experience gained iii 18GG, and clung to mancBUvres in 
 battalion column as a necessary corrective of the tendency 
 to loose order.2 In the battle of Gravelotte (August 18) 
 the Prussian Guards paid the penalty of this conservatism. 
 
 Canrobert's corps, which was on the right of the French 
 
 array, held the village of St. Privat, and extended a mile 
 
 to the north of it. It was a solidly built village, with 
 
 walls and hedges on its outskirts, afibrding successive 
 
 ' Henclersuii, pp. 51-53. - Blume, p. 225. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 263 
 
 lines of tire. Towards evening three brigades of the Prus- 
 sian Guards were ordered to attack St. Privat, without 
 waiting for the turning movement which the Saxons were 
 carrying out to the north of them, or for artillery prepara- 
 tion. They had to cross more than a mile of gently rising 
 ground which aftbrded hardly any cover. Reckoning 
 themselves to be beyond the effective range of infantry 
 tire, they began their advance mainly in columns of half 
 battalions, with some company columns in front which 
 threw out skirmishers. The long range fire of the 
 French skirmish line, 600 yards west of the village, 
 inflicted serious losses on them from the first, and these 
 increased as they drew nearer. The columns soon lost 
 their cohesion, but struggled bravely onward in swarms, 
 until they reached the French skirmish line, and were 
 able to use their own rifles with effect against the troops 
 in the village. Beyond this they could make no progress 
 until the Saxons were ready to join them in a combined 
 assault from north and west, for which the fire of twenty- 
 four batteries had meanwhile paved the way. 
 
 The final assault did not cost many men, for the French 
 were falling back ; but the Guards lost 30 per cent, of their 
 strength altogether, and one battalion lost 55 per cent.i 
 More than half the ofiicers were killed or wounded, and in 
 the case of the mounted ofiicers the proportion was much 
 higher. Some idea of the storm of fire to which they 
 were exposed is given by the fact that Canrobert's infantry 
 expended in two days' fighting (August IG and 1 8) nearly 
 two miUion cartridges, which was the total expenditure of 
 the Prussians in the war of 1860. 
 
 While the Guards were attacking St. Privat two other 
 corps attacked the left of the French army, which was on 
 high ground separated from Gravelotte by the wooded 
 
 1 Balck, p. 28. 
 
264 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 ravine of the Mance. This ravine, of which the Germans 
 had ah'eady gained possession, gave them cover to within 
 half a mile of the French fighting line; and there had 
 been no reply to the preliminary cannonade by the German 
 batteries near Gravelotte. The conditions seemed favour- 
 able; but when the infantry issued from the woods and 
 came within short range, " they suddenly found that the 
 French artillery and mitrailleuses had by no means been 
 silenced — about two hundred pieces opening on them 
 with fearful effect, while at the same time the whole crest 
 blazed with a deadly fire from the chas«e2K>t rifles. Re- 
 sistance like this was so unexpected by the Germans that 
 it dismayed them; and first wavering a moment, then 
 becoming panic-stricken, they broke and fled, infantry, 
 cavalry, and artillery coming down the slope without any 
 pretence of formation, the French hotly following and 
 pouring in a heavy and constant fire as the fugitives fled 
 back across the ravine towards Gravelotte." ' 
 
 " It would have been better," says Moltke drily, " if the 
 chief of the general staff, who was on the spot, had not 
 allowed this advance so late in the day." - All that he had 
 written about the difEculty of attacking troops well armed 
 and well posted must have come vividly home to him. 
 But the time had come when he was at length able to 
 combine offensive strategy with defensive tactics, and 
 when the Germans were to get the benefit of the breech- 
 loader's efficacy to check an advancing enemy. The world 
 was surprised to see a French army of 150,000 men shut 
 up in Mctz, and starved into surrender, by a German army 
 which was not much larger and was spread over a circuit 
 of nearly thirty miles. But this investment line, long and 
 thinly manned as it was, had no Hanks to be turned ; its 
 strength was quickly increased by field intrenchi 
 ' Sheridau, ii. 375. - Kiieg von 1870-71, p. ! 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 265 
 
 the French troops could not be massed to attack any 
 one section of it without warning, and the forces at the 
 threatened point could hold their own long enough to 
 allow reinforcements to come up. It was not an iron 
 ring but an elastic band, which yielded to some extent to 
 the assailant's efforts, but clung round his flanks. It was 
 not severely tested, for Bazaine's attempts to break out 
 were little more than formal. 
 
 The battle of Sedan (September 1) was practically a 
 case of the same kind. The Germans enveloped the 
 French army so completely that they had no need to 
 drive their attack home. Their task was in the main to 
 resist the efforts of the French to escape from a hopeless 
 position, and to keep them exposed to a crushing artillery 
 fire. The gallant charges of GalliSet's cavalry had no 
 result except their own destruction. They confirmed what 
 Moltke had written in 186!) : " Infantry in good order 
 need fear no cavalry attack, so long as it keeps cool. That 
 is far more important than its formation, which only 
 matters so far as it heightens its sense of security." * 
 Already in 1866 the Prussian infantry had been told not 
 to form square to resist cavalry.'- 
 
 Bredow's brigade showed at Vionville (August 16) how 
 much might be done by the well-timed charge of six 
 squadrons. It not only served its purpose — to gain breath- 
 ing space for Alvensleben's infantry — but it put ten 
 French batteries out of action for the rest of the day. 
 The batteries, however, were exposed on a ridge with only 
 three companies of chasseurs as a guard for them. The 
 ground allowed Bredow to approach under cover, and to 
 charge through the line of guns when some batteries were 
 in the act of relieving others. There was a regiment of 
 infantry (three battalions) on the reverse slope behind the 
 
 ' Moltke, p. 200. 2 lloheiilulie, p. 2oU. 
 
266 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 batteries ; but it was already shaken, and the flying guns 
 and limbers broke through it, opening the way for the 
 German lancers and cuirassiers.^ 
 
 In the People's war which followed on the collapse of 
 the Empire and the Imperial army, Gambetta did all that 
 one man could to repeat the achievements of 1794, but he 
 was not able to organise victory like Carnot. He had to 
 do with a single power and a set purpose, instead of a 
 half-hearted coalition. It was not a fight between a nation 
 and an army, but a fight between two armed nations, one 
 trained, the other untrained. The Government of National 
 Defence had half a million of men at its disposal in Sep- 
 tember,^ but not much more than half of them could be 
 called soldiers. Towards the end of the year the total 
 rose to a million, but as Moltke wrote to his brother 
 November 23), " an armed crowd is very far from being 
 an army, and it is brutal to lead such men into battle." In 
 his anxiety to save Paris, Gambetta could not wait to orga- 
 nise or discipline his improvised corps ; he hurried them 
 forward imperfectly equipped on disconnected enterprises. 
 
 At Bapaume (January 3, 1871) 40,000 French found 
 themselves unable to dislodge 15,000 Germans, and at St. 
 Quentin (January 19) they were themselves driven from 
 their positions by 33,000 Germans. At Beaune la Rolande 
 (November 28) 11,000 Germans held their ground for 
 several hours against 60,000 French, and at Loigny-Pouppry 
 (December 1, 2) less than 40,000 Germans repulsed and 
 completely defeated 100,000 French. When Bourbaki 
 marched to the relief of Belfort with more than 100,000 
 men, Werder, who had only 42,000 (of which half were 
 landwehr), telegraphed for instructions whether he should 
 raise the siege. It trammelled his movements, obliged 
 
 » SevuecfBistoircxiii. 170-190. 
 2 lb., xxvi. 341-346. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 267 
 
 him to extend his force too much, and exposed him to 
 attack in rear, so that defeat would mean disaster. The 
 answer came promptly from headquarters that he was not 
 to raise the siege, and the three days' fighting on the 
 Lisaine (January 15-17) justified the decision. 
 
 The broad result of the lessons of 1870 is stated as 
 follows by a German infantry officer: "No volleys in 
 battle ; no, or at least very few, attacks by troops in close 
 order ; great deployments of skirmishers on both sides ; 
 long-continued gradually advancing musketry fights, often 
 rolling backwards and forwards; at last, the flank of one 
 party turned, or else one side exhausted ; the other side 
 pressing on in consequence, or a rush of dense clouds of 
 skirmishers who endeavour at any price to dislodge their 
 opponents, not forgetful that in case of failure and retreat 
 they are dead men. On both sides great dispersion, inter- 
 mingling of troops, particularly in broken ground ; hence 
 the leader's control diminished." ' 
 
 William I. and his advisers were unwiUing to accept this 
 loss of control. They tried to combine the older method 
 with the new, and continued to look to the coming up of 
 the second line in solid formation to decide the action. 
 The revised drill-book, issued in 1873, showed no sub- 
 stantial change in this respect. The French Regulations 
 for manceuvrcs, issued m 1875, took fuller account of 
 recent experience. They recognised that bodies of troops 
 must be broken up into small units and extended when 
 they came within the zone of effective fire ; that fire must 
 be the chief means of action ; and that the skirmish fight, 
 instead of being merely preparatory, must be carried 
 through to the end. The fighting lino would advance 
 by rushes up to the critical stage, being fed from the rear 
 as it moved forward ; after sufficient preparation, it would 
 
 1 Boguslawski, p. S8. 
 
268 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 be joined by the reserves, and would try to storm the 
 position. Both in France and Germany the balance of 
 opinion was strongly in favour of offensive tactics. 
 
 The Russo-Turkish war of 1877 gave fresh means of 
 judging of the effect of rifled breech-loaders. The Turks 
 were inferior in numbers and organisation, but they had a 
 better rifle than that with which the greater part of the 
 Russian iafantry was armed, and they had also a bettor 
 fleld gun. As they fought mostly on the defensive, they 
 derived the full advantage from their weapons. Of many 
 examples the best are to be found in the fighting round 
 Plevna. 
 
 A force of 9000 Russians was sent to occupy Plevna, an 
 open town which was the meetmg point of many roads, 
 and was within 50 miles of the Russian bridge over the 
 Danube. On arriving there (July 19) it found 15,000 
 Turks in possession, for Osman Pasha had arrived from 
 Widdin a few hours before. The Russians attacked next 
 day, but were repulsed with a loss of one-third of their 
 men. Ten days afterwards (July 30) the attack was 
 renewed by 32,000 men. By that time Osman had 20,000, 
 and he had made redoubts and intrenchments on the hills 
 surrounding the town. After some very severe fighting 
 the Russians were again repulsed, with a loss of 7000 
 men. 
 
 The Russian pride and prestige were deeply touched by 
 these failures, and it was felt that no effort must be spared 
 to wipe them out. The Roumanians were called upon to 
 help, and they contributed one-third of the 100,000 men 
 who were brought together for the purpose in the early 
 part of September. But the positions were now much 
 stronger, for the Turks were indefatigable in adding to 
 their works. " An infectious desire, which never relaxed 
 till Plevna fell, seized the soldiers to dig: themselves in 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 269 
 
 like moles." ' The trenches were so made as to aftbrd 
 successive tiers of fire, and 500 cartridges were provided 
 for each man. The orders were : " As soon as you know 
 or suppose the enemy to be within range of your rifles, 
 cover the space presumably occupied by him, or presum- 
 ably to be traversed by him, with quick fire, independent 
 of distance, duration, ditiiculty of aim, probability of 
 hitting, and consumption of cartridges." - The positions 
 formed a horse-shoe, IG miles in circuit, and open towards 
 the west. Convoys and reinforcements had come in, bring- 
 ing up the Turkish numbers to 30,000. They had only 70 
 guns, while the Russians had 440, including 24 siege pieces. 
 The assault was to be made on three sides, like the 
 previous one. The right wing, 24,000 men, was directed 
 against the Grivitza redoubt, which formed the eastern 
 end of the northern defences : the centre, 25,000 men, was 
 to attack the works covering Plevna on the south-east ; 
 and the left, 15,000 men, was to advance from the south. 
 Four days were spent in cannonading the Turkish positions, 
 but with small result, though there was great expenditure 
 of ammunition. During these days the left wing gained 
 ground, and established itself on the Green Hills, south- 
 west of Plevna. The three attacks were meant to be 
 simultaneous, at 3 p.m. on September 1 1 ; but circum- 
 stances made them successive. Skobeleff', who commanded 
 on the left, became engaged in the morning, fought all day, 
 and by evening had taken two works on the outskirts of 
 Plevna. The sound of the firing caused two regiments in 
 the centre to attack prematurely. They were repulsed 
 with heavy loss, and renewed attempts by other regiments 
 had no better success. On the right, the Grivitza redoubt 
 was stormed, but did not prove (as it was suppo.sed to be) 
 the key of Plevna. This was the only fruit of the day's 
 
 ' Herbert, p. 210. ■ lb., p. 281. 
 
270 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 work, which cost the Russians and Roumanians 18,000 
 men ; for Skobeleff, after holding his ground heroically for 
 nearly twenty-four hours, was obliged to fall back to his 
 former position for want of support. 
 
 The unprecedented rain of bullets to which the assail- 
 ants were exposed was one cause of their failure. It 
 began when they were still a mile from the works, and 
 caused them serious loss, even when they were hidden 
 from view by the ground. But their own tactics contri- 
 buted to their defeat. The attacks were disconnected, 
 and where (as in Skobeleff's case) they met with some 
 success, reinforcements were not furnished to secure what 
 had been won. The successful troops found that they had 
 entered the enemy's positions m the form of a wedge, 
 and were exposed to concentric fire from three sides. 
 There were few sappers, and the infantry had thrown 
 away their tools, so that they had to use bayonets and 
 mess tins for intrenching the positions they took. 
 
 The normal attack formation of the Russians was two 
 lines of company columns preceded by skirmishers; but 
 the columns of the second hne soon closed up with the 
 first, and presented large targets to the enemy. Their 
 close order, while adding to their casualties, did not serve 
 to develop a crushing fire in reply. Kuropatkin (who 
 was Skobeleff's chief staff officer) says : " Even when we 
 had arrived within 600 paces of the enemy we made but 
 little use of our rifles, and attempted to advance without 
 firing a shot, without taking advantage of the natural 
 cover which the ground afforded. " ^ 
 
 Skobeleff's own opinion, as expressed after the battle, 
 was: "The only formation in which troops can success- 
 fully assault intrenched positions is in successive lines 
 of skirmishers. The division general must be perfectly 
 ' K.E. Occasional Papers, v. 140. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 271 
 
 thoughtless of his own comfort and safety, and post him- 
 self between the skirmishers and the reserve, where he 
 can feel the pulse of the battle and have his troops in his 
 own hand, and judge himself of the moment when the 
 successive battalions in reserve should be sent forward. 
 . . . The reserves must be sent in at the moment when 
 the reasonably brave men have been long enough engaged, 
 and have met with sufficient resistance to begin to feel 
 nervous, but before they have actually begun to retreat ; 
 and it is in deciding upon the opportune moment for 
 sending forward his reserves that the art of a division 
 commander consists." ' 
 
 It was in this way that he succeeded where others 
 failed. His men had to advance over 1100 yards of 
 falling ground covered with vines, to cross a brook, and 
 mount a steep slope of a quarter of a mile, in order to 
 reach the Kazanlik redoubts. He sent forward eight 
 battalions which got as far as the brook ; a reinforcement 
 of fifteen fresh companies carried them half-way up the 
 slope; twenty companies more brought them nearly to 
 the upper redoubt, but a counter-attack checked them. 
 Then Skobelefl', having used up his reserves, rode forward 
 himself, and by his personal stimulus captured the work.^ 
 In winning and holding this part of the Turkish defences 
 the loss of his infantry was 40 per cent. 
 
 After the third failure it was decided, by Todlebcn's 
 advice, to treat Piuvna as a fortress, invest it on all sides, 
 and starve the defenders out. For several weeks the road 
 to the west was still open, and the Turks might have 
 retreated on Sofia; but Osman had orders to stay at 
 Plevna at any cost. Reinforcements were sent to him, 
 but they only shortened his resistance. By December 10 
 his provisions were exhausted, and his attempt to cut his 
 ' H.E. Occasional Papers, V. 134. - Kuropatkin, i. 382. 
 
272 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 way out inevitably failed. He was forced to surrender, 
 with 40,000 men. The Turkish soldiers, so stubborn in 
 defence, are said to have lacked dash in attack, but their 
 cheerful endurance of hardships was exemplary. 
 
 In spite of the final catastrophe, for which Osman was 
 not responsible, Plevna was a striking example of the 
 combination of the strategical offensive with the tactical 
 defensive. The impression made on Skobeleff led him 
 to say that " if the French armies in the second period 
 of the war of 1870-71 had kept strictly to the plan 
 of occupying strategic positions (directed by preference 
 against the lines of communication), combining with this 
 a strictly defensive system of tactics, assisted by field 
 fortifications, the campaign would have had a result more 
 favourable for the French." ^ 
 
 He and others did their best to induce the Russians 
 after the war to develop fire tactics and rely less on the 
 bayonet. But they met with strong opposition from 
 Dragomirov, a forcible and indefatigable writer, who had 
 taught tactics, had witnessed the campaigns of 1859 and 
 1866, and had commanded a division with distinction in 
 1877. He insisted that national character must be taken 
 into account : " The conclusions of the Prussians must 
 not be applied to our men, who are well known to prefer 
 fighting shoulder to shoulder." He urged that improve- 
 ments in small arms are always followed by a recrudes- 
 cence of defensive tactics, and by schemes for avoiding 
 loss in attack ; but the principles of tactics are substan- 
 tially what they were, and Russian leaders should still 
 look to Souvorov as their guide. Good troops should 
 not indulge in long-distance lead-pumping ; they should 
 husband their cartridges and fire volleys. An attack 
 once launched should be resolutely carried through : 
 
 1 Report of September If), 1877. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 273 
 
 what the bullet cannot do tlie bayonet will. This is 
 the only means of findinj^' out whether a position is 
 really held in force. The greatest pains should be taken 
 to develop the sense of duty as well as the intelligence of 
 the soldier, to make him skilful in the use of rifle and 
 bayonet, and eager to close with the enemy. Such was 
 the substance of his teaching, which commended itself 
 to the national sentiment.' 
 
 In France there was a reaction in the same direction, 
 partly owing to the influence of Dragomirov. The 
 Instructions of 1875 were charged with looking too 
 exclusively to fire effect, and lacking the spirit of the 
 offensive. New instructions were issued in 1884, and 
 were modified several times in the next ten years. In 
 these it was laid down that, if an attack was not a mere 
 demonstration, the main thing was to get forward, and 
 fire was only a means to it. The function of supports 
 and reserves was to sustain the forward movement rather 
 than to increase the intensity of the fire. The normal 
 interval between the files of the chain of skii-mishers 
 wa.s reduced from six paces to three; the supports were 
 suppressed, and the reserves brought nearer to the fighting 
 hne. The final charge would be made by men practically 
 shoulder to shoulder and in two ranks, one section of each 
 half company being behind the other. VoUey firing by 
 sections was recommended for the fighting line, though 
 the French had always preferred independent tiring, 
 and Napoleon had declared it was the only kind of fire 
 practicable in war.- 
 
 In Germany the prevailing current was m the opposite 
 direction, though equal stress was laid on a vigorous 
 offensive. The Infantry Exercise issued in 1888, on 
 the accession of William II., definitely recognised for 
 
 > R.r.fl./. Journal, xxxii. 98r>. - Thiry, pp. 34-101. 
 
274 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 the first time that " the fight is commenced, and in 
 most cases carried through to the end, in extended 
 order." i To maintam the density of the. fighting line 
 and its full fire action, the front of a company should 
 not much exceed 100 metres (or about two men per 
 yard). The advance by rushes should only be resorted 
 to when the enemy's fire made it imperative, and then 
 one portion of the fighting line should keep up its fire 
 to cover the advance of the other portion. When short 
 range had been reached, and the final assault had been 
 sufficiently prepared, closed bodies from the rear would 
 join the fighting line and carry it on with them. The 
 laying down of definite rules for the execution of an 
 attack was prohibited, and stress was laid on developiiag 
 the initiative and alertness of the subordinate officers and 
 of the men. The latter must be trained to fire-discipline, 
 for volleys were regarded in Germany as things of the past. 
 As regards the closed bodies above mentioned, it was 
 soon recognised that even company columns were in- 
 admissible under fire, and in a few years nothing was 
 to be seen at German manojuvres but lines upon lines 
 of deployed skirmishers.- Another method of advance 
 which found favour at long ranges was by sections or 
 squads in fours or in file.-' These " snakes " or " worms," 
 with wide intervals between them, would suffer less than 
 line or column from artillery fire, and could make their 
 way better through woods and obstacles. How to get 
 men forward in sufficient strength to prevail without 
 incurring prohibitory losses, and how to direct and 
 control them when extended, were knotty questions, 
 and their difficulty was aggravated by the adoption of 
 smokeless powder, magazine rifles, and quick-firing guns. 
 
 ' Part li.. para. 19. - R.E. Occasional Papers, xix. .W. 
 
 » Balck, p. 322. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 275 
 
 It was the needs of naval warfare, the defence of ships 
 against torpedo boats, that led to the development of 
 these novelties; but they were soon turned to account, 
 not only for coast batteries and fortresses, but also for 
 service in the field. Magazine rifles of small bore (threo- 
 tenths of an inch) were issued to the German infantry 
 in 1890-91, and other countries followed suit. They not 
 only gave the means of very rapid fire at need, but they 
 had greater range, accuracy, and penetration, a flatter 
 trajectory, and lighter ammunition. They could send 
 their bullets 3000 yards, which was not nmch short of 
 the efi'ective range of shrapnel, so that the rifle threatened 
 to overtake the field gun. It was the wish to keep 
 outside the rifle fire of the Turks, armed with a weapon 
 of less range, that had made the Russian artillery so 
 inefi'ective at Plevna. 
 
 But the smokeless powder which gave the magazine 
 rifle its value lent itself to correspondmg progress in gun- 
 making. The strain on the gun was less, so that for a 
 given weight higher velocity and longer range could be 
 obtained. Absence of smoke allowed the rate of fire to be 
 increased from three rounds to thirty rounds a minute. The 
 new type guns were of various calibres, and it was found that 
 pieces much heavier and much lighter than the ordinary 
 1 ."i-pounder field gun could be taken into the field. Field 
 howitzers firing oO-lb. shells charged with high explosives 
 were introduced, and shrapnel was made more effective. 
 
 The French had adopted universal service in 1872, and 
 in 1889 the term of service with the colours was reduced 
 from five years to three. By 1900 the number of their 
 battalions hud been doubled, the number of their field 
 batteries trebled. The war strength of the French army 
 rose to nearly two millions, or including the territorial 
 army to four millions, of trained men. The other great 
 
276 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 continental powers increased their forces correspondingly ; 
 and it became evident that in future battles would be on 
 a much larger scale, and prolonged perhaps for several 
 days. Ammunition trains had to be considerably in- 
 creased to moot the needs of the new guns and rifles. 
 Smokeless powder helped the defenders to conceal their 
 numbers and position, while long-range weapons hindered 
 staff" oflicers from reconnoitring or from carrying orders 
 to troops engaged. It was not easy, therefore, for a 
 general to plan the battle beforehand, or to regulate it 
 when once begun. The risks of frontal attack by day 
 turned attention to night operations, and to wide envelop- 
 ing movements which would take time. Mobility became 
 more important than ever, though there was likely to be 
 little scope for the use of lance or sabre. The dismounted 
 action of cavalry, the employment of mounted infantry 
 and of cyclists became pressing questions. 
 
 The war in South Africa, which began in 1899, threw 
 light on many of the points on which speculation had 
 been active. It also threw light on the question how far 
 the professional soldier retains his old pre-eminence over 
 "men with muskets." In 1848 Sir Harry Smith, with 
 six companies of infantry and two squadrons of Cape 
 rifles, had routed 1000 Boers at Boomplaats. In 1881 the 
 British had met with mortifying reverses, and in expla- 
 nation of them Sir George Colley wrote : " The want of 
 good mounted troops told very heavily against us, and 
 our soldiers are not as trained skirmishers and shots as 
 the majority of theae Boers, who from their childhood 
 have lived in the country, and to a great extent by their 
 guns, and are used to stalking and shooting deer." ' 
 
 It was known that the Boers had increased in number, 
 1 Butler, p. 318. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 277 
 
 and had provided themselves amply with guns, rifles, 
 and ammunition of the latest type; but it was reckoned 
 that the Transvaal and Orange Free State could not 
 muster more than about 50,000 burghers, ranging from 
 sixteen to sixty years of age, and unused to war. When 
 the British Government decided to send out an army 
 corps, bringing up the forces in South Africa to 70,000 
 men, it was thought to be doing more than was needed : 
 " Against such an array of bayonets, sabres, and carmon, 
 what can General Joubert's half-trained mob of irregulars 
 expect to accomplish ? " ' The force was in fact the largest 
 that Great Britain had ever sent ofi'. 
 
 The war lasted two years and a half, and it is now 
 reckoned that the total of those who fought on the Boer 
 side (including foreigners and Cape Colony rebels) was 
 not much short of 90,000 ; but it is doubtful whether more 
 than half of them were in arms at any one time. On the 
 British side, the regular troops employed amounted to a 
 quarter of a million, and the auxiliaries to nearly 200,000, 
 including colonial corps. The offers of the colonies were 
 at tirst accepted as a mere form : their contingents were 
 to be mainly infantry, and the total was put at less than 
 2.">00 men. But soon there was a cry for mounted men, 
 and the colonial corps rose to 29,000 men, besides 50,000 
 men raised in South Africa. 
 
 The war passed through three phases, which to some 
 extent overlapped : the Boer invasion of British territory, 
 the British invasion of the Free State and the Transvaal, 
 the guerilla war directed against the British network of 
 occupation. It had been thought that 15,000 men would 
 be enough to protect Natal, but the action at Lombard's 
 Kop (October 30) dispelled this belief. Sir George White 
 found that to defend himself at Ladysmith was as nuich 
 
 ' SlandaM, October II, 189il. 
 
278 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 as he could do ; and he was shut in there for four months, 
 in spite of the efforts of a relieving array which gradually 
 rose to some 35,000 men. Yet the Boer forces in Natal at 
 no time exceeded 27,000, and were latterly much less. The 
 British failures (Colenso, Spion Kop, Vaal Krantz) were 
 attempts to drive a wedge into the enemy's positions, so 
 that the assailants were enveloped instead of enveloping. 
 It was only when the situation was reversed that success 
 was attained. To account for the British tactics, after 
 making all allowances for the character of the ground and 
 the mobility of the Boers, we must fall back on the fact 
 noted by Colley that the British infantry soldier was no 
 match for the Boer as a skirmisher. 
 
 The men themselves knew it. " The astuteness and 
 adaptability of their invisible foe, how cleverly he fought 
 in all shapes, how rarely he committed himself, how rarely 
 he was at a loss, were subjects of frequent discussion 
 amongst them, and one heard more than one surmise as 
 to what would happen ' if we were allowed to scatter over 
 the country like the Boers do ! ' Poor fellows, the pro- 
 position was usually succeeded by a thoughtful silence, 
 and a helpless look which augured ill for comfort in the 
 verdict. Once a man actually and boldly averred what 
 all had in their minds: 'They've got more brains nor 
 we ! ' and the announcement was not negatived by his 
 comrades." * 
 
 Their officers came to recognise that precision of drill 
 may be even detrimental, and that in the form of intelli- 
 gence required on the battle-field the town-bred European 
 soldier is as far behind the natural man of the hills and 
 plains as he is in hardiness and keenness of sight.- Usually 
 the balance is more than redressed by the difterence of 
 equipment, but that was not the case in South Africa. 
 
 1 ■' Liuesmau," p. oil. - May, p. 68. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 379 
 
 Consequently "in situation after situation where our 
 soldiers were helpless the Boers were perfectly at home. 
 It was this which made one Boer equal to three freshly 
 landed British soldiers in everything except those hammer 
 and tongs fights which, in such a war, are quite excep- 
 tional." ' 
 
 The last remark touches the weak point of the Boers. 
 They were as a rule careful of their skins ; they had no 
 bayonets, and disliked coming to close quarters. There 
 was so little discipline and subordination among them 
 that each man practically did as he pleased, and it was 
 useless for the leader to give orders which his men disap- 
 proved. This accounted for their want of enterprise in 
 the first months of the war, for the failure of the assault 
 on Ladysmith (January G, 1900), and for the purely 
 passive character of their defence. On the other hand 
 the British infantiy never showed more courage and 
 discipline than in returning again and again to the assault 
 of positions from which they were shot down by an unseen 
 enemy. Smokeless powder was a godsend to the Boers. 
 They could keep themselves and their guns hidden ; and 
 their schanzes were so cunningly made that " a keen-eyed 
 man could approach within a few yards of them without 
 detecting that a stone had been moved." - 
 
 In the second phase of the war the open country of the 
 Free State allowed cavalry and artillery to be of more 
 service to the infantry. Of the 45,000 men with whom 
 Lord Roberts advanced from Bloemfontein on Pretoria, 
 three-tenths were cavalry or mounted infantry. This 
 enabled him to march on a broad front, and to turn the 
 enemy's flank. As he reported in the case of the Zand 
 river (May 10), " they occupied a position twenty miles in 
 length ; ours was necessarily longer." By these tactics he 
 
 ■ Hamilton, i. 5. * Pilcher, p. 18. 
 
28o THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 forced the Boers back, and reached Pretoria with small 
 loss, having marched 250 miles and crossed three rivers 
 in a month. 
 
 The mounted troops to whom his success was largely- 
 due did most of their fighting on foot, seizing points of 
 vantage and holding them, and so gaining time for the 
 infantry. Great hopes had been built on the shock action 
 of the cavalry, but little came of it. At Elandslaagte 
 (October 21, 1899) two squadrons charged twice through 
 a stream of retreating Boers with good effect ; but under 
 similar circumstances elsewhere {e.g. at Karree siding, 
 March 29, 1900) the Boers showed so bold a front that the 
 cavalry, though in a position to charge, forbore to do so. 
 Perhaps the most successful stroke of horse was made by 
 Bushmen and New Zealandors forming the advanced 
 guard of Babington's column (March 23, 1901); .50 Boers 
 were killed and wounded, and 140 were made prisoners 
 with two guns, &c. These colonial horsemen had not 
 the discipline of regular troops, but they had the " disci- 
 pline of enthusiasm " under a leader whom they trusted, 
 and they had many of the Boer characteristics.^ 
 
 In the last phase of the war the Boers had no longer 
 any fixed points to guard, and could turn their mobility 
 and knowledge of the country to full account. They 
 could act in large bands or small. Their numbers had 
 shrunk to some 20,000, but those who still kept the field 
 were more apt for the offensive strokes which were now 
 their only resource. In dealing with mobile columns of 
 mounted men they developed a bold method of attack. 
 Takmg advantage of mist or rain, they came down on 
 the columns at a gallop in very open order, with loud 
 cries, and shootmg from the saddle. Sometimes they 
 succeeded in spreading a scare, and bursting into the 
 
 ' Abbott, pp. 9, 84. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 281 
 
 midst of the escort overpowered its units in detail. If 
 they were met by a steady fire they dismounted, took 
 cover, and tried to push their attack on foot. In so 
 doing, they would make extensive detours to avoid 
 ground where they would be exposed. If it could not 
 be avoided they crossed it by creeping, or by making 
 rushes of ten or twenty paces, singly or by twos and 
 threes. They formed groups of which one fired while 
 the other advanced, and so they gained ground alternately. 
 " The carrying out of the advance entirely rested with the 
 individual Boers ; commandants and field cornets merely 
 started the commandoes." ^ 
 
 It was a disconcerting novelty to the British to find 
 heavy long-range guns (even 6-inch) brought into the 
 field against them, and the Boers handled them with 
 surprising ease. The etfect was mainly moral, but the 
 British made haste to provide themselves with pieces 
 of corresponding range (up to 10,000 yards). The suc- 
 cess of the innovation, however, depended on the skill 
 of the Boers as skirmishers, which enabled them to 
 check pursuit, and give time for the removal of the 
 guns when it became necessary. The Greeks had tried 
 a similar experiment in Thessaly in 1897, but lost all 
 their gims.- The Boers also set the example, which 
 the British followed, of using one-pounder quick-firers 
 (pompoms) in the field. Though their shell-power was 
 insignificant, their mobility and rapid fire made them 
 formidable. The 50-lb. lyddite shells of the British 
 howitzers fell short of expectations, as there was seldom 
 a good target for them, and the Boers had " no nerves." 
 The expenditure of ammunition in this war was very 
 large, especially of small-arm ammunition. On the 
 British side it amounted to sixty-six million rounds, 
 
 I It.U.S.I. JourmJ, xlvi. iifio. - Calhvell, ij. 121. 
 
282 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 more than twice the expenditure of the Germans in 
 1870-71. 
 
 The war in South Africa was of so exceptional a kind 
 that large allowance had to be made for the local 
 conditions. But British officers brought home with 
 them some general conclusions, based on the weapons 
 used : that the extension of infantry in attack must be 
 carried much further than had been thought necessary 
 hitherto ; that discipline must become less mechanical 
 and more intelligent, " the discipline of a well-trained 
 pack of hounds ; " ' that to master the tire of the defence, 
 even if a position was thinly held, was exceedingly diffi- 
 cult, and that envelopment was almost indispensable 
 for success ; that guns should not be massed, and should 
 be hidden ; that mounted troops were more needed than 
 ever, but their mobility and their fire-action were the 
 things to be studied. The adoption of khaki for the 
 normal dress of the soldier, the substitution of " Infantry 
 Training " for " Infantry Drill," were significant of the 
 change that had come over the British army. A short- 
 ened rifle was adopted for cavalry and infantry alike, 
 superseding the cavalry carbine, and the artillery was 
 rearmed with a quick-firing field gun of greater range. 
 
 Abroad opinion was divided. There was much opposi- 
 tion in Germany to views that would aggravate the diffi- 
 culty of handling large masses of men on the battle-field, 
 and would not square with the great cavalry charges 
 which were a favourite feature at German manoeuvres. 
 It was argued that the war had really taught nothing 
 new, nothing to affect the principles of the existing 
 Regulations. It had been " a fight between rigid system 
 and free, sound, common sense." As a fact, there was 
 nothing peculiarly rigid in the British methods of using 
 1 Henderson, Science of War, p. 410. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 283 
 
 infantry and artillery : they had been much the same 
 as those of continental armies, and had been quickly 
 adapted to the new conditions. Nevertheless the German 
 staff preferred to take the view that "it was not the 
 suiall-bore rifle and smokeless powder nor the loss of 
 men (which was comparatively small) that caused such 
 shrinking from frontal attacks : it was the misgivings of 
 the leaders about their own capacity, and consequently 
 the shaken confidence of the troops in their leaders." ^ 
 
 In France there was less self-complacency. General de 
 Negrier wrote forcibly on the lessons of the war. New 
 regulations for infantry were issued in 1902 and 1904, 
 which aimed at simplification and the development of 
 initiative. Captains of companies were given a freer 
 hand, and leaders of sections were entrusted with fire 
 control. A system of advance by groups was substituted 
 for the chain of skirmishers. 
 
 The Russo-Japanese war threw fresh light on these 
 vexed questions. Here the combatants were not so un- 
 equal as Briton and Boer, yet the disparity was great. 
 Russia had three times the population of Japan, five 
 times as many soldiers, and seven times the revenue. 
 But the seat of war, withiia easy reach of Japan, was 
 4000 miles from Russia ; and though the single line of 
 rails which formed the only connection did far more 
 than was expected of it, the strength of Russia could be 
 exerted only slowly and partially. When the war began, 
 in February 1904, there were only 150,000 Russian soldiers 
 in Manchuria, and they had to guard and garrison two 
 naval bases 900 miles apart. Command of the sea was 
 vital to the Japanese. They were much below the 
 Russians in naval strength, all told ; and their first busi- 
 ness was to take or destroy the squadron in Port Arthur 
 
 ' KrieyiijcicluchUiclun £{n-^dschriftcn, Nos. 34-35, p. 171. 
 
284 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 before it should be joined by other ships from Europe. 
 Consequently the war hinged, hke that in the Crimea 
 fifty years before, on the siege of a coast fortress. 
 
 The first Japanese army, after occupying Korea, forced 
 the passage of the Yalu (May 1) and threatened Liao- 
 yang, the Russian headquarters. Shortly afterwards a 
 second army landed in the Liao-tung peninsula, and drove 
 the garrison of Port Arthur back upon the fortress. Two 
 divisions were left to besiege it, and grew into a third 
 army ; four marched northward and defeated a Russian 
 force which was advancing to its relief (Telissu, June 
 15). The siege of Port Arthur lasted seven months, and 
 of 150,000 Japane.se soldiers who took part in it, nearly 
 half were killed or wounded. Meanwhile, the first and 
 second armies, with a fourth army as a link between 
 them, held the main Russian army in check. They even 
 forced it to abandon Liao-yang (September 4), and fall 
 back on Mukden. In October, reinforcements having 
 raised the Russian army to more than 200,000 men, it 
 took the offensive, and tried to roll up the Japanese 
 right. While the troops held their ground there as best 
 they could, the Japanese centre and left made a vigorous 
 counter-attack, and the Russians retired to their old 
 positions on the Sha-ho, having lost more than 40,000 
 men (October 9 to IS). 
 
 The surrender of Port Arthur (January 1, 1905) set the 
 third Japanese army free to join the others, and a fifth 
 army was sent from Japan, raising the force at Marshal 
 Oyama's disposal to more than 300,000. The Russian 
 forces were by this time quite as large, and before the 
 additional troops could come up the Russians took the 
 offensive again, striking at the Japanese left. The attack 
 met with some success, but was not supported by de- 
 monstrations elsewhere, and ultimately failed (Sandepu, 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 285 
 
 January 2(i to 29). In another month the Japanese were 
 ready for a general advance, which at first threatened 
 the Russian left, but really aimed at enveloping the 
 right. A battle which lasted a fortnight, and extended 
 over a front of more than 100 miles, ended in the 
 abandonment of Mukden by the Russians (March 10) 
 and their retreat northward with a loss of nearly one- 
 third of their number. The annihilation of the Baltic; 
 fleet off Tsushima (May 27, 28) finally settled the 
 question of sea-command, and was soon followed by 
 negotiations for peace. 
 
 The prolonged resistance of Port Arthur and the 
 admirable working of the Siberian railway had made it 
 a fairly even duel between Russians and Japanese in the 
 valley of the Liao, and in each phase of it the Russians 
 had been worsted. Their commander-in-chief. General 
 Kuropatkm, the sharp critic of their shortcomings in 
 1877, had been minister of war. He was, therefore, 
 primarily responsible for anything wrong in the organisa- 
 tion or handling of his army ; but he had been often over- 
 ruled. He had also much fault to find with his tools. 
 In his farewell address to the army, and in his report to 
 the emperor, he complained that he had been short of 
 men and of war material, his lieutenants had disobeyed 
 orders or shown incapacity, and there was a lack of 
 instruction, ability, and initiative among the subordinate 
 officers. "Unfortunately there do not exist in Russia 
 a great number of men of energetic and independent 
 character." * Among officers and men alike there had 
 been little enthusiasm, little desire to distinguish them- 
 selves, and a want of the resolution to win. This was 
 partly due to "the obscurity which surrounded the objects 
 and causes of the war." 
 
 1 It.L'.S.I. Journal, 1. lir.C. 
 
286 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 On the other hand, in the Japanese army all ranks 
 were convinced that the war was a matter of life or 
 death for their country, and were animated by a spirit of 
 patriotism and self-devotion to which it would be hard 
 to find a' parallel. Napoleon's saying was borne out, that 
 moral factors count for three-fourths in war. Drawn 
 from a people of quick intelligence and rare dexterity, 
 untouched by " the enervating influences of civilisation," 
 but trained to the strictest discipline, the Japanese troops 
 combined the alacrity of Frenchmen with the fortitude 
 of Russians. They were not only first-class fighting 
 men ; they had assimilated all that their German in- 
 structors had to teach them as to military organisation. 
 The staff and departments were models of efficiency; the 
 telephone was largely used for transmission of orders and 
 direction of fire ; and a prearranged system of spies gave 
 them a great advantage over their enemy in the matter of 
 intelligence. 
 
 The course of the war confirmed in the main the 
 teaching of South Africa. The Russians fought mostly 
 on the defensive in prepared positions, and it was found 
 that frontal attacks, even by troops ready to give their 
 lives without counting the cost, seldom succeeded. The 
 second Japanese army lost a fifth of its strength to no 
 purpose before Liao-yang, and found it necessary to modify 
 its German tactics. Ground must be gained as far as 
 possible by night, trenches must be made for cover, and 
 two or three days would be needed to carry through an 
 attack.' Advance in daylight under fire could only be 
 made by creeping in open order, or by rushes of groups, 
 who dug themselves in as soon as they halted, and were 
 taught to dig lying down. The first army, operatmg in 
 more broken ground, made less use of the spade, and 
 
 » R.U.S.I. Journal, !i. 1005. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 287 
 
 advanced by rushes of companies, 100 yards or so at a 
 time. 
 
 The consumption of ammunition was so large, and the 
 difficulty of replenishing it so great, that the men some- 
 times carried nearly 400 rounds into action. They had 
 holdalls, G feet long by S inches wide, open at each end 
 and sewn across the middle, so that they formed two 
 pockets. These could be used for cartridges and emer- 
 gency rations, and the holdalls were worn over the 
 shoulder like a bandoleer. The Japanese rifle was of 
 small bore (.25-inch), and its ammunition was light ; but 
 the wounds inflicted were often trifling. 
 
 The Russians found themselves obliged to adopt the 
 same methods as the Japanese when they had to cross 
 open country under artillery fire. Captain Soloviev says 
 that, formed in Indian file at ten paces interval, " the 
 men run stooping, as fast as they can, and utilising 
 as much as possible the least inequality of the ground. 
 It is well that the leading men should be trained to 
 choose the sinuous line most advantageous to follow." 
 Volleys had to be given up, and the whistle was found 
 to be the only means of exercising fire control. In the 
 battle of Liao-yang the 34th Siberian Rifles used 1,200,000 
 cartridges, or 6:10 per man. Fire at ranges over 2000 
 yards was found effective against hidden batteries. The 
 Russians always had their bayonets fixed, and their faith 
 in the bayonet was not shaken by the war. Their strength 
 and reach gave them the advantage with it ; the Japanese 
 were shy of closing with them, and often preferred to use 
 hand grenades or even stones. But a bayonet charge 
 must not be launched acnjss a wide space, or few men 
 will survive to make it. There is no "decisive range," 
 as the regulations had assumed: "Sometimes the two 
 adversaries remain lying face to face at only fifteen or 
 
288 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 twenty paces from each other, until some gallant men 
 bound from the ranks with a shout, and hurl themselves 
 upon the enemy's trenches. Some twenty others will at 
 once respond to this example, then the whole company 
 follows the movement." ^ 
 
 A Japanese officer goes so far as to say that there was 
 but one method of attack, " namely, the selection and 
 envelopment of one wing of the decisive point." - This 
 caused the attacking troops to make wide turning move- 
 ments, which the defenders met by extension of their 
 front. The telegraph and the breech-loader had made 
 such dispersal of forces much less hazardous than it 
 would have been formerly, and 3000 men per mile was 
 a sufficient allowance generally. Battles were prolonged 
 by the distances to be covered, and by the power which 
 modern weapons have given to a weaker force to hold its 
 ground for some time against a stronger one. This caused 
 the admirably planned envelopment of the Russian right 
 at Mukden to prove less crushing than it promised to be. 
 One Japanese brigade engaged in it lost 90 per cent, of 
 its men in capturing and trying to hold a village. The 
 strain of continuous fighting, day after day, exhausted 
 both armies, and left the victors unable to follow up 
 their success. 
 
 The Russian field guns were better than the Japanese, 
 and were better horsed, but the gunners were unpractised 
 in indirect laying, to which both sides found it necessary 
 to have recourse. Rapid fire was little used because of 
 the difficulty of supplying ammunition. Shrapnel was 
 the most effective projectile against troops at ranges not 
 exceeding 4000 yards. High explosive shells were useful 
 against villages, but otherwise they did less than was 
 expected. At first the batteries on both sides hung back, 
 
 ' Ji.U.SJ. Journal, 1. 1175. "- lb., li. 331. 
 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 289 
 
 and seldom shifted their positions except at night ; but 
 latterly the Japanese artillery became less cautious, 
 followed the infantry in its advance, and gave it good 
 support. Their mountain guns were very serviceable in 
 the hilly country to the eastward. Towards the end of 
 the war, machine guns were nmch used, especially by the 
 Japanese. Their chief value was in defence. Attached 
 to advanced guards, they helped them to hold ground 
 that they had seized till other troops could come up. It 
 was found best to carry them on pack animals, with 
 tripod stands, and to work them in pairs.i 
 
 In cavalry the Japanese were no match for the Russians : 
 they were outnumbered, their horses were weak, and the 
 men were not good riders. But though the country west 
 of the railway was well suited to cavalry action, the 
 Russians derived little advantage from their superiority. 
 Mistchenko's big raid upon the Japanese communications 
 in January 1905 was ineffectual, owing to the want of 
 howitzers to make villages untenable. A raid made by 
 two Japanese squadrons seems in fact to have had more 
 result. They reached the railway north of Mukden, and 
 blew up a bridge; this caused Kuropatkin to detach 
 SOOO men from his army on the eve of the battle, to 
 guard his line. The Japanese generally avoided cavalry 
 encounters, and sent out mixed detachments for screen- 
 ing and reconnaissance. There was little scope for lance 
 or sabre; the Kghting was mainly on foot; and the 
 Russian troopers, though trained as dragoons, shot badly. 
 The .'10,000 horsemen at Kuropatkin's disposal might have 
 been treated as a mobile reserve of riflemen in the battle 
 of Mukden ; but there and elsewhere the Japanese cavalry 
 seem to have been used in this manner to better purpose. 
 
 Infantry was emphatically the predominant partner in 
 
 ' K.U.S.I. Jovrnal, li. 4S0-457. 
 
290 THE HISTORY OF INFANTRY 
 
 this war. The moral drawn from it, both by Russians 
 and Japanese, was that regulations must be simplified, 
 and initiative developed. " Our soldiers," says a Russian 
 ■writer, "positively did not know how to fight without 
 receiving the minutest detail of orders from their officers. 
 . . . We must do our recent enemy the justice of acknow- 
 ledging that they know how to fight individually whilst 
 co-operating for a common object." * Russian officers 
 regarded it as the chief advantage of night attacks that 
 they could keep their men in hand, and bring them up 
 in close formation without excessive loss. 
 
 Whilst modern war calls for men, not machines, in the 
 lower ranks, there is something of an opposite tendency 
 in the upper ranks. The higher leaders have less con- 
 trol of the fight than they used to have, and, owing to 
 the telegraph wire, they have less independence. Their 
 function is reduced at both ends. The commander-in- 
 chief, while he has more control over his lieutenants, 
 can see little for himself, and is in his turn dependent 
 on his staff. His plans are more and more governed by 
 supply and transport. There is less scope for brilliant 
 strategy and tactics, for genius and rowp d'ceil ; and the 
 quality of " the brain of the army," or rather its nervous 
 system, has become more important. Lastly, Japan has 
 shown, as Prussia did before her, that a nation which 
 mean.s to win must put forth all its .strength. Railways 
 and telegraphs have increased the size of armies by facili- 
 tating their movements, and the numbers now called for 
 can only bo had by universal training for war. 
 
 > R.l'.S.I. Journal, li. 1419. 
 
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 1901. 
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 1892. 
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296 WORKS REFERRED TO IN FOOTNOTES 
 
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 1887. 
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 1903. 
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 1903. 
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 1894. 
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INDEX 
 
 Adriaiiople, battle of, 45 
 Advance by rushes, 267, 274, 281, 
 
 287 
 >1^milius I'aullus, L., 28 
 
 the younger, 35 
 
 Agincourt, battle of, 70 
 
 Albuera, battle of, 218 
 
 Alesia, siege of, 38 
 
 Alexander the Great, 17 
 
 Alma, battle of the, 237 
 
 Alva, Duke of, 92, 96 
 
 Ambiorix, 41 
 
 American troops, 184-6, 245-50 
 
 Arbedo, battle of, 77 
 
 Arbela, battle of, 17 
 
 Archers, 6, 45, 58, 65, 71, 75, 104 
 
 Armour, 23, 47, 50, 63, 125 
 
 Army corps, 205 
 
 Arrian, 45 
 
 Artevelde, P. van, 54 
 
 Artillery, field, 87, 112, 164, 175, 
 
 192, 241, 257, 275, 281, 288 
 Asculum, battle of, 24 
 Athenians, the, 5-14 
 Auerstedt, battle of, 212 
 Augereau, Marshal, 214 
 Augustus Cesar, 42 
 Auray, battle of, 69 
 Austerlitz, battle of, 208 
 Austrian troops, 158, 170, 200, 
 
 208, 215, 241, 252-5 
 Avaricum, siege of, 38 
 
 eers, 91, 134 
 I Bannockburn, battle of, 59 
 j Battalions, 96, 98 
 
 Bayonets, 135, 207, 248, 273, 
 287 
 I Belisarius, 45, 48 
 i Beneventum, battle of, 25 
 I Beresford, Marshal, 218 
 i Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, 115 
 I Bicocca, La, battle of, 88 
 I Blenheim, battle of, 139 
 
 Blucher, Marshal, 212, 223 
 
 Bffiotians, the, 1 1 
 
 Boers, the, 276-81 
 
 Bouquet, Colonel, 177 
 
 Bouvines, battle of, 53, 64 
 
 Bows, long, 59, 67, 104 
 
 Breechloaders, 237, 250, 257 
 
 Bremule, battle of, 61 
 
 Brigades, 99, iii, 138 
 
 British infantry, 103, 122-4, 144, 
 146, 171, 184, 197, 216, 224, 
 238, 241, 276-83 
 
 Broglie, Marshal, 176, 182 
 
 Brunswick, Duke of, 212 
 
 Prince Ferdinand of, 173 
 
 Bueil, Jean de, 72, 76 
 
 Bugeaud, Marshal, 216, 232 
 
 Bull Run, battle of, 247 
 
 Bunker Hill, battle of, 184 
 
 Burgoyne, General, 178, 184 
 
 Busaco, battle of, 218 
 
298 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Cassar, C. Julius, 3S-41 
 Calivers, 92 
 Cannse, battle of, 28 
 Caracoles, 107, 109 
 Carbines, rifled, 235 
 Carmagnola, F. di, 77 
 Carnot, L. N. M., 194, 197 
 Carrhas, battles of, 41, 52 
 Carthaginians, the, 26, 33 
 Cartridges, 112 
 
 expenditure of, 255, 281, 287 
 
 carried by the soldier, 155, 
 
 257, 287 
 Casilinum, battle of, 48 
 Catinat, Marshal, 132 
 Cavalry, 10, 16, 23, 30, 32, 106, 
 
 120, 130, 159, 205, 249, 256, 
 
 265, 280, 289 
 Centurions, 24, 37 
 Cerignola, battle of, 86 
 Charonea, 16 
 
 Chancellorsville, battle of, 248 
 Chandos, Sir John, 69 
 Charlemagne, 50 
 Charles VII., 74 
 Charles the Rash, 79-82 
 Charles, Archduke, 199, 215, 232 
 Chasseurs, 176, 236 
 Close order and extended order, 
 
 154, 177, '87, 195r 200, 233, 
 
 252, 262, 267, 274, 278, 282 
 Coburg-Saalfeld, Prince F. J. of, 
 
 194-8 
 Cocherel, battle of, 69 
 Cohorts, 36 
 
 Colborne, Colonel J., 219, 228 
 Coldharbour, battle of, 248 
 Colley, Sir George, 276 
 Colonels, 96 
 Columns, 142, 148, 174, 181-4, 
 
 201, 214, 225, 263 
 
 company, 234, 255, 270 
 
 Comitatenses, 44 
 
 Conde, Prince of, 118, 127 
 Conscription, 205 
 Cornwallis, Lord, 185, 221 
 Coronea, battle of, 1 1 
 Courtrai, battle of, 53 
 Crassus, P. Licinius, 41 
 Crecy, battle of, 63-7 
 Cromwell, Oliver, 120 
 Crossbows, 52, 66 
 Culloden, battle of, 1 50 
 Cumberland, Duke of, 145, 150, 
 
 171 
 Custine, General, 193 
 Cynoscephals, battle of, 34 
 
 Danes, the, 5 1 
 
 D'Avila, Sancho, 94 
 
 Davout, Marshal, 212, 216, 222 
 
 Decius, Emperor, 44 
 
 Delium, battle of, 1 1 
 
 Depth in line, 99, in, 121, 137, 
 
 154, 187, 217, 231 
 D'Erlon, Count, 225 
 Dettingen, battle of, 144 
 Diocletian, Emperor, 44 
 Divisions, 201 
 Dragomirov, General, 272 
 Dragoons, 107 
 Dreux, battle of, 97 
 Duhesme, General, 200 
 Dumouriez, General, 190-3 
 Dunbar, battle of, 122 
 Dundas, Sir David, 179 
 Dunes, battle of the, 123 
 Dunkirk, siege of, 194 
 Dutch troops, 95, 131, 141 
 
 order, 99 
 
 Dyrrhachium, blockade of, 38 
 
 E 
 
 I 
 
 Edward I., 57, 59 
 Edward III., 56, 60,64 
 
INDEX 
 
 299 
 
 Edward, the Black Prince, 54, 64, 
 
 68, 70 
 Elephants, iS, 24, 27, 32 
 Epaminondas, 11-14 
 Essling, battle of, 215 
 Eylau, battle of, 214 
 
 Fairfax, Sir Thomas, 121 
 Falkirk, battles of, 59, 149 
 Feudalism, 49 
 
 Firelock or fusil, 124, 133, 136 
 Fire tactics and shock tactics, 135, 
 
 143, 155, 161, 174, 207, 240 
 Flemish burghers, 53 
 Fleurus, battles of, 131, 198 
 Folard, Chevalier, 142 
 Fontenoy, battle of, 145 
 Formigny, battle of, 76 
 Francis I., 85 
 Franks, the, 48 
 Frederick the Great, 153-69, 
 
 173-5. 178 
 Frederick William I., 151 
 Frederick William III., 209, 233 
 French infantry, 85, u8, 131, 145, 
 
 147, 165, 170, 184, 189, 195, 2CX3, 
 
 223, 241, 261 
 Fyrd, the, 54 
 
 (Jambetta, Leon, 266 
 George II., 144 
 Gonzalo of Cordova, 86 
 Goths, the, 45 
 Granson, battle of, 80 
 Grant, (leneral, 248 
 Gravelotte, battle of, 263 
 Grenadiers, 136 
 (luard. Imperial, 206, 228, 244 
 Guesclin, Hertrand du, 69 
 Guibert, Count, 180-4 
 Gustavus Adolphus, 108-16 
 
 H 
 
 Halidon Hill, battle of, 60 
 Hand-guns, 90 
 Hannibal, 27-33 
 Harquebus, 90, 104 
 Hastati, 22 
 
 Hastings, battle of, 58 
 Hawkwood, Sir John, 74 
 Hawley, General, 148 
 Henry I., 61 
 Henry V., 70 
 Hepburn, Sir John, 117 
 Heraclea, battle of, 24 
 Highlanders, the, 149 
 Hobelars, 63 
 Hochkirch, battle of, 168 
 Hohenfriedberg, battle of, 159 
 Hohenlohe, Prince, 212 
 Hondschoote, battle of, 194 
 Hoplites, 2 
 Horses, war, 62 
 Houchard, General, 194 
 Howe, Lord, 177 
 Hypaspists, 15 
 
 Infantry, 50 
 
 Inkerman, battle of, 239 
 
 Interlining of horse with foot, 10, 
 
 40, 1 10, 121, 139 
 Iphicrates, 8 
 Issus, battle of, 17 
 
 Jackson, General (Stonewall), 247 
 Jagers, 175, 210,221,235 
 James II., 123 
 Janissaries, 130 
 Japanese troops, 286-90 
 Jemappes, battle of, 192 
 Jena, battle of, 212 
 John, King of Fram e, 67 
 
INDEX 
 
 Jomini, General, 216, 232 
 Jourdan, Marshal, 195, igj 
 
 Kesselsdorf, battle of, i6o 
 Knights and knight service, 54-5 
 Kolin, battle of, 165 
 Koniggnitz, battle of, 254 
 Kunersdorf, battle of, 169 
 Kuropatkin, General, 270, 285 
 
 L 
 
 Lacedaemonians, the, 5-14 
 Ladysmith, siege and relief of 
 
 277-9 
 Laeffelt, battle of, 14S 
 Lance, the furnished, 74, 80, 92 
 Landsknechts, 84 
 Lannes, Marshal, 215 
 La Noue, F. de, 92, 97, 98 
 Lechffium, action at, g 
 Lee, General, 248-9 
 Legions, 20 
 
 Leipzig, battle of, no, 113 
 Length of service, 205, 223, 230, 
 
 241,251,257,275 
 Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau,Prince, 
 
 154, 160 
 Leuctra, battle of, 12 
 Leuthen, battle of, 167 
 Liao-yang, battle of, 286 
 Light infantry, 175, 196, 210, 221 
 Ligny, battle of, 223 
 Lincoln, battle of, 62 
 Line and column, 181, 207, 21 
 
 220, 225, 228, 232, 238 
 Lloyd, General, 170 
 Louis XI., 74, 79, 85 
 Louis XIV., 118, 126, 131, 139 
 Louvois, Marquis, 124-6, 133 
 Liitzen, battle of, 1 14 
 Luxemburg, Marshal, 131 
 
 M 
 
 Machiavelli, N., s3, 84, 88, 99 
 Machine guns, 257, 289 
 Magenta, battle of, 242 
 Malplaquet, battle of, 139 
 
 Maniples, 21 
 
 Mantinea, battles of, 4, 13 
 
 Marathon, battle of, 6 
 
 Marching in step, 15G 
 
 Marengo, battle of, 207 
 
 Marius, C., 36 
 
 Marlborough, Duke of, 139 
 
 Marsaglia, battle of, 132 
 
 Martinet, Colonel, 125 
 
 Matchlocks, 90, 134 
 
 Maurice of Nassau, Prince, 96, 99 
 
 Melegnano, battle of, 87 
 
 Men-at-arms, 49, 63 
 
 Menil-Durand, Baron, 181-3 
 
 Mercenaries, 26, 33, 56, So, 84 
 
 Metz, blockade of, 264 
 
 Minden, battle of, 172 
 
 Mobility, 99, ,26, 157, ,63, ,79, 
 
 181, 204, 220, 236 
 Mollvvitz, battle of, 158 
 Moltke, Marshal, 238, 254, 259, 
 
 264 
 Monk, George, 65, 133 
 Montebello, battle of, 242 
 Montecuccoli, Count, 108, 127 
 Montluc, Marshal, S3 
 Mook, battle of, 94 
 Moore, Sir John, 221 
 Morat, battle of, 81 
 Morgarten, battle of, 76 
 Mounted rifles, 249, 280 
 Mukden, battle of, 285 
 Muskets, 91, 104, 206 
 Musketeers, 99, 114 
 Musketry instruction, 237 
 
 Nachod, battle of, 253 
 Najera, battle of, 70 
 
 I 
 
INDEX 
 
 301 
 
 Nancy, battle of, 82 
 Napoleon 1., 177, 204-29 
 Napoleon III., 243, 257 
 Narses, 46, 48 
 Necdie-guns, 237, 250 
 Neerwinden, battles of, n 
 New model army, the, 121 
 Niel, Marshal, 243, 258 
 Nieuport, battle of, 100 
 Noailles, Marshal, 144 
 Novara, battles of, 84, 87 
 
 Oblique order, the, 162, 177 
 Ordonnances, 74, 80 
 Osman Pasha, 268, 271 
 
 Palatini, 44 
 Pandours, 175 
 Parthians, the, 42 
 Pausanias, 6 
 Pavia, battle of, 85, 88 
 Pelopidas, 12, 13 
 Peltasts, 7, 9 
 Percussion caps, 234 
 Perseus of Macedon, 35 
 Persians, the, i 
 Peter of Navarre, 87 
 Phalanx, Macedonian, 15- 
 Pharsalia, battle of, 40 
 Philip of Macedon, 14 
 Philip V. of Macedon, 33 
 Philip Augustus, 53 
 Philip of Valois, 63 
 Phcenicians, 2 
 Pichegru, General, 197 
 Pikes, 89,98, 135 
 Pilum, the, 23 
 Plata-a, battle of, 6 
 Platoons, 138 
 Plevna, battles of, 268-72 
 
 Poitiers, battles of, 49, 68 
 
 Polybius, 19 
 
 Pompeius, Cn., 40 
 
 Port Arthur, siege of, 284 
 
 Portuguese caijadores, 221 
 
 Prague, battle of, 164 
 
 Pretoria, advance to, 279 
 
 Principes, 22 
 
 Prussian infantry, 151, 160, 170, 
 
 178,209,223,251-5,259,274 
 Pydna, battle of, 35 
 Pyrrhus of Epirus, 24 
 
 Quick loading, 154, 254 
 Quick-firing guns, 275, 2 
 
 R 
 
 Ramillies, battle of, 139 
 
 Ramrods, iron, 154 
 
 Ravenna, battle of, 87 
 
 Regiments, 96 
 
 Regulus, M. Atilius, 26 
 
 Reiters, 92, 109 
 
 Richard I., 52, 58 
 
 Richelieu, Cardinal, 117 
 
 Riflemen, 221, 235 
 
 Rifles, 210, 234, 237, 250, 257, 273, 
 
 282, 287 
 Rivoli, battle of, 204 
 Roberts, Lord, 279 
 Rochambeau, Marshal, 1S2, 190 
 Rocour, battle of, 148 
 Rocroy, 1 18 
 
 Romans, the, 20-4, 35-8 
 Roosebeke, battle of, 53 
 Rossbach, battle of, 165 
 Rupert, I'rince, 121 
 Ruspina, battle of, 41 
 Russian troops, iCiS, 222, 238-40, 
 
 268-73, 283-90 
 
302 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Sabugal, action of, 220 
 Sackville, Lord George, 173 
 Saint Jacob, battle of, 74, 79 
 Saint Privat, battle of, 262 
 Saratoga, surrender at, 186 
 Saxe, Marshal, 143-8, 155, 176 
 Scharnhorst, General, 199, 209, 
 
 223 
 Schwerin, Marshal, 158 
 Scipio, P. Cornelius, 32 
 Scots, the, 59, 117, 122 
 Sedan, battle of, 265 
 Sempach, battle of, 76 
 Seydlitz, General, 159, 166, 169 
 Sha-ho, battle on the, 284 
 Sheridan, General, 249 
 Skirmishers, 176, 195, 200, 221, 
 
 242, 248, 253, 261, 270, 278 
 Skobeleff, General, 269-72 
 Smythe, Sir John, 65, 89, 104 
 Snaphances, 133 
 Solferino, battle of, 243 
 Solidarii, 52 
 Soor, battle of, 160 
 Soult, Marshal, 218 
 Spaniards, the, 86, 89-94 
 Spartans, the, 2 
 Sphacteria, action in, 7 
 Squares, 97 
 
 Standard, battle of the, 61 
 Steenkerque, battle of, 131 
 Stewart, General W., 221 
 Stoffel, Colonel, 254, 257 
 Swedes, the, no, 117 
 Swiss, the, 74, 76-80, 87 
 Sword and buckler, 88, 1 50 
 Supply and transport, 203 
 
 Tactics, offensive and defensive, 
 69,73, 100, 126, 142, 154, 160, 
 
 192, 221, 224, 247, 252, 260, 
 
 272 
 Taginae, battle of, 46 
 Tchernaya, battle of the, 240 
 Tercios, 96 
 Thebans, the, 1 1 
 Theodebert, King of the Franks, 
 
 48 
 Theodosius, Emperor, 45 
 Thermopylae, 5 
 Tilly, Count, 113 
 Tinchebrai, action of, 61 
 Titus, Emperor, 37 
 Torgau, battle of, 168 
 Tourcoin, battle of, 197 
 Trasimene, battle of, 28 
 Trautenau, battle of, 253 
 Trebia, battle of the, 27 
 Triarii, 22 
 
 Tribunes, military, 24 
 Trochu, General, 244, 257 
 Turcos, 260 
 
 Turenne, Marshal, 119, 123, 127 
 Turks, the, 129, 268-72 
 
 [25, 179, 206, 
 
 Valmy, battle of, 190 
 Varro, C. Terentius, 28 
 Vauban, Marshal, 135 
 Vegetius, 13, 46 
 Velites, 22 
 
 Vere, Sir Francis, loi 
 Villars, Marshal, 140 
 Vimiero, battle of, 217 
 Voltigeurs, 205 
 Volunteers, French, 189, 191 
 
 I 
 
INDEX 
 
 303 
 
 w 
 
 Wagram, battle of, 215 
 Wallenstein, A., Duke of Fried- 
 land, 114 
 Washington, General, 9, 186 
 Waterloo, battle of, 224-9 
 Wattignies, battle of, 195 
 
 Wellington, Duke o 
 
 223-30 
 Welsh bowmen, 59 
 Wheel-lock pistols, 92 
 William I., 52, 53, 58 
 William III., 131 
 William I. of Prussia, 
 
 267 
 Williams, Sir Roger, 92, 104 
 Wilson, Sir Robert, 197, 223 
 
 217-20, 
 
 233, 262, 
 
 Wolfe, General James, 155, 
 Worth, battle of, 260 
 
 Xenophon, 8 
 
 Yeomen, 55 
 
 York, Duke of, 194- 
 
 Zama, battle of, 31 
 Ziethen, General, 168 
 Zorndorf, battle of, 168 
 Zouaves, 236, 243 
 
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