EXCHANGE 
 
 8061 '12 WiVd 
 'A 'N 'asnoBJ 
 
The Pre-Socratic Use of 
 
 As a Term for the Principle of Motion 
 
 BY 
 
 SISTER M. THOMAS AQUINAS, O. S. IX, M. A 
 
 OF T; 
 
 SISTEI;- 01 UINT DOMINI- , StNsiNA 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 Submitted to the Catholic Sixters College of the Catholic 
 < '// of America in Partial Fulfillment 
 
 of the Requirements for the Degree 
 Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 JUNE, 1915 
 

 
The Pre-Socratic Use of 
 
 As a Term for the Principle of Motion 
 
 BY 
 
 SISTER M. THOMAS AQUINAS, O. S. D., M. A. 
 
 OF THE 
 
 SISTERS OF SAINT DOMINIC, SINSINAWA, WISCONSIN 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 Submitted to the Catholic Sisters College of the Catholic 
 University of America in Partial Fulfillment 
 of the Requirements for the Degree 
 Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 JT-TNE, 1915 
 
NATIONAL CAPITAL PRESS, INC 
 
 BOOK MANUFACTURERS 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The general purpose of this study is to modify some of the effects 
 due to the necessities of language among the Greek philosophers 
 of the fifth and sixth centuries B. C. There can be no doubt 
 that ideas conceived at this time suffered from lack of adequate 
 forms of expression. Later thinkers, exhibiting a disregard for 
 the effects of inadequate terminology, have assigned to the pre- 
 Socratic philosophers theories inconsistent with true growth of 
 thought. A study of the word ^VM as standing for a kinetic 
 principle in the minds of philosophers preceding Socrates cannot 
 fail to emphasize the consideration of the need of terms as a factor 
 in the history of philosophy. 
 
 On the positive side, this study would suggest an adjustment of 
 the sources for Greek terms for the soul in an effort to account 
 for the vocabulary of later philosophers regarding ^uxi? proper. 
 
 The method adopted in the collection of pre-Socratic terms 
 would balance a too ready acceptance of words ascribed to early 
 thinkers and an absolute rejection of terms colored by Aristotelian 
 influence. 
 
 The scope of the study includes terms for apx^ for ^v\ij as 
 a kinetic principle, and for would-be agent causes as used during 
 the century and a half of Greek speculation from Thales (585 B.C.) 
 to Democritus (420 B. C.). 
 
 The frequent mention of Diels' Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker 
 (abbreviated For.), of Diels' Doxographi Graeci (Dox.) 9 of Ritter 
 and Preller's Historia Philosophiae Graecae (R. P.), and of Hick's 
 edition of Aristotle's De Anima indicates the free use of works 
 invaluable in this study. 
 
 To the Reverend William Turner, S. T. D., at whose suggestion 
 this thesis was written, is due grateful acknowledgement of 
 encouragement and assistance. 
 
 Sister Thomas Aquinas. 
 Feast of Saint Thomas Aquinas, O. P., 
 
 March 7, 1915. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 I. Introduction. 
 
 1. The Purpose of a Study of Terms for Kinetic foxy- - 7 
 
 2. The Method of Treatment of Pre-Socratic Terms. ... 11 
 
 II. Study of Terms for Kinetic 
 
 1. Early Ionian Terms .............................. 14 
 
 2. Early Pythagorean Terms ......................... 21 
 
 3. Terms of Heraclitus .............................. 25 
 
 4. Eleatic Terms ................................... 29 
 
 5. Summary of Terms of Pre-Socratic Dynamism ....... 33 
 
 6. Terms of Empedocles ............................. 36 
 
 7. Terms of Anaxagoras ............................. 39 
 
 8. Terms of the Successors of Anaxagoras ............. 43 
 
 9. Summary ....................................... 46 
 
 III. Bibliography. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 1. THE PURPOSE OF A STUDY OF TERMS FOR KINETIC 
 
 Aristotle, in the first chapter of De Anima, justified his treatise 
 on the soul when he said: "It would seem, too, that an acquaint- 
 ance with this subject contributes to the whole domain of truth." 
 Likewise a knowledge of the word 4/vxy as used in a particular 
 sense by the early Greek philosophers seems well worth while as 
 teaching that Truth is the First and the Last. 
 
 Since an understanding of the first attempts at a physical 
 system implies a first-hand rather than a traditional knowledge 
 of the words these thinkers used, a study of the kinetic fax?) is 
 proper to an investigation of the theories of the physicists before 
 Socrates. 
 
 The use of faxy in another sense than for the soul of man recurs 
 from Thales to Democritus. Commonly held to stand for a 
 principle of animation, in its earliest use it may have stood for 
 only the principle of motion. For these early thinkers life was not 
 necessarily coextensive with motion. Linguistic poverty accounts 
 for the use of this term to express now the idea of mere mobility 
 and again the quality of animation. According to an imperfect 
 analogy "a likeness and a difference" (Theophratus III, 152 
 Winimer) objects could have been thought of as e/^xa en- 
 dowed with if/vxy and the whole term could have been used 
 when only the attribute of motion was being predicated of things. 
 
 We cannot too often recall, in a study such as this, that the object 
 of speculation at this period was nature and that the purpose 
 of the so-called philosophers of these days was to find an under- 
 lying principle a "one." Sometimes they cast the problem into 
 another form and set it in terms of change when they asked how 
 things were "moved." 
 
 It is fairly established that there was no definite speculation 
 regarding the human soul in the early days of philosophy. It goes 
 without saying that the three Aristotelian distinctions of ^ux 1 ? 
 were not in the minds of the pre-Socratics. The first philosoph- 
 ical ^vxr] represented a kinetic principle rich in promise. The 
 physiologers took the term faxy out of popular phraseology 
 and raised it from its place in their Homeric and pre-philosophical 
 
 7 
 
3 ' PRE-SGCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 inheritance to stand for a would-be cosmothetic force somewhat 
 after the manner in which they adopted apxrj for philosophical 
 terminology. 
 
 The knowledge of pre-Socratic systems has suffered from a con- 
 founding of the term \f/vxn as used for a kinetic principle with 
 the old (and later the new-old) term \f/vx"n as used for the principle 
 of animation and for the soul of man. The identification of if/vxy 
 and apx*] has branded the earliest lonians with latent materialism. 
 The simplest explanation of the identification of these /terms is 
 by no means final. To decide that, after the physicist had reduced 
 all things to air, fire, or some other body, he postulated, by way of 
 a corollary, this primary element as the cause of vital function 
 is only to include \j/vxij taken as standing for the human soul, 
 in apx'n ^ the material substratum of all things. Commentators 
 were prone to read into a term the sense it held in their own time. 
 The only meaning of the term faxy in the mind of most later 
 thinkers was ^ux 1 ? as it stood for the human soul and included 
 the principle of life. Again, the analysis of this equation which 
 discredits scepticism as a natural attitude is on the side of \f/vx~n as 
 a term for soul proper. The fact that the power of the mind gives 
 rise to processes mentally reproducing the nature of the object 
 known has been noted as potent enough to cause early thinkers to 
 infer that the soul is a mixture of all elements. If all things were 
 reduced to a primitive substance, then would the mind that knows 
 them be that substance; ^ux 1 ?, the knowing part of us, becomes 
 identical with apx'n > the first principle. However satisfactory as 
 explanations of theories attributed to the philosophers who began 
 to give attention to mental science, for the early lonians at least, 
 who, as physicists, certainly used \f/vx~n in other than the old sense, 
 these solutions of the equation are strained. The formation of 
 what seems to us an equation was probably due to a lack of words, 
 while \f/vxr) as the original member of it was merely kinetic in force. 
 apx'n was the basis of all things and all things were moved, \f/vxn 
 being the principle of motion. If apx'n and faxy coexisted 
 hylokinetically, then \l/vxrj as a force in nature was the kinetic 
 aspect of apx'n- Philosophy from the first tended toward physical 
 dualism and fax*} buried in apx'n contained part of the efficient 
 cause in germ. The crude but prophetic half -concept ion of a 
 force causing things to move was impeded by a lack of words for 
 this new element of thought. The growth of the notion of trans- 
 
INTRODUCTION 9 
 
 lent force culminated in vovs or vovs /ecu twh- Anaxagoras was 
 the true successor of the earlier thinkers; the Atomists were 
 unworthy heirs of Ionian philosophy. 
 
 Recalling that distinctions very clear in our own day had not 
 yet been made in philosophy at this time, we cannot project upon 
 the pre-Socratics a system of causes which was the outcome of a 
 synthesis of many threads of speculation. Nevertheless, the 
 philosopher of that day was the forerunner of both the cosmologist 
 and the scientist, whose conclusions can never be contradictory. 
 These early explanations due to natural processes of thought 
 carried phases belonging to separate fields of later philosophical 
 speculation. When studying Greek philosophy in its beginnings, 
 we must not overlook the fact that there was often mental dis- 
 crimination on the part of the early thinkers where we find identity 
 of term. Their lack of words for their new ideas should not convict 
 them of the ancient errors of modern times. 
 
 Besides its effect on our knowledge of the physical theories of 
 the pre-Socratics, a consideration of the exact sense of their use 
 of il/vx'n and its derivatives should discredit the assumption of 
 ethnological animism. Recent theorists, not emphasizing the 
 distinction of kinetic \J/vxy as a principle for inanimate objects 
 and ^UXT? as a principle of life and thought, have tried to convict 
 the earliest Greek philosophers of animism in support of the 
 * 'soul-theory" or "ghost-theory" of religion. This theory, which 
 attacks the integrity of the history of religion, is insecurely based 
 on evidence afforded by the mere necessity of language at a period 
 before philosophy distinguished immanent and transient motion. 
 Philology has offered opposition to this evolutionistic trend of 
 thought by pointing out that objects called living were so called 
 from a lack of words to represent qualities they were conceived as 
 possessing. (Cf. Max Miiller Lectures on the Origin of Religion.) 
 
 Viewed in our perspective, many of the terms for qualitative 
 refinement and for quantitative indeterminateness applied to 
 ij/vxy as a term for the principle of motion, now in reference to 
 the kinetic aspect of apx'n and again to apx'n without regard to 
 its principle of motion, contributed to the vocabulary used to 
 describe fax*} proper when the heirs of Socrates began to turn 
 their minds to conscious psychological speculation. Philosophy 
 now easily passes from the notion of soul as a life-giving, animating 
 principle to the idea of a sensitive or of a rational soul. The 
 
10 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 Greeks arrived at the complete notion of \l/vx"n by two lines of 
 thought. One line began in the earliest physical systems of the 
 pre-Socratics. Faintly drawn for themselves, it is almost obliter- 
 ated for us through their lack of words. We know only that they 
 used the term \l/vxh ; we do not know that they even perceived the 
 analogy which led them to use a term wider than the power they 
 intended to connote by it. We cannot regard the words gathering 
 around this natural force as the sole influence in the development 
 of terminology for iwxh proper. Kinetic \f/vxri may appear dis- 
 torted in the isolation to which it is subjected in an effort to balance 
 former lack of consideration of its claims as a factor in termi- 
 nological progress. In offsetting the decided tendency to indicate 
 the effect of the old popular term and idea and of the vague philo- 
 sophical \f/vxr] proper on the ^u%i? of the physicist, we cannot 
 disregard cross-lines of popular notions and terms with would-be 
 philosophically technical thought and expression. Yet, while 
 we admit this interaction as well as the unconscious subjective 
 element in speculation by which the power of thought is trans- 
 ferred to things, we would qualify for even the first Greek philos- 
 pher the assertion that inanimate were assimilated to animate 
 objects. 
 
 When philosophical speculation centered on the human soul, 
 attention turned first to the element of sensation, that other 
 source of knowledge and terms for if/vxy so often noted by Aris- 
 totle. (Cf. De Anima 403 b 2). There is no sharp definition of 
 the periods for the use of ^vx'n m physical and psychological 
 senses. When the time came to consider the element of motion 
 in the definition of the human soul and the ideas and terms for 
 il/vxy as an objective principle were in turn caught up for "our 
 soul," the use of the word faxy had completed an orbit in the 
 history of philosophy. In seeking to determine how part of the 
 vocabulary came to be at hand for the expression of Platonic and 
 of Aristotelian notions for the new-old power in man, we find at 
 least one source of terms in expressions for the force in nature for 
 which the old terms for power, human or divine, had been borrowed 
 by philosophy in its beginnings. The Homeric and popular 
 inheritance of terms for faxy was not directly transmitted to the 
 greatest Greek philosopher. The loan of terms was compensated 
 for with interest by the physiologers who had, on the way, ground 
 down many of these words to terms fitting the ideas of incorporeal- 
 
INTRODUCTION 11 
 
 ity and of immortality as defined on the heights of philosophic 
 thought. 
 
 2. THE METHOD OF TREATMENT OF 
 PRE-SOCRATIC TERMS 
 
 We have aimed to follow a via media and to adopt in our method 
 a mean between over-ready acceptance of terms for the pre- 
 Socratics and a final rejection of all terms attributed to them on 
 the authority of those affected by Aristotelian form of expression. 
 Truth cannot be sacrificed to an exaggerated attitude of historical 
 insight. The words of those thinkers were pre- Aristotelian, but 
 the human mind philosophized even when the philosopher knew 
 nothing of the nature of his own mode of thought. We shall not 
 deny to the Greek thinkers before Socrates certain tendencies 
 natural to speculation in every age. 
 
 "When a given symbol which represents a thought has lain for 
 a certain length of time in the mind, it undergoes a change like 
 that which rest in a certain position gives iron. It becomes 
 magnetic in its relations it is traversed by strange forces which 
 did not belong to it. The word, and consequently the idea it 
 represents, is polarized." (O. W. Holmes. The Professor at the 
 Breakfast Table.) 
 
 An appreciation of the early Ionian standpoint often demands 
 that words attributed to Ionian thinkers be subjected in the days 
 of developed terminology to a process of depolarization. The 
 early philosophers themselves, though scarcely realizing its need, 
 were unconsciously influenced by some such process when com- 
 pelled to adopt for their new ideas terms in use as forms of religious 
 and popular expression. The terms of religion suggested them- 
 selves through the evident relativity of the new philosophical 
 notions and of the old conceptions of the attributes of the gods, 
 who, while not then in philosophy, were deep in the lives of these 
 philosophers. The tendency of thinkers to stop on the brink of 
 the great conclusion just short of a great contribution and to fall 
 the lower for their ascent often accounts for a falling back on old 
 catch-phrases and popular expressions. 
 
 The terms for kinetic ^v\ii used by the philosophers of the 
 principal schools before the time of Socrates fall into two general 
 classes: (1) the terms found at first hand in the fragments of the 
 early thinkers themselves and (2) the terms occurring in mediate 
 
12 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 and secondary sources which state opinions attributed to these 
 thinkers. 
 
 Where we have an immediate and first-hand source in an authen- 
 tic fragment, we must further consider the philosopher's termino- 
 logical inheritance, whether popular or philosophical, as well as 
 his attitude of mind in using his words. Later thinkers were often 
 inclined to overrate an unscientific, popular, or casual use of a 
 term. An unphilosophical expression remains in the class which 
 Aristotle would call a mere oi/ojua. On the other hand, there was 
 sometimes an effort for exactness in an attempt to express a 
 thought which was ahead of current terminology. An old term 
 had then taken on a new content or inner sense Stawta, as 
 Aristotle would call it. Again, even when the use of the term was 
 scientific, the philosopher's temperament often dictated his form 
 of expression, and style, or Xeis, regulated the adoption of one 
 word above another, as in the case of Empedocles and of Heraclitus. 
 The point of view of the age and of the philosopher consciously 
 using these terms largely determined the inner sense of the word. 
 Philosophy in that age was taking for granted all things but apxrj- 
 While turning full attention on the sense of faxy in one place, 
 the philosopher could have accepted, as his age accepted, t v x*l 
 with other terms as mere ovonara. 
 
 We may locate the second class of terms in two principal mediate 
 sources: Aristotle and the Doxographers. The Doxographers 
 include Theophrastus, the authors of the Placita, who, for the 
 most part, drew from him, Plutarch, Simplicius and the other 
 historians of opinions. Plato, whose references to pre-Socratic 
 thinkers are comparatively few, can scarcely be regarded as a 
 fruitful source for this period. To the Pythagoreans and Parmen- 
 ides he gave some attention, presenting them, however, not as 
 historical characters but as his own creations. 
 
 Aristotle has been accused of reading his own views into the 
 theories of early philosophers. In the first chapter of De Anima 
 and in the first book of Metaphysics he has given a synopsis of the 
 opinions of those who went before him. It is true that this 
 account is in his own terms, and yet he seemed to recognize the 
 frequent attempts of the other seekers to bring their phraseology 
 up to the level of their new ideas. While he censured, in some 
 cases, it would seem, undeservedly, he did not fail to praise as well. 
 In cautious qualifications, here and there, of his own terms in 
 
INTRODUCTION 13 
 
 explaining the theories of his predecessors (Cf . De An. 404 and 405), 
 Aristotle was evidently conscious that he was himself speaking 
 on the heights of his own system. 
 
 We must observe a cautious discrimination of sources when 
 accepting terms occurring in the Doxographers. (Cf. Fairbanks 
 p. 263). An et7Tp or a X&ycrat were often dropped in the tradi- 
 tion to which the words of Aristotle and of others were subjected. 
 These historians of opinions, failing to depolarize the terms they 
 cited, exhibit tendencies of "accommodation," of false inference, 
 and of inaccurate listing of philosophers. In many cases the 
 historian of philosophy has accepted doxographic tradition on 
 faith. It should not be necessary to note that distinctions familiar 
 enough today were contributed by periods subsequent to the fifth 
 century B. C. The pre-Socratics did not deal in the full-grown 
 ideas and much less in the words often attributed to them. The 
 method of Theophrastus (and of those drawing on him as a source) 
 of casting into Aristotelian terms the naive solutions offered in 
 pre-Socratic times was sometimes responsible for distorted tradi- 
 tion. We shall endeavor, then, not to transform a pre-Socratic 
 thinker into a post-Aristotelian, but thus forewarned, we may 
 accept the potent fact that the philosophers themselves strove for 
 new words and that their minds "compelled by truth itself " 
 (Arist. Met. 984, b 8) spoke words other than those afforded by 
 their language. 
 
II. STUDY OF TERMS FOR KINETIC 
 1. EARLY IONIAN TERMS 
 
 The early lonians were physicists; they were neither meta- 
 physicians nor psychologists in the sense these words bear today. 
 The method of each early Ionian philosopher might be described 
 as corresponding to the method of Thales, who was led to his con- 
 clusion about a first principle by things that appear to the senses. 
 (Simpl. Phys. 23, 21 Dox. 475.) A recollection of this objective 
 view-point discredits over-drawn deductions regarding Ionian 
 theories. If the problem of change furnished by the senses was 
 the problem these thinkers set out to solve, in their solutions they 
 began, in a certain sense, to lay down a doctrine of causality. 
 The word then used for "cause" was not atria but apx'n- By 
 this was meant a principle approaching Aristotelian "material 
 cause,'* and yet the Ionian said no more than that apx'n furnished 
 the ground for the existence of other things. That a material 
 cause should be held as actually giving being to its effect had not 
 yet suggested itself to these early thinkers. Saint Thomas noted 
 that those of the ancient philosophers who acknowledged motion 
 in things admitted motion only as to accidents, as in rarity and 
 density, aggregation and disgregation. (Summa Theolog. I, Q. 
 LXIV, a. 2.) Yet while they were looking beneath the surface 
 for a fundamental principle, they were at the same time developing 
 a principle of motion. Aristotle (Met. 984 b I) seemed to see in 
 the ideas of Parmenides the first recognition of the nature of 
 such a cause. If we trust to the natural mode of thought and go 
 back even of Parmenides, we find traces of the crude conception 
 and of the imperfect and confused expression of some kind of 
 force, which for the pre-Socratics averaged into an expression 
 indicating kinetic power. To the Ionian physiologers at this 
 point in the development of philosophy we leave wide margin 
 for the unquestioning acceptance of the idea of a moving force. 
 The popular god was dropped from the world of the physicists, 
 who were considered adeoi (Cf. Simplicius, Phys. Dox. 475), but 
 their habits of thought were not so easily changed since their 
 need of words caused them to revert to the term 6e6s for this 
 newly conceived force. Words heretofore used in quite another 
 sphere, yet bearing for pre-Socratic thinkers a suggestive analogy, 
 were frequently heard in the childish accents of their speculations. 
 14 
 
EARLY IONIAN TERMS 15 
 
 The early Ionian inheritance of foxy as a general term for the 
 source of human activity was strong enough to keep that word 
 prominently before a thinker groping for a form of expression for 
 his latent agent cause. Granting that the first agents for the 
 human language were human agents, we may maintain that the 
 anthropological element, and with it the element of life, was drop- 
 ped when the old word foxy was retained by the physicist. 
 
 The two statements most directly attributed to Thales have 
 reference to foxy i n its kinetic sense, as the energizing force 
 and the source of motion, //he said that the magnet has foxy be- 
 cause it moves iron, said Aristotle (De An. 405 a. 19), then Thales 
 conceived the soul as something having the power of motion 
 KLvyriKov n. Aristotle, consciously treating irepi foxy*, thus 
 cited an instance of the early use of the term foxy- In this passage 
 Aristotle was calling attention to the element of motion in the 
 definition of the human soul which he was himself constructing. 
 Thales would have regarded the soul as KivyrLKov TL since he used 
 the word foxy for his moving force, yet it is quite possible that 
 he would not recognize himself in the De Anima. His outlook 
 was in quite another direction when he used the significant form 
 foxy. 
 
 Perhaps, said Aristotle (De An. 411 a. 7), Thales said that all 
 things are full of gods, because, "as some say,'* foxy is interfused 
 (/zjuix0cu) in things throughout (tv ro> 6Xo>). iravra here was 
 for Thales the merest unification of the world of phenomena. The 
 expression 0ooi> ir\ypy iravTa, which has been elaborated for him 
 as apxy Mto, Kai KivovfjL&y (Simpl. Phys. Dox. 475), further bespeaks 
 the need of terms. 
 
 Plato (Leg. X, 899 B) decided to include foxai under the 
 term 6eoL whether they order (/COOT/CIV) the whole heavens as 
 living beings in bodies or whether they accomplish this in some 
 other form and manner. Plato further showed that he was here 
 only repeating the apothegm of Thales. We cannot explain 
 the form and manner in which the moving force acted on the 
 elementary water for the first Ionian philosopher. Plato himself, 
 on the strength of the statement that things are full of gods, in 
 Platonic phraseology called foxy y fox^ amcu. This mov- 
 ing force, hylokinetically present in things, is an instance of a 
 prophetic conception held by the Greek mind. 
 
 Diogenes Laertius (1. 27) asserted that Thales held the world 
 endowed with foxy (^fox^) and full of Scu/zom in place of 
 
16 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 the 6eoi of the apothegm quoted by Plato and Aristotle. Thales 
 was* again (Cf. Aetius, Dox. 301) noted as holding TO irav as 
 entvxov and full of daifjuovcs, but the tradition was too hard 
 pressed by Stoic influence when it attributed to Thales the identi- 
 fication of God with the mind of the universe, (vovs rov Kofffwv 6 
 0e6s). Cicero fell in with this doxography (Cf. Burnet p. 46) 
 and even raised this tvx'h to the level of a full grown agent cause. 
 (Cf . D. Deor. N. 10, 15 earn mentem quae ex aqua cuncta fingeret.) 
 
 Since Thales in no conscious sense distinguished matter and its 
 opposite, the heirs of Aristotelian thought and terminology have 
 overdrawn decidedly in such statements as: "He supposed soul 
 to be unsubstantial form." (Cf . Simpl. in Arist. De An. 8 r 31, 32). 
 Tradition has assigned to Thales a fuller vocabulary than he 
 possessed and thoughts that are beyond his highest conceptions. 
 Although his first principle was "one and moved" (/ua KCU 
 KLvovnevy) , his if/vxrj was a most elementary cause, the form and 
 manner of whose activity is all hidden in the one word KIV&V. To 
 say that for him a divine moving power (Swa/us 0ela /aprjri/o?) 
 pervaded (drfKeiv) the elementary water (Aet. Dox. 301) is to 
 distort the thought and much more the words of Thales. Yet 
 when he said that the world was full of gods, Thales had fallen 
 behind his own thought through need of words. 
 
 It can better be said what this first philosophical \l/vxy was not 
 than what it was. It was not water nor was it the popular deity. 
 The first principle, the object of speculation was one and moved. 
 Everything came from water, but everything was full of gods. 
 The dpxi? was determined and its /aVrjo-is was if/vx^l- 
 
 Aside from the inferences of his commentators, there is no 
 evidence of an attempt on the part of Thales himself to give any 
 terms to the human soul. We have noted that later efforts to fix 
 \l/vxi) proper were significant in their appeal to the quality of 
 motion which the physicists were forced to express in the old 
 terms %etv tvxfy- 
 
 The process of how things came out of the elementary water 
 has been described for Thales as the purely accidental process of 
 solidifying and melting. (Cf. irrjyvvffBat, and diavlevBaL of Hipp. 
 Dox. 555.) 
 
 The point of transition from Thales to Anaximander is in the con- 
 ception of a first principle. Thales was one of those who said 
 that the material substratum of things was one and moved, but 
 
EARLY IONIAN TERMS 17 
 
 he said also that it was limited. (TreTrepao-nevn Simpl. Phys. 
 Dox. 475.) Anaximander's first principle could not be quanti- 
 tatively designated by any word then in use and so he adopted for 
 philosophy a word to signify the boundlessness or the endlessness 
 of his apxrj- He first imported (/co/afci?) the term aireLpos. (Cf. 
 Simpl. Phys. Dox. 476). It is not so probable that Anaximander 
 was the first to employ the term apx'n (Hipp. Dox. 559) in a 
 philosophical sense. (Cf . Burnet p. 52.) 
 
 While there is no evidence for the qualitative determination of 
 Anaximander's principle, we cannot doubt that he unquestioningly 
 regarded it as material. Commentators tried qualitatively to 
 determine this apx'n which was TO aireLpov by fixing it between 
 air and water and again between air and fire on the strength of 
 false interpretations of Aristotle, De Caelo 303 b. (Cf . R. P. 16 b.) 
 
 To Anaximander, among others, was attributed the statement 
 (Theodoret Dox. 387) that the nature of ^vx'h is depots. 
 This is perhaps significant as bringing into some relation the 
 falsely determined apx'n and the element of motion within it, 
 which Anaximander likewise may have expressed by the 
 term fax*]- 
 
 In the consideration of the "process" as explained by early 
 thinkers we find traces of the kineticism, general or particular, 
 for which they seem to have made ^vx'n stand. Anaximander 
 was not ready with words to describe this "process." Theo- 
 phrastus (Dox. 476) has noted his poetic form of expression where 
 it is said that things return of necessity (Kara TO xp^ v ) to 
 that from which they spring, "paying the penalty to one another 
 according to the order of time." The process for him was one 
 requiring a separation of the opposites (airoKpivoiikvuv TUV 
 havrluv) and this separation took place through eternal motion 
 (5td TTJS cuStou /ai^o-ccos). This "eternal motion," postulated in 
 addition to TO airtipov (Hipp. Dox. 559), is prominent in doxo- 
 graphic tradition for Anaximander. Hermippus (Dox. 653) 
 represented Anaximander asserting that apx'n w &s older (Trpe<rj3vTpa) 
 than water and was eternal motion (cu5ios KLVTJO-LS) by which (ravTy) 
 things came to be and were destroyed. 
 
 Two fragments attributed to Anaximander occur in Aristotle's 
 Physics (203 b) where Aristotle himself assumed TO aireLpov as 
 the subject of irepitxew airavra Kal iravra, Kv&epvav. Of whatever 
 the power to surround all and to direct all was predicated, it is 
 
18 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 significant that these words are found in a verbal citation of one 
 of those thinkers who, as Aristotle noted, gave no other cause 
 than TO aTreipov. The Ionian was doubtless giving in these terms 
 directive power to the kinetic aspect of TO aireipov. (Cf . Tannery 
 p. 98). Aristotle further assumed TO aireipov to be TO Belov, be- 
 cause it was for Anaximander and his contemporaries adavaTov 
 /cat avu\edpov. However, in this passage Aristotle did not fail 
 to cite vovs and <iXia as instances of the progress of philosophy 
 whereby the full grown if/vx'n cause came into its own. 
 
 Hippolytus (Dox. 559) repeated irepikxtw for Anaximander 
 and gave to apx*) the aidios of the Kivrjais. He added for apxn the 
 term ayrjpcos as kindred of the dfldz/aros and the d*>a>Xe0pos quoted 
 by Aristotle for Anaximander. To these may be added the 
 terms cos aytvrjTov re KCLL &<J)6apTov attributed by Simplicius (Phys. 
 465, 13 D) to the apxy of Anaximander. This apxy Simplicius 
 called 6elov TO aiTiov. The use of the term Qtlov may indicate 
 Anaximander's reversion to a form of the word deos for his partly 
 inherent force. In the days of Anaximander apxh was elevated 
 from popular to philosophic terminology according to the same 
 principle by which ^vxh took on its new sense. 
 
 The "eternal motion" of Anaximander passed on to Anaximenes. 
 With Anaximenes we have the continuance of the use of the term 
 &7Ttpo$ as found in his predecessor, but to the qualitative deter- 
 mination of the apx^i this philosopher seems to have given most 
 of his attention. Since we find with him the most definite apxy, 
 we may here endeavor to determine what these thinkers meant 
 by that term. 
 
 Aristotle (Met. 983 a 27), in giving his own definition of "mater- 
 ial cause," said (983 b) that most of the early philosophers thought 
 that only first principles in the form of matter were the sources of 
 things, (kv vX??* eifct . . . dpxcu.) (Cf. R. P. 10 a.) Aristotle, 
 attempting in the same passage to define what early thinkers 
 meant by apxy, decided that e ov 'tariv airavTa TO, OVTO, best 
 fitted their principle, however the TrXrjflos and the ddos may have 
 differed for the individual thinker. 
 
 Anaximenes identified his apxh with ar)p, a word said to have 
 been used by him synonymously with Trvev^a. (Cf . Act. Dox. 278.) 
 Simplicius (De Caelo 615 Heiberg) said that di?p was chosen 
 as apx^i by Anaximenes because it was sufficiently adaptable to 
 change. (euaXXotcoros Trpos ju 
 
EARLY IONIAN TERMS 19 
 
 Conscious of the need of words, Anaximenes (Aet. Dox. 278) 
 reverted to irepLexew of Anaximander to express the activity of 
 arjp. Plutarch (de prim. frig, c 7, 947 F) gave x^Xapos as a 
 new term for Anaximenes in attributing to him the statement 
 that the relaxed state of matter is from heat. 
 
 Wherever arip-apx'h is assigned to Anaximenes, Klvijais is found 
 with it. Theophrastus (ap. Simpl. Phys. Dox. 476) recorded 
 that Anaximenes held an "underlying nature" (viroKeLnevrj <ixris) 
 which was fj.'ia and aTretpos. After describing the varying rarity 
 and density of arip, Theophrastus added: "And he, too, posits 
 eternal motion (idvrjo-Ls <U5ios) through which change takes place. 
 (5t' f)v Kai rr\v fjLerapo\riv yivtaBai). We have as another form 
 of expression for this eternal motion of Anaximenes Klvrjffis 
 e aiavos. (Ps. Plut. Strom. Dox. 579.) 
 
 Olympiodorus (Berthelot, Collection des anciens alchimistes 
 grecs, p. 83), introducing the false fragment for Anaximenes 
 tanv 6 ar)p rov acr^ndrov) said piav 5e KLVovfjLevrjV aireipov 
 iravr&v r&v ovrwv . . . rbv depa. 
 
 Hippolytus (Dox. 560) repeated aweipos afip for Anaximenes 
 and included 8tol Kai 6ela among the things of which the Ionian 
 made it the source. Continuing, Hippolytus gave motion as 
 one of the causes why air becomes perceptible and represented 
 Anaximenes as having named motion with other changes, but as 
 having had a special place for it in his mind when he added 
 KLvtlffdai 8t ael. However, the remark that things would not 
 change (/*era/3dXXe') unless arjp were in motion (el M dvoi.ro} is 
 evidently the statement of the doxographer himself. 
 
 In place of being the principle from which the gods and divine 
 beings came, arjp was identified with 0eos by Anaximenes accord- 
 ing to Aetius (Dox. 302) who especially noted the term 0e6s. 
 
 The fragment attributed to Anaximenes (Aet. Dox. 278) 
 (olov 17 ifrvx'n V flUtTepa ar)p ovaa avYKparel was, KCLL 6\ov rov Koa^ov irvev- 
 jua Kai arjp Treptex^t.) is especially noteworthy as marking off 
 17 \f/vx~n T? fintrepa from the new philosophical principle ^vx'n- 
 The term for the human soul was used here only in a casual com- 
 parison and is seen to be the same dpxi? as 6eol and all other 
 things. Whence its power (rwyKparelv rmas if not frornihe funda- 
 mental kinetic \fsvxy was a question that remained to be asked. 
 The (rvjKparclv statement can scarcely be made significant as 
 
20 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 describing a function of the old ^vx'n not yet an object of philos- 
 ophy. For Anaximenes arip-apxr) was the real subject of irtpikyjuv . 
 
 The terms depia (Dox. 214) and depots (Dox. 287) assigned 
 to Anaximenes as descriptive of fax*} were doubtless derived by 
 direct inference if they refer to if/vxy proper. All things were 
 arjp: then the soul must have been like d^p. Again, they may 
 have been affected by the survival of the relation of arip-apx'h 
 to fax?) as the kinetic aspect of d^p. 
 
 The fact that he postulated a qualitatively determined apxr) in no 
 wise convicts Anaximenes of a retrogression. We have seen him 
 taking advantage of the direipos of Anaximander to express the 
 lack of quantification of his first principle. In the accounts of 
 the process by which things came from "air-mist" he seems to 
 have made an effort for words to describe differences demanding 
 a higher complexity of expression than the terms for the "separa- 
 tion" process of Anaximander. 
 
 Theophrastus (Dox. 476) described the process of "thickening 
 and thinning," by which the nature of things was made to differ 
 for Anaximenes, when he said that arjp becomes apaiovpevos and 
 again irvwoviJLtvos. The forms dpcucoffis and TTVKVUO-IS are also 
 used to describe the states of Ionian dpx*?. (Ps. Plut. Dox. 579). 
 
 Diogenes of Apollonia (423 B. C.) is found in the company of the 
 lonians of this century as holding dpxi? identical with difa (Cf. 
 Aristotle, Met. 984 a 5). Aristotle assigned the refinement of 
 the arip-apx'n of Diogenes, which was iravTuv XeTrroMCpeo-raros, as 
 the cause of the moving power of soul proper for those who 
 identified ^u x ^ with "air-mist." (Cf. De An. 405 a. 21 ^u x ^ 
 . . . 37 dt \eirT6TdTov KLVTJTLKOV elvai). Anaximenes had given a 
 new turn to things by all unconsciously posing as a representative 
 of immateriality. He appears to have sought a first principle from 
 which all things including motion could in reality come. The 
 criticism (Aet. Dox. 278) which rejected the semi-monism of 
 Anaximenes is, of course, out of place. dXXd KCU TO TTOIOVV alnov 
 vwoTiSkvai was not intelligible to an early Ionian philosopher. 
 
2. TERMS OF THE EARLY PYTHAGOREANS 
 
 In a treatment of terms for the Pythagoreans the difficulty 
 lies in keeping earlier and later Pythagorean doctrines and terms 
 distinct. In most statements of opinions for "the Pythagoreans" 
 Neo-Pythagorean influence is strong. The doctrine of opposites, 
 the idea of harmony, and the substantiality of number colored 
 many of their opinions, and yet the earlier thinkers of this school 
 were working in the same direction as the early lonians. 
 
 The question of the human soul must have been for the Pytha- 
 goreans, as members of an ethical society, a vital one. Few of 
 these doctrines, however rich in significant phraseology, were 
 connected with scientific speculation. One of the traditional 
 works of Pythagoras himself is irepi ^ux*7* (Cf. Diog. L. VIII-7). 
 Brotinos, a Pythagorean preceding Hippasus, has been credited 
 with a work irepi vov KOLL Stadias. (Cf. lamblich. Vor. p. 29.) 
 Some of the early terms of the Pythagoreans for the faculties of 
 perception and knowledge would be in place in a study of the 
 growth of terms for the element of sensation in the definition of the 
 soul proper. 
 
 The possible emphasis with which the "soul of man" was dis- 
 tinguished from any other fax*] in statements for the Pythago- 
 reans draws a line between the popular term and the term for a 
 kinetic principle. This distinction occurred in the traditional 
 oath: "By him who transmitted to our soul the tetraktys, which 
 has the spring and root of ever flowing nature." (For the 
 apeTepa. $VX<L cf. avOpuirov ^vx'h of Herodotus, II, 123 where he 
 ascribed the doctrine of immortality to the Egyptians and to the 
 Pythagoreans. A further instance occurs in a statement of 
 Pythagorean divisions of the soul Alex. Polyh. ap. Diog. VIII, 
 30.) 
 
 The term Ke<aXd replaces \l/vxa. in one form of the oath. 
 (Cf. Aet. Dox. 280 and R. P. 65 (a).) (Od. 2, 237 has /ce<aXcu 
 for \l/vxal of Od. 3, 74.) For the iraya aevaov </>u<rea?s 'plfana T' 
 of the oath cf. 71-77777 KCU apx^ Kivriffews of Plato. (Phaedr. 245 C.) 
 
 The terms aBavaros (Hipp. Dox. 557) and a<0apros (Dox. 392) 
 were traditionally ascribed to Pythagoras for ^vx"h- The term 
 aevaos of the oath contributes to the notion of "eternity" so 
 often connected with the Ionian concept of motion. 
 
 21 
 
22 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 Doxographic tradition (Act. Dox. 280) assigned to Pythagoras 
 dpxat . . . 01 apidjioi /cat <7U/-t/zerptat at kv rourots, as Kat apfjiovias 
 KaXet. Of the dpxal, continued the doxographer, one tends 
 toward the creative and form-giving cause which is intelligence, 
 that is god (kiri TO TroirjTLKov CUTIOV Kat eldutov, oirep kariv vovs 6 
 0e6s) and the other tends toward the passive and material cause, 
 which is the visible universe, (tiri TO TraOrjTiKdv TC Kat V\IKOV, 
 
 OTTep kffTlV 6 OpCLTOS KOO-jUOS.) 
 
 Although we may question this assertion for Pythagoras him- 
 self, the words of the early representatives of this school indicate a 
 tendency toward dualism and a probable use of the term ^u%i? 
 for the principle of motion. 
 
 If we allow for doctrines peculiar to the philosophers in the west 
 (Cf. Arist. Met. 987 a. 15), we find a decided correspondence 
 between early Pythagorean and early Ionian terminology. For 
 Pythagoras daijjMves were ^uxiKat ouoiat. (Aet. Dox. 307.) Ac- 
 cording to secondary sources, Hippasus of Metapontum held 
 TreTrepaffjj.vov tlvai TO irav Kat detKt^ryrov. (Diog. L. VIII, 84.) 
 
 For Hippasus (and Heraclitus) we have from Aristotle (Met. 
 984, a. 7) the word xup as his dpxr/. Theophrastus (Dox. 475) 
 filled in with ev Kat Kivovptvov Kat TrtTrepaffjjievov. Hippasus was 
 again named with Heraclitus in a statement containing for 
 TTVP the term deos (Cf. Clem. Protr. Vor. p. 31.) Aetius (Dox. 
 388) added to these the name of Parmenides in the statement 
 17 if/vxy - TrupcbSrjs. 
 
 A recurrence of thought gives an apx'n one and moved and here 
 and there identified with Beds', the term ^xh then partakes of 
 the qualitative determinateness of the double first principle. A 
 recognition of the growing ideas of the early Pythagoreans should 
 release them from the class of hylozoistic monists. 
 
 An instance of the use of ^ux 1 ? at this time as a philosophical 
 term to connote life may be found in the words of Epicharmus 
 (480 B. C.). In the following first hand fragment (Vor. p. 91) 
 Epicharmus marked a transition later to be noted : 
 
 dXX' 6<T<ra irep 77, TravTa Kat yv&jjLrjv <=xt " 
 
 OV TtKTt 
 
 f COPT (a) dXX' 7rtoet Kat Trotet 
 
 The context here differs from that in which the expression 
 is found as a citation for Thales. When \f/vx"n is 
 
EARLY PYTHAGOREAN TERMS 23 
 
 used in a statement regarding man, the element of motion is for 
 us covered by the element of life, but for pre-Socratic philosophers 
 there was as yet no formal distinction of immanent and transient 
 activity. 
 
 An epigram of Epicharmus (Vor. p. 100) may be noted for a 
 possible identification of 777 and 6eos. Again, his terms in a 
 fragment (Vor. p. 93) wherein vovs was distinguished from all 
 else command attention as expressions for faxy proper on the 
 side of perception. 
 
 Even in his so-called monism, the Pythagorean divided the 
 underlying substratum of things sometimes into two and sometimes 
 into ten principles. dpt0/*6s, said Aristotle (Met. 986 a. 15) the 
 Pythagoreans considered dpx*?, and of number the elements 
 (oTotxeta) were TO &PTLOV KCLL TO TrepLTTov (Cf. Met. 985, b. 25.) 
 
 Aristotle placed Alcmaeon among those who held at dpxat dixa. 
 Aside from this doctrine peculiar to himself as a Pythagorean 
 ("and they seemed to be speaking about another heaven and other 
 bodies than those perceived by senses" Met. 1090, a. 34) Alcmaeon 
 continued in the same direction as the lonians. A term for per- 
 petual motion occurs in De Anima (405 a 29) where Aristotle 
 assigned to Alcmaeon a reason for the immortality of \f/vx"n- There 
 if/vx'n is aj9a.va.Tos on account of its resemblance to ot d0d*>arot and 
 it possesses this likeness by reason of being ever in motion 
 (cbs dei Kivov^kvrf}. Aristotle further said that Alcmaeon had 
 held Kiveladai, yap /cat TO, 0eta TravTa avvex&s det. The term TO. dela 
 as standing for the heavenly bodies (De An. 405 b. I) is the 
 evident contribution of popular belief. 
 
 Aristotle noted (De. An. 404 a. 18) that "some of the Pythago- 
 reans" identified if/vxy and TO. kv T<# dept u<r/-iara while others 
 again called \f/vx"n TO TCLVTCL KLVOVV. 
 
 To Alcmaeon was assigned the opinion 0eot . . . . ot do-repes 
 etcrt e^vxoL ovTes. (Clem. Protr. Vor. p. 102.) Built on the 
 De Anima statement for Alcmaeon is the assertion of Aetius 
 (Dox. 386) which repeats dittos Kivrjcns and gives ^vxrj as <uerts 
 avTOKlvr)Tos. The term <f>vai,s here recalls Plato's speculation 
 (Cratyl. 399 D-400 A) that the word i^uxi? is derived from the 
 expression 77 fyvviv 6xt KGU x. Diog. Laert. VIII, 83 said 
 that Alcmaeon held ^x 1 ? to be aBavaTos and Kivelvdai (rvvexus- 
 
 It is doubtful whether we have in Philolaus an instance of a 
 purely kinetic fax*]- The term occurs with the conventional 
 
24 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 force in several fragments of Philolaus. (Cf. Vor. 243, 244, 254.) 
 We meet with interesting and prophetic forms of expression in a 
 doubtful citation for Philolaus regarding Oeos. (Cf. Vor. 247.) 
 
 Worthy of note for us is the fragment of Philolaus (Vor. 239) 
 which says: a Averts 5' ev ro> /coo^ico apfjLoxOrj e airelpuv re /cat 
 TrepdLvovTuv. (Cf. Act. Dox. 283.) 
 
 \ further instance of the harmony idea which illustrates the 
 natural demand for a directive and harmonizing principle occurs 
 in a statement of Philolaus (Vor. 241) which granted to dtStos 
 evcra /cat aura a (f>v<n,s a certain 0cta /cat OVK avOpuTrivi] yvuais. He 
 significantly added here: advvaTov rjs /ca aurats (rats dpxats) 
 Koo'iJL'rjdrjvai, el JJLT) apjAovla eireyevro. We meet the term Kparelv also 
 in another expression of the idea of the harmonizing and ordering 
 force of Philolaus. (Procl. in Tim. Vor. 234.) 
 
 The harmony notion was brought to bear on \f/vx"fi proper in 
 Aristotle's account of "a certain other opinion." (Cf. De An. 
 407 b. 30). ^vx'h is there ap^ovia TLS that is Kpaons /cat 
 (rvvdeais evavriuv. Plato (Phaedo 85 E) identified if/vxy of Philo- 
 laus with apuovLa TLS wav and he further said (Polit. 1340 b. 18) 
 that some of the "wise men" held that the soul has harmony 
 and others that it was itself harmony. 
 
 A new term for Philolaus is found (Theol. Arith. Vor. 235) 
 as \I/vxw-s & dSt, following Aristotle's identification of ^ux?7 
 Kal vovs with TWV apiB^v irddos (Cf. Met. 985 b 30). 
 
 The false fragment for Philolaus (Stob. Eel. Vor. 247), lending 
 itself to the doctrine of the world soul, contains the expression 
 dpxd rds KivfjffLos re /cat juera/3oXas and the significant combina- 
 tion vovs /cat \^ux^- 
 
 Ecphantus of Syracuse, if faithfully represented by Hippolytus 
 (Dox. 566), must be added to the number of those using the 
 term if/vx'n as a kinetic force. In him too we see the combination 
 vovs /cat -^vxh- For Ecphantus (Dox. 566) ra ff^nara were moved 
 HTjre UTTO jSdpous fji^re Tr\rjj^s but vw6 Oelas Si^djuecos which Ecphan- 
 tus, according to the doxographer, called vovs /cat ^vx^- (Cf. 
 Plut. Dox. 217 where for Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle 
 vovs 6 KIVOVV was said to be do-co/iaros.) 
 
 Although the terms ascribed to the early Pythagorean philos- 
 ophers are often doubtful or colored, yet they bear evidence of 
 the survival of ^vx~n as a term for a kinetic principle, at the same 
 time foreshadowing the terminology of an actual distinction of 
 matter and force. 
 
3. TERMS OF HERACLITUS 
 
 The history of Ionian philosophy after 504 B. C. can be traced 
 in first-hand sources as well as in the records of opinions. The 
 terms in the fragments of Heraclitus, proverbially obscure, are 
 influenced by the two phases of a theory more than half in line with 
 the early Ionian solutions and yet carrying a new element of 
 thought. The vague and figurative expression of a force apart 
 from things appears to have begun with Heraclitus. 
 
 In a confession of his own effort for precision of expression 
 Heraclitus says (Frag. 2 (Bywater) Vor. p. 61): "Men seem un- 
 skilled when they make trial of words and matters such as I am 
 setting forth in my effort to discriminate each thing according to 
 its nature and to tell what its state is." 
 
 The fragments of this heir of the early lonians offer terms for 
 the material principle, for the element of motion, and for the 
 process by which things came from fire. ^vx"n in a kinetic sense 
 appears to have been used by Heraclitus. 
 
 The directive phase of irvp is shown in Frag. 28 (Vor. p. 71) where 
 the thunderbolt is said to direct the course of all things, (oicudfav) 
 (Cf. Frag. 21, Vor. 67 where TrpTjarrjp is one of the irvpos rpowaL) 
 The term oicudeLV derived from ota, the handle of the rudder, 
 recalls the Kv^pvdv of Anaximander. Heraclitus himself used 
 Kvpcpvav in relation to yvco^rj of Frag. 19 (Vor. 68). A further 
 attempt to unfold two principles out of irvp was seen by Hip- 
 polytus in the use by Heraclitus (Frag. 24, Vor. 71) of the words 
 XprjvfMxrvvri and Kopos. Hippolytus thought that "want" was the 
 process of arrangement (Sia/c60>c?7(7is) by fire and that "satiety" 
 was the tKirvpuais, and so this commentator decided that irvp 
 was <f)p6vLiJ.os and called it TTJS Stouiycreajs ruv 6Xcoj> atrtos. The 
 activity of irvp may have been further described in Frag. 26 
 (Vor. 71). Heraclitus characteristically expressed his pan- 
 metabolism in Frags. 41-42 (Vor. 64). 
 
 Frag. 20 (Vor. 66) offers important terms: "Order (KOCT/XOS) the 
 same for all things, no one of the gods or men has made, but it 
 always was and is and ever shall be an ever living fire wvp 
 dei^coof." For the oure rts Qeuv cure avBp&Truv e-jroLrjae of this frag- 
 ment cf. Frag. 65 (Vor. 67) where wisdom (TO ao<t>ov) is tv and is 
 willing and yet unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus. The 
 
 25 
 
26 . PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 "process" is found in the same fragment (20) in the terms 
 aTTTOjuej'os and aTroa^evvv]ji,vos and this "kindling and quenching" 
 took place according to fixed measure. (p.krpa). Frag. 77 (Vor 
 66) gives the same words for the process where Heraclitus said 
 that man like a light (<j>aos) is kindled and put out. Frag. 78 
 (Vor. 74) also emphasizes the subjective view-point and applies 
 directly to the phases of mortal life the universal law of change. 
 
 The words of Heraclitus so far noted mark a tendency on the 
 part of the philosopher to draw out the note of efficiency in irvp, 
 and it remains to be seen whether he ever expressed this aspect 
 of a.px'n m terms of faxy- Heraclitean terms for the definition 
 of \f/vx'n proper on the side of sensation occur in several fragments 
 where the conventional force of \f/vxr) became philosophical. How- 
 ever, the term ^vx'h was evidently employed in a kinetic sense 
 by Heraclitus. In the spurious fragment (131 Bywater) faxy 
 would undoubtedly bear that sense. (Cf. Diog. L. IX, 7 
 Travra \f/vx&v elvai KCLI daipovuv 7r\rjprj.) Frag. 71 (Vor. 68) 
 ifsvxfis ireipaTo, OVK av ccup6io may hold a survival of kinetic 
 \l/vxrj- (Cf. dTTctpos . . . apx-f) of Anaximander.) Frag. 68 
 (Vor. 67) states that it is death (da.va.Tos) to ^uxdt to become 
 water, for e u5aros 5e ^vx'n (ylvtTai). (Oavaros here stands for 
 17 eis 'drepov aroix^-ov /ieraj3o\i7 according to Philo. R. P. 38 a.) 
 With this we take Frag. 25 (Vor. 73) where fire lives in the death 
 of earth and air lives in the death of fire : water lives in the death 
 of air, and air in that of water, (ftj irvp rbv yys davarov K. r, X. 
 (Cf. Plut. de E. 18, 392 C-Vor. 73). A reconciliation of Frag. 68 
 and Frag. 25 is found in Frags. 41-42 (Vor. 64) where Heraclitus 
 uses the new term avadvfjLLacrdai. 
 
 In his elementary attempt to fix psychological values, Heraclitus 
 may have been affected in his use of tvx'h by the terms for the 
 process. (Cf. Frags. 77-78.) Arius Didymus (Dox. 471) ascribed 
 to Heraclitus a theory for \j/vxr) proper showing this tendency. 
 "Wishing to make it clear that at if/vxat- aJ'aflu/ucojuepcu voepai ael 
 ylvovTCLL, he likened them to rivers." Moreover, we have (Dox. 
 471) the inference for Heraclitus that \l/vxy was CUO-^TIKT) 
 
 It seems clear that the term \l/vxn will bear our interpretation 
 in this later Ionian thinker. Standing for the principle of motion, 
 was seemingly identified with one of the four elements just 
 
TERMS OF HERACLITUS 27 
 
 as the material principle seemed to have been identified with 
 irvp. (R. P. 38 b notes the explanation of Philoponus for whom 
 the Heraclitean irvp was 17 rjpa di>a0ujuia<ns and who also said 
 
 Aristotle's statement (De An. 405 a 25) for Heraclitus takes 
 over for faxy proper the earlier thinker's terms for kinetic faxy- 
 Here Aristotle, as in the case of Thales, qualified his assertion 
 that Heraclitus identified apxrj and ^vxr) by the words "if he 
 identifies it with 17 dya0u/ua<ns from which he derives all other 
 things." Aristotle added the terms do-wjuarcbTaros and 'peov det 
 for the if/vx'n-o-PX'n of Heraclitus. Aetius (Dox. 389) represented 
 Heraclitus distinguishing between 17 rov KOCT/XOU $vx"n (which he 
 called avadv^iaffLS kit ruv vypuv) and the ^vx'n & Zs T4 x>ts - 
 Theodoret (Dox. 386) gave for the \J/vxt of Heraclitus the term 
 
 Further secondary authorities keep Heraclitus in line with the 
 early lonians. Aristotle (Met. 984 a. 7) named him with Hippasus 
 as holding irvp for his apxrj- (Cf. also Aet. Dox. 292.) Theo- 
 phrastus (Dox. 475) elaborated this statement with the terms ev 
 and KWoviJLtvos and TreirepaffiJievos, with TTVKUV<TI,S and with navuffis 
 as terms for the process. The Heraclitean process was thus 
 described by Aetius (Dox. 283) : "As this (TTUP) is quenched all 
 things come into order. (KO(7juo7roieZ<r0cu)." In the description of 
 the origin of earth, water and air from fire, as conceived by Hera- 
 clitus, Aetius (Dox. 283) offered a repetition of the new term 
 dva0u/ua(70ai found in Frags. 41-42. 
 
 "Motion" for Heraclitus was variously described by the second- 
 ary authorities. Plato (Cratyl. 402 A) said that for Heraclitus 
 TTOLvra x^P^ K ^ ^ v M^ci. To the followers of Heraclitus 
 (ot *pkovrts) he ascribed the doctrine iravTa Kivtlrai (Cf. Theaet. 
 180 D-181 A.) Again, Aristotle (De An. 405 a. 28) said that 
 Heraclitus thought that all things were in idvrivis. Aetius (Dox. 
 320) distinguished for Heraclitus between eternal motion (dtStos 
 KLvriffis) and ^Qapr-q /averts. Aetius (Dox. 303) offered for irvp 
 the term d(5tos. 
 
 Up to this point Heraclitus had not departed from the old order, 
 but the personification of a dual activity in some of the fragments 
 of his work marks a turning point in the early efforts of Greek 
 philosophy. The term epts and apuovla vaguely expressed the 
 notion of a force apart from things. 
 
28 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 Frags. 20 and 65 would put Heraclitus philosophically among 
 the aOtoi. In Frag. 36 (Vor. 71) 6 0eos was roXe/zos dp^vrj by 
 one phase of the power there ascribed in the term dXXotouo-flai. In 
 Frag. 44 (Vor. 69) we find TroXejuos TTCLVTUP pev Trarrjp tan iravruv 
 51 P<HTL\vs. Frag. 62 (Vor. 73-74) gives both terms epis and 
 TroXejuos and all things arise /car' epiv. (6(^77 is here identified 
 with epis.) Frag. 46 (Vor. 63) combines both harmony and strife. 
 "Opposition unites and from differences comes the most beautiful 
 harmony." (xaXXto-rr/ apuovia.) Aristotle (Eud. Eth. 1234 a. 25) 
 named Heraclitus as blaming Homer (S107) for his wish that strife 
 would pass away. 
 
 Heraclitus himself was probably unconscious of the implications 
 of the notion he conveyed in thus imperfectly speaking in terms of 
 dualism. His other force, ^vxn inherent in dpx^> was not yet 
 supplanted in his mind and survived here and there in his term- 
 inology as the kinetic phase of his irvp-apxr}. Frag. 18 (Vor. 
 77) where ao<J>6v is TTCLVTUV Kex^piff^vov and Frag. 19 (Vor. 68) 
 by the words yv^rj ore?? eKvpepvrjve iravra. 6td TTOLVTUV foreshadow 
 later terms for a real second cause which will arise with the passing 
 of kinetic \f/vxr) into vovs. 
 
4. ELEATIC TERMS 
 
 Before tracing the idea of an external force as developed by the 
 lonians, it is worth while to examine the terms of the Eleatic 
 philosophers for the notion of efficient cause and for the ever 
 growing tendency toward immateriality. These philosophers 
 furnished terms for the powers of ^vxh proper on the side of 
 knowledge and perception, but it is doubtful whether there is 
 any trace in their writings of the term \l/vx"h in a kinetic sense. 
 
 Xenophanes was radical in his differences with the earlier 
 philosophers. For him there was no change, and the unity was 
 God. He was the first to philosophize on the Deity. Aristotle 
 and Theophrastus have noted his method as unusual. Aristotle 
 criticized Xenophanes for failing to make things clear. "Looking 
 up into the broad heavens," Xenophanes asserted that unity is 
 God. (Cf. Met. 986 b. 22.) Theophrastus admitted, according 
 to Simplicius (Phys. Dox. 480), that the record of the opinion of 
 Xenophanes came from some other source than to-ropia -rrepl 
 
 The effort of Xenophanes was strongest toward ideas and terms 
 that would take away false notions of the deity that was being. 
 Since for him there was no motion, a second principle, even as an 
 aspect of apxri, should have been out of place. In some of the 
 fragments, however, we find a reversion to the Ionian attitude. 
 The terms 71-77717 and yeverup in Frag. 11 (Karsten) (Vor. p. 51) 
 and the eK 7(1(775 iravra statement of Frag. 8 indicate a physi- 
 ologer's interest. Earth and water form the twofold source in 
 Frags. 9-10. In Frag. 9 we are all sprung (eKyevonevBa) from earth 
 and water. In Frag. 10 all things oaa. ylvovr' rjdt (frvovrai are 
 earth and water. In Frag. 12, offering forms for the limitation of 
 one phase of the source, we find the terms TreZpas and aireipov. 
 
 The doctrine peculiar to Xenophanes and his school is found in 
 Frag. 4 where he said Being or God always abides in the same 
 place, not at all moved, (mvovnevos ovbkv). A strong effort for 
 a term for incorporeality is found in a fragment usually accredited 
 to Xenophanes. (Frag. 2.) The climax of the theodicy of 
 Xenophanes is reached in the magnificent hexameter of Frag. 3: 
 "Without effort (God) swings all things by the power of thought." 
 (v6ov <t>ptvi) (Cf. Diog. L. IX, 19). 
 
 29 
 
30 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 The sole instance of the use of fax*! by Xenophanes occurs 
 in Frag. 18 where he attested the acceptance of the doctrine of 
 metempsychosis by Pythagoras. Diog. L. IX, 19 ascribed to 
 Xenophanes the term irvev^a for his ^vx'fj- 
 
 Parmenides, striving to distinguish things according to opinion 
 from things according to truth, although affected by the ideas and 
 terms of Xenophanes, still reverted to old notions and time-worn 
 terms. In his "metaphysics" according to reason (/card rov 
 \6yov), as a consistent Eleatic denying all movement, he would 
 have been excluded from the ranks of thinkers whose terms offer 
 evidence for if/vx^i as a principle of motion. Nevertheless, an 
 examination of the terms in which he expressed his "cosmology 
 of the apparent" discloses a tendency to give to his irvp-apx'h an 
 aspect of force. 
 
 Aristotle, censuring Xenophanes and Melissus for crudeness, 
 said (Met. 986 b. 27) that Parmenides seemed to speak in some 
 places with more care. OuaXXoj> fiKkiruv) "But being compelled 
 to account for phenomena," continued Aristotle, "he assumed that 
 things are one from the standpoint of reason (/card rov \byov) but 
 plural from the standpoint of sense, (/card TT\V ai<r6r}(TLi>) " 
 
 Parmenides (Verses 83-84, Vor. p. 120) said that true belief 
 completely rejected generation (7 kvevis) and destruction (6Xe0pos). 
 Again in v. 77 generation is extinguished (dTreo-jSeorai) and des- 
 truction is incredible. (dTruoros) Parmenides (v. 100) included 
 generation (ylveadai) and destruction (6XXu<r0ai) among those 
 things which mortals believed true but which he would himself 
 consider but a name, (ow/za). 
 
 In the poem of Parmenides entitled rd Trpos a\rjdeLav we find 
 the privative terms ayevrjTos and av&XeOpos (v. 59), drpc/z^s (v. 
 60), aKtvijTOS (v. 82), dreXeo-ros (v. 60), dreXeurrjros (v. 88), 
 airavaros (v. 83), avapxos (v. 83) all applied to TO kbv. His 
 other expressions describing Being are important as terms later 
 to be adopted generally by philosophy. (Cf . Verses 60, 62, 78-80, 
 and 89). 
 
 The terms applied by Parmenides in his philosophy rd Trpos 
 bbfrv to a new force on the way to the clear expression of the 
 idea of efficient cause may be regarded as the results of the efforts 
 of Ionian thinkers for terms for their principle of motion. Aris- 
 totle's assertion (Met. 984 b. I) that none of those who affirmed 
 that all is one understood the nature of an apxh rijs K<,vr)<reus ex- 
 
ELEATIC TERMS 31 
 
 cepted Parmenides in so far as this Eleatic in reality held two 
 causes. Aristotle (Met. 986 b. 33) especially noted the terms wvp 
 and 777 used by Parmenides for his two air Lai. Parmenides 
 himself (v. 113) said that there are two /uop<ai which men have 
 determined to name. These he described (vv. 116-117) as ethereal 
 flame of fire (fine, (TJTTIOS), rarefied (dpcuos), and everywhere 
 identified with itself) and (v. 119) flameless darkness, dense and 
 heavy in character. (Cf. v. 122 for the terms <dos and vv). 
 In v. 125 he gave to 5cu/ioji/ the term Kvftepvav. 
 
 In v. 120 Parmenides proposed to tell every seeming arrange- 
 ment (5iaKo<rjuos) of his two principles. Aristotle (Met. 984 b. 
 25) cited the verse of Parmenides (132) which names "Epcos as 
 the first of all deal. This "Desire" Aristotle called an airLa 
 the activity of which he expressed by the words Kivclv and 
 Parmenides (v. 127) mentioned a bainuv rj TTCLVTCL 
 Simplicius (Phys. 39, 12) noted the TTOLTJTLKOP element 
 of thought here. However correct may be the identification 
 (Cf. Aet. Dox. 335) of AI/CT? (v. 69) and of 'AvayKrj (v. 86) 
 with this dalnuv (v. 127), the doxographer saw in this bai^v 
 (which he called Ku/Sep^rts /cat /cXTjpouxos) a source of motion 
 and generation for all things. 
 
 The tendency of the Doxographers (cf . tradition for Pythagoras 
 and for Heraclitus) to give an efficient aspect to one phase of the 
 dpxr? may be seen in a statement of Theophrastus (Dox. 482) for 
 Parmenides where TTVP is regarded as TTOLOVV. (Cf. also Hippolytus 
 Dox. 564.) It is a question whether these statements are quite 
 consistent with the concessions of Parmenides to popular opinion. 
 He appears to have tended toward a second cause in his dalfju^v 
 and at the same time to have emphasized the double aspect 
 of apx*) by the terms irvp and 777. 
 
 The term irvp^dijs was attributed to Parmenides for ^i/xr?. 
 (Cf. Aet. Dox. 388). Elsewhere (Aet. Dox. 443 and Theophr. 
 Dox. 500) there is some evidence of the confusion of \l/vxh as a 
 physical principle and \l/vxh perceptive and animate. 
 
 As a pupil of Xenophanes and a contemporary of Heraclitus, 
 Parmenides possibly fell heir to terms by which he expressed his 
 vague idea of a second cause, but that later division of philosophy 
 which treated of \f/vx^i proper is particularly indebted to him for 
 the distinction of truth and opinion. 
 
32 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 Zeno, the double-tongued Eleatic dialectician (Cf. Simpl. 
 Phys. 30 r 138, 30), confined himself to proofs of the unity of 
 being by a method earning Aristotle's irapo\oyi^a6ai. (Cf. 
 Physics 239 b. 5.) Zeno brought out nothing peculiar to himself, 
 but he started further difficulties. (Cf. Plut. Dox. 581.) Diog. 
 L. IX, 72 noted Zeno's Eleaticism in his superficial denial of motion. 
 The earlier terms dittos and aTreipos are attributed (Aet. Dox. 
 303) to Zeno and to Melissus. The doxographer there also as- 
 signed to Zeno the term deia for his ^ux 1 ?- I n one of the apeo-Kovra 
 of Zeno (Diog. L. IX. 29) we find ^vxy called /cpdjua. 
 
 Although consistent with true Eleaticism, Melissus offered 
 interesting and significant terms. The fragments of the work 
 Trepi <u(recos fj Trepi TOV ovros bring out his method and indicate 
 his inheritance of terminology. The Eleatic denial of motion 
 was expressed by him in Frag. 10 (Vor. p. 149) thus: (TO kbv) 
 Kivoviievov 5 OVK av elrj. Discussing KOCTJUOS in Frag. 6, Melissus 
 used the terms erepoioDo-fleu and ^ra.Koan.r]Sriva.L. 
 
 Simplicius, significantly prefacing Frag. 8 (Vor. 149), affirmed 
 that Melissus meant Being to be aff&jjLarov. This fragment 
 seems to indicate a very vague notion of incorporeality, and yet 
 we cannot read the expression del crcbjua w exw as the contem- 
 porary of Melissus read it. Olympiodorus (Vor. 142) represented 
 Melissus employing as terms for his apxy the words /ua, cudvijTos, 
 aTreipos (Cf. Parmenides v. 104) and 0eZos. (Cf. Aet. Dox. 303.) 
 
 The Eleatic philosophers, not so far from the world of sense as 
 their own apparent efforts and the traditional titles of their works 
 would imply, nevertheless enriched philosophic terminology and 
 laid up for later thinkers modes of expression which could fairly 
 convey newly conceived ideas. The field of philosophy had already 
 begun to widen and the growth of tendencies in speculation 
 concerning nature, in minds not wholly unaccustomed to notions 
 shading into the idea of the incorporeal, could not fail to be influ- 
 enced by terms for the activity that was first expressed by kinetic 
 
5. SUMMARY OF TERMS OF PRE-SOCRATIC DYNAMISM 
 
 Allowing always for the fact that we are analyzing philosophy 
 alive in men's minds when put out in certain terms, we find the 
 dynamism of the predecessors of Anaxagoras expressed in three 
 answers to the first question of philosophy. In one sense we may 
 say that these early thinkers found three ways of avoiding the 
 question of causality. The simplest course was the one taken 
 by the early lonians who, "not at all displeased with themselves," 
 said ev TO inroKtlntvov (Cf. Arist. Met. 984 a. 30), including an 
 unexplained motion in the substratum of things. The Eleatics 
 avoided the question for the time by altogether denying motion. 
 Aristotle saw in this course the method of those who saw the 
 difficulty and were conquered by it. (Cf. Met. 984.) Heraclitus 
 took yet another course in his assertion that all is motion. 
 
 The early lonians reduced the many to a "one" in terms of 
 physical matter and took for granted as their primitive substance 
 a physical substratum which was eternally moved. Their genius 
 for relations had, very probably, not so far exercised itself as to 
 combine with their first principle physical things and the move- 
 ment observed in qualitative change (not then so much as reduced 
 to physical energy). This gap, if at all evident to them, they 
 bridged by terms, old or new, for purely accidental change. A 
 set of terms for the mode of action of their dynamic "one" is 
 found along with the set of terms for the "one" itself, and the 
 formula ^vxy-apx'n covers mere hylokineticism. 
 
 The phase of the notion of causality to which efficient action is 
 in last analysis reduced was presented by the Pythagoreans, who 
 left the sense-perceived world to answer the same question which 
 had proposed itself to the early lonians. The Pythagoreans 
 raised the quantitative property of things into that other sphere 
 where Plato was to find his "Idea" and Aristotle his "Form." 
 We have no means of knowing from the words of the Pythagoreans 
 the nature of the contents of the quantity expressed by the earlier 
 of these philosophers in terms which hold them in regions of 
 matter. As physical speculation widened, that mode of action 
 expressed in the condition of proportion was accounted for by the 
 Pythagoreans in terms for "harmony." The union of the opposites 
 of which their first principle was composed called for expression 
 
 33 
 
34 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 supplied here and there by ^vx'h and even by \j/vxri *ai vovs 
 denoting only a physical condition. 
 
 Before the Eleatics began in any way to develop the notion of 
 cause, they struck a note of criticism. Before they attempted 
 to account for things they tried to reduce the object of their inquiry 
 by excluding from philosophy what they called non-Being. 
 Although they fixed no ground for the distinction of truth and 
 opinion, yet their efforts in this direction served to raise and to 
 leave open a future question for philosophy. If judged by their 
 terms, the attempt of the philosophers of Elea to get away from 
 sense in knowledge and from physical in object was far from 
 successful. From the "all" of Thales to the "unity" and "Being" 
 of Parmenides there was certainly an advance in terms, and yet 
 notions transcendent at first sound were probably on the level 
 with the Eleatic concept of Being akin to our idea of space. 
 However certainly the ideas of being and of bodilessness are 
 reduced, on evidence afforded by their own words, to physical 
 counterparts, philosophy cannot but be grateful for the contribu- 
 tion of such terms as those of Parmenides for his "Being." There 
 should have been for the Eleatics no chasm from the many to the 
 one, and yet in their inconsistency or in their concessions to popular 
 thought they, too, accounted for plurality in terms of accidental 
 change. Parmenides may have been merely describing physical 
 conditions of union for the two phases of his primitive substance 
 in words that now seem to carry the true note of efficiency. 
 
 The time had not yet come for philosophy to see the final 
 relation of things and their ultimate cause, but meanwhile thinkers 
 here and there were defining a less inadequate notion of the Deity. 
 The early Ionian (to adapt the words of Saint Augustine (De Civ. 
 Dei VIII, 2) for Anaximenes) "nee . . . negavit aut tacuit, 
 non tamen ab (Ipso) . . . factum . . . credidit." If, in 
 the eyes of the old religion, to be a philosopher was to be cifleos, 
 Truth soon supplied itself as an object for the mind of the philos- 
 opher without a God. A study of the growth of terms for the 
 "Deity" and for "mind" shows the Pythagorean and the Eleatic 
 philosophers at their best in these regions of thought. 
 
 Heraclitus addressed himself to the genetffc as opposed to the 
 static phase of things. No longer primarily concerned with 
 that from which things originated, philosophic speculation now 
 began to ask how the world came to be what it is, the very question 
 
SUMMARY OF TERMS OF PRE-SOCRATIC DYNAMISM 35 
 
 that would compel these thinkers to arrive at the true notion of 
 efficiency and all that it implies. Heraclitus was critical in his 
 acceptance of sense evidence, but, although he looked beneath 
 for reality, from his terms we may conclude that he saw only 
 physical reality. For him the mode of activity expressed in the 
 order that remains was as real as the continual passing of the 
 individual, the truth of which he arrived at by a Greek guess. 
 Ultimately a dynamist, Heraclitus spoke for mechanism the 
 strongest words thus far found in philosophical terminology. So 
 long as the relation of the material cause and its activity was 
 expressed as Heraclitus expressed the relation of "fire" and its 
 motion, kinetic faxy had still survived. Although he seemed to 
 raise "fire" above the other elements which he postulated with it, 
 his terms sometimes indicate that he conceived \f/vxrj in the 
 sense of a more special energy. If there was a definite sense in 
 his use of the term aelfaov for irvp an actual introduction of 
 the element of life in the motion of his dpxi? and if he used 
 if/vx'n as another term for the activity of apxrj, philosophy in the 
 person of Heraclitus was on the point of seeing for the first time 
 the immanent character of \f/vxr} as a physical activity. (Cf. 
 Alcmaeon who, on secondary authority (Aet. Dox. 386), gave 
 to $ueris the term avTOKlvrjTos). The element of immanency of 
 the KlvrjffLs aldios of the first apxr} was not immediately evident 
 to the first philosophers. The force directly combined with 
 matter, which they called through dearth of words 6e6s and ^uxi?> still 
 continued as a \f/vxr} principle of motion. Dynamism or hylo- 
 kineticism we may call a system inaccurately described as 
 hylozoism. 
 
 The notion of efficient cause may have entered with Heraclitus. 
 He may have meant to convey by his epts a new idea of which 
 he half saw the need, and yet this "Strife" might have been for 
 him but a phase of deos (Frag. 36) in the sense of merely describing 
 a physical condition. His conception of TTUP as de# uov is most 
 noteworthy. If kinetic ^u%?7 had up to this time for the early 
 thinkers no immanency, we take it as an evidence of the sincerity 
 of their quest that they henceforth strove to separate matter and 
 its motion. 
 
6. TERMS OF EMPEDOCLES 
 
 From a glimmer of the idea of efficiency in the figurative forces 
 epis and appovia existing for Heraclitus along with the dynamic 
 aspect of his first principle irvp, we pass to Empedocles who, in 
 his efforts to reconcile Heraclitus and the Eleatics, was the first 
 (if we accept the word of Aristotle, Met. 985 a. 21) to express the 
 notion of efficiency. 
 
 In his endeavors to determine true knowledge, Empedocles 
 aimed at accuracy of expression. He believed that it is hard to 
 get at the mind of man (vv. 367-368 Stein) and he realized that 
 custom often dictates forms of expression. (Cf. v. 44.) He 
 bade his hearers look with the eye of the mind (wos) at the well 
 pointed report (v. 363) which he assumed they demanded from him 
 as from an oracle. His effort appears again in his desire to speak 
 forcefully in case there had been in his former words anything 
 defective, (v. 96.) 
 
 Aristotle fixed the method of study of the philosophy of Empe- 
 docles when he advised (Met. 985 b. 32) that we heed the Siawua of 
 the pre-Socratic rather than a ^eXXi"erai \kyuv. Although his 
 expression was characteristically poetical and mythological, 
 Empedocles has been placed for us in Aristotle's Poetics (1447 b. 17) 
 as a <f>vai,o\6yos rather than a TTOITJTTJS. 
 
 Trying to work out a system where things are one and many 
 (TroXXd re KO.L ev) (Cf. Plato Sophist. 242 D and Arist. Phys. 
 187, a. 20), Empedocles, in a reaction against prevailing thought, 
 said that "fools" and those to whom far-reaching thoughts (v. 45) 
 are denied think that "mingling" is coming into being and that 
 "separation" is destruction. (Cf. vv. 36-39.) 
 
 Empedocles postulated the four elements as his material cause. 
 The term 71-77777 occurs with him in v. 128 and the form dp%77 in 
 v. 130. The elements are named in mythological terms in vv. 
 33-35. In vv. 104-107 Empedocles asserted that mortals and 
 even OeoL arise from these elements which appear to have been 
 also the means of the power <t>povelv. (Cf. v. 336-337.) 
 
 Aristotle's statement (Met. 985 a. 23) that Empedocles set irvp by 
 itself (/ca0' auro) is witness to the tendency of those who are still 
 dynamists to limit the activity of the material cause of one element 
 and to make the rest of the apxy passive. Although Empedocles 
 
 36 
 
TERMS OF EMPEDOCLES 37 
 
 seems to have made one of these elements predominant by setting 
 "fire" over against the other three, still here and there he gave 
 them all equal power. (Cf. vv. 87-89 and v. 112.) To "fire" in 
 particular belong powers contained in the term Kparelv (Cf. v. 
 112). In v. 263 "fire" separating (KPLVO^VOV) caused men and 
 women to arise (avayciv) . A doctrine peculiarly Empedoclean 
 (vv. 265-267) maintains that irvp through its desire to reach its 
 like, caused ouXcx^uels TVTTOL to spring up out of the earth. In a 
 special application of the "elemental fire" (dry 67 iov irvp) to the 
 theory of vision he used the term ravawrepos (v. 325) to denote 
 the refined character of his irvp. However, although "fire" is 
 more important than the other elements, it, too, plays a sub- 
 ordinate part. (Cf. vv. 215-216.) 
 
 The mention of KuTrpts (v. 215) brings us to a consideration of 
 the forces of Empedocles which Aristotle (Met. 985 a. 21) named 
 as 3>iXta and NeZ/cos. Empedocles usually introduced these forces 
 along with the elements and may even have used them as modes of 
 expression for mere physical conditions of repulsion and attraction 
 as Heraclitus used the terms "Strife" and "Harmony." (Cf. vv. 
 102-103, 66-68, 248-251.) 
 
 The activity of his own "Strife" and "Love" in the "process" 
 was brought out by Empedocles in w. 171-175. Terms for the 
 motion of things coming into being are found in vv. 69-73 where he 
 tried to reconcile continual change and immobility. The terms 
 for the forces of Empedocles vary. He usually expressed them by 
 the words Net/cos and ^L\6rrjs (171-172). V. 250 has the term 
 epis coupled with $1X67775 of v. 248. Again, in w. 190-195 he 
 used 'AQpodiTT] and NcZicos "which wrought the birth of things." 
 
 "Love" under the names of Aphrodite and Kypris doubtless held 
 the strongest note of efficiency for Empedocles. (Cf. v. 213, 215- 
 216, 240-241.) Empedocles himself was probably one of those 
 whom he mentioned (405-407) as having had no 6eb<s but Kvpins 
 Bao-t'Xeta. 
 
 The element of chance enters in v. 196 and again in v. 174 and 
 v. 255. The term rvxy occurs in v. 195 where by the IOTTJS of 
 TVXIJ all things Tre(f>p6vrjKev. (Cf. v. 231 where it is the property of 
 all things to have (frpbv^ais and a share of j>w/*a.) 
 
 Plato (Leg. X 889 B) named Empedocles among those who relied 
 on 06(7ts and rvxn rather than on rkx^i or vovs or any 0eos. (We 
 note in this passage the term fyvxos which Plato applied to the 
 elements of Empedocles.) 
 
38 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 Aristotle (De gen. et corr. 333 b. 20) said that for Empedocles 
 "Love" separated the elements, which were before 0eos in origin. 
 Empedocles himself identified these with Otoi (Cf. vv. 104-107.) 
 A noteworthy attempt on the part of Empedocles to fix the notion 
 of a deity is found in vv. 137-138 where a sphere rejoicing in 
 solitude is said to have been fixed in a vessel of harmony. Nearest 
 to incorporeality of all his notions and recalling a like attempt on 
 the part of Xenophanes are the ideas conveyed by the terms of 
 vv. 344-351 where a divine being is defined as sacred and ineffable 
 mind alone. (<t>prjv tepi? KCU d0eo-$aros.) 
 
 The term ^uxi? is not found in the extant fragments of Empe- 
 docles. His commentators used it when giving his doctrine of 
 metempsychosis (Cf. Hipp. Ref. Dox. 558), but dv^os is his own 
 word for the life of animals (v. 414) and of men (v. 435) who have 
 changed their nop<f>*l (v. 430). The word (twos is found in v. 32 
 for the spirit in Hades. 
 
 The verses 333-335 of Empedocles were quoted by Aristotle 
 (De An. 404 b. 11) as authority for the statement that for Emped- 
 ocles the elements were apxr) and each element was ^vx'n- (Cf 
 Theophr. Dox. 478 where six apxai were credited to Empedocles.) 
 The terms of Empedocles could not have been omitted in an 
 examination of the growth of words expressing the earliest notion 
 of a real moving cause. 
 
7. TERMS OF ANAXAGORAS. 
 
 Aristotle's assertion (Met. 984 a. 11) that Anaxagoras preceded 
 Empedocles in age but followed him in works places Anaxagoras 
 for our purpose. Difficult as it is to fix the dates of the later 
 Ionian philosophers, it is quite impossible exactly to determine the 
 influence and the dependence of each on the ideas and terms of the 
 other. The task of all who followed Heraclitus and the Eleatics 
 was to synthesize the elements of truth in both systems. Anaxa- 
 goras, a true successor of the early lonians, inherited and developed 
 the tendency of Heraclitus to advance toward ideas and terms 
 which would destroy the identification of apxr] and its motion. 
 Anaxagoras was for Aristotle (Met. 984 b. 15) the first "sober 
 thinker," and yet by their "random talking" his predecessors had 
 assisted him in the way of making the terms for his new ideas 
 less inadequate than they would otherwise have been. 
 
 His effort for precision of expression, even in a particular instance, 
 shows that Anaxagoras realized the value of accurate terminology. 
 (Cf. Frag. 17, Diels. Vor. 320.) His critical tendency of method 
 may be seen in the apothegm ascribed to him by Aristotle (Met. 
 1009 b. 25) : "Just such things as men assume will be real for them." 
 Aristotle (Met. 989 b. 4) recognized the efforts of Anaxagoras for 
 terms and noted that while Anaxagoras did not speak rightly or 
 clearly, yet he meant almost the same thing as those who spoke 
 later with greater clearness. 
 
 In a study of the terms of Anaxagoras, we find safety only in 
 his own words since the whole tendency of his commentators has 
 been to identify his term vovs with vovs as it came into meaning 
 after Socrates. We have seen a growing tendency on the part of 
 philosophers to fix epistemological values, and yet we find nothing 
 of this in the extant fragments of Anaxagoras. By raising the 
 notion of vovs, semi-popular and particular, to the idea of a 
 directive cause is one way by which Anaxagoras may have come 
 to postulate an efficient force. However, this seems a big step 
 for a thinker at this stage of the development of thought. He 
 might have taken out the if/vxy which was the dynamic term for 
 the motion of the apxr] and have made it the separate cosmothetic 
 force under a kindred term. By some such process as this, we 
 think, Anaxagoras postulated vovs. He did not all at once arrive 
 
 39 
 
40 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 at a full realization of the implication of his new idea, and so we 
 find with him \l/vxn remaining in things as a cause of motion (and 
 possibly restricted to animate being) while at the same time its 
 powers had already passed over into vovs. 
 
 Before giving attention to the idea peculiar to Anaxagoras, we 
 shall make the transition from the other lonians to him through 
 his terms for what would correspond to the former apxy and 
 Kivrjcris. Terms for the "surrounding mass" (TO irtpikxov) of Anax- 
 agoras are found in Frag. 2 (Vor. 314) and Frag. 14 (Vor. 320). 
 "Air and aether" (arjp /cat al6rjp) occur in Frags. 1 (Vor. 313), 
 2 (Vor. 314), 12 (Vor. 319). The terms nvclv, airoKpiveaOai, 
 diCLKpiveffdai for "motion" occur in Frag. 13 (Vor. 319). Motion 
 is frequently expressed in terms of "rotation" or "whirling" 
 (Cf. Frag. 12 Vor. 318). Force (Biry) and swiftness 
 as sources of motion are found in Frag. 9 (Vor. 317). 
 One phase of the process of how things came from air and aether 
 is described in Frag. 15 (Vor. 320) as a avyxupelv and an 
 ixxwpelv. (Cf. also Frag. 16 Vor. 320 and Frag. 12 Vor. 319.) 
 
 Anaxagoras appears sometimes to have overlooked vovs as a 
 source of special activity and to have substituted for it physical 
 conditions. However, vovs as an omnipresent TTJS Kivfoeus alnov 
 was at all times very real for him. (Cf. Frag. 8 Vor. 317 and 
 Frag. 14 Vor. 320.) In his analysis of things as they now are, 
 Anaxagoras insisted that, excepting vovs, nothing is absolutely 
 separate or capable of existing apart or of itself. Many of his 
 negative statements served only to emphasize the attributes of 
 vovs. He frequently reverted to wavra TTCLVTOS iiolpav juerexci of 
 Frag. 6 (Vor. 316). When things were all together, nothing was 
 clear and distinct by reason of their smallness (UTTO o-^t/cpor^ros) , 
 but finally of whatever "seeds" there were the most (pruv TrXetcrra) 
 each object became and remained distinctly (evdrj\6rara) qualified 
 by their character. (Cf . Frag. 1 Vor. 313 and Frag. 12 Vor. 319.) 
 
 In the answer to the question at once suggested by OTUV TrXeZcrra 
 we come upon the notion of a "world of erTrcp/jara" peculiar to 
 Anaxagoras. (0-Trepjuara became for Aristotle TO, 6/zoiojuepr;) . 
 These are described in Frag. 4 (Vor. 315) where Anaxagoras said 
 that in every compound there existed o-irepfiara iravruv xPWaruv. 
 
 Anaxagoras, explaining nepl rrjs CLTTOK pier LOS in Frag. 4, made 
 certain mystifying references to another world or another order. 
 Simplicius (Phys. 157, 9) noted this erepa TLS Sta/coo^o-is as 
 
TERMS OF ANAXAGORAS 41 
 
 not CU0-077T17 and considered that Anaxagoras spoke cos irepi 
 
 and that his Sid/cpio-is was voepd. (Cf. Anaxagoras on "other 
 
 world swiftness" in Frag. 9 Vor. 317.) 
 
 It is safe to say that the fragments of Anaxagoras containing 
 references to vovs itself are the most important words spoken 
 thus far in philosophy. The phraseology is still far from strict 
 terms for the incorporeal, but we can almost see the efforts of 
 Anaxagoras in his emphasis on the simplicity of vovs as he aims 
 to confer upon it powers yet new. 
 
 In Frag. 11 (Vor. 318) vovs is set apart from all other things. 
 The end of Frag. 12 (Vor. 319) contains the same thought. 
 There Anaxagoras maintained that vovs is mixed with no other 
 thing but is ftovos CLVTOS eir' COJTOU. The significant term avroKpar^s 
 occurs in Frag 12. (Cf. Plato, Cratyl. 413 C who gave to 
 the vovs of Anaxagoras the terms auro/cpdrcop, ovOevi fjLeneiyfjLevos, 
 Further terms for vovs are: aireipos and Kparelv and 
 eyicrTOV (Frag. 12). The words XCTTTOTCLTOV iravruv XPV' 
 fjLaTuv Kal KaOapuTCLTov of Frag. 12 indicate that the old striv- 
 ing toward immateriality continued in Anaxagoras. 
 
 At this point we may compare with vovs the Heraclitean 
 \6yos and TO (ro<j>6v and yvkw, which are not always clear. 
 In Frag. 2 (Vor. 61) Heraclitus attested to the ignorance of men 
 regarding \6jos and further said that all things ylvevdai Kara TOV 
 \6yov. He complained (Frag. 18 Vor. 77) that no one had yet 
 reached the conclusion that TO cro<j>6v is TTCLVTUV Kexupivntvov. 
 He mentioned yvuM in Frag. 19 (Vor. 68), which Diels renders: 
 "In Einen besteht die Weisheit, die Vernunft zu erkennen, als 
 welche alles und jedes zu lenken weiss." In Frag. 65 (Vor. 67) 
 Heraclitus represented TO ao<t>6v as willing and yet unwilling to 
 be called by the name of Zeus. 
 
 If Anaxagoras took up for vovs the ideas of Heraclitus, it cannot 
 but be seen that the yv&n-ri of Anaxagoras is something distinct 
 from vovs itself. However much vovs, through the power by 
 which it 7?co and bitKOffwat, excelled an unthinking agency, 
 it cannot be reduced to one of its own attributes, even to the 
 highest power it possesses. 
 
 The only instances of the use of $vxh by Anaxagoras lend them- 
 selves to the interpretation of $vxh as a term for the principle of 
 motion. Frag. 4 (Vor. 315) gives aiBpuiroL Kal TO. aXXa froa 
 off a. x?)* exct. If iK\i? was here actually used in a restricted 
 
42 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 sense as the principle of animation, we may conclude that it was 
 at the point where vovs took its place in the terminology of 
 cosmology that \f/vxrj became peculiar to animate being. The 
 other instance of the Anaxagorean \f/vx~n (Frag. 12) repeats the 
 expression 6aa if/vxyv exet. ^X 5 ? may have been restricted in 
 Frag. 4, but oaa \f/vxr)v exet (Frag. 12) has an extension as wide 
 as ovrjv eKLvrjcrev 6 vovs of Frag. 13 (Vor. 319). 
 
 We cannot say how definitely vovs superseded \j/vxr) in the 
 mind of Anaxagoras. In particular applications of vovs to the 
 cosmological process the old way of thinking may have led him 
 to couple \l/vxr) with vovs in portions of his work that have 
 never reached us. Plato (Cratyl. 400 A) cited Anaxagoras as 
 holding that the <ixns of all things was vovs and that it was 
 faxy which arranged (biaKoa^dv} and controlled (exeu>) all things. 
 (Cf. Doxographic tradition for Ecphantus.) Aristotle's difficulty 
 over the relation of faxy and vovs of Anaxagoras is well known. 
 (Cf. De Anima 404 b 1, 405 a 13, 429 a 18). 
 
 It was natural that Plato and Aristotle, whose minds were 
 ruled by Socratic standards and fixed conditions of knowledge, 
 should have been disappointed at the failure of Anaxagoras to 
 apply his doctrine of vovs. The new agency, vovs, was not yet 
 alight with finality for Anaxagoras. It remained for Socrates to 
 quicken vovs into a final cause. In the act of abandoning \f/vxv as 
 a kinetic principle philosophy began to speak in such terms as 
 t&v, fj.\f/vxos, a\I/vxos and ^VX^CTLS. The real substitute for kin- 
 etic il/vxy would appear only when Greek philosophy had reached 
 its height. 
 
8. TERMS OF THE SUCCESSORS OF ANAXAGORAS. 
 
 It is a question whether Anaxagoras deserved the reproach of 
 Aristotle (Met. 985 a. 18 ff .) to the effect that, when he had used 
 vovs as a wxavri irpos T-qv KOffnowouav, he reverted to it only 
 when at a loss for a cause, in other cases accounting for things by 
 any other cause rather than vovs. Philosophy at this period 
 found new life in the doctrine of the vovs of Anaxagoras. Greek 
 thought had been advancing all the way from Thales to Anaxagoras, 
 but the heirs to the terms and ideas of the great pre-Socratic 
 were unable or unwilling to take advantage of their heritage. 
 
 There are no extant fragments of the works of Archelaus. 
 Diogenes Laertius (11, 16) has placed him for us as an Athenian 
 or a Milesian, a pupil of Anaxagoras and a teacher of Socrates. 
 
 Aetius, Dox. 331, attributed a doctrine to him in these terms: 
 UTTO depfJLov Kal kfjL^vx't'CLS (rv&Trjvai rov KOGIJLOV. For him ayp and 
 vovs were 6 Qeos (Aet. Dox. 302), but the doxographer qualified 
 0eos as not KOOTXOTTOIOS. 
 
 The influence of Anaxagoras on Archelaus is apparent in the 
 statement (Philop. de an. 71, 17 Hayd.) that Archelaus was among 
 those who said that the all was moved UTTO rov vov. (We note in 
 this passage rfj \f/vxy TO KLvelv.) A tendency to employ vovs in a 
 particular sense appears in a statement attributed to Archelaus by 
 Hippolytus wherein he granted vovs to all living things (Dox. 563) . 
 
 If the system of Anaxagoras were to be judged only by the 
 representation it received at the hands of Diogenes of Apollonia, 
 then Plato would have been justified in his assertion (Phaedo 98 B) 
 that Anaxagoras made no use of vovs but treated "air" and 
 "aether'* as causes. (Cf. Plato's word aroira as descriptive of 
 these causes.) 
 
 Aristotle's statements regarding the aWrjp of Anaxagoras are in 
 place in a consideration of the system of Diogenes. Aristotle 
 (De Caelo 302 a. 31) noted that Anaxagoras used the words irvp 
 and aWrip synonymously. 
 
 In an effort to explain the phenomena of animate life, Diogenes 
 limited to living things the vovs of Anaxagoras which Aristotle 
 (De An. 405 a. 13) has called the Anaxagorean dpx^- The term 
 used by Diogenes is vorj<ns and vorjffis was for Aristotle himself 
 (De An. 407 a. 20) vov Kivr)<ns. 
 
 43 
 
44 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 Simplicius (Vor. 335) ascribed to Diogenes (Frag. 4 (Diels) 
 Vor. 335) an arjp-apxrj which was the source of life as well as 
 of \f/vxri *cu voxels. In the words of Diogenes (Frag. 4) ^u%i?, the 
 same for all living things, was a^p. (Cf. Frag. 5.) 
 
 Frag. 5 (Vor. 335) contains as significant terms for d^p-vo^o-is 
 Kvftepvav, Kparelv, Beds. Frag. 7 (Vor. 339) describes the first 
 principle as aldi-ov KO.L adavarov ao>jua. (Cf. also Frag. 8 Vor. 339.) 
 Theophrastus (Dox. 477) gave to the arjp of Diogenes the terms 
 aTreipos and aldios. 
 
 Aristotle's statement (De An. 405 a. 21) has been given for 
 Anaximenes as one of those included under "certain others," but 
 Diogenes is deservedly the only one there named as identifying 
 \l/vxh and di7p. di7p is there described as TTOLVTUV XeTrTojucpedraros. 
 Aetius (Dox. 392) said that for Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Arche- 
 laus, and Diogenes ov<rla ^uxrjs was aepudrjs. However, Diogenes 
 is the only one whose words convict him of that charge. Of 
 Diogenes it can be said as of no other philosopher before him that 
 to have faxy was to be tfj,\l/vxos. In Diogenes we find true 
 hylozoism. Whereas Anaxagoras caught his vovs from above 
 by a brilliant stroke that did not fully succeed in bringing it 
 down to things, Diogenes postulated vorjcrus inhering in arjp. 
 He outlined his monistic system with open eyes in contrast to 
 Xenophanes whose pantheism probably never presented itself 
 to his own mind. 
 
 While on the one hand the strivings of Anaxagoras were wasted 
 on Diogenes and their results appropriated by conscious dynamism, 
 vovs failed equally of development with the Atomists. Leucippus 
 is credited (Aet. Dox. 321) with a work irepi vov of which we 
 have no fragments. In the fragments of the works of Democritus 
 we find terms new and significant, ^vxt as a term for "our soul" 
 was frequently used by Democritus (Cf. Frags. 171, 159, 187 
 Diels). Frag. 1 (Vor. 385) contains the term ^uxcoois. 
 
 Frag. 11 (Vor. 389), describing the two kinds of yv^rj as 
 and ffKorirj, indicates a critical attitude and recalls 
 56a of Empedocles (v. 343). The term aij/vxos 
 (Frag. 164 Vor. 414-415) occurred for the first time with Demo- 
 critus. (Cf. also the term a\oyos of this fragment (164) and the 
 terms ejui/^xos and a\f/vxos of the introduction to the fragment 
 by Sextus Empiricus.) 
 
TERMS OF THE SUCCESSORS OF ANAXAGORAS 45 
 
 The phrase oaaa. if/vx^ ex (Cf. Anaxagoras) recurs in Frag. 
 278 (Vor. 435). Here ^vxy is confined to mortals and other coa. 
 
 We are indebted for the most part to Aristotle for the physical 
 doctrines of the Atomists. He gave as their orotxeta the terms 
 TO 7r\?7pes /cat TO Kevov. Simplicius (Phys. 36, 1) (Vor. 346) used 
 the term arojua in describing the doctrine peculiar to cosmological 
 atomism. Aristotle contributed the account regarding the 
 "natural necessity" according to which the atoms came together. 
 <i>crts was given as the principle of motion. (Cf. Phys. 265 b. 24.) 
 Simplicius (Phys. 327, 14 Vor. 364) criticized the Atomists for 
 giving no atrt'a but airo rauro/idrou /cat Tvxns (Cf. Aristotle, Phys. 
 196 a. 24.) Cicero (De Deor. Nat. 1, 24, 66) in the words "sed 
 concursu quodam fortuito" may have drawn on the apparent 
 identification of CLVTOHCLTOV and TUXT? (Cf. Arist. Met. 984 b. 8). 
 
 The latent materialism of Democritus was brought out by 
 Aristotle (De Resp. 471 b. 30) where 17 \f/vx"n was TO Bep^ov and 
 certain fl-x^a^a in the air were called vovs /cat faxy- As a 
 statement of Democritus we have (Plac. Dox. 390) the assertion 
 that all things juerexet tvxw TTOIO.S. The "incorporeality" of the 
 TTUP of the Atomists was described by Philoponus (Vor. 369) as 
 ev ffujJuiffLV affunaTov Stct \eTTTOfJLepeiav. 
 
 Democritus received much attention from Aristotle in the 
 De Anima. Although Aristotle admitted (405 a. 13) that Anax- 
 agoras meant by vovs something different from \f/vxri, he seemed 
 certain that Democritus used vovs and if/vx^ as interchangeable 
 terms (Cf. 404 a. 28). ^i>xi? proper is for Democritus 
 TTVP rt /cat depfiov (404 a. 1). "The spherical atoms," continued 
 Aristotle, "Democritus called irvp /cat ^vx"n- These spherical soul- 
 atoms most easily find their way through things and, being 
 themselves in motion, they set other things in motion, for the 
 Atomists assumed 17 \j/vxr) as that which furnished motion to 
 living things." No such sharp lines as Aristotle drew around vovs 
 existed for the Atomists whose use of the term was probably akin 
 to its force in the phrase /c TTCLVTOS voov of Herodotus (8, 97) . 
 
 Aristotle (De An. 405 a. 8) commended Democritus for neatness 
 of expression. Perhaps the greatest contribution of systems 
 that failed to develop the idea of vovs was the contribution of 
 more precise and accurate terminology for ideas already in the 
 mind of philosophy. 
 
9. SUMMARY. 
 
 It remains to review in these systems, all of which were incom- 
 plete, the instances of the use of \l/vxri as a term for motion. The 
 early lonians, for the most part oblivious of the real problem, 
 included motion in the generic notion of cause. In particular 
 instances they used the expression \f/vx^ exew as merely equiv- 
 alent to KLvrjriKov won. Again, when speaking of beings of a 
 limited sphere, they expressed the property of life by the same 
 phrase ^vxhv 'extiv. \f/vxy possibly came to stand with some 
 for the general principle of Klvrjcris which, while it had not yet 
 worked itself out into a separate force, was nevertheless on the 
 way to becoming a specific cause. 
 
 In the period of transition, when \f/vxr] as a dynamic force was 
 passing into if/vxri KCLL i>ovs and into vovs as a term by itself for a 
 mechanical and a final cause, whether through an over hasty 
 advance or through a reaction, thinkers in all good faith gave the 
 power of thought even to all things. \l/vxy in their minds had not 
 yet fully separated from things when, with Heraclitus, a material 
 principle that was falfwov replaced the apx?) which had before 
 been aeiKtvrjTov. \l/vxh had not so much narrowed as it had con- 
 tinued, almost in a faded sense, as the principle of motion for 
 all things to which the term $uov had been extended. Thus 
 "whatever has ^ux^" stood now for all things whatsoever and 
 again for all things with life. Moreover, from philosophers yet 
 lacking sharp distinctions of the power of life and the power of 
 thought we may expect such statements as those of Epicharmus 
 to the effect that all living being is endowed with thought and 
 attempts such as those of Philolaus to distinguish the power of 
 thought in man and in nature. Heraclitus and Empedocles were 
 marked by this tendency to grant <j>povr)<ris to all things. 
 
 The pivotal idea of all philosophy before Socrates is the vovs of 
 Anaxagoras. This cosmothetic force, vovs, was for him the only 
 thing absolutely separate and unmixed, but his language at 
 that time offered no better terms for it than XeTrroraros and 
 Kadapuraros . The idea of an efficient force was for Anaxagoras 
 paralleled by the notion of true immateriality. Empedocles had 
 veiled the aspects of the separate moving power under poetical 
 and figurative terms. The genius of Diogenes of Apollonia was 
 
 46 
 
SUMMARY 47 
 
 not great enough for his inheritance and so, in the answer 
 v6r)<ns-br]p he returned to a position which philosophy had 
 outgrown and in his self-satisfied cosmological monism he can be 
 rated only below the early lonians. The philosophers before 
 Anaxagoras had all tended towards a separation of force from 
 matter and in their hylokineticism may be regarded as the fore- 
 runners of dualism in a sense in which the acknowledged hylozoist 
 can never be so considered. At this point it took genius to see 
 that the problem was not solved by the mere naming of yv&fjLrj or 
 voi>s as a separate force. 
 
 While philosophy, rising to the distinction of the element 
 of thought and the element of life, was separating a rational force 
 from "first substance," it did not all at once desert its old position, 
 but left the element of life inhering in all matter. At this time 
 terms for life and terms for distinctions of powers came to be used 
 in a more conscious sense. 
 
 In Diogenes of Apollonia we find frequent use of the terms for 
 life and a distinction of \f/vxr] and vorj<ns. txtiv vorjcriv took on 
 with him definite meaning, while there seems to have been in his 
 mind a complete identification of the ideas connoted by the phrases 
 eijuf/vxov elvai and ^vxrjv txw- 
 
 The inestimable value of the Anaxagorean vovs was ceded away 
 and its true development was again thwarted when philosophy, in 
 the system of the Atomists, turned into the lane that must lead 
 to a dead wall. However, the appearance, at this point, of the 
 first systems of latent panpsychism on the one hand and of latent 
 materialism on the other can be regarded as part of the growth of 
 philosophy in the sense that, while the natural tendency of the 
 sincerely philosophizing mind is in neither direction, these systems, 
 evolved before adequate notions or terms for the immaterial order 
 had been advanced, in the light of the system of Aristotle would 
 serve as instances of cast-off hypotheses. 
 
 Among the words of Democritus we find the terms "0)77, \f/vx<*)<Ti>s 
 and the noteworthy use of aXcryos and of a^vxos. The ova a 
 xt phrase recurring in Democritus is equivalent to 
 without the uncertainty attending its use by Anaxagoras. 
 
 As the extension of the term \f/vxy became more restricted by 
 lines of demarcation separating the regions of speculation, active 
 specialization in one sphere attached more definite sense to terms 
 hitherto used with a vague meaning. No clear notions of imma- 
 
48 PRE-SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE OF MOTION 
 
 nent and of transient motion had yet been conceived. </>u<ns and 
 eaaa had appeared as terms of Philolaus, and Plato tells us, in a 
 characteristic speculation on the derivation of the term ^vxn, that 
 it was a refinement of the expression 17 fyvaiv b\el KCLL ex**- The 
 Atomists, less inexcusably than the philosopher of today, thought 
 to solve the problem of motion by the doctrine of "natural neces- 
 sity" or self -movement. We have noted the terms </>u<ns and 
 TO avTOfjLaTov ascribed to them by Aristotle. On secondary 
 authority Alcmaeon has been credited with <u<7is auro/d^ros 
 KCLT' aidiov K.(vi}aiv. The term aeifaov for the dpxi? of Heraclitus, 
 who attributed natural energy to his TrDp-dpx??, appeared simul- 
 taneously with an incipient effort to separate original motion from 
 original matter. A fragment occurring in Stobaeus (Flor. 1, 
 180 a.) and credited to Heraclitus by Diels (Vor. 78) reads: ^UXTJS 
 kffTi \6yos eavTov av&v. Anaxagoras, refusing to other things 
 existence c<' eauroj, demanded an unmixed and separate char- 
 acter for a vovs which was avroKparr]s. Aristotle (De. An. 404 
 a. 8) credited the Atomists with KLVov^eva KO.L CLVTCL as a term for 
 their first principles. The language of all these attempts fore- 
 shadows Plato's terms for the definition of ^vx'n proper (Cf. 
 Phaedrus 245 C) TO O.VTO eauro KIVOVV. 
 
 The "natural necessity" explanation, complete only when sup- 
 plemented by the theory of matter and form, did not satisfy the 
 Greek physicist whose science must be crowned by his cosmology. 
 The first Greek thinkers set the problem in a question which for 
 us would read: To what shall we refer the activity of transient 
 material energy and the immanent principle of animation? This 
 question later widened to include: To what shall we refer the 
 spiritual activity within us which is but extrinsically dependent on 
 its organism? faxy activity had from the first demanded Aris- 
 totle's /w>p0i7. The connotation of kinetic \f/vxri in objective sys- 
 tems which held no adequate notion of immateriality determines, 
 from a certain standpoint, the position of each pre-Socratic phil- 
 osopher. 
 
 The charge that the earliest of these thinkers endowed a\f/vxa 
 with \l/vxy (Diog. L. I, 24) is unfair in the sense in which 
 it is made. Out of his wealth of thought and term Aristotle 
 (De. gen. an. 762 a. 18) could guardedly say: irai>Ta 
 
SUMMARY \ : ..; &Q. 
 
 The subsequent history of Greek philosophy may be written 
 in outline in the words of three men. The true development of 
 the vovs of Anaxagoras came only in the doctrine, advanced on 
 empirical principles by Socrates, that whatever exists for a useful 
 purpose must be the work of an Intelligence. (Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 
 4,4.) 
 
 Plato (Timaeus-29 D) on the way to truth said that 6 K6<7/zos 
 was foios {JL\l/vxos evvovs through the Trpovoia rov Beov. 
 
 Philosophy made a transition in the words of Aristotle (De Caelo 
 271 a. 33): 6 dt 6eos /ecu 17 <f>v<ns ovdev ^arrjv TTOLOIXTLV. There ever 
 remains the a^oBavfjiaaroTepos of Socrates (Mem. 1, 4) regarding 
 the Creator of foja en<j>pova /ecu evepya. Nature must seek the 
 source of its laws in God. When the genius of Aristotle, never 
 deserting his position in passing from kingdom to kingdom in 
 philosophy, had contributed a irpurov KLVOVV aKivrjTov (Phys. 256 a.) 
 and a v6rj<rt,s vojffeus (Met. 1071 b. 20), it remained for Christian 
 philosophy to complete this last word of pagan thought with the 
 necessary ideas of the providence and the personality of God. 
 Christian philosophy in turn is complete only when religion binds 
 the world of the physicist and the psychologist back to God, Who 
 has endowed His creature man with a mind having as its object 
 Truth, the First and the Last. 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 I. Texts of Sources and Commentaries. 
 
 ARISTOTLE, Works. Bekker. (Berlin, 1831-1870). 
 
 Editions of separate treatises: 
 
 Metaphysica, Christ. (Leipsig, 1895). 
 
 De Caelo, De Genera tione et Corruptione. Prantl. (Leipsig, 
 1881). 
 
 Physica. Prantl. (Leipsig, 1879). 
 
 De Anima, Hicks. (Cambridge, 1907). 
 
 Aristotle's Psychology. Wallace. (Cambridge, 1882). 
 PLATO, Works. Bekker. (Berlin, 1816-1823). 
 
 MULLACH, Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum. (Paris, 1883-1888). 
 DIELS, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. (Berlin, 1906). 
 
 Doxographi Graeci. (Berlin, 1879). 
 
 RITTER ET PRELLER, Historia Philosophiae Graecae. (Gotha, 1913). 
 WIMMER, Theophrasti Opera. (Leipsig, 1862). 
 JACKSON, Texts for the History of Greek Philosophy. (London, 1901). 
 
 II. Secondary Authorities. 
 
 ZELLER, Die Philosophic der Griechen. (Leipsig, 1892). 
 
 BURNET, Early Greek Philosophy. (London and Edinburgh, 1892). 
 
 TANNERY, Pour 1'histoire de la science hellene. (Paris, 1887). 
 
 GOMPERZ, Griechische Denker. (Leipsiz, 1896). (Trans, by Magnus, 
 
 London, 1901). 
 ADAMSON, The Development of Greek Philosophy. (Edinburgh and London, 
 
 1908). 
 
 BENN, Greek Philosophers, Vol. I. (London, 1883). 
 BAEUMKER, Das Problem der Materie in der Griechische Philosophic. 
 
 (Minister, 1890). 
 
 BEARE, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition. (Oxford, 1906). 
 MILLERD, On the Interpretation of Empedocles. (Chicago, 1908). 
 FAIRBANKS, The First Philosophers of Greece. (London, 1898). 
 BAKEWELL, Source-book in Ancient Philosophy. (New York, 1907). 
 ROHDE, Psyche. (Leipsig, 1898). 
 
 MULLER, Lectures on the Origin of Religion. (London, 1878). 
 TURNER, History of Philosophy. (Boston and London, 1903). 
 STOCKL, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophic. (Ed. Ill, Mainz, 1888). 
 
 (Trans, by Finlay, Dublin, 1887). 
 
 WEBER, History of Philosophy trans, by Thilly. (New York, 1896). 
 WINDELBAND, History of Philosophy trans, by Tufts. (New York, 1901). 
 UEBERWEG, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic. (Berlin, 1894). 
 GONZALEZ, Historia de la Filosofia. (Madrid, 1886). (French trans. 
 
 Paris, 1890-91). 
 
 TEICHMULLER, Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe. (Berlin, 1874). 
 50 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 51 
 
 EISLER, Worterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe. (Berlin, 1910). 
 
 ARLETH, in Archiv f. d. Geschichte d. Phil., VIII. 1, pp. 59-85, VIII, 2, pp. 
 
 190-205. 
 
 ZELLER, in Archiv. f. d. Geschichte d. Phil., VIII, 2, pp. 151-152. 
 HAMMOND, in Philosophical Review, Vol. IV. (July, 1895). 
 AVELING, in Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. III. (Cause.) 
 DRISCOLL, in Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I. (Animism,) 
 
VITA 
 
 The author of this dissertation, Sister Mary Thomas Aquinas 
 O'Neill, O. S. D., was born March 7, 1884, in Madison, Wisconsin. 
 She pursued her elementary studies in Saint Raphael's parochial 
 school of her native city under the direction of the Sisters of 
 Saint Dominic of Sinsinawa, Wisconsin. She was graduated from 
 the Madison High School in 1902. In 1904 she entered the 
 novitiate of the Sisters of Saint Dominic, at Sinsinawa, Wisconsin. 
 From 1906 to 1911 she taught in Saint Clara Academy, Sinsinawa, 
 and worked at intervals in the University of Chicago and in 
 Saint Clara College. In 1911 she began work at the Catholic 
 University of America, receiving the A. B. degree in 1912 and the 
 M. A. degree in 1913. 
 
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