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 LIBRARY 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 SANTA BARBARA 
 
 PRESENTED BY 
 
 MRS. MACKINLEY HELM 
 
 IffHHHEBH 

 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 
 
 TESTED BY MIEABEAU'S CAliEER 
 
 TWELVE LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH 
 
 REVOLUTION, DELIVERED AT THE LOWELL 
 
 INSTITUTE, BOSTON, JIASS. 
 
 BY 
 
 H. VON IIOLST 
 
 Vol. II. 
 
 CHICAGO 
 
 CALLAGHAN & COMPANY 
 
 1S94
 
 Copyright, 1894, 
 
 BY 
 
 CALLAGHAN & COMPANY 
 
 t
 
 DC 
 / k / 
 
 u ' LIBRARY 
 
 /// UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA' 
 
 SANTA BARBARA 
 
 SDeMcatefc 
 
 TO 
 MY WIFE, 
 
 ANNIE ISABELLE, ne'e HATT, 
 
 IN TOKEN OP GRATITUDE 
 
 FOB THE SYMPATHY AND AID 
 
 GIVEN ME FOR TWENTY-TWO YEARS 
 
 IN MY LITERARY LABORS.
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 Vol. II. 
 
 LECTURE PAGE 
 
 VII. "The Party of One Man " 1 
 
 VIII. The 5th and 6th of October, 17S9, and the 
 
 Memoir of the 15th 41 
 
 IX. The Decisive Defeat of (he 7th of November. . . . 8:) 
 
 X. Other Defeats and Mischievous Victories 128 
 
 XI. Mirabeaii and the Court 167 
 
 XII. The End. A Unique Tragedy 207
 
 THE FfiENCH DEVOLUTION. 
 
 TESTED BY 
 
 THE CAREER OF MIRABEAU. 
 
 LECTURE VII. 
 The Party of One Man. 
 
 At the solemn opening of the States-General, as 
 we heard Mirabeau say, " they were drunk with 
 the desire to applaud, and they applauded unto 
 satiety." As to one man, however, the assembly 
 made an exception. Gouverneur Morris, who was 
 present, reports, that when Mirabeau entered, he 
 was " hissed." The days came when he was more 
 thunderingly applauded than any one else, but at 
 the same time hissing never ceased, and it is still 
 continued, I am tempted to say, not only in 
 France, but by France. Not to applaud him is
 
 2 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 impossible, for it would only prove that one is too 
 dull to understand that he was a genius. But it 
 is with a kind of reluctance and a somewhat apolo- 
 getic air that France glories in him, while the 
 hissing is not done with regret. There is an 
 undertone of elation in the moral satisfaction 
 derived from it. It seems to say : " There is, of 
 course, no denying that he was the greatest orator 
 of the revolution, but don't insult me by supposing 
 that this betrays me into not taking him at his 
 true worth." 
 
 This applies also to his best biographer. Mr. 
 Lomenie once calls him " the inexplicable man." 1 
 Some historians might have hesitated to write and 
 publish several stout volumes on a man, so long as 
 they had to confess to themselves that they failed 
 to understand him. Happily Mr. Lomenie did not 
 think so — happily, for he has brought many new 
 facts to light and enabled us to see in many re- 
 spects more clearly and more correctly. Mirabeau's 
 biography, however, must needs still be written, 
 for it evidently can only be written by a man who 
 does understand him. 
 
 That Mr. Lomenie did not succeed in this is, in 
 my opinion, due to the following causes : — 
 1 CEuvres., II. 436.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 3 
 
 The historian lias to be an uncompromising 
 searcher for truth. In searching for truth he has, 
 however, not to be animated b} T the spirit of the 
 state attorney working up a case, but by that broad 
 sympathy capable of seeing that, if men and times 
 are but really understood, the moral guilt of their 
 follies and crimes almost always appears diminished 
 by one-half. Men, however, never can be really un- 
 derstood, if they are not judged as children of their 
 times. I am far from charging Mr. Lomenie with 
 having overlooked this ; but, I think, he has not 
 allowed it all the weight that must be accorded to 
 it. Much of what ought to be charged against the 
 times — principally or, at least, to a considerable 
 extent — is made to appear, altogether or chiefly, 
 an item of Mirabeau's personal account. He is a 
 genuine son of his times. Not only their character- 
 istic brilliant traits, but their follies and vices also 
 have in him a pre-eminent representative. 
 
 Mr. Lome'nie, besides, has not found his way out 
 of the maze of contradictions presented by Mira- 
 beau's character. He has not kept sufficiently in 
 mind that almost all men are a compound of in- 
 consistencies and self-contradictions. Truly har- 
 monious and thoroughly consistent characters are 
 so rare, that they might be called white ravens,
 
 4: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 but with most men — and especially uncommon 
 men — there is one predominant trait, and this 
 furnishes the key to the character. Mr. Lome'nie 
 thinks he has discovered this predominant trait in 
 Mirabeau's character, but having unconsciously 
 approached his task with the spirit of the state 
 attorney, he necessarily got into a wrong track, 
 and every step led him further away from the 
 correct solution of the problem. Mirabeau's 
 policy, he asserts, " is, then as always, an essen- 
 tially personal policy," directed by the " passions 
 and calculations of personal interest." 1 It is true, 
 so long as Mirabeau, to a great extent by his own 
 fault, practically lives without any task, impure 
 and unscrupulous egotism is indeed to a revolting 
 degree the propelling force of his life. But the 
 more ambition asserts itself as his dominant 
 passion, the more also purer and higher motives 
 contend for the mastery with this egotism ; and 
 when the revolution at last furnished him with a 
 task worthy of his genius and adapted to his 
 character, they are, in the main, to such a degree 
 in the ascendant, that the charge only proves how 
 utterly the biographer has, in fact, failed to under- 
 stand his hero. 
 
 1 Corresp., V. 318, 319.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 5 
 
 Sure enough, Mirabeau writes himself on July 
 17, 1790, to La Marck : "If one has not more 
 energy and does not dispose of more means, I 
 shall soon be forced to a change of role without 
 a change of will ; for after all my strength is my 
 existence, and in the general conflagration I must 
 needs employ it for myself, if I find no way of 
 applying it to the public welfare." 1 These lines, 
 however, only apparently sustain Lomenie's accu- 
 sation. If properly read, they are a striking refu- 
 tation of it. The declaration, that in future he 
 will eventually be guided by his personal interests, 
 manifestly implies the assertion that this has thus 
 far not been the case ; and this declaration is a 
 warning, nay a threat, provoked by deep patriotic 
 dismay, because the king had once more so piti- 
 ably failed to improve the opportunities offered 
 three days before by the Federation festival. 
 Besides, the emphasis is to be laid on the assurance, 
 that his will is not to change. So long as he 
 lived up to this promise, he could not fail to find 
 some way to use his strength for the public wel- 
 fare — if no longer to effect any positive good, at 
 least to avert greater evils. The grain of truth, 
 which Lomenie's assertion contains also as to the 
 1 Corresp., II. 102.
 
 6 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 period of the revolution, is confined to the confes- 
 sion : " My strength is my existence." Though 
 his despondency more than once became so great, 
 that he professed to be longing and ready to 
 abandon the field, he never could have done it. 
 So long as things could become worse than they 
 were, he had to stay in the thick of the battle. 
 With him it could be ended only with his exist- 
 ence — and primarily, not because patriotism re- 
 quired this of him, but because his strength was 
 his existence. His father was right, when he 
 wrote as early as 1771 : " At bottom I am afraid, 
 that to calm him down and to extinguish him 
 would amount to pretty much the same thing." 
 
 As Mr. Lomenie is satisfied that personal in- 
 terest was the determining element in Mirabeau's 
 policy, it goes without saying that he, like most 
 Frenchmen, thinks his claim to greatness rests 
 principally upon his eloquence. Unquestionably, 
 as the miraculous lance is essential to the Achilles 
 of the poet, so his oratorical pre-eminence is 
 essential to the historic Mirabeau. But the 
 oratorical powers of the Titan of the first period of 
 the revolution, no more constitute this Titan than 
 the lance of Achilles was Achilles. 
 
 Lome'nie feels himself that Mirabeau held an
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 7 
 
 absolutely unique position in the Assembly, and 
 this was certainly not due to his being the great- 
 est of its orators. Louis Blanc very felicitously 
 characterizes this unique position. He closes 
 the description of the three main party groups, 
 which were gradually evolved in the Assembly by 
 the political contest, with the graphic sentence : 
 " The fourth party consisted of one man, Mira- 
 beau." 
 
 Yes, and he not only was a party by himself, 
 but he knew beforehand that it would be so, and 
 was determined, that it should be so. He writes, 
 in May, 1789 : " It is to undertake a proud and 
 difficult task to minister to the public welfare 
 without sparing any party, without worshipping 
 the idol of the day, without other arms than 
 reason and truth, respecting them everywhere, 
 respecting nothing but them, having no other 
 friends than them, no other enemies than their 
 adversaries, not recognizing another monarch than 
 one's conscience, no other judge than time. Well ! 
 I shall perhaps succumb in this enterprise, but I 
 shall persist in it. " 1 
 
 This being the lofty task he intends to assume, 
 
 1 " Mais jen'y reculerai pas." I think this implies more 
 than only not to shrink from it. — Corresp., I. 349.
 
 8 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 it could not be personal ambition alone that 
 caused him to write to his father immediately after 
 his arrival in Provence : " This will be my com- 
 pass : I must be a member of the States-General." 
 In a letter to Mauvillon * he states his other con- 
 sideration with blunt directness : I have " the 
 presumption to believe myself useful and even 
 necessary to them." Necessary in the strict sense 
 of the word, and he says with the same blunt 
 directness why so. In his Note of June 20, 1790, 
 he urges the queen to force Lafayette to conclude 
 an alliance with him, by telling him : " M. de 
 Mirabeau is the only statesman of this country ; 
 no one else has his ensemble, his courage and 
 his character." 2 So it was. Many others were — in 
 a high, and partly even in a higher degree than he 
 — endowed with this or that quality of the states- 
 man, but he alone was a statesman in the full 
 sense of the word, for in him alone all the re- 
 quired qualities were combined, and of the most 
 essential ones he was possessed in an eminent 
 
 1 Sept. 22, 1788. Lettres a Mauvillon, 396. 
 
 2 Corresp., II. 42. To Mauvillon he had written : " Quand 
 vous aurez hi (the papers which he sends him), j'ose dire que 
 votre estime redoublera, et que vous direz : Voild enfin un 
 Frangais qui est ne avec Vdme, la tete et le caractere dliomme 
 public." — Lettres a Mauvillon, 462.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 9 
 
 degree. Mr. Stephens hits the nail on the head in 
 saying : " He was essentially a practical states- 
 man, and that is the reason why his character is 
 so little appreciated by Frenchmen." 1 
 
 The first requirement of the practical statesman 
 is fully to understand the situation, i. e., to base 
 his calculations and his acts completely and ex- 
 clusively upon the stern facts, and not upon what 
 might be and ought to be. If the National 
 Assembly and its successors were wanting in any- 
 thing it was this, and if any one thing can be 
 designated as the main root of the follies, crimes, 
 and disasters of the revolution, it is this. Mirabeau 
 did not need the painful lessons of experience to 
 learn this truth, and to realize its overshadowing 
 import. And if he could be justly charged with 
 inconsistency in every other respect, unswerving 
 and relentless consistency characterizes his politi- 
 cal career in the application of this truth. Half 
 a year before the States-General meet, he writes 
 to Mauvillon : " Three roads must lead us to the 
 most inalterable indulgence : the consciousness of 
 our own shortcomings, the discretion which is afraid 
 to be unjust, and the desire to do good, which, as it 
 cannot recast either men or things, must try to 
 1 Hist, of the Fr. Rev., I. 430.
 
 10 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 derive advantage from all that is, as it is." * And 
 ere the organization of the Assembly is effected, 
 he rebukes Sieves and warns the deputies of the 
 third estate, saying : " There is this essential 
 difference between the metaphysician, who, in the 
 meditation of the study, grasps the truth in its 
 energetic purity, and the statesman who has to 
 take into account the antecedents, the difficulties, 
 the obstacles ; there is, I say, this difference be- 
 tween the instructor of the people and the political 
 administrator, that the one thinks exclusively of 
 ivhat is, and the other occupies himself with what 
 can be." 2 
 
 Now what was the situation at the meeting of 
 the States-General ? Its determining features can 
 be stated in three sentences. A revolution was 
 not impending, but the country was in the midst 
 of a revolution ; in certain directions this revolu- 
 tion had to be radical, if the political and social 
 
 1 Oct. 22, 1788. Lettres a Mauvillon, 416. In the same 
 letter he says : " En verite, dans un certain sens tout m'est 
 bon ; les evenemens, les hommes, les choses, les opinions ; 
 tout a une anse, une prise. Je deviens trop vieux pour user 
 mon reste de force a des guerres ; je veux la mettre a aider 
 qui aident. . . N'excommunions personne et associons-nous 
 a quiconque a un cote sociable. Mai est ee qui nuit, bien est 
 ce qui sert. Nous devons nous garder d'etre ennemis des 
 autres ecoles ; c'est la posterite qui marquera les rangs." 
 
 2 OEuvres, I. 237.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 11 
 
 regeneration f the commonwealth was to be 
 effected ; if proper measures were not taken at 
 once, the revolution was sure to rush beyond the 
 proper limits and thereby itself put its achieve- 
 ments into the greatest jeopardy. From the out- 
 set Mirabeau consciously plants his feet firmly and 
 squarely upon these three basal facts. 
 
 As to the first, sufficient proof has already been 
 adduced by some quotations I had to give in 
 former lectures. In a few minutes I shall offer 
 one more. 
 
 As to the second, he wrote, on the 16th of 
 August, 1788, to Levrault : 2 " War against the priv- 
 ileged classes and against privileges, that is my 
 device." And when, in January, 1789, a Paris 
 paper called him " a mad dog, upon whom the 
 Provencaux could not bestow the slightest confi- 
 dence," he replied : " If I am a mad dog, that is 
 an excellent reason to elect me, for despotism 
 and privileges will die of my bite." 2 His revolu- 
 tionary programme is comprised in these two sen- 
 tences. He never extended it beyond them. But 
 from the first it was perfectly clear to him that 
 the revolution would be more than loth to stop 
 there. Malouet, who is not subject to the suspi- 
 1 Memoires, V. 187-189. 2 lb., V. 269.
 
 12 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 cion of being biased in his favor, testifies in his 
 Memoirs : " He is perhaps the only one in the 
 Assembly who has seen from the beginning the 
 revolution in its true spirit — that of a total subver- 
 sion." Indeed, from the beginning. More than 
 four months before the meeting of the States-Gen- 
 eral, he wrote to the minister Montmorin : 1 "I, as 
 citizen, tremble for the royal authority, which is 
 more than ever necessary at the moment that it is 
 at the verge of its ruin. Never was a crisis more 
 embarrassing and presented more pretexts for 
 license ; never was a coalition of the privileged 
 classes so menacing to the king, so dangerous to 
 the nation ; never did a national Assembly 
 threaten to be so stormy as that which is going to 
 decide the fate of the monarchy, and to which one 
 comes with so much precipitation and mutual dis- 
 trust." 
 
 Why he is determined to wage a war of exter- 
 mination upon the privileges is distinctly stated 
 in the before-mentioned letter to Levrault : 
 " The privileges are useful against the kings, but 
 they are detestable against the nations, and ours 
 will never have any public spirit as long as it is 
 not delivered of them. For this reason we ought 
 1 Dec. 28, 1788. Corresp., I. 340.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 13 
 
 to remain, and I, personally, shall be very monarch- 
 ical. 1 Ah, forsooth, what would a republic be, 
 composed of all the aristocracies that gnaw us ? 
 The abode of the most active tyranny." 
 
 And in the same letter he states, as succinctly, 
 why he confines his revolutionary programme to a 
 war of extermination upon the privileges and 
 despotism. " Do not let us undertake too much. 
 Concurrence (of the States-General) in regard to 
 taxes and loans, civil liberty, periodical assemblies, 
 those are three capital points which must be based 
 upon an explicit declaration of national rights. 
 The rest will come quick enough." 
 
 " Do not let us undertake too much ! " In Octo- 
 ber, 1790, he writes : " Because the Assembly has 
 got stuck fast by doing too much, it is crushed by 
 the ruins it has heaped up." 2 And in December 
 
 1 Je vous suppli de m'engager envers M. de Montoaorin (in 
 soliciting his support to get Mirabeau elected to the States- 
 General) a tout ce a quoi vous vous engageriez vous-meme a 
 ma place, et a rien de plus. Je puis promettre d'epargner 
 Tindividu (Necker). Je ne puis pas promettre de respecter 
 ou menager d'autres principes que les miens. Mais ce qui 
 est tres-vrai, et ce qu'on peut croire, c'est que je serais dans 
 l'Assemblee nationale tres-zele monarchiste, parce que je 
 sens profondement combien nous avons besoin de tuer le 
 despotisme ministeriel, et de relever l'autorite royale." — 
 Mirabeau, Nov. 16, 1788, to the Due de Lauzun. — Memoires, 
 V. 200. 
 
 2 Corresp., I. 214.
 
 14 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 of the same year : " The work (of the Assembly) 
 in its entirety presents to the eyes of the observer 
 only an inextricable chaos, in which the legisla- 
 tor has lost himself by doing too much." 1 But 
 it did not take him until the fall of 1790 to see 
 that the Assembly realized every day, more and 
 more, what he, before the meeting of the States- 
 General, perceived to be the greatest danger. 
 From the first moment he was fully aware of it, 
 and therefore from the first moment he threw him- 
 self with equal energy into the two antagonistic 
 parts, which the circumstances compelled him to 
 play to his last hour. 
 
 He was universally looked upon as the very im- 
 personation of the fierce and implacable revolu- 
 tionary spirit. And that he was — to the extent of 
 his own revolutionary programme. Irrevocably 
 he was resolved to cany this out at any cost, to 
 break down at any risk every resistance to it, from 
 whatever quarter it be offered, for not to do so 
 was with him to renounce with full consciousness 
 the regeneration of France and to abandon her to 
 her fate. It was he who, on the 23d of June, after 
 the sSanee royale, without any authority from his 
 co-deputies, dared to speak in their name and tell 
 1 Corresp., II. 443.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 15 
 
 the master of ceremonies, that the order of the 
 king would not be obeyed. Whether he did it in 
 the exact words handed down by tradition is a 
 very irrelevant question, of importance is only the 
 incontestable fact, that he took the initiative and 
 forced his colleagues to the alternative, either to 
 cover themselves with inextinguishable shame by 
 shrinking from the task they had sworn in the 
 tennis court to fulfil, or to challenge the govern- 
 ment and the conservatives of the upper orders to 
 appeal to force. And when, in the beginning of 
 July, the concentration of troops around Versailles 
 and Paris indicates, that a new coup oVetat is con- 
 templated, it is again he that steps forward, mov- 
 ing an address to the king, not only praying, but 
 also warning him to desist. 
 
 " Have they foreseen, the advisers of these 
 measures, have they foreseen, what consequences 
 they must have even for the safety of the throne ? 
 Have they studied in the history of all nations, 
 how the revolutions have commenced, how they 
 have been brought about? Have they observed 
 hy what a pernicious concatenation of circum- 
 stances, the most moderate minds are thrown out 
 of the bounds of all moderation, and by what a 
 terrible impulse an intoxicated people plunges
 
 16 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 into excesses, the first idea of which would have 
 made it tremble ? " * And with a lucidity, which 
 ought to have carried conviction even to the dull 
 intellect of Louis XVI., he states the reason why 
 the crown would stake its very existence in an 
 attempt to prevent the Assembly from carrying- 
 out his programme. 
 
 " How can the people fail to become agitated, if 
 one awakens its apprehensions in regard to the 
 only hope that is still left to it ? Does it not 
 know that, if we do not break its chains, we shall 
 have rendered them heavier, we shall have riveted 
 oppression, unshielded we shall have delivered 
 our fellow-citizens to the pitiless rod of their 
 enemies, we shall have increased the insolence of 
 the triumph of those who rob and insult them ? " 
 So it unquestionably was ; and therefore no choice 
 was left to the Assembly. If the government 
 once more threw the glove into its face, it had 
 to pick it up and fight to the bitter end, or the 
 people would put their heel upon it as upon the 
 government. 
 
 That people, who were too obtuse or too much 
 enwrapped in their passions to realize the force 
 of these arguments, did not see that his left was 
 
 i CEuvres, I. 305.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 17 
 
 reining in as strongly as his right vigorously 
 applied the lash, can hardly astonish one. Still 
 it was quite as patent. From the first hour, he 
 sets himself with all his strength against every- 
 thing that goes beyond his own programme. 
 
 Even his colleagues of the third estate appre- 
 hend that " he will ruin the public cause by 
 excess of zeal ; " 1 and it is he who keeps them 
 down to the policy of " masterly inactivity." 
 " The impetuosity of this incendiary," he writes, 
 referring to himself, " has produced what ? — The 
 doing-nothing of the commoners who, if they had 
 done anything before having a plan, accord, 
 cohesion (de Vensemble), harmony, would have 
 got stuck fast at every step, become the laughing- 
 stock of Europe, the scourge of the realm, im- 
 potent as to everything except to do harm." 2 
 Not for a moment does the idea enter his head, 
 that the commoners should confine themselves to 
 passive resistance, but he sees that everything 
 would be lost by precipitation. " In a word," he 
 concludes the sentence just quoted, " they would 
 have left the government no resource but their 
 dissolution." On the 18th of May, he presents 
 both sides of the question with equal clearness. 
 
 1 Lcttres a Mauvillon, 462, sq. ' 2 Corresp., I. 349. 
 
 '1
 
 18 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 " Let us not encourage the intriguers, not expose 
 the weak ones, not lead astray, not alarm public 
 opinion, let us go ahead with provident circum- 
 spection, but let us go ahead." 1 
 
 The government at once furnished him an 
 opportunity, pointedly to call attention to the fact, 
 that such " provident circumspection " implied the 
 imperative necessity, not to identify the king with 
 the government. With a view towards initiating, 
 promoting, and directing the crystallization of the 
 unconnected particles constituting the States- 
 General, he undertook the publication of a }Daper, 
 called Etats Q-eneraux. Prompted by its hatred 
 and fear of him, the government at once suppressed 
 it. In a letter to his constituents he fiercely de- 
 nounced the order. "After a deceitful, crafty 
 toleration," he exclaims, " a cabinet, pretending 
 to have the cause of the people at heart, has the 
 hardihood to seal up our thoughts, to grant free- 
 trade to lies, and to forbid as contraband the 
 necessary export of truth." 2 But at the same 
 time he says : " Everybody knows to-day, that 
 such false measures proceed at the most from the 
 cabinet ; that the king has no part in them." As 
 
 1 CEuvres, I. 191. 
 
 2 Ire lettre du comte de Mirabeau a ses commettans, p. 5.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 19 
 
 yet, the attitude of public opinion towards him was 
 such, that the incident excited comparatively but 
 little indignation, because it was he that had been 
 struck. But, although he again and again re- 
 peated the warning, neither public opinion nor 
 the Assembly ever learned to understand that, if 
 France was to remain a monarchy, it was indis- 
 pensable thus to distinguish between the king and 
 the government. 
 
 When he, like the other deputies of the third 
 estate, is of opinion that the time for action has 
 come, he still insists, and even more emphatically 
 than before, that one must proceed with painfully 
 discreet circumspection. " All conciliatory means 
 are exhausted," he says, on the 15th of June, " all 
 conferences are at an end ; we can only take de- 
 cisive and perhaps extreme resolutions. . . Ex- 
 treme ! Oh, no, gentlemen, justice and truth are 
 always in a wise medium ; extreme resolutions 
 are always but the last resources of despair ; and 
 who could reduce the French people to such a 
 situation ? " * " Our course," he says, " must be 
 equally judicious, legal and graduated." 2 
 
 Legal ! The impetuous tribune, whom the 
 father appropriately called *' Monsieur l'Ouragan," 
 i (Euvres, I. 222. 2 lb., I. 228.
 
 20 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 Mr. Cyclone, pleads for legality, and he is in dead 
 earnest about it. As the upper orders persist in 
 refusing to join the third estate, he urges the 
 deputies to proceed alone, but to remain scrupu- 
 lously within the bounds of legality in constituting 
 themselves. Therefore he entreats them : " Do 
 not assume a name that frightens. Devise one 
 that cannot be contested, which, milder and not 
 less imposing in its plentitude, is adapted to all 
 times, is susceptible of all the developments which 
 the events will put within your reach." 1 There- 
 fore he insists that, whatever name be chosen, the 
 sanctions of the king cannot be dispensed with. 
 Therefore he contends with all his might against 
 the third estate alone, calling itself " National 
 Assembly," before having been joined by the 
 upper orders, for there is a tremendous force in 
 names — this name ignores the existence of the 
 upper orders, which is not merely a fact, 2 but also 
 the law of the land — therefore its assumption at 
 this juncture virtually subverts the existing legal 
 order of things and passes with the ploughshare 
 over it — by a purely revolutionary act it radically 
 and by principle severs, in regard to questions of 
 the greatest moment, the present and the future 
 ] CEuvres, I. 227. 2 lb., I. 244
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 21 
 
 from the past. He suffered his first portentous 
 defeat, not because the third estate intended to 
 plunge into a radical revolution, but because he 
 had spoken a language as unintelligible to most of 
 the deputies as if it had been a foreign idiom. 
 
 When clergy and nobility, partly upon a direct 
 order of the king, had joined the Assembly, this 
 was considered irrefutable proof that he had 
 seen spectres in broad daylight. His lips dis- 
 covered a bitter drop in the sweet cup of universal 
 rejoicing. " The 23d of June," he said, " has 
 made upon this people — agitated and suffering — 
 an impression the consequences of which I fear. 
 Where the representatives of the nation saw only 
 an error, the people believed to see a conscious 
 purpose to attack their rights and powers." 2 
 When the urgent remonstrances against the con- 
 centration of troops were cast to the winds by the 
 government, and Necker was dismissed, the people 
 proved that Mirabeau had read their minds cor- 
 rectly. They rose in open rebellion, stormed the 
 Bastille, and, after the victory, soiled their hands 
 by a number of atrocious murders. Mirabeau 
 bluntly told the government and its instigators, 
 that they were "only harvesting the fruits of 
 
 i CEuvres, I. 263.
 
 22 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 their own iniquities. One despises the people 
 and wants it to be always mild, always impassible ! 
 No ; here is a moral to be derived from these sad 
 events ; the injustice of the other classes towards 
 the people lets it find justice even in its barbar- 
 ism." But again with the same intrepidity he 
 exposes also the other side of the picture to the 
 light. "I make haste to say that the whole 
 National Assembly has well felt that the continua- 
 tion of this fearful dictatorship exposes public 
 liberty as much as the plots of its enemies. So- 
 ciety would soon he dissolved if the multitude, get- 
 ting accustomed to blood and disorder, would put 
 itself above the magistrates and bid defiance to 
 the authority of the laws; instead of marching 
 towards liberty, the people would soon throw 
 themselves into the abyss of servitude ; for but 
 too often danger causes men to rally round the 
 flag of absolutism, and in the midst of anarchy 
 even a despot appears a saviour." 1 The end of the 
 story of the revolution gives no doubtful answer 
 
 1 (Euvres, I. 349. A few weeks later he writes : "Qui ne le 
 sait pas ? le passage du mal au bien est souvent plus terrible 
 que le mal lui-meme: l'insuborclination du peuple entraine des 
 exces affreux ; en voulant adoucir ses maux, il les augmente; 
 en refusant de payer, il s'appauvrit ; en suspendant ses tra- 
 vaux, il prepare une nouvelle famine." — Courrier de Pro- 
 vence, No. 23, 3d to 5th of Aug., 1789.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 23 
 
 to the question, whether he was right or not. 
 Others were as deeply impressed by this side of 
 the picture. After the brutal murder of Toulon 
 and Berthier by the populace, Lally-Tollendal 
 moved that the Assembly put a stop to the horrors 
 by issuing a proclamation to the people. Mira- 
 beau commenced his comments upon the motion 
 with the enunciation of the weighty truth : 
 " Small means would uselessly compromise the 
 dignity of the Assembly.'* 1 It was but another 
 formulation of Washington's well-known senten- 
 tious remark : " Influence is not government." 
 
 One of the main causes of the disastrous devel- 
 opment of the revolution was that the Assembly 
 utterly failed to comprehend this all-important 
 truism. Mirabeau never lost sight of it for a 
 single moment, and he fully understood that the 
 maintenance of a real and strong government 
 was quite as much as a revolution, a sine qua 
 non, for the regeneration of France. Therefore 
 he opposed Lafayette's motion to commence the 
 work of reconstruction by formulating a declara- 
 tion of the rights of man. " The statesman," he 
 says, " furnishes arms to the people only in teach- 
 ing it to use them, for fear that in a first fit of 
 
 1 CEuvres, I. 342.
 
 24 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 intoxication it might rush into horrors, turn them 
 against itself, and then cast them away with as 
 much remorse as fright. Therefore it is abso- 
 lutely necessary that a declaration of rights do 
 not precede the constitution of which it is the 
 basis, in order that the principles of liberty, ac- 
 companied by the laws which are to direct its 
 exercise, be a benefit to the people and not a 
 snare and a torment." l Again he was defeated, 
 and aofain the course of events is one uninter- 
 rupted succession of stunning proofs that he was 
 right, if ever a statesman was. 
 
 He was capable of looking beyond the day, and 
 his eye pierced through the most dazzling and 
 seductive appearances to the sober and harsh 
 essence of things. Therefore he, who has sworn 
 that privileges shall die of his bite, calls the 
 famous night of the 4th of August, which at 
 one stroke shattered feudalism in France, " an 
 orgy." " There you have our Frenchmen," he 
 says in bitter irony ; " here they have been ' 
 — alluding to the discussion on the rights of 
 man — " a whole month disputing over syllables, 
 and in one night they subvert the whole old 
 order of the monarchy." He was not recreant 
 1 Courrier cle Provence, No. 28.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 2o 
 
 to the faith he had professed for many years, 
 but he reproved the Assembly for acting as if 
 it thought the arduous work of the political and 
 social reconstruction of a great state could be 
 done to advantage in the spirit of a crowd of half- 
 grown girls, carried away by a sudden paroxysm 
 of enthusiasm. " If one had properly discussed 
 the propositions," he writes to his uncle, 1 "one 
 would have destroyed less, but susceptibilities 
 would have been excited in a less degree ; every 
 party would have regained, by the fusion of minds, 
 what it would have lost by sacrifices ; one would 
 at least have avoided the danger of crushing 
 under a heap of ruins the nascent edifice of 
 liberty." 
 
 There is in the utterances I have mentioned — 
 and if time allowed I could add an almost infinite 
 number of similar character — something that is 
 common to all of them. He does not strive — and 
 that is the second indispensable requirement for a 
 true statesman — for what is in itself desirable, but 
 confines himself to what will be, under the oriven 
 circumstances, a real achievement, because it does 
 not go beyond what is adapted to the times and 
 the people. In other words : Mirabeau wants a 
 1 Oct. 25, 1789. Memoires, VI. 176-181.
 
 26 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 revolution only so far, and in such a wa} r , that it 
 can and will result in a reform, and he fully 
 understands that to determine what will con- 
 stitute a genuine reform one has to ascertain 
 not only what needs reforming, but also how 
 far the capacity for reform goes. Whatever lies 
 beyond the limits of this capacity, must neces- 
 sarily work harm, though it be ever so unques- 
 tionably a reform if considered independently of 
 the given circumstances. 
 
 Now we have seen what the ancien regime had 
 made of the people. If this be kept in view, it is 
 patent that the capacity for reform was, of neces- 
 sity, as limited 1 as the need of it was boundless ; 
 
 1 It is this basal fact which so many people still fail to 
 understand. The National Assembly could enact any laws, 
 but its fiat could not render the people over night fit for the 
 laws it enacted. Mirabeau writes : " Nous perirons par la 
 partie honteuse des finances, nous et notre magnifique revo- 
 lution, si nous ne nous resolvons pas a circonscrire rigou- 
 reusement ce que nous pouvons. . . . Cependant changez 
 votre systeme d'impots, et laissez a l'industrie et au com- 
 merce, abandonnes au regime de la liberte, a reparer les 
 plaies de la fiscalites et a fournir des moyens de reconstituer 
 et d'amortir votre dette, et vous verrez ce que deviendra en 
 quinze ans votre empire francais constitue. Je dis quinze 
 ans, parce que rien ne prendra de veritable racine que par 
 im bon systeme d'education publique, et certainement il 
 faut au moins quinze ans pour planter des hommes nou- 
 veaux." — Lettres a Mauvillon, 504.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 27 
 
 for, as Mirabeau said, " Liberty never was the fruit 
 of a doctrine elaborated by philosophical deduc- 
 tions, but of e very-day experience and the simple 
 reasoning's elicited by the facts." Therefore, 
 whatever broke loose from the past in such a way 
 as completely to cut the ligaments of historical 
 continuity, went necessarily too far. This the 
 revolution utterly failed to understand, and to 
 Mirabeau this was from the outset a self-evident 
 truth. "We are not savages," he said, " coming 
 naked from the shores of the Orinoco to form a 
 society. We are an old nation, and undoubtedly 
 too old for our epoch. We have a pre-existing gov- 
 ernment, a pre-existing king, pre-existing preju- 
 dices. As far as possible one must adapt the things 
 to the revolution and avoid abruptness of transi- 
 tion." 2 From the beginning this was the very basal 
 idea of his policy. As early as the 16th of June, 
 the day on which the third estate constituted 
 itself as National Assembly, he writes to Mauvil- 
 lon : " The fermentation is prodigious, and one is 
 irritated that I am always with the moderates. . . 
 It is certain that the nation is not mature. The 
 excessive inexperience, the terrible derangement 
 of the government have put the revolution 
 
 1 CEuvres, II. 18. 2 lb., U. 118.
 
 28 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 into a hot-house. It has gone beyond our apti- 
 tude and instruction. I conduct myself accord- 
 ingly." i 
 
 There are, however, very different types of 
 moderates. Not only in the Constituent, but also 
 in the Legislative Assembly, and even in the Con- 
 vention, the majority — measuring with the stand- 
 ard of the times — were moderates, and yet the 
 greatest responsibility for the disasters of the 
 revolution rests in a way upon them, because they 
 were only moderates in a general kind of way and 
 therefore ever liable to be completely swayed by 
 the impulse of the moment, thereby themselves 
 forging the fetters, with which the radical minority 
 chained them to their chariot. Mirabeau's modera- 
 tion bore no more resemblance to this kind of 
 moderation than the granite rock resembles the 
 quicksand. It rested upon a simple notion, which, 
 with him, was an unshakable conviction. What- 
 ever, according to the logic of facts, followed from 
 these premises, implicitly imposed moderation 
 upon him and, at the same time, fixed the limits 
 of it, provided always that the superior consid- 
 eration of carrying out his own revolutionary pro- 
 gramme did not force him, against his will, tem- 
 
 1 Lomenie, IV. 280.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 29 
 
 porarily and in regard to specific questions, to 
 disregard its behests. 
 
 " When," he said, on the 7th of August, 1789, 
 " the royal prerogative, that is to say, as I shall 
 show in due time, the most precious possession of 
 the people is discussed, one will see whether I 
 know the extent of it. Ah, I defy beforehand the 
 most respectable of my colleagues to surpass the 
 religious respect in which I hold it." * Nothing 
 is to make him swerve by a hair's-breadth from 
 fulfilling to the letter his promise, that despotism 
 and absolutism shall die from his bite ; but never- 
 theless the ceterum censeo of the arch-revolutionist 
 is, that the royal prerogative must be maintained, 
 not only in form, but also in substance and as an 
 all-permeating fact. For if anything is clear to 
 him it is this, that, while the French people never 
 can dispense with a strong government, they now 
 stand more than ever in need of it, partly because 
 everything is in a state of disintegration and dis- 
 solution, and partly because, more than by any- 
 thing else, the issuing of the revolution in a reform 
 is imperilled by the danger that all powers will be 
 usurped by the National Assembly. In the great 
 debate on the question, what name the deputies of 
 
 1 CEuvres, I. 385.
 
 30 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 the third estate should assume in constituting 
 themselves, he replies to Thouret : " He answers 
 to what I have said on the necessity of the royal 
 approval, that he does not deem it necessary when 
 the people have spoken. And I, gentlemen, be- 
 lieve the royal veto to such a degree necessary 
 that I should rather live at Constantinople than in 
 France, if he were not to have it ; yes, I declare 
 that I should know nothing more terrible than the 
 sovereign aristocracy of six hundred persons, who 
 could render themselves to-morrow irremovable, 
 the day after to-morrow hereditary, and would 
 end, as the aristocracies of all the countries of 
 the world, by encroaching upon everything." ] 
 " Here," says Ludwig Hseusser, " the history of 
 the Convention is written in three sentences." 
 Indeed, the worst form of absolutism is that exer- 
 cised by a numerous assembly claiming to be in- 
 vested with the sovereignty of the people and, con- 
 sequently, arrogating to itself all governmental 
 powers, including the judicial, the executive, 
 and the constituent. This holds good for all times 
 and all peoples. And in France it had necessarily 
 to come to this, unless the royal prerogative was 
 maintained, for according to the whole historical 
 
 i CEuvres, I. 243.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 31 
 
 evolution, and according to the habits and customs 
 of the people, which are a stronger force than even 
 the law, there was for the time being but the al- 
 ternative : either to have no strong government, or 
 to let it rest with the king. 
 
 That is the reason why Mirabeau was deter- 
 mined from the outset to be " very monarchical," 
 and why he unflinchingly stuck to this resolution 
 to the last. He was simply in an eminent degree 
 possessed also of the third indispensable quality of 
 the true statesman : he understands that only 
 what can be effected with the means already 
 existing or capable of being created is attainable. 
 Therefore he sees his task in ascertaining what 
 these are and making the best of them, without 
 stopping to ask whether the}?" are what he would 
 like them to be, or starting with laying down a 
 policy at the risk of finding out, when it is too 
 late, that it cannot be carried out, because the 
 means required for it are not procurable. " One 
 must accommodate oneself to the circumstances, 
 and use the instruments which fate has given us," 1 
 he said on the 15th of June. 
 
 Of all the circumstances by far the most impor- 
 tant, however, was that, if left to itself, this 
 
 1 GEuvres, I. 224.
 
 32 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 Assembly would inevitably drift under the propel- 
 ling influences of the other circumstances into 
 such a condition that, as he said on the 27th of 
 June, 1 " the representatives of the nation would 
 no more be the masters of their movements . . . 
 and would be reduced to the worst of all calami- 
 ties, that of having only the choice between mis- 
 takes," until they finally became " a legislative 
 body . . . which does everything, except what it 
 ought to do." 
 
 There was only one way to prevent this : the 
 government had to take the lead. This also was 
 perfectly clear to Mirabeau even before the States- 
 General met. In the remarkable letter of Decem- 
 ber 28, 1T88, to Montmorin, which I quoted be- 
 fore, he says : " Does the cabinet, which has rushed 
 into this fatal defile by trying to postpone the 
 convening of the States-General instead of getting 
 ready for them, occupy itself with the means how 
 not to have to fear their control, or rather to ren- 
 der their co-operation useful ? Has it a fixed and 
 solid plan, which the representatives of the nation 
 would onlv have to sanction ? 
 
 " Well, I have this plan, Count. It is connected 
 with that of a constitution which would save us 
 
 1 (Euvres, I. 266.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 33 
 
 from the plots of the aristocracy, from the excesses 
 of democracy, from the profound anarchy, into 
 which the government, by wanting to be absolute, 
 has plunged with us." * 
 
 Impudent fool ! He, upon whose garments the 
 dust and mould of half the state prisons lay thick, 
 daring to volunteer his advice to the government ! 
 He had the effrontery to renew the attempt, 2 when 
 the States-General had met, requesting Malouet 
 to act as mediator between him and the ministers. 
 Malouet thus tells the story of his interview with 
 him. " I distrusted him as much as I was preju- 
 diced against him. I thought him one of the 
 most dangerous innovators, and therefore I was 
 very much astonished by his debut with me. ' I 
 have desired an interview with you,' he said, 
 ' because I see that with all your moderation you 
 are a friend of liberty, and because I am, perhaps 
 even more than you, alarmed by the fermentation 
 I see in the heads, and by the calamities to which 
 it may lead. I am not the man to sell myself 
 ignominiously to despotism ; I want a free, but 
 monarchical constitution, I do not want to under- 
 mine the monarchy, and if measures be not taken 
 betimes, I see so many giddy heads in this Assem- 
 
 1 Corresp., I. 341. 2 In the last days of May. 
 
 3
 
 34 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 bly, so much inexperience and exaltation, and in 
 the privileged orders such inconsiderate acrimony 
 and resistance, that I apprehend, with you, terrible 
 commotions. I appeal to your uprightness ; you 
 are in touch with Necker and Montmorin, you 
 must know what their intentions are and whether 
 the} r have any programme at all. If this pro- 
 gramme is sensible, I shall defend it." Mont- 
 morin peremptorily declined to see him, Necker 
 reluctantly consented, but received him with 
 haughty rigidity, as if the count was a lackey, 
 obsequiously soliciting to be taken into the service 
 of the gracious lord. That was just the right 
 tone to assume towards a Mirabeau. A cutting 
 remark, turning on his heel and leaving the room 
 was the work of a minute. Mirabeau told 
 Malouet : " Your man is a dunce ; he shall yet 
 hear from me." 
 
 We do not know the details of the plan, which 
 the ministers refused to receive, but the leading 
 idea of it is clearly indicated in the letter to 
 Montmorin, and his subsequent speeches and 
 writings are a running commentary upon it. The 
 government, which has already virtually renounced 
 absolutism by convening the States-General, shall 
 unite with them in destroying the privileges and
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 35 
 
 establishing a moderately liberal constitutional 
 monarchy, governed in every respect by law, and 
 only by law. " This coalition between the executive 
 and legislative power, without which a state like 
 France cannot last, without which an ever stormy 
 liberty leaves only the alternative between des- 
 potism and anarchy." 1 That he repeats again and 
 again in innumerable variations. Upon this un- 
 questionably everything ultimately depended. 
 But no more hopeless task could be conceived than 
 to make either the people, the Assembly, or the 
 court understand just this. As to the two former 
 he says : " There is no power that does not go too 
 far, when it throws off oppression and dictates the 
 law after the victory. In the heat of discontent 
 one hardly thinks that one can give sufficient 
 extent to one's means and erect enough barriers 
 aerainst one's adversaries, and at the return of the 
 calm one perceives that one has been betrayed into 
 imprudence by fear." 2 And : " Victim of the 
 evil, the nation has only been struck by the 
 necessity of preventing its return ; and its rep- 
 resentatives, in the midst of the crisis, have taken 
 
 1 Corresp., I. 380. 
 
 2 Nouveau coup cToeil sur la sanction royale. — Memoires, 
 VI. 435.
 
 36 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 all at once all the measures suggested to them by 
 a too just resentment, and one experience which 
 was not counterbalanced by any other." 1 He, 
 however, through all mutations, held immovably 
 aloft as the banner around which all true patriots 
 must rally to avert utter ruin, the principle of an 
 honest and close alliance between the executive 
 and the legislative powers." 
 
 No mean courage was required to do this, for 
 every day the people and the Assembly more 
 implicitly recognized as an axiomatic truth which 
 only irredeemable fools and conscious knaves could 
 contest, Mably's doctrine : " Every legislator must 
 start from the principle that the executive power 
 has been, is, and will be unto eternity the enemy of 
 the legislative power." If so, then Mirabeau, as 
 nobody could take him for a fool, evidently was a 
 conscious knave and a traitor in addition, and 
 more than one gory head told what fate might be 
 in store for a man on whose forehead the populace 
 was made to see this double brand. More than 
 once Mirabeau was told that his past services to the 
 revolution only rendered his crime more unpardon- 
 able, and not a few considered it a crime in the 
 fullest sense of the word, because he did not 
 1 lb., Memoires, VI. 434.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 37 
 
 confine himself to preaching the alliance between 
 the two powers as the correct doctrine, but insisted 
 upon its being consistently applied and even dared, 
 when its proper application seemed to him to 
 require it, to champion openly the executive 
 against the legislative. Marat demanded that the 
 highest among all the gallows, which he wanted to 
 have erected, be assigned to the " accursed " Mira- 
 beau. But if he was not the man " to sell himself 
 ignominiously to despotism," he was no more the 
 man to be cowed ignominiously by the clamoring 
 of the populace and its demagogical leaders. If 
 there was a man in the Assembly who was 
 possessed of the fourth indispensable quality of 
 the true statesman, courage, then it was he. He 
 himself repeatedly and emphatically asserts it, 1 
 and his father fully endorses him in this respect. 
 " Since Csesar," as his father wrote in 1782, 
 "there never was such audacity and temerity." 
 One scene will suffice to show whether there was 
 truth in the assertion. He is stubborn^ contend- 
 ing for the royal prerogative in regard to the 
 right of peace and war. The enraged Jacobins 
 
 1 On the 24th of April, 1789, he writes to Montmorin : 
 " Uaucun mortel, en dignite ou u.on, la menace envers moi 
 ne-pexd avoir ni grace, ni convenance." — Corresp., I. 347.
 
 38 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 are determined to carry their point at whatever 
 cost. A vast excited crowd is collected before the 
 hall of the Assembly, listening eagerly to the 
 reading of an article bearing the significant title : 
 " The great treason of Count Mirabeau disclosed." 
 Two sentences will abundantly characterize it. 
 " Take care that the people do not pour gold, the 
 burning nectar, into thy viper's gullet to quench 
 forever the thirst for it which consumes thee ; 
 take care that the people do not carry thy head in 
 procession as that of Toulon, whose mouth they 
 filled with hay." When he enters the Assembly 
 a friend warns him of the danger and shows him 
 the article. He replies : " One will carry me away 
 from here triumphant or in shreds," delivers one 
 of his greatest speeches and conquers in the 
 main. 
 
 Neither the Assembly nor the populace can 
 make him wince. But he has not only the animal 
 courage, which braves physical danger. Highly 
 as he prizes popularity, not only for its own sake, 
 but above all because it is power, he does not 
 flinch before unpopularity either. " I did not 
 need this lesson," he says in the speech just men- 
 tioned, " that it is but a small distance from the 
 capitol to the Tarpeian rock. But the man who
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 39 
 
 contends for reason, for his country, does not so 
 easily acknowledge himself vanquished ; who is 
 conscious of having rendered good service to his 
 country and principally to be still useful to it, who 
 is not satiated by vain renown, and, compared to true 
 glory, holds the success of a day in contempt ; who 
 is intent upon telling the truth, who wants to 
 effect the public welfare independently of the ever 
 vacillating opinions of the masses, finds in himself 
 the reward of his services, the charm of his troubles, 
 the price of his dangers ; he may expect his har- 
 vest, his fate, the only one that is of interest to 
 him, the fate of his name, only from time, the in- 
 corruptible judge, who does justice to all. Let . . . 
 them abandon to the fury of the deceived people 
 him who for twenty years wages war upon every 
 oppression, and who spoke to the people of France 
 of liberty, constitution, resistance, at the time 
 when these vile calumniators lived in all the pre- 
 vailing prejudices. What do I care ? Such blows, 
 dealt by such hands, 1 will not check my course. 
 I tell them, answer, if you are able ; then calumni- 
 ate as much as you like." 2 
 
 I ask, does a man, whose policy is always deter- 
 mined by essentially personal interests, speak and 
 
 1 " Ces coups debus ci i haut." 9 02uvres, III. 356, 357.
 
 40 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 act thus in such a situation ? I ask, does he on this 
 occasion merely brave physical danger and cast 
 popularity to the winds, or must what he says and 
 what he does be acknowledged to be a magnificent 
 display of that highest courage of the true states- 
 man, to take the initiative and assume responsi- 
 bility? And his whole course in the National 
 Assembly, from beginning to end, is one continu- 
 ous string of manifestations of this greatest and 
 most indispensable quality of the true statesman. 
 Ah indeed, he must be hard of hearing, who can- 
 not discern throughout this course the ring of the 
 proud and stern declaration with which he an- 
 nounced his intention to go himself to rebellious 
 Marseilles : " Marseilles will submit, or I shall 
 perish ! " * 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 413.
 
 LECTURE VIII. 
 
 The 5th and 6th of October and the Memoir 
 
 of the 15th. 
 
 " Consummatum est, all is consummated. . . 
 We can tell the National Assembly : Now you 
 have no more enemies, no opponents, no veto to 
 fear ; you have but to govern France, to render 
 her happy, and to give her such laws that the 
 nations, following our example, shall make haste 
 to transplant them and to make them nourish 
 with them.'" l Thus Camille Desmoulins and the 
 other statesmen of the Palais Royal judged the 
 5th and the 6th of October. The revolutionary 
 storm had run its race. The goal was reached ; 
 the sky swept clean of all clouds. Henceforth 
 the sun of liberty would shed its glorious light 
 in dazzling effulgence on a peaceful and happy 
 country. 
 
 If so, the millennium verily had come, when 
 
 1 Revolutions de France et de Brabant, No. 1. 
 
 41
 
 42 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 figs shall be gathered from thistles and the briar 
 bushes bend low with the weight of grapes. 
 " Consummatum est." Ah, yes, there was but too 
 much truth in these first two words. But what 
 was consummated? The correct answer to this 
 question must be found in the true story of those 
 two portentous days, unless France was exempt 
 from the law, that no less in the moral than in the 
 physical order of things the fruit corresponds to 
 the seed. 
 
 On the 14th of July the nobodies of Paris had 
 learned to know their strength. They had acted 
 an independent and decisive part, relegated the 
 National Assembly to the second place, and put, 
 with crushing effect, their heel upon the neck of 
 the old government and the partisans of the past. 
 Under the ancien regime the government had 
 monopolized all political power, arrogating to itself 
 the role of irresponsible political providence ; from 
 the storming of the Bastille it ceased — not legally, 
 but in fact — to be at all a determining political 
 factor, while public opinion held it ever more and 
 more exclusively responsible for all real and sup- 
 posed grievances. The authority of the National 
 Assembly had apparently suffered no detriment 
 from its having played but a secondary and, in the
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 43 
 
 main, even only passive part in the catastrophe 
 overwhelming the government on that decisive 
 day. On the contrary. In the provinces, public 
 opinion was practically unanimous in sustaining 
 the Assembly as the legal enunciation of the 
 nation's sovereign will. And between Paris and 
 the Assembly there was seemingly no antagonism, 
 because the Assembly had strongly disapproved 
 of the policy, which Paris had forced the govern- 
 ment to retract. They were virtually in accord as 
 to the What, though their disagreement as to the 
 How might be in truth somewhat greater than the 
 Assembly cared to acknowledge after the accom- 
 plished fact. Paris had not merely acted as the 
 arm striving, though not directly bidden by the 
 head, yet in conformity with its will ; but, having 
 acted upon a sudden impulse, it did not at once 
 fully realize to what an extent it had really 
 emancipated itself from the National Assembly, 
 and as yet it was not in the least consciously 
 tempted to supersede the legitimate head, or even 
 to usurp the character of a rival or co-ordinate 
 head. According to all appearances, therefore, 
 the 14th of July had inured altogether to the 
 benefit of the Assembly. The government having 
 been compelled to surrender at discretion, and
 
 44 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 there being no other rival power, it held uncon- 
 tested and absolute sway over the whole country. 
 Nor was there now any reason to let the nobodies of 
 the capital have it all their own way again, in case 
 they should try once more to lead in the dance as 
 they saw fit. On the 14th of July they had had to 
 deal only with half-hearted bungling " minions of 
 despotism," commanding troops upon whom there 
 was no reliance in such a fight. Now the sub- 
 stantial classes of the population, whose personal 
 interests were at stake in an attempt to subvert 
 law and order, were perfectly organized and well- 
 armed. Surely, the National Assembly and the 
 nation might rely upon the national guard to nip 
 in the bud any serious danger eventually arising 
 from that quarter. 
 
 There were many flaws in this reasoning, and 
 soon but little perspicacity was required to discern 
 them. At the beginning of August feudalism was 
 broken down by the National Assembly, and 
 before the end of the month the first attempt was 
 made to do open violence to it. The marquis St. 
 Huruge started at the head of a mob for Versailles, 
 to bring the obnoxious representatives of the right 
 to their senses by the application of the lynch-law
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 45 
 
 cure. 1 Though he was foiled in such a way as to 
 render him ridiculous and contemptible, the vista 
 into the future was none the less ominously dark. 
 What had failed now might succeed the next time. 
 The essential fact was, that France had been noti- 
 fied not merely by empty words, but by a deed, 
 that her regeneration was not to be left exclusively 
 to the National Assembly. The Palais Royal was 
 going to lend it a helping hand in the arduous 
 task, and it considered it its incontestable right, 
 as well as its patriotic duty, to do so whenever and 
 howsoever it should deem meet. One lived and 
 learned fearfully fast in those days. By this time 
 the revolutionary catechism of the spokesmen of 
 the Palais Royal was already reduced to the simple 
 maxim : Whatever love of liberty and ardent patri- 
 otism dictate is manifestly paramount duty, and 
 every duty presupposes the right to do what it 
 bids one do. Their followers were fully equal to 
 
 1 The resolutions passed at the Cafe Foy, of which I shall 
 soon have to speak in another connection, very ingeniously 
 reconciled the recourse to this infallible remedy with a 
 commendable respect for the law : " Les citoyens reunis au 
 Palais Royal pensent que Ton doit revoquer les deputes 
 ignorans, corrompus et suspects. 
 
 " La personne d'un depute etant inviolable et sacree, leur 
 proces sera fait apres leur revocation." 
 
 St. Huruge went to execute these resolutions.
 
 46 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 this lo^ic and their belief in the self-evident dosrma 
 was more honest than that of many of their leaders. 
 As to them, therefore, Mirabeau certainly preached 
 to deaf ears, when he wrote : " The success of the 
 project would have been a thousand times more 
 disastrous than the dissolution of the Assembly by 
 a stroke of despotism. . . . The Assembly dissolved 
 by citizens ! dispersed by a faction ! A civil war 
 and a sea of blood would have been the least terri- 
 ble of the consequences. The constitution was 
 about to perish before being born .... you prom- 
 ise victims to popular fury, outrages to justice, 
 blood and cruelties to the fatherland. Poor mad- 
 men ! what more could you do if you were its 
 enemies? . . . All the strength of the National 
 Assembly is in its liberty ; liberty resides in the 
 combat of opinions. If there the opinions should 
 be enslaved, the nation would be reduced to 
 bondage. . . Your club is not France, and France 
 would, after all, rather receive laws from her king 
 than obey the National Assembly subjected to 
 your threats and the docile instrument of your 
 sovereign pleasure." 1 
 
 There is an undertone of anxious misgiving 
 bordering upon despair in the impassionate solem- 
 
 1 Courrier de Provence, No. 34 ; Aug. 30, 1789.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 47 
 
 nity of this adjuration, and yet the last sentence 
 was too optimistic. If France were now forced to 
 the alternative he indicated, and if it were done in 
 such a way that the plainest mind could not fail 
 correctly to understand the issue, she would un- 
 questionably choose as he thought. But would 
 she do so, in case it was done gradually and so as 
 to obscure more or less the true issue ? And sup- 
 Dosinsr that even then her inclinations should 
 prompt her to make the same choice, would she 
 know how to assert her will ? Would she still be 
 able to do so ? But howsoever the future might 
 answer these questions, his main assertion was 
 irrefutable : France will have exchanged the abso- 
 lutism of the ancien regime for a worse despotism, 
 if the self-appointed avengers of liberty of the capi- 
 tal be allowed to speak the decisive word. They 
 scuttle the ship ere it is fairly launched. 
 
 On the 5th of October they knocked the bottom 
 out of it, in a somewhat different manner from 
 that intended by St. Huruge and his prompters 
 and backers, but even more effectively. 
 
 According to the revolutionary legend the 
 poorer classes of Paris were reduced to a condition 
 verging upon famine. That is a gross exagger- 
 ation. The situation was sufficiently serious to
 
 48 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 throw the masses into a state of unrest and keep 
 them excited without the aid of designing agitators. 
 But this spontaneous fermentation was due much 
 more to the apprehension of future distress than 
 to the actual suffering of want. Bread was scarce, 
 but thus far there had always been yet enough of 
 it to keep maddening hunger from the door. In 
 politically quiet times the public peace would not 
 have been disturbed. But now all the demagogues 
 needed to do to make the smouldering coals blaze 
 up in a fierce flame was to let in a little air. The 
 government helped them by daring to call into 
 question the wisdom of some of the provisions of 
 the laws framed by the National Assembly in 
 pursuance of the resolutions of August 4th. The 
 court, as usual, did the best to work the destruc- 
 tion of what it wanted to preserve. The mines, 
 which blew up the foundations of the old order of 
 things on the 23d of June and the 14th of July, 
 had been dug and charged by itself. Now it 
 furnished, by an utterly insane, because wholly 
 purposeless demonstration, the fuse to the dema- 
 gogues to blast their mine. 
 
 On the first of October the officers of the gardes - 
 du-corps gave a banquet to the officers of the regi- 
 ment of Flanders in the theatre of the royal palace
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 40 
 
 at Versailles. Under the influence of the liberal 
 potations many a bold sarcasm and denunciation 
 was launched against the National Assembly and 
 the revolution in general. Court ladies stimulated 
 the royalistic enthusiasm of the valiant knights by 
 decorating them with white cockades — white being 
 the color of the Bourbons. The assertion, that 
 cockades in the three colors adopted by the resolu- 
 tion * were insultingly torn off, was a malicious 
 invention of the revolutionists. It could not be 
 done, because no such cockades were in the room. 
 
 The time was certainly well chosen to indulge 
 in such aimless provocations, for Loustalot had 
 just proclaimed in his Revolutions de Paris : " A 
 second revolutionary onset is needed ; everything 
 is getting ready for it." 
 
 When he wrote those words it was not wholly 
 inconsistent with the facts to put the second half 
 of the sentence into the impersonal form. This 
 was completely changed by the banquet. The 
 provocation was after all not demonstrative enough 
 to cause a spontaneous uprising of the masses. 
 But those who, for one reason or another, wished a 
 second revolutionary onset, saw the excellent op- 
 
 1 Strictly speaking they were as yet only the colors adopted 
 by revolutionary Paris. 
 4
 
 50 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 portunity it afforded them, their number was con- 
 siderable, and among them was one man who had 
 the means, when he chose to engage in operations 
 of this kind, to do it on a large scale. From the 
 first there is system and purposeful direction in the 
 agitation. The masses seem to have been slower 
 to warm up to the proper temperature than one 
 had expected. To quicken the flow of their blood 
 they had to be told that that of every true patriot 
 was boiling. It is significant that the weekly 
 papers had to tell of many dramatic and exciting 
 occurrences, of which no mention whatever is 
 made in the dailies. The suspicion is naturally 
 awakened that the stirring stories are partly the 
 product of the fertile editorial brain, or that at 
 least gnats are made to do service as elephants, in 
 order to " fire " the heart of the unsophisticated 
 patriots. Enough conscious lying has been done 
 in the revolution to keep the furnaces of hell aglow 
 for many a year, 1 and the story of this banquet has 
 come in for its due share. The alleged outrage 
 upon the revolutionary cockade received a proper 
 setting by a sinister tale of a treacherous plot 
 
 1 Cam. Desmoulins frankly confessed : "La fable aida un 
 soulevement general aussi bien que la verite, et la terreur et 
 les oui" dire aussi bien que les faits notoires." — Revolutions 
 de France et de Brabant, IV. 362.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 51 
 
 hatched and about to Ijc carried out by the court 
 party. The king, it was asserted, was to be 
 brought to Metz for the purpose of calling the 
 partisans of the ancien rigime to arms and setting 
 France ablaze with the torch of civil war. In this 
 story also there was a grain of truth. There were 
 persons urging the king to yield no more, but to 
 offer resistance to further encroachments of the 
 revolution, and, in order to be able to do so, to get 
 out of the centre of the storm and to go to the 
 eastern frontier. Louis XVI., however, was far 
 from lending a willing ear to these counsellors. On 
 the evening of the 5th, when the women were 
 already for hours in possession of Versailles, he 
 still declared in a letter to Count d'Estaing that 
 he would not fly, because to do so would be to in- 
 augurate civil war ; he even declined to do any- 
 thing that might be interpreted as an intention to 
 defend himself. 1 
 
 1 " Vous voulez . . . que je prenne tin parti violent ; que 
 j'emploie une legitime defense, ou que je m'eloigne de 
 Versailles. . . La fuite me perdrait totalement, et la 
 guerre civile en serait le resultat. . . Dieu veuille que la 
 tranquillite publiquo soit retablie ; mais point degression, 
 point de mouvement qui puisse laissor croire que je songe a 
 me venger, meme a medefendre." — Con - espondance inedite, 
 I. 159, quoted by Buebez et Roux, Histoire parlementaire de 
 la Revolution francaise, III. 111.
 
 52 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 Resentful suspicion and fear were strong levers 
 to work upon the imagination and the feelings of 
 the masses, but the banquet furnished still another 
 of even much greater power. " While the people 
 are starving, the myrmidons of despotism spin 
 treason, gorging themselves at Lucullian orgies ! '' 
 That was a crushing argument in the ears of ex- 
 cited under-fed masses, fearing soon to see the 
 wolf at their doors. And to persuade them that 
 it was high time for them once more to act, was 
 all that was needed. If they could be goaded into 
 taking matters into their own hands, they were 
 also sure to do what they were wanted to do. 
 According to their reasoning, it was self-evident 
 that to get the king to Paris was in itself an in- 
 fallible and lasting cure of their grievances. The 
 plotting aristocrats would be left out in the cold, 
 and the king, whether he liked it or not, would 
 have to do what they wished to be done. That 
 he would be able to do it, was not subject to any 
 question. The notion of the omnipotence of gov- 
 ernment, bred by the ancien regime, had not been 
 eradicated by the revolution ; it had, on the con- 
 trary, cast deeper root. It was not a pleasantry, 
 when the king upon his forced entrance into Paris 
 was jubilantly hailed as the " baker ; " these chil-
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 53 
 
 clren of all ages were fully satisfied that they had 
 now secured the baker, at whose bidding the bins 
 had always to stay filled with flour and the ovens 
 full of loaves. 
 
 The Mercure de France of September 5th re- 
 ports, that already, on the 30th of August, they 
 spoke at the Palais Royal " of bringing the king 
 and the dauphin to Paris. All virtuous citizens, 
 all incorruptible patriots were exhorted to start 
 forthwith for Versailles." 1 So the first attempt 
 to effect, by mob violence, the transfer of the royal 
 residence to Paris antedated the realization of the 
 idea by fully five weeks. Now, however, the 
 prompters of the masses, as it seems, kept their 
 ulterior purpose more in the background. It is 
 true, Camille Desmoulins states, that on the even- 
 ing of October 4th — a Sunday — " the women '' 
 agreed " to meet the following morning at the foot 
 of the lantern to go from there to Versailles." 2 
 he wrote his narrative nearly a year after the Oc- 
 tober events. But that is no reason to doubt its 
 
 1 Quoted by Taine, La Revolution, I. 127. The two projects 
 of expelling the obnoxious deputies and of bringing the king 
 to Paris, " pour y demeurer en surete au milieu cles fideles 
 Parisiens," were combined in the motion discussed and 
 adopted by this meeting in the famous Cafe Foy. — SeeMoni- 
 teur, I. 399, 417. The king was to be " requested." 
 
 2 Revolutions de France et de Brabant, III. 365.
 
 54 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 correctness in this particular. He cannot be sus- 
 pected of having indulged in an invention, because 
 it could serve no conceivable purpose ; there were 
 few men in Paris, if any, in a better situation to 
 be well informed about a fact of this kind, and it 
 was of a character so to impress itself upon the 
 mind, that his memory could not fail him after so 
 short a time. The letter, however, with which 
 the municipal council sent a delegate at about 
 noon, on October 5th, to the National Assembly 
 and the ministers declared : " The representatives 
 know of no other pretext for this revolt than the 
 sudden fermentation caused by cockades in colors 
 different from those of the Hotel de Ville, a fer- 
 mentation which the fear of lacking bread has ren- 
 dered more dangerous." 1 It has been inferred, 
 from the wording of this declaration, that at this 
 hour the council was still ignorant of any inten- 
 tion to make an exodus to Versailles for the pur- 
 pose of bringing the king to Paris. If this be 
 correct, the council can hardly have been informed 
 of the agreement made the evening before by the 
 women. That they would have known of it, if 
 secrecy had not been enjoined upon those who 
 
 1 Proces verbal de la Commune, lundi, 5 octobi-e. Buchez 
 et Roux, III. 120.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 55 
 
 were parties to it, is, however, all the ruore certain, 
 because the councilmen had just proved by some 
 extraordinary measures that their eyes were widely 
 open to the danger of a move in that direction. 1 
 The objection, that the fairies of the rear streets, 
 garrets, and cellars were not likely to plan such a 
 movement in secret, has no weight. The scheme 
 did not originate with them ; they were mere tools, 
 and it was sufficient to instruct a comparatively 
 small number of leaders. There is abundant evi- 
 dence that the 5th of October was not a sponta- 
 neous revolutionary upheaval, but a well-laid plot. 
 The official minutes of the council say : " It 
 seems that the people have made the insurrection 
 at the same time in the different quarters of the 
 city, and that this insurrection was premedi- 
 tated." 2 
 
 At dawn the women commenced marching to 
 the Hotel de Ville. " On the way," says Camille 
 Desmoulins, " they recruit among their sex travel- 
 
 1 Loustalot reports, in the above quoted number of the 
 Revolutions de Paris : "Desle meme soir, les representans 
 de la commune repandirent dans les districts qu'il y aurait 
 a craindre que le peuple ne se portat, la nuit, dans les corps- 
 de-garde pour desarmer la garde nationale, afin de partir 
 aussitot pour Versailles ; on doubla les postes, les patrouilles, 
 et la nuitse passa tranquillement." 
 
 2 Buchez et Roux, III. 122.
 
 56 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 ling companions as one recruits sailors in London : 
 women are pressed into service." At the Place 
 de Grreve, " these women begin to let down the 
 lantern religiously, as in great calamities the reli- 
 quary of Sainte-Genevieve is let down." Ere the 
 guillotine became the centre-piece in the coat-of- 
 arms of French liberty, the lanterns served the 
 people as ever-ready gallows. The letting down 
 of the lantern, therefore, was a most emphatic 
 announcement that serious business was in- 
 tended. 
 
 The gallows put into proper trim, the women 
 tried to penetrate into the H6tel de Ville. Lafay- 
 ette, writes Camille, " was advised of this move- 
 ment ; he knew that all insurrections were com- 
 menced by women, whose maternal bosom is 
 respected by the bayonets of the satellites of des- 
 potism." You see, there is no lack of cool and 
 shrewd reflection in these revolutionary fire-eaters. 
 When Camille takes the witness-stand in regard 
 to such a fact, he can hardly be challenged, and 
 according to him the women did not lead to quite 
 the extent they are generally supposed to have 
 done. The men used them as an impenetrable 
 shield. Quite an ingenious idea! But is a 
 charge with the bayonet the only way in which a
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 57 
 
 large armed force can disperse a crowd of women ? 
 Was it lack of judgment, lack of skill, or lack of 
 will, that prevented the general, who was " advised 
 of the movement," to act while the mob could 
 have been easily scattered to the four winds with- 
 out shedding one drop of blood ? Upon the un- 
 paid national guard he could implicitly rely. The 
 rioters knew it well. It was believed that it had 
 been contemplated to disarm them by a sudden 
 night attack upon their guard-rooms, and Loustalot 
 states, that " the people relied more upon the fidel- 
 ity of the paid " national guard. 1 His great aston- 
 ishment at this most significant fact is wholly 
 feigned. The paid national guard consisted of 
 former soldiers of the regiment that had set the 
 example of riotous insubordination, and of other 
 elements that were, if not exactly riff-raff, at least 
 first and second cousins of riff-raff. They were 
 natural allies of the mob, and the 5th of October 
 was entirely a day of the mob instigated by self- 
 seeking demagogues. The unpaid national guard 
 
 1 " Ce qui est incroyable, c'est que le peuple comptait plus 
 sur la fidelite de la troupe soldee que sur celle de la troupe 
 non soldee : probleme etrange, et qu'on ne peut expliquer 
 que par la foule d'inconsequences et de vexations que se sont 
 permises et les comites des districts et les commandans de 
 patrouilles."
 
 58 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 consisted of the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie was 
 a perfect stranger to the plot. As yet the condi- 
 tions were such, that it was only the fault of the 
 man if he could not find in this the necessary 
 strength to frustrate it. 
 
 Not many persons -who have cut a prominent 
 figure in great times, have lost so much by having 
 the search-light of critical history turned upon 
 them as Lafayette. As to the part he played on 
 the 5th of October, he himself has always seen a 
 halo around his head. But even the most favor- 
 able interpretation of it at all compatible with the 
 hard facts, turns the streaming light of this halo 
 into very dingy yellow. He seems to be quite 
 unconscious that there are not only sins of com- 
 mission, but also of omission. Yes, sins of omis- 
 sion. He was the responsible guardian of the 
 public peace. Therefore it was his bounden duty 
 to act at once and in such a manner, that a riotous 
 demonstration of some hundreds of women could 
 not develop into an irresistible uprising. He, 
 however, practically remained a passive looker-on, 
 i. e., wasted hour after hour in fine speeches and 
 unavailing entreaties, until, as he himself told the 
 king, " the will of an immense crowd commanded 
 the armed force and there was no possibility of
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 59 
 
 preventing their going to Versailles." * Camille 
 does him only justice in calling him " Temporizer 
 Fabius." But he almost seems to suspect him of 
 having rather willingly allowed the mob all the 
 time it needed to become irresistible. 2 The 
 famous white charger remained hitched to the 
 post till the vanguard of women had arrived at 
 Versailles ; he mounts it at last, forced by the 
 former gardes frangaises, one of them telling him 
 — accompanying the words with a suggestive 
 gesture with his musket — " General, to Versailles 
 or to the lantern ! " 3 and then he rides at such a 
 pace that it is pretended, as Camille says with 
 mocking exaggeration, the great horse needed 
 nine hours for the journey. 
 
 1 Report of the commission of the municipal council. 
 
 2 Lafayette himself admits: "J'avais pense depuis long- 
 temps que l'assemblee serait plus tranquille et le roi plus en 
 surete a Paris."— Mem. de Lafayette, I. 286 ; edit. 1837-39. 
 It is rather striking that, to my knowledge, every historian 
 championing Lafayette has somehow managed to skip over 
 this sentence. Even if it be not considered as furnishing 
 reason for suspicion in regard to what he left undone on the 
 5th of October, it is surely worth quoting because it throws 
 such a flood of light on the political perspicacity of the 
 man. 
 
 3 Lafayette uses a very full brush in painting the dangers 
 which he had to brave. He writes : " A diverses reprises le 
 fatal reverbere fut descendu pour lui ; vingt fois il fut 
 couche en joue."— Mem. de Lafayette, I. 282.
 
 60 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 When Lafayette wrote down his recollections, 
 his memory played him many a trick. Not only 
 is his chronology of the fatal day strangely at 
 fault ; he forgets to record that a partisan of his — 
 Vauvilliers, a member of the municipal council — 
 announced to the ministers some hours before it 
 became a fact, that the whole national guard had 
 started for Versailles to bring the king to Paris, 
 that he himself sent an adjutant to the municipal 
 council to insist upon his being authorized to 
 march to Versailles, that the council sent four 
 delegates along with him, who were to demand, 
 among other things, that the king " confide the 
 guarding of his sacred person exclusively to the 
 national guard of Paris and Versailles," and trans- 
 fer his residence to Paris. Irrelevant these facts 
 are certainly not, and scanning them in the light 
 of the position which the 5th of October created 
 for the general, one cannot help asking oneself, 
 whether his silence upon them is quite acci- 
 dental. 1 One of the most suggestive documents 
 
 1 His narrative is co paratively brief, but he finds space 
 to intimate twice that his virtue was even superior to his 
 courage, and that but for the purity of his heart the day 
 might eventually have raised him to the dizziest height. In 
 Paris the spokesman of the former gardes-francaises, who 
 were among the first to raise the cry " a Versailles,' - apostro-
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 61 
 
 bearing upon the history of the fatal day is a car- 
 icature, representing a white horse with Lafa- 
 yette's head, led by a proletarian armed with pike 
 and axe ; the legend reads : " My friends, lead 
 me, I beg you, to sleep at Versailles." 
 
 Though it cannot be directly proved that 
 Lafayette rather liked to be led to Versailles, cir- 
 cumstantial evidence renders it likely. That the 
 Duke of Orleans and those who made the impo- 
 tent ambition of the dissolute prince a means to 
 serve their own impure ends, had taken a very 
 active part in kindling the fire, is as good as 
 proved. 1 
 
 phized him thus : " Mon general, le roi nous trompetous et 
 vous comme les autres ; il faut le deposer ; son enfant sera 
 roi, vous serez regent, et tout ira bien " ; and in Versailles, 
 upon entering the royal palace, he repelled with a smart 
 apropos the denunciatory greeting " Cromwell !" 
 
 1 Grace Dalrymple Elliott writes in her Journal of my Life 
 during the French Revolution (pp. 37, 38) : "The Duke of 
 Orleans was certainly not at Versailles on that dreadful 
 morning (the 6th), for he breakfasted with company at my 
 house when he was accused of being in the queen's apart- 
 ment disguised. . . He expressed himself as not approving 
 of the bringing of the king to Paris : ' that it must be a 
 scheme of Lafayette's,' but added, ' I dare say that they 
 will accuse me of it, as they lay every tumult to my account. 
 I think myself this is a mad project, and like all Lafayette 
 does.'" Apart from the absurd accusation as to his being in 
 the queen's apartment, this, of course, proves nothing. Such 
 a breakfast-table was not the place to unbosom himself
 
 62 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 That it could have been kept under control by 
 acting promptly and with energy is demonstrated 
 by the fact, that without recourse to powder and 
 lead or steel, the Hcitel cle Ville was cleared of the 
 rabble, holding for a while complete possession of 
 it, carrying away the arms, ransacking the draw- 
 ers for money, and even attempting to set fire to 
 the building. 
 
 Meanwhile part of the women had started for 
 Versailles. Threats of fiendish bestiality against 
 the queen 1 and the presence of men disguised as 
 women in the crowd, indicated only too clearly 
 that terrible things had to be expected. Everv 
 female encountered on the march, whether young 
 or old, clothed in rags or in elegant attire, was 
 forced to join the procession. Arrived at Versailles 
 the horde first paid its respects to the National 
 Assembly. The wenches made themselves com- 
 
 without reserve. It is, however, not improbable that he 
 said what he thought. But did he say all he thought ? He 
 could, indeed, not be benefited by having the king brought 
 to Paris. He rests under the accusation, that according to 
 his programme the 5th of October should be the last day of 
 the reign, perhaps even of the life of Louis XVI. , and the 
 6th the first day of his own regency. That the man, who 
 afterwards cast a formal vote for the death of the head of 
 his family, was none too good to pursue such a scheme, is 
 certain. 
 1 Taine, 1. 133.
 
 THE FEENCH REVOLUTION. 63 
 
 fortable in the seats of the representatives and 
 bade them " shut up," as they had not come to 
 listen to long-winded speeches, but to get bread. 
 But when Mirabeau hurled a sharp rebuke into 
 their faces, they lustily applauded him. The 
 president 1 was made to lead a deputation of the 
 shrews to the king. On foot he trudged through 
 rain and mud at the head of them to the palace, 
 surrounded by the boisterous crowd, jesting and 
 threatening, laughing and cursing. In the hall of 
 the Assembly, a duchess of the street seated her- 
 self in his chair. 
 
 When at last, late in the evening, Lafayette 
 arrived with the national guard, he assured the 
 king that he had nothing more to fear. Louis 
 submitted to whatever he was asked to do ; only 
 in regard to the transfer of his residence did he 
 give an evasive answer. 
 
 Upon an examination of the question, whether 
 Lafa}^ette did all he could and ought to have done 
 to make good his promise that the public peace 
 and order would be no more disturbed, I can, to 
 my regret, not enter. I can only mention that 
 the account of La Marck, who speaks as an eye- 
 and-ear-witness, throws a strange light upon the 
 
 1 Mounier.
 
 64 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 general's own story. Whether he be blamable or 
 not, the promise was not fulfilled. Early in the 
 morning the mob penetrated into the palace by an 
 unguarded side-entrance. Over the corpses of 
 those who tried to bar their way they rushed to 
 the apartments of the queen. Marie Antoinette 
 had barely time to save herself into the rooms of 
 the king. In the letter to D'Estaing, which I 
 mentioned before, Louis had written : " The 
 Frenchman is incapable of a regicide." Lafayette 
 arrived in time to prevent this assertion being 
 put to a severer test. When Louis stepped out 
 on a balcony and announced his Avillingness to go 
 to Paris, he was enthusiastically cheered. Against 
 the queen, however, the delirious rabble contin- 
 ued to hurl the fiercest curses and imprecations, 
 until Lafayette led her out on the balcony and 
 kissed her hand. In that moment, he says, the 
 peace was concluded. Yes, the peace which, by 
 way of the guillotine, led to the graveyard. 
 
 A few hours later the royal family was on its 
 way to Paris, and the National Assembly resolved 
 never to separate itself from the king. Royalty 
 had formally struck its flag before the mob and 
 accepted the rabble as its master. But that was 
 by far not all. The mob had trampled into the
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 65 
 
 dust every one of the constituted authorities. It 
 is for this reason that the 5th and 6th of October 
 are the most portentous, the darkest days of the 
 revolution. The municipal council and the com- 
 mander-in-chief of the national guard had, accord- 
 ing to their own confession, received the law from 
 the mob, and the National Assembly had not 
 merely been unable to stem the torrent ; like the 
 municipal council and the national guard it had 
 been treated to contemptuous kicks, and like them 
 it had submitted to being pressed into the service 
 of the mob. On the 5th and 6th of October the 
 proletariat of the capital made itself the de facto 
 sovereign of France. This fact is the main key to 
 the whole subsequent history of the revolution. 
 This time the proletariat had become completely 
 conscious of the full scope and purport of its vic- 
 tory. Would it ever again scruple or hesitate 
 to dictate the law to the city government, the 
 bourgeoisie in uniform, the king, the National 
 Assembly, when it saw fit to do so? Would it 
 ever again doubt its ability to do it, after having 
 succeeded so completely ? Henceforth a weari- 
 some march of many miles was no longer required. 
 Week in and week out, day and night, Avere its 
 
 fino-ers around the throat of the kino- and the 
 5
 
 66 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 National Assembly, and therewith around the 
 throat of France. 
 
 What, on the 30th of August, Mirabeau had 
 declared " a thousand times more disastrous than 
 the dissolution of the Assembly by a stroke of 
 despotism," had, in a modified form, come to pass. 
 Did he still think as he had thought then ? 
 
 Quite a while before the vanguard of the wo- 
 men arrived at Versailles he notified the President 
 of the Assembly that, as he expressed himself, 
 " Paris marches upon us," urging him to hasten 
 to the palace in order to have the necessary 
 measures taken for panying the impending blow. 
 Mounier, who deeply distrusted the impetuous 
 tribune, refused to give credence to the informa- 
 tion. When Mirabeau vouched for its truth and 
 with an air of peremptoriness insisted upon his 
 advice, Mounier replied : " Paris marches upon 
 us ; well ! so much the better, we shall all the 
 sooner be a republic." 1 
 
 On the 10th of October, Malouet demanded 
 jDroscriptive declarations against libellous writings 
 exciting the people to acts of violence. Mirabeau 
 rose in opposition, saying : " Do not multiply vain 
 declarations ; revive the executive power ; know 
 
 1 Buchez et Roux, III. 78.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 67 
 
 how to maintain it ; brace it by all the support 
 that can be derived from the good citizens ; else 
 society falls into dissolution and nothing can save 
 us from the horrors of anarchy." 1 
 
 On the 14th he introduced a rigorous bill 
 against attroupements, an imitation, as he himself 
 said, of the English Riot Act. 2 
 
 Was it not a pretty bold undertaking in the 
 face of these public utterances and acts to suspect 
 his position towards the events of the 5th and 
 6th ? Ought they not to have been convincing 
 to every unprejudiced mind ? But let us suppose 
 that other facts or alleged facts, upon which I 
 cannot enter, left ample room for reasonable 
 doubts. Time, upon which he often declared he 
 must rely for his vindication, has brought a docu- 
 ment to light which answers the question in such 
 a way, that, as to it, malice itself can no longer 
 discover the shadow of a rent in his armor. 
 
 If there was a man in Fiance, whom the storm 
 bursting forth on the 5th did not take by surprise, 
 it was he. Towards the end of September, as 
 La Marck tells us, he often said, speaking of the 
 court : " What are these people thinking of ? Do 
 they not see the abysses opening up under their 
 
 1 CEuvres, II. 271. * lb., II. 278, sq.
 
 68 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 feet? " One day he exclaimed : " All is lost ; the 
 king and the queen will perish, and you will see 
 it ; the populace will kick their corpses." La 
 Marck looking at him aghast with horror, he 
 emphatically repeated : " Yes, yes, they will kick 
 their corpses ; you do not sufficiently understand 
 the dangers of their position ; but their eyes ought 
 to be opened to them." * 
 
 Now, on the 7th of October, Mirabeau went to 
 La Marck and told him : " If you have any means 
 to make yourself heard by the king and the 
 queen, convince them that France and they are 
 lost if the royal family do not leave Paris. I am 
 working at a plan to get them out of it ; will you 
 be able to go to them and assure them that they 
 can count upon me ? " 2 La Marck promised to 
 deliver the plan, and a few days later Mirabeau 
 gave him the remarkable document which is 
 known as the Memoir of the 15th of October. 3 
 The bailli had once said of him : " His head is a 
 mill of thoughts and ideas." Perhaps at no other 
 moment of his life did he justify this word more 
 than then. With truly miraculous celerity he 
 ties the warp of an astounding, all-embracing plan, 
 
 1 Corresp., I. 112. - lb., I. 119. 
 
 :! Ib., I. 364-382.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 69 
 
 and everything indicates that, if his arm is but 
 left free, he will be able to weave in the woof 
 with equal celerity. 
 
 The Memoir begins by stating that neither the 
 king nor the National Assembly is free in Paris, 
 i. e., Mirabeau starts from the point which was in 
 fact absolutely decisive for the whole subsequent 
 course of the revolution. Then he proceeds to 
 ask, whether the king is at least personally quite 
 safe, and answers this question thus : " In the 
 situation in which he is, the slightest catastrophes 
 could compromise this safety. . . The excited 
 mob of Paris is irresistible ; winter approaches, 
 provisions may be scarce, bankruptcy may ensue. 
 What will Paris be three months hence ? Cer- 
 tainly a hospital, perhaps a theatre of horrors." 
 The ministers, he continues, are without any 
 resources. Only Necker, whom he calls " a truly 
 empty head," still enjoys some popularity, but he 
 does not know how to use it. Then he goes on : 
 " The provinces are not as yet torn asunder, but 
 they observe each other ; a covert dissension an- 
 nounces storms. The exchange of provisions is 
 more and more interrupted. The number of mal- 
 contents increases by the inevitable effect of the 
 justest decrees of the National Assembly. A
 
 70 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 nation is in essence nothing but what its labor 
 is. The nation has become disused to work. 
 The public force lies in public opinion and the 
 revenues of the state ; all the ties of public 
 opinion are severed and only the direct taxes 
 are paid and even these but in part, while half 
 of our taxes are indirect ones. It will require 
 several years to restore what six months have 
 destroyed, and the impatience of the people, 
 stimulated by distress, manifests itself on all 
 sides." 
 
 Besides, circumstances steadily press on towards 
 another disastrous event. The National As- 
 sembly, organized upon a wrong principle and com- 
 posed of too heterogeneous elements, loses every 
 day more and more the public confidence. " It is 
 pushed beyond its own principles by the pernicious 
 irrevocability with which it has invested its first 
 decrees, and, not daring either to contradict itself 
 or to retrace its steps, it has made its very power 
 another obstacle. ... A dull commotion is setting 
 in, which can in one day destroy the fruits of the 
 greatest exertions ; the body politic falls into 
 dissolution ; a crisis is necessary to regenerate it ; 
 it needs a transfusion of fresh blood. 
 
 " The only means to save the state and the
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 71 
 
 nascent constitution is to bring the king into a 
 situation which will allow him to unite himself 
 instantly with his people. 
 
 " For a long time Paris has swallowed up all 
 the revenues of the state. Paris is the seat of the 
 fiscal regime abhorred by the provinces ; Paris 
 has created the public debt ; Paris has ruined the 
 public credit and compromised the honor of the 
 nation by its pernicious stock-jobbing. Shall now 
 the National Assembly also see nothing but this 
 one city and for its sake plunge the whole kingdom 
 into perdition ? . . . What is one to do ? Is the 
 king free ? His freedom is not complete ; it is not 
 recognized. 
 
 " Is the king safe ? I do not think so. Can 
 Paris save itself ? No ; Paris is lost, if it be not 
 brought back to order, if it be not forced into 
 moderation." 
 
 Then he proceeds to discuss the question, how 
 one can extricate oneself from the appalling 
 situation, and by what means the impending 
 dangers can be averted. 
 
 " Several means are available, but among them 
 are some which would unfetter the direst evils, 
 and I mention them only to divert the king from 
 them as his inevitable ruin.
 
 72 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 " To withdraw to Metz, or any other point on 
 the frontier, would be to declare war to the nation 
 and abdicate. A king, who is the only protection 
 of his people, does not fly from his people ; he 
 lets it be the judge of his acts and principles, but 
 does not sever at one blow all the bonds uniting 
 him with it; he does not arouse against himself 
 the universal distrust; he does not put himself 
 into such a situation that he can return to his 
 state only with arms in his hands, or is reduced to 
 beg the aid of foreign countries. 
 
 " And who can calculate how far the exaltation 
 of the French nation would go, if it were to see 
 itself abandoned by its king to unite himself with 
 the proscribed and become himself one ; how far 
 it might go in arming itself for resistance and 
 defying the forces he could muster against it? 
 After such an event I should myself denounce the 
 king. 
 
 " To retire into the interior of the kingdom and 
 to summon the whole nobility would not be less 
 dangerous. Whether it be justified or not, the 
 whole nation, in its ignorance confounding the 
 nobility with the patriciate, will, for a long time, 
 consider the noblemen, as a class, their most im- 
 placable enemies. The abolition of the feudal
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 73 
 
 system was an atonement cine to ten centuries of 
 madness. One could have moderated the move- 
 ment, but now it is too late, and the sentence is 
 irrevocable. To unite himself with the nobility 
 would be worse than to throw himself into the 
 arms of a foreign and hostile army ; that would 
 be to choose between a great nation and some 
 individuals, between peace and civil war with 
 extremely unequal forces. 
 
 " Where would be in such a case the safety of 
 the king? A corps of noblemen is not an army 
 which could wage war ; a province cannot en- 
 trench itself. Would not the greatest part of this 
 nobility be crushed, killed, even before uniting ? 
 Would its estates not be destroyed ? And if it 
 were only summoned to bring the greatest sacri- 
 fices, the mortal blow would be dealt ere one 
 could exchange views and come to an understand- 
 ing ; and if one intended to preserve to the 
 nobility all of its exemptions and privileges that 
 public opinion and enlightened reason have 
 destroyed, docs one believe that peace, that the 
 revenues could be restored in a nation, which 
 thereby would be robbed of its dearest and most 
 justified hopes ? 
 
 " To go away in order to regain liberty, de-
 
 74 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 nounce the National Assembly and dissolve every 
 connection with it, would be a less violent course 
 than the two preceding ones, but not less danger- 
 ous ; it would endanger the safety of the king ; it 
 would also inaugurate civil war, because many of 
 the provinces want to maintain the decrees of the 
 Assembly . . . because the enlightened part of 
 this nation knows that one must provisionally 
 obey even the errors of a legislative body, without 
 which no constitution whatever could ever be 
 established. Then neither the nobility, whose 
 passions he does not share, nor the nation, whose 
 intents he does not accept, would be for the 
 king. . . . 
 
 " Besides it is certain that a great revolution is 
 needed to save the kingdom, that the nation has 
 rights, that it is about to regain them all, that 
 they must not only be restored, but also consoli- 
 dated, that only a national convention can regen- 
 erate France, that the National Assembly has 
 made several laws which it is indispensable to 
 accept, and that there is no safety for the king 
 and the state but in the closest coalition between 
 the monarch and the people." 
 
 Only one means is left, " which is certainly not 
 without danger; but one must not believe that
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 75 
 
 one can get out of a great clanger without danger, 
 and all the forces of the statesmen must now be 
 exerted to prepare, to moderate, to direct, and to 
 limit the crisis, but not to prevent it, for that is 
 absolutely impossible, nor to postpone it, for that 
 would only serve to make it more violent. 
 
 " This last plan can be carried out by simple 
 means. Of course these means should be pre- 
 pared beforehand down almost to the minutest 
 details. Only at the moment the resolution is 
 taken should they be communicated to those who 
 are to employ them. The cabinet is not suffi- 
 ciently well-meaning, or at least not considered to 
 be so, to admit it into the confidence. It is a last 
 resource of the public weal and the personal wel- 
 fare of the king. All would be lost, if indiscre- 
 tions were to reveal a plan which might be con- 
 sidered a conspiracy, if its aim and consequences 
 be not known, while its only object is the welfare 
 of the state." 
 
 Then follows the sketch of the plan. 
 
 While the arrangements for the departure of the 
 king are being made, public opinion in the prov- 
 inces must be prepared for the impending events. 
 The progress of events will unquestionably de- 
 monstrate with ever increasing impressiveness
 
 76 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 the fact that the king is not free. The national 
 guard of Paris is sure to step out of its legitimate 
 functions, if one tries to confine it to them. By 
 asking the support of the National Assembly, its 
 eyes will be opened to its own situation and it will 
 see its own existence imperilled. Thus it will 
 become more and more patent that the public 
 welfare imperatively demands the departure of the 
 king. To insure the departure, his guards shall 
 be " systematically dispersed," and under different 
 pretexts an army of 10,000 men organized, consist- 
 ing entirely of national regiments to be placed 
 midway between Paris and Rouen. Then the king 
 shall depart for Rouen in broad daylight. Rouen 
 shall be chosen, first, because it is in the interior of 
 the kingdom, thereby precluding the suspicion 
 that the king intends to fly, then, because from 
 there Paris can be provisioned and thus the good 
 intentions of the king be demonstrated, and final- 
 ly, because the Normandie has a numerous and 
 energetic population, and Bretagne and Anjou, 
 being also loyal, are within easy reach. Simulta- 
 neously with the departure a proclamation shall be 
 issued, declaring that the king throws himself into 
 the arms of his people, because violence had been 
 done to him at Versailles ; that he, as he would
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 77 
 
 prove, had been denied the right of every citizen 
 to come and go as he pleased ; that this situation 
 had served as a pretext to the malcontents to re- 
 fuse obedience to the decrees of the National 
 Assembly, thereby compromising the fruits of a 
 revolution, in which he took as lively an interest 
 as the most zealous friends of liberty; that he 
 wished to be inseparable from his people, as he 
 had irrefutably proved by choosing Rouen as the 
 place of his residence ; that he was the first king 
 of France wishing to give the nation its rights, 
 and that he had persisted in his intentions, despite 
 his ministers and other advices calculated to cor- 
 rupt monarchs ; that he had irrevocably sanc- 
 tioned such and such decrees of the National 
 Assembly, but that there were others, which he 
 deemed not sufficiently considered or advanta- 
 geous enough for the people, and that he therefore 
 desired the people to examine them once more, 
 acknowledging, however, their binding force as 
 laws in the meantime ; that he would ask the 
 National Assembly to join him in order to con- 
 tinue its labors, but would soon call another con- 
 vention to examine, confirm, modify, and ratify the 
 decrees of the first ; that he wished, above all, the 
 public debt to be considered sacred ; that he was
 
 78 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 willing personally to submit to the greatest sacri- 
 fices and would not require more than one million 
 a year ; that the public creditors should no longer 
 be allured by vain promises, but receive an ade- 
 quate security ; that he would subdue his people 
 not by arms, but by his love, confiding his honor 
 and safety to French loyalty ; that he wished only 
 the welfare of the citizens and wanted to be only 
 a citizen himself. — Couriers should bring this very 
 firm, but very popular proclamation into all the 
 provinces. — Another proclamation should be sent 
 to the National Assembly, setting forth the motives 
 for the king's resolution and asking it to follow 
 him to Rouen. It would undoubtedly do so, if it 
 were free ; if it could not do it, the session would 
 thereby ipso facto be closed. The Assembly's 
 being under constraint would become so apparent 
 that it would soon be possible to convene another 
 Assembly. Further proclamations should con- 
 tinue to enlighten the people about their true 
 interests, and the changing of public opinion 
 would soon commence to work a change in the 
 spirit of the National Assembly. If anywhere 
 resistance should be attempted, the executive, 
 authorized by the National Assembly, would use 
 its whole power to overcome it.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 79 
 
 Nothing came of the plan. La Marck gave the 
 Memoir to the Count of Provence, the king's 
 eldest brother. He praised Mirabeau's intentions, 
 but treated it as an interesting academical treatise, 
 declaring — no doubt only too truly — that it was 
 impossible to induce the king to take so bold a 
 course. But though the Memoir led to no prac- 
 tical results, it is one of the most remarkable 
 political documents in existence. Its critical part 
 shows the whole subsequent history of the revolu- 
 tion as in a magician's mirror, and this whole 
 subsequent history of the revolution irrefutably 
 proves, that if there still was any possibility to 
 save the king's head and spare France the reign of 
 terror and the ensuing despotism of Napoleon, it 
 could have been done only by adopting Mirabeau's 
 plan and entrusting its execution to him. If the 
 records of everything else we know of Mirabeau 
 were forever obliterated, this one Memoir would 
 suffice to prove that he was a political genius of 
 the very first order. Only the utter imbecility of 
 fanatical doctrinarianism can find in it materials 
 for the charge that he became a recreant and 
 turned against the revolution, whose foremost 
 champion he had thus far been. Every line of it 
 demonstrates that, in fact, his whole mind was
 
 80 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 bent upon not only maintaining, but also, as he 
 said, consolidating the revolution in saving it 
 despite itself from itself. There was no other way 
 to do this than by appealing from Paris to the 
 country, and to do it now and in such a manner, 
 that the country could respond to the appeal not 
 only by sentiments and wishes, but by decisive 
 acts. And this was possible only if the king 
 accompanied the appeal by the explicit and em- 
 phatic declaration of his identification with the 
 revolution, guaranteeing the unimpeachable sin- 
 cerity of the declaration by irreversible acts. 
 
 It is not surprising that, at the time, many 
 strongly suspected or even firmly believed Mira- 
 beau to be one of the principal authors of the 5th 
 of October. In their opinion the sins of his youth 
 were sufficient evidence that moral scruples would 
 never be a check to his political ambition ; his 
 political past, of which they noticed or understood 
 only the one §ide, that of the revolutionary fire- 
 brand, seemed to them in perfect keeping with a 
 manoeuvre of such brazen ruthlessness ; and many 
 an inconsiderate a propos of his rash and unruly 
 tongue furnished strong pegs to distrust and jeal- 
 ousy, hatred and stupidity, on which to hang 
 plausible accusations. These people were so
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 81 
 
 blindfolded by prejudice, that they simply ignored 
 the incompatibility of their assumptions .with the 
 public utterances and acts of Mirabeau which I 
 mentioned. When the National Assembly de- 
 cided that the facts elicited by the judicial inquiry 
 conducted by the Chatelet gave no cause to pro- 
 ceed against him, they remained satisfied that it 
 was a miscarriage of justice. They grievously 
 wronged him ; but in these times, when morbid 
 suspiciousness became more and more one of the 
 cardinal virtues, their error was, under the cir- 
 cumstances, almost excusable. But what shall 
 one say of the writers of to-day who, with the 
 Memoir of the 15th before their eyes, still persist 
 in putting every particle of those incriminating 
 baubles under the microscope of their critical 
 acumen, and at least intimate that there is no tell- 
 ing whether he was not, after all, for a while and 
 to some extent, in collusion with the conspirators ? 
 La Marck relates that Avhen he told Mirabeau half 
 a year later that, up to that time, even the queen 
 had supposed the charge .to be well-founded, "his 
 mien instantly changed; he became yellow, green, 
 hideous. The horror which he felt was striking 
 . . . for a long time he could not get over the 
 
 painful impression that he should have been the 
 6
 
 82 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 object of such a horrid, suspicion." 2 Small won- 
 der ! The man who said that the course he urged 
 upon the king would be considered " a con- 
 spiracy," and who had predicted before the Octo- 
 ber events that the mob would " kick the corpses 
 of the king and the queen," could not have failed 
 to see that by the Memoir of the 15th he put his 
 own head under the executioner's axe. To say 
 that he had had a share in the conspiracy is, there- 
 fore, to say that he had helped to hatch and ex- 
 ecute a criminal plot, possibly leading to regicide 
 and sure to cost human life, for the purpose of 
 attempting, right after its complete success, to 
 undo at the risk of his own neck what he had 
 done. The assumption is a palpable absurdity. 
 Since the publication of the Memoir of the 15th, 
 Mirabeau's accusers have, therefore, no longer any 
 standing in the court of common sense. It takes 
 learned historians to still grant them a hearing 
 and gravely to wag their wise heads at the awful 
 things they have to report of the great miscreant. 
 : Corresp., I, 148, 149.
 
 LECTURE IX. 
 The Decisive Defeat of November 7th, 1789. 
 
 Not intellect and character, but character and 
 intellect are required to be a leader of men, and the 
 more so the stormier the times and the greater the 
 issues. Mirabeau invariably rested his claims to 
 leadership primarily upon his character and not 
 upon his superior intellect. One of the chief tests 
 of character, however, is the effect of obstacles and 
 defeats upon the will. With weak men it always 
 slackens under their pressure, though they be intel- 
 lectually veritable paragons ; upon the strong char- 
 acter it has a bracing effect, and acts as a spur. 
 
 If Mirabeau had misjudged himself as to this 
 
 paramount question, the shelving of the Memoir 
 
 of the 15th of October by the Count de Provence 
 
 as an interesting academical treatise would have 
 
 been a staggering blow, for it proved that from 
 
 those who were personally the most interested in 
 
 it, no assistance could be expected in intelligent 
 
 83
 
 84 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 efforts to avert the impending doom of the mon- 
 archy; it had to be saved without them and in 
 spite of them, or it could not be saved at all. It 
 is therefore eminently characteristic of the man, 
 that at no time is his initiative more vigorous and 
 buoyant than in the weeks immediately following 
 this grievous disappointment. 
 
 On the 14th of October he had submitted to the 
 Assembly a law concerning " les attroupements" 
 "imitating," as he said, "but not copying" the 
 English Riot Act. When he had finished reading 
 it, the Assembly vividly applauded but did not act 
 upon it until, a week later, the mob in Paris had 
 once more dipped its hands in blood, massacring 
 the baker Francois upon the accusation that he 
 reserved some of his bread for customers able 
 and willing to pay higher prices. Mirabeau then 
 improved the opportunity to warn the Assembly 
 that though a martial law was necessary, the most 
 urgent need was to put the executive again into a 
 condition enabling it to fulfil its duties. "The 
 executive power avails itself of its own annihila- 
 tion," he said. 1 And to guard against an unjust, 
 one-sided interpretation of this accusation, he wrote 
 in the Courrier de Provence : " Not without reason 
 1 CEuvres, II. 294.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 85 
 
 does the cabinet avail itself of its own annihilation 
 to hold itself excused in regard to the disorders of 
 society ; if it has no power (s'i7 ne peut rieTi), it is 
 not responsible for anything." 1 
 
 Still nothing was further from his mind than 
 the intention fully to exonerate the ministers. In 
 his opinion they were — not intentionally, but by 
 incapacity — highly culpable, but the Assembly 
 was at least as guilty as they. He wrote in these 
 days to Mauvillon : " The monarchy is in danger 
 rather because one does not govern, than because 
 one conspires. If no pilot presents himself, the 
 vessel will probably run aground. If, on the con- 
 trary, the force of things compels to call a man of 
 brains, and furnishes the courage to conquer all 
 human deferences and the petty jealousy which 
 will always try to prevent it, you do not imagine 
 how easy it is to make the public vessel float. 
 The resources of this country, even the mobility 
 of this nation, which is its cardinal vice, furnish so 
 many expedients and facilities, that in France one 
 must never either presume or despair." 2 He is 
 satisfied that the future depends on having the 
 right men at the helm more than on anything else ; 
 but he sees as clearly, that in this tempestuous and 
 1 No. 56. - Lettres a Mauvillon. 488.
 
 86 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 reef-bound sea, the ship must be sailing toward 
 destruction even with the best men at the helm, if 
 they be denied the possibility of making use of 
 their strength and their skill. Neither by striking 
 the shackles off the arms of the present utterly 
 incapable ministers, nor by putting efficient but 
 equally fettered men in their chairs, could the 
 perils of the situation successfully be coped with. 
 Only if a proper change of persons and a proper 
 change of system in regard to the position of the 
 executive and its relation towards the legislative 
 could be brought about simultaneously, would the 
 hope that the revolution might be turned back and 
 kept down to its legitimate task of reform, rest 
 upon a more solid foundation than mere wishes. 
 
 That Mirabeau did not need the lesson of the 
 5th and 6th of October fully to understand this, 
 is proved by the fact, that three weeks before, an 
 article of the Courrier de Provence (Sept. 14) had 
 already advocated the remedy which he proposed 
 in the Assembly on the 6th of November. On 
 the 9th and 15th of October the Courrier had re- 
 turned to the charge. The articles may not have 
 been written by himself, but the paper was his 
 organ, and nobody could suppose it to act without 
 his authorization in a question of such moment.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 87 
 
 Above all, however, he had as early as Septem- 
 ber 29th, and in the Assembly itself, explicitly de- 
 clared in favor of following the example of Eng- 
 land, and demanded that the question be taken up 
 and decided. 1 The charge which Montlosier pre- 
 ferred against him on the 7th of November, that 
 he had sprung a mine upon the Assembly by his 
 motion, was therefore wholly unfounded. 
 
 It cannot, however, be doubted, that but for 
 those two October days Mirabeau would have 
 proceeded more slowly. They forced upon him 
 the conviction that not a day might be lost with 
 impunity. From that moment all his energies are 
 bent upon carrying out the double programme. 
 Without Lafayette's consent and co-operation 
 this was unquestionably an impossible task. For 
 weeks he and his friends, supported ostensibly 
 with ardor by Cice\ the Archbishop of Bordeaux 
 and keeper of the seals, are day and night at work 
 to bring about an alliance with the general. For 
 this purpose the two men met on the 15th or 16th 
 of October at Passy, in the house of the Marquise 
 d'Aragon, Mirabeau's niece. This first conversa- 
 tion was mutually deemed sufficiently satisfactory 
 to continue the negotiations. Our material con- 
 
 1 Moniteur, No. 65, pp. 532, 533.
 
 88 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 cerning them is unfortunately neither ample nor 
 definite enough to get a perfectly clear idea of them. 
 Too much must be read between the lines and even 
 guessed. The difficulties are trebled by the fact 
 that for a while a purely personal question, Mira- 
 beau's pecuniary embarrassments, is in such a way 
 mixed up with the great political question, that it 
 is impossible to separate the two ; they are, so to 
 speak, intergrown. Lafayette was to procure him, 
 directly or indirectly, by the appointment to an 
 ambassadorship, the pecuniary aid he stood in 
 need of, and this was in a way to form the basis of 
 the pact. Mirabeau's wants were so urgent that 
 he might have succumbed, or, at least, come des- 
 perately near succumbing to the temptation of 
 buying relief at the expense of his ambition and 
 patriotism, if his rich and open-handed friend La 
 Marck had not repeatedly assured him that he 
 would never allow him to sink under the load of 
 his debts. Mirabeau soon became all the more 
 willing to rely upon these promises as Lafayette 
 sent him not quite half the amount he had under- 
 taken to get for him. The money was promptly 
 returned, and every idea of going for the sake of 
 the money with a big title into virtual exile, 
 definitely abandoned. But that was not all.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 89 
 
 On the 26th of October he informs La Marck 
 that Montmorin has proposed to Lafayette to 
 nominate him, Mirabeau, ambassador to Holland 
 or England, " not to go there, but to decorate 
 me and to render me worthy and fit for the 
 supreme honor of having in my pocket a promise 
 from the king which assures me that I shall be 
 minister next May." " Lafayette," concludes 
 the important letter, " is to speak only this 
 morning to the queen, but, to tell the truth, he 
 seemed to me less decided than ever, and succumb- 
 ing under the fatality of his indecision. As to 
 myself, I shall resume the combat, firmly resolved 
 — ivhat is in their own interest if it be true that they 
 think me necessary — not to lose an inch of ground, 
 and convinced that at the very latest by the end 
 of next month, everything will go to smash." 1 La 
 Marck replied : "This would be acceptable, if all 
 this were not, as you have strong reasons to an- 
 ticipate, to go to smash before the end of next 
 month." 
 
 La Marck was not as much given to using 
 
 strong language as Mirabeau, and at this time he 
 
 still took a much less gloomy view of the future. 
 
 His ready assent to Mirabeau's prophecy, therefore, 
 
 1 Corresp., I. 406, 407.
 
 90 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 leaves no doubt that, as is to be inferred from the 
 whole situation and the general tenor of the cor- 
 respondence of the two friends at this period, their 
 lugubrious prediction is not intended to be as 
 sweeping as at first sight the " everything " would 
 seem to indicate. They only refer to the cabinet 
 and what is directly in connection with and de- 
 pendent on this question. In their opinion the 
 present administration can no longer be saved, 
 neither by the passive resistance of the king, nor by 
 all the small devices of the ministers themselves, 
 clinging most tenaciously to their chairs, though 
 their seats are cushions of thorns. And Mirabeau 
 is determined himself to do his best for the fulfil- 
 ment of his prophecy. 
 
 You remember that from the beginning he had 
 charged the ministers with matchless ineptitude. 
 It therefore goes without saying that, if he could 
 have acted entirely to suit himself, he would also 
 now from the first have declined to listen to any 
 other proposition, peremptorily insisting upon 
 their being compelled to go. But to gain at once 
 Lafayette's consent to such a radical course was 
 utterly out of the question. He considered it, above 
 all, almost a sacrilege to think of overthrowing 
 Necker. Mirabeau, as we know, deemed him the
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 91 
 
 worst of all, and the general certainly did not put 
 his own political acumen into the best light by still 
 having so much faith in the financial necromancer, 
 whose only miracles, ever since the convocation of 
 the States-General, consisted in the rapidity and 
 thoroughness with which he destroyed his reputa- 
 tion as a great financier and statesman. But this 
 did not alter the fact that Lafayette's support 
 was indispensable. Mirabeau, therefore, so far 
 yielded as to enter upon negotiations with the 
 ministers, but he did it reluctantly and without 
 abandoning- even for the moment the intention to 
 bring all the pressure within his power to bear 
 upon Lafayette, to frighten him into adopting his 
 views. On the 17th of October he informs La 
 March, that in the forenoon the general is to 
 bring him to Montmorin, and that in the after- 
 noon he is to see Necker, who is mad about 
 it and has only consented because he is at 
 bay and feels the knife to be at his throat. 
 Then the letter continues : " Lafayette, who is 
 alarmed by the question of provisioning (Paris) 
 and uneasy about the provinces, must be forced 
 to come to a decision. I myself am resolved to sup- 
 port the motion of Necker's resignation (depart),
 
 92 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 so deeply am I convinced that everything is 
 perishing." 1 
 
 The interview with Necker lasted five hours. 
 According to Mine, de Stael, Necker said in the 
 course of it : " My strength consists in morality ; 
 you have too much esprit not to feel some day the 
 necessity of this support ; until that moment has 
 come, it may suit the king under the actual cir- 
 cumstances to have you for minister, but we two 
 cannot be ministers at the same time." Mirabeau 
 did not fail to acknowledge and reciprocate the 
 compliment. On the 19th he wrote Lafayette : 
 "If you have reflected upon the perfidious col- 
 lusion of the ministers with the brutal or 
 rather truly delirious pride of the despicable 
 charlatan (Necker) who has brought the throne 
 and France within an inch of their ruin, and 
 who persists in rather consummating it than to 
 acknowledge to himself his incapacity, you do 
 not believe any more that I can be in the least 
 their auxiliary. 
 
 " They have insulted me, marked me out ; they 
 have tried, so far as they could, to denounce my 
 ambition and the difficulties which I throw in 
 their way ; they could only disarm me in oper- 
 
 1 Corresp., I. 385.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 93 
 
 ating the public welfare, and the evil spirit of the 
 human race is not further from that than they. 
 Permit me to entreat you, that you no longer 
 demand from me that I spare them and that . . . 
 I may at last enable the nation to judge, whether 
 the actual cabinet can save the state." 1 He tells 
 him, that the very next day he will attack the 
 ministers, and he is as good as his word. 
 
 Two days later La Marck warned him not to 
 precipitate matters ; just because his becoming 
 minister was an imperative necessity, he should 
 not risk anything. Mirabeau did not spurn the 
 advice. The negotiations went on, but, as I 
 mentioned, came to naught, and Lafayette could 
 not make up his mind what to do. Three days 
 after Mirabeau had informed La Marck of Mont- 
 morin's offer and his determination to reject it, 
 Lafayette writes him, underlining the sentence: 
 " What would you say, if Necker should threaten 
 to go in case Mirabeau arrives," i. e., is made 
 minister ? It is hard to tell what to make of this 
 question. Is it to him still so much a matter of 
 course, that Necker's going would be the greatest 
 calamity, that he, in spite of everything, assumes 
 even Mirabeau will shrink back if he learns that 
 1 Corresp., I. 389, 390.
 
 94 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 this would be the consequence of his entering the 
 cabinet ? This would seem to be the most 
 natural interpretation, if Talon had not reported 
 the same day to La March, that he had found the 
 general dissatisfied with Necker, " positively 
 announcing that the wheel will turn to-day." 
 
 For two or three days the go-betweens seem to 
 have been very confident of complete success. It 
 is likely that two undated lists of ministers in 
 Mirabeau's handwriting were projected in these 
 days. One of them is headed by Necker's name 
 as prime-minister, but with the remark : " Because 
 one must render him as powerless as he is inca- 
 pable, and at the same time preserve his popu- 
 larity to the king." Mirabeau figures in it as 
 member of the cabinet, but without any special 
 department. To his name the remark is added: 
 " The petty scruples of human deference are no 
 more in season. The government must loudly 
 announce that its foremost auxiliaries will be 
 henceforth sound principles, character, and talent." 
 Lafayette is to be a member of the cabinet with 
 the title of " Mar £ dial de France" and tempo- 
 rarily invested with the office of commander-in- 
 chief for the purpose of reorganizing the army. — 
 The second list is incomplete and divided into
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 95 
 
 two groups, respectively headed : " Part of La- 
 fayette," and " Part of the Queen." 1 
 
 One is evidently on the eve of the decision, but, 
 unfortunately, the more we approach it, the more 
 fragmentary also our sources become. Thus 
 much we can see, that both sides are equally active 
 in getting ready for the battle. Lafayette has, after 
 all, again failed to " turn the wheel." His exas- 
 perating consistency in swinging like a pendulum 
 from right to left and back from left to right 
 nothing can overcome. Talon writes, on the 5th 
 of November, to La Marck : " I am going to La- 
 fayette ; we shall do the impossible to determine 
 him." And in the same note he says : " A terrible 
 plot, I repeat it, is being formed against Mirabeau 
 in the Assembly." 2 This is no news to Mirabeau. 
 He writes on the same day to La Marck : " The 
 bomb of my enemies is to explode on Monday ' : 
 (the 9th). And he knows as well that the min- 
 isters do not propose to be led like sheep to 
 the slaughter-house. On the 6th he informs La 
 Marck, that they have had a conference at La- 
 fayette's, who, he declares, was mad about them 
 on the 4th, but is completely duped by them. 
 But he is in high spirits. He is determined to 
 1 Corresp., I. 411, 412. 2 lb., I. 416.
 
 96 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 head them off. On the 5th he announces to La 
 Marck, that he will attack them the next day and 
 tells him how he intends to do it. I do not see, 
 he says, what miracle could make these gentle- 
 men live, if from Monday next they can get no 
 dollar more, and " are to-morrow compelled to 
 accept or refuse the honor of seating themselves 
 among us." A victory, which he achieved on 
 that day in another question over the cabinet, 
 elates him so much that he writes on the morning 
 of the 6th to La Marck, that his cause has advanced 
 " at giant strides." Lafayette, he thinks, will 
 be compelled to surrender practically at discretion, 
 grateful that his (Mirabeau's) " personal fidelity " 
 will cede to him the honor of presenting the list 
 of ministers, which he (Mirabeau) will compose 
 for him. 
 
 The letter states that he proposes to open the 
 attack "by a simple tactical evolution." M. Lo- 
 menie infers from this expression that the financial 
 question, which was the order of the day, only 
 served him as a " pretext." If tnis be correct, his 
 further strictures upon the speech cannot be re- 
 futed. He charges the remarks upon the financial 
 problems with being "somewhat lengthy," and 
 asserts that Mirabeau, after having entertained the
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 97 
 
 Assembly " for an hour with these preliminaries, 
 came abruptly, and almost without transition, to the 
 true object of his discourse." If so, then at least 
 on this occasion Mirabeau evidently cuts a rather 
 sorry figure as an orator. That is all the more 
 surprising, because he had had ample time for 
 preparation and intended to strike a decisive blow. 
 M. Lomenie ought to have been struck by this 
 as much as the most ardent admirer of Mirabeau, 
 for the one thing in which he acknowledges him 
 to have been a master mind is oratory. He, there- 
 fore, must hold others excused if with them the 
 suspicion is aroused that the fault may lie not 
 with Mirabeau, but with him. In my opinion it is 
 one of Mirabeau's greatest speeches, but M. Lo- 
 menie could not do him justice as an orator, be- 
 cause perhaps in no other case has he so strikingly 
 proved his inability fully to understand and appre- 
 ciate him as a statesman. Mirabeau does not seize 
 upon the financial question as a pretext, does not 
 waste an hour in irrelevant preliminaries, is not 
 driven to take abruptly an awkward side-leap in 
 order to get at last somehow to his true object. 
 The financial question had been the immediate 
 occasion for convening the States-General; the 
 financial question had continued to be one of the
 
 98 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 main propelling forces of the revolution ; the 
 financial question became every week more the 
 most pressing and the most immediately dangerous 
 problem, the financial question had broadened into 
 the question of the whole economical condition of 
 the country, disintegrating more and more not 
 only the political, but the whole social structure — 
 so long as no efficacious remedy was applied to the 
 financial distress and the rapidly progressing vitia- 
 tion of the whole economical condition of the 
 country, every day was in itself a "giant-stride" 
 further towards the abyss, and, finally, no remedy 
 could be efficacious, unless the axe was laid to the 
 main root of the evils, that threatened to let the 
 revolution terminate in chaos. Therefore, what- 
 ever the order of the day, he had to make the 
 financial question the basis of his argument, if he 
 wanted to treat the problem confronting France 
 ex fundameyito and argue as a statesman. On this 
 basis he builds with a master's hand. There are 
 no prolixities, no irrelevancies, no sophistries, no 
 captivating oratorical flourishes. It is a matter-of- 
 fact speech, closely knit and of flawless logic : not 
 an argument manufactured for the purpose of 
 arriving at a predetermined conclusion, but an 
 array of irrefutable facts constituting an unbreak-
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 99 
 
 able chain leading straight up to the conclusion. 
 But from beginning to end it is the reasoning not 
 of the political metaphysician operating with the 
 logical categories of the school, but of the states- 
 man fully conscious that he must shape his course 
 according to the merciless logic of facts and there- 
 fore never lose sight of the whole, viewing and 
 judging everything in its relation to and its bear- 
 ing upon the Avhole. This M. Lomenie fails to 
 do. The point of view from which he judges 
 speech and speaker is not the whole situation, but 
 the isolated fact that Mirabeau wants to overthrow 
 the cabinet and become minister himself. Choos- 
 ing this point of view he does not look to the 
 speech for the correct interpretation of the an- 
 nouncement that the attack will be opened by a 
 simple tactical evolution, but this announcement 
 is, without any proof, assumed to furnish the key 
 to the speech, i. e., to be a formal avowal that he 
 will not attempt to conquer by proving, but in- 
 tends to outmanoeuvre the adversary by stratagems. 
 In fact the tactical evolution consisted only in 
 keeping as much as possible all personal questions 
 out of view. Not by attacking the ministers did 
 lie propose to get rid of them, but by putting the 
 cabinet into such a position, that henceforth only
 
 100 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 able ministers would have any chance of main- 
 taining themselves. Indeed a dexterous tactical 
 move, but also something more than that: the 
 only means to save the country. 
 
 Literally not a minute does Mirabeau waste in 
 preliminaries. In the very first sentence he suc- 
 cinctly states the thesis he j)roposes to prove : 
 among the multiplying financial disorders " are 
 some, the aggravation of which could render all 
 our labors useless ; " 1 in other words : if a financial 
 sanitation be not effected, everything is at stake. 
 At the head of the financial disorders he puts the 
 disappearing of specie. " A nation accustomed to 
 the use of specie . . . cannot be deprived of it for 
 any length of time without trouble arising in all 
 its transactions, without the efforts of individuals 
 to sustain them becoming more and more ruinous 
 and preparing very great calamities. These 
 calamities approach at long strides. We are on 
 the eve of a formidable crisis." Commerce can 
 no more procure the specie it needs ; everybody 
 hoards it for his own safety ; the causes, which 
 drive it out of the country, become every day 
 more active, and yet it is indispensable for the pro- 
 vision trade, on which the maintenance of public 
 1 CEuvres, II. 395.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 101 
 
 tranquillity so largely depends. "Absolutely 
 nothing is done to combat the calamity of our 
 foreign exchange ; " drafts on Paris are so dis- 
 credited, that they can no longer be negotiated in 
 any commercial place. The caisse d'escompte con- 
 tinues to flood the country with its paper money, 
 which is justly looked upon with growing distrust, 
 since the government has begun to dispense it 
 from the obligation to pay on presentation specie 
 for its notes. Necker's very reputation has struck 
 a blow against the public credit. Everybody 
 reasons thus : if ever he is reduced to the neces- 
 sity of having recourse to such means, all resources 
 must be exhausted. Confidence has vanished and 
 is vanishing more every day. The withdrawal of 
 other securities to the amount of about 200 mill- 
 ions has increased the stringency. All the great 
 commercial centres, and, above all, the capital, are 
 already " reduced to the last expedients." " Are 
 the anxieties of Paris in regard to the supply of 
 provisions not as much the effect of the scarcity 
 of specie and the apprehensions it excites, as of 
 the dark plots, so difficult to understand and so 
 impossible to prove, to which one persists in at- 
 tributing them?" If an economical catastrophe 
 befall Paris„in consequence of a great number of 
 
 _ LZBKAK I 
 
 mrVERSITY OF CALIF 
 SANTA BARBARA
 
 102 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 suspensions, ruin must spread from this centre all 
 over the country. " Would it not be a miracle, 
 upon which no one dare put his trust, if in so gen- 
 eral a calamity the social bond did not break ; if 
 in default of physical force moral force were to 
 preserve it ? 
 
 " You undoubtedly ask yourselves, gentlemen, to 
 what these observations are to lead us ? To turn 
 us more than ever away from the resource of 
 palliatives, to dread vague hopes, not to expect 
 the return of a happier time except by multiply- 
 ing our efforts and measures to bring it about, 
 not to go on trying by used-up resources to throw 
 our embarrassments upon those who will come 
 after us. Our efforts would be useless ; the reign 
 of delusions is past ; experience has taught us too 
 much the perfidy of all means leaving to imagina- 
 tion alone to create the motives of confidence." 
 
 If this be beating around the bush with irrel- 
 evancies used as pretexts, I am yet to read the 
 first political speech that takes the bull by the 
 horns and states with all the plainness and suc- 
 cinctness that language is capable of, what the 
 speaker is driving at. One only must not, in the 
 face of his express declarations, impute to him 
 that he merely wanted to overthrow the cabinet.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 103 
 
 This was not the end, but a means to the end, 
 and but one among several. What he wants is to 
 put an end, once for all, to the policy of palliatives 
 and initiate a radical cure, and he declares and 
 proves that in the nature of things, everything can 
 be but a palliative, unless confidence be restored. 
 " In one word," he says, " one must do away 
 with all the causes destructive of confidence, and 
 put in their place the means, the efficacy of which 
 is discernible to the least trained eyes and sustains 
 itself by the solidity and wisdom of their own 
 construction." Mind: all the causes destructive 
 of confidence. 
 
 Then he proceeds to state and discuss the means, 
 which, in his opinion, ought to be put in their 
 place. He begins with the supply of provisions, 
 i. e., with the question which more than any one 
 other thing renders Paris a volcano threatening 
 every day a new eruption. He thinks an attempt 
 ought to be made to induce the United States to 
 pay their war-loans by sending France grain. 
 
 Next he suggests for the administration of the 
 public debt the establishment of a caisse nationale 
 with revenues of its own, commensurate to the 
 obligations to be discharged by it and independent 
 of the ministry of finances. This would not only
 
 lOi THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 completely restore the confidence of the creditors 
 ol the state by giving them a perfect guarantee 
 that they will always be paid what they have to 
 claim, but also engage this powerful class, in their 
 own interest, in every way to support the caisse 
 nationale and the public credit in general. 
 
 What more, he then asks, will have to be done, 
 to secure to the nation the credit it deserves? And 
 he answers : " The return of peace and good order, 
 the restoration of the forces of the empire." He 
 pretends to think that one is rapidly advancing on 
 the high-road towards this goal, but declares that 
 it cannot be reached, so long as there is an antag- 
 onism between the Assembly and the ministers, 
 and this antagonism, he asserts, must continue, so 
 long as the ministers are absent from the National 
 Assembly. " All good citizens sigh for the re- 
 establishment of the public force ; and what public 
 force can we establish if the executive and legis- 
 lative powers look upon each other as enemies and 
 fear to discuss in common the public affairs ? " 
 
 That this was the pivotal point of the whole 
 political problem, is incontestable. On this occa- 
 sion Mirabeau assumed it to be so patent, that it 
 required no proof. He at once proceeded to the 
 examination of the question, whether the means,
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 105 
 
 by which he proposed to bring about the necessary 
 concert between the two departments, be adapted 
 to the end. 
 
 In England, he said, " the depository of a long 
 course of experiences on liberty," the nation con- 
 siders the presence of the ministers in Parliament 
 not only absolutely necessary, but one of its great 
 privileges. It thus exercises over all acts of the 
 executive power a control which is more important 
 than any other responsibility. 
 
 " There is not a member of the Assembly that 
 cannot interrogate them. The minister cannot 
 help answering . . . every question is official, has 
 the whole Assembly as a witness ; evasions, ecpiivo- 
 cations are judged by a great number of men, who 
 have the right to insist upon more explicit an- 
 swers. . . What lias one to oppose to these ad- 
 vantages ? Will it be said that the National As- 
 sembly has no need to be informed by the minis- 
 ters ? But where are, in the first place, the facts 
 to be found which constitute the experience of the 
 government ? . . . Can one say that those who ex- 
 ecute the laws have nothing to tell to those by 
 whom they are devised and determined? Are the 
 executors of all the public transactions . . . not like 
 a repertory, which an active representative of the
 
 106 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 nation must constantly consult? And where could 
 this be done to greater advantage to the nation 
 than in the presence of the Assembly? Outside 
 the Assembly the inquirer is but an individual, to 
 whom the minister can answer what he likes, and 
 even not answer at all. Will he be interrogated 
 by a decree of the Assembly? But then one ex- 
 poses oneself to procrastinations, delays, tergiversa- 
 tions, obscure answers. . . Does one say that the 
 minister can be summoned to appear before the 
 Assembly ? . . . only the majority can summon him, 
 while in the Assembly he cannot escape the inter- 
 rogatory of a single member. 
 
 "Where could the ministers combat with less 
 success the liberty of the people ? where will they 
 make with less inconvenience their observations 
 on the acts of legislation ? where will their preju- 
 dices, their errors, their ambition be unveiled with 
 more energy ? where will they contribute more to 
 the stability of the decrees ? where will they more 
 solemnly take the obligation to execute them ? . . . 
 
 1 " Does one say that the minister will have 
 more influence in the Assembly than if he had not 
 
 1 The paragraph-structure in this and similar quotations 
 may appear a little odd. It is always strictly according to 
 the original.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 107 
 
 the right to sit in it ? It would be pretty difficult 
 to prove it. The influence of the ministers, if it 
 is not due to their talents and their virtues, springs 
 from manoeuvres, seductions, secret corruptions, 
 and if anything can diminish the effect of these, it 
 is when they, as members of the Assembly, are 
 constantly under the eyes of an opposition, which 
 has no interest to spare them. 
 
 " Why should we fear the presence of the min- 
 isters ? Must we dread their vengeance ? Is it to 
 be apprehended that they will themselves mark 
 out their victims? One would forget that we are 
 making a free constitution. . . The laws on in- 
 dividual liberty will liberate us from ministerial 
 despotism. That is the true, the only safeguard 
 of the liberty of votes. 
 
 " No, gentlemen, Ave shall not yield to frivolous 
 fears, to idle phantoms ; we will not have that 
 distrustful timidity which rushes into traps from 
 very fear to defy them. 
 
 " The first agents of the executive power are 
 necessary in every legislative assembly; they form 
 a part of the organs of its intelligence. The laws, 
 discussed with them, will become more easy ; their 
 sanction will be more assured, and their execution 
 more complete. Their presence will prevent in-
 
 108 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 cidents, steady our march, promote concert between 
 the two powers to whom the fate of the empire is 
 confided." 
 
 He concluded with a threefold motion, covering 
 the three remedies he had suggested. The last 
 one, clad in the form of an invitation to the min- 
 isters, conferred upon them " a consultative voice, 
 until definite provision be made in regard to them 
 by the constitution." 
 
 So many members vividly applauded the orator 
 that he might well feel confident of success. And 
 even apart from the cogency of his reasoning the 
 Assembly, if it cared anything for being consistent, 
 had indeed good cause for receiving the motion 
 favorably. On the 4th of August the king had 
 notified the Assembly of the appointment of three 
 new ministers. 1 The last sentence of his letter 
 read thus : " By choosing from your Assembly I 
 indicate my desire to entertain with it the most 
 constant and most amiable harmony." Upon 
 demand the letter had to be read a second time 
 and each time it was loudly applauded. Then, 
 state the Archives Parlementaires, " upon the 
 
 1 The Archbishop of Bordeaux, Champion de Cice, the 
 Archbishop of Vienne, La France de Pompignan, and de la 
 Tour-du-Pin-Paulin.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 109 
 
 motion of several members the Assembly votes 
 unanimously an address of thanks to the king for 
 the mark of confidence which he has given it." 3 
 The new ministers, it is true, had ceased to occupy 
 their seats in the Assembly, but, so far as I can see, 
 not in consequence of any action on the part of 
 the Assembly ; their letter of the 5th of August to 
 the Assembly is silent on this point. 2 On the 
 other hand, however, the crown had claimed the 
 right to send the ministers before the Assembly, 
 verbally to communicate to it the views of the 
 government, and the Assembly had not contested 
 the claim. But three days after that letter of the 
 king, to which the Assembly unanimously voted to 
 reply by an address of thanks, the cabinet appeared 
 before the Assembly, Cice announcing: "We are 
 sent to you by the king to deposit in your bosom 
 the apprehensions agitating the paternal heart of 
 His Majesty." 3 
 
 Would an opinion, based merely on these facts 
 and on what was revealed on the surface of the 
 
 1 Arch. Pari., IX. 341. 
 
 2 Mirabeau said in the Assembly : •• lis out juge a propos 
 d'abdiquer la titre des representans de la nation ; ils ont cm 
 bien faire, mais il est permis d'avoir deux avis a cet egard." 
 — Moniteur, Sept. 29, 1789. 
 
 3 Arch. Pari., IX. 360.
 
 110 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 situation, not rather have charged Mirabeau with 
 having set up an unnecessarily huge apparatus 
 for the attainment of his end, than with having 
 undertaken a hopeless task ? And the speeches 
 that were made against his motion were 
 eminently calculated to confirm this view. I 
 say speeches, for to say arguments would be 
 an unwarrantable abuse of the word. Blin's 
 speech, the only one with at least a pretence at 
 arguing, was a tissue of gross, self-contradictory 
 sophisms. Instead of refuting Mirabeau, he 
 tears to pieces a man of straw set up by him- 
 self. He undertakes to prove the impropriety of 
 consulting with the ministers in the Assembly, 
 by gravely demonstrating that it would not be 
 the proper thing to consult " only " the ministers — 
 he pretends to think that the adoption of the 
 motion would preclude the ministers being con- 
 sulted by committees, because Mirabeau has 
 spoken disparagingly of these — he opposes the 
 motion, now, because the poor ministers ought not 
 to be exposed to the ruthless attacks of ambitious 
 members, and, in the next minute, because they 
 will force all sorts of obnoxious laws upon the 
 Assembly, for their responsibility will have been 
 rendered a " chimerical terror." The experiences
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. Ill 
 
 of England, according to him, are only the most 
 impressive warning against the motion : if the 
 ministers had not been in Parliament, England 
 would never have lost her American colonies and 
 numberless bad laws would not have been 
 passed. Let the motion be adopted and there is 
 but one alternative : either the executive power is 
 unnecessarily and uselessly depressed and debased, 
 or " the Assembly is no longer free and the nation 
 is in danger of losing its liberty." " The only 
 enemies of the kings and of the nations are the 
 ministers." 1 
 
 This apothegm of political doctrinarianism run 
 mad was the climax of the speech. The climax, 
 but not the true key to it. This was concealed in 
 a vague and enigmatical remark about some 
 " ambition of a near or distant future." Princi- 
 pally to ponder this over-night, and not to digest 
 the argumentative hash to which it had been 
 treated by Blin, the Assembly postponed its decis- 
 ion to the next day. That boded no good. 
 Apparently Mirabeau had every reason to be of 
 good cheer ; in fact the battle was virtually lost, 
 for the constitution of the Assembly was such, 
 that it was almost sure to succumb if poison of 
 1 Arch. Pari., IX. 711-71;).
 
 112 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 this kind was allowed to work for twenty-four 
 hours. 1 
 
 The tone which his adversaries assumed the 
 next day, at once apprised Mirabeau that he was 
 defeated. Montlosier excelled Blin in the holy 
 zeal with which he declaimed against allowing 
 the ministers " to enlighten our debates with their 
 false light, to fill them with their false doctrine ; " 
 but his concluding assertion, that the proposition 
 must have "a mystic sense," smartly turned 
 Blin's dagger around in the wound. Lanjuinais, 
 who followed him, disdained to fight with innuen- 
 does. With visor wide-open he struck straight 
 home. "An eloquent genius," he exclaimed, 
 "prevails on you and subjugates you; what would 
 this man not do, if he were to become minister?" 2 
 
 1 According to the Arch. Pari. , Blin spoke on the 6th and 
 7th. The second speech, however, reads so much like a 
 synopsis of the first that one cannot help suspecting a 
 blunder on the part of the editors, though it is almost too 
 gross to seem credible. If Blin spoke but once, it is as good 
 as certain that he did so on the 7th. In that case the situa- 
 tion would have been apparently still more favorable for 
 Mirabeau, but in fact he had all the more reason to expect a 
 defeat. As his motion had been vigorously supported by 
 some, and none of the other opponents had adduced any- 
 thing against it bearing even the semblance of a serious 
 argument, the refusal to come to a vote was inexplicable 
 unless it concealed a sinister design. 
 
 2 CEuvres, II. 433. The synopsis of Lanjuinais' speech in
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 113 
 
 That was David's pebble felling Goliath to the 
 ground. Lajuninais ended by making the 
 counter-motion, that during the legislative period 
 and for three years after the close of it, no repre- 
 sentative of the nation be allowed to accept from 
 the executive power any place, pension, prefer- 
 ment, grace, etc. 
 
 Mirabeau's reply was absolutely crushing, but 
 he spoke against a pre-determined and irrevocable 
 resolution. Nobody so much as attempted to 
 answer him ; he was simply voted down. 
 
 " I cannot believe that the author of the motion 
 seriously wishes to have determined that the elite 
 of the nation cannot contain a good minister. 
 
 " That the confidence accorded by the nation to 
 a citizen must be a reason for excluding the confi- 
 dence of the king. . . . 
 
 " That in declaring that, without any other 
 distinction than that of virtues and talents, all 
 citizens have an equal aptitude for every employ, 
 one must except from that aptitude and that 
 equality of rights the twelve hundred deputies 
 honored by the suffrage of a great people. 
 
 " That the National Assembly and the cabinet 
 
 the Archives Parlementaires is so brief, that it is worthless. 
 Not even any allusion is made to this sentence. 
 8
 
 114 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 must be so divided, so opposed to each other, that 
 one ought to discard all means which might 
 establish more intimacy, more confidence, more 
 unity in the plans and in the measures. 
 
 " No, gentlemen, I do not believe that this is 
 the object of the motion, for I shall never be able 
 to believe an absurdity. 
 
 " Nor can I imagine that what with our neigh- 
 bors serves the public welfare, can be with us only 
 a source of evils. . . . 
 
 " Nor can I believe that it is intended to offer 
 this insult to the cabinet, to think that whoever 
 belongs to it must eo ipso for this fact be suspicious 
 to the National Assembly. 
 
 1 " To three ministers already taken from the 
 midst of this Assembly and almost upon its vote, 
 that this example has taught that a similar promo- 
 tion would be dangerous in the future. 
 
 " To every member of this Assembty that, if he 
 were called into the cabinet for having; done his 
 duty as citizen, he would cease to do it by the fact 
 in itself of his being minister. . . . 
 
 " I besides ask myself : is it a point of the con- 
 
 1 The reader has of course to supply for this and for the 
 following sentence, " to offer this insult", from the preced- 
 ing paragraph.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 115 
 
 stitution one proposes to settle? The moment 
 has not yet come to examine whether the functions 
 of ministers are incompatible with the quality 
 of representative of the nation, and such a ques- 
 tion cannot be decided without discussing it at 
 length. 
 
 "Is it a simple police rule which one intends to 
 establish ? Then there is perhaps a previous law 
 which one ought to obey, that of our mandates, 
 without which none of us would be what he is ; 
 and in this respect one ought, perhaps, to examine, 
 whether this Assembly is competent to establish 
 for this session an incompatibility of which the 
 mandates know nothing and to which no deputy 
 has subjected himself. 
 
 " Shall every representative be forbidden to 
 resign ? Our liberty would be violated. 
 
 " Shall he who resigns be prevented from 
 accepting a place in the cabinet? Then one in- 
 tends to curtail the liberty of the executive power. 
 
 " Is it proposed to deprive the constituents of 
 the right to re-elect the deputy whom the king- 
 has called into his council ? Then not a rule of 
 police is to be rendered, but a point of the consti- 
 tution must be established." 
 
 "Furthermore: can it not easily happen that
 
 116 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 the Assembly itself believes salvation dependent 
 on having ministers, that share its principles and 
 views, taken from its midst? 
 
 " However great the number of statesmen, 
 which so enlightened a nation as ours may con- 
 tain, is it nothing to render 1,200 citizens ineligi- 
 ble, who already are the Slite of the nation ? 
 
 " I ask : shall the king prefer courtiers or those 
 to whom the nation has not given its confidence, 
 though they may have solicited it, to the deputies 
 of his people ? " 
 
 As it is impossible to answer these questions, 
 he says, it is impossible that the ostensible object 
 of the motion be its true purpose. " To render 
 homage to the intentions of him who has moved 
 it, I am forced to think that some secret motive 
 justifies it, and I shall try to divine it. 
 
 " I believe that it can be useful to prevent 
 certain members of the Assembly from entering 
 the cabinet. 
 
 " But as it is not proper to sacrifice a great 
 principle in order to obtain this specific advantage, 
 I propose as an amendment the exclusion from 
 the cabinet of those members of the Assembly 
 whom the author of the motion seems to fear, and 
 I undertake to name them.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 117 
 
 " There can be, gentlemen, but two members in 
 the Assembly, who can be the secret objects of 
 the motion. The others have given sufficient 
 proofs of liberty, courage, and public spirit . . . 
 Who are these members ? You have already 
 guessed it, gentlemen ; it is either the author of 
 the motion, or myself. . . The amendment, gen- 
 tlemen, which I propose, is, that the exclusion 
 which one demands, be confined to M. de Mira- 
 beau, deputy of the commoners of Aix." 
 
 One would have to search the annals of parlia- 
 mentarism a long time to find another speech 
 every single sentence of which is such a sledge- 
 hammer stroke. Never did a prouder word pass 
 the lips of Mirabeau than his amendment, and it 
 painted the situation with photographic exactness. 
 The vanquished put himself the laurel wreath of 
 victory upon his brow, and the victors stood before 
 him as culprits caught in the act. Blin's motion, 
 to exclude the members of the Assembly for the 
 duration of its session from the cabinet, was 
 adopted by a great majority, but the Assembly 
 had borne testimony to the immense superiority of 
 the man and its unappeasable jealousy of him in a 
 way, which put an indelible stigma not only upon its 
 political discernment, but also upon its patriotism.
 
 118 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 "Every time that Mirabeau was too much in 
 the right," says Mejan, the editor of his speeches, 
 " he was accused of having too much talent " ; 
 and, " they only assassinated the principles and 
 reason."' Alas ! they did more. They also 
 ground the axe for Louis XVI., and at the crank 
 of the whetstone stood those who palmed them- 
 selves off as his only trusty knights. Most of the 
 " right," i. e., the conservatives, voted with the 
 dominating faction of the majority for Blin's 
 motion, and La Marck directly charges Cice" with 
 being the real originator of the plot which was 
 hatched against Mirabeau and his motion between 
 the two meetings of the Assembly on the 6th and 
 7th of November. 1 Led by a minister of the king, 
 his especial champions stabbed the one man who 
 could have saved him, if it still was possible to 
 save him, 2 and therefore they stabbed the king 
 by stabbing Mirabeau. 
 
 1 Corresp., I. 420-422. Lafayette corroborates LaMarck"s 
 assertion. 
 
 2 1 cannot refrain from calling attention to the following 
 remarkable sentence in a letter written by Mirabeau on 
 Sept. 3, 1788 — notice the date — to his uncle : " Un evene- 
 ment (his election to the States-General) qui me mettrait en 
 scene dans un moment qui va recommencer la monarchic, 
 en la constituent, si elle est encore susceptible d'etre con- 
 stitute." — Mem., V. 193. The italics are mine.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 119 
 
 " I should think myself very happy if, at the 
 price of my exclusion, I could preserve to this 
 Assembly the hope to see several of its members, 
 worthy of my confidence and all my respect, become 
 the confidential advisers of the nation and the 
 kins:, whom I shall not cease to consider indivisi- 
 ble." With these words Mirabeau had concluded 
 his reply to Lajuinais. They were not a hollow 
 and hypocritical phrase, but expressed his true 
 sentiments. Though he ardently wished to be- 
 come himself minister, not only to satisfy his 
 burning ambition, but also because he was 
 thoroughly convinced that as a statesman he 
 towered far above all others, yet he deemed the 
 legal establishment of the correct principle con- 
 cerning the relations of the two departments of 
 infinitely greater import than this or any other 
 personal question. This is no mere conjecture; 
 the assertion is fully provable by positive evi- 
 dence. 1 
 
 1 On the 18th of November he writes to his sister Mme du 
 Saillant : " Ne me parle pas de ces haines trop betes si elles 
 ne sont pas atroces, et ne t'en fache pas pour nous, mais pour 
 le bien de FEtat, et de la revolution qu'ils ne comprennent 
 pas ; en verite j'aurais le droit d'en parler comme Ciceron a 
 Atticus." Allusion is made to the passage in the 16th letter 
 of the 1st book, commencing : " Quaeris deinceps, qui nunc 
 sit status rerum, et qui meus."— Memoires, VI. 420.
 
 120 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 The second list of ministers in his handwriting, 
 which I mentioned, does not contain his name, 
 and Lafayette states directly : " Mirabeau re- 
 nounces entering (the cabinet), provided that he 
 has an influence upon it." 1 Then he (Mirabeau) 
 again and again repeats — as well in his private 
 correspondence as, at a later period, in his Notes 
 to the court — that there is no salvation, unless the 
 insane decree of November 7th be repealed, and 
 in these declarations his own name is, at the most, 
 mentioned, so to speak, incidentally ; as a rule they 
 contain no reference whatever to himself. Thus 
 he writes already at the end of 1789 : " What 
 more will have to be done ? — Revive the executive 
 power; regenerate the royal authority, and con- 
 ciliate it with national liberty. That will not be 
 done without a new cabinet, and this enterprise is 
 noble and difficult enough for one to wish to 
 belong to it. But a new cabinet will always be 
 badly composed, so long as the ministers are not 
 members of the legislature. The decree concern- 
 ing the ministers must therefore be reconsidered. 
 It will be reconsidered, or the revolution will 
 never be consolidated." 2 
 
 The brief but masterly recapitulation of his 
 1 Memoires, II. 432. * Corresp., I. 429.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 121 
 
 reasons for this opinion in a Note of the 12th of 
 September, 1790, to the court, is so absolutely free 
 from personal considerations that, so far as this is 
 concerned, it might have been written by a Wash- 
 ington. The decree, he says, " must be openly 
 attacked by the king and by all those who want to 
 save at the same time the monarchical government 
 and the kingdom,"' for, " in a representative gov- 
 ernment it is impossible that the ministers should 
 not sit in the legislative body, if the nation is not 
 to be exposed to violent shocks and the royal 
 authority to continual attacks. Their presence 
 alone can serve there as an intermediary and com- 
 mon bond between the powers, which it is easier 
 to separate in theory than in practice. Thereby 
 all the active measures of the legislative body will 
 seem measures of the executive power ; one would 
 no longer present two opposite ends to the respect 
 of the people ; there would be unity of action in 
 the authority ; the National Assembly would in- 
 crease its real strength ; and the king would pre- 
 serve his prerogative, [f this measure is always 
 indispensable in the form of government which 
 we have adopted, it is still more so in a moment 
 of revolution, when the royal authority, assaulted 
 on all sides and paralyzed in all its energies, can
 
 1"2'2 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 perish either by inaction or by the rivalry of 
 another authority, which would only need to be 
 favored by circumstances to crowd it out en- 
 tirely." i 
 
 That was but too true, because when it had been 
 decided that the king was to have only a " sus- 
 pensive " and not an absolute veto, the question of 
 granting him the right of dissolving the legislature 
 was, as M. Lomenie says, "considered as ipso facto 
 discarded/' 2 Without the possibility of appeal- 
 ing from the legislature to the people, and the 
 ministers " being mere clerks (eommis) at the As- 
 sembly's commands," 3 the crown was completely 
 at its mercy. 
 
 The fatal seed yielded, month after month, a 
 more abundant crop of poisonous fruit. Mira- 
 beau's anxiety to find some means of uprooting it, 
 therefore, steadily increased, though the realiza- 
 tion of his wish to enter the cabinet himself pal- 
 pably became more and more impossible. In 
 October, 1790, he repeatedly advises the king, if 
 the decree be rescinded, either to appoint a mixed 
 cabinet — half moderates and half radicals — or to 
 give all the places to pure Jacobins. The first 
 proposition was based upon what he had written 
 
 ! Corresp., II. 178. 2 lb., IV. 438. a Ib., V. 16.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 123 
 
 half a year before to Lafayette in proposing 
 to him an alliance once more : let us " unite 
 the opinions by the men, as we cannot unite the 
 men by the opinions." l The latter advice is in 
 itself irrefutable proof that, apart from all per- 
 sonal aims and ends, he implicitly believed what 
 he said about the absolute necessity of an organic 
 connection between the legislative and executive 
 power. But there was, unquestionably, also more 
 than a grain of truth in his oft-quoted remark : 
 " Jacobins that are ministers will not be Jacobin 
 ministers." 2 
 
 It hardly needs to be stated that when in Septem- 
 ber, before the fall of Necker, he advised the king 
 openly to attack the decree, he intended to do so 
 himself. We have the draft of the speech he pro- 
 posed to deliver in the Assembly. 3 " He aban- 
 
 1 Apr. 28, 1790. Corresp., II. 4. 2 lb., II. 228. 
 
 8 Memoires, VIII. 126-149. " Voila ou nous a conduit la 
 separation inconsequente des premiers agens du pouvoir 
 exeeutif et des representans de la nation. Oui, je suis force 
 de le repeter, les malheurs qui ont accompagne les premiers 
 temps de notre revolution, ceux dont nous avons etesucces- 
 sivement assaillis jusqu'ici, ceux dont noussommes menaces 
 encore, n'ont eu et ne pourront avoir de cause plus directe 
 et plus certaine . . . je vais tacher de vous demontrer, par 
 une analyze exacte et rigoureuse, que pour l'avenir comme 
 pour le passe votre decret serait une cause essentiellement 
 generatrice d'anarchie et de discorde, car il est tout-a-fait
 
 124 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 cloned the intention, because he soon became con- 
 vinced that there was not the slightest chance of 
 success, and without the possibility of success the 
 attempt would have been a gross, tactical blunder, 
 for it could only have the effect of lessening his 
 influence and furnishing arms to his enemies. 
 Lafayette cut the string of his bow. 
 
 As early as the summer of 1789 Mirabeau had 
 told the Assembly : " You must show a profound 
 contempt for the absurd dogma of political infalli- 
 bility." 1 The admonition was as little heeded as 
 most of his warnings. The further the Assembly 
 advanced in its revolutionary course, the more it 
 became addicted to the sweet sin. Its worst off- 
 spring was the resolution that its decrees should 
 be irrevocable, until a new constituent Assembly 
 was convened. The doubts as to the wisdom of 
 this course were, however, after all, not completely 
 silenced. At least a back-door was provided to 
 remove rotten timber if it should appear that by 
 
 destructif de la constitution dont l'etablissement vous oc- 
 cupe : 
 
 1. Parce qu'il porte atteinte au droit de la nation ; 
 
 2. Parce qu'il empeche l'accomplissement du premier 
 devoir du monarque ; et parce qu'il gene, dans l'exercise des 
 leurs, et les ministres et l'Assemblee. 
 
 1 Aug. 18. CEuvres, II. 36.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 125 
 
 some inexplicable accident the infallible builders 
 of the New France had used any. Neither the 
 next legislature nor the people were to have any 
 power over their work, but they themselves were 
 to revise it before attaching to it the unbreakable 
 seal of legal infallibility. This opportunity Mira- 
 beau was to improve, though, as he said, " It 
 was mounting the breach and exposing myself to 
 great dangers." Trusting that public opinion in 
 the provinces would give him sufficient support, 
 he was determined " openly to attack all that part 
 of its (the Assembly's) work, which is the cause of 
 the present calamities of the kingdom . . . leaving 
 it no alternative but complete retraction or stub- 
 born obstinacy." He was confident that, if prop- 
 erly managed, the disgust of the departments 
 with "the legal anarchy" could be turned to such 
 account, that a "counter-revolution in the idea" 
 would be "as inevitable as invincible." "La- 
 fayette," he writes, "at first entered upon this 
 plan and undertook to have the materials col- 
 lected ; soon he saw in it only a means to separate 
 the constitutional from the regulative articles, to 
 fill up some gaps in the actual constitution and to 
 elude the imperious and salutary necessity of a 
 ratifying assembly. Then he wanted to charge a
 
 126 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 committee with this labor, though it cannot be 
 divided . . . ; he was sure, he said, that he could 
 get me into that committee and have me made its 
 reporter. Finally . . . he resolved to concert with 
 the Jacobins the success of a plan which the Jaco- 
 bins had to fear the most. He believed that he 
 could re-establish the principles of the monarch- 
 ical government by the influence of a republican 
 sect." The committee was appointed, and Mira- 
 beau was not made a member of it, though, as he 
 asserts, Lafayette had the day before, given 
 " his word of honor " to another person that he 
 would be. 
 
 As to this last charge, Mirabeau himself or his 
 informant has probably laid the color on too thick. 
 Thus much, however, is certain. Lafayette, who 
 emphatically disclaimed any republican tendencies, 
 who ever posed as the especial champion of the 
 constitutional monarchy 1 — Lafayette, who had 
 
 1 At least in his professions towards the king. What he 
 really was— a monarchist or a republican — it is impossible to 
 tell, simply because he never knew it himself, being also in 
 this respect " l'homme aux indecisions." He declared him- 
 self to have been in 1789 at heart a republican, but by neces- 
 sity a monarchist. On the 27th of March, 1793, he wrote from 
 Magdeburg to Mr. Von Archenholz in Hamburg : " J'avais 
 sacrifie des inclinations republicaines aux circonstances et 
 a la volonte de la nation."— Mem. de Dumouriez, II. 459.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 127 
 
 forsaken Mirabeau in the decisive battle of the 7th 
 of November, now rendered the decisive defeat of 
 that day irretrievable. " Finding a board that had 
 escaped the public shipwreck," Mirabeau bitterly 
 exclaims, " he has laid his hands on it only to 
 break it." 1 
 
 Then he professed to have been converted into a royalist by 
 the events of the 5th and 6th of October, 1789. D'Estaing 
 wrote on the 7th of October to the Queen: "M. de Lafa- 
 yette m'a jure en route, et je le crois, que ces atrocites avai- 
 ent fait de lui un royaliste." (Moniteur, II. 46.) On the 20th 
 of May, 1790, he plumes himself on his royalism, and boasts 
 of a victory over the republicans. He says, in a letter of 
 that date, addressed to his cousin Bouille: "II s'est eleve 
 dernierement une question sur la paix et la guerre qui a 
 separe notre parti, d'une maniere tres marquee, en 
 monarchique et republicain : nous (the former) avons ete 
 plus forts : mais cette circonstance et bien d'autres, m'ont 
 prouve que les amis du bien public ne sauraient trop s'unir." 
 (Mem. de Bouille, 123.) The flight of the king caused him 
 to return to his old love. According to Ferrieres he con- 
 sidered it " comme la voie la plus propre de conduire a la 
 republique." (Mem. de Ferrieres, II. 334.) Nevertheless he 
 went with the royalists. The manner in which the fact is 
 stated by him in the above-quoted letter to von Archenholz, 
 is certainly a corroboration rather than a denial of Fer- 
 rieres's assertion. " Lorsque apres son (the king's) evasion 
 l'Assemblee constituante lui offrit de nouveau la couronne, 
 je crus devoir reunir ma voix a la presque unanimite de ce 
 decret." — Mem. de Dumouriez, II. 461. 
 1 Corresp., I. 192-193.
 
 LECTURE X. 
 Other Defeats and Mischievous Victories. 
 
 " One must never judge my conduct in part, 
 neither upon one fact, nor upon one speech. Not 
 that I refuse to give my reasons for every one ; 
 but one can only judge them as a whole and 
 exercise an influence by the whole. It is impos- 
 sible to save the state day by day." Thus wrote 
 Mirabeau on the 10th of May, 1790, to the king. 1 
 
 Unquestionably, in the nature of things it is im- 
 possible to save a state day by day. But it is 
 certain that, unless he did just this, he could not 
 save it at all, for insurmountable obstacles barred 
 every other way against him. Though it became 
 from week to week more true, it had been true 
 from the beginning what he wrote in January, 
 1790, to La Marck : " We drift at random on 
 the sea of unforeseen events, old prejudices, and 
 invidious passions." 2 There was no one in com- 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 13. 2 lb., I. 446. 
 
 128
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 129 
 
 mand of the craft. It ploughed its way through 
 the surging waves, as the fitful storm happened 
 to strike the sails. We have seen how Mirabeau 
 had tried to avert this by urging the legal captain 
 actually to assume the command and keep the ves- 
 sel upon a predetermined course. He had failed, 
 and from the first hour everything concurred to 
 render it from day to day more certain that every 
 attempt, either to set a captain over the crew or to 
 have a definite course laid out, must result in a more 
 complete failure. To do this, would by no means 
 have rendered salvation a certainty ; but without 
 doing this, salvation was no more possible than a 
 house can be built without a base on which to 
 build. From time to time and in regard to this or 
 that question, Mirabeau might succeed in prevent- 
 ing a fresh blunder or even in getting the right 
 thing done ; but all he could thereby achieve was 
 at best that the vessel would keep afloat a little 
 
 1< >ngrer. At best, for what was in itself an acllie Ve- 
 ts 
 
 ment would always be liable to be turned into a 
 
 fresh source of calamity by adopting only one half 
 
 of his advice and rejecting the other half, while its 
 
 salutariness depended altogether on its adoption as 
 
 an integral whole. 
 
 The father compared Mirabeau's mind to a mir- 
 9
 
 130 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 ror, ill which everything is pictured and effaced in 
 an instant. Lome'nie endorses 1 this harsh judg- 
 ment and finds its justification, as to his policy, 
 principally in its innumerable and rapid mutations. 2 
 So far as the charge is borne out by the facts, it 
 serves as a proof of Mirabeau's claim to genuine 
 statesmanship. 3 If he had not displayed such a 
 versatility in his tactics and even in his strategy, 
 he would have been what Lome'nie believes him 
 to have been : an orator with a rather thin and 
 pretty impure varnish of statecraft. One of the 
 main charges he brought against Necker was that 
 
 ' IV. 73, 74. 
 
 2 If the charge is true, then no man was ever guilty of 
 grosser self-deception than he. He wrote to Mauvillon : 
 " J'ai mis plus de suite qu'un autre mortel quelconque, peut- 
 etre, a vouloir operer, ameliorer et etendre une revolution 
 qui, plus qu'aucune autre, avancera l'espece humaine. 
 Vous verrez aussi que ce qui n'a du vous paraitre longtemps 
 que les apercus electriques d'une tete tres-active, etait la 
 combinaison d'un energique philantrope, qui a su tourner a 
 son but toutes les chances, toutes les circonstances, tous les 
 hasards d'une vie singulierement etrange, et feconda en 
 bizarreries et en singularites." — Lettres a Mauvillon, 476. 
 
 3 He writes, January 4, 1790 : " Les cartes sont tellement 
 melee dans ce tripot-ci, il est si difficile pour un joueur un 
 peu systematique d'y combiner un coup, les sottises de part 
 et d'autre y dejouent si completement tous les calculs, qu' 
 apres une deperdition d'esprit et d'activite, dont chaque 
 journee est tres-fatiguee, on se retrouve au meme point, 
 e'est-a-dire au centre du chaos." — Corresp., 447,
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 131 
 
 the minister was in his policy " always at war with 
 the circumstances." x He was not guilty of the 
 same mistake, for he understood that the states- 
 man has to shape his policy according to the cir- 
 cumstances, though he be ever so much displeased 
 with them. He never changed as to the What, and 
 not to change as to the How would have been 
 the height of impotent doctrinarianism, because 
 the circumstances were constantly undergoing such 
 changes, so that to-day was worthless or worse 
 than worthless, what some weeks or months before 
 had been best calculated to attain the What. No 
 consistency as to ways, means, and methods was 
 possible, so long as wind and waves had virtually 
 sole command of the ship. So long as this was 
 the case, the true statesman could have but one 
 aim and end : to get her out of this condition at 
 any risk ; for as long as she was in it, everything 
 else was necessarity but a hazardous makeshift. 
 And to get her out of this condition was Mira- 
 beau's one aim and end, and became so ever more 
 and more, the more it became evident that the task 
 could not be accomplished. On this question 
 everything depended, and as to this question, his 
 very victories had necessarily the effect of defeats. 
 1 Corresp., II. 155.
 
 132 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 Necessarily, for it was but too true what he 
 wrote to Lafayette : " The circumstances are very 
 great, but the men are very small." x They were 
 not quite so small as they appeared to him in his 
 wrath, but still they were too small to see how 
 small they were as to statecraft in comparison to 
 him. They realized the difference just enough to 
 resent it most bitterly. The thought to have 
 the state saved by him was so unbearable to them, 
 that it rendered them incapable of honestly exam- 
 ining the question, whether it could be saved 
 without him or not. Whenever his ascendency 
 approached a certain line, they deemed it a sacred 
 duty towards themselves and the country to 
 thwart him without stopping to ask, whether they 
 thereby did not thwart themselves and drag the 
 country further towards the brink of the abyss. 
 His only source of power was his genius, and 
 that was a blade without a handle and a lever 
 without a fulcrum, if those, who alone could make 
 his thoughts authoritative, active will, were deter- 
 mined under no circumstances to do so to the 
 
 1 Dec. 1, 1789. Corresp., I. 423. To Mauvillon he wrote : 
 "Helas! mon ami, vous avez trop raison : Beaucoup de 
 vanite et pen d 1 amour de la gloire. C'est a cause de cela 
 qu'il faut changer le caractere national." — Lettres a Mau- 
 villon, 507.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 133 
 
 extent it had to be done, if it was to be of 
 avail. 
 
 On the 7th of November the Assembly had 
 chained itself down to this determination by erect- 
 ing it into a law ; and the one man, with whose aid 
 the wheels could perhaps, after all, have been 
 reversed, was quite as effectually chained down to 
 it by political shortsightedness, misplaced moral 
 punctiliousness, and, above all, the jealousy of 
 unbounded petty vanity. 
 
 Circumstances had lifted Lafaj^ette into such 
 a position, that it may be considered doubtful 
 whether Mirabeau could have sufficiently fructi- 
 fied a victory on the 7th of November, if he did 
 not succeed in either conciliating or overthrowing 
 him. But the defeat was unquestionably irretriev- 
 able if he could do neither. From the 5th of Oc- 
 tober, Lafayette was the most powerful man in the 
 realm, not to do good, but to avert as well as to 
 bring about some of the worst evils. Therefore 
 one of the main points in Mirabeau's programme 
 from that day on is to coax or to force him into an 
 offensive and defensive alliance, or to break his 
 power. The unintermitted and most arduous 
 struggle to achieve either of these ends is a con- 
 tinuous series of defeats, and next to that of the
 
 134 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 7th of November he has suffered no more portent- 
 ous ones. 
 
 Mirabeau always lent a helping hand to his 
 adversaries. In this case, too, he was far from 
 being blameless. Lafayette's character renders it 
 a certainty that he could never have made up his 
 mind to accept in thorough good faith the prof- 
 fered alliance. But Mirabeau made it doubly cer- 
 tain by airing most freely his contempt of the 
 general's political capacities, and by indulging in 
 regard to him too in his dangerous taste for invent- 
 ing nettling sobriquets. That the caps fitted the 
 general's head to perfection was not calculated to 
 make him fancy them any better, and the balm of 
 fulsome flattery, which Mirabeau now and then 
 poured over the wounds, could not have much 
 healing effect, because the perfume of insincerity 
 was too strong. 
 
 Upon Lafayette, however, rests by far the greater 
 half of the responsibility that this alliance was not 
 concluded, which might have changed the fate of 
 France. Though the idea of it was profoundly dis- 
 tasteful to Mirabeau, because the mean opinion he 
 had of the general's talents rendered it humiliating 
 to him, he repeatedly returned to the charge, 
 because he was equally well aware that the chance
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 135 
 
 of overthrowing him was exceedingly small, and 
 that the imperative interests of the country ad- 
 mitted of no other alternative than an alliance. 
 And coarse flattery was not the only means by 
 which he tried to attain his end. He did address 
 him also as a man, whose better and higher im- 
 pulses ought to be considered as so strong, that 
 they can be successfully appealed to in the lan- 
 guage of bitter, but wholesome truth. If La- 
 fayette's character had been of that loftiness of 
 which he himself was ever the last man to enter- 
 tain the least doubt, 1 resentment would not have 
 
 1 His self-complacency and self-deception verge upon the 
 comical. The most perfect of men cannot rightfully claim 
 " la tranquillite d'une conscience pure qui n'eut jamais a 
 rougir d'un seul de ses sentiments, ni d'une seule de ses 
 actions." The man who approaches the nearest to this an- 
 gelic purity — frail human nature being left out of his moral 
 make-up — will be the last to speak and boast of it. Lafay- 
 ette was ever the hei'ald of his own virtues, and in sounding 
 their praises he opened his mouth as wide as a public crier. 
 " Je vous jure," he wrote in June, 1789, " que dans les douze 
 ans de ma vie publique, si j'ai fait beaucoup de fautes, je 
 n'ai pas eu un moment dont je ne m'applaudisse, et parmi 
 les fautes que j'ai faites il y en a beaucoup que je dois a la 
 prudence d'autrui." Happy France ! Things were being 
 set to rights by this immaculate man, into whose ears even 
 the whisperings of ambition tried to worm their way in 
 vain. In a letter to the Due de Liancourt, which must have 
 been written in the second half of August, 1789, he says : 
 ' ' Ma situation est bien etrange. Je suis dans une grande
 
 136 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 been the principal and ultimate effect of Mirabeau's 
 castigations, accompanied, as they were, by earnest 
 entreaties. He would have confessed to himself that 
 he, too, was indeed far from being spotless, and in 
 the consciousness of his own shortcomings he would 
 have found the moral courage to silence the protests 
 of his self-righteous virtuousness, and for the 
 country's sake to lock arms with the giant, though, 
 as a contemporary says, his face was punctured not 
 only by the small-pox, but also by vice. More 
 than once Lafayette was on the point of doing it, 
 but at the last moment the promptings of his nobler 
 qualities were always overcome by the insinuating 
 sophisms of his smaller self. And he not only 
 drew back, but he drew back in a way which 
 proved that even as to fundamental principles, his 
 virtue was not entirely flawless. "Let M. de 
 Lafayette name a single occasion when I have not 
 done more than I had promised him ; let him name 
 a single one, when lie has not failed to keep his word 
 with me, and I consent to declare our accounts 
 
 avanture, et je jouis de penser que j'en sortirai, sans avoir 
 eu meme un mouvernent ambitieux a me reprocher, et 
 apres avoir mis tout le monde a sa place, je me retirerai 
 avec le quart de la fortune que j'avais en entrant dans 
 le monde."— Mem. de Lafayette, I. 307, 272, 276; edit. 
 1837-39.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 137 
 
 balanced." T On the 3d of October, 1790, Mirabeau 
 charged La Marck to send this message by Se'gur 
 to Lafayette, and neither the general, nor Segur, 
 nor any of his other friends has ever been able to 
 refute the accusation that he repeatedly did go 
 back upon his solemn engagements with Mirabeau. 
 Nobody will contend that the moral repulsion, 
 with which Lafayette tried to justify his conduct 
 towards Mirabeau, 2 was either feigned or without 
 cause. But unless Lafayette knew of a hand 
 equally skilful and strong, he could neither as a 
 statesman nor as a patriot justify his pushing away 
 this one because there were some ugly stains on it. 
 And he never even pretended that he knew of 
 such a hand, except his own, and history gives, 
 no doubt, full answer to the question, how far that 
 was equal to the task. Besides, how could a can- 
 did man, who felt such an unconquerable moral re- 
 pulsion, write to the object of this moral repulsion : 
 " Mutual confidence and friendship, that is what I 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 208. La Marck writes Nov. 9, 1790, to 
 Mercy- Argenteau : " sa (Lafayette's) mauvaise foi egale son 
 incapacite." lb., II., 300. 
 
 2 "Lafayette eut des torts avec Mirabeau, dont rimrnor- 
 talite le choquait . . . il ne pouvait s'empecher dc ltd 
 temoigner une mesestime qui le blessait ... On craignit 
 mes repugnances pour son immoralite." — Memoires du Gen- 
 eral Lafayette, II. 3G7.
 
 138 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 give and expect." 1 No, not the moral repulsion, 
 but something else was really unconquerable. 
 
 Lafayette writes in his Memoirs in regard to 
 Mirabeau's wish to be elected President of the 
 Assembly for the " Federation " festival of July 14, 
 1790 : " Lafayette, without offering any opposition 
 to his being President on another occasion, wished 
 for this one a virtuous patriot, and he said so frank- 
 ly." Now, either Mirabeau deserved the uncon- 
 querable moral repulsion, and then he was never 
 worthy to occupy the chair of the Assembly, or 
 he was, his moral taints notwithstanding, worthy 
 to occupy the chair of the Assembly, and then the 
 unconquerable moral repulsion overshot the mark. 
 But, apart from this, Lafayette's nice distinction 
 would have been plausible, if the occasion had been 
 simply a patriotic festival without any political 
 import, and if Mirabeau had merely intended to 
 serve some personal ends. The general was, how- 
 ever, aware that neither was the case. He knew 
 that Mirabeau wanted to improve the unique 
 
 1 Corresp., I. 413. Oct. 29, 1789. It is besides deserving 
 of notice that according to his own confession the moral 
 scales he himself used in politics were none too sensitive. 
 He writes : " Je me suis souvent servi d'instruments qu'il 
 faudra bientot briser. J'ai tout essaye excepte la guerre 
 civile."— Mem., I. 272 ; edit. 1837-39.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 139 
 
 opportunity to blow the dying embers of loyalty 
 into a flame, which might have given again some 
 solidity to the 1 (leaking rivets of the tottering- 
 throne. And this opportunity Lafayette would 
 not let him have, not because he was illoyal, not 
 because he was consciously striving for a republic, 
 but because he himself wanted to cut the most 
 prominent figure on the occasion — because he 
 wanted to be, what Mirabeau declared him to be, 
 " the rival " of the kino-. 1 And if he wanted to 
 
 O 
 
 outshine the king, the thought that he might be 
 outshone by Mirabeau was, of course, utterly un- 
 bearable to him. These are not conjectures. His 
 vanity was too great to allow him to refrain from 
 proclaiming it with his own lips in a most offensive 
 manner. When Frochot asked him his reasons 
 for objecting to Mirabeau alone as President, he 
 replied : " Mirabeau behaves too badly towards me ; 
 I have vanquished the King of England in his 
 power, the King of France in his authority, the 
 people in its fury ; T shall certainly not yield the 
 place to Mirabeau." 2 " These words show," re- 
 marked Mirabeau, k * how far he is possessed of tin' 
 secret of his smallness and the weight of his van- 
 ity." Indeed, a crushing weight. Vanity is to 
 1 Corresp., II. 26. 2 lb., II. 54.
 
 140 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 such a degree the dominant trait of his character 
 that to it more than to anything else it is due that, 
 apart from his American debut, all the unparalleled 
 opportunities offered him by the strangest coin- 
 cidence of circumstances are invariably cast away, 1 
 frequently even turning his good qualities and 
 high aspirations into direct means for inflicting 
 the greatest injuries upon his country. Even his 
 staunch friend and admirer, Jefferson, is compelled 
 to charge him with "a canine appetite for popu- 
 larity," 2 and Lafayette himself directly endorses 
 this judgment by speaking of " the delicious sen- 
 sation of the smile of the multitude." 
 
 But there were yet other defects in Lafayette's 
 intellectual and moral make-up, which rendered it 
 
 1 Bouille characterizes him thus: "Je redoutais son car- 
 actere mefiant et dissimule, plus que son ambition, que 
 j'aurais desire voir satisfaite, s'il avait voulu sauver le roi, 
 la monarchie et sa patrie, en arretant la l-evomtion au point 
 ou elle etait alors (Oct., 1789), eten etablissant un gouverne- 
 ment sur des bases et sur des principes solides et convenables 
 a la France et au genie de ses peuples. M. de Lafayette le 
 pouvait ; il etait le seul horn me qui eut alors assez de force 
 et de puissance ; mais il avait de Fambition, sans le carac- 
 tere et le genie necessaires pour la diriger : elle se reduisait 
 au desir de faire du bruit dans le monde et de faire parler 
 de lui. Ce n' etait pas un homme mechant, et encore moins 
 scelerat ; mais il etait au-dessous, je pense, de la grande cir- 
 constanceouilsetrouvait." — Mem. de Bouille, 85. 
 
 2 Jefferson to Madison, Jan. 30, 1787. Jefferson's Works, 
 II. 108.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 141 
 
 imperative upon Mirabeau to exert himself inces- 
 santly and to the utmost to effect his overthrow, 
 when the negotiations for an alliance came to 
 naught. He never tires in his Notes to the Court 
 of analyzing the reasons which must make every 
 day another step towards perdition, so long as one 
 does not muster courage to shake off this incubus. 
 If he had never written anything else, these criti- 
 cisms upon Lafayette's character, the nature of 
 his power, and the inevitable consequences of the 
 two, separately and combined, would secure him 
 a place among the keenest and most penetrating 
 political thinkers and observers of all times. 
 Though La Marck is right in saying : " There are 
 2,000 causes for a single effect," x the history of the 
 revolution becomes surprisingly lucid, if one but 
 fully grasps the leading facts constituting the main 
 working causes. Among these, however, Lafay- 
 ette and the nature of his power are unquestionably 
 of the very first rank, and as to all the principal 
 points, Mirabeau understood the man as well as 
 1 lis position so completely, that all the researches 
 of history have only served to corroborate his 
 judgment. 
 
 Ever since the 5th of October, Mirabeau calls 
 
 1 Aug. 23, 1791. Corresp., III. 178.
 
 142 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 him " dictator " and points out that his dictator- 
 ship is of the worst kind imaginable, because it is 
 merely a fact and therefore uncontrolled by the 
 consciousness of responsibility. This was all the 
 more a danger which it was impossible to overesti- 
 mate, because to this man a real dictatorship would 
 have been as much a horror, as he delighted in this 
 counterfeit of it. To be called and to fancy him- 
 self dictator and really to be one to the extent not 
 only of being more powerful than any one else, 
 but also of being indirectly 1 able to prevent every- 
 body else from doing what he did not want to be 
 done, that was the acme of his ambitious cravings. 
 But though he valued this ten times more than his 
 life, he would ten times rather risk losing it all, 
 than formally and officially to assume the supreme 
 direction with immortal glory at the end of the 
 narrow and rugged path, but the spectre of per- 
 dition grinning up to him from the precipices on 
 the left and on the right. Not only his physical 
 courage and his own belief in the intensity and per- 
 fect honesty of his lofty sentiments and aspirations 
 are above suspicion ; as to the negative side also his 
 moral courage must be acknowledged to have been 
 
 1 By the agency of those upon whom the official responsi- 
 bility rested.
 
 THE FREN'CH REVOLUTION. 143 
 
 of a high order. But as to the positive moral 
 courage, which, in mighty political and social up- 
 heavals is the most indispensable requisite of a man 
 in a leading position, lie was most lamentably defi- 
 cient. In the garb of extreme favor fate was, in 
 fact, very cruel to him, for it thrust him into a 
 first-class role, and the essential elements for sus- 
 taining in such times the part of a character was 
 entirely forgotten by nature in his intellectual and 
 moral equipment. 
 
 On the 28th of April, Mirabeau wrote to Lafa- 
 yette : "In the midst of so many dangers I forget 
 the greatest : the inaction of the only man who 
 could prevent them. But, undoubtedly, this dicta- 
 torship is not to consist in doing nothing." 1 No, 
 not exactly, but, as I already intimated, worse than 
 that : his doings were confined to preventing others 
 from doing what ought to have been done. This 
 he did most effectually, for, as La Marck said: 
 " Insufficient in the great things, this man is very 
 adroit in the small ones." 2 One would, however, 
 do him wrong by supposing that his barring the 
 way to others was entirely due to the irrepressible 
 jealousy of his vanity. To a great extent it sprang 
 from the same cause that was at the bottom of his 
 1 Corresp., II. 3. lb., II. 285.
 
 144 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 doing nothing himself. Mirabeau calls him 
 " rhomme aux indecisions, the man of indecisions. 1 
 He ever at the same time wills and wills not, never 
 willing so clearly and so resolutely that he feels it 
 to be an imperative necessity and peremptory duty 
 to act up to his will. The more momentous the 
 question, the surer it is that he will either try to get 
 off with the semblance of acting, or come to a dead 
 halt in his acting, ere it becomes decisive. " Decis- 
 ion," however, as Mirabeau told him, " is what we 
 need the most and the only means of salvation." 
 And, like all men who lack this quality, he tried 
 to make up for his own deficiency by consulting 
 other people to such an extent that bad was ren- 
 dered worse — especially as he took good care to 
 ask advice only where he was sure that the answer 
 would not be wholly distasteful. To his face 
 Mirabeau severely reproved him for his proneness 
 to surround himself exclusively with men who, 
 though not without merit in some respects, are 
 after all only second and third class and utterly 
 unfit for the tasks to be performed, because " not 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 34. On the 24th of October, 1789, La Marck 
 writes to Mirabeau : " II est tout a fait a vous, et il le serait 
 efncacement s'il savait, non pas etre decide, rnais conserver 
 la decision dans laquelle il est laisse chaque fois qu'on lui 
 a parle de vous comme j'en pense." — Corresp., I. 402.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 145 
 
 one of them knows the men and the countrv, not 
 one of them knows the affairs and the things. 
 Marquis, our time, our revolution, our circum- 
 stances resemble in nothing what was ; neither by 
 esprit, nor by memory, nor by social qualities can 
 one to-day conduct oneself; only by the combina- 
 tions of meditation, the inspiration of genius, the 
 omnipotence of character." 1 
 
 It would be difficult to imagine a worse com- 
 bination of qualities for a dictator, and the nature 
 of Lafayette's power was such that an absolutely 
 fatal crop of consequences had inevitably to spring 
 from it. 
 
 Mirabeau says in his Note of June 1st, 1790, to 
 the court: "Lafayette derives his force from the 
 confidence which he inspires in his army (?'. e., the 
 national guard of Paris). He inspires this con- 
 fidence only because he seems to share the opinions 
 of the multitude. But as it is not he who dictates 
 these opinions — for of all cities in the kingdom it is 
 Paris where public opinion, directed by a mass of 
 writers and a still greater mass of other lights, is 
 the least at the power of one man — it follows that 
 Lafayette, who has acquired his influence only by 
 singing to the tune of Paris, will always be forced, 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 20. 
 
 1(»
 
 146 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 iii order to preserve it, to follow the torrent of the 
 multitude. What barrier could he oppose to it ? 
 — -Will a general of national guards not soon be 
 without soldiers and without power, if his princi- 
 ples are not those of his army? — -It is, therefore, 
 easy to foresee, what his conduct will always be. 
 To fear and flatter the people ; to share its errors 
 from hypocrisy and from interest ; to sustain the 
 most numerous party, whether it be right or wrong ; 
 to frighten the court by popular movements, which 
 he will have concerted, or which he will cause to 
 be apprehended in order to render himself nec- 
 essary ; to prefer the public opinion of Paris to 
 that of the rest of the kingdom, because he does 
 not derive his force from the provinces — that is 
 the often culpable and always dangerous circle, in 
 which he must needs be compelled to move — that 
 is his whole destiny." 
 
 " Though not a demagogue this man will there- 
 fore be formidable to the royal power so long as the 
 public opinion of Paris, of which he can only be the 
 instrument, Avill make it a law unto him. Now 
 supposing that the kingdom returns to sounder 
 ideas on true liberty, the city of Paris will be 
 the last to change principles, for it is the deepest 
 steeped in radicalism. Therefore it is of all citi-
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 147 
 
 zens, Lafayette, upon whom the king can count 
 the least. . . 
 
 " What would it then mean to compose the 
 cabinet of men devoted to Lafayette? — They 
 would strive to make the whole kingdom con- 
 form itself to Paris, while the only means of salva- 
 tion is to bring Paris to its senses by the king- 
 dom. . . At the same time slave and despot, sub- 
 ject and master, he would be the most formidable 
 tyrant." 1 
 
 On the 15th of September, Mirabeau summed 
 up this reasoning in a few words : " All powerful 
 for doing harm, Lafayette is and must become 
 more and more powerless to prevent it." 2 Five 
 days before he had already written : " It is possi- 
 ble that the shame of tolerating an insurrection in 
 the presence of an army of 30,000 men will drive 
 Lafayette some day to fire upon the people. Well, 
 he thereby would wound himself mortally. 
 Would the people, who have demanded the head 
 of M. Bouille for having fired upon revolting 
 soldiers, forgive the commander of the national 
 guard after a combat of citizens against citizens? " 3 
 And in November, when the mob vented its wrath 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 27-20. 2 lb., II. 182. 
 
 3 lb., II. 171.
 
 148 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 upon the residence of M. de Castries for his having 
 wounded in a duel Charles de Lameth, Mirabeau 
 dryly remarked : " This man," I said to myself, 
 " who sees this house devastated as a simple spec- 
 tator, will have neither the force nor the influence, 
 if it become necessary to save the kins'." * 
 
 Every one of these assertions has been borne 
 out by the facts — every one of these predictions 
 has been fulfilled to the letter. 
 
 To determine correctly the responsibility that 
 rests upon Lafayette personally, the question must, 
 of course, be propounded and answered, how far 
 the vicious nature of his power resulted from 
 circumstances over which he could exercise no 
 control. Mirabeau did not fail to see that this was 
 to a very considerable extent the case. If he had 
 been heard betimes and his advice had been fol- 
 lowed implicitly, this would have been different. 
 It is one of the earliest and most momentous cases, 
 in which infinite harm resulted from his achieving 
 but half a victory. 
 
 To his motion of July 8, 1789, concerning an ad- 
 dress against the concentration of troops, had been 
 attached the motion, to request the king " to order 
 that in the cities of Paris and Versailles civic 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 341
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 140 
 
 guards be at once levied, which, under the orders 
 of the king, will be amply sufficient to maintain 
 public order and tranquillity." 2 An overwhelm- 
 ing majority voted for the address, but an over- 
 whelming majority also adopted the amendment of 
 Gaulthier de Biauzat to strike out all that related 
 to the formation of civic guards. As soon as the dis- 
 missal of Necker became known in Paris, the gravity 
 of this blunder became apparent. After the mischief 
 was done, which Mirabeau had intended to prevent, 
 the civic guard was organized, but in spite of the 
 horrors which had preceded and followed the 
 storming of the Bastille, half of his advice remained 
 even then unheeded. In what manner he proposed 
 to have the guard put " under the orders of the 
 king," cannot be said to a certainty- It is, how- 
 ever, probable that his idea was, pursuant to a 
 suggestion from Duroveray, to have the officers 
 appointed by the government. 2 The government 
 was allowed no direct influence whatever upon it, 
 and the consequence was that the national guard, 
 gradually but steadily, lost its original character. 
 
 1 GEuvres, I. 308. 
 
 2 Lafayette, on the contrary, warned the electors of Paris 
 on the 14th of July, " de se deiier des officiers generaux que 
 le gouvernement mettrait a la itte de la milice bourgeoise." 
 — Proces-verbal des electeurs, I. 405.
 
 150 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 From an instrument to maintain the government 
 of the law, it was changed more and more into an 
 instrument for promoting the revolution, radical- 
 ism, and, ultimately, the undisputed sway of the 
 sovereign mob and its demagogical leaders. " One 
 can hardly imagine," writes Mirabeau on the anni- 
 versary of the portentous victory of the Paris mob 
 in Versailles, "how much the petty vanity to be 
 armed, to have a uniform, to plaj r at soldier, to 
 make oneself noticeable, to obtain a command, and, 
 above all, a kind of impunity, have contributed 
 towards rendering the French heads revolution- 
 ary." 1 And in the great Memoir of December, 
 1790, he declares that, "in an infinite number of 
 respects the national guard of Paris " is to be con- 
 sidered "an obstacle to the re-establishment of 
 order. Most of its chiefs are members of the 
 Jacobins, and, carrying the principles of this so- 
 ciety among their soldiers, they teach them to obey 
 the people as the paramount authority. This 
 troop is too numerous to acquire a corps spirit ; 
 too closely connected with the citizens ever to dare 
 to resist them ; too strong to leave the smallest 
 chance to the royal authority ; too Aveak to oppose 
 itself to a great insurrection ; too easily corrupted, 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 213.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 1 5 1 
 
 not in the aggregate, but individually, not to be 
 an instrument ever ready to the hands of the fac- 
 tions ; too conspicuous by its apparent discipline 
 not to give the tone to the other national guards of 
 the kingdom, with which its chief has the infatua- 
 tion to correspond ; finally, too ambitious not to 
 render the formation of a military household of 
 the king very difficult." 1 Here again the history 
 of the revolution is a running commentary upon 
 his assertions, fully bearing out every one of them. 
 The national guard, which, if organized before the 
 storming of the Bastille and upon sound princi- 
 ples, might have done so much towards awaken- 
 ing, propagating, and enforcing a proper under- 
 standing of true liberty, became indeed one of the 
 main obstacles to the re-establishment of order, be- 
 cause, as with its chief, the power for doing mis- 
 chief increased as fast as that of preventing it 
 diminished. There was only this difference in the 
 two cases, that his race was run much sooner than 
 that of the national guard. When his eyes were 
 partly opened to the fact, where he had helped to 
 lead the country, and when he earnestly, though 
 with no more political discernment and positive 
 courage than before, tried to reverse the wheels, 
 
 ••Curivsp., II. 418.
 
 152 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 the national guard just entered upon that phase of 
 its downward evolution, which commenced by its 
 being the conscious and willing ally of the rabble, 
 and ended by its being itself the organized rabble. 
 To understand fully the import of this portent- 
 ous evolution, it must be borne in mind that at 
 the time France had virtually no army. " Since it 
 has learned the public law, the army is no longer 
 an army," Mirabeau wrote to La Marck a few days 
 after the mob had forced the king to transfer his 
 residence to Paris. 1 As early as the 8th of July 
 he had warned the government that this would be 
 the effect of " electrifying ' the troops ' by the con- 
 tact with the capital and interesting them in our 
 jDolitical discussions." 2 The National Assembly 
 was not slow to endorse the reproofs administered 
 to the government, but it had no ear for the equally 
 emphatic warning that this was at least as great a 
 danger to the liberty it proposed to establish, as to 
 the crown. Soon, however, this became so appar- 
 ent that it passed a formal vote of thanks to 
 BoiiiHe", when he argued the question with the 
 rebellious regiments at Nancy with powder and 
 lead. But though in an emergency the Assembly 
 still mustered sufficient courage to eulogize some- 
 1 Oct. 16, 1789. Corresp., I. 383. « CEuvres, I. 304.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 153 
 
 body else for daring to do the right thing, it was 
 much too faint-hearted to draw itself the logical 
 conclusions of the fact that as it was told by Mira- 
 beau, " with an army without discipline public 
 peace cannot exist." 1 It did not want to under- 
 stand that, as a little water is but fuel to a o-reat 
 fire, " special decrees for every particular insurrec- 
 tion" were worse than worthless. How could the 
 systematic and heroic cure proposed by Mirabeau 
 — disbanding of the whole army for the purpose of 
 reorganizing it at once upon the basis of an ade- 
 quate oath — meet with any favor in an Assembly, 
 which accompanied with demonstrations of dis- 
 pleasure his declaration that, to counteract the ill 
 use made by the people of the rights of man, a dec- 
 laration of the duties of every citizen had become 
 necessary ! 
 
 In the address of the 9th of July lie had made 
 the Assembly say : " Sire, we are always ready to 
 obey you, because you command in the name of the 
 laws . . . our very fidelity orders us to resist," 
 if your agents were to do violence to the laws. 2 
 This was sound doctrine in a state that proposed 
 to establish a government of law. But it was a 
 most monstrous doctrine, if it was virtually inter- 
 • CEuvres, IV. 10. -'lb., I. 315.
 
 154 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 pretecl to the effect that only the king and his 
 agents should be bound by the laws. In theory 
 and in practice the people and their representatives 
 had to be as implicitly subject to them, and this 
 was, in the nature of things, impossible to attain, 
 unless the laws entrusted to the government the 
 means required for executing the laws. Every 
 month this was more lost sight of, by the people 
 as well as by the Assembly. As the revolution 
 recognized the people as the source of the law, the 
 logic of the masses, armed with the rights of man 
 as the supreme law, concluded that they, in their 
 quality of people, were superior to the law ; and 
 the Assembly, though not formally and expressly 
 endorsing this claim as the Convention was to do, 
 rendered the complete realization of the doctrine 
 inevitable, by acting upon the principle that to es- 
 tablish liberty the government must above all be 
 debarred from being a government. " Take care " 
 — Mirabeau warned them in the debate on the right 
 of peace and war — " take care that, by carrying the 
 distrust of the moment into the future (*. <?., the 
 constitution), we do not render the remedies worse 
 than the evils. . . Take care that, in order to re- 
 strain (the government), you do not render it in- 
 capable of acting. . . Take care ; we would con-
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. L55 
 
 found all powers by confounding action with will, 
 direction with law ; the executive power would 
 soon be only the agent of a committee ; we would 
 not only make the laws, but also govern." 2 
 
 As to the particular question in hand, he carried 
 his point in the main, as I have mentioned before ; 
 as to the general question he was, according to his 
 own testimony, utterly defeated. The National 
 Assembly, he says in the Memoir of December, 
 1790, " has believed to solve the problem of a per- 
 fectly free monarchy, by creating a royalty without 
 power, without action, without influence, admitting 
 it in theory, and forgetting it in practice." 2 This 
 has been done, as he asserts, 3 because "the secret 
 object of the legislators was to organize the king- 
 dom in such a manner that they would have the 
 option between republic and monarchy — " " the 
 materials for a republic greatly exceeding those 
 
 ' CEuvres, III. 334, 335, 337. In the same debate lie said: 
 " Pretendez-vous, parce que la royaute a des dangers, nous 
 la i re renoncer aux avantages de la royaute. Dites-le nette- 
 nient; alors ce sera a nous determiner si, parce que le feu 
 brule, nous devons nous priver de la chaleur de la lumiere 
 que nous empruntons de lui. Tout peutse soutenir, excepts 
 1 inconsequence : dites-nons qu'il ne taut pasde roi, ne nous 
 dites pas qu'il ne faut qu'un roi impuissant, inutile." — 
 CEuvres, III. 374. 
 
 - Corresp., II. 442. a Oct. 14. 1790. Corresp., TT. 226.
 
 156 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 for a monarchy,"' as he declares in November. 1 
 But, as the Assembly has " established a kind of 
 democracy without destroying the monarchical 
 government, or rendered royalty useless without 
 establishing a complete democracy, i. e., has aban- 
 doned its original basis without putting anything 
 in the place of it," this has resulted in the forma- 
 tion of " a monstrous government, which it is im- 
 possible to put into effect ; " 2 therefore the consti- 
 tution would only have to be left to itself to ren- 
 der " its self-destruction almost inevitable." 3 The 
 intended organization of a monarchy with the mon- 
 arch practically left out, he insists, has resulted in 
 the construction of a nondescript commonwealth 
 without any executive. " The Assembly, while 
 admitting royalty, has not erected an executive 
 power. I do not intend merely to say that it has 
 arrogated this power to itself. I mean that it does 
 not exist, and even cannot exist." 4 
 
 If any one thing is more irrefutably established 
 by the subsequent course of events than another, 
 it is the truth of these charges. But if this is so, 
 was Mirabeau then not egregionsly mistaken when 
 he wrote to his uncle in October, 1789, that the 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 320 s lb., II. 432. 
 
 s lb., II. 215. 4 lb., II. 427.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 157 
 
 revolution necessarily had " to go a hundred times 
 further than one could have imagined," because 
 after the storming of the Bastille " one no longer 
 thought of establishing liberty, believing that it 
 had been conquered?" 1 Indeed, no ! This was 
 one of the main roots of the whole disastrous de- 
 velopment. On the 14th of July everything had 
 yet to be done as to the establishing of liberty. Up 
 to that day, and by that day, nothing was achieved 
 but the absolute certainty, that by the government 
 and the reactionists of the two upper orders any 
 effectual resistance to the establishment of liberty 
 could no more be offered. The Assembly, how- 
 ever, thought exactly the contrary, or at least acted 
 as if it thought the reverse. It deemed liberty 
 conquered, i. e., established, and saw its task in 
 rendering impossible its being ever again wrenched 
 from the people by the government and the upper 
 orders. Mirabeau, on the contrary, saw Avith the 
 utmost clearness that these quarters were now 
 completely at the mercy of the victorious revolu- 
 tion, and that henceforth the real danger lay 
 exactly in the opposite direction. " You," he told 
 the Assembly in his great speech of May 22, 1 790, 
 " you only speak of checking the ministerial 
 1 Lomenie, V. 421.
 
 158 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 abuses, and I talk to you of the means to repress 
 the abuses of a representative assembly. I talk to 
 you of arresting the insensible inclination of every 
 government towards the dominant form, which 
 one impresses upon it." 1 Here is the real danger, 
 because a numerous assembly " cannot be subjected 
 to any kind of responsibility." 2 
 
 From this point of view, he had in September, 
 1789, so strenuously and persistently fought for 
 the royal veto, not, as he declared, as a royal 
 prerogative to which the king had an inherent 
 claim, but because required by the public welfare 
 as a bulwark for the people against their repre- 
 sentatives. 3 If these were sustained by the people, 
 
 1 (Euvres, III. 365. 
 
 2 " On parle du frein cle l'opinion publique pour les repres- 
 entans de la nation ; mais l'opinion publique, souvent egaree, 
 meme par des sentiments digues d'eloges, ne servira qu'a la 
 seduire ; mais l'opinion publique ne va pas atteindre separe- 
 ment chaque membre d'une grande assemblee." — (Euvres, 
 III. 320. 
 
 3 " Si quelque traces de precipitation et d'immaturite 
 marquaient deja l'avenue legislative ou elle (la nation) est 
 entree, conviendrait-il de n'environner les legislateurs d'au- 
 cune barriere ; de ne leur opposer qu'une resistance de forme 
 qui s'evanouit d'elle-meme ; de leur livrer ainsi sans defense 
 le sort du trone et de la nation ? 
 
 " Les sages democraties se sont limitees elles-memes ; 
 elles se sont def endues par des precautions puissantes contre 
 la legerete des actes publics ; les lois qu'elles se donnent sont 
 elaborees successivement dans differentes cbambres, qui en
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 159 
 
 the king would anyway always have " to obey." 
 But, if there arises a difference of opinion between 
 the perpetual representative of the people, the 
 king, and its temporary representatives as to what 
 the interests of the state require, it is proper and 
 necessary that by means of the royal veto the 
 question be submitted to the people for adjudi- 
 cation. 1 Lafayette persuaded Montmorin and 
 Necker to declare on the part of the government 
 that the king would be satisfied with a suspensive 
 veto. That was, as experience taught, ten times 
 
 examinent les rapports, les convenances, le fond et la forme; 
 ce n'est que dans leur parfaite maturite qu'elles sont portees 
 a la sanction populaire. A plus forte raison, dans une mon- 
 archic ou les fonctions du pouvoir legislatif, celles-la meme 
 qui ont le plus d'activite, sont confiees a une Assemblee 
 representative, la nation doit-elle etre jalouse de la moderer 
 de Fassujettir a des formes severes, et de premunir sa propre 
 liberte contre les atfceintes et la degeneration d'un tel 
 pouvoir ; car il ne faut pas Foublier, FAsseniblee nationale 
 n'est pas la nation, et toute assemblee particuliere porte avec 
 elle des germes d'aristocratie. 
 
 " Quelles precautions ont-elles ete prises, dans la constitu- 
 tion qui se prepare, pour garantir la nation ce ces dangers? 
 .Nous voyons le pouvoir executif surveille, contenu de toute 
 maniere; et nous ne connaissons jusqu'd present d'autre 
 regie au pouvoir legislatif que s<>s propreslumieres, d'autres 
 barrieres que sa propre volonte. En se constituant cor) is 
 unique, il est privo <!(> Tavantage de se controler lui-meme, 
 etde murir dans son scin ses propres deliberations." Nou- 
 veau coup d'ceil sur la sanction royale.— Mem. VI. 443, 444. 
 
 1 (Euvres, II. 93, 96, 99, 100, 114.
 
 160 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 worse than no veto power at all would have been, 
 for while it did not give the king the power, which 
 Mirabeau demanded for him in the interest of the 
 people, it compelled him to make himself per- 
 sonally the target of the unbridled passions and 
 sinister demagogy. 
 
 But not the king alone had to pay dearly for 
 Mirabeau's defeat. The history of the veto ques- 
 tion is one of the strongest proofs that the Assem- 
 bly was the victim of a gross delusion in believing, 
 that to break down the power of the executive 
 was identical with increasing and confirming its 
 own power. With Lafayette, the ministers, and 
 the Assembly, the decisive argument was the 
 wrath of Paris. Not the Assembly, but the 
 clamor of the unreasoning masses instigated by 
 irresponsible agitators, virtually decided the ques- 
 tion. The Assembly was already far on the high- 
 road towards rendering " the legislator himself," 
 as Mirabeau said, " nothing but a slave, who is 
 obeyed when he pleases, and will be dethroned, 
 if he shock the impulse which he has given." 1 
 
 In this case the government, the commander-in- 
 chief of the national guard, the Assembly, and 
 the people had united in breaking the shield, with 
 1 Corresp., II. 445.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 161 
 
 which Mirabeau tried to protect at the same time 
 the king, the Assembly, and the people. In other 
 questions of equal import he was compelled in a 
 way to lead them himself, with open eyes, towards 
 the precipice. 
 
 Thus, above all, in regard to the assignats. It is 
 as undeniable that to him more than to any one 
 else it was due that the Assembly attempted by 
 this means to avert bankruptcy, as it is certain 
 that among the levers, with which France was 
 precipitated into the abyss of terror, this device 
 was one of the most powerful. To acknowledge 
 this is, however, by no means to admit that the 
 responsibility for its having this effect rests upon 
 him. " To-day bankruptcy, hideous bankruptcy 
 is there ; it threatens to consume you, your pros- 
 perity, your honor — and you deliberate ! " 1 Thus 
 Mirabeau closed his wonderful improvisation for 
 instantly voting the extraordinary income tax of 
 25 per cent, demanded by the government, and the 
 vast hall seemed to shake under the convulsive 
 applause elicited by the overpowering fervor of 
 his patriotic appeal. 2 Was bankruptcy afterwards 
 
 1 (Euvres, II. 187. 
 
 2 In a sense it hardly can be called an improvisation. 
 Nearly two years before, in a letter addressed to Montmorin 
 
 ii
 
 162 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 less hideous, less dangerous ? Did the facts not 
 prove with really terrible impressiveness that this 
 one word contained, as he asserted, all calamities, 
 all horrors, that of national dishonor included? 
 And if so, was it then not right, nay an impera- 
 tive duty to have recourse to assignats, although 
 he knew them to be a seed, which might be event- 
 ually turned into dragon teeth? Yes, he knew 
 that full well. Although he saw and laid stress 
 upon the fact that the assignats were most effect- 
 ive weapons against the enemies of the revolution, 
 because whoever owned an assignat had a personal 
 interest in upholding it, 1 he avowed that the 
 measure had at first "frightened" him, 2 and in 
 his 28th Note to the Court he wrote : " Can one 
 guarantee the success of the assignats ? I answer 
 frankly, no. One can guarantee nothing in a 
 kingdom like France, and above all in circum- 
 stances, when so many different passions and so 
 
 (Nov. 20. 1787), he had hurled as withering denunciations 
 against bankruptcy contemplated at the time by the gov- 
 ernment as a means to obviate the necessity of calling the 
 States-General. " Deshonores au dehors, furieux au dedans, 
 en derision aux autres, en horreura nous-m ernes, dangereux 
 seulement a nos chefs, tels nous allons etre, si le roi montre 
 seulement l'intention de manquer a ses engagements." See 
 the whole letter.— Mem. IV. 468-477. 
 
 ] CEuvres, IV. 61, 78. 2 lb., IV. 50.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 163 
 
 many prejudices are engaged in perpetual com- 
 bats." * But on the other hand he again and 
 again insists that one is in the vice of stern neces- 
 sity — that there is no choice. 2 And neither then 
 nor ever afterwards has a single one of those, who 
 have condemned him, been able to refute this 
 assertion or even but attempted to say, what else 
 could have been done. Nor is there, so far as he 
 is concerned, any force whatever in the argument 
 that, while bankruptcy would have been a terrible 
 calamity in 1789 and 1790, it became a hundred- 
 fold more terrible calamity by being staved off for 
 some years by means of the assignats. The fact 
 is undeniable, but he cannot with any color of 
 justice be held responsible for it. No man in the 
 Assembly had a fuller and correcter conception of 
 the overshadowing importance of the financial 
 question, and therefore also no man insisted 
 earlier, more strenuously, and more persistently, 
 upon its being treated in a comprehensive and 
 systematic way. 3 But he preached to deaf ears. 
 He compared the emission of assignats to the 
 treatment of skilful physicians who, though they 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 155. 
 
 2 CEuvres, IV. 83, 84, 85, 122, 123, ITS. 
 
 3 lb., III. 86,87.
 
 164 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 do not cure, prolong life by fighting the most 
 immediate cause of clanger, and thereby procure 
 a chance for the healing forces of nature to assert 
 themselves. 1 The Assembly acted as if it deemed 
 the emission of assignats the financial salvation of 
 the state. He said : " The interregnum of the 
 laws is the reign of anarchy." 2 The Assembly, 
 in a hundred ways, protracted and aggravated the 
 interregnum of the laws. He, conforming himself 
 to the ever-changing circumstances, devised means 
 after means that could be made conducive to a 
 condition of things, which would render it pos- 
 sible to improve the prolongation of life attained 
 by the assignats to initiate by political sanitation 
 the gradual economical sanitation. The Assembly 
 not only refused to do whatever would have made 
 them fit means for a great end, but it and its suc- 
 cessors directly perverted them into a most effica- 
 cious means to thwart his ultimate end : the re- 
 establishment of a real government. To hold 
 him responsible for the mischief wrought by the 
 assignats has about as much sense as to charge 
 the crimes of the Inquisition to the teachings of 
 Christ. 
 
 Was he equally blameless as to the equally per- 
 1 CEuvres, IV. 76. * lb., IV. 28.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 165 
 
 nicious consequences of his half-victories in the 
 church question? It is cercainly impossible to 
 prove it, and even to make it plausible would be a 
 very hard task. He saw from the first that the 
 Assembly, in taking up the question in the manner 
 it did, inflicted a wound upon the revolution so 
 deep and so malignant, that it might easily prove 
 fatal ; and his later systematic efforts to entangle 
 the Assembly more inextricably in the suicidal 
 polic}-, were a part of his general plan to discredit 
 it for the purpose of opening a way to a wholesome 
 reaction. 1 For these two facts there is positive 
 and irrefutable proof in abundance, and they go 
 far towards proving that his guilt cannot be as 
 great as it appears at first sight. But they are 
 surely not sufficient to exonerate him completely. 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 365, 366, 367, ff. He writes, Jan. 27, 1791 : 
 " Voila line plaie toute nouvelle, mais la plus envenimee de 
 toutes, qui va ajouter encore un foyer de gangrene a tons 
 ceux qui rongent, corrodent et dissolvent le corps politique : 
 nous nous etions fait un roi-effigie, sans pouvoir ; et un corps 
 legislatif qui adminstre, qui informe, qui juge, qui recom- 
 pense, qui punit, qui fait tout, excepte ce qu'il doit faire. 
 A present nous arrangeons, le schisme religieux a cote <lu 
 schisme politique ; nous n'avions pas assez de resistance, 
 nous en suscitons a plaisir ; de dangers, nous evoquons le 
 pire de tous ; d'embarras, nous soulevons le plus inextric- 
 able ; c'est de quoi amener la fin de tout, si l'Assemblee ne 
 se lasse pas bientot d'obeir aux anarchistes." — Mem. VIII. 
 248.
 
 166 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 
 
 To determine with exactness the extent of his 
 guilt is, however, impossible, because we are not 
 fully informed about his motives. There is still a 
 veil spread over this important chapter of his revo- 
 lutionary career, and it will, perhaps, never be 
 removed. To me it seems likely that here, as 
 according to his own confessions in many another 
 case, the excitement of the moment and the pro- 
 vocations of the injudicious stubborn resistance of 
 the adversaries of the revolution, lashed his impet- 
 uous temper into such a passion that, ere he was 
 himself aware of it, he had rushed far beyond the 
 line which, in his own calmer judgment, he ought 
 not to have overstepped. However that be, thus 
 much is certain, that his course in this question 
 raised a barrier between him and the king, which 
 the character and the religious views of Louis XVI. 
 rendered more insurmountable than any other, and 
 this was as great a calamity for France as some of 
 the worst blunders of the Assembly. The un- 
 breakable chains, which a fatal concatenation of 
 uncontrollable circumstances fastens to the arms of 
 the giant of the revolution, are riveted by his own 
 guilt.
 
 LECTURE XI. 
 Mirabeau and the Court. 
 
 Ever since unimpeachable documentary evi- 
 dence was brought to light, proving that Mirabeau 
 was for a long time the secret adviser of the court, 
 innumerable persons in France and elsewhere have 
 deemed this fact in itself incontestable proof, that 
 he was a double-faced and double-tongued wretch 
 — a paragon of the vilest type of traitors, betray- 
 ing equally both parties they pretend In serve. 
 Mirabeau himself in July, 1790, when suffering 
 from an attack of the disease which ended his days 
 a few months later, sent to La Marck his papers, 
 including the notes to the court, requesting him 
 "in case of death to give them In some one taking 
 enough interest in my memory t<> defend it.*' In 
 reply to La March's answer accepting the trust, he 
 wrote: "1 assure you that my courage is greatly 
 revived by the thought thai a man like you will 
 
 not suffer that I be entirely misjudged. I shall 
 
 It 17
 
 168 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 either soon go hence, or I shall leave in your hands 
 noble elements of vindication." 1 Now, whatever 
 else Mirabeau may have been, an idiot he was not. 
 It is, therefore, patent, that either those must be 
 guilty of an absurdity, who consider him convicted 
 of revolting depravity by the fact in itself of his 
 having entertained clandestine relations with the 
 court, or that his moral vision must have been so 
 abnormal that he, in good faith, mistook black for 
 white. A moment's reflection ought to convince 
 any one, that not the moral, but the historical 
 vision of those severe judges is most strangely 
 obfuscated. 
 
 France was engaged in a revolution, but who- 
 ever intimated that this revolution was anti-mo- 
 narchical, was at the time universallv hooted down 
 as a base calumniator. But if the revolution was 
 not intended to be anti-monarchical, how then 
 could it be incompatible to be at the same time 
 a sincere revolutionist and the adviser of the 
 crown ? As to Mirabeau it is manifestly nonsensi- 
 cal to assert such an incompatibility, for we have 
 heard him declare before the States-General met, 
 that he was determined to be " very monarchical." 
 He simply was true to his word. The fact in 
 
 1 Corresp. , I. 23.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. Lli'J 
 
 itself, that he acted as adviser of the crown, does 
 not cast a shadow of a shadow upon him. That, 
 however, is not saying that he was blameless. 
 But whether he was guilty and, if so, what the 
 character and the extent of his guilt was, depends 
 entirely on the answers that must be given to the 
 following two questions : what were his motives 
 for advising the court, and what advice did he 
 give? Or to put them into a more definite form : 
 was he a mercenary and a recreant to the political 
 convictions he still publicly professed ? The two 
 questions cannot be separated. To form an intel- 
 ligent opinion and judge fairly, all the facts con- 
 stituting the case and having a bearing upon it, 
 must be known and considered in their connection 
 as a whole. 
 
 Mirabeau received money from the king. That 
 is an established fact. An equally undeniable 
 fact, however, is, that for generations public opinion 
 — and more especially that of the upper classes — 
 considered it a matter of course, that anybody who 
 had a chance to get money from tin; king should 
 improve it. If we want to be just judges, we 
 must keep this well in mind, because Mirabeau, 
 like every historical personage, has to be judged 
 by the standard of his and not of our times.
 
 170 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 Mercy d'Argenteau, the Austrian ambassador, and 
 La Marck were men not only of spotless, but of 
 most scrupulous honor, and while they were per- 
 fectly familiar with the laxity of Mirabeau's moral 
 principles in money and other questions, the 
 thought never entered their heads that the fact 
 of his taking money from Louis XVI. could 
 in the opinion of any one throw the slightest 
 reflection upon him. Nor were they altogether 
 wrong, even if he be weighed on the more 
 sensitive scales of our times, for he was paid 
 for work done and services rendered. And the 
 work was not only very considerable, but it also 
 involved no small outlay for paying collaborators, 
 agents, clerks. If Mirabeau had received nothing, 
 he would have given not only his time, but also 
 his money to the king. That was not only more 
 than anybody had a right to expect from him ; he 
 could not have done it for the simple reason that 
 he had no money. It is true : by the death of his 
 father he had become the legal owner of a fair 
 fortune, though the old Marquis had made his 
 second son the principal heir — the legal owner of 
 a fair fortune, but he had by no means come also 
 into actual possession of it. The great economist 
 had left his affairs in such a tangled condition,
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 171 
 
 that unless Mirabeau withdrew entirely from 
 politics and devoted himself for some time wholly 
 to his private interests, he remained exactly in his 
 former condition, i. <?., a bankrupt with such a 
 mountain of debts on his back, that he had con- 
 stantly all the trouble in the world to find to-day 
 the mone}'- he absolutely needed for the morrow. 
 For nearly a year longer he submitted to this, 
 rather than to think for a moment of settino; his 
 own affairs to rights and letting the state take care 
 of itself. That at all events proves that hanker- 
 ing after money was not the dominant trait of his 
 character. The trouble was, in fact, that now as 
 ever before, he was wholly destitute of a proper 
 appreciation of it. In a sense he cared no more 
 for it than for the dirt under his feet. That, 
 money or no money, he was to gratify his every 
 desire, was to him a matter of course. He, there- 
 fore, always spent lavishly — his own money, if he 
 happened to have any, if he had none, that of 
 other people. It may sound strange, and still it 
 was so ; money was no object at all with him ; T 
 all he cared about was, without having to think of 
 money, always to do what could not be done witli- 
 
 1 See the characteristic story told by Mine, de Nehru, 
 Mem. IV. 419, 420.
 
 172 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 out having plenty of money. He was therefore 
 sorrily unscrupulous about how he got the moiie}' 
 he wanted to spend, but for the same reason he 
 also never even felt so much as tempted to stoop 
 to means by which he would have lowered himself 
 in his own eyes. 1 When he had written a de- 
 nunciation of the Banque de Saint-Charles, he was 
 offered a big sum for suppressing the pamphlet ; 
 he preferred to carry all he had to the Mont-de- 
 Piete*, the public pawning shop of Paris. 2 Now 
 his creditors, whom La Marck justly calls " his 
 worst enemies," harassed him so, that he was com- 
 
 1 He was pelted by such a shower of charges of venality, 
 that he wrote, with felicitous irony : " En verite, je me 
 vends a tant de gens, que je ne comprends pas comment je 
 n'ai pas encore acquis la monarchic universelle." — Lettres a 
 Mauvillon, 472. 
 
 2 Corresp., I. 103. See his letter of Oct. 4, 1788, to his 
 father. Memoires, IV. 188-191 : " Provoque par Dupont lui- 
 meme, que j'en atteste, bafoue par lui de ne m'etre pas fait 
 40,000 fr. de rente dans les vertiges de l'agiotage, je suis 
 reste etranger a toute speculation, menie innocente ; j'ai 
 vecu, petitement vecu, de mon travail et du secours de mes 
 amis ; mais je n'ai jamais ni joueun ecu, ni regu un sou en 
 present, moi qui faisait flechir, en quelque sorte, a mon gre, 
 le balancier de la Bourse ; moi dont on aurait paye le silence 
 de tout Tor que j'aurais voulu accepter. . . Tant que M. de 
 Calonne n'a pas ete chef de parti et de parti dans l'agiotage, 
 il a trouve cela tres-bien, et m'a meme lance . . . Quand le 
 ministre a ete agioteur, il a voulu m'imposer silence, et j'en 
 ai parle plus haut."
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 173 
 
 pletely at his wits' ends, and might have been 
 ultimately driven to some desperate resolution, if 
 this friend had not responded to his appeal for 
 help in his dire distress, and yet, as La Marcksays, 
 " he would only have needed to let the gold come 
 to him, which the factions scattered about in pro- 
 fusion." 1 The extravagant joy to which Mira- 
 beau gave demonstrative expression upon learning 
 that the king's liberality far exceeded what he had 
 dared to hope for, was more than undignified ; it 
 was revolting. But his circumstances were such, 
 that to say he ought not to have taken money from 
 the king, is to say he ought not to have assumed the 
 task he did assume. This task, however, was the 
 attempt to save the king and the kingdom. To 
 abandon them to their fate would certainly not 
 have been patriotic, and I suppose that the moral- 
 ists who, with the zest of holy monks burning a 
 heretic, have nailed his memory to the pillory for 
 taking this money, will admit that patriotism ought 
 also to be an article in a statesman's code of morals. 
 But if Mirabeau consented to be the secret 
 adviser of the court for the sake of eaniinij' the 
 money, his vindication can, of course, not be based 
 upon the plea of patriotism, even if one be of opin- 
 
 iCorresp., I. 137.
 
 174: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 ion that his counsels were in conformity with the 
 true interests of the monarch as well as of the 
 state. It can, however, be proved beyond the 
 possibility of contradiction, that the salary he re- 
 ceived was but an incident, and not his end. 
 Neither when he offered his assistance to the 
 ministers before the meeting of the States-General 
 and in the first weeks of the session, nor when, in 
 the Memoir of the 15th of October, he urged his 
 advice and his help directly upon the royal family, 
 had he intimated the expectation of any pecuniary 
 remuneration. In his negotiations with Lafayette, 
 as we have seen, this question had indeed played 
 no small part, because he was driven into a corner ; 
 but although he was fairly hunted down by his 
 creditors, he had ultimately rejected the offers of 
 the ministers and of Lafayette — the latter evident- 
 ly counting upon the civil list of the king to make 
 good his promises. After the defeat of the 7th of 
 November, Mirabeau had been for a while in con- 
 nection with the Count cle Provence, pursuing the 
 idea of making him the ostensible " pilot " with a 
 view to being himself, under his name, the real 
 commander. Also in this episode no mercenary 
 motives can be proved. 1 He had soon to give up 
 1 True, Etienne Dumont in his Souvenirs (230) asserts :
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 175 
 
 the project, because it became too apparent that 
 the prince, though intellectually greatly the su- 
 perior of his brother the king, was, as to character, 
 wholly unfit for the part Mirabeau intended him 
 to play. 1 After this attempt had failed, he did 
 not again offer his services. Understood by no 
 one and repulsed with insulting superciliousness 
 by all whom he wanted to save, he became equally 
 
 ''Monsieur s'engageait a lui payer 20,000 francs par mois 
 jusqu'a ce que ses affaires fussent liquidees, et a devenir son 
 seul creancier." I cannot attribute any weight to this testi- 
 mony. In my opinion, the man who knows of no better 
 way to convince the world of his superior genius than to 
 write a big book in every way disparaging his dead friend, 
 is a witness less to be trusted than an avowed enemy. 
 There is no reason to suppose that Mirabeau would have 
 made Dumont his confidant, if he had concluded such a bar- 
 gain, and what we know from La Marck about his pecuniary 
 embarrassments at the time proves, that he cannot have been 
 a pensioner of the prince. This also disposes of the promise 
 of the prince, published in Lafayette's Memoirs, to become 
 Mirabeau's sole creditor. Let us take the word of the editors 
 for it that the original is in the prince's own handwriting. 
 Does that prove that Mirabeau accepted his offer ? Neither 
 would Mirabeau have been practically a beggar at this time, 
 nor would the relations between the two men have been of 
 such short duration, if a bargain of this kind had been 
 struck. 
 
 1 On the 23d of Dec, 1789, Mirabeau writes : " Au Luxem- 
 bourg (the residence of th<> prince), on a peur d'avoir peur.'" 
 Six days later : " II a la purete d'un enfant, mais il en a la 
 faiblesse." And on the 27th of Jan., 1790 : " Ce qui est au- 
 dessous de tout, c'est Monsieur.'" 1 — Corresp., 486, 440, 460.
 
 176 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 embittered and discouraged. In the Assembly he 
 spoke but seldom and in his letters he repeatedly 
 complained of being tired and feeling bored. He, 
 who had thus far always taken the initiative, had 
 no hand in bringing about the change in his rela- 
 tions to the court. He was even wholly unaware 
 that a change was contemplated, until he was in- 
 formed that on the part of the court it was a fixed 
 resolution. 
 
 In March, 1790, LaMarck, who since the middle 
 of December was in Belgium, received an invita- 
 tion from Count Mercy to return to Paris on ac- 
 count of matters of importance. He at once com- 
 plied, arriving in Paris on the 16th. His first in- 
 terview with Mercy took place on the 18th. He 
 expected to be interrogated on the Belgian affairs. 
 Mercy, however, forthwith began to speak of his 
 relations to Mirabeau and ended by requesting 
 him to serve as mediator between the king and 
 the great tribune. La Marck consented under the 
 condition that Mercy should himself see Mirabeau 
 and take part in the negotiations. As Mercy 
 could not divest himself of his quality of Austrian 
 ambassador he, very naturally, was loath to do so. 
 In consequence of this difficulty the matter was 
 allowed to rest for a fortnight. A second inter-
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 177 
 
 view in the beginning of April resulted in Mercy's 
 consenting secretly to meet Mirabeau in La Marck's 
 house. The conversation ran entirely upon the 
 political situation of France, but Mirabeau was 
 given no intimation as to the ultimate purpose of 
 his friend and the ambassador. Mercy, highly 
 pleased with Mirabeau, told La Marck in leaving, 
 that the queen wished to see him the next day. 
 Marie Antoinette, who at the end of September or 
 in the first days of October, 1789, had told La 
 Marck : " I trust we shall never be so unfortu- 
 nate as to be reduced to the painful extremity of 
 having recourse to Mirabeau," 1 now commenced 
 the conversation by informing him, that for two 
 months the king and she had been thinking of 
 entering into connection with Mirabeau. After a 
 while they were joined by the king and it was 
 agreed, that La Marck should broach the subject 
 to Mirabeau and invite him. to submit his views on 
 it in writing to the king. Mirabeau received the 
 overtures with a transport of delight. The idea, 
 as La Marck savs, " to be at last enabled to be use- 
 ful to the king," elated him so highly that, carried 
 away by his sanguine temperament, the fearful 
 obstacles in his way were, for the moment, dwarfed 
 
 1 Corresp., I. 107. 
 L2
 
 178 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 almost into insignificance. In a letter, dated May 
 10 th and addressed to the king, he gave, briefly 
 and succinctly, as he himself terms it, " the pro- 
 fession of faith which the king has desired," declar- 
 ing : " This writing will forever be either m} r judg- 
 ment or my witness." This letter was for some 
 time in the hands of the king, and as yet not a 
 word had been said about money either by Mira- 
 beau, or to him, or even between La Marck and 
 Mercy. Mirabeau had bound himself in a way 
 which, as La Marck justly says, " was to stake his 
 head," without knowing whether they intended to 
 give him a copper for it. Is that the way a man 
 acts who means to sell himself and whose political 
 and general conscience is in his pocket? The 
 first to speak of money were the queen and the 
 king, after telling La Marck that the letter of May 
 10th was wholly satisfactory to them, and from 
 Mercy came the suggestion to pay his debts, in 
 order to enable him to give his time entirely, and 
 without being molested by his creditors, to the 
 great affairs of state. When La Marck asked 
 Mirabeau, to give him the figure of his debts, he 
 very characteristically replied that he knew noth- 
 ing about it, and when he had ascertained that they 
 amounted to 208,000/, he dolefully said, that the
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 179 
 
 king could never think of paying so much. Louis 
 engaged to do that, paid him beside 6,0001. a month 
 for his current expenses, and gave to La Marck 
 four promissory notes, each for 250,000/, to be paid 
 after the close of the National Assembly, in case 
 Mirabeau had been true to his promises. 
 
 What were these promises and how were they 
 kept? If Mirabeau's accusers can convict him in re- 
 gard to these two questions, it can, of course, avail 
 him but little that as to the money question, he was 
 by far not as black as they would make one believe. 
 On the other hand, if they cannot make out a case 
 against him in regard to these two questions, it is 
 evident that, though his relations with the court 
 were surely not altogether free from blame, his 
 own opinion of them must be in the main correct. 
 Would it be surprising if that should be the re- 
 sult of an impartial examination of the facts ? If 
 any man was not disposed to judge him too 
 leniently it was Lafayette, and even he did him 
 the justice to testify : " Mirabeau was not inac- 
 cessible to money, but for no amount would he 
 have sustained an opinion that would have 
 destroyed liberty and dishonored his mind." 1 If 
 I were asked, what chapter of his whole history 
 1 Memoires, II. 3G7.
 
 180 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 redounds, upon the whole, the most to his honor, 
 not only as a statesman, but also as a man, I 
 should unhesitatingly answer : that of his rela- 
 tions to the court. 
 
 The " profession of faith " 1 is preceded by the 
 declaration, that his repugnance to playing farther 
 an active part would be invincible, " if I were not 
 convinced, that the restoration of the legitimate 
 authority of the king is the first need of France 
 and the only means to save her." The sight of 
 constantly growing anarchy, horror at the idea of 
 having " contributed only to a vast demolition, 
 and the fear to see another chief of the state than 
 the king," imperiously bid him not to stay shut up 
 " in the silence of contempt." Whatever else the 
 king might have to expect from his secret coun- 
 sellor, he certainly did not propose to mince mat- 
 ters, but to be terribly plain-spoken. Or was it 
 but the cheap trick of an audacious political jug- 
 gler to tell the king to his face that nothing less 
 than his crown was at stake ? Did he intend to 
 excite exaggerated fears in order to make his ser- 
 vices in averting them appear much greater than 
 they really were ? The last sentences of the letter 
 will answer this question in no uncertain way. 
 1 See the letter of May 10th.— Corresp., II. 11-13.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 181 
 
 The profession of faith itself is compressed into 
 a single sentence : " I engage myself to serve with 
 all my influence the true interests of the king ; 
 and in order not to have this promise appear too 
 vague, I declare that I believe a counter-revolution 
 as dangerous and criminal, as I deem chimerical 
 the hope or the project of any government in 
 France without a chief, invested with all the neces- 
 sary power to apply all the public force to the 
 execution of the law." Another sentence expresses 
 the same idea in other words : " I am as profoundly 
 averse to a counter-revolution as to the excesses 
 to which the revolution, fallen into the hands of 
 bungling and perverse men, has conducted the 
 people." Supposing, for argument's sake, that the 
 king and the queen wanted him to assist them in 
 re-establishing the royal absolutism, could they, 
 after reading these lines, still believe that they had 
 addressed themselves to the right man ? Surely, to 
 declare the very idea of a counter-revolution " crim- 
 inal," was a strange way of signifying one's will- 
 ingness to become a traitor to the revolution. 
 Mirabeau's accusers have ever deemed it super- 
 fluous to show wherein his counsels to the king 
 were a betrayal of his political past, because to 
 them the assertion of compatibility between faith-
 
 182 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 fulness to the revolution and serving the king is a 
 self-evident absurdity : they see in it a contradiction 
 in terms. Mirabeau was of exactly the opposite 
 opinion. Because he was determined to be faithful 
 to the revolution, he accepted the king's invitation 
 and promised to serve him. In his very first Note 
 to the court he expressly declared, that by doing 
 so he did not shift his position by a hair's-breaclth. 
 " I shall be what I always have been : the defender 
 of the monarchical power regulated by the laws, 
 and the apostle of liberty guaranteed by the mo- 
 narchical power." 1 
 
 That was not merely the announcement that he 
 would never turn traitor to the revolution. It was 
 the formal declaration that he was not to be ex- 
 pected to become in any respect or to any extent a 
 tool. He promised to serve the king, but he explic- 
 itly forewarned him that he would never become 
 his servant — never be at his orders. " I know," 
 he says in his 36th Note (October 24, 1790), 
 defending himself against reproaches occasioned 
 by the attitude he had assumed in regard to a 
 certain question, " I know that I have promised 
 everything, but have I promised anything, 
 but to serve according to my principles? Shall 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 25.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 183 
 
 I deceive in order to please, or render myself 
 useless in order to be faithful ? " 1 Faithful, as 
 the court seemed to understand faithfulness. 
 True faithfulness required him to serve only 
 according to his principles, no matter how much 
 this might displease the court. As early as the 
 27th of January, 1790, at the time of his relations to 
 the Count de Provence, he had written to La 
 Marck : " When they have not followed a single 
 one of my advices, not improved a single one of 
 my conquests, not turned to profit a single one of 
 my operations, they complain, say that I have 
 changed nothing in their position, that one cannot 
 count very much upon me, and all that because I 
 do not ruin myself with a light heart in order to 
 sustain advices, things, and men, whose success 
 would inevitably ruin them." 2 
 
 Even if he had intended and promised to serve 
 the king primarily for his own sake, that would 
 have been the only course consistent with the task 
 he had assumed, for the whole agreement was 
 based upon the idea of the superiority of his polit- 
 ical judgment : he was to guide, and not to go as 
 he was bid. But he had, in fact, consented to 
 serve the king, because he wanted to serve' 
 1 Corresp., II. 265. 2 lb., I. 460.
 
 184 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 royalty, and royalty he wanted to serve, because he 
 was convinced that to do so was to serve France. 
 The court possibly still considered the three things 
 identical, in the sense that the proper criterion for 
 the true interests of royalty and of France was 
 what the king deemed to be his interest. If so, 
 the fault was not Mirabeau's. As early as Decem- 
 ber 29, 1789, he had written to La Marck : " Only 
 one thing is clear: they would like to find for 
 their service amphibious beings who, with the 
 talent of a man, have the mind of a lackey. They 
 will irremediably be ruined by having fear of men 
 and carrying always the petty repugnances and 
 fragile attractions of another order of things into 
 this, where what is strongest is not yet strong 
 enough ; and where even if they were themselves 
 very strong, they would still need, for the sake of 
 public opinion, to surround themselves with strong 
 people." 1 The man, whom his just indignation 
 over the political imbecility, which frustrated all 
 his exertions, drove to the excess of calling the 
 king and queen "royal cattle" (betail), 2 would 
 certainly not prostitute his talent and his man- 
 hood to the extent of playing the part of a lackey. 
 On the 4th of December, 1790, he told the king : 
 1 Corresp., I. 441. * lb., II. 237.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 185 
 
 " The question is no longer merely to save royalty, 
 but to save the public cause and the kingdom." 1 
 To make this distinction was to announce that, if 
 — by the fault of the king or without it— an in- 
 compatibility between serving the king and sav- 
 ing the public cause and the state should arise, he 
 would no longer be found at his side. In the 
 Memoir of the 15th of October, he had already 
 declared this most explicitly and emphatically, 
 directly to the royal family, and according to his 
 radical friend Cabanis,he repeated this declaration 
 shortly before his death in regard to the same 
 eventuality, the flight of the king to the frontier, 
 substituting, however, for the " denunciation " of 
 which, he had given notice in the Memoir, the an- 
 nouncement that he would " cause the throne to be 
 declared vacant and the republic proclaimed." 2 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 382. 
 
 2 " J'ai def endue la monarchie jusqu'aubout ; je la defends 
 meme encore que je la crois perdue, parce qu'il dependrait 
 du roi qu*elle ne le flit point, et que je la crois encore utile ; 
 mais s'il part, je monte a la tribune, je fais declarer le trone 
 vacant et proclamer la republique." (Corresp., I. 252.) La 
 Marck insists that Mirabeau can have said no such thing, 
 because, as we know, he declared again and again the depart- 
 ure of the king an absolute necessity. I see no difficulty in 
 reconciling this fact with the statement of Cabanis. That 
 he writes simply " departs " certainly does not pi-eclude that 
 Mirabeau spoke or, at least, only thought of a flight to the
 
 186 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 To declare a counter-revolution " criminal " was 
 absolutely devoid of sense, if he did not mean to 
 serve the king only because and so far as the in- 
 terest of the state required it. To arraign him for 
 his relations to the court is, therefore, simply ab- 
 surd, unless he can be convicted either of having 
 changed his mind as to the criminality of a coun- 
 ter-revolution, or of having defined the counter- 
 revolution, which he deemed criminal so narrowly, 
 that achievements of the revolution were to be 
 sacrificed, which he had hailed or even declared 
 indispensable. 
 
 If the documents are studied, so to speak, only 
 from the headings, it seems easy to convict him 
 out of his own mouth of both charges. For a con- 
 eastern frontier with a view to invoking the aid of foreign 
 powers. La Marck's statement, that he communicated the 
 result of his negotiation with Bouille to Mirabeau, and that 
 he (Mirabeau) expressed himself satisfied with it, is also not 
 incompatible with this opinion. The sounding of Bouille as 
 to his willingness to aid the king in leaving Paris did not 
 necessarily imply just such a flight, and La Marck does not 
 say, that he told Mirabeau that it was this that was contem- 
 plated. What Mirabeau says in the Memoir of the loth of 
 October on this question, renders it an impossibility that he 
 should have approved of such a plan as that, which the king 
 afterwards tried to execute. Yet on June 4th, 1790, he 
 writes to La Marck : " II ne faut, en aucun cas et sous aucun 
 pretexte, etre ni confident, ni complice d'une evasion, et 
 qu'un roi ne s'en va qu'en plein jour, quand c'est pour etre 
 roi." — Corresp., II. 34.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 187 
 
 siderable time he goes to the length of contending 
 that even a civil war might be resorted to to bring 
 about the necessary reaction ; and the central idea 
 of the great Memoir of December, 1790, is a thor- 
 ough overhauling of the constitution and the 
 systematic discrediting of the National Assembly, 
 because unless it be ruined in the public estima- 
 tion, the contemplated changes in the constitution 
 cannot be effected. Thus he undeniably does ad- 
 vocate a counter-revolution. But if we take the 
 pains to read the whole Memoir, and not only to 
 read, but also to study it, we see that he after all 
 persists in his unqualified denunciation of a coun- 
 ter-revolution by any illegitimate means, and, above 
 all, by force of arms. Only in the legitimate way 
 of revolutionizing, i. e., changing public opinion, 
 does he want to bring about a counter-revolution. 
 He is satisfied that this is likely, if not certain, to 
 lead to an appeal to the ultima ratio. 1 But though 
 he sets himself most resolutely against the idea of 
 making the sword the arbiter between the king 
 
 1 In this respect his opinions change with the changing 
 circumstances. In the December Memoir he again assumes 
 the possibility of attaining the end without a civil war. 
 His principal reason for thinking that eventually a civil war 
 would be " a blessing in disguise " was, that it " est le seul 
 moyen de redonner des chefs aux homines, aux partis, aux 
 opinions." — Corresp., II. 137.
 
 188 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 and the nation, the expectation that his policy will 
 kindle a civil war, does not deter him from advo- 
 cating it. Not the king against the nation, but the 
 majority of the nation, headed by the king, fight- 
 ing the minority, which by its factiousness and 
 insane radicalism hurries France into perdition — 
 that is the civil war he has in view. Closest alli- 
 ance of the king with his people and sincere iden- 
 tification of the king with the true spirit of the 
 revolution — these two maxims remain to the last 
 the main pillars on which the whole structure of 
 his policy rests. 
 
 The December Memoir enumerates what, in his 
 opinion, not only ought to be preserved of the 
 work of the revolution, but also will be preserved, 
 whatever may befall France. This list and the 
 remarks accompanying it not only prove that he 
 never became recreant to his original faith, but 
 they also show that, though he passed the severest 
 judgmentr upon the political incapacity of the 
 Assembly, he never lost sight of the fact that it 
 had done enough for France to entitle it, in spite 
 of everything, to eternal gratitude. Of the " de- 
 structions " of the revolution, he says that " they 
 are almost all equally beneficial to the nation and 
 the monarch." " I mean by destructions, the aboli-
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 189 
 
 tion of all privileges, of all pecuniary exemptions, 
 of feudalism, and of several disastrous taxes. I 
 mean besides the destruction of the provincial 
 bodies of the pays d'elats, of the parliaments, of 
 the clergy and fief-holders as political bodies in the 
 state. I, moreover, count among the great advan- 
 tages to be preserved, the uniformity in the assess- 
 ment of taxes, the principles of a more popular 
 administration, the liberty but not the impunity of 
 the press, the liberty of religious opinions, 1 respon- 
 sibility of all agents of the executive power, 
 admissibility of all citizens to all employs, a less 
 arbitrary way of granting favors and pecuniary 
 aid, and a stricter control in the administration of 
 the public funds. In a word, I admit into my sys- 
 tem the benefits of the revolution as well as the 
 cardinal elements of the constitution. . . In fact, I 
 consider all the achievements of the revolution 
 and all that must be preserved of the constitu- 
 tion as such irrevocable conquests that, unless the 
 empire be dismembered, no subversion could 
 destroy them. I even do not except an armed 
 counter-revolution : if the kingdom be recon- 
 
 1 In the Assembly he had arduously contended against 
 mere religious tolerance, insisting that the very word toler- 
 ance implied an unwarrantable arrogation of power.
 
 190 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 quered, the victor would, after all, have to com- 
 pose with public opinion, to gain the good will 
 of the people, to consolidate the destruction of 
 abuses, to give the people a share in the legisla- 
 tive power, 1 to let it choose its administrators. 
 From this observation I draw this important con- 
 clusion : if the advantages of the revolution and 
 the true foundations of the constitution are inde- 
 structible, it is of little consequence whether the 
 National Assembly suffers in its popularity, in its 
 force, in its credit ; the nation can only gain by it, 
 because all the really useful decrees of this 
 Assembly will survive it, and only its fall, whether 
 it be slow or precipitate, will furnish the means to 
 correct its work. Because this result is well 
 assured, the true friends of liberty, those who pre- 
 fer being the saviours of their country to the per- 
 fidious popularity vouchsafing them some praise, 
 can unite their efforts to attack the Assembly, and 
 thereby fulfill their duties as great citizens." The 
 royal authority alone cannot even attempt the 
 reorganizing consolidation of the true revolution, 
 i. e., the revolution confining itself to reform ; only 
 in concurrence with an Assembly of the represent- 
 atives of the people, i. e., in unison with the suc- 
 1 " Qu'il admit le peuple a la confection de la Ioi."
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 191 
 
 cessor of the National Assembly, can the arduous 
 task be accomplished. 
 
 Does this programme propose the revivification 
 of the ancien rSgime in anything whatever ? Is 
 anything lacking in it, that is essential to a truly 
 liberal constitutional monarchy ? Is the method, 
 by which the end is to be pursued, not that of a 
 strictly orthodox constitutionalist ? 
 
 It is neither possible nor necessary here to enter 
 upon the details of his plan. La Marck and Mercy 
 were full of admiration for the stupendous, all- 
 embracing genius Mirabeau displayed in it, but at 
 the same time they thought it too vast, too com- 
 plicated, too dependent on an army of able and 
 trusty agents whom it was impossible to find, and 
 requiring too much time. All that was true 
 enough. But while it is often comparatively easy 
 to keep a leaky, storm-beaten ship afloat, if but the 
 right thing be done at the right moment, the most 
 skilful engineer cannot raise a sunken ship with- 
 out great apparatus, the preparation and applica- 
 tion of which is not an affair of days and weeks, 
 but of months, if not }^ears. That was now the 
 condition of things. The task confronting Mira- 
 beau was no longer to keep the ship afloat, but to 
 raise the sunken ship. It was not due to a lack
 
 192 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 of skill or energy on his part, that she had sunk 
 in spite of all his efforts. The hope that he would 
 be able to save her had been revived in him by 
 the unexpected overtures of the court, because he 
 thought that he would now at last be put into a 
 position to act. That was a gross delusion, and 
 that he allowed himself, for a little while, to be 
 betrayed into this delusion by the consciousness of 
 his strength, spurred on alike by patriotism and am- 
 bition, is the one mistake which can be justly laid 
 to his charge. 
 
 La Marck was not a genius, but a clear-headed, 
 sober, and judicious observer. He had not hailed 
 Mercy's communication as the dawn of morning. 
 In his opinion they had already waited too long, 
 and he frankly told not only Mercy, but also the 
 king and the queen, that he greatly doubted 
 whether Mirabeau would still be able to redress 
 the harm he himself had helped to do. When the 
 king announced that Mirabeau was not to be in 
 communication with the ministers, and even en- 
 joined the most scrupulous secrecy towards them 
 in regard to the whole affair, the count's heart was 
 almost as heavy as before Mercy had spoken to 
 him. He very justly writes : " Did such means 
 not look more like an intrigue than dexterous
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 193 
 
 and powerful measures, worthy of a government 
 and commensurate to the proposed end ? " x In- 
 stead of paving the way to the concert between 
 the executive and legislative power, which Mira- 
 beau deemed the primary condition for arresting 
 the downward course, the king, by thus giving 
 his relations to Mirabeau the character of an 
 intrigue, only paralyzed the executive still more, 
 by rendering unity of purpose, will, and action 
 more than ever impossible. The king was not 
 the government, and to advise the king was use- 
 less or even worse than useless, unless he per- 
 suaded or compelled the ministers to act as he 
 wanted them to. With a man like Louis XVI., 
 the one and the other was out of the question. 
 If Mirabeau gained sufficient ascendency over 
 him, to make him not only subordinate his own 
 opinions to those of his counsellor, but also in a 
 measure to stand up for these, the ministers, if 
 they happened to hold different views, would only 
 conclude from it that an irresponsible, and there- 
 fore in a sense illegitimate, secret influence coun- 
 teracted the influence, which, in consequence of 
 their constitutional responsibility, they were not 
 only entitled, but in duty bound to claim ; and 
 
 1 Corresp., I. 147. 
 13
 
 194 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 such a well-founded suspicion was certainly not 
 calculated to foster the proper relations between 
 them and the king. If, in conformity with the 
 tendencies prevailing in the Assembly, they were 
 only too much inclined to antagonize rather than 
 to serve the crown, any manifestations of such a 
 concealed power behind the throne would be more 
 than likely to drive them into conscious and 
 systematic hostility. The king's being in favor 
 of anything would become in itself a reason for 
 opposing it, and thus the hapless monarch would 
 be the more in danger of turning the best advice 
 into new sources of calamity, the more implicitly 
 he tried to conform to it. This must be fully 
 understood, if justice is to be done to Mirabeau in 
 regard to his truly desperate struggle against 
 having men devoted to Lafayette called into the 
 cabinet. There is no answer to what he wrote 
 October 24th to the court : " One asks of me 
 counsels which I would give uselessly, if I cannot 
 concert with the ministers. Whether strong or 
 weak in fencing, I must have some ground on 
 which to plant my foot. There are many meas- 
 ures, which neither the court nor I can execute, 
 and which ministers in whom one could confide, 
 might attempt with success and without danger.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 195 
 
 What confidence could I have in a cabinet, created, 
 sustained, directed by my enemy ? " 1 At last a 
 direct contact was established between him and 
 Montmorin, that is to say, he was enabled to act 
 through the minister, and in spite of the weakness 
 of Montmorin's character, the connection was suf- 
 ficiently fruitful to prove that in this way some- 
 thing might be achieved. Mirabeau virtually 
 directed the foreign relations, and but for him 
 the war-cloud hovering on the horizon might 
 easily have risen then. 2 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 264. 
 
 2 In the 28th Note of August 17, 1890, he writes in regard 
 to the Spanish-English quarrel about the Nootka Sound, 
 which threatened to drag France into a war with Great Brit- 
 ain : " Si vous vous etes condamnes a un role passif a l'inte- 
 rieur, pourquoi le ministere veut-il vous entrainer a un role 
 actif a l'exterieur? Quelle detestable politique est done 
 celle qui va droit a transporter sur Leurs Majestes la respon- 
 sabilite qui ne peut que resulter d'une perilleuse alliance, 
 d'une guerre desastreuse, ou il n'y a pas une seule chance de 
 succes ? Comment ose-t-on proposer au roi de tenter pour 
 l'Espagne ce qu'il n'ose pas pour lui-meme? Comment com- 
 promet-on son existence dans une mauvaise partie qui n'est 
 pas la sienne ? . . . lorsque l'anarchie est arrivee au dernier 
 periode, ne f remit-on pas al'idee de remuer lesbrandons d'une 
 querelle exterieure, qui ne peut qu'allumer une guerre gen- 
 erale et vingt guerres civiles dans le royaume ? Tant d'inco- 
 ln'-rence me passe, je l'avoue. Je suis stupefait de tant de 
 faiblesse unie a tant d'audace, ct, laissant a votre habile 
 ministere sa politique profonde, je suis trop loyal, je dois 
 trop a Vos Majestes ce que ma conscience et mes lumieres
 
 196 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 One minister, however, was no more the gov- 
 ernment than the king was. In the main the 
 character of Mirabeau's relations to the court 
 remained unchanged ; in some respects it even 
 looked more than before like an intrigue on 
 account of one minister having become a party to 
 it. So long as every possibility was withheld 
 from Mirabeau to bring his superior mind and, 
 above all, his superior will directly to bear upon 
 the government as a whole, nothing was or could 
 be gained. He himself, as La Marck very correctly 
 says, had been before in all essentials a strenuous 
 defender of monarchical principles. As to him- 
 self, therefore, the court obtained by the May 
 agreement only what it substantially had had from 
 the beginning. In form, however, the change in 
 his relations to the court was so radical, that to 
 some extent inevitably even positive harm had 
 to result from it, if in essence no corresponding 
 change in his political position was effected. The 
 change in form was of such a character, that it 
 
 m'indiquent comme la verite, je suis trop avide du retablisse- 
 ment de l'ordre, pour ne pas soutenir, dans le comite des 
 affaires etrangeres, que nous ne pouvons nous meler que de 
 nous-memes, et que nous ne devons chercher qu'a nous 
 maintenir en paix avec quiconque est en paix avec nous." — 
 To the last he remained of this opinion.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 197 
 
 compelled him to act as if a corresponding change 
 in essence had taken place in his position, and this 
 not being really the case, it forced him again and 
 again into momentary changes of attitude, injur- 
 ing 1 the court and detrimental to his influence 
 
 O 
 
 upon it. By insisting upon its remaining a secret 
 to the cabinet, the king had implanted an element 
 of untruthfulness into the relation, and untruth- 
 fulness, as it rarely fails to do, yielded a rich crop 
 of poisonous fruit. 
 
 Mirabeau never knew what the court would 
 do with his advice, and having to act perfectly in 
 the dark, he could not always act consistently 
 in his double role of secret adviser of the king 
 and member of the Assembly. Experience soon 
 taught him always to expect, that from indolence, 
 weakness, or fear, the king would ultimately do 
 what the ministers wanted him to do. But as 
 representative, citizen, and patriot, he was not 
 absolved from responsibility as to what was done 
 by telling what ought to be done. His having 
 assumed the latter obligation had only put him 
 under heavier bonds as to that older and para- 
 mount duty. Argument proving inefficient, he 
 had to try compulsion, and compulsion could be 
 exercised only by exciting fear. This he could
 
 198 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 do any moment from the tribune of the Assembly, 
 for every day offered not only an opportunity, but 
 also a temptation to indulge in a flight of his 
 revolutionary eloquence. Though he well knew 
 that this was wielding a double-edged weapon, he 
 did it more than once, and not only when he 
 really had no other choice. The court compelling 
 him to have recourse to it sometimes, his hot 
 temper betrayed him into using it oftener and 
 striking harder with it than, according to his own 
 confession, he ought to have done. This secret 
 connection with the court often acted upon him 
 more as a lash than as a curb, for, on the one hand, 
 as La Marck wrote to Mercy, " He will not con- 
 sider himself seriously engaged, so long as he 
 only furnishes simple notes and suggests ideas 
 which one does not follow," 1 and on the other, he 
 was determined to do everything in his power 
 really to become what the king, by logical im- 
 plication, had requested him to be : the directing 
 mind and will of the government. 
 
 In Januaiy, 1791, Montmorin complained that 
 
 when he spoke to the king " about his affairs and 
 
 his position, it seemed as if one talked to him of 
 
 things concerning the emperor of China." 2 And 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 288. 2 lb., III. 30
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 199 
 
 in October, 1791, La Marck wrote : " Louis XVI. 
 is not fit to reign — by the apathy of his character 
 — by that rare resignation which he takes for 
 courage and which renders him almost insensible 
 to the danger of his position — and, finally, by that 
 invincible repugnance to the labor of thinking, 
 which causes him to divert every conversation, 
 every reflection on the dangerous situation." * 
 He was the same man in May, 1790, and 
 therefore there is no doubt whatever, that he had 
 never so much as tried to render himself an ac- 
 count of what his invitation to Mirabeau implied. 
 But it is fully as certain that the king and the 
 queen would have deemed it an absurdity as well 
 as an indignity, if anybody had told them that it 
 implied the request to take full charge of the helm, 
 "It is evident," says La Marck, "that fear alone 
 had driven them to court this formidable tribune." 2 
 No one knew that better than Mirabeau himself, 
 and he thought it best to tell his royal clients at 
 once very plainly that he was fully aware of it. 
 In the second Note to the court, he urges the 
 queen to tell Lafayette, in the presence of the 
 king : " It is evident that he (Mirabeau) does not 
 want to help ruin us ; one must not run the risk 
 1 Corresp., III. 248. - lb., I. 147.
 
 200 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 that circumstances compel him to will it ; he 
 must be for us. In order that he be for us, we 
 must be for him. . . We are resigned or resolved 
 to give him the confidence of despair." 1 But his 
 object in telling this was not to increase their fear 
 of him. 2 There was a passage in the Note, which 
 may have impressed the queen that way ; but if so, 
 the day was to come which would undeceive her 
 and prove that those terrible lines had not been an 
 attempt at intimidation by a demagogue, betrayed 
 by the impatience of his ambitious audacity 
 into preposterous exaggeration, but the solemn 
 warning of a genuine prophet of fearful clearness 
 of vision. " The king," he wrote, " has but one 
 man, and that is his wife. There is no safety for 
 her but in the re-establishment of the royal author- 
 ity. I like to believe that she would not care 
 for her life without her crown ; I am perfectly 
 sure that she will not keep her life if she does not 
 keep her crown." No, he does not want to sub- 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 42. 
 
 2 This is not mere conjecture. There is positive proof for 
 it. He says in his 18th Note : " La derniere note que j'ai en- 
 voyee a cause de l'inquietude, et presque de l'effroi. Je le 
 regarclerais comme un bien salutaire effroi, s'il eut produit 
 l'activitie au lieu d'aggraver Fespece de torpeur ou reduit 
 l'infortune. Mais comment ne pas s'apercevoir qu'en aigui- 
 sant la crainte, il emousse la volonte?" — lb., II. 136.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 201 
 
 jugate by intimidation. His purpose is to con- 
 vince by opening the eyes to the appalling gravity 
 of the situation, that there is but one alternative : 
 implicit confidence or perdition. " It is no longer 
 time either to half-confide or to half-serve. . . 
 One must not think that one can, with the help 
 either of accident or of combinations, get out of 
 an extraordinary crisis by ordinary men and 
 measures." 
 
 He read the characters but too correctly. If 
 anything at all was to be attained, it could only be 
 through the queen. But neither was her influence 
 upon the king strong enough, 1 nor could she her- 
 self be made to see the things as they really were 
 and to do with sustained resoluteness what they 
 required to be done. While she understood better 
 than the king the necessity of coming to terms 
 with Mirabeau, implicit confidence was with her 
 even more out of the question than with him. 
 The man was repulsive to her, and while her pride 
 was great enough to conquer fear, she had neither 
 the keenness of intellect nor the strength of will to 
 conquer aversion. Besides she, too, shirked the 
 intellectual and moral effort of looking the fearful 
 reality full in the face and pursuing her own re- 
 1 Cfr. Corresp., I. 124, 125 ; II. 287, 288.
 
 202 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 flections upon it unflinchingly to the end. The 
 second time she saw La Marck in regard to the 
 arrangement with Mirabeau, she kept him over 
 two hours, but a great part of the time the con- 
 versation ran upon other topics. " The purpose of 
 my audience," he says, " was almost lost sight of ; she 
 tried to turn it away. As soon as I spoke to her 
 of the revolution she became serious and sad." 
 But every time she soon dropped the unpleasant 
 subject and resumed, " in a tone of cheerfulness " 
 and with her customary "amiable and graceful 
 humor," her sprightly chat on something else. 
 " This trait," he adds, " paints her character bet- 
 ter than all I could say about it." 1 Like the 
 king she is at bottom a votary of the policy of the 
 ostrich. Not only in her conversation, but also in 
 her thinking does she drop the unpleasant subject 
 when it is getting too unpleasant. Therefore she 
 never comes to see the necessity of Mirabeau's 
 support. When she has come to the point of 
 admitting the necessity of conciliating him so far, 
 that he refrains in future from putting himself at 
 the head of the column of assault, she shudders, 
 turns away, and deliberately closes her eyes against 
 what lies beyond. 
 
 1 Corresp., I. 156, 157.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 203 
 
 This it is, above all, that from the outset dooms 
 all the efforts of Mirabeau to utter failure. The 
 terrific pressure of implacable cruel necessity 
 might, perhaps, after all, have overcome the per- 
 sonal distrust and aversion, if king and queen 
 had at all been capable of implicit confidence, stern 
 thinking, whole-souled resolutions, determined, 
 consistent, and sustained action. They them- 
 selves were the principal builders of their 
 scaffolds, not, however, by any imputed crimes, 
 but — to put it bluntly — by being in most ex- 
 traordinary times, intellectually and morally, woe- 
 fully ordinary people. They are the primary and 
 chief authors of their doom, but infinitely less by 
 what they do, than first by doing always the 
 wrong thing whenever they do anything, and 
 then by doing in the main nothing at all, never 
 knowing either what, or when, or whether, or how 
 to will. This is the key-note of Mirabeau's Notes. 
 Month after month he strikes it with greater force, 
 and finally with the fierceness of despair — ever 
 more and more in vain. 
 
 On the 17th of August he writes : " It is time 
 to decide between an active and a passive role ; 
 for the latter, though I think it wholly bad, is in 
 my eyes less so than this alternating between
 
 204: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 attempts and resignation, half- will and despond- 
 ency, which excites distrust, lets the usurpations 
 take root, and floats from inconsistencies to in- 
 consistencies." 1 How much effect the warning 
 had, can be judged from the following passage in 
 the Note of September 28th: "I confess, not 
 without regret, that I am of very little use, but 
 they impose upon me much more the duty to 
 serve than they give me the possibility for doing it. 
 They hear me with more kindness than con- 
 fidence ; they are more anxious to know my ad- 
 vice than to follow it, and above all, they do not 
 sufficiently realize, that the passive r61e of inac- 
 tion, if it were preferable to all others, does not 
 exactly consist in doing nothing, or letting only 
 those act who do harm." 2 On the 12th of No- 
 vember he writes : " The pest-laden wind, which 
 can destroy at any moment the king, the Assembly 
 itself, the whole nation — the secret leaven of 
 fermentation, perpetuating and nourishing the 
 devouring fever, are in the court ; in its whole 
 conduct, in its inaction, in its too slow or retro- 
 grade march ; in its role of simple looker-on which 
 it affects to play ; in the perpetuity of the most 
 detestable cabinet ; in the passive system of the 
 1 Corresp., II. 136. 2 lb., II. 196.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 205 
 
 most bungling polic} r ; finally, in that sum of cir- 
 cumstances which, persuading the feeble minds 
 that the court has secret projects, causes the 
 ardent minds to multiply the excessive measures 
 of resistance. But the lightning is in the cloud." 1 
 By the 2d of January, 1791, he thought the court 
 wished to get rid of him and he expressed his 
 willingness to abandon the thankless task. 2 As 
 early as the 17th of August he had written : " I 
 shall wait for a clap of thunder to break this 
 deplorable lethargy." He had waited in vain, and 
 therefore he saw himself more and more reduced 
 to preventing here and there, as to this or that 
 detail, further mischief, since " Your Majesties . . . 
 do not think yourselves in a condition to attempt 
 anything for the public cause and yourselves." 
 To the " silence of contempt," buoyant hope had 
 succeeded for a moment upon the overtures of 
 the court, because they seemed to offer an opening 
 for at last putting the resources of his genius and 
 the force of his will to the test of action, and 
 while every day cried louder and more imper- 
 atively for action, he was, from first to last, prac- 
 tically condemned to talk, talk, talk — to the 
 wind. 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 325, 326. s lb., III. 18, 19.
 
 206 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 Even of dull Louis XVI. and merry Marie 
 Antoinette, moulded by nature altogether for a 
 holiday-life, it is not easy to believe that they can 
 really have thought but for a minute, that anything 
 could come of that. If they had, how dense must 
 have been the film over their eyes, when they 
 read the letter of the 10th of May ! There Mira- 
 beau had told them plainly enough how he himself 
 viewed the prospects of the future, even if he be 
 afforded every opportunity of making the most of 
 all his powers in action : " I promise the king loy- 
 alty, zeal, activity, energy, and a courage of which 
 one has perhaps no idea. I promise, in fact, every- 
 thing except success which never depends on one 
 man, and which only a very audacious and very 
 culpable presumption could guarantee in the ter- 
 rible malady that undermines the state and men- 
 aces its chief."
 
 LECTURE XII. 
 
 TJie End. A Unique Tragedy. 
 
 " If this plan be carried out, one may hope for 
 everything ; and if not, if this last plank of salvation 
 drift away, every calamity, from individual assas- 
 sinations to pillage, from the downfall of the throne 
 to the dissolution of the empire, has to be expected. 
 What other resources can remain ? Does the 
 ferocity of the people not steadily increase? Do 
 they not more and more foment hatred against 
 the royal family ? Do they not openly speak of a 
 general massacre of the nobility and clergy ? Is one 
 not proscribed simply for a difference of opinion ? 
 Are the people not made to hope, that the land 
 will be divided among them ? Are not all the 
 great cities of the kingdom in terrible perturbation? 
 Do not the national guards preside at all the acts 
 of popular vengeance ? Do not all the magistrates 
 
 tremble for their own safety, without having any 
 
 207
 
 208 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 means to provide for that of others ? Finally, can, 
 in the National Assembly, infatuation and fana- 
 ticism be pushed to a higher degree ? Ill-fated 
 nation ! To this thou hast been brought by some 
 men, who have supplanted talent by intrigue and 
 conceptions by commotions. Good but feeble 
 king ! unfortunate queen ! To this fearful abyss, 
 the floating between a too blind confidence and a 
 too exaggerated distrust have brought you ! One 
 effort is still possible, but it is the last. If it be 
 not made — or if it fail — a shroud will cover this 
 empire. What will then be its fate ? Where will 
 this vessel, struck by lightning and tossed by the 
 storm, be driven to ? I do not know ; but if I 
 should escape the public shipwreck, I shall always 
 say with pride in my retreat : ' I exposed myself 
 to destruction in order to save them all ; they did 
 not want it.' " 1 
 
 When, in December, 1790, Mirabeau drew this 
 appalling picture of the situation for the court, he 
 was President of the Jacobin Club. At the time, the 
 man holding this position had not as yet necessarily 
 to be a conscious representative of all the subver- 
 sive tendencies. The few words which Mirabeau 
 spoke in assuming the presidency were a pointed 
 1 Corresp., II. 485, 486.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 209 
 
 rebuke of " licentiousness." 1 But the presiding 
 over the Jacobins, after all, implied a degree of rad- 
 icalism which was manifestly not in accord with 
 his position as adviser of the court and still less 
 with the programme of the December Memoir. 
 From this incontestable fact, however, is not to be 
 concluded that he plays false in the sense that he 
 has no political convictions and no programme ex- 
 cept, by hook or by crook, to play an important 
 part. But it drastically shows that, his aim being 
 what it is, the circumstances irresistibly force upon 
 him a double part, which ultimately must def}>- the 
 most consummate skill. 
 
 In his first great speech on the mines he said : 
 " Abstractions, which are the best manner of reason- 
 ing, are neither the only nor the principal elements 
 of the art of governing." 2 The difference between 
 him and all the others simply consists in this, that 
 this trite truth is fully understood by him from the 
 beginning, that he draws all the correct conclusions 
 from it, and that he knows what the essential ele- 
 
 1 " Deja tous les Francais sont auxiliaires de la liberte : il 
 ne roste qu'a les renclre tous ennemis de la licence et auxili- 
 aires de la paix. 
 
 " C'est dans ces principes, Messieurs, que je tacherai de 
 remplir les devoirs de la presidence." — Nov. 30, 1790. Au- 
 lard., I. 399. 
 
 2 March 21. 1791. (Euvres, V. 426. 
 
 14
 
 210 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 ments of the art of governing are. He is fully 
 aware that the most essential of them all is to 
 take the people as they are, i. e., that it is not 
 sufficient to keep always in view that one has 
 to deal not with figures and formulas but with 
 men, but that one has besides to take into con- 
 sideration the specific intellectual and moral con- 
 ditions and dispositions of the particular na- 
 tion as historically evolved and as affected by 
 the peculiar circumstances of the time being. 
 This intuitive political judgment, which verged 
 upon the miraculous, was to a great extent at- 
 tributable to his extraordinary knowledge of men, 
 and this was the one good fruit of his wild 
 and checkered career, which had brought him 
 into intimate contact with all classes and kinds 
 of people. The truly bewildering mobility and 
 versatility of his own mind and temperament en- 
 abled him really to understand them all, and by 
 his uncommon skill in asking, he improved the 
 opportunities thus offered him in a degree no 
 other man could have done. The Prussian Dohm 
 writes : " He understood the art of asking in a 
 degree of which it is hard to give a conception if 
 one has not been present at his conversations." 1 
 
 1 Quoted by Professor Stern.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOUJTION. 211 
 
 The art to ask pertinent questions and to ask them 
 in such a manner that also pertinent answers are 
 given, is, however, but one way to get at the facts, 
 and, as I said in a former lecture, to base his 
 policy upon the facts is the first requisite of the 
 genuine statesman. Among the facts he has to 
 ascertain, the frame of mind in which the people 
 happened to be at the time in regard to the para- 
 mount questions at issue, is always one of the 
 most important, and in a general and all-embracing 
 revolutionary upheaval, it is by far the most es- 
 sential, for the ultimate question : tvhat is achiev- 
 able under the given circumstances ? cannot be 
 determined, unless the correct answer is found to 
 the question : how has one to set about in order to 
 attain the end ? And as to this How, the princi- 
 pal factor in the condition confronting the states- 
 man is the frame of the popular mind. The most 
 exalted statesmanship can no more ignore it in 
 regard to the manner of proceeding, than it can 
 overleap the limits set by it as to the What. In 
 both cases failure is equally certain, for though 
 there is truth in the old saying, that the great 
 statesman does not allow himself to be domi- 
 nated by the circumstances, but dominates 
 them, circumstances can be dominated in poli-
 
 212 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 tics only by conforming to them to a certain 
 extent. 
 
 No statesman has ever had a higher opinion of 
 his own powers than Mirabeau, but also no states- 
 man has been more fully conscious of what fearful 
 fetters those immutable political laws were to his 
 powers. He clung tenaciously to the hope that he 
 would ultimately succeed in spite of everything ; 
 but almost from the first it was a hope against 
 better knowledge, for he saw but too clearly that 
 the frame of the public mind was such as to 
 render the case a desperate one, with, at the most, 
 one chance against nine. 
 
 La Marck, in one of their discussions, quoted 
 Bacon's remark, that while a little philosophy 
 leads away from religion, much philosophy leads 
 back to it, 1 and contended that it was applicable 
 to almost all human institutions. " There is not 
 one," he said, "which the shallowest declaimer 
 could not attack with apparent success ; but this 
 success will always be annihilated by the strong 
 reason of the ready and profound statesman, who 
 
 1 " But farther, it is an assured truth and a conclusion of 
 experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of philoso- 
 phy may incline the mind of man to atheism, but a farther 
 proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to 
 religion."— Bacon's Works, ed. Ellis & Spedding, III. 267.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 213 
 
 knows how to defend the foundations of the social 
 order." " Bravo ! bravo ! " exclaimed Mirabeau ; 
 "but that is now no longer the question. No 
 single man will be able to bring the French back 
 to saneness ; time alone can restore order to the 
 minds ; with them one must never either presume 
 or despair. To-day the French are ill, very ill ; 
 one must treat them cautiously." 1 
 
 Indeed, very ill — and the nature of the disease 
 rendered it imperative to admix a strong dose of 
 the very virus with the remedies, so to speak, to 
 enwrap them in it. He himself was surely one of 
 those who, as he said, would rather save the 
 country than enjoy " a perfidious popularity," but 
 to dispense with popularity was in the strictest 
 sense of the word impossible, unless he renounced 
 the aspiration to be a determining force in the 
 revolution. 2 Without it he was Samson shorn of 
 his locks. In his Note of November 17th to the 
 court he writes : " To acquire the right success- 
 fully to enter upon the course when the true 
 interests of the throne are to be defended, it is, 
 above all, necessary that I prepare the people to 
 
 1 Corresp., I. 208, 209. 
 
 - Montmorin told him : " Vous seul avez sn vous depopu- 
 lariser par courage et vous repopulariser par prudence." 
 —Corresp., II. 391.
 
 214 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 hear my voice without distrust, that I dispel its 
 suspicions, that I be counted among its surest 
 friends, and, from this point of view, my popular- 
 ity, so far from alarming the court, ought to be 
 deemed by it its safest resource." 1 Popularity, 
 however, could be achieved and preserved only by 
 speaking in a tone which would awaken an echo 
 in the breasts of the people, and, in the actual 
 frame of the public mind, that was a tone which 
 illy accorded with his true programme. In the 
 garb of radicalism, often even strongly tinged with 
 demagogism, he had to present his moderate and 
 conservative ideas, if he were to have any chance 
 of making them prevail. 2 Necker's celebrated 
 daughter, Mine, de Stael, who was certainly not 
 disposed to judge him too favorably, writes : " One 
 could not help having pity with the constraint 
 imposed upon his natural superiority. Constantly 
 he was compelled in the same speech to act as 
 partisan of popularity and of reason. He tried 
 to wrest from the Assembly, with demagogical 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 337. 
 
 2 He writes Nov. 26, 1790, to La Marck in regard to his 
 attitude in the church question : " Ce n'est qu'en se tenant 
 dans une certaine gamme que Ton peut, au milieu de cette 
 tumulteuse Assemblee, se donner le droit d'etre raisonable." 
 lb., II. 361.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 215 
 
 phrases, a monarchical decree ; and he often let the 
 royalists feel his bitterness, even when he wanted 
 to carry one of their points ; in one word, it was 
 evident that he had constantly to combat between 
 his judgment and the necessity of success." l 
 
 He had by no means a taste for such equivocal 
 tactics. He writes to La Marck : " It makes more 
 trouble and requires more true dexterity (not 
 genius) thus to tack, than to fight ; that is, per- 
 haps, the rarest part of talent, at least with some- 
 what distinguished talents, for it is the least 
 attractive and that which lives on little accumu- 
 lated combinations, privations, and sacrifices." 2 
 And to the court : " One must dissimulate if one 
 wants to supplement strength by dexterity, as one 
 has to tack in a storm. That is one of my princi- 
 ples and purely based on the observation of life, 
 for it is entirely opposed to my natural character. 
 I must at first take the key of those whom I want 
 gradually to force to adopt mine." 3 
 
 It was indeed utterly opposed to his character, 
 and therefore his skill was all the more to be 
 admired, for he had to subject himself to no little 
 
 1 Considerations sur les principaux evenernens de la revo- 
 lution francaise, I. 353, ed. 1820. 
 
 2 Corresp., II. 146. 3 lb., II. 336.
 
 216 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 constraint. How great this skill was, but also to 
 what a humiliating degree he had sometimes to 
 submit to this " tacking " policy, is most strik- 
 ingly illustrated by his attitude in the debate on 
 the important question, what the constitution 
 should provide in regard to a regency. He is 
 more anxious than ever to see his opinion pre- 
 vail, and yet he blandly declares that he has 
 formed no opinion ; his argument is a tangle, but 
 thus much is clear, that if it is at all intended to be 
 indicative of what his vote is to be, he must cast 
 it for an elective regency ; he, however, abruptly 
 breaks off and dismisses his reasoning with a con- 
 temptuous kick by declaring, in a tone of lan- 
 guid unconcern, that in his opinion the report of 
 the committee, sustaining the opposite view, might 
 be adopted. This is done, and a heavy load is 
 taken from his mind. 1 
 
 1 (Euvres, V. 459-479. His true opinions are revealed by 
 the following letter to La Marck : " Nous sommes dans un 
 grand danger. Soyez sur que Ton veut nous ramener aux 
 elections, c'est a-dire a. la destruction de Fheridite ; c'est-a- 
 dire a la destruction de la monarchic L'abbe Sieyes n'a 
 jamais courtise l'Assemblee, ni agiote une opinion comme 
 il le fait, et ses partisans sont tres nombreux. Je n'ai jamais 
 ete vraiment effraye qu'aujourd'hui. Je me garderai bien 
 de proposer demain ma theorie ; je porterai toutes mes 
 forces a ajourner, en critiquant le projet de decret, en prou- 
 vant qu'il est insuffisant, incomplet, qu'il prejuge de grandes
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 217 
 
 Mirabeau once called the Assembly "a restive 
 donkey, which cannot be mounted without using 
 great discretion." 1 This time he had mounted 
 it; but to manage the balky animal, it was, above 
 all, necessary to keep oneself perfectly under con- 
 trol, and this he by no means always did. The 
 
 questions, etc. , etc. Certainement ma theorie ne passerait 
 pas, et l'ajouniement reussira. Envoyez chercher Pellenc 
 (his secretary) immediatement ; qu'il etude dans le plus 
 grand detail le decret ; qu'il en recherche tous les dangers 
 pour la liberte publique ; qu'il l'envisage sous tous les 
 rapports ; qu'il ne prenne que des notes ; mais qu'il de- 
 veloppe assez ces notes, pour que je parle avec fecondite. 
 II sait au fond ma doctrine a present, mais je ne veux que 
 la laisser entrevoir ; je ne veux pas la hasarder ; gagnons du 
 temps, tout est sauve. Je crois que beaucoup de gens desir- 
 ent se renfermer dans une mesure provisoire. Ne dusse-je 
 gagner que deux jours, j'emmenerai Pellenc a la campagne 
 avec moi, et nous y mettrons toutes nos forces. Soyez star, 
 mon cher comte, que je ne m'exagere pas le danger, et 
 qu'il est immense. O legere, et trois fois legere nation ! — 
 Notre armee est, dans cette question, pour les deux tiers a 
 l'abbe Sieyes." — Corresp., I. 245-248. Oncken's opinion (Das 
 Zeitalter der Revolution, etc., I. 344, 345) that Mirabeau was 
 no longer quite in his right senses, is one of those unaccount 
 able extravagances, with which the distinguished historian 
 occasionally surprises his readers. He needed to remember 
 only that the committee on the Constitution and the Assem- 
 bly were not identical to find another way out of the diffi- 
 culty, which, as far as he gratuitously asserts, everybody 
 admits to be insurmountable. The wild assumption is, how- 
 ever, only the fitting climax of a series of one-sided and 
 exaggerated criticisms, in which virtuous indignation has 
 got the better of political discernment. 
 
 1 Droz, Hist, du regne de Louis XVI., III. 59.
 
 218 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 government and those who considered themselves 
 the only true champions of the crown in the As- 
 sembly, vied with each other to render it almost im- 
 possible for him to do so. 1 The latter, in their 
 passionate imbecility and blind hatred of Mirabeau, 
 more than once succeeded in lashing him into such 
 a fury that, while he had taken the floor for the 
 purpose of calming and restraining, he ended by 
 sending one revolutionary thunderbolt after the 
 other crash ing through the hall. 2 
 
 These provocations go much further towards 
 excusing him than it might appear at first sight, 
 for they usually involved much more than a mere 
 personal question, as to which he might and 
 ought to have kept his temper. The more he 
 wanted to keep the revolution within bounds, the 
 
 1 " L'imperitie et la perfidie du gouvernement d'un cote, 
 l'imbecillite et la maladresse du parti ennemi de la revolu- 
 tion de l'autre, m'ont entraine plus d'une fois hors de mes 
 propres mesures ; mais je n'ai jamais deserte le principe, 
 lors me me que j'ai ete force d'en exaggerer l'application, et 
 j'ai toujours desire rester ou revenir au juste milieu." — Cor- 
 resp., I. 428. 
 
 2 See the most striking instance, lb., II. 331. — To judge the 
 violence of his language justly, it is, however, necessary 
 also to keep always well in mind how true it was, what he 
 had written already in 1787: " Peut-on regenerer, peut-on 
 raeme reformer ce pays-ci, sans attaquer aussi vehemente- 
 ment les personnes que les choses ? " — Premiere lettre du 
 comte de Mirabeau sur l'administration de M. Necker, 7.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 219 
 
 less he could allow anti-revolutionary ideas and 
 tendencies to pass unchallenged. When reaction 
 again dared to raise its voice, sound policy, his 
 convictions, his honor, and even his personal 
 safety made it alike imperative upon him to 
 knock it mercilessly on the head with his terrible 
 club. 1 But, however excusable these occasional 
 unfeigned relapses into the tone of the radical 
 revolutionary tribune, they had necessarily the 
 effect of increasing every time the dislike and the 
 
 1 In October, 1790, the question of asking the king to dis- 
 miss the cabinet and to substitute in the navy the tricolore 
 for the white pennant, offered an opportunity for one of 
 these passionate sallies. Not only the court, but also La 
 Marck was very dissatisfied with him. Mirabeau wrote to 
 his friend on the following day : " Hier je n'ai point ete un 
 demagogue ; j'ai ete un grand citoyen, et peut-etre un habile 
 orateur. Quoi ? ces stupides coquins, enivres d'un succes de 
 pur hasard, vous offrenttout platement la contre-revolution, 
 et Ton croit que je ne tonnerai pas ! En verite, mon ami, 
 je n'ai nul envie de livrer a personne mon honneur et a la 
 cour ma tete. Si je n'etais que politique je dirais : ' J'ai 
 besoin que ces gens-la mecraignent.' Si j'etais leur homme 
 je dirais : ' Ces gens-la ont besoin de me craindre ? ' Mais 
 je suis un bon citoyen, qui aime la gloire, l'honneur et la 
 liberte avant tout, et certes messieurs du retrograde me 
 trouveront tou jours pret a les foudroyer. Hier j'ai pu les 
 faire massacrer ; s'ils continuaient sur cette piste, ils me 
 f orceraient a le vouloir, ne f ut ce que pour le salut du petit 
 nombre d'honnetes gens entre eux. En un mot, je suis 
 l'homme du retablissement de l'ordre, et non d'un retablisse- 
 ment de l'ancien ordre." — Corresp., II. 251.
 
 220 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 distrust of the court. And the less the court 
 became disposed to profit by his counsels, the 
 more he had to be bent on strengthening his 
 popularity. The fact that the Jacobins elected 
 him President 1 twice in succession, bears wit- 
 ness to the skill he displayed in this respect. In 
 spite of this remarkable success his position was, 
 however, by far not as strong as it seemed. The 
 leaders knew full well that he was the most 
 determined, as well as the most puissant opponent 
 of their destructive tendencies. 
 
 The political and social disintegration had by 
 this time reached such a stage that nothing could 
 be achieved by merely covering conservative ideas 
 with demagogical drapery. Mirabeau had to step 
 down to a much lower level as to his means. He 
 frankly avows that the central idea of the great 
 December Memoir, the systematic discrediting of 
 the Assembly, is " an intrigue." He writes : " If 
 the issue were not a last resource and the welfare of 
 a great people, my character would prompt me to 
 reject all these means of a wily (obscure') intrigue 
 and insidious dissimulation, which I am forced to 
 counsel. But what shall one do, what try . . . 
 if one has to contend against intrigue and ambi- 
 * Each time for twenty days.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 221 
 
 tion, and the instrument with which one is at- 
 tacked is the only one with which one can 
 defend oneself ? . . . One must ruin the Assembly; 
 the task is to save the finest empire of the world, 
 if it still be time ; such an end justifies all means, 
 as necessity no more admits of a choice, and dis- 
 simulation, even deceit, is after all better than war. 1 
 And a little later : " One can only save oneself 
 by a plan blending . . . the combinations of the 
 statesman and the resources of intrigue, the cour- 
 age of great citizens and the audacity of crim- 
 inals." 2 Such was the direful situation. La Marck, 
 whom no one can suspect of the slightest inclina- 
 tion to resort to means of questionable propriety, 
 writes in the same days : " One must not overlook 
 that we have to contend against intrigue, which 
 almost always can be successfully met only by 
 intrigue." 3 True enough. But to expect salva- 
 tion from an intrigue was a delusion, for no 
 intrigue could manoeuvre the revolutionary temp- 
 est back into the caves whence it had burst forth 
 and there seal it up. The demagogical intrigues 
 were primarily not a cause, but merely a symptom. 
 Nevertheless, nothing could, in fact, be done now 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 463, 464. 2 lb., II. 510. 
 
 *Ib., II. 416.
 
 222 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 but to fight the devil with his own fire, for al- 
 though the conflagration could not be put out, 
 a fresh attempt to get it under control had to be 
 preceded by beating the incendiaries off, who, 
 systematically and with set purpose, fanned the 
 flames and poured oil into them. Even this, how- 
 ever, was, under the circumstances, more than the 
 shrewdest intriguer could accomplish. The fear- 
 ful ascendency of the demagogues was due to the 
 fact that, as Mirabeau had said, the French, i. e., the 
 whole people were " ill, very ill " — too ill not to 
 give always ten chances to one to the intriguer for 
 worse against the intriguer for better, provided the 
 former had but the faintest suspicion of the lat- 
 ter's being astir. The intriguer, however, is surer 
 to scent the intriguer from afar than vultures and 
 ravens the battle-field. Mirabeau had repeatedly 
 duped the demagogues by urging conservative 
 measures with radical thunder, but as soon as he 
 commenced to send Notes to the court, the pack 
 was on his trail and never again lost it entirely. 
 Suspicion was at times lulled, but never dispelled. 
 Nor could it be. For as from first to last he was 
 compelled as a rule to wear a half-mask, so also 
 from first to last he never hesitated, when the 
 occasion called for it, to fling it proudly away and
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 223 
 
 to expose his true features in all their imposing 
 force to the maddened radicals. 
 
 It is a redeeming feature in this checkered life, 
 that, in his last weeks, fate offered him several 
 opportunities to prove that he could rise to being 
 full}- his better self, growing with his opportunities 
 morally also to his full intellectual height. 
 
 On the 1st of February, his ardent wish to pre- 
 side over the Assembly was at last fulfilled, and 
 Lafayette could convince himself that France 
 would have been none the worse for his presiding 
 on the day of the Federation festival. Even his 
 adversaries had nothing but praise for him. It 
 was universally acknowledged, that no man had 
 presided with greater dignity and understood better 
 to make the dignity of the Assembly respected. 
 If such a firm and skilful hand had held the 
 reins from the first and permanently, the As- 
 sembly would not only have worked more expe- 
 ditiously and methodically, but it might have set 
 an example as to parliamentary decorum, which 
 would not have failed to exercise some salutary 
 influence upon its successors and those who 
 lorded it over them from the galleries. 1 
 
 1 See his graphic picture of the Assembly's haphazard way 
 of working and the consequences of it. — Memoires, VI. 264- 
 266.
 
 224 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 Only a fortnight after resuming his seat among 
 the members, he had his fiercest encounter with 
 the radicals and demagogues. The terrors of the 
 revolution had driven Mesdames, the old aunts 
 of the king, from Paris. Their passports stated 
 that they were going to Rome. Without any 
 warrant of law, local authorities, backed bv the 
 mob, repeatedly opposed the progress of their 
 journey. These incidents brought the question of 
 emigration in an acute form before the Assembly. 
 Chapellier, speaking in the name of the committee 
 on the constitution, proposed that a committee of 
 three be appointed, without whose permission no- 
 body should be allowed to emigrate. Mirabeau 
 objected to the reading of the bill, and moved the 
 order of the day. He insisted that it was not 
 possible either to justify or execute a prohibition 
 of emigration. 1 "Not indignation, reflection must 
 make the laws," he declared. The code of Draco, 
 but not the statutes of France, would be a fit 
 place for a law like that contemplated by the 
 committee. Its barbarity was the best proof of 
 
 1 That was no new theory with him. Repeatedly and 
 ardently he had contended for liberty in this as in all other 
 respects. ' ' La seule bonne loi contre les emigrations est 
 celle que la nature a gravee dans nos coeurs." — Monarchie 
 Prussienne, I. 20 ; edition in 4°.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 225 
 
 the impracticability of any law against emigration. 
 With the most concentrated despotism in the 
 most ruthless hands such a law never had been 
 executed, because in the nature of things it could 
 not be executed. " I declare that I should con- 
 sider myself released from every oath of fidelity 
 toward those who become guilty of the infamy of 
 appointing a dictatorial commission. . . The popu- 
 larity, which I have had the honor to enjoj^ like 
 others, is not a weak reed ; 1 I want to sink its 
 roots into the earth on the imperturbable basis of 
 reason and liberty. If you make a law against 
 emigrants, I swear that I shall never obey it." 
 Applause and hisses interrupted the speaker at 
 almost every sentence. The radical left grew 
 more and more violent in its demonstrations of 
 disapproval, until he cowed it by hurling against 
 it, with the full force of his lion's voice, that grand, 
 imperious : " Silence to those thirty voices ! " — 
 A motion was made and carried which virtually 
 amounted to an adjournment of the question for 
 an indefinite time, and as long as Mirabeau lived 
 no law against emigration was passed. 
 
 1 Mejan (CEuvres, V. 404) writes thus, and thus the sen- 
 tence is always quoted. But is it not possibly a misprint, 
 pas being substituted for qiC : " n'est qu'un faible roseau?" 
 15
 
 226 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 Mirabeau bad not achieved a victory, but merely 
 repulsed an attack by throwing the weight of his 
 influence and of his masterful personality to the 
 last ounce into the scales. Whether he would be 
 able to achieve even thus much the next time was 
 very doubtful. Yet on the same day the radicals 
 returned to the charge in a personal onslaught, 
 and on the field on which the wind and the sun 
 were always wholly with them. Reason and true 
 liberty were by this time at a sufficient discount 
 to warrant the hope that success would crown a 
 vigorous effort, completely and once for all to 
 uproot the popularity of the man whose presump- 
 tuous temerity went to the length of attempting 
 to sink its roots into this bed-rock. The suspicion 
 expressed by one of his admirers, that a brutal 
 social affront was a stratagem with a view to 
 stabbing him from behind in the back, was prob- 
 ably not without foundation. If so, the sorry 
 conspirators were hoisted by their own petard : 
 they only did him a service by giving him a 
 warning which he did not fail to understand and 
 to heed. He had been invited with others to 
 dine at d'Aiguillon's. When he presented him- 
 self at the door he was refused admission. It 
 seems to have been expected that after this slap
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 227 
 
 in the face, he would not dare to show himself at 
 the Jacobins. The "silence to the thirty voices" 
 had reminded these heroes most forcibly, that it 
 was certainly very much easier to slay this man 
 with their venomous tongues when he was not 
 there to answer them. Aye ! They did not know 
 the man yet. It had not been a vain boast, but 
 the plain statement of a fact, when he wrote to 
 the king : " I promise a courage of which one 
 has perhaps as yet no idea." No surer means 
 could have been found to make him go to the 
 Jacobins than thus to notify him by a mortal 
 outrage, that their leaders were determined in 
 dead earnest to hunt him down. 
 
 We have a long and spicy report from the pen 
 of Camille Desmoulins on this memorable even- 
 ing session at the Jacobins on February 28th. 
 Camille, once the ardent admirer of Mirabeau and 
 his exquisite dinners, now draws his pen-picture, 
 not with ink, but with gall and sulphuric acid. 
 Oh, into what a pitiable and contemptible figure 
 this reputed Titan of the revolution turns, if we 
 but look at him closely ! There he sits, writhing 
 in impotent rage and in fear under the lash so 
 mercilessly applied by those true giants, Duport 
 and Alexandre Lameth. He himself had said :
 
 228 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 " When I shake my terrible mane, nobody dares 
 to interrupt me." 1 And now — as with Christ on 
 Calvary, says Camille — the perspiration drips 
 down from under his mane in large drops, pressed 
 out by agony. And how futile his embarrassed 
 efforts to impose upon the clear-eyed and straight- 
 hearted patriots by his shallow sophistries, hollow 
 excuses, and pompous oratorical flourishes ! It 
 is true : he is not ejected from the club, and when 
 he leaves, there is some applause. But nobody is 
 deceived. In acknowledgment of past services 
 he is allowed one more chance to repent and 
 return to the true faith. 
 
 Happily there is another pen-drawing of this 
 evening session preserved, and it presents a rather 
 different view. The Swiss Oelsner - also tells us 
 what he saw with his own eyes and heard with his 
 own ears. Full justice is done by him to Mira- 
 beau's adversaries. In his reply to Duport, Mi- 
 rabeau seems really not to have been at his best, 
 and Lameth's onset was in fact terrible. The 
 
 1 Dumont, Souvenirs, 282, 283. 
 
 2 Bruchstiicke aus den Papieren eines Augenzeugen und 
 unparteiischen Beobachters der franzosischen Revolution, 
 1794. We owe the identification of the author to Professor 
 Stern. I quote from Aulard's translation of the report. See 
 the original, Stern, II. 316-319.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 229 
 
 consummate adroitness of the attack was only 
 surpassed by its unfathomable perfidiousness. 1 It 
 was a master effort to render Mirabeau at the 
 same time " odious and ridiculous." So wildly 
 was the speaker applauded, that Oelsner began to 
 fear that Mirabeau was done for and that nothing 
 less was intended by his assailants than to unchain 
 the mob against him. Perhaps it would have 
 
 1 Already in May, 1790, Mirabeau had denounced the 
 meanness and suicidal madness of the ever-growing practice 
 of treating a difference of opinion as a crime and of substi- 
 tuting imputations and calumnies for argument. " On 
 dirait qu'on ne peut, sans crime, avoir deux avis dans une 
 des questions les plus delicates et les plus difficiles de l'orga- 
 nisation social. . . 
 
 " On vous a propose de juger la question par le parallele de 
 ceux qui soutiennent l'affirmative et la negative ; on vous a 
 dit que vous verriez d"un cote des homines qui esperent 
 s'avancer dans les armees, on parvenir a gerer les affaires 
 etrangeres ; des hommes qui sont lies avec les ministres et 
 leur agens ; de l'autre, le citoyen paisible, vertueux, ignore, 
 sans ambition, qui trouve son bonheur et son existence dans 
 le bonheur commun. 
 
 " Je ne suivrai pas cet example. Je ne crois pas qu'il soit 
 plus conforme aux convenances de la politique qu'aux prin- 
 cipes de la morale, d'amler le poignard dont on ne saurait 
 blesser ses rivaux, sans en ressentir bientot sur son propre 
 sein les atteintes. Je ne crois pas que des homines qui 
 doivent servir la cause publique en veritables freres 
 d'armes, aient bonne grace a se combattre en vils gladiateurs, 
 a lutter d'imputations et d'intrigues, et non de lumieres et 
 de talens ; a chercher dans la ruine et la depression les uns 
 des autres des coupables sneers des trophees d'un jour, nuis- 
 ibles a tout, etmeme a la gloire." — CEuvres, III. 355, 378.
 
 230 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 come to that, if the President had succeeded in 
 his perfidious attempt to adjourn the meeting 
 without allowing Mirabeau once more to reply. 
 But when Mirabeau, who, according to Oelsner, 
 had not lost his composure for a minute, again 
 had the floor, the conspirators had lost the game 
 for this time. Oelsner writes : " It was a hot 
 combat. He put forth all the resources of his 
 genius to vanquish his young and agile adversary. 
 He clutched him and his companions with a hand 
 of iron and of fire. He wrenched from them their 
 false arms and struck incurable blows. His boil- 
 ing wrath gushed over all who had impugned him. 
 Truths, which no one had ever dared to breathe 
 in the club, crashed like claps of thunder through 
 the hall. His boldness, his noble bearing, petrified 
 the audience with astonishment. Thus he put 
 down the furious, and there was not one from 
 whom he did not force, if not applause, at 
 least high admiration. Even in the National 
 Assembly Mirabeau had never been more mas- 
 terful." ! 
 
 Mirabeau finished his answer to his assailants 
 the next day in the National Assembly, as spokes- 
 man of a deputation of the departmentl adminis- 
 1 Aulard, Jacobins, II. 112.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 231 
 
 tration. 1 His attitude in the emigration question 
 was by no means the only grievance of the 
 Jacobins against him. One of Lameth's principal 
 charges was, that in an address of the departmental 
 administration to the people drawn up by him, he 
 dared to denounce those as the real enemies of 
 liberty, who constantly declared the constitution 
 and liberty in danger. Mirabeau now repeated 
 this charge more emphatically, pointing more 
 directly to the Jacobins. "From all the frag- 
 ments of the old institutions and the old abuses," 
 he says, "an infectious sediment, a corrupting 
 leaven has formed, which is incessantly stirred by 
 perverse men in order to develop all its poisons. 
 I mean the factious who, in order to subvert the 
 constitution, persuade the people that it must act 
 by itself, as if it were without laws, without 
 magistrates. We shall unmask those culpable 
 enemies of its tranquillity, and we shall teach the 
 people that, if the most important of our functions 
 is to watch over its safety, its post is that of labor, 
 seconded by the peace of active industry and 
 domestic and social virtues." 2 The Assembly 
 
 1 In the latter half of January he had succeeded in having 
 himself elected to the important position. 
 
 2 CEuvres, V. 408.
 
 232 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 applauded and decreed that the address be 
 printed. 
 
 Thus ended this fierce single-handed contest with 
 insane radicalism and ruthless demagogism, which 
 excites even in Mr. Lomenie unalloyed admira- 
 tion. Mirabeau's " image," he says, " appears in 
 it with a character of greatness," which it has on 
 no other occasion to the same degree. 1 So it is ; 
 but it is the greatness not of the conquering hero, 
 but of the hero who, although bleeding already 
 from a hundred wounds, strikes his most powerful 
 blow while the deadly shaft is piercing a vital 
 organ. Mirabeau furnished incontestable proof on 
 the 1st of March, that the Jacobins had not intim- 
 idated him on the previous evening, but he soon 
 again ceased to attend their meetings. 2 Now, as 
 
 1 (Euvres, V. 307. 
 
 2 There is no reason to doubt that Lucas Montigny's state- 
 ment to this effect is in the main correct, though he is mis- 
 taken in asserting that he never again set his foot into their 
 hall. He had left it on the 28th saying : " I shall stay 
 among you until I am ostracized," and from a letter of 
 March 4th to La Marck we learn that he had been again at 
 the club. But he reports a defeat : it is true, a defeat with- 
 out a combat, for the scene which " les a remontes au dia- 
 pason de la fureur " was enacted after he had left, but still 
 a defeat. " Je suis en verite toes-decourage, tres-embarasse, 
 tres-fache de m'etre mis si seul en avant, puisque tous les 
 coups de la tempete vont porter sur le seul homme qui veu- 
 ille la chose pour elle, et qui ne soitpas un hanneton." — Cor-
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 233 
 
 ever before, lie took his stand on the stern facts. 
 As his turning himself into a Jacobin of the gen- 
 uine dye was out of the question, he never again 
 could exercise any influence there, and there was a 
 fearful amount of truth in what Lameth had said : 
 " Only from the midst of this Society can Mira- 
 beau wield the lever of opinion ; 2 outside of it all 
 his force is of no use to him ; as despised as Maury 
 he becomes as powerless (wwZ)." 2 More and more 
 the Jacobins succeeded in monopolizing the manu- 
 facture of popularity, and the ingredients of the 
 article fabricated by them were unreason and 
 everything antagonistic to true liberty. Mirabeau 
 himself broke and tore the roots of his popularity 
 by persisting in the attempt to force them into the 
 double rock of reason and genuine liberty. 
 
 And by doing this he does not add a single 
 grain to his influence with the court. Only a 
 week after this terrible hand-to-hand struggle with 
 the Radicals, Count Fersen, the gallant Swedish 
 
 resp., III. 78. — Laporte, intendant of the civil list, assures 
 the king, March 3d, that Mirabeau's breach with the Jacob- 
 ins is irreparable. Stern, II. 294. 
 
 1 Mirabeau's rejoining the club in the beginning of Oc- 
 tober, after having stayed away from it for many months, 
 was in itself an acknowledgment that there was a great deal 
 of truth in the assertion. 
 
 2 Aulard, II. 107, 108
 
 234 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 knight of Marie Antoinette, writes to his sovereign, 
 Gustavus III. : " His principles are always bad, but 
 they are less so than those of the others. In spite 
 of that, it is interesting not to have him against 
 one." That is all the court cares for : not to have 
 him for an open adversary. And thus one feels 
 and thinks about him, although one is fully aware 
 that, as Fersen expressly states, " he is compelled 
 to hide himself under the forms of democracy in 
 order not to lose all his influence." 1 
 
 The part he had played in the revolution, as he 
 wrote to Lafayette in April, 1790, rendered it 
 impossible to him ever to be " neutral ; " too 
 many eyes were fixed upon him ever to admit of 
 his hiding ; with him even " silence " was sure to 
 be counted " a crime." 2 And while he is thus 
 forced, by his very superiority, always to fight in the 
 forefront, every defeat he suffers, every unequal 
 contest that, thanks to the valor of his arm, ends 
 in a drawn battle, nay, every victory he achieves, 
 ultimately tends to isolate him more and more. 
 Higher and higher he towers above all the rest, 
 but on the right and on the left they equally fall 
 away from him. He knew well what that signified, 
 
 1 March 8, 1791. Klinkowstroem, Le Comte de Fersen et 
 la Cour de France, I. 86. 2 Corresp., II., 3.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 235 
 
 for lie did not — complacently or cowardly — shut 
 his eyes against the facts when they boded no 
 good to him personally. This constantly progress- 
 ing isolation meant that his every step was a step 
 further to the brink of the Tarpeian rock, for in 
 contending for the salvation of France he was 
 contending against an irreversible decree of fate 
 — not that inscrutable arbitrary power of the 
 ancients, but simply the necessary resultant of 
 the unalterable given facts. No mortal has ever 
 issued as victor from such a contest. Therefore 
 nothing better could have befallen him, than that 
 he was called off on the 2d of April after an illness 
 of but a few days. Up to this day many have 
 thought differently. More than one eminent his- 
 torian has declared it an open question whether 
 he could have reversed the wheels. Why have 
 they not gone to Mirabeau himself for an answer 
 to their question? He has given it often and 
 plainly enough. What he had told the king in his 
 letter of the 10th of May, he had repeated in a dif- 
 ferent form, but fully as emphatically in his Note 
 of December 4th : " One can count upon my 
 zeal, but not on an omnipotence which I do not 
 have." i To arrest, single-handed, the downward 
 1 Corresp., II. 383.
 
 236 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 course of the revolution required nothing less than 
 omnipotence. 
 
 One of the unalterable facts of no small moment 
 was Mirabeau's own past. No one knew better 
 than he the tremendous weight of the chain that 
 was thereby riveted to his wrists. Already in the 
 fall of 1789, he often bitterly exclaimed in the 
 hearing of La Marck : " Oh, what harm the im- 
 morality of my youth does to the public cause ! ' 
 We have heard him repeatedly declare that char- 
 acter is the paramount requisite for a statesman, 
 and that he — and he alone — possessed it. The 
 first assertion is incontestable, and the second was 
 true as to courage and force of will. But there is 
 a third element indispensable in the make-up of a 
 genuine statesman's character. The motives and 
 the ends must be essentially moral. Was Mirabeau 
 possessed of this requisite ? Could it be presumed 
 that he possessed it? It was this question that 
 rendered his past an almost insurmountable barrier 
 between him and success. Confidence he needed 
 above all, and just this he found nowhere. It was 
 bitter and cruel, but terribly true what the father 
 had written : " He gathers in what those reap 
 who have failed as to the basis, the morals. . . He
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 237 
 
 will never obtain confidence, even if he tried to 
 deserve it." 1 
 
 And it was by no means only the immorality of 
 his youth that caused all to distrust him. The 
 kind of double game which the uncontrollable 
 circumstances forced upon him, necessarily fur- 
 nished always fresh aliment to the distrust of all. 
 But there is no denying, that from first to last he 
 also added fuel to the fire, when he would not 
 have needed to do so and even might have damped 
 it. Immorality was so deeply ingrained into his 
 whole being, that it would crop out at the slightest 
 provocation or temptation. Turn and twist as we 
 will, there is as to state affairs — and especially in 
 
 1 Lomenie, IV. 141. In 1785 Mirabeau had written in his 
 answer to Beaumarchais : ' ' Mon premier but, en me vouant 
 a la perilleuse profession d'apotre de la verite, fut de meriter 
 l'oubli de mes longues erreurs. Voila le seul interet, la seule 
 ambition que je connus jamais : et j'espere enobtenirle suc- 
 ees : car enfin qu'importent au public les ecarts d'une folle 
 jeunesse, si l'age mur lui paie un tribut noble et genereux ? 
 Mais malheur a ceux qui se feraient un titre de torts des 
 long-temps avoues, cruellement expies, et peut-etre suffis- 
 amment repares, pour me refuser les egards que merite tout 
 citoyen incessamment occupe d'etudes, de recherches, d'ou- 
 vrages qui interessent le bien general ! " — Memoires, TV. 
 276, 277. This time the father proved to be the better 
 prophet. — In a letter to Soufnot (Oct. 4, 1787), Mirabeau 
 says : " Les folies d'une bouillante jeunesse, ontete le prem- 
 ier aiguillon qui m'a presse de payer a mon pays un tribut 
 noble et genereux." — Mem., IV. 449.
 
 238 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 great revolutionary upheavals — some truth in his 
 maxim, that " the petty morality kills the great 
 morality." But he put a strong dose of cynicism 
 into it and was ever lamentably ready to make 
 it a cloak for his inexcusable moral trippings. 
 Thereby he to the last continues to be his own 
 worst enemy. While his right breaks one link of 
 the chain dragging down his arm, the left is busy 
 putting a fresh rivet to another or forging a new 
 one. He is an assiduous ally of cruel fate, denying 
 him the possibility of applying to their full extent 
 the extraordinary powers bestowed upon him by 
 nature. 
 
 And yet it surely might have been different. 
 The moral pollution was certainly not only skin- 
 deep. The whole blood was vitiated. But in the 
 depths of this Titanic character lay a vast moral 
 reserve force. 1 It was doomed to remain latent, 
 
 1 La Marck, telling of his offer to aid him in his pecuniary 
 embarrassments in order to put him ' ' en etat de conserver 
 son independence et de ne s'occuper que du bien public et de 
 sa gloire," writes : " Ilfut profondement touche de ma sol- 
 licitude pour sa gloire, et l'eloquence naturelle, mais entrain- 
 ante, avec laquelle il me peignit son emotion, me confirma 
 de plus en plus dans la conviction qu'il y avait de puissantes 
 ressources dans le coeur d'un tel homme. . . Dans plusieurs 
 circonstances, lorsque je fus irrite de son language revolu- 
 tionnaire a la tribune, je m'emportai contre lui avec beau- 
 coup d'humeur. . . je l'ai vu alors repandre des larmes
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 239 
 
 but the two magic words, Possibility and Responsi- 
 bility, might have brought it into full activity at 
 any moment. Nothing less than a task com- 
 mensurate to his ambition and to his powers could 
 bring his great and good qualities into full play, 
 and nothing less than the full weight of supreme 
 official responsibility could keep him steady. But 
 by this stimulus combined with this ballast, what 
 was weak and vile in him would have been brought 
 so far under control, that he would have become 
 what he could be. For the weak and the vile 
 were in the main but acquired qualities, a volcanic 
 temperament, miseducation, the follies, vices, and 
 crimes of a rotten political system and a rotten 
 society, and a tangle of untoward accidental cir- 
 cumstances concurring in planting the germs and 
 nursing them into luxuriant growth. The great 
 and good were inborn and therefore ineradicable, 
 though dross be piled ever so high over them. 
 Nature had made an uncommon effort in moulding 
 this man, and life had made an uncommon and 
 
 comme un enfant, et exprimer sans bassesse son repentir 
 avec une sincerite sur laquelle on ne se pouvait tromper. II 
 faut avoir eu avec un pareil horame des relations aussi 
 suivies et aussi intimes que les miennes, pour connaitre tout 
 ce que la pensee a de plus eleve et le coeur de plus attach- 
 ant."— Corresp., I. 108, 109.
 
 240 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 most persistent effort to corrupt nature's master- 
 work. There was but one incentive powerful 
 enough to arouse him to the supreme effort re- 
 quired for terminating the contest between nature 
 and life by a glorious victory of the former : by 
 putting him to the highest test, in allowing him 
 to contend for the highest prize, he could be in- 
 duced to conquer himself. 
 
 He knew it, for he said so. In the Note of 
 June 20th, he charges the queen to tell La- 
 fayette : " He needs a great aim, a great danger, 
 great means, a great glory." 1 There is nothing 
 " inexplicable " about him, if one but grasps the 
 tremendous import of these words, and sees that 
 they are the main key to his character* What an 
 awful pathos they impart to his whole career ! 
 Yes, he needs a great aim and a great glory. His 
 becoming truly great depends on having a chance 
 accorded him to be very great. It was denied 
 him, and a life which nature had intended to be- 
 come an enduring blessing and the glory of a great 
 nation, was rendered but a tragical incident in its 
 history, bearing no fruit and leaving no trace. 
 What Mirabeau had been foremost in destroying 
 and what had to be destroyed, would have 
 
 1 Corresp., II. 42.
 
 • THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 241 
 
 crumbled into dust though he had never lived. 
 As to the positive tasks confronting France, he, 
 however, was " the party of one man." He alone 
 was able to construct pari passu with the destroy- 
 ing, and thus to construct, that the new structure 
 would be adapted to the true nature and actual 
 condition of things. But he was condemned to 
 spend all his forces in checking and abating as to 
 this or that detail, the blunders of all the rest, in 
 numberless cases amounting, as to their effects, 
 to irredeemable crimes. Not enough that doctri- 
 narianism and prejudice, indolence and passion, 
 obtuseness and perversity prevent him from arrest- 
 ing the universal pressing on towards chaos and 
 anarchy ; his very devices for doing so are per- 
 verted into battering-rams for breaking down the 
 last bulwarks, and more than once he is compelled 
 to assist the madmen himself. Never had France 
 stood in greater need of a pre-eminent, constructive 
 statesman, never had she had to boast of a greater 
 political genius, never had a statesman yearned 
 more ardently to rescue her, though it cost the 
 last drop of his heart's blood, and — as he himself 
 said — he had only pre-eminently contributed to a 
 vast destruction, which, as he predicted again and 
 
 again, would irresistibly go on so long as anything 
 16
 
 242 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 was left to be destroyed. That was an infinitely 
 more tragical fate than that of being assassinated 
 like Caesar for being too great, or that of suffering 
 like Louis XVI. a felon's death, at the hands of 
 an ungrateful people for having been too small. 
 
 As early as January, 1790, Mirabeau bitterly 
 complained : " Always restricted to advise, never 
 able to act," I shall probably have the fate of Cas- 
 sandra : " I shall always predict truly, and shall 
 never be believed." 1 Like all his prophecies, the 
 prediction was fulfilled to the letter. Nor would 
 he have escaped this sad fate, if there had been no 
 taint upon his character. " Falling myself, and 
 probably one of the first, under the sickle of fate," 
 he writes in his Note of August 17th, " I shall be 
 a memorable example of what is reserved to men 
 that are, in politics, ahead of their contempo- 
 raries." 2 Yes, his being ahead of his times was the 
 primary and principal cause why all his construc- 
 
 1 Corresp., I. 449. 
 
 2 Corresp., II. 138. It is interesting to note in this connec- 
 tion La Marck's opinion, that Mirabeau would " unquestion- 
 ably " have ended on the guillotine, if he had not died a nat- 
 ural death, ere Master Samson, the executioner of Paris, 
 became the greatest equalizer of France. Of Mirabeau's 
 determination " de sauver le roi dans le bouleversement 
 general, et de Tarracher aux mains des anarchistes, qui ne 
 pouvaient pas manquer de devenir bientot ses bourreaux," 
 LaMarck says : " C'etait risquer sa vie." — lb., I. 151, 152.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 243 
 
 tive political genius : could bear no other fruit than 
 dismal prophecies, which stand unparalleled in 
 truthfulness and unerring minuteness. 
 
 When his supreme hour had come the distant 
 boom of cannon drew from him the proud ques- 
 tion : " Are these already the funeral rites of 
 Achilles?" And one of his last words was: "I 
 take with me the shroud of the monarchy ; after 
 my death the factions will fight over its shreds." 
 So they did, becoming more and more convinced, 
 that to demolish not only royalty, but government, 
 was to establish liberty. The mortal remains of 
 Mirabeau were the first to be deposited in the Pan- 
 theon, which the National Assembly consecrated 
 to the ashes of the greatest sons of France. When 
 that revolutionary version of the gospel of liberty 
 had attained full sway, they were cast out and 
 those of Paul Marat, who had demanded the 
 highest gallows for him, put in their place ; where 
 they now mingle with the dust, nobody knows 
 nor ever will know. Thus the Terrorists were the 
 last to confer a mark of honor upon him. For 
 
 1 To obtain an adequate idea of Mirabeau's fertility in pos- 
 itive and constructive ideas, it is indispensable to consult 
 those also of his writings, which most of his biographers 
 have not deemed worthy of any attention. See for instance 
 the Memoires, IV. 91-104.
 
 244 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 
 
 who will deny that it was an honor, even in the 
 coffin, to be ostracized by those who made terror the 
 foundation of liberty, canonized the guillotine, 
 and kicked God Almighty out of His temples to 
 make room for the goddess of Reason. Most of 
 those who had done the best to bring this about, 
 learned how holy the guillotine was when they 
 were made to ascend its fatal steps themselves. 
 Those who survived saw the red cap of Liberty 
 expand and stiffen into a military cocked hat. 
 Even in the first year of the revolution Cas- 
 sandra — Mirabeau had foretold this transformation 
 as explicitly as the end of the king and the queen. 
 Is eloquence a source whence such predictions 
 can spring ? The French historians have read 
 and registered these and all his other prophecies, 
 verified by the facts, but with most of them, the 
 superabundance of a whole century's stern lessons 
 have not sufficed to open their eyes to the fact that 
 his claim to greatness cannot chiefly rest upon his 
 oratory. He himself declared, in so many words, 
 that in his own estimation he was, above all, states- 
 man, and only in the second place orator and 
 writer. 1 In quantity and in quality, the work done 
 by France since the establishment of the third 
 1 Aug. 26, 1790, to La Marck. Corresp., II. 146.
 
 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. 245 
 
 republic in regard to the history of the revolution 
 challenges the highest admiration. Is it neverthe- 
 less to last another century ere she is prepared to 
 do full justice to her greatest son of the greatest 
 period of her history ? Who can tell ? Mere 
 knowledge of the facts does not suffice. Her 
 judgment upon this chapter of her past must be 
 warped so long as she flinches from probing the 
 present to the quick ; and much as the third 
 republic has done for the intellectual and political 
 advancement of the nation, it has as yet not pro- 
 duced that supreme moral courage required by the 
 precept of the Greek sage : " Know thyself ! ' 
 
 THE END.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Aix, Mirabeau's suit against his wife at, 216. 
 
 American war, effects of, 101. 
 
 Ancien Regime, political structure under, 2 ff . ; system of 
 justice under, 6, 211 ; self-government under, 13 
 over-government under, 14 ; sale of offices under, 15 
 financial embarrassments under, 19 ; estate under, 20 
 clergy, 20 ff . ; nobility, 26 ff . ; destroys itself, 124 
 utter bankruptcy, 126 f. ; many-headed opposition 
 to, 129 ff. ; destroyed by Louis XIV., 132; has dis- 
 integrated people, 152 ; inconsistency of, 210 f. 
 
 Archives Parlementaires, II. 108, 109 ; confusion as to 
 Blin's speech, II. 112 (note). 
 
 Army, practically dissolved, II. 152 ; Mirabeau proposes 
 reorganization, II. 153. 
 
 Arneth, 74 (note) ; 78 (note) ; 90 (note). 
 
 Arnold, Matthew, 75. 
 
 Assignats, II. 161 ff . 
 
 Attroupements, bill against, II. 67 ; II. 84. 
 
 Bachaumont, on the economists, 148 ; on Rousseau's 
 
 Contrat Social, 158. 
 Bacon, II. 212 and note. 
 Banqiie cle Saint Charles, denunciated by Mirabeau, II. 
 
 172. 
 Bar, 156 (note). 
 
 Barante, on optimism, 237. 
 
 247
 
 248 INDEX. 
 
 Barentin, opening speech, 243. 
 
 Bastille, stormed, II. 21 ; effects of storming of, II. 42. 
 
 Beaumarchais, Mirabeau's letter to, II. 237 (note) 
 
 Berthier, murdered, II. 23. 
 
 Besancon, intendant of, on sentiment in his province, 
 239. 
 
 Besenval, opinion of M. Antoinette, 87 (note) ; testifies 
 as to elasticity of marriage bond, 181 (note). 
 
 Blanc Louis, on Mirabeau's position in Assembly, II. 7. 
 
 Blin, speech against Mirabeau, II. 110. 
 
 Bouille, on nobility, 27 ; on financial ruin of nobility, 67, 
 232 ; conduct at Nancy, II. 152. 
 
 Bourgeoisie, apish vanity of, 43 ; attitude toward prole- 
 tariat, 51 f ; Robespierre against, 53 ; disintegration 
 of, during rev. , 55 ; improving material conditions of, 
 56; intellectual conditions under anc. reg., 56; en- 
 gage in discussion of polit. problems, 150. 
 
 Brienne, 116 ; dismisses notables, 116 ; is dismissed, 125. 
 
 Buffiere, Pierre, name of Mirabeau at school, 195. 
 
 Cabanis, quotes Mirabeau as to action after flight of king, 
 II. 185. 
 
 Cafe Foy, resolutions of, II. 45 (note). 
 
 Caisse nationale, suggested by Mirabeau, II. 103. 
 
 Calonne, on penalties from gabelle, 37, 103 ; appointed 
 controleur general, 106 ; his debut, 107 ; his financial 
 policy, 107 ff ; takes up Turgot's reform programme, 
 109 ; has assembly of notables called, 110. 
 
 Campan, Mme, on appointment of Maurepas, 90 (note). 
 
 Cassagnac, 112 (note). 
 
 Champford, 77 (note). 
 
 Chapellier, proposes committee on emigration, II. 224. 
 
 Chatelet, Marquise du, treatment of canaille, 52. 
 
 Choquard, Abbe, one of Mirabeau's teachers, 195. 
 
 Christianity, seriously undermined, 136. 
 
 Church, s. clergy ; intolerance, 133 ff ; loses religious con- 
 tent, 136 ; merely privileged class, 136.
 
 INDEX. 249 
 
 Cice (archbishop), acts as go-between for Mirabeau and 
 
 Lafayette, II. 87 ; intrigues against Mirabeau on 
 
 Nov. 7, II. 118. 
 Clement XL, 133. 
 Clergy, taxes levied by, 22 f; upper and lower, 23 f; 
 
 riches of, 23 and note ; poverty of lower, 24 ; 
 
 luxury of higher, 24 ; delusions of rev. leaders 
 
 about, 25. 
 Clergy of France, 20 ; form of contribution to state, 21 ; 
 
 conditions attached to grants by Ordinary Assembly 
 
 of, 22 ; political activity of, 22. 
 Clugny, 96. 
 Colbert, 101. 
 
 Compte rendu, 103 ; limitations of, 104 ; political im- 
 portance of, 105 ; success of, 106. 
 Condorcet, delusion about the nature of man, 158. 
 Conseil du roi, 10. 
 Controleur general, 11. 
 Constitution, to be made, 253 ff ; untoward conditions 
 
 for making of, 257 f . 
 Corvee, 35 ; abolished, 94 ; re-established, 98. 
 Cour pleniere, 122. 
 
 Courrier de Provence, II. 22 ; II. 46 ; II. 84 ; II. 86. 
 Court, s. Versailles and nobility ; d'Argenson on, 72 ; 
 
 charm of, 74 ff . 
 Croupes, 71. 
 
 D'Aiguillon, Mirabeau refused admission at, II. 226. 
 Daire, 102 (note). 
 
 D'Antraigues, Mirabeau praises moderation to, 236. 
 D'Aragon, Marquise (Mirabeau's niece), II. 87. 
 D'Argenson, on court, 72 ; on study of public law, 143 ; 
 
 on anti-monarchical opposition, 145. 
 De Biauzat, Gaulthier, II. 149. 
 De Castries, II. 148. 
 December Memoir, II. 188 ff . 
 De Fleury, 106.
 
 250 INDEX. 
 
 De Lamoignon (Guillaume), view of power of States- 
 General, 220. 
 
 De la Tour, on optimism, 237, 238. 
 
 De Pailly (Mme.), becomes Marquis Mirabeau's mistress, 
 184 ; character, 185 ; as a mischief-maker, 185. 
 
 Desmoulins, Camille, praise of mob-rule, 256 ; judgment 
 on 5th of Oct., II. 41 ; on necessity of lying, II. 50 
 (note) ; II. 53 ; describes insurrection of women, II. 
 55 f. ; on Lafayette, II. 59 ; describes attack at 
 Jacobin club on Mirabeau, II. 227 f. 
 
 Despotism, Essay on, s. Mirabeau, 212. 
 
 D'Espremenil, 119 (note). 
 
 D'Estaing, Louis' letter to, II. 51 and note ; II. 64. 
 
 Dictionnaire philosophiqiie, 147. 
 
 Dohm, on Mirabeau's mastery of art of asking, II. 210. 
 
 Don gratuit, 21 ; voted by Ordinary Assembly, 21. 
 
 D'Ormesson, 106. 
 
 Droz, quoted, II. 217. 
 
 Dubarry, Madame, 88. 
 
 Dumont, assertion concerning connection of Mirabeau 
 with Monsieur, II. 174 (note). 
 
 Dupont de Nemours, 109. 
 
 Duport, 11. 227 f. 
 
 Duroveray, II. 149. 
 
 Economists, 147 ; a sect, 148. 
 
 Edict of Nantes, revocation of, 132. 
 
 Elliott, Grace D. , on Duke of Orleans' share in events of 
 Oct., II. 61 (note). 
 
 Estates, character of two upper, 20 ; privileges of, 20 ; 
 first estate, 20 f ; second estate, 26. 
 
 Etats Generaux, published by Mirabeau, II. 18 ; sup- 
 pressed, II. 18. 
 
 Etiquette, of Versailles, 64 ff . ; as to money-affairs, 67, 68. 
 
 Federation Festival, II. 5. 
 Fersen, Count, on Mirabeau, II. 234.
 
 INDEX. 251 
 
 Feudalism, in France and Germany, 29 ; in France, 29 f. ; 
 shattered, II. 24. 
 
 Fifth of October, Lecture VIII. ; origin of insurrection 
 of, II. 47 ff. ; a well-laid plot, II. 55 ; effects of, II. 65. 
 
 Finances, under anc. reg., 19 ; embarrassments because of, 
 19 ; example of bankruptcy of court, 69 ; Necker at 
 head of, 100. 
 
 Flour-war, 97. 
 
 Foreign clergy, 21 (note). 
 
 Form, as first law of life, 74 ff . : drawback of, 76. 
 
 Fourth of August, called an " orgy," II. 24. 
 
 France, ancien regime (which see) ; resources of, 19 ; at- 
 titude toward Mirabeau, 258 ; fails to appreciate 
 Mirabeau, II. 244 f. 
 
 Francois (baker), murdered, II. 84. 
 
 Frederick the Great, absolutism compared with that of 
 Versailles, 63 ; again, 72. 
 
 Frederick William, 72. 
 
 French idealism, 258. 
 
 French literature of 18th century, not a cause but a symp- 
 tom, 142 ff. ; is revolution in abstract, 152. 
 
 Frochot, II. 139. 
 
 Qabelle, 36 ; penalties from, 32. 
 
 Generality, 11. 
 
 Government, abject senility of, 125 ', drove intellect into 
 
 opposition, 131 ; logical outcome of insistence on per 
 
 capita vote, 247 ; abdicates to States-General, 248, 
 
 257 ; II. 43 f . 
 Grands bailliages, 122. 
 Grimm, rosy view of future, 151 (note); on prevalence 
 
 of speculation, 162. 
 Guilds, 47 f . ; proletariat formed by, 48. 
 
 ELeusser, Ludwig, II. 30. 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, on nature of Man, 157.
 
 252 INDEX. 
 
 Holland, T. E., 156 (note). 
 
 Hotel de Ville, mob cleared out of, II. 62. 
 
 Huguenots, Turgot's exertions in behalf of, 134. 
 
 Intend ant, 11. 
 
 Jacobin Clttb, Mirabeau president of, II. 208, 220 ; Mira- 
 beau attacked at, II. 227 ff . 
 
 Jansenism, 133. 
 
 Jefferson, on king, 95 ; on notables, 112 ; on Lafayette, 
 II. 140. 
 
 Jesuits, suppressed, 135. 
 
 Joseph II., letter on French government, 73 (note); criti- 
 cism of French society, 77 (note). 
 
 Journal historique, 93 (note). 
 
 Joux, Fort, 202. 
 
 Kapp, 206 (note). 
 
 La Fare, on nature of privileges, 227 f . 
 
 La Marck, 75 ; on composition of States-General, 249 
 (note) ; II. 5 ; on Lafayette in Versailles, II. 63 f . ; 
 testifies to Mirabeau's innocence concerning Oct. 
 events, II. 67, 68, 81 ; gives memoir of 15th Oct. to 
 Count of Provence, II. 79 ; charges Cice with defeat 
 of Nov. 7th, II. 118 ; is charged with Mirabeau's de- 
 fence, II. 167 ; acts as mediator between court and 
 Mirabeau, II. 176 ; laments incompleteness of con- 
 nection, II. 192 f. ; on Louis XVI., II. 199 ; on Marie 
 Antoinette, II. 202, 212 ; on necessity of intrigue, II. 
 221 ; on Mirabeau's moral character, II. 238 (note). 
 
 Lafayette, II. 8, 23 ; attitude on 5th Oct., II. 56, 58 ff. ; 
 lapses of memory in his " Eecollections," II. 60 ; his 
 treachery to Mirabeau, II. 126, 136 : in Versailles, 
 II. 63 ; history of attempted alliance with Mirabeau, 
 II. 88 ff . ; his polit. creed considered, II. 126 (note) ;
 
 INDEX. 253 
 
 his great power after Oct. events, II. 133 ff. ; reasons 
 why he does not accept alliance with Mirabeau, II. 
 134 ff . ; his vanity, II. 138 ff . ; defeats Mirabeau's 
 ambition to be president during federation festival, 
 II. 138 f . ; his indecision, II. 143 ff . ; sources of power, 
 II. 145 ff. ; action in veto-question, II. 159 ; denies 
 Mirabeau's venality, II. 179. 
 
 Lally-Tollendal, II. 23. 
 
 Lameth, Alexandre, 124 (note); wounded in duel, II. 148 ; 
 attacks Mirabeau at Jacobins, II. 227 f . ; 
 
 Lamoignon, 114 (note). 
 
 Lanjuinais, speech against Mirabeau, II. 112. 
 
 Lantern, as means of execution, II. 56. 
 
 Law (financier), 103. 
 
 Le bailli, s. Le chevalier de Mirabeau. 
 
 Le Tellier (Jesuit), 133. 
 
 Lemontey, 131. 
 
 Lettres a Mauvillon, quoted in notes. 
 
 Lettres de cachet, 198, 199 ; work by Mirabeau on, 214. 
 
 Levrault, Mirabeau's letters to, II. 11. 
 
 Limousin, Turgot intendant of, 98 ; 
 
 Lit de justice, 9 ; of March, 1776, 94. 
 
 Louis XVI., slave of etiquette, 65 (note) ; education and 
 character, 84, 85 ; La Marck's opinion of, 85 (note) ; 
 expects great things of notables, 113 ; sees through 
 Parliament, 117 (note) ; on States-General in 1776, 
 120 (note) ; speech at opening of States-General, 240 ; 
 plays a passive part on 5th and 6th Oct., II. 51 ; during 
 6th Oct., II. 64 ; appoints ministers from Assembly. 
 II. 108 ; chargeable for failure of Mirabeau's plans, 
 II. 193 ; characterized by Montmorin and La Marck, 
 II. 198 f. 
 
 Louis XIV., maxim of Vitat c'est moi, 3 ; sale of offices 
 under, 16 (note), 26 ; Versailles, creation of, 62 ; 
 prominence of court, 63 f . ; called le roi soleil, 64 ; 
 demoralization of France through, 71 ; hated by 
 people, 81 ; destroys anc. rig., 132 ; his church policy. 
 132 f . ; results of church policy, 134.
 
 254: INDEX. 
 
 Louis XV. , principle of government, 3 ; as grain-specu- 
 lator, 71 ; despised by people, 81 ; apres nous le de- 
 luge, 82 and note. 
 
 Longo, Marquis, 172. 
 
 Lomenie, 103 (note), 186 (note) ; on Mirabeau's education, 
 195; injustice of, 198, 199; calls Mirabeau "inex- 
 plicable," II. 2 ; criticism of work of, 2 ff. ; sees 
 only orator in Mirabeau, II. 6 ; criticism of speech 
 of Nov. 6th, II. 96 f. ; refutation of criticism of, II. 
 99 f . ; praises Mirabeau for conduct at Jacobins, II. 
 232. 
 
 Loustalot, II. 49 ; on preparations for 5th Oct., II. 55 
 (note), 57. 
 
 Louvois, 101. 
 
 Lowell, E. L., 13 (note) ; on feudal burdens, 29 ; on rural 
 classes, 30 ; on material prosperity, 38. 
 
 Lying, in the revolution, II. 50. 
 
 Mably, on danger of executive power, II. 36. 
 
 Malesherbes, 91, 105 (note). 
 
 Malouet, advice to Necker, 233 ; on Mirabeau's clear- 
 sightedness, II. 11 ; on interview with Mirabeau, II. 
 33, 66. 
 
 Manuel, 233 (note). 
 
 Marat, damns Mirabeau, II. 37 ; in Pantheon, II. 243. 
 
 Marie Antoinette, Mirabeau's favorable opinion of, 85 ; 
 character of, 85 ff. ; Besenval's judgment on, 87 
 (note) ; contributes to Turgot's overthrow, 95 ; dur- 
 ing 6th of Oct., II. 64; suspects Mirabeau, II. 81, 
 177 ; proposes to win Mirabeau, II. 177 ; Mirabeau 
 calls her the one man at court, II. 200 ; no trust in 
 Mirabeau, II. 201 ; characterized by La Marck, II. 
 202. 
 
 Marignane (Miss), marries Mirabeau, 200 ; character, 
 201 ; the bailWs opinion of, 201 (notes) ; her adultery, 
 202. 
 
 Marriage, character of, under anc. reg., 180 f., 184, 204.
 
 INDEX. 255 
 
 Masses, their condition, 238 f . ; attitude toward bour- 
 geoisie, 239 ; support sought by Nat. Assembly, 254, 
 255 ; direct Nat. Assembly, 255. 
 
 Maupeou, 83. 
 
 Maurepas, 89 ; history of appointment, 89 (note) ; opposes 
 Turgot, 92 ; 
 
 Mauvillon, II. 8 and note, 9, 26 (note) ; Mirabeau on his 
 own moderation to, II. 27. 
 
 Mejan (editor of Mirabeau's speeches), 4 (note) ; II. 
 118. 
 
 Memoir of 15th of October, its origin, II. 68 ; analysis of, 
 II. 69 ff . ; its failure, II. 79 ; its penetrating insight, 
 II. 79 f. 
 
 Mending, by government of Louis XVI. , 83. 
 
 Mercure de France, II. 53. 
 
 Mercy d'Argenteau, 85 (note) ; assists in negotiations be- 
 tween court and Mirabeau, II. 176 ff., 192. 
 
 Mesdames (daughters of Louis XV.), table expenses, 69 ; 
 influence appointment of Maurepas, 89 and note ; 
 incident connected with their flight, II. 224 f . 
 
 Metra, on pol. inexperience of States-General, 250. 
 
 Mirabeau, Jean Antoine, in wars of Louis XIV., 167 ; 
 Mirabeau genuine grandson of, 215. 
 
 Mirabeau, Victor Riquette, Marquis de, on agriculture, 31; 
 on Paris, 61 ; prophesies as to result of Necker's sys- 
 tem, 103 ; aversion to son, 164 ff. ; sows his wild oats, 
 169 ; settles down, 170 ; his economical labors, 170 ; 
 his moralizing tendency, 170 f., 177; humanitarian, 
 171 ; believer in blue blood, 171 ; want of balance, 
 172, 173 ; devotion to mother, 172 ; son of anc. reg., 
 174 ; sensitiveness, 175 (note) ; family ambition, 176 ; 
 failure of speculations, 177 ; stubbornness, 178 ; 
 scribomania, 179 ; paternalism, 180 ; marries, 180 f. ; 
 takes a mistress, 184 ; guilt apportioned, 187 ; 
 threatens to send son to Dutch colonies, 197 and note, 
 198 ; uses lettres de cachet, 199 ; requests to have 
 Mirabeau locked up, 205 and note ; sends son to 
 Vincennes, 207 ; reasons for releasing him, 208 ; tes-
 
 256 INDEX. 
 
 tifies to son's oratory, 216 ; destroys his son's career, 
 218. 
 
 Mirabeau, chevalier de (le bailli), on Paris, 57 (note) ; on 
 flour-war, 97 (note) ; most estimable character, 168 ; 
 his wild youth, 168 and note ; on his brother, 175 
 (note) ; on brother's speculations, 177 ; on Mme. de 
 Pailly, 186 (note) ; on Mirabeau's wife, 201 (notes) ; 
 on his brother's treatment of son, 209, 210 (note), II. 
 25 ; on his nephew's intelligence, II. 68. 
 
 Mirabeau, Marquise de, marriage, 180 f . ; character, 182 : 
 adultery, 183 ; her lawsuit, 183 ; Mirabeau champions 
 her cause, 205. 
 
 Mirabeau, 4, 10, 24 (rjote), 27 ; on Paris, 45 ; on money- 
 favors of court, 70 ; under spell of form, 75 ; opinion 
 of M. Antoinette, 85 ; reason for Calonne's failure, 
 109 (note) ; view of Calonne's end, 110 ; reason for 
 joy at convocation of Notables, 113 ; claims to have 
 advised convocation of Notables, 113 (note) ; on par- 
 liament, 117 (note), 118 and note ; on necessity of 
 summoning States-General, 126 (note) ; his birth, 164 ; 
 sensuality, 182 and note ; influence of household on, 
 188 ; father's treatment of, 189, 190 ff . ; natural in- 
 telligence, 189, 190 ; charm exercised by, 192 and 
 note ; degraded to common rank, 195 ; in army, 197 ; 
 nature of guilt, 197 ; tendency to contract debts, 200 ; 
 marries, 200 ; falls in love with Sophie, 202 ; flight 
 and sentence, 203 f . ; his manner against his father, 
 205 ; at Vincennes, 206 f . ; released, 207 ; tribute to 
 his father, 208 : sufferings at Vincennes, 210 ; essay 
 on Despotism, 212 ; on Lettres de Cachet, 214 ; polit. 
 importance of, 214, 217 ; announcement of pol. creed, 
 
 215 ; returns to prison voluntarily, 215 ; his oratory, 
 
 216 ; literary excellence of writings, 217 ; necessity 
 of States-General, 234 ; joy over convocation, 235 ; his 
 moderation, 236 ; his disgust with Necker, 236 f., 245 ; 
 on Necker's speech, 241 f . ; on inexperience of States- 
 General, 250 ; on French national character, 251 ; on 
 unwieldiness of Assembly, 252 ; on control of As-
 
 INDEX. 257 
 
 sembly by masses, 255 ; II. 22, 46 ; on untoward con- 
 ditions for making constitution, 257 ; is hissed, II. 1 ; 
 selfishness not mainspring of activity, II. 4f., 39 f. ; 
 forms party of one man, II. 7 ; opinion of his own 
 statesmanship, II. 8 (note) ; his practicality, II. 9, 10, 
 23, 24, 25 f., 31, 211 ; his programme, II. 11, 13, 17 f. ; 
 his clear-sightedness, II. 12 ; on 23d of June, II. 
 14 f . ; on 4th of Aug. 24 f . ; his revolutionary spirit, 
 II. 14 f . ; his royalism, II. 12, 29 ; his moderation, II. 
 17, 19, 27 f., 33 ; debate on assuming name of Nat. 
 Assembly, II. 20 ; predicts despotism, II. 22 ; fears 
 despotism of Assembly, II. 30 ; his foresight, II. 33, 
 35, 67, 79 ; his interview with Necker, II. 34 ; pro- 
 gramme proposed to Montmorin, II. 34 f. ; insists on 
 strong executive, II. 36 f., 66; his courage, II. 37, 
 38 f . , 85 ; conduct on 5th and 6th Oct. , II. 66 f . ; ques- 
 tion of participation in Oct. events, II. 67 f . , 80 f. ; 
 Memoir of the 15th Oct., II. 68 ff. ; his plan for sal- 
 vation, II. 75 ff. ; his character, II. 83 f., 237 (note), 
 238 and note ; attempts to form alliance with Lafa- 
 yette, II. 88 ff . ; is offered ambassadorship, II. 89 ; 
 great speech of Nov. 6th., II. 96 ff. ; analysis of 
 speech, II. 100 ff. ; considers means to establish con- 
 cert between executive and legislative, II. 104 ff . 
 moves to give ministers seat in Assembly, II. 108 
 his speech of the 7th, II. 113 ff. ; his defeat, II. 117 
 his noble patriotism, II. 119 and note, 121 ; on neces- 
 sity of reconsidering decree of Nov. 7th, II. 120 f . ; was 
 he without a consistent policy ? II. 128 ff. ; absolute 
 necessity of winning or destroying Lafayette, II. 
 133 ff . ; shares blame of defeat, II. 134 ; strictures on 
 Lafayette, II. 142 ff . ; analyzes sources of Lafayette's 
 power, I. 145 ; proposes to put Nat. Guard under 
 order of king, II. 149 ; proposes reorganization of 
 army, II. 153 ; attitude on question of peace and 
 war, II. 154 f . ; attitude on question of royal veto, 
 II. 158 f. ; attitude on question of assigyiats, II. 
 161 ff . ; attitude on church question, II. 165 ff . ; 
 17
 
 258 INDEX. 
 
 measure of guilt for evil effects, II. 166 ; question of 
 guilt of connection with court, II. 169 ; mitigating 
 circumstances, II. 169 ff . ; carelessness about money, 
 II. 171 f . ; is not venal, II. 172 f . , 178 ; his connection 
 with Monsieur after Nov. 7th, II. 174 f. ; history of 
 connection with court, II. 176 ff . ; joy at overtures, 
 II. 177 ; his prof ession of faith of May 10th, II. 178 f., 
 181 ff . ; the pecuniary agreement, II. 178 f . ; faithful- 
 ness to revolution and to king, II. 182 ff., 188 ff. ; de- 
 prived of influence on executive, II. 193 f . ; connec- 
 tion between him and Montmorin, II. 195 ; his am- 
 biguous position, II. 197, 203 ff., 209, 214 ff., 219, 242 ; 
 President of Jacobins, II. 208, 220 ; his means become 
 less reputable, II. 220 ; President of Assembly, II. 
 223 ; defends right of emigration, II. 224 f . ; attacked 
 at Jacobins, II. 227 ff. ; his death, II. 235, 243 ; the 
 weight of his past, II. 236 f. ; personal causes of 
 failure, II. 236 ff . ; constructive statesman, II. 241 ; 
 suffers fate of Cassandra, II. 242 ; France unable to 
 do justice to him, II. 244 f. 
 
 Mirabeau-Tonneau (younger brother of former), 172 (note). 
 
 Mirabeau's wife, s. Marignane. 
 
 Monnier, Sophie de, Mirabeau falls in love with, 202, 
 203 ; relations to husband, 203. 
 
 Monsieur, s. Provence, Count de. 
 
 Montesquieu, defends sale of offices, 17 (note); on Paris, 
 59. 
 
 Montigny, 172 (note); on Marquis Mirabeau, 179 ; II. 232 
 (note). 
 
 Montlosier, II. 87 ; speech against Mirabeau, II. 112. 
 
 Montmorin, 118 (note), 270 ; warned by Mirabeau, II. 
 32 f . ; refuses to see Mirabeau, II. 34 ; connection be- 
 tween him and Mirabeau, II. 195 ; on Louis XVI., II. 
 198. 
 
 Morris, Gouverneur, on the French masses, 238 ; on 
 Necker's opening speech, 241 ; on Barentin's speech, 
 243 ; on reception given Mirabeau in Assembly, 
 259.
 
 INDEX. 259 
 
 Mounier, leads deputation of women to king, II. 63 ; 
 answer to Mirabeau, II. 66. 
 
 Napoleon, II. 79. 
 
 National Assembly, s. States-General ; moderate charac- 
 ter of, 242 ; wanting in practical statesmanship, II. 9, 
 117 ; does too much, II. 13 f.; prospective slavery of, 
 II. 32 ; disagreement with Paris, II. 43 ; invaded by 
 . women, II. 62 f . ; inconsistent course in question of 
 interdependence between legislative and executive, 
 II. 108 ff. ; decrees itself infallible, II. 124 ; thanks 
 Bouille, II. 152; destroys executive, II. 155 ff. ; 
 adopts suspensive veto, II. 159 ; self-destructive 
 effects, II. 160. 
 
 National Guard, is assurance of order, II. 44, 57, 58 ; 
 Mirabeau's plan respecting, II. 149 ; compromise- 
 measure adopted, II. 149 ; degeneration of, II. 150 f. 
 
 Necker, 18 (note), 19 ; at head of finances, 100 ; view of 
 ability of, 100 f.; foolish policy, 101 ff. ; reforms 
 effected by, 103 ; his compterendu, 103 ff. ; dismissed, 
 106 ; reappointment of, 125 ; on proposed perma- 
 nence of States-General, 229 ; leaves everything to 
 haphazard, 230 ; has no programme, 233 f . ; speech 
 at opening of States-General, 241 ; effect of dismissal, 
 II. 21 ; interview with Mirabeau, II. 34 ; judgment 
 of Mirabeau on, II. 69 ; Oct. interview with Mira- 
 beau, II. 92. 
 
 Nobility, 26 ff.; transformed into a privileged class, 26; 
 character of lower, 26 f . ; Mirabeau on, 27 ; higher, 
 27 f. ; humanitarian spirit of, 31 ; position as class in 
 state, 32 f . ; no moral right to claim immunity, 32 ; 
 direct and indirect taxation of, 33 f. ; blue blood 
 theory of, 41 ; petition of peers of 1717, 42 ; at Ver- 
 sailles, 65; wealth of, 67 (note); appeals to king for 
 money, 68 ; offices created for, 69. 
 
 Notables, assembly of, 110 ; composition of, 110 ; Ca- 
 lonne's plan with regard to, 111 ; sarcastic reception
 
 260 INDEX. 
 
 of, 112 ; their single reform, 112 ; political import- 
 ance of, 114. 
 
 Octroi, 54. 
 
 Oelsner, on Mirabeau's defence at Jacobins, II. 228. 
 Oncken, 94 ; doubts Mirabeau's sanity, II. 217 (note). 
 Optimism, epidemic, 237. 
 
 Orleans, Duke of, relation to events of Oct., II. 61 and 
 note. 
 
 Palais Royal, II. 41 ; assists in regeneration of France, 
 II. 45, 53. 
 
 Pantbeon, Mirabeau's remains deposited in, II. 243. 
 
 Paris, Mirabeau on, 45, 58 (note); necessity of under- 
 standing, 45 f . ; complex nature of, 46 ; masses of, 
 46 f.; view of le bailli on, 57 (note); upper orders in, 
 58 ; growth of, 59 ; ascendency of, 59 ; Montesquieu 
 on, 59 ; Mirabeau's father on, 61 ; position criticised 
 by Mirabeau, II. 71. 
 
 Parliaments, 8 ; character of legislative power, 8 ; origin 
 of legislative power, 8 (note); crushed, 122 ; reply of 
 Parliament of Toulouse, 122 ; claim to be represent- 
 ative, 144 ; of Rouen demands account of revenue, 
 145 (note); of Aix condemns a papal brief, 147. 
 
 Parliament of Paris, attitude toward guilds, 47 ; recalled 
 from exile, 92, 93; later attitude, 116; opposition 
 for its own sake, 117 ; escapes from exile by bargain, 
 119 ; its declaration of principle, 120 ; crushed, 122 ; 
 sudden unpopularity of, 231. 
 
 Patriots, succeed economists, 149 ; their object, 149. 
 
 Pays d'etat, 5. 
 
 Pays Selection, 6. 
 
 Peasantry, condition of, 29 ff. ; s. clergy and nobility. 
 
 Pensions, s. nobility ; amount of, under Necker, 70. 
 
 Per capita, vote by, 243. 
 
 Philadelphia Convention, compared with Nat. Assembly, 
 253.
 
 INDEX. 261 
 
 Philosophers, constituting opposition, 138 ; compared 
 
 with reformers of 16th century, 138 ; leave one tenet 
 
 of anc. reg. untouched, 142. 
 Philosophic spirit, s. philosophers ; in cabinet, 148 ; 
 
 complete victory of, 152 ; does not base on fact, 
 
 153 ff. 
 Pierre-en-Cise, 211. 
 Place de Greve, II. 56. 
 Pompadour, Mme., 89. 
 
 Pontarlier, 202 ; Mirabeau returns to prison in, 215. 
 Portalis, pitted against Mirabeau at Aix, 216. 
 Press, liberty of, granted, 232. 
 Privileges, s. clergy and nobility ; moral disintegration 
 
 caused by, 39, ff. ; consequences of destruction of, 
 
 44 ; in domain of labor, 47 ; upper orders cling to, 
 
 227 f. ; Mirabeau against, II. 11, 12. 
 Proletariat, 48, 49 ; pauperism of, 49 ; growing despair 
 
 and lawlessness of, 50 f. ; becomes sovereign of 
 
 France, II. 65. 
 Provence, Comte de, receives memoir of 15th Oct., II. 
 
 79 ; connection with Mirabeau, II. 174 and note. 
 Provence, claims to being a distinct "nation," 6 ; effect 
 
 of hot sun of, 167. 
 Provinces, dependence on Paris, 60 ; Young's experience 
 
 with, 60. 
 Public opinion, infallibility of, 141 ; Necker's tribute to, 
 
 141 (note). 
 
 Quesnay, 170. 
 
 Rabaut Saint Eteenne, on possessions of nobility, 67 
 
 (note). 
 Reason, dominant, 139 ; dogmatism of, 140 ; defects of, 
 
 154. 
 Resources, s. France. 
 Republicanism, at court, 78 ; confused nature of, 79.
 
 262 INDEX. 
 
 Revolutionary spirit, how far Mirabeau was identified 
 with, II. 14. 
 
 Rights of man, discussion of, II. 23, 24. 
 
 Robespierre, on bourgeoisie, 53. 
 
 Rocquain, on recall of Parliament, 93 (note) ; on flour- 
 war, 97 (note) ; on expulsion of Jesuits, 135, 137, 151. 
 
 Roland, Mme., epigram on liberty, 163. 
 
 Rosen, court duties of, 65. 
 
 Rouen, chosen as retreat for king, II. 76, 77. 
 
 Rousseau, 34 ; influence on society, 78 ; effect of writings 
 on bourgeoisie, 150 ; on constitution of society, 153 
 and note ; his doctrine of equality tested, 155 f. ; his 
 doctrine of man's nature considered, 157 f . ; does not 
 consider himself a practical statesman, 159 ; poison 
 in teachings of, 160, 161. 
 
 Saillant, du, 208 (note). 
 
 Saillant, Mme. du (Mirabeau's sister), II. 119 (note). 
 
 Salons, engage in polit. discussion, 149. 
 
 Sansculottes, 53. 
 
 Seance royale, 120 ; of 23d of June, II. 14 f. 
 
 Seguier, 152 (note). 
 
 Segur, on republicanism of Society, 80. 
 
 Seven Years' War, effect of disasters of, 144. 
 
 Sieves, on reign of terror, 55 ; on third estate, 57 ; on 
 science of politics, 158 ; does not propose to put doc- 
 trines into practice, 159 ; rebuked by Mirabeau, II. 10. 
 
 Soulavie, 95 (note), 111 (note), 118 (note), 121 (note). 
 
 Spontaneous anarchy, 240. 
 
 St. Antoine, 52, 61. 
 
 St. Marceau, 52, 61. 
 
 St. Huruge, Marquis de, heads mob for Versailles, II. 44. 
 
 Stael (Mme. de) testimony as to repub. spirit of Paris, 
 150, 232 (note) ; repeats Necker's conversation with 
 Mirabeau, II. 92 ; on Mirabeau, II. 214. 
 
 States-General, convened last in 1614, 41 ; term becomes 
 popular, 119 ; inevitableness of, 126 and note ; de-
 
 INDEX. 263 
 
 manded by clergy, 137 ; negative import of, 219 : 
 belong to anc. reg., 219 and note ; hist, views of power, 
 220 ; task assigned them by government, 221 ; in- 
 definiteness of task, 221 ff. ; inevitable disagreement 
 of, 224, 225 f . ; question of vote by orders discussed, 
 228 f. ; obstinate on vote per capita, 244 ff. ; com- 
 position of, 248 ; no political experience, 249 ff . ; 
 want of unity of aim, 251 f. ; size, 252 ; bears char- 
 acter of constituent Assembly, 253, 256 ; situation at 
 meeting of, II. 10 f. ; constituted Nat. Assembly, II. 
 20 f. 
 
 States-General (Holland), surrender Mirabeau, 206. 
 
 Stephens, H. M., on deputies to States-General, 248 ; on 
 Mirabeau's statesmanship, II. 9. 
 
 Stock-jobbing, under Necker, 102. 
 
 Taille, 34. 
 
 Taille noble, 227. 
 
 Taine, on aristocracy before rev., 32 ; en blocs thinking of 
 peasantry, 38, 39, 58 (note) ; on Versailles under 
 anc. reg., 62, 77 ; on revol. before revol., 151 ; on 
 import of cry of return to nature, 153 ; " spontane- 
 ous anarchy," 240 ; II. 62 (note). 
 
 Talleyrand, 113. 
 
 Talon, II. 94 ; attempts to bring Lafayette to a decis- 
 ion, II. 95. 
 
 Taxes, inequality of, 20 ; method of levying, 35 ; inequal- 
 ity of province in regard to, 36. 
 
 Terray, 83, 117 (note). 
 
 Third estate, s. under clergy, nobility, and peasantry ; 
 position toward other two, 41 ; demands recogni- 
 tion of equality, 227 ; double number of representa- 
 tives, 230 and note. 
 
 Thouret, Mirabeau replies to, II. 30. 
 
 Tocqueville, view on centralization, 10 ; view on new 
 provincial assemblies, 123 (note). 
 
 Toulon, murdered, II. 23, 38.
 
 264 INDEX. 
 
 Troyes, parliament at, 119. 
 
 Turgot, on villages under anc. reg., 12, 13 ; reforms in 
 taxation, 36, 47 ; on selfishness of cities, 54 ; as con- 
 trdleur general, 91 ; opposition to, 91, 92 ; attitude 
 toward exiled parliament, 92, and note ; dismissed, 
 94, 95 ; his reforms annulled, 96 ; effect of dismissal, 
 98 f. ; warns king against American war, 101 (note), 
 105 (note), 109 ; article, " Fondation," 148 ; optimist 
 237. 
 
 Unigenitus (bull), 133, 134. 
 United States, II. 103. 
 
 Vauvenargues, on Marquis Mirabeau, 179. 
 
 Vassan (Miss), marries Marquis Mirabeau, 180 f . 
 
 Versailles, focus of ancien regime, 62 ; ruins nobility, 67 ; 
 mob starts for, II. 53 ff . 
 
 Vincennes (dungeon), 198, 207. 
 
 Voltaire, in Bastille, 42 ; ecrasez Vinfame, 138 (note) ; as 
 apostle of reason, 140 ; predicts growing opposition 
 of parliament, 144 ; article on grain, 147 ; on de- 
 structive spirit of philosophers, 163. 
 
 Von Gleichen, on Marquis Mirabeau's treatment of son, 
 191. 
 
 Von Sybel, 40. 
 
 Weber, 114 (note) ; on Brienne's campaign against priv- 
 ileged orders, 232 (note). 
 Women, insurrection of, s. 5th of October. 
 
 Young, Arthur, on activity of Paris, 60.
 
 DC 
 141 
 
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