m •>&Aavaan-^^ "^^AHvaan-^ ^OFCALIFOff^ ^OFCAllFOff^ ^^\^EUN1VER5'/^ ;lOSAN \WEUNIVERS/A ;,OFCAIIFO% .^,OF•CAll .jVafllH'^ '^6'AJJViil ^^UBRARYQ^ |/Ul9 i ^ ^'S. ^. "'^mimi^^^ "•^MOiim-i^'^^ 4.0F ^OFCAllFOi?^^ .-^MFl'N'ivFi^T/A .v\ins,vs'nFirr> A\^EUNIVER5'//. o AMEUNIVERy/A ' '^Aii3AINfl3UV' ^^^HIBRARYQ^ ^^IIIBRARYQ- ^(i/ojnvjjo=^ '^(i/o/iivo-jo^ ,5.\^EUNIVER% vvlOSANCElfx^, &Aavjiaii# ^TiiJONv-soi^ ^lOSAMCElfx. o "^/iiiJAINn 3WV ^WE-UNIVER5"//, — SIX SHILLINGS. Post Free, or Carriage Paid to any part of the AVorld. CALL RIGHTS RESERVED.] EXTRACTS FROM SOME PRESS NOTICES OF THE FIRST EDITION. " This is the only complete work on a subject of vital importance to Inf:uitry in the Field. It fills a want that has hitherto existed in English ililitary Literatui-e, and should be in the hands of all officers. Besides dialing \v-ith the question of Infantry Fire, and how to use it at all ranges, so as to obt;iin the maximum effect, it also embraces subjects which have a direct bearing on Infantry Fire, such as range-finding, supply of ammunition on the battle-field, iniluence of ground on effects of fire, principles of musketry instruction, tuctittil deductions, and the use of the magazine rifle." — Fioiteer. " Capt. 3Iayne has done a real good to the Ser\-ice in giving us a work which pkces before us clearly ;ind concisely the whole question." — Jvunial a. U. S. Institution. " A book dealing exhaustively and ably with a most important branch of the art of War. . . A valuable contribution to technical Military literature." — Colbuni's U. S. Magazine. " Capt. MajTie's book is sure to be widely read and largely quoted. . . . The th;inks of the public are due to Capt. Mayne." — Arimj and A'di'y Magazine. " The appearance of Capt. C. B. Mayne's work upon Infantrj' Fire Tactics will be welcomed by all Military men." — Morning I'o.st. " Capt. C. B. Maync has contributed a valuable addition to our knowledge of the functions of Infantry in War." — ^irmy ^- Navy Gazette. " We now close the book, strongly urging every regimentiil officer to provide himself with a copy." — Admiralty and Horse Guards Gazette. " A work of real merit, of which wo cannot too strongly recommend a study." — Bulletin de la Iteuniun des Officicrs. "A work showing signs of great labtmr and profound knowledge in nearly every question reLiting to the subject." — licvue Militaire Beige. " lie who luis become acquainted with tho rich contents of this book is obliged to admit that the notices of the English Slilitary press on it are just." — Vronstadt Vcstntk. " Hitherto as fire direction and tliscipline havt! l)een all but unknown in the Englisli Anny, such a j)ubliiation is therefore hailed there with particular Nilisfactioii, and on the Continent this valuable study is sure to find many readers." — Inttrnational JUvue. " For tho English Anny, Capt. Mayne's book is of tho utmost importance. . . . Not enough pmise can bo bestowed on tho Author for bringing out this subject to the knowledge of the Army at largo. I'o us IhiM book iH of value as a critic4il collection of priiicij)leH recognised in Foreign Annie.s, and its study cannot be too highly recoiuuiended." — Mil liar- U'uchcnblntt. UD 330 PREFACE. The following work is the result of some years constant, though pleasant and interesting work, and my labours will be far more than repaid if, in any way, they are productive of good to the British Service. The size of the book shows the development that the subject of Infantry Fire Tactics has reached, and in the following pages the reader will see that superiority of fire is to be obtained more by a rational and good tactical use of the rifle than by any actual superiority of armament , though this latter consideration must be given its full weight. Other things being equal, the better the rifle, and its ammunition, the greater will be the effects of the fire. The following pages will show the kind of data and statistics that should be found out for any new rifle, by experiments, in order to work oiit rules for the Fire Tactics to be used with it. But though, in the following pages, rules of firiag have been deduced, based on the total height of an average man, yet it would appear to be preferable to use only the height of an average man's shoulder for this purpose. I have endeavom-ed my best to place the arguments on both sides of any debateable matter as fairly as possible, and I must ask the reader to pay as much attention to the footnotes throughout the book, as to the matter to which they refer. The only mathematics used in this book, are simple addition, subtrac- tion, multiplication and division, except in one part onlj" of the book, in dealing with "Indirect Fire." In this case, a slight knowledge of trigonometry is also required. A study of the following pages will well illustrate the old adage, that "a more perfect tool requires a more skilful workman," and we must never forget that under the rude test of war, if we wish to obtain even a small result in the field, it is necessarj- to demand much in peace. It is the inherent impressionable character of the nature of man, that may, and often has, upset the most matured plans and resolutions. One of the great objects of militarj' training, is to so strengthen a man's natural moral qualities by the iron bands of discipline, and by the groove that custom and habit induce them to move in involuntarily, that they may become more of a fixed quantitj- under all circumstances, than a fluctua- ting one. This object can only be attained by constant training and practice in ■what should be done in the field, and this is all the more necessary, because knowledge, and the application of that knowledge, are two totally different things. Knowledge is comparatively easy to attain ; the applica- tion of it is hard. The former has first to be gained by study ; the latter, which is the real key-note of success in war, can then only be leamt by constant practice. We have not nearly enough target practice in our army, by which alone accuracy of fire can be obtained. Accurate firing, or quality of firing, is of more importance than the mere quantity of it. AVith regard to the general conclusions arrived at in the following^ pages, it will be found that Jirc at sJiort ranges should be the general rule in order to obtain decisive results, and that long-range fire should only he made use of under conditions favou)-ablc to its efficacious employment : while, at all ranges, the most stringent control over the fire should be maintained. My gieat difficulty has been a want of English statistics, and I have had, in consequence, to gather my information from a considerable num- ber of foreign works, which have not in many cases agreed with one another, and as the following pages have been written only in the spare time that I could find amidst considerable professional work, I am afraid that some errors and mistakes ma}- have crept into them. For these, I must offer an apology to the reader, and I should be very much obliged if any one would kindly do me the favour of pointing out such errors ta me, or any parts of the book which may appear ambiguous. Sly best thanks are due to Jlajor SlacClintock, K.A., who has given me much infonnation on various points, and I have also to thank Major E. Nash, K.A., and many other officers, especially foreign ones, who have been good enough to give me their views and criticisms on various points, and who have sent me much fresh and useful information, nearly all of whicli lias been embodied in the following pages. 'ITic follfiwing list gives most of the works that have been consulted in my studits, and, in many cases, complete extracts have been taken from them, but ns these oxtracts wore at first made in the form of manuscript notes for private use, without reference to theatithority, apologies are here made for any non-recognition, in th(> body of th(! work, of the authority of the extracts, or of which portions are extnicts. C. B. Mayne, UoYAI, MlI.ITAUY CoLLKOK, Copt., li.E. KiNOHTON, Can AHA. Augtul, 1888. yii. LIST OF BOOKS CONSULTED. Eeport of the Siege Operations Committee on the Bungeness Experiments of 1879, on Musketry, Machine Gun, and Artillery Fire. Journal des Science Militaire, 1876 to 1884. Revue Militaire de V Etranger, 1876 to 188-1, Bulletin de la Reunion des Officiers, 1883 Sc 1884. The English, American, German, French, Austrian, Russian, Italian and Dutch Musketry Regulations. Revue Militaire Beige. Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution. Cours Theorique de Tir, by Capt. Bert, 1876. Text-book of Gunnery, by Capt. Mackinlay, R.A., 1883. Principles of Gunnery, by Major Sladex, R.A., 1879. Treatise on Military Small Arms and Ammunition, by Lt.-Col. Bond, R.A., 1884. Tactical Xotes, by Major D. Joxes, R.A., 1881. long Range Infantry Fire and Musketry Instruction, by Capt. W. James, R.E., 1879. Modern Fire, by Capt. W. J.\mes, R.E., 1881. Infantry Fire Tactics, Attack Formations, and Squares, by Liexjt.-Gen. Sir G. Graham, V.C, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., 1886. Proposed Changes in Musketry Instruction, by Major C. Brooke, 1882. The Utilization of Rifle Fire in the Field, by Major C. Brooke, 1883. Fire Tactics of the German Army, translated by Lt.-Col. Helsham Jones, R.E., 1881. Let Feux de Guerre, by Capt. Bazin, 1881. Tir Incline de V Infanterie, by Commandant Pakquie, 1878. Le Tir de V Infanterie aux Grandes Distances, by C. C. J., 1880. Le Tir en Terrain Varie, by Col. P., 1880. Considerations sur les Feux d^ Infanterie appliques a V Attaqtie et a le Defence d^s Hauteurs, by Major Joindre, 1882. Des moyens d^augmenter la puissance des Feux de V Infanterie sur les Champs de Bataille,'})}' M.A30R Tollin, 1882. Zes Critiques du Riglement de Manoeuvres du 12 Juin, 1875, by Major Tollin, 1884. Principes de Tir, by Col. Lamiravx, 1883. Conferences sur le Tir pour les Offieiers d'' Infanterie, by Col. Lamiravx, 1885. Ze Combat de V Infanterie et les Reglements Actuels, by Capt. Savari, 1883. (hi the Results of Field Firing in India, by Gen. Hardinge, 1879. Za periode de 1881 a Vecole de Tir (Beige) et de perfectionnement pour V Infanterie, by Capt. Timmermans, 1881. Vlll. La period* df 1S83 a Vecolc de Tir fBclge) et de pcrfcct'xonnement pour VInfanterie, by Cai-t. De Nevnhevser, 1884. V Armament de V lufanterie Fraiiqaise et sa Comparison arcc les Armes de Guene Etrangeres, by Capt. Ortus, 1877. Valeitr Comparer, pour le Combat, dii Fusil Actttel de VInfanterie Europeenne, by Cai-t. Outi.s, 1880. Le Tir de VInfanterie et son Influence sur VEmpIoi de V Artilhrie, by Lieut -Col. Guossmaxx, 1879. Action dii Feu dc VInfanterie aux Grand^s Distances, by Lieut. -Col. Gkossmaxn, 1878. Emploi du Feu de VInfanterie dans la Guerre de Siege, by Lieut. -Col. Gkossm.\xx, 1879. Infantry Fire in Fortress Warfare, by Lieut.-Col. Von Boguslawski, 1881. La BataiUe, (Translation of a German Essay), 1881. Lettres sur VInfanterie \ by Prince Kraft De Hohenlohe-Ixgelfikqen, Lettres sur VArtillcrie / 1885. Report on the German Army, by Col. Barox Kaulbars, 1880. Tactique de Combat drs Trois Armes, by Lieut. -Gex. Brialmoxt, 1881. The Modern Sportsman's Gun and Rifle, by Walsh, 1884. The Fighting of the Future, by Capt. Iax Hamilton, 1884. Precis d'llistoire Militaire, by Capt. Dubail. Etude sur la Tactique des Fcux de V Infanterie, by Lieut.-Col. Bavay, 1884. Defensive-Offensive- Tactique, by Lieut. Keucker, 188o. On Indirect Infantry Fire, (Translated from the Italian), 188:5. Instruction sur Ic Remplacemcnt des Munitions en Campagne (Oflicial), 1884. Du Remplacemcnt des Munitions d' Infanterie sur Ic Champ de BataiUe, by A. ^Mariotti, 1880. Le Raritaillement des Munitions d^ Infanterie, by Col. Lamirau\, 1883. Lc Ravitaillemcnt des Munitions en Allemagne, 1883. Instructions for the Supply of Ammunition in Battle, G.O., 58, 1878. Regulations for the Supply of Stores to an Army in the Field, A.C., Nov., 1S81. Quelques Reflexions sur les Armes a Repetition, 1S83. Les Fusils a Magasin en Allemagne, 1883. De la Tactique des Fcux et des Armes a Repetition, by M. E. SiMOXD, 1884. Les Fusils a Repetition et In Charge de nos Soldats en Campagne, by Commandant Tollin, 1885. La QucHtiun des Fusils a Repetition en Allemagne, 1880. Magazine Rifles, by Ma.ior Fohbery, V.C, 1882. Magazine Rifles and Repeaters, by Ma.i<)R Foshkhy, V.C, 1883. Repealing Riflen, ],y C'ai't. \V. James, K.E., 1881. The U'eldon liange-flnder, by CoL. Drayhox, R.A. ; and also by Colonel J. B. liu iiaudson, K.A. Range and Position Finding, by Capt. Watkin, R.A.. 18S1. The Nolan Rangc-flndrr, ])y Capt. Nolan, R.A. Note oti a Short linsc Uange-finder, by A. Mallook, 1886. CONTENTS PAET I. Chap. ' Page I. Introductiox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. The Poaver of the IIartini - Henry Eifle. — Ricochets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 III. Individial Fire. — Its Inaccuracy .. .. .. 17 IV. Determination of the Accuracy of a Rifle. — Dimensions of the Shot-Groupings of a Martini- Henry Rifle for Individual Fire . . . . . . 45 V. Practical Trajectories and the Limits for iNon-iDUAL Firing . . . . . . . . . . 57 VI. Remarks ox the Efficacy of Individual Fire at Different Ranges . . . . . . . . . . 87 VII. Rapidity of Fire. — Useful Effect . . . . . . 97 VIII. Determination of Distances ,. .. .. ,, 103 PART II. IX. Collective Fire. — Combined Use of Two or more Elevations. — Ricochets.. .. .. .. .. 129 X. Estimation of the Effects of Collective Firing .. 155 XI. Influence of Ground and Obstacles on the Effects OF Infantry Fire. — Inclined Fire. — Indirect Fire. — Night Firing .. .. .. .. .. 185 XII. LoNG-R.ANGE versus Short-Range Fire . . . . . . 245 XIII. Supply of Ammunition on the Battle Field . . . . 279 XIV. Uncontrolled and Controlled Fire . . . . . . 343 XV. Fire Discipline and the Control and Direction of Fire. — Fire-Units or Groups . . . . . . 353 PART III. Chap Page. XVI. Tactical Dedvctioxs. , XVII. Musketry Instruction XVI II. The Use of Entrenching Tools in the Field XIX. Magazine Eifles APPENDIX I. Effects of Atmospheric Conditions ON the Fire of Rifles APPENDIX II. Trajectory Tahle . . APPENDIX III. ) Tarles showing the Results of APPENDIX IV. ) Collective Firing. PLATE I 421 463 485 495 513 NOTICE ON THE SECOND EDITION. On account of the very favourable manner in which the First Edition of this book has been received, there has been a considerable revision and re-grouping of matter in the Second Edition, with a large amount of fresh information added. By these alterations it is hoped that the value of the work, whatever it may be, has been greatly increased. The most important additions are to be found in Chapter X. , showing how the effects of fire have been ascertained on the Continent. It is most important that similar experiments should be carried out for our new rifle, both at home and in India, for the effects of fire stated in this work are not the same for all rifles. The few pages on ' ' Musketry Fire Tactics," to be found in our Infantiy Drill Book of 1884, are a deliberate and unacknowledged translation from the French Musketry Regulations — so much so that, where the French have laid down the outer limit of long-range fire as the range for the extreme graduation of their backsight, 1,600 metres, or 1,700 yards nearly, the same limit has been inserted in our Drill Book, although our backsight is only graduated up to 1,400 yards ! And all these French statistics for the Gras rifle, after having been dressed up in English units of measure, are headed Limits for the Employment of Fire with the Martini- Henry Rifle ! Is it a proud position for a country like England to coolly copy the work of other nations like this ? To always follow is to always remain behind. Chapter XV., on Fire Discipline, and Chapters VII. and XIX. on Eiipidity of Firing and Magazine Eifles, have also received special revision and additions. Chapter XIII. on Ammunition Supply has been in large part altered to bring it up to date with the latest published regulations on the subject. With regard to the fire of magazine rifles, the -wTriter has made some experiments as to whether such rifles do or do not entail an increased expenditure of ammunition. In these experiments the target was made to appear at intervals for a short time, and during these intervals of exposure a rapid aimed fire was kept up, using the magazine each time. The result was that nearly double the amount of ammunition was expended, with nearly double the number of hits. The ranges were known. The rifle used was a "Winchester magazine rifle, used as a single-loader and as a magazine rifle. In Appendix I. will be found some new and interesting information concerning the effect of atmosplieric conditions on the flight of bullets. It will be seen that the eifect may often be considerable, and it seems verj- necessary that officers should know what these effects are, and in what way to allow for effects of temperature and wind especially. The effect of atmospheric pressure is fairly constant over a large tract of country, and so does not require the constant attention of officers, like the temperature and wind do. One kindly critic. Colonel Mackinnon, of the School of Musketry at Hythe, has objected to the title of the present work, sapng that Infantry "Fire" Tactics cannot exist separately or apart from Infantry Tactics generally. The Author fully coincides with Colonel Mackinnon' s \'iews, but custom permits of the individualising or separation of Tactics into various sub-branches, and it is to the sub-branch of the efficient use of the rifle in the field that the present work is devoted. In foreign militarj' literature we constantly meet uTith the terms ' ' tactics of marching," " tactics of fighting," " tactics of mobilisation," " tactics of supply," "tactics of fortification," &c., &c. ; the word "tactics" meaning the execution, or rather methods of execution, adopted to carry out the conaption, which is the true province of strategy'. It is with this mean- ing of Tactics that the Author has adopted the present title of the book. C. B. M. NoTK. — Just as tlus book was being finally printed, the Author re- ceived a copy of the new official pamphlet, " Infantry Tactics as Lijiitcuctd by Fin," which is evidently intended to re-place the few pages on " Musketry Fire Tactics" in the Field Exercises of 1884. Much of this pamphlet has been bodily taken from this book, and in it, the sub-division of ranges, recommended on i)ago 2G6, has been piactically adopted. The new (tcnnaii Ammunition Supply Regulations have been very inadeciuiitely tinljodied in tliis wurk, because, uj) to the time of going to {(resH, t}ie Autlior lias not bcmi able to obtain any good account of them. TART I CHAPTEE I. INTRODUCTION. In tlie next war, the nation which has best educated its troops to the true character of modern fighting, by teaching them to do in peace what they will have to do in war, and by subordi- nating to that end tlie whole training of the soldier, will have placed itself in a position to have gone, at least, a long way on the road to gain success. Now-a-da3\s the instruction of the individual soldier is all important, for he must be imbued with the spirit of modern lighting, feel thoroughly at home in the various phases of the fight, know what is required of him in them, and be able in all circumstances to make the best use of his weaj)on. Improved weapons have increased the range at which fire may be opened, and the deadliness of fire at all distances but especially at the short ones, and the consequence of this has been to replace the shock tactics of closed bodies by the fire of extended ones, as the ruling principle in battle. This natiu-ally requires more individual action on the part of the soldier ; but as this apparently has a tendency to do away with the authority of the leaders, it raised at first a great cry against it, as being subversive of dis- cipline and contrary to the principles of being able to keep men in hand, available for the ever varying requirements of a fight. Experience has, however, shewn that this greater individual action for the soldier is a necessity, and hence the problem to be solved is, how the consequent unavoidable loosening may be best minimised and adapted to attain the end in view ; a rigid training to true principles is now recognised as the only way of doing this, and to so habituate the men in peace time to what they will have to do in war, as to cause it to become a second nature to them. After a hard struggle the bullet has gained a complete superiority over the bayonet, but it is o?iI>/ in the proper use of the rijlc, as regards fre, ihaf this sujjen'oriti/ lias been won. However, a use for the bayonet still exists in its proper place; the final appeal has still to be made with it in action, to show the demoralized defenders how hoj)eless is their case by proving to them the power the attacking troops still possess of advancing; besides which, it gives a moral and material support to troops at night, on sentry dut}', »S:c. ; but henceforth it is to fii'e, and not to the final hand-to-hand conflict, that the true decision of the fi^ht must be looked ; the bullet must render the bayonet attack feasible and possible. The late actions in the Soudan afford examples of this fact in the highest degree. Our troops there had to withstand the most desperate assaidts conceivable, which they annihilated by fire alone. "Wliile we relied on our fire our losses were few, and they only really began to occur when we had to give it up to use the bayonet instead. " Formerly fire-arms were used to induce such a state of things as would make it possible to bring the bayonet to bear. The fact of a baj'onet charge taking place, then, implied that the critical moment had come. Now the rush to seize a position implies that the critical moment has j^assed, or the rush is sure to be fruitless." — {Wellington Prize Essay 1872, p. 86)- The English Muskctrj' Regulations of 1877 said that: " The rifle is placed in the soldier's hand for the destruction of his enemy ; liis own safety depends upon his efficient use of it ; it cannot, therefore, be too strongly incidcated, that every man who has no defect in his ej-esight may be made H good shot, and that no degree of perfection he may have attained in the other inirts of his di-iU, can, tipon service, reuK'dy any want of proficiency in this ; in fact all his other instruction in nuirching and mana-mTing can do no more than jilaco him in the best possible situation for using his rifle with (^Hcct." AH this is ])erfe(tly true and greatly to the point, except the HenteniM' that ever}' nuin with good eyesight can 1)0 made a "good" shot or even a " fairlj' good" shot, as the Aluskt'try Regulations of 1887 say. The whole of our old Hvstt m of musketry was based on this statement, and the individual fire of a single man was accordingly raised to the highest place. The falseness of this hypothesis, and the i)ractice consequent on it, was amply proved in our late campaigns, wln-re our shooting is reported to have l»een as bud as it could jiossibly be. The fa or down to obtain the trajectory for any given amount of inclined tire. This state- ment is not of course mathematically correct, but it is sufficiently so for all practical purpose as regards the trajectories of rifle bullets, when the fire is not much inclined. •AhIo whon ;i grazing firo ceases und Lecomes a droi>pingone, bccp. 193. CHAPTER II. THE POWER OF THE MARTINI-HENRY RIFLE.— RICOCHETS. At target prailiee, men lying clown, from being able to rest their elbows on the ground, fire more accurately than those kneeling; and those kneeling than those standing. Thus the lying-down position should be the normal position for firing, especially as the nearer the enemy is, the more destructive is his fire, if he is not demoralized, and the more necessary is it to lie down in order to form the smallest possible mark ; this position has also other advantages besides that of allow- ing of more accurate shooting, viz. : that the smoke of the powder in dispersing begins from the lowest part, so that men lying down can see the enemy when men kneeling or standing up cannot distinguish anything thi'ough the smoke ; the lying- down position fiu-ther allows of the smallest folds of ground being utilized as cover.* The following is an approximate trajectory table of the Martini-Henry rifle when it is held one foot above the ground, and aimed at the foot of the mark (see p. 67 ct seq.). This, supposes the man firing to be Ipng down, in which attitude he would almost always be in action, — at long ranges to get a more steady aim, and at medium and short ranges to form a smaller mark. Hence, if aim is taken at the bottom of the target, the line of sight may be taken as coincident with the ground. The height of cavalry is taken as 8 feet, of infantry as cth feet. The distances are given to the nearest yard, and the heights to the nearest J of a foot, so that they are only approximations ; the groimd is fiu-ther supposed to be parallel to the line of sight. The data in this table are for a muzzle velocity of 1,320 feet per second, a fine day {i e., barometer 30-ins. thermometer 62'' F. and the weight of a cubic foot of air .534'22 grains) and when the force of gravity =32-1908, and hence they would he different for other muzzle velocities, and other conditions of atmosphere and (/ravity. * Of course there are cases in whicli a lying-down position woul i be useless, as in a flat country intei-sected with hedges, or when on ground covered with high gi-ass, bushes, &c. T ^^B IjE I. 1 2 ' 1 4 ' i 1 6 7 Range in yards. Ancrle of Elevation of Mean trajector}-. Greatest height of Mean trajectory in feet above line of sight. (1) Distance in yards of greatest height of mean tra- jectory from origin of (1)' Angle of drop of Mean tr.ijectorj^. Angle. (2) lin. Tangent. lin. 100 1 10 381-67 -0029 0-05 52 304-00 200 21 163-31 -0061 1-00 105 128-00 300 34 101-11 •0099 2^7o 160 78-20 400 49 70-17 •0142 o^OO 216 55^40 500 1 9 49-82 -0201 8^50 273 41^90 COO 1 27 39-51 -0253 13-25 331 33-00 700 1 46 32-42 -0308 19-00 387 26-10 800 2 G 27-27 -0:)G7 26-25 446 21-20 900 2 28 23-21 -0431 35-25 507 17-60 1000 2 oO 20-20 •0495 45-75 566 14-70 1100 3 14 17-70 -0565 57-43 623 12-50 1200 3 40 15-60 -0G41 73-50 690 10-60 1300 4 8 13-83 -0723 90-50 752 9-13 1400 4 40 12-25 -0816 109-92 812 7-87 1 ')00 5 1.5 10-88 -0919 G-82 IGOO T) .')4 9-08 -1033 5-94 1700 6 37 S-62 •1160 5-20 1800 7 24 7-70 -1299 4-57 1000 8 14 6-91 •MI7 4 03 2000 9 7 f.-23 • 1 605 3-56 2100 10 3 5 -64 •1772 3-12 2200 11 3 5-12 -1953 2-75 2300 12 7 4-66 -2147 2-43 2400 13 17 4-24 •2361 2- 15 2500 14 2') 3-89 •2571 1-89 2G00 15 53 3-51 •2845 1-G8 2700 17 28 3-18 •3146 1-50 2800 19 18 2-80 •3602 1-30 2900 21 10 2-58 •3872 1-13 3000 23 20 2-32 •4313 0-94 (1) Tlii'sc iniinliiTH HiipnoHc tin' line of si ,'lit coin'Rlcnt with tin- ijrroiunl. (2) The-ie arc given t same weight and fired out of similar rifles, tlio bhjw must bo liarder and the penetration greater. (3) Greater eliicieney in covering tlie ground; because for the same range, the bullet does not ris<* so high in the air. Hence, what is most nnpiired in a military rifle is (u fiat a trojeclory as possible at all ranges, but especially for tactical and * The ponctrntion of a hullot depends on its striking energy and rota- tion, and on the form und miitcriiil of both the bullet and tho object other reasons, at tlie sliorter one^j, with the greatest accuracy of fire attainalle. A\Tiere ranges are accurately known, as at measured hntts, it is usual in rifles for prize shooting to try and gain accuracy alone. In war, ranges are not known anything like accurately, and therefore flatness of trajectory is most important to reduce the effect of errors of estimation of distances. The effects of flatness of trajectory and accuracy must be considered together. In some French experiments it was found that the Winchester rifle was more accurate than the French rifle, but it has a much higher trajectory, and is not therefore so well adapted for mihtary j^ui-poses. Thus accuracy of tu^e does not entail or even improve flatness of trajectory, but for the same rifle a flatter trajectory as a rule improves the accuracy, which latter quality mainly dej)ends on the perfection of manufacture of the rifle and its ammuni- tion, and on the oblicj^ueness with which the bullet strikes the target ; while flatness of trajectory almost entirely depends on the muzzle velocity and sectional density"'-' of the bullet. Very accurate weapons with higli trajectories are all very well with skilful and cool men, who know their distances exactly ; but great accui'acj' of fii-e cannot at any time be readily utilized by the mass of men, especially when excited imder fii-e and unsteady from rapid movement. The errors of a good shot firing without a rest are double those made when firing from a rest ; for an average shot they vary from three to four times more ; while those of a bad shot, who fires hurriedly and without aiming, are iucalcidable. But flatness of trajectory can be utiHzed immediately by every man, botli good and bad, as it is independent of the man, and thus a flat trajectory increases the value of a rifle for military purposes. Hence we should principally aim at progTess in flattening the trajectory of the arm more than in increasing its accui-acy. We must always remember, however, that rijles are iceapom ('•hose vahi.'.' onhj (/ej)cnds on the skill of those I'sinff them. Kicochets. As a ride in experiments against targets we do not deal with the effect of "ricochets" (as ricocheting bullets are called), but to do so in the field is to detract, to a very important * For definition see official Treatise ou Militan,- Small «\i-nis and Ammunition. 14 extent, from the full value of our fire. The following remarks on the value of ricochets have Loeu extracted from the report of the Siege Operations vOommittee on the fire of the Martini-Henry rifle. If the angle of drop is not too great, and the nature of the ground suitable, a bullet on striking the ground "svill glance or ricochet off it, and go on, but on account of the right- handed twist or rotation of the bullet, given by the rifling of the barrel, the bullet usually deflects to the right after touching the ground. Experiments have shown that the mean rise of the ricochets, after touching the ground, is about twice the drop, but it is very variable, and the mean deflec- tion to the right is about 1 in 1 00, the maximum being 2 in 100, so that it may bo taken as ahnost continuing in the plane of the trajectory. The practical limit in range on level ground at which ricochets can occur is about 2,000 yards, where the drop is 1 in 3'oG, but it depends greatly on the nature and slope of the surface on which the bullets fall. Ricochets have been obtained up to 2,700 yards in some cases, and in which the bullet continued for 100 yards from there. Bullets on striking at 1,400 j-ards ricochet for about 300 yards and show a great deal of striking energy. Bullets fired at short ranges on level ground will ricochet several times, and some of them go to considerable distances. Up to 1,500 j'ards the mean length of the first ricochet is about 280 yards, which remains pretty constant with the range, because, though as the range increases up to 1,500 yards, the bullets rise with less velocity, yet they rise at proportionately greater angles (as the angle of drop is greater), and this causes a somewhat uniform distance to bo maintained. Beyond 1,500 yards the lengtli of tlu^ iirst ricochet decreases, because the relative pro- portion between the velocity and angle of rise diminishes. A slight considi'iation will show tliat a fire which meets 1lu' ground at a small angle is favourable for ricodiet, while a dropping lire is not. i'ruiu Taljle I., on page 9, wo s(!e that the striking velocity of a bullet is least at 2,()00 yards, and that it in- creases after that. The reason of this is that the effect of the attraction of the earth on the bullet, which is making it to drop more and more vertically and rapidly every moment, is gi-eater than the olfoct of the resistance of the air. Now the penetration at 2,r)()0 yards will disable men, and therefore it wiU do so at longer j-anges ns well. Thus at the extreme 15 range of the rifle the bullet still retains sufficient striking- energy to cause effective ricochets on reverse slopes with suit- able fall. The penetration of the ricochets of the Martini-Heni'y buUets has been found to be remarkable, even at the long ranges of 2,500 and 2,800 yards, for some of them passed through a f -inch spruce board. All this shows that the bulk of ricochets are effective, and the Siege Operations Committee found that, on the targets fired at, one-fifth of the hits were ricochets, a very important proportion. Taking only the rising part of their flight after impact, the whole dangerous zone of musketry fire at any given range on a favourable surface may, as far as ricochets occur, be considered as one -half greater than the direct dangerous zone alone, exclusive of any effect due to the sub- sequent droj). For the effect of the slope and nature of ground on ricochets see pages 205, 206. XoTE. — (See page 9). Approximate formula for the theoretical dangerous space of the mean trajectory for infantry (Qfeet high J, for ranges over 400 yards. Dangerous space in yards for infantry, 6 feet high, 56,000 Range = + 31 Range 200 where the range is expressed in yards. The dangerous space for cavalry fS feet high) for ranges of bOO yards and over, are about one-third gi'eater than those for infantry. 17 OHAPTEE irr. INDIVIDUAL FIRE.— ITS INACCURACY. By individual fire is meant an independent fire, in which each rifle is directed on a different object, the range and elevation being either judged by the soldior himself rn* given him personally by his leaders. Experiment shows, and theory, as we shall see, confirms it, that, however good a shot a man may be, his bullets will never strike on the same spot, even when the same point is aimed at each time with the same elevation, Tnit they will fall over a considerable surface^' whose length in the direction of the fire is much greater than the breadth at right angles to it. This can only be due to involuntary "errors" being- made both in elevation and direction at the instant of firing ; and from the elongated surface over which the bullets strike, we conclude that, in shooting, any errors made in elevation tell niore than the same errors made sideways or in direction. These errors arise from a variety of causes to be now explained, and they show more and more as the number of men firing increases, because it is quite improbable that each man will bring his rifle to the shoulder, aim, and pull the trigger in the same way, or have adjusted his backsight to exactly the same height by such insensitive means (though the only ones possible in the field), as his forefinger and thumb, or to have used the same amount of foresight in aiming, as the others. The causes of irregidarity, or of errors, in the firing of a rifle, may be classified under seven different headings, some of which apply both to firing in the field and at targets on measured ranges, and others only to the latter case. The causes of error are as foUows : — 1. Those due to an imperfect determination of the exact range. 2. Those due to imperfections in tlic soldier. •'5. Those due to imperfections in the rifle. ■1. Those due to imperfections in the ammunition. 5. Those due to changes in atmospheric conditions. 6. Those due the method of executing the fire. 7. Those due to the duration of the fire. * The word surface is used in preference to area as convej-ing more to tht? immathematical mind. 18 Most of these causes inaj- bo further sub-cliviclccl into constant and variable causes. The constant causes of error deflect the fire without necessarily altering the accuracy of it, that is, they will produce a " concentration" or "good gi-oup- ing" of hits, but away from the point aimed at, and they only require the soldier to make suitable corrections in aiming to place his shots around the point to be hit. The variable causes of error are those which vary with each shot and ju-oduce a " dispersion " or " bad grouping " of hits ; they are as a rule due to the bad or irregular manufacture or preservation of the ammunition, to want of the skill in the firer, to adverse and inconstant atmospheric conditions (such as gusts of wind, great cold which numbs the soldier, cloudy weather, an obscure or badly lit up mark, etc., which render accurate aiming impossible), and to other accidental or temporary causes such as a heated barrel which burns the hamls, the trembling caused by fatigue or long continuous tii'ing, etc. However, to thoroughly understand what we are dealing with, it is necessary to enter more fidly on these points as we shall now do. 1. Effect ox the Shootixg of Not Ivxowing the EjVnges Exactly. I'^or accurate Hhooting at all didances, the ranyc must he accurately known ; this is an impossible condition in the field, for it can only be approximately ascertained, even with the aid of instruments called ranye-finderK, which under the most favorable • 'ircumstances and with traiiU'd lucu, are only nblo tn road to a percentage of the truth. 2'o hit an ohject, almost evcri/(hin eye, by the use of range-finders, or from any artillery in position near at hand, for artillery can easily find t}u> range by watching the burst of their shells when they strike the ground, or by any other means. It is saifl that tin; service jiuttern rangtr-finder, called the " Wntkin .l\*ange-finder," can iindarange to within 2p.c, of the truth A\ ith ]ira('tised mew, and under favourable conditions, but 19 as it is rather a complicated instruniont to use, few men can work it with such accuracy, and in the field the conditions for a favorable use of it rarely occur. A simpler instrument, even if less accurate, is a great desideratum, especially as the requirements of the "Watkin Eange-finder " hardly renders its use applicable for infantry under fire, even at medium ranges, though it may be so for artillery who fight at longer distances ; besides which, most men fijid it hard to learn and easy to forget. If we have no range-finder, or cannot get the range from the artillery, then we have to guess the distance, which is the ver}' worst way of ascertaining it. In tliis case, the efficacy of the fire must be somewhat hap-hazard, and no exact, but only broad rides (which, besides other information, it is the object of this work to give), can be formed for making the chance of hitting the object fired at, a maximum. For a full description of the means of ascertaining ranges, we must refer the reader to Chapter VIII. on Eange-fijiding. 2. Effect ox the Shooting of Imperfections in the Soldier. As rifles are weapons whose value only depends on the skill of those using them, the imperfections in the soldier are, perhaps, the greatest cause of error in shooting. Two good shots, even when aiming at the same sj)ot, with the same elevation, and with the same rifie, will make different shooting, because they hold the rifle to the shoidder cliff erentl}', support it differently, see the backsight more or less clearly, use more or less of the foresight in aiming, pull off the trigger dift'erently, &c. -V great deal depends on the eyesight and on being able to see clearly the sights and the objects aimed at. Any obscuration fi'om smoke, haze, etc., or imperfect defijiition of the object aimed at, affects the aim. For accurate shooting the object fired at must be clearly seen ; this condition is affected by the range, the size and colour of the object, the nature and colour of the background, and the firer's ej-esight, &c., and in firing at men or horses at long ranges, one gi'eat difficidty of accurate shooting is that the apparent minuteness of the object fired at, as comjjared with the tip of the foresight, gives no definite point to aim at, and thus a man does not really know whether he is aiming a few feet too high or low, or to the right or to the left, and stiU less whether he is aiming at the centre of the object. Exact aiming at small •20 objects at long- ranges? is thereforf iiupossjiblo, and with an ordinary background (not a sky-line) cavalry cannot be distin- guished from infantiy by the eye alone over 1,400 yards. Thus at long ranges only large bodies of troops in close order f omiations, presenting a large mark, should be fii-ed at ; but noAV-a-days troops are not hkely to expose themselves in such a "way. As a rule in action all that men have to aim at is a bank or puff of smoke, which gives a very indefinite object, and the smoke arising from a large number of men, fii-ing independently, is often so great as to completely prevent them seeing through it, while in any case it would greatly affect the aim and the accuracy of the fire, both by obscuring the view and by getting into the eyes and making them smart.* As the range increases, a greater elevation of the backsight has to be used, which causes greater difficulty in aiming irom the position of the lirer being more strained, aud from its being more difficult to know if the sights are upright. A backsight, graduated for more than 1.400 yards is of little value with the rifles and ammunition at present in use, as a man's neck is not long enough to tise it. The jjosition of the eye with reference to the backsight, affects the amount of foresight used. A line of sight, taken on a target with the eye 2 or ;5 inches from the backsight, will l)robably appear off tlie target if the head could be drawn back without moving the rifle. The firer must, therefore, get accustomed to always hold his head in one jiosition so as always to ensure, as far as possible, using the same amount of foresight, but in different lights th(,> same man will use different amounts of foresight, using more as tho light is duller, because he cannot see the foresight si) plainly. The effect of this is to give greater elevation and cause the bullet to go further than it should. C)n a liner day than usual the opl)osite occurs. A man's eyesight and general steadiness are greatly affected by his state of liealth, and by what he has been eating ami drinking. Hence, from this reason alone, a man's shooting will differ fiom day to day, evi-n sujjjuising that lio uses the same rifle, and all other coiulitioiis aic the sam(>. The backsight of the Martini-TIeniy rille is graduated ftn- use wifli a fiuf foresight. This is all very well for match tiring, but in tlie excitement of action, when men are fatigued witli marcliing. brcMtliless with rapid moving, or when firing at ol»jects wliifli .ire only seen for n few moments, it is • 'I'hi.'* in jiiirti' ui.iily tlic lhs<; with chemical jtowtloiH, .such aa tho E V. 21 impossible, even if the men aim at all, to use a tine foresight, and hence a full foresight is invariably made use of, which causes the fii-e of the Martini-Henry rifle to go high. The height of the foresight is 0-12 inches and its distance from the backsight, when the latter is down, is 24-55 inches, and when the backsight is up, 26-50 inches ; hence when the backsight is down the foresight subtends an angle of 16-80 minutes of are, and when the backsight is up, an angle of 15-58 minutes of arc. Hence if we suppose an error of 15 minutes of elevation to be caused by the use of what is known as "a fidl foresight," we find that, at the different ranges given below, it woidd cause the bullet to strike the number of feet, given in the following table, higher than it shoidd at the different distances stated from the muzzle of the rifle. These numbers only refer to the size of foresight given and the stated distance between the fore and back sights. For any other height of foresight or distance apart of the sights, the following table would not be correct. T.A.BIjE II. Kange in Yards. I Approximate rise of the bullet in feet, due to using a full Foresight i equivalent to 15 m. of arc, with the Martini-Henry rifle. At 100 yds. At 200 yds. At I At At I At 300 yds. 400 yds. 500 yds. 600 yds, At 700 yds. At 800 yds 100 '200 ;juo ■100 500-^ ()00 700 800 1-47 1-34 2-87 1-23 2-61 1-00 2-07 M7 1-16 1-14 1-09 2-50 2-49 3-92 2-45 2-32 4-12 3-27 3-93 3-86 3-65 4*55 I — 5-47 5-44 5-36 5-07 7-08 7-06 6-95 6-56 8-80 8-67 8-19 10-45 9-89111-65 Remark.— This table also .shows the effect of using too much foresiglit wit)i iliti Mai-tini-Henry rifle. If one-tentli of the foresight was u.sed, instead of a fine siglit, the error would be about one-tenth of the above figures.— (See also Footnote on p. 23). * The reason why the figures in this table increase again after the 400 yards range, is because the position of the backsight with reference to the foresight has been altered. 22 The approximate alteration in range, due to using- a full Foresight, equivalent to 15 m. of arc, with the Martmi-Henry rifle is as follows :— 100 yds range increased to 225 yds. 600 yds. range increased to 680 yds. 200 ,, ., 315 „ 700 „ „ ,. ., 775 „ 300 ,, ., 400 ,, 800 ,, ,, .. .. 870 „ ■100 ,, ,, 490 ,, 900 ,, ,, ., „ 965 „ 500 ,. ,, 585 ,, 1000 ,, ., ., ,.1060 ,, From Talile II. we see that iu lii'iug the Martini-Henry rifle with a full foresight, it makes a difference of ahoiit half the height of a man at 250 yards, and the whole height of a man at 450 yards, showing the necessity of graduating the backsight for a fidl foresight, such as the men woidd use in the field. The use of a fine foresight is quite impracticable for war purposes.* The Americans, who of all nations have perhaps paid most attention to the science of accurate individual shooting, say in their musketry regulations, "great care must be taken . that the amount of front sight taken is the same as that usually seen hy the soldier,'''' but as slight changes in this latter particidar produce considerable effect on the target, consequently, " at the short and mid-rangcs.f a halfsight " shoiild generally be taken ; at the longer ranges, " especially if the light is bad, it may bo better to take " full siglit." There is no mention here even of a fine sight for accurate target sliooting, but as in tlie fi(>l(l, simplicity sliould be aimed at in all cases, it wi)uld be better to always use a full foresight and to train men to its use in peace time. The difference in using a line full fore.sight is like the difference in rimdiiig small and large }»rint, this difference is more appreciably felt in movcts by the grooves in the barrel, causes it to drift to the right for i-easons wliieli ciinnot b(' gone into here; the amount of this drift for the Martini-TIt'nry bnllet at different ranges is given in Table J. on pa;::*! U, and we see that it increases more rapidly 29 than the range.* The diift for a given range is sometimes (corrected by the position of the notch of the backsight ; the .300 yards range was the one chosen for the first pattern of the Martini-Henry rifie, and thus, from this cause alone, for ranges under this distance, the bullet tended to go rather to the left of the point aimed at, and at greater ranges to the right. But this correction of the drift for a particidar range, causes a displacement of the backsight, making it no longer vertically over the axis of the barrel, and makes the sighting, from that cause alone, vary for all other ranges. In the last pattern of the Martini-Henry rifle, this correction of the drift for a given range has given place to another method. The backsight bed is now soldered on to the barrel in such a position that when the leaf is raised, it is inclined to the left 1'^ G' with the vertical line through the axis of the bore. This inclination is intended to correct the permanent deflection due to the rifling, but it does not do so altogether. It gives only a more approximate correction than the method given above, but does not altogether ehminate the effects of drift, and hence, many of the observations already made still apply, but with less force. f * Those amounts appear to be incoiTect, when compared witlf the ilrift of the rifles of other nations. Thus taking the American and French rifles, m"c have — For the American rifle ; Ranges, in }-ards Drift, in feet 100 200 300 400 500 0.095 0.11010.23310.417 0.796 600 1.311 700 i 800 900 1 j i j 2.20313.110 4.085 1,000 5.166 For the French Eifle : Range, in metres.. 1, OOOjl, 100,1,200 1,300 1,400 1,.500|1, 600 1,700 1,800 Drift, in feet 6i I 9J I 13 16i 221 291 39 48.?- 60 1 metre being equal to nearly l-|',f yants. Tlie drift of the English rifle is not likely to be so very much larger than those of either of the above rifles, as stated. t 'ITie only means of accurately correcting the drift with the backsight, is for tlie notch of the backsight to move sideways by means of the slide, carrying the notch, working in a suitable groove cut in the leaf of the backsight. Such a method would seem an improvement on the present one. It is used in the American and Belgian rifles. The tciuperatiiro of the rilie ali'ects the shooting con- siderably. Metal expands with heat and contracts -with cold, and the effect of the barrel becoming' hot liy prolonged continuous firing is to expand the metal inside as well as outside, and therefore to increase the size of the bore. As the bore expands the sectional area of the bullet (wliich is made to fit the barrel by being " set up " with the blow given it by the sudden conversion of the powder charge into gas), is increased, and tlierefore the retardation Avhich it suffers. Hence no two shots can be fired under tlie same conditions. After each shot the powder leaves in the barrel a variable fj^uantity (of about six-tenths of the original .charge) of solid moist residue of a black colour, called the fouJiug. After a short time this residue collects so much, especially in the grooves, as to serioush* affect the fire ; for this reason the grooves should be as shallow as possible. Tlie smaller the calibre the greater is the chance of this evil, because the quantity of fouling for the same amount of charge remains the same while it is spread over a sriialler surface. As the barrel gets hotter, the fouling dries and cakes, and thus tlie bidlet, in forcing its way out through the barrel, meets with gi'eater resistance, gi^ang a smalhn* muzzle velocity and, therefore, a greater curvature of the trajectory for a given range, and consequently an increase of ehnation will be required. On a liot day this incr(\ase is generally necessary, even so soon as after tlie secoiul or third shot. If the bore be allowed to become rusty'^' the resistance to the passage of tlu^ bullet will be increased, its proper expan- sion will be prevented, its rotation impaired, and it will leave the liarrel with a reduced muzzle velocity. The amount of jn-essure reciuired to release the trigger in firing is called the " pull oil," and should be between 6 and 8 Ib.s. The greater it is the more it will cause the hand of the firer to tremble. A G lbs. pull off is considered the smallest amount compatible with the rough usage which a military rifle has to undergo. If the bore is not symmetrical with the exterior, the want of uniformity in the distribution of the metal of the barrel will be a source of error by causing an irregularity in the heating and ex])ansi()n of the metal, and in the wave of metal liuised by the passage of the bullet, rermanent ])rojections swax has also lieen found to f^'ivc better results than the ])nre wax wad. Th(! new wad for Die Knfield-Marlini rille is ,1-inch thick, consisliiif^ of i inch of liard cardboard next tlio jwwder, and ]^ inch of beeswax next the bullet. T Tlie advantages of th<' solid-ilrawn cartridge has at length been 35 the chamber, and, therefore, alter the amount of force lost in exj^anding- it ; this results iu diminishing, to a greater or less extent, the velocity of the bullet. Upon the interior diameter and upon the length of the cartridge case depend the amount of compression wliich the powder receives ; this and the degree of crimp to the case around the bidlet, also affect the initial velocity. The Government powder in the Martini-Henry cai'tridges (principally from the varying size of the grains, the density, and the quantities of dust powder in the charges) gives a muzzle velocity varjdng between 1,240 and 1,340 f.s., and hence imiformity of lii-e cannot ever be expected, nor can the graduations of the backsight be even looked on as more than mere approximate guides. The advantage of a high muzzle velocity is that for a given bullet it requires a less elevation for a given range, from giving a flatter trajectory and therefore greater dangerous zones, so that a high muzzle velocity is one cause of efficiency of fu-e which shoidd be aimed at, especially at short ranges, though other causes, such as the weight and shape of the bidlet also influence the question. Another advantage of a high muzzle velocity is that it gives a greater striking velocity. The striking energy of a bidlet depends on its weight and on the square of the velocity with which it strikes. As the weight of the bullet practically remains constant, its striking energy, which governs its power t)f penetration, depends on the striking velocity squared. The deviatory causes in shooting, extraneous to the rifle and ammunition, have greater effect and cause greater errors as the muzzle velocity decreases. The amoimt of folding left in the barrel after each shot depends on the materials of the cartridge and on the perfection of the manufacture of the powder. Inferior powder («.£■., powder of low density, with much damp in it, etc.), causes an anioiuit of fouling which very soon reduces the accuracy of the fire. recognised in England, though it has long been used abroad. It is to be the cartridge for our future armament. Being air-tight, it preserves the powder charge better from moisture ; it does not require such heavy ammunition boxes as the present ones, as it is harder to damage ; it can be refilled manj' times by hand machines ; and it is the only kind of cartridge that can be used with machine guns. When the solid drawn cartridge is introduced, it is to be used with infantry rifles, cavalry car- bines, and machme guns,^ — the carbine being altered to suit it, — so as to have only one kind of ammunition in the field, — a most important point. c 2 36 5. Effect ox the Shootixg of Ch.sjs^ges in Atmospheric coxditioxs.* The backsight of the Martini-Heniy rifle is theoretically supposed to be graduated for the particidar temperature of 62'^ Fahr., a barometric pressure of 30 inches, for such a state of air in "svhich one cubic foot of air. weighs 534-22 grains, and when the force of gravity is equal to 32-1908. If the temperature of the air increases or decreases, the density of the air is respectively diminished or increased, and hence the graduations on the backsight will be respectively too high or too low, that is, while using the same elevation, the range will be increased or decreased respectively, the other conditions remaining the same. If the barometer rises or falls, the other conditions remain- ing constant, it means that the air is more or less dense respectively, and the graduation will be too low or too high, i.e., the range will decrease or increase with the same elevation. The state of tho atmosphere is a very important point as regards the elevation to be used, fine days often requiring as much as -/trth of an inch higher elevation than damp days for exactly the same range. The reason of this is that on wet days, the barometer is low and the humidity of the air {i.e. the water vapour in the air) by its elastic force, fiu'ther diminishes the density and resistance of the air, and so increases the range for the same elevation. The state of the atmosphere also affects the powder charge, causing the same elevation to give different ranges in summer and winter. Taking the average of one year only, it was found at the Uoyal Laboratory that the mean muzzle velocity of the Martini-Henry ritlo from April to September was 1,323 f.s., while from October to March it was onlj' 1,300 f.s., this difference was principally due to the different states of dryness of the powder. For this reason solid drawn cartridges are better than the rolled ones, as they keep out the damp better. Kain and snow increas(> the density of the air and produce an opposite residt to liumidity. The higher we arc* aliove the mean sea level the loss dense is the air nnd the less powerfid is gravity, f and the elevation • See also Appcndi-x I. t For pointH above the earth's fiurfacc, the force of gravity varies approximatelv inversely as the square of the distance from the centre of the earth, 'fhe force of gravity also alters with the latitude, being greatest at the poles and least at the equator. 37 lias to be largely reduced for a given range. Tkis is well- kiiowu in the hills of India. The rate of ignition of the powder too is affected by the less pressure of air, the higher we go the slower is the burning, which rec[uires an increase of the elevation for a given range. On a hot dry day the fouling di'ies rapidly in the bore and increases the resistance, reducing the muzzle velocity and range, and hence necessitating a higher elevation than on a damp day when the folding is moist, which, then acting as a lubricant, reduces the resistance to the bidlet in its passage through the bai-rel. As the temperature of the air increases, the general effect is, as a rule, to increase the absolute amount of moisture in the air, and therefore, for the reasons given above, to increase the velocity. Increase of temperature also increases the muzzle velocity, in that less of the work of the powder gas is absorbed in heating the barrel, and a greater amount is available for its effect upon the bullet. This will produce, in cold weather a considerable variation between the earher and later rounds tiri'd, which in warmer weather is not so noticeable. For all these reasons, we see that the graduations on the backsight can only be approximate guides. A glare in the eyes from the reflection of the siui off the ground, waviness caused by heated vapour rising from the ground, smoke, fogs, mists, etc., all interfere with the shooting. Intense cold too prevents the rifle being properly used. Dust and powder smoke being driven into the eyes, or a strong wind blowing into the firer's face, which might happen on ser\-ice, is another cause of error in shooting. The motion caused to the air immediately surrounding a barrel heated by much firing, often makes the object aimed at appear indefinite, and so affects the shooting. The effect of clouds or bright simshine is often considerable. On bright hot days there is greater probability of local currents, produced b}^ the differently heated ground, which may cause unaccountable deflections. On these days also there is a possibility of portions of the range being in shade : that particular ground will therefore be cooler, and eonst- quently the adjacent air, being of greater density, will offer increased resistance to the bullet. Under these conditions there is greater probability of inaccurate shooting, When the day is overcast, the light being of a dull grey, and evenly diffused, it is more likely that the air over the 38 whole range "will "be of a uniform temperature and free from local eddies. Suck "weatlier ib the must favourable for accu- rate practice. When the light is alternately bright and then shaded by clouds, the difficulties confronting the firer are much increased. These changes of light, besides affecting the conditions -which cause a deflection of the bullet, also have a considerable influence uj)on the manner of aiming. Changes in the brightness of the light seem to affect the aiming of different men in various ways ; suggestions which might prove of value in many cases might therefore prove erroneous in others. It is, however, generally found that when the sun is shining from the left it lightens up the left side of the foresight and the right side of the notih of the backsight ; the ri'sult is that in taking aim, one is apt to be guided by those brilliant spots instead of the real centres of the sights, and tlie axis will be directed to the right ; while on the other hand, when the sun is on the right, we shall be liable in aiming to direct the axis to the left. Blackening the sight is the only means of preventing the possibility of any error arising from this cause. When the sun shines both on the sights and on the object, the fine point of the foresight is very distinctl}' seen, and con- sequently a little more elevation is required than on a dull day, when owing to the foresight being less clearly defined, more of it is imconsciously taken up into the alignments. This error is less liable to occiu- when a full foresight is used than for a fine foresight. Up to this point we have not referred to wind. But there is hardly a day without a certain amount of wind, and BO we must cimsider its ellects. According to the direction of the wind as regards the direction in which the soldier is firing, it is called a side, a back, or a head wind. Wind, which is air in motion, will, by its pressure, affect the progress of the bullet, driving it to the left of the line of fire if blowing from the riglit and rice versa. The eifect of a constant side wind, giving a constant side pressure, is to make the bidlet move sideways in its course in a more rapid ratio than the range (see Tablo 1.), and th(>refore in a liorizontal curve (of much the sanu^ nature as the vertical curve of the trajectory, though much less bent) and not in a draiyldlinc, for exactly tlie same reason as the vertical trajectory is a cui've — the constant pressure of the wind replacing the constant force of trravitA'. 39 If the wind is blowing from the front, it will add to the resistance, and conset|uentIy decrease the range of the bullet ; and if from the rear, by diminishing the resistance, it will enable the bullet to fly f ui'ther. As no fixed rules can be laid down to guide the soldier as to the amount of allowance he shoidd make for the wind, he must gain experience by his practice, noticing how much it is necessary under different conditions to direct his line of fire to that side from which the wind is blowing when dealing with a side wind, only gi\4ng his rifle a little more or less elevation when dealing with a wind from the front or rear; always taking into consideration three things, the strength and direction of the ivind, and the distancn of the object at which he isffing, since on the latter will depend the length of time the wind will have to act. He should notice, if possible, where the greater number of his shots strike, and make more or less allowance, as he fuids it necessary ; and he should bear in mind that the effect of a wind from the front or rear is much less than that of a side wind, which acts on a larger surface of the bullet ; and also that the effect of a wind from the front is greater than that of a wind from the rear. Further, if a considerable dip exists between the firing point and the objective, the force of the wind over the dip will be greater than if the dip did not exist. A strong wind also increases the density of the air, and therefore its resistance, and hence when a strong wind is blowing, and a great deal of wind-gauge is necessary, a little extra elevation is generally required. No satisfactory deviations due to wind have been made t)ut for the EngHsh rifle and ammunition, but the French regula- tions say that for the same range the deviations are proportional to the strength (or velocity') of the wind, and thus thej' only give the deviations (laterally and in range) for a wind moving with a velocity of a metre (3-28 feet) a second, i.e., for a light air. The deviations for am' othei velocity are found by multiptying the given de^dations by the velocit}^ of the wind in metres per second, the velocity being jueasured, not in the direction of the wind, but at right angles and jjarallel to the direction of the fii-e. The following table gives the lateral deviations of the French bullet under a side wind moA-ing with a velocity of 1 metre per second ; with a head or rear wind of the same velocity, the deviations in range are said to be 3 times the lateral ones with a side wind. 40 T-AuBLE I^^. i;aiv-'e. Lateral deviation. l{ange. LatL-ral delation. Kange. Lateral deviation. Kange. Lateral deviation. metres metres metres metres metres metres metres metres 100 0-02 600 0-72 1100 2-42 1600 5-12 200 0-08 700 0-98 1200 2-88 1700 0-78 300 0-18 890 1-28 1300 3-38 ISOO C-48 400 0-32 900 1-62 1400 3-92 500 O-oO 1000 2-00 loOO 4-o0 For any olhor direction of the wind tlian at right angles or ])arallel to the line of fire, the figures in the tables must be multiplied by the sine of the angle of iiu-idenoe of the wind ; the alteration in range will be found by multiplying them by 3 times the cosine of the angle of incidence. These figures and calculations show that the allowance for wind in the field can only be guess work. There is one method of making allowance for a side wind at all ranges, namely, by directing the line of sight to the right or left of the object as the case may be. In this method in order to get the correct elevation, which would not be ensured if aim Avere not first taken on the object, the soldier must first align the sights on it in the ordinary way, aiul then without pausing or dwelhng on the aim, move the rifle sideways in the direction and to tlu^ extent riHjuired. There is a second metliod of allowing for tlie wind ])y means of a wind-iiaitfie, wliich is a horizontal scale marked on the slide of the ])a\ / .,^4^ . ^ /r/T 1 ^A 'T - \.. 1\ .'\. 1 1 1 1 »- 0-- - 3-^ " . . • - / - 1 . wt- ' 1 Vr^jin, '^ jL 1 ~1~ _\ T^^ ^- Fig. 1. 'I'ho vertical i^ionping of a sorics of shots. (- ,.- liadius of the circle enclosing the hcsfl lialf of the hits j u li Kadi us of the circle enclosing all the vertical deviations (' (• Ivadius of the circle enclosing all tliv lionzontal deviations J Some ahnormal hits not included. Fig. 2. 'I'lic liori/.ontal i;ic)tn)in;': nf a srriis "f shut--. TlnTc results iroiii i1m' jiIiovi-, that \vi' raiuiot liro along an isdliitrd ti'iijcetory, and as tlicro is no reason wliy the causes wliich inniii'n('(! the fli}:^lit of aju'ojcctiU'shouhl not act ns much iu one dii-cction as in tin- op]>o8ito one, avIumi a ]nri^ and is thiif whieh each projectile would liii\o followed, if the causes which niodiiied its iiioveTneiil li.'ifl iii.t existed. Tlie ilill'ereuees liefwfvn the reol 47 iiud tlitj uioau trujuctoi'it's arc called tlic i-rrorfi of tke prujcc-- tiles, these eri'ors being due to the causes already enumerated. If we conceive the range divided into a certain number of parts, then the ordinates--" of the mean trajectory at the points of division, will be the mean of all the ordinates of the tra- jectories of the bullets fired, at the same points of division. This mean trajectory is the one that all calcidations and data are usually referred to, and it is the trajectory worked out by Bashf orth's Tables. Table I. on pp. 8 and 9 refers only to the mean trajectories of the different ranges. If we look at the manner in which the hits are grouped on a vertical or on a horizontal target, they appear at first to be very irregularly distributed, and apparently without law, but as the number of hits are increased, we shall see, on a closer study, that roimd a certain point which marks the mean trajec- tory, the shots are nearer one another than in the other parts of the target. This point is found to have the following properties : — If we suppose a number of lines drawn at equal distances apart, and parallel to any line drawn thi'ough the central point of the group of shots, then the zones which are eqiii- distant from the central line, will each contain the same nirmber of hits, showing therefore, that the chances of error are the same on either side. Also the number of hits in the successive zones of the same width diminisli according as the zones are more distant from the central line. Thus the dispersion of the shots on a target is far from being arbitrary-, but always follows a certain law, which allows us to draw up tables of accuracy, by which we can classify different arms in order of merit, supposing that they are fired imder the same normal external conditions. The construction of these tables residts from certain defini- tions and methods of measuring the errors, which are given in "Section 3. Testing rifies and ammunition," on p. 211 of the Musketry Eegidations of 1887, and to which we must now ask the reader to refer before proceeding fiirther. However, in the following pages we shall use the word "error" instead of " de%'iation," as conve}'ing more to the mind. The point where an}- bidlet strikes a vertical or horizontal target, is called its 2^oint of impact and tlie point where * The ordinate of any point in a trajectory is its height above the line of sight, measured in a direction at right angles to this latter. 48 the rneau trajectory Avould strike the same target, (i.e., the central point of the group of Iiits,) is called the point of mean impact. The ahove errors (obtained either by direct measurement on the target, or from a diagram of the shooting, plotted to scale) permit us to appreciate the value of a fire, as regards accui'acy alone. From them wo can calculate the position of the point of mean impact of the mean trajectory on the target, and therefore its position with respect to the point aimed at. The accuracy of a rifle at any given range may he defined as the probability it gives of striking an object of given dimensions at that range. It depends both on the position of the point of mean impact with regard to the point aimed at, and of the manner in which the shots are grouped around this point of mean impact. The value of a rifie is greater for a given distance, accord- ing as the point of mean impact of the sliots iired at this distance is nearer to the ]>oint aimed at, and as the shots arc more concentrated round the point of mean impact. This method of judging the accuracy of the fire of a rifle witli respect to the point of mean imjiact, requires that diagi'ams of groups of shots should be made for each distance. If the target is prepared in small (3 to 6 inch) scpiares, then we can mark on a diagram of the target (drawn to a smaller scale on paper) the position of each hit, and the errors can then lie measured to scale. The absolute errors can be measured directly from the scale or by eye after describing concentric circles, whose 7-adii vary by the length of the side; of a s(piar<\ The vahie of the mean absolute error, however, which, with a well finished rifle, allows us to judge of the skill of a firer, cannot be considered as the exact measure of tlie accuracy of the weapon. It frcijuently liappens that the sliots are grouped quite away from the point aimed at. If the elevation em])loyed is too low, the sIkjIs group themselves luuler the point aimed at ; it' the lin(! of sight is not in the plane of fire, tlu'V group to the right or left as tlu; case may be ; if the wind l)lows from one side all the sliots are thrown to the oppositi; direction. "Whrn thes(> diifcrent causes act together, the grouping may })(' carried to u considerablo distanci' from th(> point aimed at. The absolute error of each shot, with regard to this point, becomes then very considerabh", and the mean absolute error reaches a value which might indicate a bad fire. The hits, however, can be well groujied, and in tliis case the weapon 49 should be considered accurate, and all that would be required to cause a really efficacious fire, as regards accuxacj', is to neutralize the causes which have made the mass of the shots strike so far from the point aimed at. A kno-«dedge of the position of the point of mean impact, thus gives us the following information : — 1. We know how much and in what direction to allow in aiming to correct the fire, so as to strike the point aimed at. 2. We can see whether the fire is affected most in a vertical or in a horizontal direction at any given distance. 3. A comj^arison of the positions of the points of mean impact at different distances, enables us to distinguish if the causes of deviation are permanent or temporary ones. Let us suppose, for example, that after having regidated the sights in the morning, we fire vrith the same sights again in the afternoon to test them, and find that all tlie shots strike higher, then we must conclude that either the density of the air has diminished, the weather having changed ; or that the powder is not the same, or the charges are greater ; or that a wind has been blowing from the rear which did not exist in the morning ; or that the light has changed and tlie fii-er has used more foresight than in the morning. All these cir- cumstances can be verified, however, by weighing the charges, examining the powder, comparing the meteorological reports, &c., relative to the two trials. If the means of the horizontal errors have altered, and if they vary irregularly according to the distance, we can conclude that the causes of de^-iation have themselves varied, that they have acted in an accidental or temporary manner, and tliat they are not inherent in the weapon. For example, a squally wind, pei*pendicidar to the plane of fii'e and changing direction. If the means of the horizontal errors vary always in the same direction and in a progressive manner with the distance, the cause can only be attz'ibuted to the weapon or to the fii-ei-. It is either due to di-ift or to a constant error in the aiming. If the variations of the mean horizontal errors in the sainc direction do not increase with the distances, they can only In- attributed to an exterior cause, such as a wind blowing laterally and in an imequal manner during the duration of the fire. Hence we see why the position of the point of mean impact with respect to the point aimed at, gives a very imperfect idea of tlic accmacy of the rifle, as the position of the point of mean impact can remain the same with very different grouping's round tliis point. The mean ahsolute error with respect to the point aimed at, measures the triteness of the rifle or the correctness of the fire. According- as the whole grouping, whether it he dispersed, or concentrated, is more or less distant from the point aimed at, the rifle is said to be imtrue, or true, or the fire is said to be badly or well corrected. The dispersion or concentration of the shots icith respect to one another is the best measure either of the accuracy of the aim, or of the skill of the fir cr when the iceapon used is hioioi to he true. e • ••• Fig. 'Jlius let UK cuiisidfr htur groupings, A, B, C, D (Fig. .3) obtained by a good flrcr with four dilTcrent rifles under the same external coiulitions wliib' aiming at tlie point P; the weapons wliidi give Ihe groups ]i and D are less accurate than lliose wliicli give the grou])s A and C: those whicli give llie gi'()U])s A ami I?, nvc truer than those whicli give thi^ groujis (' and J) ; ami finally the rifle whicli gave the groiip I) is neither accurate nor true. In this case the accuracy of the dilb rent rifles depends on Ili(* perfection of their manufacture, and on that of tlie ammu- nition, while the trueuess of ench rifle depends on a good 51 disposition of the sighting apparatus {i.e., the back and foresights). Now let us suppose that these foiu- groups have heeu obtained from the same weapon (an accurate one) by four different fii-ers imder the same external conditions ; the fii'e of the two men who made the groups A and B are the best corrected, and that of the two men who made the groups A and C are the most accurate. The fire C is accm-ate but it is not corrected ; the fire B is true but it is not accurate ; the fire D is neither accm-ate nor correct. In tliis case the acciu'acy of the fire depends on the manner in which the firer directs his aim, keeps it in the direction, and pulls the trigger ; while the trueness of the fii'e depends on how the corrections have been made, that are necessarj' to carry out in the aiming, more or less to the right or left, and above or below the object. A rifle is therefore only good when it is hath accurate and true, and a firer is only skilful when he is able to groiqj his shots well and to direct this grouj) on the ohject to he hit. The accuracy and trueness of a rifle must be assured by its manufacture and by that of its ammunition, in order that we may have as absolute quantities as possible to deal with and the soldier have con- fidence in his weapon. Now since the manner in which a rifle groups its shots is the measure of its accuracy, it is very necessary, in deter- mining the accuracy of a rifle, to ehminate the effect of the accidental causes which make the projectile deviate from the point aimed at, and therefore for this purpose we must take the mean absolute error with respect to the centre of the group round which point all the shots are distributed. The mean absolute error, taken with respect to the point of mean impact, gives a relatively more correct idea of tlie accuracy, than the mean absolute error taken with respect to the point aimed at ; this is easily seen from Fig. 3, by examining the gi-oups C and D, of which C is more concentrated than D, though it is fiu'ther from the point aimed at. If we consider the error of the two groups with respect to P, the point aimed at, the error of group C will be greater than the error of group D, notwithstanding that the rifle which gave tlio group C is more accurate than that which gave the group D. The mean absolute error for any range with reference to the point of mean impact, is called in England the "figure of merit " for the given range, and it is the method of comparison D 2 52 used in England for tlie firo of different rillcs. The actual liorizontal and vertical errors have not been hitherto considered in the English service in estimating the comparative accuracy of tvro or more rifles, though, as we shall see, thev are of the highest importance in considering the question of individual fire in the field. The tvro columns, 2 and 3 in Table V., giving the radii of the circles wliich enclose all the vertical and all the horizontal <'rrors, have been calculated (for -want of practical in- formation regarding them) projtortionally to certain statistics given in the Gennan ^Eusketry Regulations for the ^Mauser rifle.* This method of doing so is not mathematically correct, but it is sufficiently near the truth for comparative work ; the necessary data have not been obtainable to get more accurate figiu*es. Before finding these errors, the Germans deduct a certain percentage of hits, varjing with the range, for abnormal shots; these percentages are as follows: at 100 m., 1 p.c. ; at 150 m., 2 ; at 200 ra., 3 ; at 250 m., 4 ; at 300 m., 5 ; at 350 m., 6 ; at 400 m., 7 ; at 500 m., 8 ; at 600 m., 9 ; at 700 m., 10; at 800 m., 11; at 900 m., 12; at 1,000 m., 13; at 1,100 m., 14 ; at 1,200 m., 15 ; at 1,300 m., 16 ; at 1,400 m., 17 ; at 1,500 m., 18 ; and at 1,600 m., 19 p.c. In no German or other work has it been found Avhy these percentages are deducted from the recorded hits before deter- mining the values of the errors, but doubtless the necessity for doing so has been found from the immense number of ex- periments Avhich the Germans have made. • These statistics have been found with the use of "full" sight. In England a fine sight is used because the backsight is graduated for it. 53 T -A. B Ij E ^^. Dimensions of the Shot-Groups made by the Martini- Henry Eefle on a Vertical Target. 1 ' 2 3 4 Range, in yards. ■?-. p Ill ^'1 Radius of circle en- closing all the horizontal erroi's. KEMAIiKS OX DOUBLE THE IIORIZOXTAL AND VEP.TICAL ERRORS. Yard.s. Feet. Feet. 50 11 11 100 23 23 150 29 29 200 40 35 The size of a head. 250 52 44 300 69 58 ( A little less than the width of { the vulnerable part of a man. 350 85 72 400 1 08 86 450 1 17 94 ( A little more than the width of \ a man. 500 1 33 07 550 1 50 20 600 1 68 38 C50 1 87 51 { A little more than the height of \ a kneeling man. 700 2 10 08 ( A little less than the width of \ two men. 750 2 30 81 800 2 58 98 850 2 84 2 14 ( Rather greater than the hciglit ( of a man. 900 3 16 2 35 950 3 57 2 60 1000 3 85 2 78 1050 ^ 37 2 99 1100 4 68 3 20 54 -jSli i<**i ,JOo 200 2ao H>o ioo 600 7oa aoo seo looo two ids Fig. 1. Graphical Curve of the Errors given in Table V.* The above errors are those made by a good marksman, and it must be clearly remembered, that these numhers are by no means absolute, hut only comjyarative. The accuracy of the fire varies every day, as the ammunition and as the density of the air, and consec^uently the retardation, varies, and according to the condition, eyesight, and skill of the iirer. But the above * Whatever results have been found by experiment from a largo number of observ'ations they should always 1)0 graphically represented by curves, to see that they pi'cscnt no anomalies, and to rectify them if ncccssiirj-. These curves are drawTi by scsttinj? off the ranges to scale along one straight lino, and at the end of each range draw at right angles to this line, otlior lines whoso lengths rc])rescnt the numerical value (to any otlicr cdiivcnicut sralc) of the dat.i olitaincd for tlic range, and then join the ends uf these upright lines. If then' are any anomalies th(! numbers given by the jirobable or regular curve, joining the ends of tlie majoritv of th(! uj)right lines, are most likely to bo right, because, as has been >aid, when a large number of shots have been fired, there does exist some kiml of law among the results. in resiiltH (il)laiiied by the Jlartini-IIenry rilh), tlien^ seems to be some kind of anomaly between the results oblained uj) to 100 yards, and those olitained for longer ranges. This is due to th(! different methods of sighting used, and tlie alteratiim of the ilislance of tlie liacksight from the eye, for ranges tinder and over -100 yards. This f;ict is also very jilain in Tabh^ 11., p. 21. Tablo V. shows the folly of altering the elevation, as is often done, after each shot because it iloes not hit the exact spot aimed at. If tho shotH hit witliin the limit of error, that is all that can bo oxpoctod. Tho elevation should only bo altered when tho auccosbivo hits indicato the lire is too high or too low generally. 55 numbers furnish a useful basis for comparison, and fur working on. From Table V., we see that the vertical groupings of the Martini-Henry rifle take the form of a circle up to 150 yards inclusive, and at greater distances than this, the form of an ellipse or oval, of which the greater axis is vertical. The diameters of this ellipse increase with the range, and their dimensions vary more or less, according to the degree of accuracy of shooting of each rifle, and skilfvdness of the tirer, for a rifle is so much thu more accurate, and the firer more skilfid, as this siu'face is smaller, i.e., as the hits aru better grouped. With known ranyes the limiting distance of such an individual fire, in which every shot hits, depends on the limitiny vertical or horizontal error. As a general rule, an increase of the breadth of an object beyond a certain point, without a corresponding- increase of height, has no sensible influence on the possibility of a single man hitting it, because the vertical errors are gTeater than the horizontal ones. Four men, side by side, may be taken to represent a square with a side of 6 feet. Now suppose we want to know at what hiown range a good shot, under favourable conditions, can strike this target almost at every time. A man should not fii-e at such an object beyond a range at which his greatest error is 3 feet, if he wishes to hit as often as possible. From Table V. on p. 53, we see that this greatest error corresponds to a range of almost 850 yards, when a good shot will hit 89 times out 100. This corresponds very much with what we find in practice. Similarly a man Ipng down can be supposed to occupy a square with a diameter of 1-5 feet and a good shot mider the most favourable conditions will hit it 95 out of 100 times at a range of about 300 yards, at which the maximum error is 0-69 feet. Now these numbers entirely depend on the range and proper elevation being known, on the point of mean impact coinciding with the point aimed at, on the man being a very good shot, no wind, and other favoiu-able conditions which rarely exist together. In reality we must di\'ide the results obtained by the best shots by three or four, to find those which can bo expected from the mass of men, and then divide, according to French and German practice, the result by 10, to find thoir probable value in battle for known ranges, a condition rarely possible in the field. Certainly, less than -aVth or Vtfth 56 of peace results can only be relied on in Trar ; the Austrians say -7-otli.* -Vll nmsketrj- data can only be approximative, and to be ou the safe side "we should always use the most im.favourable ones, because in the field a soldier's ammunition and rifle run so many chances of deterioration. Thus, in all cases, we should carefidly avoid placing absolute reliance on data found on the practice range, which are as a rule obtained imder the most favom'able conditions, by skilfid and practiced men, with every aid possible to cnsiu-e accuracy of fire. * A compiiriBon in any war of tho amount of ammunition firod away and tho numhor of killnd and woundod, kIiows that tho number of rounds oxjwndcd to ovcry man killed and wounded, is to he reckoned l)y liundredM. Sucli would not Ijd the eawo if j)eace remilts were in any way in harmony with war rosuKs. There is an old saying that " It takes a trtical and liori/ontal errors respectively for the I'ange will includ(> all the hits, b'ss the dullets will really strike the ground in front of the target, and strike it 2x1 '08 or 2- 10 feet from the ground. Thus, it may be noticed that the height at which the shot, forming tlie lowest trajec- tory, ricochets into the target, always coincides with twice the greatest vertical error of the shot at the distance fired at, and 69 lieuce all the ricoclieting hullets, under the supposed con- ditions, -will strike a target of the height of a man up to the 800 yards range. (iv) If'lien aim is taken at the middle of the ohject, if a shot be fired with a little too much eleration, or if too much of the foresight is used, the bullet may pass above the head of a standing man ; this inconvenience is not so much felt ichen aim is taken at the bottom of the object. This can be seen by comparing, in Table VI., the heights of the upper trajectory of the cone above the ground in each of the two .-ases of aiming with the 400 yards elevation, at the bottom and at the centre of objects placed successively at 400, 350, 300 yards, &c. As men in action always use a full foresight, the backsight should be graduated for its use so as to avoid this error as much as possible, and if aim is taken always at the foot of the object, the theoretical evil of a less accurate fire resulting from the use of a full foresight is almost entirely avoided. (v) The foresight, trhich covers half the height of an upright man tvhen the latter is at a distance of 200 yards, is not so likely to hide the objective from view. Thus, at ranges over 200 A'ards, the least upward movement made by the barrel will, if the centre of a man is aimed at, entirely hide the objective from the view of the firer. This onl}^ occurs at greater distances than 400 yards, if the bottom of the object is aimed at. (vi) Tactically it is more advantageous to aim at the bottom of the object than at the centre. " If the smoke hides the objective it is impossible to aim at its centre, while on the coutraiy it is very easy to distinguish and aim at a mark taken on the line of separation which exists between the cloud of smoke and the ground, this lino being clearly defined in the field. On the other hand, if the adversarj', while advancing, disappears behind some artificial shelter, or is lost to sight in a depression in the ground, aim can still be taken at the entrenchment, or at the mark on the ground previously selected, and the bullets thus fired will have a good chance of being well directed. Besides, is not the soldier in the heat of action always tempted to take too full a sight ? In making him aim at tlie bottom of tlio object, a compensating influence is brought to bear on this fault, M-hich is so common amongst men in the field. Further, by thus aiming at the bottom of the objective the com? is lowered, and the enemy as he advances, plunges himself more deeply into the rain of bidlets, instead of getting out of it, as he would, if aim had been taken in the centre of theobject fired at." 70 "With reference to the jwi'jit that should he aimed at on the object to be hit, the Germans very sensibly say that men should as a rule be accustomed to aim at the bottom of a target, because in action, even at the longer ranges, all that a man often has to fire at is a bank of smoke, and the bottom of this cloud against the ground forms a definite line to aim at, while it would be hard to know at what other point of the moving cloud to tell the men to fire; at the longer ranges such nicety of aiming at any exact spot on a man is imnecessary, from the inaccuracy of individual fire,*' and because the exact range and the effects of wind and other causes of error are not known at all, so that the firing must be somewhat chance work. Thus all that can be done is to aim at some definite mark as near as possible to the position of the object to be hit. The mere fact, that no two bidlets, fired by the same man, will hit in the same place, shows the uselessness of aiming at long ranges at any particidar spot in individual firing. With regard to the closer ranges in action there is still an advantage in aiming at the bottom of the object to be hit. As a rule men in action fire much too high, especially the nearer the enemy is, and their excitement greater, and such a plan will tend to keep the bullets down. Even if a bidlet does strike short, the ricochet will be effective, while if it goes too high it will pass right away. The German regida- tions say: " It is required to hit the object somewhere rather than to hit it in one particular point, and tlierefore it is better to choose a point low down to aim at than a liigher one, and consequently the foot of the object will be aimed at as a rule with a suitable elevation of sight." Tlie excerption, in the Genuan regulations to this rule, is when tlic object is less than 270 nu'tres off (the range of the low(>st sight on the Mauser rifle) and it is under half the lieight of a man, in which case, the aim is to be taken at a distance of one or two apparent " heads" under llie ()])ject according to tlie range. The French regulations also say: "In action itis best as a rule to aim at tlie foot of the ol»ject.' The line* of intersection of the objects with tlu* ground generally funiish(>s more distinct and api)areiit points to aim at than tht^ centr(> of tlic* object." The Italian regulations say: "Aiming at the lowest edge of an objoctivo has the following advantages: — (1) The line * UraidcB, th(! iicrunicy of ii ]n()])(>r]y oxoculod loiip; range firo is not dopondont on tho accunicy of individtisil firo, as will bo explained in Part II. 'I'ho conditions f>f long and short range fire are, in fact, • ntircly different. 71 of iutersectiou of the object witli the ground is always well defined and distinct, and, therefore, more easy to aim at than any central point, which is generally vague and undetermined, and easily lost sight of when the enemy is partly covered with the foresight. (2) In battle the enemy is often hidden by smoke, and, in this case, aiming at the centre is impossible, whilst it is always possible to aim at the line of demarcation of the smoke with the ground. (3) Aim is to be taken at the foot of the object in every case without exception, even when firing at small targets, such as men tying down, at very short ranges, because if aim is taken at the centre it wiU. not be possible to hit'these objects, from the cone of buUets passing over them. (4) By aiming at the feet, the flatness of the trajectory is better utilized, in fact, the depths of ground beaten by the whole cone, and in which any forward move- ment of the enemy does not necessitate any change of elevation, are gi-eater when aim is taken at the feet than when taken at the centre. . . To accustom the soldier, in peace time, to the most favourable system of aiming in war time aim will always be taken at the foot, even at target practice." The Am.erican regulations say : — " In order that the effect of the ricochet may not be lost, care should be taken not to over- estimate the distance, and to aim at the feet of the enemy. This selection of a point of aim, is, in fact (except when the enemy is within short range), especially advantageous ; as, when it is employed, a greater number of the bullets in the shot-group will xisually prove effective ; and, as moreover the line of separation which exists between the cloud of smoke and the ground offers the best defined object, and also the error so common in the heat of action of taking too full a sight is neutralized." At the very shortest ranges, when rapid fire takes place, the whole front is soon covered with a cloud of smoke, which hides the enemy from view ; the onl}' ride then is to hold the rifle parallel to the ground and fire direct to the front. Sometimes, however, an aimed individual fire at single objects may be made use olP, especially in savage warfare. With the English rifle, which is sighted for as short a range as 100 yards, aim may be taken at the centre of a small object at the shorter ranges so as to get shot group higher on it, though if the object is very small, this is often better done by aiming at its intersection with the groimd, from its being better seen, and not hid by the foresight. If the range is unknown it is also best to ai:u low (for the same reason that a too low elevation is preferable to a high cue), because the ricochet ma}' hit, while a bullet that passes too high passes right away harmless. As the rifle is sighted for 100 yards, aim at 50 yards need only be taken 4 inches, and at 25 or 75 yards 2 inches, under the point that would be aimed at if the object were 100 yards off. With regard to standing men, we can still use the 400 yards elevation, if aim is taken at the feet, for the shortest ranges, because in Table VI., Me see that at 100 yards the bullet would, in tliis case, strike about 3i feet above the ground ; at 50 yards it would theoretically be better to aim at the knee, when using the 400 yards elevation, but expe- rience shows that the action would have been decided before this range was reached, and that at such close ranges men fire very high. At the longer ranges, from the uncertainty of individual fire,^ it is immaterial whether the centre or the bottom of the object is aimed at, but as at tlie shorter ranges, liowever, the men should always aim in action at the bottom of objects to be hit, for the reasons already given, thoij .should therefore he alicaijs accustomed to use this point, hy its hcinr/ made the normal point to be aimed at at all times. If the range is exactly known, then, Avliih; aiming at the foot of the object, a slightly liigher elevation may be used, depending ou the height of the object, so as to raise the shot grou}) on it. When aim is taken at the bottom of an object, the luean trajectory of the cone and the line of sight intersect at the range corresponding to the elevation used ; thus the upper half onl}' of the cone strikes the ol)joct at that distance whilst the other half falls short and can only strike after ricocheting. But on tlie held of })attle, we must always remember that, as neither the objec-tives nor the fir(>rs are stationary, the distances diminish without ceasing, so that by aiming at the bottom of the object, tlie enemy, as he advances, ])lung(>s more deeply into tlie rain of bullets or eilicacious /one, instead of getting out of it, as lie would if aim had })eon taken at the centre of the object lired at. Besides, if the enemy is retreating, a Bight for 50 yards over the estiiiijl' The accuracy of the rille also allows of this, for the width of the shot group at 400 yards is only 1-72 feet (Table V.) or rather wider than the vulnerable part of the body of one man, but less than his total width, and the depth of the shot gToup is only 2-16 feet. Thus, seeing that the zone of the 400 yards elevation, grazed by the whoh^ cone, when aim is taken at the feet, is not "less than 400 yards, the enemy will alwaj's be hit if he is within that distance, even if an error of jiulgment in estimating the distance has been made. If the enemy is missed l)y the first shot, he will be hit by one of the following ones, especially as in order to capture the required position, he must advance or plunge more and nidre into tlie efficacious zon(^ of the definidcu-'s Indicts. Table VI. shows that the elevation of tlie upper trajectory above the ground Avitli the 400 j'ards elevation, is 2-99 feet, at 350 yards and 4-81 fec^t at 300 3\ards; hence an objective half the height of a man (3-67 feet, see p. 58,) will he struck when aim is taken at its foot by the whole cone at about 325 yards, but not so at 300 yards. Thus the limits of the zone grazed by all the cone, with the 400 yards elevation, for an object half the height of a man, lies l)etween 325 to 400 yards. The accuracy of the rifle also coincides with this, as the total vertical error is 2-16 feet ; and hence the 400 yards sight can be used between 325 and 400 yards, for objects as Avido as a man (1-33 feet), and of a height equal to half tlic height of a man, ij't/ip ram/e is known. It only remains furtlier to see if the depth of the grazed zone for an object half the height of a man r(. GG, it would ])0 nocossarv to usd tlio 300 yards olcvation, with a fidl forosipht, in action, to obtain tho host results. This, it vnW hv supposod, will h(> fully homo in mind with rofia'cnco to the frdlowiiif^ jiajfos. t From numerous oxperimcmts made in ( <(ini:my it has been found that tho average errors made in judging distances ujp to 1,'JOO yards is from Jth to ith the (^stimated distance. Tlie Russians say i^th the r.ange is tho average (jrror. 'J'lie (ieriuati rules for tiring however, allow f(U' an eiTor of ith the range, which will hw the error used throughout this book. But twiee this eiTor should lie allowed if the object should 1)0 on either side r)f the range umler consideration, as the error may be too groat or too little. However, in th(^ aliove cas(', the object is supposed to be on one sifle only of the range considered, and su only theaclu;il error is used. 75 consideration. Thus, if the real distance is 350 yards, and a sight of 400 yards is used, the object will still be struck, since the zone grazed by all the cone 3-67 feet from the ground, extends from 325 to 400 yards, or for 75 yards. Table VII. is a similar one to Table VI., but is worked out for the 300 yards sight. Distances. Upper T rajectory. Lower Ti ajectory. Bottom of Centre of Bottom of Centre of Object. Object. Object. Object. Yards. Feet. Feet. Feet. Feet. 50 1-42 4-09 1-20 2-87 100 2-45 5-12 1-99 4-66 150 2-92 5-59 2-34 5-01 200 2-86 5-53 2-06 4-73 250 2-11 4-78 1-07 3-74 300 0-69 3-36 —0-69 1-98 From tliis talile we see that if the aim be directed on the foot of the object, the upper trajectory is everywhere under the height of an object equal to half the height of a man (or 3'67 feet) as its greatest height is 2-92 feet. Hence, for the Martini-Henry rifle, all that is actually required for war purposes as regards sights for short ranges, when aim is taken at the foot of the object, is a fixed sight for 300 yards, and a flap sight for 400 yards, and the usual leaf sight for longer ranges* ; but the backsightbught to be graduated for a full foresight which men will always use in action. * The three sights of the Manser rifle are : — 1. The fixed sight for 270 metres. 2. The flap sight for SoO niMres. o. The leaf .sight for 400 metres and upwards. The flap sight is the true fighting sight of the rifle ; the fixed sight is rather a supplementary sight, to be employed against objects half the height of a man, or the height of a kneeling man and less ; while the leaf sight for 400 metres is the special sight against cavalry. A metre is Iro yards nearly. 76 If siicli a fixed sight for 300 yards is adopted, then simple special rules would have to be given for its use at shorter ranges, when aim is taken at the bottom of the object ; such as "At — yards, aim to be taken one (or two) apparent heads' lengths below the object to be hit."* But the cases where small objects have to be fired at at such short ranges rarely occur in war, and never in any serious circumstances as in an action. Hence, such rules will have a very limited application. The conclusion now arrived at is, that with the Martini- Henry rifle, the two elevations of 300 and 400 j-ards, combined with aiming at the foot of the mark, are sufficient to keep all the ground up to at least 400 j-ards well under fire if the backsight is graduated for use with a full foresight. If a fine foresight is retained, then for each of these distances, the elevation for 100 j-ards less must be used. The principle of using a single elevation for different distances lias now been recognised in England, but the principle lias been badly applied. Thus in the Musketry Eegulations (1887) the 200 yards elevation is to be used in the attack and defence practices; but the men are ordered to aim at the head of the enemy at 26o yards in the attack, or at 320 yards in the defence, and lower down as the distance lessens, until at 150 yards in the attack, or 100 yards in the defence, from the enemy, th(^ feet are to bo aimed at. From the foregoing pages it wiU be seen that this is quite un- necessary, as aiming at the feet throughout is ample. More- over, in action, under 300 yards, men will not think of the range (and much less will they calculate it to 5 yards as in 26o yards !), and at what part of the enemy's body they should aim in conseqiience, even leaving out of consideration the fact that th(! enemy will be upright at one nunuent and kneel- ing or lying down the next. AV'ith all the information we now have of the wild and high firing of our troops in our small wars, anything tending to make men aimhigh is gnmtly to bi' (lejirecated, and this is a strong reason for teaching men to ahvayx aim at the f<'s and onwards the elevation corresponding to 50 metres under tlie range, is to bo used. Example : the elevation for 400 metres to be used at 450 UKitres." (Seep. 180). Tlie French regulations, after laying down that all aiming- is to ha at the foot of tlie object, give the following rules for the employment of the sights : " The different elevations can bo utilized in tlie following manner — * Roo footnoto on 1). 7''i. Frmn (o '10 tiiiMrcs and from 2.'{0 to 270 niMrcs, iiiiii is takiii witli lln' fixi'd si^lit :it tlui I'oot of tlie object ijimilurly with the llap bight between ^30 and JoO metres. 79 "The 200 metres elevation*: between and 200 metres against men laying- clown, kneeling, or standing. "The 300 metres elevation: between and 300 metres against men kneeling or standing. "The 350 metres elevation: between and 350 metres against men standing. "The 400 metres elevation: between and 450 metres against mounted men. "The employment of the other elevations necessitates a greater accuracy in estimating the distance of the object." (C) Limits for the Employment of Ixdividu.u. Fire. Individual fire is the fire of individual men when left to their own initiative ; that is to say, it is the fire of men freed from all control, and therefore free to choose their object, their elevation, and to regulate their own consumption of ammu- nition, while collective fire is the regvilated, if not simultaneous action of a number of rifles against a named objective, in obedience to the will of a single man. In the fu'st case, the fire is left to the initiative of the individual men, whence its name of individual fire, and in the second case, it is placed in the hands of a leader. Now it is very important to remember that there are two completely different conditions under which indi\ddual fire can be used : — 1 , Against a mass of enemies in a battle, and 2. Against a single enemy, or a small group of men when accidentally met with. "With this second condition_ only it is intended to deal here at present. For want of recognition of these two cases much misunderstanding has arisen in defining the limiting ranges of individual fire, when directed against objectives of various sizes, for the soldier woidd naturally say, " If it is laid down that I am not to fire at a kneeling man, say beyond 300 yards, then I must never do so if he is at ranges beyond that." On the face of it we see that such a conclusion woidd be absurd for battle requirements, where cii-cumstances are quite different to the second case given above. In action, in front of the soldier there is a practically continuous line of enemies, behind which, at various intervals, come other lines and other bodies of men. If he fii-es at a particular man in the fi'ont line, whatever his attitude (though usually it is only a bank of * The lowest elevation oa the French rifle. 80 smoke a soldier has to aim at), and if he misses the particular man aimed at, he may hit another at either side of him, or one in the lines or bodies of troops behind, "while the noise of his firing cheers hims(4f that of his passing shot tends to instil fear into the enemy. Hence in action the following rules for the limits of individual fire cannot apply in the full. In Part II. vre -will more thoroughly study the question of fire tactics in battle. At present we must remember that we are not dealing with such tactics. Accepting the above definition of individual fire, it becomes necessary to fix some limits within which this fire may be employed, or else a serious waste of ammunition would take place, from the area of the shot groups being too large as compared with that of the objectives fired at. The accuracy and flatness of trajectory of a rifle, the skilfulness of the men in firing, and the errors made in judging distances, lay down precise limits for the employment of individual fire under the supposed conditions. These limits may be theoretical or practical ; the first case supposes a very good sliot making no mistakes and knowing the exact distance ; the second assumes that the two factors of errors in aiming and errors in estimating distances, will always militate in the field against attaining the theoretical result. First, with regard to the ilworeiical limit for the employ- ment of individual fire in the field, leaving out of consideration any error on tlie part of the firer in directing liis rifle, let us see what the limit for the use of individual fire should be when the range and elevation for it are exactly known. In this case the centre of the shot gi-oups coincides with tlie position of the objective, and hence the dejjfh of the (/ruufid (/razed bi/ the whole cone does not affect the (question, prurided finch a zone exists. In Plate I. wo see that 800 yards is the maximum range at w^hich there is such a zone grazed on the whole cone. Farther, at 800 yards the lieiglit of the shot group being 5*10 feet (see Tabhi V.), or nearly the lieiglit of a man, and its width ;5*'JG feet, a good lirer will put 89 per cent, of his shots in an objective of a group of Ji men, but beyond 800 yards the dcptli of the groups arc more than o;30 feet, and even a good lircr ciiniKjt jiut a dcliuite proportion of liis .shots into a line of infantry; ho only fires by chance and trusts to luck. Also we sc(! that at 800 yards the firer must make no error in directing his rillc, as the shot group, even when well placed, is only just within the height of a man. 81 Now, with regard to the practical limit for the employment of individual fire in the field. As said above, two factors govern it; erx'ors in aiming, and errors in judging distance. At .500 yards the width of the shot group is only about 2-14 feet, and its depth 2*66 feet. Thus, at this distance a goodfirer tising the proper elevation, and firing on a group of two men, 3'50 feet wide) will put 92 p.c. (deducting abnormal shots) into the objective. But this good shot has to judge the distance, and in doing so he may commit an error of ^- or 62 yards, too much or too little. The question now is, whether this total limit of error of 124 yards is compensated for by the depth of the ground grazed by all the cone. In Plate I. will be found the depths of these zones for different ranges. From this plate we see that with a 500 yards elevation the zone grazed by the whole cone extends for only 51 yards, which, therefore, does not even nearly compensate for the above possible error in judging the distance, even supposing that the centre of the shot group is not displaced by abnormal or accidental influences, which, however, is usually the case in reality. A similar calculation will show that 400 j-ards is the greatest practical limit for individual fii-ing, and from the construction of the backsight of the Martini-Henry rifle, the elevation for 400 yards affords a practical guide for the limit of such a fire. Hitherto we have considered the firer to be skilful enough to prevent his rifle moving while firing, but suppose a less skilful firer to make an angidar error in aiming of about 10 minutes too high.*'" An angular error, in the position of the line of sight, of 10 minutes of arc will cause a vertical error in the position of this line of 0-873 feet for every 100 yards, and so the vertical error will be 4-3G feet at 500 yards and 6-98 feet at 800 yards. If we add the error of 4-36 feet, of the line of sight for 500 yards, to the depths of the shot groups at the same distance we get 5-69 feet and hence a firer who makes an error of 10 minutes too high in aiming will not be able to hit, at this distance, a group of men in line, but he can at 450 yards. At 800 yards the depth of the shot group being 5*16 feet or nearly equal to the height of a man, a fu'er must not make even the least error, and hence 800 yards is the theoretical * Tliis error must not bo confounded with taking too much foresight. It is an error to be allowed for besides this latter error, and is due to un- steadiness in holding the ritie to the shoulder. F 82 limit, while 450, or, better still, 400 yards, from the construc- tion of the backsight, is the practical limit for individual fire. It may be remarked here that tliough the effects of an angular error in aiming increases "with the distance when fired at a vertical target, yet this is not the case if the bullets are received on a horizontal surface, or on a series of targets placed in column. In fact the error in range caused by a given angular error in aiming decreases instead of increases "witli the distance. For example, the angle of elevation for 100 yards is O"" 10' and for 200 yards it is 0° 21' or a difference of 11' for a difference in range of 100 yards or 1' for about every 9 yards. The angle of elevation for 400 j^ards is 0"" 49' and for 500 yards it is 1" 9' or a difference of 20' for a difference in range of 100 yards, or 1' for about every 5 yards. The angle of elevation for 900 yards is 2° 28' and for 1,000 yards it is 2" 50" or a difference of 22' in a range of 100 yards, or 1' for about every 4-5 3-ards. This explains Avh}- the length of the front or beaten zones shewn in Plate I. vary very slowly after 500 yards. Eesume. If we compare tlu; heights cjf the objectives met with in war with the depth of the shot gi-oups beyond 400 yards, and if we consider the errors caused l)y any angidar deviation in the aiming, we are forced to the conclusion that even a good shot lias very little chance at greater ranges of putting a definite proportion of his hits into an objective the height of a man. On the other hand a cone, capable of causing an efficacious dangerous zone, cannot be obtained unless at least 50 cartridges are fii-ed. A single man cannot afford to cxpcaul such a great amount of ammunition on a single objective, especially if ]i(; cannot Avatch tlio results of liis sliots, and oven if he attempted to do so, lie would not hav<' tinu! t(j expend such a great proportion of his sii])ply sulficiently rapidly or in identical conditions. I''ui1lier, it is necessary ilial this deplli of zone should lie at least ecpial to one-fourth liu! range, in order to neutralize the elToct of a probable wrong estimation of the distance, but this proportion of the zone, grazed by tin; whole cone, to the range, only exists when the range is under 400 yards. But 83 this error of estimating the clistauee cau only be absolutel}' corrected when the trajectory is under the height of a man, which occurs onl^' fur ranges under 400 yards, and hence the 400 yards range should be considered as the maximum limit for individual fire in the field. The construction of the present backsight of the Martini-Henry rifle also favours this conclusion for practical purposes. Thus, when the distances are estimated it is useless to fia-e over 400 3'ards, and when the distances are exactly known, over 800 yards, and then onhj at suitable objectives, and as these distances have been worked out for a good marksman thej' may be taken as the extreme ones and should never be ex- ceeded. The Germans say, fi-om the preceding arguments, that nothing is to be expected beyond 400 or 800 yards from the fire of single men, and that at such distances, the skill of the fu'er cannot counterbalance the unfavourable influences independent of his action.'''' Thus, instead of making 8 skilful men, free to choose their own objectives, flre 60 cartridges in 2 minutes on 8 or 10 objectives perhaps, they prefer at greater ranges than the above, to resort to an intermittent collective fire, that is to say to concentrate simidtaneously the fire from 60 men, expending an equal number of bullets, on the same objective with the same elevation, and then to make a pause in the fire. The Germans consider individual fire over the ranges given above, that is to say, a fii-e, the conduct of which is left to the individual men, to be a true waste of ammunition. The Germans particularly insist on the fact that in Avar the object and the firer are not stationary, but are subject to movement at the end of very short intervals of time ; hence the impossibility of a soldier, placed at distances at which the zone grazed by all the cone cannot be considered from being so small, being able to expend a sufficient number of projectiles in * Two French writers have made the following calculations as to the number of rounds required by an average shot at different ranges to put an isolate standing enemy hors de combat. Either estimate shows the great increase of ammmiition required as the range increases, to effect a given result. Eange, in metres .... 200 300 400 500 600 Number of rounds . . 13 16 30 47 112 — 5 to 6 10 to 12 14 to 16 30 to 34 84 identical conditions, that is to sa}', of firing at the same range and from the same place, a series of bullets on the same object, all of which are intlispensable conditions to be fulfilled, in order to obtain an efficacious dangerous zone.""'" The soldier, on the contrary, fii-es at first on one object, then on another, and it is not possible for the trajectories of projectiles, so fired in different directions, to form a cone of any density. f Of course in outpost, or in advance or rear guard ■svork, individual fire can be used in certain circumstances at any distance, but in this case the fire is mainl}' made use of as a signal or for intimidation, and the firer does not expect any other result. Thus, at 400 yards, t\n' y.ovlv oi individual Jire, or of fire which does not rise above the height of a man, or of fire based on the extent of the zones grazed by the whole cone, terminates, and the zone of collective firt\ or of fire l)ased on the depth of the efficacious beaten ground, begins. This collective lire, in which the control should be invariably placed in the hands of the leaders, and not abandoned to individual inclination, is conducted on the Continent according to principles which will be pointed out in Part II. "Witli regard to the limits for employing individual fire against difterent objectives, the German regulations lay down for the ^Mauser rifle that — " A good shot can be expected to hit "At 200 metres, an object of less heiglit tlian half tlie height of a man. "At 2o0 mt'tr<'S, an oliject of liaif the luiglit and of the full width of a man. "At 3.30 metres, an (d)je(t of Iialf the height, ])ut of gi'eater width than a man. "At 4;)() metres, an obji'ct of the lieight of a man, or of an isolated mounti'd man. * Tho firo of crack shot-s on an ciRiny in line at 800 yard.s, at which the /one ffrazid is two yiirds dci'i), and {\\v ^shtween them when possibl(\ The more arcurofe the arm, the better the results cMained at small nh/ects, hut this dijfcrenee is not so sensible on lartjer objects as provpcd formations, against ichieh a less accurate weapon is as good as a more accurate one. The combination of the errors of tiie rifle for different ranges witli the mean trajectories allows us to get a very fair comparison of the dangerous zones of the arm. Trace the mean trajectory until it meets the ground. (See ]'ig. G, p. ;")•).) The theoretical dangerous zone extends from 1 lie point wliero it is a man's height from tlie ground to lli(< first graze, luit counting ricoclicts. ^^\\t tin's is udt all. Trace the eiiv('l(i])ing cones of thi" vertical eii-ovs ;ind jiidjdiig them until they also meet the grouml. TIhii. iml lountiiig ricocliets, the i-(>itl liangi rous zone is IVoni A to (I, where A is the point Avher(! the under side ol' lliccone tjrst comes within :i inuii'.s heii^ht oi' the ground. FrojM Fig. (■), we see tiiat there are really llire(> distiiu't zones, viz., from A to C, culled th(( rear danf/erons zone ; C to E, the 89 central dangerous zone ; and E to G, the front dangerous zone or beaten zone. If the errors are greater tlian those supposed, or if the trajectory was more curved, there woukl be no central zone. This can be seen from Plate I. All the space between C and E is the true dangerous zone of the rifle, as nearly 100 per cent, of the shots will strike between these points. This true dangerous zone depends both on the flatness of the trajectory and the accuracy of the arm. If the trajectory is high, whatever the acciiraoj, it ivill be small. If the trajectorg is very low, but the accuracy is slight, tee shall at all events get a central zone of moderate length. Hence we see that fiatness of trajectory is of more relative importance than accuracy. The ideal of perfection of fire is an almost straight trajectory with such an accuracy that at the greatest distance of firing the diameter of the circle of the double probable error does not exceed the height of the enemy. We are stiU far from this. The exact length of the dangerous zones shewn on Plate I. are for the given distances, which latter can rarely be exactly ascertained in the field, even with range-finding instruments, and even if the range is exactly known, the variations caused by the powder, the barometric pressure and other known and unknown causes, render it impossible to obtain this zone accurately, under all conditions, and hence they are only approximative. The dangerous zones for cavalry are greatly in excess of those for infantry, from their greater height and the greater chance of hitting them. From the comparativel}- great depth of the dangerous zones we see that deep formations like columns, must sufi'er more than thin formations like lines, and hence these latter for- mations must always be used under effective fire. The figures in Plate I. show the inutility of individual long range fire, from the small extent of the ground covered. With the 300 yards elevation, we have a dangerous zone six times greater than that of the 1,000 yards elevation, but when we also come to consider the far smaller area of the shot gi'oup at the shorter range, we are many times more likely to hit a man at .'300 yards than at 1,000 yards. At long ranges we must also consider the fact that ths efl^ect produced does not correspond with the number of shots fired, and therefore, an enormous consummation of ammunition is required to obtain a satisfactory result. We must remember hat all our remarks are at present confined to the fire of V 90 individual men, eacli firing- at a different mark; the collective fire of masses Trill be considered later on. Long' range tire is all very well -where the supply of ammunition is unlimited, when it would only cease from the fatigue of the firer, or the choking of his weapon. In a siege, when the position of the enemy's Latteries are knownlmd their position is in the limits of the range of the weapon, long range fire can be well used, for the soldier behind cover can rest his rifle and can fire over 200 rounds in a day without much fatigue. In this case he is not then obliged to confine himself to the 100 or 120 rounds which are usuall}'- only available for him in the field. There is an absolute necessity in the field to take count of the consumption of cartridges, from the great difficulty of supplying thoni under fire. If the soldier begins tQjire.atJ. ,400 3''ards, he will have time to consume the greatest part of his ammunition before producing any serious effect. Disregarding a few slight losses, the enemy will advance in an extended formation up to 600 yards, at which distance he will begin to Giperience serious losses. If the enemy has reserved his fire, and if his soldiers have fired but little, they will begin at this distance a fire which will be almost decisive, from the moral and material effect it will have ; a moral effect, becaAise the soldicnjjvjio^&e^s that his^irech) not stop the enemy, gets nervous and loses confidence in hlsTarm ; and a material effect, because the enemy has a gTcater nxmiber of cartridges to fire, and consequently, by keeping up a careful fire at 600 jards andjunder, niay_us(e __up their opponents' cartridges, and then advance, to 300 yards, at which distance the effect of fire is terrible, and the side which has used up all its cartridges is lost, and perhaps destro3'ed without being able to reply. A disordered rapid fh'ght cannot save it, as bidlets travel quick(>r tlian legs, and in tlve time a man takes to run _lQO_iir_iiflU-yards (say 2 minutes) he can receive 20 shots from liis adversary, wlio aims at liis ease, as he runs no danger. It will not be a fight, l)ut a massncr(>. The Frencli regulations of 1H75, laid down. "The attackers advance in deployed groups until Ihe enemy's infantiy fire Iteconies dangerous at about HOO yards; then the groups must be deployed, ;ind the manh conlinued in this formation. At this period a slow (ire is fo be openecl by the scouts only." The utility of this lias been queried l)y many French writers, who rightly (!onsider individual fire to be useless at such ranges. .Scouts in advance are useful to get information of 91 the groimcl, hut tlicy slioiikl not vrasto their ammxmition by tiring- at such long- ranges. The French regulations go on to say, " on reaching- 600 yards, at which distance fire can be used -with advantage, it "will open along- the whole line." Then follow the details for the continuation of the attack, until the enemy is approached to within 300 yards. "At this distance a rapid fire is delivered to cover the position occupied by the enemy with a hail of balls, to destroy the moral force of the defence, and to raise that of the attack. After some moments of this rapid fii'e, a quick advance is to be made, &c." " The enemy may abandon his position, either because he feels his inferiorit}', or because he has used up his ammunition, or because his flanks are turned, t&c." These passages are all the more remarkable because the FrerK>lijiised a general long range, individual fire at from SOD to 1,500 yards with some success^mder certain favorable circumstances in 1870-71, especially in the battle of Gravelotte at St. Privat. Want of anmiiuiition has often caused an attack to cease, as well as to cause a position to be abandoned. In the war 1870-71, no useful effect was gained by the long range individual fire of the French infantry against the Grerman extended formations. It certainly caused serious losses to closed masses, but it had comparatively little effect on the Prussian infantry in dispersed order, so that this infantry could alwaj's advance up_t^_4()CL^rds, the then maximum range of their rifle, from which they opened fire without much disadvantage. The same remark applies to the long range individual fire of the Turks, and the attacks made by the Russian infantrj' iu 1877-78. Fire_atJong_ranges, is a negation of the offensive, and should be avoided for~Oiis~reason alone as a general practice. Hitherto, we have supposed the distance to be exactly known, and, if we now consider the great errors made in judging distances, we reahze how greatly the efficacy of fire at long ranges ma}' be diminished, especially as the distances increase it is harder to judge, which increases the errors, while the length of the dangerous zone decreases. From what has been said in the foregoing pages we can now see why it is that the knowledge of the accuracy of an. arm {i.e., the probable chance of hitting), combined with the mean trajectory, is absolutely necessary, if we wish to know exact 1}' the value of its fire, on an object of given dimensions at known and imknown ranges. Officers who have to determine the direction and intensity 92 of the fire, such as those commanding the firing line, must have this knowledge. A knowledge of the dangerous zone, as determined by the mean trajectory only, is of no practical utility to an officer, but he ought to know as well both the size of the group of bullets which envelop the purely theo- retical trajectory, and the flatness of the trajectory. It is only by the combination of these data, accuracy and flatness of trajectory (both of which vary according to the range), that the probable efficacy of a fire can be calcidated, if the range is known and the sight properh^ adjusted to it, with no disturb- ing wind, and if the point of mean impact coincided with the point aimed at — conditions which rarely exist, except for the shortest ranges, showing the uncertainty, and therefore probable waste, of long range individual fire. From a know- ledge of the heights of the trajectory and of the errors of the Martini-Henry rifle, given on j). 53, simple graphical representations have been drawn (see Plate I.), which shows in a striking way the diminution of the efficacy of tire according as the range increases. The French musketry regulations of 1877, limited the.fire of the mass of infantry on the practice range to 600 metres (660 yaKls), and those of 1875 insisted on the inutility of fire at long ranges, and on the necessity for infantry reserving its fire for close ranges. A nitjht graduated up to high ranges (sag begotid 1,000 gardsj is a 'permanent .wuree of danger for imperfect/g trained troops eommanded hg inexperieneed officers. Theg should be taught that this sight fivith whieh it is also rerg dijfieult to fire J is onJg meant for some rerg rare and particular cases, such as hi sieges, tchcre ranges cayi be accuratelg measured and the effects watched, and that in the field, after 800 gards f putting down the outside limit J, the individual f re of skirmishers has no efficacg, whilst under 600 gards it is dangerous, and its effect is decisive as soon as ice are within 400 gards. This was the experience of tlie Franco-German and Russo-Turkish Wars. Taking all tilings into consideration, from the flatness of the trajectory; tlic errors of an average sliot ; the appear- ance, for aiming iit, of tlie si/(M)f th(M)bje{t at tlie range; from being tln' liiniling range at which a dangerous zone, grazed liy the wlioh^ con(>, exists tlirougliout its Icngtli wlien aim is taken at the feet; from tlie ])r(il)al)i]ity of the terror in judging fin' distance Iteing c(ininionHurat() with the dangerous zone; and from the dispei-sion of tlu^ })u]lets being not too great ; the range of 100 yards appears to.be the mnximuni range at which an average shot should be allowed to 93 fire inclividuall}', when tlio range lias to be guessed, and then only at objects the size of a single upright man. Single horsemen may be fired at up to 4.30 yards under siniilar con- ditions. Good shots might be allowed to fii-e up to 000 yards, and very good shots to 800 yards, hut only if the range is known, and the prohahle effect of any ivind not very great. At short ranges, up to 400 yards, causes of error such as weather, density of air, lighting uji of sights, drift, wind, and other deviating causes, have only a slight effect. SoMK Observatioxs ox Eaxge, Flatxess of Trajectory, AXD Accuracy. At 400 3'ards, every shot can be put into a six feet scj^viare target by a good shot, but taking a number of men we find that only from 30 to 60 p.c. of the shots hit, and we also find different results obtained by the same men in different years, and under different instructors. Tlie difference in the remits obtained, will always depend more on the instruction acquired, than on the theoretical value of the arm. Whatever may he the theoretical accuracy of this arm, if the instruction of the soldier is had, the results must of necessity he only moderate. The following is of great importance for mihtary rifles. An examination of all results of firing, shows that the most accurate arm has only a real superiority when the ohject fired at is of small dimensions. In such a case, a very small amoimt, more or less, in the errors of the rifle is not to be disdained. But on targets representing even a simple group of men, or the head of a column of fours, the difference of residts o1)tained, is onl}^ slightly felt with an ordinary firer. It is only very good shots alone, who can appreciate the value of, and make good use of a more accurate arm. Thus, if at 300 yards range the mean absolute error of one rifle is 7 '9 inches, and of a second one 12'5 inches, a very good shot will obtain the following percent- ages on the circular targets against them. Diameter of P.C. of the P.C. with Circular Target. First Kitle. Second Eitie U feet. 100 99-5 3 „ 100 79-0 H „ 76 45-0 But an ordinary firer who can get only 40 p.c. of the above results on the 4 i foot target, will not get anj-thing like this 91 pei'centage ou tho H- foot target, whichever rilie he fired with. He woukl scarcely get to 10 or 12 p.c. of the above results ou the smaller target, because the deviations caused by his want of skill are much greater than the difference between the two mean absolute errors, which is only about 4-6 inches. All the experiments and trials made by us and other nations at known ranges, give much the same percentages, and show that j)ractically all tho present ritlos for war i)urposes have the same accuracy in the hands c»f a large number of men, and that the value of the results depends much more on the instruction of the men than on the arm itself. But when we come to consider the fatness of the trajectory, this is not the case. At unknown distances it Avill have an enormous influence on the results. Two rifles fii-ed by the .same man, when the range is only approximatively known, will give very different results according as the curvature of their ti'ajectories permits of a greater or less error of elevation of the sights. The lower the trajectory, the greater may be the error allowed in appreciating the distance to get the same result. Judging distance is alwa^'s a difficult matter to do, even with fair accuracy, and the ditliculty increases rapidly with the range, while the shot grou})s also increase, and the practical dangerous zone rapidly decreases at the same time, and so intensifies the tnTor. Everything points to the inutility uf long range individual fire, and the necessity of keeping such fire iov the shorter ranges ut' 400 yarils and under. W(! now see why aecurac}' of lire.', tliougli it ]ilnys an important nUe, is placed after ranges and flatness of trajeett)ry in order of importance (see p. 11) in thi' (puilities of a military rifle. However, these tliree factors are so connected, that they cannot Ite separated without giving partial, and, therefore, erroneous im2)re.ssions. Wo cannot employ in our caliudations a purely linear trajectory, but we must «'nvelop it in a cone of trajectories, governed ])y tlie usual error.s made in sliooting, and it is by so doing that we can be certain of the vabi(f of the results, and be- able to compare the relative value of any anus. JJange and flatness of trajectory aic flir tirsf considerations, as they remain the same for all firers, and any progress in them, is u progress for the whole mass. Accuracy is, therefore, in a certain measurt', subordinate to flatness of trajectory and range. When it is sullicient, it is 'Jo not indispensable to increase it, for this increase can onh' be utilized by the best shots, and not by the mass, but still, when increased accuracy can be conveniently obtained, it is advisable to do so, for it helps to increase the dangerous zones of a good shot. Thus, a military rifle ought to have a fairly long range, with the flattest trajectory and greatest accuracy possible. The c^uestion of the accuracy required for a military rifle is well stated in the following extracts from lectures given in the Eoyal United Service Institution, by Colonel V. D. Majendie, E.A., in 1867 and 1869 respectively: — '• Extreme accuracy is, of course, a good thing to have in a military rifle, just as well as to have a watch which will beat time like a chi-onometer ; but for ordinar}^ circum- stances of warfare a rifle of average precision will answer all our pui'poses, just as a chronometer movement is not absolutely essential in every day life. If we can get the extreme accuracy in either case, without sacrificing other (qualities or without great outlay, well and good ; but men exposed to a searching fire, hurried, wearied, confused, surrounded by smoke and strange noises, wounds and terror, will fail generally in giving good effect to the precision of which even a moderately accurate arm is capable." Again, "I have always held a strong opinion that it is unwise to sacrifice to exceeding accuracy of shooting, other c|ualifica- tions. If you cannot obtain such accuracy without serious loss, without incurring a danger of fouling, without unduly lengthening or strengthening your cartridge, without unduly increasing your strain, then assuredly the extreme accuracy should be thi-own overboard. But it wiU hardly be con- tended that if without any such loss you can secure an exceedingly accurate rifle you should not secure it. For ordinary purposes of warfare this great niceness of shooting is, I admit, not necessary." 97 CHAPTEE VII. RAPIDITY OF FIRE.— USEFUL EFFECT. Rapidity of fire is tlie possibility of firing the greatest number of shots in a given time. Many think that the value of breech- loading arms depends on the rapidity of their fire. Though "we must not exaggerate the importance of rapidity of fire, yet we must take it into serious consideration. The object is attained hy reducing to a minimum, the time required to load the rifle. We must be very careful not to look upon a breech- loading rifle as an arm for rapid fire, but as a rapid loading arm, which allows a man to be always ready with it when a favourable moment comes, because very rapid firing is generally inaccurate and worthless, and causes a deplorable consumption of ammunition, from its usually being unaimed, and, perhaps, not even fired from the shoulder, especially if the firer is excited. The only case when unaimed rapid fire is permissible, is when a thick line of the enemy is very near {i.e., within 200 yards). The rapidity of fire of military rifles is nothing else than a result of facility of loading, and of being able to keep up the fire. All breech-loading arms are either simple breech-loading or magazine arms. The former have to be loaded every time, after firing, with a cartridge taken from the pouch, the latter have a magazine, either in the butt or under the barrel, or one that can be attached, containing from 6 to 10 cartridges, which are put into position for firing by an automatic mechanical movement. The rapidity of a continuous fire tvith these mayazine arms is only greater than that of the ordinary rifie as long as any cartridges remain in the magazine. After that, even if the soldier has time to refill it, the raj)idity of fire in a given time becomes the same as that in a simple breech- loading rifle, at all events, with the magazine rifles that are at present before the public. A simple breech-loading, rifle can be fired about G to 10 times in a minute from the shoulders and with aiming. It can be fired quicker from the hip, Avithout aiming, and by jerking the trigger. The^ Martini-Henry rifle can be thus fire^twenty-five times iu aTmlnufe^ 98 The best magazine rifle, -with its magazine full, can be fired 15 to 18 times in one minute without taking it from the shoulder, after which it can only be tired at the rate of an ordinary breech-loader. Thus, practically a large number of rounds such as 100, if fj-ed as rapidly as possible, can be fii-ed by either kind of rifle in about the same time, 7 or 8 minutes.* But with such fiire we must consider the excessive fatigue that it causes, the right shoulder becomes bruised and very fatigued by the recoil, and the muscles of the arms and shoulders, especially those of the left arm, become unsteadied by a sort of nervous trembling ; the rapidity of fire c^uickly diminishes, notwith- standing any muscidar efforts which tend still more to weaken the firer, and so takes from his fire any kind of accuracy, that the best shot would miss a battalion column at 100 yards under such conditions. Colonel Campe says : — " The rapid fire (at the final stage of an attack) ought not to last more tlian five minutes ; 40 or 50 well aimed shots fired by each man ought to suffice, especially when the artillery has prepared the attack and shaken the enem}'. If the fire lasts longer, the men begin to fire badly, and finally the fire slackens. The moral effect that one wishes to produce on the enemy diminishes or vanishes, and the enemy has then time to bring uj) reinforcements to the threatened point. On the other hand, the increasing ardour that the offensive movement, aided by tlie firing, has given to the men, dies out by degrees. A rapid fire always creates confusion, an evil which is not slow in passing into the minds of the men, who soon see and hear nothing, and finish bj" escaping from tlie control of their leaders. It is necessary, therefore, to move forward at the end of five minutes." Colonel von Sclu-rif is of the same opinion. "The physio- logical influence of a rapid fire on the nervous system of the comljatants is such tliat, at th(! end of a very short time, whicli cannot reasonably last more tlian five minutes, the troops on tlie offensive will citlier dasli forward or retire." Tlie Erendi regulations fix tlio duration of tlie rapid fire at the last stage of tlu' attaik at tlire(> or four minutes. Tlie Belgians, in IKHI, carried out some experiments on the durati(j]i and rapidity of a rapid fire. The following is • When tho firo is not carried out as rapidly as possible, far more rounds can bo fired I'rym u uiuiju^u rifle iliun frym u siinplu brcucli- loader. IScc p. OO'J. 99 the account given of them. ''The necessity of a rapid fire, executed at the distance where a rifle has its full efficacy, is generally admitted now-a-days. But independently of the physiological influence, of which Von Scherff speaks, it appears necessary to ask whether, in this rapid fire, the rifle would not become so heated, at a given moment, that the men fixing would find themselves compelled, by this fact alone, to suspend their fii-e.*' This evidently would depend on the degree of rapidity attained by each man in the fire, which latter would be so much the more Cj^uickly interrupted or suspended by the heating of the barrel, as the skill of the man in loading and firing quickly was greater. " On account of this consideration, 100 men have been made to fire individually (with the Albini rifle) as quickly, and for as long a time, as possible. The men were ordered to aim, and the number of cartridges fired by each man, and the time taken to do so were recorded, and are given in the following table, the numbers in which give an idea of the great differences which exist between different men. Time employed. m. s. 2 10 2 40 3 4 4 30 ') 6 G 30 1 t 10 8 Number of Cartridges fired indiudually by each Man. 7-25-19-20 ■30-30 ■30-30-22-28-30-30-30-39-30-30-30-30 ■35-40-30-30 ■38-48-30-30-32-31-30-23.31-40-40-41-40140-3G-31-35 •31-40 ■ 50 •39-50-50-50-50 ■70-70-70-48-50-50-55-55 "These differences show that many men continued firing, in spite of the very sensible heating of the ban-el, while others stopped prematurely. " The residt of this experiment shows that the average per man was 35 shots in five minutes, that is to say that in the * This heating- of the barrel is a very important question. In the new Enfield-Martini ritie, the lower part of the hnn-el is covered with a wooden easing, to pre^-ervo the men's hands from the hot harrel. o a :: 100 maximum time -svliicli a rapid fire should, according to the authorities given above, each man tii'ed on an average 35 shots, or seven per minute. " Hence, at the moment of opening the rapid fire, each man shoukl have at least 40 rounds at his disjiosition. At the same time we must not lose sight of the fact that when the rapid fire ceases, the advance by successive rushes may have to be re-taken, which would require a further supply of ammunition." The Belgians, again, made some further experiments in 1883, in rapid fii'ing at a range of 250 metres, during periods of three and four minutes. They wished to determine prac- tically certain data, as follows : — 1. — The heating of the barrel. 2. — The average number of cartridges that a soldier can fire in one minute with the Belgian rifle, and conse- quently the number of cartridges a soldier should carry. 3. — The influence which a prolongation of rapid firing can have on the eflicacy of the fire. It was found that at the end of three minutes, the l)arrel, though hot, could bo held, but not so at the end of four minutes. The men, while aiming, and while only seeking rapidity of fire in rapidity of loading and in raising the rifle to the shoulder, tired nine shots a minute, or thirty-six in four minutes. Now, if an attacking force has advanced from 700 to 250 metres l)y rushes of iiUy metres, and has fired three rounds at each halt, it will have expended twenty-seven rounds per man before reacliing tlie 250 metres rang(\ wliich, added to tlie anniiunition expended in a possible rapid fire of four minutes duration, nuikes a total of sixty-tliree rounds l»(!r man (or nearly all lie carries at present) expended before the iinal assauH and subsequent pursuit takes place, slunving that a (•onsi(leru1)l(? battabon su])ply must 1)0 carried, and that an increusi- must bo made, as well in tin? amount carried by the men (liemselves, as the pt)ssibility ol' buig range fire has also to be considered. In comparing the results obtained after a rapid fire of four minutes with those obtained by a similar fire of three minutes, it was found that the relative ellicacy of fire diminishes with the greater duration of the fire. This is due to the heating of the l»arrel, which alters the trap^ctories and makes tlie manipulation of the rifle more difficult, — to the fouling of 101 the barrel, to the n ccumulation of smoke which made it harder and harder to aim, to the fatigue of the men, and to the excite- ment wliich a prolonged and rapid fire produces on the nervous system. From this, it can be concluded that four minutes is the extreme limit during which a rapid fire can be kept up. But, in these experiments, the men were fresh and had not been previously moving and firing as they would have to do in action. Hence the inconvenient heating of the barrel and the extreme fatigue caused by rapid firing would probably be reached in about two instead of four minutes, in reality (especially if the baj'onets are fixed), which is the practical limit already given. Experience shows that the mass of men cannot support a really rapid fire for more than 2 minutes, while maintaining a reasonable accuracy, that is about 20 rounds with a simple breech-loading rifle, and 26 to 30 with the best magazine rifle. Some similar experiments caiTied out in France showed that after men had been fatigued by being marched for four hours over bad roads, not only was the rapidity of the fire decreased, but also the percentage of hits. Consequently, the above results may be looked upon as maximum ones, especially at the end of a hotly contested fight. Thus, in a continuous rapid fire, magazine arms do not lead to a waste of ammunition any more than ordinar}^ breech- loaders, while in certain cases in war they may be most valuable, especially for the defensive, when magazine rifles would have an advantage over ordinary breech-loaders from being able at a given moment to deliver a much more rapid fire, and to pour in a greater mass of projectiles, which would probably have a decisive effect. At close ranges, rifles of all kinds have about an equal value as regards accuracy and flatness of trajectory and then it is that rapidity of fire must be taken into account in considering the final result. The comparison of rifles, by their range, flatness of trajectoiy, and accuracy onl}', is not sufficient to give an exact idea of what these weapons can do in war. The value of a fire depends not only on its possible destructive power, but also on the promptitude of this action, called its imfxd effect. The rapidity of a fire is expressed by the numl^cr of rounds expended by one man in one minute, and it is found by multiph'ing the total number of shots fired by 60 and dividing b}' the time of firing in seconds multiplied by the number of men firing. 102 Thus, if 82 men fire 526 shots in 1 min. 12 sec. (72 seconds), the rapidity of fire is ^? !ix»^" or 5-34 shots per minute per man. The rapidity of a fire rarely requires to come up to 10 rounds a minute ; 1 to 4 rounds a minute is ample as a rule, depending on the distance of the enemy. The useful effect of a fixe is measured bj- the probability of hitting by the rapidity of the fii-e, and it can be defined as the number of hits made by one man in a minute on a given object. It is found by multiph"ing the number of hits made by 60, and dividing by the time of firing in seconds multiplied by the number of men firing. Thus, if 124 hits have been made in 72 seconds by 82 men, the useful effect is -fij^S-a or 1*26 hits per minute per man. The rapidity of fire and useful effect are often calcidated per 100 men. From the above, Ave can see how it is that a quicker and less accurate fire may give a greater useful effect than a slower and more accurate one. As a general rule, as the rapidity of fire increases, the percentage of hits decreases, but the useful effect or total number of hits may be much increased. The exclusive object of rapidity being thus dangerous to accuracy, it results that efficac}^ of fire only increases with the rapidity up to a certain limit, after which it diminishes, and hence we should not exclusively try to increase the rapidity of a fire, nor to hurry on its execution. We see that in calculating tlio useful effect we only con- sider the results obtained in a given time, without reference to tho amount of ammunition expended. For accurar y, on the contrary, only the results of tho fire are considered, witliout reference to tlie time employed in obtaining tliem. In thn field, against troops in column, or against any object which has deptli as well as width and height, the useful effect depends also on tho flatness of the trajectory, or rather the dangerous zone. All progress in weapons tending to increase tho rapidity and ease of loading, also increases both the rapidity and useful effect of lire. 103 CHAPTEE VIII. DETERMINATION OF DISTANCES. The importance of this subject is best shewn by the following quotation from a lecture given on Eange-finding by Captain Watkin, E.A., in 1881, at the E.U.S. Institution. " The' necessity of knowing the distance of the object to be fired at is not one that is forcibly brought to notice under the present system of training. All, or nearly all, firing takes place at measured ranges. The soldier on coming to the practice ground is told at what elevation to put his sight, and is satisfied when he makes a good score. How bitter must be his disappointment when he comes to actual warfare and finds that his fire, which was apparently so deadly at home, is harmless at the very time when it is a matter of life or death that it should be effective. Look, on the one hand, at the annual returns of the shooting of the Army, and on the other, at the actual results obtained in the last campaign in South Africa. What is the reason of this ? Chiefly, I believe, because our soldiers are not taught (as they might be) to fire under conditions more nearly assimilating to those of actual service. For example, if dummies were put up as targets on broken ground, the men would soon find out how powerless they were to make effective practice, unless the distance were truly estimated, and would take a much keener interest in educating their eyes, even, perhaps, tolerating the use of an instrument that would help them out of their difficulty. Our artillery practice is, I consider, even more at fault, for though there may be some skill in holding a rifle straight when the range is knowoi and the target stationary, there is absolutely none required to lay a gun under similar circum- stances. The artillery also labour under the disadvantage of a very limited supply of ammunition ; but I believe both these drawbacks to efiiciency could be easily overcome without any increased expenditure. Anyone who has seriousty tried to estimate distances, must have found how difficult it is to do so with even approximate accuracy on familiar ground and at short ranges. In a stran ge^countr}^, and at longer ranges, the unaided eye_is_so unreliable as to give results quit^-Traetess' for any practical purpose. In the days of 104 smooth-bores and Brown Besses, the correct estimation of the range was perhaps not a necessity', the difference "between any two rounds fired under similar conditions being consider- able, but now that we have such guns as the 6-inch and 8-inch, which are capable of sending fifty out of a hundred shots into a vertical target, 4x5 feet, at a distance of a mile, surely it is worth while taking a little trouble to ascertain the distance, withoiit which <'veiy round woidd be lost. " The following advantages would, I believe, be gained, if an efficient-^'stein of range-finding Avere introdticed into the Army : " 1st. A demoralizing effect on the enemy by a firo efficient from its commencement. " 2nd. A steadying effect on our own men. " 3rd. A check on reckless expenditure of annnunition. " 4th. A consequent saving in transport. "But these advantages fire not to be obtained by the course hitherto pursued ; the distribution of a few range- finders to the Army without an}' organized staff, or system of training, is of no use whatever ; it is courting failure, and throwing discredit (m the whole subject. " The opinion of Officers of high standing, and of great practical experi(>nce, is that the i)ower of our artillery might bo enormously increased by the habitual use of range-finders in the hands of properly trained men. Unless, then, some such syst(>m be organizinl, we shall soon be loft hopelessly behind other nations, Avho are devoting care and attention to the su})j('(t." The following remark was made with reference* to artillery fire, })ut refers (•(pially well to infantry lire: — "The tmsatis- factory practice at unknown ranges -whilst nuuionuvring rapidly, shows tliat a large quantity of ammunition may be wasted without the fact being observable from the battery, and i)oint8 to the necessity of some means being provided for ascertaining in the field, and, within reasntly ai)proxiiiuite limits, a large quantity of valuable ammunition, and all tlie nuiro valuable from the difficulty of transporting it to the fi(>ld of battb', is absolutely wasted. In order tn hr aJilr In fire ucturolchj irilli fin;/ rijir tvhatever, tho nnldicr must k)wio tlir disiancc hrtirrrn him and the object to be hit. For instruftioual purposes in shooting, these distances are fixed and laid down liv direct measurement; but before an 105 enemy the distances are unknown, and it is necessary to appreciate them in the most prompt and exact manner possible in order to regulate the fire. Skill in appreciating distance is therefore the indispensahle complement of skill in shooting. These two processes are taught at first separately, but they should afterwards be applied together in " field firing." There are several ways of ascertaining the distance of an object with a more or less degree of accuracy : — 1 . By direct measurement. 2. By the use of optical instruments called "range- finders." 3. By the use of the plane table or prismatic compass. 4. By judging distances by sound. 5. By comparing the height of a distant standing or mounted man with a known height. 6. By the use of a large scale map. 7. By the practice of artillery near at hand. 8. By watching bullets strike the ground. 9. By judging distances by the eye. 1 . Direct Measurement of Distances. The direct measurement of distances, if carried out with a measuring tape or chain, is the most accurate method of all.* They can also be paced, for which purpose a man must know the average length of each of his paces, and to do this he should be made to pace up and down a measured distance of 100 yards and find out how many of his paces go to that dis- tance, from which the length of his pace may be got by a simple proportion sum. Men in testing their paces over a measured distance are very apt to increase the length of their paces towards the end, especially' when several trials are made, in order to make the numbers agree. They should be carefully warned against doing this, and they should practice pacing until they can pace 100 yards within 2 or 3 paces eacli time on all grounds. If the man can step 111 paces in 100 yards, then he has only to deduct -iVth of the number of paces stepped to find * If the ground, over which the measurement is made, slopes much, a correction must be made, in proportion of the cosine of the slope, to get the true horizontal distance, if this is required. 106 the corresponding; distance in yards. This gives a very natural length of pace, namely 32-4 inches, which is stepped by most men. Yards may be paced, if a man can do so, but to do this easily and without constraint, he must walk at a rate of 4 miles an hour. The average error of pacing is 3 per cent., or gVrd of the distance. But this method of measurement is quite inapplicable in the presence of the enemy, though the distances can be measured before he arrives. 2. Measueemext of Distances by Optical Instbtjments. Distances can be measured by optical instruments called range-finders. They arc all based on solving a triangle with a known base of from about 15 to 120 yards, the greater base being required for the greater range. As a rule, the generality of them can only find a range in about four minutes to within about 4 per cent., or -/-j-th, of the truth with average men, though with some instruments and under favourable circumstances it can be found to within 2 per cent., or -,Vth, of the truth in 2i minutes by skilled men. At the longer ranges — i.e., over 600 yards — it may be possible for infantry to use such instruments, if the men can do so without attracting the enemy's attention, but certainly at closer ranges, dxiring the din and smoke caused by the engagement of large bodies of troops, and under fire, the use of such instruments is no longer possible by infantry, and hence avo see the nccessit}'^ for having a rifle wliose trajectory (when using a full sight*) is under the height of a man up to 600 yards. In England, w(> have a Sub-committee of the Ordnance • At tho Hluirt (liHtiincos, just lioforo tho time for tho (Iccisivo attack, tho onnmy will make iis(> of iill the accidents of tlic f^nmiul (o cover himself ; his proscnci! is only shewn hy tlie smoke of (lie dischaj-fi^ed rifles, the removal of tli(^ woimded, or the movements of the men who leave one shelter to roach another, or to p;ain jjronnd to the front. These short and rapid a]>i)earances can only be made us(' of if the distances can ho rapidly appreciated, and the men are quick at aiming. For this latter purpose, a full sight is Ix^lter than a fine sight. And hence it would seem hotter to graduate the backsight to suit a full sight. Other reasons for this have already been given. 107 Committee for the purpose of considering the question of range-finders and their relative merits. But this Sub-com- mittee have not issued any set of conditions, for the guidance of inventors as to what they consider a range-finder must fulfil before it can be accepted. This should most certainly be done,^' together with the offer of a considerable reward, for inventors often do not really understand what is required, and as the question is a most important one with modern rapid-firing, long-range rifles, and the service Watkin range-finder is not suited for use with a rapidly advancing infantry attack, some settlement should be arrived at at an early date to prevent the waste of ammunition which a very wrong estimation of the range causes. The following headings may be taken as a guide as to the requirements which an infantry range- finder shoidd fidfil, so as to be applicable for use by infantry in actionf : — 1. Cost moderate, so that every ofiicer, and even non- commissioned officer, might have one. 2. The total amount of equipment required for use with it to find a range to be small, and to be easily replaced in the field if lost or broken. 3. It should be compact, of few pieces, of light weight, small size, and reqviiring only to be held in the hand, without the use of any tripod so as to be very portable, and capable of fairly I'ough usage without sustaining damage. 4. It should be easily and rapidly packed and unpacked, and got ready for observing. 5. It should require no delicate manipulation, education of the e3'e, or mathematical knowledge. The ranges should be given, for preference automatically or by a simple miiltiplication or division sum. It should not require the use of verniers or microscopes. 6. It should be easy and convenient to use. 7. It should not require being placed with extreme accuracy over a given spot, which only causes delay. 8. Its maximum eiTor should never be greater than 100 yards at 1,500 yards, so as not to require more than two elevations to be used in combination. (See Chap. IX.) * This has just been done for the first time, see service papers for 26th May, 1888. It is to be hoped that this excellent precedent will be extended to all other army materiel requiring improvement. t See pages 381 and 382 for the general conditions which a range- finder should fulfil for this purpose. 108 9. It should be of strong and simple mechanism, not easily put out of, or constanth- recpiiring, adjustment; hut it shoidd he capahle of being tested to see if it is in adjustment, and, at the same time of being readjusted accurately when this is found necessary. 10. It should be capable of easy repair, if damaged. 11. It shoidd only require, if possible, one man to take a range, but not more than two men, who would otherwise get in each other's way, and attract the enemy's fire. 12. It should be capable of taking a range in two minutes at the most. 13. It shoidd, if possible, allow of ranges in different directions being obtained from the same base.* 11. It should be capable of being used by men kneeling or lying down. 15. It should be capable of being conveniently and rapidly used by advancing infantry, who make periodical short halts. 16. It should be capable of l)eing used with a telescope or other magnifying apparatus. 17. It should be easy to teach to men. 18. It should not require a longer base tlian the length of a rifle, if possible, or of over 50 yards for the longest ranges ever required to be fired over by infantry, and, if possible, means should be provided for obtaining the length of the base without direct mcastirement. But this latter conditicm is not vcr}' important, as the observer has, as a rule, to pass from one end of tlie base to th(> other, aiul he can pace it while doing so. For this purpose accurate pacing is required, whicli should, therefore, be frequ<'ntly clH^cked over measured distances. At ranges over GOO or 800 yards, time and circumstances allow of a 50 j-anls ])ase bring paced in comparative safety, * Tlio only raiifji'-findiT.s nmonfrst Ihosc tlial arc now in ijcncrnl nsc, that pintidlhj I'uKil tliis r('(|nircniciit air tlic I'latc and I ) red j^c- Steward inHlnuncntM. All (he others rc(iuir(! an alteration in the direction of tlio base with any chanj^e in the direction of tlie ranj^^c roipiircd. The Nolan inRtrumont also fnllilH this roquirnment, b>it, there arc other objoctions to this ranpe-findcr, which will bo pointed ont, fnrther on. The JIallock rHnpe-findfT is the only one whith perfectly I'lilfils this requirement. fSec p. 110). 109 and consequently of the range being taken with a range-finder requiring a greater base than the length of a rifle. With such a range-finder, once the range is found, the subsequent ranges can be found by deducting the distances traversed by the advancing line, hostile or otherwise, as detennined by pacing or estimation. Eange-finders requiring only a 5 feet or smaller base, and capable of reading to within 50 yards up to 800 yards, should be carried by officers and non-com- missioned officers for determining ranges under 800 yards ; one of the other kinds, requiring a longer base, could be cari'ied in each company by a non-commissioned officer trained in its use. The Mallock range-finder seems to promise great things as a short base range-finder. It must, however, be remembered that, " In order to obtain the full benefit of any range-finder, thoroughly competent observers must be employed. To hope that any method of range-finding can be used by men who are unskilled, is a delusion." It is a most important point to know the capabilities of range-finders for rapid use in an advancing infantry firing line in action at ranges over 600 yards. Under that distance the accuracy of a trained enemy's fire would not permit of much work of that sort, and the probable errors made in guessing the ranges under 600 yards would be, more or less, in keeping with the practical dangerous zones (if we include the effect of ricochets) of the rifle at present in use, and Avill be quite in keeping with any of the proposed rifles of the future. AVe will now give a short account of the principal different optical range-fiiiders that have been proposed. They may be grouped in three types : — 1st type. — Those requiring a fixed short base, as Clerk's Gruthi'ie's, Adie's, Berdan's, and Malloek's. 2nd type. — Those partaking of the nature of a theodolite, as Nolan's. Zrd type. — Those partaking of the nature of a sextant, as the Sextant, Watkin's, Poste's, Drayson's, De Bylandt's, Weldon's, Eobert's, Goulier's, Gautier's, Labbez's, Dredge-Steward's, and Bate's. The optical range-finders of the first type find the distance by the amount of displacement of the object as seen from either end of the base. But this arrangement, which appears simple and correct in principle broke down until latel}^ in practice, owing to the gi-eat difficulty of superimposing the images with 110 exactness, from tliese images being so very unsteady on account of being reflected from single mirrors. But Mr. Mallock lias lately devised an instrument,*'' con- sisting of a tube only 2^ or 5 feet in total length, and which can be carried in parts ; it has two mirrors set at 45° at one end and two mirrors set at 45° to one another when the index is reading zero, but which angle can be slightly altered by a micrometer screw. A telescope looks partly into one of the two last mirrors and partly past it. The instrument can be held vertically or horizontalh' by one man, and 10 readings can be taken by him within two minutes with only a maximum error of 100 j'ards at a range of 2,500 j-ards, and 50 yards at a range of 1,500 yards when the 5 feet base is used; with the 2^ feet base the maximum errors are 100 yards at 1,500 yards and 50 j-ards at 1,000 yards. The use of the four miiTors, instead of two, prevents, for reasons that cannot be gone into here, any errors due to a slight bending of the tube being felt. It requires no apparatus, it only requires one man so work it, it contains its own base, it gives the range directly from a scale, and it is easily adjusted and tested. It, in fact, is the one and only instrument whicli almost entirely fulfils all the conditions laid down on pp. 107, 108, and on pp. .381, 382, and it can be perfectly easily used by an advancing infantry line in action. The only disadvantage in the instrument is the loss of light that occurs in the reflected image from its being reflected four times. Its weight in its present experimental form is five pounds. The Her dan Range-finder used by the Kussians is carried on a cart, and consists of two very large telescopes fixed at a distance of 6 feet apart, one of tliem Ijeing capable of a slight angular displacement. To olitain tlie range, the cross wires of botli telescopes are directed on to exactly the same portion of the object, and the angular movement of the movable telescope, as registered by a micromct(>r screw, gives the distance. Tliis instruiucnt does not fullil tlie IGtli condition given on p. 108. * Thift inNtrmncnt is oxactly similar in ])riii(ii)lr lo one inventod by Cai)t. Gautior (not llu! Kamo instrument us tliat mciitiuncil on i)ago 114). it was shown at tlio I'aris Kxliibition of 1807, ami is oxplaiticd in Vol. XVIU. of Iho U.K. Professional TajxTs of 1H70. Vi\\A. (iautier's range-finder would seem admiraldy adajjted for artillery purposes, and eluims to measuru distuuccs up to 0,000 yardb accuratoly cnuugh for practical pui-posca. Ill Tlie Nolan Range-finder consists of two separate telescopes, mounted somewhat like theodolites, placed on two tripods or gun carriages some distance apart, by which the two base angles of the triangle can be measured, and the range found by means of a calculating disc, when the base is known. This was at one time the service range-finder, but it has since been superseded by less cumbersome and equally accurate ones. The third type of optical rangefinders, like the others, find the range by the solution of a triangle. AVith the Sextant, and with Watkin's, Poste's, and Drayson's instruments, the tri- angle solved is a right-angled triangle. The right angle is laid off at one end of the base by an optical square, carried separately or contained in the instrument, and the angle at the other end is measured by the instrument which, when the base is known, gives the range either automatically, or in multiples of the base, or from a table. One fault of the Sextant ty^e of instrument (the Sextant, "Watkin's, and Poste's) is that they are affected by parallax, an error due to the distance apart of the glasses, and this parallax varies inversely as the distance of the object directly looked at. In the Sextant onl}' can this error be found and allowed for. Under favorable conditions, ranges can be found by means of the Sextant (even a pocket one) and suitable tables, with surprising accurac}'. The Watkin Eange-findcr, which is the present service one, is, in reality, only a sextant, in which the horizon glass is movable, and the index glass is fixied,"^-" and hence, as the horizon glass moves, the position of the eye must be moved accordingly. To save the trouble of direct measure- ment, the same instrument is made to measure the true base by means of a subsidiary base 1 8 feet long, and after adjusting a sliding pivot to the true base on a graduated bar, the range is denoted automatically on a di'um, the movement of which alters the position of the index glass slightly in order to measure the angle at the opposite end of the base to the right angle. This instrument is affected by parallax, and if used by an unpracticed observer very different results can be obtained for the same range, from the difficulty of holding it exactly in the. true plane passing through the observer's eye, the object observed, and the head of the picket at the other * In the Sextant the horizon glass and the position of the eye opposite it are fixed, while the index glass, attached to the index arm, moves. 112 end of the base. The inventor states that with this instru- ment ranges can be found in two minutes to within 1 per cent, of the trutli, but such accuracy and rapidity is not generally obtainable, as extreme accuracy is required in laying off the right angle, in holding the instrument exactly over the ends of the base, and keeping it in the plane given by three fixed points. It is too expensive, and its accessories are too large and numerous for it to form any part of the equipment of an officer or non-commissioned officer, while it is not an easy instru- ment to learn. But the adjustments are easy, it is one of the most accurate instruments yet invented, its size and weight (independently of the pickets that have to be used with it) are convenient, and two men are the most required to work it. It is, however, well adapted for artillery purposes, when its equipment can be easily carried. Fosfe\-Steward range-finder. Messrs. Elliott Bros., 101, St. Martin's Lane, Strand, are the manufacturers of tlie Bate rang(>-finder, and Messrs. Steward, 40G, Strand, London, of the Dredge-Steward range-finder. But tlie best instrument of all for infantry purposes is the 2i feet Mullock instrument. Officers could easily carry this in plac(f of field glasses, as it is used witli a telescope. A 5 ft. instrumeut could lie carried per company or per battalion for the better determination of long ranges. 3. Mkahuiikmknt of Distances with the Plane TaIILK AM) PlUSMATIC CoMTASS. For troops in a defensive or stationary position, witli ample time, iind at some little distance from the enemy, the plane 117 table is not only tlie very simplest, but at the same time one of the most accurate instruments for finding ranges. It finds the ranges by plotting triangles to scale. Any base can be used to obtain good triangles, and the ranges of many objects in different directions can be found from the same base, "svhile the saving of time in taking such a number of ranges is considerable. It only requires one man to work it. Since the value of the plane table as a surveying instrument has been recognised, it will always be found with an English army in the field, among either the Staff or the Engineer stores, and indeed it would be a great advantage for one to be car- ried in the regimental stores of every battalion. The prismatic compass can be used in the same way, though it is not nearly so accurate as the plane table. But neither of these instruments can be used in an advancing infantry line, and hence they can only be looked on as auxiliary methods which can be used under suitable conditions. The plane table and prismatic compass give the horizontal distance of the objective from the observer; all other methods of finding the range give the actual length of the line joining these two points ; the differences, however, in the ranges obtained on account of this, will not, in most cases, be of sufficient importance to be taken into consideration. 4. Measurement of Distaxces by Soukd. Sound travels at the rate of 1,113 feet or 371 yai'ds in a second, when the temperature of the air is 50" F., and this rate increases or decreases at about r0966 feet for each degree Fahr., for temperatm-es respectively above or below the one given above; the velocity also increases somewhat with the loudness of the sound, but these variations cannot cause any serious error in the ranges estimated by sound. Wind, the humidity of the air, and barometric pressure strongly influence the intensity of the sound, but very slightly its velocity^ and hence, in ordinary circumstances, they do not cause any sensible errors in the appreciation of distances by sound. When the smoke or flash of a rifle or gun is seen, there exists a certain time before the noise of the e.xplosion is heard. If this time can be estimated in seconds we can calculate the distance the sound has come. This method is particidarly advantageous when opposed to a well sheltered enemy who tires without being seen. Besides 118 whicli it is susceptible of considerable accuracy (to within 50 yards of a range), which, allows of its use in different circum- stances when the direct measure of the distances is impossible. The time between the sight and sound of the explosion can be estimated by the aid of a mental counting at a given rate, which can be learnt thus. Take a lead ball and hang it by a thread to a nail so as to oscillate fi-eely. The length of this pendulum between the point of suspension and the centre of the ball should be exactly 39J inches. The time of each oscillation of this penduliun, that is the time taken by the pendulum to go from one end of the swing to the other, is one second. The rate of coimting that should be leanit is to coimt 11 in the interval of 3 oscillations,* because sound travels 1,100 yards nearly in that interval, and then as a man counts the imits of the natural nimibers. 1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6, etc., beginning with 1 directly he sees the smoke or flash, each imit corresponds to a distance of 100 yards. f Thus the number 6 counted between the smoke and the soimd would correspond to 600 yards. As one is very apt to lose the proper cadence, continual practice is essential. A watch with a second hand can also be used for this bj^ officers. The counting should begin directly the smoke is seen, or else large errors will arise, but it requires practice to do this. "This counting can easily be acquired by most soldiers, no artificial instrxrment being needed ; this faculty is one thing in favour of this method of calcidating distances, another is, that while by other methods the greater the distance the greater the proportionate error, in this it is the reverse, the greater the distance the less the proportionate error; this method is not one claiming to supersede others, but it is a useful and simple adjunct." In the quiet of the night this method of judging distance by Bound after seeing the flash is veiy good. However, this method has some disadvantages. The appreciation of distances b}^ sound jircsonts groat tlifficulties in a continuous fusilade, or when the firer is so sheltered • If the pendulum is 2.92 inches in lonplh between the point of suspension and centre of the ball, each swing will represent 100 yards. t Theoretically the count should begin at directly the enemy is Hcr-n to fire, Imt practirally the brain cannot tftke up the coimt so quickly and the sound has travelled .some diRtance before the count is begun, and consequently it has been found that better results are obtained by beginning the count at 1 instead of 0. 119 that the smoke is only visible some instants only after the shot has been fired. If there is much noise going on around, as when fii'ing, it drowns the sound of the enemy's shot, and if the enemy is fixing much any one particular shot cannot be selected to judge from, as all the sounds run into one another. There is another serious drawback to this method, which is, having to wait until the enemy commences firing. Judging distances from the fire of a single rifle is difficult beyond 1,300 yards, and is impossible beyond 1,600 yards.* From the sound of the simultaneous fire of a body of 50 men, distances can be judged up to 3,000 yards, and by the fire of artillery up to 6,500 yards. Instruments for measuring ranges by sound are much used by the French and other Continental nations. They are simple, cheap, and, under farotirahle conditions, give results not to be surpassed by other kinds of range-finders. Two dilf erent kinds will now be referred to. The Boulenge Range-finder or telemeter consists of a closed glass tube about 6 inches long filled with benzine, and contains a silver traveller or indicator, formed of two discs connected with a central wire. The diameter of the discs is rather less than that of the tube,f and the traveller descends slowly | and uniformly when the tube is held verticall}', from the resistance of the liquid in it. A scale showing every 25 yards is engraved on the tube, the intermediate readings being estimated by eye. A wood or copper covering preserves the glass tube fi'om breakage. One end of the instrument can carry a small compass, and the other be utilized as a shrill whistle. The instrument, with the indicator at zero, is held horizontally in the hand, the back of which is kept upper- most, and when the smoke or flash of an enemy's gun is seen, it is rapidly placed vertically and replaced horizontal when the report is heard. When each observer knows his only personal error (which is about yth of a second on an average) and applies it, the maximum error is 25 yards for all ranges, while veiy often no error is made at all. At Hythe it was found that under 400 yards the time was too short between seeing the flash or smoke and hearing the * At Hythe this distance was found to he 1,000 yards. t The dimensions have hecn calculated so as to equalize, by its expansion, the error caused by the expansion of the liquid and the increased velocity of sound, due to an increase of atmospheric temperature. i It has a velocity 25,000 times less than that of sound. 120 report to use the instrument with success, while over 1,000 yards the smoke and report of a single rifle were not properl}' seen or heard. Artillery can be seen and heard at a longer distance. Under 400 yards, however, the flatness of the trajectory is such that an accurate estimate of the range is not essential. The Watch Itange-Jinder exactly resembles a common watch in appearance. The two hands are placed at XII. or zero. A small spring catch is placed on one of the wheels, so that, after the watch has been wound up, the slightest pressure on the spring catch releases the wheel and the hands fly round, the long hand 12 times faster than the small hand. On removing the pressure from the catch, both hands are stopped instantly, and the number of revolutions made by each of the hands is registered on the face of the watch since the instant the pressure was applied, and a comparison of this number with a table gives the distance of the origin of the sound. Ranges can be read with this instrument to within 10 yards, especially if the officer knows his personal error. The great fault of all range-finders depending on the velocity of sound is that we must wait the enemy's pleasure to fire, before we can ascertain the range in his presence. "With regard to jiulging distances by sound the English musketry regulations say : — Judging distance by sound can only be looked upon as auxiliary to judging by sight. It might be usefid, under favoiirable circumstances, at long range, and in front of a well-posted enemy, who fires occasional shots from cover without showing himself ; and it is the only method by which distance can be judged at night. It is certainly quicker than the range finder, and can be used when the latter cannot, and b}' its means long distances can be judged luore accurately than short distances. Witli a body of men properly instructed, the moan of errors should not exceed rjO yards. It is, however, useless to try to judge distance l)y sound wlu-n the enemy's fire is well sustained, or when liis men arc sheltered in sudi a way that the smoke i^an only be seen some instants after the sliot has been fired. It is difficult to judge distance fioni tlio rc'])ort of a single rille l)oyond 1,200 yards, and im]i()ssibl(! t(i do so fityond 1,500 yards. Section volleys will enable the distance to bo judged up to 3,200 yards, and the fii'e of artillery up to 6,500 yards or nearly 3J miles. 121 5. Measuremext of Distances by Comparison of Known Heights. The principle of this method is to ascertain the distances by the variable angle an object of known height subtends at different distances. The objects chosen are a standing man, or a mounted horseman, of average height, that is, these objects are made the distant base of a triangle whose apex is at the observer, and the distance is found by similar triangles. To effect this, telescopes have been used, having in the focus of the object glass two horizontal wires, the distance between which can be varied. Other scales seen against the wires gives the distances at which a standing or mounted man would fill the space between the wires. These instruments have not proved satisfactory, and besides, standing men or horsemen vary in height and may not be fully seen, while the instruments require strong steady tripods to enable the wires to be laid on the object. Also a distance is often required where there is no man to be seen to judge from. A very simple though rough method of appreciating distances has been lately proposed in France. Its advantages are its simplicity and lightness, and that it gives distances more accurately than when these are guessed by the eye alone. The instrument, if it can be called such, is only the figures of a standing and kneeling man (^-o-th of the real size) drawn on and cut out of the edge of a piece of cardboard, sufficient paper being left at the base to enable it to be held by the forefinger and thumb. An assistant holds this up steadily and the observer moves backwards until the card- board figure agrees in size with the man observed in the distance. The distance between the observer and the man holding the cardboard is measured, and multij)lied by 50, to obtain the range. Taking 5 feet 6 inches as the average height of an upright man, the theoretical error caused by observing men 5 feet 3 inches and 5 feet 10 inches would be less than iVth of the distance sought. If the distance between the observer and the assistant is measured by pacing, we may have a possible error of -3-3-rd of the. range. These two errors acting together might cause an error of -iVth of the range. Added to these, is the difficulty of precisely judging when the figure exactly coincides with the object observed. In France, out of 30 measurements, only one had an error as great as ^th the range, while the mean error was only -A-nd of the range. It is not necessary to see 122 the wliole object ; it is sufficient if only the upper part of the man's body can be seen, but if the cardboard figure is lit up more than the object, it should be shaded. This process can be used in clear weather up to 1,100 yards and over, but it is best to use field glasses with such long ranges. The dis- advantage of this method is that it requires a bit of ground sloping parallel to the line of sight to the enemy, and hence could not be used on the crest of a position or on groimd that does not slope as required, and further, in the presence of the enemy it requires the enemy to show himself. 6. Measurement of Distances by Mats. Eanges can be measured from maps drawn to a large scale. The accuracy of this method dejiends on the scale of the map, but on a one inch map ranges can be measured to within 25 yards, and on a six inch map to within 5 j-ards, by the aid of ordinary dividing compasses. Thus this method is one of the most accurate ways of ascertaining a range, but, on the other hand, such maps are not always available, and the exact position of the enemy on the map cannot always be known with certainty. 7. Measubement of Distances by the Fire of Artillery. The ranges of certain objects fired at by artillery can be obtained from the artillery officers when they are near enough at hand ; and then knowing these ranges, others can be judged by comparison with them. Artillery can easily ascertain ranges up to 1,500 yards l)}- watching tlio burst of their shells, and seeing if they fall short or over, and so regulate their sights, but at longer ranges it is very hard to say what tlie amount of such an error may l)e. As infantry pass by artillery in action, tliey should always enquire the rangi', and then deduct the amount they move forward. 8. Measurement of Distance by the Fire of Infantry. In a similar way, under favourable circumstances, the " strike " of a large number of bullets (the Germans say from 123 80 men, tlie Austrlans, 8 to 14 men) fired simultaneously at the same object can be watched. But the method is only suitable for distances over 600 j'ards from the enemj^* and the fall of bullets cannot be seen, even on favourable ground and with strong glasses, over 1,300 yards. If the ground is at all stony or hard, or covered with grass or standing crops, or in wet weather, the strike cannot be observed at comparatively close ranges, and even with a good telescope and on favourable ground, the strike cannot be seen beyond 1,300 yards, nor consequently the elevation corrected. In the Umbeyla Campaign ( 1 863) on the north-west frontier of India, a certain number of explosive bullets were taken for ascertaining ranges, which proved very successful ; but explosive bullets are no longer allowed in war by the Declara- tion of St. Petersburg, dated 11th December, 1868, to which Great Britain attached her consent. 9. Measurement of Distances by Eye. If we have no other means of finding the range of an object, we must judge or rather guess the distance of it. Judging distances by sight depends on the degree of visibility of the object, on the distinctness with which it can be seen, on its apparent height when its dimensions are known, and on the comparison of its distance with a known distance that a man has either marked down before him, or engraven on his memory. The distinctness with which any object at any particular distance is visible varies considerably with different men, and no inflexible rule, for estimating distances, can, therefore, be laid down. Further, judging distances is a very difficult operation to do with an3i;hing like accuracy, as so many physical circumstances, such as the 'position of the sun, the time of day, the nature of the lighting, the state of the atmosphere, the nature and colour of the background, whether, the intervening ground rises or falls, &c., affect the appearance of the object and its apparent distance, so much so that one- * See Chapter XIV. for reason why "volley" firing cannot be used under this range in action. At 300 yards . -A-th At 600 yards . ith At 1,200 yards . itli 124 eighth of the estimated distance may he considered as the minimum possible error at the longer ranges, even when judged by at least four practical and skilful observers, and the mean of their observations taken. The American regulations state that the mean errors of estimating distances are — the estimated range. But the rules for firing in continental armies are based on an average error of ith the estimated range at all distances, and consequently this value of the error of judging distances will be the one used throughout the following pages. Objects seem nearer the better they are lighted ; the larger they are, the brighter their colour ; the darker the background against which they stand, the purer the air ; the more uniform the tint of the ground between them and the observer. They look further off when looking towards the sun {i.e., when the sun is in our eyes), and vice versa. The clear, cold air of winter, or after a thunderstorm, makes objects look clearer and nearer, while snow, rain, fog, powder smoke, or the vapour caused by the heat of the sun makes them look further off. Bad weather makes objects look confused and further off. A smooth expanse, as fields covered with snow, cornfields, or water, has the effect of rendering the distances apparently shorter. Ground falling from the observer has the same effect, and the contrary when it risers. Undulating ground tends to make objects look further off, while flat ground has the contrary effect. In the (-lear air of mountains objects look much nearer than they really are. Men must be exorcised first at known, Ix'foro tliey can judge unknown distances. Each man sliould try and remember what parts of the figure, arms, accoutrements, dress, »S:c., of men he can clearly see at diffen^nt distances. Too minute observations should ))o avoided and the upper parts of the bodies sliould 1)0 examined in preference to the lower parts, as th(!So latter arc often masked; tlie colour of the uniform need not be noted, as it is different for different armies and (;veu for different brandies of the same H(!rvico. The Kussian Colonel Kaulbars, in liis well-known report on the German Army, states that general rules used in Germany for estimating ranges are as follows : — 12.3 "At 50 metres a man can see the mouth and eyes of an enemy clearh". ,,100 ,, ,, ,, the e3'es as points. ,, 200 ,, ,, ,, the buttons and different parts of the uniform. ,, 300 ,, ,, ,, the face. ,, 400 ,, ,, ,, the movements of the arms and legs. ,, 500 ,, ,, ,, colour of the cloth. "•'' But each man must form rules for himself, because the same ones cannot hold good for all men, as the strength and clearness of vision of different men varj^ considerably, and objects will naturally vary in appearance according to the eyesight of the observer. The height of the foresight, when the rifle is in the firing position, covers half the height of an infantry soldier at 200 yards, and the whole height at 400 yards. Beyond 650 yards it is difficult to estimate the range from the appearance of single men alone ; squads of 3 or 4 men at least, should then be examined in different attitudes. Judging distances should be practised by men and officers over all kinds of ground, in all directions, in all weathers, and at all times of the year, to show them the practical diificulties of appreciating distances by sight, and how the appearances of men and objects are modified by their situation, according as they are lit up or in shadow, or on hilly or flat ground, or in cut up or open country. As a rule, short ranges are over estimated and long ranges under estimated ; the range which each man can usually estimate correctly varies with the man, but it is about 500 yards for most men who have had sufficient practice. It is an advantage, however, to slightl}^ under- estimate the longer ranges, because experiments have shewn that in collective firing a better result is gained by using elevations rather under that for the exact range than by using the proper elevation. From what has been said we can see that as so many considerations affect it, the eye is the very worst means of judging distances, no two men will give the same answer, for practicall}' it is entirely guess-work, and the greater the inaccuracy of the method of judgment the more it * This is in reference to the dark hlue and dark green uniforms used abroad. En^lisli red can be distina:uished at much Ioniser distances. 126 is to be deprecated, as it causes greater waste of precious ammunition. The inaccuracy of judging distances by eye is further in- creased in action, by a want of coobiess in those judging, who are themselves being fired at and are consequently excited and nervous. The latest Grerman Musketry Eegidations, in treating of the appreciation of distances, gives preference to the method of guessing ranges by eye, principally by means of the remem- brance of known distances, well engraved by practice on the memory of the soldier, and also by comparisons made of the different appearances which the human body, and the dress, arms, and accoutrements, present at different distances. But the regulations adds as a warning, that comparisons of this kind on the person of an enemy are always difficult to make in war, in the usual conditions of battle. The Germans teach their men by constant practice in varied ground to judge distances up to the limit of individual fire only, i.e., up to 400 metres exactly, and up to 800 metres approximately, and their ofEcers and non-commissioned officers up to 800 metres exactly, and up to 1,200 mutres approximately, the extreme limit that they consider that infantry fire should be used up to (see Chapter XII.). But in every German company, the 6 or 8 men Avho show the best aptitude for judging distances are, while placed under the orders of a non- commissioned officer, distributed along the extended firing line, and in action, after every forward movi>ment of their own side or of the enemy, tht^y call out to the non-com- missioned officer what they judge the range to be, and he informs the officers what is the average of the estimates made. This is an admirable system and one worthy of imitation. The Germans train their men to estimate distances more by the rem<;mbrance of known distances "well engraved " on the mind tlian by the different appearances of an enemy's bcKly at different ranges, because "the conditions of combat rarely permit of such observations being made on the person of the adversary as can 1)0 utilised fur the estimation of distances." (Jonsei^uoutly the men are tlioroughly exercised in en- graving on tlieir memory tlio distances of .00, 100, and 200 metres hy rcpriitcd exercises in varied ground ; these distances wlien impressed on the memory, then serve as " units of measure," for estimating distances wliilo remembering that 127 the same length on the surface of the ground appears shorter as it is further from the observer. To train the men, the above three distances, are picketed out on the ground in different directions across the front and away from the men. The men are made to observe when standing, kneeling, and lying down, the different appearances of these lengths at different distances and in different directions. The men are then tested at unknown distances, which distances they have to measure with a cord of known length or by pacing. The causes of any errors of evaluation are explained (see page 124.)* When the men are found efficient at estimating distances up to 200 metres they are then trained to estimate distances up to 400 metres, and after that up to 800 metres. For estimating distances over 200 metres and up to 400 metres, one of two methods can be used, viz.: — 1 . The observer estimates how many large units of measure, {i.e., of 100 or 200 metres) there are in the distance, and the remainder he divides by eye into fractions of 50 metres. 2. The observer seeks some point which he thinks divides the distance in half. He then divides by eye the nearest half again in two, until he thinks he can accurately estimate the portion of the range nearest him, which he multiplies by twice the number of divisions he has made. Should anything interfere with finding suitable points for sub-dividing the distances (as when a deep dip occurs in the intervening ground, or when the distance is across water) then the observer can choose an object in another direction which appears to be at the same distance, and judge its distance. The G-erman regulations prefer this second method, on account of the difficulty of estimating the fore-shortening of the unit of measure, as the distance increases. Distances up to 800 metres are estimated in the same way by the men ; and officers and non-commissioned officers are trained in the same way, to estimate distances up to 1,200 metres. The regulations also recommend that the men should have impressed on them, the lengths of certain distances which they have to go over daily, or which are continually before their eyes, such as the dimensions of the parade ground, the length of a portion of a road over which they habitually pass, etc. * The German regulations say, that in a combat, distances are generally imderv((Uied especially in the lying down or crouching position. 128 Eksumk. From the foregoing we see that direct measuremeut of distances is onl}- possible when the enemy is not present ; range-finders, such as are at present in use, except the Mallock instrument which may not be at hand when required, are. onlj' available over 600 A-ards and then onty under favourable con- ditions ; judging by eye is available at all times, but is a most inaccurate method; judging by sound, though very accurate, is only applicable in certain cases but not for general use under all circumstances; judging by comparison of heights is only better than by eye ; artillery laaj be some distance off and allowances have to be made for the distance of the observer from the guns, and for any difference in distance between the objectives; the strike of bullets can rarely be seen ; and maps may not be available. However, judging by eye, in spite of its inaccuracy, is the only method suitable for general use at all times, and there- fore it should be constantly practised. The mass of the privatesjind corporals should be aide to judge distances up to 600 yards, and some specially trained men, sergeants and officers, up to the extreme graduation of the ritle or to 1,400 yards, to within one-tenth of the range, so that, under the more unfavourable circumstances of war, they can rely on finding them to within an eighth of the range.* Field glasses should also be made use of if necessary. The mass of the men should n«jt be trained over the above distances, for if so, they will tlien think they may fire at such ranges. Judging distauci's, difficult in peace tinu', is still more so in war, whert' the opponents are continually moving. It slioidd be carefully impressed on every man how usele.ss the fire of an individual man is unless lie is capable of estimating correctly the distance* of tlie object aimed at. Tliis difficulty not only increases witli llie range, but in a more rapid ])r()portion. }F/n/i 0)1 the (IrfenHtvc, and if tinu* pi'rmits Ix-fore the arrival of tlie enemy, (he ground and slopes ((round the jjom'tion should be studied with cure, the distances of all important points should be measured uith the greatest exactness, and other positions marked, if necessary, by cairns of stone, bunches of straw, lopped trees, or otli(!r Himphf nusans, taking care to arrange tliem so tlmt they will not IxMiefit tlu) enemy. Tlie ranges when found should be handed to tlie immediate headers of tlie men, so as to make tlieir fin- us terrible aspossibh' at all stages of tlie fight. • The alK)vc iin; tho o.xtroiiie distunccH laid down in the Americuii regulatioii.s I'm- training men and (dticfi.s to o.'^liniale distani'ij.-i. 1-29 PART II. CHAPTER IX. COLLECTIVE FIRE.— COMBINED USE OF TWO OR MORE ELEVATIONS.— RICOCHETS. The definition of collective fire lias already been given on p. 79, and before going furtlier we must warn the reader that wfi^are nx)w going to deal with conditions which are totally different from those governing an individual fire. As we have seen in Part I, the efiicacy of an individual fire depends (1) on the ballistic properties of the rifle, (2) on the skill of the man, (3) on his skill in appreciating distances, and (4) on atmospheric influences. Further, in Part I., the inaccuracy and inefiicacy of a frontal individiial fire at ranges over40U-y-aids.in the field was pointed out, from the extent of the errors in shooting ; from the pro- bable error in estimating the range, which increases with the range, not being in harmony with the dangerous zone, which decreases with the range ; from the point of mean impact not being likely to coincide with the point aimed at ; from the effects of deviating causes being appreciably felt ; from the unknown variations required in the elevation on account of atmospheric changes; and from the effects of the fire not being seen, and hence from not being able to correct them. In fact the wonder at first sight is, that, under such very adverse circumstances as have been enumerated in Chapter III. Part I., an indi\"idual man can hit a single enemy at all at ranges over 400 yards, but the explanation of the fact that men are killed and wounded beyond this range is that, (1 ) if the fire of a number of men be directed on the same object, then all the opposing influences already enumerated do not affect all the men equally, and some of the bullets are certain to hit the object aimed at, and also (2) that the enemy is in several lines of men close to, and close behind, one another, so that if the man aimed at is missed, one of those on either side or behind him may be hit. 130 The fii'st of these conditions is the only one that it is in the power of either side to control or make use of, and it can only be attained itj a collective fire being directed on a named objective, and not by each man firing as he pleases, which would ordy be the same as uncontrolled independent individual firing, because each man would then be firing at a different point or object in front of him. In order not to create a wrong impression by the term " uncontrolled independent firing," it may be stated here that though individual men may be firing independently, yet they may all be firing {a) at one object, or {b) at different objects; the former is a collective fire, and points to its being con- trolled by a liigher authority : the latter is the fi-ontal and uncontrolled fire which we have hitherto considered. Ha\'ing stated the result that can be attained by collective firing, let us see how it can be best conducted to get the greatest effect from it, i.e., to make the greatest number of bullets hit. The fii'st thing we see is that in order to get a collective fire the men must all fire at the same objective, and to do this they must be under control. If the named objective has any breadth, the men firimj at it need not all fire at exactly the same spot, for a little consideration will show that the effect will be exactly the same whether the fire be distributed along this front, or directed at any particular spot on it. But if the front of the named objective is not of the same density or size throughout, that is to say, if some parts of the enemy's line consist of men grouped together, and others of men extended, or, if in some parts men are standing up and in others lying down, then, of course, the firing would be directed on densest and most expos(Hl i)ortions. When a body of men fire on the sauK^ object witli nominally the same eh^vation, th(^ men forming th(^ maxs wlio arc firing, cannot all have rifies with the same peculiarities, or uso identically the same elevations, have the same power of eyesight, uso the same amount of foresight, have the same steadiness, &c., nor can they be siuiilarly affected by the samci moral influen(!es, and hence tlieir fire becomes spread over a consid(M-abl(! space, especially in the direction of the fire. Th(!re results from this a number of tinjcMtories which form, as a whole, a cone aualogous to that formed by the fire of individual men, but which has much greater dimensions in all directions. The groups thus obtained, either on a vertical target or on tin.' ground, may bo called collective groups, and as 131 it is difficult from their size to collect them on a vertical target, especially Tvhen the range is rather great or the number of men firing is considei'able, it is usiial to note the groupings of the shots on the groimd in order to study their distribution, and to ascertain the length and breadth of the efficacious or heaten ground or %one^', as it is called, which includes the whole, or any given percentage, of the shots. If the groupings of the shots for any given elevation or range be noted on the grovuid, or on a vertical plane, they will be foimd to form a kind of an ellipse, the greater axis of which is in the direction of the fire, and the hits in this ellipse will be found to be most densely grouped towards the centre of the siu'face struck, just as in the fire of a single arm. When the ground is parallel to the line of sight, the depth of the ground struck by shots fired with the same elevation is found to decrease as the distance of the object increases. Fig. 8. When a sufficiently large number of bidlets are fired at different ranges of from 500 yards up to 1,400 yards, the beaten zone is equal to about 300 yards on an average at the shorter, and 200 yards at the longer range, if we only consider 90 per cent, of the hits, that is, deducting 10 per cent, for abnormal hits. Over 1,400 yards the depth of the beaten ground, for 90 per cent, of the hits begins to decrease more rapidly. But, if we only take the densest part of the group, including the best 50 per cent, of the shots, the beaten zone is about 150 yards at 500 j^ards, and 100 yards at 1,400 yards ; or half these distances in front and half in rear of the point of mean impact, which latter should corre- spond with the range if the proper elevation nas been used. Thus, if the body of men firing is divided into two equal parts, and the two halves simultaneously use sights differing by fifty yards, the depth of the beaten zone at 1,400 yards for * The dangerous zone of a collective fire is the beaten zone, plus the theoretical dangerous zone of the lowest trajectory-, given in Table I., pp. 8 and 9. I 2 132 the best fifty per cent, of the shots is increased to 150 yards ; if two sights differing by 100 yards are used, this beaten zone is increased to 200 yards. If the body of men is divided up into three equal parts and use sights differing by 100 yards, this beaten zone is increased to 300 yards, and so on. These numbers can be corroborated by means of the dia- grams of musketr}- fire drawn up by the English Siege Operations Committee, from experiments made at Dungeness in 1879-1880. In all these experiments, executed by a body of men firing at the same object and with the same elevation, the vtasfi of tlie bullets fell within the limits of 150 yards* under and over tlie range for which the elevation was suited, the intensity of fire t)eing greatest at about tlie proper range for the elevation used, and decreasing gradually both ways, thereby enormously increasing the practical beaten zones of such a fire, practically making it over 800 yards foi- each range. This is very important indeed, because Avhen the collective fire of a number of men is being dealt with, the practical dangerous zones of individual fire for a given range may be neglected as being too small to be considered. Some experiments carried out in Ik^lgium in 1881 and 1883 showed that :— 1. With trained and chosen men tlie best 50 p.c. of the hits covered 100 metres at all ranges. 2. With average men the best 50 p.c. of the hits were spread over 150 mrtres at ranges undrr 1,000 inctres ; over 125 metres at 1,000 metres; over 100 metres at ranges between 1,000 and 1,1()0 metres; and over 125 nuHres ut ranges over 1,400 metres. IJiit this last result is due really to a change in the nifthod of siglitiiig. Thus we see that trained and chosen men can obtain more restricted zones than can l)e got Ity ordinary shots. The Frencli regulations say, "The depth of the beaten zone is * Tho report of tho Sicpo ( )])erjition.s Comiuittoo indirectly states thin, iiH it wiys tliiit wiHi ii iMxiy of 7iieii firin^^ with '2 siplif s rcf^-ulatcd for 1,2')0 and 1, ;{.'>() yards, tlie diHtrilmtion of hits at the ran^o of 1,H00 yards was fairly unifonn over a dejith of -1 00 lo MO yards, which gives tho margin in the text ahove. And again, we find it stated, that when using two elevations in comhination (see j). l.'iO), differing hy 200 yards, viz. : COO and 800 yards, and the ilOO and 1,100 yards elevations, the gron])ing of hits shewed a ga]), imlicatiiig that a less interval than 200 yards between the elevations is d(\sirahl(' ut the ahovonanuMl rajiges to cover the wholo depth fired at. 'J"oo jnnch reliance, however, cannot h(i placed on thcHo experiments, as Oiey only lasted for si,\ inrmths, and do Jiot embody th(; experience of several years, as foreign statist icH do. 133 sensibly constant, wliatevcr the distance of the ohject may he; it is about 100 metres if the best 50 p.c. of the hits or the (h:'nsest part only of the grouping be considered." These numbers are not absolute, and can evidently increase or decrease with the skill of the men tiring. The different depths of the groupings obtained by good and bad firers show the influence of the skill of the men and of fire discipline on the efficacy of a collective fu'e. These influences are not the only ones which can make the depths of the beaten zones vary ; there are others as well, such as fatigue, the emotions of the men, the inclination of the ground, atmospheric conditions, &c. There results from this that the fire of infantry cannot be compared altogether with that of artillery as regards its groupings. In fact, the fire of artillery is a fu-e from a fixed rest with a well-assured aim. It does not depend nearly so much on the nerves of a man, and the small differences which occur in the weights of the powder charges have much less influence on the ranges when the charges contain many thousands of grains instead of weighing from 70 to 85 grains only. Thus it is dangerous to rely on deductions found by calculation only as to the probable effects of infantry fire. The experimental method alone can give any results worthy of confidence. The conclusions to be di'awn from the above is that infantry should be as carefully instructed in collective as in individual firing during their annual course. It is also essential that the principles of fire discipline should be instilled into the men, and that they should be trained to fire perfect volleys, as these produce the best effect. It is also essential that even the smallest unit should have exact ideas on collective firing, and that men should know the distances at which they should make use of the different kinds of collective firing (see Chap. XV.). The following explanation shews why the total length of ground beaten with the buUets of a collective fire decreases as the range increases. As the range increases, the angles of elevation increase more rapidl}' ; or, in other words, an error of l"^ too much elevation at 100 yards makes the bullet go 400 yards further, while the same error in elevation at 2,100 yards, makes the bullet only go 100 yards further. Thus, the longer the range, the less does a given small error in elevation affect the space over which the bullets fall ; and therefore, the longer the range, the less is this space. "WTien the rifles are fired fromre6t8(see p. 241), this is foundtobe more the case than when 134 they are fired from the shoulder, which can be easily under- stood. At the shorter ranges, the mass of the bullets fall near the point of mean impact, but at the longer ranges they are more evenly distributed over the beaten zone ; and thus it is that the central 50 per cent, of the bullets fall in about the same space of 100 yards, at all ranges, from 500 up to 1,400 yards. "We must be carefid to sepai-ate the effects of bidlets falling into a space on a horizontal plane and hitting a vertical target. Table 11., on p. 21, shews that a constant slight error in elevation causes a largely increasing error in vertical height as the range increases : while, as shewn above, it causes a decreasing error in a horizontal direction, under the same conditions. This is the reason why it gets harder to hit a vertical target as the range increases, while the horizontal extent of ground into which the best 50 per cent, of the bullets fall, remains practically the same. The above numbers are average ones and are by no means absolute, but maj- increase or diminish according to the skill of the men, and if rests are used ; but the dispersion in depth, whatever it may bo, still remains independent of the distance, if a sufficient n\imber of rounds are fii'ed, though it varies with the inclination of the groimd on which the bullets fall, as will be shown later on.*' The surface of the horizontal group, which contains 50 per cent, of the hits, is called the nucleus of the group ; that which contains the next 40 per cent., the etivelope of this nucleus ; and the liits produced by ricochets and the re- mainder of the shots is called the tailing. The centre of the nucleus is the point of mean impact of the liorizontal groTip, but tlic best 50 per cent, of the hits are very uniformly distributed over the nucleus, consequently, to get the best result possible, some part of the nucleus sliould fall on the ()})jt'ct to ])e hit, and hence, in dealing with a collective fire, a knowledge of the range to within half the dej)th of the niiclcuH {i.e., within 50 yards) is all that is re(juired. • " From thi.s it follows that Ihc rollcctivo firo of .several men at a single tarpot, at diHtanct^s over 440 yanlH, is not the true gaujjfo of their eflicicncy. It is necc8.sarj' that they lin; at a Hcrica of screens, which will register all the hits ; then, from their density, an estimate of the value of their shooting can be obtained. The position of the densest part of the nucleus offers no elue, as it does not depend on the efforts of the men, but on factors beyond control." — (Major C. Brooke). 135 The -svidth of the ground beaten, when a single point is aimed at, also increases with the range. The French regu- lations say that when all the rifles are directed at the same point the width of the group of hits in yards between 500 and 1,500 yards for the best 50 per cent, of the hits, is about equal to the number of hundreds of yards in the range {i.e., 5 yards at 500 yards, 10 yards at 1,000 yards, &c.); it is 30 yards at 2,000 yards, and 60 yards at 2,400 yards. The width of the groujjs for 90 per cent, of the hits is about double that for 50 per cent, of the hits. Captain Neunhauser, commenting on the Belgian experi- ments of 1883, says : — " It is necessary to remark that one of the great causes which makes the collective lire of infantry less accurate at long ranges than at the shorter ones, lies in the greater amount of the lateral errors, the deviating causes having so much greater influence as the distances become greater. In fact, the beaten zone is not a line but a surface. If the rectangle which contains the grouping of the best half of the hits is only a few yards broad at the short ranges, it tends to approach a sc^uare at the longer ones, and con- sequently, to increase the beaten surface. The grouping of hits is therefore less dense in this latter case, and the hre less efficacious, thus placing theory and practice in agreement." Because the conditions of individual and collective firing are so different, the dangerous zones of a collective fire for the various ranges cannot be worked out in the same way as the dangerous zones for individual fire, and, indeed, we cannot lay down definitely, as can be done for an individual fire, any limits of efficacy for a collective fire by means of comparative values of the probable errors and the size of the target, but what we do see is, that the actual value of each of the zones of a collective fire depends on the theoretical dangerous zone of each bullet as well as on the extent of ground struck. The less the angle of drop, the greater are the number of bullets included in the height of the object fired at, so that the theoretical dangerous zones of individual fire given in Table I., p. 9, may be taken as giving some indication of the comparative value of a collective fii-e at different ranges. The longer the range, the more vertically the bullets drop, and therefore the less dangerous is the beaten zone, or the efficac}' of the fire from a given number of men. As the space over which 50 per cent, of the bullets faU remains nearly constant, this efficacy for different ranges 136 can be relatively measured, by the horizontal distance passed over by a bullet, near the centre of the nucleus, at the end of its flight, divided by the vertical height through which the bullet falls in that distance. The numbers thus obtained are given in column 7 of the trajectory table given on p. 8, and from this table we see that a collective fire at 1,700 yards will have only half the efficacy of one at 1,200 j^ards and one quarter of one at 800 3'ards and one eighth of one at 500 j-ards. This is supposing that the lateral dispersion remains constant as well as the longitudinal dispersion, which we know is not the case. Taking the lateral dispersions given on p. 135 as correct, the lateral dispersion at 1,700 yards is three times, and at 1,200 yards is about twice that at 500 yards, so that the efficacy of a fire at 1,700 yards is only about one twenty -fourth, and of one at 1,200 yards is only about an eighth that of one at 500 yards. This statement is far from being absolute, but it is only given as an example to show how the efficacy of the concentrated fire of a given number of men rapidly decreases with the range. Thus, at known rangex, to get a similar effect, by a collective fire at 1,200 yards as at 500 yards, we must employ a con- siderably greater number (jf men (or rather amount of ammu- nition) than tlie number required to g(^t the same effect if the same object is oidy 500 yards off.*' But, besides the efficacy of the fire decreasing so rapidly with the range, it gets at the same time harder and harder, as the range increases, to estimate the distance to within 50 yards, both of which conditions tend to make the fire less and less efficacious as the range becoiues hmger, so that there is a limiting range, after wliicli any fire, althougli concentrated and aimed, really becomes lia])-ha/.ar(l or as it may bo called " chance lire " however carefully the man may ai)u. Neither this limiting rang(\ nor tlu* result of such a fire can well be definitely stated, but th(* (experience of the war of 1877-78, lias sliewn that a " cluince fire " against troo])s in any deep dose-order formations proved very terrible, wlien kept up by a mass of men at even such long ranges as 2,000 yanls. • In hattlo, for mf)r!il rcii.sona, it is brltor to cxpond Iho nuiuired am- munition iiH ranidly an ])OHsi)iln liy iiuTcuHinp iho numlior of nu^n firing. Kuddcn Iohhi-h intitniduto th(> fimmy nioni th.'iii if tho 1o88(!H wore more frradiial; to cxpond the nt'coswiry .'tnioiint of ammunition l)y making a frw nun tin- a long tim«, takcH all tho offensive spirit out of them. 137 If the range can only be found by any means to a certain percentage of the truth, then a body of men all using the same elevation shoidd not fire at a longer range than that at which twice * the given percentage of error is greater than the beaten zone for the range. Beyond this limit, an efficacious fire cannot be ensured, and ammunition is likely to be wasted, that is, too many bullets will be expended for the amount of good gained, which bullets would have been better kept for a shorter and more effective range. We must therefore inquire what is to be considered in our calculations as the extent of the beaten zone ? Is it to be the extent of ground struck by 90 per cent, of the bullets (300 to 200 yards) or that struck by 50 per cent, of the bullets (100 yards)? The latter value being almost a constant one, and having the hits almost uniformly spread over it, has been accepted by all Continental nations, and as they have experience, while we have none, we cannot do better than accept their conclusions as to what should be considered as the beaten zone for all ranges over 400 yards up to 1,400 yards ; under the 400 yards range a controlled fire is hardly ever possible, as it becomes perforce a frontal individual fire from the excited and uncontrollable state of the men. This central beaten zone of 100 yards, formed by the nucleus of a collective fire, is a very fair factor to deal with, because when the effect of ricochets is considered, 50 per cent, of the shots is a very fair allowance to take of the total number of shots. To try and utilize the whole zone for 90 per cent, of the shots would be pushing theorj^ almost too far. If the range can be found with a range-finder to within 3 per cent, of the truth, then a body of men all using the same elevation should not fire bej'ond such a range than that at which 6 per cent, of it is greater than the accepted beaten zone of 100 yards. Such a range is 1,700 yards. But in practice, and especially with the excitement of being in action and under fire, it will be hard to find such a long range so accu- rately, and as we have seen that at long ranges it reciuires the collective fixe of a far greater number of men to produce the same effect as a given number of men at 500 yards, the ♦ In dealing with trajectories under the height of a man, as we have done in Part I., for individual fire, we have only used the percentage of error as the object fired at was supposed to be at a less distance only than that suited to the elevation used. But this condition no longer exists, and we must now use twice the pei-centage of error, as this error may just as well be over as under the true range. 138 above limit must be considerably reduced in practice to about 1^5^00 yards Xsee Chap. XII.) as the maximum range allowable in practice, and then only under favourable conditions. Thus, firing beyond a certain range, say 1, 300 yards, in rjiund numbers, should never be attempted unless there is at hand such an unlimited supply of ammunition, as the Turts had in 1877-78 (which however can rarely be the case), and we can afford to waste some, because beyond that range the fii"e really becomes chance fire, the effect of which, is to cover a large area of ground^ with dropping shots which luckily may, and j)erhaps may not, do any damage to the enemy. We must not trust to luck and cliance in war more than necessar}-, and never when we can avoid it, as can be done in this case. In future when we talk of "long ranges" we shall mean, until we more detinitely express them, ranges somewhere about, but not^exceeding, 1,300 yards. In every case in firing at long ranges, a most careful "fire discipline," and control of the firing, must be kept up to ensure concentration, on the object to be hit, as the indepen- dent fire of individual men at long ranges is simply chance fire in its worst form. The longer the range the more necessary is the collective fire of masses, or of large groups, of men, so as to concen- trate a large number of buUets on the front of the same objective The strcnfffh of these (/roups, or rather the amount of ammttnitioyi required, to ensure the same effect at each range, rises in a more rapid ratio than the range. But even tlien there must be a limiting range beyond which firing away ammunition will be unprofitable, and which would liave been better kept for ranges more adapted to tlie power of the rifle. This range cannot b(; laid down, yet it is certainly over the range of 1,300 yards, hut even this range is not general! g arailahle, from the usually imdulatory or covered cliaracter of ground, which allows of contending bodies to approach eadi otlicr unseen to shorter distances. If we have no range-finder, and cannot got the range from the artiUery, or from maps, or by watcliiiig the strike of the bullets, or by any other means, the only way of getting the range (jf an object, is to judgo or ratlier guess its distance. Judging distances is, as we liave seen, a very diflicult operation, from Ro many ph^'sical circum.stancos alTectiug the eyesight ; so much so, that a writer in the Revue Militaire de VEtranger says that the Germans allow ith of the estimated distances as the jirobable error to be allowed for in such cases, even when 139 judged by a number of practised and skilful observers (never less than four) and the mean of their estimates taken. That is to say, that the total limits of error are within one-third of the estimated distance ; this seems an enormous allowance, but from a consideration of the rules of fii-e laid down in Continental armies, we shall see that a total error of one- fourth the estimated range is allowed for, which supposes a 2:)ossible error of one-eighth of the estimated distance in judging the range by eye. This limit of one-fourth the range, would require that, when all the men use the same elevation, and when the ranges are estimated by eye alone, a controlled collective fire should not be opened at a greater range than four times the constant beaten zone of a concentrated fire (4 X 100) or 400 yards, but a collective fixe at such ranges is not required, from the accuracy and efficacy of individual fire within that limit, and from the flatness of the trajectories of the military rifles at present in use in all European armies. Now the only way to get certain results at ranges over 400 yards, when the range is estimated by eye, is to divide up the body of men firing at a given object into two, or three, or more equal parts, as the case may be, and to make each sub- division use a different elevation at the same time. By this means, vrith a given number of men, a greater depth of ground is swept, though with a less intense fire than if one elevation is used by the whole body. The number of eleva- tions to be used depends chieflj^ on the range and the constant beaten zone of 100 j'ards at each range. The greater the range the greater is the probable total error of judging it, and therefore the more elevations should be used, and also if the same intensity of fire is rec[uired at each range the greater, in the same proportion, should be the bodj' of men firing, or rather the quantity of ammunition expended, than the number required if the range is known. The number of elevations to be used is also somewhat governed by the consideration of the depth of the object fired at, and as to whether it is stationary or moving.* If the object has no depth, and is stationary, the range can be found with fair accuracy, by watching the effect of the collective fire on the enemy, i.e., whether, Avith a given elevation, it has any effect on decreasing his fire at the point aimed at, or b}' watching the * For this purpose it is just the same whether the men are stationary and the object is moving, or vice lersd. 140 strike of the bullets -vvliere the ground is favourable for such a course. In such a case, one elevation only, or two at the most, would be required. Against very deep formations, as a battalion column of fours, which allow a considerable latitude in judging the range, because it does not much matter if the head or rear of the formation is hit, fewer sights are required than against shallow formations. But if the object is moving, and so constantly altering the range, a greater number of sights are required than if it is stationary. But let us take the extreme cases, and then we shall know what we have to reduce in more favourable circumstances. As the beaten zone of a collective fire for different ranges is constant and equal to 100 yards, we see that to obtain a continuous beaten zone with the combined use of different sights, these sights must not differ from one another by more than the elevation for 100 yards. Thus, when two elevations differing by 100 yards are used we get a beaten zone of 200 yards, and so when the range is guessed by eye, and we may have a probable limit of error of one-fourth the estimated range, a body of men should not tire at over (4 X 200) or 800 yards. Similarly when three elevations, differing by 100 yards, are used, we get a beaten zone of 300 yards, and under similar cir- cumstances, as above, a collective tire should not be opened in this case at over (4 X 300) or 1,200 yards. From what has been said before, we need not consider ranges over this. At any distance, if the range is known, onJi/ one sight nhould be used, and two or three sights will only be employed according to the accuracy with which the range is known. The number of sights to bo used is found thus, — Multiply the estimated range b}' twice the fraction of the range representing the jirobable error of estimation. This gives the distance over which the bullets must be spread, if the result is 100 or less, then one sight for tlie estimated range is sufficient. If the result is I.')0, tlien use two sights, one for 2.3 yards under, and the otlier for 2.j yards over tho estimated range. If the result is 200, then use two siglits, one for 50 yards under, and the otlier for oO yards over tlie estimated range. If the result is 2.30, use thrcio siglits, one; for tlie estimated range, one for 75 yards under, and ^nw for 75 yards over it ; and if the result is 300, use three sights, one for tho estimated range, one for 100 yards under, and one for 100 yards over it. A little consideration will show how these results are arrived at even nientallv. 141 The usual practical rule, liowever, for the use of two elevations is, that one elevation should be for 50 yards under, and the other for 50 yards over the estimated range ; and for three elevations, it is that one elevation should be for the estimated range, one for 100 yards under, and the third for 100 yards over it. In the latest German regulations of 1887, it is stated that when the ranges are guessed, and a stationary object is fired at, two sights, differing by 50 metres will be usecl for ranges between 400 and 600 metres; two sights, differing by 100 metres for ranges between 600 and 800 metres ; and three sights for ranges over 800 metres ; if the objects are moving, then for ranges over 400 metres, several sights differing, in the direction of the movement, by 100 metres, will be made use of; if the range is known, then two sights are sufficient up to 800 metres ; over 800 metres, if the range is not known, three sights must be used. The Grerman regulations of 1879 said: — "The exact range can be demanded from the artillery, if this arm is near at hand, or determined by other means which allow of the distances being appreciated, such as judging by e^-e, from a good detailed map, &c., «S:c. "It is evidently advantageous to know the distance to a yard, but this is not absolutely necessary ; generally, it is sufficient to fix the limits between which the objective of the fire lies or is moving. For example, between 500 and 600 yards, or between 800 and 1,000 yards."^-" "The correction of the fire by observing the strike of the bullets is only practicable if the ground offers favorable conditions ; it succeeds especially with volleys concenti'ated on the same point. f "The choice of the sight to be used depends on the degree of inclination of the ground struck by the btdlets with respect to the line of sight, on the extent of the ground in depth, and also on the degree of precision with which the distance of the object can be determined, or the limits between which it can be placed. "Beyond 440 j-ards the employment of a single sight only promises good results, if the object is stationary, if there is * But tlie closer the limits are to one another the better. t Of course all the men firing for this object must use the same eleva- tion. It is not a question of g-etting a good length of beaten zone, but of throwing up dust, and for this purpose as many bullets as possible should be projected on the same spot at the same instant. 142 the time and means to coiTect tlie fire, and finally if the configuration of the gi'ound situated in advance of the object is not susceptible of diminishing the efficacy of the fire. " In every other case, and particularly against objects moving directly to the front or rear, it is, as a rule, necessary to make use of two or more sights, differing by 100 j^ards from one another. Up to 770 yards, two sights are sufficient; beyond that, three ought to be used. "When firing at objects moving directly to the front or rear it is necessary to consider, in choosing the sights, the direction of the movement of the object. "If two sights are employed they will be divided between the front and rear ranks ; if three sights are used they will be divided between the three ' ziige ' of the company. "It is not advantageous to fire with two or three sights with fractions of troops less than a 'zug' (70 to 80 men) or a company (200 to 250 men) respectively. "In the choice of the sights to be used, it is necessaiy to select those which will cause the surface of the groimd to be covered with projectiles, to receive a sufficient number of them. For example, if the surface on which the object is, is between 600 yards and 800 yards, the sights to be used are those for 650 and 750 yards; if between 800 j-ards and 1,200 yards, the sights for 850, 950, and 1,050 yards are to be used." The French regulations are given on p. 147. The Austrians say that the combined use of different sights is to be very exceptional, for by so doing, if the object fired at is not of great depth, a portion of the fire is thereby thrown awaj-, and the efficacy of the fire is inversely as the extent of the beaten surface, for a given nimiber of men. The Italian regulations say that only one elevation is to be used under 500 metres ; if the distance is known and the object is stationary, use one sight up to 800 metres, and two beyond that distance ; if the distances are unknown and the object is moving use two sights up to 800 metres, and three beyond tliis range. In this last case tlie num1)er of sights should Itf^ dimiiiislu'd or increased on account of the inclina- tion of tli(^ ground, wlicn tlie Icngtli of tlie beaten zone is increased or diiniiiislicd more than half of what it would have been on ground parallel to th(^ liiu^ of sight. Two sights are to be usi.'d l)y at least a section (50 to (iO men), and three sights by at least a c(Mii[)any (200 to 250 ukmi). A combined use of three elevations is, as a rule, ihi' most that is ever required to be used in practice, but we ought always, 143 when possihie, to try and avoid firing binder such conditions as require so mani/ sights to be used, from the comparatively great consumption of ammunition which snch a use of different elevations must cause, unless very favourable objectives present themselves, and the available supply of ammunition is more plentiful than is usually the case. The combined use of different sights can also be employed to neutralize the influences of the atmosphere and the nature of the slopes of the ground in the neighbourhood of the object. The influence of the slopes of the ground, will be pointed out in Chap. XI., but we may here point out the effect of temperature on the choice of sights to be used. In the Belgian experiments of 1883, it was found that the distance of the centres of the groupings of hits made on a horizontal surface, was invariably beyond the object fired at, even with a head wind. This fact was not entirely due to the known tendency that men have of firing too high It was principally due to the temperature, which was about 86° F., while the Belgian rifle was sighted for a temperature of 41° F. only. The consequence was that at long distances, between 1,000 and 2,000 metres, the difference of 45° F. in the temperatures made the bullets range fi'om 75 to 150 metres further than desired. Thus, whenever objects without depth are fu-ed on, the temperatui-e must be seriously considered, and the sights either regulated in consequence or multiplied. We have seen that two or three elevations, used simul- taneously, give an effective fire-swept area, having a depth which varies from 200 to 300 yards. It is clear that this residt is only obtained with a given body of men at the expense of a diminution of effective fire on any given point of the fire- swept area, and therefore to bring up the effect of the fii-e it is necessary either to fire more rapidly, so as to burn more cartridges, or to attain this end by increasing the number of men employed, in order to obtain the desired effect without prolonging the duration of the fire. When possible, the latter method is to be preferred, as prolonged firing ought always to he avoided, in order not to loeaken the moral effect which muslcetry ^re ought to produce by means of sudden losses rapidly inflicted. The ranges of 400, 800, and 1,200 yards given above for the combined use of 1, 2, and 3 sights respectively, agree very nearly with German practice, and suits the construction of the backsight of the Martini-Henry rifle. 144 Tlie Germans divide the space wliich extends between any two hostile forces into thi'ee zones*: — ( 1 ) The short %one^ comprised between the muzzle and a distance of 440 yards (400 metres), (2) The medium zone, which comprises distances between the short zone and a distance of 770 yards (700 metres). (3) The long zone, which comprises distances between the medium zone and a distance of 1,320 yards (1,200 metres). When the range is not known and has to he estimated hy eye, or when one side is in movement, and when the atmospheric influences, and the slopes of the ground near the enemy, are tiot favourable, the Germans employ, as a general rule, one sight for ranges in the short zone, two sights for ranges in the medium zone, and three sights for ranges in the long zone. It cannot be too strongly impressed on officers and men, that as the range increases, even when a single elevation only is used, the amount of ammunition expended has also to be increased to get the same results, and that the amount of ammunition to be expended, when two or three elevations are combined, is twice or three times respectively that required for a single elevation, if similar residts are required to be obtained. The following taT)lp, taken from the Italian regulations for the Verterli ritlo, will bringlioiue t(jth(>niind the necessityof em- ploying more men, or of liring more ammunition, as therange in- creases, to get the same result when using a single elevation only. Taking 1 per cent, of hits as the (!fficacy to bo expected in war, and tliat at peace experiments ten timers better residts can be obtained than in Avar time, that beaten zone is only ct)nsidered, which, even at its extremities, gives 10 hits. The length of this beaten zone increases and diminislies with the number of bulhits fired, and so in order to obtain a constant beaten zone of 100 metres for use, in tlie manner sliown above, the least number of rounds are laid down that should be fired at (>ach range to ensure it. "Tlie folli)\ving table suffices in practice to sliew tlio cilicacy of a colU'(tiv(» iire, and to appruxiiuately calcubito tlie number of biiUets necessaiy to produce a given effect against a given object." • Tho CU'rmans consider that the heaton zono of a roncontrntod fire ftxtends for 100 iiiMrcs or 110 yards. If wo \\m' this doj)th iiiHtiMul of 100 yards in the; above nilculaliun.s, wc oht.iin the following diHtantos usod by the GermanB. 145 •2 P "a S' H g Metres. Number of Bullets to bo fii-ed. Length of beaten Zone against Standing Infantry. Metres. Hits made. CO o ti o 2 o o o ON o o 400 100 From the muzzle to 450 15 57 oOO 100 250 from 300 to 550 15 44 600 100 200 „ 450 ,, 650 10 38 700 100 150 ,, 600 ,, 750 10 28 800 100 150 ,, 700 ,, 850 10 22 900 100 100 ,, 850 „ 950 10 18 1,000 loO 100 ,, 950 ,, 1,050 10 25 1,100 150 100 ,, 1,050 ,, 1,150 10 22 1,200 200 100 ,, 1,150 „ 1,250 10 22 1,300 200 100 ,, 1,250 „ 1,350 10 18 1,400 300 100 ,, 1,350 ,, 1,450 10 22 1,500 300 100 ,, 1,450 „ 1,550 10 20 1,G00 400 100 ,, 1,550 ,, 1,650 10 26 N B.— T( infantry, it tively, the s hmgih of tl between 20{ ) obtain the is necessar) ibove numb 16 beaten zo ) and 450 m same effect against kneeling ' to tire appro.vimately H or 4 er of bullets. Against these ne for the 400 metres elcvatioi c'tros. or lying times r objectiv 1, extern down espec- es, the s only With regard to the least niimber of men with whom combined sights should be used, the Germans insist that the body of troops employed should be at least a " zug " (which on a war footing is eijual to-iffl— o i- 80 Tuen & t least, or an average English company), and the Italians say a section of 50 ox j60 men, when two sights are used, biit both say that a company (2OO-Qr_250jnen) should be employed when three sights are used. This comparatively great increase of men, is due to the rapid decrease of efficacy of a collective fire as the range increases, as has already been explained. In Grermany, when two sights are used, the two ranks of the "zug" each use one, and when three sights are iised, each "zug" of the company use one, there being three "ziige" to a company. 146 An English company formed np in two ranks, is sub- divided into two half-companies, of two sections each. Hence, when three elevations are to be used, it would be inconvenient to emplo}' an equal number of men to fire with each sight. In this case it would be best to make two sections of the company use the elevation for the presumed range, and the other two sections each to employ, one the elevation for 100 yards over, and the other the elevation for 100 yards under, the supposed range. Or, if it is laid down that when two sights are to be used, a whole English company must be employed, and when three sights, three English companies, then each half-company or compau}' should be made to use one. Each rank should not be given a different sight, as it makes it more ditficult to see that the men are using the proper elevation, than if each unit of men used the same one. The combined use of two sights can easily be arranged for, while that of tliroo sights is much more ditficult. But the necessity for the use of throe sights at once rarely occurs, and when it does, it is only at ranges over 800 yards, when there is comparatively but little danger or disturbing influences, and when there is ample tinn^ to make the necessary arrange- ments. It must never be forgotten that a combined use of two, and especially of three, sights, would only be made if circum- stances recjuired it. The above rules for the use of combined sights, tcith the alove strengths of the bodies of men firing, have been found to give the following result — namely, that the hits from a collectiA'e mass fire, executed at all ranges up to 1,300 yards, with a suitable combination of sights and strength of firing bod}', will always give an effective residt t)f 10 per cent, of th(! shots iired, against an object anywhere within the beaten zone. Von ]>ogiislawski and Campr, however, are no warm advocates of combined siglits, especially at long ranges, and the latter says "all tricks of iin; are o])p()sed to sound tactics. Long rang(» fire with combined siglits, as well as indirect fire (see ]). 'i.'H) only li-ad, in the o])eii fit'ld, to waste of aninmnition. These luriliods, lutwever, may be advan- tageously used in siege warl'jii'i'." Jn spite of the criticisms of llic above well-known (i»M'nian military writers, it is only fail- 1o say that tlu^ (iennau infantry do not use a combination of sights Avhen the range is known within .OO yards, when neither opponent is moving, or 147 when the atmospheric couditions, and the slopes of the ground in the neighbourhood of the object aimed at, are such as only to affect the practice slightly. A proof of the value of combining two or more sights when these conditions are not fulfilled will be given in the next chapter. The Germans do not question the advantages of accurate aiming, and careful firing, as might be supposed from their use of different sights. The depth of the fire-swept areas would be much more than 100 yards if the men did not aim or fire carelessly (see p. 133). Random firing would, therefore, overturn the whole system of fii-e which they have adopted. The French regulations say, concerning the simultaneous emplojTnent of several sights : — "The simultaneous employment of several sights against a single object increases the depth of the ground beaten, to the detriment of the density of the fire, and therefore this method of procedure requires to be used with great discernment. The fii-e with a single elevation for the distance of the object will always have the greatest efficacy. " Two sights differing by 100 yards may be used against a moving object or against an object of considerable depth. "The simultaneous employment of several sights is not admissible by fractions of troops of less strength than 50 men." The use of several sights doubtless causes an increased expenditure of ammunition to attain a given resvdt, but if it is only calculated to produce a certain percentage of hits it does away with all hesitation and trials in the choice of the range. Ranges, from their great value when known (both in greatly increasing the efficacy of fire and in preventing an unnecessary waste of ammunition) should always be determined by range-finders, or obtained from the artillery when possible, for both methods are far preferable to judging the distance by eye, and if these are not available, the distance judged should be tested by trial concenintted fii-es executed simidtaneously, called volleys, directed on the object to be hit, and which should be carried out by at least 50 to 80 men, while an observer goes out to one flank to watch the result. The first volley is so regidated as to fall short if possible, and the next one over, and then from the sights used, the approximate distance of the object can be deduced. In the field fixing, practiced in Germany, it is, as a rule, necessary to fire 4 to 5 trial volleys to get the range correctly. K 2 148 But this can only be done if the ground is favourable for it. The concentrated mass of biJlets, caused by such a fii-e, if they strike on a hard, dry, sandy, or dust}' surface which can be seen, throw up the dust perceptibly where they fall, and so enable the range to be tested. But if the bullets fall on turf, wet or soft ground, into furze, heath, bushes, or trees, or behind a fall or rise of the ground, or straight into the face of a hill, no dust will be thrown up, and the strike cannot be seen even comparatively close to an observer. Even with a good telescope and on favourable ground the strike of bullets cannot be seen over 1,300 yards, and consequently the elevation cannot be corrected beyond that range. Another point must be referred to here so as to prevent any misconception of ideas, for, though the reasons for it will be entered into more fully further on, yet the residts have already somewhat entered into our present considerations. From the undoubted advantages of a collective lire as regards its efficacy and the possible control over it, it must be kept up as long as possible ; so intimately are these connected that collective firing is only possible so long as control is possible, and the limit of such control with disciplined troops may be put at about 400 yards from the enemy. Nearer than this, and often at a longer range, the men ar{> too much influenced by the moral excitement caused by the enemy's fire, the noise, the cries of the wounded, and the siglit of the dead, etc., to be C(jntrolled at all, and a rapid indep(!iident tire is then involuntarily delivered straight to the front of tlie extended mass. No order can prevent it. Tliis cliange from a controlled collective to an independent fire is not sudden, l)ut has been gradually coming on as the power of cimtrol has d(>creased, and must be expected to cease entirely at about 400 yards from thi^ en<^niy, when the men will fire only to their direct front, and Avill only be influenced by tlu^ training and discipline they have liad in their peace training, and 1)y the personal exam])h', and not by the words, of tlieir leaders. The nearer we are to tlie enemy tlie greater will be the effect of a controlled collective* fire, but the harder it will be to maintain this control over the men, and tlierefore to get their fire concentj-ated on nauu'd objectives. Tlius these two opposite considerations may ]»h taken as contending for mastery over one aTioflici-, and fxjx'rience lias sliewn lliat the neci'ssarv control of tlw irhalr liody of nuMi in a propcily prepared action, can, ]>erhap.s, he kept up to about (iOO yards from the enemy, ;iii(l of tlif siiialli'st fractions iij) to iiliout KIO yards. Hut on 149 the other haud there has been no experience yet of contending troops, each of whose firing has been controlled and concen- trated. The idea of " fire discipline," and the " direction" and "con- trol of fixe," has only sprung up since the war of 1870-71, and the necessity for it Avas still further impressed by the results of the war of 1877-78, in which terrible residts were obtained with even no fire discipline, control, or direction, but only by such an extravagant use of ammunition as can rarely be possible. Complaint may be found with the indefinite conditions tliat have been arrived at about collective fire, and with the fact that statistical details of results have not been given as for independent individual fire. Here we may add a word of warning from the past. All attempts to lay down definite and absolute data (which, in the first place, a little consideration shows it is impossible to do from the number of counteracting influences) as to the absolute efficacy of the rifle, and then to reason out from this, facts founded on the nature of the arm, has alwaj'S bitterly failed, as experienced by the losing sides in the wars of 1859, 1866 and 1870, from the in- determinate moral factors, which must so largely enter into calculations of war, not having been allowed for. After 1859 and 1866, theorists laid down that the day of the offensive was past, and that, from the nature of the arms in use, the defensive only could win. How this deduction was realized, in the war of 1870-71, all the world knows. "The Germans handle with special prudence the data obtained on the practice range, and, thanks to their tactical good sense, they avoid the dangerous ];)ath along which those whom they call ' the specialists of the practice range ' seek to hurry them. ' Their sound judgment, based on war, has triumphed over the exaggerated speculations of technicalists, and they carefulhj avoid sacrificing to any formal idea, the very diverse factors which occur in tear, and guard against the fault of pushing technical speculations to their utmost consequences.^ " General Brialmont, very properly writes : — " With regard to the results obtained in peace experiments, we must warn our readers that they notably differ from those obtained in war. Executed generally with skilled firers, disturbed by no emotions, on known ranges, on flat ground, and against fixed targets, which can be distinctly seen, all peace experiments give maximum residts ; ver\^ usefid, and even indispensable, to appreciate, not the absolute value of a fire, but its relative value, in comparison with other kinds of tire executed under the same conditions. It is from such a point of view only 150 that peace experiments liave a real importance in practice. They give precise indications on the manner of disposing the troops, and of directing their fire, hoth in the attack and defence. The officers, charged with the instruction of miisketiy fire, should always take care to warn their subordi- nates that the results obtained in peace practices will not he even nearly reached on the battle-field." Thus, all data should only be looked on as relative, because it is impossible to obtain absolute figures with regard to the var^dng circumstances under which infantrj* fire can be applied. Havinef recognised the value of certain methods of proccedinci, and decided on them as standards of comparison to go hy, all that is of any practical value is to state u'hether other methods are better or worse. The numerical residts could be given of many experiments in field firing made in England and abroad, but as it is almost impossible to obtain a full account of the exact conditions under which they took place, and as many of them were carried out before the present system of musketry fire tactics (see Chapter XIV. was instituted, these residts are apt to be misleading ; and, hence, the Author has considered it preferable to adhere, as a rule, to general statements only. The results of collective firing should only be regarded as relative data, and the arrangements that we ought to make in action with this kind of fire, should be such as to get the greatest probable amount of effect in the shortest time possible, so as to leave as little as possible to chance, and to hasten on a decision as quickly as possible. One further point must bo referred to here with regard to obtaining i\\Q greatest efficacy of fire. A clear uninterrupted field of fire is the first condition. The possibility of obtaining shelter from the enemy's fire is only a secondarj^ con- sideration in a decisive action, though its merits may be weighed in a temporising affair. The destruction of the enemy is the principal point aimed at, and, to effect tliis, the side which hopes for success must be prepared to make tlu^ necessary 8a(;rifice of m(>u. No success in war can he gained without a corresponding sacrifice, and omelettes cannot be made irithout breaking eggs. Tliis fact must be deeply engraven on tlio lieart of every soldier. RiCOCnETS FROM A Coi-LECTIVE FlRE.* In Part I. we considered the effects of tlie ricochets of an • These remarks arc taken from Col. Lamiraux's Conferences sur le Tir, d^c. 151 individual fire ; now we must do the same as regards collec- tive firing. One of the most interesting points in connection with the production of general effects by fire is that of ricochets. The study of the power of an arm is incomplete withovit at least a general study of the ricochets it can produce. In the old smooth bore guns the ricochetting power of their spherical shots was, perhaps, the main cause of their efficacy, such as it was, and even now the extraordinary effects of case shot are in a very great measure due to the continued progress of their balls by ricochetting. Unfortunately, in spite of all efforts to do so, no law can be laid down for ricochets, as they depend on the groimd that the bullets fall on, more than on an}i;hing else, although the shape of the bullets, the flatness of the trajectory, and the striking velocity, have also some influence in regulating the number of times the bullets ricochet. The French have made some experiments with the Grras rifle, and obtained the following results for a collective fire directed against an ordinary target placed on a level smooth sandy beach by the sea, i.e., on ground very favorable for ricochets. First Zone. Second Zone. Third Zone. Distance of Target. In advance In rear Dead groimd. Limit of ricochets of target. of target. beyond the target. Metres. Metres. Metres. Metres. Metres. 200 — — — 1,200 300 — — — 1,200 400 75 75 200 1,000 oOO 75 75 200 1,000 600 75 75 200 1,000 TOO 75 150 200 800 800 75 100 100 800 900 75 50 100 700 1,000 75 40 100 600 1,100 — — — 475 1,200 — — — 475 1,300 — — 400 1,400 — — — 400 l,o00 — — — 300 1,600 — — — 200 1.700 — 150 1,800 — — — 140 The above peculiar results are average ones only, and are 152 grapliic-ally shewn in tlie following fignres. When the hits were observed on the ground, a zone on which there were no hits, called the dead ground above, was always found in firing between 400 and 1,100 metres. Up to 400 metres and beyond 1 ,100 metres there was no dead ground. Beyond 1,100 metres the extent of ground beaten by ricochets rapidly decreases as the range increases. Fire at Distaxces between 200 and 300 Miltres. Cone of Fire. Cone of Ricochets. "Fig. 9. Fire at Distances between 400 and 1,100 Mi;TRES. Cone of Fire. Dead (h'ound. Fig. 10. Cone of Ricochets. Fire at Distances of 1,100 Mithes, and over. Cone of I'Mrc and Ricochets. Fiu. 11, TIic ])ow(r (i! pi'iM'Iralioii, or Ivilliiig jiowcv, (if tlid ricocliet^ TN'ere found to be satisfactt^tr}- even at tln' longest ranges. 1.53 The French regulations sum up tlie above results in the following words : — "^Vhen the hre is directed on a hard surface, parallel to the line of sight, the bullets ricochet beyond the first point of impact, provided the range does not exceed 1,900 to 2,000 yards. "At the shorter ranges under 400 yards the bullets make several successive bounds or ricochets. •'Under these conditions the length of each ricochet is about from 300 to 400 yards up to a range of 400 yards, from 200 to 300 yards up to a range of 800 yards, and from 100 to 200 yards beyond this. " The bullets in ricochetting deviate laterally, and thus cover a much wider surface of ground than that which is covered with dii-ect hits, but with a marked tendency to carry them- selves to the right when the rotation is to the right, (as in the Martini-Henry rifle). "The width of the ground beaten by the ricochets of a coUectiA'e fii-e directed on a single j)oint is about 30 to 45 yards, and it seems independent of the range. "From the above we see that an object can be hit by bullets falling short, which by ricochetting add to the direct hits. "The cii'cumstances which appear to give the best results against an object of small depth are those where the densest part of the cone of bullets strikes at the foot of the objective. " Some of these results can be readily deduced from the diagrams of the Dungeness Experiments of 1879-80. Col. Lamiraux states, that this cj^ueston of ricochets was considered in France, as well as that of the flatness of the trajectories in determiningthe normal sight to be used in battle. In action at close ranges men either do not aim at all or aim badly, and it is only diflicidt to get them to adjust their sights to the range, and hence it is necessary to determine what single elevation is best for use at all the effective short ranges, in order to ensui'e some results when the rifles are in the hands of excited men who will not keep adjusting their sights. Taking for granted that the majority of the troops in action will not tii-e over 600 metres, it is necessary to determine what single elevation gives tlie best results between 600 and 700 metres. The following results of ricochet hits have been obtained in some French experiments. With the 200 metres elevation, very bad results. With the 300 metres elevation, good results were obtained 154 at 200, 300 and 400 metres ; at 500 and 600 metres they were poor, but traces of ricochets which might be effective, were found in advance of the targets up to 150 metres at 600 metres, and up to 200 metres at 600 metres. With the 400 metres elevation, the target was not struck by ricochet hits at 200 metres, while at 300 metres they were too few to be considered ; very good results were got at 400 and 500 metres; at 600 metres the fii'st traces of the ricochets showed that the target would probably be in the safest part of the dead ground. For these reasons. Col. Lamiraux considers that the 300 metres elevation is the best for war purposes at short ranges with the Gras rifle. 155 CHAPTER X. ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTS OF COLLECTIVE FIRING. In this chapter it is proposed to show how the effects of infantry fire have been ascertained, and what these effects are so far as can be made out from, peace experiments, and what deductions we may make from them.'^'' Before going further it is useful to remind the reader that though peace experiments are useful to find out what we can about our weapons, yet all such experiments must be largely discounted by a liberal margin for all those physical and moral causes which tend to disturb a man's mind in action. In most peace experiments the ranges are known ; the tai-gets are continuously exposed to a certain amount ; no bullets, bursting shells, shrapnel bullets, fragments of iron, splinters, dust, stones, sights of dead and wounded men, cries of pain, sound of passing bullets, &c., distui'b the minds of the men firing. It is such things which tell on the moral of the men, and it is superiority of moral which usually decides victories. If it were not for these disturbing influences on the enemy, we cannot see how, in the face of the results of peace experiments any attack formation could advance over the open. In reality the ranges are imperfectly known, both sides utilise every bit of cover, and the ranges are constantly altering, which theoretically should favour the defenders, who fire from a fixed base, while the forward movement of the assailants renders them unsteady and makes it harder to supply them with ammunition. But the nearer the enemy, the more disturbing is his presence to the defenders, who begin to think that they cannot stop him, while the attacking artillerj^ being able to approach, fires with more deadly accuracy. It is the difference in moral between the attack and defence more than anything else, which enables an attack to succeed, and it is large losses, suddenli/ inflicted, that forms the best and surest way to reduce the moral of either side. * Most of the first portion of this chapter is taken bodily from Nos. 548 to 564 of the Mevue MiUtairc de VEtranger for 1880, and from a digest of them which appeared in Vol. XXVII. of the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution entitled, " The Utilization of Rifle Fire in the Field," by Major C. Brooke. 156 A collective fire oug-ht to be used, as has ali-eady been said, when it is no longer possible to rely on the extent of the grazed zones, and when we have to base the probabilities of the results on the depths of the effective dangerous zones. The fire, the results of which are based on the extent of the grazed zones, is a fire of theoretical certainty^ that is to say, a fire in which each shot (after deducting anomalous shots) ought to liit if the tire is executed under the conditions required by theory ; whilst the fire based on the extent of the effective dangerous zones is a fire of probabiliti/ in which a certain proportion only of the bidlets fired normally have a chance of liitting. This percentage will approach the theoretical one, according as we more nearly approach the conditions under wliicJi the experimental tiring has been executed. The probable useful effects of a collective fii'e can be determined, and this has been done in almost all the European armies ; but as the experimental tii'ing lias not been in all cases executed in identical conditions, there is not, in appearance at least, a perfect agreement in the results obtained. On the other hand, different methods having been used to register the results, tlie tables of results are not always easily comparable. Thus it is necessary to state the conditions under which any experimental firing has been executed for determining the destructive effects of collective firing and also the methods employed for drawing up numerical and graphical tables for expressing the effects of this fire. It is only after having studied these indispensable preliminaries that we can profitably consider the general observations which an examination of these tables have suggested, the technical interpretation of the results which they contain, and, lastlj', the interpretations whicli have been given to these technical results wliere they are made use of for improving the methods of using infantry fire. AsregardsthfMtbjectivestliat we should clioose to lire against in experiments, a Freiicli writer says : — " When large objects " are mentioned, such tactical formations will be meant as " may be ('xpe(;ted to be seen witliin 2,.;()0 yards, sucli as a " company column (of at least 200 men), a battery of artillery " in action, or u s(juadron. Of course, by accident, a column " of route, or a battalion rpiarter column, &c., may offer itself " as an objective ; but tliis will be an exceptional case, and " it would not be wise to build up any theories on so narrow •• a basis. Further, the ri'sults obtained on the above- " mentioned units will allow iis to judge of those which " would he obtained on more extensive formations." — (C. C. J.) The company columns jnferred to above are companies formed in coIuinns~of sections. AltJiau^^,Q n the Continent each company is composed of 250 men on mobilisation, yet, after a few days' marching' and hard work, tlieir normal strength will be but little over 200 men each. The Gennan and Belgian companies are divided into three sections of about 70 men each, 23 yards. or ^0 files, and the rectangle | 1 1 occupied by the company column 4 i in close order is consequently | — |i ' n yds. about 23 yards wide by 11 yards ^ i deep, each man being supposed , 1 to occupy 24 inches in the ranks. Pj^. i-^ 17 yards. The French, Austrian, Russian, I 1 ^ and Italian companies are divided ■* into four sections of about 50 men I |i each, or 25 files, and the rectangle 4 )> i6 yds. occupied by the company column in | |i close order is consequently about .1 17 yards wide_by_ 1^6 j-ards deep. | \i j Fig. i;i. There are two ways of obtaining a record of the result of experimental collective firing, depending on the nature of the ground available for the experiments. 1 . If the ground is a smooth, sandy flat, so often found on sea shores, then the points of impact of the bullets on the ground can be recorded by mai-king out the ground in suitable squares. A line of targets is required for aiming at. This is the easiest, simplest, and cheapest way when suitable ground can be found. 2. When such ground cannot be obtained, then any level bit of ground of sufficient length may be chosen, parallel to the line of sight, and a series of vertical targets* erected on it at any convenient distances apart. They are usually placed 10 yards or 10 metres apart, but to save targets the Germans in * These targets are made of some light material, covered with paper and stretched on oasilv movahlc frames. 158 tlieir experiments placed each target so far behind the one in front that a bullet grazing the top of this latter would strike the foot of the one behind it ; iu this case each bidlet theoretically leaves but one mark ou the entire series of targets. From the vertical record thus obtained, the horizontal represen- tation is easily deduced. From this it is easy also to deduce, by means of the theoretical dangerous zones, what the hits would have been on a series of vertical targets placed at 1 metres apart. If these targets are the height of a man, then each of them would be hit by all the bullets falling in rear of them to a distance equal to the theoretical dangerous zone for infantry for the range of the target. We will consider the results obtained by this latter method first. The Germans have carried out a very great number of experiments at their Musketry School at Spandau, to ascertain the effect of collective fire. The fire was conducted by means of volleys tired by men Ij'ing down using rests, and at targets 6 feet high, and 20 metres (22 j'ards) wide. The number of men tiring varied from 10 to 50 — as a rule 25 wcn-e I'mployed ; but the experiments showed that the number has hardly any influence on the results, provided there are at least 1 men firing. The men were extended over a front equal to that of the target (20 metres), and were ordered to aim straight to their front and at the bottom of the first target of the series. The results, broadly speaking, have already been given in Chapter IX., but the detailed results are given in Tables A, B, 0, and D in Appendices III. and IV. ; the target which receives the largest. number of bullets is called the " nucleus " of the series. Table A gives the destructive effect of a collective lire Avitli a single sight against a series of targi'ts (J feet high and 20 metres wide, that is against a lino of standing men; and also tlie effect of the same fire on a Grerman company column, standing. This latter effect is obtained l)y adding the depth of the colujun to the extc-nt of the theoretical diwigerous zone and counting tlie number of hits in this .space. Table ]j gives the destructive elfect of a collective fire against a series ol' targets 18 inches high and 20 metres wide, that is against a line of men lying down, but not undercover; and also tlie effet^t of Uw same fire circumstances, gives rise to a denser and more regular grouping of hits will be the best, and have the most destructive effect in the field. There is no method more searching for testing the value of different patterns of rifles than the rigid comparison of the series of terms obtained from long continued collective firing. A study of the representative series proves that shill infirmg is shewn just as much in collective firing as in individual firing^ and also we see from the series that xoe commit a fault when we attempt to judge of the sldll of a hody of men, at distances over 400 yards, hy its fire at a single target. If the men, though still firing from a rc^st, are less skilful than those by whose fire the representative sori(^s were obtained, and makc^ errors of elevati(m in excess of 30 minutes, the seri(^s will bi^ lengthened and the s]u)ts in the nucleus and in th(! adjoining screens will be less dense; and further, the series will be less regular in cliaracter. By employing men still less skilful in iiring, all these irregularities will be accentuated, and it may luq)pen that gaps will appear in the series in the ncighbourhoo(i of the distance corresponding to the sight in use. Hence to obtain the same result irom skilful and unskilful men the latter must fire more ammunition. A\'hen tlie iiring takes place uithout rests the series is much leiigtiicned and Ix'comes irregular, the destructive effect of the fire ceasing in some jflaces. These gaps are more numerous and occur nearer to the distance corresijonding to the sight used in j)roportion as the inaccuracy of th(> fire • The density hero meant in tlmniinihorof hits dividoilhy (lie danf-crous aone exprcHHcri, sny, i)i yards, liy (liis we get th(; dfjisity jxt yard of dangerous zone. t ITio theoretical dangerous zone for infantry is equal to six feet, divided by the tangent of the unglo of drop. increases. It is for this reason that the Germans insist on the necessity for firing from rests over long ranges. This also proves the incorrectness of the statement that collective fire is the negation of all mushetnj instruction. On the contrary, the re- presentative series show, by the modifications they undergo when deduced from the firing of bad shots, that the training and careful instruction of the soldier is as necessary and has as much influence in collective firing as they have in individual firing. The skill of the firers is so much the greater as the record of their shooting gives a more regular, more continuous and denser series. From this it follows that the collective fire of several men at a single target at distances over 400 yards is not the true gauge of their effiiccncy. It is necessary that they fire at such a series of screens as will register all the hits ; then from the density and regularity of the series an estimate of the value of the shooting can be obtained, for the position of the nucleus offers no clue for this purpose, as it does not depend on the efforts of the men, but on factors beyond their control. In fact, the nucleus, as a general rule, does not coincide with the engraved range corresponding to the elevation used. For instance, atmospheric conditions have their influence on the firing. The Mauser rifle is sighted for a temperature of 2J-° C (35° F), and a lower temj)erature than this would cause the series to be less dense than the normal one, while a higher one would make the series denser. An atmosphere more or less warm makes the whole series respectively advance or retire with reference to its normal position. Between -f 3° C and — Z'^ C, a fall of temperature displaces the series towards the firing point as much as 12 metres for each fall of 1° C for ranges between 400 and 1,200 metres; on the other hand a rise of temperature between 3° C and 15° C (58-5° F) removes the series further away as much as 4 metres for each rise of 1° C for the same ranges. The hygrometric state of the air sometimes counterbalances this increase of range, for when the ground is much heated by the sun, the most densel}' saturated layer of air is at a certain distance above the ground, and consequently acts as a retarding force more powerfully on high trajectories than on low ones. Also an elevation of temperature tends to neutralise the bringing of the nucleus towards the firing point at ranges under 700 metres caused by aiming at the foot of the target (see p. 159). Any irregularity of the series, due to want of skill in the men firing, may be neutralised by firing a greater number of cartridges. Also if fewer rounds are fired then those given in i<;s -3 1 -"III 1- 1 ,11 S 1 ^ - 1 1 t- 1 II g 1 - - II n \ \ 1 1 £ 1 1 1 1 1 § 1 CO ^ -H 1 t— 1 1 g i O 'r ^1 o S o :m - •sn..pnx|i , 5^ S 2 - 1 1 s - ^ -^ 1 1 5 S 2 -*• P 1 OS ■<*< ei ■* Sj 1 ^ t'aci* of it to be wrong ; General IJrialuHint stales it is wrong, and In- made some experi- The Austrian Exporiments show the same. 171 ments which confirmed his views. The results he obtained were that when 180 men advanced from about 400 j-ards to about 60 3'ards while firing, the losses of a company column were at the least double those of a company in Une. This seems much more in accordance with war experience, because from the above table, columns of attack could be used under fire, while numerous cases could be quoted from the wars of 1870-71, and 1877-78, to show that neither such columns, nor any closed formation, can exist luider modern fire, unless the enemy has been so demoralized as to fire very wildly and high. In proving his case General Brialmont points out that the bases on which the Germans worked out their percentages were wrong, as they have not allowed for the fact that in a line formation after the first hits have been made, gaps are formed, through which the succeeding bullets pass harmlessly, while in a column formation, bullets thus passing through the leading echelon, will strike those in rear.* The losses of an ext exixLed^fi^ging line, in any attitude are less than thar~oia closed line in the same attitude, and Avill vary proportionately to the density of the firing line. To be on the safe side we should take the minimum per- centages given in Table XIV. Both the French and Germans consider that only one-tenth of the results obtained in peace can be counted on in war, and the French further think there is a waste of ammunition, unless a loss of 10 per cent, in peace time (or 1 per cent, in war) can be inflicted. The French experiments made in 1879 at the camp of Chalons, over measured ranges, also showed that of all forma- tions of closed ranks the lino formation is least vulnerable. The results are tabulated as follows : — * A German officer commenting on this statement writes : ' ' The " results of our (the German) experiments, are quite different to those " obtained by General Brialmont, but ours are confirmed by the Kussian "experience at Lovtcha. General Brialmont fired against a company ' ' column which had no skirmishers in front, so that the men could see the " column quite distinctly. The case is different if a company column is ' ' advancing behind a line of skirmishers and screened by thick bands of "smoke covering the whole front." Certainly in General Brialmont's experiments, the fire was concentrated on the column, but the experience of the Franco-German war seems to corroborate his conclusion, for in that war it was found impossible to bring up any columns under tire into the firihs: line. 172 The Percextages of Vulnerability of a Closed Lixe of 200 Mex 2 Deep, axd of a Compaxy of 200 Mex in CoLUMx OF Sectioxs. {Scc p. 157. 1 Di.stiinccs. Upright position. Kneeling position. Lying down position. Line. ( Column. Line. Column. Line. Column. ]MMres. 1,000 20-0 33-0 12-0 2o-0 G-2 20-0 1,100 14-2 25-0 9-0 20-0 4-5 16-C. 1,200 11-0 ! 20-0 7-1 16-6 3-5 12-5 1,300 8". -5 10-0 ,V2 12-5 2-() 9-0 ],400 6-() 12-5 4-1 10-0 2-0 5-8 1,.jOO 5-2 10-0 o ' '<> 8-3 1-7 4-3 1,600 4-1 7-6 2-0 0-2 1-2 3-2 1,700 3-2 6-2 2-0 4-7 1-0 2-4 1,800 2-7 5-0 1-6 4-0 0-8 1-8 From this ta])li' ^\^^' soc that : — 1 . A cumpaii}- (250 lueii) in lino formation, Avith respect to vulnerahility, is always prefi'rablo to tlic formation of com- pany column of sections. 2. That tliis advantage shows itself more strongly in tho lying down position according as tho rango decreases, whilst the proptn-tion of vulncirability in the npriglit ]H)sition remains almost tho same. \'\)V example, if the vulnerability of the line foiMuatiou is represented ))y 1, we have for tlie lying down position : — Ratio of vulnerability between the two formations at 1,800 mctres=V:;=^.'i. liatio of vulnerability l)etween tin- two formations at 1,000 nictres= ,''o-., =.,'.2. Tlicro is a good difference botweon these ratios. • General Brialmont's objoctionH, givrn abo'e, apply hero also. According to him. tho 1o8.s«b of the line would be less than half of those BtHlcd in l"ith tallies. For the uprig-lit position we liave : — Ratio of vulnerability at 1,800 metres =t:i^=-i4g. liatio of vulnerability at 1,000 metresrr2A:A:iz-ig, These ratios are almost equal. ' ' The tables of the French Committee on infantry fire, on the vulnerability of tactical units, are very exact on the practice ground ; but these tables have been obtained with soldiers who have been well placed, well directed, perfectly trained, and having al)solutely no danger to fear ; that is to say, with men placed in conditions which it is impossible to obtain under the lire of an enemy." 80 that these tables can only give relative and not absolute results. "With regard to the chance of hitting different formations in open ground parallel to the line of sight, the French regulations say that, " AVithin 440 yards, a kneeling man is not much less hard to hit than a standing man. " Between 440 and 880 yards, the possibility of hitting a line of skirmishers is sensibly proportional to the surfaces exposed to the fire, and the amount of loss it experiences depends on the density of the line. " A line of groups of two men each side by side, is more easy to hit in all cases than a line of corresponding density having ecjujil intervals between the men."' " The vulnerability of a closed squad will, as a rule, compel them to deploy as skirmishers when they are from 660 to 880 yards from the enemy. "Under 440 yards, deej) formations are very vulnerable, even when they only present a weak front. " Between 440 and 880 yards, and especially at longer ranges, objects witli a small front are hard to hit, because of the lateral deviation which atmospheric circumstances may impart to the projectile. "Lines with a long front allow of an easy correction of the fire in direction, but over 880 yards, their vulnerability is small because of the small extent of the dangerous zones. " The vidnerability of a line diminishes very rapidly with the distances, and almost in the ratio of the dangei-ous zones ; beyond 660 yards, it is sensibly proportional to the height of the object. ' ' Colimm formations of a considerable front (such as company columns of 200 to 250 men each) form very vulnerable objects and facilitate the correction of fire in direction. * Because groups of 2 men offer a broader and more definite point to aim at. 174 " Over 880 j^ards the company column is on an average twice as vulnerable as the company in line. " The vulnerahility of deep formations does not decrease as rapidly as that of a line, as the distance increases ; it depends on the number of sub -divisions forming- the column and the dangerous zone for the distance considered. Over 880 yards the vulnerability of closed columns remains sensibly the same whatever be the attitude of the men, standing, kneeling, or lying down. " The increase of range of modern arms, condeimis the use of deep formations within ranges at which they are vulnerable, but it does not authorize fire being opened at too great distances." We must also alwaj's bear in mind that it is thedensHi/ of the JMiuaiioiLy^ line or column ^ ichieh is one of the greatest causes of loss. As the heights "oi the objectives in war are fixed quantities, the depth and not the breadth of a formation has most effect on the consequent losses, as the depth of the different dangerous zones are far greater than their Avidth, which latter quantity is governed by the width of the shot- groiips oidy. Tlie superiority of line over column formations under fire is thus undoubted as regards vulnerability, and we see they must also be so as regards su[)eriority in execution of fire. Tht^ advantage of column formations is in facility of marching and control, but as soon as the elfects of iire become sensible this consideration must give way to tliat of the preservation of tlie m(^n, not for tlieir own sakes. but for that of the object in view. It is admitted as a principle in France, that as soon as a formation nuxy be expected to suffer on the practice range a loss of 10 per cent., it must be modified in such a manner as to reduce the losses, so that by the application of this principle, the formation of company columns (of 200 men) ought to bo abandoned in open ground, if the enemy knows the range, at 1,500 nirtrcs (see Table XV.) and be replaced by the line formation, but as a line formation for a whole company of 200 men is too clumsy for marcliiug, a line of sections in line, witli intervals (of a section as a rule) must be used. Then at 1,200 metres aiiotlier disposition is required, bei-ause tlie sections in line then begin to suffer a 10 per cent. loss. This is a theoretical statement, for it 8uppost>s the ranges to be known and the troops unexcited by an enemy's fire, neither of which conditions exist in war, but the French say it is u maximum result \n hich must be 175 allowed for. In reality, troops even on the defensive will rarely open fire over 800 yards, except at large objects of considerahle depth. All the above figures, both in the German and French experiments, show that both the height and depth of an object fired at are more important than its breadth ; by the German experiments, at the longer ranges, the losses suffered in the column formation are twice as much as when the men are in line, and when the men are lying down in line their losses are about one-fourth those when standing in line, and when lying down in column formation about twice less than when standing in column. From this we see that cavalry, which has a greater height than infantry, will suffer more than these latter at all ranges, and hence fire may be opened on them at longer ranges. AYith regard to artillery, in 1878, in Austria, a comj^any of 211 iut'autry iirrd at 1,500 yards {the range being hnown), at targets roprcsouting three guns in action with their detach- ments. Ten rounds were fired by each man in SA- minutes. 189 balls, or 9 per cent, struck the targets, or, in other words, the guns were silenced in 3 J minutes, the whole of the 108 men forming the personel being hit within that time. At 1,000 yards they obtained 11 "5 per cent, of hits. In France also, it has been found that if a company' (250 men) of infantry succeed in creeping up to within 1,500 yards of a battery of artillery, [tlie range being known,) the horses and men would all be disposed of in a very few minutes. Such experiments tend to show that artillery will suffer sensible losses^at 1,200 yards at least, instead of 800 yards, whichT^up to late years, was considered the limit of the effective range of infantry fire. The range therefore at which fiii'e may be oj)ened on an enemy with advantage depends greatty on the enemas forma- tions and as to whether the objective is infantry or cavalry. Let us see how the results given can receive a practical application. The percentage of hits are sufficient for comparisons between the results that may be expected from a fire directed on different objectives. But as it does not matter if an enemy is struck by one or many buUets, consequently the only data of any practical value to us are those by which we can say, "If we fire so many shots, depending on the range, we shall put so many of the enemy out of action." From Table XIV. we see that if we fire 200 rounds at 700 metres at a standing Hue of 50 men in cl ose o rder we shall put 20 to 35 17(i out of action. Let us take the worst ease and say 20. Suppose now a company of 200 men are firing against a company of equal strength and we want to know how many rounds are required to hit half of the enemy, that is to say, 100 men, when they are standing in close order line in the open. In firing one round per man, 20 of the enemy are hit ; consequently to hit 100 men, 5 rounds per man must be expended, or 1,000 in all. If the enemy is Ij'iug down in line, then four times this number is required. If the enemy is standing and is widely .extended, then perhaps only one will be hit for every 100 rounds fired, and to hit 100 men 10,000 rounds must be fired or 50 rounds per man. But we sliall be suffering losses ourselves, and, if this be considered, it will not bo too much to say that we may have to fire 70 to 80 rounds per man to obtain the above result, that is to say, the whole supply carried by each soldier. 8uch is the manner in which we can calculate, from the data obtained from experiments, the expenditure of ammuni- tion necessary to obtain certain residts on any given formation. The losses of kneeling position are one-lialf those for standing positions, and the losses of the lying position are one-fourth those of the standing position. According as the men in a firing line is extended 2, 3, 4, &c., men's breadths apart from centre to centre, 2, 3, 4, &c., times respectively the amount of ammunition must be fired to get the same result. But as it is impossible to remember the data for all ranges, they should bo remembered for the standard ones of 400, 800 and 1,200 yards or metres. "We must now consider tlie first of the two methods given on page lo7 for ol)taining a record of the efl'ects of collective tiring, namely tliat of marking out a ihit piece of ground* in Huitabli' s(piares, ami transforming the ]iits on to a correspond- ing paper diagram. In this maniun- an c>.\act representation of theli(»rizi)ntal grouping of the liits is obtained. 'This method lias been largely used in France, and to some extent in England, in the few experiments we have carried on in collective firing. (jiven tlii^ gi-aphical representation of tlie liorizontal gr()ui)ing of tlic^ liits, it is easy to determine the liits on any olijeetive, by drawing to scale a rectangle wliose length is equal to the front of the objective, and whoso depth is equal to the depth of tlio objective increased by the theoretical dangerous zone for tlie range ajid for the height of the objective. The nunibei- of hiis included in this area gives • The ground should he at least COO yards long hy 150 yards wide. 177 the hits on the object fired at. The hits in an extended firing line will be the same as those on a single man. If the fire is directed on an open column, and if the distance between the successive jiarts of the column is greater than the theoretical dangerous zone, then each section must be treated isolatedly as if it was a single line. Another way of finding the vulnerability of any formation when its width is less than that of the dangerous zone, is to ascertain the density of the hits per square yard over the beaten zone, then if JV be the total number of hits per square yard ; 8 the area over which they faU in square yards ; Z the length of the theoretical dangerous zone in yards of the mean trajectory" for the range; Z the length of the front of the formation, and iV jD is depth, then — ^ the deusitv per square vard and tlie S vulnerability of the formation = — X Z (xf + -D\ S If the formation has a greater width than the effective dangerous zone, then we may use the density of hits per yard of depth of the effective dangerous zone and, the formula for tlie vulnerabilitv becomes — (^ + -O'l where IJ is tlie depth of the effective dangerous zone. The Belgians in 1881 tested the value of this last formula and found it to agree very exactly with experience. General Brialmont and Commandant Paquie asserted that the efficacious zone, containing .50 percent, of the hits, was 150 metres between 500 and 1,000 intHres, and 100 metres for ranges over 1,000 metres and up to 1,800 mi'tres. This statement was tested and found to lie the case, taking the averages. Commandant Paquie also asserted that the hits in the efficacious zone are uniformly distributed in the direction of the depths of the zone. If this is the case, then the density of hits per metre for ranges under 1,000 metres is -f\"u- or ^ per cent.; and for ranges over 1,000 metres it is -i^^^'o- or ^ j^er cent. ; and from this it is easy to determine a priori for any given distance, the losses that can be inflicted on any formation whatever, which would be of the utmost value to officers charged with directing the fire in action. Thus if the theoretical dangerous zone for standing infanti-y is 15 metres at 1.200 mtUres. then a stationarv close line of 178 standing infantiy ought to receive at that distance 15 X A or 7A- per cent, of the bullets fired. If the objective is a column fonnation, the depth of the column must be added to the theoretical dangerous zone, that is to say, if the distance between tlie elements of the column is less than the theoretical dangerous zone, and the total depth of the column does not exceed certain limits. Thus if the objective is a line of close company columns of sections* (9 metres in depth) then the percentage of hits on it should be at 15+9 1,200 metres or 12 per cent. 2 For distances under 1,000 metres we must divide by 3 in the above cases. The experiments to verify these conclusions were made with targets 5 feet 8 inches high, and representing a line of standing infantry. The last column of the following table gives the percentages obtained by experiment, to compare with the column before it. Kang-e in Metres. Tlieoietical dangerous Zones, in Mt^tre.s. C'alculatod p,c. of hits on a c'olinnn of Sections. Company in Lines. Calculated p.c. of hits. Experimen- tal p,c, of hits. 400 129 46-0 43-0 — GOO 61 23-0 20-3 18-0 HOO 34 14-3 11-3 10-4 1,1)00 '22 12-9 9-1 9-G l,'2O0 ir> 12-0 7-5 8-3 1,400 11 10-0 .'■)•.-) 5-4 1,000 8 8-5 4-0 4-0 1,800 G T-f) 3-0 — '_>,000 r, 7-0 2- 5 — * 'J'horr; urc llirci' McclioriH in a l>flgi;in coinj)!!?!}-. t 'I'hi' ])(;ri'fiitfig<'H for llic 1,000 niMroH lauf^c avc fuiiinl liy iliviiliiig liV 2-'> tin iPi-in •>(■■', .•mil 2. 179 From this it appears that at 400 metres the com]3any column (formed of three sections with a depth of 9 metres) suffers almost as much as the company in line ; but as the distance increases the column suifers more losses relatively, namely, twice as much at 1,400 metres, and three times as much at 2,000 metres. This conckision, however, supposes that all the front of the company column (25 metres) is greater than that of the dangerous zone ; this is almost the case up to 1,200 metres, but not so over that distance ; con- sequentl}- the above percentages for the compau}^ column are too great at ranges over 1,400 metres. This was confirmed by experiment. Further if there are any intervals between the men in a line, the proportion of the intervals to the front must be deducted from the percentages of the line. Experiments were made to test General Brialmont's state- ment in his " Etude siir les formations de combat de Vinfanterle,^^ that "from 600 to 1,200 metres, the chance of hitting a deployed scj^uad of 14 men (8 metres), or a company formed up in two ranks (48 metres) was the same." The experiments were ver}^ incomplete, but, as far as they went, they showed that this was not the case. Targets were used representing the fronts of a demi-section (12 metres), of a section (24 metres), of two sections (48 metres), and of a company (72 metres), and the results showed that though these units were equally \n.ilnerable at 400 metres, yet, as the range increased, the smaller the unit the less it suffered. At 1,000 metres, the vulnerability of the two sections was 0'97 ; of the section, 0-84 ; and of the demi-section, 0-GO of that of the company. The above considerations form excellent data by which officers can guide themselves in dhecting fii-e in the field ; they can only be considered as an approximative basis, it is true, but they suffice to form an idea of the losses that can be inflicted on any particular formation when once the proper elevation to be used is known. The same principle can be applied to men in extended order, and in any of the attitudes of standing, kneeling, or lying down. In firing against a battery of six guns, placed at 12 metres apart, with the limbers 20 metres in rear of the guns, and with targets representing the men and horses, the following percentages of hits were obtained, on the men and horses only, by 120 men, each firing 10 rounds by volleys : — At 1.200 metres, lO'o per cent. ; at 1,400 metres, 8 per cent. ; at 1,600 metres, 4 per cent. ; and at 1,800 metres, 2-3 per cent. The percentage of hits on the men, hsrses, and materiel : — At M 2 180 1,200 metres, 12 per cent. ; at 1,400 metres. 8.5 ^ev cent. ; at 1,600 metres, 5-0 per cent. ; and 1,800 metres, o-8 per cent. This shows that irhen the jri'oper elevation for the range ifi known, artillery can seriously suffer from infantry fire at 1,200 metre.s. if the hattery is not coyered hy epaulments. Similar experiments against a battery were carried out in 1883, with the same results. In these trials, the emploAinent of three combined eleyations were used, when the ranges were guessed, and the results obtained were rather greater than one-half tJiose obtained with one elevation, with known range, especialhj when the fire was rather short. This effect is evidently due to the effective action of ricochets. This superiority of results, from an under-estimatiou of the range, was noted throughout all the Belgian experiments of 1883, and points to tlie fact that // is letter to under-estimate than to over-estimate the ranges* With regard to the effect of fire oh various formations, the records procurable of the Belgian experiments are not so complete as those of the French experiments made at Chalons in 1876. Statistics of these are given by Captain Bazin and Colonel Lamiraux, but those given by the latter officer show lower results tlian those given by the former, on account of their inchuling trials made at unknown as well as at known ranges, and in th(> volley and mass firmg. Captain Bazin's statistics liave been chosen as giving tin* maxima, or ideal results tliat it is possible^ to obtain. Tlio units fired at were of various sizes, in line and column formations, and in column by a flank. Tlie company column has been described on page 157. The half company column (/(? demi-eolonne de compagnie) is composcnl of two sections in column at a distance of .5 yards apart. It contains only Iialf the number f)f men that tlic comijany column and colimm of lialf-coiii])ani('s do. Tlie following data, found in 1876, do not quite agree with those found in 1879, given in Table XV, p. 172. • The Gt!inmns have evidently uiTived at the same conclusion — see the German mles for the employment of sights, given on p. 78. 181 ^^ "~~ ^^^ ^^■" b ^ s. >« ,« u V. \* ^ m ^r nn ^1 C5 O' CO H-" r-1 r-. 1— > o 3 J^ o o o d p o o o o o o o o o ^ ^ to to CO « 5^ d p- o o o o '-' to CO o> CO >-' Oi IK o o ^ CO CO t— 1 !_• to CO CO o^ •a sag o 1-' >-' to *^ o> 00 o to ^l to o ^4 o 1^ o" o o 00 *- to o o to to u> CO o CO o n ,_, ^ to to CO (*- 05 •d ^^ H- >-' lO CO o^ ^1 CO CO - T to o 00 Oi o 3§: o CO CO oo to to 00 to •"^ *^ o CO '-' en rs 1 h-* 1—4 ^-1 H-* to CO t^ 1^ C2 •a Half- com- pany 20 men d M lO CO \i~ C5 00 >— ' hi- CO o» CO lO CO o< ? o to o 00 ^ o o 05 ^ CO ^ to to o C' _ ^ to to Oi \t^ en o w d to CO CO Cn ^4 to ►— ' Oi o Oi en 4- to CO o< ^ o to ^ o 00 to '-' >^ o ^ to CO fs ^ l_ ^ to to CO 4^ o< o< ^J •d Com- pany column of 4 section to 6 en o CO CO CO CO CO CO oo 1^ © Oi o CO Ci >*1 lA o a B d ^ ,_, to to CO >(^ >K as •d -2-2 to CO fn ^I «0 to OS m r»") to rn 6i o d< Cs to ^I C5 Oi -j CO *. ~» 9 d K g s g £, ^ ^ ^_, to to CO 1^ en OS •a -a „ ap CO CO >«>• -■1 oo o > 05 C/i cx> S 2 d-S* d CO Oi 05 '- o> 00 to CO •- CO o 00 ►- CO p S'^i ^ •a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 o o ►^ CO on oo to to 00 to o '-' CO 4- p Pi p 1 1 1 o o o o H- ^_ to CO Ci o co •d |w '-" to CO >f- © t^' o CO o *^ CO .« o K B O DO H-l l_t w S 2 l-l '-' I-" 1— ' I-* ^ |n5 to to CO 1^ -J o c< o >^ i1 C5 ^I CO o ^ to ^ CO >- to o ? o S" o >_, ,_, ,_, -d "d ra td III *-• to to to 00 CO >(^ Ij^ tn o< ^I o CO ^l 00 o to >*^ 1— CO o to o CO to o to oo a s )_• t_l r_i to •d "d O E CO CO 1*^ >(^ m fT> ^I r/1 t-1 44- no 4- o 00 o lf>- to o to •"" o to to CO CO o p •< ^ o ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ to to CO CO 4^ •d £--d O CT Ci ~l CO o 1— < CO ol CO (— ' o< o c> o c ?= 2 ds to o - to o CO to CO to CD o - o >*- ra g-?? 1 1 ^ t_^ )_1 ^_4 to •d Half com- pany olumn to to CO 6 CO to o 4^ >«^ in C5 6 to CO CO en to oo CO n H^ t-^ t_( H-l l_l to lO CO IB S "^C — ■:.■> o ^J ■X. ~ o t<. — ^I CO --J to r.S-c^ - — = IC — ~ CO " ■*- o ^' == 00 >i~ ~ i'' ' 7 5 182 From Table XVII., we see that the percentage of hits on the line formations are not proportional to the widths of the objects. Tims at 1,000 metres, the company which has four times the front of a section, receives 15-2 per cent, of bullets while the section receives 13-2 per cent. This is easily explained. It depends on the relative widths of the object and the beaten zone. So long as the width of the object is greater than that of the beaten zone, the percentage on all objects of the same nature will be nearly the same. The company column presenting eight men in depth appears to suffer only but little more than the column of half- companies presenting only four men in depth. The reason is that the latter column has double the widtli of the former one. The half-conipau}^ column has only half the depth and width of the company column. The columns by a tlank are the least vidnerable ; then come line formations, and lastly colimin formations. Experimental tiring has been carried out by all nations against attack formations^ but the data obtained from such tiring are of little value as the enemy does not remain in the open, but gets under cover, and he can alter the distance between the different lines if necessary. The French regulations*' say, "a collective lire may be opened : — "At 550 yards, on a line of skirmishers of slight density (one man to every 5 yards). "At 660 3^ards, on a line of skirmishers of average density (two men to ever}'- 5 yards). "At 880 yards, on a tliick lino of skirmishers or on a company with open files. " At tlio following known distances, fire if well regidatcd and directed, will produce satisfactory effects on troops in close order : — " At 880 yards, on the closed group with a front of 5 yards. " At 1,100 yards, on a line with a front of 11 yards. " At 1,.300 yards, on a line with a front of 22'yards, or a division of artillery, i.e., 2 guns with their waggons. " At 1,050 yards, on company columns of 200 uieu (at least), and on c(»nipact bodies of artillery, or cavalry. " These limits, which are not absolute, can bo increased wlion atmOHpheric circumsfances am favourable, and when • ThoRO have boon almost exactly copied in the "Musketry Firo Tactics" laid down in our ihill-hook. 183 the means for correcting the tiro exist. On the other hand they are too great when the means of correcting the fire is uncertain, or if the enemy is partly covered by obstacles." The author regrets to say that he is unable to give any results from the few records that he has of the collective firing that has been carried out either in England or India. These trials have been carried out in a manner unsuitable for basing any conclusions on them, either on account of the few rounds fired or because of the too limited diagrams of the hits that have been made. Statistics of the same nature as those already considered in this chapter are much wanted for the English rifle, for the residts of certain experimental trials seem to show that they are not the same as those for foreign rifles. Many deductions can be drawn from the data given in the foregoing pages, with reference to the best formations for infantry in battle during the various stages of the fight, but as such matters do not come within the province of this work, they must be left to the reader to work out for himself. 185 CHAPTEE XI.*^ INFLUENCE OF GROUND AND OBSTACLES ON THE EFFECTS OF INFANTRY FIRE.— INCLINED FIRE.— INDIRECT FIRE.— NIGHT FIRING. Influenck of (jtROUND. All that has been hitherto said, as regards the effects of musketry fire, refers to tire falling on ground, which, at the point where the bullets fall, is parallel to the line of sight, whether this latter be horizontal or inclined. But in reality the effect of the fire with regard to the dangerous and beaten zones, and the effects of ricochets vary very considerably with the nature, shape, and peculiarities of the ground on which the bullets fall. It is very important to study these different effects, as well as the circumstances which increase or lessen them, because it is only by such information that a rational use of the fire can be made, and that such tactical dispositions can be chosen as will offer the least chance of being destroyed by the fire of the enemy. Before proceeding further, it is as weU to make some pre- liminary statements to prevent confusion and to insure simplicity. In the following pages by " rising ground,''' and ''■falling ground,'''' we shall mean ground at the point where the bullets fall, rising or falling, in the direction of the fire with respect to the line of sight, and we shall suppose it, unless otherwise stated, to extend for such a distance as to influence the whole dangerous zone. It may be remarked here that such rising ground is always Aasible, while the falling gi-ound is invisible, to the firers. Thus in Fig. 14, in the direction of the fire, C E and D C are really rising ground, but they are falling gi-ound in respect to the lines of sight A C G and B D H respectively. Similarly D C is rising ground both naturally and also to the line of sight A D F dii-ected an object at D. * A great portion of thi? chapter is taken from the French Bc^Iemcnt iur V instruction du Tir. 186 Fig. 14. Tiie apparent crest of such rising- ov falling ground, is the point where the lino of sight forms a tangent to the gronnd, and hence from Fig. 14 we see that the position of this crest depends on the position of the origin of the lire ; as the j)osition of the origin of the liro alters, then there is a different apparent crest for each position. Thus, C is the apparent crest for an observer at A, and D is the apparent crest for an observer at B. A fire is more or less grazing, with reference to a given slope of ground, according as the bullets pass over a longer or shorter extent of ground under the height of the objective above it, thus rendering dangerous a more or less considerable space. The dangerous zone for an object of given height and for a given trajectory is, as we know, the extent of ground over which the given object can bo struck by the given trajectory, and therefor(^ the maximum dangerous zone is attaini'd when the height of the trajectory above tlie ground, at any point along tlie rang(>, does not exceed that of the object fired at, in which case the lengtli of the dangerous /one will extend from the mu/zle of th(^ rille to the point of impact of tlie buUet on the ground, and licyoud iliis point also if llie I'icochet is considered. The clcuicnts on which ihe extent of the dangerous zone at any given range depends ai'o (1) the flatness of the tra- jectory for tli(» range, (2) the height of the object, and (3) the shape of the ground on which the obj(>ct is standing. The flatt(!r tln! triijectory, the less the laiige, llu* greater the height of the object and the more parallel the ground is to the angle of fall of the bidlet, the greater is the dangerous zone, and vice versa. 1S7 "We must now consider the influence of the shape of the ground on the dangerous zones. Suppose the ground, at the point of fall of the bullets, instead of being parallel to the line of sight, as we have hitherto supposed it to be, is inclined to this line. <.- -TolaL efFijcjcjuuxivLi- Zone. ■■> • •* Fig. 15. It is easy to see from Fig. 15 that when the bidlets fall on rising ground the length of the dangerous zone decreases according to the steepness of the ground. But if the bullets strike on falling ground the dangerous zone is increased and is at a maximum when the slope of the ground, beyond the crest A, is just the height of the objective from the trajectory. Thus the increase of the dangerous zone, caused by different slopes of groimd, is not indefinite, because as soon as the ground falls more than stated above, it is no longer grazed by the trajectory along its whole length. The total dangerous ground includes the ground grazed as well as the ground struck by the bullets. The depth of ground grazed is nothing else than the dangerous zone caused by the lowest trajectory. It is on this condition of grazing the surface of the ground, under the height of the objective, that the length of the dangerous zone depends. From Fig. 1 5, we see that at the short ranges, for which the trajectories are veiy flat, the ground which gives the greatest dangerous zones is that which faUs only slightly behind the object fired at. At the long ranges, on the contrary, where the curvature of the trajectorj^ is much more accentuated, ground falling more and more rapidl}', as the range increases, will be more favourable. 188 Tliiis a slope fallings 1 in 50 -with regard to the line of sight, behind the object fired at, causes a dangerous zone at 500 yards, three or four times greater than that on ground parallel to the line of sight, but at distances from 1,100 to 1,600 yards this inclination only produces an insignificant increase. At 1,600 yards it requires a slope falling 1 in 12, behind the object fired at, as regards the line of sight, to double the extent of the dangerous zones. Let us consider a cone of trajectories (obtained by a col- lective fire) starting from the point (Fig. 15), the line of sight H being directed on a point A, in rear of which the ground presents different inclinations. Suppose the central trajectory 01 A to coincide with A, then if the nucleus of the cone is limited by the trajectories N M N' M'; the surface struck on a vertical object A V is represented by A Y'. But according as the ground slopes and has the different positions AC, AD, AH, AP, etc., the depth of the beaten zones becomes greater and has successively the different values A C, A D', A H', A P', etc. Finally, it reaches its maximum extent A F' on the surface A F, which forms a tangent at A to the trajectory I A passing through A. Beyond this inclinationbegins a grazing firedown to the slope AE, which, for effectiveness against standing men, should never be more than 5 A- feet below the trajectory passing through A. Thus from the point A, there will be a portion of ground which will not bo beaten with the bullets but which wUl bo dangerous thi-oughout its whole extent to standing men so long as the lowest trajectory is not more than 5,V foot from the ground. The under part of the nucleus falls on the ground between and A, in advance of the point A, and causes a distance a A to bo struck b}^ bullets, and a distance K a to be grazed. These differences in the depth of the dangerous and beaten zones practically remain the same whatever ma}- be the position of Fig. 15 in space, caused by moving it around the origin of fire, 0, as a centre ; hence, according as the lino of sight is inclined or horizontal, the extent of the shot groupings varies only according to the angle which this line forms with the ground which r(iC(;ives the bullets. If w(! (>xamine tlu; grouping of the cone of bullets on planes parallel to, and at different inclinations to the lino of sight, wo 800 tliat this grouping is denser on ground rising with respect to the lino of sight, and is less dense on ground falling witn respect to it. 189 In some French experiments it was found that in a con- centrated lire at 1,100 yards, the central nucleus, containing half the shots, covered a depth of 110 yards on ground l)arallel to the line of sight, viz., from 1,045 to 1,155 yards. If we consider the intersection of these two extreme trajec- tories on ground of different slopes, the following results are obtained, where the fractions representing the slope express the inclination of the ground with resj)ect to the line of sight, which latter cuts the trajectory at a mean distance of 1,100 yards from the muzzle. For ground rising with respect to the line of sight : — Slope. Ground heaten with elevation for 1,100 yards. .iV 90 yards— from 1,056 to 1,146 yards.' -oV 71 yards— from 1,065 to 1,136 yards. -iV 55 yards — from 1,072 to 1,127 yards. For ground falling with respect to the line of sight : — Slope. Ground beaten with elevation for 1,100 yards. liV 1 36 or 68 yards \ According as the whole or 2-0- 202 or 106 yards > onl^-half the nucleus falls "tV 401 or 272 yards ) on the sloping ground. For less slopes than -gV, rising or falling, the depth of the ground beaten tends to approach 110 yards — the extent of the nucleus on ground parallel to the line of sight. But on avch slopes of small inclination, the heaten zones caused hy fire at short distances have greater variations in depth than the beaten zones of fire at lonfj ranges on f/reater slo2)es. t- 'T'rvUatiC Zon^ j^<<3^ ]-1"^j- Beacon Zent' _ • Df/Uadeci Zone Or 'DtUI^UViiS Zone/ Fig. 16. The depth of ground that any obstacle shelters from the bullets lired at any given distance, is called the defiladed zone oj the obstacle at the g ire n distance (see Fig. 16). This zone is the space whii-h extends from the crest of the obstacle to the point I -JO of impact, on the ground, of the trajectorv which grazes the crest or top of the obstacle. If the ohstack^ is higher than a man, the latter can only be hit towards the end of the defiladed zone furthest from the obstacle, when the bullet passing over the crest comes within his height from the ground, i.e., when it grazes the surface. Thus the grazed part only of the deliladed zone is dangerous, and consccpu'ntly the proiecivd' zone is less than the defiladed zone In* the extent of the grazed zone. The higher the obstacle, the greater are the defiladi^d and protected zones for a given range and given form of ground on which the obstacle stands. "\^^len the heiglit of the obstacle is less than that of a man, the })rotection it affords is only partial. A\'h(^ther complete or partial, the protection afforded by obstacles, on any ground struck by bullets, has the effect of considerably diminishing tlie efficacy of the fire. The defiladed and jirotected zones increase or decrease tinder the same conditions as those which cause the extent of th(> whole dangerous zones to vaiy. Thus they diminish as the range increases, and they increase as the height of the o})stacl<' increases. As the ground rises or falls with respect to tlie line of sight, the defiladed and protected zones are respectivi'ly decreased or increased for a given range and given heiglit of the obstach'. Altliougli the extent of ground l)eaten or rendered dangerous varies according to its inclination to the line of sight, yet tlie irajectories of the bullets can in no way be influenced by the ground itself, and lience a vertical object, situated in tlie group of falling bullets, will always be equally lialde to be struck, whatever may be the inclination of the ground on which it stands to tlu' line of sight. Thus the results of a fire on a thin objeet without depth, such as a line fonnation for example, are not modified by the inclination of the ground. This line formation presents at all distances and on whatever ground it ni.iy he, an olijective of an almost invariable height. IJnt this is not the case for eehejoiied or deep formations. Taking first the case (»f echeloned formations, ii seeond lim", in order iMjt to l)e under (he siime lire us the troops in front, out of its dangerous zone ; thus its distance should be regulated l)y the inclination of the ground on which the bullets fail, and by the range, which latter alTects tin- fiatness of the trajectory and tli(! angle of fail ofllir Imll.l. 191 Fig. 17. A battalion in attack formation (see Fig. 17) will not, there- fore, have the same relative security in all kinds of ground. If the whole of this formation occupies 600 yards in depth, all the echelons may, in a favourable case, be comprised in the same dangerous zone on ground falling with reference to the line of sight, whilst on rising ground the rear echelons will not be struck by the fire du-ected on the fii'st line. Hence it may sometimes be advantageous to deploy a force on ground sloping towards the enemy, especially if it has a steep slope, rather than on the reverse slope, if this latter be very gentle : that is, troops may often be safer on the exposed surface of a hill than on the reverse side of it. ^ilf\ Fig. 18. With regard to deep and closed formations, such as an English company column of 80 men in fours,* they are, as regards vidjierability, equivalent to vertical objects of greater height as the range increases (see Fig. 18). Such a column at 800 * The company is taken as having opened out one-third of its length, i.e., it occupies about 3G yards in column of route. 192 yards is represented by a vertical object 12 feet in height, and at 1,400 yards by an "object 19-6 feet in height on ground parallel to the line of sight. It thus has a considerable vulner- ability, the amount of which will vary also with the inclination of the ground; and in Fig. 14 we see that this formation will experience less losses on a slope falling with regard to the line of siglit tliau on ground j)anill('l to, or rising witli regai'd to, the lint' of siglit. This effect is most I'l'lt on gi'oiiinl which lulls suliiciently to allow th(( trajectory, which grazes the cn-st, to leave a defiladed zone ])ehind it. On ground rising with icrei'cnce to the line ol' sight, the same fornuition on tlie othci' Inmd conu's under veiy dilTerent conditions, for it is then struck by ))ullets which would have passed over tlieni on gi'onnd ])arallel to tlu' lini' of sight. Thus we see that on a ground which rises as regards the line of siglit, tlie lire is less grazing, while the grou]ung of the liits is denser, the objects are naturally more visilde, and the observation — and therefore the correction of tlie fire — easier than with ground pai-allej to the line of sight. On groiiiul falling with regard to the line of sight the grazed zone is incrciised, but it is impossible to observe the strike of tile lilllhl- to reiriilati' tile tire li\ . Mild hence tlli>- 193 effect of the fire depends almost entirely on chance as wo are trying to hit invisible objects. It is, however, important to know the grazing effects of fire on ground falling with respect to the line of sight, so as to obtain as much of it as possible ; but, if it is intended to make use of this kind of fire, we must expect to sacrifice accuracy of fire in trying to produce these grazing effects on supposed or unseen objectives. Collective infantry fire is either plunging {i.e. dro2')ping) or grazing, though it is impossible to say at what range the former begins. The longer the range, the more dropping is the fire ; and the shorter the range, the more it grazes. The efficacy of a concentrated infantry fire principally depends on its grazing power over the whole depth of the dangerous zone. From the want of efficacy of a di'opping fire, it ought to be used with moderation, to avoid waste of ammunition. A grazing fire may be a very efficacious one, when it covers a great extent of ground, but the amount of ground covered depends on the range, on the elevation, and on the form of the ground at the point where the bullets fall. A little consideration will show that the higher the ground on which the objective stands above the origin of fire, the greater should be the range, to produce the same efficacious fire from grazing. Thus, to obtain an efficacious fire, we must have a good idea of the reliefs and slopes of the ground ; but, according to some French writers, the given efficacious effect is to be got not only at the exact range corresponding to these conditions, but also for some 50 yards under and over it. To obtain the same effect on different slopes, at the same height above the origin of fire, the men firing must go further from the crest, according as the inclination, with respect to the line of sight, of the slope in rear of it, gets greater. The fire becomes eccentric when it is delivered from a point nearer than the proper distance con-esponding to each slope and difference of level, that is, a defiladed zone is created in rear of the crest fired at. We see that firing at troops on ground falling with regard to the line of sight, comes under the heads of dropping and indirect fire, and, knowing the angle of fall of the buUets for different ranges (Table I., on p. 8), the slope of the ground, and the position of the troops, an effective tire might be kept up by placing the troops firing at a range suitable to the fall of the ground. 194 In the field, the exact slopes of the ground in front cannot be — or very rarely can be — ascertained, and it will be rarely possible, even if known, to place troops in the exact positions from Avhence the slopes can be effectively swept ; hence such a mathematical use of inf antr}- lire cannot be accurately made in the field ; but, in sieges and investments, when the slopes of the ground of the defence will be probably known, such fire can be largely used. In action, infantry fires directly on what it sees, and has enough to do to regulate this dii'ect fire to get decided residts, without ti'jang for doubtful results by any such indirect or dropping fire, which would further entail a great expenditui-o of ammunition. However, since the shape of the ground has more or less influence on the effect of the fire, this influence should be thoroughly understood by all officers, so as to draw the greatest possible advantage from it. Slight folds may hide from view, but not from fire, and thus, if the range is known, fii"ing may be continued with success, even though the enemy has dis- appeared for the moment. According to the nature and degree of the slopes near the object aimed at, the depth of the zones swept or grazed by the projectiles may be diminished or increased, and thus it may be necessary to modify the normal rules for the use of sights. In ground rising with respect to the line of sight, the dangerous zones are diminished, and hence a greater number of sights are rerpiirod than on ground parallel to the line of sight, to cover tlie same extent of ground by the fire (see Italian regulations, p. 142). Similarly, cm ground falling witli respect to the line of sight, the dangerous zones arc increased, and a less numl)er of sights may ho required. Anotlier j)oint with reference to the use of fire on hilly ground, is tlu* ]t(>rniissibility of firing over the heads of troops in front. From tlie flatness of the trajectories of rifles, this cannot, as a rule, Ix? permitted in the field on ground parallel to the lin(! of sight, but it may be used in sieges, when the rifles are fired fr<»m rests, or wlien firing indirectly over nn obstacle of such a height as to r(>nder it inipossihle to strike the troops in iVont. Tim danger is not so much from the low height of fln' trajectory of the bullet above the line of sight, as from tlie careless or bad firing of the troops. As far as the trajetrtory is concerned, the l)ulh>ts would always pass over the heads of men in front, if the right elevation was used, and the lini' of si^'ht also diret^ted over the heads of the troops in front i.r., if the olijective can be seen over them. 195 As a preponderance of fire is the deciding element n battle, with modern long range weapons, troops must get accus- tomed to the sound of fire passing over their heads, though, if possible, they shoidd be warned of it beforehand. The French regulations say with reference to the influence of the form of the ground on the results of the fire : — " In a fight, troops cannot choose their own ground. " In the offensive, as in the defensive, the tactical units operate on the place assigned to them : they cannot leave the field of action told off to them without hindering the advance, or paralyzing the fh-e of the adjacent fractions. They ought, therefore, to utilise the ground given them in the best man- ner j)ossible. " The remarks which follow are intended to shew the ad- vantages and disadvantages which different shapes of ground offer as regards the effect of fire. " "With modern tactics, based on the disposition of the troops in depth, and on the carrjdng out of the combat by a firing line of extended troops, the knowledge of the accuracy of the ann at different distances does not give a complete idea of the value of fire in war. " Other things being equal, two adversaries on horizontal ground possess the same power of fire, but not so on hilly ground where fires of equal accuracy cover very different zones, according to the configuration of the soil. " The depth of the dangerous ground is increased by ground falling with respect to the line of sight ; it is dimin- ished, on the contrary', on rising ground. These augTaentations and diminutions are so much the more accentuated as the inclination of the ground with respect to the line of sight is greater. " Ground falling with respect to the line of sight presents a crest which hides objects in rear from the view of the I'uemy. " If the fire is directed on this crest with the exact elevation of sight for the range, half the bullets fall in front of the crest, t/ie other half ^jciss above it, and fall further from the crest as the range is shorter, as the angle formed by the ground with the line of sight is greater, and as the bullets themselves pass at a greater height above the crest. " There results from this not only an increase in the depth of the surface struck, but also the creation, in rear of the crest, of a zone of ground more or less deep, above which the bullets pass at a greater or less height. This zone of ground N 2 190 is said to be grazed by tho bullets ; but it only does so in an efficacious manner if tlip lower trajectories are not more than half the height of a man above the groimd."* With regard to fire directed on flromid risinff irifh respect to the tine of sigJit, the French regulations say : — " The objectives are visible and perfectly distinct fi'om one another ; they are only indifferently sheltered or masked by the folds of the ground, and an efficacious tire can be directed on each of them. "Objects without depth have the same vidnerability as on ground parallel to the line of sight. Close column fonnationsf of any kind are the most vidnerable, but the depth of the dangerous ground is much diminished. "The supports and reserves will not generally suffer from the fire directed on the firing line, and can therefore only be hit by a fii-e directly aimed on them. " Tho effects of ricochets are less dangerous than on ground parallel to the line of sight or falling with respect to it (see p. 205). " On ground rising with respect to the line of sight, in order to obtain the same depths of beaten ground as those obtained with one sight on ground parallel to the lin*^ of sight, it is necessary to employ two or three sights." With regard to fire directed on ground faUing in respect to the line of sight the French regulations sa}' : — " IFhen executed under fa'OKrahle conditions, these fires have the advantage of rendering dangerous great spaces in rear of the crests. The bullets directed on the defenders of the crest can hit the supports and reserves at distances at which these echelons coidd only be touched on ground parallel to tho line of sight by a fire biMUg directly aimed on them with tho proper elevation of sight for the di.stance. "A fire directed on gi'ound falling with respect to the line of sight, renders the position of artillery difficvdt when it is <'sta})lisli(d at the crest. " ]{ut it must uftt bo forgotten that th(> objectives in rear of tlie crest are invisililc to tlie adversary and tliat consequently it will oidy be due to chance if they are hit by a fin* concen- trated on a narrow front. " (ir'iicr.'illv tlicv cfiu onlv sulTcv from the fire directed on * Because troops in rear of tho crest would bo resting on tho ground. *" Such as n qunrttT-rolumn find n column of ronto in fours. 197 the front lino, and these objectives are so much the less vulnerable as their front is more restricted, their formation more compact, and their positions better cliosen. " The ground grazed is less dangerous than the actual zone beaten by the dense part of the cone of bullets. "To get the best result ponsihle the five on even very gentle slopes requires to he delirered from relativelg great distances ; at shorter ranges it becomes less efficacious as the enemj'';* jiosition is approached. Besides, it is impossible for the assailant to appreciate the inclination of any ground falling with respect to the line of sight, as he cannot see it. " With such ground, a fii'e executed at the medium ranges, (see p. 266) on a position known to be strong^ occupied b}' the enemy, may furnish excellent results, should it have a simultaneous effect on the firing line and on the fractions of troops in rear. "Efficacious fire can commence at greater distances than tliose already laid down (see p. 182) for gi'ound parallel to the line of sight. "From the above it results that collective fires, of small width, are not the best for the attack of a position of this kind ; it is only an individual fire, spread uniformly along the enemy's front, that can sweep all the ground in rear of the crest and strike the troops in reserve. "It is advantageous to advance rapidly up to the probable distance (which is very difficult to appreciate exactly) at which the fire furnishes the maximum depth of dangeroxis ground on the opposite slope." Commandant Paquie, of the French army, has published some brochures on this c[uestion of inclined fire, and has given much interesting information concerning it, some of which we will no]v give. In firing on inclined ground, if the inclination of the ground on which the bi the further must the origin of fire bo in order to efficaciously cover a horizontal plateau with fire. "\ATaat is gained in flatness is lost in efiicacy of inclined fire. To obtain the same beaten or efficacious zone, when the slope of the plateaii rises or falls beyond the crest, the distance of the origin of fire nnist be respectively diminished or increased 100 yards for every unit of rise or fall in 100 units horizontally. From what has been said, we see that an inclined fire may have two effects, one on the crest at Avhich it is directed, and the other at some point on the ground beyond it. To complete tliis subpn-t of Inclined Fire, we must give t]u> Gennau melliod of treating it, even at the expense of some rep((tition. Tn doing so wejhave now to considcT th(> modificn- tioiis whicli lijivc t(» b(> ap])li('d to tlie normal scries given in Ta])le A, wlicn tlic bullets fall on a surface more or less iii- clini'd (rising iuul falling) witli res]iect to the line of sight. The basis of nil llie calculations on this sul)ject ersion. This principle may b(< stated as follows: We may, for practical purposes, consider the cone of dispersion of the bullets of a collective fire as a rigid cone. This cermanently connected with the movements of the line of sight that it rises and falls witli the latter, provided the elevation or depression remains within certain limits. The principle of the rigidity of the trajectory is not an 199 absolute one. It is only true within certain limits for relatively small angles of elevation or depression of the line of sight, such as are iisually employed on a battlefield. The principle of the rigidity of the cone of dispersion has, however, larger limits than when applied to a single trajectory, on account of the larger surfaces covered. The study of the modifications to be made to the normal series, when the cone of shots falls on a surface whose inclina- tion diffei's from that of the line of sight, is perhaps the most interesting of all those subjects which relate to collective fii'e, because from the examination of these modifications arise the simple and practical rules on which the Germans base their field firing. The normal series only apply to a flat surface parallel to the line of sight, and as combats in war rarely occur on such ground, it hajipens that, as a general rule, the bullets fall on surfaces rising or falling with respect to the line of sight. In these cases the real angle of fall differs from the normal angle of faU, and consequently the theoretical dangerous zones are increased or diminished, the beaten zones lengthened or shortened, and the density of the hits increased or diminished. But these modifications cause corresponding- variations in the effective dangerous zones, and modify the value of the real destructive effects of the fire, and hence their study is essential, if we wish to direct rationally the fire of infantry on varied ground. The normal series on a surface parallel to the line of sight are averages obtained between the effects produced on surfaces rising and falling with respect to the line of sight. The modifications given by theory have been tested by experiments on varied ground, and found to be correct. Two methods can be employed in the theoretical study of these variations of the normal series. The fijst method consists in finding the alteration in the number of hits on screens placed 10 metres apart; and the second method consists in finding the distance apart of screens, to obtain the same number of hits on them as in the normal series. As this latter method is much the simplest it will be adopted here. It is easy to show that the theoretical dangerous zones, the beaten surfaces, and the distances between the screens, on ground sloping with reference to the line of sight, in order to obtain the same number of hits on each of them, are inversely proportional to the tangents of the angles of fall. Hence, in order to get the same number of hits on each, the 200 distance between the screens on ground sloping with refer- ence to the line of sight should be equal to — 10. Tangent of real angle of fall. Tangent of normal angle of fall. Also we have — The normal depth of ground beaten. Tangent real angle of fall. The real depth of ground beaten. Tangent normal angle of fall. The normal angle of fall of a bullet is the angle of drop with reference to the line of sight. The real angle (f fall of a bullet is the angle of drop with reference to the inclination of the surface of the ground that it falls on. For ground rising v>'itli respect tothc lineof sight, llie real augle of fall is equal to the normal angle of fall increased by the angle formed between the line of sight and the surface of reception.* For ground falling with respect to the line of sight, the real angie of fall is equal to the nomial angle of fall diminished by the angle formed between the line of sight and the surface of reception, f If this last angie is equal to the normal angle of fall, the bullets gi'aze the surface of the ground ; and if it is gi'eater than the normal angle of fall, then the bullets do not gi'aze the surface of the ground, but pass above it. In the study of these questions, we must avoid the danger of accepting the results in a too dogmatic; spirit, and of not sufficiently considering their tactical aspect, Aviiich is by far the most important tiling in war. Thus, from purely theoretical deductions, one might be tempted to introduce into the execu- tion of fire on the battleliiid exact and complicated nu'thods of procedure, involving, iii critical situations, the use of tables of ordinates, slopes, correc^tions for liarometer and thermometer, differences of level, etc., as well as the knowledge of certain data, wliidi, as a rule, it is not possible to obtain, viz., the slopes of the ground on -which the enemy is standing. This error lias been avcnded by tlie Gi'rmans, who, as we shaU see, liave collated some precepts for the direction of fii-c> on varied ground as simple as their rules for fire. Hence, tliough we are ii such as to give a very bad effect to our fire, which would tlieri>f(»re become wasted. The following tabh^ for tlu' ^lausrr riilr gives the redu(;tions to be niad(> in thr 10 mrtrc intervals of llie normal series in order that each screen may have tln^ same number of hits on it, when tli(! ground rises with respect to the liiu; of sight; it also gives tht; total lengths of tlie efficacious dangerous zones on the same gi-ound. 203 T.A.BLE Xl^VIII. Eleva- tion for Normal angle of fall. Num- ber of roimds fired. Depth of efficacious dangerous groiuid. Reduction of the 10 mOtre intervals in the normal series ■when the ground makes an angle wth the line of sight of When the ground is pai-allel to the line of sight.* When the ground makes an angle with the line of sight of +3° +5° +10° +3° +5° +10° m. O ' m. 400 MO 100 210 63-00 42-00 23-10 3-0 2-0 M 500 1-40 100 200 75-50 50-40 29-40 3-5 2-4 '. 1-4 1 600 2-10 100 170 68-00 51-00 28-90 4.0 3-0 1-7 700 2-50 100 130 62-40 43-50 27-30 4-8 3-5 2-1 800 3-30 100 110 55-00 45-10 27.50 5.0 4-1 2-5 900 4-20 200 140 81-20 64-40 40-60 5-8 4-6 2-9 1000 5-10 200 110 69-30 56-10 39-60 6-3 5-1 1 3-6 1100 6-0 200 120 79-20 64-80 44-40 6-6 5-4 1 3-7 1200 7-0 200 80 55-20 45-00 32-00 0-9 5-7 4-0 1300 8-10 300 100 72-00 61-00 43-00 7-2 6-1 4-3 1400 9-20 300 110 82-50 70-40 50-00 7-5 6-4 4-6 1500 10-30 — — — — — 7-8 6-5 4-9 1600 11-50 — — — — 8-0 7-3 5-2 Tc tal .. 480 761-30 594-30 386-40 :\i ian . . 134 70-00 54-00 35-00 From this table wo see that the average depth of the efficacious dangerous zones is 134 metres for the Mauser rifle in the normal case, and it is 70, 54, and 35 metres when the ground rises 3°, 5", and 10° respectively with regard to the line of sight. Or in other words the efficacious dangerous zones are approximately equal to ^, \ , and \ of the normal efficacious dangerous zone ichen the ground rises respectively 3^, 5^, and 10° *See footnote on page 160. 204 with regard to the line of sight, and consequently are approximately equal to 2, 3, and 4 times the normal efficacious dangerous zone ivhen the ground falls 3*, 5°, and 10"^ respectively with regard to the line of sight. Hence every time the ground of reception rises about 3' with the line of sight it is necessary to employ two elevations ; if it rises about 5^, three elevations, Szc. Thus, though we cannot be siu'e of making the bullets fall on the objective with a single elevation, yet with two or three elevations we can not only ensui'e this, but are certain to obtain an efficacious jfire. On the other hand, when the efficacious dangerous zones are increased by tlie gTound falling witli respect to the line of sight, we can cover a great depth of ground with an efficacious fire by means of a single elevation. The practice of combining sights lias therefore tlie effect of not onlycounterbalancingthe effect of movement of tlie objective, of errors in judging the distances, and of deviations caused by atmospheric influences, but also of the alterations in the lengths of the effective dangerous zones caused by variations in the slope of the ground of reception with respect to the line of sight. All these causes of error, Avhen working together, often have a very considerable effect. Further, the practice of eomluning two or more elevations does not entail a useless consumption of ammunition. Often superior results are obtained b}" the use of two combined elevations to tliose obtained with a single elevation witli the same consumption of ammuniti(m. (See pp. 103 and 104). On undulating ground, the bullets fall on ascending and decending slopi's connected by almost horizontal plateaux. Conse(|uently the real dangerous zones differ but little fi'oni the normal om-s when the slopes of the ground do not exceed the value of the normal angles of fall for the trajectm-ies of the longest ranges of the rifle. When thi; origin of fire has a small command over the surrcninding ground, thia'i'al dangerous zone may even sometimes be greatcn- than the nonnal ones. In firing uphill we (detain, as a rule, longer (effective dangerous zones than firing downhill. But this does not ])rove that firing ui)hill has a greater absolute value than firing downhill. In tin- first place in firing downhill wo are often able to obtain the tactii-al advantage of two tiei's of fire; furtlier, w(! can more easily see th(! enemy's movements and regulate the fire, by watching its effects, and thus pi'ofit b}' tli(! losses inflicted on the enemy to hasten on the success of the action. 205 But when there is a choice of position, infantry ought to avoid a too elevated site, unless for temporary purposes, or unless they are compelled to occupy it by the cii'cumstances of the fight. The best position is a crest which does not dominate the surrounding gi'ound too much. But this rule is by no means absolute, for infantry have often to cover the artillery which must occupy the crest ; in this case they must move down the slope and often partially up the opponent's slope, in order to keep the enemy's skirmishers at a distance of at least 1,200 yards from the artillery. Effect of the Form and Nature of the Grouxd ON Ricochets. The length of each of the ricochets is increased by a ground falling, and decreased by ground rising, in the direction of the bidlets' movement. Generally ricochets go to a greater distance as the angle of drop of the bullet with regard to the surface of the ground is smaller. AVhen the ground is of average hardness, this angle should not be greater than 15^ in order that the bullets may ricochet. Soft ground, or gi-ound covered with thick vegetation, or with a surface cut up by transverse projections or furrows, stops the greater number of the ricochets. A soil hardened by frost or firmly-set sand is, on the contrary, eminently fitted to make bullets ricochet. Stony ground makes the ricochets very variable, and causes splinters of stone to fly about. If the profile of the ground on which the bullets fall short, has a slightly concave or hollow form, as in Fig. 20, these biillots will ricochet on to the object. But if the profile of the ground is convex, as in Fig. 21, they are likely to pass over the object. A rounded crest therefore, in front of the object gives a good protection against ricochets. Fio. 21. 206 The appearance of dust thrown up hy the bullets in rico- cheting, facilitates the observation and correction of the fire. In firing down hill, as in Fig. 22, or into the face of a hiU, as in Fig. 23, there may be no ricochets. On the Occupation or Ground Inclined to the Line OF Sight. "When firing from a low position to a higher one, as from a valU'V at an enemy on a ridge, a wide or more than one dangerous zone is obtained, and the result of the fire majf it' very great under favourable cinaimstances. In tlie cases shown in Figs. 24 and 25 we see two zones of ground swept by fire, one at tlie crest and tlie other l)eyatly dimiuish(Hl ])y the jdunging nature of the fire, wliieli will also dimiuish the effects produced by ricochets, and there will l)e, besides, only (mo dangerous zone swept by the fire ; hence, th(M)refirally, the position of the defond(n' on the crest of the hill will be worse than thiit of the nttnek. 207 Fio. 2.3. Now, suppose the line of defence to be retired on the plateau, 500 to 800 j-ards from the crest (see Fig-. 25), then the situation is reversed, because when the defenders fire on the enemy's firing line, as soon as this latter reaches the crest, the bullets which graze this crest may sweep the slopes behind it, // tlieij have a suitable inclination, and strike the troops in rear. These considerations, and others to be referred to presently, have caused many military writers, especially among the French,'-' to dispute the advantage of taking up a position at the crest of rising ground. A defensive position can be taken up in one of thi'ee different manners : — 1 . The crest of the position may be strongly held. 2. From the powerful concentration of fire, to which the crest is subjected, the latter may be lightly held, and abandoned at an opportune moment, and the battle fought out at a second and main line of defence, 500 to 800 yards in rear of it. * Commandant E. Paquie is perhaps the most ahle advocate of the views to be now exposed. His two best-known works are : — Tir incline fie Vhifanterie and Feux de guerre. The Author regrets that as the latter book was not procurable, (being out of print,) he has not been able to make use of it. 208 3. A lino in front of the crest niaj^ he lield by infantry, leaving the crest for the artiller}', and as a cover for the reserves. But the value of ground, for a defensive position, must not be examined merely as regards its effect on the efficacy of fire and the cover that it aSords, but we must also consider how it facilitates or delays the movement of troops, how the flanks are secured, and other such tactical points. As it is essential to arrive at the truth in the \dtal question of the method of defending a position, we will first deal with the arguments of those who oppose the hitherto accepted method of liolding the crest of a position as the main line of the defence and then give the criticisms of their opponents.*'" We will, before doing this, state what the probable manner of occupation of a crest line would be. The defence aims at two points: — (1). Resistance with which to destroy the enemy's power of assault and his power of resisting counter-attacks; and (2). The offensive return, or counter attack, which alone can gain success. Hence the object of the defence is to keep the enemy under fire in circum- stances unfavourable to himself. To do this, the defenders try to draw advantage both from the ground itself and from their own tire. Formerly these advantages were sought for by selecting a position with passive obstacles in front, which 'could only be crossed by the enemy's columns at certain points under effective fire. But this obstacle equally prevented any decisive offensive return. "With the modern breech- loading rifle — with which a man's fire may be considered as continuous — it has been found by experience that the best obstacle to offer to an attack is a clear and wide field of fir(^, and hence tlie modern idea of a good position is one which offers an extensive and clear field of tire in front of a series of strong tactical points of support,! tcitJmi support ing distance • It is hero fair to warn thn roador that, although the Author eon.sidcra ii strong occupation of thn crest lino, or of a lino in front of this crest line, us Iho g(;neral rule to ho followed, and the strong occupation of •A lino in rear of the crest as hcing only suited to sj)ccial cases, yet he has maile every endeavour in liis power to give a fair rcprosentiitiou of ])oth sides of tlie rpustion. t "The defence onglit always to try and augment the value of the ground by fortification, and the shelter trench has bccomo for it a con- dition of lif(r or death." — (V^mi Schelf.) Again, although the following words were written with regard to a lino of detached forts, they apply equally well to u line of strong points: — "A single fort is of little use, but a front oi forts, where the enemy cannot pass one without coming in reach of the adjacent fort, has a different aspect." — (Von Waldstalts-n.) 209 of one another, which are strongly occupied, while fewer troops are placed in the intervals. The artillery and the reserves for the counter-attacks are posted in, or in rear of the intervals. The strong points draw the enemj'^ towards them, exposing his flanks to the intervals, from which local offensive retiu'ns can be made. The efficacy of such returns depends on their being made at the proper moment, with all the energy possible, and on tlie flanks of the enemy in j)reference. Offensive retiu-ns, through the weakly held intervals, can be made at any period uf the fight, to take advantage of any mistake of the enemy, or to gain time by forcing the enemy to temporarily halt, but these earlier offensive movements should only partake of the nature of local sorties, which retire again, as soon as their object is attained, under the protection of the strong points ; they should not have a decisive character, which should only belong to the counter-attack made about the period of the assault, when the enemy is in the greatest confusion. Seconclj__and, in some cases, third lines of defence should be prepared to check an}' local advantage gained by the attack in the front line, to prevent it spreading right and left, and to force the enemy to retire, by the powerful fire directed on him from the lines in rear. Thus the offensive-defensive being- looked to as the best method of defence, the defence reserves all the troops it can for offensive returns by telling off, to man the front line, the least number of troops that may be considered sufficient to break the strength of the enemy while maintaining their position. To do this it concentrates its forces at the strong points, so as to obtain at them the most powerful fire possible to the front and flanks, and holds the intervals less strongl)-. Fire is only opened when the enemy arrives at the most favourable distance for the efficacious action of the defender's fire.^-' The French official publication, Quelqtws indications pour h combat, thus describes the arrangements made by the defen- sive in the defence of a position : — " The defensive draws its principal strength from its fire, and from a judicious employment of the ground. The perfecting of fii-e-anns has been esj)ecially profitable to the defensive, by rendering possible the destruction of the assail- ant at a Ions: distance. * This varies with the size and height of the objective, and with the accuracy with which the ranges arc Ivnown, See Chapter X 210 ''In the defensive, it is important to deceive the enemy as long as possible as to the exact position chosen ; as to the troops which are concentrated there ; as to the development (-)f the line of defence, and as to the points on which its flanks rest.'^' " The infantry of the line of battle, posted according to the groimd and the probable direction of the attack, will hold itself in readiness in rear of the positions assigned to it.f ' ' If there are in advance of the principal line of defence, at a distance of 850 to 1,300 j'ards, any obstacles (such as farms, woods, &c.) ha^'ing a good view in the direction of the probable attack, they must be included in the line of battle, by occupA'ing th<^in by battalions or companies, according to their importance. "These woods, farms, &c., are the bastions of the liae of battle ; they are flanked by it. " The mission of the troops which occupy them, is to break the fii'st efforts of the enemy, by defending, to the last man, the positions which have been confidetl to them. "As a rule, there is no advantage in disseminatiag the infantry by making them occupy more advanced posts. The defenders of such posts, being out of reach of support, would be easily driven in by the advance guard of the assailant, and their movement to the rear would produce a fatal impression on the viornl t»f the troops. "It is six'ciall}^ with the fire of the u-hok that the defence ought to act.:|: Consequently, the dissemination of the infantry ought to bo avoided." Tlio attack, at the opening of an action, concentrates its artillery lire flrst on the artilli-ry and then on the strong tactical points of the defence ; this tire is supplemented, when con- sidered advisable, by the Are of strong linc>s of infantry; and as soon as the deniornli/ation of the defenders is secured and his artillery siliniced, llie attacking lines are then pushed forward to the assault. Arfjunvnls (Kjahint the occxjKdioH (f the erext line of a position. Tlie ()p]t(inents to the , under which the artillery of the attack cannot come into action without being destroyed, and the attacking infantry cannot further advance. The artillery of the defence Avould be still further in rear, beyond the effective musketr}' range of the attack, now in possession of the crest, and would aid the infantry fire of the main lino of defence, by firing over it, while it cannot be silenced in this position. Under these conditions, walls, houses, farms, (Jtc, can bo fidly made use of by the defence, as they cannot be destroyed by distant artillery fire, and after demoralizing llio attackers b}' a combined artillery and infantry fire, the decisive off(uisiv(* return can bo effectively made. Thus the artillery of the attack cannot now gain that preponderance (»f fire, by which alone llie action of its iufnutry can be ])repared and can succeed. The main line of the defenders and their supports and reserves are not reached by tlio bullets which graze the crest, while a ])()siti()n in rear of llie crest reverses th(! conditions of the iuclini'd fire, aiul now • The italicH iiro our own. t " It is in(Minvoni(>nt for Ihc iidiick (o doploy at a proat distanco from Ihc fnomy : ihiH is u reason why the defence should try and compel it to do HO." (Von .Sclircff). 'J'his is one j^^ioat reason for makinp use of advanced posts. 'ITie advisaliility of making use of adviiiieed posts is not < onfined merely to the eondilioii.s tliat Ihey should ho within supporting diHlance of the crest and have an a.ssured lino of retreat. Their gnjutost .•idvantagi' lies in their forcing the early dei)loyment of the enemy, aiul thus to liring early into liis ranks, confusion and disintegration. 213 gives tli(^ defenders the chance of reaching the enemy's echelons in roar of his firing line by the bullets, which pass over the crest, of the fire directed on it (see Fig. 25). The true object of a fight is not merely to gain ground, but to attain the destruction of the enemj' ; the required ground is gained after this. Otherwise, to apply the principle of men not yielding ground, the line taken up by outposts or by an advanced guard ought logically to be made the line of resistance. Hence the retirement of the troops from the crest cannot be objected to, while this feigned retreat will probably draw on an enemy, deceived by an apparent success, to certain destruction. The advanced troops woidd be taken from the reserve, which they would rejoin after retiring, so as to leave the main line of defence intact and undemoralised by any losses. The advocates for always taking up a position in rear of a crest, support then' conclusions from examples drawn from the fighting that took place during the investments of Metz and Paris by the Germans in the war of 1870-71. During these phases of the war some examples are to be found of defending a position in rear of the crest which were attended in all cases with success. The Grennan positions at Champigny and Buzenval in front of Paris well illustrate the method of defence described above. At the battle of Champigny the French made a sortie against the Gennan investment lines. The lines of defence at this point were about 400 yards in rear of a crest of rising ground which commanded it slightly, as the ground sloped gently down from the crest. The German infantry were posted behind cre- naleted walls, and their artillery behind epaulments. This line was completely hidden from the view of the French artilleiy. The French infantry found no difficulty in dislodging the enemy's detachments from their advanced positions in fi-ont of the crest. At the crest itself the resistance was finner, still not serious ; the Germans retired, seeking to entice the French after them. These, on arriving at the crest, were subjected to a heayy fire, but they succeeded in obtaining some shelter, and returned the fire without doing the Germans, who were well sheltered, any serious damage, and awaited the arrival of their guns, which were required to effect a breach in the enemy's position, so as to enable them to assault it. As soon, however, as the guns showed themselves, and before they could even be got into action, a withering short range rifle fire was directed on them, inflicting such heavy losses, that 1214 all but a few gams were prevented from opening' tire, and even these were speedily silenced, and the artillery was compelled to retire. The infantry, which had also heen stopped, was not able to resume its advance, and had, therefore, also to retire. General Ducrot, narrating these events, says, "We have been vanquished by the ground." At the battle of Buzenval the same thing happened. The French ascended the slopes of the plateau held by the Germans in rear of its crest ; the French reached the crest, but found it impossible to bring a single gun into action. The French infantry found itself singly opposed to the two combined arms, infantiy and artillery, of the enemy, covered by walls and epaulments, and could not, consequentlj', do anything. Some wi'iters have pointed out that the above principle of the occupation of gi'ound is not by any means a new one, as it was the custom of the Duke of Wellington, whenever he wished to take Tip a defensive position, to seek out a plateau, and establish himself behind the crest, jicd otif of view of the enemy. The front slope was defended by sldrmishors, who retired before the advancing French columns of attack, which, on arrival at the crest, were over- whelmed, thrown into the most complete disorder, and de- moralised, by a heavy tiro of bullets and of case from guns, from the real lino of defence, about 50 yards in rear of the crest, followed up by a bayonet charge in line, which invariably was successful. On similar principles to those already given, the opponents to the defence of the crest of a position deny that the front edge of a wood, of no great depth, is the best lino for defending it. They consider that the wood shoiild take the place of a crest- line in Avlmt concerns the combined action of artilleiy and infantry ; the true lino of defence, they say, is situated witliin muslcctry ranges in r(>ar of the wood, from AvlKnice it will bo in\nilnerable behind the coA^er it Avould utilis(>, necessitating the intervention of ai'tlllcry in order to be f()rc(>d. The edge, they considi'j*, constitutes an excellent advan(M'd linc^, but that an obstinate resistance should not be made at it, liecausc; tho maximum elTort cannot be ]>roduced there, as the assailant pre- sumably possesses a superiority of artillery and inlantry tire. Infantry ]ilaced at the edgn of a wood can offectually oppose an enemy's infantry, l)ut Avhen tlio action of the latter is assisted by artill(>ry, the def(>nders, wlio cannot bo effectively Imcked u]i by their own artillery, ar(^ very badly situated. As nn example of this, at Spichercu the French lield the crest of 215 a steep slope covered with woods, Lut tliey did not strongly hold the lower edge of the woods. The Gemians soon found their way through the woods to the crest, hut coidd not advance beyond that point, even after the guns had been dragged up, until the French left flank was turned and they had retired. Arguments in favor of holding the crest line of a position. The advocates for defending the crest-line of a position say that, although the theoretical exactness of the statements already given for inclined fire cannot be contested, yet we must guard ourselves in practice against drawing too absolute conclusions fi'oni them. In dealing with the defence of localities, they say that the modern method of placing houses, farms, villages, &c., in a state of defence, is not to hold the walls and houses themselves at first, but to choose a natural or artificial line in advance of them, composed of hedges, enclosures, ditches, raised roads, abatis, shelter trenches, &c., against which obstacles artillery has but little effect. The walls and houses would only be occupied after the outer line had been penetrated by the eneni}' and the enemy's artillery compelled to cease fire for fear of hitting their own troops.* In proceeding in this manner we can, without fear, choose as strong tactical points in the line of defence, the villages, &c., found situated on the crest. Strong points, so situated, have also the great advantage of giving an extensive view over the ground in front, and are thus able to assist in the defence of the position in a manner which they could not have done if they had been situated far in rear of the crest. f * The following description of the occupation of St. Privat is given by an anonjinous French author (C. C. J.), who is in favor of defending a position in rear of the crest. "A brigade defended the \^llage, but did not occupy it ; it was posted round the edge, like an exterior ring, 300 metres in front of it ; the walls were crenaleted, and shelter trenches constructed ; the village itself was the objective of the Prussian artillery ; the advanced line did not suffer at all." The French only eyacuated this position for want of ammunition, and because their right flank was turned, in spite of the nearly 200 gims that were eventually bi-ought to bear on the village. The line chosen for defence should be far enough in front of the houses to prevent splinters and falling masonry hurting the men. Another great advantage in this advanced line of defence is, that it is possible to maintain a better control over the men than if they were scattered in different houses or yarts of a house. t "Avoid choosing ^'illages to be fortified from which the sui-rounding ground cannot be weU seen, or which are dominated within rifle range." — (General Brialmont). 216 The wood at Spicheren, if it had hccn strongly held, along its front, would not have been penetrated by the Germans, who in turn conld not have taken the Eotherberg spur in flank. As the French held the crest of tlie 8piehen>n platean, the loss of the wood caused an opening in tlie line whicli had a bad effect on the Erench troops in forcing- them to retire, and only made them more ready to retreat altogether, and not utilize their large unemployed reserves when they imagined their left flank had been turned. "With reference to the fighting round Metz and Paris in 1870-71, of which we have quoted two cases, those of Cham- pigny and Buzenval, General Brialmont writes — "Those who quote the battles around Paris and Metz in order to prove that the Germans established their principal line of defence in rear of the crest, forget the difference between the defence of a line of investment and the defence of a position by an army in the field. In the fonner case, points of resistance (parks, private country residences, fanns, &c.), situated in rear of the crest, are occu})ied in preference, so as to be, as much as possible, sheltered from the artillery fire of the besieged ; in the latter case, on the contrary, the jioints of resistance are chosen so as to menace the flanks of the troops who try to pass them, and they are consequently to be found either in advance of the first line of battle (n- on this line. An entrenched village, situated in rear of the crest, would be, doubtless, less exposed ; but it would also produce less efPect. We ought not to lose sight of the fact that artdlery has resources and can emplo}- methods of procedure which give to its indirect fire an efficacy, which the indirect fire of infantry cannot obtain. The problem consists less in selecting villages, &c., to servo as strong tactical points in a line of battle, in such situations as are sheltered from the fire of the enemy's artillery than in organizing their defence so that tliis fire can produce but little effect," in the manner already stated. The I'^rench sorties froni Mi'tz and Paris were directed ngainst a continuous investment line, so that they luid no fhiidvs lo iidiuk, wliih' tlieir own were exposed; and it must not be foi-gotten lliat the German positions were HO chosen jmd fortified as uwrcly to gain lime to coucentrnto tln'ir lroo])H, in superior numbers, liefore atfiiekingaud driving liiick fh(! I*'rench. Again imd jigiiin wc; rend liow tlie French Horties were stojtped and (h'iven liMck, not so mucli l»y tlie frontal fire they met witli I'roni lliese retired ])ositionH timt the Germans took up, as from the pliysical obstacles they 217 met witli, and the flauk counter-attacks that wore directed on them. In the numerous cases in the Franco-Grcrman war, -where a position was occupied at the crest there is no indication to show that the effect of the fire passing over the crest was in an}' way approaching' to what has been stated, or that it prevented a vigorous defence from being carried out, or supports and reserves from coming up. The French positions were almost invariably captured by being out-flanked and turned, and not by the effect of the fire du'ected on the crest line of the position.* AVith regard to the Duke of "Wellington's method of proce- dvu-e, it can be stated that the properties of inclined fire were not known in his days, and that all he aimed at was to act by surprise. He placed his troops in line on the top of the ridge or plateau, just far enough in rear of the crest as to be out of sight of the enemy. The French attacked m columthi, who, when they arrived at the crest, saw suddenly before them our deployed lines, who at once poured one or two volley's into the dense masses before them, and then, before the French could recover the effect, they dashed forward witli the baj'onet, and drove back the helpless and disorganized French columns. No one can assert that the same success would have been obtained against deployed or extended troops, and hence, our successes were due more to the vicious attack formation of the French, and to an intelligent and rational emplo^mient of fire by the English, than to the fact that the principal line of resistance was in rear of the crest. Coming now to the more technical considerations of inclined fire, allowing that the assailants' fire does pass over the crest, the troops and artillery on the crest, and the echelons in the rear, can always protect themselves by masks of earth or other shelters. In dealing icith the question of inclined fire, we have see7i how much a knowledge of the ranges, of the differences of level, and of the slopes of the ground with regard to the line of sight, enter into the question, none of ivhich data are, or can he accurately * At Gravclotte, the French occiipied the crest of the position, and the second French Corps (Frossard) numbering 19,000 infantry, placed in sheltered trenches on the left of the French positifm, was attacked hy two German Army Corps (70,000 men) ; and whih^ tlu;so latter snftered enormously, its loss in killed was only sixty men and otlicers, in wounded 366, and in missing (due to wounded and unwounded prisoners) 195 : total 621. These numbers included fom- killed, tw(>nty wounded, and one missing from among the reserve (or corps) artillery, and three missing from among the Administrative Services. All the remaining losses were among the infantrv. L'18 known in the field.'''' The effect of an inclined fire from an advantageons range, depends on a large n^imber of rounds being fired from the same position, but attacking infantry, in order that the offensive spirit may be projierly kept up, will never remain long at any one spot, and as they only fire very few rounds at each range, such a really dangerous zone is never formed as Avould stop any reinforcement by the supports and reserves, who can always take the opportunity of moving up during the pauses in an enemj^'s fire, or over those parts of the ground which are not receiving his collective fire. Besides this, many of tlie bullets will be stopped by the obstacles and hillocks which exist on every ground in civilized countries. A 7>ear approach to the crest tends to create on the reverse slopes of a plateau a protected zone, which increases in depth and height as the range decreases, allowing of masses of troops to he concentrated near the crest, or the firing line to he retired, without danger. Thus, as the enemy approaches the crest, the defiladed zone in rear of it gets greater and greater, and the bidlets passing over the crest, fall further and further in rear of the position, allowing reinforcements to approach in safety, just at a time when it is rerj^uired for them to do so. This is easily seen from Fiir. 20. ■^fii ttW^fJSIL. Fig. 2G.t • Conimandiint r.-uiuii' di.sputc.s llic necessity of kiiuwiiif^ tliesi; data accurately. "The ai)i)reciation of the diffen^ncc of level and of the dis- tances do not reciuire f^reat aeeuriiey ; for a difference of level of 25 to 35 metres, the fire; at any ranpe bet\v(;en GOO and 500 metres, is very eflieacious; ffir a difference of level of 15 to '25 metres, a tin! at any ranf^;{! hetween 600 and 400 metres, aequires a maxinnim of j)ower. The difficulty of estimation is not f^rcjit, as we see, and an inclined fire leaves a Tcry wide marfositions can be seen; the artillery and the rifle can be utilized to their fullest ranges; the enemy cannot se(> the echelons in rear, while any of the enemy's echelons can br> fired on ; tlie effeirt of the fire can be seen and watcheil, and allowed for if it is ill-adjusted ; Ihn time for <»])[)()rtune counter-attacks can be well judged; the artillery of the attack must cease tiring wlien their iufautry arrives near the crest, and as the fin; of this infantry passes well in the air ])eyond tlie crest, the supports and reserves can • On p. 210, we saw that a French official pnhlication Btates that troops in advanced posts are not to retire, but to fight to the last man. 221 easily come up in safety; if the artillery of the defence is over})owered, it can retire temporarily and re-open when the attacking artillery has to stop firing' ; *' and a commanding position adds to the moral force of the troops holding it, hy giving them a feeling of security, and takes away from that of the attack, which has only an imperfectly defined crest-line to fire at, and one which changes with the range. (See Fig. 14.) General Brialmont writes : — " Iiifantr}- can only fire well at objects that they can see, and hence we would oid}' deceive ourselves very much if we placed it 660 to 770 yards in rear of a crest, and expected it to sweep this crest with its fire and liit the assailant (whom they cannot see), whilst he advances u[) the front slope of the plateau. In fact, it is very rare that a crest-line can be sufficiently clearly made out to be used, by the enemy, as a point to aim at. In most cases, it is invisible, on account of the brushwood, clumps of trees, hedges, crops, &c., which cover the ground, and hence the fire, directed on it, cannot have any precision." With reference to the statement, that if the firing line is at the crest, the ground on which the supports and reserves have to advance is dangerously swept, General Brialmont writes : — " This argument has not the importance that is attached to it ; first, because, in order to sweep the plateau on which the echelons of the defence are placed, it is necessary to take up a certain fixed position, and on either side of this the trajec- tories cease to graze the ground ; secondly, because m the defence, the number of echelons can be reduced, or brought nearer to one another, and sheltered in trenches ; thu'dly, because the reserves and main body ought only to advance at the moment when the fight takes place on the crest, when, consequently, the fire of the attack has ceased to sweep the plateau." A line of defence is not now-a-days unifonnly occupied, and hence there will be intervals which, having no fire, will not attract that of the enemy. It is behind these intervals that the troops in support would be placed, and thus they woidd not suffer from the fire which the occupied parts draw on themselves. The efficacy of tiers of fire has been proved by experience, * The French ai-tillerj' fi-equently did this in 1870-71. Pcrhi^ps in the near future artillery will be provided with l)ullet-proof shields to enable it to continue to light under the fire of infantry and shrapnel. and their effects are such as to justify, in abnost every case, where the ammunition can be spared, a great consumption of ammunition. It is of great use to fire on the enemy's reserves Avhen they can be seen, even at short ranges, to try and compel them to retreat, as they invariably draw back with them the lines in fi-ont. * It is only by holding a crest line that these tiers of &re can be obtained, and, as we have seen, the fi-ont slope of a crest may be less dangerous than the reverse one. The Gennan regulations acknowledge this, and recommend that in suitable cases, a position on the front slope should be taken up. Another advantage of lines of fire from shelter trenches on the front of a slope, is, that the enemy's fire tends to keep the men in their places, tor the}- feel that the}' run into danger 1)}- trying to retire. Tiers of tire are more usually obtainable than is commonly thought. Crest lines are rarely clearly defined, and, as troops shoidd always see the foot of the slope to be defended, they must be placed a little way down it, at what is called the military crest (see D., Fig. 14), in contra-distinction to the true crest (see C, Fig. 14), and then a second line can be formed for more distant fire from the top. Thus, in Fig. 14, troops at C cannot see B, and so they ought to be placed at D, and then a second tier of fire can be obtained at C ; also, if the defenders' firing line is at D, the enemy's fire* is not so likely to go over the crest to sweep the ground in rear. Commandant I'acpiie, says that — " The jirinciples involved in the inclined fire of infantry counsel a slow advance, and an increase of the intensity of the fire at distances Avhich procure the ma.xiiinim of power. It is, therefcn-e, of some use to know the distances which allow of dominant positions being swept over all tlieir depth The assailant who rapidly crosses the zone which gives his fire its maximum power (see footnote, p. 218), in order to expose himself sooner to the close fire of the enemy, and to produce a less effect, does not know liow to make use of his weapon." All tacticians are now-a-days agreed that onct^ infantry are launched to the attack, tJiey sliould carry it out wifli all tlie energy possible; ♦ Tho value of firing on rcscrvos was well illuHtrated in tho third liattlo of Plevna, when (icncral SlopliclcfF rrpcllcd tho fourth counter- attack iiiadi' on hi)n liy llir Turks, after lie liad caipiurcd thi' rcdnuljts, hy (iriiif^, not on llif Turkish firiu;^ liiir, luit (ni Dicir rcscrvcH in rear, wlioin lie tliuH conijicllrd to williiiraw, anil who were? soon followed hy their firing line. This shows that a eloud of skii-niisher.s cannot protect or maHk closed troops in roar of them when opposed to nn able enemy. 223 hut if they acted as above advocated, the offensive spirit, so essential to success, would soon ho completely destroyed ; besides, no one can carry in their heads the data for inclined tire, or bo expected to carry tables for them, and to examine tliom under a hot fire in action. Crest-lmes for defence are always to be found, while suitable positions for defending it from a distance are rarely so ; and hence, this latter method must always be the ex- ception, and not the rule. And, if a considerable plateau does not exist behind the crest (see Fig. 26), as is often the case, and the position held is a ridge, the whole theory of the efficacy of inclined fire, based on its theoretically deep beaten or efiicacious zones, falls to the ground. The experience of war sanctions the use of the crest-line, and no examples can he fairly given shewing the supposed terrible effects of inclined fire on reverse slopes. Inclined fii-e depends for its effect on fau-ly long ranges ; it is directed on a thin and sheltered firing line at the crest of a position in the hope of reaching the echelons in rear. But, as we shall see in Chapter XII., such long range fire ought in- variably to be concentrated and directed on objects of suitable dimensions. But a fire concentrated on a narrow front does not give good results for inclined fir'ing, as we have seen that the French regulations state (see p. 196); to obtain any efficacy with an inclined fire we must use indi\'idual fixing, uniformly beating the whole crest, and hence, in using infantry fire as inclined fire, with the object of covering the ground in rear of the crest with bullets, we run a great chance of wasting valuable ammunition, which can only be replaced with the greatest difficidty. (See Chapter XIII.) Finally, as rifles with far flatter trajectories than those at present in use are likely to be generally adopted at an early date, the supposed efficacy of inclined fire will be greatly reduced. Positions in rear of a crest-line are doubtless suitable for special cases, such as a second line of defence in rear of the crest ; for investment lines which are exposed to very' powerful artillery- fire from the forts, &c., of the defence, and in which the main object is to gain time to collect the besiegers' supeiior forces ; or for the defence of any very steep positions which have to be taken up, the fi'ont slopes of which are imsuitable for being held. The unsuccessfid defence of the Eotherberg spiir, at the battle of Spicheren, and of MajubaHill, in the Boer war, illustrate the danger of defending at the crest such very steep 224 slopes as allow of the enemy collecting unseen and in safety at the foot, or near the crest, for a further offensive movement ; and this advantage the advocates for the defence of a position in rear of the crest, woidd always give to the attack. "Whatever may be the practical effects of inclined fire, we cannot help owning that very useful information is obtained in studymg its possible effects, so that should these effects over be realized, officers may know how to act. A knowledge of the possible effects of inclined fire wUl also prevent ofiicers being surprised Avhen they receive some bidlets in a position where it appears their men ought to be sheltered. Tlu' German regidations say on the subject of inclined fire : ' ' If the fire is du-ected on ground inclined in one du*ection or the other, the length of the dangerous zone is shortened or lengthened according as the groiiud rises or falls and propor- tionately to the slope. There is an advantage when the ground on which the object stands is ])arallel to the line of sight, or is inclined slightly below it, and a disadvantage when it rises. It is just the opposite as regards the efficacy of the enemy's fire." This is all that can really bo said about inclined fire, and these simple statements are far from offering a basis on which to build a now theory for the occupation of positions. "It should be added that if the Germans practice field- fii'ing on varied ground they do not attribute to inclined firo the same importance which some French military writers ascribe to it. The Germans modify the normal rules for the use of sights in accordance with thr nature and degree of the slopes near the object aimed at, slopes which may diminish or increase the depth of the zones swept or grazed b}^ the projectiles. Tliey admit, also, that it may be sometimes advantageous to dt'pl(jy a force on ground sloping towards tlie euumy, if it has a steep slope, rather than on a reverse slope which may bo very gentle. Tliey carefully avoid sacri- ficing to a formal idea the very diverse factors which occur in war, and guard against \]w fault of pusliing technical specu- lations lo tlieir utmost: (•onse(iueuccs." — /iriiK^ J/i/ilnirc de VEtran the advance of the hostile artillery, or to make it suffer losses by a fire at 1, ()()() metri-s. Tliis would not be the case if this lino were placed at the crest or in rear of it." The French official publication, Qitflqun indications pour le combat, api)arenfly recognises tht< uliovo advantages, as can be Hcen in the extract already given from it on ]>]). 209 and 210. One thing that must striko every one after a study of the foregoing pages, is the great importance which must be now-a-days attached to thr kn<»vlcdrft< of (fronnd and its employ- 227 7nent^ in knowing its use offensively and defensively, and its eifect on the fire, both in the attack and defence. The value of ground is not absolute ; it not only varies with the nature of the arms, with their range and combinations, but it depends also on the actual positions that the troops occupy on it. "A knowledge of the ground is no less indispensable for the attack than the defence, — here to profit by some strong points, there to avoid them. The ground dictates to the defence the points of resistance and the tactical dispositions ; it indicates to the attack the dii'ections in which a bayonet attack has no chance of success, and those where it can succeed. . . . Tactical dispositions ought to be based on the properties of the ground ; an ideal formation on a horizontal ground would be annihilated if it were blindly placed on intersected and varied ground ; there does not exist any panacea applicable to all cases." The French regulations say, with respect to the occupation of ground inclined to the line of sight, " The advantages and disadvantages of such ground, as regards its occupation, follow principally from what has already been said about the fire which troops occupying it are exposed to ; they depend also on the efiB.cacy of the fire that the troops can produce. " Ground, Falling as regards the Enemy'' s Line of Sight. " The most favourable ground for defence is one which presents, in front of the firers, a clear glacis, forming a free field of fire of great extent, and inclining gently in the direc- tion of the enemy. "The gi'eater the inclination of the slojie in rear of the crest the better are the echelons in rear, situated on the reverse slopes of the position, sheltered from the fire of the attack. To cover steep slopes with fire it must be executed at the longest ranges, which takes from its accuracy, and reduces its efficacy. " Slight undulations of ground hide troops from the view of the enemy, but they are not sheltered by them from fire coming over the crest in their du*ection. "In the occupation of these positions the firing line should be sufficiently in advance, so as to overlook the ground, and to leave in rear a sufficient mask to protect the reserves. " Everj' position which forces the defensive artillery to come very close to the firing line, although the enemy's batteries can fij'e from their normal position, is defective or badly occupied. " The line of defence placed in front of the crest will not be p 2 228 occupied iinifoi'ml}' along the -whole front. There -will be in- tervals which, having no lire, will not attract that of the enemy. "It is behind these intervals that the troops in support will be placed. They will thus, in a great measure, be sheltered from the fire directed on the tiring line, and close to the emplacements which they will generally have to occupy when it becomes necessary to reinforce their line of fire. " If the ground in advance of the crest has a steep slope and offers natural shelter, stages of fire can be made use of, if the fire from the upper lines does not present an}" danger to the fractions in front, lower down the slope. " The troops placed in rear of the line of defence ought not to think themselves out of reach of tlie enemy's fire because they are hidden from his view. If there is no shelter they ought to take formations with a narrow front, and remain at a distance when the enemy fires at long ranges, and according as the enemy advances, they must approach the crest to protect themselves from the effects of his fire, which, as the ranges decrease, falls farther in rear. "This forward movement coincides, further, with the tactical neccessities of the figlit. " On ground falling as regards the enemy's line of sight, the observation of the points where his bullets fall furnish a useful indication as to the positions which should not be occupied by the supports and reserves, because these points depend on the form of the ground, and not on the wish of the firers. "In the choice of a second line of defence, when it is not imposed by the nature of the ground, and the existence of natural obstacles, the distances to which it will be possible to efficaciously beat the slopes in advance of th(* crcvst, and up which tlie enemy must advance, should be considered. "It is at these distances, determined on l)eforehand, that the shelter trenches or other works of tliis second line of defence must be constructed, whicli will so mucli the better permit of stoi)piTig tlie iiursuit and of re-estaMisliing tlio tight, as the entiiiy's artillery comes more Avilliiu the effica- cious z(m(< of muHketry fire, which will better pi'ovent its coming into action. " Gnnoid liisiiif/ oh regards the Ennm/x Line of Sight . " Ground of this nature is favourable to the carrying out of the figlit liy the firing line principally. "On Huch grounu, column formations of any kind aro 229 eminently vulnerable, and hence line formations, with intervals between the subdivisions, are preferable. "The distances between the different echelons may he less as the inclination of the ground is g-reator. " The echelons in rear of the firing lino will, as a ride, only suffer from the fire especially directed on them. " They ought therefore to make use of every accident of the ground to cover themselves ; if there are no artificial or natural shelters, they will find that, in order to join the firing line, their best protection is an uninterrupted forward movement, [so as to rapidly cross over the diminished dangerous zones, which allows them also to get away, in a single forward movement, from the effects of any regulated fire of the enemy. " Finally it should be pointed out that such ground has the grave disadvantage of exposing all the defensive dispositions to the enemy, who can see all the movements carried out in the interior of the position." The Germans have made considerable experiments on in- clined fire against the attack formations , of their probable enemies, but the results of these experiments have been kept a profound secret, being only entrusted to senior officers. Plunging, Curved, on Dropping Fire. Obstacles forming a covering mass furnish a more or less considerable protection according to the height of the obstacle and the range. Therefore, to hit an enemy placed behind a shelter, the men firing must be placed at such a distance that the bullets rise high enough in their trajectories to fall with a high angle of drop, and so to diminish the depth of the detiladed zone, by plunging or dropping, so to say, behind the obstacle. This kind of fire is called a curred, or plunging, or dropping fire. The efficacy of a dropping fire depends on the angle of drop of the bullets on striking. On looking at the trajectorj- table, pp. 8 and 9, we see that at 800 yards an object eight feet high covers on ground, parallel to the line of sight, a depth of 8X18=144 feet in rear of it and at 1,400 yards only 8x8=64 feet in rear of it, so that troops in line immediately in rear of such cover would always be safe from inf antr}^ fire and even if they did suffer they can evade it by moving to the right or left as the enemy cannot see them nor the effect of their fire. The greater the angle of drop, the greater is the searching power of the fire, as it is called. Thus to ensure effective results from a dropping fire in the 230 field, the range, the direction of the object, and the nature of the ground in rear of it miist be accui-ately known, and if the distance is not suitable, the range must be altered. But this can only be done when there is plenty of time at disposal, as in a siege, where the objects fired at are stationary, and thus ver}' favourable for a dropping fire. But such a fire may even then be ineffectual if the defenders are weU provided with traverses, blindages, &c., &c. Under ordinary circiimstances, however, in an engagement in the open field, a dropping fire is of little practical use. A drojiping fire, as said above, can, under favoiirable circum- stances, render great service in sieges ; but it can only be emplo3-ed with anj*- degree of efficacy by placing the men at sufficiently great distances from the obstacle. V.^C?'-^ ...x Fig. 127. Siege and rampart batteries liave, as a rub^, an average height of about 8 f(H^t above tlu^ fighting terreplein. At a di.stance of 1,000 yards, and for an obstacle 8 feet high, the defiladed zone has a deptli of 90 feet, while tlie protected zone for a standing man lias a depth of 24 feet only. Thus, to liit a standing man on tlie terreplein, which is generally about 30 feet wide, th(> men firing should be placed more than 1,000 yards from a covering parapet, S f'e(>t high. It is necessary also to use an elevation r;ilher greater than for the exact range, so thai the centre of the nucleus or the central trajectory may pass slightly over the crest of the obstacle. It is sufficient, fur this i>urpose, to aim at the erest of the obstacle with the sight for a range of 2.j or 60 yards greater than the exact range.* • As a collective fire would nlways be used for indirect firing?, 60 per cent, of the Imllits would ahvfivH }ic spread over 100 yards. This will clirnin tc any theoretical error from using a too great elevation. 231 In siege trenches, the protected zone against a fire at 2,000 yards, perpendicular to the crest, extends, for a standing man, to the rear of the trench ; thus it is not possible to sweep these trenches by a fire directed perpcndicidarly to this crest. C \P c■^. 1 V £' 1 1 1 1 1 "^v. ";>? 1 -'' Fig. 28. Thus, in order to search out these works, it is necessary to fire at the crest in the most oblique direction possible. In fact, we see that, if the fire is executed in the direction BD (Fig. 28), oblicj[uely to the crest XY, instead of in the direction AD perpendicular to it, the lowest trajectories of the cone of bullets, passing over the parapet, strike at C instead of at C. The defiladed zone is consequently diminished by the quantity CF, and the zone between the lines mm' and 7in', which was sheltered fi-om fire perpendicular to the crest, will now be beaten by the oblique fire. If the trenches or lines of fortifications are not provided with traverses, and can be taken in enfilade, it is not necessary that the trajectories should have a great angle of drop, and thus such an enfilade fire is efficacious at all distances. INDIRECT Fire. By indirect fire is meant any fire directed on objects that are masked from the view of the firers, and which are at some distance in rear of the covering obstacle. Thus the problem of indirect fire reduces itself to this case — viz., to determine Uw elevation with which one should aim at a visible point, chosen as an auxiliary- object, in order that the mean trajectoiy may pass over the intervening obstacle, and through the centre of the real object. 232 Suppose we -wisli to covei- with fire, from the point (Fig. 29), an object B placed be3-ond an obstacle C, such as the crest of a liill, a wood, a wall, &c., which hides the object B from the sight of the lirers at 0. To be able to make any use of indirect fire, the direction of B from 0, the distance UB, and the difference of altitudes of the points 0, C, and B must be known from a map drawn to a scale of at least ,io,V-,7o, or about .^'tlis of an inch to a mile. From the point draw the horizontal lino OX ; this line cuts the covering obstacle in V. If the object B was visible from 0, it Avould bi; necessary in order to hit it, to aim at it directly with the angle of elevation TOB for the Avliole range; but the object being hidden, it can still be struck by aiming at an aiLxiliary point V situated in the horizontal OX passing through 0, into tlie angle of elevation TOH, provided that the difference of altitude, C'F, hetivctn and C, is /ess than the ordinate FN of the trajeetori/ ONJI. Instead of aiming horizontally, which offers certain diffi- culties, we can witli advantage use tlie ert'st O of tlie obstacle, or any otlier well-dellned mark on it, as a pitint or lino to aim at. In this case it is necessary to aiiu iil llie iioint (' with the anglt! of elevation TOE. "\V<' must now liiid on the line GO produced, ihe jiosition of tlie point K where tlie trajectory cuts this line, that is to sa}', the distance Oh], so as to lind from it the sight to be uschI. If OK is h^ss than OC then we cannot firo indirectly until we go to a more suitabh^ firing ]ioint. The solution ol' the problem depends almost entirely on the relations Ix'tweeii the angles TOB, TOO, COX, and XOl'., and to determiiKi the reliiti(»ns ol' these angles to one another ^ fiqure, nimilar to th((t (ifFiij. 2'J, s/nudd dliraiis lir dni/oi. In the ahove figure the angle TOB=T0(J + C0X + BOX. 233 There are several methods of solving the problem of indirect fire, but the best of all is the simplest one, whicli does not require the use of any formula;. All that has to bu done is to make use of columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table I. p. 8 in connection -with an easy arithmetical calculation. From a map we must obtain the difference of level, I, between B, the object fired at, and the height of the origin of fire at ; the difference of level c between C, the point aimed at, and the origin of fire ; D, the distance of fi'om B ; and d, the distance of from C. The height of the rifle above the ground must be inckided in the height of the origin of fire. As the map gives only horizontal distances, these can be used for the true distances, without appreciable error, if the differences of level are not too great with regard to the distances separating the different points. If the horizontal distances found in the map cannot be used without appreciable error, then the true distances can be found, from the information on the map, by taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the horizontal distance and the difference of level, expressed in the same units of measure. In the following calculation we shall use the horizontal dis- tances, it being understood that the true distances can be used instead of them if thought desirable. Dividing c by d, we get the tangent (expressed as a fraction) of the angle which the line of sight, when aimed at the point C, makes with the horizontal. From Table I. we can then determine what this angle is. Similarly by dividing I by D we can find the angle BOX. Deduct or add (according to the figure) these angles from or to the angle of elevation for the whole range OB, and find from the table to within 25 yards, the range corresponding to this new angle of elevation. Then if the sights are set for this range, and aim is taken at the auxiliary point, the enemy will be reached, if a collective fire spreading over 100 vards is made use of. Examples:— If Z)=l,400 yards; f/=700 yards; i=100 feet; and c=50 feet. then tan. COX= ' ^ = — and tan. BOX= ■ = — 3x700 42 3X1400 42 Therefore COX=BOX=r.22', and the angle COB=2'=.44'. But the angle of elevation, TOB, for 1,400 yards=4=.40'. Hence the angle TOE=l°.56', which is the angle of elevation for 750 yards. If the anglo TOE i^i Ivss than the elevation fur the range 234 OC, or if the angle COB is greater than the angle TOB, then an indirect fii-e is not possible under the given conditions, and other more suitable conditions •woidd have to be sought for to enable it to be carried out. Thus, if in the above case r=loO feet, then the angle TOE ^voidd be equal to r.W, which is the angle of elevation for 500 yards, and consequently the bidlets fii-ed from would not have passed over to point C, 700 yards off. If the height of C was 300 feet, the angle COB woidd have been greater than the angle of elevation TOB for the whole range, and we coidd not make use of an indirect fu'e. Before we coidd use an indii'ect fire in these last two cases, we shoidd have to move the origin of fii'c, 0, further away from tlie point B, required to be struck. The elevation found in the above calculation is for a range within twenty-five yards of the true one, but as a collective fire would always be used for indirect firing, this error woidd not be much felt, from the bidlets falling over 100 j-ards. We have supposed above that the object is placed on a lower level than that of the firers, but a similar calculation can be applied to the opposite case. The same thing can be done if the point of aiin chosen is below the horizontal plane passing tlirough the origin of fire, or is beyond the point to be hit. In considering the tlifference of altitudes of the different points, we must take care to increase the altitiule of the origin of fire by the height of the rifie above ground, /. e., about three feet for kneeling men, and five feet for standing men. Indirect lire always ought to be corrected, when possible', liy watcliing its results, In' an officer ])lae(>d in a convenient situMtioii. Every iiietliod 111' s( living tlie ]»r(tble]u of indirect fire depends on all thr- relations of height and distance between the three points, Avhich haA'(> to be considered in indirect fire, being known; but this will only occur in the defence of fortresses and ])()siti(ms ]trepared bef(»rehand. In the field, the apjtlic.'ition id' indirect (ire must be limited to those cases in which the deterininatiun ol" the throe ])oints in (juestion can be instantaneously known or estimated with sntficient accuracy. These cases occur when a mounted commander, or one who can place himself in a tr(»n or •)tlier high ]K)int of observation, can see the enemy, when his troops standing on the ground cannot do so. In such eases, tlu; easiest method to make use of indirect fire is to employ columns 1, 2, and 3, of Table I. 235 in connection with an easy calculation in the manner alread}' shown. The difference of level in yards hetwoen the point aimed at and the height of the rifles above the ground must be estimated or found with a clinometer, and the distance of the same point in yards estimated or measured. But it must never be forgotten that the efficacy of an indirect fire depends on whether or not its effects can be seen so as to coiTect the fire. If it cannot, then, in the field, when the supply of ammunition is limited, it is useless to attempt to make use of this kind of fire. It is often possible to post an officer on the covering mass^-* for this very purpose of observing the fire ; he would of course be to one side of the direct line of fire and he must be careful to make his observations in accordance with the remarks given for obsei'\'ation of effects of fire on p. 401. Indirect fii'e, however, can rarely be used in the open field. In defensive positions, and principally in sieges, indirect firing can render great service. But, in order to obtain every advantage fi-om it, it is necessary that the ground over which it is executed shoidd be well known, that some marks should have been put up, and that the altitudes of the different points, as well as their distances apart, should have been measured. This information for the en-virons of fortified places should be written down in Firing Tables. A firing table contains all information on the different probable points of passage of the enemy (bridges, cross roads, defiles, debouches, etc.), as well as the corresponding con- venient situations for the firers of the defence. It contains also, for each station, the point to be aimed at, and tli(^ sight to be used. Thus we see that indirect fii'O reqiures the previous know- ledge of certain topographical data in order to detemiine the point to be aimed at, and the sight to be emploj-ed. In the offensive, an occasion to use it will rarely be found ; but cases for employing it may occur in the defensive, when there has been ample time to prepare the position and study the ground in fi-ont of it. In siege warfare, however, it may be appKed, and be made to render veiy great ser^dces to both the troops of the attack and of the defence. * If the covering mass is a hill and is quite close in front, i.e., 200 or 300 yards off, it would of course be occupied in preference, when possible, and a direct fire made use of. 236 But indirect fire can onl}- be carried out in the field when, by the aid of a sufficiently accurate map, the position of the objective, of the auxiliai-y point aimed at, of the origin of fire, and of the alignment of these three points are known, as well as the horizontal distance which separates them, and their differences of level. From these data the sight to be used can be determined, Avhich in some cases can be rectified by watch- ing the strike of the bullets. Another thing we see is, that indirect fire can only be used when the ordinates of the trajectory are sufficiently great to allow of it passing over the height or obstacle which prevents the object being seen, and hence, to execute an indirect fire, the origin of tlie fire may have to be movc^d further away from the object to be hit, in order to get greater ordinates. Again, as the powder charge, and cousocpicntly tlie muzzle velocity and angle of elevation for any given range, cannot be altered in rifle aimnunition, we cannot fire iucUrcctly on an object unless the range is suitaT)le. Resumk. Thus, though long range fire can be executed on unseen objects, yet it necessitates a thorough knowledge of the ground, and of other particular conditions, and hence this nature of fire is impracticable iu war, except in two special cases : — (1) When the fire is inclined, by which, wlieu iiring from a valley or plain on to the crest of a plateau, a dangi>rous zone is olitained by indirect fire much di>eper than on ground parallel to thi.' line of siglit, by wliiili the direct shots, aimed on till' shooting line occupying tlie edge, may strike the supports and reserves in rear. When, however, the defender withdraws liimsclf frcjui ihc edge of the plateau, the power of using inclint'(l tire passes to tli(> defender, who tlu>n, by his direct fire on Uw enemy's shooting line, wlien it reaches the cre.st, may cause loss to the enemy's (M-helons in rear. We Imve already discussed th(f (pu'stion as to the advisability of trying to make any serious use of this kind of fire. (2) When the fire is dro]»])iiig, the objective Iteing a fortifi- cation ; l)ut th(! effect of this finMvill he somewhat modified ]»y the modern use of traverses and blindages. It is in fortress warfare, as pointed out by Von Boguslawski and diiefly on the side of the attack, that a long range dntpping rifle fire will br |)rinci]i!illy used in the future. The infantry 237 of both sides will no longer be reduced, as of old, merely on the one side to iii'e on the attacker's sap heads, and on the other on the defender's embrasures to keep down his artillery fire by harassing and decimating his gunners. But it will have in the future, a more extended r6le ; infantry can now combine its fire with that of the siege artillery, and help it by sweeping the ramparts, and rendering them for a time, untenable by the garrison. This use of rilie fire seems destined to give important results against detached forts, and more especially so against isolated works, particidarly those Avhich can be surrounded, when detachments can be so placed as to enfilade the faces of the works and compel the garrison to get under cover. The musketry fire from the ramparts of modern forts is often veiy weak, from the number of traverses and guns, which take up so much space, and hence the fire of the attacking infantry, putting artilleiy fire out of consideration for the moment, can only be returned with effect from the covered way or from shelter trenches placed in front of the works, or from a low parapet placed in front of the main ramparts, affording to the infantry sufficient space to deploy. If the Russians had employed long range fire in the manner indicated above, at Plevna, it would have considerably facilitated their attacks. It has been already stated that long range infantry fire should be concentrated on the same objective, and used by masses {i.e., large bodies of troops) only, and if used judiciously in such a manner it must prove of the greatest advantage in fortress warfare and will be a great assistance to the fire of artillery. In a siege, long range fire being used by weU-covered detachments at exactly known ranges, and on a clearly defined object, very easy to aim at, the rifles being rested on boards, etc., (see Figs. 30 and 31, p. 2-11), its results cannot be compared with a similar fire in the field, where the infantry are exposed to all the excitement of battle, and where the fire has to be directed on a moving adversary who can onl}' be seen at short intervals, at unknown or imperfectly known and continually varying ranges, and at no clearty defined objective. Again, in siege warfai'e, the siege train of the attack can bring up an imlimited supply of infantiy ammu- nition, while the sujiply of ammunition to attacking troops in ordinary field warfare, is a very difficult problem to solve satisfactorily. A body of infantiy, extended in prolongation of the face of a work, coidd, by the use of several sights, 238 cover its wliole extent "witli fire. An enfilade fire dropping about 1 in 14 (from 1,000 yards) and a plunging fire of about 1 in 4 (fi-oni 2,000 yards) could be used together on a fort; they would prevent the garrison fi'om moving freely on the ramparts, and Tvoidd take in reverse its rear faces even over an}' parados that may exist. If every man fired 100 rounds per hour, a battalion of 800 muskets would pour into the fort a mass of 160,000 bullets in the space of two hours, which coidd not but have a most telling effect, unless the fort possessed more than the usual amount of casemates and blindages. At the commencement of an attack on large entrenched camps, the rdle of infantiy wiU also uow-a-days be still more considerable than formerly. The detached forts sui-rounding such camps will be joined hj lines of trenches and batteries of position. The besieger, by appearing suddenly before the place, and by seconding the fire of his first siege batteries with a hea\'y infantry fire may, perhaps, be able to so sweep the ground between the two or three forts chosen for attack as to prevent the besieged from maintaining or reinforcing these intermediate lines. Under these circumstances, Von Boguslawski thinks that the besieger may be able to penetrate by main force through the line of exterior defences, and completely surround one of the forts, when it can be attacked like an isolated work, in the manner described above. To effect this purjiose it is of course assumed that the Ix'sii'ger can dispose of greatly superior forces, and so to cmplo}' infantr}' in masses against the intermediate lines of the defence will, it is considered, bo the most effective manner of using the preponderating force. This is in ])rincipl<' nothing but a reproduction of the nrdiiiarj' conditions of an attack on a defensive position in the iield. — a iK^iivy fii'u disorganizing the defence and preceding the assault. This distant lire, from not having the same eiticacy as fire at shorter raiig<^s, and from entailing a gi-eat consump- tion of ammunition, .sliould oidy lie lookinl upon as a h(>lp to th(t artillery to disorganize the dt'f(>nc(\ and so prepare tlio tissaull. Tndcr 1hes(> circumstances, the ])assivo ol)stacles ])rcsented }»v fieldworks being but slight, the lines which a distajit fire has compelled to Ix^ more or less evaciuited, may vciy possibly fall before an attack rapidly executed in great force. Against the forts themselves these results will bo much less, since diStSnt infantry fire, although it may inconvenience the 239 defenders, cannot prepare the assa iilt. becau se even supposing the defenders- dciy en from their parapets, the assaulting cohimns would be sto pp ed by the p assive obstg-cles (deep diteheSj scarps^_etc.) undestroyed^^b}^ art illery fir e, where they will be fully exposed to the unsubdued fire of the flanking defcncL's. Tliis docs not of course apply to w^ijjs without any diteh-llankiui^' defences, such as the Turkish defences at Plevna, and which were therefore open to assault. Even if it be found impracticable to employ infantry in the above vigorous manner, yet there can be no doubt that the duties of infantry at the commencement of a siege will be much transformed and developed in the future. Hitherto its action has been more passive than active, the duties of infantry having been chiefly confined to investing the fortress, and protecting the exertions of the fii-st batteries ; but now owing to its improved weapons, its action will become more active. For this reason, Von Boguslawski insists upon the necessity of instructing both officers and the rank and file in the employment of indirect fire, and proposes to create a special siege infantry, just as there is a special siege artillery. A writer in the German military paper, the Militdr Wochen- llatt, for February, 1885, in discussing the question of indirect infantry fij*e, is of opinion that its effect in the field is generally open to question, as it leads to great expenditure of ammuni- tion, with but doubtful results. The modern rifle, he considers, with its low trajectory, is seldom suited to its employment, except at long ranges, and where troops are known to be concealed in shallow depressions of ground ; on the other hand, if operating against troops protected by siege works or field entrenchments, direct rifie flre is of but little use, unless the enemy exposes himself above the parapet, and the only means of reaching the mass of men who are sheltered within the Avorks is by employing artillery fire. It is much to be desired that some means shoidd be devised to make rifie fire effective under such circumstances. The profile of ordinary siege works protects the men against fire with a less angle of descent than IS'', and as the rifle, even at a range of 1,700 yards (the maximum distance for which the Grorman rifle is sighted), has only an angle of descent of about 11^ to 12", it is of little use against men under cover. The maximum range of the rifle is reached with an elevation of 35° and any attempt, with the present ammunition, to use it with greater elevations so as to clear the parapet at shorter ranges, woidd probably prove futile, on account of the height to which 240 the hiillet would rise, and the increased resistance of the air making the fire uncertain. Hence the writer of the article referred to above, thinks that experiments should be made to ascertain whether this inconvenience could not be overcome b}* employing a special cartridge with a reduced charge of slow-burning powder. The advantage that would be derived from the emplo}-ment of indirect infantry fire during siege operations, when the distances can always be accuratelj- ascertained is so great, that this suggestion is worth consideration.* It would, of course, be necessary to have a supplementary sight, that would allow of the proper elevation l)eing given for certain ranges, and precision might further be secured by firing the rifle from a rest. The additional sight need not form a permanent feature in the rifle, but need only be attaclied Avhen required. Special elevation tables would answer the same purpose. DiuECT AND Indirect Aiming. From the foregoing we see that fire can be executed in one of two ways : — 1. By aiming directly at the object to be hit witli the proper sight for the distance, called direct aiming. 2. By aiming at an intermediate object, in line with the object to be hit, with such a sight as will ensure the given range, — tho point aimed at on the intermediate object being such as will ensure the bullets passing over it and not being stopped by it; this is called indirect aiming. How to find the proper elnvation for indirect aiming has been ah-eady given under llie lieading of " Indirect fire." In some experiments on indirect aiming, carried out by tlie Siege Operations Committee, a pole (with a number on it) was set up f<»r each man, or a sirip of canvas was hung up on a HU])ported win> about ]iv(> feet and a-half from the ground, with small numbers painted on it at intervals of about two feet, along the top edge, and numbered so that • Artillery h»H Imd to rdIvo tln' ])rul)lom of iiHin^; c;niiH for l)oth indiroot and dirf<'t. liro in HifRneral Urialniont su(j;f,n.stH, llu^ enemy niight send out ))i(]jed marksmen to Bhoot down nny ono attempting to feed the lircs and then wait until they wont out before attacking. 245 CHAPTER XII. LONG RANGE VERSUS SHORT RANGE FIRE. In drawing any conclusions from certain facts that happened in the wars of 1870-71 and 1877-78, we can only make deduc- tions as to what will occur when the opponents are equal in numbers, in tactical and fire instruction, in armament, and in discipline. In both the wars quoted, there was inequality in every one of these points. In the Franco-Grerman war, the Prussians were superior in administration, numbers, instruction, discipline, and in artillery, but were armed with a much worse rifle. The}' entered the campaign with the idea that the attack, after an artillery preparation, was to be carried out by a line of skirmisher.s, followed by closed columns of attack. In the war of 1870-71, the history of every action that took place shows, that the commencement of an infantry attack was broadl}' conducted thus : — The infantry advance was fii'st of all prepared by a concentrated fire of artillery on the main points of attack, which served in great measiu'e to shake the hostile force, and lessen its power of resistance, after which followed the infantry attack. "WTien a sufiicient artillerj' preparation was not carried out from using too few guns, or for want of a good artillery position, as at Spicheren, or where it was not effectively ensured, as in the attack of the Prussian Guards at Gravelotte, wo find that, either an enormous loss was sustained, or the attack was brought to a standstill. The attack formation of each of the two brigades of the Prussian Guards at St. Privat, when they suffered so fearfully, consisted of an entire battalion extended in front as skii-mishers, followed by two lines of half-battalion columns in rear.* When it was possible to push on without having to extend, the formation usually employed by the Germans was that of company columns. * Since the Franco-German war the hattalion attack formation has been altered. It now consists of two companies, side by side, in advance, with a third of each extended as skirmishers, and the remaining two- thirds in support, while the other two companies, massed in rear of the centre, followed as reserves, separating from one another as they came under the influence of the enemy's fire. 24G It was soon found tliat, wliatevcr the original fonnation of the troops may be, there Tvas only one form admissihle imder fire, — skinnishers, supports, and reserves will all soon take up extended order to avoid \iseless loss, and unless great care is taken, will merge into one shooting line. There are two reasons for this last fact, ( 1 ) because men do not like being fired at without firing back in return, or in being killed by the enemy without a chance of killing him, and this leads to the supports and resei'vcs, thrown out of their close formations by the fire of the enemy, rushing forward to their comrades in the skirmishing line to join them in crushing the enemy b}'' their fire ; (2) because there is the innate desire to get to a range of 300 to 400 yards fi'om which alone the men feel that they can fire with decisive effect. This course of action was greatly facilitated by the continuoiis fire kept up by the skirmishers, which rivetted in a great measure, the fire of the defenders, and thiis aided the advance of the troops in rear, who were, as a rule, only too anxious to rush forward. Before 1870, tlie Gemians had only fought against moderate-ranged, muzzle-loading rifles, and at the time of the Franco-German war, it was laid down tliat fire could only be considered effective at close ranges under 410 yards (the Prussian rifle being then only sighti^l up to that distance), and that tlierefore every effort sliould be made to get the troops within that range before commencing the fire fight. Tlie Germans, liowever, soon found tliat the Freaich Avcro armed with a vastly superior wea])on to their own, and that they also made use of an entirely new feature in war — a rapid, long ranging infantry fire. Its dissolving effect on tlie close order formations first used by the attacking troops was very great, and Avas felt early in any action, both sujiports and reserves being reached liy it. No mere extension of the Aveak firing line first used was sufficient to cover the ndvanc(> of the trooj)s in rear, and hence it was found nbsolulel}' necessary both to extend flic troops in rear and to engage a number of rifles, at lea.'^t e(jual to the nunil)er used by the defender, so as to crush his fire, and thus to enable the troops in rear to advance. The feeble skinnisliing line at first used could ntil get on willmut rfinfoj-cemcnls, which were soon refpiired liy the heavy losses caused by the enemy's fire, and thus the su])porls (jiiickly became absorbed into the skir- mishing line. Tlien if Iho losses were still severe, or if the advance was checked, the reserve also joined the firing lino, aU alike eager to get near euougli to the enemy to return with effect 247 liis fire, which they could not stand witliout roply.-^ Often, too, a rash advance of the firing lino drew on the troops in rear to extricate it from danger. The skirmishers, instead of being, as originally intended, merely a screen to cover the advance of the closed main body, intended to carry the position, now became the real fighting line, which for the reasons already given, became made up of various companies and battalions, or even of different brigades well mixed together, and who always carried the positions in dispersed order. This fighting- line was, however, composed of distinct groups, formed anyhow by the energies of the officers, and which were kept together and impelled forwards only by the example of the officers and noQ -commissioned officers leading them, and by a mutual desire to act in common support of one another against the enemy. f Such a line would, and very often did, sway backwards and forwards, as it felt the pressure of the enemy's fire, and as it was carried on by the impulse afforded to it by anj' fresh troops sent into it from the rear. It alone won the victor}-, and there is no example in the wars of 1870-71 and 1877-78 of its merely preparing the way for the advance of troops in closed formations. The official accounts of the battles of "Wiirth, Spicheren, and the fighting round Metz, give accu- rate and vivid descriptions of this method of fighting, and typify the conduct of troops under the influence of modern rifle fire, when unprepared for its terrible dissolving effects. The immediate tactical outcome of the war of 1870-71 was then, as far as infantry are concerned : — 1, The actual fighting must be done by the fire of troops in dispersed order, supported by other troops in rear also in extended order if necessary, but if possible, in close order. | 2. The decisive fire zone extends only to 400 or 500 yards from the enemy, and eveiy effort should be made to prevent the attacking troops opening a serious fire until they reach tliis distance. * The Gei-mans apparently do not admit this, for in their latest Musketrj' Regulations they state: — " A well-trained infantry ought to be capable, at a given moment, to stand firm under the fire of the enemy, without returning a single shot." t Throughout the whole account of the Franco-Gei-man war, we constantly read of German officers offering help to, or demanding it from, one another. X As to the advantage of close order over extended order formation, see p. 448. 248 This second deductiou shows that the h)ug- raiig-e fire of the French was treated as unaimed fire, which Avoiild occasion loss to, hut could never stop, a well trained and disciplined infantry. The wild confusion which occurred in the German attacks was not accepted as a tactical necessity, because they •were produced by the unexpected efficacy of modern fire, by the rashness of the Gemian attacks, and by the German troops not having been sufficiently trained to this kind of fighting. But it must be remembered that the Germans were armed with a far inferior weapon to the French, and also that the latter, though making use of long range fire, had never trained their troops in its proper use. Thus, though we may admit the tactical formations deduced by the Germans, yet. from the facts of the war of 1870-71 alone, we need not do so with regard to the use of the rifle, for it may be possible to instruct troops in the use of aimed fire, other things being favourable, at ranges considerably beyond those stated above. Every one acknowledges the desirability of arriving at an effective range liefore commencing the real fire fight. But what is an etiective range ? Frederick the Great said, wlien the whites of the enemy's eyes were visible. Our Peninsidar victories were gained by a judicious use of infantry lire at even then close ranges, and now-a-days better shooting can be made with the Martini -Henry rifle at 1,000 yards than with the old Brown Bess at 100 yards. Improved fire-arms have increased both the range at which, and the readiness and facility witli whicli, fire may be opened and kept u]i, and tJio conscqiu-nce of this ]ms been, not only to replace the old sliock tactics by fir(\ but to increase the so-called efiective range. All Continental nations say that tlie time lias now come when infantry may open fire at ranges undreamt of before 1870. The French, when they began the war of 1H70-71, knew that their rifle was superior to the German rifle, not only in iucuracy and rapidity (»f fire, but more especially in range. There was, consequently, a natural tendency to i\ri> as early as jxissilde at llie eneiny (which was further incn'ased liy ilw outlet which the bold French s])irit, being kept on the defensive, found by so doing), and to over- whelm liim with a storm of bidlets before he could approach 1o the assault, that is at a time when, by the inferiority of his weapon, the eneiny was unable 1o rej)ly. Thus the French kept np an iucessunt lire at long ranges, but with no Jire 240 discipline (see Chap. XV. )> which led to a large amount of this fire being unaimed ; rifles -were even fired from the hips without aiming, the consequence of which was, that though the ground in front of the position Avas more or less swept with hullets, up to a distance of 1,600 yards, yet it caused the Germans to suffer less and less as they got nearer to their adversaries, from the mass of the fire passing over their heads.* Never- theless, unaimed as the long range infantry fire of the French was in a great measure, yet it, on many occasions, icJien ojjposed to plainly seen dense formations, caused severe loss to the Germans, as happened to the Prussian Guards at St. Privat, who, in less than thirty minutes, lost a third (6,000 men) of their nimiber by a rifle fire at ranges varying from 600 to 1,500 yards. They suffered so that they did not make any further attempt to get nearer than 600 yards to the village until the French artillery had been silenced, until St. Privat had been shelled by nearly 160 guns for some hours, and the French had used up all their ammunition, and until the French right flank, which rested on the village of St. Privat, had been out-flanked and turned. Nearly all accounts now agree in attributing the French retreat from St. Privat to want of ammunition, which prevented them from continuing the fight on equal terms. At first the formation of the Prussian Guards was very deep and close, but the French fire soon dissolved it into a deep skirmishing line.f * The cause of this fire going high may also be partlj' ascribed to the French troops not altering their sights, and to their aiming at the centre of the enemy's bodies, as they were then trained to do (see Plate I.), and partly to the fact that men are apt to fire high when firing dowTihill. t At the battle of Gravelotte, on the 18th Aug., 1870, of the German losses, 94 per cent, were due to the French infantry fire, 5 per cent, to artillery fire, and 1 per cent, to swords, lances and bayonets. But nothing is more misleading than numerical data without stating the conditions under which they were obtained. The French artillery was badly used, and silenced early in the fight, and consequently the Gei-mans suffered an exceptional percent■ This is another reason for allowing the men to fire while advancing, hut under strict control — to intimidate the enemy and inalcr liim fire wildly. The Turkish infantry were armed with a good rifle (the Martini-Peabody), but were essentially uninstructed — a large proportion of them being even perfectly ignorant of the proper use of the sights — and if, as there can be no doubt, their fii'e, in great part unaimed in the true sense of the word, could cause such fearful losses, it stands to reason that had the Russians been opposed by better trained soldiers, their losses would have been far gi'eater. "The opinions on the elficacy of the Turkish fii'e at long and short ranges are very variable. Some writers say that the Tm-ks fii-ed very little at long ranges, and reserved their ammunition to make a terrible fii'e at short ranges ; others assert the contrary. Perhaps both statements are true ; but the first appKes only to the regular and disciplined Turkish troops, who obeyed the orders of their officers. In general, the Turks did not spare their ammunition, but, if they fired at long ranges, the fire of the disciplined troops at short ranges lost nothing of its efficacy when tlie soldiers waited until the enemy was close, in order to open suddenly an intense fusilade. The second statement applies only to the irregular troops, who were placed behind epaulments, with abundant ammunition which they used and abused; it is certain, however, that the rain of lead the}* sent at great distances caused some losses." The value of long range fire, ivhen executed under favourable circumstances, is thus shewn b}' experience. It is, however, only fair to remark here, that the Turkish system for the supply of ammunition:- to the troops in action, was perfect. AVith them there never was auy want of ammu- nition, as every man had more than he could fire. But such an organization is not ever likely to occur among civilized troops who require more personal impedimenta than did the Turks, who only carried food and ammunition. Further on we shall see that this question of supply of ammunition has a most important bearing on the question of long range fire. * See footnote on p. 249, wiich applies equally in this case. 252 The Eusso-Turkish war is a marvellous example of kow a great army failed to profit by the lessous taught by the experiences of 1870-71. The JRussians had a bad rifle,*' and bad artillery, they relied on shock tactics, putfinglittleTaith in infantry fire, and consequently they kept their men in closed formations of considerable size, -svhich formed enomious targets to aim at, and in tliese formations they tried to close ■vrith the enemy to attack him with the bayonet. They made no use of cover, but simply laid down where halted. The losses were fearful; the infantry dashed on over long distances in the open without firing, and witli immense braver}', but onl}' to be slaughtered down ; the tactical units got dissolved and mixed up, and the advance became disorderly, the disorganised swarm passing out of the couti'ol of their leaders. "When the men did fu-e, in the advance in the earlier fights, against orders, it was just how tliey pleased, and it was usually a sign that the force of the attack was spent, and that a retreat was impending, unless fresli troops were at once brought forward. Besides this, tlieir attacks were often undertaken with too small a force, and the fundamental rules for a successful attack were nearly in every case neglected, viz. : the jtreparation by a prepoudcrating ai-tillery fire and a flank attack combined with one in front. The Russians nearly always attacked .simply in front. Both the artiller}' and infantry were badly used, and, with what fire there was, there was no attempt to concentrate it, and the artillery often opened at impossible ranges, and did not advance to support their infantry during tlie attack. On the other liaud, on the onh' two occasions in this war, in the attacks on Nicupolis and Lovteha, where the artillery and infantry were pro])erly used, the attacks were most successfully carried out with comparatively small losses. The Turks on the other hand, had a good rifle, but were perfectly untaught or uninstructed in its use, but they had unlimited suj>]ilies of anunuuition, and supi>lenu>nted accuracy of fire by (quantity. Under these conditions they inflicted the .severest losses known in modern history on their opponents, atlpng ranges up to 2,i30U yards. Neither tlie French nor tlie Turks had any instruction in making the best use of long range fire. In both cases it was used in a wild unconl rolled way as a possible method of * Thn Russian riflo was only sighted up to 600 paces (fiOft-ynrds). L:it< r on in the War, extemporised siyhts lor lougcr ranges were used. 253 breaking the force of the attack before it became dangerous, and whou it was directed on deep closed formations, this result was invariably attained, but when it was directed on lines, even dense ones, of skirmishers, it never stopped a resolute advance to the shorter and decisive ranges, ihit what will be the effect of a well controlled long range fire against such formations cannot be definitely stated until the next great war, though it may be -conjectured from experiments made in peace time, and from what it has already done in war. The fii'st Cjuestion to be solved with regard to long range fire is, whether it should ever be used in war '? AV'hen infantry was armed with a muzzle-loading rifle, there was good reason to place every reliance on the effect of close range fire. ]Aapi4ity_of — fire ( ]id no t exist, and the ,wiiapmL- was inaccurat-fr at~j:anges__of_ even 200 yards. Tlie attack was made in closed formations (cliiefl}^ columns) which advanced without any or very little firing, so the defender's fire was reserved till the attack was quite close, and then it was usually decisive. But now the attack from the power of the modern breech-loader, is exclusively made in ex- tended order and a jiowerful fire is brought to bear on the defimders for a considerable period of time. No closed bodies are offered as targets at anything hke close ranges, and by far the best objects to fire at, both for moral and tactical reasons, are formed by the firing line of the enemy and its supports. To resei"ve all fire against these until they reach ranges at which the old rifle could have effectively crushed them, woidd be to wilfidly throw away the advantages of the new ones, namely, accuracy at long ranges and rapidity of firing. The experience of two campaigns lias shown that with modern weapons, even unaimed, undisciplined fire is capable of giving, under certain conditions, great results at long ranges ; and if, therefore, we can employ a well-aimed and controlled fire at these ranges, we may expect to obtain far greater residts under the same conditions. " The long range fire of infantry is not powerful enough t(.) play a decisive role in war ; nevertheless, as in certain conditions, it can exercise a serious influence on the issue of fights, it is necessary to understand it well, as nmch to preserve oneself from its effects as to make a useful em- plo}-ment of it against the enemy. Let us examine, therefore, the results of experiments, the conditions under which these 254 experiments have been made, and the results obtained; we shall then be able to state the efficacy of this fire, and deduce fi'om it its application in Tvar." — (C.C.J.) This examination has been made in the last chapter. The, modern rifle can kill up to its extreme range of about 3,400 yards, while on the practice ground it can carry with accuracy to over 2,000 yards, when the distance is exactly known, and even" a "chance fire" (see p. 13G) from it is far from useless, and ma}- cause serious loss, provided the ammunition can be spared. But contending lines, when close to each other, fire for the most part wildly and too high, because the men are too nervous to take steady aim. At long ranges, on the other hand, men can fii'e with more coolness, and, therefore, steadiness, and exactly as required, but the fire is not so efi'ective. But no battle has been won by long range fire ; it has only been decided at the short ranges. Besides, in long range fii'ing, the question of eyesight comes in. As Lord Wolseley says: — "Taking a mass oi men — because an army is a great mass of average men — I believe, out of every 1,000 soldiers in any army, j'ou will find that 10 per cent, cannot even see at 1,000 yards, much loss hit an object at that distance." This is another factor that tends to redmre the efficacy of long range fii'o. The modern rifle can kill at ranges so great that aiming is impossilfle, from the eyesight not l)eiug powerful enough to distinguisli the objects aiuicd at; though, undi'r favourable circumstance's, wlier(> the ground is known, and time is avail- able for the necessary arrangements re([uired for it, rifles can 1)0 laid on rests or boards, giving tlu> proper elevation for the required range, and tli(> men can fire from such a rest in the required direction. Tliis will cover a certain extent of ground witli bullets, but miicli less so than if the rifles were fired from the shouldc^r. This method, however, can only bo employed for ti'(jops in permanent onti'enchments, as in sieges, firing on an enemy's battery, or other considerable mark. It may also be used for night firing, so as to sweep the ground in fnait, should any night attack bo expected. Having in tin- last chapter shewn tlie power of infantry tire at diil'erent ranges, under the most favourable conditions, Ihe ([uestion for d(>cision is — shall infantry fire up to the full range oi the jifle, or shall it reserve its fire lor more elfisctivo ranges 'f There can he liitli' doiihl tliat il'troojisoii //ir (/rfciisivr aro 255 provided ivith flcnin of ammunition, know the ranges, hate a good view of the ground in front, and are skilled in the use of the rifle, it would be throwing- away an advantage of the defence not to use the power of the weapon at long ranges, if fitting objects, such as an enemy's reserves, in large, close formations, show thenist'lves. But such afire must always he kept under strict control bg the officers, and it should he regulated by the probable effect it will produce, by the quantity of ammunition available, and by the facility for rejjlenishing it. Further, for long range fire to be effective, the ranges should be known tcith fair accuracy, and this advantage the defence usually has. On the offensive, the moving troops are constantly changing the range, and, as we shall see (Chapter XIII.), are unable to replenish their ammunition to anything like the required amount, and thus it would be unwise to waste cartridges by shooting unsteadily over an ever-changing, and, consequently, not accurately known distance, and, therefore, in the attack, long range fire should only be resorted to hy special troops, either taken from troops of the reserve judicipusbQiosted on, high- positions in rear, to cover the advance of the actual attacking Knes, by hring over their heads, or by troops tlu-own out at first to carry on a tem- porising fire-fight until the main body is read}' for action. Although opinions greatly differ as to the manner of (>mploying long range fire, and the ranges at which it should be used, yet all own that when judiciously kept under control, it may inflict very serious loss to the enemy. Up to 1870 the efficacy of the independent fire of the average individual soldier at all ranges was looked upon as the criterion for the effective fire of the whole body, and thus an}^ fii-e over 400 yards was considered unadvisable, as a single man's chance of hitting an opponent was so smaU beyond that range with the rifles then in use. In fact, the Germans, in 1870-71, when on the defensive, tried always to obtain a clear field of fire of about 400 yards only, and reserved their fire for that range with an invariable success in stopping the enemy's attack. But this war and the war of 1877-78 have shown that it is the fire of masses of troops, and not that of individuals, which has to be dreaded, and, therefore, as the effect of fire beyond 400 j-ards is due to a certain proportion of the bullets fired at a named objective taking effect, such fire should not be independent, but should be controlled and delivered only at the command of the leaders of the fighting units, in order to increase this certain proportion as much as possible. 256 The main arguments ag-aiust long range fire are : — 1 . That the propoi-tion of misses to hits, and, therefore, waste of ammunition, is very great, and hence it would be better to reserve the tii-e for ranges where the proportion is more favourable. 2. It involves a great expenditure of ammunition — greater than can usually be supplied — and, there- fore, the men ma}' run short of cartridges at or before the decisive mouumt of the struggle arrives. 3. It is fatal to the offensive spirit, which is so necessary to success. I. Large columns and other objects of largo dimensions, against wliich only this kind of tire is known to be effectiA-e, are less and less seen on the battle field. 0. Firing at the same object with sights set for different ranges, which must be done when the ranges are not accurately known, and if anv certainty of effect is to be ensured, is tlio negation of efficacy of fire. G. That if the men are allowed to fire at long ranges, their fire will decrease in efficacy as the enemj' approaches the position. 1. "With regard to the first objection, we have little or no statistics based on experience of actual war, as to the "useful effect " obtained b}- troops who liavo employed long range fire in the field, but we have a largo mass of inft)rmation obtained from experiments nuide abroad, which, of course, will not absolutely repri>sent what nuiy be expected in war. It is said tliat the useful percentage of shots fired in actual war varies from 1 to 12 per cent, of tliose of peace practice, because on thebattl(> field ranges can rarely boascortainedwithanything like accuracy, and the required elevation to bo given varies very mucli with the weather, wiud, &c. In France, Italy and Germany it is considered that only about one-tenth of tho results obtained in peace ex])eriments can be counted on in war, whicli estimate we shall acci'pt in future, on account of tho autliorities it emanates from. Since 1H7(), e.\[)eriineuts Jiave been carriiMl on in Prussia to a-scertain the uctual value of hmg rang(^ fire, undei- conditions res(*mbling, as iiuu'h as possible, those of war. In tliose experiments, a solution to the ruliowini;- (juestions was aimed at:— {a) UaH long range fin' any value in war, when directed against a visible or invisible enemy V 257 (b) If so, how should it bo applied, by independent or controlled fire ? (c) If the latter, what regulations are required to maintain the fii'e discipline necessary for it ? The reply to («) has been in the affirmative, under certain conditions, which will be stated presently; with regard to (i), slightly better results were got from independent than from controlled fire, but as the latter is so much more favourable to leadership and keeping the men in hand, it shoidd as a rule be employed for this kind of fire ; besides, tlie difference in efficacy is likely to disappear under the more unfavourable conditions of war. How query (c) has >)eeu dealt with, will be seen in Chapter XV. As far as actual effect is concerned, the resvilts of the experiments have been given in Table XIV., on p. 170, which residts, taking the minimum percentages (as should be done), and considering no percentage under 10 per cent, (which, according to German and French estimates, would give 1 per cent, in war*), certainly do not show a sufficiently useful percentage to justify the use of long range fire {i.e., any fire at over 800 yards, as is the usual accepted definition of it) against a line of standing men at over 1,000 yards. From these facts it may be safely concluded that i/ie prohalle result of long range fire is -worth the expenditure of ainmunition, if there is an ample supply of ammunition for the shorter ranges as irell, if it can be easily replenished, if the ranges are hiown, if the atmospheric conditions] and slopes of the ground are not too unfavourable, if the object fired at is of suitable dimensions, especially as regards depth, and, as we shall see presently, if the fire is cvecuted by troops specially detailed for the purpose. Modern regulations for musketry fire have all made certam concessions, such as may have been considered judicious, to long range fire, but at the same time most of them have sought to put officers on their guard against any abuse of it, which might compromise, in any way, the character of energy of move- ment and efficacy of fire which is the essence of infantry fighting. Long range fire ought only to be opened on the order of the officers. X Its abuse would constitute a grave danger. * If each soldier has 100 rounds on entering the comhat, and in firing them all away makes one hit only, a body of men, firing, will put out of action a number of men equal in numbers to themselves. t Such as a strong wind, -which deflects the bullet and ^^halves the rifle. X Really, of the senior officer present. U 258 Emploj'ed witliout discernment it would almost always be inefficacious, which would discoui'age the troops and raise the moral of the enemy, while, also, in spite of all precautions to ensure its replenishment, the ammunition might run out. The ' direction ' of long range fire presents serious difficulties, and its efficacy is not in any way comparable to that of shorter ranges. In ojiening fire at 1,700 yards, a far greater number of cartridges is expended than if the fii'e were begun at 440 yards, and we run the risk of wanting ammunition at the decisive moment, because the replenishing of the ammunition can never be assured in a certain manner." Thus, long raiir/c fi'n'nff must he under ihv immediate control and siijiervision of the leaders, in order to attain its utmost effect, and to prevent waste of ammunition ; the men should never be allowed to fire when they like, at what they like, or as many cartridges as they like. But if the senior officer present sees that an opportunity occurs of employing long- range fire with success, it would surely be wrong to say that under no circumstances is it to be permitted. What is Avaste of ammimition? Is every bullet that does not hit a man wasted? If so, then a vast proportion of bidlets tired in any action, even at short ranges, is thrown away.* In reulity, the emplopnent of long rang(^ fire only ceases to be judicious when tlie number of hits does not boar a proper proportion to the number of cartridges exptaided. The proportion accepted abroad is 1 ])er cent, in Avar, or 10 ])i'r cent, in jjcace experiments. Admitting this, tlien, from wliat has been said, long range tiring is admissible wlu'u the conditions laid down on p. 257 are fulfilh'd, and the requisite jn-oportion of hits can be obtained. 2. The second and third objections to the employment of long range fire, ai)])ly less to the; defensive than the olfeusive. * La Natiiri, I'ur February, 1885, iiuLlishiw nohk! interesting dotails uh to the nuiiilier of liiillet.s rcciuired to kill ii iiiiin. At Solferino, it is estimated lliat S, 100, ()()() sliots were iiri'd liy the Austrinns, which occasioned a loss to the I-'rench a)id Sardinian tr(ioi)S of '_',()(K) kilh^l and 10,000 woiunled; so tliat in tliis l)a1tle 4,200 sliots were n'(iiiir(Ml (o kill, ;ind 700 to wound oin' man, sliowin;^ an expenditure of '-'TX lbs. of lead for eacli injiii killed. 'Die (lerni.ins, huwevi'r, in llu' {•"raneo-tJernian war appear to liave sliot niueli lieller, for it is e;ileulated that with an expenditure of thirty million rille bullets in\d HG'2, 000 artillery projectiles, the French lost ;{5,000 killed, or died from wounds, tluis reducinir the avcnij^e number of shots recpiired to kill a man to 1,:U)0 (about 80 lbs.) This calculation must liave been arrived at by assessinj^ the artillery ])rojeclileH tired at tlic number of bullets they woidd corresjroiul wifli in weitflit. 259 With reference to the second objection to long range fire — the expenditui-e of ammunition it entails — as regards the defence^ it •will be rarely possible to liave (if power of movement in the Held is to be retained) such a supply of ammunition as the Turks had at Plevna (500 rounds per man), unless defending an entrenched camp covering an arsenal or depot of ammunition, and as long range lire has never yet prevented a determined enemy from advancing to close quarters, even though it has inflicted serious losses on him, it would be fatal for the defence to run short of ammunition so as to cripple its action during or after the battle by depriv- ing it of all power of fui'ther action until a fresh supply is obtained. Therefore, the emplo;yTnent of long range fire by the defences will be influenced, not by the range of the rifle, but by whether the expenditure of ammunition will be justified by the losses expected to be inflicted, which in turn depends on the nature of the ground, the quantity of ammunition available, the facility for replenishing it, the formations of the enemy, the accuracy with which the ranges are known, &c. There is further, a moral danger to be considered, namely, that if the defenders do not see the enemy checked at all by their long range fire, they may become demoralized as the enemy approaches. Hence, if a long range fire seems to be having no effect, it should be stopped, and the enemy allowed to approach before opening fire again. But to be able to stop such a fire at will, it must be imder the strictest control from the first. With reference to the attaclc, in considering the duties of the troops kept in reserve, the difficulties of supplying troops under fire with ammunition (see Chapter XIII.), and that the further the enemy is off, the easier is the supply brought up to the men, the second objection is met, ■// the use of long range fire is confined, tchen the conditions for its employment are favourable, to special troops detailed for the purpose, to assist the artillery in its preparation, and if it is not executed by the actual assaidting troops. When the actual assault has begun, after a suitable artillery and infantry fire preparation, it should, to ensure the greatest chance of success, be carried out with the greatest energy and in the shortest time possible. Within the effective range of infantry fire, the attackers, during their advance, must alternately advance rapidly, to avoid loss, and lie down, under cover if possible, to fire and regain breath. Though breathless haste may avoid loss for a time, yet a steady fire alone can inflict it, — but speed of K 2 260 movement and steadiness of aim cannot go together. To attempt to combine both, in the actual assaidt, is to sacrifice both, and, as both are requisite, they may bo used separately by assigning- distinct troops for each — some to prepare and cover the advance, and some to reach the ultimate goal in conjunction "with the foimer. In addition to the exhaustion of the men during the advance to th<> assault, which produces unsteadiness of tire, we must consider the exhausti(jn of ammunition and the means of replenishing it. It is generally accepted tliat it is impossible for tlie ammunition with which the infantry is at present supplied (about 1 00 rounds per man), to last out, if the attacking troops themselves do all the firing, and thus, for the assailant to make full use of his rifle, he shoidd supplement the prepara- tOE^^artiilery fire with long range infantry fire, e^cuted by a certain portion of troops thi'own out in advance,"^' and who could be depended on to hold their ground, and to ply the enemy with an effective lire, until the lines of troops destined to carry out the actual attack move up, and advance to decide the action. AVhat the attack recpiires is a preponderance of counter -fire so as not to be over-mastered by the defence, and it is most fully assured by the above method. A deliberate fire from such advanced troops at ranges from 1,000 to 600 yards f behind natural or hastily thrown up cover, | Avill greatly assist the artillery in its preliminary task of subduing the fire of the defence, and at these ranges a stationary infantry fire may be kept supplied with fresh ammunition l)y carriers. When their fire is about to be masked l)y the advance of the attacking troops, they should advance with them. After this combined long range infantr}- and artillery fire, and still under long range artillery fire (for, except under very favourable circumstances, infantry cannot fire over the heads of friendly troops in • Those may bo tho adviinco guard, reinforced, if neeessary, by some of tho first troops of the main body that arrive. t 'J'ho nearer the better for eflieacy of fire, but not no eloso as to prevent tluir heinj^ witlidrawn if neeessary, or beintc supplied with fresh ammunition whin r((juired, or as to entice or cause the men to bring on a decisive i risis, wliich may <-auso them to recoil, lose iiwrnl, and even draw into the fif^lit the troops in rear, before the way for their action has lii'en ])roj)eily i)rcparcd. X All infantrv should carry entrenching tools as part of their equipment fsee Chapter XVlII.), and be taught to throw up shelter trenches while lying on tho ground. 261 advance, from the flatness of the rifle trajectories and the danger of stray shots), the assaulting lines will advance as rapidly as possible, and reserve the naass of their fire until within effective ranges, when it becomes too difficult a matter to supply them with fresh ammunition. This question of how to bring up supplies of anamiinition into the firing line during an attack, and how to -distribute them to the men, actually engaged, is admittedly one of the most difficult, and at the same time one of the most important problems to be solved in modern warfare, and Chapter XIII. is specially devoted to its consideration both for the attack and defence. The matter will be found to be principally a cj[uestion of administrative detail. However, the^Bussians say that modern, experience shows that_before_b£ing sent forward to the attack, every soldier should have at least 120 rounds in his possession, so as to reduce the chance of running short of ammunition to a mini- miun. There is no doubt that however brave and devoted troops may be, their corn-age fails them as their ammunition, or power of offence, becomes exhausted. 3. The third objection to the employment of long range fire, that it tends to destroy the offensive spirit — the true secret of success in war — is essentially applicable to the assailing troops. This objection being based on moral grounds, it is difficult to prove or disprove it. The opponents of long- range fire say that if men are allowed to open fire at long ranges, they will not advance, but Avill prefer to lie C[uietly where they are, and fire away at what they think a safe distance from the enemy. On the other hand it may be urged that such would only be the case with undisciplined troops who are not in hand as they should be. Besides, if men find their fire taking effect, they will willingly go on to complete the defeat of the enemy, and if it is not taking effect it can be stojDped, and the men ordered to advance at once, as a corrective. As a practical fact, it has been found in all wars that when advancing troops })egin to feel tli(^ fire of the enemy, it is impossible to stop their repl}ing to it,'^' and hence it will be advantageous to meet this feeling half way, and allow a few rounds to be fii-ed, more for the purpose of keeping up the spirits of the men than for any real effect to be expected from * A good e.xample of this is given at p. 10 of the Frontal Attack of In/antri/, but see the first footnote on p. 247. 262 it, but undor the strictest control, during the advance to the more effective ranges, at which a more general and continuous fire will he opened. In the Franca-Genuan war, the Germans suffered much at long ranges when the}- did not fire, but as soon^^asjhey opened tire on the enemy their losses began to decrease, because tlieir bullets began to excite the French troops who no longer adjusted theii' sights to the range, or -ainieJwith sufilcient calmness. The Eussians found exactly the same thing in 1877-78. This thii'd objection, however, can also be met, as was the second, by onh/ allowing special troops to make tise of long range fire to assist the preparatory artillery fire, and by not allowing the troops who are to carry out the final offensive movement to participate in it. However, it ma}- be said that the third objection will only be felt when the "fiix- discipline" (see Chapter XV.) of the troops is imperfect, or when the officers and men have not been sufficiently practised in the use and object of long range fire. 4. The fourth objection that large objects such as battalion columns, &c. (on the losses of which, from long range fire, its advocates lay so much stress), will no more be found on the battle field, may be admitted up to a certain point, but practical experience and experiment, both show that smaller objects such as company columns and tliick shooting lines also suffer considerably from tire at very considerable ranges. Further, we miist remember that faiilts will always be committed on the batth* tield, as history shows.* At any rate every one must admit that the long range fire of infantry will considerably affect the roles of artillery and cavalry, for neither can avoid offering a largo target to the enemy. Cavalry can do nothing till it closes with the enemy, and it can now suffer from rifle tire at a distance of 1,400 yards. Aj;-4,40U ,^ai'ds (the extreme sight of the !Martini-IIenry rifle) 50 men, // the exact range were hioirn, could by successively concentrating^ tlieir tire on tli(> guns of a battery, employed elseic'/iere, very fr-wpst faults and who knows how to profit by those of thn r^nfiny. that will nbtain Ihe victory." Again, " Tho best general is h-- \yhc- mnl-i"* thr f.-uvet mi'ifnkps." 263 power of artillery is inei-easing- every clay in a far more rapid manner than that of the rillf. Artillory have powerful means of estimating ranges either l^y watching the large volume of smoke caused by the bursting of shells, Or by means of the accurate range-finders they can safely employ. Artillery fire, again, is vastly superior as regards accuracy than musketry fire, and each shrapnel shell of the 9-pounder gun carries G.'] bullets, which at 1,400 yards, spread over a cousider- abkrarca, (.'S|H'(ially in clepth, the diiisity of the hits on which woidd be increased inihe same ratio as the number of guns firing on tin- same object. The new lo-pounder gim has a shrapnel shell which carries 116 bullets, and its tire will be ail the more terrible and accurate than that of a 9-po"under gun, from its greater number of bullets, its greater striking velocity, and its flatter trajectory. Infantry have not the means of judging the range with an>i;hing like the same accuracy, and the accuracy of its fire decreases very rapidly as compared with that of artillery, as the range increases. 5. With regard to the fifth objection to the employment of long range fire, that the combined use of several sights is not conducive to efficacy of fire, we cannot from any war experience say definitely whether it is or is not expedient to fire at the same object with different sights ; but peace experiments have shewn that a better useful effect can be obtained from them, than with a single sight, when the object fired at is very deep, when it is moving, and when the range is imperfectly known, tmder tvhich conditions only it is proposed to emploij them. The bidlct rain caused by a combined use of different sights, is more evenly spread over a given surface, and the zone of useful effect is considerably deepened, but on the other hand, with a given number of men firing, according as 2 or 3 sights are employed, within each half or third, respectively, of that zone, only one-half or one-third of the number of bullets fall that woidd take effect if only one sight were used. Therefore, if a long range fire is to be opened, it is not judicious to employ a combination of sights, except under the specific conditions laid down, which enable a inore certain iiseful effect to be obtained in such cases, than when a single sight is used. 6. The sixth objection that a long range fire will reduce the efficacy of the fire at shorter ranges, has more real"valiie than_ at first sight appears, as it depends a great deaTon the physical nature of the man. There is no doubt that the use of long rangp fire greatly increases the number 264 of rounds fii'ed, and tlie more rounds fired tlie greater is tlTe fatigiio f-niiscfl to the men, and tlie less efficacious will he the fire. Ag-gjuj^ the^eifect of the recoil of the rifie soon heg-ins to tell most seriously, and after some rounds the shoulder gets so sore that the men fear to put the rifle to it. This especially applies to our Martini-Henrj' rifle.*" Thi.-^ may account for the French and Turks, in the wars of 1870 and 1877, who made use of long range fire, having fired so much from the liips, and conseqiiently as the enemy got nearer, the fire was found to he less efiicaeiaus.f No fire discipline will get over this difficulty, which is a most serious one. The recoil of the Martini-Henry rifle is the greatest of all the Euroi)ean rifles, and is its greatest defect. This CA-il is greatly reduced in oiu" future rifle. This objection can be best overcome by the employment of different troops for long range fire and for the attach^ as already suggested. It cannot be too strongly laid down that the general question as to the advisahilitg of emploi/ing long range fire is intiinatelg bound vp with that of the available supplg of ammunition, the facility for replenishing it, and with the means acailahle for ascertaining the ranges. At long ranges, the efficacy of the fire, falling more or less vertically over the beaten zone, becomes very small, and hence if the greatest effect is to be produced, the range must be accurately determined Avithin 50 yards, or half the constant beaten zone of a collective fire. But the more accurately the range is determined the better will the densest pai*t of the ntulcus be brought on to the objective, and the more effective will be the fire. Thus, the objections to the employment of hmg range fire fail s(» long as // is employed by special troops, is kept well wider control, and is only resorted to irhen the result is lively to Justify the expenditure of ammunition. This latter consideration will bo greatly infhienccd liy tlie size of the objectives, the jtrobalile accuracy with which the range; is kiutwii, ntmos- ]»lieric coiiditioiis, llie sl(i])es of the ground, and liy the supply (»f aiimmiiition available at Ihe jiarlienlar lime and ])lace, and the facility for replenishing if, and hence Ihe decision must be made liy the responsible senior officer j/rcsent. wlio alone can judge of this. __ — — ■ • Sco footnoto, p. 24. t That is to wiy when tho (lit-uliirs lirod wliilo advanring. When the Kussinns did not firo and so intimidatt' their opponents, they suffered more UB they got neunr. 265 If tlie ground in front of a position to bo defended, slopes sufficiently, and the defenders can have two or more lines one above the other so as to form a series of lines of tire, the rear lines will be able to fire with safety over the heads uf the men in front, and keep up a very effective fire against the supports and reserves of the attack, while the men in the front line engage the enemy's skirmishers or check their advance. But such a fire will only be feasible at the longer ranges while th(^ enemy is still at some distance (because of the low trajectories of the bidlets at the shorter ranges), and with troops Ixaving a "fire discipline." In the defence of such a position, long range fire will prove of the greatest advantage, if the suppl^' of ammunition available justifies the expenditure, as, by its emplojTnent, and in no other way, can losses be inflicted with certainty simidtaneoush' on all the lines (firing, supports, and resei'ves) of an attacking force.* On the offensive, if attacking troops suffer much from a long range fire of the defenders, it is desirable, in order to give a moral support to the men, that they should be occasionally allowed, during their advance, to answer it, because advancing without firing in such a case is very demoralising to the men. But this shoidd only be done with the greatest circumspection, and in no case must it ever endanger the ammunition running short before the final assault. Further, as has been already stated, a well-directed fire kept xip by the attack demoralizes the defenders, and causes the attacking troops to suffer less as they get nearer the enemy. Thus the employment of long range fire, under suitable conditions^ being permissible, the next thing to consider is — what do we mean hy-_a_lon^ range fire ? At_wh|it minimum distance^ may it be safcT fo ' conimence ? AVliat is its character? Th©~Germans, who must be considered as the great masters in the art of war, consider that fire at very long ranges shoidd be left exclusively to the artillerj' — infantry fire being emjiloyed only at the shorter ranges. "(Shi)rt range for infantry, long range-for-artiilei-yj-that is briefly the division of the parts which, tliey consider, the two arms are specially called upon to i^lay on the field oi battle. But where are we to draw the line between long and short ranffes V" See footnote, p. '222 26G The Germans di^-ide the space in front of a line of infantry into tkree zones, viz. : — Tlie short zone from the muzzle up to 440 j^ards. The wed/urn zone from 440 yards to 770 _yards. The long zone from 770 yards up to 1,300 yards. The French divide the ground in front of a line of infantry in a similar manner, thus : — The short distanees, from to 440 yards. The medium distanees, from 440 yards to 880 yards. The long distances, from 880 yards to 1,G50 yards. The extreme distances, be^-ond 1,650 yards. This is the sub-di^-ision that has been practically adopted in our "Field Exercises for Infantry, 1884" (page 305), but the compilers of this drill book, in laying down 1,700 yards, as they have done, for the extreme limit of long range rifle Are, appear to have forgotten that the Martini-Henry rifle is only sighted to 1,400 yards, and that therefore we cannot fire up to 1,700 yards with it, although the French rifle is sighted to this distance. The Austrian sub-division is : — The short zone, from to 500 paces (417 j'ards). The medium zone, from 500 to 1,000 paces (417 to 835 yards). The long zone, from 1,000 to 2,000 paces (835 to 1,670 yards). From what wo have said in Part I., and in Chapter IX., antl from the construction of the sights of the Martini-IIcnry rifle, wo may accept for our own practice, the sub-division of tho ground into tho following zones* : — The short zone, fi'om to 400 yards. The medium, zone, fi'om 400 yards to 800 yards. The long =o«fi, fnmi 800 to "l,4()0 yards. ' Tho sight for 400 yards is lli(> gi-catcst el(n-ati(m given by the bed of tho back sight, and 1, 100 yards is the extreme elevation of the rifh^, whicli is a little ov(^r the German estimate, but under tliat of tlie Frencli and Auslrian. Altliougli lliey differ as above in dividing up tlie ground in front of inlanfry, th(» French and Gerjiians agree pretty fairly, as to the lini tactics to be used in each zone or class of distances. • This sub-division tho Author considers preferable to th.it piven in the drill-book of 1884. The method of siprhting will impress the 400 yards r.an(i;e on tho memory of the dulle.st soldier ; 800 yards is twice 400yard.~, and 1,400 yards is the extreme distance for which the rifle is sighted, This Bub-division has lately been practically adopted officially. 267 Tlie short zone, tliey consider, belonj^s exclusively to inde- pcudent firing ; it is for the free independent fire of troops, eaclTnian clioosing liis~own marlc, as at these ranges it is not necessary, from the accuracy of the arm, to direct several rifles the same object to gain an effect. AMlu^se sliQit xa-u^es tiiis independent fire becomes very rapid. I'apid independent fire entails the largest expenditure of ammunition, during the time it lasts, makes the luen unstead}", and, if the line is stationary, soon renders _ all aiming impossible from the men being enveln])ed in a thick cloud of smoke after a few roimds. Tiiiy sort ut iir< is, therefore, only to be used exceptionally, and very sparingly, and only within the short zone. Beyond 400 yards nothing is to be expected in action from single shots, as at such distances any skill of shooting and quality of the rifle cannot coimterbalance the unfavourable moral influences of a combat, aoxd -of -not being sufficiently certain of the range, both of which are independent of a man's personal skill. The fire of single men beyond this range the Germans consider to be a veritable waste of ammunition, because the dangerous zones of the rifle at these ranges are not sufficiently large to compensate the effects of error in judging distances. The soklier having reached the short zone may be left free to choose his own object, because it is no longer necessary, in order to obtain a result, to direct the fire of several rifles at once on the same object, for the errors to be expected in judging distance are here propor- tional to the extent of the dangerous zones, and the size of the areas representing the grouping of the shots at these ranges do not exceed that of the breast of a horse ; nor do they equal the front of two men, even at 400 yards. (See Table of Errors, p. 53.) Objects in the medium zone shoidd be covered AVith a carefully concentrated fii-e of groups of men in extended order on the same object, and under the orders of their officers. The zone of medium ranges is specially appropriated for the collective fire of groups, by which is meant the fii-e of groups of skirmishers directed on the same object (in which it differs from the independent fii-e of skirmishers), and it may be directed on an}^ objects, no matter what their dimensions are. In the zone of long ranges, the Germans deprecate any general use of even concentrated fire, but when used, they say it should be chieflj- directed on objects having a certain amount of breadth and depth, such as a battery, a close 268 infantrj' column of at least 200 men, or a squadron column of caralr}'. Ill any such case a concentrated fire is to be directed on it hy the largest available tactical units, so as to attain the desired result as quickly as possible. Over 1,300 yards or in the cvfiruir ranges, as tliey may be called, we couie to the zone of hold artillery lire, whicli extends up to about 3,500 yards, and the Germans consider that the fire action must be then left in the hands of the artillery, because the ranges beyond 1,300 yards cannot be judged sufficiently accurately, and the fire is so uncertain as not to be worth the expenditure of cartridges. In fact, the Germans and other nations ridicule the idea of expecting an efficacious infantry fire at a greater range than about 1,300 yards. Thus infantry, at least in the open field should not be called on to fire beyond the limits of the long zone, but should leave to its better cjualifiod auxiliary, the duty of preparing the task which it will be the duty of the infantry to complete when the proper time comes. The Russians, whoso close formations suffered so terribly in 1877-7H from tlie long range fire of the Turkish infantry — but which did not stop their advancing — say in their latest regula- tions, that the accuracy of the rifle only shows itself fully when the dimensions of the object aimed at are in keeping with the range ; that as close fire alone has ani/ real accuracy and importance in battle, the loncf range power of the rife must be used with extreme reserve, and then only when the result is pretty sure to justify the expenditure of ammunition ; two or more sights \v\\i be used in long range fire ; over 500 yards only on(^ sight will bo (*x('e])tionall3' used; individual tiro is elfcctivo up to 750 yards, but beyond tliis any effect is only duo to chance', and tlicrcforoat longer ranges tlie firo of groU])s must bo us(>d so as to concentrate a number of sliots upon special points; th(* concentration of fire is (•(lually effective at shorter ranges; skiruiisliers are never to lire when on the nu)ve, as it would render their fire completely ineffective; they nuiy tire either iutlividually or liy fi'actions, if the o)»ject aimed at is in keeping with the distance. A I'rench writer, M. l-Jiiile Siniond, says, "It is ^irvi alone which will assure victory in the future to the troops who know how to make use of it. Not only will long range fire prepare the attack, but short range fire will often prove UK<'lchs, nnd the issuo of the battle will have bersn decided before the enemy is approached The war of 269 1870-71 not only demonstrated the already-known necessity for a preponderance of lire, Lut it showed at the same time the power both of long range and of rapid firing.* The success of the Prussians has been attributed to many causes which have nothing to do with it ; particularly the famous principle of sparing the ammunition, and of only opening fire at short ranges. In fact, while the-French caused a rain of projectiles at considerable distances, the Prussians reserved their fire for the distance of 400 paces. At long distances the French bullets, generally tired anyhow, on account of the bad instruction the French soldiers had received in musketry, covered the ground uniformly, and caused considerable losses to th(> German reserves. Unfortunately, once this zone was crossed, the enemy was not much exposed, because the short range fire, though rapid, was not adjusted; as a consec[uence, it only quickened the advance of the . enemy, who sought to escape the bidlets of the French, whose inefficacious fire could neither stop nor destroy them. At short ranges, the French soldiers always fir-ed- too high. In the infatuation which arose for the German armj', their fire tactics were much praised, and the French long range fire was blamed. This rejiroach is not just, since the French inflicted the most serious losses on their enemies with this kind of fire. Only the faulty execution of their short range fire should be blamed. The Germans have not been blind to this question, and, immediately after the war, they studied both long range and rapid firing. Why economise cartridges when good results can be obtained ? If the French made an error, it was in not having sufiicientl}- studied the methods of firing, and in not having ensured the replenishment of the ammunition. AVe have only to recall the manner in which the French inflicted losses on the Germans in 1870. It must not be forgotten that, although overwhelmed by nimibers, the French almost alwaj's, in the battles previous to Sedan, inflicted greater losses on the Germans, than the latter did on them." M. Simond also seeks to prove the same point from the Eusso-Turkish war, viz., the greater value of a long- range and rapid fire over short range firing; and in support of his opinion he quotes the Eussian General Zeddeler, as follows : — " Oiu* (the Eussian) regidations were not in accordance with the requirements of modern fighting, for they particularly insisted on the necessity ' It is not merely rapid, but accurate fire that is required. 270 of economising' cartridges, and on accuracy of fire. This principle of economy of ammunition was wliat ^ve Jbad most at heart, and Ave did not cease to recommend it to the men. "When the Turks gave their infantry a king-range and rapid- loading weapon, they were not dehided with the illusion that their troops would only fire at short ranges and would spare their ammunition. They A-iewed the situation much more simply, and decided to utilize to the utmost limits the proper- ties of the rifle, and to fire on all objectives with the greatest rapidity possible. If we compare the Turkish army with the Frencli arm}' in IBTO, Ave ^ee an identical employment of the rapid-loading rifle, the only difference being that the Turks obtained results which the French had not thought of Now-a-days extended order has been adopted, and the only favourable objectives that show themselves are the firing line and its supports when they change position at the double, that is to say, when they make short appearances. It would not be reasonable, with such targets, to fire little and at short ranges. Two recent campaigns, made AA-ith the new armament, show that long range fire, even when ver}' imjx'rfect and badly studied, can, nevertheless, produce considerable effects. Besides, waste of ammimitiou and bad t'mployment of fire in past wars, do not proA'e anything against raj)id firing and its employment at hmg ranges, but rath(>r a defective application in the methods of using it, and lastly, Avhen the control of the fire has escaped from the leader, th(^ fault lay, in most cases, in tlie insufficiency of the regulations as regards niles for firing. Conse(]iunitly, it is necessary to practise all infantry in long range fire, as a procedure in A\'ar. It is nrct'ssiiri/ to orcnrhrhii rapiilli/, hj fhe aid of masses of lead instant anco a sly projtrlid^ the iinfavourahlc ohjccts ir/iir/i noir-a-dai/s show t/irmselres on f/ir tiatlle Jii'ld. It is not sufiicient to ('(Uitent ones<>lf Avith iiring little and accurately, but to try and avoid all del'ectiA'O employment of fire, by determining beforehand the dilTer(>nt cn.seH in wliidi one or tlie oilier iiiitli(i(l of living onght to be used." M. Sinioiid eoiitinueK, "('olon<'l V , said in 1880, that 'file inuleriul eifects of a fire at 'JOO metres are absolutely nil, if the ground is not horizontal. Further, the (Uises are rare when fire at lOO metres will have any ollicacy ; to obtain this, it Ih neccHKnry to lire on a jilafeau at a level of at least 10 metres liiglier. I''or this reason, it is always necessary to fu'e at a longer range. Therefore, it is generally from a distance that an eflicacious lire will ensure flie success that Avill take 271 place.' .... Colonel P bases his theory ou the effect of fire on different slopes of ground, but it can also be justified by numerous examples drawTi from late wars, and especially from the Russo-Turkish war. The Turks, notwithstanding the ad- vantages of their entreuched position before Plevna, always fled when the Pussians came within oOO metres of them.*' It was at the long distances, on the other hand, that the fu'e of tlie Tui'ks was deadly, and occasioned terrible losses on the Pussians. Captain Kouropatkin has said on this subject : ' The fire from an entrenched position does not increase in iutensity according as the assailant advances ; it appears that the precision of tha -fire is greatest at. ji'om 1,200 to 600 paces, after Avhich it gets less. The least courageous men cease firing ; most oi the others load and puU the trigger without raising it to the shoulder, and hence the mass of the bullets fiy over the heads of the adversary.' " AVTien the assailant has arrived Avithin a short distance, the moral of the defenders is shaken, the emotion of the fight is at its greatest intensity, any want of skill among the men influences, not only the accuracy, but also the rapidity of the fire, which at tliis moment, therefore, becomes less rapid and deadly. The Prussians understood this well in 1870, as they rushed to the assaidt as soon as possible, because, as the Prussian Greneral Paris saj^s, 'once the long range zone had been crossed, the men were little exposed, from the bullets passing too high.' In the Pusso-Turkish war, the Russian reserves, in spite of their officers, threw themselves into the firing line, because they were suffering more losses than the latter without being able to reply, and because they wished to advance more rapidly. The attacks degenerated into regular races, tlie assailant seeking to suffer less loss(>s bj'' approaching the position. Thus, a rapid fire at short ranges is not the decisive fire." The conclusion here arrived at is open to much criticism. In the first place, the long range fire of the French and Turks, although it caused losses to their opponents, never stopped th(Mr attacks altogether, and so never produced a decisive effect. The severe losses at long ranges which the Gennans and Pussians suffered in their attacks were due more to their premature attacks, before a sufficient preparation liad been effected by their artillery, and to the favourable objec- tives they presented to the fire of their enemy by their dense * This statement, as a fixed rule, is hardly in accordance with the different accounts of the war. formations, than to the mere fact that their opponents fired at long ranges, and although the Germans and Kussians suffered more total losses than their opponents, yet at the shorter ranges they did such execution in so short a time as to demoralize the enemy sufficiently to admit of an advance in mass to capture the position. The result of a battle does not depend on the number killed and wounded, but on the determination or obstinacy of the troops to stand or advance, and thin determination is best overcome, not hij the total numher of losses, irrespective of the time they arc injiicted in, but on the rapiditif with which the losses are effected. The French and Turks aimed at the centre of the enemy's bodies, andTas at close ranges they did not alter theu' sights, the fire in any case would have gone over the enemy's head, especially as they were firing down- hill (see p. 160). It was only when the Germans and Kussians began to open fia'c and to so discompose their enemies as to prevent them adjusting their sights or aimhig, that their losses began to decrease ; but these losses were principally due to the faulty tactics and faulty attack formations employed when the losses wei'e incurred, and which exposed closed masses of trooj)s to the enemy's fire. What the effects of fire will be in the future when opposed to modern ideas of attack formations and methods of using fire can only be decided by the next great campaign, but M. Simond's argu- ments, given above, can only go to prove that the defence may open fire on suitable objectives at longer rang(>s than the offen- sive, from the ranges being known and the means of supplying aniuiunition being more easily carried out. French, Germans, Russians, all say that on account of the i/rraf ifficanj (if short range Jirc, which alone is decisive, and from tlie uncertainty of estimating ranges and of being able to re]»lenish llie ammunition expended, the attack will always endeavour to get witliin tlie sliort or effective ranges of the enemy before opening lire. " Nevertheless, tlie most determined advocates of tliis close fire allow tliat the tntops of tlie lirst line can only fulfil the refjiiirement of getting witliin elfectivc* range of the enemy wlien the ground on wliich they move is partieiilarly favour- able. Shoultl it not b(! HO, iire must be opeiu-d before arriving at 400 yarui)i)ly of ammunition on the spot justifies the expenditure, when the atmosplieric conditions and slopes of llic groimd an^ not unfavourable, and when the ranges are known within sullicient limits, l)ut it is only at ranges under 1,000 yards that any real serious residts need be expected, as troo])s under fire will invariably Ix- in an extended line. "Tiie ]»o\ver and ellicacy of modern lins depends on two conditions: lirstly, on the exact appreciation of the distance, which, on the other hand, is strictly coiniected with the llatnesM of the trajectory; and secondly, on 1 lie formation of the trooj)H lired on." The (iennans liave no great partiality for fire over 1,300 yards, nor for indirect lire in field operations. This • With tln' Knf^liHli rillr wr cimiiot fire over 1,400 yardH in the field, without Hpocial iimiii>s'itH for doiii^f ho. From what haa bocii said, this IN rathtr an udvuutagc than otherwise is what a Gennan -writer says: — "Is it not a characteristic sign that it is in the small armies of Europe that advocates are found for setthng the question of long range infantry iii'e according to the results of the practice range, whilst in the great armies it is settled on very dilferent principles ? Is it thus reserved for those who have had no opportunity of gaining war experience, and can have, there- fore, but a limited scope of view, to bring out theories and to push speculation to its extreme limit ? " The main firing line of the defence should not carry on a long range fii'e, but this should be done by advanced troops or outposts, or guns supported by an escort of infantry sent forward to compel the infantry of the enemy to deploy sooner."^-' These troops would, of course, have to withdi-aw when attacked by superior forces, probably when the enemy arrives within about 600 yards of them, so as not to retreat f under a heavy fire, and with great loss. Thus the troops who have to carry on the main defence are left intact when the enemy approaches, and will have a full supply of ammunition which, therefore, may not recjuire replenisliing during the heat of the action, while some of that of the enemy has already been expended. Thus on the defensive, long range fire will be principally used at the commencement of the action, and its use restricted to fortified advanced posts, and to detachments whose object will be obtained if they compel the assailant prematurely to assume an open formation. * The advantage of forcing an early deployment on the part of the enemy^ instead of letting him approach to closer ranges in denser forma- tions, IS that at the commencement of an engagement the attackers are iincertain of the defensive arrangements, and this forced early deploy- ment prevents any mistake in the disposition of the attack being corrected, as troops extended under fire cannot manoeu^Te, but only move straight to the front or rear. Moreover, from the difficidty of controlling extended troops, the advance is made slower, and confusion is more quickly caused, by the inevitable mixture of troops which takes place when supports, &c., are sent forward to reinforce the fii-ing lino. This early deployment may also cause the enemy to open fire sooner than he should, and so cause him to use up his ammunition, while it renders the control of his fire more difiicult. "It is inconvenient for the attack to deploy at a great distance from the enemy; it is a reason for the defence to try and compel it to do so." This is one great reason for occupying advanced posts in front of a defensive position. t It is advisable that any small detachments, other than those placed in advanced posts, sent forward by the defence to compel the enemy to assume open formations prematurely, should be taken from the reserve and return to it after retreating. S 2 276 Expenditure of ammunition need not be considered in such a case bv these advanced detachments. The Dutch regulations say: — "Firing at long distances has for its object to prolong the preparation and to compel the adversaiy to assimie early a more open formation and to seek for shelter. But as the resvdt of any battle is decided at short ranges, sufficient ammunition must always be main- tained for the close fight, and all useless expenditure of ammunition must be avoided." The emplo}-ment of long range fire by the attack has already been discussed, namelj-, that it should not be used by infantry destined to execute the actual assaidt, but by lines of infantry judiciously posted so as to facilitate by their fire the advance of the former. In the attack of stationary objects, like fieldworks, fortifi- cations, entrenchments, camps, &c., long range fixe over -1,300 yards may be extremely useful. In the open field the rifies can onl)' be fired from the shoulder, but in the above cases, the rifles may be fired from rests, causing a far more accurate fire, a concentrated fire may in such cases be used up to ranges of 3,000 yards, as every accurate means can theu be used for obtaining the exact range, and the supply of amm\i- nition wiU be practically imlimited. "It must not be forgotten that long range fii-e onl}' offers grave inconveniences, without anj' advantage, to an army which attempts to make use of it in the field without previous practice. The use of long range fire is too delicate to allow of its being thus improvised. It is only by means of well- studied and understood regidations, and by constant experi- ments and i>ractice, that troops can be made to execute it witli coolness, and tlu* officers to direct it Avith discernment." AN'Iiatt'ver uses long range fire may bo put to, the fact must never bi' lost sight of, that in an attack, if the fire be comm(>nced too soon, the offensive' spirit of the troops will suffer and will give the attack a prolonged character. Further, the moral force of troops will suffer as soon as they perceive their own fire to 1)0 ineffective, while tliat of the adversaries increases in yiowor. 'J'he great point, however, that must always bo clearly kept in mind is that Jour/ nint/r fire can nnrr replace the drcisire Jirr at short raiif/is ; loTTg range fin" can oidy play a^(>condary part, never a deeiHive one, Imt lliis secondary r6lc Jnay, in many instances, lio of tlio greatest value if used judicioiisly and under the couditious already stated. 277 Every nation has laid down, in a more or less detailed manner, the tiro tactics to be carried out in an action, oven though they do not agree in every point. Some think that infantry fire "will^ be useful in the preparation of the fight, and ai-b disposed tolDegin to open fire at from 1,200 to 1,300 yards, and even beyond ; others say that fire should not be opened until within 700 or 800 yards of the enemy, or even nearer. But all are unanimous that the final phase, whether it is ordered or not, will be an intense fire, during which one side or the other will abandon the fight after a short time involuntarily. However, it is evident that, in the future, two adversaries will enter into a war with the feeling that it will be by fire that they will determine success, either by its equality or quantity, or, better still, by a combination of both the quality and cpiantity, and that every effort will be made to obtain the maximum effect from the rifle. Now-a-daj's, since fire is considered the only means of des- truction in battle between two adversaries, the first thing to bo considered, after regidating the employment of the iirej_js the question of replenishing the ammunition that vnR be expended. The consideration of the supply of ammunition and the facility for replenishing it, exercises, as we have seen, a very great influence on the question as to when the order to com- mence firing should begin. It is certain that a body of troops, having an unlimited supply of ammim^ition, need not fear any waste of ammunition, nor of its running short at the decisive moment, and can open fire at far greater ranges than those fixed for ordinary circumstances. Besides, even if it is necessaiy to increase in strong pro- portions the supply of ammunition carried by the men, it woiild not be a serious reason to refuse any rifle or method of firing which will give us a superiority of fire on the battle field. The question of fire is strictly connected with that of the supply and replenishment of the ammunition. But we ought not to subordinate the fire to the nvmiber of cartridges carried by the men, that is to say, the principal to the secondary consideration. If the new tactics of the future require a greater number of cartridges, we must seek new expedients for supplying them to the soldier on the battle field. We must not give up any advantage offered by a particular kind of fire, which may decide success because we have only insufficient means for carrying the required quantity of ammunition. Further 278 on we shall see that it is possible to easily allot more ammu- nition to the soldier than he has at present at his disposal. " The condition, which ought to overrule all others, is to obtain a superiority of fire. It is necessary that everji;hing should gixe in to this requirement. This is the price of victory." The value of preventing the supply of ammunition running short being' so great, we will now proceed in the next Chapter to consider how it is effected. 279 CHAPTER Xin. SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION ON THE BATTLE FIELD. The question of the supply of ammunition for infantry and of replenishing this ammunition on the battle field is now-a-days an all important one. Modern rifles of rapid fire and long range have, in fact, introduced into war a new factor, which imposes the absolute obligation of modifying the tactics of fighting, of regidating the emplo3Tnent of the fire, and of keeping up its intensity during the whole duration of a long fight, by means of a well-arranged system of replenishing the ammunition. The wars of 1870-71 and 1877-78 have both shown in an undoubted manner the immense value of a vigorously conducted and well-directed infantry fii-e, when directed on suitable objectives at the greatest distances, in all periods of the fight, from the preparation of the attack to the pursuit of the enemy. But this can only be attempted when there is sufficient ammunition available. Although entire confidence cannot be put in long range fire, yet where it is possible to use it with effect it should not be neglected, because the material eifects so produced always give a moral superiorit}', Avliich is one of the most solid guarantees of success to the troops who possess it. With the use of long range fire, we must admit of a greater consvmiption of cartridges than in the past, and of a greater necessity for ensuring to the infantry a certain and sufficient replenishment of the consumed ammunition, this replenish- ment being, according to Von Schi-eff, a condition for the existence of infantry, to which, therefore, a fidl and entire satisfaction must be given. On the other hand, an increase of the nimiber of cartridges carried by the foot soldier without a corresponding decrease in the weight of the articles of his eqiupment, is limited by the fatigue Avhich this increase of load would cause him. Therefore, it is equally important to consider the means of improving the methods of supplpng the troops in the tiring line during the fight, as well as of increasing the supply to be carried by the soldier when lie enters into action. 280 Horsetzky (an Austrian officer) says, "The principal oljjfition against Itmg range tire is waste of ammunition. The same objection Avas raised against breecli-loading rifles at the time of their adoption. What is meant I)}' waste of ammunition ? Is every bidlet which misses its mark to be considered as such? If so, then millions of cartridges fii-ed even at short ranges must be considered wasted, for experience shows that even in the close fight tlie average cfficacj' of the lii'e is less than 1 per cent. In reality, expenditure of ammunition wiU be judicious as long as the nimiber of shots fired maintain a suitable relation with the results Avhich the ballistic Cjualities of the rifle, the range, and tlie dimen- sions of the object woukl lead us to expect. Troops who fire at long ranges Avill evidently have more occasions for making use of tlieir fire, and will, therefore, expend more cartridges than troops who onl^-fire at short ranges. Thus the emplo^Tuent of long range fire comjH'ls an increase in the number of cartridges to be put at the disposal of the men. But this is only a secondar}- point. If long range fire is recognised as a real advantage, this consideration is only a matter of detail, because we must regulate the supply of ammunition to the necessities of the combat, and not make the mode of action I if the infantry depend on a number of cartridges fixed on beforehand. The measures to lie taken to secure ammunition in sufficient (piantities to the troojjs lie in the domain of organisation, which latter ought to conform itself to the requirements of tactics." It is useless to tr}' and base our calculations for the amount of anmiunition required to be available for a soldier on his entry into action on the experience of past wars, because the conditions of future wars, in which bt)th op])onent8 will be well trained in iire tactics, will not be the same as in the past. Besides it is very hard to obtain even approximately the amount of anununit ion exiteiided in various wars. And then, again, tlu' statistics given are often very misleading; the average number of cartridges expended i)(»r man of th(^ whole force is often given, which averages is not xisually very great. ]iut it is very ran; that tlie whole force is ever engaged. Generally all tin- efr<»rt of a battle, especially as regards infantry fire, falls on the 1roo])s in the iigliling line, the i-cniainder of tin- force acting in a moral sense by its presence on the field and Jieing availiililc for action. Thus, many battalions lire away a great many more rounds per man than the average for the ulioh' force, and in providing ammunition 281 for troops, the estimate must not be for the average, but for the viaxuiiHiit oxpenclitiiro in one day, and also for the possibility of the troops being engaged for several consecutive days without having an opportunity of making up their supply of ammunition. In the campaign of 1866 the Prussians in both Hanover and Bohemia only expended 1,850,000 cartridges altogether for 268,000 rifles, or about 7 rounds per man, including lost cartridges and those of the wounded, dead and disappeared ; but at Koniggratz the I. Prussian Army, heavily engaged all day, only spent on an average 12 rounds per man, though one regiment (three battaHons) expended 30 rounds per man, and some companies 80 rounds per man, or 20 rounds more than they carried. At Nachod, one battalion consumed 23 rounds per man, at Skalitz and Trautenau tlie average expenditiu-e was 28 rounds per man, but some of the leading companies fired away 80 to 100 rounds per man. litis was all sliorf ran (ic fire. The Austrians, on the other hand, tliougii only armed witii muzzle-loaders, expended 64 rounds per ritle in Bohemia, and 5 rounds per ritle in Italy, ov 15,600,000 rounds in all, as against one-eighth that number tired away by the Prussian breech-loader. This was a curious and unexpected residt, and gave rise to the supposition, that with a rapid-firing rifle the fire would be quicker, but that there woidd be less of it on account of the decision being more quickly arrived at. But the war of 1870-71 showed the falseness of this deduction, when the breech-loader was pitted against the breech-loader, for the Germans expended 30, 000, 000 cartridges. In 1870 the French Armv of Metz, during the three days of the 14th, 16th and 18th August (the last date being that of the battle of Gravelotte), expended 25 to 30 rounds per man, but the troops defending St . Privat fired away all their cartridges 1^90 rounds per nian), and had to retire purely for want of ammunition. Tliia was a long range fire. At the action of ( 'hampigny, during the Siege of Paris, the French had 108 rounds per man, which were nearly all used up, and the French had to retire. Tfiis restdt u-as due to a want of artillery preparation. The XII. German Corps fired in various battles fi'om 6 to 15 rounds per man, using short range fire only, though some of the German troops in the Avar, when unable to advance, fired away all their ammunition after three or four hovu's fighting, and had often to draw on their ammunition colunms. Wlien this happened it teas due to a want, 282 or insuficienn/, of art iller)/ preparation. In five German Army Corps the consumption for the whole war was 90 rounds per rifle, and in three others, 45 rounds per rifle. These are only averages for the whole force, and do not represent the cxpenditiu'e of the corps and units first thrown into action, who often used up their whole supply. It is this expenditure of single units that is of the gi-eatest importance. In the wars of 1866 and 1870-71 tliis expenditui-e often amounted to 100 rounds per man, and in the war of 1877-78 to over this number. At the same time it must be remembered that dm-ing this Franco-German war, no real fii*e tactics, as now understood, existed, and the importance and necessity of collective fire at ranges over 400 yards, so as to obtain the maximum efficac}' fi'om the rifle, was not realised, or consequently practised. The Eussians, in 1877-78, fired 50 rounds per man, though, on many occasions, some of the troops fired away all they had, their greatest consumption being 94 rounds per man. Some Turkish battalions fired 150 rounds, and, as some assert, even 500 rounds per man in tlie day, nsiufj a wild undisciplined long range fire. This is the highest exptnuliture ever known. It must l)e borne in mind tliat the above figures are in excess of the real number of cartridges actually fired, for they include ammunition that liad not been fired, ])ut which was lost by being dropped or left on tlie dead and woimded. However, such contingencies must enter into our calculations, U8 they will always occur. In some experiments made in Gennany in 1876, during a field day in which the heaviest fire was ordered to Ite kept up, no man fired more than 40 rtmnds, but only short range firing wan used. ]?ut on the other hand, at somo ('Xp(>rijiients madnemy's fire is not good, bke tliat of the Russians in 1877-78, these pack animals can l)e l)rouglit riglit up into the firing line, as the Turks did frequently. I'lit if tlie fire is good, tliis could not be don<> with iiupunity. Besidi'S the above, a general su])i)ly ol' ainiuuuitiou is carried in the fielil, and it is divided into several fractions, which are distributed among the divisions and army corps. Thescj fractions march after onctanother in the ()rd(>r of tlnur corps, and it is intended that they should rei)lace or replenish one another according to need. The problem, however, is not (•onii)lctely solved thus, though the difficulty is, at least, much lessened; tho main question being, how to Tiring the ammunition carried in the carts or 285 •wagons or on pack animals into direct contact with the combatant soldier in action. Any increased lightness in tlie ammunition will increase the supply that can he earned, and thus increase the facility of jirolouging the fire.'^' Before the war of 1870-71, the French thought that the infautr}' soldier could carry an average weight of 66 lbs. and march from 15^- to 19 miles a day at a moderate pace over level ground in a good condition, supposing he has, as well, sufficient food and rest. But roads are usually hilly, and in war get cut up, and are not kept up in good repair, the men have little rej^ose, with bad or indifferent food and cooking, forced marches are often made, and bad weather occui's, all of which reduce the power of the man for such work, and so fatigue him after a long march as to r uder him incapable of giving the best residt in a fight. A number of experiments have been made in France to see if it was not possible to reduce the weight of the clothing and equipment of a soldier, that is, the dead weight which adds nothing to the vigour of a soldier, so as to increase the food and ammunition he shoidd carry. The consequence of these experiments has been, that a French soldier has now to carry his rifle and bayonet (11 lbs.), ammunition (7ilbs.), equip- ment (l^lbs.), change of clothing (12 lbs.), 3 days' food (Tibs.), and camp equipment (10 lbs.) ; total 49 lbs. It cannot be thought of, with the present ammunition, to make the men alivays carry the f idl supply considered necessary now-a-days (100 to 120 rounds at least) if he has also to carry his rifle, valise and its contents, great-coat, clothing, intrenching tools, bayonet, water and food, which amount to over 60 lbs. in the English service. Under these circumstances about 7A- lbs. weight of ammunition (or 70 rounds of the Martini- Henry rifle) seems to be the utmost amount that he can conveniently carry. But the Turks, who carried nothing but great-coats, food, ammunition, bayonets and water, often carried 150 rounds on their persons. f * For instance, when the new English 0-298 inch bore rifle is issued, 140 rounds can be carried for the same weight as 70 rounds of the present ammunition. t Weight of 100 rounds of English ammunition, 10-6261bs. ,, ,, French ,, 9-63G ,, ,, ,, German ,, 9-2-10 ,, ,, ,, Austrian ,, 9-350 ,, Eussian ,, 9-020 „ 1286 But it is a serious question now-a-days, considering the rapidity of modern wars and of the manoeuvres executed during them, and also the great vahie of mobility in war, whether the infantry soldier should bo made to carry all that he does, especially in the mountain Avarfare in which our troops are so often engaged, and in which any dead weight that a soldier has to carry is vevj detrimental to his fighting capacity. In European wars, the men are invariably biHetted, unless in the actual presence of the enemy, and so there is no real necessity for canying various articles of comfort. In hot climates, of course, the men cannot be expected to carry anything but their greatcoat, rifle, bayonet, ammunition, intrenching tool, food and water, and, in the author's opinion, the valise itself, ■'" for carrying the great coat and extra rations and ammunition. This is all that is really required in any war, if mobility of movement is required, as the baggage wagons, even in Ijivouac, will always come up and bo with the men during the halt, Avhen they can get any change of clothing, etc., required. Everj-thing else should bo carried for the men. It woiJd doubtless increase tho trains, but the result would be a gaiu in moving power, so necessary in modern warfare. In fact, in the Franco-German war, many • Whatever things may be carried for the men, it should be laid down ns a most stringent rule, that they should iirrcr part with their valises, even if empty, becausi- if they do not cany them, all nu'uns of cai-rying extra food and ammimitioii are gone, while there is no way of carrying the gi'eat-eoat so comfortably as in the valise ; the rolled great-coat, in the fonn of a horse collar, worn round the man, is an exquisite piece of tortin-e and discomfort to him, especially on a hot day. Napoleon I. said " There are livr things whicli sliould never be separated on service from the soldier, viz. : liis rillc, ammunition, knapsack, provisions for at least 4 days, and his inlniicliing tool." To these, may be added, bayonet, food liaversack, water-bottle, great-coat, a pair of socks, and a pair of boots. The contents of the knapsjtck may bo reduced to llie least volume possible, if circumstances retjuire it, but the soldier should always have it with liim. 'I'liis is very important, becau.se in case of necessity to lighten a soldier, tho contents of tlie kna])Sjiclv or valis(^ may be thrown away, or put into store, but lie should never part with tlie valis(^ itself, thougli empty, as a ]iair of boots, socks, extra food, and amnnuiition may b(! nnitiired to lie carried in it, and fresh clotiiing may be got in other places by recpiisition. The importamc of tliis has not been realized in the English service. I f it is (•onsi< .")74,.'}f)() rille cartridges and 1 l,2H.'i revolver cartridges. The prrmmi for the direction and leading of each section 291 is fiirnislied l»y tli(> artillory of tlio division to wliich it is told oif to especially supply, and consists of one captain, and two lieutenants from the reserve forces, one quarter- master, six assistant quarter-masters, one chief artificer, one (jiiarter-master sergeant, six foremen, one master and two assistant farriers, two blacksmiths, two cai^penters, six pyrotechnists, two harness makers or saddlers, two trumpeters, and about 150 drivers. The second echelon of the army corps park carries 33 cai'tridges for each infantry soldier, and artillery ammunition for the replenishing- of the sections of the first echelon. It carries besides some spare articles, and the necessary stores for the repairs of artillery. It is divided into four sections. Each of the first three sections consists of : — 3 Grun carriages for the 3-543 inch gun. 1 ,, ,, ^ ,, 3-150 ,, 18 Artillery ammunition wagons for the 3-543 inch gun. 4 ,, ,, _ _ )? J) 3-150 ,, 15 Infantry ammimition wagons. 1 Revolver ammunition wagon. 1 Forge wagon. 1 Harness wagon. 1 Forage wagon. Total 45 wagons in section. No. 4 section of the second echelon of the army corps park is almost entirely devoted to can-ying artillery ammuni- tion, but it has three wagons of revolver ammunition for the combatants of all arms, each wagon carrying 33,858 revolver cartridges. The infantry and revolver ammunition wagons are like those already described, and therefore each of the first thi-ee sections carry 272,160 rifle cartridges. The personel for the direction and leading- of each section of the second echelon is furnished by the corps artillery, and consists of one captain, two lieutenants, one adjutant, one quarter-master, six assistant quarter-masters, one quarter- master sergeant, one master and two assistant farriers, two harness makers or saddlers, two trumpeters and about 370 drivers. There is no special reserve of rifle cartridges for the other arms besides infantry, but they can draw on the infantry- reserve when necessary.* However, for the independent * This shows the advantage of ha\Tng one cartridge for all arms. T 2 292 cavab'v divisions, a reserve of three wagons per di-\-ision is made, in which the fore chest of each wagon curries revolver cartridges, and the hind chest carbine cartridges. Behind the army corps parks comes the army park, comprised of five similar echelons for the intermediate supplj' between the stationary magazines and the army corps parks. Atjstria-Htjngary. — In the Austro-Hungarian army tlie ammunition is carried partly: — 1. By the soldier. 2. ]\v company ammunition wagons. ."]. By divisional and army corps parks. 4. By army parks. Each .soldier carries 1 00 rounds on him,* hut when an action is expected to begin, each man is given a supplementary packet of 20 cartridges, taken fi'om the company wagons, which gives 120 rounds for his immediate disposal, but technical troops (engi- neers and pioneers) only carry 30 rounds each, while all non- commissioned officers have only 20 rounds each. These numbers refer to the -43 inch calibre rifle, but the future Austrian rifle is to have a calibre of -315 inch, and 145 of the new cartridges weigh the same as 100 of the present ones. This would enable each company wagon to carry about 10,000 rounds instead of 7,000, and the other parks would also carry, if considered necessary, a proportionate increase. Tip to 1887 each battalion of 800 men liad two four-horsed ammunition wagons each carrying 21,000 cartridges (42,000 in all), or .52'o cai-tridges per man. These wagons wore somcwliat similar in shape and princijdc to the French ones, and w<'r(' sujtjjlied from the divisional parks. Each wagon was under the charge of a non-commisioned ofFuer. But tlicsc battalion wagons, which are only old artillery • It is interesting to note also how these 100 rounds arc carried. GO roumlH arc (•!irri(> ,, revolver. 18 )> ,, cavalry carbine, 74 n ,, 3-150 inch gun. 82 ,, 3-543 ,, ,, and a certain quantity of powder and dynamite. The army corps ammunition park consists of 51 carriages, 260 horses, and 250 men. * Such as the corps Eirtillery, corps engineers, &c. t Thus the divisional and army corps parks are practically only different sub-di\-isions of the same line of ammunition supply. 294 Independent infantry divisions have a special divisional park which carries : — 10 rounds per infantry rifle. 15 ,, ,, rifle of the technical troops. 35 ,, ,, cavalry carbine. 18 ,, ,, revolver. 100 ,, ,, 3-150 inch gun. 110 „ „ 3-543 „ „ _ The above different parks form what is called in Austria the "first line of the artillery reserve establishments." They replenish themselves from the " 2nd line of the artillery reserve establishments " which consists of : — (fl) Tlie army ammunition pari;, which carries, 32 rounds per infantry rifle. 6 „ ,, rifle of the technical troops. {b) The army reserve ammunition pari; which carries, 24 rounds per infantiy rifle. 15 ,, ,, rifle of the technical troops. (c) The army field ammunition d{;p6t, which carries, 60 rounds per infantry rifle. 22-5 ,, ,, rifle of the technical troops. Russia.. — In the Russian army the ammunition is carried partly : 1 . By the soldier. 2. By battalion and regimental carts. 3. By field ammunition parks. Each soldier carries HI rounds on liim, — 30 in his pouches and 54 in his knapsack. In 1S77 tliev only carried 00. Prior to 18K6 each haft al ion had four ammunition wagons (one to each conipany). Kucli wagon carric*! 1)1 5 packets of 12 cartridges each, or 11,310 cartridges wliicli gave (iO rounds per man. Tlicsc wagons were conducted liy men Ix'Iongingto flir> ((luiiiany, anil were eouiniaii(le(l ]py ;i noTi-commissioned oflieer. By an order dated 17lli .Tuiu-, 18.S(3, tlier(> are to bo 33 two- wlu'cled one-horse ammunition carts per regiment of four })attalionH, tluit is Ifi earts for the 16 companies of the regimi'ut, and 17 to form a general regimental r(>serve. The supply carried by tlie 33 carts is 153,501 cnrtridges or 48 rounds per rifl(» f(l or bouglit camels for the transport of tlieir ]»aggage. 10 animals were told off for the tents (four tents for 11 men eadi l»er aninuil), 20 for tlie ammunition supjdy (2,000 rounds per animal, or HO per man), 10 for llie tools and cooking utensils, 10 for the oiliccrs' baggage, and the remaining .iO for tlio transport of five days' >)i8(!uit and food sujjplies. K.V()i.ANi). — In tho English army the aniniuuition is carried partly* : — • InthoG.O. for July 1878 nnd for October 1887, the different linos «.f ammunition MuiJpiicH iiro (lc.si(,'nated as tho hattiilion, divisional, and army corjiH " riHcrve.M. " Tho wordw "NUpply" and "columns" aro l)tir])OH<;ly umid licm inNl<'ad of the word " rest rvos," aw tln' functions (pf theso columns arp in no way those of a reserve, because their supplies are for actual use, whan required, and are not for being kept back or r nrsimonioTuly issued, m the vord " reserve " implies. 297 1 . By the soldier. 2. By battalion ammunition carts and pack animals. 3. By the battalion baggage wagons. 4. By divisional ammunition columns. 5. By army corps ammunition columns. Each soldier carries on him 70 rounds, — 40 in his pouches and 30 in his valise. Each battalion has 4 two-horsed two-wheeled ammuni- ti(m carts, each carrying 7,200 rounds (28,800 in all), or 30 rounds per man. Each cart carries 12 boxes of cartridges ciu-h containing 600 rounds, or 7,200 rounds in all. The cart- ridges are made up in packets of 10 rounds each. The drivers are taken from the battalions. Two j)ack animals accompany the small arm ammunition carts. Each box with its contents weighs about 80 lbs. ; the lid of the boxes slide in, and is then fixed with a j)in attached to a tajie held down with sealing wax. These are easily opened, but before 1880 the lid was screwed down, so that it was difficidt to get at the ammunition, especially if the screw- driver was lost, which often happened, when the box had to be broken or prised open by some means or other. The carts are of special design, and are fitted with six small and one large compartment each ; each of the small compartments carries two small arm ammunition boxes, and the large compartment carries a few entrenching tools. In a locker under the cart, 480 rounds of pistol ammunition are carried. These carts, therefore, cannot be used for any other purpose. Each cart has a leather pocket outside, in which the necessary tools are placed, and two canvas bags for distributing t\w cartridges are carried in a shallow well under the cart. Two such bags are also provided per company, and are worn by two men of the company for the same purpose. This gives 22 canvas bags per battalion. These canvas bags are made with two pockets, each 13 inches wide by 16 inches deep, connected together by a canvas strip of double thickness, in which arm-holes are cut so that it can be put on like a waistcoat. Such a canvas bag, or rather pair of bags, can be placed on the shoulders of a man or on a pack animal (one pocket lying on either side). The pockets can each hold 200 rounds, or 400 in all, giving a weight of about 43 lbs. If pack animals are used instead of carts, 24 to 25 animals are required per battalion to carry this ammunition, as one 298 animal can only carry two boxes or 1,200 rounds, ■which with, the packsaddle, cover, straps etc., weigh 206 lbs. or nearly 15 stone, exclusive of forage, picketing gear, blankets, and grooming necessaries. Each division of 7 battalions has a divisional ammunitio7% column (in charge of the artillery of the division to which it is attached), which for mancou\Ting purjDoses is divided into two sub-divisions, each composed partly of artillery ammuni- tion wagons, and partly of infantry ammunition carts. These sub-divisions carry between them a divisional reserve of 40 rounds of rifle ammunition per man. The carts are the same as those attached to battalions. The army corpsammunitioncolumn is organized in three sections, each carrying a full supply for one divisional ammunition column (that is, 30 rounds per man of small arm ammunition). Although these sections are, as a ride, kept together, j'et this sub-division was instituted so that any division sent off on detached duty can, when desirable, take its second line of ammunition supply with it. This anny corps ammunition supply is under the corps artillery commander. The small arms ammunition in it is carried in wagons and not carts. Ammunition, dcpdfs, containing at least 320 rounds per rifle in the field, are organized in rear imder the Ordnance Department. Thus wo see that there is no special or separate provision for the corps artillery, or oven for the divisional artillery, as pre- vails abroad, but as th(>ro are three divisions in an English aruiy corps, each divisional ammunition column carries one- third of tlu! artiUory sup])li(>s for the corps artillery in addition to thos(> for tlic divisional artillery. This is a very defective arrangement, because if one division is detached with its aiiiiiimiitioii column, it tak(>s with it onc^-third of the su]>plies for the cor])s artillery which remains with the oilier two divisitms. The Frencli, (Teniiau, or Austrian subdivision, which allots a distinct section or unit to the divisional infantry, to the divisional artilli-ry, and to the corps artillery, is much to lie jirelcrred. Willi regaid to the mode of conveying the ammunition, wlu'thor on wlieels or on pack animals, it is a. question to be df-r-ided by comnion-seiise and the nature ol" iho roads. If the roads are grxid enough, wheeh'd frans]»ort is a saving of horses, uttondantH, foorl, &c., because a 2-horsed cart carries at least as much as eight pack animals. Tf the roads are bad and carts cannot tr.'i\cl, piicl< nninialH must be used. 299 Where small forces are engaged, as in our savage wars, they cannot protect the zone of territory in rear for any distance, and hence the ammunition supplies, beyond those of the battalion, must be kept close to the force. They are usually called the "second reserve of ammunition," the immediate battalion supply being designated the "first reserve of ammunition." In Afghanistan the ammunition provided and kept up in the field was, for cavalry and sappers, 200 rounds per man ; for infantry, 500 rounds per man ; and for the artillery, 500 rounds per gun. The rifle and carbine ammunition was thus distributed : cavalry and sappers carried 40 rounds on their persons, and the infantry 70 rounds. The infantiyhad a first reserve of 30 rounds per man, which accompanied each battalion ; the cavalry and sappers had no first reserve. In the second reserve, the infantry had 200 rounds per man ;* cavalry and sappers, 60 rounds per man. In the stationary "ordnance field park reserve," there were, for infantry, 200 rounds per man ; and for cavalrj^ and sappers, 100 rounds per man. All except the last reserves were carried on mules. In Ashantee, where both wheeled transport and pack animals Avere out of the question, each infantry soldier carried his 70 rounds, and a battalion reserve of 50 rounds per man was carried by coolies under a non-commissioned officer, each coolie riarrying one box on his head. A further reserve in addition to this, of at first 50, and subsequenth* 70, rounds per man, was carried by similar means, and had its place in the column of route under the charge of the artillery. As some of the troops fired away 100 to 120 rounds in the bush fight- ing, they had to be supplied during the action, and as the boxes took some time to open, because the lids were then screwed down, the boxes of both the battalion and first reserve of ammunition were kept unscrewed. Thus we see that all the different armies echelon their ammunition in much the same manner, although the distribu- tion of tlie ammunition in the different echelons is not the same. The battalion and other supplies form successi-\e magazines of ammunition. Evidently no ammunition beyond that carried in the arm}' corps ammunition columns can be immediately available on a battle field ; and, indeed, only the leading echelons of these columns can be so. In the following * This large supply was necessitated by the fact that the marching columns were frequently several days' marches away from any stationary depot of ammunition fi'om which any fresh supply could he obtained. 300 table the ammxinition supplies for replenisliing the army corps columns, being- a matter of ordinary supply, will not be considered. Calling the various echelons by the names of those corresponding to them in the English organisation, we see that the distribution of the ammunition, in the different European armies, is as follows : — Method by which the Ammunition is carried. Supply of Cartridges for Combatant. ■if ^1 Remarks By the men* In battalion wagons Total of first supply for I fighting line. . . ... ) In divisional or first line of \ ammunition columns ) General Total of supply for ) field of battle j In army corps or second line ] (if animiinition columns 100 38-4 168 29-5 78 18-1 100 35 70 30+ 46-4 48 184 13 30 t A further supply of 11 "5 rounds per man is carried in the German ser- vice, and 10 rounds per man in the English sci-vice, in the company or battalion baggage wagons, but which may not be avail- able on the battle- field. Tlicr-i- iimnlicrs are liascd on tlu; l)attaliou being at full ■s(rciij^tli, liut if we consider the men a])seut fromtlie ranks in war timo from sickness, wounds, or deaths, and that the car- • Thu.s tlic woiglit of Miiiimmitidn canicil liy tho men of dilTcront ii.'itioiiH arc as followH : — liv the (Icnimn HcjMicr ,, French ,, ,, Austrian ., ,, ]iUHsiun ,, ,, Kui^Ush In (i.O. 101, of OctobiT, 1887, it h stated that when tho new small- lioro rifle (0-20H inly ])c us(>d, and that, even in the most hotly contested actions, all the troops present are rarely engaged, so that the supplies carried for these can, if required, be utilised by the troops firing, Ave find that with ordinary precautions for suppl\-ing the men, each man may be supposed to have from 120 to 150 rounds at his disposal in action, and have a further supply ready f(n' him at the end of the day. The Eussians say that each soldier requires 120 cartridges at least to be on him, to carry him through an action. The officers commanding battalions are responsible for the ammunition carried bj- the men and in the battalion wagons ; th(^ artillery is responsible for the first and second lines of ammunition supplies ; the depot supplies in the English service are in the charge of the Ordnance Department. There can be no doubt that if long range fire is not used, if a rigid fii-e discipline is maintained, and if the troops are only pushed forward within the medium zone, after an efficient artUJeri) preparation^ 70 to 100 rounds are sufficient to carry out an attack. But if long range fire is used, with no tire discipline, and the troops are pushed forward to close ranges before the necessarj- artillery preparation is completed, then no limit can be piit on the number of rounds that will be expended, but past experience shows that long- range fire is only permissible when the immediate available supply of ammunition is at least ecj^ual to 120 rounds per man, and the means of replenishing the expended ammunition comparatively easy and ample. Rules for Replexishing Expended Ammi'xitiox. The above supplies of ammunition only S(jlve half tlu' problem of replenishing the spent ammunition. The cartridges are on the battle field, more or less near the men according to the ground, and especially according to the circumstances of the tight. It now remains to consider how to render them available for the troops engaged — i.e., how to transport them from the echelons in rear to the echelons in fi'ont. This is the most difficidt part of the problem, and the following remarks will show how the various Continental nations hope to solve it. GrERMANY. — The company ammunition wagons are to place 302 tliemselves, from the begiiining- of the action, close to the troops which they have to supply, and in as sheltered a place as possible. A non-commissioned otticer always remains with each wagon, and shows its situation at once by means of a white flag" with a black square in the middle, placed to one side and at a distance fromthe wagon, on a spot where it can be easily seen. At night this flag is replaced by a green lantern. This flag or lantern simply shows a depot of supply, and it is laid down as a principle that any troops engaged are to be supplied from any wagon whatever. If circumstances require it, the connection between the battalion and its ammunition wagons may be assured hj mounted orderlies. As soon as the battalion has taken position and the action begins, two or three men per company and a non-com- missioned officer, told off beforehand, who have been previously exercised in this duty, proceed to the wagons and take off tlieir knapsacks, and an^'thing that will hinder tJieir move- ment, as they ought to have no other occupation than that of fulfiUing the duty with whidi they are charged. Tlie non-commissioned officer, who has charge of the men gives to each of them a canvas bag capable of carrying 500 cartridges (44 lbs.) which is considered the limit of weight whicli one man can cany to a considerable distance or over difficult ground. Tiny tlien return to the engaged companies, distribute the ammunition tluy carry, return without orders, and c(mtiniu> tliis coming and going as long as necessary. Latterly, liowcvcr, tlic Germans and Austriuns have con- sidered that no reliance is to be placed on schemes for supplying attacking troo}>s in this way with fresh ammunition during the final stages of an action — i.e., under 500 yards. They consider further tliat 24 lbs. weiglit, or 12 packets of 20 rounds each, or 240 rounds in all, is all that a man can be reason- ably expected to carry. Each of his journeys Avould take at least thirty minutes, going and r(>turning from the fighting line to the second lin(>, when^ the battalion ammunition wagons are supposed to be stationed. Assuming that the tiring line of a <(»nipany, in an attack, is sujjplied with aiiimunition by means of from three to six cai'riei's (one or two }ier "ziig"), lliree such men, for example, will bo able in fhirfy minutes fo convey to the fighting line only 720 cartridges, or say four cartridges for each man of the ronijtany. From this it is dear how great are the efforts, and how long is the time required to rei)lenish the ammunition, 303 which can be expended in less than a minute, even with vevy deliberate firing. Therefore, on the offensive, tlio men ought to be fully supplied with ammunition especiaUi/ before the attack heginfi, and the carriers should begin their work as soon as the firing has commenced, in order to prevent as far as possible the ammuni- tion running short, because a sufficient swpply for infantry is a necessity for its very existence, and consequently such a condition must be accorded a complete and ample satisfaction. When previously-selected positions have to be defended, it is laid down that small depots of ammunition are to be established along the line. The replenishing of the ammunition ought to be assured beforehand on the defensive by supplies brought up close to the troops who fire ; on the offensive, the f idl supply of ammunition must be served out before throwing the troops forward in the attack ; under fire, also, the cartridges of the killed and wounded should be utilized. It is reported that the Germans have decided to serve out 20 cartridges extra to each man before he enters into action, pockets being specially made in the tunics to receive the supply. More ammunition may be given to men on the defensive than in the attack, because they can lay it on the ground. As a general rule the battalion wagons may be expected to be within 880 yards of its battalion in action ; the wagons of a regiment (three battalions) or a brigade (two regiments) may be collected together if necessary; and if the case is urgent, an ammunition wagon can be taken at full gallop up to the lighting line. All troops engaged have the right to supply themselves at the wagons situated nearest to them, whether they belong to them or not. The battalion wagons are replenished by the first echelon of the army corps ammunition colimm. The battaHon adjutant is especially charged with looking out that the sei"\'iee of supply is well carried out. Directl}- a wagon is empty it ought to be at once sent to the nearest echelon of the ammunition column, and exchange its empty boxes for full ones. But as this method of proceeding may cause a delay in the supply, the commander of the first ammunition echelon can, if he thinks ht, and must, if he receives the order, send some of his wagons to the points where the ammunition seems to be becoming quickly consumed from the amount of hre, so that an empty ammunition wagon 304 may be rapidly replaced by a full one, while it goes to the tirst echelon to be refilled, and then returns. The empty wagons of the first echelon are sent as soon as possible in gi'oups of foiu" or five under a non-commisioned officer to the second echelon of the arm}' corps ammunition column, where they remain temporarily. In theii' place an equal number of full wagons are sent to the first echelon from the second. "WTien an ammunition wagon goes to be refilled, a provisional receipt is given for the ammunition taken ; but a regular oue is given later on when the supply is regularly replaced after the action. Fkance. — In a regiment (of three battalions) the personnel specially told olf to the battalion wagons includes a chief artificer, who is mounted, and is charged with the general superintendence of all the regimental wagons ; a non-com- missioned officer and two soldiers are furtlier told off to each battalion wagon, who mount on the wagons when only these latter are moving rapidly. The r('i)lt'nishing of the supply carried by the troops themselves is only made from the wagons after all the cartridges, taken away from any dead, wounded, or other men for any reason, have been used up. The battalion wagon is refilled as soon as possible by the ammunition ])arks, on the order of the battalion commandant. The cartridges of men placed hors de comhat are carefully collected for distribution among the c(mibatants; any in excess, after completing the individual supply, is placed in the baggage wagons, or in wallets carefully tied up; cart- ridges are only returned to the ammunition parks, when there is no means of carrying them with the corps. On th(( field of liattle tlic battalion wagons are kept together rcgiiiicntally ; f)nly exceptionally do they accompany their respectivi' l^attnlions. Their position is assigned to them liy the officer commanding the regiment or battalion, and they lire, as far as possi})le, to keep themselves concealed from the \ ie\v of the enemy, 'i'liey sliould not be more than 1,100 yards from the firing line, luit tliis distanc«; may be decreased whe)i cover is uvailnlth' : in all ciises they must keep as near as ]»ossilile to the firing line. At critical moments the ((inimanding (illieer may direct tliem to be moved up rapidly tn the tiring line. 'J'jieir position is marked by day ))y a yellow flag, placed, as far as possible, well to n fl.-ink, so thiit it may not iifford a mark for the enemy; and at 305 nig-lit by a yellow liglit.-'' On tlio field of battle, Lorses ro(]uired to replace tliose in the battalion wagons are drawn from the ammunition sections, on the order of the general of tlie division, or, in cases of urgency, of the brigadier. One or more extra jiackets of cartridges are to be issued to the men before joining the firing line, and every favourable moment, every pause in the fight, eveiy lessening of the enemy's fire, &c., is to be seized for renewing the sujDply. In important defensive positions, depots of ammunition may be established along the line, and even the battalion wagons may be posted there, provided cover can be obtained for them. Obtaining ammunition by sending men for it from the front, is absolutely forbidden : it is to be brought from the wagons to the tiring line by men taken from the reserve companies, told off for the purpose : no man is to be taken from the firing line for this purpose. Each of the men, told off for the duty of supply, carries a double wallet, twelve of which are in each wagon. In the double wallet 56 packets of cartridges are placed. The weight of a wallet thus loaded is about 37 lbs., and it is carried slung over the shoulder, one pocket in front, the other behind. If time presses, the bundles of 28 packets, in which these packets are made up, need not be opened before jdacing the packets in the wallets, but the brealdng up is preferable. The bearers of the wallets distribute the packets of cartridges among the men firing, returning to the wagons for a fresh supply when the contents of the wallets are exhausted. If a battalion wagon has to supply troops other than those to which it is attached, the non-commissioned officer in charge of the wagon makes the issue on a voucher, or, in default of one, on a simple memorandum, even written in pencil, but signed by the commanding officer of the battalion, and bearing the number of the company, battalion and regiment to which the ammunition is issued, the amount of the demand, and the rank and signature of the individual making the requisition. As a rule, when the battalion wagons are grouped together, one is emptied before any ammunition is issued from another ; the chief artificer, being responsible for the replenishment of his supply, must consequently know where the nearest ammunition section is * The small arm aramimition sections in rear have the same yellow coloured flags and hmtems ; the artillery ammunition sections have blue flags and lanterns to distinguish them U 306 posted, and take care tliat the non-comnussioned officers in charge of the wagons are also acquainted with its where- abouts. As soon as a wagon is near!}- emptied, the remainder of its contents is placed in the wallets, and the chief artificer sends to the nearest ammunition section for a full wagon. This is brought uji by a corporal, and its contents transferred to the empty battalion wagon, the non-commissioned officer in charge of the latter giving a receipt, specifying the nature of the ammunition delivered to him, and the hour at which he received it. The empty wagon then returns to the ammunition section from whicli it came. The first echelon of the army corps park ouglit to be suffi- ciently near tlie troops to be able to f iiruisli them, without delay, with the ammimition they reipiire. Unless otherwise stated, its position will be about l.GOO yards in rear of the tiring line, the sections being placed as near to the troops, to which they are allotted, as the roads allow of. They are only to remain on the roads in case of necessity, and must leave them as soon as sufficient openings and the necessary ramps have been made. Tlie divisional and corps artillery <'ommanders are to be informed of their arrival as soon as possible. Each infantry section is indicated by a yellow flag, and each artillery section by a hlue flag by day, and at night by lamps of tlie same colour. After an fiction, the ammunition sections are directed on ]((»ints designated as "di.stribution centrc^s," in order to carry nut tlie general su])ply. Empty wagons are sent in groups for this purpos(>, untU'r an officer. Tlie supply is to be made liy moving the ammunition from one wagon to another, and not by an excliange of wagons, wliieh is only to be done as rarely as possible. Cavalry divisions are to l)o supplied by any ammunition section appealed to. Every demand for ammunition is to ])0 satisfied, (*ven when made by strange corps. The second eclielon (jf tlie army corps park is tt) be kept, as a rule, a day's march in rear of tin* troops, 1)ut during a battle il will be brought up nearer to the first echelon. Its sections always march united, and forma single " distribution centre", at which the eni]»fy wagons of the first echelon are refilled. The eni])ty wagons of tint second echelon an; sent in large groups to the nearest anny ])ark for refilling, the j)()sition of which should have Iji-en ])reviousIy made known to it by the com- niandcr t»f llii' corjis artillery. Similarly, the commanders of the echelons of the uiniy park should know the positions of 307 the second echelon of the army corps park, so as to put them- selves in communication with it. The second echelon of the army corps park has to satisfy all demands for ammunition, by whomsoever made. Any commander in an independent position can send a written requisition (even in pencil) for ammvmition, but his demand should not exceed his immediate wants, as he can send for a further supply if necessary. Even if a demand is made without a written reqiiest, it must be acceded to, but a receipt is to be taken. In order not to break up the bundles of ammunition, the nearest nvmiber of bundles to the demand made is sent, but an insufficient supply will allow of less ammunition being- sent than the demand asked for, and a receipt for the actual amount taken is to be given. Requisitions are to be satisfied by whatever echelon or park they are presented to. Immediatelyafter a battle, "states" are to be sent in, showing the amount of ammunition required to re-establish the normal supply. Similar " states" are to be sent in every five days. AusTKiA-HuNGARY. — The following information has been taken from the jff (>«•«(? Militairc de V Etr anger iov loth December, 1887. It is pointed out that while the infantry has been given increased resources in ammunition, yet the Austrians try to avoid a useless consumption of ammunition by giving each soldier a particularly careful instruction in what concerns fire discipline. (See Chap. XV.) Tliis question, which actually forms one of the principal pre-occupations of the chief commanders, and on which the Emperor himself has many times questioned the officers of the corps he has inspecteil, has been made the object of a special appendix to the drill regidations of the infantry. But in spite of these precautions it is considered that the expenditure of ammunition will be considerable, and hence the following rides have been laid down both for completing the supply carried on the men and for replenishing the ammunition expended. The commanders of regiments and battalions are responsible that the ammunition carried by the men is always complete, and that it is completed when necessary. "WTien an engagement is expected, each man is to have given him, before starting on the march, or during a halt, 20 supplementary rounds, di-awn from the company Avagons ; each non-commissioned officer will receive at the same time, the number of cartridges normally allotted to the men. The aunnunitiou Avagons always accompany the troops, u 2 308 During an action, the auimnuition wagons remain, n.s a general rule, near their battalions. If any companies are detached, they are accompanied by their wagons. The wagons of a regiment or gi-oup of battalions, can be coUeeted under the commander of these troops in a single column, and placed imder the command of an officer. As soon as the combat has begun, the ammunition wagons advance, without waiting for orders, close to the reserve of their battalion, and follow its movements, taking advantage while so doing of all cover, and avoiding exposiu-e. AVhen the reserve enters the tiring line, the wagons come up as close as possible, as near as the shelter atforded by the ground permits. When the decisive action has been pronuunced they will advance, and rejoin the battalion as soon as they can. The movement of columns, formed of all the wagons of a regiment, or of any group of battalions whatever, will be regulated on the same principles. The situation of the wagons is shewn, during the day, by a red flag, which in an action must not be placed where it will attract the enemy's attention. The wagons will bo faced to the rear, and if they are exposed to artillery fire they will be placed at intei-vals of 20 paces. In the offensive, as soon as the battalion takes the forma- tion for comT)at, the leading companies will tell off six to eight men, if possible from among the buglers, drummers, or infantrj' jjioneers, wlio will proceed to the wagons imder a non-comniissionod ollici'r. They are then each given a haver- sack coutaining ^00 to -100 cartridges, which they carry back to their (cmipanies. 'J'lic su])se(|uent replenishing of the ammunition is ordered })y the commander of the battalion, or regiment, or group. Tlie suiiplenieiitary cartridges ar(> generally larried to the firing line by the troojts reinforcing it ; this duty can also be coniidrd 1o the carci of small detachments sent forward to the firing line under a non-commissioncnl officer, and who remain there. Tlie eiigagf'd companies jirofit by any pauses in the combat lo replenish their expended ammunition, and to equalise the Hup]ily of ammunition l)et\v('en tln^ men of the same company. Tlie men are to take t]i(> ammunition of tin* dead and wounded, and to distril)ute it among their comrad(!S. In tln' defensive, ("specially in the defence of inhabited places or organised positions, the aninuniilion wagons can Ite emptied, oven before the commencement of the combat, and 309 the contonts distrihutocl, or ratlior placed near the front lino at certain favourable points. Tin; quartermaster-sergeants {les sous-officicrs comptablefi) are charged with the loading of the wagons, witli the distribution of tlie ammunition, and with the replenishing of the wagons at the divisional park. In each battalion, the senior among tliem takes command ; he is responsible for the leading of the column during the combat — the others are at his disposal ; \w employs them to maintain the connection with the reserve, to reconnoitre the ground, roads, &c. He is advised by the battalion commander as to the situation of the divisional park. In distributing the ammunition, the rear cases of tlie first wagon are first emptied, and then the front ones*'; each wagon must be completely emptied before the nest one is drawn on. The empty wagons are formed in column by corps of troops, and taken to the divisional park, where the empty cases are exchanged for full ones. In exceptional cases, in which stn-eral Avagons of a battalion (or of a regiment) have T)een drawn on at the same time, as many wagons will be filled up as possible from the remaining supplies, and then only the empty ones will be sent to the divisional park. A\Tien a strange corps demands ammunition, the demand is to be acceded to, wholly or in part, according to tlie urgency, and to the amount of tlie supply. The quartermaster-sergeant attached to each wagon is to keep an account of the number of cartridges distributed, both to his own and to strange corps ; the issues are to be made, however, without written demands or receipts. These instructions present three particularly interesting points. {a) The distribution of a supplement of 20 cartridges before entering the fight, making the personal supply 120 rounds, — an excellent measure, which increases the confidence of the soldier, and allows the fire to be given all the energy possible, ixoiii the beginning of the action. f * The reason of this is in case any of the horses are killed or wounded, and a retreat has to be made rapidly, or if some ammunition has to he rapidly sent to troops in a critical position, then the rear part can- he unlimbered, and the horses can gallop away willi the fore part. Thus, in case of retreat, some of the ammunition is saved, the enemy only capturing the empty rear parts. t The Austrians were the first to institute this precaution. Their example has been since followed by both the French and Germans. 310 (b) The replenishing of the ammunition by the troops of the supports, who carry it forward with them, and distribute it. This method of proceeding woidd certainly bo best of all, if it coidd be proved, firstly, that the troops of the support always moved up to the troops iu the firing line requiring to be supplied, for it often happens that this line is rein- forced by extending it, or by sending the supports into the gaps, and secondly, that a soldier would consent, when once in the tiring line, to give wp for the profit of liis neighbours a part of the ammunition which he carries. This latter point can be practically got over by discipline, and training the men to the idea of mutual co-operation, and by giving them more ammunition than they can conveniently hold while using their rifles. It has, however, in all cases, the great merit of not taking men from the firing linos, and if it is not always applicable j-et such a practice will be very useful in many cases. (c) The direct subordination of the ammunition wagons to th(^ battalion and regimental commander. Russia. — The latest Russian regulations for the supply of infantry ammunition in battle appeared in June, 1880. The substance of them is as follows : — At the moment when the troops cput the formation in column of route, in order to take tlie formation of assembly, the company (or squadron) ammunition wagons, which immediately follow tlie troops, form up 20 paces behind their regiments or battalions in one line or in two lines, 15 j)ac(>s apart. Tlie intfu'val between the wagons is two or throe paces. Tf, iTi tlie fonnation of assembly, the battalions are formed up in line, the ammunition wagons ar(> posted as above; but if, on tlie contrary, tlie regiments or battalions are formed up one behind the other in column, then according to tho orders of the commander of the colmun, tli»> ammunition wagons will be posted either immediately bi-hind the fraction to which they belong, ns above, or in rear of tho column in several distinct lines, ]r» paces ajtart. Th(> wagons of each regiment (or is(»latc(l battalion) will form one line only. At llie niomenl when llic fro(»ps pass from Ili(> formation of asHcnibly to the fonnafion ol' combat, the commanders of the different units give some general instructi(ms to tlii^ ordnance iflViccrnfo/firrrs (ViiDncmruf J in charge as to the position to be taken u]» by the ammunition wag(ms, according to the ground and the exigencies of the eonibiit. In open ground they ought 311 not to be further from the liriug line than the regimental reserves (third line) ; if, on the contrary, the ground offers any shelter, they can be placed behind the battalions of the ■second line, and even belaind the companies forming the battalion reserves of the first line. According to the nature of the combat or of the gi'onnd they can also be apportioned between the battalions. The ordnance officer in charge of the wagons is to post them as much as possible under shelter from fire, while con- forming to the orders he has received from the commander of the troops. He must inform this commander of the place chosen, who in tium informs the officers under his orders. During the action the ordnance officer must remain near liis wagons, and take every means to'satisfv' all the demands for ammunition coming from the fij-ing line. Also he must follow the coiu'se of the engagement, and in the case when, from the circumstances of the fight, he has not received in good time the order from the commander of the troops, he must not hesitate to take on himself to advance or retire the wagons, according to the new conditions of the fight, in order to be always able to fiu'nish ammunition everywhere where it is necessary. If the wagons are apportioned to battalions, they are posted and moved according to the orders of the battalion com- mander, who tells off a non-commissioned officer to lead them. The same remark applies to a detached battalion or company. The wagons then pass under the ordcn-s of the commanders of these units and follow them. When possible, a mounted non-commissioned officer of the regimental train should be chosen to command the wagons of a battalion. If this is not possible, a senior non-commissioned officer is chosen, and the r6le he plays is the same as that of the ordnance officer. The position taken up by the ammunition wagons is marked by day by a red flag, and by night by a green lantern. These signals should be so placed as not to draw the fii'e of the enemy on the wagons. In the offensive, according as the ground permits, the wagons join the engaged units, or remain in rear. Thus they can be taken to the reserve battalion of the regiment, or to the companies forming the battalion reserve, or even to the firing line. If they cannot at once join the fij-ing line, the replenish- ing is carried out by successive demands made on the units in rear, who in turn are supplied by the troops in rear of them 312 ov by tlie ammTiiiitlon wagons, if these are not too distant. Tlit^ ammunition of the dead and wounded is also to he utilised. These measures are only to ho taken when it is not possible for the engagcod troops to supply themselves directly t'rom the -wagons. "When a xmit is near any wagons and receives a demand for ammunition, it will direct the men sent for the supply to the wagons. The Commandin- of any troops who require anmiunition, sends 2 or 3 men to the commanders of the units nearest in rear of him. These commanders immediately make their men give up lialf the ammunition that they carrj-, and they also furnish the necessary number of men required to carry them to the troops who need them. As a rule 6 to 10 men, com- manded by a non-commissioned officer, can carry the cartridges necessary for a company. If this ammunition is taken from the wagons, it is carried in the zinc boxes or bags which form part of the system of supply. In default of bags the men can use the hoods and skirts of their cloaks. When they reach the fractions to be supplied, they distribute the cartridges they have brought up, and remain under the orders of the commanders of these fractions. This measure ]irevents a too-frequent coming and going between the different xmits. Furthermore, for greater ci'rtaint}', before taking the fonnation for combat, the men who are to be first di>ployed should be given a certain number of packets of cartridges, which are taken from the ammunition wagons, and which the men put in their pockets. Every demand for ammunition is to be satisfied, whoever may be the troops from whom it emanates. in order to reph>nish the wagons themselves, they are directed, according as they become emptj'-, on the second grouji of the regimental train, at the head of which march the 8 ammunition wagons told olV to the companies and the general regimental reserve. In th(' case of a defensive coudtat, the cartridges are earned lieforehaTid to a favourable ])oiiit of the position. It is the fluty of the ordnance olficer to secure all the ammunition that has not been used up when the troops pass from tlu; defensive to the olfeiisive. Such are tlie reginniitnl dispositions in vogue in the Russian Army for solving the and the Austri;in regulations soeni to Inivo a very practical cliaractir. Sjiccinl all'iitioii is drawn to tlie method of supply, since 313 introduced into the Enp^lish regulations, of drawing on the troops in rear, and of taking the precaution, at th(! cuiumence- ment of the action, to immediately increase the quantity of ammunition carried by the men who are first to open fire. Before the ahove regulations appeared, the Russians practised various methods, two of which are given below. Before the action begins, each company detaches two men who accompany its wagon, and are charged witli the supply of their company. These men carry the cartridges in bags close up to the firing line, one man carrying the ammunition, and the other man the two rifles, and the next journey they change duties. The ammunition bags are emptied on the ground, at a point indicated by the captain, and the men come and take their cartridges from the heap. Such a method of procedure as the above is likely to occasion great disorder in the firing line, and a downiight waste of ammunition. In 1884 another metliod was tried. When the ofRcer in command of the company firing line noticed that the ammimition was running short, he made a bugler sound the "Fire rapidlj^" which had been previously arranged was to signify " Send forward ammunition." All the buglers of the reserve repeated this call, at which signal the officer commanding the company reserve told off two to four men, to whom the remainder of the men of the reserve"'-' gave some of their packets of cartridges. These men placed the packets in the pockets of their tunics, trousers, and gi-eat (^oats, and in their ca2}s, and advanced as much as possible towards the centre of the different extended sections ; they laid down about ten paces in rear of the firing line, and cried out " Cartridges." They then threw the packcits to the section commanders, who in turn threw them to the men in the firing line without getting up. The men who brought Tip the cartridges did not return, but joined the firing line, placing themselves under the orders of the nearest section conmiander. In this manner the supply was carried out in from seven to ten minutes. Tliis method seems to merit some consideration. But the repeated bugle calls seem a bad institution, as the engaged companies can always communicate with the reserve by means of signals and connecting links, and if the enemy knew the custom and heard the call, they might especially * Presumably during the practice there was no ammunition -wagon present, from which this ammunition would have been taken in preference. 314 direct their fire on the men whom they see bringing up the ammunition. Each company in the Eussian army has a small flag of a particular colour, for the guidance of the men who supply the ammunition, so that they can easily find again the com- pany they have to supply, and the white flag of the ammunition wagons shows them the direction to be taken to get to it. j?he battalion comniander is charged with the duty of ensuring the supply of his companies with ammunition. A mounted man of the regimental train accompanies him for the purpose of establishing, if necessary, a connection between the battalion and the wagons. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, in the moun- tainous country in which the Eussian army had to fight, the four-wheeled ammunition wagons, used by them, did not give the results expected from them. They were found too climisy and unmanageable, and many Eussian writers demanded that the tA'pe of wagon should be considerably lightened, and that the system of supply of ammunition on the battle field should be much modified. This has been done, and the regulations given above have been largety based on their suggestions. General Zcddcler has wi'itten best on the sub- ject, especially with regard to securing the supply cm the battle tielcl l)y nu'aus of pack animals. He stated that the ammuni- tion should bo carried in liglit two-wheeled carts, drawn by tliree horses side by side, and that aU the carts of a regiment should be divided into two sections, one of them being always with the regiment and the other in rear of the cohunn with the second line vf artillery wagons, which has since been done. Some German and Eussian ■wi'iters (General Zeddeler among them) think that eitlier two or more pack aninuils should accompany each battalion wagon, or that the harness of the draught horses should be capable of being used for pack ]»urposes, and that two cases, capable of carrying 1,000 cartridges eacli, sliould be provided for each pack animal ; tlio horses taken out of the shafts an^ for carrrying the ammunition (if there are no special pack animals for this ])Ui1)ose) to a more advanced point than ilie amnuinitiou cai-ts or wag«jns can 1»e taken, either singly or in groups, under a non-commissioned officer. Kach horse should have a man to lead it, and if a horse is killed, the nuin with it must remain near it until another horse is brought up, III- until the men who liave to cairy tlie rartridges to the < ojufiatanis ('((me up and remove tlieiu. 315 The Russian authorities have apparently acted on the above suggestions, for in the official work on The Armed Strength of Russia (p. 258), we read that to convey the ammunition from the wagons to the firing line, "the cartridges are sent forward in bags secured to hooks on the harness of the outside horses (driven four abreast), which are thus temporarily used as pack horses. A horse carries six bags, each containing 24 packets of cartridges." The Grerman authorities have apparentlj' decided to act in a similar manner, for in the Revue Militaire de VEtranger (No. 572), we find that "the supply of ammunition to the firing line is no longer to be carried out by means of carriers. This method has been recognised as completel}^ inefficacious, and the two leading draught horses of the battalion ammunition wagon will be employed instead. Each horse will carr}^ two boxes of 1,000 rounds each." These horses will only be taken as far as the supports of the firing line, who will carry forward the supply for the men firing. Greneral Zeddeler recommends that the position of the battalion reserves shoidd, in the first instance, be near the site selected for attending to the wounded men of the battalion, as the constant communication between this spot and the front, would facilitate the supply. Turkey. — In 1877-78, the Turks effected their replenishing of ammunition by means of pack animals carrying 2,000 roimds each in 2 zinc-lined boxes, which were led by the men of the battalion right up to the firing line. This method was per- missible, from the bad fire of the Russians, who were armed with a \eTj inferior weapon, but it is doubtful whether such a plan coidd be carried out against a European foe with modern fire tactics. The men themselves carried little but fuod and ammunition, and so managed to carry 120 to 150 rounds of ammunition ( 1 3 to 15 lbs. in weight) each on their persons. England. — Until 1887 the English regulations were quite .silent concerning the connection which exists between the engaged troops and the battalion ammunition carts. But this has now been remedied by Gr.O. for October, 1887, which appears t(i be supplementary to the Gr.O. of July, 1878. Commanding officers of battalions are responsible for the 110 rounds per man in regimental charge, and they must take eveiy opportunity to fill up, as required, from the divisional columns. Officers commanding the Eoyal Artillery of divisions and ami}- corps, are responsible to the general officers conmiandiug 316 flivisions, &c., for the 70 rounds pcrriflo in their ammunition columns. Tliey will till up from tho (Ordnance reserves whenever any ammimitiou has been drawn from their columns l>y officers commanding battalions, &c. The position of the divisional and army corps ammiuiition columns on the line of march is settled by general officers commanding diWsions and araiy corps. Commanding officers of battalions must be kept infomied where those columns are. The position of the regimental reserves is settled by generals of brigades. As a rule, two small-arm ammunition carts and the two mules will follow immediately behind each battalion, and tlio rest of the small-arm ammunition carts will follow the brigadi'. (If pack animals only are used, a similar distribution will be made.) Before going into action, the oflicer commanding each battalion will select a moimtcd officer to have charge of the regimental reserve ammunition, and a warrant officer, or staff-sergeant and the pioneers, to bo detailed to assist him. This mounted officer will superintend the issue of ammunition from the regimental reserve to the company carriers, and arrange for its conveyance to those engaged in the fighting line. Tlie cai)tain of every company on service will detail one non-commissioned officer and two privates to act when required as ammunition carriers (if the company is strong, thi-ee privates sliould be detailed). Only men of proved courage, strength, and activity should be selected for this duty, the importance of which cannot be over-rated. "Whenever a general action is anticipated, the whole of the ammunition reserves will be dosed up as much as possible, and commanding officers will issue to the men the 10 rounds from the regiiuental baggage wagons. The regimental arrangement for filling up the men's pouches imm(>diately befijn* and during an action will bo as f'oHowH : — ^\'Ilon a battalion is aliuut to attack, the oflS.cer commanding will order the issue of extra ammunition, so that, if possible, every num shall carry 100 i-ounds on liis jktsou. This anmiunition will bi« distributed by the carriers, assisted by ])ioneerH and supernumeraries. After tlio issue tlie carriers will join tlio regimental ammunition reserve. If for any reason tlio regimi'utal ammunition reserve is not close at haml, the fighting and su[)itorting bodies will be furnished with two extra packets per man from the main body. This 817 will be replaced as soon as possible from the regimeutal reserve. The position of the regimental reserves iu action will be one small-arm ammimition cart and one mule immediately in rear of each haK battalion, and the other small-arm ammuni- tion carts close at hand in rear of the centre. During the action, communication will be kept up between the carts and the fighting line, partly by means of the mules, and partly by means of one non-commissioned officer and two privates detailed by the captain of each company to act as carriers. These carriers will bring the ammunition from the mule (or from the cart) in bags, and distribute it to the men in the ranks. The bags, which are specially made for the piu'j)ose, form part of the equipment of the ammunition cart. Immediately these extra issues are made, the regimental reserve will be filled up by drawing from the nearest ammuni- tion column. The mounted officer will use his own discretion as to the time when he should send forward the carriers of tlie companies engaged with two packets for every man of their companies. The loads are not to exceed 40 lbs. to each carrier, and, when advisable, the cai-riers will be led up to the supporting and fighting lines in action by the warrant officer (or staff-sergeant). AVhen still more ammunition is required by the fighting line in action, it will be taken forward under command of the mounted officer, the pioneers, band or any men at hand fi-om the main body acting as carriers. The officer will leave his horse before he enters the zone of aimed-fire and proceed with the ammunition to its destination. The carriers will move direct to the companies for which they are destined, according to the rules which govern an advance under fire. On arriving at the fighting line they will distril)ute the anmiunition to tlie supernumerary rank, and remain with thuir companies, unk-ss otherwise ordered. Supernumeraries in the fighting line must ensure that not more than a few rounds are taken to the rear by any efficient soldier who may be sent back ; and that all ammunition from the killed and wounded is distributed to the fighting and supporting lines. The system of carrying ammunition by hand herein pro- vided for is not to excuse every endeavour being made to pusli forward as far as practicable the reserve ammunition carts, for if they be skilfully and boldly handled by the officer in 318 (liarge, tln-y ought, imiler ordinary clrciimstniiocs, to g-et withm 1,000 yards of the fighting Hue in action, and on broken and undidating gronnd oonsiderahly nearer. Tlie immense importance of liaving a supply of ammunition out of sight of the enemy and yet witliin easy tlistance of the fighting line, "will justify' gi-eat risks being incurred in gaining such a position. It is the duty of the brigade staff to ensure that the emptied regimental ammunition transport are replaced by others fi'om the reserve massed with the brigade column, but to save time all regimental ammunition transport when emptied, must at once proceed to the nearest di%'isional ammimition column to refill, and then at once retm-n to its position in rear of the troops engaged. Ofiicers and Iniglers sliould, during the fight, keep them- selves supplied with at least 40 roimds each to distribute when necessary. The regulations of July 1878 state that the divisional ammunition colimin will be placed, during an action, (me to two miles in rear of the troops. Its Commander, in taking up position, has to see that his wagons and carts do not obstruct the line of conununication, while securing facility for sending his sxipplies to the front. He has to reconnoitre the roads and patlis leading to the fi'ont, and keep himself informed of any change in the progress of the action, and of the movements of the troops. A look-out post is to bo esta})lished. Drivers aiul cjthers are not to quit tlii'ir carriages at any time. T\w troops in front are to l)e informed of the position of tlu; divisional ammunition rtdumn, in order that empty carts and wagons going to the r(>ar for supplies may bo correctly directfd. Wlicn tiiiu> does not permit of the empty carts and wagonslx'ing nlillcd, filled ones arc to be sent forward at once. The second sub-division of tlie divisional ammunition column is to be drawn on first, leaving th(> first sub-division intact as long as possilile, ready to })e sent to tlie front on an enK-rgeiicy. The Officer conuiianding a divisional ammunition cobiiiiu is responsible for keeping liis su])plios as complete as possilib? from the army corps ammunition columns in rear, and when he sends emjity carts and wagons to bo replenislnHl tljey art) to 1m( dispatched in suitabh; numbers and mider proper guidance. The army corps amiiuinition column is to keep within one day's infantry march of the front or fighting line. No portion of it, except under circumstances of emergency, is to b(' })roiiglit 319 imder fire, since its object is to serve as a connecting link between the divisional ammunition column in front and the field depot or arsenals in rear, whence its supplies are drawn. If, however, it is considered desirable to send forward any portion of this reserve, the artillery officer commanding it will arrange for the charge and safe custody, as well as for the convenient posting of such detachments. The position of the army corps ammunition column, and of any advanced detach- ments, must be made known to the commander of the divisional ammunition columns. Although, as a rule, the empty carts and wagons of the divisional ammunition columns will return to be replenished at the army corps ammunition column, the officer commanding the latter can despatch filled wagons from his column to the front on an emergency. The commander of this column is to keep himself in communication with the head-cj^uarters of the army corps, and to seek orders as to whether he should increase or diminish his distance from the main body. " The English regulations of July 1878, conclude with stating that the foregoing instructions are intended for general guidance only, ancl can be altered by the officer commanding the forces in the field. In Ashantee, the ammunition was carried by carriers, and as the enemy's fire was very inefficacious, they were brought up to the fii'ing line, and the ammunition distributed by them to the troops firing, under the guidance of a non-commissioned officer. In Afghanistan, the necessity for supphing men under fire was never felt. In the Jowacki campaign, the country was too hilly for the pack animals to follow the troops during an attack, and so they were left behind, and twelve men of each company followed in rear of the skirmishers, carrying, besides their own ammunition, rifles, &c., leather boxes containing 200 rounds each. The total supply for the battalion was, there- fore, 19,200 rounds, or about thirty rounds per man, as the battalions were only rather over 600 strong. The men disliked this work extremely, and it was found necessary to relieve them after two miles of heavy and broken country. This method had the serious objection of temporarily withdrawing ninety-six men per battalion, or more than a company. As there Avas but little firing, the efficacy of this system was not tested. 320 3. Observatioxs ox Supplying Ixfantky -with Ammunition, .VXD Deductioxs Therefkom. From the foregoing we see that as far as concerns the suppl}- of infantry ammunition, all the military powers have about the same ideas, and employ tlu! same means, namely, that the men should carry a certain (quantity of ammunition, and a further siipply should be carried in successive battalion, divisional, and army corps trains, replenished from stationary depots, and from all that has already been said, it may be seen that the whole subject can be divided under the following six headings : — 1 . The number of cartridges to be carried by each man, and how they should be carried. 2. The method of supplying the engaged troops from the battalion supply of ammunition. o. The mancouvring and placing of these battalion supjilies. ■1. The replenishing of the battalion supplies from the divisional columns. .'). The rei)lenishing of the divisional columns from the army corps columns. (5. The replenishing of the army corps columns from the army reserves. (1.) The maximum amount of ammunition expended in any fight, essentially depends on the fire tactics employed, and the fire discipline which the men possess. Experience has shown that the old method of supplying ammunition to engaged troops, based on the employment of " carrii-rs " is insuliicient for troops armed with breech- loaders, as tliey cannot carr}'' on their worlc nearer than 500 yards from tlu* enemy. Etonomy of ammunition is assured by a strict fire discipline (see p. t'JoG), and waste is avoidtid by a rational " direction of iire " (see p. 3.35), ammunition })eing only c(»nsid<'r('d "wasted" wlu'u it is uselessly expended. As fire nuiy now l)e opened at greatei- distances tlian I'oniu'rly, and as an eilicacious result is desiri'il at these ranges, it is nec(!ssarv to use tlir that tho number of (tartridges carried by the men, and the present methods of Hui)plyiug thorn, are totally inadequate to meet these conditions. 321 In tho defence, the problem of the supply of ammunition is comparatively easy, but on the offensive or demonstrative this is not the case. The troops . covering tho hatterios of the attack must be capable of maintaining a musketry fire from the beginning of the fight, until the troops told off for the attack move forward to accomplish their task, that is, dui'ing six to eight hours. In a temporising action, the firing line must not be advanced nearer than 500 or 600 yards to the enemy's main line of defence, so as to prevent its being drawn into a compromising attack before the proper moment, and its principal duty is to prevent the enemy's skirmishers from getting within such a distance (about 1,200 yards) of the attacking artillery, which it is charged with covering during the first phase of the fight, as to be dangerous to it. The firing line can only obtain this residt and give their fire an aggressive character, by directing an efficacious fire on the enemy's skirmishers every time they attempt to advance beyond a certain point ; but at the distance which still separates the hostile lines, and which will not sensibly diminish imtil the final attack is delivered, it is only possible to act against skirmishers by directing on them a collective fire of a certain density. Infantry, even if they have the most exact fire discipline, cannot carry out this prolonged duty with only the 70 rounds carried on the men, or with the supplement of 30 rounds per man in the battalion ammunition wagons, and the idea of suppljang them, with any large amount of ammunition, over open groimd miist be looked upon as almost impossible. The problem to be solved is, how to increase in strong proportions the supply of ammunition carried by each soldier of the attacking troops, without increasing his load during marches and operations. The war of 1870-71 showed that the number of rounds carried by the men was not sufficient for long and sustained actions, and the infantry of both sides had often to stop fighting for want of ammunition, and in nearly every case the failure of ammunition was caused by the loss of connection between the engaged troops and their ammunition wagons or ammunition columns ; by the habit of taking off the knapsack (in wliich some of the ammimition was carried) before attacking, without first taking the ammunition out of it ; and by the loss of the officers directing the fire. The want of ammunition will be felt still more in the future, but with troops well trained to fire discipline, 322 a rational direction of the fire will always act as a palliative to tliis e\41, but, in any case, in order to make use of the ballistic f|uaKties of modern weapons, more cartridges will have to be tired than fonnerly. The troops, charged with the preparation of the fight, cannot carry out their duty with only 100 rounds (taking the English system), while the troops told off for the assaidt, and who are at fii'st kept in rear for the purpose of carrying out the decisive attack later on, will not require to fire even the cartridges carried by the men. This fact must be con- sidered in drawing up rules for tlie replenishing of ammuni- tion on the battle field, especially when the possibility is admitted of distributing the two roles of preparation and execution between the troops before engaging them in an offensive combat. The tactics of infantry are now-a-days based on the dis- tribution of troops in depth, because the principal means left to a commander of making his influence felt, under modern conditions of fighting, is to maintain sufficient troops in rear of the firing line to send forward later on at the proper place and at the proper moment. But, as an army consists of units (army corps or divisions) which march separately during the period of operations, and only re-unite for the fight, it will be the commanders of these units who will decide which of their particular troops are to be employed for the preparation and which for the execution of the attack. The trooi)s to be kept for this latter purpose will have sufficient ammunition on th(( men, and so, if necessary', their battalion wagons wff// bo used to supply tlxe troops in front witli ammunition ])el'ore these latter enter into action ; Init as tlu' troops kept back for carrying out thc^ attack proper, may possil)ly be called on during the j)r(>paration, to assist in it or to ward off a Hank counter-attack, or for otlier duties, it will 1m< better not to make use of tlieir wagims for supplying the firing line, but some of tlie carts or wagons from the nearest ainninnition columns should 1)e advanced to the front, and dislrilmted among the leading battalicma as soon as contact with the enemy b(>comes imminent.* As soon as any battalion cart or wagon is ompty, it should go to the nearest Jiniiuunition column to be refilled, or better still, as the supply is getting hlu»rt, word sliould be sent • With rofpird to tho position of tho diviuional ammunition reserves on fhf lino of miirrh tn suit (ho nbovo suggoHtion, bOO page 336. 323 hack to this column, which will at once send forward a full wagon or cart to the required spot ; by this means each man can be given from 30 to 40 rounds extra, besides those carried in the battalion reserves, and which can be carried in the pockets and haversack and which should be the first to be fired away, together with those which have hitherto been kept in the valise and which are now similarly carried, keeping those in the pouches to the last, as they are most easily got at when the critical and decisive stage of the fight arrive. These supplies should, when possible, be issued to the men before they are sent into action, and during the artillery preparation. The employment of long range fire, and a want of control over the tire, and of fire discipline, always involve the greatest expenditure, and vice versa. However, in the future, in wars between European armies, who have all studied now how to make the most of their infantry fire, long range fire is certain to be employed, in combination with the artillery, in the preparation of the attack, in order to overcome the efficacy of the enemy's fire, which alone prevents an assaidt being given, and to do this the men will require at least 120 to 150 rounds each, even when their fire discipline, and the fire tactics employed, are the best. In savage warfare, or when opposed to badly armed troops, or to troops unskilled in the use of their weapons (which can now-a-days only occur among uncivilized nations), probably half this number combined, with a good fire discipline, is suifieient, because long range fire will not be required, as it will be far better to keep the fire for the shorter ranges*, and the nimibcr of troops and the close order tactics used in such operations, d(i not so easily lend themselves to the sub-division of the troops, viz. : some to prepare the combat with long range fire, and the remainder to decide it. But if the fire discipline is bad, 100 and 120 rounds can be easity expended, as our experience in oiu' small wars has shewn. Taking only European wars into consideration, it may be laid down as a principle, that considering the almost absolute impossibility of suppl}-ing the men with ammunition, when * On account of the greater efficacy of the fire, the limited quantity of ammunition that can be 'taken into the field from the difficulty of transporting it, and because savages should be beaten at their best ranges, the shortest ones possible. Savages prevented from attacking by long range fire, never consider themselves beaten. X 2 324 once under an effective fire {i.e., at ranges under 500 yards), cvertj soldier ahould cam/ as lan/c a supplji as possihh into arfion, due regard being paid to the role he vrill have to play. Recognizing that there is a limit to the burden which it is advisable to impose on a soldier, General Zeddeler boldly recommends a diminution in his general equipment to allow of the number of rounds considered requisite (which may be put down at from 100 to 120 rounds) being carried on the soldier. A soldier must carry a rifle, bayonet, ammunition, in- trenching tool, haversack with food, water, great coat, and a valise in which to carry extra ammunition, food, and the great coat ; and it is a ver}' open questioii whether a greater gain than disadvantage is not to be obtained by carrying the rest of his kit for him. In the course of the war of 1870-71, the Germans often did this, and little, if any dis- advantage was found from the increase of baggage wagons, with a good organisation. However, in tlie present English equipment, the soldier has 40 cartridges in his pouches, and 30 in liis valise, Avliich latter will soon be required ; and to gi-t at them the valise must be put on the ground, which the soldier would liardly do during the iiglit while under fire, or if he did he would leave it behind. This manifest inconvenienct^ has hitherto been overcome by the troops, when about to engage, taking the cartridges out before doing so, and placing them in their pockets. A soldier's eqmpment ought logically to be divided into two independent parts, one carrying what is necessary for fighting, and whicli lie sliouhl always carry, and the other what is necessary for living, aner now con- sidered necessary; and, if any of these cartridges are to be carrii'il in tlie valise, they should lie in small (in boxes ])lace(l on each side or on the back of the valis(> and covered with n flap. Then, if a man wants t(» replenish his sui>ply, or if he is killed or wounded, he or one f)f his comrades has only to lift up the \\i\y mid llie boxes of amniunition can be easily tiiken out. ( )n tlie line of nuinh. the 'i'urks in 1H77-7H, carried I'JO • In thoir now Infantry equipment the Germans have carried out this prindplf. 325 rounds about their persons, })nt they had no valise or knap- sack, and when on the defensive they went into the trenches witli tlieir pockets, ponches, &r., full of annnunition, and also carried in their Imnds, handkerchiefs or articles of clothing tilled %vith cartridges. It would be of immense advantage if the valise could be readily put on and taken off a man's back without disturbing the rest of his equipment.* Many writers consider that now-a- days, under nu)dern rifle fire, to enable a serious and energetic attack to be (carried out, a man must be relieved of every burden possible, and that therefore valises should be removed before an assault, especially after a long march. Every question in war shoidd be considered in the aspect of what men can do when fatigued. This removal of the valises has frequently had to be done in late wars, and experience has shewn that if successful, the men regain their valises ; if unsuccessful, they often throw them away, even if they get them back, which is by no means certain. Onty the actual troops under fire need remove their valises, if it is decided they are to do so, and these are the troops wliich, if successful, cannot pui-sue, from their disorganised condition ; and so the fact of their not having their vaHses would not much affect the c^uestion of their subsequent rapid advance. But, besides fighting, troops have to live and be fed, and as two or three da3-s' food are carried in the valises, most wi'iters do not consider it advisable to allow the men to take them off, in case they may not see them again. A striking- example of this was seen in the French retreat from Worth, in 1870, when the French troops suffered much misery, and became very demoralised for want of food and means of cooking it : they had taken off their knapsacks during the fight, and did not recover them in their hurried retreat. The Germans, in this war, only took oft' their knapsacks before an attack when they felt, or saw themselves certain of success, or else when they wished to make a rapid march. f * .Such an equipment (invented b)' the author) was tried at Aldershot, and was approved of and recommended for adoption by the Equipment Committee, but like most other service inventions it seems to have been strangled and biu-ied in some W.O. pigeon hole. t Thus the XIX. Cxcrman division deposited their knapsacks on the 7th August, 1870, near Saarbriicken, and they oidy got them back again on the 23rd August. The XXIX. Brigade took off theii- packs before crossing the Moselle, just Avhen the situation of the Prussian army at Vion^nlle (16th August) was very critical, and defeat seemed more probable than success. The Russian Kostroma Ivcgiment also took off their packs before attacking the Turks at the first battle of Plevna ; but when they were defeated they lost their packs. 326 Anyhow, the valise being quickly removable, as suggested above, facilitates the cartridges in it being easily got at without all the accoutrements having to be taken off ; and in marches and travelling, such a qualification woidd be in- valuable to relieve the men of their loads at the halts. Further, if the contents of the valise are divided into two distinct parts — a "fighting" and a " personal comfort " part — and the former is made as light as possible, and the ammunition carried in it is so placed as to be readily got at with the aid of a comrade without taking the vaHse off, then, if the "personal comforts" are carried for the man, the necessity for taking the valise itself off Avould rarely occur, and shoidd be always avoided, except at halts or when travelling by rail, carriage or boat, when it does not matter. The pouches in the English service have to be stiff or lined with tin, to prevent the cartridges, made of sheet brass, being injured. If the cartridges were of solid metal this woidd not have to be the case. To carry the large supply of anmiunition now required in action, eaih man should be yiieu as ma iii/ pockets as possible in his coat and trousers^ and miyht be further supplied irith an extra haversack for the purj)ose, to be worn on the rii/ht side. The additional weiglit of this haversack, which would oidy be filled on going into action, need not bo considered. Solid- drawn cartridges woidd reduce any chance of injury from rough usage, to the ammunition in such a case. One very important point in preventing waste of ammunition by means of fire discipline, and which is only a matter of detail, is to make the cartridges up in packets of five, in order to increase tlie trouble of opening them, and so to give the officc^rs more c, one and a-lialf to twice more of it can be carried. With th<* intnidiiction of a new riile, it is intended to ailopt a solid- drawn cartriclge for it (2) Witli regard to siijtiilyiiig the engaged troops with ammunition Irom the Imttulion sui»[)lies, the only means ])OHHi))le of doing so, under n jienvv lire, is to have it carried Ity men, and it may here he i imarked tlifit sueli a method is only applicalde wlieu still al a distance from the enemy {i.e., over 500 yards), as no method has yet been devised by which troo])-^ < ^mi I.-' '-npplied at any time of the action 327 during' the close combat. Tlie bringing up of ammunition to a firing line by means of pack animals, is only possible wlien the enemy's fire is ineffective. There are objections against taking men from the companies actually engaged and sending them backwards and forwards for supplies, when the fijing line is near the enemy, because the amount of ammunition they can so bring up is totally inadec[uate to the wants of the men firing, from their limited power of carrying much weight over heavy ground or enclosed country, and because of the distance they have to go for the ammunition. A single man cannot carry more than ^00 to 400 rounds (32 to 43 lbs.) ; the battalion supply cannot, except under very favourable circumstances, be nearer the firing hne than 880 yards, which will take a man half-an-hoiu- to go twice over it, including the time requii'ed to get his supply .'•' This would require eight to ten men to even enable 100 men firing to keep up a slow fii"e of one round per minute, and eight to ten men is too great a percentage to take away for this purpose at the critical stages of the fight. The Austrians and oxu-selves propose to use the buglers, drummers and pioneers, for this duty. Further in the English service, officers and the buglers remaining in the firing line are to carry a supply for distribution when necessary. Then, again, it is very unfair to expect men to cross and recross a fire-swept zone simply carrying ammunition, and it is more than probable that when the men once reach the fiaing line they "will remain there, even if their own rifle has been left behind, for they can get rifles from the dead or wounded. It ought to be laid down that, as far as possible, no man should ever be sent from the firing line to the rear to find ammunition, for every time a man leaves a place, where the fire has been heaA^-, to go and seek for ammunition in rear, there is a good chance of his not returning for the day. All these inconveniences are best met by taking the men for supplying the ammunition from the supports and reserves, and not fi-om the men of the fixing line. These men, after having received their supphes fi-om the battalion carts or wagons, can be sent either to the supports, who will carry them on, or direct to the companies to be sup- plied according to the orders they have received. These men * The English regulations seem to think that 1,000 yards is a fair distance. It would he impossible to keep up a sufficient supply over this distance. 328 can be reneAvod as required, aud if tliey are ordered to remain in the firing- line without heing sent bach to the reserve, all the advantages of the Austrian method of supply are thus gained -without having its inconveniences. The method of supph-ing ammunition by means of reinforcing groups from the sujiports, previously furnished Avith ammunition, is an excellent alternative method. HoweA'er, not to exhaust the reserves too soon, when the action commences, men can be taken at first for the work from the companies engaged, and when reinforcements are required later on, tlien the men from the supports and reserves can be utilized for suppl^nng ammunition as above. The Russian plan of having a distinguishing flag for each company is a very good one to ensure facility of supply. The argument that the men when once in the fii'ing line will not give up tlio cartridges they have, can be met by dis- cipline, by giving the men more cartridges than they can conveniently hold while making use of their rifles, by making thmu carry these cartridg(^s in their lielmc^ts, turned upside down, like buckets, and by training them to realize tlie value of mutual co-operation. Again, the utility of distributing, before tlu; fight, ammunition taken from the battalion and divisional supplies (see p. 322) to each man in all the companies to be engaged, cannot be too strongly insisted on. Any increase of load at this moment, in the shape of anmiu- nition, is not of much account, as it diminishes as the fight progresses, and the best method of all for ensuring to a soldier a mfftcient siipplt/ of ammuvition for the fight, in to gire him, from the first, the full supply considered ueeessnrj/, to carry on his person ; but tlie strictest fire discipline must be maintained not to let him waste a round of it. Supplying engaged troops by means of tlie anniiuiiifion carried cm tlie persons of the troops in real- is an excellent substitute for su])plyiiig from wagons wlien tlu'se are too far away. But it slioiiM only be resorted to in case of necessity, as the t7-oo])s from wliom tlie ammunition is taken may rcfjuire it befoic lln'y can get a fresh sujiply themselves. One jilan iiiiglif he tried to increase the sn]»]>ly of aniuuini- lion tluit can bo brought up l)v ciii-riers, which is to liav(* one or more light strelchors, with slings, for passing ovctr tlio shoulders, attaclieil to the liandles, carried on the auimunitiou wagons or carts. Two men can carry more ammunition In' Hiich UKMUis than lliey can in bags. Such a stretcher might Ix! litted w ifli a small wheel, s transport of ammunition from the carts or wagons to the engaged troops by means of pack animals, * The method proposed by Major Geddos, in a paper entitled " Manual Transport," to be found in Vol. XXIV. of the Journal of the Royal Uiiilcd Service Institiiiio/t, might be experimented on for this pui'pose. 330 in a four-horsed wagon, two horses might be used thus, if they had a suitable harness, as two horses are enough for the empty wagon, and they can get another pair of horses from the divisional column to bring back the loaded wagon, thus leaving two horses in the divisional column for the empty wagon left there. In carts di*awn by two horses, one horse can be used for this purpose. Special pack animals, such as donkeys, ponies, or mides (two per wagon or one per cart) could be taken if thought necessary ; but such a use of pack animals is doubtfid under a well-directed fire, because a pack animal forms a fairly large mark, and cannot be so easily kept under cover as a man. But when the enemy is still some little distance off, ammunition coidd be thus taken up to the supports at least. In savage warfare, however, pack animals can be taken up to the fu-ing line. The Turks took their pack animals up to the firing line, but then the Ivussian fire was very bad. When pack animals can be used for carrying ammunition to the firing line, they Avoidd of course bo employed in pre- ference to carriers, as they can carry more than men can, and do not take away so many men from the battalion for the ammunition supply sei'vice. (o) The manoeuvring and placing of the lialtnliou ammu- nition su])plies is a very important point. All nations give as drivers to tlie battalion ammunition carts or wagons, infantry men taken from the battalion to which their carts or wagons are told otf. Experience has shewn that in war, the proper manauivriug of the infantry battalion ammu- nititjn sup[)li(.'s can oidy be a.ssured by drivers taken from the tnjops Avhich tht\v are to accompany. A trooper of tlie military train, or of tlie artillery, attached to iin infantry c()r])s to drive its aniniuuition cart.s or wagons would, in the held, find many difJiculties. lie is unknown to all around him, and cannot have the sanu; interest in tli«' corjis as one of its own men. Therefore infantry should be cliarged with the manoouvring of its own lighting train, the nuiintenanci^ of its carts or wagons, and the ])reservation of its ammunition. Tiiis does not a]iply U) the divisional and army ct»r[is ainiuuuitit)n cohinms. The drivers of tiie liattalioii carts or wagons ought to be given an extensive an instruction as possible, so as to mako them cupal)l(! of carrying out, and of making their wagons do evorytliing that can be ex[)ected of th(!m. Then, these curts or wagons, well liorsed and will driven l»y the men 331 of the battalion will, far from being- " imj)ediinenta, " as they are sometimes considered, thus become a precious instrument, doubling the value of the troops, who Avill be certain of being well provided. An intelligent non-commissioned officer, capable of initiative, is indispensable for the proper guidance of the battalion carts or wagons, for choosing the situations for them, for the distribution of the ammunition, for the replenishing of the empty wagons, &c. Hence the non-commissioned officer shoidcl be practised in this work in peace time, and not be only told oil for it in time of war. The German plan of making the battalion adjutant responsible for the battalion wagons is a questionable one, as this officer is required for many other duties in the field. It is also very important that a certain number of men should be trained in each battalion to looking after ammuni- tion ; these should be the men who act as the loaders and unloaders of the wagons, and give the ammunition to the men who are to supjDly the cartridges on the battle field. One or two men should be told off permanentlj" to each wagon ; these men should accompany the wagon in all its movements, and when it has to move rapidly may get on it, and while going prepare the bags and ammunition for distribution. This sei-idce of the battalion fighting train ought to be organised in peace time, as this is the only means of ensuring' that the duty will be properly carried out at the moment of l)attle, which is the one object to which all military institutions ought to converge. Un the line of march, the battalion carts or wagons ought to follow, wholly or in part, immediately in rear of their respective battalions, or they shoidd be grouped together in rear of the brigade ; but no battalion ought ever to tliink of moving or going into action without an ammunition cart or wagon, any more than a battery of artilleiy would think of doing so without its wagons. As the position of the battalion carts or Avagons on the battle-field cannot be laid down in an abs(dute manner before- liand, a great latitude should be allowed in this respect, but the regulations of the various Continental armies all sliow the necessity of not having the wagons more than 880 to 1 , 100 yards from the firing line, and of sheltering them as much as possible from the enemy's fii-e. The first thing to be laid down is, that every cart or wagon should follow its battalion in all cu'cumstauces, and get as near to it as possible. It 332 maybe stated that, in the majority of cases, the cart or wagon should move with tlie Ixattalion reserve. Tlie introduction of voUe3's at long- ranges will eousiderahly affect the roJe of this reserve, for, as some of the comjianies advance towards the enemy, this reserve Avill, if possible, be established in favoiu-able positions, and cover the advance by volleys at long ranges : as this will cause a considerable consumption of ammunition, the place of the cart or wagon should be near it, either between it and the support, or on one of its fianlts, or in rear, but always near it. When the reserve itself takes a direct part in the action, tlie cart or wagon nuiy, or may not, be sent to the regimental or brigade reserve, and may oven, in very exceptional cases, 1)6 brought into the tiring line itself, such as when a battalion is established in a defensive position, or wlion a position or advanced point lias l)een captured and must be held at all costs against counter-attacks, &c. The position of the carts (u- wagons ought to be indicated botli by day and night b}- very apparent signals, sucli as a coloured flag by day, and a coloured lantern by night, placed at a distance of 150 to 200 yards to one side, so as not to draw on the cai'ts or wagons the enemy's tire. The tlags and lanterns should be of the same colour. It is very important that all the ammunition wagons of the battalion and divisional sup]»lies should be the same, so as to be interchangeable. Tliis does not a}»ply so miu-li to the army corps ammunition columns, whicli have more time to load and unload. If tlie wagons for infantry and artillery are of the same pattern, tliey should l>o coloured dilTerontly, or have broad bands of distinctive colouring to distinguish them. Also flags and lamps of dillerent c(»l<)in's should indicate their different positions. Similai-ly, all artillery wagons should bo the same. None of these interchangealdo wagons should bo marked by any corps distinctions. The measures adopted by all foreign powers, of establishing a constant connection betwecMi the wagons and the com- mniidcis of tlio dillerent tactical units ]>y means of mounted onlcilicH, is a very excellent one. < Jencral Zoddelcr'.s proposal that the battalion ammunition sup])lics should l)e kept near the droHsing places of llic wounded, is also a good one, as the constant flow of wounded men to this point would at once ]>oint out the direct i(»n of the bjitfaliiui aunnunition supplies to the nU'U sent to seek it. Evj^-y battalion cart d, "to replenish their supi>lies." Also we rend in the Cierman (tffieial account of the Franco- (lennau war that " 'I'lio want of ammunition was felt on a large scale nt first during the battlo of Mars-la-Tour by the infantry of the .'Jrd Army Torps ; then by iho corps of the 1st Army engaged on the iHth August, to the east of the defile of (rravelotte ; on the 28th November by the detachments of 335 the lOtli Army Corps -which occupied Beaiino-le-Rolande ; and in many other battles. Similar inconveniences were specially felt by the 1st Bavarian Army Corps during its combats in the basin of the Eure and on the Loire. In the majority of the numerous combats delivered in these countries, the battalions were almost always obhged to limit their action for want of cartridges, or to go to the rear in order to replenish their ammunition. This want of cartridges was always due to the rupture of the communications between the combatant battahons and their ammunition wagons, or the ammunition columns." Hence we see the importance of entrusting such columns to good and experienced officers. Some writers have considered that the infantry should have charge of its own divisional and army corps ammunition supplies, instead of the artillery, but this would only un- necessarily create further commands. The artillery can per- fectly well carry out the duty, and are more accustomed to the care and preservation of ammunition than infantr}'. Infantry is the main fighting arm, and it should leave the supply duties to the auxiliary arms. With regard to the position of the divisional ammunition columns on the line of march, on the defensive the supply arrangements are comparatively easy to carry out : but on the offensive let us consider the case of two English divisions (14 battalions) marching on the same road in column of route'^", and coming into action, with the ammunition columns in the rear. The first brigade of the leading division will act as the advance guard, and will be the first troops to deploy and expend their ammuni- tion. They will be about two miles ahead of the main body. The second brigade of the leading division, forming the head of the main body, will probably prolong the line of the first brigade, and will be about four miles from the divisional ammunition colimms. Thus allowing a rate of march of 3 miles an hour, on account of firing being heard, the first brigade will have been 2 hours and the second 1 J hours in action, before the divisional columns can arrive to replenish the battalion carts. This is supposing the roads open and free to movement. The * This is supposing the worst case, as when pursuing troops in column of route are checked hy a rear guard. Against an enemy in a known position, the attacking troops would probably form up beforehand for battle, and move ,over the last three or foiir miles in lines of battalion quarter columns, if the natm-e of the country permitted it, in which case the divisional ammunition columns could be brought quite close up to the leading troops. 336 roads may he obstructed, the divisional columns will he look- ing for shelter, and taking np their positions, and so the above times ■would in reality be increased. Thus some, or even all, of the anmiunition carts of tlie divisional supplies of the leading infantry division should march in rear of the leading brigade, close up to the front. This will not prevent the ri'ar division arriving in time to perform its part as a reserve of troops, because the increase of the length of a column by introducing even 21 such carts — i.e., 3 per battalion of thp leading division — is only 315 yards (allow- ing 15 yards to a cart), or about the length of a battalion in column of fours. The artillery divisional ammunition supply may march in rear, as all batteries of artillery carry enough am- munition with them to fight for some houi-s, and their distant position from the enemy allows of their being comparatively easily supplied, which is not the case with the infantry, who l)y this time have apj)roac]ipd tlie eneni}' so near as to be practically out of reach of fresh supplies, unless they are brought up by the supports or otlnn- reinforcing troops. (5) The rules for replenishing the divisional columns from the army corps columns are practically the same as thosc^ given above. The commander of the army corps column should inform the divisional ammunition columns of its where- abouts, and establish connection with them by means of orderlies or signals. (6) The army corps ammunition columns are replenished from the stationary depots forming the army reserve and which are created at fresh points as tlie army advances. The supply is brought to them from the depots by the general transport wagons of tin- army. The army ammunition reserves are in charge of the Ordnance* Department. TvKSUMK. Thus we see from the foregoing Ihc ilifTcrenI means available to make llif su]iply oraiiiimiiiif ion on the l»at tie field as perfect as possible. Tlie ]>rineipal ]»oint8 ar(» ns follows : — 1. The ])ersniiMl necessaries in a soldier's valis(> should bo reduced to a mininuim, while the number of cartridges which lie carries should be increased to (if Irnsf 100 rounds, and an extra haversock and ain]>h' ]iocketH (in his coat and trousers) should be given him, to enable him to do this, and to receive a further supply of 50 or more rounds on entering into action. 2. The supplying of ammunition should, as much as 337 possible, precede the attack, because tlie service can ouly bo exceptionally carried out during- a close fight. Every pause in the fight should be fully made use of from the very outset to replenish the supply of the men firing, and the ammunition on the dead and wounded should always be made use of. 3. The load of the foot soldier shoidd be lightened to the extreme limit possible, but it should be absolutely forbidden to put the valise on the ground previous to an attack, unless the cartridges have been first taken from them. The cartridges in the pouches to be used last. 4. There shoidd be a universal pattern infantry ammunition cart or wagon for the battalions and divisional ammunition columns, so that they may be interchangeable. 5. If they are of the same nature, the infantry carts or wagons should either be of a different pattern or shape, or be painted a different colour to those of the artillery (or have 1 lands of different bright colours on them) to distinguish them, so as to facilitate the supply. 6. The battalion and divisional ammunition carts or wagons need not have the name of the corps or column painted on them, so that there need not be any necessity to return them to their original owners after an action. 7. Flags and lamps of different colors are recpiired, to show the positions of the battalion carts or wagons, and of the infantry and artillery sections of the ammunition columns. These flags in an action should be placed at some distance to one side of the supply centres that they mark. 8. The cartridges shoidd be solid-drawn, and made up in packets of five ; they can then be kept in red coloured canvas bags with handles, each containing 250 rounds, or 50 packets of live each. AVooden, tin or zinc-lined boxes may hold four of such bags each or 1,000 rounds, and two boxes wovdd form a convenient load for pack transport ; the cover of the boxes shoidd be very easily opened, without the assistance of instruments. 9. Special red coloured canvas bags should be carried on every battalion wagon or cart, and on a certain number of men per company told off to enable the ammunition supply service to be carried out. Supplementary stretchers, capable of conversion into hand barrows might also be carried on the wagons or carts for facilitating the distribution of ammunition. 10. In each battalion a non-commissioned olHeer should be trained for the ammunition service, also some men of each company to act as drivers of the wagons, and others to carry 338 out the duty of carriers, loaders, &c., and thus to create a true battalion fighting train. 1 1 . The supply from the battalion carts or wagons to the combatants to be carried out as much as possible from the rear by men taken from the supports and reserves. Officers and buglers may also carry some ammunition for distribution. 12. In special cases engaged troops may draw on the personal supply of the troops in rear of them. 13. Constant connection to be established between the bat- talion and divisional columns, bv mounted men trained to this duty. 14. When it is intended to make a detennined resistance, small depots of ammunition shoidd be made in rear of the fighting lines. 15. Immediate replenishing of every empty cart or wagon by the divisional and army corps amnninition columns, either by an exchange of ammunition, or, if circumstances require it, liy an exchange of wagons or carts ; these latter to be brought up to the point required. 16. To enable the supply to be carried out by pack animals, on favorable occasions, either special pack animals should be provided for the purpose, or some of the draught horses should be given pack saddles (or riding saddles strong enough to be used for pack purposes) ; a pair of canvas saddle-bags woidd then be required for each pack animal. 17. During the marches which precede an imminent action, the divisional column ought to hand over one or two wagons, or an equivalent number of carts, to each battalion destined to take part in the preparation of the tight. The com- mander will base his orders for the distribution of these wagons or carts, on the distribution of the rd/ct of prei)aration and execution among tlie attacking troojis. The advance guard should also liave a I'crtain proportion of extra ammu- nition carts or wagons attached to tliem. IS. A]\y r>if/tif/(s sliould bn iillowed to draw on the battnlio!! sujiplics of any battalion for aniniunition. A signed r<'(]iiisilion should not lie r<'(|uir('(l, lint a statement as to the amount di-awn, the hour, and by whom drawn, sliould be made out by the non-c(»mniissione(l oflieer in charge, while tlie nmmuniti»»n is l)eing served out, to act as a chock both on the amount of amjnuTiition left in the liattalion reserves and iipon tlie corps who have tired away so much. Thus we see that the problems of how to bring up supjilies of ammunition into the firing lino in the attack, and how to oov distrihute them to the men actually eugaged, are two of the most difficult and at the same time two of the most important problems to be solved in modern warfare. On the defensive^ on the other hand, it is not a difficult matter to organise arrangements which shall ensure that a stationary line of defence will, witliin certain limits, never run short of ammunition, because one of the first cares of the defence, when a position is to be energetically held, would be to create ammunition depots close in the rear of each tactical unit, by emptjang the battalion ammimition carts or wagons and then having them replenished. Seeing how difficult it is to supply the firing lines with fresh ammunition in the attack, the troops should be well supplied before commencing the engagement, and it is for this reason that most ammunition supply regulations now direct that before an action the battalion supply of ammunition, in whole or in part, should be distributed to the men. A greater supply is usually given to the men when on the defensive than in the attack, as they can excavate small receptacles in the trenches for the ammunition, which has not now to be carried. Since therefore, it is so difficult to supply the assaulting troops of the attack with fresh ammunition in the short and decisive ranges, such troops should reserve their supply to the utmost, and not commence firing until within effective range. Their advance should be prepared, covered, and rendered feasible by a well-sustained artillery fire, and also, when possible, by fire from lines of infantry at long ranges, disposed in suitable positions behind cover or hasty entrenchments, and which can then be kept supplied with fi*esh ammunition as in the defence. In defending and attacking intrenched camps, when tlio fight lasts several days, the supply of fresh ammunition can be effected at night, as was done in and around Metz in 1870. As it is easier to supphj ammunition than men to an army in the field, a largo supply of ammunition with a good supply organisation may make up for a superiority in numbers with a defective method of supply on the part of the enemy. Hence we see the necessity for perfecting the arrangements for the supply of ammunition in eveiy way possible. It cannot be too strongly insisted on, that troops should be frequently practised in peace time at being supplied with ammunition during an attack, " for this service can only be ensured by the aid of men perfectly accustomed to duties of this kind." Y 2 340 Before concliuling-tliis chapter we miist refer to the question of using carts or Avag'ons for carrying thebattalion and divisional annnunition reserves. England and Eussia make use of two- wlieeled carts, while Germany, France and Austria-Hungary use wagons with limbers, &c., verA-like those used by artillery. Such wagons maji get mixed up with the artiUery on(^s unless distinguished by colour, but these colours may be easily obliterated by the rough usage and exposure of a campaign, and being special wagons require special manufacture, and cannot be used for any other purpose. England and Russia--' have both come to the conclusion tliat two-wheeled carts will answer every purpose. They re- quire more careful loading than wagons, but thej'' cannot be mistaken for the artillery ammunition wagons, and are more ensily replaced by local means. They must be strongly made, so as to be capable of being taken across country. But as regards the relative a(h'antages of one m" two large wagons or s next probable battle iield of Austria, is covered with deep and marshy depr(>ssions which can only bo (•ro.ssed by Avagous at cerlain bi-idges and fords ; in other districts the slojies are so impracticable that wheeled vehicles must follow the roads. Thus in a mass of lircunislances, compulsory ])oints of ])aHsage will lie ibiind, at which would occur, during an action, if each battalion had control over its own wagons or carts, an accumulation of annnunition columns, each nnirching on their own account to iind the reserve of their battalions. This accumulation will bo all the more • Tlu: KiiHHiaiiM in 1880 i-xpcrimciitcil with (litrcn^nt Iciiulsof iiimiiuni- li(in cfirtH iind wii^^oiis, and uuik! ti»tUution, 1887. 343 CHAPTER XIV UNCONTROLLED AND CONTROLLED FIRE. There are two methods of allowing men to fire : — 1 . TJncontrolhd or indei)cndent fire^^' iu which each man fires at his own convenience and judgment as to range and objective. 2. Controlled or collective Jire,\ in which the independency of the fire of the individual men is controlled and directed according to the will of their commander. Controlled fire can only be executed when the men are collected into organised tactical groups or massed bodies, which are then used _as_ '_* units of fire," because^ under an enemy's fire, one leader alone cannot control a large number of individual men, although he can a smaller number of organised groups each under a recognised subordinate leader. Uncontrolled individual fire is naturally independent fire, and anything independent should be avoided as much as possible in war, as, it is not likely, from being uncontrolled, to work for the mutual good of the whole. As Greneral Skobeleff said in one of his famous orders in the Greok-Tepe campaign "In the art of affording mutual action has always lain and will always lie the secret of victory ; " and again, before the battle of Lo\'i;cha in 1877 he said, "Do not forget the sacred duty among all, to give help at all costs, whoever your neighbours may be." Both uncontrolled and controlled fire have their theoretical advantages and disadvantages, but practically, it has been found that uncontrolled fire is very pernicious, and is con- ducive to great waste of ammimition, and what is far worse, to great loss of moral force in the men using it. The advantages and disadvantages of the two kinds of fii'e are as follows : — Advaj^tages of Uncontrolled Fiee. 1. It allows the soldier the greatest independence to fire when and at what he likes. (A doubtful advantage when the good of the whole shoidd always be thought of. ) * The word "individual" is piu-posely not used here, as "individual firing " does not necessarily mean " uncontrolled firing" as "independent firing" does. t Collectivmess of fire nccessitatea control. 314 2. It gives a quicker and more continuous fire than con- trolled tire, -^-hich must liave pauses for instructions and orders. 3. In certain situations, as in cases of extreme danger and excitement, it applies itself Letter to the moral state of the soldier, because it does not require a continued attention to the commands of the leaders, as a controlled fire does. DiSADVAXTAGES OF UNCONTROLLED FlKE. 1 . A\'lien once begun, especially A^hen near the enemy, it can neither be regulated nor moderated, and degenerates into a rapid, wild and inaccurate tire. 2. From not being able either to regidate or moderate it, it conduces to an excessive consumption, and therefore waste, of ammunition, and to disorder. 3. There is no check as to what the men are tiring at, or if they are using the proper sights, or even that they are aiming. 4. it soon produces in front of stationary men such a thick smoke that the object hred at is comjDletel}' hidden — a dis- advantage which does not show itself to the same degree in controlled fire. 5. It presents to a commander such great ditflculties in controlhug both the fire and the men. that it almost renders any required offensive advance impossible which is not already in operation when the uncontrolled fire begins. ■•■ G. It has a very bad eii'ect on the nun-al spirit of the men, as it tends to increase tlie excitement, by causing an impression tliat danger is near, and as the ammunition decreases, so does the courage of the men engagt'd, uidess fresh troops or sufliiicnt ammunition arc forllicoiuing at this moment. 7. The iire cannot bo readily directed from one object to another, or the sights altered. Tliis is very important when tlie enemy's (cavalry are to bo f(>arc(l. 8. It is the least terrifying kind of lire fo an enemy, e8])ecially at tlie longer ranges. 1). It is almost always froiilal and iin((inc('ii(i-;i(e(]. 10. Jts eHicaci(»iiH use at all ranges requires a higher state oF discipliiK^ and training among the troops than is usually possible. * 'J'hc only way el' conlnilliiifr indciKnilcnl firiiif^ to any oxtont i.s by mf'iinH of Hhrill whiHtlrs, ;iii(l by {lecustuining men in pcuco timo to ceuso firing wb(;n tliiy hear llicni. 345 Geucrally, once an uncontrolled firo is allowed to begin, especially if the enemy is near at hand and the excitement great, it will continue unchecked until the last round has heen spent, from the natural tendency or inclination of the men to fire as hard as they can, for the purpose of keeping their spirits up, so as to enable them to stand the intense mental strain of the moment. In very heavy firing neither bugle, nor voice can be heard to put a stop to it, though foreign writers assert that a ver}- shrill Avhistle can be used for this purpose with effect. Therefore this uncontrolled lire shoidd be used as rarely as possible, and to practice it at drill is considered, by some wi'iters, not only needless but positively harmful. At short ranges, in close contact with the enem}-, any controlled fire will of itself degenerate into a lipid uncontrolled fire, the men will no longer pay any ai..ntion to orders for control, and the pauses will disappear. There is no need to order independent or uncontrolled fire in such cases, for no prohibition will prevent it. AdVAXTAGES of Co^'TEOLLED FiRE. 1. Not a round of ammunition can be fired without orders. 2. It gives the means of regulating the intensity of the fire by the rapidity with which the words of command are given. 3. It gives the means of seeing that all the rifles are directed on the named spot, and that the men use the sights ordered. 4. The fire can be stojiped to allow the smoke to clear off, when it gets too thick. 5. The pauses in the fire can be as long as the commander pleases. 6. The pauses enable orders to be passed down the line as to what is to be fired at, the sights to be used, when to cease fire, when to advance, &c., and has a quieting effect upon the men when they are tending to get out of hand. 7. It permits the commander to control the effects of the fire, according to the residts he sees produced. 8. It enables the fire to be stopped at will, on an order, which permits of an immediate offensive advance from the defensive or halt. 9. The fire can be rapidly directed from one object to another, such as to oppose an unexpected charge of cavahy. 10. It allows a change of elevation to be made at any instant. 340 1 1 . It allows of a use of combined siglits -wheii means of ascertaining the distance accurately are -nanting. 12. It allows of seeing whether the men are aiming or firing wildly. 13. It gives better results at all ranges, because if men are left to themselves, they always fire at a prominent object only ; a controlled fire can be directed successively against all parts of the enemy's line. 14. It has a sudden and therefore offensive character. 15. It has a very terrifying effect on the enemy, when the range is known and the fire is well deUvered, as it suddenly pours in at once a searching concentrated mass of bidlets at one spot, while in imcontrolled fire the fire cannot be concen- trated and so the bullets fall here and there. 16. It shakes the moral force of the enemy by the sudden loss of a number of men. 17. It requires less discipline and training on the part of the men to got good residts. Although the following remark of General Brialmont was made with reference to formations, yet it can be equally well applied to the relative moral effects of controlled and un- controlled firing. "Men in cohmm are more powerfully impressed by losses than men in line, especially if they lialt to fire. This is because the men killed or wounded in a deep mass are seen by a greater number of soldiers than the same number of killed and wounded men in a thin line. This difference of moral effect is especially felt when infantry is exposed to artillery fire." General Brialmont might also have added " or to a collective infantry fire." A given number of men falling at the same instant will produ(;e a greater de- moralising efft'it on the remainder of the men than an equal number of men falling here and there, singly or ui twos and threes. Disadvantages of Controlled Fike. 1. Tlie gn\'itost rapidily of fire cannot be obtained from it, from its requiring ptmses for instructions to be given, but this rapidity of fire is rarely wanted until the closest ranges have lieen reached, while it soon causes such a thick chmd of smoko that llie object cannot be seen, wliich must decrease the eificacy of the fire and cause a great waste of ammunition. This c-vtreme rapidity of fire only takes place when it becomes n47 uncoutrolled from the proximity of tlio enemy, and when the objective therefore is near enough to he hit by being- in the dangerous zone of the rifle when the Litter is placed parallel to, or better still, slightly inclined towards the ground, which is the only rule for aiming that can be followed in a thick smoke. 2. It is unsuitable to certain demoralising situations, as for example, the very close approach of an enemy, which keenly impresses a soldier, and makes him inattentive to the voice of his commander. Controlled firing is only possible when the troops have suificient calmness and presence of mind to listen to orders. In European warfare this is rarely possible at the short ranges, except on the defensive, when the firing line is sheltered by natural obstacles or by entrenchments. From the above examination of the properties of controlled and uncontrolled firing, we find that a controlled fire unites the greatest number of advantages and ought therefore to be preferred for all cases for which it is suitable. Therefore uncontrolled fire should only be tolerated when a controlled fire is not possible, viz., when in veiy close proximity to an enemy. Whatever the disadvantages of controlled fire may he, they ivill be amply compensated for hy the control maintained over the men, hy the certainty that ammunition ■will not he icasted, that the sights will he properly adjusted, and that the fire is directed tvhere required. ' ' Fire can be executed in two ways : by command, or independently. Experiments have been made with both alternately. In war, it is very important not to waste ammu- nition uselessly ; the fire ought to cease immediately that the objective disappears, or when it offers too small a siurface; the ofiicers ought therefore to be masters of it, and, in this point of view, fire by command has the preference." — (C.C.J.) " Controlled fire preserves us from the thoughtless firing of a soldier who believes he has accj^nitted his conscience b}' having fii-ed off all his cartridges without considering the nil residts which arise from such a badly organised fii-e." — (Okounef.) "Controlled fii-e renders a commander capable of can'jing forward his men at the exact moment he jiidges opportune ; he holds them better in hand so to say ; controlled fire j^ro- duces on the enemy an overwhelming moral effect, because it presents to his mind a feeling of order and consequently of an ;}48 organised force ; it prevents waste of auinninition in a futile firing ; in a "word, when properly applied, it should absolutely prevent the success of an offensive movement on the part of the enemy." — (Girard.) "In an uncontrolled fire soldiers do not adjust their sights properly ; they fire (juicldy, the smoke prevents them from seeing before them, the noise of the firing drowns the voices of the leaders, and even the sound of bugles, and thus the men continue to uselessly waste their cartridges." — (D'Azemar.) The Italian regulations say, "The maximum effect of fire can only be obtained so long as the fii'e can be concentrated on the point which seems to be the most important, and in the shortest time possible." This can only be done by means of a fire perfectly under control. Every cartridge may be life tu' death to a man, so he should never waste a round. He shoidd never fire where he cannot see anything to fire at, but he may fire at smoke and ought to do so, to intimidate the firer tlun-e, and so demoralise him, and make him fire wildly, while he may even hit liim. Victory is not decided by mere loss of nuvthers only, hut it is gained hy that side trhich canjirst intimidate or demoralise its opponent. " The Grermans liave very strong ideas on the character which ought to be given to lire in battle. They do not hold with a sl(jw, continuous, progressive fire ; in their o}>inion, the action (jf tire should in all circumstances be sudden, unex- pected, and i)owerful in order to present an offensive character. Thus, this action can only nuik(f itself felt during successive very short intervals, separated by a pause, during which order and calmness are re-established, smoke is allowed to dissijjate, and orders relative to the objectives to l)e fired at, the I'levations to be used, are given.* Tlu) elfects of suddenness and the power of the lire obtained liy lueans of such an internuttentlire apply e elevation), at a height of one foot above it, the bullet will first touch the ground at a distance of about 125 yards from the muzzle. But by the time the soldier has come to within 400 yards of the enemy his shoulder is tender, he is very excited, and liis moral force is highly strained and he is anxious to fii-e as (quickly as possible. All these causes tend to make him tire very high, while bringing the rifle up to the shoulder tends still further to throw the muzzle up, and experience oidy shows this to be the case. Tlius practically 350 under the conditions of war we should find that a man lying down and tii-ing from his shoidder will make his lire sweep over the first 400 yards in front of him, counting ricochets, as of coui'se, much of such fire will be ricochets, and will be almost eqiiall}' effective when directed against the thick firing line of the enemy. Now, taking the ease of men who will aim, in Part I., it was shewn that if a man, with a Martini-Henry rifle, used the 400 yards elevation with a fine foresight, or the 300 yards elevation with a full foresight, and aimed alwaj's at the enemy's feet he would always hit an upright man at any distance up to 400 yards. Therefore, up to 400 yards, or as near as we can get to the enemy, we should employ controlled fire which enables us to assume the offensive readily, to control the fire, and to hold the men in hand, while it has a high moral effect on one's own men, and a bad one, especially if well directed, on tlie enemy. Ha\'ing got as close as possible, say 400 yards, or even nearer, the strain becomes very groat on the men, and we cannot prevent a rapid uncontrolled fire. Any hope of forcing the men forward now against their instincts will be hopeless. Now comes a period of the most rapid fii-e. This will bo the critical moment of the fight ; soon a desire or panic to rush forwards or backwards, will seize the men ; if tlie enemy is demoralised and consequently relaxes his fire, or retires, then the men will rush forward to victory, but if the enemy is not shaken, and still pours in a deadly stoad}^ fire, then the men must recoil before it with terrible slaughter. A rapid short range fire is not an accurate individual fire, hut depends for itn rjficactf on the grazing power of the jire of the mans of troops. Tlio French musk(>trv regulations say that, "a rapid fire, executed at from 220 to 330 yards, only owes its efKcacy to the flatness of tlie trajectories. One is forcibly led to use it when the moment of the final crisis arrives. Its duration will ])(' very sliort, and tliis crisis will be followed by the sohilion." A rapid lire is most fatiguing to the lui'ii, and eaiinot possibly be maintained long. (S(><» Chapter VII.) Ilitlierto we liave only c(tnsid(Ted tlu^ soldier as pitted ;igfiiiist an enemy as well jiniiedjis himself, and equally skilled in the use (»f the wea[»on. Against an inferior fire or (Mieniy, a controlled lire will be just as effective at these short ranges, and may be f'easilile to maintain, Iteeause as the men will not bo so excited or demoralised by iirevious losses, a greater control over the fire will be possiV)lr. Hut at all times, we must 351 remember that so many causes tend to make uncontrolled fire inaccurate (viz., hasty tiring, individual faulty appreciation of distance, badly adjusted sights, and thus waste of ammunition, smoke, and the tendency that such a fire has to weaken the moral force of the men), that we ought to try and keep it for the shortest ranges only. As has been pointed out before, the longer the range, the more necessary is it to use collective firing, so as to increase the chance of hitting, and also the longer the range, the larger, if possible, shovdd be the number of men firing at the same mark. Controlled fire allows a deli- berate aim to be taken, and a deliberate and far more accurate estimation of range ; it allows of watching the men adjust their sights, and of controlling the expenditure of ammunition ; there is much less smoke with it than in uncontrolled firing, Avhile this smoke clears away C[uicker ; it tends to increase the moral force of the men, besides which, it does not form a continuous line of smoke, continually showing one's position to the enemy. Thus in every case, controlled firing is best, and should be maintained until the enemy is so close as to render it impossible to be carried out, from the excitement and tension of the men's minds, and then a rapid uncontrolled fire must be permitted, — in fact it cannot be stopped, for the men will take to it of their own accord. The worse the enemy, and the better one's own troops are, the less will this distance be, and vice versa. Thus controlled firing is essential, because it is of the greatest importance that a commander shoidd not cease for a single instant, if possible, to have his men perfect^ under his hand, if he wishes for success. This can only be done by con- trolled firing, as an uncontrolled fire, unless in exceptional cases, reduces the power of control over the men to a minimum. "Thus the edvication of the soldier ought to be directed towards a severe fixe discipline, so that a commander may, in the middle of a combat, obtain every advantage from the rifle, and be able to pass suddenly from the defensive to the offensive, when the opporttme moment, always short in war, presents itself." 353 CHAPTER XV. FIRE DISCIPLINE AND THE CONTROL AND DIREC- TION OF FIRE.— FIRE UNITS OR GROUPS. Now, since infantry in action acts almost exclusively by lire, it can only obtain a superiority over an enemy by means of a superiority of fire. This superiority is gained, other things being ecjual, either by a numerical superiority, by a greater efficacy of lire, or by a greater rapidity of lire, combined in each case with a great consumption of ammunition, and suitable formations of small depth, to prevent excessive losses from the enemy's fire. Con- sidering opponents equally well armed, numerical superiorit}' is limited by the space available for the troops ; greater efficacy of fire, by the training received in peace time ; the consumption of ammunition in action, by the amount carried by the soldier, to which may be added the extra quantity which may be issued to him before entry into action ; and the rapidity of fire, by the loss of accuracy which it entails when pushed to extremes, the available supply of ammunition, and the facility of replenishing it. With regard to the formation, the greatest amount of fire, from a given front, is obtained from troops in line, in close order, two deep ; but long lines in such a formation are not manageable, and wovdd suffer great losses under modern fire, and hence opened out lines in single rank are what are now-a-da^-s used, at all events in the earlier stages of the fight, until the enemy has been demoralised and the efficacy of his fire so reducecl as to admit of denser and deeper formations. Infantry fii-e. in order to be efficacious, must be directed by the troops in extended order on comparatiA'ely few objectives, at a time, so that it may be of a collectivi* nature ; in a word, grouping of skirmishers and concentration of fire is the modern idea of fighting. The great range of modern rifles allows of the concentration on a single object, not only of the fire of the troops immediately opposite it, but also of the neighboimng troops ; and the grouping of these troops, and placing them under the direct control of their officers and others, facilitates the "direction of the fii'e," and permits of the needful concentration of fire, which is necessaiy to obtain the greatest effect. Besides, it is the officers alone 354 who are capable of deciding -when the opportune moment arrives to open fii-e ; they alone can judge of the results to be expected, and estimate whether the consumption of ammunition will be remunerative or not, or even advisable from the facility and means available at the spot for replen- ishing it. The French regulations express themselves in the following manner on the general principles for conducting fire in action : — "Fire is the preponderating element in battle. Its action must not be abandoned to individual initiative, or else it wiU degenerate into a useless f usilade, cause a waste of amm;inition, and accordingly expose the troops to the danger of finding themselves practically disarmed at the decisive moment. " The (lidy of controlling the fire falls on the commanders of the companies forminff the fighting line, and on the officers employed in this line. "The captain determines the objects to be fired on, the nature of the fire, the fractions of troops to be thrown into the line during the whole period of preparation. He orders the general distribution according to the object to be attained, reinforces the line according to the necessities of the fight, and, while leaving to the officers under his orders the necessary initiative for the execution of the duty which he has assigned to them, he watches that the fire does not deviate from the direction which he has assigned to it, and tries to control it up to tlie last moment. "The sectional commanders (according to the orders they have received) indicate to the nn^n the siglits to be used, point out the objective to be aimed at, the number of cartridges to })e fired, and regulate tlie intensity and duration of the fii-e. " Tli(> duty of tlie coiumauders of [])(> small(>r imits [i.e. groups), is to watch that tli(> orders are carricnl out concerning the sights to b(> used, the direction of the fire, the paus(^s and re-o]ieiiiiig of llie fire, or in a word, to assure the execution of the orders given. "The control of fire refpiires calmness, decision, skill in estimating distances, tactical judgment to apjireciato the importance of the different obj(>ctives that present themselves, as well as a complete knowledge of the properties of the ground, the ballistic qualities of the rifle, and of the effects it can produce." The frerman regulations say with regard to the control of fire in action : — " In action, the utilisation of the rifles, as long 355 as control of fire exists, belongs to the leaders. A rational employment of tlie fire is one of the essential guarantees of success. The necessary conditions to obtain it, are — calmness, tactical judgment, skill in estimating distances, gift of obser- vation, correct appreciation of the ground, and knowledge of the ballistic properties of the weapon." The first principle in action is to concentrate the fire on the important points, and to put in action the greatest number of rifles possible, so as to obtain the desired result in the shortest time. To do this, the following questions would, during the period of preparation for the assault, pass through an oificer's mind in about the order given. ' ' When shall I open fire, and what number of rounds must I expend ? What number of men must I place in the firing line ? What is the exact line on the ground on which I must extend them ? What named objectives must I specify to them to fire on ? What is the range of these objectives, and what sights must the men use ? What kind of fire must be used ? What intensity should the fire have ? What attitude should the men fii'e in ? How can I best observe the results of the fire ? " Having determined on an answer to each of these questions, an officer has still to ask himself during the period of exe- cution, when the advance to the assault takes place, — " Shall I let my men fire while in movement ? What number of rounds am I to let the men fire at the halts after each rush forward? When shaU I order the bayonets to be fixed?" Besides these questions, an officer must also frequently ask himself — "How is my expended ammunition to be re- plenished? " The direction of the fire consecj[uently means (1) the deter- mination of the moment of opening fij-'e,"^-" the estimation of the number of cartridges to be used to attain a definite resiJt, and the consideration whether the existing phase of the fight, as well as the available supply of ammunition, and the facility of replenishing it, will justifj^ such a consumption ; (2) the detennination of the force required in the firing line, in order that the number of cartridges deemed necessary may be fired in the desired time; (3) the choice of the ground to be taken up by the men; (4) the selection and allotment, amongst the body of troops firing, of the objects to be fired on ; (5) the determination of the range and choice of sights * This is more with reference to the period before the actual of£enEi%e attack takes place. z 2 356 to he used ; (6) the determination of the kind of fire to he used ; (7) the intensity of the fire to he kept np ; (8) the choice of the attitude to he taken iip hy the men firing; ; (9) the ohser- vation of the resiJts obtained; (10) the advisability of allow- ing men to fire while in movement or not ; (11) the nmnher of roimds to he fired at the temporary halts after each rush or hound in advance; (12) the choice of the moment when bayonets should be fixed; and (13) finally, the supply of fresh ammunition and means of providing it during the various phases of the fight. The control of the firing consists in the carrying out of the above orders, that is, in ordering the elevation, the objective to fire at, the number of rounds to be fired, and the kind of fire to be employed, in seeing these orders obeyed, and in watching that the men take carefid aim, with the required elevation, and on the desired objc^ct. Tlie direction and control of iirc are included under the name oi fire tactics. Fire discipline, or the execution of the fire, may be defined as notliing but the unhesitating haliit. developed in the men by instruction and training, of commencing, or ceasing, or relaxing the fire, or of concentrating it upon a defined object, all in obedience to the deHberate will of the commander. No firing should ever be permitted tcithout orders, and it should cease immediateh/ the command is given for it to cease. The Italian regulations say that "In order to obtain the maximum effect from infantry fire, the indispensable conditions are : — A rigorous fire discipline on the part of the troops who execute it, and an intelligent direction on the part of the headers wlio conmiand it." Up till lati'ly, in Continental armies, the company* of 200 to 250 men was c(msidered as tlie "unit of fire," and, tlierefore, most of the duties of directing the fire Ix'longed to th(^ coiiinianders of the companies in the firing line, wliile the (hity of the sectiimal connnanders and non-com- missioned oflicers was to control tlie fire of the men, by taking care that they aimed at the object indicated, with tlie sight ordered, that they carefully observed the proper in- • A German coinpiiny of thrno "ziipo" consists of 2!i() men in w.u linur, and, in action, Iiuh h " zu^i: " or ono-third of tl)o men extendi d in llii) firing line, tlie romiiindcr heinp in support. The Austrian, Itali.ni, H>id French eomixtnies consist of 'J50 men, divided into four sections eacli. 'riH\se com])anioH, after the first few days cam]iaig7iing, will only nm.slcc about 200 men each, even before an action takes jdaco. tervals of periodic firing, that they oxpenclod only the numbers of rounds ordered, and that they did so in the time fixed. Tlie sectional commanders were the agents of the company com- mander in all that related to the control of fire, and abroad, where the sections are further sub-divided into groups, each under a leader for control and guidance, the sectional com- manders were assisted in this duty by the group leaders. But lately in the Grermau and other armies this duty of the fire direction has been also thrown on to the sectional com- manders, from the difficulty that the company commanders have in commanding and directing such a large body of men under fire as a companj^ of 200 to 250 men. The direction of the firing is thus confided to the officers and section leaders in tlie firing line, the actual control of the firing is left to the group-leaders, while fire discipline is required of the men. The complete maintenance of such a sub -division of duties is only possible at some distance (about 400 yards and over) from the enemy, before such serious losses have occurred as must entail an irregular mixing of groups and sections on the troops in rear being sent forward. ■^•' The Grermans ivj to avoid this irregular mixing as long as possible, which must loosen the control, and when it must take place they inake the small groups and sections in the fii'ing line close in on them- selves, as required, as the losses occiu', and then reinforce them by bringing up complete groups or other units into the gaps so left. But even when this is not possible, or has not been done, there is an immense value in having a number of men, accustomed to lead in a firing line in order to try and guide and direct the confusion and so to lessen it. Men must be taught in peace practices to attach themselves to the nearest commander, and to obey the rank, and not merely the person only, so as to accustom them to obey strange leaders when under them. Two things are necessary for this, (1) that each soldier shoidd have the strongest conviction of the uselessness of independent fire at all ranges over 400 yards, and of the efficacy of a collective fire ; and (2) discipline among the men — the key note of every * jNIuch confusion of ideas has arisen from an improper use of the words " mixing of units." The words " in-egular mixing" are purposely made use of here. The Author has, on p. 4 2 7, endeavoured to define the expression " mixing of units " more clearly, and to i)ut a limit to its use. A regular mixture of units, hy placing them side hy side, cannot have the s;ime disadvantages as an irregular mixing of them, causing them to he all jumbled up anyhow together. 358 success in \rar. All the above remarks cau be applied per- fectly -^ell to tlie English organization, except tlie remarks concerning group-leaders, as vre have not yet introduced the group system in our attack formation. It is to be hoped that, in the future, the non-commissioned officers of the English army will be taught and allowed to lead and control the action and fire of the men in both close and extended order. The sections of Continental companies, when mobilized for war, vary from 60 to 80 men in strength, and these are sub-divided into groups of from 8 to 16 men each, each under a non-commissioned officer or old soldier,* and which are given a bond by being used for administrative purposes, and for the sub-di%asion of duties in barracks, camp and quarters. When the non-commissioned officers have been well taught, and consequently looked up to and respected by the men, it must have a great influence in action, especially in the final confusion of the fight. At the shorter ranges, groups are soon broken up by the dissolving power of the modern breech-loader, and get mixed up liy tlie fresli arrivals of troops from the rear. Now comes to the front the effect of any dis- cipline and peace instruction that the men have had to place themselves under the nearest leader, even if a non-commis- sioned officer, in order that their fire may be given the greatest effect by being used collectively. The following extract is taken from the well-known pamphlet, T/ir Frontal Attack of Infantry: — "The importance' of non-commissioned officers depends less on their command of appointed groups than on the influence Avliich their position, experience and matured character insures them over the skirmishers in tlu'ir vicinity. Tliey are the mainstay of the offiix'r in the exercise of his influence; over the skirmishing lin(\ They should be the first to follow him, and so draw (he men on by their example, and in an emergency they must \)v able to take his place. For this it is necessary in ])eace tinu> to mak»^ every endeavour to develoj) their intelligence for tactical relationsf and countiy, and to elevate them both mentally and morally. * 'I'ho Uormaii fcioup coiisisls of eight men only ; the " zug," a third of a company, contains 10 of such gi'oups, under the oHieors and non- commissioned officers of the "zug." The I'Yench and Austrian groups consist of 14 men in war time, and four groups go to a section, or 16 groups to a company. t Tactics cannot be separated from fire. Modern tactics is the art of obtaining the greatest development of fire with the least loss to oneself. 359 "It is, however, the company officers wlio are of tlie gi'eatest importance for the maximum development of the whole strength of the skirmishing fight. They must have the greatest impulse for independent activity, so as to seize immediately each opportunity for action. They should have sound tactical judgment, so as to survey the situation c|uickly, and make dispositions according!}-, so as to join in the fight properly, either by an opportune support of another detach- ment or by taking advantage of any weakness displayed by the enemy. Lastly, they should have a knowledge of country, so as to be able even in action to detect the slightest advantage offered by it. " Training men to independent action may tempt them to get away from control sooner than they should, for greater independence, and so destroy all order and power of guidance of the whole, especially at a time when the extent of ground covered by the extended troops, and the tax made on them by the impressions of the action, have enormously increased the difficulties of the command." Continental practice does not, however, agree with another extract from the same work, namely, — " The system of working men b}' groups in the firing line in peace time is very pernicious, as it makes men look to the group-leaders for ever3-thing; the men get accustomed to be led, and do not make any use of their intelligence. " From what has been said, this leading of the men in the firing line is just what is wanted to obtain mutual action, and it rec[uires the fidlest intelligence of the man to allow himseK to be thus led. The independent action of men in the firing line, at ranges over 400 yards, cannot be too strongly deprecated. The Grennans, who have perhaps studied this cjuestiou most deeply, are unanimous in declaring that fii'e discipline must be principally obtained by the moral ascendancy of the leaders over their men ; but they own, that even with this ascendancy the control of the fire can only l)e maintained up to a certain point. The most ijerfect mpervmon ivill lead to no result unless it is supplemented hy the most stringent fire diseipline, and it cannot be too strongly impressed that it is only tvhen every soldier has been well practised in this fire discijiline that the full ejfect of modern rifles can he obtained. When direction and control are no longer exercised, fire must become irregidar, and therefore, as a principle, the company and sectional conmianders must endeavour to preserve 360 the eoutrol of the fire as long as possible, even in the shortest ranges. ''To kei'p tlii'ir men in hand oiig-ht tlierefore to be the constant and principal preoccupation of every company ofticer in all peace exercises ; they ought to try and maintain the direc- tion of the fire as long as possible, even Avhen their men have entered into the zone of short ranges. If they know how to do this, if they succeed in time of peace in inculcating into their men this fixed conviction of ' not to fire a single shot without the appi-oval of the nearest officer,' then they may hope to obtain in the field snch a fire discipline as will be fi-uitful of great residts." Now let us deal in detail with the first twelve different jiarts of the duty of direction, mentioned on pp. oo5 and 356. The thirteenth heading, on the supply of ammunition, has been fully dealt Avitli in Chapter Xlll. and will not be re- ferred to again. 1. The Distance at which Fire should be Opened akd THE Number of Cabtridges to be Used to Attain a Definite Object. No definite rules can be laid down for such an estimation, but it is greatly governed by th(> cover available, the existing phase of the fight, the target offered by the enemy, the avail- abl(> supply of ammunition, and tlie facility of replacing it, all of whicli must be well considered, in order to come to a con- clusion whether such a ccmsumption is justified. This is imu-h iiinir important for the attack tliau tlic defence, as the means of supplying men constantly moving towards an enemy over liri'-swi'pt ground nro far harder tlian those of supplying stationary men under cover. Naturally, the first rule is to appi'oach tlie enemy as near as possible, so as to opiMi the most efficacious fire possi])le. " ( 'onimanders of com])anies in llie tigliting line ouglil, on ]>rinei]ile, to order commence firing, not when the infantry lire of the enemy l)ecoiues dangerous, l)ut when the line has got to such a disfance from the enemy that its fire is effective.*' In advancing t(» the attack, and as soon as the artillery jire- jiaration is al an end, they slu)ul(l endeavour t(» ]iush their * 'l"li(! clTcctivo ratij^o at any iiKUiiciif, depends on tlw! acciu-jicy with \vlii()i tliis range in known, and the si/.i! and exposnl li(>if;'ht of tlio ol»j('(;tivc. The Kciicral <)|)ini<)ii, Imwiver, is tliat men sliould lin allowed to Hro a little early in tlwt fiKlil, wliile advaneiiif;, to k(M>i) tlie olTiin.sive sjiiril lip, .iihl not t" chiiKiinl tno miuii fmiii tluan. 361 firing" lino within effective range of the enemy, that is in prineiph* (theoretically) up to 400 yards, then immediately to reinforce the line in each company, and then to connncnce tiring. " Xevevtheless, the most determined advocates of tliis close fire allow that the troops of the first line can only fulfil the requirement of getting within effective range of the enemy, when the ground on which they move is particularly favour- ahle. Should it not be so, fire must be opened before arriving at 400 vards, that is to say at some distance between 800 and 400 yards. " In the German army it is held that when on the defensive fire should be opened sooner than on the offensive, as a rule at 800 yards. This divergence of practice is justified by the facts that, for the defensive, the ranges are more accurately known, and may even be marked, the supply of ammunition is easier, the men are under cover and can tire from a rest. "It is needless to say that if, before arriving at 800 yards distance, the enemy should offer a favourable mark, a fire of masses would be directed upon it. "All the commanders engaged, but particularly those com- manding units not yet within effective range of the enemy,* should always try to estimate the amount of ammunition which must be expended to attain a definite object, and consider whether the immediate situation of the fight, the local avail- able supply of ammunition, and the facility for replenishing it, will justify the required expenditure. " In the case of a false attack, or a delaying action, it may be absolutely necessary to execute a vigorous fusilade, or to keep up a more or less lively fire at distances more or less considerable, although there may be little hope of inflicting serious loss. The object to be gained, in these cases, is to deceiA'e the enemy, and to keep him tied to the spot ; the fire should therefore be regidated accordingly, but the commander should always take account of the amount of ammunition required for the action which he is ordered to carry out, and arrange for a proper supply of cartridges to replace the expenditure. " These considerations of supply, therefore, exercise great influence in fixing the moment when the order to comnumce firing should bo given. It is quite certain that a body of troops supplied with an unlimited amount of ammunition * For example, troops in the first line, while the artilleiypri:]iar;ition is going on, or troops in .seoond line, or troo])s sent to execute a false attack or a delaying action. 362 would scarcely need to tliiuk of waste, aud might open fire at much greater distances than those which have been laid down for ordinary practice. Moreover, it is not to be forgotten that, in an attack, opening iii-e at too great distances diminishes the offensive power of troops, and gives a pro- tracted character to the attack. It may be added that the moral force of the troops is injured by seeing that their fire is ineffective whilst that of their adversary increases in power. "Commanders of companies judge the expenditure of ammunition and estimate the number of rifles to be brought into play by certain very simple data," obtained by calculation fi"om the results gained by peace experiments on the effect of modern rifle fii-e at different ranges on different formations, and on the different positions of standing, kneeling and lying down. Beyond the limits of accm*ate independent fii-e, certainty of effect is only to be obtained by the collective fii-e of a g^eat number of rifles on the same object. In this case only can we count on a certain percentage of hits, Avhich will depend on the height, breadth and depth of the object. For practical purposes. Tables IX. aud XIA^. (pp. 145, 170), show sufficiently well the relative proportion of losses, between the line and column, lying down and standing, and gives sufl&cient data for ascertaining the desirability or otherwise of opening fire. The following simple data, obtained by calculation from Table XIY., are given by Maj(ir Yon Metzier : — "When the object represents a line of men standing up, and is divided into spaces equal to the breadth of a man, one hundred shots give at 4-fO yards twenty hits, at 770 yards ten hits, and at 1,100 yards five hits. "Against a kneeling enemy, at meilium and long ranges, the results would be less by a half, and if he were lying down they would be one-fourth oidy. Against an extended line the results would Ix^ a half, third, &c., according to the density of the line; against u company column the losses up to 770 yai'ds would be mor<' considerable,*' and beyond that distance would even be doul)le(l." All the nuniliers given in the above statements can only be considered as ap]tro.\iuiative. To get a good elicit against objects over 770 yards reipiires a large expenditure of ammunition, and if it is to be quickly attained, as should l)e invariably done when possible, a pro- portionately largo number of men must be employed. Under • See Gononil Brialmout'H remarks on j). 171. 363 certain circumstances, however, a good effect against large objects, such as batteries and closed bodies of troops, may be obtained up to 1,300 yards. The data given in Tables IX. and XI. show the approxi- mate connection between the number of hits and the ammunition consumed. As an inefficacious fire weakens the moral force of the men delivering it, and raises that of the enemy, therefore before opening fire the company commander ought always to consider if the consumption of cartridges thought necessary to attain a certain object is in harmony with the result hoped for, and is justified by the situation of the fight and the supply of ammunition available. If the company commander sees no residt from his fire he should at once stop it, and wait for a more favourable opportunity for re-opening fire. "With the question of the amount of ammunition required for a definite object, the question of the distance of the object is intimately connected. We see from the above-mentioned tables that the longer the range, the greater is the amount of ammunition required to he exjjencled to gairi the name result. Thus, this fact combined with the supply of ammunition available and the rdle that the particular body of troops has to play, will ■ decide whether the tire maj- be opened at once, or reserved for a closer range. The closer the enemy is approached the harder it will be to break off the fight, should this be required to be done. The French regulations say: "The distances at which fire may be opened depend on the greater or less facility- of con'ecting the fire, on the form of the gi'ound, on the vulnera- bility of the objectives, and on their tactical importance. " The only result of firing at a distant objective is to demoralise a body of men, to retard their entry into action, and thus to give greater chances of success later on ; the occupation of an important point, such as a bridge, a dehouehe which an enemy must pass through, &c., can be rendered difficult by it ; but it rarely produces decisive results, the only results aimed at in a decisive action. Thus its usage demands a sound and carefully weighed appreciation of the situation, and it must not be left to the initiative of leaders of all grades. As a rule it is the battalion and company leaders who will deter- mine the object, the time, and the duration of such a long range fire. "It is especially at the short distances that it is necessary to have available a great niunber of cartridges and rifles, in 364 ortler to have a decisive supcriorit}- at the timt' when the fire l)r<)duces the surest and most powerful effects. "The 2)reparation of the attack at long distances belongs to the artillery, and it is only exceptionally tliat infantry can join in it. "A premature opening of fire in the fighting line onl}^ prolongs the fight, and leads, therefore, to a weakening of the ammunition supply and of the moral energy of the assailants. ' ' On the offensive, in open ground, the firing line ought never, as a rule, to open fii-e beyond 800 yards. Intersected and close ground allows it to approach to short distances without firing. '' On the defensive, occasions will be found, more often than on the offensive, of making use of an efficacious fire even up to 1,300 3'ai*ds, on objects of large dimensions, principally on artillery and cavahy. •'This distant fire of the defence will also compel the assailing troops to take open order sooner, and perliaps cause them to make a greater consumption of ammunition at longer ranges than they should." But long range fin* sliould never be attempted unless the range is known within sufficient limits, and care must be taken that its iise does not involve a want of ammunition at the decisive moment, and special care must therefore be given to replacing the ammunition as it is expended. " It should always bo borne in mind that beyond 800 metres (880 yards) a serious I'fficacy can only be obtained by a great individual consumption of annnunition if there is not time to put a sufficient number of rifics into action. Hence, the fire at all these ranges, except in exceptionally favorable circumstances, should not l)e ordered liy captains of companies, lint when the order is given to iire on any stated objective, tlie total number of cartridges rerjuireil to ol)tain a ust>ful effect should l»e unliesitatingly used, for experi(>nce has shewn tliat an inefficaeious iire seriously influences in a dangerous manner tlie spirit of the troops firing, and acts morally to the profit of the enemy. " Up to HOO metres oltjectives of full height can be lired on with good results, liut beyond KM) metres, any eliicacv on <»b- jectives of small height is only to be obtained by a larg(! consumption of ammunition. " Fire b(!yond 800 metres is an exception that can only be jusfilied by the vulnerability oi' the enemy's formation in front, height and depth ; it can lie us(ul up to 1,'iOO metres on 365 special objectives such as batteries, columns, masserl for- mations, etc." — [Bulletin cle la Reunion des Officiers, 1885). Having considered the range and the amount of ammuni- tion that will have to be expended in attaining the object in Adow, the company commander will have further to consider whether the existing phase of the fight, or the ammunition that he has, will justify the expenditure. If the combat is in real earnest, as in a decisive battle, then every round must be retained by the attack for the shorter and decisive ranges. Hardly anything will justify a single round being expended at any range beyond the nearest tliat can be got to, though, from the moral encouragement that returning fii'e gives the men advancing under fire, a few rovmds, under the most severe control, may be fired during the advance to the decisive ranges. Then, again, in such a fight, it is impossible to supply ammunition when the real advance has once begun. In temporising actions, or false attacks, fire may be opened at longer ranges, as the attack will not be pushed home, which enables it to be broken off at an}^ moment, and thu supply of ammunition is facilitated. If there is no artillery, or if there is an inferiority in this arm, infantry will have to prepare its own attack, in which case a much larger amount of ammunition will have to be expended, and a proportionately larger supply will have to be provided for. 120 rounds, fii'ed only at the rate of one a minute, will be expended in two hours. The amount of ammunition to be expended cannot bo formidated by any rules, but experience alone can form a guide to this consideration, and this experience is entirely wanting in the English service. After all, we see that there are no exact rules that can be given with regard to estimating the exact amount of ammuni- tion to be expended to attain a definite object. All that can be said is, that if a decisive residt is required, the ammunition must be saved for the shortest range possible. Tlie shorter the range, the men being in hand, the more effective the fir(>. The more important the objective fired at is, in a tactical sense, the greater is the number of cartridges that should be poured on it. n we do not wish to close with the enemy, then get to the nearest distance which will still allow us to retire unimpeded, so as to get the greatest efficacy possible to injure him as much as possible. To break an enemy's strength in every 366 Tvay, however small, is the ohject of war. The sum of several small effective efforts will, iu the end, amount to a large result. 2. Determination of the Fokce Eequired. Having formed some idea as to the amount of ammunition to be expended, the next thing is the determination of the force requii'ed in the fii-ing line, in order that the nimiber of cartridges deemed necessary may be exjieudcd in the desired time. It may be laid down that when an earnest attack is con- templated, it should be carried out in the shortest time possible, and with the greatest determination. Clearness of design and energy in execution is, therefore, essential for success. A long, di'awn out, hesitating attack is fatal to the offensive spirit and to victory. The first condition of all is to gain a superiority of fire. This is the price of victory. The French regidations say : — "The number of men to be employed depends on the tactical object in view, on the number of cartridges necessary to obtain a good efficacy, and on the time available for the execution of the fire. "A slow fire, left to individual men, has no useful effect, while it offers the great inconvenience of delaying a forward movement. "The supports ought to be brought up into the firing line as soon as it is really necessary' to act by fire. It is essential for effect, to produce from tlio beginning a powerfid con- centration of fire on the enemy's front." As fire is the preponderating element in baifl(\ the suppoi'ts should be moved \\.\) to the weak extended .skirmish- ing lines as soon as tire is to be seriously open(>d ; it is essential tliat a powerfnl combination of lire should l)e opened on tlie enemy from the very lirst, as soon as an effective range is readied. Jl(i]>idity of net ion is hesf (difainrd hy I he suddenness of fire, tchieh is one of the principal conditions of its ejjicacy. The moral influence of a material rcnult gained is the greater as this result is obtained in a nhorter time. Ah the moral effect of sudden and rapid losses is so great, it is best to expend, the required ammunition as quickly as possible, hy employing the greatest number of rifles that can he conveniently used (it one time on the same objective. "Tho useful effpft of n fire depends on its accuracy and 367 rapidit}', but this result is better sought in the medium and long ranges by means of the accuracy of the fire, and the number of men made to fire, rather than by too great a rapidity of fii-e." It should be remembered by the leaders that the moral effect of fire upon troops is the greater the more it is concentrated, not only as to place hut also as to time. A whole company firing five rounds per man on a given objective, will produce a greater impression than a fourth of the company firing twenty rounds per man. The Italian regulations say: — "Being given a tactical objective to destroy by fii-e, the effective to be employed will depend on the number of buUets necessary to obtain the required result, and on the time that it is to be effected in. Thus, for example, if one is obliged to expend a considerable number of cartridges in a relatively short time, which usually happens when a long range fire is to be directed on troops in movement or against a battery coming into action, or if one wishes to ascertain the range by obser-sdng the strike of the bidlets, it is necessary to rapidly employ a considerable force, in order to be able to concentrate on the objective a great mass of projectiles in a very short time. In these cases it is necessary to make a body of men to fire, of strength at least equal to a company (200 men). For these purposes, Table IX., p. 145, must be carried in the memory, at least approxi- mately." " On the offensive, moral and material superiority consist, at the present day, in not being afraid to expend the necessary number of men, and in getting so near to the enemy as to be able to make the effect of our fire felt very quickly, and thus to inflict rapidly on the enemy the amount of loss required to be decisive of success." (Jloderne Fcuer- taktik). Nevertheless, it is evident from many Continental writings, that voices are now being raised in favoiu' of the maxim that "the assailant ought to open fire as soon as the fixe of the defensive party begins to be effective." The same author adds "In perfectly level country one can rarely approach within 800 yards of the enemy without covering the advance by fire. The losses would become in fact so heavj^ that the fighting line would be insufficient to ensixre a superiority of fire. Even if it were possible to arrive within 400 yards of the enemy's position, as has often been recom- mended, it cannot be denied that the men being without rover woidd, at this range, be in a very critical position." 308 A French Ao-iter, in the Journal dcs Sciences Jl/Iitaircs (1880), says, that when pitted against the breech-loader, "The greatest superiority shovdd be tried to be secured by deploying great masses of skirmishers. To restrict the fire, by only extending the fewest possible skirmishers at first, only tend to place us, from the beginning, in a state of inferiority as compared with an enemy acting according to other principles. The German principle is to give a great density to the line of skirmishers })lacing the men almost elbow to elbow. Lines of skirmishers shoidd be more or less strong from the beginning ; weak lines partake rather of the character of an advanced guard tight to keep off small hostile detachments, but they are not suitable in T)attles, properly so called, because they only obtain results very slowly, and therefore they will, after all, have to be reinforced when the fire-fight begins. Dense lines of skirmishers will be preferable in open groimd, but in enclosed ground, on the contrary, where sometimes unforeseen events occur, a thinner line of skirmishers would be used, so as to leave more in reserve. As the defence usually fires at known distances, and Avith more coolness, from its being sheltered, it is less likely to waste its ammunition, and hence it can open fire sooner, while its fire need not be so intermit- tent as that of the assailant, who has to suspend his tire while moving. A moral ascendancy on the part of the attack is rec[uired, capable of resisting such a superiority of conditions. The tactical object can only be reached at the price of certain sacritices, to which we must make up our minds. A timorous preparation of the assaidt, with a small proportion of the force, can only serve to raise the tone of the defence." It must not be forgottcMi tliat tlie extended firing line is now the attacking formation. Columns of attack are now iuadmissibh^ under modern lire, and they liave been replaced })y a dens(f line of skinnislicrs with large reserves in rear to draw on. Victory now, as ever, depends on tin? final close attack of masses, and the ])rolilem is how to g(>t the mass across the tire-swept zoni' to deliver its assault. ■ ForuKU'ly it was effected })y a thin line of skirmishers engaging the (>nemy, followed by closed columns for effecting the assault, now it is effected by the skinnishing line itself, which has to bo very dcnise, foi* the ])uri)os(! of giving it sullicient moral and material strength for the ]iurpoHe. But it may ho asked how is such a line to live under thenccuracy of modern fire, and arrive at assaulting distances ? The answer is, it cnnnot do so unless the defenders 369 liave hoen sufficiently shaken and domoralizod by a preparatory artillery or combined artillery and infantry fire of some hours duration on the main points of attack. Experience has shewn that wherever this has not been done the attack has failed, by being brought to a standstill, or driven back by the fire of th(! defenders, provided that the anmiunition of the latter has not run out, as that of the French right did at Gravelotte. This preparatory action is the true secret of the success, and even possibility of an assault, against troops armed with modern weapons, and skilled in their use. Both Germans and Russians suffered terribly when they neglected this principle of modern tactics. "The German infantry, from its sound tactical judgment, has escaped from the danger which seems to threaten that arm of the service in other countries, viz : of having the formation of its front line regulated solelg tvith the view of avoiding loss. In order to reduce losses, they choose formations suitable for overcoming the resistance of the enemy as quickly as possible, and not those which are least obnoxious to loss." " You cannot nialce omelettes without breaking eggs,'''' and no success can be gained in war ivithout a sacrifice.''^ " Thus the Germans give preference to such formations as best assure the exercise of conmiand, the cohesion of the force, the connection as well as the reciprocal action of its different component parts, and above all to the vigour and even solemnity of its attack. It is, they say, the long-j)rotracted, indecisive, wavering actions which lead to the greatest losses, and not those vigourously and rapid!}' carried out. ^Ul the German military writers, even those who demand llie largest concessions to fire tactics, appear to be unanimous in maintaining and fostering the offensive spirit in their infantry, a spirit which seeks, after the preparatory fire of the artillerg, to bring up to within effective range of the enem}', opposite those parts of the hostile line which have suffered most from the cannonade, and where the fore-ground is most favourable to their approach, troops well in the hands of their leaders, and with their pouches as full as possible." Thus the rule is to gain a decisive effect with the greatest rapidity possible, and to do this, we must bring up the greatest number of men possible, in order not to reduce the useful (effect of the fire by a too great rapidity of fire, which injiu-es the accuracy. The number of cartridges to be fired are better expended by a large number of men firing a few rounds in a short time than by fewer men firing more rounds in a longer time. In the former case also the men's personal 370 suppl}' of ammimition will not be so weakened for further action, — a verj' important point. In Continental warfare, one man per yard can be used in the attack or defence during the fii'st phases of an action, after a suitable artillery prepar- tion ; in savage warfare, double this niuubcr can be used. If a decisive effect is not aimed at, then only enough rifles may be brought into the firing line to check the enemy seriously, should he try to advance. The German regidations say that if two sights are em- ployed, then there is no advantage in firing with less than eight}' men (a third of a company), and if three sights, a whole company (250 men) should be employed. The Austrian regulations say that "To ensure a reasonable effect with long range fire for a given expenditure of car- tridges, it should not, as a rule, be undertaken with bodies of less than fifty men, and then onl}' against deep columns and masses, such as company columns, closed supports and re- serves, or thick shooting lines in the open up to 1,000 yards, or against battalion or squadron columns under like conditions lip to 1,200 yards. If any of these objects are partially hidden, they shoidd have a greater depth than indicated above to justif}' their l)cing fired at. Batteries of artiUerv and large general staffs ma}- be fired upon up to 1,200 yards under any circumstances." " If it is proposed to employ infantry against artillery, the Germans say, a distinction must be made if the artiUcry is occupied elsewhere or not. Wlien a battery is in action against artillery, a single company (of 200 men) may be opposed to it at from 900 to 1,;500 yards. But if the battery is not occupied elsewhere, and can turn its fire on the opposing infantry, then tin? Germans would employ at least four companies [i.e. a battalion), against th(^ battery, because the result of exjieriments made l>v Ixtth the French and Germans has shewn them that at tliese two rang(>s a l>attery produces an effect equivalent to twice and four times, respectively, that of a coni])any of 200 men*. iSiinilnrly, when infantry stiek to ]»revent artillery I'roiii taking u]) a positicm, it should employ at least a battalion, so as to spread d(>ath amongst • An Kiif^lisli Imtlrry will |)rn1)!il)ly require more infantry to silence it, from its HUperior Hhrii])nel ])r<>je(tileH. Kac^li shi'll of the new l.'j-jjoundor fiold pun wirries 1 Ifl hiiUolH. A liiittcrv of O-iwunders ain »!vun now ilefend their own front, if tho f^onnd i.i open for at leaat 1,000 yards to this front. 371 the teams and men, and throw it into disorder before it can unlimber."* — {Revue Militaire de VEtr anger). 3. — On the Choice of the Grouxd to be Taken Ur by THE Men. The German regulations say that a free field of fire is the first condition ; to shelter oneself from the enemy's fire is only a secondary consideration. Consequently, the men in the firing line must be pushed on to the further edge of any cover, or to the top of any rise in the gi'ound, until they can plainly see the enemy they have to fire on. 4. The Selection of the Objects to be Fiiied on. "The fii'e of infantry in war has for its object: on the offensive, to facilitate the advance of the assailant b}" destroying the force of the resistance of the enemy on each successive position that he may occvip}', in such a way as to capture as rapidly as possible, and with the least loss, the ' key ' of the battle field, while causing the enemy the greatest loss possible in order to ensure a prompt and demoralising retreat, and to prevent any offensive returns on his part ; on the defensive, to retard and prevent the advance of the assailant, by inflicting the maximum of losses on him and throwing his ranks into the greatest disorder, then, when he has nearly reached the defender's position, to destroy him and force his retreat by overwhehning him with projectiles; in certain cases, the fire has only a purely demonstrative object, which consists of merely holding the enemy at certain points, while the real resistance or attack is made at others. "Thus a battle is a double problem of fire and manoeuvre. To reach the enemy and drive him off ; to wait for the enemy and repulse him ; these are the objects. The fire is only a means, though the preponderating one, either by its destructive or even moral effects." Colonel Bavaj', a Belgian officer, who has lately given some interesting notes on the choice of objectives in action, writes, "However important different methods of executing fire may be in influencing the efiicacy of the fii-e, j-et this * As to the tactical power of field artillery when well used, see a pajjer entitled "Infantry Fire r. Artillery Fire," by Col. L. Hale, R.E., in Vol. XX^^I. (p. 247) of i\x(i Journal of the Royal United Service Institution . Aa 2 efficacy can only produce any useful eifect from a tactical 2:)oint of view if it stops or paralyses the enemy's movements and breaks liis combinations. Thus "svo must try more to obtain useful effects than merely the satisfaction of inflicting some losses on the enemy, for however great these latter may be, they are of Kttle use if they do not prevent his final success. It is therefore very important from the first to seek the means of giving to the efficacy of the fire the greatest sum of useful effects, that is to say, its greatest tactical gain ; and this should be the principal object studied by tacticians, as their speculation woidd be of little avail if they do not give the most capable means of rapidly ensuring victory. "In order that the losses inflicted on the enemy may produce the greatest useful effect, it is necessary that they should be inflicted on those gi'oups of the adversar3''s dis- position for attack, which, by their role, strength, and situa- tion, can exercise a serious influence on the course of the action, and these, as the opportunity occurs, should be imme- diately destroyed or weakened. It can be therefore said that it is on the best choice of the objectives to be fired on that tho greatest tactical result of the efficacy of the fire depends. "The question of the choice of the objectives is a capital one ; it dominates aU others in connection with the direction of fire." A French ^nitcr says: — "On the offensive, as well as on the defensive, it is necessary to avoid scattering the fire. In accordance with this principle, the objects aimed at are to bo changed but rarely, and if new objects of distinct importance appear, it is better to send fresh bodies into the firing lino to fire at them, rather than to change the original direction of fire of the troops previously engaged." But this can only be done when gaps exist in tho fighting line, or if f lie new troops can be brouglit up on the flanks. Tho Frendi regulations say: — "Tho fire of a suffiiient number of rifles having been concentrated on clearly defined objects, all changes of olijeetive sliould b(> carefully avoided, so long as the result fii-st intended has not been obtained." TIk^ German regulations say: — "It is nec(>ssary to remark, that too fre(jnent changes of th(! oT)jecfive lead to a scattering of lire, and therefore it is very nec(>ssary to avoid doing so. " Tlie oltjects ar(< cliosen primarily according to their impoj-fance from a tncticnl ]ioint of view, and then tlie firc^ can be directed on sudi olijecfs wliicli. liy tluir dimensions, and 373 l)y the coufiguration of the grouud, promise some cliances of obtaining a serious eifect. "The judicious choice of the object, and the concentration of the fire on this object, are some of the most difficult duties in the direction of the fire." Again, they say: — "Up to 800 yards, all objects can be successfiJly hit by the collective fire of groups, but beyond this limit, lire should only be opened exceptionall}', and then only on objects whose dimensions offer favoiu-able chances. These objectives are, for example, batteries and considerable masses of troops, which can, if necessary, be fired on with good results up to distances of 1,300 yards." The Italian regulations say: — "In all cases the choice of objectives ought to be princij^ally subordinated to the tactical needs of the moment. If from a tactical point of view, many objectives have the same importance, that one should be chosen which has either the greatest depth ; or the greatest visible height, or is situated on ground most favorable for efficacy of fii-e." The Belgian regulations say : — " In action, it is the duty of the leaders to direct the fixe of their men to obtain advantageous results from it. "A judicious conduct of fii-e is one of the most essential guarantees of success ' ' In the deploj-ment, it is necessary to tell off a section of the front to each unit " One ought to insist, with regard to the general direction of the fh-e, on concentrating the fire on the same important point, and during a very short time. "A very frequent change of objectives conduces to the scattering of the fire. "The objects wiU be chosen, in the first place, according to their importance from a tactical point of view; and, in the second place, the fire can be directed on those which offer some favourable chances to be hit, by their dimensions, the con- figuration of the ground, &c." Thus we see that most instructions on the choice f>f objectives are rather vague. Colonel Bavay's hrochure on the subject gives the most complete rides for guidance, and most of the following remarks are extracted from it. So long as the enemy's disposition for fighting can be clearly made out, it will be relatively easy to make a judicious choice of the objectives to be fired at. This is usually the case in engagements of small units such as battalions, &c., 374 but Tvlien many battalions are engaged side hv side, eacli of tliem fight on a restricted front, and although the disposition may be clear enough at first, yet it soon presents a confused aspect, from the different groups in the first echelon or firing line not advancing at the same rate, and from the corresponding groups following in rear in the second and third echelons not being able to foUow their movements with regularity. The parallelism of the echelons is therefore soon broken up. Again, the echelons in rear of the filling line seek for shelter, and in doing this di'ift to the right or left of their true line of advance. Thus, from the unequal progi'ess and lateral displacement of the different groups, certain zones of the enemy's field of battle soon do not present any semblance of the original disposition, which alteration is still further augmented by any false dii'ection taken by the men in the firing lino. Now, if we consider that this disposition, when viewed obliquely, would appear still more confused, we can lay down that the ^V*^ rule in the judicious choice of the objectives to be fii'ed on, is that, provided the enemy in front is making a serious attack, which it is very necessary to destroy, and that he is within range, we ought to jjarficidarly select objects in the part of the enemxfs fighting disposition directly in front of us, leaving to the neighbouring troops on the right or left the duty of dealing tvith the objectives in the parts of the disposition opposite to them. But, as a number of groups may appear in the part of the enemy's disposition in on(>'s front, we must further choose between them. The firing lino of the enemy, altliough weak at first will soon become menacing ; but it has too feeble an effective to be able of itself to obtain a solution. Behind it comes the second eclielon or the supports, who, when they join the firing line, carry it forward with fresh ardour to the zone of ciruacious fire, from whence th(\y prepare the final phase of the fight. Further in rear is the third echelon or the reserves, wlio reinforce the sup])orts wlien it is necessarj'', foHow their movements, and wait for the moment Of the assault. Confident in their numerical force, and stimulated by the real progress they see, they soon join in their turn the most advanced groups, and giving them an energetic impulsion, tlioy push on the mass of the combatants to the assauh, of the position. Ah to which of these echelons should be fired on at the beginning of the action and during its different phases, will 375 l)e pointed out preseutly, but it may Le stated, that however good may bo the reason why, at a given moment, one objective may be selected in preference to another, it does not follow that according to the enemy's progress, the objective to be fired on should not have to be frequently changed ; on the contraiy, the objective must be changed according to the variable conditions of the fight. But too frecj^uent changes cause a loss of time, and lead to a scattering of losses, which prevent them from producing in any part a decisive effect. Hence, unless a stronger reason does not require ■us to act otherwise, we ought to fire on the same ohjective until we have destroyed it, or at all events, until tve have inflicted on it sufficient losses to temporarily paralyze its action. The roles of the different echelons in a fighting formation, stated above, show that these echelons are the "organs of action" of the fighting disposition. The mechanism of their movements has been so regulated as to give the disposition the maximum tactical effect, and hence, by considering the role of each of them, and the influence they exercise on the course of the fight, we can determine in which of the echelons we should choose the objectives to fii'e at. The duty of the fixing line is to open out a way for the echelons in rear. It exercises a considerable influence on the progress of the fight, as a bold or timid advance communicates itself immediately to all the disposition — success or defeat can almost be foretold by it. The fact of the first echelon having to make use of its fire to partly annihilate that of the enemy, and create a veil behind which the whole of the disposition can advance, is an acknowledgment that the fire of the defender is much more efficacious than that of the assailant, and consequently to avoid a certain destruction, before he can act with the bayonet, he will do all he can to shorten as much as possible the phase of the fight in which he finds himself in inferior conditions to the defenders. Hence, it is necessary, in principle, to choose the first ohjectives to le fired at, among the groups of the nearest echelons which threaten the greatest danger. General Skobeleff said in his instructions issued to the troops sent against the Akhal Tekkes : — " Even in European wars it is most important to obsei've the foremost groups of the enemy ; it is not really the mass of individuals present on the gi'ound that decides the victoiy, but the progress which, thanks to different circumstances, a few brave men may make advancing in isolated groups. Consequently, every attention must be paid to the appearance of groups of this nature, and direct on them by means of volleys the full power of yoiu* fire, for if you neglect to inflict great losses on them, these groups "O'lll increase in size in a wou- derful way and decide the affair in their favour. I counsel the leaders of all fractions to keep a watchfid eye on these advanced groups ; there is not a doubt but that, in annihilating them, we destroy (in the germ) all the initiative force of the rest of the mass." To effect this General Skobcleff recommended controlled tiring in the animated words given on p. 415. But during the course of an engagement the nearest troops of the enemy are nut always those which it is necessary to destroy first. Thus when the attack begins with an artillery duel, the infantry covering the artiller}- do not constitute the most immediate peril to the defenders, as the artillery alone then fii'e with efficacy, and the defenders cannot hope for much effect with their fire against the fii'st echelon of the enemy, on account of its distance, and of the groups composing it being scattered. But they can on the other hand, if they are in a good position and know the ranges, cause sensible losses on the artillery, which offers wide and deep objectives. During this artillery duel mounted officers are sent to reconnoitre the position or to carry orders, and if possible they should be shot, so as to delay the elaboration t)f the plan of the attack, and to injure its execution by preventing the troops receiving their orders. Thus the first exception to the last rule given is that when the attach heginn hij an artiUcri/ dud, and the f/uns are ivithin rijie range, or when during this prelude to the attttek, mounted officers are seen making a reconnaissance of the position or carri/ing orders, we should select as ohjcctiees, the enemg\s artil/erg and these mounted ojficers. When the fire of the defenders compels the (>nemy's firing line to Imlt, then the second echelon will come into action, and to do Ko it will liave to approach the firing lin(\ Up to this point the supports will liave taken care to keep themselves sheltered from the defender's lire, l)\it now they will have to show themselves to reach th<( firing line, presenting now objfictives on Avliich it is necessary to inflict losses, because if tluiy ar(« destroyed they prevent th(^ iiring line advancing. If the second ech<'lon fails lo produce the desired result of carrying forward the iiring line, the third echelon will be similarly used, and should be iired on for the same reason.* Hence the second * Sec footnote on p. 222. 377 exception to tlio last rule given is, lohen the most advanced echelon of the enemij cannot any longer advance, then ice must select ohjectkes to fire at, first in the second and then in the third echelon, ivhen theij advance. Further, if the firing line is halted for any reason, and offers very bad objectives, then the fire may be directed on objectives in the second or third echelon, provided such exist ivith a depth, height, and width, suitable to the range. The necessity for acciimulating large forces in certain parts of the battle field in order to carry on the assaidt at these points, causes only a relatively small quantity of troops to be available for the 'other portions who can then only have a demonstrative role. The firing line may not, in such a case, press forward very far, and its tii-e will be more noisy than efficacious. The r6le of the second echelon will be to feed the firing line, so as to maintain its density, in order to prevent the enemy realising the merety temporising effort being made. In this case the enemy's firing line should be fii-ed on, so as to prevent it subse- quently attempting to alter its role and take the offensive. The tactical object, the immobilisation of the firing line, being attained, either by the whole or pai-t of the defender's forces, or if there is any certainty of its being attained, then more favourable objectives in rear should be fired on, if they present themselves. Considering the important moral role pla3'ed by the troops in rear of a defensive firing line, and that the assailant has as a rule no immediate fear of any offensive action on the part of this firing line, they ought always to fixe on the supports and reseiwes of the defenders whenever the}^ appear in sight. At the close ranges the men will fij'e only on the echelon nearest to them, as it will appear to them t(j be the greatest danger, and they will be too excited and uncontrolled to listen to orders to fire on any other objective. The Tiu-ks in 1877-78, employed picked marksmen to fii-e on the officers of the enemy. This is a very good proceeding, because officers have a great influence on the progress of an attack ; the men, ha^-iug been trained to do so, look to them for orders and guidance, and when the officers are down, and orders are not forthcoming, the men begin to get out of hand, and the progress of the attack is delayed. From all that has been said about the superiority of col- lective fire over independent fire, it cannot be too strongly laid down, that when there are many groups in an objective at different ranges they should each be fired on successively ivith a collective fire 378 from the graded numhcr of rijies possible, and every effort should be made to prevent thejire being rendered inefficaeious from its being directed on all the groups at once, in order to produce the greatest tactical result 2)ossibIe during the duration of the fire ; but if all the groups are at the same range then the men may fire at the group in front of them . The greater the range the greater are the number of men required to obtain an etficacious eonective fire. But these groups, in any one echelon, may not all have the same importance, and hence we must consider which to select. Including under the word "vulnerability" the effect on the fire of cover and of the formation of the enemy's troops, the different objectives may find themselves in one of four conditions : — faj Having the same effectives and vidnerability. (bj Having the same effectives and different vulner- abilities. fcj Having different effectives and the same vidnerability . fdj Having different effectives and different vulner- abilities. In the fii'st case, in order to act so as to gain as C£uickly as possible the greatest tactical residt, we ought to fire on those objectives which have others in rear of them to be hit by buUets going higli, ricochets, &c., or on those groups at which officers and mounted orticers can "be seen, or on the most tVirward groups, the destruction of whiili demoralises those in rear. In the second case the olijective having the greatest vidnera- ])ility should bo first selected to be fired on. The third and fourth cases are not so easy to deal with, as they are also governed by the role to be played by the objec- tives in the action, and so it is not entirely a question of material losses. Thus in the third case, though two supports (of unequal strt>ngth aiul in tlie same formation, &c.) to different parts of a firing line cannot be absolutely prevented from reaching it and carrying it forward, yet in some cases it would l)e Ix'ttcr to fin! on tlii'- weaker H in the intervals between tin; strong ])oint8. Thus a skilful defeiuler will find numy oi)portuniti(\s of using a flank and cross firo with great effect, and the objective for tlu^ fire shonld ])e one, wliich, if deHtroyed, would liave most (effect in rolling back or even stoi»])ing the advance, due con- eiderution being had to the relative vulnerability and ellectives 381 of tlio ohjcctives formed by the enemy's troops and echelons of attack. 5. DETERillXATION OF EaNGE"^ AXD CnOICE OF SlGHTS. At short distances the correction of the fire is eas}', for great errors cannot be made in the choice of the sight ; these errors besides will be partly compensated for by thci great flatness of the trajectories. With the Martini-Henry rifle; in using the elevation for 400 3'ardsf with a fine foresight, Avhich is the true elevation for the close tight, and aiming at the feet of the enemy, the ground is beaten up to 400 yards, by direct hits and the ground beyond is rendered dangerous by ricochets if it is favorable. The sight for 400 yards is also the best elevation for cavalry at short distances. At greater distances the correction of the fire necessitates as exact an approximation as possible of the distance of the object, as well as a knowledge of the influence of atmospheric circumstances, especiall}'' of the temperature and of the wind, on tlio direction and range of the bullets. The efficacy of the fire of masses of men, even if not collective, depends, like that of individuals, more on the exact range being known, than on the individual skill or training of the men, for the one is a fixed unalterable quantity, whiln the other is a variable moral factor, never very reliable in action at the best of times, and which is influenced by whether the men are fatigued or not, by their state of mind from the excitement produced by the effect of the enemy's fire, b}^ the fear of death, and by the surrounding sights and noises. So many things tend to make the firing, even of masses, unsteady in the field, that we feel justified in saying that, in action the efficaoj of the fire^ of troops ( dificiplined or not) dcpcnda more on the range being known than on the individual skill or training of the men in shooting. Unless the range is known the very best fire may not hit the mark, while if the range is known the very Avorst may do so. Thus nearly everything depends in firing, on the range being known, and hence every officer, and even non-commissioned officers, ought to have a simple portable range-finder, by which ranges can be determined rapicUy, even while lying down, up to 1,200 yards, within a less percentage than ^th of the range, so as to be better than judging by the * This question has been more fully gone into in chapter A^III. t Or the 300 yards elevation with a full foresight . 382 eye. To within -i^o-th. of the truth might easily be got, which would only require the use of one sight up to 600 3'ards, and two sights up to 1,200 yards, according to the calcidations already given in Chapter IX.* The eye is the very worst means of judging distance, for no two men will give anything like the same answer with confidence ; practically it is entirely guess- work, and the greater the inaccuracy of the method of estimation, the more it is to he deprecated, as it causes greater waste of precious ammunition. Therefore the use of a simple, easilj^ and quickly worked portable range-finder, which can be worked h'ing down under fire, having as a base the length of a rifle or sword for ranges imder 800 yards, and a longer one for ranges over this, may be considered absolutely essential, even if it can only read to iVth of the range up to 1,200 yards. From the importance of knowing the ranges, the distances of various prominent objects should be measured, when time allows from certain points and noted, and even certain ranges marked out when on the defensive ; information as to ranges should be asked for from the nearest troops, especially from the artillery as they are passed, tiie ranges under this being deduced ; maps should be consulted, range-finders made use of, or the distances detennined by any otlier method, as by eye, the mean of tlie observations made by several pei'sons being taken ; or, if the ground is suitable (/.c, ojjen, dry, and sandy), trial volleys may be employed, taking care to use rather a low elevation at first. When a valuation of tlie range has been decided on, the choice of tlie siglits to be \ised is made in accordance witli the principle laid down in Chapter IX, rememb(>ring that the condition and training of the troops, tlie mobility of the ob- jective, atmospheric conditiHHiiro of air, duo to altitude of locality, ti'inpcratiirc, and wind. Till- cfTcctH of a head or rear wind arc oft(>n as gi'oat as the probalili; error in cHtiinatinu; the range. 383 combined use of 2 or 3 elevations is made, than when the sights arc adjusted exactly to the supposed range. As a rule it is most convenient in collective firing to order such elevations as are multiples of 50 or 100 yards, as they are quickest and most accurately taken up. The constant beaten zone of 100 yards minimises any errors caused by so doing. But sometimesintermediate elevations may be used, especially against small and stationary objectives at known ranges, and when the observation of the results of the fii-e canbe easily made. For the close fight, also, General Brialmont reconunends iising a lower elevation than that for the true range, with aiming at the feet to correct the effect of the error of iu-ing too high, and to benefit by the ricochets. " In order to avoid the effects of too high a fire and the difficulty of getting the soldier to alter his sights within the zone of very efiicacious fire (500 metres), a rather lower elevation than that for the range shoidd be used in the attack. For example, use the 400 metres eleva- tion at 500 metres, the 300 metres elevation at 400 metres, and the 200 metres elevation at 300 metres, which will be retained until the end of the fight." Also it must be remembered that men firing downhill are apt to fire higher when excited by the proximity of the enemy than when firing uphiU, and so a lower sight should be used in the former case than in the latter for the same rtinge. Against cavalry, almost all Continental nations lay down that short range fire only is to be used. The German regu- lations state that the 350 metres sight is to be used against cavalry, and the French regulations lay down the 400 metres elevation. The Eussian regulations are more decided, for tliey forbid a fii-e against cavali-y at longer ranges than 400 paces (333 yards). Tlio reasons given for this are as follows : — 1. The uncertainty of hitting at longer ranges an object moving forward with so much velocity. 2. At longer ranges the sight would have to be constantly adjusted, which causes a loss of time. 3. The essential point is not so much to cause hea\'y losses among the mass of mounted men, but much more to break the spii-it or dash (elan) of the charge, by bringing down a number of horses. 4. A body of cavahy, exposed from the beginning of its charge to a fire of jioor efficacy is not influenced by any moral deterrent ; but the opposite is the case when this body is kept under the constant menace of a sudden and terribly effective discharge. 384 Tlio above rules, given in tlie Russian regulations, and the reasons for it, appear so logical and irrefutable, tliat we should do well to accept it in our tactical procedure. The Belgians recommend fixing the bayonet just before meeting a cavalry charge, if there is time to do so, as a moral support to the men, and then to only open lire at 400 metres vrith the 300 metres elevation. A volley can be given in each 150 metres crossed by the cavalry, so that the third volley would be given at the 1 00 metres range if the cavalry had pushed on. If the fire is opened too soon, at 450 metres, this error has been found, l\y experiments, to have but little influence on the results, on account of the great extent of the dangerous zones and ricochets at close ranges. It is ahnost needless to say that the same point should always be aimed at on charging cavalry, to prevent loss of time in giving orders which may not be obeyed. At such short ranges the 7ueu would iire straiglit to tlieir front. 6. TlIK KIND OF FlKK TO BE UsED. Now as we have seen a commander can choose between two kinds of fire — (i.) Independent or uncontrolled lire ; and (ii.) Collective or controlled fire. But as fire discipline and direction entirely depend on control, independent fire, from what has already been said about it in Chapter XIV., is only to be tolerated when these are not possible. The effect of sucli a fire is usually very- weak, except at the very sliortcst ranges {i.e., under 400 yards), as it is made up by the independent fire of individual men, wliicli is oidy effective up to sucli ranges, and if these men are exciterl, or out of liand from tlie etTects of tlu' enemy's fire, it becomes wild, and cannot be stopped until tlie last round is expended. Itsliould only be tolerated at the shortest ranges, whc-re a single man may hope to hit tlu* object ho aims at whil<> firing at liis own discretion and freely choosing his own obj(K'tive. The conlrolled lire of men may be ex(>cuted in Iwo ways: — (rt) l{y llie iiidiiidiuiljiir of f/ie nuiss or inas-s/iriin/,* as it will ♦This fire \h generally rallod "individual firo" or " firo of fikinnishnrs " in tlm rfgulations of forcip:^ arniics, hut thcso names aro not u.Hodhnif, to prevent any coTifusion wliich niif:;ht arise from a different meaning having already l)(!en atlaclied (o tliem in jirevious jvii^os. 385 ho Ccalletl, in ■\vhieli cacli niau fires tlie nimibpi' of roiiiifls stated, at his own convenience, at tlie named object, and Avitli the sight or sights ordered, thereby causing, at intervals, a continuous rain of projectiles to be concentrated on the object. {b) JJy volley firing, in which all the men fire together simul- taneously by word of command at the named object, and with the sight or sights ordered, thereby causing a concentrated mass of projectiles to bo suddenly projected at the same instant, but at intervals, on the object fired at. Both nmss and volley firing can be carried out by closed or extended bodies of troops, but volleys require considerable control over the men, and can, therefore, only be executed in action by extended men at the medium and long distances, when the required control is possible. As close order formations cannot exist under modern riflo fire, volleys and mass fire by troops in close order can only be used under special circumstances, as, for example, in savage warfare, when firing after retreating troops, Avhen troops out of infantry fire are threatened by cavalry, &c. Thus they arc not of general practical use in the ordinary conditions of Continental warfare. English companies of 100 men are perhaps the largest unit they are applicable to under any circumstances, from the difficulty of one man controlling a larger body. The essence of a collective fire is control, so as to get the greatest effect possible out of it. In order to control infantry fire and to allow it to he effective, there niusthe pauses in it, during which the smoke is allowed to clear away, the effect of the fire watched, and orders and information transmitted as to the object to be fired at, the ranges, and the sights to be used, &c., &c. The Greraians and French lay great stress on these pauses for another reason. They deprecate a slow continuous fire for infantry, because it causes too great an expenditure of ammunition, and gives none of the advantage gained by the moral effect caused by sudden losses. They say that the action of fire should be sudden, unexpected, and powerful, so as to have an offensive aspect, and that this action should be felt only during successive very short periods, divided by pauses which. are utilised as above stated. The French regulations say that, "The suddenness of fire is one of the principal conditions of its efficac}-. The moral infljience of a material result is greater as this result is obtained in a shorter time." Bb 38G This sudden and powerful action can only be obtained Avitli troops perfectly trained in tire discipline, and Avhen the direction and control of the tire have been thoroughly practised. This kind of fii-e is considered to be more impressive, to require less ammimition in obtaining a certain result, and to gain this residt in less time than a sustained slow and continuous lire. The Germans always endeavour to get a maximum effect in a minimum of time. " One ought to try, as regards the general direction of the fire, to concentrate the fire on the same important point, and during a very short time." It may be remarked that the Austrians advocate a sustained slow fire. The French say, further, that a slow fire, executed by isolated men, has no useful effect ; it presents, moreoA^er, the incoTivcnicuce of retarding thi' advance .Vlthough the German r(^g\dations lay great stress on the suddenness f)f fire, and lay down that men advancing under fire are to do so by successive advances of fractions, during each of which all fire is to cease, and after which the sudden fire is to open, yet in some parts of the German anny their practice differs from this, for tlie men liave been taught to deliver wliile advancing over the longer ranges, a mass fire of a stated number of rounds, by each man in succession of a group or other named unit running out to the front, halting, kneeling down and firing, and tlicu waiting for the lino to come up to advance again witli it and to await his turn. They trust to the discipline niul training of their num to effect this witliout confusion. "'•■ It is considcri'd that sudi a nu-thod is more adapted to kee]iing up the moral force of the men, who will advanci' more reiidily when firing, as it helps to keep up tlnir s]>irits, and lends to denioriilise tlu' enemy. Those remarks do not apply to the method of advance by sliort rapid rushes at the close ranges, Ix'cause these rushes are nuide at full S])eed, to avoid loss, and then-t'ori" no tiring ran take ])lace during them. In \-olley firing a ]>aust* is obtained iit llie end of each volley, but in mass firing the only way to obtain the pauses, and to prevent the fire escaping from control anil degtaierating into an ind<'i)endent fire, is to limit the number of rounds to ]»<• fired l>y each man, who must then cense tiring. The number sfafrd should 710I exceed Jour, as men und(!r fire, • It would Horm imfcrnhln to niiiko the uu-n fiiv lhn« in p:roupH (hco j>p. 40() and I'JS). V.iUh >::n)iiii hIiouM 11111 out to (he front under its loiidir and halt for thf^ linn to coini! up. Control over the men would bo l)ptfir k<]it up }ractice might Iiave some reason, l)Ut as tliemeu tliemselvcs, or tlie enemy, are moving, and so nlti'riiig tlio range, and as they will, wlien left to themselves, fire first on one oltjcct and tln-n oji another, that is, tlie conditions under • On p. 8t it wns jmintid out. that tlio iiractionl daiT^crous zones (Iralt with in I'art I., (li'iti'iulcil on a laix" nniiilicr of rotiiKls liciiis; fiiod under tho Bamt- conditions, i.r., at Ihf siiiic ]> lired in a given time. A well-adjusted mass fire is (•onsider( d by the French and (Jermans to l)e sliglitly mcire accurate lor a given number of rounds, indei»endently of time, tliaii volleys, but 1 lie difference', at the })est, and on measured ranges, is only slight, and undei- the less favorable circumstances in tht! lield they may, lor all practical ]iurji(»seH, be considered of e(jual accuracy. ]{ut, in a given time, mass firing gives an undoul)fe(lly l)etter result or useful effect (see p. KM . This was pnncd in tlieUelgian 391 cxperimonts of 1883, iu wliick it -was found tliat though volleys, ut a range of 300 metres gave the best percentaijen of liits, yet a rapid individual lire gives the gi-eatest number of hits or destructive eifect, from the greater number of bullets lired. In Chapter YII., we saw that a more rapid and less accurate fire, could, within certain limits, give a greater useful effect than a slower and more accurate lire, though only of course at the expense of wasting a considerable amount of annnu- nition. If aim is really taken by the men, mass firing giA^es ratlicr Ijetter results, but, on the other hand, volley firing is the only real means of ensuring that the men do take aim. The Italian regulations say that with mass firing "it is difficidt to regulate the fire, and to maintain fire discipline. ]\Iass firing, without an iron di-scipUiu\ easily degenerates into a (piick and unregidated fire." Volleys are the oidy certain means of directing the wlude fire on the object chosen by tlie leader, and we must remember tliat the one essential condition for efiicacy of fire, over 400 yards, is to concentrate it on particular objectives, and not allow it to be scattered anywhere on a wide front. In volley firing the point to be fired at is indicated, the men only loaJ and fire by word (jf command, the consumption of ammunition is strictly regulated, and all waste is reduced to a minimum. But volley firing requires great coolness on the part of the leader, as well as on the troops, and therefore it can onh' l)e employed at a certain distance from the enemy, unless the troops are covered from his view and fire. The German musketry regulations of 1884 state that volleys can be used in the opening phases of a fight, but the}' add that the troojjs which make use of them ought not to be exposed to an efficacious fire ; T)ut this same remark can be equally applied to controlled mass firing. The leaders must be very careful that the volleys are fired together, for if some men are allowed to fire before or after the others, independent firing will pro- bably ensue. Unless troops are thoroughly well trained and disciplined, a controlled fire of any kind canncjt be main- tainetl iu action, bnt will soon degenerate into independent fire. In repelling night attacks, when troops are so liable to get out of hand, from not being able to s(>e what is going on, volleys are the only kind of fire that it is ad\isable to employ to prevent a rapid, wild, independent fire taking place. 392 Another advantage of volloys over mass and independent fire is for use ag-ainst a body of troops in motion, especially cavalry. Then vcjlle^-s have a g'r(>at superiority, in ensnring that an alteration of sights is made. Cavalry charge at the rate of 400 j-ards a minute, during Avhich time two rounds can be fired with accuracy. Thus, if alternate units lire, one may use an elevation 200 yards less than the other. '^•" IMen woidd not thus regulate their sights in any other kind of tire. When cavalry are Avithin 500 yards, tlie men cannot be relied on any longer to fire volleys, and will fire independently, which does not so much matter at this close range, provided they will cease firing when necessar}-. But volley firing really requires the men to be grouped together near one another, either in single or double rank. But close order, in single rank even, is not permissible binder GOO yards, against modern rifles, until the enemy has been demoralised, and tlie efficacy of his fire reduced, and therefore this may be taken as tlie minimum range in tlu^ open for volleys by an}' considerable numlicr of men, tliougli extended groups of skirmisliers, when their tactical Ixnuls have not been altogether dissolved, can still ust? them at a closer range. The value of volleys is so great in supervision of fire and economy of ammunition, that they slumld l)e used as long as possible, by trying to make tlie skirmishers execute tliem in small groups, jn'ovidcd they can by so doing fire the number of cartridges deemed neci'ssary in 1 lie (b^sired tinu\ If iu)t, mass firing must be resorted to, in which a greater number of rounds can be fired in any given time, and thus a better useful effect gained. Though volh'vs and mass iiriiig give much the same results in the lield, for a given ninuber of rounds, independently of the time tiny are lived in, yet the conimnnd and moral force that can Iw maintained is greater in tin- former case than in the ntlnr. All the advantages ol' volley liring, hnwever, ninst not b;' expe(;te(l in war; still tln-v should be ainu'd at as far as pos- Hibl(! ; and it isnom^the less certain that the more troo])s linvo l)ecn trained in tinn' oi' ]ieace to pay attention to the slightest sign or gesture ol' their leaders, the greater will be the discipline and power of confi-ol over them in llu! light. It is a matter of ]»eace-training and constant ]iractice. 'J'nio/js irliicJi liurc vof been dro/.ru info if, iri/l nof pfisfii:><.r of artillery, troops Lavo to Lrcak up iii action into small g'roups at long-er rang-cs than infantry liro Avould ever bo opened at. Hence, if it is decided to oi)en tire at ranges over 80U yards, it is undoubtedly best to cmjjloy volleys from small bodies of men, as also from the economy of expenditure, the power of regulating and watching the lire, the moral force imparted by a feeling of order, and the conmumd over the men that they give. Hence the line of men recpiired to give the requisite amount of collective fire must be divided into ^^Jire-units" (seo i*. 406), aud the com- mander of each fire-unit gets the order for the direction of the fire, which he conmiunicates to the men, and sees carried out. As the enemy is approached, and his fire gets more accurate, losses occur, and the control gets more difficult ; but, if any abnormal mixing of units has not yet taken place, then, by a judicious reinforcing, hj pushing complete units into gaps, instead of directly to the front, volleys can and should be still continued as long as possible, by means of tlie small "fire-units," especially if the men are inclined to get out of hand. But if an irregular intermixture of units has taken place, or when the control for volleys gets too difficult, mass firing must be resorted to, and every effort made to maintain it until it develops of its own accord into a rapid independent or nneontrolled fire, in which the men will no longer pay attention to the directions of their leaders limiting the number of rounds to be fired, thus causing the pauses to disappear ; after which, the personal example or infiuence of the leaders is the only controlling effect on the men, and then a few minutes will decide the action one Avay or the other. If the enemy is de- moralised, from having suffered, materially and morally, from a sufficiently accurate and prolonged artillery prepara- tion, and from the intense rifie fire that has been poured in on him, his fire ■will slacken, and the attack Avill rush forward to victory ; if not, the attack will be driven back, which retreat, if unsupported, and if followed up by the defence, will be most disastrous to the assailants. Mass firing can be taken up by the same fire-imits, when volleys are no longer possible. Before joining the firing line, all leaders must be informed as to the direction of the attack and the fire, and men who get separated frcjm tlieir groups ought, from previous instruction, practice and discipline, to join themselves to the nearest leader for the purpose of collective firing. Indei)endent fire will dictate its own time and range; the greater the discipline, the longer ^\•ill this uudesired period be delayed. 39t The propL'rtifS of volley llriug- are so seJiu-.tive, in spite of their being harder to execute than mass and independent tirmg, that they havt; led to their frequent use in ])eaeo exercises at shorter ranges than practicable in "vvar. Volleys cannot be enforced within the range of eft'ectrve individual tiring {i.e., 400 yards at the least), because at that range they are, as a rule, quite impracticable in the tield when opposed to ci\'ilized troops, for the noise and excitement of battle disconcert the troops, orders are no longer distinctly heard, or even punctually obeyed, every man seeks to obtain from the ground a slielter from the enemy's lire, the group units get involuntarily broken np, and independent hring will, if care is not taken, supplant that of volleys, Avithout any human power being able to prevent it. It belongs to the leaders to foresee this moment; recognizing it in time, they will tliemselves order mass firing to commence before in- di'pendcut living connuences of itself; they will then, perhaps, witli tlu' aid of disci])liiu'. training, and shrill whistles, be alili' to preserve the direction of lire, and limit the number of (•artris, even on tlie defensive, by trooi)s who are well in hand, and who have been well trained, and possess a liigli degree of tiro discij^line. Thus, they are not so likely to succeed with young troops, or even with old soldiers, who are fatigued or excited. !Mass firing and independent liring are, therefore, as a general iiile, ihe only kinds of firing possible at the shorter ranges, w lien nil efforts must b(! directed to ])revent them deviating from the originid direction, and degenerating intt) a wild, irri'gular fire, so wasteful of anmiunition, at a fiiue when ammunition cannot l)e replaced. Some writers assert tliiit war ex])erience lias always demon- strated the iiiqiraeticability of using volleys in action. \'ou Jioguslawski is ]tartiiularly strong on this point. Jn tliis aiithuritv's 'Dtttical IhthtrtlDiis from the War of 1870-71, we find : — "The eases in wliieli volleys were lired in a downright infantry engagement could ]»roli!itily lie easily counted; the few cases, in which the use (tf volleys can be well authi'ii- ticated, were when the French were surjirised. Neitlier 30'} French nor Germans ever succeeded in pusliing- furward battalions or companies to fire volleys. Even when on the defensive, to which, accordinj^ to theory, volley firing is par- ticularly applicable, it coidd so seldom be employed, that the few exce})tions prove the nde. Even behind cover, field- works, barricades, &c., the fire of dense clouds of skirmisliers was preferred to bringing- forward bodies in close order to fire vollej's." But it must be remembered that in the Franco-Grerman war, sucli a stringent fire disci})line, as is nt)w tht)ught neces- sary to be instilled into Continental troops, did not then exist, uor any of the definite fire tactics now employed abroad. The contending armies had great numbers of young troops and reserve men ; volleys were attempted by large units, siich as by companies of 200 men strong, and they were tried to be used at vevj short ranges ; so that in this war, everything was against the practicability of using volleys in action. Everyone admits that volley firing in action can only be carried out, so long as fire discipline and control exist. Lieutenant A. Keucher, a well-known Belgian officer, writes : — " Xo one has yet been able to give an exact solution to tlie problem : Ifliat air the best measures to tale in peace time in order to keep the men in hand, in action ? Everyone is agreed that only those can maintain fire discipline up to a certain jjoint who can keep their troops in hand. Many indirect means have been proposed to attain tliis object, such as voile}- firing, the individual firing of a stated number of rounds, &c. " The next war will fix the value of these expedients ; but no direct means have as yet been found, and it is not probable that any will be found, because Jirc discipline depends e.c- clusiveh/ on the general discipline of the troops, and hence ail peace instruction ought to impress on the soldier this con- A-iction, that he ought always, at every moment of his military life, to subordinate his own desires and Avdl to the higher ones of his chief, to give to this latter an absolute confidence, and to obey all his commands and signals. Those who, during peace time, will have instructed their troops according to these princiitles, will eqiu'illy sut'ceed in M"ar to kee]) them in hand, up to a certain point. ' Up to a certain point ' is expressly stated, because Gennan officers recognise tliat, in action, the excitement of the men becomes so great at close ranges, that sufficient hold cannot be ensured over them to rely on their executing any orders with coolness." But the greater the discipline of the men, the nearer will this 396 certain limit of control, and therefore- of volley firinp^, 1)0 to the onemy, if it is executed by small bodies, and not by large tactical units, as a wliole. The great superiority of volleys is the po-svcr they afford of being able to direct th(^ fire of a number of rifles simultaneously on a named object, of obtaining from the men the necessary submission to discipline in order to drive the enemy's skirmishers out of any shelter they ilia}' momentarily have obtained, and of subordinating their desire to obtain cover to that of obtaining a good position for firing, as it is a well- known fact that men are, in practice, more pre-occupied with seeking to obtain shelter than with obtaining a good field of fire, and that careful aiming and steadinc^ss can only be maintained in the heat of action T»y a rigid hre discipline. In other words, it is owing to volleys that lire can be maintained in the desired direction, Avhich cannot always be done in mass firing. The f^xpenditure of ammunition is not so great as in mass firing, from the greater numlier of pauses, and another advantage claimed for volh'vs is that they will keep the troops opposite to the objective assigiu'd to them, and prevent that tendency to incline to the flanks, which is so noticeable in all recent battles, in the endeavour to seek a zone of safety, l^ut on the other hand volleys are only possible, so long as the troops are Ixyoiul really efft'ctive rangt>, from the difhculty of controlling the men sulliciently witliin that distance. The value ofrollei/s, as compared irith viaxs firiug, is loidoiibfed/i/ more one of tiioral than material effect, both to o/ie^s own men and to the enem]/, and as Napoleon 1 . said that moral (effects are three times tin; value of material ones, volleys for this reason are to be preferred to any otlier kind of tiring, when practicable. Tlie opponents (jf volley tiring, as a rule, lose sight of tin's moral sid(! of the (juestion ; tliey nt^arly always base tlieir arguments on tlie relative nuniln r of hits made on targets by each kind of tiring. A'olliys are, undoiibf rdly, most suited to th(> defensive*, and for use at long halts, which naturally are of a d(>fensive nature. On thi' offensive, the use of volleys is principally confined to the ])erio(l of iireiiaration, and therefore lielongs to long- range fire, as a i-ule. The Freiieh regulations say: — " i*'lre sliould be sulliciently slow to be well aimed. It ought to be often stojjped liy metre or less long pauses, to allow tlie smoke to dear off, to judge the effect ]M'odu<'ed, to give the necess.arv orders, an)andoned. "Tlie sudden re-opening of the fire at a short distance will tlien produce on the assailant a considerable effect. " The emplo;y^nent of volleys contributes to the maintenance of the control of the commanders over their men, facilitates the concentration of fire, permits of the rectification of the fire, by observing the strike of the bidlcts, and gives the means of regulating the consumption of ammunition. "Volleys by squads or groups ought to be executed as long as the men can be kept in the hands of their leader. " On the offensive, volle3-s belong to the long range period of the action. They are not to be used by the troops actually carrying out the attack, because they convey an idea of iiumobility and relative security, which are incomjiatible ideas with that of a vigorous offensive. " Volleys will be executed by troops told off specially for the duty, by the reserves placed in positions on the flanks, or on any commanding places, or by troops only reqiiired to make a demonstration. ' ' Vollej-s are not to be expected at short ranges, not even from any troops in closed ranks, who may be brovight up to reinforce the firing lines, unless they are sufficiently sheltered ; after capturing a position, volleys con.stitute the best means of carrving out the pursuit and of regaining the troops in halul. " On the defensive, the sheltered troops will make use of volleys as long as possible. Even at the last moment, when the assailants dash forward to the assault, volleys will be v(^rv efficacious against an enem^' who does iKtt lire, and wiio advances over the open. . 398 " Volleys in closed ranks will not be executed in general by- fractions of troops greater than a section (50 men). In certain cases they may be employed -w-ith half a compam' (100 men). " Beyond 800 yards it "vrill sometimes be advantageous to concentrate the fire of many fractions on the same objective. "J/ffss fring Tvell directed and slowh' executed, gives residts slightly superior to those of volley's, but it has the inconvenience of rendering the fire discipline, and the cor- rection and concentration of the fire more difficult. " Rapid firivg, executed at a distance of 220 or 330 yards only, owes its efficacy to the flatness of the trajectories. Troops are forcibl}- led to use it when the uKmient of the final crisis arrives. Its duration will always be ver^' short, and the crisis will immediately be followed by the solution." Tlie Grerman regulations say: — "With volleys, by closed ranks or skirmishers, tlie troops are more readily kept in hand, and the commanders are more masters of the tire ; besides it is easier to o1)serve the strike of tlie bullets, and therefore to detennine the sight to be used. " Sometimes, with thick lines of skirmishers, the smoke . which covers the front and prevents aiming, may sensibly t diminish the chances of efficacy. In this case, the volley is to ' be preferred to mass-firing {fen de tirailleurs). "In order to prevent mass firing degenerating into an irregular fusilade, it is necessary to fix, before the opening of the fire, the number of cartridges to be expended by each man; as a rule, not more than thre(\ In this way certain necessary pauses are produced, during \\lii(h the smoke clears off, and orders are disseminated. A rapid independtMit fin* re([uir(>s a greater (luautity of ammunition than mass firing, it disquiets the men, and as after a few rounds the front is c(»vered with a thick suiok(>, it soon Itecome.s impossibl(> to aim. Also, as it is much mor(^ difficult to direct this fire, and to discipline it, its enipluyment ought to be limited to exceptional cases." When volley firing is employed, it should not bo (>xecuted by more than 100 men (an JOnglish comitany), or at a greater rate than 5 rounds a miiuite, in order to obtain the greatest efficacy from it ; but tin* number of successive volhys should not exceed 4, without a longer pause to prevent it degent>rating into an iiulejiendent fire. Between each volley there sliould bo sufficient time given t'i>r fho men to load, aim and firo without huirviuf; thini. iind betwei'U every 4 volleys there 399 slioukl he a sufficiently long pansp to maintain calmness among the men, and to allow the smoke to disperse. Yov some further remarks on volley firing, sec " Fire Units," on p. 408. 7. — Ox THE Intensity of the Fire to Be Kept Up. The intensity of the fire that should he kept up is governed by the time at one's disposal for obtaining the desired result. It should also be remembered that the moral effect of any result increases Tvith the cj^uickness with which the result is gained. Against a battery of artillery, even beyond 800 metres, a quick fire should be allowed, while on objects of small depth, only a slow fire. One to five rounds a minute is quite quick enough for firing in ordinary circumstances, though this may rise to ten rounds a minute just before the time of the final bayonet charge, i^ufficient accuracy at ranges over the short distances cannot be expected with a gi'eater rapidity than five rounds a minute. A very thick line of skirmishers soon creates along its fi'ont a cloud of smoke, which considerably hinders its fire action ; in such a case, vollej's should always be made use of, pro- vided the conditions at the moment permit of their being used. Rapid firing has a disturbing influence on the men, the smoke very quickly becomes too thick to be seen through, and the direction and discipline of the fire cannot be main- tained ; hence, rapid firing should only be employed in exceptional cases, and with the greatest parsimony and reluctance. 8. The Attitude of the Mex Firixg. The attitude of the men firing affects the efficacy of the fire. At short distances, on the practice range, there is not much to choose between any of the four positions of standing, kneeling, sitting, and lying down, but, as the range increases, the differences in the shooting begin to tell very perceptildy. At the longest ranges the lying-down position gives the best results, and the standing i)osition the worst. In field firing, in which the attack is carried out as much like reality as possible, better practice can be made at tlie shorter ranges in the standing and kneeling positions than in the lying down one, because the heaving of a breathless man's chest against the ground in this last position affects the 400 steadiness of tlie rifle more than -wlien it is raised off the ground. This fact also snits the moral and tactical requirements of a fight, hecanso it is dangerous at the shorter ranges to let attacking troops lie down, as it not only tends to destroy the offensive spirit required for an energetic attack, but also it may not be possible to get the men to rise again, especially if they have suffered much. But in order to allow of upright troops reaching an enemy's position, it is essential that the enemy must first be denioralised liefore the assault is made, so as to reduce the efficacy of his firc."^'' The upright position, liowcver, suffers most from fire, and the lying down position the least. Hence on the defensive or during the preparation of the attack, when the troops are more or less stationary, the lying down position would always bo used, except in a flat country, when men lying down cannot, as a rule, see anytliing to fire at, especially if the enemy is kneeling or lying down also, and he is beyond the short ranges. The attack can safely use this position to within about ()()0 yards of the enemy. The kneeling position is very fatiguing if used for any length of time, and so it would only lie used during a short luxlt in an advance when on(> does not wish to let the troops lie down. This position would be taken up wluni tlie lying down position is given up, and it would be used to within about 300 yards of the enenn'. Tlie sitting position is a very good one, and is not nearly so tiring as the kneeling one, Init the men cannot readily take it up or get up from it. It is far more suited to the defensive than to tlie attack. The standing position is the best for the actual assault, during which very short, if any, halts are made. Men cannot fire rapidly when lying down, but tliis position allows of a more freipient use of rests for the rifle, by moans of objects on the ground, than any other position. Resting • A (lennsin ofliror criticising; the abovo paragraph writes, "Thoro is on(! tiling in wliich I cannot agree with you, that is, to tiro at short dinUincoH in the ntamling jiosilioii ; even it' tho moral ])ow<>r of tho (lofonder he nhakin, he. will still he ahlc to deliver a very heavy fire, and if v(Hi do not allow tho ni«n to lie down, they will do ho without orders, which is still worse, besides, the dangerous zones will he far great('r in tiring lying flat on thi? ground than in tiring standing. Also at long distances it will very often he inipossihle to see the ohjeetivc while lying on th(! ground." However, the experienro of tho Kranro-(}orinan and |{usso-Tnrkish wars is that when tho enemy is demoralised, his tiro at short ranges, however heavy it may he, will do relatively little damage, from its going high. 401 tlio rifle on such supports is, as a rule, favourable to ofRcacy of fire, but any decided advantage by so doinj^ can only be obtained from troops who have been trained to it. 0. — The Obsehvatiox of the Results Obtained. The German regulations say that the strike of the bullets and the eifect of the fire should be carefully watched -with held glasses, in order to rectify the sights, and to increase the efficacy of the fire. AVhcn several elevations are being used in combination, every effort should be made to tr}' and diminish the number of them by an accurate determination of the range. The value of knowing the range, and of only using the one elevation best suited to it has been shewn in Chapter X. Intermediate elevations to those marked on the backsight can only be usefully employed when the ranges are known, and the observation of the results easy. In observing the effects of a fire, the direction of the wind must be taken into account, and it will often be advantageous (especially when on the defensive and in firing from entrench- ments) to post observers to one side of the line of fire, wlio should communicate with the men firing either b}- signals or relays of messengers. Such observers should bear in mind the following instructions laid down in the French regu- lations : — "It will often bo useful to regulate the fire practically by some trial volleys, and to watch the effect with the aid of glasses. At first, a sight for a less distance than the estimated one should be used, which is afterwards increased by 100 yards at a time until the right range is found. " In observing tho points of impact, or the strike of the bidlets, it is necessary to consider that, in a well-regidated fire, half the bullets will fall on each side of the object. The dust produced by the bullets in advance of the object is tlierefore not a proof that the fire is too short ; wliUe the absence of dust in a favoiirable soil for observation is a certain indication tliat the fh'o is too long. The beaten zone will begin at least 100 yarels in advance of the object with firing executed at ranges over 800 yards. (See Chapter IX. for the reason of this;. "On imdulating groimd, the presence of a depression (the bottom of which cannot be seen into) in front of the object, may make the observation of the strike on the ground very Cc 402 difficult, and therefore the determiuatiou of the sight to be used. If the bullets strike in the depression of the ground, no dust can be seen by the firers, Avhich might make them think the elevation used is too high, Avhilu in reality it is too short. "AMienthe men for obsei'viug the tire are placed very far out of one flank of the body of men executing the firing, a too short lire, and good in direction, will appear to fall to the left of the mark for an observer on the right, and to the right for an observer on the left. " Conversely, a too long fire, and good in direction, appears to fall to the right of thi^ mark for an observer on the right, and to the left for an observer i)laced on the left. "These deceptive appearances must be taken account of in the appreciation of tlie strike of the bullets on the ground." 10. WlTEX MEX IX >rOVEMEXT MAY FIRE. The cj^uestion of allowing men to fire while nu)ving does not mean that they are not supposed to halt to actually aim and discliarge tlu» rifle, but what it does mean is that these halts are very sliort, lasting only just long enougli to take aim and release the trigger before tlie movement takes place again. The prejiaration for the assault liaving been completed, the troops to carry it out must now advance. Tliere is no doubt that the advancing troops must use tlicii- iire when witliin the short ranges, but tliere is s(mie doubt as to whether they should halt at all before that and fire. " Distant iiring and fn'fpimt hiiltsareuot good for pr(>pariug the troops for the ofYensivi^ because it breaks their dash, diminishes their ardour, and causes them to be too attentive to their losses, which an; always deadly at tlu^ halting places, whose distances ma^' be exactly known to th(> defence." Furfher, as an enemy's fire is only efficacioiis when the distances are exactly known to him, and as exp(>rience shows that the {.greater part of the losses suffered by the attack, occur at the halting places, one of llui greatest safeguards of the attack is to move forward so as to constantly alter the raiip;e, and hence, affi-r tlm preparation is comi)l(>ted, the attacking s shoidd move forward as rapidly as posHJbNt to the short and decisive I'aiiges. AVe will first consider the moral side of the (piesfion, which has jilri'Mdy been leFcrred to in ('hM[ttei- XIT. (Jeneral 403 Brialinont writes, "AVlien men hear the bullets of the enemy hissing past them, and see their comrades falling around them, they fire in order to conquer their emotions, or to try and forget everything, using a full foresight, and often not aiming at all, or even bringing the rifle to the shoulder. ' The instinct of every man, says Napoleon, is not to allow himself to be kiUed without defending himself.' If the soldier, at this moment, is not allowed to fire, he ' woukl try to save himself by moving forwards or backwards,' while, if he fired accurately, he would soon destroy the enemy, '/'//r,' as Col. A. Du Picq has judiciously observed, in his Etude siir le combat, '■ is the safcti/ valve of the c mot ions.'' '''' And again, "It is certain that even with trained and disciplined troops, a hre while in motion will have little accuracy after any rapid movements to within a short distance of the enemy ; but under these unfavourable circumstances any kind of iire will not have much efficacy. Hence preference should be given to that kind of fire which least delays the advance and sustains the moral of the men ; and this, undoubtedly, is a fire while in movement." Thus it is judicious to forestall the desires of the men, during their advance, and to direct them into a useful channel, by allowing them to fire a few rounds while moving forward, under the strictest control, so as to ensure efficacy of fire at the same time. We have seen that both Grermans and Russians suffered severely Avhen they attempted advancing against an enemy without firing, wiiile their losses decreased when they fired, as they approached the enemy's position, by the demoralization their fire caused among the opposing troops. But as a control over the fire cannot be so well kej)t up while the men are thus in movement, they should only be allowed when any real effect is required, to fire in this way, in a serious manner, when control is no longer possible, i.e., at under 400 yards from the enemy. ^' Again, even allowing that while advancing the ranges are constantl}' decreasing, and therefore the probable efficacy of the fire increasing, such tire during movement cannot be so effica- cious as a more stationary tiro at even longer ranges. Hence men should only be allowed, when a serious result is expected, to open a powerful fire while moving at the short ranges * See last footnote on p. 453, as to how the fire during movement should he carried out in the advance to this short range. Cc 2 404 only and when an independent fire can give an efficacious result. When a rapid fire is required at close ranges, especially in the standing position, when the bayonets are fixed, and when the front is covered with smoke, many writers recommend that the men shoidd fire from the hip, whih' holdiug the rifle horizontally, and the}' assert that good ri\sults can be gained by doing so. They consider tliat to train men to do this well is only to forestall what tluy will do in reality, because then, especially young troops unaccustomed to war, when close to the enemy, will neitlier adjust their sights nor aim, or even bring their rifl(>s to tlie shoulder, while to try and make them do so will only make them lose time, and even expect from them an impossi])ility. In all ages and in all armies it has been noticed that troops fire high at short ranges, and the advocates of firing from the hip, with the rifie held horizontally, assert that this is the best way of keeping the fire low, thereby gaining both accuracy and rapidity. Firing from the hip is no innovation, as it has l)een practised in the past by some of the Contimnital armies. But to be able to get an effiutive fire from the liips, it is necessary that the recoil should not be too great, and as the recoil of the Martini-Henry rifie is very excessive, it is doubtful whether it can be judiciously employed in this way, thoiigh the men are certain to try to do so, from their shoulders beginning to sulfer after GO or 40 rounds only have been fired. 11. The NrMifKii of Eouxds to hk Fireii at E.vcii ITalt DnuNO AN Advance to the Assault. Granted, that the troops moving forward to earry out the final assault are allowed to lire during tlu^ advaiue, what number of rounds are they to ex])end until they come within the short ranges 'i ]\ruch, of course, depends on tlie available sujiply of ammunition. At altout the range? of 2o0 or 300 yards the men will be engaged in a rapid independent firing, wliich may last four or live minutes, and during Avhich ujtwards of 40 rouiuls will bo expended. After that they re(jtiiie at least twenty more rounds to consolidate a success or to cover a retreat — that is, at about ;500 yards from the enemy, each man ought to have (iO rounds on his ])erson. 8ui)]tose the advance to take; place from KOO yards up to '-'.50 yards from the enemy, or over Tj-jO yards before the ciitiial pi lio'l ofiapid liring begins. 405 If tlic cuoiiiy is very demoralised, and the effect of liis fire poor, then the advance may be made without a stop, -and it would take some seven minutes to cross the 550 yards at tlie rate of three miles an hour, and as men running forward in turn, singly or in groups, to fire cannot well expend more than two rounds a minute, they will tire at least foiu'teen rounds in this time. If the enemy's fire is still efficacious, the advance will have to be made by successive rushes of alternate companies in larger units over a space of 50 yards at least. Troops ad- vancing tlius would make ten successive pauses between 800 and 250 yards, and it would be during these pauses they would fire. The length of these pauses should be as short as possible, in order to give the attack all the vigour and dash possible, and because the halting places are dangerous spots, as most losses occur at them ; but, on the other hand, they must be long enough to allow of the advance of the rear echelons being covered by fire, and for the men of these echelons to get into position and to open fire. Most writers agree that one minute should be about the average length of a pause, during which about three rounds may be fired, after adjusting the sights to the range. Conserpiently, in such an advance from yOO to 250 yards, each man would fire 30 rounds, re- quiring that the troops when they began to move forward to an attack should each have in their possession 90, or, allowing for bullets dropped, 100 rounds on his person. 12. Whex the Bayoxet SiiorLD be Fixed. It has been found that when the bayonet is fixed on to one side of the rifie, it causes the fii"e to go to the same side and rather lower than before, and therefore, theoreticallj', for a given range, aim must be taken rather higher, or a higher elevation must be used. But practically in the excitement of battle, and from the agitation of rapid movement, this result will have the effect of keeping the fire down, which cannot but have a great influence at the shorter ranges over which the assault is made. The moral effect of fixing bayonets on approaching the enemy is very great, and as the men should fire while advancing to the assaidt, the bayonets should be fixed at about 300 yards from the enemy's position, just before this assault is begun. The soldier should have thoroughly impressed on him that the fixing of bayonets in action is a sign to him that the time 40G has come wlieu it is more dangerous for liim to retire than to advance, and that if he advances w-ithout hesitation the enemy will certainly not wait to cross bayonets with him. FiRE-UxiTs OK Groups. Fire-units are necessary for two reasons. 1 . To get the maximum efficacy of fire a large mmiber of men must be brouglit into the tiring line, and their tire must ])e concentrated. But a dismounted officer's control cannot be felt over a very wide front in action, and hence the firing line must be divided into fractions which form the fire-unifs. 2. In obtaining the number of rifles required in the firing line they must not be pushed in without order or organization, else control will vanisli. For this purpose, regular organized imits only must be put into the line at a time, and the number of rifles must be counted at so many fire-unit ft or (/ roups, and not as so many men simply. These units may be of various sizes, and sliould invarialdy be sub-multiples or fractions of the regular tactical unit — the company. Another point is, that these sub-units must not act independently, or else we run a risk of losing power of control, and of the great effect of concentrated fire. To get the greatest number of rifles into play, the men must be placed in line in single or dt)u})le rank ; but long lines cannot be commandiHl by voice, and also the ground rarely lends itself to their movements. It is ver}- important to remember that the power of directing the fire depends more on the front occupied by a imit than on the strength of this unit in men. The longest effective line that can be com- manded ))y voice or whistle, by a dismounted man, even at a distance from the enemy, is a front of about fifty paces. This is about the maximum front over Avliich a dismounted man's control can ))e felt in action, which gives fifty rifles in one line, or 100 rifles in two lines. An exact front of 50 paces would not, of course. )u> taken as tlie fire-unit, ])Ut tlie nearest organized tactical imit whose front most nearly coincided with tliis distance would 1)0 so taken. If we emi)loy fewer tlian lii'tv men at long ranges to form a fir(!-unit, we run the risk of losing tlie great effects wliicli a concentrated fire is destinr-d to l)ring alxiut, and l»esid(\s, th(» ♦control of the firing would lull into monOiands than necessary for such a fii-e. Tlie snuillest i)erniissible grou])S of men sliould lie such as to prevent the control of the firing from fulling into the hands 407 of inexperiencetl leaders. The fewer the groups or units, the easier is the direction of the fire controUed, but the harder they are to command individually. It is very essential that the important duties of the command of each unit (/. e., the direction, kind of firing, judging the distances, &c.) should, as long as possible, be carried out by officers, and not by the non-commissioned officers, who should see that the men conform to the officers' orders, and should transmit these orders along the line. These are most im- portant duties, and must not be neglected for more ambitious ones. Taking an English company at war strength, or about 100 men, these, if extended at one man per pace, as would be the case in a decisive fight, would cover 100 paces, which woidd give two fire-units of fifty men, or half a company each, under an officer. As the enemy is approached, the difficulties of conti'ol and command increase, but by this time the objects to be fired at have been more clearly indicated and impressed on the men, and hence the fire-units may now be reduced in size to twenty -five men, or one c[uarter of a company each, each vmder a sergeant. This shows the necessity of having non-commissioned officers trained to lead in action. Further, it is highly necessary' that the men should be trained to work in groups when at a distance from the enemy, and that their independency of action is only to begin when control is no longer possible ; that they must do so because it is best for the mutual good of the whole, and to obtain the best effect of their fire by concentration ; this can only be done by fully impressing on the men by practical experiments the inaccuracy of independent fire at ranges beyond 400 yards, when these have to be guessed, and that this can only be corrected by their voluntarily placing themselves under the nearest leader to obtain the required efficacy by concentration of fire. This is particidarly necessary when fresh supporting troops arrive irregularly in line ; they should be taught to place themselves under the commanders already in the front line, and not to look for orders from their own officers only, unless they have been moved as a complete body into a gap. As we still get nearer the enemj', the larger organized units are broken up, from the difficidty of controlling fire, but the shorter the range the less important is concentration, and thus smaller groups are permissible; but gro^ips of from 8 /o 16 men each moj he considered the minimum and maximum numbers 108 respect iivJi/ fur rjfectiri' fire. Umlcr a cIosl' fire a siiiylc man canuot louk after more tliau 10 men at the most iu extended order, so as to see tliat tliey are carrying out exactly the orders of the battalion officers. iSnialler groups than of about 8 nu^n Avould split up the commands too much. Men lying dmvu can only be in one line. If we are not opposed to modern -weapons, as in savage warfare, the men may kneel or stand in close order, and fire in two ranks, which gives the real maximum amount of lire for a given front, but against modern weapons only half this real maxim\im amount of fire is attainable until the actual attack takes place, which presupposes that the demoralization of the enemy has been effected, or else the men would suffer too much. We may take a front of oO paces as the front of the maximum firing-unit under one man when at a distance from the enemy. In close ord(>r iu two ranks this would give a maximum firing-unit of 100 men or an English company. Some experiments that have Tieen made officially in Franco since 1878 have shewn "That individual firing, as far as accuracy is concerned, is superior to volley firing; that volk»ys by groups (of about 12 men) are superior to volleys by sections (50 men) ; and volleys by sections to those by half-companies (100 men). But it must be remarked that the differences are so slight as to give none of these kinds of fire a marked superiority over the others." This official statement has, however, been disputed by individual writers. An anony- mous French writer, whose brochure, Le fir de V hifduterle aux grandcs d/sfaiices, has been much quoted, wriles : "The best volleys are those fired by groups, but tlu' maximum effective of the body firing ought not to exceed 100 men in two ranlo. The more the fire-unit is ri'duced in size the better is it in the hands of its leader, who can Itetter look after it, while the men can liear him and execute his orders better. The regu- lations wisely order the commander to give the word '/V/r' in volley firing, wlien lie sets (he rifles steady; tliat is when the men are ready and liiive liuished aiming. ]5ut (he simultaneous readiness of (he whole unit will be harder to obtain, as there are more men in i( ; if (In? command '/V/y' is given before they have all aimed, (here will b(> many sho(s find wide of the mark ; if lie wai(s longer, he will fafigue those ready. . . Group volleys can be executed with the men in two ranks or deployed. The same can be done wi(h volleys from demi-sectious (2.5 men); but if (hese are deployed, the 409 I'roiit will be luuro tliun .'30 yards. It is not pusisible to execute good volleys with a larger body of extended men." tfeneral Brialiiiont states that the ilre of pelofoiis (80 men) giv(>8 better results than the tire of companies (250 men). " This dili'erence can be explained by the fact that in firing by pelotons, the soldier, finding himseK placed under the immediate eye of his leader, keeps greater calmness than ■when tiring by comi)anies, during which the multiplicity of orders trouble, not only the subordinate leaders, but also the men ; by which often a badly directed and inaccurate fire is obtained." Again, "The weaker the unit which iires the volley, the more efficacious is the supervision of the leader, and the more sustained is the attention of the men." Thus, small groups are the best to use, in order to gain the greatest result from the fire. But the precaiition given on J). 398, with regard to pauses, miist be all the more carefully adhered to as tlie fire-units become smaller. Even if the French official conclusion, that vollev firing is rather less accurate than a controlled and steady individual firing, is correct, yet at all ranges beyond the short ones, volleys are preferable, from the moral residts and power of control they give, while the difference in accuracy is most likely to vanish in the battlefield, from the ranges not being known, and from the excited state of the men. A\Tien firing with two sights, alternate units of whatever size they may be, or half of each unit may each fire with a particular sight. "When firing with three sights {i.e., at ranges over 800 yards when the distance is estimated by eye), it will be best to tell off a third of each unit to fire with the same sight. This can be done easily, as the eneni}' is still more than 800 yards off. A\"hole groups and not alternate men should use different sights, so that their commanders may more easily see that their orders are being obeyed. Hence it is most essential that each fire-unit should have a leader to control and direct its fire. The position of each fire-group or unit must T)e looked upon as that of a gun in a battery, or as a battery in a long line of artillery. The orders for the direction of the fire are passed down the line to the leaders, or told them before the action is fully committed, i.e., what they are to fire at, the number of rounds, the rate of fire, the kind of fire, the sight each is to use, &c., and any other such orders, and then the leaders order their groujis or units to fire as commanded, and see it carried out. The fundimental rule of artillery action 410 of massing the batteries and concentrating tlie fire in the earlier stages of the fight, appKes equally well to infantry — mass the fire units or groups and concentrate the fire on the important points of attack. This sub-division of duties is a most important principli\ which has hardly yet been fully recognized or taken its proper place in the English army. No work of any kind can be car- ried on successfully except by a regular tlistribution of the work to organized bodies or groups under responsible leaders. This refers to any kind of work carried out by any sized body of men. An army nmst have its front sub-divided and distributed to army corps, that of army corps to divisions, that of divisions to l)rigades or regiments, that of battalions to companic^s, and so on. It is the only way in which an}- duty can be effectually carried out. Every progress in the i)erfection of the rifle will more and more assimilate the conduct of its fire to that of artillery. Infantry officers, to thoroughly understand the proper way of using infantry iire, always remembering that while artillery moves it is useless, which is not the case with infantry, should study artillery tacti(,'s, and how its fire is controlled and directed in action. Eacli rifle in a fire-unit or group must bo looked on as a gun in a Ijattery ; each fire-unit as a battery in a long line of artillery. Orders for the direction of the fire must bo given to the commanders of the fire-units, through the regular leaders in the chain of tlie military organization, who in turn communicate the orders to tlie men and see them carried out.* Thus, and thus only, can infantry firi' reach its greatest pos- sible eflicacy in the field, and the waste of annnunition be re- duced to a minimum. Ecpially with this must every means be studied of allowing ranges to be riuiekly ascertained with tlie greatest accuracy i)ossil)le. The artillery ruh^ of mas.siug batteri<'s and eoiicentrating lire, apjilies with full force to infan- try; and artillery, like ini'iintrv, when at too close ranges to carry this out, fire directly to tlieir own front, independently and rapidly and then only. The growing siniihirity in the field Itc'tween the ])raetiee «)f inl'antry and artillery fire, is one of tli(! most remarkable facts in the ])rogress of modern lire tactics. This is in every way to be desired, as it will cause infantry oflicers t(» study artillery, and ai)]>reciate its value and strength. • At tln'closiT ratij^cH, iitlii'iTs (luuKit inovi; ii]) and down the liiir givirif; ordfTH, and bd tlic men and group leaders Hhuuld bo traintil tv i>as3 orders alon^ the line. 411 For further remarks on the tactical use of these fire groups in action, see Chapter XVI. Eesume. In conclusion, we ^ may quote the following from the Revue Jill if a ire de r£tr(niffer {1881): — "The regulation of fire in Germany is based on the following principles : — " 1 . Above 440 j-ards no result is to be expected from isolated shots, because the errors in judging distance are greater than the depths of the dangerous zones. As the skill of the marksman cannot counterbalance this unccrtaint}-, the Germans do not employ picked men to open fire. "2. Fire-action, according to German A-iews should always make itself felt in the shortest possible time ; it shoidd be powerfid and unexpected. The Germans, therefore, condemn a deliberate and continuous fire ^ and adopt the contrary method, that is, short ^Jcriods of 2)oiverfuJ Jire, separated by intervals of more or less duration. "3. The direction of fire in Germany rests with the captain, though there is a growing tendency to make over this direction to the section (zug) leaders. "4. In j}rinciple, firing is to be commenced when on the offensive at 440 yards, and on the defensive at 770 yards from the enemy, a-Iten the action has been jJtrjMired bij artiUert/, and in all cases when it is a decisive action, and not a demon- strative or delaying action. It is understood that should there be no artillery, infantry must prepare its own attack at longer ranges. The same rule holds good in cases of an inferiority in artillery. "5. To obtain a moral and material superiorit}-, do not hesitate, when on the offensive, about the necessary expen- diture of men, and get close enough to the enemy to be able rapidly to inflict on him the amount of loss rec[uired to break down his resistance. " 6. Use different sights in combination, so as to compensate for the errors in judging distance, as well as for the motion of the object, the state of the atmosphere, and the slopes of the ground near the object. "7. Use rapid independent fire sparingly. " 8. Always decide, before opening fire, how man}' rounds to expend, taking into consideration the available supply of ammunition. "9. In action, keep control over the fire as long as possible ; endeavour to do so always. 412 "10. Avuid squauderin-warl'ar(>, the Germans will juako use of indircit fire, even uj) to distances corresponding to the »'xtreme graduations of the sights. Long range in- fantry fire is capable of producing very serious rc^sidts in fortress warfare, (^specially in attacking fortu (Vanrl. The suj)ply of eartridges is unlimited, ranges can be accurately determiiu'd, range tables and auxiliary points of aim can be used ; the skirmishers can fiml support for their rifles, and Imving almost nothing to f(>ar, siuci' lliey slinuld Imvi! thrown • Tli.'it iH, of two c()ii)i)anipH, .sinco cadi hnttalion tlirowH forward two companius, nml kct-jm two in rcMorvo. Tliin advance, liy nifilicH, may also lie cxofiitod liy altcniato half-liatlalions or comiianicH, but the breukinjj \\\> of tho lirin^j-lini; should not gi. b<'lo\v this limit. 413 Tip cover, will be iu tho best possible position for delivering accurate tire. In short, the men are in a situation almost similar to that in which the experimental practice fire is carried out on the ranges ; and, consequently, it would not be surprising if residts should be obtained which approach those obtained in experimental firing." From the foregoing pages, we cannot but be deejjly im- pressed with the importance that is attached to infantry fire in the gigantic armies on the Continent, and with the minute- ness and completeness with which the subject has been studied by them. Can we say the same in England V "With pain it must be said that we are a long way behind other nations in the matter. As far as individual skill is concerned, our men, it must be owned, in spite of our oft-repeated catastrophes in the field as regards musketry fire, compare most favourably with the soldiers of other armies, but the}- outstrip us all- together in fire discipline, direction and control. 21ie secret of the failure of our munhetnj fire in the field is that fire discipline, direction, and control, are practicalhj unknown among us. Con- centration of infantry fire or the necessity for it, are not even hinted at in any one of our regidations. A certain amount of control is certainly aimed at in volley and mass firing having been instituted to a small extent, but there has not been, until latelj', a single word in our regulations as to their uses, the ranges at Avhich they are to be used, or anything to guide an officer, nor even the results of any experiments or data on such kinds of fire have been given which could guide him to a decision. We have not yet got rid of the notion that the accuracy of the independent fire of the individual soldier must be looked upon as the criterion of the effective fire of the whole mass. T/ie independent fire of individuals in the field is of little, and we may say of no value, beyond 400 yards; the only really effective fire is that which proceeds sinmltaneously from a great many rifies directed on the same j^oint, that is from concen- trated fire. Again, pauses in the firing arc very necessary, and the possibility of these pauses being obtained, whethm' by limiting the munber of rounds to be fired, or by using a shrill whistle as the signal to cease, depends entirely on the men, non- commissioned ofiicers, and officers having been trained to it in peace. This " fire discipline " cannot be improvised on the battlefield, it can only be obtaintnl by constant practice in peace times. The methcxl adopted in England, of keeping the fire under control l>y the leaders naming the men, or files, 414 or ranks who are to fire, cannot be maintained at sliort ranges, and is ineffective at long ranges ; and, b}' snch a method, the suddenness and offensive character of a controHed, intermittent, collective firing is lost, as well as the possibility of shaking the moral force of the enemy, which the sudden loss of a number of men is most likely to produce. In every way our fire tactics have been bad, and before we can hope for real success in this direction, our officers must have given them, in authorized regulations, clear ideas upon the principles to be employed in directing and controlling the firing- line, and for obtaining a fire discipline sufficiently strict to ensure attention and obedience on the part of the men to the orders of their officers, even under the disturbing influences of battle, and, further, to make these regulations of any practical value, constant practice must bo made with them. It is with those o})jocts in view tliat the education of soldiers in their annual training sliould bo directed, and not witli the sole object of gaining a liigh figure of merit at target practice with the number of cartridges allowed to be annually expended, whicli has been the cxii'se of the English system. Instruction in individual firing should only bo carriinl out with the chief object of t(^aching men to utilize all accidents of the ground for cover and as rests to tlieir rifles, and when thrown l)y tliomselves or on their own ri'sourees, to clio)s(» rapidly tl\e object to fire at, to calculate; the distance; from it, and to judge whether the distance is within tlie limits within which a single shot may be expected to yield a result {i.e., 400 yards at the most), to choose the elevation to be given, according to the apparent distance of tlie object, to profit by the moments when the object is visibl(% and fiually to accustemi him to regulate his own movements witli tlie rapidity and direction of the advance. It may be considered flint lire discipline, dir(>etion, and control are not retpiired in small wars against savage or uncivilized nations. Tliis is a great mistake. The nature of tlie enemy and his weajioiis may govern and change our tac- tical format ions, liut never the fire discipline, dir(>ction, and control, which alone can assure tlw fullest efficacy of the firo })ein^- attainetl under any conditions. With an enemy nnnrnie(l with modern weajjons, or unskilled in its use, dosed formations may be retained, from the great advantages of the control and the moral su]>])ort they lr\\■^. fJic jncn, and volleys may be used up to a much '-liorftr raiiLre, liii( e the Iju- tactics descri'ied in the 415 foregoing pages can alono develop the full efficacy of the fire. General Skobeleff, wlio commanded the Russian troops sent in 1 880 against the Akhal Tekkes, a Trans-Caspian tribe, who had hitherto successfully defended themselves against the Russians in their stronghold of Geok-Tepe, fully realized the necessity of his officers retaining complete command of the fire of their men. He several times specially recommended volley firing, even at short ranges, and then after the instructions already given on pp. 375 and 376, adds, " That is why I cannot urge too strongly on commanders to have the fire of their men under control, and in order that this grand maxim may be a reality', and not merely empty words, is necessary that the com- mander of every unit should know how to make the hearts of his soldiers beat in unison with his own before the battle. " He mii'it have his troops completely in hand at the critical moment of action, and they must be in his hands an instru- ment Avhich serves him to express with a supreme energy, his thoughts, will, and feelings." These are the ideas of one of the most successful generals of modern days, on the subject of fire tactics against uncivilised tribes. The value of these instructions to us is, that they apply with ec[ual force to our troops, engaged, as they constantly are, in small wars against uncivilised nations. Let us turn to our own experience with our present fire discipline, direction, and control. The Boer war showed us the absolute failure, as could be expected from the foregoing pages, of our system of relying on the independent uncon- centrated fire of individual men. Can anyone assert that the residt would have been the same if our men had been taught and accustomed to place themselves under the orders of the nearest officer or non-commissioned officer, that their fire might be rationally and effectively concentrated, and if the officers and non-commissioned officers had been accustomed to such a responsibility, and able to direct and control the fire? Doubtless our tactics were bad in every way — frontal attacks against a detennined enemy, skilled in the use of his rifle — but the greatest cause of our failure was the want of confidence the men had in their own individual shooting as compared with that of the Boers. Had the fire of groups of men been concentrated at ranges over 400 yards, over which independi'ut fire is valueless, this want of confidence would not have been felt nor helped in the final disaster. In Ashanti'C, our men in the bush fighting, sometimes fired 416 away 100 to 120 rounds with indepeuclent firing with apparently very small result. That is, they fired away more ammunition individually than in some of the most hotly contested European battles. This was only short range firing, and such a number could not have been spent had the fire been controlled. Take again a more favourable case. In Afghanistan our troojis, as a rule, opened an independent fire at ranges between 700 and 900 yards, as we had not then (1878-79-80) anysucli tiling as "fire discipline" in our service, and killed very few for the number of rounds fired. One notable instance was at Dek Sarak, when 28,000 rounds were expended on 50 killtnl at ranges undi'r 400 yards. 200 of the enemy were really killed that day, but 100 were shot down by a single vof/ci/ from one company at about 100 yards range, and another 50 wer(> killed in a cavalry charge. The remainder of the anmmnitiou was expended on 50 killed. All this firing was at the shortest ranges, and, except the one volley, was a purely independent fin\ In this action there was no fire discipline, control, or direction, oilicers were to be seen taking rifles from tlie men and making practice for themselves. The result was that the whole of the ammunition Avith the force was fired away, and the troops had to rc^tire back to camp for want of ammunition, followed up by the enemy the whole Avay. One of tlie most successful actions in the Afghan war was the fight of Ahmed Kluyl. lli're th(> men kept their heads, had cunlideiice, and drove diT tlu^ enemy with Cdusiderablo loss l)y independent fire at vcri/ f/iorf ranges, liut even then, some of the enemy succeeded in reaching tlie l)ayonets of our men. Ih-eecli-loading rifles, if pvojx'rly employed, can do better than that. Still it may Ik; s;nd,that if tlut enemy'sattack h.'ul not been so suddiui — it came like a surprise — that better results would have been got. (Jenrral Stewart liad just drawn up Ivis Iradiiig lirigjidi' in out; liiu' witliout any reserves; he Imd intcndi'd to wait fi»r liis rear l)rigade, souk; miles behind, to como up to act as a reserve, and then to attack. ]iut the enemy snddeidy surged down and wen' drivtMi uiT. It was all over in twenty minutes. Wlien our troojis were shut uji in Slierpur, on several occasions when iiulejiendent fire l)egan it increased to such a ]»itch tlnit neitlier Itugle nor voice could l»e heard, and the men (lid not slop until they had lired the hist round they had on them. 'J'he encniy did not mind tiiis fire; but when volley 117 firing liad tu be resorted to in the end in order to maintain control over the men, the enemy Avere invariably seen seeking for a safer position. At the disaster of ]Stai\vand, the uncontrolled independent tire of onr troops failed to stop the onrush of the closed masses of th(^ enemy, and had no effect on their artillery. Who can say that even with the defensive tactics we employed, so bad against an Asiatic foe,'" that the result woidd have >)een the same, had we had in our arm}' such a system of fire tactics as has alread}- been indicated. In Egypt in 1882, complaints invariably came, after every action, of the bad shooting of our troops, and why '? — because it was independent unconcentrated tire. In nearly all our late actions in the Soudan, both in 1884 and 188.5, our firing was of the wildest description,! and by no means produced the result that should have been gained had our troops been trained to a good system of fire tactics, and to fire discipline. Twice our squares were broken, but this it must be said was due more to faulty tactical arrange- ments, and to the opening of the scj^uare by the troops themselves than to any fault of the rifle. Thus, at Tamai, the enemy had only twenty yards to rush over before reaching the already opened out leading square, and, consequently, the power of our rifles could not be brought into play. At Abou Klea, the skirmishers on foot in front of the square masked its fire, and the enemy arrived at the already opened out square, with these skirmishers. At Tamai, the rear square had a clear field of fire of 500 yards, and onh^ volleys were fired from it, and the consequence was that with the control and discipline maintained over the men by so doing, none of the enemy were able to cross the fire-swept ground. It was thought that from the extended order of fighting, which the modern breech-loader necessitates, the troops would require less training than formerly, and that, because of the rapidity of fire of modern weapons, partially trained and imperfectl}^ disciplined militia, volunteers and raw levies woidd also be more reliable. But actual experience in war has shewn that this is very far from being the case, and that the fire discipline, direction, and control, which the use of * As General Kobert.s said "When you meet an Asiatic, go for him, and when you have him on the run, keep him so." t The fire was so wild that the helmets of the front rank men were often blown ofE by the rear rank men, and some state that more serious consequences occurred in some casp'*. Dd ns the modern rifle requires for the ammunitiou to last out, and for obtaiuiug' the uiaximuni effect of the sujiply carried, are more difficult to carry out, and require more peace training tlian the old drill in close order which muzzle-loading rifles permitted. Immediately after the war of 1870-71 it was generally thought that the greatest independency should be given to the individual soldier in his actions, but this idea soon died out abroad, while it has ever since been retained in England. Mutual, and not independent action, is the secret of success in uar, and for mutual ai-tion to exist, there must be discipline, direction and control. The Avord "independent" should be cut out of every regulation and drill-book. Every action can be classified under "individual" (which does not necessarily imply independency), and " mutual " action. The independent training of men is an evil that cannot be too strongly repressed ; present conditions retjuire the men to be ti'ained to Avork mutually in grt)ups under a leader, and not independently. The advantages which a firing-line, divided into groups or commands, has over a continuous firing line, with each man working according to his own lights, are : — 1. It enables a better control to be maintained of the men, so that they are kept better and longer in liand. 2. It enables a concentrated fire to be kept up, even at the shorter ranges, and on tlie objects required to be fired at. 3. The pauses, so necessary to enable control to be kept up, are facilitated. 4. It conduces to a more rigorous execution of given orders. "). It lielps to avoid waste of ammunition — the grou]) leader having tlie power of moderating llie lire according to cinnmstances. (>. It penuiis of a more rational utilization of tlie cover given ])y llie ground, and of a more energetic advance in tlio attack. 7. It gives to eacli man a contact witli liis comrades in tho group, wliicli increases his feeling of security and confidence, by tlie moral ju'otection it affords. 8. It ]»resent.s to cavalry a series of organized groups, quickly fonned, and (•a])able of sufficient resistance. •J. It allows uf volleys being executed at much shorter ranges. 10. Itallovsof orders being more easily passed along tho filing line. 419 By " groujis " it must not be tlioiight that a closed hody of men is intended — tlie <>Tuup may be extended. The word " unit " perhaps more fully expresses its meaning. The leaders of these groups, in the final stages of the fight, ai'B the officers and non-commissioned officers, but the latter have, when the enemy is still distant and the combined grouj)s are large, their special invaluable duties in the "control" of the fire, and so they must never presume to take separate command of a group unless they receive the order from an officer, who finds the control getting too difficult to inaintain, or if the officer is killed or wounded. The men in peace time must have a full and clear conviction impressed on them of the value of mutual action, and of the uselessness of independent action, for it is only b}^ so doing that they will liaA'e the discipline to voluntarily place tliem- selves under the control of the nearest leader, whoever he may be. The independent firing of the French in 1870, and of the Turks in 1877 should be taken to heart by all, as a warning of how not to act. The men knew their rifies could carry long distances, and with little regard to aiming or to range, they fired away in the direction of the enemy, ■n'ithout guidance or control. Although heavy losses were thus inflicted when directed on large closed bodies, yet such firing never beat off a determined attack in open order, and it is liable, moreover, at the most critical moment, to cause troops using it to run short of ammunition, as so frequently happened to the French, necessitating of course their retirement. The Germans on the other hand, when on the defensive, n('ver opened fire beyond a range of aboiit 400 yards, and yet their iire, steadih^ and well delivered — the result of stern discipline and training — was invariably successful. Dd 2 41' I PAllT III. CHAPTER XVI.-^-^ TACTICAL DEDUCTIONS. The German regulations state that : " The science of leading masses of infantry consists in suitably employing their fire by concentrating it according to time and place, and iu throwing disorder, by this fire, among the enemy's troops." General Lewal writes : " The manner of disposing infantry on the battle field, of conducting a cavalry charge, or of placing batteries, is a direct corollary of the effects of tire." All history shows the following main principles, governing the tactics to be em]>loyed in any war, to be unchanged by time : — 1. That, in all times, those who had tlie greatest mobility and who knew best how to make use of it and of their fire, had an incontestable superiority in the fight. 2. That a relative increase of artillery has generally denoted a bad infantry. 3. That the progress in the armament of infantry is the principal cause of the successive reforms in the tactical formation of troops for fighting 4. The weapons of one army determine the formations re- quired to obtain the best results from them. f). The weapons of the adversary detemiine the formations required to render their power as feeble as possible. C. Discipline, previous training, and custom, are prime factors in the tactical methods of ])rocedure on the battle field. 7. Victory can only be assured by the demoralisation of the enemy, caused either by the infliction of losses, by an effective lire, or ])y the failure of his ammunition, or by the moral effect of superior numbers, superior armament, out-flanking him, &c., &c. * A considerable part of this chapter is taken from a jiamphlet written bv the Author, entitled, The I.ate Bnttkx i)i f/ic Soiaffi/i, ft/id Jl"i//rii Turticx : A Replu, J=ol, tlu> men, arms, and ground, put at his disposal. Hence, the subject of tactics should be the j)rincipal oltject of military study in an army, esjieeially as good tactics may save a bad strategy, while the most brilliant strategical combinations must fail if battles are lost. In the following ])nges we ])ropose to confine our reuuirks to infantry iJi-ineijially, becaust^ infantry on the battle field, whether it gains or yields ground, irresistibly draws the other arms with it in its advance or retreat. A study of any battle, es])ecially of the battle of Sadowa, in the Austro-l'russiaii AN'ar rif 18(}(), will give a striking ])iiic)f of this truth. We 8('(( here that a defeated f(U-<'e, in spite of the most heroic; efloicts of a good artillery or of flu* vigorous charges of a liiave cavalry, loses tlie Inittle liy the inferiority (moral (u- -123 niatei'ial) of its infantry, while a good, bravo, and well discip- lined infantry even witli a poor artillery- and badly used eavaliy, can be successful. It is useless to seek for details of tactical procedure, suited to modern conditions, in the days of the muzzle-loading rifle and smooth bore artillery. Hence, vre cannot even go back as far as the Crimean war for this purpose, except to prove one thing, — the impossibility of a long rigid line of troops being able to advance, as such, over any distance to the attack. The campaigns of 1859, 1864 and 1866 furnish us with no real deductions for tactical formations, although they give additional proofs to the now fully recognized principle, that before the bayonet assault can be delivered, the enemy must first have been demoralized by an efficient fire preparation. In the latter war the Prussians had such an immense superiorit}' in armament as to . render comparisons of little avail. The Franco-German war of 1870-71, simply startled the civilised world with its rapidity, with the enormous number of combatants required for modern war, with the boldness, not only of the strategy, but also of the tactical formations adopted, and with the dissolving effect of the breech-loader on any kmd of closed formation, line or column, at ranges hitherto deemed quite safe. The French, in this war, had the better rifle, but were much inferior as regards numbers, organLsation, training, discipline, and administration. Neither side, however, employed any of the definite fire tactics described in Part II. In 1866 the eyes of Europe were opened as to the power of the breech-loader, at all events, at short ranges. The Prussians partly saw its true power, and reduced the size of their columns i»f attack to that of company columns of 2.50 men each — so that they might move more easily, while offering a smaller tai'get to the enemy. But the necessity of obtaining all the cover possible from accidents of the ground by the use of very small units and extended formations was not as yet fully realised. When the war of 1870 began, skirmishers were still looked on as only a means to prepare the way for the final assault, wliich was to be carried out by company columns of attack. No one yet dreamed of carrying out an attack from fii'st to last with lines of skirmishers only. The battles of Wilrth, Spicheren, and the fighting round Metz soon convinced the Crermans that when opposed to 121 modern rille lire in tlie iiaiids of trained troops, the day of "columns of attack" was past;*' that extended formations were required in order to enable the troops to move over the fire-swept zone with the greatest rapidity, to obtain the fullest advantage from the cover afforded by the ground, to lesson the destructive effect of the enemy's lire during an advance, and to enable the attack to arrive without annihilation at the decisive ranges ; that the skirmishing line, instead of being an auxiliary, was the principal means of offence and defence ; that bodies in rear must simply 1)0 oonsiderod as feeders to this line, and that in place of the old close ctdumns of attack, physically breaking the power of the enemy, it was necessary to substitute iiiccessirc lines of attack for carnjiug out an offensive assault after the poivcr of the enetiitj has been hroJ;en hij the fire of the leading h'ne.f The duty assigned to the reserves of a battalion by English writers on tactics, and whicli is laid down in our drill-book, of finally forcing an enemy's position in conjunction with the tro(jps already extended, is not in accordance with war experience. As Colonel E. Clivi-, Grenadier Gimrds, said, in 1878, in a lecture he gave befon^ Lord AVolseley and a number of other distinguished Englisli oliicors. "As I road the military liislorii-s of jiasl cauipiiigns, the part that reserves have ti> play is ijuite dilferent. It is that of carrying forward the wave of attack, and not of making the final rush in line, though the latter was the duty of tlio reserves when attacking niuz/.lo-loaders." The false duty, mentioned above, assigned to tlie liattalion reserves by the English, especially when a system of attack is based upon it, or even affected by it, contains a great element of dangi'r, because it may, and probably will, indis- pose commanding officers to expend tlie battalion resen'es, when necessary, from the thought that if they ar<^ once thrown into the iigliting line, tluy liave no troops available to drive the enemy out of his jtosition, and the result of thin ui/l probahlif be font/, ha/fi/if/, indecixirc af larks, incapable if drivinij an eneinif frcm his j/osifion, denioralisini/ to the men, and inritini/ defeat. It Hoems strange that now , in 18H8, it is si ill necessary to point • " All writors who )mv(> spcn nnythingof recent fightinj!:, appear to 1)0 aj^rti'd that an attac k in column is a thing no longer possible." — {H'cliiiKjlon JVizr Ksxiii, l.ST'J.) t TliuH prartiinlly suli'<(ilu(iiip' nn '' open cdluniii " fdr the old " iluseil column " I'f .iit.irk. 425 out that an attaclc aj^aiiLst tin? luodcrn ritlf has uovtr been carried out in tliu above manner. Colonel E. Clive, in tlu; lecture referred to above, pointed out that the lesson gaim-d from the wars of 1870 and 1877 was, that direct attacks can hardly ever succeed, except at a most tremendous sacrifice. So that, thoug-h the suggestion, that thcs companies of a battalion are sufficient and likely to shake an enemy, may be a good one to instil into troops in view of minor combats, yet it is not a proper axiom in the higher military exercises, because this is talking of shaking the enemy with a force of two men per pace. The attack is far more serious than this, and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the first as Avell as the second line will have to be expended before the enemy is shaken and the time has come for the final charge. In all the accounts of the wars of 1870 and 1877 Ave invariably read of the final decision being made, not along the whole front, but at the decisive points or localities, with "great swarms," "dense clouds," "thick masses" of skirmishers from eight to sixteen men deep. General Skobeleff , after the Eusso-Turkish war, expressed his opinion that "the only formation in which troops can successfully assault entrenched positions is in successive lines of skirmishers." The facts stated in Parts I. and II. ha\e given us data on which we may base our tactical deductions for the future. T/ie oh/ect of all tactics is to obtain victor// Inj the demoralisation of the enemy, and we can have nothing so demoralising as a well directed and terrible fire. Thus by an efficacious fire we ensure the demoralisation of the enemy, and, therefore, hij ayi efficacious fire IV e ensure victory. In the present chapter we cannot pretend to deal with the whole qiu-stion of tactics, and the moral elements which affect it ; of course, an enemy can be made to retire by threatening his line of retreat, or he may do so from having expended all his ammunition. Such cases we cannot deal with, and all that we can touch on is the tactical procedure that will best ensure a maximum of efficacy for the fire. The animal instinct of man is that of self-preservation and avoidance of danger. But by discipline and maintenance of control over the men, tliis instinct can be completely over- mastered. The same can be done by moral influences, such as love of country, enthusiasm in the (-ause, love of glor}-, desire' for distinction, &c., but discipline and control are the two immediate factors we intend only to deal with here. Custom or habit is anotlun- prime factor in war. And it is a recognized fact that men who are thoroughly accustomed liy practice • to 42G do certain actions in orJiuary tinios Nvill do the same in moments of great mental strain. " The best infantry are those who fire the best, most to the purpose, and Avho, while producing the greatest useful effect, consume the least ammunition," and so every soldier shoidd be thoroughly taught how to obtain from his rifle the highest results it is capable of gi\'ing, by a good method of instruction and by constant practice. It should always be remembered that a fire is only terrible when it is irell directed. History furnishes many examples of the Innlliant residts obtained by a well commanded and executed fire, and of how a body of men is only powerful by its fire-power tr/ien the men keep their calmness and presence of mind. One of the most certain pledges of victory is efficacy of fire, and this can only bo obtained ])y men who do not get too excited to ensure it. Therefore, we must seek the means of allowing men to preserve their moral forces, and also to fire well anil be under control as long as possible in action. These means lie (1) in a good orrjanisation, which ensures the necessary (lommand over the men ; (2) in a strict discipline, which ensures the necessary obedience and suppression of their animal instincts of self-preservation ; and (3) in sound and constant practice, which ensures the men acting from habit, in a manner they ought to do, in moments of the greatest mental strain. " Tlie condition wliich ought to rank before all others is to obtain a superiority of fire over the riu>my. It is necessary to make everytliing give way to this reipiiremi'nt. The victory is at tliis price." Napoleon I. wrote : " Fm) is everything, the rest is but of small account." (fcncral Lewal writes: '' Kiri' is tin- great, the principal, and almost tlie no vi these latter could, if tliouglit necessary, act as ammunition carrier, who would carry out his duties as long as possible, so as to allow the other men to enter the iinal singe of the tight as fully supplied as jtossible, lifter which he would join a grouit in tlu' tiring line, if hecaniKtt lind his own. About (5 of such groups, each uiider a grouji-leiider. would form a hali'coni])any rtf .')() nn'n, imder two sergeants and a lieutenant; wliicli would nuike tlie comi)any about 100 strong, with 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, I sergeants, and 12group-leaders, liesidestlie usual adiuiiiisti'ative stall', l»uglers, X'c. Tlu" conijiaiiy on jimivhIi' woidd lie sized, numbered, told ott', tVe.. as le-ual, iiitu li.ill' ediiipanies, sections, and fours, and each ' 'lln- (iciiimiiM unnallj- ciinilny j^ronim (pf only ci^lit men ouch ; ttii uf Hiiih units fonnin*!; a " znj;; " or a third of a (•oin])any of 'i.'iO iniii. 'J'lii' niaxiiiiniM strcnLH)) of ii irionii in tlir (Iiiukiti scrvico is 1'.' in'Mi. 129 section would then bo divided, as far as possible, into groups of 8 men each, and a leader appointed to each"^'. The left hand 5^-roup of each section may have to vary in streng-th from 1 2 as a maximum to G as a minimum, it being made a rule that no group is to exceed 12 men. Jint fur such an, orgiuiisatiuii to succeed it is essential that the meti, from the time tliei/ are recruits^ should he trained to it, hi/ heim/ made to icork in f/roups, under f/roup leaders, in their squad and rompani/ drills, as well as when workin'j in the hattalion. We must not now run away with the idea that all has been done that can be, when this group organisation requu-ed for battle has been made to enter into the organisation of the company, as has been done in every European amiy but our own. Any such system of organised groups will, at a certain period of "the light, be dissolved on the battle field by the enemy's hre ; all the small organised tactical groups will, sooner or later, be broken up from losses, from the inevitable drift- ing of the men to the right and left, and from the unavoidable mixing of the larger units. In The Frontal Attach of Infantry,] by Captain LajTuan, we read: — " In an offensive engagement, however, after a few minutes (within the short ranges), there are no longer an}- decided {i.e., organised) groups. . . . Here and there, in the vicissitudes of the fight, new groups are formed . ." The minimising of this evil can only be sought for in the training which the men have ivceived in peace time. Every man should be taught and fully impressed with the idea uf the uselessness of independent individual action at anything Itut the shortest ranges, and of the immense value of mutual action, even at these shortest ranges, when possible, and that consequently he should always voluntarily place him- self under the orders of the nearest leader for control and guidance, so that the greatest good for the whole may be obtained. Colonel L. Hale has pointed out that the narrow basis of * In the first edition of this work it was sngjirested to place two gi-onps or a section under a sergeant, and two sectitnis under a lieutenant as permanent commands, hut on reconsideration, the Author has altered this. The reason for this is hest given in the words of Col. Home in his Preris of Modern Tactics (p. "212) in reference to such a system: — "If any of these commanders are killed the confusion must he great," as a change of commands would have to he made throughout the company: "the division is carried too 'far.' " It is hetter for tlie captaia to superintend the whole of his gi-oups, assisted by his officers and sergeants, as in the German service. t This pamphlet was written in 1873, before the system of fire tactics already explained had sprung into existence, and before the group syetem of fighting had reached its present devrlnpmpnt . ■i;30 personal and individual attachment "is all very well in thcorv, but it is utterly vicious in practice, . . . Avhereas, -wo ought to seek to establisli in the confusion of battle, a feeling of universal camaraderie ; soldiers under lire shoidd feel that it does not matter two straws whether it is their own personal comrade and friend whom they are to assist and to whom they can turn for help, but that so long as the man near them is one of their own army, it is him they must help, it is he who will help them. They will not tind their own company officers there ; these will have fallen, their battalitm will be led b}' a company officer, their sergeants will be leading companies, and in their difficidties they must follow the nearest leader." Captain La3^nan, referring to non-commissioned officers as group leaders at the short ranges, writes: — "The importance of the non-c(mimissioned officers depends perhaps less upon their command of ai)pointed groups than upon the intluenco insured by their position, experience^ and matured character, over the skirmishers in their vicinity." Thus, after providing for a group s^-stem in the original organisation of the company, to be used as long as possible, we have done all we can do if we train the men to the idea that, when the organised groups, are broken up, they should voluntaril}- form themselves into groups, under the nearest leader, to whatever regiment or corps he may belong, in order that the greatest control, power of comnuuid, facility for giving orders, and the utilisation of the whole to one pur- l")0se may be obtained, and also that a collective and controlled tire may be possible, in order that the best use may be mado of the fire, and that any waste of valuabl(> ammuni- tion may be avoided, by preventing a useless, iiuleiiendent, unainu'd rapid lire at ill-judged ranges. Tlie importance of this cannot b(» exaggerated. All military autliorities are fully ngi'oed on tlie iiilliienee wbieli custom or habit has on tlio acti(m of men, and tliey consider tliat tlie instinctive nature in men, of unconsciou.sly acting in moments of great tension and of higli mental strain, according 1i> a AV(>ll-]>racticed custf)m, may be fidly relied on in badle iis an aid to tactical jirocedure, even when the men are under a very heavy fire, causing them serious losses. The ex])erienc<> of every war has frecnieiifly eoiiiii'iiied this fad in a most niiirkeil manner, and, indeed, we can see it in many actions of our daily existence. The iire-gi'iiiips, advocated above, which they in reality are, must now l)e looked tinon as the guns of a battery of urtillerv. The firing shouhl not be continuous, or else the lire •131 will soon got out of control, and will not tease until *tlie last round has been expended, })esides which it will also lose the moral effect of concentration and suddenness. In the intervals thus caused in the tiring, the orders are passed down the tiring" line as to the object to be th'ed at, the number of rounds to be expended, when the fire is to cease, and the advance to be resumed, &c., &c. These orders are given in the first place to tlie group leaders, who communicate them in turn to the men imder their immediate command, and see that they are executed as requu'ed. When tlie lire is so hea\y that officers cannot move up and down the line giving orders, then the men must jtass the word along the line, but for them to be able to do this, they must have been practised at it in jieace exercises. The officers, and even the group leaders, must be constantly on the look-out to appoint fresh grouj) leaders from among the men of the groups nearest them, in the place of those who have been killed, or too badly wounded to continue their duties. Before going further, it is necessar}- to point out here that " the assault ought to take place at particular points, and that we ought not to think that every deployment or fight, even an offensive one, shoidd end by an assault The offensive is not the assault, and no one has the right to advance and engage his troops without the consent of the commander of the whole force, or the}' may act contrary to his wishes. The offensive is not forcibly obliged to end by an assault. The assault is only a particular act of the offen- sive, at a given point and for particular motives." Until the actual assault is to take jilace, which it must always be remembered is only one phase of the attack — the concluding one — the rules for the action of artillery are fidly applicable to infantry employed as stated above, viz. : — 1. To get within effective range. 2. When once there to move as little as possible iintil the advance to the assault takes place."' o. To mass tlu^ lire-groups {i.e., guns) instead of dispersing them. 4. To concentrate the fire on the main points of attack. But as troops must advance to the assavdt, and as a long fire fight tends to destro}' the offensive spirit and to use up ammu- intion, arrangements must be made to subdivide the troops for preparing and executing the assault in the manner presently to be described. * This presupposes a subdivision of the duties of preparation and jissaiilt, as advocated in Chapter XI. \:V2 Thus for modern liglitiug' small tactical units are necessary, and also a thorongli individual training of the men, to impress on them in the fullest manner that mutual co-operation is the. secret of success in tear. Every man must i)lace himself under the nearest leader for mutual co-operation for battle and hre discipline, and for receiving- and transmitting orders. Indi- vidual action is waste of power, tends to panics, and is in every way to bo avoided. It is absolutely essential that every man should regulate his actions by that of his neighbours, and not light in the manner of savages, each for himself. Accepting tlu' usual fighting front of a battalion as two men per pace, history shows us that it is impossible to expect to attack and drive off a well posted enemy with such a force alone, and that therefore the actual mixing of even large units on the same front must occur at some ])eriod or otlier of a hotly -contested tight. Brigades and divisions are found to get mixed, in spite of every precaution, and hence, all that we can hope to do is to delay the moment of this unwished for, though unavoidable, mixing as long as possible, and to make such previous arrangements that wlu-n the mixing does take place among the larger units, discipline, direction, and control can be maintained over both the men and their fire by means of very snuxll units. The conclusion which every European nation but ourselves has ariived at, in this respect, is, that the s(dution must be sought for in tin- organisation of the coni- ]»any, whicli, as has been already pointed out, is divided for the purpose into groups of 8 to 1 men, each under a recognized leader whom they follow and ])ay attention to, and whoso orders they implicitly obey; and if a man gets separated from his own group he is expected and trained to attach himself to the nearest oik; ; mutual and not iudependent action is thus taught in every way. It is hoped that by this group system (which lias not yet been tested in war), carried out and jiractised to tlie fullest in peact; time, the evils arising from the mixing of the larger units will be greatly mitigated, while the necessary (li.s(i])linr>, direction, and control will l)e far better maintained wliiili nu-rely relies on arranging coni])ani<'s, battalions. iVc, so as )i(»t to intermix — an uusolvable ])roblem UH yet. In the irroup system, instead of llie captain liaving to h)ok alter and control a great number of men extended oyer a large front, whicli it is not in tho power of any man to do properly, he conlini's his attention to n few group leuderw, who in turn, liave only a f e\v men to look after; that is, the rnptniu only deuls with the group leadevi directly, and through them with the mfui indirectly. 433 Altliougli Continontal officers liavo recog-nlsecl tho fact that the intenuixture of compauies and larger units cannot be avoided, and that a mere arrangement of tlieso units cannot prevent its taking place at some time or other, yet they are not in th(^ least blind to the confusion and loss of control it will entail, xndess some counterpoise is adopted to prevent or minimise them. This counterpoise is the group S3-stem in the company organisation, and given it, they insist that the amount of confusion and loss of control (which must take place in every attack) will be much less than any other system can ensure. Tlu'n only lower the unit that is not to be broken >ip, or intermixed, to the group. By this s_ystem the group is made the true "fighting unit," and the company, a collection of these units. It is by this means, as we shall presently point out, from the reinforcing being effected by the same groups com- plete, that the fighting unity is thus absolutely maintained at every stage of reinf(jrcenient, because tlie reinforcing only causes an increase in the number of "fighting units" in the firing line, and not a mixture of them. This leads us to the question of reinforcing the firing line, which must, sooner or later, cause a mixture of, at all events, the larger units. There are two wa3-s of feeding a firing line ( 1 ) by flank reinforcing, and (2) by direct reinforcing from the rear. The latter will at once cause a mixture of any kind of units, however small. The men in a firing line ought invariably to advance straight to their front, and not seek for cover laterally,* but the supports and reserv(!s shoidd always seek for cover wherever it can be found, not for their own sakes, but to save men, for the good of the whole. Hence when men in rear of the firing line advance according to the position of existing cover, the drifting is often so great that it is impossible to ensure even parts of companies re- inforcing theii- respective extended portions in front. Troops in rear of a firing line will further involuntarily converge * A great distinction must be made between the attacJc and fikinnishbig proper. In the former men must never act independently, but always mutually in groups and larger fractions ; while in the latter they may have even, at times, almost complete independence of action. In an attack men must be taught to advance straight to their front, and not seek cover to the right or left, and so crowd up some parts of the line without necessitj-, and leave gaps in other parts ; but in skirmishing, where tho men are further apart, cover may be so sought for. AVhen misses of men get crowded together under fire behind cover, e.vperienco shows that there is great difliculty in getting them to go forward again. Ee 404 laterally towards tlio decisive points of the fight,* and to where cover can be obtained nearest the enemy. The truth is that tj"pical or nomial attack fonnations are very good in their way to train officers and men to a nomial mode of procedure that should be aimed at, and to ensure steadiness, but they do not represent what has ever occurred, or ever will occur on the battle field, where the fire of the enemy and the cover available will mainly shape the form assimied by the attackinj^ troops. f This fact points out to us one principle that a battalion formation fur attack should fulfil, namely, that all troops required for reinforcing the Jiring line at the closest stages of the fight should be in complete units, and independent of those in the firing line. The battalion reserves fall under this condition, and hence they should be fonned of complete companies ; but the supports, being required ior reinforcing in the earlier stages of the fight, should be fonned of the same tactical units as are in the firing line, so as to carry out the principle of all modern fighting, tliat every commander should have, m his own sphere of action, ample reserves whereuith to carrg out that portion of the jight vhich he himself is directing and is responsible for. The flank system of reinforcing depends on the troops in the firing line closing in as losses occur, and fresh troops being pushed into the gaps. We can easily see that if these rein- forcing fresh troops are ])rouglit up in organised imits, that the problem of maintaining control in the firing line, is as nearly solved as it is possible to be. But, at the same time, it is impracticaltle to expect large units in the firing line to close in uiuler fire, or to Itring up large units for reinforcing ; and so the only solution is to organise the troops in small units or grou])s, and for these groups only to close in on tliemselves, as losses occur in them, and to cany out tln^ flank reinforcing by pushing intact groups into th(> small intervals so left. This system of reinforcing only multiplies or in- creases the number of groups or lighting units in the firing line, and quite prevents their mixing, at nil events in all but * Altliouffh tlio trooj)H .•tie jittniclcd towards Iho sound of lioavy firinp, yot thov Hjiroad out wlun struck liy it, nnd consciiucntly ichcivoh aro rfqnircd tf> In- jiuslicd into llic iiriiif;^ line to krop it at tho pi'oju'r dcn.sity. Wlurf lli(> line is too thick, coin])lctc proni)s should Ik) wifluhvnvn, mil>))li<'d willi fnsli ammunition, iind sont forward again to any point roquirinj^ reinforcements. T .lomini writes : — " In discussion on tlieso suhjecls I remark ti fatal tendency in the clearest minds to riduce every systi'in of war fo ahsoluto foims, a)id to cast in the sanii' mouM all the tactical fonualions a j^eneral may arran^^e, without fakinjj; into consideration localities, moral circuiu- fctanccH, national diaractcri.stics, or the ahilitics of tho commanders," 435 the very closest stages of tlie fight. This method is the only one used abroad, and was only introduced in 1884 into oiir drill-hook ; direct reinforcing from the rear is only per- missible (from the confusion and loss of men it entails), when the above system of flank reinforcing cannot possibly be carried out, which would usually be the case when within 400 yards of the enemy, just before the assault takes place. As pointed out in Chapter XIII., it is not probable that any control is possible under this range. Officers and group leaders must be constantly on the look- out to see when reinforcements are coming up, so as to close in their groups in time. Each group shoiUd have a directing file or man, on whom the other men dress themselves, and to whom they subordinate their movements. The position of the group leader will be behind this file, so as to direct his move- ments, and when the group is closed in, it will do so on the file of direction. The groups should not actually close in until the reinforcements come up, because the more they are extended, the less likely they are to be hit. Thus, abroad, reinforcing the firing line is effected by organised groups ; as gaps occur in the firing line from losses, and from the groups closing in, they are filled up by com- plete group units being sent forward, each acting under its leader, who looks to the nearest officer in the firing line for his orders. In this way, on the Continent, they claim, by a gi'oup system in the company organisation, to have arrived at the best method of maintaining the discipline, direction, and control of the firing line, and to have reduced to the lowest limits possible, the evils arising from the mixing of the larger units, which must inevitably ensue in time. This system, which is being developed to its utmost abroad, puts further in the background than ever, all schemes for preventing such mixing by an arrangement of the companies, and larger units.* * In the German Grand Manoeuvres of 1884, the German hrigade attack formation of 6 battalions was as follows, according to the corre- spondent of the Times of the ■24th September, 1884. Two battalions were placed in the front line, and each extended 3 out of their 4 companies on a total front of 800 yards ; these companies formed their own firing lines and supports ; the supports were 200 yards in rear of the firing line ; the 4th company followed 300 yards in rear of the supports, as a first reserve. The third battalion followed the 2 rescrv-e companies at a distance of -500 yards. These 3 battalions belonged to one regiment, and the 3 battalions of the other regiment of the brigade followed much further in rear as a main rescr^'e. This advance in 5 lines docs not look like placing the larger units so as to prevent their mixing, and yet, as the Times correspondent Ee 2 436 If to prevent the mixing of the larger units, wo place all the companies of a battalion side by side, and then also all the battalions, brigades, &€., side by side, for the same purpose, we finally arrive at placing the whole force in a single line. Such a course is inadmissible, and hence, placing distinct units behind one another must occur at some point or other ; and, if this is admissible for the larger units, there must be even less harm in it for the smaller t)nes, the men and officers of which know each other very nearly, as well as the}- do those of their own respective units. Thus, the two main reasons for the introduction of the group system abroad were, (1) to prevent or minimise con- fusion and loss of control that takes place when the larger units reinforced one another : and (2), to carry out the system of fire tactics, dealt with in Part II., which have been adopted for many years past abroad, and which have only lately appeared in our own drill-book. But, instead of a small, handy group, we employ the section, which at war-strength (25 to 30 men) would be far too strong for any one man to control, or to maintain a proper fire discipline in it ; and, it is too large for reinforcing purposes. Our attack formation leaves nothing to bo desired, except a group system of working, to which the men .should have been trained from the time they are recruits. At present, our men and nou- conmiissioned officers, and even olficers, do not know the true writes: — " The principles of those infantry tactics seemed to beat the fingers' ends of every oflicer ; and the men, too, appeared to be imbued ■with a thoi-ouf;h knnwle(l<:;c of what Ihfv had to do whrn ordered to do it. In no single case did I observe any crowding or confusion ; nor could any lady more deftly, easily, or giacefully expand her fan, than did each ofhcer manipulate the column under his command." But then, it must be remeiubcred, that every German company commander has the greatest liberty allowed him in c'lrrying out his onlers ; yet, even this will not account for all; the key to it lies in the statement: — " The manteuvres of the last few days sIicwimI how careful (ienuan ofliccrs are in striving to jirevent a useless waste of iimmuuition, and in enforcing what they call a severe ' fire discipline.' lOven when file-liring, the nu-n are only allowed to expend 3 cartridges, and then look round for further orders. The 1>etf or to attract the attention of their men auiiitenant^< and ca]>tains are jirovidcd willi a whistle, and sometimes the Held was all alive with tlie shrill notis of these little instrunu'nf s, as with the seductive ]ii)iing of so many liird e;itchers. I oliserved that the oflicers commanding the; skirmisliing lines always gave the men their aim iind ntnge, and they endeavoured to see that their orders were strictly oVjeyed." A closer inspection would have shewn tliat these oQicere worked by organised groups \inder regular group leaders. 437 necessity for working in groups. It lias not been impressed on them by fire experiments, as is done abroad, and so the working of even our section system is not anytliing like as vigorous as it should be ; and the whole duty of lire direction may be said to be almost unknown among us, as the question of infantry* lire tactics has l)een sadly neglected in England. Our fire discipline has hitherto been of the very worst descrip- tion, and there has not been a single campaign, made by us of late years, in which numerous complaints have not })een made of the wild shooting of our men. It is the faidt of not having hitherto had any system of fire tactics, and not of the men themselves ; and, now that such a system has been instituted, let us hope that it will be vigorously insisted on, and then, it will be found, that wild flriug will cease, or at least be minimised. It could be easily shown that if the group system Avere introduced into the organisation of our companies and the train- ing of our men, it would not only greatly increase the efficacy of our fire and tactical procedure in modern warfare, but also in our numerous wars against savages. It is a system eminently adapted for gettiug the greatest effect from the breech-loading rifle, and will be still more so for the repeating or magazine rifle, the future ai-mament of infantry ; and further, when we come to consider that, at the final stages of a modern fight, the firing line is no longer under control as a Hue, and that the men are only led on by the personal influence and example of the leaders nearest them, we cannot help feeling that tJie group system is the essence of any modern attack formation. It is well known that men under fire collect in groups and look for orders, and hence the group system described above only systemises, utilises, and places under control what men do involuntarily, thus forming a natural course for the instincts of men to move in, instead of trying to force these instincts to run in a direction contrary to nature. One thing must not be forgotten, that a fight is first begun by an advance guard, and the troops of the main body have to join in, if possible, on its flanks ; biit often they are compelled to make use of the same ground, causing from the very beginning an intermixture of the larger units, which would be fatal to the maintenance of fire discipline, direction and control, were it not for an efficient group systt-m of fight- ing, thoroughly understood by the men, and conducted with skill and judgment by the officers. A consideration of the above svstem of fifrhtin": with modern -1.38 rifles cauuot l)ut bring to our notice the fact of tlie very great percentage of British officers — especially senior ones — killed, to men, -who, to their honour, bravely met their fate like true soldiers, at the head of their troops in the hour of victory. With reference to this we cannot but recall to our minds a German criticism on the bravery of our officers and men. It is to be found in an account of the Egytian war of 1882, written by Lieut. -Col. Hermann Vogt. We will give the quotation in full, as it is full of import and deep earnestness to us, and thoroughly explains how it is that we invariably have such a high percentage of officers killed and wounded to tliat of the men. " All the machinery of the War Office* has again proved unwieldy and unpractical. Its influence, which obstructed and narrowed the free action of the army, was scarcel}' counterbalanced by the inferiority of the enemy, and by the bravery of the British troops. Under three attacks — two of tliem surprises — the men held their ground for liours against heavy odds, and they charged the earthworks and the death-dealing cannon's mouth without a moment's hesitation. 'The English infantry,' a French general (General Foy) has said, ' is the best in the world ; fortunately it is not numerous.' The praise conveyed in this saying is still applicable as far as regards the personal bravery of men and officers. The hitter ^ it is true, treat the Sere ice, even hi the fchl of battle, more as sport for the development of personal courage than as a continuous series of ohligatonj actions in the interest of a great whole ; but this is the natun; (jf Britons, wlio cultivate* cveiy kind of sptu't. Tlu> following expression is ascribed to thf Duke of AV^ellington — the ' Iron Duke ' — that type of all English generals : — * I always found men who followed \h.v hounds brave and valiant soldiers.' This treatment of war as sjiort serves to explain the want of vigilance in those precautionary and out- ])ost services where that quality is specially recjuired. Tho kniglit iiglits with i»raisewortby courage, and then straightway gives way to carelessness and rejjose. The sustained alert- ness of outpost duties, froiu which little credit is to Ito gained, seems somehow beneath his dignily, aiul tlui Britisli have, in consequence, b(U>n twice surprised in this short campaign, to say nothing of tho ninnerous attacks of the liechniins, the object of w hicli was ]ilund. With an independent detachment, a flank attack can be arranged for tactically, i.e., on the field of l»attle. 4. In iiuh-jiendent detadi- ments, the artillery can more or lesH choose its own ])osit ions, and fight on tlie flanks of the infantry, or in any intervals in the line. 1 . In large battles most of the troops have a restricted front imposed by the presence of other troops on either side of them. 2. In large battlers tlie rear lines cannot overlaj) tlie front lines, and hence an attack cannot tactically outflank the enemy, but must partake of a frontal character tactically. 3. In large battles, flank attacks can only be arranged for sti-ategically, i.e., off the battle field. 4. In great battles the artillery of an army corps (a])out 100 guns) takes up a. front of a})out 2,000 yards at least, under the most favour- able eii-cnmsfnnces, and henci' 441 5. In independent detaoli- nients the troops can be placed and moved so as to make the best use of the ground in any direction to gain the object in vie^y. 6. In combats made by in- dependent detachments, the opportunities for the use of cavahy on the battle field may be many. 7. In the minor combats conducted by independent detachments, the attack will have most chance of success by skdf ul generalship on the battle field. artUlery must fight on the same ground as the infantry, firing over the heads of the latter. It has no choice of positions, but must make the bestusepossibleof theground it is on. 5. In large battles the troops must move straight to their front, and they can only make use of the ground lying directly between them and the enemy. G. In large battles the use of cavahy on the battle field itself is very restricted. 7. In large battles the suc- cess of the attack depends more on the best use being made of the physical means of destruction emploj^ed, and on the previous strategy that has brought on the battle. Hence in minor combats conducted by independent detach- ments, the attack will have most chance of success by skilful generalship (an unknown factor) on the battle field ; in large battles, on the other hand, the success of the attack depends more on strategical combinations and on the best use being- made of the physical means of destruction employed. Conse- (piently we will principally confine our remarks to what is required for the larger battles, which must necessarily be of a more mechanical nature than the smaller ones, but, from what has been said, we see that we really want two normal forma- tions for fighting, one for use in large battles, in which the front of the tactical units are restricted, and the other for use in smaller fights, in which an extension to a flank can be easUy effected. It is very necessary to tiy and realize what will be the nature of the attack in the future, and to train our oflicers and men to the normal types of formation best adapted to it. As Colonel Von Schell says in his " Studies on Artillery Tactics ": — *' The history of war sliows on every page that we are 442 often obliged to deviate from normal forms ; but, it also shows from time to time, in a very plain manner, that the conditions of the combat would have probably been presented in a very much more favourable manner, if the Commander had tried to keep as near as possible to the normal formation." Thus, as General Lewal says : — " Normal tactical formations have a real absolute value, provided they are adapted to the configuration of the ground, to the nature, and to the moral situation of the troops, — the three elements which control the action of every good or skilful tactician." As it is intended to deal with only siich questions as affect the efficacy of the fire of the attack and defence, Ave cannot enter into several important matters eifecting modern tactics in connection with tlie details of the general method of the fighting of the future to be described. Amongst these are the manner of taking up formations for battle (offensive and defensive), for great and small tights ; the determination of the fronts of a battalion and other units, for attack and defence ; the methods of directing the attack ; the position that should betaken up by the commanders of different units ; the method of issuing and transmitting orders in the field ; the organisation of tactical xmits to suit modern fighting require- ments ; the distribution of troops and trains on the line of march, for modern fighting ; composition of advanccnl guards ; details of the artdler}' combat ; tlu^ armament and use of cavalry ; and the method of using advanced guards aiul outposts, &c. Having thus limited the field el' iucjuiry, we can now proceed to consider it. Tlu! visible sign of victory to an attacking force is the occu})ati()U of tlie enemy's oi'igiiuil ])osition, and tliis can t)nly 1)0 effected ])y t]u> final cluirg(» of masses after they have rendered its execution feasible, 1)}' having efftn-ted the demo- ralisati(»n of the enemy l)y fire, or by liaving caused liim to use up all liis ammunition, and so rendered him powerless for defence; the l)ayonet liaving no chance against nu)dern rapid- loading fire-arms, well KUi)})lie(l with annuunition.* • lleforring to HtatiHticH, the jjoicciilagc of bayoiu^t wounds to others in W!ir li.'id lioon : — Crimcnn War (1.S51 -.'>;')), O-'ll per oont. ; Italian War (18.j!)), ()-2.'} ])('r crnl.; Danisli War (ISOl), OOS jut cent.; Aimtrian War (ISGG), O-O."? \irv wni. ; lM-aii(<)-(;cnnan War (1S7(»-71), 0-O.S \wr cont. ; IJoHnian Campaign (187H), OOIJ per cent.; iiuHso-Turkish War (1877-7H), no ht.aliMtifs. This hIiows the superiority of the liullet over the ))ayonet, and points lo the conclusion that Huch a rigid line, as formerly uscil, is not rcijuired for (he modern liayonet charge, which can now only ho fjirried out when the ( risis is jiast. The magazine-rifle in the future will ])rol)aliIy take the place of the hayonul as the Boers used their wcapyuB at Majubu Hill. 443 No assault in modern warfare has ever Leen carried out by an extended line, properly so-called. In all accounts of the great battles of the war of 1870-71, we read of assaults being carried out at the decisive points by " great swarms," " thick clouds," " dense lines," &c., of skirmishers 8 to 16 men deep, and the possibility of such a feat when opposed to modern breech- loaders, must, of course, pre-suppose the demoralisation of the enemy, or the failure of his supply of ammunition, rendering him in either case incapable of further serious resistance, or of injuring the dense mass in front of him. If neither of these conditions were fulfilled, th(! assault was invariably repulsed. Masses are required note -a-daijs, as formerhj, to force a jiosition and to drive the enemij out of it ; the extended order of modern warfare is used as a means to collect this mass ivithin assaulting distance ; the regulation attack formation is onlg a basis to start from ; and the loose formation of the thick "line" is, in spite of the immense difficulty of retaining command over the men, now necessary to execute the assault, because no rigid closed line can move any distance without being completely broken up, as seen at the battle of the Alma. Further, if an extended formation cannot carry out an assault it is not good for receiving one, both on account of its weak- ness and of the want of moral force it imparts to the soldier. At the instant of contact, therefore, a closed formation of some hind ■is required, whether in loose or rigid close order, both in the attack and defence. The first result of the experiences of the war of 1870-71 was to cause many theoretical writers to assume that, the whole key to the secret of success was to break up an imaginary two- deep line formation at some distance from the enemy ; to send it forward in extended portions, while maintaining a fire-fight across the fire-swept zone, in order to reduce the effect of the enemy's fire, to more easily obtain cover, and to secure greater mobility; then, at about 150 yards from the eneni}-, to reform a two-deep* line again, by the closing up of the rear portions ; and, finally, after a short rapid fire, to carry the position b}' a rapid advance, followed by a charge. But not one single fight in modern warfare has ever been carried out in this manner, and get it is the controlling j^t'ixciple of our drill-book. And further, all past history shows that, at the decisive moment, it is not * The 30 to 50 per cent, losses which the firing line has now-a-days to submit to, and the fact that men have only a certain amount of " go " in them, which evaporates after a time, does not seem to have been considered in this arrangement. 444 possible to olitaiu any sucli true tactical formation, as aimed at above, with -svliich to deliver the assault, and also that victory depends not so much on the number of men killed or ■wounded on either side, as in tlie moral effect produced on the determination of the survivors to remain or advance ; that side -n'hich has the greatest determination to effect its object, and lias still the means of doing so, Avill win ; and hence all regular attack formations can only be "starting," and not " final " ones. In our own late experiences, at Tel-el-Kebir, in 1882, the Highland Brigade is stated to have been formed up in line two deep witliin .'UJO yards of tlie enemy befm-o the assaidt took place, and yet the entrenchments were reached by a cloud of men of ditf(n'ent battalions without any true tactical formation (see p. 46o, Vol. XXVII., JouDial R. U. S. Institution). In the Soudan also, wlien the ]>ayonet charges were made, tactical formations wei-(^ at once broken up. At the end of the battle of Albuera, in the I'eninsular War, the Fusilier brigade, although it had advanctnl in a two-deep line, were found to be crowded up bjur d(H>p in spite of their enormous losses. Practical war experience has shown, tliat tlie power of the modern ride is such, that a frontal attack against a well-posted, disciplined, and unshaken enemy will rarely succeed. The usual causes of defeat l)y a frontal attack are, want of discipline and training, and the consecpient want of moral force; which kee])s men at their place in obedience to orders, even when opposed to overpowering numlx^rs ; a too great au extension of front ; or a failure! of ammunition. The un- certainty of long range lire, and tlie feeling of security whiih distance impresses, will nevcu- cause victory, whatever the opponent's losses may be. No battle has ever lieen won at long ranges. It is only the sliortest ranges possibU* tliat are decisive. Thi' problem of b<»w to obtain accuracy of tire at all ranges is comparatively easy for the defensive ; but the attack, on the other hand, labours under the disadvantage of having to combin(i as much as ])ossibli' the contradictory elements of rapidity of movement and accui-acy of \\u\ and they can only do this by sub-dividing the duties of ])re{)aration and execu- tion, and by advanoing ra])idly to such short ranges, at which the fire (nniiot lielp l)eing eificaeious, and consetpiently decisive, and tlu; ])rol)lem, for the attack, is how to do this without excessive losses. The war of 1870-71, besides sliowing the almo.st impossibi- litv of reacliijig this ili-^taTH'e })y a ]uirely frontal attack, sliowed 445 that it was pussiMo to tlo so hy attacking- tLo enemy's flank at the same time. Flank attacks have more chance of success than frontal ones, from the shape of the ground, on which the attacked flank rests, being- less favourable for defence than that taken up as the front ; from the preparation for re- sistance being usually weaker on the flanks than on the front ; fi'om the moral dislike or feeling of danger inherent in animal nature when danger threatens the flank or rear ; and from tlio terrible effect of an enfilade fire. The sound of firing even on their flanks or rear often intimidates the defenders of a position, and causes their retirement, or at least produces a tendency to do so, readily. It may be laid down now as a maxim, that when opposed to a well-posted and disciplined enemy, armed with the modern breechloader, flank attacks are the only ones that have a real chance of succeeding. Flank attacks of course eventually become local front attacks, but the new front is weaker than the true front of the force. A flank attack, however, can only be carried out by superior numbers or superior generalship. Besides the losses being less, the results gained from a suc- cessful flank attack are usually greater than those from a frontal one, as the enemy is driven fi-om his most favourable and direct line of retreat, supposing- him to have taken up a position across this line, as would generally be the case. Small bodies of troops can he moved easily, and should therefore always attack the flanks of an enemy ; and in fact the smaller the body the stronger reason it has, leaving other considerations out of the c[uestion, for canying out a flank attack, because it has not sufficient weight or strength of itself to successfully attack in front an enemy i)0sted in a favoiirable ]>osition for defence. Small bodies of men have no imperative line of communication to be cut off from, as they can live any- where, and so they can retreat in any direction. But if they do so, and are covering other troops, they should send back word what they have done, and rejoin them as soon as possible for combined action (which cannot be effectively carried out by separated troops), and for replenishing the ammunition expended. Thus it may be laid down that now-a-days,;^r/«Z: aftacls arc the main attacks, vJtiJc front aJ attacks arc the ticcondarif or auxilianj hioveincnts, and are only made iise of generally as a strong demonstration *' to tie the enemy's troops down and so to render * It is essential that this demonstration should he so carried out as to make the enemy stand, and lliat it should he ready to change to a decisive attack if the enemy offers a clumi.e for its success. 440 them immobile and incapable of being used elsewhere. But history shows, however, many examples that JJank attach, ■ivithout such frontal attacks, are vcri/ liable to be defeated, by being out-fanlced themselves. But seeing that any flank attack upon a position becomes in time a local frontal attack, the following reniarks will be con- fined to the l)est method of carrving out a frontal attack under the conditions of modern European warfare, and as the defensive should invariably be looked on as only a preparation for a subsequeyit offensive (provided the relative strengths of the contending parties are not too disproportionate), antl defensive tactics being simple as comparted with those of the attack, the latter onlj"" will be dealt with in this chapter. Any adopted normal attack formation for use against troops, armed with and trained to the use of the modern rifle, requires amongst other things the following conditions to be fulfilled : — 1. It should enable the best use of the rifle to be made at all times, and greatest dev(dopment of fire to be obtained at the decisive moiuent. 2. It should present the most difficult target to the enemy's fire. 3. It should allow of the best use of cover being made until within assaulting distance. 4. It shoidd afford the greatest mobility possible at all times. 5. It should give the greatest facility for the transmission of orders at all tinu^^s. 1. The two-deep line formation is undoubtedly the best for obtaining the ])e.st and most powerful us(* of the rifle, but war experience! and peace experimeuts havii slu»wn tlmt when oppf)sed to modern rifles in the hands of practised troops, any eloHcd formation is inadmissible, from the losses it entails, until flio enemy's resistance Ims l)(>en brok(>n, or until ho has been d(>moralised, froni its not being able to obtain cover readily or easily, and from the want of power to move, iidu'rent in closed line formations. As columns cannot exist under modern fire, we need not consider the pos.sil)ility of using theni in an attack formation opposed to it. These conditions disappear in savage warfare, in which closed columns can be used for tho advance, and closed lines for both \\\i\ defence and tho attack, when this latter is only made over short distances. 'J. An extcuided formation offers the smallest target to tlm onemy's fire, )»ut if the eueuiy has no iir(> power to speak of, close-ordi'v formations should oulv bi; used. 447 3. An essential feature of modern fights is the necessity for making use of tlie cover offered by the ground, in order to increase the effect of the fire of the attack, and to diminish that of the defence. Hence, an enclosed countiy is f avoiirable for an attack, and an open one for the defence. But in every case, -whether in attack or defence, when once the effective ranges have been reached, a clear field of fire must l)e sought for by the men, in preference to any cover which hides the enemy from view, because at these ranges the greater object is to destroy the enemy, the lesser to protect oneself from him. "With regai'd to making use of cover, this can be much more readily done l)y extended formations than by closed ones. 4. The best safeguard from an enemy's fire is rapidity of movement to pass cpiickl}' over the fire-swept ground, which, at the same time, reduces the efficacy of the enemy's fire, by constantly altering the range. On this subject Von Bogus- lawski writes: "It is an established fact that the rapidity of advance is a great method of reducing the effects of the adversary's fire. AU attacks and movements executed under fire of the enemy should be done at the double, or at least by stepping out, if the natiu'e of the ground, or the fear of fatiguing the troops, prevent this." The greater part of the losses in an action occur at the halting places during an advance. This is another reason for a rapid and continuous forward movement when the advance has been once ordered. But a great and sustained rapidity of movement is, on the other hand, prejudicial to accuracy of fire, as it causes the men to arrive breathless at the decisive ranges, and so prevents the possibility of demoralising the enemy by an effective fire.* It is infantry fire which really decides the issue, though it may be greatly helped b}' the artillery, and hence gi-eat mobility for movement is only recpiired up to the effective ranges, after which the advance must be slower in order to ply tlie enemy with an effective fire to demoralise him before the final assault is made. On the other hand, any check in an attack reduces the offensive spu'it on which success so * This fact and others, such as the absence of any definite fire tactics, a smokj^ atmosphere, and the excitement of the men in battle, all prevent aim being taken, and account for the Gkrman artillery often being able to fight the French infantry at ranges of 800 yards, in 1870. Generally, too, the French had been demoralised before the guns had got •within this distance. The French are particularly noted for the rapidity of their attacks. 448 much depends. Tlie latest ideas for obtaiuiug tlie necessary fire preparation (of both artillery and infantry) with the requisite mobility, "svill be given presently. 5. The necessity of being able to transmit orders at any period of the tight, and of assuring their deliverance and execution, both for fire purposes and for directing the move- ment, is so apparent as to make further comment needless. But this transmission of orders can only be effected by main- taining or ensuring an unbroken line of organized gi'oups, or other tactical units, in the firing line, and by training the men to pass any orders down the line during tlie pauses, ■when the efficacy of the enemy's fire prevents olficers from moving up and down the line. To fulfil the first four of the above rec[uirements, troops, when opposed to modern rifle fire, must be extended, while, to fulfil the first and last ones, they must work in organised groups under regular leaders. The breadth of a target does not increase its vulnerability, whicli only depends on the depth, height and density of the target. Hence, an extended line, if thick, is as vulnerable as a rigid closed lino two deep, but it is more mobile, can take cover more easily, and can make better use of the rifle during an advance. But the disadvantages of an extended formation, as compared with a close order formation, lie in the greater diificulty of control over the men, and of supervision and connuand, and in the confusion that ensues during any forward movc^nu'ut, from the mixing i)f tlie lai'gcr tactical units. As troops, when 0})posed to modi'ru rific's skilfully us(h1, must bi' extendi'd, we must try and see how these disadvantages can 1)0 reduced to a minimum, and the method now advocated by the best Con- tinental authorities for doing so, have been already stated. Close order formations are all that are retpiired for use against savages armed with hand weapons, or rvvn armed with lilies, but unskilled in their use, and who principallj' employ shock tacti(^s ; they further give a great moral force and control over the men and power of transmitting orders.* Cover is not now retpiired, and as tlie men should bo formed in lino to get the niaxinmm of fire, they can advance in small * Tlio (liwiHtrr (»f Tsiindlliwim.'i sliows how romiiMclv we havo lost ni;;lit of tli(! I'act tliat tin- necessity for an extended order in a lifjihting formation ceascH to exist wlieii \vi- aie not oiipnsed to the modern riih>, and that in Hiich a case c losed formations, covered witli a few auxiliary Kkirmislirrs, or rntlier Hcouts, i< ho n/iati/d utvariabhj be iiioimfal, aro more than ever adajited fur tioiij)s armed witli hreoch-loading riflos. 449 columns (capable of rapid cleployiucnt) to within close and effective range, and then form into line to effect the de- struction of the enemy by fire before finally closing with him. Against badly-armed or trained troops who do not go in for shock tactics, a line of groups, or other tactical units, (each in close order), may be used, if the nature of the ground is such as to prevent any more simple form of attack being used. That troops must be sent over a fire-swept zone in extended portions, when opjjosed to modern rifle fire delivered by trained troops, is, however, an inevitable fact ; but modern attack formations must he based on the principle^ that troops kept in rear are simply for the purjjose of feeding the extended firing line in front in order to keep up its fire power, to carry forward the wave of attack,*" and finall}-, Avhen the enemy's strength is broken and the weak points seen, as will be the case when the position is nearly reached, to carry forward, at these weak points, masses of men, also in extended order if necessary, to break in at them. If it is j^ossible, from the demoralisation, or from the pre-occupatiou of the enemy in other directions, to bring up the men in close-order formations for this purpose, it will be better, as the men would then be more in hand, and the subsequent and inevit- able mixing of the larger units would be reduced to a minimum. Tlie attacks must he general, the assaults local, so as to enable the attackers to be superior in force at the point where the assault takes place. Napoleon I.'s saying, that ' ' if you try to be strong everywhere you are weak everywhere," must never be forgotten in any operation of warfare. Such a method of attack naturally entails a great mixing of the larger units. To mitigate the evils arising from this, the method adopted for years past on the Continent, and Avhich was only last year introduced into our system of attack, is, as we have ah'eady pointed out, to make small j^ortions of the firing line close in to a flank, or on their centres, as losses * Experience shows that, in action, a line of troojis pushed out in front has only a cei'tain amount of energy which ■wall carry it forward over a certain space, after which there is a tendency to h;ilt and look to the rear for supports, which, if not sent forward then, may cause the retreat of the foremost line. The supports must bo sent forward before the retreat begins, and, being fresh troops, -with their energy une.-?pendcd, they will carry their line further forward, and it is in tliis way that the fight in front must be incessantly fed from the rear, and carried forward at the same time. 450 occur, leaving gaps, and into these gaps the reinforcing or suppoi'ting troops are pushed in organised groups or units, at all events, during the tirst periods of the fight. During the later periods such a proceeding may not be possible, from the loss of leaders and the excitement of tlie men, and loss of organised control over thorn ; then we can only trust to the discipline and training which the nien have received in peace time, to place themselves under the nearest leader, whoever he may be, and of whatever rank or corps, for guidance and for receiving orders that are required to be carried out. To carry out the attack as described above, every writer of authority clearly lays down that tve must employ small tactical units, like companies, and give to them all the independence permissible, consistent icith the qeneral good of the whole, and the ohject in riew.^' These small tactical units must be pushed forward as required, but, with great circumspection, for troops once engaged under fire, at even medium ranges (/.<'. between 4U0 and 800 yards\ ran never now- a-days, as of old, be withdrawn and used for otlun- purposes ; and, further, troops, once so engaged under fire, can only move backwards and forwards, and not at all to the riglit or left.f Hence it is the duty of every comuiander to emplo}' deep echeloned formations, covering an extensive belt of ground in depth, and to retain a reserve in hand, however small, tor contingencies : ))ut he must never hesitate to employ it, should the wave of attack cease rolling forward, provided tlun-e are uthcr reserves in rear. If not, then only the most desperate circumstances or real signs of the enemy wavering should induce him to sacrifice his last reserve rather than allow tlie attack t(j fail ; otherwise he must use the reserves kept back to cover the retreat. • Tlu'io has b(>on much opposition of late to tho uso made of the squaro formation in the Soudan. The Author cannot hclj) lliinkinp lliat their use, under the conditions of the ])res(;nt nature of the peace traininpf of our men and of th(! war, was judieiuus, conhiderinp; that l'',n^:;lis]i troops aro trained to move in hattalions, and tliat any iiKlejiendent action of companicH is unknown in oin- service. In action, esiKH-ially in savago warfare, (lie tirst tiling men listen for is a quick decisive word of com- mand, and tliis can come far hetter from a company commander than fnmi a battalion commander. I'ntil wc; changi' our system of drill in j)ence time to allowing companies to move with more independence in carrying out 1)attali<)n or brigade formations, it would be dangerous to bcpn it in tho face of iin enemy. t Except troops making a tactical flank attack, who mu.^-t wheel or form up, in fra'.-tions or as a whole, to the assailed flank of the enemy. 451 Fewer troops now-a-days are required than formerly to be kept massed in reserve in case of retreat, from the great retaining power of the modern rifle. Pursuits are extremely difficult now-a-days, from the confusion caused by tho mixing of the larger units in the fighting line of the attack during an energetic advance under modern fire.''-' Hence the defeated troops in late wars have usuall}^ been able to retire without serious pursuit, especially when even a small intact reserve has been maintained which can hold its own against a disorganised, though numerically superior, enemy. These latter should in any case, for their own safety, halt to reform when the enemy's first position is carried, as they can never know whether he may not have a second line prepared in rear, against which a disorganised advance would be stopped, and the first success turned into a defeat. The necessity of re-forming engaged troops as soon as the engagement ceases, or during any pause in the fight, is so great in these daj^s of fighting in extended order against an unseen enemy hidden by cover, that it cannot be too strongly impressed on leaders of all ranks. It is only b}' so doing that command, control, and cohesion, can be maintained, the evil caused by the mixing of the larger units reduced to a minimum, and the moral effect of numbers impressed on the men, who are apt to think their losses greater than thej- really are. Ee-forming the tactical units also has the effect of rendering the men available for use in other directions, which they were not before, and of having them as completely in hand as possible to meet any fui'ther attempts of the eneni}-. These remai'ks apply to both the attacking and defending troops. An attack may be divided in four distinct phases, each of which is more or less carried out in every battle in the order given, namely, (1) the reconnaissance; (2) the preparation; (3) the execution or solution, including the bayonet assault ; and (4) the re-forming of the tactical units and consolidation of any success or the retreat. The execution should really be sub-divided into two periods, (a) the advance, and (5) the assault or attack proper. Tho exact points at which the assault should be delivered can oiily be determined when the preparation has been completed and the execution begun. The first part of the execution is really . * At Sadowa, in 1866, the II. Prussian army corps took six hours to pick out its men and re-form before it could pursue. Ff 2 452 a feeler for the second part, and, as every offensive movement does not necessarih' end with an assault, this latter should never be seriously attempted by any troops without a distinct oi'der from the commander of the whole force, because to make it certain of success, they require to be backed up by large masses of other troops in rear,-'' for if thej' are not so backed Tip, the assaidt may fail, and the troops making it, driven back, while their retirement is certain to cause that of the troops on either side as well. The difference between the advance and the assault, and that the former is not necessarily followed by the latter, can be best seen by reference to the jtroceedings of a siege. Col. Home in his Fn'cis of Modern Tactics says, " The attack on an enemy's position is based entirely on the science of the attack on a fortress. A mass of artillery tire is concentrated on certain points ; under cover of that fire the infantry advance until checked by infantry fire. Again the infantry fire is sTibdued by the infantry fire added to the artillery fire of the attackers, a breach is made in the enemy's position, and through that breach a formed body of men is pushed, who make a lodgment there. Such in general terms is the attack oi a fortress. Such in general terms is the attack of a l)osition, with this difference, the former is the work of days, the latter that of hours." The assault is, in a siege, the last act of the fight, and is delivered at particular j^oints on the front attacked, and so it must not be confused or mixed up with the other acts of the offensive, or connected witli them as taking place at the same moment. The investment, the parallels, the zigzag approaches, &c., are all different acts of the offensive, taking place at different times and towards different points. These points are determined by the general in command, and it is at them alone that the final act of the assault is made, with all the troops available, and not along the wliole front attacked. Hence evei-y oifcusive movement is not necessarily intendcul to finish with an assault. 'J'liis is a very iiii])orf ant point for all <.)fHcer8 • ' ' Tho iniRenil)ln, doubtinp, unmilitiiry policy of HmiiU storming parties, on th(! pica tliuf if wo fail we caiiiiot Ioho many ni(-n, causrs more mis- chiof, loHH and (lisi^racc (li.in any otlicr i)ro(('('(linf:: in war." — (Sir John ]'^^•go^^lo). "TIk'sc words, thout^li rcfin-inp to assaulting j)artioH at niogeH, aro jiiHt HH true of all attackin;^ l)artioH." — (Home). Tho failure of tho English attack on the Kcdan at Sebabtopol, and of the Russian attacks on Plevna, were duo to tho neglect of the principle of using Bucceseive waves of supports to force the utsuult home. 453 to bear iu miuJ, aud tliereforo ua ofliuer should approach the enemy nearer than 400 yards without a distinct order to do so from the general officer commanding- that portion of: the line, or unless the enemy is distinctly giving ^va3^ A " German General" writes, ''In general, modern fights (as compared with those of the past) are distinguished by three characteristics: 1st. The attack demands a much longer and more careful preparation ; 2nd. The assault itself occupies a much shorter time ; and 3rd. The result is far more decisive." The efficacy of a concentrated long range fire, the difficulties of supplj'ing ammunition to troops engaged at ranges under 500 yards, and the moral effect of a continuous advance in an assault without stopping, has lately led to the recom- mendation of telling off a certain proportion of the troops, with a large supply of ammunition,* to advance, after the enemi/\i artiUerij haa been silenced^ to abcnit 600 yards from the enemy,! to jtrc^pare the way for the final assault, in con- junction with the artiUery, by a long range fire-fight of perhaps considerable duration.;]: These men would remove their valises and entrench themselves. Up to the end of this period the attack acts principally on the defensive. A\Tien the demoralisation of the enemy is considered sufficient, as can only 1)6 judged by the lessening of his fire, or by its want of efficacy, then a forward movement by successive advances on the front of a battalion if possible, or of companies at the least, is to be made by the firing line,§ with the aid of fresh troops if necessary, to within 300 yards, when the bayonets will be * This supply of ammunition is obtained from the ammunition carts of tlie battalions, told off for the execution of the assault, who do not require more than 70 rounds per man for this purpose alone, and from the divisional ammunition columns. These troops, thus thrown forward, should hav(>, if possible, 180 to 200 rounds per man on their persons, so as to reduce to a minimum the necessity of having to supply them with more ammunition under fire t Or nearer, if possible, but not so close as to prevent their lieing supplied with fresh ammunition, if necessary, or as to entice or cause the men to bring un a decisive crisis which may cause them to recoil, lose moral force, and even draw into the fight the troops in rear before the way for their action has been properlj- prepared. + "Tedious though the preparation for the attack be, its residt is " decided with the speed of lightning." — A Gennan General. § The fire being still kept up by men, or better still by entire groups, running to the front in turn and halting to fire, until the line comes up to them, when they again advance and wait theii' turn. (See p. 386.) 454 fixed, and a terrible fire poured in. Before this occurs, the circumstances of the fight, which has now reached a decisive crisis, will have pointed out the most favourable points of breaking the enemy's line, and there, after a few minutes of hea-sy firing, the advance to the final assault must be rapidly made, while still keeping up the fire, in conjimction with fresh troops sent forward from the rear, with ringing cheers, colours flying, bugles sounding, drums beating, and all the pomp and dash of war, without stopping, and without a halt. Over the last fifty yards the charge will be made at the double. "Formerly the fire-arms were used to induce such a state of things as woidd make it possible to bring the bayonet to bear. The fact of a l)ayonet charge then implied that the critical moment had come. Now the rush to seize a position implies that the critical moment //ff.9 ^7ffssffl', or the rush is sure to be fruitless."— ( IVcUiiuifon Prize Kssaji of 1872, p. 86.) If the enemy has not been sutficiently demoralised by the previous artdleiy and infantry fire preparation, and by the rapid musketry fire at 300 ^-ards and under, the attack will fail and be driv(>n back. The demoralisation of the enemy by losses must be effected before the assaulting distance is reached ; witliiu this distance the result is far more duo to the moral effect produced by an advance of the assailant's masses than to tlie effect of his fire, as short range fire in action is Acry inaccurate at ranges over 50 yards, from the excitement of the men. If th(^ enemy is sufficiently demoralised for an assault to succeed, he will retreat, even though an advance be made against him without bayonets. This was excmplifiiMl at Mnjuballill, Avhen tlio ]5oers successfully assaulted, witliout using l)ayonets, a position licld by our troops. AVithin 50 yards llie fire of the assaulting troops begins again to be low enough to produce losses among tliedi fciKb'rs, and it is probal)le that tlie magazine rifle in the future will greatly take tlie place of the bayonet during nn assault. In all the actions in tlu' Soudan, our greatest losses occurred when we gave* up firing to use tlie bayonet, lint the bayonet, fixed to the rifle, no doubt gives a very great moral Bupport to the soldiej", and will therefore always have its place. General llardinge, in a lecturt! On the JlexuHs af Field Firing in hKlio^*- stated that from the results of field firing carried out in India, it was I'unnd that the best effect for the Martiui- Tulu luiiml in V.il. X.XIJI. of The Jvurticl of the It, U.S. IimtilHtion. 455 Henry rifle was obtained between the ranges 900 and GOO yards, because the shorter ranges are only reached by rapid advances, and this gain of distance is more than counter- balanced by loss of breath and other physical disabilities, which impair the accuracy of the weapon. Breathless haste may avoid losses, but steady fire can alone inflict it. Speed of movement and steadiness of aim do not go together, and if we try to combine both, we sacrifice both, and as neither can be dispensed with, the only thing is to use them separately by assigning distinct functions to separate troops, some to prepare the advance, some to cover its near approach, and some to reach the ultimate goal. However men shoot, they will ahva^'s fire better from a fixed base than from a moving one, although the moving one brings them to shorter ranges, and this is another reason for telling off a certain proportion of the troops to fire from a fixed base during the reconnaissance and preparation for the attack, and with these troops imtil the final advance takes place the artillery maxim of not moving guns well in action may be adopted with the best effect for ranges over 400 yards. Such a method also enables us to make use of the long- range power of the weapons now in use. If we do not use them at these longer ranges, we lose the greatest part of their advantage, though this long-range fire must only be emploj'ed in accordance with the principles already given in Chapter XI. Fire is everything now-a-days ; it is the principle, while shock, though still necessary, is the secondary means, and hence the preparatory action of artillery may be most advantageously assisted by the long-range power of the modern rifle. A preponderance of fire is required for success, either for the attack or for the defence, and to establish this preponderance of fire we must bring into effective play every rifle possible at all stages of the fight. Even the fire of reserve troops must be made use of when possible, like artillery, from a fixed base during the advance, and over the heads of the troops in front, to help to keep down the fire of the enemy. Whole companies in close order might, for this purpose, be brought like batteries, into distant action, as they can then be plentifidly supplied Avith ammunition. In the advance by successive rushes of alternate units, it is most essential that these units should be such as have at least a front of one-quarter that of a battalion. This is veiy important, for many reasons, which can be best shewn by a reference to some of our fighting in Afprhanistau. Besides •156 allowing our men, in this -war, to liro independentl}', as a rule Avithout any control, and at too long ranges (700 to 900 3'ards), the firing line, in an attack, Avas often allowed to advance iu driblets of twos and threes. It was quite a common thing to see several men and officers some way ahead of the true firing line, whose fire was thus masked. If whole companies had been advanced together by the order of their captains, it would have made such a really energetic offensive movement as would have added greatly to the moral effect of the advance, both by intimidating the enemy and encouraging our own men more, while it would have prevented the weak- hearted and cowards from lagging behind and shirking their duty. One subaltern per company should be ordered to always remain in rear, to see that every man advances with his company. Capt. May, in his famous Tactical Retrospect of the War of 18CG, points out that the Avatching over troops in action is a necessity. "It is not sufficient that the eye of the leader is directed on the enemy ; to advance and leave half the men behind on the way cannot lead to any advantage. The company should have an officer in the supernumerary rank, who should be responsible on his honour that he will keep there, and not rush to seek his laurels in the front. Then it will be easy to bring the company full and complete into action." During the execution of the last ra})id phase of the attack {i.e., during the rapid advance over the last 300 yards) the men must never be allowed to lie down, for two reasons: (1) it takes away froni the nu)ral offensive spirit, and the men are only with difficulty made to get up again to advance; and (2) according to Continental exi)erience, under the agitation of moving after an energctit- advance, fire from a standing or kneeling position is more effective than from a lying-down position. This advance, under such conditions, is now practi- cable, for the fact that the ordi'r for the execution of the attack 1ms been given, presupposes, (>ither tliat the enemy is demoralised, or that his power has been broken, or that his ammunition has failed, rendering him powerlt3ss to defend liimself against a vigorous assault, or to inj ure it sufficiently, })y what lire power he has left, to check it. Tlie recuunaisKducr and j/rcparatioii of an attack are two essen- tial features of modern battles. The reconnaissance is carried out, in i»n'fcreuce, Ity cavalry, and, if necessary, l>y the infantry of the advance guard, who must, after driving in the enemy's outposts, lie extended over tlie wholi; front of the enemy's posi- tion, iu order to cover its own artillery, which now comes into 457 action, to di'tiw tlio eueiiiy's fire, and thus to liiid out tlio extent of his position, and the distribution of his front line of troops. The preparation for the attack is then carried out by artillery, assisted, if necessary, ])y infantry Captain Layman, in The Frontal Attack of Infantry, says: — "We now know what a frontal attack against a position defended with breech-loaders signifies. " If we have resolved to undertake this task — in any case the most difficult and sanguinary for which infantrj- can be employed — then the least we can do is to make the most care- ful preparation, in order to secure the greatest possible chance of success. "It is not to be accomplished solely by an impetuous rusli forward ; the greatest bravery can be wrecked in a tire-zmie of 1,000 paces. The time which is spent in making good dis- position and introducing the attack is never lost." This time is always to be got now-a-days during the artillery preparatory combat. It is of the utmost importance in modem lighting that troops should be prevented, as far as possible, from hurrying into action in fractions, before the whole force is ready to begin the fight simultaneously, as it only renders them liable to be beaten in detail. In 1870, the Grermans nearly met with a disaster at Spicheren through doing this, and at Gravelotte they suffered enormous losses from the same reasons, and also from an imperfect reconnais- sance, which caused them to make a very great error as to the position of the Frcuich right fiank, through which some batteries were silenced almost immediately they opened fire. The Grerman troops at Gravelotte, contrary to the wishes of their Royal Commander, it nmst be said, rushed into action as they arrived on tlie battle field, and it is extremely doubtful Avhether they gained the sliglitest advantage, or hastened on the final decision by so doing, while, on the other hand, they suffered enormous losses. " A German Greneral," writing about this Inittle, says " the German commander resolved at all hazards to drive back i\w Freuch upon Metz, wliile Marshal Bazaine was bound to hold fast to the only lino of communication with the rest of France that still laj^ open to him. Tlio decisive point of the position, therefore, was at St. Privat, on the extreme Frencli right, by which the last line of com- munications ran. As the fate of the whole battle naturally turned upon tJie course taken by events at St. Privat, the desperate fighting and frightful slaughter that took place along tlie r-.'st of the line was wholly unnecessar}-, and was 4o8 wilfully hroiiglit ou by the assailants, ratlier tlian caxiscd by irresistible necessity." As to the French losses on the left, opposite to where the Germans attacked so unnecessarily and lost so heavil}-, General Ilamley writes, " the Second French Corps on the left of the position Avas attacked by two, afterwards three, German Corps ; and while these suffered enormously, its loss iu killed Avas only (50 men." In addition to these there were only 36G wounded and 195 missing (including- wounded and unwounded prisoners.) The fights at Borny and ou the Mars-la-Tour-^'ionville-Eezonville line, before Gravelotte, were brilliant exceptions to the rule ; the French were retiring, and their retreat had to be stopped, at aU costs, by the leading troops as they came up until the main body could arrive and deliver a decisive combat. The f()lh)wing remarks apply principally to the conduct of troops in large battles, where. troops have to fight on restricted fronts, and ))rute force has more to be resorted to than iskilfid use of ground and movements, on account of the attacks partaking more of tlu^ luiture of frontal attacks than would bo the case in tlu' minor combats delivered by indepi'iident detachments. Di'taclunents are nu)re mobile tluin great masses of troops, and consequently can more (^asily march round each others' Hanks, or arrange for a tactical out-fianking movement. The infantry may be dividi-d as follows, as a nonual basis for practice, if they liave to cany out tlie reconnaissance as well as the other duties or ])lmses of Uw. fight: one-sixth for recon- naissance and tiivcriiij;' tlic aitillerv, which woidd be the advanced guard; on(^ or two-sixths nu)re for the prepnrati(m, to be sent forward after* tlie enemy's artillery has l)een silenced and its own artillery fire has been turned on the hostihi infantry; tlir(!e or two-sixths more for tlie execution; and tlu' renuiiniiig om^-sixth in resi'rve to act as rallying point afti'r, or for completing tlie alfack, or for covering a retreat. When till" prcjiaration is completed from a nuiximum normal rang<' of (iOO yards, th(» p.ircution sliould 1)(! carried out as * Tlir rciison wliy Wwy shoulil not })i! ncnl forward licfdi-c tlii.s, is to save tho infaiitiy from every uscIchn casualty iinlil the actual iiionn^Tit of at^sault, when tliny will jtroliably have to hear fj;reat losses. Serious losses incurred hefore that inouieiit are of liltle avail, and therefore to ho avoided. If the infantry for the preparation are sent forward hefore this, tlie fiKht l)i;Conies simply a prolon;;ed duel of artillery rcrmix artillery, anil infantry rrrnDs infantry, exposing; the infantry to losses hefore they need hi ^ ; so thoy shoidd wait unt 11 the art illery is free to throw its aid into the scale US wrcll, so a- to hrinj,' on thi: linal decision as rapidly as possible. 459 alroaJy descri'bed as rapitlly as possiT)lo, the secret of success leitif/ clearness of conception, and energy in execution. As a line of defence now-a-days consists of a line of detached localities, the actual assaults will be confined to these points, so that, although the troops told off to carry out the reconnaissance, and the preparation are extended over the whole front, yet the troops to execute the assault are not ; consequently on the actual fronts of assault a greater relative proportion than five-sixths of the whole force to the total tnmt it occupies, is obtained for the assaulting troops. The experience of the Franco-German war showed that the attack should have, including all troojis and reserves, about 12 to 14 men per yard of front; this allows for the troops required to carry out the flank attack, as well as those to hold the enemy in front. This would give for the attack, after deducting the troops to cany out the flank attack and local assaidts, at least 1 man per yard of front for the reconnais- sance, 2 to 3 men per yard for the preparation, 5 men per yard for the advance, and 10 to 15 men per yard for the local assaults. The defence should have from 7 to 10 men per yard of front, for any hope of a'successful resistance. During the reconnaissance, the troops should be well exten- ded, simply to draw fire and to cover the artillery, but in the preparation and assault they should be collected in organised bodies, to deliver their fire with the greatest effect, and to enable more control and unit}- of purpose to be obtained. The possibility of carrying out the above in its entirety, wholly depends on a properly recognised and organised Division of Duties, both in the upper and lower units of the anuy. The division of duties and the organisation for it, as far as the lower units have been concerned, have already been touched on, but these cannot be applied to a large force in itself. A\Tien large armies are opposed to one another, the front of attack and defence must be divided into sections, tlie troops in each having their own duties to carry out. Each section will have its firing line, supports, and battalion reserves, if these latter are considered necessary,"^' and also local reserves if rec^uired. Behind these there will be a large general resei-ve (including the reserve proper) to each amiy corps front of from 3,000 yards on the offensive to 4,o0l) yards on the defensive;! ^^^ o^Y difference between the * In 1870 whole battalions were often extended in the filing line, the reserves being furnished by other battalions in rear. t These were the \isual fronts taken up by the Geraian army corps (of 25 battalions each) in the war of 1870-71. 460 defence and attack in these respects being- that the numerical proportion of the reserves to the rest of the force is smaller in the defence. The tactical deductions to bo drawn from the Franco- German and Eusso-Turkish wars, in the former of which the breech-loader was pitted against the breech-loader for the first time, are great and numerous. Some of the facts that these campaigns and subsequent experiments have clearly brought into view are : — 1 . The enormous power of the breech-loader at all ranges Tip to 1,300 yards, but especially at the short ranges under 400 yards. 2. That from 400 yards and under, an upright man can be hit by every shot aimetl at his feet with the 400 yards back-siglit. 3. The uselessness of individual fire over 400 yards, from the height of tlie trajectory, and from not knowing the rangi's sufficiently accurately, and the consequent necessity of con- centrating a number of ritles on the same i)bji'ct at greater ranges tluin tliis, to obtain the desired result with the greatest rapidity and suddenness. 4. The dissolving power of the bret'ch-loader on closed formations at all ranges, and its defensive power, when in the hands of xinshaken troops, over the open against any attack formation. 5. The enormous losses caused by purely frontal attacks over open ground, and tlie consequent necessity of an effective artillery preparation, or of simultaneous decisive flank attacks arranged for either tactically or strategically, when opposed to the breech-loader. 6. The necessity of studying tlu' (jucstion of tlic supply of ammunition. 7. The n(H'essify nf a gi'diq) cessitv (tf extended formations and small tactical units, with an independence of action only governed }»y the mutual co-operation of the whole, and tlie general obj(>ct in vii>w. W. Tlie necessity of carefully training the men to mutual and not independent action, ami uudcr conditions as like war as poHHi})le. 10. The necessity of a deep disposition of troops in successive lines, when opposed to modt'rn rifle iire, in order to enaldo commanders to have some troops in hand to control the fight, as troops once engaged under lire can only move backwards or forwards, but not to a flank. 461 1 1 . The necessity of a long; preparation by artillery and infantry fire before the assault, in order to demoralise the eneni}'. 12. The necessity of carrying forward the line of attack by successive waves, or rather additions, of skirmishers. The effect of the introduction of long range fire has been to force the fighting formation to be taken xip considerably further off ; and thus, if faults are made in the origmal dis- positions, they will be harder to repair. The employment of reserves will be more difficult. If they are to be preserved intact, they must be kept well in rear, and as a consecj[uence, it will not always be possible to ensure their opportune arrival. General Skobeleff has laid down that, under modern fire, " The only fonnation in Avhich troops can successfully assault entrenched positions is in successive lines of skirmishers. The divisional general must be perfectly thoughtless of his own comfort and safety, and put himself between the skirmishers and the reserves, where he can feel the pulse of the battle, and have his troops in his own hand, and judge himself of the moment when the successive battalions in reserve should be sent forward. " There are in eveiy command a small percentage of cowards who will shirk away at the first opportunity ; a certain number of men of rash bravery, who will go too far forward and get killed; and a majority of men of ordinary courage who are liable to waver as the tight gets hot. " The reserves must be sent in at the moment when the reasonably brave men have been long enough engaged, and have met with sufficient resistance to begin to feel nervous, but before they have actually begun to retreat : and, it is in deciding upon the opportune moment for sending forward his reserves that the art of a divisional commander consists." But the Eussian attacks, it may be said, were nearly always directed frontally against the enemy's position, without a sufiicient artillery preparation ; attempts to turn one or both flanks of the enemy being very rare. Modern infantry fire has made flank attacks almost a necessity now, because any frontal attack against an undemora- lised defender in position, with a clear field of fire of 400 yards, will be too costly a proceeding, and is only then likely to succeed under such favourable circumstances as are rarely likely to occur. The employment of reserves will be more difficult. If they are to be preserved intact they must be kept well in rear, and 462 as a consequence it -vrill not always be easy to ensure their opportune arrival. The artillery of the attack Avill be forced further back, or will be obliged to resort to some such exjiedients as bullet- proof shields. The use of cavalry charges on the battle field will be still more restricted than ever. The use of cover, natural and artificial, has been raised to a point of the greatest importance. For temporising or delaying fights (as in advance or rear- guard actions, or for points against which it is only intended to demonstrate), long-range fire will be particularly suited, and also, it will often be possible by fire from long ranges to deceive the defenders of a position as to the real point of attack, and it will be of peculiar value in a pursuit. On the defensive, it will often obviate the necessity of occupying points which can be covered by it from the main line, and it will be most useful in delaying an attack by making the enemy deploy early and thus causing mixing and con- fusion in his ranks at an early period of the fight. One of the advantages of advanced posts is to secure this early deploy- ment and confusion by long-range five. One of its most important qualities is the power of using it, when the form of the ground is suitable, both in attack and defence, over the heads of men in front, thus often enabling two or more stages of fire to be used. The terrible effect of (such a method is to be read of in the accounts of the battles I'ound Plevna, wlu^re the Turks often liad two or more lines of infantry, one above the other, causing thereby enormous losses to the liussians. Long-range fire will Ite of great advantage totlu' attack, in turning or outflanking movements, as it will render possildo for them to pour in i\ i)o\verful enfilade fire siuldenly on the defensive line, from a much longer range than has hitlierto l)eeu the case. Similarly, it may lie of use to the defence when a turning or out-flanking movement is itself out-llanked. It will enable a much more powerful fire to l)e concentrated by a superior attacking force on any ])oint of the defender's line, Bine(! troops from more distant parts of the field can take part in it. Lastly, in tlie cnso of troops attacking n position on tho crest of a /. A French writer, in commenting on the -«'ar of 1870-71, writes: — "The fire of the French infantry was terrible. At great distances they sent out a hail of bullets, which, though fired hap-hazard, did not the less cause much loss. But when this zone was crossed, a relative safety was found ; and at the short distances it could be seen, that the Grerman soldier, care- fully instructed in musketrj-, had an unshaken confidence in his weapon, that he made use of it with coolness and method, and therefore with a sureuess that the French were far from equalling. With respect to firing, the Grerman inf antr}' had the superiority, which it owed to the long and minute instruction that had been given it in peace time." (See also p. 250). The importance of these words cannot be over-estimated. The principal instruction in mushetrij should he such as to J'atjil the requirements of the friJitim/ tactics of the da>/. The fight now-a-days is exclusiveh' carried out in extended order. On the battle field the positions of artilleiy and infantry are only distinguished by the smoke which rises from behind shelter trenches and epauhnents. The only rather more favourable objects, which are now-a-daj-s seen, are the firing line and its supports, when they change position at the double, that is to say, when thej^ make short appearances. To insist on firing little, and only at short distances, on such targets, with the modern rifle, is not reasonable, considering the con- siderable effect that it can give, at even fairly long ranges, as shown by past experience in the field and on the practice range, even when badly used, provided the required amount of ammunition is available, both as regards place and time. 464 Besides, the waste of ammunition and the bad emplojTiient of fire that has been seen in the past, are no arguments against rapid fire and its employment at long ranges against suitable ohjecfives, but show rather a defective application of the fire, and whenever the conduct of the fire has escaped from the leaders, the fault, inmost cases, has been from the insufiiciency of the regulations on the siibject, and from want of fire discipline. Up to 1870 the accuracy of individual fire at all ranges was considered as the test of efficacy of the shooting in the fire-fight. The war of 1870-71 dispelled this idea, and it was then accepted abroad that individual fire is of little use over 400 yards, beyond which distance the collective fire of masses should be used, and for such a fire to be possible the men must not only be organised in fire-units, whose fire can be directed and controlled by leaders, but they must have fire discipline as well. The English system of raising the value of individual fire at long ranges far above its proper level, lies at the root of all our faUure of musketry fire in the field. English soldiers have hitherto been taught to fire in- dividually over nuvasured ranges at distances which it is absolutely wrong to do in the field, according to all Con- tinental experiences. 400 yards is the extreme limit for individual fire in the field, when ranges are judged, except against svich largo targets as would show great remissness on the part of the enemy, and then only for good shots and when the range is fairly well known. The great danger of allowing men to fire individually at ranges much over 400 yards in peaco time is that it makes them think that they should do so in war time. Volleys and mass-firing are mentioned in our regulations, but hardly anything is said as to their applicability, their relative values, the ranges suited to them, or their raison (Vetre. Individual fire is tXw guiding princi[)le of our musketry instruction, wh still seem to adlicre to tlm idea that the criterion for effective fire is the accurate independent firo of individual soldiers. Accordingly no cxjicriments of any practical value havo })een made in England, as aliroad, from our want of apprecia- tion of tlie tru(^ use of the rifle in war, and licnc^o for nearly all the data that has been given in this book, foreign sources have had to bo drawn on. Musketry instruction ought to be divided into two clear and distinct parts. 46.5 ( 1 ) The traiuiug- iuid development of the skill of the individual man in shooting-, oi* iarfjd practice. (2) The instruction of the men and tactical units in the practical employment and conduct of fire, or tear 'practice. It is for a want of recognition of these two clear and distinct hi'anches of musketry instruction that our regulations have failed to he reall}- practical. Our new musketry regidations are an immense improvement, but even in them the Author cannot help thinking that the distinction has not been fully realized. AVe will deal with each of these parts in turn. Target Practice. To effect this, not only must the man be made to shoot over known ranges, but he must be given a stimulus to shoot well, by creating an emulation and competition between men and companies, by rewards* and prizes, by classifying the men, and by punishment in exceptional cases, and the men shoidd always be made to understand what they are doing. It is very essential that this part of the musketry instruction shoidd be A'ery carefully carried out, so as to gain good results in order that tlie men maij attain a perfect confidence in the poicers of their weapon irhen iceJl used. " The increasing development of the material forces in war, requires a parallel de\'elopment in the moral forces. In order to overcome, without 1)eing weakened, the most difficidt phases of the attack, which begins now-a-days at over 2,(M)0 yards, the soldier requires more powerful moral qualities than in those days when the danger only began when he arrived within hearing of the voice of his enemy. Everj'thing that can raise the moral ([uality of the soldier ought therefore to bo maintained and care- fidly cultivated. In the first place comes the confidence of the soldier in his rifle." Thus no pains should bo spared to make the soldier perfectly reliant on his weapon. Again, it must never be forgotten that rifie-()sition drills (150 metres^ firing with aiming tubes at 2.') paces, and half-an- hour's gymnastics. The next morning we put t'very scpiad for one hour tlirough g^nnnastics and aiming drill. The non-commissioned officer has, on the march to the ranges, about tln-ee miles distant, to instruct liis men in the use of the rifle, lieiglit of traji'ctoiy, &c., by sending a few men in advance and ordering them at intervals to advance, lay down, retire, &c., and rpiestioning his men witli him as to tlie sight to be used, range, point to be aimed at, &c." Naturally a difference should Tie made lietweeu the recruit, who handles a rifle for tlie lirsi limi-, and tlie trained soldier wJio knows what to do. From wliat has been said, th(^ courses ftu' the development of the skill of the recruit in shooting, and for the annual practice of the trained soldier for the same object, uiiglit be : The Ilecruit. (i) Preliminary instruction^ consisting of : (ff) Theoretical principles. yb) Cleaning arms. (r) Aiming drill.* ' d) Position drill and firing exercises.*' ' I 'lank firing. / Instruction firing. (ii) Target jiract ice, individual lire only, at ')(), 100, 200, .'500, and loo yards, in drill order; 10 rounds at ••asition (irillH, and the firing cxcrciHOHJinMiptlyoxpre.ssed in till" Anifn'can ninsUrfry rc-riilatiniis :i.s tlu' A l> (' of ufood slinnting. 467 All other kind of firing and judging distances should belong to the "war practices." Instruction firing has been nieutioned above, but it will not be referred to again until p. 481. The targets shoidd be those known as "third," "second" and "first-class targets," without figures of men on them ; the aim shoidd bo taken at a mark in the centre of the bottom of the target with such special elevations (given on a printed table) according to the range as will ensure the bullets striking a central bull's-eye if properly fired, and the hits valued according to their distances from the centre ;'"'•' the result of each shot to be signalled back ; all this being carried out just as is done at present. From this target practice all classification of shots, prizes, rewards, and returns should be made out. From what has been said in Chapter IX. about the great extent of grovmd beaten by ji collective fire, no attempt should be made to classify individual men by the results of the war practices, as such a classification would be very unfair. For the development of individual skUl in firing we must have competition, with money prizes or rewards of some kind, and punishment. C'ompetition must produce the best indi- vidual shooting, as it does the best of anything else. But this competition should be limited to battalions alone, and each battalion should have given it a certain sum of money and other rewards, depending on the number of men trained, to compete for among themselves. The money and rewards should 1)0 bestowed at once, and not some time afterwards. By such a method the huge system of checking the returns of the whole army will l)e dispensed with to a certain degree. It is unfair to say that one battalion is better than another when tlie}^ compete in totally different climates, conditions, and ranges from one another. No comparisons should be made between battalions, as far as target practice is concerned, but a certain fair standard of shooting should 1)0 insisted on Avhich, if not reached, then the training should be continued, and even punishment awarded, provided no physical disability is the cause. f * From Chapter III. and IV. we sec the uselessncss cf altering the sights after each shot. The sight should only be altered if the mass of the shots show any necessity for it. t Physical disability occurs oftener than is Tisually suspected, as Lord' Wolseley said at the R.U.S. Institution on the '26th February 1886 : "I think we shoot quite as well as the armies of any other nation. Of course you can teach some individuals to shoot rcmtrkaby will, but Gg -Z 4G8 The recruit should be given a riiie as soon after ho joins as possible, in order that he may get quickly accustomed to it, even before his actual instructiou begins. It should not he forgotten that, especially -svith recruits, the great art of in- struction is to dwell forc/hl;/ on tliin^ii rcani/ esxoifidi, moderatehf on things important, lifjhthi on things nearly indifferent, and to omit things of no practical axe to the man. A recruit should first b(> told and ha^-e his mind strongly impressed with what a rille can do at any given distance by being shown, and then he shouhl be made to make it do what he has seen it can do, if properly managed, and if, after tiring a certain number of rounds, he fails to reach the recpiired standard, provided he has no pliysical disabilities, he should be made to pay for the extra aninuinitinu and have his leave and other privileges stopped. Target practices for both the recruit and tlie trained soldier should only be carried out during the most favourable months of the 3-ear for good individual sliooting. In the Grerman service every car(> is taken in the individual education of the soldier, especially in whatever affects his moral qualities. Thus in the German s(>rvice everything is done to prevent the men feeling tliat tiring is an unpleasant duty. For example, it is laid down that, "if a nmu gets agitated at tli(> moment of ]iulling the trigger he must not be allowed to tire a .shot ; if he cannot acntly the captains of com])auies can easily train tlie whole of tlieir men from beginning to end without any difficidty. lint in the Knglish service, \\\\r\\ the recruits come in indrildits hy voluntaiy enlistment, this is almost impractic- able, at all rvrnts as regards obtaining the best results. The taking a ma.-M of iiicii, 1h laiiHc tlic .\nny is a grout mass of average iiifii, 1 iMlifvi- that out of oveiy 1,000 .soldicis you oxaniino in any .:iriny, you will find that 10 jmt cent, cannot even hoc at 1,000 yards, nnic'li 1("k.s hit an olijert at tliat diMancc. I am loally not oxaggorating ; Ihcy could not. I liclicvc, ^r(• :i juan on lioiscback 1,000 yards off. 'I'hcrcforo to talk of making cv. ry man a i-'ood shot in our aiTuy is ]>racti cully impossihlc" 469 iimlouljteilly l>e.st solution for our service is tlie enqjloyuient of paid battalion Musketry Instructors, Avho train the recruits and then hand them over as trained to the captains of companies. 2. "War Pkactice. In beginning- the war practices, the men should have fulh- impressed on them the fact that what they liave alreacty done in their target practices is simply to teach their men liow to shoot, to keep their skill in shooting, and if j^ossible to improve it, and that as it depended on the ranges beino- verv accurately known, it could not be applied in war, because the enemy would not signal back the results of each shot. For this reason the words '"war practice" are particularly chosen though to train the men properly it should be further subdivided into ra/ir/c /jracturs, over known ranges, and Ji<'ld practices^ over unknown ranges, only trained soldiers carrying out the latter, 100 rounds at least being expended for each kind of practice. In these war practices there should be but little individual firing; volley* and mass-firing, carefully controlled, and only executed by word of command, being cliiefiy used, in order to impress on the men the necessity of mutual, and not independent, action. In war, independent firing will come of its own accord, and need not be ordered (see ]). 345 \ and so men need not be regularly trained to its use. Still, however, men shoidd be trained to execute a rapid accurate fire, for trained men can fii'e 10 rounds a minute, while untrained men can only iu-e 5 in the same time. All Continental nations instruct their troops in this. The only individual instruction that should T)e given in these practices is, to teach the soldier how U) hit, how to utilize ground, and how to make the best use of obstacles for cover, and h(t\v to take advantage of the time during Avhicli an objective may be visible. Teacliing men to fire on a moving or (lisa])])earing object is a most valualtle instruction, and one to which great attention is paid abroad. Our own experiences in the field of late years liave painfidly demonstrated to us its necessity. The means of executing fire on moving objects are very simple and cheap; * In firins: volleys, it is most essential to make all the men to fire together on the order " Fire : " or else, when the men are excited under an encmy'.s fire, if some men fire before or after the others, the firing may degenerate into an uncontrolled, independent fire. 470 tlie metliod laid down in tlie French Mnsketry Eegiilations seems all that can be desired. The range practices should be executed by .tquad-s of men (see p. 408), recruits being in drill order, and trained soldiers always in marching order. The held practices should also be carried out in marching order. These war jiractices shoiild include judging distance drills and practices (the ranges being judged to Avithin a tenth of the true range),* firing at movincf and disappearin>j targets, and skirmishing. The skirmishing should l)e most rigidly carried out, in conformity with the principles laid down in Chapters XIV. and XV., so as not only to fully instruct and train the men to fire discipline and control, but to instruct the officers and leaders in directing the fire. To ensure the necessary intelligence on the part of the men to carry this out, lectures on the object of fire discipline and control should be given them, Avhic-h should also illustrate the necessity iov a collective fire at all ranges over 400 yards. f To fully impress the men with this, they should be practically shoAvn hg cot/ipanics at war strength (so as to get a sufticient nuinber of rifles for concentration) the differenci' in the results to l)e obtained by independent and concentrated fire at guessed ranges. Many circumstances, however, occur in action whicli lakt^ from the ofiicers tlu^ power of controlling tlie fire. It will then be the duty of the non-commissioned officers, and in defauU of them any selected men, to carry this out. But under a very efficacious fire of the enemy, in the fight at close ranges, tliis nu'thod of action will ceas<^ to have any value, and success will tlu'U dc^pend on individual initiative alone. Hence arises tlie necessity of teaching and instructing tlie individual man so that he may be able to act according to his own instinct, and know, without being told at the time, liow to utilise, in all cases, the pro]»erties of his rifle. Jiut this instntetlov is f^iicsH tlic liinj^f to witliin ono-eififljlli of if, tlicv slioiild he trained to liiiil it to williin oiic-lcntli in poaco time. 'l"h(! distunccn judged ^liould 1.1' those Ktated on ]). I'JS. t Expcrinifnts iire really r<(|iiir((l to sIidw tliis thoroughly, Id wln'ili cu.Sf u HcrifS ol' scrfcn.i (right positions, but to enable them to use tliese positions, the t-nemy must have been demoralised beforehand, or else the attack, in any case, wotild not succeed. The upriglit position also allows of a more rapid advance being made to the final assaidt. As the field practices are intended to train the officers and non-commissioned officers in the direction and control of tire respectively, as wc^ll as to train the men to fire discipline, it is very important that the officei's themselves, altlu)ugh they woidd never fire in action, should also have been trained like the men, so that they may know and realize exactly what ele- ments and difficulties they have to deal with. Further, to give officers and non-commissioned officers the most perfect training possible, all tlte units vninujcd in tvdr pracfici's xJiouJd invtiridbly he at war sttrnf/t/i. Nothing is more diilicult, or oonduci's more to cojifusiou in battle, than suddenly being <;alled on to comnumd a greater numlter ot' uu>n than one has been accustomed to. Another important point is that no atftuk fornififion xhould he pnutiscd icithout men, o^iccrii, and qroitp- /eadcKH, hcini/ fallen oat to represent casualties, for otherwise an unreal state of things occurs wlien the sliootiug lim^ is rein- forced. Tho working by groups slu)uld be rigidly enrorced in all war practices, and in jiractising the attack fornuition. "Field Jiring by groups is intencbul to liabituato tlie nu>n to fire disi'niline; that is to say, to commence and ceasi^ fir(^, to increase or dimini; h the rapidity of it, &c., at the wish of their leader ; to tire with the sight ordered, on tho object which is told them, 473 aud not on tlie enemy in their direct front ; to lire only the number of cartridges ordered ; and lastly, to take account of the effect of their shots and of the consumption of their annnunition. This field tiring, besides instructing the men, is intended to instruct the officers with regard to the direction of the fire. The officers learn by these exercises to choose the most favora>)le moment for opening fire, as well as the ob- jective on Avhich they ought to concentrate the fire ; to estimate the distances ; to observe the strike of the bullets ; to regulate the fire by trial volleys. They accustom themselves also to the use of combined sights, the number of which they make to vary with the distance of the enemy, the slope of the ground near the object to be struck, and the dejith also of the object. They have, further, to choose between the different kinds of fii-e ; to consider the expenditure of amnmnition to gain a given result, and to regulate the consumption of the annnuni- tion, according to the available supplies aud the phase of tlie fight." Greneral Brialmont writes : — "The success of modern fighting- requires that troops should possess in the highest degree what is known as hattle discipline, or Jire dincijjline, that is to say, obedience in the middle of the emotions of the fight. This quality is only to be fotmd in trained and disciplined soldiers, commanded by leaders who inspire them with entire confi- dence." To inspire confidence, the leaders must be capable of carrying out their duties of direction and control, and their capacity of doing this depends far more on actual practice than on mere study alone. AVith regard to firing, the lat(\st German musketry regu- lations lay great stress on aiming quickly,*^ in all the ](ositions of standing, kneeling, and lying down ; because in war the objects fired at are essentially mobile, advancing or i-etiring, appearing and disap]»earing, and so it is especially necessary to rapidly take up the line of sight in order to liit the enemy. Field firing can be best carried out in the Avinter tim(>, except in the proposed camps of exercise, when the summer time would be made tise of. In the winter the coimtrv is open in every way, and offers opportunities for the most varied manoeuvres, which further, cannot hurt any * This cannot lie done with the fine sighting of the Martini-IIenry rifle. In any future rifle we have, the Laik-.^ight should be as near the eye ;is possi1)le, and he graduated for a full fore-sight, by which nieuns alone, quick sighting can be obtained. 474 cultivated land, as there are no cnriis in the ground then to be spoilt. In a great many places land could be teniporarUy obtained for Held tiring in winter time. A strip of country 2\- miles long by half a mile wide, is ample for a battalion, and a few patrols jiosted round woidd warn people off while the exercise was going on. This field firing, when properl}' carried out, is worth all the rest of the musketr\' instruction put together. " Although new arms and new tactical forms are no doubt necessary for modern war, there is something more than these required to make our troops efficient. I mean ' tactical training ' — the thorough training of our soldiers in what they have to do in war Mere barrack-square drill will not suffice : all ranks must practice in peace Avhat they have to do in war ; and, until this is done thoroughly, no army can be called efficient." — ;Capt. James'. We are, as yet, far from this standard in the British army. In war, volleys by groups wcnild be kejjt up as long as ])Ossible, but in 2>eace practiee volleys should be used for ranges over 400 yards, and mass-firing o/i/i/ for ranges under these. Any comparisons made between th(^ different rcgiiiK^nts in the service should be nuide l)v means of the results obtained ))y at lead ttro, and if ])ossible more, war practices. Twice or more times a year the same conditions of firing sho\ild be sent to every battalion (ni the same date, to be carried out as soon as possilde without previous practice. Such comparisons of data, made by a considerable number of men, are not so much affected by the different conditions of ranges, climates, &c., as tlu)S(> of ifidiA'idual fire are, and they can tlieref ore form a more or less reliable standard of the way in which the war training of a battalion and its oftict^rs lias b»H'n carried out. Althougli tlie men should be taught and ]U'actise(l to fire volleys l)y grou]is, yet no conq»aris(iiis sliould be mad«> of tlie results of sucli iiriiig, Itecause witli siicli small bodies of men a sufficient number of bullets cniniot be fired, as a rule, Avitliout allowing tlie men I'ar more ammunit ion than is usually available, in order to obtain a Irue criterion of the efiicacy of the fire. .Major (leneral Gordon said in IHK;; on the discussion on Cid. l''osberry's Y.( '. lecture (»n Jfaf/aziiic Jiijics and L'rjxafcrfi, given at the lioyal I'nited Servici- Ijistitntion "With regard to field firing, 1 linve seen much of it in India, and from what has been said this afternoon, I don't think that tli(> main object «»f its introduction is generally realised. Practice liy scpmds of 10 or 12 men on a range or <»n known ground in no way meets the desired ]iui-i>osi'. Jts intention is to habituate the 475 iiion to firing in tlie greatest available masses, as on service, and to enable the ofticers and men to see the effect of such lire Tipon figures and screens which are entrenched and only placed on such ground as the enemy would occupy. Many advantages have followed this method of carrying out field firing, amongst them, the searching consequence of long range fire on screens, i^laced often out of sight of the firers, in covered positions such as would be occupied by the supports and reserves of an enemy." The lowest units between which any comparisons of collective fire should be made should be companies at war strength, and for this pur- pose the men should tire at least 5 rounds per man at each range. Then again, such comparisons of war practices should only be made between tactical units of about the same size, for as Greneral Hardinge has pointed out, experiments show that the quality of infantry tire is in inverse ratio of the quantity of men firing, which means that in field firing twice one does not make two, and that as the number of men firing is increased from companies to battalions, brigades, &c., the proportion of hits to rounds fired falls in a very rapidly decreasing manner. It is evident that a few skir- mishers can shoot better than a greater number of them, because the smaller the number the freer will be their choice of ground, both for cover and aim, thereby obtaining the minimum of exposure with the maximum of effect. Again it is evid(^nt that a long line of moving skirmishers can ueithei' advance quickly nor fire well. It cannot tire well, because a sniall unit like a brigade expands a tire line of about 800 paces, in which individual divergence is strictly prohibited, and also to maintain the true direction and intervals, even for a short distance, is high tension drill, and conseqiiently bad ground makes it impossible, while the best ground makes it slow. Such a formation cannot advance quicker than 2 miles an hour across the zone of greatest danger, and also such a line cannot fire well, because small inecpialities of ground, when a man lies down, become mountains hiding the object beyond, and tlius Idind an incredibly large proportion of the rifies of the already hampered advance. For all these reasons comparisons between the results of tield tiring should be confined to those of units of about equal strength. The annual inspections by the general officers commanding districts and garrisons should be bj- means of the war practices only. In these war practices veiy great stress should be placed ■176 ou the instrufti(.)ii uf officers aud uon-couuuissioued uiriccrs in tire dii-ection and control. As weather does not affect the results of concentrated firing nearly so much as it does individual tiring, the war practices should go on all the year round, except during the times re- quired for individual firing and for the summer diills. IlESUME. The above system of musketry instruction, based on a complete separation between target and war practices, seems, from the data given in Parts I. and II. to be as rational aud ])ractical a system as it is possi1)le to give to troops, and one very suited to field service. Tliroughout it the aim has been to make the principles of musketry instruction to go hand-in- hand with the tactical requirements of the battle field — which should be the aim of all military instruction, organisation, institutions — and to give the greatest weight to the war j)ractices. A soldier during his first year should only be putthrougli the recruit's course, and through the trained soldier's course in his subsecpient yi-ars ; a recruit has so much to learn in his first year that he should not be pushed too much. There should be se])arate musketry regulations for cavalry and infantry, aud each should be divided into four distinct parts, viz., the training of the recruit and of the trained soldier, and target and war practices. These regulations ought to give many illustrations of the rifi<\ its sights and the nu^thods of adjusting them, methods of aiming, diagrams showing the apparent sizes of the targets at different ranges when the book is lield at arms lengtli, apparent size of men in different positions at d iff i^rent ranges, &r., &.c. Notliing im])resses themind somucli as diagrams, a good illustration iswortli pages of (explanation. For such a system of nuisketrv training we see tluit it is most ess(^ntial that the company olficers sliould train their own men after tliey have been luuided over to tliem as trained recruits })y tlie musketry instriu'tor, so as to acciistom tliese recruits to fire discipline and to thecontrol of llieir own officers and non-commissioned ofiicers, and also to accustimi the officers to tlieir liigher duties of direction, and the non- commissioiu'd officers to tli<' coiilnd of llie iiring groups. With regard to tlie extent and character of tlie training in Tnusketry retpiired for l)otli nu-ii and oificer.s, we cannot do lietter than ir latcMt niuskelry rejjulationH. 479 Tlio musketry reg-ulations state that the Schoul of Musketiy is established (1) for the special miisketr}' training of officers and sergeants, in order that they may qualify themselves to train their troops and companies ; and also (2) that a uniform system of instruction may prevail throughout the army. This latter object is quite unnecessary, as it can be fully ensured by the regidations if they are adhered to, as they shoidd be, and by appointing officers as Inspect or h of Mmh'tnj in each military district. If regulations cannot ensure this, then we ought to have special schoctls for drill, and various other subjects. The appointment of Inspectors of Musketry is a step in the i-ight direction, and would allow the School of Musketry to devote itself to higlier things tlmn it does at present. The former object ought to be what the School of Musketry should confine itself to, but not in the way that it does now. It ought to be a great experimental school, at which officers of all ranks should lie assembled, to s(^e such experi- ments of collective fire, inclined fire, indirect fire, &c., as cannot 1)0 carried out in every })lace, and which require experienced ofiicers to conduct them where the}- can be carried out. Half-yearly reports on any such firing carried out should be sent to all battalions by the School of Musketry. It shoidd be the duty of the officers who have attended the School to im- part to their battalions on their return, what they have seen and learnt there. The duty of a Scho(d of ]\Iusketry should be t(» keep up the instruction of the army in shooting to modern tactical requirements, and to the ever-improving power of the rifle ; it should originate improvements in arms and tactical methods of procedure, and not be content to follow the footsteps of others, — those who follow are always behind. As an example, the following are the objects for which the Prussian School of Musketry at Spandau was instituted, as stated in the decree ordering its establishment: — (1) to improve the arms and ammunition in the service; (2) to make experiments with the arms of foreign nations, and to keep the national army informed of the real value of the armament of its possible adversaries; and (3) to form good musketry instructors, and to spread throughout the army a profound knowledge on fire-arms and their properties. These duties arc carried out by a permanent staff of officers and non-commissioned officers, assisted by an "experimental detachment" and an "instructional detachment." The course of instruction lasts 5 months. The Belgian School of Musketry at Beverloo, has for its object: (1) to introduco a uniform system iuto the methods of tighting, to spread throughout the army a profound knowledge on the fire-arms, the ammunition, and the methods of firing in use, and on tactics, the use of ground in war, jind fortitication on the battlefield ; (2) to form good instructors; and (3) to study the fire-arms, ammunition, and methods of firing, and the regulations on the tactics and field service of infantry in foreign armies, to make experiments on varied ground, and to deduce from them the modifications necessary to be made in the tire-ai'ms, ammunition, methods of firing, and regidations of the army. The course of instruction lasts '6 months, and is divided iuto .J ])arts. — 1. A tactical coarse, bearing on tlie most recent changes introduced into tlie tactics of marching, fighting, and halting, (as actually applii'd to ground) of foreign armies. These changes are compared with the home regulations, and even experiments are made in the country to test their valu(>. 2. A field fortification coarse, for the use of infantry, in which the progress realized in foreign armies is examined. ;>. A )itudetr>i coarse, in which the methods of firing at different ranges are shewn, and how to maintain fire discipline; a comi)arative .study of foreign rifics, ammunition, and methods of firing is also ma(l(\ The Ivussian iScliool of Musketry at St. Petersburg lias for its object fl) to prepare company commanders, by means of theoretical and practical instruction, for the execution of the duties wliich fall on them as chiefs of a fundamental unit ; (2) to si)read throughout the army rational ideas on tlie eni- plo3^nent of fire in action; (3) to assure uniformity in the in- struction in firing; (4) to study, under all aspects, the port- able firearms adopted for the Jvussian Army; (o) to study any iiiipro\ements pro])osed f(ir the portable fir(>arms, cartridges, and everything affei'ting the armament and fire ; (G) to make experiments; and (7) to collect information concerning tlie arms in use in foreign armies. Th<^ commandant of the school is an oHicer of high rank, and lie is assisted bj' a ](ermanent effective, composed of a ])rrsonnl staff, a staff of ]»r()fessors, and a firing com]»any, and by a variable effective, eumposed of officers and men same men fin* 100 rounds at six t.-irgets 40 metres apart, from 000 to 800 metres. From the hits made on the tai'gefs, the points of fall of the Itullets on the ground, and, eonse(|Uently, the density of tho tire at a given ]toint on tin- beaten ground, are easily deduced. 483 (b). Day firing, under the conditions of siege warfare. — In this exercise groups of men, placed in shelter trenches, fire from 400 to 700 metres against objects 14 in. high (or head targets), placed on some moimds of earth, to represent the height that the heads of an enemy's infantry would appear above a parapet. {e). Night firing, on supports or rests. — In this exercise groups of men fire — at distances of 200 and 400 metres — against targets representing sections of 60 men in closed ranks, or against targets of different widths, representing groups of men. During the day the men are shown how to best place the supports on which their rifles are to rest, so as to keep them in a fixed direction ; then the men are made to fire, during the day, from these supports, in order to allow them to take note of the angular error which each rifle ma}- make during the fire, and to thus teach them to avoid, as much as possible, this source of error in night firing. After this, the proper night firing is proceeded with, the supports being only placed on the gTOund at nightfall, and the fire being only commenced when it is perfectly dark. Such are the demonstrations, at once both practical and elementary, that the Grerman soldier receives during the " instruction firing." The great value of instruction firing is to vividl}' im^^ress on the men's minds the relative values of the different kinds of fire at different ranges. It is only when this has been done that we can hope to get them to work in groups under fire and not independently. Another kind of instruction shooting, much employed in Austria, France and German^', is effected by means of chamler ■rifles (see p. 466). This kind of firing has been lately intro- duced into England by Mr. Morris, by means of a tube, which fits into the bore of the Martini-Henr}^ rifle, through which is discharged a miniature bullet at miniature targets, at ranges up to 300 3-ards, while it can also be used in a long room. This innovation promises, in an indirect way, to give a veiy powerfid means of developing the individual skill oi both the recruit and trained soldier in shooting. In the first place, as there is no recoil to unsteady a recruit, it is invaluable to teach him the effect of errors in shooting, how to aim, and how to use the sights, and to see if he "pulls off" in releasing the trigger. It is weU adapted also to illustrate the rise of a bullet in its trajectoiy and other points in the theory of musketr}-. By it men can be perfected in aiming, in pressing the trigger at the right moment, in Hh 2 184 keeping the sig-lits iiprigiit, and in using the sights for the longer ranges, and thns bringing the rifle, hand, and eyo to Avork together in unison. The following extracts are taken from the repoi-t of the Committee of the National Rifle Association on the IMorris Tuhe and Sheds : — *" "The ordinaiy aiming drill and snapping of triggers is virtually useless for j'oung soldiers, for there is nothing to show them their errors ; but with the ' IMorris Tube ' and its diminutive cartridge it is otlicrwise. "\Ve therefore consider that for the ordinary aiming and snapping drill, actual shooting with the ' Morris Tube ' and cartridge might be substituted Avith the l)est possible residts, especially for recruits. We are further of opinion that with a preliminary course of drill with the ' Morris Tube ' and cartridge, the ordinary course of blank cartridge tiring might be dispensed ■with, as young soldiers would tliereby derive so much more confidence in the use of their weapons that ih.cj might at once jiass from the drill with the ' Morris Tube ' and cartridge to actual practice at the targets. There would thus be a con- siderable saving of money in the discontinuance of blank tiring in the course of musketry drill, which would go very far to supply the tubes and anmmnitiou tliat would be required fur the training of riH-ruits." Even instruction can be given, by means of these tubes, in firing at miniature disappearing and moving targets repre- senting men, horses, &c., at dift'crent ranges. The best proof of the use of thesn tubes is tliat those wlio have used them have made the best target shooting in practice. Thus they have " a real and practical value whicli cannot be easily ovca'-rated, both as an educational agent in rifle shooting for recruits and young soldiers, and as a valuabhi means of ritie practice for the trained soldier, espf^cially in cases wliere access to ojien rifle rang(>s is both diflicult and costly. "\\'e also think they wovdd b(> a great attraction to soldiers, if, under due supervision, tlie latter could freely use them for private matches, whicli would tend mor(> than nny- tliing ... to develop and foster an interest in the most lUH^essary branch ol' n soldier's education, viz. : rifle shooting." * TTip Hhcd is only nn nrranKPmr'nt to intorcopt all ill-aimed or acci- Stat<'S wen^ (>nabled to so long nuiintain their sti'uggle with the overwhelming forces of the Noi'tliern States. JJotli obstaclo and slielter W(n"kH were freely used in this war, the former especially by tht^ weaker side, and in woody country where tho enemy could advance to short ranges unseen. Jn the Pnisso-Austrian War of lHG(i, the Anstrians, when they found themselves out-matched in arniinneiif, and forced to act on the defensive, should most certainly have made tliu greatest use of entrenchments ; but 487 thoy neglected to do so, and suffered enormously in conse- quence. In the Carlist and Franco-German Wars shelter trenches were freely used, and the p^reat battle of Gravelotte, in the latter war, might have ended differently, had not the French ammunition run out on their right. Skobeleff's opinion on this latter war was as follows : — "There can be no doubt in my mind that the French Campaign of 1870 would have ended with much better results for the French had they, during the second period of the campaign, and in view of the present armament of infantry, and the comparatively weak effects, as far as decisiveness goes, of long range artillery, confined themselves strictly to unexpected strategic attacks (especially along the lines of railways, for instance), combined with a purely tactical mode of defence, with the aid of field fo rtificat ion." During this second period of the campaign it must be remembered that the French armies were composed of very badly -trained levies. The Eusso-Turkish War, like the American Civil War, was notably a war of field works, and had the defenders of Plevna been properly backed up by their field armies, or had the Russians not fortified the Shipka Pass, the war might have ended very differentl}'. "Every- where in the fights at Plevna, at Lovtcha, and wherever the attack had to advance or hold its ground, the want of tools, was severely felt by the Russians. In the struggle to hold the redoubts on the ' Green HiUs ' taken by Skobeleff, the men, enfiladed as they were on both flanks, worked all night with sword-bayonets, canteen lids, and hands, and even threw the dead into the gaps to bar the Turks." Everyone has read Skobeleff's complaints of the want of tools before Plevna. No one coidd accuse him of want of dash or reck- lessness under fire, and yet, when his division was led south to assist in a very rapid advance on the Turkish capital, he provided his men with Turkish spades, which they cheerfully carried to Constantinoplo, slung across the back, having learned their value in battle. Col. Eraser, R.E., who followed the war, quotes the following extract from a Russian report : — " If the Government does not give its infantry a portable spade, the soldiers will buy them with their last pence." AVhile the Russian generals in 1877 thus strongly deplored the neglect that their Government had shewn in not providing a sufficient number of portable tools, the Austrian generals, who conducted the campaigns in Bosnia and Herzegovina congi-atulated their own Government in having taken the precaution of providing a spade to every two men. •188 TliiLs, Austrians, Frencli, Germans and Ivussians liavo all felt the advantage of even the most hastily constructed defences in war, and although all these nations la_y the very greatest stress on the necessity of taking the offensive in battle, yet they one and all, especially since the liusso-Turkish war, have adopted light entrenching tools as part of the infantry soldier's equipment, to be used as infantry weapons, little less effective in their way than rifles. As the tide of battle rolls backwards and forwards, the offensive and defensive attitudes of the contendmg sides change ; the entrenching carried out by the side flrst acting on the defensive is, as a rule, fairly com- plete ; that executed during any offensive movement is usually confined to rapidly placing captured positions in some kind of state for defence, so as to act as a tactical point of support for covering any possible subsequent retreat. As a rule in au attack, special troops (engineers and pioneers) would be sent forward for the purpose of securing the ground gained, but these troops may be wanted for other duties or elsewhere eugaged, and so the attacking infantry themselves may have to do the work, as at Plevna. Hence the necessity of infantry, under all conditions, being provided with entri'uching tools, is now fully established in every army, and the next questions are, what kind of tools are required ^and howshouldthcy bccarried V Taking tliis latti'r cpiestiou first, wagons witli entrenching tools areof little value, as infantryhave to work over fields andfences, througli woods and enclosures, and on ground over which wheeled vehicles cannot pass, aiul so the tools may not be forthcoming when wanted. To be of real vahu' the i-n- t rendu ng tools must go with the rifle, and the principal ones, at all events, should be carried on the soldier.* This principh; lias been accepted in every ('ontinental army. General Skobeleff's opinion, given in his rt'port of the third batth; of Plevna, has often been (pioted, that the first thing a soldier throws away when in diiliciiltii's is his entrenching tool, and that theri'fon* it would be better cither to send the tools after tlie attacking force, or to have u special cor])s attached to each regiment (of tlircc! battalions), whose duty it is to place any should adopt for our service, wo must remember that, though a 491 battalion, 800 strong, would occupy a shelter trench about 400 yards long on the defensive, rcquu-ing say 400 tools, yet the supports and reserves have also to construct cover for themselves and perhaps a second line of defence, so that nearly every man, say 80 p. c. in each company,'" should carry the "Wallace spade, and the remainder should carry small axes for woodwork, making abatis, clearing ground, &:c. It may be useful here to point out the difference between English and German practice in the construction of shelter trenches. The Germans have three kinds of shelter trenches, for men firing lying down, kneeling and standing respec- tively. The shelter trench for men lying down corresponds to our shelter pit with a parapet one foot high ; that for kneeling is 16 inches deep and 40 inches wide, with a parapet 20 inches high ; that for standing is 20 inches deep, and wide enough to provide earth for a parapet 32 inches high. The Germans have no wide, shallow shelter trench like ours for the lying down position, they seek for cover, not in width of trench and thickness of parapet, as we do, but in depth of trench, and height of parapet, Avhich is the true principle of gaining shelter. The British soldier is well known to have an inherent dislike to digging, but so had the Russians at first (in 1877), for we see that the first thing they tkrew away was their entrenching tool, and yet after the first rude shock of war we see how eagerly they clung to them subsequently. "We ought to train our infantry to use entrenching tools freely, and the best way to make them do so is to make them always carry them and be continually practised with them. The men would thus soon learn to feel that the entrenching tool is as much a weapon for their use as the rifle. The prejudice against the use of the spade is not reasonable. " The (British) infantry must rise to a higher conception of its functions and duties if it woidd not fall back behind that of all Europe. The recruit must, indeed, be first trained in the barrack square to discipline of limbs and mind ; but that once done, he must be developed into the best possible fighting animal. Drill is all very well as the alphabet of his work, but too much of it, uni'elieved by higher training, kills that individuality which is above all things necessary to the fighting of to-day. * This proportion should depend on the natiu-e of the country. It might vary between 70 and 90 per cent., according as the country is kno^\^l to be more or less •wooded or intersected with hedges. ■]•)•_' This is the .seirot of tlie Boors' smccbs (in 1881) as far as it weut ; but there is no reason why tlie English soldier should not, on an average, he a better fighting aninial than the average ]}oer. lie may probably never attain to ipiite such prolicieiuy in shooting, but he may add many t^ualities wliich the l>o(n's have not. The development of the individual, coupled witli discipline, will do wonders, and one of the directions in which that development should move, is the use of the spade. " It may be here remarked that the opinion of the great German writer, Yon Boguslawski, on the Boer war is that our defeats were far more due to our tactical errors than to the superior shooting of the Boers, and an impartial studj- of the a\ ar wiU lead anyone to the same conclusion. The value of entrenchments depends on the troops holding them {vide Plevna and Tel-el-Kebir). "In considering the whole cpiestion of positions, we must never forget that though positions may increase the resistance of troops, yet the troops themselves must be considered hrst. He who expects too much from the ground will be left in the lurch " (Von Waldstalteu). Througli neglect of this last principle we suffered severely at Majuba Hill. Shelter cover is only required during th(^ first stages of the fight until the enemy is demoralised, when the troops must leave it to take tlie offensive, and hence such cover must be easily crossed to enable sucli a movement to be made. Some writers are opposed to earthworks where this offensive action has to be made, saying that they would tie the troops down, from their not liking to leave them. ]}ut, if troops are trained to look on such shelter cover as merely a temporan* resting place or musketry position, tlien there will be no difHculty in getting them to leave it to conclude a victory. The French, Carlists, Russians, and Turks freely left their shelter trenches to attack Avith tlu^ Itayonet. But obstacle c(»ver, such as heavy iield works, do tie troops down. Hence they should only ]m> used by tlu> defensive wlien tlu-re is a great inferiority of numl)ers, and at sncli i)oints Mlicre a subse(pu'nt offensive countiT-attack cannot be made. These licavier works are consecpiently more suited to jirotect the ilanks and rear of a position tlian tlio direct front . Seeing the great inijiortance of even sliglit eiirtliworks to jtrotect infantry against tlie lire of modern rilles and artillery, it is hard to understand the delay that there has lieen in 493 providing- the British infantry with the "Walhifo entrenching^ tool. It is liig'lily important that they shouhl carry it when- <'ver they parade in marehin^^ order, so as to make them feel it is a veiy essential part of their equipment. Further, in tlii'ir annual course of training, they should he frec[uently practised in its use to make the men feel its importance and to destroy any prejudice against it. Even at drill the}' should i»e made to go through the motions of using it in i:)laees where they may not turn up the earth. Man}' writers have stated that "the earth is the true shield or breastplate of infantry," and this spirit should be imbued into the men. A well-known Clerman writer, Capt. C. Yon Widdern, says: — "In the attack, as in the defence, it is desirable th.it tlie spade shoidd be utilized as much as the rifle and bayonet. It is high time to accustom infantry to consider this tool, eqiuxUy as the rifle, as an arm from which it can obtain jirofit, not only on the defensive, to resist the attacks of the enemy, but also on the offensive, especially in order to promptly put a newly-captured position in a state of defence, and to thus ward off any offensive returns." One of the most character- istic features of the annual German Autumn Manoeuvres is the multiplication of field works. Hasty field works are freely used on the line of outposts, on the main line of defence, and on the line of retreat. "Even during an engagement the infantry throw up earth at every step, and place the edges of villages and woods into a state of defence, and this, too, as much on the offensive to secure the positions gained, as in the retreat to hold on to the ground." To use the tool in offensive movements the men should be trained to use it lying down. To enable it to be got at at any moment the AVallace entrenching tool is attached to the baj'onet frog, in which position it has not been found to incon- venience the men in their movements in any wa}'. All experience points to a ver}- great use of entrenchments in the next European war, (in which we may be engaged), in order to minimise the effect of modern weapons, and as such works favour the defence more than the attack, it is very essential that our small army shoidd make a special study of tliem, and that it should be given the opportunity, not only to make them once in a way, but to practice them constantly. One of the best tacticians in the German army, General Baron Yon Wechmar, writes: — "It often happens that isolated fractions of an advancin": force will be obliged to a?t 494 temporarilj^ on tlie defensive. For instance, an advance guard may meet an enemy superior in numbers, and may fear being attacked before it can be supported by the main body. In sucli a case, tbis advance guard, instead of engaging in a doubtful offensive combat, would do everA'thing to fortify as much as possible a rajiidly-chosen position, by means of shelter trenches and epaulments. In a future vrar, "when ■we (the Grermans) -will no longer have a numerical superiority, and -when our adversaries "wiU be better prepared to resist our offensive blows, icJiich icill he as rigorous as fonnerhj, the emploATuent of the auxiliarj' means, oifered by fortification, will often be necessary. Ai-e we sufficiently exercised in these improvised works of fortification on the battle field? We do not think so. Practice is ahsohdeh/ necessary in order to Icnow how to rapidli/ choose the ground to he strengthened^ and to calculate the nianher of men and toots, as ivell as the time required for the execution of the icorlcsP One of the most ready obstacles tliat can be made in the field is a bougli abatis, while the best obstacle to an enemy is a clear fit'kl of fire. Hence it frequently happens that brush- wood has to be cut away, in front of a position, and boughs ob- tained. In the absence of axes, the British infantry, as at present equipped with a triangular shaped bayonet, could not do this. If our troops had sAvord-bayonets, such as the troops of France, Gennany, and Austria possess, then a good deal might be done in this way, even without axes. These sword- bayonets are quite capable of doing thi' lighter work of cutting down ])OTighs and brushwood. In the accounts of the late ►Soudan campaigns we frequently read of the use made by the Eoyal Engineers of their sword baj-onets in cutting down bushes and fonuing "zerebas." The sword-bayoiu't is just as good for killing purposes as the present bayonet in use by lis, which is pei'fectly unfit for any other ])ur])ose than stabbing. Cutting l)rush\vood, »S:e., with a sword-bayonet would not im- pair its stabl)ing (jiialilies, because the momentum of a lu'avy rifle, impelled forward with the strc^ngth of a man's arms, would drive a sword-bayonet attaehc^d to it, however blunt its edge might be, through anything in reason.* • Sinci' the al)Ovo was written it has been decided (o introduce a light sword-bayonet into the English service. 495 CHAPTEE XIX. MAGAZINE RIFLES. A magazine rifle is one which contains in itself, or attached to it, a supply of ammunition, independent of that in the soldiers' pouches, and which can be passed into, and ejected from, the rifl.e, without having to handle the cartridges in any way, thus causing a greater rapidity of fire while the supply of ammunition on the rifle holds out. Hence, other thingsheing equal, that magazine rifle in the hest which containn the greatest number of cartridges. The question of the xise of magazine rifles has not been so widely studied in England as it has abroad, and hence, we do not find the variety of opinion on the matter in English writings as exists on the Continent. Indeed, the number of English officers who have ventured an original public opinion on the matter are extemely few, while others have only made short indefinite references to the subject. No doubt this is due in a gi-eat measure to want of facilities for officers to come in contact with these magazine rifles. AVe do not propose to enter into any details''' with regard to the numerous magazine arms that have been invented, but only with regard to their tactical uses, the methods of employing them, and the conditions they should fulfil. Magazine rifles were first used in the Ajnerican Civil "NVar with varying success. The faults that existed in them at that time lay principally in their comj^licated and delicate mechanism and in the paper cartridges then in use. It was only when the solid-di'awn cartridge was invented, that magazine rifles promised any advantage in the future, in fact, a solid-drawn cartridge case is an essential requirement for a magazine rifle. However, after tlie American War, the question of using these rifles feU into abeyance. The Franco-German AVar re-opened the question, and in 1872, the European Powers set themselves hard at work in experimenting with them and considering how they should be used. But the disadvantages of complicated and delicate * For a description of some of the principal magazine arms in use, see official " Text Book on Military Small Arms and Ammunition." 49G mechanism and inferior ballistic qualities* were not as yet overcome. However, tlio Freucli lead the Avay, Tiy arming their navy with the Kropatschek nnder-barrel magazine rifle, in 1878. ^ While the French experiments were being carried on, the Eusso-Tnrhish "War was at its height, and Eiirope was being vividly impressed with the enormous power of the modern rifle. Magazine rifles were often successfully used by the Turkish cavalry in this war, and the taking of Sfax, in Tunis, in 1883, in which the French Krojiatscliek magazine rifles were very successfully iised, settled the Cjuestion. The Germans have already armed a larg(^ proportion of tlunr troops witli magazine rifles, and the French, English, Austrians, and Italians are following suit. One of the great difflculties that foreign jiowers have to contend is the expense of re-arming their huge armies . with new weapons. Up to eomparativeh' lately, inventors con- structed entirely original weapons, which involved a complete re-armament. To avoid this exjiense, efforts have been directed at utilising the existing weaj)ons abroad, which have since been crowned with great success. Although Continental armies had been making a regular study of the question f)f magazine rifles since 1872, yet it was not until 1880 that any real move Avas made in the matter by our Government. The prevab^nt idea that our rifle was such a superior one as compared with Continental rifles, might, probably, have been ono cause for tliis delay, biit official experiments made in England in 1880 dispelled this pleasant dream, when it was found that our rifle was no l)etter tlian the French or German rifles, wliile it was inferior to the Ivnssian one. Before going any further, we may thus liroadly classify as foUows tlie different kimls of magazine riih's tliat are of any practical use : — 1. Under-l)arri'l magazine rifh's, in wliiili the cartridges (about eight in numlicr) are phiccd in a lube or uuigazino under the l)arrel of the rifle. 2. Butt magazine rith-s, in wliicli tlie cartridges (about six in nuinlii'r) are plai ( il in a tulut or nuigazine situated in fhi" ])uft of tli<^ rifle. .'5. n<))>per magazine rifhs. in wliicli tlie cailridgcs (about * These carl irr mag;izin<' lillcs liail ruily li;:li( Imllrls :iml weak charges. The mng'T/iiK' v\i\cH now in use, t:ik-i> thf ordin.ny litli; ( artiidfj'n. 497 ten ill number) are placed in dotacliable hoppers or maf^azines. The number of cartridges for each kind of magazine rifle may be taken as a maximum. There is also another plan, which can hardly be taken as rejiresenting or fulfilling the definition that we have given of a magazine ritle. It is an appliance or device called a "quick-loader," to hold about ten cartridges, for the pm-pose of expediting the loading of the ordinary breech-loader. The quick-loader, when attached to the barrel of the. rifle, near the breech, only puts the cartridges in a more favourable position for quick loading than when they are in the soldier's pouch. The disadvantages of a magazine under the barrel are, that the weight of the rifle is increased; that the base of each cartridge rests on the point of the bullet of the next, and, owing to the jar or recoil of rapid firing, or when ordei-ing arms, or to an over sensitive '"•' or projecting cap, cartridges have exploded accidentally in the magazine, destroying the rifle, injuring the soldier, and making his comrades lose con- fidence in their weapons. The mechanism is delicate and complicated. The refilling of the magazine is not convenient, as the cartridges have to be worked against a spring that is required for pushing them out again. If the magazine is kept fully loaded for any length of time, this spring is apt to get weakened. The great disadvantages of this kind of magazine, however, are, that we cannot see how many cartridges there are left in the magazine at any given moment, and that they give nomeansof preventing the men using them if they wish to, because the leaders cannot see if their men are employing them or not, and thus the magazine may be empty just when it is required to be used. Also, owing to the position of the magazine, the balance of the rifle constantly alters as the magazine is being emptied. The disadvantages of a magazine in the butt are exactly the same as those above, with the additional ones that it carries fewer cartridges, and that it requires a very thick and unwieldy butt. A rifle, however, with this kind of magazine is not subjected to the same variations of balance. * It is impossible to manufacture caps of exactly the same degi-ee of sensitiveness, especially if exposed to variations of tempcratiu-e and dete- lioration from age. Il 498 A further disadvantago of under-barrol and "butt magazine rifles is that they must always be carried headed. AVhat is wanted is a magazine rifle that can be loaded -when required ; that is a rifle that can be used as a single loader, and at the word of command can be loaded and nsed as a magazine rifle. The detachable hojiper magazine avoids all these disadvan- tages. The cartridges in it lie one upon another, so that no explosion can take place in it from the cause stated above, and no man can &s. it on the rifle before he is ordered to, without its being seen. As soon as one hopper is emptied, it can be re-fllled, even when on the rifle, or it can be rapidly removed and replaced by another filled one. iYom the position of the magazine the balance of the arm is maintained under all circumstances, but, except in the Lee hopper, which is flxed under the rifle and in its axis, it slightly alters the sjTumetry of the rifle (see p. 27), the effect of which, however, may be neglected for practical jnirposes on the battle held. The best form of hopper is that which is fixed above the rifle so that the cartridges may fall into th(^ breech action by their own weight, without having to be forced in by means of a spring, which has to be used with hopjiers that are fixed imder thv barrel. These hoppers should also be fixed to the left side of the rifle, so as not to interfere with the direct re-loading of the rifle wlum the hopper is emjity, and there is no time to fill or re-place it. A hopper shoidd carry as many cartridges as possible with- out inconvenience, and should have a catch to prevent the cartridges, at any moment, from falling into the breech action, when the magazine supply of ammunition is no longer to be drawn on. AVith the ])resent ammunition 1 rounds is the most that can 1)0 conveniently held in a ho])])(^r, but with a smaller Itore rifle and not such a bottle-shaped cartridge, as at present used, a greater number of rounds could be put into it. A slot sliould lie cut in the* side of ihe hopper in order to enable anyone to see how many cartridges there are in it at any given m(»ment, wliile to prevent th(^ men using the luagazine pu])]»ly, until ri'(piired, when the magazine is fixed, tlie hop]ter should, in the Author's opinion, 1)(> capabl(» of folding l)aclc until it hangs verfically. Jf then a soldier puts it uy) to make use of it, witlutut orders, he can lie at onco cliecked. For riflf'S witli a bolt lireecli-nction one great advantage of the liopper magazine is the simjtlicity of the mechanism recjiiired for it. Great diflicidty haa been experieuced iu 499 utilisiiig the falliug block breecli-aetiou of our Martini-Henry rifle for working a magazine, hut lately Ca2)t. C. Greville Harston, late R.M.L. Infantry, has overcome this mechanical difficult}', and his invention is now under trial. There is a strong opinion abroad, which is also gradually springing up in England, tliat we made a great mistake in 1870 in adopting the falling block breech-action for our rifle, not so much on account of its unsuitability for magazine purposes, the future use of which was not realized then, but on account of its inferior mechanical power for loading and extracting cartridges. Mechanically speaking, the direct action of a bolt for both loading and extracting is far superior to loading with the thumb and extracting with the indirect action of a lever operated on by a falling block, as we have in our present riffe. ~We have lately frequently heard from the Soudan, of the want of extracting power that exists in our rifle, for ejecting cartridges that have stuck for any reason. With a bolt breeth-aetion these complaints would not have occiuTcd, unless the base of the cartridge tore away from the body of it, an occurrence which is not likely to occur at any time if a good design and manufacture has been ensured. Further, a solid- drawn cartridge case is known to requu-e a stronger extractor than the rolled sheet brass ones that we use, as the expansion of a solid-drawn cartridge case when fired, is more permanent than that of a rolled one, and this is another reason for introducing the bolt breech-action in any future rifle for our sei'\'ice. Arguments have often been used in England against a bolt breech-action on account of the frequent failures of the Prussian needle gun and French chassepot in the Franco- German "War. Metal cartridges were not used with these weapons, and the breech was so badly closed that a large escape of gas occurred when each cartridge was fired. The consequence was that that barrel and breech-action became so fouled that the cartridges could not be put into the barrel, and the working of the bolt became so laborious as to " utterly destroy the steadiness of a man's hand, by sending a tremor up into his arm, which rapidly discj^ualihed him for firing with accuracy." This state of things no longer exists, since a solid- drawn cartridge has been universally adopted abroad, and Continental officers assert that a direct bolt-action tires a man no more than the indirect lever-action that we employ in our rifle. The only approach that has been made besides Capt. Ii 2 500 Harston's late invention, to utilising the falling Week breech-action for magazine purposes is in the Owen Jones -weapon, in -vrhich the striker and spiral spring in the block of the Martini-Henry rifle are replaced by a hammer worked by an ordinary bent spring,"^- and the cartridges, carried in a detachable hopper magazine, are operated on by a handle, under the butt, the movement and mechanism of which are respectively no shorter and far less shnple than that of an ordinary bolt-action. Thus a bolt breech-action is the most practical method of obtaining a magazine rifle. The best bolt breech-actions yet invented, are those of 'Mr. Bethel-Burton and of Mr. Lee. The Bethel-Burton bolt-action, or the Lee, can be used ■with any of the different kinds of magazines that have been enumerated, and they differ from those used on the Continent, by having the projecting handle at the rear end of the breech, which greatly simplifies it, and the mere action of raising the handle vertically, "cocks "the striker in the bolt, which is operated on by a spiral spring. These bolt-actions contain only four separate simple ]iarts, which are very easily taken to pieces for cleaning, and put together again by a soldier.f But one of the main features of them is that, when the bolt is pushed home, it is completely covered in, so no dust or dirt can get into its working parts. The general conditions which a magazine rifle should fulfil are as follows : — 1. Its ballistic, qualities (flatness of trajectory, range, and accuracy) shoidd not be inferior to those of the rilles at present in use. 2. It should be capable of use as an ordinary breech-loader, at all times, and of vfry simply and rapidly allowing the maga- zine being brought into i»lay, and vice rerK('i,nt any given numient. 3. AVlien used as an ordinary brt'och-loader, it should flro as quickly as the rifles at present in use. 4. The working of its bret>ch-acti(tn should lond and extract the cartridge cttming from its magazine witliout any assistance of the hand. 5. It should 1)0 capable of allowing oilicers to see if tho • A Kpiral Hprinp; imd strikor woro ndojitiMl for IhcMiirtini-lIcmy rifle as boinfj: Himjjlcr and lulti r than a hammer and bent spring'. t To take tho l-reoch-action of tlio Martini-IIeiirv rifle to j)ioro.s and to jmt it foKother apain, is 1»y no means an easy operation, and requiroa Dpecial implements for doing ho. 50 i men are using the magazine supply, and of seeing how many cartridges remain in the magazine at any given moment. 6. Its mechanism should bo strong and simple so as not to require delicate care, and should bu able to stand the rough usage of war. 7. Its mechanism should be easily taken to pieces, cleaned, and put together again. 8. Any damage to its magazine should not affect the use of the arm as an ordmary l»reech-loader. 9. Its mechanism should not be injured by the bursting of defective cartridges, nor allow of any gas escaping from the breech. 10. The cartridges in its magazine should not be liable to accidental explosion, either by the shock of discharge, or dui'ing drill, or in case the riile has an accidental fall, and the bullets in the magazme should not be liable to alteration in shape from the same causes. 11. Its magaziue should bo capable of being easily and quickly refilled at any moment. 12. Its mechanism should not be liable to be rendered useless by fouling, dust, sand, or rust. 13. Its weight should not be much greater than that of the rifle at present in use. 14. Its magazine should contain at least ten cartridges, and as many more as convenient. The above conditions are completely fulfilled by using a rifle with a bolt breech-action and detachable hopper magazine. By such means the simplicity and weight of the rifle are not altered, while the increase of weight carried on the soldier is insignificant. In Chapter YII., p. 97, it was pointed out that the modern rifle must not be looked on as a Aveapon for indiscriminate rapid fire, but as a rapid-loading arm wliich allows a man to be always ready with it when a favourable moment comes. The principle on which magazine rifles depend is to suppres.s the movements of carrying the liand from the rifle to the pouch, taking a cartridge from the latter, moving the hand back to the rifle, and placing the cartridge in the breech. But the time of these movements however, is not very long, and as the magazines of tlie magazine rifles at present before the public cannot hold more than 10 rounds, the gain is not very great, and only exists while any cartridges remain in the magazine. Numerous experiments have shown thit the c. ntiuuous fire 502 of magazine rifles is only more rapid than that of ordinary breech-loaders while any cartridges remain in the magazine, and that there is no general gain in rapidity of fire in filling it again as soon as empty. This fact is not snliiciently realized in England, because a distinguished cavalry officer stated, only in July, 1884, that "the magazine rifle will probably be the most dangerous arm you can place in the hands of infantry. If you can enable the infantry soldier to discharge forty bullets in a minute, it will be impossible to supply him with ammunition " "With the magazine rifles at present in use, it is impossible for a soldier to fire more than half this rpiantitj'' in the first minute, after which ca continuous fire cannot be more rapid than at present with the ordinary breech-loader. Besides, the above quotation presupposes no fii'e-discipline or control over the men, even at ranges where anununition can be supplied. But when we come to consider an intermittent fire in which, during the successive periods of fire, the magazine is xised and is re-filled during the pauses, then undoubtedly, the expenditure of ammunition is much greater for magazine rifles than for ordinary breech-loaders. Consecpiently, magazine rifles do (»ntail a greater expendi- ture of ammunition when the fire continues for some time, than ordinar}' l)reecli-loaders. Therefore, Ave must trust to prevent an}- waste by a greater fire discipline on the part of tli<' men ; l)ut any very great increase of expenditure, ivith fhe rifles at present hi use, is not over likely to be tho case, for two other reasons — the recoil and the fatigue caused by such a fire. The recoil qui'stion is a very serious one. The energy of the recoil of the Martini-Henr}- is very excessive, it being 16-G ft. lbs., or 3-5 ft. lbs. gi-eater than that of the French rifle, and 5'o ft. lbs. greater than that of tlie German and Eussinn rifles. For practical use in the field, when often 150 rounds will have to 1)0 fired by eacli man, the energy of recoil shfndd not excec'd a maximum limit of 13'0 ft. lbs.* • Even this limit may bo two high, because in the war of 1870-71, •luring the optmlions of the III. German Division round Drou.x, on nevural occasions wlicn tlie Fn^ndi hiid bo(?n driven out of the woods that thoy held, many ChaHsojH'it rillcH (Uio recoil of wliich i,s about the same as tlie jiresont (Jras rifle used by tlie l'"nn(h), were fwimd fastcniHl by (heir plingrt to tho (roes (o neutrali/e the effect of the recoil, and in the liurnrjd n^lrcat they wi're left behind for want of lime to unfasten them. According ti) the war correspondent to tlu; J/aiir/ici/rr (limrdiaii, on ono o(('aHion, over 900 rillcM wen; taplurcd in ii wood in this manner by ono rru-ssinn company. 503 An efficacious aimed rapid fire simply could not be kept up •with the Martini-Henrj- rifle from the violem^e of its recoil. The fatigue, also, of a loug coutinued, rapid fire, is very great, esjiecially if the recoil is severe. The right shoulder hecomos fatigued by the recoil, the muscles of the ai'ins and shoulders (especially the left one) become agitated by a nervous trembling, the rapidity quicldy diminishes, in spite of the muscular efforts of the firer, and the fire loses all its accuracy. Experience shows that a continuous rapid fire of any accuracy can only bo kept up for about two minutes (see p. 101). As regards the smaH-bore rifles of the future (about 0-3 inch bore) the questions as to the increased supply of amnnmition required for magazine rifles and the effect ( f recoil, are practically solved. The recoil with those rifles is said to be very small, and as regards the quantity cf ammunition, the latest English regulations on the supply of ammunition, state that with the small-bore bullet twice the number of rounds can be carried for the same weight as are now carried. We have seen that those Continental armies which use the bolt breech-action can easily and efficaciously change their rifles into magazine weapons by the addition of a hopjjer magazine. This cannot be done, so far as we know as yet, with the Martini-Henry rifle, and so with this rifle all we can do is to try and shorten the time of procuring a cartridge. This may be done in two ways (1), by facilitating the entry of the hand into the pouch, and (2) by the use of qviick- loaders (see p. 497). The pouch requires modification for this purpose. It is covered with a flap, which falls down each time, without, however, preventing the cartridges falling out in rapid movements. The pouches hold too few cartridges, and those which are in them are hard to get at. AVhen we possess a solid-drawn cartridge, a large pouch or bag might be tried, wider at the bottom than at the mouth, pHable enough to adapt itself to the body^ and capable of being rapidly opened and closed. When opened, the mouth shoidd remain so, and be large enough to admit the hand freely with a packet of cartridges held in it. A strip of leather fastened round the inside of the mouth of the bag, and sewn only along its upper edge to the latter, will prevent the cartridges falling out while the men are doubling, &c. A quick-loader is only a kind of pouch, which can be attached to the barrel, near the breech, and from which the cartridges 504 protrude, so that tliey can Le rapidly seized and witlidra-vni. These quick -loaders have given very good results, nearly as good as those of magazine rifles, and they have the great advantage of being cheaper, of being cajiable of being rapidly changed, and of allowing the leaders to see if the men are using them, and, if so, Iiotv many rounds they have left in them at any given moment, while they do not interfere with the use of the bayonet. These (piick-loaders can be well used with the Martini-Henry ritle, and they have been adopted by the Eussians in preference to a removable magazine, probably on the score of Jbonomy, as they have only lately re-armed their infantry with the ISerdau ritie. The necessity for using magazine rifles or quick-loaders in the future, will be best seen by considering the tactical use to which they will be put, and, although we shall only refer to magazine rifles, yet the following remarks apply equally ■well to the use of quick-loaders. The tactical use of magazine rifles laid down by Englisli writers, is not at all in accordance with Continental ideas. In England, it is considered that they should be used at short ranges only. We constantly see, in English writings, that magazine rifles arc adapted for close quarters, for the defence of woods, villages, bridges, defiles, })arricades, ditches of fortifications, &c., and that they should form the armament of such special troops as woidd only be engaged at close quarters, such as cavalry, engineers, seamen, &(\ On the Continent, on the other hand, the universal opinion is that magazine rifles slundd lie usi'd at all ranges, // the objectives fired at are suitable to the raiujc. TIk^ tactical iise of magazine rifles abroad is entirely based on what has been said in Chapters XII., XIV., and XV. It has l)een frc^piently stated, that the moral effect caused by an efflcacious fire is greater, as tlie time in which the losses are effected is less, that is according to the suddenness and rapidity with which they are inflicted. The objectives usually fired at in war, are very variable and mobile, and are often only s(>en at intervals, and it is in order to pour a rapid (ire on tliese short appearances, tliat a magaziiu* rifle is recpiired to inflict the greatt!st loss possible in tin; shortest time. " Magazine rifles lia\c tin' uinldu lit cd advantage of allowing at any given iiistanf, and especially, at the decisive moment of the light, the enemy to be overwhelmed with a mass ol" projectilea." 505 If fire is to be opened on any given objective at any range, then -while the fire lasts its useful effect should be as great as possible, and in Chapter YII. wo saw that rapidity of fire increases this useful effect, and it is only by the use of maga- zine rifles that the greatest possible mass of lead can be directed on an enemy at any given moment. The greater the useful effect, the greater will be the moral effect on the enemy, and hence the power of being al)le to inflict sudden losses on an enemy will go far towards attaining victory. "Now-a-days, from the moment when his masses arrive on the field of battle, we try to prevent the enemy coming to within the short distances. Hence all the power of the fire of the troops ought to be utilised as early as possible, in order to take away as soon as possible from the enemy the vigour that it is necessary for him to possess for the close fight." We can only obtain decisive results by the c^uantity, as to time and place, as well as by the quality, of the fire. There- fore, we must try and obtain both. Quality of fire can only be obtained by training in peace time, and cpmntity of fire, as to time and place, by means of magazine rifles. We have already pointed out, on p. 348, the necessity of the fire ha\4ng pauses in it, for purposes of control, and in order to give it an offensive aspect. The necessity for this manner of conducting the fire is increased for the tactical use of the magazine rifle. By making the men re-fill their maga- zines when empty, the necessaiy pauses are easily obtained, and the increased rapidity of the fire while it lasts, must give the fire a very terrible character. Althougli the magazines may be full, they shoidd only be brought into play against objectives suitable to the range ; they would not, on the other hand, be used when men are allowed to fire while advancing. Thus, with magazine rifles, the power of the fire is increased during the successive periods of intermittent fire, and, if too great a rapidity of fire is avoided, the gain in rapidit}- does not cause any loss in accuracy. The quality of the rifles used in a collective fire can only be appreciated by the numerical expression of the effect of its fire over the whole depth of the ground grazed by the cone of dispersion. This effect can be shewn, either by graphical curves, or by the number of hits made on a series of equi-distant targets. AVhen men are tired and fatigued, the greater the number of rounds they can fire imder the same conditions, the better and more continuous will be the numerical expressions representing their dangerous zones, and the theoretical destructive effects 506 of the fire of two different rifles will he proportionate to tlieir rapidit}' of fire, and for this reason — for a fire lasting one to two minutes, magazine rifles will have a great superiority. From the smoke which ixsually covers the opposing sides, aim can only be taken at the line of intersection between the smoke and the ground. "In thesi' conditions, it is no longer a question of aimed or regulated fire, but the destructive effect of the fire will depend on the <|uantity of bullets tired during each halt ; a magazine rifle will then have the superiority, which will be all the more marked if the calibre adopted permits the soldier to carry, without increasing his load, one-fourth more of ammunition, which he will be able to expend during this phase of the attack." With magazine rifles, the fire should essentially be earned out by means of volleys, and not l)y independent firing, to prevent the magazines being too rapidly emptied, but the fire should be made to increase gradually in rapidity as the range decreases, and as the efficacy of the fire, consequently, becomes more certain. The following extract from a lecture on " Magazine Eifles," by Colonel Fosbery, V.C., shows the great value of volleys "with magazine weapons at even short ranges : — " I remember hearing a Confi'derate ofiicer relate liis first experience (in the American Civil AVar) of the Spencer magazine rifle, and though the name of the place has, I am Borry to say, escaped my memory, the othin- dt'tails have not. "He stated that the Federals liad occupied and stockaded a strong position on the top of a hill, conuuanding, if I recollect right, the passage of one of tlieir great rivers, a position from wliich it was necessary they shoidd bo expelled if possible at once. "A strong storming part}' was accordingly formed, and assemT)led at niglitfall in a woody l)ottom at tlie foot of the hill. "When tlic moon rose, they commenced silfutly to ascend, until at last lh(y saw just above tlicm tlic long black parapet against tlw sky-line apparently Avithout a defend(M". "On some sound being made, liowever, the alarm was given, and in an instant the parapet was liiuul with heads, and a volley ])oure(l into the assailants at close quarters, which was almost instantly i'oll()W<'d by a second. This was a war of surprises, and coming to thn conclusion that their enemies had double Itarrels and must now re-load, the stormers cheered and rushed at the work ; luit they luul reckoninl without the yponcer. Five more volleys followed the fii'at two without a 507 second's intermission, and the broken remains of the party took refuge in the bottom to attempt that post no more. " On another occasion a Federal brigade, which had already suffered severely in action, and was reduced to a fraction of its original numbers, came in sight of a vastly superior body of the enemy, which instantly made preparations to attack, and moved down on them full of confidence, as my informant said, drums beating and colours flying. "For a moment everyone thought that all was lost. The officer in command, however, understood his business and knew his weapons. He ordered the magazines to be filled, the men to take such cover as they could hnd and wait for the Avord of command. Nearer and nearer came the enemy, and still the thin line waited in dead silence. AVhen, however, they got within a hundred paces, the order came out sharp and clear, and volley after volley from the repeaters mowed them down in an instant. The ranks fell one over the other in heaps, and the survivors, panic-struck at this sudden and unexampled slaughter, turned and fled, leaving the spoils of war to the enemy they had too soon despised." For savage fighting, where the enemy rushes on in thick masses to the attack, the fire of magazine rifles at short ranges would be invaluable. With regard to the more detailed use of the magazines in action, among the supply of ammunition carried in the valise should be two filled hopper magazines (or cj^uick-loaders for the Martini-Henry rifie), each of which should hold at least 10 rounds. These would be taken from the valise before entrj' into action, and one attached to the rifle and the other to the waist- belt. The one attached to the rifle would be re-filled again and again as it was emptied, so as to steady the men and to cause pauses in the fire. Just before the assault the leaders would try and preserve both magazines full, so as to get a rapid fire of 20 rounds at least, just at the moment of the assault, by rapidly changing the magazines, throwing the empty ones on the gi'ound, which can be collected again afterwards. Men cannot stand much more than 20 rounds of such rapid firing. Naturally during an attack, many hopper magazines would be lost or injured by the enemy's fire, and to make uj) these deficiencies an extra supply of filled hoppers shoidd be carried in the field in the ammunition supplies. Having shown the necessity for magazine rifles as an armament for infantry, we may well wonder why they have not been adopted before or more generally introduced than 508 tliey liave been. Till quite lately, before the introduction of the hopper magazines, the adoption of magazine rifles entailed a complete re-armament, and consequently avast outlay of money which no nation cared to face. Besides which, the earlier magazine rifles, "only partially fulfilled the reqiiirements, from a practical point of view, of such weapons. Their loading was a cliflicult operation ; their different parts were complicated ; and they were not sufficiently soHd. i)ust, sand, and rust coidd easily, at a critical moment, prevent the working of the mechanism, and as there was considerable ditficulty in taking them to pieces, cleaning, and putting them together again, a considerable time elapsed before the weapon was ready to fire again. Further, it was necessary to make use of very small cartridges to place a sufficient number in the magazine ; consequently the weight of the powder charge was so small, with regard to that of the bullet, that the muzzle velocity was low and the accuracy poor. On the other hand, the position of the centre of gravity being changed with each shot fired, the firer was put out and tired batUy. Lastly, these magazine rifles only allowed of a rapid fire when used as such ; if used as ordinary breech-loaders, they could only be fired very slowly." Thus till lately tlie faidt of magazine arms has been their complicated and delicate mechanism and their higli trajectory, from their light ammunition (caused by a light bullet and small charge), whicii did not give a sufficient velocity and sectional density to counteract the eifect of the resistance of the air on the light bullets. These faults do not now ludd good as arguments against the introduction of magazine rifles, because })y means of hopper magazines, existing rifles (exc-ept the Martini-Henry rifle) and ammunition can be readily made use of. But <,'ven with the old wi^apons good results luive been obtained, as we have already sliown, and the Comte d(! I'aris, who took part in the American Civil War, stated with regard to the ISpencer magazine carbine: — "It is an excellent weapon, the use of wliicli spread more and more in tin* Federal army. Extra- ordinary examples of defence, duo to the rai)idity of fire of this wea]»(»n, can })e quoted, and tlio Federal infantry regi- ments Avlio triery good." lint even in spite of tliis tlK'V did not find advocates until tlu' solid - drawn metal cartridge case was invented. One other groat point must not bo overlooked in making magazint! rifles the future nrnmmont of infantry, viz., the moral tjtrength it will give to the sid • using them. 509 General Brialmont writes: — "It is incontestable, however, tliat the magazine rifle augments the confidence of the soldier at the decisive moment which precedes the assault, and that tins effect ought not to be disdained in war, where moral plays so great a rdle.'''' A writta- in the German military paj)er, the Militar Zeifung, of the 17th February, 1883, states: — "The infantry which is first armed with a magazine rifle, cmd whose instruction has been directed aceordinrj to the rules required for the good employ - inent of this arm,'-'' will be certain to possess, when opposed to an enemy, a sentiment of marked superiority, not only on the battle-field, but also in all the enterprises of minor warfare." It is thus very certain that a magazine rifle will assure to any infantry which is armed with it, such a moral superiority, that as soon as any one great Power will have adopted it, all the others will be forced to follow its example ; f and we have seen that a magazine rifle will give materially, as Avell, a tactical superiority to the troops Avho make use of it against an enemy armed with the ordinai-y breech-loader. Hence everything points to the necessity of arming all troops with magazine rifles or carbines as the case may be. If we only deal Avith the fire of magazine rifles at short ranges, we may well doubt the advantage of any change of armament. What is expected from a rapid fire is to destroy the moral of the enemy by sudden losses caused by an intense fusilade, and to break his strength and demoralise him by the losses which this fusilade will produce. No doubt the whistle of passing bidlets profoundly impresses men, but there is a limit to this. Whether a firing line receives 1,.500 or 2,000 bullets a minute, the impression at the moment will bo the same, especially as the men in the firing line are firing as well, and the noise that they make is so great that any superiority in the enemy's fire would not be noticed. This is particularly the case at the closest ranges. The losses suffered is the real factor which will destroy both the moral and strength of either side. But the men firing are being fired on, which, at short ranges, destroys the accuracy of their fire. It has frequently been noticed in wax * These rules arc strictly in accordance with the princii^les laid down in Chapter XV. t Germany has adopted it, and France, England, Italy, and Austria arc now doinu- the same. 510 that losses decrease as tlie ranges diminisli, and it must never be forgotten that want of efficacy of the fire of one side increases the moral of the opponent. Short-range fire also is one of great rapidit}', but rapidity of fire, beyond a certain point, does not necessaril}'' increase the losses of the enemy. In the experiments made in France on magazine arms it was found that, for the same time of firing, the effect produced was in inverse ratio to the number of bullets fired. A fire of 8 to 1 shots a minute always gave a ver}'- superior useful effect to that whit'h expended 16 to 18 cartridges in the same time. Tlius great rapidity of fire loses in one respect more tlian it gains in another. Thus as far as short-range fire is concerned, the opponents to magazine weapons may have some grounds to figlit on, but we must always remember that the demoralisation of the enemy is not the work of a few seconds, and hence it will not be gained b}' a short intense fire at short ranges, especially if the previous losses have been few. The fuemy must be de/iiorah'sed before the nhort rangea for rapid fire are reached, and to do this most eftectually we have sought to show, that magazine rifles must be ;ised at all ranges at which fire is to be opened, especialh' as by the time the shortest ranges are reached, the magazine may be empty and there may not bo time to re-fill them. The German oificial regulations on the use of the now magazine rifle, says : — " The magazine^ gives to the soldier a continual reserve of ammunition, by means of which he can, at any instant, be ready to firo. This reserve will always bo assured, if a discreet and judicious use is made of it, and if advantage is taken of all occasions to refill it. The soldier ought never to forget tliat his new riile increases the necessity for an absolute discipline of the fire, and that it is intended to produce, not only a supc^rticial acc(^leration in the fire, but also a superior eilicacy of fire." To ensure this, a pcaco ediuation and training is absolutely essential. A French writer in tlio lierue 31 Hit aire de VEtravger, for 15th March, 1887, after an exhaustive article on the new German magazine riile, and after examining Gennan official and private oi)inion8 as to its use, thus coiu'ludes : — " It is necessary, therefore, to conclude that tlie new armament will not lead to any tactical revolution. Its eiiij)Ioii)iic)it will increase the necfx/iitt/ of a strict disci j)li)ir in tlie fire \ it will e(]ually forco both the assailant and tlie defender to presei-V(\ more; carefully tliau in the past, their resen'cs for tlie decisive instant. But, 511 after all, tlie procedure for supplying the front {i.e., shooting line), for bringing up the reserves in mass and under cover, in order to assure superiority of numbers at the desired place and moment — all these tactical methods, which the invention of the breech-loading rifle had profoundly modified, and even renewed — will remain the same to-day, as in the past, without being any way affected by the adoption of the magazine rifle . . . Its adoption is only a progress of a secondary order which has the characteristics of a transitory' measure, perhaps in paving the way for a small-bore rifle, the study of which is only a question of time, and which the necessity for an increase in the number of cartridges will impose." How true these latter words are can be seen by the proceedings and recommendations of the English Magazine Rifle Committee. A German writer in the 2£ilitdr Wochcnhlatt says : — "If the new rifle has any advantages, it offers no essential property which modifies the principles of employing rapid-firing breech- loading rifles." Note. — Tlie reader is advised to consult the article on " La question dii f/tsil de ffucrrr,'' which appeared in the Eeruc MiUtuire dc VEtrangcr for 30th May, 1887 (No. 671) for the latest ideas on magazine rifles. This article reached the author's hands too late to he emhodicd in this Avork. 512 Note. — (See p. 468). — One of the great faults of the English system of musketry training is the shortness of the coui-se. ykill in shooting requires constant practice, as it is an art easily forgotten. Our men only get a few- days' shooting in the year. This is radically \\Tong, and in these few days they are hurried through a complex course of different kinds of tiring, and are expected to be perfect in each kind after one trial only! A\'Tiat a contrast to the German system I Where om- men get but a few days' ti-aining, covering a complete course, in Germany three months is considered none too long merely to lay a firm basis only of the recruit's instruction — a basis that can be built upon later. As regards target practice, the German idea is to teach a recruit to shoot well at short distances, and in his first year he is only allowed to slioot at ranges of 100, loO, and 200 metres. In England, on tlu; other hand, the object seems to be to imsh on the recruit to long-range firing as speedily as possible, for on the eighth day he is made to fire at 500 yards, a distance which the German recruit is not allowed to attempt before his second years' service. The number of points (95) required to pass a recruit into the second class is too low, and might be obtained with forty misses out of eighty shots without getting any bull's eyes. The attempt to teach aiming-drill up to GOO yards in two days, and to judge distances up to 800 yards in six days can hardly be expected to yield satisfactory results. In Germany the military authorities are satisfied if the recruit can judge distances up to 200 metres within 50 metres in twelve weeks. Thejirst object of infiuttrn is to hit, the second is to hit, i/iid the third is to hit. This can only be ensured by a constant and prolongixl training both in target practice and in tire discipline, and not by a few days firing only. .5 1 ;) APPENDIX I. THE EFFECT OF ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS ON THE FIRE OF RIFLES. A bullet must displace tlie particles of the atmosphere ♦luring its passage through it. Consequentlj^ the trajectory of a bullet is affected by variatious in the density or weight of the atmosphere. These variations are caused by changes in the temperature, in the amount of moisture, in the local pressure of the atmosphere, and in the altitude above sea level. Any variation in the density of the atmosphere must affect the amount of retardation experienced by the bidlet. The longer the range and the lower the velocity the greater this effect will be, while at very short ranges and with high velocities the effect is scarcely noticeable. Certainly, in war a barometer and thermometer cannot always be considted, but it is none the less desirable that officers should realise what effect atmospheric conditions may have on the flight of bidlets, especially so as it will be found that variations of temperature have the greatest effect, particularly when such variations are so large that tliey are easily appreciated by their effect on the senses. The less the density of the aii-, the less is the amount of retaixlation, the quicki'r will the bullet reach its destination, and the greater will be the range for a given elevation, or in other words, for a given range the less will be the elevation. We will consider the subject under the following lieadings : 1. Barometric pressure and altitude above mean sea level. 2. Temperature and atmospheric moisture. 3. Wind. 4. Condition of the powder charge. Kk 514 1. Bakometkic Peessuhe a^t) Altitude. The mereurj' column of a barometer is kept xip by tho atmospheric pressure. The higher yre go above the sea level the less air ■we have above us, aud the less is the pressure, and consequently the less is the densit}- of the air, supj^osing for the moment that tlie temperature remains constant. From the following formula3 we can obtain very nearly the normal barometric pressure corresponding to a given altitude above sea level, and n'ce versa, for a mean temperature of 50"' F., between the temperatures at sea level and at the observer. JFor an ordinary barometer we have the mean rise in feet per inch fall of barometer at an altitude of A feet. = 909-2 + 0-0166 A. + -0000001 A- = Jf suppose. Then normal corrected height of barometer at altitude A feet. A — 30 M If the sum of the temperatures at tho sea level and the observer is greater than 100^ F., decrease the given altitude l>y loVo pfii't for every degree above 100° F. ; if it is below 100" F., increase tlie given altitude by tlie same proportion for ever}' degree below 100° F. before using it in the calcidations. The mean rise in feet per inch fall of barometer at corrected noiTual barometer reading B indies. = 909-0 + 14-5 (30 — B) + i (30 — B)-. = iV^ suppose. Then altitude A corresi>onding to normal barometer pressure B inches = N (30 — B). If tho sum of tho temperatures at sea level and at tho observer is greater than 100°F. increase the altitude found by i-Mro part for every degree F. nbove 100^ F.; if it is below 100° F. decrease tho altitude found ])y same proportion for every degi-cc F. below 100° F. 2. TEMrEn.\TruE Axn Atmospheric Moisture. A decrease in tho temperature of tho air makes tlio air denser and vice rirsa. Cunsetiuently, the natural decrease of temperature wliicli takes place as we rise in altitude tends to neutralise tho diminution in the density of tho air duo to this altitude. Afjueous vapour or moisture reduces the density of tho air. 515 Its amount, called the humidity, depends on the temperature. When dew is deposited, the air is said to be saturated, or to contain 100° of humidity. But the extreme variations in the density of the air, caused by the variations of the moisture in it, are so small compared to those produced by changes of temperature, that, for military purposes, no great error will result if the air is considered as being jiu^ saturated. Eemarks. "Wo "wiU now consider the combined effects of altitude, barometical pressure, temperature, and moisture. The reduction of atmospheric pressure (as measured by a fall in the barometer) has a very similar influence upon the motion of the bullet to that which would bo produced under ordinary atmospheric conditions if an addition were made to the weight of the bullet without enlarging its sectional area or lessoning its muzzle velocity. Professor Bashforth's Tables are calculated on the supposition that the air is dry, and weighs* 534-22 grains per cubic foot at a temperature of 62° F., and with a barometic pressure of 30 inches. If the rise and fall of the barometer is only considered, the sectional den- sity need only be multiplied by 30 height of barometer in inches, and the rest of the calculations worked out as before. If the temperature and moisture are also to be taken into account, then it is necessary to ascertain the weight of a cubic foot of the air in which the bidlet is fired, by means of meteorological tables, such as Glaisher's. In this case the sectional density must be midtiplied by the factor 534-22 ■weight of cubic foot of air in grains, instead of the factor given above. If strict accuracy is not required, a close approximation to the weight of air may be obtained by means of the following table, given by Lieut. Zalinski, of the United States Ai-my. The barometer is supposed to be at 30 inches, and moistiu-e at 66 jids per cent, of saturation {i.e., the aii" is jias saturated). * Relative densities are represented by relative weights. Kk2 516 Tempei-ature. Weight of a cubii' foot of Air. Mean change of •weight for each one-tenth inch fall or rise in barometer. Mean change of ■weight for 1" F. rise or fall in temperatui'e. Mean decrease of -weight with humidity at saturation. Fahr. Grains. Grains. Grain. Grains. — 30° 647 — — — — 20° 633 21 1-4 — — 10° 619 2-1 1-4 0-10 0^ 60.5 2-0 1-4 0-20 10° 592 2-0 1-3 0-35 20° 579 1-9 1-3 0-53 30° 507 1-9 1-2 0-76 40° 555 1« 1-2 103 50- 544 1-8 1-2 1-42 60° 532 1-8 1-2 1-96 70° 521 1-7 1-2 2-6(; 80° 509 1-7 1-2 3-60 90° 497 1-7 1-2 4-83 100° 485 1-6 1-2 6-5() 110° 473 1-0 1-2 8-32 From tliis tal)l(' tlircc tliiiijj:s jirc ;ip|iari'iit : — (1) Tliat an nveragT' tliaii}i;'o of 15-0" F. of tcniperaturo is equivalent to a (;hanf^o of 1 incli in tlie bciglit of tlic barometer ; (2) that tlie usual small changes in tlu? height of the barometer at any given spot «»n the (garth's surface alTect the density of tlie air HO slightly that they niay be neglected; and (.'») thattlio efTect of temperatui-e, -wliich often clianges several degrees during tho day and during different seasons, may frequently be too great to be negh'cted. Altliough 15 is tlie average number of degi-ees F. that have tlie same effect on tlie density of th(! air as 1 inch of the barometer pressure, yet the real number of degreea is very nearly expressed by the following formula. 517 Number of degrees F. equivalent to 1 inch of the barometer, at temperature T^. F. 1 = 15 + — (.50-T) 30 The method already stated of ascertaining' tlio effect of of atmospheric conditions by means of Bashforth's Tables is not applicable for ordinary purj)oses. The following fonnulse are well adapted for this purpose, and give results within ihe errors that exist between single cartridges. Ejfeds of (lir itresmre as measured hy the haromdcr. From tables given in Walsh's Tlic Ilodeni Sportsman'' s Gnu and Rife, in the American musketry regulations, and other works, the following formula has been deduced. Let E = range in yards. B = normal barometer reading in inches, b = local ,, ,, ,, at moment of firing. Then B — b = local variation of barometer pressure. The normal increase of range due to normal pressure B l-5(30— B)E E = = X 15 (30— B) 100 1000 The increase of range at moment of firing due to local pressure b 1-5(30— b)E E X 15 (30— b) 100 1000 Hence the increase of range in yards due to a change of f B — b) inches of the barometer E = X 15 B— b) 1000 or increase of range due to change of 1 inch in the barometer 15 E 1 000 In the above formulae, n phis result means an increase of range, and a tninus result a decrease. As (B — b) rarely exceeds -Jth* of an inch, t/ie alteration ef range, due to local variations of the barometer, is so small that it can be neglected in the f eld, and hence it will generally be sicfficient to take onlji the normal height of the barometer at the locality of fring, which depends principally on the altitude above sea level. 518 Effect of Altitude. On p. ol-i we find the formula for calculating approximately the number of feet rise in altitude equivalent to a fall of one inch of the barometer. Hence, if A be the altitude in feet above the sea level, and M be the equivalent number of feet to 1 inch of the barometer, then the increase of range due to A feet of altitude. 15 A E A E X = — X- M 1000 p. 1000 M Where p = — r= CO-G + -0011 A. 15 From the foregoing we see that when the sights of a rifle are graduated for use at the sea level, any considerable rise above the sea level causes the engraved elevations to be too great for the ranges marked agaiast them. This is an important fact, often overlooked ; for example, in Afghanistan and South Africa, our troops were employed at elevations over 3,000 feet above the sea level, which caused a considerable increase in the range engraved for each elevation (see example p. 523). Effect of TEMrEUATUiiE. The temperature decreases about 1° F. for every 300 feet of altitude, and on p. 517 the formula has been given for ascertaining the number of degrees F. which have the same effect on the fliglit of a bullet as a rise or fall of one inch of the barometer. From this we find that it varies from IG degrees F. at temperature 32° F. to 13-4 degrees F. at tem- j)erature 100*^ F., the mean Itciiig 11-7 degrees, or 15 degrees nearly. Hence, 15 degrees F. ca\iso an alteration of range equal to 15R 1000 or the alteration of rang(> due to a change of one degi'ce F in the temperature is e(j^ual to li 1000. CoDScquently, if T be the temperature F. for >v]uth tlie 519 rifle is sighted, and t be the temperature F. at the momcut of firing, then alteration of range due to (t — T) degrees F. K = (t— T). 1000. A j^lus result means an increase of range, and a minus result a decrease. T and t can be taken as any two temperatures, if the difference of effects of these two temperatures is required. The temperature of the air often varies very considerably during a single day, and still more so between the different seasons of the year. The annual variation may extend from 0'^ F. to 110^ F., or through a range of 110 degrees, which must have a very marked effect on the proper elevation to be used for the same range at different seasons of the year. 3. "WixD. Ill considtn-ing the action of the wind upon the flight of a projectile, "we have to determine the probable effect not only upon elevations, but upon deflections. To do this we must tiHHHiiie that ihe icind remains tuiiform in force, for with a variable wind wo cannot make any calculations. The forci* or pressiu-e exerted by a wind is in a direct ccmnection with its velocity, and consec[uently the force of wind is designated b}' its velocity in miles per hour or feet per second. The connection beween the velocity and pressure of Avind is shewn in the following table : — T.A.BILE II.' ■_, . ■ Velocity. a Velocity. 3^ gl» §1=5 7'3 o O Feet per ||.s Description. a o Feet per 2 o-° IP Description. "A sec. 1" 1"^ sec. r 1 1 1-17 0-00.5 Hardly per- 20 29-30 1-968 Fresh breeze ceptible 2.5 36-G7 3-075 Stormy ,, 2 2-93 0-020 30 44-01 4-429 Sloderate gale ■^ 4-40 0.04.3 Just percep- tible 40 o8-C8 7-873 Fresh ,, 50 73-35 12-300 Strong ,, ■1 .'V.S7 0-080 Light air 60 88-02 17-715 Heavy , , .} 7-33 123 Light breeze 80 117-36 31-490 Storm 10 14-CG 0-492 Gentle ,, 100 146.66 49-200 Hun-icane 15 22 -00 1-107 Moderate ., * Pressure in lb per square foot is equal to the velocity in miles per liour squared, divided by 200. 520 As tlie direction of the wind varies, marked changes occur in its relative effects in "botli the range and the deflection of the projectih'. To arrive at any satisfactory conchisiou, it is necessary to resolve the wind force into two component forces, one acting in the direction or plane of the fire, and the other at right angles to it. AVe can then make the necessary- allowances as if each of these two forces acted independently. The component of the wind force acting in the plane of fire is called accelerating if the wind is from the rear, as it increases the range for a given elevation ; and it is called retarding if the wind is from the front, as it decreases the range. This component acting at right angles to the jilane of fire is called derialing or defecting^ and makes the bullets go to the right or left as the wind is from the left or right respectively of the plane of fire. The direction of the /rind can Le obtained by observing its effects on the smoke, on trees and grass, on flags, or upon any exposed portion of the body (as the face). The force of the irind is usually designated in miles per hour, and can be obtained accurately from an instrument called an anemometer. But it can be appro.ximately judged by observing the manner in whicli boughs of trees, and flags are affected ; also by the sensations produced upon the face and other portions of the body. If such estimates are compared with anemometer readings, they will be made willi very fair accuracy. Now suppose the direction of the wind to be denotere, remem- bering that ajj/ns answer means an increase in range, and a iiiinm means a decrease. In the field, a pocket aneroid, with an aitaclied thermometer, would give all the data necessar}' for an approximate calcula- tion for the alteration of range to be cxi)ected in different localities, when using the engraved elevations on the back- .sijrlit. The foUowing reniarks were made by *lie Field newspaper ot' the 3rd iSfarch. 188S, on the alxne j)aper, extracts of which was sent to the editor : — We have received from Caiitain Mayue, K.lv, tlie above malhiniatiial linjier, Iht; fornwiho ol whieh seems admiralily adapted for faeilitatinj^ the estimation of the chanpe in lenj^th of the range of jjrojeetile tliat results from alterations in the condition of the atniosiihere. Th<> process a]>pears to he based on the jirineiple that tlie atinosiiherie resistance to the pa.ssjipc by this 5 in. fall, and we have 7o as the number of yards increase on a range of 1,000 yards; or, in like proportion, 7'o j'ards on 100, 30 yards on 400, and so on. Again, supposing the temperature to l)e liigh and the barometer low, then a fuiiher reduction in atmospheric resistance occvus, a difference of 15° Fahr., being equivalent to an inch on the barometer. In the absence of direct knowledge of the temperature when the lifle was sighted, 60° may be assumed as being about the English average ; and consequently, when the thennometer marks 90° there would be a difference of 30° to allow for, which would be equivalent to 2 in. barometric fall. But it is needless to convert it in this way, as the number of degi-ees of difference maj' be added direct to the previous total. Thus taking 75 yards to be the increase on 1,000 yards range, as in the previous example, the addition of 30 for increase of temperatm-e would raise the number to 105 yards. Where no barometer is at hand, but the altitude is approximately known, 1,000 feet elevation may be assumed as equivalent to an inch barometric fall ; so that at an height of 5,000 feet the 5 would serve as examples. At greater elevation than 5,000 feet the result woidd be slightly over- estimated, but not very materially. Next, as to the effect of the wind, its velocity may be multiplied by 15, and di\'ided by six. Thus, suppose a 6 o'clock wind of 10 miles an hour. This 10 maybe taken as the multiplier of the 15, and on being divided by 6 would give 25 as the result. The combined effect of low barometric, high temperature, and favourable breeze would then be shewn as follows : — __ Increase in 1000 yards. 5 in. fall of barometer (5 X 15) . . 75 yards 30" rise in temperature .. .. ..30 ,, 10 mile breeze (15 X 10 -f- Gj .. .. 25 ,, Total increase of range .. .. 130 yards If the temperature were down to just below freezing point, and the breeze were from " 12 o'clock," then both of these would have to be deducted instead of added, and the result would stand as an increase of only 20 yards instead of 130. The difference between -} and 1 is so small as scarcely to be worth reckoning, and it seems to us that fur all practical puiposes, XL, XII., I., and v., VI., YIL, maybe taken as equal, with 11. , IV., VIIL, X., as half values. In conclusion, we may say that so far as we have calculated them, the results obtained by me;ms of Captain IMayne's formuhc come very close indeed to those marked out by much more cumbrous jirocesses. They cannot be expected to be absolutely correct, because tlu; ratio of atmo- spheric resistance is not exactly the same with different velocities; but, after all, variations of a few feet in ranges of hundreds of yards cannot be considered of any practical importance. 526 Captain IMayne alludes in his paper to the slight effect of B — b on change of range, and shows that it may be dispensed -svith in the calculations from altitudes. A similar ground may, we think, be taken for dispensing with a calculation of the value of ^, the difference between yi: and -Vh— 10 lo being too small to have any material effect on change of range ; and so, instead of ;,, we have — — In a similar way with the wind influence IS 1,000. V R 15 V E instead of — v make it — ' — X — - and there is a uniformity 4 1,000 6 1,000. ^ throughout, in the use of this number 15, which seems to us to be an aid to memory, and would enable any one to mark out simple problems in the head, without having recourse to pencil and paper. The revised fonnula would thus be _K_ I (t_T) +JA^4- f ^^1 1,000 I ^ 1,000 — « ' as the alteration in range due to atmospheric conditions. AlTROXIMATE KlLES FOR CaI.CULATIXO THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF ATMOsriCEUIC PUESSVKE, TeMPEUATUUE, and "NViND ON THE IvANQB OF A Bullet. (1) Ecduco altitude of observer to corresponding temperature effect by dividing altitude by CO, and to this add any rise of temi)eratui-c above, or from it deduct any fall of temperature below the normal temperature for which the rifle is sighted (say 00° F). (2) To this apply + f — ' ' where V is tlio velocity of tlie wind in — 4 miles per hour ; -j- for a rear wind. (3) ]\Iultiply result by tlie range in yards, and divide by 1000. Tliis gives the increase or decrease of range for any given graduation of the backsight, according as the combined effect of (1) and (2) is + or — respectively. Note 1. — If thr local hammrtcv rcadlur/ at thr inslaiit of fr'uifj is given irintiriil of thr alti/inif, multiply (.'50 — barometer reading) by 15 to roduco it to corresponding temperature effect and then proceed as before. Note 2. — Another w;iy of finding the corresponding teinperaturo effect to the altitude is to luultiply tlie altitude 1)y 15, and divide by 1000. Also the coiTosponding temperature effect of the wind may bo p>it in the form of -f- f - -• Id this way wo get a play on tlic number 16, which may — G bo of assistance to the memory. ATPENDIX I rds, of the trajectories of the Mai ocity of 1,315 f.s., and when the Ther. is 1_ ng most closely to the " culminating poin Yards. . 650 700 750 800 850 100 02 200 0-7 300 1-3 400 1-9" 500 2-o; 600 3-2< 1 700 3-9 6-167 800 4-6i 18-89 13-93 7-805 900 5-4^ 32-42 28-76 23-92 17-48 9-632 1,000 6-2^ 46-60 44-28 40-80 35-80 29-39 1,100 7-U 61-86 60-64 58-59 55-11 50-23 1,200 8-o:i 77-50 78-11 77-59 75-71 72-46 1,300 9-04 94-12 90-34 97-38 97-21 95-63 1,400 10-08 111-9 115-7 118-5 120-0 120-3 1,500 1M& 130-3 136-0 140-5 144-0 14G-1 1,600 12-31 150-2 157-7 164-1 169-5 173-8 14 o ATTENDIX II. Tabic of the Heights, in Feet, above the line of sight, at every 50 yards, of the trajectories of the Martini -Heniy Rifle, at all ranges, for every 100 yards, from 100 to 1,600 yards. Ftirn PrcJLTtile with n blunt ogival heiid, a mui/Je velocity of 1,316 f.B., and when tho Thor. is at 62° F., Bar. 30 ins., and 1 cw>>. ft, of air wfighB 534-22 grains. NoTB. — Tlio Height approximating most closely to tho "culminating point " of each trajectory is printed in larger tj-pc .s a-2 Yabds. fi 60 I OO 150 200 260 300 350 400 460 600 5.50 0.0 650 700 760 800 860 900 950 1.000 1.050 1,100 1,160 ' 1,290 1 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 1,450 1,500 1,550 1,600 100 ^7 200 7473 1 0S9 8361 300 1 307 2 216 s 634 2 460 1 694 400 I 901 3 446 4 644 6 071 4 958 4121 2 135 600 2 630 4 743 6 666 7 830 s 613 8-484 7 476 1 670 600 3 208 6 151 8 760 81 12 37 13-20 13 26 12-61 U 06 8 192 4-782 700 3 915 7 60S 11 02 13 92 16 36 18-10 f 26 19-41 18 85 17 32 14-69 11 00 6 167 800 4 657 9 143 13 41 17 18 20 66 23-26 ?6 56 26-86 87 02 ■26 39 25-09 22 56 18 89 13 93 7 806 900 5 416 10 77 16 94 20 65 26 01 28-72 ¥ 25 34-16 35 ■2 36 43 36-10 34 86 32 42 28 76 23 92 17-48 632 1,000 e 272 12 48 18 39 24 28 29 09 34-46 SO 28 42-12 41 83 46 77 47-76 47 72 46 60 44 28 40 80 36-80 29 39 21-27 11 63 1,100 ; 144 14 29 21 39 28 09 34 61 40-60 ^c 68 50-62 64 44 57 66 50-99 01 31 61 86 60 64 68 69 65-11 50 23 43-71 35 68 25-71 13-96 1,200 8 072 16 21 24 39 32 18 39 88 46-95 6i4 59 60-47 64 71 69 26 73-05 76 80 77 50 78 11 77 69 73-71 72 46 67-66 01 34 63-14 43-20 31-11 16-36 1.300 9 042 ' 18 21 27 61 30 45 46 36 53-67 6k 82 68-82 75 37 81 39 86-66 90 03 94 12 34 9T 38 97-21 63 92-60 88 OS 81-74 73-67 63-62 50-80 36-54 19-01 1.400 10 08 20 34 30 82 98 51 19 60-82 '1' 58 78-75 86 76 94 30 lOI-l 100 9 111 9 7 118 5 120-0 120 3 110-2 116 5 112-1 106-1 98-06 87-66 75-41 60-19 43-42 23-40 16 22 57 34 29 45 71 67 31 68-31 8^ 76 89-16 98 66 107 7 116-2 123 7 130 3 136 140 6 144-0 146 1 146-9 140 3 144-0 140-1 134-2 126-0 116-1 103-2 88-82 71-26 60-46 27-20 31 24 97 38 00 50 79 63 84 76-33 90 55 100-2 111 ♦ 1-.2 ' 132-4 141 7 150 ^ 167 7 IG4 ' .69-5 173 ' 176-7 178 1 178-0 170-4 172-8 16,-1 169-0 149-4 137-4 '"'" 104-6 84-03 59-71 31-19 " # m c :, distances in mi'tres. 130 } 140 150 1 IGO 170 i 180 190 -IW 1 lilii 1 1 6 1 6 1 5 4 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 6 1 6 1 6 4 1 3 1 4 1 2 1 2 1 1 8 1 7 1 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 8 7 4 3 ! 1 1 2 2 2 1 j i 1 2 2 2 1 III 1 4 3 2 2 1 1 i 5 1 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 , i 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 i t < ' 1 1 - 1 i i • 1 i i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 _ ! ■■'. -' ! 1 1 1 3 1 • 1 1 2 1 r, 4 ! 3 4 , 4 1 3 4 1 3 1 Ji 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 ■ 1 1 1 ! - : 2 1 '1 ■ • 1 2 1 '^ 1 3 1 1 1 2 4 — \ 1 1 « 1 , - — 1 1 — I 1 1 1 1 1 _ 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 i A P P E X B I X III. SERIES 0-3TAIXED WITH ONE SIGHT AGAISST MEN STANDING. TLc men fiml lying down with thuir riflea supiiortcd on a rest. Targets 20 m&fres wido, 1-80 mttrcs high. ist ' I ■«- 1 "■ I » I '" I ^'T ' _ i _L cm: SEEIES OBTAINED WITH ONE SIGHT AGAINST MEN LYING DOWN. Targets 20 mitroB wide, « mjtto high. ,«,„ - — ". \ i \ _I_LJ_',.LJ_'__ -^—\ — 1^— 1 1 1 .,,_._. ;_'; c ,:, ;', . : :. ~ri — ii — n — - — rr n ;, ■. , ; i' ! 1 i 1 1 - 1 ' 1 i : ■ c Back sig-hts adjusted for 4(Kjjjnd SOO'mr J500and600m7 _6 UBTAI>'ED WITH TWO SIGHTS AGAINST A LI>rE STANDING e adjmtel for 600 and 600 m. ..U^.,^.^.^..^.^^,....^. '"isS. OT|!SO|!?0J!B0|.!m|3(>)|a!0|38O|330!m|a50|a80|»0|380|a»0|4w|«0|i!O|mj«0|l»J4mj«0|«jJ480[K<>|5l0|»I()|!™JM0|™ ±J^ jnuTF jFj IT 1^ ^^ p._no,.,«,. „l8,L»j.,i « 68 1 SO 18 32 11 1 IS 17 1 18 1 ].. thil.exMuaiwnt^h.l.. 1 1 1 1 -I^H-^IH^- - gM =F -''-'r' — ^ — i._i. 1 1 1 1 III! II 1 1 II ^ ^ '<■■■■■■' ■■ - '" '■ ■'" •■ -■■ -'!-■■ ,.713913812. HJ^I^ L- 900 1 810 ] B!0 j SSO 1 MO 1 SSO 860 1 870 1 880 1 S90 1 !(»|S10 1 890 j im 1 910 t i™ j «» 1 wo 1 1» 1 8» jlIOT|1010;i0»]l«»[lO10{lM^^ .,. 8 1 S 1 8 i ^ ± « 50150 KII18I11! UI30 38 IIS 28 ST 1 !8 1 21 1 18 1 It 1 13 1 a i-^;^^X\ III 1 1 . > p 1-1 111 H — H— ^ 1 1 1 1 - -W^a-iSf" ^™ — -1- -1-K- E :z ~ ^ i III i I i 1 1 1 1 1 1 -8-| ioTo- 1 ni-ir: -iTi-2ii-8niir|-M- ; "I 18" f-rSi^'l'M Ml' Ml 13 T »T»7 K IS 121 21111 29 2s!8o|29|38 88 138 IS 119 111 2.11311.119 lollO 1. 1. 8 mTl5 18 13 118 -^-S-S-s- T Tl ■ 1 1 ■- — TMIlKli OF MEN'S BKEADTHS ((I 40) HIT ON A TARGET THE HEIGHT OF A JIAN (1-80 m.), AND (20 m.) oh 60 M:N"S BREADTHS WIDE. (All hits on tho eaine man's breadth counting .ib one hit.) I ! I I 1 I I ' I i 'II 4 13113313713813013613 J I I I I I I I r- o ference to yment in nied bj' a payable to )e payable expenses ied, and ver loss re credit 3ur List, Sca/e of of/stance heights. '^<^C!CjS. PRINTERS AND PUBLISHERS, 3ROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 1891. SPECIAL 1891. JST OF MILITARY WORKS. T E I^ JVC S : GALE & POLDEN respectfully desire to intimate, in reference to their List, that : — The Calculation of Prices is made on the basis of payment in NET CASH. Therefore ALL ORDERS must be accompanied by a remittance. Cheques should be crossed " London and Provincial Bank," payable to the order of GALE & POLDEN. Post Office Orders should be payable at CHATHAM. IMPORTANT NOTICE. By the adoption of the cash system of business, all expenses of collecting accounts, and loss by bad debts, are avoided, and ready-money customers are not charged extra to cover loss through defaulters, which must always be the case where credit is given, hence the Secret of our Liberal Terms. Several Military Works are now omitted from our List, owing: to their not being up to date. Ciistotnei's iclio may receiDe Duplicate Catalogues voill greatly oblige if tliey vuill place the same ou the Mess ov Library Table. We keep the Largest Stock of MILlTaHY Boohs in the World, aiid our Stoch at times exceeds a Quarter of a Million Volumes. Haviug a Loudou Tvaneller, Customers lA^ho 1 desire it, cau be called upou for Orders, by seudiug a Post Card to our Factory, statiug their luishes. We cauuot be responsible for auy of our A.geuts' delays. A.II orders foru:arded direct to our Factory at Chatham are attended to ou the day they are receiDecl, if Cash is sent u^ith Ordei\ RETAIL ESTABLISHMENTS AT High Street, Old Brompton, Chatham, A X I ) Wellington Street, Aldershot. STEAM FACTORY, Westcourt Street, Chatham, England. 3 GALE & POLDEN'S MILITARY SERIES. (ALL NEW EDITIONS.) 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These Permanent Passes are now being universally used throughout the Service, they are made in three sizes, suitable for the pocket, as under ; No. 1 size can be supplied with Army Form ]j 295 inside, they can also be printed to any Ptegimental Pattern for initialling monthly or otherwise ; if 50 or more are ordered, the Crest of Corps is added free of charge. We may add, that since the issue of the new G.O. re Passes, we have sold over a Hundred Thousand. In most Corps they are sold at the Regimental Canteen at 2d. each ; and wherever they have been tried, the men have gladly ptir chased them. No. 1 size folded, No 2 size folded, No. 3 size folded, 3-ins. X 2^-ins. 3-ins. x 2-ins. 2.L.ii^g x 2-ins. SAMPLES SENT ON APPLICATION. All one Price as under — 1 dozen, 3/-; 50 @ 2/6 per dozen; 100 @ 2/3 per dozen; 200 @ 2/- per dozen ; 500 @ 1/9 per dozen ; 1,000 @ 1/6 per dozen- Strongly made in Red and Blue Cloth, and in Green Cloth for Rifle Battalions. The Passes quoted abore are all made of very best strong cloth, but can be made of a cheaper cloth, if desired, and also at a cheaper price. rROMPTITUDIO IN DESPATCH OF GOODS IS ONE OF OUR SPECIALITIES. 6 copy of war office letter. 52. Horse Guards, General No. „^ ^ 97^^ War Office, 9th August, 1890. Sir, With reference to paragraph lOS, Sectioti XV., Part II., Queen's Regulations, 1 have the honor, by desire of the Commander-in- Chief, to invite your attention to a Book- called "The J^ on- Commissioned Officer's Guide to Promotion," published at 216, by Messrs. Gale Sf Polden, Chatham,, which appears to His Royal Highness to be a useful book to be brought into Garrison Libraries, Reading and Recreation Rooms, in order that the young soldiers may have an ouportunity of reading it. T h.ave the honor to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, (Signed) A. DELAVOYE, Assistant Director for Director General. Kor lull pHi-liculiiih of thcbc b(K)kn i?ec jihrc 11. NOW READY; POST FREE FOR CASH WITH ORDERS. .s. d Aldershot Divisional Standing Orders. Revised Edition ... 2 Aldershot, Military Map of. 3-in. scale, specially surveyed and Plate engraved, to meet Military requirements. Printed on Paper and folded in Cloth Case ... ... ... 2 ,, Linen .. ... ... .. ... 3 6 " We have received from Messrs. Gale & Polden, a most excellent Military Map of Aldershot and the fturronnding Country. It is on the scale of 3-inclies to a mile, and is admirably clear in regard to the camps, rifle ranges, roads, waterways, &c." — 4?-w.i/ and Navy Gazette. Army Allowances, Regulations Relative to issue of 1 6 Army Signalling, Morse Alphabet and Auxiliary Signs or Signals. I'rinred on Cards ... ... ... ... ... 3 Army Signalling Regulations. Being a complete compilation (if !ill orileis, icy Major Buxton 7 Field Works : tiieir Tcclmical Construction and Tactical .\ iipliialion, by Colonel C. B. Bkackenbury, R.A. iu Two Volumes 12 BROMi'TUN WORKS, CHATHAM. 1 9 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, .s. d. Company Drill Made Easy. By William Gordon, 2nd Batt. trordon Highluuders. 7th Edition. With 54 illus- trations, in accordance with the New " Infantry Drill" ... 1 6 "The direction of all ranks, and explanation of the words of command are clear and concise." — Broad Arroiv. " It is simple, clear, and will be found most useful by those for whose benefit it is intended." — United Service Gazette. t Catechism on Company Drill, with Appendix on words of Command. By William Gordon ... ... ... ... 1 t These are works of the utmost value, and are intended to answer a twofold purpose : — 1st, to afford the student an easy and ready means of committing to memory all the various movements in Drill; 2nd, to enable the examiner to put every question in a much more concise and intelligible form than could otherwise be accomplished if depending on the Infantry Drill alone. The Appendix on words of Command will be found equally useful, more especially to those who have acquired a habit of giving them incorrectly, and for whose information and guidance this has been specially introduced, as it not only contains the incorrect words of Command so frequently made use of, but also shows the reason why they ought not to be given. Catechism on Field Training. By Major H. Fitzroy- Marryat. 6th Edition, in accordance with the Revised Syllabus in New Infantry Drill ... ... ... ... 2 " The instruction is divided into periods of a week each, and is concise, simple, and well arranged. An index facilitates harking back when necessary."— -T'^^e Times. " The form of question and answer is adopted, and, in our opinion, is suited to the purpose. The book is rendered more valuable by some good Illustrations and an index." — United Service Gazette. Catechism on the Manual of Instruction in Army Sig- nalling, by Major L. Edye, R.M.L.I., and Capt. El.mhirst Rhodes, D.S.O., The Royal Berkshire Regiment ... ... 2 The value of visual signalling is now fully recognised, an indifferent signaller is worse than useless, and the great responsibility resting on all signal officers and men in the field renders it necessary for men to make themselves acquainted with every detail connected with this service ; additional inducements have lately been held out to volunteers to qualify themselves in this branch of military training, and this work is intended as an aid to all in reading the Manual, and becoming thoroughly at home in the various methods of signalling. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 10 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Catch Questions in Infantry Drill. By Lieut. G. D'Arcy KvANs, 1st Royal Irish Rifles ... ... ... ... ... 6 Cavalry Training, in English and Hindustani. 2ud Edition. In accordance with the New Cavalry Regulations. For the use of the British Otficers, and Xative Officers, and Non- commissioned Officers of the Indian Cavahy. By Capt. H. Eardley-Wilmot, 2nd Madras Lancers. Author of " Manual of Persian Phrases," &c., &c. ... ... ... 2 6 Cavalry Roll Book and Handbook of General Information. By Qr.-Mr.-Sergt. PiLLiNGER, O.R.C., lOth Royal Hussars 2 6 Contents: — Instructions for keeping the Roll Book; Discharges; Discipline; Arrest; Drunkenness; Orders of Parade ; Mode of Carry- ing Equipment ; Education ; Troop Roll ; Roll of Horses ; Numerical Roll of Arms, &c. ; Mountings. Cavalry Outposts, Questions and Answers on. By Capt. R. H. MOKKisoN, late Comdt., S. of Ins. for Aux. Cavalry... 9 "A useful little book, must be of service to officers and men of the yeomanry by elucidating the true object of outposts and the duties connected with them. It may also, with great advantage, be put into the hands of non-commisaioned officers of the Regular cavahy." — Army and Navy Gazette. Cavalry On Vedette, an easj' aide memoire to Vedettes on Outpost Duty. Arranged by Capt. R.S.S. lUnEN-PowKLL, 13th Hussars ... ... " 3 Cavalry Kit Plate, Arrangement of Shelf Pordoz. 1 „ „ „ Kit on Bed 10 Cricket Scoring Book, The Official, ^lade of the best paper and containing the amended Rules of the Game. Cloth Bound 1/6 & 2 6 Conventional Signs, as used in Military Topography Per Do7,. 1 Defence and Attack of Positions and Localities- By Col. Sen AW 3 6 Drill Cards -Recruit or Squad Drill, Part 1 3 Company Drill, Part II 3 Formation and Evolutions of a Battalion, Part III 3 Brigade Drill, Part IV 2 B ROMP TON WORKS, CHATHAM. 11 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Dress Regulations for Army 2 Elements of Tactics for Volunteers. Bj^ Captain Blomfield, The Lane. Fusiliers, Adjt. 1st Vol. Batt. Lane. Fusiliers ... 1 6 Encampments, Regulations and Instructions for 9 Equipment Regulations 1 6 Engineering, Elementary Manual of Field 1 6 Field Fortification, Notes on the Text -books. Specially arranged for. Officers preparing for Promotion Examina- tions. 3rd Kdition. Entirely new and fully illustrated with upwards of Thirty Plates. By Maj. H. D. Hutchinson, B.S.C " 4 " A compilation which will prove useful. A most practical work in every way." — I'/ie Pioneer. " Major Hutchinson's past experience as a Garrison Instructor eminentlj- qualifies him to know the pitfalls that students are likely to fall into, and to point them out. We fancy all candidates will find his Notes of the greatest assistance in preparing for examination." — Civil and Military Gazette. " A little volume, compact, well-digested, and curiously complete, without looking formidable." — The Saturday Review. Firing Exercise and Aiming Drill. For Martini-Henry Rifle and Carbine. Corrected to date, from time to time, as alterations take place at Hythe. ... ... ... ... 3 Firing Exercise and Aiming Drill. For Martini-Henry Rifle and Carbine. As taught at the School of Musketry. Illustrated. PRINTED IN URDU 6 PRINTED IN NAGRI 6 These Translations have been made specially for the use of the Kative Ranks of the Army in India, by ilajor H. D. HciCHiNsoif. Fire Discipline. By Col. J. L. T. Toke, 1st V.B. R. Berks Regt. 3 Field Report Book. For wnting orders and reports of reconnaissance and outpost duties in the Field, &c. Each book contains concise directions, carbon paper for copying report in duplicate at one operation, and pencil ... 1 g Free Gymnastics, and Light Dumb Bell Drill as practised at the Gymnasia at Aldershot. By Sergt. -Major Noake.s, Gymnastic Staff ... ... ... \ Q Gymnastics. Upwards of 100 Tricks on Horizontal Bar. By A. DiMMocK, Gymnastic Instructor ... ... ... \ BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 12 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, d. Guide to obtaining a First Class Army School Certificate. 3rd Edition. By an Army Schoolmaster. Carefully compiled in compliance with the New Orders referring to the First Class Certificate ... ... ... ... ... 3 6 In this volume will be found enough to secure a good pass for a First Class Certificate. It has been compiled by an experienced and successful Army Schoolmaster, who has omitted nothing that is necessary, and admitted nothing superfluous. The aim of the volume is to place the requisite information in a compact and inexpensive form before the intending candidate. t Guide to obtaining a Second Class Army School Certificate. By an Army Schoolmaster. 5th Edition ... 1 6 "Nonrcommissioned officers and men seeking to qualifj', will find the ' Guide to Second Class School Certificate ' a very valuable little work, aiding them, as it must do, to secure success. It covers all the ground and gives hints and specimen papers in every subject. As it is an inexpensive book, it should meet with a large amount of support from those for whose special benefit it has been put together." — Armn and Xavn Gnzettc. + Guide to obtaining a Third Class Army School Certificate. By an Army Schoolmaster. 4th Edition ... ... ... 6 t The Soldier's Spelling Book for obtaining a School Certificate, including Technical Terms and Words of daily use in Army Matters. By an Army Schoui- mastcr. " To candidates for a Scliool Certificate, who are bad spoilers, this book is so arranged that a few hours' study will Tnako a good speller of a bad one." ... ... ... 6 t The Soldier's Table Card. Giving the Tables, &c., necessary for ail .Vnny School Certificate ... ... ... ... 1 + Tliosc work.s have the iipi)r()viil of tlio InR])ector8 and SehooltnasterB throughout the entire Service, and arc siieciiiUy rocnnimended by them. Forms for Practising on for the Examination. Form C. 313, KxatiiinalioM I'apcr, fld. per do/.. ; 3/- prr 1(X). Form C. 315, Aritliniotic Exaniinatinii Paper, No II., l/3perdo7,.; 5/- per 100. Form C. 31(5, Arithmetic Examination Pai)er, No. III., 9d. per do/..; 3/- per 100. Form C. 317, Savings' Bank Forms, 9d. jx-r do/..; 3/- per 100. Form C. 2107. Monthly Pay List and Lodger comi)ineeii promoted, to purchase the complete work." — Niivdl and Militarii Argus. t Hints to Young Soldiers. By William Gordon, 2nd Batt. Gordon Highlanders. 3rd Edition. Revised and Enlarged. 6 " A littlo budget of sound, good, wholesome advice, in plain language. It would be well if a copy could bo given to ovory yonng soldier just starting on liis new career." — Broad Arrow. t These Books have been pccommendcd by the Commandor-ln-Chlef. How to Post and Tell Off a Picquet, and the Details of Outpost Duty. I{.v C.n\^\.. II. Stai'YLTon-Marshall. lind Kditiun ReviHod and Enlarged... 6 BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM 15 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, Historical Records of the Forty-fourth, or the East Essex Regiment, illustrated 5 89th Princess Victoria's Regiment. Compiled by Capt. R. Brinckniiin, 2iid Koyal ]risli Fusiliers. Fully Rluaf rated 5 The Sixth Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers), a continuation of, from 1839 to 1887- By Capt. a. Sprot, Sixtli Dragoon Guards ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 5 Handbook to Field Training. By Capt. J. W. Malet, oth Fnsiliers. Fullij Illustrated ... ... ... ... ... 4 Hythe Certificate Made Easy, or. How to obtain a School of Musketry Certificate. Being an arrangement of the various subjects taught at the Schools of Musketry, and on which the Students are examined either orally or by written papers. Carefully revised and corrected to date. This work is fully illustrated and is compiled upon the New Musketry Instructions. It will be found of the utmost value to Officers and Non-Cora. Officers at the School of Musketry, Hythe. It supplies a want long felt at the school. 3 6 Infantry Fire Tactics. By Capt. C. B. Matne. 2nd Edition, Enlarged &. Revised throughout with Diaprrams and lUustration.s. This i.>; the finly complete work on a subject of vital importance to Infantry in the Field. It fills a want th'it has hitherto existed in English Military Literature, a'ld should be in the hands of all officers. Besides dealing with the question of Infantry fire and how to use it at all ranges so as to obtain the maximum effect, it also embraces subjects which have a direct bearing on Infantry fire, such as range finding, snjjply of ammunition on the battle-field, influence of ground on effects of fire, principles of musketry instruction, and the use of the magazine rifle ... ... ... ... 6 "Capt. Mayne has done a real good to the Service in giving us a work which places before us clearly and concisely the whole question." — Journal R. U. S- Institution. " Capt. C. B. Mayne, has contributed a valuable addition to our knowledge of the functions of Infantry in War."-Army J^ Navy Gazette. This book is being strongly recommended by Viscount Wolseley, Sir Fred. Roberts, Sir, A. Alison, Sir Evelyn Wood, and all the principal Generals and Commanding Officers in the Service. Infantry Fire Control, Discipline, and Indirect Fire, Notes on. By Caj.t. Sir R. .\. \V. CoLLF.ToN. Bt 1 6 The contents of this work were originally compiled for delivery as Lectures to Officers and N.C.O's, and will be found by them to be a very useful supplement to the chapter on Fire Tactics in the New Infantry Drill. As, from experience, the author finds that para. .88 of Musketry Regulations is a stumbling-block, as it were, to the majority of Officers and N.C.O's, who have not hitherto studied the subject, he has added the Notes on Indirect Fire, and now does away with the diflBculty. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 16 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Instructions in Military Engineering ■— Part I. Field Defences ... ... ... ... ... 2 „ II. Attack of Fortresses ... ... ... ... 2 6 „ III. Military Bridges ... ... ... ... 3 „ IV. Military Mining ... ... ... ... 1 6 ,, V. Miscellaneoas ... ... ... ... 3 6 Infantry Drill ... 1 Letters on Infantry. By Prince Kr.^ft Zu Hohenlohe Ingelfixgen ... ... ... 6 Letters on Cavalry, By Prince Kkaft Zu Hohenlohe Ingelfinqen 6 Letters on Artillery. By Prince Kraft Zu Hohenlohe Ingelkingen ... 7 6 Military Geography. By the Author of Guide to 1st Class Certificate ... ... ... ... ... 1 g Military History. By the Author of Guide to Ist Class Certificate 16 Military Handwriting and the copying of Official and other manuscripts 16 Military Atlas. Containing colored maps comprising the wlidle world ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 2 Magazine Rifle, Manual Exercises 3 Firing Exercises 3 Magazine Rifle, Handbook for. By Capt. L. E. du Moulin, ItoyaU Sussex KcgiiiieiiL. Illutit rated .. ... ... 1 6 Containing detailed descriptioti of the Rifle and Ammunition. Tables of Coinjjarison with other Arms. Firing Exercise and Aiming Drill, and niucii other information. Musketry, How to Improve Shooting in the Ranks. |{y Marksman 1 Musketry. The Annual Course for Trained Soldiers. 'Tabulated. My ("ait. L. K. dc Moulin, lloyal Sussex Ri'gimeiit. Printed on large sheets for Barrack Room. Perch.z 2 Containing information for tiie whole of tlie Range and Field Practices, compiled on one sheet — positions, targets, sights, registers, object of each practice, method of conducting, hints where to aim, classifK at ion, jiri/.cs, badges ; ap]>roved l)y t ho authorities. Musketry Regulations 1 BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 17 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, Manual and Firing Exercises, with Aiming Drill, for the Martini-Henry 6 Contents : — General Directions ; Manual Exercise ; Manual Exercise in Two Ranks, and Piling Arms ; Funeral Exercise; Paying Compliments with Arms ; Dismissing a Company ; Review Exercise ; Manner of Inspecting Arms on Parade ; Rifle Exercises for Sergeants ; Guards and Sentries; Instructions for cleaning the Rifle; New Bayonet Exercise ; Firing Exercise and Aiming Drill, for Rifle and Carbine. Do. do. for ARMY SERVICE CORPS, specially arranged, as used at Aldershot ... ... ... ... ... ... 6 Military Sketching for Non-Corn's and Men. Fully Illustrated 6 Military Sketching Made Easy and Military Maps Explained. By Major H. D. Hutchinson, B.S.C, Garrison Instructor. 4th Edition. Revised throughout ... ... 4 "This useful work, besides conforming in every ivay to the Official Text- took of Military Topography, aims at being more explicit and explan- atory than this latter on the various points dealt with. In this the Author has succeeded." — Royal Engineers' Journal. " All these points he very clearly explains. * * we are sure that many an Ofiicer will feel obliged to Major Hutchinson, for easing his weary way through the mazes of this subject." — Broad Arroic. t Military Training in English and Hindustani. Strictly in accordance with the New Infantry Drill, and on the lines laid down by H.E. the Commander-in-Chief in India, in G.O.C.C, dated 24th August, 1887. For the use of Britisli Officers, and Native Officers and Non-Comraissioned Officers of the Native Army in India. By Major H. D. Hutchinson, 1st Batt. 3rd Goorkhas. Author of " Milita/ry Sketching Made Easy," " Eortification Notes," ^c, Sfc. English and Urdu Edition ... ... ... ... ... ... 2 6 English and Nagri Edition ... ... ... ... ... ... 2 6 This work on "MILITARY TRAINING" is printed in parallel pages, in English and Urdu, and English and Nagri. Fully Illustrated. With this book in their hands, British Officers, Native Officers and Non-commissioned Officers will be able to learn and to teach in the most thorough and systematic manner. Manual of Military Law. Containing Army Act and Reserve Forces Act, 2,6. Abbreviated Edition ... ... 1 6 t Recommencled by H. E. Sir Frederic Roberts, Bart., V.C, Commander-in-Chief. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 18 GALE * POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, Manual of Drill and Physical Exercises. With or without Dumb-bells or Mnsic. By Thomas Chesterton, Instructor of Physical Exercises to the London School Board. Carefully illnstrated with upwards of 150 Plates 2 6 For the use of Teachers in day and evening Schools, Instructors of Physical Exercises, &c., as taught at the Military Gymnasia at home and abroad, also in the London and other Board Schools, Principal Public Schools, Civil Gymnasia, Polytechnic Institutions and Evening Classes throughout the country. Militia Regulations 2 „ Officer's Examiner 4 6 Movements of Color Party at Battalion Drill, &c 6 Nicknames in the Army. Nearly every Regiment in the S»>rvice has (or has had) a Nickname, and this little book gives the most complete record of tlie same ever printed ... 1 Physical Training Without Arms, in accordance with New Infantry Drill. IHuBtrated with Twonty-sis Plates, as tautrht at Aldersliot, 3rd Edition, 9d. Bound in Cloth 1 " Physical Training, with its numerous and rich plates, and costing but a shilling, ought to be in the hands not only of military men, but all schoolmasters. It is a most useful, handy, and interesting volume. Its hints and directions are invaluable." — Free Press. t Printed in Urdu 9 t Printed in Nagri 9 Physical Drill With Arms, New Bayonet Exercise and Attack and Defence, in accordance with the New Drill. Illustrated with Thirty-Sis Plates, as tauglit at Aldtr.shot 9d. Bound in clotli 1 "A invaluable little book, for, thanks to the admirably drawn plates, of wliich there are thirty-six, it will be of great use to the thousands of desk-workers who can get no such training as that of the soldier, and for whoso health it is at least as necessary." — United Service GdzAtfi. t Printed in Urdu 9 t Printed in Nagri 9 (Jagf" t Tliese two Hooks are now ready in Urdu and Nagri, the Translations having been tnade specially for llu; use of the Native ranks of the army in India, by Major II. D. Hutchinson. Tlieec books are puhlishei! with all the original illustrations and explaiiatioiiH, and the Translator's name will be a sufficient guarantee for their completeness and utility. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 19 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Passes (W.O. Pattern). Per 100, 6d Per 1000 4 ,, Permanent, cloth bound, will last for years ... Per Doz. 3 For full particulars of Permanent Passes in accordance with G.O. 36, of March, see page 5- Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Army. Part I. 1/6; Part II 2 6 Do. do. do. do. Interleaved. Two Vols. Bound together in Best Cloth ... 9 6 Royal Warrant for Pay, Promotion, &c. " 16 Remarks and Suggestions on our Military System. By Gapt. II. G. Pl-rdon, North Staffordshire Regiment. ... 2 Register Cover for Marking Points at the Target, Black Waterproof, with Elastic Band, greatly improved ... ... 2 Regulations for Mounted Infantry 1 6 On Guard ; What to do and How to do it. 6th Edition... 6 " A useful little handbook, the ver.v thing that the yoimg and inexperienced stand in need of, arranged by Capt. M. Quaylf-Jonbs, 6th Royal Warwickshire Regt., has been forwarded to us for notice. A more concise and better guide could not have been compiled. Ever\- officer will remember the fear and tremor in which he stood when the startling cry of " Guard, turn out ! " first broke upon his ears, and will, although smiling at the recollection, reflect to himself that the instnxctions contained in the Queen's Regulations and on the board of orders of the guard-room, were not altogether of an explicit and satisfactory nature. Capt. Quayle-Jonks has remedied this defect." — j»-my 4" iVupy Gazffte. On Outpost ; What to do and How to do it. By Williaji Gordon. 7th Edition ... ... ... ... ... ... 6 In compiling this Hand-book, the chief aim has been to embody the very essence of Outpost work, in the clearest and simplest manner, in a handy sized form, well adapted to carry in the pocket, and easy for reference at any time, either in the field, camp or quarters. "Never have we met with a more clever little work on Outpost Duty." — Broad Arrow. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. B 2 20 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, Official Letter Writing, Orders, &c.. Guide to, by an Army Schoolmaster. 3rd Edition ... ... ... ... ... 1 6 " A most iiseful work for young Officers and Non-Commissioued Officers of all Branches of the Service. In this work are compressed concise, yet full directions, not only upon Official Letter Writing and Orders, but also upon Handwritint^, Style of Composition, Punctuation, Precis Writing, Military Abbreviations and Relative Rank, together with such business terms as are, or may be, appli- cable to Military life. To those whose duties require an acquaintance with clerical work of any kind it can be confidently recommended." — Army ^^ Namj Gazette. Officers' Pocket Book for Home and Foreign Service ... 3 6 "Officers' Pocket Book, by Mr. Gordon, 2nd Goi'don Highlaiiders, which is less voluminous than Lord Wolseley's manual, contains a digest of much useful knowledge arranged in Alphabetical Order, and taken from the best authorities." — Army ^' Navy Gazette. " Mr. Gordon bids fair to become the most prolific compiler of military books in the British Army. From courts-martial to guards, from rations to the Esmarch bandage, every subject of practical interest to soldiers is noticed ; and it would be well if every British officer carried in his head the varied information contained within the biiiding of this book." — United Service Gazette. Roll and Memo. Book for R.E. Field Companies. By Capt. J. C. Tyler, R.E. 3rd Edition. Revised throughout 2 " This work contains various roll forms that are required by an officer in charge of a company ; details of daily routine ; tlie duties of all ranks; full list of equipment; directions which embrace the remotest item ; hints on a variety of subjects, useful recipes, scales of forage, and indeed information on nearly evory point likely to be useful to company officers, no matter how e-Kjierienced they may be." — Admiralty Sf Horse Guards Gazette. Rhymes from the Ranks. By Qr.-Mr.-Sorgt. H. Morey (late 2nd Batt. Tlio Royal Irish Rifles) 1 " ' To the Army, in which I spent the best years of my life, this little book is, with all its defects, most respectfully dedicated by. the Author.' Many of the Rhyrncs ar() of coiiHiderublo moril, aiul will bo j)opular in the Ranks, for whom thoy have been principally written." — Irish Times. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 21 GALE & POLDEN, PKINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Regulations for the Royal Engineers 3 Road Reports, printed, and ruled. 3d. each or Per Dozen ... 2 Scoring Book, The All Range (Wimbledon) 16 Scout's Guide. By Captain Delavoye 2 6 Skirmishing, Attack & Defence for a Company, Battalion and Brigade. By 8ertieut. W. W. Norman, B.S.C. Complete with Compass ... ... ... ... ... ... 10 Without Compass ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 6 6 The above has been especiall.v designed for the use of officers engaged on Outpost and Recdrmoitriiig duties. At such times, officers are expected to carry with them a pocl.et book for ordinary notes, another for writing Field Reports, and, in addition, instrument.-i for making sketches. All these reiiuisites arc contained in one book, the contents being as follows: — (1.) A drawing board U x 7i" (which can be folded to half the size), a compass, a rough clinometer and a ruler. (2.) Willesden water])ioof drawing paper for sketches, and ruled paper for reconnaissftuce reports. (3.) A refill note book with printed forms for field reports, and also some blank pages for temporary notes. (4.) Some very useful memoranda relative to reconnaissance reports, 4c., 4c. Field Service Sketch and Note Book. Made of Willesden Watcrpioof I',i])cr. .Vnanired by Capt. WltiLoUOHBY Vkk.skk, l{ifl.' I{iin;ade, l)..-\.A.(J.,Sh()rncIitTe. With compass 5 Field Sketching Book ruled in squares 6 Protractors for Surveying. As used at the S.M.E., Chatlmm; Jiiiil the autli(irizi(l Pattern in India. Ivory 7/-. Boxwood 2 6 "Gale and f'oldon have just brought out a new surveying ])rotractor, which poHsesses the following advaniagcs. It is iirovidod with "a diauronal scale, from which any suitable scale can bo made by the Surveyor in the flehl ; instead of the numerical figures, on the face of the jinilraclor is engraved a simi)lo rule for detenniuiiig the vertical intervals, and a formula for constructing any scale of slope dilToring from the engriiv<>d normal one. A formula for llie conversion ot h1o|)0m ex|iros.sed in degrees into the same slopes exi)ressod as fractions and vie* ccriii is also given. The protractor is also furnished with scales of four and six in. to the mile." — Kuynl Kngineem' Journal. Oale Sf Polden are the sole Publishers for the books issued by the Aldershot Military Society, BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHA 26 SPECIAL NEW MILITARY WORKS, SUITABLE FOR COMPANY, TROOP, AND BATTERY. Alphabetical Roll and Descriptive Book. This Alphabetical Roll and Descriptive Book is so arranged as to meet the present requirements of the Army ; plerty of room being allowed for the constant changes that now take place in the company ... 1 Barrack Room Arrangements (Infantry). Official. Being instructions for the Soldier in the arrangement of his Barrack Room ' PerDoz. 2 Bed Cards, No. 1 size, 4i by 3-ins. Without Crest, per 100 2/6, 200 4/- 500 8 „ ,, „ ,, With Crest beautifully Stamped in Relief, per 100 3/6, 200 5/- ...500 10 ,, „ No. 2 size, 3i by 2i-ins. Without Crest, per 100 1/6, 200 2/9 500 6 „ „ WithCrest, 1002/6, 200 4/-, 500 8 Door Cards, No. 1 size, 4f by 3J-ins. Without Crest, per 100 3/6, 200 5;- 500 10 „ ,, „ ,, With Crest beautifully Stamped in Relief, per 100 4/6, 200 6/- ... 500 15 „ ,, No. 2 size, -H bv 3-ins. Without Crest, per 100 2/6, 200 4/., 500 8 „ „ „ „ With Crest, per 100 3/6, 200 5/- 500 10 OrderBook(A. B. 137) 1/6. Washing Book 6 Case for Soldier's Pocket Ledger, without Pocket i o ,, „ „ ,, ., Best Leather, with Pocket 2 Any Soldier can bind his Pocket Ledger in these cases. „ „ Annual Musketry Return. Whole Cloth Cover ... 2 „ „ Pay and Mess Book, lettered, with Pocket. Leather... 7 „ ,, Pay List, lettered, with Pocket. Leather 7 „ „ Passes (Army Form B. 295) Cloth 1 3 ,, „ Daily Messing Book. Plain or with letter of Co. ,, 13 „ „ Army Orders ,, 10 ,, „ Target Register. Black Waterproof 2 „ „ Judging Distance Register. Black Waterproof ... 1 6 26 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS ct PUBLISHERS, d. Case for Defaulters' Sheets, made in Leather, -ftnth Thumb Screws, Strap and Buckle, Lettered with Title and Company. Warranted to keep the leaves from falling out. These oases are made large to take all sizes of Defaulter Sheets, and to protect the edges. Will last for 10 years ... ... ... 10 Case for Despatches, Documents, &C. For carrying Documents and Forms between Orderly Room and Office ; will be found very useful on Parade. Made in Leather, with pocket, strap and buckle. Lettered in gold with crest of Corps and letter of Company ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 7 Cases for Free Kit Issue Sheets, made in leather, with Thumb Screw.s, Strap, &c. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 7 Duty Rosters, strongly bound in Cloth ... ... ... 2/6 & 4 „ ,, Sheets Per Doz. 1 6 Drill Certificate for Mtisketry, Printed on Strong Paper, Per Doz. 9 Daily Messing Books, to last one Month. 4d, each, or Per Doz. 3 Expeditious Method of Calculating a Soldier's Service ... 3 Extracts from Queen's Regulations and General Orders affecting all Non-commissioned Oificers and Men. For hanging iu liarrack Kooius ... ... ... ... Per Doz. 2 Firing Exercise and Aiming Drill. For Martini- Henry Rifle. iJorrected to date, fiom lime to time, as alterations take place at Uytho. All Non-CiMninissioJied Otlicors wishing to pass their Musketry ExaTuiiiation and obtain their Certificates should jiossess a copy. Single Copies, 3d. ... Per Doz. 2 Fire Engine, Instructions for the Mounting and Working of ... 3 In.struction Cards for Cleaning Martini-Henry RiHo and ( 'arbinc, :iti. ... .. ... ... ... ... Per Doz. 1 6 Inspection Cards used at Qenl's. Inspections. Infantry, Per Doz. 1 „ „ „ „ „ Cavalry, Per Doz. 2 Instructions for Packing the Valise in time of Peace and War Per Doz. 6 I;R0M I'TOiN WoliKS, C HA 'I' II AM. 27 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, KIT PLATES— Valise Kit Plate, Illustration showing Kit on Bed (Infantry) «• d. No. 1 l*'^!- I>oz. 1 Valise Kit Plate, Illustration showing Kit on Bed (Highland) No, 2 Per Doz. 1 Valise Kit Plate, Illustration showing FIELD Kit Laid on Parade (Infantry), No. 3 Per Doz. i Valise Kit Plate, Illustration showing Kit on Barrack Room Shelf, No. 4 Per Doz. 1 Valise Kit Plate, Illustration showing FIELD Kit Laid down on Parade (Highland), No. 5 I'er Doz. i o Valise Kit Plate, Militia (Infantry), Kit on Parade, No. 6 Per Doz. 1 VaUse Kit Plate (Militia), Kit on Bed, No. 7 Per Doz. i Valise Kit Plate (Militia), Kit on Bed, Highland Kegiments, No. 8 Per Doz. 1 Slade-Wallace Kit Plate, Illustration showing FULL Kit on Bed (Infantry), No. 10 P.r Uoz. i o Slade-WaUace Kit Plate, Illustration showing FIELD Kit on Bed and arrangement of Barrack Room Shelf (Infantry), No. 12 Per Doz. i o Slade-Wallace Kit Plate, Illustration showing FIELD Kit Laid down on Parade (Infantry), No. 13 .. Per Doz. i o Note Book, the Army. Made in three Sizes- No. 1. — 4-iii. by 2i.in. in Cloth, 6d. Leather 9 „ 2.— 5-iu. by 3-"in. „ 9d. „ 10 ,, 3.— 5i-in. by 3i-in. ,, 1/- „ 1 6 Orderly Sergeant's Detail Book, to last twelve mouths, for SO to 200 men. ArraTiged for Home and Foreigu Service 5 On Guard Writing Companion, made in leather, fitted with pocket to hold .'Vrmy Forma and Foolscap, Penholder, Pens and Pencils 2 6 For compactness, finish and strength, it is very ingenious. It can be put in a valise, or folded up with tlie fjreat coat. For Non-Commissioned Officers on guard, in the field, or on board ship, it will be found invaluable. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 28 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Passes (W.O. Pattern) Per 100 6d. ; Per 1000 4 Pay-Sergeant's Complete Account Book, to last twelve months, for 80 to 200 men. 6th Edition. Arranfjed for Home and Foreign Service. The Pay Sergeant's Complete Account Book has been arranged ■v\ith a vievr to assisting Pay Sergeants in keeping all the information necessarj' for filling in their Pay Lists, & other useful information connected with their company. CoxTEMs : — Nominal and Descriptive Roll ; Roll of Arms, Equipments, &c. ; Clothing Roll; Necessaries; Return of Arms and Accoutrements ; Rations ; Distribution of Arms and Accoutrements ; Bedding ; Furloughs ; Deficiencies of Kit of Absentees ; Classes of Instruction ; Crimes ; Stoppages for Wives and Children ; Charges against Corps and Companies ; Clothing Return for Recruits ; Kit Inspections ; Extracts from Regimental Orders ; Monthly Course of Ti-aining ; Musketry Drills ; Returns, &c. ; and blank ruled paper at end ... ... ... ... ... bound in Black Cloth 5 Do. do. do. do. bound in Leather 7 6 Pay-Sergeant's Index Ready Reckoner 1 Register for Marking Up Musketry Drills and Attendances during Monthly Course of Training 2 Sights for Wind-Guaging. Supplied witli Hod, White or Blue Sight Lines per 100 4 Sergeants Pocket Book, for Home and Foreign Service. Hy William (iordon, 2nd Batt. Gordon Highlanders. For Ojjinions of the Press see Page 21. Leather, 3/6 ; Cloth ... 2 6 Squad Books for Pocket (Sep pag(< 22). Troop Sergeant-Major's Account Book, The. To last twelvemonths. Arrangeil for Home and Foreign Service 6 Most carefully compiled by a Cavalry Quartor-mastor who has had very great experience in keeping Cavalry Returns. " We pay Special Attention to all new Foi-tnn and Books that are useful to Colli r-Serqeants ; therefore any new work required can he supplied a few hours after it» issue. If you don't Jvnd what you require in this list, please write for it." New IlluHtratod Lisl for O.C. Companieu and Color Borgcants, po8t froeon application. I'. KOM I'TON WORKS, (Ml .\ 'I' HAM. 29 WAR OFFICE FORMS, &c., KEPT IN STOCK. ALL THE LATEST PATTERNS. 100 1,000 Absentee Reports, B 290 9d- 5- Company or Troop Monthly Musketry Return, B 186 2/6 Instructions for filling in the above Return each 3d. Company or Troop Musketry Prize Statement Form, 01716 2/6 Crimes, B 252 l/- 6/- Daily Parade States, B 288 2/- 15/- Defaulters' Sheets, B 121 2/6 18/- Estimates of Pay, M 1430 2/- 15/- Free Kit Issue Sheet, B tst ^/" ^°l' Inventory of Kit, B 253 2/- 15'. Memo. Forms, C 348 i/- 6/- Minor Offence Reports- For Battery, Troop, or Company 1/- 6/- Morning Sick Reports, B 256 1/- 6/- Musketry Transfer Register, B 193 2/6 Passes, B 295 6d. 4/. Ration Returns, B 289 i/- 6/- Return of Accoutrements and Appointments. B 293 .. 2/6 18/- Savings' Bank Forms, No. 2, 1743 2,6 Weekly Church Parade States, B 258 2- 15/- each doz. Company or Troop Annual Musketry Return, B 192 .. 6d. 5/- Daily Messing Book. A. Book 48 4d. ,s/- Defaulters' Sheet Specimen Form B 121, containing instructions for the tillitii; in of the Reports ... ... 4d. 3/- Diagram for Testing Rifles 2/- On Outpost Duty, Questions and Answers, for liang- iwrr in Bari-ack Rooms ... .. ... ... ... 3d. 2/- Order Book, Army Book, 137 1/6 16/- Pay and Mess Book, N 1504 6d. 5/- Pay List, N 1505 9d. 8/- Register of Judging Distance Practice, B 189 id. 9d. Road Report, K 1305 3d. 2/- Scale of Fines for Drunkenness, B 138 id. l/- Signalling Scribbling Book, Army Book, C 119 l/- 10/- Signalling Message Book A.B. 119 A 2,- 20/. Target Practice Register, B 188, for Volley or Inde- pendoiil Firin<; ... ., ... ' Id. 1/- Target Practice Register, B 190, for individual Firincr ... id. i/- FORMS FOR VOLUNTEERS. per iloz. per 100. Company Parade States 9d. 4/- Guard Reports 9d. 4/- New Musketry Requirements for Efficiency 6d. 1/6 Class Register & Individual Target Practice, E 553 ... 1/6 6/- Cover for above 2/- each 20/- doz. Case to hold Co. Annual Musketry Return each 2/- 30 LIST OF DEPARTMENTS, BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. Engraving. Having executed orders for a variety of Visiting, Complimentary and Ball Programme Cards, Ac, we are prepared to submit numerous sampler. Sookbinding. We have increased our facilities for Bookbinding, and are prepared to un- dertake any orders for that department, and can guarantee execution with as much dispatch as is consistent with good workmanship. Gold Blocking. Regimental Crests, Badges, and Colours .stamped in gold upon any article made of leather or cloth. Brass Stamps designed and engraved for blocking. Lithographic Printing. We can submit various samples of our Lithographic Work, such as Plons of Kit, Regimental Flags, Badges, Music &c. ' Publishing. We are prepared to make arrange- mvulH with authors of approved Military Bw)ks for i)rintiiig an. I piibli8hing of such workH on the most, hberal terms Authors aro invited to forward a specif men copy of their work. Letter-press Printing. Estimates will be forwarded for Stand- ing Orders, Regimental, and any de- scription of Miscellaneous Printing ; the utmost expedience used in production of the work. Music Printing. We undertake to publish Regimental Marches, Bugle Calls, Ac, with the Crest, Motto, ic. of the Regiment on Cover. Samples upon application. Stationery. Being large buyers of Stationery, we can supply Canteens and Messeo, at wholesale prices, in quantities. Relief Stamping, The large number of orders which are being constantly received, afford a most featisfttctory jiroof of the opinion of oup customers, on the production in this branch of the trade. Copper-plate Printing. Visiting, Complimentary, AVodding, Invitation, Menu and Band Progiamme Cards, Book-plates, Crests, Ac, printed in best style. Die Sinking. Dies sunk by flrst-class Artists in the newest and most fashionable stylo : CroHt«, Arms, Badges, Monograms, M()itoe»,and Addresses. All Regimental Dies kept in stock. All Ocodi Mtlt Carriiun J'aid to nny part of tht World. INVITATION CARDS. 100 ... ... 6/6 200 ... ... 11/6 300 ... ... 15/6 500 ... 24/- 31 SERGTS'. & COKPLS'. MESSES. Books strongly recommended for Mess Tables. s. d. Infantry Fire Tactics ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 6 Company, Battalion, and Brigade Drill made Easy ... ... ... 5 Catechism on Company and Battalion Drill ... ... ... ... 3 Guide to Promotion, Lance-Corporal to Corporal ... ... ... 2 6 Guide to Promotion, Corporal to Sergeant ... ... .. ... 2 6 Guide to Official Letter Writing, Orders, &c. ... ... ... ... 1 6 Guide to First Class Army School Certificate ... ... ... ... 3 6 Sergeants' Pocket Book ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 2 6 Military Sketching Made Easy ... ... ... ... ... ... 4 Blotting Pads with Leather Corners ... ... ...each 1/6 and 2 6 The Best, Cheapest, and Prettiest Dance Invitation Cards and Programmes yet introduced for the Service, with Regimental Crests. DANCE PROGRAMMES. DANCE PROGRAMMES. >A/i4.i. t /-. J o n -1 With handsome cords. Without Cords & Pencils 4.„^^„i» o ^„„„:p„ ot+o^ul>^ tassels &. pencils attached 100 10,6 100 21/. 200 19/- 200 38/- 300 25/. ■ 300 52/- 500 35/- 500 80/- Envelopes to fit Invite Cards, with Crest of Regiment 2/- per 100. Orders executed within a few hours, and proof sent (when required) hy return of post. Samples can he had on application. Cloak-Room Tickets, on stout paper, good bold figures in duplicate, and perforated centres. Packet 1 — 1 to 200; Packet 2—201 to 400; Packet 3—401 to 600. All at 2/- per Packet. BALL ROOM PROGRAMME STAND, 7/6. Made in leatlier, gold lettered, supplied with hold figures from 1 to 20, and names of all dances (including Supper Dance), which may be instantly changed. For Balls and Quadrille Partie.s they will be found indispensable. Made to stand, or hang up. Regimental Playing Cards, with the Ciest of the Regiment, can be supplied without extra charge for Crest if six dozen packs are ordered. 6 doz. at 23/- per dozen ; 12 doz. at 21/- per dozen. Sergeants' Mess Rules, Billiard Rules, Propositi(m Books, Inventory and Mess Property Books, Caterers' Stock Books, Daily Liquor Consumption Books, Balance Sheet Books, Messing Books, &c., printed and bound to order. Tradesmen's Order Book, 5/0. Rubber Stamp for Marking Papers, Magazines, &c., with Crest of Regitnent and " Sergts.' Mess" below, best quality, with Everlasting Ink Pad, Ac, complete, 16/0. Ditto. ditto. 2nd quality, with Ordinary Pad, 12/0. Reading Cases for Newspapers and Magazines. See Libreury List of Prices on Page 33. 32 OFFICERS' MESSES. The Eoyal Set of OflBcers' Mess Account Books (copyright) arranged by Qr.-Mr. D. White, Manchester Regiment. s. d. No. 1.— Order Book, containing 300 Perforated Order Fortas, bound with counter parts 5 No. 2. — Cash Accoant. Foolscap size, 13in. by 8in., Printed and Ruled, Paged and Bound in Leather 12 No. 3.— Ledger. Double Foolscap size, 26in. by 16in., containing combined forms for all charges, Folioed, Printed, Ruled, and Bound in Leather ...28 No. 4. — Cellar Book. Medium size, 22in. by 18in., Ruled, Printed, Paged and Bound in Leather 24 No. 5.— Messing Account. Double Foolscap size, 26in. by 16in., Ruled, Printed, Paged and Bound in Leather 24 No. 6.— Dail.v Wine .\ccount. Doable Foolscap size, 26in. by 16ui., Ruled, Printed, Paged and Bound in Leather 24 No. 7.— Mess Sergeants' Stock Book. Double Foolscap size, 26in. by 16in., Ruled, Printed, Paged and Bound in Leather '. 24 No. 8.— Summary of Monthly Accounts. Double Foolscap size, 26in. by lUin., Ruled, Printed, and Bound ill Leatli'ir ." 24 No. 9.— Breakage Book. Foolscap size, 13iu. by 8in., Ruled, Printed and Bound in Leather 10 No. 10.— VLiiitors' Book. Foolscap size, 13in. by Sin., Ruled, Printed, and Bound in Leather. Will last for many years 12 No. n .—Minute Book. Foolscap size. 13in. by 8in., Ruled, Printed and Bound in Leather 10 No. 12.— Stock Book. Foolscap size, 13in. by Sin. A., Linen; B., Silver; C, Glass ; D., Furniture. Each Book Printed, Ruled and Bound in Leather 12 No. 13.— Guest Book. Medium 4to. size, 21-in. by 9-in., Ruled, Printed and Bound in Leather 10 No. 14.— Caterers' Daily Account of Messing Stores Purchased No. 1.').— Caterers' Monthly Grocery Account Book No. 16.— Whist Book 250 500 Daily Messing and Wine sheets, size 21in. by 161 in 36/- 60'- Mc98 Debit Forms, size 4Jin. by 7iin 7/- 10- Moss Bills of Faro, size 44iii. by 7iin. .. 5- 10- MoRS Washing Books containing diiplirate forms with siiocial washing lists, ouch 2- CasoR for Names of Prnsidcnt^ Vice-President, &c., in Whole Red Leather, to stand on mantlo-sholf or to Imng »ip. Gilt finished each S r Guard Ho'iks for Invoices, size 12in. by »Jin., Jt-bound ... each 5 Giiiird l'."oks for Rocoit)ts „ „ „ <"acli 5 Bust UubbcT Slaiiips, fnr I'liptM-H uiiil Uiion ciicli, from J Q 12 12 12 1,000. 90/ 16/- 15 33 RECREATION ROOMS AND LIBRARIES. Booka strongly recommended for Library Tables. Manual and Firing Exercise, Bound iu Cloth ... Hints to Young Soldiers, Bound in Cloth Guide to Civil Employment, Bound in Cloth ... On Outpost Duty, Bound in Cloth On Guard, Bound in Cloth Catechism on Field Training Physical Training, Fully Illustrated, Bound in Cloth. Physical Drill, Fully Illustrated, Bound in Cloth Guides and Alarkers' Duties Guide to Promotion, Lance-Corporal to Corporal Guide to Promotion, Corporal to Sergeant Infantry Fire Tactics Company, Battalion and Brigade Drill made Easy Catechism on Company and Battalion Drill ... Guide to obtaining a 2nd Class Army School Certificate Guide to obtaining a 1st Class Army Sciiool Certificate Guide to Ofiicial Letter Writing, Orders, &c. .. Military Sketching Made Easy, Fully Illustrated Skirmishing, Attack, and Defence, for a Compy., Batt., & Brigade (. d. 9 9 9 9 9 2 1 1 2 2 6 2 6 6 5 3 1 6 3 6 1 6 4 2 Slottinf? Pads with Best Morocco Leather OomPrs, 1/fi and 2/6 SRCh. Playinj? Card.s at 10/- and 12'- per Doz. Packs. Specially manufactured for the Army Pens 10 per Gros.s. Blotting Pajier 1/6 and 2/- per Quire. Penholders 3/- per Gros.s. I5e.sC £nk 1/- and 2/- per Bottle. Gummed Labels for Books, Plain or Printed, 1/- per Packet. Tradesmen's Order Books, 3/6. Rubl)er Stamj) for Marking Pajiers, Magazine.«, &c., with Crest of Regiment and the word Library below, best quality with Everlasting Ink Pad, &c., complete, 16/-. Ditto ditto 2nd (luality, with Ordinary Pad, 12/-. READING CASKS FOR NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES. Common Best Common Best Cloth. Leather. Cloth. Leather All the Year Round . .. 2/- 5/. Illustrated News 3/ .. . 71- Argosy .. 2- i/- Judy 2/- . . 5/. Army and Navy . 2/9 .. 71- Leisure Hour 2/- . . 5/- Army List .. 2/- .. 4.1- Longman's Magaziuo 2/- . . 4/- Belgravia .. 2/- .. 4/- Macmillan 2/- . . 4/- Black and White .. 3/- .. . 71- Nineteenth Century... 2/- .. . 5/- Blotting Cases... .. 3- .. 7/' Naval & Mil. Magazine 2/- . . 5/- Bradshaw 2/- 4/- Naval & Mil. Argus ... 2/9 . . 71- Broad Arrow ... " 2,9 '.'. C,6 Overland Mail 2/9 .. . 6/6 Cassell's Magazine . 2/- 5/- Pictorial World 3/- .. . 7/- Century .. 2/- .. 5/- Pioneer 3/6 .. . 8/- Chambers' Journal . . 2/- .. 5/- Punch 3/- .. . 5'- Civil & Military Gaz. 3/6 .. 8/- •Regimental Paper ... 2/- .. . 5/- Cornhill . 2/- ... 4/- Saturday Review ... 2/9 .. 6/6 Family Herald . 2/. .. 6/- Sporting & Dramatic 3/. .. . 7/- Field . 3/- .. 7/- TempleBar 2/. .. . 4/- Fun . 2/- . 5/- Tit Bits 2/- .. 6/- Good Words ... . 2/- 5/. Truth 2/9 . 6/6 Graphic . 3- ... 7/- United Service 2/9 .. 6/6 Harper . 2- ... 5/- Vanity Fair 2/9 .. 6 6 Home News ... . 29 6/6 World 2/9 .. 7/- Household Words 2/- 5/- To all Leather Cases the Crest of Regiment is added free of Charge. • When ordering, please send a copy for siic. 34 CANTEENS, GROCERY BARS COFFEE SHOPS. Grocei^ Bar or Coff.'o Bhop. ACCOUNT BOOKS, In accordance with the Army Order, Nov., 1889 ; — Form A. General Monthly Stock and Cash Ledger... „ B. Cash Book of Daily Takings ., ■■,'. Daily Stock Fiof^k „ D. Tradesmen's General Ledger „ K. Invoice Order Book „ F. Monthly Abstract of Receipts and Expendi- ture Ditto in sheets see inider. Troops or Companies' Monthly Messing Account Book Liquor Brtr. 12/- 10/- 12/- 15/- 3/6 12/- 25/- 10/- 25/- 16/- 3/6 12/- 15/- The above books are made of the best Account Book Paper, itrongly bound in leather, lettered in gold, and loith printed List of Articles to last for years. ACCOUNT BOOKS, IN SHEETS FOR DETACHMENT CANTEENS - l''i>iiii A. General Monthly Stock and Cash Ledger, for 1 year 6/- „ B. Cash Book of Daily Takings „ 2/- „ C. Daily Stock Book „ 6/- ,, 1). 'J'radcKnien'.s (jciieral Ix;dger, 50 tsliccts, 3/6 ; 100 shoots, 6/- „ F. Monthly Abstract of Receipts and Expenditure, 50 sheets, 7/6; 100 sheets, 12/- 35 FORMS, &c. Daily Messing Books, Official Pattern, A.B. 48 per doz. 3/- „ „ „ Covers for same ... ••• each 1/3 Price List of Articles sold in Canteen. Size 22^-in. by 17J-in., 25 2/6, 50 3/6, 100 6/- List of Articles giving Percentage Form, Army Form F. 707, 25 2/-, 50 3/-, TOO V Canteen Debit Forms, Statement of Company Accounts, Memo- randum Forms, ' ^/v ^ u? ^ ^ 3 o ^(!/0JllV3JO-^ ^OFCALIF0ff;(A .. . ^ \WEUNIVERS//- ^OFCAllFO/i' 3 58 Oil 56 9950 -< 4 f AGILITY ^lOSANCEl£r> AA 000 942 941 ^OFCAllFOi?,^ v;,OFCAllFO% ^^AHVHan-^^ >t?AavHgn"iS^ ^lllBRARYQc. ^ILIBF: 'd/OJIlVDJO'^ "^il/OJllVJ-JO-^" ^WEUNIVERJ/A o ^lOS-ANCElfX;> o %a3AINft]WV' ^0FCAIIF0/?,I|^ 4n^ !ti I ^ xK^' £> A\^EUNIVERS'//i ^lOSANCElfX^ o