m m m m H V-.:-.:,-.^ngrer. At best, for what was in itself an acllie Ve- ts ment would always be liable to be turned into a fresh source of calamity by adopting only one half of his advice and rejecting the other half, while its salutariness depended altogether on its adoption as an integral whole. The father compared Mirabeau's mind to a mir- 9 130 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. ror, ill which everything is pictured and effaced in an instant. Lome'nie endorses 1 this harsh judg- ment and finds its justification, as to his policy, principally in its innumerable and rapid mutations. 2 So far as the charge is borne out by the facts, it serves as a proof of Mirabeau's claim to genuine statesmanship. 3 If he had not displayed such a versatility in his tactics and even in his strategy, he would have been what Lome'nie believes him to have been : an orator with a rather thin and pretty impure varnish of statecraft. One of the main charges he brought against Necker was that ' IV. 73, 74. 2 If the charge is true, then no man was ever guilty of grosser self-deception than he. He wrote to Mauvillon : " J'ai mis plus de suite qu'un autre mortel quelconque, peut- etre, a vouloir operer, ameliorer et etendre une revolution qui, plus qu'aucune autre, avancera l'espece humaine. Vous verrez aussi que ce qui n'a du vous paraitre longtemps que les apercus electriques d'une tete tres-active, etait la combinaison d'un energique philantrope, qui a su tourner a son but toutes les chances, toutes les circonstances, tous les hasards d'une vie singulierement etrange, et feconda en bizarreries et en singularites." — Lettres a Mauvillon, 476. 3 He writes, January 4, 1790 : " Les cartes sont tellement melee dans ce tripot-ci, il est si difficile pour un joueur un peu systematique d'y combiner un coup, les sottises de part et d'autre y dejouent si completement tous les calculs, qu' apres une deperdition d'esprit et d'activite, dont chaque journee est tres-fatiguee, on se retrouve au meme point, e'est-a-dire au centre du chaos." — Corresp., 447, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 131 the minister was in his policy " always at war with the circumstances." x He was not guilty of the same mistake, for he understood that the states- man has to shape his policy according to the cir- cumstances, though he be ever so much displeased with them. He never changed as to the What, and not to change as to the How would have been the height of impotent doctrinarianism, because the circumstances were constantly undergoing such changes, so that to-day was worthless or worse than worthless, what some weeks or months before had been best calculated to attain the What. No consistency as to ways, means, and methods was possible, so long as wind and waves had virtually sole command of the ship. So long as this was the case, the true statesman could have but one aim and end : to get her out of this condition at any risk ; for as long as she was in it, everything else was necessarity but a hazardous makeshift. And to get her out of this condition was Mira- beau's one aim and end, and became so ever more and more, the more it became evident that the task could not be accomplished. On this question everything depended, and as to this question, his very victories had necessarily the effect of defeats. 1 Corresp., II. 155. 132 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. Necessarily, for it was but too true what he wrote to Lafayette : " The circumstances are very great, but the men are very small." x They were not quite so small as they appeared to him in his wrath, but still they were too small to see how small they were as to statecraft in comparison to him. They realized the difference just enough to resent it most bitterly. The thought to have the state saved by him was so unbearable to them, that it rendered them incapable of honestly exam- ining the question, whether it could be saved without him or not. Whenever his ascendency approached a certain line, they deemed it a sacred duty towards themselves and the country to thwart him without stopping to ask, whether they thereby did not thwart themselves and drag the country further towards the brink of the abyss. His only source of power was his genius, and that was a blade without a handle and a lever without a fulcrum, if those, who alone could make his thoughts authoritative, active will, were deter- mined under no circumstances to do so to the 1 Dec. 1, 1789. Corresp., I. 423. To Mauvillon he wrote : "Helas! mon ami, vous avez trop raison : Beaucoup de vanite et pen d 1 amour de la gloire. C'est a cause de cela qu'il faut changer le caractere national." — Lettres a Mau- villon, 507. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 133 extent it had to be done, if it was to be of avail. On the 7th of November the Assembly had chained itself down to this determination by erect- ing it into a law ; and the one man, with whose aid the wheels could perhaps, after all, have been reversed, was quite as effectually chained down to it by political shortsightedness, misplaced moral punctiliousness, and, above all, the jealousy of unbounded petty vanity. Circumstances had lifted Lafaj^ette into such a position, that it may be considered doubtful whether Mirabeau could have sufficiently fructi- fied a victory on the 7th of November, if he did not succeed in either conciliating or overthrowing him. But the defeat was unquestionably irretriev- able if he could do neither. From the 5th of Oc- tober, Lafayette was the most powerful man in the realm, not to do good, but to avert as well as to bring about some of the worst evils. Therefore one of the main points in Mirabeau's programme from that day on is to coax or to force him into an offensive and defensive alliance, or to break his power. The unintermitted and most arduous struggle to achieve either of these ends is a con- tinuous series of defeats, and next to that of the 134 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 7th of November he has suffered no more portent- ous ones. Mirabeau always lent a helping hand to his adversaries. In this case, too, he was far from being blameless. Lafayette's character renders it a certainty that he could never have made up his mind to accept in thorough good faith the prof- fered alliance. But Mirabeau made it doubly cer- tain by airing most freely his contempt of the general's political capacities, and by indulging in regard to him too in his dangerous taste for invent- ing nettling sobriquets. That the caps fitted the general's head to perfection was not calculated to make him fancy them any better, and the balm of fulsome flattery, which Mirabeau now and then poured over the wounds, could not have much healing effect, because the perfume of insincerity was too strong. Upon Lafayette, however, rests by far the greater half of the responsibility that this alliance was not concluded, which might have changed the fate of France. Though the idea of it was profoundly dis- tasteful to Mirabeau, because the mean opinion he had of the general's talents rendered it humiliating to him, he repeatedly returned to the charge, because he was equally well aware that the chance THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 135 of overthrowing him was exceedingly small, and that the imperative interests of the country ad- mitted of no other alternative than an alliance. And coarse flattery was not the only means by which he tried to attain his end. He did address him also as a man, whose better and higher im- pulses ought to be considered as so strong, that they can be successfully appealed to in the lan- guage of bitter, but wholesome truth. If La- fayette's character had been of that loftiness of which he himself was ever the last man to enter- tain the least doubt, 1 resentment would not have 1 His self-complacency and self-deception verge upon the comical. The most perfect of men cannot rightfully claim " la tranquillite d'une conscience pure qui n'eut jamais a rougir d'un seul de ses sentiments, ni d'une seule de ses actions." The man who approaches the nearest to this an- gelic purity — frail human nature being left out of his moral make-up — will be the last to speak and boast of it. Lafay- ette was ever the hei'ald of his own virtues, and in sounding their praises he opened his mouth as wide as a public crier. " Je vous jure," he wrote in June, 1789, " que dans les douze ans de ma vie publique, si j'ai fait beaucoup de fautes, je n'ai pas eu un moment dont je ne m'applaudisse, et parmi les fautes que j'ai faites il y en a beaucoup que je dois a la prudence d'autrui." Happy France ! Things were being set to rights by this immaculate man, into whose ears even the whisperings of ambition tried to worm their way in vain. In a letter to the Due de Liancourt, which must have been written in the second half of August, 1789, he says : ' ' Ma situation est bien etrange. Je suis dans une grande 136 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. been the principal and ultimate effect of Mirabeau's castigations, accompanied, as they were, by earnest entreaties. He would have confessed to himself that he, too, was indeed far from being spotless, and in the consciousness of his own shortcomings he would have found the moral courage to silence the protests of his self-righteous virtuousness, and for the country's sake to lock arms with the giant, though, as a contemporary says, his face was punctured not only by the small-pox, but also by vice. More than once Lafayette was on the point of doing it, but at the last moment the promptings of his nobler qualities were always overcome by the insinuating sophisms of his smaller self. And he not only drew back, but he drew back in a way which proved that even as to fundamental principles, his virtue was not entirely flawless. "Let M. de Lafayette name a single occasion when I have not done more than I had promised him ; let him name a single one, when lie has not failed to keep his word with me, and I consent to declare our accounts avanture, et je jouis de penser que j'en sortirai, sans avoir eu meme un mouvernent ambitieux a me reprocher, et apres avoir mis tout le monde a sa place, je me retirerai avec le quart de la fortune que j'avais en entrant dans le monde."— Mem. de Lafayette, I. 307, 272, 276; edit. 1837-39. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 137 balanced." T On the 3d of October, 1790, Mirabeau charged La Marck to send this message by Se'gur to Lafayette, and neither the general, nor Segur, nor any of his other friends has ever been able to refute the accusation that he repeatedly did go back upon his solemn engagements with Mirabeau. Nobody will contend that the moral repulsion, with which Lafayette tried to justify his conduct towards Mirabeau, 2 was either feigned or without cause. But unless Lafayette knew of a hand equally skilful and strong, he could neither as a statesman nor as a patriot justify his pushing away this one because there were some ugly stains on it. And he never even pretended that he knew of such a hand, except his own, and history gives, no doubt, full answer to the question, how far that was equal to the task. Besides, how could a can- did man, who felt such an unconquerable moral re- pulsion, write to the object of this moral repulsion : " Mutual confidence and friendship, that is what I 1 Corresp., II. 208. La Marck writes Nov. 9, 1790, to Mercy- Argenteau : " sa (Lafayette's) mauvaise foi egale son incapacite." lb., II., 300. 2 "Lafayette eut des torts avec Mirabeau, dont rimrnor- talite le choquait . . . il ne pouvait s'empecher dc ltd temoigner une mesestime qui le blessait ... On craignit mes repugnances pour son immoralite." — Memoires du Gen- eral Lafayette, II. 3G7. 138 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. give and expect." 1 No, not the moral repulsion, but something else was really unconquerable. Lafayette writes in his Memoirs in regard to Mirabeau's wish to be elected President of the Assembly for the " Federation " festival of July 14, 1790 : " Lafayette, without offering any opposition to his being President on another occasion, wished for this one a virtuous patriot, and he said so frank- ly." Now, either Mirabeau deserved the uncon- querable moral repulsion, and then he was never worthy to occupy the chair of the Assembly, or he was, his moral taints notwithstanding, worthy to occupy the chair of the Assembly, and then the unconquerable moral repulsion overshot the mark. But, apart from this, Lafayette's nice distinction would have been plausible, if the occasion had been simply a patriotic festival without any political import, and if Mirabeau had merely intended to serve some personal ends. The general was, how- ever, aware that neither was the case. He knew that Mirabeau wanted to improve the unique 1 Corresp., I. 413. Oct. 29, 1789. It is besides deserving of notice that according to his own confession the moral scales he himself used in politics were none too sensitive. He writes : " Je me suis souvent servi d'instruments qu'il faudra bientot briser. J'ai tout essaye excepte la guerre civile."— Mem., I. 272 ; edit. 1837-39. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 139 opportunity to blow the dying embers of loyalty into a flame, which might have given again some solidity to the 1 (leaking rivets of the tottering- throne. And this opportunity Lafayette would not let him have, not because he was illoyal, not because he was consciously striving for a republic, but because he himself wanted to cut the most prominent figure on the occasion — because he wanted to be, what Mirabeau declared him to be, " the rival " of the kino-. 1 And if he wanted to O outshine the king, the thought that he might be outshone by Mirabeau was, of course, utterly un- bearable to him. These are not conjectures. His vanity was too great to allow him to refrain from proclaiming it with his own lips in a most offensive manner. When Frochot asked him his reasons for objecting to Mirabeau alone as President, he replied : " Mirabeau behaves too badly towards me ; I have vanquished the King of England in his power, the King of France in his authority, the people in its fury ; T shall certainly not yield the place to Mirabeau." 2 " These words show," re- marked Mirabeau, k * how far he is possessed of tin' secret of his smallness and the weight of his van- ity." Indeed, a crushing weight. Vanity is to 1 Corresp., II. 26. 2 lb., II. 54. 140 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. such a degree the dominant trait of his character that to it more than to anything else it is due that, apart from his American debut, all the unparalleled opportunities offered him by the strangest coin- cidence of circumstances are invariably cast away, 1 frequently even turning his good qualities and high aspirations into direct means for inflicting the greatest injuries upon his country. Even his staunch friend and admirer, Jefferson, is compelled to charge him with "a canine appetite for popu- larity," 2 and Lafayette himself directly endorses this judgment by speaking of " the delicious sen- sation of the smile of the multitude." But there were yet other defects in Lafayette's intellectual and moral make-up, which rendered it 1 Bouille characterizes him thus: "Je redoutais son car- actere mefiant et dissimule, plus que son ambition, que j'aurais desire voir satisfaite, s'il avait voulu sauver le roi, la monarchie et sa patrie, en arretant la l-evomtion au point ou elle etait alors (Oct., 1789), eten etablissant un gouverne- ment sur des bases et sur des principes solides et convenables a la France et au genie de ses peuples. M. de Lafayette le pouvait ; il etait le seul horn me qui eut alors assez de force et de puissance ; mais il avait de Fambition, sans le carac- tere et le genie necessaires pour la diriger : elle se reduisait au desir de faire du bruit dans le monde et de faire parler de lui. Ce n' etait pas un homme mechant, et encore moins scelerat ; mais il etait au-dessous, je pense, de la grande cir- constanceouilsetrouvait." — Mem. de Bouille, 85. 2 Jefferson to Madison, Jan. 30, 1787. Jefferson's Works, II. 108. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 141 imperative upon Mirabeau to exert himself inces- santly and to the utmost to effect his overthrow, when the negotiations for an alliance came to naught. He never tires in his Notes to the Court of analyzing the reasons which must make every day another step towards perdition, so long as one does not muster courage to shake off this incubus. If he had never written anything else, these criti- cisms upon Lafayette's character, the nature of his power, and the inevitable consequences of the two, separately and combined, would secure him a place among the keenest and most penetrating political thinkers and observers of all times. Though La Marck is right in saying : " There are 2,000 causes for a single effect," x the history of the revolution becomes surprisingly lucid, if one but fully grasps the leading facts constituting the main working causes. Among these, however, Lafay- ette and the nature of his power are unquestionably of the very first rank, and as to all the principal points, Mirabeau understood the man as well as 1 lis position so completely, that all the researches of history have only served to corroborate his judgment. Ever since the 5th of October, Mirabeau calls 1 Aug. 23, 1791. Corresp., III. 178. 142 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. him " dictator " and points out that his dictator- ship is of the worst kind imaginable, because it is merely a fact and therefore uncontrolled by the consciousness of responsibility. This was all the more a danger which it was impossible to overesti- mate, because to this man a real dictatorship would have been as much a horror, as he delighted in this counterfeit of it. To be called and to fancy him- self dictator and really to be one to the extent not only of being more powerful than any one else, but also of being indirectly 1 able to prevent every- body else from doing what he did not want to be done, that was the acme of his ambitious cravings. But though he valued this ten times more than his life, he would ten times rather risk losing it all, than formally and officially to assume the supreme direction with immortal glory at the end of the narrow and rugged path, but the spectre of per- dition grinning up to him from the precipices on the left and on the right. Not only his physical courage and his own belief in the intensity and per- fect honesty of his lofty sentiments and aspirations are above suspicion ; as to the negative side also his moral courage must be acknowledged to have been 1 By the agency of those upon whom the official responsi- bility rested. THE FREN'CH REVOLUTION. 143 of a high order. But as to the positive moral courage, which, in mighty political and social up- heavals is the most indispensable requisite of a man in a leading position, lie was most lamentably defi- cient. In the garb of extreme favor fate was, in fact, very cruel to him, for it thrust him into a first-class role, and the essential elements for sus- taining in such times the part of a character was entirely forgotten by nature in his intellectual and moral equipment. On the 28th of April, Mirabeau wrote to Lafa- yette : "In the midst of so many dangers I forget the greatest : the inaction of the only man who could prevent them. But, undoubtedly, this dicta- torship is not to consist in doing nothing." 1 No, not exactly, but, as I already intimated, worse than that : his doings were confined to preventing others from doing what ought to have been done. This he did most effectually, for, as La Marck said: " Insufficient in the great things, this man is very adroit in the small ones." 2 One would, however, do him wrong by supposing that his barring the way to others was entirely due to the irrepressible jealousy of his vanity. To a great extent it sprang from the same cause that was at the bottom of his 1 Corresp., II. 3. lb., II. 285. 144 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. doing nothing himself. Mirabeau calls him " rhomme aux indecisions, the man of indecisions. 1 He ever at the same time wills and wills not, never willing so clearly and so resolutely that he feels it to be an imperative necessity and peremptory duty to act up to his will. The more momentous the question, the surer it is that he will either try to get off with the semblance of acting, or come to a dead halt in his acting, ere it becomes decisive. " Decis- ion," however, as Mirabeau told him, " is what we need the most and the only means of salvation." And, like all men who lack this quality, he tried to make up for his own deficiency by consulting other people to such an extent that bad was ren- dered worse — especially as he took good care to ask advice only where he was sure that the answer would not be wholly distasteful. To his face Mirabeau severely reproved him for his proneness to surround himself exclusively with men who, though not without merit in some respects, are after all only second and third class and utterly unfit for the tasks to be performed, because " not 1 Corresp., II. 34. On the 24th of October, 1789, La Marck writes to Mirabeau : " II est tout a fait a vous, et il le serait efncacement s'il savait, non pas etre decide, rnais conserver la decision dans laquelle il est laisse chaque fois qu'on lui a parle de vous comme j'en pense." — Corresp., I. 402. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 145 one of them knows the men and the countrv, not one of them knows the affairs and the things. Marquis, our time, our revolution, our circum- stances resemble in nothing what was ; neither by esprit, nor by memory, nor by social qualities can one to-day conduct oneself; only by the combina- tions of meditation, the inspiration of genius, the omnipotence of character." 1 It would be difficult to imagine a worse com- bination of qualities for a dictator, and the nature of Lafayette's power was such that an absolutely fatal crop of consequences had inevitably to spring from it. Mirabeau says in his Note of June 1st, 1790, to the court: "Lafayette derives his force from the confidence which he inspires in his army (?'. e., the national guard of Paris). He inspires this con- fidence only because he seems to share the opinions of the multitude. But as it is not he who dictates these opinions — for of all cities in the kingdom it is Paris where public opinion, directed by a mass of writers and a still greater mass of other lights, is the least at the power of one man — it follows that Lafayette, who has acquired his influence only by singing to the tune of Paris, will always be forced, 1 Corresp., II. 20. 1(» 146 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. iii order to preserve it, to follow the torrent of the multitude. What barrier could he oppose to it ? — -Will a general of national guards not soon be without soldiers and without power, if his princi- ples are not those of his army? — -It is, therefore, easy to foresee, what his conduct will always be. To fear and flatter the people ; to share its errors from hypocrisy and from interest ; to sustain the most numerous party, whether it be right or wrong ; to frighten the court by popular movements, which he will have concerted, or which he will cause to be apprehended in order to render himself nec- essary ; to prefer the public opinion of Paris to that of the rest of the kingdom, because he does not derive his force from the provinces — that is the often culpable and always dangerous circle, in which he must needs be compelled to move — that is his whole destiny." " Though not a demagogue this man will there- fore be formidable to the royal power so long as the public opinion of Paris, of which he can only be the instrument, Avill make it a law unto him. Now supposing that the kingdom returns to sounder ideas on true liberty, the city of Paris will be the last to change principles, for it is the deepest steeped in radicalism. Therefore it is of all citi- THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 147 zens, Lafayette, upon whom the king can count the least. . . " What would it then mean to compose the cabinet of men devoted to Lafayette? — They would strive to make the whole kingdom con- form itself to Paris, while the only means of salva- tion is to bring Paris to its senses by the king- dom. . . At the same time slave and despot, sub- ject and master, he would be the most formidable tyrant." 1 On the 15th of September, Mirabeau summed up this reasoning in a few words : " All powerful for doing harm, Lafayette is and must become more and more powerless to prevent it." 2 Five days before he had already written : " It is possi- ble that the shame of tolerating an insurrection in the presence of an army of 30,000 men will drive Lafayette some day to fire upon the people. Well, he thereby would wound himself mortally. Would the people, who have demanded the head of M. Bouille for having fired upon revolting soldiers, forgive the commander of the national guard after a combat of citizens against citizens? " 3 And in November, when the mob vented its wrath 1 Corresp., II. 27-20. 2 lb., II. 182. 3 lb., II. 171. 148 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. upon the residence of M. de Castries for his having wounded in a duel Charles de Lameth, Mirabeau dryly remarked : " This man," I said to myself, " who sees this house devastated as a simple spec- tator, will have neither the force nor the influence, if it become necessary to save the kins'." * Every one of these assertions has been borne out by the facts — every one of these predictions has been fulfilled to the letter. To determine correctly the responsibility that rests upon Lafayette personally, the question must, of course, be propounded and answered, how far the vicious nature of his power resulted from circumstances over which he could exercise no control. Mirabeau did not fail to see that this was to a very considerable extent the case. If he had been heard betimes and his advice had been fol- lowed implicitly, this would have been different. It is one of the earliest and most momentous cases, in which infinite harm resulted from his achieving but half a victory. To his motion of July 8, 1789, concerning an ad- dress against the concentration of troops, had been attached the motion, to request the king " to order that in the cities of Paris and Versailles civic 1 Corresp., II. 341 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 140 guards be at once levied, which, under the orders of the king, will be amply sufficient to maintain public order and tranquillity." 2 An overwhelm- ing majority voted for the address, but an over- whelming majority also adopted the amendment of Gaulthier de Biauzat to strike out all that related to the formation of civic guards. As soon as the dis- missal of Necker became known in Paris, the gravity of this blunder became apparent. After the mischief was done, which Mirabeau had intended to prevent, the civic guard was organized, but in spite of the horrors which had preceded and followed the storming of the Bastille, half of his advice remained even then unheeded. In what manner he proposed to have the guard put " under the orders of the king," cannot be said to a certainty- It is, how- ever, probable that his idea was, pursuant to a suggestion from Duroveray, to have the officers appointed by the government. 2 The government was allowed no direct influence whatever upon it, and the consequence was that the national guard, gradually but steadily, lost its original character. 1 GEuvres, I. 308. 2 Lafayette, on the contrary, warned the electors of Paris on the 14th of July, " de se deiier des officiers generaux que le gouvernement mettrait a la itte de la milice bourgeoise." — Proces-verbal des electeurs, I. 405. 150 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. From an instrument to maintain the government of the law, it was changed more and more into an instrument for promoting the revolution, radical- ism, and, ultimately, the undisputed sway of the sovereign mob and its demagogical leaders. " One can hardly imagine," writes Mirabeau on the anni- versary of the portentous victory of the Paris mob in Versailles, "how much the petty vanity to be armed, to have a uniform, to plaj r at soldier, to make oneself noticeable, to obtain a command, and, above all, a kind of impunity, have contributed towards rendering the French heads revolution- ary." 1 And in the great Memoir of December, 1790, he declares that, "in an infinite number of respects the national guard of Paris " is to be con- sidered "an obstacle to the re-establishment of order. Most of its chiefs are members of the Jacobins, and, carrying the principles of this so- ciety among their soldiers, they teach them to obey the people as the paramount authority. This troop is too numerous to acquire a corps spirit ; too closely connected with the citizens ever to dare to resist them ; too strong to leave the smallest chance to the royal authority ; too Aveak to oppose itself to a great insurrection ; too easily corrupted, 1 Corresp., II. 213. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 1 5 1 not in the aggregate, but individually, not to be an instrument ever ready to the hands of the fac- tions ; too conspicuous by its apparent discipline not to give the tone to the other national guards of the kingdom, with which its chief has the infatua- tion to correspond ; finally, too ambitious not to render the formation of a military household of the king very difficult." 1 Here again the history of the revolution is a running commentary upon his assertions, fully bearing out every one of them. The national guard, which, if organized before the storming of the Bastille and upon sound princi- ples, might have done so much towards awaken- ing, propagating, and enforcing a proper under- standing of true liberty, became indeed one of the main obstacles to the re-establishment of order, be- cause, as with its chief, the power for doing mis- chief increased as fast as that of preventing it diminished. There was only this difference in the two cases, that his race was run much sooner than that of the national guard. When his eyes were partly opened to the fact, where he had helped to lead the country, and when he earnestly, though with no more political discernment and positive courage than before, tried to reverse the wheels, ••Curivsp., II. 418. 152 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. the national guard just entered upon that phase of its downward evolution, which commenced by its being the conscious and willing ally of the rabble, and ended by its being itself the organized rabble. To understand fully the import of this portent- ous evolution, it must be borne in mind that at the time France had virtually no army. " Since it has learned the public law, the army is no longer an army," Mirabeau wrote to La Marck a few days after the mob had forced the king to transfer his residence to Paris. 1 As early as the 8th of July he had warned the government that this would be the effect of " electrifying ' the troops ' by the con- tact with the capital and interesting them in our jDolitical discussions." 2 The National Assembly was not slow to endorse the reproofs administered to the government, but it had no ear for the equally emphatic warning that this was at least as great a danger to the liberty it proposed to establish, as to the crown. Soon, however, this became so appar- ent that it passed a formal vote of thanks to BoiiiHe", when he argued the question with the rebellious regiments at Nancy with powder and lead. But though in an emergency the Assembly still mustered sufficient courage to eulogize some- 1 Oct. 16, 1789. Corresp., I. 383. « CEuvres, I. 304. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 153 body else for daring to do the right thing, it was much too faint-hearted to draw itself the logical conclusions of the fact that as it was told by Mira- beau, " with an army without discipline public peace cannot exist." 1 It did not want to under- stand that, as a little water is but fuel to a o-reat fire, " special decrees for every particular insurrec- tion" were worse than worthless. How could the systematic and heroic cure proposed by Mirabeau — disbanding of the whole army for the purpose of reorganizing it at once upon the basis of an ade- quate oath — meet with any favor in an Assembly, which accompanied with demonstrations of dis- pleasure his declaration that, to counteract the ill use made by the people of the rights of man, a dec- laration of the duties of every citizen had become necessary ! In the address of the 9th of July lie had made the Assembly say : " Sire, we are always ready to obey you, because you command in the name of the laws . . . our very fidelity orders us to resist," if your agents were to do violence to the laws. 2 This was sound doctrine in a state that proposed to establish a government of law. But it was a most monstrous doctrine, if it was virtually inter- • CEuvres, IV. 10. -'lb., I. 315. 154 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. pretecl to the effect that only the king and his agents should be bound by the laws. In theory and in practice the people and their representatives had to be as implicitly subject to them, and this was, in the nature of things, impossible to attain, unless the laws entrusted to the government the means required for executing the laws. Every month this was more lost sight of, by the people as well as by the Assembly. As the revolution recognized the people as the source of the law, the logic of the masses, armed with the rights of man as the supreme law, concluded that they, in their quality of people, were superior to the law ; and the Assembly, though not formally and expressly endorsing this claim as the Convention was to do, rendered the complete realization of the doctrine inevitable, by acting upon the principle that to es- tablish liberty the government must above all be debarred from being a government. " Take care " — Mirabeau warned them in the debate on the right of peace and war — " take care that, by carrying the distrust of the moment into the future (*. s propreslumieres, d'autres barrieres que sa propre volonte. En se constituant cor) is unique, il est privo Tavantage de se controler lui-meme, etde murir dans son scin ses propres deliberations." Nou- veau coup d'ceil sur la sanction royale.— Mem. VI. 443, 444. 1 (Euvres, II. 93, 96, 99, 100, 114. 160 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. worse than no veto power at all would have been, for while it did not give the king the power, which Mirabeau demanded for him in the interest of the people, it compelled him to make himself per- sonally the target of the unbridled passions and sinister demagogy. But not the king alone had to pay dearly for Mirabeau's defeat. The history of the veto ques- tion is one of the strongest proofs that the Assem- bly was the victim of a gross delusion in believing, that to break down the power of the executive was identical with increasing and confirming its own power. With Lafayette, the ministers, and the Assembly, the decisive argument was the wrath of Paris. Not the Assembly, but the clamor of the unreasoning masses instigated by irresponsible agitators, virtually decided the ques- tion. The Assembly was already far on the high- road towards rendering " the legislator himself," as Mirabeau said, " nothing but a slave, who is obeyed when he pleases, and will be dethroned, if he shock the impulse which he has given." 1 In this case the government, the commander-in- chief of the national guard, the Assembly, and the people had united in breaking the shield, with 1 Corresp., II. 445. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 161 which Mirabeau tried to protect at the same time the king, the Assembly, and the people. In other questions of equal import he was compelled in a way to lead them himself, with open eyes, towards the precipice. Thus, above all, in regard to the assignats. It is as undeniable that to him more than to any one else it was due that the Assembly attempted by this means to avert bankruptcy, as it is certain that among the levers, with which France was precipitated into the abyss of terror, this device was one of the most powerful. To acknowledge this is, however, by no means to admit that the responsibility for its having this effect rests upon him. " To-day bankruptcy, hideous bankruptcy is there ; it threatens to consume you, your pros- perity, your honor — and you deliberate ! " 1 Thus Mirabeau closed his wonderful improvisation for instantly voting the extraordinary income tax of 25 per cent, demanded by the government, and the vast hall seemed to shake under the convulsive applause elicited by the overpowering fervor of his patriotic appeal. 2 Was bankruptcy afterwards 1 (Euvres, II. 187. 2 In a sense it hardly can be called an improvisation. Nearly two years before, in a letter addressed to Montmorin ii 162 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. less hideous, less dangerous ? Did the facts not prove with really terrible impressiveness that this one word contained, as he asserted, all calamities, all horrors, that of national dishonor included? And if so, was it then not right, nay an impera- tive duty to have recourse to assignats, although he knew them to be a seed, which might be event- ually turned into dragon teeth? Yes, he knew that full well. Although he saw and laid stress upon the fact that the assignats were most effect- ive weapons against the enemies of the revolution, because whoever owned an assignat had a personal interest in upholding it, 1 he avowed that the measure had at first "frightened" him, 2 and in his 28th Note to the Court he wrote : " Can one guarantee the success of the assignats ? I answer frankly, no. One can guarantee nothing in a kingdom like France, and above all in circum- stances, when so many different passions and so (Nov. 20. 1787), he had hurled as withering denunciations against bankruptcy contemplated at the time by the gov- ernment as a means to obviate the necessity of calling the States-General. " Deshonores au dehors, furieux au dedans, en derision aux autres, en horreura nous-m ernes, dangereux seulement a nos chefs, tels nous allons etre, si le roi montre seulement l'intention de manquer a ses engagements." See the whole letter.— Mem. IV. 468-477. ] CEuvres, IV. 61, 78. 2 lb., IV. 50. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 163 many prejudices are engaged in perpetual com- bats." * But on the other hand he again and again insists that one is in the vice of stern neces- sity — that there is no choice. 2 And neither then nor ever afterwards has a single one of those, who have condemned him, been able to refute this assertion or even but attempted to say, what else could have been done. Nor is there, so far as he is concerned, any force whatever in the argument that, while bankruptcy would have been a terrible calamity in 1789 and 1790, it became a hundred- fold more terrible calamity by being staved off for some years by means of the assignats. The fact is undeniable, but he cannot with any color of justice be held responsible for it. No man in the Assembly had a fuller and correcter conception of the overshadowing importance of the financial question, and therefore also no man insisted earlier, more strenuously, and more persistently, upon its being treated in a comprehensive and systematic way. 3 But he preached to deaf ears. He compared the emission of assignats to the treatment of skilful physicians who, though they 1 Corresp., II. 155. 2 CEuvres, IV. 83, 84, 85, 122, 123, ITS. 3 lb., III. 86,87. 164 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. do not cure, prolong life by fighting the most immediate cause of clanger, and thereby procure a chance for the healing forces of nature to assert themselves. 1 The Assembly acted as if it deemed the emission of assignats the financial salvation of the state. He said : " The interregnum of the laws is the reign of anarchy." 2 The Assembly, in a hundred ways, protracted and aggravated the interregnum of the laws. He, conforming himself to the ever-changing circumstances, devised means after means that could be made conducive to a condition of things, which would render it pos- sible to improve the prolongation of life attained by the assignats to initiate by political sanitation the gradual economical sanitation. The Assembly not only refused to do whatever would have made them fit means for a great end, but it and its suc- cessors directly perverted them into a most effica- cious means to thwart his ultimate end : the re- establishment of a real government. To hold him responsible for the mischief wrought by the assignats has about as much sense as to charge the crimes of the Inquisition to the teachings of Christ. Was he equally blameless as to the equally per- 1 CEuvres, IV. 76. * lb., IV. 28. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 165 nicious consequences of his half-victories in the church question? It is cercainly impossible to prove it, and even to make it plausible would be a very hard task. He saw from the first that the Assembly, in taking up the question in the manner it did, inflicted a wound upon the revolution so deep and so malignant, that it might easily prove fatal ; and his later systematic efforts to entangle the Assembly more inextricably in the suicidal polic}-, were a part of his general plan to discredit it for the purpose of opening a way to a wholesome reaction. 1 For these two facts there is positive and irrefutable proof in abundance, and they go far towards proving that his guilt cannot be as great as it appears at first sight. But they are surely not sufficient to exonerate him completely. 1 Corresp., II. 365, 366, 367, ff. He writes, Jan. 27, 1791 : " Voila line plaie toute nouvelle, mais la plus envenimee de toutes, qui va ajouter encore un foyer de gangrene a tons ceux qui rongent, corrodent et dissolvent le corps politique : nous nous etions fait un roi-effigie, sans pouvoir ; et un corps legislatif qui adminstre, qui informe, qui juge, qui recom- pense, qui punit, qui fait tout, excepte ce qu'il doit faire. A present nous arrangeons, le schisme religieux a cote defend it.*' In reply to La March's answer accepting the trust, he wrote: "1 assure you that my courage is greatly revived by the thought thai a man like you will not suffer that I be entirely misjudged. I shall It 17 168 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. either soon go hence, or I shall leave in your hands noble elements of vindication." 1 Now, whatever else Mirabeau may have been, an idiot he was not. It is, therefore, patent, that either those must be guilty of an absurdity, who consider him convicted of revolting depravity by the fact in itself of his having entertained clandestine relations with the court, or that his moral vision must have been so abnormal that he, in good faith, mistook black for white. A moment's reflection ought to convince any one, that not the moral, but the historical vision of those severe judges is most strangely obfuscated. France was engaged in a revolution, but who- ever intimated that this revolution was anti-mo- narchical, was at the time universallv hooted down as a base calumniator. But if the revolution was not intended to be anti-monarchical, how then could it be incompatible to be at the same time a sincere revolutionist and the adviser of the crown ? As to Mirabeau it is manifestly nonsensi- cal to assert such an incompatibility, for we have heard him declare before the States-General met, that he was determined to be " very monarchical." He simply was true to his word. The fact in 1 Corresp. , I. 23. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. Lli'J itself, that he acted as adviser of the crown, does not cast a shadow of a shadow upon him. That, however, is not saying that he was blameless. But whether he was guilty and, if so, what the character and the extent of his guilt was, depends entirely on the answers that must be given to the following two questions : what were his motives for advising the court, and what advice did he give? Or to put them into a more definite form : was he a mercenary and a recreant to the political convictions he still publicly professed ? The two questions cannot be separated. To form an intel- ligent opinion and judge fairly, all the facts con- stituting the case and having a bearing upon it, must be known and considered in their connection as a whole. Mirabeau received money from the king. That is an established fact. An equally undeniable fact, however, is, that for generations public opinion — and more especially that of the upper classes — considered it a matter of course, that anybody who had a chance to get money from tin; king should improve it. If we want to be just judges, we must keep this well in mind, because Mirabeau, like every historical personage, has to be judged by the standard of his and not of our times. 170 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. Mercy d'Argenteau, the Austrian ambassador, and La Marck were men not only of spotless, but of most scrupulous honor, and while they were per- fectly familiar with the laxity of Mirabeau's moral principles in money and other questions, the thought never entered their heads that the fact of his taking money from Louis XVI. could in the opinion of any one throw the slightest reflection upon him. Nor were they altogether wrong, even if he be weighed on the more sensitive scales of our times, for he was paid for work done and services rendered. And the work was not only very considerable, but it also involved no small outlay for paying collaborators, agents, clerks. If Mirabeau had received nothing, he would have given not only his time, but also his money to the king. That was not only more than anybody had a right to expect from him ; he could not have done it for the simple reason that he had no money. It is true : by the death of his father he had become the legal owner of a fair fortune, though the old Marquis had made his second son the principal heir — the legal owner of a fair fortune, but he had by no means come also into actual possession of it. The great economist had left his affairs in such a tangled condition, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 171 that unless Mirabeau withdrew entirely from politics and devoted himself for some time wholly to his private interests, he remained exactly in his former condition, i. prince), on a peur d'avoir peur.'" Six days later : " II a la purete d'un enfant, mais il en a la faiblesse." And on the 27th of Jan., 1790 : " Ce qui est au- dessous de tout, c'est Monsieur.'" 1 — Corresp., 486, 440, 460. 176 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. embittered and discouraged. In the Assembly he spoke but seldom and in his letters he repeatedly complained of being tired and feeling bored. He, who had thus far always taken the initiative, had no hand in bringing about the change in his rela- tions to the court. He was even wholly unaware that a change was contemplated, until he was in- formed that on the part of the court it was a fixed resolution. In March, 1790, LaMarck, who since the middle of December was in Belgium, received an invita- tion from Count Mercy to return to Paris on ac- count of matters of importance. He at once com- plied, arriving in Paris on the 16th. His first in- terview with Mercy took place on the 18th. He expected to be interrogated on the Belgian affairs. Mercy, however, forthwith began to speak of his relations to Mirabeau and ended by requesting him to serve as mediator between the king and the great tribune. La Marck consented under the condition that Mercy should himself see Mirabeau and take part in the negotiations. As Mercy could not divest himself of his quality of Austrian ambassador he, very naturally, was loath to do so. In consequence of this difficulty the matter was allowed to rest for a fortnight. A second inter- THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 177 view in the beginning of April resulted in Mercy's consenting secretly to meet Mirabeau in La Marck's house. The conversation ran entirely upon the political situation of France, but Mirabeau was given no intimation as to the ultimate purpose of his friend and the ambassador. Mercy, highly pleased with Mirabeau, told La Marck in leaving, that the queen wished to see him the next day. Marie Antoinette, who at the end of September or in the first days of October, 1789, had told La Marck : " I trust we shall never be so unfortu- nate as to be reduced to the painful extremity of having recourse to Mirabeau," 1 now commenced the conversation by informing him, that for two months the king and she had been thinking of entering into connection with Mirabeau. After a while they were joined by the king and it was agreed, that La Marck should broach the subject to Mirabeau and invite him. to submit his views on it in writing to the king. Mirabeau received the overtures with a transport of delight. The idea, as La Marck savs, " to be at last enabled to be use- ful to the king," elated him so highly that, carried away by his sanguine temperament, the fearful obstacles in his way were, for the moment, dwarfed 1 Corresp., I. 107. L2 178 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. almost into insignificance. In a letter, dated May 10 th and addressed to the king, he gave, briefly and succinctly, as he himself terms it, " the pro- fession of faith which the king has desired," declar- ing : " This writing will forever be either m} r judg- ment or my witness." This letter was for some time in the hands of the king, and as yet not a word had been said about money either by Mira- beau, or to him, or even between La Marck and Mercy. Mirabeau had bound himself in a way which, as La Marck justly says, " was to stake his head," without knowing whether they intended to give him a copper for it. Is that the way a man acts who means to sell himself and whose political and general conscience is in his pocket? The first to speak of money were the queen and the king, after telling La Marck that the letter of May 10th was wholly satisfactory to them, and from Mercy came the suggestion to pay his debts, in order to enable him to give his time entirely, and without being molested by his creditors, to the great affairs of state. When La Marck asked Mirabeau, to give him the figure of his debts, he very characteristically replied that he knew noth- ing about it, and when he had ascertained that they amounted to 208,000/, he dolefully said, that the THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 179 king could never think of paying so much. Louis engaged to do that, paid him beside 6,0001. a month for his current expenses, and gave to La Marck four promissory notes, each for 250,000/, to be paid after the close of the National Assembly, in case Mirabeau had been true to his promises. What were these promises and how were they kept? If Mirabeau's accusers can convict him in re- gard to these two questions, it can, of course, avail him but little that as to the money question, he was by far not as black as they would make one believe. On the other hand, if they cannot make out a case against him in regard to these two questions, it is evident that, though his relations with the court were surely not altogether free from blame, his own opinion of them must be in the main correct. Would it be surprising if that should be the re- sult of an impartial examination of the facts ? If any man was not disposed to judge him too leniently it was Lafayette, and even he did him the justice to testify : " Mirabeau was not inac- cessible to money, but for no amount would he have sustained an opinion that would have destroyed liberty and dishonored his mind." 1 If I were asked, what chapter of his whole history 1 Memoires, II. 3G7. 180 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. redounds, upon the whole, the most to his honor, not only as a statesman, but also as a man, I should unhesitatingly answer : that of his rela- tions to the court. The " profession of faith " 1 is preceded by the declaration, that his repugnance to playing farther an active part would be invincible, " if I were not convinced, that the restoration of the legitimate authority of the king is the first need of France and the only means to save her." The sight of constantly growing anarchy, horror at the idea of having " contributed only to a vast demolition, and the fear to see another chief of the state than the king," imperiously bid him not to stay shut up " in the silence of contempt." Whatever else the king might have to expect from his secret coun- sellor, he certainly did not propose to mince mat- ters, but to be terribly plain-spoken. Or was it but the cheap trick of an audacious political jug- gler to tell the king to his face that nothing less than his crown was at stake ? Did he intend to excite exaggerated fears in order to make his ser- vices in averting them appear much greater than they really were ? The last sentences of the letter will answer this question in no uncertain way. 1 See the letter of May 10th.— Corresp., II. 11-13. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 181 The profession of faith itself is compressed into a single sentence : " I engage myself to serve with all my influence the true interests of the king ; and in order not to have this promise appear too vague, I declare that I believe a counter-revolution as dangerous and criminal, as I deem chimerical the hope or the project of any government in France without a chief, invested with all the neces- sary power to apply all the public force to the execution of the law." Another sentence expresses the same idea in other words : " I am as profoundly averse to a counter-revolution as to the excesses to which the revolution, fallen into the hands of bungling and perverse men, has conducted the people." Supposing, for argument's sake, that the king and the queen wanted him to assist them in re-establishing the royal absolutism, could they, after reading these lines, still believe that they had addressed themselves to the right man ? Surely, to declare the very idea of a counter-revolution " crim- inal," was a strange way of signifying one's will- ingness to become a traitor to the revolution. Mirabeau's accusers have ever deemed it super- fluous to show wherein his counsels to the king were a betrayal of his political past, because to them the assertion of compatibility between faith- 182 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. fulness to the revolution and serving the king is a self-evident absurdity : they see in it a contradiction in terms. Mirabeau was of exactly the opposite opinion. Because he was determined to be faithful to the revolution, he accepted the king's invitation and promised to serve him. In his very first Note to the court he expressly declared, that by doing so he did not shift his position by a hair's-breaclth. " I shall be what I always have been : the defender of the monarchical power regulated by the laws, and the apostle of liberty guaranteed by the mo- narchical power." 1 That was not merely the announcement that he would never turn traitor to the revolution. It was the formal declaration that he was not to be ex- pected to become in any respect or to any extent a tool. He promised to serve the king, but he explic- itly forewarned him that he would never become his servant — never be at his orders. " I know," he says in his 36th Note (October 24, 1790), defending himself against reproaches occasioned by the attitude he had assumed in regard to a certain question, " I know that I have promised everything, but have I promised anything, but to serve according to my principles? Shall 1 Corresp., II. 25. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 183 I deceive in order to please, or render myself useless in order to be faithful ? " 1 Faithful, as the court seemed to understand faithfulness. True faithfulness required him to serve only according to his principles, no matter how much this might displease the court. As early as the 27th of January, 1790, at the time of his relations to the Count de Provence, he had written to La Marck : " When they have not followed a single one of my advices, not improved a single one of my conquests, not turned to profit a single one of my operations, they complain, say that I have changed nothing in their position, that one cannot count very much upon me, and all that because I do not ruin myself with a light heart in order to sustain advices, things, and men, whose success would inevitably ruin them." 2 Even if he had intended and promised to serve the king primarily for his own sake, that would have been the only course consistent with the task he had assumed, for the whole agreement was based upon the idea of the superiority of his polit- ical judgment : he was to guide, and not to go as he was bid. But he had, in fact, consented to serve the king, because he wanted to serve' 1 Corresp., II. 265. 2 lb., I. 460. 184 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. royalty, and royalty he wanted to serve, because he was convinced that to do so was to serve France. The court possibly still considered the three things identical, in the sense that the proper criterion for the true interests of royalty and of France was what the king deemed to be his interest. If so, the fault was not Mirabeau's. As early as Decem- ber 29, 1789, he had written to La Marck : " Only one thing is clear: they would like to find for their service amphibious beings who, with the talent of a man, have the mind of a lackey. They will irremediably be ruined by having fear of men and carrying always the petty repugnances and fragile attractions of another order of things into this, where what is strongest is not yet strong enough ; and where even if they were themselves very strong, they would still need, for the sake of public opinion, to surround themselves with strong people." 1 The man, whom his just indignation over the political imbecility, which frustrated all his exertions, drove to the excess of calling the king and queen "royal cattle" (betail), 2 would certainly not prostitute his talent and his man- hood to the extent of playing the part of a lackey. On the 4th of December, 1790, he told the king : 1 Corresp., I. 441. * lb., II. 237. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 185 " The question is no longer merely to save royalty, but to save the public cause and the kingdom." 1 To make this distinction was to announce that, if — by the fault of the king or without it— an in- compatibility between serving the king and sav- ing the public cause and the state should arise, he would no longer be found at his side. In the Memoir of the 15th of October, he had already declared this most explicitly and emphatically, directly to the royal family, and according to his radical friend Cabanis,he repeated this declaration shortly before his death in regard to the same eventuality, the flight of the king to the frontier, substituting, however, for the " denunciation " of which, he had given notice in the Memoir, the an- nouncement that he would " cause the throne to be declared vacant and the republic proclaimed." 2 1 Corresp., II. 382. 2 " J'ai def endue la monarchie jusqu'aubout ; je la defends meme encore que je la crois perdue, parce qu'il dependrait du roi qu*elle ne le flit point, et que je la crois encore utile ; mais s'il part, je monte a la tribune, je fais declarer le trone vacant et proclamer la republique." (Corresp., I. 252.) La Marck insists that Mirabeau can have said no such thing, because, as we know, he declared again and again the depart- ure of the king an absolute necessity. I see no difficulty in reconciling this fact with the statement of Cabanis. That he writes simply " departs " certainly does not pi-eclude that Mirabeau spoke or, at least, only thought of a flight to the 186 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. To declare a counter-revolution " criminal " was absolutely devoid of sense, if he did not mean to serve the king only because and so far as the in- terest of the state required it. To arraign him for his relations to the court is, therefore, simply ab- surd, unless he can be convicted either of having changed his mind as to the criminality of a coun- ter-revolution, or of having defined the counter- revolution, which he deemed criminal so narrowly, that achievements of the revolution were to be sacrificed, which he had hailed or even declared indispensable. If the documents are studied, so to speak, only from the headings, it seems easy to convict him out of his own mouth of both charges. For a con- eastern frontier with a view to invoking the aid of foreign powers. La Marck's statement, that he communicated the result of his negotiation with Bouille to Mirabeau, and that he (Mirabeau) expressed himself satisfied with it, is also not incompatible with this opinion. The sounding of Bouille as to his willingness to aid the king in leaving Paris did not necessarily imply just such a flight, and La Marck does not say, that he told Mirabeau that it was this that was contem- plated. What Mirabeau says in the Memoir of the loth of October on this question, renders it an impossibility that he should have approved of such a plan as that, which the king afterwards tried to execute. Yet on June 4th, 1790, he writes to La Marck : " II ne faut, en aucun cas et sous aucun pretexte, etre ni confident, ni complice d'une evasion, et qu'un roi ne s'en va qu'en plein jour, quand c'est pour etre roi." — Corresp., II. 34. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 187 siderable time he goes to the length of contending that even a civil war might be resorted to to bring about the necessary reaction ; and the central idea of the great Memoir of December, 1790, is a thor- ough overhauling of the constitution and the systematic discrediting of the National Assembly, because unless it be ruined in the public estima- tion, the contemplated changes in the constitution cannot be effected. Thus he undeniably does ad- vocate a counter-revolution. But if we take the pains to read the whole Memoir, and not only to read, but also to study it, we see that he after all persists in his unqualified denunciation of a coun- ter-revolution by any illegitimate means, and, above all, by force of arms. Only in the legitimate way of revolutionizing, i. e., changing public opinion, does he want to bring about a counter-revolution. He is satisfied that this is likely, if not certain, to lead to an appeal to the ultima ratio. 1 But though he sets himself most resolutely against the idea of making the sword the arbiter between the king 1 In this respect his opinions change with the changing circumstances. In the December Memoir he again assumes the possibility of attaining the end without a civil war. His principal reason for thinking that eventually a civil war would be " a blessing in disguise " was, that it " est le seul moyen de redonner des chefs aux homines, aux partis, aux opinions." — Corresp., II. 137. 188 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. and the nation, the expectation that his policy will kindle a civil war, does not deter him from advo- cating it. Not the king against the nation, but the majority of the nation, headed by the king, fight- ing the minority, which by its factiousness and insane radicalism hurries France into perdition — that is the civil war he has in view. Closest alli- ance of the king with his people and sincere iden- tification of the king with the true spirit of the revolution — these two maxims remain to the last the main pillars on which the whole structure of his policy rests. The December Memoir enumerates what, in his opinion, not only ought to be preserved of the work of the revolution, but also will be preserved, whatever may befall France. This list and the remarks accompanying it not only prove that he never became recreant to his original faith, but they also show that, though he passed the severest judgmentr upon the political incapacity of the Assembly, he never lost sight of the fact that it had done enough for France to entitle it, in spite of everything, to eternal gratitude. Of the " de- structions " of the revolution, he says that " they are almost all equally beneficial to the nation and the monarch." " I mean by destructions, the aboli- THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 189 tion of all privileges, of all pecuniary exemptions, of feudalism, and of several disastrous taxes. I mean besides the destruction of the provincial bodies of the pays d'elats, of the parliaments, of the clergy and fief-holders as political bodies in the state. I, moreover, count among the great advan- tages to be preserved, the uniformity in the assess- ment of taxes, the principles of a more popular administration, the liberty but not the impunity of the press, the liberty of religious opinions, 1 respon- sibility of all agents of the executive power, admissibility of all citizens to all employs, a less arbitrary way of granting favors and pecuniary aid, and a stricter control in the administration of the public funds. In a word, I admit into my sys- tem the benefits of the revolution as well as the cardinal elements of the constitution. . . In fact, I consider all the achievements of the revolution and all that must be preserved of the constitu- tion as such irrevocable conquests that, unless the empire be dismembered, no subversion could destroy them. I even do not except an armed counter-revolution : if the kingdom be recon- 1 In the Assembly he had arduously contended against mere religious tolerance, insisting that the very word toler- ance implied an unwarrantable arrogation of power. 190 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. quered, the victor would, after all, have to com- pose with public opinion, to gain the good will of the people, to consolidate the destruction of abuses, to give the people a share in the legisla- tive power, 1 to let it choose its administrators. From this observation I draw this important con- clusion : if the advantages of the revolution and the true foundations of the constitution are inde- structible, it is of little consequence whether the National Assembly suffers in its popularity, in its force, in its credit ; the nation can only gain by it, because all the really useful decrees of this Assembly will survive it, and only its fall, whether it be slow or precipitate, will furnish the means to correct its work. Because this result is well assured, the true friends of liberty, those who pre- fer being the saviours of their country to the per- fidious popularity vouchsafing them some praise, can unite their efforts to attack the Assembly, and thereby fulfill their duties as great citizens." The royal authority alone cannot even attempt the reorganizing consolidation of the true revolution, i. e., the revolution confining itself to reform ; only in concurrence with an Assembly of the represent- atives of the people, i. e., in unison with the suc- 1 " Qu'il admit le peuple a la confection de la Ioi." THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 191 cessor of the National Assembly, can the arduous task be accomplished. Does this programme propose the revivification of the ancien rSgime in anything whatever ? Is anything lacking in it, that is essential to a truly liberal constitutional monarchy ? Is the method, by which the end is to be pursued, not that of a strictly orthodox constitutionalist ? It is neither possible nor necessary here to enter upon the details of his plan. La Marck and Mercy were full of admiration for the stupendous, all- embracing genius Mirabeau displayed in it, but at the same time they thought it too vast, too com- plicated, too dependent on an army of able and trusty agents whom it was impossible to find, and requiring too much time. All that was true enough. But while it is often comparatively easy to keep a leaky, storm-beaten ship afloat, if but the right thing be done at the right moment, the most skilful engineer cannot raise a sunken ship with- out great apparatus, the preparation and applica- tion of which is not an affair of days and weeks, but of months, if not }^ears. That was now the condition of things. The task confronting Mira- beau was no longer to keep the ship afloat, but to raise the sunken ship. It was not due to a lack 192 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. of skill or energy on his part, that she had sunk in spite of all his efforts. The hope that he would be able to save her had been revived in him by the unexpected overtures of the court, because he thought that he would now at last be put into a position to act. That was a gross delusion, and that he allowed himself, for a little while, to be betrayed into this delusion by the consciousness of his strength, spurred on alike by patriotism and am- bition, is the one mistake which can be justly laid to his charge. La Marck was not a genius, but a clear-headed, sober, and judicious observer. He had not hailed Mercy's communication as the dawn of morning. In his opinion they had already waited too long, and he frankly told not only Mercy, but also the king and the queen, that he greatly doubted whether Mirabeau would still be able to redress the harm he himself had helped to do. When the king announced that Mirabeau was not to be in communication with the ministers, and even en- joined the most scrupulous secrecy towards them in regard to the whole affair, the count's heart was almost as heavy as before Mercy had spoken to him. He very justly writes : " Did such means not look more like an intrigue than dexterous THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 193 and powerful measures, worthy of a government and commensurate to the proposed end ? " x In- stead of paving the way to the concert between the executive and legislative power, which Mira- beau deemed the primary condition for arresting the downward course, the king, by thus giving his relations to Mirabeau the character of an intrigue, only paralyzed the executive still more, by rendering unity of purpose, will, and action more than ever impossible. The king was not the government, and to advise the king was use- less or even worse than useless, unless he per- suaded or compelled the ministers to act as he wanted them to. With a man like Louis XVI., the one and the other was out of the question. If Mirabeau gained sufficient ascendency over him, to make him not only subordinate his own opinions to those of his counsellor, but also in a measure to stand up for these, the ministers, if they happened to hold different views, would only conclude from it that an irresponsible, and there- fore in a sense illegitimate, secret influence coun- teracted the influence, which, in consequence of their constitutional responsibility, they were not only entitled, but in duty bound to claim ; and 1 Corresp., I. 147. 13 194 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. such a well-founded suspicion was certainly not calculated to foster the proper relations between them and the king. If, in conformity with the tendencies prevailing in the Assembly, they were only too much inclined to antagonize rather than to serve the crown, any manifestations of such a concealed power behind the throne would be more than likely to drive them into conscious and systematic hostility. The king's being in favor of anything would become in itself a reason for opposing it, and thus the hapless monarch would be the more in danger of turning the best advice into new sources of calamity, the more implicitly he tried to conform to it. This must be fully understood, if justice is to be done to Mirabeau in regard to his truly desperate struggle against having men devoted to Lafayette called into the cabinet. There is no answer to what he wrote October 24th to the court : " One asks of me counsels which I would give uselessly, if I cannot concert with the ministers. Whether strong or weak in fencing, I must have some ground on which to plant my foot. There are many meas- ures, which neither the court nor I can execute, and which ministers in whom one could confide, might attempt with success and without danger. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 195 What confidence could I have in a cabinet, created, sustained, directed by my enemy ? " 1 At last a direct contact was established between him and Montmorin, that is to say, he was enabled to act through the minister, and in spite of the weakness of Montmorin's character, the connection was suf- ficiently fruitful to prove that in this way some- thing might be achieved. Mirabeau virtually directed the foreign relations, and but for him the war-cloud hovering on the horizon might easily have risen then. 2 1 Corresp., II. 264. 2 In the 28th Note of August 17, 1890, he writes in regard to the Spanish-English quarrel about the Nootka Sound, which threatened to drag France into a war with Great Brit- ain : " Si vous vous etes condamnes a un role passif a l'inte- rieur, pourquoi le ministere veut-il vous entrainer a un role actif a l'exterieur? Quelle detestable politique est done celle qui va droit a transporter sur Leurs Majestes la respon- sabilite qui ne peut que resulter d'une perilleuse alliance, d'une guerre desastreuse, ou il n'y a pas une seule chance de succes ? Comment ose-t-on proposer au roi de tenter pour l'Espagne ce qu'il n'ose pas pour lui-meme? Comment com- promet-on son existence dans une mauvaise partie qui n'est pas la sienne ? . . . lorsque l'anarchie est arrivee au dernier periode, ne f remit-on pas al'idee de remuer lesbrandons d'une querelle exterieure, qui ne peut qu'allumer une guerre gen- erale et vingt guerres civiles dans le royaume ? Tant d'inco- ln'-rence me passe, je l'avoue. Je suis stupefait de tant de faiblesse unie a tant d'audace, ct, laissant a votre habile ministere sa politique profonde, je suis trop loyal, je dois trop a Vos Majestes ce que ma conscience et mes lumieres 196 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. One minister, however, was no more the gov- ernment than the king was. In the main the character of Mirabeau's relations to the court remained unchanged ; in some respects it even looked more than before like an intrigue on account of one minister having become a party to it. So long as every possibility was withheld from Mirabeau to bring his superior mind and, above all, his superior will directly to bear upon the government as a whole, nothing was or could be gained. He himself, as La Marck very correctly says, had been before in all essentials a strenuous defender of monarchical principles. As to him- self, therefore, the court obtained by the May agreement only what it substantially had had from the beginning. In form, however, the change in his relations to the court was so radical, that to some extent inevitably even positive harm had to result from it, if in essence no corresponding change in his political position was effected. The change in form was of such a character, that it m'indiquent comme la verite, je suis trop avide du retablisse- ment de l'ordre, pour ne pas soutenir, dans le comite des affaires etrangeres, que nous ne pouvons nous meler que de nous-memes, et que nous ne devons chercher qu'a nous maintenir en paix avec quiconque est en paix avec nous." — To the last he remained of this opinion. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 197 compelled him to act as if a corresponding change in essence had taken place in his position, and this not being really the case, it forced him again and again into momentary changes of attitude, injur- ing 1 the court and detrimental to his influence O upon it. By insisting upon its remaining a secret to the cabinet, the king had implanted an element of untruthfulness into the relation, and untruth- fulness, as it rarely fails to do, yielded a rich crop of poisonous fruit. Mirabeau never knew what the court would do with his advice, and having to act perfectly in the dark, he could not always act consistently in his double role of secret adviser of the king and member of the Assembly. Experience soon taught him always to expect, that from indolence, weakness, or fear, the king would ultimately do what the ministers wanted him to do. But as representative, citizen, and patriot, he was not absolved from responsibility as to what was done by telling what ought to be done. His having assumed the latter obligation had only put him under heavier bonds as to that older and para- mount duty. Argument proving inefficient, he had to try compulsion, and compulsion could be exercised only by exciting fear. This he could 198 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. do any moment from the tribune of the Assembly, for every day offered not only an opportunity, but also a temptation to indulge in a flight of his revolutionary eloquence. Though he well knew that this was wielding a double-edged weapon, he did it more than once, and not only when he really had no other choice. The court compelling him to have recourse to it sometimes, his hot temper betrayed him into using it oftener and striking harder with it than, according to his own confession, he ought to have done. This secret connection with the court often acted upon him more as a lash than as a curb, for, on the one hand, as La Marck wrote to Mercy, " He will not con- sider himself seriously engaged, so long as he only furnishes simple notes and suggests ideas which one does not follow," 1 and on the other, he was determined to do everything in his power really to become what the king, by logical im- plication, had requested him to be : the directing mind and will of the government. In Januaiy, 1791, Montmorin complained that when he spoke to the king " about his affairs and his position, it seemed as if one talked to him of things concerning the emperor of China." 2 And 1 Corresp., II. 288. 2 lb., III. 30 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 199 in October, 1791, La Marck wrote : " Louis XVI. is not fit to reign — by the apathy of his character — by that rare resignation which he takes for courage and which renders him almost insensible to the danger of his position — and, finally, by that invincible repugnance to the labor of thinking, which causes him to divert every conversation, every reflection on the dangerous situation." * He was the same man in May, 1790, and therefore there is no doubt whatever, that he had never so much as tried to render himself an ac- count of what his invitation to Mirabeau implied. But it is fully as certain that the king and the queen would have deemed it an absurdity as well as an indignity, if anybody had told them that it implied the request to take full charge of the helm, "It is evident," says La Marck, "that fear alone had driven them to court this formidable tribune." 2 No one knew that better than Mirabeau himself, and he thought it best to tell his royal clients at once very plainly that he was fully aware of it. In the second Note to the court, he urges the queen to tell Lafayette, in the presence of the king : " It is evident that he (Mirabeau) does not want to help ruin us ; one must not run the risk 1 Corresp., III. 248. - lb., I. 147. 200 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. that circumstances compel him to will it ; he must be for us. In order that he be for us, we must be for him. . . We are resigned or resolved to give him the confidence of despair." 1 But his object in telling this was not to increase their fear of him. 2 There was a passage in the Note, which may have impressed the queen that way ; but if so, the day was to come which would undeceive her and prove that those terrible lines had not been an attempt at intimidation by a demagogue, betrayed by the impatience of his ambitious audacity into preposterous exaggeration, but the solemn warning of a genuine prophet of fearful clearness of vision. " The king," he wrote, " has but one man, and that is his wife. There is no safety for her but in the re-establishment of the royal author- ity. I like to believe that she would not care for her life without her crown ; I am perfectly sure that she will not keep her life if she does not keep her crown." No, he does not want to sub- 1 Corresp., II. 42. 2 This is not mere conjecture. There is positive proof for it. He says in his 18th Note : " La derniere note que j'ai en- voyee a cause de l'inquietude, et presque de l'effroi. Je le regarclerais comme un bien salutaire effroi, s'il eut produit l'activitie au lieu d'aggraver Fespece de torpeur ou reduit l'infortune. Mais comment ne pas s'apercevoir qu'en aigui- sant la crainte, il emousse la volonte?" — lb., II. 136. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 201 jugate by intimidation. His purpose is to con- vince by opening the eyes to the appalling gravity of the situation, that there is but one alternative : implicit confidence or perdition. " It is no longer time either to half-confide or to half-serve. . . One must not think that one can, with the help either of accident or of combinations, get out of an extraordinary crisis by ordinary men and measures." He read the characters but too correctly. If anything at all was to be attained, it could only be through the queen. But neither was her influence upon the king strong enough, 1 nor could she her- self be made to see the things as they really were and to do with sustained resoluteness what they required to be done. While she understood better than the king the necessity of coming to terms with Mirabeau, implicit confidence was with her even more out of the question than with him. The man was repulsive to her, and while her pride was great enough to conquer fear, she had neither the keenness of intellect nor the strength of will to conquer aversion. Besides she, too, shirked the intellectual and moral effort of looking the fearful reality full in the face and pursuing her own re- 1 Cfr. Corresp., I. 124, 125 ; II. 287, 288. 202 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. flections upon it unflinchingly to the end. The second time she saw La Marck in regard to the arrangement with Mirabeau, she kept him over two hours, but a great part of the time the con- versation ran upon other topics. " The purpose of my audience," he says, " was almost lost sight of ; she tried to turn it away. As soon as I spoke to her of the revolution she became serious and sad." But every time she soon dropped the unpleasant subject and resumed, " in a tone of cheerfulness " and with her customary "amiable and graceful humor," her sprightly chat on something else. " This trait," he adds, " paints her character bet- ter than all I could say about it." 1 Like the king she is at bottom a votary of the policy of the ostrich. Not only in her conversation, but also in her thinking does she drop the unpleasant subject when it is getting too unpleasant. Therefore she never comes to see the necessity of Mirabeau's support. When she has come to the point of admitting the necessity of conciliating him so far, that he refrains in future from putting himself at the head of the column of assault, she shudders, turns away, and deliberately closes her eyes against what lies beyond. 1 Corresp., I. 156, 157. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 203 This it is, above all, that from the outset dooms all the efforts of Mirabeau to utter failure. The terrific pressure of implacable cruel necessity might, perhaps, after all, have overcome the per- sonal distrust and aversion, if king and queen had at all been capable of implicit confidence, stern thinking, whole-souled resolutions, determined, consistent, and sustained action. They them- selves were the principal builders of their scaffolds, not, however, by any imputed crimes, but — to put it bluntly — by being in most ex- traordinary times, intellectually and morally, woe- fully ordinary people. They are the primary and chief authors of their doom, but infinitely less by what they do, than first by doing always the wrong thing whenever they do anything, and then by doing in the main nothing at all, never knowing either what, or when, or whether, or how to will. This is the key-note of Mirabeau's Notes. Month after month he strikes it with greater force, and finally with the fierceness of despair — ever more and more in vain. On the 17th of August he writes : " It is time to decide between an active and a passive role ; for the latter, though I think it wholly bad, is in my eyes less so than this alternating between 204: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. attempts and resignation, half- will and despond- ency, which excites distrust, lets the usurpations take root, and floats from inconsistencies to in- consistencies." 1 How much effect the warning had, can be judged from the following passage in the Note of September 28th: "I confess, not without regret, that I am of very little use, but they impose upon me much more the duty to serve than they give me the possibility for doing it. They hear me with more kindness than con- fidence ; they are more anxious to know my ad- vice than to follow it, and above all, they do not sufficiently realize, that the passive r61e of inac- tion, if it were preferable to all others, does not exactly consist in doing nothing, or letting only those act who do harm." 2 On the 12th of No- vember he writes : " The pest-laden wind, which can destroy at any moment the king, the Assembly itself, the whole nation — the secret leaven of fermentation, perpetuating and nourishing the devouring fever, are in the court ; in its whole conduct, in its inaction, in its too slow or retro- grade march ; in its role of simple looker-on which it affects to play ; in the perpetuity of the most detestable cabinet ; in the passive system of the 1 Corresp., II. 136. 2 lb., II. 196. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 205 most bungling polic} r ; finally, in that sum of cir- cumstances which, persuading the feeble minds that the court has secret projects, causes the ardent minds to multiply the excessive measures of resistance. But the lightning is in the cloud." 1 By the 2d of January, 1791, he thought the court wished to get rid of him and he expressed his willingness to abandon the thankless task. 2 As early as the 17th of August he had written : " I shall wait for a clap of thunder to break this deplorable lethargy." He had waited in vain, and therefore he saw himself more and more reduced to preventing here and there, as to this or that detail, further mischief, since " Your Majesties . . . do not think yourselves in a condition to attempt anything for the public cause and yourselves." To the " silence of contempt," buoyant hope had succeeded for a moment upon the overtures of the court, because they seemed to offer an opening for at last putting the resources of his genius and the force of his will to the test of action, and while every day cried louder and more imper- atively for action, he was, from first to last, prac- tically condemned to talk, talk, talk — to the wind. 1 Corresp., II. 325, 326. s lb., III. 18, 19. 206 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. Even of dull Louis XVI. and merry Marie Antoinette, moulded by nature altogether for a holiday-life, it is not easy to believe that they can really have thought but for a minute, that anything could come of that. If they had, how dense must have been the film over their eyes, when they read the letter of the 10th of May ! There Mira- beau had told them plainly enough how he himself viewed the prospects of the future, even if he be afforded every opportunity of making the most of all his powers in action : " I promise the king loy- alty, zeal, activity, energy, and a courage of which one has perhaps no idea. I promise, in fact, every- thing except success which never depends on one man, and which only a very audacious and very culpable presumption could guarantee in the ter- rible malady that undermines the state and men- aces its chief." LECTURE XII. TJie End. A Unique Tragedy. " If this plan be carried out, one may hope for everything ; and if not, if this last plank of salvation drift away, every calamity, from individual assas- sinations to pillage, from the downfall of the throne to the dissolution of the empire, has to be expected. What other resources can remain ? Does the ferocity of the people not steadily increase? Do they not more and more foment hatred against the royal family ? Do they not openly speak of a general massacre of the nobility and clergy ? Is one not proscribed simply for a difference of opinion ? Are the people not made to hope, that the land will be divided among them ? Are not all the great cities of the kingdom in terrible perturbation? Do not the national guards preside at all the acts of popular vengeance ? Do not all the magistrates tremble for their own safety, without having any 207 208 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. means to provide for that of others ? Finally, can, in the National Assembly, infatuation and fana- ticism be pushed to a higher degree ? Ill-fated nation ! To this thou hast been brought by some men, who have supplanted talent by intrigue and conceptions by commotions. Good but feeble king ! unfortunate queen ! To this fearful abyss, the floating between a too blind confidence and a too exaggerated distrust have brought you ! One effort is still possible, but it is the last. If it be not made — or if it fail — a shroud will cover this empire. What will then be its fate ? Where will this vessel, struck by lightning and tossed by the storm, be driven to ? I do not know ; but if I should escape the public shipwreck, I shall always say with pride in my retreat : ' I exposed myself to destruction in order to save them all ; they did not want it.' " 1 When, in December, 1790, Mirabeau drew this appalling picture of the situation for the court, he was President of the Jacobin Club. At the time, the man holding this position had not as yet necessarily to be a conscious representative of all the subver- sive tendencies. The few words which Mirabeau spoke in assuming the presidency were a pointed 1 Corresp., II. 485, 486. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 209 rebuke of " licentiousness." 1 But the presiding over the Jacobins, after all, implied a degree of rad- icalism which was manifestly not in accord with his position as adviser of the court and still less with the programme of the December Memoir. From this incontestable fact, however, is not to be concluded that he plays false in the sense that he has no political convictions and no programme ex- cept, by hook or by crook, to play an important part. But it drastically shows that, his aim being what it is, the circumstances irresistibly force upon him a double part, which ultimately must def}>- the most consummate skill. In his first great speech on the mines he said : " Abstractions, which are the best manner of reason- ing, are neither the only nor the principal elements of the art of governing." 2 The difference between him and all the others simply consists in this, that this trite truth is fully understood by him from the beginning, that he draws all the correct conclusions from it, and that he knows what the essential ele- 1 " Deja tous les Francais sont auxiliaires de la liberte : il ne roste qu'a les renclre tous ennemis de la licence et auxili- aires de la paix. " C'est dans ces principes, Messieurs, que je tacherai de remplir les devoirs de la presidence." — Nov. 30, 1790. Au- lard., I. 399. 2 March 21. 1791. (Euvres, V. 426. 14 210 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. ments of the art of governing are. He is fully aware that the most essential of them all is to take the people as they are, i. e., that it is not sufficient to keep always in view that one has to deal not with figures and formulas but with men, but that one has besides to take into con- sideration the specific intellectual and moral con- ditions and dispositions of the particular na- tion as historically evolved and as affected by the peculiar circumstances of the time being. This intuitive political judgment, which verged upon the miraculous, was to a great extent at- tributable to his extraordinary knowledge of men, and this was the one good fruit of his wild and checkered career, which had brought him into intimate contact with all classes and kinds of people. The truly bewildering mobility and versatility of his own mind and temperament en- abled him really to understand them all, and by his uncommon skill in asking, he improved the opportunities thus offered him in a degree no other man could have done. The Prussian Dohm writes : " He understood the art of asking in a degree of which it is hard to give a conception if one has not been present at his conversations." 1 1 Quoted by Professor Stern. THE FRENCH REVOUJTION. 211 The art to ask pertinent questions and to ask them in such a manner that also pertinent answers are given, is, however, but one way to get at the facts, and, as I said in a former lecture, to base his policy upon the facts is the first requisite of the genuine statesman. Among the facts he has to ascertain, the frame of mind in which the people happened to be at the time in regard to the para- mount questions at issue, is always one of the most important, and in a general and all-embracing revolutionary upheaval, it is by far the most es- sential, for the ultimate question : tvhat is achiev- able under the given circumstances ? cannot be determined, unless the correct answer is found to the question : how has one to set about in order to attain the end ? And as to this How, the princi- pal factor in the condition confronting the states- man is the frame of the popular mind. The most exalted statesmanship can no more ignore it in regard to the manner of proceeding, than it can overleap the limits set by it as to the What. In both cases failure is equally certain, for though there is truth in the old saying, that the great statesman does not allow himself to be domi- nated by the circumstances, but dominates them, circumstances can be dominated in poli- 212 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. tics only by conforming to them to a certain extent. No statesman has ever had a higher opinion of his own powers than Mirabeau, but also no states- man has been more fully conscious of what fearful fetters those immutable political laws were to his powers. He clung tenaciously to the hope that he would ultimately succeed in spite of everything ; but almost from the first it was a hope against better knowledge, for he saw but too clearly that the frame of the public mind was such as to render the case a desperate one, with, at the most, one chance against nine. La Marck, in one of their discussions, quoted Bacon's remark, that while a little philosophy leads away from religion, much philosophy leads back to it, 1 and contended that it was applicable to almost all human institutions. " There is not one," he said, "which the shallowest declaimer could not attack with apparent success ; but this success will always be annihilated by the strong reason of the ready and profound statesman, who 1 " But farther, it is an assured truth and a conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of philoso- phy may incline the mind of man to atheism, but a farther proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to religion."— Bacon's Works, ed. Ellis & Spedding, III. 267. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 213 knows how to defend the foundations of the social order." " Bravo ! bravo ! " exclaimed Mirabeau ; "but that is now no longer the question. No single man will be able to bring the French back to saneness ; time alone can restore order to the minds ; with them one must never either presume or despair. To-day the French are ill, very ill ; one must treat them cautiously." 1 Indeed, very ill — and the nature of the disease rendered it imperative to admix a strong dose of the very virus with the remedies, so to speak, to enwrap them in it. He himself was surely one of those who, as he said, would rather save the country than enjoy " a perfidious popularity," but to dispense with popularity was in the strictest sense of the word impossible, unless he renounced the aspiration to be a determining force in the revolution. 2 Without it he was Samson shorn of his locks. In his Note of November 17th to the court he writes : " To acquire the right success- fully to enter upon the course when the true interests of the throne are to be defended, it is, above all, necessary that I prepare the people to 1 Corresp., I. 208, 209. - Montmorin told him : " Vous seul avez sn vous depopu- lariser par courage et vous repopulariser par prudence." —Corresp., II. 391. 214 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. hear my voice without distrust, that I dispel its suspicions, that I be counted among its surest friends, and, from this point of view, my popular- ity, so far from alarming the court, ought to be deemed by it its safest resource." 1 Popularity, however, could be achieved and preserved only by speaking in a tone which would awaken an echo in the breasts of the people, and, in the actual frame of the public mind, that was a tone which illy accorded with his true programme. In the garb of radicalism, often even strongly tinged with demagogism, he had to present his moderate and conservative ideas, if he were to have any chance of making them prevail. 2 Necker's celebrated daughter, Mine, de Stael, who was certainly not disposed to judge him too favorably, writes : " One could not help having pity with the constraint imposed upon his natural superiority. Constantly he was compelled in the same speech to act as partisan of popularity and of reason. He tried to wrest from the Assembly, with demagogical 1 Corresp., II. 337. 2 He writes Nov. 26, 1790, to La Marck in regard to his attitude in the church question : " Ce n'est qu'en se tenant dans une certaine gamme que Ton peut, au milieu de cette tumulteuse Assemblee, se donner le droit d'etre raisonable." lb., II. 361. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 215 phrases, a monarchical decree ; and he often let the royalists feel his bitterness, even when he wanted to carry one of their points ; in one word, it was evident that he had constantly to combat between his judgment and the necessity of success." l He had by no means a taste for such equivocal tactics. He writes to La Marck : " It makes more trouble and requires more true dexterity (not genius) thus to tack, than to fight ; that is, per- haps, the rarest part of talent, at least with some- what distinguished talents, for it is the least attractive and that which lives on little accumu- lated combinations, privations, and sacrifices." 2 And to the court : " One must dissimulate if one wants to supplement strength by dexterity, as one has to tack in a storm. That is one of my princi- ples and purely based on the observation of life, for it is entirely opposed to my natural character. I must at first take the key of those whom I want gradually to force to adopt mine." 3 It was indeed utterly opposed to his character, and therefore his skill was all the more to be admired, for he had to subject himself to no little 1 Considerations sur les principaux evenernens de la revo- lution francaise, I. 353, ed. 1820. 2 Corresp., II. 146. 3 lb., II. 336. 216 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. constraint. How great this skill was, but also to what a humiliating degree he had sometimes to submit to this " tacking " policy, is most strik- ingly illustrated by his attitude in the debate on the important question, what the constitution should provide in regard to a regency. He is more anxious than ever to see his opinion pre- vail, and yet he blandly declares that he has formed no opinion ; his argument is a tangle, but thus much is clear, that if it is at all intended to be indicative of what his vote is to be, he must cast it for an elective regency ; he, however, abruptly breaks off and dismisses his reasoning with a con- temptuous kick by declaring, in a tone of lan- guid unconcern, that in his opinion the report of the committee, sustaining the opposite view, might be adopted. This is done, and a heavy load is taken from his mind. 1 1 (Euvres, V. 459-479. His true opinions are revealed by the following letter to La Marck : " Nous sommes dans un grand danger. Soyez sur que Ton veut nous ramener aux elections, c'est a-dire a. la destruction de Fheridite ; c'est-a- dire a la destruction de la monarchic L'abbe Sieyes n'a jamais courtise l'Assemblee, ni agiote une opinion comme il le fait, et ses partisans sont tres nombreux. Je n'ai jamais ete vraiment effraye qu'aujourd'hui. Je me garderai bien de proposer demain ma theorie ; je porterai toutes mes forces a ajourner, en critiquant le projet de decret, en prou- vant qu'il est insuffisant, incomplet, qu'il prejuge de grandes THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 217 Mirabeau once called the Assembly "a restive donkey, which cannot be mounted without using great discretion." 1 This time he had mounted it; but to manage the balky animal, it was, above all, necessary to keep oneself perfectly under con- trol, and this he by no means always did. The questions, etc. , etc. Certainement ma theorie ne passerait pas, et l'ajouniement reussira. Envoyez chercher Pellenc (his secretary) immediatement ; qu'il etude dans le plus grand detail le decret ; qu'il en recherche tous les dangers pour la liberte publique ; qu'il l'envisage sous tous les rapports ; qu'il ne prenne que des notes ; mais qu'il de- veloppe assez ces notes, pour que je parle avec fecondite. II sait au fond ma doctrine a present, mais je ne veux que la laisser entrevoir ; je ne veux pas la hasarder ; gagnons du temps, tout est sauve. Je crois que beaucoup de gens desir- ent se renfermer dans une mesure provisoire. Ne dusse-je gagner que deux jours, j'emmenerai Pellenc a la campagne avec moi, et nous y mettrons toutes nos forces. Soyez star, mon cher comte, que je ne m'exagere pas le danger, et qu'il est immense. O legere, et trois fois legere nation ! — Notre armee est, dans cette question, pour les deux tiers a l'abbe Sieyes." — Corresp., I. 245-248. Oncken's opinion (Das Zeitalter der Revolution, etc., I. 344, 345) that Mirabeau was no longer quite in his right senses, is one of those unaccount able extravagances, with which the distinguished historian occasionally surprises his readers. He needed to remember only that the committee on the Constitution and the Assem- bly were not identical to find another way out of the diffi- culty, which, as far as he gratuitously asserts, everybody admits to be insurmountable. The wild assumption is, how- ever, only the fitting climax of a series of one-sided and exaggerated criticisms, in which virtuous indignation has got the better of political discernment. 1 Droz, Hist, du regne de Louis XVI., III. 59. 218 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. government and those who considered themselves the only true champions of the crown in the As- sembly, vied with each other to render it almost im- possible for him to do so. 1 The latter, in their passionate imbecility and blind hatred of Mirabeau, more than once succeeded in lashing him into such a fury that, while he had taken the floor for the purpose of calming and restraining, he ended by sending one revolutionary thunderbolt after the other crash ing through the hall. 2 These provocations go much further towards excusing him than it might appear at first sight, for they usually involved much more than a mere personal question, as to which he might and ought to have kept his temper. The more he wanted to keep the revolution within bounds, the 1 " L'imperitie et la perfidie du gouvernement d'un cote, l'imbecillite et la maladresse du parti ennemi de la revolu- tion de l'autre, m'ont entraine plus d'une fois hors de mes propres mesures ; mais je n'ai jamais deserte le principe, lors me me que j'ai ete force d'en exaggerer l'application, et j'ai toujours desire rester ou revenir au juste milieu." — Cor- resp., I. 428. 2 See the most striking instance, lb., II. 331. — To judge the violence of his language justly, it is, however, necessary also to keep always well in mind how true it was, what he had written already in 1787: " Peut-on regenerer, peut-on raeme reformer ce pays-ci, sans attaquer aussi vehemente- ment les personnes que les choses ? " — Premiere lettre du comte de Mirabeau sur l'administration de M. Necker, 7. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 219 less he could allow anti-revolutionary ideas and tendencies to pass unchallenged. When reaction again dared to raise its voice, sound policy, his convictions, his honor, and even his personal safety made it alike imperative upon him to knock it mercilessly on the head with his terrible club. 1 But, however excusable these occasional unfeigned relapses into the tone of the radical revolutionary tribune, they had necessarily the effect of increasing every time the dislike and the 1 In October, 1790, the question of asking the king to dis- miss the cabinet and to substitute in the navy the tricolore for the white pennant, offered an opportunity for one of these passionate sallies. Not only the court, but also La Marck was very dissatisfied with him. Mirabeau wrote to his friend on the following day : " Hier je n'ai point ete un demagogue ; j'ai ete un grand citoyen, et peut-etre un habile orateur. Quoi ? ces stupides coquins, enivres d'un succes de pur hasard, vous offrenttout platement la contre-revolution, et Ton croit que je ne tonnerai pas ! En verite, mon ami, je n'ai nul envie de livrer a personne mon honneur et a la cour ma tete. Si je n'etais que politique je dirais : ' J'ai besoin que ces gens-la mecraignent.' Si j'etais leur homme je dirais : ' Ces gens-la ont besoin de me craindre ? ' Mais je suis un bon citoyen, qui aime la gloire, l'honneur et la liberte avant tout, et certes messieurs du retrograde me trouveront tou jours pret a les foudroyer. Hier j'ai pu les faire massacrer ; s'ils continuaient sur cette piste, ils me f orceraient a le vouloir, ne f ut ce que pour le salut du petit nombre d'honnetes gens entre eux. En un mot, je suis l'homme du retablissement de l'ordre, et non d'un retablisse- ment de l'ancien ordre." — Corresp., II. 251. 220 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. distrust of the court. And the less the court became disposed to profit by his counsels, the more he had to be bent on strengthening his popularity. The fact that the Jacobins elected him President 1 twice in succession, bears wit- ness to the skill he displayed in this respect. In spite of this remarkable success his position was, however, by far not as strong as it seemed. The leaders knew full well that he was the most determined, as well as the most puissant opponent of their destructive tendencies. The political and social disintegration had by this time reached such a stage that nothing could be achieved by merely covering conservative ideas with demagogical drapery. Mirabeau had to step down to a much lower level as to his means. He frankly avows that the central idea of the great December Memoir, the systematic discrediting of the Assembly, is " an intrigue." He writes : " If the issue were not a last resource and the welfare of a great people, my character would prompt me to reject all these means of a wily (obscure') intrigue and insidious dissimulation, which I am forced to counsel. But what shall one do, what try . . . if one has to contend against intrigue and ambi- * Each time for twenty days. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 221 tion, and the instrument with which one is at- tacked is the only one with which one can defend oneself ? . . . One must ruin the Assembly; the task is to save the finest empire of the world, if it still be time ; such an end justifies all means, as necessity no more admits of a choice, and dis- simulation, even deceit, is after all better than war. 1 And a little later : " One can only save oneself by a plan blending . . . the combinations of the statesman and the resources of intrigue, the cour- age of great citizens and the audacity of crim- inals." 2 Such was the direful situation. La Marck, whom no one can suspect of the slightest inclina- tion to resort to means of questionable propriety, writes in the same days : " One must not overlook that we have to contend against intrigue, which almost always can be successfully met only by intrigue." 3 True enough. But to expect salva- tion from an intrigue was a delusion, for no intrigue could manoeuvre the revolutionary temp- est back into the caves whence it had burst forth and there seal it up. The demagogical intrigues were primarily not a cause, but merely a symptom. Nevertheless, nothing could, in fact, be done now 1 Corresp., II. 463, 464. 2 lb., II. 510. *Ib., II. 416. 222 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. but to fight the devil with his own fire, for al- though the conflagration could not be put out, a fresh attempt to get it under control had to be preceded by beating the incendiaries off, who, systematically and with set purpose, fanned the flames and poured oil into them. Even this, how- ever, was, under the circumstances, more than the shrewdest intriguer could accomplish. The fear- ful ascendency of the demagogues was due to the fact that, as Mirabeau had said, the French, i. e., the whole people were " ill, very ill " — too ill not to give always ten chances to one to the intriguer for worse against the intriguer for better, provided the former had but the faintest suspicion of the lat- ter's being astir. The intriguer, however, is surer to scent the intriguer from afar than vultures and ravens the battle-field. Mirabeau had repeatedly duped the demagogues by urging conservative measures with radical thunder, but as soon as he commenced to send Notes to the court, the pack was on his trail and never again lost it entirely. Suspicion was at times lulled, but never dispelled. Nor could it be. For as from first to last he was compelled as a rule to wear a half-mask, so also from first to last he never hesitated, when the occasion called for it, to fling it proudly away and THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 223 to expose his true features in all their imposing force to the maddened radicals. It is a redeeming feature in this checkered life, that, in his last weeks, fate offered him several opportunities to prove that he could rise to being full}- his better self, growing with his opportunities morally also to his full intellectual height. On the 1st of February, his ardent wish to pre- side over the Assembly was at last fulfilled, and Lafayette could convince himself that France would have been none the worse for his presiding on the day of the Federation festival. Even his adversaries had nothing but praise for him. It was universally acknowledged, that no man had presided with greater dignity and understood better to make the dignity of the Assembly respected. If such a firm and skilful hand had held the reins from the first and permanently, the As- sembly would not only have worked more expe- ditiously and methodically, but it might have set an example as to parliamentary decorum, which would not have failed to exercise some salutary influence upon its successors and those who lorded it over them from the galleries. 1 1 See his graphic picture of the Assembly's haphazard way of working and the consequences of it. — Memoires, VI. 264- 266. 224 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. Only a fortnight after resuming his seat among the members, he had his fiercest encounter with the radicals and demagogues. The terrors of the revolution had driven Mesdames, the old aunts of the king, from Paris. Their passports stated that they were going to Rome. Without any warrant of law, local authorities, backed bv the mob, repeatedly opposed the progress of their journey. These incidents brought the question of emigration in an acute form before the Assembly. Chapellier, speaking in the name of the committee on the constitution, proposed that a committee of three be appointed, without whose permission no- body should be allowed to emigrate. Mirabeau objected to the reading of the bill, and moved the order of the day. He insisted that it was not possible either to justify or execute a prohibition of emigration. 1 "Not indignation, reflection must make the laws," he declared. The code of Draco, but not the statutes of France, would be a fit place for a law like that contemplated by the committee. Its barbarity was the best proof of 1 That was no new theory with him. Repeatedly and ardently he had contended for liberty in this as in all other respects. ' ' La seule bonne loi contre les emigrations est celle que la nature a gravee dans nos coeurs." — Monarchie Prussienne, I. 20 ; edition in 4°. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 225 the impracticability of any law against emigration. With the most concentrated despotism in the most ruthless hands such a law never had been executed, because in the nature of things it could not be executed. " I declare that I should con- sider myself released from every oath of fidelity toward those who become guilty of the infamy of appointing a dictatorial commission. . . The popu- larity, which I have had the honor to enjoj^ like others, is not a weak reed ; 1 I want to sink its roots into the earth on the imperturbable basis of reason and liberty. If you make a law against emigrants, I swear that I shall never obey it." Applause and hisses interrupted the speaker at almost every sentence. The radical left grew more and more violent in its demonstrations of disapproval, until he cowed it by hurling against it, with the full force of his lion's voice, that grand, imperious : " Silence to those thirty voices ! " — A motion was made and carried which virtually amounted to an adjournment of the question for an indefinite time, and as long as Mirabeau lived no law against emigration was passed. 1 Mejan (CEuvres, V. 404) writes thus, and thus the sen- tence is always quoted. But is it not possibly a misprint, pas being substituted for qiC : " n'est qu'un faible roseau?" 15 226 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. Mirabeau bad not achieved a victory, but merely repulsed an attack by throwing the weight of his influence and of his masterful personality to the last ounce into the scales. Whether he would be able to achieve even thus much the next time was very doubtful. Yet on the same day the radicals returned to the charge in a personal onslaught, and on the field on which the wind and the sun were always wholly with them. Reason and true liberty were by this time at a sufficient discount to warrant the hope that success would crown a vigorous effort, completely and once for all to uproot the popularity of the man whose presump- tuous temerity went to the length of attempting to sink its roots into this bed-rock. The suspicion expressed by one of his admirers, that a brutal social affront was a stratagem with a view to stabbing him from behind in the back, was prob- ably not without foundation. If so, the sorry conspirators were hoisted by their own petard : they only did him a service by giving him a warning which he did not fail to understand and to heed. He had been invited with others to dine at d'Aiguillon's. When he presented him- self at the door he was refused admission. It seems to have been expected that after this slap THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 227 in the face, he would not dare to show himself at the Jacobins. The "silence to the thirty voices" had reminded these heroes most forcibly, that it was certainly very much easier to slay this man with their venomous tongues when he was not there to answer them. Aye ! They did not know the man yet. It had not been a vain boast, but the plain statement of a fact, when he wrote to the king : " I promise a courage of which one has perhaps as yet no idea." No surer means could have been found to make him go to the Jacobins than thus to notify him by a mortal outrage, that their leaders were determined in dead earnest to hunt him down. We have a long and spicy report from the pen of Camille Desmoulins on this memorable even- ing session at the Jacobins on February 28th. Camille, once the ardent admirer of Mirabeau and his exquisite dinners, now draws his pen-picture, not with ink, but with gall and sulphuric acid. Oh, into what a pitiable and contemptible figure this reputed Titan of the revolution turns, if we but look at him closely ! There he sits, writhing in impotent rage and in fear under the lash so mercilessly applied by those true giants, Duport and Alexandre Lameth. He himself had said : 228 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. " When I shake my terrible mane, nobody dares to interrupt me." 1 And now — as with Christ on Calvary, says Camille — the perspiration drips down from under his mane in large drops, pressed out by agony. And how futile his embarrassed efforts to impose upon the clear-eyed and straight- hearted patriots by his shallow sophistries, hollow excuses, and pompous oratorical flourishes ! It is true : he is not ejected from the club, and when he leaves, there is some applause. But nobody is deceived. In acknowledgment of past services he is allowed one more chance to repent and return to the true faith. Happily there is another pen-drawing of this evening session preserved, and it presents a rather different view. The Swiss Oelsner - also tells us what he saw with his own eyes and heard with his own ears. Full justice is done by him to Mira- beau's adversaries. In his reply to Duport, Mi- rabeau seems really not to have been at his best, and Lameth's onset was in fact terrible. The 1 Dumont, Souvenirs, 282, 283. 2 Bruchstiicke aus den Papieren eines Augenzeugen und unparteiischen Beobachters der franzosischen Revolution, 1794. We owe the identification of the author to Professor Stern. I quote from Aulard's translation of the report. See the original, Stern, II. 316-319. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 229 consummate adroitness of the attack was only surpassed by its unfathomable perfidiousness. 1 It was a master effort to render Mirabeau at the same time " odious and ridiculous." So wildly was the speaker applauded, that Oelsner began to fear that Mirabeau was done for and that nothing less was intended by his assailants than to unchain the mob against him. Perhaps it would have 1 Already in May, 1790, Mirabeau had denounced the meanness and suicidal madness of the ever-growing practice of treating a difference of opinion as a crime and of substi- tuting imputations and calumnies for argument. " On dirait qu'on ne peut, sans crime, avoir deux avis dans une des questions les plus delicates et les plus difficiles de l'orga- nisation social. . . " On vous a propose de juger la question par le parallele de ceux qui soutiennent l'affirmative et la negative ; on vous a dit que vous verriez d"un cote des homines qui esperent s'avancer dans les armees, on parvenir a gerer les affaires etrangeres ; des hommes qui sont lies avec les ministres et leur agens ; de l'autre, le citoyen paisible, vertueux, ignore, sans ambition, qui trouve son bonheur et son existence dans le bonheur commun. " Je ne suivrai pas cet example. Je ne crois pas qu'il soit plus conforme aux convenances de la politique qu'aux prin- cipes de la morale, d'amler le poignard dont on ne saurait blesser ses rivaux, sans en ressentir bientot sur son propre sein les atteintes. Je ne crois pas que des homines qui doivent servir la cause publique en veritables freres d'armes, aient bonne grace a se combattre en vils gladiateurs, a lutter d'imputations et d'intrigues, et non de lumieres et de talens ; a chercher dans la ruine et la depression les uns des autres des coupables sneers des trophees d'un jour, nuis- ibles a tout, etmeme a la gloire." — CEuvres, III. 355, 378. 230 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. come to that, if the President had succeeded in his perfidious attempt to adjourn the meeting without allowing Mirabeau once more to reply. But when Mirabeau, who, according to Oelsner, had not lost his composure for a minute, again had the floor, the conspirators had lost the game for this time. Oelsner writes : " It was a hot combat. He put forth all the resources of his genius to vanquish his young and agile adversary. He clutched him and his companions with a hand of iron and of fire. He wrenched from them their false arms and struck incurable blows. His boil- ing wrath gushed over all who had impugned him. Truths, which no one had ever dared to breathe in the club, crashed like claps of thunder through the hall. His boldness, his noble bearing, petrified the audience with astonishment. Thus he put down the furious, and there was not one from whom he did not force, if not applause, at least high admiration. Even in the National Assembly Mirabeau had never been more mas- terful." ! Mirabeau finished his answer to his assailants the next day in the National Assembly, as spokes- man of a deputation of the departmentl adminis- 1 Aulard, Jacobins, II. 112. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 231 tration. 1 His attitude in the emigration question was by no means the only grievance of the Jacobins against him. One of Lameth's principal charges was, that in an address of the departmental administration to the people drawn up by him, he dared to denounce those as the real enemies of liberty, who constantly declared the constitution and liberty in danger. Mirabeau now repeated this charge more emphatically, pointing more directly to the Jacobins. "From all the frag- ments of the old institutions and the old abuses," he says, "an infectious sediment, a corrupting leaven has formed, which is incessantly stirred by perverse men in order to develop all its poisons. I mean the factious who, in order to subvert the constitution, persuade the people that it must act by itself, as if it were without laws, without magistrates. We shall unmask those culpable enemies of its tranquillity, and we shall teach the people that, if the most important of our functions is to watch over its safety, its post is that of labor, seconded by the peace of active industry and domestic and social virtues." 2 The Assembly 1 In the latter half of January he had succeeded in having himself elected to the important position. 2 CEuvres, V. 408. 232 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. applauded and decreed that the address be printed. Thus ended this fierce single-handed contest with insane radicalism and ruthless demagogism, which excites even in Mr. Lomenie unalloyed admira- tion. Mirabeau's " image," he says, " appears in it with a character of greatness," which it has on no other occasion to the same degree. 1 So it is ; but it is the greatness not of the conquering hero, but of the hero who, although bleeding already from a hundred wounds, strikes his most powerful blow while the deadly shaft is piercing a vital organ. Mirabeau furnished incontestable proof on the 1st of March, that the Jacobins had not intim- idated him on the previous evening, but he soon again ceased to attend their meetings. 2 Now, as 1 (Euvres, V. 307. 2 There is no reason to doubt that Lucas Montigny's state- ment to this effect is in the main correct, though he is mis- taken in asserting that he never again set his foot into their hall. He had left it on the 28th saying : " I shall stay among you until I am ostracized," and from a letter of March 4th to La Marck we learn that he had been again at the club. But he reports a defeat : it is true, a defeat with- out a combat, for the scene which " les a remontes au dia- pason de la fureur " was enacted after he had left, but still a defeat. " Je suis en verite toes-decourage, tres-embarasse, tres-fache de m'etre mis si seul en avant, puisque tous les coups de la tempete vont porter sur le seul homme qui veu- ille la chose pour elle, et qui ne soitpas un hanneton." — Cor- THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 233 ever before, lie took his stand on the stern facts. As his turning himself into a Jacobin of the gen- uine dye was out of the question, he never again could exercise any influence there, and there was a fearful amount of truth in what Lameth had said : " Only from the midst of this Society can Mira- beau wield the lever of opinion ; 2 outside of it all his force is of no use to him ; as despised as Maury he becomes as powerless (wwZ)." 2 More and more the Jacobins succeeded in monopolizing the manu- facture of popularity, and the ingredients of the article fabricated by them were unreason and everything antagonistic to true liberty. Mirabeau himself broke and tore the roots of his popularity by persisting in the attempt to force them into the double rock of reason and genuine liberty. And by doing this he does not add a single grain to his influence with the court. Only a week after this terrible hand-to-hand struggle with the Radicals, Count Fersen, the gallant Swedish resp., III. 78. — Laporte, intendant of the civil list, assures the king, March 3d, that Mirabeau's breach with the Jacob- ins is irreparable. Stern, II. 294. 1 Mirabeau's rejoining the club in the beginning of Oc- tober, after having stayed away from it for many months, was in itself an acknowledgment that there was a great deal of truth in the assertion. 2 Aulard, II. 107, 108 234 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. knight of Marie Antoinette, writes to his sovereign, Gustavus III. : " His principles are always bad, but they are less so than those of the others. In spite of that, it is interesting not to have him against one." That is all the court cares for : not to have him for an open adversary. And thus one feels and thinks about him, although one is fully aware that, as Fersen expressly states, " he is compelled to hide himself under the forms of democracy in order not to lose all his influence." 1 The part he had played in the revolution, as he wrote to Lafayette in April, 1790, rendered it impossible to him ever to be " neutral ; " too many eyes were fixed upon him ever to admit of his hiding ; with him even " silence " was sure to be counted " a crime." 2 And while he is thus forced, by his very superiority, always to fight in the forefront, every defeat he suffers, every unequal contest that, thanks to the valor of his arm, ends in a drawn battle, nay, every victory he achieves, ultimately tends to isolate him more and more. Higher and higher he towers above all the rest, but on the right and on the left they equally fall away from him. He knew well what that signified, 1 March 8, 1791. Klinkowstroem, Le Comte de Fersen et la Cour de France, I. 86. 2 Corresp., II., 3. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 235 for lie did not — complacently or cowardly — shut his eyes against the facts when they boded no good to him personally. This constantly progress- ing isolation meant that his every step was a step further to the brink of the Tarpeian rock, for in contending for the salvation of France he was contending against an irreversible decree of fate — not that inscrutable arbitrary power of the ancients, but simply the necessary resultant of the unalterable given facts. No mortal has ever issued as victor from such a contest. Therefore nothing better could have befallen him, than that he was called off on the 2d of April after an illness of but a few days. Up to this day many have thought differently. More than one eminent his- torian has declared it an open question whether he could have reversed the wheels. Why have they not gone to Mirabeau himself for an answer to their question? He has given it often and plainly enough. What he had told the king in his letter of the 10th of May, he had repeated in a dif- ferent form, but fully as emphatically in his Note of December 4th : " One can count upon my zeal, but not on an omnipotence which I do not have." i To arrest, single-handed, the downward 1 Corresp., II. 383. 236 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. course of the revolution required nothing less than omnipotence. One of the unalterable facts of no small moment was Mirabeau's own past. No one knew better than he the tremendous weight of the chain that was thereby riveted to his wrists. Already in the fall of 1789, he often bitterly exclaimed in the hearing of La Marck : " Oh, what harm the im- morality of my youth does to the public cause ! ' We have heard him repeatedly declare that char- acter is the paramount requisite for a statesman, and that he — and he alone — possessed it. The first assertion is incontestable, and the second was true as to courage and force of will. But there is a third element indispensable in the make-up of a genuine statesman's character. The motives and the ends must be essentially moral. Was Mirabeau possessed of this requisite ? Could it be presumed that he possessed it? It was this question that rendered his past an almost insurmountable barrier between him and success. Confidence he needed above all, and just this he found nowhere. It was bitter and cruel, but terribly true what the father had written : " He gathers in what those reap who have failed as to the basis, the morals. . . He THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 237 will never obtain confidence, even if he tried to deserve it." 1 And it was by no means only the immorality of his youth that caused all to distrust him. The kind of double game which the uncontrollable circumstances forced upon him, necessarily fur- nished always fresh aliment to the distrust of all. But there is no denying, that from first to last he also added fuel to the fire, when he would not have needed to do so and even might have damped it. Immorality was so deeply ingrained into his whole being, that it would crop out at the slightest provocation or temptation. Turn and twist as we will, there is as to state affairs — and especially in 1 Lomenie, IV. 141. In 1785 Mirabeau had written in his answer to Beaumarchais : ' ' Mon premier but, en me vouant a la perilleuse profession d'apotre de la verite, fut de meriter l'oubli de mes longues erreurs. Voila le seul interet, la seule ambition que je connus jamais : et j'espere enobtenirle suc- ees : car enfin qu'importent au public les ecarts d'une folle jeunesse, si l'age mur lui paie un tribut noble et genereux ? Mais malheur a ceux qui se feraient un titre de torts des long-temps avoues, cruellement expies, et peut-etre suffis- amment repares, pour me refuser les egards que merite tout citoyen incessamment occupe d'etudes, de recherches, d'ou- vrages qui interessent le bien general ! " — Memoires, TV. 276, 277. This time the father proved to be the better prophet. — In a letter to Soufnot (Oct. 4, 1787), Mirabeau says : " Les folies d'une bouillante jeunesse, ontete le prem- ier aiguillon qui m'a presse de payer a mon pays un tribut noble et genereux." — Mem., IV. 449. 238 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. great revolutionary upheavals — some truth in his maxim, that " the petty morality kills the great morality." But he put a strong dose of cynicism into it and was ever lamentably ready to make it a cloak for his inexcusable moral trippings. Thereby he to the last continues to be his own worst enemy. While his right breaks one link of the chain dragging down his arm, the left is busy putting a fresh rivet to another or forging a new one. He is an assiduous ally of cruel fate, denying him the possibility of applying to their full extent the extraordinary powers bestowed upon him by nature. And yet it surely might have been different. The moral pollution was certainly not only skin- deep. The whole blood was vitiated. But in the depths of this Titanic character lay a vast moral reserve force. 1 It was doomed to remain latent, 1 La Marck, telling of his offer to aid him in his pecuniary embarrassments in order to put him ' ' en etat de conserver son independence et de ne s'occuper que du bien public et de sa gloire," writes : " Ilfut profondement touche de ma sol- licitude pour sa gloire, et l'eloquence naturelle, mais entrain- ante, avec laquelle il me peignit son emotion, me confirma de plus en plus dans la conviction qu'il y avait de puissantes ressources dans le coeur d'un tel homme. . . Dans plusieurs circonstances, lorsque je fus irrite de son language revolu- tionnaire a la tribune, je m'emportai contre lui avec beau- coup d'humeur. . . je l'ai vu alors repandre des larmes THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 239 but the two magic words, Possibility and Responsi- bility, might have brought it into full activity at any moment. Nothing less than a task com- mensurate to his ambition and to his powers could bring his great and good qualities into full play, and nothing less than the full weight of supreme official responsibility could keep him steady. But by this stimulus combined with this ballast, what was weak and vile in him would have been brought so far under control, that he would have become what he could be. For the weak and the vile were in the main but acquired qualities, a volcanic temperament, miseducation, the follies, vices, and crimes of a rotten political system and a rotten society, and a tangle of untoward accidental cir- cumstances concurring in planting the germs and nursing them into luxuriant growth. The great and good were inborn and therefore ineradicable, though dross be piled ever so high over them. Nature had made an uncommon effort in moulding this man, and life had made an uncommon and comme un enfant, et exprimer sans bassesse son repentir avec une sincerite sur laquelle on ne se pouvait tromper. II faut avoir eu avec un pareil horame des relations aussi suivies et aussi intimes que les miennes, pour connaitre tout ce que la pensee a de plus eleve et le coeur de plus attach- ant."— Corresp., I. 108, 109. 240 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. most persistent effort to corrupt nature's master- work. There was but one incentive powerful enough to arouse him to the supreme effort re- quired for terminating the contest between nature and life by a glorious victory of the former : by putting him to the highest test, in allowing him to contend for the highest prize, he could be in- duced to conquer himself. He knew it, for he said so. In the Note of June 20th, he charges the queen to tell La- fayette : " He needs a great aim, a great danger, great means, a great glory." 1 There is nothing " inexplicable " about him, if one but grasps the tremendous import of these words, and sees that they are the main key to his character* What an awful pathos they impart to his whole career ! Yes, he needs a great aim and a great glory. His becoming truly great depends on having a chance accorded him to be very great. It was denied him, and a life which nature had intended to be- come an enduring blessing and the glory of a great nation, was rendered but a tragical incident in its history, bearing no fruit and leaving no trace. What Mirabeau had been foremost in destroying and what had to be destroyed, would have 1 Corresp., II. 42. • THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 241 crumbled into dust though he had never lived. As to the positive tasks confronting France, he, however, was " the party of one man." He alone was able to construct pari passu with the destroy- ing, and thus to construct, that the new structure would be adapted to the true nature and actual condition of things. But he was condemned to spend all his forces in checking and abating as to this or that detail, the blunders of all the rest, in numberless cases amounting, as to their effects, to irredeemable crimes. Not enough that doctri- narianism and prejudice, indolence and passion, obtuseness and perversity prevent him from arrest- ing the universal pressing on towards chaos and anarchy ; his very devices for doing so are per- verted into battering-rams for breaking down the last bulwarks, and more than once he is compelled to assist the madmen himself. Never had France stood in greater need of a pre-eminent, constructive statesman, never had she had to boast of a greater political genius, never had a statesman yearned more ardently to rescue her, though it cost the last drop of his heart's blood, and — as he himself said — he had only pre-eminently contributed to a vast destruction, which, as he predicted again and again, would irresistibly go on so long as anything 16 242 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. was left to be destroyed. That was an infinitely more tragical fate than that of being assassinated like Caesar for being too great, or that of suffering like Louis XVI. a felon's death, at the hands of an ungrateful people for having been too small. As early as January, 1790, Mirabeau bitterly complained : " Always restricted to advise, never able to act," I shall probably have the fate of Cas- sandra : " I shall always predict truly, and shall never be believed." 1 Like all his prophecies, the prediction was fulfilled to the letter. Nor would he have escaped this sad fate, if there had been no taint upon his character. " Falling myself, and probably one of the first, under the sickle of fate," he writes in his Note of August 17th, " I shall be a memorable example of what is reserved to men that are, in politics, ahead of their contempo- raries." 2 Yes, his being ahead of his times was the primary and principal cause why all his construc- 1 Corresp., I. 449. 2 Corresp., II. 138. It is interesting to note in this connec- tion La Marck's opinion, that Mirabeau would " unquestion- ably " have ended on the guillotine, if he had not died a nat- ural death, ere Master Samson, the executioner of Paris, became the greatest equalizer of France. Of Mirabeau's determination " de sauver le roi dans le bouleversement general, et de Tarracher aux mains des anarchistes, qui ne pouvaient pas manquer de devenir bientot ses bourreaux," LaMarck says : " C'etait risquer sa vie." — lb., I. 151, 152. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 243 tive political genius : could bear no other fruit than dismal prophecies, which stand unparalleled in truthfulness and unerring minuteness. When his supreme hour had come the distant boom of cannon drew from him the proud ques- tion : " Are these already the funeral rites of Achilles?" And one of his last words was: "I take with me the shroud of the monarchy ; after my death the factions will fight over its shreds." So they did, becoming more and more convinced, that to demolish not only royalty, but government, was to establish liberty. The mortal remains of Mirabeau were the first to be deposited in the Pan- theon, which the National Assembly consecrated to the ashes of the greatest sons of France. When that revolutionary version of the gospel of liberty had attained full sway, they were cast out and those of Paul Marat, who had demanded the highest gallows for him, put in their place ; where they now mingle with the dust, nobody knows nor ever will know. Thus the Terrorists were the last to confer a mark of honor upon him. For 1 To obtain an adequate idea of Mirabeau's fertility in pos- itive and constructive ideas, it is indispensable to consult those also of his writings, which most of his biographers have not deemed worthy of any attention. See for instance the Memoires, IV. 91-104. 244 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. who will deny that it was an honor, even in the coffin, to be ostracized by those who made terror the foundation of liberty, canonized the guillotine, and kicked God Almighty out of His temples to make room for the goddess of Reason. Most of those who had done the best to bring this about, learned how holy the guillotine was when they were made to ascend its fatal steps themselves. Those who survived saw the red cap of Liberty expand and stiffen into a military cocked hat. Even in the first year of the revolution Cas- sandra — Mirabeau had foretold this transformation as explicitly as the end of the king and the queen. Is eloquence a source whence such predictions can spring ? The French historians have read and registered these and all his other prophecies, verified by the facts, but with most of them, the superabundance of a whole century's stern lessons have not sufficed to open their eyes to the fact that his claim to greatness cannot chiefly rest upon his oratory. He himself declared, in so many words, that in his own estimation he was, above all, states- man, and only in the second place orator and writer. 1 In quantity and in quality, the work done by France since the establishment of the third 1 Aug. 26, 1790, to La Marck. Corresp., II. 146. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 245 republic in regard to the history of the revolution challenges the highest admiration. Is it neverthe- less to last another century ere she is prepared to do full justice to her greatest son of the greatest period of her history ? Who can tell ? Mere knowledge of the facts does not suffice. Her judgment upon this chapter of her past must be warped so long as she flinches from probing the present to the quick ; and much as the third republic has done for the intellectual and political advancement of the nation, it has as yet not pro- duced that supreme moral courage required by the precept of the Greek sage : " Know thyself ! ' THE END. INDEX. Aix, Mirabeau's suit against his wife at, 216. American war, effects of, 101. Ancien Regime, political structure under, 2 ff . ; system of justice under, 6, 211 ; self-government under, 13 over-government under, 14 ; sale of offices under, 15 financial embarrassments under, 19 ; estate under, 20 clergy, 20 ff . ; nobility, 26 ff . ; destroys itself, 124 utter bankruptcy, 126 f. ; many-headed opposition to, 129 ff. ; destroyed by Louis XIV., 132; has dis- integrated people, 152 ; inconsistency of, 210 f. Archives Parlementaires, II. 108, 109 ; confusion as to Blin's speech, II. 112 (note). Army, practically dissolved, II. 152 ; Mirabeau proposes reorganization, II. 153. Arneth, 74 (note) ; 78 (note) ; 90 (note). Arnold, Matthew, 75. Assignats, II. 161 ff . Attroupements, bill against, II. 67 ; II. 84. Bachaumont, on the economists, 148 ; on Rousseau's Contrat Social, 158. Bacon, II. 212 and note. Banqiie cle Saint Charles, denunciated by Mirabeau, II. 172. Bar, 156 (note). Barante, on optimism, 237. 247 248 INDEX. Barentin, opening speech, 243. Bastille, stormed, II. 21 ; effects of storming of, II. 42. Beaumarchais, Mirabeau's letter to, II. 237 (note) Berthier, murdered, II. 23. Besancon, intendant of, on sentiment in his province, 239. Besenval, opinion of M. Antoinette, 87 (note) ; testifies as to elasticity of marriage bond, 181 (note). Blanc Louis, on Mirabeau's position in Assembly, II. 7. Blin, speech against Mirabeau, II. 110. Bouille, on nobility, 27 ; on financial ruin of nobility, 67, 232 ; conduct at Nancy, II. 152. Bourgeoisie, apish vanity of, 43 ; attitude toward prole- tariat, 51 f ; Robespierre against, 53 ; disintegration of, during rev. , 55 ; improving material conditions of, 56; intellectual conditions under anc. reg., 56; en- gage in discussion of polit. problems, 150. Brienne, 116 ; dismisses notables, 116 ; is dismissed, 125. Buffiere, Pierre, name of Mirabeau at school, 195. Cabanis, quotes Mirabeau as to action after flight of king, II. 185. Cafe Foy, resolutions of, II. 45 (note). Caisse nationale, suggested by Mirabeau, II. 103. Calonne, on penalties from gabelle, 37, 103 ; appointed controleur general, 106 ; his debut, 107 ; his financial policy, 107 ff ; takes up Turgot's reform programme, 109 ; has assembly of notables called, 110. Campan, Mme, on appointment of Maurepas, 90 (note). Cassagnac, 112 (note). Champford, 77 (note). Chapellier, proposes committee on emigration, II. 224. Chatelet, Marquise du, treatment of canaille, 52. Choquard, Abbe, one of Mirabeau's teachers, 195. Christianity, seriously undermined, 136. Church, s. clergy ; intolerance, 133 ff ; loses religious con- tent, 136 ; merely privileged class, 136. INDEX. 249 Cice (archbishop), acts as go-between for Mirabeau and Lafayette, II. 87 ; intrigues against Mirabeau on Nov. 7, II. 118. Clement XL, 133. Clergy, taxes levied by, 22 f; upper and lower, 23 f; riches of, 23 and note ; poverty of lower, 24 ; luxury of higher, 24 ; delusions of rev. leaders about, 25. Clergy of France, 20 ; form of contribution to state, 21 ; conditions attached to grants by Ordinary Assembly of, 22 ; political activity of, 22. Clugny, 96. Colbert, 101. Compte rendu, 103 ; limitations of, 104 ; political im- portance of, 105 ; success of, 106. Condorcet, delusion about the nature of man, 158. Conseil du roi, 10. Controleur general, 11. Constitution, to be made, 253 ff ; untoward conditions for making of, 257 f . Corvee, 35 ; abolished, 94 ; re-established, 98. Cour pleniere, 122. Courrier de Provence, II. 22 ; II. 46 ; II. 84 ; II. 86. Court, s. Versailles and nobility ; d'Argenson on, 72 ; charm of, 74 ff . Croupes, 71. D'Aiguillon, Mirabeau refused admission at, II. 226. Daire, 102 (note). D'Antraigues, Mirabeau praises moderation to, 236. D'Aragon, Marquise (Mirabeau's niece), II. 87. D'Argenson, on court, 72 ; on study of public law, 143 ; on anti-monarchical opposition, 145. De Biauzat, Gaulthier, II. 149. De Castries, II. 148. December Memoir, II. 188 ff . De Fleury, 106. 250 INDEX. De Lamoignon (Guillaume), view of power of States- General, 220. De la Tour, on optimism, 237, 238. De Pailly (Mme.), becomes Marquis Mirabeau's mistress, 184 ; character, 185 ; as a mischief-maker, 185. Desmoulins, Camille, praise of mob-rule, 256 ; judgment on 5th of Oct., II. 41 ; on necessity of lying, II. 50 (note) ; II. 53 ; describes insurrection of women, II. 55 f. ; on Lafayette, II. 59 ; describes attack at Jacobin club on Mirabeau, II. 227 f. Despotism, Essay on, s. Mirabeau, 212. D'Espremenil, 119 (note). D'Estaing, Louis' letter to, II. 51 and note ; II. 64. Dictionnaire philosophiqiie, 147. Dohm, on Mirabeau's mastery of art of asking, II. 210. Don gratuit, 21 ; voted by Ordinary Assembly, 21. D'Ormesson, 106. Droz, quoted, II. 217. Dubarry, Madame, 88. Dumont, assertion concerning connection of Mirabeau with Monsieur, II. 174 (note). Dupont de Nemours, 109. Duport, 11. 227 f. Duroveray, II. 149. Economists, 147 ; a sect, 148. Edict of Nantes, revocation of, 132. Elliott, Grace D. , on Duke of Orleans' share in events of Oct., II. 61 (note). Estates, character of two upper, 20 ; privileges of, 20 ; first estate, 20 f ; second estate, 26. Etats Generaux, published by Mirabeau, II. 18 ; sup- pressed, II. 18. Etiquette, of Versailles, 64 ff . ; as to money-affairs, 67, 68. Federation Festival, II. 5. Fersen, Count, on Mirabeau, II. 234. INDEX. 251 Feudalism, in France and Germany, 29 ; in France, 29 f. ; shattered, II. 24. Fifth of October, Lecture VIII. ; origin of insurrection of, II. 47 ff. ; a well-laid plot, II. 55 ; effects of, II. 65. Finances, under anc. reg., 19 ; embarrassments because of, 19 ; example of bankruptcy of court, 69 ; Necker at head of, 100. Flour-war, 97. Foreign clergy, 21 (note). Form, as first law of life, 74 ff . : drawback of, 76. Fourth of August, called an " orgy," II. 24. France, ancien regime (which see) ; resources of, 19 ; at- titude toward Mirabeau, 258 ; fails to appreciate Mirabeau, II. 244 f. Francois (baker), murdered, II. 84. Frederick the Great, absolutism compared with that of Versailles, 63 ; again, 72. Frederick William, 72. French idealism, 258. French literature of 18th century, not a cause but a symp- tom, 142 ff. ; is revolution in abstract, 152. Frochot, II. 139. Qabelle, 36 ; penalties from, 32. Generality, 11. Government, abject senility of, 125 ', drove intellect into opposition, 131 ; logical outcome of insistence on per capita vote, 247 ; abdicates to States-General, 248, 257 ; II. 43 f . Grands bailliages, 122. Grimm, rosy view of future, 151 (note); on prevalence of speculation, 162. Guilds, 47 f . ; proletariat formed by, 48. ELeusser, Ludwig, II. 30. Hamilton, Alexander, on nature of Man, 157. 252 INDEX. Holland, T. E., 156 (note). Hotel de Ville, mob cleared out of, II. 62. Huguenots, Turgot's exertions in behalf of, 134. Intend ant, 11. Jacobin Clttb, Mirabeau president of, II. 208, 220 ; Mira- beau attacked at, II. 227 ff . Jansenism, 133. Jefferson, on king, 95 ; on notables, 112 ; on Lafayette, II. 140. Jesuits, suppressed, 135. Joseph II., letter on French government, 73 (note); criti- cism of French society, 77 (note). Journal historique, 93 (note). Joux, Fort, 202. Kapp, 206 (note). La Fare, on nature of privileges, 227 f . La Marck, 75 ; on composition of States-General, 249 (note) ; II. 5 ; on Lafayette in Versailles, II. 63 f . ; testifies to Mirabeau's innocence concerning Oct. events, II. 67, 68, 81 ; gives memoir of 15th Oct. to Count of Provence, II. 79 ; charges Cice with defeat of Nov. 7th, II. 118 ; is charged with Mirabeau's de- fence, II. 167 ; acts as mediator between court and Mirabeau, II. 176 ; laments incompleteness of con- nection, II. 192 f. ; on Louis XVI., II. 199 ; on Marie Antoinette, II. 202, 212 ; on necessity of intrigue, II. 221 ; on Mirabeau's moral character, II. 238 (note). Lafayette, II. 8, 23 ; attitude on 5th Oct., II. 56, 58 ff. ; lapses of memory in his " Eecollections," II. 60 ; his treachery to Mirabeau, II. 126, 136 : in Versailles, II. 63 ; history of attempted alliance with Mirabeau, II. 88 ff . ; his polit. creed considered, II. 126 (note) ; INDEX. 253 his great power after Oct. events, II. 133 ff. ; reasons why he does not accept alliance with Mirabeau, II. 134 ff . ; his vanity, II. 138 ff . ; defeats Mirabeau's ambition to be president during federation festival, II. 138 f . ; his indecision, II. 143 ff . ; sources of power, II. 145 ff. ; action in veto-question, II. 159 ; denies Mirabeau's venality, II. 179. Lally-Tollendal, II. 23. Lameth, Alexandre, 124 (note); wounded in duel, II. 148 ; attacks Mirabeau at Jacobins, II. 227 f . ; Lamoignon, 114 (note). Lanjuinais, speech against Mirabeau, II. 112. Lantern, as means of execution, II. 56. Law (financier), 103. Le bailli, s. Le chevalier de Mirabeau. Le Tellier (Jesuit), 133. Lemontey, 131. Lettres a Mauvillon, quoted in notes. Lettres de cachet, 198, 199 ; work by Mirabeau on, 214. Levrault, Mirabeau's letters to, II. 11. Limousin, Turgot intendant of, 98 ; Lit de justice, 9 ; of March, 1776, 94. Louis XVI., slave of etiquette, 65 (note) ; education and character, 84, 85 ; La Marck's opinion of, 85 (note) ; expects great things of notables, 113 ; sees through Parliament, 117 (note) ; on States-General in 1776, 120 (note) ; speech at opening of States-General, 240 ; plays a passive part on 5th and 6th Oct., II. 51 ; during 6th Oct., II. 64 ; appoints ministers from Assembly. II. 108 ; chargeable for failure of Mirabeau's plans, II. 193 ; characterized by Montmorin and La Marck, II. 198 f. Louis XIV., maxim of Vitat c'est moi, 3 ; sale of offices under, 16 (note), 26 ; Versailles, creation of, 62 ; prominence of court, 63 f . ; called le roi soleil, 64 ; demoralization of France through, 71 ; hated by people, 81 ; destroys anc. rig., 132 ; his church policy. 132 f . ; results of church policy, 134. 254: INDEX. Louis XV. , principle of government, 3 ; as grain-specu- lator, 71 ; despised by people, 81 ; apres nous le de- luge, 82 and note. Longo, Marquis, 172. Lomenie, 103 (note), 186 (note) ; on Mirabeau's education, 195; injustice of, 198, 199; calls Mirabeau "inex- plicable," II. 2 ; criticism of work of, 2 ff. ; sees only orator in Mirabeau, II. 6 ; criticism of speech of Nov. 6th, II. 96 f. ; refutation of criticism of, II. 99 f . ; praises Mirabeau for conduct at Jacobins, II. 232. Loustalot, II. 49 ; on preparations for 5th Oct., II. 55 (note), 57. Louvois, 101. Lowell, E. L., 13 (note) ; on feudal burdens, 29 ; on rural classes, 30 ; on material prosperity, 38. Lying, in the revolution, II. 50. Mably, on danger of executive power, II. 36. Malesherbes, 91, 105 (note). Malouet, advice to Necker, 233 ; on Mirabeau's clear- sightedness, II. 11 ; on interview with Mirabeau, II. 33, 66. Manuel, 233 (note). Marat, damns Mirabeau, II. 37 ; in Pantheon, II. 243. Marie Antoinette, Mirabeau's favorable opinion of, 85 ; character of, 85 ff. ; Besenval's judgment on, 87 (note) ; contributes to Turgot's overthrow, 95 ; dur- ing 6th of Oct., II. 64; suspects Mirabeau, II. 81, 177 ; proposes to win Mirabeau, II. 177 ; Mirabeau calls her the one man at court, II. 200 ; no trust in Mirabeau, II. 201 ; characterized by La Marck, II. 202. Marignane (Miss), marries Mirabeau, 200 ; character, 201 ; the bailWs opinion of, 201 (notes) ; her adultery, 202. Marriage, character of, under anc. reg., 180 f., 184, 204. INDEX. 255 Masses, their condition, 238 f . ; attitude toward bour- geoisie, 239 ; support sought by Nat. Assembly, 254, 255 ; direct Nat. Assembly, 255. Maupeou, 83. Maurepas, 89 ; history of appointment, 89 (note) ; opposes Turgot, 92 ; Mauvillon, II. 8 and note, 9, 26 (note) ; Mirabeau on his own moderation to, II. 27. Mejan (editor of Mirabeau's speeches), 4 (note) ; II. 118. Memoir of 15th of October, its origin, II. 68 ; analysis of, II. 69 ff . ; its failure, II. 79 ; its penetrating insight, II. 79 f. Mending, by government of Louis XVI. , 83. Mercure de France, II. 53. Mercy d'Argenteau, 85 (note) ; assists in negotiations be- tween court and Mirabeau, II. 176 ff., 192. Mesdames (daughters of Louis XV.), table expenses, 69 ; influence appointment of Maurepas, 89 and note ; incident connected with their flight, II. 224 f . Metra, on pol. inexperience of States-General, 250. Mirabeau, Jean Antoine, in wars of Louis XIV., 167 ; Mirabeau genuine grandson of, 215. Mirabeau, Victor Riquette, Marquis de, on agriculture, 31; on Paris, 61 ; prophesies as to result of Necker's sys- tem, 103 ; aversion to son, 164 ff. ; sows his wild oats, 169 ; settles down, 170 ; his economical labors, 170 ; his moralizing tendency, 170 f., 177; humanitarian, 171 ; believer in blue blood, 171 ; want of balance, 172, 173 ; devotion to mother, 172 ; son of anc. reg., 174 ; sensitiveness, 175 (note) ; family ambition, 176 ; failure of speculations, 177 ; stubbornness, 178 ; scribomania, 179 ; paternalism, 180 ; marries, 180 f. ; takes a mistress, 184 ; guilt apportioned, 187 ; threatens to send son to Dutch colonies, 197 and note, 198 ; uses lettres de cachet, 199 ; requests to have Mirabeau locked up, 205 and note ; sends son to Vincennes, 207 ; reasons for releasing him, 208 ; tes- 256 INDEX. tifies to son's oratory, 216 ; destroys his son's career, 218. Mirabeau, chevalier de (le bailli), on Paris, 57 (note) ; on flour-war, 97 (note) ; most estimable character, 168 ; his wild youth, 168 and note ; on his brother, 175 (note) ; on brother's speculations, 177 ; on Mme. de Pailly, 186 (note) ; on Mirabeau's wife, 201 (notes) ; on his brother's treatment of son, 209, 210 (note), II. 25 ; on his nephew's intelligence, II. 68. Mirabeau, Marquise de, marriage, 180 f . ; character, 182 : adultery, 183 ; her lawsuit, 183 ; Mirabeau champions her cause, 205. Mirabeau, 4, 10, 24 (rjote), 27 ; on Paris, 45 ; on money- favors of court, 70 ; under spell of form, 75 ; opinion of M. Antoinette, 85 ; reason for Calonne's failure, 109 (note) ; view of Calonne's end, 110 ; reason for joy at convocation of Notables, 113 ; claims to have advised convocation of Notables, 113 (note) ; on par- liament, 117 (note), 118 and note ; on necessity of summoning States-General, 126 (note) ; his birth, 164 ; sensuality, 182 and note ; influence of household on, 188 ; father's treatment of, 189, 190 ff . ; natural in- telligence, 189, 190 ; charm exercised by, 192 and note ; degraded to common rank, 195 ; in army, 197 ; nature of guilt, 197 ; tendency to contract debts, 200 ; marries, 200 ; falls in love with Sophie, 202 ; flight and sentence, 203 f . ; his manner against his father, 205 ; at Vincennes, 206 f . ; released, 207 ; tribute to his father, 208 : sufferings at Vincennes, 210 ; essay on Despotism, 212 ; on Lettres de Cachet, 214 ; polit. importance of, 214, 217 ; announcement of pol. creed, 215 ; returns to prison voluntarily, 215 ; his oratory, 216 ; literary excellence of writings, 217 ; necessity of States-General, 234 ; joy over convocation, 235 ; his moderation, 236 ; his disgust with Necker, 236 f., 245 ; on Necker's speech, 241 f . ; on inexperience of States- General, 250 ; on French national character, 251 ; on unwieldiness of Assembly, 252 ; on control of As- INDEX. 257 sembly by masses, 255 ; II. 22, 46 ; on untoward con- ditions for making constitution, 257 ; is hissed, II. 1 ; selfishness not mainspring of activity, II. 4f., 39 f. ; forms party of one man, II. 7 ; opinion of his own statesmanship, II. 8 (note) ; his practicality, II. 9, 10, 23, 24, 25 f., 31, 211 ; his programme, II. 11, 13, 17 f. ; his clear-sightedness, II. 12 ; on 23d of June, II. 14 f . ; on 4th of Aug. 24 f . ; his revolutionary spirit, II. 14 f . ; his royalism, II. 12, 29 ; his moderation, II. 17, 19, 27 f., 33 ; debate on assuming name of Nat. Assembly, II. 20 ; predicts despotism, II. 22 ; fears despotism of Assembly, II. 30 ; his foresight, II. 33, 35, 67, 79 ; his interview with Necker, II. 34 ; pro- gramme proposed to Montmorin, II. 34 f. ; insists on strong executive, II. 36 f., 66; his courage, II. 37, 38 f . , 85 ; conduct on 5th and 6th Oct. , II. 66 f . ; ques- tion of participation in Oct. events, II. 67 f . , 80 f. ; Memoir of the 15th Oct., II. 68 ff. ; his plan for sal- vation, II. 75 ff. ; his character, II. 83 f., 237 (note), 238 and note ; attempts to form alliance with Lafa- yette, II. 88 ff . ; is offered ambassadorship, II. 89 ; great speech of Nov. 6th., II. 96 ff. ; analysis of speech, II. 100 ff. ; considers means to establish con- cert between executive and legislative, II. 104 ff . moves to give ministers seat in Assembly, II. 108 his speech of the 7th, II. 113 ff. ; his defeat, II. 117 his noble patriotism, II. 119 and note, 121 ; on neces- sity of reconsidering decree of Nov. 7th, II. 120 f . ; was he without a consistent policy ? II. 128 ff. ; absolute necessity of winning or destroying Lafayette, II. 133 ff . ; shares blame of defeat, II. 134 ; strictures on Lafayette, II. 142 ff . ; analyzes sources of Lafayette's power, I. 145 ; proposes to put Nat. Guard under order of king, II. 149 ; proposes reorganization of army, II. 153 ; attitude on question of peace and war, II. 154 f . ; attitude on question of royal veto, II. 158 f. ; attitude on question of assigyiats, II. 161 ff . ; attitude on church question, II. 165 ff . ; 17 258 INDEX. measure of guilt for evil effects, II. 166 ; question of guilt of connection with court, II. 169 ; mitigating circumstances, II. 169 ff . ; carelessness about money, II. 171 f . ; is not venal, II. 172 f . , 178 ; his connection with Monsieur after Nov. 7th, II. 174 f. ; history of connection with court, II. 176 ff . ; joy at overtures, II. 177 ; his prof ession of faith of May 10th, II. 178 f., 181 ff . ; the pecuniary agreement, II. 178 f . ; faithful- ness to revolution and to king, II. 182 ff., 188 ff. ; de- prived of influence on executive, II. 193 f . ; connec- tion between him and Montmorin, II. 195 ; his am- biguous position, II. 197, 203 ff., 209, 214 ff., 219, 242 ; President of Jacobins, II. 208, 220 ; his means become less reputable, II. 220 ; President of Assembly, II. 223 ; defends right of emigration, II. 224 f . ; attacked at Jacobins, II. 227 ff. ; his death, II. 235, 243 ; the weight of his past, II. 236 f. ; personal causes of failure, II. 236 ff . ; constructive statesman, II. 241 ; suffers fate of Cassandra, II. 242 ; France unable to do justice to him, II. 244 f. Mirabeau-Tonneau (younger brother of former), 172 (note). Mirabeau's wife, s. Marignane. Monnier, Sophie de, Mirabeau falls in love with, 202, 203 ; relations to husband, 203. Monsieur, s. Provence, Count de. Montesquieu, defends sale of offices, 17 (note); on Paris, 59. Montigny, 172 (note); on Marquis Mirabeau, 179 ; II. 232 (note). Montlosier, II. 87 ; speech against Mirabeau, II. 112. Montmorin, 118 (note), 270 ; warned by Mirabeau, II. 32 f . ; refuses to see Mirabeau, II. 34 ; connection be- tween him and Mirabeau, II. 195 ; on Louis XVI., II. 198. Morris, Gouverneur, on the French masses, 238 ; on Necker's opening speech, 241 ; on Barentin's speech, 243 ; on reception given Mirabeau in Assembly, 259. INDEX. 259 Mounier, leads deputation of women to king, II. 63 ; answer to Mirabeau, II. 66. Napoleon, II. 79. National Assembly, s. States-General ; moderate charac- ter of, 242 ; wanting in practical statesmanship, II. 9, 117 ; does too much, II. 13 f.; prospective slavery of, II. 32 ; disagreement with Paris, II. 43 ; invaded by . women, II. 62 f . ; inconsistent course in question of interdependence between legislative and executive, II. 108 ff. ; decrees itself infallible, II. 124 ; thanks Bouille, II. 152; destroys executive, II. 155 ff. ; adopts suspensive veto, II. 159 ; self-destructive effects, II. 160. National Guard, is assurance of order, II. 44, 57, 58 ; Mirabeau's plan respecting, II. 149 ; compromise- measure adopted, II. 149 ; degeneration of, II. 150 f. Necker, 18 (note), 19 ; at head of finances, 100 ; view of ability of, 100 f.; foolish policy, 101 ff. ; reforms effected by, 103 ; his compterendu, 103 ff. ; dismissed, 106 ; reappointment of, 125 ; on proposed perma- nence of States-General, 229 ; leaves everything to haphazard, 230 ; has no programme, 233 f . ; speech at opening of States-General, 241 ; effect of dismissal, II. 21 ; interview with Mirabeau, II. 34 ; judgment of Mirabeau on, II. 69 ; Oct. interview with Mira- beau, II. 92. Nobility, 26 ff.; transformed into a privileged class, 26; character of lower, 26 f . ; Mirabeau on, 27 ; higher, 27 f. ; humanitarian spirit of, 31 ; position as class in state, 32 f . ; no moral right to claim immunity, 32 ; direct and indirect taxation of, 33 f. ; blue blood theory of, 41 ; petition of peers of 1717, 42 ; at Ver- sailles, 65; wealth of, 67 (note); appeals to king for money, 68 ; offices created for, 69. Notables, assembly of, 110 ; composition of, 110 ; Ca- lonne's plan with regard to, 111 ; sarcastic reception 260 INDEX. of, 112 ; their single reform, 112 ; political import- ance of, 114. Octroi, 54. Oelsner, on Mirabeau's defence at Jacobins, II. 228. Oncken, 94 ; doubts Mirabeau's sanity, II. 217 (note). Optimism, epidemic, 237. Orleans, Duke of, relation to events of Oct., II. 61 and note. Palais Royal, II. 41 ; assists in regeneration of France, II. 45, 53. Pantbeon, Mirabeau's remains deposited in, II. 243. Paris, Mirabeau on, 45, 58 (note); necessity of under- standing, 45 f . ; complex nature of, 46 ; masses of, 46 f.; view of le bailli on, 57 (note); upper orders in, 58 ; growth of, 59 ; ascendency of, 59 ; Montesquieu on, 59 ; Mirabeau's father on, 61 ; position criticised by Mirabeau, II. 71. Parliaments, 8 ; character of legislative power, 8 ; origin of legislative power, 8 (note); crushed, 122 ; reply of Parliament of Toulouse, 122 ; claim to be represent- ative, 144 ; of Rouen demands account of revenue, 145 (note); of Aix condemns a papal brief, 147. Parliament of Paris, attitude toward guilds, 47 ; recalled from exile, 92, 93; later attitude, 116; opposition for its own sake, 117 ; escapes from exile by bargain, 119 ; its declaration of principle, 120 ; crushed, 122 ; sudden unpopularity of, 231. Patriots, succeed economists, 149 ; their object, 149. Pays d'etat, 5. Pays Selection, 6. Peasantry, condition of, 29 ff. ; s. clergy and nobility. Pensions, s. nobility ; amount of, under Necker, 70. Per capita, vote by, 243. Philadelphia Convention, compared with Nat. Assembly, 253. INDEX. 261 Philosophers, constituting opposition, 138 ; compared with reformers of 16th century, 138 ; leave one tenet of anc. reg. untouched, 142. Philosophic spirit, s. philosophers ; in cabinet, 148 ; complete victory of, 152 ; does not base on fact, 153 ff. Pierre-en-Cise, 211. Place de Greve, II. 56. Pompadour, Mme., 89. Pontarlier, 202 ; Mirabeau returns to prison in, 215. Portalis, pitted against Mirabeau at Aix, 216. Press, liberty of, granted, 232. Privileges, s. clergy and nobility ; moral disintegration caused by, 39, ff. ; consequences of destruction of, 44 ; in domain of labor, 47 ; upper orders cling to, 227 f. ; Mirabeau against, II. 11, 12. Proletariat, 48, 49 ; pauperism of, 49 ; growing despair and lawlessness of, 50 f. ; becomes sovereign of France, II. 65. Provence, Comte de, receives memoir of 15th Oct., II. 79 ; connection with Mirabeau, II. 174 and note. Provence, claims to being a distinct "nation," 6 ; effect of hot sun of, 167. Provinces, dependence on Paris, 60 ; Young's experience with, 60. Public opinion, infallibility of, 141 ; Necker's tribute to, 141 (note). Quesnay, 170. Rabaut Saint Eteenne, on possessions of nobility, 67 (note). Reason, dominant, 139 ; dogmatism of, 140 ; defects of, 154. Resources, s. France. Republicanism, at court, 78 ; confused nature of, 79. 262 INDEX. Revolutionary spirit, how far Mirabeau was identified with, II. 14. Rights of man, discussion of, II. 23, 24. Robespierre, on bourgeoisie, 53. Rocquain, on recall of Parliament, 93 (note) ; on flour- war, 97 (note) ; on expulsion of Jesuits, 135, 137, 151. Roland, Mme., epigram on liberty, 163. Rosen, court duties of, 65. Rouen, chosen as retreat for king, II. 76, 77. Rousseau, 34 ; influence on society, 78 ; effect of writings on bourgeoisie, 150 ; on constitution of society, 153 and note ; his doctrine of equality tested, 155 f. ; his doctrine of man's nature considered, 157 f . ; does not consider himself a practical statesman, 159 ; poison in teachings of, 160, 161. Saillant, du, 208 (note). Saillant, Mme. du (Mirabeau's sister), II. 119 (note). Salons, engage in polit. discussion, 149. Sansculottes, 53. Seance royale, 120 ; of 23d of June, II. 14 f. Seguier, 152 (note). Segur, on republicanism of Society, 80. Seven Years' War, effect of disasters of, 144. Sieves, on reign of terror, 55 ; on third estate, 57 ; on science of politics, 158 ; does not propose to put doc- trines into practice, 159 ; rebuked by Mirabeau, II. 10. Soulavie, 95 (note), 111 (note), 118 (note), 121 (note). Spontaneous anarchy, 240. St. Antoine, 52, 61. St. Marceau, 52, 61. St. Huruge, Marquis de, heads mob for Versailles, II. 44. Stael (Mme. de) testimony as to repub. spirit of Paris, 150, 232 (note) ; repeats Necker's conversation with Mirabeau, II. 92 ; on Mirabeau, II. 214. States-General, convened last in 1614, 41 ; term becomes popular, 119 ; inevitableness of, 126 and note ; de- INDEX. 263 manded by clergy, 137 ; negative import of, 219 : belong to anc. reg., 219 and note ; hist, views of power, 220 ; task assigned them by government, 221 ; in- definiteness of task, 221 ff. ; inevitable disagreement of, 224, 225 f . ; question of vote by orders discussed, 228 f. ; obstinate on vote per capita, 244 ff. ; com- position of, 248 ; no political experience, 249 ff . ; want of unity of aim, 251 f. ; size, 252 ; bears char- acter of constituent Assembly, 253, 256 ; situation at meeting of, II. 10 f. ; constituted Nat. Assembly, II. 20 f. States-General (Holland), surrender Mirabeau, 206. Stephens, H. M., on deputies to States-General, 248 ; on Mirabeau's statesmanship, II. 9. Stock-jobbing, under Necker, 102. Taille, 34. Taille noble, 227. Taine, on aristocracy before rev., 32 ; en blocs thinking of peasantry, 38, 39, 58 (note) ; on Versailles under anc. reg., 62, 77 ; on revol. before revol., 151 ; on import of cry of return to nature, 153 ; " spontane- ous anarchy," 240 ; II. 62 (note). Talleyrand, 113. Talon, II. 94 ; attempts to bring Lafayette to a decis- ion, II. 95. Taxes, inequality of, 20 ; method of levying, 35 ; inequal- ity of province in regard to, 36. Terray, 83, 117 (note). Third estate, s. under clergy, nobility, and peasantry ; position toward other two, 41 ; demands recogni- tion of equality, 227 ; double number of representa- tives, 230 and note. Thouret, Mirabeau replies to, II. 30. Tocqueville, view on centralization, 10 ; view on new provincial assemblies, 123 (note). Toulon, murdered, II. 23, 38. 264 INDEX. Troyes, parliament at, 119. Turgot, on villages under anc. reg., 12, 13 ; reforms in taxation, 36, 47 ; on selfishness of cities, 54 ; as con- trdleur general, 91 ; opposition to, 91, 92 ; attitude toward exiled parliament, 92, and note ; dismissed, 94, 95 ; his reforms annulled, 96 ; effect of dismissal, 98 f. ; warns king against American war, 101 (note), 105 (note), 109 ; article, " Fondation," 148 ; optimist 237. Unigenitus (bull), 133, 134. United States, II. 103. Vauvenargues, on Marquis Mirabeau, 179. Vassan (Miss), marries Marquis Mirabeau, 180 f . Versailles, focus of ancien regime, 62 ; ruins nobility, 67 ; mob starts for, II. 53 ff . Vincennes (dungeon), 198, 207. Voltaire, in Bastille, 42 ; ecrasez Vinfame, 138 (note) ; as apostle of reason, 140 ; predicts growing opposition of parliament, 144 ; article on grain, 147 ; on de- structive spirit of philosophers, 163. Von Gleichen, on Marquis Mirabeau's treatment of son, 191. Von Sybel, 40. Weber, 114 (note) ; on Brienne's campaign against priv- ileged orders, 232 (note). Women, insurrection of, s. 5th of October. Young, Arthur, on activity of Paris, 60. DC 141 v.Z THE LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Santa Barbara Goleta, California THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW. AVAILABLE FOR CIRCULATION AFTER DISPLAY PERIOD SEP 9tH> kJC 3Mv-< - s 291967 i0m-8,'60(B2594s4)476 II Hi EBBau Hi MT HI ■ UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 000 173 309 6 §£&&£ m