UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES HISTORY OF FEDEEAL GOVEKNMENT, FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE TO THE DISEUPTION OF THE UNITED STATES. BY EDWARD A. EREEMAN, M.A. LATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD. • VOLUME I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION— HISTORY OF THE GREEK FEDERATIONS. "Could the interior structure and regular operation of the Aehaian League be ascertained, it is probable that more light might be thrown by it on the science of Federal Government, than by any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted" The Federalist, No. xviii. MACMILLAN AND CO. anb Camrjrij&ge, 1863. I LONDON! H. CLAY, SON, AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS, BEBAD STREET niLL. •• • ••••• •....;•: ..••••.*..• !'•* • • • * • • .•: • • • • • • • • • • • • * • • • • • • *• : ••• • • • • * • • * • • • • • • • '.* • • • • 1 1 *' JC7^ F3FS 3 TO SPYEIDON TRIKOITPES, LATE GREEK MINISTER AT THE COURT OF LONDON. My dear Mr. Trikoupes, There is no man to whom I can inscribe so fittingly as to yourself a volume which deals mainly with the restoration of Grecian freedom after a period of foreign oppression. As the native historian of regenerate Greece, yon fill a position strikingly analogous to that of the illus- trious writer who forms my chief guide through- out the present portion of my work. Like Polybios, your youth was spent among men and exploits worthy of the countrymen of Aratos and Philopoimen; like Polybios too, your later years have been spent in recording, in the still yi DEDICATION. living tongue in which he wrote, the great events of which you were an eyewitness and a partaker. You have helped to win for your own immediate country an honourable name among the divi- sions of the Greek race; you have helped to place iEtolia on the same level as Achaia, and to raise the name of Mesolongi to a reputation no less glorious than that of Megalopolis. And in one respect you are more happy than your great pre- decessor. Polybios lived to see a time when the freedom of his country was wholly extinguished, and when all that he could do for her was to procure for her some small alleviation of her bondage. You have lived to see your country answer the calumnies of her enemies by conduct which they cannot gainsay ; you have seen Greece once more draw on her the eyes of ad- miring Europe by one of the justest and purest Revolutions in all recorded history. While all 1hat he could do was to obtain some contemp- tuous concessions IVom an overbearing conqueror, ' you are called on to take your share in the de- liberations of an Assembly where every honest heari In Europe trusts that twice-liberated Hellas DEDICATION. vii will be at last allowed to fix her own destinies. Whatever may be the result of those delibera- tions, whether a King is again to sit on the throne of Theseus or a President again to bear the seal of Lydiadas, that they may lead to the full establishment of law and freedom in the land where law and freedom first arose is the earnest wish of Your sincere and obliged friend, EDWARD A. FREEMAN. SoMERLEAZE, WELLS, January Zrd, 1863. PREFACE. I trust that no one will think that the present work owes its origin to the excitement of the War of Secession in America. It is the first instalment of a scheme formed long ago, and it represents the thought and read- "^ ing of more than ten years. All that late events in America have done has been to increase mv interest in a subject which had already long occupied my thoughts, - and, in some degree, to determine me to write at once W what otherwise might have been postponed for some time ^ longer. M The present volume is mainly devoted to the working of the Federal system in Ancient Greece. The Federal period of Grecian history is one which has been generally neglected by English scholars, and I trust that I may have done something to bring into more notice a period than which none is richer in political lessons. But it must be remembered that I am not writing a history of Greece or a history of Achaia, but a history of Grecian Federalism. From this difference of object it follows that I have treated my subject in a somewhat different manner from that X PREFACE. which I should have thought appropriate to a regular his- tory of Greece or of any other country- First, As a his- torian of Federalism, I look to everything mainly as illus- trating, or not illustrating, the progress of Federal ideas. I dwell upon events, or I hurry over them, not according to their intrinsic importance, but according to their importance for my particular purpose. I have disposed in a line or two of battles which were of high moment in the history of the world, and I have dwelt at length on obscure debates and embassies, when their details happened to throw light on the Achaian Constitution or on the mode of proceeding in the Achaian Assembly. It so happens that much of the information most valuable for my purpose comes in the form of details of this kind, which a general historian would, naturally and properly, cut very short. I mention this merely that I may not be thought to have either depre- ciated or overvalued subjects which, writing with a special object, I have looked at mainly from the point of view dictated by that object. Secondly, In writing the history, not of a particular country, but of a form of government which has existed in several countries,/! have constantly endeavoured to illus- trate the events and institutions of which I write by para! lei or contrasted events and institutions in other times and places. 1 have striven to make the politics of Federal Greece more intelligible and more interesting, by showing their points <>!' likeness and unlikeness to the politics of modern England and America. 1 Bhould have dbne this, in some degree, in a history of any sort, but I have done it PREFACE. XI far more fully in a history of a form of government than I should have done in an ordinary history of Greece or of any other country. And I trust that I have not compared ancient and modem politics in the mere interest of any modem party. I have certainly not written in the interest of either the North or the South in the American quarrel. I see too much to be said for and against both sides to be capable of any strong partizanship for either. Possibly this may not be a bad frame of mind in which to approach the history of the quarrel, when the course of my subject brings me to it. At present, what I have had to do has mainly been to argue against the false inferences on the subject of Federalism in general which some have drawn from recent American history. And, if I do not write in the interest of either side in the American dispute, neither am I conscious of writing in the interest of any English political party. I am conscious of holding strong opinions on many points both of home and foreign politics ; for historical study does more than anything else to lead the mind to a definite political creed ; but, at the same time, it does at least as much to hinder the growth of any narrow political partizanship. A historical student soon learns that a man is not morally the worse for being Whig or Tory, Catholic or Protestant, Royalist or Republican, Aristocrat or Democrat, Unionist or Confederate. He soon learns to sympathize with individuals among all parties, but to decline to throw in his lot unreservedly with any party. But he will not cany his political toleration so far as to confound political differences and* moral crimes. Indignation at successful wickedness is a feeling of which Xll PREFACE. no honest man will ever wish to rid himself ; no honest man, above all no honest student of history, will ever bring himself to look on the Tyrant whose very being implies the overthrow of right with the same eyes with which he looks on the mere political adversary whose motives may be as honourable as his own. In writing the present volume, I have endeavoured to combine a text which may be instructive and interest- ing to any thoughtful reader, whether specially learned or not, with notes which may satisfy the requirements of the most exacting scholar. )\In the text therefore I have, as far as possible, avoided technicalities, and I have thrown the discussion of many points of detail into the notes. I have throughout been lavish in the citation of authorities, as I hold that an author should not require his readers to take anything on his bare word, but should give them the means of refuting him out of his own pages, if they think good. If I have overdone it in the matter of references, I am sure that every real student will allow that it is a fault on the right side. I have felt such deep gratitude to those authors who really act ;is guides and not as rivals to the original writers, and I have felt so aggrieved at those who follow another course, that I was determined to do all 1 could to avoid blame on this most, important score. The nature of the authorities for this period of Grecian history h;is been explained in several passages of the volume itself, and the chief among them, 1'olvluos and PREFACE. Xlii Plutarch, ought to be familiar to every scholar. But besides the evidence of historians, there are few parts of history on which more light is thrown by the evi- dence of coins. In this branch of my subject, I am bound, at every step, to acknowledge the benefits which I have derived from the numismatic knowledge of my friend the Hon. John Leicester Warren. A careful com- parison of his numismatic and my historical evidence has enabled us together to fix several points which pro- bably neither of us could have fixed separately. I should have drawn more largely on Mr. Warren's resources, which have been always open to me, were scholars not likely to have the benefit of his researches into Greek Federal Coinage in a separate form. At the risk of offending some eyes by unaccustomed forms, I have spelled Greek names, as closely as I could, according to the Greek orthography. This practice is now very general in Germany, and it is gradually making its way in England. Mr. Grote first ventured to restore the Greek K ; Professor Max Midler, in the Oxford Essays, went several degrees further. For the Latin spelling, nothing can be pleaded but custom — a custom, which is merely a part of that unhappy way of looking at everything Greek through a Latin medium, which has so long made havoc of our philology and mythology. In exactly the same way, serious mischief — I believe I may say serious political mischief — has been done by our habit of looking at nearly everything in modern Europe through a French medium, and of speaking of German, XIV PREFACE. Italian, and Flemish places by French corruptions of their names. Strange to say, while we clothe Italian names in a French dress, we usually clothe Modern Greek names in an Italian dress. Inexplicable confusion is the necessary result ; names which have not altered since the days of Homer are written in endless ways to adapt them to a Western pronunciation which is hardly ever that of Englishmen. The island of Melos has never changed its name, and its name is sounded in the same way by a Greek and by an Englishman. It seems eminently absurd to talk about Melos in the history of the Pelo- ponnesian War, but, if the island happens to be mentioned in a modern book or newspaper, to change its name into that of Milo the slayer of Clodius. The only way to pre- serve consistency is to write every Greek name, old or new, according to the native spelling, and to leave each reader to pronounce according to accent or quantity as he pleases. This I have done throughout, with two excep- tions. When a name has a really English, as distin- guished from a Latin or French, form, such as Philip, Ptolemy, Athens, Corinth, I should never think of making any change ; indeed I rather regret that we have not more forms of the kind. Again, a few very familiar names, like Thermopylae, Boeotia, &c., though the form is not thoroughly English, I have left as they are usually spelled. The change which has the most unusual look is the substitution of the Greek ai for a in the ending of plural feminine names. In many crises, however, there is also ;i singular form in use, which I have preferred wherever I could. PREFACE. XV 1 have given three maps, showing the boundaries which the different states treated of assumed at dif- ferent times. These have been reduced, with the neces- sary changes from Kiepert's Atlas von Hellas. The boundaries of the Achaian League at the different times fixed on will be found, I trust, to be accurately given, but the position of a few of the cities is matter of un- certainty. But among the states of Northern Greece, the ^Etolian and Macedonian conquests and losses made every frontier fluctuating, and we have less accurate in- formation about those regions than we have as to the changes in Peloponnesos. It is therefore extremely difficult to fix the boundaries of any state north of Boeotia at any particular moment, and my attempts, or any others, must be taken for what they are worth, as merely probable approximations. I trust that the second volume, containing the history of the Swiss and other German Leagues, will follow the present with all reasonable speed. But it involves a minute examination of some very obscure portions of history, and I cannot fix any certain time for its appear- ance. SOMEKLEAZE, WELLS, January 2nd, 1863. DIRECTIONS TO THE BINDER. PAGE The Mop of Greece at the Beginning of the Kleomenic "War, opposite 429 ,, ,, at the Peace of Epeiros ,, 599 ,, after the War with. Antiochus . ... ,, 638 CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION. TAGE Object of the work 1 Federalism a compromise ; therefore hard to define 2 General definition for historical purposes 2 — 3 Definition of a perfect Federal Government 3 Internal Sovereignty of the several members, combined with the Sovereignty of the Union in all external matters 3 — 4 Wider range of the history 4 Four great examples of Federal Government 5 1. The Achaian League, B.C. 281 — 146 5 2. The Swiss Cantons, a.d. 1291—1862 5 3. The United Provinces, a.d. 1579—1795 5 4. The United States, a.d. 1778— 1862 5 Characteristics of the Four great Confederations 6 The German Confederation 6 Other ancient examples ; in Greece ; in Italy ; in Lykia 7 Other German Leagues ; the Hanse towns 7 Other American Confederations 7 — 8 CHAPTER II. CHARACTERISTICS OP FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED WITH OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS. Illustrations of the relations of the members in a perfect Federal Commonwealth 10 Two conditions of a true Federal Government 10 Two classes of Federal Commonwealths ; First, the "System of Con- federated States," where the Central Power deals with the State Governments oidy 1 ] Second, the "Composite State," where the Central Power acts directly ou all citizens 11 b xviil CONTENTS. PACK The distinction one rather of means than of ends, and not always to be drawn in history 12 — 15 Different classifications of governments ; 1st. into Monarchy, Aristo- cracy, and Democracy ; 2nd. into Absolute and Constitutional Governments 15 — 16 Need of a cross division 16" Federalism a compromise between Great and Small States .... 16 Division into Great and Small States irrespective of their several forms of government 17 — 18 Definition of Large and Small States 18 Characteristics of the Independent City 19 Patriotism confined to the City 19 Full development of city independence in Greece 20 Early and comparatively unimportant approaches to Constitutional Monarchy and to Federal Republicanism 20—21 Municipal character of the Greek Commonwealths, aristocratic and democratic alike 21 — 22 Civic Tyrannies 22 Condition of Dependent Cities in Greece 23 Difference between a dependent City and a member of a Federation . 24 Comparison of dependent cities with English Colonies .... 25 — 26 No means of general Incorporation supplied by the system of Inde- pendent Cities 27 Incorporation carried as far as possible by Athens in the case of the old Attic Cities 28 Its impossibility in the case of the later Athenian Empire .... 29 Dependencies of medieval and modern Italian cities, and of Swiss Cantons 29 • Effects of incorporation at Rome , 30 Town autonomy in mediaeval Europe ; the independence of the cities modified by the claims of the Emperors 31 — 33 General view of the system of Independent Cities 33 Varieties in internal Constitutions and in external relations . . . 33 — 35 Different relations between the City and its Territory 36 Comparative gain and loss of the system 37 Advantages of small Coi onwealths 37 Political Education of the individual Citizen 37 — 39 Comparison with the English Eouse of Commons 39 — 40 \ Contrast with the Florentine Parlii int 10 Connexion of Athenian history with the subject of Federalism, . 11 — 42 Greater responsibility of the Athenian citizen than of the English J member 42 Po ni if the English Ministry 42 — 44 Received duties of the private member; different duties of the Athenian Citizen 44 Ihe \ semblj a Government as well as a Parliament 44 Function oi the Senate and of Ihe Generals 44 — 45 CONTENTS. XI PAGE Nothing analogous to "Office" and "Opposition." 45 Direct Diplomatic action of the Assembly 46 Effect of these powers on individual citizens . 47 : Athens the highest type of the system 48 Opportunity for the development of genius 49 Intensity of patriotism in small States 49 — 50 Identification of all citizens with the City 50 Bad side of the system of city Commonwealths 51 Their greatness less permanent than that of greater States .... 51 Common fallacy as to the weakness of small States 52 Different positions of small States where they are merely exceptions, and where they are the general rule 53 Position of Free Cities in the Middle Ages 54 Constant warfare among Free Cities 54 Force of antipathy between neighbouring towns ; examples in Greece and Italy 55 Comparison between citizen-soldiers and professional soldiers . . 56 — 58 Severity of the Laws of "War 58 — 60 Increased bitterness of faction in small States 60 — 61 Local disputes commonly more bitter than general ones 62 General balance of gain and loss in small States 62 — 63 Definition of Large States, irrespective of their forms of government. 64 Two immediate results ; smaller importance of the Capital ; represen- tative character of National Assemblies 64 Position of the Capital in a large State ; its influence either indirect or violent 64 — 67 Necessity of representative institutions in a Free State of large size . 67 Representative Government not necessarily Cabinet Government . 67 — 68 Exceptions to the representative system in modern Europe and America 69 Electiou of Polish Kings 69—71 Napoleonic Universal Suffrage ; its delusive nature 71 — 72 English and American ways of obtaining the same object . . . 72 — 73 Election of the American President practically another exception . . 73 Its difference from Napoleonic Universal Suffrage 73 — 74 General view of the system of large States 74 Extent of local diversity in large States 75 — 76 ■ Opposite systems of Centralisation and of Local Freedom indepen- dent of the form of the Central Government 76 Difference between Municipal and Federal rights 76 — 78 ■ General characteristics of large States ; balance of gain and loss 78 — 79 Advantages of great States 79 Peace secured to a large country 79 Lessening of local prejudices 79 — 80 Lessening of the evils of War 80 — 81 Lessening of party strife 82 Disadvantages of large States 83 Inferior political education 83 h 2 XX CONTENTS. PAGE Ignorance and corruption of many electors 83 — 84 Different forms of bribery .at Athens and in England .... 84 — 85 These vices inherent in the system 85 — 87 Balance of advantage in favour of large States 87 — 89 Federal Government a system intermediate between Great and Small States 89 It combines, though in an inferior degree, the special advantages of both systems 89—90 Federalism a compromise ; therefore suited only to certain positions 90 — 91 Popular prejudices on the subject 91 No general deductions to be made from recent American events . 92 — 93 Instance of similar disruptions in Monarchies 93 No case against Federalism in general, nor against the original American Union 93 Testimony of the Southern States to the Federal Principle ... 94 A large State may be a Republic without being a Federation ... 95 No argument to be drawn from failures in England aud France . . 95 A Federation may consist of Monarchies 96 Imperfect approaches to kingly Federalism in the Feudal system 96 — 97 A strictly Federal Monarchy unlikely to last 97 Other approaches to Federal Monarchy 98 Instance of two or more Kingdoms under one King 98 — 99 Members of a Federation may be either Cities or States of consider- able size 100 Difference of scale in Europe and America to be considered . 101 — 102 General view of Federalism as an intermediate system 102 Intermediate position as regards government of the whole terri- tory 102—103 Intermediate position as regards Political Education .... 103 — 104 Comparison of a State with a Kingdom, and with a consolidated Republic 105—108 Circumstances under which a Federal Union is desirable . . 108 — 110 General result of Modern Federalism 110 Results of the American Union Ill [ts comparative permanency as compared with France . . . Ill — 112 Evils which the Federal Union has hindered 112—11:5 alleged i of the Federal tie; true in a sense, but not necessarily injurious 118 — 114 Circumstances under which a Federal CTnion may be lasting . . . 114 Circumstances under which il may be useful as a transil ional slate . 114 Cases for consolidation, and for separation 114 — 115 le i of leparation when needed ; its good side .... 115 — 118 Probability that a Federation « ill be Less anxious than a kingdom to i' coyer revolted members 118 he "ii istency of striving to retain unwilling members 119 Witne ) of Switzerland in favoui "I the Federal system . . 1 1 * * p_;i ipitulation 121—122 CONTENTS. XXI CHAPTER III. OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL. PAGE The Amphiktyonic Council not a trae Federal Government . . . 123 Origin of the Error ; opinions of modem writers .... 124 — 126 The Council a Religious, not a Political, body 126 — 127 The Delphic Amphiktyony only one of several 127 Its incidental political action 127 — 128 Amphiktyouic Crusades 129 The Council becomes the tool of particular States 129 No inherent force in its Decrees 129 — 130 Indirect importance of the Council in the History of Federalism 130 — 131 Its close approach to a Federal system, without ever growing into one 131 — 133 Its constitution unsuited to historical Greece 133 The Amphiktyonyan Union of Tribes, not of Cities .... 133 — 134 Unfair distribution of the Votes ; analogy of the Unreformed Parliament 134 — 135 These incongruities less palpable in a religious body 135 Amphiktyonic championship of Philip 136 Reforms under Augustus ; new arrangement of the votes . . 136 — 139 Approach to Representative forms in the Council .... 139 — 140 The Amphiktyonic body Representative, because not really a Government 140 — 141 Political nullity of the Council during the greater part of Grecian History 141 — 143 CHAPTER IV. OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. § 1. Of the Nortliern Leagues. An approach to Federal Government not uncommon among the ruder portions of the Greek nation 144 — 145 The Phokian League as described by Pausanias 145 Probably a revival of an earlier League 146 The Akarnanian League 147 Various Notices, B.C. 431— 167 147—148 Constitution of the League 149 The Epeirot League 150 Early Republican development in Chaonia and Thesprotis . . . . 150 Constitutional Monarchy in Molossis 150 — 151 Foundation of the Federal Republic of Epeiros, d.c. 239—229 151—152' No real Federabsm in Thessaly 152 Position and Power of the Thessalian Tagos 152 — 153 XX11 CONTENTS. VAOE Monarchy of Jason, B.C. 372 153 Undisguised Tyranny of his successors, B.C. 370 — 357 153 Thessaly a dependency of Macedonia 154 Legislation of T. Quinctius Flamininus, B.C. 197 154 § 2. Of the Boeotian League. History of the Boeotian League ; its warnings 155 Dangers of an overwhelming Capital in a Federal State . . . 155 — 156 Legal and practical position of Thebes in the Bceotian League . . 157 The circumstances of Bceotia suited to a Synoikismos, not to a Federal system 158 Effects on general Grecian History 159 Three Periods of Bceotian History 159 First Period, b.c. 776— 387 159 Bceotia both an Amphiktyony and a Political League . . . 159 — 160 Use of the words "Bceotian" and "Theban "by Thucydides and Xenophon 160 — 161 Constitution of the League 161 Subject Districts or Subordinate Leagues 162 Office of the Bceotarchs and of the Four Senates 162 — 164 Federal and Local Archons 164 — 165 Theban Archon a mere Pageant ; real power vested in the Polemarchs 165 Power of Thebes shown in the History of Plataia 166 Secession of Plataia from the League 166 Ill-feeling between Thebes and other Towns ...... 167 — 168 Theban claims at the Peace of Antalkidas 168 — 169 Dissolution of the Bceotian League, B.C. 387 169 Second Period, B.C. 387—334 169 The Peace carried out in the interest of Sparta 170 Spartan garrisons in tlie < 'it ies ; Restoration of Plataia 170 Oligarchic and Democratic Parties 170 Weakness of the Democratic element in Bceotia 170 — 171 Thebes, hitherto the centre of Oligarchy, becomes, by her Revolution [ i.'. 379], the centre of Democracy 171 Career of Felopidas and Epaminondas 171 — 172 Bad results of Theban supremacy 172 Nomina] revival of the League 172 Real subjection of the .Lesser Cities to Thebes 172 — 174 D( traction of Bceotian Towns 174 — 175 General dislike towards Thehes throughout Greece 17;"' Gradual growth of the Theban claims 175 — 177 Parallel between Thebes in Bceotia and Sparta in Lakonia . 177 — 179 The claims of Thehes exclude all true Federalism in Bceotia . 17!" — 180 I.'' toration of the destroyed Towns 180 l ii traction of Thehes by Alexander [b.o. 885]. Zealous co-operation of the Boeotian Towns 180 CONTENTS. XXlli PAGE Third Period, B.C. 335—171 180 Restoration of Thebes by Kassander, B.C. 316 181 Restoration of the League with a modified Headship in Thebes 181 — 182 Insignificance of Bceotia in later Greece 182 Constitution of the League 182 — 184 Dissolution of the League by Quintus Marcius, b.c. 17] .... 184 §3. Of Various Attempts at Federal Systems. — Ionia, Olynthoa, Arkadia, dr. Unsuccessful attempts at Federal Union 185 Advice of Thales to the Ionians 185 — 186 Degree of connexion among the Ionian Cities ; no true Federal Union 186 Their relation essentially Amphiktyonic ; its differences from the elder Amphiktyonies 186 — 187 Thales probably intended a true Federal Union 187 — 188 His advice not taken ; its rejection a striking illustration of Greek political ideas 189—190 Attempted League of Olynthos dissolved by Sparta, B. c. 382 . . . 191 Fatal results to Greece from its dissolution 191 — 192 """Views of Mr. Grote too favourable to the designs of Olynthos . . 192 Proceedings of Olynthos as described by Kleigenes 192 The terms offered acceptable to the Macedonian Towns, but rejected by the Greeks of Ckalkidike 193—194 Their real nature not Federal Union, but absorption into Olyn- thos 194—197 Federal Union of Arkadia, B.C. 370 197 Little previous importance of Arkadia 197 History of Mantineia ; her destruction and restoration . . . 197 — 198 Arkadian Union hitherto merely Amphiktyonic 199 Lykomedes designs a true Federal Union 199 — 200 Temporary success of the Federal scheme 200 Foundation of Megalopolis 200 General adhesion of Arkadia to the League 201 Constitution of the League ; the Assembly of Ten Thousand . 201 — 203 Probable existence of a Senate 203 Institution of a sole General 204 Foundation of Megalopolis ; its advantageous position . . . 204 — 205 Decline of the Arkadian League ; history of Megalopolis . . 205 — 207 Pretended scheme of Federal Union in Euboia, B.c. 351 . . 207 — 208 Evidence of the growth of Federal ideas in Greece 208 § 4. OftJic Lykian League. The Lykian League ; its excellent Constitution 208 Strabo's description and testimony to its practical working . . . 209 Merits of the Lykian Constitution ; no Capital 210 The Assembly Primary, not Representative 210 — 211 XXIV CONTENTS PAGK Apportionment of votes to numbers 211 — 212 Approach to Representative Government 212 A Senate not mentioned, but to be inferred from analogy . . 212 — 213 Federal Magistrates 213 Date and Origin of Federal Government in Lykia 213 Relation of the Lykians to the Greeks 213 — 214 Lykia subject to Rhodes, B.C. 188 214 Traces of Federalism before the subjection of Rhodes . . . 214 — 215 Lykia independent, B.C. 168 215 Origin of the Constitution described by Strabo 216 Destruction of the League by Claudius, A. D.c. 50 .... 216 — 217 CHAPTER V. ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE, § 1. General Character of the History of Federal Greece. Common neglect in England of the History of Federal Greece 219 — 220 Earlier Grecian History mainly the History of Athens ; nullity of Athens in the Federal Period 220—223 Comparison between the earlier and later History of Greece . 223 — 224 Wide spread of Hellenic culture 224 Importance of this age in Universal History and in the History of the Greek race 224 Effects of Alexander's Conquests 225 Character of the age of Polybios 225—226 Comparison between Tlnicydides and Polybios 226 — 227 Beginnings of the Federal Revival, B.C. 281 228 Gaulish Invasion 228 Reconstruction of .Macedonia under the Antigonids 229 Revival of the Achaian League 229 ( ipposite aims of Macedonia and Achaia ; position of the Antigonid Kings 230 Condition of Greece under Philip and Alexander, and under the Successors 230—231 Position of revived Macedonia and Greece 231 Comparison ofJMacedonia in Greece with Austria in [taly . . 232 — 235 Generous aims of the Achaian League 235 An earlier establishment of Federalism in Greece qoI desirable 235 — 236 Effects of the League 236—237 S 2. Origin and Early Growth of (he League. Growth ol Federal ideas in Greece in the Fourth Century B.o. 237 — 238 Further Federal reaction against Macedonian influences .... 238 I [j tory ol Aeli.iin ; early Onion of the Achaian Towns . 238- 240 ;< i lazitj ofthe bond during tin Old League . . 240 CONTENTS. xxv PAGE Achaia during the Peloponnesian War 240 History of Pellene ; Tyranny of Chairon, B.C. 368—335 . . 241—242 Achaia under the Successors and under Antigonos Gonatas, b.c. 314—288 243 Final dissolution of the Old League 244 The Twelve original Cities ; loss of Helike and of Olenos . . 244 — 245 Traces of Federal action under the Old League 245 Beginnings of the revived League ; Union of Patrai and Dyme [b.c. 280], of Tritaia and Pharai 245—246 Union of Aigion, Boura, and Keryneia, B.c. 275 246 Extension of the League over all Achaia 246 — 247 Loss sustained hy Patrai in the Gardish War 247 Quiet and peaceful growth of the League 248 Markos of Keryneia prohahly the true Founder of the League 248 — 249 I seas of Keryneia ahdicates the Tyranny 249 Nature of the Greek Tyrannies ; difference between their earlier and later forms • 249—252 § 3. Of the Achaian Federal Constitution. Probable formal enactment of the Federal Constitution, b.c.c. 274 . 254 Sources of information 254 The Constitution formed for the Achaian Towns only 254 Democratic Constitution of the League 254 — 255 Differences between Achaian and Athenian Democracy .... 255 Independence of the several Cities 256 Subject Districts or Dependent Towns 256 — 257 Tendencies to assimilation among the members of the League, both in Achaia and in America 257 — 259 The League really a National Government 259 No independent Diplomatic Action in the several Cities .... 260 Comparison with America ; the restriction less strict in Achaia 260 — 261 Particular Embassies by licence of the Federal body . . . 261 — 262 Later exceptions under Pioman influence 262 The Federal Assembly ; its Democratic Constitution . . . 263—264 Aristocratic elements in Achaia 264 Contrast with Athens ; the Achaian Constitution a nearer approach to modern systems 264 — 265 Causes of the difference, arising mainly from the greater extent of territory in Achaia 265—266 The Assembly practically Aristocratic 266 — 267 Its nature not understood by Continental Scholars 267 Analogies in England 268 Practical Democratical elements 269 — 270 Votes taken by Cities, not by heads 270 Advantages and disadvantages of this system of voting . . 271 — 274 General merits of the Achaian Constitution 274 XXVI CONTENTS. PAGE Short and unfrequent Meetings of the Assembly ; consequent restrictions on its powers 275 — 276 The Initiative practically in the Government 276 Place of Meeting ; first Aigion, afterwards other Cities ; advantages of Aigion 276-277 Greater power of Magistrates in Achaia than at Athens .... 278 The Achaian Magistrates form a "Government" 278 — 279 Comparison with America and England 279 — 280 Various Federal Offices 280—282 The ten Ministers : probably chosen from all the Cities indis- criminately 282 — 283 Relations of the Ministers to the General 284 An Achaian " Caucus " 285 The President or General 285 Powers and number of the Generals in other Greek States .... 286 Two Generals of the Achaian League reduced to One . . . 286 — 287 Extensive powers of the Office ; comparison with a modern First Minister 287—288 Comparison of Aratos and Perikles 288 Greater importance of Office in Achaia than at Athens . . . 289—290 Comparison of the Achaian General, the American President, and the English First Minister 290—291 Closer approach to the English system in Achaia, owing to the General being himself a Member of the Assembly . . . 291 — 292 Greater power in the General necessary in a Federal than in a City Democracy 292—293 Chief Federal Offices unpaid, but without a property qualifica- tion 293—296 Power of summoning Assemblies vested in the General in Council . 296 The Ministers act as Speak ers of the Assembly 296—297 Joint action of the. General ami Ministers in diplomatic matters 297—298 Unrestrained power of ihe General in "War 298 Union of military and political powers contrary to modern usage 298—299 The General's title military, but his badge of office civil .... 299 Athenian experience on the union of civil and military powers; their gradual separation 300 — 301 The A* liaian system a ri-m-i imi ; its disadvantages 301 The Presidential intei pi gnum aggravated by the ani >f powers 301 — 302 Qui ti,,ii of re-election of the Presidenl ; the Achaian General incapable of immediate re-election 302 — 306 The Senate 306-308 Financial and Militarj policy of the League 809—810 Military Contingenl leredbj the Assembly 310 enarii i; Federal garrisons 31" — 311 General comparison between the Achaian League and the United States; their close general resemblance 311 CONTENTS. xxvii PACE Differences between a Confederation of Cities and a Confederation of States 312 Analogies and diversities in the position of the President . . 312 — 315 No exact parallel in Achaia to the American Senate .... 315 — 316 Closer analogy of the Norwegian Lagthing 316 — 317 Higher position of the Achaian Ministers 317 Achaia the more democratic in theory, and America in practice . . 318 The American Constitution not a conscious imitation of the Achaian 319 Eemarkahle treatment of the Achaian Histoiy in the "Feder- alist" 319—321 An unconscious, likeness to the ancient parallel, more valuable than a conscious one 321 — 322 CHAPTER VI. ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE jETOLIAN LEAGUE. General resemblances and differences between the Leagues of Achaia and .Etolia ; their practical teaching 323 — 326 Early Histoiy of yEtolia ; probable early approach to Federal Union 325—327 iEtolian acquisition of Naupaktos. B.C. 338 327 The League in the reign of Alexander. B.C. 336— 323 .... 328 Share of the ^Etolians in the Lamian "War. B.C. 323— 322 ... 329 iEtolia during the Wars of the Successors 329 Glimpses of ^EtoUan Constitution at this time 330 Share of the iEtolians in the Gaulish "War. B.C. 280 330 Annexation of Herakleia 330 Earlier development of iEtolia in some points ; closer union of the Cantons 331—332 iEtolia a League of Districts rather than of Cities .... 332 — 334 Democratic character of the League tempered with Aristocratic elements 334—335 Powers of the Assembly 335 The Senate of Apokletoi 336 Federal Magistrates 337—338 Powers of the General 338—339 Foreign Policy of the League ; contrast with Achaia . . . 339 — 342 Variety of relations in the iEtolian League 342 — 344 Differences of position among the conquered states .... 344 — 347 Comparisons with the different relations of British Dependencies . 347 Comparison between iEtolia and Switzerland 347 — 351 xxviii CONTENTS. CHAPTER VII. HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE TO THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA. — B.C. 281 — 222. § 1. From the Foundation of the Aclmian League to the Deliverance of Corinth. B.C. 281—243. B.C. PAGE 284—272 Revolutions of Greece and Macedonia during the first years of the League 353 State of Peloponnesos ; favourable position of the Achaian League 354 261 — 251 Ten years blank in Grecian history 355 255 Institution of the sole Generalship 355 Biographical character of the Achaian history . . 355 — 356 680—580 History of Sikyon ; its early Tyrants 357 365 Euphron founds Democracy 357 308 — 301 Sikyon under the Successors 358 301 — 251 Second period of Tyrants 358 Administration of Timokleidas and Kleinias 359 264 Tyranny of Abantidas ; escape of Aratos to Argos . . . 359 252—251 Tyranny of Paseas and of Nikokles 360—362 251 Deliverance and internal pacification of Sikyon by Aratos 362—364 251 Annexation of Sikyon to the Achaiau League . . 364 — 365 Importance and novelty of the step 365 — 367 Sikyon admitted on equal terms 367 — 368 251 — 245 Position of Aratofr ; his relations to Antigonos and Ptolemy 368—369 245 Aratos elected General of the Li tague 369 His permanent position and character 369 — 374 Effect of the onion of civil and military powers .... 374 245—244 First Generalship of Aratos 373 War with dStolia ; defeal of the Boeotians a1 < lhaironeia 374—376 243 — 242 Second Generalship of Aratos 376 Deliverance of Corinth, and its accession to the League . 377 Accessi f Megara, Troiz&L, and Epidauros .... 377 Position of Athens and Argos 378 Aohaian invasii E Attica 378 — 380 Vain-attempt to attach Athens to the League . . 379—380 Condition of Argos: succession of the Argeian Tyrants . 380 Tyranny of Aristomachos the Firal 380 Aratos encourages conspiracies against him 381 Greek view of Tyrants and Tyrant-slayers . . . 381 — 386 D.atli of Aii t achos the Firsl : succession of Aristippos the Second 386 CONTENTS. xxix B-C PAGE 243 — 242 Vain attempt of Aratos on Argos 386 Suit at Mantineia between Aristippos and the League . . 387 Ptolemy Philadelphos becomes tbe ally of tbe League 387 — 388 Aratos' pension from Ptolemy 388 Illustration of tbe Aebaian Constitution supplied by the first two Generalships of Aratos 388 — 390 § 2. From the Deliverance of Corinth to the Annexation of Argos. B.C. 243—228. 241—240 Third Generalship of Aratos 391 Eelatious of the League with Sparta 391 — 392 Contrast between Agis and Aratos 392 Difference in their plans for the campaign ; Agis retires . 393 Capture and recovery of Pellene 393 — 394 Truce with Antigonos ; alliance with vEtoha 395 239 Death of Antigonos Gonatas 395 Tbe Demetrian War 395 239 Unsuccessful attempt of Aratos on Peiraieus 396 Illustrations of tbe position of Aratos 396 — 397 239 — 229 Various attempts on Athens ; feeling towards Aratos there 397—398 243—229 Attempts of Aratos on Argos 398—399 Kleonai joins the League 399 Death of Aristippos the Second : tyranny of Aristomachos the Second 399—400 Eival celebrations of tbe Nemean Games .... 401 — 402 Extension of the two Leagues in Arkadia .... 402 — 403 E evolutions of Mantineia 403 — 404 Union of Megalopobs with the Aebaian League ; its effects. 404 Character of Lydiadas 404 — 407 233 Lydiadas chosen General 407 Eivalry of Aratos and Lydiadas 408 — 409 231 Second Generalship of Lydiadas 409 — 410 239—229 Affairs of Northern Greece ; Eevolution in Epehos . . 411 First political intercourse with Eonie 412 Hostility of the ^Etolians towards Akamania 412 239 — 229 Akarnanian Embassy to Eome 412 — 413 231 Siege and rebef of Medeon ; JLtohan Assembly in the camp 413—415 230 Eavages of the Illyrians in Peloponnesos and Epeiros . . 415 Alliance of Epeiros and Akamania with the Illyrians . . 416 229 Joint expedition of the two Leagues to relieve Korkyra 416 — 417 Death of Markos 417 Demetrios of Pharos 417 Interference of Eome 418 XXX CONTENTS. B.C. PAGE 229 Korkyra, Apollonia, and Epidamnos become Roman allies 418 Humiliation of Illyria 418—419 228 Roman Embassies to the two Leagues, and honorary Embassies to Corinth and Athens 419 — 420 Eventual results of Roman interference 420 229 Inaction of Macedonia ; death of Demetrios . . . 420 — 421 229 — 221 Protectorate and reign of Antigonos D6s6n . . . 421 — 422 Advance of the League after the death of Demetrios . . 422 229 Application of the Athenians to Aratos when out of office 422—423 Aratos buys the Macedonians out of Attica 424 Progress of the League ; union of Aigina and Hermione . 425 Unauthorized negociations of Aratos with Aristomachos of Argos 425—426 Lydiadas interferes as General 426 229 — 228 His proposal for the union of Argos rejected at the instance of Aratos, but carried on the motion of Aratos as General 426—427 Aristomachos General 428 Onion of Pillions with the League 428 Estimate of the conduct of Aratos 428 228 Commanding position of the Achaian League . . 429 — 430 § 3. From the beginning of the war vrith Klcomcnes to the opening of negotiations with Macedonia. b.c. 227—221. 371—227 Internal condition of Sparta 431—432 211 Reform and fate of Agia 432 236—222 Reign of Kleomenes 432 226— 225 Revolution of Kleomenfis 432—433 Relations between Sparta and the League .... 433 — 434 Differenl position of Sparta from the cities delivered by Aratos 435 War acceptable on both sides 436 — 437 position of the /Etolians; their inaction throughout the Kleomenie War ' . 437—438 Their acquisitions in Thessaly 438 •J2s S|i.irt;m aci|uisii.ioii of the AStolian towns in Arkadia . . 439 Achaian interests involved in this annexation . . . 439 — 440 Deliberations of the Achaian Governmenl 440 Attempt of Aratos on Tegea and Orchomenos. . . 440 — 441 227 Cleomenl i fortifies Athenaion 441 Achaian declaration ofwai ; annexation of Kaphyai to the League 441 — 442 227 226 Generalship of Aristomachos; battle hindered by the no rf( i' ace of Aratos i 12 1 1 1 CONTENTS. XXxi B.C. PAGE 226 Indignation against Aratos ; Lydiadas stands against bim for the Generalship 445 226—225 Twelfth (?) Generalship of Aratos 445 Aratos' campaign in Elis; his defeat at Mount Lykaion 445 — 446 Mantineia surprised by Aratos and re-admitted to the League 446— 44S Results of the recovery of Mantineia ; temporary depres- sion at Sparta 448 — 449 226 Battle of Ladokeia ; death of Lydiadas .... 449 — 451 Utter defeat of the Aekaians ; indignation against Aratos . 451 Assembly at Aigion ; strange vote of censure on Aratos 451 — 453 Aratos contemplates resignation, but recovers his influence 453 225—224 Generalship of Hyperbatas 453 Kleomenes' Revolution at Sparta 454 His successes in Arkadia ; he recovers Mantineia . . . 454 224 Third victory of Kleomenes at Hekatombaion .... 455 Position of Aratos and of Kleomenes 455 — 458 Probable nature of the supremacy claimed by Kleomenes 458 — 459 Aratos begins to look to Macedonia 460 — 461 Difference between his view and that of Plutarch or of modern writers 461 — 463 § 4. From the Opening of Negociations with Macedonia to the end of the War with Kleomenes. B.C. 224—221. 224 Twofold negociations with Sparta and Macedonia . . . 463 Beginning of negociations with Kleomenes 464 224 — 223 Aratos declines the Generalship ; Timoxenos elected 464 — 465 Beginning of negociations with Antigonos 465 Dealings of Aratos with Megalopolis ; commission from Megalopolis to the Federal Assembly .... 465 — 466 Megalopolitan envoys allowed to go to Macedonia . 467 — 468 Their favourable reception by Antigonos ; letter from Anti- gonos read in the Federal Assembly ; speech of Aratos thereon 469 — 471 Negociations with Kleomenes ; strong feeling in Ms favour 471 Negociations interrupted by Kleomenes 1 illness .... 471 Mission of young Aratos to Antigonos ; Antigonos de- mands Akrokorinthos 471 — 473 Kleomenes breaks off the negociations 473 — 474 Universal indignation at the thought of surrendering Corinth 474 — 475 Appearance of extreme factions in the Achaian cities ; they lean to Kleomenes 475 — 476 His schemes appeal to Town- Autonomy against the Federal principle 47(i — 477 XXX11 CONTENTS. B.C. PAGE 223 Kleomenes wins the Arkadian and Argolic Cities . 478 — 479 Violent proceedings of Aratos at Sikyon 479 Corinth calls in Kleomenes ; Megara joins the Boeotian League 479—480 No real argument against Federal Government to he drawn from these events 480 — 483 223 Effects of the loss of Corinth 483 Aratos invested with absolute power, and defended by a guard 484—485 223 He refuses the offers of Kleomenes, and asks for help of .Etolia and Athens 485—486 223 Final vote of the League to invite Antigonos and cede Akrokorinthos 486 Estimate of the conduct of Aratos 487 Lowered position of the League from this time . . 487 — 488 Comparison between Cavour and Aratos .... 4S8 — 491 223 — 222 Change in the character of the "War ; Kleomenes now the champion of Greece 491 Degradation of the League ; monstrous flattery of Anti- gonos 491 — 492 223—222 Recovery of the revolted cities 492—493 Argos returns to the League ; execution of Aristomachos 493 — 494 223 Antigonos put in possession of Akrokorinthos .... 494 222 Fate of Mantineia 495 Tegea united to the League 495 Antigonos keeps Orchomenos 496 222 Kleomenes takes Megalopolis ; first mention of Philopoimen 496 221 Battle of Bellasia ; defeat and exile of Kleomenes . . . 497 Antigonos' treatment of Sparta 497 221 Death and character of Antigonos 497 — 498 New position of the League 498 CHAPTER VIII. HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE FROM THE 11ATTLE OF SELLASIA TO 'I m; it. \i B OF EPEIROS. i i.e.— 221— 205. State of Greece after the fall of Kleomenes 499 Grand alliance under Macedonian heaclsh i p . . . 499 — 500 [nternal and external condition of the . A< haian League 52 Undiminished influence of Aratos; his relation to the Macedonian Kings ;">o-j r>o:< Character of Philopoime'n ; comparison between him and Aratos 503—504 Withdrawal of Philopoimen from Peloponnesos ; probable • planal ion of his conducl oil I 5iuan Senate 658—659 17:» I7s Kiilliknitrs elected Genera] 659 1 7J L68 Effectsofthe war with Perseus on the Federal states . . 659 Greei patriotic feeling now on the Macedonian side . . 659 < lharacter of Perseus 660 Character of L /Kmilius Paullus 661 178 Dependent condition of /Etolia ; civil dissensions '> be applied to any union of component members, ' ;i| i" u " where the decree of union between the members sur- DEFINITION OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 3 passes that of mere alliance, however intimate, and chap. i. where the degree of independence possessed by each member surpasses anything which can fairly come under the head of merely municipal freedom. Such unions have been common in many ages and countries, and many of them have been far from realizing the full ideal of a Federal Government. That ideal, in its highest and most elaborate development, is the most finished and the most artificial production of political ingenuity. It is hardly possible that Federal Government can attain its perfect form except in a highly refined age, and among a people whose political education has already stretched over many generations. Two requisites seem necessary to constitute Definition a Federal Government in this its most perfect form. On Federal 6 ° the one hand, each of the members of the Union must Gov< : m - ' I. ment. be wholly independent in those matters which concern each member only. On the other hand, all must be sub- ject to a common power in those matters which concern the whole body of members collectively. Thus each jnem- Internal Ber w ill fix for itself the laws of its criminal jurisprudence, fon&eof and even the details of its political constitution. And it the s . everal x members. will do this, not as- a matter of privilege or concession from any higher power, but as a ma tter of absolute right, by virtue of its inherent powers as an independent commonwealth. But in all matters which concern the general body, the sovereignty of the several members will cease. Each member is perfectly independent within its own sphere ; but there is another sphere in which its independence, or rather its separate existence, vanishes. It is invested with every right of sovereignty on one class Sove- of subjects, but there is another class of subjects on which thfunion it is as incapable of separate political action as any pro- m aI1 vince or city of a monarchy or of an indivisible republic, matters. The making of peace and war, the sending and receiving of ambassadors, generally all that comes within the depart- B 2 GENERAL INTRODUCTION. CHAP. I. Wider range of the his- torical view. ■ of triples pucid illustra- tion. ment of International Law, will be reserved wholly to the central power. Indeed, the very existence of the several members of the Union will be diplomatically unknown to foreign nations, which will never be called upon to deal with any power except the Central Government. A Federal Union, in short, will form one State in relation to other powers, but many States as regards its internal admini- stration. This complete division of sovereignty we may look upon as essential to the absolute perfection of the Federal ideal. But that ideal is one so very refined and artificial, that it seems not to have been attained more than four or five times in the history of the world. But a History of Federal Government must embrace a much wider range of subjects than merely the history of those states which have actually realized the Federal idea. We must look at the idea in its germ as well as in its per- fection. We shall learn better to understand what perfect Federalism is by comparing it with Federalism in a less fully-developed shape. In order thus to trace the Federal principle from its birth, we shall have to go back to very early times, and, in some cases, to very rude states of society. But of course it will not be needful to dwell at much length on those commonwealths of whose con- stitution and history it would be impossible to give any detailed account. For some commonwealths, which may fairly claim the name of Federal Governments in the wider sense. ;i mere glance will be enough. Our mure detailed examination must be reserved for a few more illustrious exam | tics of Federal Union. There are a few famous i commonwealths which, either from having perfectly, or nearly perfectly, realized the Federal idea, or else from their importance and celebrity in the general history of the world, stand out conspicuously at the very iirst glimpse of the Bubject, and whose constitution and history will deserve and repay our moat attentive study FOUR GREAT FEDERAL COMMONWEALTHS. 5 Four Federal Commonwealths, then, stand out, in four chap. i. different ages of the world, as commanding, above all others, the attention of students of political history. Of these four, one belongs to what is usually known as Four great "ancient," another to what is commonly called " me- f Federal direval " history ; a third arose in the period of transition G 07 ^™- between mediaeval and modern history ; the creation of the fourth may have been witnessed by some few of those who are still counted among living men. Of these four, again, one has been a thing of the past for many centuries ; another has so changed its form that it can no longer claim a place among Federal Governments ; but the other two, one of them among the least, the other among the greatest, of independent powers, still remain, exhibiting Federalism in a perfect, or nearly perfect, form, standing, in the Old World and in the New, as living examples of the strength and the weakness of the most elaborate of political combinations. These four famous Commonwealths are, First, the Achaian League in the later days of The Ancient Greece, whose most flourishing period comes League, within the third century before our own era. ^ 281 ~ Second, the Confederation of the Swiss Cantons, The Swiss which, with many changes in its extent and constitution, ^ D 1291L has lasted from the thirteenth century to our own day. 1862 - Third, the Seven United Provinces of the Nether- The LANDS, whose Union arose in the War of Independence p^" 20 against Spain, and lasted, in a republican form, till the vmc ?^ w „ A. P. 10/ 9- War of the French Revolution. 1795. Fourth, the United States of North America, The which formed a Federal Union after their revolt from the states' British Crown under George the Third, and whose destiny *■£ 1778 ~ 6 C4ENERAL INTRODUCTION. chap. i. forms one of the most important, and certainly the most interesting, of the political problems of our own time. Of these Four, three come sufficiently near to the full realization of the Federal idea to be entitled to rank Character- among perfect Federal Governments. The Achaian League, lstics of the Four au -d the United States since the adoption of the present federal ° U Constitution, are indeed the most perfect developments of tioua. the Federal principle which the world has ever seen. The Swiss Confederation, in its origin a Union of the loosest kind, has gradually drawn the Federal bond tighter aud tighter, till, within our own times, it has assumed a form which fairly entitles it to rank beside Achaia and America. The claim of the United Provinces is more doubtful; 1 their union was at no period of their republican being so close as that of Achaia, America, and modern Switzerland. But the important place which the United Provinces once filled in European history, and the curious and instructive nature of their political institutions, fully entitle them to a place in the first rank for the purposes of the present History. All these four then I purpose to treat of at some considerable length. Over less perfect or less illustrious examples of the Federal system I shall glance more lightly, or use them chiefly by way of contrast to point out more clearly the distinguishing characteristics of these four great TheGer- examples. Thus, for instance, the modern German Con- federation, federation is, in point of territorial extent and of the power of many of the states which compose it, of far greater importance than any of the European instances among the Four. But its constitution is so widely removed from the perfection of the Federal idea that, for our presenl purpose, this Union, which includes two of the Greal Powers of Europe, is chiefly valuable as illustrating by contrast bhei '<• perfect constitutions of Achaia and 1 Sec Motley'e Rise oi the Dutch Republic, iii, H5. OTHER FEDERATIONS. 7 Switzerland. On the other hand there can be little doubt chap. i. that there were in the ancient world several other Confede- Other rations, whose constitutions must have realized the Federal examples ; idea almost as perfectly as the more famous League of Achaia. But some of these possessed so little influence in the world, that they can hardly be said to have a history. In the case of others we know absolutely nothing of the details of their constitutions. Northern Greece, especially, in Greece ; in the later days of Grecian freedom, abounded in small Federal States, but we have no such minute knowledge of their history and constitution as we have of those of Achaia. Even the great and important League of ^Etolia, so long the rival of Achaia, is far better known to us in its external history than hi its internal constitution. Again it in Italy ; is clear that the Thirty Cities of Latium, and probably some other similar Leagues among the old Italian com- monwealths, must have been united by a Federal bond of a very close kind. But we know hardly anything about them except what may be picked up from the half-mythical narratives of their wars and alliances with Rome. Lykia in Lykia. too, beyond all doubt, had a Federal constitution which was in some respects more perfect than that of Achaia itself. But then Lykia has nothing which can be called a historv, and its Federal constitution arose at so late a period that its independence was provincial rather than strictly national. So, in later times, the Swiss Confe- Other deration was really only one of several unions of German leagues ; cities, which happened to obtain greater importance and permanence than the rest. One of these unions, the famous League of the Hanse Towns, still exists, though the Hanse with diminished splendour, in our own day. So, in days later still, the precedent of Federal union given by the English settlements in North America, has been followed, other though as yet with but little success or credit, by several of coSe" the Republics which have arisen among the ruins of Spanish latuns - 8 GENERAL INTRODUCTION. chap i dominion in the same continent. All these instances, Greek, Italian, German, and American, will demand some notice in the course of our present inquiry. But they will not need that full and minute attention which must be reserved for Achaia, Switzerland, the United Provinces, and the United States. Before, however, we go on to describe in detail the constitution and history of any particular Federal state, it will be desirable to make some further remarks on Federal Government in general, and to draw out at some length the points of contrast between that and other political systems. CHAPTER II CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED WITH OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS. I HAVE already given something like a definition of CHAP " "' Federal Government in its perfect form, premising that that perfect form is not to be looked for in all the examples which will come under our present survey. We have seen that it is not to be found in all even of the four illustrious Confederations which I have selected for special examination. Compared with the constitutions of Achaia and America, the Federal compact of the Swiss Cantons before the French Revolution, and even the Union of the Seven Provinces, will appear to be only remote approaches to the Federal idea. But in the present Chapter, where I propose to contrast Fede- ralism with other political systems, I shall take my picture of a Federal Government wholly from the most perfect examples. Much, therefore, that I shall say, will be quite inapplicable to the United Provinces or to the old Swiss League, much more so to the so-called German Confederation of our own day. A Federal Commonwealth, then, in its perfect form, is one which forms a single state in its relations to other nations, but which consists of many states with regard to its internal government. Thus the City of Megalopolis in old times, the State of New York or the Canton of Zurich now, has absolutely no separate existence in the face of other powers : it cannot make 10 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. CHAP. II. Illustra- tions of the relations of the members in a perfect Federal Common- wealth. Two con- ditions of a true Federal Govern- ment. war or peace, or maintain ambassadors or consuls. The common Federal Government of Achaia, America, or Switzerland, is the only body with which foreign nations can have any intercourse. But the internal laws, the law of real property, the criminal law, even the electoral law, may be utterly different at Mega- lopolis and at Sikyon, at New York and in Illinois, at Zurich and at Geneva. Nor is there any power in the Assembly at Aigion, the Congress at Washington, or the Federal Council at Bern, to bring their diversi- ties into harmony. In one point of view there is only a single commonwealth, as truly a national whole as France or Spain ; in another point of view, there is a collection of sovereign commonwealths as independent of one another as France and Spain can be. We may then recognize as a true and perfect Federal Common- wealth any collection of states in which it is equally unlawful for the Central Power to interfere with the purely internal legislation of the several members, and for the several members to enter into any diplomatic relations ' with other powers. Where the first con- dition is not obtained, the several members arc not sovereign.; their independence, however extensive in practice, is a merely municipal independence. Where the second condition is not obtained, the union, how- ever ancient and intimate, is that of a mere Con- federacy rather than that of a real Confederation. lint another distinction will here arise. Even among those commonwealths which at once secure to every member full internal independence, and refuse to every member any separate external action, there may be 1 I reserve the exceptional ease, to be discussed in the course of the history, oi a particular State holding diplomatic intercourse with foreign powers by expre • licence of the Federal power, See an instance in Polybios, ii. 18. This is most conspicuously a case in winch the • ti • |.: ion proi . the rule. TWO CLASSES OF FEDERATIONS. 11 wide diversities as to the way in which the Central chap. ii. Power exercises its peculiar functions. It is here that Two we reach that division of Federal Governments into Federal two classes which has been laid down by most of the Con " llou - J wealths. writers on the subject. In the one class the Federal First > TQ e t-» r* i> " System rower represents only the Governments of the several of Con- members of the Union; its immediate action is CGDr Stc J^» fined to those Governments ; its powers consist simply ^ here f^e \_ cllll HI in issuing requisitions to the State Governments, Power which, when within the proper limits of the Federal with the authority, it is the duty of those Governments to carry ^j*** rovern- out. If men or money be needed for Federal pur- ments. poses, the Federal Power will demand them of the several State Governments, which will raise them in such ways as each may think best. In the other class, Second, the Federal Power will be, in the strictest sense, a *f>, el seqq.) 1 Ait icle of I onfederation, Art. vi. § 1. 4 Bee Wneaton, i. 90. I'l.' attribute oi I ongress under the Confederation and under the SYSTEM OF REQUISITIONS. 13 Federal Power upon individuals, the objects of the chap. ix. Federal Union could not be carried out. The several State Governments are indeed, under the other system, constitutionally bound to carry out all requisitions which do not transcend the limits of the Federal authority. But we may be sure that the State Governments will Inade- i «tii f i uac y of always he under a strong temptation to disobey such the system requisitions, not only when they really transcend the sitioX 1 limits of the Federal authority, but also when they are simply displeasing to local interests or wishes. 1 Such a compact, in short, may constitutionally be a Federal Union, but practically it will amount to little more than a precarious alliance.' 2 Still a Confederation of this sort aims, however ineffectually, at being a true Federal Union. The American Confederation of 1778 professed, while the German Confederation does not profess, 3 to form one power, one nation, 4 or whatever may be the proper word, in the face of other powers and nations. The articles of Confederation wholly failed to carry out their own Constitution were (with some not very important exceptions) the same. "What was done was to make them real and effective in the only possible way, by making them operate directly on the people of the States, instead of on the States themselves." — Bernard, p. 69. 1 See Mill, p. 301. 2 Mill; Cf. Bernard, p. 68. See also Marshall's Life of Washington, iv. 256-62. 3 On the German Confederation, see Mill, p. 300. 4 I do not feel called upon, at all events at this stage of my work, to enter into the great American dispute between National and Federal (see Federalist, Nos. 39, 40 ; Tocqueville, i. 268 ; Calhoun, i. 112-161 ; Bernard, p. 72). I confess that it seems to me to be rather a question of words. A power which acts in all its relations with other powers, as a single indivisible unity, is surely a nation, whether its internal constitution be Federal or otherwise. So to call it in no way takes away from the independent rights of the several members. In the language of Polybios, the word edvos is constantly applied to the . Achaian and other Federal commonwealths ; indeed he seems to use it as the special formal title of such bodies. See, for instance, xx. 3, where $6vos, the Federal State, is opposed to iroKis, the single city-commonwealth. According to Toccpieville (i. 268) the American constitution is neither 14 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAI, GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. purpose ; and the closer union of 1787, under the existing constitution, was the result. Still, for my immediate purpose, it does not seem needful to attend very closely to the distinction between these two classes of Federa- tions. In many of the ancient Leagues with which we shall have to deal, it is evident that, on the one hand, the League formed a single state in the face of all other states, and that, on the other hand, the independence The dis- of the several members was strictly preserved. But it not ? always i s not always easy to say how far the Federal Assembly to be made j ^ ie p e j era i Magistrates exercised a direct power over m history. ° L the individual citizens of each city, and how far it was exercised through the Assemblies and Magistrates of the several cities. We know, for instance, that in the Achaian League there were Federal taxes ; x we do not know whether they were directly gathered by Federal collectors, or whether they were merely requisitions to the several cities, which their Assemblies and Magistrates apportioned by their own authority. The latter arrangement is just as likely as the former ; but, if it could be shown to be the plan actually in use, it would hardly have the eifect of degrading the Achaian League from the rank of a Composite State to that of a mere Confederacy. 2 It is enough to enable a commonwealth to rank, for our National nor Federal, bu1 some third thing, for which no name exists. He calls it "un gouvernemenl national ineomplet." The truest difference between a Federation and a perfectly consolidated Governmenl is thai already given. In a Federal state the several members retain their Bovereigntj within their own range : thai Is, the Federal power oannot alter their internal institutions. In an ordinary monarchy or mhlic, the supreme central power, in whomever it Lb vested, can alter the institutions of anj province or city. See Bernard, p. 71. ' Pol LV. 80. al Kotval flfftpopal. 2 Tl, hi of requisitions is indeed in no way eonlined to Federal commonwealths; it is quite compatible with monarchy, and indeed it has ceedinglj comm inder barbaric di potisins. The Sultan requin a certain contribution from a district, which the authorities of the diatrid h-\ bi I raita them. The royal administration is thus eased CLASSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENTS. 1 5 present purpose, as a true Federation, that the Union is chap. ii. one which preserves to the several members their full internal independence, while it denies to them all separate action in relation to foreign powers. The sovereignty is, in fact, divided ; the Government of the Federation and the Government of the State have a co-ordinate authority, each equally claiming allegiance within its own range. It is this system of divided sovereignty which I propose to contrast at some length with the other principal forms of government which have prevailed at different times among the most civilized nations of the world. Forms of government may be classified according to so Classifica- many principles that it is needful to state at the onset go^ern- what principle of division seems most suited for the nieut ; comparison which I have taken in hand. The old stereo- Monarchy, typed division into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, cracy, and is sufficient for many purposes. A more philosophical Dem °- division perhaps is that which does not look so much to the nature of the hands in which supreme power is vested, as to the question whether there is any one body or individual which can fairly be called supreme. This is the division of monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, respectively, into absolute and constitutional examples Absolute of their several classes. 1 Thus the old Athenian common- stitatioaal wealth, where all power was directly exercised by the Gov ^ rn * People, was an Absolute Democracy. An American State, on the other hand, where the People is recognised as the ultimate sovereign, where all power is held to flow from the people, but where a delegated authority is divided in different proportions between a Governor, a Senate, and a House of Representatives, is said to be an example of of a certain amount of trouble, and the district at once acquires a certain amount of municipal freedom. But that freedom, great or small, exists merely by concession or sufferance, not of right, as in a Federal State. 1 See Calhoun's Works, i. 28, 34, et seqq. 16 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. Constitutional Democracy. In this way of looking at them, an Absolute Government of any of the three kinds has quite as many points in common with an Absolute Government of one of the other kinds, as it has in common with a Constitutional Government of its own class. But neither of these divisions seems suited to our present purpose. A Federal commonwealth may be either aristo- cratic or democratic ; or some of its members may be A cross aristocratic and others democratic ; those Aristocracies needed? au( ^ Democracies again may exhibit either the Absolute or the Constitutional type of their own classes ; indeed, though Federal States have commonly been republican, there is nothing theoretically absurd in the idea of a Federal Monarchy. The classification of governments, which we must make in order to work out the required contrast between Federalism and other forms, will be in fact a cross division to the common classification into Monarchies, Aristocracies, and Democracies. Federalism, as I have already said, is essentially a compromise ; it is something intermediate between two extremes. A Federal Government is most likely to bo formed when the question arises whether several small states shall remain perfectly independent, or shall be consolidated into a single great Federalism state. A Federal tie harmonizes the two contending mi I "i!,"." principles by reconciling a certain amount of union with 1 "'"' '" , a certain amount of independence. A Federal Govern- lireal .iuu Small nient then is a mean between the system of large states and the system of small states. But both the large states, the small states, and the intermediate Federal system, may assume a democratic, an aristocratic, or even B monarchic form of government, just as may happen. The two extremes then, with which the Federal system has to be compared, arc the system of small states and the tern of large states. Speaking roughly, the one is the COMPROMISE BETWEEN LARGE AND SMALL STATES. 17 ordinary political system of what is called classical anti- chai\ n. quity, the other is the ordinary political system of modern Europe. The system of small states finds its most perfect developement in the independent city-commonwealths of Old Greece ; the system of large states finds its most perfect developement in the large monarchies of Europe in our own day. It is not too much to say that the largo and the small state alike may be either monarchic, aristo- cratic, or democratic. As a general rule, small states have flourished most as republics, and large states have flourished most as monarchies, and the natural tendency of the two classes of states seems to lie in those two directions respectively. But there is no sort of con- The tradiction in the idea of a small state being monarchic 1^™°" or of a large state being republican. Many small princi- *j™ of palities have enjoyed a fair amount of prosperity and several good government, and the experiment of governing a large Govem- country as a single republic has been so seldom tried that ment * we are hardly in position to decide whether it is neces- sarily a failure or not. l But, this question apart, it is clear that a small republic may be either aristocratic or demo- cratic, that a large kingdom may be either despotic or constitutional. And it is also clear that, while free states, great and small, have certain points of resemblance, large states and small states respectively have also some points of resemblance, irrespective of their several forms of government. It is in these points, where large states, whatever their constitution, form one class, and small states, whatever their constitution, form another, that Federalism takes its position, as a mean between the two, sharing some of the characteristics of both. I may add, that while Federalism, as a compromise, is liable to some of the inherent disadvantages of a compromise, it mani- festly, in those positions for which it is suited at all, goes 1 See Tocqueville, i. 270, 271 ; ii. 250. 18 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. a good way to unite the opposite advantages of the two opposite systems between which it stands as a mean term. I shall therefore now proceed, first to contrast at some length the two great systems of large and of small states, and then to show the way in which a Federal Government occupies a position intermediate between the two. ' Speaking roughly, I understand by a small state one in which it is possible that all the citizens may, if their con- stitution allows or requires it, habitually assemble for Definition political purposes in one place. By a large state I under- bid Small stand one in which such personal assemblage is impos- Statea sit>le ; one, therefore, where, if the state be constitutional, the constitution must be of the representative kind. The large state, however, to have all the characteristics and advantages of a large state, must commonly be much larger than is absolutely necessary to answer the terms of this definition. But I by no means intend to confine the name to what are commonly understood by the name of Great Powers. All the Kingdoms of Europe, and even some principalities which are not Kingdoms, will count as large states for the purposes of this inquiry. All alike share the characteristics which distinguish them from tho system of small states. The most perfect form of this last is found when every City, with its immediately surrounding territory, forms a commonwealth absolutely independent and enjoying all the rights of a sovereign power. This was the political system usual in the common- wealths of ancient, Greece and li.ik, and it has been fully elucidated by the various great modern writers on Greek and Roman historv, but most fully and elaborately by 1 ii tn.i\ be objected thai a Federation may consisl either of small or of ];n they are here defined [ ahall recur to this "point presently. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDEPENDENT CITY. 19 Mr. Grote. The ruling idea of the politicians of those chap. a. ages was what Mr. Grote calls the "autonomous city- Character- community." A man's "country 1 ," in those days, was not SS^S?" a region, but a city 2 ; his patriotism did not extend over a den tCity. wide surface of territory, but was shut up within the walls of a single town. His countrymen were not a whole nation of the same blood and language as himself, but merely those who shared with him in the local burghership of his native place. A man, in short, was not a Greek or an Patriotism Italian, but an Athenian or a Roman. Undoubtedly he JhoCity. 10 had a feeling, which may, in a certain sense, be called a patriotic feeling, for Greece or Italy as wholes, as opposed to Persia or Carthage. But this feeling was rather analo- gous to that which modern Europeans entertain for the great brotherhood of European and Christian nations, than to the national patriotism which an Englishman or a Frenchman entertains for England or France. The tie between Greek and Greek was indeed closer than the tie between European and European, but it was essen- tially a tie of the same kind. Real patriotism, the feeling which we extend to regions far larger than the whole of Greece, did not reach beyond the limits of a single Grecian city. This state of things is by no means pecu- liar to ancient Greece and Italy ; traces of it are still to be seen in modem Europe ; and it existed in its full force in some European states down to very recent times. But it was in the brilliant times of ancient Greece and Italy that this system found its fullest developement, and that it made its nearest approach to being universal over the civilized world. In modern Europe independent cities have existed and flourished ; a few indeed even now 1 Xlarpis. The same use of the word is common in Modem Greek. 2 Aristotle excludes from his definition of iruAis anything at all ap- proaching to the size of a nation. Babylon is hardly a city — e'xr any loss of purely local freedom; it was the loss of all share in Sovereignty in the highest sense Lewis, Governmanl of Dependencies, p, 166, el seqjj. '-' Thai there were isolated cases of oppression on the pari of individual Athenian commanders, like Pachfis, there is no doubt. But there was tainlj no habitual oppression ea the part 06 the Athenian government. COMPARISON OF DEPENDENCIES — ENGLISH COLONIES. 27 which the Greek city deplored when it was reduced to chap. n. a condition of dependent alliance. It follows therefore that a system like the Athenian Alliance or Empire always remained a system of detached units. A Greek city either remained independent, retaining its full sovereign rights, or else it became more or less dependent upon some stronger city. There was no means No means by which it was possible to fuse any large number of cities, portion" like the members of the Athenian Alliance, into a single ", uder ° the system body with equal rights common to all. A Federal Union of Inde- easily effects this end, but it effects it only by depriving cities. each city of the most precious attributes of separate sove- reignty. A Constitutional Monarchy, by means of the repre- sentative system, also easily effects it, though of course at a still greater sacrifice of local independence. Even under a despotism, there is not the slightest need for placing the inhabitants of a conquered, ceded, or inherited province in any worse position than the inhabitants of the original kingdom. But a Greek city had no choice but either absolute independence or a position of decided inferiority to some other city. It is clear that a city-commonwealth can incorporate only within very narrow limits. In such a commonwealth the city itself is everything in a way into which the inhabitants of large kingdoms can hardly enter. And the representative system, by which all the inhabitants of a large country are enabled to have a share in the government, is not likely to occur to men's minds in such a state of things. Every citizen in a Democracy, This has been forcibly brought out by Mr. Grote (vi. 47, and elsewhere). See also North British Review, May, 1856, p. 169. Cf. Lewis, Government of Dependencies, p. 102. I have drawn my picture of a Greek dependent city from the most favoured of the Athenian allies. But the condition of different allies of Athens differed much ; and the position of a dependency of Sparta or Thebes in the next generation was far inferior to that of the least favoured subject of Athens. Cities. 28 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. every citizen of the ruling order in an Aristocracy, deems it his inalienable right to discharge his political functions in his own person. Consequently incorporation cannot be carried out over an extent of territory so large as to prevent the whole ruling body from habitually assembling in the Incorpo- city. Athens indeed, in a remote and unchronicled age, carried as actually carried incorporation as far as a city-common- ^biebv wea lth could carry it. There is no record of the causes Athens, an{ j circumstances of the change, but there is no reasonable doubt that the smaller towns of Attica, Eleusis, Marathon, and the rest, were once independent states, 1 which were afterwards incorporated with Athens, not as subjects of the ruling commonwealth, but as municipal towns whose inha- bitants possessed the common Athenian franchise equally in the case with the inhabitants of the capital.' 2 But then Attica was Attic not so large a territory as to hinder all its free inhabitants from frequently meeting together in a capital whose position was admirably central. All Attica therefore was really incorporated with Athens. Athens became the only City, in the highest sense, in all Attica, and all the free inhabi- 1 Sec North British Review, May, 1856, p. 150. 2 There can he no douht that this incorporation was the main causo of the great power and importance of Athens. As such, it is one of the great events in t lie history of the world. No other Creek city possessed so large an immediate territory, or so great a number of free and equal citizens. The territory <>f Sparta was much larger; hut then Sparta held the Lakonian towns as subjects; their inhabitants had no voice in general politics; whatever freedom they had was merely th.it of municipalities under a despotism. Thebes called herself the head of a I'xeotian League, hut the smaller Boeotian towns, as we shall see when we reach that part oi her history, looked on her as a Tyrant rather than as a President. A Boeotian town was practically a Bubject dependency of Thebes, but throughout Attica, n territory hardly smaller than Bceotia, the smaller towns were free municipalities, and their inhabitants were citizens of Athens. This was a wonderful advantage, precluding all fear of internal -.ii or discontent . There is :i dialogue in Kenophdn, comparing Bceotia and Alliens at hiigth. in Which the Athenians are always set against the Iheutians as a whole, nol againsJ the Thebana only. m)kovv olada, %T\, '6ti 7rArfflct fitv oiikv fulavi tlfflv ' Mrfvaioi Hoiutwv ; olfia yap, tf Flanders can hardly be separated from that of the neighbouring and kindred provinces which were all fiefs of the Empire. Provence, of course, was aol French till late in the fifteenth century. 3 The Emperor of course was supreme, in theory at least, everywhere. Bu1 the independence of a town was often much more practically modified by the neighbourhood of some local Duke, ('..nut, or Bishop. GENEKAL ASPECT OF CITY-COMMONWEALTHS. 33 some vague and shadowy superiority over them belonged chap. h. of right to the chosen King of Germany and Italy, the crowned and anointed Emperor of the Romans. From all these causes, the independence of city-common- wealths, even in mediaeval, and still more in modern, Europe, must be looked on as merely a secondary element, existing only in an imperfect shape. It is to old Greece that we must ever look for its one great and splendid manifestation. Let us now strive to picture to ourselves the condition of a country whose great political doctrine is that of the perfect independence of each separate city. Such a land is crowded with towns, each of them acknowledging no superior upon earth and exercising all the rights of sovereignty as fully as the mightiest empires. Within General limits, it may be, less than those of an English county, thTIyftem among a people one in blood, language, manners, and of I j ule - religion, you may pass, in a short day's journey, through Cities. several independent states, each of which makes war and peace at its pleasure, and whose relations to its neighbours are regulated only by the public Law of Nations. From any lofty peak you may look down on several capitals at a glance, and see the territory of several sovereign commonwealths lying before you as in a map. Within this narrow compass there may be perfect examples of every varying shade of political constitution. In one city pure Democracy may reign ; magistrates may be chosen, laws may be enacted, treaties may be ratified, by an Assembly in which every free citizen has an equal voice. In another, an hour or two from its gates, all Varieties power may be in the hands of a narrow Oligarchy, who Constitu- bind themselves by oath to be evil-minded to the People. 1 tlons ' 1 Al'ist. Pol. V. 9, 11. tivv jxkv yap ev iviais [dAiyapx'iats] ofii'vovm, " Ka\ rw Srffj.0) ko.k6vovs ea-ofxca, Ka\ f}ov\cv ra a i I foi th in I hucydidi i, i. 82, 37. VARIETIES IN THEIR CONSTITUTIONS AND RELATIONS. 35 yet be attached to each other by ancient affection ; they cuap. n. may be accustomed to have friends and enemies in common, and they may, without resigning any portion of their independent sovereignty, habitually follow the political lead of some mightier and more venerable city. 1 Others may have sunk from independent into dependent alliance ; their internal laws and government may be their own, but their fleets and armies may be at the absolute control of another state. 2 Or they may even be without any fleet or army of their own ; they may pay tribute to some imperial city, which engages in return to defend them against all aggressors. 3 Or some unhappy cities may have fallen lower still ; dependent alliance may have sunk into absolute subjection. Law and life and property may all be at the absolute com- mand of a foreign governor, for whom even the domestic Tyrant would be a good exchange. And his yoke may be embittered rather than alleviated, Avhen his power is supported by the intrigues of degenerate citizens who find their private advantage in the degradation of their native city. 4 Again, as there may be every conceivable variety of relation between city and city, so we may also find, within the same narrow compass, every con- 1 This was the condition of the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta during the great Peloponnesian War. Lacedsemon took the habitual lead, but matters of common interest were debated by the voices of the whole Confederacy, and each city was free to act, or not to act, as it thought good. See Thuc. i. 125 ; v. 30 ; Grote, vi. 105. It is instructive to see how, after the temporary confusions following the Peace of Nikias (B.C. 421), the different states gradually fell back into their old places and relations. Cf. Xen. Hell. vii. 4, 8. 2 This was the condition of Chios, Mitylene, and the other allies of Athens which never exchanged contributions of men for contributions of money. See Grote, vi. 2. 3 This was the condition of the great mass of the Athenian allies. 4 This was the condition of the extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta after the great victory of Aigospotamos (b.c. 405). On the harmosts and dekarchies, see Grote, ix. 271, et seqq. ; Isok. Panath. 58. D 2 36 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. CHAP. II. Different relation between the City and its Territory. ceivable variety of relation between the city itself and its surrounding territory. In one district, as we have seen in the case of Attica, every free inhabitant, that is every man who is neither a slave nor a foreigner, 1 enjoys the full franchise of the City, votes in its Assemblies, and is eligible to its honours. In another, the rural inhabitants may be personally free, protected by the laws in all their private rights, but shut out from the political franchise, subjects in short, rather than citizens, of the sovereign commonwealth. 2 In the third, the City, the abode of free warrior-nobles, may be surrounded by lands tilled for them by serfs, Lakonian Helots or Thessalian Penests, whose highest privilege is to be the slaves of the Common- wealth, and not the slaves of any individual master. But, in all these cases alike, the City is the only recognized political existence. Each city is either sovereign or deems itself wronged by being shorn of sovereignty. At a few miles from the gates of one independent city we may find another, speaking the same tongue, worshipping the same gods, sharing in the same national festivals, but living under different municipal laws, different political consti- tutions, with a different coinage, different weights and measures, different names, it may be, for the very months of the year, levying duties at its frontiers, making war, making peace, sending forth its Ambassadors under the protection of the Law of Nations, and investing the bands winch wage its border warfare with all the rights of the jinnies and the commanders of belligerent empires. Now what is the comparative gain and loss of such a 1 It must be of course borne in mind thai the children of a foreigner, though born in Hi" land, still remained foreigners. This seems strange to ob as applied to the question of nationality, but it is simply the rule- of burghership as it was carried <>ut in many an old English borough. 2 This is essentially the condition <>r the Lakonian irfptotKoi. They had towns, but all notion of their separate political being was so utterly lost, that their inhabitants had more in common with a rural population. ADVANTAGES OF SMALL COMMONWEALTHS. 37 political system as this? There are great and obvious chap. n. advantages, balanced by great and obvious drawbacks. Compara- Let us first look at the bright side of a system to which andlossof the nation on which the world must ever look as its tnesvstem - first teacher owed the most brilliant pages of that history which still remains the text-book of all political knowledge. First of all, it is clear that, in a system of city-common- Advan- wealths, the individual citizen is educated, worked up, sma \\ improved, to the highest possible pitch. Every citizen in ^"jTh™" the Democracy, every citizen of the ruling order in the Aristocracy, is himself statesman, judge, and warrior. English readers are apt to blame such a government as the Athenian Democracy for placing power in hands unfit to use it. The truer way of putting the case would be to say that the Athenian Democracy made a greater number of citizens fit to use power than could be made fit by any other system. No mistake can be greater than to suppose Political that the popular Assembly at Athens was a mob such as f t he gathers at some English elections, or such as the Assembly cS^ 1 of the Roman Tribes undoubtedly became in its later days. It was not an indiscriminate gathering together of every male human being to be found in the streets of Athens. Citizenship was something definite ; if it was a right, it was also a privilege. The citizen of Athens was in truth placed in something of an aristocratic position ; he looked down upon the vulgar herd of slaves, freedmen, and unqualified residents, much as his own plebeian fathers had been looked down upon by the old Eupatrids in the days before Kleisthenes and Solon. 1 The Athenian 1 This quasi-aristocratic position of the citizen necessarily follows from the nature of a civic franchise. The freedom of the city could be acquired only by inheritance or by special grant. But in a great commercial and imperial city like Athens a large unqualified population naturally arose, 38 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap, ii Assembly was an assembly of citizens, of ordinary citizens without sifting or selection ; but it was an assembly of among -whom the citizens held a sort of aristocratic rank. Such an unqualified population may exist either in an Oligarchy or in a Democracy, and their position is legally the same in either case. The difference between Oligarchy and Democracy is a difference within the citizen class. In a Democracy civil and political rights are coextensive ; in an Oli- garchy political rights are confined to a portion only of those who enjoy civil rights. The really weak point of Greek Democracy is one which I have not mentioned in the text, because I Avish to make my remarks as far as possible applicable to city-commonwealths in general, whether aristocratic or democratic. Each gives the same political education to those who exercise political rights ; the difference is that in the Democracy this education is extended to all the citizens, in the Aristocracy it is confined to a part of them. The real special weakness of pure Democracy is that it almost seems to require slavery as a necessary condition of its existence. It is hard to conceive that a large body of men, like the qualified citizens of Athens, can ever give so large a portion of their time as the Athenians did to the business of ruling and judging {apx*tv na\ 8iKa£eii>), without the existence of an inferior class to relieve them from at least the lowest and most menial duties of then- several callings. Slavery therefore is commonly taken for granted by Greek political thinkers. In Aristotle's ideal city (Pol. vii. 10, 13) the earth is to be tilled either by slaves or by barbarian ireploiKoi. In an Aristocracy no such constant demands arc made on the time of the great mass of the citizens ; in an Aristocracy therefore slavery is not theoretically necessary. It might therefore be argued that Democracy, as requiring part of the population to be in absolute bondage, was really less favourable to freedom than Aristocracy. In the Aristo- cracy, it might be said, though the | >• >[ i t icaJ rights of i lie ordinary citizen were narrower, it was still possible thai eyery human being might be personally free. Bui the experience of Grecian history does not bear out sueli .-in inference. Slavery was no special sin of Democracy ; it was an institution common to the whole ancienl world, quite irrespective of particular forms of government. And in fact, the tone of feeling, the general seiili lit of freedom and equality, engendered by a democratic constitution actually benefitted those who were without the pale of citizen- hip or even of personal freedom. It must doubtless have been deeply ailing to a wealthy fxiroucos, whose ancestors had perhaps lived at Athens for several generations, to ■■> <■ the meanest hereditary burgher preferred to him "ii all OCCffi ion I. It must have been more galling than it was ill a city like Corinth, where strangers and citizens were alike subject to the ruling order. Bn1 Dei iracj really benefitted both the slave and the stranger. The slave was far better off in democratic Athens than in aristocratic Sparta or Chios. (On the Chian slaves, see Time. viii. 40.) The author of the strange libel on the Athenian Commonwealth attributed to Xenophfln POLITICAL EDUCATION OF THE CITIZENS. 39 citizens among whom the political average stood higher chap. a. than it ever did in any other state. Our own House of Commons, though a select body, does not necessarily consist of the 658 wisest men among the British people. Many of its members will always be mere average citizens, Compaxi- neither better nor worse than many among their con- ^ E ng . stituents. A town sends a wealthy and popular trader, JJcom^ an average specimen of his class. A county sends a mons. wealthy and popular country gentleman, an average specimen of his class. Very likely several of those who vote for them are much deeper political thinkers than themselves. But the average member so elected, if he really be up to the average and not below it, will derive unspeakable benefit from his political education in the House itself. He cannot fail to learn much from the mere habit of exercising power in an assembly at once free and orderly, and from the opportunity of hearing the speeches and following the guidance of those who are really fitted to be the leaders of men. This sort of advan- tage, this good political education, which the English con- stitution gives to some hundreds of average Englishmen, the Athenian constitution gave to some thousands of average Athenians. Doubtless an assembly of thousands was less orderly than an assembly of hundreds; but it must never be thought that the Athenian Ekklesia was a makes it a sign of the bad government of Athens that an Athenian could not venture to beat a stranger (/xeroiicos) or another man's slave ! (Xen. de Rep. Ath. i. 10.) This accusation speaks volumes as to the condition of slaves and strangers in aristocratic cities. In modern times the experiment of a perfectly pure Democracy, one, that is, in which every citizen has a direct vote on all questions, has been confined to a few rural Cantons, where the demands on the citizen's time are immeasureably smaller than they must be in a great city. The question of slavery therefore has not arisen. American slavery is, of course, a wholly different matter. On the general subject of ancient citizenship see Arnold, Time. vol. iii. p. xv. (Preface.) 40 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. n. mere unruly crowd, ignorant of all order and impatient of all restraint. The mode of proceeding was regulated by fixed rules just as much as the proceedings of our Parliaments. As far as we know the history of Athenian debates, breaches of order were rare, and scenes of actual violence — common enough in the Roman Forum — were absolutely unknown. It was surely no slight gain to bring so many human beings into a position habitually to hear — and that not as mere spectators, but as men with an interest and a voice in the matter — the arguments for and against a proposal brought forward by Themistokles and Aristeides, by Perikles and Thucydidcs, by Kleon and Nikias, by Demosthenes and Phokion. 1 It is the habitual practice of so doing which is the true gain. Popular Assemblies which are brought together only at rare in- tervals are incapable of wise political action, almost inca- « ontrast pable of free and regular debate. The Parliament of Florentine Florence, for instance, was a mere tumultuous mob, which ment. seldom did anything except vote away its own liberties. Such a political franchise could give no political education whatever. But the Athenian citizen, by constantly hearing questions of foreign policy and domestic administration freely argued by the greatest orators that the world ever saw, received a political education which nothing else in the history of mankind has ever been found to equal.' 2 1 Tocqueville, Dem. an Am. ii. 241. "C'est en participant a la legis- lation que l'Annrii ,iiu uptrend a eonmiitro les lois ; c'est en gouvemant, qu'il s'iustruii dea formes du gouvernement." How much more truly conkl this he said of llie Athenian. • One of the leu faults in M. de Tooqueville'a Democracy in America is liis failure to appreciate the Greek republics. Such words as the following .sound strange indeed to one who knows what Athens really was. " Quand j«' compare les republiques grecque et romaine a. ces republiques d'Amerique ; les bibliothequ.es manuserites des premieres et leur populace gi'ossiere, aux mille joiiinaux (|iii .sillonneut les sceondes et au peuple eelaire i j m - les habite," Sea. (ii. 287). Fancy the people who heard and appreciated fischylus, Perikles, and Aristophanes, called a "populace grossiere," '" i an e they had no newspapers to enlighten them ! Ami this by a writer THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. 41 The ordinary Athenian citizen then must really be chap. u. compared, not with the English ten-pound householder, Compari- but with the English Member of Parliament in the rank- Athenian and-file of his party. In some respects indeed the j£j^j e political education of the Athenian was higher than any English , . member. which a private member in our Parliament can derive from his parliamentary position. The comparison is in- structive in itself, and it is more closely connected with my immediate subject than might at first sight appear. When I come to the political history of the Achaian League, I shall have to compare the working of popular government, as applied to a large Confederation of cities, with its working as applied, on the one hand, to a single city like Athens, and, on the other, to a large country, whether a republic or a constitutional monarchy. Connexion of Afnp- I shall then show how the principles of the Achaian con- nian }lis . stitution, no less democratic in theory than the Athenian {Jj^jjjjj^ constitution, were modified in practice by the require- of Fede- ■po 1 1 CTY1 ments of the wholly different state of things to which they were applied. Athens, in short, is the typical City and the typical Democracy. A clear view of the Athenian constitution is absolutely necessary in order to under- stand, as we go on, the modifications which later Greek Federalism introduced into the old ideal of the demo- cratic city. I therefore do not scruple, with this ulterior purpose, to enlarge somewhat more fully on Athenian political life than would be of itself necessary in a com- parison between the system of separate city-common- wealths and the system of larger states. The Athenian citizen, the Achaian citizen, the English Member of Par- who, in his own walk, ranks deservedly among the profoundest of political philosophers. It is some comfort that Lord Macanlay, at all events, could have set him right. See the well-known and most brilliant passage on the working of the Athenian system in his Essay on Boswell's Life of Johnson (p. 177, one vol. ed.) 42 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. CHAP. II. Greater responsi- bility of the Athenian citizen than of tin' Englinh Member. Po ition of the I lisli .M inifltry. liament, resemble each other in being members of popular bodies each invested with the most important powers in their respective countries. But the functions of the three are not exactly the same, nor is the political educa- tion received by the three exactly of the same kind. The Athenian had the highest political education of all, because he had the highest responsibility of all. The comparison between Athens and Achaia I will put off to another Chapter ; I will now rather try to show what the Athenian political education really was by comparing the powers and responsibilities of the ordinary Athenian citizen with those of an ordinary Member of our own House of Commons. There can be no doubt that an Athenian citizen who habitually and conscientiously discharged his political duties was called on for a more independent exercise of judgement, for a more careful weighing of opposing argu- ments, than is practically required of the English private member. The functions of the Athenian Assembly were in a few respects more limited, 1 but, on the Avhole, they were much more extensive than those of the English House of Commons. The Assembly was more directly a governing body. Demos was, in truth, King, Minister, and Parliament, all in one. In our own system the written Law entrusts the choice of Ministers, the declara- tion of war, the negotiation of peace, in general the government of the country as distinguished from its legislation, to the hereditary Sovereign. But the con- vmtional Constitution adds that all these powers shall be exercised by (lie advice of Ministers who, as chosen by the 1 Mattel 'i Legislation, whirl] we Hunk so preeminently the business of a popular Assembly, were at Athens by qo means wholly in the bands ni the Ekklesia. Its powers were ;i good deal narrowed bj the institution "I the Nomotheti i Grote, \. .•him. On the othei band, the Assembly exercised exactly those functions of electing i" offices, ami declaring war and peace, any direel share in which we oarefullj refuse to tin 1 Bouse of ( lommons, COMPARISON BETWEEN ATHENS AND ENGLAND. 43 Sovereign out of the party which lias the majority in the CHAP - n - House, may be said to be indirectly chosen by the House itself. These Ministers, a body unknown to the written Law, but the most important element in the unwritten Constitution, exercise royal power during the pleasure of the House. 1 As long as they retain the confidence of the House, they take the management of things into their own hands. 2 The House asks questions ; it calls for papers ; it approves or censures after the fact ; but its vote is not directly taken beforehand on questions of peace, war, alliance, or other matters of administration. It leaves such matters to the Ministers as long as it trusts them ; if it ceases to trust them, it takes mea- sures which practically amount to their deposition. No Minister remains in office after a direct vote of censure, or even after the rejection of a Government motion which he deems of any importance. He may indeed dissolve Parliament ; that is, he appeals to the country. But if the new Parliament confirm the hostile vote of the old one, he has then no escape ; he is hopelessly driven to resignation. No Minister receives instructions from the House as to the policy which he is to carry out ; least of all, when he rises in his place in Parliament to advo- 1 With us a body which has no existence in the eye of the Law exercises the chief power in the name of the Sovereign and during the pleasure of the House of Commons. We shall presently have to contrast this with the Achaian and American system by which a magistrate, chosen for a fixed time, exercises nearly the same powers in his own person. Athens differs from all these by what may be called vesting the royal authority in the House of Commons itself. 2 The gradual change of political language and political habits is curious. The Sovereign no longer presides at a Cabinet Council, because the practical function of the Ministers is no longer to advise the Sovereign, but to act for themselves, subject to responsibility to Parliament. Therefore it has of late become usual to apply the name of "Government" to the body which used to be content with the humbler title of "Ministry" or "Administration." Its members are felt, subject to their parliamentary responsibility, to be the real rulers. 44 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. CUAP. II. Received duties of the private Member. Different duties of the Athenian Citizen. Tho As- sembly a Govern- ment as well as a Parlia- ment Functions of tho Senate ; cate one policy, is he bidden by the House to go to his office and take the requisite administrative steps for carry- ing out another policy. Hence, under our present parlia- mentary system, the average member is in truth seldom called on to exercise a perfectly independent judgement on particular questions of importance. He exercises his judgement once for all, when he decides whether he will support or oppose the Ministry; by that decision his subsequent votes are for the most part determined. Whether this is a high state of political morality may well be doubted ; it is enough for our present purpose that it is the political morality commonly received. Matters were widely different in the Athenian Assembly. Every citizen who sat there exercised much higher functions than those of an English private member. He sat there as a member of a body which was directly, and not indirectly, sovereign. His own share of that corporate sovereignty it was his duty to discharge according to his own personal convictions. Athens had no King, no President, no Premier ; she had curtailed the once kingly powers of her Archons till they were of no more political importance than Aldermen or Police Magis- trates. She had no Cabinet, no Council of Ministers, no Council of State. 1 The Assembly was, in modern political language, not only a Parliament but a Government. There was indeed a Senate, but that Senate was not a distinct or external body: it was a Committee of the Assembly, appointed to put matters in regular order for i I cannol bul think that Mr. Grote, to whom, more than to any other man, we are indebted for true views of the Athenian Democracy, has been BOmetimeS Led astray by bis nun English parliamentary rx]>erion<'e. He clearly looks on Nikias and other official men as coming nearer to the English ides of a " Government," and Cledn and other demagogues as coming nearer to the English ides of a "Leader of Opposition," than the forms <>f the Athenian commonwealth allows!. 1 h.-iw tried to set tins forth at some Length in an article in the North British Review! May, 1856, \>. 157. DIRECT SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ATHENIAN ASSEMBLY. 45 the Assembly to discuss. There were Magistrates, high chap. ii. in dignity and authority — the ten Generals, on whom, far more than on the pageant Archons, rested the real honours and burthens of office. But those Magistrates of the were chosen by the Assembly itself for a definite time ; it was from the Assembly itself that they received those instructions which, in all modern states, whether despotic, constitutional, or republican, would issue from the " Government." There was nothing at Athens at all Nothing analogous to what we call "Office" and " Opposition." to "Office" Perikles, Nikias, Phokion, appeared in the Assembly, as position/' Generals of the Republic, to propose what measures they thought fit for the good of the state. Their proposals, as coming at once from official men and from eloquent and honourable citizens, were doubtless always listened to with respect. But the acceptance of these proposals was by no means a matter of course ; their rejection did not involve immediate resignation, nor did it even imply the rejection of their proposers at the next yearly choice of Magistrates. The Assembled People was sovereign ; as sovereign, it listened to its various counsellors and reserved the decision to itself. Perikles, Nikias, and Phokion were listened to ; but Thucydides, 1 Kleon, and Demosthenes were listened to also, and their amend- ments, or their substantive proposals, had as fair a chance of being carried as those of the Generals of the common- wealth. A preference given to the proposal of another citizen involved no sort of censure on the official man who was thus placed in a minority ; it in no way affected his political position, or implied any diminished confidence on the part of the People. The Sovereign Assembly b.c. 415. listened patiently to the arguments of Nikias against the Sicilian expedition, and then sent him, with unusual 1 I mean of course Thucydides son of Melesias, the rival of Perikles ; quite a different person from Thucydides the historian. 46 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. marks of confidence, to command the expedition against Direct Di- which he had argued. It was the Assembly which, by action of its direct vote, decided questions of peace and Avar ; it the ;\ s " was the Assembly which gave its instructions to the sembly. J ° Ambassadors of Athens ; and it was the Assembly which listened, in broad daylight and under the canopy of heaven, to the proposals which were made by the Ambas- sadors of other powers. In modern times, even a repub- lican state has some President, Secretary, or other official person, to whom diplomatic communications are inmie- diatelv addressed. The consent of a Senate may be needed for every important act, but there is some officer or other who is the immediate and responsible actor. 1 We shall see a very close approach to this system when we come to look at Greek Democracy as modified in the Federal constitution of Achaia. But in the pure Democracy of Athens there is no approach to anything of the kind. b.c. 343. When King Philip has to communicate with the hostile republic, he does not commission a Minister to address a Minister ; he writes in his own name to the Senate and People of Athens. 2 The royal letter is read, first in the Senate before hundreds, and then in the Assembly before thousands, of hearers, each of whom may, if he can gain the car of the House, take a part in the debate OH its contents. So, when the reading and tho ' By tin- American Constitution the assenl of the Senate is needed for the treaties entered into bj the President, and the power of declaring wax is vested in Congress. But all diplomatic business up to these points is carried "i* after the forms usual with the Governments of other states'. Despatches are qo! addressed to Congress, nor even to the President, but to a Secretary of State, whose office is no1 mentioned in the Constitution. According to Athenian practice, the letters of Earl Russell on the affair of theTrenl would have been addressed, not to Mr. Seward, bu1 to the Bouses of Congress, and the liberation of the Southern Commissioners would have needed a rote oi I hose bodies. ee the Bpeech ot Demosthenes (or rather of Hegeaippos) aboul II ilonni o (I iraton Attioi, vol. Lv. p. 82). ATHENS THE HIGHEST TYPE OF CITY-COMMONWEALTH. 47 debate are over, it is by the sovereign vote of those chap. ii. thousands of hearers that the policy of the common- wealth is finally and directly decided. It is evident Effect that the member of an Assembly invested with such powers mi powers as these had the very highest form of political citizen"^ education opened to him. If he did his daily duty, he formed an opinion of his own upon every question of the day, and that not blindly or rashly, but after hearing all that could be said on either side by the greatest of orators and statesmen. Of course he might blindly follow in the wake of some favourite leader — so might a Venetian Senator, so may an English Peer — but so to do was a clear forsaking of duty. The average Athenian citizen could not shelter himself under those constitutional theories by which, in the case of the average English member, blind party voting is looked upon as a piece of political duty, and an independent judgement is almost considered as a crime. The great advantage then of the system of small city- commonwealths, the system of which the Athenian Demo- cracy was the greatest and most illustrious example, was that it gave the members of the ruling body (whether the whole people or only a part of the people) such a political education as no other political system can give. Nowhere will the average of political knowledge, and indeed of general intelligence x of every kind, be so high as in a commonwealth of this sort. Doubtless 1 General intelligence, not of course general knowledge, which must always depend upon the particular age and country in which the common- wealth is placed. The average Englishman knows far more than the average Athenian knew, because the aggregate of knowledge in the world is incomparably greater than what it was then. But the average Athenian probably knew far more in proportion to the aggregate of knowledge in his own day ; most certainly he had a general quickness, a power of appreciation and judgement, for which we should look in vain in the average Englishman. 48 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. to take Athens as the type is to look at the system Athens the in its most favourable aspect. The Athenian people type b seem to have had natural gifts beyond all other people, ot ! he and the circumstances of their republic brought each system. * ° citizen into daily contact with greater political affairs than could have been the case with the citizens of an average Greek commonwealth. At Rome, again, the vast numbers of the Assembly and the comparatively narrow range of its functions must have effectually hindered the Comitia from ever becoming such a school of politics as the Athenian Pnyx. The Roman Tribes elected Magistrates, passed Laws, and declared war ; but they did not exercise that constant supervision over affairs which belonged to the Athenian Demos. The ordinary powers, in short, of a Government, as distin- guished from a Parliament, were exercised by the Senate and not by the Tribes. It was not every city-commonwealth which could give its citizens such opportunities of improvement as were enjoyed by the citizens of Athens. But, in estimating the tendencies of any political system, they must be estimated by their most perfect manifestations both for good and for evil. And undoubtedly even commonwealths which gave their citizens far less political education than was to be had at Athens must have given them far more than is to be had in any modern kingdom or republic. We idolize what is called the press, 1 as the great organ of modern cultivation ; but, after all, for a man to read his newspaper is by no means so elevating a process as it is to listen with his own ears to a great statesman and to give his own independent vote for or against his motion. And great statesmen moreover grow far thicker on (he ground in commonwealths of 1 li is worth notice thai the "press "in common language always means newspapers and nol I ks. INTENSE PATRIOTISM IN SMALL STATES. 49 this kind than they do in great kingdoms. Many a chap. h. man who has a high natural capacity for statesman- Oppor- ship is, in a large state, necessarily confined to the the dive-* narrow range of private or local affairs. Such a man ^P 6 " 11 ; 1 ^ ° * or genius. may, under a system of small commonwealths, take his place in the Sovereign Assembly of his own city and at once stand forth among the leaders of men. In a word, it can hardly be doubted that the system of small commonwealths raises the individual citizen to a pitch utterly unknown elsewhere. The average citizen is placed on a far higher level, and the citizen who is above the average has far more favourable opportunities for the display of his special powers. This elevation of the character of the individual citizen is the main advantage of the system of small states. It is their one great gain, and it is an un- mixed gain. It does not indeed decide the question in favour of small Commonwealths as against Federa- tions or great Monarchies. These last have their ad- vantages which may well be held to outweigh even this advantage ; but it clearly is unmixed gain as far as it goes. Less absolutely unmixed is another result of the system, which is closely connected with both its good and its bad features. A system of small com- Intensity monwealths raises in each citizen a fervour and mten-fsJ^L °" ism m sity of patriotism to which the natives of larger states ^!f\ are quite unaccustomed. 1 It is impossible, even in a fairly homogeneous country, to feel the same warmth of affection for a large region as for a single city or for a small district. An Englishman is patriotic ; a Dane, as a countryman of a smaller state, is more patriotic still ; but neither England nor Denmark can awaken the same glow of patriotic zeal as the great 1 On the intensity of patriotism in small commonwealths, see Macaulay, Hist. Eng. i. 350 et seqq. E 50 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. a. name of Athens. 1 A man loves his birthplace, he loves his dwelling-place, he has a loyal respect for the seat of his country's government. But with the great mass of the subjects of a large kingdom these three feelings will severally attach to three different places. With an Athenian or a Florentine they all attached to the city of Athens or of Florence. In a smaller state, like Megara or Imola, the local patriotism might be yet more intense still, for the Athenian citizen might really be a native and resident, not of Athens, but of Marathon or Eleusis. But the inhabitant of the rustic Demos was still an Athenian ; if his birthplace and dwelling- place were not within the city walls, they could hardly be far out of sight of the spear-head of Athene on the Identifier- Akropolis. In any case the City was far more to him citizens than the capital of a modern state can ever be to the with the g rea t Du ik f it s inhabitants. To adorn a capital at the expense of a large kingdom is one of the most unjust freaks of modern centralization ; but in adorning the city of Athens every Athenian was simply adorning his own hearth and home. Walls, temples, theatres, all were his own ; there was no spot where he was a stranger, none which he viewed or trod by the sufferance of another. The single city will ever kindle a far more fervid feeling of patriotism than can be felt towards a vast region, large parts of which must always be practically strange. And this intensity of local patriotism is closely connected with all that is noblest and all that is basest in the history of City-commonwealths. Where the single city is all in all, no sell-devotion is too great which her welfare demands, no deed of wrong is too black which is likely to promote her interests. The unselfish heroism of Leonidas and Deems Bprang from the very same source as the massacre of Mclos and the destruction of Carthage. ThuC. \ii. 64, tA fj.4ya 6i'o/xa t£v 'KQr\v2v. BAD SIDE OF CSTY-COMMONWEALTHS. 51 For that there is a weak and a bad side to this chap. ii. system of separate city-commonwealths is as obvious Badside as that there is a great and noble one. First of all, system of the greatness of such commonwealths is seldom so en- ^" on _ during as that of larger states. A democratic city, above wealths, all, if it would preserve at once freedom at home and a high position abroad, has need of a certain high-strung fervour of patriotism which is not likely to endure through many generations. This Mr. Grote has remarked in the case of Athens, when he compares the feeble resistance offered by the contemporaries of Demosthenes to the growing power of Macedonia with the vigour displayed by their fathers in the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. 1 A state again whose political franchise depends wholly Greatness on the hereditary burghership of a single city cannot so states less easily strengthen itself by fresh blood from other quarters, jh^that as can be done by a great nation. A conquest destroys of greater a city ; it not uncommonly regenerates a nation. Of all city-commonwealths none ever had so long a day of greatness as Rome. One main cause doubtless was because the Roman People was less of a purely civic body than any other city-commonwealth, and because no other city-commonwealth was ever so liberal of its franchise. Rome thus grew from a city into an empire ; other cities, aristocratic and democratic alike, have often seen their day of greatness succeeded by a long and dishonoured old age. Nothing could well be more miserable than the latter days of democratic Athens and of oligarchic Venice. During the period of Grecian history with which we shall chiefly have to deal, the once proud Democracy of Athens sinks into the most contemptible state in Greece. And surely the dregs of a close body like the Venetian patriciate afford the very lowest spectacle which political history can produce. 1 Grote, iv. 240. E 2 52 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. Common fallacy as to the chap. ii. Here then lies the real cause of the inherent weakness of these small commonwealths. Nothing can be so glorious as the life of one of them while it does live. The one century of Athenian greatness, from the expulsion of the b.c. 508- Tyrants to the defeat of Aigospotamos, is worth millenniums of the life of Egypt or Assyria, But it is a greatness almost too glorious to last ; it carries with it the seeds of its own destruction. This kind of weakness, at all events this want of permanency, is inherent in the system itself. But another kind of weakness, with which the ancient com- monwealths are often reproached by superficial observers, is not inherent, or rather it has no existence at all. Men who look only at the surface are tempted to despise Athens and Achaia, because of the supposed insignificance of what are called " petty states " in modern Europe. There are men who, when they look at the colossal size of despotic weakness France or Russia, are led to despise the free Confederation of small states. of Switzerland and the free Monarchy of Norway. How utterly contemptible then must commonwealths have been, beside which even Switzerland and Norway would seem empires of vast extent. Such a view as this involves the fallacy of being wholly physical and forgetting all the higher parts of man's nature. France and Muscovy have indeed incomparably greater physical strength than Switzerland or Norway, but the Swiss or the Norwegian is a being of a higher political order than the Frenchman or the Muscovite. And this view also involves another fallacy. It goes on a mistaken analogy between small states, when they arc surrounded by greater ones of equal material civilization, and small stales, when small slates constituted the whole of the civilized world. There is a certain sense in which the interests of Switzerland arc smaller than the interests of France, hut there w;is no possible sense in which the interests of Athens were smaller than the interests of Persia. The small states of modern Europe SUPPOSED WEAKNESS OF SMALL STATES. 53 exist by the sufferance, by the mutual jealousy, possibly to chap. ii. some extent by the right feeling, of their greater neigh- Different . , ,,« position of bours. 1 But the small commonwealths ol old Greece were sma ll actually stronger than the contemporary empires ; they s were less than those empires only in the sense in which Great Britain is less than China. The few free cities where they now left in Europe are mere exceptions and anomalies ; exceptions, they could not resist a determined attack on the part of one even of the smaller monarchies. Cracow could have a.d. 1846, been wiped out of the map of Europe at a less expenditure of force than the combined energies of three of the Great Powers. If Germany and Europe chose to look on, Denmark could doubtless annex Hamburg, and Bavaria annex Frankfort. So it must ever be when Free Cities are merely exceptions among surrounding Kingdoms, when every Kingdom maintains a standing army, when a city can be laid in ashes in a day, and when the reduction of the strongest fortress has become simply a question of time. But when we discuss the merits of a system of Free Cities, we do not suppose those Free Cities to be mere exceptions to a general state of things, mere relics of a political system which has passed away ; we suppose a state of things like that of old Greece, in which and where the independence of every city is the universal, or at thegeneral least the predominant, rule of the civilized world. And rule - even in much later times, in those centuries of the middle ages when Free Cities, though not predominant, were still numerous, a city surrounded by strong walls and defended 1 Just at this moment Federal Government in general has acquired a certain amount of popular discredit from some of the acts of the power to which a momentary caprice has specially attached the name. It there- fore cannot be out of place to point out the admirable union of dignity and modesty, the unswerving assertion of right combined with the absence of all unseemly bravado, which has distinguished all the acts of the Swiss Federal Government during the recent aggressions of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, both in the annexation of Savoy and in the more recent violation of Swiss territory in the Dappenthal. (February, 1862.) 54 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. in the Middle Ages. Constant warfare among Free < 'ities. chap. ii. by valiant citizens might successfully resist the resources Free cities of a great empire. Feudal levies could not be kept to constant service, and, before the invention of gun- powder, the art of attacking fortified places lagged far behind the art of defending them. A single city now- adays is weak as compared with a small kingdom, just as a small kingdom is weak as compared with a great kingdom. The fact that no state can resist a power which is physically stronger than itself proves nothing as to the merits of particular forms of government. Aris- tocratic Rhodes, democratic Athens, federal Achaia, and kingly Macedonia were all alike, as their several turns came round, swallowed up by the universal power of Rome. But there is a far greater evil inherent in a system of separate Free Cities, an evil which becomes only more intense as they attain a higher degree of greatness and glory. This is the constant state of war which is almost sure to be the result. When each town is perfectly inde- pendent and sovereign, acknowledging no superior upon garth, multitudes of disputes which, in a great monarchy or a Federal republic, may be decided by peaceful tribunals, can be settled by nothing but an appeal to the sword. The thousand causes which involve large neighbouring states in warfare all exist, and all are endowed with ten- fold force, in the case of independent city-commonwealths. Border disputes, commercial jealousies, wrongs done to individual citizens, the mere vague dislike which turns a neighbour into a natural enemy, all exist, and that in a form condensed and intensified by the very minute- ness of tlie scene on which they have to act. A rival nation is, to all but the inhabitants of a narrow strip of frontier, a mere matter of hearsay ; but a rival whose dwellingplace is within sight of the city gates quickly grows into an enemy who can be seen and felt. The CONSTANT WARFARE AMONG SMALL STATES. 55 highest point which human hatred can reach has commonly chap. ii. been found in the local antipathies between neighbouring Force of cities. The German historian of Frederick Barbarossa ^tween speaks with horror of the hate which raged between jJ^JJjJJJ; the several Italian towns, far surpassing any feeling of national dislike between Italians and Germans. 1 In old Greece the amount of hatred between city and city seems to depend almost mathematically upon their dis- tance from one another. Athens and Sparta are commonly rivals, often enemies. But their enmity is not inconsistent with something of international respect and courtesy. When Athens was at last overcome, Sparta at once b.c. 404. rejected the proposal to raze to the earth a city which, even when conquered, she still acknowledged as her yoke- fellow. 2 That proposal came from Thebes, between whom and Athens there reigned an enmity which took the form of settled deadly hostility. 3 The greatest work that orator or diplomatist ever achieved 4 was when Demo- b.c. 339. sthenes induced the two cities to lay aside their differences, and to join in one common struggle for the defence of Greece against the Macedonian invader. But even Examples Athenian hatred towards Thebes was gentle compared ^ i ta i y . with the torrents of wrath which were poured forth upon unhappy Megara. 5 So too in Boeotia itself; just as Frederick entrusted the destruction of Milan, not to his own Germans, but to Milan's enemies of Lodi and a.d. 1162. i See Eadevic of Freisiug, iii. 39. Cf. National Review, No. XXIII. (January, 1861) p. 52. 2 Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 19, 20. 3 Circumstances led Athens and Thebes to receive help from one another in the very crisis of their several revolutions (b.c. 403 and 382) ; but when these exceptional causes had passed by, the old enmity returned. It never was stronger than during the later campaigns of Epameinondas and during the Sacred War. * See Arnold's Rome, vol. ii. p. 331. 5 This comes out strongly in those scenes in the Acharnians of Aristo- phanes, in which the Boeotian and the Megarian are severally introduced. 56 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. cnAr. II. B.C. 335. Compari- son be- tween citizen soldiers and pro- fessional soldiers. a. i.. 1631, v.h. L576 Cremona, 1 so Alexander left the fate of Thebes to the decision of his own Greek allies, and the vengeance, not of Macedonia, but of Plataia and Orchomenos, soon swept away the tyrant city from the earth. 2 A system of Free Cities therefore involves a state of warfare, and that of warfare carried on with all the bitterness of almost per- sonal hostility. The more fervid the patriotism, the more intense the national life and vigour, the more constant and the more unrelenting will be the conflicts in which a city- commonwealth is sure to find itself engaged with its neighbours. The same causes tend also to produce a greater degree of cruelty in warfare, and a greater severity in the recog- nized law of war, than is found in struggles between great nations in civilized ages. An army of citizen soldiers is a very different thing from an army of professional soldiers. Undoubtedly the citizen soldier never sinks to the lowest level of the professional soldier. He never attains that pitch of fiendishness which is reached when the pro- fessional soldier degenerates into the mercenary, and when the mercenary degenerates into the brigand. Old Greece \\ as full of wars, of cruel and bloody wars, but she never knew the horrors with which France, Germany, and Belgium were familiar from the wars of Charles of Burgundy to those of Wallenstein and Tilly. Such scenes as the sack of Magdeburg and the Spanish Fury at Antwerp are all but without parallel in Grecian history, they are altogether without a parallel among the deeds of Athenian or Lacedaemonian citizens. 8 But if the citizen i otto Morena, >i|>. Muratori, vi. 1103. Sin- Raul, Lb. 1187. « Arri.-iii, i. 8. 1 1 ; 9. 1»I. 3 Two events a] ■ in Grecian history ai all approach nrhal was almost the normal < -> > t ■< ! i t i< >i i of European warfare in the sixteenth century. One occurs in the Greece of Thucydides, tli" other in the Greece of Polybios. I ',ut Ln the earlier instance the guilty parties were not Greeks at all, in the they were thi lowe t of Greeks, the profei ionn] robbers of /Etolia. COMPARISON OF CITIZEN AND PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS. 57 soldier does not degenerate into the wanton brutality chai\ u. of the mere mercenary, yet the very feelings which elevate the spirit of his warfare serve, on the other hand, to render it far more cruel than warfare waged by a civilized army in modern times. The modern professional soldier does as he is bid ; he does what is required by pro- fessional honour and professional duty ; he is patriotic, no doubt, but his patriotism would seem vague and cold to an Athenian marching to Delion, or to a Milanese going b.c. 424. forth to Legnano. In any case the war is none of his own making ; he is probably utterly indifferent to its abstract justice, and utterly ignorant of its actual origin. The enemy are nothing to him but something which pro- fessional duty requires him to overcome ; they never did him any personal wrong ; they never drove away his oxen, 1 or carried off his wife. It is another matter when two armies of citizens meet together. The war is their own Avar ; the general is probably the statesman who proposed the expedition ; his army is composed of the citizens who gave their votes in favour of his proposal. The hostile x general and the hostile army are not mere machines in the hand of some unseen and distant potentate ; they are the very men who have done the wrong, and on whom the wrong has to be avenged. Defeat will at once involve the In B.C. 413 the little Boeotian town of Mykalessos was fallen upon, and the inhabitants massacred, by Thraeian mercenaries in the service of Athens (Thuc. vii. 29, 30). Even in the midst of the terrible Pelopon- nesian war, this deed of blood raised a cry of horror throughout all Greece. The other case is the seizure of Kynaitha by the iEtolians in B.C. 220 (Pol. iv. 18). They were admitted by treachery ; once admitted, they massacred friend and foe alike, and even put men to the torture to discover their hidden treasures. This last extremity of cruelty is un- paralleled in Grecian warfare, and any Greek but an ^Etolian would have shrunk from it, but it was a matter of every-daj r business with the Spanish soldiers of the sixteenth century. 1 II. A. 154. od yap ttcottot' i/.ias $ovs TJXaaav, o£8e jj.tv '[-Kirovs, ou$e ttot iv #i'j; ipifiwAaKi, fiumavelpri, napirbv iSijK^aauT'. 58 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. bitterest of evils, ravaged lands, plundered houses, friends and kinsfolk led away into hopeless slavery. Men in such a case fight for their own hands ; they fight, in very truth and not by a metaphor, for all that is dear to their hearts, irtxidas, yvvouKas, deuv re ■Karpc&wv s'Stj, Orjicas te TTpoySvwi'. 1 War of this sort is habitually carried on with much cruelty. A modern kingdom seeks in its warfare the mere humiliation, or at most the political subjugation, of the enemy. The Greek or Italian warrior, as we have seen, not uncommonly sought his destruction. A nation may be subdued, but it cannot well be utterly wiped out ; a single city, Milan or Thebes, can be swept away from the face of the earth. The laws of war, under these circum- Severity of stances, are cruel beyond modern imagination. The life of War. " °f th c prisoner is not sacred unless the conqueror binds himself by special capitulation to preserve it. 2 To kill the men and sell the women and children of a conquered — at all events of a revolted — town was a strong, perhaps unusual, act of severity, but it was a severity which did not sin against the letter of the Greek Law of Nations, and which it was held that particular circumstances might justify. Even when the supposed rights of war were not pushed to such fearful extremes, the selling of prisoners as slaves was a matter of daily occurrence. 3 In such a state 1 /]•: eh. IVr.s. 396. 2 See Time. i. 30 et passim. J The familiarity of this practice comes out strongly in an incidental notice in PolybioB (v. '.'M. Certain .Kinliims were taken prisoners by tin' A.chaians ; among them was one Kleonikos who had formerly been the wp6^(i>os or public friend of the Achaiax) State. On account of this persona] clai n the regard of his captors lie was not sold (Std t6 irpu^tvos virdpxt'f Tail' 'Ax""<^' / Trapavri ixlv ovk iirpdOi])^ hut after a while released without ransom, The sale of the prisoners who had no such claims is imed as a matter of course. The same author elsewhere (ii. r>7) m large size. vested with political rights, will not exercise those rights in their own persons, but through chosen persons com- missioned to act in their behalf. The private citizen will have no direct voice in government or legislation ; his functions will be confined to giving his vote in the election of those who have. This is the great distinc- tion between free states of the modern type, whether kingly or republican, and the city-commonwealths of old Greece. It is the great political invention of Teutonic Europe, the one form of political life to which neither Thucydides, Aristotle, nor Polybios ever saw more than the faintest approach. In Greece it was hardly needed, but in Italy a representative system would have delivered Rome from the fearful choice which she had to make between anarchy and despotism. By Representative or Parliamentary Government I would not be understood as speaking only of that peculiar form of it which has grown up by the force of circumstances in our own country. A Cabinet Government, where the real power Represen- is vested in Ministers indirectly chosen by the House ofQ 0yem . Commons — that is, chosen by the King out of the party f ient B0 * ' •> ° i- d necessarily which has the majority in the House of Commons — is Cabinet only one out of many forms of Representative Govern- men t. ment. It suits us, because it is, like our other institutions, the growth of our own soil ; it by no means follows that F 2 08 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. it can be successfully transplanted whole into other countries, or even into our own colonies. 1 By a Repre- sentative constitution I mean any constitution in which the people, or the enfranchised portion of them, exercise their political rights, whatever be the extent of those rights, not directly, but through chosen deputies. Such a Representative constitution is consistent with the full per- sonal action of the Sovereign within the legal limits of his powers ; it is consistent with any extent, or any limitation, of the elective franchise. I include the constitutions of mediaeval England and Spain, of modern Sweden and Norway, the constitutions of the United States and of the several States, even the old theoretical constitution of France in the days of the States-General. All these are strictly representative constitutions, though some of them dift'er widely enough from what a modern English- man generally understands by the words Constitutional Government. A Representative Constitution may be mon- archic or republican, it may be aristocratic or democratic. The Representative system would be as needful in the case of a franchise vested in a large noble class scattered over the whole countrv, as it is in the case of a franchise vested in every adult male. But if political rights were con- fined to a hereditary body so small that its members could habitually meet together, say if our House of Lords possessed the whole powers of the state, the government would probably assume another form. The ruling aris- tocracy would almost unavoidably be led to take up their chief residence in the capital. The constitution would, in fact, become a city-aristocracy, like that of Bern or Venice, bearing rule over a subject district. i On tliis subjec1 the eighth chapter <>f Earl Grey's Essay on Farlia- mentary Government (London, 1858) is well worth reading; bul of course there \* another side, or rather several other sides, t<> tin question. ELECTION OF THE POLISH KINGS. 69 The necessity of the Representative system in a large chap. h. state is so universally accepted as the result of all European and American experience, that I need not stop to argue the point at any length. But it may be necessary Excep- to speak a few words on two or three real or apparent thTrepre- exceptions, in which political power is, or has been, sei * tativ . e *■ r ' system in directly exercised by the people, or the qualified part modern of them, in large modern states. The exceptions which and occur to me are : First, the way of electing the Kings Amenca - of Poland under the old monarchy ; Secondly, the new- fangled Napoleonic fashion of electing "Emperors," approving constitutions, annexing provinces, by what is called "Universal Suffrage ;" x Thirdly, the practical (not the constitutional) aspect of the election of the President of the United States. In all these cases the people, or the qualified portion of them, takes a more direct share than usual in political action. But even in these cases the representative system, as the means of ordinary legis- lation and government, is not disturbed. The old Kingdom of Poland called itself at once a Election n 1 1 Kingdom and a Republic. In fact its constitution in- p ii s h geniously united the evils of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Km S s - Democracy, without the redeeming features of any of the three. The political franchise was vested in a nobility so numerous, and many of them so poor, that, while they formed a close aristocracy as regarded the rest of the people, they formed a wild democracy among themselves. Such a nobility, it need not be said, has absolutely nothing in common with the British Peerage. The Polish 1 The Florentine Parliaments and the Venetian Great Council are not real exceptions, as being found in the constitutions of single cities. The latter was a part of the ordinary system of government in an aristocratic state. But the Florentine Parliament, which I have already once men- tioned (p. 40), may be well referred to again, as it is so strikingly analogous to the Napoleonic Universal Suffrage. The whole Florentine people, perhaps once in a generation, met together in the square and presently entrusted absolute power to some Commission, sometimes to some Tyrant. 70 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. nobles were not so much a nobility in any common Nature of sense of the word, as a people, like the Spartans or Nobility, the Ottomans, bearing rale over a subject race. 1 Such a very numerous nobility differs from the electoral body of a constitutional state as a Greek aristocracy differed from a Greek timocracy. In the one case the political franchise can be obtained only by hereditary succession, and, when once obtained, it cannot be lost. In the other case, it is attached to the possession of a certain amount of property, and may be gained and lost many times by the same person, if his property, at different times of his life, rises above, or sinks below, the necessary qualification. The difference is analogous to that between the hereditary burghership of a town and a municipal franchise attached to ownership or occupation. According to all ordinary political notions, the Polish nobility was a body which could not possibly meet together ; it was as much under the necessity of delegating its powers to representatives as the electoral bodies of England or America. And for most purposes it did so delegate them. The common functions of a legislature were entrusted to an elective Diet, a body which had some strange peculiarities of its own, 2 which do not bear on our present subject. But, once in each reign, the whole body met to elect a King; they met armed ; and, in theory at least, the assent of every elector present was required to make a valid election. It is not wonderful If election by such a body, like election by the Roman People in their worst days, often took the form of a 1 I do not mean to imply thai the Polish nobility was historically an aristocracy ol conquest. Aristocracies which have grown tip gradually, like thai "i Venice, often become narrower than those which really owe their origin t<> conquest. ' The besl known is the requiremenl of unanimity, which gave every member of the Diel a treto upon all its arts. Bee Calhoun, i. 71. He reallj does not seem \\ holly to disapprove of the practice. NAPOLEONIC UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE. 71 pitched battle. That this mode of electing a King, or of chap. h. discharging national business of any kind, was an absurd and mischievous anomaly few probably will dispute. It was in fact merely an innovation of the latest and worst days of the Polish Republic. 1 And it was felt to be an evil by all wise and patriotic Poles. The constitution of 1791, by which Poland, in her last moments, tried to assimilate herself to other European nations, abolished election altogether, and instituted a hereditary monarchy. The Napoleonic Universal Suffrage, which has de- Napo- Iconic stroyed freedom in France and has reduced Savoy and Universal Nizza to the same level of bondage, is simply a palpable f t " tt j' a f e ' cheat, which, had its results been less grave, would have si ve i p -n T , . nature. been the mere laughing-stock ol Europe. It is a mere device to entrap a whole people into giving an assent to proposals which would not be assented to by their lawful representatives. Hitherto it has been in every case a mere sham. There has been no free choice, no fair alternative between two or more proposals or between two. or more candidates. The people have only been asked to say Yea or Nay to something which has been already established by military force. The election of a Polish King was a real election, a real choice between candidates ; the pretended election of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte to the pseudo-Imperial Crown of France was no election at all. But supposing a vote of this kind ever offered a fair alternative, the system would be no less pernicious. A people cannot be fit to exercise direct political power, unless they are habitually trained to 1 Till the extinction of the House of Jagello in 1572, Poland followed the common law of early European Kingdoms. There was a Royal Family, out of which alone Kings were chosen, hut the Crown did not necessarily pass to the next in succession. The peculiarity of Polish history is that, in an age when other kingdoms had become purely hereditary, the Poles made their Crown purely elective. The practice of choosing Kings without regard to descent and by the voice of the whole nobility dates only from the election of Henry of Anjou in 1573. 72 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. exercise it. In a great kingdom they cannot be sa habitually trained. They may be perfectly fit to choose legislators; 1 they cannot be fit to legislate themselves. Least of all can they be fit to legislate now and then on the most important of all questions, the choice of a dynasty or a constitution. Such an occasional and, so to speak, spasmodic exercise of power must be utterly worthless. Undoubtedly a great exceptional power of this kind may well be entrusted, not to the ordinary Legislature, but to a body specially chosen for the English purpose. Tii the United States the meeting of such rican ways extraordinary Conventions under certain circumstances is nUthfT" specially provided for both in the Federal Constitution same ob- and in the Constitutions of the several States. In our icct own country it would doubtless be thought right by all parties that the introduction of any great constitutional change should be preceded by a Dissolution of Parlia- ment. The election of the new Parliament in such a case would practically come to the same thing as the choice of a Convention in America. The whole body of electors would have, rightly and fairly, a special oppor- tunity given them for considering the subject ; but the final voice of the nation would speak through its lawful representatives, and not through the mockery of " Uni- versal Suffrage." The English and the American practice both give full scope to the popular will in a way cou- 1 It must be remembered that Hie Napoleonic "Universal Suffrage" lias nothing in common with the use'ofthe words "Universal Suffrage" in E ngli sh politieal controversy. Nobody lias ever proposed that every adult male should vote in the making ol laws, but only in tin- choosing of lawgivers. Whether this is desirable is a separate question, quite unaffected by the results of the Napoleonic device. An impartial thinker will probably say that those, whether many or i'^w, who are lit to use votes, ought to have votes ; thai it is desirable thai the whole people should be fi1 i them; bu1 that, excepl possibly in the New England States, it would be hard to find a country where the whole people are fii to use them. See Tocqueville, Dem, i n Am. ii. 120. ELECTION OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT. 73 sonant with the received principles of all modern con- chap. ii. stitutional states. The Imperial invention is simply a blind ; it is the device of a despot to deceive people by promising them something freer than freedom. The election of the American President is, not indeed Election formally, but practically, another exception to the rule by American which, in all modern free states, the political powers of ^ctiraiiv the people are exercised solelv bv their representatives, another exception. Formally, it is not such an exception. The President is not chosen by the people at large, but by special electors chosen for the purpose. 1 But as those electors exercise no real choice, as it is known before the election how everv candidate will vote if elected, this election of electors practically comes to much the same as a direct popular election of the President, There can be no doubt that this is one of the weak points in the American system ; it is the point in which the calcula- tions of the illustrious men who framed the American Constitution have most signally failed. 2 Still, the popular election of the President has several points of advantage over the Napoleonic Universal Suffrage. First, the mere Its dif- form of electing electors pays a certain outward homage fromNa- to the representative system, while it is openlv trampled P ol ? omc , 1 ^ L " x universal under foot by the Xapoleonic device. Secondly, the Suffrage. 1 How those electors shall be chosen is left by the Federal Constitution (Art, ii. § 1, 2) to be settled by the Legislature of each State. Originally, in most of the States, the Legislature itself chose the electors; but, in all the States, except South Carolina, this power has been gradually transferred to the people at large. There are some good remarks on this subject in Shaffner's War in America, p. 187, et seqq. The Confederate Constitution (Art. ii. § 1, 2) copies the old provisions. 2 See Hamilton in the Federalist, No. 68. He remarks that "the mode of appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States, is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents." Even when Tocqueville wrote, this particular evil had hardly manifested itself. Cf. Calhoun, i. 369, 385. 74 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. n. indirect mode of election, even as it is, has at least this result, that the President who is elected need not have a numerical majority of the people in his favour. This alone is no inconsiderable check on the tyranny of mere numbers. Thirdly, regarding the election of the Pre- sident as really placed in the hands of the people, still it is a very different matter from electing "Emperors" and voting the annexation of provinces. The election of a President is not an irregular, occasional business like saying "Oui" or "Non" to the perpetrator of a suc- cessful conspiracy ; it comes regularly at stated intervals, about as often as our Parliamentary elections. There is therefore no reason why the American people may not be as well trained to elect Presidents as the English people are trained to elect Members of Parliament. Still, the election of the President, as it is now practically con- ducted, though by no means such an evil as the Napo- leonic Universal Suffrage or the election of the Polish Kings by the whole body of the nobles, is certainly a deviation from the representative principle, and is so far an anomaly in the practice of modern free states. We will then assume these two immediate results of the increased size of territory, the legal equality of all General parts of the country, and the necessity for representative Bvstemof institutions, if the state be constitutional. Let us then ';"-• pass, in imagination or in reality, through such a large state, through any kingdom, in short, of modern Europe. Its mere divisions, its Counties or Departments, may well be equal in size to the territories of several independent on. u.ii cities of old Greece or of mediaeval Italy. A glance at answers the map of modern Italy or modern Greece at once sets !'.'. '""' v forth this difference. Wo look on the Kingdom of Greece ( """ '- as one of the pettiest slates in Europe; its weight in wealths, ,. . , _ ,. European pontics is hardly so great as that oi one ol GENERAL VIEW OF LARGE STATES. 75 its smallest cities might have been in the days of Athens chap. ii. and Sparta. But a province of the Greek Kingdom is made up of what was once the domain of several Greek commonwealths. Corinth, Sikyon, Pellene, Phlious, are all found in a single department ; Orchomenos, Mantineia, Tegea, and Megalopolis are all subordinate to the modern local capital of Tripolitza. So too the portion of Lom- bardy which free Italy has lately wrung from the Austrian a.d. 1859. Tyrant contains some ten or twelve cities, which once appeared as free republics, fighting for or against the Swabian Emperor. So again not a few cities, which once were free commonwealths under the suzerainty of the Empire, have been swallowed up during the six hundred years' aggression of the Kings and Tyrants of Paris against the old realms of Germany and Burgundy. We find then, in traversing a modern kingdom, that an extent of territory which, on the other system, would be cut up into count- less independent commonwealths, is governed by a single Sovereign and is, in most cases, administered according to a single code of laws. If the state be despotic, the despot is equally master of the whole kingdom ; if the state be constitutional, the highest power in the land will be an assembly in which the whole kingdom is represented. 1 But within these limits the amount of local freedom and of local diversity may vary infinitely. In Extent of one kingdom everything may be squared out according V ersity in to the most approved modern cut-and-dried system. No g^ es man may be allowed to move hand or foot without licence from some officer of the Crown ; local liberties, local bye- laws, magistrates or public officers of any sort locally elected, may be something unknown and proscribed. In 1 The whole kingdom, not necessarily all the dominions of the sove- reign. Every integral part of the United Kingdom is represented in the British Parliament — the disfranchisement of a Comity would not be thought of for a moment — but the Colonies and dependencies are not represented, not being parts of the kingdom. 76 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. another kingdom all this may be reversed ; local and historical rights may be carefully respected ; the assem- blies of towns and districts may retain extensive powers of local legislation ; magistrates and public officers may be elected by the districts which they are to govern, or, if they are appointed by the Crown, they may be appointed according to a principle Avhich gives them nothing of the character of Government functionaries. 1 Opposite These two opposing systems, of Centralization and of < Vntraiiza- Local Freedom, do not at all necessarily depend upon tion and t j ie constitution of the central government. Local free- ot Local Freedom dom is quite possible under an absolute monarchy ; local pendent of bondage is quite possible under a representative Demo- 1 f tl 1 " 1 crac 7" A wise despot will humour his people by allowing central them local liberties which will not affect his real power, ment. and which, by acting as a safety-valve, may really stave off revolution for many years. On the other hand many states nominally free have had no idea of freedom beyond giving each citizen that degree of influence in the general Government which is implied in the possession of an elec- toral vote. That general Government may be one which he helps to choose, and yet he may be left, in regard to all those things which most directly concern him, as helpless a machine in the hands of an official hierarchy as if that hierarchy derived its commission from a despot. Difference But, in any case, whether the local Government be cen- Munfdpal tralized or municipal, its character is wholly dependent on ■'"V 1 l ' 1 ;' 1 ''" the general Law of the Land. Wherever there are rights raj rights ; ° ° 1 An English. County is an aristocratic republic; the magistrates, though formally appointed by Royal Commission, are practically co-extensive with the Local aristocracy. A" English borough, as regards its administration, is a representative democracy, tempered in some degree by the indirect election of the Mayor and Aldermen. The borough magistrates, appointed by tin.' Crown from among Hi" chief inhabitants, introduce n slight aristo- cratic element into the judicial department. Bui neither Town-Councillors, iioi Aldermen, nor Countj and li gh Magistrates, have the Least analogy wnli tli.' administrative hierarchies of foreign states. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MUNICIPALITY AND FEDERALISM. 77 which are beyond the powers of King and Parliament, ohap. ii. we have passed the bounds of strict municipality and are approaching the border-land of Federalism. 1 We Municipal might easily conceive the municipal principle carried pf n d en t e " much farther than it is in England ; one might conceive ° n the , ° General towns and counties at home, no less than Colonies Legisla- abroad, possessing nearly the same internal powers as a Swiss Canton or an American State. But such towns and counties would still possess their powers, not of in- herent right, but merely by positive law. Their rights, Federal however extensive, would be delegated and not inde- dependent pendent ; they would still remain mere municipalities, of lL and would not become Sovereign States. That portion of sovereignty which is vested in the State or the Canton cannot, without an unconstitutional usurpation, be in any way touched by the Federal power. But the most ex- tensive rights of a mere municipality are the mere creation of Common or Statute Law ; they may be legally altered or abolished without the consent of the municipality itself being asked. A vote of the national Legislature in a free country, a Royal Decree in a despotic country, can legally found, modify, or destroy all merely municipal institutions, just as it seems best to the sovereign power. A single Act of Parliament might at once cut down all English local rights to the level of French or Russian centraliza tion. An Imperial Ukase might at once invest Russian 1 England and "Wales, though local bodies retain much local freedom, form a perfectly consolidated Kingdom. But the relations between England and Scotland, where certain points are reserved under the terms of a Treaty between two independent kingdoms, make a slight approach to the Federal idea. The relations between the United Kingdom and the Colonies approach more closely to a Federal connexion, but they differ essentially from it. The Colony, as we have seen above (see p. 26) may have the same internal independence as the Canton, but it differs in having no voice in the general concerns of the Empire. The relation therefore of the Colony to the mother-country is not a Federal but a dependent relation. See Lewis, Government of Dependencies, caps. ii. iv. 78 CHAKACTEEISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. towns and counties with all the rights enjoyed by those of England, or with rights more extensive still. The one measure would in no way deprive the English elector of that portion of influence over public affairs which he at present enjoys. The other measure would in no way infringe upon the sole legislative authority of the Autocrat. In any consolidated kingdom or republic, whatever be the extent of local freedom, the variety of local law and custom, it exists purely on sufferance ; it emanates from, and may be altered by, a central power external to itself. The local body is, in most cases, strictly confined to local affairs ; it has no voice, even by representation, 1 in the general legislation of the kingdom ; if a local body takes any part in national affairs, its voice is purely consulta- tive ; in most countries indeed it has not even a con- sultative voice, it can make its wants known to the Sovereign or the Legislature only in the form of a Humble Petition, a process equally open to every human being in the nation. The great state then, whether it be a despotism, a constitutional kingdom, or a consolidated republic, con- fines local action to purely local matters, and vests all general power in the national sovereign or the national legislature. That sovereign and that legislature may in- deed derive their powers from the popular will, but in the exercise of those powers neither individuals nor local bodies can have more than an indirect influence. Rights arc equal throughout the whole land ; the capital has no legal privilege beyond any other city; the constitution, where there is a constitution, is of the representative kind. From these characteristics of large states at once follows a General character- istic of large States. i The body holding local authority, the Town Counci] or the Quarter .1. , la n"t represented, as such, in Parliament The county or borough members represent the inhabitants of the county or borough, not i he municipal government. ADVANTAGES OF GREAT STATES. 79 chain of gains and losses which are the exact opposites chap. h. of the gains and losses which attend on the system of Balance of 1 . Gain and city-commonwealths. Loss. First and foremost, the blessing of internal peace is at Advan- once secured to a large country. This alone is an advan- ^ ilt tage so great that it must be a very bad central govern- states - ment indeed, under which this one gain does not outweigh every loss. A large modern kingdom will contain perhaps Peace hundreds of cities, whose districts, under the old Greek a la^e system, might continually be the scene of a desolating C0Ulltl T- border-warfare. All of these will, under the modern European system, repose safely under the protection of one common authority, which has power peaceably to decide any differences which may arise among them. And the same cause which hinders local quarrels, when they do arise, from growing into local wars, will also go very Lessening far to prevent local quarrels from arising at all. Towns prejudices. and districts may indeed often retain irrational local prejudices, and the clashing of commercial interests may often arouse local jealousies which are not irrational. But when, as in the best regulated modern kingdoms, the inhabitants of every town and county are all citizens of a common country, when the inhabitants of one district may, without losing any civil or political rights, transfer their abode to any other, there can never be any very serious local differences between fellow-subjects of the same race and language. Even when such differences of race and language exist as may be found within the limits of France or of Great Britain, provincial diversities may now and then afford a subject for pseudo- patriotic talk, but it is in talk that they are sure to evaporate. 1 Indeed, it often happens that the country 1 It has been gravely declared at a Welsh Eisteddfod that Her Majesty is properly Queen of Wales with the province of England annexed. 80 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. which fancies itself to be subject and degraded is, in very truth, a favoured district. Such a country often has its full share of the advantages of the common government, while it keeps its own local advantages to itself. 1 When differences of race and speech assume a really serious character, it shows that they are real national diversities, and that the two countries ought to be under separate governments. But mere local jealousies between town and town, between county and county, become of no political importance whatever. Towns which, in old Greece or in mediaeval Italy, would have sent armies against one another, towns which would either have lived in constant warfare, or the stronger of which would have reduced the weaker to dependence, have, in a large modern kingdom, hardly any disputes which require the interference of the Legislature or the Law Courts. Under a good central government, which gives perfectly equal rights to all its subjects, peace and good brotherhood will reign through- out the whole realm. And a really good central govern- ment will not attempt to push union too far. It will not seek to extinguish that moderate amount of local dis- tinction, local feeling, and local independence, which is both a moral and a political gain. The utter wiping out of local distinctions goes far to reduce the whole realm to that state of subjection to a single dominant city which, whether under a monarchy or a republic, is the worst political condition of all. However this bo, the province and tlio kingdom have shown no tendencies towards separation for several centuries. In Gaul matters seem to be different; the existence of the Breton Ajrchseological Society, which one would have thoughl was a harmless body enough, has been found inconsistent with the safety of the " Imperial" throne of Paris. ' Scotchmen are eligible to the highest offices in England, rind they constantly fill them without any Englishman feeling the least jealousy. Englishmen arc, 1 suppose, equally eligible to offices in Scotland, but they ■ bi till them. LESSENING OF THE EVILS OF WAR. 81 The same system, again, which tends to take away chap. u. all causes of dispute between different portions of the Lessening same nation, tends equally to diminish the horrors of f War. external war between different nations. We have already seen that the recognized war-law between contending king- doms is much less severe than it is between contending cities. The severity of its actual exercise between the disciplined armies of two civilized states is lessened in an almost greater proportion. But take war between great states in its worst form, take such a war as might be waged between Alva on one side, and Suwarrow on the other. Even such a war as this will inflict, in proportion to its scale, a far less amount of human misery than a really milder conflict between two rival cities. It will not recur so often ; wars indeed, when begun, may last longer, but the intervals of peace will be proportionally longer still. And when war does come, it will be, so to speak, localized. A happily situated, especially an insular, nation may wage war after war, and spend nothing except its treasures and the blood of the soldiers actually engaged. To an Englishman war has long meant only increased taxation and the occasional death, what he deems the happy and glorious death, of some friend or kinsman. It is quite another sort of thing to endure all this, and at the same time to have your lands ravaged by Archidamos or your city sacked by Charles the Bold. But there is one very important difference between the warfare of Archi- damos and the warfare even of Charles the Bold. Archidamos could ravage every corner of Attica, Charles the Bold could ravage only a very small part of France. While Charles lay before Beauvais, the inhabitants of 1472. Bourdeaux might sleep, as far as Charles was concerned, in perfect safety and tranquillity. Even of an invaded territory it is only a very small portion which directly feels the horrors of invasion. Besides, the Great Powers have G 82 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. not uncommonly agreed upon the ingenious plan of sparing each other's territories altogether, and fighting out their quarrels on neutral ground. Thus, for a cen- tury or two, whenever there was a war between France and Austria, it was generally carried on by common consent on the convenient battle-ground of Flanders or The Thirty Lombardy. The worst war of modern Europe, the War yfa* of the Thirty Years, derives its peculiar horror from 1618-48. ^ s h aym g i ess than usual of the character of a war between two great nations. France, Sweden, and other powers, took a share in it, but it was primarily a civil war of religion. As such, it combined, in a great degree, the horrors of a war waged between small states with the scale of a war waged between great ones. The wars which we can ourselves remember, the Russian War of 1854-6 and the Lombard campaign of 1859, have been mere child's play compared with the great internal Avars either of Greece or of Germany. The scale of the powers engaged of course caused a tremendous loss of life among actual combatants, but the general amount of misery inflicted on the world was trifling in proportion to what was caused cither by the Pcloponncsian War or by the War of Thirty Years. Cases of special cruelty or per- fidy in modern warfare have been almost wholly confined to local and civil conflicts, and those most commonly among the less civilized nations of Europe. On the whole, the substitution of large kingdoms for city-commonwealths has immeasurably softened the horrors of war. 1 i ening And as the system of large states abolishes local Btrifo* warfare and diminishes the severity of national warfare, so we have seen by implication that it very seriously diminishes the bitterness of political strife. These ad- vantages form a great, indeed an overwhelming, balance • Bee however, on the other side, an eloquenl description iaSismondi, R( pub, [tal, ii. 148. DISADVANTAGES OF GREAT STATES. 83 of gain on the side of the large state. But it must not ciiap. ii. be forgotten that there is a reverse to this picture also. We have seen that the great advantage of the city- Disadvan- commonwealth is the political education which it gives, We° the high standard which it tends to keep up among statos - individual citizens. This is the natural result of a inferior franchise, like that of the city-commonwealth, which ed uca ti on makes it at once the right and the duty of every man to exercise direct deliberation and judgement on public affairs. This education a city-democracy gives to all the citizens ; even an aristocracy or timocracy 1 at all liberally constituted gives it to a large portion of them. But in a large state the only way in which the mass of the citizens can have any share in the government is by choosing their representatives in the Parliament or other National Assem- bly. It is plain that such a franchise as this, indirect in itself and rarely exercised, cannot supply the same sort of political teaching as a seat in the Athenian Assembly. A large number of the electors will always remain ignorant and careless of public affairs to a degree that we cannot believe that any citizen of Athens ever was. Under ignorance any conceivable electoral system, many votes will be given roptionof blindly, recklessly, and corruptly. Men who are careless man / % about political differences, if well to do in the world and not devoid of a conscience, will not vote at all ; if they are at once poor and unprincipled, they will sell their votes. Many again who are not corrupted will be deceived ; a hustings speech has become almost a proverb for insincerity. This ignorance, carelessness, and corrup- tion among the electors appears to be the inherent vice of 1 In Greek political language a Timocracy (tijj.okpo.tIu) is a government where the franchise depends on a property qualification, distinguished from the Democracy, which is common to all citizens, and from the Aristocracy, which is in the hands of a hereditary class. G 2 84 CHAEACTEEISTTCS OF FEDEBAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. representative government on a large scale. There is probably no form of government under which bribery can be wholly prevented. It is a vice which occurs everywhere in some shape or other, but which varies its shapes infinitely. If bribery appears in a despotism or in a city-commonwealth, it commonly takes the form of bribery of the rulers ; in a representative government, it takes the form, the really worse form, of bribery of the electors. The ministers of despotic Kings, the chief citizens of aristocratic republics, have been open to bribes in all ages. The chief citizens of democracies lie equally under the same slur. At Athens we hear constant com- plaints of bribery ; but it is always bribery of that particular kind which is unknown among ourselves. We Different near G f demagogues and generals being bribed to follow forms of & ° nm i in- bribery at this or that line of policy. The charge was probably m an d in many cases unfounded, for charges of corruption are England. casv ^ bring and hard to disprove. But the fact that it was so often brought and so readily believed shows at least that it was felt not to be improbable. It is certain that any citizen who was known to be above conniption obtained, on that account, a degree of public confidence which sometimes, as in the cases of Nikias and Phokion, was above his general desert. But of bribery in the popular courts of justice we hear very little, and of bribery in the Assembly itself we hear absolutely nothing. That Assembly doubtless passed many foolish, hasty, and passionate votes, but we may be quite sure that it never passed a corrupt vote. But we may believe that Kleon or Ilyperbolos often had his reward for the motion which he made to the People, ;ui<1 to which the People assented in good faith. Among ourselves the vice manifests itself in an exactly opposite Bhape. Kleon \v:is accused of receiving bribes himself, but never of bribing others. No recent English statesman has ATHENIAN AND ENGLISH FORMS OF BRIBERY. 85 ever been suspected of receiving bribes, but few perhaps chap. it. are altogether innocent of giving them. It is long indeed since any great English Minister has made a fortune by corruption of any kind. But in the last century Members of Parliament were bought with hard cash ; in the present century the representatives are no longer bribed them- selves, but they do not scruple to bribe the electors. The example of Rome might possibly be quoted on the other side. Rome was a city-commonwealth, and yet, in the later and corrupt days of the republic, bribery at elections was as common at Rome as it is among ourselves. But this was evidently for the same reason which makes it common among ourselves. The Tribes were open to bribery, because they had, in those days, become little more than an electoral body ; their legislative power had long been hardly more than a shadow. There are then two forms of corruption, each the natural growth of a particular state of things, and each of which has its peculiar evils. The corruption of a single great Minister may do greater immediate harm to the state than the wholesale corruption of half the boroughs in England. But when electors generally come to look on a vote as a commodity to be sold instead of a duty to be discharged, when they look on a seat in Parliament as a favour to be paid for instead of a trust to be con- ferred, more damage is done to the political and moral instincts of the people than if a corrupt Minister took hostile gold to betray an army to defeat or to conduct a negociation to dishonour. These vices of ignorance and corruption in the electoral body seem to be the inherent evil of modern representative government. There is no panacea, whether of conservative These or of democratic reform, which can wholly remove them, herentin Vote by Ballot would probably do a good deal to lessen in- j 1 ^ s ^ s ~ timidation and something to lessen corruption ; but there is 86 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. no reason to think that it would entirely wipe out the stain. Nor can corruption be got rid of by limiting the franchise to some considerable property-qualification. Actual bribery may be got rid of, but not corruption in all its forms. Those whose social position sets them above being bribed with hard cash will easily find out ways of repaying themselves for their votes by appoint- ments in the public service or by jobs at the public expense. 1 And the vices of ignorance and prejudice are beyond the reach of Reform Bills. Ignorance and prejudice are the monopoly of no particular social class and of no particular political party. Really wise men and good citizens are to be found scattered up and down among all classes and all parties. No system has yet been found which will make them, and none but them, the sole possessors of political power. No class has any real right to despise any other class, whether above or below it in the social scale. In times of any wide- spread political delusion, a Papal Aggression, for instance, or a Russian War, the madness seizes upon all ranks and all parties indiscriminately. The few who still hearken to the voice of reason are a small minority made up out of :i!l classes and all parties. Very little then is gained by i ii \ may mere legislative restrictions of the franchise. The vices atedbut" of electoral ignorance and corruption are inherent in the not wholly svs ( elH Tliev are the weak side of European Parliamen- t.-iiv Government, just as Athenian Democracy and Ame- rican Federalism have also their weak sides of other kinds. I>nt though the evil can never be overcome, much may he done to alleviate it. If well informed men will make it their business to diffuse sound political knowledge among i Tocqueville (Dem. en km. ii. 88) says thai in the reign of Louis Philip the bribery of .an elector was olmosl unknown in France. This was doubtless because the lii^li qualification a1 which the franchise was fixed enderccl > irrupti lifferent from ti which ore rife in our i : irougb GENERAL BALANCE IN FAVOUR OF LARGE STATES. 87 the people ; if they will deal with the people as men to be cdap. «. reasoned with, not as brutes to be chained or as fools to be cajoled ; if as large a portion of the people as possible has some direct share in local matters however trifling; much may be done to raise the character of the electoral body. But it is in vain to hope that the average standard of the electoral body of a large state will ever stand so high as the average standard of the popular Assembly of a small one. We must not dream of ever seeing the every-day Englishman attain the same political and intel- lectual position as was held by the every-day Athenian. On the whole comparison, there can be little doubt that Balance of the balance of advantage lies in favour of the modern \ n favour'' system of large states. The small republic indeed deve- g t f a tes Se lopes its individual citizens to a pitch which in the large kingdom is utterly impossible. But it so developes them at the cost of bitter political strife within, and of almost constant warfare without. It may even be doubted whether the highest form of the city-commonwealth does not require slavery as the condition of its most perfect developement. The days of glory of such a commonwealth are indeed glorious beyond comparison ; but it is a glory which is too brilliant to last, and in proportion to the short splendour of its prime is too often the unutterable wretchedness of its long old age. The republics of Greece seem to have been shown to the world for a moment, like some model of glorified humanity, from which all may draw the highest of lessons, but which none can hope to reproduce in its perfection. As the literature of Greece is the groundwork of all later literature, as the art of Greece is the groundwork of all later art, so in the great Democracy of Athens we recognize the parent state of law and justice and freedom, the wonder and the example of every later age. But it is an example which we can 88 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. ciiAr. ii. no more reproduce than we can call back again the inspiration of the Homeric singer, the more than human skill of Pheidias, or the untaught and inborn wisdom of Thucydides. We can never be like them, if only because they have gone before. They all belong to that glorious vision of the world's youth which has passed away for ever. The subject of a great modern state leads a life less exciting and less brilliant, but a life no less useful, and more orderly and peaceful, than the citizen of an ancient commonwealth. But never could we have been as we are, if those ancient commonwealths had not gone before us. While human nature remains what it has been for two thousand years, so long will the eternal lessons of the great Possession for all Time, 1 the lessons which Perikles has written with his life and Thucydides with his pen, the lessons expanded by the more enlarged experience of Aristotle and Polybios, the lessons which breathe a higher note of warning still as Demosthenes lives the champion of freedom and dies its martyr — so long will lessons such as these never cease to speak with the same truth and the same freshness even to countless generations. The continent which gave birth to Klei- sthenes and Cains Licinius and Simon of Montfort may indeed be doomed to be trampled under foot by an Empire based on Universal Suffrage ; but no pseudo- democratic despot, no Crcsar or Dionysios ruling by the national will of lialf-a-million of bayonets, will ever quite bring hack Europe to the state of a land of Pharaohs and Nabuchodonosors, until the History of Thucydides, the Politics of Aristotle, and the Orations of Demo- Sthene's, arc wholly forgotten among men. We have thus compared together the two systems of government which form, as it were, the poles of our 1 Krfjfja vantage citizen so perfectly as an ancient city-commonwealth. But f both it secures a far higher amount of general peace than the sys ems ' system of independent cities ; it gives its average citizens a higher political education than is within the reach of the average subjects of extensive monarchies. This form of government is a more delicate and artificial structure than either of the others ; its perfect form is a late growth of a very high state of political culture ; it is, even more than other forms of government, essentially the creation of circumstances, and it will even less than other forms bear thoughtlessly transplanting to soils where circum- stances have not prepared the ground for it. For all 90 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. Federal ( rovern- inent a Compro mise, chap. ii. these reasons there is no political system which affords a more curious political study at any time. And, at this present moment, the strength and the weakness which it is displaying before our eyes make its origin and its probable destiny the most interesting of all political problems. I have said that Federalism is essentially a compro- mise, 1 an artificial product of an advanced state of poli- tical culture. Near approaches to it may be found in very early stages of society, and yet it is clearly not a system which would present itself at the very beginnings of political life. It is probable that both the great kingdom and the independent city existed before the system of Federations was thought of. It is quite certain that both great kingdoms and independent cities had reached a high degree of splendour and of political importance before Federal Governments played any re- only suited markable part in the history of the world. Federalism is a form of government which is likely to arise only under certain peculiar circumstances, 2 and its warmest admirers could hardly wish to propagate it, irrespective of circumstances, throughout the world in general. No one could wish that Athens, in the days of her glory, should have stooped to a Federal union with other Grecian cities. No one could wish to cut up our United Kingdom into a Federation, to invest English Counties with the rights of American States, or even to restore Scotland and Ireland to the quasi-Federal position which they held before their respective Unions. A Federal 1 See Bernard's Lectures, p. 73. 1 The circumstances under which a Federation is possible and desirable are discuss, I by M . de 'I' [ueville (Dem. en Am. i. 269, el seqq.) and by A!,. Mill (Rep. Gov. ]'. 298). It is curious t" see the different aspects in which Hi' matter is Looked at bj i«" such able writers. There is ao ■ ontradiction between them, bu1 each supplies something which is wanting n the other. positions. FOE WHAT POSITIONS IT IS SUITED. 01 Union, to be of any value, must arise by the establish- chap. ti. ment of a closer tie between elements which were before distinct, not by the division of members which have been hitherto more closely united. All that I here claim for Federal Government — though, to be sure, no more can be claimed for any other sort of government — is that it may be looked upon as one possible form of government among others, having its own advantages and its own disadvantages, suited for some times and places and not suited for others, and which, like all other forms of government, may be good or bad, strong or weak, wise or foolish, just as may happen. At this moment there Popular -i-i j i n prejudice is unreasonable prejudice abroad against federal (jrovern- on the ment in general. This is partly because we hold ourselves, SU3jec ' and that quite justly, to have lately suffered a wrong at the hands of one particular Federal Government, 1 partly because it is thought by many that the disruption of the greatest Federal Government that the world ever saw proves that no Federal Government can possibly hold together. A moment's thought will show the fallacy of any such in- ferences. They are exactly the sort of hasty conclusions which a knowledge of general history dispels. All that these facts prove is the indisputable truth that a Federal constitution is not necessarily a perfect constitution, that the Federal form of government enjoys no immunity from the various weaknesses and dangers which beset all forms of government. They undoubtedly prove the existence of mismanagement in the conduct of the American Re- public ; they probably prove that circumstances have 1 January, 1862. These errors are fostered by the strange hal >it which the newspapers have of calling the Government at Washington, "the Federal Government," as if it were the only one in the world, or as if the Government of the Confederate States were not equally a Federal Govern- ttient. It would he about as reasonable to call any kingdom with which we had a dispute "the Royal Government," and to make inferences un- favourable to monarchy. 92 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. rendered it undesirable that the whole Union should No general remain united by a single Federal bond. But they prove ?o bemade ™ more against Federalism in the abstract than the from misgovernment of particular Kings and the occasional American disruption of their kingdoms prove against Monarchy in events " the abstract. At this stage of my work I desire to keep myself as clear as possible from the tangled maze of recent American politics. I postpone to a later stage any definite judgement on questions which have as yet hardly become matters of history. I am not now con- cerned to judge between North and South, to act as the accuser or the champion either of President Lin- coln or of President Davis. I have to deal only with such mistaken inferences from recent events as affect the general question of Federal Government. I am not concerned to defend either Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Davis ; but I am concerned to answer any inferences which reflect on the wisdom either of Markos and Aratos or of Washington and Hamilton. The South has seceded from the North, whether rightly or Avrongly I do not here pronounce. There can be no doubt that, to say the least, a plausible case can be made out on behalf of Secession on the ground of expediency. 1 It is quite possible that there may not have been that degree of mutual sympathy 2 between the States without which a Federal Government cannot be successfully carried on. It is quite possible that the Union, as it stood, was too large to be properly governed as one Federal commonwealth, perhaps as one 1 Mi-. Spence's arguments (American Union, p. 198) to show the constitu- Hanoi riijhi of Sccc ;sion carry n< aviction to my mind, but his arguments on the ground of expediency deserve, to say the Least, the mosl careful answer thai the North can give them, Professor Bernard's Lectures on the constitutional question seem tome to maintain a very jusl mean between the extreme virus of Mr. Bpence on the one Bide and M r. Motley on the other. - Bee Mill, Representative Government, p. '298. NO CASE AGAINST FEDERALISM IN GENERAL. 93 commonwealth of any kind. All these admissions would chap. ii. prove nothing, either against Federal Government in the abstract, or against the wisdom of the founders of the particular Federal Government of the United States. Let it be granted that the continuance of the American Union was undesirable, that it was expedient and just for the Southern States to separate. This proves no Similar more than is proved by similar disruptions in the case tionsin of monarchies. In different ages of European history, ^ e ^ ase Sicily has seceded from Naples, Portugal has seceded archies. from Spain, Greece has seceded from Turkey, Belgium has seceded from Holland, Hungary, we all trust, is about to secede from Austria. These examples are not gene- rally looked upon as proving the inherent weakness and absurdity of Monarchy. The secession of South Carolina and her sisters goes exactly as far and no further to prove the inherent weakness and absurdity of Federalism. What all these instances prove is merely this, that, both under Monarchies and under Federations, States are sometimes joined together which had better be separated. So far jsr case from the disruption proving anything against Federal- pluralism ism in the abstract, it does not even prove anything in general, against the American Union as it came forth from the hands of its founders. Those founders, when they legis- nor against lated for thirteen States on the Atlantic border, could not ^ai™" foresee the enormous extension of the Republic from American Union. Ocean to Ocean. Nor could they foresee those vast diversities of interest and feeling which have, since their time, arisen between the different sections of the original Union. The opposition between slaveholding and non- slaveholding States, between agricultural and manufactur- ing States, is an opposition which has arisen since the establishment of the Federal Constitution. Could they have foreseen all that has happened since their day, Washington and his colleagues would have been, not land. 94 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. n. merely the wise but fallible men which they undoubtedly were, but unerring prophets, a character to which they Testimony laid no claim. And, after all, the Southern States have, Southern in their very secession, paid the highest tribute that could to the be P a ^ *° * ue g enera l principle of Federalism. They Federal nave seceded from one Federal Government only to set Principle. 1861. up another. Their first act has been to re-enact the old Federal Constitution, with only such changes in detail as the experience of seventy years had shown to be Parallel of needful. 1 That Belgium, in separating from the Dutch andHol- Monarchy, still remained a kingdom, proves far more in favour of Monarchy than its separation proves against it. So the fact that the Southern States, in separating from the old Federal Union, forthwith set up a new Federal Union of their own, proves far more in favour of Federalism in the abstract than their separation proves against it. I abstain at present not only from enter- ing on the details of the recent Secession, but even from entering on the details of the Federal Constitution itself. I refer to them here only to answer popular objections, to show that recent events in America prove absolutely nothing against Federalism in the abstract, and that we ought to be able to discuss the comparative merits and defects of Federalism and other forms of government as dispassionately in 1802 as wc could have done in 1860. I have several times, when speaking of Federal Govern- ments, assumed incidentally that their constitution will be republican, just as I have also sometimes assumed inci- dentally that the constitution of a large consolidated state will be monarchical. 1 have done so simply because, up lo this time, experience lias shown that they commonly 1 See tli^ Confederate Constitution in Ellison's Slavery and Secession i i adon, 1861), p. 312. QUESTION OF A LARGE NON-FEDERAL REPUBLIC. 95 are so. There is indeed no absurdity in supposing that chap. ii. the government of a large country might permanently assume the form of an Indivisible or Consolidated Re- public. There is no reason in the nature of things why A large a large state, with an Assembly representing the whole be a Re- nation, might not intrust executive functions, not to a P ul j llc hereditary King directed by Ministers approved by the being a Federa- Assembly, but to an avowedly elective Council of State tion. or to a President chosen for a term of years. The attempts hitherto made to establish such a government have been so few that their failure by no means proves that some future attempt may not be successful. They have commonly been made under much less favourable circumstances, and under much less worthy leaders, than the Federal Constitution of the United States. Some Cromwell or Buonaparte has commonly soon appeared to convert the Republic into a Tyranny. No one can No argu- mourn over the extinction of the Rump in England. a iawn The republican constitution was in no sense the work of J. 1 '?" 1 x failures in the nation ; the mockery of a representative body which England ordained it was in truth an oligarchy in no whit better than France. the royal despotism which it succeeded or the Tyranny by which it was followed. The last French Republic fell because of the twofold madness of placing a born con- spirator at the head of a free state and of entrusting a republican President with the command of an enormous army. Instances like these certainly do not show that the Consolidated Republic is at all an impossible form of government for a large country. But since, as a matter of fact, all the greatest states of the world are, and commonly have been, monarchic-ally governed, I have, for conve- nience, in my comparison of the great state with the small commonwealth, assumed that the great state would be a monarchy. So, on the other hand, there A Federa- ls no abstract absurdity in supposing that a league of co ^^ 96 CHAEACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. monarchies, especially constitutional monarchies, might as- of mou- sume the true Federal form. But, as a matter of fact, all the greatest and most perfect Federations, past and present, have always been Republics. I have therefore, in like manner often assumed, in contrasting Federal states with others, that the Federal state would be a Republic. 1 The question of the possibility of a Federal Monarchy is one which it may be worth while to follow out a little further. The relation of lord and vassal between sove- reign princes, if strictly carried out, would produce some- Approach thing very like a kingly Federation. 2 The vassal prince Federalism is sovereign in his internal administration, but his foreign Feudal policy must be directed by that of his suzerain. He system. must never wage war against him, and he must follow his standard against other enemies. But in truth this is an ideal which has never been fully carried out, and, if it were carried out, it would not produce a perfect Federal Government. It has never been carried out, because the harmonious relation of lord and vassal which it supposes has never permanently existed. Sometimes a too power- ful suzerain has reduced his vassals from the estate of vassals to that of subjects. Sometimes too powerful vassals have thrown off vassalage altogether, and have The theory grown into independent sovereigns. The one process carried y took place in France and the other in Germany. By ""*' annexing tlie dominions of their vassal princes, the Kings of Paris extended their territories to the sea, the Rhone, and the Pyrenees.' 1 In Germany the vassal princes and commonwealths gradually grew into practical indepen- dence of their nominal King the Emperor. The very 1 See Archdeacon Denison's Prize Essayon Federal Governmenl (Oxford, 182!)), p. 88. •-• See the Federalist, No. 17, ]>. !'<>. 3 The EU and (1.'' Pyri nei . nut the Rhine and the Alps, which have boon reached by i theT process. See above, p. 31. QUESTION OF FEDERAL MONARCHIES. 97 name of the German Kingdom died out in popular chap, ii, thought and popular language. 1 The old Germanic body is often spoken of as a Confederation, and it may fairly claim to rank among Confederations of the looser kind. But it was a Confederation only so far as it had ceased to be a monarchy. Its modern successor, the so-called German Confederation, has but little of the true Federal character about it, and, so far as it is Federal, it is not monarchic. Some of its members are even now Republics, and it has not, like the old Empire, any acknowledged monarchic head. And, even if the feudal theory had ever and, if been harmoniously carried out, the relation of vassal prin- (mt , would cipalities to an Imperial head would not of itself amount ^J^true to the true Federal relation. It would rather resemble Eedera- the relation of dependent alliance in which Chios and Mitylene stood to Athens. To produce anything like true Federalism, all national affairs should be ordered in a National Assembly, an institution which in feudal France was never attempted, and to which the Imperial Diet of Germany presented only a very feeble approach. It is indeed possible in theory that the powers of the Scheme , . of a true American President, as they stand, might be vested in a Federal hereditary or elective King, and that the functions of the Monai ' ch y; Governors of the States, as they stand, might be vested in hereditary or elective Dukes. Such an Union would be a true Monarchic Federation. The connexion would be strictly Federal, and Kings and Dukes would be in- vested with really higher powers than were held by a King of Poland or a Duke of Venice. But such a constitution has never existed ; it would be a political machine even unlikely more delicate and hard to work than a Federation of 1 The name however remained down to the last. The formal titles, even of Francis the Second, were " Erwahlter Romischer Kaiser, Konig in Germanien und Jerusalem." These he laid aside, and, dissatisfied with his hereditary rank of Archduke, assumed the portentous title of "Emperor of Austria." H 98 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. n. Republics. We may safely say that it could not last through a single generation. Other ap- But kingly states have sometimes made a nearer toFedsnd approach to true Federalism than anything that could Monarchy. p rac ti ca ll y gi W out of the relation of lord and vassal. We may pass by instances in remote ages and barbarous countries, of whose details we have no record. Such may, or may not, have been the Twelve Kings of Egypt ' and the Five Lords of the Philistines. 2 We may pass by the a.d. 1859. abortive scheme of a Confederation of Italian Princes with the Pope at their head, which was put forth by Louis Napoleon Buonaparte only to become the laughing-stock Two or of Europe. A far nearer approach may be found in the Kingdoms case of the union of two or more kingdoms under one under one K mo -. 3 The kinsdoms so joined may form one state in all King. ° ° * their relations with other powers, while they may retain the most perfect independence in all internal matters ; they may keep their own laws, their own constitutions, and a distinct administration of the ordinary government. a.d. 1603- Such were England and Scotland during the century between the Union of the Crowns and the Union of the a. k 1782- Kingdoms; such were Great Britain and Ireland during the last eighteen years of the last century ; such have a.d. 18H- been Sweden and Norway for nearly fifty years past. But 1 Mi"' such unions have been few in number, and they have commonly been the result of accident. A Kingdom has been conquered or inherited by the King of another Kingdom ; it lias received the stranger as its sovereign, but it has retained its own constitution and laws. When many states have been SO united, as by the I hikes of Burgundy, the Kings of Castile, and the so-called " Emperors " of Austria, had they been governed with any regard to right and justice, something like a Federal Monarchy might 1 BeTod. ii. c. 117. 2 1 Sum. vi. I. 3 Mill, Representative Government, p. W3. ACTUAL APPROACHES TO FEDERAL MONARCHY. 99 have been the result. But in Spain, the rights of hide- chap. h. pendent kingdoms first sank into mere provincial liberties, Spain ; and then were absorbed by the general despotism of the common Sovereign. Spain has risen again, not indeed as a Confederation, but as a constitutional kingdom, which lacks nothing except rulers worthy of the nation. In the case of the "Austrian Empire," long years of tyranny and The faithlessness have produced a hatred of the central power Empire ; " which separation alone can satisfy. But, were this other- wise, it may be doubted whether a union of such utterly incongruous nations, even on the mildest and justest terms, could ever satisfy the conditions necessary for a Federation of any kind. Where only two crowns have been thus united, a tendency to more perfect union has commonly arisen. This, in its best form, has taken the form of an equal fusion of the two kingdoms ; in its worst form it has degenerated into an absorption of the weaker kingdom by the stronger. In our own country, Scotland Great Bri- has first been united with England, and then Ireland has i re iand ; been united with Great Britain. Of cases where such more perfect union has not followed, the most permanent and beneficial has been the union of Sweden and Norway. That Sweden is to say, the terms of union preserved to Norway liberties Norway. which otherwise she might have lost. The union was a desirable mean between mere absorption by Sweden, and an attempt at perfect independence which would probably have been fruitless. The union has worked well, through the indomitable love of freedom which reigns in the noble Norwegian nation. But it is hardly a system which a patriotic Norwegian would have hit upon as desirable for its own sake. On the whole the general tendency of history is to show that, though a Monarchic Federation is by no means theoretically impossible, yet a Republican Federa- tion is far more likely to exist as a permanent and flourishing system. We may therefore, in the general H 2 100 CHAKACTERISTTCS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. course of our comparison, practically assume that a Federal state will be also a Republican state. When I speak of the Federal system as one intermediate between the systems of large and of small states, it may be objected that the states which compose a Federation may be either large or small states, according to the definitions of large and small states which I have already Members given. It is undoubtedly true that the members of a ration may Confederation may be either single cities or states of a Cities or considerable size. The Achaian League was a League of States of Cities, the United States are a League of countries, many consider- _ , # able size, of which exceed in size the smaller kingdoms of Europe. It therefore naturally follows, that in Achaia the internal governments of the several cities resembled those of any other Greek democracy, while the internal governments of the several American States follow the common type of modern European constitutions. That is to say, the Achaian cities had primary, the American States have representative Assemblies. It is clear that a great com- monwealth, like the State of New York, is as much obliged to adopt representative institutions as England or Italy. 1 But though the component parts of a Federation may be as large on the map as sonic European kingdoms, they are not likely to be states which really occupy the sume position. This great size of the States is peculiar to the American Union, and we must take into account the 1 Switzerland exhibits an intermediate state of things. Some Calitons have primary, others have representative Assemblies. It is only in one or two of the largest Cantons thai representation can have been absolutely necessary on geographical grounds. It must have been introduced else- where by the influence of the common type of European freedom. A Canton like Geneva, consisting of a large town with a very small sur- rounding territory, would have Beemed the place of all others to revive a De racy of the Athenian kind. Bu1 the constitution of Geneva, though democratic, is representative ; Denios, in Ins purity, is to be round only in one' of the small rural Cantons wliieh contain no important town. DIFFERENCE OF SCALE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA. 101 difference of scale between America and Europe. In a ottap. ir. newly settled continent, a country which covers as much Difference ground as France or Spain may, in population, in every- Europe thing in short except mere extent, be only on a level with j™ ( a to me ' a small Swiss Canton or German Duchy. The difference b . e , con ; siuered. may be seen not only between Europe and America, but between the older and newer parts of the American Union itself. The area of Texas is between three and four times as great as the area of all the New England States ; the population of Texas, bond and free, is less than half the population of the one State of Massachusetts. 1 Though several of the States are of the size of kingdoms, it is only one or two in which it would not be perfect madness to set up as wholly independent powers. A Federal connexion with other states is just as necessary to most of them as it was to the Achaian cities, or as it now is to the Swiss Cantons. Still it undoubtedly makes a great difference in the character of a Federation, whether its members are single cities or states of such a size as to require Repre- sentative Assemblies. That is to say, while Federations, as a class, occupy a position intermediate between the two other systems, some particular Federations will approach nearer to one extreme, and others to the other. A League of the Achaian sort will share many of the merits and the' defects of a system of independent city-commonwealths. A League of the American sort will share many of the merits and the defects of a system of large monarchies or repub- lics. And yet the position of Federations as a class still remains distinct and intermediate. The position of Mega- lopolis and that of New York, both being sovereign in their internal affairs, and mere municipalities as regards foreign 1 Area of Texas, 237,504 square miles, of all New England, 65,038, of Massachusetts, 7,800. Population of Texas, 601,039, of all New England, 3,318,681, of Massachusetts, 1,231,065. I take my figures from Ellison's Slavery and Secession, p. 362. 102 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. powers, have really more of resemblance to one another, notwithstanding the difference of scale, than the position of Megalopolis has to the position of Athens and the position of New York to that of England. Though one Federation will incline more to one extreme and one to the other, it is still trae that Federal Governments, as a class, occupy a middle position between the two extremes. Along with some of the defects inherent in a compromise, they have the advantage of a middle position in uniting, to a considerable extent, the merits of both the opposite systems. 1 General A Federal Government then secures peace, order, and Federalism unit y to a lar g e territory, not so perfectly as a large king- ilSimi "- dom does, but far more perfectly than can be done by termediate L "* system. a system of small independent states. It affords to its citizens a political education less perfect than is afforded to the citizens of a city-commonwealth, but far more perfect than is afforded to the subjects of a large kingdom. In theory indeed the Federal Government secures peace, order, and national unity just as well as the kingdom does. The Federal power supplies legal means for settling dis- putes between State and State, just as readily available :is those which a large kingdom supplies for settling disputes "between district and district. The Federation is as truly sovereign in its own department as the State is in its own department Resistance to the lawful commands of its Governmeni is as much rebellion as resistance to the int.r- lawful commands of a monarch, An injury done by one J',!', -itV.V/i State to another State or to a citizen of another State is : ' " " I not a matter of international wrong; it is a mere breach govei n in- hi of of the peace, to be rectified by the Federal Courts or, the whole ten it<>i v. 1 So Tocqueville, i. 278. [/Union est libre el heureu e comma une petite nation, glorieuse e1 forte comme une grande. bin, ii. 208. La forme federate que Lea Americains on1 adoptee, e1 qui per i h I'Union de jouir ,1,. | a |, m ance d'une grande republique et dc 1 1 ei urite' d'unc petite. EXAMPLES OF ITS INTERMEDIATE POSITION. 103 if need be, to be chastised by the Federal army. The ohap. n. theory is exactly the same ; but the Government of a Federation Avill have more difficulty in carrying the theory into practice than the Government of a con- solidated state. For Federal purposes the several States are merely municipalities or individuals, but they possess- infinitely greater powers than can ever belong to munici- palities or to individuals. 1 If they wish to resist, the means of resistance are far easier. In the looser kind of Federa- tion, that which works only by requisitions, disobedience to an unpleasant requisition will be a matter of course. Even where the Union is closest, the coercion, however just, of a recalcitrant State is sure to be a difficult and invidious business. The mere threat of nullification or secession by several States may weaken the action of the Federal power in a way which their constitutional opposition in the Federal Assembly could not do. There is therefore no doubt that a Federal Government is practically less efficient to maintain peace, order, and national unity than a consolidated Government. That it is more efficient to maintain them than a system of small independent states, which in truth does not seek to maintain them at all, needs no demonstration. In like manner it is easy to show that a Federal State Inter- .. g. ,. . , , mediate will afford its average citizens a degree ot political educa- position tion, greater than they can obtain in a large kingdom, less p^^f 3 than they can obtain in a city-commonwealth. Doubtless Education. the amount of developement and education which a Federal State gives to the individual citizen will mainly depend upon the size and the internal constitution of its several members. In a Confederation of Cities the several cities will approach to the character of independent i On these subjects there are many striking passages in Tocqueville. See especially, i. 241, 251, 252, 254, 256. Some of these passages have been strangely misunderstood by his English translator. 104 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. city-commonwealths ; in a Confederation of large States the several States will approach to the character of large kingdoms or republics. Yet certain general tendencies will ran through both classes. It is impossible that any member of a Federation of either kind can give to the mass of its citizens such a degree of political education as may be given by a perfectly independent democratic city. The Achaian Cities possessed, some of the Swiss Cantons still possess, Democracy in its purest form, where every adult male citizen has a direct voice in the popular Assembly. But no such City or Canton can possibly give its citizens the same political education as was given to the citizens of democratic Athens. 1 The very condition of the case forbids it. The mere existence of the Federal tie at once prevents the citizen of Pellene or of Schwytz from being called on to deliberate and decide on such important and instructive questions as were laid before the citizen of Athens. It was the discussion of those high questions of imperial policy on which Perikles and Demo- sthenes harangued, which gave their hearers the very highest of all political teaching. But these questions, so far as any parallel to them can exist at all, are, by the Achaian and Swiss system, transferred from the Assem- blies of each particular City or Canton to the Federal Assembly at Aigion or at Bern, The chief means of improvement is therefore at once placed out of the reach of the ordinary citizen of the Federation." Still, the powers of the City or Canton arc far more than municipal; it is really soycrcign in all purely internal matters. A share therefore in its government must afford a political edu- i Thai pure Democracy i- blow confined t" sonic of the mosl backward among the Cantons is purely accidental. The argumenl would apply equallj if it existed ;il Geneva or Basel. •■• The Achaian Assembly was in theory a Primary Assembly, butil had practically much more of the character of a Representative one. This will i„- ,h .11 ed .it l< Dgtfa in < lhapter V. POLITICAL EDUCATION IN FEDERATIONS. 105 cation, if inferior to that of the Athenian, yet at least chap. ex. superior to any that can be obtained in the purely muni- cipal Assemblies of an extensive kingdom. Again, in a city or small district, the constitution may legally be repre- sentative ; the legal function of the private citizen may be, not to make laws, but only to choose law-makers. Still, in such a commonwealth, the people at large will always have a far greater insight into public affairs, and will always exercise a far greater influence over their course, than can possibly happen in a large kingdom. In a Compari- Confederation of larger States, where some members may g^teanda be as large in geographical extent as some European Kingdom, kingdoms, the direct share of the people in the govern- ment cannot well be greater in kind than it is in a consti- tutional monarchy. It may be greater in amount, because more offices may depend upon popular election ; but in the State of New York, no less than in the Kingdom of Britain or of Italy, the direct influence of the people can- not go beyond the election of legislators and magistrates. But their indirect influence will be far greater in the State than it can be in the Kingdom. Republican habits and feelings will cause appeals to the people to be far more common and far more direct than is usual in a monarchic state. Political meetings and regularly organized Conventions will be far more common and far more influential. There will not be the same wide difference as to regularity of proceeding and as to moral weight between such self-appointed bodies and the con- stitutional Assemblies of the country. And this indirect Compari- influence of the people will not only be greater than g tatc , ^.[^ it can be in the constitutional Kingdom ; it will be ^.^f^". greater than it can be in the consolidated Republic, public. It will doubtless be greater in the consolidated Re- public than it can be in the Kingdom ; but it may be doubted whether in a consolidated Republic it will be at 106 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. CHAP. II. Self- Govern- ment in Federal States. all more enlightened or useful than it can be in a Kingdom. In a large Republic, say France in its short republican day, the danger is that the people will gain increased influence without increased means of improve- ment. The institutions of a smaller commonwealth, while they give the people the increased influence, give them the increased means of improvement along with it. No means of improvement, save the unattainable standard of the Athenian Assembly, is equal to that afforded by a good system of local Self-Go vernment. « Now of all systems the Federal Republic is the most favourable to local Self- Govemment ; the Consolidated Republic would seem to be less favourable to it than the Constitutional Monarchy. In such a Republic, the one Sovereign Assembly, the true and sole representative of the nation, will, in its natural love of power, be far from favourably inclined towards any authority which does not directly proceed from itself, towards assemblies or magistrates over which it has only an indirect control. The Parliament of a Monarchy, whose sphere is limited by its very nature, is not likely to have the same jealousy of local rights as the omnipotent National Assembly of a Republic. And both a Federal Congress and a State Legislature may be expected to have less jealousy still. Both As- semblies are accustomed to limitations of various kinds; the Federal Congress indeed is limited in a way which prevents it from touching local rights at all. And the Slate Legislature, which might touch them, is itself accustomed to limitations of one kind at the hands of the Federal body, and will therefore be more inclined to tolerate limitations of another kind at the hands of local bodies. The very model of the Federal Govern- 1 Tocqueville, ii. 208. Lea institutions communales qui, moderanl le d( |». i. 'I- In majority donnenl en mSme t< mps an peuple le gout t Bern and the possible. Th EXAMPLE OF SWITZEELAND. 121 mountaineer of Uri, — the Swabian of Zurich, the Lorn- oha*. ii. bard of Ticino, the Burgundian of Geneva, the speakers Constitu- of the unknown tongues of the Rhsetian valleys — all can meet side by side as free and equal Confederates. They can retain their local independence, their local diversities, nay, if they will, their local jealousies and hatreds, and yet they can stand forth, in all external matters, as one united nation, all of whose members are at once ready to man their mountain rampart the moment that the slightest foreign aggression is committed on any one of their brethren. The Federal system, in short, has here, out of the most discordant ethnological, political, and religious elements, raised up an artificial nation, full of as true and heroic national feeling as ever animated any people of the most unmixed blood. An American State can secede, if it pleases : no Swiss Canton will ever desert the protection of its brethren, because it knows that Secession, instead of meaning increased independence, would mean only immediate annexation by the nearest despot. If any one is tempted to draw shallow inferences against Federalism in general from mistaken views of one single example, he may at once correct his error by looking at that nearer Federation which has weathered so many internal and external storms. No part of my task will be more de- lightful or more instructive than to trace the history of that glorious League, from the day when the Austrian a.d. 1315. invader first felt the might of freedom at Morgarten to the day when a baser and more treacherous despotism still, in defiance of plighted faith and of the public Law of Europe, planted the vultures of Paris upon the neutral a. p. i860. shores of the Lake of Geneva. I have thus gone through the comparison which I de- Recapitu- signed between the two opposite poles of political being, and that ingenious and nicely balanced system which is 122 CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. chap. ii. intermediate between the two. I have compared the small City-Commonwealth, the great Monarchy or Consolidated Republic, and the Federal Union, whether of single Cities or of considerable States. I have pointed out the inhe- rent advantages and disadvantages of the three systems, and the circumstances under which each is preferable to the others. I now draw near to my main subject, to show the practical working of the Federal principle as it is exemplified in the history of the Federal Governments of the Ancient, the Mediaeval, and the Modern world. CHAPTER III. OF TUB AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL. Before entering on that great developement of the Federal chap. hi. principle which marks the last age of independent Greece, it will be well to speak somewhat more briefly of certain less perfect approaches to a Federal system, which may be seen in the earlier days of Grecian history, and of which the noble work of Aratos was doubtless in a great measure a conscious improvement. And, first of all, it will be needful to say a few words as to an error which is now pretty well exploded, but which was of early date and which once had a wide currency. Many philosophical speculators on government have been led into great mistakes by the idea that Greece itself, as a whole, and not merely particular Grecian states, ought to be ranked as an instance of Federal union. The body which has been often mistaken for a Federal The Am- Council of Greece is the famous Council of the Amphi- Council ktyons at Delphi. Probably no one capable of writing upon p^ u a r *[ ue the subject can have been so wholly ignorant of the whole Govern- 11 -i meut - bearing of Grecian history as to take the Amphiktyonic League for a perfect Federal union after the Achaian or American pattern. But it is easy to understand how such a body as the Amphiktyons may have been mis- taken for a Federal Diet of the looser kind. It is certain 124 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL. chap. in. that Dionysios, 1 pretty clear that Strabo, 2 not unlikely that Cicero, 3 supposed the Amphiktyonic Council to have been invested with far more extensive powers than it ever possessed, at all events during the best days of Greece. Origin of The error on their part was natural : the later history of independent Greece was conspicuously a history of Fede- ralism ; and it was easy to carry back the political ideas of the times with which they were most familiar into days in which those ideas were most certainly unknown. And indeed there seems some reason to believe that the Amphiktyonic body had, in the age of Strabo, really put on something more like the outward shape of a true Federal body than it had ever worn in the age of Demosthenes. From the later Greek and Latin writers the error naturally spread to modern scholars. In days when all " the classics" were held to be of equal value and authority, and when it was hardly yet discerned that all "the classics" were not contemporary with each other, men did not see how little the descriptions of Strabo and Pausanias, even though backed by an incidental allusion of Cicero, were really worth, when weighed against the emphatic silence of Thucydides, Aristotle, and Poly- bios. And in truth modern scholars, writing under the 1 iv. 25, H<' goes on, ill liis usual style, to say lmw Smius Tullius founded the Latin League in imitation of the Amphiktyons. Now the Latin League, though probably not a perfect Federal Government, has a fair righl to be classed among i Lose approaches to the Federal idea. 2 be :'. (vol. ii. i>. 278). Strabo Bpeaks of the League as consisting of ■n-6\ets, Pausanias, (x. 8, 2) more accurately of jivy. Strabo's expressions, TrtfA rcof Koivwu PovXfVfTS/xfvof and Siicas '6vwv. All those expressions, Like those of Herodotus to be pn entrj quoted, hardly amount to more than the name 'EWitvorAfucu, as applied to certain officers, nol of a Hellenic Federa- tion, bu1 of the Athenian Confederacy. THE COUNCIL PRIMARILY A RELIGIOUS BODY, 127 The Amphiktyonic Council represented Greece as an chap. hi. Ecclesiastical Synod represented Western Christendom, not as a Swiss Diet or an American Congress represents the Federation of which it is the common legislature. Its primary business was to regulate the concerns of the The temple of Apollo at Delphi. And the Amphiktyonic AmpM- Council which met at Delphi and at Thermopylae was in 0] *iy "ne of truth only the most famous of several bodies of the same several. kind. An Amphiktyonic, or, more correctly, an Amphi- ktionic, 1 body was an Assembly of the tribes who dwelt around any famous temple gathered together to manage the affairs of that temple. There were other Amphiktyonic Assemblies in Greece, amongst which that of the isle of Kalaureia, 2 off the coast of Argolis, was a body of some celebrity. The Amphiktyons of Delphi obtained greater importance than any other Amphiktyons only because of the greater importance of the Delphic sanctuary, and because it incidentally happened that the greater part of the Greek nation had some kind of representation among them. But that body could not be looked upon as a perfect representation of the Greek nation which, to postpone other objections to its constitution, found no place for so large a fraction of the Hellenic body as the Arkadians. Still the Amphiktyons of Delphi undoubtedly came nearer than any other existing body to the character of a general representation of all Greece. It is therefore incidental easy to understand how the religious functions of such a Functions body might incidentally assume a political character. Thus council the old Amphiktyonic oath 3 forbade certain extreme 1 The derivation from d/xfiKrioves, quoted by Pausanias (x. 8,) from Androtion, is now generally received. Indeed the spelling AM*IKTI0NE2 occurs on the Amphiktyonic coinage at Delphi. 2 Strabo, lib. viii. c. 6 (vol. ii. p. 203). T H> 8e koI 'A/mQiktvovIo. tis irepl rd hpdv tovto, kiTTa. iroAeoov, at /ast^x " Ttjs dvaiaf, k.t.A. This gives the original idea of an Amphiktyony. 3 iEsch. Fals. Leg. § 121. 128 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL. chap, iiia measures of hostility against any city sharing in the com- mon Amphiktyonic worship. Here we get on that mixed ground between spiritual and temporal things on which Ecclesiastical Councils have often appeared with more honour to themselves than in matters more strictly within their own competence. The Amphiktyonic Council for- bade any Amphiktyonic city to be razed or its water to be cut off, with as good an intention, and with about as much effect, as Christian Synods instituted the Truce of God, and forbade tournaments * and the use of the cross-bow. But, more than this, the Amphiktyonic Council was the only deliberative body in which members from most parts of Greece habitually met together. On the few occasions when it was needed that Greece should speak with a common voice, the Amphiktyonic Council was the natural, indeed the only possible, mouth-piece of the nation. Once or twice then, in the course of Grecian history, we do find the Amphiktyonic body acting with real dignity in the instances name of United Greece. We naturally find this more phiktyonic distinctly the case immediately after the repulse of the action. Persians, when a common Greek national feeling existed for the moment in greater strength than either before or afterwards. Then it was that the Amphiktyonic Council, evidently acting in the name of all Greece, set a price b.i i7'.». upon the head of the Greek who had betrayed the defenders of Thermopylae to the Barbarians. 2 But, in setting a price on the head of Ephialtes, the Amphiktyonic Council, as head of Greece, hardly did more than was done liv the Athenian Assembly, if not as the head of Greece, yet as its worthiest representative, when it proscribed 1 \ i ;it the Second Lateran Council. See Roger of Wendover, ii. lOOj Eng. Hist. Ivl. - Herod, vii. - J1 I (80 213). Ol twv 'EW^vcov UuKayopoi 4Trti(tfpv£ai>. Professor Rawlinson, in bis Translation of Herodotus, strangely strengthens the words of the historian into "the deputies of the Greeks, the Pylagone." ITS INCIDENTAL POLITICAL ACTION. 129 Arthmios of Zelcia for bringing barbaric bribes into chap. hi. Hellas. 1 Sometimes again we find, naturally enough, this Amphik- great religious Synod, like religious Synods in later times, Crusades, preaching Crusades against ungodly and sacrilegious cities, against violators of the holy ground or of the peaceful worshippers of Apollo. And, whatever Ave may think of the pious zeal of zEschines against the Lokrians of b.c. 3 to. Amphissa, 2 we may at least fairly believe that the first Sacred War under Solon 3 was a real Crusade, carried on b.c. 595. with as distinct a sense of religious duty as ever sent forth Godfrey or Saint Lewis or our own glorious Edward. At The other times the Amphiktyonic Council, just like other becomes religious Councils, does not escape the danger of being ^ e «£2} of perverted to purely temporal purposes. Nothing is easier states. than to see that the Amphiktyonic Council, in the days of Philip, had sunk into a mere political tool in the hands first of Thebes, then of Macedonia. 4 And in all cases, No inhe- whether the sentences of the Council were just or unjust, i n its whether they were dictated by religious faith or by political Decrees - 1 JEsch. Ktes. § 259. It is a favourite common -place with the orators. 2 Msch. Ktes. § 118, et seqq. Thirlwall, vi. 80. 3 Plut. Sol. 11. JEsch.. Ktes. § 108. In later times (B.C. 281) we find a Crusade against /Etolia led by the Spartan King Areus (Justin, xxiv. 1) on the same ground as this of Solon, namely the sacrilegious cultivation of the plain of Kirrha. But I do not see the evidence for asserting, as is done by Droysen (Hellcnismus, i. 645) and by Mr. P. Smith (Diet. Biog. art. Areus) that this was in consequence of a formal Amphiktyonic decree. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 53. There is an intermediate Sacred War (B.C. 449. See Thuc. i. 112) in which the Amphiktyons are not spoken of at all. 4 There seems however no ground for believing that the Amphiktyons took upon themselves to elect Alexander as chief of Greece against Persia. The statement of Diodoros to that effect (xvii. 4) is, I suspect, a confusion, most characteristic of Diodoros, with Philip's appointment as chief of the Amphiktyonic Crusades. Both Philip and Alexander were chosen, so far as they were chosen at all, by the Congress of the Confederate Greeks at Corinth (Arrian, i. 1. Diod. u. s. ). Diodoros is however followed by Mr. Whiston in the Dictionary of Anticpiities, p. 81, and oven by Mr. Grote (xii. 15). But Droysen seems to me to see the state of the case much moro clearly. ' ' Aber so durftig war diess einzige Analogon einer verfas- sungsmassigen Nationaleinigung [the Delphic Amphiktyony] dass Philipp K 130 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL. chap. in. subserviency, the Amphiktyonic body had no constitutional means at its command for carrying them into execution. The spiritual tribunal had no temporal power ; culprits had to be delivered to the secular arm, and the secular arm had to be looked for wherever it might be found. If no pious city like Thebes, no pious prince like Philip, undertook to act as the minister and champion of the Council, an Amphiktyonic judgement had no more in- herent force than the judgement of a modern Ecclesiastical Synod. Sparta, the most devout worshipper of Apollo, took no heed to the Amphiktyonic fine which Theban b.c. 371. influence procured as the punishment of the treacherous B.o. 382. seizure of the Kadmeia by Phoibidas. 1 So did Philomelos and his successors in Phokis resist both anathemas and armies, till the clear eye and strong hand of Philip saw and grasped his opportunity at once to avenge Apollo and to make his kingdom Greek and himself the leader of Greece. Otherwise a bull from Delphi or Thermopylae (.o. 357- could have done as little to stay the march of Onomarchos as bulls from the Vatican, unsupported by the arm of the French invader, could do in our own day to stay the inarch of the first chosen King of Italy. But though the Amphiktyonic Council was in no sense a Federal Government, its importance in a History of miirect Federal Government is of a high order. Tho negative mport- . rt & ace of the bearings of the existence of such a body can hardly be overrated. Nothing proves so completely how dear to the elbsl die neue Form fines Bundes in K. ninth versuchl hatte, die Nation oder ili'' uachsten Kreise derselben zu einigen." Hellenismus, ii. 503. Droysen's strong Macedonian bias must however be guarded against, jusl like the strong anti-Macedonian bias of Mr. Grote. 1 , tj7 8f fxtO' krlpas, f) /.(trek irA(ti'>i>coi>. We shall presently come to ,n for thinking that this system of Contributory Boroughs belonged onlj i" tin late i Form <<\ the institution. I. n, Pali Log. g 122. ITS UNFAIR DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES. 135 some of its most distinguished members, but it could only chap. in. have been the deputies of these little insignificant tribes who gained for the whole body the contemptuous descrip- tion given of it by Demosthenes. 1 But in a purely religious Assembly these incongruities were probably not found so intolerable as they assuredly would have been found in an Assembly exercising real political power. The very ano- Incon- t • i c gruities mahes were consecrated by the traditional reverence ol i ess felt in centuries. The very points in the constitution of the ^ody: ° nS Council which made it so unfit for political action, made it only more venerable when looked at as a holy represen- tative of past ages. What if certain tribes had sunk from independence to bondage % Statesmen might indeed, in their earthly policy, regard such merely political changes, but misfortune, without guilt, could not degrade any faithful worshipper of Apollo in the presence of his patron God. The zeal and piety of Athens and Sparta were not more fervent, doubtless they were far less fervent, than the zeal and piety of the little communities around the Temple, whose whole importance was derived from their share in its management. The God of Delphi was no respecter of persons ; he looked with equal favour on the devotion of the weakest and of the most powerful wor- shipper. A change in the constitution of the Council would probably have been looked upon by the mass of Greeks as a heinous sacrilege. But, while such a constitution existed, the Council was unfit for political power, and, whenever it did meddle with political matters, 1 Dcm. Cor. § 190. 'AvOpoinous dwelpovs Kiywv koX t3 /j.t\\ov ov irpoopu- ixevovs, tovs Upopivnyovas. Or arc we to infer that the Hieronmemones were an inferior body to the Pylagoroi ? As iEschines was one of the latter, we may infer that the greater members of the AmpMktyony sent deputies, in that capacity at least, who would not deserve the description. But in any case, the majority of both orders would come from the pettj tribes, and would doubtless be what Demosthenes describes, 136 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL. ohap in. its interference was invariably mischievous. Any power ■which could command the votes of the little tribes about Mount Oita could procure whatever decisions it chose in the Amphiktyonic body. Philip, the common foe of Greece, was welcomed by the Amphiktyons as a deliverer, b.c. 352. a true servant of Apollo, a pious Crusader against the Ampliik- usurping and sacrilegious Phokian. It is not improbable tlampion- ^bat 1 mj W °f tne smaller Greek cities may really have ^I'l,'." 1 shared, from shortsighted political motives, in this ill-timed Hiihp. ° goodwill to the Macedonian. But this only shows the more clearly the utter unfitness of the Council to act in any way as a political mouth-piece of Greece. When Demosthenes had united Thebes and Athens in one common cause, the union of those two great cities did not command ;i single integral vote in the Amphiktyonic Council. It is certainly very remarkable that, long after the Council had ceased to be of any importance whatever, many of the defects in its constitution should have been reformed. Pausanias 2 describes the Council as it stood in his time, when, under the Roman dominion, the debates of the Amphiktyons must have been of considerably less moment than the debates of an English Convocation. Reforms Some at least of the changes which he mentions he attri- Ausrustua butes to the legislative mind of Augustus Crcsar. The '' ' : '\\ Council, in this its later form, became at last, in a great A. I>. ] I. ° degree, ;i representation of Cities, when Greece had no more independent Cities to represent. An attempt too was made, after the happy precedent set by the wise confede- ration of Lykia, 8 to do what in modern political language is called apportioning members t«» population. In the old state of things the Dolopians, Magnesians, Ainians, and Phthidtic Achaians had formed a large proportion of the 1 Edinburgh Review, vol cv. p. 819 (April, 1857) - x. 8, 5. Tin I,- i.i in Leogui will to deecribed in the next chapter. REFORM UNDER AUGUSTUS. 137 Council. Now they lost their separate Amphiktyonic chap. hi. being ; the Dolopians indeed had ceased to exist alto- gether; 1 the other tribes were made what we may call Contributory Boroughs to Thessaly. The votes thus saved were divided among several new and several restored members. The Phdkians had, at the end of the Sacred b.c. 346. War, lost their Amphiktyonic votes, which were transferred to Macedonia, as the due reward of Philip's Crusade in the cause of Apollo. In the new constitution Augustus found room both for Phokians and Macedonians, as Avell as for the inhabitants of his own new city of Nikopolis. Delphi, Athens, Euboia, now appear as substantive mem- New ar- i • t • rangement bers. I lie two Lokrian votes were divided between the two of votes divisions of the Lokrian nation. The Dorian votes, in like council, sort, were divided between the original Dorians of the North and the Dorians of Peloponnesos, that is to say those of Corinth, Sikyon, Argos, and Megara ; for Sparta, which shared in the exclusion of Phokis, does not seem to have shared in its restoration. The whole number of votes was raised to thirty, and, instead of each constituency, as before, possessing two votes, the votes were now distri- buted among the members of the League in various proportions ranging from one to six. 2 Three of the mem- 1 Pans. U. s. Ou yap en t\v AoAottoju yevos. - The whole scheme is as follows : — Nikopolis (5 votes. Macedonia 6 — Thessaly (with Malians, Ainians, Magnesians, and Phthiotic Achaians 6 — Boeotia 2 — Phdkis 2 — Delphi 2 Northern Doris Ozolian Lokrians Epiknenddian Lokrians Enlioia Argos, Sikyon, Corinth, and Megara . . . Athens 30 138 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL. chap. in. bers, Nikopolis, Athens, and Delphi, were single cities, and these, it is expressly said, 1 sent representatives to every meeting. The other constituencies were still not cities but races ; their Amphiktyonic representatives were to be chosen by the several cities of the race in turn. Thus the vote of the Peloponnesiau Dorians would be given in successive years by a Corinthian, a Sikyonian, a Megarian, and an Argive, 2 while every meeting contained one member for Athens, two for Delphi, and six for Nikopolis. Most of the cities in short were in the same position as the counties of Nairn and Cromarty before the Reform Bill, when they sent a member between them who was elected in alternate Parliaments by Nairn and by Cromarty. This account of Pausanias is well worth studying, as setting before us a very curious piece of amateur constitution- making. Had the Amphiktyonic body in the days of Augustus still retained any practical functions to discharge, its constitution, as settled by the Imperial reformer, would seem to be by no means unhappily put together. The Council was not indeed a representation of the whole of Greece, but neither had it ever been so in earlier times. It still gave an undue advantage to the North over the South ; but something might be said for this in the case of a 1 Tails, ii. v. At fiif St) nuKeis 'AOrjvat Kal At\(po\ leal ?} "NtKiiiroKis, avrai liXv airocTTtWovcTL avvtSpevcrovTas 4 s a)x iaiiv. '-' It would seem that disputes Bometimes arose among the contributory cities about their Amphiktyonic rights. At. least in an inscription in Boeckh's Collection, No. 112] (vol, i. p. 578), a certain Archenoos of Argoa i- praised for having, among his other good deeds, recovered tin' Amphiktyonic rights Of his native city — fxt-ro, to avaawaai avrdv to SlKawv T7js 'A/j.rptKTvovfias t?7 7raT/)i'5i. Another inscription (1124) commemorates an Argeian Amphiktyon named Titus Statiliua Timokratea, the sun of Lamprios— a curious illustration of "Greece under the R ana;" Titus being doubtless an Argeian who had obtained Roman citizenship. Another hybrid of the an t, Caius Curtius Proklos, is commemorated, in another cription (No, 1058, vol. i- p, 559) i a Megarian Amphiktyon. SYSTEM OF CONTRIBUTING BOROUGHS. 139 confederacy founded to manage the concerns of a Northern ohat. hi. temple. We must also remember how completely Athens and Sparta had fallen from the position which they held in the days with which most of us are almost exclusively familiar. The weakest points of the Augustan charter are the enormous number of votes given to the new city of Nikopolis and the very scanty amount of representatives allowed to the Dorians of Peloponnesos. Still, after all allowances, the new constitution of the Council was cer- tainly a great improvement upon the old one. But possibly it was only because of the utter nullity of the Amphiktyonic body that any such constitution was bestowed upon it. The founder of the Empire could well allow so harmless a safety-valve to carry off the last feeble ebulli- tions of Hellenic freedom. While the firm grasp of Roman Governors was pressed tight upon the provinces of Mace- donia and Achaia, their inhabitants might safely be permitted to play either at Town-Autonomy or at Federal Government beneath the sacred shadow of the Delphian Temple. It can hardly fail to have been observed that the Amphi- Approach ktyonic Council, both in its earlier and its later forms, S cntative makes a far nearer approach to the forms of Representative J™ "j* e Government than anything which we find elsewhere in Council. ancient Greece, whether in the constitutions of Federations or in those of single cities. In every Greek Government, as we cannot too constantly bear in mind, every qualified citizen was entitled to take his personal share and did not delegate his rights to another. No Greek city, no Greek Federation, presents an example of a real Representative Assembly. But the Amphiktyonic Council is strictly a Representative body ; in discussing its nature, it is im- possible to avoid introducing the language which we familiarly employ in speaking of modern Representative 140 OF THE AMPHIKTYONTC COUNCIL. chap. in. bodies. It may indeed be said that, after all, the Amphi- ktyonic Council was merely a Senate, and that, in conformity with universal Greek precedent, there was an Amphiktyonic Popular Assembly, in which every worshipper of Apollo had a right to appear. But it is clear that the Amphi- ktyonic Council filled a much more exalted position in relation to the Amphiktyonic Assembly than the Athenian Senate, for instance, did in relation to the Athenian Assembly. In the Amphiktyonic Constitution it is the Council which is really the important body, and the Council is certainly representative. But a really representative Senate would be just as great an anomaly in an ordinary Greek constitution as a representative Assembly. The real reason why Ave find representative forms in the Amphi- ktyonic body, while Ave do not find them in ordinary Greek Governments, is that the Amphiktyonic body was in no The sense a Government at all. The Amphiktvonic Council was Council . not a not exactly a Diplomatic Congress, but it was much more ment, but like a Diplomatic Congress than it Avas like the governing ; '."'. ( " Assembly of any common wealth, kingdom, or Federation, for a The Pylagoroi and Ilieromnemoncs were not exactly Am- purpose. bassadors, but they were much more like Ambassadors than they were like Members of a British Parliament or CA r cn an American Congress. The business of the Council was not to govern or to legislate, either for a single state or for a League of states ; its duty was simply to manage a single class of affairs, in which a number of independent commonwealths were alike interested, but which did not come within the individual competence of any one of their number. It is manifest that this could only be dono by deputies from the several states interested, that is byrcpre- sentatives. The nearest approach to the Amphiktyonic Council in modern times would be if the College of Car- dinals were <<» consist of members chosen by the several Roman Catholic nations of Europe and America. Sneh a REPRESENTATIVE NATURE OF THE COUNCIL. 141 body would be entrusted with business in which every chap. hi. Roman Catholic country is interested, but it would not form a Federal or even necessarily a local Government. The Amphiktyons were the guardians of the Delphic Temple, but they no more formed a local Government for the city of Delphi than they formed a Federal Government for the whole of Greece. The Council was representative, The Am- just because it was not a Government, though again we bodywas" 3 may, if we please, wonder that the employment of repre- representa- sentative forms in the Council did not suggest the employ- cause it ment of representative tonus in the Jbederal, it not Govern- in the City, Governments of Greece. In like manner it ment " would be a very interesting subject of inquiry whether, from a similar set of causes, representative forms, or a close approach to them, did not exist in Ecclesiastical Synods much earlier than they did in Secular Parliaments, and whether the founders of the representative system in modern Europe may not, consciously or unconsciously, have had ideas suggested to them by the constitution of the Assemblies of the Church. It belongs rather to a historian of Greece than to a historian of Federal Government to run through the whole evidence which so conspicuously shows the poli- tical nullity of the Amphiktyonic body during the best days of Greece. This has been amply done, to say nothing of the earlier work of Sainte Croix, both bv Bishop Thirlwall and Mr. Grote. The Amphiktyonic Political Council is of no moment in the world of Tlmcydides, ^j), 1 ; it is of no moment in the world of Xcnoplion, it is Council during the of no moment in the world of Polvbios. Its short and greater mischievous importance belongs wholly to the days of Grecian Demosthenes and Philip. Tlmcydides never once men- Hlstor v- tions it, though he has often occasion to mention the Delphian Temple, to record stipulations for its management, 1-12 OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL. chap. in. and at least one war for its possession. 1 It is clear that, in his time, the Council so iar from holding any Federal authority over the general affairs of Greece, was not even independent in its own proper sphere of religious duty. And if we find it playing an important part in the days of Demosthenes and Philip, the difference is simply because Sparta and x\thens, in the previous century, had not thought worthy of any notice at all, while now first Thebes and then Philip found that even the Shadow at Delphi was capable of being made useful as a political tool. The Politics of Aristotle contain no mention of it. Polybios speaks of it twice, 2 neither time in a way implying any sort of Federal power. The mistake of looking at the Amphiktyonic body as a Federal union of Greece arose only in times when freedom in all its forms, Federal or otherwise, had utterly passed away from the soil of Greece. Yet the Amphiktyonic Council is an institution of no small importance in a general history of Federal Government. What it was and what it was not, shows more speakingly than anything else how utterly alien to the Greek mind, in the days before Macedonian domination, was anything like 1 Tim Sacred War in B.o. 449. Thuc. i. 112. See above, p. 129. 2 The first time (iv. 25) the Amphiktyons are simply mentioned in their proper character as guardians of the Delphic Temple, [n this duty they bad been interfered with by the /Etolians, and Macedonia, Achaia, and the other allied powers, agree to effeel their restoration. The second passage (xl. >')) is very curious indeed ; it seems to se1 the Amphiktyons before us, ao1 as a political, bu1 as a Literarj body, a new which certainly did no1 occur i" DSmosthenSs. Aulas Postumius wrote a I k in Greek, and ked to be excused if, being a Foreigner, he made mistakes in language, Cato tells him thai if the Amphiktyonic Council had Bel bira to write in • link (el p.lv yiip avTifi ru rwv 'AfupiKTUovuv avvlhpiov (rvviraTTe ypdtyav Imoplav), his excuse would have been a .u r ""'l one ; but as aobody obliged 1,1111 to write in Greek or i" write at nil, he bad no excuse if he wrote badly. This storj is also told by Plutarch, Cato Maj. 12. It reminds one ol -i' tiii \ 'b criticism on Byron : " If any suit could ho broughl l ord Byron, for the purpose "I compelling him to put into court ,i certain tttil j "i |— try, ' &c. Edin. I.V\ , Jan. 1808. POLITICAL NULLITY OF THE COUNCIL. 143 a Federal Union of the whole nation or even the most chap. nr. remote approach to it. 1 1 On this subject of the Amphiktyonic Council, the eighteenth number of the ' ' Federalist " should by all means be read. It is clear that the authors, Madison and Hamilton, had not the least notion of the true nature of the institution, but it is most curious to see the strong political sagacity of the authors struggling with their Titter ignorance of facts. They were politicians enough to see the utter political nullity of the Council in Grecian history ; they were not scholars enough to see that it never really pretended to any character from which anything but political nullity could be expected. Some of the particular comments and illustrations are most ingenious. I shall have again to refer to this curious paper when I come to speak of the remarks of the same writers on the Federal constitution of Achaia. M. de Tocqueville also seems to have misunderstood the nature of the Amphiktyonic Council. He compares (i. 266) the position of Philip as executor of the Amphiktyonic decrees with the preponderance of the Province of Holland in the Dutch Confederation. Philip's position was really a great deal more like that of his French namesake when he under- took, by commission from Pope Innocent, to wrest the Kingdom of England from the sacrilegious John. Tocfraeville's English translator does not point out the error. Still more recently an example of the same sort of union of political shrewdness with utter lack of historical knowledge is to be found in Mr. Spence's work on the American Union, a book not indeed to be compared with the writings of Hamilton or Tocrpieville, but abounding in keen observation of facts and in sound inferences from those facts. But Mr. Spence's remarks ou the Amphiktyonic Council and the Achaian League (p. 7, 8) are merely Hamilton served up again. Of jEtolia, Lykia, and even Switzerland, he seems never to have heard. Mr. Spence too is without Hamilton's excuse ; if ho could not read Polybios, he might at least have read Thirl wall. CHAPTER IV. OF TDK MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. § 1. Of the Northern Leagues. Pholis, Ahwnania, Epeiros, Thessaly. chap. iv. I HAVE already remarked that the greatest and most civilized states of Greece were precisely those which clave most strenuously to the principle of distinct town-auto- An ap- nomy. The approaches to Federal Government which we Federal ° find in the earlier history of Greece appear only among the meltnol more backward portions of the nation ; and, as we know uncommon Du t little of the details of their several constitutions, we among the , ruder por- can derive from them comparatively little knowledge bear- tii.'r.nrk ing on our general subject. In fact some sort of approach " ' u " u - to a Federal Union must have been rather common than otherwise in those parts of Greece in which the city-system u;is never fully developed. 1 In a considerable portion of Greece the cities seem to have been of comparatively little consequence ; particular cities and their citizens are seldom mentioned ; we far more commonly hear of the district and its inhabitants as a collective whole. Such seems to have been the case with the Lokriaus, the Northern Dorians, ami, so far as they can be said to have i "'ill.' v tern <>f federation existed everywhere in the early state "f iety, .hi. I ,\. ■iini.i was ripe for its renewal a1 a later period, because no one town had bo outgrown the others as to e pire to become the capital of the whole country." Aanold's Life, i. 273. EARLY FEDERALISM IN NORTHERN GREECE. 145 had any political existence at all, with those other little chap. rv. tribes of which we scarcely hear except as returning so disproportionate a share of members to the Amphiktyonic Council. The whole tribe is spoken of as if it had some sort of political unity ; yet they certainly were not monar- chies, and we do not hear of the domination of any single city. There must have been a common power of some kind, and yet it would be hardest of all to believe that whole tribes formed indivisible republics, and that the villages or small towns whose inhabitants made up the tribo had no separate political existence at all. Some rude form of Federalism can hardly fail to have existed among them. Among other tribes, as the Phokians and Akarnanians, we have distinct evidence that some sort of Federal Union really did exist. But of the details of their constitutions we know nothing ; we have at best only a few scraps belonging to later times, when the examples of Achaia and /Etolia had given such an impulse to the Federal principle everywhere. Of the Phokian League The nearly all our knowledge ' comes from an incidental men- league. tion of Pausanias, who describes the building, the Pho- kikon, where the Federal body used to assemble. 2 But the traveller is much more anxious to describe the pillars and statues which adorned the place of meeting than to give us any information as to the constitution of the League itself. We gather however from his account that the Ph<5- kikon did not stand in any town ; possibly the Phokians 1 In this chapter I am chiefly concerned with the constitution and the earlier history of the several Minor Leagues. Their history during the great Federal period of Greece I reserve, like that of the Achaian League itself, for my more strictly historical chapters. a Paus. x. 5, 1. 'Es 8e rr)v iir\ AeAcpwv evde7av avacrrpfipavTi iic AavXlSos, Kai \6vTi e-irl to irpuffai, ianv oikoSoVw* iv hpuntpa, rijs 68ov Ka\ov)x(vov QookikIv, es o diro eKaffTqs 7roAea>s ffvviaffiv ol 4>coKe7s. Of. Drumann, Ge- schichte des Verfalls der Griechischen Staaten, p. 436. There is a pleasing simplicity in the notion of suddenly coming upon the seat of a Federal Government by the roadside. L 146 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap. iv. may have taken warning by the example of their Boeotian neighbours. We also gather that these meetings at the Phokikon, like so many other old Greek institutions, pre- served their nominal existence down even to the days of Pausanias. As to the date of the Phokian Union, when b.c. 346. we remember the utter destruction of the Phokian towns after the Sacred War, it is clear that the League spoken of by Pausanias must have been an institution of a later age b.c. 196. than the time of Philip. Indeed as all Phokis was, for a b.c 146. short time, incorporated with iEtolia, and as all Greek Leagues were for a while dissolved by the Romans, 1 the mimic League of Pausanias' times must have been actually established since the days of Mummius. But it would probably reproduce the forms of the constitution as they Trobably stood in the great Federal period of Greece. And this f an League again, like the Achaian League itself, was probably League on ^ a rev * va l °f an older union, so that what Pausanias saw may well have been the shadow of the state of things which existed before the ascendency of Philomelos. The Pho- kians are always spoken of as a substantive whole ; 2 we hear of embassies 3 being sent, and business in general being transacted, in the name of the whole Phokian body. B.c. 359- Philomelos and his successors were chiefs, tyrants, or whatever we choose to call them, not of this or that city, but of the whole Phokian people. 4 Yet the Phokians had numerous cities, as more than twenty were destroyed after the Sacred War. It seems necessarily to follow that some sort of Federal Union had always existed in Phokis, and, as we hear of no dominant or presiding City, the Phokian 1 Bee below, a1 (be end of the nexi Bection, - Dem. Pals. Leg. 92. d S^os rf tiJc 4>wk^wc. :i Xen, Hell. vi. I. I. Of 9f0KfiJ ^irQt(r$(vov us tJ)v AaKtSal/xova. * Diod. xvi. 23. 'O 4>i\iifxri\os, fxiyiarov ix uv ^ v Tn ^ , l > a»«Cv \ot/ iVxypoV ir^df t»7 \axrirt. An. . < teog. art. A.carnania, * \ i ■ I j . I It'll, iv. 6, 4. Xlifx\pas it ^TparAv Trptit t<) uonov twv , kKapvdvwv. « PoL M. i-v <■ i.iv. \wiii. 17. Leucade hsc sunt decreta. Id capul A.carnaniee , pat, eoque in concilium onraea popoli convi oiebant. Bo xxxvi. 11. <* Pol, \.\xviii. 5. THE AKARNANIAN LEAGUE. 149 Ambassadors were sent by the Federal body, 1 and pro- chap. it. bably, just as in the Achaian League, it would have been Constitu- held to be a breach of the Federal tie if any single city had League. entered on diplomatic intercourse with other powers. As in Achaia too, there stood at the head of the League a General with high authority.' 2 We know not whether this was an ancient Akarnanian institution, or whether it were introduced in later times in imitation of the Achaian or iEtolian system. What little more we know of the con- stitution of the League is derived from an inscription found at Aktion, 3 the subject of which is the honours con- ferred by the Akarnanian body on two Romans named Pub- lius and Lucius Acilius. This inscription incidentally tells us of the existence of a Senate and Assembly, 4 according to the common Greek model, of a Priest of the Aktian Apollo, who seems to have been regarded as a Federal magistrate, of a Secretary of State, 5 and of three other magistrates 6 whose functions are not explained. The General is not mentioned. Possibly the office may have been abolished under the Roman dominion, or it may have been usual to date the years, not by the Generals, but by the Priests of Apollo. So, at Athens, years were reckoned not by the effective magistracy of the Ten Generals, but by the almost honorary magistracy of the Archon. The existence of coins bearing the name of the whole Akarnanian nation shows that there was unity enough to admit of a Federal coinage, though coins of particular cities also occur. 1 Pol. ix. 32. irapayevofjLiOa fx.tv dird rod koivov tQv 'Anapvavuv enre- ara\fxivoi irpos iifxas. 2 Pol. V. 6. rJKev ix wv 'Apicrr6v ' AKapvavwv. 67rl ypafi/J.a,Teos t small honour for a half barbarian state. * Thuc. ii. 80. Xdovts 5e x^ 10 ' ct/SaafAtimx, wv i)yovuro tit' irrjeriw irporTTairiu 4k ruu dpxiicoO ytvovs 'bcoTvos Kal NiKavup' iarpartvovro 5* fjurh. Xu/ivoov Ka\ (,-)i(TTTpwro\ d^aa'iKfvroi. The nam. I'liutyns in these regions reminds one of the Souliol hero Phdtos Tzabellas. ; Niebuhr, Eist. Rom., i. 609, Eng. Tr. ' [b. ii. 179 el seqq. ' Thuc. ii. 80. MoAuirrrodt 8e 1)7* io7ros .. 1 QapiirOV TOO liainAtws iraibds 6vrus. ill THE EPEIROT LEAGUE. 151 Molossian King met his people in their National Assembly chat. iv. at Passaron, where the King swore to govern according to the Law, and the People swore to preserve his Kingdom to him according to the Law. 1 The temporary greatness of the Molossian Kingdom under Alexander and Pyrrhos is Ec - 35 °- . J 272. matter of general history. Our immediate business is with the republican government which succeeded on the bloody extinction of royalty and the royal line. f°- 239_ Epeiros now became a Republic ; of the details of its constitution we know nothing, but its form can hardly fail to have been Federal. 2 The Epeirots formed one Federal political body ; Polybios always speaks of them, like the in Epeiros. Achaians and Akarnanians, as one people acting with one will. Decrees are passed, Ambassadors are sent and received, in the name of the whole Epeirot people, and Epeiros had, like Akarnania, a federal coinage bearing the common name of the whole nation. Epeiros was, undoubtedly in all its dealings with other nations, one Republic. But it is hard to see how a Republic, unless it assumed the Federal form, could have em- braced so large a country, one which included many cities, 3 and several tribes which in earlier days had been quite distinct. The Federal form too was then in its full prevalence among the Grecian states, and was that which a newly founded Republic would most naturally adopt. 4 Of the Epeirot magistrates we find no distinct 1 Pint. Pyrrh. 5. EldiOeicrav oi fiaxnKtls iv XJacrcrapoovi, x^P'f r V s MoAot- t'iSos, 'Apilca Ait Ovaavns opKWfAoruv roiis 'Hireipwras Kal opici^eiv, avrol ju.tv ap£eiv kroj ion and Bchoi a, a '■' l.iv. cadi 10. Pauaanias Praetor e1 Alexander Magiater Equitum. * Niebuhr, Kleine Bchriften, L 248. Tittmann, 713 e1 aeqq. II. (i. Thirlwall, viii. 861. NO TRUE FEDERALISM IN THESSALY. 153 legal sanction. 1 But he came much nearer to the character chap. iv. either of a King or of a Tyrant than to that of a Federal President like the General of the Achaians. The Tagos, a citizen of one Thessalian city, exercised over all Thessaly ' a supremacy hardly to be distinguished from kingship, 2 a supremacy to which other cities submitted with reluctance, 3 and to which they were sometimes constrained to yield by force of arms. 4 Nor do we hear of anything like a Federal Council or of any other check upon the power of the Tagos, when he was once appointed. Jason of Pherai acts Monarchy i i ,., T7 -. t i • mi i of Jason. throughout like a King, and his will seems at least as un- controlled as that of his brother sovereign beyond the Kam- bounian hills. 5 Even Jason seems to have been looked B . c . 372-0. upon as a Tyrant; 5 possibly, like the Athenian Demos, he himself did not refuse the name. 7 Certain it is that, after Undis- Jason's death, the office of Tagos became, under his sue- Tyranny cessors Polyphron and Alexander, a Tyranny of the worst cessors a " kind. 8 In the next century, whatever may have been the ?-°- 370 ~ nominal form of the constitution, Thessaly was practically a dependency of Macedonia. 9 The country indeed retained nominal independence enough to enter into treaty-engage- 1 Xen. Hell. vi. 1, 18. Tax^ 5e 6 'idaaiv ' ixoAoyovjjLivtas rayds twv QdauaXuiv /ca0ei(TT7)/ce<. lb. vi. 4, 28. Meyas i*ev -qv nal StoL to tc^ i/6/j.Cj) QicraaXdiv Tayos KaOeardvai. 2 Niebuhr, KL Sch. u.s. Die "Wiirde des Tagus, welche Jason iiber- tragen ward, war eine konigliche. Cf. Herod, v. 63, where we find a fiaffiAeiis of Thessaly, meaning doubtless the Tagos. 3 See the whole speech of Polydamas, Xen. Hell. vi. 1. 4 lb. vi. 1, 5. 5 lb. vi. 1, 18 ; 4. 29, 30. 6 When Jason was murdered, the assassins were received with honour in various Greek cities, on which Xenophon (vi. 4, 32) adds

€s avruv u7) rvpavvos yevoiro. 7 Arist. Pol. iii. 4, 9. 'ldiAi7nros ... 01} f.t.6vov tw eirl QpaKTfs iroktwi/ eyeveTo 154 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. (HAP. IV. Thessaly a depend- ency of Mace- donia. B.C. 346- 198. Legisla- tion of T. Qu melius Flami- uinus, b.c. 197. merits, and to be enumerated in lists of allies alongside of Achaia and of Macedonia itself. 1 But it is clear that the will of the Macedonian Kings was practically undisputed, and also that in Thessaly, as elsewhere, their influence was maintained by the worst of means, by fostering disunion and disorder of every kind. 2 We know that elsewhere an efficient Federal system was the thing which they most sedulously discouraged, and no system of the kind is likely to have existed during the time of their supremacy. Flamininus was a lawgiver of a better sort ; he doubtless sincerely desired to give both Thessaly and all parts of Greece as much liberty as was consistent with the dominant interests of Rome. His constitution at least set free the smaller Thessalian towns from their previous bondage to the great cities, 3 but the internal constitutions of the towns were, with the natural instinct of a Roman, fixed by him on an oligarchic basis. 4 But even a freer and better system, if dictated by a foreign deliverer, could be of little value then and of little interest now. There is no sign of anything like real native Federalism in Thessaly, and therefore any minute examination of Thessalian political antiquities would be alien to our subject. § 2. Of the Boeotian Lcayue. The political history of Boeoti a is of far more importance than that of Thessaly; it is, indeed, in an indirect way, Kupios, &W& Kal (-)6ttoAous vtf ainbv itroi^aro 5id rov .'/8oj>. This seems accurately to difltingui l> between tin 1 cities of ChalMdikfi, directly incor- porated with Macedonia, and those of Thessaly, merelj broughl underan overwhfllming Macedonian influence. 1 I'.il. iv. '.'. 'H ytyiv-wivi) avp-ixaxla . . . 'Axoioiy, 'Hirttpoirais, QwKtvffi, MciKtSutri, Boiu>to?s, 'AKapvaai, &(TTa\tns. - Liv. uuriv. 51 :i Niebuhr, El. S< b, L. 248, B. 3ee ThirlwalL viii. 861, THE BCEOTIAN LEAGUE. 155 one of the most important portions of the political history chap. rv. of Greece. The Boeotian League Avas undoubtedly a very ill History arranged political contrivance ; but its history gives us, if Bibotiam only by way of warning, some of the lessons which are most Leauue ; needful in a general survey of Federal Government. The its Warn- fate of the Boeotian Confederacy is a constant commentary on the dangers which may arise to a Federal State from the influence of an overwhelming capital. A great capital, even in a consolidated state, has a strong tendency to be a great evil ; but the existence of such a capital among a League of republics is more perilous still. A single great Dangers city, standing out prominently above all the others, is whelming always likely to destroy the true Federal equality, and, in- c '^ lt 1 al , 1 | 1 stead of remaining a single equal member, to become first the State. President, and then the Tyrant, of the League. Of course a Federation neither can nor ought, any more than other form of government, to check the growth and prosperity of any of its cities ; but it is highly desirable to take such measures as may secure the League against a dispropor- tionate influence on the part of any single member. A Federal State will do well to fix its Seat of Government anywhere rather than in its greatest city. If a Federal State has a capital, the same dangers at once arise which even in a consolidated state arise from the influence of one preponderating city. But in a Federal State they are likely to assume a yet worse form. In a monarchy the capital has, after all, no different legal position from that of another town ; it is invested with no portion of sovereignty, nor is it commonly in the habit of legal political action. But in a Federal body, the capital is already a sovereign commonwealth, capable of, and accustomed to, distinct political action within its own sphere ; it is therefore far more likely to encroach upon the rights of weaker members than can be doue in a monarchy or an # indivisible republic. Most of the wisest Confederations have avoided this 156 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. CHAP. IV. Most Con- federa- tions have avoided a pre- dominant Capital. danger, by having no capital at all, none at least m the same sense in which Paris or even London is a capital. We have seen Akarnanian Federal Meetings held on an entrenched hill-top, and Phokian Federal Meetings in a temple by the wayside.. The Achaian Congress, in the best days of the League, met in the insignificant town of Aigion, and afterwards in the several cities in turn. In the Dutch Republic the enormous influence of Amsterdam was somewhat counterbalanced by the arrangement by which both the Provincial States of Holland and the States-General of the United Provinces were held, not at Amsterdam, but at the Hague. So either a wise providence or a most happy accident has fixed the Seat of Government of the American Union in a city which is simply the Seat of Government, and nothing else. One cannot avoid a vague feeling of possible danger, if the gigantic city of New York were the permanent dwelling-place of the Federal President and Congress. Happily New York, like Amsterdam, is not only not the capital of the United States, it is not even the capital of the State to which it gives its name. So in Switzerland, the Federal Govern- ment till lately held its sittings in three towns, Bern, Zurich, and Luzern, in turn. It is a grave question whether it was a wise arrangement which has fixed the Seat of Government permanently at Bern. Hern indeed is not the greatest city of Switzerland, but it is the only one which combines an amount of population and a geo- graphical position which could allow it to aspire to the rani of :i capital After these real Confederations, it seems almost ludicrous to speak of the body which calls itself a Confederation in Germany, but even that takes cure to hold its Federal Meetings at Frankfort and not at Berlin <>r Vienna. Now in the Boeotian League we see the evils of a preponderating capital carried to their ex- treme point. The greal city of Thebes became the DANGERS OF A CAPITAL IN A FEDERATION. 157 mistress, and in the end the tyrant, of the whole League. 1 chap. iv. She at last came to rule with greater severity over kindred Position cities, members of the same Federal body, than Athens i n the ruled over protected or conquered States. She at last j^ 01 ™," became the object of a relentless hatred on the part of the smaller towns, which surpassed even the ordinary bitterness of hatred between hostile Hellenic cities. In short, the whole internal history of Boeotia is one long record of feuds between Thebes and the other cities, Plataia, Thespia, and Orchomenos. And the lesson is the more striking, because, as far as we can make out from our scanty notices of the Boeotian Constitution, the mere * formal position of Thebes does not seem to have been at all extravagant or anomalous. To the great executive ^.„ ° & Difference college of the Bceotarchs, while the other cities contributed between one member each, Thebes contributed two. That is, in ! in \i pfa C . the chief magistracy of the Federation, the great city of jj| cal Posl " Thebes legally commanded only two votes out of eleven or thirteen. Yet we find the Boeotian League, throughout two thirds of its history, existing only as an instrument to advance Theban interests, constantly to the disadvantage, sometimes to the utter destruction, of the smaller towns of the Confederation. At last the weaker cities sink into the state of mere subjects ; they are spoken of by Isokrates under the very same name which the subject Lakonian towns bear in reference to Sparta. 2 It is probable that, in the actual position of Bceotia, a really well ordered Federal Government was impossible. 3 The vast superiority of Thebes over every other Boeotian 1 Boeckh. C. I. vol. 1. p. 727. Aut plurima ex Thebanorum quasi dominorum, gerebantur potentia aut ceteri Bceoti a Thebanis segre»ati abenas sequi partes solebant. 2 Isok. de Pac. § 141. Ta /.izv 077/8aiW Trpdy/xara irovy)p£s ex fiv vo/il^ere, OTl TOl)s 7T€ piOlKOVS &8lKOV. 28. '' I low completely Attica became merged in Athens is shown by the I a i that one has to form sonic Buch unusual word as " Attican," in express an inhabitanl of Attica oiler than an Athenian. The difference between ' hOi)vaiot and 'Attikhi was perceptible so late as B. o. 300. See Grote, ii. oi>7. THREE PERIODS OF BCEOTIAN HISTORY. 159 territory filled with loyal citizens, Sparta, with her whole chap. rv. territory filled with unresisting subjects, 1 each enjoyed Effects on peace at home, and each might aspire to the general Grecian supremacy of Greece. Thebes was always too busy in Hlstor y- maintaining her local supremacy to aim at any such am- bitious schemes, till the two men arose who were to give her for a moment both a local and a general supremacy such as she had never held before. 2 The history of the Boeotian League naturally falls into Three three periods. The first extends from our earliest histo- Bceotiau rical notices of the country to the first dissolution of the lllst0 ^- J b.c. 776- League at the peace of Antalkidas. The second includes 387. b.c. 387- the short but brilliant period of Theban greatness, down 334. to the conquest of the city by Philip and its destruction l' 7 °{ 334 ~ by Alexander. The third includes the history of Bceotia from the destruction of Thebes by Alexander and its resto- ration by Kassander down to the filial dissolution of the League by Quintus Marcius Philippus. During the first period we find, as early as we can get First at any certain information, the Boeotian cities united by B ( . j'/g. both a religious and a political bond. They formed an 38 ' - Amphiktyony, and they also formed a Federal Govern- Bceotia ment. Of these two, one cannot doubt that the religious AnvpMk- association existed before the political League and served t >'" 11 ,X am ] L ° a Political as its groundwork. The Boeotian Amphiktyony held its League. 1 The Helots several times revolted, the Perioikoi never, and the Perioikoi had as much interest in suppressing a Helot revolt as the Spartans themselves. 2 Drumann, p. 428. Daher konnten Sparta und Athen das Principat fiber alle Griechen zu erringen streben, wahrend Theben noch dahin •bemiiht sein musste, die Herrschaft in Bootien zu erlangen. Compare, at this moment, the three great despotisms of Europe. Russia has force enough to keep down all internal enemies ; France (whatever its ruler may have) has no internal enemies to keep down ; Austria is, like Thebes, helpless from internal dissensions. 160 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap, iv solemn festival at the temple of the Itonian Athene near Koroueia j 1 its title was the Pamboiotia, 2 a name formed after the same analogy of so many other religious gather- ings of the same kind. How soon this Amphiktyonic connexion grew into a political union it is hard to say, but it is clear that the Boeotian League was looked on as an institution of old standing during the Peloponnesian War. It must both have existed and have been perverted from its original purpose, before the oppressed Plataians sought b.c. 519 for Athenian help. We may fairly believe that the Federal (Clinton), . „,,... c. 510 union ol Boeotia was as old as federal institutions m auy 222? eiy ' part of Greece. The old Boeotian League, as far as its outward forms went, seems to have been fairly entitled to the name of a Federal Government, but in its whole history we trace little more than the gradual advance of Thebes to a practical supremacy over the other cities. This difference between the theory and the practice of the Boeotian consti- tution is curiously illustrated by the ordinary language Use of D0 t i ] l c f Thucydides and of Xenophon. Whenever there is the words J . "Boeotian" anything like a formal mention of the whole people, in the "Thdmn" description for instance of a battle or a negociation, the l.yThucy- wor( | use( j j s "Boeotian ;" but when the historians narrate elides and Xi n i»ii i). or comment in their own persons on the policy of the League, the word " Theban " is commonly used instead. Thus the whole argument about the fate of Plataia is put by Thucydides into the mouths of "Theban," not of "Boeotian," orators/ 1 just as the first treacherous assault on the town is attributed wholly to Theban heads and to ' I' ins. i\. 84, 1, Trjs > \ru>vlas' A0i)vas errrl rd itpiSi/' KaKflrai 5<) enri 'Irdvov toD 'A^iktiWos. This smaller Ainpliikl y Amphiktydo himself. " Btrabo, \<<\. ii. p, 205. Cf, PoL Lv. 3; ix. :m, for the iruvi'iyvpis of Hie Pemboidtia. 1 I'hih iii. 60. Oi Wr)/3a?wi SdffavTts .... t\tyoV. EARLY SUPREMACY OF THEBES. 161 Thcban hands. 1 But when he comes to describe the battle chap, iv of Delion, 2 and the ncgociations after the Peace of Nikias, a he gives to the armies, ambassadors, and senators their formal title of "Boeotians." So Xenophon attributes to ' Theban " politicians the proposal 4 to destroy Athens and the receipt of bribes from the Great King, 5 but in describing the battles in the Corinthian war, 6 he too falls back upon the technical name "Boeotian." This usage of ordinary language exactly expresses the truth of the case. The League was a Boeotian body animated by a Theban soul ; the devices of Theban statesmen were habitually carried out by the hands of Boeotian soldiers. 7 It is perfectly evident that the Boeotian League had the form of a real Federal Government. It is equally evident that it altogether wanted the true Federal spirit. The Constitu- common government was carried on in the name of the League, whole Boeotian nation. Its most important magistrates bore the title of Boeotarchs ; their exact number, whether eleven or thirteen, 8 is a disputed point of Greek archaeology, or rather of Boeotian geography. For our purpose the number is indifferent ; the important point for us is that' Thebes chose two Boeotarchs, 9 and each of the other cities 1 TllUC. ii. 2. TlpoiSoure s of Qr)f3a7oi, k.t.A. 2 lb. iv. 91. Of 8e BoloitoI . . . £wz\eyouro, k.t.\. 3 v. 36 et seqq. throughout. 4 Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 19. "AvrtXiyov Kopivdioi pikv xal @T]f3a?oi . . . . /j.rj (TirevSerrdcu 'Adtjuaiois. 5 lb. iii. 5, 3. Oj if roils Q-qfiais -rrpoeo-rwres .... irdQovo-i Anxpovs. 6 lb. iv. 2, 17 et seqq. 7 Tittmann (p. 696) seems to me to under-rate throughout the practical supremacy of Thebes during our first period. ' TllUC. iv. 91. T£v &W(ov PoiioTapXto", o'i tlcriv eVSe^a, ov ^uveiratvovvraiv fiax^ffOai .... TlayoovSas 6 AloAaSov, fSoHaTapxwv e« ®7}f$!i>v fj.fr' 'ApiauOiSov rod Avo-ifj.ax'io'ov, nal yiye/iouias ova-qs avrov, k r.\. where see Dr. Arnold's note, and compare Boeckh, vol. i. p. 727, and Mr. Whiston in Diet, of Antt. art. Bceotarches. 9 Boeckh (u.s.) explains the second Theban Bceotarch to have been tho representative of some town formerly a member of the League, but after- M 162 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. niAi". iv. Subject Districts or Sub- ordinate Leagues. O lliee of till' BlL'O- tarclis. one. 1 The same narrative from which we learn this fact shows also that, besides the cities which were, in name at least, sovereign states, Boeotia, like Switzerland in the old time, contained districts which did not enjoy direct Federal rights, but which were connected, in some subordinate way, with some one or other of the sovereign cities. 2 It may however be doubted whether these dependencies were, strictly speaking, subject districts, like the Italian possessions of Uri, or whether Boeotia was not, like the Grisons, a League made up of smaller Leagues. However this may be, the Bceotarchs, as representatives of the several Boeotian cities, were the supreme military com- manders of the League, 3 and, as it would appear, the general administrators of Federal affairs. This is the ordinary position of the military commanders in a Greek wards merged in Thebes. This is a highly probable explanation of the origin of the custom ; practically the double Theban Bceotarchy, like the four members for the City of London, represented the superiority of Thebes to the other cities. 1 Mr. (irote(vi. 523) speaks of the Tliootarchs as consisting of "two chosen from Thebes, the resl in unknown proportions by the other cities." Certainly Thncydides does no1 directly say that there was one Bieotarch from each city, bu1 almost every scholarseema to have taken it for granted (see Hermann, Pol. Ant. § 170, Eng, Tr.), and it is hard to imagine any arrangement by which any sovereign city would be lefl without its Bceotarch. This narrative of Thucydides, and another which will presently be referred to, are, as far as I know, our only authorities for the number and power of the Bceotarchs during this firsl period of the League. With the Bceotarchs of the 'lays of Epameinfindas we have as yet no concern. 2 Thuc, iv. 7<>. XatpcJvtiav S«, rj 4s 'Opx^f^vov £vi'T(A(?, where see Arnold's noli'. I cannol help thinking thai the word £wreA.tiV implies a greater degree of freedom in these dependenl places than Dr. Arnold allows. See . Boeckh. i. 728. 3 It may be doubted whether the words vytnovias ot/aris atfrov, in the pa age of Thucydides (iv. 91) lasl quoted, imply thai the supreme com- mand was always rested in a Theban Bceotarch, or whether il was merely the turn of Pagdndas to command thai particular day. It is worth notice thai the BoeotL rmy a1 thai time \\ : in any uniform order, bul the troops of each city followed their own customs. The Thebans were twenty-five deep, the others in differeni proportions. Thuc. iv. 98. CONSTITUTION OF THE BOEOTIAN LEAGUE. lC.i state, as we see by the authority possessed by the Ten chap. iv. Generals at Athens, and by the Federal General of the Achaian League. The Bocotarchs of course command at Delion, but they also act as administrative magistrates of i?.c. 424. the League by hindering Agesilaos from sacrificing at b.c. 397. Aulis. ] We see something more of their functions in a narrative of Thucydides which gives us almost our only glimpse of the internal working of the Boeotian Federal constitution. During nearly the Avhole of our first period, the Boeotian government was oligarchic. Just as in Achaia each city had its local democratic Assembly and the League had its Federal democratic Assembly, so in Boeotia the Federal Government was oligarchic, and we cannot doubt that the government of each particular city was oligarchic also. 2 The supreme power of the League was vested in the Four Senates of the Boeotians. 3 Of the The Four constitution of these Senates we know absolutely nothing ; ' but it is most probable that the division was a local one, and that the Four Senates represented four districts. If so, it shows that the Federal bond in Boeotia must have 1 Xcn. Hell. iii. 4. 4. Ot (Sou&Tapxoh ir4fj.\pa,UTes lirweas, k.t.A. This has a military sound, but it was doubtless in strictness a measure of police. 2 Mr. Winston (Diet, of Antt.) is doubtless justified by analogy in supposing that cacb Boeotian city had its own fiovXr) or Senate, and Sfj/ios or Popular Assembly (see Boeckh, i. 729), but the passage wliicb he quotes from Xenophon hardly proves it (Hell. v. 2. 29). It merely speaks of a Theban fiovA-fi and that during the time (b.c. 382) when the Con- federation was in .abeyance. I am not clear about the existence of Popular Assemblies in the Boeotian cities during our first period. There is, as might be expected, abundant evidence for their existence in later times, but I doubt whether any of the many inscriptions in Boeckh, which mention a Sfj/.tos, belong to the days of the old oligarchic League. 3 TllUC V. 38. Teas reaffapffi flovXcus rSiv Bolcdtwv, a't'rrep airav to Kvpos exovcriv. Tittmann (p. 695) assumes their representative, and denies their aristocratic, character. The latter at least is clear enough. A Federal Srjixos, like that of the Achaians, is mentioned in later inscriptions (see Boeckh, i. 728) ; but one can hardly fancy its having even a nominal existence earlier than the revolution of Pelopidas. M 2 164 OF THE MINOE CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap. it. been much laxer than it was in Achaia, and the necessity of consulting several Assemblies suggests resemblances between the constitution of Bceotia and the constitution of the United Provinces. Still less do we know how four co-ordinate Senates were kept in harmony together ; but b.c. 421. the only glimpse which we get of them sets them before us as submissive and tractable bodies, which commonly did little more than register the edicts of the Bceotarchs. 1 Their constitutional powers seem to have been something like those of the American Senate ; the Bceotarchs propose to them a scheme of a treaty, which it rests with them Diplo- to accept or to reject. We may even believe that the Action Senates were, on such matters at least, only authorized to Senates consider proposals made to them by the Bceotarchs, and and the that they had no initiative voice of their own. 2 It is clear Boeotarchs. * that the actual negociation was carried on wholly by the Bceotarchs, just as it would be by an American President and his Ministry. In this particular case the Boeotarchs fully expected that the Senates would have ratified their proposals without examination or explanation, and they were much surprised at finding the proposed treaty rejected. 3 The whole story gives us a very poor impression of the management of the Boeotian Foreign Office. Though the Bceotarchs were, like the Athenian Generals, practically the most important officers of the state, yet, like the Athenian Generals, they did not stand formally at Federal its head. The nominal chief of the League was a magis- Archons. tratc called the Archon of the Boeotians, 4 whose name 1 (f. Grote, vii. 84. Tiny must, as Boeckll (i. 728) remarks, have been assembled in one place. 5 Sic Arnold's note on Time-, v. 38. 3 'I'll in . ili. Oio/uKVoi ttJv 0<)uAj)»', k&v /xrj (tirwaiv, ovk &AAa xpr/cptflcrBai ■f) & . Mr. Whistou infers from this inscription that the Federal Archon " was probably always a Thehan." As the inscription specially mentions that the particular MAGISTRATES OF THE LEAGUE, 165 seems to have been used as a date even in purely local chap. iv. proceedings in the several cities. 1 We also find local Archons in the several cities.' 2 Though many of the in- scriptions which record the names of these Archons are doubtless later than the Peace of Antalkidas, or even than Kassander's restoration of Thebes, still the analogy of other states would lead us to believe that the Archons, both of the League and of its several cities, were magis- trates of the highest antiquity. Probably the Boeotian, like the Athenian, Archon had once been the real ruler of the state, and had been gradually cut down to a routine of small duties, sweetened by the honour of giving his name to the year. Of the particular Archon of Thebes, Plutarch 3 Theban records an usage, which, though his mention of it belongs f^!™ to a time later than our present date, must surely have Pa g eant - been handed down from very early times. The Theban Archon, at least in the interval between the occupation of the Kadmeia by Phoibidas and the delivery of Thebes by B .c. 382- Pelopidas, was chosen by lot, 4 and kept a sacred spear of 379, office always by him. These customs are not likely to have been of recent introduction ; they savour of high antiquity, and point to the Archon as a venerable pageant rather than as a magistrate possessing real authority. He is spoken of, not as a ruler but as a sacred person, and it is Real power clear, from the whole narrative of Xenophon and Plutarch, ifmarchs. that the main powers of the state were then in the hands of the Polemarchs. 5 Archon commemorated was a Theban, I should have inferred the contrary. This inscription is of a later date than the restoration by Kassander. 1 See the inscription in Leake's Northern Greece, ii. 132. Xapoirtvw &PXovtos BotaiToTs, k.t.K. 2 See Rose, Inscriptt. Grsecc. 264 et seqq. 3 De Genio Socratis, 30. 4 lb. 6 Kvd/j.t(TTOs apxwv. 5 See especially Xen. Hell. v. 2. 30. rov v6fiou KtXtvovros 4^7mi jtoA.«- (idpx<>> Xafidv, et tij So/ce? #|ta 9a.va.TOv notui/ 1G6 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. CHAP. IV. Power of Thebes shown in the His- tory of Plataia. Plataian Secession from the League, b.c. 519? Yet, with all this show of good Federal Government, the true Federal spirit could have had no place in a League where evervthing was carried on in the selfish interest of a single city. What the position of Thebes in the Boeotian League really was is shown by the whole history of the brave and unfortunate city of Plataia. The Plataians set the first recorded example of Secession from a Federal Union. But it was most certainly not Secession without a cause. The Plataians broke through their Federal obligations, they forsook the ancestral laws of all Bceotia, 1 but it was because those obligations and those laws had been perverted into mere instruments of Theban domination. They found the Theban yoke too hard to bear, and they sought for aid against the oppressor, first at Sparta and then at Athens. 2 Even thus early, Secession from the Boeotian League was looked on by impartial spectators as a right to be secured against the over- whelming ascendency of Thebes. The Corinthians, when called in as mediators, determine that Thebes has no right to control any city which does not wish to belong to the Boeotian Confederation. :) It is clear that language like tins would never be used of any really equal Confedera- tion in any age. If a mediator were to be tailed in to settle American differences, the form of liis decree would not be that New York should leave the Confederate Slates undisturbed. That the example of Plataian seces- sion was not followed l>y other cities may be partly owing to geographical causes. No other Boeotian city, except ' Tlnir. iii 66 i I ;il. To irdvrwv Motunuiv Trdrpta. I cannot believe in .I,, rivalry between Thebes and Plataia, such as Drumann i ins to imply, :i ; if Plataia disputed the firsl place in the League with Thebes. Drumann also strangclj its all mention of the connexion between Plataia anil Al Inns. Herod. \ i. L08. Tri(£(vfj.(voi vird Vrifialuv. Time. iii. 65. ">rt &t)l3a?oi ■fluas i/iidtrayro lid I i iullW Till)? J.I.J) l3(W\n/.Ul (il'S IS UuiUOTUVS TlAl'.U FIRST PERIOD OF B030TIAN HISTORY. 167 Tanagra, lay so temptingly near to a powerful protector, chap. rv. And the events of the Peloponncsian War at once tended in feeling to beget a bitter feeling between Athens and the Boeotians Thebes generally and to show how little real help Athens was able T " l W ng lcl to give to a dependency beyond Mount Kithairon. 1 But towards the end of the war, we hear in general terms of b.c. 407. strong disaffection towards Thebes on the part of the smaller cities,' 2 and in one case, even before the Peace of b.c. 423. Nikias, in the very year after the common Boeotian victory at Delion, the Thebans destroyed the walls of Thespia, Thespia. on the ground of the "Atticism" of the inhabitants. 3 The language of Thucydides would almost imply that this was a mere act of high-handed Theban violence, without even the form of legitimate Federal action. He adds that the Thebans had long wished to destroy Thespia, and now found their opportunity. The city could not resist, be- cause the flower of its warriors had fallen in the war with Athens. Such examples as this and that of Plataia might well cause a sullen acquiescence in Theban domination. Against Thebes backed by Sparta, resistance was hopeless. It was not till long after, when Thebes and Sparta were Oreho- enemies, that, at last, on a favourable opportunity during B . . 395. the Corinthian war, Orchomenos openly seceded. 4 The event is recorded by Xenophon in the form commonly used to express the revolt of a subject or dependent state. But, lomr before this, in the famous pleadings as to the fate of Plataia. b c 427 Plataia, though the Thebans put prominently forward the general principles of Boeotian Federalism, still the whole 1 See Grote, iv. 222. 2 Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 2. BowraJe fj.ev yap iroWo), Tr\eoveKTOv[ievoi vird &T)Baicov, $vsfJ.ei><£s avTols ex ovaiv ' 'M-Zivyai 8e ovSiv 6pa> toiovtov. Tho date of this dialogue, which I have already had occasion to quote (see above, p. 28), between Sokrates and the younger Perikles, is fixed to the year 407 by Perikles being spoken of as a newly elected General. lie was one of the unfortunate commanders at Arginousai. 3 Thuc. iv. 133. 07}/8cuiu ©eairUwv T€?x os irepiuKov, k.t.K. '' Xen. Hell. iii. 5. 6. Avaavdpos y Opxo^v'wvs awtarrjae SriBaiuv. 168 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap. iv. is practically treated as a dispute between Plataia and Thebes. The Plataians ask that they may not be given up to the vengeance of the Thebans ; they pray that Plataia may not be destroyed, and its territory not be annexed to that of Thebes. 1 They prayed in vain ; the captives were massacred, their city was destroyed, and their territory was confiscated, not to the profit of the Boeotian Union, but to that of the Theban State. 2 Thus the power of Thebes went on increasing, 3 and no doubt the discontent of the smaller cities went on increasing also, down to the time of the Peace of Antalkidas. Then we first find the Theban claims formally put forth in all their fulness, but only, as it proved, to bring utter dissolution upon the whole Confederacy. In the Plataian conference all that the Thebans had ventured formally to claim was a primacy, expressed by a word 4 familiar to Greek diplo- matic language, and not formally inconsistent with the independence of the smaller towns. Afterwards we have seen the Boeotarchs, themselves Federal magistrates, going through at least the form of consulting the Federal Councils. But now the Thebans openly put themselves forward as the representatives, or rather as the sovereigns, of all Boeotia Antalkidas comes down with his rescript from the Great King, ordering that all Creek eitics should be independent. 6 It suited the policy of Sparta to con- Theban claims at the Peace of Antal- kidas, B.c. 387. 1 Thuc. iii. 68. "TfJ-f'ts Si el K-rtvtiTi tffias Kal x™P av T ^l v UKaTadSa fc)7j/3a'/5a irun'}(TfTf. ? Thuc. iii. f>8 (the whole chapter). 3 Manso, Sparta, iii. 150. Theben begniigte rich nichl 'Vn- erste, ea rerlangte 'lie Bauptetadt im bootischen Lande and es in der Art sra seyn, u i>- ill Lakonion Sparta. 1 Thuc. iii. 61. Ouk i\(,iovv olToi,uxnrtp eV^x^ t^ 7rpwTO^, ^yffxovfvt a6ai u' rifxwf. t \, ,,,_ ||,i| v 1. 31. Tds 5i &\\as 'EKKyvlSas ir6\tis Kal fiiKpas Kal fx(yd\as avTufi'ifiovs aiptlvai. '■ II. v 2, 16. BftcAl vfias [Aan-tSai/ionouvl rrjt p.ii> Botwrias iirim\i]Or}i>at nirwi /uj' Huff %v tlr). POSITION AND CLAIMS OF THEBES. 169 strue this independence in the strictest sense everywhere chap. iv. except in Lakonia. When the Peace was to be sworn to, according to the usual Greek custom, by the representa- tives of every power concerned, Ambassadors from Thebes, not Boeotarchs or Ambassadors from the Four Councils, demanded to take the oaths on behalf of all Bceotia. 1 The Spartan King Agesilaos refused to receive their oaths, or to admit them to the benefits of the Peace, unless they for- mally recognized the independence of every Greek city, great and small. The Ambassadors had no such instruc- tions from their Government, 2 and it required a Lacedae- monian declaration of war to bring Thebes to consent to such terms. They were evidently understood as a formal renunciation of all Theban superiority in Boeotia, and apparently as a formal dissolution of the Boeotian League Disso1 "-, rr J . tion of the in any shape. As the Thebans consented to the required Boeotian recognition of independence, 3 we may conclude that every B . c .°387. Boeotian city entered into the terms of the treaty as a sovereign commonwealth, and we may thus look upon the old Boeotian Federation as formally dissolved. The second portion of Boeotian history includes the Second splendid day of Theban greatness under Pelopidas and B .c. 387- Epameinoudas. As I am not writing a History of Greece, " but a History of Federal Government, all that I have to do is to pick out from the general narrative such points as bear directly upon the Federal relations between Thebes and the other Boeotian towns. By the Peace of Antal- kidas all Greek cities, great and small, became independent under the guaranty of Sparta. But Sparta seems, through- 1 Xen. Hell. V. 1. 32. Oi 8e @T)f3a?oi t}|ioi/»/ virep iravrwv Boiwtwv oixvvvai. Ibid. Ot 5e tuv @rifialaii> irptalSeis ZXeyou on ovk iirecrTa.Ajj.4i>a (r. ' \ri.t. Pol, v. 3. 5. '!> W?}/3a«s /xnA r^i/ eV OiVoi/tojs Hu-XV nanus iTtvontviui> i) SrinuKiiarlu tlt6dpri. SECOND PERIOD OF BOEOTIAN HISTORY. 171 again detached from the Athenian alliance by the first chap. iv. battle of Koroncia. The invasion which led to the battle of Delion was planned by Athens in concert with a demo- b.c. 424. cratic party in Boeotia, ' but the utter failure of the scheme doubtless gave a deep and lasting blow to the democratic interest. The histories of Plataia and Thespia, as already Thebes, recorded, leave hardly any doubt that this democratic or ^ g en ^j. e Athenian party was the party of the independence of the ° f 01l_ smaller cities against Thebes. But the dissolution of the League, and the Spartan occupation, for such it was, which followed, must have put matters on quite another footing. Oligarchy no longer meant, either in Thebes or elsewhere, the ascendency of the ancient nobles of the land, whose rule, in a country where it had been so little interrupted, may well have involved no practical oppression. 2 Olig- archy now meant the domination 3 of a small number of citizens, whose power rested entirely on the presence of a foreign force. A powerful democratic spirit was naturally becomes, called forth, and, above all, at Thebes, hitherto the centre volution, of oligarchy. A democratic revolution delivered Thebes th e G C cntre at once from her traitorous citizens and from her foreign ot Dem °- cracy. garrison, and the new Tlieban Democracy entered, under Pelopidas and Epameinondas, upon its short and glorious career. There is no portion of Grecian history which more thoroughly awakens our sympathies than all that personally concerns those two most illustrious citizens. We hardly Career of know which more to admire, Pelopidas the slayer of the r B . c , 379! 30-hj and 1 Thuc. iv. 76. 2 The Platonic Sokrates (KritOn, c. 15) calls (b.C. 399) Thebes and Megara well governed cities — tvvoixovfxhas troXm koX twv dvdpcuv roi/s Koa/Jiwrdrovs — iiivofxovvrai "yap, k.t.X. He does not call them evi/ofiin'/xevas simply as being oligarchic, as he goes on to blame the ill government of oligarchic Thessaly — e/cei yc\p 5?) TrAei(TT7) dra^ia iced dicoAacria. 3 Xenophon himself uses the strong word Svvaa-rda, only less strong than Tvpawis, meaning in fact a Tyranny in the hands of several persons instead of one only. t» ndaais *ydp to?s iroKzcn Swaarucu KaOmnriKarav i'sTep if 0?j/3aij. Hell. v. i. 46. 172 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. CHAP. IV. Epamei- ndndas [b.c. 379- 362]. Bad re- sults of Theban su- premacy. Nominal revival of the League. New Bceo tarchs. B.C. 378. Liberal profes- sion of Thebes. Tyrants, or Epameinondas who refuses to stain his hands even with Tyrants' blood. The fight of Leuktra, the invasion of Lakonia, the restoration of Messene, the foun- dation of Megalopolis, the deaths of Pelopidas in Thessaly and of Epameinondas at Mantineia, are all among the most spirit-stirring scenes even in the eventful history of Greece. But it is easy to see that Pelopidas and Epameinondas were the chiefs of a people utterly unworthy of them ; that the momentary greatness of Thebes did but leave Greece yet more disunited, 1 more ready to become the prey of the Macedonian aggressor ; and that, looking at the matter with the eyes of a historian of Federalism, this second period of Boeotian history is yet more disastrous than the first period before the Peace of Antalkidas. The League was nominally revived ; constitutional Federal language was employed in formal documents, 2 and Bceotarchs, and not mere local Polcmarchs, again appear as the com- manders of the Boeotian armies. 3 It is also clear that, immediately after the Theban Revolution, the Theban cause was popular in the Boeotian cities. 4 No doubt the Theban Democracy, like the Athenian Democracy, put itself for- ward, and that for a while sincerely, as the champion of independence and democratic government everywhere, in opposition alike to native oligarchies and to Lacedaemonian garrisons. But the result soon showed how impossible it 1 .\' n. Hell. vii. 5, 27. 'AKpurla 5« Kal rapaxT) ^ri ir\ela>t> /xtToi tt)c [4v Maurwela] n&xy lylvrro fj irp6ad(v iv tjj 'EWdSi. Four years after- wards Philip tool Amphipolis. - The Koivr) truvoSos -rdv Botwrwv (Diod. xv. 80) received complaints from Thessaly againBt Alexander of Pherai (b.o. 364) ; ami, just before Chairdneia (b.o. 888), Philip senl an embassy M t6 koivov tQ>v Boiwtwu (Diod. .wi. 85). Cf. above, p. 1 <'■'<. note :'.. » The aumber nov* was seven (Paus. ix. 13. 6, 7). I do not know of .■my distinct evidence whether any of these Bceotarchs were really chosen by i lie smaller (nuns or nut. Orote, x. 215, 268. Xenopl (Hell. v. 1. 46) seems to imply a ..it of secession of the Dfonos from the smaller cities, 6 fiivrot Sij^os ^{ avTwv \twv troKiaiv | til rcti Mrf#cu djrfX a V*'- CAREER OF PELOPIDAS AND EPAMEINONDAS. 173 was that an overweening eity like Thebes should ever enter chap. iv. into the true Federal relation with weaker states. Thebes showed more quickly than Athens, or even than Sparta, how easily Presidency may be developed into Empire. It does not indeed prove much that the recovery of the Boeotian cities is spoken of by Xenophon in terms which are applicable only to a reconquest by force of arms. 1 To a Lakonian partisan like that renegade Athenian, the expulsion by Theban hands of a Spartan harmost and the oligarchy which he maintained, doubtless seemed to be the high-handed extinction of a legal government by the hands of a foreign invader. But though the Boeotian cities Real sub- willingly entered into a revived Boeotian League, they soon {b^iessff found that a Boeotian League was now onlv another name cities to Thebes. for bondage to Thebes. A nominally democratic Boeotian Assembly, instead of four oligarchic Senates, might now sit to register Theban edicts in the name of the League, but the practical nature of the relation between Thebes and the other cities admits of no doubt. It is enough that the language of historians and orators always 1 Xen. Hell. v. 4. 63. Qpdcrews 8?) 4crrpaT€iiovTO oi Orjfiaioi inl rds TripiotKiSas ir6\ets [mark the word TrepioiKiSas] Ka] iraMf avrds dveKd/jL&avov. vi. 1. 1. oi Si 07j/3a?oj, eirel KaTzoTptyavTO tcls if rrj BotcoTia woXets, ka-r par ivov nod els tt)v a>/a'5a. This clearly implies actual warfare, hut what follows the first of the two passages as clearly implies that it was a warfare in which the Demos in the cities attacked took the Theban side. Still I cannot understand Mr. Grote's meaning when he says (x. 183, 4) "that the Thebaus . . . revived the Boeotian confederacy, is clearly stated by Xenophon " — in the two passages just quoted. It is clearly stated that "the Thebans again became presidents of all Boeotia" (p. 183), but surely not that they revived a confederacy. Xenophon speaks not of reviving a confederacy, but of Thebes warring against and conquering certain cities. Considering Xenophon's prejudices, his language is in no way inconsistent with the fact, otherwise sufficiently established, that the restoration of the Federal system was at least professed. But surely his words <)o not clearly state it. And considering what happened to Plataia and other cities so soon after, I certainly think that the practical aspect of the case is better set forth in the words "subjugation" and "submitted" used by Bishop Thirlwall (v. 71). 174 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap. iv. implies that Thebes had become practically sovereign. The smaller cities are spoken of in language which implies subjection ;* we hear now, not of a Boeotian Confederation, but of a Theban State, into which other cities are com- Destmc- polled to merge themselves against their will. 8 Finally we p 0U ot hear, during this period, of the utter destruction by Theban towns : hands of no less than four Boeotian towns. Plataia now b.c. 373 paid for the crime of having so long been, first an Athc- Orcho-' 0t n ^ an au( ^ * nen a Spartan outpost, 3 Orchomenos, once menus, rescued by the personal interference of Epameinondas, 4 at B.C. OOo or 363; of last, during that hero's absence, became the victim 5 alike B.c? S 373or °f its ancient mythical rivalry, 6 and of its more recent Ere* political opposition. Thespia, disaffected even before the b.c. 363? fight of Leuktra, 7 was destroyed soon after, and Koroncia shared the fate of Orchomenos. 8 These events, the destruction of so many Hellenic cities, above all of the ancient and renowned Orchomenos, to which Thebes her- 1 IleploiKoi, irepioaciSes v6\eis. I liavc already mentioned this use of tlic wind. 2 See the expressions used in the Plataic Oration of Isokrates, 8, 11, jut) TreiaOeTtrav tt)v YlXa.Ta.Uuv itoKiv d\\a ^taaOucrav 0»;/3aiois [not BoioitoTs] aWTtXiiv T7JS (T(/)€T^a$ 7ToA.lT6iaS Ol/StV S(OfX€VOVS KOlVOOVilU dp ay Ka^ overt — avuTe\t?v 4s rds 0t}/3cis — -nposraTrav Tj'yiuV — ov twv &A\wv dpKTtov, k.t.X. Something is doubtless to be allowed for angry Plataian (or tsokratic) oratoiy, something doubtless to the old special hatred between Thebes and Plataifl ; still the mosl vehement orator in South Carolina would not use such language with regard to any single Northern Slate, though ho mighl apply it to the Northern CTniou in general. :| The details of the destruction of Plataia are given l>y Pausanias, ix. 1. 1. el seqq. * Diod. xv. 57. I'aus. ix. 15. 3. Thirlwall, v. ins, 9. Grote, x. 264. n Diod. nv. 69. The Plataians were only expelled ; the men of Orcho- menos were killed and the women and children sold, like the Melians and skionaians by Athens. According to Pausanias (ix. 15, 14) the Thebana lew or branded such Boeotian exiles as they me1 with in their Pelopon- nesian campaigns. 11 Isok. Plat. II. Oi) tw dWwi/ ainoh |t-)>i/3ai(»iv| dpKTtov, dWci tto\i) fxaKKov 'Opxc/J-fviois tpiipof olffTtOV' o'vtws ydp fix* 7 <^ iraXaiAv. ' Pan ... ix. ]'■'. B, 14. 1 I. The date of the destruction of Thespia is doubtful, see Thirlwall, \. 86. Grote, x. 219. i in the date of the destruction of Kordneia, Bee Grote, x. 427. THEBAN TREATMENT OF THE SMALLER TOWNS. 175 self had once been tributary, raised a feeling of profound chap. it. indignation through out Greece. 1 When the genius of Epameinondas no longer guided her counsels, and even during his lifetime whenever he was not at hand to restrain her passions, Thebes stood forth as a city of coarse and General , ii. • dislike of brutal upstarts, who had suddenly risen to a place in the Thebes Hellenic world for which they were utterly unfit. 2 No out s " Grecian city seems ever to have been more thoroughly Gl f e ot' 2 _ hated than Thebes was between the battle of Mantineia 338. and the battle of Chaironeia. Athens felt for her a repugnance which she never showed towards either her Spartan rival or her Macedonian conqueror. To overcome this loathing, and to range the warriors of Thebes and Athens side by side against Philip, was the most glorious exploit of the glorious life of Demosthenes. 3 The dates of these acts of Theban violence towards the smaller Boeotian cities are in some cases matters of dispute. Most of them occurred after the battle of Leuktra, but that of Plataia took place before. Certain it Theban is that, just before that battle, the Theban claims had before the risen to their full height. In the negotiations which L e$ktra preceded it we seem to read over again the negotiations BC - 371 - which preceded the peace of Antalkidas. 4 The Thebans swore to the Peace, or were willing to swear to it, in the name of all Bocotia. 5 Agesilaos, as before, demands a 1 See Grote, x. 427, xi. 285. 2 Ephoros, quoted by Strabo, ix. 2. (ii. 248, Tauch. ) TeXevrrjc-avTos yap tKelvov ['Eira/ncii'oii'Sov] tt)v riyefxoviav dirol3a\e7i> evdvs toi)s Qr/Paiovs ai rfjs Kara Tfo\e/xov dpeTrjs. 3 See a noble passage in Arnold's Rome, ii. 331. 4 Pausanias (ix. 13. 2) evidently confounded the two occasions, as he introduces Epameinondas as the Theban orator before the Peace of Antalkidas. 5 It is certainly hard at first sight to reconcile the accounts of this event given by Xenophon (Hell. vi. 3. 19) and by Plutarch (Ages. 28) and Pausanias (see last note). But they do not seem to me quite so contradictory as Mr. Grote thinks them (x. 231, note). In Xenophon's story, the Theban 1/6 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap. iv. recognition of the independence of the other Boeotian cities, and the admission of each to swear in its own name 1 as a sovereign commonwealth. The Thebans again refuse ; they are again excluded from the treaty, but this time with very different results. Their former refusal and exclusion had been followed by their submission, by the dissolution of the Boeotian League, at last by the occupa- tion of the Theban Kadmeia by a Lacedaemonian garrison. The present refusal and exclusion was indeed followed by b.c. 371. a Lacedaemonian invasion of Boeotia, but that invasion was crushed at the fight of Leuktra, and soon after repaid by b.c 369. the presence of Theban invaders in Sparta itself. In this negociation, as in the former one, Thebes for- mally claims to be regarded as the head of Boeotia, the representative of the whole Boeotian body towards other powers. She demands to be looked upon as capable of Ambassadors first allow Thebes to be set down as having sworn, and on the next day demand (eic4\evoi>) to have the name " Thebans " struck out, and "Boeotians" substituted. Mr. Grote asks "why should such a man as Epameinondas (who doubtless was the envoy), consent at first to waive the presidential claims of Thebes, and to swear for her alone ? If he did consent, why should he retract the next day?" Now it strikes me that the pro- ceeding is capable of another explanation, and that there is no "waiving of presidential claims," and no "retracting the next day." It is evident from the language of all the historians and orators, that the supremacy of Thebes was now far more openly avowed than it had been under the old League, and that the word "Theban" was now constantly used where "Boeotian" would have been used in tie preceding century. The Thebans might well swear as "Thebans," meaning to carry with them the whole of their confederates ; to say " Theban " rather than "Boeotian" might he meant not as any " waiving of presidential claims," but rather as the strongest way of assert ine; them. P.ut Aevsilaos might very well choose to take il in a contrary sense ; he would call on the other Boeotian cities to swear separately ; the Thebans would then demand to have the doubtful word "Thebans" changed into "Boeotians;" that is, to have their oath taken as the oath "if all Boeotia. Then would follow the lively dialogue between Epameinondas and Agi lilaos recorded by Plutarch and Pausanias, precedi d probably by some such reasoning on the Theban side as Mr. Grote uppo 1 This is more (dearly brought out by Pausanias (ix. 18. 2) than by any • I ie. THEBAN CLAIM OF SUPREMACY. 1/7 contracting, by licr single act, international obligations chap, rv, binding on all the Boeotian cities. In this negociation, as Grav Trap' 7]fxiv. The whole passage is a curious picture of the position of the weploiKot. Of course an Attic Brj/xos, as such, was politically nothing, but its inhabitants severally wero Athenian citizens ; a Lakonian ttoAis was also politically nothing, while its inhabitants severally were mere helpless subjects of Sparta. The Lakonian -rr6\tis are mentioned in rather a different way in a curious passage of Herodotus (vii. 231) where Demaratos tells Xerxes of the many Lacedaemonian cities, among which he merely speaks of Sparta as the greatest, and inhabited by the bravest among the brave Lacedaemonians. Herodotus was nut a politician like Thucydides or Polybios, still less was he ii pamphleteer like Isokrates; such a description was quite enough for his conception of a picturesque dialogue between Xerxes and Demaratos, without bringing in political distinctions which Xerxes would not have understood. But a mere " English reader" might he led seriously astray as to the political condition of Lakonia by reading this single passage of Herodotus by itself. Yet strange to say, Professor Kawlinson, who discusses at large the population of the city of Sparta, and who adds to the Hook a learned dissertation aboul Alarodians and Orthucorybantes, does not ronohsafe the "English reader" tin- least information as to the real political condition of Amyklai and Kpidauros Liincra. t > 1 1 these Perioikic w6\tn see Qrote, ii. 184 e1 seqq. COMPARISON OF THEBES AND SPARTA. 179 Greek had ever yet questioned the absolute rights of ohar iv. Sparta over the Lakonian towns. No Spartan, probably no Greek, had ever before imagined that treaties requiring ' that every Greek city should be independent might be so construed as to make Amyklai independent of Sparta as well as to make Orchomenos independent of Thebes. Epameinondas now put forth a principle which at once loosened the very foundations of Spartan dominion, and he lived to carry out his principle in the most practical shape. Before his work was over, he had rent away from Sparta half her territory, and had set up an independent b.c. 369. Messene in opposition to Sparta, as Sparta had set up an independent Plataia in opposition to Thebes. It is impossible not to rejoice even at the mere humiliation of Sparta, and still more so at the restoration of the The claims heroic commonwealth of Messene. 1 But it is clear that exclude dl the words of Epameinondas contained a sentence of death tru . e Fe . de " rahsm m against Boeotian Federalism or Boeotian freedom in any Bceotia. shape ; 2 it is clear that, though he held back his un- worthy countrymen from the grosser acts of oppression, yet his life was devoted to the mere aggrandizement of 1 The restoration of Messene however, except as a mere blow to Sparta, proved a failure. The career of the restored Messenians is inglorious, quite unworthy of the countrymen of the half-mythic. Aristoinenes, or of the gallant exiles of Naupaktos. The glory of Epameinondas as a founder is to have been the creator of Megalopolis. 2 Mr. Grote thinks that the words of Epameinondas do not imply that he claimed that "Thebes was entitled to as much power in Bceotia as Sparta in Laconia," (x. 231. 234) but only that the Federal union of Bceotia under the presidency of Thebes should be looked on as being " an integral political aggregate " as much as Lakonia " under Sparta, " or as Attica — he does not venture to say " under Athens." Surely there is no analogy between a Federal head of several independent cities, a despot city ruling over several subject cities, and a country where the whole is, so to speak, one city, while the smaller towns are mere parishes. Unless Epameinondas meant his parallel between Thebes in Bceotia and Sparta in Lakonia to be exact in all points, it has no force at all, and it is open to an obvious retort. And certainly the position of Sparta in Lakonia was utterly inconsistent with Federalism or with freedom of any kind. N 2 180 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. GnAP. iv. the one city of Thebes, and not to the general good of Boeotia or of Hellas. Different as was the general character of our first and our second period of Boeotian history, the terminations of b.c. 338. the two were strikingly alike. After the defeat of Chairo- tion "of 1 the ne ^ a ' Thebes had to receive a Macedonian garrison into destroyed the Kadmeia, as she had before had to receive a Spartan Towns. ' x garrison. Plataia, Thespia, Orchomenos, and Koroneia now arose again, 1 surrounding Thebes with allies of Mace- donia even more zealous and hostile than they had been in their former character as allies of Sparta. The troops of these cities served heartily with Alexander in his campaign Destruc- against Thebes, 2 and it was by their voices 3 that the tyrant Thebes by city was devoted to the destruction which she had so Alexander, ft en inflicted upon others. As Thebes had enriched hei- rs, c. 3do. L Zealous co- self with the territory of four of her Boeotian sisters, so, operation of the now that her own day was come, the Macedonian con- Towns" queror divided the whole Theban territory among his Boeotian allies. Thebes now vanishes for a while from among the cities of the earth. As one of the bulwarks of independent Greece against Macedonia we may lament her fate ; but the special historian of Boeotian Federalism cannot weep for her. The third period of Boeotian history may be more Tiiini briefly gone through. The part played by Boeotia in the :',;,:. 17-i. later history of Greece is almost always contemptible ; and 1 Paus, iv. 27. 10. i.\. 37. 8. He assigns the restoration to Philip, A i ii:i 1 1 (i. !•. 19) to Alexander. - Arrian, i. 8. 14. Diod. wii. 18, Arrian mentions also the Phokians, :t A it. i. 9. 16. To« St fierarrxovat tuv tpyuv £u,u/uaxois (oh 8t) ko.1 £it4- arpt^KV 'AK^avtipos t& icaTa rets 07f/3as SiaOuvai) Tt}v ixtv Kah/xtiau povpa Ka.Ttx eiv »8of« ti)v tt6\iv Si icaTairicd(j>ai tls t8a(j>os, Kal tt\v x<*>pa.v fiiavtl/j.a.i to7$ |u^yuax ols - ' '■ Diod. icviii. LI. Dioddros (xvii. L 4), with much less probability, makes Alexander assemble and consult tovs o-wtSpovs twv 'eaatji'oij', to Kowhv o-vvlZpiov ; thai is, probably, the Corinthian Synod, or possibly, in so blundering a writer, the Delphic Amphiktyons. THIED PEEIOD OF BOEOTIAN HISTORY. 181 of the few important events in which she was concerned chap. iv. I shall speak elsewhere. Thebes did not long remain a ruin or a sheep-walk, an example of the fate to which she had herself once wished to reduce Athens. 1 As she had b.c. 405. found a Macedonian destroyer, she now found a Macedo- nian restorer. Thebes was restored by Kassander ; 2 it ^on of 1 " would seem with some sort of formal consent 3 on the part Thebes by . Kassander oi the other Boeotian towns. They or course were deeply b.c. 316. interested in a proceeding which might possibly threaten them with a mistress, and which, in any case, involved an immediate surrender of territory. On the other hand, to say nothing of the power of Kassander and of the general feeling of Greece in favour of Theban restoration, it is quite possible that the Boeotian cities found that they had really not gained by the destruction of the greatest of their number. Elsewhere the step was highly popular ; Athens, the partaker in the later struggles of Thebes, gave zealous help towards her restoration ; gratitude towards the city of Epameinondas prompted help no less zealous on the part of Messene and Megalopolis ; contributions came in from various parts of Greece, and even from the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily. 4 Thebes thus rose again, and before long she again became the head of a Boeotian League, 5 but Restora- with powers very inferior to Avhat she had possessed in the League davs of her might. The date of the reconstitution of the Wlt1 , 1 « , ° mollified. League does not seem certain, but, through the whole Headship in Thebes. range of the history of Polybios, Boeotia is always spoken of as a political whole, just like Phokis or Akarnania. But 1 Isok. Plat. 34. "EdevTo oi [QrifScuot] tt\v \\/ij(pov cos xP'h ttJv tc iroKiv i^avdpaTroSlcraffOaL Kai rrjv \wpav ctvelvai /u.t]\o$6tov cSsirep to Kpuralov ireSlov. Cf. Suidas in (xtj\o^6tos. .See above, p. 161. 2 Paus. iv. 27. 10. Boeot. vi. 7. 3 Diod. xix. 54. Kdo-aavdpos . . . ireicras rovs BoiwToiis, aviffT-rjo-f rrjv iro\iv. 4 Fans. ix. 6. 7. Diod. xix. 54. 5 Boeotiae caput, Liv. xxxi. 1. xlii. 44. 182 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap. iv. the revived Boeotian League cuts a very poor figure beside the Achaia of Aratos or the Sparta of Kleomenes. The Boeotians once ventured to join with the Achaians against the iEtolian brigands, but after a single defeat, they gave up all share in general Grecian politics. 1 They seem even to have entered into some relation to the aggressors, in- b.c. 245. consistent Avith perfect independence, 2 a relation presently to be exchanged for a yet more servile submission to Iusigmfi- Macedonia, 3 Nor did they atone for external insignificance cance ot " ° Bceotiain by a vigorous and orderly government at home. The Greece. account of the internal state of the country given by Polybios is ridiculous beyond conception. The Boeotians did nothing but eat and drink ; they ate more dinners in b.c. 201— a month than there were days in it ; 4 they let the adminis- 222—197. tration of justice sleep throughout the land for twenty- five years. 5 Yet these Boeotian swine 6 seem to have possessed a Federal constitution to which the models afforded by neighbouring states had given a better form than it had possessed in the days of Ismenias or of Constitu- Epameinondas. Thebes was the head of the League, the tionofthe p] ace f meeting for the Federal Assemblv, 7 but she no League. x ° •" longer enjoyed the same tyrannical power as of old. At 1 PoL xx. 4. Pint. At. 16. ' PoL xx. 5. 'EyKaraAlnovTes toi)s 'Ax«wis irposivafxav Ahu\o?s rd (Ovos. Droysen (ii. 870) takes this to imply actual avp.Tro\iTfla with the Stolians, and undoubtedly the same word, in a slightly differenl construc- tion, is used to express the annexation of Sikyon to the Aeliaian League, ii. 43. "Aparos . . . ti)v Trarpftia. . . . irpoatud/xe irpos ttJv tusv 'Axcuwv TruAiTtlav. Bui this would seem to prove tOO much, and the words need nol imply more than close alliance and slavish subsen iency to yEtolia. :t PoL xx. 5. 'Tn^ra^ap crv. '■ [bid. Also x\iii . 2. I ►rumann 1 189) seems rather to misconceive this period. Surely Polybios de crib > time of carelessness and corruption, rather than one of \ iolence I Pausi rechl >. ' I'md. l>l. \i. 158. 'Apxaiov uvttSos . . . BoiaiTiav ui>. ' Liv. xxxiii. 1 . CONSTITUTION OF THE REVIVED LEAGUE. 183 the head of the League, as at the head of other Leagues, CHAP lv there was a single General, 1 who probably stepped into the position originally held by the ancient Federal Archon. There were also Boeotarchs, 2 whose office now T would answer pretty well to that of the Achaian Demiourgoi or Ministers ; and, as in Achaia, there was a Commander of Cavalry. 3 There was a Federal Assembly in which we may gather from an expression of Livy, 4 that each of the confederate cities had a distinct vote. We hear nothing of any oppression on the part of Thebes, 5 nor very much of dissensions between the several cities. Not that Bceotia, any more than other Greek states, was free from party disputes, but they seem to have arisen almost wholly from questions of foreign policy. There was, in the war of Philip and Flamininus, a Roman and a Macedonian party, B-c . 198.7. and Thebes was the stronghold of the Macedonian interest. 6 A stratagem of Flamininus 7 compelled the Boeotian League to embrace the Roman side. The factions and crimes by which this change of policy was followed are hardly worth recording. But at least the dissolution of the League was not the work of internal dissensions, but wholly of the insidious policy of Rome. To break up Federations and alliances among Grecian cities was always one of the main objects of any pow r er, native or foreign, which aspired to supremacy or illegitimate influence in Greece. Thebes indeed for a moment, while Epameinondas 1 Pol. xx. 6. ivioi tuiv v XP&'' 0V avvreT-qpriKos rrjv koivt)v (rv/j.TTo\iTelav, Kal ttoWovs Kal irotKi\ovs Kaipo\)s Siairecpevyds irapa- So£a>s, Tore Trpoimus Kal aKoylffTcos e\6fxevov rd irapa Tlepffecas, eiKij Kal TroiSa/)i£i)5t5s tttotjOIv KareXvOr) Kal SieaKopnlffOr} Kara ir6\€is. The difference between e&Vos and tt6\is, in the political language of Polybios, is that between a Federal State and a single city. See \\. 3, and many other passages. law habitually represents the words by "gens" and "civitas." He also often uses "populus" in the sense of State or Canton as a member of a Lea Mommsen (i. 682) holds thai the formal dissolution of the League did ao1 take place till b.o. I (*'>. I do nol see how ilns can l>c reconciled with the words of Polybios and law. A BoBotarch is spoken of in the interval, but he is apparently a purely Theban magistrate- fiuiwTapx&v Trji'iicavTa iv (-)?Jj8ais. I'ans. vii. 1 I. (!. ■> Pausanias (vii. \<'<. '■> 10), describing the results of the rictory of MummiuS (B.O. 1 I'i. ) adds, (rvvtSptd rt Kard tOvos ra tKdcrrwv, 'Ax°-iwv Kal to iv ftaiKtvaiv f) VIoiutihs f) IripooQl irov ttjs 'EAAaSoy, kot«A.«'Ai/to o/xotoos irdvra. tTKTi fit nv iroWots ventpnv tTpdirovTO is t\(ov 'PajuaToi ttjs 'EWdtios, Kal (TvvtSpia Kara iQvos dnoSiSoamv iKaarots rd dp\ata. I i in the former pari "I this passage Mr. Whiston (Diet, of Ant. art. Bceotarches), following Boeckh (i, 727), infers thai Mummiue found a ATTEMPTS AT FEDERAL UNION. 185 CHAP. iv. § 3. Of various attempts at Federal Systems — Ionia, Olynthos, ArTcadia, &e. Besides these Federations of Phokis, Akarnania, Epeiros, and Boeotia, all of which actually existed and flourished, we must not pass by some less successful attempts at the Unsuceess- establishment of Federal Governments in ancient Greece. temp ^ at Several such efforts were made at various times, which bore Federal Govern- IIO permanent fruit. Still they are important facts in ments. Grecian history, and, as they serve to illustrate the history and the growth of the Federal idea, they form a natural portion of our subject. It may be doubtful how far we are entitled to reckon among such attempts the advice which, according to Hero- Advice of dotus, 1 was given to the Ionian Greeks by the philosopher ^ ales to Thales when they were first threatened with Persian inva- Ionians. sion. Some degree of union had alwavs existed among the BC- 5i5 ' Bceotian League to dissolve in B.C. 146, and therefore that the League must have been "partially revived" after its dissolution by Marcius in b.c. 171. But surely Pausanias, especially when using the pluper- fect tense, may just as well refer to the dissolution under Marcius, or, as the pious antiquary is not the most infallible authority in strictly historical matters, Pausanias may even have forgotten that the dissolution of the Bceotian League was the work of Marcius and not of Mummius. It seems hardly worth while to extemporize a revival and a second disso- lution without better authority. The latter portion of the passage, as referring to a nominal restoration later than B.C. 146, does not bear on the point. On the restoration there spoken of, see Thirlwall, viii. 502 ; l'inlay, Greece under the Romans, 25. All these imaginary Confedera- tions continued to exist, with their whole staff of Generals, Archons, Bceotarchs, Senates, &c. down to a surprisingly late period of the Roman Empire. This is abundantly shown by the inscriptions in Boeckh. But it is hardly worth enlarging on such mock constitutions in a History of Federalism, except when they either illustrate the institutions of earlier times, or when one gets such curious details as Pausanias gives (see above p. 136) of the Amphiktyonic Council after the Augustan Reform Bill. 1 Herod, i. 170. 'E/ceAeue 'iv fiovAfurrfpiov 'lavas eKTrjadai, to 8e elvai iv TtCft' Ttwv yap elvai /itoov ttjs 'lwvirjs' ras Se a\Kas ir6\ias olKeofiivas ^njSei/ ■Ijffffov vojxifcaQai, KaTawep ti oTyuoi etev. 186 OF THE MINOE CONFEDEKATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap. iv. Ionian colonies in Asia, but there is no ground for believing that their union was of a kind which at all amounted to a real Federal Government. 1 They had indeed general Former meetings at the Panionion* but those meetings were Connexion ° between primarily of a religious kind, though undoubtedly they tll6 Ionian were often taken advantage of for political deliberations Cities. among the several cities. Their connexion in short seems to have been rather closer than that of a mere Amphi- ktyony, but it is clear that it came nearer to an Amphiktyony than to a true Federal union. It is a relation of a peculiar Their kind, a sort of developement of the old Amphiktyonic rela- esseutTallv ^ on ' °f wn i° n we fi n( l some other instances, especially Amphi- among the Greeks of the Asiatic colonies. It is a species ktyonie. to . r . of union which might naturally arise among settlers in a foreign land, mindful of their old home and of their com- mon origin, but still in no way disposed to sacrifice any portion of their separate political being. Unions like those of the Asiatic Ionians and iEolians 8 were in fact Amphi- ktyonies instituted for a special, and that partly a political, end. They differed from the Amphiktyonies of Old Greece in this. In an Amphiktyony of the elder kind, the union between the members simply exists for the sake of the Its differ- temple. The common temple gives its name to a body ence from ' tii elder which, except in reference to that temple, has no common ktyonies. being at all. In these unions among the Asiatic Greeks, this relation is reversed. The union is much more religious than political, still it is something more than the mere 1 Mr. Blakesley, in bis edition of Eerodotua, (vi. 7 etal.) seems to me greatlj to exaggerate the amount of true Federal ideas in [onia. A much truer picture is given by Bishop Thirl wall, (ii. 115, 191) and still more clearly by Mr. Qrote, (iii. 3-15). - See EerocL i. 142. 8. '■' The Boeotian Amphiktyony of Kordneia would be a union of very much, the same kind aa these unions among tin,' Asiatic Greeks, if we eon l 'li&vaiv. We may well doubt whether such a formula was commonly used. 2 Blakesley on Herod, vi. 7. "He would have selected Teos somewhat on the principle on which the site of Washington was selected for the 190 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap. iv. sian and Epliesian pride would not consent to surrender an atom of Milesian or Epliesian Sovereignty to a Federal Council sitting at Te6s. This advice of Thales, and its fate, also illustrates another remark which I have already made. It was precisely the greatest and most illustrious cities of Greece which clung the most pertinaciously to their sepa- rate town-autonomy. Sparta, Athens, and Ave may fairly add Thebes, were willing enough to bear rule over other cities ; they were willing enough to be the chiefs of a body of allies more or less dependent upon them ; Athens at least was once willing to incorporate other cities as it were into her own person ; but neither Sparta, Athens, nor Thebes ever consented to unite with other cities in a free and equal Federal bond. It was only among the ruder and less advanced tribes of Greece that the true Federal principle had, in the days of Thales, made any visible progress. We cannot doubt that necessity had already drawn the towns of Phokis and Akarnania into those Federal unions which we find existing among them throughout the whole duration of Grecian history. But the Ionic cities were, in the days of Thales, among the foremost cities of the Hellenic name. They were as little likely as Sparta or Athens to follow Phokian or Akarnanian precedents of union ; they were rather as fully disposed a*s Sparta or Athens could be to cleave to the full possession of all those sovereign rights which the Hellenic mind held to be inherent in every sovereign Hellenic commonwealth. Projected Far more Important in Grecian history is the attempt ,;;!, s made by Olynthos, shortly after the Peace of Autalkidas, I ''••'• :j82 J to organi/e a general confederacy of the Greek and Mace- donian cities in her own neighbourhood Sparta, as the interpreter ;ms. Xen. Hell. v. 2. 12,) but the Thracians are spoken of as the merest subjects or tools, (d\\d ,ut)i> Kal yelroves eiW avTo7s QpaKes oi dflcuTiKevTot, ol Qepairzvoixri /xlp Kal vvv ^5?j tovs 'OXwBlovs' el Hi t/w" eice'ivovs ecrofrai, k.t.\. lb. 17.) That is to say, the Macedonian allies were worthy of whatever measure of freedom Oiynthos thought good to leave to her Greek allies ; but Thracians, even though advanced enough to do without a King, were fit only for that subjection which was the natural lot of the barbarian. Xen. Hell. V. 2. 18. At ydp aKovaat tQv Tr6\eu>v rr\s iroXirelas koivoi- vovcrui, k.t.A. 2 Seethe Plataian Oration of Isokrates (9 — 11) quoted above, p. 174. 3 Xen. Hell. v. 2. 12. 'E^' wre xp^ a ^ ai vojxois rots avroTs Kal ' niw.s ton V, REAL NATURE OF THE OLYNTHTAN SCHEME. 195 City strictly speaking. The word which lie employs 1 is chap. vi. that which denotes, not a League like Phokis or even like Boeotia, but the union of the Attic cities with Athens. But even if, as in the case of Attica, the full Olynthian franchise was to be communicated to all the allied cities, still such a franchise must have proved a mere delusion- Mere distance, and the greatness of some of the cities concerned, would have effectually hindered an union after the Attic pattern. A Federal union was doubtless just what was wanted ; such an union would have provided the needful bulwark against Macedonia without violating the independence of any Grecian city. But there is nothing that shows that any real Federal Council or Assembly was proposed. Akanthos is required to accept the laws and citizenship of Olynthos. The Akanthians naturally answer that they wish to retain their own laws and their own citizenship. 2 A Federal union would in no way have im- plied the surrender of either. In truth, the aspect of the whole case looks very much as if what Olynthos really wished was to reduce the Chalkidian towns to the condition familiar in Roman political language as the Civitas sine 1 Dem. Fals. Leg. 298. Oviru XaAKiSzow iravroov els tv (Tw^Kia^evuv. Pausanias indeed (viii. 27. 2) uses the same word, and its cognate awoiKurfj.6s, of the foundation of Megalopolis, which was designed to be the capital of a real Federal state, and Polybios (iv. 33) uses it of the foundation alike of Me- galopolis and of Messene. But, both at Megalopolis and at Messene, there was a literal and physical (twoikktix6s. The inhabitants of several Arkadian towns migrated to the newly founded Great City ; and the scattered rem- nants of the Messenian people were gathered together from various quarters to fill the new Messene. So Olynthos itself owed its first origin to another literal separate thi m from the Olynthian connexion when they had once tasted its advantages. Very true, lmt what were the main advantages spos I ' N"i the private or public rights of Olynthian citizens, lmt unlimited plunder under Olynthian banners. After mentioning the ex> pected influence of the imyatiitu and hfier^trtis, he continues (Xen. Hell. v. 2. l'.M, tl . . . . yvwtTovTat 8ti /ufTO TiSi' icparovvTow (irtaGai KfpSaAeov tcTrli', iitiffp 'ApKiiSirX, s outcld' d/xolus (C\vra lirrai. Of COUrse the lirtyafiiai and (yKr^trti'i, even without any political franchise, would do ;n ■thiim, bu1 the main attraction is the pro peel of gain through the contemplated conqui ta of Olynthos, jusl as thi Arkadian allies of Sparta lined by service in the Spartan armies. This is hardly the notion of Federal uni mtertained cither by Aratos oi bj Washington, EARLY HISTORY OF ARKADIA. 10/ well have rejoiced, to see a powerful Greek state, whether oha*. n. an ( Mynthian Empire or a Chalkidian League, fixed as a boundary against Macedonian aggression. But certainly the Olynthian scheme, as described in the only extant contemporary account of it, 1 does not seem to answer the description of a true Federal connexion nearly so closely as some much more obscure unions of Grecian cities which already existed. Shortly after this attempt at Federal union — if Federal union we are to consider it — in Northern Greece — a far more promising attempt was made to establish a Federal Federal state in Arkadia. The decline of the Lacedaemonian arkadia, power after the battle of Leuktra opened the way f r B - c - 3 '°- political changes and new combinations in all parts of Greece. The Arkadian race, though one of the most l> ittle r re - • • n • vious im- ancient and most numerous divisions of the Grecian name, portance of had hitherto been little heard of in Grecian history. Since the predominance of Sparta in Peloponnesos had been firmly established, the Arkadians had chiefly appeared in the character in which they are described in the speech of Kleigenes of Akanthos, that namely of submissive allies of Sparta, following her banners for the sake of the plunder to be derived from Spartan conquests. The city of Mantineia alone had, on several Mantineia; occasions, taken «, more prominent and independent part 1 We can hardly set against the contemporary description of Kleigenes such vague expressions as we find in the speech of Chlaineas in Polybios (ix. 28), r)v ti (TvaTTJixa -r&v eVl QpaKijs 'EAArj^cov, ovs dncpKiaav 'A9r)va?ot Kal Xa\Ki5e7s, 3>v jxiyiffTov e?x e "P^XW Ka ' SiivafMiv 77 tQv 'OAvv6'looi> 7r<$A.i?. Here, though the preeminent position of Olynthos is clearly set forth, we do find the word avarrj/xa, the technical name for true Federations like those of Achaia and Lykia, used to denote the relation between the Chalkidian cities and Olynthos. But a casual expression used so long after does not prove much, and moreover Chlaineas seems to be speaking of the times immediately before Philip, to which his language would be still less appropriate. 198 OF THE MINOK CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap. iv. in Grecian affairs. In the interval between the Peace of b.c. 420. Nikias and the Sicilian Expedition, Mantineia appears, together with Argos and Elis, as a leader of anti-Spartan herde- movements within Peloponnesos. 1 In the second period struction by Sparta, of Spartan supremacy, after the Peace of Antalkidas, Mantineia incurred the "wrath of Sparta to that degree that she, a Hellenic city, enrolled in the Homeric cata- logue, 2 was degraded from the rank of a city, and her inhabitants were distributed among the four villages Avhose union, at some ante-historic and even ante-mythic period, was said to have been the first origin of the Mantineian state. 3 It may be that, as the Lacedaemonian partisan Xenophon tells us, there were Mantineian oligarchs base enough to find a selfish satisfaction in this degradation of their native city. 4 It is more certain that, as soon as the Spartan power was broken at Lcuktra, the members thus violently separated were again united. Mantineia appeared Itsrestora- once more as a city, and again began to take an important 87? P ar * m * ne affoi 1 ' 8 °f Arkadia and of Hellas. 8 Mantineian patriotism now took a bolder flight than it had ever taken Plan of an before. The reunion of Mantineia was. only to be the pre- Federa- cursor of the union of all Arkadia. Up to this time there t1 " 11 - had been no real political connexion between the different branches of the Arkadian name. The different cities and districts had retained some vague notions of national kindred, and sonic degree of unity, as in Ionia and else- where, had been kept up by common religious rites. 1 ' 1 See Thuc. v. 15 e1 seqq. 2 II. fi'. <><>7. Kal Ttytr\v ilx ov Kal tAavriv4i)v ipa7(ivi\v. 3 Keil, ll'-ll. v. "_'. I 7. KaQriptOt) fxiv t6 Tflxos, 5iy/. 8. 'E£ a>/' 81) Kal ol Mavrtvus, a5s ^877 avidvofioi iravri.- iraniv uvrts, fj\0uv T6 Tracts Kal 4ipT)(plrravTo fxiav -noKiv t?)v Mavrlvttav itoiuv, nal Ttixi^ttv tJjv ituKiv. This hows thai Mantineian satisfaction at the Sioikkt/ui's urn I have been < onfined to b fen oligarchs, 8 See Qrote, x. 284. PLANS OF LYKOMEDES. 199 Arkadia, in short, fonncd an Amphiktyony of its own, an chap. iv. institution perhaps the more needful for a people who Arkadian had no share in the general Delphic Amphiktyony. But hitherto hitherto the connexion had been purely Amphiktyonic ; " 1( " '>' we find no trace of any real political union between the ktyonic. several Arkadian towns. Mantineia and Tegea, the tAvo chief among them, were frequently hostile to one another. At this very time we find them in marked opposition ; Tegea adhered to the interest of Sparta, while Mantineia naturally attached herself to the rising power of Thebes. Under such circumstances, the formation of a general Arkadian Federation was at once a noble conception and a most difficult undertaking. Its author appears to have been Lykomedes of Mantineia, 1 who certainly merits there- by a high place among the statesmen of Greece. His Plans of design for an Arkadian union embraced a plan for a real d | a> ome ' Federal Government, and it gave the Federal principle a much wider scope than had ever before been opened to it in Grecian affairs. The scheme of Lykomedes was a noble and generous one, and, though it bore but little immediate fruit, yet its memory, no doubt, contributed hints to the great Federal statesmen of later Greece. It also served the cause of Federalism in another way ; its one great result, the foundation of Megalopolis, gave Federal Greece some of the noblest of her leaders. Lyko- medes designed a Federal Government in the strictest sense ; he did not, like the politicians of Thebes and Olynthos, seek for any invidious supremacy for his own . , city ; his plans contemplated a free and equal union of union to be the whole Arkadian name. The uuion Avas to be strictly Federal. 1 Diodoros (xv. 59) attributes the first idea of the Arkadian union to a Lykomedes of Tegea. This is probably merely one of his characteristic blunders, though it is curious that a misconstruction of a passage of Pausanias (viii. 27. 2.) has led some scholars to ;i belief in a Lykomedes of Tegea on quite independent grounds. See Thirl wall, v. 110. 200 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap. iv. Federal ; the several cities were not to lose their existence as free Hellenic commonwealths, but Arkadia, as towards all other states, was to be one ; l the united Arkadian body was to have a Federal Assembly, Federal magistrates, and a Federal army. To avoid all jealousies between existing cities, to cut off all rivalry between Tegea and Mantineia, all fear of the new constitution proving a mere cloak for a supremacy on the part of either, a new Federal Capital was to be founded as the seat of the Central Government of the Arkadian people. And all this was Temporary no mere vision ; the success of the scheme was indeed but S! Federal temporary, but it did succeed for a while, and it was no scheme. f au i t f Lykomedes if more selfish politicians undid his noble work. For a few brilliant years Arkadia was really one ; Mantineia did not envy Tegea, and Tegea did not Founda- Tex Mantineia, Megalopolis, the Great City, arose as the tion of Washington of the new Federation, and there the general Megalo- ° . polis, b.c. Arkadian Assemblv met to transact the general Federal affairs of the Arkadian nation. And if this great and wholesome change was not brought about absolutely with- out violence, it certainly was brought about with much less violence than any other change of equal moment in recorded Grecian history. A local revolution at the right moment 2 took away all danger from the Lacedaemonian 1 X' n. Hell. vi. 5. 0. 2,vvi}yov in\ rb crvviivai re irav to 'ApicaSiKiiv, Kal 8 Tl VlK(f>t) IV T

Koivf was effected, whether the majoritj of the 'I'm Thousand was ascertained by counting heads, or whether each city had a distinct \ ote. The Latter is more consonanl with Greek Federal praci ice. '■' Bee th. account of the Tegean revolution in Sen. Hell. vi. 5. 7 et i '|'|. i if, i Irote, i, TEMPORARY FEDERAL UNION OF ARKADIA. 201 tendencies of Tcgea. Tcgea joined the League ; nearly chap. iv. all Arkadia, and a few towns whose Arkadian character was doubtful, 1 entered into it with delight. Orchomenos General i • adhesion of indeed, and a few other towns," still clave to their com- Arkadia to plcte separate autonomy. That they were compelled by e eagae " force 3 to share the common destinies of the nation was doubtless not abstractedly justifiable, but we could hardly expect it to be otherwise. There are no signs of general compulsion on one side and general unwillingness on the other, such as we have seen in the cases of Thebes and Olynthos. With what zeal the scheme was adopted in most parts of Arkadia, we learn from an incidental notice in the hostile Xenophon. 4 Agesilaos reached the Arkadian town of Eutaia, and found in it only old men, women, and children. Every male of the military age had gone to attend the Arkadian Constituent Assembly, and to take his share in the formation of the Arkadian Federal Constitution. 5 For the details of the Arkadian constitution we are, Constitu- as usual, left to incidental notices. Here we have again League. to deplore the loss of the great political work of Aristotle. All that is preserved of his account of Arkadian matters amounts to the fact that he mentioned the Assembly of the Ten Thousand ; not a detail survives. 6 Xenophon, the bitter Lacedaemonian partisan, could have told us everything if he had chosen, but he does not even record the foundation of Megalopolis. The existence of the 1 Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 26. So vii. 4. 12. (b.c. 365). KaraXajx^dvovcrtv ol 'HAeibi Aacrtdiva, to /xev ira\at6y eavT'JJv ovra, iv 8e t<£ irapdisTi crvvTeKovvra 4s to 'ApKaSiKuv. 2 Xen. Hell, vi. 5. 10. 11. 3 lb. 13. 22. 4 lb. 12. 6 lb. Tovs iv rrj (TTpaTevatficp rjXiKia olxopevovs is to 'ApKaSwdv. See Grotc, x. 287. Bishop Thirl wall (v. 117, note) seems to take another view, but is not this Assembly at Asea the same as the meeting which he himself describes in p. 110 ? 6 See Arist, Pol. (ed. Oxon. 1837) p. 300. 202 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap. iv. G rea t City, like that of its sister Messene, was so glorious for Epameinondas, so disgraceful aud calamitous for Sparta, that the reuegade Athenian had not the heart to insert their names in his history. Yet it is from Xenophon's occasional notices that we have to glean most of the little which we do know of the details of the Arkadian Federal system. The League had a Federal The Assembly which met at Megalopolis, and was known as rfT<£ bly the Ten Thousand. 1 As to the constitution of this As- Thousand ; sem bly there has been some doubt, but the most probable opinion is that which represents it as being, like the Achaian Assembly of later times, open to every citizen of its ( onsti- every Arkadian city who chose to attend. 2 That it was a representative Assembly, in the sense of being composed of chosen delegates, seems unlikely, both from the great- ness of the number, and because there is no parallel for such an Assembly of Delegates in any known Grecian commonwealth. The Assembly, especially during the enthusiasm of the first days of the League, would doubt- less be hugely attended, and ten thousand is a large attendance, when we remember that five thousand citizens was above the average attendance in the Athenian Assem- bly. 3 There is no need to infer from the name Ten Thousand that there really was any fixed number. The name was undoubtedly in familiar use, but it need not have been a formal title ;* it is most likely only a vague, 1 Ol nvptoi. Xni. II. 11. vii. 1. 38 ct pass. Dcm. F. L. 220, &c. Tho ■ i : i iii<- constantly occurs. 2 This is i lir view of Mr. Grote (\. 817), and it seems inure in accordance withgeneral Greet notions on such matters. Bishop Thirlwall (v. 117) discusses several othei views. I can hardly persuade myself either that 1 1 , . Assembly was an army, or thai it consisted wholly of Megalopolitans. This lasl notion seems opposed to the whole nature of the League. :1 Thuc. viii. 72. 1 The common formula foraGrees Confederation, t^ nmvbv Twv'ApKaSwv, d as equivalenl to of p6pun. Ken, Bell \ii. 1. 35. 38. CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE. 203 and probably an exaggerated, way of expressing the vast chap. iv. numbers of the Arkadian Assembly. The functions of the Powers of Ten Thousand were those which were commonly vested in Thousand the sovereign Assembly of a Grecian commonwealth. The Ten Thousand made war and peace in the name of all Arkadia, 1 they received and listened to the ambassadors of other Greek states ; 2 they regulated and paid the standing army of the Federation; 3 they sat in judgement on political offenders against the collective majesty of the Arkadian League. 4 That they were assisted in their deli- berations by a smaller Senate is not distinctly asserted : Probable but we might fairly infer it from the analogy of other ^ J ^ tence Greek states, and the results of antiquarian research have Senate. made it almost certain that the Arkadian Assembly did not depart from the usual pattern. 5 There were Federal Magistrates, whose titles are not recorded ; 6 and at the 1 Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 2. AvKop.ij8ris . . . irtlOei toi)s /ui/p/ous irpdrTav irepL avuixax'ias npos avrovs. Cf. vii. 1. 38, and Diod. xv. 59. 2 Dem. F. L. 220. 3 The ewdpnoi or eViAe/cTOf. Diod. xv. 62. Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 22. 33. 4 See the trial of the Mantineian trpucrraTat (were these Magistrates, or merely popular leaders ?) in the passage of Xenophon last quoted. 5 Pausanias (viii. 32. 1) speaks of the Qepoi\iov at Megalopolis, which he defines as t6 /3ov\euTr'ipwv o rots /nvpiots iirenoi-qTo 'ApKaSoov. Colonel Leake finds its ruins in the position, near the Theatre, pointed out by Pausanias, and concludes that, "though it may have been subservient to the uses of the Council of Ten Thousand, it could hardly have been em- ployed for its actual assembly, as such a multitude could only bave been seated in a theatre-shaped edifice." (Morea, ii. 39.) Bishop Tbirhvall (v. 116) infers from this, with great probability, that there was a Senate, ami thai this Qepalhiov was its place of meeting. This view is also con- firmed by the use of the word fiovKevTtjptov by Pausanias. The Ten Thousand were not a @ov\rf, nor would they meet in a PovAevTTJpwv. The Ten Thousand themselves doubtless met, as Colonel Leake suggests, in the Theatre ; but hard by their own place of meeting was the smaller /ZovKev- T-fiptov, for the use of the fiovX-q, the Committee chosen, by lot or other- wise, from among the Ten Thousand, to discbarge the usual functions of a Greek Senate. 6 "Apxovres are mentioned, Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 24 ; 4. 33. Their formal title may or may not have been Archon. 204 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. CHAP. IV. Federal Magis- trates. Founda- tion of Megalo- polis, B.C. 370. Advanta- ge. his posi- tion of the Federal Capital. head of the -whole League there seems to have been, as in so many other cases, a single Federal General. 1 These Federal officers, we cannot doubt, were elected by the Assembly of the Ten Thousand. The Federal capital of Megalopolis was formed by the union of several villages or small towns, the inhabitants of which were gathered together as citizens of the Great City. In a few instances we regret to hear that compulsion was employed, 2 but in most cases the inhabitants of the small Arkadian townships gladly accepted their offered promotion to the rank of citizens of the national capital. 3 It may perhaps be doubted whether the choice of any city as the place of Federal meeting was per- fectly wise ; a better place might perhaps have been found, as in the case of the Phokian League, 4 under the shadow of some great national sanctuary, such as the great temple of the Arkadian Zeus. But if Federal Arkadia was to have a capital at all, there can be no doubt as to the wisdom of the choice actually made. Here we may, with Pausanias, 5 discern the guiding genius of Epameinondas. To have chosen Mantineia, Tegca, or any other of the ancient cities, as the Federal capital, would have opened the w&y to innumerable jealousies, and might even have led to the same evils of which the Arkadians i This seems implied in Buch expressions as (Xen. Hell. vii. 8. 1) A oirras ixMiruv iirtidovro .... auvtKtyovro is Trjv MtyuKyv 7I-liA.il/ (TTTlwhT), K.T.K. ■' See above, p. I 15, p oias distinctly rei Epamoindndas as the true founder of Mi galopolis. Pan I. nil 27. 2. yvwp.il n*v Toiaiyrj? owyK^Wo ol 'Apxddts, rjjj wi\tutii «iKtrrTi)s 'Eirafxu-wt'Sas o OvjjSaios ow StKalw koAoito &v, tovs Tt yip 'ApKuSas oItos $v 6 lirtytloas is tov avvoiKiaft^v, k.t.A. FOUNDATION OF MEGALOPOLIS. 205 had such a living example before their eyes among their ohap. it. own Boeotian allies. And Epameinondas himself, when acting as the counsellor of the Arkadians, would doubtless see the danger as clearly as any Arkadian ; in Arkadia he would advise for the good of all Arkadia, and not be warped by that narrow local patriotism which led even him to sacrifice the general welfare of Bceotia to the selfish interests of Thebes. Had the Ten Thousand met at Man- tineia or Tegea, the noble scheme of Lykomedes might only have led to the destruction of that which he had most at heart ; he might have become the founder, not of a really equal Arkadian Confederation, but of a mere Mautineian or Tegean Empire over Arkadia. Such a danger was much less to be dreaded from a new city called into being at the will, and for the purposes, of the Confederation itself. And, besides this, the Great City, as its later history shows, occupied a most important military position. It com- manded one of the main passes by which Sparta used to pour her troops into Arkadia. Some such bulwark as was supplied by Megalopolis was imperatively required for the safety of the country. And it was the more needed, because the other chief city of southern Arkadia, and that which commanded the other approach, was Tegea, so lately gained over from subserviency to Spartan interests, and still probably containing a party unfavourable to the national cause. These considerations might reconcile even distant members to the position of the Federal capital, not in the centre of the Confederation, but on its most exposed border. With Epameinondas no doubt the chief object was effectually to shut Sparta in, Megalopolis keeping her in check from the north, and the other new city of Messene from the west. The Arkadian League, as an important Greek power, Bcclino did not last long. We are not well informed as to the Arkadian steps of its decline ; but, before the death of Epamei- Lea £»e. 206 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. chap. iv. nondas, Mantineia and Tegea were again hostile cities. b.c. 362. Their positions, during the last stage of his warfare, are singularly reversed from what they had been eight years before. Mantineia is now the allv of Lacedsemon, and Tegea is the stronghold of the Theban interest in Pelopon- Eistoryof nesos. Megalopolis always remained a considerable city, Megalo- polis. though it did not wholly answer the intentions of its founders, either in its extent or in its political importance. At a later period we find it a zealous ally of Macedonia ; later still it appears in the more honourable character of an important member of the Achaian League, illus- trious as the birthplace of Lydiadas, Philopoimen, and Polybios. The Assembly of the Ten Thousand sur- vived the loss of Lykomedes and of Epameinondas ; b.c. 347. iEschines and Demosthenes pleaded before it ; ' and Demosthenes uses language which implies that it still at least professed to act in the name of the whole Arkadian b.c 353. people.' 2 Demosthenes himself pleaded the cause of Megalopolitan independence before the Athenian As- sembly, 3 when the Arkadian city was again threatened by Sparta and defended by Thebes," and when a faction in Megalopolis itself, as before in Mantineia, desired the dissolution of the Great City and the restoration of their own influence over its former petty townships. 6 Later again, b.o. 880. in the war between Agis and Antipater, all Arkadia except Megalopolis took the patriotic side ; Megalopolis stood a siege ill the interest of Macedonia,' 1 and its losses were repaid by a pecuniary compensation levied on the vanquished cities. 7 Opposition to Sparta would natu- rally drive Megalopolis into alliance with Macedonia, and it may well be believed that, in the days of Macedonian 1 Dem. V. L. 220. 2 Bee Lb. 10. 11. :i In the oration vwlp Miya\oiro\n£i>. A Bee Thirlwall, v. 3(37—70. ■ Thirlwall, v. 3G8. ' ffiach. Ktes. 165. - Q. Curl. \i 1. 81. DECLINE OF THE ARKADIAN LEAGUE. 207 domination, selfish interests may have made the position chap. iv. of a powerful city in close alliance with Macedonia ap- pear preferable to that of a Federal capital of Arkadia. Certain it is that, from this time forward, the Macedonian interest was very strong in Megalopolis, and equally cer- tain that no general Arkadian League existed when the Achaian League began to be organized. The great scheme of Lykomedes, the most promising that any Grecian states- man had yet designed, had altogether fallen asunder. And yet his labours were far from being wholly fruitless. He had given a model for the statesmen of later genera- tions to follow, and he had founded the city which was to give birth to the most illustrious Greeks of the last age of Grecian independence. After this Arkadian Confederacy, which, if it had a poor ending, at all events had a grand beginning, it may seem Pretended almost ludicrous to quote a mere abortive scheme, or ^^^1 ° pretence at a scheme, our whole knowledge of which is Union in contained in a single sentence of a hostile orator. Kallias, 351 the Tyrant of Chalkis, he who was defeated by Phokion at Tamynai, veiled, if we may believe ^Eschines, his IdSUrf f schemes of ambition under the pretext of founding a clialkls - general Euboian Council or Assembly in his own city. 1 Not a detail is given us, but the words employed seem to show that a pretence at true Federalism was the bait. A Federal scheme proceeding from such a source would probably have borne more likeness to the abortive scheme of an Italian League put forth by Louis Napoleon a.d. 1859. Buonaparte, than to the noble works of Aratos and Washington. But in either case the bait of a Federal 1 iEscli. Ktes. 89. KaAAias 6 Xa\Ki5eds, puKpbv SiaAnrwv xp" vov , t&Aiv 7?/ce avuiSpiov is XaAulSu crvv&ywv, e^aipeTov 5' avrtp rupavvtSa ■trposTroiovjj.fvos, l(rxvpav Se rr^v Eufioiav Z. 6 lb. "AAAat dpx> maintain this view. The democratic character of the League is clear both from the demo- cratic 'Iii i " iii "l the a Mill cities, the locaJ Hrjuoi of which are constantly mentioned in the Inscriptions, and from tin' distinct testimony of one in- scription hi 'ii" (C. I. 1289) where as anonymous worthy is praised as tvtpyirr\v tov 5j)'/uou and hiaTi]pt^aavTa tovs t« i<6/aovs xa.1 7i)v irdrpwv ftrintiKpuniai'. MEEITS OF THE LYKIAN CONSTITUTION. 211 by the majority, not of heads, but of Tribes or Cities. In cuat. iv. the Primary Assembly of a large district some such ar- rangement as this is absolutely necessary, in order to put distant Tribes or Cities on an equality with those which are near the place of meeting. If the votes in the Roman Assembly had been taken by heads, the mob of the Forum could always have outvoted the genuine agricultural plebeians. But, in most of the ancient constitutions, each Apportion- member, each Tribe or City, whether great or small, had Votes to only a single vote. This was manifestly unfair, and might NumDers - easily lead to discontents. Thus the Italian Allies of Rome bitterly complained when they were, after the Social War, admitted indeed to the Roman citizenship, but dis- b.o. 88. tributed among eight tribes only among the thirty-five. 1 They were equal in number to the former citizens, but, by this arrangement, they could, at the utmost, command only eight votes, less than one-fourth of the whole number. Thus, on any questions which concerned their special in- terests, they were left in a perpetual and hopeless minority. The Lykians avoided this danger by giving to their cities a greater or less number of votes according to their size, being the first recorded instance of an attempt to apportion votes to population. Those Xanthians who might be pre- sent in any Assembly determined the vote of Xanthos by a majority among themselves ; that vote counted as three in reckoning up the decisive vote of the Assembly. The vote of a smaller city, ascertained in the same way, counted as two or as one. 2 But though such a system 1 Veil. Pat. ii. 20. 2. 2 A small confederation, {a-va-rrnxa) consisting of Kibyra and three other towns, in which Kibyra had two votes and the other towns one each, was probably a humble imitation of the Lykian League. Strabo, .\iii. 4 (vol. iii. p. 160). As Kibyra was always under Tyrants, though well disposed Tyrants (srvpavviuTo 8' dei" aoos 5' o/aics), one would like to know how the Monarchic and the Federal elements were reconciled. The mere use of the word Tyrcmb, and not King, implies republican forms. P 2 Even 212 OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE. CHAP. IV. Approach to Repre- sentative Govern- ment. A Senate not men- tioned, but its exist- ence to be Inferred from analog)'. was not really representative, it was a very near approach to the representative principle. 1 No doubt, alike in Lykia, Achaia, and Rome, the vote of a distant Tribe or City was often canvassed at home, and perhaps practically decided, before the general Assembly met. At any rate those citizens of any city who were present would know and express the wishes of their fellow-citizens who remained at home. It would have been a comparatively small change, if each city had formally elected as many of its citizens as it had votes, and had sent them with authority to speak in its name in the Federal body. But the change does not seem ever to have actually been made. In this, as in so many other cases, the ancient world trembled on the very verge of representative government without ever actually crossing the boundary. 2 The description of Strabo does not mention a Federal Senate. But the universal practice of the Greek common- wealths may make us feel certain that there was a Senate, of some sort or other, in Lykia no less than in Arkadia. The several cities of Lykia had each their local Senates, 3 and we may be sure that the Federal Constitution fol- lowed the same universal model. It need not surprise us that a tiling almost certain to be taken for granted is not directly mentioned. The Athenian Senate is not very often spoken of; it is never so prominent as at the Even tli. Gauls in Asia (Ktmbo, xii. 5. vol. iii. p. 55) seem to have made .."Up rude approach t" Federal ideas ; bu1 these utterly obscure constitu- tions are reallj matters of archaeology rather than of politics. 1 See Niebuhr, Hist. Iloin. ii. 29. 30. Kng. Tr. - Bee Mommsen's R ische Geschichte, ii. -ii 7. :1 The style of each city is commonly the familiar one t) /3»ijAt) k word once used by Polybios (xxxviiL 5) in speaking of Achaian affairs, meaning, us it would appear, the Council of Ministers. Src li.u I10IV11, l»;is Lykische Volk (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1 362), p. 24. ORIGIN OF THE LYKIAN LEAGUE. 213 moment of its destruction by the Four Hundred. 1 The ohap. iv. very existence of the Arkadian Senate has, as we have seen, mainly to be inferred from the dimensions of an architectural monument. We may therefore be sure that the Lykian Assembly, like other Greek Assemblies, was assisted by a preconsidering Senate, but we cannot tell what the exact constitution of that Senate was. As for the Federal Magistrates mentioned by Strabo, their titles arc not mentioned, except that of Lykiarch, Federal borne by the President of the Union. 2 The magistrates tra tes. of the several cities may have borne the title of General ; at least Dion Cassius speaks of the General of a particular city, 3 as well as of the common army of the whole League. 4 The exact antiquity and origin of the Lykian League it might be difficult to discover. Bishop Thirlwall 5 hints Date and that Federal Government may have been of very early Federal introduction into Lykia. Yet we must remember that ^^ the Lykians were not Greeks, and that they seem not Lykia. even to have had that degree of ethnical affinity to the Greeks which it is easy to recognize in Macedonians and Epeirots. We need not suppose a people who proved themselves so capable of receiving Hellenic culture to have been wholly of an alien stock ; but till philologers are better agreed as to the nature of the Lykian language, it is hardly the part of a political historian to hazard R e i at j on f vague conjectures about them. It is clear that the early j^ e L y _ Lykians were, in the Greek sense of the word, Barbarians ; the Greeks. 1 Thuc. vtii. 69. 2 The Lykiarch seems to have borne the formal title of attoXoydraTos (C. I. 4198, 4274), something like our "Right Honourable." This is a sort of orientalism of which we find no trace in proper Greece. 3 Dion, xlvii. 34. Ka\ tovto Kal oi Mvpus (Troir^crav, waSr) t6v (TTpaT-qydv aiiTwi/ . . . a.TriXvTi\ Ai/Ki'ac Ka! Ka/i/as ra /jl^xP 1 to ^ Mcudvtipov SfbutrOat 'Publots vird 'Vu/Mxiajy LATER HISTORY OF LYKIA. 215 Rhodians looked on the Lykians as mere subjects ; the otar it. Lykians maintained that they were at most dependent allies. 1 It is certain that the gift did not hinder the existence of some sort of Federal union. The Lykians, even while subject to Rhodes, retained the ordinary style of a Greek Confederation ; 2 much more then must they have employed it during the earlier days of their independence. Poly- bios too, in his whole narrative of these times, constantly speaks of Lykia as a national whole. Ambassadors appear at Rhodes, Rome, and Achaia, speaking in the name of the whole Lykian people, 3 in a way which implies a commission from some central power. But the Federal Union could not as yet have been quite perfect, as we also hear of Ambassadors being sent by the single city of Xanthos, 4 which would have been quite contrary to the principles of the constitution described by Strabo. At last, after the war with Perseus, the Rhodians were no Lykia in- longer in favour at Rome ; they were deprived of their ^wT ' lately acquired continental dominions, and Lykia and Karia were declared free. 5 Now it was, doubtless, that Origin of A A the C onsti- some unknown Lykian Lykomedes, some statesman who tution had carefully studied the working of all the existing tys"rabo. Federal Governments of Greece, devised the constitution which so happily avoided all their errors. The Lykian 1 Pol. xxvi. 7. EvpwvTcu Aukiol Sefiofxevoi 'PoSiois ovk Iv Scopea, t6 Se irXelof is ° , , that Emperor took advantage to destroy this remaining vestige of ancient freedom, and to reduce Lykia, like her neighbours, to the dead level of a Roman province. Such an ending, and for such a cause, is especially sad after so bright a picture of days so very little earlier. The last Greek Federation was now no more, and many centuries were to pass by before the world was again to see so perfect a Federal system, or indeed anything worthy to be called a Federal system at all. Liberty was gone from the earth, or lingered on, in an obscure and precarious form, on the Northern shores of the Inhospitable Sea. 4 But it is a pleasing thought that, as the Achaians and the Lykians arc the nations who stand forth, in our first Homeric picture, 5 as the worthiest races of Europe and of Asia, so it was the Achaians and the Lykians who were 1 Bee Dion Caseins, xlvii. 34. - Strabo, U.S. Outw S' (vfonov^vois avrols ffwt'jStj irapA 'Poj/uo/oij f\tv- Otpois SiartAeirai, rA irdrpia vi^ovai. 3 Dion f'nssius, ix. 17. Toi/'s t* AvkIovs (rraffiA-iravTas, Ssrt ko.\ 'Pwp.alovs Tipaj dvoKTflvai, iSovKuKTarS rt ko! is rdv rrjs Tla^(pv\ias fdfiou islypatyfv. Suet. Claud. 2. r ». Lyciis ob exitiabiles iuter Be discordiae Libertatem ademit. One would like to hear the Lykian version of these troubles. Disturb- ances are sa ilj produced in a small state which a greal neighbour wishes to annex. « On the Republic of Cherson, Bee Finlay, Byz. Emp. i. 415. b On Hi" Lykians of Eo r, Bee Gladstone's Homer, i. 181. If the Homeric L Strabo, xii. 8, vol, Lii. p. 65) do not occupy Uio LATER HISTORY OF LYKIA. 21/ the last to maintain, in Europe and in Asia, the true ciiap. iv. Federal form of freedom in the face of the advances of all-devouring Rome. same geographical position as the historical Lykians, so neither do (except quite incidentally) the Homeric and the historical Achaians. But it is hardly possible that the recurrence of the two names, Lykian and Achaian, in this way can be purely accidental. CHAPTER V. ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chat. v. It is no easy task to write the history of Greek Fede- ralism with due regard at once to chronology and to geography. In my last chapter I have been obliged to carry on parts of my narrative down to a time even later than the suppression of the two great Federal Govern- ments of Greece. It seemed, on the whole, the better plan to clear off both the earlier and the minor instances of Greek Federalism, before entering on any examination of the great Leagues of Achaia and yEtolia. But there is no reason to doubt that the Federal principle was as old in Achaia and .Etolia as in any part of Greece whatsoever. The history of the Achaian League, like the history of the Boeotian League, extends over the whole period dining which we have any knowledge of Grecian affairs. But there is this important difference between the two, that by far the greater interest attaches to the earlier days of the Boeotian, and to the later days of the Achaian, League. We arc led to trace the history of Bocotia to its dishonoured close only because of the borrowed interest reflected from the earlier daysof Boeotian glory. We are led to examine into the obscure and scattered notices of the earlier days of Achaia only because of the surpassing interest which attaches to the full dcvelopcment of the great Achaian Confederation. It is natural then to CHARACTER OF LATER GRECIAN HISTORY. 219 deal with the Boeotian Confederation as a whole before chap. v. entering at all on the history of the Achaian and iEtolian Confederations. Again, the Arkadian and Olynthian Leagues were neither of them permanent ; those of Phokis, Akarnania, and Epeiros were always of minor importance ; of Lykia, as a Federal state, we should never have heard at all, save from a single notice, and that left us, not by a historian, but by a geographer. On the whole therefore it seemed the best arrangement, though at some sacrifice of chronological exactness, to deal first with all these com- paratively imperfect instances of Greek Federalism, before entering on any description of Achaian or iEtolian politics. Having now cleared off these minor examples, we are in a position to enter upon the first of the great divisions of our subject, the first great developement of the Federal principle which the world ever beheld, and which forms the main centre of the last hundred and fifty years of Old Greek independence. § 1. General Character of the History of Federal Greece. The later history of Greece has been, as it seems to me Common at least, unduly depreciated by most English scholars. England of The great work of Polybios lies almost untouched in our f j^Jfe^f Universities. The mythical books of Livy are attentively Greece. studied, while those which record the struggle between Home and Macedonia are hardly ever opened. The last great English historian of Greece ' deliberately declines entering on the Federal period of Grecian history as forming no part of his subject. In Germany the case is widely different. The student who undertakes to master this period with the help of German guides will certainly 1 Grote, xii. 529. 220 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. not have to complain of any lack in point of number. He Abundance will rather be puzzled at the difficulty of choice between writera" 111 manv candidates, and at the diversity of the paths through on the which thev will severallv offer to guide him. The im- sub J ect - p portance of this period was strongly set forth by Niebuhr, and few portions of history have ever met with a more enthusiastic and vivid narrator than the days of Alexander and his Successors have found in the eloquent pages of Droysen. 2 Every state, Macedonia, Achaia, yEtolia, Bceotia, has found in Germany its special historian. Of so vast a literature I am far from professing myself to be completely master ; but, from such acquaintance with it as I can pretend to, I may say without doubt that the English scholar will find the best portions of the best writers care- fully weighed in the balance by the unfailing accuracy and unswerving judgement of a countryman of his own. Bishop Narrative Thirlwall has continued his great task to its conclusion ThiriwaU. with unflagging powers. With him Aratos and Kleomenes are as essential a part of Hellenic story as Themistokles and Perikles. His last volume must always lie before the historian of Grecian Federalism as the best of comments on the work of the illustrious Greek Avho has handed down to us the talc, too often fragmentary, of the last days of his country's freedom. Earlier The truth is that, in reading the earlier history of Greece, we arc, for the most part, really reading little mainly the more than the history of Athens. We read events as history of . . . « . . ... \ i inns, chronicled by Athenian historians ; we turn for their illus- tration to the works of Athenian philosophers, orators, and poets. We look at everything from an Athenian point of view ; we identify ourselves throughout with that great Democracy which was the true mother of right and 1 Lectures on Ancient History, iii. o. r »2 (Eng. Tr.) <•( al. ' <;• < in' lii <■ Alexanders des Gro en; Hamburg Geschichte des Hel- lenismus, 2 vols. Hamburg: 1836. DEGRADATION OF ATHENS. 221 liberty, of art and wisdom. We trace her fortunes as chap. v. if they were the fortunes of our own land ; when we condemn her acts, we do it with that sort of reluctant feeling with which we acknowledge that our own country is in the wrong. Sparta comes before us as the rival of Athens, Macedonia as the destroyer of her greatness ; of other states we barely think from time to time as their fortunes become connected with those of the school x and ornament of Greece. In turning to " the Greece of Polybios " 2 we feel a kind of shock at finding ourselves in what is in truth another world. It is still Greece ; it is still living Greece ; but it is no longer the Greece of Thucydides and Aristophanes. The sea is there and the headlands and the everlasting hills ; Athene still stands, spear in hand, as the guardian of her chosen city ; Demos still sits in his Pnyx ; he still chooses Archons by the lot Nullity of and Generals by the uplifted hand; but the fierce t ] ie Federal Democracy has sunk into the lifelessness of a cheerless Penod - and dishonoured old age ; its decrees consist of fulsome adulation of foreign kings ; a its demagogues and orators are sunk into beggars who wander from court to court to gather a few talents of alms for the People which once received tribute from a thousand cities. 4 Philosophers still babble in her schools about truth and wisdom and virtue and valour ; but truth and wisdom and virtue 1 Time. ii. 41. EvveKwv re \4yu tqv re iraaav -n6\iv tjjs 'EAAaSos iral- Sevfftv eleai, k.t.A. 2 Grote, xii. 528. 3 Pol. V. 107. , A6r)va7oi Se . . . . twv ixkv &A\a>v 'EAkT)viKu>i> irpd^ewv ov8' dirolas /JLtTtixov, anoAovOovvres 5e rrj tCiv irpoeaTWTwi' alpiffti Kal ra?s tovtwv 6pfj.ous els TcavTas rods flacriKus l£(Kex vvTO i Ka ^ hd\i a ^ v ^ v T ^ v ;irii;iri>, .i t> linn iiiibu Grseci bellum ( t eritqua. CONTRAST OF EARLIER AND LATER GRECIAN HISTORY. 223 language itself has changed ; fastidious scholars, fresh from chap. v. the master-pieces of Attic purity, look down with con- tempt on the pages in which the deeds of Spartan and Sikyonian heroes are recorded by historians brought up in no politer schools than could be found at Megalopolis and Chairdneia. It may at once be freely admitted that the later history of Greece, " the Greece of Polybios," has nothing like the Compari- life and richness and freshness of that earlier state oftweenthe things which we may call the Greece of Thucydides. The w? er aud one still enjoyed the native freedom of youth ; the other History of Gl'66C6 at best clung to the recovered freedom of old age. The fervent lover of the earlier and fresher developement of Hellenic life is thus tempted to despise the records of a time which seems to him feeble and decrepit. Yet the recovered liberties of Achaia were a true shoot from the old stem ;* they were the reward of struggles which would not have disgraced the victors of Marathon or the victors of Leuktra ; and the very circumstances which make the later fortunes of Greece less interesting in the eyes of a purely Hellenic enthusiast make them really more in- structive in the eyes of a general student of the world's history. The early history of Greece is the history of a time when Greece was its own world, and when town- autonomy was the only form of political life known within that world. Beyond the limits of Hellas,' 2 all man- kind were Barbarians ; they were to be ruled over or to be used as instruments, they were to be flattered or to be oppressed, but they were never to be admitted as the real political equals of the meanest man of Hellenic blood. Pol. vii. 9. MaxeSovlav Kal rrju aWrju 'E\\d5a .... MaiceSoVes Ka\ twi> dWccv 'EWrjvcov oi av/uiuaxoi, k.t.X. 1 PaUS. vii. 17. 1. "Ate Ik StuSpov \f\oo^r]uefov, dvi8\drrTT](Teu tic ttjs 'EAAa'Sos to 'Axuikuv. 2 Hellas, it should be remembered, is wherever Greeks dwell, not merely Greece — »j avuex'hs 'EAAas — in the geographical sense. 224 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. Within the bounds of Hellas, the political struggle lay between single cities oligarchically governed and single cities democratically governed. In either case the in- dependent city-commonwealth was the one ruling political idea. Monarchy was unknown or abhorred ; Federalism was as yet obscure and undeveloped. The Greece of Polybios opens to us a much wider and more varied scene. Greece is no longer the whole world ; Greece proper, Character Greece in the geographical sense, is no longer the world's period ater mos t important portion. Rome and Carthage dispute the empire of the West ; Syria and Egypt dispute the empire of the East ; Greece and Macedonia stand on the edge of the two worlds, to be swept in their turn, along with all other combatants and spectators, into the common gulf of Roman dominion. But if Greece had lost her political preeminence, she had won for herself a wider and a more Wide abiding empire. The Greek language, Greek art, general spread of Q ree k civilization, were spread over the whole East, and Hellenic L culture. were before long to make a conquest only less complete of her Italian conquerors themselves. Philip, Alexander, and their Successors, the destroyers of Greek political greatness, had been everywhere the apostles of Greek , intellectual life. The age of Polybios is, in met, the age ance of when the world's destiny was fixed for ever, when the in unfver- decree of fate was finally pronounced that for all time ■alhistory, jj ul||( . s \ um \ ( \ oc the political, and Greece the intellectual, mistress of mankind It is, in its true place in universal history, a period of the very deepest and most varied and in the interest. And to the historian of the Greek race and ,'k language, as distinguished from the historian of the soil liacc - of Hellas, no period in the whole range of Grecian history assumes a deeper importance. The age of Polybios is the age which connects the Greece of Mr. Grotc with the Greece of Mr. Finlay. Philip and Alexander were in truth the founders of that Modern Greek nation which CHARACTER OF THE AGE OF POLYBIOS. 225 has lasted down to our own time. If they destroyed the ohap. v. liberties of Athens, they laid the foundation of the general Effects of A li'XUIl- intellectual dominion of Greece. By spreading the Greek der'a Con- lauguago over lands into which Greek colonization could fiU0Sts - never have carried it, they did more than any other single cause to open the way for the preaching of Christianity. In founding Alexandria, Alexander indirectly founded the intellectual life of Constantinople. By permanently Hcllenizing Western Asia, he conferred on the Empire of Constantinople its great mission as the champion of the West against the East, of Christendom against the Fire-Worshipper and the Moslem. 1 It is one of the many evil results of the shallow distinction popularly drawn between "ancient" and "modem" history that the whole later life of the Greek people, from Philip to our own day, is so utterly neglected. My present subject brings me only upon a very small portion of so vast a field. To the historian of Federalism the Polybian age is important mainly as the age of republican reaction in Greece itself against the Macedonian monarchy. And it is surely something, to put it on no other ground, to see what was the state of Greece herself in an age in which, though the freshness of her glory was gone, she was still important — no longer politically dominant, but intellectually more Character supreme than ever. The Greek history of this time iSofPoiy" more like the history of modern times ; it is less fresh bios - than that of earlier days, but it is also less uniform, and for that very reason it is more politically instructive. It is no longer morely the history of single cities ; it is the history of a complex political world, in which single cities, monarchies, and Federations, all play their part, just as they do in the European history of later times. It is a time 1 See the Edinburgh Review, vol. cv. p. 340, Art. Alexander the Great. History and Conquests of the Saracens, Chap. I. The World at the coming of Mahomet. Q 226 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. of deeper policy, of more complicated intrigues ; an age when men had lost the vigour and simplicity of youth, but had almost made up for the loss by the gain of a far more enlarged experience. Compare, for instance, the two Compari- great historians of the several periods. Thucydides never Thucy- went out of the immediate Greek world ; but for his pd**- fortunate exile, he might never have gone out of the dominions of Athens ; his reading was necessarily small ; he spoke only one language ; he knew only one form of political and civilized life. But an inborn genius, an intuitive wisdom, a life spent amid the full youth and freshness of the first of nations, sets him at once above all who have come after him in ages of greater experience. Polybios, 1 on the other hand, is like a writer of our own times ; with far less of inborn genius, he possessed a mass of acquired knowledge of which Thucydides could never have dreamed. He had, like a modern historian, read many books and seen many lands ; one language at least beside his own must have been perfectly familiar to him ; he had conversed with men of various nations, living in various states of society, and under various forms of government. He had himself personally a wider political experience than fell to the lot of any historian before or n.c. 222 or after him. The son of a statesman of Megalopolis, he could remember 2 Achaia a powerful Federation, Mace- donia a powerful monarchy, Carthage still free, Syria still 1 <»n the character of Polybios as a historian, see Mommsen, Rbmische <■■ chichte, ii. 427. 2 Whether Polybios could, strictly speaking, remember all this, depends partly on Hi" disputed question of the year of his birth. (Sec Diet, of Biog. art. Polybius.) B.o. 222 certainly seems t larly, but there is no need to ii\ it bo late as b.o. 204. The requirements on both Bides would be mi'i by such a date as b.o. 210. Bu1 even the reckoning which places his birth latest would bring all within his lift-, ami thr intcnuniiai r would bring all within the compass of his po able me ry. Tim in- telligent child of a distinguished statesman would surely have Borne under- mding <>f such an evenl as the battle <>f Zamaal the age of eigbl years. COMPARISON OF THUCYDIDES AND POLYBIOS. 227 threatening ; he lived to see them all subject provinces or chap, v. trembling allies of the great municipality of Rome. In his youth he bore to the grave the ashes of Philopoimen, b.c. 183. a Grecian hero slain in purely Grecian warfare ; he lived to secure some little fragments of Grecian freedom as b.c. 145. contemptuous alms from the Roman conqueror. A man must have lived through a millennium in any other portion of the world's history, to have gained with his own eyes and his own ears such a mass of varied political know- ledge as the historian of the Decline and Fall of Ancient Greece acquired within the limits of an ordinary life. 1 This revived life, this after-growth of Hellenic freedom, Begin- dates from about the year B.C. 280, a date marked out by nmg301 1 It is curious to see how Mr. Grote, in his depreciation of "the Greece of Polybios," looks at everything from a purely Athenian point of view. (See the close of his xcvith chapter, vol. xii. p. 527 — 30.) He sometimes almost reminds one of a remarkable passage of Polybios himself, which, to be sure, goes almost as much too far the other way. Ei 5« rripovvres rd Trpds rds irarpib'as b"iKaia Kpicrei irpa.yfj.dTwv SiecpipovTo, vbpiQomts ov ravro avixcplpov 'AOrjvaiois eli/ai Kal reus eavrSv ir6\eaiv, ov 877 irov Sid tovto KaAdcrdai Trpo56ras exPV v «"'toi)s virb Ar)jxoaOivovs' 6 5e irdvra fxerpwv trpds to rrjs iSlas irarpiSos trv/upipop ical irdvras riyov/xevos 5e7v toi)s "EA- \r)vas dirofSkeTreiv irpds 'ABiqvcuovs, €t 5e /j.tj, irpoSoVas aTroKaXeTv, dyvoelv fioi So/cet «al iro\i irapairaUiv rrjs dKrjBeias. (xvii. 14.) In Mr. Grote's view, Athens has become contemptible ; Greece is no longer the whole world ; the autonomous city is no longer the single type of Grecian government. Therefore Grecian history has come to an end ; or at all events Mr. Grote has no heart to continue it. The very passages in which Polybios (i. 3, 4. ii. 37) sets forth the greatness of his own sub- ject, the connexion of the local history of his own land with the general history of the world, are quoted to prove that Polybios himself looked on later Greece as having "no history of its own." Mr. Grote, in earlier volumes, has pointed out with delight the beginnings of a Federal system in Arkadia and at Olynthos. One might have expected him to have gone on with equal delight to trace out its full developement in Achaia. But in Mr. Grote's eyes the whole charm of Grecian history passes away with the greatness of Athens. Mr. Grote's defence of the Athenian democracy has won him such everlasting gratitude from every true student of Grecian history, that it is much to lie mourned that he should be so enamoured of that one object as to see the whole history of monarchic and Federal Greece from a distorted point of view. Q2 228 OBIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. Polybios himself x as signalized by the nearly contem- the Federal poraneous deaths of some of the greatest Princes of the Revival, r The elder form of Hellenic freedom and the mil- age. B.c. 280. versal empire of Macedonia were now alike things of the past. Those only who belonged to a generation already passing away could remember either the oratory of De- mosthenes or the conquests of Alexander. The dominions of the great conqueror were divided for ever, and the first generation of his Successors had passed away. Anti- gonos and Kassander had long been dead ; Demetrios n.c. 284-0. Poliorketes, Seleukos, Lysimachos, Ptolemy the son of Lagos and Ptolemy the Thunderbolt, 2 all died, mostly by violence, within three or four years of each other. Alexander's own line had long been extinct ; his realm was left without an heir ; usurper after usurper had seized upon the Macedonian throne ; and a scourgo more fearful than even the old Median invasion was bursting upon Macedonia and Greece alike. The storm of the Gaulish inroad swept all before it in Macedonia, but the arm of the Delphian Apollo 3 checked its progress, like that of the Persians of old, when it presumed to threaten the most venerated shrine of Greece. The fierce iEtolians, turbulent brigands as they too often showed themselves, stood forth, as before in the Lamian War, as tho true champions of Hellas. The whole barbaric host was de- stroyed or took refugo in Asia, there, strangely enough, to lcam some mcasuro of Grecian civilization, and to be thought worthy, by strangers at least, of some approxi- mation to the Grecian name. 4 After this delngo a new stato of things aroso. Its natural developcment was, it ( ratiliflh Invasion, B.C. 280- 279. B.O. 322. Recon- struction 1 Fol. ii. 41. 2 'o Ktpavi>6s, like Hamiloar Boreas and Bayezid Fildirim. Soo Thirl- w.ill, viii. l.'i. :I Pan*, i. 3. 6. viii. 10. 0. etal. Cf. II. rod. viii. 35 et s<'. n 4 GtallognBci Liv. xxxvii. R. Bee above, p. 212. BEGINNINGS OF THE FEDERAL REVIVAL. 229 may be, checked for a while by the splendid and erratic cn,u>. v. career of the one prince who seemed to have been pre- of Mace- served from the earlier period. Pyrrhos the Molossian, Greece! 11 after threatening alike Rome and Sparta, died before Argos b.o. 289- by an ignoble death. The removal of the Epeirot knight- errant left the field open for the growth of two opposing powers. Monarchic Macedonia began again to reconstruct herself, and again to aspire to dominion, under the able and ambitious prince who founded her last dynasty. 1 Antigonos Gonatas, son of Demetrios Poliorketes, and TIl °. f n . tI " D gonids in grandson of Antigonos who fell at Ipsos, secured the Macedonia. Macedonian throne. He kept it, with one short interval, 168. till his death ; he carried out the Macedonian policy during BC - 278 ~ a long reign, and transmitted his crown and his Hellenic position to four successors of his house, three of them the natural heirs of his body. In the meanwhile the scattered Revival members of the Achaian Confederation began to draw Achaian together again, and to form the centre of the revived £ "^si political life of republican Greece. It is the varying re- lations between the great Greek monarchy and the great Greek Confederation, diversified by the strange pha3no- menon of iEtolia, at once a Democratic Confederation and an aggressive tyranny, and by the brief but splendid revival of Spartan greatness, which form the staple of the history of Federal Greece. i On the position of Macedonia in this age see Droysen's Hellenismus, ii. 553. Allowance must of course he made for the writer's ultra-Mace- donian hias, just as for Mr. Grote's ultra- Athenian bias. When Droysen however goes ou to compare the progress of Macedonia in Greece with the progress of Prussia in Germany, he forgets or despises tho difference between small principalities and small republics. A German County or Bishoprick loses nothing, but rather gains, by being incorporated with a great German Kingdom ; a Greek city lost everything by being incorpo- rated with Macedonia. The sympathy which would attend the King of Italy in any attempt to recover Rome and Venice — I might add Dalmatia and the Italian Tyrol — would not extend to an attempt to annex a Swiss Canton, even of Italian speech, or to an attempt to overthrow the imme- morial liberties of San Marino. 230 OKIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. The objects of these two rival powers, the Achaiau Opposite nation and the Macedonian house, 1 were exactly opposite Macedonia to each otner - The aim of the Antigonid Kings was to and reduce as large a portion of Greece as possible under Aeliaia. i • ■ • either their immediate sovereignty or their indirect in- fluence. The aim of the Achaiau Federation was to unite the greatest possible number of Greek cities in the bonds of a free and equal League. In these later Macedonian Kings, though some of them were far from insignificant men, we must not look either for the personal greatness or for the political position of the old monarchs of the Position line of Herakles. Philip and Alexander made it their Antigonid chief boast to be the chosen leaders of a Greek Con- ° s ' federacy. And, though Athens, Sparta, and Thebes were naturally of another mind, there can be no doubt that many of the smaller cities willingly accepted their su- premacy. 2 It is true that neither Philip nor Alexander shrank from any act of severity which suited their pur- is.c. r 3is. poses. Philip destroyed Olynthos ; Alexander destroyed B.c. 335. xiiebcs ; if he expelled Tyrants from some cities, he esta- Condition .,.,,„. . , -r. , i • ,, • n ,i of Greece blishcd Tyrants in others. But during the reigns ot the rhulpand two g rctlt Kings there was no systematic interference with Alexander. th e internal independence of the Grecian cities. One or two fortresses only were held by Macedonian garrisons. The two great Athenian orators, during Alexander's life- time, discussed the whole policy of Athens and Macedonia in a way which would have been oilensive alike to Kas- sander the oppressor and to Demetrios the deliverer. The darkest times for Greece began when Alexander was 1 Polybios draws this distinction very forcibly (ii. '•'•'i): mpl Si rod rwv 'Axcum" tOvovs, Ka\ irtpi ttjs tw MaKtSuvwv ohcias. * See the passage from Polybios (rvii, U) quoted in p. 227. The Mega- Lopolitan historian, the hereditary friend of Macedonia, of course carrii matters too Gar, bul we are bo ap1 t" l""l< ^ • t everything with Athenian eyes thai it is well to stop sometimes t" consider how things seemed to < .i> • 1. 1 of other citii GREECE UNDER THE SUCCESSORS. 231 gone. The unsuccessful, though truly glorious, struggle of chap. \ . the Lamian War laid Greece far more hopelessly prostrate b.c. 323,2. at the feet of inferior masters. During the wars of the Greece Successors, Greece became one of the chief battle-fields Successors. of the contending princes. The various cities were indeed b.o. 323 often flattered and cajoled. First Polysperchon and then Demetrios — Demetrios, it may be, for a while, in all sin- cerity — gave himself out as the liberator of Greece ; but Polysperchon and Demetrios alike liberated cities only to become masters of them themselves. Generally speaking, each Greek town became a fortress to be struggled for, to be taken and retaken, by one or other of the selfish up- starts who were laying waste Europe and Asia in quarrels purely personal. At last, as we have just seen, about forty years after the death of Alexander, nearly sixty after Philip's crowning victory at Chaironeia, a more settled order began to arise out of the chaos. The field was now cleared for a second struggle between Macedonia and Greece, but between Macedonia under a new dynasty of Kings, and Greece represented by new champions of her freedom. Macedonia, lately a prize for every soldier of Position of fortune to struggle for, became, if no longer mistress of Macedonia East and West, yet at least a powerful Kingdom under !f d a settled dynasty. Greece was no longer the battle-field of B .c. 281- many contending rivals ; she had one definite enemy to 223# struggle with in the single King of Macedonia. The in- terests of Macedonian princes elsewhere, especially of the Egyptian Ptolemies, were rather linked with those of Grecian freedom. The Antigonid Kings were rivals whose power it suited them to depress, while the wise rulers of Alexandria were far too clear-sighted to attempt the acquisition of any supremacy in Greece for themselves. The history, then, of the growth of the Achaian League is the history, not only of a political struggle between Fede- ralism and Monarchy, but of a national struggle of Greece 232 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. ohap. v. against Macedonia. It is a struggle which at once recals to mind the most glorious event of our own day. The Macedonian power in Greece in some respects resembled Compari- the Austrian power in Italy ; ' but, allowing for the clif- Macedonia ference of times and manners, it was by far the less in Greece hateful of the two. The Macedonian in Greece, like with Austria in the Austrian in Italy, held part of the land in direct sovereignty, as an integral portion of his kingdom. Amphipolis and the Chalkidian peninsula were irrevocably annexed to the monarchy of Pella, and Thessaly, though nominally a distinct state, was held in a condition of de- pendence not easily to be distinguished from subjection. 2 Besides this extent of continuous territory, many strong detached points in various parts of Greece were held by Macedonian garrisons. In other cities the Macedonian King ruled indirectly through local Tyrants who held their power only through Macedonian protection. 3 Where no opportunity presented itself for any of these forms of more complete absorption, it was enough to do all that might be to prevent the growth of confederations and alliances, and to ensure that those states which still retained some legrec of independence shoidd at least remain weak and i No historical parallel is ever completely exact. Macedonia, for our presenl purpose, has strong points of analogy to Austria ; I have elsewhere pointed out resemblances between the position of Macedonia in Greece and that nf Naples in Italy— some even between Macedonia and Piedmont itself, odor, | Essays, 1857, p. 1.14. - Seeabove, p. 154. Bee Dem. PhiL iii. 42. Cf. Ait. vii. 12. 7. Kpa- itpcp hi ... . hi' the Hellenic Confederacy of which he was the elective head. :i Pol. i\. 29. Ta 7« (X7\v Kacradftipw Kal Ai\p.r)Tp[u> irfirpay/ifva, Yovara, t/s uuk oTSfi' ; . . . wv oi /xiv &/xuipoy liroirfaav rod ttjs 56fxaTns. The whole speech of the ^Etolian Chlaineas, where these words occur, Bhould be studied as 8 powerful ramming up of the inti Mao donias i COMPARISON OF MACEDONIA AND AUSTRIA. 233 disunited. 1 This had been of old the policy of Sparta ; it chap. v. was the policy of all the Macedonian Kings ; it is equally the policy of tyrants in our own time, when we see the despots alike of Paris and Vienna gnashing their teeth at every accession of strength to the free Italian Kingdom. The establishment of the Antigonid dynasty seems to have been accompanied by a special impulse given to the worst of all these forms of oppression ; Antigonos Gonatas is described as relying more than any of his predecessors on the indirect way of ruling through local Tyrants. 2 We can well believe that this last condition was far worse than incorporation with the Macedonian Kingdom, worse even than the presence of a Macedonian garrison. So in our own times, the Austrian annexation of Venice, the French occupation of Rome, have not involved the same permanent horrors as the local tyrannies of Parma and Xaples. But the rule of Macedonia, sharp as the scourge doubtless was, was certainly in some respects less irksome than the rule of Austria. It was not so com- pletely a rule of strangers. The Macedonian Kings, and doubtless their subjects too, at least studiously claimed to be Greeks ; whatever the merits of the claim, it was prominently put forward on all occasions. 3 If not Greek 1 All this -will be found drawn out at length by Polybios (h. 41). The words of the historian speaking in his own person cpiite bear out the rhetorical expressions of the iEtolian orator just quoted. 2 Pol. ii. 41. UXfiarovs yap St) povapxovs ovros ['Avriyovos] e/j.8pos Kal ol a E\\r)i>es. Arr. ii. 2. 4, 5. i. 16. 11. cf. 10. Isokrates fully recognizes Philip as a Greek (Phil. 10), but a Greek reigning over foreigners, (ovx 6/xo»jfd yap xpf/yai ere 234 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. by blood — and Philip and Alexander at least were Greek by blood — they were rapidly becoming Greek in language and intellectual culture. Doubtless it was a poor sub- stitute for the true independence of old times for the Greek to be able to say that his master was half a country- man ; but it at least makes a wide difference between the lot of Greece under the half-Greek Macedonian, and the lot of Italy under the wholly foreign Austrian. 1 Greece indeed soon found that Macedonia was far from being her worst enemy. During the Avhole of this period, ever since the Gaulish invasion, Macedonia at least efficiently discharged the functions of a bulwark of Greece against the restless barbarians on her northern frontier. And the time at last came when the Macedonian King was felt to be the champion of Greece in a truer sense than when Alexander marched forth to avenge Hellenic wrongs upon the Persian. Every patriotic Greek must have sympathized with the Macedonian nation, if not with its contemptible King, in the final struggle between Perseus and Rome. Through the whole history our feelings lie, naturally and rightly, against Macedonia and for republican Greece. But there is no reason for looking upon Macedonia with any special abhorrence, or for representing her Kings as rods ix(t>"E\\rivas fvepyer^v, ManeSovoiv Sk fiaaiXevftv, twv 5e fiapfidpaiv us ■KKflarov &px ilv t «.t.\. (§ 178). Ho was t<> conquer barbarians to give them the advantages of a Greek roaster. Cf. also Isuk. Archid. 61. Ait. ii. 7. 7—9. 1 I am of course speaking here solely of the modern sway of the so- called "Emperors of Austria," nol of the old Teutonic Caesars, whose [mperiaJ title and bearings they venture to assume. Otto, Henry, and the Fredericks were Emperors of the Romans and Kings of Italy, recog- nized byall Italians, zealously supported by many. Frederick the Second, Hi,, greatesl of them all, was himself an Italian by birth, language, and i, ,,,|„ i. nt j his Italian home was ever the dwelling-place of bis choice. I ho [mperiaJ chum i doubtless gradually dried up into a mere legal fiction, i, ui even a legal fiction is something different from the high-handed iti..n of modern Austria* OBJECTS OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. 2.5.J perfect monsters, or even as barbarian invaders. The okap. v. Great Alexander, with all his faults, still stands forth, alongside of the Great Charles, among the heroes of whom human nature is proud. And, taking the common standard of royal virtue, 1 the merits of Antigonos Gonatas and Antigonos Doson will assuredly not fall below the average. In extending their dominions and their influence they did but follow the natural instinct of their class, and Anti- gonos Doson at least sinned far less deeply in accepting Akrokorinthos than Aratos and the Achaian Congress sinned in offering it. The object of the Achaian League, on the other hand, Generous was the union of all Peloponnesos, or, it may be, of all Achaian Greece, into a free and equal Democratic Confederation. Lea S ue * Such at least was the wide scope which it assumed in the days of its fullest developement, under Aratos, Philo- poimen, and Lykortas. And surely no nobler vision ever presented itself to a Hellenic statesman. We shall soon see but too clearly the defects in the general constitution of the League, and the still greater defects in the personal character of its great leader. But the general objects of both were as wise, generous, and patriotic as any state or any man ever laboured to effect. Other Greek statesmen had worked mainly for the mere aggrandizement of their own cities ; Perikles lived for Athens, Agesilaos for Sparta, Epameinondas for Thebes ; but the worthies of Sikyon and Megalopolis spent and were spent in the still nobler cause of Hellas. And they came at the right time. From An earlier one point of view we may be tempted to regret that their men t Jf lot had not been cast in an earlier day, and that an effec- ^q^cc 111 tive Federal System had not been long before established not desirable. : 1 "The station of kings is, in a moral sense, so unfavourable, that those who are least prone to servile admiration should be on then guard against the opposite error of an uncandid severity. " Hallam's Constitu- tional History, ch. x. vol. i. p. 647, ed. 1846. 236 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. in Greece. The establishment of such a system might indeed have saved Greece from many evils ; but it was at once utterly impossible and, in the general interests of the world, utterly undesirable. How impossible it was we see by the whole tenor of Grecian history, by the nullity of the Amphiktyonic Council, by the failure of attempts, like that of Lykoniedes, to establish even partial Federal Unions, by the little which, after all, Aratos and his successors were able actually to effect. And, if it had been possible, it was no less clearly undesirable. A Federal system in the days of Athenian and Spartan greatness might have spared Greece the miseries of Athenian and Spartan warfare ; it might have saved her from Macedonian conquest ; * it might even have warded off, or at least delayed, her ultimate subjection to Rome. But Greece united in a Federal bond could never have becomo the Greece which has challenged the love and admiration of all succeeding ages. The brilliant devclope- ment of Hellenic greatness, alike in war, in politics, in art, in eloquence, and in poetry, was inseparably linked to the system of independent city-commonwealths. The dissensions and the wars of Greece are tho prico which .she paid for becoming the world's teacher for all time. Again, had Greece never sunk beneath the armed force of Macedonia and Home, she would never have won the Macedonian and the Roman as the permanent apostles of her civilization and intellectual life. It was well that Greece was disunited ; it was well that Greece was con- quered ; but it was well also that she should revive, if only for a moment, to give the world the first great ex- Effect ,i limbic of a political teaching of yet another kind. Greece fcheLeague. j i;i( j {l i rt , a( iy ( i onc Qer wor fe ;IS (]„. |;„, ( l () f autonomous 1 Droysen, Elellenismus, ii. 508. H&tte rich i\iinrov Suvaffreias aAAoTe /uei/ &AAcos ^xcopej t& irpdyfxaT avrols Hard tos irepiardcrfis, t6 ye fj.r)v koiv6v ■jroKlrevna, KaOdirep upiJKa/J.€V, ei> Sr)f.ioKpaTii> Na.vira.KTov 6fxu>ixoKei> AitoiA.o?j irapa5a5 twv fStKriffTtov 4k ttjs 'A\aias, 4v- Swaffrevet 6 'ETrap-ivcovSas, dSsTe fj,-f) (pvyaSevffai robs Kparlffrovs, /x-qTe tto\i- Tiiav /xiTaffT7)ffai, &C. 3 lb. vii. 1. 41 — 3. Grote, x. 365. Helwing, Geschichte des Ach- Bundes, p. 225. 4 Pseudo-Dem. w.t.w. 'AAe£. 12. 'Axatol (x\v ol iv UeKonovpriffai iS^fxoKpa- tovvto, Tovruiv 5' iv TlfW-fivri vvv Ka.Ta\4\vKe rov firj/xov 6 MaKeSwis e/cjSaA.cie r<2v ttoAitwv tovs irKsiffrovs, ra. 5' tKelvow ro7s oIkstclis StSooKe, Xaipaiva Si rbv TraXaiffTrju Tvpuvvov eyKariffrrifffv. Pans. vii. 27. 7. KareKvcre [Xaipaiv] iroXirelav, €/j.o\ 5oKt7v, tt)c ef TleXKrfvr), Swpov t6 tirKpOovooTarov irapa 'A\c£dv5pov tov $i\hnrov \a/3v, rvpavvos TrarpiSos ttjs- chJtoD KaraffTfjvai. This Chairon could not therefore be, as Dr. Elder (Diet. Biog. art. Chseron) thinks, the same as the Chairon who is mentioned by Plutarch (Alex. 3), for the latter was a citizen of Megalopolis, while both Pausanias and Athenaios distinctly mark Chairon tbe Tyrant as a citizen of Pellene. E 242 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. to the community of goods and women. 1 How Pellene had offended the Macedonian King Ave know not, but it appears that the establishment of the tyranny was accom- panied by the expulsion of a large proportion of the citizens." This seems to mark some special ground of quarrel with the particular city of Pellene ; for Alexander would hardly have thus punished a single town for the share which all Achaia had taken in the resistance to his father at Chaironeia. 3 The presence of this domestic Tyrant prevented Pellene from joining with the other Achaian cities in the movement against the Macedonian dominion b.c. 330. set on foot by Agis, King of Sparta. 4 After the disastrous battle in which Agis fell, the Achaians and Eleiaus are said to have been condemned, by the anomalous body which then issued decrees in the name of Greece, to pay a hundred talents as indemnity to Megalopolis, which had embraced the Macedonian cause and had stood a siege at the hands of the allies. 5 The establishment of Chairon by Alexander was the beginning of the system which was more fully carried out by the succeeding Macedonian Kings. Kassander held several of the cities with his garrisons, which were driven out by Aristodemos the 1 Athen. xi. 119. XaLpaiv 6 U(\\T)ueds, Ss ov )x6vov TWdtuivi. iax^o-Kiv, dKAa Kal HtvoKpdrti, Kal ovtos ovv rijs irarpiSos irucpus Tvpavv^aas ov fiovov rovs dplo-Tovs tu>v -noKnwv i^Kaotv, d\\d Kal rois TovTwvSovAot? rd KTifaara twv 5to~woT x a P l(T( ^l J - el ' 05 > Ka ^ TaJ tKtivwv ywcuKas o~ui>(pKio~e wpos yd/tov Koiuwviav' tout' u>i'. 2 Pseudo-Dem. u.s. 3 PaUS. vii. 6. 5. Tov fiif iv Xaipwvtla 4>i\'nnrov r ivdvrta Kal MaK(S6voiv [iroKt/xov] ol 'Axa.iol ixir(ax ov - ' .]'. -i h. Kti'S. 165. 'HAe?oi 8' avro?s [AaKfSatfxoyiois] o-v/x/x€Tf0d\ovTo Kal 'Axttwl irdvTfs irKifv X\t\\r)va'ivib' l >iov. Thai : . All tender's synod a1 Corinth. See above, p. 129. \'\ i< is possible thai Dioddroa may bare too bare been dreaming of the Amphiktyons. ACHAIA UNDER THE SUCCESSORS. 243 general of Antigonos from Patrai, Aigion, and Dyme. 1 chap. v. In the case of Patrai and Aigion, this expulsion is spoken b.o. 314. of by our informant as a liberation, 2 but the Dymaians ,' in ,i, r the resisted the liberators in the cause of what the same Succ historian calls their independence. 3 Whatever we make of this language, it at least points to a difference of political feeling in the different cities. Demetrios also, in the days when the son of the King of Asia gave him- self out as the champion of Grecian freedom, expelled Kassander's garrison from Boura, and gave to that city b.c. 303. also something which is spoken of as independence. 4 But when Demetrios became King of Macedonia, he seems to b.c. 294. have walked in the way of his predecessors, and both he and his son Antigonos are mentioned among the princes under whom some of the cities were occupied by Macedonian garrisons and others by local Tyrants. 5 At what moment under Antigonos the League definitely fell asunder it is hard to say : the Gonatas, process, doubtless, was gradual; but as Antigonos Gonatas 6 3^*288. is mentioned among the Kings who had a hand in the evil work ; and, as it was at no very advanced stage of his 1 Diod. xix. 66. J lb. TlaTpas fxev rfXevOepwae .... rots Alyievcri kcltcL 56y/j.a rrjv £\ev- Oeplav /3ov\6/j.tvos diroKaraffTTjffai. 3 lb. TlapaKa\(cravT€s dW-fiXovs dvTex i(T ^ al T '? s avTOVOfxlas. 4 lb. xx. 103. Arifx-^TpLos .... Bovpav fxev icard Kpdros eiXe, Kal toIs TTo\iTais dirfSwKe rrjv avrovofjiiav. 5 Pol. ii. 41. Pausanias (vii. 7. 1) strangely says that no Achaian city but Pellene was ever under a Tyrant, seemingly confounding the time of Alexander with that of the Antigonids ; rvpdvvcav re ydp tr\iiv T\<-W-fivr)s at &\\ai 7ro'\€is rdv xP^ yov <" ra,/Ta direlpais icrx^Keaav. 6 Antigonos Gonatas first began to play a prominent part during his father's lifetime, about B.C. 288, when he was left in command of Demetrios' garrisons in Greece. This was probably the time when Antigonos com- pleted the dissolution of the League. Its complete dissolution is ex- pressed by Polybios (ii. 40, 41) in the words Kard tt6\iv StaAvOevros rov tuv 'Ax' edvovs inrd twv e'/c MaKeSovias QaaiKeuiv. The formula 4k MaKedovias may well express Demetrios and Antigonos when they were not in actual possession of the Macedonian throne. Cf. Niebuhr, Lect. on Anc. Hist. iii. 259, Eng. Tr. Strabo, viii. c. 7. (vol. ii. p. 220). R 2 cities. 244 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. reign that the cities began again to draw together, it Final Dis- would seem that the period of complete isolation cannot the old have been very long, and that the work of reunion must League. naye b een found proportionably easy. Twelve The twelve cities of the original League, as enumerated by Polybios, 1 were Helike, Olenos, Patrai, Byrne, Pharai, Tritaia, Leontion, Aigeira, Pellene, Aigion, Boura, and Keryneia. Of these Helike seems to have been originally the chief ; its great temple of Poseidon 2 was the seat of the religious meetings of the Achaian people, and the city was Loss of probably also the seat of the Federal Government/ But r B#a 373] Helike was swallowed up by an earthquake, and its site and of covered by the sea, long before the dissolution of the old League. 4 Olenos also was deserted by its inhabitants 5 at some time before the revival of the League, so that ten cities only were left. Of these, since the loss of Helike, Aigion was the greatest. It was the seat of the Federal Govern- ment under the revived League in the very latest times, 7 as 1 Pol. ii. 41. s See Strabo, 1. viii. c. 7. p. 220. Fans. vii. 24. 5. 3 Not necessarily, tor Kon'meia was the religious centre of Bccotia, while Thebes was the political head. 4 Pans. vii. 24. (I, el seqq. Strabo, n.s. Pol. ii. 41. This destruction is by I'ausanias ascribed t" the wrath of Poseid6u at some suppliants being dragged awaj from his altar. In this, as Bishop ThirlwaU (viii. 88) says, "we perceive a symptom of some violent political agitation." " Bee Leake, Morea, ii. lf>7. ThirlwaU, viii. 90. The expression <>f Strain), ov , as usual, right. Had Olenos remained as a considerable city during the time of the see i League, we could hardly fail to have come across some mention of it in the historj of Polybios. Ami Polybios him- veil distinctly Implies that Olenos had perished before his day. ii. 41. tovto 5' t)v Ik Scititita iriiKewv, , cn)5' aSs vTraKovffai. If one can trust the details of such a story, the word ne^ai might imply that the Federal Assembly was in session, and not at Helike. - Pol. ii. 41. See Clinton, Fast. Hell. ii. 204. 246 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. Grecian states, and as was done in after times on the accession of fresh cities to the League. 1 Of the circum- stances of their union we know nothing ; Polybios does not mention the presence either of garrisons or of Tyrants in these particular cities ; his words might seem rather to imply that they were free from either scourge, but only that the circumstances of the time had led to an opposition of feelings and interests among them. 2 As to the next stages of the process the historian is more ex- plicit. Aigion had a garrison, Boura and Keryneia were Union of ruled by Tyrants. Five years after the union of Patrai rB?°275 ] an d Dyme, the people of Aigion themselves expelled their Boura, garrison and joined the Union. Boura was freed, and its Tyrant slain, by the people of the city, aided by their already liberated brethren. 3 Iseas, the Tyrant of Kery- neia, watching the course of events and seeing that he would probably be the next attacked, voluntarily sur- rendered his power, and, having obtained security for his and Kery- own safety, he annexed his city to what Polybios, now neia. , for the first time, calls by the proud title of the Achaian League. 4 Extension Seven cities were now in strict union ; we know not the f 4 1 League to steps by which the two eastern towns of Aigeira and all Achaia. p£H cll g Averc recovered, but their annexation could not 1 PoL ii. 41. oi55e (0rj iraaas rds tt6\(is x (a P lA'Aep7ias ecrKeSdir9Ti in Pol. xl. 3. Cf. v. 94, for a similar phrase about another town. Strabo (vol. iii. p. 224) says that each of the original twelve rities consisted of eighteen B-fj^oi. 248 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. CHAP. T. Quiet and peaceful growth of the League, B.C. 280- 251. cities had time to strengthen their habits of freedom and good government, to develope their political constitution, and gradually to prepare themselves for the day when their League was to step forward as the general champion of Grecian freedom and as one of the great political lights of Greece and the world. Names of indivi- duals. Markos of Keryueia. B.o. 255. B.C. 229. Markos jiroLalily the truo Founder of the League. During this time there are only two names of individuals which we can connect with the course of our history ; these are two citizens of the small town of Keryueia, Iseas and Markos. Of neither of them is much recorded, but quite enough to make us wish that we knew more. Of Markos we shall hear again, and always honourably ; Polybios gives his whole career the highest praise ; * twenty years after his first appearance he was chosen the first sole General of the League ; 2 twenty-six years later still, the noble old man, still in the active service of his country, perished in a sea-fight against the pirates of Illyria.' 1 But it is the earlier exploits of Markos which we desire to know more in detail. He would almost appear to have been the Washington of the original League, though his fame has been obscured by the later and more brilliant services of Aratos. A day came when the deliverance of Boura seemed a small matter compared to the deliverance of Sikyon and Akrokorinthos ; but, in the day of the deliverance of Boura, that small success was of greater moment than the greatest successes of later and more prosperous times. The very name of the hero, Italian rather than Greek,* raises curiosity as to his origin and history. He was a citizen of* Keryueia, but we find 1 PoL ii- 10. MapKos 6 Kfpvvtdv, dvijp irdfra rd SlKctia rep Koivtp rwv 'Axa-'wv ■noKtrtuft.aTt 7rt7roi7jK(<)s M*XP' '"fl* KaTatrrpixpijs. » Pol. ii i ••. :i Pol. ii. 10. i Brand tatei (GeBchichte iEtoliens, 202) makes the true form Mdpyos and not MdpKns. But would not Metros be a name quite as strange "ii other grounds 1 I follow Thirlwall and l'.ld Greece between the fall of the PeiBistratids and the age of the Successors. Euphrdn at Sikyon and Timophams at Corinth are the most famous exceptions. The Thessalian Tyrants have perhaps more in common with the Tyrannies of the later period, of which they maj be Looked irj as the beginning. i Bee above, p. 22. I do not a a thi gain of substituting, with Mr. Grote, the word " Deapol " fox "T.\ rant" ae the translation of the Greek Ttipawos. Whichever we use musl be used in a Ixed technical sense, differing some- whal from its usual i lern meaning, Europe now contain! several 1 1. pol . bul only one rdpavvot. EARLIER AND LATER TYRANNIES. 251 and familiar ; though hereditary dynasties were seldom ciiap. v. founded, yet many cities were under the government of several Tyrants in uninterrupted succession ; republican government may often have been unknown to two or three generations of citizens. 1 In such an age, a man ambitious of power, and to whom no nobler way of obtaining it presented itself, may have grasped at the Tyranny as his only path to greatness, without the least intention of in- flicting any wanton oppression upon his countrymen. 2 It is clear that there were the same sort of differences among the Greek instruments of Macedonia as we have seen in our own times among the Italian instruments of Austria. 3 No fair person would confound the government of the deposed rider of Tuscany with the government of the deposed ruler of Naples. But Greece saw, what Italy has not seen, Tyrants prudent and noble-minded enough to lay down the Tyranny of their own will, and honestly to adapt themselves to a change which they could not, and may not have wished to, avert. Such was the noble Lydiadas of Megalopolis, whom we shall soon meet with as one of the brightest glories of the League. Such may i When Aratos delivered Corinth in B.C. 243, the Corinthians had not had the keys of their own city since the time of Philip — ninety-five years. Pint. Arat. 23. 2 "The Tyrants consisting of his [Antigonos Gonatas'] partisans were men of very different characters : some were moderate and bearable persons, while others were extremely cruel." Niebuhr, Lect. on Anc. Hist. iii. 259. 3 An objection may be brought against a parallel between the Greek Tyrants and " legitimate " rulers like the deposed Italian Princes. But all the dynasties lately reigning in Italy reigned only by virtue of treaties contracted by foreign powers, to which those who alone were concerned were no parties. The Princes of Lorraine, though one of them was probably the best despot that ever reigned in Europe, had really less right in Tuscany than the old Visconti had in Milan. This sort of legitimacy was something quite unknown in old Greece, and I cannot help thinking that if a specimen had appeared, whether in the form of an individual ruler or a whole dynasty, Greek political thinkers would have set it down as a case of Tvpavvis rather than of lawful fiaaiKtia. 252 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. well have been Iseas of Keryneia in its earlier clays. And it must have required yet greater -vigour in Iseas to set such an example ' than it required in Lydiadas, a gene- ration later, to follow it. For Iseas, when alarmed for the security of his power, did not fly, as many a meaner tyrant has done, and leave his city to its fate ; he did not ask his royal patron for support against the encroaching spirit of freedom ; he laid down his power, and, trusting to the faith of the Confederate cities, he himself annexed Keryneia to the League. 2 Of his subsequent career we know nothing; Polybios does not tell us whether Iseas, like Lydiadas and Alistomachos, lived to know how much really greater is the position of the republican magistrate than that of the despotic prince. But the conduct of Iseas shows a prudence or a magnanimity, or rather an union of the two, which at once stamps him as no common man. And it is honourable to the otherwise insignificant town of Keryneia to have produced the only two men whose names we know during this first period of the League's history, and both of them men of whom the little that we know makes us anxious for a more intimate knowledge. i I know of only one clear exempli' of a Greek Tyrant in the earlier period willingly surrendering his power. This is Cadmos, Tyrant of K6s, contemporary wiili Hi" Persian War, who gave up his Tyranny — IftaJj* re tlvai Kal Sftvov (-kiAvto-; ovSfvds, aAAcL dir6 SiKaiocrwris ^s /xtaov Kyotcri Kara- 0th rrju apxfa (Herod, vii. 164). II'' our Keryneian Tyrant. Mr. Bunbury says thai [seas "judged it prudenl to provide for his personal safety by voluntarily abdicating the sovereign power, whereupon Ceryneia immediately joined the achaians," as if Isms had no hand in uniting Ceryneia with the League. Now the words of Polybios (ii. Hi BXe a7ni0<7icj>or tt)p apx^f xa\ Aa0cif t& irimd irapd twv '\X ai <*v inrlp ttj* dffaA«i'as irpostOriKf ttjv irSAtu ttjkW ti) rajf 'Axaioiv (Tv(m)p.a. This surely implies thai Isms, just like Lydiadas, was himself tin- chiei promoter of t ho union. THE ACHAIAN CONSTITUTION. 253 § 3. Of the Achaian Federal Constitution. It must have been in the course of these years, during which the League was growing up in peaceful obscurity, that that Federal Constitution was formed which was after- wards extended over so large a portion of Greece. As usual, however, we have to frame our account of it from incidental notices, from general panegyrics, and from records of particular changes in detail. We cannot lay our hands on any one document, on any Declaration of Independence, on any formally enacted Federal Con- stitution, to act as a decisive authority in our inquiries. We may console ourselves with the thought that an inquirer at any equal distance of time will have to frame his picture of the British Constitution from information of exactly the same kind. Certainly he will not find any one authoritative document clearly setting forth the powers of King, Lords, and Commons, or exactly defining the Prerogative of the Crown, the Privilege of Parliament, and the Liberty of the Subject. Still less will he find any such document setting forth such hardly less important points as the nature of Government and of Opposition, or explaining the exact constitution of the Cabinet and the functions of the Leader of the House of Commons. But, though no such document has survived to our time, we have every reason to believe that the Achaian Constitution, unlike the British Constitution, was enacted and recorded by public authority. The first union of the four towns was looked on as a mere revival of the old League, pro- bably on the laxer terms of union on which that old League seems to have been formed. We have seen that it did not hinder Patrai from acting independently of his confederates in the Gaulish War 1 just as we saw Pellene, 1 See above, p. 247. ciiAr. v. 254 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. CHAP. V. Probable enactment of the Federal Constitu- tion, b.c. circa 274. Sources of Informa- tion. The Con- stitution formed for the Achaian Towns only. under the old League, acting independently of its con- federates in the Peloponnesian War. 1 Such a course would have been contrary to every principle of the Federal Constitution in the days of its maturity. Most probably, when all the surviving Achaian towns were reunited, the union was intentionally made more intimate, and its terms were enacted and recorded by common consent. 2 No such document however is preserved to us ; and we have to form our ideas of the Achaian Constitution chiefly from the incidental notices and general comments of Polybios, and from such further incidental notices as are to be found in writers like Plutarch, Pausanias, and Strabo. Polybios unfortunately does not begin his detailed narrative till a later period, when in truth the most interesting portion of the League's history had passed by. Of its foundation and its earlier fortunes he gives a mere sketch, but it is a sketch for which we may well be thankful, a sketch clear and masterly as might be looked for from such a hand. We have abundant evidence to show that the Federal Constitution was formed while the League still embraced only the small towns of the original Achaia. The greater cities which afterwards joined the Union were admitted into a body the relations and duties of whose members were already fixed and well understood. This will plainly appear, if only from one or two points in the constitution which were suited only to the circumstances of the original Achaian towns, ami which were found to be a source of inconvenience, and even of unfairness, when the Union was extended over a wider territory. Demi The whole constitution of the League was Democratic. ,','" Polybios constantly praises it as the truest and purest of V 1 ""' all Democracies. 8 Yet we shall soon sec that, Democracy 1 Bee above, p. 240. - Thirlwall, "iii. 80, 00. Pol n 88. 'Iirrjyopi'a^ /f«) 7ra^7jrr/aj Ko) HaOAXov Zr)fXOKparias a\r)8ivrj? DEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF THE LEAGUE. 255 in Achaia was practically a very different thing from chap. v. Democracy at Athens. It is possible that Polybios might have looked upon the constitution of Athens as an Ochlo- cracy as opposed to the true Democracy of his own land. But the fact rather is that in theory Achaia was as strictly democratic as Athens, but that the circumstances of the League unavoidably tempered the Achaian Democracy in practice in a way in which nothing occurred to temper the Athenian Democracy. In both alike the sovereign power was vested in a Popular Assembly, in which every free citizen had an equal right to attend, speak, and vote. In Differences between both alike the People, and the People alone, enacted laws, Achaian elected magistrates, contracted alliances, declared war and A n t } ien i an peace. But in Achaia conditions which never arose at Dem °- cracy. Athens modified this popular sovereignty in many ways. Far greater legal power was placed in the hands of par- ticular magistrates. Far greater power of an indirect, though not an illegal, kind was thrown into the hands both of magistrates and other leading men. The Assembly indeed always remained the supreme and undisputed authority, but the powers even of that sovereign body would have appeared sadly curtailed in the eyes of a democrat whose ideas were formed solely on Athenian models. The constitution of the League was strictly Federal. The Federal form of government now appears in its fullest and purest shape. Every city remained a distinct State, sovereign for all purposes not inconsistent with the higher sovereignty of the Federation, retaining its local Assemblies and local Magistrates, and ordering all ex- clusively local affairs without any interference from the central power. There is no evidence that the Federal Government, in its best days, ever directly interfered with cniKei> airo7s vo/j.o6£tt)v). It was however by no means the policy of Antigonos to break through constitutional forms, ami we may fairly conclude thai Prytanis was named by the King at the request of tin- Megalopolitana themselvea His 1. ■_ lation however only gave rise to fresh disputes, and at last Aratos was ien1 by decree of the Federal Assembly (koto t6 rwv 'hxuitHv b~6y/xa) to reconcile the contending parties, which he effectually did. Here again there was no breach of the cantonal rights of Megalopolis. Aratos acted implj a b mediator. The two parties agreed on certain conditions, which the City of Megalopolis, no! the Federal Government, caused to be engraved <>n a pillar in one of its temples. (i(\> oh (Arj!,av ttjs Trpos dAAiJAovs Siatyopas, ypdtpavrts tir o~tSiAi)v dvidtoav.) ■ I'ol. iv. 18. 4 Plut. At. 44. 'hparos Si ffTparrjyds alptBfh inr' 'Apytlwv t-rrticrtv adroit, k.t.a. ■'■ Bee above, p. 2 17. '■ Plut Phil 18. 7 inhabitants appear to have had no direct share in the chap. v. general Federal citizenship. We have seen this sort of relation among the aristocracies of Boeotia ; we shall meet with it again among the Swiss Cantons, aristocratic and democratic alike. But one would hardly have expected to find it amid the Equality and Fraternity of the Achaian League. But the toleration of such inequalities is really a necessary deduction from the doctrine of the sove- reignty of each State within its own limits, just like the toleration of the " domestic institution" of the Southern States of America by a Federation which scrupulously excludes the word Slave from its own Constitution. But, though the several cities remained internally independent, we cannot doubt that their close union for all external purposes strongly tended to assimilate them to one another in their internal constitution and laws. It can hardly be supposed that the political constitution of any member of the League was other than democratic. We see the same phenomenon in the United States. The Federal Con- Tendencies stitution merely provides that each State shall have a latum™ 1 republican government ' and shall not grant titles of V, mn \ s tbe 1 ° & Members nobility ; 2 within these limits it may be as oligarchic or of League, as democratic as it pleases. Any State that chose might Achakand transact all its affairs in a primary Assembly like those Amenca - of Athens or Schwytz, and might give its chief magistrate no higher powers than those of an Athenian Archon. Or it might, as far as appears, make as near an approach to monarchy as would be implied in the creation of a Polish King or a Venetian Doge. For the existence of those Princes was never held to destroy the claim of Venice much as if it had been a kc^utj inpioiKts of Corinth, b. viii. c. 6 (vol. ii. p. 214). tf Landed property, in the other cities of the League. 3 But it is hardly likely that an Achaian citizen could, as a citizen of the United States can, exchange at 1 Smith's Comparative View of the Constitutions of the Several States, &c (Philadelphia, 1796). Tables i. & il " \n. i. § 2. I. Cf. § t. i. :| Thus much a1 least seems implied in the words imKiTtta and f) will, or after a short time of residence, the franchise of chap. v. his native State for that of another. 1 But the tendency to assimilation among the several cities was very strong. In the later days of the League it seems to have developed with increased force, till at last Polybios could say 2 that all Peloponnesos differed from a single city only in not being surrounded by a single wall. The whole peninsula employed the same coinage, weights, and measures, and was governed by the same laws, administered by the same magistrates, senators, and judges. But while the Achaian Constitution strictly respected the local rights of the several cities, it in no wise allowed their local sovereignty to trench upon the higher sove- reignty of the League. The Achaian League was, in The German technical language, a Bundesstaat and not a mere ,^f e a JStaateiibimd. 3 There was an Achaian nation, 4 with a National ( rovern- national Assembly, a national Government, and national ment. Tribunals, to which every Achaian citizen owed a direct allegiance. The whole language of Polybios shows that every Achaian citizen stood in a direct relation to the Federal authority, and was in full strictness a citizen of the League itself, and not merely of one of the cities which composed it. The Achaian cities were not mere municipalities, but sovereign commonwealths. 5 But in all external matters, in everything which concerned the whole Achaian body and its relations to other powers, the 1 Aratos, as we have seen (p. 256), was once elected chief magistrate of Argos, but this was in a moment of great political excitement, and the fact hardly proves that a less distinguished Sikyouian could have held the office in an ordinary year. 2 See the famous passage, ii. 37. The identity there spoken of seems to me merely to express the result of the assimilation spoken of in the text. It need not imply any compulsory introduction of uniformity, still less any extension of the powers of the Federal body in later times. 3 Helwing, p. 237. See above, p. 11. Of. Tittmann, p. 675. 4 "Edvos. See above, pp. 13, 184. 5 In Greek phrase, ir6\eis and not 8ij,uo«. S 2 260 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. cnAr. v, No inde- pendent Diplo- matic Action in the several Cities. Compari- son with America. Federal Government reserved to itself full supremacy. No single citv could, of its own authoritv, make peace or war, or commission Ambassadors to foreign powers. But it would appear that the separate action of the several cities was not quite so rigidly limited in the last respect as it is in the American Union. The cause of the difference is obvious. The American States, before their union into a Federal Republic, had been mere Colonies, mere dependencies of a distant Kingdom. Independent diplomatic action was something to which they had not been accustomed, and which they could cheerfully do without. It was a great advance in their condition when the right of acting on their behalf in dealings with other nations was transferred from a King over whom they had no control to a Federal President in whose appointment they themselves had a share. But the cities of the Achaian League, those at all events which lav beyond the limits of the original Achaia, had been, before their union, absolutely independent powers, accustomed to carry on wars and negotiations in their own names without reference to any superior authority. Even the rule of a Tyrant did not destroy this sort of independence ; a single citizen indeed usurped powers which belonged of right to (lie whole body of citizens, but they were not transferred to any individual or any Assembly beyond the limits of the city. When the Tyrant was overthrown, this power, with the other powers which he had seized on, at once reverted to the people of the city. The right of direct intercourse with foreign powers is one of the last which an independent citv or canton is willing to sur- render to any central power, as we may sec by the history of both the Swiss ami the Dutch Confederations. For Sikyfln, or Mantineia, or Megalopolis to forego this high attribute of sovereignty, and to entrust, powers which it had once exercised without restraint to an Assembly in NO DIPLOMATIC ACTION IN THE STATES. 261 which it had only one voice among many, was really no chap. v. small sacrifice for the public good. It is rather to be wondered at that it was so easily surrendered by so many Peloponnesian cities, and that the loss was for the most part so peaceably acquiesced in. But while an Ambas- Restriction sador sent to or from New York or South Carolina is ^AchaT* a thing unheard of, an Ambassador sent to or from Corinth or Megalopolis was a thing rare indeed, and perhaps irregular, but not absolutely without precedent. The Corinthians, after their union with the League, b.c. 22s. received separate Ambassadors from Rome, 1 before Rome was dangerous. They came indeed on a purely honorary errand ; another embassy had transacted the political business between Rome and the League ; still, whether of right or of special permission, the single city of Corinth did give audience to the Ambassadors of a foreign power. It is quite possible that for a single city to receive an embassy was not so strictly forbidden by the Federal Constitution as it was for a single city to commission an embassy. This last, it is clear, was for- bidden by the general law of the League, just as it is forbidden' 2 by the Constitution of the United States. Cases however occur in the course of Achaian history alike of the law being dispensed with and of the law being violated. 3 We have a full account 4 of one very Particular r ., .. .. .. ,., ,. Embassies curious instance 01 a single city entering into diplomatic by licence of . F( deral body. 1 Pol. ii. 12. We shall come across this embassy again in the course of the history. - The Constitution (Art. i. § 10. 1) absolutely forbids all diplomatic action on the part of the several States, and the Confederate Constitution (Art. i. § 10. 1) repeats the prohibition. The looser Confederation of 1778 only forbade the receiving or sending Ambassadors "without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled." Art. vi. § 1. Cf. § 5. 3 Tittmann (678) mistakes these exceptions for the rule. 1 Pol. ii. 18-50. 262 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. CHAP. V. B.C. 224. Later ex- ceptions under Roman influence. b.c. 198. relations with a foreign power by special permission of the national Congress. The fact of such a permission being asked shows that, without it, the proceeding would have been unlawful, but the fact of the permission being granted equally shows that the request was not looked upon as altogether unreasonable and monstrous. The occasion was no other than the fatal application to Mace- donia for aid against Sparta, which was first made by an embassy sent from the single city of Megalopolis, but with the full permission of the Federal body. 1 This is perhaps the only recorded case of a breach of the rule during the good times of the League ; and this took place in a season of extreme danger, and was the result of a deeply laid scheme of the all-powerful Aratos. In later times, when unwilling cities were annexed to the League h\ force, and when Roman intrigue was constantly sowing dissension among its members, we shall find not unfre- qucnt instances of embassies sent from particular cities to what was practically the suzerain power. The old law now needed special confirmation. It was agreed, in the first treaty between Aehaia and Rome, that no embassj should be sent to Rome by any particular Achaian city, but only by the general Achaian body." Rut this agree- ment was of course broken whenever its violation suited Roman interests. Sparta especially, and Messcnc, cities joined to the League against their will, were constantly laying their real or supposed grievances at the feet of the Roman Senate. Here again we may learn the lesson 1 l ball narrate this curious proceeding in detail al the proper point <>l ili. In itorj . I' ; vii. "J. •). 'Axa'&v /uev yap ftfn)To and tov koipov napd Tt\v 'Puifxaiuy f}t>vKj)v dnttvat Trpttrfleis, ISia 5t dm IpijTo yu?) npfcrfif uiaQai t&s n6\fis Herat avvi Splov toS 'Axaiwi' /xtrt^xov. See 'I li n I\\ ;i 1 1, \iii. 90 (note), That thi prohibition was an exception, and not simplj the confirmation of an ancient rule rendered mori needful on entering into relation with so powerful an all quiti in< onci i> able THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY. 2G3 that a Federal body can derive no strength from the in- cjhap. v. corporation or retention of unwilling members. The supreme power of the League was vested in the The As- sovereign Popular Assembly. This was the Congress of f the the Union, differing from the Congress of the American Lea S ue - Union mainly in this, that, according to the common political instinct of the Greek mind, it was a primary and not a representative Assembly. 1 The latter notion has indeed been maintained by two German scholars, 2 but no sound arguments arc brought in support of their opinions, and it does not seem to have met with favour in any other quarter. There can be no doubt that every Tlie D e- TIT ( 1 V f \ tlf* citizen of every city in the League, at all events every Constitu- citizen who had attained the age of thirty years, 3 had 1 It is spoken of as 'Axaioi, eOvos, cwofios, irArjdos (PoL iv. 9, 10, 14. v. 1. xxxviii. 2), ol ttoWo'l (xxxviii. 4. xl. 4, ddpoia84vres els iKK\i)fflav oi -rroAAol twv 'Axa-idv, xxi. 7), iKKArjffla (Pol. xxviii. 3), ox^os (xxviii. 7), dyopd (xxviii. 7. xxix. 9). These expressions explain those like avveSpoi (Plut. Ar. 35) and aweSpiov (Paus. u.s.) which might at first sight convey another idea, and which probably arose out of the practice of later times. See Niebuhr's Hist. Koine, ii. 30, Eng. Tr. Thirhvall, viii. p. 91, note. Tittmann, 680. The formal title of the body, as usual, is to koivov tQv 'Axatuf. Pol. xxviii. 7. Boeckh, C. I. no. 1542. Paus. u.s. - Helwing, p. 229. Drumann, p. 463. The chief argument adduced in behalf of this opinion is a single place of Polybios, where he remarks that a particular Assembly, in the very last days of the League, was attended by a greater number of people, and those of a lower class, than usual (Pol. xxxix. 4) : iced yap avvridpoLffdn) irArjOos epyaffTTipiaKcoi/ Kal fiavavacov dvQpanruiv, olov ov84ttot€. This is merely the sort of language which a Tory historian would use in describing the first Reformed Parlia- ment. It evidently implies that these people bad a right to be there, but that so many of them had never before been known to come. Helwing argues that their presence was " gegen Gewohnbeit und Gesetz." It was doubtless "gegen Gewohnbeit," but not "gegen Gesetz." Droysen, who is generally disposed to make the constitution of the League more aristo- cratic than it really was, fully admits the popular character of the general Congress (ii. 462). Cf. K. F. Hermann, § 186. n. 5. Eng. Tr. and the im- portant note of Schorn, 371. 3 So Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 91) infers from Polybios, xxix. 9, where he speaks of a avyK\T]Tos, iv y (TwefSaii't /lit) fx6vov ov/.<.Tropevt T( ndwts HvQponroi StSlairl o-' dSs-Tltp dfdpa rvpvwvov. lb, 1 : i •_; 7 . Sii£art Tdvrrjs 'F.\\d8os q/.ui> Kr. lb, 1880. \cip\ u> fracjiKiv twv 'EAA.TJJ/WJ'. [sok. Areop. 29. St't Ttiv fiiv dijfxoi' Ssvtp ripawov KaOtardvai ris dpxdi iwv oisirsp oIkvtos. Ari tut. Pol, ii. 12. 1. p rvpdvvcf zapi(6fi.tvot. lb. iv, I. 2(L t"<>>, . <,' " Sf)fxus • :,, , .. TTnAAwr. •' See above, p. 42. DEMOCRATIC THEORY OF THE ASSEMBLY. 265 a Cabinet Council acting as the President's advisers, and a chat. v. Senate invested with far higher functions than the mere Committee of the Assembly which bore the same title at Athens. In short, at Athens the People really governed ; in Achaia they did little more than elect their governors and say Aye or No to their proposals. It will be at once seen that these differences all tend to Achaian make the Achaian Constitution approach, far more nearly tion than that of Athens, to the state of things to which we * "^^, are accustomed in modern Republics and Constitutional to modem systems. Kingdoms. And they all spring from the different po- sition of Democracy as applied to the single City of Athens and Democracy as applied to a Federal State embracing a large portion of Greece. The Athenian Assembly was held at a man's own door ; the Achaian Assembly was held in a distant city. 1 It follows at once that the Athenian Causes Assembly was held much oftener than the Achaian As- Difference, seinbly and was much more largely attended by citizens ™*^u of all classes. The Athenian Assembly was held thrice from tne greater in each month ; the Achaian Assembly was held of right extent of only twice in each year. The poorest citizen could regu- larly attend at Athens, where a small fee recompensed his loss of time ; the poor Achaian must have been un- usually patriotic if he habitually took two journeys in the 1 Some of the Attic Denioi are undoubtedly further from Athens than some of the old Achaian towns are from Aigion ; but no point of Attica is so distant from Athens as Dyme, for instance, is from Aigion, so that, on the whole, the rural Athenians were nearer to the capital than the Achaians, even of the older towns, were to the seat of the Federal Government. Also the city of Athens and its ports must always have contained a very large proportion of the citizen population, while Aigion was merely one town out of ten or twelve. Still the old Achaia is not very much larger than Attica — in superficial extent it is probably smaller — and it might perhaps have been possible to have united it by a awoiKKr/jids iustead of by a merely Federal tie. The essential differences between Athens and Achaia begin to show themselves most clearly when the League began to extend itself over much more distant cities, which no tie but a Federal one could, according to Creek notions, ever have connected. 260 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. year at his own cost to attend the Assembly at Aigion. For the Athenian Treasury could easily bear the small fee paid to the citizens for attendance in the Assembly, but no amount of wealth in the Federal Treasury of Achaia could have endured such a charge as the payment of travelling expenses and recompense for loss of time to the whole free population of Argos and Megalopolis. The poor Athenian then was both legally and practically the political equal of his richer neighbour ; the poor Achaian, though he laboured under no legal disqualification, laboured under a practical disqualification almost bordering on "" V,^' disfranchisement. The Achaian Assembly practically con- sembly " x " chiefly sisted of those among the inhabitants of each city who tt 'i i by rich were at once wealthy men and eager politicians. Those Ult-'ll. citizens came together who were at once wealthy enough to bear the cost of the journey and zealous enough to The As- Dear the trouble of it. It was, in fact, practically an srml.lv . I • 1 practically aristocratic body, and it is sometimes spoken of as such. 1 ,.,1,(1,.' Its aristocratic character may have been slightly modified by the possible presence of the whole citizen population of the town where the Assembly met. But we may doubt whether even they would, on ordinary occasions, be so eager to attend an Assembly of such a character as they might have been if the democratic spirit had been more predominant in it. Jiut, if they did, though some effect is always produced by the presence and the voices of any 1 In I, i\y (xxxii. 21) tlic . \ < • 1 1 ; i i . i ? i General Aristainos addresses the \ . i r 1 1 . 1 % :is Priiicipes AchcBorvm. But, especially as ii comes in a Bpeech, we cannol be quite certain Lha1 this expression really answers to anything in Polybios or any other Greek author. Bu1 it would fairly enough expre - the els ol persons of whom the Assembly was mainly composed, for />,;,,.;,,.. i{ ee Livy, sxxiii. 14) does no1 always mean magistrates, bul leading men, whether in office or not. Polybios (iv, 9) has the phrase oJ TTpnetTTWTf; tUv 'Axoiw", bu1 this evidently means the AaM<»/>7"' as Presi- dents of the a embly, n<>t any aristocratic class. It is just possible thai the words in Livy may be b formal address to the ba/uopyol l'i. idi hi lil ■ "in " M i. Speaker. " ARISTOCRATIC KLKMKNTS IN PRACTICE. 267 considerable body of men, still, as they could at most chap. v. control a single vote, their presence would be of but little strictly constitutional importance. The Congress, democratic in theory, was aristocratic in practice. This contrast of theory and practice, which Aristotle 1 had fully understood long before the days of the League, runs through the whole of the Achaian institutions. By Continental scholars, less used to the working of free Notunder- i f i i -i stood by governments than those of our own land, it seems Conti- not to have been thoroughly understood. They have g®J olar8 often imagined the existence of legal restrictions, when the restriction was in fact one which simply made itself. They see that the Assembly was mainly filled by members of an aristocratic class, and they infer that it must have been limited by law to a fixed body of representatives. They see that offices were mainly confined to the rich and noble, and they infer that the rich and noble must have 1 Arist. Pol. iv. 5. 3. Ov Sei 8e \avQa.vnv oti iroWaxov crvfjL(ie$i)Ktu Ssre tt\v fx\v Tru\iTeiav tt)c Kard tovs vofxovs /J.7J Srj/xoriKrji' eivai, Sid 8e rd tfdos KM. t?\v dywyrjv TroAiTtveadai 87]/j.otlkws, 6/j.ola>s 5e Kal ttoXiv nap' aWois ri)v fxtv Karat, tovs y6fjL0vs flvai iro\ireiay b~r)fj.OTiKWTtpav, rrj 5' dyooyfj Kal rots rideaiv oKiyapx^cBai /jLaWov. So again, in a passage which almost reads like a prophetic description of the League, and which indeed may have been true of the small Achaia of his times (Pol. v. S. 17) ; novax&s 8e Ka\ evSex^Tai a/xa elvai 8rnj.oKpaTiai/ Kal apiGTOKpaTiav . . . . rd /j-hv ydp Qeivai iracnv apx^v St] /auk par ikov, to 8e tovs yuoopijxovs elvai «V reus dpxeus apia-TOKpariKov. He goes Oil to say that this happens when offices are unpaid, as they were in Achaia. Compare Hamilton's remarks in the "Federalist," No. Iviii. (p. 318). " The people can never err more than in supposing, that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. Experience will for ever admonish them, that, on the contrary, after securing a sufficient number for purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government may become more democratic ; but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine may be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed." The Achaian Government however never deserved the name of an Olig- archy. It was an Aristocracy in the literal sense of the word 268 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chav. v. had a legal monopoly of office. To an Englishman both Analogies phsenomena are perfectly simple. What happened in land, Achaia is merely what happens daily before our own eyes in England. Every Achaian citizen had a right to a seat in the Assembly, but practically few besides the high-born and wealthy exercised that right. Every Achaian citizen was legally eligible to the highest offices, but practically the choice of the nation seldom fell upon poor men. So the poorest British subject is legally eligible to the House of Commons equally with the richest, but we know that it is only under exceptional circumstances that any but a rich man is likely to be elected. Even while the pro- perty qualification lasted, it was not the legal requirement which kept out poor men, but the practical necessity which imposed, and still imposes, a standard of wealth much higher than that fixed by the old law. 1 And more- over, it is in the most purely democratic constituencies, in the " metropolitan" boroughs for instance, that a poor man has even less chance of election than elsewhere. But though the Democratic Constitution of Achaia pro- duced what was practically an Aristocratic Assembly, it must not be thought that Achaian democratic institutions were mere shadows. The working of the Federal Con- stitution was aristocratic, but it was not oligarchic. The leading men of Achaia were not a close and oppressive body, fenced in by distinct and odious legal privileges; Tim Aa- their predominance rested merely on sufferance and oon- *Jj vcntionality, and the mass of the people had it legally in craticbut their power to act for themselves whenever they thought archie. good. The members ol the Assembly, meeting but rarely, i Ti: i,,ii form of Hi.' property qualification had at leasl an in- telligible object, 'i'ln' requiremenl of real property waameanl to serve a eh. i interest. It included the landowner, even of moderate estate, while it excluded the merelj monied man, however wealthy. Bu1 the property qualification, in its later form, when real property was no1 required, seems i absolutely meanint i THE ASSEMBLY ARISTOCRATIC BUT NOT OLIGARCHIC. 269 and gathered from distant cities, could have had none of chap. v. that close corporate feeling, that community of interest and habitual action, which is characteristic of the olig- archy of a single town. An Achaian who was led astray from his duty to the national interests, was much more likely to be led astray by regard to the local interests of his own city than by any care for the promotion of aristo- cracy or democracy among the cities in general. And, of whatever class it was composed, every description of the Assembly sets it before us as essentially a popular Assem- bly, numerous enough to share all the passions, good and bad, which distinguish popular Assemblies. It had all the generous emotions, all the life, heartiness, and energy, and all the rash impetuosity and occasional short-sighted- ness, of a really popular body. So our own House of Commons may, if we look solely to the class of persons of whom it is still mainly composed, be called an aristocratic body ; but, when it comes together, it shows all the passions of a really democratic Assembly. Contrast it with a Spartan or Venetian Senate ; contrast it even with our own House of Lords. So the Achaian Congress, though the mass of those present at any particular meeting might be men of aristocratic position, was still in spirit, as it was in name, an Assembly of the Achaian People. Its members could not venture on any op- pressive or exclusive legislation against men who were Practical legally their equals, and who had a perfect right, if they 2X°ai chose to encounter the cost and trouble, to take their elemeuts - places in the same Sovereign Assembly as themselves. We cannot doubt, and we find it distinctly affirmed of one occasion, 1 that, in times of great excitement, many citizens appeared in the Assembly who were not habitual frequenters of its sittings. Extraordinary Meetings, sum- 1 Pol. xxxix. 4. See above, p. 263. Compare tin' description of the tumultuous Assembly in Livy, xxxii. 22. 270 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. moned by the Government to discuss special and urgent business, would, as a rule, be far more largely attended than the half-yearly Meetings in which the ordinary affairs of the Commonwealth were transacted. 1 And we must always remember that each city retained its independent democratic government, its Assembly sovereign in all local affairs, and in which Federal questions, though they could not be decided, were no doubt often discussed. 2 In the Assembly of the State, if not in the Federal Congress, rich and poor really met on equal terms, and many oppor- tunities must have arisen for calling in question the conduct of those citizens who took an active part in Federal business. A Federal politician whose votes at Aigion were obnoxious to his fellow-citizens at home might be made to suffer for his delinquency in many ways. Thus the people at large held many checks upon those who were practically their rulers, and it was legally open to them to undertake at any time the post of rulers them- selves. One can hardly doubt but that those citizens of any particular town who attended the Federal Congress practically acted as the representatives of the sentiments of that town. Thus, though the mass of Achaian citizens rarely took any pari in the final decision of national affairs, yel the vote of the national Assembly could hardly ever be in opposition to the wishes of the nation at large. The votes in the Assembly were taken, not by heads, ^. ent y but by cities. 11 On this mode of voting I have already « ities, nd J J by heads, had occasion to make sonic remarks. 1 It was one common in the ancient republics, and it has become familiar to us 1 See Pol. rxix. '.». ' J Liv. xzzii. 19. Neque solum quid in senatu quisque civitatis sua aid in communibus c siliis gentis pi" sententifl dicerenl ignorabant, &c, : < See Niebuhr, Hist. Rome, ii 29, Eng. Tr. Thirlwall, viii. 02. Kor- tiim (iii. 160) maintains the contrary ; bul it is impoa ible to believe thai ilike Liv. \.\\ii. 'J'J, '■'• and sxxviii. 82 merely mean that theciti of the ame ton □ Ba1 together in the theal re * Sir above, p. 211. VOTES TAKEN BY CITIES. 2/1 by its employment in the famous Assembly of the Roman ohap. v. Tribes. Nor is it at all unknown in the modern world. It was the rule of the American Confederation of 17/B, 1 and the present Constitution of the Union retains it in those cases where the election of a President falls to the House of Representatives. 2 In a Representative Consti- tution this mode of voting must be defended, if it be defended at all, upon other grounds ; in a Primary Assem- bly, like that of Achaia, it was the only way by which the rights of distant cities could be preserved. Had the votes been taken by heads, the people of the town where the Meeting was held could always have outvoted all the rest of the League. This might have been the case even Evils while the Assembly was held at Aigion, and the danger wlichthis would have been greater still when, in after times, Assem- svM " n & guarded. blies were held in great cities like Corinth and Argos. The plan of voting by cities at once obviated this evil. It involves in truth the same principle which led the Patrician Fabius and the Plebeian Decius to join in con- fining the city-populace to a few tribes, and which has led our own House of Commons steadily to reject all pro- posals for an increase in the number of "metropolitan" members. The representative system would of course have effectually secured the League against all fear of citizens from a distance being swamped by the multitude of one particular town. But the representative system had not been revealed to the statesmen of Achaia, any more than to those of other parts of Greece. As matters stood, the only remedy was to put neighbouring and distant cities on an equality by ordering that the mere number of citizens present from each town should have 1 Articles of Confederation, Art. v. § 4. 2 Art. ii. § 1. 3, and the 12th Amendment. The Confederate Con- stitution preserves the same rule, and introduces it in another case, namely the voting of the Senate on the admission of new States. Art. iv. § 3. 1. 272 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAG CE. CHAP. V. Evils of the Acbaian arrange- ment of votes. no effect on the division. And of course the most obvious form which such a regulation could take was to give a single vote to each city. And probably, while the League was confined to the ten towns of the old Achaia, no bad consequences arose from this arrangement. Some of the towns were doubtless larger than the others, but there could have been no very marked disparity among them. But it was quite another matter when the League took in great and distant cities like Sikyon, Corinth, Megalopolis, Argos, at last even Sparta and Messene. It was clearly unjust that such cities as these should have no greater weight in the national Con- gress than the petty towns of the old Achaia. It was the more unjust, because we can easily conceive that questions might arise on which the old ten towns would always stick close together, and so habitually outvote five or six of the greatest cities of Greece. 1 While the personal influence of Aratos lasted, questions of this sort seem to have remained pretty much in abeyance, but to provide a counterpoise to this undue weight of the old towns was one great object of the administration of Philopoimen. The most effectual remedy would of course have beeo to let the vote of each town count, as in the Lykian League, 9 for one, two, three, or more, according to their several sizes. But this was a political refinement which wits reserved for a later generation, and it was one specially unlikely to occur to the mind of an Achaian legis- lator under the actual circumstances of the League. The cities external to the old Achaia were admitted, one by one, into ;m Achaian League, already regularly formed and prac- tically working. In the earlier stages of its extension, 1 Schorii p. 61. In diesei Hinsichl strebteder Bund nach vollig demo- kratischer Freiheil and Gleichheit, was zwar apaterbin einer Aenderung bedurfl h&tte, damil oicb.1 die Herrschafl and Gesetzgebung l»'i den Schwachen gewesen wbj e ■j See above, p. 'Jin. CONSEQUENCES OF THE MODE OF VOTING. 2/3 above all when the first step was taken by the union of chap. v. Sikvoii, the admission of new towns into the League was doubtless looked upon as a favour ; in more degenerate times they were sometimes compelled to enter into the League by force. In neither of these cases was it at all likely that a city newly entering into the League should receive any advantage over those cities which already belonged to it. To have given Sikyon two votes and No fair Corinth three, while the small Achaian towns- retained of°bkme only one each, would have been no more than just in itself against the ^ J League. — if indeed it would have reached the strict justice of the case — but it would have been a political developement for which there was as yet no precedent, and which we can have no right to expect at the hands of Aratos or of any other statesman. 1 It was a great step in advance of any- thing that Greece had seen, when new cities were admitted into the League at all on terms of such equality as the Achaians offered. Greece had already seen petty Leagues among kindred towns or districts ; she had seen great Confederacies gathered around a presiding, or it may be a tyrant, city ; but she had never before seen any state of cluster of states offer perfect equality of political rights to all Greeks who would join them. The League offered to its newest members an equal voice in its Assemblies with the oldest ; it made the citizens of all alike equally eligible to direct its counsels and to command its armies. It is hardly fair to blame a state which advanced so far beyond all earlier precedent merely because it did not devise a further improvement still. Had that improvement been proposed, anterior to the experience which proved its necessity, it would have appeared, to all but the deepest political thinkers, to contradict that equality among the 1 See Schorn, 67, 68. His strictures are perfectly just in themselves, but they arc rather hard on Aratos and the Achaians merely for not pos- sessing premature wisdom. T 274 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chai\ v. General merits of the A.haiaii Constitu- tion. several members which was the first principle of the Federal Constitution. Had any patriotic Corinthian claimed a double vote as due to the superior size and glory of his native city, he would have seemed to threaten Dyme and Tritaia with the fate which Thespia and Orchomenos had met with at the hands of Thebes. Lykia made exactly the improvement which was needed, because her legislators had the past experience of Achaia to profit by. The Achaian principle was revived in all cases under the first American Confederation, and it is retained in one very important case in the actual Con- stitution of the United States. Nor is it in all cases an error; the principle of equality of votes for every State, great and small, has always been adhered to in one branch of the Federal Legislature, and it has always been rightly defended as a necessary check on the supremacy of mere numbers. In short, though the Achaian Constitution failed, in this respect, to attain to the full theoretical perfection of the Lykian constitution, yet the League fully merits the enthusiastic praises of its own historian as the body which, without retaining selfish privileges or selfish advantages, first freely offered Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity to every inhabitant of Peloponnesos. 1 The same causes which made the Achaian Assembly practically ai) aristocratic body served also to make its BittingS short and linfrequent. The League had no capital tand mid QO court; there was nothing to tempt men to stay Meetings 1 a* the place of meeting any longer than the affairs of °} jj" the nation absolutely required. Everj man's heart was with his hearth and home in his own city: he went, up to do his duty in the Federal Assembly, and to oiler sacrifice to the Federal God; but to tarry half the i Pol. ii. 89, 42. TIMES OF MEETING. 275 year away from his own house and his own fields was chap. v. an idea which never entered the head of an Achaian politician. The Assembly met of right twice yearly, 1 in Spring and Autumn. The Magistrates were originally elected at the Spring Meeting, afterwards most probably From in the Autumn. 2 The Session was limited to three days. 3 Besides the two yearly Meetings, it rested with the Government to summon extraordinary Meetings, on occasions of special urgency. 4 From the shortness of the Conse- Assembly's Sessions naturally followed certain restrictions ^etaon*" on its powers, certain augmentations of the powers of the p^ e s rs executive Government, which to an Athenian would have seemed the utter destruction of all democratic freedom. 1 The two yearly Meetings are clearly implied in Pol. xxxviii. 2, 3. The Koman Ambassadors come to the Autumn Meeting at Aigion (5«a- Kzyojxtvwv Tois 'Axcuois iv rrj rwv Alyieaiv ir6\ei, c. 2). It is agreed that, instead of the Assembly coming to a decisive vote, the Ambassadors should meet some of the Achaian leaders in a diplomatic conference at Tegea. Kritolaos meets them there, and tells them that he can do nothing without the authority of the next Assembly, to be held six months after (eis rrjv t^rjs crvvoSov, rjris efieWe yeveaOai /xercL ^rjvas #|). This was, of course, mere mockery, as a special Assembly could have been called, or special powers might have been obtained from the Meeting at Aigion, but the pretext shows the regular course of things. The Autumn Meeting appears in PoL ii. 54, iv. 14, xxiv. 12 ; the Spring Meeting in iv. 6, 7, 26, 27, 37. v. 1. So seemingly in xxviii. 7, by the name of ij irpu>T7) dyopd. 2 See Schorn, p. 210. Thirlwall, viii. 295. Cf. Clinton, Fast. Hell. A. 146. 3 Pol. xxix. 9. Liv. xxxii. 22. Both of these are cases of an extra- ordinary Meeting (ffvyKKrjros). If this rule prevailed on such occasions, much more would it in the common half-yearly Meetings. 4 Pol. V. 1. 'S.vvrjyev [o ffrpaTriyds] rods 'Axaioi)s diet twv apx^vraiv els inKk-offiav. The words nard, v6fxovs in the next sentence show that this was a perfectly regular proceeding. Cf. Pol. xxiii. 10. 12. xxiv. 5. In one case (Pol. iv. 7) we meet with a strange phenomenon of a Military Assembly, an idea iEtolian or Macedonian rather than Achaian. The ordinary Meeting votes that the General shall summon the whole force of the League in arms, and that the army thus assembled shall debate and determine (crwaysiv rdv (TrpaT7jy6i> toi)s 'Ax^oi)s iv tois ttirAois, o 6' &i/ toTs (Tvve\0ovo-i /8ouA.€uo^eVois Soft tovt elvai icvpwv). This looks like an un- usually small attendance at the regular Assembly. Cf. Livy, xxxviii. 33. T 2 270 OEIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. It has been thought, on the highest of all authorities, 1 that, in an extraordinary Assembly at least — and an extraordinary Assembly would, almost by the nature of the case, have to deal with more important business than an ordinary one — a majority of the Executive Cabinet could legally refuse to allow any question to be put to the vote. The This seems at least doubtful ; 2 but it is evident that, in Initiative . _ practically a Session of three days, the right of private members Govern- *° Drm » m hUHs, or even to move amendments, must ment. have been practically very much curtailed. No doubt the initiative always practically remained in the hands of the Government. In an extraordinary Assembly it was so in the strictest sense, as such an Assembly could only enter- tain the particular business on which it was summoned to decide. 3 And in all cases, what the Assembly really had to do was to accept or reject the Ministerial proposals, or, it may be, to accept the counter-proposals of the leaders of Opposition. The ordinary Assemblies were, at least during the first period of the League, always held at Aigiou ; but it seems Place of Meeting ; first Aigion, 1 Tliirlwall, viii. 91, 92. s The passage referred to is Liv, xxxii. 22. SeeSchorn, 242. Here the Sa/xtopyoi arc equally divided whether to put a certain question 1" the vote or not ; bul this does no1 prove that they had the power to refuse to put anj question, because the objectors ground their refusal on the illegal nature of the particular motion. The case seems rather to be like tho famous refusal of S6krat6s, when presiding in the Athenian Assembly, to put an illegal motion to tho voto. See Xen. Hell. i. 7. 15. Cf. Grote, viii. 271. i.iv. xxxi. 2/5. Non licere legibus Achseorum de aliis rebus referre, quain propter quae convbeati essent. h does not however follow from this that private members could uo1 propose amendments, or even substantial motions, relating t" thai busi- H( , and it seems clear from a passage in Polybioa (\.\ix. 9) that they lni^lit. (T17 5* SfvTtpa tuJ> T^^tpwi', li> f) Hard rods vS/auus tSti tcJ \pi)tpl(T/xaTa wpostptpw toi)s /SouAoyutVoi/r, k.t.a. ) In the Assembly which he describes two quite different motions are made and discussed. Most probably the Com rnment propo al w< re made on the firsl day, those <>i private mem' bi i on ti ad, and I be vote taken on the I bird PLACE OF MEETING. 277 to have been in the power of the Government to summon chap. v. the extraordinary Assemblies, as at any time, so in any afterwards place, which might be convenient. 1 Aigion had been cities. chosen as the place of meeting for the original League, as being the most important of the old Achaian towns after the destruction of Helike. In after times it was at least as well adapted for the purpose for an opposite reason. It might be the greatest member of the original League, but it was insignificant compared with the powerful cities which were afterwards enrolled in the Union. Aigion was Advan- a better place for the Federal Government than Corinth ^fdon. or Megalopolis, for the same reason that Washington is a better place for the American Federal Government than New York. There was not the least fear of Aigion ever being to the League of Achaia what Thebes had, in times past, been to the League of Boeotia. Still, how- ever, a certain dignity, and some material advantage, must have accrued to Aigion from the holding of the Federal Assemblies, and from the probable frequent presence of the Federal Magistrates at other times. This may well have aroused a certain degree of jealousy among the other towns, and we shall see that, at a later time, Philopoimen carried a measure which left the League with- out even the shadow of a capital, and obliged the Federal B -c 189. Assemblies to be held in every city of the League in turn. 2 I have several times, in discussing Achaian affairs, used the words Government, Ministers, Cabinet, and such like. I have done so of set purpose, in order to mark the most important of all the differences between the city-Democracy of Athens and the Federal Democracy of Achaia. In 1 See Helwing, p. 227. 2 See Helwing, 227, 228. Thirl wall, viii. 393. That it was actually carried, though Tittmann (682) thinks otherwise, appears from Pol. xxiv. 12, where an ordinary meeting is held at Megalopolis, 278 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. CHAP. V. Greater power of Magis- trates in Achaia than at Athens. The Achaias M agia- t rates foi in a "Govern- ment." speaking of Athenian politics no words could be more utterly inappropriate ; Demos was at once King and Parliament ; the Magistrates whom he elected were simply agents to carry out his orders. This was perfectly natural in a Democracy whose Sovereign Assembly regularly met once in ten days. Another course was equally natural in a Democracy whose Sovereign Assembly regularly met only twice in each year. It was absolutely necessary in such a case to invest the Magistrates of the Republic with far greater official powers than any Magistrates possessed at Athens from the days of Kleisthenes onwards. It was, in short, necessary to give them the character of what we, in modern phrase, understand by a Government, and to confine the Assembly to the functions of a Parliament. We must of course make one exception, required by the universal political instinct of Greece ; the final vote on matters of Peace, War, and Alliance rested with the Assembly. This follows at once from the difference be- tween a republican Assembly, sovereign in name as well as in fact, and the Parliament of a Monarchy, which in theory is the humble and dutiful Council of a personal Sovereign. All the differences between Athens and Achaia naturally flow from the differences between the position and extent of the two commonwealths. In the single City of Athens the democratic theory could be strictly carried out ; in the large Federal territory of Achaia it could be carried out only in a very modified form. The extent of territory led to the infrequent Meetings of the Assembly ; flie infrequent Meetings of the Assembly led to the increased authority of the Magistrates ; for a ruling power must be lodged some- where during the three hundred and fifty-nine days when the Sovereign Assembly was not in being. AW therefore find tin- Federal Magistrates of Achaia acting with almost :i lil Ik restraint as the Ministers of a modern constitu- tional State. They are the actual movers and doers of POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT. 279 everything; the functions of the Assembly are nearly chap. v. reduced to hearing their proposals and saying Aye or No to them. And, as the Magistrates were themselves elected by the Assembly, we should naturally expect, what the history at every step shows us to have been the case, that the vote of the Assembly would be much oftener Aye than No. The Achaian Assembly was addressed by Ministers whom its own vote had placed in office six months before ; it would, under all ordinary circumstances, give them a very favourable hearing, and would not feel that sort of jealousy which often exists between the American Congress and the American President. In fact, the relations between an Compari- . , , . son with Achaian Government and an Achaian Assembly were in some America respects more like those between an English Government and JJJ^ ng " an English House of Commons than the relations between an American President and an American Congress. The Points of Achaian Magistrates, being Achaian citizens, were neces- nkeness sarily members of the Achaian Assembly ; so in England {° n *[ ng " the Ministers are, by imperative custom, members of one or other House of Parliament. In Achaia therefore, just as in England, the members of the Government could appear personally before the Assembly to make their proposals and to defend their policy. But in America the Ministers of the President are strictly excluded from seats in Congress, 1 and the President communicates with that body only by a written Message. Again, as Con- gress does not elect, 2 so neither can it remove, either i Constitution, Art. i. § 6. 2. This restriction is modified in the Con- federate Constitution. 2 Congress never elects the President freely ; under certain circumstances (see Amendment 12) the House of Representatives have to choose a Presi- dent from among three candidates already named. The President again may be (Art. i. § 3. 6. ii. § 4) deposed by a judicial sentence of the Senate on an impeachment by the House of Representatives. But this of course requires proof of some definite crime ; there is no constitutional way of removing him simply because his policy is disapproved. 280 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. the President or his Ministers ; it therefore follows that the Legislative and Executive branches may remain, during a whole Presidency, in complete opposition to one another. In England the House of Commons does not either formally appoint or formally depose the Ministry, for the simple reason that the Ministry has no legal existence ; but it does both in a way which, if indirect, is still highly effectual. In Achaia, the Government was, not indirectly but directly, chosen by the Assembly. There was not, any more than in America, any consti- tutional means of removing them before the end of their term of office ; a Government which had ceased to enjoy the confidence of the House had therefore to be con- stitutionally borne with for a season. But, as their term of office was only one year instead of four, such a season of endurance would be much shorter than it sometimes is in America. Even in England, a Government must be weak indeed which, when once in office, cannot, by the power of Dissolution or otherwise, contrive to retain power for as long a time as an unpopular Achaian Government could ever have had to be borne with. Altogether the general practical working of the Achaian system was a remarkable advance in the direction of modern consti- tutional government. And it especially resembles our own system in leaving to usage, to the discretion of particular persons and Assemblies, and to the natural working of circumstances, much which nations of a more theoretical turn of mind might have sought to rule by positive law. Federal The Achaian Government then, when its details were n "' finally settled, consisted of Ten Ministers, who formed a Cabinet Council lor fche General of the Achaians, or, in modern language, the President of the Union. Besides these great officers, there was also a Secretary of FEDERAL MAGISTRACIES. 281 State, 1 an Under-General/ and a General of Cavalry. 3 chap. v. It is probable that the latter two functionaries were General of merely military officers, and did not fill any important political position. It is clear, for instance, that the Under- General] Under-General was, in civil matters at least, a less im- portant person than the Vice-President of the American Union. The American Vice-President is ex-officio Presi- dent of the Senate, and, in case of any accidental vacancy in the Presidentship, he succeeds to the office for the remainder of the term. But of the Achaian Under- General we hear nothing in civil affairs, and if the General died in office, his place for the remainder of the year was taken, not by the Under-General, but by the person Avho had been General the year before. 4 The active officers of the League in civil matters were clearly the General, the Secretary, and the Ten Ministers. The exact functions of the Secretary are not described, but it is easy to guess at them. He was doubtless, as Secretary Secretaries of State are now, the immediate author of ° all public despatches, and in minor matters he may often have been entitled, as Secretaries of State are now, to act on his own responsibility. It is evident from the way 1 rpa/A/juxTevs. Pol. ii. 43. Strabo, viii. 7 (vol. ii. p. 221). The office was as old as the League. 2 'TiroaTpaT-qyos. Pol. iv. 59. xl. 5. In v. 94 one Lykos of Pharai is called virocrTpdrriyos rfjs avvrtAeias rrjs TraTpiKijs. This I take to mean a local magistrate of some little confederacy formed by Pharian townships like those of Patrai. See above, p. 247. Or, in the particular place where the phrase occurs, it may refer to the temporary union of Dyme, Pharai, and Tritaia in B.C. 219. See below, Chapter viii. Either of these views seems more likely than that he was ' ' commander of the pure Achaian forces, as distinguished from those of the whole League." K. F. Hermann, 186. 9. Such a distinction is quite alien to the whole spirit of the constitution. 3 'lTnrdpxys. Pol. v. 95. x. 22. xxviii. 6. Schorn (p. 62) supposes that this officer took the place of the second General, when the number was re- duced to two. This may well be true in his military, but hardly in his civil, capacity. 4 Pol. xl. 2. 282 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chai". v. in which both Polybios and Strabo speak of it, that the office was one of high dignity and importance. The Ten Ministers, the Cabinet Council of the Presi- dent, are called by various names. 1 They seem to have been the Federal Magistrates of the League in its earlier and looser state. Their number ten, as several writers have observed, 2 evidently points to the reduced number of the old Achaian towns after the loss of Helike and The Ten Olenos. This at once suggests a question as to the position of these Magistrates when new cities were added to the League. The number remained unaltered ; 3 and it has hence been inferred that the Cabinet Council always continued to be filled by citizens of the old Achaian towns. 4 Yet it would be of itself almost impossible to believe that this important office was confined to citizens of the old Achaia, and that an Argive, a Corinthian, or a Megalopolitan would have been ineligible. Had such been the case, we should hardly have found Polybios, himself a citizen of a non-Achaian town, using such strong language as he does as to the liberality of the League in extending fall equality of rights to every city which joined it, and reserving no exclusive privileges to the 1 Their forma] title was S^fiiovpyoi, hapiopyol, Damvwgi. l'til. \\i\. ."'. Pint. Ar. 48. Liv. \xxii. 22. xxxviii. SO. Boeckh, C. I. 1542 (vol. i. p. 711, of. ]i. 11). There were also Local Sa/uopyot as Magistrates of particular cities. They ai Lore vaguely called dpxovrts, dpxa-l (Pol. v. 1. xxiii. 10, 12. xxiv. 5. xxix. 9, 10. xxxviii. 4), and— with evident reference to their jo action with the I •• Q< iral —crvvdpxovrts, ffwapx"" 0'"'- xxiv. 12. \xvii. 2. xxxviii. 6); also irpotmcSres (Pol. ii. 46. iv. V), irp6$ov\on'\ (Pint. Phil 21), and, apparently, ol tt's ytpovalas (PoL xxxviii 6). Bee Thirlwall, viii. 92, 491. Neither Tittman (688, 6) nor Kortiim (iii. 161) is perfectly cli .i about this Lasl onusua] t it le. Polybios uses the verb avniptiu to i pre b meeting of the Cabinet. xL 4. ohorn, 62, 68. Thirlwall, viii. 91. :1 Livy, xwii. 22. i i take this to be Bishop Thirlwall's meaning (viii. Ill) when he Bays, ««8l i ■; it appears, we are Led to conclude thai the places in both th( c board continued to bi filled by A-chseans." THE TEN MINISTERS. 283 elder members. 1 In conformity with these professions, the chap. v. General, as we know, was freely chosen from any of Probably 7 " chosen the towns enrolled in the League, and indeed he seems from all to have been, oftcner than not, a citizen of a non-Achaian canton. These arguments alone would almost lead us to believe that, when the League had attained its full development, the old number Ten, though still retained, ceased to bear any practical reference to the ancient number of towns, and that the office of Minister, as well as the Presidency, was open to every citizen of the League. It not uncommonly happens, in the growth of constitutions, that numbers of this sort are retained long after they have ceased to bear any practical meaning. So the Ten Achaian Ministers may have once really represented the Ten Achaian Towns, and yet, at all events after the accession of Sikyon, they may have been chosen indiscriminately from any of the confederate cities/ But we are hardly left to argue the point from probabilities. There is a full description in Polybios of the proceedings in an Achaian Cabinet Council, 3 with the names of several of the members. Four of the Ministers are mentioned, and, of these, three, besides the General, are citizens of Megalopolis ; 4 the fourth is a citizen of Aigeira, one of the old Achaian towns. The exact relations of the Ten Ministers and of the 1 Pol. ii. 38. OuSevl ydp oiidtu inroKenrotxevt] ir\eov4KTTHJ.a to?s e| dpxys, itra 5e -waura iroiovaa to7s del -KposAa/x^avo/xsvois, k.t.X. Cf. C. 42 throughout. Cf. K. F. Hermann, § 186. n. 10. s The only expression which looks the other way, is that of Damiwgi cicitatium. Liv. xxxviii. 30. On the other hand, in xxxii. 22 he calls them Magistrates gcntis, which lulls at least as much for their strictly Federal character. 3 Pol. xxiii. 10, 12. These dpxal, dpxovres, summoned by the General, must be the council of Ministers. Indeed we find nearly the same story over again in Pol. xxiv. 5, where the formal word Srjfxtovpyoi is used, clearly as synonymous with apxovres. 4 Aristainos the General, Diophanes, Fhilopoimen, and Lykortas, all from Megalopolis ; Archon from Aigeira. The General himself takes no part in the debate, but his party is outvoted. 284 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. CHAP. V. Relations of the Ministers to the General. The Ministers prill generally united among tliclll- aelvi Secretary to the executive Chief of the State are not very clearly marked. It must have been essential to the good government of the League that they should be able to work together in tolerable harmonv, and that their differ- ences, if they had any, should not go beyond a debate and a division among themselves. For Achaian statesmen had certainly not reached that pitch of refinement by which a division in the Cabinet is held to be a thing not to be thought of. They had not discovered that all differences of opinion must be compromised or concealed, or that, if this is impossible, the minority must resign office. This is a political refinement which can exist only where, as among ourselves, the whole constitution of the Ministry is something wholly conventional, where the Cabinet has no legal existence, and where the rights and duties of its members are regulated purely by usage. But the Achaian Cabinet was directly elected to a definite office to be held for a definite time ; if differences of opinion arose among its members, they were simply to be settled by a majority, like differences of opinion in the Senate or in the Assembly itself. In the United States the President chooses his own Ministers, and that with a much greater freedom of choice than is allowed to any Constitutional King. The Achaian President had his Ministers chosen for him; but then they were chosen along with himself, at the same time and by the same electors; the majority which carried the election of the President himself would probably seldom give him colleagues who were altogether dis- pleasing to him. If, on some occasions, 1 we find the General and his Cabinet disagreeing, the special mention of the fad seems to show that it was something excep- tional Altogether the science of electioneering seems to have obtained B very lair de\ elopement in the League. 1 See Pol .wiii. 10. si. i. But In the ■ ■. the disagreement doi nut go beyond n division in the Cabinet its if. AN ACHAIAN " CAUCUS." 285 Polybios in one place gives us a vivid description of an chap. v. Achaian "Caucus," 1 where several leading men of a par- -An ticular party met to discuss the general aitairs ot that "Caucus." party, and especially to settle their "ticket" for the next election. They agreed upon a President and upon a General of Cavalry. It is not expressly said that they agreed upon other Magistrates as well, but we may reason- ably infer that they did. At least we cannot infer the contrary from the sole mention of an officer who does not commonly appear in connexion with politics. One cannot help suspecting that the President alone would have been mentioned, if his subordinate officer had not chanced to be the historian himself. In comparing the constitution of the Achaian League with the constitutions of modern free states, it is difficult to avoid speaking of its Chief Magistrate by the modern name of President. But we must remember that his real official title was Strategos or General. In all the demo- The Pre- sident or cratic states ot Greece there was a strong tendency to General. strengthen the hands of the military commanders, and to invest them with the functions of political magistrates. Thus, at Athens, the Archons remained the nominal chiefs of the state, but their once kingly powers gradually 1 Pol. xxviii. 6. Nothing can he plainer than that this was simply what the Americans call a "Caucus." Yet two distinguished German scholars, Schorn (p. 64) and Droysen (ii. 463), have built upon this passage a theory that the Sa/j.wpyo(, (who are not mentioned,) had the sole right of proposing candidates for the Presidency. Bishop Thirlwall of course sets them right (viii. 91). Indeed Schorn himself, by the time that he reached the event itself in his actual narrative (p. 354), seems to have letter under- stood the state of the case. "What Polybios here describes is simply tip! preliminary process which must go before every public election. This is one of the many cases in which a citizen of a free country lias a wonderful advantage in studying the history of the ancient commonwealths. Many things which the subject of a continental monarchy can only spell out from his books are to an Englishman or an American matters of daily life. 286 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. CHAP. V. Powers of Generals in other Greek states. B.C. 490. I different numbers in different states. Two Generals of the Achaian League reduced tn < (in'. B.C. 255. dwindled away into the merest routine. The Ten Generals, officers seemingly not known before Kleisthenes, 1 became really the most important persons in the commonwealth, entrusted with as large a share of authority as Demos would entrust to anybody but himself. The transition between the two systems is clearly seen at the battle of Marathon, where Kalliinachos the Polemarch, one of the Archons, is joined in command with the Ten Generals. Earlier, he would have been the sole commander ; later, he would have had no part or lot in the matter. In most of the later Grecian states, especially in the Federal states, we find the highest magistrates bearing the title of General. The number of Generals differed in different Leagues, but it was always much smaller than the Athenian Ten. The Epeirots had at one time as many as three, 2 but the Arka- dians under Lykomedes, 3 the Akamanians, 4 and the xEto- lians 6 had each a sole General. The Achaians, for the first five-and-twenty years of their renewed Confederacy, elected two Generals. Then an important change was made in the constitution by reducing the number to one. In the em- phatic words of Polybios, 8 "they trusted one man with all their affairs." "Now," he continues, "the first man 1 Grote, iv. 181. ; See above, p. 152. 3 See above, p, 204. 4 S( i, p. 1 19. ■' See nexl Chapter. '' Pol. ii. 43. EIkocti ixlv uvv 6T7) rot irpwra Ka\ irtvTt ovvtiroXiTtvaavTo /tc0' iavT&v al irpoeiprjutvat ir6\fis, ypafxfiaria koivov Zk irepiuSov irpoxtipi- fr/xti/at kcu Svo ffTpaTTiyovs' /ueto 5e ravra ira\iv tSo^tv oi3to?s eva KaOiaravtiv Ka\ TOVTCp 1Tl(TT flif iV VTTtp TWV oKoiV, KOI TTpWTOS tTU^f T7JS TI/U7JS ravT-qs Mdpuos 6 Kepwtvs. After reading tliis passage, and after consider- the tendency in Federal Greece, in America, and in Switzerland, to give to every Federal bodj a ingle President, it is curious to find • 'alhoun (Works, i. 898) arguing againsi a single President, saying that no common- wealth ever retained freedom under a single President, wishing t\ the Speaker. I > 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 (p. 462) seems to confound this ytpovvla with the flovKj or Senate. Tittmann (( uratelj distinguishes them, though he is not ijuii, ,-i. ;h about their identity with the fiaiuapyol. RELATIONS OF THE GENERAL AND HIS MINISTERS. 297 he would have been as unfit to act as President of the chap. v. Assembly as the Leader of the House of Commons is to be at the same time its Speaker. Theoretically the same objection might seem to apply to his ten colleagues ; they were as responsible as he was for the measures on which they had to take the votes of the Assembly. But they were not so personally bound as he was to be active speakers on their behalf. Our own House of Lords presents a close analogy. The Lord Chancellor is Speaker of the House ; he presides, and puts the question. But, unlike the Speaker of the Commons, he is also a member of the Government, an active member of the House ; he can vote, speak, bring in bills of his own, just as much as any other Peer ; one class of bills indeed it is his special duty to bring in rather than any other Peer. Still it is felt that the Speaker of the House cannot fittingly be the Government Leader in the House ; some other Peer is always looked upon as the special representative of the Cabinet in the House of Lords. This division of par- liamentary duty exactly answers to what I conceive to have been the division of duties in the Assembly between the Achaian Ministers and the Achaian General. Out of the House, the General and his Ministers doubtless Joint acted in concert in all important civil business. On some diplomatic great occasions we distinctly see the whole Government matters - acting together. For instance, Aratos and his Ten Coun- b.c. 223. cillors 1 all went to meet King Antigonos, and to make arrangements with him for his coming into Peloponnesos. In short, in all civil and diplomatic business the General acted together with the other members of the Government. He was chief of a Cabinet, and we know what powers the chief of a Cabinet has. He could not indeed get rid of a refractory colleague, as a modern First Minister can ; 1 Pint. Ar. 43. 'A/injura fXfTci t&v Ziffjuovpyuv 6 'Aparos aincp. 298 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. but we may be sure that, in the good times of the League — the days of Kritolaos are another matter — a General who was in the least fit for his place could always com- mand a majority among his colleagues, and a majority was all that was needed. I'urc- In military affairs the case was different. The Ten were power a P urc b' c *i y il magistracy ; the General, besides being the °* thl ' , . political chief of the state, was also, as his title implies, General m f m # L War. its military chief, and that with far more unrestrained power than he exercised in civil affairs. The Sovereign People declared war and concluded peace ; but while war lasted, the General had the undivided command of the Achaian armies. The Achaians, as Polybios says, trusted their General in everything: they did not hamper his operations in the field in the same way as was too often done by the Venetian, Spartan, and Dutch Republics. There was not the same reason or temptation for doing so. The hereditary Kings of Sparta were naturally looked upon with jealousy by the Ephors, who represented another principle in politics. And Venice, in her land campaigns, had commonly to do with mercenary leaders, whose fidelity might not always be absolutely trusted. But if an Achaian General, a citizen chosen for a year by the free voices of his fellow-citizens, cannot be fully trusted by them, no man can ever be trusted at all. Ill fact he commonly was both fully and generously trusted. Be was allowed to act for himself, subject only to the after-judgement of the Assembly, in which his proceedings might be discussed after the fact 1 But [Jnionof it is in this union of the child* military and the chief militan .. . . . an d pojj political power in (he same person that we see the main poinl of difference between ihe Achaian system and that 1 Tliii I wall, \ in |n'. " He wielded the military force ol tin League in the field with absolute, though aol irrcspon ible authority UNRESTRAINED POWERS OF THE GENERAL IN WAR. 299 of all modern states, republican or monarchic. 1 No First ohap. v. Minister of a constitutional monarchy thinks of com- unlike manding its armies ; it is felt that his duties lie in quite Btate8i another sphere. The American President is indeed, by the Constitution, 2 Commander-in-Chief of the Federal forces by sea and land ; that is to say, they are neces- sarily at his disposal as the chief executive Magistrate ; but it is not implied that the President shall always be the man personally to lead the armies of the Republic to battle. But in the Achaian League the General was really a General ; his command in the field was as much a matter of course as his chief influence in the Assembly ; his only official title 3 was a military one ; though it should be noticed that the outward symbol of his office was one purely civil. We have seen a Theban Archon His title with nothing military about him, but whose badge of but 27' office was a spear ; 4 we now find, in curious contrast, Jjjjjjge of that the badge of office of the Achaian General was civil. the purely civil symbol, a seal. The General kept the Great Seal of the League ; and his admission to or resignation of office is sometimes spoken of as accept- ing or laying down the Seal, 5 much as we speak, not indeed of a Commander-in-chief, but of a Lord Chan- cellor. This union of civil and military duties, which was usual in the later Greek Republics, looks at first sight like a retrograde movement, after the experience of the 1 I speak of the civilized states of Europe and America ; I do not answer for Mexican or South American Republics. 2 Art. ii. § 2. 1. 3 Polybios is singularly fluctuating in the various titles which he gives to the Assembly and to the Ministers, hut I do not remember thai the General is ever called anything hut arpaT-r]y6s, or, perhaps, it* equivalent riyefxtov (see iv. 11. v. 1) ; -rrpoea-Tcos (ii. 45) is hardly meanl as a formal till-. 4 See above, p. 1(35. * Plut. Ar. 38. 'E/SovAei/o-aTO (j.\u evOvs [6 "Apa-ros] diroOeaOai ti)i' (T(ppay7?>a, Ka\ ir\v ffTparrtylav a"int of Ph6ki6n'a retort tr> a, troublesome orator 7t 6vro% 4yd (ms. P1u1 Phdk, 16. Compare also the story of Phdkidn and function - UNION OF CIVIL AND MILITARY DUTIES. 301 callings were utterly separated. Phokion is the only man chap. v. in whom there is the least approach to an union of them. Iphikrates and Chabrias were strictly professional soldiers, who eschewed politics altogether. Demosthenes, iEschines, Hyperides, never thought of commanding armies. Indeed in their days it was but seldom that the armies of Athens were formed of her own citizens and commanded by her own Generals ; they were too Employ- commonly mere mercenary bands commanded by faithless nierce- aries. soldiers of fortune. It may have been the remembrance D of the evils inflicted on Greece by these hireling banditti, The A P fl *1 1 *J ll which induced both the Achaian League and the other System a later Greek commonwealths to fall back upon the old reactlon - system, and to insist upon the union of military and civil powers in the chief of the state. The arrangement Disad- doubtless gave greater unity and energy to Federal action ; ^ "^ es but it undoubtedly had a bad side. It by no means system. followed either that the wisest statesman would be also the bravest and most skilful captain, or that the bravest and most skilful captain would be also the wisest states- man. Aratos was unrivalled as a diplomatist and par- liamentary leader, but his military career contains many more failures than successes. Could he and Lydiadas have divided duties, as Perikles and Kimon did, the League might perhaps never have been driven to become a suppliant for Macedonian protection. It is also clear that the union aggravated one difficulty which perhaps can never be entirely avoided in any government where magistrates are elected for a definite time. Once a year, The Presi- or once in four years, what we call a Ministerial Crisis terregnum comes round as a matter of course. It is felt to be a a &s ravaiei Arehibiades in the same life, c. 10. Demosthenes and JEschines both served in the army, and iEschines gained tome credit for personal gallantry, just as Sokrates did, but no one ever thought of choosing any one of the three to the office of General. 302 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. CHAP. V. by the union of powers. B.C. 220. practical fault in the American system that the President is chosen so long before he actually enters on his office. 1 A practical interregnum of some months takes place ; the incoming Government are still private men ; the outgoing Government, though still invested with legal powers, can- not venture to use them with any effect in the face of their designated successors. A circumstance recorded by Poly- bios" shows that this difficulty was felt in Achaia also. The .Etolians chose for an inroad the time when the official year was drawing to its close, as a time when the Achaian counsels were sure to be weak. Aratos, the General-elect, was not yet actually in office ; the outgoing General Timoxenos shrank from energetic action so late in his year, and at last yielded up his office to Aratos before the legal time. We know not exactly how long the Achaian interregnum lasted, but it is evident that we here find the American difficulty, and that aggravated by the fact that the President had himself personally to take the field. At Rome the change of Consuls seems to have sometimes had the same effect ; but, in the best days of Rome, the danger was tempered in two ways. It was lessened by that habitual devotion of every Roman to the public interest, to which neither Achaia litti- America nor any other state can supply a parallel. Ami the custom, by which a Consul whose services were really needed was commonly continued in his command as Proconsul, prevented the occurrence of any interregnum at all in the cases where it would have been most hurtful It may perhaps be doubted whether, in another point, 1 [n the United Stat il i pavated by the utter failure of the ,,,n titutional provisions for the double election of the President. The lv , ,1,1,1 qo1 only does not enter on office Lmmcdiatel] on his legal elec- t ■ « > r i , but, long before the Legal election takes place, il i alreadj practically decided who will be elected, and the interregnum ;it once begin , 8, 7. PRESIDENTIAL INTERREGNUM. .'{().'{ the practice of the League diminished or aggravated an chap. v. evil Avhich lias often been pointed out in the American Question rm • -i 1 1 /-* i • ■ . • °f reelec- system. Ihe power given by the Constitution, and, at tion of the one time, often exercised in practice, of reelecting the Presldeut President, at least for one additional term of office, 1 has often been made the subject of grave complaint. It places, it is argued, the Chief Magistrate of the Union in the somewhat lowering position of a candidate for the suffrages of the citizens ; it causes him too often to adopt a policy, which may not be in itself the best, but which may be the most likely to lead to reelection ; and it causes the latter part at least of a Presidency to be often spent in canvassing rather than in governing. 2 The Achaian President held office for a vear onlv ; he Achaian . ,. General in- was incapable of immediate reelection, but he might be capable of chosen again the year after. 3 In conformity with this redeSion! law, Aratos, during his long ascendency, was commonly elected, seemingly quite as a matter of course, in the alternate years. In those years when he was not himself in office, he was often able to procure the election of 1 The Constitution puts no restriction upon reelection ; in practice no President has ever remained in office for more than two terms. 8 On the other side see the ingenious arguments in the "Federalist," No. lxxii. p. 390. Doubtless, as in most political questions, there is something to be said on both sides, but practically the disadvantages of reelection seem decidedly to predominate. This view is strongly taken by Tocqueville, i. 228, et seqq. The new Southern Confederation has made the President incapable of reelection, but has given him a longer term of office, namely, for six years. Art. ii. § 1. 3 Pint. Ar. 21. 'E7T€i /ut) tear iviavrbv e^rjv, Trap' iviavrdv a!pe?, 7. 82. Tin6^(vov r&v iiirb t&v irep] "Aparov (Is- ayA/xtvuf), Eyperbatas, &c. Beem mere nominees and instruments of Aratos. Even with I. diad i and Aristomachos be interferes in a Btrange way. ■-! As his son the younger Aratos. Pol. i\. 87. v. 1. :i See Droysen, ii. 188. I shall examine this question in a note at the end "I' < 'hapter v iii. * Pint. At. II. Tf B' 'Apdrtfi trvvrjKOov (Is 'S,tKvuvar<3i' , Axiiiwu ov voWol, Hal y(vo/j.(VT)s iKi(\7)rrias yptOr] arpaTtjyds adrOKpdrup, Kal ■n(pi(ffT?)(ra.TO n tl ther band this title was the ftrsl Btep of D, o the Tyranny. Bu1 the guard of Aratos was at lea tard of ci1 teens i of mercenaries. REELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT. 305 practically to influence his conduct in office. But the pro- chap. v. hibition of reelection at any time, however distant, may lead to still worse evils. It was tried at Rome in the case of the Consulship, 1 but it was afterwards given up. Such a rule, it is obvious, might often deprive the State of the services of its best citizens at the very time when they were most wanted. But the Achaian system of forbidding immediate reelection, though it could not entirely remove, probably did a good deal to lessen, the evil complained of in America, And it effectually stopped what was really the danger in Greece, that of the same man being elected, year after year, till he contrived to convert a permanent Presidency into a Tyranny. Aratos indeed, even when Special not in the highest office, was the practical ruler of the ^.^g 11 League ; still the alternation of official and non-official years at least marked the distinction which separates the republican leader, however great his official power and personal influence, from the Tyrant reigning by force. If his government once, for a moment, assumed something like the outward form of Tyranny, even that extreme measure had some shadow of constitutional sanction, and it was ventured on only in a moment of extreme danger to the Union and its chief. The laws of the Achaian commonwealth allowed an able and eloquent statesman to exercise an almost unbounded influence, but they sup- plied an easy means of checking him if he displayed the least tendency to abuse his power. Every alternate year at least he had to descend to the legal rank of a private citizen, and it rested wholly with his fellow-citizens whether he should ever rise above it again. It is clear that the Achaian League did not, as Republics are sometimes charged with doing, exhibit any jealousy of distinguished men. The whole career of Aratos shows the contrary. After his death no one inherited his full influence ; but 1 Liv. Epit. Ivi. X 306 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. CHAP. V. Position of suc- ceeding Generals. we always find the Federal President a person high in both personal and official position. Unless it were during the few wretched years before the final Roman Conquest, the best men in the country never shrank from public affairs or stood aloof from the great offices of the State. Achaia, like all other countries, was not free from personal jealousies and party divisions ; but the several parties seem commonly to have fairly striven to place their best men in the chief office of the Commonwealth. It is only twice or thrice, and that, in one case at least, through an over- whelming foreign influence, that we find a confessedly incapable President set at the head of the League. 1 It is a great problem in government to secure power enough in the rulers without trenching on the rights of the whole body. This problem the Achaian League seems very satisfactorily to have solved. The Senate, Between the Government and the Popular Assembly there stood, as in all other Greek commonwealths, a Senate. Of this Senate we have less knowledge than we could wish. Its mention in our authorities is not so frequent as one might have expected, and in some passages it is hard to distinguish its action from that of the Popular Assembly." There are however other passages which make it clear that the Senate was a distinct body. 3 The 1 Aa in ili' ci of ] itos. Pol. iv. 82, v. ^, 80, 91. Cf. ri. 8. ■ Pol. i\. 'J''>, \\\iii. 3 (a passage which I Bhall deal with hereafter), where /Sovtof might almosl betaken for one of the man] synonyms of the ubly. Sii in xxiii. !i, $ov\tvrfipiov Beems to 1"' used for the place "I' Sleeting of the Assembly, which elsewhere is a theatre. \\i\. L0, sxxviii. -J. I'm iiKiini, Staatsverfa ,6 t. :; In Pol. ii. :: 7, the fStivKtvTai are clearlj mentioned as distincl Fedora] officors, jusl lil.'' Hi'- apxovTts and HncvaTat, with whom thej i n joined. So in ii. 16, xxiii. 7, 8, \\i\. !», the /(. Cf. v. 30, 91. In v. 1, we see the Federal Congress distinctly voting supplies, but we have no hint as to the way in which they were to be levied. ' 310 GEiGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chaf. v. tain sum which ihe city bad to raise< by whatever form of local taxation it thought best. And really, .houdi i.'ie L .lited States prefer a system of more strictly Federal taxation, tlicre seems nothing in the other method neces- Military Barily inconsistent with the strictest Federal unity. 1 In gents military matters, we find the Assembly sometimes requiring ? rd S particular cities to furnish particular contingents, 2 and Assembly, sometimes investing the General with power to summon the whole military force of the League. 3 Beside these citizen soldiers, the League, according to the custom of the age, made large use of mercenaries, whose pay must have come out of the Federal Treasury. But they seem to have been kept strictly under the orders of the Federal General and his subordinate officers ; we never see Achaia, like Florence and other Italian states, at the mercy of a hired Captain. Out of these two classes of citizen and mercenary soldiers, the League kept up a small standing army, enough at least to supply a few important places Garrisons, with Federal garrisons. The immeasurable importance of Akrokorinthos caused a Federal garrison to be kept there, b.c. 243- after the deliverance of the city, 1 as regularly as a Mace- donian garrison had been kept during the days of its bondage. We also read of garrisons being kept in one or two cities, like Kyuaitlia 5 and Mantineia, 8 whose loyalty to the League was doubtful, or whose local Governments required Federal help against a discontented party. 7 But, beside what was necessary for these purposes, the League 1 Bee above, p. 14. 2 Pol v. 91. 3 PoL IT. 7. 'E\prjv\aKT\v txuvras twv rax^v ica\ aTpaTt)y^v -rrji ir6\tu>s i^ Axa'W « Pour hundred Achaian citizens and two hundred mercenaries. Pol ii. 58. 7 ,\ imilar powei is gives bj the Constitution of the United stales. Ait. iv. , I Fedi ral 1-i:\ FEDERAL GARRISONS. 311 is not likely to have kept any force, whether of citizens or chap. v. mercenaries, constantly under arms. But the extensive military reforms of Philopoimen * show that the citizens b.o. 210, 207 must have been in the habit of frequent military training, or he would hardly have had the opportunity of intro- ducing such considerable changes as he did into both the cavalry and the infantry of the League. In considering the constitution of the Achaian League, General it is impossible to avoid comparing it, almost at every step, son be- with the constitution of the United States. If I have JSSS" 5 pointed out some points of diversity, it is because the L, ";M' l ° 1 , L J> nn.l the general likeness is so close that the slightest uulikeness United at once makes itself felt. The two constitutions are as like one another as, under their respective circum- Close n iii mi •■!•«• genera] re- stances, they could be. Ihey arose in different quarters semblance of the globe, among men of different races and languages, thl^o and with an interval of two thousand years between the two. The elder Union was a Confederation of single Cities, which had once been strictly sovereign Republics, invested with all the rights of independent powers. The younger Union was a Confederation of large States, which had hitherto been mere colonies of a distant Monarchy, and which, before the War of Independence, never thought of pretending to sovereign rights. Even the New England colonies, though the circumstances of their foundation gave to their early days much greater independence than European colonies commonly possess, were still colonies, and fully recognized their allegiance to the mother country. With this difference of position to start from, it is much more remarkable that there should be any considerable degree of likeness between the two constitutions than that there should be some considerable degree of uulikeness. ' Pint. Phil. 7. 0. 312 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. The chief differences between them are the natural results Differ- of the difference between a Confederation of Cities and GI1CGS arising ■ a Confederation of large States. From this distinction difference a ^ ouce follows the main difference of all, that the between a Achaian Congress was a Primary Assembly, while the Coufede- . ° J ration of American Congress is a Representative Assembly. From a < oiitiile- this again follow certain differences of detail; the ration of American Congress could be, and is, bi-cameral, which the Achaian Congress could not be ; the Achaian Presi- dent was chosen by Congress, or by the nation, as we choose to put it, while the American President is legally chosen by special electors ; the Achaian President was a member, and the leading member, of Congress, while the American President is a power external to Congress. On this latter very important point we have seen that the practical working of our own Constitutional Monarchy makes a nearer approach to the Constitution of Achaia than is made by the Constitution of the United States. Analogies From a Primary Assembly, where every citizen has a right aitiesin to appear, it is obviously impossible to exclude the Chief tlon'.'r'th., Magistrate of the State. So the forms of a modem Con- President, stitutional Monarchy require the actual, though not the avowed, wielder of the royal power to be himself a member of one or other House of the Legislature. But such a position would be hardly consistent with the office of a President whose kingly functions are conferred on him by Law and not by an unwritten conventionality. Still the general position of the Chief Magistrate in the two constitutions is strikingly alike, and the more so when we remember that the historical origin of the two Di ereni offices was wholly different. The American President, origin "I ... . ' theoffice ''lie the Athenian Archon or the Roman Consul, inherited, System* un( ^ er ''"' necessary limitations of a republican system, the powers of which the King wns deprived by the Revo- lution, lie answers very exactly to the Athenian Archon COMPARISON BETWEEN ACHAIA AND AMERICA. 313 in his second stage, when a single Chief Magistrate was cnAr. v. chosen for ten years. The powers of the President are essentially kingly ; he lacks indeed the power of declaring war, but it is his function to negociate treaties of peace ; he has the command of the national forces ; he has the mass of the national patronage ; and he possesses a legislative veto, which is the more practical because it is only suspensive. All these powers are strictly royal ; Kingly only, when put into the hands of a republican magistrate, of the* they are necessarily limited in various ways. In some p me " L ' a ? cases the confirmation of the Senate is legally required for the validity of the President's acts ; he is, like the Consul, the sole mover and doer, but another power in the State possesses the Tribunitian function of forbidding. 1 In all cases his power is practically limited by the tem- porary tenure of his office, and by his personal respon- sibility' for any illegal act. Still, limited as they are in 1 This analogy is not quite perfect. The President's acts have to be formally confirmed by the Senate ; the Consul's acts needed no formal con- firmation from the Tribunes. All that the Tribune did was to step in with his Veto when he thought good. But the right of confirmation, in the hands of a body which can originate nothing, is practically reduced to a right of rejection. 3 I mean responsibility in the old Greek and in the legal English sense, not in that in which we often speak of Ministers being " responsible to Parliament." This last phrase simply means that the House of Commons may discuss their acts, and that, if it disapproves of them, it can easily drive them to resignation. But a Greek Magistrate was, and an American President is, liable to legal trial and punishment for his official acts. So is an English Minister, but not as a .Minister. If it can be proved that the First Lord of the Treasury has been guilty of malversation at the Treasury, if it can be proved that he has, as a Privy Councillor, given the Sovereign illegal advice, the Law can in either case touch him, by impeach- ment or otherwise. But as "Prime Minister," with a good or a bad "policy," the Law cannot touch him, because it knows nothing of his existence. In our system, Parliamentary responsibility has become so effective as to make strictly legal responsibility nearly a dead letter. But in the American system, there is no such thing as Parliamentary re- sponsibility ; ten thousand votes of censure cannot displace the President, but an impeachment can. 314 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. CHAP. V. Nothing roya] about the Achaian General. General resem- blance of the two Presidents their exercise, the powers are in themselves kingly ; ' the President stepped into the King's place ; he has really more power than a Constitutional King has personally, though less than belongs to a powerful First Minister acting in a Constitutional King's name. But the Achaian General did not succeed any King ; if there ever was one King over all the Old Achaian cities it was in a long past and mythical time ; the single General succeeded to the functions of the two Generals whom the League originally elected. There Avas therefore nothing kiugly about his origin ; the Achaians deliberately decided that one Chief Magistrate was better than two. and that it was well to clothe that Chief Magistrate with powers unknown to earlier Democracies. 2 But the general resemblance between the Heads of the two Unions is obvious ; what- ever may be the differences in detail, we see, in both caseB, that a highly democratic constitution can afford to invest a single chief with nearly the whole executive power, and we sec, in both cases, that so great an extent of legal power may be suiricicnt to gratify the ambition of the citizens i Hamilton, in the " Federalist " (No. lxix. p. 371), labours hard, as his argument requires, to show the points of difference between the elective and responsible President and the hereditary and irresponsible King. Thai is, he brings forward the republican limitations of the President's powers more Btronglythan the kingly nature of the powers themselves. II. then compares the President with the Governors of particular States, Bhowingthal the President's powers do not, on the whole, exceed theirs. I'.ui the powers of a State Governor arc no less kingly within their own range, and they are also kinglj in their origin. The Governor of the in- dependent State succeeded the Governor of the dependent Colony, and he, whether elected or Dominated, was essentially a reflected image of Kingship. The Governor of the State retained the position of the Governor of the Colony, with such changes as a republican system aecessarilj re- quired It m;i\ be doubted whether republics which had bad no sort of i periei t monarchical institutions would have invested any single i trate with the large powers possessed by the American Governors. " The daya when At Inns iia.i :) Bingle Archon were of course Long before ii. became a Democracy, I" fad the gradual advances of Democracy were largely made si the exp I I he An honi hip. POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE TWO SYSTEMS. 315 who are successively raised to it. Neither Union hesitated chap. v. to create something like a temporary King, and neither Union ever fell under the sway of anything like a per- manent Tyrant. 1 In both these respects the Achaian and American Democracies stand together, and are distin- guished alike from the earlier Democracies of Greece and from the Democracies of mediaeval Italv. Florence in- deed, and other Italian cities, invested their magistrates with far greater powers than those of either the Achaian General or the American President. But those powers could be safely vested only in a Board or College ; a single chief came in only as a temporary Dictator,' 2 and the temporary Dictator often contrived to convert himself into a Tyrant. The Achaian and the American Confede- ration stand together as the two Democracies which have entrusted a single Chief Magistrate with the greatest amount of power, and those in which that power has been less abused than anywhere else. The American Senate is an institution to which there No exact is no exact parallel in the Achaian system. The founders - m Achaia of the American Constitution adopted the general prill- African ciple of a Second Chamber from the constitution of the Senate. mother country. They adapted it to republican ideas by making its seats elective instead of hereditary, and they invested it with some powers which the British House of Lords does not possess. It is the constitutional check on the power of the President, and it is the special 1 The doubtful stretches of authority on the part of the President during the present struggle can hardly fail to remind us of the irregular pro- ceedings of Aratos in the crisis of the Kleomenic war. See below, Chapter vii. But I see as little reason to suspect Mr. Lincoln, as there was to suspect Aratos, of any real intention to establish a Tyranny. 2 The Podesta of so many cities, the Roman Senator, and so forth, were originally Dictators required by special emergencies, though those emer- gencies sometimes lasted so long as to convert the Dictatorship into a permanent Magistracy. I do not remember any magistrate in a demo- cratic city really analogous to the American President. 316 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. t. guardian of the rights of the several States. Each State, great and small, has its two Senators, while in the House of Representatives members are carefully appor- A Second tioned to population. Where the Assembly is primary, Chamber . ^i t> •-• i impossible a Second Chamber, in the same sense as the .British maryAs- House of Lords or the American Senate, cannot exist, sembly. jj. - g Q f ^ie essence f such a Chamber that its members should not be at the same time members of the Lower House. But in a constitution like that of Achaia, no citizen, whatever office he may hold, can cease to be a member of an Assembly whose very essence is that it consists of all the citizens. A Senate is necessary for many purposes ; sometimes it prepares measures for dis- cussion in the Assembly, sometimes it acts independently by commission from the Assembly ; but in either case it is a mere Committee of the sovereign body, a portion of its members acting on the behalf, and by the authority, of the whole. The special duties of the American Senate were, in Achaia, part of the duties of the Sovereign Assembly itself. The Assembly finally confirmed the treaties which the General negotiated ; the Assembly, in which each city had an equal voice, was itself the natural guardian of State independence. The principle of State equality which America confines, in most cases, to one branch of her Legislature, was applied in Achaia, in a more rigid form, 1 Analogy of to her Bingle Assembly. The Aehaian Senate is more W egian analogous to the Norwegian Lagthing than to anything 1 '"""• in the constitution either of England or of America. The Norwegian Storthing is, like most other European Assem- blies, Representative and aot Primary; it is indeed doubly ' in the Arii.,]. .11 \ embly, each city, great or small, had one vote. In the American Senate each State, greal or Bmall, i ad an equal Dumber <>f Senators, bul the votes are ao1 taken bj States; the two Senators of a State may vote on opposite Bides oi the question, like the two members for an BJn gHwb count] or borough. POSITION OF THE SENATE AND CABINET. 317 representative, being chosen by indirect election. But it chap. v. so far approaches to the nature of a Primary Assembly that there is no distinct Second Chamber. The Storthing chooses a Lagthing from among its own members, and the body thus chosen discharges several of the functions of a Senate or House of Lords. 1 But even here the analogy is very imperfect ; for the Lagthing, being a mere portion of the Storthing, exists only while the Storthing is sitting, while it is of the essence of a Greek Senate to act when the Public Assembly is not sitting. A less important difference between the Achaian and American Constitutions may be seen in the far higher legal position Higher of the Ministers or Councillors of the Achaian General, of the as compared with the Cabinet of the American President. MhlSrs But, even here, we have seen that, in all probability, the [ Ao /-" quoted above, p. 267, AMERICA NOT A COPY OF ACHAT A. 319 distant in time and place, in any degree a conscious imi- chap. v. tation of the elder? I am inclined to think that it was lion not a not. The founders of the American Union Avere not imitation scholars, but practical politicians. They were fully dis- '.^.lni'u posed to listen to the teaching of history, but they hud small opportunity of knowing what the true and uncor- rupted teaching of Grecian history really was. Those Eemark- chapters of the "Federalist" 1 which are devoted to the ',',', !n1 " consideration of earlier instances of Federal Government ",' , 11 "' Acnaian show every disposition to make a practical use of ancient history precedents, but they show very little knowledge as to what "Fede- those precedents really were. It is clear that Hamilton la ' and Madison knew hardly anything more of Grecian history than what they had picked up from the " Observations" of the Abbe Mably. But it is no less clear that they were incomparably better qualified than their French guide to understand and apply what they did know. Mably's account of the xVchaian League, 2 like his account of the Amphiktyonic 3 Council, is in the style of the French scholarship of the last century. How that looks by the light of English and German scholarship of the present century, hardly needs to be told. Of course the Amphi- ktyonic Council appears as the "States-General" of a regular Confederation, which is paralleled with the Confederation of Switzerland. In treating of the Achaian League, Mably confounds the Assembly with the Senate ; 4 he has hardly 1 Federalist, No. xviii. p. 91. 2 Observations sur l'Histoire de Grece. Guivres de Mably, iv. 1S6, ed. 1792. 3 lb. iv. 10. See above, p. 143. 4 " On crea un senat commun de la nation ; il s'assembloit deux fois ban a. Egium, au eommenceineut du printemps et de l'automne, et il dtoit compose des deputes de chaque r&publiqne en uombreegal, Cette assembles ordonnoit la guerre ou la paix," &e. p. 187. The confusion is tin- more curious, because in matters of mere detail, like the two yearly meetings, ?dably is accurate enough. He had evidently read his books with care, I ut without the least power of understanding them. 320 OKIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. CHAP. V. Mably's account of the League, followed by the American writers. any notion of the remarkable powers Tested in the General, or, as he calls him, the Prsetor ; l finally, he loads Aratos with praises for that act of his life which Plutarch so emphatically condemns, which Polybios has so much ado to defend, his undoing his own work and laying Greece once more prostrate at the feet of a Macedonian master. 2 The comments of the American statesmen on such a text are curious, and more than curious; they are really in- structive. Their vigorous intellects seized on, and prac- tically applied, the few facts which they had got hold of, and even from the fictions they drew conclusions which would be perfectly sound, if one only admitted the premisses. They instinctively saw the intrinsic interest and the practical importance of the history of Federal Greece, and they made what use they could of the little light which they enjoyed on the subject. One is at first tempted to wish that, instead of such a blind guide as Mably, such apt scholars had had the advantage of the teaching of a Thirhvall, or that they had been able to draw for themselves from the fountain head of Polybios himself? Had they known that, in the Achaian Assembly, Keryneia had an equal vote with Megalopolis, how dexterously would they have grappled with the good and 1 lie does indeed Bay (p. 190), " Elle lit la faute heureuse de ne Conner qu'a un seul pr&eur ['administration de toutes Bes affaires." This is of course a translation of those famous words of Polybios to which 1 have so often referred ; bul mo words ever stood more in need of a comment. a "(),, n,. peut, je crois, donnertrop de louangea a Aratus pour avoir recouru a la protection de la Maceaoine mime, dans une conjoncture facheuseoti il B'agissoil du Balul des Acheens. Plutarque ue pense pas ain i," .v.'. p. L97. This my curious argument goes on f< r Beveral pages. Polybios had pniised Aratos a little ; Mably was determined to praise him much. a 'pi,,. ,.],],.,. Presidenl Adams scans to have gone to Polybios, at least in ., translation. Ee gives a long extract on the Achaian history. Defcnco of Ho- Constitute .*<■. i. 298. l'-nt he is far lion, entering into its practical value like the authors of the " Federalist." GREATER VALUE OF AN UNCONSCIOUS PARALLEL. 321 evil sides of such a precedent. How they would have chap. v. shown that the principle of State equality which the Achaians thus affirmed was amply secured by the constitu- tion of the Senate, 1 while the unfairness which could not fail to attend this part of the Achaian system was carefully guarded against by the opposite constitution of the House of Representatives. 2 Had they fully realized the prominent position of the Achaian General, so different from any- thing in earlier Democracies, what an example they would have had before them to justify those large powers in the President for which they so strenuously contend. 3 But it was really better for mankind, better for historical study, that the latter of these two great experiments was made in practical ignorance of the former. A living repro- An tmcon- duction, the natural result of the recurrence of like ness to the circumstances, is worth immeasurably more than any ™rallel conscious imitation. It is far more glorious that the m(ne , , _ t valuable wisdom and patriotism of Washington and his coadjutors than a should have led them to walk unwittingly in the steps of one Markos and Aratos, than that any intentional copying of their institutions should have detracted ought from the freshness and singleness of their own noble course. Had it been otherwise, the later generation of patriots might have shone only with a borrowed light ; as it is, the law- givers of Achaia and the lawgivers of America are entitled to equal honour. In truth the world has not grown old ; the stuff of which heroes are made has not perished from among men ; when need demands them, they still step forth in forms which Plutarch himself might have pour- trayed and worshipped. The dim outline of Markos of Keryneia grows into full life in the venerable form of Washington ; a Timoleon, unstained even by Tyrants' 1 See Federalist, No. lxii. (p. 334). 2 II.. Hv. (p. 298). 3 lb. lxix. (p. 371, ft soijq. ) Y 322 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. chap. v. blood, still lives among us under the name of Gari- baldi ; it remains for us to see whether the modern world can attain to another no less honourable form of greatness, whether, among the rulers of later days, one will ever be found who shall dare to enter upon the glorious path of Lydiadas. CHAPTER VI. ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE jETOLIAN LEAGUE. The Achaian Confederation is an object of such sur- chap. vi. passing interest, both in Grecian history and in the general history of Federal Government, that I have dwelt upon its smallest beginnings and its minutest constitu- tional details at a length which seemed no more than their due. But, alongside of the League of Achaia, there existed, during nearly the whole time of its being, a rival Union, differing from it but slightly in constitutional forms, equal or superior to it in military power, but whose general reputation in the eyes of the contemporary world was widely different. The League of iEtolia preceded General that of Achaia in assuming the character of a champion bkncea of Greece against foreign invaders. But, in that period * nd Dif " ° 1 ferences of Grecian history with which Ave are most concerned, the between tllC League of iEtolia most commonly appears as an assem- Leagues of blage of robbers and pirates, the common enemies of^5J aad Greece and of mankind. The Achaian and the /Etoliau Leagues, had their constitutions been written down in the shape of a formal document, would have presented but few varieties of importance. The same general form of Government prevailed in both ; each was Federal, each was Democratic ; each had its Popular Assembly, its smaller Senate, its General with large powers at the head of all. The differences between the two are merely those Y 2 324 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE yETOLIAN LEAGUE. chap. vt. differences of detail which will always arise between any two political systems of which neither is slavishly copied from the other. Both are essentially Governments of the same class. If therefore any general propositions as to the moral effect of particular forms of Government had any truth in them, we might fairly expect to find Achaia and iEtolia running exactly parallel careers. Both Achaia and zEtolia were alike Federal states ; both were alike Democracies in theory ; both were alike tempered in their practical working by an element of liberal Aristo- niu-tra- cracy. If therefore Federal states, or Democratic states, which or Aristocratic states, were necessarily weak or strong, thevgive peaceful or aggressive, honest or dishonest, we should emptiness see Achaia and yEtolia both exhibiting the same moral proposi- characteristics. But history tells us another talc. The politics political conduct of the Achaian League, with some mis- takes and some faults, is, on the whole, highly honourable. The political conduct of the /Etolian League is, through- out the century in which we know it best, almost always simply infamous. The counsels of the Achaian League were not invariably enlightened ; they were now and then perverted by passion or personal feeling ; but their gene- ral aim was a noble one, and the means selected were commonly worthy of the end. But the counsels of the /Etolian League were throughout directed to mere plunder, or, at most, to selfish political aggrandizement. Some politicians might tell us that this was the natural result of I lie inherent recklessness and brutality of democratic governments. If so, tin* same evil results should have appeared in the history of the Democracy of Achaia. If it be said that Achaia was saved from such crimes by the presence of an aristocratic element, .Ftolia should h;i\e been saved in the like manner. For the tempering of democratic forms by aristocratic practice is us visible in the history of AStotia as in the history of Achaia. ff, on COMPARISON BETWEEN ACHAIA AND iETOLIA. 325 the other hand, it is argued that a Federal Uuion is chap.vl necessarily weak, and that even Achaian history contains instances of such weakness, it is easy to answer that no Monarchy, no indivisible Republic, ever showed greater vigour and unity than the original /Etolian Confederation. There are absolutely no signs of disunion, no tendency to separation, visible among any of its members. If iEtolia fell, and fell before Achaia, it fell through causes wholly unconnected with its Federal constitution, through war with an irresistible foreign foe, through grievous errors of its own committing, but errors to which Consolidated and Federal states, Monarchies and Republics, Oligarchies and Democracies, are all alike equally liable. The history of ^Etolia indeed shows that the Federal form of govern- ment is no panacea for all human ills ; it shows that a well-planned constitution at home is no guarantee for wise or honourable conduct in foreign affairs ; but these propositions are so self-evident that we need hardly go to iEtolia for the proof of them. But the combined history of the two great Greek Confederations certainly does show the utter fallacy of all general propositions as to the good or evil moral effect of political forms. It proves, above all, the utter fallacy of the declamations in which it is fashionable to indulge against Republican, and espe- cially against Federal, Governments. National character, national circumstances, no doubt both influence the poli- tical constitution and are influenced by it. But the two things are essentially distinct from one another. The Achaians, an upright and highly civilized people, capable of noble and patriotic designs, but somewhat deficient both in moral and military vigour, lived under nearly the same political constitution as the /Etolians, an assemblage of mountain hordes, brave, united among themselves, and patriotic in a narrow sense, but rude, boastful, rapacious, and utterly reckless of the rights of others. The forms of 326 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE .ETOLIAN LEAGUE. chap. vi. a Democratic Federation did not hinder, among either people, the developement of its characteristic virtues and vices. Neither have we any reason to suppose that their developement would have been hindered by the forms of a pure Democracy, of an Oligarchy of birth or of wealth, or of a Monarchy either despotic or constitutional. Early His- The early history of the xEtolians is very obscure, and !i:t*ulia it * s hard t° say at what time a Federal system was first organized among them. Our chief knowledge of them in ante-Macedonian times comes from the account which b.c. 426. Thucydides gives of the unlucky campaign of the Athenian Demosthenes in their country. 1 They there appear as the most backward portion of the Hellenic nice ; their language was difficult to understand, and their greatest tribe, the Enrytanes, were said to retain the barbarous habit of eating raw meat. 2 Above all, they still lived in detached and unfortified villages. 3 Indeed at no time do the /Etolians seem to have attained to the full perfection of Greek city-life. When their League was at the height of its power, we still find but small mention of ^Etolian towns ; indeed we may distinguish the .Ktolian League, as an union of districts or cantons, from the Acliaian League, Probable which w;is so essentially an union of cities. 1 Some sort of union union would seem to have existed among them even in among 1 bo /Etolian tril" . ' Thuc. iii. 9 I, el seqq. '-' IN. 'Ayvoo(TT6TaT()i 5t yXdiraav nai oi/j.o(pdyoi, ws Keyovrat. Sic Xi> buhr'a Am-. Hist. iii. 270. :i Hi. OIkovv 5( ii'Anr7ros] AheoAoh ■KapaSwaeiv ; Strabo, 1. ix. C. 4 (vol. ii. p. 290). ecm 8e [Nav- ■naKTus] vvv AiVwAwr, $i\'nrirov -nposKplvavros. See Thivlwall, vi. 20. 328 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE JETOLIAN LEAGUE. chap. vi. of receiving and holding a common possession. So, before that time, there were public monuments at Thermon, dedicated in the common name of the ^Etolian nation. 1 On the other hand, Arrian speaks of zEtolian b.c. 335. embassies to Alexander in a way which has been sup- posed to imply that no JEtolian Confederation then T h e existed. 2 But the passage may be explained in other L TE™ wa J s > an ^ it * s c * ear tnat > ^ tne League did not exist at Reign of the beginning of the reign of Alexander, it had acquired b.c. 336- 'a good deal of consistency before his death. The ac- 328, quisition of Naupaktos was only the beginning of a long series of iEtolian annexations, which stand out promi- nently in the later history of Greece. While Alexander was conquering Persia, the /Etolians had compelled Oi- niadai and some other portions of Akarnania to unite themselves, on some terms or other, with the JStolian body. 3 Vengeance for this aggression was strongly de- i See the inscription'which Strabo (vol. ii. p. 350) quotes from Ephoros, a writer contemporary with Philip; 'EpSujUiWoj ttoTS' AitooAov rivV av{6i)Kav hlrwXoi atyertpas ixvTJfi dpeTrjs esopav. See Thirlwall, viii. 226. - Artian, 1. 10. 3. AItcoKuI 5e irpev&tia.';, , and Dioddroa (XViU. 8) "I A _ . B.C. 323-2. fruitless struggle known as the Lamian War. By the result of that war, Athens was, for the first time since the days of the Thirty, deprived of freedom as well as of greatness ; she had to surrender her orators, to restrict her franchise, to receive a foreign garrison, humiliations which Philip and Alexander had never inflicted on her. The /Etolians were more fortunate ; when the course of the war had turned utterly against them, they were de- livered by the necessity under which Antipater and Kra- teros found themselves of resisting Eumenes in Asia. They were left wholly untouched, partly, it would seem, because it was still hoped, some day or other, to carry out the sentence of deportation against them. 3 In the JStolia later wars of the Successors, the iEtolians play a consider- theWara able part, and they are always spoken of as a single "' l^ e people, acting with a common purpose. But the glimpses speaks of 'Axapvaves es rd Alru\iKdv ffwreXovvres (i. 25. 4). This would seem to show that some at least of the conquered Akarnanians had been incorporated (on whatever terms) rather than expelled or extirpated. 1 Diod. U.S. Kal yap 6 @as ovk Olvtadwv iraTSes d\\' avros imBijaei tt)v StK-qv avro?s. So Pint. U.S. 2 This was agreed upon by Antipater and Krateros in the Lamian War (Diod. xviii. 25), but Bishop Thirlwall (vii. 218) hints, with every look of probability, that such may have been the mind of Alexander himself. Such a scheme was quite in the spirit of Alexander's other plans (Diod. xviii. 4. Thirlwall, vii. 141) ; but it hardly suits either the position or the character of Antipater or Krateros to devise it, though they might be quite ready to carry it out, if already conceived by Alexander. 3 Diod. xviii. 25. AieyvaiKSres vcrepoi/ avTods KaraTroAe/xijaai Kal paraa- rrjaai iravoiKiovs a-xavras els rijv e'prj/uiav Kal irofip cot cStcc ttjs 'Aalas Keififvrfv X&pav. 330 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE .^TOLIAN LEAGUE. chap. vi. afforded us of their internal state and constitution are few Glimpses and feeble. On one occasion we find an .Etolian army jEtoliao leaving the field for a while to go home and discharge the tionlu* 11 duties of citizens in the National Assembly. 1 In another this time, passage we find our first personal mention of an /Etolian General ; 2 in others we see the JEtolian Federal Assembly discharging its proper function of commissioning Ambas- sadors in the name of the whole nation, 3 and of listening Share to the representatives of foreign powers. 4 In the defence iEtoliana of Greece against the Gauls we again find the yEtolians Gaulish honourably prominent. Here also we obtain one or two War, more glimpses of their internal condition and their foreign b.c. 280- . . 279. policy. The year before the invasion they had compelled Annexa- the Trachiiiian Herakleia to enter into their Confederacy, Herakleia. ail( l they now, says our informant, fought for it as for a possession of their own."' We also come across the names 6 of several .Etolian officers, and apparently of at 1 There ran hardly be any doubt that this is the true meaning, as argued by Droyeen (i. 73) and Thirlwall (vii. 1!»7), of the expression Sid Tivas edviKas xp*'" 1 *, in Diod. xviii. 13. "EOvos is the set formula, in Polybioa at least, for a Federation, and tdviical xp f ^ ai cannot be so well translated as by the words "Federal purposi Bu1 it would be a Btrange phrase indeed t<> describe an Akarnanian inroad, as Schorn (3) and Koi-tiim (iii. I'iim suppose. 2 Diod. xviii. 38. 7 £iv -hv (TTparriyds 'A\t£avSpos aItw\6s. This need not imply . 'i General of the League; but, as we find a single General booh afterwards, it se< ms most natural so to interprel it. :l Diod. xx. !*'.'. Tov koivov twv A}tgl>Au a-KoartihavTos irptafitvTds irtpl SiaXvatwv. 4 Diod. xix. tin". 'Eirl Si tovtwv 'ApiffToS-ij/xos .... fcrl tov koivov twv AitoiKwv SiKatoAoyi^ffd/xtvos irpotTpi^arro to\ ir\rf0r] fior)dtiv rots 'AvTty6vov irp6.yiia.criv. '' I 'aus. x. 20. 0. "'Erfi ydp irportpov tovtwv ot Aitw\o\ crvvTiKtlv Toi>s 'Hpa.KKtwTasrfvdyKa.o-av is t6 AItwKikoV t6t* oSv rf/j.vvoi'TO air irtpl ir6\tws ovSiv T( 'HpaKKtoorais /xdWov rf koI avTo7s 1TpaS7)K0v' dvOtiruv ni AlTU' v ->i iETOLIA UNDER THE SUCCESSORS. 331 least one General of the League. Every mention of the ohap. vi. people gives the strongest impression of national unity. It appears then that, if we looked onlv at the Federal Earlier 11 ... Develope- period of Grecian history, we might be inclined to give ment of the palm of antiquity to the iEtolian rather than to the m some Achaian League. The Federal system of iEtolia was P° mt8 - clearlv in full working before the first four cities of the original Achaia had begun to draw together. The whole .Etolian nation was united, as one body under one head, for years before the ten Achaian cities invested Markos of Keryneia with the Presidency of the whole Achaian nation. But this was merely the natural result of the violent separation of the Achaian cities by the Macedonian power. The Achaian League was the revival Its causes. of an ancient union after a season of forced disunion. No such blow ever fell upon vEtolia, though, as we have seen, a heavier blow still was threatened. The .Etolians were thus enabled to improve and to enlarge, at a time when the Achaians were driven to rebuild from the foundation. It is not wonderful then if some steps in the developement of Federalism were taken in ^Etolia earlier than they were in Achaia. It is certain that yEtolia was united earlier than Achaia under the presidency of a single General, but it appears, on the other hand, that the legal powers of the iEtolian Chief Magistrate were more restricted than those of his Achaian brother. It should be remembered that the precedent of a single General at the head of a Federal State had been long before set by the Arkadians in the days of Lykomedes. 1 There can be no doubt that the union among the closer members of the iEtolian League was still closer than the among the union among the members of the Achaian League. This ^ tolians - 1 Src, above, p. '204. 332 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ^TOLIAN LEAGUE. chap. vi. is clearly true of all the original .Etolians, whatever may have been the case with the noiwEtolian states which were afterwards admitted or forced into the Confederacy. This is the natural result of the difference between an Union of Tribes and an Union of Cities. 1 It has been already more than once remarked that Federalism took root earliest among those portions of the Greek race which were in every way the least advanced, and which were furthest removed from the ideal perfection of Greek city-life. When several closely allied tribes occupy a continuous territory, the feeling of political independence in each will be weaker, and the feeling of national unity in the whole body will be stronger, than it can be in the case of several cities, each capable of, and accustomed to, The the exercise of the fullest rights of sovereignty. To unite LeaguTof" cities which have once tasted of full autonomy is far more J'^'j.' ts difficult than to unite districts where cither there are no than of c itics or else the cities are quite secondary. Thus, in England, the distinctions between the old Anglian, Saxon, and Jutish Kingdoms were soon and easily effaced ; but it has required many more centuries, and the teaching of a long and latter experience, to bring the great cities of Italy to act as members of one united nation. Hence, though the anion of the Aeliaian Cities was never so .lose as the union of the .Etolian Tribes, yet it was a for greater triumph of the Federal principle to bring Corinth, Sikyon, and Megalopolis to act together at, all, than it was to bring about a much closer union between this and that horde of .Ktolian plunderers. For, after all, the ■ Bo Brandstater (p. 806) ; "Vielleicht hatteesBonsI den Aetolern fdr- derlich Bein konnen, daaa Bie orepriinglich nichl Bowohl ein St'adtebund (medio aohaer) sondern mehr ein VbTkerbund waren, ""'1 folglich nichl in m. \ iele einzelne [nteressen rich zertheilen durften. Tittmann (728) remark tint there is no recorded instance of separate tiononthe pari ot any iEtolian canton, while, in every other League, om< in d ur, ^TOLIA A LEAGUE OF DISTRICTS, NOT OF CITIES. 333 close union of the yEtolian Tribes was little more than ohap. vi. the union of a band of robbers, faithful to each other, and enemies to the rest of the world. 1 It would be hard to say exactly how close that union was, and what measure of independence was left to each of the constituent members of the League. 2 But it seems probable that those cities which were incorporated with the League did not lose those rights which were essential to the existence of any Greek city. The exact terms of admission will be discussed presently ; but it would be far easier to believe that Naupaktos and Herakleia were reduced to the con- dition of dependencies, without any share in the general deliberations of the iEtolian nation, than that they lost the universal rights of local legislation and free choice of local magistrates. 3 The relation of dependent alliance was familiar in Greece ; the sacrifice of local indepen- 1 Compare what Isokrates says of the Lacedaemonians (Panath. 245), st' ouSels av aiiToiis Sid -ye rr)v o/xSvotav SiKaioos itraivicreiev, ovSev fxaWov rj rois KaTaTvovTiards Kal AyaTas Kal roits irepl rds &AAas dSiKias ovras' Kalydp iittivoi iv AlruAla iroAir(v6vruv roi)s Kdovs). It may however be that a grant of citizenship lurks in the words cis AlruAuv tvruv ruv Ktiuv. 334 OKIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE JETOLIAN LEAGUE. chap. vi. dence in exchange for a share in the general govern- ment was an idea confined to the pre-historic statesmen of Attica. Demo- The constitution of ./Etolia was Democratic in the same character sense in which the constitution of Achaia was Democratic. League ^ nat is t° say, the supreme power was vested in the Popular Assembly, the Panaitolikon, 1 in which, as in Achaia, every citizen had a vote. 2 But it is evident that, in so large a country as even the original /Etolia, the same causes must have been at work which infused so tempered strong an aristocratic element into the Democracy of with Aris- . . . _ . toeratic Achaia. One may however easily conceive that members e emen s. Q f ro ^|j er ] 10 rdes would be more easily drawn from their mountains to arrange schemes of plunder, than the orderly citizens of Achaia would be drawn to discuss subtle points of diplomacy, which were safely left in the hands of those who were practically their representatives. It is probable then that an .Etolian Congress was, as a rule, more largely attended than an Achaian Congress. But in such a state of society the feelings of clanship and of personal attachment arc always strong. A freebooting chief, at whose call many warriors had enriched themselves with 1 riai/atToiAi/fa (Boeckh, ('. I. ii. 632) or Pancetolicv/m, Liv, \.\xi. 20. Lii \ (xxxi 82) seems to use the word Pylaicum as synonymous. Possibly ParuBtolicum means an . 1 1 1 ■ ■ I i ; « 1 1 Assemblj , if held in its proper place in the old capital Thermon, or seemingly even at Naupaktos d,iv. x.wi. '2!», 4k), while PylaXcwm is the same body held, as ii sometimes was, at Kerakleia or elsewhere in the neighbour! I of Thermopylae. ' See Schorn, p. 26. Thirlwall, viii. 226. Diod. u.s. (see p. 880). T.) Kntvtiv tuiv AitwKwv, to ■/tK^Ot]. 1'n]. iv. f>. 7} Koun) rwv \lrui\iv ovi>o8os. The nature of the .Kt"lian Assembly is plainly set forth in the descrip- tion 11I I. i\v (wxvi. 28, 29). ConstbarU ei ex omnibus oppidis oon/vc- eandot /Btolos ad condlivm ; Omm/is coacta muUitudo, &c. This comes from PolybioS i.w. 10), ypdtpau tfio£(v its raj Tr6\(is «o) avyKaKtlv tovs Arra>Aoin X"-P lv T0 ^ fiov\(vrTas AltooAovs, k.t.A. 7 Pol. iv. 5. xx. 1. 10. So Livy, xxxv. 34. Apocletos (ita vocant sanctius concilium ; ex delectis constat viris). 336 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE .ETOLIAN LEAGUE. chap, vi. Committee of Thirty being appointed from among them. 1 The This Senate, as usual, considered matters before they were Apokletoi. brought forward in the General Assembly; 2 in concert with the General, it summoned the Assembly to discuss proposals which needed its sanction ; 3 and sometimes, whether by commission or by usurpation, it acted in the name of the nation without consulting the Assembly at all. 4 That it represented particular noble families, 5 or that it was an aristocratic body in any other sense 1 Pol. XX. 1. TpiaKovra tuv diroKX^ruv irpoex^'picravTO rods crvueSpev- aovras fiirci rov &a.ai\tws. Liv. xxxv. 45. Triginta principes, cum (piibus si qua vellet consultaret, delegenmt. This election was made by the Assembly. See Schorn, 27, note 4. Thirlwall, viii. 226. A passage in Livy (xlv. 28) might lead one to believe that the iEtolian Senate was a body so large as to contain more than 550 members of one party. In B.C. 167 the Romanizing leader Lykiskos procured the murder, by Roman hands, of that 'number of citizens of the patriotic party. " Quingentos quinquaginta principes ab Lycisco et Tisippo, ciivumsesso senatu per milites Romanos, missos a Brebio pra?fecto pnrsidii, interfeetos ; alios in exsilium actos esse." It is however possible that the meeting may really have been one of the Popular Assembly, and that Livy uses Senatus vaguely, as Polybios once at least (xxiii. 9) does fSovKevrfipwv. Still a Senate of a thousand members, the number most naturally suggested, is quite possible according to Greek ideas. 2 This seems implied in the words of Polybios (iv. 5), oSre koivtjv tQv AlTwKuV TTpOiSf^iflfVOl (TWOSOV O&Tt TOIS a-KOK\JjTOlS ffv/xixeTabuvTfS, K.T.K. and (XX, 10) ( i-i 1 1 1 i;i 1 1 1 1 (p. 504) says, " I>i<- Apocleteu onterschieden sich darin von den Demiurgen der Acbaer, dass sir in dringenden Fallen im Namen des Volkes beschliessen durften." Bui the Achaian parallel to the ApoklGtoi is ii.ii the Ddmiourgoi, but the Senate, which doubtless did often receive BUcl B d( legated power from the Assembly. 3 Pol. xx. 10. Liv. xxxvi. 28, 29. See above, p. 884. * See Livy, xxxv. 84. The A|H,klrtoi here decree certain important military expeditions, forwhich secrecy, or rather treachery, was m eded, ■' Schorn, p. 27. " Dieser [ Rath] Bcheinl die edlen Geschleohter vert re- ten mid ails del llaiiptlillgell hestalldeli VM halien." If Seliom, as Bishop Thirlwall suggests, gets Ins " Eauptlinge" from [ivy's Trigvnta Principes p, t quoted, il it reallj ■> wry slight foundation to build on. The word /■ moipes is constantly used by Livy to denote men of influence in a commonwealth, whether actually in office or not. FEDERAL MAGISTRATES. XI? than that in which all /Etolian and Achaian institutions ohap. vi. may be called practically aristocratic, is an idea supported by no evidence whatever. Of other Magistrates, besides MagL- the General, we find but few notices. There was a body ' called Synedroi, 1 and another body called Noniographoi.* It would be a natural guess that the Synedroi were, like the Achaian Deniiourgoi, the Assessors or Ministers of the General, but our only notice represents them as a Court acting with the General to take cognizance of cases of piracy. 3 In zEtolia such a function may well have been vested in the Executive Government of the League ; probably no inferior power would have been able to act with efficiency on those occasions when the national interest required that the national tendency to plunder should be restrained. It is at least evident that the Synedroi were a permanent Magistracy, and not merely appointed on occasion. The language used about the Nomographoi 4 seems to show that the yEtolian state- papers were revised at certain times, when these officers had to insert such laws, treaties, and other public acts, as had been passed since the last revision. It certainly im- plies that they were a regular permanent Magistracy, b.c. 205. Therefore when we read of Dorimachos and Skopas 5 1 Boeckh, C. I. 2350, 3046 (vol. ii. p. 280, 632), cf. i. 857. 2 lb. 3046. 3 The Teians in the one case and the Keians in the other ohtaiu from the TEtolian Assembly letters of protection against ^Etolian inroads. Any cases of infraction are to be referred to the General and Synedroi. 2350. ei 54 rls Ka ayv toi)s Kelovs, rov arparaybv del rdv trdpxovra rd eV Pdruihiav KaTayiy-eva KaraBiKa^ot/Ta icvpw elfMev, Kal toi)s crvvedpovs KaTaSiKaQifTas to7s Kelois t&v twv dyovToiv avTovs ^aaiav, &y ica SoKtadfai/Tt, Kuplovs el^ev. 3046. €i 5e ris Ka dytj r) avTods rj rd e/c t«s it6Kios rj x^P as > T « /*«*' *H l pavr) avairpuffcreiv rov tyStKrjfravra rrpits avvfSpovs dsl roi/s evapxovs. 4 The Teian decree is thus ordered to be enrolled. lb. 3046. ottcds 8e Kal els rods vofxovs Karax^piffOri d dviepwcris Kal d davXia, rods KaTacrraQivTas vofioypdcpovs KaTax«"pi|ai, eirei Ka ai vopoypafpiai yhuvrai, ets toi)s vofiovs. 5 Pol. xiii. 1. Ol AlrwAol . . . otKeioos SiaKet/nevot rrpds Kaivorofxlav rijs olKeias TroAireiav, ciKovto vo/j.oypd(pous Aopifiax " Ka ^ ^xoirav, . . . ot Kal TrapaAafi6vTts rr)v Qovaiav ravrriv eypaipav vofiovs. z 338 OKIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE .ETOLIAN LEAGUE. chap. vr. Powers of the General. effecting large changes in the iEtolian laws by virtue of this office, we may believe that they were appointed Nomo- graphoi with enlarged and unusual powers, but not that the office itself was something extraordinary or occasional. At the head of the League, as in Achaia and elsewhere, stood the Federal General. His main powers, civil, mili- tary, and diplomatic, were much the same as those of the General of the Achaians. He commanded the armies of the League, and represented it in negociations with foreign powers. But what we may call his parliamentary functions seem to have been somewhat different from those of the Achaian chief magistrate. In Achaia we have seen that the General was required to be an effective speaker in the Assembly, like our own Leader of the House of Commons, while the formal Presidency was vested in his Ministers. 1 In /Etolia, on the other hand, the General ap- pears to have been strictly the President of the Assembly, 2 and, being President, he was expressly forbidden to give any opinion on questions of peace and war. 3 We may take for granted that an ^Etolian General would be far more likely to take the warlike than the peaceful side of any such question ; such would doubtless be the bias of the mass of the Assembly also ; it was therefore wisely provided that they should not be exposed to have their passions yet further roused by inflammatory harangues from the chief magistrate of the commonwealth, lint the restriction seems also to point to a certain feeling of jealousy towards the General and his high powers of which we find no trace in the Aehaian body. As Presi- ' Bee above, p. 296, 7. a lAv. xxxi. 32, whore the General Damokritos clearly acta aa President. ■' Liv. xxxv. 2f>. Bene comparatum apnd AStoloaesse, tie Preetor, quum <|i' bello i "ii iilm 1 1, i|i ie ententiam diceret. Some editions have Achceos, bnl ii is dear thai no reading bu1 £toh» fonx '>n ii.. .if the restriction, see Thirlwall, viii 227. POWERS OF TIIE GENERAL. 339 dent of the Assembly, lie could, as we have seen, summon chap. yi. extraordinary Meetings. 1 He was elected' 2 at the regular Autumnal Congress, and he seems to have entered upon his office the same day, 3 without the delay which took place between the election of an Achaian General and his actual entrance upon office. Besides the General, there Com- were, as in Achaia, a Commander of Cavalry and a Secre- CavaJiy, t;iry of State. These three seem to be spoken of as the ^l^f 516 " three chief officers of the Republic. 4 state - Our notices of the internal constitution of iEtolia are so Foreign slight, and they present so few important points of contrast f the with that of Achaia, that a more interesting field of inquiry Lea S ue - is opened with regard to the foreign policy of the League. One point which calls for special examination is the re- lation of the League to those non-^Etolian states which v » i 1 See above, p. 335. 2 Tittmann (Staatsverfessung, 387) and Dr. Schmitz (Diet. Ant. art. iEtolicuin Foedus) infer from an obscure passage of Hesychios (v. Kvd/xeo irarplcji) that " the Assembly nominated a number of candidates, who had then to draw lots, and the one who drew a white bean was strategus." The passage in Hes3 r chios is, Kvu/xcp irar piy. 2,os Kal rui> AitcoAcJj' Tcis dpxdf Kvav' SieKAijpovv Se auras Kvdp.u>, Kal 6 t6v AevKov Aa/3cii/ iAdyxaw' dvdyzi Se tovs X9^ vovs i °° s '"d * v 'Ivdxy Kua/j.ol36\o v SiKaa-Ttjv. There is not a word here about the Assembly nominating candidates who drew lots. If the words of Hesychios prove anything, they prove that the election of all iEtolian magistrates was left wholly to the lot. To make us accept so improbable a stoiy, we should need some much better authority than Hesychios. The lot was never applied, even at Athens, to really important offices, like that of General, and we hear nothing of it in Polybios or any trustworthy author. No doubt Sophokles, as usual, transferred the practice of Athens in his own day to the mythical days of iEtolia, and Hesychios, by way of explanation, transferred it to historical vEtolia also. 3 Pol. ii. 3. Aeov T»7 Kara wudas rip.(pa. yzvtoBai T7)e ctfpeatv Kal ttjs irapd\rj\piv Trjs dpxijs, KaOdirep edos iffrlv AitcoAoZs. iv. 67. irapd 5e tols AlrwAoTs tjStj twv dpx c "P 6ff ' a " / kclQ^kovtoov arparriyos 7Jpe8r] Aopi/xaxos, Ss TrapavTiKa rrjv dpxyv TTapaXajSu>v, k.t.A. 4 Pol. xxii. 15. Liv. xxxviii. 11. The iEtolians (b.c. 189) are required to give hostages to Rome, but these three great officers are exempt. Z 2 ^40 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ^TOLIAN LEAGUE. chap. vr. were induced, or more often compelled, to become, in some sense or other, members of it. The history of iEtolia is conspicuously a history of annexation. So, it may be said, is the history of Achaia also. From Markps to Philopoimcn the League was ever extending itself over a wider territory, ever increasing the number of the cities which formed its component members. Some of the Achaian annexations may have been unjust and impolitic ; those at all events were so which were effected against the Contrast will of the annexed cities. But it does not appear that Achaia an . v cit . v > wnen once a(miittc< ^ 1)V whatever means, into the Achaian League, was ever placed in a position of depen- dence, or of any kind of formal inferiority to those cities which were in the League before it. The object of the League was to unite Achaia, Peloponnesos, if possible all Greece, in a single free and equal Federation. The end at least was noble, even if over-zeal sometimes misled Achaian statesmen into the employment of questionable means. But it is hardly possible, by the widest stretch of charity, to attribute such a broad and enlightened patriotism to the brigands of the .Etolian mountains. It is true that their character is known to us only from the descriptions of enemies, and something may fairly be abated from the general pictures of .Htolian depravity 1 which we find in cur Achaian informants, lint the facts of the case 'plainly show both that powerful men in iEtolia i I',,], ii. 45. AitoiAoI 5«i rrjv %nt Failed t<> !"• extended to the ffltolians. They have found vigorous advocates in Lucas (Ueber Polybiu Dai tellung des Aetolischen Bundes. Konigsberg. 1827) and Brandstater (Die GK chichten des Aetolischen Landes, Volkes, and Bundes. Berlin. 1844). N'm . l . ,ui,t the judgement of Polybios about the /Etolian . ju I like his judgement aboul tleomenes, must be received with a saution; but I aot bins to shake one's general i Rdi nee in Ins narrative. The worst ,, .i to the (Etolians are too cl( ai to be denied. FOREIGN POLICY OF JETOLTA. 34] could venture upon the grossest breaches of International ohap. vi. Law without any fear of restraint from the national Government, 1 and also that the avowed policy of the Government itself was seldom swayed by any regard to good faith or to the rights of others. Notwithstand- ing the gallant behaviour of their ancestors both in the Lamian and in the Gaulish War, the iEtolians of the ^tolian times with which we have most to do could make less against claim than any other people in Greece to a character for (jleece - extended Hellenic patriotism. The Greek commonwealth which deliberately introduced the strong arm of Rome into Grecian warfare 2 was far more guilty than even the commonwealth which gave up Akrokorinthos to the Mace- donian. Long before that time, iEtolia had agreed upon a partition, first of Akarnania and then of Achaia, with a Macedonian King; 3 she now agreed with Rome to make b.c. 211. a series of conquests at the expense of Akarnania 4 and other Grecian states, in the course of which the soil of the conquered countries was to remain an /Etolian pos- 1 See above, p. 335. Compare the envious declamation of Philip in Pol. xvii. 5. Tois AitidKo'ls iOos virapx^t A") p.6vov, irpos ovs df avTol iro\tfiuiai, toutuvs avTui/s dyeiv Kal t^v tovtiov xwpav' d\\d Kav crepol rives Tro\efj.\o?s dviv koivoo S6y/j.aros Kal irapeTvai ducpurepots roTs TroAe/j.ovaii' Kal rrjv x^P av dyeiv rrjv afxcpoTepco:', oisre irapa fxev rots AituiKo'is ^Tj're <*AAa iraai tols dfj.ipi(T^iiTouai irepi twos iroifiovs ex^poiis elvai rourovs Kal iro\e/j.lovi. Brandstater (272) calls on us to dis- tinguish between the piratical doings of individuals and the national action of the League, but the charge is that the Federal Government did nothing to stop the piratical doings of individuals. 2 The first diplomatic intervention of 1 tome in Grecian affairs was indeed made at the intercession of Akarnania (see the next Chapter), and, curiously enough, it was in support of Akarnania against .Ktolia. Hut the JLtolians were undoubtedly the first to bring Roman fleets and armies into Greece, and the first to plan and carry out the destruction of Grecian cities in partnership with Roman commanders. a Pol. ii. 43, 45. ix. 38. See the next Chapter. 4 Pol. ix. 38. xi. 5. So Livy, xxvi. 24. Darent operant Romani ut Acarnaniam /Etoli haberent. 342 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE /ETOLIAN LEAGUE. ( lompari son be- tween jEtolian and A' haian annexa- tions. chap. vi. session, while the moveable spoil was to be carried off by the barbarians of Italy. 1 Aratos made at least no snch infamous terms as these with his Macedonian patron. In all this we see a system of mere selfish aggrandizement, quite different even from the mistaken policy which occasionally led Achaian statesmen to enlarge their League by the incorporation of unwilling members. The annexations made by Achaia were at least made on terms of perfect equality ; the annexations of iEtolia were, in many cases, simple conquests by brute force. As might be expected, there were wide differences in the condition of the an- nexed countries, and in their relation to the ^Etolian state. That relation seems to have varied, from fall incorporation on equal terms, to mere subjection, veiled under the specious forms of dependent alliance. It should be re- membered that the Achaian League, besides the generous principles which it professed, and on which, in the main, it acted, had a great advantage in the continuity of its territory. The League gradually spread itself over all Peloponnesos ; under more favourable circumstances it might have spread itself over all Greece ; in either case- its territory would have been one continuous sweep, an inestimable advantage in the process of fusing the whole Continuity into one political body. No Achaian citizen, however Achaian remote, had, in the best days of the League,'' to cross a territory; f ore jflm territory in order to reach the seat of the Federal ■scattered ^ nature Government- No Achaian citizen, with the single ex- oi t he , , . , ki, ,],,!,. ception ot the people oi Aigina, had to expose himself, 1 PoL ix. 89. (Speech "I Lykiskos the Akarnanian.) "HSrj irapi'tp-qvTai filv 'Axapi/ditwu OiViaSaj ;ca) Ntjitoj/, icaTicrx " ^* irptiriv tt)v rwy Ta\alirvpwv ' IKiriKvpiaiv iroAiv, ^afSpanoSiad/xtvot /xtrd 'Vufxaiuv avrrfv. Ka\ rd /liu riitva na\ roLi yvvaiKas dirdyovm 'Pw/xaini, vfirrAfifra StjAopo'ti awtp eiViJy iarri Trdrrx" 1 ' TOtl Jiro rds Tv\wi> irMToiaiv (£(>vcrlas' T« 5' ^Satyr] i<\i)pi>vo- i twv t}ti/xt/Ki>to)I' AiVaiAoi'. 'I'Im' outlying cantons of Pleurdn and Hfirakleia air exceptions, bul they were united to tin Leagui only in verj late times. ACHAT A.N AND yETOLTAN ANNEXATIONS. 343 even during the shortest voyage, to the risk of capture by obap. vi. sea. Achaia then knew only two forms of political con- nexion — the alliance of wholly independent powers on equal terms, and the incorporation of cities as equal members of the national Achaian League. But the iEtolian possessions and alliances were scattered over all parts of Greece, inland and maritime. Mantineia 1 in her Arkadiau valley, Teos 2 in the middle of the Mgse&n, Kios 3 on the shores of the Propontis, all were compelled, or found it expedient, to enter into some relation or other, be it subjection, alliance, or incorporation, with the iEtolian Federation. Nor was the League less busy in extending its borders nearer home. I have already had occasion incidentally to mention some of the iEtolian acquisitions in central Greece, such as Naupaktos, He- rakleia, Stratos, and Oiniadai. Even the whole Boeotian League at one time entered into relations with iEtolia which seem to have been more intimate than those of mere alliance between two independent powers. 4 Delphi must have been seized upon in some way or other, as the Temple and the Amphiktyonic Council are spoken of as b.c. 220. at one time needing deliverance from vEtolian bondage. 5 Now these annexations were made in various ways. Some Variety of of them were simple conquests ; in others, including, -J ^^ strange to say, Mantineia, 6 the inhabitants are said to ^"Jjj 1 " 1 As also Tegea and Orchomeuos. Pol. ii. 46. 2 And KeGs ; see above, p. 333. 3 As also Lysimacheia and Kalehedon. Pol. xv. 23. Kios had an JStolian Governor ; (TTparriyov Trap' AhaiXoov iv avTrj SiarpifSovTos K ■ 1 i . i . Ii is however hard to Bee how this perfectly fair tu quoque affects the fact of ,l'',toli;ni domination. ' Pol i\. 8. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 282. :i Bchorn, 29. Thirlwall, n.s. Bchorn's argument Beoms to me to prove thai Cephallehia was ao1 admitted to even a forced nir<>\iT(uofxfi>T) to?s aItu>\o7s — may not have been practically In the same Buhjecl condition ANALOGY OF BRITISH DEPENDENCIES. 347 CHAP. VI. relations between a dominant country and its dependen- cies are familiar enough in our own political experience. The inhabitants of Kcphallenia and of the other Ionian Compari- . . Sl) " with Islands are held by our own nation in a condition of the .in- dependent alliance, which, in the opinion of the weaker laj^naof ally, does not differ from absolute subjection. The in- gjjjjjj^. habitants of Malta and Gibraltar legally possess all the cies. rights, public and private, of British subjects, but they have no opportunity of receiving anything more than that general protection which is equally afforded to the Ionian ally. The inhabitants of Guernsey, Jersey, and Man, though their islands are not formally incorporated with the United Kingdom, are not looked on as foreigners ; their position practically combines the advantages of protection and of incorporation, they unite the strength of a great monarchy with the local freedom of a small commonwealth. We can thus easily understand the great variety in the prac- tical condition of the various states which formed the outlying portions of the JEtolian Federation. And besides these dependencies and half-incorporated members, xEtolia of course had, like other states, equal allies, united only by the ordinary bonds of international engagements. The ancient connexion between iEtolia and her supposed colony Eiis lasted do\wi to the latest days of Grecian history ; and, though the weaker state doubtless often humbly followed the lead of the stronger, it does not seem ever to have deviated, in form at least, from the nature of a free alliance between two independent and equal powers. I have, in my last Chapter, endeavoured to trace at Compari- some length the points of analogy and diversity between t^.,,,,,", the League of Achaia and the United States of North ^£ r f d America. There are several points in which the League laud. of /Etolia suggests a similar comparison with the Swiss 348 ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE JETOLIAN LEAGUE. chap. vi. Confederation. But the parallel between JEtolia and Switzerland is far from being so close as the parallel between Achaia and the United States. That the part played by Switzerland in modern Europe is far more honourable than the part played by ^Etolia in ancient Greece is a distinction not directly to the purpose, as Ave are not discussing the moral characters of nations, but astolia and their political constitutions. But it is certainly onlv in land re- the weaker points ot the Swiss constitution, and in the each other ^ ess honourable features of the Swiss character, that we in their fiiTcl the chief points of likeness to .Etolian models, while worst points, the likeness between Achaia and America is mainly shown Achaia and , . , . , , . . . , America m those points which are most honourable to both nations. in jtheir j n mos £ f those respects in which the League of .Etolia differs from the League of Achaia it approaches to the old constitution of Switzerland. The .Etolians, like the Swiss, were a nation of mountaineers, and their League, like that of Switzerland, was originally an union not of cities, but of tribes or districts. The oldest members of the Swiss League, the famous Forest Cantons, contained, and still contain, no considerable town ; they still remain the most perfect examples of rural Democracy which the world ever saw. A mountain Democracy of this sort is something very different from the Democracy of a great Both city; it is sure to be brave and patriotic, but it is also originally ' . t u sure to contain a stronger conservative, not to say ob- no1 f " structive, element than can be found under any other form Cities. f government. Nowhere does the wisdom of our fore- fathers meet with greater reverence than in a small com- munity of democratic mountaineers. That the .Etolians lagged behind the rest of Greece, that the rural Cantons lag behind the rest of Switzerland, is no more than any 1 civic one would naturally expect. In Switzerland, the accession Switzer- of considerable towns to the original League of the Forest Cantons, probably saved the whole body from reproducing COMPARISON BETWEEN ^ETOLIA AND SWITZERLAND. 349 some of the worst features of iEtolian life. When Bern chap. vi. attached herself to the mountain alliance, it was as if a. d. 1352. Athens or Corinth had joined the zEtolian League and had become its ruling spirit. Even the earlier accession a.d. 1332. of the much smaller town of Luzern had a considerable effect on the character of the League. This civic element in Switzerland saved her both from remaining in perpetual obscurity, like some of the Leagues of Northern Greece, and from obtaining an importance purely mischievous, like that of /Etolia. And, even as it was, the history of Switz- erland exhibits only too many instances of an JEtolian spirit. The tendency to serve as mercenaries, regardless of the cause in which they serve, is the least disgraceful form which this spirit has taken. The purely conservative Grandeur and defensive history of Switzerland is the most glorious sedative* 1 ' portion of modern European history. It is one tale of Jj lstul- y °f unmixed heroism, from the day when the heroes of Mor- land, garten first checked the course of Austrian tyranny, to the iseo. day when their descendants calmly appealed to admiring Europe against the base perfidy of their own apostate citizen, who had robbed them of the bulwark which Europe had guaranteed, and which the robber himself promised to respect up to the very moment of the consummation of his crime. But the warmest admirer of the brave Con- Aggressive federation cannot deny that, at the only time when Switz- t { lc Swiss erland played an important part in general European m Ital * v - affairs, it was a part conceived far too much in the spirit of Skopas and Dorimachos. The Swiss too often appeared in the Italian Avars of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in a character not very unlike that in which the .Etolians appeared in the days of Aratos and Philopoimcn. The betraval of Lewis Sforza bv his Swiss Guards was an act a.d. 1500. which required the devotion of the Swiss Guards of a later a.d. 1792. Lewis to atone for it. The territories south of the Alps, whether possessed by the Confederation at large or by 350 OEIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE .ETOLIAN LEAGUE. land and of .Etolia chap. vi. particular Cantons, were won by aggressions as little to be a.d. 1503- defended as the annexations of either Buonaparte. Now 1512 that the Canton of Ticino enjoys equal rights with its German and Burgundian 1 fellows, no one would degrade the citizens of a free republic into the subjects even of an Italian King ; but history cannot forget that there was a time when the Switzer was to the Lombard as truly an alien master as the Gaul, the Spaniard, or the Austrian. Subject It is in relation to these subject districts that the resem- Switzer- ° blauce between yEtolia and Switzerland becomes most close. The union between the original /Etolian Tribes was indeed far closer than that between the old Thirteen Cantons, closer even than that between the Achaian Cities or the American States. But while Achaia, like America, admitted no members to the League except on terms of perfect equality, 2 iEtolia, like Switzerland in her old state, possessed allies and subjects in every conceivable relation, from equal friendship to absolute bondage. The state of things under the old Swiss League — the various positions of Confederate States, Allied States, Protected States, Districts subject to the League as a whole, Districts sub- ject to this or that Canton, Districts subject to two or more Cantons in partnership — relations, all of them, which a Greek might well express by his elastic word Sym/poliby — all this teaches us, belter than anything else, what was the real condition of the cities, districts, and islands, which were brought into connexion with vEtolia in such various whys and on such various terms. The Swiss territory, Confederate, Allied, and Subject, was indeed 1 BtergundUm, qoI French. No one who regards either the pasl or the future, will ever apply, as i-> t ften done, tin' came " French Switzerland " to thai part of the < lonfederation where a Romance langu is spoken, See above, p. 8 1 . ■ 'ill. peculiar circumstances of the l>i trie! of Columbia prevent it from b( ing looki do: eal < kc< ption, and a "Territory " is simply an infant St:iic ten itory continu- COMPARISON BETWEEN JETOLTA AND SWITZERLAND. •' i •"» 1 continuous, or nearly so, 1 while the allies a">ul subjects of chap. vi. JEtolia were scattered over the whole mainland and MtoYm islands of Greece. This is the natural differ ance between a purely inland country, like Switzerland, and one which, like iEtolia, always possessed some sea-board, and soon found means to acquire more. But, if our analogy fails in this purely external and physical point, the experience of our own nation, or of any other nation which has con- quered or colonized by sea, steps in to supply the de- ficiency. Thus does history ever reproduce itself, at all events within the great circle of European civilization. The Greek, the Swiss, the Englishman, are all beings of the same nature, all possessed of the same good and evil qualities, ready to be called out by the recurrence of the same excitements and temptations. Till we learn wholly to cast away the silly distinction of "Ancient" and "Modern," and freely to employ every part of history to illustrate every other part, we shall never fully take in the true unity of the political life of Europe, or realize as we should that the experience of man in times past, alike in great empires and in siugle cities, is no mere food for antiquarian dreams, but is the truest and most practical text-book of the philosopher and the statesman. 1 Muhlhausen was an isolated ally of Switzerland, which, after the French annexation of Elsass, was entirely surrounded by French territory ; — we are now unhappily driven to use nearly the same language of Geneva itself. Muhlhausen, by more recent arrangements, has been handed over to the same fate as Colmar and Strassburg. CHAPTER VII. HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE ACHA.IAN LEAGUE TO THE RATTLE OF SELLAS1A. B.C. 281 — 222. chap. vii. I do not propose to give, in this and the following Chap- ters, any complete narrative of the later history of Greece. Such a task belongs to the historian of Greece or of the Greek people, not to the historian of a particular class of governments. But a certain amount of direct narrative CD seems essential at this stage of my subject. We have now traced out the origin and the political constitutions of those two great Federations which became the leading powers in the last days of independent Greece. It seems necessary to the completeness of the subject to show their systems actually at work, and to give some account of the eminent men who guided their internal dcvelopenient and their foreign policy. With this view I propose to go through the last century and a half of Old Grecian history, passing lightly over such points as do not concern my immediate subject, but stopping to narrate and comment in detail when we come across things or persons directly interesting to a student of the history of Federalism. 1 1 of this period, aa of bo many others, we have no complete contem- porary history : for b great pari of it we have no contemporary history .-,i alL Polybios narrates in detail from the beginning of the War <>l° the Leagues in b.o. 221 ; ol the earlier times he gives merely an intro- ductory dcetch. Bui we have Polyhios' history in » ] .. - 1 1 ■ . i state only for ahoul ii\'' years; from b.o. 216 onwards, we have only fragments, though very extrusive and Important fragments, Down to n.c. 168, we FITCRT YEARS OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. 353 chap. vir. §1. From the Foundation of the Achaian League Revolu- to the Deliverance of Corinth, B.C. 281 — 243. £onof " <■ recce and Macedonia The first years of the growth of the Achaian League are '! uri "« the . . . . nrst years contemporary with the invasion of Macedonia and Greece «f the by the Gauls and with the wars between Pyrrhos and B.o28i- Antigonos Gonatas. Pyrrhos, for a moment, expelled 2 ' 2 ' Antigonos from the Macedonian throne, which Antigonos B .c. 273. recovered while Pyrrhos was warring in Peloponnesos. By the time that Pyrrhos was dead, and Antigonos again B .c. 272. firmly fixed in Macedonia, the League had grown up to maturity as far as regarded the cities of the old Achaia. For the next ten years also Antigonos had his hands b.c 272- 263 full in other quarters. He was engaged in a war with Athena, in the earlier stages of which the republic had b.c. 268- the support of Sparta and Egypt. He had also a 263 ' much nearer and more dangerous enemy in Alexander the son of Pyrrhos, who had succeeded his father on the have the history of Livy, who, in Greek matters, commonly followed, and indeed often translated, Polybios. From B.C. 168 to b.c. 116, that is, till the final loss of Achaian independence, we have only the fragments of Polybios. We have also Plutarch's Lives of Aratos, Philopoimen, Agis, Kleomenes, and Titus Quinctius Flamininus. These are largely derived from contemporary writers now lost, especially from Phylarchos, a strong Kleomenist writer, and from the Memoirs of Aratos himself. We are thus often enabled to hear both sides of a question. There are also occa- sional notices in Pausanias, Strabo, and other writers, which, in the case of Pausanias, often swell into considerable fragments of history. It is evident therefore that to study this period in detail is a very different business from studying the history of the Peloponnesian War, where a man has little more to do than to read his Thucydides, and then to turn for illustrations to Aristophanes and Plutarch. In the later period, not merely the illustrations, but the history itself, has to be dug from a variety of sources. The English scholar will generally find it enough to read Bishop Thirlwall's last volume, accompanied by those portions of Polybios and those Lives of Plutarch which belong to the subject. Having compared every word of Bishop Thirlwall's narrative with the original writers, I can bear witness to its unfailing accuracy, as every reader can to its unswerving impartiality and wisdom. A A 354 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. throne of Epeiros. Alexander inherited all Pyrrhos' en- mity towards Antigonos, and, like Pvrrhos, lie actually Circa b.c. succeeded in expelling him for a short time from Mace- donia. 1 The war with Athens, known as the Chremoni- dean War, ended in the capture of Athens, the placing of Macedonian garrisons in the city and its ports, and apparently in the destruction of the Long Walls." This was the last blow to the little amount of power which State of Athens still retained. Of the Peloponnesian cities, many, Pelopon- . ' ih-*>*. especially Sikyon and Megalopolis, were held by Tyrants in the Macedonian interest. Corinth was in the more singular position of being held, not by a native Tyrant, but by a Macedonian prince of the royal house, who was, virtually at least, independent of the King. 3 It was held successively by Krateros (half-brother to Antigonos through his mother Phila), by Alexander son of Krateros, State of and by Alexander's widow Nikaia. Sparta remained in- dependent, with her old constitution and laws, with her two Kings, her Ephors, and her Senate ; but she was sadly fallen both from her Hellenic position without and from the purity of her Lykourgeian discipline within. The old spirit however, as we shall soon see, was still there, n.c. 272. and she was able to drive back Pyrrhos from her gates with as much energy as a hundred years before she had driven back Kpamcinondas. Still it marks the decay alike of her power and of her discipline that she had i ,„,,-. gates from which to drive him back. Thus far, then, i'ioii it t'h. circumstances had favoured the quiet and peaceful growth Achaian of the League. Acliaia was surrounded bv enemies, but all were so occupied with what appeared more important matters that there was little fear of their meddling with her. Such a period of danger, ever threatening, but never striking, was admirably suited to strengthen the feeling of union and to give an impulse towards good government 1 See Thirlwall, viii. p. 98. ; lb. p, 100, 3 lb. p. 118. INSTITUTION OF THE SOLE GENERALSHIP. 355 and improvement of every kind. This period embraces ohap. vir, the first twenty years of the League, during which, beyond b.o. 281- the gradual growth of the League itself, we have not a single notice of its history. Then follow ten years b.o. 261- during which all Greece is nearly a blank to us, but in the course of which one most important change was effected in the Achaian polity. It was in the twenty-fifth year of the revived League Institution that, instead of the two Generals who had hitherto been General- yearly chosen, the Achaians for the first time placed at ^' OKK B.C. JtOO* the head of the Federal Commonwealth a single General or President with full powers. Markos of Keryneia, as he deserved, was the first citizen thus called upon to wield in his own hands the full authority of the state. Polybios 1 records the fact and its date, but he gives no explanation of the causes which led to this great constitutional change. In those threatening times, the feeling of union among the members of the League must have been growing stronger and stronger. To vest the chief power of the nation in one man's hands expressed a clear national conviction of the advantage and the need of unity of purpose and vigour of action. It is easy to conceive that practical evils may have arisen, especially in a Federal state, from the existence of two supreme magistrates with equal powers. The working of the ^Etolian League, which, with all its faults, was a model of united and vigorous action, may well have taught the Achaians that, in this respect, their constitution was inferior to that of their neighbours. Be this as it may, the change was made, and it was made at a time when it led the way to still greater changes. From Biogra- . ill- pit i phical this time forward, the history of the League becomes character mainly the biography of several eminent men, who, in their ^chai! turns, presided over its councils. This personal character hi st01 T of the Achaian history gives it a peculiar kind of interest, 1 ii. 43. A A 2 m 356 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. an interest more like that of modern history, and on ; widely different from the feeling with which we study the records of aristocratic commoiiAvealths. In the stately march of the Roman annals, greater men, it may be, than any that the League produced seem as nothing beside the superior greatness of the commonwealth in and for which they lived. The Roman polity did not derive its impress from them, but it stamped its own impress upon them. The Achaian League, on the other hand, derived, as we can hardly doubt, its first character from Markos of Keryneia ; there can be no doubt whatever that, in its wider and more ambitious form, it was essentially the work of Aratos of Sikyon. Up to this time the League had been confined to the ten cities of the original Achaia. We have no reason to suppose that its extension beyond those limits had ever presented itself to the mind of any Achaian statesman. Within those narrow bounds, it had doubtless given an example of all those republican virtues of equality and good government for which Polybios gives it credit ; it had already displayed, on a small scale, that generous zeal for freedom, that readiness of exertion for the freedom of others, 1 which he claims for it as its distinguishing virtue. But the Achaian League had hitherto been strictly an Achaian League ; it had not aspired to become a League of all Hellas, or even of all Feloponnrsos. It was now to receive a new member and a new citizen, who were to impress upon its policy a wholly different character, or, more duly, to find for its original character a wider field Re nits of action. The League, by receiving Sikyon into its annexa- fellowship, ceased to be Achaian in any strict ethnical , "" 1 "' sense; it might now consistently advance till it embraced 1 l'ul. ii. '12. 'Arrl iroffTjj Trjy iavTwv Diod. xx. 102. Plut Prmrtr. 25. * Schori] (p. 69) ingeniously infers this from the Btatemenl of Plutarch {.\y. 9) that, a1 the return of Aratos in b.o. 251, there were SikyOnian exiles who had been nearly fifty years in banishment. These fifty years go back exactly to the date of the battle of Ipsos. •'• Droysen (ii 804, 6) stands up for them on the ground of Strabo'a expression (b. Viii. «'. 0. VOL ii. p. 218), irvpavv^Oi) St irKtlaTov xp° vov ' d\\' dtl rods rvpavvovs liritiKus &vSpas e(Txtf " Aparov b" lirupavto-TaTov, k.t.k. It is iiiiuli more likely, though Droysen despises the notion, that Btrabo was thinking of the old Orthagorida ; and, if his words arc to be construed ijuite literally, Axatos himself musl be reckoned i og the Tyrants. It is very Likely thai Borne of these Tyrants maj have been patrons of arl we know thai one of the worsl of them was something I ii.i bul w ha1 thi ii ' SIKYON UNDER TYRANTS. 3.j9 common consent at the head of affairs. 1 The exact nature chap. vn. of their office is not described ; our brief notice of it reads Adminia- like an extraordinary commission, for life or for some ,,r Timo- considerable time, to reform and govern the common, g^inias! 1 wealth. 2 Under their administration something like settled order and prosperity had begun once more to appear, when Sikyon unhappily lost both her patriotic nmiristrates. Timokleidas died ; Kleinias Avas murdered Tyrannyof . A.bantidas, by a citizen named Abantidas, who seized the Tyranny b.c. 264. and again subjected Sikyon to a reign of terror. The friends of Kleinias were for the most part banished or put to death ; his young son 3 Aratos, then seven years old, was destined to the same fate ; 4 but he found a friend in the family of his persecutor. S6s6, the sister of Aban- Escape of tidas, was married to Prophantos the brother of Kleinias ; the child sought refuge in his uncle's house, and Soso found means to shelter him from her brother, and to send him in safety to Argos, where his father had many power- ful friends. Here he was brought up till his twentieth vear. His literary education seems to have been neglected, Education 17 of Aratos but it is quite possible that the neglect may have been no at Argos. real loss. That Aratos was an eloquent and persuasive speaker we need no proof; without eloquence of some kind no man could have remained for life, as he did, at the head of a Greek commonwealth. Perhaps the very absence of rhetorical and sophistic training may have left i By some strange confusion, Pausaniaa (ii. 8. 2) makes Timokleidas, after the fall of Kleon, reign as joint-Tyrant with a certain Euthy demos. The people under Kleinias rise ami expel them. 2 Pint. Ar. 2. E'iKovto Ti^oK\dSai/ apxofTa. Kal KXeiviav. . . . t/5tj $4 Tiva ttjs TroAirei'as KaraffTiunv ex 6 "' Soicoi/ffijs Ti;uo/cAei5as fJ-iv d-mdave, k.t.K. 3 In after times, the local legends of Sikyon attributed to the deliverer a miraculous origin, like that of Aristomenes and Alexander. The God Asklepios had visited his mother Aristodaina in the form of a dragon. Paus. ii. 10. 3. iv. 14. 3. 4 Paus. ii. 8. 2. "Kparov Se 'A/ZavrlSas (pvydSa iiroi^atv, fj /col outos direx&Sp77(rei' y ApaTo? tQihovrris. He was now seven years old. Plut. Ar. 2. 360 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. room for something more nearly reproducing the native strength of Themistokles and Perikles. His physical education was well cared for ; the future deliverer of Sikyon and Corinth contended in the public games, and received more than one chaplet as the prize of bodily prowess. It is possible that this devotion to bodily exercises may not have been without influence on his future career. The discipline of the athlete and the discipline of the soldier were inconsistent, 1 and these early laurels were perhaps Avon at the expense of future defeats of the Achaian phalanx. Further than this we have no details of his early life ; but we find him, at the age of twenty, vigorous, active, and enterprising, full of zeal, not only against the Tyrants who excluded him from his own home and country, but against all who bore usurped rule over their fellows in any city of Hellas. Succession Meanwhile matters in Sikvon went on from bad to f T t at Sikydn. worse. Abantidas had a turn for those rhetorical exer- cises which Aratos neglected ; he frequented the school of two teachers of the art named Deinias and Aristoteles, who, from what motive we are not told, one day assassi- nated the Tyrant in the midst of his studies. His place b.c. 252-1. was at once filled by his own father Paseas, who was in his turn slain and succeeded by one Nikokles. The eyes of men in Sikyon now began to turn to the banished son Expecta- of their old virtuous leader. Aratos was looked to as the from , \m,,. future deliverer of his country, and Nikokles watched his course with a degree of suspicion proportioned to the hopes of those whom he held in bondage. But, as yet, the Tyrant deemed that he had little to fear from the personal prowess of (he youth. Indeed Aratos purposely adopted 1 Bee Pint. Phil, ^.. The remark however i a old a Homer. II. xxiii. 668 671. Certainly Alexander of Macedon (Herod, v. 22) and Ddrieua of Rhode combined the two characters (see Grote, viii. 'JI7 ami of. x. 164), bul one can hardly fancy Periklda stripping ,-it Olympian YOUTH OF ARATOS. 361 a line of conduct suited to throw Nikokl&s off his guard, chap. vn. He assumed, at all events when he knew that agents of the Tyrant were watching him, an appearance of complete devotion to youthful enjoyments and frivolous pursuits. Men said that a Tyrant must be the most timid of all beings, if such a youth as Aratos could strike fear into one. 1 But the real fears of Nikokles were of another kind. He did not so much dread the personal prowess of Aratos as the influence of his father's name and con- nexions. The position which the family of Kleinias must have held is marked by the fact that the Kings both of Macedonia and Egypt were among his hereditary friends. 2 We may see also the first signs of a weakness which pursued Aratos through his whole life, when we hear that he at first hoped to obtain freedom for his country through Early royal friendship. To look for the expulsion of a Tyrant at Aratos. the hands of Antigonos Gonatas was a vain hope indeed. 3 It appears however that the King did not absolutely refuse the new character in which the inexperienced youth prayed him to appear : he put him off with fair words ; he pro- mised much, but performed nothing. Aratos then looked to Ptolemy Philadelphos of Egypt, whose rivalry with Macedonia seemed to guarantee his trustworthiness as an ally of Grecian freedom, and whose actions did not always belie his pretensions. But in leaning on Egyptian aid Aratos soon found that he was leaning on the staff of 1 riut. Ar. 6. 2 Sehorn (p. 70) suggests, ingeniously enough, that the connexion between the house of Kleinias and the Ptolemies began during the Egyptian occupation of Sikyon in B.C. 308-3. But how came the same family to be on such terms with both the rival dynasties at once, with tho descendants of Ptolemy and with the descendants of Demetrios ? 3 Something may be allowed to the inexperience of a youth of twenty ; it is indeed hard measure to hint, as Sehorn (p. 70, note) does, that Aratos at first merely wished to be Tyrant himself instead of Xikokles. Every act of his life belies the imputation. Niebuhr (Lect. Anc, Hist. iii. 277, Eng. Tr. ) does Aratos more justice. B.C. 251. 362 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. a broken reed ; whatever might be the good intentions of Ptolemy, he was far off, and the hopes which he held out were slow to be fulfilled. The young deliverer at last learned no longer to put his trust in princes, but only in the quick wits and strong arms of himself and his fellow- exiles. A Sikyonian exile named Aristomachos, and two Megalopolitau philosophers named Ekdemos and Demo- phane's, 1 are spoken of as among his principal advisers. Deliver- The details of the perilous night-adventure by which Sikyon by ^Jatos and his little company surprised and delivered Aratos, Sikvon have all the interest of a romance. 3 Here, in the last days of Greece, our path is strewed with tales of personal character and personal adventure, such as we have met with but seldom since we lost the guidance of Herodotus. For our purpose it is enough that all Sikyon lay down at night under the rule of Nikokles, and heard at dawn the herald proclaim to the delivered city that Aratos the son of Kleinias called his countrymen to freedom. Never was there a purer or a more bloodless revolution ; Sikyon was delivered without the loss of a single citizen ; the very mercenaries of the Tyrant were allowed to live, and Nikokles himself, whom public justice could hardly have spared, contrived to escape by an igno- ble shelter. Never did mortal man win glory truer and more unalloyed than the young hero of Sikvon. Sikyon was now free, but she had dangers to contend against from within and from without. Antigonos, to whom the youthful simplicity of Aratos had once looked for help, 1 The name are variously given. They are Ekdemos and Demophanes in PoL l 22. Tint. Phil 1. Suidaa, v. ^hkottoI^v ; Ekd£los and Mega- Lophanes in Pans. \iii. 19. 2; Ekdelos in Plufc At, . r >. Suidaa also turns Nikokles into Neokles. 2 One is strongly tempted to tell the tale once more ; bul the Greek of Plutarch, the Germi r Droysen, and the English of Thirlwall are enough It should !»• remembered thai all the details rest upon good authority, namely the Memoirs of Aratos himself, DELIVERANCE OF SIKYON BY ARATOS. .'50:i now hardly concealed his enmity. 1 The infection which chap. vh. he thought he could afford to neglect while it spread External no further than the petty Achaian townships, was now ternal beginning to extend itself to cities of a higher rank. And, ijj 1 ^!,^ 3 within the walls of Sikyon, Aratos had to struggle against difficulties which were hardly less threatening. With the restoration of freedom came the return of the exiles. Under this name are included both those who had been formally banished, and those who had voluntarily fled from the city, during the days of tyranny. 2 Xikokles, during his short reign of four months, had sent eighty into exile ; those whose banishment dated from the days of earlier Tyrants reached the number of five hundred. Some of these last had been absent from their country fiftv years. 3 Many of these men had lost houses and lands, which thev naturally wished to recover, but which their actual possessors as naturally wished to keep. Doubtless, in so long a time, much of this property must have changed hands more than once, so that the actual pos- sessor would often be an honest purchaser, and not a mere grantee of a Tyrant's stolen goods. The young deli- verer was expected to satisfy all these opposing claims, as well as to guard his city against Antigonos and all other enemies. What was chiefly wanting for the former Internal purpose was money ; and here the friendship of King tion t y Ptolemy really stood him in good stead. He obtained, Aiatos - at various times, a sum of one hundred and seventy- five talents, partly, it would seem, as a voluntary gift, 4 1 Pint. Ar. 9. "EirifSovhtvonivyv fiiv QwQev koL opwuri [t<£ 'Apary] 8«d rrjy iXevdeplav, To.po.TTop.ivr\v 8' vcp' auTT/s Kal araaid^ovaav. 2 The word by Bchorn (p. 72) in iln' words, " Nacli Bause ruriickgekommeu setzte ex eine Commission tueder, an deren Spitre er Bslbst brat." These internal mi i an of ajatos, or some of them, seem t<> have heen later than the annexation of Bikydn i" the League. Hut it, seemed better t.i finish tiir account of the deliverance and pacification of Bikydn heforc > atering on the career of Aratos a? a Federal politician. ANNEXATION OF SIKYON TO THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. 3G5 a Greek city willingly to surrender its full and distinct cuak vii. sovereignty was a thing of which earlier times presented only one recorded instance. Corinth' and Argos had once removed the artificial limits which separated the Argeian b.c. 393. and the Corinthian territory, and had declared that Argos and Corinth formed but a single commonwealth. 1 But so strange an arrangement lasted only for a short time, and it was offensive to large bodies of citizens while it did last. Still Argos and Corinth were, at least, both of them Doric cities ; their citizens were kinsmen in blood and speech, sharing alike in the traditions of the ruling race of Pelo- ponnesos. It was a far greater change when Sikyon, a city Import- of the Dorian conquerors, stooped to ask for admission to novelty of the franchise of the remnant of the conquered Achaians. 2 step * Federalism, as we have seen, was nothing new in Greece, but the Federal tie had as yet united only mere districts or very small towns, and those always districts or towns of the same people. For one of the greater cities of Greece to enter into Federal relations with cities belonging to another division of the Greek race was something alto- gether unknown. But now the Doric Sikyon was admitted into a League consisting only of small Achaiau towns, 3 any one of which singly was immeasurably her inferior, and whose united strength hardly equalled that of one of the great cities of Greece. 4 The Sikyonians were to lose their 1 Xen. Hell. iv. 4. 6. See Grote, ix. 462. The change, in the opinion of Xenophon and the Corinthian oligarchs, amounted to a wiping out of their city ; al Tore /jllBs d£w\6yov irohews au/iiravTes 6fwv Suyafj.iv oi/K $x 0VTes - 3G6 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. VII. Beginning of a new Epoch. General extension of the League and its Objects. national name 1 and being; Sikyon indeed would survive as an independent canton, untouched in the freedom of her local government ; but in all dealings with other states the name of Sikyon would be sunk in the name of Achaia. The warriors of Sikyon would be commanded by Achaian Generals,- and her interests would be represented in foreign Assemblies and at foreign courts by Ambassadors commissioned bv the whole Achaian body." Such a change must have given a complete shock to all ordinary Greek feeling on such subjects. The accession of Sikyon to the League was the beginning of a new state of things in Greece. No more striking testimony could be borne to the prudent and honourable course which the League had hitherto followed within its own narrow limits. 4 This first extension beyond the limits of Achaia at once put the League on quite a new footing. Hitherto it had been a merely local union ; it now began to swell into Pan-hellenic importance. 5 When once Sikyon had joined the League, other cities were not slow in following her example. From the moment of the admission of Sikyon, it was an under- stood principle that the arms of the League stood open to 1 Pint. U.S. So PolybioS (ii. 38), tto>s ovf kcu 5«i rl vvv fvSoKoCffiv ovrol t( xa\ t6 \onrdv TrKrjdos t<2v U(KoTrovvr]rriuji' &fxa rrjv irnKtrtlav rwv 'Axa'ai* 7 /col ty)u TTposriyopiav ntTti\ri<, Trjf iavTov S6^av Ka\ rrju ttjs iraTpiSos Svvafj.iv, cos ivl rwv 4trt- TV\6vT rov del (nparrtyovvra twv 'Axaiuij', tfre Av/iatof, ftrt Tpiraifus, tin y.iKpoT(pa% tipcH wv ti>x<» f^Aews. :) Aratofl Beems to have gone to Alexandria in a purely private character to ask help of King Ptolemy as ;i friend of liis family. 4 Bee Plutarch's panegyric on the League (Ar. B), and Polybioa passim, i;illv ii. 38 and 1-'. ' Droysen, ii. 869. "Durch den Beitritl von Sikyon und durch Aratoa Vfrl>in. 866. 2 Pint. Ar. 1;"'. 'Avriyavos 8' 6 /3a(TiA«i)s d.vuAjX(VO<; lit arSrw «a' finvAo- Htvos ^ /j.tTciytti' c7Aan t?7 iAia irpds ai)i<>i' i} SiafidAAfiv 7r;i()s t6v I"It oKt /xaiov &AAai r( th of Corinth and of Athen . CIVIL CHARACTER OF ARATOS. .'!71 became the ruling passion of his soul. 1 In that cause ohap. mi. Aratos spared neither personal cost nor personal exertion ; for the liberties of Greece he was ever ready to spend and to be spent. And again, in this also resembling Perikles, he was wholly free from the fault which upset so many eminent Greeks, which ruined Themistokles, Pausanias, and Alkibiades, to say nothing of Alexander and Deme- trios — incapacity to bear success. Aratos, like Aristeides and Perikles, remained, till his last day, the contented citizen of a free commonwealth. Even in the times of his worst errors, we can still see the difference between the pure gold of the republican chief and the tinsel of the Kings and courtiers with whom he is brought in contact. But these great and good qualities were balanced by Faults of several considerable defects. The ambition of Aratos was c i iar a C ter. satisfied with being the first citizen of Achaia and of Hellas, but he could as little bear a rival near his throne as any despot. It was, in his view, absolutely essential, not only that Achaia should be the first power of Greece, but that Aratos should be the first citizen of Achaia. National envy made his foreign policy unjust to Sparta ; personal envy made his home policy unjust to Lydiadas ; a mixture of the two converted a national struggle between Sparta and Achaia into a personal rivalry between Kleo- menes and Aratos. His hatred to Tyranny, his zeal for freedom, his anxiety for the extension of the League, often carried him too far. He did not scruple to seek noble ends by dishonourable means ; he did not avoid the crooked paths of intrigue and conspiracy ; he was thus led into many unjustifiable, and some illegal, actions And, 1 Fol. ii. 43. Ai€T6Aei . . . irdaas ras tirifio\as xal irpa|eis -rrpds tv reKos dvai>. tovto 8' r/v to ManeSSuas /u.(V e/s iv rais iirifioXais, in tf\f/ti 5' oJ ixivwv t<) htiv6v. 5«) Ka\ Tpoira'i^v In avrdw Rktiroinoiv iirAi)pw(Tt ri)v UtKo-nivvqanv, xa\ TJjSf np roll woKtfiiots atl 7i xtlpwroi. 1 Plut, Ai I FIRST GENERALSHIP OF ARATOS. 375 territory. 1 On the other hand the League was in alliance chap. vir. with Alexander, the Macedonian Prince of Corinth. Alliance Aratos had contemplated an attempt to drive out so Achaiana dangerous a neighbour, but Alexander seems to have AlexMuW proffered his friendship to the League, 2 an act which, of Corinth, under such circumstances, was equivalent to throwing off all allegiance to his royal uncle. This friendly position of Corinth must have been a great advantage in any movement of the Achaian troops either by land or sea, but it does not appear that either Alexander on the one side or Antigonos on the other took any active part in the war. This struggle was therefore more strictly a Social War, a War of the Leagues, than the later war to which the name is usually confined. The belligerents were the three Leagues of Achaia, Bceotia, and zEtolia, the Boeotians having entered into an alliance with Achaia against the common enemy. Aratos crossed the Gulf; he ravaged the coast, from Kalydon, the old Achaian outpost, 3 now again an /Etolian city, to the Ozolian Lokris, now in willing or forced union with the robber League. He was then about to march into Boeotia to ioin his allies ; but the Boeotarch Amaiokritos* did not Defeat wait for him ; he engaged the iEtolians at Chaironeia ; he Bceotians himself fell, and his army was utterly defeated. The Boeotians now joined the iEtolian alliance, 5 and sank for ever into utter insignificance. Whether the failure of the intended meeting between the Achaian and Boeotian forces was the fault of the Achaian or of the Boeotian commander does not very clearly appear ; ° but probably 1 Pol ii. 43, 45. ix. 34. Sec ThiilwalL viii. 11(3. Kiebohr (iii. 282) places it after the deliverance of Corinth, and Droysen (ii. 387) lain- still. s Pint. Ar. 18. 3 See above, p. 239. 4 'AfiaioKpiros, Pol. xx. 4. 'A/ioMKpiTos, Plut. Ar. 16. s See above, pp. 182, 343. 8 Plutarch says that Aratos vffreprio-e rfjs /uax 7 ?* (Ar. 161 Polybios, at Chairo- neia. 376 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vn. Aratos was thereby saved from a defeat in his first vear of command. Had he had an opportunity of displaying his characteristic weakness so early in his official career, the course of the subsequent history might have been greatly changed. The Achaian constitution, as we have seen, did not allow the immediate re-election of the General ; but after Second the necessary lapse of one vear, 1 Aratos was again General- l " ° ship of placed at the head of the state. The year of his second b.c. 243. Generalship was one of the most memorable in the history of the League. Four new cities, one of them the most important point in Peloponnesos, were added to the Achaian Union. We left the League at war with Antigonos, and on friendly terms with his rebel- Position of lious vassal Alexander of Corinth. We know nothing under of Alexander's personal character or of the nature of his ^ an er > government ; but we may believe that the rule of a kins- man of the royal house, one too who came of a good stock, the grandson of Krateros and Phila, may have been some degrees less irksome than the rule of mere local oppressors like the Tyrants of Sikyon. However this may be, Alex- ander died just at this time, poisoned, as some said, by widow ^ 1C emissaries <>l" Antigonos. His widow Nikaia succeeded Nikni. to his power; the King of Macedonia did not scruple to ,'i,,,! ,,, make her the victim of a ludicrous deception, by which he ','",'""' 57 contrived to win Corinth for himself.- The enemy was A nt i ;onos, J ii. c 244. as Bishop Thirlwal] (\ iii. n 7> Bays, clearly lays the blame on Amaiokritos. See his n hole descripl ion, \\. 4, 5. 1 I'lui. Ar. lii. 'Eiiavr $' i!(TTtpoi> avOu (TTpaTityuiv. This is explained by the constitutional passage in cap. 24. Polybios (iL 18) says, dySoip 5* Trd\iv irtt (TTpaTiiyds alptOth tc) SfuTepuv, thai Lb, the eighth year from the deliverance of Sikyon. -• The tale is well told by Plutarch, Ar. 17. It naturally moves the indignation of the Macedonian Droysen (ii. :'>71). According to him the ry comes from Phylarchos, and therefore is aol to be believed. Why may aol Phylarchos have sometimes told the truth I and why may aol the Btorj hav< cofuc from th< Memoirs of Aratos ! ACCESSION OF CORINTH TO THE LEAGUE. 3/7 now brought to the very gates of the League, and Aratos' chap. vn. own city was the most exposed of all. Another brilliant Deliver- enterprise of his own peculiar kind, a night-adventure Corinth as perilous as that which had rescued Sikyon, restored :n " 1 ll . s * >> > accession Corinth to freedom. 1 For the first time for nearly a to the League, hundred years the Corinthians were masters of their own b.o. 243. city. 2 Aratos easily persuaded them to join the League ; 3 their mountain citadel now became a Federal fortress* instead of a stronghold of the oppressor. The port of Lechaion at once shared the fate of the capital ; that of Kenchreia remained for a time in the hands of the enemy. 5 So great a success raised alike the fame and the power of the Achaians and their General. Megara was occupied Accession by a Macedonian garrison ; 6 its people now revolted, pro- Troizen, bably with Achaian help, and at once joined the League. '^ uros pi ~ Within Peloponnesos, the cities of Troizen and Epidauros 7 followed their example. The territory of the fifteen Con- federate cities now stretched continuously from the Ionian to the iEgsean Sea, from Cape Araxos to the extreme point of the Argolic peninsula. The key of Peloponnesos was now in the hands of the Union — the fetters of Greece 8 were broken. But, immediately beyond the new Achaian frontier, two of the most famous cities of Greece were still in i Pint. Ar. 18-23. The tale is Liilliantly told by the biographer. Cf. Pol. ii. 43. 2 Plut. Ar. 23. See above, p. 251. 3 The scene in Plutarch (c. 23) is a fine one. Aratos, weary with his night's labour, appears in the Corinthian theatre leaning on his spear, unable for a while to speak, amid the cheers of the delivered people. Then, crwayayeov kavrbv 8ie£7jA0e \6yov virep twv '&x ak uv ttj -rrpd^ti Ttpe- Trovra Kai crvveireicre rods Kopwdlovs 'Ax^'ow yevsaQai. * Plut. Ar. 24. See above, p. 310. 6 It must have been acquired soon after, as we find it Achaian a few years later. Plut. Ar. 29. 8 Plut. Ar. 24. Meyapels aTOffravrts y hvriy6vov t<£ 'Apdrcf npos(8ti/ro. Cf. Pol. ii. 43. 7 lb. 8 Corinth, Chalkis, and Demctrias, so called by the last Philip. 378 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. bondage. To win Corinth, Athens, and Argos to the League in a single year would have raised Aratos to a height of glory which the heroes of Marathon or Ther- Position of mopvhe might have envied. Athens, fallen as she was, andAigos. still retained her great name and the shadow of her ancient freedom, and she was now beginning to assume the character which she held under her Roman lords as the sacred city of literature and philosophy. How far this last claim spoke to the heart of the Sikyonian athlete it is hard to say, but certain it is that to win Athens to the cause of Grecian freedom was an object on which the heart of Aratos was always strongly bent. To Argos he was bound by still closer ties ; his youth had been spent within her walls ; her deliverance was the payment which he owed her for the shelter which she had given him in the days of his adversity. 1 The condition however of the two cities was different. Athens seems to have been at this moment in possession of as much liberty and demo- cracy as was consistent with the presence of .Macedonian troops, not indeed in the City itself, but in the other A.haian fortresses of the Attic territory. 2 The League was at war of Attica, with Macedonia ; and Attica was, under such circum- stances, clearly liable to be dealt with as an enemy's country. Attica was once more, as in the days of Archi- damos, invaded by a Peloponnesian army, even the isle of Salamis, occupied as it was by a Macedonian garrison, was ravaged by the Acliaian troops. But Aratos took care to show that it was not against Athens, hut against her oppressors, that he was warring. lie released all his Athenian prisoners without ransom. This, it must be remembered, was, according to the received rules of 1 Hut. At. 26. 'ApytLois SovXtvovffiv dx0t\uv T( v Tvpavvov oi rwv ApKTT.'fiaxof, '7"» if Tl TroAei OpfrtT^pia it\v tKtvOtplav dniiSouvat (piXnTiniwutvos Hal to?v 'Axanns TrposKofil(Tat -ti)v ttoKiv. 2 Bee Thirlwall. viii. 99, 100 ATTEMPTS ON ATHENS. 3/9 Grecian warfare, a piece of extraordinary favour. The oka?, vu. ordinary fate of prisoners of war was to be sold as slaves ; even to put them to death, though a rare and extreme act of severity, did not actually violate Greek International Law. 1 It was not likely that Aratos should show any special harshness towards a people who were enemies only through their misfortune ; but his extreme lenity might Vain fairly be expected to call forth some marks of Athenian to attach gratitude. Aratos doubtless expected by this means ^ th^ 8 to open negociations which might lead to the union of League- Athens with the League. 2 No such result happened ; Athens gave no sign. Fear of Antigonos may well have been a stronger feeling than hope from Aratos, but this was not all. The Federal charmer always charmed in vain in Athenian ears. No Greek city ever needed the help of Confederates more than did Athens in the days of Aratos ; but the Athens of the days of Aratos had, unluckily for herself, not quite lost the memory of the Athens of the days of PeriklCs. The once imperial city could not bring herself to give up the shadow of her old sovereignty ; she could not endure to see her citizens march at the bidding of a General from Sikyon ; she could not endure to exchange absolute independence for a place in a Peloponnesian Assembly where the vote of Athens might be neutralized by the vote of Epidauros or of Keryneia. A degrading subserviency to Macedonia and Rome, an abject worship of every foreign prince who would send alms to her coffers, was not inconsistent with a nominal indepen- dence and a nominal Democracy. Incorporation Avith the League would have given her the substance at the expense of the shadow ; Athens would have been once more really free, and the borders of liberated Greece would have been 1 See above, p. 58. 2 Pint, Ar. '24. 'A9i]faiois 5e rods eKevdtpovs df Aristippos. The order of the names, Aristippos, Aristomachos, Arist- ippos, Aristomachos, certainly Looks very like a family succession, and Phylarchos, as quoted by Polybios (\\. (><>>, distinctly '-alls the second Aristomachos a descendant of Tyrants {-n-ftyvKws iKTvpdwwv). On the other hand, had Aristippos the Second been the son of Aristomachos the First, one nuvlit have expected Plutarch to introduce him with some mention .,l in, kindred to his predecessor, and not simply as a worse Tyranl than In' u;is (Qoixiartpos ixtivov Tvpawos. Ar. 25). 'I'll' 1 enterprise of Anil. is on Sikyon also snins to sliou thai Ar.u'os was free, or at Leasl not under any very oppressive or Inquisitorial government, in b.o. 251. still, il tlio dynasty was a hereditary our, we may well believe thai it was less oppre ive than thee mon n f Tyrannies, till the advance of Aratos and iln- League began t" pu1 nil Tyrants on their guard, [f Aristomachos had any border feud with ffikokles, especially if he tl gh1 thai Aratos merely Intended to substitute himself for NiUki.-s as Tyranl of sikyon, h mighl 'mii have i ncouraged his design. 3 iM.n . Ar. 25. ATTEMPTS ON ARISTOMACHOS OF AEGOS. 381 Antigonos and the JEtolians. He found men in Argos chap. vn. willing to take the Tyrant's life, if they could only get Aratos swords to take it with. The General of the Achaians ra g es con- presently provided them with daggers. We must not s l f r ! la "' s judge of this action by our modern English notions. llim - English feeling revolts against assassination under any circumstances. Sometimes it goes so far as to see more guilt in the conspirator who plots the slaughter of a single public enemy than in the conspirator who plots schemes of treason which involve the slaughter of innocent thousands. Greek feeling was very different. The Ty- Greek rant, that is, the successful conspirator, the triumphant Tyrants plotter of a coup d'etat, the man who had overthrown iJ? d 1 # Tyrant- the freedom of his country, who had sacrificed the pro- slayers. perty, the liberty, and the lives of his fellow-citizens, was looked on as no longer a man but a wild beast. He who had trampled all Law under his feet, whose power rested wholly on the destruction of Law, had no claim to the protection of Law in his own person. As his hand was against every man, so every man's hand might righteously be against him. Against a criminal who, by the very greatness of his crimes, was placed beyond the reach of ordinary justice, every citizen was entitled to act as at once accuser, judge, and executioner. As Tyranny was the greatest of crimes, if for no other cause than that it involved all other crimes, 1 so the slaving of a Tvrant was looked on as the noblest of human actions. 2 The 1 Pol. ii. 60. Auto yap Tovvo/xa [to rvpavvos] irepie'xfi r-fjv a. cip dpxuvTw ipyov icrrl robs dpxofJ.fvovs tcus avTtHv int/jLeXeiaiS iroi€?v fuSai/iorecrTepoi/y, rots 5e Tvpdvvots (60s KadtffrrjKf rols TWV &Wwv ttovois Kal xaKo?s avrols tjSovds irapao~Kfvd£eiv. avdyicri 5e toi)$- towvtois Zpyois eirtxetpoiVTas rvpavviKois Kal ra?s o-vfxrr\v rr)v elpr\vr)v rois dve\ouo~i Ka\ rip.wpr)(ra/x(vois eiraivos Kal rifxrj ffvve£riKo\ou6et irapd ro7s dpdws \oyi- (ofUvois. Two things arc remarkable in this last passage^ Polybioa goea beyond all ordinary Greek feeling in justifying torture as applied to a captive Tyranl ; he also recognizes in the King Antigonos as much li^ht to chastise a Tyrwnt as in Aratos himself. The tacts of the rase w ill be considered hereafter. 1 Tic debates held a1 the time on the < dud of Timoledn (Plut. Tim. 5 7) arc among the tnoal instructive pieces of evidence mi the subject. Men doubted whether Timoledn was a fratricide or a Tyrannicide ; thai is, tiny doubted whether he had killed Timophanea from patriotic tivea or to gratifj a private grudge; bu1 no one doubted that, if he did kill him in, in patriotic tives, the deed was praiseworthy. It is worth notice thai Timoledn could ao1 bring himself to kill his brother with his own hand (ih 1 1 GKEEK FEELING TOWARDS TYRANNICIDE. 383 cannot enter into the feelings with which the Greek char vii. looked upon the Tyrant-slayer, because Englishmen have The Greek never in any age known the full bitterness of Tyranny, telligible We have had our oppressors and unrighteous rulers, our j^"^ 11 " evil Kings and their evil Ministers, but we have never cause of the seen a power which wholly rested on the utter trampling cireum- down of law and right. We have seen bad laws and un- English just judgements, Ave have seen civil wars and revolutions, lustol T- but no age of English history ever beheld a Government which was founded solely on perjury and massacre. The nation has always had strength to resist by the might either of reason or of armed force. Our oppressors have been overthrown in peaceful debate, or they have been smitten to the earth upon the open field of battle. They have been sent to the block by sentences, sometimes, it may be, unjust, sometimes, it may be, illegal, but which still, by the very form of a judicial process, showed that the dominion of Law had not utterly passed away. Kings and rulers have indeed died by private murder, but such murder has always been a base and needless crime, con- demned by the unanimous voice of the nation. No English Doctor of the fifteenth century would have ventured, as was done in contemporary France, to defend one of the a.d. 1408. basest assassinations on record by the abstract doctrine of the lawfulness of slaying Tyrants. 1 Once only, when a power, illegal indeed and founded on force, but neither degrading nor practically oppressive, showed some faint likeness to the Tyrannies of earlier and of later days, did 1 When Lewis, Duke of Orleans, was murdered in 1407 by John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, the act was defended in an elaborate dis- course by John Petit, a theologian, who lays down the abstract doctrine of Tyrannicide, and justifies it by many examples, most of them very little to the purpose. See the whole speech in Monstrelet, cap. 39, p. 35, ed. 1595. Cf. Jean Juvenal des drains, A. 140/. p. 191. ed. 1653. Certainly the likeness between Duke John and Tinioleon is not striking. 384 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAl*. VII. a.d. 1657. In the estimate of their own time the Ar- geian con- spirators were praise- worthy, Aratos not so. Englishmen ever venture to maintain the thesis that there are times when Killing is no Murder. 1 With the feelings naturally produced by such a past history as this, if our sympathy does not lie absolutely with the Tyrant, it lies stronglv against the Tyrant-slayer. When seeu through the mist of ages we do not refuse him a kind of reverence ; we respect the names of Ehud, of Brutus, and of William Tell ; 2 but we shrink from him as an assassin when he appears in the form of a man of our own age. We must learn to put aside a morality which arises mainly from the conditions of our own past history, if we wish to judge aright of a Greek of the days of Aratos. That the slaughter of Aristomachos at the hands of any citizen of Argos would have been a virtuous and noble action no Greek politician or moralist could have doubted for a moment. Whether Aratos was justified in having any hand in such a transaction is quite another matter. Aratos was the chief magistrate of a commonwealth with which Aristomachos was not at war, and to which apparently he had done no injury. And, if he had been at war with the League, the assassination of an open enemy was 1 The famous pamphlet bearing this title is well known. In 16T>2 we find a Captain Thomas Gardiner petitioning Charles the Second "for relief;" besides bis services in the civil War, he pleads as a title to the King's bounty that he "in 1657, intended an attempt on Cromwell, but was taken in the Gallery at Hampton Court with two loaded pistols ami a dagger, kept 12 months a prisoner, and only failed to be sentenced t.i death by want of evidence on the trial." Calendar of State Papers, 1661 2, p. fi'l'.). AVe may doubt whether Aristomachos and Aristippoa Let conspirators go so easily. 2 i tmst to hive a more fitting opportunity for discussing the story of the first deliverance of Switzerland. It is enOUgb lure to say that, in the tale as commonly told, the old Swiss Revolution appears as one of the purest of all Revolutions; there is only one aet which the most rigid morali ,i could deno se as a crime, oamelj the slaughter of Gassier by William Tell. Now, strange to say, this one doubtful action is the one feature i, I' the tale which has |,ei in iiient ly fixed itself in popular memory; and it i. never spoken of without admiration. POSITION OF ARATOS TOWARDS ARGOS. 'Mo deemed as odious in Greek warfare as it is deemed now; chap. vii. Aratos would never have thought of employing assassins against the General of the yEtolians or even against the King of Macedonia. We can hardly be wrong in saying that, however praiseworthy the slaying of Aristomachos might be in an oppressed Argeian, it in no way became the President of the Achaian League to encourage plots against his life. But in the mind of Aratos the hatred of Tyrants had become a kind of passion, under the influence of which he often forgot the dictates both of honour and of prudence. And Argos was all but his native citv : Aratos' * S 1 1 1 ■ ( " ] ; \ 1 there he had spent his youth ; thence he had gone forth position to his great work ; the freedom of Argos was as dear to )).J n | [[,' his heart as the freedom of Sikyon, and he felt towards ^§ os - a Tyrant of Argos all the intensity of hate which would glow in the bosom of a native Argeian. In his eyes the Argeian Tyrant was not a mere foreign power, a national rival, capable either of honourable peace or of honourable war ; he was a common enemy of mankind, against whom all means were lawful ; he might be picked off from behind a tree or ensnared in a pitfall, with as good a conscience as men would pick off or ensnare a wolf or a tiger. Antigonos was a King, an enemy, not always, it may be, a very scrupulous or honourable enemy ; but he was still an enemy, entitled to be dealt with according to the laws of war and the laws of nations. Let him only keep within his own realm, and nothing hindered him from being the friend, or even the ally, of the Achaian commonwealth. Alexander of Corinth, a Prince and a Macedonian like himself, and the immediate ruler of a Grecian city, had not been deemed unworthy of the closest friendship of the League. Towards the Mace- donian King of Egypt Aratos and his countrymen were only too lavish of their honours. But the Tyrant of Argos could, in the eyes of Aratos, never be an ally, a friend, C c 38G HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. or even an honourable enemy. No Law of Nations could protect him whose very existence was the contradiction of all Law. With him short rede was good rede ; the only question was how to get him out of the way with the least cost of time and trouble. Aratos, with these feelings, mingled without scruple in all the Argeian plots against Aristomachos. Those plots failed ; the con- Death of spirators quarrelled and denounced oue another. Soon machos after indeed Aristomachos was killed by his own slaves, the Fust ; j^j. Argos was not delivered. In his stead arose a succession ° of A list- second Aristippos, a Tyrant, we are told, yet more cruel Second. than himself. 1 Aratos seized, as he thought, the favour- able moment. He entered Argolis with such Achaian troops as he could collect at so short a warning, hoping that the Argeians themselves would at once rise and join Vain him. But Tyranny had done its work, the worst of all of Aratos its cy il works ; men's hearts were bowed down by op- ii Argos. pvcssJo!^ aut | they had not courage to meet the deliverer. Aratos was of course in no position to undertake the conquest of Argos with his hurried levies, raised probably without any formal authority from the Achaian Assembly. He retired ; had he succeeded, the technical error in his proceedings would doubtless have been forgiven, and the deliverance of Argos Mould have been reckoned as glorious as the deliverance of Corinth. As it was, he earned only the questionable reputation of having led the Achaian troops against a city with which the Achaian League was not at war. 2 This breach of in- ternational light was referred, according to a custom not uncommon in Crecce, to the arbitration of a friendly city. Aristippos pleaded his cause before a Mantiiieian 1 l -l 1 1 1 . ,\r. -jr.. Bee above, p. nso. 2 Hi. Twv 8i TroKAa>i> [twv 'Apytlwv] tffii) HiA rljv (ruvrfOtiav tOt\o$ov\ws iX ( ' )l '' TU, 't ,(^Vf JLa "OTf- VAIN ATTEMPTS ON ARGOS. 387 tribunal; 1 Aratos, who did not appear, was condemned chap. va. to a small fine. The condemnation shows that the Man- Suit at tineian judges appreciated the formal wrong of which between " Aratos had been guilty ; the insignificant amount of the f^fiSf 08 penalty showed equally that they appreciated the cir- League. eumstances and motives which extenuated his conduct. It would seem also to have been during this second Ptolemy Generalship of Aratos, that Ptolemy Philadelphos, hitherto phos'i', the ally of Aratos and of Sikyon, was prevailed on by him aiw^he to become the ally of the Achaian League. The King League. was, in return, invested with the supreme command of the Achaian forces by land and sea. 2 The title and office were of course purely honorary ; the only way in which Ptolemy could really help his Greek friends was by sub- sidies in money. We have seen how efficacious his aid in that way had been in the local affairs of Sikyon. Either then or now Aratos accepted a yearly pension of six talents from the King. 3 This has an ill look; but the 1 We must suppose (see Thirlwall, viii. 126) some treaty or agreement, general or special, by which the Mantineians were recognized as arbiters between Argos and the League. The way in which Plutarch tells the story implies that, though Aratos did not appear, the League did not at all decline the authority of the judges. The suit too was against the League, though the sentence was against Aratos personally. (Plut. Ar. 25. Alkt)v iffx ov [ol 'Axaiol] iirl rovTcp irapd Maurivevatv, rjv 'Apdrov fj.rj irapSvTos 'ApicTrnriros eT\e Siwkoov Kal y,vQv eVi^tf?/ rpiaKovra. ) This seems to show that Aratos had acted without due authority from the League. Schorn's (p. 94) wild notion that the tribunal here spoken of M'as a Macedonian court to which all the Pelopomiesian Tyrants held themselves responsible, is well refuted by Droysen (ii. 399). Aristippos might accuse before such a court, but neither the Achaian League nor any Achaian citizen would acknowledge its jurisdiction ; indeed one can hardly fancy Aristippos being so foolish as to accuse Achaians before it. What the story does prove is that Mantineia, in B.C. 243, was independent, and neither Achaian, ^Etolian, nor Macedonian. 2 Plut. Ar. 24. UroKejj.a7ov 8e ' tlOU SUp- the Achaian people seem to do nothing. Doubtless this V^ed re- appearance arises in a great degree from the form in which years. our information as to these years has come down to us. What we know comes from the brief sketch of Polybios and from the Life of Aratos by Plutarch. But this is not all. In the analogous sketch by Thucvdides, and in Plutarch's Life of Perikles, the Athenian People are not thus overshadowed by their leader. The difference arises mainly from the difference between Athenian and Achaian Democracy, and especially from the totally different position in which each placed its first citizen. Perikles was practically the master of the Athenian 390 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chai\ vn. Assembly, because that Assembly habitually voted as he counselled it. Legally he was the servant of the Assembly, bound to carry out whatever the Sovereign People had decreed. Aratos was practically as great as Pcrikles, and he was legally much greater. It was the Assembly which Great determined war and peace ; but the whole plan of every II? \hr campaign, where he would go and where he would not go, , F " 1, Ia ! was the General's own affair. It is clear also that the details General. of diplomatic proceedings were left to his discretion, at most after conference with his Cabinet Council. It is evi- dent that many of the things done and attempted by Aratos during these two years could uot possibly have been debated beforehand in the Federal Assembly, or even in the Federal Senate. Achaia was at war with Antigonos ; Antigonos held Corinth ; whether to make a night-attack on Corinth or to forbear was a question for the General to settle on his own responsibility. That responsibility, like that of a modern Minister, came after the met. These great powers vested in a single man undoubtedly tended to give the policy of the League a character of unity and consistency, above all of secrecy, where secrecy was needed, which could not possibly exist under the older form of Democracy. On the other hand, an officer holding swell great powers was exposed, almost by the Constitu- tion itself, to a constant temptation to overstep them. The invasion of ArgOS, if not B crime, was certainly a blunder; I tnt it was a blunder which no Athenian General could i wt have been tempted to make. $ 2. From the Deliverance of Corinth to the Annexation of A /■*. B.C. 243— 22a Aratos may now lie looked upon as the permanent chief o\ the League He Riled thehighes! magistracy in alter- RELATIONS BETWEEN ACHAIA AND SPARTA. 391 natc years, and, even when out of office, he was still ohap. mi. practically the guiding spirit of the commonwealth. In Third his third year of office we find the League still at war with ^p f ' iEtolia, but now in close alliance with Sparta, Agis was g^^j now one of the Spartan Kings, Agis the pure enthusiast King Agis. and the spotless martyr, who perished in a cause than which none could be either nobler or more hopeless, the attempt to restore a corrupted commonwealth to the virtue and simplicity of times long gone by. His whole career is one of the most fascinating pieces of later Grecian history ; but his attempts at reform, his selfish adversaries and his no less selfish friends, the beautiful pictures of his domestic life, of his self-sacrifice and his martyrdom, do not directly bear on the history of Achaian Federalism. It is enough Relations for our purpose that Sparta and the League were now Leacme closely allied, that the iEtolians were expected to enter ^' lth t Peloponnesos by Avay of the Isthmus, and that Agis ap- peared at Corinth at the head of a Lacedaemonian con- tingent. 1 The two allied commanders were singularly i Those who havo studied the history of these times know well that the circumstances of this war are involved in much confusion. According to Pausanias (ii. 8. 5) the League was, some time or other, at war with Agis, jjwho took Pellene, and was driven out by Aratos. This account Droysen (ii. 380) adopts, and supposes that the alliance between Sparta and the League was concluded after this campaign, because the Lace- i Lsemonians, in Pausanias, depart vir6(nroi>8ot. Pausanias also elsewhere (viii. 10. 5 — 8 ; 27. 13, 14) tells us of a siege of Megalopolis by Agis, and also of a pitched battle near Mantineia, in which Aratos and Lydiadas command the Achaians, and in which Agis is killed ! This talc is utterly absurd ; all the world knows that Agis was not killed in any battle at Mantineia or anywhere else. The whole epicstion has been thoroughly sifted by Manso (Sparta, iii. 2. 123), who is confirmed by Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 127, 148). The supposed capture of Pellene by Agis is a stupid perversion of the real capture of Pellene which will presently be mentioned. His imaginary Arkadian campaign comes from a confusion between this Agis and his predecessor of the same name in the century before (see above, p. 242^, who really besieged Megalopolis and fell in battle near Mantineia. I might add that the details of the battle in Pausanias seem to be a mixture of those of the battle last mentioned and of those of the battle of Ladokeia, to be hereafter spoken of, where Aratos and Lydiadas did 392 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. VII. ( lontrast lift ween Agis ami Aratos. contrasted. Agis was a hereditary Kiiig, vet he was, in a certain sense, a revolutionist ; Aratos was a republican chief, the sworn enemy of Tyrants, and no lover of Kings, but he was at the same time a politician essentially con- servative and aristocratic. 1 Both were reformers ; the reforms of both consisted in restoration not in innovation, but while Aratos aimed at, and succeeded in, possible political reforms, Agis dreamed of social changes, the restoration of a past state of things, which it was as hopeless to attempt as to turn back the planets in their courses. Both were young — Aratos was still only thirty — but Aratos, even ten years before, had an old head on young shoulders, while Agis had all the best qualities of youth, its hopefulness, its daring, its pure and unselfish enthu- siasm. One is tempted to believe that Aratos looked on Agis as a hare-brained fanatic, and that Agis looked on Aratos as a cold-blooded diplomatist, intriguing, disin- genuous, and cowardly. The gallant young King longed for an opportunity to win credit for himself and his army ; military renown would be of all things the most valuable towards his ulterior objects at home ; to his Spartan heart war meant victory or death in the open field ; schemes, surprises, night-adventures, were not his element ; above command against a Spartan King, though that King was nol Agis bu1 K l> "UK Q There La also a story, alluded to more than once, bu1 never directly narrated, both by Polybioa and by Plutarch (Pol. iv. 84. i.\. 84. Pint. Kl.-iiin. is), aboul a greal /Etolian Inroad into Lakonia, in which the plunderers carried off a wonderful amounl both of spoil ami captives. No date Is given; Schora (p. 91) ami Bishop Thiilwall (viiL i""'t place ii lat.i- than this. It is, to say the hast, \n\ tempting to pni it, with Droj mi (ii. 887), aboul this time. It seems to agree well with a ii when Sparta and Achaia air allied againsl .I'.tolia. This is on.' of the. v things which make tie wish thai Polybios had begun his detailed history earlier. i i have alreadj often shown that the Achaian Democracy was practi- cally an Aristocracy in tin' be I snst "I the word, an dpiaroKpaTia as distinguished from a mere 6\iyuf>x'ia. CONTRAST BETWEEN ARATOS AND AGIS. 393 all, if Lakonia had just before been pitilessly ravaged by ohajp. vn. these verv JStolians, every feeling of honour and revenge Difference J . i m tneir led him to wish for a decisive action. Aratos, on the plans for other hand, looked on a battle as the last resource of an paign# ignorant general ; he had never fought a pitched battle yet, and he was not going to fight one now to please the young man from Lacedsemon. Let the JEtolians come ; the harvest was gathered in ; the country people might take refuge in the towns till the storm had passed by ; the enemy could not do so much damage in a passage through Achaia as they would do if they won a battle at Corinth. 1 Agis, unconvinced, yielded to the superior authority of the Achaian General," and, soon after, for some reason or Agis retires. other, he and his army retired. 3 The common feeling of the Achaian army was strongly with Agis. Aratos had to bear many bitter reproaches on his supposed weakness and cowardice. 4 But military and constitutional discipline prevailed ; the chief of the League was obeyed. The Capture xEtoliaus passed the Isthmus undisturbed ; they passed C0V ery of through the Sikyonian territory ; they entered the old PeUene - Achaian land ; they burst on the city of Pellene, took it, i Here Plutarch definitely quotes the Memoirs of Aratos. (Agis, 15.) f3e\riov ijyeTro, rois Kapiroiis a\^^ v o.^avras OVyKeKOfUffniuap r&v yewpywv, i:api\Qilv rovs iroXen'iovs rj /*<*X]7 SiaKlvivvevffcU irepl rwv bXtuv. 2 lb. "E(J>7j [o "A/yis] . . . iroirfcreiv rd Sokovv 'Apdrw, xal ydp irpecr- fivTtpSv r elvai Ka\ ffrparr\yuv 'Axatwu, ols ovx^ ttposrdfwv oub" riyyaoixevos, dAAci (Tvarpareva6jj.iVOS tJkoi kcu lio-q(JT). 3 Aratos dismissed them — rods o-vpijxdxovs i-n-aiveaas Sia TrAeurroJ' AItwAcZv Swajxivcp ervvepyep XP^cajuei/os [o "Aparos]. Cf. Pol. ii. 44. 3 Pol. ii. 44, 46. 'O AyfxT\Tpia.Kb's Tr6\f/j.os. 4 See Scliorn, p. 88. He reckons up llvpata, Lamia, the Phthiotic Thebes, Melitaia, Pharsalos, Larissa Kremaste, and EcMnos. 5 Phylakia. Plut. Ar. 34. See Thirhvall, viii. 133, for an exami- nation of several small controversies which have arisen about the details of the Demetrian "War, but which do not at all hear upon the subject of this history. 6 Pol. xx. 5. See above, p. 182. 396 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. The two objects dearest to the heart of Aratos were Unsuc- still the deliverance of Athens and the deliverance of tempt of Argos. Over and over again did he attempt both. l Pei- Aratoa on ra j eus was gtill held bv its Macedonian garrison. Even Peiraieus, J b.c. 239. before the death of Antigonos, while the League was still at peace with Macedonia, Aratos did not scruple to cause one of his agents to attempt a surprise of the fortress. In his own Memoirs he strove to make the world believe that this man attacked Peiraieus on his own account, and that, when he was beaten back, he affirmed that Aratos had sent him. His name was Erginos, a native of Syria, but doubt- less of Greek or Macedonian descent, who had been one of the instruments of Aratos in the capture of Akro- korinthos. 2 He was therefore a tried and trusty agent of the Achaian General, very likely to be employed by liim on such an adventure, but hardly the man to attempt to capture cities on his own account. So unlikely a story met with no credit at the time, and Aratos suffered some- what in reputation among his countrymen 8 for bringing on the League the discredit of a breach of truce. This piece of information is valuable on many grounds. It shews ns the true position of Aratos as chief of the League. It illustrates the great powers which were vested in an Achaian General. The attack on Peiraieus must have been made wholly on Aratos' own responsibility, or he could never have attempted to throw off that rcsponsi- IlluBtra- bility on the shoulders of a private foreigner. Aratos had th,Tpo8i- undoubtedly exceeded his Legal powers, but it was only '^ '', ''J (he legal extent of those powers which gave him the opportunity or the temptation of exceeding them. But it also sets him before us as the really accountable chief of a U'vv commonwealth. Great as Aratos was, he had 1 I 'I ill. Ar. 88. Ov 51s ovtil rpls d\\& irn\\di„' ii/A(aiw. ATTEMPTS ON ATHENS. '-W7 to undergo the free criticism and censure of a popular chap. vn. Assembly, and to meet and answer orators who evidently did not scruple to withstand him to his face. But it would seem also that the Assembly was satisfied with such criticism and censure ; the permanent influence of Aratos was clearly not diminished, nor is it certain that there was any intermission in the practice of electing' him President in alternate years. 1 We may also observe that the international morality of the League is higher than that of its chief. Aratos did not scruple at a breach of treaty which the feeling of the Achaian Assembly evi- dently condemned. We may remark again the different feelings with which a King and a Tyrant were looked upon. King Antigonos has his rights ; he is entitled to all the advantages of International Law ; the League at once feels that any breach of treaty towards him is a stain upon the national honour. But it does not appear that what we should call the far more dishonourable attempts of Aratos upon the Argeian Tyrants called forth any such indignation at home, and we have seen how lenient was the censure pronounced upon them even by neutral judges. When war again broke out with Mace- Various i • * j.i attempts donia, Aratos was able to renew his attempts on Athens ,,„ Athens, in a more honourable form. He took a personal share !;;,',; 23 ' in repeated, but always unsuccessful, invasions of Attjca, in one of which he received a severe wound. 2 After his defeat in Thessaly two rumours were afloat, one that he was taken prisoner, the other that he was dead. The former was that which reached King Dcmctrios, who sent a ship from Macedonia to bring the captive to his 1 The whole question of the Presidential years of Aratos will be dis- cussed in a note at the end of the next chapter. Plut. Ar. 33. "A7ra| 8e /ecu rd (TKe\os eOTracre Sict tov Qptairiov (pevywf koI TOfioLS e\a/3e iroWcts 6epairev6/j.€vos ical iro\dv XP& V0V * v aiut KoixpoTTiTa KoAaxtlas rijs np()s MaKt- hiivas vntpf3a\<5i>Tts £rrTt6pri. Vlpds ipyr\v tvObs iKtTTpaTtvaas 4ir' adrobs &XP' T *? s 'AKaSij/xlas ■npnr\\Qtv' (Ira irtiffOtls ovUlv 7J5i'/cr)(T6)/. :1 See the comparison in Plutarch (Ar. 25, 26) of the position of the two. I ompare also the description of the private life of Aristippos with that of Alexander of Pherai in I'lut. Pel, ''^>. Alexander however has ;i wife, \i i tippos has only an ipu^U^ with ^ complaisanl mother. FURTHER ATTEMPTS ON ARC! OS. 399 had equally plotted the death of the Tyrant's predecessor, chap. vn. possibly his father. But one would rather not believe tluit King Antigonos was a fellow-conspirator, and it may well be that the report to that effect was only an un- authorized conjecture of Aratos himself. 1 On the part of Aratos, every sort of attack, secret or open, was em- ployed for many successive years. The war was of the usual kind ; Aratos fought and lost one or two pitched battles, but in diplomatic dealings, in surprises, in night-marches, he was as skilful and as daring as ever. In the open field, by the banks of the river Chares, the General of the Achaians ran away, when victory was declaring for his army ; 2 yet the same General could in his own person scale the walls of Argos, fight hand to hand with the Tyrant's mercenaries, and only retire when disabled by a severe wound. 3 Bitter was his disappointment when he found that the Argeians, whom he came to deliver, stirred not hand nor foot in his behalf, but sat by and looked on at his exploits as if they were sitting to adjudge the prize in the Nemean Games. 4 But if he ran away at the Chares, if he had to retire from Argos, he presently gained the city of Kleonai as a member of the League. KleOuai ... ioins the When the Tyrant marched against this new acquisition, League. Aratos, by a forced march, forestalled him, entered the city, sallied forth vigorously, drove back the enemy, chased them to Mykene, and left Aristippos dead upon Death the field. The victory, however, was for the present fruit- ipposthe less ; a second Aristomachos, perhaps the son of Arist- s «' ,m(l - 1 " ~2wcpyovvTos 'AvTty6vov. Plat. Ar. 25, — perhaps only a suspicion expressed by Aratus in his Autobiography." Thirlwall, viii. 126. 2 See the whole story in Plut. Ar. 28. 3 lb. 27. 4 Hi. Ot fi.cv 'Apyeloi, KaOdwep ovk virep rrjs sKelvwv {AevOtpias rrjs fiaxys ovaris, d\\' oos rdu dywva tQiv Ne/xeiW Ppa/ievoi/Tes, Xffoi Kal Sucatol Beared KadijfTO r<2v yivo^ivuv -ttoAAt)^ ijtrux'a" dyovres. This, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 126) says, is probably Aratos' own comparison. 400 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. ippos, 1 seized upon the government with Macedonian Tyranny help, 2 and Argos was as for from deliverance as before. 3 ot Aristo- x ' ° machos the Second. 1 See above, p. 380. 2 Pint. At. 29. 'O 5* "kparos, ovrw Xa/xirpus evTVxrfvas . . . '6/j.ws ovk eAafie rd *Apyos ovS' -qXivdepaxre, twv Trepl 'Ayiav Ka\ top veurepov Apicno- /J.O.XOV yueTOL 5vvd/j.(u;s fiarnKiKrjs ■napusTTtcrovTwv koX Karaa-xovroDV t& irpay- fxara. Agias was douhtless the Macedonian commander. 3 The accession of Aristomachos involves a question of some import- ance. Was this the time mentioned by Polybios (ii. 59), when Aratos entered Argos, but retired on finding that the Argeians did not support him, on which Aristomachos put eighty of the chief citizens to death with torture as adherents of the Achaiana ? The point is worth examining, for this Aristomachos was afterwards General of the League, and one naturally wishes to know whether any man wdio held that office had ever been guilty of such a monstrous crime. Droysen (ii. 436) and Bishop Thirlwall — the latter perhaps not quite positively — place it at this time. (See the narrative and note, Thirlwall, viii. 134.) According to this view, Aratos pressed on in his pursuit to Argos itself, and entered the city ; but Aristornachos had already seized on the government, and, as soon as Aratos had retired, he murdered the eighty citizens. I confess that the narrative of Plutarch does not give me the idea that Aratos continued the pursuit beyond Mykene, and the words of Polybios do not give me the idea that the massacre was the very first act of the ride of Arist- ippos. It may well bo doubted whether the story in Polybios and the story in Plutarch have anything to do with one another. Dr. Schmitz, in the Dictionary of Biography (art. Aristomachus) places the massacre much later, in the time of the Kleomenic War, after Aristomachos had joined the Achaian League, and again forsaken it. 1 can find no point in tie history of those times which suits the events, and the whole language of Polybios points to the days when Aratos was trying to deliver Argos from the Tyrants, not to the days when Argos was a revolted city of the Achaian Union. Schorn, on the other hand (p. 118), throws out a. hint which seems to me in have great probability. " Das Verbrechen, welches ihm [Aris1 achus] der genannte Schriftsteller [Polyhius] (2, 59, 8 f.) zur Last legt, hat jener wahrscheinlich nicht begangen, Aus Plutarch (Arat. 25 and 27) Lassl sich vermuthen, dass Polyhius den jiingeren Aristomachus nnt dem alteren oder vii Imehr mil Aristippus verwechsoll hat." That Polybios has thus confounded Aristomachos with <>ne of his predecessors seems really very likely. The description which he gives of Aratos entering 'Argos, and retiring because lie found mi help from the citizens, agrees with nothing whieh is elsewhere i i id of the reign of Aristomachos the Second. Bui it very well agrees with the firsl passage quoted from Plutarch bj Schorn, in the time of Aristomachos the First, and still moiv with the second , in the lime of A list i|i]ios. The question then arises whether Polybios could have made such a mistake. w, mi, i remember that Polybios, in this pari of bis work, is writing of ACCESSION OF KLEONAI TO THE LEAGUE. 401 The accession of Kleonai, though in itself an incon- chap. vn. siderable city, must have added somewhat to the position Accession of the League in general estimation. The Kleonaians to the were doubtless willing and zealous confederates. Their ft^S 6 "*. city had hitherto occupied a position with regard to Argos somewhat like that which had been occupied by Pisa with regard to Elis. As the Pisatans claimed to be the lawful presidents of the Olympic festival, so the Kleonaians claimed to be the lawful presidents of the Nemean festival. But, for ages past, their rights had been usurped by their powerful neighbours of Argos, who seem to have held Kleonai in the condition of dependent al- liance. Accession to the League was, to a city in such a position, promotion in every sense. The League knew of no distinctions between its members, and Kleonai was doubtless admitted as an equal confederate, on a perfect level with Sikydn and Corinth. And, more than this, the Kleonaians were now, for the first time, able to vindicate their rights, and to celebrate their own Nemean Games. The League, numbering Corinth and Kleonai among its members, had now two out of the four great national festivals of Greece celebrated within its territory. But the Argeians did not tamely surrender their privilege. Like the Eleians, when the Arkadians celebrated Olympic Games under Pisatan presidency, 1 they ignored B -c- 364. events which happened before his own birth, and that Plutarch had before him the same contemporary writers that Polybios had. The difference between the authority of the two is therefore not so very great. And Polybios does not mention this massacre in any part of his own regular narrative, but as an obiter dictum in a somewhat rhetorical attack on the historical credibility of Phylarchos. In the very next chapter (ii. 60) there is a flat contradiction as to the fate of this very Aristomachos between Polybios and Phylarchos followed by Plutarch. It therefore really does not seem so very unlikely that Polybios may have here con- founded the younger Aristomachos with one of his predecessors. Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 28, etseqip On this occasion the claimants came to a regular battle within the sacred precincts, of which we do not hear at Nemea. D D 402 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vn. the Kleonaian festival, and celebrated Nemean Games of their own. It was part of the International, or rather of the Canon, Law of Greece, that all competitors on their Rival cele- way to or from any of the national games had free lnatious . . of the passage, even through the territories ot states with which GamesT their own cities might be at war. This immunity is said never to have been violated before ; but now all com- petitors at the Argeian Nemeia who passed through any Achaian territory — and none could come by land from Northern Greece without doing so — were seized by the Achaians and sold as slaves. 1 This unjust and cruel act was doubtless vindicated on the technical ground that the Argeian Nemeia were not the true festival, and that therefore competitors going to or coming from them had no right to any privilege. But anyhow they were travellers from friendly or neutral states, who were not injuring the League or any of its cities. Plutarch calls this proceeding a proof of Aratos' inexorable hatred 2 towards Tyrants ; it was at all events a strange and pitiful way of showing it. Extension \y c mus t now trace the progress of the League on ot the . ' League in the side of Arkadia, It is evident that the old ArkadiaD Union, the work of Lykomcdcs, had now utterly passed away. No Assembly of Ten Thousand could, for many years past, have been gathered together in the theatre of the Great City. The Arkadian eities now appear alto- gether single and disunited, and many of them were ruled liv Tyrants. And, up to this time, those cities which had ZEtolian joined either of the two great Confederations had, whether 'I'!.'.!!" i'n by choice or by compulsion, attached themselves to iEtolia '"■ rather than to Achaia It must be remembered that, in- accessible as Arkadia and J3tolia look to one another on 1 I'lul. Ar. 28. ' Up. OO'toj m^uSuii -f\v teal d.7rapalrriTos iv rif fjiiauv toi)s' rupdwous. EXTENSION OF THE LEAGUE IN ARKADIA. 403 the map, the close alliance which always existed between chav, ra, iEtolia and Elis gave the ^Etolians constant opportu- nities of meddling in the internal affairs of Pcloponnesos. 1 Tegca, Phigaleia, 3 Orchomcnos, became iEtolian allies or subjects. Kynaitha, on the other hand, at some time of Accession which we do not know the exact date, had joined the thaand " Achaian League. This city had been torn to pieces by "."'' a internal struggles, till at last the party which had the towns upper hand asked for Achaian help, and received a Achaian garrison under an Achaian commander. 3 This precaution ea ° ue - does not show that Kynaitha was admitted to the Union on any but the usual equal terms ; for we have already seen that a Federal garrison was also kept at Corinth, which was beyond doubt an independent and highly important member of the League. Other Arkadian towns were also won to the League, as Stymphalos, Klei- tor, Phcneos, Kaphyai, Heraia, and Telphousa, but gene- rally we kuow nothing of the time or manner of their acquisition, but learn the fact only from afterwards finding them incidentally spoken of as Achaian towns. 4 Mantineia Revolu- went through a series of revolutions, of which we should Mantineia, like to know the exact dates. 5 She first united herself to 1 Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 136) connects these Arkadian acquisitions of iEtolia with the great /Etolian invasion of Lakonia. See above, p. 392. 2 Pol. iv. 3. 8 lb. 17. See above, p. 310. We may suppose that the failure of Aratos before Kynaitha, mentioned incidentally by Polybios (ix. 17), took place at some early stage of these events. Aratos was vios a.K^v, which can only refer to the time of one of bis earliest Generalships, or possibly to some subordinate command before he was General. See Brandstater, p. 237. 4 See Pol. ii. 52. 55. iv. 19. Polyaiuos (ii. 36) records a stratagem by which the Achaian General Dioitas obtained possession of HSraia. It is a silly story enough, and Polyainos shows how little he understood the Achaian constitution, by making the Heraians oiler themselves as subjects of the Achaians ; 'iKtrcvovres diroAafiuv rr\v TrarpiSa, (is eisa~6is vtti^kooi yevr](r6/j.evoi to?s 'Axaiols. But the tale preserves to us the name of an otherwise unknown Achaian General. 5 Pol. ii. 57. D D 2 404 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GFvEECE. CHAP. VII. Before B.C. 227. Union of Megalo- POl IS with the Achaian League, B.c. 234. Character of Lydia- HAS. the Achaian body, and then — our first recorded instance of secession — deserted it for a connexion, on whatever terms, with .Etolia. We have no certain information when this revolt took place, except that it was before the war with Kleomenes, and therefore at some time within our present period. Mantineia was perhaps induced to forsake the League, when the League admitted to its fellowship a city which was Mantineia' s special rival. For we have now reached the time when the League made, in point of actual strength, its greatest acquisition since that of the Corinthian Akropolis, and one which proved in its results the greatest of all its acquisitions since that which made Aratos himself its citizen. Megalopolis, the Great City, once the Federal capital of Arkadia, now became a single canton of the Federation of Achaia. No greater gain did the Achaian Union ever make than this which gave her one of her greatest cities, and a long succession of her noblest citizens. It was a bright day indeed in the annals of the League which gave her Philopoimen and Lykortas and Poly bios, and, greater than all, the deathless name of Lvdiadas. Lydiadas, Tyrant of Megalopolis and thrice General of the Achaian League, is a man of whom but little is re- corded, but that little is enough at once to place him among the first of men. 1 We know him mainly from records tinged with the envy of a rival, and yet no facl is recorded of him which does not in truth redound to his honour. In his youth he seized the Tyranny of liis native city, but he seized it with no ignoble or un- worthy aim. We know not the date 2 or the eirenm- 1 Besides the accounl of Lydiadas in Plutarch's Lives "i Axatoa and Kleomene's, and the brief mention of Polyhios tii. lit, there is an admiring picture of him drawn by Pansanias, \iii. 27. 12. " Drovsen iii. 872) places it ;< 1 »• ► 1 1 1 b.o, 244, a after tin' seizure "f tut this dal ■ 'in ■ \ idence. LYDIADAS TYKANT OF MEGALOPOLIS. 405 stances of his rise to sovereign power, but there is at least chap. vn. nothing to mark him as one of those Tyrants who were the destroyers of freedom. He is not painted to us as a midnight conspirator, plotting rebellion against a state of things which made him only one free citizen among many. Still less is lie painted as the chief magistrate of a free state, bound by the most solemn oaths to be faithful to its freedom, and then turning the limited powers with which his country had entrusted him to overthrow the liberties of which he was the chosen guardian. We do not read that he rose to power by driving a lawful Senate from their hall by the spears of mercenaries, or by an indis- criminate massacre of his fellow-citizens in the streets of the Great City. We do not read that he reigned by crushing every nobler feeling, and by flattering every baser passion, of his subjects ; we are not told that every man of worth or talent shrank from his service, and left him only hirelings and flatterers as the agents of his will. There is no evidence that the dungeons of Megalopolis or the cities of free Greece were filled with men whose genius or whose virtue j was found inconsistent with his rule. We do not hear that his foreign policy was one of faithless aggres- sion ; that he gave out that Tyranny should be Peace, and then tilled Peloponnesos with needless wars. It is not told us that he seized on city after city, prefacing every act of plunder with solemn protestations that nothing was further from his thoughts. Still less do we find that he ever played the basest part to which Tyranny itself can sink ; that he stretched forth his hand to give a hypocri- tical aid to struggling freedom, and then drew back that he might glut his eyes with the sight of a land wasted by anarchy and brigandage to which a word from him could at any moment put an end. No ; Lydiadas was, in the sense of his age and country, a Tyrant, but it was not thus that he cither gained or used a power which in 4(KJ HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. formal speech alone deserved to be called a Tyranny. Others had reigned in the Great City far less worthy to reio-n than he ; he felt within himself the gifts and aspira- fcions of the born ruler ; and, in a city which had long been used to the sway of one, the vision of his youthful imagina- tion took, pardonably enough, the form not of a republican magistrate but of a patriot King. Men told him that the sway of a single man was best for times like his, that his heart and arm could better guard his native land than the turbulence of the many or the selfish narrowness of the few. He looked on sovereign power as a means of working his country's good and of winning for himself a glorious name ; he would fain be a King of Men, a Shepherd of the People, like the Kodros of legend or the Cyrus of romance. He grasped the sceptre, and for a while he wielded it. But he soon found that his dreams of patriotic royalty were not suited to the land or the age in which he lived. And soon a nobler path stood open before him. He saw the youth of Sikyon enter upon a higher career than that into which he himself had been deluded. He saw that a man might rule by better means than an arbitrary will, and might rest his power on better safe- guards than strong walls and foreign mercenaries. He saw Axatos, the chosen chief of a free people, wield a power greater than his own, purely because his fellow- citizens deemed him the wisest and the worthiest among them. lie saw how far higher and nobler a place in the eyes of Greece was held by the elective magistrate of the great Confederacy than by the absolute master of a single city. He heard himself branded by a name which he shared with wretches like NiUklcs and Aristippos ; he R the an, i raised against him, which was, whenever the favourable moment came, to hurl him from power by a doom like their*. 4ratoe had already marked LydiadaB I'm- the next, victim, ami Vfegalopolis as the next cit\ LYDIADAS RESIGNS TBE TYRANNY. 407 for deliverance. 1 The Lord of Megalopolis, like Iseas atoHAP. vn. Keryneia, had now his choice to make, and he made it nobly and wisely. He called his rival to a conference, he laid aside his power, he dismissed his guards, he went back to his house, Tyrant now no longer, but one free citizen of the free commonwealth of Megalopolis. The first act of that commonwealth was naturally union with the Achaian League ; the name of Lydiadas was passed Lydiadas ., « ,1 r* » j chosen from tongue to tongue through every city ot the Coniede- General, ration, 2 and at the next annual election of Federal magis- BC ' 2 * trates, the self-dethroned Tyrant of Megalopolis was raised to the highest place in his new country as the General of the year. Lydiadas, in resigning absolute power, did not wish to resign power altogether, but only to hold it by a tenure at once worthier and safer. He lived to be three times General of the League, to distinguish himself alike as a statesman and as a soldier, and at last he died in battle within sight of his native city, and was honoured in death by a conquering enemy whose career was only less noble than his own. The acquisition of Megalopolis as an Achaian city, Effects and of Lydiadas as a leading Achaian citizen, were im- Ci xxisitioia portant in many ways. The League was now brought p ol ^ Iegal °" into the very thick of central Peloponnesian politics ; an increased impulse must- have been given to its exten- sion throughout Arkadia, and the Tyrannies which still remained in the Argolic peninsula must have become more completely isolated. But the acquisition of Mega- 1 It should be noticed that Plutarch, following doubtless the Memoirs of Aratos, puts this motive far more prominently forward than Polybios and Pausanias, who represent Megalopolitan traditions. The words of Pausanias are especially strong ; iirel 5e rtpX iro fypoviiv, Kari-reavev eavrdv eiiAf TvpavviSos, nainep is to dacpaXes 07) ol ttjs dpxvs Kaduipfxia/xevv^- 2 Paus. viii. 27. 12. Meya\oiroXiT<2v 5e (jvvtcXovvtoiv ^5tj r6re is to" Axa'tKdv, 6 AvStdSijs iv re avroh M(ya\oiroXiTats nal iv to?? ivatriv 'A\aio7s iyivtro ovtw So'ki^oj ws 'Apdrcp -rapicwCrji'ai rd is Bo^av. 408 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. lopolis and the conversion of Lydiadas had two results which were more important still. They made the terri- tories of the League continuous with Lakonia, and they Rivalry of gave Aratos a rival. Hitherto the policy of Aratos and Lydiadas. * ne policy of the League have been the same thing ; except the one obscure mention of Dioitas, we hea'r the name of no other Achaian statesman ; Markos was still living, still serving his country ; we may well believe that he was placed in the chief magistracy in some of those years in which Aratos could not legally hold it, but he has well-nigh passed out of memory, and there is nothing which brings cither him or any one else before us as a rival of the recognized chief of the League We read indeed that some acts of Aratos brought on him a certain amount of censure in the Assembly, but none of them had given any lasting shock to his predominant influence in the commonwealth. The accession of Lydia- das to citizenship, his election to the chief magistracy, at once gave Aratos his match. Lydiadas was as ambitions and as energetic as himself, and, as events proved, a far abler soldier. Placed at the head of the armies and the councils of the League, he had not the slightest intention of acting as the instrument of another man. Our account of their disputes comes doubtless from the Memoirs of Aratos himself; it must therefore be taken with the necessary allowances, as we have no counter-statement from the side of Lydiadas. We can well believe that two reins of feeling ran through the Achaian public mind, as men spoke of the great citizen whom they had just adopted. Admiration would be the first reeling. The man who had voluntarily given up sovereign power, who had deliberately preferred the position of a republican magistrate t<» thai of an absolute ruler, would be extolled 08 a hero indeed, as the \cr\ lirsl and noblest of the Friends of freedom. Ami of h truth the angel of freedom LYDIADAS GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE. 409 might well rejoice over such a repentant sinner, more than chap. m. over a Markos or a Washington who needed no repen- tance. But, on the other hand, it is easy to believe that there were men who held that the Ethiopian could never change his skin, that the man who had once been a Tyrant would be at heart a Tyrant still, and that the destinies of a free Confederation could never be safe in the hands of a man who had once wielded an absolute sceptre over one of its cities. 1 By such men every action and every word of Lydiadas would be subjected to a far more rigid scrutiny than had ever attended the political or military career of Aratos. That Lydiadas was thrice chosen General — once Second at least in the teeth of Aratos' strongest opposition 2 — slupoi' that, when that opposition prevented further reelections, he Lydiadas, still served the League faithfully in subordinate commands, is quite proof enough that all such suspicions were utterly unfounded. We are told that he was constantly exhorting the League to needless undertakings, 3 which the superior wisdom of Aratos discountenanced. Considering what we 1 l'lut. Al. 30. ' / ri Sparta in the days of Cyrus. 8 In both cases the power appealed to interfered by a haughty message, but sent no effectual aid. Rome ordered the ^Etolians to desist from all injuries towards Akarnania, 1 i Pol. ii. 2-4. '-' Strabo, lib. x. <•• 8 (ii. -ill). Ol 'AtcapvdvfS ffot}>t oi ^erArxotci' povoi rfjs 4w\ rods irpoyovovs rods Ik('h>ui> crrpartias' o&rt y&p iv tu> AlTuiKtictp KcnaKoyw (pp&faivro, ourt ISla. i i. .I., tin, ■ sviii. 1. :| Herod, i. I H, I * '|'|i, cvidcnci i"i this Roman emboss} !■• /Etolia Bcems quite sufficient, WAR BETWEEN .EToLlA AND AKARNANIA. 41 .'5 a mandate which only led, in mockery of the barbarian chap. ra. interference, to a more cruel inroad than Akarnania had ever before suffered. At the time which we have now reached, Ave find the JEtolians engaged in their usual business of extending their Confederation by force of arms. They were besieging the Akarnanian town of Medeon, which had refused to become a member of their Mede6n League. 1 While the siege was going on, and when the jstolians, inhabitants were already counted on as a certain prey, BC ' 23L the autumnal equinox brought round the time for the yearly election of the iEtolian Federal Magistrates. The Assembly summoned for that purpose was evidently held JStolian beneath the walls of Medeon. The zEtolians had come mthe with their whole force, 2 and, under such circumstances, ^3 e with /Etolians, as with Macedonians, the army and the Medeon. nation were the same thing. Doubtless those citizens of iEtolia Proper who remained at home would be summoned ; but it is clear that the outlying cities incorporated with the League could have no share in a Meeting so collected. In this Assembly of citizen- soldiers, the General who was going out of office — his name is not mentioned — set forth his hardships before his hearers. He had begun the siege of Mededn ; he had brought it to a point at which no man doubted of the speedy capture of the city ; had it been taken within his year of office, he would have been entitled to the dispo- Justin — that is, Trogus Pompeius — doubtless, as Niebuhr says (Kl. Schr. i. 256), followed Phylarchos. But it involves an apparent contradiction to a passage of Polybios, in which he seems to imply that the Roman Ambassadors who not long after visited iEtolia and Acbaia were the first of their nation who had visited Greece in an official character. (See Pol. ii. 12.; Niebuhr, u.s. ; Thirlwall, viii. 140.) But I am not certain that the words of Polybios positively, or at all events intentionally, deny the fact of this earlier embassy. As it led to no results, it probably was not in his thoughts, and even his words need hardly imply any direct contradiction of the story in Justin. 1 Pol. ii. 2. 2 Pol. ii. 2. %Tpr\v imv i'nr\uf tavTcfi (rvyxwp('i(TOat. - Il>. TivwvSl, Kal fxaAia-TU twv irpoi6vTiav irptls tt)i/ dpx^'% aix$i(rfrr)To\)VTWV w,„)s rd \ty6nfva. :t "'■ :! - See above, p. 889 SIEGE AND RELIEF OF MEDEON. 415 General. This attack, supported by a sally from the city, chap. m. completely routed the besiegers. Great spoil fell into the hands both of the lllyrians and of the people of Medeon. The latter presently in turn held their Meeting, and the Medeonian Assembly voted that the decree of the iEtolian Assembly should be duly carried out, and that the names both of the outgoing iEtolian General and of his successor should be inscribed on the trophy raised by the victorious Akarnanians. 1 The Illyrian King Agron, and his widow Teuta, who Ravages presently succeeded him, were emboldened by this success niyrians over such renowned warriors as the iEtolians to carry on ™, *^°" their piratical excursions on a yet wider scale. They ravaged the coasts of Elis and Messenia, as they had often done before. Both countries had a long seaboard, and the principal towns were inland, so that invaders by sea could gather a large booty without danger of resistance.' 2 They now ventured on a bolder achievement. A party of Illyrian it tvi • m * • r~M • mi • capture of them had occasion to land near Phomike in Lnaonia. Inis phoiuikS, place, one of the greatest cities of Epeiros, had been en- B,a 230, trusted to the care of eight hundred mercenary Gauls, who betrayed the town to the lllyrians. This form of national defence certainly gives us no very favourable impression of the wisdom of the new Epeirot Republic. Nor had its native armies another Pyrrhos at their head ; they utterly failed in the attempt to recover Phoinike. The young League of Epeiros now applied for help to the elder Leagues of iEtolia and Achaia. 3 Help was sent, but no 1 Brandstater (269) derides what he calls "das Episodische and Unwe- sentliche dieser Anekdote." I confess to being thankful for so life-like a report of an iEtolian debate. The independent action of the Medeonian Assembly (e'/cKA.7jcrfa) should also be noticed. Akarnania formed one commonwealth in all dealings with other nations, but, just as in Achaia, the canton of Medeon had its own local Assembly, with full sovereignty in local matters. 2 Pol. ii. 5. 3 lb. 6. 'E-rrp4afievov npbs tovs Aitw\ovs /col rd ruiv 'Ax.an*'*' etivos. 416 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vn. battle was fought ; the cause of inaction is not mentioned, Alliance of but Aratos was General of the year. Phoinike however Epeiros . and Akar- was restored on terms to its owners, and the Lpeirots, "-hil ti^ together with the Akarnanians, concluded an alliance with Illyiiaus. the Illyrians, by virtue of which they for the future helped the barbarians against their benefactors from Southern Greece. ' The two Leagues were now generally looked to as the protectors of Hellas. Epidamnos, Apollonia, Kor- kyra, were all attacked or threatened. All three are spoken of as independent states, from which we may infer that Korkyra, which had formed part of the Kingdom of Pyrrhos, did not form part of the Epeirot League. 2 Of these three cities, Epidamnos had gallantly beaten off an Illyrian attack ; Korkyra was actually besieged, when a joint embassy from all three implored the help both of Joint ox- yEtolia and of Achaia. 3 The petition was listened to with of the two favour by the Assemblies of both Leagues, and ten Achaian toreiieve sm P s > manned with contingents from both nations, 4 were Korkyra, scn t to the help of Korkyra, Lydiadas was now General ; there was therefore no delay, no shrinking from action. Whether he himself commanded is not recorded, but the ships were sent at once, 5 and they were sent, not to intrigue or to lie idle, but to fight. This is the first time that we hear of any naval operations on the part of the League, and that, singularly enough, at a moment when its chief was an Arkadian landsman. The Achaians of the original towns, though dwelling on a long sea-l>oard, seem never to 1 PoL ii. 6, 7, where the matter la discussed a1 length. Mommsen (Rom. Ges< ii. i. 869) aj i, " Balb gezwungen halb freiwillig traterj die Epeiroten miict. of < teog, Aii. ( lorcj ra. • Pol. ii. 9. '' Mi. Oi 51 ['Axatol Ka\ oi A1twAo\\ Sia.Kouaa.i'Tfs twv Ttfitcrflfwi' Ka\ rrposfif- (,6.fxtvui roiis \oyovs i-nXt'ipwcrav Kou'ij rds rwf 'AxaiaSr 8t'«o favs Karacpp&KTOvs. ' Hi. KarapTifravTa 5' iv oKiyais i\p.ipais ZnKtov £ir\ ttjs KfpKvpas, iKrl[OVTt$ Kvmiv r-^v TraKtopKiav. DEATH OF MARKOS. 417 have been a maritime people ; their coast had no important ohar vti. harbours, 1 and we hear nothing of any Achaian exploits by sea. But the acquisition of so many maritime cities, above all of the great Corinth with its two havens, would naturally tempt the League to aspire to the character of a naval power. And it would well agree with the lofty spirit of its present chief to seek to win glory for his country on a new element. 2 The original iEtolians too were essen- tially a still more inland people than the Achaians, but the possession of Naupaktos would naturally give a mari- time impulse to them also. The treaties with distant cities like Teos and Kios 3 show that iEtolian pirates infested the iEgaean and even the Propontis, but the language of Polybios seems to imply that the /Etolians had no Federal navy, while the Achaian League habi- tually kept ten ships. 4 This combined naval enterprise of the two Leagues unluckily failed. The Achaian squadron, with its half Achaian, half iEtolian crews, was defeated by the combined fleets of Illyria and Akarnania. Among other ships lost or taken, a quin- Death of quereme was sunk which carried Markos of Keryneia, Keryneia. the original founder of the League, still, in his old age, rendering faithful service to a commonwealth of which he had long ceased to be the guiding spirit. Korkyra had to surrender ; she received an Illyrian garrison, commanded by a man who was one of the chief pests of Greece and the neighbouring lands, Demetrios of Dome' trios Pharos. This man, a Greek of the Iladriatic island from c which he took his name, here began a career of treachery 1 Hut. Ar. 9. QaAaTTt) -KposcfiKovv [oi 'Axaiol] a\in4va>, ra iroWa Kara fiaxias e/c^epoyueVj? wpds rrji> ij-jrapoi/. Yet Patrai has become a great port in later times. 2 This may well have been among the irpaf eis ovk &vay itaiai proposed 1 i\lai> $ir\tav M rijt ' AiruKAwvlat . . . Ka\ tovtccv d-nnhi^afjitvwv ku\ Z/ivtwv iavrodt tit rrju iirirponrjv, . . . 'Pw/xaloi Sk Ka\ roi)t "E/Kltaftvlovt vapaKa^Avrtt civ tt)c -nltrriv TTpnijynv, K. T.A. ' Bee Tlmhv.,11, \iii. 1 in. note. INTERCOURSE WITH ROME. 419 Akarnania and tlic defiance of ^Etolia were doubtless by chap. vif. this time forgotten. iEtolia, like Rome, was an enemy of Illyria, while Akamanian galleys, if they had not sailed to Troy at the bidding of Agamemnon, had undoubtedly swelled the numbers of the pirate fleet of Tcuta. Aulus Roman Postumius, the final conqueror of the Illyrian Queen, sent to the Two Ambassadors to the two Leagues, who explained the ^'^^ causes of the war with Teuta, and of the appearance of Roman armies in a quarter where their presence might seem threatening to Greece. 1 They then related the events of the campaign, and read out the treaty which had just been concluded, the terms of which were so favourable to the interests of every Greek state. The Roman envoys were received, as they well deserved, with every honour in the Assemblies of both Confederations. The political embassy Mas followed by one, apparently of a Honorary religious or honorary character, to Corinth and to Athens, to Corinth The Corinthians bestowed on the Romans the right of ?£„- sharing in the Greek national festival of the Isthmian Games. 2 This was equivalent to raising the Roman People from the rank of mere barbarians to the same quasi-Greek position as the Epeirots and Macedonians. 3 It shows also that the administration of the Isthmian Games was still in the hands of the State of Corinth, and had not been at all transferred to the general Achaian body. As administra- 1 This seems implied in the expression of Polybios (ii. 12), dirtAoyicraPTo T(is alrias roO iTo\(fj.ov Kcd ttJs Sia/Hwreoos. 2 Pol. ii. 12. 'Aird 8e raxiTqs rrjs Karapxys 'Pa>fj.a7ot fxev evOews aWovs irpccrfitvTas e|a7rs'crT6assy. Bee above, p. 261. •j "Man 1< : ( 1 1 i i fragen, ob der Jubel in Bellas grower war oder die s. li:. tn, alfl stiii t der zehn Linienschiffe der achaeischen Eidgenossenschaft, der streitbarsten Macht Griechenlands, jetzt zweihunderl Begel der Barbaren in ihre Eaten einliefen and mil einem Schlage die Aufgabe losten, ilir den Griechen zukam and an der dieae bo klaglicl gescheitert waxen." Mommsen, Rom, Gesch, i. 371. 3 "In the course of this ahorl war, nol only Corcyra, bul a.pollonia also, and Epidamnua, submitted to the Romans at discretion, and received their liberty, as was afterwards the case with all Grei 1 1 . i a gift from the Roman people." a i nold, iiL 89. AFFAIRS OF MACEDONIA. 421 to help Medeon, we hear of absolutely no Macedonian chap. vn. interference, either warlike or diplomatic, in matters which would seem to have very directly touched Mace- donian interests. We are not told with what eyes Macedonian statesmen looked upon the first appearance of so formidable a power as Rome in lands so closely bordering upon their own. Nor do we hear that Rome thought it necessary on this occasion to enter into any rela- tions with the Macedonian Kingdom. Roman embassies went on political errands to Aigion and Thermon, and on honorary errands to Corinth and Athens, but no envoy seems to have been dispatched in either character to the court of Pella or to the sanctuary of Dion. This appa- rent temporary insignificance of a power lately so great, and soon to be so great again, is explained by the unusual activity of the restless northern tribes, and by the com- motions which commonly attended a change of sovereign in Macedonia. 1 The reign of Demetrios ended about Death of the time when the Romans first crossed into Illyria. 2 B q%£, os ' He appears to have died in battle with the Dardanians ; certainly he had lately been defeated by them. 3 The heir to his crown was his young son Philip, but the royal authority was assumed — first, it would seem, as Protector Protecto- and then as King for life 4 — by Antigonos, surnamed Doson, 5 p^^'"} a distant kinsman of the royal house, but with a distinct Antigonos Doson, reservation of the rights of young Philip as heir-apparent, b.o. 229- 2°1 A new King of Macedonia seldom ascended the throne without some disturbance, and a King reigning on such 1 See Flatlie, Gesch. Mac. i. 143, et seqq. 8 Pol. ii. 44. Arifirirplov 5e fia an unworthy substitution of the merchant's craft for that chap. vir. of the warrior. Though Athens had not actually joined the League, Progress yet this exploit of Aratos, and the consequent close Lea ACCESSION OF ARGOS TO THE LEAGUE. 427 most regular and constitutional way, to bring about an chap. vu. object which had been for years one of the darling wishes of the heart of Aratos, and which he had himself been endeavouring at some sacrifice to effect. We can under- stand the natural disappointment of Aratos at seeing the accomplishment of his own cherished scheme transferred to his rival ; but this in no way justifies the factious and unpatriotic conduct to which he now stooped. What arguments could have been brought, above all by Aratos, against a Government proposal for the annexation of Argos, history does not tell us, and it is certainly very hard to guess them by the light of nature. He could hardly have had the face to argue that the General of the League had no right to discharge one of his consti- tutional functions, because a private citizen or an inferior magistrate 1 wished unconstitutionally to usurp it. But it rejected is certain that xVratos spoke in strong opposition ; that on instance of the division the Noes had it, that the Government motion [ B ™ 229-8,] was thrown out, and that Aristomachos was dismissed from the Assembly, apparently with a degree of disrespect which, Tyrant as he was, he certainly had not deserved. 2 But, before long, things are quite altered ; Aratos is again but earned General ; 3 he has made his peace with Aristomachos ; he mot i n of brings forward, and triumphantly carries, 4 the very motion q™^ 8 B.C. 228 avepwirov. Helwing (p. 102), the idolater of Aratos, sees in all this only a very improper interference with Aratos on the part of Lydiadas. 1 It is always possible that Aratos may have filled some other Federal magistracy in the years when he was not General. 2 Plut. Ar. 35. ' AvTf itt6utos y&p avrov ['Apdrov] 5t' dpyrju airrjXaaav roils nepl -rbv 'Apicrrv/xaxoy. 3 See Flathe, ii. 157. Thirlwall, viii. 166. The Assembly at which Lydiadas produced Aristomachos was probably the regular Spring Meeting of the year 228. At that Meeting Aratos woidd be elected General for the year 228-7. When he came into office, he might either summon a special Assembly for the discussion of the question, or might introduce it at the regular Autumnal Meeting. 4 Plut. Ar. 35. 'E7rel 8e avjATTfiffdus Tvakiv avrbs rjptaro nep\ avTwv 8ia- 428 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. (hyp. vii. which a few months before he had caused to be igno- Aristo- miniously thrown out ; Argos is united to the League ; Gen«3, and, at the next election of Federal Magistrates, Aratos b.c. -227. jg succee ded in his office, not, as had now become the rule, by Lydiadas, but by Aristomachos himself. This election was doubtless made through the personal influence of Aratos, and the narrative seems rather to imply that it was part of the bargain between him and Aristomachos. Union of Alon£ with Argos and Aristomachos, Phlious and its with the Tyrant Kleonymos 1 were also admitted into the League, League. w y Cn thus included all Argolis. By these annexations Aratos doubtless gained much fame, but it was at the expense of his true honour. Plutarch tells us of the wonderful proof of the national goodwill and confidence Estimate which the Achaian Assembly showed to Aratos. 8 One conduct of who is not a professed biographer of heroes might be \i ttos. tempted to say that neither Aratos nor the Assembly ever showed themselves in a more paltry light. It is perhaps not quite unknown in other constitutional governments for a statesman's view of a measure to differ a good deal, according as he is in office or in opposition. But to an impartial spectator this proceeding of Aratos will perhaps appear an extreme, not to say shameless, case of such sudden conversion. One cannot help wondering how any Assembly could be got to follow him to and fro in such a course. Hut, granting that some ingenious misrepre- sentations, some fervent declamations, had once beguiled the Assembly to reject the proposal of Lydiadas, yet afterwards to accept the proposal of Aratos was, on- the XiytvOai irapwv, ndura rdx iu ^ KO ' ^poOv/j.a>? i\pr)(pl(TavTO Kal ■KposfSt^auro fj.lv tout 'Apytious ku\ 4>\ia examine questions which arc matters of Spartan, not of Federal, history; bul 1 believe that mj notion of Klcoincncs will lie found quite in harmony with the views of Bishop ThirlwalL Sec his llistorv. viii. 160-188. REVOLUTION OF KLEOMENES AT SPARTA. 433 the Ephors on their seats of office, and summoned the 9 HAp - vn - people of Sparta to behold and approve the deed. An age which has condoned the most deliberate perjury and the most cold-blooded massacre which history records is hardly entitled to be severe on the comparatively mild coup (Tttat l of the Lacedaemonian King. He put out of the way by violence, because Law could not touch them, men who, there is every reason to believe, had put to death his own royal colleague, and then charged him with the deed. 2 The slaughter of the Ephors was a stroke in which Agis or Epameinondas would have had no share, but it was one at which Ehud, Tell, or Timoleon could not consistently have scrupled. The Ephors, the real Tyrants, once gone, Kleomenes stood forth as the King of a free people, the General of a gallant army. He was no longer the slave of a narrow caste of ruling families ; he was the beloved chief of a nation, which, recruited by a large addition from the subject classes, was now a nation once more. A people thus springing into a revived life is sure to be warlike, if not positively aggressive. The discipline of victory — and Relations only a chief like Aratos can lead such a people to defeat — Sparta is needed to teach it to feel its own powers ; it is needed j^JLq to efface all divisions, all hostile memories, by common struggles and common triumphs in the national cause. How was Peloponnesos to contain two such powers, each in the full vigour of recovered freedom, each fresh with all the lofty aspirations of regenerate youth ? What were to be the mutual relations of the revived League and of the 1 Four of the Ephors were killed, with ten persons who attempted to defend them. Eighty citizens were banished, that is, not sent to sonic Spartan Cayenne, but allowed to live in any Greek city except Sparta, retaining their rights of property, and encouraged by a promise to be allowed to return home at some future clay. So small an allowance of bloodshed and confiscation would be counted a very poor day's work at the "inauguration " of an Empire or a Red Kepublie. a See Thirlwall, viii. 172. cf. 103. F F 434 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. tit. revived Kingdom ? Above all, what were to be the personal relations of two such chiefs as Aratos and Kleo- menes ? Free and equal alliance would be the bidding of cold external prudence. Sparta, such a counsellor would say, is far too great to become a single city of the League ; Achaia, on the other baud, is far too free and happy as she is to be asked to admit the slightest superiority on the part of Sparta. Live in friendship side by side ; and hang- up your shields till the iEtolian again proves faithless, or till the Macedonian again becomes threatening. Advice sound indeed, advice at once prudent and benevolent, but advice which two ambitious chiefs and two high-spirited nations were never likely to take. The war between Sparta and the League began before Kleomenes had accomplished his great revolution at home. Tli ere can be no doubt that it was a war which was equally acceptable to the leaders on both sides, and that in no case could peace have been kept very long. It was like the old Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens; in both cases war was the natural result of the position occupied by two rival powers ;' in both cases the grounds of warfare which were alleged on either side were at most the occasions, and not the real causes, of the struggle. In the eyes of Aratos, Sparta was ;i power which stood in the way of his darling scheme of uniting all Pelo- ponnesus into one Confederation." On that object his mind had dwelt so long that he had begun to regard himself as having a mission to compel as well as to persuade the refractory; the deliverer was at last beginning to share Causes of war lii'twt'cn Sparta ami the League. 1 'I'll in-, i. 23. Trjv fitv yap d\y]0crrrdT-qu Trp6' al 5' ts to (fiai'tpdv Afyo/uri'cu alrlat ui5" i)ocu> ihuTipw;>. This is as true of Orcln inos and Athenaion as of Kpidamnos and Km kyi a. '•' I'lill. Kl. '■'>. '() ydp 'kparos . . . i'/3oi/AfTii flip i, ■,',/• tit niav rrvr- Tn£ii' dyayt?V llfKowofy-qdiuvi, k.t.A. SPECIAL POSITION OF SPARTA. 435 Kome of the feelings of a conqueror. Elis, Sparta, and ohap. mi. some Arkadian towns J were still wanting to the completion of his great work. Now Sparta, and Elis also, stood in a Different wholly different position from the cities which Aratos had of Sparta incorporated with the League in earlier days. Sikyon, ^P ^ Corinth, Mcgara, Argos, had every reason to rejoice in livered by Aratos. their annexation. Instead of foreign or domestic bondage, they obtained freedom within their own walls, and true confederates beyond them. Sparta had no such need ; she had no foreign garrison, no domestic Tyrant ; she lived under a Government which, whether good or bad, was a national Government, resting on the prescriptive reverence of eight hundred years. No enemy threatened her, and, had any enemy threatened her, she was fully able to resist. She was far greater than any one city of the League ; indeed the event proved that she was able to contend on more than equal terms with the League's whole force. Her immemorial polity, the habits and feelings of her people, were all utterly inconsistent with the position of a single member of a Democratic Confederation. 2 What was de- liverance and promotion to Corinth and Argos would to Sparta have been a sacrifice of every national feeling, and a sacrifice for which no occasion called, Sparta was never likely to enter the League as a willing member, and Aratos had yet to learn that none but willing members of a League are worth having. Sparta was too strong to be herself directly attacked ; but she might be weakened and isolated, till she was either actually conquered, or else led to think that accession to the League would be the less of two evils. On this point Aratos, Lydiadas, and Aristoma- 1 Pint. Kl. 3. 'ATTtXe'nroi'To AaKeSaifiSvioi /cat 'H\e?oi Kal 6'croi Aa«€- '6ai/Aovlois 'ApK&Seov trposeixuv — that is, doubtless, Mantincia, Tegea, and Orchomenos. Phigaleia, too, and perhaps sonic other Arkadian towns,, were not yet incorporated. He should also have added Messene. 2 See the remarks of Schorn, p. !)0". F F 2 43G HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vn. chos would be of one mind. To Lydiadaa the matter would seem very simple : Sparta was the old enemy of his city ; Sparta and Megalopolis had, as usual, border dis- putes ; territory was said to be unjustly detained on either side ; ' the hope of Achaian help against Sparta was doubtless one among the objects which had led him to join the League at all. To Aristomachos, if he had in him a spark of the old Argeian spirit, Sparta would be the object of a hatred no less keen than it was to Lydiadas. The day was at last come when the old wrong might be redressed, when Argos, if not, as of old, the head of Peloponnesos, might at least see Sparta brought down to her own level. The three chief men of the League would thus be agreed, or, if there was a difference, it would be a War ac- difference as to the means rather than the end. We can o^both we ^ believe that, while Aratos was weaving his subtle web, sides. Lydiadas and Aristomachos would bo clamouring for open war with Lacedamion, and setting forth tho standing border-wrongs of their several cities. To Kleomenes, on the other hand, war was just as acceptable as it could be to the most warlike orator at Aigion. He had not as yet appeared as a revolutionist; he was a young and orderly King , humbly obeying bis masters the Ephors. But he was doubtless already meditating his daring plan of carrying out the dreams of Agis with tho strong hand. A war in which be might win the popularity and influence which attend a victorious general, a war in which he might show himself forth as the retriever of Sparta's ancient glory, was of all things that which best sailed his purpose. 1 He rejoiced at cxvry hostile sign on the Achaian 1 I'ln!. Kl. 1. 'E/it/UoAr) 5^ ttjs Aaicuiiucijs rd 'AOrfvawv 4ar\, Ka\ nhc 7Tf«)r Toit MfyaAirtrnKiras rfc tTriStKoi'. Pol. ii. \d. Td KaKoifitvoi/ ' hO^vaiov iv Tiy tu;*/ MfyaAr>7niAiToi»/ X«W- '" ''"' Mogalopolitan bis! <>ri;i li llm it of Megalopolis i" LtheWion 'liil no1 leem open i" those doubts which were Intelligible a1 the distance of Chairdneia. ! l'lllt. Kl. '!. OUfUVOi 8' &i> iv iro\*nt£lai' (pduvi'i- (Tavrts, k.t.K. 438 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. Achaians were, at one stage of it at least, at war with out the their cherished allies of Elis. There is the other fact, War. which we shall come to presently, that Aratos himself, before he took the final step of asking for Macedonian help, first asked for help from JEtolia. Had the two Leagues been on the same cordial terms on which they were a few years before, that help would never hare been refused ; but had the .-Etolians been such bitter enemies to Achaia as Polybios represents, that help would never have been asked for. In the latter case they would doubtless have taken an open part against the League long before. The truth doubtless is 1 that the .Etolians were jealous of the progress of the x\chaian League in Arkadia, but that, just now, Peloponnesian affairs seemed .Ktoiian to them of secondary moment. Their hands appear to tionslii uavc been at this time full of enterprises for extending Thessaly. their power nearer home. They Avere hostile to Macedonia, and were occupied in some of their Thessalian con- quests. This extension of their continuous territory was a more important object than the retention of a few inland towns in Peloponnesos. They were doubtless well pleased to see the two great Peloponnesian powers at war with one another ; they may even have taken such steps as Avere likely to embroil them together ; but their agency was clearly something quite secondary throughout the matter, it is evident that, in the explanation given by Polybios of the causes of the war, we have not the historian's own statement of matters of fact, but only the best apology which Aratos could think of for his own unpatriotic con- duct. In fact, no very remote causes need be sought for to account lor the Kleoinenic War ; Sparta and Achaia, Klcuiiicncs and Aratos, were shut up within one penin- 11 la ; and that was enough. ca #irlwall, SPARTAN ANNEXATIONS IN AHKAD1A. 439 It will be remembered that the zEtolians had certain chap. mi. possessions in Arkadia, the nature of whose relation to the League, whether one of real confederation or of sub- iection, is not very clear. 1 One of these towns, Mantineia, Spartan J ^ acquisition had, as we have seen, from whatever cause, forsaken the of the Achaian for the JStolian connexion. Mantineia now, to- towns in gether with Tegea and Orehomenos, was, on what ground £■ ^j or by what means we know not, induced by Kleomenes 2 — he is already always spoken of as the chief doer of every- thing — again to exchange the iEtolian for the Laccda> monian connexion. On what terms these towns were united to Sparta, whether as subjects, as dependents, or as free allies, does not appear. But in any case their new relation was one which involved separation from the Mto- liau body. The iEtolians however made no opposition, and formally recognized the right of Sparta to her new acquisitions. 3 Such distant possessions were doubtless felt to be less valuable to the /Etolian League than the certainty of embroiling Sparta and Achaia. For it is evident that their occupation by Sparta was a real ground for alarm on the part of the Achaians. As the territory Achaian n interests of the League now stood, these cities seemed naturally involved designed to make a part of it. As independent common- ™ xa tf 2J*" wealths, or as outlying dependencies of zEtolia, they had doubtless been always looked upon as undesirable neigh- bours. But it was a far more dangerous state of things now that a long wedge of Lacedaemonian territory had thrust itself in between the two Achaian cantons of Argos 1 Pol. ii. 46. Tds AIto>\o7s ov fi6vov (rv/x/iax'^as v%apx_uuffas d\\d Kal avfMiro\iTfvonti/as t6t( ir6\eis. See above, p. 346. 2 lb. KAeo/ueVous irtTrpa^iKOivriKuTOS avrobs [rovs Alrui\oi)s] Kal fl"app- prifxivov Teyeav, Navrivetav, 'Opx&l J - evuv - 3 lb. Ovx olov ayavaKTovvras dAAct Kal [iefiaiovvTas avTu [KAeo/ue'cei] T7JJ/ irapd\7]i\/i.v .... tKovalws ■Kapaattov^ov^vovs Kal ras peyforas diro\- AuVTas u-(keis ieeKovT^v. The sentence of which these extracts arc parts is one of the longest I know in any language 440 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. and Megalopolis. 1 But however much such a frontier might in Achaian eyes seem to stand in need of rectifi- cation, no formal injury was done to the League by the Lacedaemonian occupation of Orchomenos and Tegea, cities which were not, and never had been, members of the Achaian body. Mantineia indeed might, to an Unionist of extreme views, seem deserving of the chas- tisement of rebellion, but it was rather late in the day to take up such a ground, after quietly seeing the city — seemingly for several years — in iEtolian occupation. But nations and governments are seldom swayed by such con- siderations of consistency. Any nation, any government, would have been stirred up by seeing the frontier of a rival power suddenly carried into the heart of its territory, and that by the occupation of one district at least to Delibera- which it could put forth some shadow of legal right. The AchaLi G course taken by Aratos was characteristic. He and the other members of the Achaian Government' 2 determined that war should not be declared against Sparta. A decla- ration of war would have required the summoning of a Federal Assembly and the public discussion of the state of affairs. But it was determined to watch and to hinder the movements of Kleomeiu s. The mode of watching and hindering was doubtless left to Aratos himself. He began to lay plans for gaining Tegea and Orchomenos by one of Govern- ment. All' mill i,l' Aratos '■ii Tegea and < ircho- jnmu.s. i "Durch sie war plotzlich oeT*y tov twv 'Axa'tSi/ 7roAiTei/yuaT0S iroKtfxov fttv wpds ixyoiva Kardpx (lv > ivlarandai hi T nul ict^wv Tpianoaiwi/ iv 'ApK>a>y napa rols 'Axoi^s koi frovAifXfvos (Is rrjv AaKwfiKrjv ijjifiaXuv. ■ Ik 'np/x-nnivov 5i irivrias [rov ' Apiarop-axov] virrJKOvfftv [6 "Aparon] KaXirapAv avi>t(TTpa.Ttvtv. Kl. I. »Oj8l}0«ls t^ rSXfxav 6 "Aparos o£k tlwTt OiaKlvSwtVtTal Tll4l(TTpaTT)y6l'. Kl. I. 'AwijAOt \ottopo6ptVOS fl&V virH rwv 'AxaiwJ', X !itua C^l ttyos 8 * koX KaTatypovuipitvos vtt& twv AaKtSatnuviuf ovSi ■xtvTaKHTX'^u"' tJ wArjOos ,■;*. This clearlj 1 1 from Phylarchos. '■ ,\i. 3. r ». Tirt Avaiitov KOTTtyop^Qf), Was this ' leoa! impeachment, or i,,, rclj hi oppoi ition Bpi i cb in th( A i mbly LYDIADAS REJECTED FOR THE GENERALSHIP. 145 hear. So loudly did public opinion make itself heard chat. vxi. against Aratos that the Megalopolitan chief ventured on a Indigna- step on which no man, probably, had ever ventured before, against The Generalship in alternate years had, with one doubtful Al;i, " s exception, 1 belonged to Aratos ever since he had been General at all ; it was enough if Markos or Dioitas or Lydiadas or Aristomachos held the office when Aratos could not legally do so ; no man had yet appeared as an opposition candidate when Aratos himself could laAvfully stand. Now, trusting to the general feeling aroused by Lydiadas stmids the disgrace of Pallantion, Lydiadas ventured on this against extreme course ; he stood forward, at the next Federal {l ^^ election, as a candidate to succeed Aristomachos in the General- ship, Generalship. 2 But the indignation of the Achaian people b.c. 226. against Aratos was never a very lasting feeling ; he had the same gift of recovering a lost reputation that he had of retrieving a lost battle. Lydiadas stood for the General- Twelfth (?) ° General- ship in vain ; the force of habit was too strong ; to elect ship of Aratos in alternate years was so old a prescriptive custom BC 226-5. that it seemed to have the force of law. And thus the man who dared not look an enemy in the face on the field of battle was for the twelfth 3 time chosen General of the Achaians. The campaign opened by an attack on Elis on the Aratos' part of Aratos. 4 How the Eleians had become engaged m Elis. in the war docs not appear. 6 Their close connexion 1 See note to Chapter viii. * Ar. 35. Tlepl rijs arpaT7)yias ei'y aywva ko.1 avrnrapayyeKiav ai/rtfi [Avo-idSij] Karaffrcls [J "Aparos] (Kparija-e tjj X 6 'P 0T01 "'? Ka ' T ^ BaiSeKarov ypeOri ffTpaTijyos. 3 According to the reckoning of Plutarch. I shall elsewhere give reasons for supposing that it was more probably the tenth. 4 Plut. Kl. 5. 5 "Die Aitolier halien ih'ren alten Verbiindeten keinen Beistand geleistct ; war es nur ein Raubzug, den Arat gemacht ? oiler versuchte er audi die Elier zum Eintritt in den Bund zu nbthigen ? " Droysen, ii. 482. 446 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. with .Etolia would seem to show either that the North- ern League was already looked upon as hostile, or else that the /Etolians were held to be so completely occupied with Thessalian and Macedonian affairs that their hostility was not dreaded. The Eleians are not said to have asked for help from iEtolia, but they did obtain help from Sparta. Kleomenes marched to their aid ; the Achaian army was now on its return from Elis, 1 and its course seems to show either that Aratos entertained offensive designs against Sparta or else that he found it necessary to take measures for the safety of Megalopolis. Kloomcnes The two armies met unexpectedly near Mount Lykaion, in defeats Aratos at the western part of the Megalopohtan territory ; Aratos i vkaion could not avoid a battle ; the Achaians were utterly routed ; Aratos himself escaped, but for several days he was be- lieved to be dead, just as after his former defeat at Phylakia. 2 This battle, one of the most disgraceful failures of Aratos, was characteristically followed by one of his most brilliant successes. He had lost a great battle ; Aratos he would atone for it by recovering a great city. With surprises . . _ .. Mantiueia. such portions of his scattered army as he could collect, ho marched straight upon Mantiueia, where no one- ex- pected an attack from a routed army and a dead General The city was taken, probably not without some cooperation from an Achaian party within. 3 This was the first time that the League had to deal with a city guilty of the sin of Secession. But Aratos treated the conquered Mantiueia almost as gently as he had treated the rescued Sikvr Polybioi ARATOS RECOVERS MANTINEIA. 447 he neither inflicted nor threatened any hardship; he simply chap. vit. called on the citizens to resume their old rights and their Mantineia i • t t-> i_ readmitted old duties as members of the Achaian League. But he to the did not trust wholly either to their gratitude or to their eague ' good faith. There was at Mantineia a class of inhabitants 1 who did not possess the full political franchise. These with some TT changes m Aratos at once raised to the rank of citizens. He thus its con- formed a strong additional party, attached by every tie of fa interest and gratitude to himself and to the Union. From a Mantineian commonwealth thus reconstituted it was not difficult to obtain a petition to the Federal Government 2 (ii. 57, 58) and Plutarch (Kl. 5. Ar. 36). Hero too the colouring is different, but there is no actual contradiction. Plutarch does not enlarge on the free pardon given to the revolted eity, on which Polybios is so emphatic ; neither does Polybios mention the changes in the Mantineian constitution -which Plutarch distinctly records. 1 Pint. Ar. 36. Tois /j.eroiKovs iroXiras iiroi7icrei> avrwu. What fxirotKos means at Athens everybody knows. Everything at Athens fostered the growth of a large class of resident foreigners, whose children, though born in Attica, were, according to Greek notions, no more citizens than their fathers. Thus there arose at Athens, mainly in the city itself and its ports, a large class, personally free, but enjoying no political rights. But can we conceive the growth of any large class of ixiroiKot in this sense in an inland city like Mantineia ? One is tempted to think that Plutarch here uses the word /xeroiKos loosely, in much the" same sense as irzpioiKos. He seems to do the same in a following chapter (38), where he speaks of Kleomenes as iroXXois ruv /xer o'lkwv efifiaXcvv eis "rr)v iroAiTtlav. Now any large class of ix£toikoi in the Attic sense is still less likely to have existed at Sparta than ;it Mantineia. And in the parallel passage in the Life of Kleomenes (c. 11) Plutarch himself says, dva-rrXripuaas to iroXl- rev/xa tois xapieoTarois tuv irepLo'iKcav. I am therefore inclined to think that these Mantineian ixtroiKot were really irepioiKoi, inhabitants of districts subject to Mantineia, like those subject to Megalopolis and other cities spoken of already. See above, p. 256. 2 Pol. ii. 57. MeT& Se ravra, npooptiixevoi rets iv avroTs aracreis xai tos inf hlroiXwv Kal AaKt8ai/j.oviwp imPovXcis, irpeafitvaavTis irpos roi/s 'Axaiovs rj^ioxrau Sovvai Trapa eWjSaAc (so in Kl. 5, eTXe tj)i/ tt6\iv k1 •■ 1 1 1 1 1 embassy came somewhat later. I'.. i Mantineia, now mice more a city of the League, to send Ambas- sadors (irp(afitv(ra.vT(s) to the League, as if t<> b foreign state, his an odd Bound, lull we shall find the expression again. Why, it may be asked, could qo1 thi I'll iness be despatched by those Mantineian citizens who mighl attend the Assembly ? Probably, when a city "f ih< League wished to obtain some BpeciaJ object a1 the bands of the National Government, it was 1 1 ghl thai more weight would attach to tne demand, if it were made by citizens specially deputed by the State Government, than if ii u'iv brought forward as an ordinary motion by those citizens who ■ l" p. ..( ut in tlirir Federal capacity. ' i hi the Achaian Federal garrisons, see above, p. 810, BATTLE OF LADOKEIA. 449 special jealousy upon the young conqueror of Lykaion. chap. mi. The loss of Mantineia depressed the national spirit ; and it required the use of every sort of influence l on the part of Kleomenes to obtain leave from the Ephors to continue the Avar. But it was continued. 2 Kleomenes now directly attacked Megalopolis ; he took the border town of Leuktra, and threatened the Great City itself. Aratos could not refuse help, and the whole force of the League marched to its defence. Close under the walls of Megalopolis, at a place called Ladokeia, the armies again met face to face. Aratos again shrank from battle. Lydiadas and his countrymen demanded it ; they at least would not tamely see their lands ravaged, their city, it might be, taken, because an incompetent commander had been preferred to their own gallant and true-hearted hero. And 1 doubtless the men of Megalopolis did not stand alone ; in the wide compass of the League other cities must have sent forth warriors as little disposed as Lydiadas himself to turn themselves back in the day of battle. The fight began ; the Lacedaemonians were driven to their camp by the light Battle of Achaian troops ; the heavy-armed were marching to sup- K ^,' port their brethren, now broken in the pursuit, and perhaps Bc - 226 - engaged in plunder. 3 But when they reached a trench, 1 He is said to have bribed the Ephors ; his mother Kratesikleia married the powerful Megistonous in order to secure his influence on her son's side. Here also comes in the story of Archidamos, the King of the other house, murdered, some said by Kleomenes, some said by the Ephor9. I will not enter at large into the question, but I see nothing to inculpate Kleomenes. I must again, on matters not immediately bearing on Federal History, refer generally to the History of Bishop Thirl wall. See also Droysen, ii. 484, 5. 2 Droysen (ii. 483) infers, though doubtfully, that a truce was concluded with the League. But this rests only on the expression of Pausauias (viii. 27. 15), KXtofxei/ris 6 AecevlSov Meya\6Tro\iv KartKa^fv iv cr-nov8cus. But Pausanias deals with the history of Kleomenes much as he deals with the history of Agis. The battle of Ladokeia and the death of Lydiadas in b.c. 226 are jumbled up with the capture of Megalopolis by Klecmenes in B.C. 222. 3 Plut. Ar. 37. X\ep\ tAs (X/ojvcis $taa-rrapei>Tu>i>. G G 450 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. the heart of Aratos failed him, and he made them halt on the brink. This was too much for the gallant soul of Lydiadas ; to be called on, at the bidding of a successful rival, to throw away a victory at the very gates of his native city, was a sacrifice to strict military discipline which it was hardly in human nature to offer. 1 He de- nounced the cowardice of the General ; he called on all around him not to lose a victory which was already in their hands ; he at least would not desert his country ; let those who would not see Lydiadas die fighting alone against the enemy follow him to a certain triumph. 2 At the head of his cavalry 8 he dashed on, but at the head of his cavalry alone ; the Lacedaemonian right wing gave way before them ; the ardour of pursuit carried them upon ground unsuited for the action of horse ; the fugitives turned ; they were reinforced by other divisions of their army, 4 and by the King in person ; and, after a sharp Death of struggle, Lydiadas fell fighting within sight of the walls of Megalopolis. 5 The rout of the cavalry followed the loss of their chief, and the rout of the cavalry carried with it the rout of the heavy-armed, who seem to have stood all the 1 Schorn (p. 110) seems to expect it of him. Helwing (p. 131), the worshipper of Aratos, gets quite indignant thai any one should donhl hia hero's valour. " Lysiades aber, der bestandige Gegner des Ann, beschul- digte den Feldherrn, der bei Sikyon, Korinth, and Argos genugsam persbnliche Tapfei keil bewiesen ttatte, offen der Feigheit,"&c. In the next e Lydiadas is "der unvorsichtige Lysiades," "der unbesonnene Befehls- baber," &c. It is hard for a brave and good man to be maligned alter so many agi ' Plut. Ar. 87. 'O Si Avtrtd8ris TT(pnra8wi> irpbs rd ytv6ix(va Ka\ r6v"kpaTOv ko.kI{oiv avtuaXt'iTO rovs 'nrirt'ts. ;i Was Lydiadas Imrdpxv* of the League, or only commander of n Mega- lopolitau conl 1 Plut, Kl. 6. 'O KAfo^e'i'rjs dvrjict toi)s Tapavrlvovi /col rods Kprjras 4ir' avr6v. Thai oativ( lofTarentum, nor neceasarily natives of Crete, bul descripl - of troops so called, like modern Hussars and Zouaves. Bee Thirlwall, viii. 21 it. \i. .':7. J Kn<(T( \a/j.npws dywi>i(rduffo dywi'CDV iVl Siptut Trji TraTp{f> Lydiadas. DEATH OF LYDIADAS 4ol while on the otlior side of the trench, without striking a ohap. vii, blow or advancing a step. The victory on the side of Utter de- Kleomenes was complete ; the Achaians fled in every Achaians, quarter ; and their army finally marched away, bitterly accusing the cowardice of Aratos, and openly charging him Indigna- with the wilful betrayal of his valiant rival. 1 The charge against was doubtless groundless ; Aratos acted at Ladokeia only Ala1 ' as he acted in all his battles ; the trench and the enemy together were obstacles too fearful to be encountered, and personal courage and common sense alike deserted him. Lydiadas was left to perish by an act of combined cowardice and folly, but there is no reason to believe that, while he was fighting in the forefront of the hottest battle, the Achaian phalanx was bidden to retire from him that he might be smitten and die. But the noblest spirit of the League was gone ; the best life of the nation was sacrificed to the incompetence of its chief ; Lydiadas had fallen, and it was left for an enemy to honour him. The hero of Sparta could recognize a worthy foe in the hero of Megalopolis ; and the body of Lydiadas, clothed in purple and with a garland of victory on his brow, was sent by Kleomenes to the gates of the Great City.' 2 The robe of royalty which he had thrown away in life might fittingly adorn his corpse, now that he had gone to the Island of the Blessed to dwell with Achilleus and Diomedcs and all the Zeus-born Kings of old. Almost immediately after the defeat of Ladokeia an Assembly was held at Aigion. The account of it in our Assembly only narrative reads as if the army had itself formed this a lglon " Assembly, or had compelled the General to summon it 1 Pint. Ar. 37. hWiav Se /J.eyd\rjv 6 "Aparos e\a{}e S6$as irpoeadai rov Avffid%7)i>. 2 Plut. Kl. 6. G G 2 452 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. against his will. 1 Never had the Achaian people come together with such feelings of indignation against their Chief Magistrate. Bitter indeed must have been their regret when thev remembered the results of their last election. Aratos had been preferred to Lydiadas ; and now the choice of Aratos had led to two disgraceful defeats, and Lydiadas was gone, some said betrayed to death by his rival, at any rate sacrificed to his rival's cowardice and incompetence. The indignation of the Assembly spent itself in a strange vote, which, while it shows their intense present dissatisfaction with their General, shows also the marvellous sort of fascination Strange which he had acquired over the national mind. The insure on Assembly passed a resolution that, if Aratos thought good Aratos. ^ g on w ^h the war, he must do it at his own cost ; the Achaian nation would give no more contributions and would pay no more mercenaries. 2 This vote is not to be looked upon as a mere sarcasm. Aratos had carried on so many wars at his- own cost and risk that for him to carry on a private war with Sparta seemed a thing by no means impossible. It would only be doing on a great scale what they had over and over again seen him do on a smaller one. They would not take upon themselves to run directly counter to his judgement on a matter of war and peace ; he might, if he chose, go on with the war iu his own style; he might win over Orchomenos or Tegea or Sparta herself either by diplomatic wiles or by nocturnal surprises ; his own wealth and the contributions of King Ptolemy might possibly supply him with the means ; if they did, the Federal Assembly would not stand in his way ; but it should be his war and not that of the ' I'lul. At. ''7. niatrOtis vm) rwv 'Axaiajf dncfixo^ivuiv Trp<)s 6pyi)u j}kt\86i>Tts tyi}<]>l tiotTO ItoXtfltlv. VuTE OF CENSURE ON ABATOS. 453 Achaian people ; they would neither serve themselves, nor chat, vn. yet pay mercenaries, merely that Kleomenes might set up trophies against Aratos. Some such line of thought as this would seem to be the most natural explanation of a resolution, which at first sight seems the very strangest ever passed by a sovereign Assembly. Aratos was naturally bitterly mortified at this vote of the Assembly. His first impulse was to resign his office — Aratos to lay down his seal * — and to leave those who censured plates him to take the management of affairs into their own y? sl ^ na " ° tion. hands. But on second thoughts he determined to bear up against the popular indignation. The very terms of the resolution showed his extraordinary influence over the nation, and that influence was, before long, busily at work again. Deference to Aratos was too old a habit for the League to throw off, and the national indignation had no doubt in a great measure spent itself in the mere passing of the vote of censure. 2 Before long that vote was He reco- either formally or practically rescinded, and Aratos again, ^^ ence in the year of Lykaion and Ladokeia, found himself at the head of an Achaian army. Orchomenos was now, after the recovery of Mantineia, the natural object of attack ; 3 Aratos did not take the town, but he gained some advan- tages over the Spartan troops in its territory. By the end of the official year, he seems to have been as powerful as ever. When the time of the elections came round, the office of General fell, not to Aristomachos — he might possi- General bly have taken an independent course — but to a certain Hyper- Hyperbatas, who is described as a mere instrument of J^' 1 ^ -4 Aratos, 4 and who was doubtless chosen at his nomination. 1 Pint. Ar. 38. 'Airo0€ k j, , . B - c - 224. before, 1 was the result of this first meeting of Achaians and Spartans upon Old- Achaian ground. Aratos now utterly lost heart. 9 For years he had been the chief of the League, the first man of Peloponnesos Position and of all independent Greece. He had done and suffered ° more in the cause of Grecian freedom than any man of his own age, almost more than any man of any other age. There was no longer a Tyrant or a foreign garrison from Thermopylae to Tainaron. The worst faults that could be laid to his charge were a certain unscrupulousness as to means while pursuing the most glorious of ends, and an unwillingness, after a long career of undivided power, to share his commanding position with another. This he had shown alike in his domestic rivalry with Lydiadas and in his foreign rivalry with Kleomenes. He had led the League into a war with Sparta, in which the Achaian arms had been utterly unsuccessful. It was now clear that, whatever might be the result of the struggle, Sparta would never stoop to become a single city of the League, and that Kleomenes would never willingly be anything but, what he now was, the first man of Peloponnesos. For the 1 Polybios (ii. 51) clearly distinguishes the three defeats of Lykaion, Ladokeia, and Hekatombaion as three stages in a climax, or 8' 'Axaioi to ix(v wowtov i]\arrd)dr]a'av irepl r6 AvKaiov avjXTr\aKivns Kara iropeiav rep KAeOjUeVei, to St Seiirepov e/c irapard^ews //'TTjth/o-af eV tois AoSo/ceiois koAou- fi4uois rijs MeyaAoiroAinSos, ore Kal AvdidSas eireffev, rd Se rpirov oAocrxepcSs tirraiffav iv rrj Avfxala irepl rd KaKov/xeuoy 'EKarofx^atov Trav5r]iJ.e\ SiaKiv- Svvevovres. 2 The state of things at this time is set forth by Uroysen (ii. 496 et se([([.) with his usual power and eloquence. Hut lie is, as usual, unduly hard both upon the League ami upon Aratos personally. 456 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. League to continue the war by its own unassisted force was utterly hopeless ; another such campaign as those of the last three years would throw all Peloponnesos at the feet of the conqueror. And Kleomenes was not only winning battles, he was also everywhere winning hearts. We may feel sure that Aratos, besides his national and personal rivalry, honestly condemned the proceedings of the Spartan chief. In his eyes he was a bloody and usurping revolutionist ; he had changed himself from a lawful King into a Tyrant \ x he had ventured on the final stroke of revolution, the general re-distribution of lands. To a politician like Aratos, whose feelings were essentially conservative and aristocratic, nothing could seem more to be abhorred or more to be dreaded. The general opinion of (Greece was evidently quite otherwise. Kleomenes ap- Popularity peared as something different from domestic Tyrants, from Macedonian conquerors, or even from veteran diplomatists like Aratos himself. The hero-King, the model of every soldier-like virtue,' was something more attractive than any of them. Instead of founding a Tyranny, he had put one down ; 3 he had restored both himself and his people to their ancient rights ; his very division of lands was not a revolutionary interference with private property, it was the restitution of ;i lawful state of things which only modern corruptions had done away with.' There was in every 1 I'd], ii. 47. Tuu KAfo/u'eoi/s t6 rt irdrpiov TroArr«u,ua KI X * :V0V " Ka ' T V TruK(/j.(fi npaKTiKws nod 7rapa#<)Au>s. 1'uus. ii. !». 1. KKeo/j.tvns . ■ ■ naixra- viav ifitfiuro rupai'i'lfios Tf 1-kiQviawv ua\ i/6/.iois toTs KaihfrrK6fifvo'!. A string "I' the usual charges follow. The introduction ,.i Pausanias .it leasl is singularly unlucky. The Achaian riew of Kieo* mentis reminds one of the Papal view "I Manfred or tl"' Norman iriew of Harold. 2 See the description of his camp, Plut. El 12, 18. i Sec his speech to tli" Lacedee dan people, Plut, Kl. 10. ' Whether an equal divisi f land had ever really existed at Sparta mother matti i the poinl i.- thai mcu believed thai Li had existed, and menes. POSITION OF ARATOS AND KLEOMENKS. 45/ city a party which only wished that Kleomencs would chap. tit. come and divide the land there too as well as at Sparta. Even the leading men, those who filled the Senate and the subordinate magistracies, and who had the predomi- nant influence in the Assembly, were getting sick of the long continued rule of a single man, a rule which had of General late led only to such unparalleled national dishonour. 1 tionwith Men were weary of Aratos, weary of the war ; if the war Aratos - went on much longer with Aratos at its head, the League was clearly doomed. Each city would make what terms it could with the conqueror, rather than go on submitting to defeat after defeat, in the cause of the League, or, more truly, in the cause of its General. The cry for peace on any reasonable terms became universal throughout the Achaian cities. Kleomencs, on the other hand, was nowise disposed to Position push the League to extremities. That he had joyfully menes!^ entered upon the war there can be no doubt ; but he could say with perfect truth that he had been forced to enter upon it by the attempts of Aratos upon Tegea and Orchomenos. The war on his part had been a series of victories. He had won three pitched battles ; he had taken several fortresses and smaller towns ; and, if he had lost one great city, he had recovered it with its own good will. He was in a position to dictate what terms he chose, but neither inclination nor policy prompted him to dictate that Agis and Kleomencs professed to lie only restoring the ancient and lawful state of things. See Grote, ii. 521-7. cf. 465. Kortihn (iii. 186 et al.), through forgetfulness of this distinction, misrepresents the posi- tion of Kleomenes and his party, as if they were at all like modern Socialists. 1 Plut. Kl. 17. 'E.yey6yfi Si Kivyj/xa fj.tv twv 'Axai&v aal -xpds d.-n6cna(jiv cipfj.i)ffav al -woAeis, rwv fj.lv Stjuoij/ vofx-^v re x^P as Ka ' XP e( ^" diroKoiras iKirtff- avToov, rCiv 5e Trpooraiv troWaxov Papvyo/j.evcci' Tou"ApaTov. This description indeed belongs to a later time, when the tendency to secession had become much stronger, lmt the causes of discontent here mentioned must have already been busily at work. 458 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. VII. severe terms. The main object of both sides was, in a certain sense, the same. Botli Aratos and Kleomenes wished to unite all Greece, at any rate all Peloponnesos, into one free Greek Commonwealth. That they differed irreconcileably as to the form which such a Commonwealth should take was only the natural result of their several positions. Aratos, a republican leader, sought to bring- about the union through the forms of a republican Con- federation, and, had not Sparta been so incomparably greater than any other Peloponnesian city, he would probably have succeeded in so doing. Kleomenes, a here- ditary King of Sparta, started with the greatness of Sparta St-h 'mes and her King as his first principle ; he would unite Pelo- ponnesos by joining the Achaian League, but he would join it only with Sparta for its recognized chief city, and with the Spartan King for its recognized constitutional head. 1 That he wished to establish a Kingdom of Greece," in the sense that there was a Kingdom of Macedonia, and had been a Kingdom of Epciros, seems in nowise probable. It is far more likely that he wished to fall back upon the state of things which had existed in the days of Sparta's truest greatness, before the Peloponnesian War. In that state of things the llarmost, the garrison, and the Dek- Probable aivliy were unknown ; Sparta was the constitutional ( , i ' | l, t 'J | r | '.' president of a body of free allies. Those allies were supremacy perfectly independent in their separate governments; they clan 1 r hi. did not surrender the right of separate war and peace with states Qot belonging to the Confederacy ; each state had ;i \<>i napaHiSovai tj}v rjyt/bLoviav. horn (p. ll."') Beems t" think, but there is much force ami truth in In i ipii 'l' tin' position ni' Kir ■ i Thui . i . I " ■ Ml. irdm • i ■ rs diroSoiacof Ka\ toL xup'a- 8 *& yvvou, a\X' od A«pte<5s et'/u d\\' 'A; ' neiies 460 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. Attrac- tions of the Achaian name to a chap. vii. population of Lakonia, doubtless, in some measure at least, of Achaian blood also. 1 The Achaian name was conse- crated by all the old associations of the Homeric poems ; Kleomenes might dream that he was setting up again the iieiaklfid throne of Tvndareos or of Agamemnon, and that he was King. \ . . about to reign, as an Achaian King, over the Achaian cities of Sparta and Argos and Mykene. He proposed a scheme less noble and generous, it may be, than the pure republicanism of Aratos in his best days, but a scheme as noble and generous as a conquering King ever proposed to conquered enemies ; a scheme which was at least better for Pcloponnesos than to become a depen- dency of Macedon, or to be again parcelled out among local Tyrants. Aratos looked on things with different eyes. We have now reached the time when the deliverer of Greece was so strangely transformed into her betrayer. Rather than submit to the slightest supremacy on the part of Kleo- menes, he would call in Antigonos to protect the League against him. He would undo his own work ; he would again bring Macedonian armies into Pcloponnesos; he would even endure to see a Macedonian garrison holding that very Akrokorinthos which he himself had freed. We have no reason to believe that he desired anv such thing for its own sake, still less that he was actuated by any personal motives meaner than the jealousy which blinded AlatOS begins to look to Mace- donia. to tin' Athenian Priestess (Herod, v. 7~). If Mr. Blakesley be al all right in his explanati f the designs of thai Kleomenes in Herod. vi. 74, they were not so verj different from those which I attribute to the great Kleomenes. Bu1 Mi'. Grote (v. 59) takes a view which is easier ami simpler, and at least I do not understand Mr. Blakesley's cl lo when In' talks of "Th< Lchffian League of uearlj 100 years later" — than b.o. 509. Profe boi Kawlinson, as usual when the civilized world is loncerned, gfr es no help. 1 This of course partly depends on tin 1 \\<-w taken of the origin of the l .il...iii;in Perioikoi. Mi'. Qrotc iii. 191) holds them i" have been Dorian, i rary i<> tin- genet pinion SCHEMES OF ARATOS. 461 his eyes. He would rather have resisted with the un- chap. ni. aided force of the League ; he would rather have called in the help of the sister League of iEtolia; 1 but rather than yield to Kleomenes, he would submit to become dependent upon Antigonos. Nor was it hard to call up plausible sophisms by which the worse cause might be made to appear the better. Plutarch, at his distance of time, saw the matter exactly as we do; 2 but it is clear that Poly bios did not so see it ; 3 still less would it appear in the same light in the eyes of Aratos himself. The fear of iEtolia, on which Polybios enlarges, was doubtless put forth by Aratos both in his speeches and in his Memoirs ; but it was a fear which the state of things did not justify. 4 There is not the least sign of any understanding between Kleomenes and the JEtolians ; what was most desirable in /Etolian eyes was doubtless to see Sparta and Achaia weaken one another. The real question was, If the League w T as to become dependent on some one, should it become Difference dependent on Kleomenes or on Antigonos? To Plutarch, J^".-™ to a modern writer, both removed from the petty passions and tliat of „ . , Plutarch ot the time, there seems no room for any doubt. If you or of must have a President, or even a King, take the Greek, ^ters! the Spartan, the Herakleid, the gallant soldier, the generous conqueror. To Aratos the case may not have been so clear. To humble himself and the League before Kleomenes was a far deeper personal and national humi- liation than to do the like to Antigonos. Kleomenes was a neighbour, a rival, a border enemy ; Antigonos was a great King at a distance, submission to whom would be far less galling. And Kleomenes really demanded sub- mission ; he asked for a place in the League itself which 1 Plut. Ar. 41. See above, p. 43S. 2 He sets forth the case strongly and eloquently ; Ar. 38. Kl. 16. 3 Pol. ii. 47 et al. « See Thirlwall, viii. 187. 402 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vn. would utterly destroy its constitution. Antigonos as yet demanded nothing ; Aratos might still natter himself that the Macedonian Kiug would step in as an equal ally, a friendly power external to the League, one with whom all matters of common interest would have to be debated, but whose alliance need in no wise interfere with the constitutional functions of the General, the Senate, or the Assembly. Kleomenes was the enemy of the mo- ment ; his was the power which was actually threatening ; Antisjonos came indeed of a hostile line, but he had never been personally an enemy ; national feuds need not last for ever ; the loss of Akrokorinthos might by this time be forgiven and forgotten. It was not more unpatriotic in Achaia to call in her ancient enemy against her ancient friend than it was in Sparta and Athens, after fighting side by side at Salamis and at Plataia, to call in the Mcdc as an ally or a paymaster against their old comrades. When the Captain-General of Greece marched forth against Persia, the vows of every patriotic Greek were on the side of the Barbarian And, if Aratos had been gifted with prophetic vision, he might have gone on to behold the League of Switzerland in alliance with Austria and the Seven United Provinces in alliance with Spain. Why then should an alliance with Macedonia be so specially disgraceful to the League of Achaia 1 And Kleomenes was a Tyrant, a revolutionist, the subverter of the laws of his own country, the apostle of every kind of mischief elsewhere. Antigonos was a King; the legitimacy of his title might be doubtful, but he was a King and not a Tyrant ; he had upset no Senate, he had murdered no Ephors, he had divided no lands among a revolutionary populace ; he was a steady, respectable, conservative Monarch, who might not object to act in concert with a steady, respectable, conservative Republic. Anyhow he was much better to lie trusted than (he young firebrand at NEGOCIATIONS WITH SPARTA AND MACEDONIA. 463 Sparta, to calculate on whose eccentric doings baffled even chap. vii. the experienced diplomacy of Aratos himself. Such may well have been the process of self-delusion by which the deliverer of Corinth and Athens persuaded himself that to call in the Macedonian was no treason against Greece. As for Akrokorinthos, doubtless Aratos at first contemplated no such sacrifice ; it was only after a terrible struggle, when it was at last clear that none but Macedonian aid was to be had, and that Macedonian aid was not to be had on any milder terms, that even Aratos, much more that the Achaian People, finally agreed to pay so fearful a price. § 4. From the Opening of Negotiations with Macedonia to the End of the War with Kleomenes. B.C. 224--221. In the spring then of the year 224 before Christ, Kleo- menes stood completely victorious over the armies of the League. He was willing to conclude peace on what, as Twofold proceeding from a conquering enemy, could only be called tions with most favourable terms. But Aratos, rather than admit the P^? and Mace- slightest supremacy in the Spartan, had made up his mind donia, to seek for help from the Macedonian. From this time, two sets of negociations are going on side by side, one between the League and Kleomenes, the other between Aratos and Antigonos. The successive steps in each are clearly marked by our authorities, 1 but the chronological parallelism of the two is less easy to follow. The first proposals of peace 1 Plutarch — that is, mainly Phylarchos, but Phylarchos compared with the Memoirs of Aratos — gives us the internal history of the League and the negociations with Kleomenes. On these last Polybioa is quite silent, but, as a native of Megalopolis, he describes at lull length the intrigues of Aratos with Antigonos, iu which his own city was so deeply concerned, and the facts of which are almost lost amid Plutarch's declamation, eloquent and righteous as it is. 464 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap vi t. seem to have conic from Kleomenes. The Spring Meeting of the year apparently followed not very long after the Beginning rou t f Hekatombaioii. It is not certain whether Spartan ot nego- tiations ambassadors were then actually introduced to the As- men&. l sembly, but it is probable that negociations had already begun. Possiblv thev were not vet in a state advanced enough to allow of a formal vote being taken. Certain it is that the final decision was adjourned to a Special Meeting to be held at or near Argos. 1 But it is clear that public opinion declared itself strongly in favour of peace with Sparta, 2 and that the conduct of Aratos was discussed with considerable freedom. 3 Still long habit, or the pecu- liar way in which the votes were taken, caused the usual custom to be followed, and Aratos was elected General Aratos for the following year. For the first time in his life, as declines . the Gene- far as we know, he declined the office, and the choice of p " the Assembly then fell on a partisan of his 4 named First Gene- Timoxcnos. Perhaps he really shrank from the personal ralship of „ ... Timo- responsibility of office at such a moment, a cowardly r. ' 224- f a i mrc m duty for which he is indignantly rebuked by his 223 - biographer. 6 Or perhaps he merely hoped to carry on his intrigues with the more case when unfettered by the trammels of office. Certain it is that, while public nego- ciations were going on between Kleomenes and the League, a counter-ncgociation was going on between Antigonos and one of its cities, and that with a sort of licence from the National Congress itself. This was a ■n" 1 Eif "Apyos. Pint. A.T. 39. fit Kipvav. Kl. 15. Is not this last a confusion hi ing from the fad (Ar. 89) thai Kteomen&s, when on Ins way to Ail''-, gol ao farther than Lerna) Lerna was not a city, and m semis a sinner place for ;i congress. ' Kl. 1 , r ). HovKofiffwi/ St rwf 'Axuioij' in\ rovrots 8('x((r0ai t&s StaAufftif. 3 Ar. 88. 'H fitv npos rods 8%Kovs dpyrf, k.t.a. * See I'm], iv. 82. Cf. ahove, \>. 804. Plut, Kl. 15, Oi) KaAws otnv iu x^i/u^""' irpay/xdruif flti^OVl nt8els irfpep rdv olaxa wa! wpoifltVOl tt)i/ i^ovarlav. Cf. Ar. 88. ARATOS DECLINES THE GENERALSHIP. 406 very singular transaction, which illustrates several points chap. vu. both in the constitution of the League and in the general politics of Peloponnesos. I have said in a former Chapter ' that the general Law of the League forbade all diplomatic intercourse between foreign powers and any particular city of the Union. Foreign Ambassadors were to be received, and Achaian Begin Ambassadors were to be commissioned, by no authority ne^ocia- short of that of the League itself. I mentioned also that t A ions with Antigonos. instances were occasionally met with both of the law being dispensed with and of the law being broken. Here we have a case of dispensation. 3 Aratos did not venture to propose with his own mouth to the Assembly that the King of Macedonia should be invited into Pelo- ponnesos ; he artfully contrived to throw the responsibility of taking the first step upon a city, which, of all the cities of the League, might seem the least likely to be under any irregular influence on his part. Megalopolis, Dealings the city of Lydiadas, would seem to speak with more ^ithTlega- independence than any other ; and, as the city more imme- lo P olis diately threatened by Sparta, it had more claim than any other to be heard. 3 With the help of two hereditary friends in Megalopolis, Nikophanes and Kerkidas, Aratos planned his whole scheme. These men appeared in the Megalopolitan Assembly, and there moved and carried a resolution for their own appointment with a special com- mission to the Federal Assembly. They were to ask leave, Commis- in the name of the State of Megalopolis, to go into sent f r om 1 See above, p. 261, 2. s " Allerdings war mit solchen besonderen Verkandlungen einer einzel- nen Gemeinde das Wesen der Eidgenossenschaft und ihrer Verfassung gefahrdet." Droysen, ii. 501. This is true, but hardly the whole truth. An American commentator would here be more valuable than a German. 3 Plut. Ar. 38. OvTOt yctp ime^ovro r$ iro\ffj.Cf) /ndKitrra, avv^x 1 ^ 5 &yovros avToi)t Kal (ptpovros rov KKfo/xevovs. So Pol. ii. 48. H H 466 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. Macedonia and to ask Antigonos for help. 1 A more cun- Megalo- ningly devised scheme could not have been hit upon. Federal Megalopolis was niore closely connected with Macedonia B s t S6 224 y ' than any other Peloponnesian city; there had been no slight interchange of good offices between the two states, 2 and Megalopolis had actually stood two sieges in the Macedonian interest. 3 Had Megalopolis been a wholly independent commonwealth, it would have been noAvise monstrous, as seen from a local Megalopolitan point of view, to ask for Macedonian help against a Spartan enemy. Consequently the motion in the Federal Assembly, unex- pected as it doubtless was, would not strike the hearers as something so utterly strange and unnatural as if it had proceeded from Corinth or Megara, or from Aratos himself. The Megalopolitan commissioners probably appeared at the Meeting at which Timoxenos was appointed General, that is, the Spring Meeting of the year 224. 4 They obtained the permission for which they asked, permission namely 1 Pol. ii. 48. 'PaSiws 5«i rovrcov 6p/j.r)v irapsffTT}os. The same account, according to Plutarch (Ar. 88), was given by Phylarchos. On these special commissioners from particular cities to the Federal Assembly, sec above, p. 448. - Pol. U.S. 2av oikcIoos SiaKfiixevovs avrovs Trpos Tr)v MaK(86- vwv oiKiav 4k tiLv KaroL rbv 'A/uvvtov 4'iAnrirov tvepytcriwv. i One against .Wis, b.o. 880; another against Polysperchdn, B.o. 318. Sit alinvc, p. 2(>fi. * I ilu not feel at all certain as to the exacl date. Ii should be remem- bered thai we have no armala of these transactions. Polybios gives, almo i incidi atally, the account of the Macedonian aegociations ; Plutarch gives the account of the Spartan aegociations. Each narrative is clear enough in itself, bu1 it is hard to arrange the two serii ide by side, and to fit eacl into its exact place. Soi E the expressions of Polybios (ii. 61) mighl make one think thai this whole negociatiou took placi before the battle of Hekatombaion, bul the passage, if construed strictly, might Imply thai it took place aol only before Hekatombaion, but also before Lykaion, which H is impos ible to belii MEGALOI'OLITAN EMBASSY TO ANTIGONOS. 467 to go into Macedonia, not as Federal, but as Megalo- chap. vn. politan, envoys. One would be well pleased to have some They are record of the debate which must have followed on such tl , g0 as a request ; but it is easy to understand that it would p^f^" not meet with the same strenuous opposition which would envoys to ^lace- certainly have befallen a proposal to send a regular donia. Federal Embassy on such an errand. Megalopolis had a fair claim to ask for Macedonian help ; if Antigonos chose to bestow on the hereditary friends of his house a body of troops for their protection, or a few talents to hire mer- cenaries for themselves, the League, as a League, might not seem to be dishonoured or endangered. But Aratos had gained his first point, that of familiarizing the Achaian Assembly with the notion of Macedonian help. He seems now to have withdrawn for a moment from public life ; he refused to resume office, alleging that he felt the public indignation against him too strongly to allow him to serve with honour. 1 Such a plea, coming from the deliverer of Sikvon and Corinth, the man who had been twelve times General, would be, of all others, the most likely to touch the hearts of his hearers, and to pave the way for his speedy restoration to his old influence. The avowed nego- ciation between the League and Kleomenes must have been going on at the time when Nikophanes and Kerkidas, probably carrying with them much less of the public attention, went on their strange errand to Macedonia. They reached the court of Antigonos ; they briefly set Their in- forth their ostensible commission from their own city ; withAnti- they described its dangers, and asked help from their old s onos - ally. They then went on to tell at much greater length the tale put into their mouths by Aratos.'' 2 The interests of 1 Pint. Ax. 38. See above, p. 464. 2 Pol. ii. 48. 2iroi/5?7 5e av/j.fj.i^avns oi irtp\ tov HiKovJii> 'EWrfvooi' -fiyt jxovias. " No arguments Could have been devised better suited to the purpose of convincing and per« snadingthe l>i have fell thai they were so many reasons which oughl i" have deterred him, as ■ < patriotic (Jrcck, from tin- prosecution of his at- tempt " Thirlw.ill, viii. 188. a Sfc Droysen's note, ii. soo. ANSWER OF ANTTGONOS. 469 at Macedonia was that of envoys from the single city of chap, vjl Megalopolis. They were not Ambassadors from the League, nor in any way entitled to speak in its name. Antigonos, strictly respecting constitutional forms, sent Favour- back the envoys with a letter to the commonwealth of answer of Megalopolis, promising aid, if the Federal Assembly ^}^ onos agreed to it. 1 The Megalopolitan Assembly were de- envoys . from Me- lighted at the favourable reception which their royal gaiopolia. friend had given to their request. At the next Federal Assembly — or more probably at a Special Meeting called for the purpose 2 — the royal letter was read, first to the jT he le ^^ Senate 3 and then to the Assembly ; Megalopolitan orators gonos read urgently pressed the application for Macedonian help, and Federal the inclination of both Senate and People was clearly ssem y ' favourable to them. Whether any formal resolution was passed does not appear. 4 The League could not decently apply in its own name for Macedonian help while nego- ciations were going on with Kleomenes ; but it is not impossible that the Assembly may have passed a vote authorizing Megalopolis to receive assistance on its own account. At any rate, it was on the reading of this letter that Aratos made his first public appearance in the busi- ness. No longer the chief of the League, apparently not even one of its Senators, he stepped forward as a private citizen to address the Assembly. In such a character he 1 Pol. ii. 50. ''E'ypaife 54 kh\ ro7s MeyakowoklraLS iirayytkk6i.i.(vos /3orj- Qt'jtTiiv, tcLv Kal ruts 'Ax&iots toito fiovAofxtvois r;. 2 lb. MiTfcopicrdevTes ol MeyakoiroklTai irpodu/j-ws iff%"v levai npds n-fju avfoSof tcov 'Axaiuv. Such a state of mind would hardly allow of waiting for the Autumn Meeting, and Timoxenos, who was probably in the secret, would be ready to summon a meeting if Aratos wished it. 3 lb. The Senate (t6 koivov Povkeurrfptov) and the irkfjQos or iroWoi to whom Aratos speaks, seem here, as Droysen (ii. 503, note) says, to be clearly distinguished. But PovAevrrjpiov is, as we have seen (see above, p. 306), sometimes used for the place of meeting of tho As- sembly. * Pol. U.S. "E5o|e fliveiv iirl rwf viroxcif.i£vo>v. 4/0 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vn. would be heard, if possible, with even greater favour than when he spoke with the weight of official authority. The reaction on which he had reckoned was now beginning to set in. The whole state of the case had been fully set before him by Nikophanes ; everything was going on exactly as he wished ; the name of Macedonian help was becoming familiar to the Achaian people, but Aratos had not appeared as its first proposer. He wished to avoid having recourse to it, if possible ; but if need — the sup- posed need of doing anything rather than submit to Kleomenes — drove the League to such a course, it should be the act of the League, not the act of Aratos ; it should not even be the act of the League on the motion of Aratos. 1 If Antigonos should come, if he should conquer Kleomenes, if he should alter the Federal Constitution, 2 — it was more tolerable, it seems, to have it altered by a Macedonian than by a Spartan — no man should say that it was his doing ; Megalopolis and the whole League must bear the responsibility of their own acts. Thus fortified, speech of he came forward in the Assembly ; he expressed his in the pleasure to hear of the good will of the King, his satis- Assembly. f act j on u £ tj ie p rescu t disposition of the Assembly; but he warned them not to be too hasty ; let them make one more struggle to save themselves by their own exertions ; it would be much better to do so if they could anyhow manage it ; if they failed in the attempt, let them then call in the help of their royal friend. The Assembly ap- plauded the speaker; they agreed to save themselves if they could — if not, to ask King Antigonos to save them. 1 Pol. ii. 50. MaAifrra /utv yap ZrrntvSt /u.r) irposfitriOrjvai rrjs fiorjOdas' ti 8' 4£ avdyKris M touto St'oi Karafyfiyt iv, ov /.i6i>ou lfiov\tTo 8i' avrov ytvtcrOcu t)\v K\rjrrtv, £ti 8* /xdWov ^ awu.vrwv rwv 'Axatuf. 2 lit. Ei irapayi vofxtvus <> f3affl\*i)S wal icpar^aai r

T »v KAtofj.t- vi>v% Ka\ riiv AaKtSaifJinviwv dWottlrrpoi' ti fiv aurbs dvaAa/3j) ti)i' Mtl/. NEG0C1ATI0NS WITH KLEOMENES. 471 To account for this disposition of the Achaian Assembly, chap. vii. we must suppose that the favourable intentions of Kleo- menes, of which Polybios says not a word, were not as yet generally known. The General Timoxenos, as a partisan of Aratos, would doubtless conceal them as long as he could. But when it was known how mild a supremacy Kleomenes sought for, men began once more to doubt Negocia- ° tions with whether Antigonos would not, after all, be more dangerous Kieo- as a friend than Kleomenes was as an enemy. A Special menes Assembly was called to meet at Argos. 1 Public opinion throughout the League was now so strongly in favour of Strong feeling in Kleomenes that there could be little doubt that peace his favour. would be concluded on his own terms, that is, that the Spartan King would be accepted as Chief of the League. 2 It marks the diplomacy of the time that Kleomenes, like Aristomachos, 3 was to plead his own cause before the Achaian Popular Assembly. A sudden illness on the road rendered him incapable of speaking. As a sign of his Negocia- good will, he released the chief among his Achaian ^ted prisoners, and the Meeting was adjourned till he was able J^g^ ' to attend. This illness of Kleomenes decided the fate of illness. Greece. Tt was probably during this interval that Aratos, having found the Macedonian King a less implacable enemy than he had expected, ventured to enter into direct communi- cation with him. He no longer needed the roundabout way of dealing through Nikophanes and Kerkidas. He Mission sent his own son, the younger Aratos, as ambassador — Aratosto seemingly his own private ambassador 4 — and arranged all Antigonos. 1 See above, p. 464. 2 Plut. Kl. 15. BovKofiffcou Se raiv 'Axaicov W rourois Sex^rOai rds SiaXvo-ets Ka) t6v Kkeofiivriv KaKovvrwv 4s Aipvav, and (still more strongly) Ar. 39, ive/XTreiv eudils 4(p' rtyefj.oi'ia. tov KKeofxeur) KaAouvTts is "Apyos. s See above, p. 426. 4 Pol. ii. 51. npec/3evT7)e rdv vlov 4^a-!roffTfi\as "Aparos irpds 'Avilyovov f/3e/3ai&j(raTo Ta irtpl rrjs 0or)0(las. 47:2 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. necessary matters with Antigonos. 1 To be sure there was one difficulty ; Antigonos was no more disposed than later potentates to do his work for nothing. The price which he set on that work was one most natural for him to Antigonos as k, but most unnatural for Aratos to pay, the reunion demands »«■•.. ,. a i -i • i it ii Akro- to Macedonia of Akrokorinthos. iSo one can blame ormthos. ^ nt jg 0nos f or ma ti n g the demand. He had not volun- teered to meddle in Peloponnesian affairs ; Kleomenes had done him no harm, and the Achaians had done him no good ; if any sentimental tie bound him to Megalopolis, it did not extend beyond that single city, and indeed it might be held to be cancelled by the union of Mega- lopolis with the League. It was as much as could be expected if the King of Macedonia merely sat still, and did not attack a people who had destroyed so large a portion of the influence of his house ; at any rate, he could not be expected to serve them for nothing. The terms on which his services were to be had were simply that Aratos should restore to Antigonos Doson the in- valuable fortress of which he had deprived Antigonos Uonatas. In all this Antigonos acted in a perfectly straightforward way, worthy of a ruler of the nation who called a spade a spade. 2 Macedonia did not profess to make war for an idea ; her King made no rhetorical flourishes about liberating PeloponnBSOS from the Isthmus to the Cretan Sea. Antigonos, like an honest trader, named his terms ; his price was fixed, no abatement would be taken from the simple demand of Akrokorinthos. But how was Akrokorinthos to be had? Aratos seems to have been ready even then to make the sacrifice; but it would be hard to carry through the Achaian Senate and Assembly 1 Nut. Kl 17. "'HSt) t>iusiAi)\oyr)txivwv oi)t<£ irpds rov 'Ktniyovov twv ufyivrwv. Pint. Apophth, I'liil. 1 . r >. 2kcuoi)s ti/<)7 |i)v an&.<\>i)V hiyuVTas. ANTIGONOS DEMANDS AKROKORINTHOS. 473 a resolution for surrendering the most important Federal chap. vu. fortress ; it would be harder still for the League to compel the Corinthians to admit a foreign garrison into their city. 1 Was Aratos to reverse the exploit of his youth, and once more to scale the mountain citadel, but this time to drive out an Achaian, and to bring in a Macedonian, garrison ? And, beside this, the Achaian people were evidently ready to accept Kleomenes as their chief ; if his terms were once accepted, Akrokorinthos could be won only by a struggle for life and death against the combined force of Sparta and Achaia. Aratos seems not to have dared to make any open proposal to the Assembly ; but he contrived that such deadly offence should be given to Kleomenes 1 that the Spartan King broke off the negotiations, and, instead Kleo- of appearing personally to plead his cause in the Assembly breaks off at Areros, he sent a herald to declare war against the the ■ ut, g°- League. Here again Aratos contrived to get his work done for him by other hands. All hope of a fair accommodation with Kleomenes was now at an end. Aratos would not now have to endure the disgrace of seeing the Spartan youth 1 The Accounts given by Plutarch in his two biographies (Ar. 39 and Kl. 17) do not exactly agree. The first makes Aratos send ambassadors [irpecrfiets) to Kleomenes, who had advanced with his troops as far as Lerna, bidding him come, as to friends and allies, with only three hundred followers, and offering hostages, if he felt any distrust. The other version is that he was to come alone, and to receive three hundred hostages. This, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 192) hints, looks like a confusion with the number of followers in the other story, which, though Droysen (ii. 507) thinks otherwise, seems decidedly the more probable. But one does not see in either story, as told by Plutarch, any ground for the excessive indignation which he attributes to Kleomenes. There must have been something specially offensive in the tone or form of the message. This was followed by some more epistolary sparring between Kleomenes and Aratos, such as Plutarch gave some specimens of at an earlier time. The two chiefs seem at last to have got very abusive towards one another, and that on very delicate points ; iv avTwv Ka\ KopivBiouv iysvovro iroWol Ka.Ta wp/xricrav al Tr6\(ts, tcuv pi)v Syfxoov vofxTJv re x M P as Ka ^ XP ( ^ V dnoKOTrots eAiri- crdvTuv, twv 5e vpe&TWP fiapwofizvoov to> " Kparov, iviicv 5e Kal oY dpyijs (X "' tu>c cos iirayovTa. tj; WiKoirovv/juui MaKtSoVa?. 4/6 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. (.HAL'. VII. Both cx- tremi • Lean to Kleo- menes. The schemes of Ivleo- mends :i|>|>r,!l'"l to Town- Autonomy isl the pal Principle. thought Kleomenes, if only as a novelty, the more pro- mising leader of the two. The disappointed men of rank and wealth hoped that Kleomenes, whose foes called him a Tyrant, might, like Antigonos Gonatas, patronize Tyranny everywhere, and might set them up to lord it as his vassals over their several cities. The populace, on the other hand, heard of his revolutionary doings at home ; they longed for the day when a bonfire of promissory notes should be kindled in the market-place of every city, 1 and when the lands of the wealthy should be divided into equal lots for the benefit of the poor. Both parties mistook their man. Whatever Kleomenes had done at Sparta professed to be the restoration of the old laws and discipline of the country ; it therefore by no means followed that he would appear as an apostle either of Tyranny or of confiscation anywhere else." And it is easy to conceive that another set of motives, different from any of these, might attract some partizans to the side of Kleomenes. The question was no longer whether certain terms should be agreed upon between Kleomenes and the League as a whole ; it now was whether each particular city should adhere to the Achaian connexion or should embrace that of Sparta. Now the schemes of Kleomenes, if they were at all grounded on the <>ld Pan-hellenic position of Sparta, would hardly include a true Federal Union, :\ Bundesstaat The tie by which he would unite his conquests would be alliance rather than incorporation ; they would form a Confederacy 1 Plat. A^'is, 18. Kal tv ouk %v Viompi^ovrwv TravTax^OiV. * We may gather from Polybios (ii. 55) that Stymphalos and Kleitor 478 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. VII Kleo- nienes wins the Arkadian and Argo- lic cities. Kleo- menes wins Argos, B.C. 223. and all the cities of 1 Argolis fell away ; Kaphyai, Plilious, Pheneos, Kleonai, Epidauros, Hermione, Troizen, were all lost to the League ; some towns Kleomenes took by force, others willingly went over to him. 2 Mega- lopolis, almost alone among the Southern members of the League, stood faithful, if not to the Federal bond, at least to its love of Macedonia and its hatred of Sparta. Even Pellene, in the old Achaia, was taken, and received a Lacedaemonian garrison. 3 Nor was a greater prize long delayed— indeed it preceded the fall of its own smaller neighbours. Argos, the old rival of Sparta, Argos, which no Spartan King had ever been able to subdue, Argos, which Pyrrhos had found as unconquerable as Sparta her- self, 4 now opened her gates to a Lacedaemonian master. The Achaian force had been withdrawn from the city to protect the Federal interest in Corinth and Sikyon, and Aratos had gone with it, armed with some strange arbitrary commission, how obtained we know not. 6 Kleo- remained faithful ; Kynaitha also is not mentioned among the conquests of Kleomenes. 1 Pint. At. 40. nposyevofxevaiv avry twv t9\v \dyo^.ivt\v 'AkttJi' kwtoi- KOVfTWV Kal TCiS TTuAflS iyXftpKrdvTWV. - Pol. ii. 52. 'O 5e KAto/xe'j/Tjs Karair\rj^d/j.ei'os ro'is irpotipruxtvois fvrv- X^fJ-O-ai Aonrov dStws irteiroptviro rds iroAeis, &s /j.iv ndOoav, als St rdv 6/Boi> dvar(iv6ix(vos. 3 Droysen (ii. 508) makes Kleomenes occupy Pellene with the good will of tin- inhabitants. They rose, be says, ami aided the Bpartana against the Federal troops. This must be grounded <>n the odd expression of Plutarch (KL 17^, roils ras <=| mention of SECESSION OF ARGOLIC AND ARKADIAN CITIES. 479 menes appeared before Argos ; Aristomachos, the former chap. mi. Tyrant, and late General of the League, espoused his cause ; ' he hoped, so his enemies said, to gain more by submission to Kleomenes than by fidelity to the League. Through his influence the city was surrendered, hostages were given, a garrison was received, and Argos was admitted as an ally of Sparta, recognizing her supremacy. The whole Argolic peninsula followed its example. Meanwhile Violent i'ii- i • proceed- Aratos, armed with his new authority, put to death some uags of whom he called traitors in his native city 2 — the first siky&n* recorded instance of civil bloodshed in the name of the Federal power. He then went on a like errand to Corinth, but there he found the whole city stirred up against him. He and his Federal troops were at once ordered to depart ; 3 according to one account he had to flee for his life. 4 The Corinthians then sent for Kleomenes ; 5 he Corinth po lie "I ]1 entered the city, and besieged Akrokorinthos, whose Kieo- Federal garrison still held out. 6 The possession f mene9, Corinth by Kleomenes cut off Megara from all commu- Megara nication with her confederates. She did not revolt to Boeotian the Spartan, but attached herself, by leave of the League, Lea g' le - to the now nearer Federation of Bceotia. 7 We hear the Nemean Games, which took place earlier in the year than the Federal elections. See Thiiiwall, viii. 192-4. 1 Pol. ii. 60. 6 8' im\ad6jxtvos twc Trpoeip^fieucou irwv irapd ir6Sas, 67rel fiiKpov iiriKvfifffTtpas eaxe "rets i\-rriSas virkp rod fisWovTos ev KXeoyueVei, Ti)V re TrixTpiSa Hal ri\v kavTov TTpoaipecriv aTrocrTrdcras dwd twv 'Ax«i«i / ev to?s dvayKawrdrois Katpols Trposiveipa rots exfy>o7s . Plutarch does not men- tion Aristomachos in the business. 2 Pint. Ar. 40. Tovs fj.\v eV 2,iKvt»vla. 4rj Kal TrapeSoauv T7)v ttoXiv, k.t.\. « Plut. Kl. 19. Ar. 40. 7 Pol. xx. 67. "Ore Se KXeofxevrfs (is tov 'Iffdfxov Tvp^sfKadifffv, StaitKftcr- dlvres rrposedtVTo rols BoioitoTs ftero rfjs twv .'Axa'tui/ yviifjLTfs. Megara 480 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. nothing of Aigina, which was equally cut off. As Kleo- menes had no fleet, it may have retained its allegiance — it was again Achaian some years later — but there must have been a temporary suspension of communication between it and the other cities. The League was now reduced to nine Old-Achaian towns — Pellene being lost — together with Sikyon, Megalopolis, and a few other places in Arkadia. Kleomen&s had been provoked into becoming an enemy ; he had been rejected as a Federal chief ; he now came as a conqueror, but, in most places, as a con- queror willingly received. No real argument against Federal Govern- ment to he drawn from these events. No better opportunity can be conceived for declama- tions on the weakness of Federal States than this general break-up of the most flourishing Federal State that the world had yet seen. But a little consideration will show that the events which I have just been recording really prove nothing of the kind. The true question is, not whether a Federal Government can be warranted to stand firm against every shock, but whether there are not times and places in which a Federal Government is more likely to stand firm than any other. It may be freely granted that some of the special evils and dangers which beset Peloponnesos in the year 224 arose from the Federal form of the Achaian Government. But it is easy to see that any other form of Government would have brought with it evils and dangers greater still. The peculiar form taken by the dispute between Sparta and the League could not have arisen except between a single State and a Federation ; but we may be quite certain that a Prince in the afterwards again Lefl the Boeotian for the Anhaian connexion (Pol. ib.). In Roman times Megara was again Boeotian. Caius Curtius Proklos, whom we have already me1 with (see above, p. 188) as a Megarian Amphiktyon, was also a Megarian Bceotarch. Boeckh, CI.no. 1058. An g his merits was tliiit nl' treating tin; Megarian s to a slmw of gladiators, 11 sight which would have lomewhal amazed either Eleomends or Aratos NO JUST INFERENCE AGAINST FEDERALISM. 431 circumstances in which Kleomene\s found himself would < ha vn, soon have attacked, or been attacked by, his neighbours, whatever might be their forms of government. Again, the proposal to cede Corinth to Antigonos derived its chief sting from the peculiarities of the Federal relation. For a League to pretend to cede to a foreign power one of the Sovereign States which compose it is clearly more monstrous, more threatening to the rights of every other portion of the whole, than it is for a Monarch to cede one of the provinces of his Kingdom. It is, as the event showed, far more likely to excite general indignation and rebellion. Yet it is easy to conceive that, even under a Monarchy, the cession of a province might raise serious disturbances, and might even lead other provinces to offer their allegiance to a master who seemed better able to protect them. And, after all, for a Federal power to pretend to cede one of its members is not more ini- quitous than the practice, so common among Princes, of disposing of territories with which they have not even a Federal connexion, without consulting either their rulers or their inhabitants. Federal Government, like all other human things, is imperfect, and there is a certain pressure to which it will give way. But could any other form of government have stood the trial better in that particular time and place ? A Kingdom of Peloponnesos was not No other to be thought of; the idea would have shocked every G™m- feeling of the Greek mind, and it could not have stood men t theu possible in for an hour on any ground but that of naked brute force. Greece. Town-autonomy had had its fair trial ; it had been found to mean, in that age, the presence either of local Tyrants or of Macedonian garrisons. But the League had hitherto completely excluded both evils ; even in the degenerate days on which we are now to enter, it completely ex- cluded one and greatly restrained and modified the other. And the cities which fell off from the League asked 4K2 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. VII. Real teachiii ^ of the history in favour of Fede- ralism. neither for Monarchy nor for strict Town-autonomy ; they were ready for a relation with Sparta, which, if not in accordance with the most perfect Federal ideal, might still be called Federal as distinguished from either of the other systems. The truth is that, if the Federal Government of Achaia now gave way, it gave way only because it for a moment deserted its own principles. There was clearly no general wish to secede, no wish to exchange the Achaian for the Spartan connexion, as long as those who were at the head of the League did their duty as Federal rulers. When they were guilty of treason against Greece by invoking Macedonian help, when they added the special treason against Federal Law implied in the proposal to alienate a Sovereign State of the Union, then, and not till then, did the Union begin to fall asunder. The fact that a Federal Government, hitherto united and prosperous, fell in pieces as soon as it deserted strict Federal principles, is surely rather an argument for the Federal system than against it. And, after all, the breaking-up of the League was very partial. Except at Corinth, where no explanation need be sought for, the tendency to Secession was confined to those cities which had lately joined the League, and which may not as yet have become fully accustomed to Federal principles and habits. The Old-Achaian towns stuck closely together through the whole tempest ; Megalopolis stood firm, like an isolated rock against which every wave dashed in vain. Even in the seceding cities the party which desired separation from the League on any respect- able political ground seems to have been nowhere the strongest. Everywhere Secession was brought about mainly by the very worst of political factions, by those classes whose impotence up to that moment is the most speaking witness to the general good government of the League. The opponents of Federalism are perfectly welcome to ally REAL INFERENCE THE OTHER WAY. 483 themselves either with the would-be Tyrants of Sikyon or chap. \h. with the Socialist rabble of Argos. It was only at Corinth, in the city which Aratos offered to betray, that the names of Aratos and his League stank, as they deserved, in the nostrils of every citizen. Everywhere else the movement Secession towards Secession was either merely partial or merely ^^dT temporary. It is clear that at Sikyon the mass of the temporary. inhabitants still clave to their old deliverer amid all his short-comings ; 1 at Argos we shall j)resently see that the very party which urged Secession soon turned about and repented of it. The League, in short, was, before long, reconstituted, with somewhat diminished extent and with greatly diminished glory, but still in a form which, imper- fect as it was, was better either than absolute bondage to Macedonia or than Town-autonomy, as Town-autonomy had in that age become. The loss of Corinth — the remark is that of Polybios, in Effects other Avords that of Aratos himself— was felt by Aratos as jj^e a gain. 2 It took away all difficulties and all scruples as Corinth, to the contemplated surrender of Akrokorinthos. The Bu# 223 ' Corinthians were now rebels with whom no terms need be kept ; their mountain-citadel was now a fortress held by Achaian troops in an enemy's country ; it could now be handed over to the King without let or hindrance, if only he would come with his army and take it. The loss of Corinth and of so many other cities had also another result ; — Aratos could now do what he pleased in the Federal Councils. He had no longer to deal with a great Peloponnesian Confederation which gave him rivals like Lydiadas and Aristomachos ; the Achaian League once 1 See the description of the state of feeling at Sikyon in Plut. Ar. 42, a remarkable contrast to the reception of Aratos at Corinth. a Pol. ii. 52. Tots 5' 'Axaiot)y direAtxre to0" € /ueyio-rov Trpof$\ijfj.aTos J anas in Plut. Ar. 41, for which KleomenSs besieged Siky&n, compared with the date supplied by the mention of Nemean Games which were celebrated in February in Kl. 17. See p. 479.) The regular Spring Meeting of the year B.C. 223 must have come between the two. At it Timoxenos (see Pol. ii. 53. Thirlwall, viii. 196) was reelected General for the year — another unconstitutional act— Aratos seemingly still retaining his extra- ordinary powers. During the siege of Charlestown in 1780, Governor Rutledgo of Smith Carolina was made crrpa-rriydi avronpirup, like Aratos. The Legis- lature of the State passed an act, "delegating to Governor Rutledge, and such of his council as he could conveniently consult, a power to do everything necessary tor the public good, except taking away the life of a citizen without a legal trial." (Marshall's Life of Washington, iv. 185.) Aratos (see ahove, p. 47'.)) seems not to havo felt himself under even this last restriction. The appointmenl of a Dictator was also contemplated, though not carried out, in Virginia, both in 177<> and in 17M. See Tucker's Life of Jefl i on, i. ifi2. The Roman formula, "Denl operam Consules ne quid Respublica detriment i capiat," is familiar t" tf\ si \ on< DICTATORSHIP OF ABATOS. 485 in choosing the greater evil; he sacrificed the external chap, mi independence, he risked the internal freedom, of his coun- try, but he was no wilful conspirator against her. It was probably because he felt in his own heart no wish to tyrannize that he did not scruple to assume the power and the outward garb of a Tyrant. He soon showed his strict personal integrity, perverted as was the form which even his virtues now assumed. Kleomenes spared 1 his house and property at Corinth ; 2 he made him splendid offers ; twelve talents a year, double his Egyptian pension, 3 should be the reward of the surrender of Akrokorinthos. Nay, in this hour of success, he lowered his terms ; let the League, or what remained of it, acknowledge his supremacy, and he and they should garrison the key of Peloponnesos in common. 4 In attempting to bribe Aratos, Aratos Kleomenes showed that he failed to understand the man offeraof with whom he had been so long contending. Sad as were 5ii°*_ the passions and weaknesses with which the mind of Aratos was now clouded, mere personal gain was wholly absent from his thoughts. He would not sell the least atom of his pride or his prejudice, because such a sale would have been in his eyes a sale of his country. His answer was enigmatical ; Circumstances were not in his power, but he was in the power of circumstances. 5 1 Compare the instances quoted above, p. 443. 9 On Aratos' possession of real property at Corinth, see above, p. 258. s Plut. Ar. 41. Kl. 19. The Egyptian pension must now have been stopped. Ptolemy was now on the side of Kleomenes ; nToKeficuos diro- yvoiis to iQvos KAeo/xeVfi x o PVy^" eVe^aAAero. (Pol. ii. 51.) He naturally would take his side as soon as ho knew of the dealings of the League with Macedonia. 4 He used, as his agent for this offer, not one of his own subjects, but a Messenian named Tritymallos (Plut, Kl. 19). This employment of a neutral envoy is a clear sign of moderation, and may be compared with the practice (see above, p. 387) of referring disputes to the arbitration of a neutral state. 5 Plut. Ar. 41. 'fi? ovk ex 01 r & itpdyixara, fxaWov 8' vr ovtwv txono. So Kl. 19. menes. 48G HISTOEY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vii. This reply was not satisfactory to the Spartan, whose rejoinder took the form of an invasion of the Sikyonian territory, and a siege of Sikyon itself. In this deplorable state, 1 Aratos sought for allies, perhaps merely to satisfy his own conscience and the opinion of his countrymen, by showing that the application to Antigonos was really Aratos unavoidable. He asked, but of course he asked in vain, asks for help of for help from those very .Etolians, whose expected hostility Athens! na d been so prominently put forward in justification of his course. 2 He stooped so low as to ask for aid from Athens, as if Athens could again occupy Pylos or Kythera, or could again win naval triumphs in the Corinthian Gulf. Incredible as it sounds, we are told that the Athenian people, who had once worn crowns on the report of Aratos' death, were now ready, in their gratitude, to send him help — such help as Athens could give. Two orators, named EukleidOs and Mikion, 3 persuaded them not to run the hazard, and Aratos was left wholly without allies. And Final vote now there was no other hope — the die was cast. An League Assembly was called at Aigion ; 4 Aratos — cut off from the t<. unite pj ace f meeting by the Lacedaemonian occupation of Antigonos r to J ' and cede Pellene" — made his May thither by sea ; 5 and the Federal Akroko- _^ -iii 1 • • « * 1 #» 1 • rinthos, Rump, doubtless at Ins motion, passed the final resolution to invite the help of Antigonos and to cede to him Akro- korinthos as the price of his help. 1 See an eloquent description of his position at this time — more lair towards him than is usual with the writer in Droyscn, ii. 511. - I'lut. Ar. -ii. See ahoye, p. 487. :) These must he the same as I'.ui \ kleiddsand M ikon | I'aus. ii. 9. 4), whom Philip is said tu have poisoned See Thirlwall, viii. 196. ' Phil. Ar. 42. Of /xfi> ovv 'Axaiol a\>vt\-r\KvQirts fls Atyiuv 4k(7 rdv "ApffTov iKaKow. The Meeting therefore was no1 summoned by himself as o-Tfiarrjyor ai>TOKpdTu the Aratos of the year 223, lie saved his KLEOMENES NOW THE CHAMPION OF GREECE. 491 country, he raised it to the highest pitch of glory, and chap, ra then pulled it down to the dust. Yet at heart lie was not a traitor; he was only the saddest of all instances of the way in which pride, passion, aud obstinacy will sometimes darken the judgement even of honourable and illustrious men. From this time the war loses its interest, or rather Change it assumes an interest of quite another kind. Hitherto c i iarac t er it has been a struggle between two Grecian powers for of the 00 L war, ascendency in Peloponnesos ; it now changes into a b.c. 223- struggle for Grecian freedom waged by one of the last and " noblest of Grecian heroes against the overwhelming power of Macedonia. Our hearts now go along with Kleomenes, Kleomenes as with Leonidas of old or with Kanares and Botzares in champion the davs of our fathers. Antigonos was indeed a foe of a ° nobler stamp, but he was as truly the foe of Greece as Xerxes or as Omar Briones. Aratos the deliverer of Greece, and the remnant which still clave to him, have sunk from being the bulwark of Hellas into the rank of a meclizine: Theban at Plataia. Kleomenes had been refused as a chief, and now Antigonos came as a master, or rather as a God. He was declared chief of all the allies ; ! the Achaian League was now merged in a great Confederacy together with the lesser Leagues of Bceotia, Phokis, Akar- nania, and Epeiros, together also with the Thessalians, who were hardly better than Macedonian subjects. The P e s ra <^; J _ tion ot the League deprived itself of the common rights of hide- League, pendent sovereignty ; no letter or embassy was to be sent to any other King without the consent of the King of Macedon. King Ptolemy had been a friend and a pay. master ; King Antigonos was a master who required heavy wages for his services. The Macedonian army was main- 1 Pol. ii. 54. Karaaradels TJ-ye/ucoi/ diravTwv twv avunaxw. Cf. Tllill- wall, via. 202. This was at the Autumn Meeting of B.C. 223. 492 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. . hap. vii. tained and paid at the cost of the League. As for Anti- Monstrous or 0nos himself, sacrifices were offered to him. games were flattery of & ' ° Antigonos. held in his honour, and Aratos had to appear as some- thing; like the High Priest of this new Divinity. 1 All this impious flattery was indeed no more than the age was used to ; Athens had long before set the example towards Antigonos' own ancestor Demetrios ; 2 but Athens at least did not take to King-worship till Demosthenes had ceased to guide her councils. Who would have dreamed, when Aratos sealed Akrokorinthos to expel the garrison of one Antigonos, that the same Aratos would live to welcome another Antigonos with the honours due to Zeus and Poseidon? That much that Aratos beheld and did he beheld and did most unwillingly a we may most fullv believe. But he was only reaping a harvest of his own sowing, a harvest whose nature any eyes not blinded by passion would have foreseen from the first. The military details of the war between Antigonos and Kleomenes are worthy of careful study, and nothing in Grecian or any other history is more attractive than the whole personal career of the last Spartan King. For these I will refer to the general historians of Greece and to KleomeinV own special biographer. A few points how- ever stand out which more immediately bear on my own subject. 1 Plut. Ar. )">. 'EypyfiffavTO 5' dWy /ut) ypdtpetv fia.crtKt'i /u?;5e irpta^ivtiv irpds &\\ov &kovtos 'AvTiy6vov, rptiptiv Si Kal nio-eoSoTtlv ^vayicd^ovro Toi)r Ma/ceSuVas, dvaias Si Kal Tro/UTTaj Kal dywvas 'AvTiy6vc f > avvtTtXovv. So KI. 16, AtaSi'ifxan Kal irnpijwpa. Kal MaKt Sot iko7s Kal (TarpaTriKoTs -n^osriyfiaaiv virt^iyf/t ixera ttjs 'Axofas auTOv, ha pr) KAto/ueWt TroitiV Soktj to irposraT- Toiitvov, ' AvTiyiveta Ovwv Kal TrtuaVas a'Saiy avrds iaT«pavwfj.tvos lis S-vOpuirov ifcro > task for his freedom <>f speech, •See the details in Athdnaios, vi. 62-4, especiallj the Ithyphallics n, . :l Plut. At. 45. 'flf |Jt«c8|T0 iKt'tvnv irav-rwv iKtlvov .... iir*\ tpavfpdis -, • 7i •>/» to toii' wpaTTt'! • Klirtl tiW ApaTOi'. RECOVERY OF THE REVOLTED CITIES. 49:'} The combined forces of Antigonos and the League chap. vii. had little difficulty in recovering the cities which had Recovery revolted from their Federal allegiance. Some were taken revolted by force, others received the conquerors, with what amount cltu l'o<> of willingness or unwillingness it would be hard to say. 222. In one case a remarkable internal revolution restored the greatest of the seceding cities to its place in the Union. At the very beginning of the war, before Antigonos had entered Peloponnesos, while Kleomenes was still master of a strong force at the Isthmus, and was still besieging the Achaian garrison in Akrokorinthos, Argos, his greatest Argos prize, returned of its own accord to the Achaian connexion, [^f^™ 9 The partv which had invited Kleomenes to Argos was dis- League, . J . & B.d. 223. satisfied because the Spartan King had not proclaimed the abolition of debts among his new friends. 1 At the per- suasion of one Aristoteles, the multitude rose, and called in Aratos and the allies. Now it was that Aratos, still, it would seem, Absolute General of the League, was elected local General of the State of Argos. 2 Aristomachos, once Execution Tyrant of Argos, afterwards General of the League, was of Arist >- ■' ° » > machos. put to death, 3 with the sanction, if not by the command, 1 Plut. Kl. 20. 'O St irparrcoi' y\v Trjv d/n6aTa.aiv 'ApiaTOTeKys' Kai to ttXijOos ov x a ^ f7r <^ s eireio'ei' ayavo.KTovv, on xP e ^ v dwoKOiras ovk iiroirjfftv adrois 6 K\eo/j.4i/7]s tKiricram. 2 Plut. Ar. 44. "Aparos 5e pt"f> fal irtir tin pit vov dtpetvat ryjy dpx^v Ks dnoWvfievov. The Cliaim- heiaii, at his distance of time, dues Dot share the passions of the Kiegalopolitan. 2 Pint. ih. "E/murtV avrods \6"Aparos] 'AvrtySvip to rt ioiv rvpdvvwv koX rd tu>v irpohoTwv xp^H- aTa 8«/»«d" Sovvat. This sounds like the form of the decree FATE OF AEGOS, CORINTH, AND MANTINETA. 495 as a gift from the Roman conqueror of Macedon and lord chap. vii. of Greece. b.c. 223- 19G. The other cities of Argolis and Arkadia were easily recovered during the autumn of the year 223 and the spring of 222. 1 The fate of the three Arkadian towns which had given the first occasion to the war, Tegea, Orclio- menos, and Mantineia, calls for some remark. The Man- Fate of tineians, in the eyes of Antigonos or at least of Aratos, B0 2 22. were double-dyed traitors ; they had revolted once to the iEtolians and once to Kleomenes ; no terms therefore were to be offered them. Their city was taken, its in- habitants were slain or sold, 2 and the "lovely Mantineia" was handed over to the Argeians as a reward for their repentance 3 and amendment. Its new masters planted a colony there, of which they chose their General Aratos as the Founder. His own native Sikyon had once been called Demetrias ; the name had been lost, if by nothing else, by his own exploits as her deliverer ; as if now to wipe out the error of his youth, he now changed the name of his refounded city to Antigoneia. 4 Tegea and Orchomenos were also taken. To the people Tegea of Tegea Antigonos restored the constitution of their to the fathers, 5 a strange boon, if what is meant is union to ^g 116 - the Achaian League, of which they had never been members. Orchomenos the Macedonian King kept to i Pol. ii. 54. n - Plut. Ar. 45. Pol. ii. 58. 3 Pol. ii. 53. revvaius rwv 'AxaiaJe (piKorlfius 5e rcZv 'Apyeiwv 4k /ueTa^te- \eia? avrbv [KXeo^eVrj] dixwafxefaiv. 4 Pint. Ar. 45. T&v yap 'Apyeicov tt)i/ ttJa.ii/ irap" y Avriy6vov Saipcav \a$6vTwv Kal KCLTOiKi^eiv tyvooKoroiv avTos oi/acrTTjy alpe8ils Kal (rrparriyos wv i\pj}t men- was gone, but Megalopolis contained a citizen worthy to Philo- take his place, in Philopoimen the son of Krangis. He, it.. mi v w i,ii e the mass of his countrymen fled to Messene, headed a diversion which secured their retreat. He, when Kleo- menes offered to restore their city unhurt on condition of their forsaking the League, exhorted them to endure everything in the cause of their country and their allies. 3 Klconienrs. when his offers were rejected, utterly destroyed the city which, for a hundred and fifty years, had been at once the memorial and the pledge of Spartan humi- liation. It \\as on the field of Sellasia, 4 one of the saddest i iv. 6. ' Pol. ii. 55. Pint. Kl. 23. 3 So shvs Plutarch (Phil 5. Kl. 24), who makes the MeRalopolitnn.* inclined to accept Cleomenes 1 offer till they are dissuaded by Philopoimen. Phylarchoe, whom Polybios (ii. f.1) seems to follow, describes them aa baldly needing such dissuasion. They would not hear RUeomenta 1 letter to tin end, and eoultl hardly l.e kepi from stoning the hen re i 4 The battle of Sellasia is commonly placed in the year it.c 222; but ii.. succession of summers and winl an by Polyhios (ii. 54) would rather bring it to 221, in which it is placed by Bishop Thirlwall. CONCLUSION OF THE WAR, 497 names in Grecian history, that the final struggle took chap. vn. place between Sparta and Macedonia for the headship of Battle of Greece. One hardly knows whether to count it as an ^', 11 aggravation or as an alleviation of the blow that it was partly dealt by Grecian hands. Philopoimen and the Achaian cavalry had a distinguished share in winning the victory. Philopoimen, like Lydiadas at Ladokeia, charged without orders, but he was somewhat better supported by Antigonos than his great countryman had been by Aratos. After a valiant struggle, the Lacedaemonians were defeated ; Kleomenes endured to survive, and to wait in Defeat and vain, in the despotic court of Egypt, for better times. Kk-o- Sparta now, for the first time since the return of the mengs - Herakleids, opened her gates to a foreign conqueror. Antigonos treated her with the same politic lenity which he had shown everywhere except at Mantineia, It would be his policy to represent the war as waged, not against Sparta, but against her so called Tyrant. The innovations Antigonos' of Kleomenes were done away, 1 but Sparta was not required of Sparta. to join the Achaian League. Her compulsory and useless union was reserved for a later stage of our history. The death of Antigonos soon followed his settlement Death and of Peloponnesian affairs. Aratos, who had sung pseans f Anti-* in his honour, gave him a bad character in his Memoirs. 2 gono f' ' to B.C. 221. It is hard to see the reason for this in his acts, and it clearly was not followed by Polybios. Antigonos, a King and a Macedonian, was far less blameworthy than Aratos, a Greek and a republican leader. An opportunity was offered him for recovering an old and precious pos- 1 Pol. ii. 70. UoXirfVfxa rd Tra.Tpt.ov avrols Karaarr^o-as. Cf. Pint. Kl. 30. It is doubtful whether Antigonos did, or did not, leave Brachyllas the Thehan, for a time at least, with some authority at Sparta. See Pol. xx. 5. Thirlwall, viii. 218. If he did, it must have been only with some temporary commission, like that of Prytanis at Megalopolis s Plut. Ar. 38. 'Ev to?s vwo/xi>rj/ji.a.(ri KotSopajy Sitri\ti. Kl. 16. 'Avri- yovov dpr]Kibs ko.ko. fivpia 5i' 3>v a.-no\s\onttv \)Trojxvr\^.a.T(ii'.'. But See Pol. ii. 7". K K 498 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. cHAr. vii. session of his house, and of vastly extending the power and influence of his Crown. That he accepted it no man can wonder ; one would be half inclined to blame him if he had not. And, if we do not see in his career the won- derful magnanimity ascribed to him by Achaian admirers, it was at least something to win so many cities with so little needless cruelty. Both Sparta and Athens, in the days of their power, had shed Grecian blood far more freely. Altogether Antigonos Doson was a King who need not shrink from a comparison with any but the selected few, the Alfreds and the Akbars, among those whom the accident of birth has called to rule over their felloAVS. Himself only a distant kinsman of the royal house, born a subject, and called to the throne by popu- lar election, he better knew how to deal with freemen than the mass of Kings and their satraps. We shall soon see how both Macedonia and Greece could be made to suffer at the hands of one born in the purple. b.o. 2Si- We have thus, for sixty years, traced the growth of the League, from the union of two small Achaian towns, till it became the greatest power of Peloponnesos and of N. >w pod- Greece. We have seen it fall from its high estate through tic. n of the , League. the envy ot the man who had done most to raise it. We leave it now restored nearly to its full extent, with the exception of that mountain citadel, that key to its whole position, without which its extent was a mockery, and its ■■• •'• '-'-'- freedom little better than a name. We have still, in the 146. following Chapter, to continue its history for another period of seventy-five years, retaining its internal consti- tution, vastly increased in territorial extent, but, in ex- ternal affairs, with only a lew very short intervals, reduced almost to the condition of a dependent ally, first of Macedonia and then of Rome CHAPTER VIII. HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE BATTLE OF SELLAS1A TO THE PEACE OF EPEIROS. B.C. 221 — 205. The Macedonian intervention in Peloponnesos, and the chap. viii. results of the battle of Sellasia, had wholly changed the State of 1*0 6C6 aspect of Grecian affairs. The greater part of Greece was after the now united in an alliance, of which the King of Macedonia gjL. was the real, if not the acknowledged, head. Beside the mengs. Macedonian Kingdom and the Achaian League, this Con- federacy included all the Federal powers of Northern Greece, 1 with the exception of ./Etolia. The spectacle of Grand so many Federal Commonwealths thus closely allied, both under with one another and with a Government of another kind, c i ^ n gives this Confederacy a special interest in the eyes of a headship, historian of Federalism. The formal relations between the several allied powers were apparently those of perfect equality. The extraordinary authority which the Achaians had conferred upon Antigonos seems to have lasted no longer than the duration of the Kleomenic War. It certainly did not descend to his successor Philip. But Achaia and other republican members of the Confederacy 1 Pol. iv. 9. "En yap ivopKos tfxeve iracriv r; ytyevr)ij.4vr} a>/ce'a?, 'AKapvSvas, $lknrirov. The Thessalians, as nominally independent, were enrolled in the alliance : but, as practically Macedonian subjects, they were not thought worthy of a formal embassy being sent to them. K K 2 500 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. VIII. Relations of the other 1 1 reek States. 1 sternal and ex- ternal condition of the axhaian League were exposed to all the dangers which commonly attend alliances between the weak and the strong. It would be too much to say that they stood to Macedonia in the relation of dependent alliance ; but they seem to have stood practically in the same sort of subordination in which the Peloponnesiau allies stood to Sparta at the beginning of the great Peloponnesiau War. 1 Sparta had now, by the fall of Kleomenes, been reduced to an unwilling union with the Allies. 2 Messene was friendly to the Allies, but was not formally enrolled among them. 3 This enumeration includes pretty nearly all Greece, except Athens, of which we have just now no mention, and Elis, which of course retained its old connexion with ^Etolia. As for /Etolia itself, notwithstanding all that we have heard of danger from that quarter, the old alliance between the Achaian and iEtolian Leagues was not held to be dissolved by the new engagements of the Achaians.* In like manner iEtolia stood towards Messene also in a relation which is spoken of as one of friendship and alliance. 5 As for the Achaian League itself, its internal constitu- tion remained unchanged, its General, its Senate, and its Assembly still continued to exercise their old functions. There is no reason to suppose that their practical working had at all degenerated. Aehaia still retained its mixture of moderate Democracy and moderate Aristocracy, its freedom > See above, p, 158. 3 Sparta does not occur in the list, bul its relation i spoken of in the mi pa ige (Pol. iv. 9) by the uame of av,ufj.axia- So also c. 28. 1 The Messfinians (Pol. W. 9) ask for admission to the Confederacy (ij komo) crvp/taxtyt which the Achaians cannol granl withoul the i sent of i be other allies. 1 PoL LV, 15. "Ovra yap aOrol [ol AitojAoi] i' Kal rwv Mmt(tt)vIwv. Cf. iv. 7, KvTtroKp.i)aav \ol AiVa'Aol ] iirifirivai iiTparoTriSw \\c>ia\, napu tiA(a? «al nvfxfiax^at t>W ■fji'Tivuvv iroirj(Tii Xp6voiay, SO C. 5. Mv, eirixupa Trjs /3a. 3 Thirlwall, viii. 406. C£ Liddell's History of Rome, ii. 80. 504 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vin. better times we may judge by seeing what he did make of it when Achaian armies were beginning to be useless. As a general, he needed only a wider field to have been the rival of his contemporaries Hannibal and Scipio. The man who at once transformed such military materials as Aratos had left him into an army capable of winning a pitched battle over Lacedaemonians was, in his own sphere, as great a commander as either of them. His policy, as well as that of Aratos, sometimes erred on the side of too great eagerness for the extension of the League. This error took a characteristic form in each of the two men. Compa- Aratos sometimes pushed the arts of the diplomatist rison betwei .u almost to the verge of treachery ; Philopoim^n sometimes mSn and pushed the honest vigour of the soldier beyond the verge Aratos, f Y i ] cnce anc i vindictiveness. In internal Federal politics, we find him the author of reforms designed to carry out in greater fulness the true ideas of Federal union and equality. These great qualities might have been of eminent use in the days of Aratos ; in the days of Pliilo- poiniGn they were nearly thrown away. During a great part of his life, all that he could do was, by a policy neither servile nor obstinate, to mitigate the bitterness of Roman encroachment, and to ward off the day of final bondage. For this purpose we can hardly doubt that the unrivalled diplomatic powers of Aratos would have been more useful than the straightforward energy of PhilopoimSn. lie was a brave soldier and an upright citizen, but he had no special gift of influencing the minds of Macedonian Kings or Roman Proconsuls. Philopoime'n, in short, was one of the heroes who struggle against late, who arc allowed to do no more Mian to stave oil' a destruction which it is beyond their power to avert. Temporary ll i^ wv\ remarkable that, For several years after the :l i beginning of our present period, we lose sight of Philo- CHABACTEE OF PHILOPOIMEN. 505 poimen altogether. 1 His conduct at Sellasia procured him ohap.vih. the marked notice of Antigonos. The King made him the of Philo- most splendid offers ; ~ wealth and high command were &o m p e i . ready for him, if he would only enter the Macedonian P onuesos - service. That Philopoimen utterly refused to sell himself for all that Macedonia could give is no more than we should have expected from his general character. But his conduct in other respects is not so intelligible. He went into Crete to learn the art of war amid the constant local struggles of that island. While there, he contrived to do his country some at least apparent service, by extending her alliance among the Cretan cities. 3 But if Philopoi- men wanted a field of action, why did he not seek it in Peloponnesos ? Why did he refuse to his own country the direct advantage of his skill and valour in the struggle with JEtolia which we are just about to record ? History Probable gives no answer to this question ; but an obvious con- tion of his jectnre presents itself. Philopoimen absented himself coluluct - from Peloponnesos during the whole remaining life of Aratos ; shortly after his death he returned. Was he warned by the example of the great citizen whom Megalo- polis must still have been bewailing ? Did he see that it was as hopeless for him as it had been for Lydiadas to depose Aratos from the first place in the League, and that, while Aratos held the first place in the League, his own great qualities would be as much thrown away as those of Lydiadas had been ? He may have had no mind to enter on a vain rivalry, which was certain to issue in his being baffled and rejected in the Assembly, which was not unlikely to issue in his being forsaken, or even betrayed, on another 1 Brandstiiter (358) strangely introduces him, without any explanation, into the middle of the Social War, transferring thither an exploit which happened ten years later. See Pint. Phil. 7. Thirlwnll, viii. 290. 2 Plut. Phil. 7. He refused, according to his biographer, ^aXiara t^v vtov vs ix ovi the Li haps I- ttcr expre the moanu CAUSES OF THE SOCIAL WAB. 507 § 1. The Social War. B.C. 221—217. We have seen that most of the ^Etolian possessions chap. vhi. in Peloponnesos had fallen into the hands, first of Ti Kleomenes, and then of the Achaians or their Mace- f ^chaia donian protector. The iEtolians however still retained ^o 221 ~ the smaller city of Phigaleia, lying on the confines of Phigaleia Arkadia, Messene, and Elis. The town stood to the ^tolians. iEtolian League in that doubtful relation in which we find so many of its outlying possessions ; its inhabitants bore the name of citizens, 1 but their condition probably ap- proached nearer to that of subjects, or, at best, of depen- dent allies. Phigaleia could not have been valuable to yEtolia in any way but as a military post ; it was held by an iEtolian Governor, 2 and therefore doubtless by an ^Etolian garrison also. Soon after the accession of Philip, Dori- Dorimachos, the iEtolian commander at Phigaleia, began pikers to be guilty of various acts of plunder on the neighbouring -^ and friendly territory of Messene\ A strange diplomatic quarrel followed, 3 which led to the most bitter hatred on the part of Dorimachos towards those whom he had in- jured. In conjunction with a kinsman and kindred spirit named Skopas, and with the connivance of the iEtolian 1 Pol. iv. 3. , ETU7x al ' 6 ^6 Tore avfi-KoKiTivofxiwi) rots hlrwKols. But we soon afterwards (iv. 79) find the Phigaleians dissatisfied with the iEtolian connexion, which there is called avpixaxta- 2 Dorimachos was "sent, according to Polybios (iv. 3), \6yai /xh irapatyv- Ka^tov rrfv re x°°P av Ka ^ T ^ v 7r ^" / r ^ v ^LyaKewv, epyy 5e KarcuTKSirov tu^lv ix^v ruu iu neXoirovvrjcra) rrpay^aruiv. Brandstater (342) asks, with BO simplicity, " War das etwas so Schlimmes .'" There is something really amusing in this writer's half apologies for his clier Pol. iv. 1 and, more briefly, Thi 508 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vui. General Ariston, 1 but without any sort of authority from either the Popular Assembly or the Senate, 2 he planned a series of incursions which amounted, as Polybios expresses it, to a declaration of war against Messene, Achaia, Epeiros, Extensive Akamania, and Macedonia, all at once. 3 Various acts of the of aggression on all these states followed ; among other .Etohans. things, a fort named Klarion, in the territory of Megalo- polis, was seized upon, but the iEtolians were soon driven out by the Achaian General Timoxenos, with the help of Taurion, the Macedonian commander at Corinth. An JEtolian army also passed through the western cantons of the old Achaia ; its leaders indeed disclaimed all hostile intentions, but their followers passed on to Phigaleia, plundering as they went, and from Phigaleia they began the devastation of Messene in good earnest. The narrative of these events brings forward one or two points of political interest, of which I have already spoken in my general description of the Achaian Con- May, stitutiou. The JStolians chose for the time of their inroad the season when the Achaian official year was drawing to its close, when Achaia, in short, was in the throes of a Presidential election. Timoxenos, the General actually in office, was a friend and partisan of Aratos, and apparently no opposition was expected to the election, according to the usual custom, of Aratos himself as Ins 1 Aristdnhad Borne bodily infirmity (Si&Twas crwixariKas daOtutias) which qualified him from service; In- was .i kinsman of Dorimachos and . practically (In- chief power was in the hands of Dorimachos. PoL iv. 5. - I 'nl. il. B. Kara, Koivdi/ fitv ovk It6Kixo. irapaKaKt'ii' toi)s Aitw\ovs, k.t.A. nun Kotvr)v tuu AiruiAttij' irpoiSf^aufVai avvoSuv out* tois diroicK-^TOis iru/u/itTa- O'lCTfS, K.T.A. 3 PoL il. s. Kara. tcU a^Twv fyjuds leal Kplcrtis StaAafi.fvTts Sua Me(T(T7]vioii, 'HTTtipuiTais, 'Axaio??, 'AKapvacn, MaKtSi'tri, Tr6Ktnov O^vtyKav. Of COUTS6 rln ioI imply, bn1 excludes, any formal declaration of war hy .Ktolia powci B.O. 220. /ETOLIAN INVASION OF ACHAIA. 509 successor. 1 Still the iEtolians knew 2 that even so slight chap. mi, a change would cause some additional weakness in the invasion Government, and that the holding of the regular Spring p"!^ a Assembly for the election would draw away most of the 'l; 1 '^ 1 J Election. leading men from the defence of their homes. At this moment the /Etolians marched, plundering as they went, through the cantons of Patrai, Pharai, and Dyme. The Aratos Assembly met ; Aratos was elected General for the next B .c. 220- year, but he would not, by Achaian Law, immediately 219 enter upon his office. The Assembly also decreed that help should be sent to Messene, that the existing General should summon the whole military force of the nation in arms, and that the body thus gathered together should be invested with the ordinary powers of the regular Assembly. 3 Timoxenos was unwilling to enter upon any important business, whether civil or military, just before 1 Polybios' (iv. 6) words arc, «V <£ Aonrds rjv Ti/j.o^evif> /.dv dAlyos en xp^os rijs dpxvs, Aparos 5e KaO'iaraTo fj.ev els rbv iviavrbv rbv iiuovra. arpaTqybs virb toov ^Kxo-iwu, ovirco Be e/j.eAAe r^v a.p\T\v i^etu. These words, by them- selves, would most naturally imply that Aratoa was already actually General- Elect. But, directly after (c. 7), tj Kad^Kovaa e/c twv vifxtav crvvoSos — that is, surely, the regular Spring Meeting of the year B.C. 220 — comes together. At this Meeting the injured cantons complain of the iEtolian aggression ; the inroad therefore must have been before the actual day of meeting. After the Meeting, Timoxenos is still actually in office, though Aratos is known to be his successor. "We must therefore infer that Aratos was formally elected at the Meeting mentioned in c. 7, and that the words of Polybios in c. 6, only imply that his election was, before the Meeting, an understood thing, to which no opposition would bo made. He was then, at the time described in c. 6, not General- Elect, but what some people would call General- Designate. So in the American Presidential interregnum there arc two stages. There is first the interval between the election of electors (which practi- cally determines the election of the President) ami the formal election of the President himself ; there is secondly the interval between the formal election of the President, and his actual " Inauguration." 2 That the iEtolians really had an eye to all this, is manifestly implied in the words of Polybios (iv. 6), irapaT^ptjaai'Tts rbv Kaip6v. 3 Pol. iv. 7. See above, p. 275. The small attendance at the regular Meeting may be understood, if no opposition was to lie offered to the election of the General. olO HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. Aratos enters on office before the legal time chap. viii. the end of his term of office. 1 Moreover he distrusted the military efficiency of his countrymen ; their defeats in the early part of the Kleomenic War, and the habit of looking for Macedonian help which had grown upon them during its later years, had greatly relaxed the courage and discipline of the nation. 2 Timoxenos there- fore delayed earning out the resolution of the Assembly. Aratos, on the other hand, seems to have been seized with a sudden fit of military enthusiasm. He who had been the quench-coal to the warlike ardour of Lydiadas and Aristomachos now began to complain of the delays and lack of energy of Timoxenos. 9 He felt sure that nothing effectual could be done till the reins of power were again in his own hands. He at last actually pre- vailed on Timoxenos to give up to him the seal, the badge of the Presidential office, five days before the legal time. 4 Aratos at once issued his summons to the several cities ; 5 the military Assembly met under arms at Megalo- 1 Pol. iv. 7. "Ogov ovttw \i)yov dWorpicus aoi(fs vnt A.Itw\wi/ dviwcdrtpov ixpv T " T, » 5 irpdyficuriv. The d\\oTpt('iri)<; spoken oi directly ,11, i- means hostility to the Jitolians t to Timoxenos. See Lui ite. • Po] a i Bo Plut, Ar 17. See above, p. 299. ■ Pol ,i n r , typmpt— This is the usual formula. DISGRACEFUL CAMPAIGN OF ARATOS. 511 jpolis, and acted in all respects as if it had been the chap. vin. regular Assembly at Aigion. 1 It received Messcnian Military Ambassadors who asked for the admission of their city to ;f f ^ the Grand Alliance. 2 The Achaian Government 3 answered lo l' olis > b.c. 220. that the Achaians could not admit them without the consent of the other members of the Confederacy, but that they would themselves help them on the delivery of hostages to be kept at Sparta. The campaign which Disgrace- followed displayed, on the part of Aratos, something which Iw^f even Polybios can only describe as the height of folly. 4 Aratos - He was not only beaten in the field as usual, but he had the incredible folly to send away the greater part of his army, and to allow himself to be altogether out-generalled. He underwent a defeat at Kaphyai, which was almost as His de- destructive as any which he had undergone at the hands Kaphyai. of Kleomenes. The iEtolians traversed Peloponnesos without opposition, and at last returned home by way of the Isthmus. 8 1 Polybios calls them ir\rj6os (iv. 9) and 6x Aot (iv. 7), just like the regular Assembly. 2 Pol. iv. 9. See above, p. 500. Drumann (p. 464) mistakes this for an application for admission to the Achaian League. For that purpose the word used would have been iroKneia or tTvfj.iro\ireia, not avfj./j.axia. 8 Pol. iv. 9. Ol irpoto-rwTfs rwv 'Axa-'w, that is, the 8v)/juovpyoi. The proposal for the Messenian alliance being contrary to treaty, the Sr]/j.iovp- yoi would not put it to the vote ; but the promise of Achaian help must have required a vote of the Meeting. 4 Pol. iv. 11. Ot Se rwv Axaiwv Tfye/xoves [he tries to veil the real culprit by the plural form] ovtw kf the Macedonian Con- federacy. Also the Isthmus would be in any ease a. strange place to disband, with a Macedonian garrison at Corinth, and the hostile territory of Bceotia to be passed through. 512 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. mi. An Achaian Assembly was held a few days after the Accusation departure of the JEtolians. The national feeling was strong against Aratos. He had displayed unusual zeal for action fence of Aratos in the Assembly Votes of the Achaian he had seized on office prematurely and illegally ; and his haste had led only to greater national ignominy, and to the display of greater military incapacity, than ever. His political adversaries strongly pressed all the disgraceful points of the campaign, in accusations of which Polybios has preserved to us the heads. 1 One would be still more anxious to read the answer of Aratos. For answer he did, and with wonderful effect. Helpless as he had been on the battle-field of Kaphyai, in the parliamentary campaign of Aigion he was irresistible. We gather from Polybios that he denied some of the charges, asked indulgence upon others, and was eloquent about his old exploits. Anyhow he contrived, as he had so often done before, to turn the tide of popular feeling in his own favour. He succeeded in diverting the public indignation from himself to his accusers, and he again found himself directing the counsels of the League with all his old influence. 3 At the same time the Assembly passed a series of decrees for the conduct of the war. 3 The General was to gather a fresh army, and to concert measures with the Governments of Lacedsemou and Messen§ for the common defence against the . Ktolians. Ambassadors were also sent to all the members of the (.rand Alliance, 4 at once asking for help and proposing the admission of Messene into the Confederacy. An .Etolian Assembly was held i PoL iv. II. ; I'd]. U.S. rif/)! tQv i^ijs airavTa ftovKtitaOat Ktnci T-ijv 'A/jotou yvu>fir)i>. Schorn (p. 142) mighl have pared the remark, " Wie anders wiirde Bein i i • i.il]. ii iein, wenn er ein Athener gewesen ware ! " a1 least if it ia meanl aa a Censure upon Athens. Barely Athenian confidence in Nikiaa and Ph&kidn was well nigh e blind aa Achaian confidence in Aratos, » Pol, iv. 15. * See above, p. 199. VOTES OF THE ACHAIANS AND yETOLIANs. 513 about the same time, and it passed a decree which, on first chap.vht. hearing, sounds incredibly strange and contradictory. 1 The and iEtolians, allies of the Achaians, allies of the Messenians, Aasem- voted to keep the peace with the Lacedaemonians, Mes- blies - senians, and everybody else, the Achaians included, unless the Achaians admitted the Messenians into their alliance. This last course they would look upon as a casus belli. Such a decree, in its naked form, seems so preposterous that we cannot help suspecting that there must be some- thing behind, which our Achaiau informants have not told us. The terms of alliance between iEtolia and Messene may well have contained some provision which would be infringed by an alliance between Messene and Achaia. The alliance between iEtolia and Achaia was of course an Probable ii- • i i explana- equal alliance, a partnership on equal terms between two tion of the great Confederations of nearly equal power. As allies on Vote. 11 such terms, iEtolia and Achaia had, in better days, appeared side by side as the defenders of Greece against barbarian inroads. But we may doubt whether an alliance between Relations iEtolia and Messene was an alliance on perfectly equal .Etolia and terms. Messene was not annexed ; it did not become part Messeue - of the iEtolian League ; ~ it retained a perfectly distinct Government of its own. 3 But all this is quite consistent with a state of practical, and even formal, dependence. 1 Pol. iv. 15. Tlpayna itolvtuv aKoyuTarov. Lucas (p. 104) seems to see nothing wonderful in it. 2 The word used to express the connexion between iEtolia and Messene is always avfi/naxla, not J a i o1 ' f 1 Tlv o^TOlJl ^s StKaiuSocrias ITpOKakoiTO Wtpi T<2v ytyuvtiruv r) Kul wff Aia twv fxi\\6fTu i ma or of the hi itoi iau liiin RELATIONS BETWEEN y-ETOLTA AND MESSENE. 515 No mockery could be more bitter than a grave answer that chap. vm. tlie Federal Government of vEtolia was guiltless of inroads on Achaia or Messene ; that, if iEtolian citizens had mis- conducted themselves — say, by plundering Messenian lands or by defeating the Achaian General at Kaphyai — such iEtolian wrong-doers, while on Achaian or Messenian ter- ritory, were subject to Achaian or Messenian law. An iEtolian Assembly, in such a frame of mind, when it heard of the application of Messene to be admitted into the Achaio-Macedonian Alliance, might well vote any such admission to be a breach of friendly relations with iEtolia. In all this there would be not a little solemn and trans- parent hypocrisy. But it is with such solemn and trans- parent hypocrisy that international disputes are most commonly carried on, very seldom with the monstrous and irrational impudence which the words of the iEtolian resolution seem at first sight to imply. The Achaian Embassies to King Philip and to the Achaian Epeirot League were so far successful that both those to ^ Epeiros. lace- powers gave their consent to the admission of Messene ^^j* * into the alliance. 1 But neither Epeiros nor Macedonia as yet sent any succours. All Greece, we are told, was so familiar with the evil deeds of the iEtolians that they did not excite any particular emotion. Both the King and the League refused for the present to declare war. 2 The 1 Pol. iv. 1(5. Oi 8' 'HireipuTai Ka\ QiAiirnos 6 f}afft\evs aKovffavTts rwv u-pecr/SeW rods fxcv Meffffriviovs els rrjy o-vfj.fxax'tav TrposfAa/Zov. That is, they gave their consent to their admission ; they could not admit them of their own act, any more than their Achaians could. Their formal admission would take place at the general Congress of the Confederacy of which we shall presently hear. a Pol. U.S. 'E7r2 S« rols vtto r&v AlrwAoSv ■KeirpayLievots irapavrlKa fifv riyav. vin. iEtolians therefore continued their career of iniquity. iEtolian They procured Skerdilaidos the Illyrian and Demetrios of incursions .„, . _ '. , in Pelo- .Pharos to ravage the coasts ot Peloponnesos, while three ponnesos. _^olian leaders, Dorimachos, Skopas, and Agelaos, 1 pressed on into the heart of the peninsula. They carried with them iEtolian troops in vast numbers ; it was in fact an invasion of Achaia by the whole force of iEtolia. 2 Still there was no avowed national action ; all was the private piracy of particular ^Etolian chiefs ; it was Agelaos who, of his own authority, made an alliance with Skerdilaidos ; it was Dorimachos who, of his own authority, besieged and insincerity sacked a city of the Achaian League. The ^Etolian Jltolian Government knew nothing about it ; the iEtolian Pre- Govem- sicleiit sat still at home, wondering what all his countrv- ment. ° ^ men were gone after, and professing that he at least had no war with Achaia, but was at peace with all the Avorld. 3 Polybios argues that such conduct was extremely foolish ; 4 so it doubtless was on the principle that honesty is the best policy ; but it really was little more than a stronger case than usual of an attempt to throw dust into men's eyes by diplomatic insincerity. Meanwhile Dorimachos pressed on. He was invited by a party 5 in Kynaitha, that i This seems to he the same Agelaos of Naupaktos whom wo shall after' wards find acting in it moro honourable character. " l'ol. iv. ]0. 'S.vvadpoiiravTfs irav57j/uel roi/s AlrwAovs ivf&aXov tls rrjv ' Ax bob r l'i ieden gegen die axheer bielten. " * II). KuijOis icai iraib'iKdv irpuy/xa iroiwy. l'i. nparro/xtyris outo?? Trjs rwi> KvvcuQiwv iroKtUS, It is clear however from the narrative which follows that the AStolian faction was only a ■ tnall party in the city. CAPTURE AND SACK OF KYNAITHA. 517 turbulent Arkadian city whose internal dissensions have chap. vm. been already mentioned. 1 We left Kynaitha an Achaian Affairs of city, occupied by a Federal garrison. The ruling party were well affected to the present state of things, and the exiles professed anxiety to return home and dwell peace- ably as citizens of the Achaian League. With the consent of the Federal Government," the exiles were readmitted. At the same time the Federal garrison was withdrawn ; it had been a necessary precaution in days of dissension ; it was no longer needed now that Kynaitha was again an united commonwealth. Some of the exiles were leading Return citizens, who had in former times held the office ofnaithaian Polemarch. 3 The reconciliation was in appearance so Exiles - perfect that the exiled Polemarchs were restored to their office. But the confidence both of the Kynaithaians and of the Federal Government was infamously abused. The Kynaitha Id 6 1 rayed. office of Polemarch involved the care of the city-gates ; to Dori- the restored Polemarchs slew their colleagues, and opened mac the gates to Dorimachos. They gained little by their Horrible perfidy ; the iEtolians plundered, slew, and even tortured 4 Kynaitha all parties without distinction ; they then offered the town Julians, to their Eleian friends, who prudently declined it ; next, they left it in the hands of an JEtolian garrison ; finally, on hearing of the approach of Macedonian succours, the 1 See above, p. 403. 2 Pol. iv. 17. Oj Kare'xoi'Tes tt}i/ ir6\iv iirpferflevov [on this word see above, p. 448] irpds rd rwv 'Axaiuv e9vos, &ov\6/j.evoi /xerd T-rjs ckuvwv yvdfxvis noieTaOai ras SiaAvcreis. iirtx^pVO'dvTwv 5' kroifxois Sid rd ireireioQat crcpicriv a.jx*h, note 1. Q Pol iv. 16. Oi AaxtSainovtoi, 7rposaT&>s /xif ^\fvO(pu>/j.tvot 8' 'Avriy6vov xa'i 8tTtp.las, dfyilKovTis 5< MaictSdvi /iAlmr fxr\Kv virtvavrlap WpdrrttV. He repeats I he words TrpostpaTws rfKfudtpuifAtvoi Sf 'AtTiy6vov in c. 22, and in the same chapter, in the Bpeoch of A.dei- in nit" , w i read "I roil Ma.Ktfi6i>a! (Vipyiras Hal auiTij/ios. AFFAIRS OF SPARTA. Ml) every step on her part contrary to Achaian or Macedonian ohap.tiii. interests was a sin of the blackest ingratitude. Since the departure of Kleomenes, the throne had been carefully kept vacant, 1 a fact which may surely be taken as implying that Sparta still looked upon him as her lawful King. Kleomenes was not a Harold or a Sebastian, living only in the fond imagination of a heart-sick people ; the hero of Sparta still lived, dwelling indeed in the house of bondage, but not without hope of being one day restored to his home and kingdom. 2 The government was in the hands of a College of Ephors, whose opinions are described as being divided, three favouring the iEtolians and two favouring the Allies. 3 The iEtolian party was also the Kleomenic party, not assuredly out of any love towards iEtolia for her own sake, but because iEtolia represented oppo- sition to Philip and the Achaians. In this divided state of things, troops were sent to support Aratos in his unlucky campaign, but Polybios implies that there was no real intention of giving the Achaians any effective help, 4 and he even goes so far as to charge the Lacedaemonians — that is, doubtless, the majority among the Ephors — with con- cluding a secret treaty with the JEtolians. 6 More violent Diaturl - measures now followed ; Adeimantos, one of the philipp- splrta* izing Ephors, was murdered, together with some citizens of his party, with the connivance — so our Achaian histo- rian tells us — of his colleagues of the other party. Other SPO! 1 Pol. iv. 22, 35. The later passage is more emphatic ; noXirfvo/j. KO.T& rd Trarpia. ffx&bv ijSr) TpeTs eviavrovs fxird Trjv KKeo/iUvovs eKWTwaiu, ovtf iirev6r}ffav ouSerrore /3c«nAe(s Karafrrrjaai ttjs ^TtJpr^s. A strange turn is given to the fact by Pausaniaa (ii. it. 3); Aa/ce8e5pwv Kal dtaipwv /xaWov fj orv/.i/.idxw exorres rd^iy. Sq C. 19, aroxa^u^tfoi tov SoKfTy txlvov. 5 lb. 16. Ml.. 22. 520 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. < H.U\ A'lII, Philip sits in judge- ment on the Spartan parties at Tegea, citizens of Macedonian politics fled to Philip, who gave audience at Tegea both to them and to an Embassy from the dc facto Government. 1 The envoys affirmed that the persons who had been killed had been the real cause of the disturbance, and they professed their own full in- tention to discharge towards the King every obligation of faithful allies. 2 The debate which followed is well worthy of attention. It sets Philip before us in a light personally honourable, but it shows how effectually Aratos had done his evil work. The Macedonian King sits in one Greek city to decide the fate of another. That it rests with him to preserve or to destroy Sparta no one seems to doubt. Everything is made to depend on the King's personal sense of justice and expediency; wc as yet see only Philip sober and are not introduced to Philip drunk, but Ave see that, drunk or sober, Philip is equally master of Peloponnesos. There were not wanting coun- sellors who exhorted him to make an example of Sparta, such as his great predecessor had made of Thebes. No reasonable man could doubt that those now in poAver at Sparta Avcre wholly in the interest of iEtolia, and that the victims of the late disturbance had perished solely on account of their attachment to Macedonia. Sparta had once been spared; she had abused the mercy of Antigonos; her day of grace Avas now past, and her destruction would be only an act of exemplary justice. Hut the counsels which finally prevailed with the young King were of a milder kind. According to Polybios, Aratos was their inspiring spirit. 8 This we may Well believe, but we may also well believe that Philip, young and as yet uncorrupted, was himself ' I'm], iv. '_!!{. Oi -npotcrTWTts rwv Aa.K(5aifj.oi>lwi> : a formula applied to the Spartan Epho to tin- A.chaian 8r)/j.iovpyol. II' Uuiia V vntaxvovvroa iroirjfftlV adrol ri\lmr(f) rd Hard T7)f . few, "'• - I ■ ABATOR DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION. 521 disposed to take the more generous part. 1 Aratos, save chap.vih. in that one terrible year of Secession, had never been a man of blood or an advocate of violent measures. We Declara- may fairly ascribe to him the answer which was finally phfflpin given by the King, one which forestalls some principles of £ lvuur of t x L feparta. international right which modern diplomatists are only just beginning to understand. As such, it does him the highest honour. But one cannot help wishing that it had been dictated by him in the Assembly at Aigion, as a free President of the Achaian League, rather than suggested in Philip's council-chamber at Tegea in his new character of Macedonian Minister for Foreign Affairs. King Philip was made to answer that the Laceda3monian Government had been guilty of no crime against the common Alliance ; that he accepted their professions of faithfulness to it, and exhorted them to continue in the same mind ; that the internal crimes and revolutions of any allied city were matters which did not come under his cognizance, so long as the city itself adhered to its public obligations. He Aratos' might exhort and recommend as an ally, but he was ]l? erdl ~ J ' views oi entitled to go no further, except when the common alii- ri J ter " ance was violated, and then only in concert with all the right. other allies. 2 Sounder doctrines were never put forth in any age ; pity that their accomplishment depended solely on the will of a youth, of precocious talents indeed, and who had as yet given no sigfhs of any but generous dispo- sitions, but who was in danger, as the event proved, of i So Bishop Thirhvall (viii. 243), " Thilip was of the age to winch popularity is most attractive, and a liberal sentiment most congenial." 2 Pol. iv. 24. 'O y&p fyiKnrnos t<£ fiey tear IS'iau tQv crvn/j.dxui' els avrovs dSiK-ofiaTa Ka,dt]Keiv t7j fxova. SeiV Koivfjs iirLffTpcxprjs Kal fiwpdciffetos rvyx&vtiv into ttolvtoiv. Philip and Aratos here keep the just mean between meddling interference in the affairs of foreign countries and the ostentatious -election of great public criminals as special objects of personal honour. 522 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. viii. being led astray by the corrupting influence of unrestrained power, and by the advice and example of some of the worst counsellors with whom any prince was ever cursed. Congress Meanwhile the deputies of the Allies were assembling U.'r' 1111111 ' at Corinth. King Philip presided at the Congress; each a € reed member of the Confederacy set forth its own wrongs, and b.c. 220, war waB agreed upon by common consent. Juster grounds for war no state ever had ; every one of the allied powers had wrongs to complain of, any one of which would be looked upon by the most peacefully disposed modern nation as supplying abundant reason for appealing to arms. Achaia, Epeiros, Phokis, Akarnania, Boeotia, each had to tell of some territory ravaged, some venerated temple despoiled ; Philip himself had as good a grievance as any ; a Macedonian ship had been seized by iEtoliau pirates, and the crew sold into slavery. 1 The decree passed Opening by the Congress was worthy of the occasion. The Allies sUIal agreed to recover whatever territory any of them had been jy u: deprived of by the enemy since the death of King Deme- "i the trios; to set free all cities which had been joined to the of°Connth. iEtolian League against their will;'" and to restore to the Amphiktyons their lawful authority over the Delphian 1 PoL iv. fi. Ueipards 4£tTr*iJ.s l-m^dras, . X\apair\t)(rlo>s 5* Ka\ rods iim) rwv Kaipwv ^vayKan-fievovs dKovtrlws p.erlx fiv T *) s hlroi\wv (Tv/unroXirfLas, Sri itdvras ruvrovs diTDKaracrr^irovmv til rd irdrpia ■Kokirevfxara, x^l' av fx°*' Tas ' Ka ' ™>*-eis rds avrwv, de8pot irapaxpypa. npea^evTas i£aireTOS tov Soy/xaros (Kcpepoiffi iravTss tois aItwKoIs -rhv dird ttjs x<*P as ToKe/xov. 2 lb. 'ATr4 [of twv AItwXwv dpxovres] ypa^fxarocpopov SiacTCHpovvTes oJs ov tivvavrai irpd ttjs t&v AItu>\wv crvv65ov Si avTwv ovBky vnep -rwv OXOIV OlKOVO/Af'tV. 3 lb. 27. 4 lb. 26. npos€\66uros irp6s ti)i/ $ovKr\v. Did he not address tlio Assembly also ? Or was this one of those Meetings where few but Senators attended ? See above, p. 307. 524 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. yiii. He made, as he deserved, a favourable impression, and all the honours voted to his predecessor were renewed to him. The Assembly unanimously ratified the decree, and pro- claimed general licence of reprisals against iEtolia. 1 Philip then returned to Macedonia, to spend the winter in preparations for the campaign of the next year, leaving behind him in Greece the best possible expectations from Behaviour his reign. 2 Macedonia and Achaia, the two most important members of the Alliance, were thus zealous in the com- Akar- mon cause. Akarnania too, though the most exposed of nama ' all to .Etolian ravages, gave in her adhesion faithfully and without reserve. 3 But the Ambassadors from the Congress Epeiros, were not equally successful everywhere. The Epeirot League played a double part. The Federal Assembly ratified the decree, and voted to begin hostilities as soon as Philip himself should begin them. But at the same time they assured — secretly, we must suppose — some yEtolian Ambassadors who were present, that it was their full purpose to remain at peace. Of the Boeotian and Phokiau Leagues we hear nothing. It has been aptly remarked that what remained of independent Phokis was actually surrounded by the .Etolian conquests, and that the Boeotians, like the Thessalians, were too dependent on Macedonia to have a real voice in the matter. 1 At Mess.'nc, though it was really in defence of Mcssenian 1 I '(.I. iv. 'j I. TiuvaxOtvTos Si tov tt\^0ovs irapfXOdv 6 Max«Tay irap(Ka.\tt Stot TThii6i>uiv avroiis alpticrGai Trjv irpds Airu\oi)s (rvfufxaxlav, fiKtj /J-iv Kal Opatrtccs KO.Trryop£v MaKtS6i/wy, a\6ya>s 5* Kal ij/ei/5a>l iyKUfiid^wv roils AiTaiAom. - Bee above, p. 8 :t The temple "I A.thdne' of t Lo Brazen House (XafjcloiKot), famous in tlio history of the Regent Pausanias, See Thuc: i. 128, l" I ALLIANCE BETWEEN SPARTA AND /ETOLIA. 531 precedent, were chosen, Agesipolis and Lykourgos. Age- chap. vm. sipolis was the lawful heir of the Agid Kings, and, as Agesipolis he was a child, he was placed under the guardianship i!!!|, ro / of an uncle who bore the auspicious name of Kleomenes. '! 1 ." SI '" L Kings. The other royal house was not extinct ; but Kleomenes had passed it by when he took his own brother Eukleidas for his colleague. The second throne was therefore filled by election ; — Polybios says by bribery, and adds that Lykourgos was no Herakleid by birth, but became one by paying a talent to each of the new Ephors. 1 On Second hearing of this revolution, Machatas gladly returned to Magnates. Sparta, and exhorted the Ephors and Kings, now the ?P art * c L ° ' joins the allies of /Etolia, at once to declare war on the Achaians. -Etoiiau According to our Achaian informants, Lykourgos first and begins made incursions into Argolis, took some towns and failed ^nak ' before others, and then, and not before, the Lacedae- monians publicly proclaimed licence of reprisals against the Achaian League. 2 The Social War now fairly began. On the one side was Beginning the whole Macedonian Alliance ; for Epeiros joined with Social some zeal as soon as the war actually began, and Messene ^ ar » _ J & ' B.C. 219. joined also as soon as its course had removed the bugbear of Phigaleia. On the other side was the iEtolian League, with Elis and Lacedaembn as its Peloponnesian allies. The war lasted between two and three years, and many Character of its military details are highly interesting, those espe-° va j. ie cially which illustrate the extraordinary and precocious genius of the young King of Macedonia. His quick and Virtues enterprising spirit, his rapid marches, his winter cam- tary skill paigns, no less than his as yet generous and conciliatory Plnh r demeanour, all marked him as a worthy successor of the 1 Pol. iv. 35. *Os Sovs eKci(TT(i> rwv e(p6poov raKavrov 'HpaKAeovs diriyovo's Ka\ /3acr(A€i)s iyey6vet ryjs SirapTTj?. 2 lb. 36. M M 2 532 HISTOEY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vin. Great Alexander, and make us the more deplore the fall which followed upon such a beginning. The daring and successful generalship of the young prince seems to have taken his contemporaries by surprise, much as the disciples of German military routine were taken by surprise at the irregular victories of the first Buona- parte. 1 And this glory at least was wholly his own ; Aratos may have prompted many of his just and con- ciliatory actions, but it was certainly not in the school of Aratos that Philip learned the art of war. But this very aspect of the Social War gives it a less attractive character in the eyes of a historian of Federalism or of Greek freedom in any shape. We cannot dwell on it with the same interest as on the parliamentary strife between Aratos and Lydiadas, or on the diplomatic and military strife between Aratos and Kleomenes. The foremost figure of the picture is no longer a Greek citizen, but Para- a Macedonian King. Greece has lost botli her heroes ; portance ^ ier practised and wily diplomatist survives, but he lias of Philip. 8im t f rom the President of a free people into the Minister of a foreign sovereign. Philip is palpably the master; he is not as yet an unjust or an ungenerous master, Ixit he is a master still. He acts as Commander-in-chief of the whole Alliance; he dispatches orders totheAchaian cities," which, five years before, they would have received from none but the General of their own choice. The General himself becomes little more than his Vice-gerent, and receives orders from him as from his superior/' On one occasion Aratos himself, the deliverer of Sikyon, the father of Pcloponnesian freedom, had to stand as some- thing like an accused criminal before the throne of his master.' He was indeed honourably acquitted, but that 1 Sim- Hacaulsy' I •■■ (Moare't Life of Byron), \<. 146, l vol. Ed. on Philip's campaigns see PoL iv. 67. Finlay's Greek Revolution, i. \'■*■ YworTTiiuriiyos Turn 'Ax<*"*'' SONDERBUND OF THE WESTERN CANTONS. 535 in dread. The three cities sent pressing messages 1 to the oeap.vhi. Federal General, asking for help. But he was not in any position to help them. Aehaian military affairs were, at that moment, at a very low ebb. We have seen how much the military spirit of the national troops had decayed, and the League had just now great difficulty in obtaining the services of mercenaries. Large arrears of pay were -till owing to those who had served in the war with Kleo- mencs ; and, under these circumstances, few were disposed to enlist under such bad paymasters. Thus deserted by the Federal authorities, the three States most in danger set up a sort of Sondcrhund of their own. They were "Sonder- among the oldest members of the League. It was the the three union of Dyme with Patrai which had been the first step ^^f™ towards its reconstruction, 2 and all three were among the four whose union had formed the nucleus of the revived Federation. Perhaps they may have felt themselves specially aggrieved, when the Sikvonian strangers whom thev had allowed to become their citizens and their Presidents either could not or would not help them in their need. They did not secede ; they did not proclaim a new Confedera- tion or a new President ; but they did agree to refuse for 1 Pol. iv. 60. To fxev irpwrov (Trefiirov ayy€\ovs irpos tov (TTparriyuv twv , Axa"5' / , St]\ovvt€S rd ytyovOTCt Kal Seo/xevoi cr [iefiovAedffdcu, irtpi Se twv koivwv rdvavTia' Trovrjpas ydp t\ tax payers, in any state. Federal or otll'TU i Brandstatei (p. 860) goes further still; " \)rr Geschichtschreiber erei- aich gegens diesen Elntschluss der drei Stadte mil dem grossten i oreohte, in dem er nur den Vortheil des Bnndes im iuge bat." Wha1 else should he have in viem I This is the doctrine of Secession with a v i Dgi ance. ■• They would almosl be justified by the provision in the American Con- stitution (Art. i. | 1". 2) which forbidsany State to keep troops i in war, unit i actually invaded, &c. Bu1 the i i artdole speciallj forbids any State to enter into anj agreemenl or compaoi with any other State, Neither Ameriei Achaian foresight provided for the particular gricvanci of which these cities complained, namely thai of an incapable i utivi presiding ovei a bankrupl Treasury, LOSS AND RECOVERY OF AIGEIRA. •"'•>/" these very cities 1 was chosen President of the Union, chap. vm. and, soon after that, the /Etolians were expelled from their post by King Philip, and the fort restored to the Dymaians. 8 The choice of a Pharaian General, while it was probably an act of special concession to these cities, shows that they were not looked upon as rebellions or suspicions members. The Western Sonderbnnd, if it is ever mentioned again, is mentioned only in one very obscure passage, 3 and then not in a way which implies that it was looked upon as a hostile or unconstitutional body. Among the military exploits of this year the most inter- Loss and esting, from our point of view, is one in which we find an f Aigeira. Achaian city really acting for itself, and not begging for Macedonian, or even for Federal, help. The main body of the /Etolians, 4 under three of their chief leaders, Dori- machos himself being one, fell upon the Old-Achaian town of Aigcira, the defences of which seem to have been strangely neglected. The enemy were admitted in the night by a deserter, 5 and, while in the full swing of mas- sacre, they were attacked and driven out by the people of Aigeira themselves. This reminds one of Aratos' old exploit at Pellene, 6 only the people of Aigeira had not wilfully allowed the enemy to occupy their city. Two of the iEtolian leaders, Alexander and Archidamos, were killed ; Dorimachos escaped, and his reputation among Dori- machos his countrymen does not seem to have been permanently ^tolian damaged, for at the next election he succeeded his friend B0 2 19- Skopas as General of the iEtolian League. 7 Skopas had 218 - distinguished his year of office by an inroad into Mace- 1 Eperatos of Pharai. Pol. iv. 82. 2 lb. 83. 3 lb. v. 94. See above, p. 281 . 4 lb. iv. 57. To Tr\rj9os rwv KlrwKwv. 5 An iEtolian, who bad deserted to the Achaians, and who now sought to win his pardon at home by this double treason. Pol. iv. 57. 6 See above, p. 394. <~ Pol. iv. 67. 538 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. VIII Sacrilege of the -Et'ilians at Dion and Dodona. Psophis annexed to the Adiaian League. Philip's conquests of l'l,i- galeia and Triphj lia. donia and a barbarous devastation of the Macedonian sanctuary of Dion. 1 Dorimachos began his year by a still more flagrant breach of all Hellenic religion, the destruc- tion of the venerated temple of Zeus at Dodona. 2 Philip's brilliant campaign in Peloponnesos is chiefly interesting to us, because, on the surrender of the once Arkadian, but now Eleian, town of Psophis, he made it over, with many expressions of good will, 3 to his Achaian allies. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must suppose that Psophis, like other Achaian acquisitions, was admitted as a member of the League, with a vote in the Achaian Assembly. But, as in other cases where strategic position or doubtful loyalty required the precaution, both the citadel and the town were secured by the presence of Federal garrisons. 4 Psophis was, as Philip took care to inform his friends, a valuable gift. 5 An Achaian garrison there would do something to cover the exposed canton of Tritaia, and to hinder any more ^Etolian visits to that of K\ naitha. But it does not appear that Philip now made over to the League any of the other cities which he took in Triphylia and the Eleian territory. Phigaleia itself, the cause of the war, soon after the cession of Psophis, dis- satisfied with the .Etolian connexion, gladly surrendered to Philip. 7 Apparently he kept this important position in his own hands. In short, between Corinth, Orchomenos, 1 PoL iv. 62. - lb. 67. 3 lb. 72. 'AneXoyicraTo 5e /cat ti)v a'iptaw Kai r-ffv tSvoiav -?)v t^ei irpos Tl) tdfOS. 1 This was .I. mi- by authority of such of the 'Axafcol &px 0VTfS (Pol. u.8. ) as were present. The word would properly mean tin- S^fxtovpyoi, bu1 I do no1 remember another instance of their interfering in purely military affau . PoL U. . Trju ri^KpuTTjTa Ka\ t^v (VKaipiav tntSt'tKyvt rijs irtiAfuiy irpis ruv iftaTwra ir6\tp.ov. 5 The Triphylian towns remained Macedonian till b.o. 208, perhaps till b.( 198 Bee Livy, ucviii 8, Cf. sxxiii. 84. Pol i- 79, RELATIONS BETWEEN PHILIP AND THE LEAGUE. 539 and the Triphylian towns, the League was pretty well chap. vm. hemmed in by outlying Macedonian possessions. In all this there is nothing for which Philip can reasonably be blamed ; but who had caused the presence in Pelopon- nesos of Kings or of Macedonians at all ? It is also during the presidential year of the younger b.o. 219 218 Aratos that we conic across the beginnings of a remarkable story, which forms the best illustration of the unhappy policy of his father. We have seen that the alliance between Achaia, Macedonia, and the other allies was, in name at least, an equal alliance. The King of Macedonia Relations seems, as a matter of course, to have been accepted as Philip Commander-in-chief of the whole Confederacy, but, what" League ever might be his practical powers, whatever might be the final results of so dangerous a partnership, nothing had yet been done which formally violated the independence of the League. The King of Macedonia might recommend, and it might be imprudent to neglect his recommenda- tions ; still the Achaian Assembly really discussed and voted upon them ; the Achaian General was still the independent chief of an allied army, not merely the officer in command of a Macedonian division. The prudence, perhaps the generosity, of Antigonos had respected con- stitutional forms ; the lord of Corinth knew that his friendship or enmity was of vital moment to the League, and that any direct interference with its liberties would not repay the cost and the shame of the undertaking. Philip was young ; the evil that was in him had. not yet „ , . x _ ^ ° J Relations shown itself; he had accepted Aratos as his chief conn- between sellor. The Sikyonian, with all his faults, was not a wilful and traitor ; he had no pleasure in undoing his own glorious Aiatos - work ; he had no temptation to sacrifice the dignity or the interest of his country, now that there was no Kleomencs to awaken national and personal rivalry. He had brought his country into what was practically a rotate of bondage. 540 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. A-III I tissatis- faction Of till! Mace- donia!] courtiers. but he at least did what he could to lessen the bitterness of that bondage. As the adviser of the young King, he preached strict observance of justice and mercy, strict fidelity to treaties, strict respect for the rights of the Achaian League, and of every other power, allied or hostile. There were no more Tyrants whom it was lawful to get rid of at all hazards, and, when dealing with Com- monwealths or with lawful Kings, Aratos was as sensible as any man of the obligations of International Law. There was nothing galling in all this either to the mature pru- dence of Antigonos or to the youthful generosity of Philip. But to some of the Macedonian courtiers such a state of things was eminently unpleasing. In their eyes the Macedonians were the natural masters of the world ; at all events they were the natural masters of Greece ; they had not come all this way to spend their blood and toil and treasure, merely as the equal allies of a cluster of petty republics. The Achaian League was, after all, little more than an association of rebels against the Macedonian Crown ; the restoration of Corinth had only put that Crown into possession of a part ofjts just rights; no satisfaction had been made for the original insult and injury of its capture, or for all the other sins of the League and its chief against the dignity of Macedon. It was unworthy of the successor of Alexander to act on terms of equality with republican Greeks; if the Achaians wished I'm- Macedonian help, let them become Macedonian BUbjectS. Tliev might keep their constitutional forms, if they pleased ; they might amuse themselves by electing a General and meeting in a Federal Assembly. The Thessalians did something of the kind ; they too fancied themselves a republic, and piqued themselves on their rc- publican freedom. 1 But they were practically Macedonian 1 Pol, IV. 76. WiwKrjdtU ti) rwv 'Axaioii' tOvoi dyayt if €i 1 1 subjects all the same. The Achaians must be reduced to chap.viil the same level. No one had thought of consulting a Thessalian Assembly as to any wrongs which Thessaly might have suffered from the /Etolians, nor must the King of Macedon be any longer exposed to the indignity of consulting an Aehaian Assembly either. The Thessa- lians obeyed the royal will without dispute or examina- tion, and the Achaians must learn to do the like. Such thoughts, we may be sure, passed through the mind of many a Macedonian courtier and captain, beside him to whom the historian directly attributes the scheme for upsetting the liberties of Achaia. This was Apelles, one of Plots of the great officers whom Antigonos had left as guardians of J^ft the young King, and who naturally had great influence t li: ,' i:m . T . . J to freedom. with him. With the view of breaking in the Achaians to slavery, he began to encourage the Macedonian soldiers to insult and defraud their Aehaian comrades in all pos- sible ways. Meanwhile he himself constantly inflicted cor- His ill- poral punishment on Aehaian soldiers for the slightest JjljJjJ 1611 * faults, and sent to prison any one who ventured to inter- Aehaian fere. The free citizens of the Aehaian towns had not been used to this kind of treatment, either at the hands of their own Generals or at those of Philip's predecessor. We hear of no public remonstrance on the part of the League or of its President ; but a party of young Achaians laid their wrongs before the elder Aratos, and the elder Aratos, in his private capacity as Philip's adviser, laid the Ttveiv kuI iroKv Siacpepfiv McuceSovwi/, Sutyepuv 8' ovSev, d\\d irdv o/xoicos iwaaxov MaKeSoai ical irav eiroiovv t6 irposrarr6ixevov rots @a rd re Kara Q(Tra\iav ko.\ MaKeSovlav /col s avrnvoXirtvoixivavs rots irtpl rdf "Aparov, rlvts tlfflv, ticdffrovs Ik tQv ■no'Ktu>v ttrt enrdrraro, Ka\ Ka^dvoov (Is rets x e V a9 tyvxayoiyti Kal iraptKahti irpiis tt)^ iavrov (pi\lat>, i(TTai>( 8« Kal T QtAiirncp, ■Kposemb'tiKVvaiv avT

XprfntTat rots 'AxaioTs kotA rrjv iyypaitTov (Tn^fxax'iav, lav 8' avrtp TrtiOrfrai Kal toiovtovs irposKau^avri (fAKovs, xP'^' T(rai *■**' U(\onovvrj(Tiots ko.t& tt)v aJrof Pov\t](tw. Were these opponents of Aratos — »J ivavrla a-rdats, as Plutarch (At. 48) calls them remnants of the oligarchic or tyrannical faction which appeared al Bikydn and elsewhere during the Kleomenic Wo ! PHILIP INTErvFERES WITH THE AC'HATAN ELECTION. ;">43 induce him to appear at the Spring Meeting of the chap, viil Federal Congress at Aigion, and to give his countenance Philip's to the party opposed to Aratos. This was not Philip's ferencea first appearance before an Achai an Assembly ; but hitherto ^'i' 1 ., J ',',', he had only appeared, as personal sovereign of Macedonia, Election, to discuss matters of common interest with the many- b.c. 218. headed sovereign of Achaia. To this there could be no more objection than to the appearance of a Macedonian Ambassador for the same purpose ; it was a sign both of earnestness and of ability on the part of Philip, and the members of the Assembly were probably gratified at the opportunity of talking with their royal ally face to face. But it was another matter when the King of Macedonia appeared at the Meeting which was held for the purely domestic purpose of electing the Federal Magistrates. This seems to have been felt ; and a rather lame excuse was made about the King being on his road through Aigion on his way to a campaign in Elis. 1 Apelles him- self was less scrupulous ; he busied himself about the election 2 with all the zeal of a native partisan. For some reason which is not mentioned, the elder Aratos did not appear this time, according to custom, as a candidate to succeed his son. His interest was given to Timoxenos, 3 who had already twice held the seal of the League. He was an old partisan, and he had by this time apparently forgiven whatever wrong Aratos had done him two years before. When the Congress came to vote, Timoxenos was 1 Pol. iv. 82. Ueldei $i\iirirov irapayeveaQai irp6s rds twv 'Axa«2j/ dpxai- pealas els Prfywv cos els tt)v 'H\elai> a/xa noLoufxevoy tt\v iropelav. 2 lb. Tlepl tQv dpxcupeaiuv evdiis eTt xp<*>P-*vos. Ar. 10), looking on Timoxenos as an opponent of Aratos, because of their dispute in B.C. 220. But surely this is making too much of a mere passing quarrel. 544 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vni. unsuccessful, there being a small majority 1 in favour of General- Eperatos of Pharai. This is attributed by Polybios wholly K]. 1 mtos. to the intrigues of Apelles, but it must be remembered !; r 218 ~ that Eperatos was a citizen of one of those Cantons which the neglect of the younger Aratos had driven to the un- constitutional foundation of the Sonderbund. 2 There can be little doubt that a wish to regain the confidence of the three western cities had something to do with the choice made by the Assembly on this occasion. These two views are in no way inconsistent Avith each other. Apelles, in influencing Achaian politicians, must have ap- Connexion pealed to sonic Achaian political feeling. He could hardly choice have practised bribery on so gigantic a scale as to secure with the | r ^] m £ means a majority of votes in a majority of the events ot J ° ^ . ' the pre- cities. If he had some hired partisans, neither he nor ,, they could well attack Aratos avowedly because he was the friend of Achaian freedom. But the neglect of the Western Cantons by the outgoing General would form an admirable cry for a dissatisfied party. A certain amount of genuine and reasonable discontent would doubtless exist, which Apelles and his creatures would turn to their own purposes. We can thus see also why Aratos did not stand himself, but put forward Timoxeuos as his candidate. The administration of the two Aratos', father and son, had, for two successive years, brought nothing but disgrace on b.o, 221- the League. But tin- Generalship of Timoxeuos, three years earlier, had witnessed some little success in the form of the recovery of Klarion, 8 and he had appeared as an advocate of prudence during Aratos' momentary tit of rash- ness. 4 Altogether we can understand that Timoxeuos was, just now, a bettet card for his party to play than Aratos himself It was probably on the question of relief to the 1 PoL iv. :'>2. Mu'Aiv ntv ■fji'VfTt, KartKpa.7 inert 5' ovv 8/iaxr. :;;. I P. :• ' P. 510. 220. ELECTION OF EPERATOS. o4."> western cities that the division ostensibly turned, and we chat. Yin. may believe that the majority of the Assembly, ignorant of the intrigues of Apelles, honestly meant the election of Eperatos to be a deserved vote of censure on those who had neglected them. It falls in with this view that, Philip immediately after the election, Philip marched to recover Teichos. the fort of Teichos in the Dymaian territory. 1 It was small, but strongly fortified ; 2 but its defenders were Eleians and not /Etolians. They at once surrendered to the King, who gave over the fortress to its lawful owners, and then proceeded to lay waste the territory of Elis. The cause which had led to the discontent of the Western Cantons was now effectually removed. Apelles was naturally elated at his success. He had, Further as he thought, effectually poisoned the royal mind, and Apelles. he had seen an Achaian President chosen at his own nomination/ He now made another attack on whatever influence Aratos may still have retained over the mind of Philip. He now charged him with treason to the Grand Alliance. Philip had, among other Eleian prisoners, cap- tured Amphidamos, the General of the Eleian common- Affair of wealth. 4 He dismissed him without ransom, and employed damos. him as a messenger to invite his countrymen to exchange the iEtolian for the Macedonian alliance, promising in such case to respect their liberties and constitution.' J See above, p. 534. a Pol. iv. 83. Xooplou ov fitya y.\v rfacpaKur/J-evov 8e SiacptpSvTiiss. 3 lb. 84. Aokccv rfvvKevui ti ttjs Trpodeaews ri 8j' aurov KaQetnacrdai rdv twv 'Axaicoi' ffTpar-qyov. * lb. 'O t£v 'HXelwv a-rpa.Tr)-y6s. This need not necessarily imply that this General was the chief magistrate of Elis, and in earlier times the Eleian magistrates bore other titles. See Tittmann, p. 366. Still it is not unlikely that the Eleians, though their constitution was not Federal, may now have so far imitated the practice of other Greek states as to place a single General at the head of their commonwealth. 5 lb. Ai)toi)s 4\iv9fpovs, & JJtolia. They were probably a common formula for such occasions, 1 Pol i\. 84 Atytiv Sti Kar ovStva rp6rrov crvfxi\tmrov 'HKtltcv Kvpiov. a Hi. 85. To fxtv olv -rrpiZrof +(Aiir7roj Sf^dfxtvoi toi>9 \6yovs Ka\(7u *K(\(ui roils TTf)>'. ti)i' "Aparou Ka) Kiyfiv Ivai'rlov iKilvusv ravra -rbv 'AirfKKijs. The ol irtpl sci ln tn include both fatheT and son, i'>>r directly after 6 -npta- flvTfpOf 'Aparai BpOaJCS. ACCUSATION OF ARATOS BEFORE PHILIP. 547 moment was to ask Philip not to condemn him on the ohap. vxxi. mere assertion of Apelles, but to searcli into the truth by every possible means before he laid any such charge before the Assembly. Philip had justice and candour enough to suspend his judgement ; Apelles could bring forward no evidence to support his charge, while Aratos was soon able to bring forward a most convincing witness to his innocence. This was no other than Ainphidamos himself, who, at this opportune moment, took refuge with Philip at Dyme. The King now fully restored Aratos Aratos to his favour and confidence, and began to look with Philip's equal displeasure on Apelles. It was about the same Q time that the Achaians gave the King a signal proof of the influence which their old chief still retained over their minds. Unless Apelles wished, as he probably did, merely to weaken the League by giving it an incompetent head, the election of Eperatos had proved a mistake. The Pharaian President was a man of no skill or daring in the field, and of no weight in the Assembly. 1 A special Influence Meeting had been called by the Achaian Government by Aratos at Philip's request, 2 in which the King appeared and asked 1 " ( ,{ 1 ^ an for supplies. The wishes of Eperatos had no influence, Assembly, 1F r B.C. 218. and Aratos and his party, if they did not openly oppose, did not at all support Philip's request. 3 In such a state of things no supplies were granted. Philip now perceived tho importance of the friendship of Aratos. The Assembly 1 Pol. v. 1. Tdf 8' 'Eirtf parol/ 6,irpo.Krov ovra rfj s 'Axaioiis Sid t<2v dpxdvTwv ds 4kk\t) eh avrovs t&v irepi tuv ' AireWfjv Ka.KOirpa.y- fioa\>vr)v. X N 2 548 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vni. had been held at Aigion, the usual place of meeting ; the King persuaded the Achaian Government to adjourn it to Sikyon. 1 This was in itself a compliment to Aratos, and in the interval he fully confessed his errors both to the father and the son. 2 He threw the whole blame upon Apelles, and begged them to be his friends as of old. Such an appeal was irresistible. In the adjourned Con- gress at Sikyon the influence of Aratos was used on behalf of Philip, and a liberal money-bill was the result. 3 Treason of Apelles now took to schemes which, in a Macedonian against officer, were even more guilty than any of his former evil Philip. deeds. He now entered on plans of direct treason against his own sovereign. He had already alienated the King's mind from Alexander and Taurion, two of his best officers, and both of them among the guardians named by An- tigonos. He now, in concert with the other two, Leontios and Megaleas, devised a plot by which all Philip's enter- prises might be thwarted, till he should at last be sufficiently humbled to put himself wholly under their guidance. Campaign The details of this vile scheme, and the general details of Of B.C. 218. . _ _ , ,r i • , the campaign, belong rather to Macedonian than to Federal history. Philip and the Achaians fitted out a 1 Pol. V. 1. 'ABpoicrOfVTOs tov ir\rf0ovs tls AXy iov Kara tovs v6jxovs . . . ir'fiixas tous apxovT as fj.tTaya.ytiv tt\v ZKicXriaiav tls HiKvivva. ' 11). Aaffuiv t6v t« wpecrfluTepov xal t6v vtwTtpov 'Aparov tls rcls X«t\lirnov. (Pint. Ar. 50.) Compare the relations of Klec.neiies with Xenarcs (Kl. 3) and with Panteus. (c. 87.) :i Fifty talents down, as three months' pay for his army, seventeen talents a month as long as he carried on the war in Peloponneeos, and corn ill :[\>Mi\i\:i\n-r {(riruv fjLvpidbas, Pol. V. 1). ii the Federal Government, a year before, could not pay its mercenaries (sec above, p. 585) where did l1 find the materials for such I subsidy now I But the passage is remarkable as showing the full power of taxation which was In the hands of the Federal Congress. It is a pity thai we are do1 told how the monej was to be rai led. See above, p. 809, PHILIP CRUSHES THE PLOT. fc -.-*A** 549 fleet, and attacked Kcphallenia, which had long acted as chav. vih. tlie yEtolian naval station. An all but successful assault on Palai, one of the towns in that island, was hindered by the arts of the traitors. Philip was as ubiquitous as usual ; he invaded Lakonia ; he invaded iEtolia, and avenged the destruction of Dion by the destruction of Thcrmon. 1 By rare prudence and forbearance he gradually Philip discovered, crushed, and punished the hateful plot of the plot. which he had been the victim. Throughout, Aratos acted as his wisest counsellor, and was therefore made the con- stant object of insult, sometimes growing into personal violence,* at the hands of the conspirators. It is interest- ing to trace, in the course of the story, several notices of the substantial, though perhaps rather unruly, freedom which the Macedonians still enjoyed under their Kings. Polybios carefully points out the almost equal terms on which the Macedonian army, not of assumption but of ancient right, addressed their sovereign, 3 and we find one of the culprits, just as in the days of Alexander, tried and condemned by the military Assembly of the Macedonians. 4 1 Polybios (v. 9-12) censures this act at great length, and doubtless with good reason. Yet it is not fifty years since British troops destroyed the public buildings of Washington, and much more lately we have heard the savage yells of English newspapers crying for the destruction of Delhi and Pekin. 2 Pol. v. 15. Plut. Ar. 48. Brandstater's comment (p. 374) is curious, " Aratos wurde von der anti-achaischen Partei fast gesteinigt und nur durch des Konigs specielle Theilnahme gerettet ; fiber die Beweggriinde sind verscbiedene Vermuthungen moglich. " 3 Pol. v. 27. Elxov y&p o-il r-!)v roiavTTjv Iffrjyoplav MaK(S6v;s irpos tovs /3atnA.e?s. See above, p. 20. * lb. 29. riToAe J ua?oi' Kpivas iv rots MaiceSdffiv dTrfKretve. Cf. Diod. xvii. 79, 80. Arrian, iii. 26. 2. iv. 14. 3. I have cut short these details, as not bearing immediately upon Federal history. The narrative is given at length by Polybios, and the English reader will, as usual, find the best of substitutes in the History of Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 258-68). 550 HISTORY OF FEDERAL (JREEL'E. chap. viii. It is more important for our subject to trace one or two points connected with the domestic history of the League. AVeak The Pharaian General did not secure the safety even of adminis- .... ' tration of his own and the neighbouring cantons. His utter m- b.(T218- capacity, and the general lack of discipline Avhich prevailed 217 - during his year, are strongly set forth by Polybios. 1 Doubt- less we here read the character of Eperatos as given by his political opponents, but, though there may be some exaggeration, there must be some groundwork for the picture. The /Etolians in Elis continued and increased their devastations in the western districts, and the cities in that quarter paid their contributions to the Federal Treasury with difficulty and reluctance." The expression however shows that they were paid, so that the most objectionable resolve of the Sonderbund of the year before a rat 03 must have been rescinded. At the next election the b.c. 217- elder Aratos was chosen General/ — we now hear nothing 21 C- of Macedonian influence cither way — and then tilings began to brighten a little. Incapable as Aratos was in the open field, his genius was admirably adapted for winning back men's minds, and he seems easily to have allayed all discontents. He summoned an Assembly, 4 ;lll and procured a scries of decrees for the more vigorouo '['^' prosecution of the war. The number of troops to be levied, both of citizens and mercenaries, was fixed, and the number and nature of the contingents from at least, two of the cities, namely Megalopolis and ArgOS, were made the 1 PoL V. 80. Tuu 5' 'Emjpa-rou rod (rrpar-qyod tiHv 'Ayaicoi' KaTaire rth tlstpnpfa. Patrai is imw mentioned as wrll as Dyme 1 and Pharai, Cf. c, 91, where the Bame en bo be said of the cities generally, i lb 80. 91, ARATOS MEDIATION AT MEGALOPOLIS :,.', 1 subject of a special decree. 1 No reason is given for the chap.vhi. special mention of these particular States, but we know that the troops of Megalopolis were in every way more efficient than those of any other city of the Union. 2 But these decrees illustrate the thoroughly sovereign Full power of the Federal Congress in all matters of national B concern. At the same time another decree, passed ap- n ''"7,jne,i parently in the same Assembly, shows no less clearly how with strict careful the Federal power was to abstain from any undue State interference with the State Governments in matters llg ts ' properly coming within their own sphere. It was now that, as has been mentioned in an earlier chapter, 3 Aratos went as mediator to Megalopolis. Violent local disputes Aratos; ■ j . ,. mediation had arisen ; there was a dispute about the laws which had at Mega- been enacted by Prytanis ; there was a still more dan- opo 1S ' gerous dispute between the rich and the poor, arisiug out of the restoration of the city after its destruction by Kleomenes. Aratos was sent, by decree of the Federal Assembly, to mediate between the contending parties, and he succeeded in bringing them to terms of agreement. He then returned to hold another Assembly ; the iEtolians, as before, 4 watched this opportunity for an inroad, but this time Aratos was beforehand with them. He had entrusted the care of the exposed districts to Lykos of Pharai, 5 with a strong bodv of mercenaries, at whose head Lvkos gained a complete victory over the invaders, xle afterwards, when the zEtolians had left Elis, retaliated the invasion by 1 See above, p. 310. 3 Pol. iv. 09. See Braudstater, 3G5. » Pol. v. 93. See above, p. 256-. 4 lb. 94. EvptiriSas . . TTipijaas vr\v tQv 'Axaiuu awotiov. See above, p. .509. 6 Polybios (v- 9 f> gives as a reason for this selection, Stcl rd tovtov virocri parriyov elvai tots rrjs ffWTf\eias ttjs waTpiKrj;. These words are not very clear, and their meaning has been disputed (see above, p. 247*, but one can hardly avoid the suspicion that they have something to do with the late Sonderbund. See above, p. 537. 552 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. VIII. ravaging the Eleiau territory in company with Demodokos the Federal Master of the Horse, 1 at the head of the mercenaries, together with the citizen force of Dyrne, Pharai, and Patrai. Meanwhile Philip was dealing far severer blows at the .Etolian power in Northern Greece. Philip's One great success was the capture of the Phthiotic Thebes ; suoess in b t it • p a i n f u l to read that, instead of liberating the Northern r t Greece. e itv according to the agreement entered into at the be. Tov rwi> 'Axa"5" Inirapxyv. ■ The words used by Polybioa (v. ;»:», LOO) certainly seemed to Imply thai the people of Phthiotic Thebea were entitled t" iis benefits; /ca-re- xAvrwv oi!tt)i/ rwu AiTuKuv -Trop(8oTis yip us traiSiw vrfrrlw xprftfacrdai t<£ $>iAitnrw Sid Ti r-ftv rJAtKiav Kal ttjj/ dtreipiav, rov jxzv QlAnnroi' tupov TeAeioy avSpa kA Kard tos etri^oAas Kal icard rds trpd^fis, avrol Se i(pdvr](Tav euKaracppovriToi Kal traiSapiuSeis tv re rots Kara, /xepos Kal tois KaQoAov tr pay fj.ao'iv. 3 Hi. 'O 5e 4>iAnr7ros da^evus itnAa^6j.i.fvos Trjs itpcxpaffeuis ravTtjs Sid to dappelv itrl T", I. AFFA1KS OF ITALY. 556 more than its match in the Roman broadsword. But chap. vm. the might of Philip was far greater than the might of either of the Molossian knights-errant. As King of Mace- donia and Head of the great Greek Alliance, he might summon the countrvmen of Alexander and Pvrrhos as merely one contingent of his army. And Italy was now in a state which positively invited his arms. While he, the namesake of the great Philip, the successor of the great Alexander, the unconquered chief of an unconquered nation, was wasting his strength on petty warfare with iEtolia and Lacedtemon, Hannibal was advancing, in the full swing of triumph, from the gates of Saguntum to the gates of Rome. It is with a feeling of sadness that the historian of Opening Greece turns at this moment to behold the mighty strife "^0^ which was waging in Western Europe, the struggle be- clo ? e ' on " , nexion of tween the first of nations and the first of men. He feels the history that the interests of Achaia and iEtolia, of Macedonia anc i and Sparta, seem small beside the gigantic issue now jgj™^™ pending between Rome and Hannibal. The feeling is flom tllis date, something wholly different from that paltry worship of brute force which looks down on "petty states," old or new. The political lessons to be drawn from the history of Achaia and /Etolia are none the less momentous be- cause the world contained other powers greater than either of the rival Leagues. Still it is with a mournful feeling that we quit a state of things where Greece is everything, where Greece and her colonies form the whole civilized world — -a state of things in which, even when Greece is held in bondage, she is held in bondage by conquerors proud to adopt her name and arts and language — and turn to a state of things in which Greece and Macedonia form only one part of the world of war and polities, and that no longer its most important part. We have already seen the beginning of this change : .556 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. VIII, Synchro- nisms of Greek and Roman history. B.C. 220. Spring B.o. 219. Autumn, B.C. 219. B.C. 218. B.C. 217. Philip at Argos, B.C. 217. Infill' Di ■ of I >6m6- t rios of Pharo . we have seen Roman armies east of the Hadriatic ; we have seen Greek cities receive their freedom as a boon from a Roman deliverer. 1 From this point the history of the two great peninsulas becomes closely interwoven. Greece and Macedonia gradually sink, from the position of equal allies and equal enemies, into the position, first of Roman dependencies and then of Roman provinces. We have now entered upon that long chain of events reaching down to our own times, the History of Greece under Foreign Domination. 2 Our guide has already begun diligently to mark the synchronisms of Greek and Roman history. Hannibal first cast his eyes on Saguntum at the same time that Philip and the Congress of Corinth passed their first decree against the JEtolians. 3 He laid siege to the city at the time that the younger Aratos was chosen General. 4 He took it while Philip was on his first triumphant march through yEtolia, 5 He crossed the Alps about the time that the first Chian and Rhodian envoys came to Corinth. He defeated Flaminius at Lake Trasimcnns while Philip was besieging Phthiotic Thebes. 7 The news was slow in reaching Greece ; a letter — from whom we know not — brought the important tidings to the King; it was sent to him in Macedonia, and, not finding him there, followed him to Argos, where he was present at the Nenican (James. 8 His evil genius was at his side ; Demetrios of Pharos, the double traitor to lllvria and to Rome, expelled from his 1 See ahoi e, p. 1 1 s 20. 2 'I'll is Nuiij.vi is at last concluded in the two final volumes of Mr. Finlay's great work, the must truly original history of our times. 3 PoL iv. 28. ' IK. 37. ■ II'. 66. s II.. v. 20. ' II'. 101. • lb. l oi . The Nemean Games must therefore have been restored to \i above, p, Wl). When Argos became a city of the League, the Federal power could have no interest in asserting the rights ol K lednai, one of the smallest members of the Onion, againsl Argos, one of the PHTLIP'S DESIGNS ON ITALY. o.">7 dominions by the Romans, had taken refuge with Philip, chap. vm. and was gradually supplanting Aratos as his ehief coun- sellor. To him alone the King showed the letter ; the adventurer at once counselled peace with iEtolia and with all Greece ; but he counselled it only in order that Philip might husband all his strength for an Italian war. Now He was the time, now that Rome was falling, for the King of j^S? _ Macedonia to step in at once and to claim his share of the eilco in prize. We could have wished to see the arguments of the Pharian drawn out at greater length. He could not have looked upon Rome as completely overthrown ; for in that case Macedonian intervention would have been mere interference with the rights of conquest on the part of Carthage. Hannibal's position must have seemed not so perfectly secure but that he would still be glad to accept of Macedonian help, and to yield to Macedonia a portion of the spoil. As Philip gave himself out as the champion of Greek interests, the liberation of the Greek cities in Italy and Sicily would afford him an honourable pretext for interference. 1 To unite them to his Confederacy, perhaps covertly to his actual dominion, would be a natural object of his ambition. The Greek cities of Italy, which Carthage had never possessed, would naturally fall to the lot of Macedonia. Even Sicily would hardly prove a stumbling- block. The surrender of the old claims of Carthage to dominion in that island would hardly be thought too dear a price for an alliance which, by rendering Italy no longer dangerous, would effectually secure the Carthaginian dominion in Spain and Gaul. But the views of Philip at this time are mere matters of speculation. Before he actually concluded any treaty with Hannibal, the state of affairs had materially changed. When Philip was thus disposed, the negociation of 1 See Flathe, Geschichte Makedoniens, ii. 279. Thirl wall, viii. 278, note. See also the speech of Agelaos just below. 55H HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. Tin. p eace was no t difficult. Without, as it would seem, even °fThe US wa iting for the return of the mediating envoys, he entered Congress into communication with the iEtolian Government, 1 and of Nau- paktos, gathered a Congress of his own Allies at Panormos. But he was determined that no man should think that he sought peace because he dreaded war. He again ravaged the territory of Elis ; and, while waiting for the arrival of the plenipotentiaries, he made the important conquest of Zakynthos. The iEtolian Assembly 3 met at Naupaktos ; the Congress of the Allies was assembled on the opposite shore of Achaia. Philip sent over Aratos 4 — such is the language now used — with his own general Taurion ; their mission soon led to an iEtolian embassy, inviting Philip to cross with all his forces and to discuss matters face to face. He did so, and encamped near Naupaktos. The /Etolian Assembly — only distinguished from the iEtolian army by not being under arms 5 — took up a position near him. The details of the negotiation required many meetings, many messages to and fro ; but at last all seems to have settled without any serious difficulty. The principle of the Uti Possidetis, 6 one highly favourable to Philip and his allies, was soon agreed to on both Speech of sides. The most remarkable event in the course of the Conference was a speech by Agelaos of Naupaktos, the substance of which lias been preserved to us by Polybios. It shows the strange union of elements in the /Etolian 1 Thifl waa done through Khonikos of N unpaid os, the irpd^eyus of Acliaiu in .Ki"li;i, who was therefore exempted from slavery. See above, p, 58, The employmenl of EUeonikos for Bach a purpose is like the similar employmeul of Amphidamos of Elis. Seep. 545. ' PoL v. Joii. Vlpds /in- tuj (Tunnax&as iroKfis ypa/x/xarocpSpovt ^airi- (TTfiAf, irapa.Ka.Kwv TTfpirtiv toi)s ovvtoptvaovTas Kai p.fdt£ovTas ttj* tiirtp rwv oiaKiHTttnv KnivnKoyias. :1 lli. lo:{. Tots AItwKo'is vavStifXf} ois tv NavrriKTw. * lli. 'Etiirt p.\\/t trpbs toi)? A«to>Aoi>* "Aparov Kal Tavpiuiva. 1 Hi. Ol 5' Ai'toiAo! x w P^ t< *" / SirAwi' riKov iravbrimL • lli ".1m-' 'yur dpipOrfpOVS a vdv i\ov(Tiv. CONGKESS OF NAUPAKTOS. 559 character, that this very Agelaos, whom we have seen chap. vm. concerned in some of the worst deeds of ^Etolian brigan- dage, 1 should now appear as a profound statesman, and even as a Panhellenic patriot. " Let Greece," he says, " be united ; let no Greek state make war upon any other ; let them thank the Gods if they can all live in peace and agreement, if, as men in crossing rivers grasp one another's hands, 2 so they can hold together and save themselves and their cities from barbarian inroads. If it is too much to hope that it should be so always, let it at least be so just now ; let Greeks, now at least, unite and keep on their guard, when they behold the vastuess of the armies and the greatness of the struggle going on in the West. No man who looks at the state of things with common care can doubt what is coming. Whether Rome conquers Carthage or Carthage conquers Rome, the victor will not be content with the dominion of the Greeks of Italy and Sicily ; he will extend his plans and his warfare much further than suits us or our welfare. Let all Greece be upon its guard, and Philip above all. Your truest defence, O King," he continued, 3 " will be found in the character of the chief and protector of Greece. Leave off destroying Greek cities ; leave off weakening them till they become a prey to every invader. Rather 1 See above, p. 517. It was worth noticing that the only two nego- tiators mentioned on the iEtolian side, Agelaos and Kleonikos, are both of them citizens of Naupaktos. It is thus clear that that city was now incorporated with the /Etolian League on really equal terms, but we can well believe that the arts of statesmanship and diplomacy were more flourishing among its citizens than among the boors and brigands of the inland country. Of the diplomatic powers of Agelaos we have seen something already when he persuaded Skerdilaidos to join the JStolians. * Pol. v. 104. 2t'/U7rAe'/covT€s t&s x^P as KaOdnep oi Toi)y -Kora/xods Sia- fiaivovTis. This curious comparison shows that we really have a genuine speech. 3 I have thrown the somewhat lifeless infinitives of Polybios into the form of a direct address, but I have put in nothing, of which the substance is not to be found in his text. 560 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vni. watch over Greece, as you watch over your own body, guard the interests of all her members as you guard the interest of what is your own. If you follow such a course as this, you will win the good will of Greece ; you will have every Greek bound to you as a friend and as a sure supporter in all your undertakings ; foreign powers will see the confidence which the whole nation reposes in you, and will fear to attack either you or them. If you wish for conquest and military glory, another field invites you. Cast your eyes to the West ; look at the war raging in Italy ; of that war you may easily, by a skilful policy, make yourself the arbiter ; a blow dealt in time may make you master of both the contending powers. If you cherish such hopes, no time bids fairer than the present for their accomplishment. But as for disputes and wars with Greeks, put them aside till some season of leisure ; let it be your main object to keep in your own hands the power of making war and peace with them when you will. If once the clouds which arc gathering in the West should advance and spread over Greece and the neighbouring lands, there will be danger indeed that all our truces and wars, all the child's play with which we now amuse our- selves, 1 will be suddenly cut short. Wc may then pray in vain to the Gods for the power of making war and peace with one another, and indeed of dealing independently with any of the questions which may arise among us." : The way in which Polybios introduces this remarkable speech leaves hardly room for doubt that it is, in its sub- stance at least, a genuine composition of the Naupaktian diplomatist. 1 It displays a Pan-hellenio spirit, sincere and 1 PoL v. 104. Tds dvox&f xa\ robs irohtfiovt xa\ Ka06\ov rds iraihiUs &t vvv Tral(ofj.(i> tti><)s dAATfAoui. ■> it ig amunng to ee Justin's vernon of thi speech <\xix. 2, 8), which )io putt mto the month "I' Philip. 1 The mere cue of tlm oratio "i>/ir/n,i throughout io long n speech w<->ul J O > ,,| [g . intestine quarrels, and arm herself, under Macedonian kratfis. headship, for a struggle with the barbarian. But the policy which, in the days of Isokrates, was a mere rheto- rician's dream, had become, in the days of Agelaos, the soundest course which a patriotic Greek could counsel. In the days of Isokrates. the barbarians of Persia were not real enemies of Greece ; they in no way threatened Grecian independence ; it was only a sentimental vengeance which marked them out as objects of warfare ; the real enemy was that very Macedonian whom Isokrates was eager to accept as the champion of Greece against them. In the days of Agelaos, the barbarians of Rome and Carthage were, if not avowed enemies of Greece, at least neighbours of tlic most dangerous kind, against a possible struggle with whom Greece was bound to husband every resource. As Greek affairs then stood, an union under Macedonian Union under headship was probably the wisest course which could be Mace- adopted. But such a course was now the wisest, simply {jp"dshi because of the way in which Greece had fallen within a now single generation. Thirty years before, but for iEtolian selfishness, all Greece might have united into one com- pact and vigorous Federal commonwealth. Ten years before, but for Achaian jealousy, Greece might have been united under the headship of one of her own noblest sons, a King indeed, but a King of her own blood, a King of Sparta and not of Macedon. Both these opportunities had passed away, and an union under Philip was now the seem to show that it is not, like so many other speeches, a mere rhetorical exercise or an exposition of the historian's own views. 1 See the oration or pamphlet of Isokrates, called " Philip," throughout. O 562 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. ohap. viu. only hope. Philip at least spoke the tongue of Greece, and affected to regard himself as the Greek King of a Greek people. 1 Macedonia had long been the bulwark of Greece against Gaulish and Thracian savages ; she was now called upon to act in a yet higher character as the bulwark of Greece against the civilized barbarians of Rome and Carthage. But the scheme of Agelaos required greater patriotism and greater clearness of vision than was to be found either in Greece or in Macedonia. A noble career lay open before Philip, but he was fast becoming less and less worthy to enter upon it. He was fast obscuring the pure glory of his youth by schemes of selfish and unjust aggrandizement ; he had already taken the first downward steps towards the dark tyranny of his later years. Agelaos' own countrymen were even less ready than Philip to merge their private advantage in any plans for the general good of Greece. We shall soon see iEtolia appearing in a light even more infamous than any in which she had appeared already. Achaia indeed presented more hopeful elements. We shall soon see her military force assume, when too late, an efficiency which, a generation earlier, might have been the salvation of all Greece. But that force was now to be frittered away in petty local strife, or in partnership with Peaceof allies who took the lion's share to themselves. Peace tos, B.o. was concluded For a few years Peloponnesos enjoyed rest and prosperity. Athens was delivered from her fears i in Philip's treaty with Carthage (PoL \ii. 9) we find throughoul such pin MaKfSovlav ical Trjv dW-qv 'E\\d5a, MuKtSdvfS Kal ol &K\oi "KAA7;i'fs. Bo, in his conference with Flamininus (Pol. wii. 4), he Bays Kd/xoC ical twv (Saaou' 'EWTJi/oif. Cf. Axrian, ii. 11. 7. So in the Bpeech of I Idskoa (PoL ix. 87-8), we find the a.chaiana and Macedonian called ifi.6(pvK»i, while the Roman axe distinguished as d*xir enmity, both Macedonia and Greece should pass into the common bondage which awaited all the BEGINNING OF ROMAN INFLUENCE IN GREECE. 565 Mediterranean nations. 1 Nothing could be more impolitic cnAP.vm. than the conduct of Philip throughout the whole business. Impolitic With all his brilliant qualities, he was far inferior to f phiiip. his predecessor. Had Antigonos D6son survived, 2 we may feel sure that the course of Macedonian politics would have been widely different. So prudent a prince would either have kept out of the struggle altogether, or else have thrown himself heart and soul into it. So now, Hannibal and Philip together might probably have crushed Rome. The Roman broadsword triumphed alike over the horsemen of Xumidia and over the spear- men of Macedon. But it could hardly o have triumphed over both of them ranged side by side. And where Hannibal was weak, Philip was strong.' 1 Hannibal, un- conquered in the open field, was baffled by the slightest fortress which had no traitors within its walls. Philip had the blood of the Besieger in his veins, and he had at his command all the resources of Greek military science. He could have brought to bear upon the walls of Rome devices as skilful as those with which Archimedes de- fended the walls of Syracuse. Aratos himself was not so old but that he might, on some dark night, have led a daring band up the steep of the Capitol, as he had, in earlier days, led a daring baud up the steep of Akroko- rinthos. But Philip shrank altogether from vigorous action ; he did not deal a single effective blow for his Carthaginian ally or against his Roman enemy. He simply 1 The gradual steps of tin- process by which Rome gradually and syste- matically swallowed up both friends and enen best set forth in the History of Mommsen. But the reader must be always on his guard against Mommseu's idolatry of mere force. Rome seems never to have definitely annexed any state al once ; all had to pass through the intermediate stage of clientship or dependent alliance. See Kortiim, iii. 276. - s, e Kortiim, iii 203. - 1 See Arnold, iii. 158, 241, - 56(3 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. viu. provoked Rome to a certain amount of immediate hostility, and caused himself to be set down in her account as one who was to be more fully dealt with on some future day. Probably Hannibal really cared but little for his aid. Philip too Whether by accident or by design, Philip did not conclude interfere an y treaty with the Carthaginian till after the crowning with effect, victory of Canine had made his assistance of far less B.C. 210. J value. 1 Probably he waited to see the course of events, and waited so long as to cut himself off from anv real share in their control. The adventures of his Am- bassadors, as recorded by Livy, 2 form a curious story in themselves, and they supply an apt commentary on some points in the Law of Nations, which have lately 1 drawn to themselves special importance. But they concern us less immediately than some points both of the form and of the matter of the Treaty. Philip's Of this Treaty we have what seems to be the full copy with preserved by Polybios, 4 and we have notices in Livy 5 and b.^216, ' later authors. It is an offensive and defensive alliance Terms between Cartilage on the one side and Philip and his in allies on the other. Each party is to help the other PoJyLios. agajjjgt a u enemies, except where any earlier obligation may stand in the way. The Romans are not, in any case, not even if they conclude peace with Carthage, to be allowed to retain any possessions, whether in the form of dominion or alliance, on the eastern side of the Hadriatic. This is simply all, as il stands in Polybios ; and a treaty concluded on such simple terms seems to have somewhat puzzled Later writers, both ancient and modern. As it stands, there seems so little for either parly to gain by it. 'I'he person really to profit, by its stipulations would seem to be Demetrios of Pharos, who would regain his lost > ThirlwalL riii, 277. Cf Flathe, ii. ^73. ' Liv. xxiii 33, 34, 89, App. Mac. 1 J January, 1862. ' Pol vii 9 ' Liv. xxiii. 88. TEEATY BETWEEN PHILIP AND HANNIBAL .">07 dominions. Philip was to help Carthage in the war with ohap.viii. Rome, and it is not said that he was to receive any pay- ment for his labours. It has excited surprise 1 that no various provision is made either for the independence of the ^',1 ™®. Sicilian and Italian Greeks or for their transference from J 1 ; 1 Uire » 01 later Roman to Macedonian rule. On the other hand, later writers. Greek writers 2 have supposed provisions for the annexa- tion of Epeiros and the rest of Greece to the Macedonian Kingdom. But the explanation of the Treaty as it stands rrobable does not seem difficult. The key to the whole position is tionofthe that Philip was too late ; he had missed the favourable rea y ' moment ; he was negotiating after Cannse instead of be- fore it. At an earlier time, Philip's help might well have seemed worth buying at the cost of a considerable portion of Italy ; but, if it ever had been so, it was so no longer. Hannibal now deemed himself strong enough, perhaps absolutely to conquer Italy by his own forces, at all events to weaken Rome thoroughly and permanently. In the case of complete conquest, he would not be disposed to divide the spoil with an ally who stepped in only at the last moment. But if Rome were not to be conquered, but still to be dismembered, those parts of her empire which Philip would have the best claim for demanding as subjects or allies, namely Sicily and Greek Italy, were also exactly the parts which Carthage also would most naturally claim to have transferred to her dominion or protection. Still Philip, though not now of the import- ance which he once was, was not to be wholly despised. He was no longer needed as a principal ; still he might, especially with his fleet, 3 be useful as an auxiliary. For such services it would be reward enough if the Roman 1 Flathe, ii. 279. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 278, note. 2 App. Mac. 1. Zonaras ap. Thirlwall, viii. 279, note. s Liv. xxiii. 33. l'liilippus Rex quam maxima classe (ducentas autem naves videbatur ellecturus) in Italiatn trajiceret. • r )08 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE chap. vm. possessions in his own neighbourhood were to be trans- ferred to himself or his friends, and if Carthage, in any future war, gave him such help as he was now to give Hannibal. This seems to be the simple meaning of the Treaty iu Polybios, and its terms agree very well with the position of things at the time. Position In this treaty, Philip negociates as a Greek King, the T.\ 'nlnii, bead °f a great Greek alliance. How far he was justified I' 1 ' in so doing, that is, how far his negociations were author- ized by the Federal Assemblies of Achaia, Epeiros, Akar- nania, and Boeotia, we have no means of judging. We have now lost the continuous guidance of Polybios. and we have to patch up our story how Ave can from the frag- ments of his history combined with the statements of later and inferior writers. Happy it is for us when the Roman copyist condescends to translate the illustrious Greek of whom he speaks in so patronizing a tone. 1 But whether authorized or not, Philip speaks in this treaty as the head of a Greek alliance, almost as the acknowledged head of all Greece. As such, he demands that Korkyra, Epi- damnos, and Apolldnia be released from all dependence on Rome. Probably they were to be formally enrolled as members of the Grand Alliance ; practically they would most likely have sunk to the level of Thessaly, or even to thai of Corinth and Orchomenos. As chief of snch an alliance, Philip may not have been unwilling to stipulate for Carthaginian aid in any future struggles with iEtolia. All this would practically amount to making himself something like chief of Greece, a ohief who would doubt- less be, in name, the constitutional head of a voluntary alliance but a chief whose position might easily degene- rate into practical Tyranny, or even, before long, into i l.iv. : ! lybius, haudqiuiquam spernendus awtor, Ik iwiii • . in i --mi incertum aucion >». EXPLANATION OF THE TREATY. 569 avowed Kingship. But no such schemes could possibly chap. vni. find a place in a public treaty concluded by Philip in his own name and in that of his Greek allies. 1 In the later writers, the simple terms recorded by Polybios gradually develope into much larger plans of conquest. The Treaty in Polybios provides for a joint war with Rome, but it contemplates the possibility of that war being ended by a treaty with Rome, and it provides that, in such a case, certain definite cessions shall be made to Philip or his allies. After this, if Philip ever stood in need of Car- thaginian help, Carthaginian help was to be forthcoming. In the copy in Livy these terms swell into something Livy's widely different. Italy is to be definitely conquered f the for the benefit of Carthage by the joint powers of Treaty ' Carthage and Macedonia ; the allied armies are then to puss over into Greece ; they are to wage war with what Kings they pleased, and certain large territories, some- what vaguely expressed, are to be annexed to Mace- donia. Philip is to take all islands and continental cities which lie anywhere near to his Kingdom. 2 All this has evidently grown out of the stipulated cession of Korkyra and the Greek cities in Illyria. Appian goes a step further. In his version the Carthaginians Appian's 11 T i i,i ii tti -T • version, arc to possess all Italy, and then to help Philip in conquering Greece. 3 This was just the light in which the matter would look to a careless Greek writer of late times, who probably had his head full of Dc'niostheiu's and Alexander and the earlier Philip, and who had no clear 1 One of Thilip's envoys (Liv. xxiii. 30) was a MagnSsian. Docs this simply show the utter subjection of Thessaly to Philip, or was Sdsitheos armed with any commission from an imaginary Thessalian League ! 2 Liv. xxiii. ?>Z. Perdomita Italia, navigarent in Grseciam, bellumque rum (|uibus Regibus placeret, gererent. Quae civitates continents, quae insular ad Macedonian! vergunt, ese Philippi regnique - at. 3 App. Mac. 1. *i\iTr7ros . . (irefiire irpos 'Avui^av . . viruTX"Ov/x(i'ui avTa> (Tn/x,aax);'o tic sir) rffv 'iTaX/aj/, el narcuvos aura* cwOono Kartp^aaaffdat T7jv 'E\\d?a. 570 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap, viil idea of the real position of the Greek states at this par- ticular time. Philip no doubt aimed at a supremacy of some sort over Greece, but, when negociating in the name of a great Greek Alliance, he could not well have publicly asked for Carthaginian help for the subjugation of Greece. Version of In Zonaras we reach a still further stage ; Hellas, Epeiros, ionaras. an{ | ^ XQ j s i an j s arc ^ ue ^] ie prize f Philip, as Italy is to be the prize of Carthage. Now, in the genuine copy, Philip counts Macedonia as part of Hellas, and acts in the name of the Allied Powers, of which Epeiros was one. To ask for the subjugation of Hellas and Epeiros would have been quite inconsistent with his own language. There may of course have been secret articles, or the Romans may have tampered with the treaty ; these are questions to which no answer can be given. But the copy as given by Polybios seems perfectly to suit the conditions of the case, and the variations of later Avriters seem to be only exaggerations and misunderstandings naturally growing out of his statements. Import- This treaty had the effect of placing all the Federal Treaty in States of Greece, except ^Etolia, in a position of hostility Federal towards Rome. It is therefore an event of no small History. moment in a general history of Federalism. It was the lir>t step towards the overthrow of the earliest and most flourishing system of Federal commonwealths which the world ever saw. From the moment that any independent state became either the friend or the enemy of Rome, from that moment the destiny of that state was fixed. The war which I am about t«» describe made Aehaia the enemy, and .Etolia the friend, of Rome; but the doom of friend and of enemy was alike pronounced ; as it, happened, the present friend was the first to be swallowed up. < )u (lie eve of such a struggle a struggle in which the republican Greeks had certainly no direct interest, one would be glad PHILIP'S INTERFERENCE AT MESSENE. 571 to know how far the different Federations really com- ohap. vnr. niitted themselves to it by their own aet, and how far Philip merely carried out Apelles' principle of dealing with Aehaia and Epciros as no less bound to submission than Thessaly herself. However this may be, the treaty was, in its terms, one which Philip contracted on behalf of his allies as well as of himself; Rome therefore, as a matter of course, dealt with all the allies of Philip as with enemies. It was however some time before the war di- rectly touched any of the states of Peloponnesos. Philip's immediate object was to secure those cities ou the Illyrian coast which were in alliance with Rome. They were to be, in any case, his share of the spoil ; if he still cherished any thoughts of an expedition into Italy, their possession seemed necessary as the first step. But he still found Philip's leisure to meddle in the affairs of Peloponnesos, for wit^'peh. which his possession of Corinth, Orchomenos, and the pa°n&»* Triphylian towns ' gave him constant opportunities and excuses. His character was now rapidly corrupting ; his ad- viser was no longer Aratos, but Demetrios of Pharos. The Affairs of first time that we hear of his presence is at Messene. In ^ ^15 that city, the oligarchical government, which was in posses- sion during the last war, 2 had lately been overthrown by a democratic revolution. 3 But there was a powerful discon- tented party, and new troubles seemed likely to break out. Both the King of Macedonia and the President of Interfer- the Achaian League, a place now filled by Aratos for the Philip and sixteenth 4 time, hastened to Messene, both, we may sup- ' pose, in the avowed character of mediators. Certainly neither of them could have any other right to interfere in the internal quarrels of a city which was neither subject to the Macedonian Crown nor enrolled in the Achaian Confederation. Aratos, we may well believe, went with a ' See above, p, ;V38. Sei above, p 514. :i Pol. vii. 9. 1 Or fifteenth. See note at the end "l the Chapter. 572 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. via. sincere desire of preventing bloodshed, and not without some hope of persuading both parties that their safety and tranquillity would be best secured by union with Acliaia. 1 With what views King Philip went was soon shown by the event. He arrived a day sooner than Aratos, and his arrival is spoken of in words which seem to show that he was Disturb- anxious to outstrip him. 2 The day thus gained he is said caused by to have spent in working on the passions of both parties, Philip. t j]j ^ ie resu j t was a m assacre in which the magistrates and two hundred other citizens perished. 3 The younger Aratos did not scruple to express himself strongly about such Last in- conduct; 4 but the father still retained influence enough Ajatos to persuade Philip, for very shame, to drop an infamous Philip scheme, proposed to him by Demetrios, for retaining the Messenian citadel in his own hands. 5 The next year Philip's Philip's crimes increase ; he sends Demetrios, on what attempt on pretence we know not, to attack Messene, an attempt in SJjJ^jf; which the perfidious adventurer lost his life. We next 1 Plutarch's (Ar. 49) expression of /Solves? may mean anything or nothing. - Pol. vii. 13. 'Ap&rov ica6uTos. Pint. Ar. 19. 'O /j.ev'Apa.TOS vv, KiKo/jLifffifOa ttjs Trpus L\tinroi>. Ill Plutarch (Ar. 52) this becomes, ravr, w Kerpd\wv, firlxeipa rrjs $aa-i\iKr)s (piAias. Here there seems to be a slight touch of the rhetorical horror of Kings, which is hardly in character in the mouth <>f Aratos. On the probability of the story of the poisoning, see Thirl wall, viii. 283. Niehuhr, Lect. iii. 3G4. 3 Pint. Ar. 54. Liv. xxvii. 31. Uni enim principi Achseornm Arato adempta uxor nomine Polycratia, ac spe regiarum nuptiarum in Mace- doniani asportata fuerat. This comes in incidentally five years after. One is tempted to hclieve that Livy had never heard of either Aratos till he camo to the events of B.C. 208. 4 Niehuhr (iii. 364 and elsewhere) talks of " old Aratos." So one is led 574 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. ( ii.vp. Yin. from the bright promise of the youth who, thirty-eight years before, had driven the Tyrant out of Sikyon. Yet, granting his one fatal act, his later years had been usefully and honourably spent, and lie retained the affections of his countrymen to the last. His own city of Sikyon and the v v mi League in general joined in honours to his memory ; at Sikyon he was worshipped as a hero ; he had his priests and his festiyals, and his posterity were held in honour for ages. 1 He was cut off when he might still have hoped to keep his place for some years longer as at least a spectator Com- of some of the greatest events in the world's history. But parison j ie ma( | c wav f or a 110 bler successor, though one possibly ana Philo- less suited for the coming time than he was himself. The crafty diplomatist, the eloquent parliamentary leader, the cowardly and incapable general, passed away. In his stead there arose one of the bravest and most skilful of soldiers, one of the most honest and patriotic of poli- ticians, but one who lacked those marvellous powers of persuasion by which Aratos had so long swayed friends and enemies, and had warded off all dangers except the poisoned cup of Macedonian friendship. The new hero of the League was Philopoime'n, a hero worthy of a better age. He fell upon evil days, because the Fates had cast his lot in them. If the days of Aratos were few and evil, they were so by liis own choice. to fancy both Philip himself in after times, ami still moro the Emperor Henry Hi'' Fourth, aa much older than they really were, because of the early a^o at which they began public life. I. ivy (xl. r>, Mi calls Philip, eenex and even sewio conavmptus, when he was qoI above sixty ; he makes <■ 80) Hannibal, a1 forty-five, call himself amen, ami talka (xxxv. 16) "I' the a&nectvs of Antiochos the Great, at about the sane -• I ia almost always Lavish the epithets "old" and "aged " ii i" >ii Henry, who died at the age of ftftj -six. On the othei hand tin (xxx. it makes FlamininuH call Philip piter immcUwra astatit, when he wa • about thirty-eight. 1 I 'Int. Aj 58, f'l BEGINNING OF THE ROMAN WAR. 57") OHAP. vm. Meanwhile the Roman war had begun, though as yet Beginning the Achaian League had no share in it. The storm first '|' ; , ,„",'„ broke upon the Federal States of north-western Greece, AN 1 ' B.C. 214. but it was not long before Achaia herself learned how terrible was the danger into which her royal ally had led her. Philip began by attacking the towns of Orikon and Apol Ionia on the Illyrian coast. He took Orikon ; but, while besieging Apollonia, he fled ignominiously before a sudden attack of the Roman Praetor Marcus Valerius Laevinus. 1 This happened between Philip's two inter- ferences at Messene, and this was doubtless the expe- dition in which Aratos, disgusted with the King's conduct, refused to take any share. 2 Laevinus continued for some years to command on the Illyrian station, and he effectually hindered Philip — if indeed Philip had any longer any such intention — from crossing over to Italy or giving any sort of efficient aid to Hannibal. But Rome had as yet no Grecian allies ; her condition was still such as hardly to make her alliance desirable. But to win allies in the neighbourhood of any prince Roman or commonwealth with whom Rome was at war was an Alliance* essential part of Roman policy. No line of conduct was more steadily adhered to during the whole period of her conquests. In each of her Avars, some neigh- bouring power was drawn into her alliance ; his forces, and, still more, his local knowledge and advantages, were pressed into the Roman service ; he was rewarded, as long as he could be of use, with honours and titles and increase of territory ; and at last, when his own turn came, he was swallowed up in the same gulf with the powers which he had himself helped to overthrow. In the wars between Rome and Macedonia this part, x Liv. xxiv. 40. * Pint. Ar. 51. 5/6 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vin. alike dishonourable and disastrous, fell to the lot of .Etolia. The momentary fit of virtue which had placed Agelaos at the head of the League had now passed away. Skopas and Dorimachos were again in their natural place as the guiding spirits of the nation. Skopas was now General, and Dorimachos retained his old influence. 1 It docs not appear that Philip or his allies had done the .Etolians any wrong, and the only intercourse between Rome and yEtolia up to this time had certainly not been friendly. A time had been when Rome had threatened .Etolia with her enmity, if she did not scru- pulously regard the rights of her Akarnanian neighbours. 2 But Rome had now forgotten the claims of Akarnania upon the forbearance of the descendants of the Trojans. Position iEtolia bade fair to be a useful ally, and Rome was of Koine. ... . P , . , . , .. again giving signs ol being a power which it was worth the while of ./Etolia, or of any other state, to b.c. 216. conciliate. Rome had survived the defeat of Cannse ; her b.c. 211. prospects were brightening ; Fulvius had recovered Capua, and Marcellus had recovered Syracuse. Lsevinus now opened a negotiation with Skopas and Dorimachos, pos- sibly with other leading men in /Etolia, 3 and he was by them introduced to plead the cause of Rome before the /Etolian Federal Congress. He enlarged on the happy position of the allies of Rome; .Ltolia, the first all v beyond the Eadriatic, would be the most happy and honoured among all the allies of Rome. No Sainnite or Sicilian orator was present to set forth the dark side of Roman connexion, nor was there any envoy from Apolldnia or Korkyra to assert the claims of his own city to be ' l,iv. x>;\i. 24. Scopas, qui tunc pretor gentis erat, el Dorymachus princep E oloi Princepa, in Livy, a I have already observed, implies political in- fluence, whether with or without official rank. " Si , p. 41 2. ' Livy, u - Tentatis prius per secreta colloquia principum animis. ALLIANCE BETWEEN ROME AND .I.Tol.IA. 577 Rome's earliest ally in the Hellenic world. A treaty was chap. via. agreed upon, that infamous league of plunder which made Alliance the name of zEtolia to stink throughout all (Jreece. Rome Rome and and JStolia were to make conquests in common ; iEtolia iEto ^' 1 B.C. 211. was to retain the territory, and Rome to carry off the moveable spoil. 1 But the great bait was Rome's old ally, Akarnania. What in modern political jargon would be Plots for called "the Akarnanian question" had always been a union" oi matter of primary moment in the eyes of ^Etolian poli- A . kallKi ticians. The moment of its solution seemed now to have come ; the gallant little Federation was to be swallowed up by its powerful and rapacious neighbour. The nego- tiators of Rome and iEtolia forestalled the utmost refine- ments of modern diplomacy. zEtolia revindicated her natural boundaries ; the reunion of Akarnania was decreed upon the highest principles of eternal right.' 2 An end was to be put to the intolerable state of things which assigned to iEtolia any frontier narrower or less clearly marked than that of the Ionian and /Egtcan Seas. Elis, Sparta, King Attalos of Pergamos, and some Tllyrian and Thracian princes, 3 might join the alliance if they wished. The Romans began in terrible earnest. They invaded Roman Zakynthos, occupied all but the citadel, captured the b.o. 211. Akarnanian towns of Oiniadai and Nesos, and handed them over to their allies. Early in the next spring the B(; - 21 ° Lokrian Antikvra shared the same fate ; the inhabitants were carried off as slaves by the Barbarians, and the iEtolians possessed the deserted city.* Meanwhile the 1 Pol. ix. 39. Liv. xxvi. 34. See above, p. 841. 2 Liv. ii.s. Acarnanas, qnos aegre ferrent Mtoli a corporesuo diremptos, restituturum se in antiquam formulam jurisque ac ditionia eorum. 3 Skerdilaidos we have met with already ; on Ph-nratos, see Thirlwall, viii. 284. 4 Pol. ix. 39. v H8t; traprjp^vTai /xiv 'AKapvavccv OiViaSa? Ka\ Nrjcrov, Kar- (i / • irtv i^ovtrias' rd 8' i5d>j>ri K\j}p0V0fM>Vffl twv tJtuX'JK^toic AitoiAo/. 1 l.iv. \wi. 25. "Hie siti sunl Acarnanes, qui, adverse vim el injuriam Etolorum pro patrifl pugnantes, mortem 01 jubuenuit." Cf. to. " Lav. n.s. /Etolorum impetum tardaveral primo conjuration i faran Vcarnanicie ; rleindi auditus Philippi ad gredi etiam in intimo it fii RESISTANCE OF AKARNAN1A. 379 prey which the Roman sword had won for them, and the chap.tiii. difficulties and complications of Akarnania remained for the present unsolved. Among the Pcloponnesian states, Elis and Messtme Condition readily joined the Roman and yEtolian alliance ; ' but it was an important object with both sides to obtain the adhesion of Sparta. A scries of revolutions had taken place in that city, some of them while the Social War was still ccoing on, and some since its conclusion. One Sedition of -i Cheil&n, Cheilon, a member of the royal family, who deemed b.c. 21 8. himself to be unjustly deprived of the kingdom, raised a tumult, beginning his revolution with what was now the established practice of killing the Ephors. But he failed in an attempt to surprise King Lykourgos, and, finding that he had no partisans, he fled to Achaia. 2 A Banish- short time afterwards, the Ephors suspected King Lykour- return f gos himself of treason, and he escaped with difficulty into ^' iEtolia. 3 Afterwards they found evidence of his innocence, b.c. 218- J . 217. and sent for him home again. 4 The other King Agesipolis AgCsipo]is is said to have been expelled by Lykourgos after the death of his guardian uncle Kleomenes. 6 Certain it is that he is found as an exile and a wanderer many years after. Lykourgos left a son, Pelops, who seems to have Pelops. 1 Pol. ix. 30. ' J lb. iv. 81. 3 lb. v. 29. It is worth notice that the veoi, who always figure con- spicuously in the Spartan revolutions of this age, appear ou this occasion on the side of the Ephors. The young were the party of Kleomenes, and Lykourgos was suspected of unfaithfulness to his principles. 4 Pol. v. 91. J Such must be the meaning of Livy, xxxiv. 26. But he confounds this Kleomenes with the great Kleomenes ; Pulsus infems ab Lycurgo tijranno post mortem Clcomcnis, qui primus tyrannus Lacedcemone fuit. But what shall we say to a writer who tells us that Sparta had been subject to Tyrants per aliquot estates? Livy's several generations stretch from the great Kleomenes to B.C. 195, about thirty years. 6 About Pelops, see Manso, iii. 309, 389. I do not however see the v v 2 580 ITTRTOItY OF FEDEEAL GEEECE. chap. vni. retained a nominal royalty in common with a certain Madia- Machanidas, who is of course branded bv Achaian writers ' 1 with the name of Tyrant, 1 We must remember that the .Etoiian same title is freely lavished on Kleomenes himself. 2 It nanian was during the reign of Machanidas that the Ambassadors Einiiassies f t ] ie r j va [ Leagues f yEtolia and Akarnania came to at Sparta, ° b.c. 210. plead their respective causes at Sparta. Machanidas, Tyrant as he was, must have respected popular forms, for it is clear that the speeches given by Polybios on this occasion 8 were addressed to a Popular Assembly. The iEtolian envoys were Kleonikos, 4 of whom we have before heard, and Chlaineas, who was the chief speaker. He sets forth the good deeds of .Etolia, which are chiefly summed up in her resistance to Antipater and Brcnnus, and also the evil deeds of Macedonia, which fill up a much longer space. He tells the Lacedaemonians that whatever An- tigonos had done in Peloponm'sos was done out of no love either for Achaian or Spartan freedom, but simply out of dread and envy of the power of Sparta and her victorious ! ' of King. The speech of Lykiskos, the envoy from the Federal Government of Akarnania, is more remarkable. It is an elaborate accusation of .Ktolia and eulogy on Macedonia. It is worth notice, as showing that there was, on every question, a Macedonian side, which was really taken by many Greeks, and that we are not justified in looking at the whole history purely with Athenian eyes. In the eyes contradiction between the two passages, I.iw, x.wiv. 32, and the fragment of Dioddros, 570 (iii. 106, Dindorf). But the matter is of very little importance. i I can Bee no ground for the violent description of Machanidas given by Mr. Dunne in the Dictionary of Biography. He seems to fancy that Machanidas was a Tarentine by birth, heedless of Bishop Thirlwall's i ning, \ in. 2 i Pa (iv. 29. 10), bj a Btrange confusion, makes Machanidas immediate Ij acceed Kleomenes. • Pol. \\. 28 89. ' II'. 37. See above, pp. 58, 558 ■' [b. 32. See above, p. 149 DEBATE AT SPARTA. 581 of Lykiskos, the representative of one of the most honour- geap.viii. aide and patriotic states in Greece, Macedonians, Spartans, and Achaians are equally Greeks ; ' the elder Philip is the pious crusader who delivered Delphi from the Phdkian ; ~ Alexander is the champion of Hellas against the Bar- barian, the hero who made Asia subject to the Greeks. 3 Antigonos is of course the deliverer from the Tyranny of Kleomenes, the restorer of the ancient constitution of Sparta. 4 He sets forth with more force the services of Macedonia as the bulwark of Greece against Illvrian and Thracian Barbarians. 5 The old sins of .Etolia against Akarnania, Achaia, Bceotia, Sparta herself, are all strongly put forward ; G the orator enlarges on the late infamous treaty with Rome, the capture of Oiniadai and Xesos and Antikyra, their inhabitants carried off into bar- barian bondage, and their desolate cities handed over to /Etolian masters. 7 He warns his hearers against the common peril ; war with Achaia and Macedonia was, after all, a struggle for supremacy between different branches of the same nation ; war with Rome is a struggle for liberty and existence against a barbarian enemy. The zEtolians, in their envy and hatred against Macedonia, have brought a cloud from the west, 8 which may pos- sibly overwhelm Macedonia first, but which will, in the 1 Pul. ix. 37. 'E(pi\OTifitls. Cf. above, p. 562. > lb. 33. 3 lb. 34. 'TirrjKOOV eTT017J(T€ tt\v 'Affiav TOIS "EWtJfflV. 4 Tb. 36. 'E/c/JaXwi/ tV rvpavvov K.a\ tovs vopovs Kal t6 irdrptov vfxiv diroKaTfcrrriae iroAiT^v/xa. 5 lb. 35. Ma/ceSoyes ot tV TrAtiui tov fiiov XP^" 0V °" iravovTai Staywi'i- £6fXfvoi irpos tovs fiapfidpovs virhp Trjs twc 'EAXtJi^oip do-. r. 7 7 . 8 lb. 37. 'E7ri(T7ra(Ta',ue»'oi t^KikoOto vi. x\iii. 8 4 Liv. xxvii. 29 PHILOPOIMEN REFORMS THE ACJIAIAN CAVALRY. 563 ;i disciple of the school of Aratos. 1 Tlic League was once ohap. vin. more driven to ask help from Philip. 8 The 1'ossibly they might have dispensed with his help alto- asks help gether ; at all events they might have confined themselves '^ £~P' to asking for a fleet to guard their coasts. The League was now fully able to contend single-handed against any enemies that Peloponnesos could send forth. If a new Kleomenes had arisen to threaten her southern frontier, that frontier was now guarded by a new Lydiadas, and there was no Aratos to thwart or to betray the plans of the new-found hero. Now that Aratos was dead, Philo- Philo- poimen had returned to his native land. He was at once General of elected to the office of Master of the Horse, or Commander a ry " of the Federal Cavalry, 3 a post which was generally under- stood to be a step to that of General of the League. 4 The whole military system of Achaia had become utterly rotten daring the long administration of Aratos, but the ease with which Philopoimen was able thoroughly to reform it shows that the nation must have had in it the raw material of excellent soldiers. He began, as a wise man should do, by reforming his own department. His predecessors had allowed every kind of abuse. Some had mismanaged Abuses matters through sheer incapacity, some through misguided Achaian zeal ; 5 some had tolerated lack of discipline to serve their a ry " own ambitious purposes. The cavalry was composed of wealthy citizens, of those whose favour had most weight in the disposal of political influence, and whose votes would commonly confer the office of General. 6 Some Masters of the Horse had knowingly winked at every sort of licence, 1 Pol. x. 20. EupuAeW 6 twv 'A.x at< * ,/ (rrparriyds &ro\fxoi -f\v kcu tto\c- /juktjs xp eias dWorpios. 2 Liv. xxvii. 29. 3 'lTnrdpxvs- s '''' above, ]>• 281, 552. 1 This is implied by Polybios (x. 22); ol 5e rfjs arpaTriyias dpeyofievoi Std ravrrjs rijs dpxvs, k.t.A. Cf. Pint. Phil. 7. 8 Pol. x. 22. Aid Trjv (Slav dSwa/xiav . . . 5ia rr\v KaKO^TjKtar, k.t.A. 6 See above, p. 295. 584 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. viii. hoping to make political capital out of a popularity so unworthily gained. Men bound to personal service were allowed to send wretched substitutes, and the whole service PMlo- was in every way neglected. PhilopoimC'ii soon brought reforms' 5 *' 1C voim g nobles of Achaia to a more patriotic frame of mind. He went through the cities of the League ; ! by every sort of official and personal influence he worked on the minds of the horsemen, he led them to take a pride in military service, and carefully practised them in the necessary lessons of their craft. An efficient body of Achaian cavalry seemed suddenly to have sprung out of the ground at the bidding of an enchanter.' 2 King The Achaians had placed the worthiest man of Greece chosen m ^ ie second place of their commonwealth, with every General of prospect of rising before long to the first. The rival JStolia, l L ° w b.c. 209. League meanwhile made a stranger election. The Achaians had once given to a Ptolemy the nominal command of all their forces ; " the JEtolians now invested Attains with 1 Hut. Phil. 7. Tas iruAets i-Ki<£v. 2 Pans. viii. 49. 7. 'Enai'^Kwv 5* t's Me-yaAvji/ ir6\ii' auTtKa viro twv 'Axoicuj/ ypero dpx^v kou rov iiririKov Ka\ (rcpas dpiarovi 'EWrfvwv dirtcpaivtv Imrevetv. Philopoimen was more fortunate in liis reform of the A.ehaian cavalry than Washington in liis attempt to raise a volunteer cavalry of the same Borl in 1778. "Sensible of the difficulty of recruiting infantry, as well as of the vast importance of a superiority in point of cavalry, and calculating on the patriotism of the young and the wealthy, if the means Bhould be furnished them of serving their country in a character which would be compatible with their feelings, and with thai pride of station which exists every- where, it was earnestly recommended l>y Congress to tin- young gentlemen of property and spiril in the several states, to embody themselves into troops of cavalry, to serve without pay till the close of the year. Pro- •.i ions were to be found for themselve and horses, and compen a*ion to be made for any horses w hich tnighl be losl in the service. This resolution did nol produce the effect expected From it. The volunteers were few, and late in joining the army. " Marshall's Life of Washington, iii. 492. ' See above, p 387. ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION. . r )8o what seems to have been meant to be a more practical ohap.viii. Generalship. 1 For, as the King of Pergamos was taking an active part in the war, his election was quite another matter from the purely honorary dignity which the Achaians had conferred upon Ptolemy Philadclphos. At- talos first sent troops into Phthiotis, and then came in person to what was now his own island of Aigina. Philip, on his march towards Peloponnesos, defeated near Lamia a combined Roman, .Etolian, and Pergamenian force, and compelled the defeated .Etolians to retreat into the city. Things had strangely turned about since the days B .c. 323- when Lamia had been the scene of a war in which Ma- cedonians appeared as the oppressors, and .Etolians as the defenders, of Greece. Before Attalos had reached Attempts Aigina, ambassadors from Egypt, Rhodes, and Chios ap- g^*^ peared in Philip's camp to offer their mediation ; and part of i Rhodes, one almost smiles to read that the diplomatic body was &,•. on this occasion swelled by an envoy or envoys from Athens. We seem to be reading over again the history of the Social War. All parties seemed inclined for peace ; men's eyes began to open to the folly of letting Greece become the battle-ground of Macedonia, Rome, and rer- sramos. 2 The /Etolians brought forward as a mediator a power of whom Ave have seldom before heard in Grecian affairs, Athamania and its King Amynander. This chief 1 Livy's statements are exceedingly confused. He says first (xxvii. 29), Attalum quoque Regem Asia, quid JEtoli summum gentis suae magistra- tum ad cum proximo concilio detul&rant, fama ertit in Eurqpam trajec- turwm. Presently (c. 30) we find, MUM, duce Pyrrhid, qui praztor in cum annum cum abscnte Attalo creatus crat. This might mean either that Attalos was chosen to be the regular General of the League, with Pyrrhias for his Lieutenant, or that Attalos was made (rrparvyds avroKparup (cf. above, p. 484), Pyrrhias being the regular General of the year. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 288. - Liv. xxvii. 30. Omnium autcm noil tanta pro J : .t<>lis rum crat . . . quam nc Philippus rcgnumque ejus, grave libcrtati futurum, rebus Grcedce immiscerctur. So, just after, Ne caussa aid Romania aid Attalo intra ndi Graxiam essct. 580 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. viii. was the prince of a semi-Hellenic tribe, whose territories Avere surrounded by those of the .Etolian and Epeirot Leagues and of the Thessalian dependents of Philip. The Athamanians took a share on the patriotic side in the Lainian War, 1 but since then their name has not been mentioned. Probably the tribe rose to independence during the decay of the Molossian Kingdom, and, on its fall, continued to form a separate principality, instead of joining the Epeirot League. Of Amynander himself we shall often hear again. Under his mediation, a truce was agreed upon, and a diplomatic Conference was appointed to be held at Aigion, simultaneously, it would seem, with a meeting of the Achaian Federal Assembly. 2 Any treaty which might be agreed upon could thus be at once ratified by the two most important members of the Macedonian alliance, by Philip himself and by the Achaian League. Meanwhile King Attalos was to be warned off or hindered from an attack on Euboia, which he was supposed to Philip al meditate. Philip spent the time of truce at Argos. It would have been very hard for any member of the Anti- gonid dynasty to make out his descent from the old .Macedonian Kings, but, on the strength of such supposed connexion, the Argeian origin of Philip was asserted and allowed. In compliment to this mythical kindred, Philip was chosen to preside both at the local festival of the Seraia and at the Pan-hellenic Games of Nemea. 8 The management of this great national festival was wholly a matter of Cantonal and not of Federal concern; it a\;c- ;i vote of the Argeian people, aot of the Achaian Govern- ment or Assembly, which conferred this high honour 1 I (iod. xviii, 1 1. ; Thia 8eem8 to be the meaning of the two i icpressions <>l Livy (xxvii. 80). It. !„,,-,■ dilata consullatio est in conciliwm Achccorum; amcilioque Roman friendship in r..c. 229 : hardly ground enough for the phrase restitueretur twenty years later. 588 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. VIII Negotia- tions broken off. Philip repulses the Romans. His alter- nate de- bauchery and ac- tivity. JEtolians, and Peigamenians both in sieges and in the open field, was not willing to allow a strip of Roman ter- ritory to be interposed between himself and his Epeirot allies. And, whichever Pylos is intended, 1 it is hard to see on what grounds Messene could just now claim an increase, or even a restitution, of territory. A spontaneous offering on the part of Philip might have been a graceful atonement for former wrongs ; but it was hardly a cession which could be demanded of a victorious prince at a diplomatic conference. It is not wonderful that, on the receipt of such an ultimatum, Philip abruptly broke off the negotiation. He retired to Argos, and there began the celebration of the Nemean Games, when he heard that Sulpicius had landed between Siky6n and Corinth. With that activity which he could always show when he chose, he hastened to the spot with his cavalry, attacked the Romans while engaged in plunder, and drove them back to their fleet, which retired to Xaupnktos. lie re- turned to Argos, finished the celebration of the festival, and then, casting aside his purple and diadem, affected to lead the life of a private citizen in the city of his ancestors. Rut, if he laid aside the King, he did not lay aside the Tyrant ; he made his supposed fellow-citizens suffer under the bitterest excesses of royal lust and in- solence. 1 He was roused from his debaucheries by the 1 According t<> I, ivy, the Achaians were to surrender Pylos. Hut it is quite impossible thai cither tin' Triphylian or the Messenian Pylos can now have been in the hands of the League. Philip had conquered Tri- phylia in tli" Social War, ami he had nut yel given it to the Achaians, il.iv. wviii. s.i it is quite possible thai Philip may have seized on tin 1 other Pylos in one of liis Messdnian expeditions, bul it is still harder to i ceive thai this can have been an A.chaian possession. Whichever Pylos is meant, it is clearly of Philip thai the cession was demanded. Here, as throughout tin period, we have to deplore the loss of the continuous narrativi of Polybios. Schorn (p L85) accepts thi Vchaian poi ession of ' i' • III. Ml l'\ I.. . u Pol. x. 26. Liv. xwii. 81. '|. TInrlwiill, viii. '2S!i. EXPLOITS OF I-1IIUP AND PHTLOPOIMEN. oil!) most threatening of all news for the Achaian cities, the chap. vm. news that an .Etolian force had been received at Elis. 1 The luxurious Tyrant was at once changed into the active King and the faithful ally ; * he marched to Dyme, where he was met by Kykliadas the General of the League, and by Philopoimen, who was still the Commander of the Federal Cavalry. :J In a battle by the river Larisos, the Exploits /Etolians were defeated, and Philopoimen slew with his an( j pi.ilo- own hand Damophantos, who filled the same post in the I""""" Eleian army which he himself did in that of Achaia. 4 In another battle, the allies unexpectedly found that they had Romans to contend with as well as .Etolians and Eleians, and after a sharp struggle, in which Philip displayed great personal courage, they had to retreat. 5 The advantages of the fight however seemed to remain with the allies, who ravaged Elis without let or hindrance. One of the constant invasions of Macedonia by the neighbouring bar- barians called Philip back to the defence of his own kingdom, and about the same time Sulpieius sailed to meet Attalos at Aigina. The two great Leagues were thus left to fight their own battles, and the Achaians had now learned how to fight theirs. In a battle near Messene, 1 Livy's notions of Grecian politics may be estimated by bis idea that Elis was a State which had seceded from the Achaian League ; Eleorv/m accensi odio, quod a ceteris Achceis dissentirent. (xxvii. 31.) "What can he have found and misunderstood in his Polybios ? 9 " Durch die Verhaltnisse gezwnngen erduldeten die Burger unwiirdige Schmach und Beschimpfung ; derm Philipp war ihr Schutzherr gegen Feinde, denen der Staat die Spitze nicht bieten konnte." Schorn, 189. 3 One is almost tempted to believe that Philopoimen filled the office of Master of the Horse for two years together, as we shall find that he after- wards did with tlic Generalship itself. But, if we accept the belief of Schorn (210-4), considered probable by Thirlwall (viii. 295), that the Achaian Federal elections were now (ever since v-f. 217) held in the Autumn, it is possible that all the reforms and exploits of Philopoimen may have taken place during the one Presidency of Kykliadas, from November, 210, to November, 209. There would not however lie the same political objection to the reelection of the l-mrdpxys which there was to that of the o-rparriyus. * Pint Phil. 7. Pans. viii. 49. 7. 5 Liv. xxvii. 32. 591) HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vm. the iEtoliaus and Eleians were now defeated by the un- assisted force of Achaia. 1 Such was the difference between Achaian troops commanded by Aratos and Achaian troops commanded by PhilopoimCn. Character The war continued for about four years longer with yeareof various success. It is needless to recount all the gains ' h " 'o™ and losses on both sides. The ^Etolians continued their 205. ravages in Western Greece, while the combined fleet of Rome and Pergamos cruised in the JSgrcan, descending on any favourable points, sometimes for conquest, some- times merely for plunder. Once or twice, on the other hand, we get a momentary glimpse of a Punic fleet making its appearance in the Grecian seas, as an ally of Philip and the Achaians.* Philip himself shines here and there like a meteor, now giving help to his allies in Greece, now defending his own frontier against the Northern Bar- barians.' Notwithstanding all his crimes, it is impossible to refuse all sympathy to so gallant and active a prince, and one who was becoming more and more truly the pro- tector of Greece against the Barbarians of the West as well as of the North. Only one of his many brilliant expe- Philip's ditions and forced marches need be recorded here. An HgrSSeia? ^Etoliaii Assembly, or perhaps only a meeting of the -" 7 Senate,' met at Herakleia to discuss the interests of the League with their ally and chief magistrate. King Attains. i Liv. xxvii. 33. - Liv. xxvii. 1."', SO. xxviii. 7. i Polybioa tx. 41) [ivos a vivid description of the various calls made apon Philip's energies at one moment during the year 208. His own kingdom was threatened by Illyrians on one side and bj Thracians on the other; he received at the same time applications for help from Achaia, Bceotia, Euboia, Epeiros, and Utarnania. I. ivy (xxviii. 6) transls Polj 1'.' 1 Pol, \. 12. XlvOSjXfvos 5* . . . ruv AirwKwv rods apx ovTas til 'HpaKKuav d0,>oi£tfT0ai X^P 1 " T »" Kuivo\t>yri6i}vai irpds oAAtJAous vntp rwv nwrwi', di>a\aPd>v t^v lvva.ft.iv he rijs 2kotoi/;ni]is Hera cloam indictum, Regemque Attalum, ad consultandum '!<• lummo belli, PHILIP'S CESSIONS TO TI1F. A.CHAIANS 591 The King of Egypt tind the Rhodians were also renewing chap.yhi. their praiseworthy attempts to bring about a peace, and their envoys, as well as others from Rome, sent doubtle on an opposite errand, were present at the meeting at IKrakleia. 1 We have before seen the /Etolians select the time of meeting of the Achaian Federal Congress as the time best suited for a safe and profitable inroad into the Achaian territory.'-' Philip now sought to repay them in their own coin ; he hoped to surprise them in the act of debate, as the Medeonians had once surprised them in the act of election. 3 He came however too late ; the meeting, whether of the whole .Etolian body or only of the Senate, had already dispersed. The Egyptian and Rhodian am- bassadors still continued to labour for peace, but it is almost impossible to follow their movements in detail, 4 and as yet both the contending parties still preferred to make themselves ready for battle. We soon after find Philip at Aigion at an Achaian Assembly. He there made over to Y.'nturum. Hunc conventum ut turbaret subito adventu, magnia itinc- ribus Heracleam duxit. Et concilio quidem iliniisso jam venit. Both Schorn (191) and Thirhvall (viii. 292, 293) take this meeting for a General Assembly. Certainly auvoSos and Conciliwm are the regular words for such an Assembly, yet the words of Polybios seem to imply that the af>x ovres themselves formed the awoSos, and did not merely summon it. i Liv. xxviii. 7. 2 See above, p. 509, 551. 3 See above, p. 415. * Livy (u.s.' makes the Egyptian and Rhodian envoys meet Philip at Elateia ; he tells them that the war is not his fault, and that he is anxious for peace; the conference is broken up by th< news that Machanidas is goiiif( to attack the Eleians during the Olympic (iames. Philip goes to oppose him, Machanidas retreats, and Philip then goes to Aigion. Now this is evidently one of Liyv's confusions. The Eleians were allies of Machanidas ami enemies of Philip. Livy's narrative also gives no place for the speech of the Rhodian envoys (Pol. xi. 5) addressed to an .Etolian Popular Assembly (of iroWol, c. 6), which cannot he the one a; Herakleia, because the presence of Macedonian ambassadors (oi irapd rov iAi7nrou -rrptcrpeis) is distinctly mentioned. I can really make aothing of the account in Appian, Mae. ii. ], 2. See Thirhvall, viii. 295. One thin-- however is clear; from about this time (Livy, xxix. 12) Rome, Pergamos, and Carthage take no active share in the war ; it is reduced to the old Greek limits of the Social War. 592 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vrn. Philip's cessions to the Aehaiau League, B.C. 208. his allies certain Peloponnesian districts which had been in Macedonian possession since the Social, some perhaps even since the Kleomenic, War. 1 These were the Arkadian citv of Heraia, which had once been a member of the League, 2 and the whole district of Triphylia, 8 which had never before been part of the Achaian body. Philip also restored to the State of Megalopolis the town of Alipheira, which he had taken in the Social War. This was an old possession of Megalopolis, which Lydiadas, in the days of his Tyranny, had exchanged with the Eleians for some compensation which is not distinctly explained. 4 This in- crease of territory wonld extend the boundary of the League to the Ionian Sea, and would interpose part of Achaia between Elis and Messene, If it was really made over to the League at this time, 5 it was an important acquisition, and one made at an opportune moment. The League could now, as of old, afford to liberate Grecian cities, for it was now able to withstand any Grecian enemy by its own unassisted force. Philo- poimen < Jeneral Philopoimcn was now at last chosen General of the League. 6 For the iirst time since Markos and Lydiadas 1 Pol. ii. 54. iv. 77etseqq. - See above, p. 108. ;i Liv. xxviii. 8. Bee above, p. 688. 4 PoL iv. 77. 'HKuoi irpost\dfiuvTO Kal rr\v twv 'AXupaptwv ttJKiv, ovaav ^1 dpXV* J** 'ApKaSiav Kal MfyaKriu iroXtv, AuSiaSou tov Mcya\oiro\lrov Kara. tJ)v TvpavviSa irpus rtpas iStas irpd^as dWayrjf Sovtos to?s 'HAtlots. 8 I Bpeak thus doubtingly, because we find these towns, al a later time, in in the hands of Philip, and again ceded by him to the League. Liv. \x.\ii. 5. .wxiii. 8 I. « SeeSehorn, 195, Thirlwall, viii. 296. Thai Philopoimeu commanded at Mantineia as General of the League is clear from the whole story, and follows from Plutarch's words (Phil 11), a-rpaT-^yuvvra t<* StvTepoi>, which otherwise are nol verj clear. According to Schorn's view, be would be , jo, ted in November B.c. 208, bo thai be would be best called the General of the year B.c. 207 j whereas, under the earlier system, the greater pari ol the official year fell in the Bame natural year as the election. The ■ . to have been 211 EuryleOn; 210 9 Kykliadat ; 209-8 i Liv. xxviii. - 7 Philopoimen. FIRST GENERALSHIP OF PHILOPOIMEN. 593 the Achaians had at their head a man capable of fight- chap. vim. ing a battle. Aristomachos, it may be remembered, of the T P1CTUG had once wished to fight one, but he was hindered by BC . 2 os- Aratos. 1 During the long administration of Aratos, 207, pitched battles were rare, and victories altogether un- known. The Old-Achaian cities had never been distin- guished for martial spirit ; and the Arkadian and Argolic members of the League seem generally, on becoming Achaian, to have sunk to the Achaian level. At Megalo- polis and Argos indeed things were in a better state ; we have seen the League, on one occasion, calling, in a marked way, for Argeian and Megalopolitan contingents •' and the Megalopolitan phalanx had been, even in the days of the Kleomenic War, reformed after the Mace- donian model. 3 Elsewhere, whatever military spirit there ineffi- was had died away under Aratos. His successors, Eury- "/thJ le6n, Kvkliadas, and Nikias, seem to have been as in- f r c n ^ mn capable as himself of commanding in the open field, and not to have redeemed the deficiency by his diplomatic powers or his skill in sudden surprises. Polybios 4 speaks with utter contempt of the Generals of this time, and we have seen that one common path to the highest office in the state Avas a course of gross and wilful negligence in the administration of the post next in importance. 5 The League had learned, in the early days of Aratos, to trust to Egyptian subsidies, to diplomatic craft, or,, at most, to midnight surprises ; latterly they had trusted to Mace- 1 See above, p. 444. s See above, p. 550. 3 Pol. iv. 69. Sec. Brandstater, p. 365. 4 He says(xi. 8.) that there are three ways of attaining to military skill, by scientific study (Sid twv VTro/xvrtiJ.a.rwv /ecu rrjs ix tovtwv KaraffKfurjs), by instruction from men of experience, and by actual experience of a man's own. The Achaian Generals at this time were altogether un- versed in any one of the three ; iravrwi' fjaai' tovtuv avtvv6i)TOi oi twu 'AxBicSf ffrparriyol dirKcos. 5 See above, p. 583. Q Q 594 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vin. donian help, 1 and to mercenaries, who never fought with real zeal in the service of a commonwealth.'' But the League had now at its head a man who was a native of the most military city of the Union, who had given his whole life to the study of the military art, and whose most ardent desire was to see the League really independent. PhilopoimOn longed to see his country defended by the arms of her own citizens, not by mercenaries in- different to her cause, or by foreign Kings who used the Achaian League only as an instrument for their own Philopoi- purposes. As Master of the Horse, he had reformed Reforms, the Achaian cavalry ; as General, he determined to reform the whole military system of the League. 3 After so long a period of neglect, reform might have seemed almost hope- less. Philopoimen had first to carry proposals for im- provement through a democratic Assembly ; he had then to impose a course of severe discipline upon men who were in the least favourable condition for it. He had not, like his contemporary Hannibal, to bring brave but untutored warriors under the restraints of military order ; he had the more difficult task before him of making soldiers out of the citizens of a highly civilized and somewhat luxurious nation. The forms of the Achaian constitution probably helped him in his work. If lie gained his first point, he gained everything. In the » 1 Plutarch (Phil 8) gives a good picture of the state of things in these respects. 2 Pol. xi. 18. Under a Tyranny, be tells us, mercenaries fight well, l..r;uise their master will reward them, and will use them, if victorious, for future conquests; bul citizens fighl ill (cf. Berod, v. 78), because they fighl for a master and nol for themselves. Under a Democracy, on the other hand, citizens fight well, because, they fighl for their own freedom, bul mercenaries fighl ill, because, the more successful the c< tonwealth is, the less it u ill need 1 1 1 > i i" sen II I :i The admirable summary of Philopoimen'a reforms i>\ Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 'j'.i.-> B) makes one almost shrink from going again over the sane' ground, I have tried to bring out a few special points into prominence. phtt.opoimen's reforms. 595 three days' session of the Achaian Assembly, it was pos- ohap. vm. sible that his proposals might be wholly rejected ; it was not likely that they should be criticized, spoiled, patched, and pared down in detail. When his proposals were agreed to, it was doubtless a hard task to carry out his scheme in practice ; yet his position had several marked advantages. He had already reformed the service which was filled by the highest class, and he had something like a model infantry to show in the contingent of his own city. And, when he had once received the necessary autho- rity from the assembled People, he had almost unlimited powers for the execution of his plans. There was no King and no Ministrv to thwart him ; there were no Councillors or Commissioners to meddle ; there was no mob of a metropolis to be cringed to ; above all, there were no Special Correspondents to vex the soul of the hero. 1 He had simply to deal with a people whose intellect he had already convinced, a people who had themselves raised him to his high office, a people whose fault was certainly not that of disobedience, fickleness, or ingratitude towards the leaders whom they placed at their head. One vigorous speech in the Assembly '—probably at the Meeting where he was chosen General — settled everything. Let the Achaians, he told them, retain their fondness for elegance and splendour; but let it be turned towards fine arms rather than towards fine clothes and fine furniture ; 3 let men vie with one another, not in objects of mere luxury and show, but in those whose possession would of itself prompt them to vigorous and patriotic action. Eight months of severe training put Philopoimen at the head of an Achaian phalanx which he could really trust. Their i Contrast the good luck of Philopoimen in these respects with the position of a Spartan, Byzantine, Venetian, or Dutch General in past times, or of an English or American General in our own day. » Pol. xi. 10. 3 Pol- xi. 9. Pint. Phil. 9. Q Q 2 596 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. vni. short spears and small shields were exchanged for the full panoply and long sarissa of the Macedonians ; they were practised in every evolution of the phalanx ; and, before his year of office was over, Philopoimen assembled at Mantineia a force with which he did not dread to meet the power of Sparta in the open field. He did not wholly give up the use of mercenary troops, but strangers and citizens had now changed places. His mercenaries were now mainlv Illvrian and other light-armed soldiers ; the real strength of his army lay in the native phalanx and native cavalry ' of the League. The Three With this new force the Achaian General met the Spartan Mantineia- King in a pitched battle near Mantineia. 2 It was the third great battle fought on the same, or nearly the same, ground. 3 b.c. 418. Here, in the interval between the two parts of the Pelopon- nesian War, had Agis restored the glory of Sparta after her b.c 362. humiliation at Sphakteria ; here Epameinondas had fallen in the moment of victory ; here now was to be fought the last great battle of independent Greece. One regrets that, at such a moment, the forces of the two worth iest of Grecian states should have been arrayed against each other; still it cannot be without interest that we behold the last act of the long drama of internal Hellenic warfare. Rome, Carthage, Pergamos,* even Macedonia, had for a while withdrawn from the scene; the struggle was to be waged, as of old, between Grecian generals commanding i Ai the Tarentines (Pol. xi. 12. Liv. xxxv. 28, 29. Thirlwall, viii. 298) "ii l"'tl> sides were qoI natives of Tarentum, but only a particular sort of cavalry, there is no reason why they may nol hare been a citizen force on both si.lcs. Polybios does not imply that they, bul rather that tin- ii'Cwvoi, were mercenaries, Ami, in any case, Philopoimen would have tin native Achaian cavalry, which he had liimself organized. Polybios (xi. 10) uses thi name Mantineia, which tlrss still re- mained m familiar use, ami no1 the more formal title of Anttgoneia. i < > ( i the three battles of Mantineia, Bee Leake's Hlorea, iii. ~>7 '.•:*. * a.ttalo had been called back to hia own kingdom to repel an invasion oi Pi King -I Bithynia. Liv. ucviii. 7. BATTLE OF MANTTNEIA. 597 Grecian armies. If there were foreigners engaged on chap. vm. eitlier side, they were mere auxiliaries, like the barbarian troops which had appeared in Peloponnesos even in the days of Epameinondas. 1 And we have no reason to doubt that Machanidas was a worthy foe, even of Philopoimen. His name of Tyrant he shares with the great Kleomenes ; but he was as clearly a real national leader as Kleomen&s him- self. It is the old strife, the old hatred, between Sparta and the city founded by Epameinondas. Machanidas marched forth, expecting a certain victory ; like earlier chiefs of his nation, he looked upon Arkadia as his destined prey. 2 And no doubt it was with a special feeling of delight that Philopoimen, the follower of Epa- meinondas, 3 stood ready, with the force of Megalopolis and the whole Achaian League, to engage a Spartan King on the ground on which his model had conquered and fallen. The details of the battle are given at length by Third Polybios, 4 who probably heard them from Philopoimen Mantineia himself. It is enough for my purpose to say that, after a BC - 207 - hard fought field, victory remained with the Federal army, and that a trench, which presented such difficulties to Aratos at Ladokeia, now seemed no such unsurmountable barrier either to Spartans or to Achaians. At the battle of Complete victory Larisos, Philopoimen, Master of the Horse of Achaia, slew f the' with his own hand the Master of the Horse of Elis ; now, Achaians - as General of the League, he slew with his own hand the King of Sparta. Had he been a Roman, he might have boasted of the Spolia Opima, like Romulus and Cossus and Marcellus. The death of Lydiadas was now avenged; but we regret to find that the Achaians, in their day of 1 Dionysios sent Celts and Iberians to the support of Sparta. Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 20. 3 Herod, i. 66 ; 'ApxaSiriv /x arrets ; /J.4ya /j.' alrus' ou rot Soicrai, k.t.A. 3 Pint. Phil. 3. . * Pol. xi. 11-18. Cf. Plut. Phil. 10. Pans. viii. 50 2. 598 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. thai. via. victory, were far from showing the same respect to a fallen foe which Kleomenes had shown to their own hero. The corpse of Lydiadas had received royal honours from his conqueror ; the head of Machanidas was cut from his body, and held up as a trophy and an encouragement to the pursuers. It was a victory indeed ; four thousand Lacedaemonians lay dead ; as many were taken prisoners ; the whole spoil remained in the hands of the victors ; and all this was purchased by the most trifling loss on the Achaian side. In point of military glory, it was the brightest day in the history of the League. For a Lacedaemonian army to be defeated in a pitched battle, for Lakonia to be ravaged at will by an invader, were now no longer the miraculous events which they had seemed a hundred and sixty years before. But the fight of Leuktra and the Peloponnesian campaigns of Epameinondas were hardly more wonderful than for a Spartan army, bred up in the school of Kleomenes, to be defeated by a native Achaian force, commanded by an Achaian General, with- out the presence of a single Macedonian soldier, and without the help of a single Egyptian talent. The Achaian army, with its General at its head, now marched as freely through Lakonia as had been done by Kpamcinondas, by Pyrrhos, by Antigonos, or by either Philip. A prouder moment in a soldier's life can hardly be conceived than when Philopoimen crossed the hostile border at the head of the army of his fellow-citizens which he himself had trained to victorv. Fhilo- poimen ravages Lakonia. Nabia Tvr.-inl of Bpai t.i. 1 t'i kwe< n 1 i The remaining events of the war may be hastened over. Machanidas was succeeded at Sparta by one Nabis, a Tyrant in every sense of the word, but who <>f> HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. IX. His dealings with the Achaian League. Philip's devasta- tion of Attica, B.C. 200. of his treaty with iEtolia, lie attacked various cities, in Asia and elsewhere, which were allies or subjects of the League, 1 and, by his cruel treatment of his conquests, he degraded himself, in the eyes of all Greece, almost below the level of the /Etolians themselves. 2 He seems to have defrauded his old allies of Achaia of the Peloponnesian districts which he had professed to cede to them during the Roman war ; 8 he is even charged with an attempt to poison Philopoimen, 4 as he was believed to have poisoned Aratos. He engaged in hostilities, which seem to have been altogether unprovoked, with the Rhodian Republic, 5 with Ptolemy Epiphanes of Egypt, and with Attalos of Pergamos, the cherished ally of Rome. He engaged in a war with Athens, for which something more like an excuse could be pleaded ; 6 but he shocked the universal feeling of Greece by practising the same barbarous and useless kind of devastation of which he and his ^Etolian enemies had alike been guilty during the Social War. 7 Athens, politi- cally contemptible, was already beginning to assume some- thing of that sacred and academic character which she enjoyed in the eyes of the later Greeks and Romans. The destruction of Athenian temples and works of art doubt- less aroused a feeling of general indignation even stronger than that which followed on the like sacrilege when wrouirht at Dion and Thermon. It was this attack on ' Lysimacheia, Kalchfidftn, Kios. See Pol. xv. 22. xvii. 2, 3. 2 Sec I'ol. xvii. 3. ('!'. tin- somewhat later siege of Aliydos, Pol. xvi. 29-34. Lav. xxxi. 16, 17. 3 Sit aliove, f>. 592. That they were detained or recovered by him is clear by his again restoring, or pretending to restore, them at a later time. I.iv. xxxii. 5. •» Pint. I'hil. 12. 5 Philip's war with the Rhodians produced several important sea-fights. Bee the description of those of Lad! and Chios. Pol. xvi. 1-9. « Two Akainaniaiis were put to death at Kleusis for an unwitting profanation of the mysteries. The Akarnanian League complained to their ally King Philip, who invaded and ravaged Attica. I.iv. xxxi. 14. • Bee above, p, 588, 549 SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR. 607 Athens which finally drew Rome into the strife. The chav. ix. justice of the Roman declaration of war cannot be ques- Justice of tioned. Philip had clearly broken the Treaty ; he had on the helped the enemies of Rome and he had injured her allies. si )j™ a He had put himself in a position which enabled the Romans to assume, and that, for a while, with some degree of truth and sincerity, the character of the libera- tors of Greece. It was wholly Philip's own fault, that a Roman, a Barbarian, was able to unite the forces of nearly all Greece against a Macedonian King, and to declare, at one of the great Greek national festivals, that all Greeks who had been subject to Macedonia received their freedom from the Roman Senate and their Proconsul. There is no Phil- need to suspect the Senate, still less to suspect Flamininus feeUnga personally, of any insincerity in the matter. That liberty of Flanu - * * ' » * J minis and received as a boon from a powerful stranger can never be othei " lasting is indeed true. But it does not follow that the philhellenism of Flamininus was a mere blind, a mere trap for Greek credulity, or that the gift of freedom was deliberately designed from the beginning to be only a step towards bondage. One might as well suppose that the servants of the East India Company who first mingled in Indian politics and warfare deliberately contemplated the Affghan war and the annexation of Oude. The second Macedonian War — the second Roman War, Second • Mace- as we may call it from our point of view — was carried on donian by three successive Roman commanders, Publius Sulpicius, u.^oo- Publius Villius, 1 and Titus Quinctius Flamininus. 2 Of these 197 - 1 I take Villius, in Greek OvlWios, to be the name intended by the 'OtiKios of Pausanias (vii. 7, 9). See Schorn, 240. 2 For $\a/j.tv7vos, Pausanias (u.s.) and Appian (Syr. 2) have $\an'ii>ios ; Aurelius Victor (c. 51) and, after him, Orosius (lib. iv. f. iii. ed. Venice, 1483) turn the nomen Quinctius into tiheprcenomen Quintus, so as to change Titus Quinctius into Quintus Flaminius. Aurelius moreover makes him the son of Caius Flaminius who died at Trasimenus. This is not very wonderful in a late and careless compiler, but it is wonderful to find the error repeated by a scholar like Schorn, p. 237. 608 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. ix. three, Titus became something like a Greek national hero. Plutarch ' does not even stop to argue whether Titus or Philopoimen deserved the larger share of Grecian thank- fulness ; the merits of the Roman allow of no dispute or comparison. Titus 2 shone alike as a diplomatist and as a warrior ; he showed himself as superior to Philip in the conference of Nikaia 3 as he did upon the hill of Kynos- Real good kephalai. His real good will towards Greece there seems will of Flami- no just reason to doubt. He lived at a time peculiarly towards favourable to the growth of such a feeling. In earlier times the Romans despised the Greeks with the con- tempt of ignorance. In later times they despised them with the contempt of conquerors. Even Titus himself lived to change from the friend into the patron, and from the patron there are very few steps to the master. But, just at this moment, all the products of Grecian intellect were, for the first time, beginning to be opened to the inquiring minds of Rome. Greece was a land of intel- lectual pilgrimage, the birthplace of the art, the poetry, and the science, which the rising generation of Romans were beginning to appreciate. The result was the existence for a time of a genuine philhellenic feeling, of which the early conduct of Titus in Greece is the most illustrious example. 4 Titus Quinctius was a Roman, and we may be quite certain that he would never have sacrificed one jot 1 Comp. Phil, el l''l. 1. a One can hardly help, when writing from tin 1 Greek side, speaking of him by bis familiar prsenomen, as he is always called by Polybios and Plutarch. It is no1 every Roman who Ls spoken of bo endearingly. i See PoL xvii. l-io. 4 Mommsen, in his Roman History, rory clearly brings oul this fact, hut he is.very severe both on Plamininua and on his countrymen for yielding to siii-h foolish sentimentality. I ronfVss that 1 cannot look on a generous iceful either to an individual or to a nation. But Blotnmf- en'a history of this period, as of all periods, is well worth reading, if the i. ftder will only re erve the right of private judgemenl in his own hands. A trueT and i ■•■ genei mate of Plamininus will be found in Kortriim, iii PHILHELLENIC FEELINGS OF FLAMININl'S. 609 of the real interests of Rome to any dream of philhel- chap. ix. lenism. But, within that limit, he was disposed to be more liberal to Grecian allies and less harsh to Grecian enemies than he would have been to allies or enemies of any other nation. He would have Greece dependent on Rome ; but he would have her dependent, not as a slave but as a free ally ; the Greeks should be Plataians and not Helots ; the connexion should be one, not of constraint, but of affection and gratitude for real favours conferred. He wished in short to make Rome become, what Mace- donia ought to have become, the chosen head of a body of free and willing Greek confederates. For a few years he really effected his object. Macedonia did not retain a Union of single ally, except the brave League of Akarnania, ever states faithful to its friends in their utmost peril. The two great p 112. i Aristainos and Xenophon ; the banished Kykliadaa accompanied Philip. Pol. xvii. 1. l.iv. xxxii. 32. « l.iv. xxxii. 2:?. I'no aninio oinnes, it Macodonrs tamquam eoiniiiimiin patriam tuebantur, it Corinthii dueetn prcesidii Androsthenem, hand us .|ii.iiii civem h ronragio oreatuni sun, Imperio in se uti patiebantur. 1 Bee Bohorn (248), who enlarges on the fan thai Cori&th, .-is b member of the League, had onlj one vote alongside ol Reryneia, &o, But Corinth, as a Macedonian outpost, had no vote anywhere. KABIS AT ARGOS. 617 sthenes, was personally popular, and the Corinthians may chap. ix. have remembered the fate of those cities which fell into the joint hands of Rome and /Etolia. Anyhow, the Macedonian Philokh-s was able to reinforce the garrison, and Lucius, by the advice of King Attalos, raised the siege. Argos, Dyum, and Megalopolis had declined to join in \oting the Roman alliance. It does not however appear that the citizens of Dyme or of Megalopolis thought that this justified them in treason against the Achaian League. A Dymaian citizen, Aiuesidamos by name, commanded a Federal garrison which had been lately placed in Argos. 1 But the Macedonian feeling was strong at Argos f the city Argos was betrayed to Philokles ; Aiuesidamos, after stipulating t ' pi 1 iii Pj for the safe retreat of his troops, himself stayed with a few t B - c - 198 »J companions and fought to the last. 3 The Argeians soon paid the penalty of their treason. In the course of the and ceded next year, Philip, in hopes of winning over Xabis to his x~ a bis, side, made over his ancestral city to the Tvrant. 4 After B,c * 19/ ' a short show of demagogic tricks, 5 the oppressions of Xabis soon reached a pitch far beyond the worst excesses of Philip. Thus both Corinth and Argos, once two of the greatest cities of the League, were now, as in still earlier 1 Liv. xxxii. 25. Presidium erat Achrcoruni nuper impositum, quin- geuti fere juvenes delecti omnium civitatium. 2 The way in which it was shown was curious. In the Argeian Assem- blies the Generals of the State [Prepares, Liv. U.S. See above, p. 256) pronounced the names of Zeus, Apollo, Herakles, and King Philip. Philip's name was now left out. The people demanded its restitution, which was made amid loud cheers. 3 Liv. u.s. 4 lb. xxxii. 40. 5 Xabis really did at Argos, what Kleomencs was in vain expected to do; he abolished debts, divided land, &c. This marks the difference between the two men. The innovations of Kleomenee at Sparta were held to be restorations of the old state of things ; at Argos he did not fee culled on to innovate at all. Xabis, who merely sought a cloak for his own tyranny, carried out the most extreme Socialist measures in both i-ities. Sec above, p. 476, and cf. Korttim, iii. 234. 6 Liv. xxxii. 4<\ Tol. xvii. 17. 618 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. IX. Exploits of the Achaian troops^ Victory of Xiko- stratos at Kleonai, B.C. 197. Achaian troops in Asia. days, dangerous outposts of its enemies. But the Achaian troops had so greatly improved under the teaching of Philopoimen that, under any tolerable generalship, they were now capable of winning a battle for themselves. An- drosthenes, the Macedonian governor of Corinth, ravaged all the neighbouring Achaian Cantons at the head of his mixed host of Macedonians, Corinthians, Thessalians, Boeotians, Akarnanians, and mercenaries of various kinds. At last Nikostratos, the successor of Aristainos in the Generalship, defeated him in a battle near Kleonai, and cleared all the territory of the League of his plundering bands. 1 This happened about the same time as the great fight of Kynoskephalai, and lovers of coincidences affirmed that the two victories were won on the same day. About the same time, also, an Achaian contingent aided in delivering the Rhodian Peraia 2 from Philip's General Deinokrates. 3 One cannot read the narratives of these successes of the Federal arms without again and again forming the vain wish that Philopoimen and Aratos could have changed places. Such was the position of the Achaian League during the second war between Philip and the Romans. Among the other Federal states of Greece, we just iioav hear but little Epeiros. of Epeiros. Soon after the first landing of Flamininus, while he and his army were waiting on the banks of the Aoos, an attempt was made, as before, to bring about a peace under Epeirot mediation. 4 This time, however, the attempt was unsuccessful. The Epeirot General* Pau- 1 I.iv. xxxiii. Iff. a That is, the tonal] Rhodian territory on the mainland, increased in D.c. 188 (mc above, ]>. '211) by the addition of all Lykia and Karia. ■ l,iv. xxxiii. 18. 4 11.. xxxii. 10. 8pea 'lata I'hilippo est, prr Epirotamm gentcm tcntandm pin- is. ( T. above, 699. 5 On the number of the Epeirot Qenerall nee above, p. 162, 599. There •were thr«o sevon years befor.v Attempt at Peace, B.C. 198. AFFAIRS OF EPEIROS AND BCEOTIA. 619 sanias, and the Master of the Horse, Alexander, brought chap. ix. the King and the Consul together. But the demands of Titus, namely the liberation of every Greek state, were such as Philip could not bring himself to yield before Kynoskephalai. 1 The League, as a League, remained charops neutral ; but Charops, one of the leading men of the R onie ° r nation, though seemingly not in office at the time, acted as a strong partisan of Rome. It was by his help, like that of Ephialtes at Thermopylae, that Titus was enabled to turn Philip's strong position among the mountains. 2 The Boeotian League, meanwhile, was strongly attached Bosotia. to the cause of Philip. It was probably confirmed in its Macedonian politics by the loss of Megara. It would seem Bceotia however that the Boeotarch Antiphilos was in the Roman ^"oi^the interest : 3 at all events, Titus and his troops contrived to R ° m ^> 7 b, c. iy / • enter Thebes, so that the Federal Assembly, which was presently held there, could do nothing but accept the Roman alliance by the unanimous vote of all the cities. 4 But the heart of the nation was still Macedonian. Boeotian soldiers served under Androsthenes at Corinth and under Philip himself at Kynoskephalai. 5 The treatment of Bceotia by Titus after his victory hardly bears on our subject ; it shows at once the strong anti-Roman feeling of the people, and the sort of contemptuous magnanimity which a Roman philhellen could, under such circum- stances, afford to display. 6 Akarnania was the home of a nobler race. That gallant akar- people, who never betrayed a friend or evaded a treaty,' clave to Philip to the last. They had seen only the * Liv. xxxii. 10. Quid victo gravius imperares, T. Quiucti ? a lb. 11. 3 lb. xxxiii. 1. * See above, p. 183. * Liv. xxxiii. 27. 6 lb. 27-30. 7 See above, p. 147. So Livy (xxxiii. 16) ; " Dus autem maxime causa eos tenuerat in amicitia Regis ; una fides insita genti, altera metus odiumque iEtolorum. " 7 NA>'IA. 620 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. ix. brightest side of Macedonia and the darkest side of Rome. Firm To them Philip, the Tyrant of Greece, was the true friend fin liPTPtiPP • of the who had defended them against the rEtolians and who i^f' „ had avenged their wrongs on Athens. To them Titus, the to Philip, deliverer of Greece, was but a chief of those barbarians who had carried off their citizens into slavery, and handed over their cities to their brigand neighbours. Shortly before Kynoskephalai, Lucius Quinctius contrived to gain b.c. 197. over some leading Akarnanians to the Roman interest* An Assembly was called at Leukas, 1 at which a sham vote of alliance with Rome was hurried through the House. 2 But the national feeling was too strong to be cheated in this way. A real Assembly was held, in which the Roman decree was repealed and the alliance with Philip was re- enacted. The leaders of the Roman party were condemned as traitors, and the General Zeuxidas was deprived of his office, because he had put the question of the Roman alliance to the vote. 3 The condemned, with a spirit worthy of their nation, refused to fly to the Roman post at Korkyra ; they appeared before the assembled People, they pleaded their own cause, and procured the reversal of the sentences against them. But the League- still firmly adhered to Macedonia. Leukas presently stood a siege at the hands of Lucius, and was taken only by the treachery 1 Cf. above, p. 1 18. '•< Liv. xxxiii. 16, Eo aequo cuncti convenerunt Acarnanutn populi : ncc iis, (|iii convenerant, idem placuit. Sed el principes e1 magistrates pexvicerunt, a1 privatum deere tu m Roman* Boeietatia Herat, hi mimes qui abfaaranl cegre paasL 'I'!,,, distinction between Prineipea and Bfagistratua is again to be noticed. The runner arc men of influence, whether in office or not, In this case clearly aol in office. ;i i,iv. n.s. Zeuxida Preston, quod 'lc el ro retulisset, tmperium i ur. This ., una in show that t lie Akarnanian General like bis JEtolian, hut unlike bis Aohaian, fellow, presided in the Assembly, and i>tit<|iirstJon« if disfranchising the greatest man in Greece. The mission of Aristainos was successful, and Philopoimen remained a citizen of Megalopolis. 8 It is Strange to read that it was out of revenge* for this !i. , .,, M insult that Philopoimen assisted several places which had '"" hitherto been incorporated with Megalopolis in obtaining i'" 1 "" 1 the rank of independent members of the League. 4 This Philo- poimen .it Mega- lopolis, b.c. 194 i BeeSchorn, ]>. 828. ee above, p. '-'•">';. 561. :1 Plut. Phil in. bove, p. 256. Plutarch (Phil. L8) does no1 mention the names of these townships, but numismatic evidence applies the names ol PHILOPOIMEN DIVIDES THE LARGER STATES. <'-< explanation can only conic from writers who did not chap, ix understand the measure. Philopoiim-n's internal policy township into in was to promote the most perfect equality among the depended several cities of the Federation. If these townships were strictly subject districts, their emancipation may have been sought simply as an act of justice, like the liberation of Vaud from the yoke of Bern. And there was another motive which might well be present to the mind of an Arkadian politician. It is clear that, up to this time, the Old-Achaian towns had possessed an undue pre- ponderance ; their ten votes might still outweigh the interests of several of the greatest cities in Greece. The plan which Philopoimen steadily pursued was well adapted to counteract this evil. To erect these dependent town- ships into independent Cantons was to give several more votes to the Arkadian portion of the League, and thus to make the geographical balance more equal 1 But this more remote advantage would be much less perceptible to local politicians at Megalopolis than the immediate loss of dominion sustained by their own city. Even if we suppose these townships to have been, not mere subject districts, but municipalities sharing in the Megalo- politan franchise, still their separation would offend a strong vein of local patriotism, which is to be found everywhere. The dismemberment of the Great City would seem to many to be an evil which more than counter- balanced the real strengthening of the Arkadian interes Alipheira, Asea, Dipaia, Gortys, Pallantion, and Theisoa. There are extant coins of all these places as independent Achaian cities. The list nearly agrees with that given by Pausanias (viii. 27. 7) of those places among the towns united in the owo«kio>os of Megalopolis, which were, not absolutely deserted. They remained in his time as villages only (2x° vffl,/ °< Me7aA.07roA.rTat Kti/ias), excepl Alipheira (and perhaps Pal- lantion), which retained the rank of a city. Alipheira was the district which had before been disputed between Megalopolis and Klis. See above, p. 592. 1 See Thirlwall, viii. 864. S S 2 628 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. IX. Philo- poimen's third General- ship, b.u. 193- 192. War with N"abis. I ndepen- diiit acti of the League. in the Assembly. 1 We can therefore well understand that such a proposal may have made Philopoim§n for a while unpopular at home, and may have given his enemies au opportunity of branding him as a traitor to his native town. How the proposal was carried, we know not, but carried it evidently was. Philopoimen steadily adhered to his policy, and it was followed both by him and by Lykortas on other occasions.'" 1 But if Philopoimen was just now somewhat under a cloud in his own city, he certainly was not so in the general estimation of the League. We have seen the Assembly and the General interfering on his behalf, and the next election once more raised him to the chief magis- tracy. Xabis continued to make inroads into the Federal territory, and he was now besieging Gythion, one of those Lakonian towns which were at least under Achaian pro- tection, if not actually members of the League. Philo- poimcn waged war against him with great success, varied only by a defeat at sea, where the Arkadian was out of his element. These campaigns were waged wholly without Roman or Macedonian help. The League acted inde- pendently in everything. An Assembly at Siku'-n refused to postpone the war till the Roman fleet could arrive, even though a letter from Titus was produced in which that course was suggested. 8 During the same year a Congress of Allies was held at Tegea, in which Aehaians, Epeirots, and Akarnanians planned and carried out the ' it may be doubted whether the State of New Yorl would willingly be cut up into four or live small States, in order to obtain eighl or ten s, i, : ii . or whether Liv< rpool <>i Birmingham would choose t.> purcb .,,, increase of Members :>t the price <>i being divided into several small boroughs. I in the Lakonian towns see above, p. 622. The Messenian towns will be tioned presently. k\ Pagai, the porl oi Megara, coins as an independent Canton, which Bhows thai the like policy was pursued there, , ill,, i :it the reuni f Megara "i a1 ome later time. I INTRIGUES OF THE .KTOLTANS WITH ANTIOCHOS. 029 campaign us freely as could have been done in the days chap. ix. of Markos or Arutos. 1 Meanwhile the /Etolians were intriguing to bring a new Antiochos foe of Rome into Greece. Antiochos of Syria had long been i, v ,),,. threatening war with Rome ; the ^Etolians new induced ~\ ."'] ;','.' "' him to cross at once into Europe. Titus had now returned to Greece with a sort of general commission to look after Greek affairs, but formally as Ambassador along with several colleagues. 2 An /Etolian Assembly was held, to which Titus first sent Athenian envoys to speak for Rome, and afterwards came himself. 3 The majority of the As- sembly was inclined to refuse him an audience, but the counsels of age and wisdom prevailed thus far. 4 These counsels however did not hinder the Assembly from passing a vote to invite Antiochos to come and liberate Greece, nor the General Damokritos from telling Titus, when he asked for a copy of the decree, that he should have one dated from the /Etolian camp on the Tiber. This absurd vaunt in the Public Assembly was followed Treach- by a resolution in the Senate of the Apokletes, 5 such as resolution could hardly have been carried, or even brought forward, % to ]^ in the councils of any other people. In former times the Senate. .Etolian Magistrates had often been charged with con- niving at the robberies and piracies of their countrymen. They now openly adopted the principle on which they had so long secretly acted. It was decreed to seize Demetrius, Chalkis, and Sparta on one day. The attempt on Deme- trius succeeded, that on Chalkis failed. To Sparta Alexa- i Liv. xxxv. 27. " 11'. 23. a Eb. 32, 33. 4 lb. 33. Principum inaximi iei iores auctoritate obtinuere ut daretur iis concilium. 5 lb. 34. See above, p. 336. Schorn (p. 274) says, " In dem Rathe der Apokleten, welcherfast unabhangig vovn I He, wurde demnach der Plan entworfen." Why? The iEtolian Assemblj was clearly sovereign, but it did not follow that it should regulate every detail of every campaign, nan (530 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. i HAP. IX. M order of Xabis by the I'.tolians. Philo- poimen unites Sparta to the Achaian i . a lie, B.c. 192. The union not for- cible, ye1 ii ■;. to I'M feeling. nieiios of Kalvdon led a bodv of horse and foot, who had received orders from the Federal General implicitly to obey their leader in everything. Nabis had asked for /Etolian help, and he believed that Alexamenos had brought it. For a while the iEtolians behaved them- selves as allies, but presently they murdered Nabis at a review. Tyrant as he was, they were not the fitting ministers of vengeance. The blow was dealt so suddenly that it was only the national love of plunder which hin- dered them from seizing and holding Sparta, according to their commission. As it was, they entered the city, but, while they were scattered in search of booty, the Lacedae- monians rallied, and slew Alexamenos and most of his followers. A few only wandered into the Achaian territory, to be there seized and sold as slaves. The Achaian General was not a man to lose such an opportunity. He hastened to Sparta with some troops ; the city was in utter confusion ; he got together an Assembly of some kind or other, 1 and procured a vote by which Sparta Avas united to the Achaian League. It does not appear that on this occasion any violence was used, or any unjustifiable change made in the laws or constitution of the new State." Sparta, after her first admission to the League, retained so much of her old dis- cipline as had survived the many revolutions of the last fifty years. Nor can it be said with strict truth that Sparta was forced into the League. All that Philopoimen did was to take advantage of an unusually favourable moment, and we can well understand the arguments by which he might, ;it that particular moment, easily carry the majority 8 of ;i Spartan Assembly along with him. 1 I. iv. . Evocatie principibus el oratione habitl . . . Bocietati Vchfeorum Lacedten ins adjurorit. - See Schorn, p, 277. 1 I'lul. Phil, IB. 'Villi' )ilv &KOVTWV, roil hi (TVHIttiffUS, irposriydyfro Hal >;.m r in -tim' \ 'Axatnvi T))i/ iriXiv. ANNEXATION OF SPARTA TO THE LEAGUE. t>31 But, even if we did not know what followed, it would be ohap. ix. hard to believe that union with the League was the de- liberate wish of the Lacedaemonian people. Sparta, shorn of all her rank and power, deprived of all her subject territory, was called upon to enter a Federation which had long been her bitterest enemy. She had to enter it as a single town, with a single vote, as the compeer of the petty Cantons of the old Achaia, perhaps even of the Lakonian townships which had just been set free from her own yoke. Such a position must have been felt by every Spartan as irksome and degrading. For a moment, after the Tyranny and the Avars of Nabis, the change would be felt as a relief ; but the very return of peace and prosperity under the Federal Government would bring with it aspirations after a higher national being than the position of a single Achaian city could satisfy. That position might do for Phlious and Sikyon, it might do even for Argos and Corinth, but it would not do for the Sparta of Agesilaos and Kleomencs. Little more than thirty years had passed since a Spartan King had seen all Peloponnesos at his feet ; the wars of Machanidas, and even of Nabis, had shown that the military spirit of the city still survived. And, beside these feelings of special dislike to the Achaian Government, a succession of revolutions had filled Sparta with elements of confusion inconsistent with lasting quiet under any Government. To Philopoimen and the Achaians it naturally seemed the greatest and most glorious of all acquisitions, when the city which had so lately threatened the whole League, was, without striking a blow, by the mere effect of a speech from an Achaian magistrate, changed into a peaceful member of the Federal body. 1 As matters now stood, Greece needed union above all 1 Pint. Phil. 15. @au/xa(TTa>s fiiv ev5oKi/.u]>Tt napa to7s 'Axo"o?x TposKTr]- fraugcos avrols ct|ia>/xa 7roAeais rr]\iKavTi)s kcl\ Sviauif ov ^ndprriv. 032 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. ix. things ; to join all Peloponnesos into one body was a patriotic and a generous project. Unhappily it proved the greater of two evils. Sparta, as a member of the League, proved more troublesome than she had ever been as a border foe. Her affairs as an Aehaian Canton gave a more constant handle for Roman intervention, and for intervention in a worse form than they ever could have done had she retained the position of an avowed enemy. Antiochos elected iEtolian General, B.C. 192. His rela- fcions with Achaia, !'." otia, The annexation of Sparta took place before Antiochos landed iii Greece. On his coming, he was elected General — seemingly General-Extraordinary ' — of the iEtoliau League, with thirty of the Apokletes 2 to assist him in the duties of his office. It will be remembered that Attalos had pre- ceded him in a similar post; 3 and that, even in Achaia, the same office had been conferred, nominally at least, on an Egyptian Ptolemy. 4 He now strove to win the other Federal states to his side. Achaia would have nothing to say to him ; his Ambassadors were heard at Aigion ; Titus himself was heard in answer to them ; the Assem- bly voted to have no friends and enemies but those of Rome, and, with zeal perhaps a little premature, it actually preceded Rome in declaring war against both Antiochos and the .Etolians/ But Bocotia openly joined the invader; he went to Thebes, he appeared in the Federal Congress, and a vote was passed receiving him 1 Liv, xxxv. '15. [mperatoremqu* Regcm appellwndwm censu&rwU. (The formula carries one on Borne centuries.) A, Brandstater (p. 146) fmperaior probablj translates aTpaT-qyds avTOKpdrwp. Phaineas, On' regular General, would hardly be deposed. - Liv, ii. . Pol. xx. 1. Bee above, p. 886. Brandstater (446) " I i-i wohl gewiss, da dreissig mil den Apokleten dieselben Bind." Bui Polybioa Bays rpiixovra rwv dir<>K\r)Twi>, showing plainly thai ilp- A|i"l | ere .i Larger body, and thai these thirty were only a Committee of them See Tittmann, 7 J 7 . i . ' Se< abovi . !• ■;-- ' Liv. xxxv. I ANTIoCHOS IN GREECE. 633 as an ally, though without formally casting aside the chap. ix. Roman connexion. 1 Epeiros, under Charops, — so lately Epeiros, the friend of Rome — played a double part ; the answer given to the King was that the Epeirots would join him, if he came to their country, otherwise they were too near Italy to expose themselves. 2 Akarnania was divided : Akar- Antiochos bought over one of the leading men named n;llua ' Mnasilochos, who won to his side the General Klytos. By a stratagem they put Medeon into the hands of the King, and some other cities joined him. 3 He also be- sieged Thourion, but he raised the siege on hearing that the Roman Consul, Manius Acilius Glabrio, had entered Thessaly. In Peloponnesos, the Eleians openly took his and Elis. side, and asked for troops from him for their defence. 4 The hppes of Antiochos and the iEtolians were shat- Defeat of tered by the victory of the Consul Manius at Thermopylae. ^Th'r!'-'^ Among the results of that battle, the point which mainly mopylae, interests us is the submission of the iEtolians to Rome. The whole story is well worthy of study as an illustration of Roman diplomacy, and it is far from lacking in military interest. xEtolians, fighting on their own soil for their Jftolian national being, were enemies whom even Rome could not B "igi_ afford to despise. The sieges of Heraklcia, Naupaktos, 189 - Ambrakia, and Same in Kephallcnia gave a foretaste of what was to be done on the same ground in our own days by the defenders of Mesolongi. One or two constitutional points are also well brought out in the narrative. One of Sub- the most striking scenes in the war is when the iEtolian /."'^toM-i Ambassadors, with the General Phaineas at their head, to ''" 1 Pol. xx. 7. Liv. xxxv. 47. xxxvi. 6. - PoL xx. :5. 3 Liv. xxxvi. 12. Aliis sua voluntatc affluent ilms, metu coaeti etiani, qui dissentiebant, ad Regem convenerunt. Quos placida oratione territos quuni permulsisset, ad sjk-ui vulgatse clementise aliquol populi Acar- nanice defecerant. 4 Pol. xx. 0. Oi 8t 'HAtToi TTapeKoiKovu Trtunew ri) n6\(i fSo-i'iOttav. (534 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. IX, Koman "Faith." Working of the vEtolian < lonsti- tution. yEtolia becomes iln Depen- denl Ally nf lidiiii', b.c. 189. unwittingly handed themselves over to the Roman Faith. 1 They knew not that, in Roman technical language, this implied an unreserved surrender of themselves and their eountry. Manras was not a foe of the sehool of Titus, and he presently began to exercise the rights of conquest in their harshest form. The iEtolian General found out his mistake, and affirmed that, though he and the Apokletes were ready to submit, yet the National Assembly alone had power to assent to such terms. 2 By the intercession of Lucius Valerius, Phaineas was allowed a truce, in order to consult the supreme authority of the nation. He first consulted the Apokletes, and then, by their advice, summoned the Assembly. 3 The people altogether scouted the notion of submission, and would listen to no reasoning on its behalf. 4 The war therefore went on. The three elements in the iEtolian constitution here come out very plainly. We see the action of the General, of the Apo- kletes, and of the National Assembly, the Apokletes filling the place both of the Cabinet Council and of the Senate in the Achaian svstem. By the treaty, if treaty it may be called, which ended the iEtolian War, the League lost its independence for ever. It became the dependent ally of Rome. It was the first state, within the proper limits of Old Greece, 6 which 1 Liv. xxxvi. '11. 8. Pol. xx. '•'. Oi hUtoKo) tKpivav tirtTptneip rd o\a Mafiw, buvTts clvtovs eis T-fjp 'Pui /xaiup via tip, ovk (156t(s tIpo. Siipa/iip (X (i TOVTO, Tip Of T7JS 7T / ff T ( to S dl>6fJ.aTl TrKaVf)6ivTfS, COS &P Old TOVTO Xtioripov o~(plfftP (\i»v virdp^opTos. napd Si 'Pto/xalon liroowa/xtT t6 Tt €i$ tj\p ir iff tip avTOV tyxtipiffai Kal to ttJv iiriTpoirrjv Sovpat nepl avTov Tip KpaTOVPTt. ■ PoL xx. 10. Sea Brandstater, p. 170, note. :| II.. Bee above, p. 884, 6, 9. 1 111. Outws dirtOtipttoOr) t<) n\rj0os oi'st' oilo" dnapTuv «i!8«is 4ir*f&d\tTO I mean in continental Greece, Bouth of Epeiros and Macedonia. Korkyra and thi Greek cities of Illyria were already in this, oi a still di rot "i 'l' i I' no on Romi . v^TOLIA BECOMES A ROMAN DEPENDENCY. 635 entered into that degrading relation. It might indeed be chat. i.\.. said that all the Greek allies of Rome were practically dependent allies. But such was not their formal position ; in name Aehaia and Rome contracted on equal terms. But yEtolia, though retaining its internal independence, became subject to Rome in all external relations. In the well-known phrase of Roman Law, the League bound itself to reverence the Majesty of the Roman People. 1 This leadership in servitude was a fitting punishment for the Greek state which had been the first to bring Roman fleets and armies into Greece. 2 The loss of dignity was accompanied by an equal loss of territory. The League Dismem- gave up all claim to the cities which had been taken from of iEtolia it during the war ; 3 Ambrakia and other towns became independent commonwealths ; * Oiniadai and its territory was restored to the Akarnanian League ; 5 Pleuron was annexed by the Achaians, who had given considerable aid during the war, and it was probably now that they acquired the still more important and more distant pos- session of Herakleia. 6 As her own share of the spoil, Rome, besides her general suzerainty over IEtolia, took 1 Pol. xxii. 15. 'O 5fj/j.os 6 t&v Aitw\uv tt)v apxh" xal rr)i> SvvacrTelay tov Srffiov raii> "Pwfxaiwv dS6\oos Trjpe'tTw. Liv. xxxviii. 11. Tmp&H/wm maj estate mque Populi Roman i gens JEtolorum conservato sine dolo malo. Livy makes one of his usual mistakes in reporting one of the terms of this treaty. The deserters and prisoners were to be given up t£ dpxovri t$ iv KepKvpa ; that is clearly to the Roman officer in command there. Livy turns this into Coiryrceorum magistratibus, as if it meant the magistrates of the Korkyraian commonwealth. 2 See Thirlwall, viii. 392. 3 Pol. xxii. 15. On the date fixed see Thirlwall, u.s. 4 See Liv. xxxviii.. 44. Schorn (p. 301) remarks, " Griechenland aber ward noch mehr zerstiickelt, als es bisher war ; denn die den Aetolern abgenommenen Orte warden frei and bildeten fur sich unabhangige Staaten." This device was of course part of the Roman policy. 5 Pol. u.s. Liv. xxxviii. 11. H See Pans. vii. 11. 3.; 14. 1. Schorn (301) adds, " Wahrscheinlich war dor crsierc von dem Achaem erobert worden and der andere freiwillig in die Sympolitie getreten." 036 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. IX. Union of Elis and Messene with the Achaian League, B.C. 191. of Flami- with Kephallenia as part of her immediate domain. The island was excluded from the treaty, 1 and was presently con- quered, after a long resistance at the hands of the people of Same. 2 Within Peloponnesos, the Achaians had already been rewarded for their adhesion to the Roman cause 3 by permission to unite Elis and Messene to the League. Since the annexation of Sparta, these two were the only cities of the peninsula which still retained their distinct existence. The relations between Messen6 and the League had commonly been friendly, and it was not very long since Philopoimen had rescued the city from the grasp of the Tyrant Nabis. 4 Elis, on the other hand, as the ally of /Etolia, had always been hostile ; some of the most famous victories of Philopoimen had been won at the cost of Eleian enemies. Yet Elis now seemed less unwilling to enter into the League than Messene. If, in the course of the various Messeninn revolutions, the oligarchic parly had now gained the upper hand, the apparent unwilling- ness of Messene 4 is easy to be understood. Later events clearly show that there was in the city an Achaian and an anti-Achaian party, and that these were respectively the parties of democracy and of oligarchy. However this may be, the Achaian invitation to join the League received no answer but a declaration of war, and it was only by the interposition of Titus himself that Mess&nG was at last induced, with a rather bad grace, to enter the Achaian I'nion. Titus added that, if the v ever had reason to com- plain of the conduct of tin- Federal Government towards 1 Pol. wii. 15. nfj>l St Kec/mAAjji/ias /ui) iVrrai iv Tens avvO^KaiS. "- Liv. xxxviii. -J'.' 80, ■ ^cording t" Plutarch (< at Maj. 12), there was a party in Achaia, ,i i,,, i ;,t Corinth, Patrai, and Aigion, which openlj apported ^ntiochos. ir , 0) the movement was ;i merely local one, and waa easily stifled Schorn (p. 279, 281 i to maki i"" much "i it. • s, i p 612 FINAL UNION OF PELOPONNESOS. <):'./" them, they had only to appeal to him.' If this was said in ohap. ix. the character of a Roman officer, it was a direct breach of the first principles of the Federal relation ; it directly violated the article in the Treaty with Rome which pro- vided that Rome should receive no diplomatic agent from any single city of the League. Titus was, it may be, by this time awaking from his dream of philhellenism, and sinking into a Roman's common way of looking on the rights of other nations. Or rather perhaps, as the per- sonal deliverer of Greece, he would have all Greece look to him as its personal patron and protector. He, Titus Quinctius, not the Roman Senate and People, would be the judge in all Grecian quarrels, and would order every thing for the good of the nation which he loved. But, in either case, he was not disposed to allow any claims of the League to stand in the way of direct Roman interests. The League had bought the island of Zakynthos of a Annexa- certain Hierokles, who had commanded there for its sove- Zakvii'tln^ reign Amvnander, and who, on that prince's fall, seems to prevented " by Flami- have thought that he had a right to dispose of it for minis. himself. 2 The morality of such a transaction seems doubt- ful, and the right of the League to a possession so acquired might well be disputed either by Amynander or by the Zakyuthian people. But it is hard to see on what ground Rome could put in her claim to an island which she had neither purchased nor conquered. So however it was ; Titus, in that quaint parabolic vein which he some- times affected/' undertook to prove that the possession of Zakynthos was not expedient for the League itself. The League was a tortoise, safe as long as it kept within its shell of Peloponncsos, but in danger as soon as it stepped beyond that limit. The same argument would have 1 Liv. xxxvi. 31. Si qua habercnt, de quibusaut recusareatti in posterum eavcri sihi vellent, Corinthwm ml $e venirent. Cf. Schorn, p. 291. " II'. ; Hi. 32. IT. xxxv. 19. H38 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. ix. applied with more force to the Achaian acquisition of Pleuron and Herakleia a little later, to which Titus seems to have made no objection. But Zakynthos, Korkyra, and Kephallenia were all of them possessions which the Romans, like later protectors of Greece, thought good to trust in no hands but their own. 1 The League extended over all Pelopon- nesos, B.C. 191. Relal ion - between Arl, and Rome. The League had thus, in the days of its decline, attained the widest measure of territorial extent to which it could ever have reasonably looked forward in the days of its greatness. It had fallen to the lot of DiophanOs to put the finishing stroke to the work of Markos, Aratos, Lydiadas, and Philopoimcn. All Peloponnesos, together with several places out of Peloponnesos, was united under a single Federal Government. Unluckily this consum- mation, so desirable in itself, came a hundred years too late. Things might have run a different course, if the Achaia of Philopoimen had sprung at once to life under the hands of Markos of Keryneia. But the Achaia of Philopoimen had to deal with an ally whose friendship was more deadly than the enmity of all the Kings and Tyrants against whom Markos and Aratos had to struggle. The bright vision of philhellenic generosity was fast passing a way from the mind of Home, perhaps oven from the mind of Titus himself. The position of Achaia with regard to Rome was one which it shared witli Rhodes, and practically with Macedonia, though Mace- donia had now formally sunk to the state of dependent 1 "The League drew in its head, and the island was given up i<> the Romans." Thirlwall, viii. 887. < T. Liddell, History of R< , ii. 42. Mi. Grote lias remarked thai the acquisition of territory by purchase is much rarer in <>M Greece than in mediaeval Europe. We have seen i ml approaches i" it in the course of our history, as the sale of Aigina t.. . \ 1 1 .■ 1 1 « . . (see above, \>. 582). Tin templated acquisition of b aev State by purcha e finds its parallel in tin' purchase of Louisiana bj the 1 1 niti'd Si.it> :. undei Jeffei on in 1808. I I i ■ i an bridgi i < ■ RELATIONS BETWEEN A.CHAIA \M> ROME. 639 alliance. The League was far too weak to contend obaf.ix. against Rome, or to maintain a really equal alliance with Rome, but it was far too strong to become Rome's mere abject flatterer, like so many contemporary Kings and commonwealths. As territory went in those days, the territory of the League was large ; most of it lay compactly together ; its inhabitants still retained their patriotism and their self-respect ; their friendship was still eagerly sought for by foreign powers ; x they still had statesmen and generals among them, and an army trained to victory under one of the three great captains of the age. 2 Such a nation needed much heavier reverses than any that they had yet met with to bring them down to the level of the Kings of Bithynia and the Demagogues of Athens. Roman vanity was wounded by the existence of a people whom it was impossible to treat as slaves, and whom there was no excuse for treating as enemies. The Roman Senate did not scruple to make use of every mean and malignant art to degrade and weaken a power which, throughout two dangerous wars, had always shown itself the faithful ally, though never the base flatterer, of Rome. The subtle diplomacy of the Senate soon found where the weak point of the League lay. The Achaian, Arkadian, and Argolic members of the Union were now firmly welded together by the Federal tie. Among them we hear of no dissensions, no hankering after separation. These were doubtless those golden days of Pelopon- nesian welfare and harmony upon which Polybios grows so eloquent. 3 But the newly acquired members, joined in some degree against their own will, furnished ad- mirable materials for Roman intrigue. 4 It was easy to 1 See the account of the embassies from Syria, Egypt, and Pergamos in Polybios, xxiii. 7 ct seqq. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 396. 2 PhilopoimC'ii, Hannibal, Scipio. See Liv. xxxix. 50, 52. 3 Pol. ii. 37, 38. 4 I cannot help protesting against the way in which this whole pei 640 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. 11 V ]\ ix. hearken to every complaint, to fan every flame of dis- content, to seize upon every opportunity of meddling in the internal affairs of the League, upon every opportunity of encouraging sycophants and discouraging patriots. Sparta, as we have seen, had been, not indeed forced, but in a manner surprised, into the League. Among the various parties in that divided city, none perhaps heartily loved the Achaian connexion, and some certainly were altogether hostile to it. At Messenc-, though the mass of the people seems to have been Unionist, there was a strong oligarchic faction bent upon Secession. Had the Achaian Government been left to itself, a generation, or less, of prudent administration might have healed all these differ- ences. But the Achaian Government had no such chance allowed it. Possibly too the character of PhilopoimC'ii, brave soldier and honest patriot as he was, was less suited for so delicate a task than the irresistible diplomacy of Aratos. But Aratos himself might have failed, when every one who had a grievance was encouraged to carry it at once to Rome or to the nearest Roman officer. What- ever decision might be given, the mere entertaining such complaints was an insult to the majesty of an equal ally. Roman intrigues with the newly annexed < 'hies. is dealt with by Mommsen in his Roman History. II'' really seeme unable in understand thai a small state ran have any rights, or thai a gene* rmis or patriotic sentiment can find a place anywhere except in the breasl of a fool. Flamininus is called names because, .-it one time a1 least of his life, he was really will disposed towards osi that the ba e traitor KallikratSs was a wiser man than he. The manifest Fact that Rome did Btir up Btrife in Greece, a Facl plainly written in every page of lat. a ( Grecian history, is dismissed amid a torrent of hard words .gainst thi who assert it. Such nun air mere "politisirende Philologen." As the words " politisirende Philologen" do not seem to be German, Greek, or : 1 1 1 \ other Language, it is haul to Know th, a exacl meaning, bul they air clearly u in expression of contempt. But whatever they maj mean, an i'.n gli h i holar may In quite contented to be Bet down as member of the La o Long as I'i ihop ThirlwaU is anothi r, DISTURBANCES AT SPABTA. 641 and a direct breach of the treaty between Achaia and chap. ix. i . Home. As Lykortas once ventured to tell Appius Clau- dius, Rome had no more to do with the way in which Achaia chose to deal with Sparta than Achaia had to do with the way in which Rome chose to deal with Capua. 1 Nevertheless the history of this time is to a great extent the history of the embassies which went to and fro about the affairs of Sparta. Of this long web of intrigue I shall attempt only a short summary. Disturbances began earlv, indeed while the fate of J ir , st rlls ' ° * ' turbancea iEtolia was still undecided. A movement showed itself at Sparta at Sparta ; the General Diophanes, accompanied by Titus Ly'phiio- himself, inarched thither to preserve order. This step was ^"m. contrary to the advice of Philopoimen, who held that, while the war between Rome and Antiochos still continued, the League had better remain quiet. As. his counsel was unheeded, he himself hastened to Sparta, composed the differences there by his personal influence, and left no excuse for either the Roman Ambassador or the Achaian General to enter the city. 2 Two years later, when Philo- Spartan poimcii himself was General for the fifth time, the on p as Spartans, dissatisfied with their new and narrow bound- Bc - 189 - aries, attacked Las, one of the towns separated from Sparta by Titus. 1 The Federal . Government naturally interfered ; an Assembly was held, which heard the com- plaints of the people of Las, and Philopoimen, as Presi- dent of the Union, required of the State Government of Sparta that the authors of the outrage should be given up to the Federal authority for trial. The Lacedaemonian answer took the form of the murder of thirty Spartans of 1 Liv. xxxix. 37. 8 Pint. Phil. 16. Tuv re (rTpaTrjydv rwt> 'Ax a "*> / Ka\ rdv vnarov [Titus was no such thing] t<2v 'Paifiaiayv iSicottjs wv a7r6KAei lb. :!■_'. Omnium civitatium, quae ejus concilii erant, consensu bellum Laci dsemoniia indictum esl . I ||,. Cseterum responsum its perplextun fait, m ei Aohsei aibi de Lacedeemone permiflsuni acciperenl el Lacedsemonii aou omnia concessa Lis interpretarentur. * Hi. 88. PMlopasmem cvntinuatwr magistratus. See Scborn, p Cf. Pol xxii. 2-'>. xxiii. l. Thia passage stronglj confirms the viem (tee above, p. 276) thai the General was now elected late in th( year. Livy clearly implies thai the ueris itvUiwm (oi 188) was nol manj months after Philopoimen's r< elee! ion. SECESSION AND RECOVERY OF SPARTA. 643 Federal army was reinforced by multitudes of Lacedsa- chap. ix. tnonian exiles. The General of the League repeated liis demand for the surrender of the aggressors on Las, and promised them a fair trial. They appeared, but the vio- lence of the Spartan exiles could not be restrained, and seventeen of the accused fell in a tumult. The judicial Execution sentence, by which sixty-three more were executed next a tKom- day, was probably hardly a more regular proceeding. 1 J^'""^ But, considering the aggression on Las, the formal vote of Secession, and the murder of their own Unionist fellow- citizens, it is not likely that they would have found any more lenient treatment before the most solemn tribunal that the League could have supplied. The General now declared his will or that of the League. The walls of Sparta were to be destroyed ; the mercenaries of the late Tyrant, and the slaves enfranchised by him, were to leave the country by a fixed day, on pain of being sold as slaves ; 2 above all, the Laws of Lykourgos, the laws under Change which Sparta had lived through so many ages, the laws Spartan which had reared Leonidas, Agesilaos, and Klcomenfs, were to be exchanged for the institutions of Achaia. The League also, by a fresh vote of the Federal Assembly at Tegea, decreed the restoration of all the Spartan exiles. Severity of this kind may not have been abstractedly Impolicy i* • a t "' Philo- unjust, but nothing could be more impolitic.' It at once poimen's suggests the question — one of the most important of^ t " of questions in our own time — whether a Federal Govern- s r arUl 1 Liv. xxxviii. 33. Sexaginta fares postcro die comprehend, a quibus Pnetor vim arcuerat, non quia salvos vcllet, sed quia perire caussa indicta nolebat, object! mulHtudmi iratce, quum aversis auribua pauca locuti essent, damnati omnes et traditi sunt ad supplicium. This trial seems to have been held before the Military Assembly, held, in war-time, to be invested with the authority of the regular Assembly of the League. See above, p. 27;"i. '-' It would probahly he held to be against Federal Law lor a mi^Ie city to hire mercenaries. See above, p. 536. 3 See the remarks of Kortiim, iii. 282. T T 2 G44 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chaimx. ment either can retain, or ought to try to retain, unwilling members in its Union. The Achaian Government would have failed in its duty, if it had not secured Las against Spartan aggression, and it was hardly to be expected that it should tolerate the establishment of a revolted Spartan commonwealth in the midst of the cities of the League. But the time was emphatically a time for mercy, it was no time for hasty or irregular execution even of the most guilty traitors. Above all, the conduct of the Achaian Government was impolitic, as holding out a fresh handle for Roman meddling. 1 And one or two pettier matters followed, from which it would seem that Philopoimen, while dealing with the old enemy of his city, forgot that he was an Achaian President and only remembered that he was a Megalopolitan citizen. Many of the mercenaries, staving bevond their time, were seized and sold ; but their price was applied, not to any national object, hat to rebuild a colonnade at Megalopolis which had been destroyed by Kleomenes. Megalopolis also recovered the disputed terri- tory of Belbine. Philopoimen seems to have carried the Assembly with him in all these things, as he probably would have carried it with him in any proposals for the humiliation of Sparta But the whole business was utterly unworthy of such a man. It shows how difficult it was for any Greek to rise above petty local passions, and it may perhaps lead us to a still greater admiration of the Achaian statesmen, who usually rose above them in so great a degree. We must bear in mind that Philopoimen could remember a time when Megalopolis was an independent city, if not under a free government, yel at least with Lydiadas for her master, and also that he had before his eyes the work of Epameindndas as the great model of his imitation. From this time onwards, the connexion of the League 1 See Thirlwall, viii. 396. CONTINUED DISPUTES AT SPARTA. 645 with Sparta was the standing difficulty of Acliaian politics, ohap. ix. Ceaseless disputes arose ; Spartan factions complained at Continued . i i • i -i-i i i /-I disputes Home against one another and against the Tederal Govern- at Sparta, incut ; the very exiles whom Philopoimfn had restored shared the old Spartan spirit, and could not endure that the city which had once been mistress of Greece should be cast down to the rank of a single Achaian Canton. 1 At one time, four different sets of Spartan envoys appeared b.c. 184. at once before the Roman Senate.* 2 It should however be remarked that none of them asked for complete separa- tion from the League ; their complaints were against one another, or against particular acts of the Federal body. A moderate Spartan politician would probably see the vanity of attempting to maintain the existence of Sparta as a wholly independent commonwealth. But every Policy Spartan would naturally revolt at the violent change in .Moderate his ancestral institutions and at the destruction of the jw^£ walls of his city. A position of equality with Messene and Megalopolis, to say nothing of Las and Gythion, was irksome, but it might be borne. But the special changes of Philopoimen reduced Sparta below the level of other Acliaian cities ; they violated that internal inde- 1 See Pol. xxiii, 4, 12. xxiv. 2. Liv. xxxix. 33. Some expressions of Polybios (xxiii. 12) are remarkable. The Spartan envoys complain that the city has lost its security and independence — iiri -noXntiav, eirt a A.rj fxlv d\iyois ovffi, Kixl tovtois twv T6(X«5v irepiypr]fx4vcA}i', dirappT]crlaffTov 5e 5ia rd /x-f) /xovov tois koivois $6y/j.a aAAo Kal ko.t iSiav vn-qpertiv roh del Kadiara/xeyois &px<>v(n. These words need not imply any unconstitutional acts on the part either of the Federal Government or of individual magistrates. The Federal constitution rested Larger powers in the chiefs of the League than Sparta had ever vested in her own Kings, and among those chiefs, wo may be sure, no Spartan at this time ever found a place. Without supposing any real oppression, the humiliation of receiving orders from Megalopolis was enough. Compare the praise bestowed hy Plutarch on Aratos (Ar. 11) for Lis loyal obedience to the Federal magistrates, even when citizens of insignificant townships. a Pol. xxiv. 4. Liv. xxxix. 48. Thirlwall, viii. 102. 640 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. ix. pcndence which the Federal Constitution promised to every member of the League. It was natural therefore that every Spartan should wish to obtain the repeal of these insulting ordinances; but it was equally natural that every wise Spartan should wish to preserve the con- nexion of his city with the rest of Peloponnesos. When the Spartans themselves did not speak of Secession, Rome could not decently suggest it. But a little later, during the Messenian troubles, the Senate tried the trick of an b.c. 183. affected neutrality. One of its rescripts ran that the affairs of the League were no affairs of the Roman People ; if Sparta or Corinth or Argos thought good to secede, Roman Rome would not feel herself called on to interfere. 1 The fortfie 69 meaning of this was plain enough ; Rome would be well Dissolu- pi ease( i to see the Peloponnesian Confederation fall tion of the r L League. asunder. 2 Corinth and Argos however knew what was Formal | f t | f ar t we jj to ^ e j ec | away fy, the insidious of Sparta, nm t • and even Sparta soon afterwards — Philopoimen was b.c. 182. , 5, ... , , , ... then no more — definitively renewed her connexion with the League, and set up her pillar like the other Achaian cities;' Quiet in- Of the other two Peloponnesian cities lately annexed, 2JJJ °™ Elis seems to have been the scene of no disturbances, but i:lis - to have settled quietly down into its place as an Achaian Canton. There is no sign that the Eleians distrusted the Federal Government, or were distrusted by it. We have 1 Pol. xxiv. 10. 'ATreKptQr) S( Suirt ovd' Sv 6 Aa/teSaijUoeiW t) Kopiv- 6lu)v fj 'Apytiuv dcpiirrrjTai Srj/nos, ov Sfijaci rovs 'Axa'ods dav/xdfciv idv fxrj npt)s aurous ^ywvrai. Is it possible thai tin- use' ii((v 'Vwuaioof dpirtTaaOai rrj* twv 'Ax«"»>>' ftoKirtlai. ' III \\\ 2, Mtrcl touto (tt))A?j? Trpoypaff'tiJi]s ri/ffiroAtTCVCTO fitrd A \uiwi' )( iitiipri). SECESSION OF MENSEM- - . 047 seen a Federal Assembly held in their city, 1 and the chap. ix. Ambassador sent by Philopoiinen to Home to excuse his doings at Koinpasion was an Elcian named Xikodrmos.* At Messene the question of Union or Secession had state of become identical with the question of Democracy or Oli- M.'s'iln^ 1 garchy in the State Government. When Messcne. was admitted to the Union, some changes in the State con- stitution were made by the influence of Philopoinien, 3 which, we cannot doubt, were changes in a democratical direction. But there was a strong oligarchic party, which hoped to recover its power by Roman help. Its leader Avas one Deinokrates, who is described to us as a good soldier, but as, in other respects, a man of profligate and frivolous, though showy, character. 4 This man visited Rome as an envoy, seemingly not from the Messenian Government, but merely from his own party. He received no open encouragement, yet he contrived to obtain a certain degree of countenance from Titus himself. He Revolt of Messene returned to Greece in his company, and presently he under caused a revolution at Messcne and proclaimed Seces- jutes' sion from the League. 6 Philopoinien, in his seventieth B -°- 183 - year, after forty years of political life, was now General of the Achaians for the eighth time. 7 He was then lying sick at Argos, but he roused himself at the news. He at once sent Lykortas to reduce the rebels. He himself hastened to Megalopolis, and there collected the cavalry of his native city, the sons of the men who had fought beside Lydiadas at Ladokcia and had followed himself to victory at Sellasia, But it was the last campaign of the old hero. 1 Liv. xxxviii. 32. See above, p. 641. - Pol. xxiii. 1. 3 Pol. xxiii. 10. Tb tov Ti'tou 5tdypajxfi.a Kal rrju rov ^iXoiroifjitvoj StopdaxTiv. * Pol. xxiv. 5. 5 Jli. Tlapay(v6fj.€vos els ii)v 'Pw/xriu Trpec/Seimls. On the 7ague use of the word irpea&evTrfs, see above, \>. 535. « Pint. Phil. 18. r Pol. xxiv. 8, 9. Pint. Phil. 18 648 HISTOEY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. ix. His immediate object was to relieve a loyal Messenian town — either Korone or Kolonides 1 — lying to the south of Capture the revolted capital. In a skirmish with Deinokrates, he and exe- cution of was at first successful, but afterwards, surrounded by poimen at numbers, the Achaian General was thrown from his horse, Messene, ant i was carried a prisoner to Messene\ But it soon B.C. 183. _ r became evident that popular feeling was wholly in his favour ; Deinokrates and his Senate therefore hastened to remove their noble captive to a surer keeping. Philopoi- men drank the cup of hemlock " in a subterranean dungeon — the last hero of Achaia, the last hero of Greece, the last whom Plutarch has thought worthy of a place on the bead- roll of the worthies of his country. According to the Achaian constitution, Lykortas, who had been General of the year before, succeeded Philopoi- men in office for the remainder of his term. This seems to have been near the end of the official year, and he was reelected at the next regular Meeting of the Assembly, Sc Ve m r ' wnicn was sllor % afterwards held at Megalopolis. 3 It was soon evident that the revolt of Messene and the death of Philopoimcn were the work of a mere faction, and that 1 Plat. Phil. 18. Koofirjv rrjv xaXovfievyv Ko\uvi8a. Liv. xxxix. 49. Ad prceoccupandum Coronen. See Thirlwall, viii. 405. 2 Plut. Phil. 20. Liv. xxxix. 50. Plutarch adds thai some of tin' Dies- iniam proposed to torture him to death, .-11111 thai they were afterwards Btoned i" death at his tomh (c. -1 1. There is no authority i'<>r either state- ment in Polybios or Livy. It reminds f the crimes which Quintua Curtius and writers of that kind have impartially heaped alike upon Alexander and upon his enemies. ;1 Tin eems to me the only way to reconcile the statement of Plutarch that Lykortaswas elected General {(\6/j.evoi irrparriydv AvK6prav, Phil. 21) s<>< hi a etc r I'liilopoimfin's death, with what we know, from the direel witness of Polybios (xl. 2, Bee above, p. 281 , to have been the constitutional practice of the League. By the death of Philopoimdn, Lykortas, as General of the year b.o, 185 1 (see Livy, xxxix. 85, 86), beca a1 se, without election, General for the remainder of tin 1 year n.c. 184-3. Hut, if the < Irni h of Philopoimdn tools place very shortly before the November Meeting of b ■ 1 8, Lykortas would need an almost immediate reelection to continue liini in office during the year B.c. L88-2. See Schorn, 318, 21. DEATH OF PHLLOPOIMEN. 6 V.) the guilt was in no way shared by the mass of the chap. ix. Messenian people. 1 In the course of the next year, popu- lar feeling compelled Deinokrati-s to sue for peace. 2 It Read- was granted, as was just, on favourable terms. Lykortas, ofMessdnfl by the advice of his Cabinet, 3 required the surrender of the j^jlJL guilty persons, the reception of a Federal garrison into Ma v> the citadel of Messene, and the unreserved submission of all questions to the Federal Assembly. The persons sur- rendered died, at Lykortas' order, by their own hands, and the Assembly 4 decreed the readmission of Messene to the League. In consideration of the damage done to its b.c. 182. territory by the war, the restored State was, seemingly at a later Assembly, exempted from all Federal taxes for three years. 5 But, in accordance with the policy which Philo- Three poimen had followed even with his native city, 6 three of towns the smaller Messenian towns, Abia, Thouria, and Pharai, adl . ul ^ ted ' as mde- were detached from the capital, and were admitted to the pendent Union as independent States, each setting up its own b.c. 182. pillar like Argos or Megalopolis. 7 These towns all lie between Messc-nC> and the Lakonian frontier, 8 a district which it was specially important to occupy with members attached to the Union both by gratitude and interest. 1 Liv. xxxix. 49, 50. Plut. Phil. 19, 20. Pol. xxiv. 12. 2 Pol. xxiv. 12. 3 lb. 'O (TTpaTriyds twv 'AxoiaJf TrapaKafiuv rovs ffvvapxovTas. * lb. "dstrcp €7riT7j5es (ri/ve'/3an'e Tore ira\iv crvvayfcrOai rovs 'Axaioiis its Me-yctA?))/ -koXiv etr\ tt)j/ Scvt ipav avyoSov. This I take to be the regular Spring Meeting of B.C. 182. Now that the official year began in November, the May Meeting would be the Sevrepa o-vvoSos. 5 lb. xxv. 3. 3,we9evTO tt}c ivpos toi)s Mtcrariviovs arrfKiiv, avyxoop-q- aavres avrols irpos to7s aK\ois l. xxiv. -I) aa tin- representative nf one of (lie discontented parties, rlia Fedora] colleague was Bippos, an Argeian, ' Pol. x.W. 8. 'Vtii' tniipai/fOTaTov t 1 which these Meetings were to be held in each city of the phap. ix. League in turn. 1 Aigion, a natural centre enough for the ohl Achaia, was a most unnatural centre for all Pelopon- nf-sos ; and Philopoimen understood Federal principles too well to give the League the curse of a capital any- where else. The change too, as tending to equalize all the members of the Union, quite fell in with his policy. It was part of the same plan which led him to sacrifice some- what of the apparent greatness of his own city by raising her dependent towns to the rank of equal members of the League. 2 It is from an incidental notice during this period that Consti- we learn the constitution of the Achaian Senate. The ()1 ,],',! Kings of Egypt and Asia still continued to seek the Senate, friendship of the League. Many costly gifts were offered by them, which were refused by the Assembly whenever they were thought derogatory to the national honour and "independence. One oifer from Eumenes of Pergamos, Rejee- made during the second Presidency of Aristainos, was of a Eumenes' very strange kind. He offered to give the League one jJ^J hundred and twenty talents, which sum was to be put out members, to interest, and the proceeds applied to pay wages to the Federal Senators at the times of Assembly. 3 The proposal must be taken in connexion with the fact that the Senators so often really formed the Assembly, so that the offer was very like a scheme for taking the whole Achaian League i See above, p. 277. - Liv. xxxviii. 30. Philopoimen summons an Assembly — seemingly a Special Assembly — at Argos, to entertain this question, The Ministers summon another at Aigion. All the world goes to Argos ; the Roman Consul Marcus Fulvius, whom the people of Aigion had call 6fiots. 052 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GRp:ECE. chap. ix. into pay. 1 The offer was rejected; the League had no mind to see its Senators pensioners of Eumenes ; the law forbade either magistrates or private persons to accept such presents ; how then could it be borne that the whole Senate should be bribed in a body ? 2 These arguments were forcibly pressed by an orator named Apollonidas of Sikyon ; the feelings of the Assembly were also strongly stirred up against the King by one Kassander of Aigina, 3 who set forth how his native island, once a free Canton of the League, was now in bondage to the very prince "who offered them this tempting bribe. 4 Legal *\y e ] iave already seen that the Achaian laws required resistance t l to Roman that a Special Assembly should be summoned only to ments. discuss some definite business, and that it could entertain no proposition alien to that business. 5 This law was more than once appealed to by PhilopoimOn in order to escape from the unauthorized interference of Roman officers. When a duly commissioned Roman Ambassador came with 1 See above, p. 307. Pol. xxiii. S. Twv yap vouwv kw\v6vtwv LLT}6iva fxi)Te ISiwtwv /ut{t« twv dpx^vTwv Trapa (iaffiAtws 5a!pa Aa/uPdveiv Kara fxrib" orroiav Tcp&tyacriv, iravras afxa SoopodoKe?rrOa.i irpo h was probably now thai the decree was passed to abolish nil ill and unseemly honours (tks dirpnru? Tt/xds i on Susapear^rai to?s c^kovo- jurjjueVots Kal crvvtvUoKe? toIs iirb rov KaiKi\lov \iyofi(voi%. 654 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. thereon at Rome chap. ix. The demand of Csecilius for an Assembly ' was at last met by a request to know what were his instructions from the Senate ; if he had any to produce, an Assembly should be held to discuss them, otherwise the law did not allow one to be summoned. Ca3cilius had no instructions to show, and he departed without his Assembly. He after- wards complained so bitterly at Rome of the supposed insult which he had received, that it was thought prudent to send Philopoimen and Lvkortas to defend the conduct of the Achaian Government before the Senate. They were told that, as the Roman Senate was always summoned to Discussion hear the Ambassadors of Achaia, so a hearing before the Achaian Assembly ought never to be refused to an Am- bassador of Rome. 2 The sophism is obvious ; it was one thing to assemble the Senators of the Roman City ; it was another to get together all the citizens, or even all the Senators of Achaia, scattered, as they were, over the whole face of Peloponnesos. And, after all, the Roman Senate and the Achaian Assembly did not answer to one another. Great as were the powers of the Roman Senate, it a\;is not, like the Achaian Assembly, the body which actually declared war and peace. That last attribute of sovereignty belonged to the Roman People in their Tribes, and they were certainly never assembled to hear the communications of an Achaian envoy. Similarly, when Titus himself, on his way to a mission in Asia, took the Messrnian Deinokratcs back with him as far as Xaupaktos, lie wrote thence to the Achaian Govern- ment, requiring an Assembly to be summoned. Philo- poim&D was now in (lie last year of his office and liis life. The answer sent was (he same as thai given lo ( 'arilius ; i lie Assembly should be summoned if Titus would, accord An A i niKlv refu in Flami- iiiniis B I 1 Pol. ii O Z( KaiKiAios, npwv ri)v TOVTUV Trpodlftfiriv, 7J£ini' tiii'h uAAoDt avrw trvvdytti' tls e spread over n much wider space. SERVILITY OF THE ROMAN PARTY. 65/ as Tyrants in the Peloponnesian cities. Koine was a chap.ix. Republic; she therefore could hardly establish her slav< as Tyrants, and probably they served her better by exercising a practical Tyranny under republican forms. Charops, it is clear, was the author of cruelties hardly inferior to those of Nabis himself; 1 but Law reigned in Achaia down to the moment of her fall ; Kallikrates could not rob or banish or murder; he could only act as a vile cross between Tyrant and Demagogue, the opponent of every patriot, the supporter of every measure which could exalt his own power at the cost of the national degrada- tion. We first hear of this wretch under the Presidency Presidency of Hypcrbatos, 2 himself seemingly a man of the same )',.,,,,; '" stamp, or perhaps only of the school of Aristainos. At any *l°j 180 ~ rate, he agreed with Kallikrates in openly avowing the slavish doctrine that no constitutional impediment ought to stand jji'',^ 11 ''^.. in the way of implicit obedience to the Roman Senate. 3 bates and . Kalli- This doctrine, of course, had to be maintained m the kratSs. teeth of a strong opposition on the part of Lykortas and Opposi- the patriotic party. The immediate occasion on which Lykortas. Kallikrates is first introduced to us is one of the inter- minable disputes about the Lacedaemonian exiles. The b.c. 179 Senate required their restitution, which Lykortas opposed as unconstitutional. It was determined to send an em- bassy to Rome to lay the objections of Lykortas before the Senate. By what chance it happened that Kallikrates himself was nominated one of the envoys does not appear." i Pol. xxx. 14. xxxii. 21. 2 Pol. xxvi. 1. Hyperbatos is probably a grandson of the person of the same name who was General in B.o. 224. See above, p. 453. Plutarch however writes the name 'XtrepPaTas and Polybios "TnepPaTos. 3 lb. Oi nepl toi> "tTrtp&arov xal KaWiKpariiv rreitfapx*"' TO»S ypo. dn/iKpiiriv Si6ti 5f< EMBASSY AND GENERALSHIP OF KALLIK HATES. 659 Leagues — JEtolia, Epeiros, Akarnania, ami Boeotia, — and chap, ix, to Rome's humble slaves at Athens, bidding them all cooperate in restoring the exiles, that is, bidding them all to pick a quarrel with the Achaians if they could. The patriots were awed, and Kallikrates brought with him a new means of influence, of which we have as vet heard nothing in the history of Greek Federalism. At the next Kalli- election the traitor was raised to the Presidency, and the ,./,.,', historian directly attributes his success partly to deception 6ene J^ and partly to bribery. 1 As soon as he entered upon his 178. office, he at once restored the exiles both at Sparta and at Messf-ne. Our next business is to trace the way in which the Effects of Federal states of Greece were affected by the war between Vitii the Romans and King Perseus, the Third Macedonian War Per feus on the of Roman history. In the course of that war, three of the Federal Greek Leagues were wiped out of the list of independent B .c. 172- states, and Achaia received a blow from which she never 168- recovered. By this time Greece had learned what Roman friendship and alliance really meant. The philhellenic dreams of Flamininus on the one side, the feeling of gratitude for recovered freedom on the other, had now utterly passed away. Things had so changed since the famous Isthmian Games that Rome was now felt to be the enemy of Greece, and Macedonia to be her natural bulwark. Macedonian and Roman lordship had both been tried, and the yoke of Maecdon had been found to be the lighter of the two. And indeed, with Rome standing by Greek the side of both, Macedonian headship over Greece was not Feeling toiovtovs \nra.px* lv ^" to?s iro\iTiv^.a(riv dvSpas oT6s iffri KaWiKpdrys. We may infer from this that Lydiadas and Aratos had acted somewhat more worthily of their illustrious names. 1 Pol. xxvi. 4. Karair\ri^dfxfvos Kal cwrptyaj Tour tf^Aous 5iwi> iv rfj avyKX^rtfi tovs ttoWovs, trpwruv fiev ripfftr] (TTparrjybs, irpds rols &\\oti kixkoIs Kal 8a'po5oK7j0e 1 1. u r 2 660 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. ix. now likely to be oppressive. If not Perseus personally, now on yet at least the gallant nation which he so unworthily the Mace- ' . * 1 1 1 <» i donian ruled, was felt to be the champion and bulwark of repub- lican Greece. Some states openly espoused his cause ; in others it is clear that every patriotic heart wished well to Character him. 1 Perseus, though free from most of his father's o erseus. v ' ces> j m( j v ices of his own, which, though they left him a better man, yet made him, at such a moment, decidedly a worse King. He is described as temperate in his life, and just in his government, and, till he lost his wits among his misfortunes, we hear nothing of any personal cruelty. He was sagacious in laying plans beforehand both in politics and war, but when the moment for action of either kind came, his heart always failed him. Philip, with all his crimes, retained some hold on men's regard, on account of his gallant and kingly spirit, always rising highest in time of danger. Perseus was about as fit to command in a pitched battle as Aratos ; and he had not, like Aratos, the art either of improving a victory or of making up for a defeat. Above all, he was basely and even treacherously covetous, descending to the lowest tricks to gain or to save money. Upon such a prince, the recovered resources of Macedonia, and the general good will of Greece, were utterly thrown away. As in all the Roman wars of this period, two or three incompetent commanders waged two or three unsuccessful <>r indecisive campaigns, till the right man came and restored to Rome that superiority which A\as inherent in Character her arms whenever they were rightly directed. The war "' ''"' . . . war with was spread over the Consulships of Publins Licinius, 1 On Up. popularity "I' Perseus in Oreece, see Pol. xxvi. 5. xxvii. 7; I.iv. \lii. 68; and especially Appian, Mac. i\. I, -1. II'' is accused at Rome, '6ti tt/><)s iroWdiv o(tu>s iv 6\iycf> dyairfro na\ lyraivoiTO. anil again i'm TroWoit t&VtOi hi \apifTfi(fi>s, Ka) (piAfWrji', ko.) (rwvrj^ &px (l - This is certainly rather hard measure, WAR BETWEEN HOME AND PERSEUS. GG1 Aulus Hostilius, Quintus Marcius, and Lucius ,Einilius chap. ix. Paullus. The part played by Titus Quinctius in the war Perseus, with Philip was played by Lucius yEmilius in the war with {^ Perseus. /Emilius seems to have been quite as well dis- Character posed towards Greece as Titus, but his personal good will Vj-:n.nins had no longer the same influence, and he was often made Paullus. the unwilling instrument of cruelties which he abhorred. As before, I will not enter upon the military details of the war, but only trace its events so far as they bear upon the politics of the Federal states of Greece. 1 We have seen that /Etolia was as yet the only com- Depen- mon wealth of continental Greece which had entered into ditionof any formal relations of dependence upon Home. Achaia, Boeotia, Epeiros, Athens, were all, in name, equal allies of Rome ; but ^Etolia had agreed to reverence the Majesty of the Roman People, and to have no friends and enemies but theirs. 2 yEtolia, then, was now a Roman dependency, i After the fall of Perseus Macedonia was divided into four Republics. The size of each district, and some expressions of Polyhios and Livy, may lead us to believe that the internal constitution of each had something of a Federal form. Polybios speaks of their ^nonpar ikt) km o-vveSptaKr) Tro\iTeia, xxxi. 12. cf. XXXV. 4. xxxvii. 4. (This o-vi/eSpiaK?) iroXneia must be distinguished from the /3as aweBpiov, or MaKeSovwv aw&piov, in iv. 23 and xxvii. 8, which is merely the King's Privy Council.) Livy (xlv. 18, 29) speaks of the Concilium of each commonwealth, a word which he commonly applies to the Assemblies of Federal states. He afterwards (xlv. 32) speaks of Synedri as the Senators of the several com- monwealths. On the whole then it is most probable thai each of the four new Republics had some shadow of an internal Federal constitution. Bui 1 doubt the theory of Brandstater (490) that the four together formed a Federation of four Cantons. This probably comes from the words com- mime Concilium gentis in c. 18, and Macedonia concilium in c. 32; bul the former must be explained, or perhaps held to be cancelled, by the more detailed description in c. 2'.», and in the latter the concilium is the £as oWSpioj/ mentioned above. There was no cownubiwn or commerciwm between the Macedonian districts (Liv. xlv. 29), and it suited the general policy of Rome to isolate them from one another. Cf. Kortiim, iii. 311. Probably Livy had no very clear idea of the matter himself. 2 See above, p. '> : '> 1. 662 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. IX. Civil dis- sensions, b.c. 173. Kornan and Mace (Ionian parties. Lykiskos General, u.c. 171. B.C. 171. free in its internal administration, but, in all its foreign relations, bound to follow the lead of Rome without in- quiry. This state of things had at least the advantage of hindering the ^Etolians from practising their old piracies upon other Greek states ; but, according to our Achaian and Roman informants, it had at home only the effect of turning their arms against one another. 1 The forms of the constitution were trampled uuder foot, 2 and the strife of factions led to mutual bloodshed. It does not appear that these contending parties exactly coincided with the respective favourers of Rome and of Macedonia ; debt is mentioned as one cause of dissension ; s it is hinted that both parties appealed to Perseus as an arbiter; 4 it is certain that, when the Roman envoy Marcellus contrived to appease their differences, he took hostages of both parties alike. r> There were however in iEtolia the same parties as elsewhere. The place of Kallikrates and Charops was filled there by one Lykiskos, who was elected General through Roman influence. Hippolochos, Nikan- der, and Lochagos seem to have answered, as nearly as iEtolians could, to Kephalos and Lykortas. /Etolian troops served against Perseus under the Roman Consul Licinius, but, when lie was defeated by the Macedonian cavalry, the /Etolians made convenient scape-goats ; the blame of the defeat was laid on Hippolochos and his friends, and they, with two other ^Etolian officers, were, at Lykiskos' suggestion, sent oif to Rome. 7 After this, 1 Pol. xxx. 11. Liv. xli. 25 or 30 ; xlii. 2. ">■ Till. U.S. "ETUl/J.01 TTfjUs TTO.V 7)0-011/, O.TTO0T)l}l.(llfl4vOt TO.S *pVX&S, d)'jT€ fJ.T)8f /8ouA.t)i/ 5i5 ^uess that somo Magistrates hail tried to procure, either lor themselves or for Borne other accused persons, a legal 1 before He- Apokletes, bul that popular fury prevented them by a massacre. 1 |,j v x iii. g, * in the speech "i Eumente, Lb. 12. - It.. 5. '• lb. 88. 7 I'..], xxvii. 13 lav. xlii. 80. App. Mae. 1". AFFAIRS OF ^TOLIA. 6G3 Caius Popillius and Cneeus Octavius visited both /Etolia chap. ix. and other Grecian states, with a decree of the Senate, b.c. 169. forbidding supplies to be furnished to any Roman officers without its authority. In the Assembly held at Thermon to receive them, they asked for hostages, which they did not obtain. At this Meeting, Lykiskos and Thoas raised insinuations against the patriotic party, and were guilty of gross flattery towards the Romans. A tumult arose ; Thoas was pelted ; and Popillius had the pleasure of rebuking the zEtolians for the breach of order. 1 Soon Perseus afterwards Perseus himself entered iEtolia. The calum- jstolia, nies of Lykiskos had driven a leading citizen named B ' 0, " Archidamos openly to take the Macedonian side. He offered to admit the King into Stratos, but the other chief men of that city shrank from so bold a step ; they called in Popillius from Ambrakia, and Perseus came before the town only to find it in the hands of his enemies. Deinarchos, the iEtolian Master of the Horse, had also been on the point of joining Perseus, but he soon found it expedient to change sides, and to join the Roman army which he had come to oppose. a But, though Stratos was Fart lost, and occupied by Popillius, the whole district of ccmntr y Aperantia, where Archidamos had great influence, openly J oms him - joined Perseus, and Archidamos himself appears among those who clave to the Macedonian King to the last. 3 In the rest of xEtolia, Lykiskos, with a comrade named Tisippos, continued his career. After the battle of Pvdna, ^Einilius Massacre was met in Thessaly by a crowd of suppliant yEtolians, who Bsebius, told him how Aulus Bsebius, a Roman officer, had, at the B,a lti7 ' instigation of Lykiskos, massacred five hundred and fifty Senators or leading men in the council-house, 4 how he had driven others into exile, and seemingly divided the property of both classes among the chiefs of the Roman party. The 1 Pol. xxviii. 3, 4. Liv. xliii. 17 or 19. " Liv. xliii. 22. 3 Liv. xliv. 43. * Liv. xlv. 28. 664 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. IX. Dissolu- tion of the League, b.c. 167 ' Death of Lykiskos, B.C. 157. Affairs of Akar- NANIA. B.C. 171. b.c. 169. Debate in the Akarna- nian As- sembly, Roman Commissioners — the hands of ^Emilius are clear from such iniquity — sat at Amphipolis, confirmed both the banishment and the murders, and merely punished Beebius for employing Roman soldiers on such a busi- ness. 1 Other /Etolians, suspected of patriotism, were summoned to Rome to take their trial there, and a lead- ing man named Andronikos was beheaded on the spot for having borne arms on the Macedonian side.'' It has been supposed that the iEtolian League was now formally dissolved ; y at all events the country sank into utter in- significance ; we only hear that civil strife continued till the death of Lykiskos ; when the land was rid of him, it enjoyed a time of at least comparative prosperity. 4 Of Akarnania we hear but little. That gallant and faithful ally of Macedonia was warned at the beginning of the war 5 that she had now an opportunity of wiping out her old errors by loyal adherence to Rome. Two years later we find the Roman Commissioners, Popillius and Octavius, meeting an Akarnanian Assembly at Thou- rion, which was divided between two parties answering to those of Lykortas and Kallikrates in Achaia. The Roman party, led by one Chremes, went further even than their Achaian counterparts, as they asked for Roman garrisons in the Akarnanian towns. The patriots, led by Diogenes, pleaded that Akarnania was the friend and ally of Rome, 1 Liv. xlv. 31. Cf. Pol. xxx. 10. s Liv. ib. "Duo securi percussi viri insigues ; Andronicus Attdromci lilius .Ktnlns, quod, patrem secutus, arms contra populum Romanum tuliBset, Liv. xliii. 21 or 23. II ll>. xlv. 26. To judge from Liw's account, Hi" heroism of the chiefs would Beem aoi t" have linn Bhared by the people. Bui one would like i" have an Epeirol historian, I 'lilt. .Km. 80. AutiAiov touto irpd^ai /xaKiffra irapa tt)? avrov e ! S i73 any or all of its cities could have been separately. Roman policy therefore seized with delight on any prospect of dis- solving the League of Boeotia, as it would have seized with still greater delight on any prospect of dissolving the more powerful League of Achaia. The Boeotian League alone, among all the Greek states, had ventured to contract a formal alliance with Perseus. 3 This was before the war between Rome and Macedonia broke out ; but of course the act was looked on at Rome as an act of hostility. Oil the first mission of Marcius and Atilius, they were met in Thessaly by Boeotian envoys, who were doubtless chosen from among the partizans of Rome. When they were Intrigues rebuked for the dealings of the League with Macedonia, Martins, they had the indiscretion not only to lay the blame on Bcl/1 Ismenias, the chief of the other party, but to add that the 1 In Pol. xxxii. 22, ol iroWol twv 4v ^oivlkti condemn certain nun as enemies of Rome. Does this action on the part of a single city imply the formal dissolution of the League ? 2 See the details of his cruelties in Pol. xxxii. 21, 22. s According to the speech of Eumeues, Liv, xlii. 12. 668 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. ix. decree of alliance with Perseus had passed the Federal Assembly against the will of several of the cities. 1 The Roman caught eagerly at this opening ; he would give every city of Bceotia an opportunity of speaking for itself ; he would thus know which cities had really opposed the Macedonian alliance. 2 Some of the discontented cities at once sent separate embassies to Marcius. 3 What little Boeo- tian patriotism was left spent itself, after much tumult, in the election of Ismenias to the post of Federal General, and in an effort, under his management, to procure the Roman Dissolu- acceptance of a formal surrender of the League as a of°the whole. 4 It was hoped that, by this step, the utter dissolu- League, ^ion f the 7jm n would be avoided, at the expense of its B.C. 1/1. ... becoming, like /Etolia, an acknowledged Roman depen- dency. This was exactly opposite to the wishes of Marcius, who contrived to obtain separate surrenders from all the cities, except Koroneia and Ilaliartos, which clave desperately to the cause of Perseus, and suffered the extremities of Roman cruelty in his behalf. 8 The Boeotian League, as a body with the least shadow of political inde- pendence, thus passes away for ever. 1 Liv. xlii. 38. Quum culpam in Ismeiiiam, principcm alterius partis, conferrent, ot quasdam civitatea dissentientes in caussam deductas. This of course only means that the votes of those cities were given againsi the Macedonian treaty. Such a minority would be in the position ■ if the New England States during Madison's war with England. 5 Liv. u.s. Appariturum id esse, Marcius respondit, singulis enim cavitations de bg ipsis consulendi potestatem fecturos. : < Hi. 13. * Sir PoL x.wii. 1, 'J. fur an account of the w bole dissension ami tumult. Tin- Thespian envoys come with a separate surrender, ismenias comes with a surrender in tin' name of the whoL League, which was just what Marcius wished I" avoid; Hard koivov irdaas rds iv WoiootIo. miAeis SiSuds lis tt\i> Tuiy irptafitvTwv iticmv. -ffv Si rovro /u.iv Ivo.vtiwto.tov to?s irfpl Tilv WldfiKiov, TO St Hard TrAkiv SitKtTv roi)r Kotairuits oiKti6raTov. So liclow, MarciUfl' Objed IS sai MaKfSdfwv oIkIui'. So Liv. xlii. I t. Id quod mil ■■;,,,. villi. n nt, discuss*) Baotorwm concilio, Liv. -.In 38 \Ihi- i " Sec abovi . p, 210. DISSOLUTION OF THE BCEOTIAN LEAGUE 009 Thus four out of the five Creek Federations vanish from chap. ix. the field of history. It remains to trace the fate of the Aohaia Achaian League from the beginning of the war with the war Perseus to the extinction of Creek independence. Achaia p ereeu 8. was far more powerful, and enjoyed far more consideration, than any other state in Greece. All Peloponnesos was united under a single free constitution ; and, allowing for Spartan and Messenian dissatisfaction, it was still moved by a single will. Such a power was not altogether to be despised, least of all on the brink of a war with Macedonia. It might even have been thought that something like real good will and gratitude was due to faithful allies, who had served Rome Avell against Philip and Antiochos, and who were now so far from taking the side of Perseus that they had — on what special ground avc know not — passed a decree Decree • 1 T • 1 1-1 °' U011 " forbidding any sort ot intercourse between Achaia and intercours Macedonia. 1 The result was that Achaian slaves ran away xX^h!' into Macedonia, and that there was no means of getting andMace ° doma. them back. Perseus, anxious to win the favour of the League, collected as many of the runaways as he could, and sent them back with a letter to the Achaian people, hinting that there was a way by which such losses could be hindered for the future. The President of the League was Xenarchos, whom Livy describes as a private partizan of Philip, 2 but, as he was the brother of Archon, we may probably set him down as a statesman of the school of Lykortas. The greater part of the Assembly wished to Debate repeal the decree ; some were favourable to Macedonia ; j',,!,^.',! others wanted their slaves back again. Kallikratos of "P 6 *'* ° B.C. Ill course opposed the repeal ; Archon supported it. Achaia was the ally of Home, ready, if war broke out, to assist Rome against Macedonia. But that was no reason why 1 Livy, xli. 23 or 28. 2 lb. Qui private gratise aditum apud Regem quterebat. 670 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAT\ IX. Mission of Mar- cellus, B.C. 173. Mission of the Lentuli, b.c. 171. Koman dealings with in- dividual cities. Macedonia should be thus politically excommunicated, why the same international courtesy should not take place between Achaia and Macedonia as between Achaia and any other power. The repeal however was deferred ; Perseus was thought to have treated the League dis- respectfully by merely sending a short letter and not an Embassy. 1 Presently he did send an Embassy to the next Federal Congress at Megalopolis, but the Roman party prevailed so far that his envoys were not allowed to address the Assembly. The next year Marcellus sum- moned an Achaian Assembly, and praised the League ' — it had sunk to that point — for its refusal to repeal the anti-Macedonian decree. Two vears later, while Marcius and Atilius visited the Northern states, two Lentuli, Publius and Servius, went through the cities of Peloponnesos, praising each other for their constancy to Rome in the wars with Philip and Anti- ochos, and hoping that they would continue to follow the same path in the coming war with Perseus/' This diplo- matic intercourse between a foreign power and particular cities was a manifest breach of the first principles of the League. It was worse even than the reception of envoys from discontented cities ; it was a direct attempt to stir up discontent where no discontent existed. To exhort this or that city, and not the League as a whole, to retail) its fidelity towards Rome was to recognize in each city a capacity for separate political action which the Federal Constitution forbade. One cannot doubt that the Len- tuli would have been as well pleased to sec the Achaian cities fall away from their Federal Union as their col- leagues Marcius and Atilius were to sec the like disruption lake place in Boeotia. We may suspect that it had been arranged between them thus to labour for the same end in 1 I.iv. xli. 24 or 29 J II.. xlii. 37 ' lb. xlii. f>. Collaudatfi genti ROMAN INTRIGUES IN ACHAIA. 671 different parts of Greece. The cases indeed were different ; chap, rx. Bceotia had concluded a treaty with the enemy ; Achaia was so firm a friend of Rome as to refuse to Macedonia even common international courtesy. Rut a natural in- stinct led every Roman of the vulgar stamp to do all he could to weaken Greek Federalism, as being the source of all Greek independence and power. But, in this case, the insidious attempt wholly failed ; no Achaian city was tempted to fall away ; the mission of the Lcntuli excited only indignation mixed with contempt. For, in going through the several cities of the League, they addressed their praises of past fidelity to several commonwealths where they were wholly out of place. Elis and Messene, which had fought for Antiochos against Rome, and, we may suppose, Sparta also, came in for the same praises as the elder cities of the League. 1 Shortly afterwards, Atilius and Marcius themselves came Demands into Peloponnesos. They had an interview with the ^ jfar- Achaian General Archon and his Ministry," and demanded a body of a thousand Achaians to act as the garrison of Chalkis till the Roman army landed. To this Archon consented. Considering the alliance between Achaia and I-1US. *& 1 This is the meaning which I get out of Livy's words (xlii. 37), Achats indignantibus eodem se loco esse . . . quo Mcssenii et Elii, i nihil aliml a gente Achseorum petierunt, &c." (xlii. 44). He probably misunderstood the term (rwapxlai, which is equivalent to ffvvapxovres, and that to Stj/ui- ovpyoi. See above, pp. 282, 649. 6/2 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. .char ix. Rome and the large powers of the Aehaian General, this course was perhaps not absolutely illegal ; Archon was one of the sounder Aehaian statesmen, and he was not likely to yield to any requests which directly contra- dicted the Federal Constitution. But it was a dan- gerous precedent for the Government thus to act upon its own responsibility, at the bidding of a foreign power. This again, like the mission of the Lentuli to the sepa- rate cities, may be looked at as another blow struck at the unity, and thereby at the independence, of the Aehaian body. Mission of Next came the mission of Popillius and Octavius, 1 which and Oc- was ostensibly designed to stop such requisitions for the * avms ' future. Such an order was in its place when addressed to iEtolia, which had become a Roman dependency, but it was a monstrous insult when it was addressed to an equal ally like the Aehaian League. The decree forbade any city to grant military help to any Roman officer, except by order of the Senate. 1 ' This clearly implied that it was the duty of every Greek state to obey every order which really Further had the Senate's authority. Again, in defiance of all Federal Federal rights, the Roman envoys went through the several rights. cities, publishing the decree, enlarging on the virtues of the Senate, and threatening all who were not avowed sup- porters of Rome. 3 It was not till after this that they condescended to attend the Federal Assembly at Aigion. It was currently believed that they came with the design of accusing Lykortas, Polybios, and even Archon, before the assembled People, as enemies of Rome. But they did not venture upon an accusation for which they found that there was absolutely no pretence. They therefore did ' See above, p. 668. 2 Liv. xliiL 17 or 19. Senatus-consultum . . . per omnes Peloponnesi urbea contulerunt, Ne quia ullam rem in bellum magistratibua Romania conferret, preeterquam quod Senatua cenauiaaet. J Pol. xwiii. .''.. CONVENTION OF THE MODERATE PARTY. 673 not appear before the Assembly, lnit contented themselves ohap. ix. with addressing a few words of compliment and exhorta- tion to the Senate. 1 The intentions of Rome towards the League were now Conven- tion of tlM made manifest. Every Aehaian statesman who was not M Rome's abjeet slave might feel himself threatened by the Au 5in | behaviour of the Roman envoys both in Achaia and in BC - 17 °- other Greek states. The leading men of the moderate party now held a Convention, to settle their general course of action, and, among other things, to determine what candidates they would propose at the next Federal elections. 2 Lykortas exhorted to strict neutrality ; it was not advisable to help either Rome or Macedonia in a struggle in which it was certain that the conqueror, whichever he might be, would prove a dangerous foe to Grecian freedom. On the other hand, to oppose Rome would be too great a risk ; he at least would not venture on it ; he had already too often opposed the most dis- tinguished Romans and with too little success. Apollo- nides of Sikymi and Stratios of Tritaia took a bolder line ; they would not oppose Rome, but they would openly and vigorously oppose those among their own citizens who served Rome for their own private advantage. Archon, on the other hand, argued that they must yield to the times, and give their enemies no occasion for calumny, lest they should share the fate of the /Etolian Nikander and his companions. The majority of the meeting, including 1 This seems on the whole to be the most likely meaning of the narra- tive in Polybios, where there certainly seems a marked opposition 1" I the proposal, but he spoke briefly ; he had spent largo sums on his costly office, 7 and he feared lest any strong support should be attributed to hopes of private advantage from a graic- 1 The names mentioned bj Polyhios arc, Lykorlas, Pnlyliios, Arke- silaos, and Aristdn from Megalopolis; Archdn from Aigeira ; Stratios from Tritaia ; Xendn from Patrai ; A,poll6nid6s from Sikydn ; and Polyainos, perhaps from the Triphylian Kyparissia (sec Pol. xi. 18^. Others of irse may have been present. 9 PoL wviii. 7. Bee above, p. 651. 3 II). npodufxws avrtp KaTavtvaavrts [ol irtpl tuv ' l Apx w ' /a ) ^tv. Sec above, |>. 288. ' Hi. Eiv tt)i/ Trpu>T7)V ayopiv. I'.ut sir p, 649, 5 III. 'O fiiu #x^ os £8t)Aos tJt fV) rivns vwdpxfi yvcifii^. • S< p. 298 ' See above, p. 201. EMBASSY FROM ATTALOS. '*"•"' ful monarch. Polybios then spoke himself; he showed chak ix. that the decree under which the honours of Ehimene's had been taken away had been misconceived, and carried out in a way not intended by its original authors. It had never been intended to abolish all the honours voted to the King of Pergamos, but only such as were either formally illegal or else in some way disparaging to the dignity of the Achaian nation. A vote was accordingly passed to that effect, and the honours of Eumenes, with the necessary exceptions, were restored to him. 1 The account of this debate also, though its immediate subject is not very important, is one of the most valuable fragments of our history. The mode of conducting diplomatic business, the constitution of the Assembly, the position of the General, the costliness, and therefore the unpaid nature, of his office, are all clearly set forth in the incidental language of a historian who is now describing his own actions. But much more important business was done in the Negoeia- same Assembly. Quintus Marcius was now in Thcssaly. ^arc A decree was accordingly passed, on the motion of the General himself, 2 to help the Romans with the whole force of the League. This being carried, a series of more detailed resolutions were passed. It was voted that the General should collect the army, and make all prepara- tions ; that Polybios and some others should go as envoys to Marcius, offering the services of the League ; that, if he accepted them, the other envoys should return with his message, but that Polybios should remain to undertake the commissariat department, and to provide supplies in all the 1 Pol. xxviii. 7, 10. Envoys were sent at i\v Bame time t«> the coronation (dvaKXriT-jpia) of the young Ptolemy Philoinetor, renewing the, old friendly relations between his dynasty and the League. * II). 10. EUrfveyKav ovv [ot irtpl rdc "'Apxwa] (Is toi>s 'Ax« Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 164) adds, "Bu1 i1 mighl no1 be an impro- bable or unju i surmise, that he also wished to entrap the A.cha into a refusal which might afterwardi bi used as a ground ol accusation linsl tin in. " EMBASSIES FROM THE PTOLEMIES. <">77 EueigetSs, who were now reigning as joint Kings, asking chap. ix. for help against Antiochos Epiphanes of Syria. Thej asked for one thousand foot and two hundred horse, for Lykortas as commander of the whole force, and for his son Polybios as commander of the cavalry. 1 This sort of request plainly shows that, as compared with any power except Rome, the League still held a high place among nations. This embassy at once caused an open division between the two Achaian parties. Kallikratcs, supported by Diophanes and Hyperbatos, were for refusing the required help ; Lykortas, Archon, and Polybios were for granting it. The matter was discussed in an Assembly at Corinth, at which few except Senators seem to have been present. 2 Kallikratcs pleaded the general necessity of keeping quiet, 3 especially while the war between Rome and Macedon was still undecided. Lykortas and his son pleaded the Egyptian alliance, the benefits received from the Egyptian Kings, and the fact that the Roman Consul had declined the offer of Achaian rein- forcements. When the feeling of the Assembly seemed decidedly on the side of Lykortas, Kallikratrs appealed to the presiding Ministers not to put the question, alleging some formal ground which hindered the present Assembly from entertaining it. 4 But, after a while, a Special Meeting i Pol. xxix. 8. a See above, ]>. 307. From the context this would seem to have been an ordinarj and ao1 a special Meeting. If so, we have to choose between the Autumn Meeting of b.o. L69 and the Spring Meeting of B.c. 1*58. The wolds Ko'ivrov rov *(Anr7rou [Quintus Maivius Philippus] tt)u irapa- X(i^o.(r'i.a.v iv ManeSoyia irowvfxeuov, look like the earlier date, and the reference to tin' embassy of Polybios to Marcius as having taken place the year before (t<£ irpoT€puv erei, c. 9) looks like the Later. Bui --<£ irpurtpov €T6i may mean in the last official year, and on the other hand the vapa- Xei/j-ao-La of Marcius seems to have practically Lasted till the arrival of ^Emilius. 3 Pol. xxix. 8. QdaicovTes 5e?i' Kad6\ov fxh' /ht) Trpay/xaTuKOTreTv. 4 lb. 9. Oj wep\ ruv KaWiicpaTi}!/ efe'jSaAoe t<) Sia&ou A tov, Sicurti- navTts toi)s &p\ovTas u>s oik ovarjs f^ovolois Kara, tovs vo/.iovs if dyn. 678 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. Debate at Sikyon on the Egyptian question, B.C. 168. chap. ix. was held at Sikyon which was very largely attended. 1 Here the subject was fully discussed. Polybios set forth his case. The Romans did not need their help ; the Consul Marcius had declined it ; even if they needed it, twelve hundred men sent to help an old ally from whom they had received many benefits, would not hinder a state which could bring thirty or forty thousand soldiers into the field 2 from still helping Rome effectually. On the second day the formal proposals had to be made. Lykortas moved that the proposed auxiliary force be sent to Egypt. Kallikrates moved an amendment that, instead of troops, Ambassadors be sent to reconcile the Ptolemies with An- tiochos. According to the forms of the Achaian Assembly, the decisive vote would not be taken till the next day,' but it was clear that the feeling of the House was strongly with Lykortas. 4 Kallikrates and his party now sought to compass their end in another way. A messenger, whose coming Avas probably preconcerted, entered the theatre with a letter from Marcius, requesting the Achaians, at the wish of the Senate, to send Ambassadors to reconcile the Kings. Polybios and his friends, not choosing directly to oppose a letter from a Roman Consul, withdrew their motion. 5 • The amendment of Kallikrates was carried ; fjovKeveaOai irtpl fSo-qQtlas. \ do qo1 profess to know what the impediment was. Tittmann (68 I) supposes it to refer to some religious objection to the dyop&B&B place oi Meeting. The nexl Aasemblj (c. 10) was held in the theatre. Considering what follows, our might think that the objection was to the BmaUnesa of tin' attendance, bu1 it is not. easy to see why .-t thinly attended Meeting, or attended only by Senators, should be Called dyopa. 1 I'ol. \.\i.\. '.». Merci 5« Ttj/a XP^ V0V . 276. 1 Hi. riaAi^ Si rwv 8ia/3<»uAiW ntportQivToiv dydiv lyiyptro vtai/iids, 7< pi)v vTMpflx" 1 ' ol w «pl tov Avk prav. IK 10, 'Avf x & 'P , )' ra, ' *'" " T ^ v '"po.yuaruiv. EFFECTS OF THE CONQUEST OF MACEDONIA 67i> three Ambassadors, Archdn of Aigeira, Arkesilaos and chap. ix. Ariston of Megalopolis, were to lie sent on an errand whieh Roman diplomacy had failed to effect. 1 Then the Alexandrian envoys handed to the presiding Ministers" a letter from the Kings whieh they had ready for the pur- pose, asking that Lykortas and Polybios might still be sent, seemingly to help with their counsel in the war with Antioehos. § 4. From the Conquest of Macedonia to the Disso- lution of the Achaiau League. B.C. 167-146. The diseussion on the proposed aid to Egypt took plaee Effects in the early part of the year 168, before the coming of (,„,,,, yEmilius and the battle of Pydna. That great victory ';' M "' J ° •> donia marks another stage in the demeanour of the Romans on the relations towards the Greek states. The defeat of Antioehos em- between boldcned them to treat their allies as dependents ; the ^chaia. defeat of Perseus emboldened them to treat their de- pendents as slaves. We have seen how they dealt with other Greek states ; how Leagues were dissolved and eities destroyed ; how the citizens of independent common- wealths were summoned before Roman tribunals, and sent oft" to Rome to meet with sueh justiee as they might find there. The Achaian League could hardly be dealt with in quite so summary a way. If no gratitude was felt for its signal serviees, some little respeet was still felt for a commonwealth whieh eould arm forty thousand soldiers, and whose alliance was eagerly sought for by the Kings of Egypt and Asia. Achaia eould indeed be conquered, like 1 Pol. xxxix. 10. Oj yelp vtp\ rov Tirov [Ne/.i4(Tiov ?] abwar^aavTis 8ia,\veu> dvaKex^f 7 ? ' "' els T V" 'P&/*V> / airpaicToi TeAeair. 2 lb. 'AviSwKav tois &px ovos Karl 76 ri)e 1 ii' ran tout irtp\ T(W AvKirricor i:ai Ka\kiKpdrrjv SiaflnAais. 'I'ii: vii. 10. i tvSpa oitapi ■ ■-■ 61 91 DEPORTATION OF THE THOUSAND ACIIAI ANS. 081 affirmed that the chief men of Achaia had helped Perseus chap. ix. during the war with supplies of money and in other ways. lie railed on the Assembly to condemn them to death; when they were condemned, he would name them. An Assembly whose older members could remember the days of Aratos had not quite sunk to such degradation as this. If any Achaians had aided Perseus, let the Romans name them ; at all events no citizen of the League should be condemned unheard. Prompted by Kallikrates, the envoy answered that all the former Generals of the Achaians were guilty, all were partizans of Macedonia. 1 Up started Challeng Xenon of Patrai, a name already known to us as a states- man of the moderate party; 2 "Then I am one who come under the charge ; I have been General of the Achaians ; yet I have never done any wrong to Home or shown any favour to Perseus ; I am ready to be tried on such a charge by the Assembly of the Achaians or even by the Romans themselves." The conscious innocence of Xenon had carried him too far.' The Roman caught at the imprudent challenge ; he demanded that all whom Kalli- krates named should be sent for trial to Rome. Sent to Depor- Romc they were, above a thousand of the best men of (1 'j j^! Achaia ; whether they were carried off by sheer force, or Thousand . \ i ' 1] it lilllSj whether the Assembly was so cowed as to pass the required b.o. 167. vote, does not clearly appear. Most probably some sort of vote was passed ; for the Senate had the mean hypocrisy to reply to one — perhaps the first — of the many Achaian embassies sent on their behalf, that they wondered at the irpSdu/J-ov, toutov rbv tivSpa ■KposeTTon',ffaro 6 KaWiKpaTrjs e's tououtov cIi'stc avrov kol\ is "to avv eSptov ese\$e7u rb 'Axaidiu tTTticrtv. On avveSpwv see above, p. 263. 1 Tans. vii. 10. 9. 'AireTu\/j.riuo'6tos iirap!>iisc ' r '" )e< l by Polybios, pleaded, in rejoinder to the 151. Senate, that the exiles had never been condemned, and directly begged that the Senate would either bring them to trial itself, or allow the Acliaians to try them. Nothing could less suit the Senate's purpose. A fair trial, whether at Koine or in Achaia, could only lead to an acquittal ; and a release of the victims, whether after trial or without, was held to be dangerous to the interests alike of Rome herself and of the Roman party in Achaia. The Senate, .''I'Ji,',. thus driven to unmask itself, distinctly declared that their release was inexpedient both for Rome and for Achaia. But, ill the \ei-v form of its answer, it took care to strike another Mow at that Federal unity which it so deeply hated and dreaded The legal description of tin- Union 1 Pol, sxxi. 8. Scnal POSITION OF POLYBK ,i:;:; was carefully avoided, and a form of words 1 was employed chap. ix. which could only lie meant as another insidious attempt to stir up division. At this answer the people every- where mourned, not only in Achaia hut throughout all (Greece. 2 But Kallikrates, Champs, and their fellows rejoiced, and ruled everywhere still more undisturbed, while the flower of the Greek nation languished in their Etruscan prisons. One only among these victims of Roman treachery seems P<>>iti affair of the Roman Senate. It was only with the i&vos or noivbv rwv 'Axaiuv that they could have any lawful dealings. 2 Pol. ll.s. KarcL Se rijv 'EAAaSa diayyi\9il. 596) .ut ;, word "I' 'Ii approval ; indeed hi seems to think ii all righl and proper ; the object was " die kindische Opposition [is thai German?] der Il'-ll n muntodl zu i CHARACTER OF ROMAN FOREIGN POLTCY. 685 temptuoua pity of his hearers rather than to any nobler ohap. i.\. feeling. 1 It may be that the Senate foresaw what would come, and set free its victims mainly in order to secure fresh opportunities for intrigue and for final conquest. Even while the flower of the nation was thus detained in Fre Italy, Home did not cease from her intrigues against the in- ,,i Rome. tcgrity of the Achaian Union. It is impossible to conceive a greater tribute to the importance and benefit of the Federal tie than these ^constant attempts to dissolve it on the part of the enemy of all Crecian freedom. The discontent of Dispute between Sparta, never perhaps fully appeased, once more furnished Sparta the occasion. There was a dispute about frontiers between i polis. the Cantons of Sparta and Megalopolis, 2 perhaps the old dispute which Philopoimen had somewhat arbitrarily de- cided in favour of his own city. 8 Cains Sulpicius Gallus, - A 'i^ion 01 O. one of the most distinguished Romans of his time, was Sulpicius going into Asia to collect accusations against King Eu- B-Ci igg_ raem's; 4 for friendly Kings, when they had served their lo9, turn, fared no better at the hands of Rome than friendly commonwealths. He was ordered to stop and settle this little matter on his way, and also, if report says truly, to detach as many cities as he could from the Achaian League. 4 Sulpicius thought it beneath him personally to decide a matter which, as Pausanias remarks, the great Philip had not thought beneath him ; he bade Kallikrates judge between the two contending Cantons. The other part of his commission almost wholly failed All the 1 Plut. Cat. Maj. !'• 2 Pol. xxxi. 9. Pausanias (vii. 11. 1) makes it a dispute between Sparta, ami Argos. See Schorn, 'ill. Considering that the maritime towns of Lakonia were now independent of Sparta, it may be doubted whether the Cantons of Sparta ami Argos were conterminous. 3 See above, p. 644. 4 Pol. xxxi. 10. ■' Paus. vii. 11. 3. Xlposiir((TTa.Kri 5e vwd rfjs fiouAijs tw rd.A\a> iroAtis ovoffas i(n\v olos re cos 7rAei aTToarfjvai. Pol. wxiii. 15. We here gel a glimpse <>r the mode of transacting business of this kind. The Ambassadors of both Bides arc heard ; then they retire, and th< citizens debate the question among themselves. The Cretan envoj Antiphatas was, bj the favour of the General, allowed to return and make a second speech ; but the proceeding was clearly irregular. :t Bee the curious details in Pol. \\\. 20. The boys in the Btreets hooted after Kallikratrs and Andrdnidas as traitors; men would nol bathe in the same water with them, ■ ThirlwalL viii. 472. RETURN OF THE EXILES. W>7 At last the exiles returned; it might have been better ohap. ix. for Greece if they had died in their bondage. Except Polybios and Stratios, no man of any eminence or experi- ence survived among them. The rest had learned nothing and forgotten nothing, and they came back full of a deadly hatred towards Rome, which a sojourn among her Italian allies was perhaps not likely to diminish. Stratios re- Return of i 11 i • t pi Stratios turned, to play, almost alone m the last days of Achaia, and the part of a prudent and honest statesman. Polybios B .c. y i5L returned also, but only for a season. Probably he found that he could do his country more real service by acting as her advocate with his powerful Roman friends than by mingling personally in the affairs of a commonwealth between whose leaders and himself there could now be little sympathy. 1 From this moment the violent anti-Roman party had the upper hand in the councils of the League. We have now reached the beginning of the scries of events which brought about the final overthrow of the last remains of Grecian independence. As Athens was the immediate cause of the war between Causes the Romans and Philip,' 2 so Athens was the immediate final war cause of the war between the Romans and the League. The S^ strange relations now existing between Athens and Oropos do not concern our purpose exeept in two points. The independent action of Oropos throughout the story bears Disputes witness to the utter extinction of the Boeotian League, Athens and we may see another attempt of Rome to reduce *qA the League of Achaia to the same level, when the Senate •' r ]r,,; 150. thought proper to nominate the single city of Sikyon as arbiter of the dispute. 3 Here, as in the mission of Gallus, and indeed in every other act of the Roman Government, we see the same insidious endeavour to tempt the Achaian l 1 See Thirlwall, viii. 17'; '- See above, p. 606. 3 Pans. vii. 11. 4. 688 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. i HAP. IX. A Spartan General of the Leasee. Achaian interfer- ence at ( >r6pos, B.C. 150. cities to separate political action, contrary to the constitu- tion of the League. At a later stage in the dispute, the injured Oropians brought their wrongs directly before the Federal Assembly. 1 The Assembly had no wish for a needless war with Athens, and declined to interfere in the matter. But the League had now fallen so low that its Chief Magistrate was open to a bribe. The present General was a Spartan named Menalkidas, a fact which shows that there was at least no open dispute at this time between Sparta and the Federal power. The Oropians promised this man ten talents, as the price of his bringing an Achaian army to their help ; Menalkidas prudently pro- mised half his gains to Kallikratcs ; and, by the joint influence of the two, a decree was passed for assisting Oropos against Athens. Menalkidas however, Spartan as he was, proved a General of the school of Aratos rather than of that of Kleomenes. Like Aratos in Boeotia, a Menalkidas came too late ; the Athenians had pillaged Oropos before he got there. Then Menalkidas and Kalli- kratcs wished to invade Attica, but the troops, especially the Lacedaemonian contingent, refused to serve for such a purpose. They might well plead that a defensive alliance with Oropos, which was probably all that the Assembly had decreed, 8 did not justify offensive operations against Athens. The army thus returned without doing anything ; but Menalkidas took care to exact his ten talents from the Oropians, and took equal care not to pay the live which he had promised to Kallikratcs.' As soon as Menalkidas' 1 I'au.. \ii. 1 1. 7. " See above, |>. 875. :i Compare the relations between Alliens, ELorkyra, and Corinth. Thuc. i. ll. ■' I tell the story as I Bud ii in our only authority (Paus. vii. 11. 7 12. :■»). I'.ui n;:i of secrel corruption, though probable enough in the main, are always suspicious in theii details, and are likelj to contain ;ih mil' li "i go i|> as of real history. H is especially hard t" understand how Menall ild have exacted the monej from the Ordpiana againsl ir will SfiWl vtto N\ti>a\Kt5a rd xp^ftara ^IcirpaxO^crav. DISPUTES WITH SPABTA. 689 official year was over, Kallikratea impeached him before chap. ix. the Assembly on a charge of treason. 1 He had, so his Novem- j to accuser said, gone as an Ambassador to Rome — doubtless b.c. 150. a private Ambassador from Sparta — and had there acted against the interests of the League, by trying to separate Sparta from it. Now, as Menalkidas could hardly have done this during his term of office, it would have been more seemly to have brought these charges a year sooner, as reasons against electing him to the Generalship. Diaios General. , . ship of of Megalopolis succeeded Menalkidas as General; his Diaios, predecessor now gave him three of his talents to get him ^9 off the charge. This the new General did, and incurred much unpopularity by so doing. The impeachment of Menalkidas seems to have stirred Disputes up once more the old Spartan dislike to the Achaian Sparta, connexion. We now hear of yet another Lacedemonian E embassy to Rome about the disputed frontier. The real rescript of the Senate is said to have ordered Sparta to submit to the judgement of the Federal Assembly on all matters not touching life and death. 2 This answer must have been pleaded on the Spartan side at a meeting of the Assembly. Diaios then affirmed that the exception not genuine ; he maintained that the lives of the Lace- daemonians present were at the mercy of the Assembly, and he seems to have called upon them at once to stand their trial on a charge of treason. 3 The Spartans proposed to appeal to the Roman Senate ; the President quoted 1 Pans. vii. 12. 2. nauffa/itvof rrjs dpxvs Mfva\KiSav tSiuiKtv 4v roh 'Axa'oTs Oav&Tov b"iKr\v. It is dangerous to draw political inferences from the language of Pausanias in the way that we do from that of Polybios. Do the words iravo-d^fvov rrjs dpxys imply something like an Attic evBvvrj at the end of the Presidential year, or are we to infer that the President could not be impeached while he remained in office ? 2 lb. 4. KaTtxptvyovm Sf avro7s ■npotiTrtv tJ 0ov\t) hiKa^taBai ra &\ka. ■nk-fiv ^"X*? 5 to fvvfSpitfi tw 'Axaitav. 3 lb. 5. Oi ftiv 5t) iiKa^fiv Aa.Kfb'a.ifxoviais ■/j^iovv kcl\ i/Vtp rrjt iKaaTov Y V 690 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. ;CHAP. IX. Diaios before Sparta. Death of Kalli- k rates, B.C. 149. that great and primary article of the Federal Constitution, engraved no doubt on every pillar in every city, which forbade any single State to hold diplomatic intercourse with foreign powers. 1 War now broke out between the League and its troublesome member, though Diaios took care to affirm that he made war, not on Sparta, but on the disturbers of her peace. 2 The Spartans, unable to resist the whole force of the Union, sent private embassies to the General and to the several cities. They got the same answer everywhere ; no city could refuse its con- tingent to an expedition lawfully ordered by the Federal General. 3 Diaios now advanced on Sparta. By this time any real Unionist sentiment which existed there must have been pretty well stifled ; the State Government 4 however did not venture on open resistance. They asked the General to name the guilty persons ; he named twenty- four of the chief citizens of Sparta. One Agasisthenes, a leading Spartan, then suggested an ingenious way of at least staving off the danger. Let the twenty-four at once fly to Rome, where they would undoubtedly find means of restoration. When they are gone, let the Spartan Govern- ment condemn them to death, and so save appearances with the League. So they did; and Diaios and Kallikrates were sent to Rome after them by the Federal Government. Kallikratrs died on the road ; Pausanias doubts whether 1 Pans. vii. 12. 5. 'Axo'"' 8s dvTeXa/n^dvovro av9is &\\ov \6yov, v6\fit ucrai TtKovffiv <"s 'Ax<«oi)s ^7j8«ju(ai/ i dirocrrfWfiv. See above, p. 262. 5 Il>. fi. "E(pa(TKtV Ol) TT) 2,TrdpTT) Tols 5f TCipdlTffOVfflV airr)v iro\tfi^(Twv d.r a loss to his chaf.iz. country. 1 It is at least possible that he might have pre- vented some of the evils which followed. Diaios and Menalkidas disputed before the Senate, and carried off a rescript, which either must have been singularly am- biguous, or else one party or the other must have lied even beyond the usual measure of diplomatists. According to Pausanias, the real answer was simply that the Senate would send Ambassadors to settle all differences on the spot. But Diaios affirmed in the Federal Assembly that the Lacedaemonians were ordered to submit to the Federal power in everything. Menalkidas meanwhile affirmed in the State Assembly of Sparta that the Senate had decreed Damo- that Sparta should be wholly separated from the League. 2 elected Damokritos now succeeded Diaios in the Generalship, and ^; enera |« 1 7 .November, made vigorous preparations for war with Sparta. b.o. 149. Rome was just now engaged in a fourth Macedonian Fourth War. The four Republics, as might be expected, did not ^jan answer ; 3 a claimant of the crown, a real or pretended War > Philip, arose, and ran through a brief alternation of 148. victory and defeat, much like those of the other Philip and of Perseus. The war ended in the reduction of Macedonia to a Roman Province. Just at this moment, Mediation the Prcetor Quintus Owcilius Metellus, who fills in this c»ciliua war the place of Flamininus and iEmilius in the former Metellus wars, entered Macedonia. Metellus was a man of much the same stamp as his two great predecessors, a brave and 1 PaUS. vii. 12. 8. Ot)5e olSa el dcptKO/xevos e's 'Pcw'.utjj' was dijOeis 6vras STj/xoKpariK^s teal ffvveSptaKrjs iroKtrelas aracnd^eiv irpos avrovs. See above, p. 661. V Y 2 692 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. cnAP. ix. Victory and banish- ment of Damo- kritos, B.C. 148. Second General- ship of Diaios, B.C. 148- 147. skilful soldier, a faithful servant of Rome, but evidently disposed to deal as gently with Grecian enemies as he could. As some Roman Ambassadors were passing by on their road to Asia, they turned aside, at his request, and asked the Achaian Government 1 to suspend hostili- ties till the Commissioners should come from Rome to settle the differences between Sparta and the League. Damokritos would not hearken, and by this time the old Spartan spirit was aroused. A pitched battle took place; the Spartans, far inferior in numbers, were utterly routed ; Damokritos, it was thought, might have taken the city if he had chosen. He was tried as a traitor, perhaps when his year of office had expired, 2 and was condemned to a fine of fifty talents. He went into exile, and Diaios succeeded him as General. Metellus now sent another embassy, again asking the new General to refrain from any further action against Sparta till the Roman Com- missioners should come. He promised to obey, and he did obey so far as not to carry on any open hostilities ; but he left Federal garrisons in those Lakonian towns which were now independent members of the League, and which were doubtless the bitterest enemies of Sparta to be found in the whole compass of the Union. 3 We may well believe that neither the citizens of these 1 Paus. vii. 13. 2. To?s TJye/xSai to?s 'Axaiuv h \6yovs e\6ui>. If this were in Folyhios, I should take this to mean that a message was delivered to the Achaian Cabinel without summoning Hie Assembly; hut it is dangerous to make infereiiees from I'ausanias. On the word ■nye/j.dv cf. p. 299. 1 Bee fans. vii. 1^. 5. Thirlwall, viii. 486, and see above, p. 698. 3 This musl be the meaning of the words of Pausanias (vii. 18. 6), ra lv KVK\cfi T7Jr 2irapT7js Tro\litr)yaytTO dvoiav, tsijyayt 8* ^5 avTa koi (ppovpas, 6pfi.t)T-fipia t7ri ri\v ^.irdpTijv 'Axato7s fhai. PaUBOnias ullv Speaks Of [aSOS as Sllhjrrt to t lie Arhaians- 'Axcuuv tv Ttf ti'.k vttJkoov. See above, p. 622. <»f this taaos I can and do mention else where. Probably it was one of the six K]euthoro]ak8nic towns which were reanm ted bj Sparta, and which therefore do no1 appear in the list given ; \ Pausanias. EMBASSY OF AURELU'S. 693 towns nor the Federal garrisons placed in them were very chat. ix. strict in observing the armistice. Menalkidas was now General of the seceding State ; he took and plundered Iasos, one of these free Lakonian towns, and thus was guilty of a more direct breach of the truce than Diaios Suicide of & , . , . Menal- himself. Popular indignation was aroused against linn kidas, at Sparta, and he put himself out of the way by poison. At last the Roman ministers arrived. By this time the Embassy Macedonian War was ended, and its successful conclusion, Amelias just like those of the wars with Antiochos and Perseus, B ™ b i''i7. enabled the Romans to take a higher tone than ever with their Greek allies. Hitherto the Senate had clearly temporized, and had used designedly ambiguous language. It now spoke out plainly enough. The Ambassadors — judges 2 they are called by Pausanias — came to Corinth, the head of the legation being Lucius Aurelius Orestes. They began, if the words of our informant are to be taken literally, by a more daring breach of all Federal right than any on which they had yet ventured. Instead of com- municating their errand, first to the Federal Government, and then to the Federal Assembly, they summoned an utterly unconstitutional meeting of the magistrates of the several cities, 3 who had no sort of authority to receive 1 Pausanias (vii. 13. 8) thus sums up his character ; MevaXKtSa /j.ev re\os tokwtov iyeffTO, dp^avri iv T favrov v

s tax*- 1 Pol, x.wviii. -z. (The whole chapter.) ' II). 8. Xuvt Sptvaavrts ol irtpl riv Kpn6\aov tupivav, k.t.K. This seems to be the must probable meaning. See p, 70:!. The word nuvthpns and it ■ ne . 1. 11 t.mih used by Plutarch and Pau • tie \ lembly, bul nol by Polybios, See above, pp. 261, 282 EMBASSY OF SEXTUS C^SAR. <>9/ Assembly, and that lie would refer matters to the next chap ix. Meeting to be held six months hence. 1 This was mere mockery, and the Romans naturally departed in great indignation. Kritolaos himself spent the winter in pro- Uncon- t • • i i'ii stitutiomil ceedmgs almost as unconstitutional as anything that the proceed- Ronians themselves had done. He went through the j^f^i several eities of the League ; * he held local Assemblies &o. 147- in each, nominally to announce what had been done at Tcgea, but really to excite the people everywhere against Rome. He even went so far as to order the local * magistrates 3 to stop all proceedings against debtors till the war was over. No wonder the President and his war policy were highly popular. At this stage of the proceedings it is almost as hard to sympathize with the Achaians as with their enemies. It is one of those cases in which a nation or a party, whose cause is essentially just, contrives, by particular foolish and criminal actions, to forfeit the respect to which it is other- wise entitled. Now, in its last moments, the Federal Government of Achaia had, for the first time, fallen into the hands of a mere mob, led by a President who showed himself a demagogue in the worst sense of the word. The class of men who had hitherto directed the affairs of the 1 Pol. xxxviii. 3. See above, p. 275. Pausanias (vii. 14. 4, 5) makes this answer of Kritolaos be preceded by a request of Sextus that a regular Assembly might be summoned at onre. Tins Kritolaos pretends to do, but, together with his formal summons, he sends secret instructions, in conformity witli which nobody came. This is not easy to believe, and it reads like a misconception of Polybios' account, as if Pausanias had been led astray by the ambiguous won! o-wtSpevcrai/Tes. It would be easier to believe, though still very unlikely, thai the Meeting at Tcgea was to be a full Meeting of the Assembly, and lhat Kritolaos prevented it in this way. Polybios clearly makes the sham summons — to whatever kind of meeting — take place before Kritolaos reached Tegea, while Pausanias places it afterwards. 8 Pol. U.S. 'Eimvopevu/J.fi'os ko.t& rdv x el ^'' a r ° Ls irdkas, tKK\r]nlas ffvpijyf. 3 lb. riapiiyyftKt toIs ipxouoi. This must mean the In. al magistral- 698 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. ix. League, the old liberal aristocracy, leaders and not enemies of the people, men who had both character and property to lose, were no longer listened to. They were naturally averse to a war in which success was hopeless, and it was therefore easy for Kritolaos to hold them up to popular Tumul- hatred as traitors. At the next Spring Meeting, held at Meeting Corinth, an Assembly was gathered together such as had at Corinth, never before been seen. It was attended bv a multitude May, B.c. 146. f l ow handicraftsmen, both from Corinth and other cities, Efforts of sucu as seldom appeared in the Federal Congress. 1 At Metellus Ll ' „ , _ to preserve this Meeting Metellus made yet one more effort. Cnseus Papirius and three other Roman envoys a appeared at Corinth, and addressed the Assembly in the same con- ciliatory tone as had been employed by Sextus. Hitherto the Achaian Assemblies seem to have been fairly decorous parliamentary bodies, but such a multitude as had now come together was not disposed to listen to any one but its own leaders. The place of meeting made matters worse, as the Corinthian people were the fiercest of all/' doubtless through indignation at the proposal to separate them from the League. The Roman Ambassadors were received with a storm of derision, and left the Assembly amid the shouts and insults of the multitude. 1 The Achaian People then went on in due order to discuss the proposals of the envoys to which they had not listened. 1 Pol. xxxviii. 4. See above, p. 263. This is the Meeting spoken of by Pausanias, vii. 14. 5. Ee Leaves out the account of Kritolaos' doings during the \\ inter. - Aulus Gabinius, Caius Fannius, and b third whose name appears in the texl hi Polybios in the corrupl form t6v vtwrtpov dKluiva ^aivov. This suggests Borne such name as Aldus Mnnius. I 'nl. U.S. Ilarrai fxiv licopofav al tt6\(is, vaySri/xd Si ical /.id\i(TTa. 7rcos t) twv Kopivdiwv. 1 Hi. XKtvd£nvTts Si T((i)v 7rpf'rr/3«u fifrd Oopvflov Ka\ Kpavyrji ^f/3a\\ov. Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 490) refers to the somewhat confused accounl in Strabo (lib. viii. cap. 6. vol. Li. 215), which seems to apply to this time; it Ling to him, the Romans were pelted «itli mud. VIOLENCE OF KRITOLAOS. 699 A few only took their side. 1 Kritolaos made a tierce chap. ix. speech against the Romans, which might not have been out of place in the mouth of Kykliadas fifty years sooner. Could vc believe in their personal purity, we might have some sympathy for the last champions of Greece, even when such championship had become madness. 2 But we violence have seen that Diaios was not above a bribe, and now ' , toi rjpeaKe to. \ey6/j.eva Sid twu TTpeafSevTwv. 2 Palis, vii. 14. 6. To fiev Srj dvSpa fiacriAea Kal iroKiv dveKeaQai ir6\efxov Kal ixt\ e\>Tvx?iv°-i avvij&r] (pOovai fxdWov 4k tov Saijxovoiv fj ro7s 7roAe/t7f- ffacri iroiu t6 eyKXrjua- 6pad(TK(cv fSov\ei'Aos virdpxeiv, Secriruras 5" oiiK &v evSoKrjffai KTr\cr6.fxevos' Ka$6\ov Se irapyuei, \eywv us, edv /xev dvSpes Siffiv, ovk dnoprfffovffi ffvfxp.dx<^v, edv °" dvSpuyvvoi, Kvpicov. 4 II). KaravicrraTo ix\v twv dpx^vT(av, Siectvpe Se rods dvrnroKtrevofievovs. 5 lb. Twv 84 ttjs yepovaias fiovKojxevwv eiriKaixfidveffQai, k.t.\. See above, p. 296. 6 lb. VlepKTTraa-djj.ei'os rovs (TT par iiiiras KaraviffraTO, KeKevcav nposeKdelu. "Were tbese soldiers citizens or mercenaries 1 In regular tames one cannot fancy mercenaries being present in the Assembly at all, nor citizen soldiers in any military dress or character, lint in these days of violence any breach of order may have happened. 7 11). "E ertpov ^(pia/xa irapavojxov, oisre Kvplovs rival rods dvOpajTrovs obs &v tir\ arpaToirfSria alp^ffovrm' Si' a rpdirov rivci HovapxiK-fti' dvekaflfi' i^ovrrlav. Sir ;iliu\p, p. 481, fur I lie ;i |>|ioin1 mm! of Anitas as (rrparriyos avToi (Pol, xl. 5), which imply the putting of a question to an Assembly, show that Andronidas was sent by the authority of sonic deliberative body or other, under the presidency of Sdsikrates. Possibly Sdsikrates may have collected the Senate, or bave done his best, however unsuccessfully, to summon a regulai Assembly. r ' Paus. vii. ir>. 10, 11. 1 Pol. xl. 1. KaOfarafxtfov (TTpariiyov J5iot twc ttoWwv. Alter Polybios' clear exposition of the law inc. 2. this seems a needless ceremony, and it i impossible to suppose that we have reached the Autumn Meeting of CRUELTIES OF DIAIO-S. 7<>:* and the returning envoys, Annif8pevcTavTes. See above, p. 696. These Ministers were perhaps elected at the violent Spring Meeting at Corinth, which accounts for their being mere creatures of Diaios, while their predecessors (see above, p. 699) did what they could to restrain Kritolaos. The time of election of the Ministers need not have been changed with that of the General. 2 Pol. xl. 5. Kadicravres StKacrris tov fitv SoxriKpaTov? KareS'tKCMTai' Bdvarov. hums. •04 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. IX, Battle of Leuko- petra and sack of Corinth, Sep- tember ? B.C. 146. skill in administration ; ferocious in war, while war lasted, but not inclined to needless oppression when conquest was once secure. Mummius now came to the Isthmus with the Roman army, and with some Pergamenian auxi- liaries, led against the Achaian League by an officer who, strangely enough, bore the name of Philopoimen. 1 He was, it is said, joined by the inhabitants of the Corinthian territory of Tenea, 2 apparently a subject district glad to throw off the yoke of the capital. A slight advantage puffed up Diaios and his troops; 3 he marched forth to a pitched battle at Leukopetra ; 4 the cavalry fled without a blow ; 5 the infantry fought bravely, but in vain. Diaios fled to his own city of Megalopolis, killed his wife, perhaps set fire to his house, and lastly poisoned himself. 6 Of the rest of the army many took refuge in Corinth, and thence escaped in the night along with a large portion of the Corinthians themselves. The city, though it offered no resistance, was sacked and burned ; of the few people who were left in it, the men were slaughtered, the women and children were sold. The history of the Achaian League, as an independent power, was over. Achaia not yet It is commonly said that Achaia was now reduced to the form of a Roman Province. It would seem that this 1 Pans. vii. 16. 1. * Strabo, 1. viii. c 6 (vol. ii. p. 214). See above, p. 256. This district must have somehow escaped the liberalizing reforms of Philopoimen and 1 ,\ k< nt.is. 3 Paus. vii. 16. 2. Yet, it is impossible to believe the tales of their ex- cessive presumption in Justin, xxxiv. 2. See Thirlwall, viii. 496. * Aurelius Victor, c. be » They were, as Bishop Thirlwall says (viii. 496), "all belonging to thai class which was opposed to the measures of Diaeus." Yet it is ,h inglorious ending for a Bervice which had ahone so under Lydiadasand Philopoimfin. '• Pans. vii. 16 i ''• Anr. Viet. a. a See Thirlwall, u.s. note, DISSOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE. 705 assertion is not strictly accurate. 1 No Roman Praetor was chap, jw sent into Greece till a much later time ;" but the Governor formally of Macedonia continued to exercise the same sort of pro- to a tectoratc over the country which we have seen Metellus IVl,vluce - exercising for some years past. In fact it was not the policy of Rome to reduce any conquered state to the form of a province at the conclusion of the first war against it. This we may see by the history of Carthage, Macedonia, , and iEtolia. But Achaia was reduced to a state of de- pendence which differed only in form from the provincial condition, and which makes it quite needless for me to continue my history any further. Achaia now surrendered herself to the will of Rome, 3 as iEtolia had done forty years before. And the arm of the conqueror fell more heavily upon Achaia than it had done upon /Etolia. That Achaia, Settle- like ./Etolia, sank to the level of acknowledged dependency f the is involved in the nature of the case ; and the Roman l 01 " 1 !^' B.C. 14o- interference with internal institutions was incomparably 145 - greater than it had ben in the case of iEtolia. Mummius of his own authority, before the usual Board of Commis- sioners arrived from Rome, imposed a fine upon the League for the benefit of Sparta, 4 and destroyed the walls 1 See Dr. Smith, Diet. Geog. art. Achaia. Mommsen, ii. 46. Kortiim, iii. 338. 2 Plutarch (Cim. 2) says, of the time of Lucullus, -q xplcns %v hr\ roS ffTparriyov rijs MaKfSovlas, ouirw yelp eh tt)c 'EWaSa 'P(op.a?ot arpar^yovs Ste-n-ep-TrovTo. Compare also the language put hy Appian (Mithrid. 58) into the mouth of Sulla towards Mithridat<"-s : MaKeSoviav re ijfieTtpav ouaav €TreTpex 6S > Ka ^ T0i>s"E\\7)vas rrjv iKfvOepiap d(pripou' ov irpiv re 7jp|a> /uerct- voilv, oi/'8' 'Apxe^aosdirtp oovna.pa.Ka\tiv, j) MaKtSovlav p.iv p.* avaaixxreffQat, riju Sf 'EAA.aSa rrjs (rijs iKAvaat jSi'ay. Here is a marked distinction drawn between the position of Macedonia and that of Greece, one which a late and careless writer like Appian would hardly have introduced, i? he had not found it in his authorities. But see Thirlwall,viii. 503. 3 Liv. Epit. Iii. " Omni Achaid in deditionemt accepld." 4 Either now, or in the arrangements of the next year, the Lakoni.ui towns (see above, p. 622) must have been reunited to Sparta. They remained subject to Sparta till the reign of Augustus ; tin y tin n Imv had no share in the nominal revival of the League. Augustus separated Z Z 706 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. CHAP. IX. Disso- lution of the League and aboli- tion of Demo- cracy in the Cities. Polyhios Legislati s for the ( 'iti'S, B.C. 145. of all the cities which had taken a share in the war * — that is, of all except Elis, MessenS, and perhaps Patrai. When the Commissioners came, they entirely abolished the Federal Constitution, with its Assemblies and Magis- tracies, and, in each particular city the constitution was changed from Democracy to what the Greeks called Timocracy, that is, that species of Oligarchy in which wealth, and not birth, is the qualification. 2 Everywhere else throughout Greece, whatever vestiges of Federal Union still survived were swept away in like manner. 3 Greece was to contain only separate cities, each of them a dependent and tributary ally of Rome. Each city was to be wholly isolated from its neighbours ; no common As- semblies were to bring men of different cities together, nor could the citizen of one city any longer hold land in the territory of another. 4 But, when they had thus rooted up the dangerous elements of Federalism and Democracy, when every city was condemned to weakness and isolation, when eacli was reconstructed with a form of government which was sure to make it the humble slave of Rome, neither Mummius nor his colleagues seem to have been disposed to push the rights of conquest to any specially tyrannical extreme. They called in Polybios as the law- giver of the new commonwealths ; i no man could have been better suited for the office. He alone was equally familiar with Achaian and with Roman politics ; he alone, in his calm and capacious intellect, combined a sincere wish to benefit his country with an utter absence of all merely sentimental patriotism. lie did not shrink from twenty-four towns, bul six of them had been tecovered bySparta before th( \ i it of PanBaniafl. ' Pans. \ii. 16; 9. 2 Hi. ArtfioKparias fiff xctTtiravt, KaBlcrra 8* &nd TiurinuTuiv tcU dpx&s. ■ Ik Set above, p. 18 I. 4 Ik Bee above, p. 258. Pol. xl. 10. Pans. \iii. BO. 9. LEGISLATION OF POLYBIOS. 707 making the best of a bad bargain, nor refuse to serve his i hap. ix. country because she had fallen from the position which she had held in his youth. During the crisis itself, he was better away ; he could not have hindered the war, and he might have been tortured to death like Sosikrates and Philiuos. But now, in his peculiar position, the friend alike of the living Scipio and of the dead Philopoimen, he could mediate, as no other man could, between the con- querors and the conquered. Freedom, greatness, glory he could not restore to his country ; but it was something to give to her cities such laws as secured; to them in- ternal peace and as high a degree of well-being as their condition allowed. And we may well believe that it was owing to his influence that, after a while, both the Achaians and the other Greeks were allowed to resume something like the forms of their old Federal institutions. 1 The Romans, perhaps the Greeks too, called it a restora- Nominal . revival tion of liberty,' 2 when the Achaian League once more () f the arose, with its Federal General, its Federal Cabinet, and League as near an approach to its Federal Assembly 3 as the new oligarchic State-constitutions allowed. But its existence was now purely municipal, or rather it was something less than municipal. Town-Autonomy and Federalism, Aris- tocracy and Democracy, were now, all alike, shadows and pageants. The League lingered on in this shape for some centuries; the exact moment of its final dissolution it i Tans. vii. 16. 10. See above, p. 184. The expressiftn of Polybios (xl. 10) that he gave the cities rovs irepl rijs kolvtjs Si/ccuoSoo-fas v6/j.ovs seems to imply that some part of his legislation took }>lace after the restoration of Federal forms. 2 See Bocckli, C. I. i. 712. Thirlwall, viii. 502. 3 The title of the oligarchic Assembly of the revived League seems to have been aweSptov. This accounts for tin' constant use of that word and its cognates by Plutarch ami Pausanias to express the Democratic Assembly of the old League. In Polybios, as we have Seen (see p. - ^s-2>, they are applied to meetings, not of the Assembly, but of the Cabinet Council. z z 2 708 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. ix. would be hard to fix, and it would be useless for my purpose to inquire. It is enough that the history of the Achaian League, as a contribution of the slightest value to political knowledge, ends with the last and most un- happy Presidency of Kritolaos and Diaios. Devotion Achaia fell ingloriously ; in her last years there is Peio- nothing to admire, except the determined, even if mis- ponnesian clirectetl, patriotism of the mass of the people. They may well be pardoned if Kritolaos and Diaios seemed to them as Lydiadas and Philopoimen. They listened to consti- tutional leaders who had at least the formulae of patriot- ism on their lips, and they fought to the death against the invader, when the aristocrats of the cavalry fled without % i striking a blow. Thrice in the world's history have the gallant people of Peloponnesos risen like a nation of heroes, and found no leaders worthy of them. They faced b.c. 146. the Roman beneath the headland of Leukopetra ; they died sword in hand upon their mountains when Byzantine A.i». 1454. priests and nobles cringed before the conquering Otto- A -d. 1821- man ; and, in our own day, they have wrested their inde- pendence from the same enemy, in spite of, rather than by the help of, the native rulers and captains of their a. d. 1862. land. And, at the very moment that I am thus summing up the long history of Greece, a new Revolution, as pure and glorious as any that expelled Macedonian or Ottoman from her soil, has again made Greece the centre of the admiring gaze of Europe. Let us hope that, this time at least, G recce may find leaders worthy of her people, and that her fourth struggle for freedom and good government may be crowned with a more lasting success than any that has gone before it. It at least augurs well for Greece that her Revolution has not been the work of the mob of a capital, but is, if ever revolution was, the deliberate expression of the will of a whole people. And a historian GENERAL RESULTS OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. 709 of Federal Greece may be allowed to rejoice when he chap. ix. hears the revived voice of Grecian freedom first sounding from the lands of his old love. The homes where Creek freedom lingered longest have been those where it has been the first to rise again ; Achaia, Akarnania, /Etolia, have been foremost in the good work, and the name of Roufos of Patrai bids fair to win a place alongside of that of Markos of Kcryneia. Through the days of Bavarian cor- ruption, just as through those of Roman conquest and of Turkish tyranny, the heart of the Achaian people has still been sound. And, in all cases alike, the most blameworthy points in the character of the oppressed have been mainly the work of the oppressor. That the Achaian League Er ™ rs fell, in its last days, from its ancient dignity — that the League place of some of the noblest of men was filled by some re suit\,f ° of the most contemptible — that the seal which had been } ion } an 1 intrigue. borne by Markos and Lykortas had passed into the hands of the traitor Menalkidas and the coward Damokritos — all this was mainly the fruit of Rome's own insidious policy. Her arts had tried, and tried in vain, to divide a people which had so well learned the benefits of union. When those arts failed, she shut up the best life of the nation in her Etruscan prisons, and so cut off that stream of uninterrupted political tradition which alone can be trusted permanently to maintain the needful succession of statesmen and of captains. If Achaia died ill, it was mainly the fault of her murderer ; and, if she died ill, she had at least lived well. For a hundred and forty years — no short space in b.c. 281- any nation's life, and a very long space among the few centuries which we call Ancient History — the League had General given to a larger portion of Greece than any previous age J^the had seen, a measure of freedom, unitv, and. general good Al luuan *" ° b League. government, which may well atone for the lack of the dazzling glory of the old Athenian Democracy. It was no slight achievement to weld together so many cities into an 710 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. chap. ix. Union which strengthened them against foreign Kings and Senates, and which yet preserved to them that internal in- dependence which was so dear to the Hellenic mind. It was no slight achievement to keep so many cities for so long a time free alike from foreign garrisons, from do- mestic mobs, domestic Tyrants, and domestic oligarchs. Roman How practically efficient the Federal principle was, in a witness maintaining the strength and freedom of the nation is best 1'.'^ shown by the bitter hatred which it aroused, first in the Macedonian Kings and then in the Roman Senate. It was no contemptible political system against which so many Kings and Consuls successively conspired ; it was no weak bond which the subtlest of all diplomatic Senates expended so many intrigues and stratagems to unloose. 1 And, if the League fell ingloriously, it at least fell less ingloriously than the kingdoms and commonwealths around it. Better was it to be conquered in open battle, even with a Diaios as its leader, than to drag on the contemptible life of the last Kings of Bithynia and Pergamos or of the beggar Democracy of Athens. The League did its work in its own age by giving Pelopoimesos well nigh a century ami a hall" of freedom ; it does its work still by living in the pages of its own great historian as the first attempt on a large scale to reconcile local independence with national strength. Ages must pass away before the course of our history will show us another so perfect and illustrious an example of a true Federal Constitution. And never, up to our own day, has Federalism, the offspring of Greece, appeared again in its native land. Yet, when we look at 1 A remarkable passage of Justin (xxxiv. 1) gives a clear and forcible summary of the whole Roman policy towards the League : "Aduei aimis potentea Romania ridebantur, aon propter BUigularum civitatuaa nimiaa "l"' s > Bed propter conspirationem nniveraarum. Namque Achaa, licet pei civitates, veluti per membra, divisi suit, nnum tamen corpus et ununi imperium habent, Bingularumque urbium pericula mutuia riribue pro- pnl, .ml." FUTURE OF SOUTH-EASTERN KUKOl'E. 711 the map of Greece, and see each valley and peninsula and obap. ix. island marked out by the hand of nature for an hide- The pendent being — when we think of the varied origin and League the condition of the present inhabitants of its several provinces "'" 1 "; l l * L model tor — when we think of the local institutions, democratic here, liberated Greece aristocratic there, which preserved the life of the nation through ages of Turkish bondage — we may well ask whether ancient Achaia or modern Switzerland may not be the true model for regenerate Greece, rather than a blind imitation of the stereotyped forms of European royalty. It may be that the favourable moment has passed for ever ; it may be that it is now too late to dream of a Federal Republic in a land where thirty years of Bavarian corruption have swept away those relics of ancient freedom which the very Ottoman had spared. However this may be now, there can be little doubt that, a generation back, the blood of Botzares and the life of Kanares would have been better given to found a free Hellenic Federation than to establish the throne of any stranger King. And let us pass Future of beyond the bounds of Greece herself, to look at that whole ^" , , ,l rn group of nations of which Greece is only one among many, Europe. although in some respects the foremost. We may be sure that a day will come when the rod of the oppressor shall be broken ; we need no prophet to tell us that wrong and robbery shall not always be abiding, that all the arts of Western diplomatists cannot for ever maintain the Bar- barian on the throne of the Ckesars and the Infidel in the most glorious of Christian temples. A day will come when the Turkish horde shall be driven back to its native deserts, or else die out, the victim of its own vices, upon the soil which it has too long defiled. Then will Greek and Serb and Albanian and Rouman and Bulgarian enter upon the full and free possession of the land which is their own. Already does Greece, free and extending her borders, Servia and Wallachia held in only nominal vassalage, Mon- 712 HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE. probably the true solvent. chap. ix. tenegro, if crushed for a moment, yet unsubdued in heart, all point to the full accomplishment of the glorious dream. And, when the full day lias dawned, are those lands to remain utterly separate and isolated, or are they, so many peoples, nations, and languages, to be fettered down by some centralizing Monarchy which would merely substitute Monarchic a Christian for an Infidel master ? Here would be the Federalism grandest field that the world has ever seen tor trying the great experiment of Monarchic Federalism. The nations of the Byzantine peninsula, differing in origin, language, and feeling, are united by common wrongs, by a common religion, and by the common reverence of ages for the Imperial City of the Basils and the Constantines. For nations in such a position, the Federal tie, rather than either more complete separation or more close con- nexion, seems the natural relation to each other. But the traditions of Servia and Bulgaria are not republican ; the mere size of the several provinces may seem, in the Old World at least, to surpass the limits which nature has in all ages marked out for European commonwealths. One set of circumstances points to Federal Union, another set of circumstances points to princely government. A Monarchic Federation on such a scale has never yet existed, but it is not in itself at all contradictory to the Federal ideal. When the day of vengeance and of freedom shall have conic, it will be for the people of those noble and injured lands — not for Western mediators or Western protectors — to solve the mighty problem for themselves. NOTE ON THE CITIES OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. Tim: following will, I trust, bo found to be an accurate list of the cities of the Acliaian League, as far as they are at present known from either historical or numismatic evidence. I mark those towns of which undoubted Federal coins exist with an asterisk ; those whose Federal coinage is doubtful with an obelus ; those whose existence as members of the League is known only from the evidence of coins I put in Italics. 1 add also the dates of accession to the League of the several cities, with references to the pages of the history : — NAME OF CITY. DATE OP ACCESSION. l'AGE. B.C. t Patrai 280 245. tDynie 280 245. Tritaia c. 279 245. Pharai c. 279 245. * Aigion 275 246. Boura 275 246. tKeryneia 1 275 246. Leontion — 246. * Aigeira — 246. * Pellene — 246. * Sikyon 251 364. * Corinth 243—223. 196—146 2 . . 376, 621. *Megara 243—223. 204— 146 2 . . 377,611. * Troizen 243 377. *Epidauros 243 377. * Heraia Between 240—235. 208 ? 403, 592. * Kleonai — 399. Kynaitha 403. * Stymphalos 403. Kleitor — 403. * Pheneos — 403. * Alea 454. * Telphousa 403. * Mantineia or Antigoneia . — 404. 1 The inscription on the supposed coins of this city is AXAIflN KAPI- NOinN, which however may perhaps more probably be a misreading for AXAIHN KOPIN©mN. This formula, AXAIX1N KOPINemN, K THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. 7 1 5 namic op on r, i. ah: .ii uxa paoe, B. C. ' Alijihiii-n * Asca I * Dipaia I •7£ys l Vxi ' 62 * ■ Pallcmtion 1 * Thcisoa / * Sparta 192 <;:;<» * Elis 191 636 * Messene 191 — * KorOiiC l 184? 648. Aliia n Thouria ( 182 649. l'liarai (Mess.) . . . . ) Spatta. (Seep. 622.) There was a village called Eua in the Tliyreatis (Pans. ii. 38. 6), which may have been Elentherolakonic. But it seems that there is no coin which can be referred with absolute certainty 1<> any Elentherolakonic city as a member of the Achaian League. 1 As coins occur with AXAIflN KOPftNAinN, the question between Korone and Kolonis in p. 649 is pretty well settled. Korone must either have been already an independent Canton, or it must have been enfran- chised by Lykortas. ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. Page 23, line 6. On the relation of Dependent Alliance, see Arnold, Later Eoman Commonwealth, i. 165. Page 34, note. Pindar freely applies the name fiacn\evs to the Sicilian Tyrants, but it may be doubted whether Herodotus, when speaking in his person, ever distinctly applies the name to any Tyrant. This has been pointed out by a writer in the National Review, October 1862, p. 300. The Tyrannies, both in continental Greece and the colonies, must be carefully distinguished from the few cases of lawful Kingship which lingered on in a few outlying places, Salamis in Cyprus for instance, long after its general abolition. Page 138, 1. 13. Besides Nairn and Cromarty, the counties of Bute and Caithness (a strangely chosen pair) and Clackmannan and Kinross also elected alternately. Page 165, 1. 19. The sacred spear can hardly fail to have been an institution of the remotest antiquity, and it points to a time when the Theban Archon, like the Athenian Polemarch, had really been a military commander. But his appointment by lot is not likely to have been introduced at Thebes, any more than at Athens, until the office had become a mere pageant. When an office is disposed of by lot, it is, as Mr. Grote shows, a sign that the office is no longer thought to require special qualifications, but is held to be within the compass of an average citizen. The lot is not necessarily demo- cratic ; as the great equalizer, it is just as likely to be introduced into an oligarchic body, where the feeling of equality among the members of the ruling order is commonly very strong. Rotation, as practically adopted in the appointment of the Lord Mayor of London and of the Vice-Chancellors of the Universities goes on the same principle as the lot. It implies that the office requires no special qualifications, but that one member of the class from whom its occupants are taken is as able to fill it as another. I 'ago 180, noto 3. Compare p. 129, note 4, on the supposed agency of the Corinthian Synod or of the Amphiktyons, and pp. 55, <;, on the hatred of the IJoeotian towns towards Thebes. Page 201, noto 5. If we .suppose this Assembly to have been armed, like ome instances in Aobaia and elsewhere (sec p. 275), the ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. 71/ Assembly and the army would in fact be the same thing, and there would be hardly any perceptible difference between the views of Bishop Thirl wall and Mr. Grote. It is not however likely (see p. 202, note 2) that this military character of the Assembly would be retained as a permanent institution. The instances in Achaia are rare, and are accounted for by special circumstances. Page 203, note 5. The word PovXcvrrjpiov (see p. 306) does seem to be occasionally used for the place of meeting of the Achaian Assembly, but we have seen (p. 307) that there is reason to believe that the Achaian Assemblies were often much more thinly attended than the ArkadianTen Thousand. But the Achaian Assembly also sometimes met in a theatre. Page 204, 1. 6. From the language of Pausanias (viii. 27. 7) it seems that some of the cities were actually deserted, while others were simply reduced to the condition of dependent villages, or perhaps of municipal towns. These last were, at a later time (see p. 626) restored to an equality with the capital, as independent Cantons of the Achaian League. Page 209,1. 1. A nearly perfect list of the Lykian cities can be recovered from numismatic evidence. Federal coins of all the six greatest cities exist, except Pinara, and of thirteen others, Antiphilos, Aperlai, Apollonia, Arykanda, Kragos, Kyaneai, Limyra, Massikytos, Phellos, Podalia, Rhodiapolis, Telmessos, and Tre- benna. This gives nineteen cities. A twentieth might be found in Phaselis, only Strabo distinctly says that that city, though Lykian, was not a member of the League : <=v Avkicdv ov /nere^fi, KaB" avrriv Se crvvea- TTjuev (vol. iii. p. 217). It is however possible that Phaselis may have seceded from the League between the days of Artemidoros and Strabo, and so have been reckoned among the twenty-three cities of the elder writer. It is certain, from the history of Telmes- sos, that the boundaries of the Lykian League, as well as of other Leagues, now and then fluctuated. Telmessos, a Lykian town, was given by the Romans to Eumenes after the war with Antiochos, B.C. 188; but, on the extinction of the Kingdom of Pergamos, B.C. 133, it was restored to the Confederation. So also there is numismatic evidence, though of a somewhat doubtful kind, for the opinion that Boubon, a town of the Kibyratic Tetrapolis, (see p. 212) formed part of the Lykian League in its latest stage. There is also evidence of "monetary Leagues" or Sonderbtinds among some of the Lykian towns, which are thought to have been connected with the disputes which led to the fall of Lykian independence. The only extant Federal coins of Telmessos belong to one of these Leagues. Page 209, note 5. On the word a-vvedpiov, see p. 263. 718 ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. Page 213, note 2. Compare the attempt by the Senate in the first Congress of the United States to confer the title of Highness upon the President. See Marshall's Life of Washington, v. 238 ; Jefferson's Correspondence, iv. 14. Page 215, note 1. So Appian, Mithrid. 62. nXfjv e'l nvts Evpevel kci\ 'Podt'oty, avfifia^TjtratriP rfpiiv, edopev, ov)( vnoreXfls, dXX en\ TrpocrraTais tivaC TeKfjLt'ipiov 8' on Xvkiovs, alriapevovs ti, Poolmv aTTfo-Ttiarapev. Page 256, note 6. Whether these townships were strictly subject to Megalopolis will be found discussed afterwards, p. 626. It is possible that they may have been more analogous to the Patrian townships mentioned in p. 247. Page 261, note 1. On this Embassy, see p. 419. The explanation of the apparent breach of rule is probably to be found in the religious chai'acter of the mission. The Roman envoys were received by the Corinthians, not as members of the Achaian League, but as adminis- trators of the Isthmian Games. In this character, they must have been in the constant habit of receiving the 6eu>plai of Greek cities. As the administration of the games always remained a matter purely of State, and not at all of Federal, concern, the reception of this particular sort of embassy — necessary in the presidents of the Games — must have been held not to interfere with the general external sovereignty of the League. Page 281, note 2. See below, 551. I cannot bring myself to any definite conclusion about these most perplexing words rfjs avuTeXdas ttjs TTaTfHKrjs. No explanation seems quite satisfactory. The use of ■n-aTpiKTjs seems so very strange that, when one remembers the expression in Polybios (xl. 3), Uarpels koi to ptra: rovro avvreXiKov, one is strongly tempted to read narptKfjs. Yet would IlarpiKos be a correct gentile form, and could a citizen of Pharai be a magistrate at Patrai ? There is certainly the case of Aratos' State-Generalship at Argos. See p. 259. Page 291, note 1. The first two Presidents opened each Session of Congress with a speech ; at other stages of the Session they sent messages. In both these respects thoy followed the common prac- tice of Kings. Jefferson extended the custom of the written mes- sage to the opening of the Session. See Tucker's Life of Jefferson, ii. 111,2. Page :>!K5, note 1. Cf. Liv. xxxv. 25. Multitudo Philopdimenis sm- tentiam r.rs/ifrf///j„/ rraf, et dmHes 6o tetnpdre rt prudential <'l, audoritate anisibett. In both these cases the General, like an Bnglisb Minister, dues not speak till after several other speakers, and apparently not till the House began to call for him. Page 2!»7, 1. 1. That in some other Pedorations, as those of Etolia and Akarnania (see pp. 338* (120), the General presided in ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. 719 tho Assembly shows the higher political developement of the Achaian system. Tho Achaian institution of tho Ten Ministers seems to have no exact parallel elsewhere. To their existence it is probably owing that we hear less of the Senato in Achaia (see p. 306) than in some other commonwealths. Page 298, 1. 7. I only remember one instance (see p. 538) of the Ministers being mentioned in military affairs, and this is on the reception of a new city into the League, a business as much diplo- matic as military. Page 302, 1. 12. See below, p. 509 Page 303, note 2. Jefferson (see his Life by Tucker i. 281 — 3) strongly objected to the power of reelecting the President, on the ground that a reeligible President would be always reelected, and would in fact become Tyrant. That this fear was chimerical in America was proved by Jefferson's own case, but it was a very real one in Greece. See p. 305. Page 304, note 4. On the position of the orpanjyos avroicpaTup, see below, p. 484. Page 314, 1. 2. The fact that the chaotic period of the old Con- federation, 1776 — 89, intervened makes but little difference. The memory of Kingship had not died out, and the anarchy of the Confederation proved the need of a head of some kind. The Federalists were always charged by their Republican opponents with endeavouring to restore Monarchy, and, in a certain sense, the charge was undoubtedly true. Page 335, note 5. On certain limitations of the powers of Special Assemblies in iEtolia, see p. 611. Such an Assembly, at least up to B.C. 200, could not make war or peace. The restriction seems a strange one, as one would have thought that a Special Assembly was most likely to be called when some sudden emergency demanded a warlike or peaceful decision. The Law was probably altered in B.C. 200, as afterwards, in B.C. 189 (see p. 630), we find a Special Assembly summoned to decide on the great question of submission to Rome, Page 345, note 1. On the whole, the explanation less creditable to Philip seems the more probable. See p. 552. Page 403, note 4. On the date of the acquisition of Ilcraia, see p. 603. Page 416, 1. 5. The Leagues of Akarnania and Epeiros thus became hostile to Achaia. The next time we hear of them (see pp. 491, 9), they are Achaian allies. The probable explanation is that the two northern Leagues became allied with Macedonia as soon as Macedonia became hostile to ^Etolia, and, as Macedonian allies, became Achaian allies along with Antigonos. As they had no direct 720 ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. cause of enmity towards Achaia, they could have no repugnance to the Achaian alliance, as soon as Achaia was again unfriendly to iEtolia. Page 447, note 1. According to Appian (Mithr. 48), Mithridates, besides the usual policy of enfranchising slaves and abolishing debts, gave citizenship to the p,eroiKoi. in the Asiatic cities which submitted to him. This reads like the proceedings of Aratos at Mantineia, but the existence of a considerable class of fieroiKot in the Attic sense is far more likely in the great commercial cities of Asia than in an inland Arkadian town. Page 495, margin. The date B.C. 223 — 196 belongs to p. 494. Page 496, note 4. On the whole, B.C. 221 seems the most probable date ; at the same time it requires the battle of Sellasia, the settle- ment of Sparta and some other cities, the return of Antigonos to Macedonia, his death, the accession of Philip, and the events which led to the Social War, to have followed one another with unusual speed. And in Pol. iv. 35, the Spartans are said, seemingly in B.C. 219, to have been Tro\irevop.evoi Kara to. ncnpia cr^eSoi/ "j8t] rpeis eviavTovs fiera rrjv K\(op.evovs cKnTcocTiv. This, however, might possi- bly be satisfied by a period of two years and a fraction. As the exact date does not bear very immediately on my own subject, I would recommend the question to the attention of professed chronologers. Page 606, L 9. The words of Plutarch are eneii^fv els "Apyos Kpvcpa tovs dvatprj'crovTas avrov. This need not imply that poison was the means to be used. Page 618, note 2. I should not have said " all Karia," either here on in p. 214. It was only Kapias to. p.*XP l T °v Maiavftpov. (Pol. xxiii. 3.) This is however much the larger part of the country. Page 626, 1. 2 from bottom. If the Eleuthcrolakonic towns were really all admitted into the League, each with an independent vote, (see p. 622) it would be as necessary to strengthen the Arkadian interest against any undue influence on their part as against that of the Old-Achaian cities. This system of dividing largo States is recognized by the American Constitution, which provides that it shall be done only by the joint consent of Congress and of the Legislature of the State inte- rested (Art. iv. § 3.1, a provision reenacted in the Confederate Con- stitution). Accordingly several new States have been formed, at various times, within the old limits of Virginia, North Carolina, Ceorgia, and Massachusetts. Just now (December, 1862) a bill is before Congress for the unconstitutional recognition of part of Virginia as a district State — unconstitutional, becauso tho requisite consent of Virginia is not given. It must be remembered that the territory of Megalopolis was at ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS. 721 this time far larger than that of any other member of the League. The other two great States of Ellis and Messene were not yet incor- porated. We here see yet another point of likeness between Mega- lopolis and Virginia. Each might be called the Mother of States as well as the Mother of I' ats. Page 642, 1. (J from bottom. After all, it is perhaps not absolutely necessary to adopt either alternative. The name of the General i'<>r the years 191-0 is not recorded. It is not impossible that it was Philopoimen himself, that the General of the year 190-89 died early in his official year, and that he was, according to law (see pp. 281, (548), succeeded by Philopoimen for the remainder of the year. If Philopoimen was thus only suffect General in 189, he might be re- elected General for the year 189-8, as Lykortas was in 183. (See p. 648.) He woidd thus be in office for nearly three years together without breach of the Constitution. The eight Generalships (see p. 647) of Philopoimen are not very easy to arrange. According to the conjecture just hazarded, the Generalship of B.C. 189-8 might be called either his sixth or his seventh, according as we count the suffect Generalship or not. If it is reckoned as the sixth, he may have filled a seventh Generalship in 187-6. He could not be re-elected in 188-7, and we know that Arist- ainos was General in 186-5, and Lykortas in 185-4. In 186-5 (see p. 653) Philopoimen was one of the ten Srjfxtovpyoi We may suspect that he commonly was so in the years when he was not General. END OF VOL. I. 3 A BY THE SAME AUTHOR. THE HISTORY AND CONQUESTS OF TTIE SARACENS. SIX LECTURES, DELIVERED BEFORE THE EDINBURGH PHILOSOPHICAL INSTITUTION. OXFORD AND LONDON : J. H. & J. PARKER. 1856. 6 This book is DUE on the last date stamped below 4)