villi . 2. . (

IcrLlJ. ii>i '

BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

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BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

XI Scries ot iptapcrs bv?

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN (ULOMJi,

PROFESSOR KDWAIM) A. FREEMAN,

GEORGE (4. CHISHOLM,

PROFESSOR SHIELD NICHOLSON,

MAURICE H. HERVEY,

AND

THE RIGHT TTONr.LE. LORD THRING.

EDITED, WITH A\ INTRODUCTION, DV
^WVWVV. S^TT.VA WTTTT^

sK.t'liETAKV AM> EDITOIl, ROYAL SCOTTISH GEOGUAPIIICAI. SOCIETY.

Published by the

Authorily of the Council of theRmLjUpScnUishitCograpliical Society.

Reprinted froii^^^^^i^^j^mnfldi^atM^irsinc."

'./ A

/• r ■

'*^r,?-ii

ifi^M:e^:

GEORGE THILIP & SOX, 32 FLEET STKEET, E.G.

LIVERPOOL: 45 to 51 SOUTH CASTLE STREET.

1892.

DA 1%

CONTENTS.

>-
■<

to
o

Introdcction. By the Editor

I. A Survey OP Existing Conditions. By Admiral

Sir John Colomb, K.C.M.G., M.P. .
■ — I.-

ir. The Physical and Political Bases of National

Unity. By Edward A. Frkemax, M.A., D.C.L.,

LL.D., Eegius Professor of Modern History at

the U niversitv of Oxford .....

III. The Commerce of the British Empire.
George G. Chisholm, M.A., B.Sc. T

IV. Tariffs, and International Commerce. By
J. Shield Nicholson, Professor of Political
Economy at the University of Edinburgh .

V. Alternative Measures. By Maurice H
Hervey, Principal of the Illawarra College,
New South Waks

VI. The Consolidation of the British Empire
By the Eight Honourable Lord Thring
K.C.B

I'AGK

^■^

123

149

INDEX

175

433226

MAP AND DIAGRAMS.

MAP OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, AND ITS OFFICIAL
AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

DIAGRAMS TO MR. CHISHOLMS PAPER.

INTRODUCTION.

THE present series of papers was planned with the
object of partly satisfying the recent public de-
mand for clearer and more reasonable views concerning
the question of Imperial Federation. These papers
were oi-iginally published in the Scottish Geographical
Magazine— the Monthly Journal of the Royal Scottish
Geographical Society — and are now re-issued in book-
form, in order to meet the demand for a wider
circulation.

The intention of the Series is to treat the subject
academically, as being one for legitimate discussion by
students of Applied Geography. Although necessarily
limited to those aspects which came more or less within
their horizon, a considerable amount of latitude has
been allowed to the authors of the papers, who have
not hesitated to avail themselves of this freedom of
treatment. Indeed, the reader cannot fail to observe
a "ood deal of adverse criticism. Most of the vital
points at issue have consequently been examined in
greater or less detail, in accordance with the judgment
of individual contributors ; and, it is to be hoped, the
ground has thereby been cleared for a rational and

X INTRODUCTION.

profitable discussion of the wliole question. They have
dealt with facts, and not with fancies.

The contributors alone are responsible for their respec-
tive statements.

A map of the British Empire has been specially
constructed to illustrate this series of papers. It
was designed by myself, and compiled by Mr. J. G.
Bartholomew. An attempt has been made to indicate
the official and commercial relations between the British
Empire and foreign countries by a system of lettering
and colouring which is readily discernible. Extraneous
data are rigidly excluded.

It is doubtless a misfortune that no name can, appa-
rently, be found to characterise the closer and more
permanent union which, in the opinion of the Federa-
tionists, should replace the ill-defined and unstable
relations existing at the present day between Great
Britain and her Colonies. But, after all, it is not so
much the nariif as the thiiuj which is of prime import-
ance. There will be time enough to find a more
appropriate designation when once the component parts
of the British Empire have been consolidated into
a responsible World-power, At present, we are only
groping in the dark towards the attainment of an
ideal on which history sheds little or no light.

The title selected for this series of papers is, there-
fore, not free from objection ; ))ut at least it has the
merit of implying an inviolable political union between
those self-governing Colonies which at the present time
acknowledge the over-rule of Her Britannic Majesty.

INTRODUCTION. xi

It is assumed, in the absence of any matured scheme,
that tliis union, which exists already in theory ratlior
than in fact, will take the form of a Confederation.
Obviously, too, all Crown Dependencies are excluded.

During the year i8gi the great Colonies made con-
siderable pi'Ogress in the direction of Britannic Con-
federation. It is clear that, before a scheme of sufh-
cient elasticity can be found to bind the self-governing
Colonies together, and attach them to the British Crown
by ties which sliould bear any ordinai'y friction, the
political unity of adjacent Colonies is an e.ssential con-
dition of success. Ceographically speaking, territories
under the same — or approximately the same — conditions
of economical productiveness, demand and supply, gain
immeasurably in strength if they can present to the
outside world an united front, and to each other per-
fect freedom of intercommunication and interchange of
commodities. Thus, the separate Colonies of Austral-
asia have found no difficulty in adopting, at least in
principle, a plan of Federation among themselves on
Free Trade lines. Their attitude towards the Empire
has been sufficiently characterised Ijy the maintenance,
at their own expense, of an Auxiliary Squadron of
the Imperial Navy in Australian waters. Since this
community of interests has been recognised, is it too
much to hope that the obstacles to Britannic Confedera-
tion will not be found to be insuperable ?

Unfortunately, the very reverse of these conditions is
observable in the North American continent, where the
Colony of Newfoundland and the Dominion of Canada

xii INTRODUCTION.

have been unable to agree upon the Fisheries Question,
and have in consequence displayed a lamentable want
of unity of interests. But in this case the proximity
of a foreign State has complicated, if not caused, this
divergence of interests. It is an exception to our case
which proves the rule. Fortunately, the loyalty of
the powerful and prosperous Dominion of Canada to
the Imperial connection has survived a severe test.
Although, as every geographer must concede, the
political destinies of Canada are intimately associated
with the development of the whole North American
continent, they are not of necessity exclusively depen-
dent thereon. The result of the recent general election
in Canada expressed the determination of the Dominion
to cast in its lot with Great Britain, and thus to main-
tain its political unity, rather than to relinquish its
independence by the alternative of absorption into the
United States. Furthermore, by the completion of the
Canadian Pacific Railway, and other public works, the-
greatest service has been rendered in the consolidation
of the British Empire. Nor must it be overlooked
that, both in Canada and Australia, the principles of
Free Trade are rapidly gaining ground ; for it is to the
general adoption of these principles that the Empire
must look for its ultimate consolidation.

In South Africa the movement in favour of Federa-
tion has made marked pi-ogress. But the unsettled
political conditions, the presence of progressive Dutch
States, and a preponderating native population, must
necessarily delay tlie formulation of any practicable

INTRODUCTION. xiii

scheme. it is, Jiowever, to be noted that, in South
Africa, a Zolloerein has been advocated as the basis
of any future political federation.

The recent commercial treaties concluded between
the Allied Powers of Central Europe, being based on
Free Trade principles, illustrate in a very striking
manner what may be called the centripetal tendency of
the economical interests of States, though, in the case
of the.se Powers, their common action was, doubtless,
largely inspired by motives of State policy.

[f it be expedient for individual States thus to adjust
the balance of power in continents, it is absolutely
necessary for a World-power like Great Britain to pro-
vide against any distxirbance of her vast Colonial rela-
tions. The loss of one or more of her great Colonies
would, at the present stage in the World's history, be
all l)ut irretrievable ; and yet, by having conceded self-
government to these ColoTiies, it is admitted that, in
principle, she has revoked all claims of sovereignty
over them : at least, a Colonial civil war is entirely
out of the question. It is, therefore, quite natural that,
in view of the possible disintegration of tlie Empire,
no means should be left untried to binil its separate
parts together by the strongest ties of political union.

Another danger which threatens the integrity of the
Empire is the possibility of attack by a hostile Power.
Probably this outweighs every other consideration, in
so far as the immediate safety of the Empire is con-
cerned : for to be prepared for war is to avert it. It is,
therefore, reasonable to assume that the first important

xiv INTRODUCTION.

step towards ]jiitannic Confederation will be the forma-
tion of a League for Defence. The Colonial Empire of
Great Britain occupies the best strategic positions in
nearly every quarter of the World, and the possession
of any portion of it l)y a foreign Power would be
a constant menace to the safety of its other parts.
Granted that it be possil)le to establish a Britannic
Confederation capable of defending its vital interests
against any probable combination of Powers, its con-
solidation would be a mere matter of time. Even at the
present rate of growth of the Empire, and of its moral
and material progi^ess, the time would not be long before
its members would enjoy the most envialde lot of any
nationality on Eartli.

JNIoreover, the centre of gravity — so to speak — of
World-power is shifting constantly to tlie West. What
the Mediterranean Sea was before the discovery of
America, the Atlantic is to us to-day : the centre around
which are grouped the most advanced nations of the
Earth — the focus of civilisation, it is not too much to
infer that, once the Isthmus of Panama is cut, or other-
wise ceases to oil'er obstacles to shipping, the stream of
Imman progress will partly become diverted into the
Pacific, anil that the political development of the States
on its shores will receive an impulse such as the World
has never before experienced. An entirely new set of
political and commercial conditions will, of coui'se, be a
necessary corollary to such a development : the Pacific
will then vie with the Atlantic for the supremacy in
human interests.

INTKODLCJ ION. xv

llial, undiT llits>' circumstauc't's, llic L'ulunial JMiipiie
of (ireat Britain, onco consolidated, would exercise a
preponderating influence on llic World's history re-
quires no fni'ther demonstration. It', indeed, it be
found possible to achieve only a measure of this result,
no degi-ee of self-sacrilice, either on the part of the
Colonies or on that of tlic mother-count rv, should l)e
regarded as excessive.

AKTliLTK SIJ.VA WHITE.

Edinuuiuui, is/ Fchniarii, 1892.

A SUKVEY OF EXISTING .CONDITIONS.

By Admieal Sir JOHN COLOMB, K.C.M.G., M.P.

A SURVEY OF EXISTING CONDITIONS.

P( )IJ'ri('AL terminology is generally difficult, but the
title that has been selected for the series of papers
to whieli the present one is introductory is more than
usually free from objection. The substantive is well
chosen, because the federal union to be attained in the
scattered Empire^ of the Queen must necessarily assume
the looser foi'm of a confederacy, and not that of a federa-
tion, sti'ictly so called. The adjective is equally apt, since
"British " is so constantly used in the nari-ower, insular
sense, whilst "Britannic" — tlie territorial title of the
sovereign of these realms, who is to all the World "Her
Britannic Majesty " — has a wider range of association,
and litly expresses the larger sweep of the idea it is
desired to emphasise. If it be not too late to change,
the imperial Federation League might with advantage
adopt the title of this series of papers.

To answer the question, " What is the empire of Her
Britannic Majesty 1 " we must turn lirst to geography
and then to history. Geographically, the lirst thing
noticeable is the scattered character of the Empire that
is usually coloured red on the maps. It literally en-
circles the globe east and west, north and south. If it
were not so ^cattei-ed the first thing to strike the eye
would be its vast extent, — more than nine millions of
square miles of the Earth's surface, a tifth part of the

4 BRITANNIC GONFEDEKATION.

whole habitable globe, the largest empire of the ancient
or modern World These characteristics lie patent.
But, if we tiegin to look closely and to analyse, two
other features shape themselves that have important
beai'ings. One of these is the distribution of the ter-
ritories between the Temperate and the Torrid zones ;
the other the isolated portion of the little land that
gives its name to, and is the political centre of, this
world-em))racing Empire.

Of these characteristics the scattered position of the
component parts of the Empire and their climatological
distribution are the two that have the most direct
bearing on the present subject. The distribution of the
territories between Temperate and Tropical climates
enables us to draw a sharp line between the Tropical
and the Tempei-ate countries. The political confedera-
tion of the Empire can I'efer only to those countries
where men of British race live from one generation to
another under free Britisli political institutions. What-
ever the more remote future may have in store, the
present question must leave out of account those Tropi-
cal portions of the Empire inhabited, and only capable
of permanent habitation, by the dark-skinned races,
governed by the vicegerents of Her Britannic Majesty,
and not intrusted with the free Briton's right of self-
government, still less therefore to be endowed with the
privilege of sharing in the government of other men
of British race. The only point of the question that
affects them is whether they would continue to be
governed by the United Kingdom alone, or by a united
empire. When we talk, then, of a Britannic confedera-
tion, we must really be thinking of the Britannic Empire
lying in Temperate or sub -Tropical latitudes; and that,

A SURVEY OF EXISTING CONDITIONS. 5

for practical })urposes, at tlie present time resolves
itself into the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, British North America, British South Africa,
and Australasia.

The second of the two characteristics having a direct
political bearing on our subject — the scattered position
of the four great groups just enumerated — is fundament-
ally responsible for the existence of such a question at
all as that which now confronts us. If these counti'ies,
inhabited as they are by a population almost entirely
of common origin and otherwise homogeneous, had lain
in geographical contiguity, there would never have arisen
such a condition of affairs as we see at present in
the political relations of each part of the whole to the
centre and to the parts. There might, indeed, and,
among a people so wedded to self-government in local
affairs, no doubt would have arisen, the need for some
loosening of the central authority over such matters by
the adoption of a federal system. But the need for
drawing closer would never have occurred, because the
existing absence of almost every substantial political
tie would never have resulted under such geographical
conditions. It is distance that has produced this result.
When the Colonies in the Temperate latitudes, inha-
bited by Britons, grew out of being governed on the
same principles as those in the Tropics, as mere depend-
encies of Great Britain, it was their distance from the
seat of government that prevented their incorporation
into the United Kingdom, or a legislative union being
thought of, while, as to the federal idea, it was not
until recently that it has come to be regarded by us as
a via media between complete legislative union and the
absence of all real political union whatever. There

6 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

wei'e uncloiil)tedly other causes determining the direc-
tion that Colonial self-government then took. Bat, if
the Colonies had been newly-opened countries next door
to us, those causes themselves would never have been
called into existence. It was geographical position that
lay at the root of the developments that have taken
place.

Historically, the actual course of events has been
briefly this. All colonies and plantations having
originally been treated alike — that is, both nursed and
governed by Britain and from Britain — those that lay
in Temperate regions, and had no native population of
which any account had to be taken, but were in-
habited entirely by men of British origin, became
Little Britains, and after a time claimed the same
amount of political freedom and the same political
institutions as were enjoyed by their brethren in the
mother-country. Distance making legislative union
impossible, and federation not heing " in the air," this
political freedom was conferred by creating local
Parliaments, and placing them in the same position
towards the Crown, represented by the governor, as
that held towards it directly by the Parliament of the
United Kingdom. Nominally the Parliament of the
United Kingdom as well as the Crown retained supreme
authoritv over the Parliaments so constituted. Practi-
cally the power of the Parliament is a reserve force
to be called out of abeyance only in great emergencies
such as that which, while we write, has arisen with
i-egard to Newfoundland ; while that of the Crown,
acting through the executive government of the United
Kingdom (as distinguished from the Crown, represented
by a colonial governor and acting through a colonial

A SURVEY OF EXISTING CONDITIONS. 7

executive), is not miicli more substantial. The poli-
tical connection between any Colony and the United
Kingdom is of the slenderest ; between any two
Colonies, except where it has since been created — as
between the Colonies of British North America by
Canadian confederation — there is none at all.

But before we can get a complete bird's-eye view of
the seneral situation we must note some other circum-
stances that accompanied the grant of parliamentaxy
self-government to the Colonies. With the right to
manage their own domestic affairs the government and
people of the United Kingdom also made to the
Colonists two free gifts of a strictly material nature,
and at an enormous sacrifice to themselves not fully
realised at the time. The first and greatest of these
gifts was nothing less than the fee-simple of the vast
territories, on the fringes of which they had settled.

The vastness of this unconditional and unreserved
bounty is even now scarcely appreciated. I'he sacrifice
it entailed on the mother-coiuitry is hardly recognised
at all. It is not only that the heritage of the whole
race was made over absolutely to a few mere handfuls
of its members, so that now a native of Great Britain
has no more property in and no more rights in or
concerning the territory of Victoria, for instance, than
any Fi'enchman or German possesses, and may even
be refused permission to enter that territory if his
pecuniary means fail to come up to a certain standard :
that is not all. There was another and directly
pecuniary sacrifice made when these lands were so
lightly given away. The Empire of Great Britain has
cost some eight hundred millions to build up. The
National Debt was^ a mortgage upon the whole of the

8 BEITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

territories composing that empire. Yet tliese large
and fertile lands, containing unknown reserves of
wealth, were simply given away to a few favoured
members of the race, freed from all responsibility for
the mortgage debt that lay upon them, the whole
burden of which remains on the shoulders of the
people of the United Kingdom. Nine-tenths and
more of the area of land charged with its repayment
has been released, and the whole stands secured upon
the remaining tenth.

After this it seems almost a small thing to come to
— but it was no small thing— the second pecuniary gift
that accompanied the concession of self-government to
the Colonies. The people of the United Kingdom
further gave them the right of levying all taxes, both
of customs and inland revenue, and applying the pro-
ceeds for their own exclusive benefit. And, negatively,
they required from them no contribution of any kind
whatever in respect of those Imperial services, supported
by the United Kingdom, of which the Colonists en-
joyed the advantages especially with themselves.

These Imperial services consist of the naval and
military, the Diplomatic and Consular, and the Colonial
Office staff. The United Kingdom keeps up the
Colonial Office for the purpose of maintaining what may
be called the discipline of the Empire. For example,
Newfoundland was recently allowed to negotiate the
basis of a reciprocity treaty with the United States.
Canada objected that its terms were injurious to
her. The Colonial Office had to adjust these conflict-
ing interests ; and we have lately read the kind of
language the Newfoundlanders use towards that Office
in consequence. It is by means of the first four-named

A SUPYFvY OF EXISTING CONDITIONS. 9

services that the foreign relations of the Empire,
whether in peace or war, are conducted. These re-
lations accordingly remain under the sole conti'ol of
the Government and people of tlie United Kingdom.
Wlien, therefore, we speak of the political independence
of the Colonies, there is this very large deduction to
be made : that, whereas they are self-governing and
mutually independent in respect of their domestic
affairs, in respect of their foreign I'clations they re-
main, constitutionally, in as completely a dependent
position as any of the Tropical Possessions of the Crown :
and herein will be found to lie the whole cnix of the
matter. When the Colonies were granted the right
of self-government, the grant was partial only ; they
were not endowed with the Imperial franchise, because
they were not then in a position to undertake the
corresponding Imperial obligations and responsibilities.
The Imperial franchise still remains vested exclusively
in the people of the United Kingdom, and upon them
exclusively devolve all the responsibilities attaching to
the defence of the Empire in time of ^ war, and the
maintenance, defence, and advancement of the rights
and interests of individual Bi'itish subjects, of the
several countries in the Empire, and of the Empire
as a whole in time of peace. There are other aspects
in which the Imperial relationship may be viewed, but
herein lies its fundamental difficulty.

We are now in a position to look into the situation
more closely. What is the actual working of the present
anomalous arrangement ? To the Colonies it means
that, while on the one hand they escape altogether the
political difficulty, the labour and expense, the money-
tax and the blood-tax, involved in responsibility for the

lo BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

maintenance and defence of the Empire in all its
foreign relations, they find themselves, on the other
hand, without any constitutional voice in foreign affairs
— even when these nearly affect their own special in-
terests — and are unable to carry out or procui-e the
adoption by the mother-country of any foreign policy,
however much they may desire it. Witness the annexa-
tion of New Guinea, attempted, on behalf of Australia,
by the colony of Queensland, but vetoed l)y the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom, and the whole annexation
policy of Australia in the South Pacific continually
pressed upon the Home Government, and that Govern-
ment's steady I'efusal to carry it out. They find them-
selves at the same time exposed to the inconvenience
and risks of wars entered upon by the Government of
the United Kingdom — wars in which it is possible they
may — some of them at any rate — have no direct in-
terest, and in the making or ending of which they have
no part or voice.

How does this affect the United Kingdom ? In the
first place, the people of the United Kingdom have to
bear the whole pecuniary expense of the four services
concerned with foreign affairs (with the exception of
some military contributions from India and the Crown
Colonies), the advantages of which are shared by all
parts of the Kmpire and every individual in it alike.
And, more than that, they may be called upon to under-
take a war, involving untold loss and misery and
enormous expense to themselves on account of some
sinde one of the Colonies. On whatever account the
war, the whole Empire suffers in some way, or at least,
runs the risk of suffering, but in all cases the United
Kingdom immeasurably the most of all. Colonists,

A SURVEY OF EXISTING CONDITIONS. ii

i-eferrino to these risks, sometimes talk of Great Britain
coinof to war in some cause that does not concern them.
There miijlit be a war in wliich not all the Colonies
would have a direct interest, as, for instance, if we went
to war with France on behalf of Newfoundland, or with
America on behalf of Canadian interests i» Bering Sea
or elsewhere. Australasia and South Africa would
have no direct interest there, but neither would the
United Kingdom itself. ] [istorically, the facts are all
the other way. Britain's quarrels for the last three
centuries, wherever the theatre of war may have been,
and whatever the ostensible rams belli, have not been
fought on grounds concerning Britain herself, but have
been in one way or another Colonial wars ; and Britain's
rmly danger of war now lies, not at home, but in one
corner or the other of the outlying Empire. A war
with Russia, even, would not in the future any more
than in the past arise from any danger threatening
these Islands, but from the danger that threatens our
lines of communication and those of the Colonies, that
threatens India, and, more remotely, Australasia in the
South, and Canada in the North, Pacific.

The existing anomalous condition of the Imperial
relationship has grown up, as we have seen, from the
partial nature of the transition from the absolute
dependence of the Colonies to the position they now
enjoy. So long as they were in a completely dependent
position, and the territories themselves remained the
property of the people of Great Britain and Ireland, it
was only right and natural that the mother-comitry
should mainly undertake the work of Imperial defence
as well as the control also of local defences. When the
Colonies obtained domestic self-government and the

12 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

ownership of their own lands they were left to supply
their own local defences, for which this country then
ceased to be responsible, but were not then wealthy
enough to undertake the expense, or jiolitically advanced
enough to be intrusted with the responsibility, of shar-
ing in an}^ Imperial obligations, whether of defence or
otherwise. But their growth has been, and continues
to be, very rapid ; and things have reached a stage
now, when on l)oth sides it is felt that the present
loose and anomalous relationship is unsatisfactory, for
different reasons, to both parties to it, and fraught with
danger to the maintenance of Imperial unity. The
anomalous nature to-day of a state of things that was
all very well even a generation ago becomes trans-
parentl}^ plain when we compare the matei-ial condition
of the Colonies then and now\

In a paper which I read in 1886, before the Royal
United Service Institution, upon " Imperial Federation :
Naval and INIilitary," some of the most striking com-
parisons were brought out between the material develop-
ment of the Empire at the period of the great Exhibi-
tion of 185 1, and at that of the Colonial and Indian
Exhibition of 1886. These were illustrated by diagrams ;
and it is not a little significant that many items in the
comparison, in which the Colonial portion bulks large
in 1886, were in 1851 too small to admit of illustration
on the scale adojited. The Consolidation of the British
Empire is, I understand, to form the subject of a
special paper in this series ; but, without trenching
unduly on the province of that paper, it will be useful,
in this preliminai-y exposition of the case for considera-
tion, to notice some of the main outlines in the picture
of the Empire drawn in the lecture referred to, and

A SLRVEY OK EXlttTlNG CONDITIONS. 13

some further statements made by myself, in the House
of (Jommons, in dealing only a few months ago witli
the question of the growth of Colonial sea-borne com-
merce and the need of naval defence.

in 1 85 I the trade of the Colonies (which throughout
must be taken to mean liritish North America, Austial-
asia, and South Africa, as distinguished from Dependen-
cies like India, Ceylon, A\'est Indies, Sec.) amounted to
24 millions of pounds sterling. In 1884-85 the same
trade had risen to 176 millions. A similar comparison
for the whole Empire between the two Exhibition
years, 1851 and 1886, brings out the fact of the follow-
ing astounding growth. In 1S51 the total trade of the
Empire, Cnited Kingdom, Colonies, and Dependencies,
added togethei", amounted to not quite 400 millions
(y^399j7^5!79^); '^^ which that of the United Kingdom
counted for 324 millions, odd. In 1886 the total stood
at 1079 millions odd, of which the United Kingdom
supplied 644 millions, the Dependencies 258 millions,
and the Colonies the balance of 176 millions.

Between the same periods, 1851 and 1886, the growth
in shipping annually entered and cleared at British
ports was equally I'emarkable. At the former date the
movements of shipping in the Colonies, being less than
5 million tons, could not be illustrated in the diagrams
on the scale necessarily adopted to bring the measure-
ments for the whole Empire within manageable limits.
It was then only 4 millions and three-quarters tons,
while in 1884-85 it had risen to 26 millions and a half.
The totals of such movements of shipping for the
Empire, for 185 1, gave a Little over 25 millions and a
quarter tons (25,283,241), of which the United Kingdom
had 14 millions and a half. In 1886 the total stood at

14 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

141 million tons. And here, it is to he noticed, the
proportions have to be reversed. The share of the
United Kingdom is 64 millions against 67 millions
pi'ovided by the Dependencies (5[ millions) and the
Colonies (16 millions).

The l)earing of these figures on the question of Im-
[)erial Defence, which means primarily the defence of
sea-borne commerce, is, of course, obvious ; and, in the
same paper, two other comparisons were made, giving
direct point to this connection. One of these compared,
on the one side, the trade of the live principal countries
(exclusive of the United States) having sea-boards on
the Pacilic Ocean, and, on the other, their effective
naval power. The countries were Peru, Japan, Chili,
China, and Australasia, in the order of an ascending
scale of their commerce. The trade of Peru and Japan
was comparatively insignificant ; that of Chili about a
quarter, and of China less than half, of Australasia.
On the other side, we find that Peru's navy had
recently been destroyed in the war with Chili; Japan
at that date maintained 7 sea-going modern cruisers,
Chili 8, and China 7, irrespective in all cases of ships
of other classes. What do we find against Australasia,
whose trade exceeds that of all the others put together ?
The entry at the time was, " Austi'alasia maintains
no ocean cruisers."

The other table compared the Colonies (in the same
sense as here throughout) with the United States of
America — a country inhabited liy an equally industrial
and peace-loving population. The area of the Colonies
is a little over 7 million square miles ; that of the
United States a little over 3 millions. The Colonial
trade was 176 millions, against 293 millions for the

A SURVEY OF EXISTING CONDITIONS. 15

United States; tlie revenue 37 uiillions and a half,
a<,'ainst 72 million.s and a half. Jiiit the " Expenditure
on War Forces " by tlie States \\ as 1 1 uiillions and
three-quarters, while that of the Colonies was "in-
capable of being showu on the diagram," being but
little more than the odd three quarters of a million
(^802,559).

On the motion for going into Committee of Supply
on the Navy Estimates in March last, I raised a debate
bv "calling attention" to the growth of Colonial
maritime commerce, and the increase of British naval
responsi1)ilities caused thereby. I pointed out that
our Home population was now dependent on maritime
trade for food, and, 1 might have added, for the means
of buying it to be gained by working up the raw
materials, the supply of which also depends on the
safety of our ocean-trade. Foimerly, danger to our
commerce was virtually cuniined to European waters
and the North -West Atlantic. The area of danger
now includes evei'y sea in the World. At the close of
our great European war (1815), the commerce to be
protected was that of the United Kingdom alone. At
that time, though we had already asserted the supremacy
of the seas, and had only the germs of an outlying
empire to defend, the naval estimates were ;^2 2,000,000.
For the present year the estimate is only something
over ;^i 4,000,000 ; and we have to protect an immense
empire, having a vastly extended area and an enormously
increased sea-commerce.

The increase over, roughly, fifty years — from the
commencement of Her Majesty's reign — is shown by
the following figures. In 1837 the annual revenue
of the United Kingdom was 55 millions, and the

i6 BRITANNIC CONFEDEKATJON.

annual sea-commerce was valued at 155 millions. At
the present day the revenue is 89 millions, and the sea-
commerce 744 millions. But a mucli larger proportion-
ate growth of sea-commerce is shown on the side of the
outlying portions of tlie Empire. The aggregate revenue
of these was, at the heginning of the reign, 23 millions,
against 105 niillions now; while the sea-commerce,
then under 55 millions, has now risen to 460 millions.
During this period, therefore, the revenue of the
United Kingdom has increased only by about one-
half, and the sea-commerce has increased five times,
while the revenue of the rest of the Empire has in-
creased nearly five times, and its sea-commerce about
nine times. Of 194 millions of revenue raised last year
throughout the Empire, 105 millions were raised in the
outlying parts ; and that portion constantly increases,
whilst that of the United Kingdom remains about
stationary.

Here, then, we have a \ery pregnant comparison
indeed. But there is more behind. The commerce of
the outlying portions of the Empire is capable of
division into two classes — tliat carried on with the
United Kingdom, in which, therefore, the United
Kingdom is equally interested, and that carried on in-
dependently. The former is put down at 187 millions,
the latter at 273 millions, per annum. It is accord-
ingly not only the trade of the rest of the Empire
rather than that of the United Kingdom which has
so greatly increased the bulk of the commerce requir-
ing naval protection, but it is in chief part their inde-
pendent trade in which the United Kingdom has no
direct interest whatever. This independent sea-borne
trade of the outlying portions of the Empire is four

A .SURVEY OF EX18TING CONDITIONS. 17

times that of Russia, two and a half times that of Italy,
about lialf that of the United States, nearly e(jual to
that of Germany, and about three-quarters that of
France; and it is increasing every year at such a rate
as to be fast overtaking the sea-borne commerce of the
United Kingdom itself.

And how is the naval protection of tliis commerce — •
the commerce of the whole Bi-itish Empire, of which
so large a [)roportion is of tlie character shown — how is
its protection pi'ovided and paid for ? Let it be borne
in mind that the commerce of the United Kingdom
requiring protection is valued at 744 millions ; that
of the rest of the Empire 460 millions, of which 273
millions have no connection with the United Kingdom
at all. Well, the Uniteil Kingdom finds 14 millions
and a quarter of the cost, tlie rest of the Empire 38 1
fhoiimji'h. Of this not very magnificent total India
alone finds 254 thousands (two-thirds of which, how-
ever, is for troopships and harbours, not for sea-going
vessels protecting trade), and the balance, except some
few hundreds, consists of the ;^i 26,000 to be contributed
by Australasia towards the cost of the local squadron
to cruise in its OA\n waters exclusively.

Out of eKortj pound derliwi spent (luriuij the current
year for the tiava/ j^yotecfion of the Empire the outlying
portions will spend about 6\'l., and the United Kingdom
the halaiice of 19.S. ^^d.

Enough of these comparisons, taken from the sources
already indicated, have been given to demonstrate very
clearly two or three propositions. First, the provision
made for Imperial Defence is very far indeed from
keeping pace witli Imperial property requiring defence.
Second, the growth of commei'ce, which causes the

iS BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

increase of property to be defended, is miich more rapid
in the outlying Empire than in the United Kingdom ;
and of that growing commerce outside the United
Kingdom the major part is independent, and has no
direct interest whatever for the United Kingdom.
Third, the United Kingdom bears practically the entire
burden of the defence of the commerce of the whole
Empire, to which India contributes an insignificant
quota, and the self-governing Colonies simply nothing
at all — for the other small quota from Australasia figur-
ing in the Estimates is devoted to local, not Imperial,
defence, and is demonstrably no relief whatever to the
expenditure of the United Kingdom, which was in-
creased iKO'l passu with that contribution.

'If we turn for a moment from the navy to the army,
we find that towards the expense of this arm of defence
the self-governing Colonies contribute nothing at all,
while the Dependencies do. Looking at the Diplomatic
Service, we see at this moment the whole burden of
Canada's dispute with the United States being borne by
the British Foreign Office and its Diplomatic agents,
while the Canadian Government merely look on and
criticise, and they and the whole people of Canada are
able to devote themselves to fighting a general election
in which this grave question plays no part whatever.
We see also, at this very moment, the Foreign Ofiice and
the Colonial Ofiice engaged in most difiicult negotiations
with France on behalf of Newfoundland in her dispute
with that Power ; while, again, the Government and
people of Newfoundland not only lend no help — not
only even stand by and criticise — but^ in addition
to criticising, i-efuse to move a finger to help their
champion. Apart from the Diplomatic Service proper

A SURVEY OF EXISTING CONDITIONS. 19

thei-e is the Consular establishment of Great Britain
in every country on the face of the globe, by means of
which every business man in the Colonies is being
assisted, either directly or indirectly, year in and year
out. In short, every individual Colonist gets the full
advantage of lieing a citizen of one of the oldest, richest,
and most powerful States in the World without either,
directly or indirectly, paying one penny-piece for the
privilege, j

Such a condition of affairs has not in it the elements
of permanency. It is possible, on the one hand, that
when the true state of the case comes to be widely
known and appreciated in the United Kingdom, the
tnx-payers may become restive under such an ap-
parently one-sided l)argain. On the other hand, the
Colonies, though well enough satislied at present with
an arrangement that relieves them of expense and
responsibility, may not always be content, even at a
saving to their pockets, to have their foreign relations
managed for them as they now are. Moreover, there
is room for very grave doubt as to whether the pro-
tection of the mother-country would prove, in the
actual event of war, as effective as is assumed. In
addition to the probability of the fleet proving in-
adequate to the large responsibilities to be faced, it is
pretty certain that, in the event of the food-supplies
of the United Kingdom being seriously threatened, the
British tax-payer would insist on the whole strength
of his na\'y being concentrated for their protection.
At present, however, the Colonists do not seem to
concern themselves about this.

There are two directions in which men's thoughts
are moving in the Colonies in connection with this

20 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

question. Among some there is a ten<lency to con-
sider the complications and risk of being dragged into
war entailed l)y the Imperial connection too high a
price to pay for the gratuitous support and pi-otection
afforded by the mother-country. Another and more
high-spirited feeling is also working against the con-
tinuance of the existing relations. Men in the Colonies,
who have minds above greed alone, and can speak their
minds without having the fear of ignorant constituents
before their eyes, feel the irksomeness and humiliation
of their present position. They cannot tolerate that
their otherwise free countries should continue, rit^-a-vis
of the outside World, to be in the position of mere
dependents, living under the protection of a wealth}-
patron. Such men desire, accordingly, either to come
forward and take up the full citizenship of the Empire,
or to sever the connection altogether, and stand boldly
before the Woi'ld in their own right and l)y their
own strength. Many men, and not a few of consider-
able political eminence, have spoken openly of separa-
tion, as we all know — unless, as perhaps we ought,
we except Lord Carrington, whose high office in
New South Wales appears to have prevented his
knowing what was notorious to every one else, and
was openly canvassed in the press and in Parliament.
'Now, however much the idea of separation is to be
depi'ecated by patriotic Britons in all parts of the
World, it has to l)e remembered that the time is past
for disputing the right of the great groups to sever
their political connection with the mother-country, if
in their wisdom, or unwisdom, they should definitely
and solemnly elect to do so. The whole case to the
contrary was given away when the Colonies were

A SURVEY OF EXISTING CONDITIONS. 21

granted responsible sjovernment, and with it the
absohite ownership of their land, freed from its share
in the public debt, and the complete control of their
finances and tariffs without any reservation of any sort
or kind calculated to maintain the political union in-
violate, in fact, the policy which found public ex-
pression in the speeches of the apostles of the old
Manchester School determined the policy of British
government in those davs. The Colonies were re-
peatedly told they were free to go, not without a hint
that the sooner they availed themselves of that freedom
the better. Responsible government was conceded as
a stepping-stone to independence, Avhich ^\■as officially
regarded as their natural destiny.

Now, however, a large niimerical majority of the
people on both sides the sea, and almost all the leaders
of opinion and far-seeing and responsible members of
the community throughout the Empire, recognise that
separation would be a mistake. But there is, in conse- j
quence of the fatal errors of policy committed by a
former generation of British statesmen and publicists,
an alarming amount of leeway to be made up. The
question of the maintenance of the Imperial connection
anywhere is an ojien one ; and it is this uncertainty
as to the future that paralyses community of action.
If it be practically an open question whether or not
the Colonies will one by one cut themselves adrift, as
and whenever it suits their individual convenience to
do so, it is the height of folly for the United Kingdom
to continue to do everything foi' them, and treat them
in all respects in a manner only reasonably compatible
with a sense of their permanent union with itself. On
the other hand, the Colonies naturally desire to pro-

22 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

long the present happy state of things ; while in some
cases, perhaps, they would in any circumstance hesitate
to take an irretrievable step in the direction of a closer
union on a permanent footing, not having quite made
up their minds what they would best like to do ulti-
mately, when the present halcyon days come to an end
for them.

Until the question is fairly faced — as it will have to
be faced before very long — no great progress can be
made. It behoves both sides, thei-efore, to consider
what the effect of separation would be. Without going
over the whole ground, it is easy to show, upon the one
case of naval and military defence, that the interests of
both the inother-country and the Colonies alike are
Ijound up iu tlie maintenance of political unity. Both
alike are equally interested in keeping open and pro-
tecting from interference the great trade-routes of the
Woi'ld in time of war as well as in peace. As it has
been well put, " Above all questions of Free Trade or of
fair trade is the paramount question of safe trade. "

To the United Kingdom the safety of its food-supplies
and the routes for what is a necessity second only to the
supply of food — the supply of the raw materials that
support its mills — is of absolutely vital moment ; and it
is the possession of naval bases in every sea that largely
contributes to this safety. If Australia, for example,
were independent, and an alien though friendly nation,
her ports, dockyards, and coaling-stations would be open
to the ships of Her ISIajesty's navy when engaged in
war, only on precisely the same terms as to those of the
enemy. While, if Australia were at war with another
Power, — France, for instance, — Britain being neutral —
this country Avould be powerless, while maintaining her

A SURVEY OF EXISTING CONDITIONS. 23

neutrality, to prevent the blockade of Australian })orts,
whereby our supplies of wool would be cut off from that
quarter. The case, in fact, might reproduce the results
that followed in our centres of industry from the blockade
of the cotton-por"ts in the American civil war.

Again, if for Australia we instance Canada, the same
I'esults would follow, with the difference that for " wool "
we must now read " food." Canada is more and more
becoming, and likely to become, the granary of the
United Kingdom, so that our food-supplies from that
source increase in importance every year. Or, to com-
plete the circle, let us suppose South Africa independent.
We are at war, and South Africa is neutral. Result :
our enemy's fleet can do that which it cannot do now —
coal at the Cape, and steam on to the attack of India or
Australia.

To the Colonies, the first and most palpable result of
separation would be felt on the financial side. They
depend for their development on the public and private
loans obtained in such abundance from England ; and
the golden stream, if it did not dry up, would promptly
cease to flow so smoothly, on such easy terms, to coun-
tries no longer under the British flag. " Cheap money"
is to these young communities as the breath of their
nostrils. They are deeply anxious now to obtain the
right of having their public stocks placed on the list of
investments sanctioned for trust funds, in order to raise
the price of their stocks, and so enable them to obtain
money still more cheaply. Obviously, the effect of
separation would be to lower these stocks and their
credit, public and private, very materially ; and this is
a contingency tlieir politicians and public men have no
desire to face.

24 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

Just at the time when facilities for borrowing were
thus seriously checked, they would at once have to set
to work and undertake expenses beyond any they have
ever dreamt of to provide for their security against
foreign aggression. They would have to set up a com-
plete naval equipment — ships, guns, dockyards, arsenals,
an Admiralty Department, and a force of officers and
seamen ; some would have to materially increase their
military forces, horse, foot, and artillery ; and they
would have to set up a Foreign Office, with a staff of
Diplomatic repi-esentatives and Consular officers in all
the civilised and half- civilised countries with which they
have any dealings, political or commercial.

Much of this seems .scarcely to have suggested itself
to the run of politicians and writers in the Colonies.
They have thought something of the question of defend-
ing their shores from foreign enemies, ])ut have for the
most part altogether failed to get a real grasp of what
that means. They think that, as they already provide
for the land-defence of their own coasts, the only addi-
tion they would have to make would be at most the
establishment of a naval squadron of their own for their
own waters, to replace the ships of the Imperial navy
now stationed there. This is a very superficial view
indeed. The cardinal fact of Imperial Defence is that
the safety of each part depends upon the aggregate
strength of the whole force of the Empire. It is not
alone the few ships on the Australian station (to keep to
the same country for illustration) that render Australia
safe from attack. It is also the ships in European
waters, in North Pacific wateis, and elsewhere through-
out the World, which, by closing up the hostile ports
of issue at the commencement of a war, would prevent

A SURVEY OF EXISTING CONDITIONS. 25

tlie despatch of an expedition in force too great t(j 1)0
resisted by tlie squadron of local defence. Moreover, it
is not the fear of that squadron or of Australia's land-
defences that would make a foreign Power hesitate on
occasion to attack her, but the knowledge that tlie whole
power of the British Empire is liehind her.

The effect of this is found in peace as well as in war.
Suppose Australia independent, and having her repre-
sentatives in the capitals of Europe, with what sort of
voice could they speak ? What force lying behind them
would sfive a sanction to their remonstrances or their
threats ? For passive defence, but little ; for effective
action in the offensive operations of defence, none at
all. No ; it is the power to back a word with a blow
that gives effectiveness to words : or. whei'e the case
does not go to such lengths, it is the authority and
prestige of a great, powerful, and historic nation, having
a place among the Powers of the World, that cause the
voice of its ambassadors to l^e listened to with respect,
and their words to carry weight and influence. Of all
this, in peace and war, the Colonies have now the in-
calculable advantage, though they scarcely recognise it.
They would find out the difference all too soon and too
surely if they threw away their birthright, and found
themselves ranking in the World with the groups of
I'epublics in South America.

And if the power of the United Kingdom, strengthened
at present only by the vague and shadowy reserve of
unapplied force, aff'orded by her outlying Colonies and
Dependencies, is so great as it is now, what would not
the might of the Empire become if all its scattered
resources were welded into one homogeneous whole ?
Under a complete federation for defence with an

26 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

Imperial navy, and each part doing its share of land-
defence and co-operating with the navy, in pursuance of
an ordered and uniform system, the effective power of
the Empire for defence would be multiplied in a ratio
out of all proportion to the mere sum of the forces
of its several parts. It would be able to defy attack,
and would form a League of Peace capable of enforcing
its will — so long as its Avill meant peace — upon the
World.

But though federation, as regards matters of actual
relations, and especially for defence, is at once the most
important and the most pressing part of the Federal
problem, it is not quite tlie whole of it. There are
other lines along which the movement might travel,
many matters calling for joint action, all helping to-
wards the attainment of national unity. The exigencies
of space forbid more than a bare mention of these
elements of unity, but their mere mention will be suffi-
ciently suggestive. Under the head of " Communica-
tions " much could be Avritten. Some steps have been
taken by the governments of the United Kingdom, and
both of the Colonies and Dependencies towards common
action in Postal matters, that may lead, it is hoped, to
far more uniformity than at present exists in this
respect. Here, and in another branch of communica-
tions — Telegraphs — the goal to be aimed at is the recog-
tion of the Empire as a solid unit. Every step in this
direction is a step towards political federation which
must make itself useful in other branches of administra-
tion as well.

Law is a thorny subject ; but it is one in which an
enormous amount of advantage would be gained by
more concei'ted action between the various parts of the

A SURVEY OF EXISTING CONDITIONS. 27

Empire. The principle of this is iih'eady recognised hy
the passage of statutes having the effect of extending
the legal processes of each part of the Empire to other
parts, and generally providing for the recognition
throughout the Empire of legal rights and oVjligations,
in whatever part of it originating. The discussions of
the Imperial Conference of 1887, and of the conferences
held among themselves by the Colonies of the Australasian
group, show how great need exists for concerted action
in this direction ; and few things would exercise a more
practically binding effect than the extended recognition
of the unity of the Empire by further advances along
this line. Business men as well as lawyers will see at
once the work that has to be done here in bankiiiptcy
and commercial law, and the execution of process in
these branches and in criminal cases, copyright, trade-
marks, &c.

The status of the Home and Colonial Civil Services
and of the learned professions and others, and the
reciprocal recognition throughout the Empire of these
ranks and diplomas, would also lend themselves to
similar treatment. Emigration and colonisation are
now subjects of great difficulty. The replies sent in by
the Colonial Governments to the questions submitted to
them, the report of the Colonisation Committee, which
has just been issued, and the evidence of Agents-General
and other witnesses, all show that, as things stand, the
attitude of the Colonies renders impossible any attempt
by the Home Government to plant our surplus popula-
tion on the vast tracts of land lying unoccupied in the
Colonies.

The question of tariffs attracts much attention just
at present ; and some persons see in it the means by

28 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

which Britannic Confedei^ation can best be achieved.
It is one of the subjects to be specially treated in a
separate paper. It will ))e sufficient here to point out
that, however desirable it may be to promote the intei'-
course of trade within the Empire, there are at present
formidable obstacles in the way of attempts to do this,
whichever direction such attempts take. If it be sought
to establish an Imperial Znllverein with Free Trade
within the Empire, there is the obstacle of the Colonial
tariffs, which are almost universally protective ; and
the Colonists show no disposition to relax these tariffs,
which, apart from protecting their young industries
against the competition of the cheaper production of the
mother-country, are by all of them presently regarded
as necessarily the chief source of revenue in countries
too young in the accumulation of wealth to stand heavy
direct taxation. If, on the other hand, it be proposed
to keep up in the Colonies a tariff-wall against the
goods of the United Kingdom, only raising it somewhat
higher against outsiders, this, on the one hand, would
not benefit the United Kingdom, while, on the other
hand, it would involve the imposition of im})ort duties
ao-ainst forei£;n countries bv the United Kingdom ; and
these, to be of any use l)y way of giving a preference to
the Colonies, must be on their chief productions, food-
stuff's, and the raw material of manufactures, to increase
the cost of which is a course that does not at present,
in the absence of any substantial countervailing advan-
tage, commend itself to the people of this country. Com-
munity of trade interests would undoubtedly be most
valuable in cementing the bonds of national unity. But
there are lines of less resistance along which the move-
ment to that end can just now more safely proceed.

A SURVEY OF EXISTING CONDITIONS. 29

Before coucliKling this, perhaps, too lengthy paper, it
seems fitting to make some reference to the work of the
Imperial Federation League, to which is due in so large
a measure the position which the (Jolonial Question
now occupies in the politics of the day, and the great
change that has come over the public mind upon the
future of the Imperial relationship within the past
few years. Formed in 1884, at a Conference held in
London, and presided over by the Right Hon. W. E.
Forster, this League has now assumed almost the pro-
portions of a national, or— though the two words ought
really to mean the same thing when applied as they are
here — Imperial, organisation. The Conference laid
down in its resolutions three fundamental propositions,
which are as follows :— (1) That, in order to secure the
permanent unity of the Empire some form of Federa-
tion is essential ; (2) that no scheme of Federation should
interfere with the existing rights of local parliaments
as regards local affairs; and (3) that any scheme of
Imperial Federation should combine on an equitable
basis the resources of the Empire for the maintenance
of common interests, and adequately provide for an
organised defence of common rights. These are broad
and statesmanlike propositions, and they have withstood
the fire of criticism — and the League has been subject
to a pretty constant, if not always very heavy, fire —
during the seven years that have passed since they were
adopted as the constitution and charter of the League.

The principal aim of the lieague hitherto has been to
diffuse information and form public opinion on the
subject of the Colonial Question both at home and in
the Colonies. The measure of its attainment of these
ends may be gauged by any one who will merely glance

30 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

over tiles of newspapers and reviews for 1883 and 1884,
and then for 1889- 1890. To the action of the League,
moreover, was directly due the convocation of the
Imperial Conference of 1887, which, besides making a
small beginning on the principle of common action in
naval defence, though not quite on federal lines, was
the means of showing how much required to be done in
the way of common action, and how it might be done
by discussions and action by Federal Councils at con-
ferences.

In conclusion, it may, perhaps, be well to say that in
this paper Federation for Defence has been given so
outstanding a prominence for two reasons. First, it
would have deserved and required such prominence in
any case, because, in the opinion of the writer, it con-
stitutes eight-tenths of the whole question of Fedei'ation.
Secondly, it seemed to call for such treatment, especi-
ally in this introductory paper, because, though other
branches of the subject are set down for separate treat-
ment, no specific mention of " Defence "' is made at all
in the syllabus of papers to follow this one, and it would
therefoi'e have to be treated, it is presumed, under the
sreneral head of "Political." This seemed a sufficient
reason for dwelling at length upon it here even to the
partial exclusion of other topics.

In closing this article I must express my indebted-
ness to Mr. Robert Beadon — a member of the Executive
Committee of the Imperial Federation League — without
whose aid it could not, owing to other demands upon my
fittention, have been prepared in time for publication.

J. COLOMB,

II.

THE PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL BA8ES OF
NATIONAL UNITY.

By EDWARD A. FREEMAN, M.A., D.C'.L.. LL.D.,
liqiius Professor of Modern History at Ihe UniversUv of OxfonJ.

THE PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL BASES
OF NATIONAL UNITY.

I FEEL it a great honour to be asked to write a paper
in a series to the seeming object of which I am alto-
gether opposed. Such a i-equest shows a wilHngness to
listen to what is to be said on the other side, which is
not common in modern controversy. It is a feeling
which I thoroughly return. There is no living writer
whom I read more gladly and with more profit that Mr.
Dicey. I am a Home-Ruler; he is an Unionist. But
I know that in his writings I shall always find the case
for the otlier side as clearly and powerfully put as it
can be. And that is a great help towards being able to
put the case for one's own side clearly and powerfully.
There would be feAver controversies in the World than
there are, and those that could not be avoided would be
carried on more reasonably than they are, if only each
side thoroughly understood what the other side means,
and further, what is sometimes harder still, if each side
thoroughly understood what it means itself.

The heading of this article is one given to me, not
one of my own choice. Considering the purpose of the
series, the main practical object of discussion which it
suirfrests would seem to be whether the actual conditions
of the Woi'ld, and specially its geographical conditions,

will allow the existence of national unitv, or such

33 ' c

34 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

measure of it as may be implied in the word " Con-
federation," between certain communities scattered over
very distant parts of the World. In discussing this
question, as in discussing any other question, it is need-
ful first of all to know what it is that we are discussing.
That is, we must fully make up our minds as to the
meaning in which we intend to use the chief words
which we use in the discussion. In this discussion let
us see, first of all, what we mean by National Unity.

I have gone very fully in another place into the ques-
tion as to what constitutes a nation ;* what I have said
there I must often assume now. The word Nation is
constantly used in very different senses, and much con-
fusion arises from its use in different senses. In some
cases it is simply used as equivalent to independeni
power. It is used thus when we speak of nder/iational
relations, when we ask, purely for purposes of inter-
national law, of what nationalitij a man is. In answer-
ing such a question as this, the Swiss Confederation
and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy each passes for a
nation. The several Spanish-speaking commonwealths
of North and South America pass for distinct nations.
A Greek of the kingdom of Greece and a Greek who is
a subject of the Turkish Sultan pass for men of different
nationalities. So do an Italian-speaking man at Trent,
another at Yerona, and a third at Lugano. But this
use of the word ncdion and its derivatives is confined to
the formal range of international politics. As soon as
we get beyond that formal range, as soon as we pass

* I refer, as I often have to do, to the Essay on "Race and
Language," which first appeared in the Contemporary llevicw for
March 1877, ^'^^l which is reprinted in my " Third Series of Histori-
cal Essays," p. 17 "5.

BASES OF NATIONAL UNITY. 35

from what is to what has been, to what may be, or to
what ought to be, our use of the word nation begins to
be affected by other considerations. To prove that men
belong to the same nation, it is no longer quite enough
to show that they are subjects or citizens of the same
political power. To prove that they belong to dif-
ferent nations, it is no longer enough to show that they
are subjects or citizens of different powers. A man's
nationality becomes rather a good deal wider than the
simple question to what minister or consul he must apply
if he needs help in a foreign country. As soon as we
begin to think of nationality in this wider sense, w^e feel
that, besides the distinction of political powers, there is
something else to be thought of which is not so easy to
define. The thought of community of blood, of com-
munity of language, of fellowship in the events of past
times, all come in. And yet we presently begin to feel
that we cannot build up a theoiy of " National Unity "
on any one of these things by itself. So to do would
soon lead us as far astray as we should be led by the
formal doctrine of international law. We gradually
come to see that there is such a thing as an idea of a
nation in the mind, but that such an idea hardly ever
answers to anything that has any actual being on earth.
Does it at all follow that the idea of a nation that we
have in the mind is a mere dream, unpractical folly, and
the like ? A mere dream it certainly is in one sense ;
unpractical folly it certainly is not. The ideal notion
of a nation is like any other counsel of perfection. Such
a counsel is a model to which every man cannot attain,
to which very likely no man can attain, but which every
man is the better for keeping before him and getting as
near to it as he can. It may therefore be worth while

36 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

to try to give an ideal definition of a nation, even
though it may be very hard, perhaps quite impossible,
to find any existing nation which answers to it.

The ideal nation then, I would say, is to be foiind
where a continuous territory is inhabited by a people
united under one government, and all of them speaking
the same language, a language which is not spoken by
any other people.

It will be noticed that I am satisfied with vinity of
language, and that I say nothing about unity of race.
The question of race is too deep for our present inquiry.
It doubtless is a practical question. That is, there is
every reason to think that strict community of blood,*
where it exists, has a real influence. But that influence
Morks iu such silent and uncertain ways that we cannot
reckon on it as an element in our calculations. We
must take the outward sign of language instead of it.
Community of language is doubtless often a witness
to real community of blood ; it is very often only its
su.bstitute. We know that it is so in many cases ; we
suspect that it may be so in many others. But in
practical matters it is the only test that we can go by.
And we must take the word language in its rough
practical sense. It does not shut out wide differences
of dialect. It is enough if the speakers of each dialect
understand the speakers of every other. Indeed I should
rather say that it was enough if there is one central
dialect which is understood by the speakers of all the

* When I speak of "community of blood," I do so under tlie
limitations drawn in the article above quoted. It is always possible
that, even where there is community of race, in the strictest sense
of the word race to which we can reach, there may be no pliysical
community of blood.

BASES OF NATIONAL UNITY. 37

others. In the sense with which we arc concerned, all
Great Britain and Ireland speaks English, except so
much as speaks Welsh, Gaelic, or Irisli. French and
Provencal are historically as truly distinct languages
as French and Italian ; but, for our purposes, all France
speaks French, except so much as speaks Basque, Breton,
or Flemish.

Now, taking this definition of an ideal nation, it might
be rash to say that there is nothing answering to it in
any part of the World. But it is quite certain that
there is nothing exactly answering to it among the civi-
lised States of Europe and America. It is equally certain
that some of those States come much nearer to the
model than others. Among those which rank as " Great
Powers" the kingdom of Italy may from one side be
said to reach it. The dialects of Italian are many and
strongly marked ; but, as language has been defined
above, we may fairly say that the whole kingdom speaks
Italian.* And on the other side, though there is an
Italia Irredenta, it is small compared with the large
districts out of the German Empire wliich speak Ger-
man. France, as far as Europe is concerned, comes on
one side nearer to the model than Italy. There is a lost
territory which France wishes to win back, bub it can
hardly be called a Francia Irredenta. Germany is further
off from the model on both sides ; Russia is on one side

* I do not forget that within the kingdom of Italy there is a
district that speaks French (or Provengal), another that speaks
German, and another that speaks Slav. But they are districts
which are almost invisible, and which may be said to come under
the rule, "Z)e minimis non curat lex." The non-French-speaking
parts of France are much greater, and the non-English-speaking
parts of the United Kingdom much greater again.

433236

38 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

nearer to it than Italy, for there are few speakers of
Russian out of the Russian Empire ; * on the other side
it is much further off than Germany, as the Russian
Empire contains millions on millions who are, not
speakers of Russian. Still, Russia and Germany are
both national powers ; if they contain non-Russian and
non-German elements, it is the Russian and German
kernel round which they are gathered which determines
everything. The Austro- Hungarian monarchy stands
among the six Great Powers at the other end. As a
whole, it has no national life or national tie whatever.
Yet, one of its chief members, the kingdom of Hungary,
has both in a large measure. Among the smaller powers
of Europe the same differences may be seen, though
most of them come much nearer to national unity than
the great ones, Switzerland stands out among them
all, a power made up by the union of fragments of other
powers, speaking four languages within its borders,!
and yet possessed of a true national life. Its example
shows that, as language habitually takes the place of
race in the formation of nations, so, vinder special cir-
cumstances, political necessities can take the place of
language.

Of the six Great Powers, as they usually are called, I

* Only the Ruthenians, the Russians of Red Russia, in the king-
dom of Galicia and Lodonieria, one of the possessions of the House
of Austria.

t German, French, and Italian are acknovvleciged by the Con-
federation as national languages. The fourth speech, the Roniansch
of Graubiinden, is not. This is most likely because the other three,
as the languages of Great Powers outside the Confederation, pro-
claim themselves as independent languages, while Romansch has
the look of a mere dialect. But it is the independent speech of
part of Switzerland, and it is not a dialect of any of the other three.

BASES OF NATIONAL UNITY. 39

have mentioned five. One remains, that with which
we are ourselves most nearly concerned. The power of
Great Britain has a very different air, according as we
look at it simply as an European power or as a power
spreading into all parts of the Woi-ld. In the former
character it comes on one side nearer to the definition of
the model nation than any of the other Gi-eat Powers.
If English is by no means the exclusive language of
the United Kingdom, yet the United Kingdom takes in
all that part of Europe where English is a natural lan-
guage ; the United Kingdom and its Dependencies take
in all that part of Europe w-here English is spoken at
all.* And I have kept back till now one point of the
original definition, namely, that the territory of the
ideal nation should be confinuous. Of course this defi-
nition is not meant to cut out every case where a
territory may consist either of a gi'oup of islands or of
a piece of mainland with islands lying near to it. Greece
and Denmark are obvious instances. Italy might cause
a moment's thought ; Capri, Elba, Sicily, and Sardinia
might seem to stand in foiu* different relations to the
peninsular kingdom ; but we need not stop to examine
the point, which just now is not a practical one. About
France, Germany, Russia, there is not much to say in
the way of islands. That Jersey, Guernsey, and their
fellows, have been for ages dependencies of England, and
have not been incorporated with France, shows how

* I have to make tins distinction, because Man and the Channel
Islands are not part of the United Kingdom, but dependencies of
it. And in them, though English has made a certain progress,
it is not the natural language. In more distant Dependencies, as
Malta, however many people maj' find it convenient to learn English,
it is strictly a foreign language.

40 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

geography may sometimes have to yield to manifest
interest and to a historic tie. With this exception, the
islands attached to each of those powers follow naturally
on the possession of the neighboming coast. If any
one grudges the possession of Aland by Russia, the
other chance is that it should go back to Sweden. The
British Possessions in Europe stand on quite another
footing. The United Kingdom consists of two large
islands and a number of smaller ones. In the middle
of them lies the dependency of Man ; at some distance
the dependent Channel Islands ; and at one end lie
Orkney and Shetland, of which I am not called on to
speak particularly. But islands like Wight, Anglesey,
Bute, may be reasonably called continuous with the Isle
of Britain itself. The only question lies between the
two great islands, Britain and Ireland. Some have
thought that their geographical position — specially with
a distinct, though dependent, State lying between them —
points to a state of things in which they should have a
certain connection with one another, but a connection
less close than that which binds the several parts of
Britain to one another. On this thorny question I will
not enter here. All that concerns us just now is that
the United Kingdom, as it stands at present, is the
one purely insular power among all the powers of
Europe, great and small. The home territory is insular ;
so are all the European Dependencies, except one
peninsular rock. And the home territory, at first sight
at least, hangs well together. If we cannot always walk
from one part to another, it is practically as continuous
as many continental territories. No foi'eign territory
comes between any part of it and any other part ; and
it has one great advantage over all continental terri-

BASES OF NATIONAL UNITY. 41

tories, n.amely, tliat it has no frontier towards any
foreign country.

Having thus got some notion of the conditions of
national unity as they exist in Europe, we go on to the
further question, what those conditions are, and whether
there are any such conditions in the case of hinds which
are in quite another case from the Lands of Europe 1 Is
national unity, in any sense at all approaching to our
definition of it, or indeed in any sense, possible in the
case of territories which do not lie continuous in Europe
or in any other part of the World, but which are scat-
tered over all the regions of the Earth, over distant con-
tinents and islands, parted from one another by vast
stretches of Ocean 1 How does the case stand when, to
go from one part to another, large foreign territories
have sometimes to be crossed, constantly either to be
crossed or gone round ? That a scattered dominion like
this can be held together by allegiance to a common
sovereign or to a common ruling city is shown by many
examples in various ages. Such was the dominion of
Carthage, Athens, Venice, and Genoa, in the INlediter-
ranean, in days when the Mediterranean was what the
Ocean is now.* Such lias been the dominion of Portugal,
Spain, France, Holland, England, since the Ocean has
become what the Mediterranean once was. And experi-
ence also proves that the central power may either hold
a despotic rule over its distant dependencies, or may
grant them the highest measure of internal freedom con-

* The unbroken dominion of Rome does not come in here.
Though, or rather because, it took in the dominion of all the cities
mentioned in the text, it was not scattered but continuous. But
in after times the Roman power at Constantinople did become a
scattered dominion, like that of Carthage and Venice.

42 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

sistent with their i^emaining dependencies. But here
the line is drawn. At this moment most of the Colonies
of Britain enjoy, in all ordinary times, each one within
its own bounds, very nearly as full an amount of freedom
as if it were an independent State. But in any wider
relations it has no voice. It can have no dealings with
foreign powers ; those it must leave to the central power
which acts on its behalf, as on behalf of all the other
Possessions of the common sovereign. Nay, it cannot
of itself enter into closer relations with its immediate
neighbours. The so-called Confederation of Canada did
not, like the Confederation of the United States, come
into being by the act of its own members. It exists by
virtue of an Act of the Parliament of the United King-
dom. That Act doubtless expresses the wishes of the
lands concerned ; but those lands might have wished for
ever if the British Parliament had not put their wishes
into a practical shape. That is to say, all these lands,
whether remaining as separate colonies or united into
the shape of a Confederation, are simply Dependencies
of the United Kingdom, enjoying such privileges as the
Parliament of the United Kingdom may think good to
grant to them. That supreme power can at any moment
override even internal independence ; it can legislate at
pleasure for the dependency even against its will. Till
quite lately we used to say that, though such a power
existed in theory, it was not likely to be carried out in
practice. But sleeping lions sometimes wake, and we
have just seen the supreme authority of the British
Parliament over a British dependency carried out in its
fulness.

Now suppose the people of the Dependencies— those
Dependencies, I mean, which are practically independent

BASES OF NATIONAL UNITY. 43

within their own range — become dissatisfied with their
dependent state, and wish, to put the case plainly, to be
put on a level with the people of the United Kingdom.
That is, suppose they wish, not only to manage their
own internal affairs, but to have a voice, in some shape
or other, in all affairs that may concern them. It is
obvious that there is one way in which this may be had.
It may be won in the same way in which it was won
by the Thirteen Colonies which became independent in
1776. That is, the act might take the same shape,
though the course which led to it might be quite dif-
ferent. That is to say, the mother-country and the
colony might part asunder, not through war, like the
Thirteen Colonies and the colonies of Spain, but peace-
fully, as Portugal and Brazil parted asunder. And if
any Colony now enjoying internal fi'eedom chose to put
forth a Declaration of Independence, it is not likely that
the mother-country would constrain it by force to remain
in a state of dependence. But, supposing the Depen-
dency wishes that its state of dependence on the mother-
country should cease, but that it does not at all wish
that its political connection with the mother-country
should cease with it. Its people, we may put it, wish to
be put on a level with the people of the mother-country,
but they do not wish to be put on a level with them
by becoming a people wholly apart from the mother-
country. They wish to be put on a level with them
by being promoted to a voice in certain matters in
which the people of the mother-country now have a
voice, but in which they have none. But they wish
to have a voice in those matters in common with the
people of the mother-country, not apart from them.
Now, this is as much as to say that they wish for a

44 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

federal union with the mother-country and with one
another. There is another form of union, possible in
theory, but which is really not worth discussing in
practice. I mean that the Colonies might be joined to
the United Kingdom in the same way in which Scotland
was joined to England and Ireland to Great Britain.
Members for the Colonies might be admitted to seats
in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. But to
carry this plan out consistently would involve the
abolition of the separate legislatures of each Colony.
One Parliament would legislate for all. By this means
the national unity which at present exists between the
mother-country and the Colonies would, on its political
side, be drawn much closer. All parts of the scattered
territory would be politically equal ; no part would
be dependent on any other part ; everything that
could be called " national " in any sense would be
common to all parts on equal terms. Yet I cannot be-
lieve that any Dependency would be willing to purchase
closer national unity on such terms as these. Surely
every British Colony would refuse to exchange its
abiding independent management of its own affairs
for a voice in affairs which would concern it only now
and then. It had surely better remain dependent than
share in an independence which has to be purchased
at such a cost. What therefore is really sought for
by those who wish for some closer and higher form of
national unity than a relation of dependence is not
absorption into the United Kingdom, but some kind
of federal union with it. Three questions here arise :
— What are the lands which are to enter into a federal
union 1 Is it possible to establish any kind of federal
union among such distant and scattered members 1

BASES OF NATIONAL UNITY. 45

If such an union can be established, will it practically
lead to any closer form of national unity ?

These questions seem to bring us to the edge of the
dark abyss of what is called "■ Imperial Federation."
But I am glad to see that in the present discussion a
good deal has been done to make it possible to argue
matters more reasonably than can be done Avhen
''Imperial Federation" has to be debated. On the
principle that language was given man to conceal his
thoughts, " Imperial Federation " is surely the wisest
name ever thought of. On any other principle it is
surely the most foolish. For it is absolutely without
meaning ; it is a conti'adiction in terms. " Empire "
implies the rule of some person or power over some
other ; " federal " implies the union of certain powers
or communities, presumably on equal terms. What is
imperial cannot be federal, and what is federal cannot
be imperial.* The power which the Sovereign and
Parliament of the United Kingdom exercises over the
Colonies and other dependencies of the United King-
dom may, if any one chooses, be called an " imperial "
power, though the use of the word leads the way to
many confusions. But if the power of the mother-

* The only case in which the words " Imperial Federation "
could have any meaning would be if they were applied to the
German Empii-e. That Empire is federal in form, and its chief
bears the title of Emperor. So far it is an imperial federation.
As for the title of its chief, I have often had to remark that the
head of a confederation which has kings among its members can
liardly be called anything but Emperor. But the position of the
Emperor and of the State of which he is the head quite cuts off
the German Empire from being reckoned as a real federation. If
anything, it is rather a federal empire, an empire in the shape of
a federation.

46 BRITANNIC CONIEDERATION,

country over tlie Dependencies is exchanged for a federal
union with them, ** empire " passes away, and the
word " imperial " is out of place. The " empire," if
that is to be the word, may be changed into a con-
federation ; the " imperial " i-elation of Great Britain
towards Australia or Canada may be changed into
a federal relation. But a thing cannot be at once
"imperial" and federal; "empire" shuts out con-
federation, and confederation shuts out "empire."
But granted that there is to be a federation of some-
thing, what are the members which are to enter into
the federal relation to one another 1 When I have
asked this question, I have sometimes been told that
Imperial Federation means a confederation of all the
Queen's dominions ; sometimes that it means a con-
federation of all " the English-speaking people." Each
of these answers has a meaning ; but they have two
very different meanings. Which are we to choose ?
The English-speaking people and the Queen's dominions
are very far from being the same thing. The majority
of the Queen's subjects are not English-speaking, and
I fancy that the majority of the English-speaking
people are not the Queen's subjects.* A confederation

* It is as well not to be positive, and I am writing without
figures. But I should fancy that the population of the United
States, even if we take off something for European immigrants
who have not yet learned English, is greater than that of the
United Kingdom and its English-speaking Dependencies. We
need not take off anything for the Negroes ; they are certainly
not English, but they are English-speaking ; and it is to be sup-
posed that tliose who asked for a confederation of the English-
speaking people meant to include them. In any case, the popula-
tion of the United States, if not a majority, must be a minority ao
great as for our purpose to be the same.

BASES OF NATIONAL UNITY. 47

of the Queen's dominions, especially if it be called
" imperial," cannot shut out the " Empire " of India ;
and if that be let in, the European, white, Christian
— however we choose to distinguish them — part of Her
Majesty's subjects will be a small minority in the
confederation. Great Britain, Canada, Australia, will
always be out-voted by the greater mass of their Asiatic,
dark-skinned, Hindu, Parsee, and Mohammedan fellow-
subjects. And the place of meeting for such a confedera-
tion cannot be Westminster or Ottawa or Melbourne ;
it must be Delhi, or anywhere that the Asiatic majo-
rity may think good. Is this what anybody in Great
Britain, or in any English-speaking colony, wishes
for 1 I trow not. But " Imperial Federation," de-
fined as a federation of the Queen's dominions, either
means this or it means nothing.

If, on the other hand. Imperial Federation is defined
to mean, as I have seen it defined to mean, a federation
of " the English-speaking people," then it must leave
out the greater part of the Queen's dominions, [and it
must take in a great deal that lies outside the Queen's
doruinions. It must leave out India ; it must take in
the United States. And here comes the very pei'tinent
question, whether the United States would be inclined
either to enter into any confederation of ours or to let
us into their ah'eady existing confederation ? One thing
is quite certain ; the United States will have nothing
to say to any " Imperial Federation " : that is — to try
to get a meaning out of a formula which is meaning-
less — to any federation in which some member, like
Thebes or Prussia, exercises a sujDremacy over the
others which may, if any one chooses, be called "im-
perial."

4S BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

These are the only two attempts at defining " Imperial
Federation " which I have ever seen. Commonly, when
a man talks about " Imperial Federation " he means
something else, something very ill-defined, something
which, if one better got to understand it, might prove
to be wise or foolish, possible or impossible, but which
is in no case federation. Sometimes it is something
about the post-oifice, sometimes something about cus-
toms and tariffs. These things are all very impor-
tant ; but they are not federation. A Postverein,
a Zollverein — I must be allowed to use the native
language of political science — is not a Bundesstaat. Even
in English the word Federatioii has a meaning. It
means that several distinct political communities agree
to become one political community for certain purposes,
and to remain distinct political communities for certain
other purposes. They agree that each community shall
settle its internal affairs for itself, but that common
affairs shall be settled by a common power in which all
the members are represented. What are to be looked
on as internal and what as common affaii's must be
settled by agreement in each case. The federal ideal
is satisfied if there are some things which each State
does for itself and some others which the Union does
for all. That the Union only should be able to act in
international affairs seems essential.* If a man talks
about " Imperial Federation," he should tell us whether
this is the relation that he proposes to establish, and
between what constituent members he proposes to
establish it.

Now the paper by Sir John Colomb, headed a " Survey

* It is essential to the Bundesstaat; it does not seem to be
essential to tlie Staatcnbund.

BASES OF NATIONAL INJ'JA'. 49

of Existing C'onditiuii.s,'' is in many ways a relief to one
who has been greatly puzzled by vague talk. Sir John
Colonib asks, "What is the empire of Her Britannic
Majesty?" To this question the obvious answer is,
"The Empire of India, and nothing else;" for nowhere
else has the word "empire" any legal meaning. Sir
John Colomb talks a good deal about "empire," but
veiy little about "imperial," and nothing at all about
" Imperial Federation." The name in short is dropped,
and we get "Britannic Confederation" instead. This
certainly makes things a little clearer. There is one
gain at least if " Britannic " is put instead of " Im-
perial." " Britannic " does suggest " National Unity "
in some shape or other. " Imperial " shuts out
national unity ; there is no national unity where one
State exercises lordship or "empire" over another.
Still, the name " Britannic " has an odd sound. It is
unknown except in the formula " Her Britannic
Majesty," meaning the Queen of Great Britain and
Ireland. The word "Britannic" is used only in this
formal diplomatic style. For we talk of " British
Government," " British dominions," " British interests,"
"British Consulate," even "British Ambassador" and
*' Britii-h Legation." We never, in English at least,
say "Britannic Government" or "Britannic Legation."
But the use of the word "Britannic" at all events
settles at once all ditficulties abovit the " English-
speaking people." The word " English " takes in the
United States, or it ought to do so. The word "Britan-
nic" assuredly does not, any more than the word
" British." And it would be hard to believe that
a " Britannic Confederation " could be meant to take
in that large majority of Her Majesty's subjects

50 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

who have nothing to do with federation or with freedom
in any shape, but who inhabit Her Majesty's Imperial
dominion in Asia. We are relieved from all those
"imperial" dangers at page 4 of Sir John Colomb's
paper. While " Imperial Federation " has never been
intelligibly defined, one side of " Britannic Confedera-
tion " is very intelligibly defined there. The Empire of
India is distinctly shut out. It is not to be in any
way federalised ; the only question about it is whether
it shall be " governed by the United Kingdom or by an
united empire." An empire to be governed by another
empire, an empii-e seemingly not united to be governed
by another empire which is united, is a little puzzling.
But we need not exercise ourselves in such great matters
as empires. " Britannic Confederation " is defined to be
an vmion of " the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland, British North America, British South
Africa, and Australasia," The West Indies and one or
two other British Dependencies seem here to be shut out ;
but, at any rate, with this definition we at least know
where we are.

The terms of the union we are not told ; but, as the
word "confederation" is used, I conceive that they are
meant to be strictly federal. That is to say, first of all,
the Parliament of the United Kingdom will give uj) its
right to legislate for British North America, British
South Africa, and Australasia, Tlien the United
Kingdom, British North America, British South Africa,
and Australasia will enter into a federal relation with
one another. They may enter either as single membeis
(States or Cantons) or as groups of members. That is.
Great Britain and Ireland might enter as a single State
of the Confederation, or England, Scotland, Ireland,

BASES OF NATIONAL UNITY. 51

Wales — or possibly smaller divisions again — might enter
as separate States. Or Great Britain, Australia, Canada,
(tc, might enter as themselves League.s, members of a
greater League, as in the old state of things in Grau-
biinden. I am not arguing for or against any of these
arrangements. I am only stating them as possible.
But whatever the units are to be — Great Britain and
Australia, England and Victoria, or anything lai-ger or
smaller — if the Confederation is to be a real one, each
State must keep some powers to itself, and must yield
some powers to a central body. That Central body, in
which all the States must be represented in some way
or other, will naturally deal with all international
matters, all matters that concern the Britannic Con-
fedei-ation as a whole. The legislatures of Great Britain
and Australia, England and Victoria, or whatever the
units fixed on may be, will deal only with the internal
affairs of those several cantons.

Now such a scheme as this is theoretically possible.
That is, it involves no contradiction in terms, as the
talk about Imperial Federation does. It is purely
federal; there is nothing *' imperial " about it. It is
simply applying to certain political communities a
process which has been actually gone through by certain
other political communities. It is proposing to recon-
struct a certain political constitution after the model of
certain other political constitutions which are in actual
working. It is therefore something better than mere
talk and theory. But, because it is theoretically pos-
sible, it does not follow that it is practically possible,
that is, that it is possible in this particular case. That
a certain system exists, that it has succeeded, in certain
cases, proves only that it may succeed in another case ;

52 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

it does not prove that it loill succeed. It proves that
there is no obvious absurdity in suggesting it, that the
suggestion is fairly entitled to be weighed, and, if need
be, answered ; but it proves nothing more. In each
case we must look to the probabilities of the particular
case, both political and physical. For this is assuredly
a case in which geography has something to say. It is
one in which it seems to depend wholly on geographical
considerations whether the scheme is likely to succeed
or not. If Canada or Australia joined Great Britain,
or lay close to Great Britain, the only question would
be between absorption and federation. Lying as they
do at a great distance, we have ruled that national
unity would not be promoted by their absorption into
the United Kingdom ; we have now to consider whether
it is likely to be promoted by their federation.

Of the federations existing at this time the two chief
are Switzerland and the United States of America.
They differ in this point, that one is very large and the
other very small ; they agree in this, that the territory
of both is continuous. But the proposed Britannic
Confederation will be scattered, scattered over every
part of the world. I know of no examj^le in any age
of a scattered confederation, a scattered Bundesstaat.
The Hanse Towns were not a Bundesstaat ; they were
hardly a Staatenhund. Of the probable working of such
a body as that which is now proposed the experience of
history can teach us nothing; we can only guess what
may be likely. The Britannic Confederation will have
its federal congress sitting somewhere, perhaps at West-
minster, perhaps at Melboui-ne, perhaps at some Wash-
ington called specially into being at some point more
central than either. We are sometimes told that

BASES OF NATIONAL UNITY. 53

modern science has annihilated time and space ; and
for some purposes it is so. I have been told that it
takes no longer to get to Westminster from the most
distant British colonies than, at the time of the union
of England and Scotland, it took to come from Shetland
to Westminster. May I be allowed to leave out Shet-
land, which has a case of its own, and to draw the line
at Caithness, or to substitute one of the Western Islands
for Shetland ? Certainly in the days of Queen Anne
both those islands and the mainland of Caithness were
a very long way from Westminster, perhaps as far, by
the almanac, as any Colony is now. Still, from Caith-
ness a man could walk to Westminster ; even from the
Islands he could get there without crossing or going
near any foreign territory. Between Caithness and
Westminster there was doubtless on both sides a good
deal of traditional ignorance and traditional dislike;
but it was the kind of ignorance and dislike which
might in time die out, and which largely has died out.
It was a wholly different feeling from the feeling of a
young dependency which wishes to love the mother-
country as long as it is allowed, but which daily feels
more and more sharply any sign of inferiority to the
mother-country. For a while their representatives will
think it grand to sit at Westminster ; presently, as the
spirit of equality grows, they are not unlikely to ask
for some more central place ; they may even refuse to
stir out of their own territory. That is to say, they
will find that the sentiment of national unity, which
they undoubtedly have in no small measure, needs some
physical and some political basis to stand on. It is hard
to believe that States which are united only by a senti-
ment, which have so much, both political and physical,

54 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

to keep them asunder, will be kept together for ever by
a sentiment only. And we must further remember that
that sentiment is a sentiment for the mother-covintry,
and not for one another. Sir John Macdonald said that
he was born a British suljject and that he would die
one. His heart would hardly have been so stirred by
any sentiment of federal brotherhood towards Australia
or South Africa Canada and Australia care a great
deal for Great Britain ; we may doubt whether, apart
from Great Britain, Canada and Australia care very
much for one another. There may be American States
which care yet less for one another ; but in their case
mere continuity produces a crowd of interests and rela-
tions common to all. We may doubt whether the con-
federation of States so distant as the existing colonies
of Great Britain, whether the bringing them into closer
relations with one another as well as with Great Britain,
Avill at all tend to the advance of a common national
luiity among them. We may doubt whether it will not
be likely to bring out some hidden tendencies to dis-
union among them.

The ground — a just and natural ground — which makes
a colony wish to get rid of the dependent relation is that
it does not like to be ordered about in any matter by
the Colonial Office at home. It does not like the chance
of being drawn by the mother-country into some rela-
tion, perhaps some war, in which it has no interest.
It may be doubted whether a federal relation will prac-
tically make matters better in this respect. In form of
course it will do so ; each colony will be represented in
the federal body, which will see to all matters of common
interest. But let us look at it in another way. There
is every chance that the federal power, executive and

EASES OF NATIONAL UNITY. 55

Iffjislative, \\ill meddle a great deal more \vith local
affaiis than the Colonial Office does now. It will do so
for the very reason that each colony will be represented
in it. It will not, like the Colonial Office, be shy of
meddling. The Colonial Office, after all, steps in only
now and then, in this and that special case. But if a
i-egular Britannic Confederation be set up, it will be
like other confederations. Its Executive bi-anch must
be always at work ; its Legislative branch must be at
work for the same kind of time that other Parliaments
and Congi-esses are at work. It will be inclined to
meddle ; it will be pressed to meddle ; it will be its
duty to meddle. It must, in the nature of things,
exercise a far greater control over each State than the
Colonial Office now does. And though each State will
have a voice in it, each State will always be liable to be
out-voted on the matters which are dearest to its heart.
The interests and feelings of a number of distant and
isolated States, none of which will have any particular
reason for dealing tenderly with on-e another, are likely
to clash with one another much oftener and much more
roughly than happens between particular colonies and a
mother-country which has every leason to deal tenderly
with all. All these tendencies are present in all con-
federations ; they are the weak side of confederations.
But they are likely to come out far more strongly in a
confederation of scattered and distant members than
they do when the States form a continuous territory.
Aiid in the scattered confederation all questions and
parties ai-e likely to be local. It is hai-d to see what
^\ill be the materials for the formation of great national
parties among such scattered elements.

And one thing mox-e must be said from the side of

56 URITANNIC COXFEDERATIOX.

tlie motlier-country itself. Does every one who talks
about federation, " Imperial," " Britannic," or any
other, always think what any kind of federation means
as regards the Parliament of Great Britain 1 We are
used to boast that that Parliament knows no superior
on Earth, that its powers are limited only by the
physical powers of nature. Make Great Britain a
member, make England and Scotland separate members,
of a Britannic Confederation, and all this gi^eatness
passes away. The powers of the British, Engli.sh,
Scottish, Parliament will at once cease to be boundless ;
they will be cut down to the measure of such powers
as the Fedei-al Constitution may leave to each of the
several States. The British, English, Scottish, Parlia-
ment will sink to the level of the Legislature of Dela-
ware or the Grand Council of Zug. Are we ready for
this ? I can speak for one man only, I am no lover
of "empire"; I am not anxious for my country to
exercise lordship over other lands, English-speaking
or otherwise. But I will not, so far as one man can
hinder it, have my country ruled over by any other
power, even by a power in which my country itself has
a voice. If it be proposed that the great and historic
assembly which King Edward called into existence in
1295 shall keep its six hundredth anniversary by sink-
ing to the level of the Legislature of a Canton of a
Britannic Confederation, then I shall be driven, however
much against the grain, to turn Jingo and sing " Rule
Britannia."

EDWARD A. FEEE^IAN.

TIT.
THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

( With Diagrams. )
By GEORGE G. CHISHOLM, M.A., B.Sc.

THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH
EMPIRE.

IT is natural that in any scheme of federation among
members of the British Empire the question of
closer commercial union should take a prominent place.
The importance of commercial interests to the life of
any country at once suggests the idea of a Customs
Union as an accompaniment of political federation.
The idea is likewise supported by historical examples.
The federation of the United States brings with it
internal Free Trade for a population of more than sixty
millions over an unbroken area of more than three
millions of square miles. In the smaller Swiss Con-
federation there is the same commercial unity. The
European empire which, if not properly a federation,
as Professor Freeman tells us, most closely simulates
one, is nearly conterminous with the German Customs
Union. There is a common Customs barrier also for
the loose confederation of Austria-Hungary together
with Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the principality of
Liechtenstein. Internal Free Trade likewise holds good
in the great federation already existing within the
British Empire — the Dominion of Canada ; and it is
one of the most important articles in the scheme drawn
up as the basis of the proposed federation of the
Australasian Colonies.

6o BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

A Customs Union for the British Empire is therefore,
at least, an aspiration naturally associated with the
first su^orestion of Britannic Confederation. Whether
such an union is practicable is a question for the futui'e.
That it is essential to any scheme of confederal io a few,
I think, would contend. In the case of the British
Empire, as pointed out by Sir John Colomb in the
first paper of this series, thei^e are undoubtedly great
obstacles in the way. Whether these can be met by
any practicable tariff arrangement (either in the way
of increased freedom or increased restriction of trade)
it is fortunately not my business to consider, since the
question of Tariffs, as they affect international com-
merce, falls to be dealt with by another of the con-
tributors to this series. I would only say here that
any attempt on the part of the mother-country to
bring about closer commercial relations with the self-
governing Colonies by artificial means, contrary to their
real interests, would be a vain endeavour. It would
have no permanent tendency to promote fedei'ation.
If political federation demands any sacrifice on the
part of either the mother-country or the Colonies,
the nature and extent of the sacrifice must be fully
understood and fairly recognised on both sides.

In this paper, accordingly, I propose to consider in
the briefest manner possible the salient features of the
commerce of the principal members of the British
Empire as that commerce exists at present,* and to
draw attention here and there to such indications as
seem to me to be afforded of the present tendencies of

* As, from want of space, many points of interest with regard to
the trade of the Empire are here passed over, I should like to
take this opportunity of drawing attention to a paper on " Inter-

THE CO-MMEKCE OF THE BRITISH E.MITRE. 6i

the commercial development. To a solution of the
problem of knitting the Empire together in closer
commercial bonds, this is only a small contribution ;
hut such an examination of the actual facts appeai-ed
to me the best preparation I could make for the further
consideration of the question. In this survey, I have,
of course, included India, for, whatever place may be
assigned to that dependency in a scheme of Britannic
Confederation, its commercial relations must certainly
be a matter of the greatest importance.

In Plates I.-III. are three diagrams, which I have
drawn up to show the proportion which the trade of
the United Kingdom with the Colonial and other
Possessions in the aggi-egate, as well as with cei'tain
groups of these Possessions, has borne to the whole
trade in each year since 1861. For comparison, I
give here the average annual value in millions and
decimals of millions of pounds of the total trade of the
United Kingdom, under various heads, for the six-
periods of five years embraced by the thirty years to
which the diagrams relate : —

1861-5. 1866-70. 1871-5. 1876-80. 1881-5. 1886-90.
Imports . . 247.6 292.8 360.2 382.5 399.9 389.0
Gross Exports . 190.8 234.7 297.7 258.0 295.3 298.5
Exports of Eritish
and Irish Pro-
duce and Manu-
factures . . 144.4 187. 8 239.5 201.4 232.3 236.3

It must be remembered that these figures do not

British Trade and its Influence on the Unity of the Empire," by C.
E. Howard Vincent, C.B., M.P., read at a meeting of the Royal
Colonial Institute on the I2tli of May 1890, in which details of
importance are given concerning the trade of each of the Colonies.

62 BEITAXNIC CONFEDERATION.

show the growth in volume of British commerce during
the period. Tlie great rise in prices of many important
commodities about 1872-73, and the great fall in prices
subsequently, cause them to be misleading in this re-
spect. The actual growth in volume, even in years
in which there was a reduction in value, has been
shown in one way by Mr. Giffen,* and in another way
by Sir Rawson Rawson,t who takes the tonnage of
ships entering and clearing at British ports as a rough
gauge of the volume of the commerce. Unfortunately
the mode in which our shipping statistics are collected
does not allow this method to afford such precise
i-esults from this point of view as the corresponding
statistics of Italy, in which the amount of cargo loaded
and dischai-ged at each Italian port is entered.

But, notwithstanding the fact that the figures above
given represent inadequately the growth in the total
volume of British trade, they indicate at least a very
large increase in the total trade within the period ; and
perhaps the most striking thing brought out by the
diagrams in Plates I.-III. is, that through all these
changes in the actual amount of the trade, the propor-
tion falling to the Colonies and other Possessions, collec-
tively, has varied within small limits. In the total
imports, the extreme limits of variation under this head
are 21.1 and 34.1 per cent.; the gross exports to the
Colonies and Dependencies were never less than 19.6
per cent., never more than 31.5 per cent. ; the exports

* See " Report to the Secretary of the Board of Trade on Recent
Changes in the Prices of Exports and Imports'' [C. 53^6] 1S88.

+ See the " Seqnel to Synopsis of the Tariffs and Trade of tlie
British Empire," by Sir Rawson W. Rawson, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
published by the Imperial Federation League ; and also each
number of the Joiirnal of tlie League.

THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 63

of British produce and manufactures never lower than
23 per cent., never higher than 36.6 per cent.

These figures of course imply that, throughout, the
great bulk of our trade has been with foreign countries,
and the aggregate of that trade has varied within limits
as narrow. They show what a formidable thing it
would be to attempt any serious diversion of that trade.
When we consider particulars, the appearance of diffi-
culty in this task is only increased. In losing our
exports to the United States, for example, we should
lose our best market for linen and jute manufactures
and for earthenware, one of our best markets for woollen
and worsted tissues, and for mixed silk fabrics, and a
market of importance for a multitude of other products.
In losing our exports to Germany, we should lose our
best market for woollen yarn. Coal, which is estimated
to form the cargo of considerably more than two-fifths
of the tonnage of vessels clearing with cargoes from the
United Kingdom,* has a comparatively limited sale in
the British Colonies, India and Ceylon are the only two
Dependencies which take any considerable quantity, and
the export to India is not increasing. As regards im-
ports into the United Kingdom, corn and raw cotton
are the two principal articles for which increased sources
of supply would have to be found in our Colonies or
Dependencies if our trade with foreign countries were
restricted in their favour. Already there is a tend-
ency in favour of an increased proportion of wheat and
flour being suppUed by members of the Empire.! But

* See Sir Rawson Rawson's corrected estimate in the July
number of the Journal of the Imperial Federation League.

t Even this tendency is doubtful. It is not borne out by the
statistics furnished to our own import tables for the last five years

64 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

no such tendency can be detected in the case of
cotton.

Before leaving the general consideration of the dia-
grams in Plates I.-III., we may note that it is as a
market for British produce and manufactures that the
Colonies and Dependencies take the most important
place in the trade of the United Kingdom. Their share
of that commerce is considerably larger than their share

(1886-90) as compared with the previous five. The following
figures give the percentage of the total quantity of wheat and fl<jur
imported into the United Kingdom from British territory in the
four successive periods of five years from 1871 to 1890 : — I l.o, I4.5,
21.0, 18.3. In spite of the decline in the last period the statement
in the text is, however, probably warranted by the considerations
subsequently adduced as to the real growth in the exports of wheat
from Canada and the probable development of the wheat trade in
North America generally (pp. 72-73), and by the fact that railways
have not yet done all that may be expected of them in the way of
increasing the wheat supply from India. But on the other side
one has to note that of late years Australasia has not been able to
keep up the amount of its wheat supplies in the British market,
whereas Rumania and the Argentine Republic have been rapidly
increasing theirs. In any case the above figures show that to make
the United Kingdom independent of foreign wheat a new origin
would have to be found for four-fifths of the total external supplies.
One other fact is, howevei, worth noting with respect to this branch
of our trade. The period 1S86-90 was the first of the successive
periods of equal length from the middle of the century (and even
earlier) in which the aggregate import of wheat and flour was less
than in the previous period, as is shown by the following figure?,
giving the average aimual imports of wheat and flour in millions^
and decimals of millions of cwts. in each of the periods from
1851-55 downwards, one cwt. of flour being reckoned as equal to
ij cwt. of wheat, as is done in the Agricultural Returns of the
United Kingdom :— 20.li, 23.59,34.65, 37.27, 50.49, 63.31, 76.78,
75.93. From these figures one may not unreasonably infer that the
United Kingdom is one part of British territory that may expect
to supply the home market in future years with a greater propor-
tion of wheat.

THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 65

in the general exports, and still more in excess of their
share in the imports of the United Kingdom.

If, instead of examining the ti-ade returns of the
United Kingdom, we study those of the separate Colonies
and Dependencies, we find that the trade with the United
Kingdom is to them relatively of much more value than
the aggregate of their trade is to us. In nearly every
case we find that the United Kingdom takes the first
place both in exports and imports, and in many cases
the bulk of the trade is with the home-country. This
is not surprising. The Colonies and Dependencies may
for the most part be classed either as new countries
engaged in the development of the agricultural resources
of the Temperate zone, or countries supplying Tropical
produce. In either case, Great Britain is in a peculiarly
favourable position for supplying their wants and receiv-
ing their products. Its wealth in coal and iron, both
found in the most favourable situations ; its crowded
and skilled industrial population, its abundance of easily
accessible seaports, all combine to make Great Britain
better fitted by nature than any other country for sup-
plying the manufactured articles that new countries and
Tropical countries require, and hence also for receiving
their products, whether in the form of raw materials or
articles of food and drink. ^loieover, the geographical
position of Great Britain and its other advantages for
shipping render it peculiarly well adapted for the col-
lection of produce from all parts of the World, to be as
widely distributed in other parts — a totally different
thing from the merely transit trade which forms a large
part of the "general" commerce of countries with a
land-frontier. The steadiness of this part of British
trade is well shown by the following figures, which

66 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

give the percentage value of the exports of foreign and
Colonial produce to the total value of British exports
for pei'iods of five years : —

Years . 1861-5 1866-70 1871-5 1876-80 18S1-5 1886-90
Percent. 24.4 20.0 19.5 21.5 21.3 20.84

Of the Colonies in which the trade with the United
Kingdom does not take the leading place, both in im-
ports and exports, the most important is Canada. Ac-
cording to the " Statistical Year- Book for Canada" for
1889, the share of Great Britain and the United States
in the trade with the Dominion in four successive quin-
quennial periods is shown by the following figures : —

Imports into Canada fur Home CuJisumj^tion.

1868-72 1873-77 1878-82 1883-87

Per cent. Per cent. Per cent. Per cent.

Prnm Great Britain 55.46 48.13 44-03 41-25

,, United States 35.08 44-24 46.18 45-i8

Exports of Canadian Produce.

To Great Britain . 37.53 47.68 47.96 46.62
,, United States , 51.50 41-31 41-76 44-41

In the year ending 30th June 1889 the proportions
were: — Imports from Great Britain, 38.68; from the
United States, 4607 per cent. Exports to Great
Britain, 43.12 ; to the United States, 46.91 per cent.

The magnitude of the Canadian trade makes these
figures all the more worth inquiring into. Let us con-
sider, then, the principal articles in which the trade
with these two countries is carried on. Among the

THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 67

articles imported in greater quantity from the United
States than from elsewhere, are bituminous coal and
anthracite, mineral and lubricating oils, raw cotton,
maize, wheat flour, hops, meats of all sorts, and other
kinds of agricultural produce of the country ; raw silk,
coffee, and crude rubber, among the produce of foreign
countries ; copper and copper wire, and, among manu-
factured articles, agricultural implements, locomotive
engines, and some other products of the iron industry,
sole leather and boots and shoes, certain varieties of
cotton, glass, and paper manufactures, besides others
of less importance. Under the head of exports sent
chiefly to the United States, we find various products
of the lumber industry — that is, wooden articles worked
lip into such a form as to be ready or nearly ready for
use, such as laths, joists, shingles, sleepers, shocks, itc,
whereas Canadian forest produce is sent to the United
Kingdom more largely in the form of deals and square
timber. Then we find among animals chiefly sent to
the United States, horses and sheep ; amongst other
agricultural produce, barley, eggs, potatoes, and hides,
horns, and skins other than fur. Among mineral pro-
ducts, that which is chiefly sent to the United States is
coal. Of the products of the fisheries, smoked herriiigs
are principally sent to the United States, dry salted cod
and pickled herring mainly to the British West Indies
and the United States, fresh salmon to the United
States, canned salmon to the United Kingdom, canned
lobsters about equally to both countries. Tanning bark
— that is, principally the bark of the hemlock pine — is
sent mostly to the United States; extract of hemlock
bark (for tanning) mostly to the United Kingdom.
Now, in reviewing such lists as the foregoing, taking

6S BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

into consideration the diverse products of the two coun-
tries and the mutual relations of their more populous
parts, one is disposed to ask with regard to the imports,
Where else could they come from? with regard to the
exports, "Where else could they go to ?

A closer examination of the trade between Canada
and the United States gives strong support to the con-
tention of Mr. Gold win Smith that the scattered popu-
lations of the Dominion naturally seek to carry on com-
merce with four different sections of the United States.
The maritime provinces of Canada and the States of
New England, together with the eastern portions of the
States immediately to the south of New England, have an
obvious interest in exchanging their products. Ontario
and Quebec are naturally anxious to trade with the
States adjacent to the parts containing the bulk of their
population — that is, with New York, Pennsylvania,
Ohio, and Michigan. As regards Manitoba, again, no
doubt Great Britain forms, as things now are, the best
market for the bulk of its produce ; but, on the other
hand, it is natural that the province should desire to
buy its agricultural implements and supply many of its
other wants through the great mercantile agencies of
St. Paul. Finally, the Pacific States of the Union are
the natural market, almost the sole market of import-
ance, for some of the principal products of British
Columbia, and the natural source of supply of some of
the chief wants of that province.

To establish these facts by an analysis of the trade
between Canada and the United States (so far as the
trade-returns of the two countries enable us to make
such an analysis) would occupy too much of our space,
but a few illustrations of the grounds for Mr. Goldwin

THE COMJIERCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 69

Smith's contention may be adduced with advantage.
We may notice in the iirst phice that in the case of coal
the United fStates stand lii-st both in supplying this
commodity to Canada and in receiving it from Canada.
But the coal which Canada receives from the United
States, partly in the form of dutiable bituminous coal,
partly in the form of duty-free anthracite, is mostly im-
ported into Ontario and Quebec,* which are not coal-
producing provinces. That which Canada supplies to
the United States is mainly sent from Biitish Columbia
to California, a State which does not produce one-tenth
of a ton of coal per head for its own population. The
Pacific coast of the United States forms, in fact, the
principal market for British Columbian coal, taking at
least seven-eighths of the whole production. To with-
draw this market accordingly would be to destroy the
industry.

Take, again, the petroleum products. Where should
we expect Canada to make good the deficiency of her
own supplies under this head except in the United
States, seeing that one of the two great petroleum-
producing regions of the World lies in that country, not
far from her own bordei's and within easy reach of the
bulk of her population ?

Though both countries are in the main agricultural,
they are fitted by nature to supply each other with

* All but a small fraction of the bituminous coal is imported into
the province of Ontario, Quebec being able to supply itself easily
enough from Nova Scotia, and receiving, in certain years at least,
more bituminous coal from Great Britain than from the United
States, though the import from Great Britain into the Dominion
is only a trifling fraction of the whole supply. From the United
States, howrever, Quebec receives large supplies of anthracite, though
not so large a quantity as Ontario.

70 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

agricultural products, some of which are most advan-
tageously produced in the one country, others in the
other. Confining our attention to the cooler parts of
the Temperate zone — that is, to the products of Canada
and that part of the United States which lies nearest
the Canadian border — we find that the United States
are able to supply to Canada, for home consumption,
enormous quantities of maize and maize (corn) meal,
wheat flour, pork, bacon and hams, beef, lard and
tallow. Canada, on the other hand, is able to supply
to the United States enormous quantities of barley and
eggs, and larger quantities of peas, apples, and potatoes,
greater numbers of sheep, cattle, and horses, than are
imported into Canada from the United States. The
Canadian barley is mainly exported from Ontario, which
supplies the barley most esteemed in United States
breweries. The eggs are sent most largely from the
same province and Prince Edward Island ; and how
much this trade meets the requirements of natural con-
ditions is shown by the fact that, in the year ending
30th June 1S89, a year in which eggs were admitted
duty free into both countries, the export of eggs from
Canada to the United States was more than twenty
times as great as the import from the United States
into Canada.

Now, in the circumstances that are merely illustrated,
and by no means fully indicated, by these facts, we need
not wonder that the trade between the United States
and Canada has shown a decided tendency to increase,
and even that it has in recent years been increasing
at a more rapid rate relatively than the trade with
the mother-country. Moreover, this trade, so far as it
has been illustrated above, is not one upon which the

THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 71

mother-country can look with any feeling of regret.
It is in no way prejudicial to us, and if it were stopped
or hindered, we could only deplore the blow thus in-
flicted on Canada as part of the British Empire. The
Canadian coal is not wanted by us, and there is no other
part of the Empire that could take it in any great
quantity. Australia not only supplies all her own wants
in coal, but already takes a share in supplying the
market of San Francisco. We aie uttei'ly unable to
supply our own requirements in mineral oil, and are
thus incompetent to make good the deficiencies of
Canada. We are glad to take Canadian timber, cheese,
butter, and wheat ; but now that the exports of barley,
eggs, potatoes, &c., from Canada to the United States
are struck at by the M'Kinley tariff, the British market
will be able to make good to Canada the loss thus caused
only to a very limited extent. At present Canada sup-
plies Great Britain (at least directly) only with the
most insignificant fraction of the barley which we im-
port. Potatoes will not bear the cost of a long transit
unless they are such as bring an exceptionally high
price, and eggs also for the most part seek the nearest
available market. Canada perhaps cannot send us too
much canned salmon, but if Canadian fresh salmon were
shut out of the United States, that would be of no
advantage to us, and merely an injury to the people of
both the United States and Canada.

We may repeat, then, that the vigorous growth of the
trade between Canada and the United States need not
be a matter of wonder to anybody, nor of regret on our
part. It is no less surprising that the people of Canada
should desire to have their trade relations with their
great neighbour as intimate as possible.

72 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

Moreover, if any forecast as to the future tendencies
of commercial development between the two countries
may be attempted, it seems to me that the geographi-
cal relations between them, and their recent economic
history, both warrant us in anticipating an increasing
need of each other's products on the part of the two
countries. Consider first the unparalleled rapidity with
which the coal and iron production of the United States
hns been growing in recent years, in consequence of
which the United States production of iron has already
overtaken that of the United Kingdom, and its produc-
tion of coal may be expected likewise to exceed the
British production within no long time. Beyond all
question this rapid development in the production of
the two most useful minei'als implies a correspondingly
rapid expansion of maniifacturing industi'ies generally
in the United States. That such an expansion has in
fact taken place is indeed notorious, and statistics show
that the agricultural industry of the country, or at least
that branch of it which is concerned in supplying the
chief food-grain of the manufacturing population, has
not kept pace with this growth. For about ten years
the wheat area of the United States has been almost
stationary. Though still able to supply all its own
population with wheat, and to afford a large surplus
for export, the amount of this surplus shows a tendency
to diminish. "The truth of the matter is," to use the
words of Dr. Longstaff, " that while the railway and
the ' self-binder ' have been increasing so largely the
wheat supply, a vast city population has been gi'owing
up in the eastern and middle States, a population as
dependent on imports of food as any in Europe." * Now
* " iStmlies in Statistics," i>. iSS.

THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 73

whereas, with regard to wheat, the United States show
a diminishing exporting power, Canada shows the
opposite. Wiiile many parts of the World in conse-
quence of the recent rapid fall in the price of wheat
have manifested a tendency to contract their area under
that crop, Canada contains in the province of Manitoba
one of those regions in which an expansion of the wheat
area has gone on unchecked.* Manitoba and the Cana-
dian North- West generally probably embrace indeed
the largest area, at least in the Xew World, in which
wheat cultivation may be extended with success for a
considerable time to come — the most extensive still-
unoccupied area suited for settlement by the vigorous
populations of Northern Eux-ope. Since the Dominion
came into existence it has passed from the list of
countries in whicli the wheat imports exceed the ex-
ports to that in which the wheat exports exceed the
imports. In the five years 1870-74 the Dominion im-
ported an excess of wheat and wheat flour amounting in
all to 5^ million bushels; in the five yeai-s 1885-89 it
exported an excess of 14^ million biishels derived from
Canadian fields. It is true that onlv an insignificant
proportion of this export is destined for the United
States, but if the facts to which attention has just been
drawn may be taken to indicate tendencies favoured by
natural conditions (which seems actually to be the case),
we may reasonably anticipate that in no long time it
will be otherwise. We may expect that in the future
the manufacturing populations of the north-eastern
section of the United States will look to the Canadian
North- West for a large part of their wheat supply,

* The area under wheat in INIanitoba increased year by year fruni
51,003 acres in 1881 to 917,000 acr>is in 1891.

74 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

just as inevitably as the manufacturing populations of
Western Europe. On the other hand the middle pro-
vinces of Canada will still find themselves most con-
veniently supplied with coal, petroleum, and probably
many other commodities, by the United States.

Considering, moreover, the enormous undeveloped
resources of Canada, both mineral and other, we cannot
but admit that if there were Free Trade with the United
States an important and healthy stimulus would be given
to the development of these resources, provided that it
did not hamper the commerce of the country in other
ways; and, keeping that fact in view, we can hardly be
surprised that there should be a strong and active party
in Canada crying out for recipi-ocity with the United
States at any cost — even at the cost, which at the pre-
sent juncture would be unavoidable, of discriminating
strongly against the products of the mother-country in
the Canadian markets. But however natural the cry
may be, its wisdom is by no means so certain. The
most intimate commercial relations with the United
States may be of the utmost advantage to Canada when
secured without other disadvantages, but it does not
follow that the people of the Dominion would find their
advantage in establishing such relations by subjecting
themselves, for example, to a tariff that would weigh
heavily upon the agricultural population— that is, the
majority of the inhabitants of the country — and, more-
over, would render all the industries of the country
subject to the caprice of a foreign government to a
much greater extent than can possibly be the case as
long as it remains master of its own fiscal system.

As regards Newfoundland, the only other important
North American Colony, the great bulk of the export

THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 75

trade of this island has always been with the great
Roman Catholic consumers of fish — Portugal and other
Mediterranean countries in Europe, Brazil in South
America, Frequently, however, the United Kingdom
stands first, even under this heading, among the in-
dividual countries. In former years it was always first.
On the import side the great bulk of the Newfoundland
trade is with members of the Empii-e, principally the
United Kingdom and Canada. Under both heads,
however, the United States are naturally prominent,
especially under that of imports. As a market for fresh
fi.sh they w^ould undoubtedly be of much greater impoi-t-
ance but for tariff restrictions.

Let us turn now to Australia and New Zealand, the
most important of all the Colonial groups furnishing
(besides minerals) principally products of the Temperate
zone. Of all our Colonies these are the most completely
British as regards the composition of their population.
At the same time, they are among those whose trade
with the mother-country stands relatively highest. In
all these Colonies the great bulk of the external trade
is either with the mother-country or with each other,
and, if we disregard the merely transit trade between the
different Colonies, the trade with the United Kingdom
constitutes by far the largest share of the whole. So far
all seems satisfactory. But if we look at the lines in
our export diagi-am showing the proportion of British
exports to these Colonies, we notice that after a long
period in which these lines show a very encouraging rise,
they have at last begun to droop. This may not mean
very much. It may only mean that in the last few years
the trade with other countries has advanced somewhat
more rapidly than that with Australasia. It does not

76 BRITANNIC CONKEDEKATION.

necessarily imply any decline, or even arrest of growth
in our Australasian trade. But when we consider the
total value of British trade with these Colonies, we find
that in the aggregate of the five years 1886-90 there
has been a decline of 6| millions sterling in the value of
the exports of British produce and manufactures, and
that this decline has not been even partially compensated
by any increase in the exports from the United Kingdom
of foreign and Colonial produce, for these show an
additional decline of more than half a million. A further
examination of this trade with the aid of Colonial
statistics brings out results even less satisfactory from
the British point of view, for we find that, while the
British trade with these Colonies has been declining,
the foreign trade with them has been growing. The
Australasian imports from the United Kingdom sank
from an annual average of ^30. 7 1 millions in 1881-85 to
;^28.78 millions in 1886-89, the Australasian exports
to the United Kingdom sank in the same period from
an annual average of ^25.93 millions to ^25.68; but
the imports of these Colonies from foreign countries
rose in the corresponding periods from an average of
_;^5.o6 to one of ;^5.59, their exports to foreign countries
from an average of £,2.^1 to ^2.93 millions.

An examination of the tx-ade returns of the individual
Colonies reveals the fact that in the trade with the
United Kingdom a large rise in the imports into Victoria
and smaller advances in the imports into Queensland
and Western Australia are more than counterbalanced
by a decline in the case of the other Colonies — above all,
New South Wales ; and that in the exports to the
United Kingdom, both the leading Colonies exhibit a
decline (Victoria much the gi'eater), whereas New

THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH EMriRE. 77

Zealand, Queensland, and AVestern Australia all show
a substantial rise. In the case of Victoria, the principal
rise in the imports consisted in luetals and machineiy,
which was, no doubt, connected with another spurt in
railway construction and factory building. On the ex-
port side New Zealand showed the most notewoi'thy
rise. Fresh mutton, hemp, sheepskins, and wool were
all despatched thence to the United Kingdom in increased
quantity in the second period, the fresh mutton trade
showing special signs of vigorous development.

In the trade Avith foreign countries we may note
particularly the share belonging to the two leading
Colonies. Under the head of imports a large rise
(averaging nearly ^^0.7 million per annum) more than
makes up for a fall in the case of New South Wales
(on the average less than ^60,000). Germany, Sweden
and Norway, ]>elgium and France, and the United
States all shared in this rise. Under the head of exports
a large rise in New South Wales (averaging about ^0.33
million) is partly counterbalanced only by a very trifling
decline in Victoria. The rise in this case is mainly
due to an increased export of wool to Germany, of gold
coin, coal, and tin to the United States.

The growth of the trade with Germany is specially
worthy of attention. It may be said to date from 1879,
when the North German Lloyd's line of steamers began
to run between Hamburg and Sydney. Since that year
the imports from Germany into New South Wales have
increased, in every year except two, from ^32,000 to
upwards of ^500,000 in 1SS9 ; the exports to Germany
from less than ;^5ooo to about the same value as the
imports. In the Victorian trade with Germany the
value of the imports advanced between the same dates

78 ERITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

with even greater steadiness fi-om ;^i 6,000, to more than
;!^6oo,ooo, that of the exports to Germany from less
than ;!^iooo to upwards of ^200,000. In both Colo-
nies this trade made a great upward bound in 1889, for
in the latter part of 1888 it was further stimulated by
the establishment of a line of German cargo boats to
open up communication between the great wool-export-
ing cities of Sydney and Melbourne, as well as Adelaide,
and the ports of Bremen and Antwerp.

We have already noted that the increased export
from New South Wales to Germany consists chiefly of
wool, and the rise in this export demands particular
consideration. From the peculiar advantages which
enormous areas in Australasia possess for the produc-
tion of excellent wool and for the production of little
else, this export may probably be safely regarded as a
permanent feature, and a permanent feature of the
greatest importance, in Australasian trade. Ten years
ago practically the whole of the wool exported from
these Colonies was sent, in the first instance, to Great
Britain (principally to London), but a large portion of
it has always been re-exported to foreign countries.
For about twenty years, indeed, wool has been tlie
principal article of foi^eign or Colonial origin exported
from the United Kingdom, and the rapid rise in the
absolute value of this export has till within the last
two or three yeai's served to make good the loss in the
British re-expoi-t ti'ade ti'aceable to the opening of the
Suez Canal and other causes. But this trade seems
at last to be threatened. Germany is not the only
country that now buys wool in increasing quantity
direct from Australasia. Antwerp, Havre, and Dunkirk
share this trade with Bremen and Hamburg. The

THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 79

total value of wool directly exported to Continental
ports increased from ^172,000 in 1881 to ;!^i,557:Ooo
in 1888.

This diversion of trade appears to be principally due
to causes over which we have no control.* We are
already in the most favourable position for acting as
the intermediaries in this trade. The growth of the
dii-ect trade witli the Continent is likely to stimulate
the demand for Australasian wool, and the Australian
Colonies therefoi-e would probably resent proposals
designed to aid the mother-country in retaining this
trade by artificial means. f The larger the direct trade
with the Continent grows, the more likely is it to be
carried on with increasing success. London still retains
immense advantages as the great wool-market of the
world in which wools of all kinds can be sorted, mixed,
and graded, and in which accordingly the buyer has the
best chance of getting exactly what he wants. But if
the direct ti\ade of Australasia with the Continental
wool-ports (which already receive the bulk of the
Argentine wool) attains such a magnitude as to enable
one or moi-e Continental ports to rival London as a wool-
market, the growth of that direct trade will thereby be
accelerated. In the meantime we can only console
ourselves with the reflection that if we are in the end

• It was, however, one of the most serious aspects of the labour
troubles at the London docks two years ago, tliat tliey tended to
promote a diversion of trade already in progress from other causes.

t So far, however, as this change in the course of trade is due not
to natural causes but to the artificial stimulus of foreign subsidies,
the endeavour to counteract the effects of such a stimulus artifi-
cially might not indeed be the wisest course to follow, but at least
would not be open to the same objection as an attempt by artificial
means to fight against natural tendencies.

8o BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

destined to lose this trade the sooner the chanere
begins, and the more gradually it proceeds, the better
will it be for us. Continued growth would in the
circumstances supposed only lead to a greater loss.
According to an alarmist report copied into the Board
of Trade Journal for May 1891, it was estimated that
half the total wool production of the Australian Colo-
nies (or at any rate of the colonies of Victoria, New
South Wales, and South Australia — it is not clear
which is meant), would be sent direct to the Continent
in 1 89 1. A change so sudden would be a disaster to
England, or at least to the port of London and the
London wool-market. But, occurring at a period when
no events took place to interfere with the peaceful
development of trade, it would be without a parallel
in modern commerce. We may hope, therefore, that the
change will proceed with more gradual steps, so that we
may be able to accommodate ourselves to it more easily.
So far there is no sign of any change so abrupt and
violent in our own trade reports, for the returns for the
six months ending June 30th 1891 show a substantial
increase in oiir import of wool from Australia over the
corresponding period of the two previous years.

The trade with the Cape Colony and Natal need not
detain us long. In recent years it presents some
encouraging features. Notably these Colonies have of
late been growing in relative importance as a market
for Bi'itish produce. In the years 1872 to 1882, we
notice the effects of the stimulus given to trade by the
working of the Kimberley diamond-field, and after a
lull we may notice in more recent years the effect of
the similar stimulus arising from the working of the
Transvaal gold-fields, much of the produce destined for

THE COiMMEKCE OF THE HKITISH EMPI1?E. Si

^vbi(•h passes throu<jh the Cape or Natal. As stated
in the beginning of this paper it is this rapid develop-
ment of new countries or new regions that Great
Britain is peculiarly fitted to pi-omote, and which
accordingly is peculiarly fitted to stimulate British
trade. Fortunately for us the favourable accounts
given of Matabele and Madiona Lands hold out the
prospect of a prolonged stimulation of British commerce
from the recent settlements in those regions. As in
some cases, however, trade that is really carried on with
foreign countries gets entered in our returns as trade
with a British Colony,* so it may happen that much of
the trade with these new British settlements may ap-
pear in these returns as trade with a foreign country.

Passing over the minor Colonies of the Temperate
zone, let us now turn our attention to the principal
Tropical Colonies and Dependencies. The most im-
portant group is of course that of the British East
Indies, and the most important constituent of that
group, India itself. In several respects the external
ti'ade of India is highly remarkable. It consists mainly
in the exchange of Tropical and sub-Tropical products
of agriculture for manufactured and mineral products
of the Temperate zone. By certain economists accord-
ingly its external trade would be regarded as the very
ideal of commerce. Its export trade in Tropical and
sub-Tropical produce is the largest in the World.

Further, the population of India is the largest in the
"World whose external trade is regulated on a Free Trade

* For that reason a line has been introduced into all our diagrams
showing the proportion of trade with the British Colonies and
Dependencies, exclusive of that witli Hong-Kong, this latter trade
being virtually trade with a foreign country.

82 BKITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

basis. The officials who control the government of
India being thoroughly imbued with the Free Trade ideas
which dominate the commercial policy of our own
country, have arranged the tariff of India on the same
principle. External trade is not exactly free. There
is still one article (i-ice) on which an export duty is
levied. But the import tariff is as limited as our own,
and is obviously designed for revenue purposes only.

The increase in the amount and value of the external
trade of India for many years has also been very re-
markable, as is shown by the following figures, which
give in millions and decimals of millions of Rx. (tens
of rupees) the average value of the sea-borne trade (the
great bulk of the whole) for periods of five years ending
the 31st of March. The figures relate to merchandise
only, including Government stores, but excluding coin
and bullion : —

1871-5-

1876-80.

1881-5.

1886-90,

Imports .

3 3- 70

39-35

53.06

64.22

Exports .

57.03

63 50

82.28

92.68

These figures may be taken as representing fairly Avell
the growth in volume of the trade of India in the
period, but, owing to the fall in gold prices, including
that of silver, which has taken place in the interval,
they are not suitable for comparison with the figures
given above for the trade of the United Kingdom.
I have accordingly calculated the value of the Indian
trade in pounds sterling, in accordance with the average
rate of exchange of the rupee for each year. The results
here follow : —

THE tOMMEKCE OK THE liUITlSH EMPiKE. 8.;

Indian Sca-horne Commerce.

Average value in niillions eatul (U'c'mials of a iniHiou £.
1871-5. 1876-80. 1881-5. 1886-90.
Iiiil)i)rts . . 31.68 3367 43-40 45-58

E.xport.s . . 53.66 53.42 67.30 65.83

These figui-es may be compared with those for the
United Kingdom above referred to, and the comparison
shows that in India the advance, on the whole, has
been much greater and much better sustained than in
our own country^a fact by no means surprising when
we consider that within the period in question India
added 11,000 miles to her railway system (thus more
than trebling its length at the beginning of the period),
and that the development of the traffic through the
Suez Canal, which affects a much larger proportion of *
the commerce of India than of that of the United
Kingdom, also belongs principally to this period.

Several features of the lines exhibiting the proportion
of the commerce with India in the whole trade of the
United Kingdom are worthy of particular attention.
First, we may note the great rise in the projsortion
both of imports from India and exports to India, but
especially in the former, at the beginning of the period
included in our diagi*ams. This rise belongs to a period
in the history of Indian commerce which illustrates in
a striking manner the disadvantage of having trade
excessively stimulated from temporary causes. The
commerce so created is difficult or impossible to retain.
The prosperity, or apparent prosperity, thus brought
about is invarialjly followed by a period of adversity,
the character of which differs according to circum.stances.
In some cases it may be a period of long and gradual

S4 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

decline : in others it may come in the form of sudden
disaster. In the commerce of India the abnormal rise
to vvhicli \^e are now referring was a consequence of the
civil war in America, when the supply of raw cotton
was so greatly reduced that the cultivation of this crop
was entered on with great eagerness in all parts of the
World with a suitable climate and a favourable situation
for exporting the product. ]ndia was the country most
powerfully aflected by the crisis. Its cotton productioii
was sv;ddenly increased to an enormous extent. During
the course of the crisis its exporting power was greatly
increased by the completion (in 1863) of the railway
from Bombay up the Bhor Ghat, a railway affording a
f^reatly improved outlet for the most productive cotton-
trrowinfir districts of the Indian table-land. The great
rise in the proportion of the imports from India during
this period was due, not only to the increased amount
of Indian cotton exported to this country, but also to
the rise in value of the commodity. The prosperity
lasted only to the end of the American war. " It led,"
says Sir Wilham Hunter, "to much wild speculation.
The collapse came in 1865. . . . The bubble schemes
and financial companies in Bombay city burst one after
the other, and In-ought down in the general ruin the
quasi-oflicial Bank of Bombay. In 1865-66 the quantity
of raw cotton exported was nearly three-fifths more than
in 1864-65, but the total value was about ^2,000.000
less. Since 1865-66 the total export of raw cotton from
India has only in one year (187 1-72) exceeded the amount
then exported, and in several years it has sunk below
the amount reached before the period of abnormal but
tern poi-ary prosperity.

Considered from the British point of view, Indian

THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 85

ti'iide is, in one respect at least, highly satisfactory.
India is the most important part of the Empire as a
market for British produce. Plate III. shows a decline
in relative importance in tliis respect after the abnormal
rise in 1863-64, due indirectly to the same cause as the
rise in the imports from India just considered ; but
after 1872 there was, on the whole, a prolonged rise,
and a high relative value has been maintained to the
last. It must be remembered, moreover, that the
diagrams, exhibiting as they do only relative values,
do not necessarily imply fluctuations in the total actual
value of the trade corresponding with the variations
in the lines there drawn. To test whether this is so
or not, we must have recourse to the figures showing
the actual values, and when this is done the result turns
out to be more satisfactory than that which seems to
be presented by the diagram now under consideration.
Taking from Indian returns the average of the five
years ending March 31st, 1890, we find that the total
value of the merchandise imported from the United
Kingdom in that period was nearly four- fifths (78.5 per
cent.) of the total value imported from all countiies, a
proportion in excess of that of at least the three previous
periods of equal length. A further examination of the
figures shows, too, that this advance in British commerce
with India is not due to any increased export to India
of foreign and Colonial produce from the United King-
dom. It shows a real growth in the value of the Indian
mai-ket for British produce.

The Import Diagram, Plate I., conveys the impression
of a less satisfactory state of matters from the point of
view of the British merchant, and in this case a closer
study of the figures confirms, and even strengthens, that

86 P-RITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

impression. In the period of five years ending March
3i.st, 1875, the value of the exports by sea from British
India was about one-half the total value. In each sub-
sequent period of five years there was a considerable
decline in this proportion until in the last period (ending
March 31st, 1890) the proportion was less than two-
fifths (39.4 per cent.). This cannot be regarded as
anything else than an inevitable consequence of the
opening of the Suez Canal. The Tropical and sub-
Tropical produce of India is of a kind required more or less
in all Temperate countries. Previously to the opening
of the Suez Canal, Great Britain was the one distribut-
ing-centre for this produce. Since that event it has,
however, become less and less so. Much of it is now
discharged directly at Meditex-ranean ports on the route
from India to Great Britain by way of that canal. The
countries that have thereby principally increased their
direct trade with India hitherto are Egypt, Austria-
Hungary, Italy, and France. In quite recent years
Germany also has greatly increased this branch of its
trade. Though the imports from Germany into India
still remain small, the exports from India to Germany
have increased about sevenfold in the four years 1885-86
to 1886-90 — in gold values from about ;^30o,ooo to
about ;^2,ooo,ooo. Possibly this result also is one of
the more indirect consequences of the opening of the
Suez Canal. But even though that event has un-
doubtedly led to the diversion of a certain proportion
of Indian and other commerce from British ports, it is
to be hoped that no one will jump to the conclusion
that it has been, on the whole, injurious to our com-
merce. It has so greatly increased the magnitude
of international commeice generally that the British

THE COMMERCE OF THE liRlTISH EMPIRE. S;

gain therefrom has assuredly been greater than its
loss.

So much with regard to the countries trading with
India. With respect to the commodities in which
Indian trade is carried on there are also one or two
matters well worthy of attention. We have said that
the exports of India consist mainly of Tropical and sub-
Tro])ical produce. But there are some notable excep-
tions to this rule. In the lirst place, there is a large
part of India in which the cool season of the year
corresponds with the only productive season of certain
parts of the Temperate zone, and in which, accordingly',
the products of that season are not Tropical. From
this region England has, since the beginning of last
decade, derived large quantities of wheat, and for a few
years the amount of this export increased so rapidly
as to excite the greatest alarm among the agricultural
population of this country. There is, in fact, no reason
to believe that this export has reached its limit, but the
statistics of recent years have shown that, at the price to
which wheat fell, partly in consequence of this new con-
tribution to the English wheat market, the export from
India was not capable of the continuous expansion that
was at one time apprehended. Down to 1890, inclusive,
the maximum import of Indian wheat into the United
Kingdom was that of the year 1885.

Secondly, the export of certain manufactures from
India has increased of late years very considerably — in
one case with quite remarkable steadiness and rapidity.
The export referred to in this case is that of cotton
yarn, which is principally sent to China and Japan. It
indicates the growth of an industry in direct competi-
tion with one of the industries of Lancashiie, and the

88 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

figures showing the severity of this competition are
very striking. The export of cotton yarn from British
India to the countries mentioned increased year by year,
without exception, from somewhat less than 8 miUion
lbs. in the year ending March 31st, 1877, to upwards
of 162 milUon lbs. in the year ending March 31st, 1891.
During the same period the amount of the British export
of the same commodity to the same destinations varied
greatly. It has never reached 48 million lbs., and in re-
cent years it has shown no tendency to increase at all.

Looking to such facts as these, Sir William Hunter
has declared that he should not shrink from " the gene-
ralisation that the World seemed now to be enterins on
a new era of competition — the competition between the
productive powers of the Tropics and of the Temperate
zone." * In the case in question, however, it is doubt-
ful whether the greater productiveness of the Tropics is
an element in the result at all. The chief factor in
favour of India in this commerce appears to be that
India not only produces the raw material required for
the industry, but also lies much nearer than England to
the markets of Eastern Asia. India's main advantage
is thus geographical, but not the advantage that it
deiives from being a Tropical instead of a Temperate
country, except in that the raw material in this case
happens to be a Tropical or sub-Tropical product.t The
advantage of India in this case is analogous to that

* Paper on the "Industrial Era in India," by Sir William Hunter,
K.C.S.I., &c.: "Proceed. Royal Colonial In.st.," vol. xix. (1887-S8),

P- 275-

t No doubt India also derives a certain advantage in carrying on
this commerce from the fact that Indian trade with China and
Japan is free from tiie uncertainty attaching to the British com-
merce with these countries, in consequence of the recent ciianges in

THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 89

which Scandinavia has for supplying timber products
to Western Europe, and Canada for supplying similar
products to the United States. The yarn exported by
India is only such as can be made with Indian cotton —
that is, coarse yarns, or " low counts," as they are called
in Lancashire. While India's export of such yarns has
been growing, and has thus put a check on the growth
of the export of similar yarns of British manufacture,
India's own import of cotton yarn from the United
Kingdom has gone on increasing, and that on the whole
not slowly. But this increase appears to be in yarns
of a better quality. Whereas in 1881 the cotton yarn
exported from the United Kingdom to India constituted
1 5.8 per cent, of the quantity and 19. i per cent, of the
value of the total British export of this commodity, it
made up in 1890, 19.2 per cent, of the quantity and
25.7 per cent, of the value. The value of this British
export to India has thus grown at a greater rate rela-
tively than the amount, from which it would appear that
India is now able to buy from the United Kingdom
more expensive yarns than formerly — a fact of no little
significance when we consider the importance of this
commodity in the consumption of the great bulk of the
people.

The only other rising export of importance from India
comin" under the head of manufactured articles is that
of leather. Of the enormous quantities of hides and
skins which India exports, a steadily increasing pro-
portion leaves the country in the dressed or tanned form.

the relative value of gold and silver. It may be noted, however,
that the Indian exports here spoken of have increased even more
largely in the last two or three years, when the value of silver was
rising, than in previous years, when it was falling.

90 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

In this case also geographical facts account for the
change. For this trade the advantages which India
enjoys are similar to those possessed by the United
States — abundant supplies of the raw material and
the tanning agents, together with a large industrial
population.

But though geographical factors, apart from the
greater productiveness of the Tropics, account in a large
measure for the growth of Indian manufactures, this
greater productiveness is, nevertheless, a fact of the
highest importance commercially. It gives rise in the
first place to a much greater variety in the products
utilisable in commerce whether in the shape of raw
materials or articles of food, &c. The Tropics have thus
a geographical advantage for a greater number of pro-
ducts than the Temperate zone. It leads also to greater
cheapness in the production of food even where the
population is dense, and hence causes wages to be
relatively lower than in the Temperate zone. It is only
in this way that a Tropical situation could tend to give
any advantage over other parts of the World in the
working of minerals where they happen to exist. But
both these advantages would appear to be counter-
balanced to a great extent by the diminished energy of
the worker in a Tropical climate. As regards wages, it
was stated in evidence before the committee of inquiry
on Bombay and Lancashire cotton-spinning, appointed
by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, that, relative
efficiency being considered, the cost of labour (including
the labour of supervision) in Bombay and Lancashire
was about equal, and that the wages of Indian operatives
increased with their efficiency.* We may hope, there-

* See the RepDit i>f this Inquiry, paragraphs 529 and 154-61.

THE COMMERCE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 91

fore, that in the future the greater luiman energy of the
Temperate zone will be the true correlative of the
greater productiveness of the Tropics ; that the two
zones will prove permanently complementary to one
another ; that, as the products of the Tropics are indis-
pensable to the inhabitants of the Temperate zone, so
certain products of the Temperate zone will remain in-
dispensable in the Tropics. Sir "William Hunter himself
})oints out that India seems, with the growth of her own
manufactures, to have an ever-growing fund for the
purchase of goods in England, and he anticipates that
in the end the development of the industrial era in
India will be a gain to Britain in common with the
whole World.

Space forbids our entering at any length on the other
Tropical parts of the Empire in the Old World, and to
do so would indeed be superfluous for the purpose now
in view. The fluctuations in the trade with Ceylon
bear witness to the vicissitudes affecting the coffee, tea,
cinchona, and other plantations of the Colony ; those in
the trade with the Straits Settlements afford similar
evidence as to the fluctuations in the tin industry of tha
Malay States, and the entrepot trade of Singapore.
Though the trade of Mauritius with the United Kingdom
is relatively small, that trade, nevertheless, furnishes
a good illustration of the saying, "Trade follows the
flag," inasmuch as the great bulk of it is with other
British Possessions, principally India and Australasia.
From the Mauritius India derives aunually from 50,000
to 60,000 tons of sugar, or even more, and yet it re-
ceives only a trifling quantity of any product from
the neighbouring island of Reunion, which is all
the more striking since it supplies to both islands

92 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

the bulk of the rice consumed by the plantation
labourers.

Our diagrams show the relative importance of our
trade with our principal Tropical Possessions in the New
World — -the British West Indies and Guiana. It is a
trade that has suffered more or less in recent years
through the competition of foreign countries, stimulated
by sugar-bounties. Till recently the trade with the
United Kingdom held the first place in the commerce of
the principal Colonies, but of late years the growth of
the export of sugar from many of them and of fresh
Tropical fruits (principally bananas) from Jamaica to
the United States has caused the latter country to rise
to the first place among those receiving the exports of
Jamaica and Barbadoes as well as some of the minor
islands. This trade is obviously greatly favoured by the
geographical conditions, and it can hardly be doubted
that it will tend to grow in the future.

GEORGE G. CHISHOLM.

UNITED KINGDOM
IN EACH OF THE YE/

w ~ 9 0^ CO r^

BRITISH

S 1861-1890.

) iD '^ CO c\j —

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.,, ,^

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YEARS
1690

89
88
87
86
85
84
83
82
81

880
79
78
77
76
75
74
73
72
71

870
69
68
67
66
65
6 +
63
62
61

I DIAGRAM SHOWING THE PERCENTAGE OF THE IMPORTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM DERIVED FROH
BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN EACH OF THE YEARS 1861-1800.

r " ! 1 ' 'il 1 1 r ' 1 ' '[ ' ic^l ''• '

M i 1 M VIm

i N 1 1 ' !■ N ' ■'

-r 1 ' ' 1 := 1 1/ 1 -1

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[ :f h4r-^-^4+^|i — ^ l-+^+^--t ■/' ' •■'<' •

- J — [M-- ^h

U 1--^-^ rC;|: ' ' T^ r : ' ■ 1 i| -^f^. ' ,■ 1

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ft ! . ;\ :

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iIHI

^ I i ' ' ' iTL ^^

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'- J^^H

- - --^ + ^- - = -- -rj r- i-, Yr-T"--

--.!i|P|||

FROM ALL BRITtSH POSSESSIONS (in 1861-64 excfuBiv
fffOH INDIA, STRftlTS SETTLEMENTS AND CErLON
TROM SRITISH NORTH AMERICA. G FROM

I oflhe Ionian islindiV B FROM ,

FROM INDIA ONLY

CAPE COLOHV AND NATAL. H

L BRITISH POSSESSIONS EXCEFT HOHS KONG.

FROM THE AUSTRALASIAN COLONIES

FROM THE WEST INDIES AND BRITISH GUIANA

II, DIAGRAM SHOWING THE PERCENTAGE OF THE GROSS EXPORTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM SENT
TO BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN EACH OF THE YEARS 1861-1890.

TO AU BRITtSH POSSESSIONS lin 1661-64 eKcluai.e orthe toman islands* B 1

TO INDIA. STRAITS 3£TTLEI«ENTS AND CEYLON D TO INDIA ONLY

S BRITISH NORTH AMERICA G CAPE COLONY AND NATAL H

ALL BRITISH POSSESSIONS tXCEFI HONG KQNG

E THE AUSTRALASIAN COLONIES

THE WEST INDIES AND BRITISH GUIANA

III DIAGRAM SHOWING THE PERCENTAGE OF THE EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM OF BRITISH
AND IRISH PRODUCE AND MANUFACTURES SENT TO BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN EACH OF THE YEARS 1861-1890.

- o

2i;

TO ALL BRITISH POSSESSIONS (in ia6l-64ei(clua.>rn ofthe Ionian i>l»nd»1. B TO ALL BRITISH POSSESSIONS EXCEPT HONG K0N8

..C TO INDIA. STRAITS SETTLEIHENTS AND CEYLON D TO INDIA ONLY E TO THE AUSTRALASIAN COLONIES

1 TO BRITISH NORTH AMERICA G TO CAPE COLOHT AND NATAL. H TO THE WEST INDIES AND BRITISH GUIANA

ly.

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE.

By J. SHIELD NICHOLSON,

Professor of Political Economy m the University/ of Edinburyh.

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCE.

TO expect," wrote Adam Smith, "that the freedom of
trade should ever be entirely restored in Great
Britain is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or
Utopia should ever be established in it. Not only the
prejudices of the public, but, what is much more uncon-
querable, the private interests of many individuals, irre-
sistibly oppose it." * This curious example of the danger
of political prophecy should suffice to dispel the apathy
generally displayed towards any consideration of the
fiscal aspects of Britannic Confederation. It is sui-ely
absurd, in the light of the history of the United King-
dom during the present century, to put aside proposals
for a closer commercial union with the Colonies and
Dependencies on the ground either of the prejudices of
the public or of the private interests of individuals.
Yet nothing is more common than to speak of the com-
plicated tariffs and the vested interests of the newest
Colonies as insuperable obstacles to any general fiscal
reform. As a matter of historical fact, however, in
much less than a century the commercial policy of the
British Empire has passed, speaking l)roadly, from the
extreme of central regulation to the extreme of non-
interference, and there is, prima facie, no reason why

* "Wealth of Nations," bk. iv. chap. ii. p. 207, M'CuUoch's edition.

96 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

a reaction should not occur if such a course is shown to
be to the mutual advantage of the Colonies and the
mother-country.

The Declaration of American Independence and the
publication of the "Wealth of Nations" were by far the
most important events of the year 1776. Up to this
time the monopoly of the Colonial trade was regarded
as one of the principal engines of the mercantile system.
Most of the great wars of the i8th century, as Pro-
fessor Seeley * (following Adam Smith) has so well
shown, originated in a struggle for trade-supremacy
in new countries — and trade- supremacy really meant
monopoly. The British Colonies, which were allowed
comparatively the greatest freedom, were still placed
under very stringent regulations both as regards their
exports and imports.! Certain Colonial commodities
were enumerated in various Acts of Parliament, and
could only be exported to the home-country, whilst
even non-enumerated products were subject to restric-
tions of various kinds. But the height of regulation
and monopoly was reached in the case of manufactures.
"The more advanced or more refined manufactures even
of the Colony produce, the merchants and manufacturers
of Great Britain choose to reserve to themselves, and
have prevailed upon the legislature to prevent their
establishment in the Colonies sometimes by high duties
and sometimes by absolute prohibitions." X To enforce
this policy many curious restrictions were imposed upon
the internal commerce of the Colonies. §

* "Expansion of England."
t "Wealth of Nations," bk. iv. chap. vii.
% Ibid., p. 261.

S; The following is an example: — "While Great Britain en-
courages in America the manufacture of pig and bar iron by ex-

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL C'UMMEKCE. 97

Nor was the regulation of trade, stx'ange as it may
seem, considered by the Colonists as beyond the legiti-
mate right of the mother- country. The American
revolt was not caused by the old-established restrictive
pohcy, nor l)y any particular modification of an excep-
tional kind, but was due to an attempt on the part of
the British Parliament to collect revenue for Imperial
purposes without at the same time granting- represen-
tation. No doubt, in the natural order of development,
the old restrictions on Colonial trade would have been
modified, and with the adoption of Free Trade by the
United Kingdom the same system would naturally have
been extended to the Colonies ; but it is extremely im-
probable that, but for the American separation, such a
complete reversal of policy could have taken place as to
allow the Colonies to impose protective duties on the
manufactures of the mother-country. The truth appears
to be that American independence completely unnerved
British statesmanship in respect to Colonial policy from
a commercial and fiscal point of view. For half a
century the remnants of the old Colonies, and those

empting them from duties to which the like commodities are subject
when imported from any other country, she imposes an absolute
prohibition upon the erection of steel furnaces and slit-mills on any
of her American plantations. She would not suffer her Colonists
to work in those more refined manufactures even for their own
consumption. . . . She prohibits the exportation from one province
to another by water, and even the carriage by land upon horseback
or in a cart, oi hats, and of wools and of woollen goods, the produce
of America; a regulation which effectively prevents the establish-
ment of any manufactures of such commodities for distant sale, and
confines the industry of her Colonies in this way to such coarse
and household manufactures as a private family make for its own
use, or for that of some of its neighbours in the same pi-ovince." —
" Wealth uf Nations," p. 261.

98 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

subsequently acquired by conquest, were governed from,
rather than by, this country through despotic governors
and powerless councils; but so soon as the growing
strength of the Colonies and the abuses of the Colonial
Office made them demand "responsible government,"
they obtained forthwith practical independence. Just
at the very time when this country was abolishing the
Corn Laws and preparing the way for general Free
Trade, her own Colonies were granted the opportunity
of adopting protection, and whilst we have been re-
ducing and simplifying, the Colonies have been extend-
ing and complicating, the list of customs -duties. At
the same time a specious justification of this timid
inactivity was found in the easy popular dogmatism
which passed current for an epitome of the " "Wealth of
Nations." Adam Smith, who had pronounced the Navi-
gation Laws the wisest of all the commercial regula-
tions of England — " dictated by the most deliberate
wisdom " — was supposed to have shown once for all
that the only duty of the statesman, as regards things
in general and Colonies in particular, was to do nothing.
The following passage from the "Wealth of Nations"* has
been strangely distorted and cramped into the assertion
that every Colony should be allowed complete independ-
ence : — " To propose that Great Britain should volun-
tarily give up all authority over her Colonies, and leave
them to elect their own magistrates, to enact their own
laws, and to make peace and war as they might think
proper, would be to propose such a measure as never
was and never loill he adopted by any nation in the
"World. . . . The most visionary enthusiast would be
scarce capable of proposing such a measure with any
* "Wealth of Nations," p. 277.

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE. 99

serious hopes at least of its being a(lo})ted. //' it was
adopted, however, Great Britain would not only be
immediately freed from the whole annual expense of
the peace establishment of the Colonies, hut might settle
with them such a treat// of commerce as would effectuatly
secure to her a Free Trade more advantageous to the great
body of the people, though less so to the merchants,
than the monopoly which she at present enjoys. By
thus parting good friends the natural affection of the
Colonies to the mother-country, which perhaps our late
(1776) dissensions have well-nigh extinguished, would
quickly revive. It might dispose them not only to re-
spect for whole centuries together that treaty of com-
merce whicli they had concluded with us at parting,
but to favour us in war as well as in trade.'' Practi-
cally what we have done in the last half-century is to
give up " all authority " without any attempt to secure
the "treaty of commerce." And the curious thing is
that the paternity of this policy should be ascribed to
Adam Smith.

As a matter of fact this same Adam Smith pro-
pounded the most definite and most practicable scheme
ever yet published of Imperial Federation. lie was
not afraid of substituting for the British Parliament
the States-General of the British Empire.* "There
is not the least probability that the British constitution
would be hurt by the union of Great Britain Avith the
Colonies. That constitution, on the contrary, would
be completed by it and seems to be imperfect without
it. The assembly which deliberates and decides con-
cerning the affairs of every part of the Empire, in
order to be pi'operly informed ought certainly to have
* " Wealth of Natious," p. 425.

lOo BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

ropi^esentatives from every part of it. That this
union, however, could be easily effectuated, or that
difficulties and great difficulties might not occur in the
execution, I do not ])retend. I have yet heard of none,
however, which appears insurmountable." * Not con-
tent with a statement of general principles, Adam
Smith actually examined the system of taxation in
force at the time in Great Britain, especially the
customs, excise, the land-tax, and stamp-duties, with
the view of determining how far they might be applic-
able to all the different provinces of the Empire ; and
he devised a scheme, according to which " the British
Empire would afford within itself an immense internal
market for every part of the produce of all its different
provinces." t

It is of the utmost importance to oliserve that the
question of tariffs embraces much more than protective
duties and Free Trade (in the narrow sense of the
terms). Trade may be cramped and petty jealousies may
be created by taxes which are imposed avowedly for
revenue only. A system of taxation may be thoroughly
bad without a single differential duty. The great
merit of Adam Smith as a financial reformer — or
rather as the teacher of a succession of financial re-
formers — consisted, not in his mere condemnation of
protectionism pure and simple, but in his substitution
of a few broad principles of finance in place of an un-
intelligible mass of historical survivals. If British
statesmen had applied these principles as they were
generally adopted by the United Kingdom to the rest
of the Empire, Adam Smith's Utopia of an immense
internal market would have been already realised.
* "Wealth of Nations," p. 2S1. t Ibid., p. 425.

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE. loi

The consequence of the want of central control has
been vividly presented in the admirable synopsis of the
tariffs and trade of the British Empire by Sir Eawson
Rawson, which reveals " the inexplicable and purpose-
less differences in the articles selected for duties
and in the rates charged upon them in many parts
of the Empire." It is not to be wondered at that the
process of compilation should have filled the mind
of the compiler with dismay, and that he should A\iite
of the '' few enthusiasts " who have dreamed of or
longed for a common British tariff. But testimonia
non 7iumeranda seel ponderanda sunt, and one of the
" few enthusiasts " is Adam Smith, who has fore-
shadowed most of the other economic reforms actually
accomplished in the present century.

Encouragement may also be found in the fact that
the present synopsis is to the corresponding synopsis
of the United Kingdom, which confronted Adam Smith,
as an unweeded garden to an untouched jungle. Every
one knows Sydney Smith's description early in the
century of the taxed Englishman, taxed on every
article that he used from the cradle to the tomb ; com-
pared with him the most taxed of Colonists bears an
easy load.

The main object of the present paper is to point out
the principles and the advantages of the financial re-
forms of the present century in the United Kingdom,
with the view of showing that — at anv rate to a great
extent — similar reforms might be carried out for the
rest of the Empire. The question will be considered
first from the point of view of Bevenue (with the indirect
consequences), and secondly from the point of view of
Protection. The first and more important question has

102 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

too often been neglected in favour of the second, and an
attempt may well be made to restore the due balance
of emphasis.

" It has been the opinion of many people " (Adam
Smith probably had in view his friends the French
economists) "that by proper management the duties of
customs might, without any loss to the public revenue
and with great advantage to foreign trade, be confined
to a few articles only." * This has been the guiding
principle of British financial reform for a century, and
has completely revolutionised our system of taxation.
So early as 1787, "to obviate the trouble and inconveni-
ence arising from the multiplicity of Acts relating to
the customs, Mr. Pitt introduced a bill for their con-
solidation," t and there is little doubt that, but for the
gigantic wars in which the country was engaged, he
would have gone much further in the simplification of
the tariff. " No, we must stand till you are seated, for
we are your scholars," is the saying attributed to Pitt
when Adam Smith came in very late to a distinguished
dinner party ; and from Pitt to Gladstone all the great
British financiers have been scholars of the Scottish
Professor. As is usual with British institutions, growth
took the place of revolution. The system of natural
liberty was not applied like dynamite a la Fran^aise, but
little by little like leaven was introduced until the whole
lump was leavened. This style of argument may seem
of the nature of ancient history, but it is not so — it is
the keystone of Commercial Federation. Let the people
of the mother-country and the provinces only remember
that the tariffs of the United Kingdom itself, even fifty

* " Wealth of Nations," p. 339. t Thi.1., p. 221, note.

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE. 103

years ago, were in a worse confusion than those of the
Empire at present, and that a century ago the confusion
was infinitely more confounded, and we should hear a
good deal less of that " idea of impossibility " which, as
Bacon said, is the greatest obstacle to any reform of
any kind.

To return to the guiding principle. It is maintained
that, so far as revenue from customs-duties is concerned,
the provinces might with advantage tax few articles in-
stead of many. It is hardly necessary to add that the
smaller the number the greater scope there is for uni-
formity, and that eveiy reduction brings us nearer fiscal
consolidation. It is not easy to give the general reader
an adequate notion of the confusion of the present system
— he must refer to Sir Rawson Rawson's tables for a
complete purview. Samples of chaos are rather curious
than instructive, but even samples are better than purely
general description. Take the case of Live Animals : *
In twenty tariffs they are all free, in eleven they are
partially free. They are usually charged with specific
duties, but in two instances they are charged ad valorem
as unenumerated articles ; in four some kinds are charged
specific rates and others ad valorem rates ; and in only
five are all kinds charged specific rates. In one of them
(the Bahamas) swine are charged by weight 2s. 9|d. per
cwt. It is worth remarking that during the first part
of this centuiy live animals were on the British tariff
list, but in spite of the strength of the landed interest
they were taken off. To proceed ; " The only article
under the head of Raw Materials which is almost uni-
versallv free is manures — s'uano and chemicals," and the

* " .Synopsis of Tariffs," p. 15.

104 15RITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

latter, we are reminded in a note, are not strictly raw
material. Guano is an excellent beginning of freedom,
but why should most tariffs include resin, tallow, tar, and
timber ? Timber, by the way, since a famous speech by
Mr. Gladstone, is the classical example of the advantage
of the reduction and final abolition of a customs-duty ;
as the duty (in this country) was increased the re-
venue fell, as the duty was lowered the revenue increased,
and when at last the duty ended the indirect eflfects were
soon proved U) be productive of still greater revenue
through the general increase of wealth.

Some Colonies in regard to 7nanufacUires tax eveiy-
thing not specially enumerated as free, whilst others
make a list of one or two hundied for taxation, and
leave the rest free. A similar variety of treatment is
accorded to minerals and viefafs. Coals are free in 23
tariffs. In 1 1 they are charged specific duties, and in 8
ad valorem. iSalt is free in 13, it is charged specific
duties in 21, and ad valorem duties in 8. Will any one
seriously maintain that sjiecial circumstances, whether
of climate, race, histoiy, or prejudice, can justify such
a curious diversity of principles and methods 1 Can any
one give a rational answer to the question, why guano
and hooli's should be almost universallv free, but almost
everything else liable somewhere or other to be hit with
a tax 1 Guano is economically the simplest of raw
materials, whilst books are the most complicated of
manufactvires. Any one who imagines that he has found
an answer to this pi'oblem may go on to the question,
why prints and engravings are generally liable to the
unenumerated rate ?

It may be said, with much appearance of justice, that
uniformity, in itself, has no real advantage, and that our

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL COJIMERCE. 105

income-tax is itself a congeiies of indefensible anomalies.*
Certainly no one acquainted with the elements of eco-
nomic or constitutional history will lay any stress on
uniformity, as such ; but the point is that these tariffs
furnish varieties, not of good, but of bad, principles.
From the nature of things a great mass of the articles
taxed cannot pay the expense of collection, as was cer-
tainly the case with the 1000 articles on the taiiff of the
United Kingdom some fifty yeax's ago. Government
does not gain what the people lose. In this connection
it must be noted that the cost of customs-duties is far
greater than appears at first sight. In the United
Kingdom, under the present simple system, it has been
computed (by Jevons, Cliffe Leslie, and others) that
the real cost, direct and indirect, of customs- and excise-
duties is nearer thirty than the nominal three per cent.
of the revenue collected.

There are perhaps only two general arguments which
can 1)6 advanced in favour of customs-duties of a heavy

* Compare Mr. Gladstone's Financial Statement, April 18, 1S53.
The income-tax was first imposed as a war-tax, by Pitt, and
" dropped along with the purpose of the income-tax in 1816." But
it was destined to be revived, and in 1S42 Sir Robert Peel "called
forth from repose this giant, who had once shielded us in war, to
come and assist our industrial toils in peace. ... It has been the
instrument by which you have introduced, and by which ere long I
hope you may perfect the reform, the effective reform, of your fiscal
and commercial system ; and I for one am bold enough to hope and
to expect that in reforming your own fiscal and commercial system,
you have laid the foundations of similar reforms — slow, perhaps, but
certain in their progress — through every country of the civilised
World." Yet, Mr. Gladstone added that, in his opinion, the income-
tax was not well adapted for a permanent portion of our ordinai-y
financial system, and he proposed a plan for its abolition, which
was to come into effect in i860.

io6 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

and extensive kind. In tlie first 2:)lace, tlie convenience
to the consumer may be set against the inconvenience
to the trader ; and secondly, tliey may be supposed to
encourage native industry. As at present we are only
concerned with revenue-taxes, the argument of conveni-
ence must be considered fii-st. Now, it is no doubt
perfectly true that, when a tax is imposed upon some
article of general consumption, the tax-payer does not
notice the little instalments of which his contribution
is made up so much as he does when subjected in some
form or other to the " odious visits " of the tax-gatherer.
This is especially true when the tax is an old tax, for it
is then considered as part of the natural cost of produc-
tion or of acquisition. " An old tax is no tax " is so far
at least a true saying. Probably not one man in ten
thousand, as he drinks a glass of beer, could tell how
much of the cost was due to taxation ; whilst the whole
ten thousand regard the income-tax and various rates as
mulcting them directly in so much money for Avhich
apparently there is no return. Direct taxes savour of
compulsion, whilst indirect taxes are always accompanied
by the pleasures of consumption.

At the same time, however, it is easy to exaggerate
this element of convenience and this apathetic ignor-
ance of the tax-payer. The consumer loves cheapness
and abundance, as was well illustrated recently in the
reaction against the M'Kinley Tariff. It is safe to say
that no argument founded on convenience would induce
the people of this country to submit again to a tax
upon bread. Even the shilling registration-duty was
forced to follow the rest of the Corn Laws. Colonies
which desire to encourage immigration must know very
well that the people whom they wish to attract always

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE. 107

try to form some idea of the scale of living. Because
colonies are young nations, it docs not follow that
colonists are young children, and ought to be treated as
such. Colonists above all people are robust and fitted
to bear present inconveniences for future advantages.
Colonial statesmen who wish to spend extravagantly
may find indirect taxation highly convenient ; but con-
venience of this kind is not generally to the interest of
the public.

The argument founded on convenience to the tax-
payer in his contribution to the revenue obviously loses
all significance, or rather may be advanced on its
opposite side, when the duties are practically unre-
munerative ; and this must generally happen when the
tariff-list is very extensive. By a very natural process
taxation on commodities tends to spread from one
thing to another — and this for several reasons. There
is an idea, which to some extent is well founded, that if
taxation is spread over a large surface it will be less
felt, and that the yield will also be larger and more
stable. British statesmen have several times called
attention, with an appearance of apprehension, to the
small number of our sources of revenue. ]Mr. Lowe
was induced thereby to invent the Match-Tax, with its
elegant motto, ^^ Ex luce lucellum" ; and Mr. Goschen's
Wheel-Tax had doubtless a similar origin, and deserves
for its epitaph, "^ vectura vectigcd."

If one article is taxed, all possible substitutes must be
taxed also. If we consider that there are many modes
of supplying most wants, and that material things like
natural species run into one another, the logical out-
come of this principle of taxing substitutes is to tax
everything. Certainly the tariff-list tends to become

io8 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

longer at a rapidly increasing rate. Then there is a
kind of popular idea of justice which demands that, if
the consumption of one class is taxed, other classes
sliall Ije taxed in like manner. Thus, in the end, the
idea of convenience is lost sight of, and in the vast
majority of cases customs-duties are levied, not simply
for revenue, but at the best as supports and protectives
for other taxes which do yield revenue.

It must be observed, however, at this point, that pro-
bably no practical politician would seriously propose to
abolish customs-duties altogether.* In the United King-
dom about 2 2 per cent, of the general revenue is due to
that source; l)ut then there are practically (making
allowance for substitutes and varieties) only four or
five articles on the tariff. The principal reform advo-
cated is an approximation to this simplicity by the
Colonies, especially in the abolition of their general
taxes on xmenumerated articles, and — where enumeration
means taxation — in the curtailment of the list. In
Tasmania, for example, lo per cent, is charged on
155 articles, besides other rates on 30 more articles;
whilst in Newfoundland and Canada 20 per cent, is
levied on unenumerated articles, and enumerated articles
pay ad valorem rates of 5 to 50 per cent. It is plain,
from simple arithmetical principles, that, for the purposes
of revenue, such duties are too numerous and too high.

Before passing altogether from the question of the
convenience of revenue-duties, some attention must be
given to a specious popular argument which will also

* Clifle Leslie, in an essay on Financial Reform, published by
the Cobden Club, proposed the abolition of all indirect taxation,
but few other reformers have gone beyond the '" free breakfast
table."

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE. 109

serve as a transition to tlie question of Protection and
retaliation. Witli many people customs-dnties find
favour above all other modes of taxation, because they
fondly imagine that such taxes are paid by the foreign
producer or trader, or in some way by the foreigner in
general.

It is a curious illustration of the original sin of all
taxation, that the idea of taxing the foreigner, instead
of appearing contemptible, as it ought to do, and at
any rate unworthy of a great nation, seems to have a
peculiar attractiveness both for people and statesmen.
It is apparently a survival of the time when, in all
languages, the words for straiiger and enemy were
identical. It is worth recalling some instances of the
manifestation of this robust barbarism in British history
in foi-mer times. Proljably the earliest foi'm of taxing
the foreigner was by levying tolls on passing bridges,
entering mai^kets, &c., and the first Free Traders were
merchants who obtained from the king (for a considera-
tion) licences of free passage through his dominions.
The much-vaunted clause in Magna Charta, which
apparently gave Free Trade to all merchants " saving
the ancient customs of the realm," was really intended
to secure the rights of the towns and lords of manors
in the exaction of dues. Next to tolls were import-
duties. These at first took the foi-m of the exaction for
the use of the king of a certain proportion of certain
things, the levy being at first made in kind. Like
other proportional payments, however, they gradually
were converted into money, and also became fixed.
Thus, the origin of the ''ancient and great customs"
is to be found in the right of the king to tax the
foreigner. The same leading idea is found in the case

no BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

of export-duties. For a long period our principal
exports were wool and other raw produce, and the
king was entitled to a certain proportion. In process
of time this proportion gave place to money payments,
and to facilitate and ensure the collection of this revenue
the export of these "staples " was confined to " staple"
towns. These towns were in foreign countries, so that
the foreigner was not only taxed but actually taxed
in foreign parts. It is hardly necessary to recall the
barbaric customs as regards shipwrecks, the piratical
exploits in the Spanish Main, the Navigation Laws,
"really founded," as Adam Smith says, "on national
animosity," and the long list of differential commercial
treaties, to illustrate further the position that for
centuries the idea of taxing the foreigner, directly or
indirectly, was considered in the highest degree laud-
able. It is by no means easy to uproot the sentiments
and prejudices that have grown up with the national
life, and it is very doubtful if " good- will " to the
foreigner, and "peace on earth " were more than pious
war-cries in the battle of Free Trade. If any British
statesman, even at the present time, could formulate a
practicable scheme by which other nations were com-
pelled or induced to pay the principal part of our taxes,
that statesman would l)e the most popular man in the
country.

Fortunately, however, for the interests of peace and
the development of international trade, taxing the
foreigner is very like "shearing the wolf." It is quite
true that, theoretically, lander certain conditions, one
nation might obtain from other nations, either by ex-
port- or by import-duties, a considerable part of its
revenue, but it is equally true that these conditions are

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE. iii

extremely unlikely to arise ; mid, even if they did arise,
it is still more unlikely that the wisdom of statesmen
would be equal to the task of taking advantage of them.
It is important to observe that theoretical exceptions
may be admitted whilst the practical application is
denied, for no greater harm has been done to the spread
of "Free Trade principles," in the broad sense of the
term, than by the attempt to reduce them to a fictitious
simplicity. To assert that every import-duty must
necessarihj fall on the home consumer is as false as to
assert that every export-duty must necessarily fall on
the foreign consumer ; it is equally untrue to say that
necessarihj the import-duties fall on the foreign producer
and the export-duties on the home producer. As a
matter of fact the incidence of export- and import-duties,
especially when the indirect effects are considered, is the
most complicated and difficult problem in economics. It
is so diiiicult, indeed, that one of the strongest argu-
ments in favour of a very simple system of customs-
duties is to be found in the uncertain and indeterminate
effects to which, especially indirectly, all taxes on com-
modities give rise.

It is impossible, in a paper of these dimensions, to
discuss the theory fully, but sufficient may be said to
demonstrate the position i\\SLi, prima, facie, the incidence
of import-duties is indeterminate, and that the effects
are very wide-reaching. Suppose, then, that a nation
suddenly imposes an import-duty upon some important
article of commerce. The immediate effect is to raise
the price of the article : that is to say, the importers
and the foreign producers endeavour to go on with their
trade without any loss of profit. But the natural effect
of this initial rise in price is to check the demand. The

112 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

decree of the check, however, depends on the kind of
ai^ticle. It is conceivable that, if the demand is very
"inelastic" — if the article, for example, is a necessary,
the quantity of which consumed may be regarded as a
first charge upon the national income — the rise in price
may have very little effect upon the quantity demanded.
In this case it is possible that the whole tax would be
paid by the home consumer. But suppose, as is possible,
that the demand falls off, the question arises : Will the
competition of foreigners induce them to lower their
prices in order to get the same market as before for
their wares 1 In this case, again, it is possible that the
market of the taxing country is so important relatively
to other markets that the foreigners cannot better them-
selves elsewhere, and to find an entrance must them-
selves pay the tax — at any rate in the first instance.
Between these two extremes any degree of division is
theoretically possible. We have to consider the intensity
of the home demand, the demand of other nations, and
the possibility of the use of substitutes of various kinds.
The tax may kill the trade altogether, or directly and
immediately, so far as demand is concerned, it may have
very little effect. For a time at any rate, in the former
case, the foreign trader may sell his stock at a loss, and
in the latter the consumer may disregard the rise in

price.

But demand is only one side of the problem ; for the
complete solution we must look at the conditions of
supply. If the home consumer bears the whole tax the
conditions of supply will of course be unaffected; but
if there is any check to demand, and some part of the
tax, in the first place at least, falls on the foreigner, it
is most important to consider what will be the effect

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE. 113

upon his production. And liere arises the question :
Who is the foreigner who is called upon to suflFer by
the tax ? In other words, will the tax in the first place
fall upon the profits, or the wages, or the rents earned
by the particular industry? Can tlie loss in the profit
of the merchant be transferred to the manufacturer or
producer ? Can lie in turn indemnify himself by trans-
ferring the loss to wages, or, in the case of raw produce,
to rent ? Finally, in any case can the particular class
injured by the tax eventually transfer this loss to the
foreign community in general ? Now, a little reflection
will show that there is no general answer * to these
questions, but that the particular answer must depend
upon the particular conditions, as, for example, the
mobility of labour and capital in the industry concerned,
the total or partial monopoly of the product, and the
scope for the expansion of industry in other directions.

So far, however, only comparatively immediate effects
of the particular tax have been considered, lliere are
also important ulterior effects resulting from the fact
that all trade is reciprocal and inter-dependent. If
by taxation importation is crippled, in some branch or
other the export trade must be similarly affected. If,
to take an extreme case, the United States were to pro-
' hibit all importation of foreign wares, it is plain that
exportation must also cease. No country would export
without a return ; in trade nothing is given for nothing.
And what is true of the extreme is true in a less degree
of the less extreme. If you check imports, ipso facto
you check exports. But then, as soon as exports begin

* The recent reports on tlie immediate effects of the M'Kinley
Act upon various German exports show that, whilst some have
suffered severely, others have hardly been affected.

ri4 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

to suffer, a similar series of questions arises as to the
distribution of the loss. fSuppose, for instance, that
the general effect of the M'Kinley Act is not to prohibit
absolutely but simply to check importation into the
United States. The foreigner will suffer, but in what
manner and in what degree? Exportation from the
States must also be diminished, and American producers
will suffer; but. again, in what manner and in what
degree 1 Which will suffer most — the American' or the
foreigner? The number of these questions might be
indefinitely extended, and the only answer is that an
answer is impossible.

At the same time, however, it is possible to indicate in
a general way some important practical results, which
are confirmed by historical or actual conditions. The
first and most obvious is that every tax upon com-
modities is so far a barrier to trade ; it is with manu-
factures like an increase in the cost of production, with
raw materials like an impoverishment of natural re-
sources or deterioration of climate. In whatever way
the loss is distributed trade must be injured. There
can be no doubt that the heavy duties imposed upon
British goods by foreign nations not only affect the
foreign consumer but indirectly at least the British
people. " Take care of the imports, and the exports
will take care of themselves," is a proposition that may
easily be turned round, and we may ask : "If the World
were to refuse our exports, how should we obtain our
imports ? " But every foreign customs-duty is a partial
refu^sal.

As regards the primary incidence of import-duties,
although theoretically it is indeterminate, there can be
little doubt that, as a rule, these duties raise the price of

TARIFFS, AND INTKUNATIONAL eOMMEKCE. 115

the article to the home consumer. This urises from the
fact that there are very few monopoHes in foreign trade,
and that unless the home consumer pays the greater
part of tlve tax importation will cease. And here it
must be observed that, by well-known principles, the
article rises in price by more than the amount of the
tax. It is clear, for example, that unless the tax is
collected immediately before the article goes into the
hands of the consumer the burden is cumulative. Mer-
chants must have trade profits upon advances made
for taxation, and these profits must include insurance
against risk. This loss may be partially mitigated, but
can never be wholly neutralised, by bonded warehouses
and similar devices ; but the broad fact remains that
practically, as a rule, indirect taxes take more from the
people than they furnish to the Treasury.*

The great evil of indirect taxation is to be found in
the indirect effects. It ought not to be necessary to
reiterate arguments which British economists have
expounded over and over again, and enlightened with a
Avealth of illustration.'!" Unfortunately, however, there

* " Therefore, for evury penny of duty we ask you to surrender,
we feel that we are giving nearly double that advantage to the con-
sumer, and a great impetus to trade." — Mr. Gladstone on the Souj}
Tax in Financial Statement, 1S53. He went on to show that one
indirect efi'ect would be to diminish African slavery, by encouraging
tlie export of palm-oil, and thus the spread of legitimate commerce.

t " The statesman who should attempt to direct private people in
what manner they ought to employ their capital would not only load
himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an autho-
rity which could safely be trusted not only to no single person, but
to no council or senate whatever, and wliich would nowhere be so
dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption
enough to fancy himself tit to exercise it." — "Wealth of Nations,"
p. 200.

Ii6 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

is a tendency to believe that truths lose in force as
they lose in novelty, and well-established maxims have
often been driven out temporarily by re-discovered
errors. The two young gentlemen who, according to
Swift's diary, " discovered that there is no God," were
probably wrong in their reasons ; and in the affairs of
the World also wisdom is slowly accumulated. Let the
sceptical reader refer to Mr. Dowell's excellent volumes
on the history of taxation ; and if any one thinks the
incidence of taxes an easy matter, let him look up his
Mill (bk. V. chap. iv.).

Another point of practical importance arises in con-
nection with the fallibility of statesmanship. Industrial
conditions are constantly changing, and to adjust com-
plicated tariffs to complicated changes is well-nigh im-
possible.* It is one thing to make out a hypothetical
case on papei', and quite another to put it into practice.
It is a remarkable fact that the very part of the old
protective system which received praise from Adam
Smith— namely, the Navigation Laws — was the first
part to be attacked by practical Free Traders. The
simple reason was that other nations retaliated, and
that attempts were then made to arrange reciprocity
treaties until such an entanglement of interests and
jealousies was created that the whole sytem fell to the
ground. Similarly, it is safe to predict that if any
general system of customs-duties is to be established for
the whole Empire, it must be on broad, simple principles.
To suppose that a concession or restriction in one part
must be met by some reciprocal operation in another,
and that masses of local prejudice must be conciliated

* ."Synopsis of Tariffs," p. i6.

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE. 117

in different ways, is to confess that commercial ami
fiscal union is impossible. Fortunately, however, there
can be little doubt that in the provinces as in the centre
simplicity would be more productive of revenue than
the present complexity.

Hitheito the question has been treated, as far as
possible, simply from the i)oint of view of revenue ; but
to many people the question of revenue seems of far less
importance than that of Free Trade and protection.
What they demand is not so much Free Trade within the
Empire as restriction against the I'est of the World, and
they apparently assume that this would be the natural
development of our present colonial system. Before,
then, proceeding to examine briefly the Protectionist
ideal, a short passage on the present state of affairs may
be quoted from Sir Rawson Rawson. " With regard
to the question of duties imposed for the protection of
local interests, agricultural or manufacturing, it is not
easy to trace them in these tariffs except in two or
three prominent cases. It requires local knowledge to
determine whether here and there some particular duty
has been imposed or incurred for the purpose of en-
couraging local interests, or whether a generally high
rate of duties on manufactures has been imposed for
fiscal or for protective purposes. In general the method
of favouring such intei'ests has been by abolishing or
remitting the duties on articles required for their use —
as, for instance, the admission free of duty into several
of the West Indian Islands of machinery used in the
preparation of Colonial products. . . . The three decided
exceptions appear to be Malta, Victoria, and Canada, to
which must now be added South Australia." Again,
the first sentence in the summary of results runs : — "As

ii8 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

it is clear that the duties, with few exceptions, have been
imposed mainly for fiscal purposes ..."

Even if the present state of affairs in the Empire at
large were far moi'e protectionist than appears to be the
case, it would be superfluous to enter into any general
discussion of the principles of Free Trade. For any
action must depend, not only on principles, but upon
facts and actual conditions. As regards principles, the
advocates of Free Trade have unquestionably damaged
their cause by dogmatism and exaggeration. By attempt-
ing to prove a universal negative — that in no circum-
stances whatever could a State gain by retaliation or
differential duties or other devices of protectionism —
they have made their opponents believe that the general
case for Free Trade is destroyed if one particular excep-
tion can be proved. But, theoretically, as economists
of the first rank, from Adam Smith* and Ricardo to
Professors Sidgwick and Marshall, have admitted, it is
easy to point out, not one, lint several exceptions. For
practical purposes, however, so far as the British Empire
is concerned, these exceptions are simply part of the
casuistry of economics ; they are like the discussions
by moral philosophers of the justification of occasional
mendacity. Free Trade, like honesty, still remains the
best policy. And it remains the best policy not only
because any other policy to he equally successful would
require the perfectly wise despot, but largely also, no
doubt, because its principles, as applied to ordinary
cases, are generally sound. To couple Free Trade within

* Adam Smith's four exceptions are well known. " Wealth of
Nations," bk. iv. chap. ii. Compare also Sidgwick's "Principles
of Political Economy," bk. iii. chap. v. ; Marsliall's " Prhiciples of
Economics," bk. x. chap. xii.

TARIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL COMMEKCE. 119

the Empire with Protection against the rest of the
World is to destroy a practical proposal by the addi-
tion of a proposal utterly impracticable. This has been
abundantly proved, implicitly if not explicitly, in the
preceding paper of this series by Mr. Chisholm. Is the
United Kingdom likely to tax raw materials such as
cotton and wool, or food-products such as wheat and
mutton, simply with the hope that a policy of this kind
would please the rest of the Empire, or, rather, certain
portions of it ? Would the Colonies consent to send all
their produce to our markets and so deprive themselves
of foreign wares ? A glance at the facts showing the
magnitude of the foreign trade of the Empire is enough
to prove that the ideal — even if otherwise attractive —
is impossiljle. A petty uniform duty on all foreign
products would simply be a source of irritation, and is
not worth considering.

The objector may, of course, refer to the policy of the
United States, and may argue that the British Empire
might with advantage follow the same lines of develop-
ment. But the conditions are wholly different. The
foreign ti'ade of the United States is comparatively
unimportant, whilst that of the United Kingdom is,
with its increasing population, essential to its existence.
And even as regards the United States it is doubtful
if it can long retain its commercial independence ; and
its present system is due much more to accident than
design.* It furnishes also a warning, on a colossal
scale, of the piincipal evil connected with Protection —
namely, the difficulty of getting rid of vested interests,

* See an admirable paper Ijy Profet^sor Taussig, in the Economic
Journal for June 1891, on "The M'Kinley Tariff Act."'

I20 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

and the tendency of one protective duty to beget a
multitude. Even Adam Smith admitted that " when
particular manufactures by means of high duties or
prohibitions upon all foreign goods which can come into
competition with them, have been so far extended as
to employ a multitude of hands, humanity may in this
case require that the freedom of trade should be restored
only by slow gradations and with a good deal of reserve
and circumspection." * But this is surely the strongest
argument against the creation by new countries of
barriers which, when conditions have changed, it will
be so difficult to remove. Occurrite morho should be the
motto for those of our Colonies which have to some
extent yielded to Protection : the old country is far too
seasoned to be inoculated.! Those who advocate any
reform must remember that the most fatal obstacle is
the exaggerated emphasis laid upon the difficulty of
making any change. Get rid of the " idea of impossi-

* Book iv. chap. ii.

t A striking instance is given by M'Cullnch (Edit, of "Wealth of
Nations," note xxv.) of the evil effects of forcing a colonial trade :
— " The trade with Canaila may be referred to in proof of what has
now been stated. It employed a large nnmber of ships and seamen,
and seemed to a superficial observer to be highly valuable. In
truth and reality, however, it was very much the reverse. A half
of this trade was forced and fictitious, having originated in the
excess duty which was formerly charged on the Baltic and other
foreign timber. The high duty on foreign timber tempted the
merchants to resort ti) Canada, New Brunswick, &c., whence they
imported an inferior article at a higher price. . . . By refusing to
import the timber of the North of Europe, we proportionally limited
tlie power of the Russians, Prussians, Swedes, and Norwegians to
buy our manufactured goods ; while by forcing tiie importation of
timber from Canada, we withdrew the attention of the inhabitants
from the most profitable employment they could carry on."

TAKIFFS, AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE. 121

bilit}'," and the task is more than half accomplished.
There are, it is true, economic laws whicli cannot be
sent to Saturn, as every nation has found to its cost
by numberless experiments, but no system of taxation
is by nature eternal and immutable. If little by little
Colonial statesmen would follow the example set by the
great British financiers of this century, and reduce and
abolish their duties, it would be easy to establish a
fiscal union. Such a union would bind far more closely
than a nominal association for defence. It Avould
naturally lead to the creation of other commercial ties,
and silently and insensibly would weld together the
fragments of our so-called Empire. For it is as true
now as it was when Adam Smith wrote that "this
empii-e has hitherto existed in imagination only. It
has hitherto been not an empire but the project of an
empire, not a gold mine but the project of a gold mine.
... It is surely now time that our rulers should
either realise this golden dream in wliich they have
been indulging themselves, perhaps, as well as other
people, or that they should awaken from it themselves.
If the project cannot be completed it ought to be given
up. If any of the provinces of the British Empire
cannot be made to contribute towards the support of
the whole Empire, it is surely time that Great Britain
should free herself from the expense of defending those
provinces in time of war, and of supporting any part
of their civil or military establishments in time of
peace, and endeavour to accommodate her future views
and designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances."
Such is the concludiug passage and, for Britons, the
culmination of the whole argument of the ''Wealth of
Nations," a work which, alike in speculative genius,

122 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

breadth of view, and practical wisdom, stands alone in
political literature. We must choose between federation
and disintegration ; and, if we wait for the pressure of
a great calamity, the warning of history is that the
alternative will no longer be offered.

J. SHIELD NICHOLSON.

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES.

By MAURICE H. HERVEY,

rriiiripal of the lUau-arra CoUcge, Hew South Wahs.

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES.

rpiIE word "alternative" presumes a choice between
JL two possible coui'ses, and with communities, as with
individuals, such choice is often perplexing. Above all
is it essential that the consequences certaiul_y, or pro-
bably, destined to ensue from the selection of one or
other alternative be clearly set fortli and understood.
And, as a necessary preliminary, the alternatives them-
selves must be exactly defined. Now, quoad Britannic
Confederation, this preliminary cannot be said to have
been overcome, inasmuch as no deiinite plan of federa-
tion has, as yet, been successfully advanced. Where
doctors disagree, who shall decide i It is easy to preach
the doctrine of Federation. It is not difficult to fore-
shadow the prospective advantages of race-union and
the prospective evils of race-disintegration ; and this,
indeed, is primarily the object of this paper. But of
what use proposing alternatives, one of which has not
been shown to be possible of adoption ?

This is unquestionably tlie reason Avhy the entire
question has so long hung fire. Perhaps no question
of modern times has more generally engaged the atten-
tion of politicians than the abstract idea of drawing
together more closely the ill-defined, relaxed bonds of
British race-unity. Our ablest writers have discussed

it, our best orators have waxed eloquent over it, an

125

126 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

influential League has for years advocated it, and striven
to keep it prominently before the public mind. And
yet the great cause has made l)ut little real progress.
Neither the Home nor the Colonial public has, in ex-
pressive modern arijot, "caught on." Federation is as
little generally understood as bi-metallism or tlie zone
freight S3'stem. And this, mainly, because no one
knows exactly what it exactly means, or how it can
possibly be brought about. Thus, while separation from
the mother-country, as one alternative, is an eventuality
realised as possible by all the Colonies, definite federal
luiion witli her, as the other altei-native, has hitherto
never assumed a tangible shape capable of serious
discussion.

From a stutly of the papers upon Britannic Confede-
ration which have already appeared in this Series, it
appears that two of the four distinguished contributors
regard some form of commercial union as an essential
preliminai-y ; one prefers that the initial steps should
take the form of defence ; whilst the fourth would
appear to reject the federal idea as wholly inconsistent
with the dignity of Great Britain. Each one of these
proposed ways of viewing the question has a strong
following, the commercial-union plan being, for the
moment, perhaps, most in favour. Moreover, the publi-
cations of the Imperial Federation League reveal the
existence of yet another class of thinkers, who advocate
political union Avithout more ado; whilst in the back-
ground lie the ereat mass of the British communities
placidly indifferent to the whole affair-, quite content to
" leave well alone," satisfied to leave the decision to
Providence and time.

Now, Providence, as we know, helps those who help

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. 127

themselves. Time is usuiilly a mere witness to the suc-
cession of effect upon cause. And the ''leave well
alone" platform is untenable because, in tlie first place,
things at present are very far from being well; and,
secondly, because they give every promise of becoming
far worse in the near future.

Yet, how bring these facts home to the popular mind i
Probably those only who have been in the habit of
addressing mixed audiences can rightly appreciate the
general ignorance rife in one British community as to
the condition and prospects of other British communi-
ties. And nowhere is this more noticeable than in (ireat
Britain. 8uch audiences love to be told that they have
a vested interest in the largest and wealthiest empire of
which history furnishes any record ; and with maps,
diagrams, and clear explanations, it is not difficult to
make this clear to all. Upon this ground it is easy to
evoke enthusiasm. But when a speaker proceeds to
describe how this vast hei'itage has been gained only
at the cost of enormous sacrifices and of ceaseless effort,
and that it can only be kept upon the same terms, the
enthusiasm dies out. That "property has its duties as
well as its rights " is a trite popular saying upon which
mvich modern legislation has been based ; but, when the
Imperial interests are concerned, it is the hardest of all
axioms to diive home. And yet, not until it shall have
been driven thoroughly well home, can any strong expres-
sion of the national will be looked for. No great move-
ment ever yet came to a successful issue which was not
supported by the people. Politicians and philosophers
may instruct, admonish, but they must in the end move
with the irresistible current of public opinion. So, too, it
is easier to convert, to convince a hundred well-informed,

128 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

thinking men than one uncultured artisan ; but unless
the artisan be convinced the conversion of the hundred
goes but a very little way. It is not sufficient to make
it clear to readers of high-class magazines that prompt,
definite action is necessary to save the Empire from
impending disintegration, and that such disintegration
would be an irretrievable national calamity. The reali-
ties of the situation, the prospects and the perils which
confront further national progress, must be disseminated
throughout every land peopled by men of British race,
by every available channel of popular instruction, and,
notably, by the popular press. Hitherto this press has
moved but sluggishly in the matter, alleging (and, it
must be confessed, not without good show of plausibility)
that, until the leading prophets of Federation shall have
agreed amongst themselves as to the lines upon which
race-unity should be maintained, no programme can be
submitted for national approval or rejection. But this
is, in reality, rather an excuse than a reason for shelving
the question. The prophets are at least agreed in advo-
cating the necessity for federation. That they are not
also agreed as to ways and means of l)ringing it about
is mainly owing to the extreme difficulty of estimating
what methods would most commend themselves to the
l)ulk of English-speaking communities. It is to be
noticed that the question," albeit the most mighty in
prospective results ever submitted to a nation, is not
one which tangibly affects the conditions of daily life.
The least intelligent members of a community can
appreciate the importance of the cheap loaf, of reduced
taxation, or of extension of the franchise ; and, upon
such questions, the popular voice is wont to speak
promptly and emphatically enough. But of the British

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. 129

Empire, its history, its value, its prospects, nine-tenths
of the race to which it belongs know extremely little
and care less. This indifference (which posterity will
so harshly stigmatise) springs from no want of
patriotism, of which an ample supply lurks in most
British hearts, but from sheer downright ignorance of
the issues at stake. And this, the most insuperable of
all stumbling-blocks upon the steep path to national
unity, the press is, by far, the most potent agency to
remove. I, for one, would rather see but a single one
of the widely-circulated London " dailies " advocating
the good cause with a will than learn that a hundred
new branches of the Federation League had sprung into
existence.

If it be asked ho%D the slumbering lion of public
opinion is to be aroused, upon what lines the nation is
to be convinced of the necessity for definite action, then
the reply would appear to lie in the clear establishment
of two single propositions : —

I. The loosely-connected component elements of what
is at present vagviely known as the British Empii-e
cannot hold together very much longer under existing
conditions; that is, the only alternative to some form
of closer union, or federation, is disintegration.

II. Federation would be to the advantage of all
British communities, individually and collectively. The
alternative, disintegration, would, on the contrary, ob-
viously at once destroy their collective interests, and
would not only injure the individual interests, but
would, in the case of many communities, jeopardise their
very existence.

Of these two propositions, the first appeals with equal

force to Great Britain and to the Colonies ; the second

ijo BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

must be viewed from two standpoints : that of the
Englishman living in Great Britain, and that of the
Englishman living in one or other of the Colonies.

I, Federation" or Disintegration ?

When, more than three centuries ago, England lirst
fairly awoke to the pangs of Earth-hunger, she came
very late into the field. Spain, Portugal, Holland, and
France had all secured a considerable start in the race
for empire. But, thanks to her insular position, her
gradually established superioiity at sea, the generally
judicious part she was enabled to take in the successive
struggles between Continental nations, and the com-
mercial basis upon which she strengthened her steady
advance, she finally emerged with more foreign posses-
sions than she well knew what to do with. Not more
than she wanted, be it well understood; because the
colonising propensities of Englishmen are apparently
insatiable ; but certainly more than she could reasonably
expect to keep for an indefinite period upon an indefinite
plan. As regards India and her other alien-peopled
Possessions, her policy has, indeed, been clear and con-
sistent. They were and are conquests, which must be
kept by the power of the sword. But, in dealing with
the vast territoiies colonised by communities of British
blood, Great Britain's course has been lamentably erra-
tic, equally generous and inconsistent. Whilst bestowing
upon mere handfuls of settlers enormous areas of land
and ample legislative freedom, thereby engendering the
idea of future independent nationality, she has retained
in her own hands paramount powers which are, to the
Colonial mind, irritatingly suggestive of Colonial in-

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. 131

feriority. Complacently recognising the probability that,
by-and-by, these communities would sigh for complete
independence, she has throughout acted as though they
would for ever remain tied to her apron-strings. Poten-
tial nationalities, even though youthful, should early be
tauglit to rely mainly upon themselves ; but the Colonies
have, throughout, been permitted — nay, encouraged, to
rely wholly upon the mother-country. They have been
treated like spoilt children, and they have sighed for
manhood, also, like spoilt children, without realising
what the responsibilities of manhood entail. To main-
tain Imperial fleets and armies, people in the United
Kingdom have for years been groaning under a taxation
which, owing to their harder conditions of life, they
could ill afford to pay ; whilst the Colonials, who, owing
to the easier conditions of life abroad, could afford to
pay their share very well, have (until recently, and then
but to a trivial amount) escaped scot-free. So long,
indeed, did they enjoy this immunity, that they now
view any proposals to tax them, for their own defence^ as
a hardship scarcely to be borne. Had Britain, before
signing away her territories with so lavish a hand, in-
sisted upon a fair distribution of the revenue necessary
for Imperial purposes over the whole Empire, this
unfair protest would never have arisen ; for true it is
that "an old tax is no tax." Colonials now evince no
gratitude for past favours ; they stare steadily at the
future; and their platform is practically this : "If, in
the past. Great Britain has protected us, and lent us
money, and built us up generally, she doubtless had her
own reasons for doing so and made a good profit out
of the transaction. Our great danger from attack at
present (whatever it may have been formerly) lies in

132 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

some outcome of her foi-eign policy, in which we are not
consulted. If we are to protect ourselves — which is the
real meaning of paying for our own protection — we
must either have a voice in this perilous foreign policy,
or cut the Imperial connection, and start a less hazard-
ous foreign policy of our own." And upon the just
principle that *Hhey who contribute shall spend," it
will Vje conceded that there is much of force in the
Colonial contention. It is, at all events, clear that the
present dead-lock cannot endure.

But even upon the not very warrantable 'assumption
that Great Britain, rather than provoke a breach with
the Colonies, should waive the question of defence-con-
tributions and continue to bear the burthen alone, the
further question arises : Could she maintain the Empire,
in its present dislocated condition, for any measurable
length of time 1 Sharp and swift comes the answer :
No. It is useless blinking our eyes to the fact that,
with perhaps a single exception, Great Britain is re-
garded with jealousy or dislike, or both, by the Great
Powers of Europe. Yet she must play her part in every
fluctuation of the balance of power.

Does the most patriotic of Jingoes seriously believe
that, in the event of war, and with a great maritime
nation against her. Great Britain could afford protec-
tion (with her existing armaments) to her foreign
Possessions 1 Or that, if her own shores were in
danger, she could leave squadrons in the Atlantic or
the Pacific 1 And what could unprotected Possessions
do, save shelter themselves beneath the neutral flag of
independence 1 Surely the position needs but small
argument, beyond a bare glance at the perils which lie
ahead. And, equally surely, if Britain and the Colonies

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. 133

neglect to set the Imperial house in order, jointly, and
whilst yet there is time, they can look for no other
result than that it should fall in ruins about their
ears.

There are not wanting those who, in the face of the
constantly increasing armaments of Europe, profess a
firm conviction that the very magnitude of these war-
like preparations will effectually glue the sword to the
scabbard until, by common consent, a general disarma-
ment takes place. They point to the fact that, with
modern weapons, the struggle would necessarily be so
unprecedentedly bloody, that no government would face
the responsibility of throwing down the glove. History,
neither past nor modern, would seem to justify such
sanguine views. But even if we admit, for the sake
of argument, that there will be no European war, or
that, if there be one, Britain will contrive to steer clear
of it, the only difference which this hypothesis can
make, so far as Imperial prospects are concerned, is
that, in lieu of rapid disintegration consequent upon
war, there would supervene more gradual disintegration
consequent upon diversity of interests. The great
Colonies are now well past the leading-string stage.
They possess all the elements necessary towards form-
ing distinct nationalities ; and each day their position,
as merely dependent factors in the sum-total of Britain's
greatness, becomes more irksome to them. They are
powerless to make a commercial treaty with even sister-
colonies without admitting to its pi'ovisions Britain's
foreign customers. They cannot even communicate
with a foreign nation, except through the British
Foreign Office. They labour under all the vexatious
disadvantages of vassalage, and they resent it. Canada

134 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

is, indeed, handicapped by the proximity of the United
States, and fears absorption into the giant Republic, did
she part company with Britain. But Australia is not
so handicapped, nor is South Africa ; and the steps
already taken by the former towards the establishment
of a "Commonwealth" (the mere name of which is in-
consistent with a monarchical form of government)
plainly shows that Australian patience is rapidly
approaching the vanishing-point. And the loss of
Australia, besides meaning the loss of more than one-
third of the whole territory in the Empire, would be a
striking precedent for others to follow. The Australian
Colonies cannot faii-ly be blamed or accused of want of
patriotism in the steps they have taken and purpose to
continue. They have waited a long time for some sign
from the mother-country. When the Imperial Federa-
tion League came into recognised existence, the Colonies
had already held preliminary federal meetings at Hobart
Town. These, failing the concurrence of New South
Wales, fell through, or, more correctly, were postponed.
But, finding that Imperial Federation fell flat in Eng-
land, they revived the idea of federating infer se, and
even New South Wales this time took part in the pro-
ceedings. Of course, all British Colonies realise full
■well that their position would be far higher as States
of a Britannic Confederation than as embryo republics.
But failing any authoritative invitation to join such a
confederation, they are preparing for the day of British
disintegration. Such, at least, is the conviction which
a residence of twelve years in the various Colonies has
forced upon the mind of the writer.

Finally, as to the question whether even loss of the
Colonies would be equivalent to loss of empire to Great

ALTEKNATIVE MEASURES. 135

Britain, I can only say that, in my judgment, it would.
An empire, of a soi-t, she could still have, so long as she
could keep a hostile Power out of India, and maintain
her rule over her Asiatic subjects at odds of four thou-
sand to one. " If this be empire, make the most of it,"
— but it is not the sort of empire foreshadowed by a
Britannic Confederation.

II. The Profit and Loss of the Alternatives.

This section of the subject may conveniently be
resolved into (broadly) two sub-sections : Financial-
Commercial and Political. And, moreover, as the con-
siderations insolved are not quite identical, so far as
native-born and colonial-born Britons are respectively
concerned, it would appear advisable to rehearse them
separately.

. (i.) Financial-Commercial Consiperations (as viewed
from Great Britain).

Most business men, if confronted with the alternatives
of continuing a business, or carrying it on, would pause
to consider the amount of capital sunk in that business.
Englishmen are nothing if not business men. It there-
fore behoves them, as a preliminary^ to total-up the
amount already invested in their Empire. "What the
total might be stated at, from first to last, it simply
staggers the imagination to conceive. But here are a
few items which, as it were, lie upon the surface.

136 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

To, say, 100 years' expenses incurred for

defence of tlie said Empire at the

(very moderate) rate of ^25,000,000

per annum ^2, 500,000,000

To extraordinary war expenses (Crimean

and petty wars, &c.) .... 350,000,000
National Debt (181 5) .... 850,000,000
Interest paid on National Debt since

181 5 2.040,000,000

^5,740,000,000

Five tliousaml seven hwulred and fortij millions ster-
ling ! One has to think the figures over for a few
minutes to get an idea of what they really mean. Yet
a few minutes' more reflection will show they are by
no means an exhaustive statement of the sums actually
spent and paid for. Yet stay ! the odd ;^74o,ooo,ooo has
not yet been paid for. It is, in fact, still owing, and
is commonly known as the National Debt. By whom
owing ? Nominally by Great Britain. But is it con-
ceivable that a Britannic Confederation, once organised,
would consent to saddle the mother-nation with a debt
contracted for the Empire? Impossible. There is
nothing radically mean in the Colonial character : if
anything, it errs on the score of liberality, where once
its sense of honour is touched. To even hint noio to
the Colonies that they should recognise any liability
in this obligation (to which they owe their very exist-
ence), would be ridiculous, because they have no voice
in the government of the Empire which it was expended
to build up. But, oiTer them a proportionate share,
as co-heirs, in this Empire, and this National Debt
would be ti-ansferred to the Britannic Confederation,

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. 137

without so much as a division. More seriously, and
apart from the National Debt, is Great Britain pre-
pared to recognise that the major portion of the huge
balance must be written off as a bad debt 1 At present
she still rules paramount over what might easily be
made the cominw race. This is the consideration, still
hers, for the thousands of millions, to say nothing of
the blood, expended. Will she allow it, of her own
mere supineness, without an effort, without one single
motherly call to her own flesh and blood, to pass away
from her — for ever ?

The taxpayer in the United Kingdom may next
proceed to inquire what becomes of the enormous
revenue which he is annually called upon to contribute.
lie will find tliat considerably more than half (some
^2^50, 000,000) is swallowed up in what may fairly be
termed Imperial expenses — that is, in army and navy,
fortifications, the Diplomatic and Consular Services,
&c. About one-quarter goes to cover interest upon
the National Debt. The balance, less than one-quarter,
remains for purely home expenditure. Is this, in his
judgment, a satisfactory state of affairs ? He is begged
to observe that the Colonial gets just as much out of
the fifty millions as he does, and, until recently, paid
not one shilling towards the amount (now he contri-
butes towards the wages of the crews of the Australian
Squadron). If he travels, he enjoys every privilege of
British citizenship, the use of the Consular Service,
the protection of the flag ; and for these benefits he
pays nothing. Nothing can well be clearer than that
advantages enjoyed by the whole Empire should be
paid for by the whole Empire, and not by a fractional
portion of it. But if it be asked why this obviously

138 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

fair principle is not carried into effect, the old answer
crops up : Great Britain alone furnishes the revenue
necessary to give effect to and sustain her Imperial
policy, because she alone shapes and directs that policy.
If it be true that they only who contribute should ex-
pend, it is, conversely, true that they only who expend
should contribute. The Colonies, having no voice in
Imperial policy or expenditure, fail to see why they
should have any hand in contributing. This is clear.
But it is equally clear that if they had a voice in the
Imperial councils, they would necessarily bear their
fair share of the Imperial expenditure.

The public debts of the Empire (apart altogether from
the debt of Great Britain) amount to ^540,000,000,
neai'ly three-fifths of which are represented by Colonial
Government securities, and almost the whole of the
entire sum is due to British investors. Now, so long as
the Colonies remain under the British flag, these securi-
ties are rightly deemed to be first-class. But how
would they be regarded did the Colonies blossom
forth as infant republics? And it may be noted
that the English Supreme Court has struck a note of
warning in this connection by persistently refusing to
sanction the investment of trust funds in Colonial
stocks. But were the Colonies definitely admitted as
States of a Britannic Confederation, these same stocks
would permanently rank amongst the very best secu-
rities.

Nor must it be forgotten that an enormous amount of
British capital has been invested in Colonial industrial
enterprises. This capital also may be regarded as safe
so long as Great Britain's existing relations with the
Colonies endure. But, once more, how would they be

ALTERNATIVE MEASUllES. 139

recrarded in the event of these relations undergoing a
rupture 1

The force of these financial considerations will pro-
bably be readily admitted ; indeed they are but a few
amongst many. Of still greater weight are the con-
siderations suggested by commerce, upon which Britain's
very existence may be said to depend. If we examine
into the existing conditions of Great Britain's trade we
find that, out of a total of ^/^y 4 1,000,000, seventy-
six millions represent trade with British Possessions
(India, ^c.) other than British Colonies, one hundred
and seven millions with her Colonies, and the balance
with the rest of the World. Consequently, the Colonial
trade proper represents but one-seventh of the total.
And the reflection suggests itself that, even supposing
Colonial independence to mean cessation of trade with
Great Britain (which it obviously never could mean),
the loss, though serious, would be by no means synony-
mous with commercial ruin. This is a fair argument ;
but it is furthermore to be borne in mind that the future
must be studied. Are these proportions likely to be
maintained ? It is not conceivable that they should.
Considering that the Colonies have, all told, but a
population of thirteen millions, the amount of their
present trade with Britain is phenomenal— nearly half
that of Britain's trade with the United States, which
have a population of sixty-two millions, and one-third
greater than is furnished by all other British Posses-
sions (including highly-prized India) with their two
hundred and eighty millions of Asiatics. If, actually,
this handful of Colonials stands forth so prominently,
how about the time (and no very long time either) when
that handful shall double, treble, quadruple in number 1

I40 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

Or, put it this way — How would a proposal be received
in Great Britain involving the loss of the Indian trade,
or a Icdsi^ez-aller policy tending to the loss of that
trade ? Would it not raise an outcry from John o'
Groat's to Land's End 1 Yet that much-prized, exag-
gerated Asiatic trade is far below the Colonial trade in
value,* and must in the future continue to take a seat
still further back, — and this, too, in face of the fact
that, whereas the Colonial trade is heavily hampered by
Protective tariffs, that of India is almost free. Who
can estimate the volume of Colonial trade which would
spring up were it made possible for the Colonies to
repeal their tariffs 1 I do not know. But this I know,
that so long as independence is the only goal which
Colonials can see in sight, they must and will strive, by
a Protective policy, to make themselves productively
independent of the rest of the World, Great Britain
included. Colonials are not simpletons ; they are quite
capable of appreciating the advantages of Free Trade ;
but they also realise what their position would be if,
relying entirely upon Great Britain for manufactured
goods, the mother-country even temporarily lost her
command of the seas. They are not so thoroughly
convinced as is the typical Jingo of Britain's invinci-
bility, and they do not clearly understand her foreign
policy. But a Britannic Confederation, of which they
would be factors — well, that might be considered invin-
cible, and, at least, they would have a voice in its
policy.

It need scarcely be pointed out, that the continually
increasing European and American tariffs are causing
the gravest anxiety in commercial circles in Great

* Compare, however, Mr. Chisholm's references to India. — Ed.

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. 141

Britaiu ; indeed, it would seem to be but a question of a
very few more years for these tariffs to reach the pro-
hibitive point when commerce must cease. How about
Britain's trade then ? Tlie thing is quite possible ; for
be it never forgotten that Great Britain is the only nation
in the World ahsolidelij dependent npo7i commerce.

A truth will always bear repetition. " Trade follows
the flag." We have neither space, nor is there any
necessity, here to illustrate the exactness of this time-
honoured maxim further than to point out that, if tlie
trade-returns be carefully analysed (and the work is
pleasant mental recreation), its truth is verified with
surprising precision. And it is natural that it should
be so, for what does the flag mean save identity of
commercial and national interests which all are alike
impelled to assist and maintain.

(ii.) Financial-Commercial Considerations {as viewed
from tlie Colonies).

Upon the Colonial mind the fact that the mother-
country has spent some thousands of millions sterlino'
would make no great impression ; the average settler
would take it vei-y much as a young man would take the
information from his father that his education and
maintenance had cost several thousands up to date — as
a matter of course, with the amount of gratitude inspired
by individual disposition. He might be brought to
see that he morally owes a portion of Great Britain's
National Debt ; but that would depend very much upon
how the obligation might be placed before him.

As regards contribution towards current Imperial
expenses, his attitude is resolute and clear. He reco"-

142 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

nises the necessity for defence against possible attack,
and that such defence costs money. To the Canadian
the question is far more simple than to the Australian ;
and Canada has found it expedient to adopt what is
practically a form of conscription as a safeguard against
possible attack from the United States. But the
Australian has no such towering neighbour, and very
much overrates the Imperial connection as his only
possible source of danger. If attacked by a foreign
power, it could only be, he alleges, because that power
would be at war with Britain upon some question to
him at once trivial and unintelligible. He, personally,
cares not one straw who owns Constantinople, or who
dominates Egypt, because his trade with India is but
small, and his route does not lie throiigh the Suez
Canal. His trade with Britain and with Europe does,
but then there is always the alternative Cape route.
Yet, he altogether forgets that he would be exposed to
at least equal perils were his political connection with
Great Britain severed. What guarantee would he have
that foreign nations would leave him in undisturbed
possession of a vast continent were the protection of
Great Britain withdrawn ? How would he fare in a
war with France or Germany, or even with China?

He realises that his continued progress must largely
depend upon his ability to borrow largely and at a cheap
rate ; but he avers that he can do so, not because he
flies the Union-Jack, but because British cajjitalists are
familiar with the vast resources of his Colony, and that
they would continue to lend upon the strength of these
resources. They have lent freely to corrupt, ill-governed,
nondescript South American republics : why not to re-
publics peopled and governed by men of British race 1

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. 143

But here again he overlooks much that is important.
There is such a thing as borrowing too dear. The South
American States have, for years, been borrowing upon
exorbitant terms, have nearly all proved unable to meet
even the interest upon their loans, and are hovering
upon the brink of bankruptcy. Even supposing that
colonies converted into republics could borrow, is it to
be supposed that they could borrow at present rates 1
And, from another point of view, is it conceivable that
British capital would flow in to aid industrial enterprises,
as it now does, were it being invested in infant re-
publics ?

As regards his commerce, the Colonial takes the broad
platform that Great Britain would continue to trade as
freely with young republics as with dependent Colonies.
That, doubtless, is mainly true. But how about that
trade if British capital were withdrawn or sparingly and
dearly lent 1 His imports would be rigidly gauged by
his exports ; and how could the latter be increased or
even maintained without help ? Let him remember that,
as matters stand, British commerce is very far from
being mainly dependent upon the Colonies, whereas
Colonial trade is most distinctly mainly dependent upon
Great Britain. It would be a bad thing for Britain to
lose or to cripple her Colonial trade, but it would be more
than a bad thing for the Colonies : it would be commer-
cial ruin. Remove the British-owned ocean-going ships
from Melbourne or Sydney, and what would remain ?

Nay, let the Colonial rather strive to realise that
separation from Great Britain would entail stagnation
and loss upon a scale wdiich it is pitiful to contemplate.
If he be driven to independence, by force of circum-
stances or by delay, amounting to refusal on the part

144 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

of Britain to receive him into federation with her, then
indeed must the burthen be borne, the loss and the
stagnation endured. But, in the meanwhile, let him
be somewhat more outspoken as to his willingness to
accept Confederation if offered to him, realising that it
is not the sort of proposal which a great nation can be
expected to make where there is a chance of refusal.

(iii.) Political Considerations [viewed from
Great Britain).

Of existing great powers, but one, the United States,
can be said to enjoy absolute immunity from attack,
unless, indeed, the States themselves deliberately pro-
voke a conflict. They have a vast continuous area,
affording sufficient scope for all reasonable national
dreams of expansion for many centuries to come. They
are ruled by the same laws and speak the same tongue.
They come up, as near as may be, to even Professor
Freeman's exacting definition of an "ideal nation."
Great Britain, whose Empire extends, in a confused
sort of way, over three times the area and five times the
population, is so far fi'om enjoying similar immunity
that she may fairly be described as the most vulnerable
of all and the worst prepared to repel attack. Her own
shores are rather supposed to be, than known to be,
safe : that is, they are still guarded by the power which
has maintained them inviolate in the past — a powerful
fleet. But her outlying dominions can, by no stretch
of imagination, be even supposed to be safe. It would
be hard to point out a single one that is safe — unless,
perhaps, Gibraltar. And this insecurity springs from
two causes, the one obvious^ the other not quite so

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. 145

self-evident. Geograpliiccal situation is, of course, tlie
obvious cause, and, necessarily, a permanent one, to be
remedied only by increased speed of communication.
The other cause lies in the ill-defined haphazard nature
of her tenure of the most important of her Possessions.
Of course I allude more particularly to the Colonies ;
but even India is in the same category.

From time to time the entire patrimony of the British
race has been made over in free gift to a few millions of
settlers, and these are now practically as much masters
of 8,000,000 square miles of territory as Great Britain
herself is of the 121,000 squai^e miles contained in the
United Kingdom. Of this clear convincing proof was
given in the replies returned by the various Colonial
Governments to a circular sent to them by a strong
committee of both Houses of Pai'liament asking: for
grants of land suitable for emigration upon a large
scale. These replies were a distinct refusal all round,
the clearest explanation whereof was given by Sir Henry
Parkes, the Premier of New South Wales, viz., that
such a proposal was utterly inconsistent Avith the
Australian watch ward, "Australia for the Australians."
This, it might be thought, would have exhausted English
patience. But not at all ; the emigration scheme was
dropped, that was all. And, as though to justify the
Colonial attitude, within two years of this incident.
Great Britain conceded her last remaining million square
miles to fifty thousand settlers in "Western Australia.
It is not, of course, pretended that any of the Colonies
have gone the length of closing their ports to would-be
immigrants ; nay, they encourage what are deemed to
be immigrants of the right sort, that is, with money in
their pockets, or skilled ax'tisans (in moderate numbers),

146 BKITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

or domestic female servants (to any extent). But these
are precisely the very persons whom the mother-country
can least spare.

Now, is it not high time to let it be known to the
dominant democrat labour factions in all the Colonies,
that neither is Australia for the Australians, nor Canada
for the Canadians, nor South Africa for the South
Africans, but that all these belong to^ and are " for
the entire British race " 1 And how accomplish this so
etfectually as by re-absorbing these somewhat self-asser-
tive offshoots into a re-organised, federated empire ?
To deprive them by force of rights already conceded is
out of the question. What other alternatives exist,
except to allow them to drift off or break off into com-
plete independence 1

Perhaps the greatest of all advantages foreshadowed
by a perfected federal policy is that, whereas a dislocated
empire is a source of weakness, a securely-knit empire
would be as a tower of irresistible strength. At present
Britain's foreign policy really consists in playing one
Great Power off against another, whilst she plays her-
self off as occasion may appear to offer. She is not
powerful enough to hold her Empire iu the teeth of
the World ; she knows it, and they know it. But a
Britannic Confederation would be under no necessity
to follow any such hide-and-seek tactics. It would
from the very outset be quite strong enough to assert
itself, and, if need were, to hold its own against any-
thing short of a universal coalition — an eventuality
which need hardly be taken into account. Can any
reasoning man pretend that Britain would not gain
enormously in political power by exchanging her
present status, as harassed guardian of a confused

ALTERNATIVE MEASURES. 147

string of Possessions, for one where slie would figure
as Parent and Premier State in a world-wide and
powerful Britannic Confederation 1

(iv.) Political Coxsiderations (viewed from
the Colonies).

It has already been pointed out that the Colonial
could not safely, or even securely, rely upon immunity
from attack from one of the Great Powers were
British protection withdrawn. But even supposing
that, by making concessions and by skilful diplomacy,
the Colonies did contrive to secure a peaceful existence,
what would their status in the World be ? Each group
would necessarily be at the expense of pro\iding and
maintaining an army and a fleet, and of organising and
paying for a wide-spread Consular Service, just as the
impoverished South American Republics have had to do.
And what force would their diplomatic utterances carry,
say, in Paris or in Berlin ? Or how would Canadian
rights in Behring Sea or Australian rights in the
Pacific be enforced ? To whom would, or could, the
travelling Colonial apply for redress or assistance, say,
in Chili or in Persia, or anywhere else 1 To his Consul ?
He might just as well apply to the nearest telegraph-
post. The United States is powerful enough. Yet,
during the Argentine Revolution of July 1890, I have
seen the British Consulate at Rosario literally besieged
by American citizens begging for Britlslt safe- conducts.
France is powerful enough. Yet, during the last
Chilian civil war, I have seen French subjects arrested
and otherwise annoyed (until a French war-ship ap-
peared upon the scene) to an extent which, had they

148 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

been British subjects, would have brought the guns
of H.M.S. Warspife to bear upon the Intendencia at
Valparaiso. Germany is powerful enough. Yet she
was fain to beg permission (during the same war) of
the British Foreign Office to place her subjects resident
in Chili under British protection. Let the Colonial be
well assured that there is no such passport throughout
the entire World as to be able to declare " I am a
British subject." I grant that, as matters now stand,
it would not add to his dignity abroad to explain that he
was a Canadian or a Queenslander. But the amended
form, " a subject of the Britannic Confederation," would
very soon be understood as synonymous with Noli me
tangere. Indeed, from this political point of view, the
Colonies have vastly more to gain than even Great
Britain herself.

MAURICE H. HERVEY.

VI.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH

EMPIRE.

By lord TllEING, K.C.B.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH

EMPIRE.

A UNITED British Empire, going forth— not con-
•^^ qnering or to conquer, but to regulate commerce
and spread peace and civilisation throughout its limits, —
would be a dominion of a grandeur and beneficence as
j-et unknown among the kingdoms of the World.

The possibility of the establishment of such a reign
of peace and goodwill has been widely canvassed. On
the one side it has been said that the component parts of
the Empire are so divergent in their interests that they
will not admit of being welded into a compact mass.
On the other side, it is replied that, granted that terri-
tories such as India and the spheres of influence in
Africa cannot enter into complete union with Canada
and Australia, there still remain a number of Colonies
capable of being moulded into an efficient working
Empire. In short, the solution of the problem of
Britannic Confederation must depend largely on what
is meant by confederation — what is the degree of union
indicated, and what territories aie intended to be tied
together by a bond of greater or less stringency. The
object of the present article is to deal with the whole
question impartially. The facts, on which the conclu-
sions in it are based, will in the main be found in the

151

152 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

able papers already published in this Series. The task
set before me is to collect and compare the results of
those papers, and to present in a succinct form the
existing conditions of the British Empire, and the
means to be adopted to draw closer the bonds of union,
or at all events to counteiact the forces tending to
greater disintegration.

The extent and genei-al characteristics of the British
Empire will be best understood by a careful examination
of the excellent map, specially prepared to illustrate
this series of papers, and appended to this number. It
should be added, that the map was designed by Mr.
Silva White and compiled by Mr. J, G. Bartholomew.
Tlie Empire compi^ehends about one-fifth of the land-
surface of the globe, and contains a population in the
gross of 348,000,000. The countries of the British
Empire occupied by settlers of European, and prin-
cipally British, origin are distinguished on the map
from those countries of the Empire in which the native
element is in numerical preponderance. In the follow-
ing pages the term Colonies is restricted to the former,
whilst the latter are classed under the generic name
of Dependencies. This classification has been adopted,
inasmuch as the main object of this paper is to deal
with cert.iin typical Colonies rather than to discriminate
accurately between the great variety of governments
prevailing in the British Empire. The other original
features of the map explain themselves. It may, how-
ever, be well to draw attention to the fact that an
attempt has been made to show at a glance, by distin-
guishing the places where there are British Ambassadors
or other accredited Diplomatic or Consular agents of
the British Government, the vast organisation main-

CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 153

tained by Great Britain for the protection and assist-
ance of all the subjects of the Empire.

The United Kingdom, the centre and head of this
vast aggregate of nations, has an area of 121,481 square
miles, and a population of 38,000,000. The Indian
Empire is far the most important of the dark-coloured
Dependencies, and has an area of 1,533,61 1 square miles,
containing a population of 286,000,000. The spheres
of influence in Africa comprehend an area of about
2,462,000 square miles, with a large population, the
amount of which is quite unknown.

The Colonies to le chiefly noted are the Dominion
of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Cape.
The area and population of each of these Colonies is
given below. The remainder of the Empire consists of
numerous smaller Colonies ; but, for the purpose of this
paper, no detailed description is required of their ex-
tent or population.

Area.
Square Miles.

Population.

Canada

3,456,383

4,830,897

Au.str;ilia .

2,944,628

3,03S,7f'3

Cape Colony

221,311

1,527,224

New Zealand

104,235

668,353

Remainder (ex

xluding India)

649,030

9,000,000

7,375,557

19,065,237

The greater part of this vast Empire has been acquired
during the course of 150 years by settlement, by con-
quest, and by that most dubious form of acquisition
which passes under the name of annexation.

Having now stated the relations between Great Biitain
and her Colonies in respect to area and population, let us
proceed to the consideration of their commercial rela-

154 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

tions. By the old school of political economists the?e
would have been deemed the only ties worth consider-
ing : we now know that sentiment and passion are as
powerful, or more powerful, factors in the friendship of
nations than even money and trade. Still, as the argu-
ment of the purse is a strong one, let us see how that
stands between the mother-country and her children.
In round numbers,

The Trade of the United Kingdom

With Canada . . is 2f per cent, of her whule trade.
„ Australia . . 55
,, Cape Colony . I^

„ New Zealand . if

■ — I if per cent, or not quite I of the
whole.
,, Remainder . 4f

„ India ... 9
„ Foreign Countries 74^

From this table it will be seen that, viewed solely from
a pecuniary point of view, the trade cf the United
Kingdom with the Colonies, though of great importance,
is far inferior in mngnitude to her trade with foreign
countries being less than 12 per cent, of her whole
trade.*

The next step in the progress of our investigations
in respect to the relations of the mother-country to the
Colonies is to ascertain under what laws the Colonies
have grown up and what privileges they now enjoy.
At common law a broad distinction is made between a
conquered country and a country settled by British

* These statistics have been kindly supplied to me by Mr. J.
FitzGerald of the Imperial Institute. They have been compiled
from the latest rettirns.

CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH EMriRE. 155

subjects. In the case of a conquered country, the ex-
isting law prevails till it is altered by the conqueror.
The case of a Colony formed by English settlers is very
different. An Englishman, according to Lord Mans-
field, on settling in an uncivilised country, carries with
him as much of the law of England as is adapted to his
situation. Liberty is his birthright, of which he does
not divest himself by going to other lands, provided
those other lands are not within the jurisdiction of any
recognised civilised power. All he requires to complete
his status as a Colonist is that the tract of land on
which he is settled should be declared by the Home
Government to be adopted by them and placed under
the protection of the British flag.

In the earlier Colonies the system most in vogue was
to grant to any adventurous spirits desirous of settling —
for example, in America, — a charter, reserving to the
Queen the power of appointing a Governor and creat-
ing two Houses of Legislature and committing to the
Governor and the two Houses full power to make all
laws necessary for the well-being of the new community.
In more modern times the usual course has been to ap-
point during the infancy of a Colony a Governor with
a Legislative Assembly, nominated l)y the Crown, to
assist him in the Government ; then, as the Colony
advances in years, to substitute two Legislative Houses ;
and, as a last stage, to give responsible government —
that is to say, to make the advisers of the Governor re-
sponsible to the two Houses in the same manner as the
Ministers of the Crown in the United Kingdom are
responsible to the two Houses of Parliament.

In jrranting these institutions to the Colonies, the
mother-country has shown no niggard hand, no selfish

156 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

spirit. She has handed over to them vast tracts of
territory — witness her most lecent gift of about one
million square miles to fifty thousand settlers in
Western Australia. She has allowed, contrary to her
most cherished policy, her Colonies to raise up against
one another the barrier of Protection, and, stranger
still, to impose protective duties against goods imported
from the mother-country. No advantage, then, has
been reserved to the mother-country. She cannot with-
ovit tlie consent of the Colony settle her surplus popula-
tion on lands defended by her navy. She cannot cany
into a Colonial port the products of Lancashire or
Yorkshire, the results of the industry of their British
fellow-subjects, without paying a heavy duty.

What, then, is the position of the Colonist as com-
pared with that of an Englishman, Scotsman, or
Irishman — say of a citizen of New South Wales as
compared with that of a citizen of Manchester ? How
do they stand as regards the mother-country 1 Both
are subjects of Her Majesty — as fully as if both had
been born in England ; they can alike be elected to
Parliament, enter the army or navy or be admitted
to the bar or to any other profession or calling for
which British citizenship is a necessary qualification.
Both, wherever they go, can claim the protection of the
British Ambassador and the British Consul. Then, as
to their powers of government. First, as to local affairs,
the New South Wales man has the advantage over the
Manchester man : the latter can by his representatives
take part in the local government of England, but he
has no reserve stock of land with which he can deal
suflicient to give many cows and many acres to any of
his neighbours who may require them. While in addi-

CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 157

tion to his acres the New South Wales man has, to say
the least, as large a power over tlie local government of
his Colony as the Manchester man has over English
local government. Then, as to taxes — the Manchester
man belongs to a community which contributes, accord-
ing to Sir John Colomb, 19s. 5^d. out of every pound
spent on the navy, and 20s. in the pound to the main-
tenance of the Foreign Office, or, in other words, to
the maintenance of the relations of the Empire with
foreign countries. In the benefit of this expenditure
the New South Wales citizen has as large a share as the
Manchester man, yet what does he contribute ? — 6|d. of
every pound spent on the navy, nothing to the army,
nothing to the Foreign Office expenditure.

Such are the general conditions of the British Empire.
It has cost hundreds of millions to build it up — an
expense wholly borne by the mother-country. It costs
over 14 millions a year to defend it at sea — the whole
of which is defrayed by the British tax-payer, except to
the extent of ;^38i,ooo, of which India pays ;^2 54,ooo,
chiefly for troopships and harbours, and Australia the
remainder to maintain a local squadron. It has cost
us a blood-tax which can only be estimated by the reflec-
tion that, according to some historians, our wars for the
last two hundred years have really been sustained for
the maintenance, expansion, and consolidation of our
Colonial Empire — " Care a qui la totcche."

What, then, are the inducements for the members of
this great family to stand by and assist each other and
the mother-country, and for the mother-country to keep
under her wing these great and growing communities ?
In considering this question, India is, of course, ex-
cluded : it has been won by the sword — it will, if the

158 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

necessity arises, of which there appears to be little pro-
bability, be kept by the sword ; and the considerations
applicable to such a possession are totally distinct from
those which bear on the question of the situation of our
Colonies, properly so-called. The spheres of influence in
Africa and the ruere Dependencies are also obviously
excluded.

Some forty years ago a Colonial Society was formed
in London for the purpose of determining the true re-
lations between the mother-country and the Colonies.
All the various political parties were represented amongst
its members. These included Mr. Walpole, Mr. Adder-
ley (now Lord Norton), Sir William Molesworth, Mr.
Cobdeii, Ml-. Godley, one of the founders of the Canter-
bury Settlement in New Zealand, Mr. Bright, and
others. The object of the Society was to obtain self-
government for the greater Colonies, then writhing and
uneasy under the eccentric rule of the Colonial Office
of the day. With this view, the opportunity was taken
by Sir A\^iniam Molesworth, on the occasion of a Bill
being brought into Parliament in 1850 for the govern-
ment of the Australian Colonies, to pi'opose a scheme
for conferring on them a complete system of self-govern-
ment. This proposal, as might be expected, was not
carried. The Government plan prevailed, and these
Colonies did not obtain responsible government till
three or four years later. The principles, however, on
■which the Society acted are at this distance of time of
more importance than the mode in which it sought to
carry these principles into effect. It was assumed that
Colonies were outlets for the surplus population of
Great Britain, that it was the duty of the mother- country
to fill up the waste places of the World, and that she

CONSOLIDATION OF THE BKITISII EMPIRE. 159

was bound to protect her Colonies so long as they were
young and unable to protect themselves, but that
national cliildren, like the children of a well-ordered
family, should be brought up with a desire to maintain
themselves, and that they would, when adult, separate
from their parent and set up for themselves. It was
taught by the political economists of the time that Free
Trade was about to make the World a universal brother-
hood, and that the fact of a country being a Colony or
not mattered nothing as respected the extent of its
conmiercial intercourse with the mother-country, and
that the burden of protecting it as a Colony far out-
weighed in a financial point of view any possible ad-
vantages to be derived by the mother- country from
maintaining the connection.

Since 1850 far other counsels have prevailed. "The
millennium " of Free Trade has not been established ;
and, in the event of a war, grave inconveniences would
arise to Great Britain, if Australia, for instance, were
an independent State. In such an event Australia,
however friendly, would be bound by the obligations of
a neutral Power. As a belligerent, Great Britain could
not fit or refit her ships at any Australian port. She
could not obtain supplies, and would have to acknow-
ledge the territorial waters of Australia as a place of
refuge within which she could not attack any ship of
the enemy.

Again, when the Colonist asserts his desire for inde-
pendence, has he ever considered that, though not wholly
independent, he is in no sense dependent on the mother-
country ? The British Parliament haslongsince renounced
the power of taxing the Colonies, and all that the
mother-country asks of her children, even in case of war,

i6o BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

is sympathy and voluntary support. Apart, then, from
the higher considerations of feeling and patriotism which,
as will be shown hereafter, condemn absolutely the
education by the mother-country of her children with a
view to separation, it may be admitted that, taking a
lower ground, and looking to the protection of our com-
merce in time of war, every inhabitant of the United
Kingdom should desire to retain the affections of his
Colonial fellow-subjects by any reasonable concession.
In discussing in those bygone years the advantages
conferred by a Colony on the mother-country, it never
occurred to the philanthropists of the Colonial Society
that there existed a possibility of the Colony aiding the
mother-country by troops or ships. The possibility of
the presence of an Australian Contingent under the
British commander in Egypt would have seemed to them
a mere dream unworthy of the consideration of any one
but a visionary sentimentalist.

If, however, we proceed to weigh in the balance the
benefit to the colony as compared with that to the mother-
country, which is secured by their mutual connection,
it will be seen that the advantages in fav"our of the
colony greatly preponderate. Take Australia as an
example, and assume her to be independent. Where
would she stand in the commonwealth of nations ? Three
millions of people would be charged with the protection
of 8800 miles of seaboard. How long would Australia be
for the Australians 1 What is there to prevent Ger-
mans, Frenchmen, Italians from creating their "spheres
of influence" in Australia? England protects them
with an expenditure of 14 millions a year, with a fleet
that can follow an enemy into every sea, and blockade
an enemy in its own ports. AVhat possible foi'ce could

CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. i6i

Australia raise which could shut up the fleet of any
European Power in port, or be prepared to meet such
a force in the open sea 1 Again, in case of separation,
at the very time when money was imperatively re-
quired for defence, what would be the value of Australian
securities 1 At the present moment the Australian
Colonies raise money in the English market at the rate
of three and a half per cent. Let them become inde-
pendent, and gi-eat would be the downfall in Australian
credit.

If we add to the cost of naval defence the expense of
keeping up an army, and last — not least — the cost of a
Foreign Office, with Ministers and Consuls and all the
attendant paraphernalia of intercourse with Foreign
States, it must be admitted that the Australian Republic
would scarcely start on its course of independence in
these days of annexation and filibustering without cast-
ing *' a longing, lingering look " at the Old Country and
its ever-present, evei^-protecting flag. Then, as is well
put by Sir John Colomb, and also by Mr. Hervey in
his very interesting article, what influence would the
Ministers and Consuls of an Australian Republic have ?
Instead of their Consul being the one to whom foreigners
ax-e often glad to apply for assistance, they would be
liable in times of danger to find themselves in the posi-
tion of those foreigners, and to have to appeal to the
charity of the British Consul, whose protection they
could no longer invoke as a right.

Having, I hope, proved that the views of 1850 were
a mistake, and that no English politician of these days
would desire to separate the sticks which are unbreak-
able while bound together, but which would snap so
readily were they attacked singly, let us turn to the

1 62 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

problem presented for solution — namely, the formation
tvitJmi the Empire of a Britannic Confederation. The
phrase '' ivttMn the Empire" is deliberately used; for
it seems sometimes to be forgotten that, assuming the
existence of such a Confederation, no inconsiderable
portion of the Empire — notably India with its popula-
tion of 286 millions, and the African spheres of influence
— must inevitably be left out. Moreover, in consider-
ing the question in the only form in which it can arise
in the immediate future, we may further narrow its
scope by confining our argument to the larger Colonies
— Canada, Australia, the Cape, and New Zealand; for
any scheme applicable to them can readily be adapted to
the smaller British Possessions when occasion arises.

What, then, is the nature of the proposed Britannic
Confederation which is intended to draw closer the
bonds of union between the mother-country and the
Anglo-Saxon Colonies? What examples can be found
in contemporary history of forms of government binding
together political communities having local self-govern-
ing powers ? — for to such forms of government the ex-
pressions "Federation" and "Confederation " are alone
applicable.

An example which may be taken to illustrate all the
characteristics of Federal Union will be found in
the United States Piepublic. The thirteen American
Colonies which revolted against British rule, found
themselves at the conclusion of the war in the position
of thirteen independent States, having no connection
with each other. The common tie of British supremacy
liad been dissolved ; and each State possessed the pre-
rogatives of making peace and war, of maintaining
armies and navies, of regulating commerce and making

CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIKE. 163

treaties with foreign nations, which had previously been
vested in the Sovereign of Great Britain. Such a state
of things was intolerable. A cluster of thirteen small
independent States lay at the mercy of any foreign
Power ; and, to obviate this danger, they agreed to form
a Confederacy. This they attempted to do by the
establishment of a central body called Congress, con-
sisting of delegates from the component States, and in-
vested with all the prerogatives of the British Crown.
The expenses incurred by the Confederacy were to be
defrayed out of a common fund, to be supplied by
requisitions made on the several States. The defects of
this Confederacy soon became apparent. Congress was
utterly devoid of all coercive authority to carry its laws
into effect. " Every breach of the laws involved a state
of war, and military execution became the only instru-
ment of civil obedience."* "A still more striking
defect was the total want of power to lay and levy taxes
or to raise revenue to defray the ordinary expenses of
government. Requisitions were to be made on thirteen
independent States. The consequence was that, though
in theory the resolutions of the Federal Government
were constitutionally binding on the members of the
Union, yet in practice they were mere recommendations
which the States regarded or disregarded at their
option." Story sums up the whole question as follows :
— " It has been justl}' observed that ' a government
authorised to declare war, but relying on indepen-
dent States for the means of prosecuting it, capable
of contracting debts and of pledging the public faith
for their payment, but depending on thirteen distinct
sovereignties for the preservation of that faith, could

*■ Fcdcraliaf., p. 74.

1 64 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

only 1)6 rescued from ignominy and contempt by find-
ing those sovereignties administered by men exempt
from the passions incident to human nature ' — that
is, supposing a case in which all human government
would become unnecessary and all difference of opinion
would become impossible."* In this state of things
the Americans perceived that it was quite possible to
maintain complete unity as a nation if, in addition to
investing the supreme government with the prerogative
powers, they added full power to impose Federal taxes
on the component States and established an executive
furnished with ample means to carry all Federal powers
into effect through the medium of Federal officers. A com-
plete system of Federal taxation enforced by Federal
courts supplied the central government with the neces-
sary funds to perform effectually all the functions of a
supreme national government.

To understand this system it is only necessary to
reflect that every inhabitant of the United States has a
double political status. He belongs to one great nation
called the United States. He is also a citizen of a local
self-governing body called a State.

The Empire of Germany is a Federal Union differing
from the United States of America in having an Emperor
at its head. The King of Prussia, under the title of Ger-
man Emperor, represents the Empire in all its relations
with foreign nations, and has the prerogative of making
peace and war ; but, if the war be more than a defensive
war, he must have the assent of the Upper House.

In considering the position of the Empire and the
prospects of Britannic Confederation, the first reflection
that occurs is that a IJritannic Confederation can extend
* Story, chap. ii. p. 96.

CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 165

only to the Colonies and not to the Imperial Dependen-
cies — meaning by the Colonies, as has been already ex-
plained, the settlements of British, or at all events of
British and other European, settlers, while the expression
Imperial Dependencies is used to designate India, Ceylon,
and the countries inhabited in the main by dark-skinned
races. To draw an accurate line of demarcation between
these two classes of Colonies and Imperial Dependencies
is not possible or necessary. Again, to enumerate the
Settlements included within the category of Colonies
would conduce little to the solution of the problem
before us, as it is with the typical representatives of each
class, and not with details, that we have to deal. The
only fact which it may be well to remember is that the
Imperial Dependencies have a population of some 300
millions and a volume of trade of^i 96,000,000, while the
Colonies have a population of some 20 millions and a
trade of ;^i 62,000,000. It is not, of course, intended
by this comparison to put the Imperial Dependencies
on a par with the Colonies in the estimation of English-
men, but to show the vast numbers whose happiness is
involved in the government of the Empire, and the
great national interests affected by that government.
Now, the common link between the United Kingdom,
its Colonies, and its Imperial Dependencies — in other
words, the force which makes the Empire — is the sove-
reignty of the United Kingdom : the prerogative of
Her Majesty to make peace and war, to maintain fleets
and armies, and to govern by that prerogative alone the
Imperial Dependencies.

Let us now consider what privileges the Colonists
desire of which they are not already possessed. They
do not, of course, claim to interfere in the local govern-

1 66 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

ment of the United Kingdom, inasmuch as the British
Government does not interfere in their local affairs ;
and a Canadian or Victorian has, to say the least, as
large a power of governing Canada or Victoria as a
Yorkshireman has of governing England. Again, the
Colonist has little to desire with respect to the regulation
of commerce. A citizen of New York or Floi'ida cannot,
as such, impose any custom duties or interfere with
trade. A citizen of Canada or New South Wales can
deal with the import and export of goods into his own
Colony as he Avills, even to the extent of imposing
burdensome duties on the manufactures of the mother-
country. It is true, a Colonist cannot make treaties
with a foreign country : but to grant this privilege
would enable Canada with four millions of inhabitants,
or New South Wales with one million, to legislate for
the Colonies and Dependencies alike — in other words,
to make treaties binding on 303 milHons of peoples.
Such a concession is obviously out of the question.
Again, with respect to the power of making peace or
war. The Australians complained some little time ago
that we were unwilling to allow the annexation of certain
islands in the Pacific. Those islands were of no conse-
quence viewed in relation to the Empire, and their
annexation might have involved us in a European war.
Would it be right that, for an indirect benefit to a
particular Colony or Colonies, a war should be set on
foot which would have disturbed the whole Empire and
cost thousands of lives and millions of money 1 And
how would a Colony in such a case be benefited by inde-
pendence? Would all Australia, having a population
of only three millions, if she made a demand on any of
the great European Powers, have a chance of sustaining

CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 167

that demand ? It is sometimes suggested that a Colony-
may be drawn into war by the mother-country, and
would be safer if independent. Here, if ever, the tu
quoqiie argument applies. As has been stated above, the
Empire is a structure which has cost hundreds of millions
of money and millions of lives to ei'ect and maintain.
'* Where is the woman 1 " is the question of the wise
man, in searching for the origin of any quarrel between
individuals: "Where is the Colony V would be an
equally apposite question in respect of any difference
arising between Great Britain and any civilised nation.
Were Great Britain assisted in the protection of her
Colonial Possessions by a Colonial fleet, and of her
Indian countries by a native fleet, would she not be a
Power capable of defying the nations of the World 1

Something may also be said of the vast influence she
would possess if her children, following her example,
would abolish their hostile tariffs, and adopt Free Trade
throughout the Empire. Would not such an Empire
be far preferable to any ZoUverein formed on the im-
possible lines of a protective tariff imposed by the
mother-country on all Colonial products to the detriment
of herself and foreign countries ? Is it to be expected
that the British citizen, who pays so much to maintain
the army and navy under the shadow of which the
commerce of the Colonies, including their protective
tariffs, is carried on, would consent to be further taxed
for the benefit of his richer brother in Canada or Aus-
tralia 1

Is it conceivable that Britain, having led the van-
guard in Free Trade, should waver in her advance, give
up her commercial treaties with foreign countries, and
reverse her policy of the last thirty years ? Surely it

i68 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

is more reasonable that the Colonies should substitute
Free Trade for Protection, than to expect that the mother-
country should return to a policy which she abandoned
for the benefit of the working-man, for the advantage
of the very class who, having emigrated, have, contrary
to the opinion of the old Homan poet, changed their
opinions with their change of climate. In short, it is
easier for countries whose united commerce amounts to
1 60 millions to alter their commercial regulations, than
for Great Britain to risk its 750 millions of trade by
again subjecting it to trammels from which it has been
so lately emancipated.

No argument is required to show that, as the British
Empire exceeds in extent every other union of States
which the World has ever seen, so it presents a com-
plexity of interests which has no parallel in history.

Confederation and Imperial taxation must go hand in
hand. If the Colonies desire representation in an Im-
perial Parliament they must be prepared to take their
share in all Imperial burdens, including the National
Debt. Further, taxes for Imperial purposes would have
to be collected by Imperial officers and enforced by Im-
perial courts, as taxes for Federal purposes are levied in
the United States by Federal officers. Such a scheme
of union cannot be looked upon as feasible within the
near future, but must be developed gradually, and pro-
gress with the advance of the Colonies in respect of
population and wealth.

But admitting this to be a barrier to the formulation
to-day or to-morrow of a detailed scheme of Confederation,
may we not initiate a system calculated to lead up to
such a union 1 The problem is a new one : new conditions
require new political relations : and, without attempting

CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 169

to prophesy what the British Empire may become before
the close of another lialf-century, let us consider what
may be done immediately in the way of Britannic Con-
federation.

Let, as Sir John Colomb suggests, an Imperial army
and an Imperial navy, as contradistinguished from a
British army and navy, be established by the mother-
country, and a fixed status in that army and navy be
offered on certain conditions to every Colony. Take
first the army, and let me illustrate my meaning by
supposing Canada to respond to the invitation of Great
Britain. Canada would raise a body of troops and
maintain them. They would not be compelled to serve
in the Imperial army unless Canada were attacked by
an enemy of Great Britain : in such an event they
would bo as completely under the command of Her
Majesty's ofiicers as the British troops. In time of
peace they would be regulated by the law of the Colony.
If the Canadian troops were required for service out of
their own country, it would be necessary to obtain their
own consent. Form a navy on similar conditions. The
ships would be commissioned by Her Majesty, but they
would not be required to serve out of a certain restricted
area except with their own consent. What has been
said of Canada applies to every other Colony desirous of
becominsr a member of a Britannic Confederation. Let
the Colonies contribute in pi-oportion to their size and
wealth to the Imperial army and navy, and there can be
little doubt that their influence in making peace and
war will be in proportion to the strength of their bat-
talions and the number of their ships. Nor need the
intervention of the Colonies in British politics be only
indirect. The direct intervention of a Colony may be

I70 BEITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

secured by elevating the position of an Agent- General
to one more akin to that of a Minister of a Foreign
State, and giving him a facility of access to the British
Government and a social position commensurate with
the important duties with which he would be entrusted.

Social links, as they may be called, between the
mother-country and the Colonies might also be multi-
plied by adopting, as Sir John Colomb proposes, freer
postage, telegraphic, and other communications. There
seems also no reason why a scheme should not be
adopted whereby an interchange should take place be-
tween the Civil Service of a Colony and the English
Civil Service. The Colonial Office might thus obtain
a practical knowledge of genuine Colonial wants and
ideas, and the staff of the greater Colonies might be
strengthened by the assistance of men versed in the
business of the higher departments in the English Civil
Service. No stronger argument for the introduction of
such a plan can be found than in the career of Sir
Robert Herbert, who has just retired from the Colonial
Office, to the resfret alike of the Colonies and the
mother-country. The personal knowledge and experience
of Colonial affairs which he gained during his tenure of
office as Premier of Queensland from i860 to 1865 have,
by universal consent, given him a unique position as
adviser to the Seci-etary of State for the Colonies.

A material step in advance has already been taken
in the blending of English and Colonial ideas by
the establishment of the Imperial Institute, whereby
Colonists, on their arrival in this country, will find an
institution in which they can conveniently meet for busi-
ness or pleasure and obtain information. Last, but not
least, the Imperial Federation League, through its able

CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 171

lecturer, Mr. Parkin, has diffused throughout the United
Kingdom and the Colonies a greater knowledge of the
advantages to be derived from closer acquaintance and
mutual confidence.

"What, then, is the outcome of the whole question 1
The Colonies have all the powers of government, which
communities can possess, except the Sovereign's pre-
rogative of making peace and war and regulating com-
merce with foreign nations. These powers are, both in
monarchical and republican States, vested in the head
of the supreme government, and are practically con-
trolled in constitutional States by the necessity of
appealing to the people for money to carry on a war
or for laws to enforce treaties. If the Colonists are
desirous of making their influence felt on these ques-
tions, the means are in their own hands. Let them
ask the mother-country to form an Imperial army and
navy, and let them contribute their quota to the land
forces and reinforce the navy with their ships. As
they grow in strength they will grow in influence, and
when the five millions of Canadians have become a
hundred millions, when the Australians can reckon
fifty instead of three million inhabitants, and their local
naval and military forces have grown in equal propor-
tion, it may be that their numbers may be so great as
to virtually shift the supremacy from the old country
to the new ; but that time has not yet arrived. The
immediate Britannic Confederation should consist of a
political organisation in which the Queen should main-
tain the existing prerogatives, but in which the Colonies,
who are able and willing to give substantial assistance
in the defence of the Empii^e, should be represented in
London by Ministers, as suggested above.

172 BRITANNIC CONFEDERATION.

Let me not be misunderstood. We may attempt
"to dip into the future as far as human eye can see,"
and imasfine an ideal State with its millions of British
subjects commanding such an ascendancy in the World
as to be able to insist that —

" The war-drum throb no longer and the battle-flag be furled
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the World ;"

but the hour is not yet, and for the present we must
rest the stability of the Empire on tlie mutual affection
of the mother-country and lier vast Colonial family.
What is there wanting in such a tie "? There is a common
origin, a common flag, a community of glorious recollec-
tions. The Canadian, tlie Australian, the New Zea-
lander, each has his share in Agincourt, in Blenheim, in
Waterloo, in the Crimea; his fathers were English-
i^ien — he, too, is an Englishman. " Ciois Romanus sum."
" I am a British subject," he may proclaim everywhere,
and he will find his claim allowed and respected. It
may be said that such ties are merely sentimental,
silken ties, broken by the slightest strain. If this be
so, then love of country is a mere sentiment, nationality
is a mere sentiment — the purest, liveliest, strongest
affections of the human heart are mere sentiments.
History tells us in every page that a common nationality
is the firmest bond which unites men in political com-
munities. Look abroad at Poland, still restless and
uneasy because her nationality has been crushed and
trampled upon. Consider the Slav aspiration for unity,
seething and disturbing Europe with its misplaced
energy and ambitious cravings. Ask the Hungarian
why he revolted from Austria and is content because his
nationality is recognised. Search the World throughout

CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. 173

its len2;Lli aiul breadth, and it will be found that com-
biuations of States are strong and compact in propor-
tion as their component members possess a common
nationality and are bound together by a community of
sentiment. Great Britain and her Colonies are the
greatest comljination of States of a similar origin which
the World has yet known. They are held togetlier l)y
the fii-mest tie — that of "kindred blood, similar privi-
leges, and equal protection."

THRING.

INDEX.

Adelaide, trade of, 78.

Africa, South, a Zoliverein iulvo-
calt;d iij, xiii.

America, effects of the revolt of
the States of, on liritish Colo-
nial policy, 97, 98 ; States of
South, and their loaus, 143.

Aiiinuils, live, tariffs on, 103.

Anthracite, 69.

Army, the support of the, 157 ;
an Imperial, suggested, 169.

Athens, 41.

Atlantic, human interests in the,
xiv.

Australasia, Colonies of, and fede-
I'ation, xi. ; trade and navy of,
14 ; staple trade of, 78. ,S'cc
Australia and Mew Zealand.

Australia, British in population,
75 ; bulk of trade of, with
mother-country, 75 ; trade of,
with Great Britain drooi)ing,
75> 76 I trade of, with Conti-
nental States, specially Ger-
many, 77 ; ])atience of, under
rule of Great Britiiin, rapidly
vanishing, 134 ; federation in,
134 j jealous of Imperial con-
nection, 142 ; refuses land for
British immigrants, 145 ; ports
of, open to likely immigrants,
145 ; area and population, 153 ;
inconveniences to Great Britain
if independent in time of war,
159; assumed as independent,
wliattlien ? 160, 161 ; protected
by Britain, 160.

Austria-Hungary, 38.

Bacox, on the idea of impossi-
bility, 103.

Barbadoes, trade of, 92.

Barley, Canadian, 70.

Books, free of tax in the Colonies,

104.
"Britannic," Mr. Freeman ou the

term, 49.

Canada, difficulties in, xii. ;
loyalty of, xii. ; and the dispute
with the United States, 18 ;
and our food - supplies, 23 ;
the confederation of, 42 ; trade
with Great Britain, 66 ; im-
])orts into, 66 ; exports from,
66 ; exports from, to United
States, 67, 70; trade of, with
United States, 68 ; its coal-
]iroducing provinces, 69; in-
crease of trade with Uniteil
States, 70; as wheat-2>roduc-
J"oi 73 ; its wheat exjiorts, 73 ;
its undevelo2)ed wealth, 74 ;
risk to, of more intimate com-
mercial relations with the
United States, 74; customs
duties in, 108 ; handicap))ed,
134 ; in a state of self-defence
against attack from the States,
142 ; area and population of,
153-

C:ipe Colony, trade with, 80;
area and population of, 153.

Capital, _ British, invested in
Colonial enterprises, 138.

Can-ingtou, Lord, 20,

Carthage, 41.

Ceylon, as coal-importing, 65;
trade with, fluctuating, 91.

Channel Islands, 39, 40.

Chemicals, free of tariff, 103.

Chili, trade and navy of, 14.
75

176

INDEX.

China, trade and navy of, 14.

Coal, as an export, 63 ; trade
in, between United States and
Canada, 69 ; in Canada and
Australia, 71.

Colonib, Sir John, on Imperial
Federation, 12 ; Mr. Freeman
on, 49 ; on contributions to
support of tlie Enii)ire, 157 ;
suggestions of, 169, 170.

Colonial Office, the, its function,
8 ; and Newfoundland, 8 ; shy
of intermeddling, 55.

Colonial Society, the, its members
and objects, 158.

Colonials, the superficial views of,
in regard to defence, 24 ; con-
tention of, 132; not simpletons,
140 ; privileges of, as compared
with citizens at home, 156.

Colonies, the British, and their
relation to the Crown, 6 ; gene-
rous treatment of, by mother-
i-ountry, 7, 8 ; political in-
dependence of, 9 ; anomalous
jiosition of, 10 ; anomalous con-
dition of Imperial relationship
with, II, 12 ; trade of, in 1851
and 18S6, 13 ; compared with
the United States, 14 ; and
the army, 18 ; and the protec-
tion of the mother-country, 20 ;
attitude of, to emigration and
colonisation, 27; their freedom,
42 ; Dependencies, 42 ; uncer-
tain relation of, to one an-
other, 54 ; dependent relation
of, irksome, 54 ; as a market
for British produce and manu-
factures, 65 ; value to, of trade
with Great Britain, 65 ; Tropi-
cal, and Dependencies, 81 ; re-
strictions on trade with, up to
1776, 83 ; demand of, for in-
de|)endence, 98 ; granted oppor-
tunities to adopt ]>rotection,
98 ; generous and inconsistent
policy of Britain towards, 130;
encouraged to rely on the
mother-country, 131 ; past the
leading-string stage, 133 ; still
restricted in power, 133 ; value
of the trade of Britain with,
139 ; attitude of, in regard to

Imperial expenses, 141 ; British
commerce independent of, 143 ;
practically masters of great part
of the Empire, 145 ; establish-
ment of, 155 ; not dependent
on the motlier-country, 159 ;
confederation advantageous to,
160; desires of, 166; powers
possessed by, 171.

Colonisation, 27.

Commerce, the, of the United
Kingdom, 16, 17 ; the cost of
naval protection of, 17 ; growth
of, 18.

Community, British, ignorance
of, in regard to the issues dis-
cussed in these papers, 127, 128.

Confederation, Britannic, defined,
X. ; aptness of designation, 3 ;
its limits, 4 ; Mr. Freeman's
criticism on the term, 50 ;
probable centre of, 52, 53 ;
advantages of, 146, 147 ; what
it should exclude and include,
162; its nature, 162; the
United States an example, 162;
can extend only to the Colonies,
165 ; must go hand-in-hand
with Imperial taxation, 168 ;
steps towards, 169.

Consular establishments, the, 19.

Cotton, export of, from India, 84.

Customs duties, extension of, in
the Colonies, 98 ; Adam Smith
on, 102 ; in the Colonies, 104 ;
cost of, 105 ; levied not simply
for revenue, 108 ; revenue in
Great Britain from, 108 ; re-
form in regard to, advocated,
108 ; should be on broad and
general principles, 116 ; hither-
to regarded simply from point
of view of revenue, 117; re-
duction of, advocated, 121.

Customs-Unions, 59; suchaunion
as an element in federation,
60 ; obstacles to, 60.

Debt, National, and the Colonies,
iu the event of a confederation,
136.

Defence, importance of a league
for, xiv. ; Imperial. 14, 24; pro-
vision for Imperial, 17, 18.

INDEX.

177

Dependencies, as distinct from
Colonies, 152 ; population anil
trade of, 165.

Dicey, ^[r. , and liis writings, 33.

J^iploniatic Service, 18.

Disintegration, preparations for,
134 ; risks to the Colonies of,
147.

Dowell, Mr., on taxation, re-
ferred to, 116.

Eggs, export of, fiom Canada to
United States, 70.

Emigration, 27.

Empire, the Biitish, integrity of,
and tlnit of her Colonies, xiii. ;
geographically, 3, 6 ; histori-
cally, 6, 7 ; abstractly, 43 ;
general ignorance of and indif-
ference to the history and ]>ros-
pects of, 129 ; instability of,
under present conditions, 129 ;
in peril, 132-135 ; investments
of Ericain in, 136; ])ublic debts
of, 138 ; ideal Britisli, 151 ;
extent of, 152 ; extent and
population of, in India, 153 ;
in Africa, 153; cost of, 157;
as such, preferable to a Zoll-
rerein, 167 ; basis of the
stability of, 172.

England, 41 ; late iu the field,
nuder the pangs of Earth-
hunger, 130 ; coloiu>ing pro-
pensities, 130.

English-speaking peojile, the, 4'\

Estimates, naval, 15.

Export duties, no, in ; efi'ects
of. III -115.

Ex|)orts, British, from 1861 to
1890, 61 ; of Biitish and Irish
])roducts and manufactures
from 1861 to 1890, 61, 63; of
Colonies and Dependencies, 63 ;
to United States, 63 ; to Ger-
many, 63 ; of foreign and
Colonial produce from 186 1 to
1890, 66 ; exports to United
States, 67.

Federal and Imperial, inconsis-
tent terms, 45, 46.

Federation, advantages of,
among adjacent Colonies, xi. ;

obstruction to, in Xewfmind-
laiul and Camula, xii. ; in South
Africa, xii. ; advantage of, for
mutual defence, 26 ; what? 44 ;
Imjierial, 45-48 ; what is a ? 48 ;
in Switzerland and the United
States as contrasted with that
projected, 52 ; Adam Smith's
scheme of Imperial, 99, 100 ; no
definite idea of, vet advanced,
125, 126 ; advantage of, 129-
146; or disintegration, 130-135.

FitzGerald, IMr. J., statistics by,
acknowledged, 154.

Fliiur, imports of, 63, 64.

Foreigner, taxing the, 109 ; ear-
liest forms of this, 109, no.

Forster, Bight Hon. W. E., and
t h e Imperial Federation League,
^29.

France, as a nation, 37, 41 ; start
of, in the race for empire, 130.

Free Trade in Canada and Au>-
tralia, xii. ; cause of, damaged
)).y dogmatism and exaggeration,
118; the best policy, 118;
comparatively easily adoptable
by the Colonies, 168,

CEK.MAN Em PIKE, tlie, a feileml
union, 164.

Germany, as a nation, 37, 38 ;
trade of, with New South
"Wales anil Victoria, jj, 78.

(Jenoa, 41.

(iibraltar, safetj' of. 144.

(Jitfen, Mr., report of , 62.

Gladstone, jMr. , a scholar of
Adam Smitli, 102, 104 ; finan-
cial statement of 1853, 105 ;
on Income-Tax, 105 ; on the
Soap-Tax, 115.

(4osL-hen, Mr., "Wheel-Tax of, 107.

(Jreat Britain, as a wealthy com-
mercial centre, 65 ; furnishes
all the revenue to support Im-
perial policy, 138 ; absolutely
tiependent on commerce, 141 ;
vuIneraViility of, 144 ; insecure
tenure of her Possessions, 145 ;
present policy of, 146 ; gene-
rosity of, to the Colonies, 156.

Guano, free of taxation, 103, 104.

Guiana, trade with, 92.
M

17S

INDEX.

HEUUEitT, Sir 11., les.suii of caveer

of, 170.
Holliiud, 41.
Hunter, Sir Win., on collapse in

Indian cotton trade, 84 ; on

the new era of uompetition, 88 ;

on our commercial prospects

in India, 91.

Import duties, 109, iii.
Imports, British, from 1S61 to
1890, 61 ; limits of variation of,

62 ; of corn and raw cotton,

63 ; from the United States, 67.
Independence, risks of, 25 ; de-
claration of American, 96.

India, as coal-importing, 63 ;
trade witli, 81-90; Free Traile
in, 82 ; imports and exports,
from 187 1 to 1890, 82, 83 ;
effect of American war on
trade with, 84 ; cotton exports,
84 ; as a mart for British pro-
duce, 85 ; value of recent im-
Ijorts from Great Britain, 85,
86 ; trade of Egypt, Austria-
Hungary, France, and Germany
with, 86 ; export of wheat
from, 89 ; export of cotton
yarn, 87-89 ; export of leather,
89, 90 ; x'olicy of Britain in
regard to, 130 ; value of trade
with, 140 ; British tenure of,

157. 158.
Institute, the Imperial, 170.
Italy, as a nation, 37, 39.

Jamaica, trade in, 92.
Japan, trade and navy of, i^.
Jingoes, the, appeal to, 132.

KnrBKRLEY diamond-field and
trade, 80.

Lands for emigration refused by
the Australian Colonies, 145.

L;inguages, national, 37, 38.

Law, uniformity as regards, 27 ;
in conquered countries and a
Colony, 155.

League, the Imperial Federa-
tion, work of, 29, 126, 170.

Leather, trade in, of India, 89,
90,

"Leave well alone," untenable,

127.
Leslie, Mr. Cliffe, proposal of,

108.
London, as a wool-market, 79,

80.
Longstaff, Dr., statistics of, 72.
Lowe, Ml-., ]Match-Tax of, 107.

Macdonai.I), Sir John, patriot-
ism of, 54.

Malta, 39.

Man, Isls of, 39, 40.

Manchester, politicians of, 21.

Manitoba, Great Britain the best
market for its produce, 68 ; its
wheat produce, 74.

Map, the British Empire, 152.

Mashona-land, 81.

Matabele L\nd, 81.

.Mauritius, trade with, 91.

M'Culloch, quoted in regard to
forcing of a Colonial trade, 120.

^M'Kinley tariff, the, effect of, in
Canada, 71, 106; effects of,

"3, 114-
Mediterranean, the, once the
j focus of civilisation, xiv.
: Melbourne, trade of, 78.
! Mill, J. S., referred to, 116.
Molesworth, Sir Wm., bill of,
158.

Natal, trade with, 80.

Nation, different senses of the
I word, 34, 35 ; the idea of, 35,
I 37 ; the territory of an ideal,

39-
Nationality, what? 35.
Navigation L;iws, Adam Smith on,
I 98, no; founded on national

animosity, no; first attacked

by Free Traders, 116.
Navy, support of the, 157 ; an

Imperial, suggested, 169.
Newfoundland, and the Fisheries

t^>nestion, xii., 8 ; dispute of,

with France, 18; trade of, 74,

75 ; customs duties in, 108.
New Guinea, annexation of, by

Queensland, 10.
New South Wales, imports into,

76 ; exports to United Kingdom ,
1 76.

INDEX.

179

New Zealand, British in iiopu-
latioii, 75 ; bulk of trade
(if, with iiiother-coiiutry, 75 ;
trade of, with Great Britain,
droojiing, 75, 76 ; exports to
United Kingdom, -]■] ; area and
population of, 152.

Pacific, liunian interests in the,

xiv.
Parkes, Sir H., reply of, to the

demand for colonisation lands,

145-
Parliament, the British, and the

Colonies, 6 ; the prestige of, to

be maintained, 56.
Passports, Briti,sh, value of, 147,

148.
Peru, navy of, 14.
Petroleum, 69.

Pitt, Mr., his Bill for consolida-
tion of customs, 102 ; a scholar

of Adam Smitli, 102.
Policy, our Colonial, for the last

half-century, 99.
Portugal, 41 ; start of, in the race

for empire, 130.
Posts, uniformity as regards, 26 ;

this suggested as a unifying

agent, 170.
Powers, the Allied, and Free

Trade, xiii.
Prices, rise and fall in, since

1872, 62.
Protection, j)rincipal evil of, 1 19 ;

allowed in the Colonies, 156.

Queensland, imports into, 76 ;
exports to United Kingdom,

n- .

Question, the practical ol)jects of
the, at issue, 33.

Race, community of, 36.

Ivailway, Canadian Pacific, xii. :
from ];onil)ay to Bhor Ghat, 84.

Rawson, Sir E., calculations by,
62 ; his synopsis of tariffs and
trade of British Emjiire, loi ;
his tables, 103 ; quotation
from, on duties, 117, 118.

Reforms, financial, in the present
century, loi ; guidii.g prin-
ciple of British, 102, 103.

Revenue, the, and trade of Great

Britain since 1837, 15, 16.
Rosario, scene at, 147.
Russia, as a nation, 38.

Seeley, Prof., on the 18th

century wars, 96.
Sentiment, as a bond of union,

54-

Separation, mooted, 20 ; right to
demand, 20 ; looked on as a
mistake, 21 ; an open but a
serious question, 21, 22; result
to the Colonies, 23, 24 ; effect
of, on the Colonials, 143.

Services, the four Imperial, 8 ;
expen.scs of, borne by the
United Kingdom, 10 ; civil,
interchange in, 170.

Shipiiing in tlie Colonies, 1851-
1886, 13 ; statistics, 62.

Smith, Adam, on P'ree Trade pros-
pects in Great Biitaiu, 95 ; on
the Navigation Laws, 98 ; his
scheme of federation, 99, 100 ;
as a financial reformer, 100 ;
foresight of, loi ; 011 customs
duties, 102 ; and his disciples,
102.

Smitli. Mr. Goldwin, statistics
by, 68, 69.

Smith, Sydney, on the taxed
Englisliman, loi.

Sjiain, 41 ; start of, in the race
for empire, 130.

Straits Settlements, trade with
the, 91.

Suez Canal, the, effect of open
ing, on trade, 86.

iSwift, quoted, 116.

iSwitzerland, as a nation, 38.

Sydney, trade of, 78.

Tariffs, the (juestion of, its
difficulty, 27, 28 ; the system of,
loo ; synopsis of, and trade,
of British Em])ire, lor ; on live
animals, 103 ; on raw materials,
103 ; expense of collecting,
105 ; the increase of, 140.

Taussig, Prof., paper of, referred
to, 119.

Taxation, in the Colonies, 104;
generallj', 107 ; the original sin

I So

INDEX.

of all, 109 ; evils of indirect,

Tuxes, on commodities, 104 ;
direct aud indirect, 106; their
destination, 127.

Tax, Income, anomalies of the,
105 ; originally a war-tax,
105 ; dropped in 1816, and
revived by Sir Kobert Peel
in 1842, 105.

Taxpayer, the, and taxation, 106,
107.

Tasmania, customs duties in, 108.

Telegraphs, as unifying agents,
26, 170.

Temperate zone, the, versus the
Tropics, in a commercial refer-
ence as regards special products
and wages, 90.

Timber, abolition of customs
duty on, 104.

Tolls, 109.

Trade with the Colonies, 13 ; safe,
the paramount question, 22 ; of
Great Britain, 61-66 ; steadi-
ness of British, 65, 66 ; diver-
sion of, as regartls wool, 79 ;
the foreign, in tlie United
States and the United King-
dom, 119.

Transvaal, gold-fields aud trade,
80.

Tropics, the, 90, 91.

Union, a federal, what? 43. 44 ;
another possible form of, 44.

United Kingdom, as a nation,
■ 39 ; its constituent parts, 40 ;
trade of, from 1861 to 1890, 60 ;
area and population of, 153 ;
trade of, with Colonies, Depen-
dencies, and foreign countries,
154-

United States, compared with
the Colonies, 14; exports from,
to Canada, 70 ; increase of trade
with Canada, 70 ; iron and coal
in, 72 ; immunity of, from
attack, 144 ; confederation,
163 ; Congress of, established,
163 ; every citizen of, with a
double political status, 164.

Unity, steps towards political,
26 ; national, 35-40 ; commer-
cial, as an accompaniment of
federation, 59.

Venice, 41.

Victoria, Australia imports into,

76, 77 ; exports to United

Kingdom, 76.

"Wak, a European, chances of,

133-
AVars, and the Colonies, 10 ; of

Great Britain, 11 ; possible, in

the event of separation, 22, 23.
"Wealth of Nations, "the, quoted,

95. 9*5, 97,9s, 99, 100, 102, 115,

120, 121.
Western Australia, imports into,

76 ; exports to United Kingdom,

77 ; concession of laud to, 145.
West Indies, trade witli, 92.
Wheat, imports of, 63, 64 ; in

Canada, 73 ; export of, from
India, 87. '
Wool, exjioits of, from Austr;ili;),

78 ; to Continental ports, 79 ;
diversiou of trade in, 79, 80.

Yaiin, cotton, export of, from
India, 87. 88 ; export of, from
Britain, 88.

ZOLI.VEKEIN, a, 4S.

OEORGE PHILII' AND IbON, LONDON AND LIVERPOOL.

Rcccnllij PuUlshal. Demy 8vo, Chith.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA,

By ARTHUIl SILVA WHITE,

SECRETARY TO THE ROYAL SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY ; EDITOR OF

THE "SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE;" FELLOW OE

THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH, ETC.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS.

A Eiril's-Eye View— Mountains, Lakes and Kivers — Climate and Cog-
nate riienoinena — The Indigenous Populations — Islam and Christianity
—The Traffic in Slaves— Progress of Ex])Ioratiou — Commercial ilesources
— The European Domination — Political Partition— Summary and Con-
clusions—Notes on the Maps, by E. G. Ravenstein, F.R.G.S. Index.

List of IMaps specially constructed by E. G. Ravenstein, F.R.G.S.,
and beautifully printed in colours : —

(i.) Height of Land— (ii.) River-Basins and Ocean-Currents— (iii.) Mean
Annual Temperature— (iv.) Mean Annual Range of Temperature— (v.)
Annual Rainfall— (vi.) Geology— (vii.) Zones of Vegetation — (viii.) Com-
mercial Products— (ix.) Density of Population — (x.) Langu.'iges — (xi.)
Religions, and IMissionary Stations— (xii.) Progress of Exploration— (xiii.)
I'olitical Partition— (xiv.) Forms of Government.

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

" The snijject of Africa is not yet exhausted, and it is treated l)y Mr. Arthur
Silva Wliite from a new and very important point of view. Such a scliunie is
manifestly well conceived, and its judicious execution by Mr. White is a<lniirably
seconded by the elaliorate series of maps which have been prepared by Jlr. E G
Ravenstein." — Timi's.

■'A most useful Ititok.'—Athena'tiin.

" We know of no other work in which so dear a general idea of African Geo-
graphy and of the present state of the continent is conveyed."— Manchester
Guardian.

_ "A concise and huuinous resume of all the authentic and important infoi'ma-
tion that lias hitherto lieen collected in relation to the Dark Continent. It is not
too nuich to say that everything worth knowing about Africa may be learned by
perusing Mr. White's comprehensive \\v\\C— Dally Telegraph.

" The book represents the results of a vast amount of labotn- and research ; and
it Itrings into their proper sequence, and into comparatively small compass, a
large numljer of facts and considerations of which a clear comprehension is al).so-
lutely necessary before the development of Africa can be undertaken with any
hope of lasting results.' —&ci«('.s7t Leader.

" The author displays a thorough mastery of the facts relating to the various
cpiestions he discusses, and his work will be of genuine service."— iVn^^^/r.

"A very valuable work ... a verital)le mine of carefully collected, diiio-ently
digested, and well-\Mitten infonnation on the Dark Contincid. The author has
a full ii'rasp of his suliject, and shows it iu all its various aspects. To all who are
interested in Afiica the work will not only be useful but almost indispensable ;
for it presents in one thick volume, iu imperial octavo, Avhat would otherwise
need many l)ooks and nuich time to get ni."— Asiatic Quarterly Review.

"The task has iierhajis never before been carried out in so systematic a
manner, n<ir with fuller connnand of the newest as well as essential facts. The
outcome of his lal)our is a geographer's di-est of value to the politician the
missionary, and the iVM\e\:"—]^atiimal Ohserrer.

" The work of the well-known Scottish author . . . primarily intended for the
general reader, but interesting also to the scienii&t:'— Peter mann's Mitteilungen.

LONDON AND FJVERPOOL : GEORGE PHILIP k SON.

GEORGE PHILIP & SON'S

List of New and Important Works

®n (3coorapbv> anb ^lavcL

Third /ulition. Croxmi Svo, Cloth, 'price ois. 6d.

HOME LIFE ON AN OSTRICH FARM.

r,Y ANISHE MARTIN.

WITH ELEVEN ILLUSTRATIONS.

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

" Mrs. Martin lias fuiuished one of the most churming descriptions of
African experience that liave come under the notice of the reviewer,
weary of book-making and padding. The work does not contain a dull
page, and it is so short and so bright in tone that we should be doing an
injustice to the author if we quoted any of the choicest bits. The account
of 'Jacob,' the secretary-bird, which swallowed the kitten alive, and
hearing it still mewing in his capacious inside, went about in futile quest
of another kitten to devour, is delightfully comic ; so also are the experi-
ences of servants and household difficulties on a farm in the Karroo, near
I'ort Elizabeth. . . . Before they agreed to ' combine forces,' both Mrs.
Martin and her husband— alluded to as T. — had evidently travelled
widely, wisely, and well ; the result being a sparkling little book of which
it would be difficult to si)eak too highly. It contains eleven illustrations
from photographs ; and, while men will enjoy it, ladies will appreciate it
even more." — Atheiueum.

'"There is not an uninteresting page in this entertaining book, while
there are very few pages indeed which do not contain something genuinely
funny." — St. James' Gazette.

" Nothing has been publisliud for a long time in the way of light litera-
ture which can give more unmitigated satisfaction than this book." —
Manchester Examiner.

"Tlic book is a rarity altogether — rare in its pretty and tasteful bind-
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tion it supplies on tliat very remarkable bird, the Ostrich," — JVeuxastk
Dalli/ Chronicle.

LONDON AND LIVERPOOL : GEORGE THILIP & SON.
2

Just PuhUshcd, super-rojial 8fo, in handsome ilhistruUd cloth cover,

(jilt top, 'price 32s.

ACROSS EAST AFRICAN GLACIERS.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST ASCENT
OF MOUNT KILIMANJARO.

By Dk. HANS MEYER.

Translated prom the German by E. H. S. CALDER

One Volume, 450 pp., containing upwards of Fortt/ Illustrations,
consisting of Photoqraphs, Heliogravures, and Coloured Frontis-
piece, accompanied bj/ Three Coloured Maps.

A limited nuinhcr of Lariic-Papcr Copies, on Japanese Vellum, with
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OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

"Tile production nf the ]']ngli.->li edition deserves all praiso. It is
well translated. , . . The volume is beautifully illustrated — thanks in
great part to the co-operation of the well-known African arti.-t, Mr. E.
Compton, and aderpiately supplied with maps in which ])r. Meyer's
survey- work has been incorporated." — Athenaum.

"Dr. Meyer's magnificent volume has more permanent value than
any of the publications connected witii the Emin Relief Expedition."
— Daily Telegraph.

"The record of Dr. Meyer's march, even through the most barren
places, is never dull, because every page is brightened with scientific
observations and deductions." — Daily Chronicle.

" One of the few books about Africa published during the year which
is of enduring scientific value. . . . There is more thoroughly scientific
work recorded in a few pages of Hans Meyer's book than in all the
vast body of Stanley literature put together." — Observer.
' "This monumental work has been translated from the German by
E. S. Calder, who has done the work well. Eorty illustrations and
three maps, all magnificently executed, adorn the work, which as a
book of travel will charm every one with its modest, unassuming style.
The observations made by the Doctor will be of infinite use to°future
travellers." — St. Stephen's Revieic.

"This work is the handsomest and most important book of travels
of the season." — Manchester Examiner.

"A most fascinating and instructive story of adventure and explora-
tion." — Liverpool Post.

LONDON AND LIVERPOOL : GEORGE PHILIP & SON.

New and Cheaper Edition, Ct'Oion Si'o, Cloth, price 3s. Gc^.

A GIRL IN THE KARPATHIANS.

By MENIE MURIEL NOEMAN.

With upwards 0/ Thirty Orifjinal Illustrations.
OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

" Miss Uowie's frosli . and pleasant book is unconventional and in many
respects original. . . . .Slie sometimes reminds ns of 'The Sentimental Journey,'
and more often of Mr. Robert Louis Stevenson with liis donkey in the Ceveimes.
Little incidents are pleasantly magnified, and casual fancies suggest trains of
quasi-i)hilosophical reflection. . . . The whole book is eminently readable." —
Tillies.

" Jliss Dowio . . . may justly claim the credit of haviuLf produced a very
remarkable and interestmg volume. . . . We are still more grateful to her for
.storing in her pages the invigorating picture of a piquant personality. . .
Wlien her refleot.ions on tlungs in general come to us with the superadded charm
of Ruthenian vivacity and sprif^htlmess, their X)rodigal variety is not lighily to
be esteemed." — Dailij Tdeyraph (Leader).

"Miss Dowie has given us a capital book. . . . Her style is fascinating.
Every page, every paragraiih, sparkles with .some pretty conceit. . . . All
through there is a fascinatnig suggestion of a jjcrsonalitj'. i'he writer's courage
and high spirits are beautifully tempered with a touch of feminine weakness,
without which the book would lack one of its distinctive charms." — Daily Nncs
Leader).

"An undoubtedly valuable contribution to our knowledge of the social life of
a people who ai'e comparatively imknown. . . . Very readable, not only for its
novelty, but on account of the personality of its certainly clever authoress." —
Daily Graphic.

" A book in which there is evidence of keen observation, humour, and a con-
siderable litei'ary gift. . . . Has a provoking piquancy and a freshness of outlook
which quite atone for any unchastened exuberance." — Anti-Jacobiii.

" It would hai-dly be too much to say of it that since Kinglake's ' Kcithen ' we
have had nothing so brilliant in its way, or disclosing a literaiy individuality so
fresh and so emphatic. ... It gives us a vivid glance at a corner of Europe tliat
hitherto has lain for us in deep obscurity ; but, better than tliis, it will furnish
to all its readers a real and rare literary treat." — Scottish Leader.

" What she has to say is full of interest and of freshness. Tiie picture she gives
l>oth of the scenery and of the roU.sh peasantry is vivid and entertaining. . .
Will be read with enjoyment by all who take it up." — Scotsmaii.

"Her style is quite unlike anything I know, and for picture-que variety of
phrase, delicacy of shading, and really fine proportion, it deserves very warm
praise. Moreover, Miss Dowie has a genuine gift of observation, and she makes
her Huthenian peasants live in these pages with vivid and occasiunally audacious
realism. . . . The book is tlic expression of a very interesting .and genuine] per-
sonality." — Sussex Daily News.

'• Undoubtedly one of the most piquant liooks of travel that have appeared of
ate." — Daily Mail.

" Far superior to tlic ordinary run of books of travel, the descriptive powers of
tlie young author being of a very high order, and the work tla-oughout is remark-
able for many passages of great power and beauty. Binding, printing, and
illustrations are alike handsome, the illustrations especially — both full-page and
cxt— being exceedingly well done." — NewcaHle Chronicle.-

LONDOX AND LIVERPOOL: GEORGE PHILIP & SON.
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

This book is DUE on the last date stamped below

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BRITISH^EMPIRE

Mr J. n. PrTzOaaAj.D,

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MAP or Tin:

ITS OFFICIAL AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.
1892.

Brittah-owneil Siumihlfi-il
fnatij N«™1 Buu.

Ti>Q*-Cantu><aUI RUIwafi -
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Faicipi CoiUnK Statiodi •)■

Rtfirtoec ta LttUriac.

IBKIllSH COLOHIES AND FOSSSSSiONS-
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