■i' I "•■; 
 
 
 ""Hi- '■ •■' ■' '• 
 
 ..^•V'.T>-- 
 
 "' ' « ' '■-'■•■ 
 
 ■■•'-•- r-^-:> ' 
 
 
 1-15 f 
 
 
 .V ■•:t.' ■;:• '■•- - 
 
 • ..r4-v. 
 
 > f 
 
 
 ( •, ''it •• 
 
 I'fe^''- "■ 
 
 
THE SILVER POUND 
 
 AM) 
 
 KXCtLAND'S monetary policy since the RESTORATION; 
 
 TOGETHER WITH THE 
 
 HISTOr.y OF THE GUINEA, 
 
 ILLUSTRATED BY CONTEMPORARY DOCUMENTS. 
 
r 
 
 Tf tbo Qwonc's Majestic amend tlie eoijrne universally, there 
 shall trroo thorbv a great Connnoility to her, and the Kealnie ; 
 and also the greatest Honour and Reputaeion in the Wi>ri(I, 
 that ever came, not only to any rrincessc, bnt at any tyme to 
 any King of this Realmc. — Paget to Parry and Cecill, 1558. 
 
 Pace fundata, !Moncta ad justiim valorem redueta. 
 
 From the inscription upon ihe iomh of Queen Elizabeth, 
 in IVisimitister Abbey. 
 
THE SILVER POUND 
 
 AND 
 
 ENGLAND'S MONETARY POLICY SINCE 
 THE RESTORATION 
 
 TOGETHER WITH THB 
 
 HLSTORY OF THE GUINEA 
 
 ILLUSTRATED BV 
 
 CONTEMPOIIARY DOCUMENTS 
 
 By S. DANA HORTON 
 
 A DELEGATE OF THE UMTED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
 MONETARY CONFERENCES OF 1878 AND 1881 
 
 LONDON 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 
 1887 
 
^^ v\ 
 
 oHNERAL 
 
 Copyright hy 
 S. Dana Horton. 
 
 1887. 
 
 cmswiCK rnF.S8:-c. .vhittinouam am, co. tooks coukt, 
 
 CHANCEKT LANE. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface ix 
 
 Introduction. — On Certain Meanings of the Word "Standard" . xxi 
 
 Chapter I. 
 THE THREE STANDARDS. 
 
 § 1. The National Instrument of Valuation 1 
 
 § 2. The Standard of Desiderata 3 
 
 § 3. The Greater Standard of Value 6 
 
 Chapter II. 
 
 THE FALL OF PRICES AND ITS CAUSE. 
 
 § 4. The Rise in the Value of the Sovereign 10 
 
 § 5. The Cause of the Fall of Prices 13 
 
 § 6. Quantity-Theories and the Indo-European Conflict of Coinages . 20 
 
 Chapter IU. 
 ENGLAND'S RESPONSIBILITY AND ENGLAND'S INTEREST. 
 
 § 7. England's Responsibility for the Outlawry of Silver .... 28 
 
 § 8. England's Interest in the Reinfranchisemcnt of Silver ... 31 
 
 § 9. Scruples touching the Intervention of the State 33 
 
 Chapter IV. 
 
 TRANSCENDENTAL SDsGLE-METALLISM . . 40 
 
 Chapter V. 
 
 A LESSON OF HISTORY: THE MONETARY CRISIS OF 1G96. 
 
 § 11. The Rccoinage of 1696, and its bearing upon the Questions 
 
 of To-day 64 
 
 § 12. The Di-sordcrs of the Time and their Remedy 70 
 
 § 13. Locke and the Ratio of 15^ to 1 73 
 
 § 14. Newton on Silver and Gold 87 
 
 99476 
 
VI 
 
 Co7ite7its. 
 
 Chattkr VI. 
 
 A LESSON OF HISTORY (I'vntinned) : TIIK DESCFA'T TO 
 
 (;OLD. 
 
 Page 
 
 § 15. TIic Ratinp of the Guinea and Pistole in England .... 1>4 
 § 1<). Tlic English Monetary System and the Originality of the 
 
 Statesmen of the Kc'foinagc l(»f» 
 
 §17. The Guinea at 21 shillings 117 
 
 Chapter VII. 
 
 A LE.SSOX OF HISTORY {Continued): THE ABANDONMENT 
 OF THE SILVER POUND. 
 
 § 18. The Arguments of Lord Liverpool 1'2.5 
 
 §19. The Anti-Silver Statutes — Lord Liverpool's Sehcnie . . . 143 
 § 20. The Monetary Theories of Sir ^Villiam Petty, of Joseph 
 
 Harris, and of Sir Robert Peel 1G.5 
 
 Chapter VIII. 
 
 SILVER BEFORE ENGLISH PUBLIC OPINION. 
 
 § 21. The Status of Silver in England since 1816 IVI 
 
 § 22, International Concurrence in the Past and in the Present 192 
 
 Chapter IX. 
 NOTABLE ARGUMENTS AGAINST INTER-METALLIC PEACE. 
 
 § 23. Certain Theses of Professor Erwin Nasse 
 
 § 24. Silver Outlawry and the Manual -labour Classes . 
 
 § 25. Lions in the Path of the Reinstatement of Silver 
 
 § 26. A Dilatory Plea 
 
 200 
 203 
 206 
 
 212 
 
 Chapter X. 
 A MONETARY BALANCE OF POWER 
 
 21' 
 
Contents. vii 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 Till-: IIISTOPtY OF THE GUINEA, 
 
 Illustkatbd by Contemporary Documents. 
 
 CONTEXTS. 
 
 NO. PAGE 
 
 1. An Order for the Coinage of Guineas, December 24, 1663 . . '2*29 
 
 2. The Statute of Free and Gratuitous Coinage, 1666 (Extract) . 230 
 
 3. The Mint IndtMiture of Thomas Neale, 1686 (Extract) . . . 233 
 
 4. Silver before the House of Commons, April, 1690 234 
 
 5. Report of a Committee in Favour of Debasing the Coin, March 
 
 12, 1694-5 236 
 
 6. Petitions concerning Guineas at 30 Shillings, February, 1695-6 . 238 
 
 7. The Bank of Enghmd and the Guinea in Camp before Namur, 
 
 July, 1695 240 
 
 8. Statutes relating to Coinage and Currency of Guineas (1696): — 
 
 A. The Guinea at 26 Shillings 243 
 
 B. Suspension of Obligation to Coin Guineas 244 
 
 C. The Guinea at 22 Shillings 246 
 
 D. Repeal of Statute Suspending Obligation to Coin . . . 247 
 
 9. Action of the Treasury touching the Currency of the Guinea, 
 
 October, 1697 248 
 
 10. Letter of the Commissioners of Excise Touching the Rating of 
 
 the Guinea in 1694-6, July 22, 1698 249 
 
 11. John Locke and the Ratio of 15"58 to 1 : — 
 
 A. Order of Reference to the Council of Trade, Sept., 1698 250 
 
 B. Report on Lowering the Guinea 250 
 
 C. Orders to the Government Ollicers not to take Guineas for 
 
 more than 2\s. Gd 253 
 
 12. Listanccs of Contradiction between Statements of Doctrine in 
 
 Locke's Writings on Money, 1690-1698 255 
 
 13. A Private Letter of Locke touching the Recoinage, March 30, 
 
 1696 257 
 
viii Contenh 
 
 s. 
 
 MO. PAGE 
 
 14. "Memoirs of llic Greut Rccoinage," MS. by Hupton Ilayncs . 258 
 
 15. Reports Relating to the Coinage, MS. .signed by Sir Isaac- 
 
 Newton, 1700-1702: — 
 
 A. Report Tuueliing the Currency of the Frencli and Spanisli 
 
 ribtoles in Kngland, .J:uiiiai7 20, 1700-1 .... 2(11 
 
 B. Report coneerning tlie cutting of Counterfeit Money . 2(!2 
 
 C. Report Touching the late Change of Ratio in France, 
 
 September 28, 1701 2G3 
 
 D. Report Touching the Rating of the Guinea, etc., 7 July, 
 
 1702 264 
 
 E. The Value of CJold in Proportion to Silver in Several 
 
 Parts of Europe 207 
 
 V. Proposals for Preserving and Increasing the Silver Coin 
 
 of this Kingdom, Jidy 7, 1702 270 
 
 10. Order in Council, Lowering the Currency of Loui.s d'ors and 
 
 Pistoles to 17.S., Feb. 5, 1700-1 272 
 
 17. Minute of Orders to the Mint Olhccrs, Feb. 12, 1701 . . . 27.$ 
 
 18. Sir James Stcuart and Adam Smith on the English Standard, 
 
 1759 273 
 
 19. Biographical Notice of Lord Liverpool 275 
 
 20. Report of the Committee of the Privy Council on Coins, May 21, 
 
 1816 278 
 
 21. The Proclamations of the New Currency, 1817 281 
 
 HISTORICAL MATERIAL— MISCELL^INEOUS. 
 
 22. Contraction in 1818-1822 287 
 
 23. Alexander Baring (Lord Ashburton) on the Silver and Gold 
 
 Standard in England *2s8 
 
 24. The Restoration of Silver before the Bank of Endand in 1828 . 291 
 
 25. A Silver Discussion in 1837 294 
 
 26. Sir Robert Peel on the Standard of Value. ]VIay 6, 1844 . . . 297 
 
 27. ^lonetary Treaties in the Past 302 
 
 28. State Papers relating to the Policy of Monetary Union, 1878, 
 
 1881, 1882 .... 306 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 A TUEOiJY and a statute ' arc on ti-ial. Tlio constituency of 
 the theory has been world-wide, and the statute is a British 
 statute, but the law is no respecter of persons ; the issue 
 cannot be evaded — whether England does well to obstruct 
 the orderly establishment of the world's Money, by main- 
 taining the Disinherison of Silver ? 
 
 In slow progression her rulers approach the final hearing 
 of this cause : In 1876, a Select Committee of the House of 
 Commons on the Depreciation of Silver ; in 1878, and in 
 1881, Delegations to represent the British Empire in the 
 International ^lonetary Conferences at Paris; in 1885, a 
 Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade and Industry ; 
 in 188G, a Royal Commission on Gold and Silver : successive 
 
 ' Section XI. of " an Act to provide for a New Silver Coinage, and to 
 regulate the Currency of this Realm," 56 Geo. III. c. 68 (June 22, 1816), 
 is as follows : 
 
 " And whereas, at various times heretofore the Coins of this Realm of 
 Gold and Silver have been equally a legal Tender fur Payments to any 
 amount, and great Inconvenience has arisen from both those precious 
 Metals being concurrently the Standard Mea.sure of Value, and equivalent 
 ftir property: and it is expedient that the Gold Coin made according to 
 the Indentures of the Mint should henceforth be the sole Standard 
 Measure of Value and legal Ten<ler for Payment, without any Limitation 
 fif Amount, and tliat tiie Silver Coin should be a legal Tender to a limited 
 Amount only, for the Facility of Exchange and ('ommeree : 
 
 " Be it therefore enacted, That from and after the passing of this Act, 
 the Gold Coin of this Realm shall be and shall be considered and is hereby 
 declared to be the only legal Tender for Payments (except as hereinafter 
 providcil) within the United Kingdom of (Jrcat Britain and Ireland,'' 
 etc. etc. 
 
X Preface. 
 
 steps in diagnosis of general economic malady, wbicli point at 
 least toward active measures of cure. 
 
 A world is waiting for decision — or for solution of the pro- 
 blem of cure — a world not as once, cynical or indifTcrent, but 
 now expectant, and one may almost say, anxious. 
 
 The following work is a contribution to tlio argument and 
 to the evidence in this cause. 
 
 Tho immediate occasion of its preparation was an invita- 
 tion, with which I was honoured in 1885, to address tho 
 British Association for the Advancement of Science on " the 
 British Standard of Value.'' The request came from tho Com- 
 mittee of Section F (Economic Science and Statistics) for tho 
 meeting in Aberdeen, September, 1885. Professor Foxwell 
 did me tho kindness to select and read portions of a lengthy 
 address. That discourse has been revised and enlarged, and 
 the accompanying documents of proof and justification, so far 
 as they bore upon events in the present century, have received 
 some reinforcement. The researches into the history of tho 
 earlier period ^ embraced in my survey, were made in 1881 and 
 1882, and were a direct continuation of earlier explorations 
 in forgotten fields of monetary history, the results of which 
 were put in print, respectively, in a treatise on " Silver and 
 Gold" (1876), in a Discourse on " Tho Monetary Situation '* 
 (1878), in a partial Documentary History of Monetary Policy, 
 accompanied by notes and explanatory essays, which was 
 annexed to the Report of the Monetary Conference of 1878, 
 and in an open Letter to Professor Jevons, entitled " Sir 
 Isaac Newton and England's Prohibitive Tariflf on Silver 
 Money," in 1881. 
 
 The results of inquiry, purely historical, into tho past and 
 
 ' For facilitating them, it is my iigrccable duty to express my in(lcl>tc<l- 
 ncss to my former collea;:uc in tlie Mimetary Couforcucc of 1881, the Hon. 
 C. W. Frcmanllc, Deputy-Master of the Mint. 
 
Preface. xi 
 
 present of the English Standard, and of an examination of 
 controlling general theories, or principles of monetary legis- 
 lation, are here presented in their bearing upon the Disinhe- 
 rison of Silver. Tho reason of this joinder of subjects is 
 apparent : for those active measures of cure for existing 
 evils, to which allusion has just been made, can be none other 
 than tho Reinstatement of Silver to its former position as 
 Money, by joint action of nations ; and the connection 
 between this proposal and the attitude of England toward 
 Silver, is plainly vital. This is true not merely because 
 other nations regard such joint action as impracticable unless 
 England takes proper part in it, but because if England's 
 omission to join is politic, in England's interest, then doubt 
 is cast upon tho wisdom of the proposed joint action on 
 the part of other nations. This proposal has been out- 
 standing ever since 1878. It was formally enacted by tho 
 Congress of the United States in that year, and presented to 
 the nations in a Monetary Conference in Paris ; and it was 
 repeated by France and the United States jointly in 1881. 
 The most important subject in the history of English Money 
 is thus the most pertinent phase of the great monetary 
 question of the age. 
 
 The present pertinence of this historical inquiry is further 
 enhanced by the peculiar need of securing precision — and, 
 especially, of guarding against overstatement — in making 
 the demand of present reform known to the English public. 
 In this direction much is, of course, to be gained by placing 
 the desired future modifications of English law into their due 
 perspective and relation to English doctrine and English law 
 — both as they have been, and as they are to-day. There 
 is also much to be gained in point of precision, through 
 an improved nomenclature ; for words are good servants, but 
 bad masters, and the words " Gold Standard " and " l^i- 
 metallism," which seem to bo in the ascendant in popular 
 
xii Preface. 
 
 discussion, leave much to be desired in point of clearness. 
 WTiile using the word " Standard " in the following pages, as 
 an inevitable portion of English speech, I have endeavoured to 
 restrict its power of misleading, by a rigorous course of defini- 
 tion, — an original analysis of its meanings, coupled -vvith 
 historical examples of their application. 
 
 This analysis and definition become the basis of a classifica- 
 tion of Money as an object of state policy ; and, by devising or 
 adopting distinct terms or names, I have endeavoured to 
 individualize certain cloudy and wandering notions which 
 have much obscured the field of vision. It rests in the 
 discretion of others to grant that co-operation which is needed 
 to naturalize these distinctions in the terminology of Money. 
 
 It will, I believe, become apparent that by this method, 
 beside obtaining a guarantee for present clearness of discourse, 
 I have succeeded in throwing light upon opinion and action 
 in the remoter past, and have established a certain order and 
 continuity in the comparison of monetary policy at different 
 periods of history. A salient instance will advise the reader 
 of the importance of this course. 
 
 The contrast between Single Standard and Double Standard 
 plays the most important part in modern discussion. Here, 
 in fact, is the line of battle along which the opposing forces of 
 Babel-tongued controversy have been arrayed. 
 
 Nevertheless, the facts which I shall set forth, show 
 that in spite of authority on either side, in spite of decades 
 of conflict and myriad outpourings of thought in print and 
 speech, this antithesis is quite fallacious. Indeed, as I shall 
 show, the English j^Ionetary System was for centuries a Single 
 Standard and a Double Standard at the same time. 
 
 Now as I read the story of the past, mistakes parallel to 
 this are found, upon critical examination, to be, historically, 
 the efiiciont cause of the present state of the law and opinion 
 which support the Exclusion of Silver in England. The 
 
Preface. xiii 
 
 " Treatise on the Coins of the Realm ^' of Lord Liverpool 
 (1805), the Act of Parliament of 1816, the views of Sir 
 Robert Peel (1819-1844), and the work of Metrical Coinage 
 Reform, which, in the decade 1857-1867, fixed the later fashion 
 of thought, are to an important extent, so far as they support the 
 Exclusion of Silver, — successive steps in a gradual accretion 
 of error ; or in the building up of a structure, a goodly part 
 of whose beams and pillars are errors of theory resting upon 
 errors of fact. 
 
 In their origin these errors of fact chiefly relate to events and 
 ideas connected with that elder System of the Silver Standard 
 and Dual Money, which was formally replaced in 181 G. Indeed, 
 a gulf seems to have separated the present century from the 
 knowledge of earlier times ; as if the memory of the monetary 
 past had been swept away by the tide of Paper Money (1797- 
 1821) ; only so much being saved as was contained in Lord 
 LivcrpooFs " Treatise on the Coins of the Realui.^' 
 
 In the following pages the effort is made to establish the 
 lines of historical communication thus broken, to take up the 
 work as Lord Liverpool left it, in 1805 — to examine the 
 claims of his treatise ^ to the position it has held as the In- 
 stitutes, if not also the Pandects, of English Monetary Right — 
 and, so fiir as may be, to supplement its defects by new 
 evidence and arfjuraent. 
 
 'O' 
 
 The direct bearing of these investigations upon the prac- 
 tical issue of to-day — namely, whether Parliament shall put an 
 end to the Disinherison of Silver — will depend, for each 
 reader, upon the importance which he ascribes to the efficient 
 causes of the order of things under which he lives : for — so 
 far as I can estimate the probability — this order of things 
 never would have existed but for these errors of fact. 
 
 ' The citations throiiKhoiit this work rffcr to tlic edition of lfi4<i. 
 
xiv Preface. 
 
 It was in the conduct of that elder System of the Silver 
 Standard and the rated Guinea, that the main principles of 
 monetary Ic^slation were established in England. The 
 dedication of this volume is but an expression of the esti- 
 mate I place upon the work of those who did most to give 
 those principles strength and consistency. That these elder 
 counsellors of England found room within England's borders 
 to deal with the Duality of Metal and Unity of ^loney upon a 
 plan which, in their narrow field, recognized the international 
 elements of the monetary problem, is an assurance that their 
 enlightenment — to the %'indication of which it is my privilege 
 to contribute — will in due time be emulated in a world-wide 
 field by their successors in that office. 
 
 It is but justice to the various monetary writers, past or 
 present, from whose conclusions I have here to express my 
 dissent, to admit that my position is based not merely upon 
 new argument, but also, to some extent, upon new evidence, 
 which fortunate researches have enabled me to discover ; to 
 the benefits of which — as giving what in a Court of Law would 
 be ground for a new trial — my opponents are equally entitled 
 with myself. 
 
 It is also fitting that I should draw the reader's attention to 
 certain documents which form part of this evidence. That 
 this volume presents to the public a reprint of ^fonetary 
 Reports from original manuscripts in the hand of Newton, and 
 that it also contains a Report signed by Locke, and the author- 
 ship of which is fairly to be ascribed to him, assures it an 
 interest which is quite independent of anything else it may 
 contain. The same remark applies in a difl'crent degree to an 
 appeal from the Governors of the Bank of England, sent from 
 Antwerp in July, 1G95, to the King of England, then in com- 
 mand of the armies besieging Namur, which reveals a monetary 
 and financial situation of peculiar interest. 
 
Preface. 
 
 XV 
 
 In thus setting fortli the later course of history, in whicli 
 the English Law-maker has been called upon to deal with 
 Money, I have sought to regard the various practical situa- 
 tions thus described, in the light of various leading truths or 
 principles, whose existence, or whose relative importance, are 
 not unlikely to be ignored. 
 
 This distinctively practical point of view has been over- 
 shadowed to a greater extent than is generally supposed, 
 the more usual course having been to regard Money chiefly 
 in its character of a broad debatable ground of economics, 
 rather than as an established institution of the state, or as a 
 concrete object of legislative amendment, at the hands of a 
 majority. To this cause is perhaps to be ascribed the fact 
 that in some minds there is a certain unwillingness to accept 
 the elementary thesis that Money is an integral part of the 
 province of Government, and that the duty is incumbent upon 
 the State to regulate this institution with a view to the general 
 weal ; and the same remark will apply to the consequences 
 which grow out of these truths. 
 
 Among the objects of ^lonetary Legislation none are more 
 important than those which have been slighted in the refusal 
 of England to give adequate co-operation with other nations 
 in arresting the chaotic course of events, caused by the Out- 
 lawry of Silver ; in producing which, England has been the 
 prime mover. 
 
 Through this course certain elementary desiderata of mone- 
 tary policy have been neglected, namely, stability in the value 
 — the average Purchasing Power — of a National Money, and 
 the maintenance of parity between it and other Monetary 
 Systems. 
 
 To the evils of the economic situation in England since 
 1873 — a reduction of the ratio of profitable activity in 
 various departments of production and of exchange, and an 
 iniquitous revolution of pecuniary conditions through the 
 
xvi Prefacr. 
 
 general depreciation of vendible things — England's consent 
 to remove the ban against Silver, offered the one practicable 
 and legitimate means of prevention or of cure. 
 
 It should bo needless to observe that these evils could not 
 have been entirely prevented, and that they cannot all be cured. 
 Nor is human knowledge equal to the task of divining the 
 precise percentage of harm which could be averted, any more 
 than a Board of Health can ascertain the exact figures of mor- 
 tality which can be prevented by some wise plan of sanitation. 
 This fact has never been held, in England, to warrant the 
 rejection of measures to promote health ; that is to say, 
 health in the purely physical sense. Economic health, how- 
 ever, has stood on a dififercnt plane. 
 
 Among the obstacles to action on England's part in the 
 direction referred to, inertia, heedlessness, and perhaps, in 
 some instances, a sordid and short-sighted self-interest, form an 
 aiTay which can only be dispersed or won over by agitation ; 
 but, of course, the obstacles with which a book can deal are 
 only those which take the form of articulate opposition. 
 
 If we count among the latter the natural disposition to 
 " stand by the old Standard," or " the existing order of 
 things," it is germane to prove, as is done in the following 
 pages, that it is not the Gold Standard which is the object 
 of attack, it is merely the Exclusion of Silver. There need 
 be no " change of the Standard " in the truest sense of the 
 word. The Gold Standard can be maintained ; Gold can 
 remain the Standard Measure of Value, the controlling 
 Money, without excluding Silver. To object that this idea is 
 novel is merely to prove that it is important. 
 
 An important place in the field of academic contention is 
 occupied by the doctrines of Unity of Standard and of non- 
 intervention of the State. The latter, in the form of an alleged 
 incapacity of Parliament, is quite disposed of by proof that 
 
Preface. xvii 
 
 England is really the home of artificial regulation of Money, 
 so that the principle which is alleged to be " artificial " is 
 in reality " natural " to English statesmanship. The results 
 of its application having been approved by the experience 
 of centuries, there is something peculiar in the efi'ort to call 
 a halt at this particular time. 
 
 Touching the doctrine of Unity of Standard, some sugges- 
 tion has already been made of misapprehensions which have 
 had currency with reference to the elder form in which it 
 appeared, and it is my privilege to deprive it of the chief 
 guarantees of authority which have been allowed to recom- 
 mend it in this century, among which is the name of John 
 Locke. In its latest form of an ascription of mysterious 
 sanctity to Gold Coin, it is an indirect ofi'shoot of the agitation 
 in favour of extending the Metric System. It was quite 
 natural for adepts in the exact sciences to fix their atten- 
 tion upon a coin as a physical weight and measure, and 
 to avoid that other arduous field of study which deals >vith 
 the institution of Money, and with the economic effects of 
 political action relating to it. Through this breach came 
 error ; for the important class of learned men interested in this 
 enlightened movement were, unconsciously, enlisted in favour 
 of an impracticable aim ; and in the pursuit of an impossible 
 Unity of Material, the disruption of an actual and beneficent 
 Unity of Money was encouraged. 
 
 This, however, is but an evanescent fashion of thought. 
 IIow slight its hold is on England can, perhaps, most 
 simply be shown by the fact that Sir J. F. W. Herschel pre- 
 ferred the Silver Standard to Gold, and a Binary Standard to 
 either. That one of the first names of the century, the 
 greatest man of science, since Newton, who has been Master 
 of the Mint, could utter this doctrine in 185:3, in London, 
 while in office, publicly, before a Royal Commission, shows 
 that the roots of the doctrine which flourished at the Monetary 
 Conforeice of 18r>7 are very near the surface. 
 
 h 
 
xviii Preface. 
 
 " But surely," it will be said, " those wise statesmen who 
 established England's system were not wholly at fault in the 
 Exclusion of Silver." Certainly not ! They were dealing 
 with facts as they then were, not with facts as they are now. 
 And the world went very well then, comparatively speaking. 
 Lord Overstone's doctrine that a metallic currency \vill take 
 care of itself, could safely enough be relied upon, so long 
 as other nations took good care of England's Money by keep- 
 ing the peace and par between the Metals. Neither he nor 
 Sir Robert Peel nor Lord Liverpool contemplated laying a 
 general embargo on Silver ; nor did the law which was 
 actually adopted in 1816 — still less did the scheme that Lord 
 Liverpool proposed — bar the door to an extended monetary 
 use of Silver in England. 
 
 Detailed consideration is further given to some of the 
 current objections touching that joint action of nations which 
 awaits England's concurrence : and to the means which are 
 used to obscure the view of the entire pi'acticability of this 
 work of economic sanitation : the restoration of permanent 
 order — in which all have an interest — in the place of chaos, in 
 which no ono has a serious interest. 
 
Co tfje a^cmot^ 
 
 OF 
 
 SOMERS, MONTAGUE, NEWTON, LOCKE, 
 
 Monetary Counsellors of England. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ON CERTAIN MEANINGS OF THE WORD STANDARD. 
 
 Some op the Various Meanings Attached to the word 
 " Standard/' when used in Monetary Discussion. 
 
 No. 1. The fineness of Money-metals, or proportion of pure 
 metal to cheap alloy. 
 
 No. 2. The fineness proscribed by law for a coin. 
 
 No. 3. The weight prescribed by law for a coin. 
 
 No. 4. The National Unit of Account, regarded as a de- 
 nomination, name, or title, as distinguished from 
 what may, at various times, be its body or substance. 
 
 No. 5. The National Unit of Coinage, being the body and 
 substance of what I call the Unit of Account. 
 
 No. 6. The Full-Legal-Tcndcr Money of a country. 
 
 No. 7. The kind of such Money chiefly in use (the chief coin 
 in use). 
 
xxii Introduction. 
 
 No. H. The kind of Mouoy, the manufacture of which is free, 
 and which maintains or controls tlie par of the 
 ^Moneys of a country, or with which the other 
 kinds of Money are kept at par. 
 
 No. l>. The Monetary System of a country, in general terms. 
 
 The application of these distinctions to law and fact in 
 England's monetary history will occupy not a few pages of 
 the following work, and full comparison -vN-ill be made of 
 the meaninera here distinofuishod with ideas and forms of 
 statement current in modern days. 
 
 In the meantime, it will, perhaps, serve the reader's con- 
 venience, if an illustration be given, drawn from actual facts 
 of to-day, but remote from the field of present controversy ; 
 which requirement can be met as follows : 
 
 ILLUSTRATION. 
 The Kingdom of Holland. 
 
 What is the Dutch Standard ? It is, according to 
 
 Meaning 
 
 No. 2. Nine hundred and forty-five thousandths. 
 
 No. 3. 9.45 gr. of Silver, and .GO-l-S gr. of Gold, to the Gulden. 
 
 No. k The Gulden. 
 
 No. 5. The Silver Gulden (at least, as I understand the mat- 
 ter ; I am not informed of any statute explicitly 
 wnthdrawing this character from the Silver Gulden, 
 though, by the suspension of its coinage in 1S75, 
 it has been thrown into what I may name a state of 
 suspended animation) . 
 
 No. G. Silver and Ciold. 
 
Introduction. xxiii 
 
 Meaning 
 
 No. 7. Silver. 
 
 No. 8. Gold. 
 
 No. 9. Nondescript ; tlio " Limping Standard." To describe 
 the Money of Holland adequately, it is necessary to 
 state that the Coinage of Gold is free for all ; 
 that Silver Coinage is now a right of the govern- 
 ment, the exercise of which is suspended ; coins of 
 both metals are Full-Legal-Tcndor; there is a great 
 stock of Silver-coin ; very little Gold ; but all 
 Moneys at par with Gold. 
 
 Speaking only in general terms, then, Holland has, all at 
 the same time : 
 
 No. 5. A Silver Standard. 
 
 No. G. A Silver and Gold Standard. 
 
 No. 7. A Silver Standard. 
 
 No. 8. A Gold Standard. 
 
 No. 9. A Limping Standard. 
 
ERRATA. 
 
 Page 35, line 1, for '" pajre v " read '' pairc ix ". 
 
 „ 46, „ 18, for " page xv " read " page xxi ". 
 
 „ 80, „ 1. for " tlie preceding" read " a preceding." 
 
 „ 93. „ 21, /or " liy the " read " by." 
 
 „ 101, „ 22, dele " late." 
 
 „ 108, „ 16, /or '• 169»" read'' 1699." 
 
 „ 108, „ 2], for " 15."" read " IS."*." 
 
 „ 110, „ \2,for " 14.*"" read" 14.*'." 
 
 „ 112, „ 10, for " dearer " read " more valuable." 
 
 „ 124, „ 16, for " weighty " read " mighty." 
 
 „ 132, „ 24, for " No. 8 " read " No. 5." 
 
 „ 135, „ 16, for " object" read " ground." 
 
 „ 143, „ 23, for " the man " read " a man." 
 
 „ 156, „ 18, for " seigniorage" read '* brassage." 
 
 „ 174, „ 4, for " No. 7 " read " No. 6." 
 
 „ 174, „ 5, ybr " No. 6" read " No. 7." 
 
 „ 190, „ 32, for " shall not be " read " shall be." 
 
 „ 199, „ 2, /or "1886" reorf" 1887." 
 
 „ 248, 253, 272, read "Return March 11." 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 TuE Three Standauds. 
 
 § 1. THE NATIONAL INSTKUMENT OF VALUATION. 
 
 To the mind of RicarJo it a])peared an axiom that '' com- 
 modities measure the value of Money, as Money measures the 
 value of commodities." 
 
 This proposition, so self-evident to a mind like Ricardo's, 
 seems not to be self-luminous to the degree desirable for the 
 practical management of the business of government; to 
 many minds, like other truths of monetary science, it lacks tho 
 glow of inherent obviousness. Were this not the case, it would 
 bo supei'fluous, in approaching the very important and very 
 practical question which is the subject of our discourse, to 
 explore the recondite foundations above which, as upon 
 solid earth, the practice of nations and the languages of 
 men are wont to proceed in dealing with the subject of 
 Money. But, as human nature is constituted, such exploration 
 is, unfortunately, a crying need. Upon the generation now 
 living has fallen the duty of rebuilding a monetary structure 
 that has been visited by earthquake. Though this duty 
 strains the strength of the interpreters of science, there is no 
 escape from it ; the present generation owes it to itself, for its 
 own present happiness and good name, and not merely as a 
 benefaction to posterity, to meet and solve the problems in its 
 path. 
 
 At such a time, reasoning upon standards of value, whether 
 
2 The TJiree Stayidards. 
 
 standards of tho value of commodities or of the value of Money, 
 needs all available support to establish, not merely the security 
 of its foundations vertically, if 1 may borrow tho figure, but 
 also to deternnno the strain in each direction which its pillars 
 are able to sustain ; that is to say, to make special precaution 
 against misunderstanding. 
 
 Hence tho importance of first clearing tho ground of ter- 
 minology, of establishing the sense in which words are to bo 
 used, of which tho reader of these lines has seen a recognition 
 in the introductory pages of this work. 
 
 Passing beyond the list there given of meanings of tho word 
 *' Standard," to consider the sense of tho phrase " British Stan- 
 dard of Value," wo shall find it, in its turn, a compoimd, open 
 to analysis and separation into outl^-ing thoughts. But in 
 completing a survey of tho subject, which I hope may servo 
 as a rough map of the labyrinth of Money, I am not unmindful 
 of tho penalties imposed by laws which I respect, upon him 
 who shall seek to disturb a land-mark ; nor am I lacking in sen- 
 sitiveness to a truth, which I was once glad to unearth, like a 
 diamond, glittering with the polish of Mirabeau's VNnt, namely : 
 " That it is not worth while to search out a new definition of 
 Money in order to introduce another error into the world." ' 
 I shall not attempt to give a definition of Money in the 
 ordinary senso ; tho views I present are essentially practical. 
 I shall assume that a Monetary System exists j that its main- 
 tenance is a duty of the State ; that the function of a " standard 
 of value " is of great importance. I seek merely to gain certain 
 general points of view from which the various conditions 
 favourable to tho adequate fulfilment of that function can be 
 discerned in duo perspective. 
 
 A consideration of the conflict and confusion, to a part of 
 which I venture to hope the list of meanings of tho word 
 " Standard " affords a clue, may perhaps lead some minds to 
 
 ' "Observations Prrliiiiiiiiiires snr le Rapport du Coinito (U's Monnoies," 
 etc. Piiiis. 171)0. Docninoiit of the C'onfcrnico of 1H78, p. "297. 
 
Sect. 1.] The National Instrument of Valuation. 3 
 
 welcome the phrase '' National Instrument of Valuation," as a 
 useful alternative for " Standard of Value " in the concrete 
 sense, and so as a servant of correct thought. I shall in tho 
 next pages note the lines of classification through which we 
 distinguish two other Standards of Value, (juite distinct from 
 the National Instrument of Valuation ; to which, claiming tho 
 right of an explorer in those fields, which, though old, are 
 ever now, I have ventured to give names, calling them " The 
 Standard of Desiderata " and " Tho Greater Standard of 
 Value." 
 
 § 2. THE STANDARD OF DESIDERATA. 
 
 Those commodities, of which Ricardo was speaking, which 
 are to measure the value of Money, must bo selected com- 
 modities. 
 
 If this bo not tho case, each vendible thing will bo on an 
 eciuality with all other vendible things, in measuring tho value 
 of Money. Beagles are vendible in England, but if a dofj-- 
 cpidcmic and a turn of fashion should (juintuplo the price of 
 beagles, no one would think that the purchasing power of tho 
 sovereign had fallen, while if wheat should rise to many pounds 
 sterling the quarter, a convulsion would ensue, in which the 
 whole world would share. 
 
 What, then, is the basis of selection of these commodities 
 which are to be united to form a just measure of the value 
 of Money ? What is to fix their relative standing ? Is it 
 fjuantity (weight, bulk, or number), or the number of times 
 they are exchanged before being consumed, oi- the length of 
 time they are in use, or their relative importance, as necessities 
 of complex modern life ? Are materials to bo counted botli 
 in their raw, and in their manufactured, state ? Arc land and 
 wages to be taken into account? Is tin; prevalent rate of 
 interest at all entitled to be considered ? ( )ii determining 
 
4 The Three Standards. 
 
 which, or wliethcr all, of these factors are to enter into the 
 result, in what exact numerical strength are they to marshal 
 themselves ? 
 
 Evidently, whatever the ground of selection, this new 
 iertium comparationis is a mental product of statistical lore and 
 of computation, a conglomerate of things desired, a conven- 
 tional, artificially compounded, body of heterogeneous objects 
 which men desire to buy ; it is for this that I have thought 
 " Standard of Desiderata" an appropriate name.' 
 
 It seems plain that in order to attain an ideally correct 
 composition of this measure — after some preliminary questions 
 ' of selection are settled — a combination must be sought of what 
 I may call averages ; an average community, or an average 
 man ; an average of his or their desires ; and some plan of 
 equalization must be devised in order to eliminate the dis- 
 parities between the qualities of various things succeeding each 
 other in n&e, or arising from the growth of new needs, tlie 
 creation of new objects, or from a change of demand for them 
 in the transformations of time. 
 
 I am not aware that this work has been done : — no conven- 
 tion has yet sex'iously sought to establish this conventional 
 standard : the organic law of a Standard of Desiderata is still 
 a desideratum. The subject seems to lack its devotees, though 
 the memory of much that has been achieved already, encom-ages 
 the belief that such devotees will appear in time. 
 
 At this point I must present an humble disclaimer. I have 
 no practical contribution to make here to the lore of " Index 
 Numbers," which is the peculiar name through which the 
 Standard of Desiderata seems to be best known to-day. I 
 have no message to give hvvo touching the composition of 
 this Standard, the chemistry of this sun of the monetary 
 firmament. 
 
 It is, however, germane for me to make, in passing, my 
 
 ' A riiaptcT (if ii Trciitise on " Silver iinfi fiold " (Cincinnati, Robert 
 Clarke & Co., 1876-7) bears this tiiK>. 
 
Sect. 2.] The Standard of Desiderata. 5 
 
 Galilean profession of faith by saying, " it is the sun, and the 
 world of ^Money turns round it." As is the sun in tlie heavens 
 a fact, although its composition he the problem of every age, 
 so, if I may borrow the comparison for those humble uses, the 
 monetary sun shines to-day as it has shone in the past, though 
 we should wait till the XXth century ere a worthy catalogue 
 be made of its elements. It marks, in fact, the inevitable 
 dividing lino, or point of departure, of movements the general 
 character of which (whether dimly or clearly) is perceptible 
 to every intelligent citizen. To the layman, as to the econo- 
 mist, its general position is known; it is spoken of in the 
 counting-house as well as in the study. AV'hoever speaks of 
 Expansion or of Contraction, of a General Rise or of a General 
 Fall of Prices, of the Purchasing Power of Money, of Appre- 
 ciation ' or of Depreciation of Money, is, whether consciously 
 
 ' Tlie words "appreciation" ami '" (lopreciaticn " ajiplicd to Money 
 (to a Standard or to Money-metal), have of late years occasionally been 
 the objects of a fallacy-breeding use, which it is perliaps worth wliile to 
 mention. 
 
 The plain meaning of appreciation is the rise, let us say, of (iokl rela- 
 tively to thinjrs vendible, which takes place as prices fall; depreciation is 
 that fall of Gold which takes place as prices rise. The fallacious use I 
 speak of, comes from the effort to appropriate the words for certain special 
 instances of rise or fall of prices ; so that, for example, they shall only be 
 used when the speaker thinks the change has been produced by certain 
 special causes, or when he thinks it is permanent, or that it is progressive. 
 
 This use is, in my judgment, unscientific and indefensible, because it 
 diverts from two useful words their ii;itiiriil signification — of a Rise 
 or Fall of the Turchasing Power of Money, and offers in exchange no 
 clearness of opinion as to the points just referred to; but in place of such 
 clearness, erects a blind, or masked defence against understanding. If any- 
 one is of opinion that some special order of prices has been neglected in the 
 account which goes to form an " Index Xuraber," or that certain causes have 
 been at work which deserve to be specially mentioned, or that the present 
 is but one stage of a certain process, it is an obvious remark that he has 
 but to say so ; and that he can hai-dly say so to any good purpose by un- 
 dermining the plain comnicn-'^ciise meaning of " appreciation " or " depre- 
 ciation." 
 
{} The Three Standards. 
 
 or not, speaking of a Standard of Desiderata, however form- 
 less his idea of its constitution. 
 
 The question of adjustment, therefore, of equivalence be- 
 tween the Actual, and the Ideal, Standard of a country, is 
 always in order, as a matter of scientific interest, though 
 seldom rising into the range of attention as an element of 
 political calculation. Our suljject cannot be fully, cannot bo 
 adequately, discussed, without raising the question — how closely 
 does the Bntish Instrument of Valuation, the body of Money 
 used in Great Britain, adhere to a " Standard of Desiderata ? " 
 In other words, how far does the Gold coin of England, which, 
 by reason of the Law of 18 IG (re-enacted in substance in 
 1870), aflbrds the sole " Standard Measure of Value" fulfil, on 
 an average over proper periods of time, the most important 
 functions of a Measure and of an Equivalent ? 
 
 § 3. THE GREATER STANDARD OP VALUE. 
 
 We have seen that it follows from Ricardo's axiom, that 
 the stability of the legal, and hence customary, instrument of 
 valuation, the Money of a country, is merely another term for 
 the constancy of the general level of prices expressed in it. 
 
 But this level of prices, in England, how exclusively is it 
 under British jurisdiction? How much more so than is the 
 level of the sea that washes Britain's shores ? In time of 
 calm the English Channel may easily bo regarded as indepen- 
 dent of the Northern Ocean or of the Bay of Biscay, and they, 
 in their tuiu, of all the continent-embracin<' seas; but thou<rht 
 dispels this forgetfulness of fluidity and of gravitation, which 
 make the sea-level one and continuous the world around. Is 
 it a violent statement to affirm that there is an analogous 
 oneness and continuity in the world's ^loney, though the sea 
 of ^loncy has its colours, the yellow, the white ? To my view, 
 at least, the mass of Gold coin in England has been, is, and 
 
Sect. 3.] The Greater Standard of Value. 7 
 
 remains a tract of sea that keeps its local level (as compared 
 with things vendible) , because of the lateral support of circum- 
 jacent tracts of Money. 
 
 English valuations, whatever the legal material for tho 
 Standard in England, are sempiternally dependent, laterally, 
 upon foreign Moneys, as well as, vertically, upon that tract of 
 coin upon which the English arms are displayed. 
 
 Wo thus disengage the idea of a Standard of Value in a 
 broader sense, which I have called the " Greater Standard," 
 as the sum total of National Instruments of Valuation, tho 
 Money of tho world. Of this Greater Standard, the distinc- 
 tively British Instrument of Valuation is but a part. In an 
 important sense, therefore, these British valuations are indi- 
 rectly expressed in terms of the Greater Standard of Value. 
 
 We note further that, inasmuch as no nation can own more 
 than a fraction of all existing Money, the centre of gravity of 
 each local-national monetary system must be outside of the 
 nation that uses it. The perfection of far-sighted policy, 
 then, is to be realized only by keeping the National Instrument 
 of Valuation in accord with the National Standard of Deside- 
 rata, and this can only be done by a favouring adjustment of 
 the Greater Standard of Value, the Money of the world. ^ In 
 its wider range, therefore, monetary policy is essentially a 
 matter of foreign, as well as of domestic policy ; a policy 
 always holding in view the adjustment of foreign tracts of 
 Money, if I may so strain the word, as well as the condition of 
 things at home ; or if we express it in a more practical way, a 
 matter of adjustment of complex international relations looking 
 to the maintenance of a certain stability of averages of price. 
 
 It must be well observed that the statement just made, 
 while entitled to the dignity of a " principle," and worthy to 
 hold guidance of legislation in tho rare instances when mono- 
 
 ' "Silver and Gold," Chapter VI., and "Monetary Situation" (1878), 
 Cliapter I., § 3, "That Money is an Institution not of one nation, but of 
 the world." 
 
8 Tlie Three Stimdards. 
 
 taryla-ws nro to be passed, yet claims attention in our argument 
 here as fact. 
 
 It is indifTcrent to what extent, in any century, English- 
 men, wliether connected or not vritli Parliament or Bank, or 
 Treasury, or Exchequer, have appreliendcd this truth lam seek- 
 ing to set fortli. The point to which I ask attention is that tho 
 truth existed. This foreign and lateral support of Money has 
 always been in place. Was there ever, I ask "nnth confidence, 
 a time when tho withdrawal of this support would not liavo 
 meant disarray for England's valuations ; that ia to say, wlien 
 a failure of the mines or a demonetization of either metal, or 
 similar interruption of normal supply and demand outside of 
 England, would not have introduced disorders into England ? 
 I think not. Now, this foreign and lateral support did not 
 exist solely " by the grace of God.'' Xo " law of nature " was 
 in force for its benefit; it vras not there by virtue of gravi- 
 tation, nor of cohesion, nor of chemical affinity; it was thero 
 because men so willed, and laws were made accordingly ; and 
 thus it appears that England was beholden to these men who 
 wnlled the things that were for her benefit, and made the laws 
 which maintained the security of her valuations. 
 
 I venture to think there is here a general truth, pointing 
 backward over past centuries, as well as forward to the future, 
 which deserves a permanent place, and a place of honour, in 
 the learning or doctrine of ^loney. 
 
 Upon the practical importance of a recognition of this truth 
 I liavo already indicated an opinion. Whether England in 
 the past was aware of this interest of hers, is a question fen- 
 the curious ; but that she should be clearly conscious of it to- 
 day is a matter of tho first importance. 
 
 So long as the constitution of the world's ^f oney was favour- 
 able, so long as the Greater Standard of Value was so adjust(Ml 
 as to promote justice and prosperity for Englishmen, tho prac- 
 tical statesman could safely leave things as they were, so far 
 as the immediate present was concerned, and perhaps could 
 
Sect. 3.] TJie Greater Standard of Value. 9 
 
 safely take the current reasoning on the subject for granted. 
 The utility of recognizing the truth in question rose to tho 
 first rank only when tho precedent of centuries was aban- 
 doned, when the constitution of the world's Money became 
 unftivourable. But the truth is not dependent upon the utility, 
 and can bo more easily seen in its due perspective from tho 
 standpoint of tlie past. To-day the Greater Standard of Value, 
 through ill-advised tampering vnth. important classes of 
 national instruments of valuation, has in fact ftillen into a 
 pitiful state of mal-adjustinent. The further course of this 
 work will throw light upon the extent of the harm done. 
 
 In the meantime we may conveniently note here that this 
 Greater Standard of Value, upon which the valuations of 
 England have always been dependent, is a Compound Standard. 
 Tho world's Money — its Measure of Value and Equivalent for 
 Property — is Silver and Gold. It always comprised — it still 
 comprises — both tho precious metals. As for the future, I 
 can safely challenge to-day — so far has conviction proceeded 
 — the sincerity of foresight to discern a future when it will 
 not comprise both metals. When, indeed, is Silver to cease 
 everywhere to be Money, Full-Legal-Tender Money, freely- 
 coinable Money ? Whatever Englishmen have done, or may 
 do, the Standard of Value in which they have had, have, and 
 will continue to have, the heaviest stake is in large part 
 Silver. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Fall of Pijices and its Cause. 
 
 § k the rise in the value op the sovereign. 
 
 That tbo British Instrument of Valuation, tho Standard 
 Measure of Value and Equivalent for Property, has expanded 
 of late years in value — that is to say, in purchasing power — 
 is a fact so generally known that wo can without further 
 preface ask for the accredited estimates of the extent of tho 
 rise. Those directly in view at the date when this work was 
 substantially written (1885) will be presented, ^vith an indi- 
 cation of the subsequent course of prices, but without de- 
 tails. As for a date to be compared with 1885, 1875 offers 
 itself as a natural term of comparison. Without going into 
 recondite questions of tho average duration of " a business,^' 
 or of an investment, it will bo admitted that we shall have an 
 idea " how things stand " if wo compare tho state of affairs of 
 ten years ago with those of to-day, and that, in any case, it 
 would be a mistake to neglect a decennial period, entirely, for 
 one either longer or shorter. As authority we can interrogate 
 Mr. Gillcn, in his article in the " Contemporary Review " of 
 June, 1885, and can conveniently compare two current and 
 accepted approximations to tho Standard of Desiderata which 
 are set forth by him. 
 
 Accordintr to the method of Mr. Ncwmarch, the " Index 
 Number "for 1875 is 2,778 ; for 1885,2,098. Mr. Giffon's 
 ovra Index Number for Exports gives (65.^ -J- 8."^) 7i*^ for 
 1875 and (G5.^— 5.°') 59/'' for 1883 ; his Index Number for 
 
Sect. 4.] The Rise of the Sovereign. 1 1 
 
 Imports gives (81."' + .-') 81." for 1875 and (81.^''— 9.") 
 71." for 1883; to which figures an allowance must bo added 
 for a downward movement to 1885. 
 
 We have, then, from the method of Mr. Newmarch a fall of 
 (2t.7°/o) 24°/o in round numbers, while exports and imports 
 show a fall of several per cent, more than 19 and 12 respec- 
 tively. It may safely bo assumed that the figures of Mr. New- 
 march, devised to represent the valuo of Money iu England, 
 arc more likely than either imports or exports to be near the 
 Standard of Desiderata for tho whole country, and we can 
 therefore accept, for tho temporary purposes of our discussion, 
 a full of 24°/o in average prices, a rise of 24°/^ in the value of 
 tho Pound Sterling, between 1875 and 1885. For tho years 
 since 1885 tho same authorities indicate a further rise. 
 
 We can picture to our eyes the importance of this rise, if 
 we observe its effect upon debts current during that period ; 
 tho National Debt, for example, regarded as a principal sum, 
 has in a certain sense increased its weight upon the shoulders 
 of tho British tax-payer between 1875 and 1885, by nearly 
 200 millions sterling ; an amount nearly equalling tho 
 Franco-German war fine. Of course I do not make this 
 assertion on my own authority ; it is merely an application to 
 Mr. Newmarch's figures of the precedent set by Jevons in an 
 important work on a kindred subject. 
 
 Whether these figures are strictly accurate or no, the broad 
 fact is ascertained, the rise in the value of Gold is a serious rise. 
 Is it still in progress ? In 1885, Mr. Giffcn saw no reason why 
 the fall should bo at an end. He thought it might go on ; in 
 fact, it was probable that it would go on, and, as we see, his 
 forecast was correct. Has England before her a further sub- 
 sidence of prices, a further upheaval of the valuo of Gold ? 
 Having myself made parallel forecasts in 187G, and since, 
 which have been justified by tho event, I feel I can inquire 
 with some confidence, how the further degradation of Silver 
 can fail to produce a further fall of price. It would therefore 
 
] -1 The Fall of Prices and its Giu^'^e. 
 
 soom to lie in the hands of the Royal Commission on Gold 
 nnd Silver to decide whether England is to suffer n further 
 subsidence of prices, a further upheaval of the value of Gold. 
 
 What, then, does this mean — for the interests of men — a 
 rise in the value of Gold, the controlling ^loney of the Occi- 
 dental world ? To answer the question rightly, wo must 
 realize that A'al nation. Appraisement in Money, is, so to 
 speak, a condition of modern thought. jNfan is as inevitably 
 an appraising being as he is a political, or a social being. 
 Labour and Property — what does man know of them to-day, 
 except as he sees them through the medium of Money ; and 
 what is there else but labour and property within the range of 
 material interests ? 
 
 The round world and they that dwell therein are appraised 
 for taxation ; both the lives of men and the surface of the earth 
 figure in business calculations as investments ; in every obli- 
 gation, in every investment, the past and the future meet each 
 other ; from the cradle to the grave, debit and credit are, as it 
 were, an air that is breathed by civilized man. 
 
 A rise in the value of Gold means a dislocation of the land- 
 marks of the property of men, — and so the rise of Gold is a 
 wrong. But it is far more than this, it is a wasting disease of 
 that economic body which is formed of the men who toil with 
 hand or brain. 
 
 The world of business, of enterprise, of investment, may well 
 be likened to a sensitive organism, which requires complete health 
 and vigour in all its various parts for its highest activity ; and 
 the motive for exertion of individuals, which is the continuing 
 cause of this health, and vigour, and activity, is the hope of 
 receiving greater money-value than was given : and it is the 
 difference between first-cost and sale-price which makes the 
 organism of business move. When prices rise, there is 
 always an encouragement to activity. But when all the 
 prices at which sales are made, are falling, then the force 
 which rules the producing ;iiid exchanging world slackens; 
 
Sect. 4.] Tlie Rise of the Sovereign. 13 
 
 there is, relatively, less movement, less production, less con- 
 sumption, less success in business ; there is embarrassment and 
 idleness ; there is a prolonged crisis ; or, what we familiarly call 
 " hard times/' The rise of Gold, then, means what may be 
 called, monetary malaria invading the health of nations, a ])laguo 
 of Money. 
 
 It is true that optimism still walks in high places, and in 
 apparent observance of the duty of cheerfulness, has assumed 
 the tone of Candide, as if all were for the best, and this were 
 the best of possible monetary worlds. 
 
 But as the years go by, this patient world grows restive ; 
 the continuance of suftering arouses question whether opti- 
 mism is not here and there a cloak for interest, and whether 
 the recipe of patience be not serving mainly to defer a diagnosis 
 which may, to the discomfiture of the elder physicians, bo 
 followed by cure. 
 
 § 5. THE CAUSE OP THE FALL OF TRICES. 
 
 What is the cause of the fall of prices ? Evidently, the Anti- 
 Silver- laws of the AVesteruXations are the primary, the efficient, 
 and the removable cause. 
 
 Of course casuistry and special pleading can find full exer- 
 cise in the game of hide-and-seek between causes and condi- 
 tions. It would be but a dull and barren age, which, after 
 having set on foot an inter-continental outlawry of one of the 
 Money-metals of man, should make default of sophistry in self- 
 defence ! In the earlier days of the Anti- Silver-movement, 
 which broke ground actively in 187;}- 1-, when ]irotest was 
 made against a policy which obviously tended to provoke a 
 check of confidence and shrinkage of values, the stereotyped 
 answer did duty in well-nigh every Occidental laDguage, " the 
 fall of prices is a mere normal reaction from a period of infla- 
 tion.'' For convenience of discussion we may call this 
 " Cause A." 
 
14 The Fall of Prices and its Cause. 
 
 But, as time has gone on, and contraction marches apace, 
 the Borviccableness of this argument wanes ; it is necessary 
 for the apologist of Anti-Silver-laws to find some other means 
 of rebutting the testimony wliich incriminates him, and so tho 
 defence proceeds upon lines which may bo briefly stated as 
 follows : 
 
 Cause B. New processes of labour, inventions, etc., which 
 cheapen production, are elevated into a cause for tho fall of 
 prices. 
 
 Cause C. New methods of business, the elimination of 
 middlemen through the facilities of inter-communication and of 
 transportation, are elevated into a cause. 
 
 These causes deal with the past fall, and, if wcmayjudgoby 
 the use sometimes made of them, are assumed to have como 
 into play just in time to be substituted as causes in the place 
 which, but for them, Anti-Silver-laws might perhaps have been 
 permitted to occupy. 
 
 Another cause is at hand to provide for the desired counter- 
 movement which is to check the fall : Postal orders, cheques, 
 telegraphic transfers, clearing-houses infinite, etc., are to 
 economize cash, set it free, and stop the contraction. This wo 
 may call " Future Counter-cause D.'^ 
 
 Of course with this ample set of causes, and marshalling tho 
 facts of their entries on the scene in tho manner suggested, it 
 is possible to piece together an arrangement, so to speak, of 
 tho play of Hamlet ^vith tho part of Hamlet left out ; and so 
 to present the Anti- Silver, Gold-favouring, monetjiry war of the 
 last decade as a pastoral-symphonic entertainment. ])ut in 
 justice to all disputants in the monetary arena I must liastcn 
 to say that, so far as I know, no one — not even tho most 
 irretrievably committed politician — is chargeable with all tho 
 extravagance in thus ignoring fact, of which 1 have endeavoured 
 to givo a combined picture. There is no such expanse of 
 malice aforethought. In fact, forethought is rare ; for cause 
 and counter-cause arc not infrequently put side by side, 
 
Sect. 5.] Causes and Conditions. 15 
 
 as if they could work together, though one works toward 
 a rise, the other toward a fall. It is only certain instal- 
 ments of fact that one disputant, and then perhaps only par- 
 tially, ignores, while another perpetrates an hiatus in another 
 direction. 
 
 In general, however, it is to bo noted that (at least so far as 
 I know), no responsible disputant, however valiant he may bo 
 in self-defence, has accepted the full burden of proof which 
 has lain from the first as a public challenge before him, namely, 
 the burden of proving how it was possible that the Anti-Silver, 
 Gold -favouring policy could, under existing circumstances, fail 
 to produce a rise in tho value of Money. Looking at the 
 subject from the end nearest to us, we can ask, who is there 
 among the champions of Gold to-day, who will take upon him- 
 self publicly to deny that, in his opinion, had Germany, in 
 taking Gold at 15 i- after Sedan, maintained her free coinage 
 of Silver, tho investments of the Western world would have 
 been spared one most potent ftictor of disorganization ? 
 
 Now these are the mighty tasks which the champions of 
 demonetization ought to bo coping with, if what seems to mo 
 their usurpation of law is to maintain itself before posterity. 
 
 I submit that a general demurrer lies to the entire genus of 
 argument we have been considering. 
 
 We start with the demand for a stable Standard of Value, 
 as commerce asks for a level sea — not an absolute plane, of 
 course — for of that wo have neither precedent nor promise : 
 winds and waves and tides are there, tides annual and tides 
 decennial, obedient to the lunar attraction of human moods — 
 but, on the whole, on the average, a level sea. This is tho 
 demand of science ; this is (jood Money ; a just ** Measure,*' an 
 honest *' Equivalent,'* to use the words enshrined in the 
 Statute of 1816. To whom is this demand addressed ? Pri- 
 marily to the State. It is tho function of the State to estab- 
 lish and maintain, as far as is practicable, a good Monetary 
 System. And such a Money was in fact provided by tho 
 
1<I The Fall of Prices and its Cause. 
 
 monetary constitution of the world as it was i]o\vn to 1873. 
 It was to the Stiito that appeal was then made in order to 
 outhiw Silver from its traditional position as Money. With- 
 out the l:i\v there would have been no outlawry; without a 
 law the outlawry cannot bo cancelled. 
 
 Now arises before us tho duty of estimating the character, 
 the influence, of this f^overnmental policy afiecting Money, 
 which mtule the breach in the monetary constitution as it was 
 down to 187o : the Gold-favouring side of which policy wo 
 may, for tho sake of brevity, leave at one side for a moment, 
 calling it a movement to get laws and regulations adopted in 
 order to outlaw Silver in tho chief ^loney-using nations. 
 What was this revolutionary policy to do for tho nations in 
 question ? This was, and is, the only practical thing under 
 discussion, tho only thing involving action on a large scale ; 
 this, or of course with it, tlie counter-proposition, to replace 
 outlawry by reinstatement; which are two sides of the same 
 (juestion, distinct acts, in a word, of the corporate and con- 
 scious free-will of nations ; the outlawry having taken place 
 to a considerable extent, the reinstatement being urged as a 
 measure of public policy. This, I repeat, was and is the only 
 important practical monetary question before the nations. 
 
 Now this outlawry of Silver reduced the customary increase 
 of the metallic stock by which the business of the world had 
 long profited; and this reduction was made just at a time 
 when national demands arose for cancellation of Paper Money 
 or for covering it with metal. It was sure, by dislocating the 
 par between Silver-countries and Gold-countries, to derange 
 the inter-metallic business of the world, and by depreciating 
 Silver to depress the Gold-price of things in Silver countries. 
 Such a movement must jirima facie, other things being equal, 
 tend to contract Gold-prices.^ Having thought, and said 
 
 ' Of course in sftyinj; this I hind nivsrlf to no rii:iii (jnantily-tlicory ; of 
 this I shall speak later. (See page '24.) 
 
Sect. 5.] Causes and Comlltiivif:. 1 7 
 
 in print, tlie equivalent of this since ISTO, I may bo allowed to 
 adduce this forecast of mine as evidence of the obviousness 
 of the view now set forth. 
 
 If "other things" are not "equal/' if counter-forces are at 
 hand tu muitralize this tendency, which occupies the ground 
 with such overwhelming force, they must come forth, prove 
 themselves, show that they can overbear the presumption, and 
 sustain the burden of proof. 
 
 Such being, then, the state of the case, let us assist at the 
 arraignment and trial of an imagined Defendant, the Demo- 
 netizer of Silver. Ho has admittedly been instrumental, as 
 we have seen, in setting agencies at work which tend arti- 
 ficially to contract prices, and to enhance the value of Money. 
 The effect has been produced. He is accused of stealing 
 from that average of prices which makes the practical measure 
 of values and equivalent for property of civilized man. The 
 crime is a grave one, and self-preservation is a law of nature. 
 ^len expert in criminal practice are at hand, under whose 
 prompting he pleads " not guilty." The trial proceeds, con- 
 sisting entirely of the defendant's testimony ; the other facts 
 being admitted. 
 
 Evidence is introduced to show : 
 
 Cause A. That some of the prices were decaying : 
 
 Cause B. That some of them were claimed by inventors : 
 
 Cause C. That some of them were being carried off by 
 railroad and telegraph men. 
 
 And further, the deponent saith not. The defence rests. 
 That is all ! To show that Defendant did not commit the 
 offence charged, counsel rely on evidence to the effect that some- 
 one else committed another offence. 
 
 The ancient and well-invented " bull " of the witnesses 
 who sought to prove a Defendant's innocence of stealing 
 by swearing that they did not see him .^tcal, has at last 
 appeared in the flesh. So fatal is the Nemesis that pursues 
 science when she is untrue to her better self! 
 
 c 
 
18 The Fall of Prices and its Cause. 
 
 But this order of argument, which, as wo have seen, has so 
 long been tolerated by educated opinion, does not yet appear 
 l)eforo us in all its native simplicity. A few strokes more are 
 needed to lay it bare. We must observe that the greater the 
 inroad upon prices which Causes A, B, and C can be held to 
 have set on foot, the higher does the A nti- Silver-policy rise 
 in the scale of incompetence, the more flagrant the blunder of 
 it. It has intensified, aggravated, disaster, when the duty 
 of the state was to remedy, to relieve. Controlled by the 
 Demonetizer, the State, which should act as physician to the 
 suffering economic body, has devoted itself to reinforcing, 
 artificially, the natural agencies that were working evil : 
 instead of antidote, it has given more poison. 
 
 Having disposed of this inversion of sense, we can now 
 proceed to assign a fitting place to Causes A, B, and C, and to 
 Counter-Cause D. To the thinker they ofier most important 
 fields of observation, and to the monetary statesman they are 
 vital elements of the problems with which he has to deal. 
 What annual increment, for example, is necessary in order to 
 maintain constancy of prices ? This is a question for science, 
 " What is desirable ?" What increase is practicable, and, at 
 the same time, safe, is another question. Each question 
 deserves an answer, though it may get none. 
 
 Without attempting to enter upon the matter fully here, 1 
 take space to note, in passing, certain points Mnth which the 
 investigation of this field will necessarily deal. 
 
 1. I have elsewhere shown ("Silver and Gold/' 187G-7) 
 that the expenence of England between IStt and 1871-, 
 indicates that the habits of Money-using are such that pros- 
 perity implies a considerable and constant increment of 
 metallic stock, in excess of the growth of population. 
 
 2. The agencies which we have reviewed, in so far as they 
 set free cash which would otherwise have to be held in a 
 specified enqiloyment, have, while tending to reduce iho 
 prices of certain classes of articles, the secondary effect, other 
 
Sect. 5.] Causes mid Conditions. 19 
 
 things being" equal, of contributiug a certain ciuota, howovoi* 
 small, toward expansion. 
 
 3. The manifold influences which affect the expansion of 
 credit — the habit of using credit compensations rather than 
 cash payments — the extension of operations into the future, 
 which enlarges the field in which such compensations can be 
 aiTanged and the figures they can attain— all these are 
 peculiarly susceptible to the impulse arising from monetary 
 operations of great magnitude, of which governments alone 
 are masters. 
 
 4. Alterations in the quantity of Money are competent to 
 intensify, or to neutralize, the practical effect in average prices, 
 of any and all influences which are exerted by the ordinary 
 operations of business ; the limit to their force is only the 
 practical one, of the amount added to, or subtracted from 
 the stock with which the hypothesis starts, due allowances 
 being made for the element of confidence, as, for example, for 
 the quality of the money, and the mode of its appearance or 
 disappearance. 
 
 It will be found that these considerations unite in establish- 
 ing the unwisdom of the policy of outlawing Silver ; its con- 
 demnation a priori, independently of late specific experience : 
 a condemnation from the point of view of 1871, as well as 
 of 1887. 
 
 If wo look closely at A, B, C, and D, we shall note of the 
 latter three, that they are of perennial stock. Any efi'ort to 
 represent them as appearing from the clouds, just in time to 
 relieve the Outlawry of Silver from this sentence of condemna- 
 tion, is doomed not only to failure, but perhaps even to ridicule. 
 I say this with all respect for a number of distinguished gentle- 
 men — citizens, respectively, of at least five difterent countries 
 — whom I have in mind, but do not name. 
 
 "Now when I shall compare the prices of things at this 
 day with those of ancient times — . . . the proofs would 
 be very disputable ... as for example . . . Cloth, 
 
20 The Fall of Prirei^ a fid its Cause. 
 
 Linen, Leather, and such like would have the like variety of 
 prices throu«^h the saino causes, viz., diftbrencc of seasons, 
 diseases, war, and through other causes, as through Impositions 
 laid on them, iiew inventions whereby the Manufacture may he 
 more easily nnrl speedily viade, engrossing of them, false 
 making of them, want of workmen," — p. 103. (The italics 
 are mine.) 
 
 Whence comes this quotation i The bodk wa.s wntten 
 about IGoO ! It is Rice \\aughan's '• A Discourse of C<»in 
 and Coinage" (1675). 
 
 1 venture, in fact, to allege without offering detail of proof, 
 save a passing allusion to the extension of the railway, tele- 
 graph, and cheque systems, in late decades, which 1 can assume 
 to be within the reader's knowledge, that Causes li, C, and D, 
 wore active in important degree, on one side or the other, 
 while prices were rising after 1850, while prices were com- 
 paratively steady, between 1868 and 1873, while prices have 
 been falling since 1873, and that as regards A, in so far as 
 it was a real tide, it tended not to exhaust itself in an ebb, 
 but to gather force for a roturning flow ; which cannot well be 
 said to have occurred. 
 
 For the rest we can close this Section by recommending to 
 whom it may concern, Counter-Clause D, as a cucumber, more 
 likely than any in the field, to yield sunshine. 
 
 § G. QUANTITY-THKOKIES ANO THE INDO-El'KOl'KAN CONFLICT OF 
 
 L'OINAGKS. 
 
 These charges against the Anti-Silvcr-policy which are 
 contained in the preceding Section, having been repeated in 
 substance in various forms yearly since 1876, 1 have gathered 
 some experience o{ the difficulty of guarding against misinter- 
 pretation in setting forth views on this nebulous subject. 
 
 Among other points it is incumbent upon me to make clear 
 
Sect. G.] Contmdion and Indian Competition. 21 
 
 that i have aftected no retrospective prophecy touchiug the 
 entire field of economic phenomena since the battle of Sedan, 
 and each and every portion of that field. I therefore call 
 attention to the fact that 1 do not aver that no rise in the 
 value of money would have occurred, if there had been no 
 governmental Outlawry of Silver ; I luerely say that no rise 
 would have occurred approaching that which year after year 
 has justified forecast, by being ascertained as fact; and that, 
 while some panic corresponding to that of 1873 must have 
 occurred, yet it never would have reached the actual acuteness 
 of that panic, nor would the following years have been marked 
 by the persistent depression which has been cumulatively 
 ascertained. 
 
 I desire also, with a similar end in view, to record a protest 
 against a i-igorous application of certain phrases which are 
 sometimes adopted in treating of the subject, which seem to 
 me to require peculiar caution to insure their usefulness. I 
 refer to " Scarcity of Gold " and " Gold-famine." Certainly 
 as popular term, analogy or simile, these expressions are 
 natural, appropriate and useful ; but for the purposes of 
 scientific precision they leave much to be desired. In one 
 sense there is always Scarcity of Gold. Who ever had as much 
 as he wanted ? In another sense there is never scarcity. Any- 
 one who can give the proper equivalent can get Gold. Famine 
 means lack of the average food, the '' ration" for the support 
 of life. The quantity-theory in matters of nutrition is, there- 
 fore, absolute, resting on unalterable fact ; but there is no 
 ration of Money indispensable to economic life. Famine, if it 
 go far enough, means death ; but a dearth of Money means no 
 such thing ; bankruptcy, repudiation, a fall of prices, no 
 matter how far, arc not absolute death to the economic body. 
 In a famine there is no substitute for food. But in a dearth 
 of the metals, men have been content with other materials or 
 with credit, and barter has always its range of practicability. 
 Between good Money and bad Money, between staLTuation of 
 
22 Tlie Fall of Prices and its Cause. 
 
 business and prosperity, between progress and standstill or 
 retrogression, between iuipoverishnient and enrichment, the 
 difference is essentially one of degree. 
 
 Beside this, in a society suffering from this '' scarcity " or 
 " famine " of Money, a disposition and possibility arc always 
 at hand, ready for a new departure, a new ccjuilibrium of 
 prices; good Money, stable Money, at a new level as compared 
 with vendible things. In the monetary field everything is 
 relative. "When people talk of famine or scarcity of Gold, 
 they merely mean scarcity at a former price. 
 
 As comj)ared with *' scarcity " and " famine " the word 
 " contraction" has certain advantages; but 1 know of no one 
 word which can be said completely to epitomize a definition 
 of the effect of Anti- Silver-laws, the dislocation of the Par of 
 the two kinds of the world's Money. 
 
 But monetary debate need not be niggardly in words. If 
 one word, or phrase, or sentence, will not do, the .situation is 
 well worthy of a paragraph or of a chapter. The public 
 should by this time have learned patience. Dealing con- 
 stantly with numbers, compelled to form an opinion at every 
 turn as to the importance of this or that '' quantity," liable to 
 have his conclusion endangered by the temptations of numeri- 
 cal analogies which are rigid and insensible to the changing 
 moods of ^loney-using men, the domain of the monetary 
 thinker is, though apparently near, really ijuite remote from 
 the range of customary apprehension. ]f wc turn to tho 
 details of practice, we find that tho practical ijuestions for the 
 monetary legislator are always questions of the amount of 
 Money, and at the same time of tho quality or character of tho 
 Money, for which provision is to bo made through the instru- 
 mentalities of government. In deciding these questions, the 
 legislator, starting as ho must from a given condition — an 
 actual (juautity and quality of Money in the hands of citizens, 
 or with reference to which the existing law of his country has 
 been framed — naturally seeks guidance for any new action 
 
Sect. G.] Contraction and Indian Competition. 23 
 
 that may be proposed^ in considerations touching- the efficiency, 
 or circulation and use, of Money, touching the relations between 
 the quantity and quality of the cash of his country, and the 
 valuations in which the citizens are interested, and touching 
 the eflect of a diminution or increase of this quantity, or 
 change of its quality, upon prices, upon the activity of 
 business, upon existing Money obligations, upon prosperity, 
 upon social development. It is throuprh this labyrinth that 
 thought and action must go hand in hand. Surely " pardon 
 must be granted to " number, as well as to '^ novelty, of words 
 when they serve to illuminate such an obscurity of things." 
 
 After laying down the reservations and limitations thus set 
 forth at length, it is safe to assert that to reason about Money, 
 and ignore questions of quantity, is to insure losing one's 
 way. To have a quantity-theory of some kind is inevitable. 
 
 The generally recognized principle is that " pnces are in 
 the inverse ratio to the quantity of Money." This, however, 
 is but a statement of a " tendency." To follow this tendency 
 into detail of practice, that is, to take note of the various 
 counter-forces that modify results yro tanto, is matter for 
 volumes in which to set forth what is known, and will be 
 matter for more volumes, when the unexplored regions of the 
 subject shall have been surveyed. 
 
 That the Silver and Gold coming from America in the 
 XVIth century raised prices in Europe is a common-place of 
 the books. 
 
 It is germane to note in passing that Adam Smith's notion 
 of the modus operandi, the stress lying on the cheapness of 
 production of new Gold or new Silver, has now — I think I can 
 at last safely say — been superseded by recognition that the 
 active force lies in the quantity added to the existing stock ; 
 it is chiefly the quantity added, not the cost of adding it, that 
 affects prices, excepting in so far as the process of adding, 
 itself absorbs a portion of that quantity. The same obser- 
 vation applies to the u<e of credit, which, I doubt not, has 
 
2i The Full of Pricea and its Caiiae. 
 
 wrought its share of the rise of prices in a similar way. 
 Through these considerations we attain a glimpac into the gulf 
 that separates Money from commodities in gcucnd. 
 
 Returning to our principle, we find that one of the counter- 
 principles hfis been well established, viz. : that an issue of 
 convertible notes did not raise prices in proportion. In other 
 words, it was an effect as well as a cause, a concomitant of a 
 instinct and separable incrcsise of ^loney-uaing business. So 
 a check of that unknown .c, the normal increment of metallic 
 stock required to maintain stability of average prices, and to 
 maintain at the same time the normal increase of exchanges, 
 which is the concomitant (cause or effect) of ** prosperity " 
 and ''progress" — this check may not lower prices, but only 
 make a corresponding contraction of use of Money. Similarly, 
 an overplus may produce new business to absorb it, and not 
 raise prices. 
 
 The quantity-theory, then, cannot legitimately be con- 
 fined within the cast-iron frame of the generalization first 
 above stated, but must be broad enough to embrace counter- 
 principles of which I have given a hint — and capable of 
 accepting the new trutlis that shall come from the broad 
 region of the uiikiiowu. 
 
 I think it will be found that the better minds, whether 
 writers or men of aff'airs, are in substantial harmony about 
 this matter, though their utterances may not be exhaustive 
 or explicit, and though they may not agree as to details. 1 
 know of no one who rejects hi fofo the view above set forth, 
 excepting now and then a crude or eccentric schoolman, or 
 some mere partisan. 
 
 The dangers of pinning i'aith to one " tendency," binding 
 one's practical conclusions in some given c.-ise to the strict terms 
 of numerical ratio, may rise more clearly in the mind when 
 such questions as the following are considered : 
 
 (A.) llow iiMU li of llie fall of prices is directly traceable to 
 absence of cash wliieh should have come into existence, and 
 
Skct. 6.] Contvactkm and Indian Competition. 25 
 
 did not mako its appoarance at all, or should have been niailo , 
 to circulate freely, and did not ? 
 
 (15.) How much of the fall of prices can ho held due to inoro 
 apprehensions, timid forecasts, fears ? 
 
 (C.) How much of the fall of Occidental Gold-prices is due 
 to the conflict or collision between Gold-based Monetary Sys- 
 tems and Silver-based Monetary Systems ? 
 
 (D.) To give a special case of the latter question (C) : 
 How far would gold-prices have fallen in Europe, if India had 
 not existed, or if such a state of affairs had obtained that the 
 specific grinding and crushing conflict between India's Silver- 
 values and Europe's Gold- values could be eliminated from the 
 question ? Of course, tlie hypothesis imports a violent stretch 
 of the imagination, but this is necessary if one seeks to divide 
 and classify and measure complex agencies which go to pro- 
 duce an important event. 
 
 (E.) "What would have been the effect of a largely increased 
 output of Gold, in the past decade — 
 
 I . Upon Gold-prices in Europe ? 
 
 1. Upon Silver-prices in India ? 
 
 (F.) What would have been the effect of a largely increased 
 output of Silver — 
 
 I . Upon Silver-prices in India ? 
 
 -. Upon Gold-pnces in Europe ? 
 
 In presence of these interrogations, it will, 1 hope, bo plain 
 that if one wishes with a word to characterize the situation, 
 the word " contraction " covers more ground than the word 
 " scarcity," or the word " famine." 
 
 We can now approach with more confidence some phases 
 of the cjucstion of Indian competition, or bettci*, of the Indo- 
 European conflict of coinages. Of late years Gold-prices have 
 gone down before Silver-prices, instead of Silver-prices rising 
 tj a new level with Gold, or, instead of the two meeting half- 
 way. To use the figure of fable, the Occidcnbil Gold Standard 
 has proved the pot of earthenware, while the Oriental Silver 
 
26 The Fall of Prices and its Cauae. 
 
 Standard proves to be the pot of iron. So mucli has been 
 settled by the experience of the last few years. 
 
 I shall present the point which seems to me of chief scientific 
 importance in this connection as a criticism of wliat 1 shall 
 name the ordinary mercantile view, and of the Anti- Silver- 
 view, of Indian competition. 
 
 To the farmer in Minnesota, as to the retired scholar, whose 
 reading excludes the teaching of the ^lonetary Unionist, this 
 competition is competition, like any other. 
 
 To the wheat-dealer, acreage in India, bushels in Liverpool, 
 are the chief thing; India, or Australia, or Russia, it is a 
 matter of quantity for sale, and nothing else. 
 
 To the retired scholar this competition, whatever its pecu- 
 liarities or effects, is a " natural " event, a normal conflict 
 of wealth-getting men. 
 
 To this I have replied as follows : Both of these views leave 
 out of account the one novel and most important element of 
 the situation ; important from the practical, and from the 
 scientific, point of view. It is statute and decree, arbitrary and 
 oj^cial, that are i)rimarihj responsible for the phenomenon; 
 the fall of prices is the result of a conflict of coinages, rather 
 than of a competition of individual men. This is not in any 
 proper sense a " natural " event, a noi*mal conflict of wealth- 
 getting men ; any more than confiscation would be a natural 
 event, or attainder against the rich a normal conflict of wealth- 
 getting men. 
 
 Occidental wheat- and cotton-growers are interested in, or 
 affected injuriously by, acreage in India, and bales or bushels 
 in Liverpool, only in the second line : first in order is the 
 price. It is but a small matter to the interests centreing in 
 Chicago or Savannah that so many bushels or bales come 
 from India ; it is everything that they come at their present 
 price. If they should come, everyone of them, at the normal 
 price whi(.h arbitrary laws have dono away with, and which 
 absence of those laws might restore, they would produce a 
 
Sect. G.] Contraction and Indian Competition. 27 
 
 moderate effect compared with that which is now exerted. 
 As it is, they come strong- in the strength of a grand army, 
 of which they are but the vanguard. The immensity of this 
 market of supply for wheat and cotton, all standing at Silver- 
 prices, and at Asiatic-prices, looms up behind the actual im- 
 ports, and enforces the drag on the prices of all Occidental 
 stocks, tending to bring all down to the scale imposed by the 
 artificially reduced Gold equivalent of Indian Silver prices ; 
 for no scheme to control the market can be carried out. 
 
 The specific loss of the Western Nations through the dis- 
 location of the par between Asiatic and European j\Ionoy 
 imports no corresponding gain to Asia. The conflict of 
 monetary systems is, to an important degree, analogous to a 
 collision, and affects the business of the world somewhat as 
 a series of earthquakes would affect the orderly pursuit of 
 happiness in a busy mining or manufacturing region. 
 
 How far this " contraction " of prices would have occurred 
 had the annual increment of total metallic Money-supply been 
 greater, is a problem which must await solution. How far 
 the phenomenon is specifically due to the habits of an Asiatic 
 people, is also curious matter for meditation. The whole 
 subject has a profound interest for the entire constituency of 
 the Occidental Gold Standard. 
 
 One thing is evident : no mere palliative will meet the 
 disease. No half-measure will avail. No measure short of 
 restoring a fixed par between Silver and Gold, at a rate as 
 near as possible to that which formerly obtained, will meet 
 the requirements of the time. 
 
CHAPTER 111. 
 
 England's Hesponsibilitv and England's Interest. 
 
 § 7. England's resi'Onsihility foi: tue outlawry of silver. 
 
 That England has the casting veto to carry or defeat a 
 measure for concurrent regulation of the ^foney-metals, is a 
 proposition that brings its acceptance with it. 
 
 This power which England Anelds is of double origin, due 
 in part to the influence which England's example exerts over 
 the feeling, the confidence, the imagination, the interest of 
 the rest of the world, the leaders of nations, and the business 
 community upon whose support laws must rest ; and in part to 
 the actual physical strength, so to speak, of the monetary 
 battalion Avhich England can marshal to join in this great 
 undertaking, of reinstating Silver to parity with Gold. If minds 
 are not wanting to whom a Silver and Gold Union, even with 
 England, the World's Clearing House, at its head, suggests 
 doubts and fears, how far beyond them must these doubts and 
 fears cast their gloom, when a Union is contemplated in which 
 England is not to join ? 
 
 A brief review of the course of the Anti-Silver-movement 
 will throw strong light upon the influence of England's 
 exaiii])le. 
 
 The Anti-Silver-movement set on foot by Germany is, in its 
 origin, distinctly and avowedly an English idea. The line of 
 its transmission to (Jermany is direct. To .1. G. Hiin'man, 
 the Monetary Counsellor of I'russia in the early decades of this 
 
Sect. 7.] Rcsponsthiliti/ for Outlawry. 29 
 
 century (a prominent co-worker with Stein and Ilardenberg 
 in her rcj^eneration), London was a monetary fairy-land over 
 which Lord Liverpool ruled as a magician. To him the pres- 
 tige of England's example bore somewhat the same relation 
 to that of other nations that the commerce of the Spree or of 
 the Upper Seine bore to the world-encircling commerce of 
 the Thames. Both by the general influence of his admirable 
 works, in which he declared in favour of the Gold Standard for 
 Prussia, and as the preceptor and inspiror of one who has 
 devoted the studies of a laborious life to monetary researches, 
 Hoft'inan's influence has remained a power. 
 
 This pupil was Adolf Soetbeer. As the official adviser of 
 the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Germany, Soetbeer 
 directed an agitation in the decade 18G0-1870, which paved 
 the way for, and made possible, the legislation of 1871-3. In 
 Soetbeer's cause, the wise and the unwise were linked together. 
 Side by side and as of equal, or indeed of paramount, impor- 
 tance with the unification of the various systems of German 
 coinage, long the object of worthy aspirations among German 
 thinkers, Soetbeer promulgated, with the sanction of the 
 council of economists, ex cathedra, the English idea of out- 
 lawing Silver. And here the circuit of influence was completed, 
 for it was the prestige of England that insured the acceptance 
 of this doctrine, in a business world which had known only 
 the Silver Standard. The result it is needless to recapitulate 
 here. It was when Germany put herself in the train of England 
 that the task of maintaining the parity of the world's Mone3's 
 against the combined attack of two Chief Powers, proved too 
 great for the Bimetallic Countries. Their coinage of Silver 
 was first limited and then stopped, and the Bimetallic Union 
 ceased its operation. 
 
 In the studies which the consequent chaotic condition of 
 ^loney has since forced upon the thinking world, the past 
 experience of England has necessarily been a favourite object 
 of consideration. Did England prosper and take the lead 
 
30 EnplancVs RespnmibUitu imd Interest. 
 
 among natious by reason of the Exclusion of Silver, or was it 
 rather in spite of it, aa Lord Beaconsfield said in 1873? 
 Gradually the view gains acceptance that though neither ho 
 nor others knew or intended it. Lord Liverpool's teaching 
 produced a system of aimless revolution, of organized disorder. 
 If the Exclusion of Silver was compatible with a good 
 ^Monetary System from 1820 to 1873, it was, as I have shown, 
 because of the comparative stability of the value of the sove- 
 rei<''n. But the demonstration is also clearly within view, 
 
 O 
 
 that in the decades that have passed since 1816, the British 
 sea of Gold-prices owed its comparative permanence of level 
 to the lateral su]iport of circumjacent oceans of Silver and 
 Gold, held as they were iu unbroken fluidity by the self- 
 ailiustinf action of laws of alternative coinage on the Continent. 
 As I have elsewhere shown, the Great Transhipment of 
 l^ritish Valuations from Paper to Gold, the Resumption of 
 Cash Payments (181G-1S23), owed its share of statesmanlike 
 achievement to the law in other countries, which kept the 
 Silver-price of Gold from rising. So likewise, in the second 
 crucial test of the Monetary System which outlawed Silver, 
 the Gold inundations from California and Australia, the 
 English Standard is equally indebted to the law in otlior 
 countries, which kept the Silver-price of Gold from falling. 
 
 So Ion"- as France, with the huge metallic stock held by her 
 and by her satellites, maintained the free coinage of Silver, so 
 long the revolutionary tendency of the Anti-Silver-thcory was 
 held in abeyance, and its character veiled from the ken of 
 most monetary thinkers. 
 
 But now this unconscious balance of power, which made the 
 local experiment of the scheme of excluding Silver a temporary 
 success, is broken. The revolutionary Outlawi-y of Silver has 
 done its perfect work in the monetary disorder of a decade, 
 at the end of which the far-seeing now look forward with 
 earnest apprehension. 
 
 The world is waking to the fact that something inust bo 
 
Sect. 8.] TiesponsihiUti/ for OutJcmTif. 81 
 
 done. What is to be douo 'i There is but one best thiutr 
 to do. It is to keep the two Moneys of the world at par. 
 This can alone be done by joint action of nations, such as that 
 proposed to the nations by the Conference of 1878. It rests 
 with the common sense of the nations to heal the fracture — and 
 to reintegrate the Greater Standard of Value, in which Great 
 Britain has so great a stake — by a new and enduring, because 
 conscious and intended, balance of power. Wliat part is 
 England to take in this now construction ? Is she to wait, in 
 the hope that other nations will unite to form a Union without 
 her, and re-establish the Money of the world in secure equili- 
 brium for her benefit, as well as their own, ^\^thout lier 
 cooperation ? What is to bo gained by waiting ? What is 
 to be gained by refusing cooperation ? 
 
 § 8. England's interest in the reinpranchisement op silver. 
 
 Does a perception of England's interest in the Reinfran- 
 chisement of Silver, on the part of the leaders of English 
 opinion, or of the accredited rulers of the country, imply an 
 intellectual, as distinguished from a moral, effort, to which the 
 minds in question are not at present equal ? 
 
 This very practical question it seems safe to answer with an 
 unc[ualificd negative. It seems safe to venture the assertion 
 that eveiy business man in England, who has the means of 
 forming an opinion, is already preparing to recognize the 
 truth. We need not take counsel of the future, nor ask whnt 
 tasks may lie before England in Afi-ica, or in Asia, for wliith 
 a settlement of the world's IMoney on a firmer basis would give 
 material support. Restricting attention to what is present and 
 close at hand, we can confidently inquire, would anything give 
 more relief to the investments of England of to-day, tlian that 
 the present course of shrinkage should be arrested, that the 
 rupee should return to its former stability of ratio to the 
 
32 EwilamVs Rcspo7isihilitii and Interest. 
 
 sovereig-n, nnil tliat coufiilencc and the sense of prosperity 
 should rcphicc depression ? 
 
 Certainly, wherever they are, in any adecjuate sense, under- 
 stood, the l^ritish people seem in a favourable mood to welcome 
 what can hardly fail to be recog"ni/ed as a universal change for 
 the better. The future is very dark. AVho, indeed, thinks he 
 sees the end of the shrinkage of property valuations, and of 
 the consequent disorganization of the machinery of production 
 and of exchange ? Do those interested in foreign trade and 
 Silver-values find relief in forecast of the future ? In an 
 address at Manchester (July 20, 1885), ^fr. (Joschcnsaid there 
 was no hope of knowing what to think ol" the insecurity of 
 trade with Silver-using countries, until the question of tlio 
 " Bland ]Jill " should be settled ; and he concluded that the 
 uncertainty may increase. And yet this is hardly the last 
 chapter of this book of the future which commerce is to read. 
 AVhat will come after the question of the Bland Bill shall have 
 been settled ? What will Holland do ? AVhat will Germany 
 do? Nay, what will India do? Indeed, what will other 
 countries not bo compelled to do, if England still holds aloof? 
 Is there, in fact, any prospect of escape in Hie future from 
 uncertainty as to the measure of values between, or in, Silver- 
 countries and Gold-countries, except by this very restoration 
 of the former equilibrium between Silver and Gold which is now 
 proposed ? Absolutely none ! The Trustees of Nations, who 
 are like officers on watch in a stormy sea, may study the chart 
 and the sky, and look ahead as far as they can : there is no 
 comfortable living in that sea : the sooner thoy make for the 
 port of Monetary Union the better. 
 
 But there is authority upon the point now before us which 
 Englishmen can hardly fail to find important. I refer to the 
 attitude of Her Majesty's Government, both under the premier- 
 ship of T;oi(l Beaconsfiold and under that of Mr. Gladstone. 
 It was the interest of England which in the Council of Nations 
 of 1878 arrayed England against the further demonetization 
 
Sect. 8.] Interest in Reinstatement. 33 
 
 of silver, and in 1881 (after all due diplomatic reservations had 
 been made), in favour of a formal reinstatement of Silver in a 
 Union of Nations. In 1881, it having become apparent that 
 no important measure of remonetization was to be looked for 
 without concurrent action on the part of England and of 
 Germany, both of these Powers showed their readiness to offer 
 inducements in order to engage the Powers which had called 
 the Conference (France and the United States), to enter, 
 with others, upon the Free Coinage of Silver. Unfortunately 
 for England as well as for other Powers, the inducements 
 offered were not regarded as commensurate with the considera- 
 tion to be given in return. And so the affair rests. The 
 solution of a problem which, while it embraces the whole world, 
 gives practical relief to the interests best entitled to British 
 support, to the productive forces of the realm, the makers of 
 its prosperity, is in England's hands. 
 
 § 9. SCRUPLES TOUCHING THE INTERVENTION OP THE STATE. 
 
 Other pages of this work set forth with some precision the 
 conflicting contentions, which have played their part in the 
 battles that proceed in the upper regions of theory, touching 
 the power of the State ; the power that is, and the power that 
 ought to be. I shall here briefly present some practical 
 considerations bearing upon the subject. 
 
 As to the general proposition, which will be examined more 
 closely in the following chapter, that it is the duty of the State 
 to maintain good Money, I doubt whether there are responsible 
 disputants who would commit themselves unequivocally against 
 it. Nor are there many who will undertake to deny that the 
 paramount quality of good Money is stability of value, or that 
 the more important signification of stability of value lies in 
 stability of average purchasing power. 
 
 That for those who hold these principles, the monetary con- 
 ditions which have obtained of late years in England, legiti- 
 
 D 
 
34 England's Responsibility cnid Interest. 
 
 luately raise the question of applying a remedy by amendment 
 of the law, is too obvious to need argument. It is not, there- 
 fore, to support the general proposition that inquiry is called 
 for : it is against certain special circumstances, exceptions, 
 reservations, saving clauses, strained scruples, and punctilios 
 of opinion, that refutation must proceed. 
 
 It will clear the ground for discussion if we set in order, and 
 in due perspective, the array of facts with which the proposed 
 reform attempts to deal, not entering into detail, but regarding 
 merely the general scope of the law, and the accepted principles 
 of administering it. These primary facts are, I regret to ob- 
 serve, even to-day, after all the mental work that has been 
 done in this field, far from being commonplaces of knowledge. 
 It has happened to me, for example, quite lately, to be under 
 the necessity of informing an American monetary theorist (an 
 economic teacher of notable influence) , that the Gold sovereign 
 was Legal-Tender in England. Errorem vidi tantuni ! — proof 
 positive of the incompleteness of an education based upon such 
 economic works as have been available for men now no longer 
 young. 
 
 It was this very " good Money," of which we have been 
 speaking, which the Legislators of the Kingdom sought to 
 establish, in framing the present Monetary System of England. 
 I do not merely aver by this, that the present Monetary System 
 under which three generations have lived, and until lately, 
 prospered, in the British Isles, and which, whether as oflcring 
 a Means of Payment, or a Standard of Account, has enjoyed, 
 and still enjoys, a broad supremacy in the calculations of the 
 whole world, was presumably intended to establish justice and to 
 maintain truth. I mean that, in fact, the legislator who 
 framed the Law of 18 IG, with the frankness of an age unpcr- 
 verted by overstrained theory, told, quite ])lainly, what he 
 meant, and that he meant no less than this — in framing the 
 Law of 18 IG. The new Pound Sterling of Gold was to be a 
 " Standard Measure of Value," and if the reader should turn 
 
Sect. 9.] The Institution of Mo7iey. 35 
 
 to the Statute (see above, page v), he will observe that the 
 idea is present that the Gold coins were to be the " Equivalent 
 for Property." 
 
 Now the words" Standard Measure of Value/' (and, similarly, 
 " Equivalent for Property "), are an aggressive assertion of a 
 claim to that stability and permanence of value, that is to say, 
 of Purchasing Power, which is the essence oi o. just measure, of 
 an honest equivalent. At the same time I am free to contend 
 that, whatever their legal force, the words are descriptive of a 
 law which ought not to need to bo written. But wo are 
 dealing with a delicate question — the degree of diligence 
 demandable from the state : and fallacious doctrine is rife, 
 which devises excuses for negligence : and it is therefore quite 
 to the point to remark that no inertia, no indifference, no plea 
 of prescription, or apology for supineness, can wipe these words 
 from the Statute Book, nor should the adroitest pleading lodge 
 in any competent mind a misconstruction of their meaning. 
 
 To guard against possible exaggeration I desire to record 
 my view that proper fulfilment of the duty of the State, 
 imports no levity nor haste in changing a Monetary System, 
 once it is founded ; no keeping it, so to speak, upon the 
 workman's bench, for uninterrupted tinkering in pursuit of a 
 microscopic ideal. 
 
 A settlement is a settlement : de minimis non curat lex is a 
 rule of practical sagacity, framed in view of the practical 
 limitations of governmental action. That a nation should set 
 the machinery of legislation at work to correct a great evil, 
 does not commit that nation to inexpedient activity in repair- 
 ing small evils. Indeed, both the practical business man and 
 the economist might join hands mth the jurist in recognizing 
 that conservatism rises, in a sense, to be a positive, rather than 
 a negative principle, where a Monetary System is to be dealt 
 with. 
 
 But these considerations impose the rule of prudence, not 
 of timidity. The present seems an appropriate time to recall 
 
36 England's Responsibility and InUrcst. 
 
 that, throughout England's history, great reforms have, from 
 time to time, appeared in the light of a restoration of rights 
 and benefits fallen into disuse, and that the possession of 
 a good Monetary System is an imprescriptible right of the Eng- 
 lish freeman. NuUum tevipus occurrit regi : there can be no 
 statute of limitations to bar the reformation of the Money of 
 the realm. To affirm, therefore, that the Anti-Silver-law of 
 1816, or its successor, the Coinage Act of 1870, is on trial to- 
 day in England, is merely equivalent to stating that there are 
 Englishmen living, who feel no inability to confront the 
 problems of statesmanship which the changes of time have 
 brought upon them for solution, and to do it in the spirit which 
 has, through former decades or centuries, actuated a worthy 
 line of monetary statesmen and reformers. 
 
 Such, then, is the general scope and purpose of the law : it 
 is there upon conditions, upon good behaN-iour, donee bene se 
 gesserit, or as if by the old-time tenure of Knight-service to 
 render loyal aid to the people-sovereign of the realm. 
 
 Proceeding further to look closely at the practice, or custom 
 of administration, we shall find that the exertion to be under- 
 taken by the State, if it is to perform what I allege to be a 
 duty, is, in cjuality if not in extent, far less an exhausting exer- 
 cise of power than that to which the State is already inured. 
 It is a curious fact, repeatedly illustrated in the history of 
 monetary policy, that, in an acute crisis, well-nigh everyone 
 recognizes the preservation of the Purchasing Power of Money 
 as a legitimate object of the most strenuous exertion on the 
 part of the State. To take instances from England's history 
 — the Cabinets that suspended Cash Payments in 1797, that 
 suspended the Bank Act in 18-i7, and in 1800 — before what law 
 did they bow ? 
 
 Salus populi suprema lex. 
 
 The safety of the people in what respect ? "Was it not the 
 interest of the people in maintaining stable Pnrdiasing Fowerfor 
 the Money of the country, which was then the supreme law ? 
 
Sect. 9.] Protection of Interests. 37 
 
 I am ready to affirm that such was the fact, and though the 
 contention be regarded aa novel, I have no fear that it can be 
 gainsaid. 
 
 From one point of view the crisis, in each case, appeared aa 
 a depreciation of values threatening to increase in acuteness, 
 and thus to extend its calamitous influence upon the finances 
 of the community — upon the fabric of obligations through 
 which the business of the country was enabled to proceed. 
 The values, and the obligations, were expressed in Money, all 
 of them existing, for what ? That the enjoyment of property 
 and the production or exchange of wealth, might proceed in 
 safety. Xow, the so-called "real " wealth or property of the 
 country or of its citizens, the existing matter or material, the 
 lands and tenements and goods and chattels, remained with- 
 out change — it was afterward what it had been before, and 
 the capacity to render services was unimpaired. Wherein lay 
 the crisis ? In the calculations of business men, touching the 
 Money-value of property and services. 
 
 If there had been no depreciation of values, the owners of 
 property could have had all the " Money ^' they needed by 
 means of sale or upon credit. -But if the owners of property 
 could have had all the Money they needed, could the crisis 
 have occurred at all ? Certainly not ! 
 
 The difference, then, between the crises of 1797, 1847, and 
 1866, on one side, and, on the other side, of the decade now 
 closing, is, in important phases of the matter, a difference in 
 degree ; the first mentioned crises being acute, intense, but 
 very short, the latter making up for its comparative mildness 
 by a phenomenal duration, by the cumulation of distress, and 
 by uncertainty of its reaching an end. 
 
 If precedent, then, is to have any weight, we can securely 
 set aside objections to the intervention of the State by citing, 
 not merely the statute of 1810 itself, but the action of the 
 British government in 1797, in 1817, and in IStiO. 
 
 And the list of precedents can be extended if need be. 
 
38 Eihjlands Responsibility and Interest. 
 
 What, for example, was the outcome of the testimony of the 
 cloud of \v^tnesses whose evidence was distilled into such 
 finished products of decision as the Resumption Act of 1819 
 and the Bank Charter Act of 181-i ? Wlwjrein lies the justifi- 
 cation for the general prohibition of the issue of demand notes 
 signed by an association other than certain specified names ? 
 Is not the answer to be found in the department of prices, of 
 the Purchasing Power of Money ? 
 
 It will also, I believe, become quite apparent that the chief 
 proposition pending for amendment of the British Monetary 
 System bears a character which ought peculiarly to commend 
 it to a race of conservative instincts. 
 
 We have not to deal with anything comparable, for example, 
 with the demonetization of Gold which was proposed thirty 
 years ago, when no less a personage than Richard Cobden con- 
 veyed to England Michel Chevalier's messages of alarm at the 
 Gold Discoveries. The proposition is merely to restore to 
 Silver throughout the world the general position as Money 
 which it held down to the year of Grace 1873. 
 
 The change urged upon England was, and is, a conservative 
 and restorative change ; maintaining the national body in 
 pristine vigour, and remo\ang nothing important except dis- 
 ease ; a legitimate amendment of the law to conform to altered 
 circumstances, preserving all its spirit, and so reforming the 
 letter as to bring the law into conformity with conditions 
 which were not in view at the time it was framed. 
 
 The former maintenance of an equilibrium between the two 
 Money-metals can, in fact, be regarded as the work of a trust 
 administered by certain nations for the benefit of all. Changes 
 occurred which compelled the abandonment of this trust : a 
 trust in which England, as the chief Money-using nation, was, 
 it is safe to afiirm, the chief beneficiary. The essential aim of 
 the proposed amendment then, so far as England alone is con- 
 cerned, is actually to restore to England advantages which, 
 under her then existing system, she enjoyed down to 1873, 
 
Sect. 9.] EnrjUuuVs Quota of Action. 39 
 
 but which she has now lost; and the local changes she is called 
 upon to make in order to secure these benefits, are but a 
 modest quota to a general fund of change, to be contributed 
 by the commercial nations as a body. 
 
 In support of these views, a triple order of evidence and argu- 
 ment will be offered in the following chapters. I shall first 
 inquire into the nature of the theories or principles of govern- 
 mental conduct which are mainly responsible for the great 
 monetary disorders prevalent throughout the world. 
 
 England's history will then be interrogated by a review of 
 action and opinion in England relating to Money since Eng- 
 land's Money passed, with the Restoration of Charles II., 
 under what may be called distinctively modern conditions. 
 After summing up the results of this inquiry, I shall endea- 
 vour to confront the salient arguments advanced in opposition 
 to the establishment of equality between Silver and Gold by 
 joint action of nations. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Transcendental Single-Metallism. 
 
 To attempt a general roll-call of all the manifold forces 
 which united to produce^ and which still maintain, the present 
 monetary dead-lock of Christendom, is here a task beyond 
 our scope. 
 
 It is chiefly to what — following further the simile of an 
 army — I may call the general-staft* of theory/that I ask the 
 reader's attention ; for here are to be sought the central inspi- 
 ration, direction, and leadership of the Anti-Silver-movement. 
 
 Touching the causal connection between great political 
 events, such as that with which we have to deal, and what is 
 called '^theory," there may well be a debatable ground of 
 opinion. Certainly instances are not wanting where an elabo- 
 rate theory appeared, in many senses, as an afterthought. 
 But in the events which led to the partial Outlawr}' of Silver 
 dogmatic teaching declares itself quite plainly as an effective 
 source of political action on a great scale. 
 
 An age like the present, which makes mighty strides in 
 impro^^ng means of transit, of transport, and of communication, 
 can hardly fail to make like eftbrt to facilitate the operations of 
 exchange ; and, accordingly, no sooner had that tide of activity 
 set in which was the concomitant and, in some measure, the 
 result of the great Gold Discoveries, than ideas of simplifying 
 the means of exchange began to show new life. 
 
Scheines of Unijicatioii. 41 
 
 Unfortunately the learning of the time was unequal to the 
 demand made upon it : defective dogma gained control of 
 the forces of civilization, and out of these defects of dogma 
 proceeded a policy destructive rather than reformatory, tending 
 to self-mutilation rather than to health. Endeavours to enlarge 
 the domain of the Decimal System, and to bring the weight of 
 the coins of different nations into simple numerical relations, 
 quite absorbed the activity of those who sought to improve 
 the means of exchange in the decades 1850-1870. These com- 
 mendable objects were thus raised to a false position ; and 
 inasmuch as the duality of Money-material seemed a barrier 
 to progress in either line, the idea took shape of getting rid 
 of one of the metals, and grew in favour, the attack being first 
 made against Gold, and later against Silver. In the field of 
 action good and evil went side by side. With the unification of 
 German Money upon the Decimal System — in itself an event 
 well worthy to accompany the organization of a New Empire — 
 came the attempted Outlawry of Silver, through which the 
 whole measure is, as it were, dragged in the dust of a lame and 
 impotent conclusion. And yet the applause of the learned 
 world was gained in advance for Germany's course. In all 
 respects save the selection of the precise weight given to the 
 new Gold Unit, the '^ Gold Marc," the action of Germany 
 was the natural sequence of the conclusions of the first 
 great International Monetary Conference of 1867. It was 
 a special scheme of Monetary Unification which was thus 
 enabled to 
 
 " Get the start of the majestic woi'ld, 
 And bear the palm alone " — 
 
 and this scheme is now in control of Occidental Monetary Law. 
 In setting forth that portion of it which I conceive to be 
 error — the theory which is directly responsible for the Anti- 
 Silver-movement — I shall endeavour to outline its logical 
 structure with a certain sharpness, and to expose it in open 
 daylight by incisive criticism. 
 
42 Transce7ide7ital Single- Metallisn}. 
 
 Lest I be supposed, in so doing, to bo overstating the posi- 
 tion of some opponent, I lay stress upon the fact that I am 
 seeking to give a comprehensive outline of theory — to reduce 
 to system, so to speak, a tendency of thought. 
 
 In order to accompli:5h this result, it is essential to be very 
 clear ; and not only is it unnecessary, but, in one sense, in-e- 
 levant, to inquire precisely how far this or that indi\adual, who 
 bore a part in the general movement which I seek to charac- 
 terize in its true nature, actually followed his convictions to all 
 their natural conclusions. 
 
 This creed, which inspired the Anti-Silver-movement, 
 divides itself into two chief articles, namely : 
 
 1 . The doctrine of TJniiy of Standard. 
 
 2, The doctrine that the State lacks power to regulate the value 
 of vioney. 
 
 The idea of Unity of Standard, in the sense now in vogue, 
 can perhaps be most properly, as well as %ngorously, charac- 
 terized as an excrescence, or by-product, of metrology, of the 
 science or art of measuring. 
 
 The history of its appearance points to this ; for, as I have 
 indicated, the Anti- Silver-mania, as a conscious passion, is a 
 direct outgrowth of the movement for "International Coinage.^' 
 I doubt if an advocate of demonetization proclaimed his doc- 
 trine before the advisers of Louis Napoleon began their endea- 
 vour to obtain for the " Gold franc " that pre-eminence which the 
 metre had rightly won in another field. The Congress of the 
 Nations which, in 18G7, gave official sanction to the English 
 Single Gold Standard as the objective point of monetary reform 
 for all countries, was thus, in many regards, rather a Metro- 
 logical, than a Monetary, Conference. 
 
 That so subordinate a matter as Metrology should be giving 
 laws to 30 important a matter as Money, is curious testimony 
 to the unconscious parsimony of science, which, as the ages 
 pass, perfects itself only when it becomes particularly necessary 
 
Coinage Weights and Measures. 43 
 
 to do so, or rather, which gives to truth a ruajority only when 
 self-dcfenco requires it. 
 
 So long as Alternative, or Optional, Free Coinage of the 
 Money-metals, in a strong body of nations (France and her 
 allies), held the balance between Silver and Gold, making 
 each, respectively, good Money in the Single Standard Coun- 
 tries — a regime which ruled the Monetary World till our day 
 — so long did the error of chaining Money to metrology re- 
 main apparently, and for the time really harmless. With the 
 coming of the revolution in the standing of the metals which 
 so deeply interests our generation, the scene changed, and 
 science set to work to repair its errors, in searching for the 
 means to cure the evil which that revolution brought in its train. 
 
 The peculiar error I seek to analyze is openly exposed in 
 the current terminology of government ; it is but the scho- 
 lastic expression of the familiar view which brackets Coinage, 
 Weights, and Measures, into one phrase. 
 
 Certainly a coin is a weight, and coins of the same name 
 ought to be, and to remain, of the same weight. Money, 
 which, for the senses at least, may bo looked on as composed 
 of coins, is a measure. Plainly, Coinage, for some purposes, 
 must consort as naturally with Weights or with Measures, as 
 Weights do with Measures, and Measures with Weights. 
 
 Again, Standard Weights and Standard Measures aro esta- 
 blished by the State, and Coinage is a monopoly of govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Of the first, the purpose is to have some fixed portion, so to 
 speak, of gravity, or of the dimensions of space, mth which 
 to compare others, so that the citizen may know what a 
 pound is, what a yard is, what an acre is, what a bushel is, or 
 a gallon. 
 
 And that is all ; if the State keep the Standard Weights and 
 Measures unchanged, or practically so, it has done its work. 
 
 So of Coinage, says the metrologist, seeking to enlarge his 
 jurisdiction, the function of government is limited to fixing upon 
 
44 Transcendental Single- Metallism. 
 
 a quantity of fine Gold or fine Silver, and to certifying copies of 
 it, 80 that the citizen may hioiv ichat a i>ound sterling is. 
 A fatal fallacy ! 
 
 As well say that the state should confine its executive 
 energies to the maintenance of a museum of arms, to show 
 the citizen what war is, or should replace judiciary and police 
 by formal j)ublication of a code of civic conduct, to show the 
 citizen what good citizenship is ! 
 
 But, before considering the relation of Money and the state, 
 we can most conveniently examine somewhat in detail the 
 measuring qualities of this weight of metal called a " Coin." 
 Its object is to measure, not things physical, constant, eternal, 
 not weight, nor length, nor surface, nor size ; but something 
 non-physical, temporary, variable, subject to the whims of 
 human will — namely, value : and its position as a constant 
 measure of value, that is to say, the permanence of its Pur- 
 chasing Power is all the time dependent and uncertain, a 
 resultant of the relative quantities of objects and the desires 
 of men. 
 
 On considering what has been said elsewhere of the Pur- 
 chasing Power of Money, it will be seen that there is no single 
 coin, nor weight of metal, which is exclusively the actual 
 measuring body, the corpus of the Standard, " Money." The 
 " measuring," in one sense, is done by the total quantity of 
 Money in use, whether this Money be duplicates of the Legal 
 Money Unit, or lawful substitutes for it ; and so, really, by the 
 total number of units, whether principal-units or substitute- 
 units. Following further this comparison with weights, one 
 may say that the actual weight of coins of any kind of use, is 
 inferior in importance to the weight prescribed by law for the 
 Legal Unit, and to the practical eflfect of provisions made for 
 authorized representations of that L'nit. Moreover, the total 
 weight of coins, or number of units, in use, is changing all the 
 time through import or export, melting down or new coinage, 
 issue or retirement. 
 
Fallacious Analogies. 45 
 
 Of course, to extend in unqualified literalness to a " mea- 
 sure^' like this, the analogies of a measure such as the pound, 
 the gallon, the yard, is preposterous. 
 
 The Law of Navigable Waters, within certain limits, treats 
 the adventures of a mud-barge on the same principles as those 
 of the Great Eastern. To its august logic Mud Creek and 
 the Atlantic Ocean are the same. So, to the Law of Bail- 
 ment, within limits, a porter with his truck and a Pacific 
 Railway Company are treated alike. But what should we say 
 of a judge who should be so smitten with literalness as to take 
 the matter seriously, and treat them really alike; give da- 
 mages of half a million for injury to a mud-barge, and issue a 
 mandamus to a porter, as the president and board of directors 
 of a truck, to execute his decrees simultaneously in San 
 Francisco and New York ? 
 
 Logically, on ultimate analysis, this is the sense of the one- 
 metal dogma. It not only puts the Pound Sterling on a par 
 with the Pound Troy, but holds as an article of faith that a 
 pound weight is not a pound weight, unless it be made of a 
 certain metal ; a quart is not a quart, unless it be measured in 
 a golden cup. 
 
 Let us now review the second article of the creed in its 
 full extent, and in line with the first ; for the one stands, as we 
 have indicated, in close and indissoluble sequence to the other. 
 
 From the doctrine ^A a/ the fixation of a chief coin, and the 
 certification of copies of it, exhaust the duty of the state, it is a 
 short step to the doctrine that to establish coins of different 
 metals, as of the same value, is to attempt to create equivalence 
 between disparate things, to violate nature, and transcend the 
 power of the state. 
 
 At the entrance to the labyrinth which our discussion must 
 thread, it will prove useful to note that, accepting the hypo- 
 theses which we have stated, the logical structure we are 
 analyzing is really at war with itself, and can be subverted 
 from within as well as from without. 
 
 
46 Transcendental Siivjle-Metallism. 
 
 The chief coins of our metrologist, of which the state was 
 to certify copies, were to be of a fixed weight of fine Gold, or of 
 fine Silver. It is implied that these coins would be Money. 
 They would both be Money in different States, it is true, but 
 still. Money, an instrument of exchange, a measure of value. 
 But exchange is international as well as domestic. Even in 
 the mind of the most literal mathematician this meaning follows 
 the word. Now this supposed trade in Money-valued goods 
 and in Money, between the Silver-Coinage- System and a Gold 
 Coinage- System means, pro tanto, equivalence of value be- 
 tween these same unequal weights of Silver and Gold. Hence 
 it follows that the state can and does bridge the gulf between 
 Silver and Gold. 
 
 Proceeding further in our examination of the one-metal 
 dogma, we may usefully compare it with principles of monetary 
 policy based upon such facts and truths as are ascertained and 
 distinguished in our statement of the meanings of the word 
 Standard (page xv). 
 
 If we put Meaning No. 5, the National Unit of Coinage, 
 into a maxim which shall prescribe for the State a policy of 
 the same carrying-distance as the one-metal dogma, we shall 
 say: 
 
 (A.) A Unit of Valuation, once adopted, should never be 
 abandoned. 
 
 In what relation does the dogma we are reviewing stand to 
 this proposition ? Are they the same in substance ; docs one 
 include or imply the other ? 
 
 They may seem to be the same, but that is all. 
 
 Proposition A is not the proposition of the one-mctallist, 
 or of the Gold-advocate of recent decades. They stand or fall 
 with Meaning No. ; they ignore or repudiate Meaning 
 No. 5. 
 
 The one-motallist says : 
 
 (B.) No State should — or my State must not — make Full- 
 Legal-Tender-Money out of more than one metal. 
 
Single Unit and Single Metal. 47 
 
 The Gold one-metallist says : 
 
 (C.) Full-Leijal-Tender Moneij sho^dd be made of Gold alone 
 (though he sometimes adds, "or of promises to pay gold^^)/ 
 
 So far as A is concerned, the idea that a material (and 
 weight) for the Unit, once selected, should not be abandoned, 
 it is evidently a sound general proposition, having for its firm 
 support — within proper limits — those considerations which 
 make constancy and order the attendants of the welfare and 
 progress of peoples. 
 
 Has the one-metallist of to-day any claim to the benefits of 
 this proposition? None! His '^one-ness" is one-ness of 
 material of which Full-Legal-Tender Money is to be made. 
 The one-ness of Proposition A is one-ness of the material 
 of which the Unit is to be made (and its maintenance at ful 1 
 weight) . 
 
 A Monetary Unit is one thing; Full-Legal-Tender Money 
 is another and quite distinct thing. Coins that embody the 
 Monetary Unit are, of course, to be Full-Legal-Tender Money ; 
 but the legal position of the Monetary Unit may bo independent 
 of the material of which other Full-Legal-Tender Money may 
 be made. 
 
 There can be a Silver Unit and Gold Money, a Gold Unit 
 and Silver Money, or Gold Unit and Silver Unit with either 
 Gold Money, or Silver Money, or both, in actual use. 
 
 The reader will note I am not speaking of what ought to be : 
 I do not say it is desirable that divorce, or separation, in any 
 degree, be made between the Measure of Payment and the 
 Means of Payment, between the National Unit of Coinages, 
 and the Money in actual use in the country. I merely observe 
 as a fact that such separation is possible. 
 
 If this statement shall awaken surprise or dissent, certainly 
 
 ^ Wt.' niav conveniently note in passing, that Proposition C conflicts with 
 Proposition A in that it proposes or sanctions a treneral abandonment of 
 old Units of Valuation in other countries than Enirland, concurrently witli 
 the maintenance of the modem Unit of 1816, in England. 
 
48 Trmiscendental Sin[/le-Metalli.'im. 
 
 its usefulness will have received sufficing proof. That the 
 literature of Money has had little to say of Money Units, seemed 
 to me very strange, until I observed that Money — belonging 
 neither to Politics and Law alone, nor to Economy alone, but 
 being a compound of all — has been, in a certain degree, a side- 
 issue for the literary specialists of either of these branches of 
 knowledge. It is here, in fact, that Monetary Science has 
 needed to perfect itself: for that the sagacity of statesmen, 
 and important lessons of the policy of nations, have not been 
 adequately represented in literature, is well proven by the pre- 
 sent state of the world — Christendom suffering from an epi- 
 demic of monetary disease, superinduced by well-meant, but 
 unskilful medication of the atmosphere of business. It is in 
 the presence of such events as this, that sight is sharpened to 
 perceive the intense practical importance — for the life, liberty, 
 and happiness of men are involved — of the broad general con- 
 ceptions of the functions of society which are set forth in books. 
 That Money is an institution of civil society, a department of 
 the state, an integral part or province of government, as are 
 judiciary, or police, or army — that it deserves a place corre- 
 sponding in dignity among the accredited sciences,^ which 
 fix the tone of the better public opinion touching the proper 
 conduct of public affairs — is a statement of truth which, I fear, 
 still lacks its meed of earnest recognition in regions of scientific 
 authority. 
 
 So far as the special subject before us is concerned, it is to 
 be observed that the Money Unit belongs peculiarly to the 
 juristic side of monetary learning; indeed, it is, in my belief, 
 
 ' The views here stated were set forth in '• Silver and Gold " (Cincin- 
 nati : Robert Clarke & Co., 1876-7), in an essay on " The Position of Law 
 in the Doctrine of Money " (London, 18SI), and in otlier publications. 
 [The essav referred to aj)pears also in the Document of the Cunference of 
 1878 (Washinjrton, Department of State, 1879), and in the Document of the 
 Conference of 1881 ; and translated by Professor de Laveleyo as •• La Mon- 
 naie et la Loi " (Paris : Guillaumin et Cie, 1881), and by E. Koch as " Da» 
 Gold und das Gesetz," Cologne, Ileimann, 1881).] 
 
The Elder Meanhuj of Smgle Standard. 49 
 
 best explained through analogies drawn from the law, which 
 will be considered on a later page/ 
 
 The legal establishment of Money, with a National Unit of 
 Valuation as its central figure, is a feature of all government. 
 In each country, each generation grows up in the domain of 
 such a National Unit."* 
 
 It will further conduce to clearness if I set forth with some 
 fulness, the fact that this distinction between the Unit and 
 Legal-Tender, between the Ultimate Standard of Valuation 
 and Legal Means of Payment, which I seek to emphasize in 
 Meanings Nos. 5 and 6, in the Introduction of this work, and 
 again in Propositions A and B, now under consideration — 
 lies imbedded in the public law of the modern world. Nothing 
 will, perhaps, more clearly show that this " one-metal," " anti- 
 two-metal" theory, whose noxious outcome we have charac- 
 terized, is a creature of our time, distinctly modern and revo- 
 lutionary, an ephemeral product of irrelevant learning, without 
 parentage of statesmanship, or claim of title supported by any 
 prescription in the past. 
 
 I venture to affirm that even at the close of the last centm^y 
 there was no nation in which there was not, historically, con- 
 stitutionally, or legally, a Single Standard in the sense of a 
 National Unit of Coinage. What were the pound sterling, 
 thaler, mark, gulden, rubel, fi*anc, dollar ? They were 
 National Units of Coinage, and all of Silver. With due 
 allowance for the occasional admission of what is known as the 
 " Parallel Standard," Silver was '' the Standard " generally ; 
 the Gold Money — though the degrees of its subordination to 
 Silver were various — was rated by Silver. 
 
 To use both metals equally as Money was the general rule : 
 
 ^ See pasres 176 and 177. 
 
 ■* There are instances of distinct and explicit transliipment (analogous 
 to a re-charter), as, for example, the change from thaler, etc., to mark in 
 Germany (1871-3), and from livrc to franc in France. 
 
 £ 
 

 50 Transcendental Slmfle-Metallism. 
 
 and though the rates and terms of currency of Gold — in 
 Hollandj for example, in the XYIIIth century, and in some 
 German states down even to a late date — are matters which 
 deserve more detailed examination than I am able to give 
 them here, yet, through custom and consent, which were 
 facilitated by the then great relative scarcity of Gold, as well 
 as by its lightness, this general rule was not far from being 
 universal. 
 
 No nation prohibited Gold. I know of no instance of 
 demonetization which deserves the name. Each nation struck, 
 or accepted. Gold Money under varying conditions, and at its 
 own rating. 
 
 A Dual *' Standard" of Money in the sense of Full-Legal- 
 Tender, a Single " Standard " of Money in the sense of 
 Monetary Unit, was thus an accepted policy of States. The 
 question of ''the Standard," in so far as it existed, was 
 a mere question of the National Unit of Valuation. It 
 was not a question of using one kind of Money to the entire 
 exclusion of the other, but only which metal should provide 
 the Unit to which the other iimst he made to conform in 
 value. ^ 
 
 It is by losing the track of this distinction when flushed 
 with new Gold, fooled by the example of England, and fired 
 
 • Hamilton's Report on the Mint contains, so far as I am informed, the 
 first formal proposition to "let the Unit stand upon the two metals:" 
 albeit his century knew nothing of the doctrine that Full-Legal-Tender- 
 Money must be made of only one metal. It does not api>ear that, although 
 Jt'lTersou, in this, agreed with his great rival, the law, as subsequently 
 passed by Congress, unequivocally makes Gold a Unit as it does SUver. 
 When a change of ratio came, iu 1S34, it was agreed without a word — 
 whatever the controlling motive of the choice — that the Gold Dollar, not 
 the Silver Dollar, should be changed. So in France, in our day, the 
 " Standard," in this sense, has been Silver. Thirty years ago, Micliel 
 Chevalier scorned the idea of preteniling that Gold could give the Unit. 
 A Silver franc, one-fifth of a five-franc piece, is, iu his view, what I have 
 called the National Unit of Coina<^e. 
 
Visionary Doctrines. 51 
 
 ■with the dreams of metrology, that intendiug reformers of 
 Money have led their generation into a slough of defeat. 
 
 The Single- Standard Doctrine of to-day has derived its 
 repute from this consensus of the past in maintaining a Single 
 Money-Unit, from the respect felt for the resolution to maintain 
 this " Standard;" a repute to which the modern doctrine has 
 no claim whatever. It is not only not the same doctrine — 
 being really a Single-Metal Doctrine, a Single-Money-ism — 
 but it moves in an opposite direction, it aims at disunion 
 instead of union, disparity rather than parity 
 
 The argument of the friends of Silver-Demonetization, in 
 their books, speeches, and articles innumerable, stands decked 
 in borrowed robes of dignity. Deprived of them, it will, 
 perhaps, be easier for the reader to detect the doctrine of 
 Single-metallism as a mystery, a superstition, a monomania. 
 
 One who should put forth speculations upon the desira- 
 bility of there being but one sex, or should object to a com- 
 pound gas as an atmosphere for his breathing, or should seek, 
 as a reformer, to excommunicate either anthracite or bitu- 
 minous coal, would meet with little sympathy in this common- 
 sense world. 
 
 Why so ? Because no effort is required to recognize the 
 vanity of such speculations. Superlative in absurdity is the 
 first ; next comes, one might say, as the comparative degree, 
 the idea of discovering a new element to serve as an 
 atmosphere ; while lastly, as a positive absurdity, comes the 
 scheme of forcibly excluding from use either of the great 
 sources of motive-power for modern industry. 
 
 And yet how far is the " mono-metallist,^' with his one- 
 metal doctrine, which we are reviewing, free from exposure to 
 the redudio ad ahsurdiim which must haunt the mono-sexuist, 
 the mono-fuelist, the mono-gaseist. 
 
 Is it less true that there are two Money-metals, two metals 
 in the maintenance of which, as Money, the world, and, in its 
 degree, each nation of it, have an interest, than that there are 
 
OZ 
 
 o 
 
 T}\ t nsce?iden tal Siwjle-Metallis m . 
 
 two POxes, or two kinds of coal, or that the earth's atmosphere 
 in which human life proceeds is a compound of two gases ? 
 
 These interwoven dualities and unities are all facts. 
 
 The absurdity I combat belongs, then, to the same family 
 as these I am imagining ; the difference is that in the one 
 case, there is a small absurdity, in the other cases there are 
 larger ones. It is easy to see the larger; it takes more 
 trouble to recognize the smaller in its true character. 
 
 It is the half-truth, half-error, of national independence; 
 the fact that, technically, formally, a nation is independent in 
 the choice, and in the regulation of its Money, which conceals 
 the unreality of the mono-metallist's dream. 
 
 This independence of decision, this freedom of will, is not 
 merely limited, but is neutralized by a dependence of motives, 
 and by the impossibilities of achievement. 
 
 In essentials, the devotee of the Gold Standard, from the 
 point of view of that past in the — conscious or unconscious — 
 contemplation of which he lives, is no more justified in look- 
 ing down upon, or ignoring, Silver, than was the student of 
 chemistry from Arkansas justified, who, after some expe- 
 riences in the laboratory, expressed a contemptuous opinion of 
 oxygen gas. 
 
 Can the self-confidence of an individual, or of a generation, 
 produce greater eflfect upon Money than upon oxygen ? 
 
 The alleged Single-Metal S3'stein which England has enjoyed 
 since 1820, was, and is, a Single-Metal System only in a limited 
 sense ; it never was monometallic in the full and truer sense 
 of the word. Gold performed its functions in England in the 
 satisfactory manner so often referred to with praise, by favour 
 of the maintenance of Silver and Gold in other countries. 
 
 Without repeating here the argument presented in Chap- 
 ters I. and III., wo may conveniently illustrate it by reference 
 to the situation in which Europe now finds itself. Europe 
 enjoys the Gold Standard to-day — that is, the Gold Standard 
 in senses Nos. 7 and 8 of the Introduction ; but does anyone 
 
The Duality of Money. 53 
 
 allege that for Europe " Money " is inonoinetallic, made of 
 Gold alone; in other words, that Europe in its business 
 transacti<jns, its monetary conditions, its valuations, is in- 
 difi'erent to, or independent of, any Money-material other 
 than Gold ? 
 
 Who would be so bold ? 
 
 The question can be negatived independently of the hun- 
 dreds of millions of Silver Money in the banks, strong-boxes 
 and pockets, of Europeans. 
 
 Waiving the past, why is the \vorld of Gold prices to-day 
 in a tremor about the future ? 
 
 Because of the conflict of Monetary Systems; because of the 
 questions, what is to be the Silver-price of Gold in Asia, or 
 the Gold-price of Silver in Europe ; because of the dread 
 that Silver will cross the ocean here, and that, in inevitable 
 reaction. Gold will cross the Ocean there ! It is not a question 
 of goods that troubles the European world : it is a question 
 of their price ; and their price is a resultant of complex forces, 
 in which the present relations of Silver and Gold Money play 
 to-day a role pei'plexing and damaging, if not destructive, to 
 the orderly progress of production and distribution of wealth. 
 
 Where, then, is the unapproachable solitude, the inexpugn- 
 able stability, the inviolate one-ness of Money '^ for Europe? 
 
 It does not exist. Money is still made of two metals. 
 
 After fifteen years of ravages of the anti-two-metal policy 
 in the leading States, man has progressed no further toward 
 his one-metal ideal than to make his two-metal Money a source 
 of anxiety and damage to him, instead of unbroken benefit. 
 The monometallist world is as obstinately tied to a duality as 
 that of the mono-sexuist, the mono-fuelist, the mono-gaseist. 
 So far as the genus homo and the planet terra are concerned, 
 the Gold-Unitarian's ideal is really non-ideal ; it requires ex- 
 traneous support : it is perfect only on crutches which are not 
 of its own substance, and, in fact, belong elsewhere. 
 
 The crutches exist no more as they once existed. The 
 
0-i Transcnidental Smtjle-Mctallisjn. 
 
 Single Gold Standard on crutches, as it was before 1874, is a 
 lost cause, obsolete beyond hope. 
 
 To advocate it to-day, is to dream of a time when all other 
 nations but one's own shall have adopted such laws as will 
 maintain the excellence of the dreamer's chosen metal as a 
 local standard of value ; so that when there is an extraordi- 
 nary demand (as in 1810-1823), they shall give him his metal 
 at a fixed price, and when an embarrassing supply comes (1850- 
 1860), they shall hold up the market for his benefit; possi- 
 bilities which belong to a golden age that disappeared from 
 the earth when the par of Silver and Gold was broken. 
 
 An unconscious Monetary Balance of Power once existed, 
 and has perished. "While it lived, maintaining Gold as good 
 Money by itself, and Silver as good Money by itself, it was a 
 simple matter for each nation to regulate its own one-metal 
 Money in seeming or supposed disconnection with other sys- 
 tems of Money. This state of affairs is at an end. By force 
 of events of sinister import, the problem for Monetary states- 
 mansliip has become positively, instead of negatively, inter- 
 national. Formerly it was important to do nothing to disturb 
 an existing Balance of Power ; now it is essential to be active, 
 to do something to restore, to re-establish, and to maintain a 
 Balance of Power. 
 
 The Balance of Power as it was (in all respects, unconscious, 
 and, in a sense, involuntary) cannot be restored ; the aim of 
 reform must be a conscious, intended. Establishment of Money 
 by the chief nations, based upon valid considerations, with 
 mutual guarantees. 
 
 There is still another sect of devotees of the Single Metal 
 whose peculiar form of belief merits notice. They are those 
 who deny that they are Single-mctallists, who say they believe 
 in Silver, and believe in Gold, l)ut do not believe in a fixed 
 ratio between them. 
 
 They are like men who should say : We are n«:>t mono- 
 riparians ; we are willing that men shall dwell on either side 
 
The Sphere of Law. 55 
 
 of a broad river ; but on condition that no bridge be built 
 across it. We are not single-gauge men ; wo arc willing that 
 narrow-orauore and broad-gauge railroads be built ; but we are 
 unalterably opposed to any facilities for trans-shipment. We 
 are not mono-fuelists ; but we insist that a man shall make his 
 choice, once for all, between hard coal and soft coal. We 
 are not mono-sexuists ; we admit that there are two sexes ; 
 we accept their peculiar relations as a fact, and tolerate the 
 consequences ; but we are in unalterable opposition to legal 
 marriage. 
 
 Minds that can please themselves with such contentions are 
 in some respects even more closely cribbed than the Gold- 
 enthusiast in the toils of the creed we are reviewing ; though 
 it is the second article, the limitation of the power of law over 
 Money, which here is salient. 
 
 The assertion that, as a matter of fact, the law does not 
 succeed when it tries, here, goes hand in hand with the assumed 
 principle that the law owjht not to try, to affect the value of 
 money ; and both the assertion of fiict and the assumed prin- 
 ciple are put forward to sustain opposition to laws for main- 
 taining the two metals in parity. 
 
 But, as we shall have occasion to show on other pages, the 
 actual power of the State to maintain parity and concurrent 
 use of money of the two metals, is amply established by the 
 experience of nations. This fact established, the mere authority 
 need not be discussed in detail. Of course the considerations 
 presented throughout this work necessitate and justify the 
 desired exercise of power. 
 
 It may, however, be observed in passing, that the mere 
 existence of paper-notes, whether full, or partial, legal tender, 
 or not legal tender, oflers a refutation of both assertion and 
 principle in their broader application ; while the observation 
 that, in fact, five-pound notes are usually at par with fifty- 
 pound notes, supplies an effective analogy with the maintenance 
 of a par between Silver-coin and Gold-coin. 
 
5 6 Transcen den tal Sinjle-Metallism , 
 
 Before proceeding \vith our analysis, it may be well to insure 
 an agreement between the reader and myself, upon the meaning 
 of words, by explaining that the views I express touching the 
 power of law to regulate the value of Money are chargeable 
 only witli referring to the range of subjects here under con- 
 sideration ; and that, in speaking of what " the law can do," 
 I assume the benefits of a presumption, to which I am well 
 entitled, namely, that, in any specific instance for which I am 
 to be held as a guarantor, the act of the corporate will of a 
 nation whose power I affirm to be suflRcient, shall be %vise law. 
 in other words, I presuppose, at least, what the jurist calls 
 " ordinary diligence " on the part both of the law-making, 
 and of the law-executing, power. 
 
 This point, though a matter of form and use of words, is 
 not unimportant. 
 
 To some minds imagination may not unnaturally present 
 the idea of regulating the value of money by laws, under a 
 magnifying glass, as the fiat of an autocracy out of alignment, 
 or bereft of contact with the society it seeks to rule : and 
 hence a fiat which the individual will not, may not, or should 
 not, obey. The struggle of generations in both Continents 
 between " Specie " and " Paper '' has made it easy to fall 
 into this line of thoui^ht. 
 
 Hence it is not out of place to fortify my caveat by an 
 illustration ; obser%ang that the task set before the nations of 
 our time, of driving in harness, abreast, the two " shining 
 coursers of exchange," has its analogies with the prosaic and 
 trivial task of driving a span of horses of good flesh and blood. 
 Of a skilful driver I am permitted to say, " He can drive that 
 span where ho pleases," and am not thereby committed to any 
 transcending of the powers of nature ; I am not chargeable 
 Nvith meaning that the place " where " driving can be done is 
 in fact a " wherever," without limit ; that the horses will fly 
 through the air at the drivei*^s will, or tunnel the earth by 
 pure propulsion of hoofs. Against this, my averment is 
 
 
The Doctrine of Non-interference. 57 
 
 guarded by a shadowy cohort of presumptions : gravitation, 
 inertia, cohesion, habits, etc. etc., all are presumed : in a 
 word, our ideas remain at the surface of the earth, as do the 
 horses and driver. And so it is with my contentions 
 touching the power of law: they are not in the air. The fiat 
 of sagacity and the fiat of incompetence are very different 
 things, and it was of the former I was speaking. 
 
 Returning from this digression to our issue, it is plain 
 that to cite historical instances of failure to maintain parity 
 or concurrent use of the two metals, is germane for one who, 
 admitting what wise laws may do, is careful to oppose what 
 he believes, and thinks he can prove to be, an unwise law. 
 But this is not the contention we are confronting ; that con- 
 tention is that the mere existence and experience of some 
 unwise laws ousts the jurisdiction, and disproves the power, 
 of the State. 
 
 In thus stating the proposition, I give it the advantage of 
 whatever reason there is to support it ; and so divest it of the 
 visionary air with which it often a])pears in public. But in 
 order to be able to affirm in defence of Anti- Silver-laws, that 
 Anti- Silver-laws are natural, but Pro- Silver- laws are un- 
 natural, it is necessary to be visionary, either on a large 
 scale, or on a small scale ; either so far to ignore the nature of 
 Money as to fail to recognize it as an institution of the 
 State, or to remain unconscious of the actual rangfe of activitv 
 required of the State in connection with the institution. The 
 incongruity of the appearance of the idea in England ^vill be 
 quite apparent when it is realized that England is the home of 
 artificial regulation of Money ; * and that when Englishmen 
 indulge in visionary system-building in this direction, they are 
 really " disabling the benefits of their own country." 
 
 If this rule is to prevail in monetary matters, should it 
 not also prevail in reference to judiciary, or police, or army? 
 
 ' See Section 9. 
 
oS Tr<inscetuhntid Sititjle-Mf'ttrlh'.ajyi . 
 
 Upon such principles, the appearance of a corrupt judge, a 
 cowardly policeman, an incompetent general, should suffice to 
 wind up the history of Civil Society, and to relegate mankind 
 to a state of nature — presumably congenial to the philosophy 
 we are seeking to expose in its true chai*acter. 
 
 The question of authority in the special matter of the Unit 
 of Valuation, viz., whether two or more materials shall sepa- 
 rately and equally be invested with the character of Money- 
 Unit, must be regarded from the standpoint of expediency, of 
 practical policy, and is no more to be rightfully excluded, 
 jier 86, on principle, by mere dogmatic limitation of what is 
 called the sphere of government, than are optional con- 
 tracts, or judgeships of concurrent jurisdiction. Xow there 
 is certainly in a statutory option to treat Substance A, Sub- 
 stance B, or Substance C, at discretion, as an embodiment 
 of the National Unit of Account — nothing which is subversive 
 of the objects for which the state exists. It is, I am aware, 
 not uncommon to regard such an arrangement as this as some- 
 thing in its nature peculiarly artificial — as compared with that 
 of the Single-Unit : but this view arises largely from the 
 failure to apprehend the essential artificiality of the Single- 
 Unit itself. 
 
 This artificiality can be shown in clear light by every-day 
 facts which are within sight of every business man, and hence 
 without profound inquiry into the true relations of the State to 
 Money. If we ask, for example, what is the real Standar<l 
 in England, we shall find theorists of the first repute in Eng- 
 land who hold the English Standard of Value to be 123."'^'*^ 
 grains of Gold \\ fine. Others would say that it was 
 the sovereign, a coin of that weight and fineness. As 
 between the manufactured article, the coin, and the material, 
 standard bullion — which though it has passed through many 
 processes of labour, may be treated as raw material — there is, 
 in the nature of things, a difference, a considerable difference. 
 Now, a most notable feature of English law, is the effort to 
 
Artificiality in Enjland. 59 
 
 remove, to annul, to neutralize this difference which lies in the 
 nature of things, — a procedure on the part of the Law of Eng- 
 land which, in the light of the economic doctrine we are deal- 
 ing with, must appear artificial in the highest degree. The 
 law relieves the owner of bullion from the great expense 
 involved in the manufacture of coin, and puts the burden of 
 these expenses upon the Tax-payer, a proceeding which obvi- 
 ously gives an artificial value to Gold bullion. 
 
 An analogous means of artificial equalization is provided by 
 English law for the coin. The sovereign should, as we have 
 observed, be of a certain weight and fineness : but the art of 
 coinage being unable to attain the ideal weight and fineness, 
 the statute artificially makes equal before the law, coins which 
 are naturally imequal. The coin which weighs 122.'*^ grains, 
 or is .'^'^*' fine, is by law, a sovereign, and Legal-Tender for a 
 Pound Sterling, just as if it were 123."'^*^ grains .^^'"^'^ fine. 
 But beyond this we have a further instance of the artificial. 
 How much are 123.""^' grains of gold |^ths fine worth in 
 pounds, shillings, and pence ? 
 
 Most readers will be surprised at the question, and perhaps 
 none will be prepared for the answer : the point being, strange 
 to say, a novel one. 
 
 The following statement of the average price of Gold is 
 taken from a Return made by the Bank of England to the 
 House of Commons. The ounce of Gold — equal in iveiglit to 
 £3 17s. lO^f?. of ideal coins — was ivorth in 
 
 
 £ 
 
 x. 
 
 <L 
 
 
 £ 
 
 s. 
 
 r7. 
 
 
 £ 
 
 s.. d. 
 
 1827 
 
 . 3 
 
 1 — 
 
 G 
 
 1832 
 
 . 3 
 
 1 - 
 
 9^ 
 
 ' 4 
 
 1837 
 
 . > 
 
 17 9 
 
 1828 
 
 . 3 
 
 ■1 -T 
 
 63- 
 
 1833 
 
 . O 
 
 1 - 
 
 H 
 
 1838 
 
 . 3 
 
 17 QJC- 
 
 1829 
 
 . 3 
 
 1 ■- 
 
 ^•1 
 
 1834 
 
 . 3 
 
 1 — 
 
 9 
 
 1S39 
 
 . 3 
 
 17 11 
 
 1830 
 
 . 3 
 
 -I — 
 
 H 
 
 1835 
 
 . 3 
 
 1 - 
 
 9 
 
 1840 
 
 . 3 
 
 17 ^ 
 
 1831 
 
 . 3 
 
 17 
 
 101 
 
 183(5 
 
 . 3 
 
 1 — 
 
 ^ 
 
 1841 
 
 . 3 
 
 17 9 
 
 Another statement from the same source ' gives four quota- 
 
 ' Tlie first statement is from a Ketiun on tlie ruMit- Debt, Is August. 
 1842 : the latter from App. 8, Rep. Banks of Issue, 1840. 
 
00 Traiiscendmtal Single-Metallism. 
 
 tions of £3 1S«. as the price for 1839. We have, then, the 
 diftcrcnce between £o 17n. G'/. and £3 18^?., — that is to say, 
 C(/. peroz,, close to 2 3 per cent. — as the range of fluctuation in 
 the price of Gold as measured by the English Gold Standard. 
 
 Since the Bank Act of 184-i made it the duty of the Bank to 
 pay £3 17s. Ot/. per ounce of Standard bullion — the three half- 
 pence of difference being supposed to cover the benefit given and 
 received — the price of such bullion, not coined, has, I believe, 
 remained nnchanged. This is, of course, at the Bank, for in 
 any other place the question of use in that place, or of trans- 
 portation to another place will necessarily enter into the calcu- 
 lation of its value. 
 
 Recognizing then the necessity or the wisdom of these three 
 distinct regulations, which, though necessary and wise, are in 
 their nature artificial, wo shall find that between the System 
 which maintains One Unit and Legal-Tender, and the System 
 which maintains Two Units and Legal-Tenders, there is, 
 properly speaking, no difference in kind : at least from the 
 point of view of naturalness, or of artificiality. 
 
 We shall also fiud that the difierence in degree, is rather 
 apparent than real. How much moi'o is it an interference 
 with the natural order of things to maintain 100 million Pounds 
 of Gold and Silver coin in England, than to maintain 100 
 million Pounds of Gold ; to give gratuitous coinage to one and 
 the other metal rather than to one: to fix a tolerance of weight 
 and fineness for a sum total, partly Gold, partly Silver, than 
 for the same sum in Gold alone : to establish a fixed jirice for 
 an amount of bullion, partly Silver, partly Gold, rather than 
 for the same amount of Gold alone? Whatever difierence 
 there may be, if it be against the Dual Standard, is of course 
 to be charged to the account of the policy, or, the expediency 
 of such an establishment. 
 
 Touching this question of policy or expediency, wo may 
 mention among the controlling elements of practical decision 
 upon a proposition of putting, or keeping, " the Unit in the 
 two metals," the following: — 
 
The Duty of the State. 61 
 
 1. The necessity that a State should act as but one member 
 of a community of independent nations which exercise juris- 
 diction over Money, each State having, so to speak, but a 
 limited property in its own Money-stock, and an undivided 
 interest in the stock of all. 
 
 2. That the stock of intrinsic Money and available material 
 for Money in the hands of man, is composed of Silver and 
 Gold, in relative quantity somewhere near sixteen tons of 
 Silver to one ton of Gold, while the prevalent rate of equiva- 
 lence maintained for the world through the law of Alternative 
 Free Coinage in the former Bimetallic Union, down to 1873, 
 was loi to 1. 
 
 We have now briefly analyzed, and characterized by com- 
 parison, the doctrine of one-metallism, and are, I humbly 
 conceive, entitled to judgment against it. 
 
 When such judgment shall have been entered in the minds 
 of a working majority of men of intellect and learning-, who 
 are the leaders of opinion in England, then the work of 
 rebuilding what has been destroyed, the enlightened regula- 
 tion of the world's Money by concurrent action of Europe 
 and America, will begin in earnest, and will attain speedy 
 fulfilment. 
 
 Then the doctrines which have marshalled the hosts of 
 Christendom to the Outlawry of Silver — the creed which rules 
 the world to-day in the existing monetary dead-lock of nations 
 and by favour of inertia, stays the hand of statesmen from 
 putting an end to it — will pass to the limbo of '' creeds 
 outworn," to be remembered only as a suicidal superstition. 
 
 But to the student of history this survey must seem incom- 
 plete and unsatisfactory unless some explanati<:)n is found of 
 the ascendency which such a compound of fallacy has gained 
 over the minds of a generation. 
 
 Such explanation has already been suggested in what has 
 
' '• '2 Tnfnsce7iden tal Sinple-Metalli>'m . 
 
 been said of the iutroduction of the Anti-two-metal system in 
 England in 18 IG, and its maintenance since that date. 
 
 As the chief financial, industrial, commercial, monetary 
 power, England's policy, sound or unsound, has for the heedless 
 world a perilous prestige. The broad empire of fashion em- 
 braces sterner things than dress. The Gold- Standard, or 
 Anti-Silver-movement, is but a form of Anglomania, which 
 events have combined to magnify into continental proportions, 
 and which, unlike many forms of Anglomania, has lacked 
 any .sound justification in England for its origin. In other 
 chapters, a review of modern monetary policy in England 
 will put to the test the justice of this assertion. 
 
 But granting that the example of England is the efficient 
 cause of existence and of authority for the one-metal crusade, 
 there has been present, it seems to me, a prevailing cause of 
 popularity, which has wrought wonders in advancing the 
 ascendency of the Gold-Standard theory. 
 
 This error, which would restrain the state from securing 
 permanent painty between the metals of which man's intrinsic 
 Money is made, moves in line with, and seems to make part 
 of, a certain all-embracing, all-inspiring, current of opinion 
 which has almost made the atmosphere of modern progress 
 — namely, the great history-making, policy-creating tendency 
 of the age toward liberty, individualism, and opposing abso- 
 lutism, interference, too-much government. 
 
 Allying itself in outward seeming with such a mission as 
 this, it was easv for error to find its wav into the convictions 
 and into the aftections of men. 
 
 As for the claim of kinship between this tendency of our 
 age and the Anti-Silver theory, if it be worth while to investi- 
 gate it, the assumption may be briefly characterized by stating 
 it as follows : — 
 
 Is it more in accord with the spirit of the XlXth century 
 that the state should perform an admitted and inevitable duty 
 
A Doctrine Misplaced. 63 
 
 in a slip-shod, bap-hazard, aud slovenly way, than to do it ^-ith 
 persevering ability and foresight ? 
 
 The state can, in ftict, as we have observed, no more absolve 
 itself from the regulation of Money than from the maintenance 
 of a System of Private Law. Its work must be done in some 
 way, cither well or ill. 
 
 The error of the monetary disuuionist, therefore, differs only 
 in degree, not in kind, from that of one who should fulminate 
 against Courts of Justice, and close his peroration with an 
 appeal that, if we must have Courts of Justice at all, at least 
 let the Judges and the Clerks and the Sheriffs be as incompe- 
 tent as possible! 
 
 That the dominion of the one-metal creed is waninsr, is 
 generally recognized iu all countries. 
 
 •' The old dragon under ground, 
 In straitor limi** bound, 
 Xot half so flir casts his usurped sway," 
 
 but still, from time to time, 
 
 '• Wroth to see his kingdom fail. 
 Swinges the scaly horror of his folded tail." 
 
 So long as the enemy shows signs of life, so long must 
 those who with the weapons of truth have checked his activity, 
 and are seeking to repair the ravages he has caused, plant 
 new arrows of refutation between his ribs. 
 
 The necessity of doing this is unfortunate ; but it is not 
 we who have made the necessity. The reader who needs no 
 reminder of the truth, must give ready pardon to the writer 
 for the time he employs in combating an error which ought 
 to be, and which every philanthropist should earnestly strive 
 to make, obsolete. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 A Lesson of History: The Monetary Crisis of 1696. 
 
 § 11. THE RECOINAGE OF 1G96, AND ITS BEARING UPON THE 
 
 QUESTIONS OF TO-DAY. 
 
 Having considered, in the preceding chapters, some general 
 questions of policy relating to the maintenance or reversal of 
 that legislative Outlawry of Silver among the Western Nations, 
 of which the English statute is to-day the chief support, and 
 ha\nng presented an analysis of the doctrine upon which the 
 English statute rests, we can now conveniently test the cor- 
 rectness of the views advanced, by a survey of the course of 
 monetary events in England, which shall throw light upon 
 the origin of the theory and practice now in vogue. So far 
 as this purpose is directly concerned, it is unnecessary to 
 penetrate to a period very remote : and, in any event, whether 
 the student shall have taken up his burden in Saxon or in 
 Norman age, or under Plantagcnet or Tudor, the dates 1GG6 
 and 1G06 will, in the end, impress themselves upon his con- 
 sciousness as the introduction, and the opening scene, of a 
 new monetary epoch, and witli these our present study of 
 history will begin. 
 
 Among the half-explored regions of monetary history few 
 
Sect. 11.] The Great Recoinafje. Ga 
 
 periods contain matter of greater interest, or of closer bearing 
 upon the great issue of to-day, than that of which the English 
 Recoinage of IGOG was the centre. In so many regards a 
 turning-point and formative period in the history of Europe, 
 the Whig Revolution which placed the Stadtholdcr of Hol- 
 land on England^s throne to fight the Stuart, the Frenchman, 
 and the Romanist, offers withal to the student ample 
 and convincing lessons in monetary statesmanship. To the 
 responsibilities of revolution and of foreign war, came the 
 cumulative burden of grievous monetary ills, affecting the 
 foundations of England^s economic life ; and, through rare 
 favour of fortune, the unexampled crisis found statesmen in 
 command. 
 
 ** Happily for England," says Macaulay, " there were 
 among her rulers, some who clearly perceived that it 
 was not by halters and branding-irons that her decaying 
 industry and commerce could be restored to health. The 
 state of the currency had during some time occupied the 
 serious attention of four eminent men closely connected by 
 public and private ties. Two of them were politicians who 
 had never, in the midst of official and parliamentary business, 
 ceased to love and honour philosophy ; and two were philo- 
 sophers, in whom habits of abstruse meditation had not impaired 
 the homely good sense, without which even genius is mis- 
 chievous in politics. Never had there been an occasion which 
 more urgently required both practical and speculative abilities; 
 and never had the world seen the highest practical and the 
 highest speculative abilities united in an alliance so close, so 
 harmoniou.s, and so honourable as that which bound Somers' 
 and Montague" to Locke and Newton." 
 
 " It is much to be lamented," continues the historian, 
 
 ' "One of those divine men, who, like a clmpel in a palace, remain nn- 
 prophanerl, whilst all the rest is tyranny, rorruption, and fojlv." — From 
 Horace Walpole's " C'atalopue of Noble and Koyal Authors." 
 
 The following is a portion of the inscription npon the monument of 
 
 V 
 
GG The }fonctm'y Crisis of IG'JG. 
 
 " that wo have not a minute history of the conferences of the 
 men to whom Enghind owed the restoration of her cuireucy 
 and the long series of prosperous years which dates from that 
 restoration. It would be interesting to see how the pure gold 
 of scientific truth found by the two philosophers was mingled 
 by the two statesmen with just that quantity of alloy which 
 was necessary for the working. It would be curious to study 
 the many plans which were propounded, discussed, and 
 rejected, some as inefficacious, some as unjust, some as too 
 costly, some as too hazardous, till at length a plan was devised 
 of which the wisdom was proved by the best evidence, com- 
 plete success.^' ' 
 
 Wiiile echoing the regret to which the historian's study of 
 imagination gives such poignancy, I am compelled to point 
 forward to other, and greater, deprivations : for, in spite of 
 the admirable products of his own research in these fields, 
 there is still far more to be lamented than that of which 
 Macaulay speaks. The record is incomplete in essential 
 
 Cliarli's Moiitagiio. Earl of Iliilifax, in Westminster Abbey: — 
 
 Kre\T etenira lunic vinun 
 Sua in senatn facundia 
 In roncilio providentia 
 In utrctqnc solertia ; fides, authoritas 
 Ad frernndain Aerarii curani evexit. 
 UIti laborantibus Kisci rebus 
 Opportune subvenicns, 
 Monetam argenteam 
 Magnu reipublicac detrinicnto imminntani. 
 Yalori pristino restitnit: 
 Et tautae niolis npns 
 C'nni flatrrante jam bello dintino 
 Ut aegrederetnr et absolveret, 
 Ne subsidia Regi Regnoque neces.saria 
 Deessent interim, 
 Ne (ides aut jirivata, aut ])ubliea, 
 Vaccilaret uspiam 
 Sapienter ca\ it. 
 ' *' History of England " in Macaulay 's CompleteWorks, edition of 186G, 
 iv. 192-.'5. 
 
Sect. 11.] The Great Recoinage. 07 
 
 points, not merely in reference to details, the lack of which 
 he hero deplores. The following pages will, 1 believe, con- 
 clusively show the inadequacy of the current accounts of Eng- 
 land's monetary experience, and will further be held to justify 
 the view that history has been erroneously written, so that not 
 only are its more important lessons still to be learned, but the 
 task is incumbent of unlearning the pretended lessons of an 
 erroneous record. 
 
 The outcome of this hiatus in literature may, indeed, in 
 time be regarded as quite a master-stroke of the irony of fate : 
 for through this negative means it has become a fable agreed- 
 upon that the devotees of the Single Gold Standard should trace 
 the pedigree of their doctrines to a glorious ancestry: and the 
 dogma of the impotence of legislation to secure the useful em- 
 ployment of both metals as material for Full-Legal-Tendcr 
 Money, has been allowed to find its sanction in what purported 
 to be the monetary history of the first of ^lonctary Powers. 
 
 It is this dogma, enforced by this example, that mastered 
 the minds of the generation which has canned and now main- 
 tains the partial Outlawry of Silver : here is the ground-article 
 of faith of those who thought that the rejection of Silver, the 
 expulsion of one of the Money-metals of mankind, could do 
 no harm, and who still think that its restoration can do good. 
 Such is its transcendent supremacy over the minds of men. I 
 can appeal with confidence to the leaders of Silver Outlawry 
 — Michel Chevalier and Charles Feer-Horzog have passed 
 away, but Esquiroude Parieu, Frere-Orban, and Soetbeer, still, 
 
 '■ Like prcat Sai'pefloii. lowor amiil llio liolrl," — - 
 
 whether the Anti- Silver-movement did not attain its ascen- 
 dency by dint of the prestige of this dogma; and whether the 
 monetary history of England has not boon authoritatively 
 presented as its august sponsor? 
 
 It is therefore eminently germane to the argument in sup- 
 port of an amendment of the policy now in control iu the 
 
68 The Monetary Crifiifi of KiDG. 
 
 Occidental World, to expunge the errors of that record, so far as 
 may be, and to have the record thoughtfully re-read, as amended. 
 
 In presenting the matter in detail, we need not follow rivu- 
 lets, but can most conveniently approach the main stream and 
 source of doctrine, in Lord Liverpool's "Treatise on the Coins 
 of the Realm.'' In the form of a letter to the King (printed 
 in 1805), the chief monetary expert of H. M. Privy Council 
 laid down the Law of Money, for his own and for later genera- 
 tions. The formal adoption of the chief features of Lord 
 Liverpool's Scheme of a Coinage System, by the British 
 Parliament, in 1816, under the Premiership of his son, and the 
 maintenance of that system down to the present day, upon 
 the lines, and with the success, elsewhere set forth, give to 
 his book an importance absolutely unique. Here is a treatise 
 upon Money, which, in an important sense, has not only made 
 the latter history of the chief monetary nation of the world : 
 but through this means at a turning-point of affairs it directed 
 the current of opinion and of action, and so set the fashion for 
 the century now current, and imposed its moral rule upon the 
 Western Powers. This book is therefore — if the expression 
 may be used — the Scripture of plenary inspiration for the 
 Anti-Silver faith : or the Magna Charta Monetaria, from which 
 is derived, what I can but call the mental slavery of our time to 
 the doctrines of Silver Outlawry. The second edition of it 
 (London, 1846) bears, indeed, upon its title-page — I know not 
 with what authority — a statement which constitutes an avowed 
 claim to this character, namely, that it is a " concise account 
 of all the facts relating to the Currency which bear upon 
 the exchanges of Europe, and the principles of political 
 science." 
 
 The theses which Lord Liverpool sustains amid the winding 
 passages of an elaborate but confused argumentation, will be 
 found to include, in substance, some of the ideas which we have 
 analyzed in the preceding chapter — and the experience of his 
 country, in the Great Pecoinage of 1696, as well as elsewhere. 
 
Skct. 11.] The Great Recoinage. 69 
 
 and the teachings of the chief literary actor in that event, 
 John Locke/ as well as those of other writers of note, are pre- 
 sented as, on the whole, sustaining the writei^'s doctrine. 
 The influence of the doctrinal testimony thus adduced to point 
 the moral of history, in persuading a later generation of the 
 soundness of Lord LiverpooFs scheme for a national system 
 of Money, can hardly be over-estimated. What man of greater 
 authority, for example, has ever written on Money than John 
 Locke, who, independently of his purely philosophical reputa- 
 tion, was the " interpreter of the Revolution,^^ which founded 
 anew the constitution and the liberties of England ? 
 
 It is therefore essential to a thorough and impartial reading 
 of the true lessons of England's experience, to inquire how 
 far these statements are justified ? 
 
 The facts I propose to prove are these : free and gratuitous 
 coinage of Silver and Gold, each unlimited Legal-Tender, 
 Silver the Unit, Gold rated in terms of Silver in the various 
 degrees allowed by the peculiar law of Legal-Tender of the 
 time, with the power in the hands of the Crown to modify the 
 rating from time to time, as occasion served: such was the 
 system which Locke and Newton and Somers and Montague 
 found, such was the system which they laboured to place under 
 secure guarantees of administrative practice and of legislation. 
 
 If this be true, I submit that this experience of England, 
 and the authority of her statesmen, make for the Silver and 
 Gold Standard, — for the duty, as well as the right and power 
 of governments to adopt such measures as may be needed to 
 maintain Silver and Gold in parity and in concurrent use as 
 Money-metals. The following pages will pi'cscnt the evidence 
 which, in my belief, establishes these conclusions. 
 
 ' " Certain it is, at any rate, that in nearly all their political action both 
 Sonaers and Monta;.fue were actuated by the principles that Locke ad- 
 vanced, and gave nttcrance to opinions with which he agreed." — Fox- 
 Bourne's '• Life of Locke," vol. ii., p. 311. 
 
"^> The Monetary Crisis of KlOn. 
 
 § 12. THE DISOHOERS OP THE TIME AND TlItlR REMEDY. 
 
 The disorder of England's Mouoy, which hiid so heavy a 
 burden upon tho statesmen of the Revolution, has been 
 brilliantly depicted by Macaulay. 
 
 " The Silver-coin," ho says, " which was then the standard 
 coin of tho realm, was in a state at which the boldest and most 
 enlightened statesmen stood aghast." Tho failure to take 
 proper measures to prevent the currency of debased, worn, or 
 clipped, and of tho old hammered, coins, by tho side of tho 
 new full-weight milled coins, naturally tended to promote 
 the melting down of all the good coins, and left tho bad in 
 circulation. " It may well be doubted," says the historian, 
 "whether all tho misery which had been inflicted on tho 
 English nation in a quarter of a century by bad kings, bad 
 ministers, bad parliaments, and bad judges, was equal to tho 
 misery caused in a single year by bad crowns and bad shillings. 
 The evil was one which daily made progress almost 
 visil)lo to the eye. There might have been a recoinage 
 in Itj'.il- with half tho risk which must be run in 10'.)6 ; 
 and, great as would be the risk in IGOG, that risk would be 
 doubled if the recoinage were postponed till 1698." (" History," 
 iv. 184, 104.) As time went on and nothing was done, a 
 general reformation of tho coinage had thus been allowed to 
 become first desirable, then important, then a crying need. 
 The " measure was lost,'' as Locke himself said. 
 
 The best coin left was the "guinea," then in the early 
 stages of its appearance in a rolo which proved to be quite 
 uni(|ue in the annals of Money. It was coined as a twenty- 
 shilling jiiece, its weight being fixed by Royal Proclamation 
 of JGGo, which lowered tho relative weight of the Gold-coins 
 of England by about eight and a. half per cent, below the rate 
 which had been established in 1<»21. .Supposed to depend lor 
 its material upon the metal which the l^)yal Company of Ail- 
 vcnturers trading in AlVica, were to bring from the Uold 
 
Sect. 12.] Disorder and Remedy. 71 
 
 Coast, it secured the name of guinea, wliicli is still held by 
 a descendant Money of account. Later, the policy of reducing 
 Seigniorage, which had already found favour with the Coun- 
 cillors of Charles II., was replaced by its total abandonment, 
 under authority of Parliament, which by the Act of 18 
 Car. II. c. 5 (see Appendix 2), made the minting of the 
 Gold and Silver-coins of the realm gratuitous, as well as free 
 to all comers, native or stranger. 
 
 A general rise in the Silver-price of Gold seems to have 
 declared itself not long afterward ; and no Proclamation 
 was issued making the guineas obligatorily current at 20 
 shillings ; but in lieu of this, it appears, that the guineas were 
 accepted at something like their current value, which rose to 
 21s., and then seems to have remained fixed for a long time 
 at 21s. 6<7. The agency of the government in maintaining 
 this *' rating '' through its control of currency in the offices of 
 receipt and expenditure will be discussed on a later page. 
 
 Returning now to the condition of the Silver-coin — so well 
 exposed through the vigorous language of Macaulay — it will 
 appear obvious that the progressive fading out of the *' Stan- 
 dard " through clipping and counterfeiting, and through the 
 exportation of all the heavier purer Silver-coins, must naturally 
 secure to the guineas, through comparison of them with the 
 decomposing mass of Silver remaining in use, the privilege of 
 acceptance at higher rates. When the deterioration and dis- 
 credit of the Silver-coins became extreme, the rate of the 
 guinea rose speedily, passing in a comparatively short space 
 from 22 to 30 shillings. 
 
 Thereupon came the proposal, " accept the fact of debase- 
 ment; scale the Silver-coin down;" which seems first to have 
 appeared in the House of Commons in 1090, but later pre- 
 sented itself clothed in the garb of authority, when, in 1005, 
 the Secretary of the Treasury offered a formal report to his 
 superiors, giving reason and detail for a scheme making the 
 Silver-crown a piece of 75 pence instead of 00. 
 
72 The Monetary Crisis of 100(J. 
 
 It was upon the state of fact and of feeling thus indicated, 
 that the activity of ^fontague, of Somcrs, of Locke, and of 
 Newton was exerted. Each liad Ijis own peculiar sphere of 
 influence, Montague and Somers in Cabinet and in Parliament, 
 Locke and Newton in the capacities to be hereafter described. 
 
 Of the specific measures which Parliament was brought to 
 adopt, and of the details of execution of the Kecoinage, 1 shall 
 not attempt to speak. The attractive chapters of ^lacaulay, 
 which I may assume to be within reach of every reader, give 
 the main features of the work. 1 seek here merely to outline, 
 from the stand-point of monetary policy, events which were 
 within, as well as events which were excluded from, the view 
 of that historian. 
 
 Suliico it briefly to say, that times were fixed after which 
 the light coins would not bo accepted by the Government at 
 their nominal rate, and after which the use of them should 
 be illegal ; that the country gradually brought to the Mint its 
 light Silver-coin, which embraced a majority of the total cir- 
 culation ; that under the able direction of the new "Warden 
 of the Mint, Mr. Isaac Newton, the capacity of the mints 
 was multiplied ; that the resolutions and discussions of Par- 
 liament, beginning in January, 1G95-6,* with a resolution fixing 
 the rate of admitted currency for the guinea at 28.s-., followed 
 that coin by several steps to 26.s\ (this Bill was passed), 25*., 
 245., till at length a Bill secured the Boyal assent April 13, 
 by which the guineas were fixed at 22 shillings. (See Appen- 
 dix 8.) Acts were alao passed taking off the obligation of J 
 coining Gold (imposed by the Act of 10(30), and prohibiting | 
 the importation of guineas. These Acts remained in force 
 during a few months of the earlier stages of the Kecoinage. 
 
 On final account, it appears that the operation of recoinage 
 cost the Government a little less than 3 million pounds — in 
 which amount, I suppose, no interest is counted. The im- 
 
 ' The legal year then begun on March 25. 
 
Sect. 12.] Disorder and Remedy. 73 
 
 portanco of the measure is well set forth by the followinj^ 
 fitrures. Accordinf' to tlio estimates within mv reach, the 
 stock of casli ill I'inglaml at William's accession, was, in 
 nominal value, about o millions of Gold, and 8 millions of 
 Silver : the ordinary revenue did not exceed '1 millions, the 
 population of England and Wales was about 5,774,000. To 
 these figures must be added whatever percentage is proper to 
 cover the growth and cliange between 1088 and 1G9G. As wo 
 compare with them an operation which, on the books of the 
 Treasury, came to near 3 million pounds, we become aware of 
 the magnitude of the task. What Legislature or Adminis- 
 tration is there to-day in any country, which could face a 
 proportionate responsibility with calmness ? Certainly we 
 can absolve the impassioned historian from any charge of 
 strained enthusiasm in his account of it. 
 
 The further fate of the new Silver-coin, and of the guineas, 
 will be set forth on a later page. 
 
 § 13. LOCKE AND THE RATIO OP 15-^ TO 1. 
 
 On both occasions, in 1690-1 and 1G95-G, Locke came forth 
 with his scholarly philippics — to the effect, " Silver is the 
 Standard, it shall not be debased. '' 
 
 A brief glance at the general monetary situation of Europe 
 will define more clearly the importance of Locke's activity. 
 The Monetary World of Silver and Gold, then contained but 
 little Gold ; for the mines of Brazil had not yet enriched the 
 stocks of Europe. Not only in England but generally. Silver 
 was" the Standard," in senses No. 5 and 7 of the Introduction 
 to this work. Both metals were Money, but the fixed Money, 
 the rating Money, so to speak, was Silver, the rated Money 
 was Gold. Of certainty and stability, either in fineness, 
 weight, or denomination of coins, the world had had little 
 experience, for under what 1 have called the Seigniorial , 
 
74 The Monetary Crisis of IGUG. 
 
 System, ^loncy was subject to arbitrary control, in a wilJcr- 
 noss of sovereignties. But in England the Silver Standard, 
 which carried the Pound Sterling, the National Unit — a lineal 
 descendant and successor of the Silver Pound- Weight, the 
 pund mere hwitcs scol/res of Saxon days — had remained, since 
 the reign of Elizabeth, unblemished by debasement, either in 
 fineness, or in weight, and in denomination it could not change. 
 
 AVitliin the same period, the Gold had been formally raised 
 four times, in its rate of currency, namely, by Royal Procla- 
 mations of James I. in 1007, 1013, 1021, and of Charles 11. in 
 1003, a total rise in sixty years of 32^ U per cent., while later, 
 as Avill be set forth in detail in the follo\ving chapter, a further 
 rise had been authorized, through the rating of Gold in the 
 Government Offices of Account. "With such experience in view, 
 it was inevitable that competent men should feel that Silver 
 was the firm-set base of England's Money. 
 
 In laying the foundations of principle in dealing with the 
 coin, Locke naturally — and, I allow myself to say, rightly — 
 brought into prominence the justice and policy of oue-ness 
 and inviolability of what he termed the " Measure of Com- 
 merce." 
 
 How, then, does this doctrine comport with the Anti-Silver- 
 position of to-day, with which we have now to deal ? Leaving 
 at one side that Locke's Single Standard was a Silver Standard, 
 fixing our attention solely upon his teaching as to the concur- 
 rent use of two metals — for here is the gist of the matter — 
 we havo to decide, whether Locke was a one-metallist or a 
 two-metallist ? To determine the point, we must necessarily 
 inquire what were his views touching the currency of the 
 " other metal," that is, of Gold. 
 
 By statute, as we have seen, the coinage of both Gold and 
 Silver was gratuitous and free. 
 
 Now the duration of this statute is phenomenal, — unique, 
 indeed, in monetary history. The continuity of its force was 
 only broken, as to Silver, without formal repeal, iu 1798, by 
 
Sect. 13.] Jolni Locke. 75 
 
 partial repeal in 181(3, and by further repeal in 1870, while as 
 to Gold — with the unimportant exception noted on page 72, — 
 it has been maintained from IGGG to the present hour. Yet 
 the tenure of this statute was derived from no recognized 
 obligation of superior force. It was not clothed with the 
 dignity of a constitutional provision, or organic compact of 
 the powers of the State ; nor was the law originally in form 
 an enactment for perpetuity, or for an iudefiuite period ; it 
 was expressly limited to a short term of years. 
 
 The curious reader \vill find the course of this most impor- 
 tant legislation set forth in the Appendix (2). He will 
 observe that of thirteen terms made continuous by re-enact- 
 ment, three were contemporaneous with the Monetary agitation 
 of which the Recoinago was the centre. The statute was re- 
 cnactcd in 1085, in lG9o, in 1701. Writing as he did in 
 1690 and in 1G95, Freo Coinage and Gratuitous Coinage were 
 therefore plainly in Locke's view, as matters in the control of 
 Parliament. Here then was, evidently, a subject concerning 
 which a reformer must needs have an opinion. I submit that 
 in order to relieve monetary literature^ from the charge of 
 absence of mind, as well as of error, in according to Locke 
 the reputation of being a single-metallist, it is necessary to 
 show at least an effort to prove that Locke rebelled against 
 this coinage of two metals. I know of no such effort. 1 have 
 no information that the question has ever been thought of by 
 
 ^ " T trust, however, tliat this House will adhere to the present stand- 
 ard, — will resolve on the maintenance of a sin<xle stan(hird, — and of (lold 
 as that standard. All tlie great writers on this subject, Sir AViliiani I'cttv, 
 Mr. Locke. .Mr. Ilan-is, and Lord Liverpool, have been decidedly in favour 
 of a sinple, in preference to a double, standard." IVom the speech of Sir 
 Robert Peel in the House of Commons on the Bank Charter Act, May (!, 
 1844. Quoted also in Mr. Ini^lis Palfjrave's important work "Currency 
 and Standard of Value in Knuland, etc." Appendix B. .'?rd llcport of 
 the Royal Comm. on tlie Depression of Trade. 188(). 1'. 3i.'l. 
 
 See also on Locke as a one-metallist, Jevons' "Invcstigatiou.'? in Cur- 
 rency and Finance." I-on<lon, 18S4. P. 332. 
 
76 The Monetary Crisis of KJIKI. 
 
 anyone but myself, and so in raising it I must give my own 
 answer, namely, that no suggestion of repealing, or of omitting 
 to re-enact, that statute, is to be found in Locke's writings. 
 The partial and temporary suspension referred to above will 
 be considered on a later page. 
 
 A careful comparison of Locke's utterances, bearing directly 
 or indirectly on the subject, reveals the fact that his views on 
 the proper legal status of Gold-coin suffered a change, between 
 his first work (IGOO), and his later publications, when brought 
 face to face with the need of immediate action, and when sup- 
 porting peculiar pressure of official responsibility, as expert 
 adviser of the Government. There are what 1 may call three 
 distinct stages of opinion. In his earlier work he advanced 
 the view, that, while Gold should be coined (see Appendix 
 12) side by side with Silver, which was the standard coin — 
 Money par excellence — yet no value, or rating, should be given 
 to Gold coins by public authority, the supposition being that 
 they would, in that event, still circulate as Money, but at their 
 market rate. In his later work, Locke recognized that such 
 ratine: should be sriven, " so the value set be under the market 
 price" — alluding, presumably, to the guinea, which was 
 Legal-Tender in the fullest sense at 20 shillings, and which had 
 long been " current " at a higher rate. 
 
 No suggestion, however, is made that the " public autho- 
 rity " should abstain from fixing a value upon the guinea, in 
 the sense of sanctioning its currency, cither at, or above, its 
 true market value, through accepting and paying it out in 
 the Government Offices of Account. Now from the experience 
 of our day, I do not fear to affirm with certainty, that when a 
 guinea was obligatory Legal-Tender between private citizens 
 for 20 shillings, and was accepted and sought to be paid out 
 in ;ill government offices at 22 shillings, its "currency" at 
 22 shillings could really bo said to be quite firmly, though not 
 permanently, established by public authority. 
 
 Still later, in 1(308, through a Kojiort, the discovery of which 
 
Sect. 13.] John Locl'c. 77 
 
 rewarded my research, and wliicli, so fiir as I am informed, is 
 now first brought to the eye of the modern student (see 
 Appendix 11-B), Locko is shown to have become aware that 
 this acceptance and payment of guineas in Government offices 
 at a certain rate, was really, in effect, a fixation of currency by 
 public autliority. It would seem to bo, in fact, a more con- 
 venient mode of fixation than any contained in the inventory 
 of the King^s Prerogative. The Report in question came 
 from the Council of Trade and Plantations. Of this body 
 Locke was then the guiding spirit. The reader will find the 
 detail of proof on this head in the excellent life of Locke, by 
 Mr. Fox-Bourne, who, however, makes no mention of anything 
 corresponding to this Report. It was signed by three mem- 
 bers of the Council beside Locke ; but 1 venture to say, that 
 internal evidence, the ideas and the language, as well as the 
 probability established by Mr. Fox-Bourne, warrant its being 
 regarded as the work of Locke. 
 
 Here we find a suggestion to change, from time to time, 
 the permitted rating of the guinea in Government offices, and 
 the recommendation for the time (September, 1698), to 
 bring it down from 22^. to 21s. Qd. I have also been able 
 to discover proof that this recommendation was formally acted 
 upon by the Government. Orders were issued (which are 
 reprinted in the Appendix), in consequence of which, a few 
 months later, in February, 1698-9 — guineas were taken at 
 Government offices at 21s. Qd. It is noteworthy, that the 
 relative value established by fixing the guinea at 21s. Qd. 
 was, as the Report itself states, "very near as fifteen and 
 one-half to one." 
 
 The following extract from the Report sets forth the points 
 of special interest : 
 
 " We are humbly of Opinion that it is necessary. Guineas 
 in their common currency bo brought down to 21s. Qd. at 
 least; And further humbly conceive that Your Excellencies 
 may fitly do it by giving directions, That the officers of the 
 
78 The Mcmetavr/ Crisis of ll!9<'>. 
 
 Receipt of his >rajesty'8 Exchequer, ami all others the Ke- 
 coivers of His Majesty's Kcvonue, do not take them at a 
 hi<,'lu'r rate. This appears to us the Most Convenient way, 
 because it may, at all times, bo a ready and easy remedy, upon 
 any further variation that shall liap])en in the world in the 
 Price of Gold ; or even in case this now proposed Lowering 
 of Guineas should not prove sufficient: For it being impos- 
 sible, that more than One ^letal should be the true Measure 
 of Commerce ; and the world by common Consent and Con- 
 venience, having settled tliat ^Measure in Silver ; Gold as well 
 as other Metals, is to bo looked upon as a Commodity, whicli 
 varying in its Price as other Commodities do, its Value will 
 always bo changeable; and the fixing of its value in any 
 Country, so that it cannot bo readily accommodated to the 
 course it has in other neighboring Countries, will be always 
 prejudicial to the Country which does it. The Value of Gold, 
 hero at the price of 21s. Od. a Guinea, in proportion to the 
 l^ate of Silver iu our Coin, will bo very near as fifteen and 
 one-half to one ; the value of Gold in proportion to Silver, in 
 Holland and Neighboring Countries, as near as can bo com- 
 puted, upon a I\Iedium, is as fifteen to one ; so that by bringing 
 down the Guineas to 21.s. G(K Gold will not here bo brought to 
 so low a Price as in our Neighboring Countries ; Neverthe- 
 less, wo are humlily of Opinion that the Abatement of six- 
 pence in the Guinea will be sufficient to stop the present dis- 
 proportionate Importation of gold ; because the Charge for 
 Insurance, Freiglit, Commission, and tho like, will eat up 
 the Profit that may then be made thereby, and hinder that 
 Trade; but if, contrary to our Expectation, this Abate- 
 ment should prove too small. Guineas may by the same easy 
 Means 1)0 lowered yet further, according as may be found 
 expedient." 
 
 Tho questions of policy relating to Gold, upon which this 
 remarkable state-paper throws light, will be considered iu 
 their wider aspects on later pages: suffice it here to mark that 
 
Sect. 13.] Jolin Locke. 79 
 
 it completely establishes the correctness of the contentions I 
 bavo advanced in roferenco to Locke's position. 
 
 That a mind like John Locke's should — at the age of sixty 
 — have passed through the several stages of opinion which I 
 have set forth, is proof of rare sagacity and candour, the 
 teachableness of a devoted servant of truth. At the same 
 time, it must, of course, be admitted that the attendant con- 
 flict of statement in his printed works — for no effort seems 
 to have been made to connect any correction with the original 
 statements — may legitimately have given rise to some mis- 
 construction of his position. Both Harris and Liverpool 
 aflbrd instances of this, the latter quoting his two stages of 
 opinion mentioned on page 7G without recognizing that the 
 second was a correction which replaced the first, while both 
 authors are unaware of the latter stage, embodied in the Report. 
 
 I must also, in citing Locke as a witness, frankly call atten- 
 tion to a vigour of expression in advocacy of Silver as the 
 " Measure of Commerce," which gives colour to these mis- 
 apprehensions, and has assisted materially in enabling great 
 men to quote him as a fierce single-metallist. 
 
 For example, in a passage of his first work, adverting to 
 the fact that " supposing Gold and Silver to bo in value as 
 10 to 1 now, perhaps the next month they may be as 15 ^ to 1 
 or 15^ to 1," he says, "two metals as Gold and Silver can- 
 not be the Measure of Commerce, both together, in any 
 country. Because the Measure of Commerce must be perpe- 
 tually the same, invariable, and keeping the same proportion 
 of value in all its parts. And so only one metal does or can 
 do to itself. So Silver is to Silver, and Gold to Gold." 
 
 For myself, I see no objection to this statement: to accept 
 it, it is merely necessary to ascertain exactly what Locke 
 meant : but it is, perhaps, only fair to admit that to realize 
 what Locke meant by it, implies a study of the history 
 of his time, upon the lines here set forth. An analogous 
 instance of vigorous expression is before the reader's eye in 
 
80 The Monetary Crisis of IG9G. 
 
 the extract reprinted on the preceding page ; for example, 
 where it is said, " Gold, as well as other metals, is to be looked 
 upon as a Commodity." To one familiar with Locke's writings 
 this very phrase, like the reference to the " Measure of Com- 
 merce," \vill, 1 think, serve as evidence that the Report came 
 from his pen. Xow in the latter half of the XlXth century, 
 while one Money-metal is the sole Measure of Commerce in a 
 nation so important as England, the statement that the other 
 Money-nictal is to be looked on (T.f a commodity, like other 
 metals, has certainly a sharp one-metallic ring to ears attuned 
 to the manifold discords of current monetary doctriue. Ex- 
 perience seems to give clearness of meaning to the phrase. 
 The present Gold Standard Law actually, as administered, 
 effectively makes Silver in England a commodity, a metal 
 and nothing more. At first glance, then, the line seems to 
 have been drawn as closely in the XVIIth as in the XlXth 
 century, between the measure and the things measured, be- 
 tween the one-metal Money on one side, and commodities on 
 the other. 
 
 What, then, is the fact ? What does the phrase mean ? 
 
 Is Locke literally committed to monetary laws which shall 
 treat Gold as a commodity like other metals ? I remit the 
 query to the reader's activity of search amid the subtleties of 
 monetary doctrine. 1 am, however, sure that he will in due 
 time concur with me, that Locke is not so committed : for, if 
 he were, it follows in logical sequence, taking the facts as we 
 know them, that he was a niultimctallist, ecjually committed 
 to the coinage of all metals ! 
 
 The status of Gold was fixed: it was Money in England, 
 as we use the word Money to-day ; its free and gratuitous 
 coinage, and Legal-Tender without limit of amount, were 
 rights established by law. Now if, under these circumstances, 
 and starting from this fixed point, wo find words current that 
 bear such meaning as to enable one to say, correctly, that 
 Gold was then a commodity in England, and if then wo take 
 
Sect. 13.] John Locke. 81 
 
 the further step to which tlio habit of the XlXth century 
 might lead us, and say that the phrase we analyze implies that 
 other metals are to be " commodities/^ upon the same footing-, 
 it follows that zinc, lead, and tin could claim Free and Gra- 
 tuitous Coinage and the privileges of a rated Legal-Tender, 
 while ii'on guineas and copper guineas would l)ravely dispute 
 the field. 
 
 Excluding this absurdity, as perforce wo must, no significa- 
 tion is left to the word " commodity " as here used, except as 
 a striking name iov an object, wliich is valued with reference 
 to the chief Money, and, to that extent, stands side by side 
 with *' other metals.'' Now it was inevitable that Gold-coin, 
 although ^[oney, in the sense in which we use the word, should 
 occupy this position in a country where the Pound Sterling 
 was, in the concrete, twenty Silver shillings of the standard of 
 43rd Elizabeth, and the Gold guinea a piece " running for " 
 so and so many shillings. 
 
 Neither, then, as a statement of what is, nor as an indica- 
 tion of what ought to be, does this XVIIth century phrase 
 stand chargeable witli complicity in tlie error, which in our 
 century has mastered the statutes that establish what is, and 
 the doctrine that seeks to comprehend what is, and shapes the 
 current ideas of Avhat ought to be. 
 
 From this result of our investigation we may draw a prac- 
 tical lesson to which the form " all that glitters is not Gold 
 Standard doctrine " seems not inappropriate. With this ex- 
 ample before us we stand face to face with proof, that to deal 
 summarily with monetary theory is to play with edged tools. 
 Plainly brevity, which is said to bo the soul of wit, may also 
 act as a seed of error, for in passing from one mind to 
 another a definition may suffer a slight yet complete change, 
 like that, for example, from sugar to alcohol, and so the harm- 
 less over-statement of one mind, losing its vitally constituent 
 atom of unexpressed knowledge, may become the militant 
 fallacy of another, 
 
 o 
 
82 Tlie Monetan/ Crisis of IC^m;. 
 
 But, returning to our theme, we shall find, in tracing the 
 course of Locke's speculative work in the field of Money, 
 that liis vigour of expression sometimes seems to lead the 
 thinker himself past the limits of soundness, and into contra- 
 diction w-ith the position he himself takes, even in the same 
 essay. Instances of this contradiction are presented herewith. 
 (See Appendix 12.) 
 
 The explanation is not far to seek. Locke's essays on 
 Money are not academic or scholastic in their ])urpose, and 
 indeed are hardly to be called systematic treatises. As Locke 
 himself said, in 1G95-G, in the frankness of correspondence 
 with a fncnd (Appendix 13), this subject, which he had 
 *' play'd the fool to pnnt about," was not one which he then 
 "relished, or which with most pleasure employed his 
 
 }} 
 
 thoughts. 
 
 This was written after his books were printed, and before 
 the date of the report here mentioned. On comparing his 
 monetary writings vrith. his great work on the " Human Under- 
 standing," or with the " Discourses on Government," which 
 justified to the learned world of his day the principles of the 
 Revolution, and opened a new era in the science of politics ; 
 and on observing the activity of his later years in the limitless 
 field of theology, it becomes e\'ident that the productions first- 
 mentioned belong to the category of occasional and contro- 
 versial papers. Vigorous, thorough, and learned, as became 
 their author, they are the earnest plea of an advocate on the 
 burning question of the day. Speaking, then, as a practical 
 statesman, Locke is entitled to the benefits of that position, 
 and his work is to be construed as a whole, in the light of the 
 res gestae. An effort was on foot, and near success, to engage 
 the statesmen of the Whig Revolution in the career of debase- 
 ment of Money, which had been a blot upon earlier ages and 
 upon former reigns. Against this Locke set his fiicc, and any 
 little over-statement he may have made is surely rather a 
 credit to his temper than a reproach to his reason. 
 
Sect. 10.] John Locke. S3 
 
 To conclude in brief, the final outcome of Locke's activity 
 in speculation ami action, iu monetary ailairs, is that his 
 authority makes for the concurrent use of the two metals as 
 Money, and for the power and duty of the state to maintain 
 them in that function. 
 
 To-day, the name of Locke is enshrined iu monetary litera- 
 ture as the <rlorious ancestor of the sinii^le-metallist doctrine. 
 I venture to think my researches have enabled me to jn-ove 
 that, in fact, he is better entitled to be known to posterity as 
 the original proponent of the ratio of 15^ to 1. 
 
 Before proceeding to other matters, we shall perhaps find it 
 profitable to pause for a moment, and look back over the field 
 of doctrine from the point wo have just reached. It is con- 
 ceivable that a reader who has been -unlling to accompany me 
 through the earlier pages of this work, and who has accepted 
 what is sought to be convoyed, especially by the Introduction, 
 and by the First and Fourth Chapters, may still omit to make 
 thorough application of the results of his survey. 
 
 In order to fiicilitate this effort on the reader's part, without 
 making too great demands upon his time, I ask him to note 
 that any lessons of history I may have discovered, or set forth, 
 serve my argument not merely as precedent or authority, 
 nor as invalidating argument, or precedent, or authority, 
 arrayed against me upon a specific point, but, withal, to prove 
 that what has lately been reckoned, in the civilization of the 
 time, as Monetary Science, is infected in grievous measure 
 with heedlessness and confusion : so that there is an inherent 
 probability of error in practical conclusions based upon that 
 science in its imperfect state. Of these practical conclusions 
 based upon the teachings of reputed ^Monetary Science, the 
 present legislative Outlawry of Silver is the controlling feature : 
 so that to establish a general prcsumjition of error against this 
 body of science as it was, is to promote a thorough and candid 
 revision of the entire foundation of Silver Outlawrv, and 
 
84 Tkc Monetary Crisis of ir)96. 
 
 of llic grounds for continuing it. It is to such rcNnsion 
 that we must look for that gathering force of conviction 
 whicli alone can procure the reversal of this unjust enact- 
 ment. 
 
 How far this revision has already extended — in certain lines 
 — is curiously shown by the matter in hand. The proposition 
 that, in order to make John Locke a sponsor of the Single- 
 Standard, in the sense of the Single-Lcgal-Tcnder, it is im- 
 portant to show that ho was not in favour of both metals, may 
 seem to-day very simple, very obvious. To-day, after decades 
 of multitudinous activity in the monetary field, when contro- 
 versy has aboundcil in many languages — one metal versus two 
 metals, single-standard vcrsua dual standard — it is, so to 
 speak, *' in the air," that a " single-standard man," a .single- 
 metallist, cannot be a friend of Free Coinage of Two Metals as 
 Full Legal-Tender. 
 
 But this is quite a new thing. It is a novel product of a 
 certain fermentation of spirit, the field of which I am 
 seeking to enlarge. The opinion which to-day is still allowed 
 to rule the world, was constructed quite independently of such 
 nice distinctions. In the original structure of argument for 
 Silver Outlawry they are quite ignored. It is in the defence 
 of Silver to-day that they are incidentally brought to light. 
 
 Lord Liverpool was perfectly conscious of the existence- 
 and effect of the statute of IGdt) : he knew that Petty and 
 Locke and Newton and Harris, as well as liimsclf, had 
 lived their lives under laws which kept the ^fint open for 
 turning bullion, whether yellow or white, into English ^loney. 
 Is it to bo supposed that his son, the Prime Minister who 
 championed the Silver-coinage Bill of ISh) in tlu- llouse of 
 Lords, or that the Rt. Hon. AVellesley Pole, the then Master 
 and Worker of the Mint, whose advocacy of it in the House of 
 CV)mmons fills many pages of Hansard, were unaware of this 
 state of things ? \Vhen they appealed, as they did in tlicir 
 speeches which carried that measure, to Petty and to Lock© 
 
Sect. 13.] John Locke. 85 
 
 and to Harris, the greatest Englisli authorities known, and 
 thus satisfied themselves and satisfied others that all the 
 counsel of the wise was in favour of the Bill, wore they merely 
 repeating by rote the doctrine which they had learned by car, 
 without knowledge of the facts that are set forth in the 
 " Treatise on the Coins of the Realm ? " 
 
 These questions open a fruitful field iu the history of 
 opinion : a lesson of no little suggestivencss in the future 
 development of the sciences of legislation, may bo found by 
 inquiring whether Lord Liverpool's " Treatise on the Coins of 
 the Iiealm'' acted as a non-conductor to all whom it then con- 
 cerned, an insulator, which cut off the proper lines of com- 
 munication by which the XlXth century might recruit itself 
 with the kernel rather than the shell of the experience of the 
 past, and whether the Demonetizers of ISIG were unconscious 
 of the real character and effect of the measure they caused to 
 be adopted. 
 
 But whatever the answer, the inheritors of the opinions 
 which found realization in the statute of 18 IG, those who for 
 two generations have guarded the doors of the Tower Mint 
 against Silver (except as material for tokens) have been quite 
 indifferent to the defects of their title. 
 
 Tlie fabric of error is surely, although slowly, being under- 
 mined by knowledge ; and by knowledge which, as we have 
 observed, has already proceeded at least so far, that to-day the 
 notion that a man cannot be a rigid single-metallist, and yet 
 in favour of Free Coinage of Two Metals, has got a foothold in 
 the general public : it has passed beyond the teaching classes 
 to the reading masses. 
 
 If what has been done in this one direction can be done in 
 other directions, the course of undermining will proceed, as 
 did that which once was perfected beneath the rock-ribbed 
 and seemingly inexpugnable floor of Hcllgato channel into the 
 harbour of New York, and accordingly a harmless explosion 
 (of opinion ending iu repeal) may be expected to follow in 
 
8C 'riiC Moiictarrj Crisis of 1690. 
 
 time, and new and placid paths be opened for the prosperity of 
 men. 
 
 In furlhtiaucc of such growth of interest and of instruction 
 among the reading masses, who make majorities in Legislatures, 
 or among those who lead them, the object-lessons of history 
 may have a wide field of usefulness. 
 
 A mind which recoils from the subtleties of a dismal science 
 may find a wholesome meaning and suggestion in the spectacle 
 of such a man, for example, as Sir Robert Peel (whose achieve- 
 ments in currency legislation are more important than those 
 of Palmerston,Beaconsfield, and Gladstone combined), speaking 
 with all sincerity, and listened to with that deference with 
 which — on matters disconnected with the (juestion of the 
 Standard — posterity can have no dispute, citing before Parlia- 
 ment in support of the Outlawry of Silver' the authority of 
 those elder English masters of Monetary Science, whom he 
 has named, who, as appears in these pages, had lived and died 
 content under laws for the Free and Gratuitous Coinage of Silver 
 and Gold, u'Jiich that same Parliament Jiad. enacted. 
 
 If the Outlawry of Silver be dealt with according to any 
 recognized code of evidence, this mere fact should render it 
 suspect. The presumptions are against it, the burden of 
 proof lies upon its defenders, when the guarantees are shown 
 to be spurious under which the most notable figure of the 
 century in financial legislation, — leader of England in framing 
 and carrying the Resumption Act of 1819 and the Bank Act 
 of IS 11, — gave it his support. 
 
 ' Sec above, note, page 7J. 
 
 I 
 
Sect. 14.] Isaac Newton. 87 
 
 § l-k XEWTON ON SILVER AND GOLD. 
 
 Miicaulay avers in his History that Xowton — iudepeudcutly, 
 I suppose, of his public action in reference to the Recoinage — 
 has left no exposition of his opinions touching the currency. 
 The eloquent historian thus loaves out of view the well-known 
 Report of 1717, upiMi wliich was based the reduction of the 
 Guinea from 21 shillings and G pence to 21 shillings. It would 
 seem, then, that the doctrinal importance of this Report had 
 escaped recognition from the English historian, though, as 
 I have had occasion to ascertain, it was the subject of 
 appreciative comment in Franco and Prussia more than a 
 century ago. Indeed, I read it first in a German translation, 
 printed at Bei*lin in 17G2.' 
 
 Researches in the direction of a history of monetary policy 
 have enabled me to bring to the surface some new evidence 
 of the activity of Newton, as well as of Locke, as Monetary 
 Counsellor of England, which I present herewith. (Appen- 
 dix 15.) Although merely in keeping with already published 
 utterances,^ special confirmation is given by these documents 
 to the views I have advanced. 
 
 The bearing of the Reports .signed by Newton as an ofiicer 
 of the Mint, upon the questions before us, can best come into 
 clear light through their parallelism with the position taken 
 by Locke ; who was, as we have seen, the distinctively literary 
 member of the quadrilateral of monetary statesmanship of which 
 Macaulay has sounded the praise. 
 
 ' The statement on page 1G8 of my treatise on " Silver and Golil," was 
 based on the erroneous snpposition tliat a tract of Newton's existed which 
 I had not seen. 
 
 " Beside tlie Report of 1717, there is a short Report ot' 1712 in 0\er- 
 sttine's " Scleeted Traets on Money." 
 
88 The Monetary Crisis of 1 G:)n. 
 
 A licpoit, dated January 20, 170l, is, in substance, a reconi- 
 uiendation to lower the rating of Frcncli and Sj^anish Pistoles, 
 which were then current at 17.''. ^'><1. Upon this recommen- 
 dation 1 find that action was had through an Order in Council 
 of February 5, 1700-1. (See Appendix 10.) This Order 
 must naturally have operated, cither as an instruction, or as 
 the cause of an instruction, to the government officer of account 
 not to take or jiay pistoles at more than 17n. Such quantities 
 of pistoles came to the Mint in consequence of this order, that 
 special exertions were called for on the part of the working 
 force. (See Appendix 17.) This whole incident, however 
 (together with an analogous incident relating to the currency 
 of ^loidore.';), is the object of a brief recital in Newton's Keport 
 of 1717: and there he states that the ]ihenomenal sum of 
 £1,400,000 was on this occasion coined into guineas. 
 
 A Keport, dated September 27, 1701, signed by Newton 
 alone, mentions a change of ratio in France, so that the Louis 
 d'or or pistole, at the new ratio, would bo worth not 17s., but 
 IG''. 7'/., and the guinea £1 0.^. 11«/. He therefore submits to 
 the Lords of the Treasury the cjuestion, whether "tlic state of 
 the Money in France being unsettled, it may furnish a sufficient 
 argument for altering the proportion of Gold and Silver Monies 
 in England." The implication seems to suggest itself that if 
 the state of the Money in France were not unsettled, there 
 could be no question as to what England should do. 
 
 It was also my fortune to discover a ]?eport of 1702, which 
 is stated to be entirely in Newton's handwriting, though 
 signed also by two other officers of the Mint, in which, fifteen 
 years before the famous l^eport already alluded to, he dis- 
 tinctly recommends the further reduction of the guinea ; thus 
 seconding with the authority of practical and professional 
 observation the hint given l»y Locke as economic adviser of 
 the Treasury four years before. 
 
 Newton's abiding loyalty to Silver, as the jiriueipal Money 
 of the realm, is further established by the testimony of Can- 
 
Sect. 14.] Isanc Neivttvi. 89 
 
 tillon in the famous '' Essai sur la Nature du Commerce ;" ' the 
 interview reported by him occurring, if 1 remember rightly, 
 some years later than 1717. It aj^pears that Cantillon elicited 
 an expression from Newton touching the idea of attaining a 
 change of ratio by raising Silver instead of lowering Gold: a 
 course which had the obvious advantages of debasement, 
 namely, that the holder of Silver would find he owned more 
 pounds after the change than before, while under the plan 
 actually pursued in 1(30G, IGl'S, and 1717, the holder of Gold 
 found he had less pounds after than before. 
 
 " This objection,'' says Cantillon, " was laid before Sir 
 Isaac Newton, and all that he could say to it was, that by the 
 established Law of this Kingdom, Silver was the only fixed 
 Coin of the Country, and as such could not be altered." 
 {" Analysis of Trade, etc.," p. 05.) The statement in the 
 French is even stronger : " Suivant les loiz fondamentales du 
 lioiaume, Vanjent hianc ctait la vraie et seule monnoie." 
 
 In bringing this incident to notice, together with other 
 glimpses of Newton's activity. Professor Jevons applied to 
 Newton's position the excellent phrase, " Nolumus leges Angliae 
 nnitari"'^ — wo will not have the laws of En<2:land changed. 
 At the same time it is evident that, inasmuch as the laws of 
 England were laws for the Dual- Legal-Tender — for Gold Money 
 as well as for Silver ^fouey — the currency of Gold is also 
 entitled to the benefits of the phrase.'^ With the evidence 
 now before us, it is shown more clearly than was possible 
 
 ' See Jevons, '• Tlu' Xationality of Political Economy," '" Contemporary 
 Review," January, 1881. 
 
 * The ori^'inal appearam-c of the phrase has a curious merit in this con- 
 nection : "Certain it is that the preat and wise men of KuL^and in the 
 Parliament of !Merton, diil not prefer a f()rei;:n law before their own, wlien, 
 motion being made by the clergie that children bom before Marriage might 
 be adjudged legitimate, they all made answer with one voice : Nolumus 
 le^ex Angliae mufari." — Diir. lirp., ed. 17G'2, p. 5. 
 
 ^ In some printed discussions relating to the views of Newton certain 
 misunderstandings have arisen, analogous to tlie misapprehension of the 
 
90 Tlu^ Momtarn Crisis of ICiM'.. 
 
 during Professor Jevons' lifetime, that Newton's conservatism 
 — beside accepting as it did, side by side with Silver, the 
 rated currency of Gold, under regulation of the State — was 
 supplemented by insight into the conditions favourable to the 
 success of such regulation, and by a desire to promote such 
 success. Once the great struggle of the Hecoinage was 
 decided, liere lay the field of progress and of reform, and here 
 accordingly was made manifest the enlightenment of Newton 
 as well as of Locke. 
 
 Touching the points of resemblance and of difference 
 between the open questions of monetary policy in their time 
 and those of to-day, I have elsewhere presented some studies 
 (mentioned in the note below) , and 1 shall endeavour herein, 
 in later pages, to complete the parallel and contrast. 
 
 In closing, I allow myself to direct the reader's eye to au 
 illustration of the historic tendency of monetary situations to 
 repeat themselves, and of the close kinship among ideas of 
 progress and of reform. In this Report of 1702, the Investi- 
 
 views of Locke wliieli lias been ascertained in the prcccdins pages of this 
 work. Tlic difriculty appears to gi-o\v out of the disposition to apply the 
 controversial terms (if to-day to a state of things (piite remote and dis- 
 parate from tliat which has produced them, and which, controllinjr the current 
 use of tlicsc terms, limits tlieir fruitful apjdication. The curious reader 
 willliud this nuitter, perhaps, sullicienlly presented in the article of Professor 
 Jevons in the "Contemporary Review" for January, 18S1, alrea<ly alluded 
 to, and in a reply to certain points in it by the present writer, cntitletl 
 " Sir Isaac Newton and England's Prohibitive Tariff on Silver Money " 
 (Cincinnati, Robert Clarke and Co., April, 1881), and in the portions and 
 fragments of an essay on " Sir Isaac Newton and Rimctallism," by Profes- 
 sor Jevons, which was left unfinished by reason of the lamented death of 
 its author. (See Jevons' " Investigations in Currency and Finance," pages 
 i?:30-3GO.) Newton's Rei>ort of 1717, with tlie debates in Parli.iment 
 relating to the fixation of the guinea at 21 shillings, was reprinted by me 
 in the Document of the C<mferencc of 1875, and was eommentetl upon in 
 essays in that Document (see jiages 245 and 25;l). I had jjreviously (in 
 1870) characterized the tixalion of 1717 on the lines here set fortii. 
 (" Silver and (»old," page 74.) 
 
Sect. 14.] Isaac Xcictoji. Ul 
 
 gator of Light and Discoverer of Gravitation, in urging the 
 further reduction of the Guinea, brings forth a phrase which 
 deserves to enlighten centuries — " France has set us an exam- 
 ple! " For myself I ofi'er to Newton for the moral of these words 
 a more heartfelt homage than that I paid on bringing words 
 of Julius Paulus and of Aristotle to the light, and discovering 
 with what depth of insight and felicity of analysis ^ ^loncy, 
 that ever-ancient though ever-novel institution, had Ijccn 
 recognized by them in its true nature. 
 
 It is like emerging from malarial fog to breathe the air of 
 mountain tops, to pass to the atmosphere revealed by such 
 a phrase as this of Newton^s, from the parish patriotism which 
 seeks to treat Money as an institution solely of the speaker's 
 nation, and refuses to recognize it as an institution of the 
 world of Money-using men. AVas Newton the less an English- 
 man, because of these words ? I venture to believe that this 
 phrase of his betrays no vagary of the cosmopolite. The 
 gentle sage was none the less a patriot : he was then a member 
 of Parliament, and to him, I doubt not, as to others, France 
 was but the ancient enemy, against whom the allied forces 
 were then preparing war, under j\larlborough as Generalissimo, 
 But neither war nor politics could disturb his clear gaze at 
 truth, nor warp the lucidity of his report of what he saw. As 
 a monetary statesman, he placed at the service of his country 
 the same order of dispassionate intelligence, to which nature 
 had yielded secrets that are a cherished possession for ever to 
 his race. 
 
 France has set us an example ! 
 
 The spirit of Xcwton still has work to do, in the land to 
 which he gave his fame. The world will breathe more freely, 
 when an awakened public opinion shall enable an English 
 Prime Minister to pronounce the equivalent for modern days 
 of Newton's " France has set us an example." 
 
 ' See "Silver and Gold," pages 1, 118, etc., ar.d Appendix. 
 
02 The Monetary Crisis of IGDG. 
 
 And such words can be said, as these were said by Xcwton, 
 without prejudice to the venerable maxim Nolimnis Icjes 
 AnijJlae viutdrl, for conservatism can Imrdly inure to sus- 
 tain judgment in favour of tlie partial experiment of two 
 generations as against the practice of centuries of English 
 law. 
 
 Should this page ever meet the eye of one to whom it shall 
 seem strange that a Prime Minister — who must be, of all 
 others, what is called a practical man — should be expected to 
 pay close heed to the opinions of a man of science, the follow- 
 ing extract from a famous speech of one who became a famous 
 Prime Minister may convey a fruitful lesson. To others, this 
 extract may serve as a link in the chain of evidence that the 
 errors of policy and of doctrine I attack, owed much of their 
 original prestige and support to a strange perversion of 
 historical truth. 
 
 The speech is the speech of the lit. lion, llobcrt Peel in 
 support of the Resumption Act of 1819. 
 
 " Sir Isaac Newton," he says, " retiring from the sublime 
 studies in which he chiefly passed his life — from the contemplation 
 of the heavenly bodies — from an investigation of the laws by 
 which their motions were guided — entered on the examination 
 of this subject; [the definition of an "abstract pound '^] but 
 that great man came back, at last, to the old, the vulgar doc- 
 trine, as it was called by some, that the true standard of value 
 consisted in a definite quantity of gold bullion, livery 
 sound writer on the subject came to the same conclusion . , ."' 
 
 In rejirinting this remarkable fiction I feel bound to say 
 that while no one can believe that the distinguished speaker 
 evolved it out of his inner consciousness, yet I am at a loss to 
 point out the ]-)robable culprit. 
 
 Perhaps the most notable revelation aft'orded by the dis- 
 course from which this extract comes lies not in the error of 
 
Sect. 14.] Isaac Xeicton. 93 
 
 fact which the reader has the material for detecting, by com- 
 paring the acts and utterances of Newton with Peel's report 
 of their outcome, but iu the orator's enthusiasm about *' the 
 true standard of value," and iu the burning faith with which, 
 like a knight-errant, he runs the gauntlet of very dragons of 
 doctrine in a Quest for " the Abstract Pound." 
 
 Is there anything Quixotic, or unpractical iu this search ? 
 I shall bo the last to say so ! The only criticism valid iu my 
 eyes, belongs to the order of that which I seek to make, 
 namely, that which attacks not inquiry, but defective con- 
 clusions reached by inadequate inquiry. If any justification is 
 needed for the labour of analysis to which the Introduction 
 and the earlier chapters of this work have invited the reader,, 
 or if evidence is needed to establish the practical importance 
 to practical men of the work of speculative thought in the 
 field of Money, this most notable of discourses in the debates 
 which led to the Restoration of Metallic, in the place of Paper 
 Money in England can most efficiently servo that purpose. 
 
 Here we see theory engaged at its work of policy-making. 
 If ever a system was founded on theory it is the system put 
 in force by the ''Peel's Resumption Act" of 1819, and it will 
 be found that from the defects of the theory arose the defects 
 in the practical working : that the evils that England has 
 suflfered appear just as the transition is made from the terra 
 jirma of the true theoretical to the quicksands of the unprac- 
 tical and the visionary. 
 
 It is this same speech which contains the passage relating 
 to the question " What is a Pound " which has occupied a 
 place of no little dignity in the political literature of Money in 
 England. In a later chapter the subject and the views of Sir 
 Robert Peel concerning it, will be considered in detail. 
 
CHAPTER YI. 
 A Lesson of History {confinuctl). — The Descent to Gold. 
 
 § 15. THE RATING OF THE GUINEA AND PISTOLE IN ENGLAND. 
 
 "We have seen that necessity, tlie mother of discovery as well 
 as of invention, hail forced the men whose fitness for the tasks 
 of statesmanship had brought them to the front in monetary 
 affairs, to recoc:nizo the need of rec;ulatin<' tlie currency of 
 Gold. As Locke says in the letter already referred to 
 (Appendix 13), ''The business of our Money has so near 
 brought us to Euin, that till the plot broke out, it was every- 
 body's talk, everybody's uneasiness But now the 
 
 Parliament has reduced Guineas to two-and-twcnty shillings, 
 as well as prohibited the receipt of clipped Money " 
 
 In dealing with the golden portion of the monetary field I 
 feel constrained to seek to enlarge its importance beyond the 
 range it occupied, so far as I am informed, in the wi-itings 
 which are deemed autlioritative in this matter. It appears 
 to mc a well-grounded judgment that the rating of Gold was 
 a key to the entire situation in England, before, as well as 
 during, and after, the Recoinage. 
 
 In putting forward novel views, which convey what may, 
 perhaps, seem a venturesome criticism upon learning and 
 statesmanshiji of jiast times, whether of the XVI I th or of 
 other centuries, I must enter somewhat into detail, in order 
 to justify my position. 
 
Sect. 15.] The Rit'uvj of Guinea and Pistole. 95 
 
 The situation of affairs which preceded the crisis of IfjOu, 
 was a novel one in two distinct respects : 
 
 1st. The improvement in the mode of Coinage (of which 
 Macaulay gives a graphic account), the mill and press being 
 substituted for the hammer : 
 
 Llnd. Coinage being made, of right, free to all, who might 
 choose to bring bullion to the Mint; and at the same time 
 gratuitous, the tax-payers bearing the expense of assaying 
 and of Coinage. 
 
 This latter innovation was introduced by the Act of Par- 
 liament of IGOG. Prior to that measure a charge had been 
 made for Coinage, which varied from time to time. Fifteen 
 shillings to the pound of crown Gold, and two shillings to the 
 pound of standard Silver, were ''his Majesty's rates'' at 
 Charles II. 's accession: but the charge for coining Gold was 
 reduced soon after, in IGGo, — ''as an encouragement to the 
 Briuger into the Mint, and soe unto his Majestic in respect 
 of the quantities that thereby may be coined," — and presently 
 the rate on both Gold and Silver was, as we have seen, 
 abolished by statute. To what extent the Mint — through 
 this law of Free Coinage, which operated as a statutory com- 
 mand and guarantee of diligence in serving the convenience 
 of the bullion-owning public — was made more active in that 
 work, I am not informed ; but it is plain that the abolition 
 of all charge for assay and coinage produced a novel facility 
 of turning metal into cash, and so introduced a novel, and 
 not unimportant, element into the calculations of England's 
 business, foreign or domestic. It must also have operated 
 as an encouragement to the further clipping of the Silver 
 and to the exportation of full-weight coins, "v\'ith which 
 latter points the glowing periods of Macaulay deal very 
 fully. 
 
 The contemporaneous facility of ])ouring Gold into the 
 circulation, at a price which gave profit, perhaps, as great as 
 the clipping of Silver, and yet involved no offence against 
 
9G The Descent to Gold. 
 
 the law, docs not seem to have attracted aclcijuato attcutiou. 
 This operation found a foothold in this new ri^'ht of Gratuitous 
 and Free Coinage, which was accorded by statute to Gold as 
 well as to Silver, and it was stimulated by two notable features 
 of what may be called the law of Money at that period in 
 England, namely, the currency of foreign Gold-coin, and the 
 arbitrary power of the Government to fix the rate at which 
 Gold-coin, native or foreign, should bo accepted and paid iu 
 the Government offices of account. 
 
 To one who owned Gold, whether it camo to him in the 
 regular course of business, or had been brought in for specu- 
 lative purposes, no desire could be more natural than to have 
 it pass for as many pounds (or shillings) as possible, ^\''he- 
 ther it was bullion which he proposed to have turned into 
 guineas at the expense of the State, or coin, foreign or native, 
 which he sought to use as it stood, the desire was very natural 
 to have it pass at as high a rate as possible. Great gain was 
 to be made in bringing Gold iu, to pass at as high a rate as 
 possible, and in buying Silver at as low a rate as possible, in 
 order to export it. Silver in England could not be the object 
 of a similar operation, for the Unit of Account, the Pound 
 Sterling, was itself of Silver; its "mint price" could not bo 
 moved except by formal Act of Parliament for the debasement 
 of the standard. There was, then, a strong pressure of self- 
 interest which operated in favour of Gold and against Silver, 
 to raise the rating of the former in terms of the latter. To 
 this pressure the Government Officer of Account, as well as the 
 individual Money-user, was exposed, and for this interest the 
 license of Government control over the rating of home and 
 foreign Gold-coin was a dangerous instrument ; for its working 
 could bo gradual, and half-concealed, and wtnild seem v( nial 
 if attention were called to it. In respect to the intervention 
 of any special private and powerful interest, as, for example, 
 on the part of the Guinea Company, 1 have no information, 
 and 1 distinctly disclaim an inference which may suggest itself 
 
Sect. 15.] The Ratimj of Guinea and Pistole. 07 
 
 to the reader's iniiiJ, that bad faith was at work — au idea 
 which should be excluded unless it can bo proved ; and 1 
 know no proof. 
 
 But it is enough to say, that in this elastic and voluntary 
 fixation of the number of shillings a Gold-coin should be 
 taken for in the Exchequer, lay a natural, powerful, and easy 
 means of disorganizing the Money of the country. Those 
 who soufjht to raise the ratings of Gold mi<i;ht find in the tax- 
 gatherer a support, and in the paymaster an ally. So far as 
 evidence has come to my view, the Government did not with- 
 hold such aid. 
 
 Of the importance of the practice of the Government, in 
 this matter, it may be worth while to remark that the daily 
 handling of income and expenditure of a nation, implies a 
 monetary agency of unique and dominant influence. If the 
 Government officers received and paid guineas at a certain 
 rate, who would be able or likely to assure their currency at 
 a different rate ? If we suppose that symptoms showed them- 
 selves in the market of a rise or a fall of the market rate, 
 it remained with the Government to stand hij the old rate, or to 
 change, and fix a. new rate; and so, while, in changing, the 
 Government may easily have seemed to be following the 
 market, it really was also guiding the market, its action being 
 none the less a cause, by reason of being an effect. At the 
 same time it should be clearly observed that, whatever its rate 
 of currency, the influx of Gold into England (see next page), 
 acting necessarily as an increase of demand for it, tended to 
 raise its market-rate compared with Silver, and that its 
 acceptance in England at a high ratio tended further to 
 bring its market-rate elsewhere up to the legal level in 
 England. 
 
 It is, in my judgment, safe to assert that a firm 
 hand, guided by a seeing eye, keeping the rating of Gold at 
 a rate which should yield to tides only, but not to waves, 
 of the metal-iiinrket, would have maintained the Gold- 
 
 H 
 
)> 
 
 98 77it' Descent to Gold. 
 
 coin in its place, and have gone far to maintain the Silver 
 like^\'iso. 
 
 Looked at as a whole, the change of composition of the 
 Money-stock of England, through exportation of full-weight 
 Silver-coins, and the swelling of the tide of over-valued Gold, 
 was, at the same time, a debasement and an inflation, for 
 which the mode in which the existing law was administered 
 was largely in fault. 
 
 As Sir AVilliam Petty had said, in 1002, of a like experience 
 early in the century, the country was " pestered with too much 
 Gold," or, as Montague said (1005) in a speech in the Commons, 
 " All Europe sent that commodity (Gold) to this market, and 
 would continue to do so till the Nation should be impoverished, 
 and undone by plenty of Gold." {" Memoirs of Montague, 
 p. 32.) 
 
 The following figures tell the story : — 
 
 Coinage. Gold. 
 
 £ s. 
 Under Charles II. . . 177,253 10 
 „ James II. . . 2,113,638 2 
 „ William and Mary 443,328 15 
 „ William III. . 2,075,550 10 
 „ Anne . . . 2,484,531 8 
 
 How great a portion of the amounts above given, by reason 
 of being recoined is counted twice, as an element in calculating 
 the amount of Money in use, and how far the recoinage of 
 the Silver, under William III., applies to coinage anterior to 
 Charles II., are matters which seem to have passed beyond 
 reckoning.' 
 
 A goodly part, then, of these millions of Gold, coined — 
 gratuitously, at the expense of the tax-payer — in the reigns 
 
 ' The figure for Silver in Queen Anne's Reign i.<; taken from Snelling's 
 "Silver Coins of the Hoalm." Riiding gives £207.094 18>-. Aid., and 
 *' for Scotland" .€41 1.117 IQ.v. 9«/., (jiioting Folkes. 
 
 
 Silver. 
 
 
 7. 
 
 £ s. 
 
 d. 
 
 5 
 
 3,722,180 2 
 
 8 
 
 8 
 
 518,310 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 70,020 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 7,014,047 10 
 
 11 
 
 4 
 
 527,407 10 
 
 41 
 
Sect. 15.] The Rating of Guinea and Pistole. 00 
 
 of James and of William and ^Eary, represent tlio speculation 
 of private individuals in English coiu, by wLicli tlio country's 
 circulation was depleted of its original stock of full-weight 
 Silver and filled with over-valued Gold ; while the figures for the 
 reign of William III. and Anno, represent a similar attack 
 upon the 7 million Silver Pounds Sterling of the re-coinage. 
 
 My contention applies to the entire period, the incubation 
 of the crisis of 1G9G, as well as the crisis itself, and the follow- 
 ing years. To state the point very clearly — though perhaps 
 also very boldly — if a fixation, let us say, if need be, at 21s., 
 had come at the beginning, instead of coming as it did at the 
 end, of the period just placed in view in our table of coinage, 
 the monetary plague, which so darkly shadows the history of 
 that time, would have been shorn of its malignancy. Such a 
 fixation would have cut out at the start the spot of infection 
 which persistently enlarged its inroads upon England's other- 
 wise well-ordered finance. 
 
 It was not, then, as it has been customary to suppose, tlio 
 neglect of the Government touching Silver merely, which was 
 in fault, but also the concurrent neglect as to Gold. It was 
 as important to rate the Gold rightly, perhaps more important, 
 than to recoin the Silver. The trouble was generated by 
 letting the Gold go '' up " as well as by letting the Silver go 
 " down ; " if it was a mistake to let the Silver-coin go down 
 in intrinsic value, while remaining " up " in nominal value, 
 it was likewise a mistake to let the Gold go up in nominal 
 value, while remaining " down " in intrinsic value. The almost 
 irremediable disorder of the Silver-coins was thus in great 
 measure a result of the easily remedial)le disorder of the Gold- 
 coins. 
 
 The measures adopted to reduce the rate of the guinea, 
 which have already been fully set forth, are, of course, evidence 
 in support of these views. But beside these there are other 
 solemn Acts of legislation wliich may serve the same purpose. 
 The further legislation briefly described on page 72, formed a 
 
lOo The Descent to Gold. 
 
 provisional arrangement destined to hold Gold-coin and bullion 
 in due subordination. The Act provides (see Appendix 8 B) that 
 between March 2, 1G96 (1095-0), and January 1, 1007 (1090-7), 
 the officers of the Mint should not he ohltgcd to coin Gold, and 
 that the importation of guineas should be a misdemeanour. 
 
 The reasons for the Act, and for the Acts which followed 
 it, are given in their preambles, and will be found of peculiar 
 interest, for they throw the clearest light, both upon what was 
 done, and upon what ought to have been done. 
 
 " And whereas great Quantities of Gold have been lately 
 imported from foreign Parts which being coined here as afore- 
 said into Guineas have been (on occasion of the present ill 
 state of the Silver Coins) taken and accepted by the Subjects 
 of this Realm at very high and unusual rates and prices tend- 
 ing to the great Damage and Loss of the Publick ; the Con- 
 tinuance of which practice (unless speedily prevented) will run 
 the Nation vastly in debt to Foreigners for the re-payment 
 whereof the Silver Moneys of this Kingdom must inevitably 
 be exhausted on Terms of great Disadvantage therefore to 
 prevent the further Growth of soe great an evil, be it enacted," 
 and so forth. 
 
 "We have here a lucid and authoritative statement, which I 
 think illustrates and justifies the principles I have endeavoured 
 to set forth in these pages. The Repeal of this Act, a few 
 months later, supplies material for criticism, and support for 
 our judgment upon the policy actually pursued. 
 
 " And whereas the reason of making the said Act was occa- 
 sioned by the high and unusual Price of Guineas which might 
 in the end be very prejudicial to the Subject. But the price 
 of guineas being now reduced to or near the Standard and 
 Sundry persons being desirous to coin Gold and also to import 
 great Quantities of guineas and Ilalfe Guineas which will be 
 very beneficial to the Trade and Commerce of this Kingdom. 
 F'or the encouragement whereof bo it enacted,'"' etc., that the 
 former Act bo repealed, and that " on or before Nov. 10, 1090, 
 one or more mills and presses bo set apart for the coinage of 
 Gold and the same kept in distinct account from the Silver." 
 
 I 
 
Sect. 15.] The RatliKj of Guinea and Pistole. 101 
 
 In that pliraso, '' to, or near, the Standard," lies tho breach 
 hy which the enemy entered to take possession. To put tho 
 g^uinea at 22s., was to put it near tho " Standard " — that is to 
 say, tho proper ratio — but not very near, and by no means near 
 enough. The grand portals were closed, but tho postern gato 
 was left ajar. 
 
 In connection with these observations upon the policy of 
 Parliament and Treasury, with reference to the rating of Gold, 
 the reader may find an interest in certain other bits of con- 
 temporary evidence, which are presented in the Appendix 
 (Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7). Of ono of these papers (which re- 
 warded my search among the Public Archives) I shall mako 
 special mention. I refer to a portion of a communication on 
 the subject of the guinea, bearing date Antwerp, G July, 1G95, 
 from tho Commissioners ' of the Bank of Enirland, then enter- 
 ing the second year of its existence. This letter purports 
 to have been sent to the camp before Namur to be presented 
 to the King, '' repeating of our instances to the King that a 
 stop may be put to this mischievous high price of Gold and 
 Guineas in England.'^ What was desired was a "proclama- 
 tion reducing the price of Guineas to the par of our neighbours 
 before the late extravagant rise." The italics are mine. 
 
 The demand for a rating of the guineas according to tho 
 " par of our neighbours," is a fitting statement of the outcome 
 of the considerations presented in this Chapter. 
 
 It will be seen that this letter of the officers of the Bank 
 also offers material suggestions upon the great issue of 
 the power of law to regulate the value of Money. In further 
 application of the views on this head, which have already been 
 presented, it is germane to ask the very blunt and practical 
 question, whether it is strained supposition to assume that 
 
 ' The question is sii<.'i:csteil in the Appendix wlietlicr llic rating of tlie 
 jrninea was not the nuiin motive of this famous visit of the Directors of the 
 Bank to the seat of war, in the course of which the Dcputj-(Jovernor, 
 Michael Godfrey, lost liis life in the trenches. 
 
1 02 The Descent to Gold. 
 
 such men as the Bank officials must have been — knew wliat 
 they were about when they sought remedy from " fatal and 
 certain evil consequences" to England and to themselves in a 
 Royal Proclamation, Were they likely to be putting their 
 faith in an empty pronunciamento ? I think not. As I have 
 shown, the founders of the Bank of England had in plain 
 view, as matters of every-day observation, forces which 
 were quite competent " to regulate the value of Money," and 
 which the preceding pages have brought in sight. Chief 
 among them was, in my belief, this very control of the Govern- 
 ment Offices of Account over the rating of the Gold-coin, of 
 which I have been speaking. 
 
 We shall do well to proceed a little further upon this line, 
 taking careful account of the doctrinal importance of the facts 
 we have ascertained, touching the rating of Gold ; of the facts, 
 I mean, that are beyond question, and also at the same time 
 of those which I indicate as matter of inference. 
 
 I do not know that we shall find better evidence on any of 
 the points presented in Section 9 and in Chapter IV., touching 
 the power and duty of the state, which, to-day, is still the 
 great issue under debate, than is exhibited in the solemnity 
 with which what were by them supposed — with entire sin- 
 cerity — to be the events of this period, were treated by Lord 
 Liverpool and by Lord Macaulay. It was, apparently, because 
 he was not informed of the orders of the Privy Council (of 
 1G98-9), and of the Treasury, touching the guinea, which 
 are reprinted in the Appendix, that Lord Liverpool, adverting 
 to the Acts of Parliament, forbidding the currency of the 
 guinea above 2Gs., and above 22s., was able to aver that 
 " when the Recoinage was completed, Guineas fell in their 
 rate or value below the value limited in these Acts, tcitliout 
 any interposition of public axitJiorify." It was by favour of his 
 unconsciousness of the whole order of fact which I set forth 
 in this chapter — the practical Legal-Tender of the Gold-coin, 
 established bv the action of the Treasury — that he was able 
 to say ; — 
 
Sect. 15.] The Ratlutj of Guinea and Pistole. 103 
 
 " In very rich countries, and especially in those wliero great 
 and extensive commerce is carried on . . . Gold will in prac- 
 tice become the principal measure of property and the instru- 
 ment of commerce with the consent of the people, not only 
 without the support of law, hut in spite of almost any law that 
 may he enacted to the contrary." (P. IGO.) 
 
 It was because he was not informed of the existence of these 
 orders, or of the Report of Locke, and I dare say also of the 
 letter referred to (all of which are reprinted in the Appendix) 
 — that Macaulay was able to say : — 
 
 " But some of the details both of [the Recoinage Act] and of 
 a supplementary act which was passed at a later period of the 
 session, seem to prove that Montague had not fully considered, 
 tvhat legislation can, and what it cannot effect. For example, 
 he persuaded the Parliament to enact that it should be penal 
 to give or take more than 22s. for a guinea. It may be con- 
 fidently affirmed that this enactment teas not suggested or 
 approved hy Locke. He well knew that the high price of Gold 
 was not the evil which abided the State, but merely a symptom 
 of that evil, and that a fall in the price of Gold would inevitably 
 follow, and could hy no human potver or ingenuity he made to 
 precede, the recoinage of Silver. In fact, the penalty seems 
 to have produced no effect whatever. Till the milled Silver was 
 in circulation, the guinea continued, in spite of law, to pass 
 for 305. When the milled Silver became plentiful, the price 
 of the guinea fell; and the fall did not stop at 22s., hut con- 
 tinued till it reached 21s. 6d." ' (The italics are all mine.) 
 
 In these utterances the reader may easily recognize the 
 familiar doctrine of the impotence of legislation to affect the 
 value Money, of which so much has been said. 
 
 Lacking information of the existence of " the law,'' both 
 Lord Liverpool and Macaulay seize the occasion to point out — 
 as they suppose — its impotence. What is the motive of this 
 
 ' ■■ IlijU.iv," in Works, iv. 202. 
 
1 ( 1 1 The Descerit to Gold. 
 
 haste ? Evidently to Lord Liverpool the idea recommended 
 itself as a good argument for Gold ; while Macaulay was quite 
 under the charm of that antipathy to interference ydih individual 
 liberty, and the " natural " course of events which, as I have 
 explained in an earlier Chapter (page 61), is still a prevailing 
 fashion of thought. Such is the power of error of fact to 
 stimulate the growth of error of doctrine. It is, however, but 
 justice to all concerned to accompany this criticism with proof, 
 which shows how natural the error was, how widespread this 
 same misapprehension of the facts has been. This may bo 
 revealed by a glance at the following extract which I trans- 
 late from Abot de Bazinghen's " Dictionnaire des Monnoies " 
 (Paris, 1701). "The Guinea was struck to be worth exactly 
 20s., or a pound sterling; later, it was raised to 2\s. G</., but 
 merely by the tacit consent of the Natioyi tvithout any public law ; 
 it remained at the rate for more than half a century," etc. 
 
 Evidently, these errors of fact are uniquely adapted to inspire 
 erroneous doctrines. 
 
 To follow our criticism somewhat more into detail, I observe 
 that what Macaulay, repeating the customary phrase, calls the 
 " high price of Gold," was not, if precision bo observed, a 
 " pi-ice," but rather a rate of currency which the Government 
 authorized. That the historian is mistaken in assuminer that 
 Locke did not recognize this, is clearly indicated by the 
 evidence. To the historian's assertion that the Act of Parlia- 
 ment forbidding the currency of the Guinea above 22s., had 
 no effect to bring them down from ;30s. to 22.s\, I venture to 
 affix, at this distance, an interrogation point. I am not pre- 
 pared with full evidence to the contrary, but merely desire 
 in this way to note that the situation calls for strict proof. 
 The point is distinct from those which we have lately been 
 discussing. The observations of the preceding pages apply 
 mainly to the period anterior to this Act. After the law was 
 passed, it was, evidently, a very great misdemeanour for an 
 official in any government office to take or give, guineas at a 
 
Sect. 15.] The Ratlnij of Guinea and Pistole. 105 
 
 rate above 22s. : and it would bo difficult withal, to discover 
 any motive for such action. To the individual Money-user, 
 the practice of government officers would serve as an example 
 and as a hindrance to transgression. If it bo really truo 
 that the Ministry failed to see to it that its own subordinates 
 carried out its measure, we have then to deal with a political, 
 rather than with an economic, event. 
 
 That there was no force at work which was competent to 
 overrule the iullucnce of the Government Offices of Account 
 in fixing the rate of guineas, is amply shown by a fact to 
 which Lord Liverpool testifies, namely, that they refused to 
 take guineas for more than oO.s., and thus prevented tlieir 
 rising above that rate. (Treatise, pp. 75 and 85.) 
 
 It remains now to direct our attention to the peculiar scope 
 of this action of Parliament, and of the Administration, which 
 I have called a " rating " of guineas. In each case the terms 
 of the command were, not to take the Gold-coin/o7'7?iore than a 
 certain sum. The Gold-coin therefore was not, strictly speak- 
 ing, made current, obligatorily current, at the rate established. 
 
 Twenty shillings remained its rate of currency in the fullest 
 sense of the word, namely, that a tender of coin at that rate 
 was a Legal-Tender of pajniient in discharge of a debt ex- 
 pressed in pounds and shillings. This status was, however, 
 a creation of the same power in the State as that which regu- 
 lated the rating in Government offices, for both lay in the 
 jurisdiction of the Crown, subject, as we have seen, to the 
 occasional intervention of Parliament, over which the Crown 
 had its veto. The Legal-Tender-power of the guinea as a 
 20-shilling piece, arose from its issuance as the equivalent of 
 20.-*., by authority of the Crown. It was as an expression of 
 sovereignty, that the Mint Indenture (see Appendix 3), a 
 conti-act of the Crown, had the force of law.^ 
 
 ' This Prcroirativc had been coiirimied by the Act of Parliament 19 
 IleniT^ VII., i-h. .■), and 5 & G Jldwanl VI., ch. 19 — the funncr providing 
 that all Gold aud Sihtir-foius "shall be current for tlic sum thcv were 
 
ion riic Descent to Gold. 
 
 AVitliout entering here upon the question of currency by 
 consent, which I find to bo another mode of autliorization 
 recognized in the law of the time, it is plain that permission 
 to pass guineas at 22 shillings, coupled with an actual practice 
 of government offices to use them as 22-shilling pieces, tended 
 effectively to legalize and to promote their circulation at that 
 rate. The rule of the Mint Indenture might still control in 
 case of captious dispute about the operation of an ofi'er of Gold- 
 coin in discharge of a debt, though all the while in the actual 
 circulation the coin stood everywhere at a higher level. It 
 was, in fiict, by no means self-evident that the rate of 22 
 shillings was not obligatory ; for the question arose in such 
 force as to elicit a resolution of the Commons, that no one was 
 compelled to accept guineas at 22 shillings. The legal efifect of 
 the Order of the Treasury stood, of course, below the binding 
 force of the Proclamation of 1717 (of which further mention 
 will be made hereafter) , which contained the words " at which 
 rate or rates (21 shillings to the guinea) we do hereby declare 
 the said respective pieces of coined Gold to be current ; " yet 
 the practical effect for the time being, of such an order as that 
 just mentioned, if continued and enforced, might be in practice 
 to a large extent the same, the probable exceptions being 
 the supposed case before-mentioned, always rare, of captious 
 dispute about a Legal-Tender in discharge of debt. The 
 main body of the Proclamation of 1717 is to the same effect 
 as the Statute and Orders for 26, 22, and 21 \ shillings, that is, 
 710^ to take guineas above 21 shillings; but it contains, in 
 addition, the above clause, which, thereupon, in the most 
 
 coined for ; " the latter forbidding, on pain of forfeiture, exchanging Coined 
 Gold or Coined Silver for more than they arc declared to be current for by 
 Proclanuttiiin. 
 
 The rate of 20 shillings for the Guinea, provided in the Mint Indenture, 
 had never been established obligatorily by Proilaniation, and hence ex- 
 chanirinir it at a higher rate ha<l never bofonie an olFcncc. The (tovernment 
 offices were therefore free to take it at a higher rate, as well as the people. 
 
Sect. 15.] The Ratimj of Guinea and Pistole. 107 
 
 binding form, fixed a limit below, as well as above, and so 
 substituted for the 20-sbiIlino: Leoral-Tender-rule of the existinji: 
 !Mint Indenture, the new rating of the Proclamation. Tho 
 ]\Iint Indentures subsequent to 1717, accordingly provided 
 for tho same coin as a 21-shilling piece. 
 
 A word, in conclusion, touching the ratio embodied in tho 
 rating of tho guinea as a 22-shilling piece. Tho ratio is 
 about 15.°^ to 1, if the comparison is between full-weight Gold- 
 coin and full-weight Silver-coin. This ratio is several per 
 cent, above the average market-rate at tho time for Gold.^ 
 
 The question, therefore, confronts us, why this high ratio 
 was chosen, for to-day it appears quite obvious that it was so 
 much above the market-rate as to oft'or a profit for the substi- 
 tution of Gold for the new Silver-coin then in process of 
 manufacture. The following considerations suggest themselves 
 in answer. 
 
 1. The greater part of the existing Silver-coin was under- 
 weight; the new full-weight Silver-coin was a thing of the 
 future ; and the actual comparison of coin with coin — a guinea 
 being, in fact, for the time, made equal only to 22 light 
 shiUings — the actual rate, so to speak, was far below 15.^^ to 1, 
 and taking the average of the mass of coins in use, could only 
 gradually rise to that figure with the completion of the re- 
 coinage, which, in the end, required near three years. 
 
 2. Twenty-two shillings was a rate which seems to havo 
 been observed for some time in the earlier days of deterioration 
 
 ' Professor Soctbcer's Tables of the average ratio of Gold to Silver in 
 Hamburi; show the ratio in that market of the years just before, and just 
 after, the fixation of the guineas above recommended, as follows: — 
 
 1695 . . . lo.02 1698 . . . 14.94 
 
 1696 . . . 1.5.00 1700 . . . 14.81 
 
 1697 . . . 15. -20 1701 . . . 15.07 
 
 1698 . . . 15.07 1702 . . . 15.52 
 
 How closely thi.s conforms to the general rates on the Continent, I am 
 not surely informed ; suflire it to say here that the facts known to nir 
 reveal no very important divergence from these fi'.'ures. 
 
108 The Descent to Gold. 
 
 of the Silver-coin, and may well have stood iu the public miud 
 as a fair average, or compromise. 
 
 3. It was a hardship to many innocent holders to " fiill " 
 the guineas at all, and it was natural that the highest practic- 
 able rate should be taken. 
 
 4. For high ratios, the example of Spain and of Portugal 
 could be adduced, an argument which, at that time, had great 
 authority. It is quite in accord with tlio then condition of 
 economic knowledge, that these countnca, which owned the 
 mines of precious metal, should be regarded as the arbiters of 
 their ratio. 
 
 5. Lastly, I observe that it is not probable that the opera- 
 tion of the law of Free and Gratuitous Coinage was well 
 understood ; upon this point further considerations will bo 
 presented upon another page. 
 
 The fixation of guineas by the Trca.sury in IGOS upon the 
 Report of the Board of Trade, of which a full account is given 
 in Section 13, reduced their rating to 21s. 6(/., and brought 
 down the ratio — as found by comparison with full- weight Silver- 
 coin — to 15.''^ to 1. The course of reasoning, which was held 
 to justify the rating at 15''., had still a certain measure of 
 persuasiveness in supporting the new ratio. The mistake of 
 the time lay in the failure to follow out the recommendations 
 of Locke's report. That report was based upon the idea that 
 the adoption of the now rating would stop the excessive impor- 
 tation of Gold : but it went on to lay down a rule for the 
 future — "but if, contrary to our expectation, this abatement 
 should prove too small, guineas may, by the same easy means 
 [an order of the Treasury] be lowered yet further, according 
 as may bo found expedient." This lowering very soon became, 
 in fact, expedient; but it was not discovered to be so. As 
 usual, the monetary interests of the nation which demanded 
 consistent and competent attention, failed to receive it. 
 
 The general course of the Government touching the rating 
 of the Pistole, has been indicated in the preceding Section, iu 
 connection with the Reports of Newton. 
 
Sect. 15.] Work of the Statesmen of 169G. 109 
 
 The desire must naturally be to keep the alignment between 
 the rating of foreign coins and that of the guineas : but the 
 path of success in this effort was, no doubt, crossed both by the 
 unwillingness to bring small fractions of tho shilling into the 
 figure of the rating, and by the varying quality of the coins 
 themselves. I know of no estimates of the quantity of 
 foreign coins circulating in England, but the amount men- 
 tioned by Newton as having been recoined about 1701 — which 
 was no les3 than £1,400,000 worth — certainly shows that they 
 might be an important factor in the circulation. 
 
 § 16. THE ENGLISH MONF.TARY SYSTEM AND THE ORIGINALITY 
 OP THE STATESMEN OP THE RECOINAGE. 
 
 The accredited statement touching the English " Standard" 
 during the past two centuries, gives for the period preceding 
 1717, the Silver Standard, for the period subsequent to 1717 
 the Double Standard. 
 
 This statement, in all probability, chiefly rests upon the 
 authority of Lord Liverpool, who states (in passages of his 
 Treatise, reprinted on p. 141) that from 41 Henry III. (1257) 
 to 1663, and again, after 1717, the Gold Coins and Silver 
 Coins were equally the "legal measure of property,^' but 
 that in 1663 the Gold Coins ceased to be a legal measure of 
 property. This account is adopted in part by Sir Robert Peel, 
 as will be seen by reference to the Appendix, page 205. 
 
 The necessity has perhaps already become apparent of a 
 radical correction of these statements ; and in pausing at 
 the close of a review of the Great Recoinage, to consider the 
 system then existing, and the work of those who administered 
 it, we may conveniently epitomize tho past and anticipate tho 
 coming pages by a tabular view of the English " Standard " 
 in tho entire period. 
 
110 
 
 The Descent to Gold. 
 
 The English Monetary System before and after the 
 Recoinage op 169G. 
 
 Knglish Gold and Silver Coins were " Current coins of the Realm : " and 
 from time to time certain Foreign Gold-coins had currency within the Realm 
 in various degrees, though, probably, never called coins of the Realm. 
 
 National 
 Init of 
 Coinage. 
 
 Jjft'ciive 
 U-gal 
 Itutio. 
 
 liatio of 
 
 oh h pa lory 
 
 L.'gal- 
 
 Tender. 
 
 Principal 
 
 Mont-y in 
 
 Use, 
 
 To preclude misunderstanding. I cull attention to the fact that the above phrases 
 have no claim Id ho contemporary with ihe events referred to — 
 
 I. lit -AYf ;i(l. ■|iiiMl for this occiuinii. 
 
 The 
 
 1663 ti>? ' 
 
 1 to 14.*" 
 
 1 to 14.*' 
 
 SlLVEH. 
 
 Silver 
 
 (the latter date 
 
 
 From 1663 
 
 
 Tuuiid. 
 
 beiiij; uncertam.) 
 Ciuiiicas at 20*. 
 
 ?— to 1604 
 
 (SepLniber ?) 
 
 Guineas at 2\s. 6(1. 
 
 1 to 15." 
 
 The '-Measure" 
 being *' lost " — for 
 
 to 1717. 
 
 At what pre- 
 
 
 From 1694 
 
 the mutilation in 
 
 
 cise date the re- 
 
 
 (probably Septem- 
 
 varying degrees of 
 
 
 duet ion of the 
 
 
 ber) to June, 1695, 
 
 tiie Silver-coins, 
 
 
 stoek of Silver- 
 
 
 the rate of Guineas 
 
 actually in use. 
 
 
 coin and influx 
 
 
 rose to 30s. 
 
 worked what I ma}' 
 eall a decomjio- 
 
 
 of Gold gave 
 the latter a ma- 
 
 
 June, 1695. to Jan. 
 
 siiinn of the Silver 
 
 
 jority in the cir- 
 
 
 1696, Guineas at 
 
 .Money — it cannot 
 
 
 culation must 
 
 
 30«. 
 
 be said, in the ])ro- 
 per .sense of the 
 
 
 remain a matter 
 of surmise. 
 
 
 Murih 25. 1696, 
 
 words, that an ef- 
 
 
 From my pre- 
 
 
 to .\pril 10, 1696, 
 
 fective legal ratio 
 
 
 sent informa- 
 
 
 Guineas at 26*. 
 
 existed. 
 
 
 tion I should 
 put the date not 
 
 
 April 10, 1696, to 
 
 1 to 15." 
 
 
 far from 17 la 
 
 
 Feb. 16, 1699, 
 
 
 
 
 
 Guinea.s at 22s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Feb, 16, 1699, to 
 
 1 to 15." 
 
 
 
 
 Dec. 22, 1717, 
 
 
 
 
 
 Guineas at 21s. 6d. 
 
 
 
 
 
 From Dec. 22, 1717, 
 
 1 tu I5.-''» 
 
 1 to 15.»o» 
 
 
 
 Guine:is at 21s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 f;<>i i>. 
 
 ' Toucliing the Government rating, the evidence is ipiite defective : the state- 
 nu'nts are in large j>art matter of inference, and are given subject to revision. 
 
Sect. 1G.] IVicWork of the Statesmen of 1 OOr.. 1 1 1 
 
 If we seek to characteinzo by a name the Monetary System 
 of Enofland as the Statesmen of the Recoinao^o — takinpf tho 
 law as it stood — united to reform its operation, we shall, I 
 think, aptly describe it as tho Silver and Gold Standard, with 
 Silver as Unit and Chief- Legal-Tender. 
 
 For my part I can frankly say, with no defective conscious- 
 ness of the part I liave borne in monetary discussion, that, 
 barring questions of detail as to tho mode of fixing the rating 
 of the guinea, tho scheme is precisely what I should advocate 
 under conditions such as those which obtained two centuries 
 ago. It appears to me, in a word, the plain common-sense of 
 what I may call a Local-Xational Bi-metallic System. The Unit 
 being held by the heavier, the more abundant, and the steadier 
 metal, and full provision made for duly holding the other metal 
 in harness as Money, at par with the Unit, the system was, in 
 my view, arranged with full adaptation to the international 
 elements of the problem as they then stood. I do not hesitate 
 to affirm that it is distinctly the analogue for that day of the 
 Union for Free Coinage of Silver and Gold, the adoption of 
 which was put upon the order of the day before Christendom 
 by the Monetary Conference of 1878. 
 
 But, like any other institution of the State, this system 
 required to be properly administered. Its proper administra- 
 tion demanded that tho Government should abandon such 
 phenomenal supineness in dealing with the coin as had already 
 wantonly forced a business crisis and heavy losses upon a war- 
 worn state, and should consistently maintain its Monetary 
 System upon the lines of policy clearly marked out for it. 
 
 The rating of the guinea must be changed — lowered or 
 raised from time to time, so as to keep the alignment with 
 its Silver- price, as altered from time to time ; the alteration 
 arising, in fact, chiefly through action of foreign Mints. 
 
 The object of this policy will be easily recognized : it was 
 to keep the English " Standard '^ securely in its place — a 
 Silver Standard in Meanings No^. 5 and 7 and 8 of our Intro- 
 
1 1 -2 Tlie Descent to Gold. 
 
 duction, a Silver and Gold Standard in Meanings Nos. G and 
 9. Jta effect, as stated in detail, must bo, not merely to main- 
 tain the local parity of coins of the two metals, or, in other 
 words, to prevent a discount on one or premium on the other 
 at home — for the habit of using both might well avail to 
 secure this result in the earlier stages of a general alteration 
 of the relative value of the metals — but also to foil the specu- 
 lator in bullion, whose operations may be briefly stated as 
 the bringing in of the metal which was cheaper to him, and 
 getting for it the metal dearer to him, without paying any 
 premium on the latter. 
 
 In this way undue alteration of the relative proportions of 
 the two metals in the ]\Ioney stock of the Kingdom was to be 
 prevented. This, iu the case now in view, would mean a 
 draining of the new-made Silver Money from the Kingdom, 
 and so a break-down of the " Standard." 
 
 It is further to be observed of the practical outcome of this 
 system — that it tended to secure an abundant circulation, 
 " the plenty of current coins of Gold and Silver," in the words 
 of the Statute of 16GG. 
 
 It was not a visionary scheme ; the iteration to that effect of 
 modern Monetary writers, in their several languages, to the 
 contrary notwithstanding. It was practicable to maintjiin 
 what later controversy might call a '' Double" Standard. 
 
 Against this iteration, born not of research, but of the 
 mere imitativeness of fashion, or of the passion of controversy, 
 I maintain that Locke, and Somers, and Montague, ajid 
 Nowton were practical men, and that their country's law had 
 established a good working system. This view can bo sub- 
 stantiated in various ways if need be, but the reader can 
 arrive at certainty without a moment's delay, on ascertaining 
 that the alleged impossibility of maintaining such a Double 
 Standard was actually performed at the period in question. 
 Franco actually enjoyed its Double Standard, in the sense of a 
 concurrent circulation of the two metals, throughout the 
 
Sect. 16.] Work of the Statesmen of IGOG. 113 
 
 greater part of the XVIIIth century. The evidence vnih. 
 which I was able to establish this fact is given in the Docu- 
 ment of the Conference of 1878, p. 715, and in the Document 
 of the Conference of 1881. (Blue Book, page 280 ; American 
 edition, page 385.) 
 
 It was a good working system, then, which only required 
 proper attention from the Ministry to insure its mainte- 
 nance. 
 
 In order to correct by anticipation a possible — nay, I regret 
 to say, probable — misunderstanding, it will be well for me to 
 state that, in my view, the mere raw elements which go to 
 form this system, were in themselves nothing new ; their traces 
 may be met with here and there throughout the centuries of 
 monetary history. 
 
 It is a strange fact — and in after times when monetary 
 history shall have been more carefully studied than it is to- 
 day, it will seem even more strange — but, in modern learning, 
 so completely has the '' dismal science " of Money been 
 avoided by the historian and the publicist, that among tho 
 learned to-day, after a decade which has witnessed more 
 monetary controversy than any series of decades anterior to 
 it, error is quite possible, and is, I fear, common, in dealing 
 with this matter. 
 
 In thus saying, that the mere raw elements which go to 
 form the system we are analyzing were in themselves 
 nothing new, I am really confronting what I may be allowed 
 to name a prevalent fallacy of limitation, a distorting 
 naiTowness of view, a forgetfulness, or inertia, born, I dare 
 say, of a natural vexation of spirit, and fatigue in threading 
 the labyrinth of Money. One would, in fact, suppose from 
 the tone of late utterances to which I could point — which arc, 
 I should add, of most distinguished source — that this matter 
 of parity and disparity between Silver and Gold (coin or 
 bullion) was quite a modern afl'air. I have to acknowledge 
 that I have myself made the counter-mistake in certain 
 
 I 
 
114 The Descent to Gold. 
 
 writings (187G-8-0) of taking the obviousness of the opposite 
 \'iew — which is the con-ect one — too much for granted, and 
 in the course of years of controversy have had occasion to 
 deplore my error. 
 
 Hence, it is doubly opportune for me to utilize this occasion, 
 aiul to justify in detail the view which 1 once erroneously 
 supposed too obvious to need explanation. I therefore 
 brin<j: to the notice of those whom it may concern, a 
 general statement touching the appearance iu history of 
 the phenomena of which we treat. I aver that ^loney 
 is a genus made up of various species ; that no insular 
 isolation of its habitat is demanded by the nature of 
 any of these several species ; there is no radical incompati- 
 bility between them ; their pro\nnces may not only overlap 
 each other, but they are capable, so to speak, of joint tenancy 
 in which the right of survivorship may apply. The use of 
 dififcrent kinds of Money is therefore naturally, to some extent, 
 a concurrent as well as a parallel and independent use. Now 
 concurrent use implies valuation of one species in terms of 
 the other, and this valuation may be, in various degrees, 
 official. Such valuation implies parity; and aberration from 
 a once recognized parity implies disparity. The natural 
 plurality of material and unity of Money make probable, there- 
 fore, the appearance, not in all times and places, but at least 
 here and there in time and place, of the phenomena of parity 
 and disparity. 
 
 Throughout the ages iu which man has made general use of 
 Money — however deficient the age may have been in scientific 
 generalizations based upon the facts in view, however limited 
 the recognition may have been of whatever generalizations 
 were actually made, and whatever the default in recording 
 the results of observation, yet the raw material of experience 
 in reference to parity and disparity must have been present in 
 some effective measure. I recall that in my early study of the 
 subject, in exploring the writings of Aristotle with this impres- 
 
Sect. 1G.] Work of the Statesmen of 1696. 115 
 
 sion in mind, his observation, or that of one who wrote under 
 his name, that it was part of the economy of a King to knoiv 
 when to raise or to loxrer the value of Money, seemed to me 
 applicable to the matters now in hand, and indeed, a very 
 weighty, very interesting, but at the same time quite a 
 natural observation, and I remember quoting it in print to 
 that eflect in 187G. But if it be true, as the tone of much 
 that is said in our time would lead us to suppose, that Sir 
 Thomas Gresham enacted ^' Gresham's law" in England, in the 
 reign of Elizabeth, and that corresponding events have since 
 occurred, it plainly follows that the Greek — who lived before 
 that day, as well as before the year XI. of the French Repub- 
 lic, or the date of Hamilton's Report on the Mint — in saying 
 those words that I have quoted was but a babbling dreamer, 
 talking to the wind. Now I believe the contrary of this. 
 Indeed, I may go so far as to aver that to the monetary coun- 
 sellors of Philip of Macedon, or of Alexander, a broad view of 
 parity and disparity could hardly have been as novel as to some 
 otherwise most competent authorities of the present genera- 
 tion in matters monetary. Not that the latter were neces- 
 sarily unaware of the fact that the use of various kinds of 
 Money is ancient, but that their minds stopped short with this 
 fact ; they omitted to proceed very far upon this unattractive 
 path of monetary thought that " wanders through a forest in 
 a mist." 
 
 The fault is hardly a rare one, for it is to this unattractive- 
 ness that the deficient growth of Monetary Science is to be 
 attributed. By reason of this unattractiveness, there has been 
 little cumulation of the results of experience to hold control 
 of legislation, so that the generations, as they follow each 
 other, seem even more liable to monetary maladies than the 
 swarms of children annually coming ^vithin reach of infection 
 are liable to measles. It is under the pressure of some evil 
 which must be speedily remedied that the study of the subject 
 of Money grows general, and that the thinker is supported 
 
110 The Descent to Gold. 
 
 in his work. T.ator, when a modus vIvovJi is established in 
 practice, when the crisis is past, and the community breathes 
 freely again, study, and interest in the subject of study, subside; 
 and with the absence of support for the scholar, comes default 
 in the continuity of scientific appreciation. Without seeking 
 further, we may perhaps find in the period just referred to an 
 illustration in point, if we make an apposite supposition of 
 what might have been. 
 
 In imagination we can contrast the Monetary Conference of 
 Paris in 1867, as it was, with what it could have been had the 
 monetary lessons of the days of Philip of Macedou, and of 
 Alexander, been available as household words of knowledge to 
 its Delegates. 
 
 Xo material has, in fact, come down to us — indeed, it is not 
 probable that any scientific record ever existed for a thorough 
 general understanding of the monetary events of that time ; 
 but it seems to me plain that events occurred which, like those 
 of the period of England's history here under review, must 
 have embodied law and evidence which under easy interpreta- 
 tion could have dispelled the illusions which in fact guided 
 the deliberations of the Conference of 1807. 
 
 The action of Philip of Macedon in establishing a Gold 
 Coinage at 12"^^ to 1, side by side with Silver — presum- 
 ably as a preparation for a Persian war — and the changes 
 wrought by Alexander in the monetary relations of the busy 
 world between Carthago and the Tigris, certainly must have 
 afforded ground for fruitful generalization upon the habits of 
 man as a Money-using animal. Surely the lost data for a 
 history of the drachma and the stater, of the Daric and the 
 ^Median shekel, could have taught a lesson to the franc, and 
 the mark, the Wilhelm and the Napoleon, and to every 
 Sovereign in the field. 
 
 But a record can be forgotten or ignori-d through the 
 laches of the present, as well as destroyed by the bar- 
 barism of the past ; and thus fields of history lie fallow. 
 
Sect. 10.] Work of the Statesmen (/ 1 690. 117 
 
 that only await cultivation in order to serve as nurseries of 
 science. 
 
 Coming now from this retrospect to the Monetary System 
 which the statesmen of 1090 in England sought to maintain 
 and to perfect, we can more readily discern it in perspective, 
 and distinguish the originality of its champions. Fx'om the 
 point of view of universal history what is really notable and 
 novel in the System I describe, is, as I regard it, merely the 
 determination to maintain in its proper force of supporting 
 numbers of coins, a Unit fixed in the metal better adapted for 
 that function, and with that end to lower, as well as to raise, 
 the rate of currency of coin of the other metal, as occasion 
 should demand. 
 
 Here lies its originality. 
 
 There had been Monetary Units : but the resolution to 
 maintain them was not a common thing. As we have seen, 
 after standing firm in England ever since the 43rd of Elizabeth, 
 the monetary edifice was trembling to its fall in and after 
 1690. And coins had been lowered, as well as raised, in 
 various countries. But a definite policy of maintaining a 
 single Unit and dual Money, upon a consistent plan which 
 included lowering as well as raising the I'ate of currency of 
 the subservient and rated metal, was not that settled practice 
 of government which the authority of the statesmen of the 
 Recoinage might, and should, have made it. 
 
 § 17. THE GUINEA AT 2 1 SHILLINGS. 
 
 After the great Recoinage, the ideas of Locke and of 
 Newton seem to have been as seed sown on stony ground. 
 Montague and Somers, in the changing fortune of politics, 
 were presently driven from power, and, certainly while 
 exposed to the dangers of a partisan impeachment, could have 
 little to say, or to think, of monetary policy. The energies 
 of monetary statesmanship were soon relaxed. The same 
 
118 The Descent to Gold. 
 
 phenomenal supineness which had allowed recoinage to become 
 a burning necessity ; the same heedlessness which had oflfered 
 the commodities and coin of England, as a prey to a swarm 
 of " Money-mongers " on cither side of the Channel, left to the 
 mercy of events the institution which had thus been founded 
 anew at so much cost. 
 
 Thus in the end, this act of heroic statesmanship proved, in 
 important measure, an empty sacrifice. The glowing pages 
 of Macaulay^s unfinished History have stood unshadowed by 
 the bathos of this finale. He was spared the task of telling 
 the tale of the plundering of England's treasure, and how, in 
 spite of Montague and of Somers, in spite of Newton and of 
 Locke, the heroes of his thrilling story of gallant adventure — 
 freighted with the hopes of a nation, and carried to masterly 
 achievement over the waves of revolution and amid the storms 
 of war — the Standard of England was in the end debased. 
 
 Continued default was made in not lowering the rate at 
 which the Government accepted the guinea. 
 
 Failing such action, the guinea remained current at 'lis. <o<l., 
 a rate far above its bullion value, compared with Standard 
 Silver-coin. Evidently so long as the government offices 
 received guineas at 2\s. G'7., and so long as the Mints were 
 bound to coin them without limit, and gratis, for all comers, 
 commerce could find its best account in paying guineas in 
 England, and Silver abroad. And so the full-weight stan- 
 dard coin of the Realm — to create a stock of which the 
 State had spent a sum greater than its regular annual 
 revenue, and equal to perhaps a fourth of the country's total 
 stock of cash — was allowed to find its way back to the 
 melting-pot in exchange for cheaper Gold, while speculators 
 on either side of the Channel reaped richly where they had 
 not sown. In the end, the stock of full-weight Silver-coin 
 was brought near to exhaustion, and, the coinage of Silver 
 being unprofitable, since Gold was the "cheaper" metal, 
 slackened and finally ceased. 
 
Sect. 17.] The Guinea at 21 S/tiUim/s. 119 
 
 Finally^ came the tardy reduction of the guinea in 1717. 
 The conditions of the market, however, having changed (pro- 
 bably because the effect of England's law had been exhausted) 
 — Gold standing below the high level which it had held at the 
 turn of the century, and which had confused the calculations 
 of that period — the reduction to 21s, proved insufficient; Gold 
 at 15*"^, the new ratio, was still over-valued as compared with 
 Silver. It was not, as is usually supposed, an enactment of 
 Parliament that made this fixation, but a Royal Proclamation, 
 ^lpoil request of the Commons. 
 
 But of the abiding intention to maintain Silver as the 
 Pnncipal Money — in which term the ideas of Unit and of 
 Chief Legal-Tender may be moulded into one — the action of 
 Parliament and Crown in 1717-8, is conclusive evidence.' 
 The new fixation of the guinea as a 21-shilling piece was 
 occasioned entirely by the scarcity of Silver, and was expressly 
 intended to remedy it. The over-valuation of Gold is, in fact, 
 expressly stated in the Proclamation of George I. to have " been 
 a great cause of carrying out and lessening the species of the 
 Silver-coins, which is highly prejudicial to the trade of this 
 Kingdom.'' To reduce the guinea to 20s. was a violent change : 
 20.''. (jd. was inconvenient on account of the fraction, while 
 21s. probably appeared a sound and conservative halting-place, 
 though it proved, in fact, quite the reverse. With guineas 
 still, after 1717, current at an over- valuing though diminished 
 rate, the transhipment of valuations to the lower standard was 
 inevitable. 
 
 Thus by non-action, without apparent intention, England's 
 monetary history of the century was made. The rich Gold- 
 mines of Brazil, and the low ratings of Gold maintained on the 
 
 * Some of the clebate;! in rarliameut in 1717-8, the Rejx rt ol' Newton, 
 the Address, and the Proehunution of the King, are reprinted in my 
 " Material for the Study of Monetary Policy," in the Document of the 
 Monetary Conference of 1878. 
 
120 The Descent to Gold. 
 
 Continent — kept Gold in the main below 15 throughout the 
 century, and Gold thus remaining, bv the failure of English 
 law, the cheaper metal in England, the self-interest of citizens, 
 thus directed, supported a currency several percent, below the 
 " Standard " in the sense of the established and recognized 
 Unit of Value. 
 
 With the impression of this " lame and impotent conclu- 
 sion " upon us, we can conveniently return to the consideration 
 of the policy applicable to the rating of Gold. 
 
 I doubt not the question has quickly taken shape in the 
 reader's mind : *' How did it come to pass that a nation of 
 England's force failed to attain an object so plainly within 
 reach of her statesmen as the maintenance of her Monetary 
 Standard in its intended place ? " 
 
 In the maze of causes or conditions which are responsible 
 for this default, and hence can yield answer to our question, 
 one element of the situation seems to me to detach itself from 
 the mass, and to hold proportions quite commensurate with 
 the occasion. This element is, as I shall state it, the novelty 
 of Gratuitous Free Coinage, and the likelihood that an entirely 
 adequate comprehension of the effect of its working would be 
 lackinsf. 
 
 To-day, in the expanse of the Doctrine of Money, there are 
 so many vast spaces unexplored, that it is by no means strange 
 that mere shortness of vision should have limited the legis- 
 lator's view at the period of which we write. "Who indeed 
 can say that Free and Gratuitous Coinage is so well understood 
 to-day, that even among adepts the applications of that know- 
 ledge are commonplaces of thought ? A right of the individual 
 to have bullion turned into !Mouey by Government officers 
 with all convenient speed, is given by Free Coinage.' The 
 
 ' '* Free " in the sense in whieli the word has been used f>l' late years. 
 Lord Liverpool, Mr. Hamilton, and others of the elder writers, use the 
 word " Free " to convey the idea of *' Gratuitous Coinage." as well as of 
 what I call '* Free Coinage." Believing that it would be a profitable 
 
Sect. 17.] The Guinea at 'IV Shillinrjs. 121 
 
 right to have this work done without expense to the bringer- 
 in, is given by Gratuitous Coinage, and these two rights were, 
 so to speak, created by the statute of IGOC. 
 
 The Literature of Money is abundant throughout the cen- 
 turies, but I venture to think that the economic importance 
 of a System of Free Coinage, as compared ^vith what I have 
 called the Seigniorial System, still awaits adequate elucida- 
 tion. Indeed, I very much fear I shall be presenting a view 
 which has a certain novelty, if I observe that so long as (or 
 wherever) Coinage is treated as a prerogative of a Milnz-herr, 
 of a Lord of the Mint, whatever his title, rather than an estab- 
 lished right of the individual, so long (or there) does Money 
 hold some of the attributes of what we know to-day as a Token - 
 Money, as distinguished from that true Commodity-Money, or, 
 — if I may compound a new word to fit a compound idea — 
 that subdivided-metal-Money, with which Englaud^s law has 
 made the world familiar. There is here in my belief a distinc- 
 tion which has not yet gained its meed of general recognition 
 in monetary literature. 
 
 Now it is plain that to reduce the guineas meant a certain 
 burden and loss to many holders of them, the number and 
 the burden all the greater as the stock of Gold was now probably 
 greater than the stock of Silver, and it was natural that 
 members of Parliament should be unwilling to impose upon 
 their constituents any greater loss than was obviously neces- 
 sary. But what was necessary ? Here arose the practical 
 diflBculty. The precedent of earlier days in England, and the 
 example of contemporary administration of Coinage, all the 
 outgrowth of the Seigniorial System, of charging a heavy per- 
 centage for the benefit of the State, in addition to the actual 
 
 amendment in monetary terminology to di.stin£rnish the right to have Ijullion 
 turned into coin, from tlie right to have the work of coinage done at 
 the expen«ie. not of the depositor, but of the State, I have used "Free 
 Coinage " to designate the former only, and '• Gratuitous Coinage " the 
 latter, — and have used all opportunities to naturalize the distinction. 
 
12i> The Dcsceyit to Gold. 
 
 cost of Coinage united to obscure the patli of the legis- 
 lator. 
 
 Had England adopted the policy of a Gold-token currency, 
 which seems to have obtained in the Peninsula, her standard 
 might have been maintained without a greater reduction of 
 the guinea. But to do this, it was necessary to charge 
 Seigniorage on Gold, or limit the coinage of it, or ■withhold from 
 depositors the priN-ilege of having bullion made Money, or to 
 adopt a combination of these measures. This, however, could 
 only be brought about by inducing Parliament to change the 
 law, to repeal the Act of 1C66, or omit to re-enact it in full 
 or in part. 
 
 I have no evidence that this plan was ever suggested. 
 But at the same time there is little evidence that the high 
 ratios of the Peninsula were recognized in their true character. 
 If these high ratios served to warrant Calonnc in raising the 
 French ratio iu 1785 from 14.^^ to 15^ as they did,' and to 
 encourage Benton and Calhoun in raising the American ratio 
 in 1834 from 15 to 16, as they did, it is certainly not strange 
 that in earlier days they should have encouraged a similar 
 attempt on the part of England to maintain a high ratio. 
 
 This condition of things, to which the fixation of 1717 failed 
 to bring the expected remedy, was naturally a grievance to 
 many right-minded Englishmen. From beginning to end of 
 the century, monetary literature speaks, one might almost say, 
 with one voice of regret, at the practical, not intended so 
 much as permitted, debasement of the Standard. A single 
 quotation may suffice to represent the spirit of many.^ The 
 following is from Joseph Harris, one of the soundest of writers 
 on Money. It is from the preface of the second volume of 
 his "Essays on Money and Coin " (17o7). The volume is, 
 
 ' Sec Documt'iit of the CoiifcrcMicc of 1878, jip. *2.J7-0. 'l^Vl. (Ditto, 
 Conf. of 1881, p. 257.) See also Benton's speech, p. 673. 
 * Sec also Appendix 18. 
 
Sect. 17.] The Guinea at 21 Skillim/s. 123 
 
 in effect, a plea for lowering the guinea ; 20 shillings being 
 the rate apparently in view. 
 
 " My purpose is/' says the author, '' to defend every man's 
 right and property ; to preserve unsullied the national faith, 
 honour, and credit ; to preserve a reign hitherto distinguished 
 by equal laws and equal administration of justice, from a blot 
 that would remain to all posterity ; to vindicate and defend 
 all these, I say, from an assassination in the dark, by a debase- 
 ment of the long-established Standard of property.'^' 
 
 But the failure to lower the rating of the guinea did not 
 stand alone among the instances of neglect in dealing with 
 the Money of the realm. 
 
 Hardly two generations had passed since the Recoinage of 
 the Silver in 169G, before a progressive deterioration of the 
 Gold-coin had declared itself, which slowly forced its way to 
 public recognition. An end was finally put to this disorder 
 by the General Recoinage of the Gold-coin of 1774, a 
 measure, the successful operation of which (see also p. 125) was 
 largely due to the wise counsels of Mr. Jenkinson (afterwards 
 Lord Liverpool) . 
 
 But this, again, is by no means the only modern instance 
 of monetary evils growing acute through a course of procras- 
 tination. Independently of that general Recoinage which 
 
 ' A curious instame of that confusion of meanings of the word Standard 
 hereinbefore so fi;lly analyzed, Uitcly struck my eye on looking into the 
 •• Dictionnaire de I'Economie Politiciue" (Guillaumin) to see what notice 
 was accorded to Harris. The article (translated from MacCullocli) notes 
 that the second volume contains a powerful plea against the debasement of 
 the litre, that is to say, of the fineness. It would be dilhcult to discover a 
 better illustration of those defects of tcrmiuology for which I have en- 
 deavoured to pronmlgate a remedy. The author of the first comprehensive 
 treatise on Money — fur I take Chevalier's gi-eat work, '"La Monnaie," to be 
 no less than this — was one of the etlitors of the Dictionary. And yet the 
 translator was allowed to take the word " .Standard " in Sense No. 2 of the 
 Introduction to this work, and so misses completely a goodly part of the 
 significance of one of the best books, as MacCulloch says, that has ever 
 been published on the subject. 
 
12-i The Descent to Gold. 
 
 began in 1810, the historian has to relate that to-day, in the 
 full tide of the Gold Standard, England finds herself confronted 
 with an appreciable abrasion of her Gold-coin, to remedy 
 which a Chancellor of the Exchequer lias proposed a veiled 
 and partial debasement of the Standard. In the presence of 
 such evidence of the disabilities under which others liave 
 laboured, in coping with a deterioration of Money under the 
 insidious inroads of time, the laches of the immediate succes- 
 sors of the statesmen of the Great Recoinage is relieved, by 
 comparison, of at least a portion of blame. 
 
 On a later page (§22) I shall seek to estimate the neces- 
 sity, or to characterize the causes, of this failure. In the 
 chapter directly follo^^'^ng this, I shall show how, at a turning- 
 point of England's history', that fatality of unattractiveness to 
 which I have adverted (pp. 113-110) which haunts the politics 
 of Money, asserted its baleful influence on a weighty scale, in 
 the failure of an accepted guide to apprehend the teachings of 
 the immediate past in his own country. 
 
 It is in Lord Liverpool's unconsciousness of truths that were 
 as household words to an earlier generation that an explana- 
 tion of later history is to be found. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 A Lesson op History (continued) , — The Abandonment 
 OF THE Silver Pound. 
 
 § 18. THE arguments OF LORD LIVERPOOL. 
 
 In spite of the opinion reflected in the writings of Harris and 
 of Stewart, the policy of further reducing the rating of the 
 guinea appears to have received no serious attention from the 
 rulers of the country ; and the general condition of the circula- 
 tion remained, till the close of the XVIIIth century, what 
 it had been in its middle decades, save for the amelioration 
 produced by the General Recoinage of the Gold-coin in 1774. 
 By this measure, the plan and execution of which are under- 
 stood to redound to the credit of Mr. Jenkinson, afterward 
 Lord Liverpool (see Appendix 19), regulations were made, 
 not only for coining the nation's stock of Gold anew, but for 
 maintaining the coins in proper condition. This most laudable 
 effort was afterwards described by Lord Liverpool as re-estab- 
 lishing the principle of Legal Tender by weight as well as by 
 tale. In connection with the Recoinage, a statute wa3 passed 
 relating to the Silver-coin which was subsequently revived by 
 other Acts, and which has given rise to general misapprehen- 
 sion ; as may be seen in books which contain references to their 
 effect down to the present day. ' 
 
 ' Lord Liverpool liiniselt', after stating correctly the jmrjiort of the Ian 
 
126 TJie Ahandonment of the Silver Pound. 
 
 Tho occasion of the original Act appears to have been the 
 importation of " considerable quantities of bght Silver-coin of 
 the nation, or, coin purporting to be such ; " and, in prohibiting 
 the importation of such coin, the Act vrithdrew from light 
 coin tho privilege of being Legal Tender by tale, for sums 
 above £25. 
 
 The effect of the Act is, that a tender of Silver-coins for a 
 debt above £25, in order to be binding in law, must be an 
 offer of coin enough to make up the weight which the proper 
 number of pounds sterling should weigh, at the rate of 5s. Id. 
 per ounce of standard Silver. It is evident that where the 
 coins were of full weight, the restriction had no application. 
 This law, however, was in force, at first, for only nine years, 
 the statute expiring in 1783. 
 
 It will appear, upon e\ndence presented in later pages, 
 that it was in the years closely following this date, that form 
 was given to the body of argument which subsequently 
 became the " Treatise on the Coins of the Realm. ^' "WTien this 
 work was undertaken, the circulation held little Silver other 
 than coins worn down so that they were hardly more than 
 counters. The monetary question of the day was, how this 
 
 (on page 14) says on another page, "The Silver-coins of this realm con- 
 sidered as coins are now Legal Tender only in snms not exceeding £25. 
 S>ioh appears to be the law on this subject." (P. 144.) 
 
 " The Act which declared them [the Silver-coins] not to be Legal 
 Tender for any sum exceeding £25 did not pass before 1774." (P. 183.) 
 
 In tlie speech of the second Lord [..iverpool in tho House of Lonls in 
 support of the new Coinage Act, the limitation was stated in the same 
 way, but at £5. 
 
 See also Professor Leone Levi's " History of British Commerce." the 
 first edition. In a second edition, lately p\iblislied. tiie error.* are corrected. 
 
 Having had occasion, some time ago, to ascertain the fact*. I found it 
 germane to set forth with some fulness the results of my examination 
 (•'Silver and Gold," 1876), and, later, to present the evidence in full, by 
 reprinting the statutes, which will be found in the Document of the Con- 
 ference of 1878, with 11 title, which conveye<I my churacterization of them, 
 as " Measures for Maintaining the Coin at Full WeiL'ht." 
 
Sect. 18.] The Argument for Outlawry. 127 
 
 defective state of the Silver-coin was to be remedied. It was 
 hardly advisable for the Government to buy Silver bullion at 
 a premium above the legal ratio and issue Silver-coins at that 
 ratio, for the coins would at once be melted down, and so in 
 the end the Government would have lost the amount of the 
 premium and cost of coinage, and have gained nothing for its 
 pains. This state of affairs had long endured ; Silver had 
 been at a small premium over Gold (as compared with the 
 Mint ratio) during the entire course of Lord Liverpoors life. 
 To meet the desideratum of a proper circulation of Silver-coin 
 under these circumstances was, therefore, the practical problem 
 vrith which he had to deal. The question was, how to make 
 and keep good Silver-coins ; and it was in view of this actual 
 situation in the XYIIIth century, when it had proved im- 
 practicable under the law as it stood to make and keep good 
 Silver-coins, that his treatise was conceived. The fate 
 reserved for Lord Liverpool's work was peculiar. The adop- 
 tion of its special suggestions did not become a practical matter 
 till after many years had passed, and till a new order of events, 
 both at home and abroad, had quite altered the terms of the 
 problem to be solved by new legislation. As will be shown 
 in the following section. Lord Liverpool's scheme was not 
 adopted in full ; some parts of it seemed to have been swept 
 away, as it were, by the momentum of his general argument 
 in support of its main feature — the reduction of the Legal- 
 Tender of Silver to £2. 
 
 That the author's point of view is that of the statesman, 
 the jurist, rather than of the banker, the statistician, the 
 economist, is an observation suggested by the career of 
 his active years, as well as justified by analysis of the 
 work. But how far is this great advantage of position 
 supplemented by appropriate utilization of the results of 
 tributary specialist study ? The answer is given by the fact, 
 that the treatise was the product of the leisure hours of a 
 retired Minister, deprived of the advantages which come from 
 
128 The Abandonment of the Silver Pound. 
 
 the criticism of publicity or of controversy, and from the 
 teaching of practical experience. 
 
 The loftiness of its style is not more marked than the 
 involved and tortuous course of its argumentation — pecu- 
 liarities which are, however, in one sense, really alike elements 
 of strength, as impressing the reader with a dignity and pro- 
 fundity, or rather an impregnable solidity, befitting ideas which 
 have since become institutions. But while the peculiarity 
 first mentioned may be held to have been imposed in a letter 
 from subject to King, the latter seems a natural incident of the 
 peculiar diflficulties which attended the composition of the work. 
 
 It is but justice to accompany adverse criticism upon his 
 ideas with evidence which relieves the author from the charge 
 of negligence. 
 
 " xVt this period,^' says Lord Liverpool (namely, in 1708), 
 " I was seized with a violent disease, which has now confined 
 me to my house, and generally to my couch, for more than 
 four years — unable to hold a pen, or to turn over the leaves of 
 a book, from wldch I miglit derive information. At intervals, 
 however, when I have of late providentially obtained some 
 respite from pain and extreme weakness, I have endeavoured 
 to revise so much as I had before occasionally written ; — to 
 arrano"e other materials previously collected ; — and to reduce 
 the whole to a form not unfit for perusal. A Treatise, written on 
 so abstruse and complicated a subject, by one exjyoscd to great 
 infirmities, must contain some repetitionji, slight inaccxiracies, and 
 other imperfections. Arrived as I now am on the verge of life, 
 I hasten to present what I have thus written, though not 
 exempt from errors, to Your Majesty, as my last service — if 
 it shall deserve that name — in grateful remembrance of the 
 o-enerous protection which Your Majesty has never ceased to 
 afford me, and of the many and great favours which you have 
 gi-aciously conferred on me." (From page 8, of Lord Liver- 
 pool's Treatise. Edition of 1846.) 
 
 On another page he observes : — 
 
Sect. IS.] The Argument for Outlau-ri/. 129 
 
 " I have now completed all I proposed to write on the Coins 
 of the realm, and I have treated shortly of Paper currency, so 
 far as the Coins arc affected by it. It is not impossible that 
 a Treatise on a subject so abstruse and intricate, and conse- 
 quently so difficult to be understood, may be thrown aside by 
 many, and, perhaps, treated with levity ; I remember that such 
 was the case when the recoinnge of the Gold Coin was under- 
 taken in the year 177-t. It is possible that even those who 
 are not without a desire for information may object, that I have 
 consumed too much labour ou points that are not worth it — 
 In tenui labor. To these my answer is, that they are little 
 aware of how much importance to the commerce of the country 
 is a good monetary system, founded on principles of wisdom 
 and justice ; and how much Coins, particularly those of a lower 
 denomination, contribute to the convenience of the inferior 
 orders of society. I am not ashamed, therefore, in my present 
 state of retirement, to have employed my leisure hours on this 
 subject — a subject which occupied the attention and talents 
 of men of no less character than Sir William Petty and Mr. 
 Locke. 
 
 "To Your Majesty, if any apology is necessary, I may ven- 
 ture to offer other pleas in my justification. "When I was in 
 Your Majesty's service, in the year 1774, I first turned my 
 thoughts to this subject, in discharge of my public duty. It 
 was in obedience to Your Majesty's commands that I resumed 
 the consideration of it, after a long interval, when you ap- 
 pointed me, in 1707, one of the members of the Committee of 
 Privy Council for Coins; and tliowjh a short time afterwanh, 
 hy the pressure of disease, all thowjhts of tJiis nature vere blotted 
 from my recollection, I have experienced, at length, by the 
 favour of Providence, a partial recovery ; and awakened, as it 
 were, from the sleep of death, I have been induced a third 
 time to take up the consideration of this subject by the repre- 
 sentations that were made to mc by Your Majesty's late 
 ministers, of the distressed state of the southern parts of 
 
 K 
 
130 The Aba7idojiment of the Silver Poinnl. 
 
 Irclaud, wliere almost all Cuins have disappeared, where a 
 most degraded system of Paper currency has taken the place 
 even of the Silver Coins, and where this Paper currency, from 
 the quantity that has been issued, has fallen in its value, and, 
 consequently, into a state of discredit, very embarrassing to 
 the poorer ranks of Your Majesty's subjects in those parts. 
 
 " The subject of which I have treated is of such a nature, 
 that it certainly has no charms to attract the attention of any 
 man ; it is, therefore, from a sense of duty alone, tliat I have 
 been induced to complete, under all my infirmities, what I had 
 before projected . Conscious of my own inability at all times to 
 fathom a science, on which men of the most eminent talents 
 have disagreed, I offer with the greatest deference what I 
 have thus written to Your Majesty's consideration. Certain I 
 am, that it will be treated by Your Majesty with every proper 
 degree of candour, and accepted with your accustomed conde- 
 scension.'*' (Pages 249-251. The italics are mine.) 
 
 A notable feature of Lord Liverpool's presentation of his 
 subject is the appeal to precedent in support of his idea of 
 making Gold the Solo FuU-Legal-Tendcr Money of England. 
 His reference to Sir William Petty and to Mr. Locke (in the 
 passage just quoted) is indicative of the general characteristics 
 of the Treatise. He chiefly endeavours to commend his conclu- 
 sions by precedent and authority — for which he seeks to lay a 
 broad and solid foundation by a review of the history of 
 Monetary Policy and of Monetary Opinion in England — to the 
 learning and acumen of which the recognition of the student of 
 Money is due, but which is infected throughout with a fallacious 
 inequality and incompleteness. It is through this method, 
 involving an a]>parcnt remoteness from dogmatic statement, 
 or from abstruse ideas, that ho seems to succeed in establishing 
 for the new legislation which ho proposes and justifies, a 
 character for a wise conservatism, as being an advance upon 
 lines recommended by a long experience ; an impression which 
 has imposed itself upon his own and later generations. 
 
Sect. 18.] The Argument for Outlawry. 131 
 
 1 have endeavoured to describe in Chapter IV. certain 
 regions of thoughtj some portion of wliicli may have contri- 
 buted to Lord Liverpool's general ideas of Money, through 
 which ho contemplates its history ; and I now seek to con- 
 sider in detail the distinctions upon which ho bases his 
 argument, and tho conclusions which he seeks to establish. 
 
 In presenting my views, I must, if only for brevity's sake, 
 deal vdih tho Treatise upon its merits as a controversial work, 
 which in the controversies of to-day is still a living force ; 
 attacking it directly with whatever advantage I may gain 
 from fiicts newly ascertained, or from truths which aro the 
 outgrowth of the present century, and naturally place the 
 critic of to-day at an advantage as compared with tho Avriter 
 of a century ago. But in doing so, I desire also to record 
 my appreciation of the contribution to Monetary Learning 
 embraced in the " Treatise on the Coins of the Realm," and 
 to observe that the default of later times in not emulating 
 Lord Liverpool's diligence in the arid and thankless field of 
 Monetary Study is chiefly chargeable for what is to be re- 
 gretted in the practical results that followed from his errors. 
 
 To one who has read the foregoing pages. Lord Liverpool's 
 argument can be tersely described as the result of confound- 
 ing together the distinctions which are briefly set forth in 
 the Introduction. Subjected to the analysis which I have 
 there presented — and which, I allow myself to believe, may 
 serve for tho anatomy of an institution, as well as for the de- 
 finition of a term — his reasoning can perhaps be most easily 
 reduced to its ultimate or simplest elements. He ignores 
 Cleanings Xos. 5 and 6 fur the benefit of Meaning No. 7 : 
 tho Money Unit is out of sight, while tho Principal Legal- 
 Tender occupies the foreground — the distinction between 
 rating, and rated. Money is lost. The result is confusion : a 
 complex of misapprehension of fact, of misapplication of 
 precedent, of misinterpretation of principle. 
 
 Should the reader desire, with the minimum of exertion, 
 
132 The Alnuidoiimciit of the Silver Pound. 
 
 to receive the proof which sustains these charges, I suggest 
 that this end can be gained if he refresh his remembrance of 
 the distinctions set forth in the Introduction by tlio light re- 
 flected upon them in Chapter IV. ; and that he recall again 
 the relation given in the present and preceding chapters of 
 the actual course of England's later monetary experience. 
 
 In the terminology of Monetary Law and of publicistic 
 discussion in the XVlIth and XVIIIth centuries, " current 
 coins,'' " Money," " Measure of Commerce," " the Standard 
 (or the ancient or true Standard) Money of the Realm" 
 are accepted terms to cover the ideas we are now dealing 
 with. These terms, it must be admitted, fail to convey with 
 precision the distinctions upon wliirh I lay such stress. 
 "What, then, is the historical or legal l)asi.s for these distinc- 
 tions? These are the points which it is essential to make 
 clear, and to these we now address ourselves. 
 
 Silver was the material of the Pound Sterling ; and in the 
 Pound Sterling of twenty Silver shillings, wo have Meaning 
 No, 5 — the National Unit of Coinage. The current coins 
 and Money were of Gold and Silver ; and here we find 
 Meaning No. G. In the Measure of Commerce, the true or 
 ancient Standard Money, as also in Newton's phrase, " the 
 sole fixed Money of the Kealm," we find ]\Ieaniug No, 7 con- 
 joincJ H'ifh Meaning Ko. 8 ; tlio Principal Legal-Tender and 
 National Unit being either in fact, or intcmhd to he, of the 
 same material. 
 
 But, as has just been suggested (see also Chapter IV,), 
 this conjunction, though desirable and important, is not 
 inevitable. A desire, an object of I'olicy, a principle to bo 
 maintained, are implied in the compound of the two meanings, 
 as well as in each meaning separately. 
 
 Here I may perhaps supply links in my chain of argument 
 which otherwise may fail to receive the reader's notice, if I 
 remark tliat, with this order of considerations, we find our- 
 selves in territory quite foreign to that which ordinarily is 
 
Sect. 18.] The Artjuniciit for (Jutlaicry. 133 
 
 held vi-itliiu ran^o of Economic Science, as it is currently 
 defined. The rightful position of law in the doctrine of 
 Money (with which I have dealt elsewhere at some length) ' 
 is peculiarly exemplified in the events with which we have 
 now to deal. It was possible that this desire, this intent, of 
 which I have spoken, might lack fulfilment, in varying measure ; 
 it might como to pass that the material of which the National 
 Unit was made might cease to be the Chief-Legal-Tender, 
 just as it might come to pass that the legitimate National 
 Unit could bt.' dispossessed entirely. 
 
 But did it, for that, cease to bo a " Standard ? " By no 
 means ! "We have, then, to do merely with the very familiar 
 case of dispossession, of disseisin, of usurpation. Certainly 
 a legitimate standard which has been ousted from its rightful 
 place, is a different thing from a standard in possession ; my 
 contention is only that there is ample place for both of them 
 in that hierarchy of " economic facts " with which Monetary 
 Science has to deal. Of the ideas of o\vnership or possession, 
 of legitimacy and usurpation, the words I have mentioned as 
 forming the current stock also fail to give any adequate 
 account ; and it is this lack — which Lord Liverpool seems to 
 have failed to appreciate and which has never, so far as I 
 know, been well supplied — which I am now seeking to make 
 good. 
 
 And it is a vital thing to do this because the defect of no- 
 menclature is not a defect of evidence. The lack of separate 
 words to express these meanings is not due to the absence of 
 experience requiring this classification, and likely to bo bettor 
 apprehended through more convenient names. 
 
 So far as the National Unit of Coinage is concerned, my 
 distinction ajiplies plainly enough to the time when the 
 
 ' In "Silver and (lohl," '• ^loiaturv Situation in 1N7S," i-c. See also 
 Documents of the Conferences of 1878 and of ls81, and espeoiallv therein 
 in a Paper on '"The Position of Law in the Doctrine of ^loney " (re- 
 printed, London, 1882). 
 
134 The Aliandoniiicnt of the Silver Pou?nI. 
 
 " Measure was lost" in lOOo, through tho mutilation of the 
 Silver-coins, as well as to the reign of depreciated and iucou- 
 vcrtiblo Paper Pounds Sterling in the opening decade of our 
 century. Tho Silver Pound Sterling of twenty full-weight 
 ghilliugs had certainly a legal existence in 1G05, and so had a 
 Metiillic Pound before and after 1810, though government and 
 citizens were dealing in Paper Pounds. Tiio samo observa- 
 tion applies to tho right of being Principal Legal-Tender. 
 Did Silver cease to bo the legitimate Measure of Commerce, 
 tho one legitimate ancient Standard ^loney of the Realm, in 
 tho sense of Principal Legal-Tender (while retaining its placo 
 as National Unit) — when Gold gained the ascendency over 
 Silver in tho circulation ? In other words, as soon as they 
 found themselves a majority, did Gold coins ipso facto usurp 
 the placo of Measure of Commerce in tho sense of lc<jitimate 
 Principal Legal-Tender ? By no means ! Such an event 
 occurred both in tho earlier half of the XYIIth century as 
 well as at the opening of the XVIIIth. Gold became tho 
 Principal Legal-Tender, in fact. In the earlier century the 
 effort to restore to Silver its majority in tho circulation was 
 successful ; while iu tho XVIIIth the eQbrt was made, and 
 was long persevered in. 
 
 As has been shown on earlier pages, the suggestions of 
 Locke, the repeated recommendations of Newton, all in accord 
 with the spirit of the ^lonetary System which their generation 
 had inherited, were followed iu 1717 by acts of Parliament and 
 of tho Crown, which can have no other meaning than to bring 
 Gold into its proper subordination to Silver ; and the .subse- 
 quent agitation in favour of reducing the guinea to 20 shillings, 
 of which a glimpse is given on page 122, is but an echo of this 
 principle which is consecrated by repeated acts of Parliament 
 and of the Crown. 
 
 To describe the situation in figures borrowed from the law, 
 the ]iosses.«;ion, or let us say a present estate, passed to Gold — 
 but it rcmainod liable to be replaced by Silver; and when, in 
 
Sect. 18.] Tlie Arijunient for Outlawry. \:\') 
 
 the lapse of time, the possession of Gold (both as Chief Money 
 and as Unit) came to be regarded as a ripening- into full title, 
 the return of Silver, like a reversion, still held a place in the 
 popular mind as legitimate. It was the work of the Act of 
 181 G to cut off this reversion. But, in fact, the Act went 
 further : it also disinherited Silver of its right as Full-Legal- 
 Tender, to which its title had ripened undisturbed through all 
 the centuries of Monetary Law in Britain. 
 
 The advice of Lord Liverpool thus established a triple aim, 
 as worthy of effort on the part of lawgivers : — 
 
 1. Formally to replace a Silver Unit with a Gold Unit. 
 
 -. To secure to Gold the position, not only of cliiof, but 
 of sole, Legal-Tender by measures 
 
 3. To oust Silver entirely from its position, as Full- 
 Legal-Tender. 
 I have shown that the real object and reason for this propo- 
 sition was, that good Silver-coins could not be kept in circula- 
 tion — a difficulty which had remained, during the greater part 
 of Lord Liverpool's life, a practical hindrance to a proper refor- 
 mation of the Silver-coins. But the means are obviously out 
 of all proportion to the end in view — a trip-hammer to 
 kill a fly — and the incongruity reaches a far higher degree 
 when it is realized that in fact (as will be shown on a later 
 page) in the last decade of Lord Liverpool's life, the main 
 cause of the difficulty he sought to remedy had disappeared. 
 Waiving the question of the necessity of a reconstruction of 
 the Monetary System of Great Britain, and inquiring merely 
 whether his book can stand as a justification of his scheme 
 upon the ground which he himself had chosen — namely, as a 
 legal argument, an appeal to historical precedent — it is now 
 plain that foundation and superstructure are alike defective. 
 
 Both in scientific insight and in practical ability, the author 
 of the Treatise shows himself inferior to his predecessors and 
 authorities with whom he seeks to establish his concurrence. 
 If we imagine any one of these men — whether it bo Sir 
 
13o Tiie Abandonment of tJie Silcer Poun<1. 
 
 William Petty, or Locke, or Joseph Harris — doaling with such 
 tiucstions as arose after the prohibition of Silver Coinage and 
 the suspension of Specie Payments in Euj^'-land, and after the 
 new settlement of the Coinage System in France, we shall 
 recof-nizo the impossibility of their falling into the confusion 
 and contradictions which characterize the Treatise. 
 
 In place of the wider considerations which their writings 
 prove to be the natural standpoint which Lord Liverpool's 
 predecessors in the office of monetary adviser of England had 
 occupied, we find a series of pleas of peculiarly narrow range. 
 
 Xotable among these is the first appearance — and a most 
 modest dchut it is for so great a performer — of the idea of a 
 preference for Gold, which is supposed to have risen to feeble 
 consciousness in the days of the Recoinage of 1690. It is 
 hinted that the high rate at which guineas passed was due to 
 this preference, and stress is laid, in support of the argument, 
 upon the general consent of the people then and after, in using 
 Gold. It is plain that such an anachronistic caprice of the 
 popular afTcctions must tend to support the claims of Gold. 
 This o-cneral consent of the people is consistently held in 
 contrast with the authority of the Government ; ' an ascription 
 of infallibility to the vox popull which, though it has a most 
 incongruous air as coming from Lord Liverpool, has, 1 (L'ubt 
 not, done much to generate what has lately been the orthodox 
 opinion touching the relation between Money and the State. 
 
 ' The clinnirc was '• hnm^rlit alxmt, imt l)v the autlioiitv of (juvormucnt, 
 lint 1)V tlie coulee of events, with tlie acquiescence, ami. I may say, the 
 treneral consent of the people." (Treatise, P. 189.) 
 
 " This [cuiTcncy of the guinea] was l>y general consent, antl conse- 
 (luently :it tlic option of the person who received them in payment, and 
 not by the authority of the fJovernment, so that this superior value was 
 not in truth the legal value." (T. 144.) 
 
 " After this recoinage the (iold c«»ins passed in payments at a higher 
 value than that at which they were still rated in the Mint indenture, or, 
 than the relative value of Gohl to Silver at that tinic would justify; not, 
 however, by the authority of the Ciovernment, Imt liy the general consent 
 of the people." (P. l:W.) 
 
Sect. 18.] The Argument for Outlaicri/. 137 
 
 How remote these contentions are from the realities of the 
 case, is made apparent in the preceding pages, where the 
 authority of the Government is seen in fact arraying in favour of 
 Gold the perpetual preference, not for a metal but for Money, not 
 for Gold but for gain, for cheapness. This was due to a mistake of 
 the Government, for it neither intended to do this, nor appa- 
 rently knew that it was doing it — -the preference, or rather 
 desire, of Ministry, Parliament, and people, being for Silver as 
 Chief Legal-Tender with Gold as its companion. That Lord 
 Liverpool was unaware of the points which I have set forth 
 in the pages devoted in this work to the rating of Gold is, as far 
 as it goes, a justification for his failing to seize the whole truth 
 touching this matter. But that the excuse does not go very 
 far, will be apparent when we consider certain facts which were 
 directly within his knowledge. 
 
 These are : 
 
 First. That, as he himself testifies,' in the days of the 
 Eecoinage, guineas were worth as metal forty-four times as 
 much as the average shillings in circulation, and so should 
 have passed at forty-four shillings, and would have passed at 
 that rate, had not the Government refused to take them for 
 more than 30s. The " superior value " and the " legal value " 
 which the author had been contemplating, are therefore shown 
 to have been before his eyes in quite a different position 
 from that he describes in the text. 
 
 Secondly. It was from a country then under the rule of 
 depreciated Paper Money, that Lord Liverpool was framing a 
 scheme for metallic coinage. If, therefore, a mere popular 
 preference gives title, and possession is conclusive proof of 
 preference, his argument would serve to justify depreciated 
 paper as the Money for the XlXth centur}-, as well as depre- 
 ciated Gold for the XVlIIth century. 
 
 ' " The guinea rose only to tlie value of thirty .>-]iillings. It i> true that 
 the farther rise of the guinea was prevented by order given to the officers 
 of the Exchequer, and to the receivers of the public revenue, not to receive 
 it in payment at a higher rate." (P. So.) See also p. 79. 
 
138 The Abandoiiincnt of the Silver Pound. 
 
 A cognate plea is the now familiar notion, that ricli nations 
 should have Gold, while poorer nations content themselves 
 with inferior metals : an appeal to vanity which would bo 
 quite appropriate if systems of coinage were matter of personal 
 adornment, and which is at best an a priori argument entirely 
 unsupported by facta. That an argument of this sort should 
 have arisen in a Paper-Money country, is a signal instance of 
 the grim humour of fate. 
 
 In order to anticipate and prevent a misapprehension, I 
 shall do well to refer here to later pages (Chap. X.), in which 
 the " preference for Gold" of to-day is considered, and which 
 reduce the present importance of such a preference to ex- 
 tremely narrow limits. But for a time when Silver was 
 effectively recognized as the normal currency of the world 
 — to borrow an excellent phrase from Mr. Bagehot — the literal 
 application of the ideas of to-day involves an anachronism. 
 The reader can obtain a glimpse into the subtleties of this 
 matter of " Preference for Gold," if he dwell thoughtfully 
 upon the psychological condition of the plexus of business 
 communities in Europe, which during an entire century, from 
 1700 to 1800, ''preferred" Gold to Silver, but only to the 
 extent of about fifteen to 'one : beyond that rate they " pre- 
 ferred" Silver to Gold. 
 
 Lord Liverpool's argument may be epigraramatically stated 
 as follows : " People prefer Gold Money to Silver so much, 
 that they will have it at any rate, and therefore we must make 
 laws to prevent their using Silver Money if they desire to do so." 
 
 On another page, the author seriously presents the idea 
 that Gold is to be preferred to Silver, because Gold is less 
 liable to fluctuations of value than Silver : a contention not 
 only erroneous, but obviously improbable when Gold was in 
 some countries a trade coin, in others a rated coin, and generally 
 recognized as the variable portion, while Silver was recognized 
 as the fixed portion of existing Money, and when Silver made 
 an overwhelming majoi-ity of it. How little Lord Liverpool 
 
Sect. 18.] lite Aiyumcnt for Outlaicry. 13!) 
 
 apprehendod the burden of proof wliicli lie undertook to sustain 
 by this contention, is shown by his relying entirely upon 
 evidence showing that Silver Bullion fluctuated in London more 
 than Gold Bullion, as iKjainst Gold Guineas ! 
 
 To complete this unique company of arguments, we note 
 here the remark that Gold-coins are superior to Silver-coins, 
 because the former " have a substitute which the Silver-coins 
 have not, at least in an equal degree ; they may bo represented 
 by Notes or Paper Currency ; which will answer the purpose of 
 all great commercial transactions, etc." (P. 182.) I cite this 
 remark, in order to exemplify beyond a question the pecu- 
 liarities of the author's work. At first glance the proposition 
 may seem not merely false, but absurd ; but I do not find it to 
 be so in fact. Tho point which I believe Lord Livcrpoolhad in 
 mind may be stated thus : People must have small change, so 
 if they have to send money abroad and have not Silver-coins 
 enough to supply the pocket and the till, and yet leave a stock 
 of Silver available for export — which was England's case from 
 beginning to end of Lord Liverpool's life — it is better to send 
 Gold than to send Silver, because the functions of Gold can be 
 supplied by paper. The defect of the argument lies in amplify- 
 ing into a general rule a suggestion of local and temporary con- 
 venience ; and the true drift of the argument is in favour, not 
 of Gold, but merely of having an abundance of Silver change. 
 
 But the mere form in which the central thesis of the work is 
 presented exposes in tho openest manner the hollowncss of 
 the argument.* 
 
 ' This thesis appciu-s in the various categories of what oupht If be, 
 should be, can only be, nuist be, is, and is to be made. An examination 
 and comparison of the following extracts will prove the correctness of the 
 views I have advance<l. 
 
 "The Money, or coin, which is to be the principal measure of property, 
 ought tn he made of one tnrtnl only. Such is the opinion of Sir William 
 Tettv.Mr. Locke.Mr. Harris, ami of all the eminent writers on coin." (r. 13.) 
 
 " And if the coins, which are the principal measure of property, and 
 instruments of commerce, ch/j only be nuu/c o/ owe of these Metals." (T. lo.) 
 
140 The Abandonment of the Silver Poioid. 
 
 Ilis thesis is, that the coins which are to be the principal mea- 
 sure of property, should he made of one metal only. (P. IGO.) 
 
 Now, so far as I know, no one proposed, nor do I find any 
 evidence that Lord Liverpool had in view, any scheme that 
 coins should be made of more than one metal. There was no 
 plan pending in England of coining a compound of two or 
 
 " Certain, however, as the i)riiiciiile is — that the Money or eoins of any 
 country which are to be tlie principal measure of property, can be miulc of 
 one metal unlij." (I*. 15.) 
 
 "First, I will endeavour to jirove that the eoins which are to l»e tlie 
 
 [>rineipal measure of property, ou^ht to he made of one Metal oiilif 
 
 I have observed that Sir William Petty, Mr. Locke, and Mr. Harris, are 
 <lecidedly of opinion that the coins, whicli are to be the principal measure of 
 prfipcrty, must be made of one metal only ; and it has been assiuned that 
 their opinion on tliis point is too well-founded to be shaken. Lest, how- 
 ever, this assumption should be supposed to l)e premature. I will here 
 insert the passages themselves which so fully justify it." (P. 124.) 
 
 " There is no circumstance that more clearly proves the truth of this 
 principle, 'That coins which are to be the principal measure of property, 
 ■can be made of one metal only ' " (than the practice of using ' Bank Money'). 
 (P. i:V2.) 
 
 " From thence results the necessity, in this country, of having coins made 
 of one metal tmli/, whicli should serve as an invariable measure." (P. 13.5.) 
 
 " From the view I have thus given of this i)art of the argument, it 
 appears, not only from the clearest deduction of reason, and by the con- 
 current opinion of the most eminent writers, but by the evidence, which 
 long experience in this Kingdom has afforded, to be a certain and in- 
 controvertible principle that coins, which are to have the principal measure 
 of propcrt}', can be made but of one metal onli/." (1\ 1.56.) 
 
 "As it is clear that the coins, wliiili arc to be tlie i)rincipal measure of 
 property, van only be made (f one metal.'' (P. 13(5.) "It will be fortunate 
 if this principal measure of property shall be found within these realm< 
 to be in coins of one metal." (P. 138.) 
 
 " After fidl consiileration of tliis extensive, abstruse, and intricate sub- 
 ject, I Immbly ofler to Your Majesty, as tlie result of my opinion : — 
 
 " First, that the coins of this realm which are to be the principal 
 measure of property and instrument o( Commerce, .ihould be made of one 
 metal only. 
 
 " Secondly, tliat in this Kingdom the Gold-coins only have been for 
 many years past, and are now, in the practice and opinion of the people, 
 
Sect. 18.] The Argument for OutLncry. Ml 
 
 moro motals, an cWkiron, like tliat of ancient linu'S, or billon, 
 the grossly alloyed metal current on the Continent, or, again, 
 what has lately been suggested in the United States, under 
 the name of a "goloid" coin. In view of this fact, Lord 
 
 the {)rinfipal measure of jiroporty ir.id iiistnimciit of Commenc." (I'. 
 lt>7.) 
 
 " If the system ikiw recoinmendeil sliouM be adopted, and tlie Gold- 
 coins he made the principal measure of pmpert y and Standard coin. ..." 
 (P. 169.) 
 
 "My opinion is, and I hope I shall he exeused in repeatin;.^ it, thai. 
 tlic Gold-eoins should continue to be the jirincipal ^leasnre of Property 
 and instrument of Commerec." (P. 17o.) 
 
 Sueli, then, are Lord Liverpool's " principal " statements of law and fact. 
 
 A direct and catci^orical denial and refutation of some of these statonionts 
 is, however, supplied by no less an authority than Lord Liverpool himself. 
 
 lie observes, on Page 139: — ''From the 41st Henry III. (12.5()-7) 
 when Gold-coins began to be coined in the Mints of tliis Kni^dnui. and 
 the coins so made of (iuld wen- drdcrctl to lie current at a certain nominal 
 value, it must be admitted that these Gold-coins became Legal-Tender no 
 less than the Silver-coins, and consequently that tliey were from thence- 
 forth equally uith the Silcer-coins, the legal measure of property y 
 
 This, he observes, continued till the date of the coinage of the guinea lit 
 1663, at which date the Gold-coins ceased to be a legal measure of pro- 
 jierty, a rule which prevailed till 1717, "when Gold and Silver-coins 
 were equally Legal-Tender or measure of property." (P. 140.) 
 
 The continued existence of this apportionment of the function of 
 "measure of property " between Silver and Gold at the date of the com- 
 position of his Treatise is also recognized in the following passage. 
 
 '• But [(this measure of property should now in a certain degree be found 
 to reside and c\'\>^t in coins made oj" different metals " (P. 138.) 
 
 Lord Liverpool, therefore, himself shows that law and fact which ought 
 to be, can only be, must be, is, is to continue, and must be made, was dis- 
 proved by the actual practice of England between the time of Henry III. and 
 1663, and after 1717. Now, inasnnich as it has been shown in the pre- 
 ceding pages, that between 1663 and 1717, the law and fact are directly in 
 opposition to his first asstunption, it is plain that no standing-ground is left 
 in modern England for his doctrine, as be states it. 
 
 The limitation of the Legal-Tender of Silver in England is — historically 
 — the product of this phenomenal confusion of thought. " If the coins," 
 says Lord Liverpool, " which are the principal measure of projierty and 
 instruments, can only be made of one of these metals, the inferior coins. 
 
142 Tlic Ahimdonmcnt of the Silver Pound. 
 
 Liverpool's cardinal proposition, that the principal measure of 
 property can bo made of one motiil only, acquires an air of 
 Hibernian simplicity. The subject contains the predicate 
 quite as explicitly, as in the proposition " the larger of two 
 apples can only be one apple/' A short cut to final judgment 
 upon the matter in hand will, perhaps, be found in the remark, 
 that if wo proceed upon the line marked out by his propo- 
 sitions (see note below) to argue that, because the larger of 
 two apples can only bo one apple, therefore it follows the 
 smaller apple is not an apple at all, or, at least, ought not to 
 be so regarded, we shall have sounded the depth and com- 
 pleted the circuit of Lord Liverpool's reasoning. 
 
 Before leaving the subject, it is germane to call attention 
 to a curions circumstance, which casts some light on the 
 situation we are considering. I refer to a plea of Lord 
 Liverpool, alleging acquiescence, or waiver, on the part of 
 creditors, as to the debasement of the Standard. "When the 
 National Debt was converted, in 1740, from 4 to 3 per cent., 
 an option, he says (page 190), was given to the fundholdcrs 
 to receive their capital. Not availing themselves of this option, 
 they may be held to have waived the point of payment in Silver. 
 But in what " Standard" was payment offered ? In Standard 
 
 made of otlicr metals, must he Legal-Tender only in a limited des^rcc." 
 (r. \'>.) The reader will note that the idea of inferiority is here intro- 
 duced. For this we may have been prepared hy the exerc-ise of the 
 author's prerotrativc of dcfiiiii!^ the sense in which his irords are to be taken. 
 
 "The coins which arc to he the principal measure of property must, of 
 course, be Lcsal-Tcnder without limitation. I sliall call this superior sort 
 of Money, or coins, the principal measure of projicrty, or Standard coin; 
 and haviu"^ clearlv defined my idea, I conceive I hare a rii^ht to make use 
 of these terms in the sense jchich J have f^iren to them." (P. 14.) 
 
 And this transition from the fact of a dual Fidl Lc<ral-Tcndcr. to the 
 doctrine which is the proirenitor of the singlc-mctallism of our day, is made 
 in despite of the author's own definition. " The coins of every Kingdom 
 or State are the measure of property within every such Kingdom or State. 
 accordin«T to the nominal value declared and authorized bv the Sovcreiirn, 
 so far as they are made Legal-Tender." (P. is.) (All the italics are mine.) 
 
Sect. 18.] The Anjumcnt for Outlaicnj. 143 
 
 Silver-coins of full weight ? Hardly. In Gold-coins, which 
 should be equal in market value to such Silver-coins ? Lord 
 Liverpool does not say so. Either of these supposed offers 
 would have added a percentage not to be despised to the National 
 Debt, as reckoned in Gold. AVo arc left to infer that payment 
 was offered in guineas, by talc, at 21 shillings, — that is, above 
 their real value. In this case, the option was not an option 
 which touched the question of the Standard at all. Hence 
 there was no waiver, no acquiescence. AVhat more signal 
 evidence than this extravagant error could be found of that 
 lack of precision in monetary thought which seems to belong 
 to the time when he wrote ; when the interest of the Public 
 Debt was paid in depreciated Paper, and when a concerted 
 effort of leaders of opinion was needed in order to enlighten 
 the public touching a fact which, to-day, would generally seem 
 self-evident; namely, that the " high price of bullion" meant 
 that the Paper Money was depreciated ? 
 
 § 19. THE ANTI-SILVER STATUTES AND LORD LIVERPOOL'S 
 
 SCHEME. 
 
 In referring the origin of the Anti- Silver policy of England 
 to Lord Liverpool, I have pursued the familiar form of presen- 
 tation under which an institution is seen as " the lengthened 
 shadow of the man." 
 
 That this generalization has narrow limits in certain direc- 
 tions, is an obvious remark. The people and the leaders of 
 England were not, in this matter, mere will-less instruments 
 of a higher power. At the same time, it must be clearly 
 recognized that — perhaps because ^Monetary Policy is so 
 peculiarly forbidding a region among the sciences of legisla- 
 tion — no salient personality arose in the generation that fol- 
 lowed hiui to dispute with Lord Liverpool the prestige of 
 mastery of it, so that events shaped themselves to relieve the 
 momentum of bis influence from friction or resistance. 
 
114 TJie Abandonmeiit of the Silver Found. 
 
 It will, however, be apparent, aa wo come to examine 
 carefully the statutes wliich found place upon the Statute- 
 book, that England proceeded in fact much further in the line 
 of hostility to Silver than the author of the " Treatise on tho 
 Coins of the Realm " himself had proposed. Lord Liverpool's 
 scheme of a National System of Coinage is, therefore, entitled to 
 be regarded independently, and in contrast with the Acts of 
 Parliament, and their practical operation, as administered by 
 successive Governments, 
 
 The Acts here referred to are, first, the laws of 1793 and 
 1790, by which the Act mentioned on page 125 was revived, 
 with the addition of clauses which first suspended, and then 
 entirely prohibited, the Coinage of Silver; and second, tho 
 Act of ISIG, which established Gold as the sole Standard. 
 
 The law of 1798-9 seems to have been passed in pursuance 
 to tho recommendations of a Committee of the Privy Council, 
 of which Lord Liverpool was a member. In the Statute itself 
 the appearance of Silver Bullion asking to bo coined at the 
 Tower Mint is mentioned as the ground of the new clauses ; but 
 there is nothing in the Statute aftecting the status of existing 
 Silver-coin except as stated on page 12G, nor is there any 
 provision formally affecting the Unit of Coinage, or giving a 
 new (lelinition of the Pound Sterling. 
 
 "With the reign of Paper, 1797-1819, a new clement of con- 
 fusion in the relative position of tho metals and coins was 
 introduced. Upon this period I shall make no special com- 
 ment here, but allow myself to refer the cJrious reader to 
 other writings bearing on tho subject.' 
 
 In order to form an adequate judgment touching the in- 
 fluence of the Anti-Silver Policy as a whole, it is necessary to 
 distinguish three quite distinct periods, namely: 1st, the 
 
 ' Sfc a cliuptrr (in the oxamiilc of En<:lainl, in n Treatise on ''Silver 
 and (idld" (("inciiuiati. 18"(?-7), and certain " ('(intril)uti(ins to the Study 
 of Monetary r«)liiy" in tlie Dci-nmcnt of the Conferenec of 1878. 
 
Sect. 19.] Lord Liverpool's Scheme. 145 
 
 Restriction of Cash Payment (that is, of the obligation of the 
 Bank of England to pay its notes on demand in Legal Coin) ; 
 2nd, Resumption of Cash Payments (replacement of Paper 
 Money by the new Gold sovereigns and convertible notes) ; 
 and ord, The following years down to 1873. 
 
 In the publications lately named (page 144), I have set 
 forth, in detail, my grounds for the opinion that the prohibi- 
 tion of Silver Coinage by the Acts of 1708-0, in the first 
 period, and the practical exclusion of Silver by the Law 
 of 18 IG, in the second, tended materially to augment the 
 monetary evils under which England then suffered, which were 
 of controlling influence upon her economic life, and thus left 
 their mark upon social and political conditions. 
 
 As to the latter period — beginning, let us say, in 1830 — I 
 waive discussion here. I am quite content it shall be assumed 
 that what is called the '' Gold Standard " — meaning thereby 
 the exclusion of Silver from Free Coinage and Full-Legal- 
 Tender, for that is what is peculiar and important in the 
 System — worked well during this period. By this, of course, 
 I do not admit that the Silver and Gold Standard would not 
 have worked better, — a remark which I make independently 
 of the remoter consequences of the Outlawry of Silver in 
 England ; namely, the adoption of England^s plan by Germany, 
 and the partial extension of that Outlawry over the Occidental 
 World. 
 
 But I desire, also, most distinctly to affirm that the Anti- 
 Silver-policy, — the practical adoption of which began, as I 
 have shown,' in 1708, rather than in 1816, the date generally 
 referred to in Monetary Literature, — must suffer the ordinary 
 fate of humanity, in that it must be judged upon its own merits. 
 I am, indeed, quite resolute in insisting that the reader shall 
 vivify and clarify his perception, that this policy should not 
 bo judged upon merits other than its own. I therefore 
 
 ' See Document of the Conference of 1878, pp. 80, 348. 
 
 L 
 
 .^rrY 
 
14G The Afxindonment of the Silver Pound. 
 
 remark, that it is one thing to adopt and establish a system, 
 and quite another thing to inherit it. In speaking of the 
 period of Restriction and of Resumption, when Anti-Silver- 
 policy was peculiarly harmful, I speak of the adopting, not 
 of the inheriting, of the plan of excluding Silver. It was 
 only when it became an inheritance, when it passed into the 
 hands of the second generation, that it became comparatively 
 harmless. But it is quite clear that the failure of a system in 
 twenty-five or thirty years of trial, is a sufficient failure. That 
 is enough for the present purpose. It warrants conclusive 
 judgment of condemnation. 
 
 It is not, however, implied by this condemnation of the 
 measures which were actually adopted, that, as opposed to 
 them, the sole alternative was the maintenance, after 1798, of 
 the system which had been in force prior to that date, namely, 
 Silver and Gold Money with Silver Unit and Coinage Free and 
 Gratuitous at 15."' to 1. That system could, of course, have 
 been amended, as well as abrogated or abolished. !My asser- 
 tion has onlv this effect, that the exclusion of Silver from 
 the Mints between 1798 and 181G, and its degradation from 
 the position of Staudai'd Money in 1810, were errors of policy 
 which entailed serious evils. 
 
 But, as has been indicated, this order of events, and of 
 considerations bearing ujion them, is quite distinct from the 
 task of picturing the situation which was in Lord Liverpool's 
 view as he wrote his Letter to the King. The story of 
 Pandora's box is incomplete, if any trait of the innocence be 
 left out of view, which led to the opening of it. 
 
 Lord Liverpool's work was first printed in 1805, but the in- 
 ternal evidence appears to indicate quite clearly that it was sub- 
 .stantially written many years before its publication. It is, in 
 fact, this surmise which alone can explain how events of the first 
 importance in relation to Monetary Policy, as, for example, the 
 state of affairs which led to the Restriction of Ca.sh Payments 
 (1797); the Prohibition of the Coinage of Silver (1798-9); 
 
Sect. 19.] Lord Liverpool's Scheme. 147 
 
 the rise of the Silver-price of Gold in 1798 and after ; and the 
 depreciation of the Bank of England notes, are either in the 
 background or entirely ignored in the Treatise. It is the 
 last-mentioned treatment that falls to the lot of the chansres 
 just mentioned in the position of Silver; no mention of them 
 is ma<le in the Treatise. 
 
 This curious fact will assume additional importance, as we 
 come to realize the effect of this rise of Gold, relatively to Silver, 
 upon the practical situation with which the legislator had to 
 deal, and the peculiarly incongruous character of the law of 
 1798-9 which prohibited Silver Coinage. 
 
 In the situation which, as we have seen ou an earlier 
 page (127), had claimed Lord Liverpool's undivided attention, 
 while composing the main body of his work, the rise of the 
 Silver-price of Gold, which occurred about the turn of the 
 century, produced a radical transformation. "Was he aware of 
 this transformation ? 
 
 In 1798 Silver was brought to the Mint by private deposi- 
 tors to be coined. Had the Mint remained open, the lack of 
 proper Silver-coin in England would have been, in a measure, 
 supplied. Side by side with the worn-out coin would have 
 appeared a goodly sum of full-weight coin. True the Govern- 
 ment must be prepared to bear the expense of coinage, but as 
 the Mint and machinery were there, and the staff and outlay 
 of the ^lint would need no inordinate increase, the added 
 expense need not have been great. No doubt, any expense 
 was onerous just at that time. But was not the lack of proper 
 Silver-coin pressing enough to justify it? The affirmative 
 seems abundantly proved by a variety of testimony ; as, for 
 instance, by Lord Liverpool himself,' who speaks in terms of 
 
 ' Referring to the issue of Spanish dollars and of Bank of Enirland 
 Tokens, Lortl Liverpool says (page "210), '' The justification of this measure 
 rests singly on the absolute necessity there was for these Silver Tokens 
 to pay the seamen of the Royal Navy, and the artificers in tlic great docks 
 of the kingdom, from the want of Coins of the lower denominations, wliich 
 
148 The Abandonment of the Silver Pound. 
 
 severe reprehension of the failure of the Government to supply 
 proper Silver-coin. 
 
 The fact that, with the sanction of the authorities, the Bank 
 of England subsecjucntly issued stamped Spanish Dollars and 
 coined Silver Tokens in large quantities, to supply the need, 
 is another irrefragable proof. But this need, in so far as it 
 was felt after 1708, was directly catised by the Act of Parliament 
 which prohibited Silver coinage, and that Act was, as has been 
 stated, passed at the recommendation of the Committee of the 
 Privy Council of which Lord Liverpool himself was a member ; 
 and in which, presumably, his influence was paramount. 
 Indeed, the coinage was stopped by command of the Privy 
 Council before the Act was passed. 
 
 It will not unnaturally occur to the reader, as justifying 
 this action of the Privy Council, that some apprehension might 
 be felt, lest by keeping the ^Eint open for coining Silver, an 
 inroad of Silver-coin might come, which would lead to an ex- 
 portation of Gold, and to an alteration of the Standard. But in 
 this event, would it not have been a simple matter to limit 
 the coinage ? The limited capacity of the Mint would in itself 
 have worked as a limitation of coinage, and the field was open 
 for further restriction by Act of Parliament. It was hardly 
 necessary, in order to restrain injurious coinage, to prohibit 
 all beneficial coinage whatsoever. 
 
 are iiecosisary for that jmrpoM- : thr bhiiia', tlirrotbri', il any sudi is to be 
 imputed, falls, not on tlios;e who permitted these dollars to be issued, hut 
 on those U'ho neglected to supply Your Majcsty\i suhjects with a sufficirnt 
 quantity of legal Silver Coins, to be employed in those payments, for which 
 these dollars now pass. Ihit not only Your Majesty's sailors and yoiir 
 own artificers are in want of lesral Silver Coins, the labourers in every part 
 of the country, and the maniifacturers in the preat and pojudous towns of 
 this kingdom, and all your good people in crery part of it. particularly the 
 inferior classes, suffer rrptally from the want of them." He also observes 
 of the existing Silver-coins (pp. 187-8), that they are so much in demand 
 iliiit "sometimes when they are wanted for particular purposes, they are 
 exchanged even at a premium above their nominal value." 
 
Sect. 19.] Lord Liverpool's Scheme. 149 
 
 In this state of affairs, wo should naturally look to a work 
 of the scope of Lord Liverpool's Treatise, which became the 
 Great Charter of Monetary Right for the XlXth century — 
 published seven years after the passage of the Act in question 
 — to explain, and to justify, measures of such extraordinary 
 purport as this, which was, perhaps, the first prohibition of 
 Silver-coinage in history, and which interfered so rudely 
 with the normal current of business life, and caused incon- 
 veniences so onerous. But there is not a word upon the sub- 
 ject in the Treatise ! 
 
 Again, it was, as I have indicated, the rise in the Silver-price 
 of Gold which had aflforded the motive of the Prohibition of 
 Coinage ; and this rise proved permanent. With the turn 
 of the century the rates of the XVIIIth century, which were 
 close to 15 to 1, had made their last appearance. The equa- 
 tion of the Metals fixed by the new Establishment of the 
 Coinage in France in 1803, was 15.""^ between the coins, and 
 15.^^ if the relative charges at the Mint are taken into 
 account to control the calculations. Now 15.^*^ means about 
 2 per cent, more Silver for Gold than 15."^, and after 1803 
 the Market Rates stood, generally, above 15.^*^, — that is to 
 say, more than 2 per cent, above the English ratio. 
 
 I find in Lord Liverpool's work, no sign of recognition of 
 this general alteration of the rates, although the Recoinage of 
 the Gold-coin at 15.^° in France in 1785, of which he should 
 have heard, but makes no mention, might have seemed pro- 
 phetic of it. Of the legislation of 1803 no notice appears 
 in the Treatise, saving, perhaps, the following passage (in a 
 
 note to page 177): '' It is asserted that /or some 
 
 reason or other the National Institute of France have long- 
 had under consideration a new system of coins, particularly 
 with the view of regulating the relative price of the two 
 precious metals." The italics are mine. The most notable 
 events of the time are thus completely ignored. Indeed, 
 almost ideal perfection is given to the unconsciousness with 
 
150 The Abandonment of the Silver Pound. 
 
 •which the author of the "Treatise on the Coins of the 
 Realm " treats the practical situation which surrounds him, 
 by the phrase " for some reason or other,*' which embodies 
 his consideration for his country's great neighbour, the chief 
 metallic power of the world, and for the international side of 
 the monetary question, upon which he was to become so great 
 an authority. The contrast between the range of thought of 
 Mr, Jenkinson, Monetary Counsellor, who became the Earl of 
 Liverpool, and Mr. Newton, who became Sir Isaac, is most 
 brilliantly illustrated as one compares Xewton's " France has 
 set us an example," and Liverpool's remark — in a note — that 
 the National Institute of France had long had under considera- 
 tion a system for regulating the pnce of the precious metals 
 — ''for some reason or other ! " 
 
 How can we account for the lack of attention which these 
 facts reveal — the failure of a Treatise, which aims to estab- 
 lish the principles of England's Monetary Policy, to mention 
 the Acts of 1798-9, the Rise of the Silver-price of Gold, the 
 new monetary law of France ? 
 
 The explanation comes very naturally, if we conclude that 
 a half-retired functionary who, in 1798, had already passed 
 the boundai-y of threescore and ten, and who was near to 
 fourscore when his book went through the press, had lost 
 touch and alignment with the busy life of his time ; that, at 
 an age when he was entitled to dignified leisure, an invalid, 
 as we have seen him to be, should have retained but the 
 diminishing momentum of the vis viva to which direction had 
 been given in earlier years of vigorous manhood. 
 
 "We now pass to a detailed consideration of Lord Liverpool's 
 plan of a Coinage System.^ 
 
 So far as Gold is concerned, it proposed the formal cstnb- 
 
 ' The following extract from his Treatise, shows the extent to which 
 Lord Liverpool rccojrnized the novelty of his scheme : — 
 
 " If it should be objected that the principles of coinage, which I 
 
Sect. 19.] Lord Liverpool's Sche/iie. 151 
 
 lishment and invesiiturc, as Pound Sterling, of a new Gold 
 coin, equalling in weight twenty twenty-firsts of a guinea. 
 
 For Silver, it proposed (pp. 170-2) that its Legal-Tender 
 should be restricted to £2, and that the cost of coinage should 
 bo taken out of the Silver-coin — the cost, the charge for 
 workmanship, brassage, hrachiorum labor, as the author ex- 
 plains it on another page : not the cost of the Mint, or interest 
 on the value of the land and buildings, but the pay for the 
 labour of the arms that manufactured the Silver-coin. " Their 
 intrinsic value, consisting of metal and workmanship," was 
 to be "equal to their nominal value." (P. 188.) 
 
 The cost of coinage, then, was to be taken out of the 
 Silver-coin : that is, the coin was to be made lighter by such 
 fraction as would cover the cost of making the coin. But 
 what coin was it that was to be so diminished ? What was 
 the original weight of the coin from which this proposed reduc- 
 tion was to be made ? What was to be the starting-point of 
 the reduction ? The distinguished author is clear on this point. 
 
 The weight which he sug-orests as that from which the 
 reduction was to be made, was not the then legal weight of 
 the English Silver-coin (such full-weight coin weighing then 
 15.*^ weights of Silver as against 1 weight of Gold), but an 
 amount equivalent in market-value to the proper amount in 
 
 humbly offer for your Majesty's consideration are wbolly new, I think they 
 should not be rejected merely on that account, in case they should be found 
 to be reasonable. But what I maintain is, that a system consonant to 
 these principles, actuulbj exists, to a certain degree, ut present, though it 
 has not been formally adopted by Your ^Majesty's Government." (P. 174.) 
 The italics are mine. But it is now plain tliat the saving clause, that this 
 new system actually existed " to a certain degree " only, is ineffective to give 
 accuracy to this statement. As a matter of history and of strict law, the 
 Pound Sterling was twenty Silver shillings, until Gold was formally clothed 
 with the functions of a Unit, by the statute of IH\G, while the statutory 
 gratuitous coinage of Silver, which was guaranteed by law, and the un- 
 limited Legal-Tender of Silver, can hardly be profitably ignored. The 
 assumed identity of Lord Liverpool's proposed system with that actually 
 in use cannot be admitted . in reality he proposed a radical change. 
 
152 The Abandonment of t/ie Silver Pound. 
 
 Gold-coin, and this market-value was to be estimated Ly the 
 legislator, for the future, through observation of the actual 
 market-rate of the past, or, to use the author's words (p. 172), 
 not " the actual price of such metal at any given time, but 
 according to the average price which such metal has borne for 
 a certain number of years past, or which it is likely to bear in 
 future in the market." (See also page 173.) 
 
 Of the Silver thus provided for, however, the reader will 
 carefully note, the coinage was to be free,' saving certain 
 eventualities presently to be stated. 
 
 ' This statement will excite surprise, and, in faci. if I am rijjbtly 
 advised of the peneral condition of o]iinion, these ])a<:es ran hardly expect 
 to find — at the date of their pnV»lication — a single reader learned in 
 monetary aflairs to whom they will not give a certain shock. I therefore 
 state fully the evidence on which I base the averment. 
 
 1. There is in Lord Liverpool's Treatise, no proposition or suggestion 
 of a proposition for limitin;: the coinage of Silver, saving the one mentioned 
 in the text above, on page 154. 
 
 2. This proposition for limiting the coinage being suggested as a con- 
 tingent modification of the general plan assumed to have been already set 
 forth, proves the presence of coinage of Silver not so limited as a part of 
 that general plan. 
 
 3. The general tenoiir of the work indicates that freedom of coinage 
 was accepted bv the autlior as an elementary principle, so to speak, or as 
 an established right. 
 
 For examide, he says on page 6 : " This mischievous practice [traffic in 
 buying Silver with Gold, and Gold with Silver-coin] and the frauds com- 
 mitted in carrying it on, are the more to be apprehended in this country, 
 where the Mint is free ; that is, where everyone has a right to bring Gold 
 or Silver to the Mint to be converted into coin; not at the oliarsro of the 
 person who brings it, but of the public." 
 
 Then follows the proposition to establish a "superior" coin of one 
 metal, and a " subservient " coin of the other ; the re(iuiremcnt of which 
 classification is obviously met by the reduction of the Legal-Tender of 
 Silver to two pounds, and by taking the cost of coinage out of tlie coin. 
 
 Again, in a ]>assage on page 174 whicli follows the lines which are quoted 
 in the precetling page, and to which I also refer the reader, he observes : 
 " The present Silver-coins, such as they are, are subordinate and sub- 
 servient to the Gold-coins : and in this quality only are current. In 
 
Sect. 19.] Lord LiverpooVs Scheme. 153 
 
 What would have been the practical operation of this 
 scheme ? Its effect can, perhaps, most easily be apprehended 
 to-day, if we imagine it applied in such a country as France, 
 the monetary conditions of which are presumably not unfamiliar 
 to the reader. 
 
 Let us suppose, then, that in France the Government hail 
 remitted the charge for coining Gold ( which, in fact, has been, 
 since 1803, from 9 to G francs per kilogram) ; that Gold had 
 been formally made the Unit of Value ; and that the Legal- 
 Tender of the 5-franc piece, etc., had been reduced to 50 
 francs — the charge for coining it remaining as it has been 
 since 1803. 
 
 France would thus have been coining Silver at the same 
 charge as now. The reader will note, however, the difference 
 in the weight of the Silver-coins in France (15^ to 1) from 
 those actually coined in England ; those coined in the latter 
 country, up to 1798, being 15.'^' to 1 of gold; those coined 
 after 18 10 being, as we shall presently find, at 14.*^ to 1. 
 
 Now, it is a curious fact that Lord Liverpool's scheme, if 
 carried out with literal precision in 1816, when the general 
 rise in the value of Gold had become a long-established fact, 
 would have produced, by reason of the matters set forth 
 in full below,^ a ratio close to 15.''", namely, 15.^", which 
 
 proposii)g these principles, it has been my earnest wish that as few 
 alterations as possible should be made in the system of coins which at 
 present exists:" and a few lines later (page 175): "The Silver and 
 Copper-coins should continue to be sul)fiervient to, and representative of, 
 these Gold-coins as they are at present." 
 
 It will be observed that the statement just quoted from page 6 of Lord 
 Liverpool's Treatise, that '" everyone has a right to bring Silver to the 
 Mint," not only fixes and sharpens the meaning of the latter passages, 
 which I have italicized, hut serves as additional evidence on the point set 
 forth on page 147, namely, the fact that the Treatise aljsolutely ignores the 
 existence of the Statutes of 1798 and 1799, which, in fact, prohibited 
 Silver Coinage. 
 
 ' Lord Liverpool's idea was that the probable Market Rate of the future 
 
l'»4 The Aharidonmo^t of the Silver Pound. 
 
 approaches tho French ratio on one side, as the Dutch ratio 
 lo.**^ approaches it on the other. 
 
 Of the practical cftect of this scheme, had it been adopted, 
 we shall have occasion to speak hereafter. 
 
 It is certainly a novel plan, and one of which it is not easy 
 to judge with confidence, for its operation has never, so far as 
 I know, been tested by practice in any country. Its author 
 so far regarded it as tentative that he adds to it, as I have 
 indicated, certain regulations which arc to bo put in force if 
 experience should show the necessity of them. 
 
 In the event that the quantity of Silver-coin should come 
 to be excessive, either through coinage by unauthorized persons 
 (fradulent coinage, although of the legal weight), or through 
 the regular working of the Mint, Lord Liverpool suggests,^ 
 
 should be (Icductil from the actual Market Kate ot' the past. Exactly 
 what the Market Ratio of the metals was between 1816 and. let us say, 
 ten years anterior to that date, does not seem to be kno>vn to-day with 
 absolute precision, but I tind that such authorities as Dr. Broeh (Document 
 of the Conference of 1878, Exhibit A, 1st Session) and Mr. R. H. Inplis 
 PalL'rave (Third Report of Royal Commission on Depression, etc., p. 328), 
 give figures which yield as averages 15.*^ and 15.^", respectively. If we 
 take the mean between these figures — 15.'"" — and deduct from it 1^: per 
 cent , which was the French coinage- charge (till a reduction to 1 per cent, 
 was made in 1834), we obtain 15.*'' as a fair approximation to the rate to 
 be dictated by the terms of Lord Liverpool's scheme, had it been ad<>pte«l 
 in fidl in 1816. If, theref(tre. wc amend this system we have imagined 
 ado])ted in France, by changing the weight of the Silver-coin tVom 15. ° 
 to 15.'", wc present Lord Liverpool's scheme correctly in detail, as its 
 effect would have been in 1816, subject, however, to the contingent limi- 
 tations hereinafter set forth. 
 
 ' His language is as follows : '• It will be objected in the first place that 
 by the proposed alteration in the Silver-coins those of Gold will occasionally 
 be drawn out of the Kingdom." (P. 179.) To this objection he makes an 
 exhaustive answer, which extends to page 184: "But if it should be 
 thought necessary, for the ]>urposc of preventing this evil [the use of 
 Silver-coins of less intrinsic value to purchase Gold-coins of greater], to 
 employ any farther guard or restriction, I will submit to Your ^lajesty 
 whether it may not be advisable that the Legislature should vest in Your 
 Majesty, or such others as may be authorized by your royal licence (these will 
 
Sect. 19.] Lord LiverpooVs Scheme. 155 
 
 as a safeguard, that Parliament should vest in the Crown (^vith 
 power of delegation, presumably, to the Bank of England) the 
 exclusive right to take Silver to the Mint to be coined. At 
 the same time he expresses himself in strong terms in favour 
 of a " great plenty '' of Silver. 
 
 Such, then, was the Coinage System which, in Lord Liver- 
 pool's contemplation, appeared desirable for England. 
 
 Upon the probable practical working of the scheme a few 
 brief observations suggest themselves. 
 
 If the restrictions of Silver Coinage suggested by Lord 
 
 Liverpool were applied literally, as he suggested them, namely, 
 
 when necessary to guard against what I may call a '' crowding 
 
 out" of Gold by Silver-coins, or any discount on Silver-coins 
 
 (premium on Gold-coin) it is plain — 
 
 (1.) That England would have accepted a vastly increased 
 quantity of Silver- coin. 
 
 (2.) That the mere facility of coining Silver in England, 
 cumulatively to the effect of the amounts actually absorbed, 
 would have tended both to raise, and to steady, the market-rate 
 of Silver to Gold. 
 
 (3.) It is also worth while to remember that Legal-Tender, 
 established by formal statute, is not the sole and exclusive 
 
 probably always be the Directors of the Bank of England), the sole right 
 of carrying Silver to your Mint to be coined. Your Majet^ty will thus have 
 it in your power to limit and regulate the quantity of Silver Coins, which 
 may at any time be sent into circulation ; but I lieg to be understood that 
 I do not mean by this restriction (if it should be thought proper to adopt 
 it), that Silver Coins of every description should not be sent in great plenty 
 into circulation : it is highly important for the convenience of your people, 
 particularly those oi the lower classes, that they should at all times be 
 current in great plenty." 
 
 Again he observes : •• If anyone can entertain the idea, that these coins 
 will be sent into circulation in so great numbers that tlioir value will be 
 depreciated by their plenty. I certainly have no such apprehension. If, 
 however, there should be the least possibility that this consequence would 
 follow, the remedy which I have proposed at the close of my answer to the 
 first objection may be immediately applied to prevent this evil." (P. 188.) 
 
15G Tke Abando7ime7it of the Silver Pound. 
 
 guaranty for the currency of a coin ; the practical interven- 
 tion of the Executive Branch of the Government can establish 
 what may be called a Special or Partial Legal-Tender. If the 
 Treasury, or the Bank of England, chose to support the Silver- 
 coins, by use, they could certainly enjoy a broad field of mone- 
 tary employment, beyond the statutory two-pound payments.^ 
 The following considerations embrace a wider ran<re : — 
 (4.) The stability thus insured to the ratio of Gold and Silver 
 at a lower figure for Gold than actually obtained in the years 
 preceding 1834-7, would have strengthened the party of Albert 
 Gallatin and the Xew York Banks in their resistance to the 
 change in the United States from 15 to IG, which was pressed 
 and finally carried by Benton and the Gold-party, then fired 
 by the hope that an Eldorado was latent in the Southern 
 Alleghanies. In place of the half-way change to lo.*'^ close 
 to the French ratio, which was urged by the moderate party 
 in the United States, 15/° would have recommended itself, had 
 England been coining at 15.'^ with a seigniorage deducted; 
 and had the United States adopted this ratio in 1837, the 
 modern outbreak of Anti- Silver leg-islation mifjht never have 
 arisen to disturb the march of progress. 
 
 (5.) Independently of thepossibleaction of theUnitcd States, 
 
 It is a curious fact that present experience (1887) supplies evidence 
 of the correctness of these observations. A veiy large amount of Money 
 not Legal-Tender at all is to-day effectively maintained in circulation by 
 the action of the Treasury. Sovereigns and half-sovereigns to the extent 
 — as I am informed — of not a few million pounds ai*e to-day in existence, 
 although below the weight fixed by statute as the "least current weight." 
 A rigid refusal to take any such coins in any Government ollicc would 
 undoubtedly restrict, if not prevent, their further currency. Of course, the 
 consent of the giver and of the receiver is, so to speak, jiarty to the act of 
 using them as Money: but if "Grcsham's law" lie true — and I know of 
 no successful attack upon it — the consent to employ a particular kind of 
 Money is not likely to be withheld to-day, when the receiver knows he 
 can use it in payments to be made in Goveriunent offices. 
 
Sect. 19.] Lord Liverpool's Scheme. 157 
 
 it is clear that, had Lord Liverpoors scheme been adopted in 
 full, the example of England could not have operated upon 
 the minds of the monetary reformers of the period 1850-1875, 
 as a convincing precedent for the exclusion of Silver, in a 
 degree approaching the extent to which it has done so in 
 fact; the idea of outla^viug Silver could, therefore, never 
 have readied that extreme height of prestige which it has 
 actually enjoyed in the minds of this generation, and thus, 
 in any case, the later history of the century might have been a 
 history of at least comparative peace between Silver and Gold. 
 
 We now follow the contrast between the actual course of 
 events and the structure of inference which we have thus based 
 upon the hypothesis of the scheme stated in the " Treatise on 
 the Coins of the Realm " being adopted by Parliament. 
 
 Wherein lies the divergence of the Statute of 1816 from 
 Lord LiverpooFs plan ? 
 
 Lord Liverpool's scheme became law in 1816, so far as the 
 following portions of it are concerned : 
 
 1 . The establishment of Gold as the Unit. 
 
 2. Reducing the Legal-Tender-Power of Silver to £2. 
 The divergence appears in the following features : 
 
 1. The Statute ordained that not merely the cost of coinage,, 
 as Lord Liverpool advised, but also a heavy seigniorage 
 should be taken out of the Silver-coin. With this chanfo 
 re-appeared under the Regency of George IV. " his Majesty's 
 rate" which had been abolished by the Counsellors of 
 Charles II. Four shillings in the Pound Troy of Standard 
 Silver was the new Mint charge, about six per cent, in all ; a 
 figure which includes the cost and the profit. 
 
 2, The starting-point for this reduction, the Aveight which 
 was to be reduced by the Mint charge, was remote from that 
 which Lord Liverpool's plan would have fixed. The old legal 
 ratio, 15.^' to 1, was taken as the starting-point, but with this 
 diflerence between the new shillings and the old, that the new 
 
158 Tlw Aliatidonmcnt of the Silver Pound. 
 
 shilling was coined 'b(S to the pound.' Four shillings, the diflfe- 
 renco between GO and 62, were retained by the Mint, and thus 
 the shillings issued were ^ (.'**^) lighter than the old, so 
 that instead of weighing 15.*' they weighed 15.*^ minus -^Ci c>r 
 14.'*. Of this reduction /'"'*' might perhaps be taken as a fair 
 charge for cost of coinage, leaving in round numbers 5 per 
 cent, as the seigniorage. The G per cent, was, however, but 
 a nominal limit : for, in fact. Silver was not worth 15."' to 1 
 in 181G or afterward. The average rate of Gold was several 
 per cent, higher than 15. *\ The controlling factors of the 
 world's demand — England's heavy draft for Resumption pur- 
 poses upon the world's small stock of Gold being the chief — 
 accounted for that. It followed, that the new Silver coin, if 
 coined ou Government account — as a good part of it was 
 certain to be ou the occasion of a general Recoinage — gave a 
 net profit of about 8 per cent. 
 
 The probable object of these divergences from Lord Liver- 
 pool's scheme has, I doubt not, occurred to the reader. It 
 was the profit of the Treasury. The reader has observed that 
 each point of the divergence gives its percentage of profit. 
 
 Beside (1) , the amount of seigniorage expressly taken, there 
 was (2), the gain arising from the purchase of Silver at a low 
 price, in so far as the coinage was to be done on Government 
 account. 
 
 Of the course of discussion among the authorities which led 
 to the adoption of these measures, but meagre records have 
 come to my notice. The proposition made its appearance 
 in public in a Report of that Committee of the Privy Council 
 (Appendix 20), hitherto alluded to, which had been appointed 
 
 ' The operation of the change was as follows : — Under the Regulation of 
 43r<l Elizabeth (1(504) the Pound Troy of Standard Silver was to be coined 
 into sixty-two shillinsrs, and under the Act of 1G66, the coinage being 
 gratuitous, the depositor received sixty-two shillin-rs for every Pound Troy 
 he gave. Under the Act of 1816, for every Potnnl Troy of Standard Silver, 
 sixty-two shillings were to be issued. 
 
Sect. 19.] The Anti-Silver Statutes. 150 
 
 in 1708^ and which now, after an interval of eighteen years, 
 " availed themselves/' as the Report states, " of the return of 
 General Peace to resume the consideration of the coinasre." 
 
 The expense of the new Mint, and of the new coinage of 
 Silver, was expressly set forth as the justification for taking 
 seigniorage, although a further argument for it is afforded in 
 the consideration that the proposed rate is " high enough to 
 protect the new coins by a slight increase of their nominal 
 value, from the danger of being melted down and converted 
 into bullion when the market-price of Silver rises/' but not to 
 encourage counterfeiting if it falls. 
 
 These views were reflected in the debates in Parliament. 
 Indeed, it appears that the idea of an even higher ratio of 
 seigniorage had been entertained in regions of authority, for 
 in the House of Lords the Earl of Liverpool proposed that the 
 coins should be struck at G7, GS, or (S^ to the pound Troy, in 
 which case 5, G, or 7, instead of 4 shillings would have been 
 retained for the Treasury. 
 
 The contrast of view between Lord Liverpool and his son is 
 thus shown to be very marked, for in the " Treatise on the 
 Coins of the Realm," the practice of seigniorage theretofore 
 obtaining in France is distinctly characterized as ^'not very 
 creditable." (P. 179.) But fiscal reasons are proverbially 
 competent to over-ride all others. 
 
 It must be distinctly remembered that the Statute of ISIG, 
 though known to later times as the Gold- Standard-law, or the 
 Anti- Silver-law, was not precisely so regarded or intended at 
 the time it was fi-amed, but was primarily a measure for the 
 reformation of the Silver coin. The great need for this refor- 
 mation, however, be it observed, was purely a creation of the 
 forgotten Anti-Silver law of 1798. 
 
 The object of the Councillors of the Prince Regent in pro- 
 posing the Law of 18 IG was, as his message states, to remedy 
 " the present defective state and inadequate amount of the 
 Silver Coinage of this Realm." It was most natural, and as 
 
1<")0 The Abandonment of the Silver Pound. 
 
 we can easily see, laudable, to signalize the return of General 
 Peace, when bayonets were melting into ploughshares, by 
 putting new and shining coins into the pockets of the people 
 in the place of old discs worn bare of inscription, or roughly- 
 coined Spanish dollars, or Bank of England Tokens, all of them 
 badges of the oppression of twenty years of war. 
 
 To attain this end without any special expense was certainly 
 a very attractive idea. And why should this attraction fail of 
 its effect? Had science any objection to make : did that far- 
 seeing statesmanship, that can sagely judge of the present by 
 help of the accumulated experience of the past, interpose its 
 veto ? In asking this question, we come in sight of the 
 mighty force wielded by those who give direction to the ideas 
 of what ought to be, in higher spheres of civil conduct. 
 
 The authority derived from the most important monument 
 of monetary learning then known, the work of a life-long coun- 
 cillor of the aged King of England, and the father of his 
 Regent^s Premier, was, in general terms, an authority to 
 elevate Gold, and to subordinate Silver from motives of imme- 
 diate domestic convenience (as regarded from the point of 
 view of the past, anterior to 1798), and without considering 
 the bearing of such action upon other nations, or upon the 
 relations of the two metals throughout the world, and hence 
 the possible recoil of such action upon England. 
 
 Evidently the Treatise had set forces in motion which it was 
 not competent to restrain. 
 
 The vice of insularity, in one who was understood to be dis- 
 cussing, from the highest stand-point of State policy, a matter 
 which by its nature was world-embracing — non-insular, anti- 
 insular upon occasion — was a fatal ^^ce ; and tended not 
 merely to perpetuate existing distortion of view, but to pro- 
 mote further distortion, and indeed, as the event proved, to 
 inflict upon posterity an accumulating inheritance of obliquity. 
 
 If we ask, whence came the impelling suggestion to this 
 peculiar creation of debased Money — for which no precedent 
 
Sect. 19.] The A?iti-Silver Statutes. 161 
 
 that one could suppose valid to English eyes could be found — 
 the solution will recommend itself as at least a probable one, 
 that the profit made in the issue of Bank Tokens had attracted 
 attention to the practicability of an analogous issue on the 
 part of the Government. The total issue of stamped Spanish 
 dollars current at 4s. G(/. (guineas being at 21s.) and of Bank 
 of England crowns and half-crowns coined was several million 
 pounds sterling, and could thus hardly have failed to excite 
 attention. 
 
 The wonder is, indeed, that the semblance of a " Ileal 
 Money," of a true Commodity-Money, was kept up at all; that 
 the new crowns and shillings were not in a erreater ded-ree 
 made tokens, counters, or metallic promises to pay ; for a 
 larger percentage of seigniorage would have paid not only the 
 expense of the Mint, but might at need have covered other 
 items of outlay ; perhaps, indeed, items similar to those which 
 were met by " His Majesty's rate,'' in earlier days. It is 
 also to be stated, to the credit of the Executive, that no 
 excessive amount of Silver was coined for the benefit of the 
 Treasury. 
 
 But the divergence of the Statute of 1816 from Lord 
 Liverpool's plan extends much further. Its provisions touch- 
 ing the Coinage of Silver furnish a remarkable chapter in 
 the history of financial legislation. The Statute was in form 
 and apparent intent a Statute for the Free Coinage of Silver 
 as well as of Gold. Section IX. is as follows : — 
 
 "IX. And be it further enacted. That from and after such 
 Day as shall be named and appointed in and by any Procla- 
 mation which shall be made and issued for that purpose, by or 
 on behalf of His Majesty, by and with the Advice of Ilis 
 Majesty's Privy Council, it shall and may be lawful for any 
 Person or Persons, Native or Foreigner, to bring any Foreign 
 Coin, or any other coin, or reputed Coin, Plate or Bullion of 
 Silver, in Mass, molten or alloyed, or any Sort of Manufacture 
 of Silver, and to deliver the same at His Majesty's Mint in 
 
 M 
 
162 Tfie Abandonment of the Silver Pound. 
 
 London, to bo there melted down and coined in Current Silver 
 Coins of this Kingdom ; and such Silver Coin, Plate, Bullion 
 or Manufiicture so brought or delivered. Shall be assayed at 
 the said Mint, and melted down and coined with all convenient 
 speed, into Silver Coins of a Standard in Fineness of Eleven 
 Ounces, Two Pennyweights of fine Silver and Eighteen Penny- 
 weights of Alloy in the Pound Troy, and in AVcight after the 
 Kate of Sixty-six Shillings to every Pound Troy, whether the 
 same be coined in Crowns, Ilalf-Crowns, Shillings or Six- 
 pences, or Pieces of a lower Denomination ; and that as soon 
 as conveniently may be after any such Silver Coin, Plate, 
 Bullion, or ^Manufacture respectively, so brought to the Mint, 
 shall be melted and assayed, there shall be delivered to the 
 Person brinj^ini^ in and delivering: the same a sum in Silver 
 Coins, of Crowns, Half-Crown?, Shillings or Sixpences, after 
 the Rate of Sixty-two Shillings of the Standard Fineness and 
 "Weight hereinbefore mentioned for every Pound Troy of 
 Standard Silver of tlio Fineness aforesaid, by such Person 
 brought and delivered into the Mint, and so proportionably 
 for a greater or lesser Weight ; and that for the Defiilcation 
 or Diminution and for the Charge for the Assaying, Coinage 
 and Waste in Coinage of all such Silver so to be brought to 
 the Mint as aforesaid, there shall and may be retained at the 
 said ^lint the sum of Four Shillings of the Standard and 
 Weight aforesaid, for every Pound Troy of such Standard 
 Silver so brought in and delivered, and so proportionably for 
 any greater or lesser Weight, making in the whole after the 
 Kate of Sixty-Six Shillings for every Pound Troy of such 
 Standard Silver ; anything in any Act or Acts in force in 
 Great Britain or Ireland, immediately before the passing of 
 this Act, to the contrary in anywise notwithstanding. 
 
 "X. And be it further enacted, That an Account shall be 
 kept at the Mint of the Amount of all sums of ^loney arising 
 from the Allowance of Four Shillings for every Pound Troy of 
 Silver to be retained at the said Mint, in manner aforesaid ; 
 and that all such Sums so retained shall in the first Place be 
 apjilied in or towards the Payment of the Expenses of the 
 coining of such Silver; and the Surplus thereof (if any) after 
 the Pa3-ment of such Expenses shall be carried to and made 
 Part of the Consolidated Fund." 
 
Sect. 19.] The Anti- Silver Statutes. 163 
 
 It will bo apparent, that the provisions made for the coinage 
 of Silver in this Statute were conceived with a view to the 
 manufacture of Silver coin for depositors, and the use of the 
 word " seigniorage/' referred to on page 159, shows the 
 intent of the authorities to have corresponded with their act. 
 Seigniorage taken out of a coin implies, by its very nature, two 
 weights, so to speak, for that coin, — that is, a nominal weight 
 and an actual weight — a higher weight which has a legal 
 existence or recognition in some form, and a lower weight 
 at which coins are struck, which, as cun'cnt, are to be made 
 equal by force of law to the former weight which gives their 
 nominal, or " fiice,'' value. All this implies Free Coinage. If 
 there is to be no coinage on account of the citizen, if the 
 Government is to do the coining on its own account, putting 
 its own property through the mill and press, and especially 
 if, as in the present instance, their face value is fixed by coin, 
 not of the same, but of another, metal, of what use to talk 
 of a Legal Weight or of seigniorage taken from it ? The 
 Legal "Weight becomes a pure fiction, and, strictly speaking, 
 the seigniorage a fiction also ; the main fact is that the Trea- 
 sury buys metal, and coins Tokens out of it, and the only 
 actuality in the affair is the weight at which the coins are to 
 be struck. 
 
 But notwithstanding this promise of Free Coinage, that is 
 involved in the very structure of the law of 181G, there has 
 been no Free Coinage of Silver under it. 
 
 AVhy ? Because the Proclamation mentioned on page IGl 
 has never been made. Through the omission of such Pro- 
 clamation the contingent limitation which Lord Liverpool 
 suggested for use in case of need has become the constant 
 and rigid rule. The result is, of course, a practical nullifica- 
 tion of the scheme of Lord Liverpool ; a departure from his 
 plan really more serious than the imposition of " seigniorage " 
 in the place of " brassage." Now it is this anonymous pro- 
 vision of the law which established the most aggressively Anti- 
 
164 The Ahandonyncnt of the Silver Poimd. 
 
 Silver feature of the English system, the complete degra- 
 dation of Silver to a Token-Money, with its coinage carried 
 on on Government account for the purpose of gaining profit by 
 the issue of under-weight coin. 
 
 "Who is responsible for this system ? Surely not Lord 
 Livirpool, except indirectly, as wo have shown him to be in 
 the matter of seigniorage. And yet it is certainly understood 
 — universally understood — that the exclusion of Silver from 
 Free Coinage has existed since 181G under his sanction as 
 that of a competent and responsible scientific authority. "\Vo 
 now, therefore, ascertain that another of the guarantees for 
 the militant error of the day is spurious. 
 
 In exposing what I find to be the defects of Lord Liver- 
 pool's argument, 1 have specially analyzed only his errors of 
 commission. But there is an error of omission in the Trea- 
 tise to which our study of England's history enables us to 
 attach peculiar weight. It is an omission which aflfords a 
 certain explanation of whatever there may be in the Treatise 
 of the doctrinaire's crudeness — a lesson not lacking in sug- 
 gestiveness for the future. I refer to the failure to discuss 
 what had been during the greater part of the XVIlIth cen- 
 tury the question touching the relative position of Silver and 
 Gold in England, which, of all others, was chiefly present in 
 the thoughts of those active in monetary discussion — namely, 
 the question of lowering the guinea. 
 
 It is quite easy for us now to see, after the fact, that as the 
 general rates of Gold and Silver actually remained so steady 
 during the XVIIlth century, a reduction of the guinea to 
 20s. 0(7. or 20s. would have provided England with the Silver 
 !Moncy she desired to have. How does it happen that, with 
 those rates in full view, a Treatise which came into existence 
 because of the necessity of providing good Silver Money, failed 
 to consider what would have been the effect of a change which 
 must have prevented any lack of Silver-coins, and which li:ul 
 been so abundantly proposed and discussed ? 
 
Sect. 19.] The Anti-Silver Statutes. 165 
 
 The reader will clearly understand that I have not intended 
 by this to present the idea that Lord Liverpool ought himself to 
 have proposed to cut down the guinea to 20s. Q>d. or 20s. either 
 in 177 t or in 1798, or in 1805. That is a matter quite apart, 
 which i do not propose to discuss. 1 am merely pointing out 
 a most notable proof of the unpractical character of Lord 
 LiverpooFs work. No matter what his own practical plan, 
 when he undertook to establish by argument the principles 
 of monetary policy for his country, upon its relation to which 
 that plan must stand or fall, it was incumbent upon him to 
 make a full and fair statement of alternative schemes, and of 
 general opinion on the whole subject. 
 
 Should this be regarded as an exaggerated demand upon a 
 '' Treatise on the Coins of the Realm," it will be found 
 germane to observe that some statement on this head is what 
 most readers would naturally expect to find in such a Treatise. 
 Something of this kind is called for under the ordinary 
 canons of construction of the duty incumbent upon an author 
 who undertakes to discuss a subject; there is an implied pro- 
 mise to that effect in the very title of the book. To the 
 absence of fulfilment of this implied promise is in largo measure 
 duo the darkness that followed the book : it became an im- 
 passable barrier which cut off the XlXth from knowledge of 
 the learning of the XVIIIth century. 
 
 § 20. THE MONETARY THEORIES OF SIR WILLIAM PETTY, OF 
 JOSEPH HARRIS, AND OF SIR ROBERT REEL. 
 
 In the roll of honour upon which Lord Liverpool inscribed 
 the names of those who in his view represented the wisdom of 
 the past touching the nicer questions of the Standard, Sir 
 William Petty stands first in the order of time, and first like- 
 wise in distinction. 
 
 It was he who in Lord Liverpool's belief first propounded 
 the solution of the great, the chief, difficulty which for centuries 
 
166 The Abandonmmt of the Silver Poufid. 
 
 of her history had oppressed the statesmen of England, and 
 which — all relief failing — had remained to his day (1G31-10S5) 
 a burden to the Commonwealth. 
 
 What was this difficulty ? 
 
 It was a difficulty which hardly can be regarded as peculiar 
 to England, or one which had lost its force when Lord Liverpool 
 wrote. On the contrary, it has pervaded the XlXth century 
 as with a congenital malady, and if the XXth century is to 
 escape from suffering by the same cause, it will only be by 
 dint of prudent regimen. "NV^o are speaking of nothing less 
 than the unstable equilibrium of the metals, the variability of 
 their relative value, the danger of local alternation from one 
 to the other ; in a word, that difficulty of maintaining a steady 
 circulation of the two, or a fixed ratio between them, which is 
 the staple source and aliment of the Battle of the Standards. 
 
 So ancient withal is this difficulty, that, if I may venture to 
 direct a ray of thought toward such remoteness, I suggest 
 that its story is better known to the totality of men who have 
 lived on the earth than that of Adam and Eve in Paradise ; 
 for the Silver Adam and the Golden Eve, each the source of 
 the other's woes, wherever known, appeared not merely as 
 tradition, but withal as a fact of the day, appealing to 
 present pecuniary interest. Wo have, in fact, to deal with a 
 product of that alleged primal curse of duality with which fiito 
 has afflicted man, a natural result of that act of Creation or 
 provision of Nature in making two precious metals, two metals, 
 instead of only one, fit to be ^Money, which in our day a school 
 of economists have discovered to bo a gross blunder on tho 
 part of its responsible author. This, then, is the difiiculty for 
 which Petty found the solution — in doing which he was but an 
 avant-courrier, announcing for a remote future tho coming of a 
 great reform. 
 
 For the XlXth century, the name of Petty is obscured in tho 
 dusk of time. It can boast no such lustre as those of Locke 
 and of Newton. But, certainly, if the opinion of tho chief 
 
Sect. 20.] Theory of Sir William Petti/. 1G7 
 
 promoter of a policy which has mastered our century is to 
 count as authority, Petty is one of the great path-finders in 
 the realm of monetary thought, to whom a generation that has 
 gone far toward outlawing Silver should, at least, pay devoutest 
 homage. 
 
 " It is proper to observe," says Lord Liverpool, " that 
 James I. consulted Sir Francis Bacon, Sir Edward Coke, and 
 many other eminent men who lived in those times ; but they 
 all appear to have been at a loss for a remedy to the evil to 
 which the country was then exposed. The Treatise of Sir 
 "William Petty, entitled, ' The Political Anatomy of Ireland,^ 
 in which he delivered his opinion, that the coins, whicli were 
 to be the principal measure of property, could be made of one 
 metal only, was among his posthumous works, published in the 
 year 1G91 ; antl as far as I am informed tJiis extraordinary man 
 teas one nf the first ivho fully asserted and maintained this 
 opinion, snf/gestiiig thereby the reined y so long sought for in vain. 
 Mr. Locke and others followed him in supporting the same 
 opinion, but this true principle, which solved the difficulty, // as 
 never yet heen carried effectually into practice." (P. lol.) The 
 latter statement is also referred to Petty, for he is quoted to 
 the effect " that one metal of the two precious metals is only 
 fit matter for Money ; and as matters now stand. Silver is the 
 matter of Money .^' But he (Petty) " expresses a doubt 
 whether in that sense there is any such Money or rule [measure'] 
 m tlie world. So that lie confirms the principle, but doubts 
 whether the governments of the loorld have ever conformed to it. 
 Sir William Petty judged rightly. It is certain that the 
 governments of Europe have not in general paid attention to 
 this rule ; nor is it surprising, that persons wholly occupied in 
 official business, should not have had leisure to study or under- 
 stand a subject, which is in its nature so abstruse and com- 
 plicated." (P. 137.) 
 
 He also spoke of Sir William Petty as one who " had cer- 
 tainly great abilities, and was more of a man of business and 
 
l(».b The Abandoiinicht of tlie Silver Pound. 
 
 of Die world than lither Mr. Loclc or Mr. Harris, etc. etc.'* 
 (P. 137.) 
 
 It is by no means Lonl Liverpool alone who treats Sir 
 William as a well-spring of thought — fans et ongo doctriua;. 
 In sucli important utterances as the great speeches of Mr. 
 Wcllesley Pole iu the Commons, and of the second Lord 
 Tjiverpool iu the Lords, iu support of the Coinage Bill of 1816, 
 and in the great speech' of Sir Robert Peel on the Bank 
 Charter Bill in 18 it, the name of Petty still stands as the eldest 
 in the line of supposed authorities for the Outlawry of Silver. 
 
 In addition to the extract above mentioned. Lord Liverpool 
 cites him as follows : — 
 
 " Sir ^^'illiam Petty observes tlmt Mowij is uwhrstooJ to be 
 the uniform measure of the value of all commodities ; and then 
 adds that the proportion of value between fine Gold and fine 
 Silver alters as the earth and industry of men produce more of 
 one than the other. That Gold has been worth but twelve times 
 its own weight of Silver, but that of late it has been worth four- 
 teen ; so there can be but one of the two metah of Gold and 
 Silver to be a fit matter for Money." (Pj). 12 l-o.) 
 
 But on an earlier page of the Treatise (p. 14) the 
 doctrine is stated with the directness and force of a command- 
 ment. 
 
 " Sir ]\'illiam Fctty says that one of the metals is the only 
 fit matter for Money." All the italics are mine. 
 
 "What was, in fact, Sir William Petty's idea as to the true 
 '' matter for Money ?" After an examination of his writings, I 
 am unable to find anything which commits Petty to the 
 opinions which Lord Liverpool imputes to him. So far as I 
 can see, his idea was simply the idea which Locke, and 
 Newton, and later, Harris, held so firmly, namely — to use the 
 terras which I have sought to justify iu this work — that the 
 
 ' Sec references in " Ciiirency niul Standard of ^'alue in KnL'land," by 
 Mr. R. II. Ini,dis ralgnive, in the tliinl Koj)ort of tiio Coniniission im the 
 Depression of Trade and Industry, 1886. Sec also Appendix 26. 
 
Sect. 20.] r/ieon/ of Sir JVilUim Petti/. 109 
 
 Unit must be maintained in one metal, and that coins of other 
 metal must be rated in reference to the Unit. And that is all ! 
 
 To prove that this is the case is, obviously — from ray stand- 
 point — to exonerate Sir William Petty from the charge of grave 
 error. But justice to his memory is not satisfied with so brief 
 an allusion. I desire, therefore, to add that while I cannot 
 concur in Lord Liverpool's efi'ort to exalt that ingenious Doctor 
 at the expense of Locke, yet the former's path- finding insight 
 in economic thought commands my hearty homage. 
 
 A consideration of the circumstances under which Petty 
 wrote supplies, as in the case of Locke, a context which of itself 
 adequately explains the peculiar use of words which has given 
 rise to so complete a misunderstanding of his position. Living 
 under the regime of Free Coinage of Silver and Gold, with 
 Silver the Chief Money, a century and a half before any 
 serious effort was made to outlaw one of the metals, it would 
 require strong evidence to show that, because he preferred to 
 give the name Money to Silver, he wished to do what it was 
 inevitable he must do if he was a single-metallist, namely, 
 deprive Gold of its monetary use. Such evidence does not 
 exist. The whole matter seems thus to resolve itself into a 
 point of style, or use of words. 
 
 If it be inquired, how Lord Liverpool could so far err, I can 
 perhaps justify my evading the question by quoting Sir 
 William Petty himself, and saying, " To explain this fully, one 
 might launch out into the deep ocean of all the mysteries 
 concerning Money." It may, however, be observed that it 
 did not comport well with Lord Liverpool's argument clearly 
 to recognize that Silver was then, by law, all that he thought 
 Petty meant it should be, actually a very true " principal 
 Money, made of one metal only." Symptoms appear in the 
 Treatise of an effort to question that this was a fact ^ in Potty's 
 
 ' •' Mr. Locke, who thought that Silver-coins were the only Mimey of 
 Account or measure of property." (P. 16.) 
 
 •• It is probable that he was not woll infi)rmeil of the history of our coins, 
 
170 The Abajuloninent of the Silver Pound. 
 
 time. It occurs to me that it might perhaps bo saiJ the 
 title of Silver to that place was not as firm in Petty's time as. 
 after the Recoinage of IGOG, which operated, one might say, as 
 a guarantee of that title, signed by Crown and Parliament and 
 people. But the fact remains, the title was good, and was 
 not seriously questioned. The pound Sterling was 20 shillings 
 of Silver, and made a majority in value of the circulation. 
 But at the same time (Jold was coinable without stint, and 
 Legal Tender without limit, at a rate. 
 
 Now, under these circumstances, the language used by 
 Petty touching (Jold and Silver is as harmless and innocent of 
 evil intent against the use of Gold Money as the similar lan- 
 guage used by Locke. Indeed, it is quite as justifiable to 
 charge Newton with a desire to demonetize (Jold because ho 
 said (see page 80) that Silver was the only true Money in 
 England, as to make a like charge against Petty because of 
 the expression that only one metal can be fit "matter for 
 Money." "With the distinction between what I shall call 
 " rating Money " and " rated Money ,^' a matter of their daily 
 observation and experience, either phrase was a natural and 
 harmless form of statement. 
 
 Lord Liverpool quotes from Petty's posthumous work 
 " The Political Anatomy of Ireland ■/' and does not appear in 
 the course of his wide reading among the monetary writings 
 of that century to have happened upon other productions of 
 Petty. Had he done so, ho would have found that the 
 expressions of his " Treatise on Taxes and Contributions " 
 (1G62) and of his " Quantulumcumque Concerning Money" 
 (1C85) are quite innocent of any indication of opposition to 
 the rated currency of Gold. As for the passage before quoted,. 
 
 wliich wdiild liftve pointed out tlicse circumstances (of a practical nature) 
 to liim. Jle asserted iix a certain fact that Silver Coins made tlic Money 
 of Account or Measure of Commerce in Knjrland and the ncichbonrins 
 countries. IIow far tliis assertion is well-founded we shall have occasion, 
 to show hiTcat'tcr." (1*. 83.) The italics are mine. 
 
Sect. 20.] Theory of Joseph Harris. 171 
 
 that Governments had failed to carry out his idea, this may- 
 explain itself as referring to the failure to maintain the com- 
 plete subordination of Gold to Silver by a consistent policy of 
 rating and of coinage ; and if this bo correct, the interesting 
 fact is brought to light that Petty's mind had passed along 
 the way which Locke and Newton were to follow in action as 
 well as thought. 
 
 The views of Joseph Harris, the author of that " Essay on 
 Money and Coins,'' which was pronounced by MacCulloch 
 one of the best works ever published on the subject, have 
 already been quoted in another Chapter (see page 123) , and 
 the substantial identity of his idea of what I have called a Unit 
 of one metal and rated Money of the other, with the view of 
 Petty, of Locke, and of Newton, dispenses us from a detailed 
 examination of Harris's work. One reference, however, which 
 Lord Liverpool makes to it deserves a special examination. 
 In citing Harris for the third time in his Treatise, Lord 
 Liverpool observes : — 
 
 '' In another part of his Essay ho asserts, that all otlier 
 metals, Gold as well as lead, are but commodities rateable by 
 Silver. He supports this opinion by the authority of many 
 great and eminent men, whoso writings and speeches on this 
 subject ho quotes in his Essay." (P. 137.) 
 
 Now the object of Lord Liverpool in citing this, as otlier 
 passages, from the acknowledged masters of monetary thought, 
 was to justify a policy the ultimate effect of which was, as 
 later generations have clearly seen, to make one metal Money 
 in England, and the other metal a "commodity." The analysis 
 already presented (page 80), in explaining a similar expression 
 of Locke's, has shown that the distinction between the 
 secondary Money-metal and other commodities, is not readily, 
 and at first glance, recognizable in its true character. 
 
 Through this citation, unexplained, as it stands, by refe- 
 rence to other utterances of Harris, it appears that the author 
 of the " Treatise on the Coins of the Kcalm," may himself 
 
1 72 The Ahandonment of the Silver PounJ. 
 
 have quite misuuilersitood, and in any case ran gn-at risk 
 of loading his readers to misunderstand, the cardinal point 
 of Harris's doctrine, in precisely the manner already set 
 forth on page SO, to which I refer the reader. 
 
 To a man like Harris, who wrote so excellent a book in 
 order to induce England to reduce the rate of currency of the 
 guinea, this distortion of his views would, perhaps,have aroused 
 as holy a horror as that which incited him to speak of the 
 laches oi England's rulers in not refonnin}' the coinajre.as "an 
 assassination in the dark," ' 
 
 The Monet^iry Theory of Sir Robert Peel has been glanced 
 at in earlier pages (pp. 75, Si), 92, 03), and it has been made 
 apparent that his ideas were in part drawn from a tissue of 
 
 A ourious j^roof of the persovoriiig foreo of Ix>nl Livorpools Treatise, 
 in settinsr the iVhion for modern thouirht, is artbnled bv the following 
 lines, wliieh eame under my eye lonjj at'ter the aliove pajres were j^enned. 
 They are from an interestinjj article on " the Queen's Assay-Master," in 
 " Miirniy's Magazine" for ilay. 18S7, by Professor Roberts- Austen, the 
 present inoumbent of that honourable otlice. Referring to Joseph 
 Harris, who held the same oflice in its elder form from 1748 to 17G4, 
 the writer speaks of Harris as the author of '* a careful and sirii^-ularlt/ 
 aiiranced Essay on Aloney and Coins, which proves him to have been a 
 rifrid mono-metallist, as it contains the expression of an opinion that only 
 one metal can be Money, a standanl measure of property and commerce 
 in any country. This essay is specially referred to by Charles, Earl of 
 Liverpool, in his celebrated letter to King George the Thinl, dated May 
 7th, ISOo, in which the a«lvantages of a single measui-e of value, and Gold 
 as that mea>ure, arc set forth with great vigour and clearness. This 
 letter has since its publication remained the autliority on the subject to 
 which it ix-lates." {T. G04-5.) 
 
 Tlie italics are mine. The reader will readily note how complete the 
 insulation has been. Thanks to the intlnence of Lonl Liverpool, the ex- 
 cellent work of the older Assav-Ma>ter in the field of Monetary Statesman- 
 ship is terra inei\^nita to his successor of to-day, who apart from his well- 
 tried excellence, in his chosen field of science, has made interesting 
 researches in monetary history ; to-day. in 1SS7, the work of the Monetary 
 Counsellor of 1774 is still operating directly as a non-conductor, to destroy 
 communication upon the most important monetary issue of the day, from 
 nn elder and better teacher in the politics of Money. 
 
Sect. 20.] Theory of Sir Robert Peel. 173 
 
 spurious evidence. It seems quite probable that, both iu 
 1819 and in IStt, he not only accepted Lord Liverpool as his 
 master, without much incjuiry into detail, and with still less 
 criticism, but also took the Act of 18 IG on trust, as the last 
 word of" science; thus even ignoring the divergences between 
 Lord Liverpool's ideas, and the outcome of the Act, which are 
 set forth ill the preceding ]iage.s (Sect. 1*J). It was, there- 
 fore, inevitable that his ideas should fall into confusion, and 
 that, being in this field the controlling individuality of his 
 time, ho should lead his people into captivity, at least so far 
 as the range of his own error extended. That the error was 
 very natural is, perhaps, sufficiently admitted in what has 
 been said elsewhere ; certainly, if the truth were all obvious 
 and easily found, so that he who runs may read, there would 
 hardly be need of a work like this to explain it. 
 
 Here, again, the word " Standard " may serve as a safo 
 guide to the situation. Peel was the champion of the 
 Gold Standard: and as such it is plain he was the cham- 
 pion of ^letallic Money against paper, of Commodity-Money 
 against credit ; the champion of unity, of conservatism, of 
 persistence in maintaining ancient right. All this is in- 
 volved in the advocacy of the English Gold Standard : this 
 I myself can state to-day as my own conviction, provided 
 that the definition of tJoe word Standard he limited either 
 to Meaning No. 5, or to Meanings Nos. 5 and. 7 of the Intro- 
 duction. In that case there is nothing to exclude from 
 English law the Free Coinage, or the Full-Legal-Tender of 
 Silver: nothing in English law which ignores the elemen- 
 tary fact that Silver possessed the advantages of Metallic- 
 Money over paper, of Commodity- Money over credit, or that 
 unity, conservatism, and ancient right were better served by 
 retaining Silver than by excluding it ; and it remains open to 
 me to maintain further, that however well the demands of 
 unity, of conservatism, and of ancient right would be fulfilled 
 by Gold, they would bo even better fulfilled by Silver, as Unit 
 
1 74 The Abandonmejit of the Silver Pound. 
 
 and chief Monoy^ than by Gold, in which case Gold would 
 remain a Standard, but not the Standard. 
 
 ]}ut vital monetary truth is swept away if the word 
 " Standard " in Meaning No. 7, be applied to Gold alone, for 
 in this case Meanings 5 and G are, as it were, absorbed and 
 lo8t, and the door is shut to Silver. Now it was in this sense, 
 loithout noiice taken of the distinctions I have drawn, — that, as 
 the champion of ancient right, Peel gave the law which rules 
 English thought to-day. 
 
 It was a glory of Confucius that (as his words are given in 
 English) ho was " a transmitter and not a maker" : and the 
 same admirable trait reveals itself in the words of Peel which 
 are quoted in these pages. Inasmuch as it lies with the 
 present generation to be a transmitter as well as a maker, I 
 allow myself to observe that the contentions I present in this 
 work go no further than to say that it is the duty of the 
 present generation to practise a fidelity to ancient right, 
 which accordinsf to the modern current use of words shall be 
 counted rather English than Chinese. 
 
 The following are important passages from Peel's speech 
 in 1819 (Hansard's Debates, vol. xl., p. G70) : — 
 
 " Upon the necessity of establishing such a [metallic] 
 Standard he could appeal to the opinion of all \\Titers upon 
 political economy, and to the practice of every civilized 
 country, as well as that of our own, antecedent to the year 
 1797. All the witnesses, indeed, examined before the Com- 
 mittee [of 1810] strongly recommended the establishment of 
 this Standard, one witness alone excepted (Mr. Smith, a 
 very respectable man), who was an advocate for the indefinite 
 suspension of cash payments. But when this witness was 
 asked whether the suspension of cash payments was to exist 
 without any standard of value, ho answered, ' Xo ; the pound 
 should be the Standard.' He was recjuired to define what ho 
 meant by the pound. His answer was, ' I find it diflicult to 
 explain it, but every gentleman in England knows it.' The 
 
Sect. 20.] Theory of Sir Robert Peel. 175 
 
 Committeo repeated the question and Mr. Smith answered, 
 ' It is something that has existed in this country for eight 
 hundred years — three hundred years before the introduction 
 of Gold." This was, indeed, the only definition ho could 
 give. But turning from this attempt at definition, and the 
 theory of Adam Smith, it would be recollected that Mr. Locke, 
 after elucidating the subject of identity, dispelling all the 
 erroneous views with reference to innate ideas, and endea- 
 vouring to penetrate even the properties of eternity, could 
 not, with all his power of reasoning, and subtlety of disquisi- 
 tion, succeed in defining what he meant by an abstract pound. 
 On that point, indeed, this distinguished man was evidently 
 misled himself, and, of course, misled his readers." 
 
 Here follows the passage heretofore quoted concerning Sir 
 Isaac Newton. 
 
 " Sir Isaac Newton,"' he says, '' retiring from the sublime 
 studies in which he chiefly passed his life — from the contempla- 
 tion of the heavenly bodies — from an investigation of the laws 
 by which their motions were guided — entered on the examina- 
 tion of this subject [the definition of an '^abstract pound"] ; 
 but that great man came back, at last, to the old, the vulgar 
 doctrine, as it was called by some, that the true standard of value 
 consisted in a definite quantity of gold bullion. Every sound 
 writer on the subject came to the same conclusion . . . ." 
 
 In the Appendix (No. 2G) I give a fuller statement of Sir 
 Robert Peel's doctrine, gathered from the speech of May 6, 
 1844, on the Bank Charter Bill; and I there mark by italics 
 the passages to which the reader's attention seems to me 
 specially due. 
 
 If I read these lines aright, the " True Standard of Value " 
 and the " Abstract Pound," in Sir Robert Peel's classification, 
 were the same ; and the concrete substratum of the idea — the 
 body, so to speak, of this soul — was an amount of Gold equal 
 to twenty twenty-firsts of a guinea (or to the sovereign autho- 
 rized to be coined by the statute of 181G). 
 
17G The Abandonment of the Silver Pound. 
 
 It was in this unity that the " old, the vulgar notion " was 
 supposed to coincide with the conclusions of Newton ; and it 
 is Locke's failure to grasp the golden idea that drew upon 
 him Peel's rebuke : it being plainly a case of gross negli- 
 gence : for certainly Locke ought to have been able to compass 
 this idea, when, as explained to Parliament, he had been coping 
 with eternity. I shall not enter upon this order of ques- 
 tions, for I hope that Locke and Newton now need no defence. 
 Indeed, I pray that the spirit of these gentle sages may descend 
 upon minds that are still in bondage to the errors which spurious 
 evidence engendered in the mind of Peel. 
 
 Mv desire is merely to test and verify the distinctions set 
 forth in the Introduction by applying them to the facts which 
 were in view of the legislators of 1819 and 184 1. 
 
 Upon careful examination of the plexus of ideas set forth in 
 the extract given in the text, it will be seen to embrace what 
 was, what is, what (in Mr. Peel's opinion) oxirjUt to have been, 
 and what ought to he. So ftir as the later history of English 
 Money is concerned, I shall touch upon its salient points in 
 the coming pages, and shall gain, perhaps, some material for 
 iudfing what omjht, at various periods, to have been done. 
 We now have to do with realities in the sense of true ex- 
 planations of the nature of an existing monetary system. 
 
 So fir as the " True Standard of A'alue" is concerned, that 
 has been considered in the first Chapter. It would be an 
 anachronism to demand that the recpiirements therein estab- 
 lished should have been realized in 1810. 
 
 But the Abstract Pound, what can be said of it — this pound 
 which, it was said, every gentleman in England knew, which 
 had existed for eight hundred years, and yet which, to say the 
 least, it was not easy to define? In order to ascertain what 
 it was, I shall once more refer the reader to the Introduction 
 of this work, and to the considerations touching the Money 
 Unit in Chajitcr lY. Upon utilizing those pages as a preface, 
 it will plainly ai)pear tliat my doctrine nnl words are expressly 
 
Sect. 20.] Theory of Sir Robert Peel 111 
 
 designed to analyze and distinguish the phenomena here named 
 " Pound " and " Abstract Pound." As I know of no adequate 
 treatment of this subject in monetary literature to which 1 can 
 refer, I must here give some extended exposition to Mean- 
 ing Xo. t of the Introduction. 
 
 A National Unit of Account is a legal entity, a creature of 
 law ; that is to say, a product of those cumulative and continu- 
 ously active forces of human will which create and maintain 
 institutions. The Pound Sterling of twenty shillings of twelvo 
 pence each was present in the consciousness of the English 
 people as a matter of language, of law, of history, of experience. 
 Unique as an institution, it is to be apprehended by a sido 
 glance, so to speak, through analogies. It had existed, in 
 continuity, throughout the centuries, as, one might say, the 
 English Chiu'ch or the English Parliament existed; or, to enter 
 a less ambitious field of comparison, as a lord of the manor^ 
 Black Pod, the head of a clan, or tenant-in-tail, or, again, as 
 a Royal Forest or the Speaker's Mace, existed. In order that I 
 may throw a broad net, and thus, perhaps, catch some meaning- 
 which -w-ill naturalize itself in the reader's mind, I add to this 
 list already given of concrete analogies more or less remote, the 
 following, which are nearer the region of abstractions — namely,, 
 an incorporeal hereditament, an office, a dignity, a right, a 
 franchise — and I also suggest the notion of an official but im- 
 personal corporation. 
 
 The right of succession inhered in the National Unit, sO' 
 that (as in the case of the various entities I have enumerated)' 
 its material substance could undergo change without inter- 
 rupting its physical existence or the exercise of its functions ;. 
 and in the case of a conflict of laws, or untoward conjunctioa 
 of events defeating the intention of the law, it might be in 
 abeyance, or have its being de jure, so to speak, and not (le 
 facto; or, again, diSercnt objects could claim the office with 
 varied justification, while, so far as the mere power is concerned, 
 it lay within the jurisdiction of the State to give to vaanous 
 
 N 
 
178 The Ahmuhviment of the Silver Poinid. 
 
 substances, at the same time, the character of the Pound 
 Sterling. In earlier sections of this Chapter some historical 
 instances are presented which are here peculiarly in point 
 (see p. IG-i) , although the bare facts to which the words " Pound 
 Sterling" would themselves directly lead the inquirer, are a 
 suflRcient exemplification. Originally a real pound of pure 
 white Silver, the " Pound in weight " descended to be a "Pound 
 in tale " of coin, and eventually reached, with the lord Eliza- 
 beth (IGOi), a weight in coin only thirty-two-ninetieths of 
 what it had been at the outset of its career, Whether, at any 
 time in later centuries, Gold was temporarily clothed in its own 
 right with the character of Pound Sterling, is a question which 
 admits of discussion. It is not, however, questionable that a 
 weight of Silver — coined under the authority of the Crown — 
 had always the legitimate and paramount title till the happen- 
 ing of the events hereinbefore set forth. Through the laches 
 of Government and consequent practice of the people, 
 habit had been attaching itself to Gold as Chief Money, when 
 panic brought on the Restriction of Cash Payments (1707). 
 This Restriction was continued by repeated Acts of Parlia- 
 ment, and thus led to a general transhipment of valuations 
 from Gold to Paper. 
 
 Xow that the general facts here stated, iu the mass or in 
 outline, were within the view of Peel, and of the witness 
 whom ho quoted, is an inference fairly to be drawn from what 
 is known of their competence, or of their opinions. "We have 
 merely to inquire into the adequacy of their scientific 
 analy.'^is ; its depth and its precision, or, in other words, how 
 far they saw below the surface. The times were evidently not 
 propitious for the dispassionate labour of science. The con- 
 trolling feature of the situation, ^^'ith which, as a member of 
 the House of Commons, the speaker of ISIO had to deal, was 
 that, though peace had long since blessed the world, 
 and Napoleon, its great disturber, was safely caged in 
 St. Ilolcna, yet England remained under the regime of 
 
Sect. 20.] Theory of Sir Robert Peel. 179 
 
 depreciated Paper-Money. It will be observed that in this 
 discourse, although delivered three years after the Anti-Silver 
 Act, Peel treated the question of the Standard as an open 
 one. It was, in effect, an open question in spite of the settle- 
 ment of 181G, from which the Gold Standard dates itself, 
 for that settlement was in large measure inoperative in 
 practice. 
 
 How general this feeling was, is well shown by the 
 follo\ving extract from a communication addressed to Lord 
 Liverpool, the Premier, by Mr. Huskisson, in February, 
 1819:'— 
 
 '' If Gold is to be our only standard, and only Legal-Tender 
 to any amount, I should adhere to my suggestion of paying in 
 bullion all sums above £25 at the present standard price ; of 
 taking a brassage upon the Gold coinage which would raise its 
 value in currency to £-4 the ounce, and to a reduction of the 
 amount at which Silver should bo a Legral-Tender to 20s. 
 If Silver is to bo our only standard (we cannot have two) and 
 unlimited tender to any amount (leaving Gold to fluctuate 
 according to the relative value of the two metals in the 
 markctl, I should retain the present seigniorage upon the 
 Silver coin, making all sums of £5 and upwards (the lowest 
 denomination of Bank note) payable in demand in Silver 
 Bullion, at the old standard of 5s. 2t?. per ounce. Of these 
 two plans I should prefer the former, but either would be 
 consistent with good faith." 
 
 The vital question of the day was, whether in time of peace 
 England should continue indefinitely to relieve the Bank of 
 England from the obligation to pay its notes on demand in 
 '' cash," and whether, in daily life, the calculations of business 
 should be chiefly expressed in terms of a Paper Standard. 
 What Money-metal, or whether both metals, should be treated as 
 
 ' From the life of the second Earl Liverpool, by C. I). Jonge. I am 
 indebted to Mr. Paul F. Tidman for bringing this passage to my notice. 
 
180 The Abandonment of the Silvei' Pound. 
 
 " cash " was a secondary matter. It was, thou, in view of 
 this situation, that the speaker sought to rally support for 
 the restoration of a true Standard of Value, and so entered 
 upon the definition of the Pound Sterling. 
 
 He asked "what is the Pound?" and, seemingly un- 
 conscious of the facts here pointed out, maintained that 
 there was only one thing entitled to the name. 
 
 From the considerations hereinbefore set forth it follows 
 that the real question at issue is to be stated by the inquiry, 
 " What substance was best entitled, upon grounds of justice 
 and of sound policy, to be securely established by law as 
 the Pound Sterling?" But the theorist of 1819 was quite 
 superior to such considerations. Standing before Parliament 
 with the "Treatise on the Coins of the Realm," the liullion Report 
 of 1810, and the Act of 1816, behind him, he was, perhaps, 
 hardly called upon to " go behind the record," and, indeed, 
 had he applied himself to reconstruct the learning of his time 
 from his seat in Parliament, he certainly would have merited 
 unique fame. But no addition is needed to the picture of 
 Peel, criticizing John Locke before the English Parliament 
 for not being, so to speak, sound on the Gold Standard, and 
 praising Newton to the skies for supposed anachronistic 
 opinions from which Xewton would probably have recoiled, 
 not merely as an imputation upon his judgment, but upon 
 his honour. The entire statement, so far as it attempts 
 to justify the Exclusion of Silver, is baseless ; and yet it 
 is through the intervention of Peel that the Exclusion of 
 Silver was transmitted to the present generation, and it is by 
 favour of his mistake that people in England to-day believe 
 that the Gold Stiindard necessarily implies the exclusion of 
 Silver as Full Money. 
 
 The situation, as set forth in accordauco with our former 
 analyt^is, was, briefly, as follows : As matter of ancient law and 
 right twenty Silver shillings were entitled to the office of Pound 
 Sterling, and the Silver Pound was, in this sense, the legitimate 
 
Sect. 20.] Thcorn of Sir Bobert Peel. 181 
 
 National Unit of Coinage. But the Silver Pound had, in 
 fact, been long since in part dispossessed by the Gold Pound, 
 ^^ of a guinea; and, later still. Gold had been, to a large 
 extent, ousted from possession by a Paper Pound,' which 
 was, however, so far as mere form was concerned, a promise 
 to pay a Metallic Pound. 
 
 As for the practical question at issue in 1816 and 1819, it 
 may be worth while to say that, from the point of view of to- 
 day, it is natural to assert, and difficult to deny, that to have 
 established the Silver Pound in its former place with its golden 
 satellite by its side, (but with the ratio of weight changed to 
 conform the English to the now firmly established French 
 ratio,) would have assured the replacement of paper by metal 
 under conditions the most favourable to all great interests 
 involved. This conclusion relates exclusively to the interests 
 
 * It is perhaps, dillk'nlt for the modern reader to realize tliat tliis form of 
 a promise to pay was, for the time, nothing but form — that the English 
 " Standard," in Meaning No. 7 of the Introduction, was Paper — and hence 
 it mav Ijc useful to present the following piece of documentary evidence, 
 which shows how such competent authorities as the Treasury and the 
 Bank reijarded the matter: — 
 
 At a Committee of Treasury, 28th March, 1804. 
 " Resolvetl, 
 
 " That, in the Opinion of this Committee, it will be advisable to attempt 
 an Encouragement to the Importation of Gold, by offering a higher Price 
 than the Coinacc Price : and that it will be rinht for the Bank to offer £4 
 An Ounce, and to let it be known that it will continue to give this price 
 for three months to come. 
 
 " That the Governor be desired to mention this to the Court." 
 
 At a Court of Directors, 7tli June, 1S04. 
 '* Resolved, 
 
 '• That the Bank do continue to purchase Gold at £4 per Ounce until 
 the 30th of September next." 
 
 From Appendix to Itcports of Committee on Besumption of Cash 
 
 Payment, 1819. 
 
182 The Ahandonmeyit of the Silver Pound. 
 
 present at that day. For tho generation which now, 
 seventy years later, inhabits England, it is plain that greater 
 interests than those of that day were hanging upon tho 
 choice of measures. Had the course just suggested been taken, 
 l*arliament, instead of giving legal sanction to a vendetta or 
 feud between Silver and Gold, would have blessed posterity 
 with the invaluable heritage of intcr-iiietallic or inter- 
 monetary peace. 
 
 I venture to believe it is also shown that such action 
 would have been entirely in keeping with the views of Locke, 
 of Newton, and of Harris — tho acknowledged teachers of 
 English policy — and the conjecture is well warranted that 
 Peel would have known what their teachings were, had not 
 the " Treatise on the Coins of the Realm " proved so complete 
 a non-conductor between tho XlXth century and the remoter 
 and wiser past. That he might consistently have made their 
 views the rule of action for his country, is obvious, from tho 
 historical facts herein set forth, and from tho justified confi- 
 dence of his country in his statesmanship. But beside this 
 we have evidence in his own utterances which will be 
 referred to on a later page.* 
 
 * Sec page 190 and Appendix 26. 
 
CHAPTER Yin. 
 Silver before English Public Opinion. 
 § 21. the status op silver in england since isig. 
 
 The provision of tho Law of 1816, which made the opening 
 of the Mints to Free Coinage of Silver contingent upon a 
 Ro3'al Proclamation, finds a simple and obvious explanation in 
 the peculiar conditions of the time. The primary object of 
 the law was to provide a new Silver Coinage, and the first 
 and chief work to bo done was to withdraw or to replace the 
 existing Silver-coin, a measure involving great eflbrt and 
 great expense. That the woi'k should be done by the Govern- 
 ment itself, and that the Government should desire to reduce 
 the expense as much as possible, was most natural. 
 
 In the end the difference between the rate of issue and 
 the cost of the Silver coined from 1816 to 1821, proved to be 
 about half-a-million pounds sterling.' But, in order to enjoy 
 these benefits, it was necessary that the right of coining 
 Silver should remain in the hands of the Government ; and 
 this result was easily attainable by making a Proclamation a 
 condition precedent for Free Coinage, a proceeding quite in 
 accordance with custom — as will clearly be seen on reference 
 to other provisions of tho Statute, and to the Proclamations 
 (see Appendix 21) which were needed to make crowns and 
 
 ^ Against this was chargeable the loss which was liquidated upou the 
 withdrawal of the old abraded coin. 
 
184 Silver be/ore English Public Opinion. 
 
 " Sovereigns, or twenty-shilling pieces " current and la^\ ful 
 Money. 
 
 When, liowever, the withdrawal of the old coin had taken 
 place, the idea of issuing a Proclamation for Free Coinage 
 naturally came within practical range, and the records of the 
 time show that the question excited attention, but I know 
 of nothing to show that it excited any very deep interest. 
 This was of course quite natural — not that Free Coinage and 
 Seigniorage are entirely incompatible, or that Section IX. of 
 the Act of 181G necessarily would not "work." To modern 
 ideas, indeed, it seems an anomaly — Free Coinage of tokens 
 — and, no doubt, to calculate its probable operation is to 
 unravel a very tangled skein. But at that time, when " Silver 
 was Silver," when it was Specie and Bullion just as Gold 
 was, the main object of one interested on the Silver side, 
 must naturally be the restoration of Silver to its former 
 position as Full-Legal-Tender, and undiminished in weight : 
 and the Silver-coins provided for by the Act of 18 10 were 
 naturally regarded chiefly in relation to that object : the 
 first question seeming to be whether or no these Silver-tokens 
 should be retained side by side with a full-weight Silver-coin 
 to be issued under an amended law. 
 
 Upon this greater issue there were expressions of opinion 
 from time to time, to which we shall recur after foUowinsr to 
 the end the story of this statutory right of Free Coinage of 
 Silver conditional upon a Proclamation. 
 
 It is one of the curiosities of monetary history that this 
 contingent right has existed down to our time,' although quite 
 
 ' Wlietlier this elder rule survived the new code estalili.-hed by the 
 Coinage Act of 1870, is a <inestion for the curious. The oriirinal Bill 
 brought in by the Ciiancellur of the Exchequer and Mr. Stansfehl coutaius 
 the following proposed re-enactment of the Act of 1816: — 
 
 (.56 Geo. III. c. (JS.) •■ \\hcrc, after tlie date in that bcliaU' fixed by 
 a proclamation under this Act, any person or body brings to the Mint any 
 silver bullion, such bullion .-hall bo assayed and coined, and delivered out 
 
 I 
 

 Sect. 21.] The Legal Status of Silver. 185 
 
 forgotten by the busy world ; for I do not recall any reference 
 to the point in later controversy, or indeed any sign of know- 
 ledge to-day that the ratio of 1717, and the Standard of 
 Elizabeth, still lurk in shadowy form iu the monetary field. 
 Perhaps in the future, when such insensibility shall have 
 become impossible, and when monetary science shall have won 
 its proper place iu the academic curriculum, it may become 
 a standing exercise for the advanced monetary student to deal 
 with the knotty problem, " what would have been the effect 
 had Free Coinage of Silver under the Statute of 18 IG been 
 put in force after 1871 ?" 
 
 Chief among the expressions of opinion bearing upon 
 Silver in the period preceding the Gold discoveries are those 
 which appear as expert evidence, namely, before a Committee 
 for Coin (Privy Council) at the Board of Trade in 1 828, and 
 before the Parliamentary Committees appointed to deliberate 
 in preparation for the renewals of the Charter of the Bank of 
 England, in 1833 and 18 H, and upon the Mint in 1837. Of 
 
 to such person, at the rate of sixty-two sliillin;is for every 5,760 grains 
 imperial weight, or 373""2419o jrrains metric weight, of silver bullion of 
 standard fineness so brought, in whatever denomination the same is 
 coined." 
 
 To this the following lines also have reference: — 
 
 " Xo undue preference shall be shown to any person or body under this 
 section, and everv jierson f)r liodv sliall have jirioritv arcnrdinLT to the 
 time at wiiich he or tliey brought such Imllion to the Mint." 
 
 The Act, as finally passed, omits the foregoing, retaining only the other 
 Free Coinage clauses which refer to Gold only; but it also contains the 
 following : — 
 
 '■ 11. It shall be lawful for Her Majesty, with the advice of Iler Privy 
 Coimcil, from time to time by proclamation to do all or any of the following 
 
 things, uamelv. 
 
 '♦**** 
 
 (10.) To regulate anv matters relative to the coinage and the Mint 
 within the present prerogative of the ("rown which are not pro- 
 vided for by this Act." 
 
 If the Free Coinage of Silver provided by the Act of 1816 was within 
 *' the present prerogative of the Crown," and was not '" provided for by 
 this .\ct," it would seem to have remained intact. 
 
186 Silver be/ore EwjlisJi Public Opinion. 
 
 these the most important is the clear and strong utterance of 
 !Mr. Alexander Baring, M.P. (afterwards Lord Ashburton), 
 whoso position can here be tersely indicated by his reply to 
 the (luestion, " whether it was possible and desirable to main- 
 tain a Silver Legal-Tender at or near the French ratio," 
 namely, " I have always thought so, and certainly think so 
 still. T have no doubt about \i." (Appendix No. 23.) 
 
 The following piece of evidence (which it was my fortune 
 to discover in a Parliamentary Paper), coming from Mr. Drew, 
 the CJovornor, and Mr. Palmer, the Deputy-Governor, of the 
 Bank of England in 1828, — against Silver, but giving the 
 reason why, — is also of interest as indicating the gulf that 
 separates the opinion of the earlier day from that later 
 doctrine of Metrical Unity with Gold as the Unit, to which 
 full reference has been made in Chapter IV. 
 
 Question : 
 
 " 1st. "Whether, in the opinion of the Bank, it bo desirable 
 that there should be established and maintained in this 
 country, at the same time that we maintain the existing Silver 
 currency, a Silver currency as a Legal-Tender, the value of 
 which should bear to Gold nearly that proportion which is 
 established in France, say about lo^- to 1 
 
 (" In replying to the three preceding queries, the Bank will 
 bear in mind that the object is to retain Gold as the bulk of 
 the currency, and to have Silver as an aid to it.'') 
 
 Answer : 
 
 " 1. Provided there bo sufficient Silver cuirency in the 
 country for the small payments, there does not appear to tho 
 Bank to be any advantage in tho proposed addition of Silver, 
 as a general Legal-Tender, from the great dij/icuUy of retaining 
 Gold as the bulk of the currency under such an arrangement." 
 (Appendix 21.) 
 
 (Tho italics are mine.) 
 
 The reader will observe that the difficulty of keeping (iold 
 as the bulk of the currency was tho point: not the dithculty 
 
Sect. 21.] Standard Bullio?i and Stafidard Coin. 187 
 
 of keepinj^ Silver at par with Gold, nor the idea that to have 
 Silver as Legal-Tender was per se an infraction of, or a 
 derogation from, the " Standard" established by the Act of 
 1816. Evidently, the dream of ^Metrology had not yet set the 
 fashion of thought. Indeed, so little was the current opinion 
 distorted by false theory, that I find in the minutes of evidence 
 before the Committee on the Royal Mint of 1837 an adumbra- 
 tion of the most advanced thought of to-day. 
 
 The mere faint suggestion of a fixed price to be paid by 
 Bank or Mint for Gold and Silver Bullion, and that Bullion 
 can remain at par in different states " as we get more civilized," 
 are certainly worthy of commemoration, and the credit of 
 these seems to lie in part with the Chairman of tlie Com- 
 mittee, Mr. Joseph Hume, and the witness Mr. Haggard,. 
 Chief Clerk of the Bullion Office of the Bank of England. (See 
 Appendix 25.) 
 
 Mr. Haggard published in 1847 a pamphlet,' entitled 
 '' Observations on the Standard of Value and the Circulating 
 Medium of this Country," in which he sets forth a plan for 
 the reformation of the English Monetary System, which is of 
 peculiar interest, and I therefore present it here in brief,, 
 stating it entirely in my own words : — 
 
 The Standard of Value to be Silver Bullion ; four ouncea 
 (|^ fine), being the substratum of a Paper Pound 
 Sterling. 
 The Full-Legal-Tcnder circulation to consist of paper re- 
 presenting that Bullion ; the Paper (Bank notes, so- 
 called) being Legal-Tender from the Bank, as well as- 
 between indi\'iduals. 
 The Coin to consist of Gold and Silver at 15!^ to 1, Gold 
 Legal-Tender for £200, Silver Legal-Tender for £2^ 
 both kinds charged with " seigniorage." 
 In speaking of the ratio, 15^ to 1, Mr. Haggard adds the- 
 
 ' I am indebted for knnwlcdi:e of this ]>amplilet to Mr. S. O. Grnv, tlie- 
 Chief Accountant of the Bank of England. 
 
188 Silrer before Ewjlish Public Opinion. 
 
 words " the same as France," which contain a reason equally 
 in accord with the views of Sir James Houblon and Mr. 
 Micliael Godfrey, and of Mr. Gibbs and Mr. Grenfell. 
 
 That the tradition of Silver Money in England maintained 
 itself among learned men, in despite of the course of events, is 
 nowhere better shown than in the words of Sir John Herschel, 
 who, though Master of the ^lint, was not afraid to say, in 
 1853, of the Single Gold Standard : " I do not mean to say a 
 Silver Standard would not be better ; I believe it would, and 
 I believe a binary Standard, half Silver, half Gold, at the 
 option of either party to insist on, would be better than either." 
 (Rep. Dec. Coinage, 1853, p. 46.) 
 
 We now come to consider the views of ^Ir. S, J. Loyd, 
 afterwards Lord Overstone. Without attempting to review 
 those endless campaigns of controversy as to Currency and 
 Banking, for which the theory of the Bank Act of 1844 
 serves as an ever-ripening apple of discord, it is germane 
 and practical to ascertain at head- quarters, so to speak, what 
 was then the General Order on the subject of Silver. 
 
 In the various markets, and in most of the currencies of the 
 world. Silver and Gold stood side by side — with little fluctuation 
 of relative value — and no one seems to have thought of in- 
 quiring why they stood by each other so steadily, or how this 
 comfortable Balance of Power was maintained. At the same 
 time England had excluded Silver-coin from being Full-Legal- 
 Tendcr, and there was no present probability that this settle- 
 ment would be disturbed. The practical dangers and 
 difficulties at that time in England with which a monetary 
 reformer had to deal, were naturally connected with the issue 
 of Bank-notes, and lessons of reform were to bo drawn from 
 England's experience in the period of Restriction, and of 
 Resumption, from the panic of 1825, and from the depression 
 of 1837 and 1830. 
 
 Such was the genesis of the novel features of the Bank 
 Charter Act: it purported to deal with the superstructure, — 
 
Sect. 21.] Standard Bullion a?id Sta7idard Coin. 189 
 
 with the parts of the monetary edifice where repair was 
 needed, with the attics and balconies, and lighter apparatus 
 connected with it, rather than with its main body, or its 
 foundation, that is to say, with Silver and Gold, with Money 
 and the State. It was natural that, as in elder times the 
 phenomena of tho solar system seemed to the learned world 
 to find their centre in the earth, so now a certain order 
 of things should bo equally well taken for granted. 
 To Lord Overstone, whose ideas were embodied in that 
 Act, Money, Coin, Bullion, used generally, included Silver 
 as well as Gold, and it was only when the relation of English 
 Coin to English Paper came into play that tho yellow colours 
 were displayed and Gold alone was spoken of. 
 
 Overstone^s great principle, " That a metallic currency, by 
 virtue of its own intrinsic value, will regulate itself," was 
 evidently constructed upon an unconscious assumption of the 
 permanence of existing conditions, an assumption which 
 was very natural, while England's Money was enjoying so 
 comfortable a lateral support from the laws of other countries, 
 that in a statement of the metallic reserves of English Banks 
 the experienced theorist did not feel called upon to distinguish 
 Silver from Gold. "What better evidence could be asked of 
 the success of the then existing " Bimetallic Union " than 
 this confidence of Lord Overstone in Silver as Standard 
 Bullion, if not as Standard Money ? 
 
 In 1832, when he urged the publication of a statement of 
 the assets and liabilities of the Bank of England, he gave 
 no suggestion that a distinction be made between the Metals, 
 and in the returns provided for in the Bank Charter Act of 
 1833, tho Bank regularly published its statements of " Bul- 
 lion," while it regularly held a goodly proportion of Silver. 
 The effect of tho Bank Charter Act of 18-i4 upon the status 
 of Silver was to limit, and yet at the same time to legalize, the 
 function of Silver, as what I may call Lawful-Money-metal, 
 or Standard Bullion, as distinjjuished from Standard Coin. 
 
190 Silver before Emjlish Public Opinioii. 
 
 In completing the list of restrictions upon the issue of 
 Bank-notes and of Paper-Money in England, the eflfort was 
 made to have assurance trebly if not quadruply sure that the 
 notes which remained should bo ever convertible, and inas- 
 much as the law made them convertible into Gold it was found 
 necessary, as the Statute declares, to limit the amount of 
 Silver which the new Issue Department of the Bank could hold. 
 Henceforth, one part of Silver to four parts of Gold became 
 the limit for Silver. That the new law was regarded as touching 
 the question of the Standard, or that the Standard had not 
 passed beyond Parliamentary action in the sense of being a 
 compact or Act of Settlement, or other law by which the faith 
 of the nation is pledged — is amply recognized by Sir Robert 
 Peel in the speech reprinted in the Appendix (20) . The prin- 
 ciple of principles, in his view, is that there must be Standard 
 Metal, Standard Coin, or Standard Bullion, and it was con- 
 sistent with this principle that it should be either Gold, or 
 Silver, or both; but he invited Parliament, as we have seen, in 
 the name of all the great writers on this subject — Petty, Locke, 
 Harris, Liverpool — to declare for the Single Standard, and 
 that Standard, Gold. 
 
 It was, of course, very natural that in fixing the limit to 
 the amount of Silver Bullion which could serve as a deposit 
 for Bank of England notes, it was ordered that the statement 
 of assets should note the character of the Bullion — and the 
 returns down to a late date show an ample use of Silver. ]5ut 
 the regulation of the Statute, so rigid in everything else, 
 shows, on the one vital point, the Gold-value of Silver, a quite 
 phenomenal laxity. 
 
 Under the Act of 18 tt Silver Ikillion is still " Bullion " — 
 and so it remains to-day. Nothing is said in the Law of the 
 amount of Silver, except that it thall not be " an Amount of 
 vSilvcr JUiUion not exceeding one Fourth Part of the Gold 
 Coin and Bullion." 
 
 From the standpoint of to-day, ihonaivctt' of this Section 
 
Sect. 21.] Standard Bullion and Standard Coin. 191 
 
 is monumental. AVo recall unlimited pages of Utopian 
 economy and Saturnian statistics, which are wisdom if Silver 
 and Gold are " commodities and nothing more," but are no 
 better than the crackling of thorns under a pot if Silver and 
 Gold are something more than mere commodities : wo recall, 
 on the other hand, the inner light and holy fire that inspired 
 the crusade for Golden Metrical Money whose banners were 
 blessed at all the shrines of learning in Christendom, and 
 then we turn to Section III. of the Bank Charter Act, and see 
 that " Silver Bullion not exceeding 07ie fourth j'xirt of the Gold 
 Bullion " is a part of the Base of England's Money ! What 
 does it mean ? In the vaults of the Issue Department of the 
 Great Bank two primordial elements, one " the fourth " of the 
 other ! But how " the fourth ? '' That implies quantity. Is 
 it the fourth part in eflfective bulk, as if one were comparing 
 a gallon of oats and a quart of wheat, or is it weight that is 
 spoken of — four pounds of Gold to one pound of Silver ? By 
 no means ! On the contrary : in bulk, the Statute provides 
 for nearly seven times as much Silver as Gold ; in weight, 
 nearly four times as much. " But how is this ? " the reader 
 well may say ; " the Statute says nothing of this.'' Not 
 explicitly ; and yet everybody has so understood it. For Silver 
 and Gold are something other than elements, or commodities ; 
 they are Money, generally exchangeable for each other by the 
 fat of Christendom ; and everyone knew it, and thought no 
 evil of it ; and it was under the advice of Lord Overstone and 
 of Sir Robert Peel that the British Parliament rightly took 
 Gold and Silver and their relations to each other for granted. 
 It was the new-fangled notion of astrological ]\Ioney, based on 
 Utopian economy and Saturnian statistics, which came into 
 fashion long after 1844, that souglit to repudiate these truths, 
 and which set one emperor after another trying to crown 
 the edifice of his reign by turning the monetary foundations 
 of it upside down. 
 
 After meditation upon these lines, those most prosaic words 
 
102 Silver be/ore English Public Opinion. 
 
 " Silver Bullion not exceeding one-fourth part of the Gold," 
 looked at fixedly, may come out before the eyes in flames, 
 a writing on the wall for these Utopias ; a prophetic inr>crip- 
 tion, which the waves of time cannot deface — " "Woe bo 
 unto thee, thy days are numbered : thou art weighed in the 
 balance, and found wanting." 
 
 An early instalment of retribution was visited upon these 
 Utopias when the follo^ving communication was sent to tha 
 Monetary Conference of 1881 : — 
 
 " Subject to these considerations [viz., the return of the- 
 Mints of other countries to such rules as would ensure the 
 conversion of Gold into Silver, and Silver into Gold], the 
 Bank Court are satisfied that the issue of their notes against. 
 Silver, within the letter of the Act, would not involve the nsk 
 of infringing that principle of it which imposes a positive obli- 
 gation on the Bank to receive Gold in exchange for notes, and, 
 to pay notes in Gold on demand. 
 
 " The Bank Court see no reason why an assurance should 
 not be conveyed to the Monetary Conference at Paris, if their 
 Lordships think it desirable, that the Bank of England, 
 agreeably with the Act of 1844, would be always open to the 
 purchase of Silver under the conditions above described." 
 
 § 22. INTERNATIONAL CONCURRENCE IN THE PAST AND IN THE . 
 
 PRESENT. 
 
 This action of the Bank of England in 188 1 affords a con- 
 venient vantage-ground from which we can look back upon 
 the expanse of monetary experience that lies between the 
 present time and the days when that Bank was founded. The 
 point which seems to me to appeal to us for attention is — 
 the simplicity of the task of insuring order in the relations 
 of the Money-metals for England's use, the practicability of 
 it, or, to express the idea in another form, the absence of great 
 
Sect. 22.] International Concurrence. 193 
 
 interests, or of natural obstacles to work against the fulfilment 
 of the task. 
 
 Let us, for a moment, imagine tlio guinea reducecl at the 
 beginning of the XVIIIth century below 21 shillings — that is, 
 to a fi'^ure which would have oftered near accord with the then 
 French ratio, and have firmly established the precedent of dili- 
 gence in observing the principle of international concurrence. 
 The reader will mark well, the supposition cannot bo regarded as 
 extreme or improbable. It merely supposes a more scrupulous 
 observance of a plain, busiuess-likc, common-sense principle, to 
 which, as I have shown, at the date mentioned, the officers 
 of the Bank of England, the "Warden of the Mint, and the 
 chief economic adviser of the Government, had respectively 
 proved their adhesion. Science and business experience thus 
 united at the time in recommending this harmony of ratio 
 between neighbouring states. Moreover, England, in fact, 
 tried to do the thing recommended. ISTow, although England 
 did it ill, instead of doing it well, it is entirely practical to 
 consider what would have been the result, if she had done this 
 thing well, instead of doing it ill. 
 
 We ask, then. Supposing England's Money brought into 
 unison with the " par of her neighbours,'"' or the " example of 
 France " accepted in full, what would have happened — what 
 might have happened ? 
 
 Obviously, we can contemplate as one result, a concurrent 
 Silver and Gold Standard (with Silver Unit in each country) 
 in France and Enfjland, at ratios close to 14^ to 1. From 
 such a state of affairs, other events might well have pro- 
 ceeded in time. As it was, great changes came. France 
 abandoned Seigniorage (once 7 and 8 per cent.) ; England 
 abandoned that statutory inhibition upon the exportation 
 of coin which makes so wide a difiference between the position 
 of the metals in the present, and in the past. But with the 
 ratio of 14^ so securely in possession, it seems at the least 
 safe to say that the change in France to 15 ^ would not 
 
 o 
 
194 Silver before English Public Opinion. 
 
 have occurred in 17S5, nor would it liave been adopted in 
 1803. The effective reason for that change * was the scarcity 
 of Gold in French circulation. IJut our supposition implies 
 that England would have parted with much Gold, certainly 
 enough to give France what she needed ; so that, really, our 
 supposition may be held to remove the reason for the change 
 of 1785, and, therefore, for the readoption of 15 ^ in 1803. 
 
 Inferring thus from history as it is, to history as it might 
 have been, it is legitimate to think that concurrence of ratio 
 between England and France, in 1700, would have maintained 
 concurrence through the century then beginning. 
 
 But concurrence in the XVIIlth century would have made 
 concurrence natural in the XlXth. Had the Monetary System 
 which I have called the Silver and Gold Standard with a 
 Silver Unit, which was, in fact, suffered to go to pieces in the 
 shallows of debasement, been maintained, it would not only in 
 the XVlIIth century have served every purpose of England 
 better than the halting system with which she was forced, 
 through the default of statesmanship, to content herself, but 
 it might well have reduced both the evils attendant upon the 
 issue of Paper-Money during the Napoleonic wars, and upon 
 the Restoration of Cash Payments; and its presence later, would 
 have spared civilization the spectacle of the Battle of the 
 Standards, in the midst of which we stand to-day, the aimless 
 Thirty Years' War of Money against Money,which coming times 
 will look back upon as a reproach to our century, and which 
 still awaits that new settlement of peace which in after times 
 may well be compared in its importance to the Treaty of 
 Westphalia. 
 
 If England^ the original instigator of this War of Coinages, 
 is still to hold the place of an obstacle to concord, certainly 
 Englishmen owe it to themselves amply to justify this course. 
 
 ^ This entire matter is set fortli in a paper on "The ratio of 15^- in 
 France," in tlie Documents of the Conferences of 1878 and of 1881. 
 
Sect. 22.] International Concurrence. 195 
 
 If tho principle of iutcrnational concurrcnco in dealing 
 with tho Money-metals is to be rejected by England to-day, 
 it must be for reasons whoso roots lie deep among tho forces 
 that have made her history. I challenge tho search for such 
 reasons. 
 
 What are tho generating forces that produced tho Anti- 
 Silver sections of England's later monetary laws, which ex- 
 clude that ancient Standard of the Realm in vindication of 
 which Somers and Montague and Locke and Newton won their 
 monetary ftime ? An answer is to be found in tho preceding 
 pages. 
 
 Undoubtedly in the line of the earlier years, some Money- 
 mongers (as they were well named), whether of high or of low 
 degree, have profited by the disorder of Money, but beyond 
 this where are the obstacles to order ? Evidently, the heedless- 
 ness of rulers, slight errors of opinion in their advisers, inertia 
 of governments, were the obstacles to realization of the de- 
 mands of an actual harmony of all great interests which made 
 entirely for order. 
 
 But all these obstacles are of subordinate quality ; they 
 belong neither to the rank of instincts, nor of habits, nor 
 of passions, nor of interests, which arc the great irresistible 
 forces that make history ; they arc all, iu fact, resolvable into 
 a slight failure of illumination on the part of men in control of 
 a nation — an obstacle, therefore, which was removable by 
 turning on a little more of the light of learning and of business 
 sense, which arc the rightful heritage of a great commercial 
 Power. 
 
 So far as the present century is concerned, tho Anti- Silver 
 laws are shown to be, historically, tho outcome of heedlessness, 
 of confusion of thought, of cheese-paring finance, of fables 
 agreed upon, of visionary system-building, and of mythical 
 science — of error, which, in order to be well forgiven, must 
 soon be well replaced. 
 
196 Silver before Ewjlish Public Opinion. 
 
 Turning now from considering these lessons of the past to 
 the task of present action, we note at once that the terms of 
 tlie monetary problem have suffered change in the centuries. 
 
 Like feudal robber-knights and war-levying bishops, the 
 seigniorial system of coinage has passed away ; more orderly 
 conditions prevail, and it is now not only possible, but common, 
 that nations should act together effectively in matters of j^uch 
 common interest as the regulation of Money. In earlier times, 
 the task of establishing a more closely concurrent monetary 
 policy between nations than then obtained, would have found no 
 obstacle in difference of metal of which the Unit was made : 
 but the idea of such a task, while not unknown, as I am able 
 to prove by English testimony, which I recommend to the 
 reader's attention, ' could have but feeble life in an ago when 
 shiftless debasement was a common exercise of prerogative, 
 
 ^ " Of Co>tr.\cting with Forkign Nations bv Ambass vdors to Kf.kp 
 Thkir Monkys at a Ckrtain Standard. — Annmirst nil tlic KcmeiiiLs 
 proiuniiKled agaiiijit tlie Altt'iatitnis ot'^Itim-ys, there is none more spetioiis 
 than tills, nor more frequent in mention, both in provisional Edicts ^^hi<■h 
 are made for the Reformation of Monevs. and in Considerations held for 
 the purpose, for it is said to advance it : That if we contract with other 
 Nations for a certain and stable standard of Moneys which may be etpial. 
 then we shall avoid all the Inconveniences that do grow by the 
 raising of Moneys, because we shall never raise them, and we shall 
 avoid all the Inconveniences that do grow by the not raising of 
 ^loneys, becau.se otiier nations shall not raise theirs. Besides for this 
 Kemedy there is alled^'ed the exami'le of fnruier .\ges. wherein it appears 
 that in uumy Treaties with tbrein Nations our Kings did contract for the 
 mutual standard of tlicir Money. But however the Proposition be specious 
 antl frequent, yet, of all other Remedies, if it be thoroughly examined, it will 
 api'car the most dillicidt. or rather iuqiossible, to be eirecte<l ; and if it were 
 elTected, it woidd turn to no use, for tlius stands the state of this iuisiness, 
 almost all the Silver which is now drawn out of the Kurth, comcth from 
 the West-ln<lies. all whicli intircly aboordcth fust in S]iaiu. whence it is 
 disjiersed into other Coiuitries Eastward ; which do draw it mito them by 
 .setting an hijiher price iqion it ; for, lus if there were no Cloth in all the 
 World but in Englan<l, no other Country could have Cloth except they did 
 jiav dearer for it than in Englaml ; and by so nuich dearer by how much 
 it were more remote from ICnglaud. because to the original j>rici', there 
 must of necessity be added an increase in regard of the time, the charge, 
 ami hazard of transporting it : so tares it with Silver, that all Countries 
 which will draw from Spain, do necessarily set a greater jirico upon it, by 
 how much thev arc more rcuiotc from thence, and this is the Reason why 
 
Sect. 22.] International Concurrence. 197 
 
 and tampering with the coins a favourite means of filling the 
 purses of a fixvoured few. 
 
 The earlier events set forth in the preceding pages are the 
 story of England's efforts in emerging from these conditions. 
 The statute of 16GG was the assumption by Representative 
 Government of the task of regulating the work of the Mint 
 upon a new principle, and upon lines of stability and publicity 
 consonant with the needs of a nation, rather than responsive 
 to the exigencies of a Court. The Statutes of the Recoinage, 
 dealing with evils assailing the very life of the nation, sought 
 to give a new solidity to the time-honoured establishment of 
 the Silver Measure of Commerce, with Gold as Current coin. 
 Had the work thus begun been continued upon the lines which 
 I have shown to have been well traced by the architects of 
 this political edifice, the dual Money of the world would have 
 found its regulation in this form. 
 
 To-day, the question of this regulation has entered a dis- 
 tinctly different phase through the change of the relative 
 quantity of the metals in the hands of man. 
 
 For the Monetary legislator of to-day, the appearance of Gold 
 
 the .«j)liear of Silver secmetli to roll from the East to the West, until it come 
 unto liiui, where it seemeth to fall into a Gulpli. But of Gokl it is not so, 
 because that comes in so great abuiulance from the East as from tlie "West. 
 
 •■ Xow then it were a great Prejudice for England and France to contract 
 witli Spain for a certain standard of Silver, except they could likewise 
 contract for the same standard with the Low-Countries, and Italv, who 
 draw p.art of their Silver from them, as tliey draw theirs from Spain ; for 
 others, they should give a stop to the coming in of their Silver, and should 
 leave the issue of it open. Nor would T>u'key contract, unless tliev could 
 also contract with Persia for tlie same, where Silver is yet higher than in 
 Turkey, and so forward into China ; neither would the Low-Couutrie men 
 contract, except they could contract for the same witli tlie Ilansc-Towns, 
 where Silver is higher than in the Low-Countries ; neither %vould the Ilanse* 
 Towns contract, except they could contract for the same with Prussia and 
 Poland; neitlier would they of Poland contract, except they could contract 
 with Miiscovie ; neither would Muscovie contract, except thov could con- 
 tract with Persia ; and so forward in all swell places Silver is still nt an 
 higher and higher rate. 
 
 " Put suppose it was possible to draw all those Countries to a certain 
 contract, what would be the use of it ? 
 
198 Silver before Enjlish Public Opinion. 
 
 hero and therein the place of Silver as the formal and statutory 
 Unit of Coinage, has tended to complicate the problem ; but 
 this cfTect has been largely neutralized by the counter-incrcaso 
 of the relative stock of Gold through the rich outpourings of tho 
 mines. Tho actual diversity of material adopted for tho Unit 
 in diflcrent countries is unlikely to form an obstacle to a con- 
 current policy of the nations, — which must of necessity embrace 
 both metals, — because such diversity can produce no serious 
 embarrassment except in an event which may bo excluded 
 from consideration because nature excludes it from probability : 
 that is to say, in the case of a future brcaking-up of tho 
 Union, or dislocation of tho parity between the metals which 
 it shall have established. 
 
 Admitting either metal as Money at an identical ratio, 
 certain to have a fair supply of either metal relatively to tho 
 other, it is a matter of subordinate importance to the nations 
 Avhich are so to unite, whether one or the other metal bears 
 tho Unit in this nation or in that. In 1873 the United States 
 made CJold the official standard of value: it would mean no 
 derogation fi'om this position if, under proper guarantees of 
 international concert, they should give the same rights to 
 Silver which Gold had under tho Silver Standard of 
 "William III. Similar privileges given to Silver in England 
 would leave the Gold sovereign in the future still, as it is now, 
 the corner-stone of tho English system ; in other words, in 
 tho free enjoyment of all the rights it has beneficially pos- 
 
 " I did ill a former Chapter observe that most Countries, and particularly 
 France and Low-Countries do seldome or never raise their Moneys, but 
 when people by Custom and general Use have raise<l fiie money before hand, 
 beyond the Publick Declaration and the State is forced to follow the People 
 whom in this case they do not master. 
 
 '■ To what end is it to contract with those Nations for that which is not 
 in their power to observe ? And that wliich is alled^red for the course of 
 lontractin;.', with forcin Nations, out of the exanij)le of former times, 
 doth clearly convince the vanity of this Proposition, for it is manifest, as I 
 have shewed in the former Cliapters that notwithst.andinir these Contracts 
 the Money was continually from time to time raised." — Chap. XVII. of 
 Kicc Vau'.dian, on "Coins and Coinage" (London, 1657). 
 
Sect. 22.] International Concurrence. 199 
 
 sessed. England would have her Gold Standard and her 
 Silver and Gold Money in 188G, just as sho had her Silver 
 Standard and her Gold and Silver Money in 1G9G, but undo*" 
 guarantees of permanence hitherto unknown. 
 
 These observations aro put forth merely witli :i view of 
 assigning its rank to the question of tho Single ^Monetary Unit 
 under the conditions that obtain to-day. I do not intend 
 thereby to express an opinion as to tho cjucstion whether a 
 change of the Unit^or whether the simultaneous formal adoption 
 of a Silver Unit and a Gold Unit — iu Jefferson's phrase, 
 " putting the Unit in the two metals " — is advisable in any 
 particular country or group of countries ; a matter which it is 
 not necessary to discuss at this time. 
 
 Recurring, then, to the scruples which support tho inviola- 
 bility of the present Standard of England, in the sense of 
 National Unit of Coinage, the Pound Sterling of Gold which 
 in 1816 became the lawful successor of the Pound Sterling of 
 Silver, whose story begins with the misty dawn of history, it 
 has, I hope, become clear that no rightful jurisdiction of it 
 need be invaded by any use of Silver as Full-Legal-Tendcr iu 
 England, however abundant, which should proceed under tho 
 conditions of international or foreign action that stand ready 
 for fulfilment. No one thinks that the English Standard is 
 debased to-day by the circulation of Bank of England notes 
 as Legal-Tender, although part of them have behind them 
 only credit, and many might have Silver Bullion, if tho 
 Bank used tho privilege accorded by the law of 184- !•. 
 Why should Silver always at par with Gold have any more 
 serious effect upon the integrity of tho (rold " Standard ?'' 
 It is generally understood in other departments of thought 
 that '' things which are equal to the same thing aro equal to 
 each other." 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Notable Arguments against Inter-metallic Peace. 
 
 § 23. certain theses op professor erwin nasse. 
 
 Many of the arguments current among monetary writers have 
 been met, directly or indirectly, in what has gone before ; 
 and the task remains to me of presenting a brief summary of 
 the remaining armament of opposition to Joint Kestoration of 
 Silver. 
 
 Professor Erwin Nasse stands in the front rank of monetary 
 writers of his time, and has lately' put forth a work on the 
 Monetary Question in Germany (''Die "Waehrungsfrage in 
 Deutschlaud") which appears to mo the most important 
 publication which the defence of Demonetization has pro- 
 duced, and therefore well entitled to be openly confronted. 
 Admittincr as fact the cardinal doctrine of Unionists that 
 Anti-Silver-law and practice have broken the par which the 
 Dual-Standard-law established ; admitting also the duty of 
 the State to interfere in order to protect against an alteration 
 of the Purchasing Power of ^loney, and thence advancing to 
 the concession that international concert may, under conceiv- 
 able circumstances, become a necessity, Nasso still seeks to 
 bar all passage for progress by the theses — 
 
 1st, not only that a Silvcr-and-Gold Union without England 
 is not safe under any circumstances : but also, 2nd, that the 
 evils now existing are not sufficient to warrant Germany in com- 
 
 ' February, 1885. 
 
Sect. 2o.] Pr'\t\'Sso)' Nassers Theses. 201 
 
 mittins: herself to the establislnnent of international concert 
 in the matter of Money. 
 
 Upon the first thesis 1 shall say nothing ; and, after all 
 that has gone before, I need enter but partially ui)on the 
 second thesis. To Nasse's vitw, however, of the nature and 
 character of the question involved, as a whole, 1 must take 
 exception. lie regards Germany's accession to a Silver-and- 
 Gold Union as an infraction of the independence of Germany. 
 He objects to what ho calls " our sacrificing the right of 
 independent regulation of our ]\roney in so essential a point 
 as the use of Gold and Silver, and betaking ourselves to a 
 contractual dependence in relation to foreign states." 
 
 To my mind this appears to bo in essence the expres- 
 sion of a certain restiveness ; of an unwillingness that 
 a certain nation should bear the ordinary burdens of civil 
 intercourse. That these are, in certain circumstances, 
 burdens, is true ; but they must bo borne : the only 
 option is between bearing them well or ill. in the course 
 of ages our race has gained an ample experience of analogous 
 purport in those regions of conduct, for example, wliich are 
 regulated by the Law of Father and Child, the Law of Hus- 
 band and Wife, the Law of Landlord and Tenant. But surely 
 if these bodies of law are of man's contriving it was not men, 
 but the nature of man, that made the necessity for them : if 
 there were no burdens to be borne there need be no laws. 
 The wise regulation is born of a necessity, and not of an 
 unrestricted, unconditioned will. 
 
 So of the relation of the State to the mattc-r before us, 
 concurrent regulation of Money. Man is a trading being, in 
 spite of Professor Xasse : he may regret it, but such is the 
 fact. And with the fact comes, for each nation, an interest 
 in the action of other nations, and a need for concurrent action 
 in the interest of all. If it were a question whether the 
 German nation should transfer its fair domain from the planet 
 Lunn, where there is no conflict of monetary systems, to the 
 
202 Xotable Ar(jumf7its. 
 
 planet Terra, where there is such conflict, we must, I think, 
 concede that Professor Nasse's position has its strength, but 
 not till then ! 
 
 In discussing the question of degree of existing evils. Pro- 
 fessor Xasso, to my surprise, allows himself to indulge iu a 
 variety of pleas which seek to defend the demonetization 
 movement from responsibility for the contraction and depres- 
 sion, which in England are admitted, by the highest authorities, 
 to be in fair measure due to this cause. 
 
 But beside this, he denies the fact of an important general 
 rise in the value of Gold. This subject has been discussed 
 in the preceding pages, and it is needless now to recur 
 to it. Professor Xasse's error on this point is beyond 
 question. But he also undertakes to make light of the drag 
 upon international trade arising from the fracture of the par 
 formerly maintained by alternative coinage in the Silver-and- 
 Gold nations. Here again he has all England, so to speak, 
 against him. Now, if Professor Nasse is really measuring 
 interests, measuring the foreign trade of Germany with the 
 foreign trade of England, of course it may well appear that 
 Germany's interest is numerically quite small. But is it not 
 customary to weigh interests rather than count them ? If 
 England has five children, while Germany has but one, an 
 alarm of scarlet fever need not produce perturbation in the 
 exact ratio of 5 to 1. 
 
 The facts upon which Professor Nasse lays great stress are 
 the expansion of Indian exports and imports of late years. 
 
 In his reasoning on this head ho neglects what appears to 
 mo the gist of the matter. The notable cftcct of Indian 
 exports does not arise from the mere provisioning of Europe 
 with these articles, but from their low ]iricc : a price made 
 artificially low by the eflect of Anti- Silver-laws, which 
 have thus had the eff'ect of disorganizing home valuations ' in 
 the States wliich adopted these laws. Their price is the obvious 
 
 ' See Section 6. 
 
Sect. 23.] Professor Nasse's Theses. 203 
 
 result of tlio rise of the Silver-price of Gold. But this rise, 
 a specific product of European Outlawry of Silver, is capable 
 of being considered apart from the continuance of fluctuations 
 and uncertainty in the Silver-price of Gold, which, cumula- 
 tively to the great upheavals by which (Silver- Gold) invest- 
 ments are seriously deranged, add a constant force to make 
 business aleatory, and injuriously affect international trade. 
 
 In the following: sections we shall confront some of Pro- 
 fessor Nasse's minor positions in detail. 
 
 § 2-1'. SILVER GUTLAWnY AXD TITE MANUAL- LABOUR CLASSES. 
 
 It appears that the apology for demonetization contains 
 one aggressive argument which wears the uniform of Humani- 
 tarianism. A social transformation is said to be in progress, 
 by which the manual-labour classes are winning a greater 
 share of the profits of work. Hence it follows — What follows ? 
 From the use which is sometimes made of this argument, 
 however ingeniously it is brought forward, the unwary would 
 really infer that it was desirable to demonetize Money, contract 
 prices, and produce a general depression of business, in order 
 to improve the condition of the manual-labour classes ! 
 
 Compared with this the naivete of Charles Lamb's China- 
 men who burned their houses down in order to enjoy roast- 
 pig, is sagacity itself. "What a satisfiiction it must be to a 
 simple-minded member of the rank and file of Silver Outlawry 
 who, in his heart, is troubled at the condition of thiugs, and 
 
 "Hack reroils, lie knows not wliy, 
 E'en at tlic sound hiniseli" has made," 
 
 to find that, after all, he has been a friend of the working-man 
 all tho time, a philanthropist without knowing it ! 
 
 But it will bo said, it is impossible that responsible writers 
 can have maintained such an absurdity — and I must frankly 
 admit this : but must observe also, that it is one thing to use 
 an absurdity oneself, and another to allow others to use it. 
 
204 Xotable Afjumefits. 
 
 Responsible writers seem to use this argument to prove that 
 the employers of labour are mistaken in thinking that prices 
 are lo\v ; it is not that at all : it is that wages are higher than 
 they once were, and profits are smaller; thus employers feel 
 depressed and discouraged : but the country ought to rejoice, 
 not to mourn. 
 
 But the same general argument which Mr. Pirmez and 
 Professor Xasse desire to make effective for Belgium and 
 Germany, lias been tried in England on the most effective scale 
 and has been " found wanting." The Belgian and German argu- 
 ments are likely to prove equally transitory with the English. 
 
 Before leaving this important subject we may conveniently 
 set forth certain theses which will be found germane : aflirm- 
 ing, namely : — 
 
 1st. That like Causes B and C and Counter-cause D, set 
 forth in Chapter III., this growing command of the manual- 
 labour classes over the comforts of life is a tendency of the 
 time, and must have been in existence while prices were rising 
 after 1850, as well as while they have been falling since lS7o. 
 (See page 10.) 
 
 2nd. That accounts of the condition of hand-workers are 
 incomplete and utterly misleading when they depend upon 
 the daili/ rate of wages merely : for then the main point is 
 omitted, namely, the animal rate, the amount of wages, steady 
 employment, regular and constant work. 
 
 ord. That accounts of the industrial activity of peoples in 
 late years, are merely a comparison of bad years with bad 
 years ; not of years of full prosperity, when the brain of the 
 man of enterprise and the arms of the labourer were working 
 " full time," each " rejoicing as a giant to run his course." 
 
 •i-th. That for many years certain strong influences have been 
 at work to obscure the perception of what real prosperity means, 
 and what a nation or a community can do, when its men of en- 
 terprise are working " full time." These influences grow out 
 of the facts 
 
Sect. 24.] Silrer aivJ Wnjes. 205 
 
 (A.) That the great school of whilom orthodox doctors, who 
 obtained control of the patient world, and prescribed demone- 
 tization are, unfortunately, bound by powerful motives to 
 maintain that the patient is doing well — in spite of appear- 
 ances : 
 
 (B.) That hopefulness and cheerfulness in adverse times arc 
 a duty. 
 
 There have been for years, therefore, good reasons why 
 men of influence should be unconsciously led, not only to 
 ignore the quality of general prosperity, but also with after- 
 wisdom to disable the benefits of former prosperous years: 
 for the collapse of 1873, relating back, imputed a degree of 
 lightheadedness to investments of the preceding years, which, 
 but for a State policy of contraction, need not have seemed a 
 justified charge. We can picture to ourselves the effect of 
 enforced idleness as compared with working full time, by the 
 query how far the brains and hands that have been idle or 
 unprofitably engaged in England since 1873, would have gone 
 toward putting Asia in harness by a railroad from the ^ledi- 
 terranean to the Indus, or bridling Africa with a curb of steel 
 from the Congo-mouth to Zanzibar. 
 
 5th. That the question of moment is, therefore, not whether 
 a nation can exist and pay its way, in spite of a certain 
 monetary policy, but whether such a policy tends, as compared 
 with another policy, to infuse that blood in the veins of people 
 which impels them to work " full time," and makes them 
 happy in doing so. 
 
 0th. That to re-iutegi*ato the foundation of the world's 
 business by settling the Silver Question would have this 
 tendency is so plain as to need no argument here. 
 
206 Notable Arguments. 
 
 § 25. LION'S IN TUE PATH OP THE REINSTATEMENT OP SILVER. 
 
 ^fany others beside Professor Nasse have discovered among 
 
 the lions in the path of a Silver and Gold Union the dangers, 
 
 1 . Tliat Treaties will not bo faithfully carried out : 
 
 ■1. That some nation will issue Paper ^^foney : 
 
 o. That too much Silver will bo produced from the mines : 
 
 4. That some terrible unloading of Silver, and buying up 
 
 of Gold, will take place. 
 
 Upon analysis these objections rcsolvo themselves into an 
 
 indictment against modern government.", that they are not 
 
 competent to manage their common interests intelligently. 
 
 I submit that while it is true that, if there bo no common 
 
 interest in the stability of the world's Standard of Value, then, 
 
 of course, there is no ground for, nor safety in, united action ; 
 
 yet if there be ground for such action the world does not 
 
 lack mental capacity to act intelligently in the matter. So if 
 
 it be for the interest of the nations to shirk carrying letters 
 
 and to steal postage-dues from each other, then there is 
 
 no ground for a Postal Union. Undoubtedly war, for example, 
 
 interrupts the Postal Service and may cause tho issue of 
 
 Paper Money : but whatever harm is so done, would it not 
 
 be done if there were no Postal Union at all, or if there were 
 
 no Monetary Union at all ? AVhere, then, is the validity of 
 
 this order of objection ? It does not exist. So, 
 
 " 111 the ni<:ht, iin.ijxinin<j some fear. 
 How easy is a bush supposed a bear! " 
 
 The gentlemen do " protest too much ! " If, for example, 
 Nassc is right in denying the evils of tho lack of a common 
 measure between nations, he should go on and deny the evils 
 of tho lack of a common measure between provinces; he thus 
 denies the advantage of the unification of German Money ; and, 
 beyond, tho path is open before him to oppose tho entire 
 institution of Money as a common measure between men; 
 
Sect. 25.] Lio)is in the Path. 207 
 
 and thus, in logical sequence, he should seek to subvert the 
 history of civilization on that line. So if this alleged inca- 
 pacity of nations to bear the ordinary responsibilities of social 
 life exists, then seclusion behiuel a Chinese wall, well 
 guarded with tlying torpedoes, must bo the statesman's 
 dream. But this new analogue of Gulliver's Laputa is not 
 the statesman's dream; in spite of Tariffs and of Armies it 
 is a trading age we live in, and its glory is that all the Chinese 
 walls are riddled with lines of rapid transit and transport, 
 and, accordingly, the possibilities of business management, 
 whose strategic lines cross the borders of nations, are greatly 
 enlarged in comparison with earlier times. 
 
 So long, then, as plain matter-of-fact common-sense trading- 
 human creatures possess the surface of the earth, we may be 
 allowed to hope that the Treasuries and the Banks may bo 
 able to protect national interests under a rational system of 
 Monetary Union consonant with the spirit of the age, quite 
 as well as the Post Office Departments manage a Postal 
 Union. It is a great task, and the responsibility of it is 
 great ; but it is not to be met by ignoring it. 
 
 As for the prophecy of an inundation of Silver from the 
 mines, those who give weight to it should take to heart 
 certain facts, among which I will only mention here the fol- 
 lowing : The advocates of Silver Outlawry are not novices in 
 prophecy : and for many years an increased output of Gold was 
 the object of prediction. jNleantime, the once infallible 
 recipe of the schools for an increase of product, namely, a 
 decrease of the cost of production, has been at work. Prices 
 have been falling since 187:3, and so the cost of producing 
 Gold has been diminishing. And yet both the prophecy and 
 the science of other days have been set at naught; for the 
 annual product of Gold has been waning, — dogma and pro- 
 phecy are alike foiled. Evidently the metals are too "precious" 
 to be amenable to reason. 
 
 But even if we waive the point, and suppose the output of 
 
208 Notable Arjumenis. 
 
 Silver should increase, how much is the increase likely to be ? 
 Nothing per cent., a little per mille, upon the stock of ^fonoy 
 in the hands of man ! 
 
 Evidently no experience of the past, no probabilities of the 
 future, on this head, can be united to construct data upon 
 which the action of nations can be based. Indeed, I venture 
 to say that the mere idea of such a thing as an inundation of 
 Silver, is an artificial product of error, that it is really an out- 
 come of the refusal of economists to recognize in their ti-uo 
 relation the conditions of Silver supply and demand in the 
 years following 1870. The fall of Silver relatively to Gold 
 was originally attributed by the partisans of Gold, not to an 
 increased demand for Gold coupled with an enormously reduced 
 demand for Silver — for to admit that would be to admit that 
 monetary law can affect the value of Money — but to a slightly 
 increased annual supply of new Silver. Thus it came to pass 
 that the few millions of the bonanzas, a minute fraction of 
 the existing stock of Precious Metal, were expanded by learned 
 fancy into an "inundation," in order to meet the emergencies 
 of erroneous theory. 
 
 As far as the stock of Silver now in sight is concerned, the 
 great mass of it is in Asia, and chiefly in China. One wlia 
 dreads that the Chinese People are about to change their 
 second nature, and reject Silver for Gold will, I fear, turn 
 deaf ears to any considerations which I can present. But for 
 this, I should endeavour to make clear my view that the chief 
 reason why there should be a desire to replace Silver with Gold 
 is that Silver is not now as good Money as Gold in England, 
 which is at present the world's clearing-house, and so close the 
 matter by observing that it rests with England to remove 
 that disability. 
 
 This remark serves also as an antidote to feai's of a violent 
 sequestration of Gold, which, it is alleged, will follow the 
 Reinstatement of Silver. Can anyone suppose that a con- 
 tinuation of the present scramble for Gold promises relief 
 
Sect. 25.] Liom in tli>' Path. 20U 
 
 from that danger, especially when such a signal is raised 
 as the enormous absorption of European Gold in India ? 
 
 Passing to other objections, I select the following from the 
 evidences of misapprehension current in learned circles: — "The 
 essence of all such schemes (inconvertible paper and Bi- 
 metallism) is to prevent, or mitigate, a fall of prices, or to 
 ci'cate a rise of prices by an immediate abundance of money. 
 But the effect is necessarily transitory . . . The annual pro- 
 duct of the two bears the same relation to the total stock of 
 both, that the product of one does to the stock of one metal. 
 Hence the permanent causes of scarcity remain." 
 
 In the latter sentences, the facts as to the past and the 
 doctrine of chances as to the future are quite ignored. 
 The annual product of the two metals has been, and the 
 chances are it always will be, in steadier relation to the total 
 stock, than the product of either alone to the stock of either 
 respectively. The statement is also quite inconsistent with that 
 threat of a coming inundation, or over-production of Silver, 
 which plays so large a part in maintaining the prejudice against 
 its reinstatement ; for if the permanent elements of scarcity 
 remain, there can be no inundation in sight. The reader will 
 also note the strange rigidity of the quantity-theory which 
 ignores confidence as an element in the volume of business, 
 and assumes that a world at war with itself will act in quite the 
 same way as a world at peace. 
 
 But these matters are unimportant here, as compared witli 
 the point that there is a radical difference between " incon- 
 vertible paper " and " bi-metallism " : that it takes more than a 
 printing-press and paper to create INfetallic ^Foney, and it i.s 
 not the same thing as Papor-^foney when it is created. 
 
 If the possibility which Jevons ' suggested, and of which a 
 hint was given long ago by ^Ir. Thorold Rogers " and by Mr. 
 
 ' '• Investijrations in Curroiicy," etc., lss4, j>. y2S. 
 - '• Princeton Review." Jan. 187r». 
 
210 Notable Ar(jinnents. 
 
 Giffen/ were to bocoino fact, and one-pound notes should 
 come into vogue south of the Tweed, then, at their issue, 
 there would be the " immediate supply " of Money which 
 has been spoken of, for the notes would set free so and so 
 many millions of Gold ; 20 millions was the figure which 
 Jevons spoke of. Now these notes are created out of nothing : 
 but how is the immediate abundance of Money to be produced 
 with Silver ? "Where is the reservoir which is to swell the 
 tide so suddenly ? It does not exist. Truly it may be said 
 of such arguments, 
 
 " The earth hath bubbles as the water has, 
 And tliesc are of tliem." 
 
 Considerable importance has been given in late discussion 
 to the question how far can the law of alternative Coinage 
 and of Dual Legal-Tender in a given country, affect the 
 relative price of the metals, when one metal has been entirely 
 exported from that country, because of its higher value 
 elsewhere. 
 
 The answer seems naturally to be that the law remains as 
 it was, the trade of that country — domestic and foreign — and 
 all the valuations of that country stand as they did ; and hence 
 to the extent of the relation which the monetary operations 
 of that country bear to the total of operations affecting the 
 metals, the country exerts a constant pressure to maintain its 
 legal ratio, as the market-ratio throughout the world. In 
 other words, the laws in question are effective in attracting the 
 would-be rising metal to the legal ratio : 
 
 1 . Negatively : in that they are excluded from operating to 
 maintain the exported metal in its supposed elevation. 
 
 2. Positively : so far as an open field for the monetary use 
 of the exported metal, at the given ratio to the metal 
 retained, and not above, affects the action of individuals 
 or of governments. 
 
 ' "Jouniiil Rt.ntist. Soc." Mnioh. lS7n. 
 
Sect. 25.] Lions in tlw Path. 2\i 
 
 France is tlie favourite field of illustration and of argument 
 upon the influence of Alternative Coinage and Legal-Tender, 
 and the lines of attack against the Reinstatement of Silver, 
 which seem to be most in vogue, bear upon the premium on 
 Gold in Paris between 1820 and 1850. 
 
 Now, the utmost that is alleged to-day about that premium 
 on Gold is, that it frequently rose to over 1 per cent., and 
 on more than one occasion was about 2 per cent, (once being 
 2. j^Q.) The general average is below 1 per cent. 
 
 As the bulk of the Money in use is admitted to have been 
 Silver, it is quite plain that the '' price " of Gold must have 
 been subject to any special demand caused by sudden, peculiar, 
 local need, such for example as led in Paris in 1878 — so i 
 was informed at the time, in the office of MM. Hottinguer & 
 Cic. — to a premium on 100 franc notes over gold. 
 
 But, independently of such special circumstances, it is 
 plain that beside the question of the exchanges, the state of the 
 coinage, the quality of the bullion for sale, the nature of the 
 transactions and their extent, are all necessary to be known 
 if the Anti- Silver contentions based upon this premium are 
 to be made good. Moreover, the matter of what I have 
 called the Mint-ratio' must come into play, and as the Mint- 
 
 ' •' Tiie ratio of 15^- to 1 is a ratio between the Coins. The Silver in 
 the Silver 5-franc piece weighs 1.5^ times as much as tlie Golil in tlie 
 Gold 5-franc piece. This ratio has been maintained without aUeration 
 since 1803. The mint price, however, has undergone various changes. 
 It was fixed in the law of 1803 at 9 francs per kilogram of standard 
 Gold, 3 francs per kilogram of standard Silver. The kilogram of standard 
 Silver containing 200 francs, and that of Gold 15-i- times as much, or 3100 
 francs, the mint ratio stood as 3091 : 197, or 1.1.69 -f : 1. In l,s;!.> the 
 mint charge on Silver was reduced to 2 francs to the kilogram, that on 
 Gold to 6 francs. The mint ratio became, therefore, 3094 : 198, or 1.5.626 : 1 , 
 and so remained till 1H50. In 1850 the mint charge on Silver was reduced 
 to 1 franc 50 centimes the kilogram. The mint ratio became, therefore, 
 3094 : 198.50. or 15.586 : 1, and so remained until 1854. In 1854 the mint 
 charge on Gold was raised to 6 francs 70 centimes the kilogram. The 
 mint ratio became, therefore, 3093.30; 198.50, or 15.583:1." — Extract 
 from the Dnntment of thr Conference of 1878. 
 
212 Xotiihle Arfjuments. 
 
 ratio till 1835 was 15.^^' to 1 — givinf,' a figure corresponding 
 to a premium on Gold of near l.\ per cent. — and was 15."' 
 after 1835, it is plain that it is well worth considering. 
 
 But fho facts hereinbefore stated (page 50), and which there, 
 so far as I know, appear for the first time in the battle-field 
 of the Standards, are themselves competent to give a quietus 
 to the whole argument. 
 
 If Gold in England, the home of the Gold Standard, moved 
 within a range of 'f^ per cent, as measured in Gold itself, the 
 wonder is that it remained in France, measured in Silver, as 
 near 15^ as it did ; and the premium in Paris between 1820 
 and IP.^O is thus transformed into an argument for Silver and 
 for laws that keep Gold and Silver in harness. Of like effect 
 is the subsequent steadiness of Standard Bullion at the Bank 
 of England; which shows how the steady market, the purse 
 always open for purchase of bullion, insures its complete parity 
 with the Legal Unit : and thus, as the market can be kept 
 steady, the purse always open, for the two metals as well as 
 for one alone, a similar parity of coin and bullion of two metals 
 is shown to be easily attainable. 
 
 § 2G. A niLATORV I'LEA. 
 
 There is one order of dilatory plea which is wont to assert 
 its place, one may say, in almost every train of argument 
 which makes defence of something that ought to be reformed. 
 It is that the evils complained of are merely transitory. 
 
 In past years, when we laid down a well-grounded forecast 
 of the evils which everybody has since been forced to admit, 
 our friends the enemy stoutly ignored the facts. As the years 
 go on, and our forecast is justified by the event, as year after 
 year the same order of facts to which wo wore wont \o point, 
 
Sect. 26.] A Dilatory Plea. 'ilS 
 
 extorts unwilling admission, we observe, not repentance, nor 
 sufficient works of repentance, but the plea that these same 
 evils, which our adversaries or their friends with such light 
 hearts precipitated upon the world against all protest, are 
 merely transitory. 
 
 Transitory ! Even Professor Nasse thinks that the dragging 
 down of the prices of agricultural products in Europe, due to 
 this artificial change of level between Indian prices in Silver 
 and European prices in Gold, is transitory. 
 
 Transitory, unquestionably ! But so is cholera transitory ; 
 so are battle, murder, and sudden death. Whoever prays to 
 be delivered from these, may also pray to be delivered from 
 such reasoning. 
 
 It will be noticed, too, that the word is quite vague ; no one 
 is committed by it to anything serious ; if the plague lasts ten 
 years, or twenty, or thirty, still, from a high point of view, 
 it is transitory. 
 
 "VVho, indeed, can measure the helplessness, if not the 
 criminal negligence — I speak hero not of persons, but of a 
 tendency which I may for the moment personify — of one whose 
 rightful province is limited to local diagnosis, and who allows 
 himself to deal with cure? I have read sober words, written 
 by men, no doubt, morally worthy as well as mentally gifted, 
 but of which an Adam Smith would have said, they should have 
 been written in blood. " Your child is dying, madam ; but 
 never mind ; there will always be children in the world." 
 
 Observe, I pray you, that our imagined statistician is quite 
 right ; it is perfectly true. Generations may suflfer untold 
 evil, but absolute depopulation and deprivation of wealth are 
 not likely to occur : while, to the observer of economic 
 phenomena, such a pageant of morbidity would bo of the 
 profoundest interest, a continual field-day ; like a clinic of 
 rarities in disease to a medical enthusiast, or, to a hunter an 
 unlimited succession of game of every clime. But of course, 
 meantime, the prosaic millions of to-dny, wlio have their one 
 
-11 Notable Arijuiiuiitii. 
 
 life to live, and who are provided with nerves of pain for the 
 ills of life, even if they be merely such as rob youth of its 
 promise and age of its peace, serve as the raw material of 
 experiment, and fill with their hearts' blood the stream on 
 which the doctrinaire sails hia little boat of theory. The 
 well-known caricature of a century ago recurs to mind : the 
 Minister at Versailles and the fowls called together, as they 
 discover, merely in order to decide the question how they 
 would prefer to be cooked — and told, when they objected to 
 being killed at all, that they were wandering from the 
 question. 
 
 To demand of monetary legislation that it should advance 
 the material welfare of the people, has now for many years been 
 treated in certain quarters as a wandering from the question — 
 as if the populations of States existed in order to maintain 
 dogmas, or the reputation of dogmatists. Surely to the 
 XXth century all this "svill seem very strange : popular 
 government and yet a " Continental corner " on Gold values, 
 liberty the watchword and the iron-handed tyranny of a Gold- 
 monomania the fact. How soon will the world of plain citizens 
 who are not interested in the plenary inspiration of any 
 economic dogma, nor in maintaining the reputations of any 
 special class of practitioners, come to make up their minds 
 that they object, so to speak, to being killed, or, in fact, to 
 anything that points in that direction ? 
 
 I am aware that tender consciences have been troubled by 
 the fear of consequences which may in some remote future 
 arise from the Reinstatement of Silver, and I have elsewhere 
 indicated a reply to certain specified objections. liut in 
 general 1 have also to say that the statesman, by \-irtuc of his 
 oflSce, acts rather as a physician than as a priest. Certainly 
 it is well, if it be practicable, to prescribe for ten years hence, 
 but surely it is not well to omit to cure the patient in the 
 meantime, under any circumstances. A business lifetime, the 
 average duration of an investment, how long are they ? 
 
Sect. 26.] A Dilatory Plea. 215 
 
 Whatever the answer, the first years will come first — first for 
 the economic subject, first for the statesman whose business it 
 is to promote his well-being-. 
 
 These self-evident observations may seem uncalled-for, until 
 one is made aware of consolation being admini.stcred by those 
 whose dogmas are responsible for many of the calamities of the 
 last decade, on the ground that the value of money was even 
 greater a few decades or a few centuries ago ! 
 
 When such things as these pass current — arguments from 
 which one would suppose that the sense of humour, that 
 instinctive modesty of the intellect, would recoil of itself — 
 one begins to suspect that there are unknown callous spots in 
 the mind, a survival of some former state of barbarism, or 
 that, by reason of some unexplained retardation or eddy in 
 the current of our development, the elementary truth 
 reflected in Longfellow^s simple phrase, 
 
 " Act in the living present, 
 Heart within, and God o'erhead," 
 
 is excluded from the political dictionaries now in use. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 A Monetary Balance of Power. 
 
 In a detailed statement of objections to the working of a Bi- 
 metallic Union when founded, Professor Nasse lays stress 
 upon two facts, and he rightly insists upon them, enforcing 
 his appeal with the excellent phrase from the French, " there 
 is nothing so brutal as a fact/^ 
 
 These facts to which he accords such favour are — 
 
 1. The modern preference for Gold over Silver: 
 
 2. The actual depreciation of Silver so far below 15^, the 
 ratio ordinarily held in view as the one to be restored in a 
 Monetary Union. 
 
 Truly there is nothing more brutal than a fact, unless it be 
 two fiicts. But there are facts and facts. There is, for example, 
 the prepotent fact, that the modern preference for Gold 
 over Silver was nil until it succeeded in getting laws passed 
 to bolster up Gold, and to outlaw Silver. Now, what the 
 Monetary Unionist has been speaking about all these years is 
 the law, not the preference : surrender tho law, and the pre- 
 ference which was nil before, will it not be nil again, or suffi- 
 ciently near a nullity ? 
 
 Does Professor Nasso believe that if Germany, knowing 
 what she does now, had the work to do over again, she would 
 ever pass such laws ? Impossible! How much,then,is this "pre- 
 ference" worth ? Preference for preference, Germany's pre- 
 ference for Gold is the greatest monetary preference of which 
 history can l)onst. Let us assume, then, tluil it was GcrinaiiyV 
 
The Preference for Gold. 217 
 
 preference for CI old that led her to pass Anti- Silver-laws, and 
 so set the world in flames of controversy and calamity. 
 And yet this was but a passing whim. Germany has 
 recovered herself: that is to say, the majority of Germans 
 who think of those things have come to understand the 
 general situation : they find things done that are very hard to 
 undo ; but if they were to be done again they would not do 
 them. Where, then, is the preference ? Has it not ceased to 
 exist? Or is the word "preference" a seine that draws in all 
 states of mind, akin, however remotely, to desire for one 
 alternative rather than another; and is the mere existence of 
 a thing proof of the " preference '* for it in the community ? 
 By this reasoning the community can be charged with a pre- 
 ference for any and all abuses that may exist in its borders ; 
 which is absurd. 
 
 But behind this range of ideas I find others, which it will 
 be well to meet on their own ground. 
 
 Let us assume that there is a preference for Gold; not in 
 the sense of a conscious and frivolous intention in ruling 
 classes of rejecting Silver, but of a constant though slight 
 pressure in favour of Gold in the minds of all men, even 
 of men who live happily in Double Standard countries, 
 and have voted for the reinstatement of Silver. Such a 
 pressure would be the analogue for the XlXth and XXth 
 centuries of a demand for treasure in which a Prince's 
 ransom could be carried on the person, which is believed 
 to have appeared as a factor of the monetary situations in 
 past times. I have myself surmised that the great rise of 
 Gold in the XVIth century was in part traceable to such a 
 disposition, arising in the long period of war which iu a 
 measure reached its close with the Treaty of Westphalia ; a 
 disposition, however, which would be followed by important 
 results, not merely because it animated the individual citizens, 
 but rather because it would afford an opportunity for the 
 political action of the community, through the wills of the 
 
218 A Monetary Balance of Power. 
 
 various Lords of the ^lint. ^^^lateve^ tho historic rate of 
 ecjuation between tho two metals, Gold is always the " better," 
 that is to say, tho less perishable, less " heavy" metal. ]\Iust 
 there not be, then, an over-prescnt, ever-active element of 
 perturbation, working against any ratio of equilibrium which 
 man may attempt to establish ? 
 
 To give the argument I oppose its maximum of advantage, 
 I will call it a natural and ineradicable tendency to deflection. 
 I will also contribute to the armament of the doctrine I 
 oppose, an observation which occurred to mo as important, and 
 which I do not remember to have seen or heard. The attrac- 
 tions of Gold may bo divided into relative or quantitative, and 
 intrinsic or metallic. In the first come portability and rarity, 
 in the latter colour, untarnishability, specific gravity, etc. 
 Now the former attractions must increase ^\^th every upward 
 movement of the ratio ; Gold becoming ever more rare, more 
 portable, as compared with Silver. Hence this pressure for 
 Gold tends not only to perpetuate itself, but to increase its 
 intensity. 
 
 Assuming, then, that the fact exists, wo seek reply to the 
 question how it is to be dealt with. 
 
 I shall observe, in the first place, that this alleged natural 
 force and tendency with which we have here to do is a domestic 
 affair, so to speak, for mankind. The preference for Gold is 
 not, as we might suppose from the tone taken by some of the 
 trumpets of learning, an event built upon a cosmic scale. 
 This point is more important than to some readers it may 
 appear, for there are really minds in which this preference 
 enjoys the prestige, one might say, of the persistence of force, 
 or of the precession of the e(iuinoxes, or of tho perseverance 
 of tho saints. 
 
 Secondly : I wish to repeat my former inquiry, liow much 
 is the preference worth ? At this my adversary will, perhaps, 
 bo surprised ; aud 1 can conceive that he may be inclined tt> 
 charge mo witli lo\nty, especially when 1 follow this inquiry 
 
Greshanis Law. 219 
 
 by asking him: Whether he has abandoned "(Jresham's 
 law ? " But I venture to hope the novelty of this transition 
 from one idea to another will disappear, for a most vital tie 
 between the ideas exists, whether it has been perceived or no. 
 The working of human self-interest, under the domain of a 
 law which allows two kinds of Money, one inferior, the other 
 superior, to do the same office, produces certain results, and 
 the statement of the process is called " Gresham's law." But 
 wherein lies this superiority or inferiority ? 
 
 The answer is that the " inferior" Money is the " cheaper " 
 Money. Wonder of wonders ! 
 
 More prefer the inferior Money ! But how is this ? Where 
 is that happy valley we were lately wandering through, 
 where men preferred imperishability, rarity, divisibility, por- 
 tability, in their Money ? To all this Gresham's law turns 
 a deaf ear — cheapness, sordid cheapness rules the day. If 
 Gresham's law be true, an ounce of cheapness is worth a ton 
 of preference. And who is there to deny that Gresham's law 
 is true ? Alas ! alas ! how brutal a fact may be ! 
 
 Another fact of the first order is — the modern preference for 
 paper over both Silver and Gold. This preference neutralizes 
 to a decisive extent the advantage of lightness, and while 
 robbing Gold of its great advantage enables the two metals to 
 act equally well by an attorney, paper, and so relegates them 
 to the untrammelled exercise of their highest function, that of 
 a combined monetary mass more nearly constant in quantity, 
 as used in its relation to population and business, than any 
 mass within the ken of the economist. I say " as used," and 
 seek to support an amendment to the older doctrine of tho 
 schools applicable to the point before us by stating that, in 
 my view, a legal ratio between the metals, created and 
 maintained jure gentium, is an element or factor in this 
 quantity and constancy. 
 
 As to the difficulties involved in tho question of the ratio, a 
 solvent is applied to a goodly portion of them by recalling tho 
 
"220 A Monetary Balanrp nf Power. 
 
 fact, that there is in the world no large stock of Silver 
 for sale. All but a trivial amount is in use as money, 
 ornament, or treasure, and not "in the market;" in the 
 sense that a CI old-price can be predicated of it without 
 duo reservations ; and as for " cheapness," this cheapness must 
 disappear when the Mint-rate of the assumed Monetary Union 
 shall become effective and Silver shall become generally coin- 
 able into ^loney. Of the probable effect of the establishment 
 of a ratio, which should bring the metals more closely to- 
 gether than they stand as bullion to-day, while detailed 
 prediction can at best move within but narrow limits, yet in 
 general it can safely be affirmed that (assuming the currency 
 of existing Silver coin to remain undisturbed), this change 
 would directly operate chiefly upon trade between Silver- 
 using and Gold-using countries, and upon the great stocks of 
 Money only in so far as their purchasing power is affected by 
 the state of this trade. So far as such trade is concerned it 
 is also to be noted that no injurious effect can be safely 
 predicated, in the estimate of which the following points shall 
 have been ignored : namely : 
 
 First : That the change in question is, as' far as it goes, a 
 restoration of the status quo ante. 
 
 Second : That its impact is reduced by being distributed 
 between the two metals. 
 
 Third : That in so far as the change is regarded as a settle- 
 ment, and firm establishment of the foundations of business, 
 there is some credit entry against every debit. 
 
 As for the permanence of the ratio which shall be adopted, 
 I have to observe that once a ratio is adopted by a majority of 
 nations a new order of affairs supervenes, and any change of 
 that ratio is beyond the ken of present statesmanship. In so 
 far as the question exists, it is a question distinctly belonging 
 to the future ; and to the future I am content to leave it. 
 
 I here approach a subject which, shortly before his lamented 
 and untimely death, occupied the attention of Professor 
 
The Future Ratio. 221 
 
 Jevons (see " Investigations in Currency and Finance/' 
 London, Macmillan and Co., 1884, p. 352) ; and the existence 
 in print of specific comments of u mind like his upon my 
 position on this subject may warrant some words of explanation 
 on my part. It does not seem to me probable that, if England 
 were to join the Chief Powers in forming a Silver and 
 Gold Union, there would come in the future any necessity 
 for a change of the ratio it should adopt. But this forecast of 
 mine is not a tenet, nor are those who hold it justly chargeable 
 with the responsibilities of foreknowledge absolute. Some 
 great revolution, either in the use, or in the stock-on-hand, of 
 one or the other, or of both, of the metals, must take place in 
 order to make such an alteration necessary. It must, however, 
 be a revolution the parallel of which has never occurred, and 
 hence can hardly be treated as within the domain of probability. 
 Who, indeed, is there left to-day to deny with argument and 
 proof that if England wills its maintenance at the ratio of 
 15 2 to 1, the Union can stand any shock of altered circum- 
 stances of which history affords a precedent ? Now, if coming 
 decades or ages have such a surprise in store as that we have 
 described, it will evidently be necessary for the world to meet 
 the emergency as best it may ; and it is also true that it is 
 impossible to cross the stream until it shall be reached. 
 
 There is a lesson of which we come in sight in thus anxiously 
 scanning the horizon of the future from the headlands of 
 thought, which I would gladly commend to certain thinkers 
 of the European Continent who are disposed to indulge in 
 tremors for the security of the Monetary Union of the future, 
 the establishment of which they seem to dread, and to wield 
 extraordinary gifts of prophecy of a coming cataclysm, in order 
 to alarm public opinion as to the danger of a nation's linking 
 its monetary fortunes with those of the rest of mankind. This 
 lesson is : That the fortunes of each nation are already so 
 linked — although very unskilfully — that it is not the linking 
 but the unskilfulness which troubles the monetary peace of the 
 
222 A Mcmetai'i/ Balance of Power. 
 
 world ; that the cataclysm, if it comes, will at any rate 
 affect all nations in their due proportion ; that, whatever may 
 happen, the emergency will best bo met by an unbroken front 
 of nations, united, with England at their head, to confront a 
 common danger ; and that, withal, if time and use shall have 
 enlarged the power of legislatures and of cabinets to guard 
 the interests of their constituents by acting in concert 
 promptly, wisely, on business principles, the alleged future 
 attack of fate may be foiled entirely, and so lose the name of 
 danger — if it comes. 
 
 Turning back, then, from the future to the present, we see 
 that this Union of Nations which it is, in my belief, the interest 
 of these nations to form, is not necessarily engaged to a 
 variable ratio, nor is it bound to a ratio explicitly fixed to-day 
 by contract for all eternity ; but, if the words be used subject 
 to the limitations usually applied to political action, the Union 
 can safely accept a ''fixed ratio." 
 
 I should, perhaps, further explain that I have no intention 
 of seeking to repel any considerations bearing upon the ratio 
 to be adopted by a Monetary Union; that is, to my mind, 
 distinctly a point of detail, however important, which it is 
 the interest of each nation to submit to the free decision of 
 the members of the projected Monetary Union itself. The 
 true objective point of argument is that the Union ought to 
 be formed. 
 
 When that question shall be brought into the way of 
 settlement by the adhesion of England, then the question of 
 the ratio will be in order, and will, it is to be hoped, be 
 amicably determined by the nations concerned. 
 
 Recurring after this introduction to tlie mustering and 
 review of facts in which I have asked my reader to accompany 
 Professor Xasse and myself, I now challenge attention to a 
 fact of all-transcending rank — a fact of facts : and that is 
 nothing less than the hypothesis of fact upon which Professor 
 Nasse's argument proceeds. Professor Nasse was assuming 
 
A Judgment of Nations. 
 
 i.LO 
 
 a Silver and Gold Union to have been formed ; and founded, 
 of course, upon a ratio which the nations shall have chosen. 
 He is offering predictions touching what will happen in that 
 event. Now, I aver that in this supposed action of nations we 
 have before us a national, a continental, a world-wide fact, a 
 fact which is competent to neutralize facts as well as dreams 
 and dogmas that may come in its way. 
 
 What, then, is the nature of the event in question ? It is 
 necessary to have a clear idea of that, in order to test the 
 sagacity of any forecast relating to it. 
 
 Here lies the difficulty : it is no light task to calculate the 
 effects of the displacement of an existing order, and hence it 
 is very natural that among those who cling to the old order, 
 there should be default in fully accepting the hypothesis they 
 are bound to enter upon. And yet there is nothing strained 
 or unpractical in the hypothesis before us, of concurrent 
 action of nations to make a new settlement of the relations of 
 the Money-metals. Germany and England are the only 
 Powers whoso assent is still denied, and in principle, the 
 object whose attainment waits for that assent is admitted to 
 be desirable by both Powers ; so far at least as their Declara- 
 tions to the Nations in the Conference of 1881 can be said to 
 bind them. The question is, therefore, rather a matter of 
 amount, than of principle : a question, how large a contribution 
 Englishmen shall advise England, and Germans shall advise 
 Germany, to make in order to attain a desired end ? But it 
 is generally understood, and fairly to be believed, that Ger- 
 many's full assent awaits the concurrence of England, and in 
 England the cause is before the Court, and upon the calendar 
 for hearing. The hypothesis, therefore, is quite a practical 
 one, within short reach of realization. 
 
 Now I affirm of this hypothesis that it implies not merely in 
 vague terms that this new settlement of the Money-metals is 
 undertaken,but that it is undertaken in earnest, that the forces 
 of civilization are marshalled in support of this new settlement. 
 
224 A Monetary Balance of Power. 
 
 The leading nations have wisely come to recognize that 
 the paramount interest of each nation is to attain stability in 
 the greater Standard of Value, by an harmonious adjustment 
 of that duality of material of the world's Money, which is, so to 
 speak, an ultimate fact of nature; and upon that basis thoy 
 have entered into bonds of intermonetary peace. But this 
 consensus of nations is a solemn judgment of nations. Upon 
 what ? Upon the past, whose crowning misdemeanour is 
 that its laws became the plaything of a whim, — of a petty 
 preference for shadow, as against substance. 
 
 Such judgment, then, being interpreted, is found to signify 
 that to enact laws in order to foster the alleged preference of 
 the individual for one of these materials over another, is to 
 institute discord injurious to the State. I affirm that such a 
 fact is not only competent to make an epoch, but to insure 
 that the epoch will be taken care of after it is made. 
 
 Apologists of discord in the world's Standard of Value may 
 rest assured that, if this great deed of mercy and of peace is 
 worth doing, it vdW be worth sustaining. To ray view, to 
 say it is not worth doing is to derogate from civilization by 
 maintaininof that chaos is better than order. 
 
 I 
 
 f 
 
*i qms igitur, amoif lirittatis Inbcnirn^ac, f)is tJirtls boluciit 
 fontra^irrrr bfl rontra scitbfir, tint fnrict ; ct si male locutus 
 sum, pfit)it)fat tfstimonium tir malo, SftJ cum rationc, nc ipsa 
 bi^ratur gratis rt boluutam' rontifmnarr, guoti non potest 
 rtftraritrr impugnarr. 
 
 Sf aucun tionrqufs, pour amour ^r brritr rngurrrr, boulliroit 
 fontrrtirr ct trrllfs ou fsrrlprf rontrr, tirn srra, mais Sf Tag 
 mal parl^ portrigr trsmongagr tiu mal abrc ralson, affin qu'il nr 
 soit bfu pour nfant ft tjf sa singuUhr boulrntf trmfrairrmrnt 
 fon^amncr rr que ftonnrmrnt nr sc pfult impugnrr nc rontrf)3irr. 
 
 jFinis trartatus ^r mutationibus monetarum a magistro 
 ilprfjolao (Drrsmr (^ 1382). 
 
 V 
 
 ) 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 NlS!TORfCAL MATERIAL FOR THE STUDY OF 
 MOXFTA R Y POL IC Y. 
 
 THE HISTORY OF THE GUINEA 
 
 ILLUSTUATIOD 
 
 BY 
 
 COXTE.AIPOPxARY DOCU.AIENTS. 
 
I 
 
rirSTORICAL MATERIAL FOR THE STUDY OF MONETARY 
 POLICY, SUPPLEMENTARY TO PAPERS PRINTED IN 
 THE DOCUMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
 CONFERENCE OF 1878. 
 
 THE IIISTOl^Y OF THE GUINEA, 
 
 Il.I,USTRATEU BY CoXTEM POR A KY DOCUMKNTS. 
 
 CONTEXTS. 
 
 NO. i'v..i; 
 
 1. The Original Order for the Coinage of Guineas, December "24, 
 
 16G3 '2-29 
 
 2. Tlie Statute of Free and Gratuitous Coinage, 1666 (Extract) . 230 
 
 3. The Mint Indenture of Thomas Neale, 1680 (Extract) . . . 233 
 
 4. Silver befoi'e tlie House of Commons, April, 1690 234 
 
 5. Report of a Committee in Favour of Debasing tlie Coin, March 
 
 12, 1694-3 236 
 
 6. Petitions concerning Guineas at 30 Shillings, February, 1695-6 . 238 
 
 7. The Hank of England and the Guinea in Camp before Namur, 
 
 July, 1695 240 
 
 8. Statutes relating to Coinage and Currency of Guineas (1696): — 
 
 A. The Guinea at 26 Shillings 243 
 
 B. Suspension of Obligation to Coin Guineas 244 
 
 C. The Guinea at 22 Shillings 246 
 
 D. Repeal of Statute Suspending Obligation to Coin . . . 247 
 
 9. Action of the Treasury touching the Currency of the Guinea, 
 
 October, 1697 248 
 
 10. Letter of the Commissioners of Excise Touching the Rating of 
 
 the Guinea in 1694-6, July 22, 1698 249 
 
 11. John Locke and the Ratio of 15"58 to 1 : — 
 
 A. Order of Reference to the Council of Trade, Sept., 1698 250 
 
 R. Report on Lowering the Guinea 250 
 
 C. Orders to the (Jovcrnment Oflicers not to take (Juiiu-as for 
 
 more than 21. v. 6*/ 253 
 
228 Contents. 
 
 NO. •'AfiE 
 
 12. Instances of Contradiction between Statements of Doctrine in 
 
 Lockf's Writinf:s on Money, 1 GOO- 1698 255 
 
 13. A I'rivate Letter of Locke touching:; the Kecoinage, March 30. 
 
 1G96 '-i-^" 
 
 14. "Memoirs of tlic Great Recoinage," MS. bv Ilopton Ilaynes . 258 
 
 15. Reports Relating to the Coinage, MS. signed by Sir Isaac 
 
 Newton, 1700-1702: — 
 
 A. Report Touching tlie Currency of the Frendi and Spanish 
 
 Pistoles in Enghind. January 20. 1700-1 .... 261 
 
 B. Report concerning the cutting of Counterfeit Money . . 2(>2 
 
 C. Report Touching the lute Cliangc of R.itio in France, 
 
 September 28, 1701 263 
 
 D. Report Touching the Rating of the Guinea, etc., 7 .July, 
 
 1702 264 
 
 E. The Value of (Jold in Proportion to Silver in Several 
 
 Parts of Europe 267 
 
 F. Proposals for Preserving and Increasing the Silver Coin 
 
 of this Kingdom, July 7, 1702 270 
 
 16. Order in Council, Lowering tlie Currency of Louis d'ttrs and 
 
 Pistoles to 17s., Feb. 5, 1700-1 272 
 
 17. Minute of Orders to the Mint Otliccrs, IVb. 12, 1701 . . . 273 
 
 18. Sir James Steuart and Adam Smith on the English Standard, 
 
 1759 273 
 
 19. Biographical Notice of Lord Liverpool 275 
 
 20. Report of the Committee of the Privy Council on Coins, May 21. 
 
 1816 27S 
 
 21. The Proclanintions of the New Currency, 1817 2s 1 
 
 HISTORICAL MATEKIAI MISCKLLANEOrS. 
 
 22. Contraction in 1818-1822 287 
 
 23. Alexander Baring (Lord Ashburton) on the Silver and Gold 
 
 Standard in England 2S8 
 
 24. The Restoration of Silver before the Bank of England in 1828 . 291 
 
 25. A Silver Discussion in 1837 294 
 
 26. Sir Robert Peel on the Stainlard (tf Valiif. May 6. In44 . . . 297 
 
 27. Monetary Treaties in tlic Past 302 
 
 28. State Papers relating to the Policy of Monetary Union, 1878, 
 
 1881, 1882 306 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE GUINEA, 
 
 ILLUSTRATED BY CONTEMPORARY DOCUMENTS. 
 
 No. 1. 
 
 AX ORDER FOR THE COINAGE OF GUINEAS. 
 [_MS. Mint Records, vol. vii. p. 52.] 
 
 Charles R. 
 
 Our Will and Pleasure is and Wee Doo hereby require and authorise 
 you to cause to be Coyned all such Gold ;uul silver as hereafter shal be 
 brought into our INIint and delivered unto you in the name and for the 
 use of the Company of Royall Adventurers of England trading into 
 Atlrica with a little Elephant in«such convenient place upon our gold 
 and silver coynes respectively as you shall judge fitting which Wee 
 intend as a niarke of distinction from the rest of our gold and silver 
 moneys and an Incounxgement unto the said Company in the Importing 
 of Gold and Silver to be coyned. And that our Twenty shillings peece 
 of Crowne gold to be coyned by the ^lill and Presse may be even 
 Twenty shillings in value after the rate commanded and allowed in our 
 late Proclamation for the raiseing the price of gold in this Our King- 
 dome of England, or as neere as conveniently may bee. Our further 
 will and pleasure is, and wee doe hereby likewise command and authorise 
 vou to cause the pound Troy of our Crowne gold hereafter to be cutt 
 into forty and fower peeccs and an halfe the whole peece being to 
 passe for Twenty shillings and the halfe for Tenn and soe the rest of 
 our gold covnes accordingly in proportion. And this shalbe your 
 sufficient warrant for soe doeing. And the Warden Comptroller and 
 Assaymaster of Our Mint and the rest of Our Officers there are to take 
 
!2.S(> The History of tlw (luuica. 
 
 notice (»f Our Will ami j)k'asurc lierein tliat our said moneys may passe 
 accordin^^lv. (liven at our Courte at Whitehall the 24"* day of 
 December KJOM. 
 
 IJv his Ma'""* command 
 
 Hknky Hknnktt. 
 To Our Trusty and ^\■ell)eloved S' Ralph 
 Fremau Ku' and Henry Slinj^eslty Esq'' 
 Masters and Workers of Our ^lint or either 
 of them. 
 
 Xo. 2. 
 
 rilK STATUTK KSTAHMSHIXC; FRKK AM) 
 
 (JHATUITOUS COINAGE OF SUA I.K 
 
 AND GOLD IN KNGLAM). 
 
 18 Caroli 11. C. 5 (IGOn). 
 
 An Act for encouratrinff of coina'ie. 
 
 Wliercas it is obvious, that the jjlenty of current coins of uold and 
 silver of this kinixdom is of great advantage to trade and commerce ; for 
 the increase whereof, your IMajesty in your princely wisdom and care 
 hath been graciously pleased to bear out of your revenue half the charge 
 of the coinage of silver monev ; (2) for the preventing of which charge 
 to vour INIajestv, ami the encouragement of the l)ringing gold and silver 
 into the realm, to l)e converted into the current money of this your 
 Majesty's kingdom, we your ^Majesty's dutiful and loyal subjects do give 
 and grant unto vnur .Alajestv tlie rates, duties or impositions following, 
 and do bcsctHli vt)ur IMajestv that it may be enacted; (H) and be it 
 enacted by the King's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice 
 and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this 
 jtresent Parliament assembled, and by tlie authority of the same, that 
 whatsoever person or persons, native or foreigner, alien or stranger, 
 shall from and after the twentieth day of December one thousand six 
 liundred and sixty and six, bring any foreign coin, jtlate or bullion of 
 gold or silver, in mass, molten or allayed, or any sort of manufacture 
 of gold or silver, into liis Majesty's mint or mints within the kingdom 
 
Free and Gratuitous Coinage. 281 
 
 of England, to be there melted down and coined into the current coins 
 of this kingdom, shall have the same there assayed, melted down and 
 coined with all convenient speed, without any defalcation, diminution 
 or charge for the assaying, coinage, or waste in coinage ; (4) so as that 
 for every pound troy of crown or standard gold that shall be brought in 
 and delivered by him or them to be assayed, melted down and coined, 
 as aforesaid, there shall be delivered out to him or tliem respectively a 
 pound troy of the current coins of this kingdom, of crown or standard 
 gold ; (5) and for every pound troy of sterling or standard silver that 
 shall be brought in and delivered by him or them to be assayed, melted 
 down and coined, as aforesaid, there shall be delivered tuit to liiin or 
 thera respectively, a pound troy of the current coins of this kingdom, 
 of sterling or standard silver, and so proportionably for a greater or 
 lesser weight ; (G) and for every pound troy of gold or silver that shall 
 be brought in and delivered to be assayed, melted down and coined, as 
 aforesaid, that shall be finer upon assay than crown gold or standard 
 silver, there shall be delivered for the same so much more than a pound 
 troy as the same doth in proportion amount unto in fineness and value ; 
 (7) and for every pound trov of gold or silver that shall be brought in 
 and delivered to be assayed, melted down and coined, as aforesaid, that 
 shall be coarser or baser upon assay, or worse in value than crown gold 
 or standard silver, there shall be delivered for the same so much less 
 than a pound troy as the same doth fall short in fineness or value ; 
 and so for a greater or lesser quantity. 
 
 1 1. And it is hereby further enacted by the authority aforesaid. That 
 there shall be no preference in point of assaying or coinage ; but that 
 all gold and silver brought in and delivered into the mint, to be assayed 
 and coined, shall be assayed, coined and delivered out to the respective 
 importers, according to the order and times of bringing in and delivering 
 the same into the mint or mints, and not otherwise ; so as he that shall 
 first bring in and deliver any gold or silver to be coined, shall be taken 
 and accounted the first person to have the same assayed, coined and 
 delivered ; and he or they that shall bring in and deliver any gold or 
 silver next, to be accounted the second to have the same assayed, coined 
 and delivered, and so successively in course : (2) and that the gold and 
 silver brought in and coined, as aforesaid, shall be in the same order 
 delivered to the respective bringers in thereof, their executors, adminis- 
 trators or assigns successively, without preference <if one Itefon- the 
 
232 The Iliiitorij of the Guinea. 
 
 other, and not otherwise: (3) and if any undue preference be made in 
 enterin<; of any fr<»hl or silver, or deliverint; out of any nionev coined, 
 contrary to the true intent and meanin<; of this act, hv any oHicer or 
 officers of the mint or mints ; then the j)artv or j)arties oH'ending shall 
 be liable by action of debt, »)r on the case, to jiav the value of the 
 gold or silver brought in, and not entered and delivered according to 
 the true intent, meaning and direction of this act, as aforesaid, with 
 damages and costs to the party or parties grieved, and shall be fore- 
 judged from his or thtir place or office: (4) and if such preference be 
 unduly made by any his or their deputy or deputies, clerk or clerks, 
 without direction or privity of his or their master or masters, then such 
 deputy or deputies, clerk or clerks only shall be liable to such action, 
 damage and costs, as aforesaid, and be forever after incapable of serving 
 »)r bearing oflice in any mint in the Kingdom of England. 
 
 III. Provided always, That it shall not be interpreted any undue 
 preference, to incur any penalty, in jxiint of delivery of monies coined, 
 if the officer or ofKcers, or their deputies or clerks, shall deliver out or 
 ])ay any monies coined to any person or persons that do come and 
 demand the same upon subsequent entries, before others that did not 
 come to demand their monies in their order and course, so as there be 
 so much money reserved as will satisfy them, which shall not be other- 
 wise disposed of, but kept for them. 
 
 IV. And for the more orderly and clear performance thereof, be it 
 enacted, and it is hereby enacted by the authority afores;iid, That the 
 master-worker of his ."Majesty's mint or mints for the time being, shall 
 at the time of the delivery and entry of any gold or silver in the said 
 mint or mints, give unto the bringer or bringers in thereof to be coined, 
 a bill under his hand denoting the weight, fineness and value thereof, 
 t(»gether with the day and order of its delivery into the said mint or 
 mints. 
 
 y. And for the further encouragement ami assurance of such lus 
 shall bring any gold or silver into \\\s .Majesty's said mint or minis to be 
 coined; (2) bo it enacted, and it is hereby enacted b\ tin* authority 
 aforesaid. That no confiscation, forfeiture, seizure, attachment, .stop or 
 restraint whatsoever shall be made in the said mint or mints, of any 
 gold or silver brought in to be coined, for or by reason of any imbargo, 
 breach of the peace, letters of mart or reprisal, or war within any 
 foreign nation, or upon any other acconnt or pret»-nce whatsoever; (3) 
 
Mint Indenture of Thomas Neale. 233 
 
 but that any gold ainl silver brought into any of his Majesty's mint or 
 mints within the Kinu:il(»m of England to be coined, shall truly ami 
 with all convenient speed be coined and delivered out to the respective 
 bringer or bringers in thereof, their respective executors, administrators 
 or assigns, according to the rules and directions of this act. 
 
 []Tlie remaining Sections proviile for an import dutv on li(juors to 
 maintain the Mint, and makiiiir t^ood a u;rant, made six years before, to 
 Dame Barbara Villiers, widow, of the sum of two-pence by tale out of 
 every pound weight troy of Silver moneys thereafter to be coined. 
 
 This statute was kept pennanently in force by 2.5 Car. II., c. H ; 1 Jac. 
 II., c. 7 ; 4 and 5 W. and :\I., c. 24; 12andl.-3 W. III., c. 41 ; 7 Annae. 
 c. 24; I Geo. I., c. 18; 9 Geo. I., c. 10; 4 Geo. II., c. 12 ; 1 2 Geo. II., 
 c. 5; 19 Geo. II., c. 14; 27 Geo. II., c. 11, and by 1 (Jeo. III., c. IC 
 The next re-enactment is that of 8 Geo. III., c. 1, which continues the 
 act until the statute of 9 Geo. III., chap. 2, re-enacts it in perpetuity. 
 Although practically abrogated, so far as Silver was concerned, by 
 the clauses for prohibition of Silver Coinage in 38 Geo. III., c. .5;), 
 (1798,) this statute remained in force till 1816 ; when, by .50 Geo. III., 
 c. 68, so much of it as guaranteed gratuitous Coinage (see also suj»-a, 
 p. 161) of Silver was repealed, and the coinage was ordained of Silver 
 Coins which should contain about 6 per cent, less Silver than Coins 
 under the former standard, while the JMint price remained the same and 
 payable in Silver, and the Legal Tender of the Silver was reduced to 
 40 shillings. The .statutes 1 Geo. III., c. 16, 9 Geo. III., c. 2, 38 Geo. 
 III., c. 59, 56 Geo. III., c. 68, are reprinted in the Document of the 
 IMonetary Conference of 1878.] 
 
 No. 3. 
 
 EXTRACT FRO.M THE MINT INDENTURE OF 
 THOMAS NEALE, 168(;. 
 
 \^^f^'^'. Treasury Papers, I'ol. ii. jVo. 21.] 
 
 ''And the said Thomas Ncale doth by these pre.sents covenant etc. 
 
 to make four sorts of Money of Crown Gold one piece that be 
 
 called the Ten Shilling piece riihg for ton shillings sterling and there 
 
p 
 
 234 Tlie History of the Guinea. 
 
 shall be four score and nine of those in tlie Pound weight Troy, one 
 other jiiece which shall be called the twenty shilling piece running for 
 twenty shillings sterling and there shall be 44 of those and one ten 
 shilling piece or the weight of a ten shilling piece in the Pound weight 
 1 roy. 
 
 [Then follow similar provisions for the 40». piece and £5 piece.] 
 
 No. 4. 
 
 SILVER HEFORE THE HOUSE OF rOM.AIOXS IX i<;:.o. 
 
 \_From tlte Journal of the House. A. ICDO. Mercurii, 9° die AprUis.'] 
 
 A Petition or divers working (iiddsmiths in and about the City «tf 
 Lo7ulon was read ; setting forth, That the Petitioners, in the Course of 
 their Trade, observing the great Scarcity of Silver, have upon their 
 Search, found, at the Custom house, That, since the First of OcUiiter 
 last past, Entries have been made of Two hundred Eighty-Six thou- 
 sand One hundred and Twelve Ounces of Silver or Bullion, and 
 Eightv-niiu- thousand Nine hundred Forty-and-nine Dollars, and 
 Pieces of Eight, by divers private Persons, for Exportation ; and doubt 
 not but that it will appear. That not only the East India Company for 
 many Years, but also divers Jeics and ^Merchants, have of late bought 
 up great Quantities of Silver to carry out of this Kingdom ; and given 
 Three-half-pence ]>er Ounce above the Value : \\hich hath encouraged 
 the ^lelting down of much Plate, and milled INIonies; whereby, for 
 these Six ISIonths past, not only the Petitioners in their Trade, but 
 the Mint itself, hath been stop from coining : And praying the Con- 
 sideration of the House in the Premises. 
 
 Resolved, That the said Petition be referred to a Committee : viz. Mr. 
 Fdey, y\.x. Machell, Sir John Knight, Sir Rich. RtynoUs, Sir Sam. 
 Bemad iston. Sir Levin Rennet, IVIr. Thornhaugh, Sir Win. Kllis, Mr. 
 Slater, Colonel Birch, Lord Falkland, 'Mr. Palmc.<t, Mr. Perry, .Mr. 
 Jliitcliinson, IMr. Bus^coicen, INIr. Keni/on, !Mr. Wilmot, Mr. Fuller, 
 Sir Cha. Windham, Sir Fdtc. Phili]>ps, Mr. Franckli/ii, .Mr. (•laidiam, 
 .Air. liiirdet, IVIr. Arnold, Sir Walter Ynung, Sir Jonath. Joining!'. Mr. 
 
Silver before the Commons in 1690. 235 
 
 Gray^ Mr. Pelham^ Sir Ralph f)/itton, IMr. Enpland, Sir Tho. Fowles, 
 jMr. Rf/der : Wlio are to consider of the said Petition ; And report their 
 Opinion thereupon to the House : And they are to meet this Afternoon 
 at Three of the Clock, in the Speaker's Chamber. 
 
 Metc/trii, 7" d'l' Ma a. 
 
 Sir Rich. Rei/nell reports from the Committee to whom the Petition of 
 divers working Goldsmiths in and about the City o{ Loiidun was referred, 
 That they had considered the blatters to them referred ; and had 
 directed a Special Report to be made of tho whole IMatter to the 
 House : The which he read in his Place ; and afterwards, delivered 
 the same in at tlie Clerk's Table : Where the same was read ; and is 
 as followeth ; vi/. : — 
 
 " That it appears, by a Certificate from the Custom-house, dated 
 Seventeenth April last, That great Quantities of Silver have been of 
 late exported ; whereof we had a particular Account for the last Five 
 Years : That above Seven Parts of Eight had been shipped olVby the 
 Jeics^ who do any thing for their Profit : The Reason was plain ; that 
 the French King, of late, finding his ^loney very scarce, had raised his 
 Coin Ten Pounds per Cent. : Which was an Encouragement to send 
 Silver to fill his Coffers : Which the Jews, for their Profit, exported 
 daily in very great Quantities ; That, on Mondat/ last, they had shipped 
 off about Sixty thousand Ounces by the Name of Foreign Silver ; and 
 great Parcels more were ready to be shipped: which did make it 
 scarce and dear, to the utter Ruin of the working Goldsmiths. 
 
 That there were also English., as well as Jeic!^ who, for their Advan- 
 tages, would doubtless melt down our Crown Pieces, &c. and sell for 
 Foreign Silver, to the Undoing of the whole Nation for want of ^loney, 
 unless a present Remedy were found to prevent Exportation of any 
 Silver or Gold. 
 
 " That the Committee hold also Certificates from the Officers of the 
 Mint, for divers Years ; and do find, that, of late, verv small Quantities 
 have been coined. 
 
 "That it was offered, that the Profit of melting down One tliousaiid 
 Pound of milled ^loney for Exportation, was Twentv-five Pounds ready 
 Money, and upwards. 
 
 "That Silver was coined at the Mint at Five Shillintrs and Two- 
 
2oG The llistorj of the Guinea. 
 
 pence />er Ounce ; but, at the Time of KxjMjrtatioii, was generally soW 
 at Five Shillings and Three-pence Halfpeny yx'/" Ounce : which gave 
 Occasion of it,s being melted down, and transjwrted as Foreign Silver. 
 
 " That divers Proposals were suggested : 
 
 " 1. A total Proliibition : 
 
 " 1'. A qualilied Prohibitittn f(»r certain Times, or an Imposition for 
 Kxportation for Silver : 
 
 "■ y. The enhansing our own Money. 
 
 " So that, though the Committee found the Complaint of the 
 Petitioners very just, and the Inconveniences to the Kingdom very 
 great, they could not agree of a ^^'ay for the preventing the same ; but 
 were hunil)ly of Opinion, That it was worthy of the Consideration of 
 the House." 
 
 Resolced, That the said Report be re-committed to the same Com- 
 mittee, upon the Debate of the House : Ami that they do thereupon 
 prepare a Bill or Bills, as they shall see cause ; and ])resent the same 
 to the House : And that, in order thereunto, the Committee do sit de 
 die in diem ; and have Power to send for Persons, Papers, and Records: 
 And that the Officers of the Mi//t do attend the said Committee : And 
 that Mr. Neah\ I\Ir. Noneis, Sir Jo/in Bands, Mr. Thornliaiitjh, Sir 
 Christopher Mns(fravc, ^Ir. Cognisht/, Colonel Birch, 31 r. Christ//, Sir 
 Peter Coryton, Sir Jerp. Elices, Sir Jos. Tredenfiam, INIr. Evans, 3Ir. 
 Slater, Mr. Tho. Folei/, I\Ir. Hen. Herbert, and all the Members of the 
 House that are INIerchants And they are to meet this After- 
 noon at Three of the Clock. 
 
 ♦ **♦♦* 
 
 No. 5. 
 
 KKPOKT OF A CO.AIMITTKK IX KWOIH OF 
 1)KBAS1X(J TH1-: COIN. .Mah. M 1 _, n;;)4-5. 
 
 \_FroTn the Joitriial nf the House of Commons.'] 
 
 ]Mr. Scobell rejjorted from the Committee appointed to receive pro- 
 posal.s, how to i)revent clipping of the coin of this Kingdom for the 
 futuri- ; and the Exportation of Silver ; and to report the same to the 
 House ; Th:U the committee had received several jiroposals accordingly ; 
 
Eepovt for Peha.^h}<j the Staiulnrd. 
 
 2;57 
 
 and had agreed upon several resolutions, which they had directed him 
 to ri'port to the House ; and he ri-ail the same in his Place ; and 
 afterwards delivered the same in at the Clerk's Table; Where the 
 same was read; and are as follows : viz.: — 
 
 '• 1. Resoiced, That it is the opinion of this Committee, That the 
 best way to prevent clipping the Silver Coin of this Kingdom for the 
 future is, to new-coin the same into milled money. 
 
 " i'. liesnlred. That it is the opinion of this Committee, That ten 
 hundred thousand j)ounds is a suHicient Sum to make good the 
 Deticiencv of the present clipped coin of this Kingdom. 
 
 " ."1. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, That tlie 
 Crown and Half-crown, hereafter to be coined, shall be of the present 
 weight and iineness. 
 
 *■• 4. ResolceJ, That it is the opinion of this Committee, That the 
 Crown piece shall go at five Shillings Sixpence ; and the Half-crown 
 shall go at Two Shillings Nine-pence. 
 
 "5. Resoiced, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the pre- 
 sent milled crown Piece go for os. Gd., and the half-crown for Two 
 shillings Nine Pence. 
 
 "6. Remlced, That it is the Opinion of this Committee, That all 
 monev to be coined under the denomination of the Half-crown, shall 
 have a remedy of six-pence in the Ounce. 
 
 " 7. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, That for as 
 much of the present coin, as any Person brings into the mint, he shall 
 have weight for weight, and the overplus by a Bill or Ticket, at per 
 cent., on a Fund, to be appropriated for that purpose. 
 
 " 8. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the pre- 
 sent laws, against clipping be enforced by some Additions. 
 
 " 9. Resoiced, That it is the opinion of this Committee, That all \>vr- 
 sons whose professions require such like Tools or Engines, as may be 
 made use of for coining or clipping, be obliged to register their names, 
 and places of abode ; and that it be penal on such as neglect to do the 
 same. 
 
 "•10. Resoiced, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that it l»e 
 penal on all such persons on whom clij^pings are found. 
 
 ''11. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that it be 
 penal on all stich persons as give more for any silver Coin than it ought 
 to «io for bv law. 
 
238 The History of the Guinea. 
 
 " 12. ItesfJreJ^ That it is the opinion of" this Conimitteo, That no 
 presses such as are used for coining, be in any other phice than his 
 IMiijestv's Mint. 
 
 " 1 ."!. /u:<i>Irri/, Tliat it is the opinion of this C'nmniittee, that it he 
 penal «»n all such persons as shall inijiort any cli|)pe(l or counterfeit 
 money. 
 
 " 14. ResrJred, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that it he 
 penal on any j)i'rM)n to export P^nglish Bullion ; and the Proof to lie 
 upon the Exporter. 
 
 ^'^ liesdcedy That it is the oj)inion of this Committee, that it be Penal 
 on any ])erson to counterfeit any foreign .Mark upon I^ullion. 
 
 '•'■ Resolccf/, That this House, will, upon Saturday Morning next, take 
 the said Report into Consideration." 
 
 No. 6. 
 
 PETITIONS CONCERXIXG THE GUIXE.\ .\T TIiHri'\ 
 SIIILLIXGS, Fki3. 1.% 1G95-C. 
 
 [^Froni the Journal of the ILmse (f Commons. ~\ 
 
 '' .Iovi> 13° die Februarii, 8° Gulielmi Terlii. 
 
 • • * * * ♦ 
 
 A Petition of seyeral Graziers, and others ; traders in Cattle in tin- 
 IVIarket of West Smithlield, London, and also of many Butchers that 
 use the said market ; and of several others receiving and paving 
 Monies, for Cattle bought and sold in the said INIarket ; was presented 
 to the House, and read ; setting forth. That about £40,000 per week 
 is returned in the said INIarket for Cattle ; which, for almost 1 - months 
 past, for want of current silver had been paid in Ciuineas at .'>(».<. a 
 j)icce ; great Part whereof they are forced to keep by them for stock to 
 trade with, and are now in their Hands: That a sudden Fall of the 
 Price of Guineas will disable them from supplying the City of London, 
 and Parts adjacent; and will tend to the Ruin of the Petitioners; 
 And praying the consideration of the House in the Premises, 
 
 Ordered, That the consideration of the said Petition be referred to 
 the C'ommittee of the whole House, t(» whom the consideration «if the 
 Price of Guineas is referred. 
 
Petitions conccrnimi the Ji(itij/</. 'JoD 
 
 A Petition of divers ^Merchants, Wooleiulrapers, and otlii'r Traders, 
 ill and about the City of London, was presented to the House, and read ; 
 setting forth, That the connnerce of this Nation is at present broujiht 
 to a stand, by the uncertain value of our (Jold, and our Silver being 
 drawn to a low ebb, it may prove of ill consequence to the jniblick good, 
 unless speedy means be taken. That the Petitioners think, a gradual 
 sinking the Value of our Gold, from one period of time to another, 
 will be the only eflectual means to prevent the designs of unfair 
 Traders, and to make the loss fall more easy, and less surprising, than by 
 rediicing them at once, which will also prevent the Exportation; And 
 praying. That the Gold Coins may be settled, and made current in 
 all payments, in sucli manner as the House shall think fit. 
 
 Ordered, That the consideration (»f the said Petition be referred to 
 the committee of the whole House, to whom the consideration of the 
 Price of Guineas is referred. 
 
 A Petition of divers Merchants and Traders in and about the City 
 of London, was presented to the House, and read ; setting forth, That 
 by reason of the Badness of our Silver Coins, some I\Ien have taken 
 occasion to raise Guineas to 80s. a-piece ; which being about 40 per 
 cent. Value here, above the pro])ortion of Gold to Silver in anv other 
 part of Europe, hath caused the bringing over to us vast quantities of 
 (iold ; causing the Exchange to fall ; and consequently, the carrying 
 out of our iSilver, in that disadvantageous proportion ; to the impoverish- 
 in*; the Kingdom : That notwithstaudin<r the care taken to reform the 
 Silver Coins, yet certain Persons continue buying and selling Guineas, 
 l)eing employed therein, as thev believe, by persons promoting their 
 Private Gain ; whereby, they are still kept up to 29*. and 30.s\, at which 
 Rate, the Petitioners are forced to receive them for Debts ; but cannot 
 pav them .so to the King's receipts, or upon Bills of Exchange, so that 
 they are necessitated to buy Silver IMonev with their Guineas at .3, 4, 
 and 5 per cent. Loss ; and thereby contribute to the (Jain of those 
 Persons who keep up that trade : That at this time, great quantities of 
 (iold is bought up in, and imjiorted hither from Holland, wliere four 
 of our milled cnnvns, and Two weiglitv Shillings will purchase a 
 Guinea ; the PnWit whereby is so great, that, if some speedy .stop be not 
 put to this pernicious Trade, our milled money will be melted down, 
 and carried away as fast as it can be coined : And praying the House 
 to take the said Inconveniences, and Loss of Commerce, into Considera- 
 
240 The Ilistonj of the Gui?iea. 
 
 tion, and to fiml some speedv and t'il'i'ctual way to previMit the said 
 abuse. 
 
 Ordered, That tlie consideration of the said Petition he referred to 
 tlie Ct)niniittee of the whole Ilonse, to wlioni the consideration of tlie 
 Price of Guineas is referred. 
 
 A Petition of several ^Merchants and Tradesmen of the t'ity of 
 London, on behalf of themselves and others, was presented to the 
 House, and read; setting forth, That the Petitioners have of late, 
 through the unsettled Price of (iuineas, been imposed upon by Bankers 
 and Goldsmiths, to whom the Petitioners have been compelled to pay 
 Guineas at umler L'!tx. a-piece, or what Hate they j)lease to take them 
 at ; th»nigh the Petitioners have, and must if they eontinue trading, 
 receive them at ■W.'<. a-piece of their Customers and Country Chapmen, 
 or else thev must receive no money by reason of the Scarcity and Bad- 
 ness of our Silver Coins : And praying, That the Price of Guineas 
 may fall gradually, as the House shall think fit. 
 
 Ordered, That the consideration of the said Petition be referred to 
 the Committee of the whole House, to whom the consideration of the 
 Price of Guineas is referred. 
 
 Xo. 7. 
 
 TlIK BAXK OF EXGL.VND AND THE CJUIXEA I\ 
 
 CAMP BEFORE NA.AHIJ IX i •;:•.-». 
 
 In presenting the following document, I suggest the (piestion w liether 
 it does not supply the kev to a problem which has slumbered unsolved 
 for many a vear — namely, Why the JJank sent three of its directors. 
 Sir James Houbl(»n (the (iovernor), Sir William Scawen, and Michael 
 CJodfrey (the Deputy-Governor), to tlie King's headcpiarters before 
 Xamur ? 
 
 \\'hen these papers were first presented to tlie Hritisli Association in 
 September, 188*), the account given by Macatilay of this famous visit 
 was the only one within range of the general reader. Lately, however, 
 in April, 1887, has appeared a work on the '' First Xine Years of the 
 BaJik of England," from no less a hand than that of Professor Thorold 
 
 I 
 
 f 
 
The Bank and the Guinea before Namur. 241 
 
 Rogers. On looking over its pages for allusions to this visit, I iinil 
 that after speaking of a decline of Bank Stock from 100 or Hi) in 
 Alarch to !tO or \)1 in succeeding months, followed by a rise from 
 June 14 to June 2», to t)'J, the author says that lie "finds nothing 
 to account for this decline, beyond the uncertainties of the war, except- 
 ing, perhaps, a rumour that the Bank was about to establish a branch 
 at Antwerp, and coin money there for the army in Flanders." He 
 then observes, '• For this or for some other purpose the Bank sent three 
 of their directors to the King's headquarters." 
 
 In Francis's "History of the IJank of England " the incident is 
 mentioned in the following terms: "The funds supplied bv the mw 
 Corporation changed the scene ; but the transmission of specie was 
 difficult and full of hazard, and .Air. (iodfrey left his peaceful avoca- 
 tions to visit Namur, then vigorously besieged bv the English monarch." 
 (I. p. 7l'.) Xow it seems that the original of this letter was written at 
 Antwerp many days before Godfrey's death in the trenches, and the 
 circumstances as we know them, as well as the very explicit language 
 of the letter, point to the rating of Gold in the Government Cilices 
 of Account in England as the motive for the visit. 
 
 The contrast shown bv this letter as between current opinion to-ilay 
 touching the interposition of the Government in the regulation of 
 money, and that which was entertained in 1095 by those who were on 
 the ground in the midst of the crisis, and who were responsible to the 
 country, to the King, and to their stockholders, is also brought into 
 the strongest light bv the important work of Professor Rogers. 
 
 The omission to take note of matters which were certainly not 
 buried in oblivion, as this letter has been, is quite phenomenal. The 
 following extract from " The First Nine Years of the Bank of Eng- 
 land," which is not in the text, being merely a note (page 35), seems to 
 be the main suggestion in its pages touching the principles of monetary 
 policy atfecting the money-metals. "Silver was virtually the currency 
 of the country, and throughout this crisis the Government was able, as 
 Governments are able, to regulate the price of the bullion which is the 
 material of the popular and nearly universal currency, by the coin which 
 they produce. It is quite another thing to try the regulation of two 
 kinds of bullion and two currencies, both equally universal." 
 
 In contravention to these dicta, it appears that the Government was 
 induced to regulate two kinds of bullion, and thereby saved the State. 
 
 R 
 
019 
 
 The Ilistorij of the Gumea. 
 
 [J/S'. Tirasurv Papers, Vol. 34, Xo. 4.] 
 
 1 
 
 Camp beforo Xaimir 11 July, IC,'.}.'). 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Ilerowitli I ri'turn you the inclosed Warrant with the Signi- 
 fication (if His Majesty's Pleasure that the Lords Commissioners of the 
 Treasury do countersii^n tlie Same. 
 
 Having received a letter from the Comm" of the liank of 
 Plngland whereof the enclosed is an extract, concerning the excessive 
 price of (iuineas, I am commanded hv His IMajestv to send the same 
 to their Lo'''' for their consideration and opinion thereupon ; which is 
 all from 
 
 Your most humble Servant, 
 
 ^\'.M. UkAI MU AVT. 
 
 His 31ajesty just now 
 commanded me to send 
 you the enclosed Refer- 
 ence. 
 
 I\Ir. LowNUES. 
 
 (Indorsed) 
 
 11 July ir.Oo. 
 F'rom I\Ir. Blalhwayt July H>i)'> concerning a complaint liv v' 
 Bank at v'' great price of fJuineas \c. 
 
 Extract of a Letter from the Commissioners of the Bank to ^Ir. 
 Blatlnvayt Dated att Antwerp 7th July, 1 <">:'■'. X.S. 
 
 We cannot forheare sending you a duplicate of what we wrote vou 
 the 2nd of this month, noe repeating of Our Instances hv your hands 
 to the King that a stoj) may be putt to this mischeevous high ])rice of 
 (lold and Guinees in England, which, as we liave said, if not speedily 
 done, will have most fatal and certain evill consequences, besides the 
 
Statutes relating to Guineas. 243 
 
 utter disabling us or any one else from paying the army, this is a most 
 perplexing matter to us, not so much for the loss we sustain by the con- 
 tract made w"' my Lords of the Treasury, Imt for that (if this perni- 
 tious Trade of sending Gold from all parts of Europe to England con- 
 tinue) it will be impossible to coniplv with it, but we will hope that 
 his ^Majesty will speedilv direct mv Lords the Justices bv Proclama- 
 tion to give rcmidv hereunto bv reducing the price of (luinees to the 
 Par of our neighbours before this extravagant rise. 
 
 (Lulorsed) 
 Commissioners of the Bank aljout the rise of Gold. 
 
 Xo. 8. 
 
 STATUTES RELATLXG TO THE COINAGE AXD 
 CURREXCV OF GUINEAS PASSED 1G9G. 
 
 A. 
 TiiK Gi'iNKA AT 2G Shillings. 
 
 7 c^- Gill. I If., c. 10, $. 18. 
 
 And for preventing the further increase of the Rate of coined 
 Gold and the mischiefe which may thence befall this Realme Be it 
 enacted by the Aulhoritv aforesaid that from and after the Five and 
 twentieth day of ]March One thousand six hundred ninety six noe 
 Person shall receive take or pay any of the pieces of Gold Coine of 
 this Kingdom commonly called Guineas att any greater or higher rate 
 than Twenty six shillings for each Guinea and not to exceed the same 
 in proportion for the Pieces of Gold called Ilalfe-Guineas Double- 
 Guineas and five Pound Pieces. And in case any Person shall 
 offend herein he shall forfeit for every such Otlence double the Value 
 of the Gold soe received or paid and alsoe the Sum of twenty Pounds 
 the one IMoiety to II is ]Majestie and the other IMoiety to the Person or 
 Persons who shall sue or informe for the same to be recovered with 
 Costs of Suit in any of His 3Iajesties Courts of Record by Action of 
 Debt, Bill, Plaint, or Information, wherein no Privilege, Protection, or 
 Wager of Law, shall bre allowed, nor any more than one Imparlance. 
 
244 TJie Iliiitorij of the Guinea. 
 
 And be it dcclarc'd, lliat nothing in this Act contained shall extend 
 or be construed to compel any person or persons to receive am (iuinea 
 or Guineas at the said Rate of Twentv-six Shillin^rs. 
 
 B. 
 ScsPKNsioN uv rnK Obligation to Coin GfiNKAs^. 
 
 7 Sf UhL III., c. 13 (in'.t.'i-*;). 
 
 An Act for takins? ofT the Obligation and Incourajrenient for 
 coiiiiiiix (iuineas for a certnin time tlierein mentioned. 
 
 WIIEKKA8 by an Act in the Eighteentli Yeare (of the lleigne) 
 of King Charles the Second intituled An Act for incouraging of 
 Coinage and continued by an other Act made in Five and twentieth 
 yeare of the (Reign of the) said King Charles intituled An Act for 
 continuing a former Act concerning Coinage both which said Acts 
 were revived by an Act made in the First yeare of tlie Reign of the 
 late King James and are continued bv an Act made in the Fourth 
 Session of the last Parliament intituled An Act for reviving con- 
 tinuiuiT and exi)lainin<r several Laws therein mentioned which are 
 expired and neare expiring Itt is provided that whatsoever Person or 
 Persons Native or Forreijrner Alien or Stranjit'r shall from and after 
 the Twentieth dav of December One thousand six hundred sixtv six 
 bring any Forreigne Coin Plate or Bullion of Gold or Silver in Masse 
 molten or allayed or any sort of ^Manufacture of Gold or Silver into 
 his ^Majesty's I\Iint or JNIints within the Kingdom of England to bee 
 there melted down and coined into the current coine of this Kingdome 
 shall have the same there assayed melted downe and coined with 
 all convenient speed without anv defalcation Diminution or charge for 
 the Assaying Coinage or W aste in Coinage so as that for every 
 Pound Tmv of Crown or Standard (ioiil that shall bie brought 
 in or delivered bv him or tiu'iu to bee assavi'il iiu'lted down and 
 coined as aforesaid there shall bee delivered out to him or them 
 resj)ectivtl\ a Pound Trov of the Current Coins of this Kingdom of 
 Crowne or Standard (miIiI. And wln-reas great Qmuitities of Gold 
 have been latelv imported from Foreign Parts which being coined here 
 as aforesaid into Guineas have been (on occasion of the present ill State 
 of the Silver Coins) taken and accepted bv the Subjects of this Realm 
 
Statutes relatimj to Guineas. 245 
 
 at verv liigli ami umisuul Rates aiul Prices tending to tlie great Damage 
 and Loss of the Publick. The continuance of which Practice (unlesse 
 speedily prevented) will run the Nation vastly in debt to Foreigners 
 for the repayment whereof the Silver ^lonevs of this Kingdom must 
 iuL'vitahlv be exhausted on Terms of great Disadvantage therefore to 
 prevent the further (Jrouth of soe great an evil Bee it enacted by the 
 King's most Excellent !!Ma jesty by and with the Advice and Consent of 
 the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in this present 
 Parliament assembled and by the Authority of the same that from and 
 after the Second Day of INLirch in the vear of our Lord One thousand 
 six hundred ninety five till the First Day of January then next follow- 
 ing there shall not be any Obligation of receiving into His ^Majesty's 
 ]Mint or flints to be coined any gold whatsoever nor shall any of the 
 Officers of His ^lajestv's 3Iints be obliiied to coin any t:old within 
 the time aforesaid for any Porsou whatsoever anything in the said 
 recited Acts or any other Law to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 And be it fiU'ther enacted by the ^Vuthority aforesaid that the 
 several Impositions upon Wiiu', \'inegar, Cider, i3eer, ]3randy and 
 Strong Waters imported levyable and payable by the Acts before 
 recited shall be applied entirely toward the Encouragement of the 
 Silver 3Iint according(ly) as is therein expressed without any relation 
 to the Coinage of Gold during the Continuance of this present Act. 
 Anything in the said former Acts to the contrary in any wise notwith- 
 standing. 
 
 Provided nevertheless that it shall and may be lawful for the Royal 
 African Company of England to bring to His ^Majesty's Tower of 
 London to be coined during the continuance of this Act such g;old as shall 
 bee imported by them the Husband of said Company first making oath 
 before the Warden Comptroller or ^Master Worker of the ^Mint for 
 the time being (which Oath any of the said officers of the 3Iint are 
 hereby authorized to administer) that all the Gold so brought to the 
 Mint to be coined for the use of the African Company was imported 
 on the Account of the said Company in return of their Goods sent to 
 Africa and on no other account which Gold shall bee received by the 
 Officers of the I\Iint and coined into Halfe-(iuineas and delivered 
 back in the same manner and with like Encouraiiement as it ouiiht 
 to have been before the making of this Act Anything herein to the 
 contrary notwithstandiiiir. 
 
240 The Iliston/ of tlie Gumca. 
 
 Ami whereas the Inij)iirtation of (iuiueiisfrom bevuiul sea mav prove 
 very prejudicial to this Kingdom in the present Conjuncture if not 
 prevented Be it therefore enacted hv the Authority aforesaid That 
 from and after the said Second day of ^larch until the said First day 
 of January it shall not be lawful for any person or Persons to import 
 Guineas or Ilalfe-Ciuincas into this Kingdom on any pretense whatso- 
 ever (upon Forfeiture of all such Guineas or IIalfe-(iuineas as shall bee 
 so imported one iMoiety thereof to His Majesty and the other to such 
 Person (ir Persons who shall seize or prosecute for the same to bee re- 
 covered by Bill Plaint or Information in any of II is ^lajestv's Courts 
 of Record at Westminster wherein noe Essoiijne Protection Priviledtie 
 or wager of Law shall bee allowed nor anv more than one Imparlance). 
 
 C. 
 
 TiiK Guinea at 22 Shillings. 
 
 7 cV Gill. III., c. 10, 5. 12. 
 
 And whereas the iinccrtaine Value of coined trold has been hiijhl,' 
 prejudiciall to Trade and an encouragement to certain evill disposed 
 persons to raise and fall the same to the great Prejudice of the Landed 
 3Ien of this Kingdomc Be it therefore enacted by the authority 
 aforesaid that from and after the Tenth day of April One thousand 
 six hundred ninety six no person shall utter or receive any of the pieces 
 of gold coin commonly called Guineas at any higher or greater Rate or 
 value than two and twenty shillings for each guinea and so proportion- 
 ably for every greater or lesser piece of coined gold and whoever shall 
 oft'end herein shall incur the penalties and forfeiture jirovidcd in an Act 
 made in this present Parliament for those that shall receive or pay 
 Guineas and other pieces of coined gold at a greater or higher rate than 
 in that Act is directed to bee recoverid by the same ways and means 
 that the Penalties ami Forfeitures of that Act are to bee or may bee 
 recovered. 
 
Statutes relat'uvi to Guineas. 247 
 
 D. 
 
 Repkal ok tiik Act susi-kndinc tuk Oiu.KiA i ion to Coin 
 
 GuiNKAS. 
 
 15 cS- 1) (lid. 1 11.^ c. 1, ICitC-;. 
 
 An Act tor iui[)ortiiig and coining Gnineas and IlaltV-Guineas. 
 
 WliiTt'as by an Act niadt' in the First Session of this present 
 Parliament entitled An Act for takin<r oil" the Oblijiation and En- 
 couragenient of coining Guineas for a certain time therein mentioned itt 
 is enacted that from the second day of 3Iarch in the year of our Lord 
 One thousaiul six lumdred ninety five until the First day of January 
 then next following there shall not bee any obligation of receiving into 
 His ^Majesty's ]Mint or flints to be coined any Gold \vhatsoever nor 
 shall the officers of His IMajesty's IMint bee obliged to coin any (lold 
 Avithin the time aforesaid for any person whatsoever and that the 
 Recompenses appointed by the Statute made in the Eighteenth Year 
 of the Reign of King Charles the Second and other subsequent Statutes 
 for Encouragement of Coinage shall bee applied to the use of the Silver 
 ^lint And it is also thereby further enacted That from and after the 
 said Second Day of IMarch until the said First day of January it shall 
 not bee lawful for any Person or persons whatsoever to import Guineas 
 or Ilalfe-Guineas into this Kingdom upon any pretense whatsoever 
 upon forfeiture of the said Gnineas or Half-Guineas. And whereas 
 the reason of making the said Act was occasioned by the High and 
 unusual Price of Guineas which might in the end be very prejudical 
 to tlie Subject Hut the said Price of Guineas being now reduced to 
 or near the Standard and sundry persons being desirous to coin (J old 
 and also to import great Quantities of Guineas and Halfe-Guineas 
 which will be very beneficial to the Trade and Commerce of this 
 Kinjrdoni. For the Encoura'rement whereof be it enacted by the 
 Kings most Excellent IMajesty by and with the Advice and Consent 
 of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in Parliament 
 assembled and by the authority of the same that the said Act and 
 every clause matter and thing therein contained (other than what 
 relates to the recompenses by the said Act appointed to be applied to 
 the Silver 3Iint and what concerns the Royal African Company) be 
 and are hereby repealed and utterly made void to all intents and 
 
248 Tlie IHstory nf tin' Cuiuf^a. 
 
 ])urj)oses and that all aiul every Person and Persons may freely import 
 into this KinLrdom (luineas and Ilalfe-Guineas as ihevmi-iht or usually 
 did before the niakin;; the said Act j)rohil)iting the same. 
 
 And be it further enactetl by liie Autlioritv aforesaid That the 
 I\Iaster and W'tirker and other Ollieers of His Majesty's INIint in the 
 Tower of London shall on or before the Tenth dav of November One 
 Tlumsand six hundred ninety six prepare and set apart one or more 
 31 ill or 31 ills Press or Presses with other conveniences to be in the 
 first ])lace employed in tiie C'oinaj:e of (iold which shall be brought 
 thitluT by any Person or Persons Native or Foreigner to be received 
 in coined and delivered out in such manner course and order as bv the 
 aforesaid Statute made in the Ei«;hteenth year (»f Kinir Charles the 
 Second is directed and appointed so that the course in Coinage of Gold 
 and Silver be kept in distinct Accounts and not interfere one with 
 another either in receiving or dulivering out of his 3Iajesty's said IMint 
 and that such coining and delivering out Gold in a distinct course 
 according to the time of bringing in the same although there be 
 silver remaining there uncoined shall not be interpreted any undue 
 preference to incur any Penalty in point of delivery of nu)ney coined. 
 Anvthin;; in the said Statute of the Eijxhteenth of Kinir Charles the 
 Second or other Statute to the contrary thereof notwithstandin<r. 
 
 No. 1). 
 
 ACTION OF Tin-: Ti{KAsrHV Torcmxc Tin-: cuk- 
 
 REXCY OF TIIK (illXKA Al' T\\ KXTV-TWO 
 
 siiiLLixcs, ](;;•:. 
 
 \_Pa)Uame)itcmf jRe(ur?i, Mair/i 1 1', 1 H.'JO.] 
 
 Copy of Letter from the IJoard of Treasury to Sir Robert Howard, 
 dated October 25th, ICOT- 
 
 Sir, 
 
 The Lords Commissioners of His ^Majesty's Treasury desire vou 
 to signify to the Tellers in the receipt of Exchetpier. that they receive 
 Guineas at 22.<. each, ptirsiiant to the advertisement in Tiie (Jazette 
 of Thursday last. 
 
 (Siirncd) Wm. r^(»\\Ni)Ks, 
 
The Rating of the Guinea. '2V.) 
 
 Copv of Advertisement inserted in The Gazette, dated from 
 Monday, October 10th, to Thnrsday, October 21st, IG'JT : 
 
 W'lIEUEAS in the (Jazette of the 11th instant, notice \\as given 
 (amongst other tliinijs), That Gnineas would be received at 2 Is. Cuf. 
 a-piece (with a discount and interest therein mentioned) for loans onlv. 
 The Lords Commissioners of His I\Iajestv's Treasury being informed, 
 that by occasion thereof, a difHculty is arisen in taking (iuineas for 
 His ^lajesty's revenues and taxes, are therefore pleased hereby to give 
 notice, that it was intended but that all receivers of taxes and public 
 revenues should receive Guineas for the same to His ^lajestv's use, at 
 the rate thoy did before the said advertisement was published. 
 
 Xo. 10. 
 
 LETTER OF THE COM.^rRS. OF EXCISE TOUCHING 
 THE RATING OF THE GUINEA IN I(i94-G. 
 
 To TlIK RlCIIT HoNIJLE. TIIK LoUUS 
 
 [_MS. Treasun/ Papers^ C().mm''\ of ius 3Ia^"^^' Tijkahy. 
 r<.K .-..'5, No. 10.] 
 
 The comm'\ of his ]\Ia'"'\ Revenues of 
 Excise humbly represent unto yo. Lo^P* 
 
 That between Christmas lGr)4 and LadydaylCOG severall of the 
 Collectors of Excise in their collections received Guineas and other 
 Species of Gold Coyne att severall rates then currant which they 
 could not i)Utt oir att the rates utt which they received the same. 
 Whereby they have been att a loss which tliev have prayd us to allow 
 them on their respective Accounts ^Vnd to that purpose have made 
 their respective Affidavits of their respective losses by receipt of the 
 said Species of Gold they so received, and that thcv have made no ad- 
 vantage to themselves thereby. A list of which respective Collectors 
 Names with the quantities of Gold soe received and the loss thev 
 have sustained thereby is hereto annext amounting to the sume of 
 LoOG, 3, 9. Wherefore wee humbly pray your Lo^'" Warrant for our 
 
2oO The Illstorij of the Guinea. 
 
 allowing the cullt'ctors their respective loss in the said list nientioneil 
 on the resjK'ctive collectors accounts to be passed by Us. 
 All which is most humblv submitted to vo. Lo'!'. 
 
 Fkan. Paukv. 
 Excise Office \\'im,ia.m Stkong. 
 
 London I. Danvkhs. 
 
 July '12 : n;i>n. V. .AIkuows. 
 
 JlIO. EVKIIAKJ). 
 
 (Indorsed) " Agreed." 
 
 Xo. 11. 
 
 JOIIX LOCKE AND THE RATIO OF 15.'^ TO 1. 
 
 A. 
 
 OUDKU OK KkKERKNCK T(» TIIK CoL'NCIL OK TuADK OK IIIK 
 QUKSTION ol- l,(tWKKIN(; TIIK (tL'INKA. 
 
 At the Council-chamber at Whitehall the eighth day of September 
 KiDO. Present their Excellencies the Lords Justices in Council. 
 
 It having been represented to their Excellencies the Lords Justices in 
 Councill that the value of Guineas at two and twenty shillings each is very 
 Prejudicial to the trade of this Kingdom, and particularly to the Im- 
 portation of Silver Bullion. Their Excellencies taking the said 
 flatter into consideration are ])leased to order that this matter be 
 referred to the Councill of Trade, who are to send for such 
 3Ierchants and others as they shall think fit and having spoken 
 with them to Report their opinion to this Board as soon as con- 
 veniently they can, what they conceive their Excellencies may fitly do 
 in the matter. 
 
 B. 
 
 RkI'OIIT SIGNKl) HV JuHN LuCKK ON LOWKUINc; IIIK (illNKA. 
 
 \_Fro7n the Journal of the House of Common$r\ 
 Vcncrii', \0" (lie Fel/niaril, 10 Gidiclmi Tertii. 
 
 Ordered, Tiiat the Commissioners of Trade do lav before this House, 
 such observations as they have made, in relation to the difVerence of 
 value of (rold and Silver. 
 
John Locke. 251 
 
 (P. oil.) IMr. Blaithwaite, from the Commissioners of Trade, accord- 
 ing to order, presented the House a copy of a representation relating 
 to the Ditlerence in vahie of Gold and Silver: And the Title therefore 
 was read : The said Representation is as followeth : viz : 
 
 {\ COJ)y.) To TIIKIK EXCKLI.KNCIKS TIIK LuUDS JutiTlCKS: 
 IMaY rr IM.KASK YOTR ExT K I.I.E NTI KS. Sept. 
 
 In t)bedience to your Ivvcellencies Order in Council dated the 8th 
 of this ]\Ionth, that we should take into consideration the \'alue of 
 Guineas, as they are now current at J2\ and the prejudice which 
 had been represented to your Excellencies to arise t'nun thence to the 
 trade of this Kingdom, and particularly in the Importation of Silver 
 Bullion ; and that having sj)oken with merchants and other fit persons, 
 we should report to your Excellencies our opinion thereupon, and what 
 we conceive your Excellencies may fitly do in the matter : we have 
 accordinglv spoken with several eminent merchants, and other persons, 
 whom we thought most capable to give us iiiformatidn therein ; and 
 thereupon must humblv report. 
 
 That the merchants and others, we have consulted thereupon are 
 generally agreed, that the Importation of Gold, occasioned by our over- 
 valuing it in the currency of guineas at 22' is a prejudice to this King- 
 dom in our Trade ; and an occasion that so much silver as the Value of 
 the Gold so imported is worth, hath been either carried out of England, 
 or hindered from coming in ; and that wo cannot expect any Silver 
 Bullion, from Spain or elsewhere, should be imported and coined here, 
 whilst we put so great an over-value upon Gold ; because it is easy 
 for merchants to know the value of both, in all Places where they deal, 
 and exchange their Silver for Gold ; and most certain, that they will only 
 import hither to be coined, what makes most for their own advantage. 
 
 But besides their Opinion, the thing demonstrates itself, for it is 
 certain. That Gold in Holland, from whence the greater Part, of what 
 lias been lately coined here been brought over to us, is about Six per 
 cent cheaper than it is here ; that is to say, The same Quantity of 
 Gold that will yield here at the I\Iint a Sum equivalent to One 
 Hundred ounces of Silver w ill there be bought for less than D-l ounces 
 of the same Silver ; and from thence it evidently follows, That whoever 
 imports Gold, gains Six per cent, here more than if he imported Silver 
 
2.32 
 
 The lllstoru of the Guinea, 
 
 to he c<iim*(l, ami carries away for it, eillier so much of our silver or, 
 at least, so much of our Commodities as that Six j)er cent amounts 
 to: which is hoth ways alike prejudicial to this Kingdom. That this 
 over value of Guineas draws (iold in upon us, the Mint is an unques- 
 tionable Evidence; when from the first of May last, to the 12th of this 
 present September have been coined 25071 •'} Guineas but in Silver only 
 72,o(JGL 8s. And it is also observable that the Silver so coined has 
 been only some Remain of our clipped and hammered ^lonev and 
 not foreign bullion imported: nor can it be hoped, that this course of 
 ■coinage, now in the INIint, viz. : The Coinage of Gold in a much greater 
 proportion than silver, should alter; but tliat it will be continued on to 
 the exportation of our silver, and very great loss to this Kingdom in trade, 
 so loni: as jrold here shall have the value of 22.*. sterlini? for a Guinea. 
 The Prejudice arising from hence to Trade and the advantage that 
 may be expected from the fall of Guineas, are also more particularly ob- 
 served to us bv ^Merchants, from the rate of oxchan're. For the course 
 of exchange between England and Holland, having of late bv the im- 
 portation of so much gold from thence been brought considerably lower 
 than the Par, the consequence of wliich is, that we pay so much more 
 for everything we brinj from thence, and receive so much less for every- 
 thingwesend thither; that course has ever since Your Excellencies Com- 
 mands to us to make Inquiry into this flatter, by the spreading of the 
 Rumours and expectation of some Change, already received an Alteration 
 of about one per cent to our Advantage ; and it is not doubted, but as the 
 Price of Guineas shall be more certainly reduced towards their true value, 
 the Exchange will rise proportionately. This being the state of the 
 ^Matter, we are Imiublv of Oj)inion that it is necessary, Guineas in their 
 common currency be brought down to 21.*. Cnl. at least; And further 
 humbly conceive that Your Excellencies may fitly do it by giving direc- 
 tions, That the officers of the Receipt of his ^lajesty's Exchequer and all 
 other, the Receivers of His IMajesty's Revenue, do not take them at a 
 higher rate. This appears to us the I\Iost Convenient way; because it 
 may, at all times, be a ready and easy remedy, upon any further variation 
 that shall hajipen in the world in the Price of Gold ; or even in case this 
 now ])roposed Lowering of Guineas should not prove sufticient : For 
 it being inipossilde, that more than one IMelal should be the true 
 Pleasure of Commerce ; and tlie world by common Consent and Con- 
 venience, havin;: settled that ^Measure in Silver; (Jold as well as other 
 
John Locke. 253 
 
 Metals, is to be looked upon as a Conunmlity, wliicli varyinLj in its 
 Price as other Commoilities do, its Value will :iluii\ s be changeable ; 
 and the fixing of its value in any Country ; so that it cannot be 
 readily accommodated to the course it has in other neighbouring 
 Countries will be always prejudicial to the Country which does it. 
 The \'alue of Gold, here at the price of 2l6-. (!</. a Guinea, in propor- 
 tion to the Rate of Silver in our Coin, will be very near as fifteen and 
 one half to one; the value of Gold in proportion to Silver, in Hol- 
 land and Neighbouring Countries, as near as can be computed, uj)on a 
 ^lediuni, is as fifteen to one ; so that by bringing ilowu the Guineas 
 to '2\s. 6(1. Gold will not here be brought to so low a Price as in our 
 Neighbouring Countries ; Nevertheless, we are humbly of Opinion that 
 the Abatement of Sixpence in the Guinea wlW be sufficient to stop 
 the present disproportionate Importation of gold ; because the Charge 
 for Insurance, Freight, Commission, and the like, will eat up the 
 Profit that may then be made thereby, and hinder that Trade ; but if, 
 contrary, to our Expectation, this Abatement should prove too small 
 Guineas mav by the same easy INIeans be lowered, yet further, accord- 
 ing as may be found expedient. 
 
 All of which, nevertheless, is most humbly submitttd. 
 
 Ph. IMeadows. 
 John Pollexfen. 
 John Locke. 
 Whitehall, AnR. IIii.l. 
 
 22 September ICOS. 
 
 Okpkrs to the Government Okkiceks not to take Guineas 
 
 Kon MORE THAN 21s. G(/. 
 
 [_Parliamentart/ Return, March 12, in.'^.O.] 
 
 add 
 or Persons 
 
 Letters addressed bv the Board of Treasury to the following Boards 
 
 Agents for Taxes. 
 Commissioners of Kxcise. 
 
 „ (ilass Duty. 
 
 ,, Customs. 
 
 Auditor of the Receipt. 
 
254 
 
 The Illstorii of the Guinea. 
 
 Copy of various Letters from the Board of Treasurv to the following 
 
 Boards and Persons : vi/. : 
 Agents for Taxes. 
 
 Gentlemen : 
 
 The Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasurv direct vou 
 to write to the respective Receivers of the Taxes, not to take any 
 Guineas that are not yet collected at more than One-and-twenty 
 Shillings and sixpence each Guinea, and that they be very careful 
 upon this occasion that no fraud he committed against the King or 
 the country, for that they may expect a narrow scrutiny will be made 
 into their respective behaviours in this matter. 
 
 Dated loth February 1(508. (Signed) ^^■M. F-ciwndks. 
 
 To Tin; KixKiVKK-Gr.NF.KAi, oi' C'istoms. 
 
 „ „ or Tin: Po>t Okkick. 
 
 or 1 UK SiAMi' Okkick, 
 
 \ 
 
 Receiver-General Customs : 
 Sir :— 
 
 The Lords Commissioners of His ^Majesty's Treasurv 
 direct you not to take any Guineas that are not yet collected at more 
 than Twenty-one Shillings and six pence each Guinea, and that you 
 be very careful upon this occasion that no fraud be committed against 
 the King or his Subjects, for that vou mav expect a narrow scrutiny 
 will be made into this matter. Dated and Siixned the same. 
 
 31 r. .Montague, 
 Sir:— 
 
 The Lords Commissioners of His -Majesty s Treasury di'>ire 
 y(»u to signify to the Four Tellers not to take any (luineas to the 
 King's use at more than Twenty-one shillings and sixpence each 
 Guinea, and that they bi' vory careful upon this occasion that no 
 deceits be committed against the King or any of His Sultjects, for that 
 they may expect a narrow scrutiny will be made into their resjiective 
 fidelities in this matter. 
 
 Dated ICth February, Kl'.tO. 
 
 Signed the same. 
 
John Locke. 255 
 
 Xo. \-l. 
 
 INSTANCES OF CONTRADICTION BETWEEN DIF- 
 FERENT STATE.AIENTS IN LOCKE'S WRITINGS 
 ON 3IONEV. 
 
 I quote from "Somk Considkrations ok the Consequkxces of 
 THE LowEiuNG okIntkkest an'I) Raising tiik Value of iMoNEV. 
 In ti letter sent to a IMemher of Parlianu'iit KIOl. The second 
 edition correcli'd. London. Awnsliani and John Cliurchil l(li)0. 
 QSecond Title.]] Skveual i'ai'kus Relating to IMoney Interest 
 AND Trade etc. writ upon several occasions, and published at 
 ditl'erent Times, by I\Ir. John Locke." []0n the reverse page.] 
 "Licensed Nov. :27, IGDL Ja. Fraser ": and from "Further Con- 
 siderations concerning Raising the Value of ^Money Wherein 
 IMr. Lowndes Arguments for it in his late Report concerning an Essay 
 for the Amendment of the Silver Coins, are particularly examined. 
 The second edition corrected. London A & J Churchil 1095. Dedi- 
 cated to Right Hon. Sir John Sommers Kt. Lord Keeper, etc. 
 
 The following extract is from the Essay entitled " Short Observa- 
 tions on a Printed Paper Intituled, For encouraging the Coining 
 Silver money in England, and after for keeping it here" in "Some 
 Considerations," the volume first above-named. (The paging is from 
 the 12nio ed. ICUG.) 
 
 " The Silver being the measure of commerce, 'tis the quantity of 
 Silver that is in every piece he receives, and not the Denomination 
 of it which the Merchant looks after and values it bv." (Page ID.) 
 And, later, " men in their bargains contract not for denominations or 
 sounds, but for the intrinsic value." 
 
 Compare these assertions with the following, which quite refutes 
 tliem, namely : — " And our bargains for Commodities as well as all other 
 Contracts being made in Pounds Shillings and Pence, our dipt monev 
 retains amongst the people (who knows not how to count but bv Current 
 IMoney) a part of its legal value, whilst it passes for the satisfaction of 
 legal contracts as if it were lawful money." (P. OH, " Further Con- 
 siderations, etc.") 
 
2.'iG 
 
 The History of the Guinea. 
 
 The latter is pure fact ; the former a broad statement wliicli in- 
 cludes in j)art what is and a part of \\\\tit ought to be, but is not, in cer- 
 tain cases. 
 
 In the Essay "Of Raising our Coin," in " Some Considerations etc," 
 after setting forth the prevalent instability (tf ratio as a reuMin 
 why (lold should not be made a Measure [unit] like Silver, he savs, 
 page 1G8 — 
 
 '' Wliat then ? (will you 1)i' roady to say) would vou have gold kept 
 out of England? Or being here, would you have it useless to Trade? 
 and would there be no 3Ionev made of it ? I answer, quite the con- 
 trary. 'Tis fit the Kingdom should make use of the Treasure it has. 
 
 "Tis necessary your fiold flioitld be coin'd, and liave the King's stamp 
 upon it to secure men in receiving it, that there is so much gold in each 
 piece 
 
 The Gold I\Ioney so coined will never fail to pass at the known 
 3Iarket rates as readily as any other species of your .Money." 
 
 Three pages later, page 171, in the same paper, he says — 
 
 " That it is the interest of every country that all the current Money 
 of it should be of one and the same metal ; that the several pieces 
 should be all of the same alloy and none of a baser mixture and that 
 the standard once thus settled should be inviolably and immutably kept 
 to perpetuity." 
 
 Here is apparently a glaring conflict. Gold money coined and 
 never failing to pass as readily as any other species of your IVIonev, 
 and yet a Single Silver Standard with all the current IMoney of one 
 and the same metal ! 
 
 There is, however, a mode of reconciliation of the two statements 
 which reduces the iinoiisistency within manageable limits. Say instead 
 of ''all till' Cuirnit -Money" all the Money which is compulsory 
 Legal Tender between individuals, and you state what, I imagine, was 
 in Locke's mind wluii he wrote the passage. The rest of the contra- 
 diction must be due to haste. There is no allusion tn the existing: 
 Statute of Free and (iratuitous Coinage of both Silver and Gold, or to 
 the fact that the Guinea was unquestioned Legal Tender (by the Terms 
 of the Mint Lidentnre) for 20 shillings. It is evid«Mit that the jiaper 
 was ])ut forth in tlie heat and haste of controversy. 
 
 Till' following is another instance of the change of tone between 
 lO'jl and 1GD5. 
 
JoJui Locke. 257 
 
 In " Some Considerations" p. 1), I fiiul : 
 
 " The Standard once settled by ])ublic authority the quantitv of 
 Silver established under the several denominations I humbly conceive 
 should not be altered till there were an aljsolute necessity shown of 
 such a change, which I think can never be." 
 
 In •• Further Considerations," page 7, Locke says — 
 
 " In coined Silver or Moneif there are these three things which are 
 wanting in other Silver. 1. Pieces of exactly the same weight and 
 fineness. 2. A stamp set on those pieces by the publick authority of 
 that Country. ;>. A known denomination given to these pieces by the 
 same authority." 
 
 The reader will observe that the " denomination " embraces the idea 
 of the legal character given to Money. 
 
 On page 22, summing up the preceding argument, he says : 
 
 "4 That iMoney differs from uncoin'd Silver, only in this, that the 
 quantity of Silver in each piece of ^Aloney is ascertained by the stamp 
 it bears which is set there to be a publick voucher of its weight and 
 fineness." 
 
 So in the argument he expressly makes a vital point which he omits 
 in the summing up, namely : the " known denomination given to these 
 pieces by the same authority." 
 
 Xo. 13. 
 
 A PHH'ATE LETTER OF JOIIX LOCKE, 
 I.N WHICH THK Rkcoina(;k is JMkntionkd. 
 
 Oates, 30th ^larch, 1(JU(J. 
 IMr. Locke to ^Ir. IMolyiieux. 
 
 The Business of our .Sidney has so near brought us to Ruin, that, 
 till the Plot broke out, it was every Body's talk, every Body's uneasi- 
 ness. And because I had play'd the Fool to print about it, there was 
 Scarce a Post wherein Somebody or other did not give me fresh 
 Trouble about it. But now the Parliament has reduced Guineas to 
 two and twenty Shillings apiece after the 10th Instant, and prohibited 
 the receipt of clip'd 3Ioney after the 4th of ]May ntxt. 
 
 S 
 
258 
 
 The History of the Guinea. 
 
 TliL* IJill has passed l»i»tli Houses, ami, I believe will speedily receive 
 the Roval Assent. 
 
 Though I c;in never hethiiik aiiv Pains, or Time of mine, in the 
 Service (if niv Countrv as far as I niav he <if anv I'se : yet I 
 must own to von, this, and the like Subjects, are not those which I 
 now relish, or that do, with most Pleasure, employ my thoujihts. 
 
 (Fnmi Locke's Warh, /tJio r</., co/. Hi.) 
 
 No. 1 1. 
 
 .MK.MDIKS OF THK (iUKAT HK-(()IXA(;K. 
 15 V IIopTON II.\\NKs, Esq., tiik King's Assay .AIastkii (17<^f^). 
 
 The following are brief extracts from a ^IS. in the IJriti>h ^luseum, 
 entitled as follows : — 
 
 " IJrief memoires relating; to the silver and (iold c<iins of 
 England, with an account of the corruption of the hammer'd monys, 
 and of the reform bv the late grand coynage at the Tower, and the five 
 country mints, in the years ICOG, IHiir, KliiO, and H'>i){). By 
 Ilopton Ilaynes, Esq., Assay IMaster of the INIint. 1700." Lansd. 
 MS. 001, JT- 64-G4. 
 
 Account ok tiik Phdvisions in Pauliamknt to rkmkdy v ii.r, 
 
 STATE OK YK CoiN. 
 
 .\nn(i n;y5. 
 
 The confusion and distraction in all receipts and payments by the 
 Guineas and Cli])t nuiny come to that pitch that nothing lesse than 
 recovnin<i all the hammerd Silver monys and reduceing the Guineas 
 could remedy the generall disorders : and the people grew so weary of 
 this greivance, that our Ennemys abroad depended upon a new 
 Hevolution, and their Partizans here were in great hopes that some 
 disorders would happen thereupon ; but to their great mortification 
 they found, after all their utmost essays to corrupt the loyalty of tlie 
 people, that thev remain'd inflexible in their allegiance and atVection 
 to the King; Ilis (iouvernment and martial genius had purchas'd 
 
Eopton lLiij)u's^ Memoirs. 259 
 
 lilm tlie Universal love of his people : »?c every body knew where to 
 charge all onr miserys, and publick misfortunes ; and plac'd all their 
 hopes of relief in some expedient to be found out in y*" ensuing 
 Session of \iV.)\. As soon as the KiiiLC was return'd from abroad he 
 was fullv and luirticularlv inform'd of tlie very ill state of the Coin, 
 and the universall comj)hiint and generall uneasinesse of his Subjects 
 (in that Account. 
 
 The Lords of the Treasury who had for some time before cousider'd 
 this matter wherein they were particularly concern'd were prepared to 
 debate it in Parliament and to propose their Expedient to the House 
 for redressinjr a greivanco that was become intolerable. And divers 
 Blembers of both Houses took some pains likewise in inquireing into 
 the State of the Coin, and considering what measures were fitt to be 
 pursued att their next meeting ; & many of 'em receiv'd it as an 
 instruction, from the Country Corporations w'"' they represented, to 
 take a particular care in remedying the ill state of the Silver mony. 
 
 The "enerall IMischiefs that were allready felt and the fatall con- 
 sequences that must have attended a delay in reforming it, allarm'd 
 the whole Kingdom & entirely convinc'd the IMembers of both 
 Houses of the necessity of beirinin^ the Session with this imiiortant 
 debate. 
 
 Every body without doors was inspir'd with an uuusuall zeale for the 
 publick on this occasion, which produced a world of papers containing 
 Proposalls to the Parliam' for amending the Silver coins, providing 
 funds for y* warr, reviving the publick credit, and supplying the 
 necessitvs of our Inland trade. 
 
 Some of which Papers I doubt not were of good use afterwards to 
 diverse Gentlemen in their Parliamentary debates; ^P. Lowndes his 
 I\Iemorial was well received by the publick. But what IM'. Locke 
 had written about y'' Coin was in very great esteem with every 
 Judicious Reader; for he expos'd the delusion of raising the value of 
 our monys, and very much contributed to the preservation of y'' legal 
 weight tk purity of 'em which some persons mightily endeavoured to 
 chaui^e. Tlie Kimxdom was oblijr'd to that very worthy Gentleman, 
 for the pains he took to serve his Country yet the all'air was of that 
 moment and generall concern that no jirivat person eouhl perhaps 
 foresee all that was ])roper to be done to restore the Coin and our 
 creditt to their ancient Standard. 
 
260 The Ilistorrj of the Guinea. 
 
 The Kinjx liimself would not iiiulortake to remeilv the ill state 
 of the Coin bv his nicer Prerogative ; but, as y* wisest of his 
 Pretlecess*^' had don before him thought fitt to advise with his 
 Parliament about it; and was pleas'd at the opening of the winter 
 Session tlie 2."} November 1095 after other weiijhtv matters to tell 
 'em in his Sjieech, That he could not but take notice of the great 
 ditiicultys wee lay under by Reason of the ill state of the Coin, the 
 redresse of tc/n'ch might prove a further charge to tJie Nation, but 'ticas a 
 matter of such general concern, and of so very great im/wrtance, that he 
 thought fitt to leave it entirely to the consideration of his Parliament. 
 
 The following excellent adiiioiiition fnnn the close of the C'hajiter 
 will be rc'cogiii/ed l)v some eves as having a peculiar appntpriateness, 
 when applied to a verv diHereiit time to that which the author had 
 in view : — 
 
 ^yhich by the vray may be an Instruction to the Gentlemen irho in 
 1605-G so zealously espoused the keeping up off Guineas, at 28 to .30«. a 
 piece and treated all such, particularly the then Chancelour of the 
 JExchequer, and some other Members who sate the fatall consequences of it, 
 and endeavour d to reduce 'em to their just value, as Ennemys to their 
 Country; but noticithstanding this ill treatment and many other aspersions, 
 this good service to the Kingdom teas ejfectually don ; and the good 
 Patriots, jcho did all they could to hinder it, have ever sitice reajted the 
 Advantage of it, as tcell as their Neighbours, and stand equally obliged tcith 
 the whole Nation to those worthy Gentlemen who did it without 'em and 
 very much against their will. 
 
Sir Isaac J^ewto/i. 261 
 
 Xo. 15. 
 
 IMOXETAUV REPORTS (170I— 1702) SIGNED BY SIR 
 
 ISAAC NEWTON. 
 
 Printed from Manuscripts found in the Tourer Mint ^ and in the 
 
 Public Record Office. 
 
 A. 
 
 \_MS. Mint Records, Vol. vii., p. 2o.~\ 
 
 To TiiK Right IIon'blk, tiik Lords Comm'us of His IMats 
 
 Trka'ry : 
 
 31av it please your Lordships 
 
 Tlie great value put upon French and Spanish pistoles in England 
 has made them of late flow plentifully hither above all other sorts of 
 Gold especially the French pistoles which are better seized and coined 
 and less liable to be counterfeited and by consequence of more credit 
 than the Spanish. For pistoles pass among us for IT*, ^d. apiece 
 whereas one with another they are worth but about 17s. ^d. at the rate 
 that guineas of due weight and alloy are worth 21s. Gd. In France 
 by an edict of I\lay last a pistole (marked or not marked) passes for 
 13 livres or 3 14-17 ecus that is for 17.*. 2 8-17<^. reckoning an ecu 
 worth 4v<f. Gd. according to the reputed par of Exchange and so much 
 may pistoles be worth here if allowance be made for the lightness of 
 our money by wearing. 
 
 About four years ago by the English putting too great a value upon 
 Scotch money the northern borders of England were filled with that 
 money and Scotland with ours the Scots making about eight or nine 
 per cent profit by the Exchange until your Lordships were pleased to 
 put a stop to the mischief. The case being now the same (but of much 
 greater consequence) in the course of exchange between English money 
 and pistoles by the overvaluing of pistoles to the nation's loss, we thought 
 it our duty to present it to your Lordships in order to such a remedy 
 as your Lordships shall think fitt. 
 
 We presume also to lay before your Lordships that the great demand 
 of silver for exportation in trade has raised the price of bullion above 
 
 ' I am indebted to the friendly courtesy of Mr. Fremanfle for the privilege of 
 examinins: these Records. 
 
2G2 
 
 77k? History of the Guinea. 
 
 lluit of silver inonies oil. or ]</, and sometimc's Cui. or 7<A per (nmce, 
 whereas monies ought to be of as great or greater vahie than bullion by 
 reason of tlie workmanship and certainty of the standard and this high 
 price of bullion has not only put an end to the coinage of silver but is 
 a great occasion of melting down and exporting what has been already 
 coined. 
 
 All which is most humbly submitted to vour Lordsliijis great 
 wisdom. 
 
 J. Stani.ky. 
 
 IMint OlHce, Januarv 120, 1701. Is. Xi:\vti)N. 
 
 I 
 
 B. 
 
 IMS. Mint Rccvy,h.~\ 
 
 To TiiH Rh;iit IT(in'i!I,k. iirK Lonns Comm's of His ^Majesty's 
 
 Thka'ky : 
 
 I\Iay it please your Lordships 
 
 In obedience to your Lordships order we have made enquirv whether 
 the Publick Receivers of money do pursue the intent of the Act of Par- 
 liament in cutting all counterfeit money offered to them in payments, 
 and do find that tis observed in the Exchequer the Custom House 
 the Excise and in the Stamp Office. But upon enquiry into the prac- 
 tice of the Bank of England we are informed that the receivers there 
 have orders only to refuse counterfeit money but not to cutt it for fear 
 of disobliging those who bring their money to be lodged there and who 
 might othenvise remove it to the goldsmiths where thev are sure to be 
 better treated. 
 
 We are also credibly informed that the Receivers General in the 
 several countys for the Land Tax, the Dutys on Glass Windo\\s, and 
 on Births IMarriages, <S:c. do not cut the counterfeit money offered them 
 in payments which may be one great reason why the trade of counter- 
 feiting is more ])ractised in the country than in towne and we are 
 liumbly of opinion that the trade of counterfeiting money would be in 
 a greate measure prevented if all publick receivers of money were re- 
 quired to putt a stop to the currency of it bv cutting it as they are 
 obliged by Act of Parliament. 
 
 All well is humbly submitted by 
 
 J. Stani.ky. 
 Is. Xkwion. 
 
Sir Isaac Newton. 2G3 
 
 C. 
 
 [^J/-y. Treasiny PitjiH'nt, Vol. /.r.rvi., \o. ofi.^] 
 
 To TiiK R r. IIon'jjlk tiik Lorus Com."m'u.s ok His ]\Iaj'ties 
 
 Treasury : 
 
 3Iay it please yo"" LordP* 
 
 By the late edicts of the French King tor raising the monies in 
 France, the proportion of gold to that of silver being altered, I humbly 
 presume to give your Lord'ps notice thereof. By the last of those edicts 
 the Lewis d'or passes for fourteen livres and the ecus or French crown 
 for three livres and sixteen sols. At ^\■c•ll rate the Lewis d'or is worth 
 1(j5. 7(f- sterling supposing the ecus worth 4s. (id. as it is recconed in 
 the course of exchange and as I have found it by some assays. The 
 proportion therefore between gold and silver is now become the same 
 in France as it has been in Holland for some years. For at Amsterdam 
 the Lewis d'or passes for nine guilders and nine or ten styvers wch in our 
 money amounts to IGs. 'Jd. and it has past at this rate for the last 
 five or six years. 
 
 At the same rate a guinea of due weight and allay is worth 
 1//. 005. Uil. 
 
 In Spain gold is recconed (in stating Accompts) worth sixteen times 
 its weight in silver of the sameallav, at wch rate a guinea of due weight 
 and allay is worth £l -Is. Id., but the Spaniards make their payments 
 in gold and will not make their payments in silver without an abate- 
 ment. This abatement is not certain but rises and falls accordingly as 
 Spain is supplied with gold or silver from the Indies. Last winter it 
 was about 5 per cent. 
 
 The state of the money in France being unsettled, whether it may 
 furnish a sufficient argument for altering the proportion of the values of 
 gold and silver monies in En<rland is most humbly submitted to vo'r 
 Lord'ps great wisdome. Is. Newton. 
 
 Mint Office, Sept. 28, 1701. 
 
 (Indorsed) 3Ir. Newton's ^Memorial concerning the proportion of gold 
 
 to silver in value. 
 
20 [ The Ilistonj of the Guinea. 
 
 D. 
 
 [_MS, Treasiay Papers^ Vol. lx.vx., Xo. IO.5.3 
 
 To 1111: Ki. IIon'ulk Sidnkv Lt)Ki) (iodommiin, I/i) IIicn 
 TiiKAsfUKU OK En(;i-am): 
 
 ^l:\\ it please vour Lord'j) 
 
 According to your Lord'ps direction we have examined the vahies of 
 several forreign coyns & endeavoured to inform ourselves of tlie values 
 of gold in proportion to silver in several nations and considered the 
 ;vavs of preserving the coyn. And by the acconipts we have met with 
 gold is Iiigher in England tlicn in France by about H'/. or 10(/. in the 
 guinea then in Holland bv 11'/. or 1:2 pence in the guinea, then in 
 (icrniany and Italy by 1 i!</. in the guinea or above. In .Spain and 
 Portuijal sold is higher then in Euiiland bv about 1 1'/. in the miinea 
 ffor the great quantity of silver coming from the West Indies has 
 brought down the price of silver in all Europe in proportion to gold & 
 principally in Spain where the bullion first arrives. The low price 
 mends the market and thereby carries silver from Spain into all Europe 
 and from all Europe to the East Indies & China, the merchants bidding 
 more for it then it goes for among the natives. In Spain the merchants 
 advance about six p cent, or above for silver : att which rate a guinea is 
 worth about 21«. 3l(i. & sometimes less. In Eiiiiland thev advance 
 .3(/. or 4(i', per ounce, and at the rate of .'v/. per ounce advance a guinea 
 is worth but '20.<. (> l-CvL 
 
 Gold is therefore at too high a rate in England by al)oul l(i-/. or 
 I2(f. in the guinea, & this tending to the decrease of the silver covn we 
 humbly conceive that our way of preserving this coyn is to lower the 
 price of gold suppose by taking Gd., !)</. or I2d. from the price of the 
 miinea so as that gold may be of the same value in Euijland as in the 
 neighbouring parts of Europe. France has set us an example for in 
 the last war when the le\\idor was raised there to 14 livres the ecu was 
 raised only to 7- sols but it is now raised to 7<' sols tho' the lewidor be 
 raised only to 1 4 livres as before so that gold in respect of silver is lower 
 in France now then in the last war in the proportion of 7'^ to 7- that 
 is bv above 13[</. in the guinea. 
 
'/"^ ^ OF THE 
 
 I UNMV:. olTY 
 
 Sir Isaac Newt cm. 265 
 
 The liberty of melting forreign monies into ingots in private shops 
 and honses for exjiortation gives opportnnity of melting down the 
 money of England for the same purpose ilor restraining of wch a law 
 miglit be useful against exporting any Ingots of Silver melted down in 
 England except in a publick Office to be appointed or erected for that 
 purpose. 
 
 The law bv barring the exportation of forrcign silver after it is 
 coyned prevents the coynage thereof because the IMerchant cannot 
 afterwards export it & tends to discourage the importation of this 
 silver into England because the ^lerchant can make no use of it whilst 
 it stays here in the form of Bullion. The bringing of silver to the 
 market of England it the turning it into money should rather bo en- 
 couraged as the proper means of encreasing the coyn, silver being more 
 apt to stay witli us in the useful form of money then in the useless 
 form of Bullion. If the merchant might export what he coynes some 
 part of what he covns would be apt to be laid out here, And this liberty 
 may be allowed him after some such manner as is described in the 
 scheme hereinto annexed. 
 
 The licensing the exportation of Bullion whilst the exportation of 
 the money is prohibited makes silver worth more uncoyned then 
 coyned and thereby not only stops the coynage but causes the melting 
 dowu of tlie money in private for exportation. For remedying this 
 mischief it maybe perhaps better on the contrary to prohibit the ex- 
 portation of Bullion and license that of money and whenever the money 
 is in danger to license the exportation of so much money only as shall 
 from time to time be coyned out of forreign Bullion. 
 
 The safety and encrease of the coyn depends piincipally on the 
 baHance of trade be against us the money w ill be melted down and 
 exported to pay debts abroade & carry on trade in spightoflaws to the 
 contrary, and if the ballance of trade be for us such laws are needless 
 & even hurtfull to trade. If trade can be so ordered that no branch 
 of it can be detrimental to the nation the money will be safe fibr wch 
 end luxury in forreign commodities should be checkt and the exporta- 
 tion of our own commodities encouraged. If a law were made ct well 
 executed against trading with more gold & silver by any !i\Ierchant or 
 Company of [Merchants then in certain j)roportions t(» tlie value of the 
 goods exported, such an Addition to the Act of Navigation might put 
 ^Merchants upon searching out sufficient ways of vending our com- 
 
2G6 Tlie History of the Guinea. 
 
 modities abroad it as we liumblv conceive he more efl't'ctual for pre- 
 serving the coyn then the absolute prohibition of the exportation thereof. 
 
 As for the alteration of tlie standard we are humbly of opinion that 
 if the value of the several species to be tliereafter coyned be diminished 
 without changing the denomination it will occasion tlie melting down 
 <Jc recoyning the species already coyned for the profit that may be made 
 thereby. And if the value be encreased the ^Merchants and j)eople will 
 value their goods by the old money already coyned in wch they are to 
 be paid and the new money of greater value (if any .shall be covned) 
 will be pickt out for exportation and the Importer who coyns it will 
 lose the overvalue to the discouragement of the covnageand in payments 
 made by sale to forreigners the nation will also lose the over value. 
 
 But if it be proposed to retain the value of the several .species or 
 quantity of fine silver therein & only alter the allav, we are humbly of 
 opinion that if small money which bv continual use weares awave fast 
 & is apt to be lost, were coyned of coarse allay as is done in several 
 countries abroad provided it were well coyned to prevent counterfeiting, 
 such money would woare longer & be less apt to be lost than the small 
 money now in use. By small money we understand Groats Three- 
 pences, Tuopences, and pence, unless the penny by reason of its small- 
 ness should be made of copper. 
 
 All wch is most humbly submitted to vor Lordps great wisdome. 
 
 :\Iint Ofhce, 7 Jul. 1702. J. Stanlkv. 
 
 Ipc. Xkwton. 
 
 (Indorsed) Report of the Officers of the MmX. about the preservation 
 
 of the Coyne. 
 
 (In pencil) All in the haiul-uTiting of Sir Isa.ic Xcwtun, 7 .lulv, 
 
 I7n2. 
 
 ^The accompanying tables, showing " the values of several forreign 
 Coynes," are here omitted. The tables, like the following paper on the 
 value of Gold, are stated in the Calendar to be in Newton's hand, 
 lieport C. is in the same hand.]] 
 
Sir Isaac Neivton. 2G7 
 
 E. 
 
 Tin; Vai.it. ok Gold in PitoroRTioN to Sii.vkh in Skvkkal 
 
 PaKTS ok ElHOI'K. 
 
 [^MS. Trcasuri/ Papers^ Ditto.~\ 
 
 The Eoiiof France goes there for 3 livres 10 sols and by the weight 
 and assay is wortli 4.s-. (!(/. English und tlicnce the Livre is worth 
 Is. 2-21(1. Tlie lA'uid'or goes there for 14 livres, wliich amount to 
 \Gs. G-94(/. Englisli. At wch rate- a Guinea is worth 20s. ^\(L For 
 as 17«. 2*8</. (the value of an unworn Lewidor in England according to 
 the annexed Table) is to IGs. G-94</. (the value of the same in France) 
 so is 215. 0(/, (the value of an unworn Guinea in England) to 
 205. 8-L</. 
 
 By the French Kings Edict of 17 Sept 1701 the ^lark of fine Gold 
 is valued at 494 livres G sols 4 deniers & the mark of fine silver at o2 
 livres 10 sols 7 deniers. According to which proportion a Guinea of 
 just weight & fineness is worth 2.0s. ^hl. in English silver money of 
 just weight >k; fineness. 
 
 The Ducat is coyned every where in Germany & some northern 
 countries adjoining of the same weight & fineness excepting that the 
 IIuHLrarv Ducats are more certainly of full value. It is coyned for two 
 old Rix dollars of the Empire or nine shillings English tk usualy goes 
 at that rate or within two or three styvers more or less, whereas in 
 England it is worth 9s. 0.3^/. But if the Rixdoller be of a lower 
 value, as are the Rixdollers of Holland, Flanders Danemark & some 
 other places, the Ducat may go for two Rix dollers & 0. B or 10 styvers 
 or above. 
 
 In Holland the Guilder or Floreii is of equal value with 20.y2(/. 
 Eniilish & the styver is Id. 041 as may be collected from the said 
 Table. And there the Ducat goes usually for "> Guilders & about 5 
 styvers, that is in our money for 9*'. 1.37. at wliich rate a Guinea is 
 worth 20s. (\\(l. 
 
 The Lewidor goes in Holland for 9 Guilders vS: about 9 styvers or 
 ICs. 4]^/. At which rate a Guinea is worth 20s. o\d. 
 
 In the Countries of the Electors of Brandenburg Saxony Hannover 
 
268 The History of the Guinea. 
 
 & Dukes of Zell Brunswick, Lunenburg, WolfLiibuttel 6: some other 
 places are covnetl (iuilders of one & the same value by consent of the 
 Princes, tho of various allays. This (iuilder consists of IG Gute 
 Groshes or 2 A IMarien Groshes <k 40 ]\Iarit,n Groshes are accounted the 
 value of an old Rixdoller or 4.«. Oil. Kniilish. So that a Guilder is 
 worth 2*. 4id. or thereabouts. Bv the Table it is \v»»rth il.«. 4 l-7</. 
 according to the weight & assay. Now a Ducat goes in the countries 
 above mentioned for .1]. Guilders or 8.t. '.» 3-7'/. <S^ sometimes for two or 
 three Groshes more. If it be valued at \)s. a Guinea at that rate will 
 be Avorth J0,«, Ad. 
 
 Ill the same countries a Lewidor is valued at 7 Guilders or there- 
 abouts, that is at !<!.>■■. 'xl. At ^\l)ich rate a Guinea is worth 20#. 5^. 
 
 At Ilamborougli the Ducats goes for two Dollars & about 8 or sols 
 lubs. or sols of Lubec. This Doller is three INIarks lubs that is 48 sols 
 lubs, recconing K! sols to a mark. But the Cross Doller well is worth 
 4*'. 4.91 r/. goes for 52 sols lubs »S: therefore the other Doller which 
 goes but for 48 sols lubs is worth only 4.<. .084//. or thereabouts. The 
 ^larks & sols lubs are at Ilamborough accounted double to the 3Iarks 
 & sold Dans or of Danemark & the four I\Iark piece or Crown of 
 Daneniark goes at Ilamborouj'h for two IMarks lubs & bv tlie assavs of 
 several pieces is worth 2«. 8.4f/. as in the Table. And at this rate three 
 marks lubs are worth As. O.Cni. English. This is the value of the com- 
 mon Ilamborough Doller & two Dollers ik nine sols lubs (the value of 
 the Ducat) are 8.'?. in. 4./. At wch rate a Guinea is worth 20s. 0^/. 
 
 At Dantzick Gold is very scarce. Their Guilder consists of 30 
 Grosh, & the Bank Doller wch is worth about As. (>(/. goes for three 
 Guilders 23 Grosh: Whence the (Juilder is 1 4:^/. The Ducat is 
 
 1 
 
 there valued at about 7 Guilders 12 (irosh: or two Bank Dollers want- 
 ing four (Jrosh, that is at about 8s. ]0.0L></. And at this rate a Guinea 
 is worth 1!».«. 11 \jl. 
 
 At (ii'iK'va the Hungary Ducat was latelv valued at two Ecus tS: 2 
 or 3 sols of flrance, that is at !).<. 2*/. or '.».«. 37. At which rates a 
 Guinea is worth about 2 0.<. !)^/. Then also the Lewidor was latelv 
 valued at 3|- Ecus of France or ](!.•>•. 101'/. At wliicli rate a (juinea 
 is worth 21.S-. 0^</. ]5ut (Jolil was lately higher in Francethen at pre- 
 sent, wch might raise the price «»f Lewidors at Geneva. I'nr tluTo the 
 Spanish I'istole was valued only at 3-j- Ecus or \Cts. Gd. 
 
 2. At (u'lioa the Croistat goes for 7 1 Hres \- bv assav is worth 
 
Sir Isaac Newton. 261) 
 
 65. G^d. & therefore the Lire of Genoa is 10^</. And there the Pistole 
 is valued at 17'- lires that is 156". 3|</. 
 
 1. At tllorence and Legorn the silver Ducat goes for 7 lires & by 
 assay is worth o*-. A.o~d. & therefore the lire of those places is !».L'247. 
 And there the Pistole of Italy goes for 20 lires or \.'js. A\jl. k, the 
 Lewidor & Spanish Pistole for between 20 & 21 lires. 
 
 At Rome, Florence, Legorn IJullogne & Ancona (a city upon the 
 Gulph of Venice) three Julios make a Teston & the Teston by assay is 
 worth \s. t;.21(/. V.V thence the Julio is 0.07'/. Ten Julios make the 
 Escudi or Ecu of Konie, hut I cannot vet procure tliat piece of money 
 for an assav. At Florence three Julios are two lires tS: 10' Julios make 
 the Ducat, and thence the Julio is (Mo*/. Now in those cities the 
 Pistole of Italy goes for 30 Julios or 155. 4^f/. & the Spanish Pistole 
 for 31 Julios or 15,v'. lO.i!.")'/. supposing the Julio 0.1 o*/. 
 
 At Bologne ».V Ancona the Sequin of \'eiiice goes for \\^ Julios or 
 9*\ 2.7'/. & the 11 unL::arv Ducat for 17 Julios or \is. 8..5.5(/, 
 
 If the Ducat of \'enice whose value is set down in the Table, be 
 that Ducat, as I am told wch goes now at Venice for lires 4 sols de 
 Piccoli the Lire of Venice will be G.o2</. And there the Ilunijarv 
 Ducat wch goes for 10 lires will be worth 85. 8.82(/. & the secpiin of 
 Venice which goes for 17 lires will be worth Us. 2.84(/. & the Pistole 
 of Venice wch goes for 28 lires will be worth 155. 2.50(/. 
 
 At ]\Iil]ain the Piece of eight went lately for 5 lires 17 sols »k the 
 Philip or Silver Ducat for (! lires, so that the Philip is to the Piece of 
 eight (or is. Gd.) as 40 to 39 & therefore is worth about -is. ~ 5-1 3</. 
 This piece, as I am informed goes at Venice for 8i- lires & therefore 
 the sequin wch goes at V^enice for 17 lires is there worth !».>.•. 2 ]0-l.'5r/. 
 as before. 
 
 At Naples the Ducat of silver is worth 3s. 4.43(/. and there the Pistole, 
 as I am informed <ioes for 4") Carlins or 4' Ducats that is for \r>s. 'lil. 
 
 By all wh'' gold seems to be lower in Italy then in France, the 
 Spanish Pistole being everv where worth less then 1 0,s\ At wch rate 
 the Guinea is worth less than 20s. 
 
 In Spain the Pistole is recconed at four pieces of eight or 18s. 
 which is 0.2(/. more then in England. And in Portugal the IMoeda is 
 recconed at ttn Crusados or 27s. 7.1'/. ^vch is 1 4</, more then in Eng- 
 land. At wch rates a Guinea is worth 22s. 5 ^/. in Spain iJt 
 22.S. 5//. in Pnrtniral. 
 
270 
 
 The History of the Guinea. 
 
 In these recconinjis stantlard Gold is valued in England at 4li p 
 ounce as Goldsmiths value it for the melting pot. The standard value 
 is .*]// 10s. 0]^/., at well rate about ^ths of a penny are to be added to 
 
 the value of the (luinea in forrcign Countries. 
 
 IMint Ofhce, 7 Jul. 1702. 
 
 (Indorsed) Proportions of Gold to Silver abroad 
 
 J. Stan LEV. 
 Is. Nkwton. 
 
 Jn. Mi. I.I-. 
 
 F. 
 
 I'liurus.vLs Ki)K Pjii;si:uvin(; »S: Encki:.v.>in(; jui: .Silvkk Coin 
 
 OF THIS Kingdom. 
 
 {MS. Trcasiny Papers, Ditto.) 
 
 All Silver exported and design'd for Exjiortation except ll'oreign 
 IMonev to be examined & enter'd in ve IMint tJc for that End upon 
 its first arrival at London, to be brought to ye ."Mint bv ve Owner & 
 Two or more otliir Witnesses, who shall there prove ve imjiortation 
 upon Oath. And sucli of ye said Silver as is not yet in ye Ingot, to 
 be there melted down into Ingots, the INIercht paying I*/, p ])ound for 
 ye melting & these Ingots & all other Ingots of ye Silver above men- 
 tion'd shall at ye choice of ye ^lerchantbe coin'd into moneys ormark't 
 with a stamp provided in ye INIint for that purpose. And ve IMaster 
 of ye ^lint (if desired) shall give ye ^lerchant an Indented Ticket cer- 
 tifying to ye Weight of ye IMoneys coyn'd out of ye said flbreign 
 Silver & ye time of ye coynage thereof: which Ticket shall be cut 
 out of a Book provided in ve INIint iS: be enter'd in the same Book. 
 
 Ingots not mark't with ve I\Iint Stamp may not be Exported nor 
 carry'd on Board any Ship, nor bought or sold, but may be brought to 
 ye I\I int for encreasing the Coin, excepting that Ingots of fine Silver 
 may be sold by Refiners to Silver Smiths, Wyerdrawers, & such other 
 Artificers as manufacture ye same. Tliis law now obtains in F' ranee 
 bv an Edict of I\Iarch was a Twelve-month for preventing ve melting 
 ilown of ye moneys. 
 
 The IMerchants upon delivering ve Mint Tickets at ve Custom 
 House may within a vear after ve Covnauje of the Monevs mention'd 
 therein bv warrant of ve Commi.ssioners of ve Customs upon a dav 
 appointed in ve "\\'arrant. Ship for Exportation, tlie said IMonevs. or ve 
 
Sir Isaac Nt'icto?i. 271 
 
 same weight of like moneys or any part thereof & also any Ingots wch 
 have ve -Mint Stamp upon them & any forreign IMoneys cV Xhc Cus- 
 tomer shall enter ve same and file ye Tickets. 
 
 All Silver English IMoneys before shipping for Exportation to pay 1 [d. 
 p ounce Troy at the Custom House for ye charges of assaying, melting 
 & Covning ye same which Duty shall be kept apart with ye Duty al- 
 ready granted for Encouragement of Coynage & therewith paid unto ye 
 Exchequer and thence imprest to ye IMr of ye 3Iint for ye same uses. 
 
 Penalties on them who counterfeit ye I\Iint Stamp or ye I\Iint 
 Tickets or Shipp oil' Si Iv it not lici'iisM, (ir ■\\itli<iut paving ve dutv or 
 upon any other day then that appointed in ye Warrant or under any 
 other name than that of ve true Owner, m- buy or sell unmark'd Ingots 
 or knowingly bring Silver to ye IMint to be IMark't or Coin'd or fi'oreign 
 which is not fibreign. 
 
 Such a Law would Enable ye Officers of ye IMint to understand ye 
 State of ye IMoney with respect to Trade. It would render Trade 
 freer than at present. It would save the ^Merchant ye trouble of 
 attending with his Bullion and Witnesses at Goldsmith's Hall & Guild- 
 hall after he has melted it at ye Refiners or Goldsmiths. It would 
 Check ye melting down of Her INIajesty's moneys for Exportation or 
 for sale to Goldsmiths, much better than ye laws do at j)resent. It 
 would encrease ye Coynage in her IMa'ts IMint & decrease ye Indian 
 ^Manufacture of coyning or Bullion in Ports where ye Company have 
 not a IMint of their own for which Coynage ye Indians receive of us 
 a lar^e Seisrniorajie. It would be profitable to ye ^Merchant by ve use 
 of liis Gold & Silver when turned into IMoney before Exportation. 
 It would encrease our Coin as well bv ve ^Merchants IMoney running 
 amongst us, till Exportation, as by what is not exported witliin ye year. 
 It would be of great Credit to ye Nation by ye Merchants exporting 
 their Gold & Silver in ye form of English money, to be current in 
 fToreign Nations and thereby make us appear abroad more rich & potent 
 than ^\'e do at present. And all this would be done without any new 
 charge to ve Government. And if ye Governmt shouhl pay the 
 charge of Coynage, or any part thereof, it would be pay'd by one part of 
 ve Nation to another j)art thereof wthout loss to ye whole. 
 
 .Alint Office, 7 Jul. 1702. J. Stam.kv, 
 
 Is. Newton, 
 Jn. Ellis. 
 
272 The History of the Guinea. 
 
 Xo. 1(1. 
 AX oHDKi; IX corxciL Torciiixc; the cl'rrexcy 
 
 OF LOriS DOHS AM) I'lSTOLES. 
 
 \_ParUamentari/ Retur/i, ^f(n■c// 12, in.')n.] 
 
 Copy of the Order of the 5tli February I7f>^-1, respecting the A'alue 
 at whicli the Louis d'Or mid Spanish Pistole were to be received 
 as part of the Current Coin of the Realm. 
 
 At tiik CoiKT AT Kknsin(;t()N. 
 
 The 5th February, 170(i, 
 
 Present : The Kiii;j's ^lost Excellent 3Iajesty in Council. 
 
 It having been this day represented to II is INIajesty in Council, Thai 
 certain pieces of fiold in French and Spanish Coin, called Louis dOrs 
 or Pistoles, do pass and are accepted in payment in this kingdom, at 
 the rate of seventeen shillings and sixpence a piece, which is near six- 
 pence more than the real value ; His ^lajesty, taking the same into His 
 Royal consideration, and being desirous to prevent the damage that 
 may accrue to His good Subjects by the great quantity of sucli Frenclj 
 Louis d'Ors and S])anish Pistoles which have of late been and may 
 hereafter be imjxtrted into this Kingdom, in case the said Louis d'Ors 
 or Pistoles should continue to be received for more than the intrinsic 
 value. His ^lajesty, with the advice of his Privy Council, is therefore 
 pleased to Order, as it is hereby Ordered, That notice be given in the 
 Gazette, that tlie said French Louis d'Ors and Spanish Pistoles be not 
 hereafter received for more than seventeen shillings a-piece. 
 
 Jas. 15(1. 1. kh. 
 A true copy, 
 Council Olfice, Whitehall, 
 i) .Alarch, 1»;30: 
 
Sir James Steuart and Adam Smith. 273 
 
 No. 17. 
 
 MINUTE OF ORDERS TO THE OFFICERS OF THE 
 MINT, FEB. IL', 1700-1. 
 
 \_MS. Mint Records.'] February Iiitli, 1700. 
 
 ^ The Warden 
 Present ^ and 
 
 (^ Master. 
 
 Upon the Notice given in the Gazett h\ Order of thi; Kinjj; and 
 Councill not to take Frencli and Spanish Pistols for nion- tlnm 17s 
 it being found tliat the merchants and GoUlsmiths brought great 
 Quantities of them to be coyned into Guineas ami dcsind a speedy 
 dispatch in Order to answer their Bills, it was resolved that the ^Master 
 should make use of all the of the 3Iint for the more speedy 
 
 circulation amounting to £9,700. 
 
 Ordered for the greater help to the Importers that Gold should be 
 melted three times a week and paid out ^lomlayes Wednesdayes ami 
 Frydayes to continue dureing the Great Importation of Gold. 
 
 No. 18. 
 
 SIR JAMES STEUART AND ADA.AI S.AHTII ON THE 
 
 ENGLISH STANDARD. 
 
 Extract fn Jin " An Inqniri/ into the Principles of Political Econom>/" by 
 Sir James Steua)i, nJ'Coltness, Bart. 
 
 (Vol. II., Chap. viii. page .3n7.) 
 
 It is absurd to say that the standard of Queen ?21izabeth has not been 
 debased by enacting that the English Unit .shall be acquitted with 1 I.'? 
 grains of fine Gold, as it wnuld be to atHrm that it would not be debased 
 from what it is at present by enacting that a ])ound of butter should 
 everywhere be received in payment for a pound sterling, although the 
 pound sterling should continue to consist of .'1 ounces, 17 pennyweights, 
 and 10 grains of standard Silver, according to the .statute of 4.'1 Eliza- 
 beth. I believe in this ca.se most debtors would pay in butter 
 
 T 
 
274 Tlic History of the Guinea. 
 
 (Chap, viii., jtages 337-B.) 
 From wliat lias bei'ii said, it in nut at all sur])riKin<; tliat the putiiKl 
 stcrliiij; ahould in fact be reilnceil nearly to the value of the (Johl. 
 Whether it ouj^ht to he kept at this value is another qtiestion, anil shall 
 he examined in its propi-r j)lace. All that we here decide is, that the 
 crininji the pound troy into (»."> shillin<;s would restore the ])roportion 
 of the nietals, and render both sjK'cies common in circulation. 
 
 (Chap, xi., pages 35;j-4.) 
 
 [mktuoi) r«iR nrsTORiNc; tiik monky unit to the sTANDAnn oi 
 
 Ki.i/Aiu; III, AM) 1 in: roNsKgiKNCKs ok this niANCK.] 
 
 I come now to the proposal of restoring the standard to that of the 
 statute of Klizabeth, which is in other \vords the same with what has 
 l)een ])roj)osed in bringing down the guineas to 20 sliillings; except that 
 it implies a new Coinage of all the Silver specie and of all the old (iolil. 
 Nothing is more easy than to execute this reformatit)n. 
 
 1. The iirst step is to order all Coin, Gold and Silver, coined pre- 
 ceding a certain year, to pass by weight only. 
 
 2. To preserve the mint price of Silver as formerly, at 5s. 2(/. the ounce, 
 and to fix that of Gold at £S 14.*. 2\</. 
 
 .;. To order the pound troy standard Silver to be coined as formerly, 
 into G2 shillings, and the pound of (iold into 44w guineas. 
 
 4. And last of all to order these guineas to pass for 20 shillings. 
 
 Thus the .standard is restored to the value of the Silver by the statute 
 of Elizabeth ; the metals are put at within a mere trifle of the proportion 
 of 1 to 14i ; all the coin in the kingdom is brought to standard weight ; 
 no jjrofit will be found in melting or exporting one species preferably to 
 another; exchange will answer, when at par, to the real par (when rightly 
 calculated), of either Silver or (Jold, with nations, such as France, who 
 observe the same proportions, and the ])ouud sterling \vill remain 
 attaclieil to Imlh the Gold and Silver as before. 
 
 Extract from Suiit/i's " Wrait/i of Natiotii^." 
 (IJook 1., Chap. V.) 
 
 Ill Kngland, therefore, and for the .same reason, I believe, in all 
 iiliuT iimdiTii nations of Kuio]ie, all accounts are kept, and the value 
 
Lord Liverpool. 275 
 
 of all j^oods ami of all estates is <;enerally fom|mteil, in Silver; and 
 \\ lii'ii we mean to express the amount of a person's fortuni', we seldom 
 mention tlu" MuiiiNer (»f jruineas, hut the nuuil)er of pounds sterling 
 which we suppose would he jjiven for it. 
 
 Xu. I'J. 
 
 HIOGHAPHICAL NOTICE OF I.OKl) LIVERPOOL. 
 
 It may serve the reader's convenience if I present here a hrief out- 
 line of Lortl Liverpool's career. I gather the following statements from 
 various sources apparently worthy of confidence, but do not vouch for 
 them from independent investigation. 
 
 Charles Jenkinson (17-7-1808) was ^I.A, Oxford in \~^>- — where 
 he wrote a poem on the death of the Prince of Wales. Later hi- wrote 
 for the "INIonthly Review," and in 17."i(; published a dissertation on the 
 formation of a national guard; and in 1758 a discourse on the "Con- 
 duct of the Government of Great Britain in respect to Neutral Nations 
 during War." 
 
 This paper was a defence of the course of the Government, whicli 
 had lately seized some Dutch vessels. It was translated into various 
 languages in Europe, and seems to have brought the author a pension. 
 He presently appeared in politics as a proteije of Lord Bute, entered 
 Parliament, and became Under-Secretary of State in ^Cl ; Secretary 
 of the Treasury, 17'><^; IMember of the Board of Admiralty, 17(!G; 
 Lord of the Treasury, 1 767-1 77'3 ; ^Member of the Privy Council, 
 1773 ; Vice-Treasurer of Ireland, 1 '"!') ; Clerk of the Pells of Ireland, 
 1775-1808 ; Secretary of War, 1 778-178- ; President of the Board of 
 Trade, 1 784-1 fiOl ; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1 780-1 »02 ; 
 Baron Ilawkesbury, 17!50; succeeded to Baronetcy as Seventh Banmet, 
 1 781) ; Earl of Liverjiool, 1 700 ; subsequently ( 'ollector of the Custi»ms- 
 Inwards of the Port of London. 
 
 He compiled and pul)li.slii(l, in 171!"', an inijiortaiit collection of 
 Treaties. 
 
 At the outset of his career he identified himself with the party known 
 as "The King's Friends," and is understood to have been the leading 
 
27(1 The History of the Guinea. 
 
 sj)irit of that System of the " Inti'rit)r Ministry " or " Double Cabinet," 
 which IJnrkf attacked in liis " Thon<:hts on the Present Discontents." 
 He was generally believed to be the chief jmlitical adviser of (ieor<:e III., 
 and the course of the government toward tlie American Colonies has 
 been ascribed to his secret influence. 
 
 The following extract from an early pag^ "'^ ^''^ " Treatise on the 
 Coins of the Realm" in a Letter to the King will indicate the occasion 
 of its appearance. 
 
 After descril)iiig the necessity and success of the general rccoinage 
 of the Gold coins — u])on his advice, in 1 771 — he ])roceeds as follows : — 
 
 " A (lifHculty then existed, and continues to exist, which must neces- 
 sarilv be removed, before any plan can be adopted for the improvement of 
 the Silver Coin. I have already observed, that (ioldand Silver, in refe- 
 rence to each other, are estimated at your ^Majesty's Mint at a difl'erent 
 value or price, than these metals are generally sold for at the market. 
 As long as this difierence subsists, both these metals will not be brought 
 in a sufficient quantity to the 3Hnt to be coined : that metal only will be 
 brought which is estimated at the lowest value with reference to the 
 other ; and Coins of both metals cannot be sent into circulation at the 
 same time without exposing the public to a traffic of one sort of Coin 
 against the other ; by which the traders in money would make a con- 
 siderable profit, to the great detriment of Your Majesty's subjects. And 
 this mischievous practice, and the frauds committed in carrying it on, 
 are the more to be apprehended in this country, where the IVIint is free ; — 
 that is, where every one has a right to bring Gold and Silver to the Mint 
 to be converted into Coin, not at the charge of the person whoso brings 
 it, but of the public : for since the llUh Charles II., ch. .'1, the charge of 
 coining Gold and Silver has been borne by the public, and, contrary to 
 the practice of most other countries, no seigniorage has been taken. To 
 ])revent this evil it is necessary to determine whether there must not be 
 a standard or superior Coin, made of one metal only ; and whether the 
 Coins made of other metals must nut be made and take tluir value with 
 reference to this standard Coin, ami become subservient to it — and, in 
 such case, of what metal this standard ("oin, to which the pre-eminence 
 and j)reference are to be given, should be made. These are delicate 
 and very difficiilt (piestions, which require great consideration. Many 
 ])ersons of acknowledged abilities and great authority have entertained 
 dillerenl opiniiuis on thi^ subject. I \\\\\ not at present farther disclose 
 
Lord Liverpool. 277 
 
 my sentiments upon it, as a considerable portion of what I intend to 
 write will be employed in the discussion of these questions ; and I wisli 
 that the opinion which I have formed should appear to be the result of 
 the reasons I shall oiler, and of the facts which I shall state : — conscious 
 that any opinion I may deliver cannot derive any weight from niysinj^le 
 judgment in opposition to the respectable authorities from which I am 
 forced, on this occasion, to ditler. 
 
 "No farther measure was adopted for the improvement of the Coins of 
 the realm, and particularly of the Silver Coin, though so very defective, 
 f(ir more than twenty years; when, in consequence of an address of the 
 House of Commons, recommending a new Copper Coinage, Vnur .Alajestv 
 was pleased, by Your Order in Council of the 7th Feb., 170», to appoint 
 a C'ommittee, wlio were to take into consideration the state of the Coins 
 of this kingdom, and the present establishment and constitution of Your 
 Majesty's IMiiit ; and to propose such improvements, in both these re- 
 spects, as might appear to them to be necessary. Your Majesty was 
 also pleased to insert my name among those members of Your Privy 
 Council who were to form this Committee. Having had some experi- 
 ence in a business of this nature, and having occasionally reilected ujjou 
 it, I ventured to open to the Committee, at their first meeting, the mode 
 in which I thought theyshould proceed in the execution of Your Majesty's 
 commands; and I suggested the principles, which, in my opinion, ought 
 to be adopted for the further improvement of the Coins of this realm. 
 The Committee made some progress in their enquiries on this extensive 
 and difficult subject ; and, in conformity with the wishes of the House 
 of Commons, they established the princij)les, on which the Copper Coin 
 should in future be made; — and a certain (jnantity of Coins, made ac- 
 cording to these principles, was sent into circulation, very much to the 
 satisfaction of Your Majesty's subjects: — but obstructions were raised, 
 wliich prevented the completion of this measure." 
 
278 Tlic Ilistorij of the Guinea. 
 
 No. 20. 
 
 HP3I'()1\T of tlie Lords of the Conimitloe of Council, appointed to 
 take into Consideration the State of the COINS of this King- 
 dom, and tlie present Kstablishment and Constitution of His 
 IMajesty's Mint, to His Royal Highness the Piunck Rk<;knt ; 
 dated the 21st .Alay UUC. 
 
 (L. S.) 
 
 AT TIIK tOLXCIL CII A.AIJJKR. WHITKII ALL, 
 
 tlie 21st of ^Liy li!H; ; 
 
 RY the Right Honourable the Lords of the Committee of Council, 
 appointed to take into Consideration the State of the Coins of 
 this Kingdom, and the present Establishment and Constitution 
 of His iMajesty's Mint. 
 
 HLS IMAJESTY having been pleased, by His Order in Council of 
 Ttli February 17D55, to direct this Committee to take into Consideration 
 the State of the Coins of this Realm, and the present Establishment 
 and Constitution of His IMajesty's I\Iint ; the Committee, in discharge 
 of their duty, have already submitted to His JNIajesty, their opinions on 
 some of the points so referred to them. 
 
 A new INIint has, at their recommendation, been erected, and 
 furnished with a most complete and extensive Coining Apparatus, in- 
 cluding all the modern improvements ; and in a Representation to 
 Your Royal Highness in Council, of (Hh ^larch 1H1.5, this Committee 
 suggested several Alterations in the Establishment and Constitution of 
 His Majesty's ]\Iint; which Your Royal Highness was graciously 
 pleased to approve ; and w liich will, it is presumed, render that 
 Establishment more efficient. 
 
 These preliminary steps having been completed, the Committee have 
 availed themselves of the return of General Peace, to resume the con- 
 sideration of the imp(»rtant subject referred to them, which the uniisually 
 high Prices of tlie precious Metals, and other circumstances arising out 
 of a state of ^\'a^, had obliged them to suspend ; and they now take 
 leave humbly to rej)resent to Your Royal Highness, that an immediate 
 Coinage of Gold and Silver Monies, would be of great public benefit : 
 
Report of Privjl Council Committee. 271) 
 
 But tluit if Your Royal lliglmess sluuild ho ploasod to give directions 
 for currying the same into etiect, they ilo not conceive it wouUl he 
 advisahle to make any Alteration, either in the Standard, Weight, or 
 Denominations of the Gold Coins. The Committee are however of 
 Opinion, that it should forthwith he proposed to Parliament, to pass an 
 Act declaring the Gold Coin alone to be the Standard Coin of this 
 Realm ; and that the Silver Coins are hereafter to be considered merely 
 as representative Coins, and to be a legal tender only in Payment of 
 Sums not exceeding Two Guineas. 
 
 The Committee do not think it necessary to state to Your Royal 
 Highness the Reasons which have led them to rec(»mmen(l that the 
 (iold Coin alone should be declared to be the Standard Coin of the 
 Realm, because they huniblv conceive that such a Declaration by 
 Parliament would in truth be merely in confirmation of a Principle, 
 already established by the universal consent and j)ractice of Ilis 
 Majesty's Subjects, and which appears to be in great measure recog- 
 nized by the Act of 38 Geo, III. chap. .59. 
 
 With respect to the Silver Coins, of which an immediate supply 
 appears to be more indispensably necessary for the public convenience ; 
 the Committee are of opinion, that no alteration should be made either 
 in the Standard of Fineness, or in the Denominations of the Coins ; 
 but thev think it will be advisable to diminish the Weight of the Pieces, 
 in order to prevent a recurrence of those inconveniences which have 
 hitherto arisen from the melting of the new and perfect Silver Coins 
 as soon as they have appeared in circulation, for the purpose of convert- 
 ing them into bullion, in which state they have generally been more 
 valuable than as Coin : The Committee are therefore of opinion, that 
 it should be proposed to Parliament to authorize Ilis IMajesty to direct, 
 tiiat in all future Coinages of Silver, Sixty-six Shillings (and other 
 Coins in proportion) shall be struck from each Pound Weight Troy of 
 Standard Silver, instead of Sixty-two. 
 
 It has hitherto been the practice in His IMajesty's i\Iint to return to 
 those who import Silver for the purpose of having it converted into 
 Coin, a quantity of Coin equal in weight to tlii' quantity of Standard 
 Silver so imported, the expense of Coining being borne by the Public. 
 So long as the Silver Coins were considered to be the Standard ("oiii of 
 the realm, this Principle appears to this Committee to have been a wise 
 one, and thev conceive that it should still ho adhered tn in respect of 
 
280 
 
 The History of the Guinea. 
 
 the Gold Coin, wliicli is now to be declared the Standard Coin of the 
 Ilealm ; hut the Committee are of opinion that the char<;e of coining 
 the Silver Coins, as well as a small allowance for Seignorage, ought to 
 l>e deducted ; and that His Majesty should be authorized to direct the 
 IMaster of His INIint to retain Four Shillings out of eacli Pound Weight 
 Troy of Silver Coin, hereafter to be coined, for the charge of IJraiisage 
 an<l Seignorage, and that the ^Nlonev received for the same, should 
 be applied to the Public Service in discharge of the interest of the Sum 
 expended in the erection of the new Mint, and in defraying the general 
 Expenses of the Mint P^stablishment. In thus stating the number of 
 Pieces to be struck from each Pound of Silver, and the amount of the 
 Sum to be deducted from Brassaije and Sei^noratre, the Committee have, 
 to the best of their judgment, endeavoured to fix on such a Kate as 
 will on the one hand be sutHcientIv high to protect the new Coins, by 
 a small increase of their nominal \'alue, from the danger of being 
 melted down and converted into Bullion wlien the ^Market Price of 
 Silver rises, while on the other, it will, they trust, not be found to be 
 so low as to aflord any encouragement to the issue of counterfeit Coin 
 if the IMarket Price of Silver should fall. 
 
 Should Your Royal Highness think fit to adopt the Plan which the 
 Committee have thus recommended, they think it would be advisable 
 that a Sum of not less than £2,500,000 in Silver Coin should actually 
 be coined, before any issue of new Coin takes place ; viz. £2,000,000 
 for the use of Great Britain, and £500,000 for the use of Jrela?id. 
 
 It will, however, be necessary, before any further progress can be 
 made in the execution of a New Silver Coinage, on the above jirinciples, 
 that the legal prohibitions against coining any Silver Coins of the 
 Realm, or altering the Weight of such Coins, arising out of the Acts of 
 18 Charles II. ch. 5. 7& « William HI, cli. 1. sec. 1 »S: \1. 11 
 Geo. III. cli. 4-2. .sec. 1. 38 Geo. IH. chap. 59. sec. 2. should be re- 
 pealed ; and with this view, the Committee take leave to recommend, 
 that in the Bill to be propo.sed to Parliament, provision .should be made 
 for the removal of those jirohibitions. \\'lH'n that sliall have been 
 effected, the Committee will procei'd humbly to recommend tn V(Uir 
 Royal Highne.s.s, the Regulations which they conceive will be necessary 
 with respect to the time and mode of calling in the Silver Coins now 
 in currency ; as well as with respect to the Allowance (if any) to l)e 
 made hereafter for reasonable wear, in each denomination of tlie pro- 
 
Procla ma lions m 1 s 1 7 . 281 
 
 posed New Silver Coins. Tlie Committee think it rij^lit however now 
 to state, as their opinion, with respect to the Silver Coins at present 
 in Circulation, that it shouhl he proposed to Parliament to authorize 
 His iNIajesty, whenever lie shall see fit to call in such Silver Coins, to 
 direct that all such Pieces as shall he judged hy the Officers of the 
 Mint to have heen actually coined in His Majesty's IMint, should he 
 received hy Tale, aiul that the holders of the same should receive in 
 lieturn an equal Value by Tale of the New Silver Coins. 
 
 \o. 21. 
 
 THE PROCLAMATION OF THE NEW CURRENCY, 1817, 
 
 Rv Ills RovAL Hir.iiNKss THE PRINCE OF WALES, 
 
 REGENT of the United Kingdom of Great Rritain and Ireland, in 
 the Name and on the Behalf of HIS .AIAJESTY. 
 
 A PROCLA.AIATION. 
 
 GEORGE P. R. 
 
 WHEREAS hy an Act passed in the Fifty-sixth Year of His 
 Majesty's Reign intituled " An Act to provide for a new Silver 
 Coinage, and to regulate the Currency of the Gold and Silver Coin 
 of this Realm," the IMaster and Worker of His ^Majesty's IMint in 
 London was authorized and empowered to coin or cause to be coined 
 Silver Bullion into Silver Coins, consisting of Crowns, Ilalf-Crowns, 
 Shillings, and Sixpences, of the Standard of Eleven Ounces and Two 
 Pennyweights of fine Silver and Eighteen Pennyweights Alloy to the 
 Pound Trov ; and in Weijiht after the Rate of Sixty-six Shillinirs to 
 the Pound Troy : And whereas in virtue of the Powers so given a 
 Coinage of Half-Crowns, Shillings, and Sixpences, at the Rate of 
 Sixty-six Shillings to the Pound Troy, and of the Standard of Fine- 
 ness above mentioned ; every such Half-Crown Piece having for the 
 Obverse Impression the Head nf His IMajestv, with the Inscription 
 " Georgius III. Dei (iratia," and the Date of the Year, and for the 
 Reverse the Ensigns Armorial of the United Kingdom, contained in 
 a Shield surrounded hy the Garter, hearing the Motto, " Honi soit qui 
 
282 Tke lliMory of the Guinea. , 
 
 nial V peiise," and the Colhir of the Giirter, with the Inscription 
 ••* Ilritanniaruni Rex Fid : Def : " with a nt-wly invented (Jraininfj; on 
 the Ed<;e of the Piece; every such Shillinj; and Sixpenny Piece 
 having for the Ohverse Impression the Head of His Majesty, with the 
 Inscription '' CJeor. III. I), (i. Jhitt : Hix. V. D." and the Date of 
 tin- Year, and for tlie Reverse the Ensijxns Armorial of tlie United 
 Kint^dom, contained in a Shield surrounded by the (iarter, bearing the 
 ^Iott(» '' Iloni soit q nial y pense," with a newly invented Graining on 
 the Edge of the Piece ; has been completed. Part of which has lK»en 
 delivered for the Use of His Majesty's Subjects, and the Remainder 
 thereof is now ready to be delivered for the Use of His ^lajesty's 
 Subjects: We have therefore in the Name and «»n the Behalf of His 
 3Iajestv, and bv and with the Advice of His ^lajesty's Privy Council, 
 thought fit to issue this Proclamation : And We do hereby ordain, 
 declare, and command, that the said Pieces of Silver Alonev shall 
 from and after the Day of the Date of this Our Proclamation, be 
 current aiul lawful IMoney of the Kingdom of Great Britain and 
 Ireland, and shall pass and be received as current and lawful ^loney 
 of the said Kingdom ; that is to sav, such Half-CVown Pieces as of 
 the Value of Two Shillings and Sixpence, such Sliilling Pieces as of 
 the Value of One Shilling, and such Sixpenny Pieces as of the Value 
 of Sixpence, in all Payments and Transactions of ^loney. 
 
 Given at the Court at Carlton House, the First Day of INIarch 
 One thousand eight hundred and seventeen, in the Fiftv- 
 seventh Year of His ^Majesty's Reign. 
 
 God save the King. 
 
 ]',v His Rovai. IIiguxkss THE PRINCE OF WALES, 
 
 REGENT of the United Kingdom of (ireat Britain and Ireland, in 
 the Name and on the Behalf of HIS iAIAJESTY. 
 
 A PR0CLA3IATI0N. 
 (iEOlUJE P. R. 
 
 WHEREAS We have thought fit to order that certain Pieces of 
 (Jold Money should be coined, which should bo called "Sovereigns or 
 
Proclamations in 1817. 283 
 
 Twenty Shilling Pieces," each of which slioiild be of the Vahie of 
 Twenty Shillini's, and that each Piece shonld be of the Wei'dit of 
 Five Pennyweights Three (Jrains ."oVo"© '^^^)' Weight of Standard 
 Gold, according to the Weights approved of and continned by Us in 
 Council, in pursuance of an Act made in the Fourteenth Year of His 
 Majesty's Reign, intituled '• An Act for regulating and ascertaining 
 the Weights to be made use of in weighing the Gold and Silver Coin 
 in this Kingdom;" And We have further thought fit to order that 
 every such Piece of Gold Money, so ordered to l)i' coined as aforesaid, 
 shall have for the Obverse Impression the Head of Ilis IMajesty, with 
 the Inscription "Georgius III. 1). G: Britanniar. Hex. F. I).'' and 
 the Date of the Year: and for the Reverse the Imaire of St. Georire 
 armed sitting on Horseback encountering the Dragon with a Spear, 
 the said Device being placed within the ennobled Garter, bearing 
 the ]Motto " Honi soit qui mal y pense," with a newly invented 
 Graining on the Edge of the Piece : And whereas Pieces of (iold 
 ]Money of the above Description have been coined at His IMajesty's 
 jMint, and will be coined there, in pursuance of Orders which we have 
 given for that Purpose : We have therefore, in the Name and on the 
 Behalf of His ^lajesty, and by and with the Advice of His ^lajesty's 
 Privy Council, thought fit to issue this Proclamation ; and We do 
 hereby, in the Name and on the Behalf of His Majesty, ordain, 
 declare, and command. That the said Pieces of Gold IMoney so coined, 
 and to be coined as aforesaid, shall be current and lawful JMonev of 
 the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and shall be called 
 " Sovereigns or Twenty Shilling Pieces," and shall pass and be received 
 as current and lawful ^loney of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
 and Ireland ; and every of such Pieces shall pass and be received as 
 (if the \'alue of Twenty Shillings of lawful iMoncy of Great Britain 
 and Ireland in all Payments whatsoever. 
 
 Given at the Court at Carlton House, the First Day of July One 
 thousand eight hundred and seventeen, in the Fifty-seventh 
 Year of His IMajesty's Reign, 
 
 God save the King. 
 
 From Ap]>cndix Z), 7, 0, to Evidence taken upon the Committee on the 
 
 Rnifnl Mint, IR.^7. 
 
HISTORICAL MxVTEKiAL— MISCELLANEOUS. 
 
287 
 
 No. 22. 
 
 CONTRACTION IN ntlO-1822. 
 
 Tiii: Effects of Resumption in Gold by Contraction of 
 
 Paper Issues. 
 
 1018-1822. 
 
 Extract from I\Iiimtt's ut" Evidence taken befon.' the Committee on 
 
 the IJank of Eiiiiland Charter, June 8, 18;52. 
 
 Examinatio)i of J. Ilorshy I'ah/ier, J£s(j. 
 No. 809. 
 
 Question. Are there any means of compelling the bank to j)roviile 
 a suiHcient (jnantity of Gold ? 
 
 Answer. The bank has only the means of obtaining an increased 
 quantity if it be deemed desirable bv contracting its issues, thereby 
 creating a scarcity of 3Ioney anil consequent fall in prices- 
 Extract from a paper on variations of prices and value of currency 
 
 since 1782, "Journal of the Statistical Society," llUi.J, p. 294, by 
 
 Prof. W. Stanley Jevons. 
 
 VARIATIONS of AVKRAGKS OF PRICK. 
 [On a scale of 100; the prices of 1782-'8.i affording this basis being assumed 
 
 to be 100.] 
 
 
 Year. 
 
 Gold. 
 
 Paper. 
 
 llilO 
 
 142 
 l.SG 
 l-JI 
 Wo 
 114 
 109 
 !l| 
 
 117 
 i;]2 
 
 112 
 
 94 
 88 
 89 
 
 1G4 
 
 i;;i I 
 
 147 
 148 
 
 1 }•> 1 2 
 
 1 ii 1 ;! 
 
 149 
 
 Ii!l4 
 
 1.5;5 
 
 181.5 
 
 1.'52 
 
 WWW 
 
 109 
 
 1 i! 1 7 
 
 120 
 
 1 }! 1 8 
 
 135 
 
 I n 1 9 
 
 117 
 
 Kx; 
 
 1820 
 
 I!!21 
 
 
 11(22 
 
 
 ir>2;5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-SS Historical Material — Miscellaneous. 
 
 ALKXAXI)KI{ nAHI\(; (LOin) Asmn'HTOX) ox THE 
 SILVER AXD (U)LI) STAXDAKl) IN EXCiLAXI). 
 
 [[.Mr. IJuriii<;'s evicU'iici' fjiwii before the Committees for Coin in 
 iwm was reprinted in Washington in 1830, in an appendix to a work 
 <in Gold and Silver, which deserved to make an epoch, althougli in fact 
 it failed to do so. 
 
 I allude to the Rejwrt of Mr. S. I). Ingham, Secretan* of tlie 
 Treasury. In it was foreshadowed a "conventional agreement between 
 the nations desiring to use both Gold and Silver as Standards of value 
 fixing the same relative values." The reader will find this Report in 
 the Document of the Conference of 1»715]] 
 
 Pai;mamkntary Papkh. — Coin. 
 
 (Extract from Minutes of Eridence taken before Oie Committee for Coin, 
 at the Board <f Trade, A/yril 2(1, 182H.) 
 
 Ai.KXANDKii Haking, Esq., I\I.P. — Examined. 
 
 Q. Is it your impression that it is possible and desirable to maintain 
 in this country a silver currency as a legal tender, founded on the pro- 
 portion of silver to gold established in the currency of France, or 
 .something very near it ; at the same time that we maintain our present 
 silver currency, which is obviously not in that proportion, and that 
 there would be an advantage in that system ? 
 
 A. I have always thought so, and certainly think so still. I have 
 no doubt about it. 
 
 Q. Would you execute that by issuing silver coin of the same 
 denominations as the present silver coin, but of a ditl'orent standard, 
 or l)v confininji it to a silver coin of a new denomination ? 
 
 A. It is quite clear that, if it were desired to have a silver coinage, 
 all of the same weight and (piulity, the present silver coinage mu.st bo 
 called in entirely ; but I can see no difiiculty whate\-er in the co- 
 existence of a silver coinage as a legal tender, in the proi>ortion, or 
 nearly the proportion, now existing in France, with the present silver 
 coinage remaining as a token, and provided the limitation continues as 
 
A. Inu'uhj {Lord Atihburion). 289 
 
 to the amount : w illi tliis precaution, I feel quite confident there can 
 be nothing to prevent those two silver coinages existing together. 
 Q. Would vou put tlu'ui under the same denomination •" 
 -V. No, I think I would not. You might take one of two plans; 
 you might either call in the ])resent silver currency, and put the whole 
 on the same footing, which would be a considerable expense, and I 
 think an unnecessary one, or you might continue the silver now out, 
 which now exists as a token silver coinage. There would be tlien the 
 present gold coin and the new silver coin as legal tenders, and as they 
 would not be interfered with hv the token coinage, and as there is a 
 considerable profit on the coining the latter, it might be c<uitinued as a 
 measure of economy, and as a means, in some degree, of defraying the 
 expenses of the !!Mint. \\'hen any additional token coinage should be 
 wanted, I do not see any objection to keeping the shillings and 
 sixpences and half-crowns as at present. In that case, I should 
 propose that the 5s. pieces should be called in, and that the silver coin 
 for legal tender should be confined to crown pieces ; or, if it should be 
 preferred, for the purpose of making a decimal division of the pounds, 
 2s. pieces might be substituted. In that case you might leave the few 
 OS. or 2s. ])ieces is not material, only, that if you make them bs. pieces, 
 then you would have to call in the 5s. token pieces which are at 
 present out. 
 
 Q. The circulation of the country would consist of a silver coinage 
 of tokens, beincr of a lejjal tender only to a limited amount: and a 
 silver coinage bein<x a le^al tender to an unlimited amount ; and a <;old 
 coinage ? 
 
 A. Exactly so. 
 
 ****** 
 Q. Supposing we were to adopt precisely the proportions of the 
 French ]Mint, would not the result probably be the same as in 
 France, namely, that silver would become the bulk of our metallic 
 currency, and that gold would be in use only for those purposes for 
 which it Avas more convenient; and that, in consequence, the diflTusion 
 of cold, which is now concentrated in this country, would be more 
 equable over the civilized countries of the world ? 
 
 A. Undoubtedly, if vou were to take the same proportions. I do 
 not see any sinjrle reason wliy exactly the same result should not take 
 place, Nvith this single difference, tlie extent of which I am not able to 
 
 U 
 
290 
 
 His torical Ma terial — Miscella?i eo us . 
 
 calculate ; that this country partially rejecting gold as its tender, the 
 effect would be U* reduce to some extent the value of gold over the 
 rest of the world. There is no doubt that, when this country returned 
 to pavnuMits in sjiecie, supposing we wanted from .£'l."),(M)(i,OU(t to 
 £2n,0(i(»,n()0 of gold, for instance, and that, to that extent, there was a 
 demand on tlie rest of the world for gold, gold got an increased value 
 from that circumstance. If you make silver a large proportion of 
 vour currency, and still more if you were to make it the bulk or the 
 whole of vtiur currency, silver w(mld gain something in value over 
 gold. A free concurrent circulation of the two metals in all countries 
 would certainly keep the proportions of each to the other most equable, 
 and have little other ground for lluctuations than such as may arise 
 from the charges of producing them. At present these fluctuations are 
 more atlected by changes in the \\aiits of the gold or silver circulating 
 countries than by any other cause. 
 
 Q. The result would be that silver wcuild rise in value over the 
 continent, as we claimed a larger proportion ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. Does not the preference given to gold in the French currency 
 arise from silver being over-valued ? 
 
 A. Undoubtedly. 
 
 Q. Supposing both gold and silver coin made legal tenders in this 
 country, and tliat the proportions rather favoured gold as a legal 
 tender, w(»uld not the advantage of a double standard, such as it exists 
 in France, be obtained, without our disturbing the existing mode of 
 our currency ; that is. with the advantage of retaining gold as the 
 bulk of it, and silver as an aiil to it ; just as in France, silver is the 
 currency and gold the aid ? 
 
 A. This mijiht certainly be easily done ; by a very sliu'ht diflerence 
 we could make gold the ordinary and habitual currency, and silver the 
 auxiliary, which would come in aid on an emergency; the variation in 
 France is seldom above a tenth ])er cent. ; it sometimes runs up to a 
 ([uarter per cent. It has been, I am t(»ld, something higher on par- 
 ticular occasions ; when the Bank of ICngland was running all over 
 the continent for gold, this was the case ; I believe, also, at another 
 time, for the service of the peninsula ; now and then, from casual cir- 
 cumstances, one metal gets preferred. If Ihissia goes to war in a 
 distant part, she does it always with gold. At the present time, gold 
 
Opinion of the Bank in 1828. 291 
 
 has beeu bought up to a hirge extent for this purpose, but unless any 
 disturbing causes of this iK'scriptioa arise, a very slight diilerence of 
 one tenth or c»iie fourth ])er cent, wimhl determine the use of one 
 metal or another. 
 
 Q. As they are liable to vary in their relative proportions, would it 
 not be a difficult v attending such a system, that \\e should have 
 frequentlv to re-adjust the proportions? 
 
 A. In using the two metals, one of two courses must be taken — 
 either to leave them to chance, and to give to the debtor the advan- 
 tage of the option, as was the case under the old system, or to fi.\ at 
 once which i.s to be vour standard, and to adjust at given periods your 
 other metal to it. If vou want the advanta<;es of the fixity of standard 
 of one metal with the facilities and conveniences of two, you must 
 take this latter course. I gave this opinion when the questions of 
 currency were brought before Parliament, and I see no objection to it 
 now. This system of occasional adjustment has been practised in 
 France, and in these matters practical experience is worth all the 
 theories of mere speculation. It is quite clear that, without this occa- 
 sional adjustment, you may lose the benefit of the double standard, 
 which is only to be preserved by keeping the value of gold and silver 
 coins within a fraction of each other. Nobody can say how their 
 value may vary according to the varying cost of their production, and 
 as it is the duty of the State to see justice done between all debtors 
 and creditors through the kingdom, I should prefer the principle of 
 adjustment to leaving the result of their contracts or engagements to 
 
 greater hazard. 
 
 Xo. U. 
 
 THE HK.STOIIATIOX OK .SILVER BEFORE THE 
 BANK OF ENGLAND IN lOi^u. 
 
 ^IlNUTKS OK EviUKNCK BKFOllK Co.M.MITTKK KOK CoiN. 
 
 QUERIES given in Writing to the Governor and Deputy-Governor 
 of the Rank of England.' 
 
 1st. WiiKTHKR, in the opinion of the Bank, it be desirable that 
 there should be established and nuiintained in this country, at the same 
 
 ' Mr. SaimiL'l Drew ami Mr John lloraley Palmer. 
 
202 Historical M<iterial — Miscellaneous. 
 
 time that wc iiiaiiitaiii the existing silwr currency, a silver currencv as 
 a legal tentler, the value of which should bear to golil nearly that pro- 
 portion which is establislKil in France, say about 15' to 1 ? 
 
 Whether, if such an arrangement be desirable, it would be preferably 
 effected bv issuing silver coin of the same denomination, but of a 
 dillereiit standard from the present, or by confining it to silver coin of 
 a new denomination ? 
 
 \\'hether the existence of such a silver currency would have the 
 effect of forcing gold out of circulation, either occasionally or per- 
 manently ? 
 
 In what manner does the Bank of England think that the exist- 
 ence of such a silver currency would operate on their transactions ? 
 
 Would it afford them security aiiainst combinations which niiixht be 
 made to their prejudice ? 
 
 Would it alVord them moans of more readily rectifying the foreign 
 exchanges ? 
 
 ^\'ould it enable them to provide with less ditliculty for periods of 
 panic or distress; and would it in any degree facilitate their procuring, 
 when necessary, supjilies of gold from abroad ? 
 
 2. \\'hetlu'r the Bank (»f England has any objection to making 
 advances on deposits of silver at a very low rate of interest, in the same 
 manner as is now done by the Bank of P'rance on deposits of gold ? 
 
 Whether such a measnre would in their view be advantageous, as 
 aflbrding convenience or security to the Bank or to the Public ? 
 
 Whether their opinion of such an arrangement would be altered, if 
 on such deposits of silver, notes or receipts were to be issued by the 
 Bank, not payable in gold, but payable in j)ortions of the silver de- 
 posited ? 
 
 3. Whether the Bank consider any and what advantages likely to 
 result from reverting to the system formerly establi>Iied by law, that of 
 making silver by weight a legal tender to any amount, the value »>f such 
 silver being either fixed in relation to gold, or such value dej)endingon 
 the market price, as published in the Gazette in the week or month 
 preceding the tender ? 
 
 Jn replying to the three preceding queries, the Bank will bear in 
 mind that the object is to retain gold as the bulk of the currency, and 
 to have silver as an aid to it. 
 
 4. Whether there be in the country, at the present moment, a 
 
Opinion of the Banlc in 1828. 293 
 
 sufficiency of coin for the jiurposes of the ordinarv transactions w hich, 
 in a country wliere paper forms so large a portion of the circulation, 
 coin is necessarily applicable, and to provide for the deficiency \vhich 
 may be occasioned by the ^vithdra\val from circulation of the small 
 notes of the country bankers ? 
 
 ANSWERS to the foregoing QUERIES. 
 
 1. I'ltovi I) i: I) there be sufficient silver currency in the country fur 
 the small payments, there does not appear to the Bank to be any ad- 
 vantage in the proposed addition of silver, as a general legal tender, 
 from the great difficulty of retaining gold as the bulk of the currency 
 under such an arrangement. 
 
 If such an arrangement were adopted, it appears to the Jiank that 
 it would be preferable to confine all the silver coin to one denomination, 
 and not to issue silver coin of the same denomination as the present, of 
 a difl'erent standard. 
 
 Whenever the state of the foreign exchan<;es miiiht give gold a hijiher 
 value, or when it might bear a higher agio, iji foreign countries than in 
 this, so far out of its relative value to silver as lo[ to 1, thereby afford- 
 ing a profit to the exporter, the gold would leave this country for those 
 parts of Europe where it might be more valuable. 
 
 For the reason given in answer to the first query, the Bank are of 
 opinion, that the proposed general legal tender of silver would not 
 materially operate upon their transactions. 
 
 It does not appear that it would afl'ord to the Bank any security 
 against combinations made to their prejudice, nor would it enable the 
 Bank more readily to rectify the foreign exchanges, nor to provide with 
 less difficulty for periods of panic ; neither does it appear to the Bank 
 that it would facilitate their procuring, when necessary, supplies of gold 
 from abroad. 
 
 2. There docs not appear to be any material objection to the Bank 
 making advances on deposits of silver for limitid periods, at a low rate 
 of interest, which might affijrd convenience to the public, when the 
 state of the foreign exchanges materially operated upon the demand 
 and price of silver in the market. The Bank are of opinion, that notes 
 or receipts payable in silver only would not be negotiable, as the same 
 coidd not be received for deposits made with the Bank. 
 
294 Historical Material — Miscellaticous. 
 
 !). The Bank can see m» advantage in reverting to the former system, 
 of making silver by weight a legal tender to any amount ; and they are 
 further of opinion, that a varying scale of value in any metal intended 
 to he used as a legal tender, cannot be otherwise than prejudicial in its 
 effect upon all contracts. The payment hy weight was formerly almost, 
 if not entirely, nugatory. 
 
 In rejilying to the three fir^t (pu'stituis, the Hank have borne in 
 mind, that the object is to retain gold as the bulk of the currency. 
 
 4. In answer to the fourth query, the Hank can only advert to the 
 quantity (tf coin in their possession, and that issued by them since 1st 
 January 1021, which, together with the silver issued from the INIint 
 since lOlG, induces the Bank to believe that there is a sulHciency of 
 coin for the ordinary transactions of the country, and aJMt tn provide 
 for the withdrawal from circulation of the small notes of the country 
 bankers. 
 
 X.). !>:>. 
 
 SILVER DISCUSSION IX i:;.7. 
 
 ExTiiArr Kiut.M TiiK EviDKNCK hkfokk tiik Ski.kct CoMMiriKK 
 ON Tin: Royal I\Iint, 1837. 
 
 Questions by Joseph Hume, Esq., IM.P., Chairman; Answers by J\lr. 
 Ila^irard, Head of tlie Hullinn Oflice of the Hank of England. ^ 
 
 '2-17-i. Are you ac{[uainted generally with the bullion market in 
 London ? — ^\'e have a great deal pass through our hands, more than 
 any other. 
 
 247"'. ^\'llat. in your opinion, would be the eflect of the IMint 
 having in possession gold or silver coin to deliver to merchants having 
 bullion to coin, so that the exchange might be made in the course of a 
 week from the period of delivering it ? — I consider that the Hank of 
 England are bound to keep coin, because their notes are payable in 
 cash, and the Hank outfht to lie the retjulators of the coinaire : they 
 ought to be regulators of tlie (juantity of bullion coined, for bullion 
 is more valuable fiir mercantile purposes than coin. 
 
 ' Mr. Win. l)i'l)on:iiro Ilatj-'anl ontorod tho Hank of Eiifrl.ind. ISOj ; hoail 
 of iht IJulhon Urtico, 1S33; rttirt'il It-JG; iIkmI IStiO. 
 
W. I). ILvjjard. 295 
 
 2-17*"'- The (jiu'stioii was, what wmihl ho tlie eftVct on the pricu of 
 bullion if merchants could carrv smaller quantities to the Mint direct 
 than can now be coined, instead of sending it to the Hank or tht' Imllion 
 merchants I — The effect wuuKl be, tliat llu- jiublie would coin when it 
 was profitable to them, and not otherwise ; and therefore vour circula- 
 tion might be deficient or it mi^ht be over doiu', because thev do not 
 coin \Yith reference to the (juantity wanted by the people, but to the 
 profit that arises upon the coinajfe. 
 
 12477. Would a facility ixiven to merchants to carrv that Iiulli<in in 
 small (piantities to the 3Iint for coinaj^e tend to raise the price of 
 bullion in the London market? — Certainly not; the fact is this, the 
 jmblic are not allowed to coin silver, they are only allowed to coin gold. 
 The price fixed by the Bank is .']/. 17.*. 0(/. for the i)nrchase of gold ; 
 the profit between coining and that price is only I \'l- ; therefore it is 
 luirdly worth their while to coin, because the profit is not sufficient. 
 
 l!47fi. Is there never a greater difference than \\<L an ounce in the 
 price the Bank gives to the seller and what it receives from the IMint ? 
 — I believe it is in consequence of the public having the privilege of 
 coining at the ]\Iint that the Bank gives 3/. 17.'<". i^"'- an ounce, when at 
 this moment I have not the least doubt they might buy it for 
 G/. 17s. G(/. 
 
 247i). That observation relates to gold ? — To gold. 
 
 2480. Suppose the same facility to be given to the coinage of silver, 
 and supposing silver to be equally pure as gold without a seinorage, 
 what effect would that have on the silver bullion market ? — It would 
 afi'ect the prices ; the public would coin for profit, and never coin 
 without. 
 
 2481. Would the price of silver in that case be more steady than it 
 has hitherto been ? — I should say yes, if made a legal tender. 
 
 2482. You think it would not produce any great change? — Xo : 
 because at present our silver is J per cent, seinorage. 
 
 248.'?. But supposing the seinorage removed ? — Then if thev conKl 
 buv the metal of the foreigner cheap, they would coin it dear ; at least 
 thev would get a good price for it ; if it was dearer than your standard 
 of value, then there woidd be no coinage. Now, if it is left to the Bank, 
 the public have the ])rivilege of bringing their bank notes to the Bank, 
 and getting cash when thev please ; and whether the price be 8/. 1 7'*. 0'/. 
 or 3/. 17-*. 10.',(/., the Bank must coin. 
 
20 i) Ui^toi'ical Material — Miscellaneous. 
 
 11404, That is with regard to gold ? — Even with the silver it would 
 be the same. 
 
 24It."i. What is the greatest variation in the price of gold that vou 
 have kiu»wn since IHIO? — In IHC* to I81MJ we purclni-sed a large 
 quantity of gold at .'?/. 1 75. (57. In 1 n20 .Mr. Rothschild brought a large 
 quantity of gold from Paris, took it to the IMint and coined it into 
 sovereigns ; he then brought those sovereigns to the Bank, and made 
 them jiay equal to .'}/. \~s. \f)\t{. for them, merely to ])ut down, in the 
 cotlers of the 13ank. In consequence of that, I have no doubt that the 
 Bank, to prevent the public coining, offer the price of .3/. 17*. S)</. per 
 ounce, in any quantity and at all times, without reference to demand or 
 supply. 
 
 248G. Then since 1532}? the Bank price has remained fixed at 
 3/. 1 7*. 0'/. ? — Yes, for purchase, and ;>/. 17-'''. lO.y/. for sale. 
 
 2487- Now what is the greatest variati(»n in the price of silver in 
 your recollection ? — It is a very extraordinary circumstance, that at this 
 present time, if silver was to be made the standard of value, I should 
 recommend that the standard should be coined at the rate of Queen 
 Elizabeth's time; that i')'2.s. of standard silver should be coined out of 
 the pound troy, instead of GO5., which is the j)rcsent rate. .Some of our 
 coin is 77I per cent, worse by wear at the present moment. 
 
 2400. Were all Elizabeth's silver coin (525. to the pound ? — I forget 
 whether the whole of it was, but I think it was. 
 
 2400. What variations have taken place in the coinageof silver since 
 then ? — Only from (>2.<. to (3G5. 
 
 2400. When did it begin ? — It began in lOlC; the alteration took 
 place then, bv Lord Liverpool's recommendation. 
 
 240). Win \v(mld you recommend that now, in case of a change ? — 
 Because it would not be cheating the public ; it would be a fair re- 
 muneration for the price of the manufactured coin, brassage, and the 
 expense of the Mint. 
 
 2402. Then it is your opinion that silver, if made a tender, should 
 be coined w ith simply a brass.age, for the expense of coining, added I — 
 That would give a per-centage to the IMint ; it would be most desirable 
 to keep a reserve fund to make the coin, when light, a proper weight. 
 
 249.3. What do you reckon the price of silver '. — At present I 
 
 2494. Yes. — It is not quite 5s. 
 
 2495. What is the {ircatcst variation vou have ever known from that 
 
Sir Robert Peel. 297 
 
 price? — At tlie time of the cash restriction, I think I recollect 7s. (></. 
 an ounce; but since that it lias hardly ever varied from Us. to 5s. Oh/. 
 
 249G. Are you able to form an opinion what the exact proportion 
 between the value of gohl and silver should be ? — According to a cal- 
 culation that I have made, it would be about lo to one, as near as 
 possible. 
 
 2407- (^11 what ground do you make that calculation ? — I calculate 
 that the exchanges \\ itii Franci' would then be about 2 "> francs ; it is 
 now 25 francs and 30 cents., I believe. 
 
 241)8. And wliv \\()uld vou make that diflerence between France 
 and us ? — Taking all the other countries as one, it seems to be the best 
 proportion you can make between gold and silver ; but you cannot 
 always keep that due proportion ; the foreign exports will afl'ect the 
 exchanges ; if silver was fixed and the other free, vou never would have 
 your circulation disturbed, as it is at present. 
 
 2409. Are you able to state whether, since the two extensive houses 
 for exchange have been established, within the last 10 or ].") years, 
 the price of bullion remains more on a par in the dillerent states of 
 Europe than formerly ? — I should say so, decidedly ; and as we get 
 more civilized, that will be still more the case ; if you overtrade, you 
 are sure to get the precious metals back again, because it is the par of 
 vour goods. 
 
 No. 26. 
 
 SIR ROBERT PEEL OX THE STANDARD OF VALUE. 
 
 Mav (\tJi, 1«44.' 
 
 Sir Robert Peel's best-known statement on the standard of value is 
 contained in his speech in the House of Commons on the Bank Charter 
 Act of May nth, 1844. He expressed himself as follows : — 
 
 " Now, I fear, there is not a general agreement on those fundamental 
 principles — that there is still a very material ditVercnce of opinion as to 
 the real nature and character of the Measure of Value in this country. 
 ]\Iv first question, therefore, is, ^Vhat constitutes this measure of value I 
 
 ' I take the following from Mr. K'. H. Iiiglis I'silgrave's Memorandum on 
 " Currency and Standard of Value in England."' (3 Kip. H. Com. on Depression 
 of Trade, p. 321.) 
 
298 
 
 llistoricid Material — Miscellaneous. 
 
 Wliat is the si<rnificali(tn of that word ' a Pound,' witli which we are 
 all familiar ? What is the eii<:afrement to ]»ay a ' Pound ' i Unless 
 we are ajjreed on the answer to these (juestions, it is in vain we attempt 
 to legislate on the subject. I/a ' Pound ' is a mere risionaiy ahftraction^ 
 a something which does not exist either in law or in practice, in that 
 case one class of measures relating to Pap«.r Currency may be adopted; 
 but if the word ' P<iund,' the common denomination of value, si^nijies 
 something more than a mere jict ion — if a 'Pound' means a (/iia)ttiti/ofOie 
 jirecitiiis metals of certain vrei(f/tt and certain fineness — if that be the 
 definition of a ' Pound,' in that case another class of measures relating 
 to Paper Currency will be refpiisite. Now, the whole foundation of 
 the proposal I am about to make rests upon the assumption that, ac- 
 cording to j)ractice, according to law, according to the ancient monetary 
 pdicy of this country^ that which is implied by the word ' Pound " is a 
 certain definite quantity of gold tcith a mark upon it to determine its weight 
 and fineness, and that the engagement to pay a Pound means nothing 
 and can mean nothing else than the promise to pay to the holder, when 
 he demands it, that definite quantity (f gold. ^^'llat is the meaning of 
 the ' Pound ' according to the ancient monetary policy of this country ? 
 The origin of the term was this : — In the reign of William the Con- 
 queror, a pound weight of silver was also the pound of account. The 
 ' Pound ' represented both the weight of metal and the denomination 
 of money. By subsequent debasements of the currency a great altera- 
 tion was made, not in the name, but in the intrinsic value of the Pound 
 sterling ; ami it was not until a late period of tlie roign of Queen 
 Elizabeth that silver, being then the standard of value, received that 
 determinate weight which it retained without variation, with constant 
 refusals to debase the standard of silver until the year IHIO, vrhen gold 
 became the exclusice standard of value. The standard of silver was 
 fixed about 15(57 ; but in 1717 the value of the guinea teas determined 
 to be 21*. ; and,yo/- a certain jicriml, both gold and silver constituted the 
 mixed standard of value. In the year 177-1, it being then enacted that 
 no legal contract should be discharged in silver fir any sum if more than 
 2i')l., gold became substantially the measure of value, and so it continued 
 to be legally and practically until 17!'7, when that fatal measure for 
 restricting cash payments by the bank was passed, and parties were 
 enabled to issue, at their discretion. Paper Money not convertible into 
 coin at the will of the bearer. Fnmi I7'.'7 to 1810, public attention 
 
Sir Robert Peel. 299 
 
 was nut much directeil to this iinjiortant Milijoft ; but in IHKt, men of 
 sagacity observed that the exchanges liad been for a considerable 
 period unfavourable to this country — more unfavourable than could l)e 
 accounted for by the balance of trade, or the monetary transactions of 
 the country. A Committee was appointed to incpiire into the subject, 
 and opinions, not really novel, but at that time very startling, were 
 enounced, to the etiect thut the '"Pound' vwa/it, injacf, nothing else than 
 a definite quantiti/ of the precious metals, and that those who promised to 
 
 pay a Pound oui/ht to pay that quantity." 
 
 ''Now, no one contends that there is or can be an absolutelv fixed 
 and invariable standard of value. No one denies that the value of gold, 
 with reference to all commodities, excepting gold itself, may be subject 
 to slight variations. But what other substance is not more subject to 
 variations in value than the precious metals? What other substance 
 possessing intrinsic value will not also be in demand as an article of 
 commerce ? It is because gold is an article (»f comiiu rci', because there 
 are no restrictions upon its export or its import, that vou can at all 
 times depend upon such a supplv of gold for the purposes of coin as 
 niav be suriicient for the wants of this country. The precious metals 
 are distributed among the various countries of the world in proportion 
 to their respective necessities, by laurs of certain y though not very obcious 
 operation, urhich, tcithout our interference, will allot to our share all that ice 
 require. Some entertain the apprehension that we may be drained of 
 all our gold in consequence of a demand for gold from foreign countries 
 either for the payment of their armies in time of war, or in consequence 
 of sudden and unforeseen demand for foreign coin for our own internal 
 consumption. It is supposed that gold, being an article in universal 
 demand, and having at all times and in all places an ascertained value, 
 is more subject to exportation than anything else. But the export of 
 gold, whether coin or bullion, is governed by precisely the same laws 
 by which the export of any otlier article is governed. Gold will not 
 leave this country, unless gold be dearer in some otlier country than it 
 is in this. It will not leave this country, merely because it is gold, nor 
 while there is any article of our jiroduce or manufacture which can l)e 
 exported in exchange for foreign produce with a more profitable return. 
 If gold coin be in any country the common medium of exchange; or 
 if the promissory notes which perform, in part, the functions of gold 
 coin, are at all times, and under all circumstances, of equal value with 
 
300 Historical Material — Miscellaneous. 
 
 gold, and are instaiitlv convertible into gold ; there are causes in opera- 
 tion which, without any interference on our part, will confine within 
 kiinwii :uiil jiist limits tiie extent to which gold can he exported. 
 There inav, no doubt, be temporary pressure from the export of gold, 
 even when it is connned within those limits ; but none for which you 
 may not j)rovidi>. noiu' to which vou wttuld not be subject, in a higher 
 degree, probablv, were anv other standard of vahn' adopted in pre- 
 ference to gold. I have thus stated the grounds which justify the 
 conclusion, that, according to the ancient monetarv ])olicv (»f the country, 
 according to the law, according to the practice that jirevailed at all times, 
 cxceptiiig during the ])eriod of inconvertible paper currency, a certain 
 <juantity of the precious mcUiIs^ definite in point of weight and fineness, 
 has constituted, and ought to constitute, the measure of value." 
 
 " It must, at the same time, be admitted that it would be quite con- 
 sistent with that jirinciple to adopt some other measure of value than 
 that ^\hicll \\o have adopted. Jl iroitid be consistent icit/i that principle 
 to select silver instead of gold as the standard^ — to hare a mixed standard 
 of gold and silcer, the relative rallies of the tico metals being determined, — 
 to dispense with gold coin altogether, and regulate the amount of paper 
 currency by making it convertible only, according to the projiosal of 
 3Ir. Ricardo, into gold bullion of a given minimum amount. I trust, 
 however, this House will adhere to the present standard, — will resolve 
 on the maintenance of a single standard, and <f gold as that standard. 
 All great writers on this subject. Sir William Petty, ^Ir. Locke, ^Ir. 
 Harris, and Lord Liverpool, have been decidedly in favour of a single, 
 in preference to a double standartl. .Air. Locke, indeed, was of opinion 
 that silver ought to be the standard, but there aj)]iears good ground to 
 doubt the soutidness rf that opinion ; and there are, at any rate, the most 
 cojjent reasons, since "old has been for a long course of years the stan- 
 (!;inl in this country, for tlie continued maintenance of it. Thev are 
 well stated in tlu' ailniirable Treatise on Coins, written by the first 
 Lord Liverpool. Li that treatise a system of coinage is recommended 
 which is in exact conformity, both in jioint of principle and detail, with 
 the system which we have adopted. Lord Liverpool observes: — 
 
 '"After full consideration of tiiis extensive, abstruse, and intri- 
 cate subject, I humbly ofi'er to Your IMnje.sty as the result of mv 
 o])inion, 
 
 "'First. That the coins of this Realm, which are to be tin' prin- 
 
 1 
 
Sir Robert Peel. 301 
 
 cipal measure of property and instrument of commerce, should bo made 
 of one metal onlv. 
 
 "'Secondly. That in this kinsTdoni the trold coins onlv have bein 
 for manv years ])ast, and are iu>\v, in the practice and opinion of the 
 people, tlie principal measure of property and instrument of commerce. 
 
 ""'It has been shown that, in a country like Great Britain, so dis- 
 tinguished for its affluence and for tlie extent of its commercial con- 
 nexions, the gold coins are best adapted to lie the principal measure of 
 property ; in this kingdom, therefore, the gold coin is now the principal 
 measure of property and standard coin, or, as it were, the sovereign 
 archetype by which the weight and value of all other coins should be 
 regulated. It is the measure of almost all contracts and bargains ; and 
 by it, as a measure, the price of all commodities bought and sold is 
 adjusted and ascertained. For these reasons the gold coin slmuhl l)e 
 made as perfect, and kept as perfect, as possible. 
 
 '•'Thirdly. It is evident that where the function of the gold coins 
 as a measure of property ceases, there that of the silver coin should 
 begin ; and that where the function of the silver coins in this respect, 
 ceases, there that of copper should begin ; it is clear, therefore, that so 
 far only these silver and copper coins should be made legal tender and 
 no further, at least not in any great degree : and it follows that the 
 coins, both of silver and copper, are subordinate, subservient, and merely 
 representative coins, and must take their value with reference to the 
 gold coins according to the rate which the sovereign sets upon each of 
 them.' 
 
 " These are, in fact," Sir Robert Peel continued, '• the principles 
 which regulate our present coinage. We have a single standard, and 
 that standard gold, — the metal which was practically the standard for 
 manv years previously to the suspension of cash payment. The silver 
 coiji is a mere token, auxiliary and subordinate to the golil coin ; the 
 ounce of silver being now coined into GGa*. instead of (i:^.*., and silver 
 coin not being a legal tender for any greater sum than 40^-." — Speech 
 on Bank Cliarter, House of Commons, IVIay G, 184-4. 
 
302 Historical Material — Miscella7icoits. 
 
 \ 
 
 X 
 
 o. L'7 
 
 MOXKTAIJV TKKATIKS I\ TIIK PAST.' 
 
 In all cases where coiiiiiiuiiities which severallv have inaintained an 
 imlepeiulent Coinage System liave come into union with each other, or 
 into subjection one to another, a conflict of Coinages must naturally 
 ensue, and the settlement of such conflict must naturally oiler analogies 
 both with the jarring of the IMonev Systems of independent nations 
 and with that .^lonetary pacification which is the aim of international 
 uiuiii'tary cnntract. 
 
 For instance, the monetary arrangements arising out of the consoli- 
 dation of the Roman Empire, or, later, out of that of the royal power 
 of France and that of the United Kingdom of (Jreat Britain, must 
 offer such anahtgies, while the partial and desultory coinage legislation 
 of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation in past centuries, 
 and in its turn the speedy monetary unification of the new German 
 Empire of to-dav, would oiler similar points of resemblance and of 
 instruction. 
 
 A list of Treaties is presented herewith : whicli, lutwever, so far as 
 earlier times are concerned, must be regarded as merely tentative ; for, 
 in view of the novelty <if the investigatii»n, it is nut improbable that 
 the list is incomplete, if not, indeed, incorrect. Treaties of the German 
 States which fornu'rly formed pari of the old German Empire stand 
 distinct from acts whith bear a character more decidedly international. 
 
 To guard against misunderstanding, an important distinction must 
 be observed. The possible future monetary treaty t»f the chief Western 
 Powers, contemplated by the advocates of the policy adopteil by the 
 United States in the law of February 28, 1878, under which the Con- 
 ference was convoked, differs in an essential point from treaties of 
 which history oilers an example. Such treaties have, it is believed, 
 invariably had for their object a Fusion of Currencies or ^lutuality of 
 Legal Tender ; the Coins struck in one country were to receive legal 
 currency in another ; and this interchangeability of Coin was the main 
 object of the treaty. 
 
 ' Hi'iirintoil from tlio Doouinent of ilio Moiu'tarv Conference of 1878. 
 
Monetwy Treaties. 303 
 
 This general object niav have implied the purpose, or carried \\ ith 
 it the result, that a certain metal or certain metals should become or 
 remain material of Coinajje in the contractini; countries, and niav have 
 included the obliixation of each party to maintain by ap])nipriate laws 
 the Legal-Tender character of such coined metal. Jjut it was the 
 coining and not the metal : it was the subdivision and the stamping of 
 the material, and not the material itself, that ofiered the motive of the 
 contract. 
 
 This happened vory naturally because, until lately, the status of 
 both Gold and Silver was regarded as fixed. It appears to have been 
 taken for granted, perhaps unconsciouslv. but in aiiv case by general 
 consent, that tlie two metals would remain ^loney ; that thev would 
 retain an international currency as material for .Aloiiev suthcient to 
 iruarantee their general status. Gold mi^ht be excluded here from 
 Legal-Tender, and there Silver might be ostracized, but there was no 
 combined eftbrt to exclude Silver, and the nations which would not 
 admit Gold as Legal-Tender furthered its use as a Trade Coin. 
 
 On the other hand, the advocates of the policy now proposed neces- 
 sarily regard the material, not the stamping of its subdivisions. 
 
 The object of this policy would be fully met by a Treaty which 
 should merely guarantee the equality of the metals before the law. 
 Under such a Treaty the contracting ])arties might each retain undis- 
 turbed their national Coins ; their mutual engagement Mduld relate 
 merely to the use of the two metals as full Legal-Tender at the same 
 ratio. Full-Legal-Tendcr power is to be appropriately secured by each 
 contracting country to its oicn Coins. In making Coins, uniform freedom 
 should be granted to the private individual to have metal coined, and 
 it is desirable that the same charge, or absence of charge, for Coinage, 
 should obtain in the contracting nations. 
 
 An examination of the History of the Coinage Confederations here- 
 after mentioned, will reveal that their disadvantages or deficiencies 
 arose either, 1st, from this extra-national legal currency of Coins, which 
 was their primary object ; or, 2nd (when they contemplat.'d the concur- 
 rent use of the two metals), from an extra-federal demand for Gold at 
 Silver-price higher than that assigned to the metal in the Federal 
 Coinage System. 
 
 These disadvantages which inhered in all European IMonetary 
 Unions actually formed, are believed to be excluded from that which 
 
30-4 JJistorical Material — Miscellaneous. 
 
 tla' I'nitt'd States has jtroposud to the iiatiuiis for discussion. It is not 
 essential, nor is it an important practical object of this policy, that 
 extra-national lejral currency of Coins should be included in the con- 
 tract, while the Union contemplated is so large that, so far as j)robabili- 
 ties can be calculated, its tranquillity could not, under any circumstances 
 which this generation is warranted in anticipating, be disturbed by an 
 extra-federal demand for Gold. 
 
 List ok Thkatiks. 
 
 fiRKMAN STATKS. 
 
 Coinage Union of the Four Electors of the Rhine, fifteenth century. 
 
 Coinage and Customs Union of the same, seventeenth century. 
 
 Coinage "■ Correspondenz " of the various Districts of the Empire, six- 
 teenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. 
 
 Coinage Agreement (7?cct'^«), of Zinna, H)77; Electors of Saxony; 
 Electors of Brandenburg ; joined by the House of Brunswick- 
 Liineburg. 
 
 Coinage Union of Leipzig, 1000; Elector of Saxony; Elector of 
 Brandenburg ; House of Brunswick-Liineburg. 
 
 Coinage Treaty of Vienna, September J 1, 17-J'5; Austria; Elector of 
 Bav:iri;i. 
 
 Coinage-Union-Treaties of Frankfort, February 22, 17'''), and of 
 ^Vo^ns, January I'J, 17l>n, of the Electors of IVIainz, Treves, and 
 the Palatinate Landgrave of Hesse- Darmstadt, and Free-Citv 
 Frankfort. 
 In some of the various treaties which established and regulated the 
 
 German TitADi: and Customs Union are to be found provisions 
 
 affecting the reciprocal acceptance of coins. 
 
 CdiN \(;i: Thkaty ok ."Mink ii. .Vugust 25, 18.'37. (Bavaria, Wiirtem- 
 berg, Baden, Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfort.) 
 
 CdiNACK Tkkatv ok Dhksdkn, July .')(), 1038. (States of the Ger- 
 man Customs Union.) 
 
 Coina(;k Tukatv ok ."Mink ii, ]\Iarcl> 27, 1845. 
 
 MoNKTARY Cartkl : for punishment of all crimes against the jire- 
 rogative of coining and (»f issuing jiaper money. Karlsruhe, October 
 21, 1845. (I'russian Customs-Union); Prussian Customs-Union, 
 February 11), 1853. 
 
Monetary Treaties^ Etc. 305 
 
 Coinage Treaty ok Vienna, January 24, 1857. (Formed in pur- 
 suance to Art. 9 of the Treaty of Karlsruhe, July 19, 1».">,'3, by 
 Austria, the Principality of Lichtenstein, and the States which were 
 parties to the Treaty of Dresden, July ;>0, 18:!!{.) Austria, Prussia, 
 Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Wiirteniherg, IJaden, Electorate of 
 Hesse, Grand Duchy of Hesse, (Jrand Duchy of Saxony, Olden- 
 burg, Saxe-^Ieiningen, Saxe Coburg and Gotha, Saxe Altenburg, 
 Brunswick, Nassau, Anhalt-Dessau-Kothen, Anhalt-Bernburg, 
 Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Schwart/burg-Rudolstadt, Lichten- 
 stein, Waldeck ami Pyrniont, lleuss older line, Reuss younger line, 
 Schauniburg-Lippe, Lippe, Landgraviate of Hesse, The Free City 
 of Frankfort. 
 
 THE LATIN UNION. 
 
 IMoNETAKY Treaty of Paris, December 23, 18G5. France, Bel- 
 gium, Switzerland, and Italy, Took eflect August 1, 18GG. Rati- 
 fied, by Italy, June 2, and July 21, 180(5; by Belgium, July 21, 
 1 }!<;('); bv Switzerland, 18GG; and by France. 
 
 The Accession of Greece to the Treaty took place April 10-22, 18G7 ; 
 of Roumania, April 1 4, 1 807 ; of the States of the Church, June 1 8, 
 18(;(;. 
 
 Supplementary Treaty of January oO, 1874. Belgium, France, Italy, 
 Switzt-rland. 
 
 Supplementary Declaration of February .'5, 187''>. 
 
 Supplementary Declaration of February 3, 187G. 
 
 Supplementary Declaration, 1877. 
 
 Treaty of Renewal of the Treaty of 1805, November 5, 1878. 
 
 Treaty of Renewal, etc., 1885-188G. 
 
 FRANCE AND AUSTRIA. 
 
 Preliminary ^Monetary Treai y ok Paris, July 3, 1807. France 
 and Austria. 
 
 THE SCANDINAVIAN UNION. 
 
 INIoNETARY Treaty ok Decemukr 18, 1872. Sweden and Den- 
 mark. 
 
 Supplementary Treaty of i"Mav 27, 1873. 
 
 Treaty of Accession <if Norway, to the latter Treaty, Oi-t(»ber 1 0, 
 1875. 
 
 X 
 
.300 Historical Material — Miscellaneous. 
 
 No. 2S. 
 
 CERTAIN STATE PAPERS RKLATIX(; TO THE 
 POLICY OF .MOXKTAKY IMOX, 1870, 1801, 1002. 
 
 COXFEREN'CE OF 1870. 
 
 (From the Document cf the Conference, jMje 21.1.) 
 
 Extract from the Report of the American Commission. 
 
 At the second session, on the 16th August, the Commissioners of the 
 United States submitted the two following projwsitions : 
 
 I. 
 
 It is the opinion of this Assembly that it is not to be desired that 
 Silver should be excluded from Free Coinage in Europe and tlie United 
 States of America. On the contrary, the Assembly believes that it is 
 desirable that the Unrestricted Coinage of Silver, and its use as Money 
 of Unlimited Legal Tender, should be retained where they exist, and, 
 as far as practicable, restored where they have ceased to exist. 
 
 n. 
 
 The use of both Gold and Silver as Unlimited Legal Tender 3Ioney 
 may be safely adopted : 
 
 First — By equalizing them at a relation to bo fixed by international 
 agreement : and 
 
 Second/i/ — By granting to each metal, at the relation fixed, equal 
 terms of Coinage, making no discrimination between them. 
 
 The following third proposition was prepared and liolil in reserve, 
 awaiting the development «f the views of the Conference : 
 
 III. 
 
 The Delegations here present agree to recommend to their respec- 
 tive governments that, by the free coinage of silver at a relation to be 
 
Monetary Conference 0/ 1878. 307 
 
 agreed upon, or provisionallv, tlirouiih oxtomlecl coinage upon •iijovern- 
 ment account and the accunuilation of silver bullion in })ublic treasuries, 
 they make a concerted etlbrt to restore silver to its function as money 
 of full power. 
 
 At no time during the further proceedings did the interest of our 
 mission appear to require the presentation of this proposition. 
 
 At the seventh and concluding session, on the liKth of August, the 
 following reply to the propositions submitted by the Delegates of the 
 United States was otlered on behalf of the majority of the European 
 Delegates : 
 
 The Delegates of the European States represented in Conference 
 wish to express their sincere thanks to the Government of the United 
 States of America for having procured an international exchange of 
 opinion upon a subject of so much importance as the monetary 
 question. 
 
 Having maturely considered the proposals of the representatives of 
 the United States, they recognize : 
 
 I. 
 
 That it is necessary to maintain in the world the monetary functions 
 of Silver as well as those of Gold, but that the selection for use of one 
 or the other of the two metals, or of both, simultaneously, should be 
 governed by the special position of each State, or group of States. 
 
 II. 
 
 That the question of the restriction of the Coinage of Silver should 
 equally be left to the discretion of each State, or group of States, 
 according to the particular circumstances in which they may find them- 
 selves placed, and the more so, in that the disturbance produced during 
 the recent years in the Silver market has variously aflected the mone- 
 tary situation of the several countries. 
 
 TIT. 
 
 That the difierences of opinion which have appeared, and the fact 
 that even some of the States which have the Double Staiulard lliul it 
 impossible to enter into a mutual engagement with regard to the free 
 coinage of Silver, exclude the discussion of the adoption of a common 
 ratio between the two metals. 
 
o08 Historical Material — Miscellaneous. 
 
 Contemporaneously with the presentation of this paper, individual 
 expressions of o|)iniun were ofiered by several of the Delegations, which 
 may Im? seen in the journal accompanyinj; this report. 
 
 To this declaration of the European Delegates, the Delegates of the 
 United States rejoined with the following statement of their views, 
 with which the formal ])roceedings of the Conference terminated : 
 
 In response to the address of the rcj)resentatives of the EurojH«an 
 States, the representatives of the I'nited States desire, on their part, to 
 express their thanks to the European States for accepting their invita- 
 tion and consulting with them uj)on a subject of so much importance. 
 
 The representatives of the United States regret that they cannot 
 entirely concur in all that has been submitted to them by a majority of 
 tlie representatives of the European States. 
 
 They fully concur in a part of the first proposition, viz., that " It is 
 necessary to maintain in the world the monetary functions of Silver as 
 well as those of Gold," aiul they desire that ere long there mav be 
 adequate co-operation to obtain that result. 
 
 They cannot object to the statement that " the selection for use of 
 one or other of these two metals, or of both simultaneouslv, should be 
 governed by the special position of each State ;" but if it be necessary 
 to maintain the monetary functions of the two metals as previously de- 
 clared, they respectfully submit that special positions of States may 
 become of secondary importance. 
 
 From so much of the second proposition as assigns as a special 
 reason for at present restricting the Coinage of Silver " that the dis- 
 turbance produced during Ihe recent years in the Silver market has 
 diflercntly aflected the monetary situation of the several countries," 
 they respectfully dissent, believing that a ])olicy of action would remove 
 the disturbance that produced these inequalities. 
 
 In regard to the third and last proposition, thev admit that "some of 
 the States which have the Double Standard," or, :vs thev prefer to say, 
 use both metals, " find it imjxtssible to enter into a mutual engagement 
 for the free Coinage of Silver." 
 
 They, as representatives of the United States, have come here ex- 
 ])ressly to enter into sucli an engagement. The difficulty is not with 
 them, and, wherever it may be, they trust it may be soon removed. 
 They entirely concur in the (.•onclusion drawn from this state «»f the 
 case that it " excludes the discussion of the adoption of a common ratio 
 
 1 
 
Monetary Conference of 1881. 309 
 
 between tlie two metals" if the nations are not ready to adopt a policy 
 
 to uphold it. We remain upon ours ; the European States upon 
 
 theirs. 
 
 \\. K. Fknton. 
 
 W. S. GllOKSBKCK. 
 
 Fkancis a. Wai.kkk. 
 S. Dana IIuutun. 
 
 CONFERENXE OF 1081. 
 {^From the Document oftlie Conference^ page 502.) 
 
 .Air. EvARTs, on belialf of the Delegates of France (IMagnin, 
 Dumas, De Norniandie, and Cernuschi), and of the United States of 
 America (Evarts, Thurman, Howe, and Ilorton), read the following 
 Declaration : 
 
 Tlie Delegates of France and of the United States, in the name 
 of their respective Governments, make tlie following Declarations : 
 
 1 . The depreciation and great fluctuations in the value of Silver 
 relatively to Gold, which of late years have shown themselves, and which 
 continue to exist, have been, and are, injurious to commerce and to the 
 general prosperity, and the establishment and maintenance of a fixed 
 relation of value between Silver and Gold would produce most impor- 
 tant benefits to the commerce of the world. 
 
 2. A convention, entered into by an important group of States, by 
 which they should agree to open their mints to free and unlimited 
 coinage of both Silver and Gold, at a fixed proportion of weight between 
 the Gold and Silver contained in the monetary unit of each metal, and 
 with full legal tender faculty to the money thus issued, would cause 
 and maintain a stability in the relative value of the two metals suitable 
 to the interests and requirements of the commerce of the world. 
 
 •T. Anv ratio, now or of late in use by any commercial nation, if 
 adopted by such important group of States, could be maintained ; but 
 the adoption of the ratio of 15 ^ to ], would accomplish the principal 
 object with less disturbance in the monetary systems to be aflected bv 
 it than bv anv other ratio. 
 
310 Ilistorical Material — Miscellaneous. 
 
 4. \\'itli()ut considering; the effect which miglit be produced toward 
 the desired object by a lesser combination of States, a convention which 
 wouUl inchule Eiitihuid, France, Germany, and the United States, 
 with the concurrence of other States, both in Europe and on the 
 American continent, whidi this combination would assure, wouUl be 
 a(K'(iuate t«t produce and nuiinlain throujjhout the commercial world the 
 relation between the two metals that such convention should adopt. 
 
 Resolltiun yon an Au.ioiijnki) 3Ikkting. 
 
 The Conference, considering that in the course of its two sessions it 
 has heard the speeches, declarations and observations of the delegates 
 of the States hereinafter enumerated ; 
 
 (iermany, Austria-IIungarv, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, The United 
 States, France, Great IJritain, British-India, Canada, (ireece, Italy, 
 The Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Norway and Switzer- 
 land ; 
 
 Considering that the declarations made by several of tlie delegates 
 have been in the name of their governments : 
 
 That these declarations all admit the expediencv of taking various 
 measures in concert, under reservation of the entire freedom of action 
 of the different governments ; 
 
 That there is ground for belic\'ing that an understanding may be 
 established between the States which have taken part in the Conference ; 
 
 But that it is expedient to suspend its meetings; 
 
 That; in fact, the monetary situation may, as regards some States, 
 call ft)r the intervention of their Governments, and that there is re;ison 
 for giving an opportunity at present for dijilomatic negotiations ; 
 
 Adjourns to Wednesday, liith April, IUU2. 
 
Proposed Co iiference ^/1882. 311 
 
 PROPOSED COXFEREXCE OF ian2. 
 
 Copy of an Identical Note scMit to tlie Powers by the (lovernments of 
 France and of the United States, IMarch 31, 1882. 
 
 Pakis, March 31, 1882. 
 
 The International ^Monetary Conference whicli was convened at 
 Paris hist year, upon the invitation of France and of the United States, 
 and in which the Government of was represented, 
 
 adjourned to meet the 12th of April, 1882. 
 
 In making this decision at the session of July 8, 1881, the Delegates 
 anticipated that, before the date thus fixed, the Governments repre- 
 sented in the Conference would be able to prepare solutions of the 
 questions involved, Avith a view to the conclusion of an international 
 convention, the terms of which should be discussed and determined 
 by the Conference. 
 
 This anticipation has been, in part, realized. From all the information 
 ■which has been received, it appears that in a large number of States the 
 question has continued to be the subject of earnest consideration and that 
 various plans have been under discussion, with the object either of re- 
 establishing the free coinage of silver money, or of restoring to the metal 
 silver its proper international value by enlarging its use as coin. Up to 
 the present time, however, these investigations do not appear to have 
 produced conclusions sufficiently positive to serve as a basis for formal 
 deliberations of the Conference. 
 
 Hence, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, in 
 conformity with the view entertained by various other Governments, 
 notably by those of Germany, Holland, and Italy, there would be no 
 sufficient advantage in re-opening the discussions of the Conference at 
 present. 
 
 In this situation, the Governments of the United States and of France 
 are of opinion that it icould be desirable to defer the convocation of the 
 Conference, subject to a determination, on tlie part of tlie States interested, 
 of the date for its re-assembling, the same to take place within tlie present 
 year. 
 
 CHISWICK IRESS:— C. WHITTI.NCIIAM AND CO., TOOKS COURT, CHA.NCERV LANE. 
 
 
BY THE SAME AUTHOR. 
 
 SiLVRR Attn Gold, and their Relation to the ProWcm nf Re<nimp«ion. (Cincinnati : 
 Robert Clarke & Co , 1876.) (I'rcscmcil as a printed li- '■ Monetary ConunU- 
 
 iion of 1876.) New edition, January, 1877 ; with Ai»i.' — 
 
 The I,aiNse»-faire theory and Iwari I'osvjsclikow, itc, »v. ., .i^i'. itjuiiit of 
 An AuoKCSs to Co.nckess against the bland Bill, Dec., 1876. 
 
 Monetary Malaria, or the Health of Nations, 1877. 
 
 The MoNKTAKV Situation. (Cincinivtti : Robert Clarke S: Co., May, 1878.) Contain- 
 ing also as Appendix papers on the Prussian Anti-Silver Theory, and its oriein in an 
 historical error. — Genenil Restoration of Silver, a condition precedent to successful cancel- 
 lation of paper money (1877). A Vindication of the Practicability of Uimctallic Union (1877). 
 
 Si-EECHES IN THE MONETARY CONFERENCE OP 1878. and DociMENTS presented.— In 
 " Proccs-Verbaux," or Kejxirt [original in French] of the Proceedings of the Conference, 
 etc. (Paris: Imprimeric Nationale, Nov. 1878, folio.) I>itto in Knglish Translation in 
 Document of the Cusfekence of 1878. (W.xshington : Govenimenl Printini; C)frice, 
 July, 1879. 918 pp., 8vo. & 4I0.) This volume comprises also the two following Titles. 
 
 Historical Material for the Sti-dyof Monetary Policy (518 pp.). Consisting 
 chiefly of documents illustrating the monetarj- history of France, England and the United 
 States (of which many are printed for the first time from MSS., and others for the first time 
 translated), compiled and edited as a partial Uocu.mentary History of Monetary 
 Policy ; and — 
 
 CoNTRinuTioNS TO THE Study OF MONETARY Poi.iCY (i2S pp.). Consisting of 
 Historical and Doctrinal Essays and a Bibliography of Money. 
 
 Sir Isaac Newton and England's Prohibitive Tariff upon Silver Money ; an open letter 
 to Prof W. S. Jevons. (Cincinnati: March, 1S81.) 
 
 La Monnaie ct la Loi. Traduction par Emilc do Lavclcyc. (Paiis : Guillaumin et Cie., 
 May, 1881.) 
 
 Das Geld und das Gesctz nebst Rede ubcr das Intercsse der Vcrcinigten Staaten an dor 
 Silberfragc. Ucbcrsetzung Von E. Koch. (KOln : Hcimann, August, 1881.) 
 
 DiSCOURS PRONONCfiS ET DOCUMENTS PRiSENTfc: DANS LA CONFERENCE MoN^TAfRB 
 
 Internationale de 1881. — In Proces-Vcrbaux. (Paris : Imprimerie Nationale, .Vugust, 
 1881, folio.) [.\lso scp.irate edition, 72 pp. folio.] Ditto in P'nglish Translation : Report of 
 Proceedings of Conference of 1 88 1. IJIue-Book. (I-ondon : Spottiswoode, September, 1881, 
 folio), and Published by department of SLite (Washington: November, 1S81); also in 
 German Translation. Published by German Government. (Berlin : 1882.) 
 
 The Position of Law in the Doctrine of MoNE^•, and other papers. (London: 
 
 1882.) 
 
 Silver as an International Question. An Address to Congress: being a letter 
 written in response to a request to Hon. A. H. Buckner, of Missouri, Chairm.in of the 
 Committee of the House of Representatives on Currency and Banking. (Washington : 
 Privately printed, February, 1885. 15 pp.) 
 
 Reasons for SfsrHNDiNC Silver Coinage. An Address delivered in response to the 
 invitation of the Executive Committee of the National Com.mekcial Convention, at 
 its meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, May 21, 1885. Also Extracts (7 pp.) reprinted by the New 
 Vork Board of Trade and Transportation, July, 1885. 
 
 Ought the National Banking System to be abolished? (AVr/A American Review, 
 September, 1885. 3 pp.) 
 
 The Internationai.ity of the Silver Question. An Address prepared at the 
 jnviLition of the Executive Committee of the American Bankers' Association, for its meet- 
 ing at Chicago, September 24, 1885. (Bankers' Pub. Assoc., New York, 1885.) 
 
 A Chapter on Monetary Policy. (Xortk American Reviav, December, 
 
 1885. II pp.) 
 
 Silver: An Issue of International Politics. An Address to Congress, March, 
 
 1886. (Cincinnati : R. Clarke & Co., 1886.) 
 
 The Bankino Community and thk Silver Question. An Address delivered at the 
 Annual Convention of the American Bankers' Association, Aug. 21, 1886, at Boston. 
 (Ill Re|X)rt of Convention, American Bankers' Pub. Assoc.) 
 
 Silver hkfore Co\gkf_ss in 1886. {Quartfrly Jounuil 0/ Ec»Homict, first number. 
 Boston: George 11. Ellis, October, 1886. 31 pp.) 
 
{ 
 
I \l_ I V-/ I \ I ■» 1 ' 
 
 University of California Library 
 or to ttie 
 NORTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 
 BIdg. 400, Richmond Field Station 
 University of California 
 Richmond, CA 94804-4698 
 
 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS 
 
 • 2-month loans may be renev^ed by calling 
 (510)642-6753 
 
 • 1-year loans may be recharged by bringing 
 books to NRLF 
 
 • Renewals and recharges may be made 4 
 days prior to due date. 
 
 DUE AS STAMPED BELOW 
 
 J UN 17 zonn 
 
 'JAN 2 & 2m 
 
 12,CXXI (11/95) 
 
 
 '*-:>■ 
 
 «■< » "CI/' 
 
 
 
 -":i>tr 
 
U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES 
 
 t 
 
 t')^* 
 
 
 ■^*#. 
 
 ■ 
 
 I >iii' III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !^*!^'V^'-y?"^"*v'v •>-' 
 
 
 
 -i'> i?f.-.»/^